Opinion ID: 205003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Computer Monitoring Conditions

Text: Mike raises four challenges with regard to the computer monitoring conditions: first, he claims that the sentencing court erred by not making any particularized findings or providing a generalized statement of its reasoning for imposing these conditions; second, he argues that the conditions are not reasonably related to his history and characteristics, the nature and circumstances of his offenses, or any of the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); third, he avers that the conditions are impermissibly vague, as it is not clear whether they apply only to computers he owns or also to computers owned by others; and fourth, he contends that the conditions involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to deter criminal activity, protect the public, or promote his rehabilitation. [2] Mike failed to raise any of these challenges to the district court. Normally, this failure would result in plain error review. However, because the court first announced these conditions in its written judgment, thus, stripping Mike of an opportunity to object to them, we will review his challenges under the abuse of discretion standard. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 51(b), United States v. Edgin, 92 F.3d 1044, 1049 (10th Cir.1996). Mike's first challenge lacks merit. A sentencing court need not provide reasons for each specific special condition that it imposes; rather, it must only provide a generalized statement of its reasoning. See, e.g., Hahn, 551 F.3d at 983. Our holding in Hahn illustrates this point. There, we held that the sentencing court had satisfied the requisite burden by stating that its imposition of twelve special conditions of supervised release was appropriate in light of the defendant's history and characteristics, the fact that the sex crimes occurred immediately after the cessation of the offense the defendant was charged with, and the fact that the defendant's probation officer is charged with supervising the defendant and not just the crime of which he has been convicted. Id. at 983. Consistent with Hahn, the sentencing court here provided its general rationale for imposing computer monitoring conditions and the sex offender conditions Mike had challenged: the results of psychological evaluations performed on Mike in 2004 and 2008, the nature of Mike's 1997 sexual offense, and the fact that Mike had failed to comply with his sex offender registration requirements. We find that this meets the applicable standard, and, thus, reject Mike's first challenge. We also reject Mike's second challenge. While it is true that Mike's offense of conviction did not involve a computer and there is no evidence in the record showing that Mike had a history of using computers in an abusive manner, these facts are not dispositive here. In 1997, Mike committed a particularly gruesome sex offense. Furthermore, psychosexual evaluations that were performed in 2004 and 2005 revealed that Mike had a sex deviance problem involving rape, that he did not take full responsibility for his sexual misconduct, and [that] he may possibly have emotional problems associated with inadequacy in social/sexual interactions involving age-appropriate females. ROA, Vol. 2, at 25. In addition, a 2008 mental health assessment showed that Mike has serious problems in the area of substance abuse, anxiety, delusional thinking and poor impulse control. Id. at 18. In light of these facts, and the prevalence of content on the internet that appeals to individuals prone to committing sexual offenses, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in finding that the monitoring of Mike's computer usage was reasonably related to the goals of protecting the public from further crimes committed by Mike and providing Mike with the correctional treatment he needs. As a result, we will not vacate the conditions on this ground. Although Mike's first two challenges fail, his third does not. Recently, in United States v. Matteson, 327 Fed.Appx. 791 (10th Cir.2009) (unpublished), we were faced with a case that involved a computer monitoring condition very similar to one of the conditions at issue here. [3] There, the defendant argued that the condition was infirm for two reasons: first, it was overly vague, and second, it was too intrusive to comply with either § 3583(d)(2)'s requirements or the Fourth Amendment. Matteson, 327 Fed.Appx. at 792. Because we agreed with the defendant that the condition was vague, as it could be reasonably interpreted to apply to any computer he used, not just the one he owned, we remanded the matter back to the sentencing court for clarification. Here, we are presented with essentially the same problem we faced in Matteson: it is not clear to which computers the conditions in question apply. In its response, the Government argues that the conditions cannot be read fairly to encompass public computers or computers owned by employers. Appellee Br. 28. We disagree. Computer monitoring condition two states that [t]he defendant further understands that he/she will warn others of the existence of the monitoring software placed on his/her computer or any such computer the defendant may have access.  ROA, Vol. 1, at 41-42 (emphasis added). Additionally, computer monitoring condition four states that the defendant shall submit on a monthly basis any card receipts/bills, telephone bills used for modem access, or any other records accrued in the use of a computer to the probation officer. Id. at. 42 (emphasis added). Due to the presence of the above language, we find that the probation officer could reasonably believe that the computer monitoring conditions apply not only to computers that Mike owns, but also to those owned by others, including Mike's employer. As a consequence, we remand these conditions to the district court to clarify their scope. If on remand the court decides that it intends for the computer monitoring conditions to apply to computers owned by Mike's employers, it must make the necessary findings, which we outline infra in our discussion of the condition limiting the types of occupations that Mike may engage in. In light of our holding, we will not address Mike's deprivation of liberty argument. See Matteson, 327 Fed.Appx. at 793 (remanding without deciding the issue of whether the condition at issue was too intrusive).