Opinion ID: 2591919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lawfulness of the Custody Order

Text: ¶ 10 Boss argues instruction 10 omitted the element of the lawfulness of the custody order. In support of this argument, she claims RCW 9A.40.060 expressly includes the lawfulness of the order as a required element of a to convict instruction and determination of this element was within the province of the jury. ¶ 11 The language of the statute for first degree custodial interference provides in part: A relative of a child under the age of eighteen or of an incompetent person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree if, with the intent to deny access to the child or incompetent person by a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person, the relative takes, entices, retains, detains, or conceals the child or incompetent person from a parent, guardian, institution, agency, or other person having a lawful right to physical custody of such person and: (a) Intends to hold the child or incompetent person permanently or for a protracted period. RCW 9A.40.060(1) (emphasis added). In order for the jury to convict Boss of first degree custodial interference, the State had to prove, among other elements, that a person or entity other than Boss had a lawful right to physical custody of O.J.B-P. To prove this element, the State relied on the custody order giving CPS custody of O.J.B-P. Boss contends that the jury should have been required to determine whether that order was lawfully entered, alleging that the order's lawfulness is a fact that must be proved to sustain a conviction and must therefore be an element of the crime. We disagree. ¶ 12 The language of instruction 10 mirrors the language of the statute: To convict the defendant of the crime of custodial interference in the first degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the defendant is a relative of [O.J.B-P.], a child under the age of eighteen; (2) That on or about the period of time intervening between May 31, 2006 through August 22, 2006, the defendant, with the intent to deny access to [O.J.B-P.] by an institution, agency or person having a lawful right to the physical custody of such person, took, enticed, retained, detained, or concealed [O.J.B-P.] from an institution, agency or person having a lawful right to the physical custody of such person and intended to hold [O.J.B-P.] permanently or for a protracted period; and (3) That any of the acts occurred in the State of Washington. CP 45 (emphasis added). Instruction 10 contains the same elements as RCW 9A.40.060, including whether a person or entity other than Boss had a lawful right to physical custody of O.J.B-P. We reject Boss's argument that instruction 10 omits an element of the statute. ¶ 13 Whether a trial court may determine the lawfulness of a court order, as a matter of law, in the context of a prosecution for custodial interference, is an issue of first impression in Washington. However, in the context of prosecution for domestic violence no-contact orders, we have established that the lawfulness of a court order is a question for the trial court to decide as a matter of law. Miller, 156 Wash.2d at 24, 123 P.3d 827. The reasoning of Miller applies with equal force to the custody order at issue herein. ¶ 4 In Miller, the defendant requested a to convict instruction that would have required the jury to determine the lawfulness of the no-contact order he was charged with violating. The trial court gave a to convict instruction that did not include the lawfulness of the court order relied upon by the State but, rather, simply required the jury to determine whether a no-contact order existed. We held that while the existence of a nocontact order is an element of the crime of violating such an order, the lawfulness of the order is a question of law appropriately within the province of the trial court to decide as part of the court's gate-keeping function. Miller, 156 Wash.2d at 24, 123 P.3d 827. The crime included an element of existence, not lawfulness of the court order. ¶ 15 Similarly, whether CPS had a custody order for O.J.B-P., i.e., a lawful right to custody, was a question of fact within the province of the jury. Whether the order itself was lawful, i.e., whether the court granting the order was authorized to do so, whether the order was adequate on its face, and whether the order complied with the underlying statutes, is a matter of law within the province of the trial court. [4] ¶ 16 Relying on Miller, the Court of Appeals reasoned that it was the trial court's role to determine whether the custody order was valid, and hence relevant: The trial court gave Boss's counsel a number of opportunities to dispute the custody order's validity. The trial court ultimately ruled, however, that the order was lawfully entered. Because this ruling was a proper exercise of the trial court's gate-keeping function to determine the custody order's validity as a matter of law, the trial court did not err by declining to include the question of the order's validity as an element of the offense in the to convict instruction. Boss, 144 Wash.App. at 886, 184 P.3d 1264. We agree. While the existence of the custody order is an element of first degree custodial interference, the lawfulness of such an order is not.