Opinion ID: 1910245
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trust's Counterclaim

Text: [¶ 16] The Trust argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a summary judgment on the Trust's counterclaim seeking to limit the scope of the Third Beach easement to a strict construction of swimming and sunbathing. Specifically, the Trust argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by construing too broadly the terms swimming and sunbathing to include walking the beach, reading a book, collecting shells, picnicking, and playing Frisbee or beach volleyball, as activities incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of the easement. [¶ 17] We vacate the trial court's judgment on the Trust's motion for a summary judgment on its own counterclaim, but do so for reasons distinct from those advanced by the Trust. The determination of the activities incidental or necessary to the proper enjoyment of an easement is a question of fact. See, e.g., Poire v. Manchester, 506 A.2d 1160, 1163 (Me. 1986) (holding that the issue of whether the actual use of an easement was proper and reasonable is a question of fact); Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 541, 175 A.2d 732, 738 (1961). In Beckwith, the holder of a profit a prendre, reserving the right to take gravel or granite from the real property of another, arranged to have holes drilled into the property in search of the ore. Id. at 533-34, 175 A.2d at 734. Although the holes were filled, the property owner brought suit for trespass, claiming that the act of drilling was beyond the scope of the easement. Id. We vacated the trial court's judgment granting the holder's motion for a summary judgment, concluding that the issue of what was reasonable for the proper exercise of a profit a prendre was an issue of fact, not law. Id. at 541, 175 A.2d at 738. In doing so, we noted the similarities between profits and easements. Id. at 536-37, 175 A.2d at 735-36. We determined that where the record reflects a dispute as to what constitutes a proper exercise of the profit, summary judgment for either party [is] not in order. Id. at 541, 175 A.2d at 738. [¶ 18] In this case, the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the Third Beach easement includes incidental and necessary activities such as picnicking, or playing volleyball or Frisbee. The question of which, if any, activities are encompassed within the easement is a factual one that requires an evidentiary hearing. The record likewise reflects that there is a factual dispute between the parties as to what activities are incidental or necessary. Accordingly, here, as in Beckwith, summary judgment is inappropriate.