Opinion ID: 1937356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Subject Premises are Exempt From the Rent Ceiling Limitations of the Rental Housing Act.

Text: Appellant argues that the increase in her monthly rent from $109 in September of 1980 to $176 in October and $180 in November was in contravention of the Rental Housing Act. Appellant asserts that the property was not exempt from the rent ceiling limitations contained in § 45-1687 [6] and that therefore the filing of a claim of exemption statement with the D.C. Rental Accommodations Office by Walter Johnson on September 29, 1980, was ineffectual. We do not agree. [7] Section 45-1686(a) exempts from rent control: (4) any rental unit in any housing accommodation of four (4) or fewer units, including any aggregate of four (4) units whether within the same structure or not: Provided, that: (A) such housing accommodation is owned by not more than four (4) natural persons; (B) none of such owners has an interest either directly or indirectly, in any other rental unit in the District of Columbia; and (C) the owner(s) of such housing accommodation shall file with the Rent Administrator a claim of exemption statement which shall consist of an oath or affirmation by such owner(s) of the valid claim to the exemption. The claim of exemption statement shall also contain the signatures of each person having an interest (direct or indirect) in the housing accommodation. Any change in the ownership of the exempted housing accommodation or change in the owner's interest in any other housing accommodation which would invalidate the exemption claim must be reported in writing to the Rent Administrator within thirty (30) days of such change. . . .[ [8] ] Appellant maintains that Carl Johnson had either a direct or indirect interest in the rental property, but did not sign, as required, the exemption statement. The interest that appellant would have us recognize as controlling is Carl Johnson's obligation on a promissory note secured by a first deed of trust on the property and his continued management of the rental units. [9] These are not, however, indicia of the interest which § 45-1686(a)(4)(C) contemplates. Rather, that code section calls for full disclosure of those persons having any ownership interest in the property. [10] As manager of the property, Carl Johnson was no more than an agent of the owner Walter Johnson. Moreover, Carl Johnson's continued liability on the promissory note secured by a first deed of trust on the property was not tantamount to ownership. It evidenced merely an underlying monetary obligation which was personal in nature. See Yasuna v. Miller, 399 A.2d 68, 72 (D.C.1979). Citing the legislative history of § 45-1686, appellant also argues that Carl Johnson is the owner of the subject premises, given a liberal definition of the term, and should not be able to evade rent control provisions by conveying the property to one who qualifies for the exemption. [11] An examination of the record reveals that Carl Johnson may have had as one motive in conveying the property to his son the evasion of rent control. [12] And as appellant suggests, this result may not have been desired. [13] Yet, the statute is not ambiguous. It clearly exempts from rent control rental housing of four units or less which is owned by not more than four persons provided the owner(s) has no interest, either directly or indirectly, in any other rental property in the District of Columbia and provided a claim of exemption statement is properly filed with the Rental Accommodations Office. In our view, these criteria have been satisfied. Walter Johnson was the owner of record of the rental units involved at the time he filed the claim of exemption statement and at the time the rent increases were implemented. [14] The record quite clearly indicates that he had no other interests in District of Columbia rental property. Consequently, it would be contrary to the clear meaning of the statute to deny him the advantage of the exemption. In re Estate of Shutack, 469 A.2d 427, 429 (D.C.1983); Davis v. United States, 397 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C.1979). This court, of course, will not look beyond the plain meaning of a statute when the language is unambiguous and does not produce an absurd result. Peoples Drug Stores v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983). Having determined that Walter Johnson was the owner of the premises within the meaning of § 45-1686, it is necessary to address the contention that he, as a potential heir of his father Carl Johnson, had an indirect interest in other District of Columbia rental property and that consequently the subject premises did not qualify for the rent ceiling exemption. We find no merit to appellant's argument. It is axiomatic that a living person has no heirs. In re Bartlett's Will, 76 N.Y.S.2d 247, 254, aff'd, 274 A.D. 136, 80 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1948). As appellee suggests, among the many facts that appellant's argument presupposes is that Carl Johnson will predecease his son Walter. We decline to indulge in any such speculation. Finally, appellant asserts that in violation of D.C.Code § 28-3101 (1981), Carl Johnson fraudulently conveyed the premises to his son Walter in an effort to evade the rent ceiling limitation and therefore retains an interest in the property, invalidating its exempt status. Appellee raises the issue of whether fraudulent conveyance was properly pleaded by appellant. Alternatively, appellee argues that the record does not support appellant's claim that the property was fraudulently conveyed by Carl Johnson to his son Walter. Superior Court Landlord and Tenant Rule 5(c) requires that a defendant who desires to interpose a plea of title in defense to a suit for possession file such plea in writing under oath. Appellee maintains that appellant's claim that the premises were fraudulently conveyed by Carl Johnson is tantamount to a plea of title and that since none was filed, appellant cannot now avail herself of this defense. We are persuaded, however, that appellant was not required to file a plea of title under Rule 5(c) since she was not claiming title in herself or in another under whom she claimed. Mindell v. Glenn, 65 A.2d 340, 341-42 (D.C.1949). In any event, where, as here, there is no necessary and direct issue of title between the parties, appellant need not have complied with Rule 5(c). Brown v. Young, 364 A.2d 1171, 1173 n. 3 (D.C. 1976); Mahoney v. Campbell, 209 A.2d 791, 794 (D.C.1965); Nickles v. Sullivan, 83 A.2d 283, 284-85 (D.C.1951). We cannot conclude, however, that Daniels was protected by § 28-3101, the fraudulent conveyance statute, which provides that [a] conveyance or assignment. . . of an estate or interest in land . . . with the intent to hinder or defraud persons having just claims or demands, of their lawful suits, damages, or demands, is void as against the persons so hindered or defrauded. The statute does not indicate, nor does case law suggest, that a person in Ms. Daniels' position was protected. It is true, as appellant contends, that we may liberally construe this statute to suppress fraud in a proper case. Leonardo v. Leonardo, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 119, 122, 251 F.2d 22, 25 (1958). [15] But it is clear that § 28-3101 is designed to protect creditors from fraudulent conveyances or persons with similar concerns. See Snider v. Kelly, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 363, 364, 135 F.2d 817, 818, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 764, 64 S.Ct. 62, 88 L.Ed. 456 (1943). [16] Aside from her counterclaims, there is no showing in the record that Ms. Daniels had any just claims or demands against Carl Johnson as contemplated by D.C.Code § 28-3101 at the time he conveyed the premises to Walter.