Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The court's initial inquiry regarding deadlock

Text: Adopting the parties' suggestion, the court called the jury into the courtroom and began its inquiry with the foreperson. Responding to the court's questions, the foreperson first indicated that he felt the jury was hopelessly deadlocked and that there was nothing the court could do such as providing additional jury instructions or rereading testimony that might assist the jury in reaching a decision. The court also elicited from the foreperson that the jury had taken three votes and that the most recent division was seven to four to one. The court then individually polled the remaining jurors, each of whom indicated that he or she agreed with the foreperson that the jury was deadlocked and that further deliberations would not result in a verdict.  The court held a sidebar conference to discuss the significance of the numerical division in the jury's most recent vote, commenting that any deadlock could not be attributed to the two jurors mentioned in the foreperson's note. The court also indicated its intention to conduct further questioning, including inquiry into the numerical breakdown of the juror's prior ballots, to determine whether the one vote meant a juror was sabotaging the deliberation process by abstaining from voting. In the presence of the jury, the court elicited from the foreperson that the juror in question was undecided, not refusing to vote. In response to the court's inquiry, the foreperson also indicated that the numerical breakdown of the second ballot was nine to two to one, and that, in the first ballot, the jury was divided eight to three to one. Again at a sidebar conference, the court observed that the trend is moving away from unanimity, but indicated it intended to direct the jury to continue deliberating. Defense counsel objected, pointing out that all 12 jurors said they were hopelessly deadlocked. Counsel also voiced his concern that the jurors might interpret the court's directive to continue deliberations to mean they should change their votes and reach a verdict. Counsel asked the court to declare a mistrial as to the penalty phase or, alternatively, to expressly instruct the jurors that, in ordering them to  continue deliberations, the court was not asking them to reach a verdict. After further discussion about the undecided juror, defense counsel indicated that he had no objection to the prosecutor's suggestion to further question the foreperson, who seemed to have hesitated when responding in the negative to the court's inquiry whether there was anything the court or the parties could do to assist the jury in its deliberations. At the same time, however, defense counsel reiterated his concerns that the jury would misinterpret the court's directive to resume deliberations as a command to reach agreement. 3 The court's further inquiry into deadlock The court agreed to conduct further questioning and, at the outset, spoke to the jury as a whole. Likely prompted by defense counsel's concerns, the court told the jurors, Nothing that I say in asking any questions of you should be interpreted in any way that I am looking for a certain decision from you or favoring a certain decision from you. I am-I think if there's one thing we've learned from the beginning of this trial, that what I've tried to do is be entirely fair to both sides, be entirely neutral, be entirely  objective. So nothing that I say now should be viewed as being different from that approach that I have taken throughout. Okay? The court then called the foreperson to sidebar and questioned him regarding his complaints that two jurors had misrepresented their views on  the death penalty. The foreperson indicated that there was at least one juror who said during deliberations that she would never feel comfortable voting for death, but that even if that juror were excused, the jury would still be at an impasse. After the foreperson had left sidebar, the parties offered their views on whether the juror in question had committed misconduct. The court then asked the prosecutor, [I]f the court were to indicate that it's prepared to declare a mistrial, is there an objection from the People? The prosecutor replied that based upon what we have on the record, no. It would seem appropriate. However, the prosecutor requested the court ask the jurors if there was anything we can do. Defense counsel opposed such questioning, pointing out that the same question had already been posed, and repeating his concern that the jury would misinterpret the court's inquiry. But when the court observed that it had questioned only the foreperson on that point, defense counsel asked whether, in that event, the court would begin its inquiry with Juror No. 2, which the court agreed to do. Proceeding in numerical order beginning with Juror No. 2, the court asked each of the members of the jury a simple yes or no question, whether there was anything that the court could do, either rereading testimony or further instruction on the law, that would assist the jury in reaching a decision. Jurors Nos. 2, 3, 7, and 10 responded, No. But Jurors Nos. 