Opinion ID: 174346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioners' Vagueness Challenges to their Convictions for Depraved Indifference Murder

Text: Both Mannix and Archer contend that their convictions for depraved indifference murder should be vacated on the ground that the statute under which they were convicted was void for vagueness. Petitioners cannot demonstrate that the state courts unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in concluding that New York's depraved indifference murder statute was not void for vagueness as applied to them. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
The void-for-vagueness doctrine derives from the constitutional guarantee of due process, which requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense `[1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.' Skilling v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2927-28, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (alterations in original) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). The touchstone of the notice prong is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's conduct was criminal. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997). The arbitrary enforcement prong requires that a statute give minimal guidelines to law enforcement authorities, so as not to permit a standardless sweep that allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Although a law must provide explicit standards, it need not achieve meticulous specificity, which would come at the cost of flexibility and reasonable breadth. Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 747 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has made it clear that when the law unambiguously specif[ies] the activity proscribed, the fact that this proscribed conduct may violate more than one statute does not render the statute void for vagueness. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). To the contrary, when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the [g]overnment may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. Id. at 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198. When, as here, the challenged law does not threaten First Amendment interests, we generally evaluate a vagueness claim only as applied to the facts of the particular case. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); United States v. Nadi, 996 F.2d 548, 550 (2d Cir.1993); see also Dickerson, 604 F.3d at 743-45. Because [a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others, Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), we will uphold a statute against an as-applied challenge if `the particular enforcement at issue [is] consistent with the core concerns underlying the [statute],' Dickerson, 604 F.3d at 748 (alterations in original) (quoting Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 493 (2d Cir. 2006)). Put another way, [o]ne to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974).
New York's depraved indifference murder statute provides that a person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2). At the times of petitioners' trials, and at the times that each of their convictions became final, recklessness was the required mental state for depraved indifference murder. People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 274, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704 (1983). Depravity and indifference were assessed by the jury, based on its review of the circumstances of the crime. Id. at 274-75, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704. In other words, a jury was required to evaluate the facts attendant to the crime, and the defendant's behavior in committing the crime, to make a determination as to whether those facts and behavior evinced a depraved indifference to human life. As the New York Court of Appeals explained, it was within the jury's province to make a qualitative judgment whether defendant's act was of such gravity that it placed the crime upon the same level as the taking of life by premeditated design. It had to determine from the evidence if defendant's conduct, though reckless, was equal in blameworthiness to intentional murder. Id. During the relevant time period, depraved indifference referred to objective circumstances surrounding the offenses committed. Id. at 276, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704. And, the definition of depraved indifference murder was well understood. Id. at 279, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also People v. Johnson, 87 N.Y.2d 357, 361, 639 N.Y.S.2d 776, 662 N.E.2d 1066 (1996); People v. Cole, 85 N.Y.2d 990, 992, 629 N.Y.S.2d 166, 652 N.E.2d 912 (1995). In Register, which governs petitioners' appeals, the New York Court of Appeals explained that depraved indifference murder is not and never has been considered as a substitute for intentional homicide. 60 N.Y.2d at 279, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704. Moreover, it reasoned, depraved indifference murder is distinguishable from manslaughter ... by the objective circumstances in which the act occurs. Id. at 278, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704. Subsequent to petitioners' convictions becoming final, this interpretation of the depraved indifference murder statute changed. The New York Court of Appeals overturned its prior precedent and held that depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state. People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288, 294, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691, 852 N.E.2d 1163 (2006). As now understood by the New York Court of Appeals, `a one-on-one shooting or knifing (or similar killing) can almost never qualify as depraved indifference murder.' Policano v. Herbert, 7 N.Y.3d 588, 601, 825 N.Y.S.2d 678, 859 N.E.2d 484 (2006) (quoting People v. Payne, 3 N.Y.3d 266, 272, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116, 819 N.E.2d 634 (2004)). But see People v. Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d 373, 383, 748 N.Y.S.2d 312, 777 N.E.2d 204 (2002) (observing that requirements that conduct causing death be aimed at no one in particular and must endanger indiscriminately the lives of many were entirely obsolete under then-existing New York law (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Contrary to the assertions of petitioners, this change in construction is of little import in evaluating these petitions for habeas corpus relief based on vagueness, for on habeas review, we must look to New York law as it existed when Mannix and Archer's convictions became final. See Henry v. Ricks, 578 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir.2009); see also Policano v. Herbert, 453 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir.2006)(Raggi, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc ).
