Opinion ID: 2611026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: cross-examination of smith's wife and rebuttal to her testimony.

Text: Smith asserts that the trial court should have restricted the cross-examination of his wife and the rebuttal offered by the state to her testimony. We disagree. Smith contends that the cross-examination of his wife was beyond the scope of her direct examination. The specific question to which Smith's attorney objected on that ground was preceded by the following questions and answers: Q. Mrs. Smith, as I understood your testimony in direct examination, you indicated that [Smith's daughter] has never told you that Bill was molesting her. Is that correct? A. [Smith's daughter] never told me about an incident in December. Q. Did she ever tell you about any incident involving Bill? A. Involving Bill, no. Q. Do you remember meeting with a couple of individuals from the sheriff's office on the 23rd day of December of 1986 regarding this incident? A. Yes, I do. Following this line of inquiry, the prosecutor then asked Smith's wife: Q. Isn't it true, in that interview, you also indicated to them that in the early fall, possibly September, [Smith's daughter] had come in and complained about Bill molesting her? It was at this point that Smith's attorney objected that the question was outside the scope of direct examination. In overruling the objection, the trial court said: This relates to direct testimony. Based on the preceding answers Smith's wife had given, we agree. We do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the question to be asked. In answering this question Smith's wife said: I do not remember her coming to talk to me about Bill molesting her, I remember her talking about the boys molesting her. Smith contends that the testimony of the two former deputy sheriffs offered to impeach Smith's wife as to this answer was not proper because it was offered to prove an inconsistency between prior statements of his wife and her testimony on cross-examination rather than on direct examination. Smith's attorney objected only on hearsay grounds to the testimony of the first deputy. He did not object to the testimony of the second deputy. Therefore, we will consider the alleged error only if we consider it to be fundamental. State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 423, 776 P.2d 424, 432 (1989). Here, we are dealing only with impeachment of a collateral witness and not with the fundamental rights of the defendant. Therefore, we are inclined not to review this issue. However, because the issue is easily disposed of by existing authority we do so. We start our analysis of this issue by stating the premise: A trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence at trial. Its judgment will only be reversed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Terry, 98 Idaho 285, 286-87, 561 P.2d 1318, 1319-20 (1977). We conclude our analysis by citing State v. Carter, 103 Idaho 917, 922-23, 655 P.2d 434, 439-40 (1981). There, the prosecution was permitted to impeach the defendant's wife, who was called as a witness for her husband, as to a statement she made on cross-examination. We found no abuse of discretion there, and we find none here.