Opinion ID: 1172684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Victim Impact and Execution Impact Evidence

Text: In the penalty phase of the trial, Frank Hoerner's mother was prepared to read a statement to the jury about the impact that Frank's death had on his family. Denise Stenson's father and sister [17] were prepared to testify about the impact that Stenson's execution would have on the three Stenson children. [18] The trial court did not allow either the victim impact statement or the execution impact statement. The trial court stated that while there was no constitutional bar to such evidence, he questioned whether under Washington statutes it was relevant to the question the jury was to answer. The court held that the fact that Stenson had children who would be left without a parent if he were executed was certainly a factor about him which was relevant, and the fact that he had a caring family was also relevant and admissible. However, the trial court explained that the direct question of the impact on individual family members could not be asked but that the relationships with his family and his children would be admitted, and the defense could argue about the role Stenson could serve in those relationships. While all of the evidence of the relationships and the potential continuing relationships were admissible, the direct question whether an individual family member would be devastated by Stenson's execution was ruled to be too much of an appeal to emotion. The trial court stated: It appears to me that the impact upon the family members of the defendant of a sentence of death is self-evident. To the extent that there is testimony as to the specific impact upon any individual, that testimony would appear to go not to mitigation factor that has to do with the defendant but mitigation factor that has to do with another individual, which is why I have ruled that the direct question as to what the impact is on you would not be admissible. In relation to the three children, there are some significant subtleties and differences. I believe that testimony that there are three children, testimony whose care they are in, testimony as to whether or not their relationship with their father could be maintained and testimony as to whether or not that relationship would be beneficial in some form would not be precluded, in my opinion, under the terms of my current order. Report of Proceedings (penalty phase) at 308-09. The trial court granted the State's motion prohibiting any witnesses from testifying as to their opinion of what sentence the jury should impose. This ruling is not challenged and is correct. [19] The defense offered evidence from the Defendant's friends and family members that they loved him, had a close relationship with him, and would continue to have a relationship with him if he were in prison. The children's grandfather (Denise Stenson's father) testified that he and his wife were raising the children, that the children had been taken regularly to visit their father in jail, and that Stenson's children would be allowed to continue to have a relationship with him if he were in prison. A mitigation specialist, who had prepared a binder of materials about Stenson, was allowed to introduce the book, which included many family photos of him as a child and as an adult with his children. At the time of Stenson's trial, this Court had not yet ruled on the admissibility of victim impact evidence in a death penalty case. Subsequently, in Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 617-633, 888 P.2d 1105, we held there is no per se constitutional bar to the admission of victim impact evidence in a capital case; the trial court has discretion to admit victim impact evidence under Const. art. I, § 35 (amend. 84). Victim impact evidence refers to evidence given by the victim of the crime (or a representative) which describes the victim or the effect of the crime on the victim and his or her family. Gentry, 125 Wash.2d at 617, 888 P.2d 1105. The Defendant in this case now argues: that the exclusion of the execution impact evidence violated his right to present mitigation evidence; that it violated equal protection to afford a murder victim's family member the right to present victim impact evidence if the defendant did not have a right to present execution impact evidence; that the rights of the Stenson children to make a victim impact statement under RCW 7.69.030 had been violated; and that the exclusion of the statement by Denise Stenson's father violated Denise Stenson's right under Const. art. I, § 35 (amend. 84) to make a statement at sentencing. In a recent capital punishment case from this Court, we addressed the issue of whether the exclusion of victim impact evidence in a trial conducted prior to our decision in Gentry was reversible error. State v. Brown, ___ Wash.2d ___, 940 P.2d 546 (1997). In Brown, the trial court had refused to admit the testimony of the victim's father as victim impact evidence. We explained: If Gentry had been decided before the trial in this case, the trial court could have, in its discretion, admitted the testimony of [the victim's father] as victim impact evidence at the penalty phase. But it would not have been error not to admit it. At any rate, the trial court did not commit error in denying victim impact evidence in this case. Brown, at 940 P.2d 598. This holding answers Defendant Stenson's contentions that his sentence should be reversed because the trial court refused to allow Frank Hoerner's mother's statement or any other victim impact statements on Denise Stenson's behalf or on behalf of her children. This decision comports with the state constitution and our state statute, since the right to make a victim impact statement at sentencing belongs not to the defendant but to the victim. Const. art. I, § 35 (amend. 