Opinion ID: 2802105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Juror’s Question

Text: Isom next challenges the trial court’s refusal to allow a witness to answer a juror’s question during the penalty phase of trial. This claim is based on the following facts. In his case-in-chief Isom called as witnesses two of his cousins, one of whom testified that she had spoken to Cassandra’s parents who “told [her] that they forgive. They forgive him.” Tr. at 13442. The other testified that Cassandra’s parents “don’t want the death penalty.” Tr. at 13533. In rebuttal the State called as witnesses Cassandra’s father and sister. Both denied having any conversations with the family about their forgiveness or the State’s request for the death penalty. Before Cassandra’s sister was excused, the trial court invited questions from the jury. One juror inquired, “does the family forgive Kevin?” Tr. at 13828. The trial court did not permit the witness to answer the question. Isom claims reversible error. “This Court has previously held that it is proper to permit jurors to propound questions during the progress of a trial, subject to proper regulation by the trial court.” Tyson v. State, 386 N.E.2d 1185, 1192 (1979) (citing Carter v. State, 234 N.E.2d 650, 652 (Ind. 1968)). Isom argues, “[f]orgiveness is potentially a significant piece of evidence that should have been considered by the jury before it made its recommendation to the court.” Br. of Appellant at 6061. Thus, according to Isom, the failure to permit the witness to answer the juror’s question as to whether “the family forgive[s] Kevin” impinged upon his right to present mitigation evidence and was thus improper. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-9(c) sets forth a number of mitigating circumstances that the jury (or the judge in the case of a bench trial) may consider when determining whether a 9 In Ritchie the author of this opinion dissented in part believing the plain language of the statute makes death eligibility contingent upon certain findings that must be weighed by the jury on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But the author acknowledges Ritchie as stare decisis on this issue. 19 sentence of death should be imposed.10 There is a statutory “catch-all” mitigator—“[a]ny other circumstances appropriate for consideration.” I.C. § 35-50-2-9(c)(8). We have observed: [T]he Legislature’s choice to allow death penalty defendants to present every conceivable mitigator is in compliance with Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 [(1978)], which requires that “the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 761 (Ind. 1998) (omission in original) (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)). It is this proposition upon which Isom relies in contending the trial court committed reversible error in not allowing the witness to answer the juror’s question. It is true that expressions of forgiveness by a victim of a crime may be considered a mitigating circumstance. See e.g. Deane v. State, 759 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. 2001) (involving a defendant convicted of murder and attempted murder in the shooting death of his brother and the serious wounding of his mother. Surviving mother expressed forgiveness and sought leniency. 10 The statute provides: The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows: (1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conduct. (2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed. (3) The victim was a participant in or consented to the defendant’s conduct. (4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person, and the defendant’s participation was relatively minor. (5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of another person. (6) The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication. (7) The defendant was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the murder was committed. (8) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.