Opinion ID: 1821484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: responsibility

Text: Given that the emanation of hazardous substances from contaminated soil into neighboring properties does constitute a discharge under sec. 144.76 (1) (a), Stats., the remaining issue is whether the owner of the land containing that soil is responsibility under sec. 144.76 (3), to take remedial action. Responsibility under sec. 144.76 (3), falls upon a person who possesses or who causes the discharge of a hazardous substance. The circuit court and the court of appeals agreed with Mr. Mauthe's contention that mere ownership of the property in which the contaminated soil is located is not sufficient to impose liability under sec. 144.76 (3). We disagree. [6] A basic rule of statutory construction is that meaning should be given to every word, clause and sentence in the statute, and a construction which would make part of the statute superfluous should be avoided wherever possible. Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 563, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981). Giving meaning to every word and clause in sec. 144.76 (3), Stats., it is apparent that liability may be imposed upon anyone who causes a hazardous substance discharge or upon a person who possesses or controls the hazardous substance being discharged even though that person did not cause the discharge. The common and ordinary meaning of a word may be established from the definition given by a recognized dictionary. In re Estate of Haese, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 291, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977). Possess is defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 1046 (5th ed. 1979) as follows: POSSESS. To occupy in person; to have in one's actual and physical control; to have the exclusive detention and control of; to have and hold as property; to have a just right to; to be master of; to own or be entitled to. Under this definition, Mr. Mauthe, individually and d/b/a N.W. Mauthe Company, does possess the contaminated soil and the chromium which is contaminating that soil. He has actual and physical control of the chromium and he owns and has exclusive . . . control of the contaminated soil. As landowner, he is the only person, absent legal intervention, entitled to take the type of remedial action necessary. He is the only person entitled to excavate, to remove the contaminated soil or to construct an impermeable barrier around the soil to prevent further discharge. The court of appeals and the circuit court reasoned that the legislature would have expressly stated its intent to impose liability as a consequence of property ownership. The terms chosen by the legislature, however, are broad. [P]ossesses or controls clearly encompasses property ownership as well as other means of possessing and controlling. It would be unreasonable to expect the legislature to enumerate all the ways in which a hazardous substance which is discharged may be possessed or controlled. [7] Mr. Mauthe also asserts that to hold him liable under sec. 144.76, Stats., would violate the ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin Constitution because the electroplating activities which contaminated the soil on his property ceased two years prior to the enactment of that statute. We conclude that to hold Mr. Mauthe liable would not violate the ex post facto clause. The action brought by the state relates only to the discharge from the contaminated soil located on his property and it does not relate to the activities which took place on his property prior to the statute's enactment. It is the abatement of this current discharge that the state is seeking. Therefore, this is not an ex post facto application of law. The manner in which our air, water and land is to be safeguarded, protected and improved is under the control of the legislature. The various laws passed and the grants of authority to state agencies is the means by which this is done. Wisconsin Environmental Decade v. D.N.R., 115 Wis. 2d 381, 414, 340 N.W.2d 222 (1983). The vitally important work of protecting the life sustaining forces around us, collectively referred to as the environment, is basic and fundamental to our survival. The means to achieve these ends are not always agreed upon. Experts often are in disagreement as to how to achieve these results. Under our system it is the legislature and the agencies it empowers to carry out its mandates that bear this tremendous responsibility. It is they who must resolve the conflicting interests and approaches to specific problems. [T]he D.N.R. is the state agency with the staff, sources and expertise in environmental matters. . . . Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, 115 Wis. 2d at 391. In the conflicts that inevitably arise over achieving an almost universally acclaimed goal, the court must look to the wording of the law and, where necessary, the legislative history to determine the legislative intent. How did the legislature intend this law to be carried out? Who was to bear the economic responsibility of carrying out its mandates? [8] Under the facts of this case, we can only conclude that the responsibility is on the owner. The legislature could have said that the taxpayers as a whole shall clean up the results of this particular from of industrial pollution. But it did not. It acted well within its authority by saying that the possessor shall bear the cost of correcting the condition on this land that is resulting in the contamination of its neighbor's property. Aldo Leopold, the great Wisconsin conservationist in his well-known work, A Sand County Almanac, (1948) at page 203 said: Individual thinkers since the days of Ezekiel and Isaiah have asserted that the despoliation of land is not only inexpedient but wrong. The statutes under consideration are a legislative recognition that the discharge of hazardous substances is one form of despoilation. The legislature has enacted this law to correct that wrong. Accepting as true the facts pled in the state's complaint as well as the reasonable inferences drawn from that complaint, we conclude that a claim for relief under sec. 144.76, Stats., has been stated. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court's order to dismiss the complaint is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.