Opinion ID: 1863568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Counts other than the Will Contest Counts

Text: The plaintiffs' complaint contained several counts that do not specifically contest Virginia's will. The circuit court's jurisdiction over these counts is not at issue, and we address the merits of each, in turn.
Counts III, XIII, and XX alleged that Waddell breached his fiduciary duty as executor of Virginia's estate, which the plaintiffs claim is also owed to them, by having several rental properties razed. The plaintiffs alleged that the razing of the structures was contrary to the best interests of the estate. They argue that the summary judgment was improper as to this claim. We first note that the plaintiffs have not specifically referred this Court to evidence in the record that supports this claim. Further, given that no plaintiff is a beneficiary of Virginia's will filed for probate on October 1, 1991, [2] we conclude that Waddell did not owe the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty in relation to the estate subject to the terms of that will. Accordingly, the summary judgment was proper as to these counts.
Count IV of the plaintiffs' complaint alleged the following: that in July 1984, Virginia issued a deed to Charlie conveying certain real property (a pecan grove of approximately 34 acres); that Charlie accepted the conveyance and kept a copy of the notarized deed in his possession; that the original deed was kept by Virginia, strictly for safekeeping purposes; that Charlie assumed possession of the real property; that after Virginia's death Charlie informed Waddell of the deed and conveyance and delivered to Waddell his copy of the deed; and that Waddell, on behalf of himself, Georgia, and Virginia's estate, wrongfully exercised dominion over the deed and informed Charlie that the deed had been voided and that the property was not Charlie's. Charlie alleged that the defendants' actions constitute wrongful conversion of the deed. Charlie acknowledges that Virginia never physically delivered the original deed to him and that delivery of a deed cannot normally occur after the death of the grantor. However, he argues that the law should recognize that delivery can be made by the executor of the grantor's estate, when the deed is found by the executor in the grantor's safe deposit box. Citing Duncan v. Johnson, 338 So.2d 1243 (Ala.1976), and other cases, Charlie also argues that the law does not require actual delivery of a deed from a grantor to the grantee, but that delivery is to be determined by whether the acts of the parties to the deed manifest an intent by the grantor to divest himself of title to the property. Thus, he argues that Virginia's act of giving him the copy of the deed and telling him he could have the property [3] constituted a valid delivery of title to him and that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to this claim. In response, the defendants simply argue that delivery of a deed from a grantor to the grantee is an absolute necessity for a transfer of title to real property, that such delivery cannot occur after the death of the grantor, and that Virginia never delivered the deed to Charlie. They contend that the trial court correctly entered the summary judgment on this claim. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) defines a deed as [a] conveyance of realty; a writing signed by grantor, whereby title to realty is transferred from one to another. Generally, a deed is ineffective to transfer title if the deed is not delivered from the grantor to the grantee. West v. West, 620 So.2d 640 (Ala.1993); Williams v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 457 So.2d 962 (Ala.1984). Moreover, there is no delivery where a deed was not given to the grantee during the grantor's lifetime, but was given to a third party for safekeeping. Chandler v. Chandler, 409 So.2d 780 (Ala.1981). However, Alabama law recognizes that the question of whether a deed has been delivered is a question of fact, to be ascertained from the surrounding circumstances and the actions of the parties. West, supra; Duncan, supra; and Chandler, supra. Physical delivery of the deed from the grantor to the grantee is not necessary where the facts clearly indicate that the intention of the grantor, by words or acts or both, was to transfer title of the property to the grantee. West, supra; Boohaker v. Brashier, 428 So.2d 627 (Ala.1983); Chandler, supra; Duncan, supra; and Williams v. Dent, 233 Ala. 109, 170 So. 202 (1936). Having reviewed Charlie's affidavit, along with the affidavits of his wife Lori, Irene Glover, Viola Culver, Miriam Prince, Espy Andrews, and Sam Chandler, [4] we conclude that questions of material fact exist as to whether Virginia delivered the July 1984 deed to Charlie by her words and/or acts and that Charlie supported his conversion claim with substantial evidence requiring determination by a jury. The trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to this count.
