Opinion ID: 3169959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Type of Relief Requested

Text: Kelly’s request for injunctive relief preventing Alabama from assessing taxes against her plainly constitutes relief that would enjoin, suspend, or restrain a tax assessment and thus meets the first requirement of the TIA bar. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341; Osceola, 893 F.2d at 1233. The TIA also prohibits declaratory relief. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411, 102 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 (1982). Under our binding precedent, the TIA also bars claims for damages because a monetary award against the state or its tax administrators would have the same detrimental effect on the state as equitable relief, and would dampen state tax collectors. See A Bonding Co., 629 F.2d at 1132-33 (concluding the TIA deprives district courts of jurisdiction over claims for money damages based on the unconstitutionality of the city tax and the tortious nature of enforcement). In A Bonding Co., the former Fifth Circuit noted that “[a] federal court suit for damages against a state tax administrator . . . would have many of the same detrimental effects that actions for tax refund, declaratory, or injunctive relief would have. 3 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, this Court adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down on or before September 30, 1981. Bonner, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). 10 Case: 15-12124 Date Filed: 01/15/2016 Page: 11 of 17 Although the federal court’s decision in such a case technically would bind only the immediate parties, as a practical matter it would undoubtedly dampen future state collection efforts.” Id.4 While the Supreme Court has declined to address whether the TIA alone acts as a jurisdictional bar to all requests for damages, it has concluded that comity, also referred to as the doctrine of equitable restraint, bars federal-court jurisdiction over a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages arising from a state tax system. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107, 102 S. Ct. 177, 181 (1981) (“Because we decide today that the principle of comity bars federal courts from granting damages relief in such cases, we do not decide whether [the TIA], standing alone, would require such a result.”). The Supreme Court explained that a damages award under § 1983 against individual state tax officials would first require a federal-court declaration that those officials, in administering a state tax, violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Id. at 11314, 102 S. Ct. at 184-85. A damages award also would have the practical effect of halting the operation of the state’s tax scheme because “such officials, faced with the prospect of personal liability to numerous taxpayers, not to mention the assessment of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, would promptly cease the 4 The former Fifth Circuit did stop short of determining whether the TIA precludes all suits for damages against administrators of state and local taxes. See A Bonding Co., 629 F.2d at 1132-33. 11 Case: 15-12124 Date Filed: 01/15/2016 Page: 12 of 17 conduct found to have infringed the petitioners’ constitutional rights, whether or not those officials were acting in good faith.” Id. at 115, 102 S. Ct. at 185. Thus, taxpayers seeking to challenge the validity of a state tax system under federal law must pursue state remedies to do so, provided that the state remedies are “plain, adequate, and complete.” Id. at 116, 102 S. Ct. at 186. This Court has explicitly relied on both the TIA and comity to conclude that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in a state-tax dispute requesting damages and declaratory relief. See Noble v. Joint City-Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors of Fulton Cty., 672 F.2d 872, 873-75 (11th Cir. 1982). And in § 1983 actions for damages for alleged constitutional violations, this Court either based its decision solely on principles of comity or determined that the suit was “in essence an action for the refund of taxes.” See e.g., Ayers v. Polk Cty., Ga., 697 F.2d 1375, 1376-77 (11th Cir. 1983); Moss v. Georgia, 655 F.2d 668, 669 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 11, 1981).