Opinion ID: 1696650
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Object to the Chancellor's Failure to Recuse Himself

Text: ¶ 42. Julie argues that [E]ven though a party may in fact have waived its right to assert error, this Court has the inherent power to notice it to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. State Highway Comm'n of Miss. v. McDonald's Corp., 509 So.2d 856, 863 (Miss.1987) (citing Johnson v. State, 452 So.2d 850, 853 (Miss.1984)). Julie claims the chancellor should have recused himself because his comments made prior to hearing her side were highly prejudicial and therefore biased his opinion. This Court has held that A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality. Buchanan v. Buchanan 587 So.2d 892, 895 (Miss.1991) (quoting Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss.1986)). See Jenkins v. State, 570 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss.1990); In re Moffett, 556 So.2d 723, 725 (Miss.1990); Collins v. Dixie Transp., Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166 (Miss.1989); Jenkins v. Forrest County Gen. Hosp., 542 So.2d 1180 (Miss.1989); Cantrell v. State, 507 So.2d 325, 328 (Miss. 1987). See also Pearson v. Parsons, 541 So.2d 447, 455 (Miss.1989). Here, the chancellor was not partial. He heard one side of the case and even commented on not having heard her side. He was fully aware the hearing was still pending, and his statements were not meant to be prejudicial. They were merely recommendations on how he believed Julie should proceed with her side. It was clear that Michael met his burden of showing that an adverse material change had taken place. ¶ 43. There is a general requirement that objections must be raised at the trial level. In re S.A.M. 826 So.2d 1266, 1277 (Miss.2002); In re V.R., 725 So.2d 241, 245 (Miss.1998). See Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d at 743 n. 3; Smith v. State, 572 So.2d 847, 848 (Miss.1990); Burney v. State, 515 So.2d 1154, 1156-57 (Miss.1987). This Court has stated that [i]f no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. Dorrough v. Wilkes, 817 So.2d 567, 577 (Miss. 2002) (quoting Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 597 (Miss.1995); Hill v. State, 432 So.2d 427, 439 (Miss.1983)). Julie claims that the chancellor's failure to recuse himself is a matter of plain error and therefore the issue should not be barred. If the fundamental right of a party has been violated, then an appellate court will address plain error issues on appeal. Pub. Employees' Retir. Sys. v. Dishmon, 797 So.2d 888, 897 (Miss.2001). This is not the case here. The chancellor has already put a lot of time into this case. He had already presided over a majority of the hearing, including the temporary motion for modification. ¶ 44. Julie argues inefficient counsel as the reason an objection was not made to the chancellor's failure to recuse himself. The standard is that of reasonably effective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Julie's counsel did nothing that a reasonable counselor would not have done. Her counsel worked with what little medical testimony she could find, which was only one of Julie's counselors. Also, counsel's failure to object is just further proof that the chancellor was giving advice, not prejudging the case. Julie did not have ineffective assistance; and therefore, no manifest injustice occurred by counsel's failure to ask the chancellor to recuse himself. B. Chancellor Adversely Prejudging the Case ¶ 45. Julie asserts that the chancellor interjected himself in the case and thereby showed his prejudice against Julie before he heard her side. This point is without merit. Here the chancellor was the trier of fact and law. There was no jury to prejudice. Once again, his comments regarding what he expected in the way of testimony were merely suggestions on how Julie should proceed. The case was not adversely prejudged; and therefore, no manifest error occurred.