Opinion ID: 2368471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Criminal Impersonation Statute

Text: One commits criminal impersonation whenever he or she knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity and uses that identity or capacity to perform one of the acts described in subsections (1)(a) through (1)(e) of the statute. § 18-5-113. In its entirety the statute reads: (1) A person commits criminal impersonation if he knowingly assumes a false or fictitious identity or capacity, and in such identity or capacity he: (a) Marries, or pretends to marry, or to sustain the marriage relation toward another without the connivance of the latter; or (b) Becomes bail or surety for a party in an action or proceeding, civil or criminal, before a court or officer authorized to take the bail or surety; or (c) Confesses a judgment, or subscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges, or proves a written instrument which by law may be recorded, with the intent that the same may be delivered as true; or (d) Does an act which if done by the person falsely impersonated, might subject such person to an action or special proceeding, civil or criminal, or to liability, charge, forfeiture, or penalty; or (e) Does any other act with intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or defraud another. § 18-5-113. The statute therefore consists of two parts: the knowing assumption of a false identity or capacity and the use of that identity or capacity to perform certain acts or to acquire certain benefits. See Alvarado, 132 P.3d at 1208. In the present case, Montes-Rodriguez was convicted of assuming a false identity or capacity with the intent to unlawfully gain a benefit for himself, in violation of subsection (1)(e) of the statute. § 18-5-113(1)(e). The portion of subsection (1)(e) dealing with the terms to injure or defraud another was not an issue in this case and the trial court did not instruct the jury on this part of the statute. Montes-Rodriguez argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he assumed a false identity or a false capacity under the statute. Although the court of appeals affirmed Montes-Rodriguez's conviction on false-capacity grounds and declined to consider the question of false identity, the conviction could be affirmed on either identity or capacity grounds. The parties raised the identity issue at trial and have addressed it in their arguments to the court of appeals and to this court. Hence, we consider both issues to determine whether Montes-Rodriguez's conviction may have been supported by the evidence.
Relying on prior Colorado case law, the majority of the court of appeals interpreted false capacity to mean a false legal qualification, competency, power, or fitness. Montes-Rodriguez, 219 P.3d at 343 (citing Bauer, 80 P.3d at 897). Both the prosecution and Montes-Rodriguez agree with this definition in their respective briefs to this court. Judge Jones used this definition in his dissent as well. Id. at 345 (Jones, J., dissenting). Looking at the statutory scheme as a whole, it is evident that false capacity refers to a false legal capacity. The statute prohibits the assumption of a false capacity, when that capacity is used to perform any of the acts described in subsections (1)(a) through (1)(e) of the statute. § 18-5-113. Each of the acts described in these subsections directly involves the law. Each subsection either creates relationships defined in law or involves actions before the court. For example, subsection (1)(a) applies when one assumes a false capacity in order to marry or pretend to marry another. § 18-5-113(1)(a). The marital relationship is defined by law, and one who marries undertakes certain legal rights and responsibilities. See In re Marriage of Schelp, 228 P.3d 151, 156 (Colo. 2010) (stating that spouses are in a fiduciary relationship with one another); In re Marriage of Manzo, 659 P.2d 669, 674 (Colo.1983) (same). Whether one has the capacity to marry is also a matter governed by law. See, e.g., § 14-2-106(1)(a)(I), C.R.S. (2010) (establishing requirement for obtaining a marriage license); § 14-2-110(1)(a), C.R.S. (2010) (prohibiting marriages entered into prior to the dissolution of an earner marriage). Consequently, one who claims the false capacity to marry also claims the false legal qualification or power to enter into that relationship. The other subsections of the statute operate similarly. Subsection (1)(b) applies when one uses a false capacity to act as bail or surety in an action before a court. § 18-5-113(1)(b). The role of bail or surety before a court is subject to extensive statutory regulation. See § 16-4-101, et seq., C.R.S. (2010). One who assumes this capacity assumes distinct rights and responsibilities under the law. Likewise, subsection (1)(c) applies when one assumes a false capacity to confess a judgment that may be recorded by law. § 18-5-113(1)(c). Subsection (1)(d) applies when one uses a false capacity to subject another to civil or criminal liability. § 18-5-113(1)(d). Both of these subsections involve actions with direct legal consequences. Although subsection (1)(e) is written in broader terms, it also requires that one assume a false capacity in order to gain a benefit unlawfully or to injure or defraud another. § 18-5-113(1)(e). In sum, each of the enumerated circumstances involves the assumption of a false capacity to perform an act or establish a relationship that has a distinct legal significance. In other words, each subsection involves the assumption of a false legal capacity. Common usage also supports the interpretation of capacity as the legal qualification, power, fitness, or role in which one performs an act. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines capacity as one's legal qualification, competency, power, or fitness. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 330 (2002). Black's Law Dictionary defines it as the role in which one performs an act. Black's Law Dictionary 199 (7th ed. 1999). Finally, Colorado case law supports this interpretation of capacity. In People v. Gonzales , we ruled that the defendant violated the criminal impersonation statute when he obtained a money order by falsely claiming that he was the husband of the named payee. 188 Colo. 272, 276, 534 P.2d 626, 629 (1975). The defendant argued that he had not committed criminal impersonation because he had given and signed his actual name on the receipt for the money order. Id. We rejected this argument, explaining that the defendant misrepresented himself to be the husband of [the payee] and that he received the money in that capacity, presumably for her. Id. In other words, the defendant assumed a false or fictitious capacity by claiming the benefits of a false legal relationship. In Bauer, the court of appeals relied on a similar approach to hold that the defendant had assumed a false capacity by continuing to practice law after his bar license had been suspended. 80 P.3d at 898. The court of appeals observed that one of the common meanings of `capacity' is `legal qualification, competency, power, or fitness.' Id. at 897 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 330 (1986)). The court also noted that capacity may be defined as `[t]he role in which one performs an act.' Id. (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 199 (7th ed. 1999)). The defendant in Bauer argued that he had not assumed a false capacity because he had the skill and knowledge of an attorney. Id. at 898. The court rejected this argument, explaining that possessing the knowledge and skill to perform the functions of an attorney is not the equivalent of the capacity to act as an attorney. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that capacity, as used in the statute, does not refer to one's abilities but rather to one's legal qualifications. Id. The court observed that, [o]nce [the] defendant's license was suspended, he no longer had the legal qualifications to act in the capacity of an attorney. Id. (emphasis added). Considering the statutory scheme as a whole, the common meaning of the word, and the relevant case law, we hold that one assumes a false or fictitious capacity in violation of the criminal impersonation statute when he or she assumes a false legal qualification, power, fitness, or role.
Having defined the element of false capacity, we now consider the element of false identity. We recently defined this term in Alvarado, 132 P.3d at 1207. In that case, the police stopped a car in which Alvarado was a passenger. Id. at 1206. The police arrested the driver and then began to question Alvarado. Id. Alvarado had an outstanding warrant for his arrest but gave the police a false name and birth date. Id. When the police ran a warrant check under that false information, no warrants were found. Id. We stated that a common sense reading and application of the statute prohibits holding oneself out to a third party as being another person when asked who he or she is. Id. at 1207. We therefore concluded that, by giving a false name and birth date to the police, Alvarado held himself out as being another person and had therefore assumed a false identity. Id. at 1208. The court of appeals resorted to a similar definition of false identity in Jones, 841 P.2d at 374. In that case, the defendant applied for a number of loans using a false social security number. Id. at 373. His application included otherwise accurate identifying information, including his proper name. Id. The court stated that [t]he common meaning of the phrase `assumes a false or fictitious identity' is to hold oneself out as someone that he or she is not. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original). Applying this definition, the court of appeals held that the defendant had not assumed a false or fictitious identity on his loan application. Id. The court noted that the false social security number was but one of several items of identifying information on the loan application and that the defendant supplied accurate answers to a number of the personal questions asked. Id. The court therefore concluded that Jones had not assumed a false identity. It explained that, under the circumstances, the failure to provide an accurate social security number was not equivalent to the assumption of another persona, as alleged in the information. Id. Consistent with our definition of the term in Alvarado and the court of appeals' opinion in Jones, we hold that one assumes a false identity under the statute by holding one's self out to a third party as being another person. We do not decide as a matter of law what factual circumstances are sufficient to constitute holding one's self out as being another person.