Opinion ID: 2526946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Restraint

Text: ¶ 56 Magaña's counsel waited nearly five years until approximately three months before trial to move to compel production (of documents requested previously in an extremely broad request for production). When the trial court granted his motion to compel, Magaña argued there was insufficient time to investigate the discovery produced before trial. In light of the nature of Magaña's broad discovery request, and the delay of Magaña's motion to compel until three months before trial, counsel's claim of prejudice because of the amount of discovery produced is unpersuasive. ¶ 57 Magaña's early discovery requests to Hyundai, a worldwide corporation, included the production of copies of any and all documents, including but not limited to complaints, answers, police reports, photographs, depositions or other documents relating to complaints, notices, claims, lawsuits or incidents of alleged seat back failure on Hyundai products for the years 1980 to present.  Clerk's Papers (CP) at 3728 (emphasis added). Thus, the request covered millions of Hyundai vehicles manufactured over multiple decades. Hyundai's consistent objections to the scope of these requests put Magaña on notice that Hyundai was not providing all possibly responsive documents. [2] Undoubtedly, Magaña's counsel knew that a motion to compel production would either result in a large volume of documents or have been limited by the court. ¶ 58 The timing of the 2005 motion to compel also undermines Magaña's argument. Magaña filed his complaint in February 2000 and discovery was first sent in 2000 and 2001. A first trial was held with substantial evidence. Due to Magaña's improper use of an expert witness, and the trial court's error in admitting that evidence, the verdict was reversed by the Court of Appeals. ¶ 59 Magaña knew on May 23, 2005, that the retrial was set for January 17, 2006, yet waited until October 27, 2005, to move to compel. Magaña's counsel had Hyundai's responses and yet waited nearly five years until the second trial was approaching to move to compel. If Hyundai's failure to produce Magaña's requested discovery was a violation of discovery rules, then Hyundai may be sanctioned. But the ultimate sanction of default judgment should not be inflicted on a party where the opposing party waited years to move to compel, especially when the opposing party had notice of the extent of the discovery requests. [3]