Opinion ID: 1880670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: issue 11. hac and felony murder aggravators

Text: Boyd argues that the evidence does not support the HAC aggravator. The sentencing order states that the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the manner of Dacosta's death indicated a complete disregard for the suffering of another human being: The evidence at trial indicated that Mr. Boyd stabbed Ms. Dacosta in the chest 36 times with an instrument consistent with the design of a torque screwdriver. The injuries to Ms. Dacosta's chest consisted of superficial puncture wounds, which did not penetrate her sternum. The injuries to the chest occurred in a pattern, indicating that Mr. Boyd inflicted the wounds at the same time. While Mr. Boyd repeatedly stabbed Ms. Dacosta, she was conscious and struggled against her assailant, as reflected by the defensive wounds about her hands and arms.... These wounds were in addition to the bite marks evident on her hands. . . . . ... The evidence indicates that Ms. Dacosta was aware of her impending death, as she fought against Mr. Boyd, through the pain, fear, and suffering that Mr. Boyd inflicted with each of the 36 blows to her chest, and up until the fatal blow to her brain. Sentencing Order at 2-3. In reviewing a trial court's finding of an aggravating factor, we review the record to determine whether the trial court applied the right rule of law for each aggravating circumstance and, if so, whether competent, substantial evidence supports its finding. Willacy v. State, 696 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla.1997). For HAC to apply, the crime must be conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim. Davis v. State, 859 So.2d 465, 478 (Fla.2003). We hold that the trial court here did not err in finding HAC as an aggravating factor against Boyd. We have consistently affirmed the HAC aggravator where the victim was repeatedly stabbed and remained conscious during part of the attack. Id. Boyd argues that the evidence did not prove that Dacosta was alive or conscious while being stabbed. However, Dr. Joshua Perper, the Chief Medical Examiner for Broward County, testified that the bruising around the wounds on Dacosta's chest, hands, and arms indicated she was alive when the wounds were inflicted. Dr. Perper also testified that Dacosta could not have raised her arm, and thus could not have sustained the defensive wounds she received, if she had been unconscious. While the exact order of wounds could not be established, there was competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Dacosta was alive and conscious for some of the attack, and was struggling with her attacker. Boyd also argues that the trial court erred in applying the aggravator that the murder was committed in the course of committing another felony because there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for sexual battery and armed kidnapping. As discussed above, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the sexual battery and armed kidnapping convictions, and thus the trial court did not err in finding the aggravator that the murder was committed in the course of a felony. Boyd argues that should we agree with him that the trial court erred in finding either of the above aggravators, we should reverse his sentence because a death sentence cannot stand when it is based on only one aggravator. Since we affirm the trial court's finding of both aggravators, we need not consider whether a death sentence is proper when only one aggravator is found. However, we note that this Court has affirmed sentences where there was only one aggravator and little mitigation evidence. See Butler v. State, 842 So.2d 817, 833 (Fla.2003).