Opinion ID: 1449754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Partition Action

Text: Defendant asserts that she should be awarded an equitable lien on the property for the monies she expended on the property's behalf. An equitable lien is [a] right, not existing at law, to have specific property applied in whole or in part to payments for a particular debt or class of debts. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 483 (5th ed. 1979). The right to reimbursements on an equitable lien is purely equitable. Hanrahan v. Sims, 20 Ariz. App. 313, 512 P.2d 617 (Ct.App. 1973). Defendant asserts that during the time she was married to decedent, she should be awarded a community's lien for all community funds expended on behalf of decedent's property. [1] Community funds expended on behalf of decedent's property consisted of principal, taxes, insurance, interest, improvement value or cost and sewer and garbage paid on the property. However, when determining a community interest in community funds expended on behalf of property purchased by a spouse before marriage, the rule has commonly excluded payments for taxes, insurance and interest. In re Marriage of Moore, 28 Cal.3d 366, 168 Cal. Rptr. 662, 618 P.2d 208 (1980). Neither taxes, insurance nor interest increase the equity value of property. The value of real property is generally represented by the owner's equity in it. The equity value does not include finance charges or other expenses incurred to maintain the investment. Id. Therefore, taxes, insurance, interest and garbage and sewer expenditures are not to be credited to Defendant. As for improvements made to the land, Defendant is entitled to the value of the improvements to the property, not the cost of the improvements. Portillo v. Shappie, 97 N.M. 59, 636 P.2d 878 (1981). Defendant next asserts that she is entitled to contribution for expenditures made after the decedent's death. She also asserts that Plaintiffs are not entitled to an offset for the reasonable rental value while she lived at the residence. Defendant correctly states the general rule that in the absence of an agreement to pay or ouster by the cotenant in possession, a tenant in common who occupies all or more than her proportionate share in the common premises is not liable, because of such occupancy alone, to her cotenant for the rent or the use of the premises. Williams v. Sinclair Refining Co., 39 N.M. 388, 47 P.2d 910 (1935); Hunter v. Schultz, 240 Cal. App.2d 24, 49 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Dist.Ct.App. 1966); Lanigir v. Arden, 85 Nev. 79, 450 P.2d 148 (1969). However, there is an exception to this general rule. When a cotenant in possession invokes the jurisdiction of a court of equity to obtain contributions from the cotenant out of possession for funds expended for the betterment of the common interest, the cotenant out of possession may defensively charge the cotenant in possession with a part of the reasonable value of the occupancy or use by the cotenant in possession and in some cases may hold the cotenant in possession accountable for profits realized from the premises. Hunter v. Schultz, supra ; Lanigir v. Arden, supra; 20 Am.Jur.2d Cotenancy and Joint Ownership § 44 (1965); 68 C.J.S. Partition § 141 (1950). In adding Defendant's expenditures in the light most favorable to Defendant and subtracting this amount from an agreed upon reasonable rental value, Defendant is monetarily indebted to Plaintiffs. However, Plaintiffs do not ask for this extra amount, only that the property be partitioned in accordance with intestate law, [2] as the trial court did. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision on the matter.