Opinion ID: 1272431
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction Regarding Second-Degree Murder.

Text: A. Standard of Review. June claims the district court erred by failing to give a specific intent instruction in connection with its instruction regarding second-degree murder. Although we review a claim that the court gave an improper jury instruction for correction of errors at law, we review the related claim that the trial court should have given a defendant's requested instruction for abuse of discretion. Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Iowa 2006). Under Iowa law, a court is required to give a requested instruction when it states a correct rule of law having application to the facts of the case and when the concept is not otherwise embodied in other instructions. Herbst v. State, 616 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2000) (emphasis added). B. Analysis. The court instructed the jury that before it could find June committed the crime of second-degree murder, the State had to prove the following elements: 1. On or about the 15th day of May 2006, the defendant shot Leo Lyman. 2. Leo Lyman died as a result of being shot. 3. The defendant acted with malice aforethought. June requested a specific intent instruction arguing that the act of shooting someone, as instructed in element number one, is an assault and to commit an assault, a person must necessarily have acted with specific intent. The district court rejected this argument and so do we. In Iowa, all crimes are statutory. Iowa Code § 701.2 (stating, [a] public offense is that which is prohibited by statute and is punishable by fine or imprisonment). Iowa Code section 707.1 provides that a person commits murder when that person kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied. Id. § 707.1. Murder in the first degree occurs when a person commits murder under any of the following circumstances: 1. The person willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person. 2. The person kills another person while participating in a forcible felony. 3. The person kills another person while escaping or attempting to escape from lawful custody. 4. The person intentionally kills a peace officer, correctional officer, public employee, or hostage while the person is imprisoned in a correctional institution under the jurisdiction of the Iowa department of corrections, or in a city or county jail. 5. The person kills a child while committing child endangerment under section 726.6, subsection 1, paragraph b, or while committing assault under section 708.1 upon the child, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. 6. The person kills another person while participating in an act of terrorism as defined in section 708A.1. Id. § 707.2. Murder in the second degree occurs when [a] person ... commits murder which is not murder in the first degree. Id. § 707.3. Thus, murder in the second degree has only two elementsa person kills another person and does so with malice aforethought. The first element required for a person to commit second-degree murder is the killing of a person. The killing can occur by an affirmative act, such as when a person shoots another person, or by an omission to act when there is a duty to do so, such as when a parent fails to provide medical care for a child who dies from a lack of care. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 6.1, .2, at 422-23, 435-36 (2d ed. 2003). The second element required for a person to commit second-degree murder is that the act of killing another person is done with malice aforethought. Malice aforethought requires the actor to have a fixed purpose or design to do physical harm to another that exists before the act is committed. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 2002). `It does not mean mere spite, hatred, or ill will, but does signify that state of disposition which shows a heart regardless of human life.' State v. Leedom, 247 Iowa 911, 917, 76 N.W.2d 773, 777 (1956) (quoting State v. Burris, 198 Iowa 1156, 1158, 198 N.W. 82, 84 (1924), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kernes, 262 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Iowa 1978)). It is well-settled law that murder in the second degree is a general intent crime only requiring proof of malice aforethought. State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 672-73 (Iowa 1986). June argues when the court instructs the jury that the State must prove June shot Leo, the court must also give the jury a specific intent instruction because a shooting is an assault, and an assault can only be committed with specific intent. We disagree. The first element the State must prove to convict June of second-degree murder is that June killed another person, namely Leo. It does not matter how she accomplished the act of killing. She could have shot Leo as alleged or withheld medical care if the State proved she had a duty to provide such care. The manner of killing another is not an element of the crime; the only element required by the Code is that she did an act that killed another person. Thus, if the State proves June did an act to kill Leo with malice aforethought, she is guilty of murder in the second degree. Neither the killing of another person nor malice aforethought requires specific intent under section 707.3. Consequently, the district court was correct in refusing to give a specific intent instruction for second-degree murder.