Opinion ID: 625095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Versus Lay Opinion Testimony

Text: We first address whether Agent Manns and Trooper Renner even provided expert testimony; if not, we have no dual testimony concerns. Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that [i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determine a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed.R.Evid. 701. Rule 702 provides that [a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702. A witness can qualify as both a fact and expert witness and an expert may base an opinion on fact or data in the case that the expert has personally observed. Fed.R.Evid. 703. Thus, the Rules do not distinguish between expert and lay witnesses, but rather between expert and lay testimony. Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee's note (2000 amends.). [L]ay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field. Id. (quotations omitted). We have explained that [a] law-enforcement officer's testimony is a lay opinion if it is `limited to what he observed . . . or to other facts derived exclusively from [a] particular investigation.' Gaytan, 649 F.3d at 581 (quoting United States v. Oriedo, 498 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir.2007)). On the other hand, an officer testifies as an expert when he brings `the wealth of his experience as [an] officer to bear on those observations and ma[kes] connections for the jury based on that specialized knowledge.' Id.; see also United States v. Fenzl, 670 F.3d 778, 782 (7th Cir.2012). However, the distinction between expert and lay testimony is often far from clear in cases where, as here, a witness with specialized. . . knowledge was also personally involved in the factual underpinnings of the case. United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 401 (6th Cir.2007). The inferences officers draw when observing and responding to situations cannot always be separated from the expertise they bring to evaluate those situations. Their observations are guided by experience and training and thus, at least some of their fact testimony will be influenced by this specialized knowledge. Agent Manns' and Trooper Renner's testimony that they are trained to watch individuals' hands when approaching a situation was not expert testimony. Nor was the officers' testimony that Christian's concealment of his hands raised a red flag. The witnesses were not offering opinions, they were simply informing the jury of their state of mind while observing Christian; the testimony informed the jury of their attentiveness and cautiousness in approaching the situation. See Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 602 (indicating that an agent can testify to his state of mind while observing a drug deal even if the testimony is informed by the agent's specialized training). We found similar observations admissible as lay testimony in Oriedo, where the agent stated that he was personally concerned about the presence of more than one vehicle at the controlled buy because it raised concerns of countersurveillance. Id. We have likewise found that officers are entitled to render lay opinions concerning criminal or suspicious activity based on their personal observations. United States v. Hicks, 635 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir.2011); see also Hicks, 635 F.3d at 1066, 1069 (officer's testimony that FBI called off operation because of suspicious behavior associated with countersurveillance was proper lay opinion). Because Trooper Renner's testimony to which the defendant has objected was not given in the form of expert testimony, we have no reason to discuss his testimony further. Agent Manns, by contrast, was asked questions that suggest he was also testifying in an expert capacity. The government qualified Agent Manns as an expert (the district court acknowledged as much) and the defendant concedes that Agent Manns was properly disclosed as an expert pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(G). Agent Manns' blended expert and fact testimony is best illustrated by his testimony on redirect. He first testified that 90 percent of people who illegally carry weapons conceal them in their waistband or coat pocket. The government then asked Agent Manns to stand in front of the jury to demonstrate Christian's arm movements. Although Agent Manns was testifying as a fact witnesshe was simply describing what he had observedthe next question crossed the line into eliciting testimony wrapped in the aura of special reliability that surrounds expert testimony: Based upon your experience encountering armed subjects in your approximate 20-year career, the significance of those arms going up and not being able to see the hands, was what? Agent Manns answered, That is a movement I have seen before in my career on occasions wherein the defendant had a gun in his waistband. It was the same movement. . . . Agent Manns had earlier testified on direct that in light of his 20 years of law enforcement experience, he had never found a firearm laying in a field unattended, supporting his belief that the gun found belonged to Christian. When eliciting this testimony, the government wasn't merely seeking lay opinion testimony; the government was asking Agent Manns to bring his experience to bear on his personal observations and ma[k]e connections for the jury based on that specialized knowledge. Oriedo, 498 F.3d at 603 (holding that different agent in Oriedo, who had found plastic baggies with the corners cut in defendant's hotel room, testified in expert capacity when informing the jury that this is how crack cocaine is packaged for distribution); see also Tribble v. Evangelides, 670 F.3d 753, 758-59 (7th Cir.2012) (explaining that witness, who summarized her experiences and used her specialized knowledge to guide the jury to a conclusion, testified in an expert capacity); United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 420 (7th Cir.2009) (interpreting drug jargon requires expert testimony where the witness is relying on his prior experience in drug investigations to explain the hidden