Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: 4. Legality of Agreement

Text: Lotter contends that Nissen's sentencing agreement violated several statutes: § 29-2519 et seq., dealing with special procedures in cases of homicide; § 29-2261, dealing with presentence investigations; § 29-2011.02, dealing with use immunity; and Neb.Rev .Stat. § 29-1004 (Reissue 1995), dealing with out-of-state transfers. We do not address the merits, however, since Lotter does not have standing to assert the illegality of Nissen's sentencing agreement. See, U.S. v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 253, 136 L.Ed.2d 180; State v. Baker, 270 N.J.Super. 55, 636 A.2d 553 (1994), aff'd 138 N.J. 89, 648 A.2d 1127; Com. v. Wallace, 522 Pa. 297, 561 A.2d 719 (1989). Standing means that a person has a sufficient legally protectable interest which may be affected in a justiciable controversy, entitling that person to judicial resolution of the controversy. State v. Stott, 243 Neb. 967, 503 N.W.2d 822 (1993). In the instant case, Lotter does not explain what protectable interest he had in the merits of Nissen's sentencing. In State v. Baker, supra , the court addressed whether the defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecutor promised, and the court accepted, a plea bargain with [a] codefendant ... requiring [the codefendant] to testify against defendant in exchange for an illegally short sentence. State v. Baker, 270 N.J.Super. at 69, 636 A.2d at 560. The court stated: [I]t does not follow that a plea bargain involving an illegal sentence denies due process of law to a defendant against whom the person receiving the benefit of the bargain gives testimony. There is always a danger that an accused who is offered a plea bargain under which he will receive a reduced sentence in exchange for his testifying against another person will give false testimony.... However, the risk of encouraging perjured testimony is substantially the same regardless of whether a plea offer involves a lenient legal sentence or a lenient illegal sentence. .... Thus, while the jury was not made aware that [the codefendant's sentence was illegal], it undoubtedly understood that he had received a reduced sentence in exchange for agreeing to testify against defendant. Id. at 70-71, 636 A.2d at 561. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's due process rights were not violated. In the absence of the violation of a legally protectable interest inuring to Lotter, there is no justiciable controversy. In U.S. v. Ivy, supra , the court addressed this issue and held that certain defendants did not have standing to challenge certain codefendants' guilty pleas. The court stated: [I]n order to accept their position, we would be required to hold that in every case in which some defendants choose to plead guilty while others choose to stand trial, a very common situation indeed, those who go to trial have standing to challenge the validity of their codefendants' plea agreements and the factual bases of their guilty pleas. Such challenges would require the government to prove the factual representations made in the plea agreements and during the plea colloquies of any codefendants from whom it planned to elicit testimony. It would also force the district court and the court of appeals to entertain what would essentially be a collateral attack on a guilty plea by those who chose to stand trial, whether or not the party who pled guilty has any desire to challenge his conviction. We are unwilling to impose such burdens on the government and the courts or to so completely pervert the existing procedures. 83 F.3d at 1282-83. This assignment of error is without merit.