Count V of the complaint alleges that on October 1, 1991, and continuing afterwards, by force and intimidation the defendants Waddell, Georgia, and Virginia's estate wrongfully exercised dominion over real property which, the plaintiffs say, was conveyed to Charlie by Virginia. Charlie claims that the defendants are trespassing on real property owned by him, that the defendants have ousted him from the property, and that he is continually suffering damage as the result of his being deprived of the possession of this land, which he says is income-producing land. He supports this claim with the same evidence offered in support of the conversion claim discussed above. In response, the defendants argue that the summary judgment was proper on the conversion claim. They argue that Charlie has no ownership interest in the real property because, they say, there was no delivery of the deed from Virginia to Charlie. We have already determined that a question of fact exists as to whether Virginia delivered the deed to Charlie in order to transfer title of the land to him. Viewing the same affidavit evidence noted above, we conclude that Charlie supported his ouster and trespass claims with substantial evidence, and that questions of fact remain as to whether the defendants committed, and continue to commit, trespass and a wrongful ouster. The trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to these claims.
Count VI alleges that Waddell, Georgia, and Virginia's estate wrongfully converted by sale, in defiance of Charlie's vested ownership rights, approximately 150 head of cross-bred Angus cattle that Charlie says belong to him. Charlie contends that Virginia gave the cattle to him as payment for services rendered in tending and developing the herd. Charlie supports this claim with his own affidavit, the affidavit of his wife, and that of Irene Glover. In response, the defendants do not argue that Charlie does not own the cattle, but instead contend that the complaint fails to allege how Charlie obtained an ownership interest in the cattle. They next argue that Charlie's statement that Virginia gave him the cattle shortly before her death would not be admissible because of Alabama's Dead Man's Statute, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-163. Finally, they argue that a transfer of the cattle, as Charlie describes it, violates the requirements for a testamentary disposition of property under Ala.Code 1975, § 43-8-131. First, we note that § 43-8-131, which requires that a testamentary disposition be in writing signed by the testator and at least two witnesses, does not apply in relation to this claim. Charlie does not contend that Virginia gave him the cattle as a gift or through any will. Rather, he claims that Virginia gave him the cattle in payment for services rendered to her. The payment of compensation for services rendered has no relation to the requirements of § 43-8-131. Although we conclude that the Dead Man's Statute, § 12-21-163, would prohibit any testimony by Charlie and his wife with regard to any statements made by Virginia about the alleged transfer of cattle to Charlie, the statute does not affect the affidavit of Irene Glover, who is not an interested party as to the conversion claim. Thus, we hold that Charlie supported this claim with substantial evidence and that questions of material fact remain. The trial court erred in entering the summary judgment as to this claim.
Count VII alleged that Waddell and/or Georgia induced one or more other unknown persons (fictitiously named defendants John Doe 1 through John Doe 11) to contact the Dale County Department of Human Resources (DHR) and, the plaintiffs say, to falsely accuse Charlie and Lori of heinous treatment of their three children. The complaint alleged that an investigation by DHR revealed no deficiencies, but that Charlie, Lori, and the children have suffered extreme emotional distress as the result of what they say was intentional wrongful conduct by these defendants. In Alabama, the actionable intentional infliction of emotional distress is termed the tort of outrage. See American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala.1980). In response, these defendants simply argue that Ala.Code 1975, § 26-14-9, provides absolute and total civil liability for one who reports child neglect or abuse. That section states: Any person, firm, corporation or official participating in the making of a report or the removal of a child pursuant to this chapter, or participating in a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom, shall, in so doing, be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. In Brown v. Pound, 585 So.2d 885 (Ala.1991), this Court held that § 26-14-9 provides absolute immunity from liability for reporting suspected child abuse, except as to claims alleging damage not related to the reporting of suspected child abuse. We conclude that the plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress relates directly to these defendants' alleged reporting of suspected child abuse. Accordingly, the immunity provided by § 26-14-9 applies. The summary judgment was proper as to this claim.