meaning of words). Christian contends on appeal that Agent Manns' expert testimony was not helpful in assisting the jury because a layperson needs no expert assistance to understand how one would have to move his arms to pull something out of his waistband. [1] Expert testimony must be helpful to the jury to be admissible. United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 510-11 (7th Cir.2009) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 702). In other words, a witness should not be allowed to put an expert gloss on a conclusion that the jurors should draw themselves. See York, 572 F.3d at 423 (`Interpretations' of unambiguous words or phrases that are plainly within the jury's understanding are unlikely to be admissible under Rule 702.) (quotations omitted). [E]xpert testimony does not assist where the jury has no need for an opinion because it easily can be derived from common sense, common experience, the jury's own perceptions, or simple logic. 29 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice & Procedure § 6264 (1997); see also Florek v. Vill. of Mundelein, Ill., 649 F.3d 594, 602-03 (7th Cir.2011). Although at first glance, Agent Manns' expert testimony that Christian's arm movements were consistent with tossing an object may appear to be a matter of common sense, a more deliberate consideration of the testimony suggests otherwise. What might seem like innocuous conduct to an untrained jury, might, to the trained eye, be indicative of criminal activity. See Winbush, 580 F.3d at 511; compare York, 572 F.3d at 423 (finding that law enforcement officers' explanation of drug jargon and code words that might seem entirely innocuous to an untrained jury is proper expert testimony), with United States v. Cruz, 363 F.3d 187, 196-97 (2d Cir.2004) (agent gave impermissible expert opinion on phrase, to watch someone's back; phrase was ambiguous and outside ambit of agent's drug jargon expertise). For example, in United States v. Parra, 402 F.3d 752, 759 (7th Cir.2005), we allowed expert testimony of seemingly innocent-looking conduct consistent with drug trafficking countersurveillance. The agent in Parra testified that the defendant was looking up and down the street around and then looking back towards [the suspected drug car], and explained why, in his expert opinion, this seemingly innocuous conduct indicated that the defendant was engaged in counter-surveillance. Id. We allowed the expert testimony even though the jury had access to the surveillance tapes. Id. Jurors are presumably not well versed in the concealment or disposal of weapons. Agent Manns had specialized training on street survival and officer safety, had significant experience encountering armed suspects, and on a few occasions observed similar arm movements when individuals were concealing guns in their waistband. As such, to his trained eye, Christian's arm movements had characteristics of illicit conduct inconsistent with someone merely zipping up his pants. Recognizing the fine distinction in arm movements from a posterior view to distinguish between tossing something from one's waistband and zipping up one's pants is within the ambit of Agent Manns' expertise and not necessarily a matter of common experience. See Florek, 649 F.3d at 602 ([E]xpert testimony is more likely to satisfy [Rule] 702's requirement that it assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue when something peculiar about law enforcement (e.g., . . . the circumstances they face) informs the issues to be decided.). But even if it was error to allow Agent Manns to put an expert gloss on this testimony, and even assuming that the error was preserved by defendant's non-specific objections, we find any such error harmless. The third prong of the plain error testwhether the error affected the defendant's substantial rightscalls for essentially the same inquiry as a harmless error analysis. United States v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 471 (7th Cir.2012) (quotations omitted). An error is harmless if the reviewing court is convinced that the jury would have convicted even absent the error. United States v. Simmons, 599 F.3d 777, 780 (7th Cir.2010). We have already found that it was proper for Agent Manns and Trooper Renner to testify as fact witnesses that Christian was concealing his hands and that this raised a red flag. Christian does not dispute that Agent Manns could have testified as a fact witness that it appeared Christian threw something from his waistband. He could also testify (as he did) that in his experience people who illegally carry weapons conceal them in their waistband. Further, Agent Manns found a gun near where Christian had paused before fleeing, and both Agent Manns and Officer Beliveau (whose testimony defendant lodges no objections) informed the jury that in their experience it is not common to find firearms laying around. (The permissibility of Agent Manns' dual nature testimony is discussed below). The defense had the opportunity to cross-examine Agent Manns on these issues and did so. The defense inquired with Agent Manns about whether what he saw could have been Christian zipping up his pants. The defense also had Agent Manns and Trooper Renner reiterate that neither actually saw Christian with a gun. On redirect, Agent Manns demonstrated for the jury Christian's arm movements; the jury was free to disregard Agent Manns' characterization of the movements and evaluate for itself the significance of Christian's conduct. The district court instructed the jury that it should give opinion testimony requiring special knowledge or skill whatever weight you think it deserves, and should judge this testimony in the same way that you judge the testimony of any other witness. See Federal Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 3.07. Further, Agent Manns informed the jury during recross that it was not his opinion that Christian had a gun, it was his belief that he did. Based on a review of the record, we do not find that allowing Agent Manns to testify to the import of Christian's arm movements under the umbrella of expertise constitutes reversible error.