Opinion ID: 1880592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allen Wheatley Jr.'s statement [i]t was the Bloods.

Text: The state argues that Allen Jr.'s statement [i]t was the Bloods was properly admitted as a dying declaration, or, alternatively, that it was an excited utterance. Ferguson contends that the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration because Allen Jr. did not believe his death was imminent, nor was it an admissible excited utterance. He also argues that the statement lacks the required foundation of personal knowledge because Allen Jr. did not have the opportunity to view his shooter. Ferguson asserts that Allen Jr.'s statement [i]t was the Bloods was inadmissible as a dying declaration because there was no evidence that Allen Jr. believed he was going to die. Under Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(2), hearsay evidence is admissible as a dying declaration if the statement [was] made by a declarant while believing that the declarant's death was imminent and the statement concerned the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death.  (Emphasis added.) The offeror of such a statement must show that the declarant was in actual danger of death and had lost all hope of recovery. Because of the dangerous nature of dying declarations, the prerequisites to their admission must be clearly established. The state of mind of the declarant is the key to admissibility and thus, this state of mind must be shown by competent evidence and must not be left to speculation and conjecture. State v. Lubenow, 310 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Minn.1981). This court has strictly construed the dying declaration hearsay exception. State v. Bergeron, 452 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn.1990). An example of this strict construction is found in State v. Bergeron , in which the declarant asked, `I'm dying, aren't I? Id. The paramedic responded, Well, you're not doing real good. Id. The Bergeron court stated that the declarant's statement I'm dying, aren't I? alone was arguably insufficient evidence that he believed death was imminent. Id. The court went on, however, to infer the declarant's state of mind by examining the circumstances surrounding the statement. The declarant was lying in a pool of blood with eight stab wounds; his lungs and abdominal cavity were filling with blood; his breathing was extremely labored; he was going into severe shock; and he died within two hours of making the statement. Id. The court held that the district court made a permissible inference that the declarant thought he was dying at the time he made his statement. Id. Ferguson contends that there is evidence that Allen Jr. did not believe that death was imminent. Jabar testified that he did not think that Allen Jr. was going to die [b]ecause he was sitting there, and he was talking to me and telling me he was going to fight. He was going to be okay. However, the first police officer to arrive at the scene went to Allen Jr. and asked him how he was doing, to which he responded, It's not good. The officer asked Allen Jr. who shot him, and he responded, [I]t was the Bloods. As in Bergeron, Allen Jr.'s statement is probably insufficient in itself to establish that he believed death was imminent. The statement [i]t's not good is ambiguous, especially in light of his statement made minutes before that he was going to be okay. Under Bergeron, however, this court will look to surrounding circumstances to infer that a declarant believed death was imminent. 452 N.W.2d at 923. Allen Jr. had just been shot in the stomach, he was bleeding profusely, he was fading in and out of consciousness, and he died within hours of making the statement. All of these circumstances together are sufficient to support an inference that Allen Jr. believed that his death was imminent. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Allen Jr.'s statement [i]t was the Bloods was a dying declaration. Because we conclude that Allen Jr.'s statement was a dying declaration, we need not address whether the statement was also an excited utterance. The more difficult question with respect to Allen Jr.'s statement is whether the statement possessed the requisite foundation for admissibility. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 602 states that a witness cannot testify to a matter unless that witness has personal knowledge of that matter. The comments to this rule provide that the declarant of a hearsay statement, like a witness, must have personal knowledge before a statement is admissible under a hearsay exception. Minn. R. Evid. 602 comment. For dying declarations, a declarant must have had actual observation or opportunity for observation of the fact which he relates. 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1445(2) James H. Chadbourn rev. (1974). The burden of showing that the witness had an adequate opportunity to make such an observation is on the person offering the statementin this instance, the state. McCormick on Evidence § 10 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed. 1992). In ruling on the foundation of Allen Jr.'s statement [i]t was the Bloods, the district court concluded that the statement was Allen Jr.'s conclusion based on what happened earlier and it is his opinion which is permissible in this situation. This is clearly the wrong standard. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Shepard v. United States, a dying declaration is inadmissible if the setting of the occasion satisfies the [court], or in reason ought to satisfy [the court], that the speaker is giving expression to suspicion or conjecture, and not to known facts. 290 U.S. 96, 101, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933). In cases where the dying declarant is identifying his killer, courts should apply especially stringent admissibility rules. See 41 C.J.S. Homicide § 288(b) (1991). If the declarant's identification is simply a result of reasoning from collateral facts, the statement should not be admitted. Id. Here, the district court stated that Allen Jr.'s statement was a conclusion based on earlier events. Moreover, both at the pretrial hearing and in its closing argument, the state admitted that Allen Jr. did not see his shooter. Because Allen Jr. had no personal knowledge and did not see his shooter at the time of the shooting, we conclude that his statement [i]t was the Bloods was mere speculation that lacked foundation. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when it admitted this statement. Even though Allen Jr.'s statement was improperly admitted, Ferguson is not entitled to a new trial if this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997). In applying harmless error impact analysis, we ask, What effect did the jury's hearing [the improperly admitted evidence] actually have on the guilty verdict rendered and whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the error. Id. In applying this test, we look to the manner in which the improperly admitted evidence  the dying declaration  was presented, whether it was highly persuasive, whether it was used in closing argument, and whether the defense effectively countered it. See Maurer v. Department of Corrections, 32 F.3d 1286, 1289 (8th Cir.1994). When the dying declaration was introduced through the police officer's testimony, the officer admitted that Allen Jr. may have just been guessing when he stated that [i]t was the Bloods. Moreover, the state did not argue to the jury that Allen Jr. actually saw his shooter. During its closing argument, the state admitted that [n]obody saw Alonzo Ferguson pull the trigger here. The defense as well argued in its closing statement that Allen Wheatley, Jr., could not see who shot him. He has no idea who shot him. When he said `[i]t was the Bloods,' we don't know if he's right or wrong. Furthermore, although the district court did not directly instruct the jury on the use of Allen Jr.'s statement, it did give a general instruction on the use of witness identifications: Testimony has been introduced in this case tending to identify [Ferguson] as the person observed at the time of the alleged offense. You should carefully evaluate this testimony. In doing so, you should consider such factors as the opportunity of the witness to see the person at the time of the alleged offense, the length of the time the person was in the witness's view, the circumstances of that view including light conditions and the distance involved, the stress the witness was under at the time, the lapse of time between the alleged offense and the identification. We assume that the jury follows a court's instructions. See State v. Forcier, 420 N.W.2d 884, 885 n.1 (Minn.1988). Therefore, we assume that the jury applied the court's instruction to Allen Jr.'s statement. Although the statement was inadmissible speculation, the jury had the information necessary to determine that Allen Jr.'s statement was nothing more than speculation. Given the court's limiting instruction and the state's admission that Allen Jr. did not see his shooter, we conclude that the verdict against Ferguson was surely unattributable to the error of admitting Allen Jr.'s statement [i]t was the Bloods. See Juarez, 572 N.W.2d at 292.