Opinion ID: 34467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: District Court’s Order Excluding Evidence

Text: of an Alleged Similar Incident As part of an omnibus motion in limine before trial, Defendants sought to exclude from the jury’s consideration any evidence relating to an alleged warrantless entry of another thirdparty residence by City of Pasadena police officers attempting to arrest a felony suspect.43 The City argued, among other grounds, that such evidence was irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, and had the he had nevertheless “informed” his officers “as a supplement, [or] additional guidance,” that if consent was withheld when they need to execute a felony arrest warrant at a third-party residence, they need a search warrant to ensure that the law is followed. Assistant Police Chief Cunningham regards Steagald as merely a “supplement” because according to him,“the issue has never come up” and “[n]o one’s complained.” 43 The incident in question occurred on March 19, 1998, less than three months before officers allegedly entered the Maddux residence. -47- potential to confuse the issues and mislead the jury. Plaintiffs intended to use the evidence to prove that, as a result of the City’s written policy respecting the planned execution of arrest warrants, a persistent and widespread practice inhered whereby felony arrest warrants could be executed at the home of a third party in the absence of exigent circumstances and without first obtaining consent or a search warrant. The district court granted that portion of the City’s motion in limine by Order of December 7, 2000. Maddux submits that the district court erred in granting the City’s motion for two reasons: (1) the longstanding position of this Court that a separate, isolated incident is insufficient to prove a persistent and widespread practice of a municipality “should not apply where there is a written policy that may be inferred to cause a persistent practice;” and (2) the evidence of this “identical situation” is admissible to contradict the City’s assertion that its officers always sought consent before entering a private premises to execute a felony arrest warrant. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, reserving the harmless-error doctrine for any perceived miscues.44 Although the district court apparently made no findings on the record in support of its decision, we cannot 44 United States v. Moody, 903 F.2d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The admission or exclusion of evidence at trial is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.”). -48- say, based on the evidence and the arguments before us, that it abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. Two affidavits submitted by the couple who owned the home in the alleged similar incident describe the events attendant to the City officers’ entry for purposes of apprehending an individual identified in an arrest warrant.45 Maddux refers us to no other evidence adduced in support of her contention of error. Insofar as neither affiant avers facts that would tend to demonstrate that their home should in fact be considered a third-party residence, Maddux has not proved that the incident in question was sufficiently similar to the alleged entry of the Maddux residence. Further, Maddux provides no sound basis for our departure from this Circuit’s rule that a persistent and widespread practice so common and well settled as to constitute a custom or policy cannot be founded on mere “isolated violations.”46 Maddux sought to introduce evidence of this one incident, which without more, even assuming its relevance, exemplifies the 45 Ted and Lisa Barta, the owners of the home that City officers entered on March 19, 1998 for purposes of apprehending an individual identified as Escobar, each signed affidavits describing the events attendant to their entry. 46 Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 768 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (“Sufficient duration or frequency of abusive practices, or other evidence, must warrant a finding of knowledge on the part of the governing body that the objectionable conduct has become customary practice of city employees.”). -49- type of isolated civil rights violation referred to above.47 Because Maddux was unable to show that the district court clearly abused its discretion in excluding this evidence, the district court’s decision as to this portion of the City’s omnibus motion in limine is affirmed.