Opinion ID: 1450597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Right to an Impartial Jury Dismissal of Prospective Jurors

Text: Further pressing the impartial jury claim, Beuke next contends that he was denied this right when the trial court improperly excused six prospective jurors who expressed any opposition to the death penalty. [A] juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, . . . must be removed for cause. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). [T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quotations omitted). [T]his standard . . . does not require that a juror's bias be proved with `unmistakable clarity' because such an exacting standard does not comport with the realities of voir dire questioning. Id. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844. A state court trial judge's conclusion that a prospective capital-sentencing juror should be excluded for cause because of his views on the death penalty is a finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness from this court on federal habeas review. Id. at 428-29, 105 S.Ct. 844. Beuke asserts that the trial court improperly removed six prospective jurors. The first two indicated that they would not impose the death penalty under any circumstances because it conflicted with their religious beliefs. The third similarly stated that he could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances, and the fourth indicated that she did not believe she could impose the death penalty even if the facts and law warranted such punishment. Unlike the others, the fifth and sixth were slightly less adamant in their opposition to the death penalty. The fifth initially stated that she did not think she could impose the death penalty even if required by the law and facts. When pressed further, however, she indicated that she would try to follow the law and impose the death penalty if warranted by the law, but ultimately affirmed that she could not agree to a verdict recommending death. The sixth candidate's testimony was similarly inconsistent. Although at one point she stated that there may be a proper case where the death penalty would be warranted, she eventually attested to her unalterable opposition to a sentence of death. After reviewing the voir dire testimony in the record, we find no constitutional error in the trial court's dismissal of these six prospective jurors. We find that each of the first four candidates stated unequivocally that he or she would not impose death under any circumstances, and the law requires that such jurors  with unshakable opposition to the death penalty  be removed for cause. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 728, 112 S.Ct. 2222. And although the fifth and sixth candidates both waffled and hedged when discussing their willingness and ability to impose the death penalty, ultimately both stated that they would be unable to join a verdict that imposed the death penalty even if mandated by law, and were therefore unfit for service on a jury charged with the burden of considering capital punishment. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. Especially in light of the deference afforded to the trial judge's conclusions on these issues, see Bowling, 344 F.3d at 519, we find no constitutional error in the trial court's dismissal of these prospective jurors.