Opinion ID: 3183410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Career Offender Sentencing Determination

Text: Kornegay also argues that his sentence should be vacated because the District Court failed to articulate whether it was relying on the “residual clause” of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) to classify his two previous robbery convictions as “crimes of violence” and thus conclude that he qualifies for enhanced sentencing as a “career offender.” He argues that this clause is unconstitutional under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which struck down a similar residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See id. Without reference to the “residual clause” of § 4B1.2(a)(2), however, Kornegay’s prior convictions were categorically crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The convictions were for robbery in the second degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10, which prohibits “forcibly steal[ing] property” (emphasis added), and which therefore “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Moreover, robbery is specifically listed as a crime of violence in the applicable Guidelines Commentary. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, Application Note 1. We therefore need not address Kornegay’s attack on the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) in order to affirm his sentence.