Opinion ID: 2542695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limiting public comment

Text: Cowan also argues P & Z violated his due process rights by (1) refusing to take public comments when considering the final plat and (2) by unreasonably limiting public comment to a few minutes for each speaker at hearings to consider the preliminary plat. The Board points out that Cowan had numerous opportunities to provide comment. Moreover, it argues, the FCDC does not require taking public comment when considering final plats and also allows for limiting public comments so that P & Z will be able to finish their agenda. In addition, the Board argues, even if the limits on public comments were unreasonable, Cowan's comments were not restricted. Procedural due process requires: some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due process requirement. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1267 (1998). Here, P & Z's actions did not violate Cowan's due process rights. Even assuming arguendo that P & Z's request to limit public comments to a few minutes per speaker prevented other citizens from presenting evidence and rebutting arguments, it afforded Cowan an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The record reveals that Cowan's attorney spoke at length and presented evidence during the hearing on the preliminary plat and during the appeals hearings before the Board. Cowan also spoke. As such his due process rights were not violated during the hearing on the preliminary plat or during the appeals hearings. However, although we hold that Cowan's due process rights were not violated, limiting public comment to two minutes is not consistent with affording an individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Moreover, neither the LLUPA nor the Idaho subdivision statutes specifies requirements for notice and hearing on subdivision application approval. See I.C. § 67-6513; §§ 50-1301 to 50-1334. The FCDC provides for notice and hearing when P & Z considers preliminary plats, but provides that [n]o public notice or hearing is required for final plats. . . . FCDC Ch. III(I)(10)(b). However, this is not a constitutional violation because due process requires only an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Castaneda, 130 Idaho at 927, 950 P.2d at 1266 (quoting Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 573, 798 P.2d 27, 32 (1990)). Here, Cowan was given the opportunity to be heard at the most meaningful time-at the public hearing on the preliminary platand therefore his due process rights were not violated. See id. Therefore, we hold that P & Z's actions did not violate Cowan's due process rights.