Opinion ID: 1497818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of the effective assistance of counsel

Text: At the conclusion of Webb's direct testimony, the trial judge ordered an overnight recess. Webb's cross-examination was scheduled for the next day. After the jury was dismissed for the day, the following colloquy took place (emphasis supplied): [THE PROSECUTOR]: Could the witness [Webb] be instructed by the Court not to discuss his testimony with anyone and be advised he is on cross-examination and that also limits his access to his attorney? THE COURT: Very well. You understand that you are not to discuss your testimony with anyone. You are still subject to your oath, and the cross-examination will start tomorrow. THE DEFENDANT: Yes. [THE PROSECUTOR]: As I understand the case law, the access to his attorney is somewhat limited, too, because he is on cross. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have got a problem with that because it's  it's not just a black letter rule. I always try to be very careful about not taking unfair advantage of situations. Recent testimony is one of them, in trying to suggest some type of change, or whatever. But if there are other matters concerning trial strategy or questions which come up from the defendant, I think the defendant has a right to be able to ask his attorney certain questions. It just shouldn't be a closure because of that relationship. He  THE COURT: Well, certainly, I think the defense attorney understands his ethical obligations. The Court expects him to understand the difference between what he can and what he cannot talk to the defendant about. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you. [THE PROSECUTOR]: I think, perhaps, I'm also directing it at the defendant to understand he doesn't have the same degree of access that he had to question his attorney and prepare responses. THE COURT: The defendant is to understand he is not to discuss his testimony this morning with his attorney. I trust the defense attorney will, if he should attempt to, indicate the ethical restrictions that are placed upon him. Other than that, I'll leave it at that. (Emphasis added). Later that same day, the following exchange occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If we could, concerning the ruling, I realize Your Honor made the ruling about contact with my client. I still have a problem with that. I will check on the case. I'll abide by the ruling, but just as an illustration I thought of, I can't  I can't tell the guy, under the rule, don't say that tomorrow on cross-examination. THE COURT: I think that's appropriate. You would not have a chance, but for the fact there is a recess at this point, to do that. She [the prosecutor] would have immediately went into cross. [THE PROSECUTOR]: That is exactly what I'm talking about. Based on the above, Webb argues that the Superior Court's order was overbroad, thus violating his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the Sixth Amendment). [3] The State characterizes the Superior Court's order as restricting only defense counsel's ability to render advice regarding Webb's ongoing testimony, a limitation which the State contends is constitutionally sanctioned. The trial judge's instruction was not clearly limited to discussions of defendant's testimony, however. Because of the pressure from the prosecutor for an instruction limiting defendant's access to his lawyer and the trial judge's vague reference to the lawyer's ethical responsibilities in response to that pressure, the ruling became imprecise and unconstitutionally overbroad. The seminal case with which we begin analysis of Webb's claim is Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). In that case, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a blanket prohibition of lawyer-defendant contact during an overnight (seventeen-hour) recess violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Geders, 425 U.S. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1332. In determining that this type of broad prohibition impinged on the defendant's rights, the Court stated: [A] sequestration order affects a defendant in quite a different way from the way it affects a nonparty witness who presumably has no stake in the outcome of the trial. A nonparty witness ordinarily has little, other than his own testimony, to discuss with trial counsel; a defendant in a criminal case must often consult with his attorney during the trial. Moreover, the rule [ i.e., that allows sequestration of witnesses] accomplishes less when it is applied to the defendant rather than a non-party witness, because the defendant as a matter of right can be and usually is present for all testimony and has the opportunity to discuss his testimony with his attorney up to the time he takes the witness stand. Id. at 88, 96 S.Ct. at 1335. The Court recognized that [i]t is common practice during such recesses for an accused and counsel to discuss the events of the day's trial. Id. These discussions often include considerations such as trial strategy, tactical decisions, testimony of other witnesses, and the possibility of a plea bargain. Id. Thirteen years later, the United States Supreme Court revisited the issue of whether a testifying defendant and his or her counsel may discuss non-testimonial matters during a trial recess. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284, 109 S.Ct. 594, 602, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989). Perry involved a trial judge's absolute ban on consultation between a testifying defendant and his lawyer during a fifteen-minute recess. 488 U.S. at 274, 109 S.Ct. at 596. On appeal, the Court affirmed the ban, reasoning: [W]hen a defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while he is testifying. He has an absolute right to such consultation before he begins to testify, but neither he nor his lawyer has a right to have the testimony interrupted in order to give him the benefit of counsel's advice. The reason for the rule is one that applies to all witnesses  not just defendants. It is a common practice for a judge to instruct a witness not to discuss his or her testimony with third parties until the trial is completed.