Opinion ID: 1156976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Failure to Apply the Presumption Harmless Error?

Text: Kodiak argues that any failure to apply the presumption was harmless error since the employer presented sufficient substantial evidence to overcome the presumption. We agree and therefore affirm the board's decision. The presumption of compensability places the burden of producing evidence on the employer. Once substantial evidence contrary to the presumption is introduced, the presumption drops out and the burden of proving all elements of the claim falls on the claimant. Bailey v. Litwin Corp., 713 P.2d 249, 252 (Alaska 1986); Veco, Inc. v. Wolfer, 693 P.2d 865, 870 (Alaska 1985). As we noted in Veco: Since the presumption shifts only the burden of production and not the burden of persuasion, the evidence tending to rebut the presumption should be examined by itself. The court does not weigh the evidence tending to establish causation against the rebuttal evidence in deciding whether the employer has produced substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of compensability. 693 P.2d at 869-70 (footnote omitted). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Miller v. ITT Arctic Services, 577 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Alaska 1978). In reviewing the evidence relied on by the Board in denying Adams' claim, we conclude that Kodiak presented sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. In concluding that the neck injuries were the source of his present disability, the Board relied on Dr. Horning's statements that Adams' back condition had returned to its pre-aggravation condition. Without discussing the presumption, the Board found that Adams had failed to meet his ultimate burden of persuasion. While failure to apply the presumption was error, we conclude that it was harmless error since Kodiak presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. We next consider whether the board's determination that Adams was no longer disabled was supported by substantial evidence when reviewing the record as a whole. Delaney v. Alaska Airlines, 693 P.2d 859, 863 (Alaska 1985). In reviewing the board's determination, our task is not to reweigh the evidence presented to the Board, but to determine whether there is substantial evidence in light of the whole record that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the Board's conclusion. Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Rogers & Babler, 747 P.2d 528, 533 (Alaska 1987); Delaney, 693 P.2d at 863. The Board may base its decision not only on direct testimony, medical findings, and other tangible evidence, but also on the Board's experience, judgment, observations, unique or peculiar facts of the case, and inferences drawn from all of the above. Rogers & Babler, 747 P.2d at 533-34. Adams argues that Dr. Horning's deposition testimony, when considered as a whole, is ambiguous on the question of the source of his present disability. Dr. Horning recommended that Adams seek other types of employment and obtain a disc-fusion operation. However, assuming that Adams did not want to go forward with surgery and thereafter claimed he could not go back to work, Dr. Horning stated [i]f he should refuse to [have surgery] then I think one might fall back and say well, there is evidence of back disease so maybe his claim that he can't continue without surgery to do that kind of job could have merit. He also stated that he would defer to the patient's judgment in this case as to when it is appropriate to quit such manual labor. The Board noted that Dr. Horning recommended alternative employment but it found that such testimony was insufficient to support a finding that the employee was totally disabled. In this context, we do not consider Dr. Horning's testimony to be ambiguous. The Board chose to rely on the doctor's unambiguous opinion that the back condition had returned to the same state in which Adams returned to the North Slope in 1985. Adams argues that the fact that his back had returned to its pre-December 1985 condition does not establish his lack of disability. He relies on the fact that he continued to work in his injured condition solely to earn enough hours to vest in his retirement program. Some courts have found that continued employment in the face of a painful injury does not prevent an award of temporary total disability benefits. [6] However, the Board concluded in its judgment that Adams' past ability to work precluded a finding of total disability. A reviewing court may not displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views even though the court [could] justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo. Delaney, 693 P.2d at 863 n. 2. In finding that Adams' disability was no longer work-related, the Board was justified in relying on Dr. Horning's opinion that the back condition had returned to its 1985 condition. We conclude that the board's determination is supported by substantial evidence and we therefore affirm the board's determination. The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED and the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board denying temporary total disability compensation to Adams is AFFIRMED.