Opinion ID: 396269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Conditions on Probation

Text: 35 The sentencing judge has the power under 18 U.S.C. § 3651 to grant probation when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby. That section also states: 36 While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant 37 May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and 38 May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had .... 39 The district judge exercised his authority under § 3651 to grant probation on the condition that Margala 40 shall forfeit any retirement pension benefits that he may have acquired during the course of his business with the corporation, he shall surrender all stocks acquired during the course of his employment as an officer and director, and that the corporation, to whom he's indebted, shall cancel the loan for which he's obligated .... 41 Margala contends that the conditions are purely punitive and, consequently, that this court should remove them. These conditions are not improper so long as they are reasonably related to the rehabilitative purpose of § 3651. See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898-900 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1975). We will normally defer to the sentencing judge because this test must be, as the Act indicates, a very flexible standard. Nor could it be otherwise in light of our uncertainty about how rehabilitation is accomplished. Id. at 264. In this case, we are unable to say that the conditions do not serve a rehabilitative purpose. Margala acquired his pension rights and the stock in question long after the scheme to defraud the public shareholders was set in motion. The sentencing judge may have decided, for example, that it would be therapeutic for Margala to sever remaining ties with BHC. 42 Margala also claims that the imposition of these conditions will exhaust his savings. If the impact of the conditions is needlessly harsh, the conditions are impermissible. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d at 898. But Margala fails to show that he would be ruined or that the harshness of the conditions is not justified by their rehabilitative effect.