Opinion ID: 1136584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Loss of Highway Funds

Text: As an alternative justification for the challenged statutes' classification of persons on the basis of age, the State asserts that a declaration of unconstitutionality of the challenged statutes in this case will result in Louisiana having no law fixing the minimum drinking age at twenty-and will cause the State to fall out of compliance with 23 U.S.C.§ 158, the National Minimum Drinking Age Act. Non-compliance, the State alleges, will cost Louisiana millions of dollars in federal highway funding. At trial, the State introduced affidavits from John Womack, acting Assistant Chief Counsel of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the federal agency in charge of determining state compliance with 23 U.S.C.§ 158, and Sharon Lyles, Deputy General Counsel for the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, to support this allegation. Mr. Womack's affidavit indicates that the lack of an age twenty-one drinking requirement will result in the loss of an estimated $14.7 million in 1996, while Ms. Lyles' affidavit indicates the state would lose $8,979,400.00 in the first year of non-compliance and $18 million per year every year thereafter. The State argues that few important governmental objectives are more important than balancing the State's budget through the continued receipt of millions of dollars in federal funds which are not otherwise available. Though the trial court failed to specifically address in his reasons for judgment the State's asserted interest in the receipt of federal highway funds, our review of the record shows the trial court was presented with argument and evidence on the issue by both the State and plaintiffs, and that he subsequently considered and rejected the State's argument. After careful consideration, we must agree with the trial judge. Although the State's objective of continued receipt of its full share of federal highway funds is an understandable and desirable goal, it is, nevertheless, not legitimate in the context of the instant case. Simply stated, where there is no other governmental interest which justifies the discrimination, the State's inability to obtain certain discretionary federal funds cannot suffice as a legitimate reason for the presumptively unconstitutional discrimination. One of, if not the most important governmental objectives of the State is the securing and protection of the rights of its citizens which are enumerated in the constitution of the State of Louisiana. See Art. I, Sec. 1, Louisiana Constitution of 1974. One of those enumerated rights is the right to live free from arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable discrimination by the state on the basis of age. Art. I, Sec. 3, Louisiana Constitution of 1974. We have already determined herein there is no basis in fact for the designation of eighteen to twenty year olds as the only group of adults in Louisiana as to which the sale or purchase of alcoholic beverages can be prohibited. In the face of this finding, the State's desire to maintain a certain level of federal highway funding at the expense of the abridgment of certain citizens' constitutional rights cannot be countenanced. [14] As the United States Supreme Court has stated, it is obvious that vindication of conceded constitutional rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to afford them. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537, 83 S.Ct. 1314, 1321, 10 L.Ed.2d 529 (1963). Furthermore, even if this court were willing to entertain the proposition that a straightforward sale of its citizens' constitutional rights could possibly be upheld under some particular set of circumstances, examination of other relevant factors in this case, i.e., whether reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives by which the State's objective could be satisfied exist and whether the discriminatory classifications contained in the challenged statutes undercut any countervailing State interests, also point toward the unconstitutional nature of the challenged age classification. First, in the instant case non-discriminatory alternatives are available to the State to maintain its eligibility to continue to receive full federal highway funding. For instance, the State has the power to impose an absolute prohibition on the purchase, sale or possession of alcoholic beverages by persons of all ages. This, of course, would maintain the State's ability to receive full federal funding without discriminating against any particular protected class of persons. Further, raising the age of majority in the State of Louisiana to twenty-one would also accomplish the State's objective without discrimination, as persons under twenty-one would then be minors, not adults, as a matter of law. While neither of these examples may be politically desirable or palatable to the State, they are nevertheless reasonable in light of our constitutional prohibition against arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable discrimination on the basis of age. Second, as we previously explained, our Civil Code accords majority status to persons upon reaching the age of eighteen. Upon attaining the age of eighteen in Louisiana, persons are treated as adults under the law for all purposes, and are accordingly assigned the responsibilities and obligations of an adult under the law. The discriminatory classification contained in these statutes to acquire federal funds clearly undercuts the State's consistently expressed countervailing interest in according eighteen to twenty year olds adult or major status. We therefore hold the trial court was correct in rejecting the State's continued receipt of its full share of federal highway funds as sufficient reason to discriminate against otherwise similarly situated adults solely on the basis of their age. When measured against the constitutional presumption against discrimination on the basis of age, the availability of non-discriminatory alternatives, and the State's countervailing interest in having its young adults act responsibly in accordance with their legal status as majors for all purposes under Louisiana law, discrimination by the State solely on the basis of age for the purpose of continued receipt of its full share of federal highway funds is not only discrimination in furtherance of an illegitimate governmental purpose, but is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable discrimination under Art. I, Sec. 3. [15]