Opinion ID: 4649113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional Facts Concerning Formal Policy

Text: In N.E.L. I, we noted the older siblings’ contention that Douglas County unconstitutionally followed a formal policy of complying with a 2007 state-court standing order that allegedly led its employees to violate the Fourth Amendment. But we found this argument waived, because the older siblings “didn’t mention the standing order in their First Amended Complaint” or their opening brief. N.E.L. I, 740 F. App’x at 932. Perhaps in response to this holding, plaintiffs have added a paragraph to their complaint alleging that “Douglas County adopted a policy contained in a standing order, CJO 07-11, authorizing the warrantless entry and seizure of Plaintiffs, which policy was the moving force behind the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ [constitutional rights].” Aplt. App. at 34, ¶ 188a. But this additional allegation does not require a different outcome. 5 Notwithstanding our waiver determination in N.E.L. I, we also addressed the older siblings’ formal-policy argument on the merits. We concluded their reliance on the policy at issue here, CJO 07-11, failed to establish a Monell claim because the standing order did not authorize county officials to enter homes without a warrant. See N.E.L. I, 740 F. App’x at 932-33. Plaintiffs’ invocation of this policy in their complaint does not dictate a different result. B. Additional Facts Concerning Deliberate Indifference In N.E.L. I we also addressed the older siblings’ contention that Douglas County’s failure to adopt an adequate policy and training concerning the enforceability of out-of-state ex parte orders constituted deliberate indifference. We concluded the older siblings failed to allege facts plausibly showing that failure to adopt such a policy was “substantially certain to result in illegal seizures or entries into homes without warrants,” or that Douglas County was on notice that its failure to act would lead to illegal seizures or warrantless entries into homes and was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm. Id. at 934 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs have added two paragraphs to their complaint concerning this claim. The first confirms that Douglas County lacked an official policy for handling requests to enforce out-of-state ex parte orders. See Aplt. App. at 35, ¶ 190a. The second relies on a provision in Douglas County’s policy manual providing that “[o]ut-of-state Court Orders are not valid on their face in Colorado, except for Foreign Protection Orders.” Id., ¶ 191a (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs 6 contend this policy manual provision made it obvious that Douglas County needed to adopt and implement an official policy prohibiting the seizure of children based on out-of-state ex parte orders. But neither new allegation fills the hole in the complaint that we previously identified: failure to plausibly allege facts that rise to the level of deliberate indifference. 2. New Claims Plaintiffs also added two new claims to their complaint, alleging that the defendants (1) violated their procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Colorado’s UCCJEA by failing to afford them notice and a hearing in Colorado, and (2) violated their right to travel. Our analysis in N.E.L. I dictates dismissal of the procedural due process claim as stated in plaintiffs’ complaint, both as it relates to the individual defendants, who are entitled to qualified immunity, see N.E.L. I, 740 F. App’x at 931 n.21; and as it relates to Douglas County, see id. at 932-34. In addition, plaintiffs have failed to identify clearly established law or a basis for municipal liability that would permit them to pursue a claim against these defendants for an alleged deprivation of their right to travel. Seeking to resurrect their procedural due process claim, plaintiffs nevertheless urge us to “overturn [our] previous rulings in N.E.L. I and II [and] find that Plaintiffs had a clearly established right to a post-seizure hearing in Colorado based on the detailed requirements of Colorado’s UCCJEA and federal decisional law.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 7. In response, the defendants urge us to follow our law-of-the-circuit principle, under which we may overturn a prior panel decision only in very specific 7 circumstances, such as when there has been an en banc consideration or an intervening Supreme Court decision. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 865 F.3d 1295, 1298-99 (10th Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs respond that this principle is inapplicable here, because both N.E.L. I and II were unpublished decisions. See Kennedy v. Lubar, 273 F.3d 1293, 1300 n.9 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he law of the circuit doctrine . . . refers generally to our policy that prior circuit precedent, derived from a published opinion on the merits, will not be overturned absent an en banc ruling of this court.”). But even if we consider this issue on the merits, the dismissal must still be affirmed. Having carefully reviewed plaintiffs’ arguments as well as our decisions in N.E.L. I and II, we conclude that given the unusual facts of this case plaintiffs have failed to point us to “existing precedent [that] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” Kisela v. Hughes, ___U.S.___, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), and that made it “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right,” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Their reliance on the UCCJEA’s procedural requirements to support their Fourteenth Amendment argument does not satisfy their burden, cf. N.E.L. I, 740 F. App’x at 930 (“Having failed to provide us authority clearly establishing that violating the Colorado UCCJEA is a Fourth Amendment violation, [the older siblings] haven’t met their burden.”), and the other authorities they cite are insufficiently particularized to the facts of this case to constitute clearly established law. Thus, dismissal of this claim is proper based on qualified immunity. 8