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12 replied, Yes, and Jurors Nos. 8 and 9 stated, Possibly. The court then indicated to the jurors that the court needed to know generally what they would find helpful, although the court also indicated that it had not discussed the matter with the attorneys and had not decided what type of assistance it would permit. The court remarked furthermore that each and every one of us in this courtroom has a lot invested in the case in terms of our time, our energy, and if we can reach a decision, I'd like to. The court added, however, that By my saying that, I'm not suggesting that you should reach any decision one way or the other. I'm just generally inquiring.  The court excused the jurors for the evening, and directed them to return to court the next day to continue their deliberations and to identify what would assist them, whether it be a rereading of instructions or testimony, or reargument by the parties. After the jury left the courtroom, the court remarked to the attorneys that there is enough going on with some of these jurors who are saying that, with some help, as yet unidentified, maybe they think it's worthwhile to continue with the discussion, and I'm not willing to simply ignore that for the time being.  4. The jury's requests for assistance and the court's denial of those requests and defense motions for mistrial The next morning, the third day of deliberations, the jury sent the court two Jury Request forms. The first form requested New Argument-different spin on final arguments (15 minutes maximum w/no babbling (no visual aid)). The second form requested to hear from Donald Brooks. The court conferred with the attorneys regarding the requests. The court first indicated that its tentative decision was to preclude additional argument by the parties. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed. Defense counsel then moved for mistrial based on jury deadlock, asking the court in the alternative to poll the jurors again to inquire whether they were hung and, if so, to declare a mistrial at that time. Pointing to the jury's request to hear from defendant, counsel also moved for mistrial on the ground that the jury was disobeying the court's instruction not to consider defendant's failure to testify. The court denied the motions for mistrial, but granted defense counsel's further request that the court convey to the jurors its ruling on their request to hear from defendant by simply saying, Denied, rather than rereading the guilt phase instruction regarding defendant's right not to testify. The court also indicated that it intended to direct the jury to continue deliberating, but that if the jurors  indicated sometime later that day that they were still deadlocked, the court would consider declaring a mistrial at that point. 5. The jury's request for further explanation of aggravating and mitigating factors When the jurors were called back into the courtroom later in the morning on the third day of deliberations, the court advised them of its rulings denying their requests to hear additional argument by the attorneys and testimony by defendant. The foreperson then indicated that an issue had just come to his attention, and he asked the court to provide a deeper explanation of A through K. (See § 190.3, factors (a)-(k).) Specifically, the foreperson asked, If you find one item in mitigation, is that enough for life in prison, if you find just one, or do you need several for each, or is it a scale? How does that operate? The court replied that it believed the standard instruction on the aggravating and mitigating factors answered that question, but indicated that it would confer with the attorneys regarding the issue. Confirming with the foreperson that no new votes had been taken that morning, the court then asked the foreperson whether the three deadlocked votes he had reported to the court the previous day reflected the jury's current position. The foreperson responded that there had been a fourth vote that previous day, in which the jury had split three to eight to one.  After directing the jury to return to the deliberations room, the court reviewed CALJIC No. 8.88, and concluded that the instruction directly answered the foreperson's questions. Defense counsel pointed  out, however, that a more specific response would be that, under California law, a single factor in mitigation is enough to justify a verdict of life without the possibility of parole. Counsel asked the court to respond to the foreperson's question accordingly. Were the court not to give such a response, counsel asserted, the jury might believe a single factor is not sufficient. The prosecutor strenuously opposed the response offered by defense counsel, arguing that it feeds right into what the [standard] instruction says you can't do, which is a mechanical weighing. Defense counsel countered that his suggested response was not inconsistent with the prosecutor's position, and he urged the court to answer in the affirmative the specific question posed by the foreperson. The court concluded that it would reread the relevant portions of CALJIC No. 8.88 to the jury, but that it would consider additional instruction as requested by the parties. When the jurors again returned to the courtroom, the court read aloud the reporter's transcript of the foreperson's question, and then reread selected portions of CALJIC No. 8.88. The court then released the jury for a lunch break. A short time later, outside the jury's presence, the court considered defense counsel's written motion asking