84); [20] RCW 7.69.030. Since the trial court did not allow any victim impact evidence, Stenson's contention that it violates equal protection to disallow execution impact evidence when victim impact evidence is admitted is irrelevant in this case. The question remaining is whether the exclusion of the execution impact evidence was reversible error in a case where victim impact evidence was properly excluded. While all relevant mitigating circumstances must be allowed in the sentencing phase of a capital case, the question is whether the effect the execution would have on the Defendant's family members is a relevant factor for the jury to consider. What mitigation evidence is admissible in a special sentencing proceeding is determined by RCW 10.95.060(3) and .070. RCW 10.95.060(3) states in part: The court shall admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence, including hearsay evidence and evidence of the defendant's previous criminal activity.... RCW 10.95.070 provides: In deciding the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4) [Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency?], the jury ... may consider any relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: [list of factors]. The list of factors in RCW 10.95.070 relates to facts about the defendant or to the circumstances of the crime and hence relates specifically to the defendant's culpability for the capital offense. Even victim impact evidence is about the direct harm caused by the crime which the defendant decided to commit. In Pirtle, [21] we explained that [d]espite [the defendant's] assertions to the contrary, mitigating evidence is not defined as any evidence, regardless of its content or relevance, that would disincline the jury to impose the penalty of death. Mitigating evidence is that which in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 671, 904 P.2d 245 (quoting Bartholomew II, 101 Wash.2d at 647, 683 P.2d 1079). The Supreme Court has held that the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any aspect of the offense that the defendant proffers. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951-52, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (jury must be able to consider any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or the circumstances of the crime); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 876-77, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). However, nothing limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. at 2965 n. 12. We recognize there are cases in which the trial court has allowed evidence regarding the impact an execution would have on the defendant's family. E.g., Benn, 120 Wash.2d at 647, 845 P.2d 289; Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 43, 113 S.Ct. 528, 532-33, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). However, in those cases, the admissibility of such evidence was not an issue on appeal. This Court has not addressed whether execution impact evidence must be admitted as a mitigating circumstance, but several other states' high courts have recently considered this issue. In People v. Sanders, 11 Cal.4th 475, 905 P.2d 420, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 115, 136 L.Ed.2d 66 (1996), the California Supreme Court found that the impact of the defendant's execution on his family may be excluded. In the Sanders case, the defendant argued that the defendant's sister should be allowed to testify about stigma to the family which would result from an execution and that the impact on the defendant's family, not only in grief, but in stigma, should be admitted. The trial court refused to admit the testimony. On appeal, the defendant relied on (1) Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), which held that the sentencer not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death, and (2) Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), [22] for the proposition that if victim impact evidence is relevant to the jury's sentencing choice, the impact of the defendant's execution on his family is equally pertinent and admissible. These are the arguments Stenson raises in this case. The Supreme Court of California found the cases inapposite and rejected the arguments. The Court said: The specific questions whether family members would prefer that defendant not be executed or believe that a death sentence will stigmatize them are not, however, strictly relevant to the defendant's character, record, or individual personality. Moreover, while the impact on the victim's family is arguably relevant to show the specific harm caused by the crime and the blameworthiness of the defendantfactors the United States Supreme Court has found relevant to the appropriate punishmentthe impact on the defendant's family is not comparably relevant to mitigate the specific harm of the crime or its blameworthiness. Sanders, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d at 790, 905 P.2d at 459. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also considered the question and concluded that mitigation evidence must be relevant to a defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense, and that potential impact on a third party is not relevant to those issues and could therefore be excluded. The court explained that although testimony concerning the potential impact of an execution on a third party may be excluded, a defendant is nevertheless able to provide a wealth of character evidence as revealed by his relationships with his family members. The court went on to say that even if the trial court's refusal to allow the jury to consider the impact of the defendant's execution on his wife and children as mitigating factors was an error, the error would have been harmless because the defendant presented the jury with a multitude of character evidence that directly focused on his relationship with his wife and children. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 680 A.2d 677, 713 (1996); see also State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 645 A.2d 734 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed.2d 873 (1996) (whether the defendant's execution would cause excessive emotional hardship to his mother neither related to the defendant's character or record nor to the circumstances of the offense and rather focused on the potential impact on a third party and was properly excluded). In the present case, the trial court did allow all character and background evidence, including evidence of Stenson's relationship with his family and friends and any circumstances of the crime which he wished to present. The court only excluded direct statements of how his execution might affect his family members. The witnesses' proposed testimony, which in fact was nothing more than their opinions as to the sentence for the Defendant that they thought might be best for the Stenson children, was not relevant to the Defendant's character or background and hence was properly excluded. As we concluded in Pirtle, this evidence does not relate to the Defendant's character, background or to the crime; it has nothing to do with extenuating circumstances and has no bearing on the Defendant's moral culpability. We agree with the California Supreme Court and the New Jersey Supreme Court that the potential impact of the Defendant's execution on third parties is not relevant. We hold there was no error in excluding both victim impact and execution impact evidence.