Opinion ID: 553863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proper Forum for Award

Text: 24 The next issue we must address is whether this court's review of the OSHRC decision affirming the First Citation precluded the OSHRC from having jurisdiction to consider Phoenix's EAJA application for fees and expenses. Relying on 5 U.S.C. section 504(c)(1) 2 , the Secretary argues that the EAJA clearly prohibits agency adjudicators from awarding fees and expenses relating to issues resolved on appeal. Therefore, according to the Secretary, only this court had jurisdiction to consider such a fee application. 25 The problem with adopting the Secretary's interpretation of the EAJA is that it requires us to overlook apparently conflicting language which Congress added in a subsequent amendment to the EAJA. In 1985 Congress amended the EAJA to provide that: 26 [w]hen the United States appeals the underlying merits of the adversary adjudication, no decision on an application for fees and other expenses ... shall be made under [5 U.S.C. Sec. 504] until a final and unreviewable decision is rendered by the court on the appeal or until the underlying merits of the case have been finally determined pursuant to the appeal. 27 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(a)(2). Even the Secretary admits that at first glance this section suggests that agencies retain authority to make fee awards in cases that have been appealed. Unfortunately the legislative history of this new section does not shed any light on the apparent conflict between it and section 504(c)(1). 28 After the 1985 amendment to the EAJA, the plain language of section 504(a)(2) provides that agencies retain authority to make fee awards in cases that the government appeals. As Phoenix points out, this provision only refers to government appeals because if the non-government party appealed, that party would not bother to submit a fee application because it obviously had not been the prevailing party. Phoenix argues that the only sensible interpretation of this new provision is that when there is an appeal of part of a case, the Commission retains jurisdiction to enter an EAJA award for the entire case after the appeal is over. 29 The rules of statutory construction require us to attempt to read these two apparently contradictory provisions in harmony. Therefore, we conclude that Congress intended that both the agency and the appellate court have jurisdiction to consider an application for attorney's fees under the EAJA if the appellate court has reviewed the agency decision. See, e.g., Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir.1985) (court should attempt to reconcile arguably contradictory statutory passages). The statutory scheme of the EAJA and the fact that courts have held that the OSHRC is analogous to a district court support our conclusion. 30 Our interpretation is supported by the analogous structure Congress mandated in 28 U.S.C. section 2412(d). Although this section deals with Article III courts, it outlines the same general procedures for EAJA applications. This court has previously held that 28 U.S.C. section 2412(d) does not mandate that the appellate court rule on EAJA applications in the first instance, even for issues reviewed on appeal. See United States v. 329.73 Acres of Land, 704 F.2d 800, 811-12 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc ). In 329.73 Acres of Land, this court held that while an appellate court hearing an appeal from a district court has jurisdiction to decide an EAJA application if it so chooses, rarely will the district court not be the appropriate tribunal to make the initial determination on the EAJA application. Id. at 811-12. Cf. Rose v. United States Postal Serv., 774 F.2d 1355, 1363-64 (9th Cir.1984) (EAJA application requires a ruling from the district court in the first instance); see also Ashton v. Pierce, 580 F.Supp. 440, 441 (D.C.Cir.1984) (district court rules on EAJA application for costs and expenses incurred in both the district court and the court of appeals). The rationale behind these decisions is that the district court, as factfinder, is in a better position to evaluate a request for attorney's fees than an appellate court. 31 This line of cases is applicable to the agency adjudication involved here because courts have held that the OSHRC is analogous to a federal district court. See In re Perry, 882 F.2d 534, 537 (1st Cir.1989). In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers v. OSHRC, the court stated that [t]he [C]ommission was envisioned by its creators to be similar to a district court. 671 F.2d 643, 652 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905, 103 S.Ct. 206, 74 L.Ed.2d 165 (1982). The court distinguished the OSHRC from other administrative bodies because it is a purely adjudicatory body. Like a district court, it has no duty or interest in defending its decision on appeal and it has no stake in the outcome of the litigation. Id.; see also Subcomm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 466 (Comm. Print 1971) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (OSHRC should be afforded the same authority as ... a judge); id. at 475 (remarks of Sen. Holland) (OSHRC should be considered a court); 116 Cong.Rec. 38708 (Nov. 24, 1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger) (characterizing OSHRC as an independent court). 32 Therefore, we hold that the OSHRC did indeed have jurisdiction to consider Phoenix's EAJA application for attorney's fees, even though the First Citation was appealed to this court. The plain language of Section 504(a)(2) indicates that the OSHRC retains jurisdiction to make fee awards in cases that have been appealed. The analogous statutory structure found in Title 28, which courts have interpreted as allowing district courts to award fees even if the decision was reviewed on appeal, coupled with the fact that courts have repeatedly held that Congress intended to treat the OSHRC as a district court, supports this interpretation.