Opinion ID: 772948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiff's State Law Malicious Prosecution Claim Against Sergeant McWilliams

Text: 33 Under Michigan tort law, a plaintiff seeking to sue on the grounds of malicious prosecution must prove the following four elements: (1) that the defendant has initiated a criminal prosecution against him, (2) that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, (3) that the private person who instituted or maintained the prosecution lacked probable cause for his action, and (4) that the action was undertaken with malice or a purpose in instituting the criminal claim other than bringing the offender to justice. 34 Cox v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 173, 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). In the current case, the district court dismissed plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim for failure to satisfy the second element of the test set out above, showing that the criminal proceedings terminated in Kostrzewa's favor. 35 The district court correctly noted that, under Michigan law, when a criminal proceeding is resolved pursuant to a plea bargain, this generally is not considered a termination of the proceedings in the plaintiff's favor. Cox, 593 N.W.2d at 175. The district court was incorrect, however, in stating that the plaintiff had alleged in his complaint that the hindering prosecution claim was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement with the prosecution. J.A. at 89 (D. Ct. Order). To the contrary, nowhere in Kostrzewa's complaint does he state that he entered into a plea agreement, nor does the complaint state with specificity how the proceeding terminated in his favor; the complaint simply states that [t]he proceeding terminated in favor of Plaintiff. J.A. at 15 (Compl.). In fact, it appears that the district court, in reaching its conclusion, may have relied upon the defendants' assertion in their motion to dismiss that a plea bargain had been made, J.A. at 33 (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss), as well as court documents attached to the defendants' reply brief indicating that Kostrzewa pleaded guilty to a reduced sentence of driving without a valid license in his possession on the same day that the obstruction charge was dismissed. These documents, however, do not indicate whether the obstruction charge was dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. 36 The district court, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, may not consider matters beyond the complaint. 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §12.34[2] (3d ed. 2000). If the district court simply took the defendants' assertion in their motion to dismiss as true in stating that a plea agreement had been reached regarding the charges made against Kostrzewa, then it both mischaracterized the plaintiff's complaint and improperly looked outside the complaint in deciding a case on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. 37 Although in some instances the district court may consider evidence outside the complaint, in doing so it converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If the district court chooses to treat the motion as one for summary judgment, it must give the parties a reasonable opportunityto present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. Id. The district court did not give such notice to Kostrzewa, however, and to rule on a motion for summary judgment without giving Kostrzewa the opportunity to produce evidence regarding whether a plea agreement existed would constitute unfair surprise to the plaintiff, particularly because he did not file any affidavits or other documents outside the pleadings that would give him notice that the district court might venture outside the pleadings. See Salehpour v. University of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 204 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1115 (1999); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 393 (6th Cir. 1975). 38 The district court may have partially based its conclusion that a plea bargain existed on the court documents that were attached to defendants' reply brief. A district court may consider public records in deciding a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1554 (6th Cir. 1997). Even if this were the basis for the district court's conclusion, the court documents submitted by the defendants do not indicate whether or not a plea agreement was made regarding the obstruction charge. Instead, the documents only show that Kostrzewa's obstruction charge was dismissed on the same day that he pleaded guilty to driving without a valid license. Without further information, the district court could not have determined conclusively that a plea agreement affecting the obstruction charge did, in fact, exist in this case. Thus, the district court erred in holding that it was beyond doubt that Kostrzewa could prove no set of facts in support of his state law malicious prosecution claim against Sergeant McWilliams that would entitle him to relief. 6 39