[] Such nondiscussion orders are a corollary of the broader rule that witnesses may be sequestered to lessen the danger that their testimony will be influenced by hearing what other witnesses have to say, and to increase the likelihood that they will confine themselves to truthful statements based on their own recollections.[] The defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him immunizes him from such physical sequestration.[] Nevertheless, when he assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses  rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trial  are generally applicable to him as well. Accordingly, it is entirely appropriate for a trial judge to decide, after listening to the direct examination of any witness, whether the defendant or a nondefendant, that cross-examination is more likely to elicit truthful responses if it goes forward without allowing the witness an opportunity to consult with third parties, including his or her lawyer.       [P]ermitting a witness, including a criminal defendant, to consult with counsel after direct examination but before cross-examination grants the witness an opportunity to regroup and regain a poise and sense of strategy that the unaided witness would not possess. This is true even if we assume no deceit on the part of the witness; it is simply an empirical predicate of our system of adversary rather than inquisitorial justice that cross-examination of a witness who is uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination is more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness who is given time to pause and consult with his attorney.... Id. at 281-82, 109 S.Ct. at 600-01 (footnotes omitted). The Court's holding was limited: [I]n a short recess[,] in which it is appropriate to presume that nothing but the testimony will be discussed, the testifying defendant does not have a constitutional right to advice. Id. The Perry court distinguished Geders on the basis of time: Geders involved an overnight (seventeen-hour) recess; Perry involved a fifteen-minute break. As to discussion of non-testimonial matters, however, the Perry court affirmed the holding in Geders: [I]t is the defendant's right to unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial related matters that is controlling in the context of a long recess. See Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. [at] 1335. The fact that such discussions will inevitably include some consideration of the defendant's ongoing testimony does not compromise that basic right. Id. at 284, 109 S.Ct. at 602. Although Perry and Geders establish the parameters for our analysis, neither addressed the factual scenario in the instant case  namely, a limitation on contact short of an absolute ban but for a period of time longer than a few minutes. This Court addressed that factual scenario in Bailey v. State, Del.Supr., 422 A.2d 956 (1980). In that case, the trial judge imposed a testimonial limitation on a defendant during an overnight trial recess. Id. at 958. In a postconviction proceeding, the defendant argued, inter alia, that the following order violated the Sixth Amendment: `Mr. Bailey, during the evening recess, I caution you and instruct you that you are not to discuss your testimony with anybody until you have completed your testimony in this case....' Id. (quoting trial court's oral order). Construing the anybody as referring to defense counsel, we stated: The instruction was precisely and simply stated. [4] Id. at 959. Distinguishing Geders on the basis that the limitation in that case was an absolute ban on lawyer-defendant contact, id. at 959, we continued: In our view, a testimonial limitation does not constitute a per se Sixth Amendment infringement of a defendant's right of access to counsel[,] id. at 960. We found that because a testimonial limitation may not be distinguishable from a blanket sequestration in the sense that each may impinge in varying degrees on access to counsel, id., abstract propositions should be discounted, and a decision rests on evaluation of the record in the trial court for prejudice resulting from the imposed limitation concerning the defendant's ongoing testimony, id. at 960-61, 963-64. In Bailey, unlike the instant case, the defendant was incarcerated and made no showing that he sought to confer with his attorney. Explicit in Perry, 488 U.S. at 281-82, 109 S.Ct. at 600-01, and implicit in both Geders, see 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. at 1335, and Bailey, see 422 A.2d at 959-60, is a recognition that the criminal defendant who decides to become a witness in his or her own defense assumes two separate but concurrent roles  that of a defendant and that of a defendant-witness. The first role requires that the defendant not be forced to sacrifice unfairly the appurtenant constitutional guarantees accorded to an accused. Among these constitutional guarantees is the right of a defendant in a criminal case to consult with counsel at any time during the proceedings. See, e.g., Geders, 425 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. at 1336. Thus, a defendant-witness may not be denied access to his or her counsel or restricted from discussing any subject with counsel during an overnight recess except that, in most circumstances, a narrowly tailored limitation on discussion of the defendant's testimony with counsel may be imposed during a brief recess while the defendant is on cross-examination. During such a recess, the defendant may discuss with counsel matters relating to the availability of other witnesses, the progression of the trial, the day's events, legal issues, strategic considerations such as whether to offer or accept a plea bargain, and other matters. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. at 602; Geders, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. at 1335; Bailey, 422 A.2d at 959-60. As noted in Geders, where the instruction against discussion with counsel during an overnight (seventeen hour) recess was overbroad (about anything), the court noted the tension between the Sixth Amendment right to access and the prevention of improper coaching: To the extent that conflict remains between the defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a long overnight recess in the trial, and the prosecutor's desire to cross-examine the defendant without the intervention of counsel, with the risk of improper coaching, the conflict must, under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 32 L.Ed.2d 358, 92 S.Ct. 1891 (1972). Geders, 425 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. at 1337. In the instant case, where Webb had finished his direct testimony but had yet to be cross-examined, we are required to review the limitation imposed by the trial court on communications between Webb and his counsel during the overnight trial recess. See Bailey, 422 A.2d at 960 (requiring case-by-case analysis). Standing alone, the Superior Court's initial admonition to Webb that he was not to discuss [his] testimony with any-one because he was [s]till subject to [his] oath[] and the cross-examination will start tomorrow would have been proper as within the trial court's discretion. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 285 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. at 602 n. 8 (noting that [a] judge may permit consultation between counsel and defendant during [a trial] recess, but forbid discussion of ongoing testimony[]); Geders, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. at 1335; Bailey, 422 A.2d at 959 (noting that a similar instruction was [p]recisely and simply stated). But that is not the case before us for review because of what followed that initial admonition. The trial court, at the behest of the State, committed error when it elaborated imprecisely on the testimonial limitation. The prosecutor had sought and received an instruction that the defendant not discuss his testimony with counsel. Not satisfied with that, the prosecutor pressed: [t]he access to [Webb's] attorney is somewhat limited, too, because he is on cross. [5] After defense counsel objected to this proposed broader denial of access, the trial court ambiguously responded: Well, certainly, I think the defense attorney understands his ethical obligations. The Court expects him to understand the difference between what he can and cannot talk to the defendant about. [6] Anything short of an unequivocal denial by the trial court of the State's request to limit further Webb's access to counsel was erroneous. The court's response to the State's request could have been construed as an admonition that Webb and his counsel were prohibited from discussing not only Webb's ongoing testimony, but also other trial-related matters. Thus, the restriction was overbroad and violative of Webb's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. It is vital in the search for truth that cross-examination should be a cornerstone of the adversary system. It is antithetical to the process of truth-seeking that any witness be permitted to consult with counsel during cross-examination to be coached on what to say, or not say, or how-to-say-it, or how to control or put a better face on testimonial damage already done. [7] This rule normally applies to a defendant in a criminal case during a short recess when the defendant elects to take the stand in his or her own defense and thereby becomes a witness. The fortuitous intervention of an overnight recess during the cross-examination of a defendant should not be an occasion for coaching which could not otherwise occur. The subject of limiting a defendant's access to his counsel is dangerous and problematic. It is an area where precision is clearly called for in order that Sixth Amendment rights not be violated. If it is unavoidable that an evening recess interrupt the defendant's cross-examination, [8] trial judges should be especially vigilant in giving unmistakably clear and limited instructions that the defendant-witness may not discuss his or her testimony with counsel, but that instruction should not permit any inference that the defendant and counsel may not discuss other matters. See Geders, 425 U.S. at 91, 96 S.Ct. at 1336. It is the nature of the judicial process that we decide only the case before us. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (1993). Accordingly, we cannot and do not prescribe a one size fits all rule to be applied in future criminal cases involving limitations on discussions between a defendant-witness and counsel during trial recesses of varying lengths. Our holding here is narrowly circumscribed to the facts of this case. [9] For example, we express no opinion on the breadth of a recent ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that, when a weekend recess is involved, the trial judge may not circumscribe the defendant-witness' contact with his lawyer even if the instruction is confined to the defendant's testimony. United States v. Cobb, 4th Cir., 905 F.2d 784, 792 (1990) (holding that such a limitation violates the right to effective assistance of counsel on the ground that it [e]ffectively eviscerates [the defendant's] ability to discuss and plan trial strategy[]), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049, 111 S.Ct. 758, 112 L.Ed.2d 778 (1991). Such a case is not before us and may not come before us, particularly if trial judges will, when feasible, manage the scheduling of trial testimony so that long recesses are avoided. See supra note 8. The remaining issue in analyzing Webb's Sixth Amendment claim is whether the trial court's error was harmless. See Bailey, 422 A.2d at 963 (holding that such claims are subject to harmless error analysis). Where defense counsel objects to the limitation order at trial, the Geders court implied that actual prejudice need not be demonstrated. See 425 U.S. at 82, 96 S.Ct. at 1332; Bailey, 422 A.2d at 963 (interpreting Geders ). This case is unlike Bailey where we found that the defendant's claim of prejudice was suspect, given the fact that he did not object to the testimonial limitation until nearly three years after trial, id. at 964. In the instant case, Webb objected contemporaneously at trial to the limitation order and diligently attempted to have the trial judge narrow or withdraw the order. The resulting instruction was ambiguous, leaving the defendant and his counsel in a sea of uncertainty regarding the propriety of any communication. Under such circumstances, we cannot say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.