Opinion ID: 2115174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sec 26, Art. IV, Wisconsin Constitution.

Text: The plaintiffs contend ch. 459, Laws of 1961, constitutes a legislative grant of extra compensation to public officers, agents, or servants after their services have been rendered or in some cases after the contract was entered into and furthermore constitutes an increase in compensation of a public officer during his term of office. The Wisconsin constitution, sec. 26, art. IV, [6] does not apply to counties. Sieb v. Racine (1922), 176 Wis. 617, 187 N. W. 989; Dandoy v. Milwaukee County (1934), 214 Wis. 586, 254 N. W. 98. The theory on which the plaintiffs predicate their argument is that the mandatory subjection of the county to the Fund constitutes a prohibitive legislative grant and, consequently, when the plaintiffs are required to make contributions to the Fund they are not doing so voluntarily but under compulsion which, in effect, is the act of the legislature. Likewise, on the same premise, the provision for withholding state aids or taxes and paying the same over to the Fund in satisfaction of prior-service obligations of one of the 26 counties is, in effect, a legislative grant of extra compensation. In the same category the plaintiffs would place the payment of state aids to counties by way of reimbursement under sec. 66.902 (6) (b), Stats. These four contentions of the plaintiffs are grounded upon the proposition that the payment or withholding of state aids or the reimbursement by the state for contributions amounts to extra compensation by the state. This contention was answered adversely to the plaintiffs in State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan, supra . That case held prior-service credits granted to a teacher did not constitute extra compensation for past services but under the plan was to be considered an encouragement and an inducement to teachers to remain in public service. The plaintiffs ask us to overrule this case and criticize it on the ground the court stated the annuity based on past service was not intended to be or operate as compensation for past services. It is pointed out by the plaintiffs that since the Dudgeon Case, sec. 26, art. IV, Wis. Const., was amended to provide that the section did not apply to increased benefits for teachers. We see no merit in this argument. Increased pension benefits are to be distinguished from contributions for funding a pension. The plaintiffs also claim some doubt has been cast on Dudgeon because of our decisions in State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1952), 262 Wis. 51, 53 N. W. (2d) 726, wherein a statute providing increased benefits for retired teachers was held unconstitutional on the ground it granted extra compensation, and in State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1953), 265 Wis. 558, 61 N. W. (2d) 903, wherein a statute providing for increased benefits for retired teachers was valid for those teachers who held themselves available for future emergency service. From these cases, it is reasoned some future service is necessary in consideration for the payment of past-service credits and, therefore, the Dudgeon Case cannot apply to the present facts because sec. 66.917 (3), Stats., provides the payment of earnings shall be a full and complete discharge of all claims for payment of services rendered by an employee during the period covered by such payment. The basic answer lies in the concept that contributions made to the pension fund are not compensation, much less extra compensation paid to public officers, agents, or servants. The payment of contributions may ultimately under some conditions inure to the benefit of the employee in the form of a pension benefit but this is not absolute or necessarily so and does not amount to compensation as that term is used in sec. 26, art. IV of the constitution.