Opinion ID: 444550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cutro

Text: 29 Cutro's principal arguments with regard to liability are that the district court erred in refusing to inform the jury that Cutro could be held vicariously liable for the accident pursuant to New York Navigation Law Sec. 48(1), and in denying his posttrial motion for indemnity from Kawasaki and Revy. 2 Neither contention need detain us long. 30 Section 48(1) of the New York Navigation Law provides, in relevant part, as follows: 31 Every owner of a vessel used or operated upon the navigable waters of the state shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vessel, in the business of such owner, or otherwise, by any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner. 32 N.Y.Nav.Law Sec. 48(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984). There were no issues of fact to be decided by the jury in relation to this statute. Cutro admitted in his answer to the complaint that he was in the business of renting boats, that he owned the boat in question, and that he had rented it to Revy. Since there was no disputed factual issue for the jury to decide, informing the jury of the statute was unnecessary. Indeed, to the extent that the jury was disinclined to impose liability on Cutro, giving the jury this information might have introduced an irrelevant factor into the jury's consideration of the liability of Revy. The court properly rejected the requested charge. 33 Cutro's argument that the district court erred in denying his motion for indemnity from defendants Kawasaki and Revy fares no better. Even assuming that indemnity is available in light of N.Y.Nav.Law Sec. 48(1), such a claim must be asserted with particularity in a cross-claim, e.g., Glasgow v. Drakes, 5 A.D.2d 693, 693-94, 169 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (2d Dep't 1957), and Cutro's answer did not include any cross-claims. Cutro made no motion to amend his answer to introduce a cross-claim for indemnity until the eve of trial, and we see no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of that belated motion, or of Cutro's postjudgment efforts to obtain indemnification. 3