Opinion ID: 2373688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Examination of Other Witnesses

Text: Appellant claims that it was error for the court to sustain a prosecutor's objection to cross-examination of witnesses by counsel for co-defendant, Mark Mitchell. Baker's own counsel did not examine these witnesses. (T.T., October 1, 1984, p. 5.35), and under Johnson, he has no standing to assert another party's claim.
Appellant asserts that the prosecutor engaged in improper summations to the guilt jury and, furthermore, that the remarks infected the penalty phase of the proceedings by producing a sanction derived from passion, prejudice, or arbitrariness. While his brief includes a lengthy excerpt of those remarks, he emphasizes the crucial importance of the following statements: the victim lived the American dream and the jury should put [its] arms around the Gambrells and promise the individuals who did this will be held responsible; Mr. Gambrell cannot be brought back to his family; the co-defendants had voted on agreed unanimously. . . . that they voted he was to die and carried out the execution. . . . it is society's fault that (they) did it is an insult to myself, to Detective Nespoli, to Detective Graham, Sheriff Dade, all of us who grew up on the streets of Philadelphia; and what manner of man sits before you. (Brief, pp. 23-24.) At the guilt phase, we long have held that statements to the jury are not improper unless their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury so that a true verdict cannot be rendered because the existence of bias and hostility makes it impossible to weigh the evidence in a neutral manner. Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 511 Pa. 429, 515 A.2d 531 (1986), and cases collected therein. Within these broad limitations, however, the prosecutor is free to argue that the evidence leads to guilt, and the Commonwealth can press its case with logical force and vigor. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 346 A.2d 59 (1975), quoting ABA Standards. On the other hand, a prosecutor may not indulge in personal assertions of guilt of a defendant either by direct statement or indirectly by figure of speech. Cronin, 464 Pa. at 143; 346 A.2d at 62. At the penalty phase, however, where the presumption of innocence is no longer applicable, the prosecutor is entitled to present argument for or against the sentence of death, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(3), and may employ oratorical license and impassioned argument, including a statement that Appellant showed no sympathy or mercy to his victims. Commonwealth v. Banks, 513 Pa. 318, 521 A.2d 1 (1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 211, 98 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987). Also, see the cases collected in Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 512 A.2d 1152 (1986). According to these standards, we find nothing improper about the prosecutor's guilt phase statements. On the contrary, the Commonwealth's representative expressly told the jury that the case should not be decided on an emotional level, (T.T. October 4, 1984, p. 8.100), while the court itself instructed the jury that closing remarks are not evidence in the case. (T.T. October 3, 1984, pp. 7.189-7.190.) The presumption in our law is that the jury has followed instructions. Commonwealth v. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. 43, 55, 337 A.2d 873, 879 (1975). We conclude that the closing remarks were designed to allow the verdict to flow from the evidence within the bounds of proper argumentation. Even if any of the remarks are considered improper, a new trial is not required for every improper remark. Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977). Only where the unavoidable effect of the remark creates such a bias and hostility that the jury could not render a true verdict will reversal be mandated in this Commonwealth. Stoltzfus, 462 Pa. at 61, 337 A.2d at 882. That is not the case under review.
In a pro-se petition, dated June 26, 1985, Appellant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel under the Post Conviction Hearing Act. New counsel was appointed on February 16, 1986, and we remanded to the trial court to consider his claims. On November 18, 1987, Judge Sabo denied the petition for relief. Appellant now appeals that denial in a series of allegations which we reject as either unwarranted or unintelligible. First, Petitioner alleges error because Judge Sabo refused to recuse himself. There is no record of any such motion for recusal. Matters which are not of record cannot be considered on appeal. Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 488 Pa. 255, 258, 412 A.2d 494, 496 (1980); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 317 A.2d 258 (1974). The only reason advanced to support the notion that Judge Sabo should have recused is that the same judge presided over his jury trial. Our law under Commonwealth v. Boyle, 498 Pa. 486, 447 A.2d 250 (1982), does not disqualify a jurist who conducted the earlier proceedings in the same case. Second, he alleges error due to the trial court's repeated refusals to appoint an investigator to find numerous witnesses. The claim is meritless. At no time did Petitioner claim that he needed an investigator to find the witnesses, while in the crucial case of Karen Hawkins, defense counsel visited her home many times. Regarding the myriad other names included in the Appellant's allegation, we find no explanation as to their usefulness as witnesses. Such claims occur in a vacuum and must be rejected. Appellant next complains that the hearing court did not permit relitigation of suppression issues, these issues had been litigated and, in any case, no related claims were made in the context of ineffectiveness in his petition. Fourth, Appellant complains that the trial court refused to permit him to testify concerning the peremptory challenges of qualified black jurors. On the contrary, he was permitted to state his personal recollection that eight black jurors were stricken by the Commonwealth. Fifth, Appellant alleges that the PCHA court would not permit him to testify about the recantation affidavit of witness, Calvin Budden. The denial was based on the fact that defendant had already testified as to the alleged recantation which occurred while both men were in prison during post-trial motions. The matter was previously litigated. At that post-trial hearing, Budden testified that the recantation had been coerced by Baker, was false, and that his trial testimony was truthful. He also argues that at the PCHA hearing, he was not permitted to ask trial counsel one question as to whether he had made any decision regarding cross-examination of witnesses, Dolan and Crosby, on their appearances at the preliminary hearing. The court then offered to allow Appellant to call trial counsel as his own witness in order to ask him this specific question but Baker chose not to do so. Appellant now states that he wanted to ask questions regarding counsel's understanding of the witness' presence at the preliminary hearing. He did not bring this to the attention of the PCHA court through offer of proof. Also, he fails to explain why he refused to call trial counsel as his own witness. Seventh, Appellant also insists that the PCHA court unfairly prohibited testimony that co-defendant Eric Joseph allegedly had been shown a statement of the Appellant on March 6, 1984, prior to his arrest. Appellant appears to suggest that this would prove that his confession dated March of the same year was fabricated by the police. Trial counsel was examined on this point by the PCHA court and stated that his own investigation had failed to substantiate Appellant's views. Appellant next complains that the hearing court halted the testimony of his brother Lawrence and refused to hear the testimony of his brother Eullies, both of whom were present but could not manage to return at a later date due to unexplained employment responsibilities. Obviously, the Appellant was free to subpoena these witnesses, but declined to do so. In any case, the claim is cast now in vague terms purporting error by the PCHA court. Ninth, Appellant claims that the PCHA court erred by closing the testimony before he could locate witnesses, including especially Karen Hawkins. As noted above, his counsel had located Hawkins and interviewed her, while Appellant offered no basis for calling the others. Last, Appellant claims that he was denied compulsory process in producing witnesses. It appears from his ambiguous language that he views the alleged absence of compulsory process as the product of the hearing court's failure to afford him an investigator and closing the proceedings before certain witnesses were located. These allegations are patently without any substance as explained above.
