Opinion ID: 2626256
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maluia's cross-examination was permissible in scope.

Text: As Maluia's testimony arose on cross-examination, the scope of the prosecutor's questions must have complied with HRE Rule 611(b). The Rule provides: Cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. Because cross-examination is essential to satisfying the basic truth-seeking function of a trial, we accord the trial courts broad discretion in administering HRE Rule 611(b). State v. Balisbisana, 83 Hawai'i 109, 114, 924 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1996) (The scope of cross-examination is generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.); see also State v. Pokini, 57 Haw. 17, 22, 548 P.2d 1397, 1400 (1976) (same). That discretion is not abused when a trial court subjects a defendant who testifies in his own defense to cross-examination as to any matter pertinent to, or having a logical connection with the specific offense for which he is being tried. State v. Culkin, 97 Hawai'i 206, 220-221, 35 P.3d 233, 247-248 (2001) (quoting Pokini, 57 Haw. at 22, 548 P.2d at 1400). Nor does a court exceed its authority by granting counsel leeway in framing their questions on cross. See HRE R. 611(b) (The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.). The latitude accorded those questions stems from the nature of cross-examination. Specifically, [c]ounsel often cannot know in advance what pertinent facts may be elicited on cross-examination. For that reason it is necessarily exploratory; and the rule that the examiner must indicate the purpose of his inquiry does not, in general, apply. Knapp v. Wing, 72 Vt. 334, 340, 47 A. 1075; Martin v. Elden, 32 Ohio St. 282, 289. It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to state to the court what fact a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). In this case, the prosecutor sought to develop information on Kepa's and Ahakuelo's credibility  a matter made relevant by their testimony at Maluia's trial. Because the issue was pertinent to and had a logical connection with the offense for which Maluia was charged, see Culkin, 97 Hawai'i at 220-221, 35 P.3d at 247-248, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Maluia to be examined on that topic.