Opinion ID: 532563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boren's claims against Metropolitan

Text: 15 Boren filed suit against Metropolitan based on a multitude of state law theories including breach of contract. As the district court correctly concluded, Metropolitan was not a party to the 1981 Agreement; therefore summary judgment on the breach of contract claim was proper. On appeal, Boren argues that Metropolitan accepted the benefits of the Agreement and is therefore estopped from arguing that it is not bound. 16 It is not necessary for this Court to determine whether Boren's estoppel argument yields any merit. Rather, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan on the basis of ERISA preemption. All of Boren's state law claims, including the breach of contract claim, have been preempted by ERISA. Boren failed to allege a cause of action based in ERISA or to allege facts sufficient to support an ERISA claim. Consequently, summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan was proper. 17 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987), the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress may so completely preempt an area that any civil complaint arising in that area becomes federal in character. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981), the Court indicated that ERISA's preemptive provision was to be broadly construed. The provision reads as follows: 18 Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. 19 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1144. 20 In the instant case, the summary judgment evidence clearly indicated that Metropolitan administered the plan as a fiduciary; it did not employ the plan in the business of insurance. It is undisputed that the N.L. plan constitutes an ERISA plan under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1003(a) and it is not exempt under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1003(b). Consequently, the only significant question remaining is whether Boren's claims relate to the ERISA plan administered by Metropolitan. We hold that they do. 21 While Boren recognizes the breadth of ERISA's preemptive power, he argues that the instant case is unique because it involves a court approved settlement agreement. Boren urges this Court to carve a narrow exception to that all-encompassing entity known as ERISA. Boren's brief at 12. We are not inclined to do so. Rather, we conclude that Boren's claims against Metropolitan relate to an ERISA plan and are thus consumed by the preemptive provision of ERISA. 22 As this Court noted in Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing Trust v. Corrigan Enterprises, Inc., 793 F.2d 1456 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034, 107 S.Ct. 884, 93 L.Ed.2d 837 (1987), the Supreme Court has indicated that a state law relates to an employee benefit plan if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Even if a state law does not expressly concern an employee benefit plan, it will still be preempted insofar as the law applies to a benefit plan in particular cases. In the instant case, Boren is relying on state law to advance his complaint that his benefits under the plan were terminated. As such, the law relates to the plan. See also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); Light v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir.1986). The state action in the instant case does not affect the plan in so peripheral a manner as to foreclose a finding that the law relates to the plan. See Sommers Drug Stores, 793 F.2d at 1456. 23 The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Metropolitan. Boren's claims against Metropolitan have been preempted by ERISA; Boren has not alleged a cause of action under ERISA, nor alleged facts sufficient to support such an action. Consequently, summary judgment was proper.