Opinion ID: 3005831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smith’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 Motion

Text: 7 Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 8 of 9 We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, or based on a Brady violation, for abuse of discretion. United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002).1 Under Rule 33, a court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). However, a motion for a new trial grounded upon newly discovered evidence must be filed within three years of the verdict. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). Furthermore, to succeed on such a motion, a defendant must establish that: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the failure to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is material; and (5) a new trial would probably produce a different result. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). Motions for a new trial are highly disfavored, and we have advised that district courts should use great caution in granting such a motion based on newly discovered evidence. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Smith’s motion for a new trial. In this case, the jury convicted Smith on February 25, 2009, and Smith 1 We note that while Smith’s Rule 33 motion is not mentioned in the COA, a COA is not required to appeal from the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion for a new trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Moreover, the notice of appeal, filed in both the underlying criminal prosecution as well as the civil habeas proceedings, designated the District Court’s order denying both the § 2255 motion and the Rule 33 motion as the subject of this appeal. 8 Case: 14-15118 Date Filed: 09/30/2015 Page: 9 of 9 filed his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence on October 19, 2012, more than three years after the verdict. Accordingly, the District Court did not err by dismissing Smith’s motion as time barred under Rule 33(b)(1). Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). Moreover, even assuming Smith’s motion for appropriate relief relating to his § 2255 motion can be construed as a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, his motion does not succeed. Here, the newly discovered evidence related to Dyson’s involvement in an unrelated information-for-sale scheme. Throughout habeas proceedings, Smith argued that the result of his trial would have been different had he been allowed to impeach Dyson regarding his involvement in this scheme. Thus, Smith failed to establish that the evidence discovered after trial was not impeachment evidence, and the District Court did not err by denying his motion. See Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1287. AFFIRMED. 9