Opinion ID: 1831265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: order denying amended motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death and for other appropriate relief in part and granting evidentiary hearing on claim v

Text: This cause having come before the Court on Defendant's Amended Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction and Sentence of Death and for Other Appropriate Relief, and the Court having reviewed the Motion, the Response filed by the State, and having held a Huff Hearing on July 23, 1999, finds as follows: CLAIM I: In Claim I of his Motion, Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve for appellate review the action of the Court in striking for cause two members of the jury panel who favored life in prison over the death penalty. The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Lockhart v. McCree, [476 U.S. 162] 106 S.Ct. 1758 [90 L.Ed.2d 137] (1986), that the Constitution does not prohibit removal for cause, prior to the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital case, prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it would prevent or substantially impair performance of their duties as jurors at the sentencing phase of the trial. Similarly, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, [483 U.S. 402] 107 S.Ct. 2906 [97 L.Ed.2d 336] (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Death qualification of a capital jury, whereby prospective jurors were excluded for cause in light of their stated inability to set aside their strong opposition to the death penalty, did not violate defendant's right to a jury selected from a representative cross section of the community. The Court noted that not all who oppose the death penalty are excludable for cause. Those who indicate that they can set aside temporarily their personal beliefs in defense to the rule of law may serve as jurors. Id., at 2914. The record reflects that the jurors were stricken after saying that they could not set aside their beliefs and follow the law, these portions of the record are attached to this order hereto as Exhibit A. Accordingly, no evidentiary hearing is necessary on this Claim. CLAIM II: In Claim II Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective in failing to call Daphne Roberts as a witness. Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984). The testimony of the victim's son, mother, and cousin refute the allegations of this claim overwhelmingly, as specifically detailed in the State's Response to Amended Motion to Vacate Conviction and Judgment and Sentence of Death.. In her deposition, Daphne Roberts stated that the victim said He hurt me, he hurt me, Mama. Fred hurt me. When asked did Kathy say Fred, she replied Yes, she did. See Deposition of Daphne Roberts, p. 19, attached hereto as Exhibit B. CLAIM III: In Claim III the Defendant argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to have the jury make separate findings on their verdict or verdicts at the guilt/innocence phase with respect to the prosecution's claim. In Brown v. State, 473 So.2d 1260 (Fla.1985), the Court held that it was proper for the trial court to refuse the use of special verdict forms which would have indicated whether first-degree murder conviction was based upon premeditated or felony-murder. In Buford v. State, 492 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1986), Buford's argument was that in light of various theories of first-degree murder presented to the jury, a special verdict form was required to insure that the jury did not convict him under a theory and factual setting which would prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. The Court held that a special verdict form is not required to determine whether a defendant's first-degree murder conviction is based upon premeditated murder, felony murder or accomplice liability. Id., at 358. Further, counsel is not ineffective for failure to anticipate changes in the law. Muhammad v. State, 426 So.2d [533] 538 (Fla.1983); Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d [1253] 1258 (Fla.1995). Additionally, this claim should have been raised on appeal and is procedurally barred. Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726, 728 (Fla.1996). CLAIM IV: Claim IV is that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a statement made by the Court to the jury about failure to put on a defense. This issue was raised on appeal but not addressed by the Supreme Court as it was not properly preserved. The record refutes prejudice to the Defendant. The Court's instruction, in context, states: Folks, the only side of this case who has to go forward and prove anything is the State side. The Defense does not have to prove anything. The burden of proof of coming forward with the evidence, of coming up with witnesses, coming forward with the exhibits, all that. The Defense is not required to prove anything. They're not required to disprove anything and that burden of proof of coming forward with the evidence is beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt. So that would not be a requirement. I just want to make sure everybody understands for the defendant to prove he had a twin, bring to you the evidence. It's possible that the Defense does not utter a word through he trial. Although it wouldn't happen. It shouldn't happen. We need to try to get on, if we can but go ahead. Transcript, pp. 247-248, attached hereto as Exhibit C. This claim is refuted by the record and barred. CLAIM V: This claim alleges that counsel was ineffective in that he failed to properly and adequately investigate and prepare mitigating evidence. Defendant has failed to state what the mitigating evidence would be and how he suffered prejudice as a result. A defendant my not simply file a motion for postconviction relief containing conclusory allegations that his or her trial counsel was ineffective and then expect to receive an evidentiary hearing. Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912 (Fla.1989). See also Engle v. Dugger, 576 So.2d 696, 700 (Fla.1991); Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331, 1334 (Fla.1997); Teffeteller v. Dugger, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S110, 114 (March 1999). There are some indications that the Defendant did not want to cooperate in the mitigation stage. Defendant was evaluated by Dr. Sanford Jacobson on January 5, 1993. The defendant told Dr. Jacobson he did not want family members to testify in his behavior. See report of Dr. Jacobson, attached as Exhibit D. When asked to explain, the Defendant told Dr. Jacobson there was no difference to him between life in prison or the death sentence because if he was in jail for the rest of his life, he was lost to his family. In an abundance of caution, this Court will conduct a evidentiary hearing to determine if trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. CLAIMS VI & VII: These claims allege incorrect application of the C.C.P. and H.A.C. aggravating factors. They were raised on appeal and are barred. Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726, 728 (Fla.1996). Matters pertaining to the use of aggravating factors to be used in the sentencing phase of a capital crime are procedurally barred because they could have or should have been raised on direct appeal. Engle v. Dugger , 576 so.2d 696, 703 (Fla.1993); Lopez v. Singletary, 634 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Fla.1994); Henderson v. Dugger, 522 So.2d 835, 838 n.(14). CLAIM VIII: This claim alleges the Defendant was deprived of a fair trial because he only had one attorney. In Larkins v. State, 655 So.2d 95 (Fla.1995), the Supreme Court held that the trial court's refusal to appoint two attorneys in a capital murder trial was not ineffective assistance of counsel and did not deprive Defendant of due process. See also Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730 (Fla.1994). Furthermore, this claim should have been raised on direct appeal and is barred. CLAIM IX: This claim is that defendant was deprived of a fair trial. It should have been raised on appeal and is barred. Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996). CLAIM X: This claim is that the trial court incorrectly commented about the Defendant stating that he wanted to be sentenced to death. The jury voted eight to four in favor of death and the jury did not hear this comment. This claim should have been raised on appeal and is barred. Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996). CLAIM XI: This claim is that the death penalty is per se unconstitutional. This issue should have been raised on appeal and is barred. Woods v. State, 531 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1988). Additionally, the Supreme Court has again recently held that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment. Provenzano v. State, [739 So.2d 1150] 24 Fla. L. Weekly S314 (July 1, 1999); Jones v. State, 701 So.2d 76 (Fla.1997). Currently the usage of the electric chair is being challenged by Thomas Provenzano in front of Judge Clarence Thomas in Orlando. In the event the electric chair is found by the Florida Supreme Court to be cruel and unusual punishment and lethal injection is not an option, this Court will entertain a renewed motion on this ground. WHEREFORE, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED as to Claims I, II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI. An Evidentiary Hearing On Claim V will be held on Friday, September 17, 1999 and 2:00 p.m. DONE AND ORDERED in Miami-Dade County this 29th day of July, 1999. /s/ ________________ Joseph P. Farina Circuit Court Judge Exhibit A Re: Juror Oshinsky MR. HONIG: That's only life in prison, with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory. MR. YERO: Life in prison would have to be one hundred years, so I know the person will rot in jail. MR. HONIG: Because we can't do it. Today it's death or life with a twenty-five year minimum mandatory. MR. YERO: No matter. MR. HONIG: No matter what we show you? MR. YERO: I don't think so. MR. HONIG: Okay. I appreciate that. How about Mr. Lopez, Dr. Lopez' row, Mr. Oshinsky? MR. OSHINSKY: In response to the Judges question, before I indicated that I thought, not withstanding my belief, that I could follow the law. Posing it the way you posed it and perhaps that enlightens what happens in the second phase, that gives me some pause and if it's strictly a recommendation that comes from my belief in the entire content, than I would have to tell you that my recommendation would have to be at best life in prison on a finding of guilty. And whether or not there is some circumstances that would push me beyond that, I can't imagine what that is, but I can't say that that couldn't be presented. MR. HONIG: So you're feeling already that if the defendant would be found guilty, you most likely vote life in prison; is that a fair summary? MR. OSHINSKY: It's a fair summary. MR. HONIG: I'm going to try to, if we get to the second phase, if we get to the question of the death penalty, you're already leaning one way, was that fair? MR. OSHINSKY: Uh-huh. MR. HONIG: If we have to prove to you that death is the appropriate punishment, are you going to make us prove it by a burden of proof higher than reasonable doubt because you have such strong feelings? MR. OSHINSKY: I'm not sure what the tests are. That is, I don't practice criminal law as the other laws. I'm not sure what is your proof or what the standard of law is to permit or recommend for the death penalty. MR. HONIG: We'll get to that in a moment. MR. MASTOS: Judge, most respectfully, there will be the standard under the Statute 921, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances