Opinion ID: 2638074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Fee Multiplier

Text: ¶ 41 Pham and Lara sought a contingency multiplier of 2.0. Their request was based on plaintiffs' counsel having accepted the case on a contingent fee basis, [8] Pham and Lara's difficulty in providing details of discrimination, and the necessity of adopting a high-risk litigation strategy of relying heavily on evidence gathered from adverse witnesses and cross-examination. However these factors are the very ones which mandate a multiplier; they certainly do not foreclose it. ¶ 42 Fee enhancements are based on the notion that attorney[s] who take[] such [] case[s] on a contingent fee basis assume[] a substantial risk that a fee will never materialize. Pham, 124 Wash.App. at 723, 103 P.3d 827. And marketplace experience `indicates that lawyers generally will not provide legal representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that risk.' Bowers, 100 Wash.2d at 598, 675 P.2d 193 (quoting Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reasonable?, 281, 325 (1977)). ¶ 43 The trial court determined Pham and Lara's case was high risk [9] but denied the multiplier request because the difficulty of the case, and its associated risk, which was a consequence of the plaintiffs' challenges in articulating their claims and the paucity of compelling relevant evidence of discrimination, are not grounds for a multiplier. CP at 653-54 (Finding of Fact 34). This conclusion makes little sense. The plain language of Bowers directs a trial court to assess the risk associated with a claim in deciding whether a multiplier is appropriate. See Bowers, 100 Wash.2d at 598, 675 P.2d 193. The Bowers approach does not contemplate denying a multiplier on the basis of the source of that risk. Thus, the majority correctly holds the trial court should not have used [Pham and Lara's] inability to articulate their claims as justification for denying the multiplier. Majority at 983-84. ¶ 44 But the majority should have gone further. Plaintiffs' inability to articulate their claims and the difficulties of proof arising from this type of disparate treatment claim are the precise reasons the trial court should apply a multiplier. Thus the trial court said no to a multiplier for the very reason it should have said yes, and faulty analysis denying civil rights attorneys their fees is simply unacceptable. A contingency adjustment is not an unearned gain or a windfall for plaintiffs' attorney. It is the inherent risk of this type of case that justifies the fee. And denying civil rights attorneys adequate fees will simply discourage lawyers from taking difficult cases, not to mention those especially difficult cases with less-than-articulate clients. ¶ 45 As noted by Hensley, Congress has taken steps to ensure § 1988 did not become a `relief fund for lawyers' ( Hensley, 461 U.S. at 446, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (quoting 122 Cong. Rec. 33314 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy))) by limiting fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs only and leaving district courts with the discretion to deny fees entirely when a fee award would be unjust. Id. With regard to contingency cases, the Court reasoned: Attorneys who take cases on contingency, thus deferring payment of their fees until the case has ended and taking upon themselves the risk that they will receive no payment at all, generally receive far more in winning cases than they would if they charged an hourly rate. The difference, however, reflects the time-value of money and the risk of nonrecovery usually borne by clients in cases where lawyers are paid an hourly rate. Courts applying § 1988 must also take account of the time-value of money and the fact that attorneys can never been 100% certain they will win even the best case. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 448-49, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). ¶ 46 Risk of loss must be taken into consideration or this type of case will never be brought. Pham and Lara were fortunate their claim prevailed. But for Pham and Lara's attorney, this case might represent one win for every five losses, and, moreover, no reasonable lawyer can afford to give away $50,000 of his time for free. A contingency multiplier is not double payment or a windfall for plaintiffs' lawyer; it is simply adequate compensation for prevailing in complex and risky litigation. The majority's decision will preclude plaintiffs suffering discrimination from bringing these actionsthe very result WLAD seeks to prevent. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 456, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ([T]he prospect of protracted appellate litigation regarding attorney's fee awards to prevailing parties is likely to discourage litigation by victims of other civil rights violations. . . . The more obstacles that are placed in the path of parties who have won significant relief and then seek reasonable attorney's fees, the less likely lawyers will be to undertake the risk of representing civil rights plaintiffs seeking equivalent relief in other cases. It may well become difficult for civil rights plaintiffs with less-than-certain prospects for success to obtain attorneys.). I believe a fee multiplier is warranted and therefore would remand for calculation, not possible denial, of a multiplier pursuant to established precedent.