Opinion ID: 202335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility Under Fed.R.Evid. 403 and 404(b)

Text: 42 In addition to arguing the drug evidence was irrelevant, Charles also claims that it was excessively prejudicial. Although Charles on appeal cites Rule 404(b), he does not make a specific claim that the evidence admitted did not serve a Rule 404(b) purpose; he instead argues that its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value, an inquiry common to both Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) claims. 43 This Court accords a district court great deference in the balancing of probative value against unfair prejudice. United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir.2005). The government argues both that the evidence was highly relevant to the narrative of the incident and also was not unfairly prejudicial because the court gave a detailed limiting instruction when the baggie was admitted, reminding the jury that Charles had not been charged with a drug crime and that any involvement he might have had with drugs did not mean he was guilty of assault. See United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 161 (1st Cir.1999) (affirming balancing of probative value against prejudice where district court had given a limiting instruction). Further, the government stated in its closing argument, this is not a drug case. It told the jury the drug evidence was relevant to whether the agents were truthfully testifying that they were doing their duty when they approached Charles, and it mentioned the evidence again when addressing Charles's argument of self-defense. 44 We have said that, `[o]nly rarely — and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances — will [this Court], from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect.' Flemmi, 402 F.3d at 86 (citation omitted). There is no reason to reverse the district court's decision here. 1