Opinion ID: 1214508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Distribution for Receipt of a Thing of Value

Text: According to Stults, the district court committed procedural error in applying the five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) for distribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain. Specifically, he asserts that insufficient evidence exists to show that he was aware that LimeWire would permit others to receive images from his computer. But the government contends that Stults's argument is without merit because the law of this circuit is that the enhancement automatically applies to a defendant who downloads and shares child pornography via a P2P file sharing network, as these networks exist for the purpose of users sharing files with one another. In the alternative, the government argues that even if the enhancement is not automatic, the district court took the additional step of finding that Stults was sufficiently computer savvy to know that he was allowing the distribution of child pornography. On appeal, our first task is to ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range. United States v. Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1120 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotations and citation omitted). A non-harmless error in calculating the guidelines range requires a remand for resentencing. Id. Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) provides for a five-level enhancement for [d]istribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain. `Distribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain' means any transaction, including bartering or other in-kind transaction, that is conducted for a thing of value, but not for profit. U.S. S.G. § 2G2.2 n.1. `Thing of value' means anything of valuable consideration. For example, in a case involving the bartering of child pornographic material, the `thing of value' is the child pornographic material received in exchange for other child pornographic material bartered in consideration for the material received. Id. `Distribution' means any act, including possession with intent to distribute, production, advertisement, and transportation, related to the transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. Id. Thus, distribution includes posting material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor on a website for public viewing but does not include the mere solicitation of such material by a defendant. Id. In United States v. Griffin, we held, as a matter of first impression, that a five-level enhancement for the distribution of child pornography for the receipt, or the expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain applied to a defendant who downloaded and shared child pornography files via an Internet P2P file-sharing network. 482 F.3d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir.2007). In Griffin, police, pursuant to a search warrant, seized a computer from a residence. Id. at 1010. Forensic analysis of the computer showed that a partially downloaded file containing child pornography had been downloaded to the computer from an IP address traced to the defendant. Id. Local police executed a search warrant on the defendant's residence and seized a computer and several CD-ROMs containing approximately 67 video clips of child pornography. Id. The defendant pleaded guilty to receiving and possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2552(a)(2) and (a)(4)(B). Id. The PSR concluded that the defendant was subject to a five-level enhancement pursuant to § 2G2.2(b)(2)(B) because the defendant's offense conduct involved the distribution of child pornography `for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.' Id. (quoting § 2G2.2(b)(2)(B)). The defendant objected to the enhancement, denying that he distributed any child pornography and arguing that even if a distribution occurred, he did not distribute the images for the receipt, or the expectation of receipt, of a thing of value. Id. Although the defendant admitted to downloading child pornography from Kazaa  an Internet P2P file-sharing network  he argued that he only downloaded the images and videos for his personal use, not for distribution to others. Id. But the defendant also admitted that he knew that Kazaa was a file-sharing program and knew that, by using it, other Kazaa users could also download files from his computer. Id. According to the government, the defendant's use of Kazaa with knowledge of its capabilities constituted distribution. By using the file-sharing site, [the defendant] enabled other Kazaa users to download files from [his] shared folder, including any child pornography files stored there. Id. At an evidentiary hearing on the enhancement, the defendant admitted to being the primary user of the computer and that he had downloaded child pornography to his computer using Kazaa. Id. An officer also testified that the defendant had admitted to knowing that by using Kazaa he would be able to download files from other Kazaa users and that other Kazaa users would be able to download files from him. Id. But the officer did admit that when the defendant's computer was seized, the Kazaa program and the defendant's shared folder had been deleted from the computer, making the defendant unable to distribute images via Kazaa at that time. Id. at 1010-11. The officer also testified that forensic analysis had recovered several deleted child pornography files on the computer and that the defendant's IP address was attached to the partially downloaded child pornography file. Id. at 1011. This IP address established that the partially downloaded file had previously been on the defendant's computer, was available for distribution, and was distributed. Id. On appeal, the issue before us was whether an expectation of receipt of child pornography through Kazaa file sharing constitutes a `thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain' for sentence enhancement purposes under § 2G2.2(b)(2)(B). Id. We noted that the defendant's use of the peer-to-peer file-sharing network made the child pornography files in his shared folder available to be searched and downloaded by other Kazaa users as evidenced by the partially downloaded files recovered by Danish authorities. Id. at 1012. As a result, we concluded that the defendant was engaged in the distribution of child pornography. Id. We then addressed whether the defendant's use of a file-sharing network to obtain child pornography from other network users, while allowing the child pornography files in his shared folder to be accessed and downloaded by others, constituted `distribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain' under § 2G2.2(b)(2)(B). Id. We held that, under the relevant facts, the government sufficiently proved that the defendant expected to receive a thing of value  child pornography by using Kazaa. Id. at 1013. Recently, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow our holding in Griffin, based on its interpretation that Griffin mandates that by sharing files on a file-sharing network, a defendant necessarily expects to receive a `thing of value.' United States v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir.2007). Our holding in Griffin that § 2G2.2(b)(2)(B)'s five-level enhancement for the distribution of child pornography `for the receipt, or the expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain' applies to a defendant who downloads and shares child pornography files via an internet peer-to-peer file-sharing network was inseparable from our conclusion that the government met its burden of establishing that [the defendant] expected to receive a thing of value  child pornography  when he used the file-sharing network to distribute and access child pornography files by introducing the defendant's admissions. 482 F.3d at 1013. Specifically, the defendant in Griffin admitted that he downloaded child pornography files from Kazaa, knew that Kazaa was a file-sharing network, and knew that, by using Kazaa, other Kazaa users could download files from him. Id. Thus, whether a defendant qualifies for the five-level enhancement must be decided on a case-by-case basis, with the government bearing the burden of proving that the defendant expected to receive a thing of value  child pornography  when he used the file-sharing network to distribute and access child pornography files. Id. Here, there is no direct evidence that Stults expected to receive child pornography when he used LimeWire, as was the case in Griffin. But the government met its burden of proof through circumstantial evidence. The district court reasonably deemed Stults, who is technically sophisticated in computer use, with knowing that he was distributing child pornography through his use of LimeWire. The district court cited the following facts in support of its determination that Stults's level of computer proficiency supported a finding that he knew how LimeWire worked: (1) Stults has a number of computers (two to three towers); (2) Stults had a large database; (3) Stults had saved substantial data obtained from other LimeWire users and kept it on CDROMs; (4) Stults's computer contained many images; and (5) a lot of data was in Stults's machine. In light of this circumstantial evidence, we conclude there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's ultimate finding and that it was not clearly erroneous. United States v. Cordy, 560 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir.2009).