Opinion ID: 203719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Status determination

Text: That the record supports the district court's finding that Arbour was involved in an extensive criminal activity, however, does not end the matter. United States v. Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 63 (1st Cir.2003) ([T]he mere fact that the defendant was involved in an extensive criminal activity does not support a finding the defendant was an organizer or leader under § 3B.1.) (citation omitted). To qualify for an enhancement under § 3B1.1(a), a defendant must have either organized or led the criminal activity. Accordingly, we address § 3B1.1(a)'s status component. Arbour's challenge to the district court's status finding has two parts. First, he contends that he did not lead or organize anyone, but merely interacted with various people during the commission of crimes. Second, Arbour argues implicitly throughout his brief that, even if he led or organized some people, he did not lead or organize the number of people required by § 3B1.1(a). The magic number, in Arbour's view, is five or more individuals. Arbour's first argument is easily dismissed the record evidence amply supports the district court's finding that Arbour led or organized criminal participants including Jackson and Giannelli. [4] Both the guideline commentary and case-law provide direction for considering whether a defendant qualifies as a leader or organizer. The guideline commentary provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that include: (1) the exercise of decision-making authority; (2) the nature of participation in the commission of the offense; (3) the recruitment of accomplices; (4) the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime; (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the illegal activity; and (7) the degree of control and authority exercised over others. § 3B1.1(a), cmt. n. 4. There need not be proof of each and every factor before a defendant can be termed an organizer or leader. Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at 111. The case law has further defined the terms leader and organizer. [T]he term leader implies the exercise of some degree of dominance or power in a hierarchy, and also implies the authority to ensure that other persons will heed commands. Id. And [o]ne may be classified as an organizer, though perhaps not as a leader, if he coordinates others so as to facilitate the commission of criminal activity. Id. With respect to leading, Arbour, who was at the top of the relevant drug dealing operation in Maine, exercised decisionmaking authority over Giannelli, personally choosing which firearm he wanted Giannelli to purchase. See § 3B1.1(a), cmt. n. 4 (exercise of decision-making authority). But the record even more clearly supports a characterization of Arbour as an organizer. There was evidence that Arbour hatched the plan to acquire firearms illegally and that he sought out three others, Jackson, Giannelli, and Thompson, to procure the weapons in his stead. See id. (degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense; nature of participation in the commission of the offense; recruitment of accomplices). Arbour's puppetry enabled him to later use these firearms as currency in his drug trade. See Tejada-Beltran, 50 F.3d at 112 (coordinat[ing] others so as to facilitate the commission of criminal activity). We turn finally to the second part of Arbour's challenge, which focuses on what he perceives to be § 3B1.1(a)'s requirement that he lead or organize at least five individuals. Arbour contends that, because he did not lead or organize five others, he does not qualify for an enhancement. This contention lacks merit. On at least one occasion, we have acknowledged the possibility that the number of individuals a defendant must lead or organize to qualify under § 3B1.1(a) may depend in part on the district court's scope finding. Specifically, the question may hinge on whether the court finds the criminal activity to involve five or more participants or whether it finds the activity to be otherwise extensive. See Rostoff, 53 F.3d at 414. In Rostoff, we established that where the defendant is involved in a criminal activity that is otherwise extensive, there is no requirement that the defendant lead or organize at least four other participants. Id. (Unlike numerosity, extensiveness does not depend upon a finding that a criminal activity embraced no fewer than five criminally responsible participants, much less a finding that the activity included four or more persons under the defendant's direct control.). But we also noted in Rostoff that some courts have held that, when the applicability of § 3B1.1(a) depends upon numerosity rather than extensiveness, the defendant must be shown personally to have [led or organized] no fewer than four other participants. 53 F.3d at 413 n. 15 (citations omitted). [5] In so noting, we cited decisions from the Seventh and Tenth circuits. Id. (citing United States v. Carson, 9 F.3d 576, 584 (7th Cir.1993) and United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1465 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1990)). Regardless of whether the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, the guideline commentary makes plain that a defendant needs only to have led or organized one criminal participant, besides himself of course, to qualify as a leader or organizer under § 3B1.1(a). § 3B1.1(a), cmt. n. 2 (To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. ) (emphasis added). Nearly every circuit court has reached this same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 466-67 (2d Cir.2004) (Defendant need have been an organizer or leader only with respect to any one of these [criminal participants] for the § 3B1.1(a) enhancement to apply.); United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 338 (4th Cir.2008) (same); United States v. Eis, 322 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329, 347 (6th Cir.2000) (same); United States v. Kamoga, 177 F.3d 617, 621-22 (7th Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Camacho, 137 F.3d 1220, 1224 n. 3 (10th Cir.1998) (same); United States v. Okoli, 20 F.3d 615, 616 (5th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 684-86 (9th Cir.1993) (same). In fact, the circuits we cited in Rostoff, the Seventh and Tenth, have since abandoned any requirement that the defendant lead or organize at least four others in order to qualify for an enhancement under § 3B1.1(a). See Camacho, 137 F.3d at 1224 n. 3; Kamoga, 177 F.3d at 621-22 (noting that § 3B1.1 is designed precisely to prevent masterminds of criminal schemes from escaping responsibility for their role simply by delegating some authority to only one or two deputies). Accordingly, both because the district court supportably concluded that Arbour's criminal activity was extensive, see Rostoff, 53 F.3d at 413, and because Arbour led or organized one or more of the five or more individuals involved in his criminal activity, he qualifies as a leader or organizer under § 3B1.1. Arbour's numerosity argument as to status must therefore also fail.