Count VIII alleged that Waddell and/or Georgia tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs' intrafamily relationships by inducing one or more other unknown persons (the fictitiously named defendants) to contact the Dale County DHR and, the plaintiffs say, to falsely accuse Charlie and Lori of heinous treatment of their three children. We conclude that this claim simply restates the allegations of the outrage claim in Count VII. For the same reason discussed above, the summary judgment was proper as to this claim.
Counts IX, XII, and XIX of the plaintiffs' complaint allege that Virginia made promises to Charlie, James Smith, and Irene Glover that, they say, Waddell, Georgia, Helms, and Virginia's estate caused to be estopped. They characterize the counts as stating a cause of action they term promissory estoppel. In essence, the plaintiffs allege that these defendants unduly influenced Virginia so that promises they say were made to them by Virginia were not incorporated into the will she executed on September 12, 1991. In response, the defendants argue that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not a cause of action. The defendants also contend that the plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Statute of Frauds (Ala.Code 1975, § 8-9-2(5)), are not admissible because of the Dead Man's Statute, § 12-21-163; do not meet the § 43-8-131 requirements for a testamentary devise; and are defeated by the § 43-8-199 six-month statute of limitations for contesting a will. We conclude that these counts are simply an attempt by the plaintiffs to recategorize the undue influence claims the plaintiffs made in their will contest counts. For the reasons noted in section III above, the summary judgment was proper as to these counts.
Count XIV of the complaint alleges that Georgia and Waddell fraudulently misrepresented to James Smith that the September 12, 1991, will was Virginia's true and lawful will. Count XV alleges that Georgia, Waddell, and Helms conspired with John Doe 12 through John Doe 14 to do the same. Smith alleged in both counts that the misrepresentations induced him to agree to a $113,000 divorce settlement with Georgia on October 7, 1991. Smith contends that the September 12 will is invalid and that Virginia's true will is a prior will that is now lost. He argues that in that earlier will he was named as the executor and as a beneficiary, and he contends that because, he says, he was falsely led to believe that the September 12 will was Virginia's true will, he gave up his right to receive any money from Virginia's estate and accepted a settlement in his divorce action with Georgia rather than litigate the divorce. Smith alleged that he suffered emotional distress upon learning that he would not inherit from Virginia's September 12 will and that because of that emotional distress he agreed to certain provisions in the divorce settlement that he otherwise would not have agreed to. Smith requested several kinds of relief from the circuit court, including the following: an order withdrawing the September 12, 1991, will from probate and declaring that it was not Virginia's last true will; an order declaring that Virginia's prior will was her true last will; an order nullifying certain provisions in the divorce judgment based on the agreement between him and Georgia; and compensatory and punitive damages. In response, the defendants argue that Smith's fraud counts are an improper attempt to collaterally attack a final judgment of divorce rendered by the Houston Circuit Court. They also argue that the counts constitute an improper will contest, that Smith has no standing to contest the September 12, 1991, will, and that this will contest was not filed within the six months allowed by § 43-8-199. We agree with the defendants that Smith's fraud counts are in actuality a will contest, in that they seek invalidation of Virginia's September 12 will filed for probate on October 1, 1991. The counts were included in the plaintiffs' amended complaint filed on October 7, 1993, and, thus, were not timely filed. Moreover, inasmuch as these fraud counts, filed in the Dale Circuit Court, seek to modify provisions of the divorce judgment entered in the Houston Circuit Court, it is an improper collateral attack on that final judgment. See Greenhill v. Bear Creek. Development Authority, 519 So.2d 938 (Ala.1988); Ex parte Edmondson, 451 So.2d 290 (Ala. 1984). A Rule 60(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion filed in the Houston Circuit Court would be the proper means for Smith to attempt to challenge the terms of his divorce judgment. We conclude that the summary judgment was proper as to these counts.