Opinion ID: 864750
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Text: 5. Your telephone number __________ If none, write none 6. If you live outside the county seat, the number of miles you live from the courthouse __________ Miles __________ Sign your name The judge shall personally examine the answers of each juror prior to empaneling the jury and each juror who cannot complete the above form shall be disqualified as a juror and discharged. A list of any jurors disqualified for jury duty by reason of inability to complete the form shall be kept by the circuit clerk and their names shall not be placed in the jury box thereafter until such person can qualify as above provided. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 (emphasis added). Clearly, this statute provides that among other things a competent juror be able to read and write. In order to determine whether a prospective juror can read or write, a form is distributed with questions to filled out by the juror. Prior to empaneling the jury, the judge will review the questionnaire answers and any juror who is unable to complete the form shall be disqualified and discharged. ¶178. The record shows the following exchange: The Court: The law requires that all jurors be able to read and write. And in order to accomplish this, a form has been prescribed which consists of six questions. They must be answered by you, and 81 they must be answered by you in your own handwriting. Let me ask: Are each of you able to read and write? Do we have anyone sitting among us who cannot read and write? (No jurors respond in the affirmative.) The Court: That's very good for such a large pool or jurors. (Juror no. 293 responds.) Almost very good. Come forward please. Deputy Anderson: 293. (Conference at the bench between court and juror. ) The Court: Geneva Bradley? How far did you go in school? Juror Bradley: Sixth. Sixth grade. The Court: Well, you have to know our ABC's, you have to know how to count. Juror Bradley: I know all of that. I know all of that. The Court: Who filled this form here out? Juror Bradley: I got my sister-in-law. Her name is Debra. The Court: You got who to fill it out? Juror Bradley: My sister-in-law. Her name is Debra. The Court: Where is she? Juror Bradley: I don't know. The Court: You can't fill out your own form? Juror Bradley: I can fill out some things. The Court: What are you doing about your problem? are you - - do you know they have courses over in the library in Cleveland? Juror Bradley: I ain't going to school. I hadn't started to school because I have - - my mother is sick and stuff, I just hadn't yet. The Court: Do you have a driver's license? Juror Bradley: No. The Court: Why you don't have a driver's license? Juror Bradley: Well, I just hadn't gotten it. The Court: All right. you may go. Juror Bradley: Thank you. The Court: 293 (Juror no. 293 excused.) ¶179. Scott claims that Bradley was never asked directly whether she could read and understand documents. Scott then argues that it is just as plausible that she suffered from a physical limitation that prevented her from writing or driving than that she could not read or understand court documents. Scott continues this logic by citing to numerous cases concerning equal protection and citing cases that do not 82 allow the disabled to be excluded from jury service simply because of a disability. He concludes his argument by asserting that his conviction must be vacated because his constitutional rights were violated by excluding Juror Bradley from the jury without knowing why she was unable to complete the questionnaire. ¶180. This Court has upheld the requirement that jurors must have the ability to read and write. In Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 318-19 (Miss. 1999), a death penalty case, this Court held that Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 literacy requirements are constitutional. Other cases have stated the following: It is unclear from Milano's brief exactly what his complaint is in regards to Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 other than unconstitutionality. This statute provides that the jury venire can be composed of (1) qualified electors, (2) persons 21 or older, and (3) persons who can read and write. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-1. This Court has previously considered the exclusion of persons under age 21 from jury service and has consistently held that the exclusion does not violate the state or federal constitution. Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 666 (Miss.1990), rev'd on other grounds; Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 319 (Miss.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 826 (1987); Fermo v. State, 370 So.2d 930, 934 (Miss.1979); Joyce v. State, 327 So.2d 255, 261 (Miss.1976); Johnson v. State, 260 So.2d 436, 437 (Miss.1972). Additionally, this Court has also upheld the requirement that jurors are required to be literate. In Milano this Court relied upon Terrell v. State, 262 So.2d 179 (Miss.1972) which ruled on the predecessor statute to § 13-5-1, which also required that a prospective juror be able to read and write. The Court reasoned that with the mix of cases in the court system in addition to the numerous written documents that are introduced into evidence, the requirement that a juror be able to read and write is reasonable. Literacy requirements pursuant to § 13-5-1 are constitutional. Id. Indeed, in the murder case, Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1324, 1331 (Miss. 1990), this Court stated that the Legislature has the power to prescribe the qualifications for jurors and the right to impose reasonable qualifications for 83 jurors when such qualifications do not violate the constitutional rights of accused persons to be tried by an impartial jury. See also Jordan v. State, 786 So.2d 987, 1023-24 (Miss. 2001) (We have held that Mississippi's jury eligibility statute with regard to age and literacy is constitutional). ¶181. We find that this issue is without merit. The Legislature may impose reasonable requirements for qualifying a prospective juror. Wilson, 574 So.2d at 1331. