Opinion ID: 1356669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Proper Booking Questions Is Admissible to Prove Appellant's Mental Condition

Text: Turning to the evidence secured during the booking interview proper, I now consider whether it was validly admitted in this case. I must respectfully dissent from those portions of the majority opinion ( ante, p. 389) which hold that, although the police may obtain neutral information necessary for proper jail administration, the state may not thereafter use the arrestee's responses to legitimate booking questions in any manner in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The initial receipt of this information was clearly authorized. It trenched on no constitutional rights and the subsequent use of evidence of the booking interview should be analogized to the disclosure of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence. Recently we addressed this distinction in Cramer v. Tyars (1979) 23 Cal.3d 131 [151 Cal. Rptr. 653, 588 P.2d 793]. We there said (at p. 139): We conclude that, while appellant could not be questioned about matters that would tend to incriminate him, he was subject to call as a witness and could be required to respond to nonincriminatory questioning which may have revealed his mental condition to the jury, whose duty it was to determine whether he was mentally retarded. Reason and common sense suggest that it is appropriate under such circumstances that a jury be permitted fully to observe the person sought to be committed, and to hear him speak and respond in order that it may make an informed judgment as to the level of his mental and intellectual functioning. The receipt of such evidence may be analogized to the disclosure of physical as opposed to testimonial evidence and may in fact be the most reliable proof and probative indicator of the person's present mental condition. (See People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529, 533-534 ... [voice identification not within the privilege against self-incrimination]; People v. Arnold (1966) 243 Cal. App.2d ... [handwriting identification not within the privilege against self-incrimination].) Similarly, a defendant even in a criminal proceeding may be required to give `real or physical' evidence in contrast to `communications or testimony' in the sense of disclosing knowledge. Thus the criminal defendant may be asked to stand, wear clothing, hold items, or speak words. ( People v. Ellis, supra, at pp. 533-534; People v. Sims (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 544, 552....) It was proper for the jury to have the benefit of its own observations of Tyars' responses, both in manner and content, to the court's questions. (See also People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 114-115 [137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135] [consent to search need not be preceded by Miranda warnings].) Here, the trial court in careful instructions to the jury (see ante, pp. 376-377) specifically limited the admission of the interview evidence, the court stating, inter alia, It is not being offered for you to consider the truth of those statements.... He is not using it for the truth of the statements in the tape, but for the thought process, the clarity of voice, the intonation, whatever you can get from it.... Thus, the majority's claim that the accuracy of the contents of the disclosures was relevant ( ante, p. 382), ignores the explicit instructions of the trial court to the jury and is wholly divorced from the context of this case. The limited purpose for which evidence of the otherwise proper booking interview was admitted distinguishes this case from those relied upon by the majority to support their conclusion that admission of the evidence violated Miranda. It is the nontestimonial character of this evidence rather than its nonhearsay purpose which removes it from the reach of Miranda. Without exception the cases cited by the majority wherein the Miranda rule was applied to exclude evidence admitted for a nonhearsay purpose all involved testimonial evidence. By making this distinction, I do not mean to suggest that there may not be other valid bases on which evidence secured during a proper booking interview may be admitted. I have attempted here only to determine the validity of the basis on which the evidence was admitted in this case.