Opinion ID: 1600783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: assignments of error number one, four and five

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying a motion to quash, motion for a new trial and motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that the bill of information was defective in charging him with six counts of bribery rather than two. It is argued that Counts I, IV, V and VI, relating to the DWI charge, constitute one offense, and Counts II and III, relating to the battery charge, constitute a second offense. Defendant contends that charging the two crimes as six was highly prejudicial and requires reversal of the convictions and sentences. Also, defendant maintains that there was no violation of LSA-R.S. 14:118 because Biossat had no authority to dismiss the pending charges. Thus, Ponthier could not influence Biossat's performance of his official duties. LSA-R.S. 14:118 provides: Public bribery is the giving or offering to give, directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present or prospective value to any of the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty: (1) Public officer or public employee; or       The acceptance of, or the offer to accept, directly or indirectly, anything of apparent present or prospective value, under such circumstances, by any of the above named persons, shall also constitute public bribery. Whoever commits the crime of public bribery shall be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than five years, or both. All that the statute requires is the intent to influence. The inability of the public employee to return value for the bribe is immaterial. See State v. Williams, 213 La. 924, 35 So.2d 856 at 858 (1948): ... it is not essential ... that the State prove that such employee had the legal right to issue or refuse to issue a certificate of public necessity and convenience,... it is sufficient that ... his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duties is intended to be influenced corruptly.... The State's position is that each offer and each gift constitutes a separate crime; that the installments were separate attempts to influence. However, there was a specific intent to influence a public employee in only two respects. Four of the counts charged had the same essential elements as those two. Since the gravamen of the six charges is essentially represented by two, Ponthier was erroneously charged with six counts of public bribery. See State v. Didier, 262 La. 364, 263 So.2d 322 (1972). There were two violations rather than six. Defendant filed a timely motion to quash the extraneous counts. Compare State v. Johnson, 278 So.2d 84 (La., 1973). The next question is whether defendant was so prejudiced by having the two crimes charged in six counts that all the convictions must be reversed. Generally, one offense can be charged in separate counts, but only one sentence can be imposed. See Comment, 37 La.L.Rev. 203 at 227. However, if multiplicity creates such prejudice that a fair trial is impossible, the multiple counts should be quashed. Compare LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 495.1. Here, the separate counts related to a common scheme or plan. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 493. No evidence was presented on the six counts that would have been inadmissible if Ponthier had been charged with only two. The jury in effect reached separate verdicts on components of two crimes. However, the facts were not complex. There was no reason for the jury to have been confused. The appropriate remedy is vacation of the convictions and sentences as to the excess counts. United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 96 S.Ct. 1023, 47 L.Ed.2d 222 (1976); State v. Bluain, 315 So.2d 749 (La., 1975). Only two sentences were imposed on Ponthier. However, the collateral effects of the additional four convictions require that they be vacated. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); United States v. Canty, 469 F.2d 114 (D.C., 1972); Blenski v. State, 73 Wis.2d 685, 245 N.W.2d 906 (1976); People v. Lilly, 56 Ill.2d 493, 309 N.E.2d 1 (1974); Carr v. State, 338 So.2d 267 (Fla.App. 1 Cir. 1976). Therefore, the convictions on counts III, IV, V and VI must be vacated. Although the trial court imposed only two sentences, those sentences reflected conviction on six counts. Therefore, the matter must be remanded for resentencing on counts I and II.