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1 places a literacy requirement on prospective jurors which this Court has upheld on numerous occasions. This Court finds that the record reflects that the trial judge asked if there was anyone that could not read or write in the jury. While Juror Bradley did not initially respond, she did come up to the bench and explain that she had someone else filled out the questionnaire. She stated that she fill out some things on the form. ¶182. The statute requires that a prospective juror who cannot complete the above form shall be disqualified as a juror and discharged. Clearly, Juror Bradley stated that she could fill out some of the form and she had her sister-in-law actually fill out the form for her. This Court finds that the trial judge was within his discretion when he dismissed Juror Bradley based upon her answers and inability to complete the form. Scott's argument that Juror Bradley was perhaps suffering from a physical limitation and also that she was somehow a disabled person, this Court finds, is unfounded and speculative. Furthermore, we find that the last alternate juror in this case was juror 71, accordingly Juror Bradley as juror 293 would never have been on the jury in any event, and thus Scott cannot support a claim that Juror Bradley's discharge in any way affected the final make up of his jury panel. XXIII. Discrimination: Race of the victim and race of the offender. ¶183. Scott argues that there is discrimination on the application of the death penalty in Mississippi. In this case, Scott, a black male, was convicted of killing Lee, a white male. He claims that because he is a black defendant and the victim is white, the race differences increases his chances of receiving the death 84 penalty by 500%. Scott suggests a reexamination of McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). ¶184. The State argues that Scott never raised this issue at trial, and it is therefore barred. In the alternative, the State claims that Scott conceded that his argument is legally insufficient. Indeed, the brief filed by Scott contains a section starting at issue XXII entitled as preservation issues with a footnote stating: As this is a capital case, Appellant has raised several issues which either this Court or the United States Supreme Court has previously overruled. Appellant concedes the following issues are foreclosed by existing precedent of the court and under a normal appeal he would not address these issues; death, in its finality and byzantine rules of procedure, is different. These issues are raised solely on a good faith basis to provide this Court an opportunity to review its or the United States Supreme Court holdings (where so possible), as well as to protect Scott's full panoply of rights should counsel have misguaged the perceived strength of the issues raised herein and this Court deny Scott relief. Finally, Scott presents these issues in order to preserve these issues for federal review, either by the Supreme Court or lesser federal court. In McCleskey, the Court stated: Our analysis begins with the basic principle that a defendant who alleges an equal protection violation has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination. Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967). [FN10] A corollary to this principle is that a criminal defendant must prove that the purposeful discrimination had a discriminatory effect on him. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608, 1 0 5 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 8 4 L.Ed.2 d 547 (1985). Thus, to prevail under t h e Equal Protecti 85 o n Clause, McCle skey must prove t h a t t h e decisi onmak ers in h i s case acted with discri minat o r y purpo se. He offers n o evidenc e specific to his o w n case t h a t would support a n inferenc e that racial conside rations played a part in h i s sentenc e . Instead, 86 he relies solely on the Baldus study. [FN11] McCle skey argues that the Baldus study compel s an inferenc e that h i s sentenc e rests o n purpos e f u l discrimi nation. McCle skey's claim t h a t these statistic s are sufficie nt proof o f discrimi nation, without regard to the facts of a particul ar case, 87 would extend to all capital cases in Georgi a, at least where t h e victim w a s white and the defend ant is black. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-93 (footnotes omitted). Therefore, pursuant to McCleskey, Scott has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination and in that he must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. Id. Scott has cited no instance in the record where the decisionmakers in his capital murder case acted with a discriminatory purpose. In McCleskey, the United States Supreme Court found that the study was insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose.  Id. at 297. In the case sub judice, Scott only cites to some studies. In Underwood v. State, 708 So.2d 18, 38 (Miss. 1998), this Court reviewed whether the death penalty can be applied fairly or in compliance with equal protection when it is allegedly disproportionately applied against black defendants in Mississippi. This Court held: The United States Supreme Court rejected this identical argument in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). McCleskey argued that Georgia's capital punishment statute violated equal protection, based upon a study showing that black defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants, and defendants murdering whites were more likely to be sentenced to death than 88 defendants who murdered blacks. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-92, 107 S.Ct. at 1766-67. The Court held that in order to raise a successful claim of an equal protection violation, the criminal defendant must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. Id. at 292, 107 S.Ct. at 1767. McCleskey's only proof supporting his claim were the results of the study. The Court determined that due to the number of variables inherent in capital sentencing and the discretion allowed trial courts in implementing criminal justice, the use of statistical evidence was insufficient to prove purposeful discrimination. Id. at 292-97, 107 S.Ct. at 1767-70. Underwood has failed to offer any substantial proof that the death penalty is applied in a discriminatory manner in Mississippi today, or that he suffered discriminatory application of the law. Underwood's argument is based solely on insufficient statistical evidence and the bald assertion that had he been convicted of murdering an African-American instead of a white woman, he would have been sentenced to life imprisonment. We refuse to reverse Underwood's sentence of death based upon this assignment of error. 708 So.2d at 38. ¶185. This Court finds that Scott has not shown any proof as to how the decionsmakers in his case acted witha discriminatory intent. Without specific examples demonstrating discrimination by the decisionmakers, we find that there is nothing for this Court to review and make a ruling, accordingly this issue is without merit. XXIV. Aggravating Circumstance. ¶186. Scott argues that at least one and probably all three of the aggravating circumstances in this case were invalid. Thus, Scott contends that the remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial, and there is no option of reweighing or applying a harmless error analysis pursuant to Miss. Code Ann § 99-19-105.8 8 Miss Code Ann. § 99-19-105 states in part: (3) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: (a) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (b) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in Section 99-19-101; (c) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to 89 Scott states that the three (3) aggravating circumstances found by the jury were [w]hether (1) the capital offense was committed for the purpose or avoiding a lawful arrest, (2) the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery, and (3) the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The State correctly claims that only two of the three alleged aggravating circumstances were considered by the jury in their instructions.9 ¶187. The actual sentencing instruction, S-1A, stated in part: the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant; and (d) Should one or more of the aggravating circumstances be found invalid on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court shall determine whether the remaining aggravating circumstances are outweighed by the mitigating circumstances or whether the inclusion of any invalid circumstance was harmless error, or both... (5) The court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took into consideration. In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court, with regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to:
(b) Reweigh the remaining aggravating circumstances against the mitigating circumstances should one or more of the aggravating circumstances be found to be invalid, and (i) affirm the sentence of death or (ii) hold the error in the sentence phase harmless error and affirm the sentence of death or (iii) remand the case for a new sentencing hearing; or (c) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life. 9 Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(3) states in part that aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (d) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery... (e) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. (h) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. 90 To return that death penalty you must find that the mitigating circumstances - - those which tend to warrant the less severe penalty of life imprisonment without parole - - do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances - - those which tend to warrant the death penalty. Consider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed: (1) whether the capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, (2) Whether the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of the crime of robbery. You must unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of the preceding aggravating circumstances exists in this case to return the death penalty. If none of these aggravating circumstances are found to exist, the death penalty may not be imposed... ¶188. The jury verdict read into the record stated that the jury found the aggravating circumstances that the capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or protecting a lawful arrest and while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery. Accordingly, the alleged aggravating circumstance that the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel was not submitted to the jury and this Court finds that any argument referencing this alleged factor will not be considered by this Court. However, Scott does argue that the avoiding lawful arrest circumstance was invalid because there was insufficient evidence. He does not argue anything in regard to the second given aggravating circumstance of whether the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of the crime of robbery. Therefore, only the issue of whether the avoiding lawful arrest will be discussed by this Court. ¶189. In the post-conviction relief case,Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1206 (Miss. 2000), this Court set forth the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence to support an instruction for avoiding lawful arrest, stating: 91 Each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to 'cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 858 (Miss.1994) (quoting Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 153 (Miss.1991)). Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1206. ¶190. Thus, this Court must determine whether there is any credible evidence upon which the jury could find the aggravating circumstance in question. Id. (quoting Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524, 541 (Miss. 1997)). In McGilberry v. State, 843 So.2d at 29, this Court addressed the aggravating circumstance of whether McGilberry created a great risk of death to many persons. In its opinion this Court held that [i]f one aggravator is found to be invalid, we are authorized to reweigh the remaining aggravators against the mitigating circumstances and affirm, hold the error to be harmless, or remand for a new sentencing hearing. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(5)(b) (Rev. 2000). ¶191. Reviewing the facts of this case, this Court finds that there is abundant evidence to support the aggravating circumstance that the capital offense was committed by Scott for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest. Lurline testified that sometime after noon Scott saw her open the door to her house and he then shot at her two times. Lee was shot and killed in his driveway. Officer Haney spotted a car that met the description of the Lee's vehicle. He pursued the vehicle with his blue lights on, traveling up to 115 miles per hour at one point, yet the driver of the car never pulled over to the side of the road. By the time Officer Haney turned onto Bobo Road, the vehicle was gone leaving only tracks on the ground. When the police found the empty vehicle near an old gin, the driver was not present at the scene. Scott stopped at the Ivy's home around 12:30 to 1:00 p.m. in Bobo to ask for a ride home, both Doris and Steven noticed that Scott was sweating and that he had no jacket. Officer Estes testified that the Lee's 92 vehicle, a gun, a bloody jacket containing Scott's driver's license, a letter from Scott's girlfriend and some other items were found near the gin. While driving Scott home, Steven observed Scott looking at the gin. ¶192. This Court finds that the evidence shows that the person that Lurline identified as Scott was clearly trying to avoid lawful arrest. Sometime near noon, Scott shot at her twice when she came to her door and spoke to her husband, who was at that point still inside his automobile. Officer Haney pursued a driver in a vehicle that matched the description of the Lee's vehicle and despite flashing the blue lights and traveling near 115 miles per hour in pursuit, the driver never pulled the vehicle over the side of the road. The Lee's automobile was later found abandoned in the old gin by police. Various articles such as a bloody coat, gun, and Scott's driver's licence and letter from his girlfriend were found near the old gin and the Lee's abandoned automobile. ¶193. Other witnesses testified that Scott came by their house sweating and without a jacket around 12:30 to 1:00 p.m. asking for a ride home. On the drive back to his house, Scott looked over at the gin. Clearly, the preceding evidence supports an aggravating circumstances that Scott tried to avoid lawful arrest by shooting at a potential witness, Lurline, that could identify him; taking a vehicle that was not his and refusing to stop the vehicle when pursued by police; dumping items of evidence; and asking for a ride back home to get farther away from the crime scene rather than going to the police station. This Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to support the aggravating circumstance presented at trial. Therefore, this issue is without merit. XXV. Cumulative Error ¶194. Scott argues that the cumulative effect of the errors in his trial warrant reversal. In Wilburn v. State, 608 So.2d 702, 705 (Miss. 1992), this Court held that “individual errors, not reversible in themselves, may combine with other errors to make up reversible error.” The question that must be asked 93 in these instances is whether the defendant was deprived of a “fundamentally fair and impartial trial” as a results of the cumulative effect of all errors at trial. Id. If there is “no reversible error in any part, so there is no reversible error to the whole. McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130, 136 (Miss. 1987). ¶195. None of the issues raised by Scott in this assignment or any of those discussed previously, rise to the level of reversible error either standing alone or when considered together. The verdict finds substantial support in the evidence and Scott failed to demonstrate any procedural or substantive errors that warrant reversal. Based on the finding of no error, this Court finds that there is no cumulative effect for all the alleged errors and, therefore, his convictions and sentences should be affirmed by this Court. XXVI. Proportionality Review of Death Sentence ¶196. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3) (2000) requires this Court to perform a proportionality review of a death sentence in a capital case. Section 99-19-105(3) states: (3) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine: (a) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; (b) Whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in Section 99-19-101; (c) Whether the sentence of death is excessive of disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant; and (d) Should one or more of the aggravating circumstances be found invalid on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court shall determine whether the remaining aggravating circumstances are outweighed by the mitigating circumstances or whether the inclusion of any invalid circumstances was harmless error, or both. ¶197. After reviewing the record in this appeal as well as the death penalty cases listed in the appendix, we conclude that Scott's death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other factor. We further find that the evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury's finding of 94 statutory aggravating circumstances. In comparison to other factually similar cases where the death sentences was imposed, the sentence of death is neither excessive of disproportionate in this case. Finally, the jury did not consider any invalid aggravating circumstances. Therefore, we affirm the death sentence imposed in this case.