Appellant raises various claims of ineffectiveness by his trial counsel. While most of these were considered and denied by the PCHA court, they will be reviewed again. We have decided that ineffective assistance of counsel requires proof that trial counsel missed or mishandled a claim of arguable merit; that there was no reasonable basis for counsel's action; and that this action caused such prejudice to the client that the reliability of the trial is called into question. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). Generalized ineffectiveness claims raised in a vacuum must be rejected. Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332 (1981). It is the Appellant's burden to prove his allegations of ineffectiveness. Counsel is presumed effective. Commonwealth v. Floyd, 506 Pa. 85, 484 A.2d 365 (1984). Appellant first argues that his counsel failed to cross-examine witnesses Dolan and Crosby on their presence at the preliminary hearing. This claim was not raised in the PCHA petition which alleged only that counsel failed to request a lineup. In any case, these claims have been addressed above. Secondly, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a lineup for Adrian Crosby prior to the preliminary hearing. As trial counsel explained at the PCHA hearing, Crosby had failed to make a photographic identification, and counsel believed he would also fail to identify defendant in person. Appellant has never attempted to prove that Crosby, who recognized him at the preliminary hearing, would have failed to recognize him in a lineup. Since such a lineup identification clearly would have hurt Appellant, trial counsel's strategy was sound. Third, trial counsel was not ineffective for not requesting appointment of an investigator. Appellant has not met his burden of establishing what, if any, useful information an investigator would have found had one been retained, as explained above. Appellant next alleges that trial counsel interviewed Hawkins and Young, both of whom Appellant claims could not be found for the PCHA hearing, only briefly and that they were not asked whether there were other persons who saw Appellant on the day of the killing. Because neither Hawkins nor Young could recall seeing the defendant on that date, they could not have identified other persons who had seen Baker. Fifth, Appellant alleges that his counsel did not interview any of the witnesses prior to trial. There is no evidence of this failure from trial counsel's testimony or anywhere else in the record. Appellant singles out trial counsel's failure to interview Christopher and Annie Jews. Both individuals could not be located even by police. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to speak to unavailable witnesses. Also, Appellant faults trial counsel for allegedly not interviewing Richard Easterling, who was called to the stand and did testify for a co-defendant. There is no evidence to indicate what useful testimony would have been obtained had Easterling been interviewed. This conclusion also applies to his claim that prosecution witnesses were not interviewed. Appellant claims that trial counsel advised him not to testify, whereas trial counsel testified that he discussed the matter with him and left the final decision up to his judgment. The PCHA court accepted trial counsel's testimony, and counsel cannot be found to be ineffective for Appellant's own decision. Trial counsel, likewise, is also criticized for not calling co-defendant, Eric Joseph, during suppression to support his contention that his confession was fabricated. Co-defendant Joseph's testimony before trial could well have exposed him to questioning which, in turn, could have incriminated him. Nor does Appellant allege that Joseph would have been willing to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to testify. We also conclude that counsel was not ineffective for not raising meritless claims of prosecutorial misconduct as discussed above. Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel failed to request a Kloiber charge as to Thomas Dolan. A Kloiber charge is given as to witnesses who previously have failed to make an identification. As noted earlier, the charge was given as to Adrian Crosby, who had failed to select Baker from a photo array, but Dolan consistently identified him. This claim is meritless. Additionally, Appellant claims that his trial counsel did not raise a claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), which requires that a defendant first must prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of his race. We point out that Batson was decided two years after the trial of this case. Lastly, Appellant claims that trial counsel somehow was ineffective for spending his own money to fund a search for character witnesses for the penalty stage. Appellant seems to conclude that his counsel, therefore, was ill-prepared. Of course, some of these witnesses did testify to his good character, and we can find no sensible reason to fault counsel's actions.