Opinion ID: 698715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Expert Testimony Regarding the Modus Operandi of Drug Traffickers

Text: 28 Over defendants' objection, the district court permitted the government to present expert testimony that drug traffickers often employ counter-surveillance driving techniques, register cars in others' names, make narcotics and cash deliveries in public parking lots, and frequently use pagers and public telephones. We review the district court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir.1991). 29 The defendants argue that admission of this testimony was an abuse of discretion because it raises concerns similar to those raised by drug courier profile cases. This Court has denounced the use of drug courier profile evidence as substantive evidence of a defendant's innocence or guilt. Lui, 941 F.2d at 847. In addition, the defendants contend that the modus operandi testimony was more prejudicial than probative because the activities described are not complex ones requiring expert explanation. Id. at 847-48 (holding that modus operandi evidence may be appropriate to explain complex criminal activity patterns). 30 These arguments are unavailing, however, because we have consistently held that government agents or similar persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants' modus operandi. United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984). See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa, 827 F.2d 604, 611-12 (9th Cir.1987) (allowing testimony that an apartment was a stash pad for drugs and money, that ledgers contained the names of the defendant's cocaine buyers, and that a particular exchange of packages was a drug transaction), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 968, 108 S.Ct. 1243, 99 L.Ed.2d 441 (1988); United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987) (testimony on how criminal narcotics conspiracies operate); United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 831 (9th Cir.1985) (testimony regarding counter-surveillance driving and a delivery that was probably drugs), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1103, 106 S.Ct. 888, 88 L.Ed.2d 922 (1986); United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir.) (testimony that defendant was acting as a lookout and engaging in counter-surveillance), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 464, 74 L.Ed.2d 614 (1982); United States v. Maher, 645 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (testimony that defendant's actions were consistent with the modus operandi of persons transporting drugs and engaging in counter-surveillance). As these cases demonstrate, the type of conduct engaged in by the defendants is precisely the type for which modus operandi evidence is often used. Such evidence helps the jury understand complex criminal activities, and alerts it to the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior. Johnson, 735 F.2d at 1202. The probative value of this evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The district court correctly allowed the expert testimony. 31