Opinion ID: 2508099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence of Prior Juvenile Adjudications for Robbery

Text: At the penalty phase, the prosecution introduced evidence that, when defendant was a juvenile, he had committed two separate armed robberies on February 3 and February 9, 1984. To prove the February 3 robbery, the prosecutor presented the victim's testimony and certified juvenile court records showing defendant's admission to the crime. To prove the February 9 robbery, the prosecutor presented only the certified juvenile court records showing the facts of the case and defendant's admission to the crime. The victim had since died.
Section 190.3, factor (b), permits the penalty phase jury to consider [t]he presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. `Evidence of prior criminal behavior is relevant under section 190.3, factor (b) if it shows conduct that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute....' [Citations.] ( People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 382, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) On appeal, defendant argues that admission of the unadjudicated jail activity was improper section 190.3, factor (b) evidence because there was no showing of violence  except against himself  and his behavior did not constitute a crime. The trial court correctly concluded otherwise. At an Evidence Code section 402 hearing before the beginning of the penalty phase, the prosecutor presented testimony regarding the three jail incidents. Defendant made the same argument that he makes now. The prosecutor countered that possession of deadly weapons in jail, coupled with threats of force or violence, was clearly criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). The court overruled defendant's objection. It found that the evidence showed that defendant possessed weapons in jail and threatened to use force or violence against the deputies to get what he wanted and that his conduct qualified as violent criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). The court further found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352. Accordingly, after closing argument, the court instructed on the elements of unlawful possession of a deadly weapon in jail, pursuant to section 4574. [9] The trial court's ruling was clearly correct. (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 382-383, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [possession of shank in jail violated section 4574, qualifying as implied threat of violence under section 190.3, factor (b)]; People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 588-589, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 [possession of razor blades in California Youth Authority; same]; see also People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1133-1134, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450 [verbal threats against deputy sheriff relevant to violent potential of the defendant's criminal conduct].) Defendant further argues that admission of the docket sheet to prove the fact of the juvenile adjudication for the February 9, 1984, robbery was improper section 190.3, factor (c) evidence. As the Attorney General points out, the trial court admitted the evidence under section 190.3, factor (b), not factor (c). [10] Although evidence of violent juvenile adjudications is not admissible under section 190.3, factor (c), such evidence is admissible under factor (b). ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 632-633, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 294-295, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052.) Relying on People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 937, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93, defendant suggests that admission of juvenile court records to establish the fact of the juvenile adjudication is inadmissible section 190.3, factor (b) evidence. However, since Champion, we have found that the fact of an adjudication or conviction is admissible to establish criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1222-1223, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1234, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 367-369 & fn. 2, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846 (conc. opn. of George, C.J.).) In any event, any error was harmless. The jury was presented with properly admitted evidence in aggravation that showed a pattern of nonconforming and violent behavior: the circumstances of the crime evidencing a deliberate, premeditated murder of an acquaintance for money in a brutal, cold-blooded, and devious manner; the circumstances of the February 3, 1984, juvenile robbery; the three incidents involving possession of dangerous weapons in jail; and four prior felony convictions. There is no reasonable possibility the penalty verdict would have been different absent evidence of the February 9, 1984, robbery. ( People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 591, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.)