Opinion ID: 510975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees to the Government

Text: 44 We have no difficulty with the district court's determination of fees due the government. That determination--that 42.6 hours was a reasonable amount of time to spend on research, writing several motions and a 26-page memorandum which capably and concisely covered several legal issues, coupled with in-court appearances--is plainly within the range of the court's discretion. This appeal does, however, raise a question of first impression in this circuit, as to whether the district court abused its discretion in the award of $100 an hour for the Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case. 45 We have no doubt that the government may recover under Rule 11 when confronted with a frivolous action. See, e.g., Engh v. United States, 658 F.Supp. 698 (N.D.Ill.1987) (government recovery of Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous suit by taxpayers). The difficult question is that of the reasonable hourly rate for government attorneys. At first blush, it seems inappropriate for the services of an Assistant United States Attorney to be valued at some kind of market rate. However, upon reflection, we can perceive no difference between the situation of an Assistant U.S. Attorney and that of a public interest lawyer whose services, the Supreme Court has held, are to be valued at a market rate, even though he or she, like Assistant U.S. Attorneys, had no regular billing rate. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). 46 Finally, we have considered but reject the notion that, in a case such as this, in which the award of counsel fees to a plaintiff who prevails against the government is limited by EAJA, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412 (1982), any award of sanctions to a government defendant should be limited to the amount allowable under EAJA. The argument is attractive, i.e., that the government should not be entitled to collect from Bass as a sanction more than he could collect from it had Napier prevailed, and thus that EAJA sets the prevailing rate in such cases. However, to apply the EAJA standard would result in counsel for the Legion being paid at a higher rate than the government, an untoward result, particularly in this case, where government counsel used its time so much more economically. 47 Moreover, since EAJA was not intended to do any more than make it possible for certain litigants to recover modest fees against the government for prevailing in certain lawsuits, we see no reason to extend its umbrella to an area that it was not intended to cover. Congress, by its limited waiver of sovereign immunity, intended to limit the government's liability, not its recovery. Accord Harris v. Marsh, 679 F.Supp. 1204, 1333 n. 210 (E.D.N.C.1987) (stating that EAJA does not set $75 per hour cap on attorneys' fees sought by government counsel).