Opinion ID: 2831677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶105. At trial, the circuit judge granted jury instruction S-8 defining insanity over Crawford’s objection. Both at trial and on appeal, Crawford’s counsel has argued that this instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof to him. I agree, so I would reverse his conviction and remand for a new trial. ¶106. This Court has long held that the burden of proof in a criminal case never shifts to the defendant, and that the State ultimately bears the burden to prove that a defendant is sane at 42 the time of the crime.9 But this Court has also long explained that each defendant is presumed sane, and that no evidence of sanity need be offered unless the evidence produced at trial creates reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s sanity.10 It is only then that the State need prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is sane.11 ¶107. Some of this Court’s insanity cases, however, have begun their articulation of the M’Naghten test with the phrase “it must be clearly proved.”12 For example, in White v. State, this Court stated: In Mississippi to establish the defense of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party accused was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of mind as to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know it was wrong.13 The jury instruction at issue in this case mirrored that language. It stated: THE COURT instructs the jury that the defendant, CHARLES RAY CRAWFORD, has raised the defense of insanity in this case. The terms and concepts of “sanity” and “insanity” as used in the jury instructions and in this case are legal terms and concepts and not medical terms. 9 Williams v. State, 205 Miss. 515, 527-28, 39 So. 2d 3, 6 (1949). 10 Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 276 (1879). 11 Id. 12 M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep 718, 10 Cl & F. 200, 1 Car. & Kirw. 130 (H.L. 1843); White v. State, 542 So. 2d 250, 252 (Miss. 1989) (citing United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1974); Edwards v. State, 441 So. 2d 84 (Miss. 1983); Palmer v. State, 427 So. 2d 111 (Miss. 1983)). 13 White, 542 So. 2d at 252 (citing McCracken, 488 F.2d at 406; Edwards, 441 So. 2d at 84; Palmer, 427 So. 2d at 111) (emphasis added). 43 The legal test for insanity under the law of the State of Mississippi is referred to as the M’Naghten Rule. The M’Naghten Rule states: to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing of the act for which the defendant has been indicted that the defendant was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as to not know the nature and quality of the act the defendant was doing, or, if the defendant did know the nature and quality of the act, that the defendant did not know it was wrong. Stated more succinctly, the test for insanity is whether the defendant was unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time the act was committed. The question of insanity is for the jury to determine. Furthermore, the jury is not bound by any expert’s testimony and may accept or reject it in whole or in part. The Court instructs the jury that even should you find that the defendant was suffering from a mental illness, an emotional problem, or some other condition or problem which could be classified as a “disease of the mind,” you may not find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity unless you also find from all of the evidence in this case that the defendant’s condition left the defendant unable to distinguish right from wrong at the time the act was committed. ¶108. While this jury instruction mirrors language that has been used in this Court to describe the M’Naghten test, it does not conform to this Court’s articulation of the burden of proof in insanity cases. The instruction clearly and improperly shifted the burden to Crawford. In White, in which this Court used the language mirrored by the instruction, the Court went on to explain thoroughly the burden of proof in these cases.14 The Court stated that: There is a presumption that an accused is sane and, therefore, the burden is initially on the accused to introduce evidence creating a reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time of the act. However, once the accused has overcome 14 White, 542 So. 2d at 252. 44 this initial burden, it is the burden of the State to present sufficient evidence to prove the accused’s sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.15 ¶109. While the defendant bears the initial burden to create reasonable doubt as to his sanity, the State ultimately bears the burden to prove that the defendant is sane. And there is a substantial difference between instructing the jury that the defendant must first create reasonable doubt, and that it must be clearly proven that the elements of M’Naghten insanity exist. ¶110. Said differently, it strains reason to say that this instruction merely referenced the initial burden the defendant bears to create reasonable doubt because the defendant need only create some reasonable doubt, not establish all of the M’Naghten elements. And it is equally unreasonable to say that this instruction never explicitly says the defendant bears the burden because, logically, only a defendant would endeavor to prove he is insane. ¶111. That said, jury instructions must be read as a whole to determine whether they adequately instruct the jury on the relevant law.16 Jury instruction S-4 stated that if the jury found the elements of rape proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it must find the defendant guilty unless the State “failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, CHARLES RAY CRAWFORD, was sane at the time the defendant committed the rape.” ¶112. While this instruction properly placed the burden on the State to prove sanity, the instructions read as a whole do not adequately instruct the jury. Conflicting instructions do 15 Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 16 Williams v. State, 134 So. 3d 732, 737 (Miss. 2014) (quoting Clark v. State, 40 So. 3d 531, 544 (Miss. 2010)). 45 not properly instruct the jury.17 The majority opinion stands in stark contrast to this principle. Here, one instruction put the burden on the State to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt and another put the burden on the defendant clearly to prove insanity. “It is well settled that it is reversible error to give contradictory or conflicting jury instructions.”18 But today’s majority concludes that conflicting jury instructions are of no concern because the Court assumes that the jury will select the correct one without any guidance to do so. So I respectfully dissent. KITCHENS AND KING, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.