We have no difficulty concluding that Mannix and Archer were both on notice that their conductshooting into an enclosed space when each petitioner knew people were insidewas criminal. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). It cannot be said that the depraved indifference murder statute, as interpreted at the relevant time, could trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Id. And, it certainly cannot be said that there was any risk that either man was unaware that his conduct was proscribed, such that their vagueness challenges would survive as-applied review. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186; accord Nadi, 996 F.2d at 550. Through the time petitioners' convictions became final, New York courts consistently held that firing into a crowd or enclosed space is a quintessential case of depraved indifference murder. See People v. Suarez, 6 N.Y.3d 202, 214, 811 N.Y.S.2d 267, 844 N.E.2d 721 (2005) (observing that [q]uintessential examples of depraved indifference murder include firing into a crowd (citing People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 192, 144 N.E. 497 (1924) (upholding depraved indifference murder conviction where defendant fired two or more shots into the house where he knew there were human beings))); accord Payne, 3 N.Y.3d at 271, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116, 819 N.E.2d 634; People v. Gonzalez, 1 N.Y.3d 464, 467, 775 N.Y.S.2d 224, 807 N.E.2d 273 (2004); see also People v. Brown, 173 A.D.2d 318, 575 N.Y.S.2d 460, 460 (1st Dep't 1991) (upholding depraved indifference murder conviction where defendant fired shot through closed door). Relying on two decisions from the Southern District of New York, Mannix and Archer argue that the depraved indifference murder statute, as applied to them, encouraged arbitrary enforcement because their conduct was indistinguishable from conduct proscribed by the reckless manslaughter statute. See St. Helen, 2003 WL 25719647, at ; Jones, 2002 WL 33985141, at . At the outset, we reject the premise of petitioners' argument. Under Register, depraved indifference murder was defined as distinct from, and requiring an element in addition to, the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter. See Sanchez, 98 N.Y.2d at 380, 748 N.Y.S.2d 312, 777 N.E.2d 204 ( Register requires a significantly heightened recklessness, distinguishing it from manslaughter ....); see also Payne, 3 N.Y.3d at 271, 786 N.Y.S.2d 116, 819 N.E.2d 634 ([T]he reckless conduct must be `so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard for the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.' (quoting Gonzalez, 1 N.Y.3d at 469, 775 N.Y.S.2d 224, 807 N.E.2d 273)); Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 276, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704 (holding that the depraved mind murder statute requires in addition [to reckless manslaughter] not only that the conduct which results in death present a grave risk of death but that it also occur `[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life' and construing the latter as an additional requirement (second alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2))). [I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). [S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975). As we are bound by the New York Court of Appeals' construction of state law at the time petitioners' convictions became final, we conclude that the depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter statutes define distinct offenses. Even if Mannix and Archer were right that they could have properly been convicted under either statute, their vagueness claims would still fail. As the district courts correctly recognized, no clearly established constitutional prohibition of statutory vagueness is violated when two statutes proscribe the same conduct and a defendant is charged under the one subjecting him to greater punishment. Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that even if two statutes overlap and have identical standards of proof, this, in and of itself, would not render them void for vagueness. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198. Rather, when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the [g]overnment may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants, an equal protection, not due process, concern. Id. at 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198. Petitioners raise no such discrimination claim here. Thus, we conclude that their vagueness arguments are foreclosed by Batchelder 's clear holding that a defendant has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable... statutes shall be the basis of his indictment and prosecution. Id. at 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198; see also United States v. Carmel, 548 F.3d 571, 579 (7th Cir.2008) (stating that Congress may lawfully punish the same action under two separate statutes without running afoul of the Due Process Clause); United States v. Malik, 385 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir.2004) (concluding that [w]hen the same acts violate multiple laws, the prosecutor is free to choose the one with the highest sentence). [13] Petitioners nevertheless submit that when the New York Court of Appeals overruled Register, and declared depraved indifference to be a culpable mental state in Feingold, the court conceded that the interpretation of the depraved indifference murder statute was unconstitutionally vague at the time their convictions were finalized. As applied to these habeas petitioners, the change in the interpretation of the statute warrants no such conclusion. Indeed, this change which does not apply retroactively, see Henry, 578 F.3d at 139-41neither diminished the notice given to petitioners that their conduct was proscribed by New York law nor authorized arbitrary enforcement of the depraved indifference statute, see generally Farrell, 449 F.3d at 484-85. Moreover, although we are of the view that the meaning of New York's depraved indifference murder statute was clear at the relevant time, it is also true that some ambiguity in a statute's meaning is constitutionally tolerable. United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir.1999); accord Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (declining to require mathematical certainty or meticulous specificity for statutes to survive vagueness review). Even if we were to consider petitioners' conduct under the law as it now stands, a rational jury could reasonably have found each man guilty of depraved indifference murder. Shooting into an enclosed spacewhether a small bathroom or a carknowing that people are inside, is conduct that evinces a mental state of depraved indifference to human life. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d at 294, 819 N.Y.S.2d 691, 852 N.E.2d 1163; see also Register, 60 N.Y.2d at 282, 469 N.Y.S.2d 599, 457 N.E.2d 704 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Accordingly, we hold that the state courts did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding (1) that, at the time their convictions became final, petitioners Mannix and Archer were on notice that their shootings were proscribed by law; and (2) that the depraved indifference murder statute did not encourage arbitrary enforcement. Petitioners have failed to identify any principle of clearly established federal law suggesting that New York's depraved indifference murder statute was void for vagueness as applied to their cases. To the contrary, Batchelder compels the conclusion that the state's decision to charge petitioners for depraved indifference murder, rather than only reckless manslaughter, does not warrant habeas relief.