so the jury will not be confused. THE COURT: I could do it in a very general way. The legislature has given us some help when we have to try to make this decision. In part, that is assuming to begin with that a jury has agreed by unanimous vote that somebody is guilty of first degree murder. In the statutes of Florida, there is a list of things that jurors can consider, can weigh, can balance, in helping them to decide in Phase II whether or not death penalty is appropriate in a particular case. They actually spell things out. You could consider this. You could consider that. In terms of saying yes, the death penalty would be applicable or maybe no, it wouldn't be for various reasons. So, you will have factors to consider. They are called aggravating circumstances. They're also called mitigating circumstances. I really don't want to get into all of them now because a jury could consider things not even on the list. When it comes to mitigating factors, there is a balance. All twelve of you will be able to express your opinions and cast your vote individually. You don't have to come up with a unanimous verdict. On Phase II, the Judge will want to hear by your vote, are you in favor by a vote of zero to twelve. It's a lot of balance, give and take. MR. HONIG: I want to finish up the line. I think I was still in Lopez' row. Is there anybody in this row? We've already talked to people, given a choice, they will always recommend life in prison. One of the things you said Ms. Rosenthal was if I saw the crime and was one hundred percent sureis there any other way if you didn't see the crime, but were one hundred percent sure? MS. ROSENTHAL: How could I be one hundred percent sure? MR. HONIG: So you couldn't do it? MS. ROSENTHAL: No. MR. HONIG: How about the third row, was life in prison MS. GRUBB: Me. MR. HONIG: And that's Ms. Grubb. Is this a religious or moral feeling or you just can't make that choice yourself? MS. GRUBB: I can't make it myself. MR. HONIG: If the State proved to you that if there was ever a death penalty case that this is it, what would be your recommendation? MS. GRUBB: Live in prison. MR. HONIG: Is there any way we could change how you feel about that? MS. GRUBB: No. MR. HONIG: Anybody else in this row? One of the things that came up with Mr. Oshinsky and Ms. Rosenthal, what do I have to prove to Ms. Rosenthal absolutely, unless she was there. I'm not sure I have to prove Exhibit A Re: Juror Kozakowski MR. HONIG: There will be another trial. There's going to be witnesses and evidence. This is an issue of where you get to see, if sitting in this box or not or whether you get the burden of making a decision because as lawyers, we stand up here and hear ourselves talk and we want to make sure that we're getting a jury that will sit fairly in this case. Like I said, there are all kinds of cases. We want to make sure this is the right case for you. Mr. Kozakowski, I made you a promise and I'm going to stick to it. I don't remember what I'm going to ask though. If you find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, you and eleven other people on the jury, when we get to the second part, are you already going to have your mind made up? What do you think you're going to do? Are you going to be able to listen and follow the law? It's like another trial. You have to start with a clean slate. Do you think you will be able to do that? MR. KOZAKOWSKI: I'm afraid, in my own conscience, that I would go for the imprisonment rather than the death penalty. MR. HONIG: If the Judge tells you, well, you can't. You have to clean it up and start from scratch. Could you do that or are you still going to be starting from one side to the other? You're still going to be starting, going towards imprisonment? MR. KOZAKOWSKI: I'm very skeptical of the death penalty. I'll always agree I didn't hear the evidence or it's right or this wasn't enough evidence that would linger in my mind. MR. FORT: I feel that there are people in prisons that should have gone to the chair or lethal injection or whatever. I feel there are people should have gone away to prison. There are people, we know, that plead mental insanity and usually they get off with just staying in prison. As far as voting, it's really not a vote. I guess it's a vote making my statement. How I feel if the man has committed first degree murder, it could have been avoided, if the man could have avoided it and he didn't. I would say I would go along with the first degree murder. I mean, I would go along with execution in one way or the other later down the road. MR. HONIG: Now, would you be able to sit if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, will you be able to sit in the aggravating and the mitigating factors with a fair and open mind or would you already have your mind made up with the guilt? MR. FORT: Once my mind is made up, it's going to stay there. MR. HONIG: But would your mind be made up as to the guilt phase or could you keep that decision only? MR. FORT: If he's guilty, he's guilty. MR. HONIG: Ms. Pegram, if the defendant is found guilty, after that, you will be able to sit and listen to the mitigating factors and be able to or would your mind be MS. PEGRAM: If he were declared guilty, I'll probably be thinking along the death penalty but, I would listen. MR. HONIG: Mitigating MS. PEGRAM: Things were, I would listen to that and it may have an effect on what I thought. I don't know. MR. HONIG: Would you be able to follow the law that the Judge gives you that says you need to listen and watch and hear the evidence on this second trial and judge it on your own MS. PEGRAM: I think so. MR. HONIG: How about you, Mr. Sanchez? These are all tough questions. They really are. MR. SANCHEZ: If the accused is found guilty, I would say I would probably vote, if I'm truly convinced that the person committed the first degree murder, yes I will.