Opinion ID: 2315178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the right to a trial record sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review

Text: In all but the most minor of criminal matters, a defendant convicted of a crime in the Superior Court is entitled to have this court review that conviction. D.C.Code § 11-721(b) & (c) (1981). In order to make this court's review meaningful, the Superior Court is required to keep a simultaneous, verbatim record of all trial court proceedings. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 36-I(a). Moreover, a verbatim transcript of pertinent portions of the trial must be included in the record on appeal. D.C.App.R. 10(c), 23(b). These court rules accordingly confer on a criminal defendant a right to have all trial court proceedings recorded and to have a verbatim transcript prepared and made available to the defendant and this court, to the extent necessary to facilitate an appeal. [2] Although there is no indication that appellant was denied the right to have her trial simultaneously recorded, she has been denied the opportunity to review a transcript of her trial and to place a transcript before this court. The government, however, urges this court not to adopt a per se rule requiring reversal in all cases where the appellant is not able to make use of a transcript on appeal. It contends that the supplemented record in this case is sufficient to assure the court that no reversible error occurred at trial, and thus argues that the lack of a transcript should be treated as harmless error. There is precedent in this jurisdiction cautioning against the affirmance of convictions on harmless error grounds in cases where an important portion of the transcript is not available on appeal. United States v. Workcuff, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 264-65, 422 F.2d 700, 701-02 (1970) (per curiam). [3] In Workcuff, the trial judge failed to have a court reporter present when he interrupted the jury's deliberations and gave a supplementary jury instruction. The court of appeals, noting that the supplementary instruction was a crucial stage of the trial, id. at 265, 422 F.2d at 702, refused to apply the harmless error rule. Although the appellant did not proffer any specific error related to the instruction, the conviction was reversed for want of a transcript of the trial judge's supplemental charge. Id. The court in Workcuff pointed to two impediments that result from the unavailability of a transcript on appeal. First, the absence of a complete and accurate transcript impairs the ability of appellate counsel to protect his client's basic rights. Id. Recollections and notes of trial counsel and of others are apt to be faulty and incomplete. Frequently, issues simply cannot even be seenlet alone assessedwithout reading an accurate transcript. Id. (quoting Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN.L.REV. 783, 793 (1961)). [4] These difficulties are greatly exacerbated when ... the attorney representing the appellant is different from the counsel who represented him at trial. Id. Indeed, `[t]he right to notice plain errors or defects is illusory if no transcript is available to one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case after the trial is ended.' Id. (quoting Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280, 84 S.Ct. 424, 427, 11 L.Ed.2d 331 (1964)). Second, the task of an appellate court becomes much more difficultand may become impossiblewhen review is based on the post hoc reports of counsel, rather than on a transcript that reflects a contemporaneous account of the trial proceedings. It is difficult enough in normal circumstances to appraise the propriety of the trial court's various actions on the basis of a cold printed record; when that record is replaced by the incomplete hearsay of one of the parties, our review is turned into an exercise in creative imagination. Id. The lack of a transcript therefore interferes with this court's assigned duty to rule on the existence and the prejudicial nature of errors raised at trial, and to address previously unchallenged defects in the trial court proceedings which prejudice the substantial rights of the appellant. Despite these significant concerns, the federal courts have uniformly refused to adopt a rule that renders every failure to provide a complete transcript on appeal per se reversible error. E.g., United States v. Piascik, 559 F.2d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, 98 S.Ct. 1235, 55 L.Ed.2d 762 (1978); United States v. Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605, 620 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857, 98 S.Ct. 179, 54 L.Ed.2d 129, 434 U.S. 922, 98 S.Ct. 398, 54 L.Ed.2d 279 (1977); United States v. Robinson, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 140, 147, 459 F.2d 1164, 1171 (1972) (per curiam); see generally 3 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 556, at 313 (2d ed.1982); Annot. 12 A.L.R.FED. 584, 590-92 (1972). Instead, they have been willing to permit convictions to stand in cases where a fair review upon appeal has not been frustrated, Robinson, supra, 148 U.S.App.D.C. at 147, 459 F.2d at 1171, and the appellate court is able to conclude that no substantial rights of the appellant have been adversely [a]ffected by the omissions from the transcript. United States v. Selva, 559 F.2d 1303, 1306 (5th Cir.1977). As a predicate to discussing whether the absence of a trial transcript in this case was prejudicial, we must examine the methods of supplementing the record on appeal as a means of mitigating the negative effects of a missing or incomplete transcript.