Opinion ID: 184883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 11 Holmes appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment for Amerex on the spoliation claims, the magistrate's failure to award him more than nominal damages for Amerex's breach of contract, and the magistrate's denial of his promissory estoppel claim. 12 In answer to our certification of questions of law, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals enumerated the elements of a cause of action for negligent or reckless spoliation of evidence, as follows: 13 (1) existence of a potential civil action; (2) a legal or contractual duty to preserve evidence which is relevant to that action; (3) destruction of that evidence by the duty-bound defendant; (4) significant impairment in the ability to prove the potential civil action; (5) a proximate relationship between the impairment of the underlying suit and the unavailability of the destroyed evidence; (6) a significant possibility of success of the potential civil action if the evidence were available; and (7) damages adjusted for the estimated likelihood of success in the potential civil action. 14 710 A.2d at 854. The evidence presented in this case, viewed in the light most favorable to Holmes, would allow a reasonable juror to conclude that (1) Holmes had a potential civil action arising out of the accident in which he was involved; (2) Amerex had a contractual obligation to preserve the car for Holmes; (3) Amerex negligently allowed the car to be sold and dismantled; (4) Holmes's ability to prove his case in the potential civil action was significantly impaired; (5) the impairment of the underlying suit was proximately related to the dismantling of the car and the attendant loss of evidence relating to the design, manufacturing, and maintenance of the car; (6) Holmes would have had a significant possibility of success in the potential civil action if the evidence were available; and (7) Holmes suffered damages. 15 In concluding that a reasonable juror could find that Holmes would have had a significant possibility of success in his underlying lawsuit if the evidence had not been lost, we are mindful that the District of Columbia has, unlike some states, see, e.g., Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, 836 (Cal.Ct.App.1984), rejected the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a reasonable probability of success. 16 A reasonable probability of success still requires a showing that success was probable. In our view, this comes too close to requiring that the plaintiff show success by what amounts to a preponderance of the evidence. ... [T]his standard is too high. Instead, we believe we should require that the plaintiff show that the underlying lawsuit enjoyed a significant possibility of success. We choose this term as it implies a showing higher than the already recognized standard of significant evidence but lower than the standard of preponderance of the evidence. The plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial and realistic possibility of succeeding, but need not cross the threshold of demonstrating that such success was more likely than not, something that would be realistically impractical of proof. 17 710 A.2d at 852. 18 Holmes submitted the affidavit of an expert in accident reconstruction who, after reviewing photographs of the car taken after the accident, determined that the car appears to have lacked reasonable crashworthiness. He therefore concluded that if the vehicle were available in the same condition that it was immediately following the accident, [Holmes] would have a substantial possibility of proving that the [car] ... was defectively designed and/or manufactured and/or maintained. We think a reasonable jury could find that the evidence that led Holmes's expert to conclude that he would have a substantial possibility of success gives rise to the significant possibility of success Holmes needs in order to recover for the negligent spoliation of his evidence. It follows that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Amerex on the negligent spoliation claim. It follows as well that the magistrate judges's decision to award Holmes only nominal damages on his breach of contract claim, upon the premise that his spoliation claim could not succeed, must be reconsidered in light of the ultimate resolution of the spoliation claim. 19 Turning to the promissory estoppel count, we affirm the judgment in favor of Amerex. The judge first found that Holmes unreasonably failed to inspect the car despite having had ample opportunity to do so. He then held that judgment for Amerex was appropriate because promissory estoppel requires the promisee to have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise. Although Holmes urges us to reverse the judge's decision, he challenges neither step of this reasoning. Instead, he focuses upon evidence showing that he relied upon Amerex's representation that it would preserve the car and that he was injured when that representation proved false. That may be so, but it does nothing to undermine the magistrate's finding that he was unreasonably dilatory in inspecting the car. Therefore, we are constrained to approve the magistrate's denial of the claim based upon promissory estoppel.