Opinion ID: 777147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA)

Text: 82 The EPPA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-09, restricts employers from using, taking adverse employment action on the basis of, or disclosing information obtained from an employee's polygraph test. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2008; Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 877, 880(9th Cir.1992); Veazey v. Communications & Cable, 194 F.3d 850, 858 (7th Cir.1999). Section 2008 of the EPPA prohibits an employer from disclosing information about an employee's polygraph test to anyone other than the following: (1) the employee or a person designated in writing by him, (2) the employer that requested the test, (3) any court[or] governmental agency ... pursuant to an order from a court of competent jurisdiction, and (4) a governmental agency, but only insofar as the disclosed information is an admission of criminal conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 2008. 33 83 Orr contends BOA disclosed her polygraph test results to the FDIC in violation of the EPPA. In support of her position, she relies on Exhibits B, X, and Y. However, none of these exhibits are admissible. Exhibit B is inadmissible hearsay. Exhibits X and Y are not authenticated. Orr's EPPA claim thus fails for lack of evidence establishing that BOA disclosed the results of her polygraph test. 84 V. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Orr's Request for a Continuance. 85 Orr contends the district court abused its discretion in denying her request to continue the June 6, 2000 summary judgment hearing because her counsel was in trial at the time and the FDIC had not produced certain subpoenaed documents. 86 We review the district court's denial of Orr's request for a continuance for an abuse of discretion. See Weinberg v. Whatcom County, 241 F.3d 746, 750-51 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.1989). There was no such abuse. 87 The district court had continued pretrial dates on two prior occasions. The final pretrial order set discovery cut-off for April 18, 2000 and the last day for hearing dispositive motions for June 6, 2000. It stated: No further continuances will be permitted. Given the discovery cut-off of April 18, 2000, Orr's request for a continuance to obtain additional discovery from the FDIC was groundless. Orr should have filed a motion to compel production of documents prior to the discovery cut-off. 88 Orr's request for a continuance due to scheduling conflicts was likewise devoid of merit because two previous continuances to pretrial dates had been granted. Moreover, Orr had notice from December 7, 1999 that the final day for filing dispositive motions was June 6, 2000 and that no further continuances would be granted. That Orr's counsel was in the midst of another trial on the day of the summary judgment hearing does not as a matter of right entitle her to a continuance. Orr lacked diligence as she waited for two weeks after being served with the summary judgment papers before seeking a continuance. Despite this, the district court gave Orr five days to cure the evidentiary defects in her opposition papers following the hearing. She failed to do so. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in denying Orr's request for a continuance. See Canada, 831 F.2d at 925-26. 89