Opinion ID: 2544078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Donna should be bound to arbitration as a third-party beneficiary or based on the principle of equitable estoppel.

Text: ¶ 24. Though the Bank contends that Donna actually signed an arbitration agreement for the Appleridge Estates deed of trust and for the June 2003 cattle-business loan, it argues, alternatively, that Donna is bound to arbitration as a third-party beneficiary or based on the principle of equitable estoppel. Moreover, the Bank does not seem to challenge Donna's allegations that her signature was forged to the arbitration agreements for the April 2004 and February 2003 loans. The Bank instead maintains that Donna is bound to arbitrate any claims with respect to these particular loans because of her third-party-beneficiary status or based on the principle of equitable estoppel. ¶ 25. We have recognized that a signatory may enforce an arbitration agreement against a non-signatory if the non-signatory is a third-party beneficiary.... Qualcomm v. American Wireless Group, 980 So.2d 261, 269 (Miss.2007) (citing Adams v. Greenpoint Credit, LLC, 943 So.2d 703, 708 (Miss.2006)). Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, prevents a party from embracing the benefits of a contract while simultaneously trying to avoid its burdens. See Terminix Int'l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So.2d 1051, 1058 (Miss.2004) (quoting Washington Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 268 (5th Cir.2004)). We elect not to address or apply either theory in this case, however, because of the impropriety involved in this case. ¶ 26. The Bank's motion to compel arbitration is, in essence, a request for specific performance. E.g., Cost Bros., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 760 F.2d 58, 59 n. 1 (3d Cir.1985). It is a fundamental principle of law that he who seeks equitable relief, such as specific performance, must do so with clean hands. E.g., Pickett v. Boutwell, 240 Miss. 18, 22, 125 So.2d 822, 823 (Miss.1961). ¶ 27. The Bank's hands are tainted here due to several apparently uncontested forgeries. Donna alleges that on several occasions, Mike forged her signature at the behest of McAlpin, an employee of the Bank. It appears that others forged Donna's signature as well. Regardless of who the forger might have been, we will not compel arbitration based on third-party-beneficiary status or equitable estoppel where the movant has encouraged or engaged in forging the nonmovant's signature. Accordingly, we find that Donna is not bound to arbitrate her claims as a third-party beneficiary or based on the principle of equitable estoppel.