Opinion ID: 1702151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: FIORE v. WHITE

Text: To answer the Supreme Court's question and to resolve the two pertinent issues set forth above requires an understanding of Fiore. Fiore was convicted in a Pennsylvania state court of operating a waste management facility without a permit, and his conviction was affirmed through direct appeal in the state court. Fiore's general manager, Scarpone, was convicted of the same offense in a later proceeding in another state court, but his conviction was subsequently reversed by an intermediate appellate court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the reversal, concluding that the state did not make out a crime because Scarpone did have a permit. The permit in question was the same for Fiore as for Scarpone. Based upon the successful ruling for Scarpone, Fiore sought both direct and collateral relief in the state courts. Fiore was denied relief and thereafter sought federal habeas corpus relief. Fiore argued that Pennsylvania had imprisoned him for conduct which was not criminal under the statutory section charged. The United States District Court granted Fiore's petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, primarily because it believed that state courts are under no obligation to apply their decision retroactively. Fiore v. White, 149 F.3d 221, 222 (3d Cir.1998). In its opinion, the Third Circuit reasoned: The district court held, and Fiore maintains on appeal, that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require retroactive application of [ Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 634 A.2d 1109 (1993)]. This conclusion, however, is at odds with the Supreme Court's longstanding position that the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject of retroactivity. Greater[Great] Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364[, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360] (1932). See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642[, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579] (1984); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 542[, 102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202] (1982). While the Court has concluded that some federal criminal decisions should apply retroactively, see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346-47[, 94 S.Ct. 2298, 41 L.Ed.2d 109] (1974); United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724[, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434] (1971), it has made clear that state courts are under no constitutional obligation to apply their own criminal decisions retroactively. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 23-24[, 94 S.Ct. 190, 38 L.Ed.2d 179] (1973). Thus, just as the Supreme Court has fashioned retroactivity rules for the federal courts based on principles of judicial integrity, fairness, and finality, see Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 304-310[, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334] (1989), the state courts are free to adopt their own retroactivity rules after independent consideration of these and other relevant principles. As the Supreme Court explained in Sunburst Oil: A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.... The alternative is the same whether the subject of the new decision is common law or statute. The choice for any state may be determined by juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We review not the wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of their acts.... [W]e are not at liberty, for anything contained in the constitution of the United States, to thrust upon those courts a different conception of the binding force of precedent or of the meaning of judicial process. 287 U.S. at 364-66[, 53 S.Ct. 145] (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Consistent with the Supreme Court's admonition that federal courts not require retroactive application of state judicial decisions, this court has refused to require application of new state decisions in habeas proceedings. Fiore, 149 F.3d at 224-25 (parallel citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court granted Fiore's petition for certiorari. In setting out the issues in the petition, the Court stated: Fiore essentially claims that Pennsylvania produced no evidence whatsoever of one element of the crime, namely, that he lacked a permit. The validity of his federal claim may depend upon whether the interpretation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scarpone was always the statute's meaning, even at the time of Fiore's trial. Scarpone marked the first time the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had interpreted the statute; previously, Pennsylvania's lower courts had been divided in their interpretation. Fiore's and Scarpone's trial court concluded that § 6018.401(a)'s permit requirement prohibited the operation of a hazardous waste facility in a manner that deviates from the permit's terms, and the Superior Court, in adjudicating Fiore's direct appeal, accepted the trial court's interpretation in a summary unpublished memorandum. Then, the Commonwealth Court, in Scarpone's direct appeal, specifically rejected the interpretation adopted by the Superior Court in Fiore's case. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Scarpone set forth its authoritative interpretation of the statute, affirming the Commonwealth Court only after Fiore's conviction became final. For that reason, we must know whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's construction of the statute in Scarpone stated the correct understanding of the statute at the time Fiore's conviction became final, or whether it changed the interpretation then applicable. Compare, e.g., Buradus v. General Cement Prods. Co. , [356 Pa. 349,] 52 A.2d 205, 208 (1947) (stating that [i]n general, the construction placed upon a statute by the courts becomes a part of the act, from the very beginning ), with Commonwealth v. Fiore, 665 A.2d at 1193; Commonwealth v. Fiore , CC No. 8508740 (Aug. 18, 1994), at 6 (refusing to apply the Scarpone interpretation because at the time of [Fiore's] conviction and direct appeals, the interpretation of the law was otherwise). Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 28-29, 120 S.Ct. 469, 145 L.Ed.2d 353 (1999) (parallel citations omitted). The Court then certified the following question to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Does the interpretation of Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, s. 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), set forth in Commonwealth v. Scarpone, [535 Pa. 273,] 634 A.2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore's conviction became final? Id. at 29, 120 S.Ct. 469 (parallel citations omitted). Before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the certified question, Fiore took the position that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not issue a new rule of law in Scarpone. Fiore claimed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had merely provided its first interpretation of an unambiguous statute and that its interpretation was an expression of the law from the date of the enactment of the statute. The state argued in opposition that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Scarpone created a new rule of law. The state argued that any court can create law with its decision. Until a court of greater jurisdiction reverses the decision of a lower court or until a court of equal jurisdiction overrules the decision, the law emanating from the initial decision remains law. The state averred that when Fiore's conviction became final, the 1989 Fiore decision by the Superior Court (an intermediate appellate court) was the controlling law concerning the permit requirements. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then ruled, based upon Pennsylvania law, that its Scarpone decision did not articulate a new rule of law. The court held that under Pennsylvania law: There can be no change to statutory law when there has been no amendment by the legislature and no prior decision by this Court. Only the legislature has the authority to promulgate legislation. Our role is to interpret statutes as enacted by the Assembly. We affect legislation when we affirm, alter, or overrule our prior decisions concerning a statute or when we declare it null and void, as unconstitutional. Therefore, when we have not yet answered a specific question about the meaning of a statute, our initial interpretation does not announce a new rule of law. Our first pronouncement on the substance of a statutory provision is purely a clarification of an existing law. Prior to our opinion in Scarpone, we had not examined Section 6018.401(a) of the SWMA. The only cases involving that statutory provision were the unpublished memorandum opinion from the Superior Court in its review of Fiore's direct appeal and the Commonwealth Court's published decision in Scarpone. As justification for accepting allowance of appeal, we recognized in Scarpone that [t]he two courts are clearly in conflict and this leaves the Attorney General's office ill-advised on how it should proceed in such situations. Scarpone, 634 A.2d at 1112. Consequently, we were not in a position to overrule a decision by this Court. Certainly, there was no narrowly defined body of law to follow concerning Scarpone's conviction for causing and assisting in the operation of a hazardous waste facility without a permit. Nevertheless, we cannot classify our ruling in Scarpone as one of first impression or without precedent. A case of first impression is one that presents an entirely novel question of law, which cannot be governed by any existing precedent. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 635 (6th ed.1990). Our resolution of the conflict presented in Scarpone was governed by familiar rules of statutory interpretation, grounded in existing case law. Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 634, 757 A.2d 842, 848 (2000) (footnote omitted). Upon return to the United States Supreme Court, the Court held: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reply specifies that the interpretation of § 6018.401(a) set out in Scarpone merely clarified the statute and was the law of Pennsylvania  as properly interpreted  at the time of Fiore's conviction. Because Scarpone was not new law, this case presents no new issue of retroactivity. Rather, the question is simply whether Pennsylvania can, consistently with the Federal Due Process Clause, convict Fiore for conduct that its criminal statute, as properly interpreted, does not prohibit. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228, 121 S.Ct. 712, 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001). The essential principle from Fiore is that a determination of what the law is at the time of a defendant's conviction is decided on the basis of state law. This principle holds true with respect to Bunkley's conviction. Therefore, the fundamental analysis in answering the Fiore question with respect to Bunkley has to be whether Florida law is in accord with Pennsylvania law as held by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that its initial interpretation of a statute does not announce a new rule of law but is purely clarification of an existing law. Based upon the express constitutional structure of Florida's court system and our precedent interpreting these provisions, the law of Florida is not in accord with Pennsylvania law in this regard.