Opinion ID: 612350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Taking the claims out of order, we begin with petitioner’s contention that the evidence 2 Although petitioner argued that it was unclear whether the state court’s adjudication of claims in a summary or incomplete fashion would be entitled to this deference, the Supreme Court has since held that deference under § 2254(d) applies to claims adjudicated on the merits even when the state court’s decision is unaccompanied by any reasoning. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). No. 09-1294 7 was insufficient to support a finding that he constructively possessed either the cocaine seized from inside the residence or the firearm found in the master bedroom and, therefore, that the evidence was insufficient to support one of his convictions for possession with intent to deliver cocaine or any of the firearm convictions.3 In support of this contention, petitioner relies on this court’s discussion of the proof required to establish constructive possession on direct appeal from a federal felon-inpossession conviction in United States v. Grubbs, 506 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007). There, this court explained that “the less evidence tying a defendant to a gun at the time of arrest, the greater the circumstantial evidence must be to support a conviction.” Id. (reversing conviction where gun was concealed in bed of the defendant’s brother, in a room where the defendant did not sleep, and the only evidence of possession was the report that defendant waived a gun that “looked like” the one seized during a confrontation in the street a month or two earlier). Not only was the circumstantial evidence more attenuated in Grubbs, but also we must be mindful of the double layer of deference that is applicable to this claim under AEDPA because the state court resolved this claim on the merits. “First, as in all sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, we must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 3 It is clear from the arguments presented that petitioner does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for possession with intent to deliver the cocaine found on his person. Nor does petitioner challenge the state court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that the drugs and weapon were in close enough proximity for the jury to reasonably infer that they were possessed at the same time. No. 09-1294 8 reasonable doubt.” Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1081 (2010). This is done without reweighing the evidence, re-evaluating the credibility of witnesses, or substituting our judgment for that of the jury. Id. Even if we might not have voted to convict, “we must uphold the jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty after resolving all disputes in favor of the prosecution.” Id. “Second, even were we to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, we must still defer to the state appellate court’s sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable.” Brown, 567 F.3d at 205. We may not grant the writ unless the state court’s decision was “objectively unreasonable,” or, in other words, no “fair minded jurists” could resolve the case in the way the state court did. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)); Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 577 (6th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 15, 2011) (No. 10A1075, 11-5328). As the Michigan Court of Appeals explained, constructive possession requires proof that the defendant had the right to exercise control over the contraband and knowledge of its presence. People v. Wolfe, 489 N.W.2d 748, 753-54 (Mich. 1992). Also, “possession may be joint, with more than one person actually or constructively possessing a controlled substance.” Id. at 753. A defendant may have constructive possession of a firearm if its location is known and it is reasonably accessible to him. People v. Burgenmeyer, 606 N.W.2d 645, 649 (Mich. 2000). Further, possession may be shown by circumstantial No. 09-1294 9 evidence and reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. People v. Meshell, 696 N.W.2d 754, 759 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). The question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence establishes a sufficient connection between the defendant and the contraband to support the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the substance. Wolfe, 489 N.W.2d at 754. Petitioner argues that no rational trier of fact could find that he constructively possessed the contraband seized from the residence when no fingerprints at all were found on the weapon, only one unidentified fingerprint was found on the false-bottomed coffee can, his driver’s license and the correspondence belonging to him bore his mother’s address, and the men’s clothing found on the floor and in the closet of the master bedroom was described only as being generally consistent with petitioner’s size. On the contrary, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that, although petitioner used his mother’s address, he had sufficient connection to the Karen Court residence and the bedroom where cocaine, cocaine packaging paraphernalia, and the semi-automatic handgun were found to support a finding of constructive possession. Petitioner’s bank statements from the previous two months were on the night stand and a letter to him from the Friend of the Court was on the kitchen counter. His nickname and signature were etched on the detached cover of the spiral notebook found in the night stand that contained a drug tally sheet. There was testimony that petitioner dated and socialized with Broome, sometimes spending the night at her home, and men’s clothing was on the floor by the bed and in the closet under the shelf where the brown tote bag was found. Petitioner was also seen leaving No. 09-1294 10 the premises on the day of the search, and he returned an hour later with more than 120 grams of crack cocaine in his pocket. Moreover, even if we were not convinced that the evidence was sufficient, we cannot conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the Michigan Court of Appeals to determine that a rational trier of fact could find that constructive possession had been established beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence introduced at trial. Brown, 567 F.3d at 205.