Opinion ID: 1200797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Age as a Factor in the Penalty Determination.

Text: (20) Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court instructed the jury that in reaching its penalty determination it could consider, among the other statutory factors enumerated in section 190.3, ... the age of the defendant at the time of the crime.... Defendant maintains that the instruction, together with the prosecutor's argument, created a danger that the jury would consider defendant's age as an aggravating circumstance, a factor over which defendant had no control. The jury was properly instructed. In People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052], we explained that mere chronological age is not in and of itself an aggravating or mitigating factor. In our view, the word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience of morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue such age-related inference in every case. ( Id. at p. 302.) Here, the prosecutor argued that, I guess you can consider [defendant's] age at the time he killed his children, 32 years old. And how old he was at the time he killed Lisa, 52. And how old he is now, 54. The point to be made here ( sic ) the defendant is not a young man, a man whose hormones are driving him out of control perhaps, or a man who just doesn't have experience, who was still in the midst of a rebellious youth. These comments were plainly directed at an age-related matter (defendant's maturity) and were not improper argument. (21) However, the prosecutor also argued to the jury, You can consider Mr. Nicolaus' age also in terms of the fact that the death penalty for Mr. Nicolaus will not deprive him of a long or potentially productive life as it would a young man. This was clearly improper argument. It did not purport to refer to any age-related matter that might have impacted defendant's character. Instead, it implied that the life of an individual more advanced in years might somehow be worth less than that of a younger individual. Although such a concept may have valid application in the determination of certain compensatory tort damages, it has no proper place in a death penalty case. `[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment ... requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.' ( Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989, 98 S.Ct. 2954], quoting Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 304 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961, 96 S.Ct. 2978].) The comment in question bore no relation to this defendant's individual character or background, or to the circumstances of this particular offense. We have determined that the improper argument was nonprejudicial. The comment was very brief, and presented no new factual matter for consideration by the jury, which was already well aware of defendant's age. The aggravating evidence in this case  in particular, the circumstances of defendant's planned and premeditated murder of his ex-wife (§ 190.3, factor (a)), and his prior conviction of the murders of his three children (§ 190.3, factor (c))  was, simply put, overwhelming. The one-sentence comment could not have affected the penalty verdict.