Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Move to Sever the Penalty Phase.

Text: Shelton argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to sever the penalty hearing and that he was prejudiced by the joint hearing. Shelton also argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. According to Shelton, [e]ven though a motion to sever the trial was denied by the court, it did not address the severance issue in the context of the potential prejudice posed by a joint penalty phase hearing. [67] Shelton contends that a motion to sever a joint penalty phase hearing raises issues that would not be addressed in a motion to sever the guilt phase of the trial. Thus, according to Shelton, the only way effectively to avoid the prejudice of a joint penalty phase hearing was to sever the penalty phase and to provide a separate jury for each hearing. Before jury selection began, Nelson Shelton made a formal motion to sever his trial. [68] Ironically, neither Outten nor Steven Shelton joined in Nelson's motion or took a position on the matter. [69] The Superior Court denied Nelson's motion to sever the trial. At an office conference prior to the beginning of the penalty hearing, the court and all counsel briefly discussed severing the penalty hearing. None of the defendants formally moved for severance and no severance occurred. On direct appeal, Shelton and Outten argued that the Superior Court should have severed the guilt phase of the trial. [70] This Court rejected that argument. [71] Now, Shelton argues that counsel was deficient in failing to move to sever the penalty hearing. We reject Shelton's contention on two grounds: (1) Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(4) bars Shelton's claim as formerly adjudicated, [72] and (2) under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3), Shelton is unable to show cause and actual prejudice for his failure to raise the issue at trial or on direct appeal.