Opinion ID: 1696386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Submission on the theory of res ipsa loquitur.

Text: Jewell asserts trial court erroneously permitted the case to go to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur, because the evidence clearly failed to show it had exclusive control of the instrumentality. Plaintiffs' theory was that a piece of elm leaf was introduced into the gas supply line for Carroll's furnace at some point between the storage tank and the solenoid valve inlet. Shortly before the explosion occurred, the leaf worked its way into the solenoid valve seat. The leaf held the valve open, permitting escape of the gas which eventually exploded. Thus plaintiffs argue the instrumentality which is significant is not the house, the furnace, or the solenoid valve, but the gas and gas supply line which transported the leaf segment to the valve. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence, not of substantive tort law. Wiles v. Myerly, 210 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Iowa 1973). Under this doctrine, where 1) injury is caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of defendant, and 2) the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used, the happening of the injury permits but does not compel an inference defendant was negligent. Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 148-49, 106 N. W.2d 351, 353 (1960); Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, 240 Iowa 956, 969, 38 N.W.2d 761, 769 (1949). The res ipsa theory does not raise any inference as to what did occasion the injury-causing event. If the necessary causal evidence is circumstantial, it must make plaintiffs' theory not merely possible, but more probable than any other theory based on the evidence. Rule 344(f) (16), Rules of Civil Procedure; Wilson v. Paul, 176 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Iowa 1970). It is not required for application of the doctrine to prove defendant had control of the instrumentality when the injury occurred. It is enough to show control at time of the alleged negligent act, provided plaintiff proves there was no change in condition of the instrumentality, and no intervening act, which could reasonably have caused the event resulting in the injury. Pastour v. Kolb Hardware, Inc., 173 N.W. 2d 116, 125 (Iowa 1969); Sweet v. Swangel, 166 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Iowa 1969); Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., supra, 252 Iowa at 149-50, 106 N.W.2d at 353. In this case the jury could have found the following facts. The furnace manufacturer inspected and tested the solenoid valve and placed masking tape over the inlet to guard against introduction of foreign materials. Nothing in the furnace was preassembled at the factory between the solenoid valve and the gas supply. The furnace remained enclosed in its shipping carton until it arrived in the Carroll basement. Neither Mortvedt nor Carroll had anything to do with the gas supply or piping the gas into the furnace. The jury could have found Jewell's employees Anderson and Jacobson were the only ones who hooked up the gas supply, and that Jacobson followed the usual practice of removing the knock-out panel and installing the black iron pipe into the furnace itself, connecting it to the solenoid valve and starting the furnace in operation. Thereafter, Jewell alone serviced the system and furnished all the gas. Carroll never attempted any adjustments. It is apparently agreed an elm leaf segment in the solenoid valve caused the gas leak and resulting explosion. From expert testimony the jury could have determined this foreign material could not have been in the valve very long without having caused trouble and was therefore not in the valve when the furnace was installed. There was evidence from which the jury might determine the leaf could not have become positioned in the valve as a result of or after the explosion. Applying our law above set out to these circumstances, we hold a jury question was generated on the question of Jewell's control of the gas line and supply, which could well be the instrumentality which introduced the leaf particle resulting in the solenoid valve's malfunction. Neither the furnace nor the solenoid (absent the leaf segment) were defective. Jewell's lack of control over those instrumentalities is immaterial to the issue of application of the res ipsa theory. See Wilson v. Paul, supra, 176 N.W.2d at 811, (We believe the trial court failed to recognize the different purposes for showing control of the torch and control of the building). Jewell further argues this case should not have been submitted to the jury on the theory of res ipsa loquitur because the evidence did not show Carroll's injury was caused without his fault. Ordinarily plaintiff meets this burden (which should not be confused with the problem of contributory negligence) by showing he has done nothing abnormal with the instrumentality causing the injury and has used it in the manner and for the purpose for which it was intended. Sweet v. Swangel, supra, 166 N.W.2d at 778. He has the burden of proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence: even though the question of his own contribution is left in doubt, res ipsa loquitur may still be applied under proper instructions to the jury. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Cal.L.Rev. 183, 202 (1949). We hold this burden as to Carroll's activity was sufficiently met to warrant submission of the case on the res ipsa theory. Nor do we agree with Jewell the case should not have been submitted to the jury on both the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and allegations of specific negligence. It is not sufficient to assert, as does Jewell, that because plaintiffs' petition alleges the explosion was caused by the leaf particle there was no occasion for application of the res ipsa doctrine. The fighting issue was how the foreign substance was introduced into the system. This set of facts presents the proper circumstances for submission of the case on both specific negligence and res ipsa loquitur. Eaves v. City of Ottumwa, supra, 240 Iowa at 968, 38 N.W.2d at 768; see Grings v. Great Plains Gas Co., 260 Iowa 1309, 1317-18, 152 N. W.2d 540, 544-45 (1967). A closely related issue raised by Jewell is based on the requirement that for the doctrine to apply the occurrence must be such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used. See Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., supra, 252 Iowa at 148, 106 N.W.2d at 353. The inference of negligence permitted arises out of common experience, not out of knowledge of specific negligent acts which occur in a given case. Wagner v. Northeast Farm Service Company, 177 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1970). But in Wagner, relied on by Jewell, the court only held an LP gas explosion would not invoke a common experience that a gas explosion results from negligence of the system installer. That case in no way modified our holding in Pastour v. Kolb Hardware, Inc., supra, 173 N.W.2d at 125, that common experience tells us ordinarily a gas explosion will not happen if due care has been exercised by all concerned. Narrowing the focus, common experience compels an inference that ordinarily elm leaf particles would not be found in a solenoid gas control valve unless someone was negligent. We hold for plaintiffs on this issue. In its final related issue, Jewell asserts the case should not have been submitted on the res ipsa loquitur theory because both parties were equally informed as to the circumstances surrounding the explosion. This contention is grounded on several Iowa decisions stating the underlying reason for the res ipsa rule is that evidence of the operative causal facts is accessible only to defendant. See Wiles v. Myerly, supra, 210 N.W.2d at 625-26; Edwards v. Des Moines Transit Company, 251 Iowa 163, 166, 99 N.W.2d 920, 921 (1959). However, as this court noted in Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, 260 Iowa 1061, 1066, 152 N.W.2d 293, 296 (1967), we have never held presence of this underlying reason is an indispensable requirement for the application of the doctrine. In any event, common experience dictates there should not be an elm leaf in the enclosed solenoid gas control valve of a residential furnace. The thing does speak for itself. The jury could well believe Jewell's employees who enclosed the gas supply system were best positioned to explain how the leaf particle came to be there.