Opinion ID: 2806518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conflict of Interest: Misuse of Defense Funds

Text: Bemore argues, first, that lead counsel McKechnie fraudulently misappropriated and diverted court-issued funds supplied to the defense, thereby creating a conflict of interest. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).8 Relying on a declaration by Barranco,9 Bemore claims that despite the $145,851.81 paid to lead investigator Charles Small—a sum totaling nearly half the defense budget—“little [to] no work was . . . done” by Small. Assertedly, McKechnie knew 8 Bemore’s briefing categorizes this contention as an IAC claim but analyzes the issue as a conflict of interest claim governed by Cuyler, not Strickland. If otherwise made out, a Cuyler claim can succeed without proving that there is a reasonable probability that the alleged conflict affected the outcome of the trial, as required under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. Bemore has, accordingly, not argued that the alleged conflict-of-interest IAC would satisfy the Strickland standard for prejudice. 9 We refer throughout to Barranco’s declaration dated June 12, 2000. Barranco has since submitted three other declarations. Those three declarations were not before the California Supreme Court, so we may not consider them here. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). We deny Bemore’s motion for a stay and abeyance to present the late-submitted declarations to state court, as he has not made the requisite showing of good cause for not having presented them earlier. See Gonzales v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2011). 18 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL of Small’s fraudulent billing but continued to pay him for work not performed because Small knew that McKechnie had cheated on his wife during a business trip, and McKechnie was afraid Small would reveal that information if he refused to pay him. Bemore also suggests that McKechnie encouraged defense specialists to bill for more hours than they actually spent on the case, and that he billed for hours worked by a law clerk who later insisted that he had “never spent so much as one minute on the case.” That money, Bemore alleges, paid for McKechnie’s gambling habit and his “lavish lifestyle; e.g., his new law office and his expensive home.” Troubling as these allegations are, Bemore has not shown that the asserted financial improprieties support a Cuyler claim. To make out such a claim, “a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. Here, it is questionable whether the allegedly padded bills, without more, could demonstrate an actual conflict of interest. Although Bemore repeatedly refers to McKechnie’s conduct as fraudulent, a violation of an ethical duty or standard of professional conduct does not create a conflict of interest absent a showing that the violation “actual[ly] . . . impaired [counsel’s] ability to effectively represent” his client. United States v. Nickerson, 556 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). And while a conflict of interest claim “may in theory lie where an attorney’s financial interests are in conflict with his client’s interests,” Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), without evidence that the available defense funds were run dry, overcharging the court—even fraudulent overcharging—has no inherent tendency to dissuade counsel from loyalty to his BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 19 client where it counts: in the investigation and presentation of the case. Further, even if we were to conclude that McKechnie’s use of funds did create an actual conflict of interest, Bemore has not shown that any such conflict affected McKechnie’s performance. Bemore acknowledges that there was no “lack of funding” or “insufficient funds” for his defense. Court disbursement lists show that eight individuals listed as experts were employed and received defense funds, and that, in addition to Small, seven investigative firms were paid small sums to conduct forensic investigation. The accusations of fraud may bolster Bemore’s other IAC claims by negating, for example, any inference that the amount of time and money spent indicates that McKechnie’s decisions were carefully considered and researched. But without a showing that McKechnie’s misuse of funds caused him to investigate less thoroughly than he otherwise would have, Bemore has not established any constitutional deprivation. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.