the court to respond to the foreperson's question by telling the jury that one mitigating circumstance may be sufficient to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. The court observed that the decisions cited by defense counsel in support of the suggested response addressed a different standard instruction, which was replaced by CALJIC No. 8.88. After hearing additional argument from the parties, the court determined that CALJIC No. 8.88 adequately answered the foreperson's question, and declined to provide any additional response. The court pointed out, for example, that the standard instruction informed the jury that each juror was free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value he or she deemed appropriate to all of the various factors, and that, to return a verdict of death, each juror must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without the possibility of parole. The court then denied counsel's motion for mistrial based on the court's decision to provide only the standard instruction in response to the foreperson's question.  6. The jury's continued deliberations and verdict After the court's ruling denying defense counsel's request to respond more specifically to the foreperson's question, counsel queried  whether the court intended to ask the jurors whether they were hopelessly deadlocked. The court indicated that it had no intention of doing so at that point in time, given the foreperson's report that the jury had not taken a vote since the previous day. Rather, the court stated that it would direct the jury to continue deliberations, and indicated that it had no set deadline for when it would declare a mistrial for jury deadlock. The jury resumed deliberations after the lunch break. At 3:05 p.m. that same day, the foreperson reported that the jury had reached a penalty verdict. On being polled, each juror indicated that the verdict setting the penalty at death was his or her individual verdict. b. Claims of error Defendant presents four interrelated claims of error based on the above described events and rulings. None requires reversal of the death judgment.  1. Coercion of the verdict Defendant argues that the court's directive to the jurors to continue deliberations after they had reported a deadlock coerced the jury's verdict in violation of section 1140 and his federal and state constitutional rights to due process, jury trial, and a reliable death verdict. His claim lacks merit on this record. Section 1140 provides in relevant part that a jury cannot be discharged without having rendered a verdict unless, at the expiration of such time as the court may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree. The decision whether to declare a hung jury or to order further deliberations rests in the trial court's sound discretion. ( People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177 , 209, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 326 P.3d 213 ; accord, People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281 , 319, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 .) However, a court must exercise its power under section 1140 without coercing the jury, and avoid displacing the jury's independent judgment 'in favor of considerations of compromise and expediency.'  ( People v. Breaux, at p. 319, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 .) As this court has explained, [a]ny claim that the jury was pressured into reaching a verdict depends on the particular circumstances of the case. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195 , 265, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 ; see Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231 , 237, 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 [whether the trial court  coerced a verdict requires consideration of the court's actions  'in its context and under all the circumstances' ].) In arguing that the court erred by not granting defense counsel's first motion for mistrial based on jury deadlock, defendant emphasizes that all 12 jurors had indicated the jury was hopelessly deadlocked, and that there was a fairly close numerical split in the votes and a trend away from unanimity. The record shows that the first three ballots showed the jury was first divided eight to three to one, then nine to two to one, and then seven to four to one. Contrary to defendant's assertion, however, the circumstances of this case show neither an abuse of discretion nor coercion of the penalty verdict. When the jury first informed the court it was deadlocked, which occurred after only a brief period of deliberating, the court elicited from the foreperson that each of the jury's first three ballots reflected a different numerical split. And, after asking only the foreperson whether he believed there was anything the court could do to assist the jury in reaching a decision, the court reasonably conducted further inquiry into the deadlock by asking the remaining 11 jurors the same question. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1036(a) [when a deadlock is reported, the judge should ask jurors whether they have specific concerns which, if resolved, might assist the jury in reaching a verdict].) Given that seven jurors indicated that such assistance would, or might, be helpful, the court had an ample basis on which to conclude that there was a reasonable probability a verdict could be reached. (§ 1140.) It is true, as defendant points out, that the court ultimately denied the jury's specific requests for testimony and argument. But we disagree with defendant's contention that because none of the tools for breaking the  deadlock that were requested by the jurors were provided to them, the death verdict must be attributable to coercion. Contrary to defendant's reading of the record, the court did assist the jury by rereading selected portions of CALJIC No. 8.88 in response to the foreperson's question whether a single factor in mitigation could support a verdict of life without  possibility of parole. Furthermore, the jury's request to hear from defendant was properly denied, at a minimum, because it fell outside the court's offer to reread testimony. The court did mention to the jury the possibility of having the attorneys present additional argument. When later denying that request, however, the court explained that allowing further argument by the parties was not a typical option for assisting deadlocked juries and that, on reflection, the court believed the penalty phase of a capital trial was not a time for innovation. That the court did not provide the specific assistance requested by the jury did not render the penalty verdict a product of coercion in this case. Nor did the court either express or imply to the jurors that they must reach a unanimous verdict, or a particular outcome. (  People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935 , 959-960, 258 Cal.Rptr. 242 , 771 P.2d 1330 [a judge's remarks regarding the necessity of reaching a unanimous verdict might produce a coerced verdict].) Defendant argues that coercion is shown by the court's remark that [e]ach and every one of us in this courtroom has a lot invested in the case in terms of our time, our energy, and if we can reach a decision, I'd like to. But the record also shows that, after making that comment, the court immediately clarified that it was  not suggesting that [ the jury ] should reach any decision one way or the other . And, the court had expressly conveyed to the jurors earlier that it was not looking for a certain decision ... or favoring a certain decision from them. Viewing the court's remarks as a whole, and contrary to defendant's assertions, we conclude the jury would not have understood the comments as a warning that failure to reach a verdict would waste both the parties' time and judicial resources. (See People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847 , 878, 884, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 376 , 209 P.3d 596 [court's remarks to the deadlocked jury, which referred to two years of  'sacrifice'  by the attorneys, the parties, and the witnesses in the case, did not suggest to the jury that it should consider the waste and hardship that would result from a mistrial, given that the court made no comments regarding the costs or prospects of retrial, or the desirability of a verdict].) Defendant argues that the court's inquiry into the numerical split in the jury's votes was coercive because it communicated to the jurors in the minority that the court wanted them to change their minds. The record does not support defendant's assertion, however. At no time did the court suggest to the jurors they should reconsider their views in light of the numerical breakdown of the votes. ( People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 , 852, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 [a trial court is not permitted to give an instruction encouraging jurors to consider the jury's numerical division when reexamining their own views].) We note, furthermore, that when questioning the foreperson, the court cautioned him to provide only the numerical breakdown of the deadlock, and not to disclose which votes were for death and which were for life without parole. This directive communicated to the jury that the court was not concerned with the direction of the voting. (See People v. Pride, supra , 3 Cal.4th at pp. 264-265, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636 , 833 P.2d 643 [court's admonition to the foreperson not to provide details of the jury's vote, and its lack of comment regarding the numerical breakdown, suggested to the jurors that the court found the direction of the vote irrelevant].) Given the fractured state of those votes, the jurors could not reasonably have believed that the court wanted them to reach a verdict of death. Defendant relies on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in  Jiminez v. Myers (9th Cir. 1993) 40 F.3d 976 ( Jiminez ) to support his claim that the court coerced the death verdict by inquiring into the numerical split of the jury's deadlock. We are not bound by the decisions of the federal appellate courts, although they may be considered for their persuasive weight.  (  People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146 , 1182, fn. 8, 158 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 , 302 P.3d 927 .) But we need not decide whether to adopt the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Jiminez because we conclude that the decision does not assist defendant. In Jiminez , after the jury reported a deadlock, the superior court judge asked the foreperson for a numerical breakdown of the numerous votes, and elicited from the foreperson that there had been some movement, to which the court remarked, [T]hat's what's important to me. ( Jiminez, at pp. 978-979.) When the jury reported a deadlock after three more hours of deliberations, counsel for both sides indicated that a mistrial was appropriate at that point, but the court decided to bring the jury into the courtroom to determine if there had been  'any substantial movement.'  ( Id . at p. 979.) The foreperson informed the court that only a single juror remained in the minority, and he confirmed there had been  'substantial movement since the last time.'  ( Ibid . ) The court then remarked,  'Due to the fact we have had that type of movement, I would request, then, to finish the rest of today and see where we are at that point in time.'  ( Ibid . ) Defense counsel objected, asking the court to inquire whether further deliberations would be productive. The court disagreed with counsel's concern that the holdout juror would be subjected to undue pressure, noting that it had asked the jury to deliberate for the  'rest of today,'  which was only a period of two hours. ( Ibid . ) The Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction, concluding that, under the circumstances of that case, the trial judge had crossed the line between permissible inquiry regarding the numerical division of a deadlock and coercive instruction. ( Jiminez, supra , 40 F.3d at p. 981.) As the appellate court explained, by expressing approval of the  'movement'  toward juror unanimity and directing the jury to continue deliberations, the court in essence instructed the jury to strive to reach a verdict. ( Id . at pp. 980-981.) And when the court learned following the second report of deadlock that only a single juror remained in the minority, and again communicated its approval of the movement toward unanimity, its directive to the jury to deliberate until the end of the day sent a clear message that the jurors in the majority were to hold their positions and persuade the single hold-out juror to join in a unanimous verdict, and the hold-out juror was to cooperate in the movement toward unanimity. ( Id . at p. 981.) The circumstances in the present matter are distinguishable from those presented in Jiminez in a significant respect. In that case, the court conveyed to the jury its approval of the progression toward unanimity. No such approval was communicated here and, therefore, it cannot be said that the court impliedly instructed the jury to reach unanimity. Indeed, the court expressly indicated otherwise, as previously mentioned.  We conclude that, in light of all the circumstances, the court's directive to the jury to continue its deliberations after the report of a deadlock neither violated section 1140 nor coerced a penalty verdict. 2. Inquiry into the numerical division of the jury Separate from his arguments regarding jury coercion, defendant claims the trial court erred by even inquiring into  the numerical breakdown of the jury's deadlock because such an inquiry is inherently prejudicial. As a threshold matter, we disagree with the People that defendant has failed to preserve his claim for appeal because counsel did not object below to the court's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury. Instead, we agree with defendant that his claim was preserved for appeal because an objection would have been futile. As this court has explained, [r]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence. ( People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228 , 237, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 , 851 P.2d 802 ; cf. People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324 , 386, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 [counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise an objection on vicinage grounds, given Court of Appeal precedent to the contrary].) Of relevance here, People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810 , 815, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 442 P.2d 353 , had  long ago approved the practice of conducting an inquiry into the numerical breakdown of a deadlocked jury. The trial court therefore would have been bound to reject any argument that conducting such an inquiry is inherently prejudicial. Although defendant's claim of error is properly before this court, we decline his invitation to reconsider this court's approval of the practice of inquiring into the numerical division of a deadlocked jury. Defendant argues that Carter 's reasoning is flawed because it relied on a series of cases that had assertedly misstated the rule in Brasfield v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 448 , 47 S.Ct. 135 , 71 L.Ed. 345 , which held that inquiry into the numerical division of a deadlocked jury is inherently prejudicial and per se reversible in the federal courts. We have repeatedly rejected the argument that defendant raises here. ( People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183 , 1254, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702 , 842 P.2d 1 ; People v. Breaux, supra , 1 Cal.4th at p. 319, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 , 821 P.2d 585 ; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 , 776, fn. 14, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 .) He provides no persuasive reason to reconsider the issue in the present case.