Opinion ID: 195128
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reconsideration of Original Sentence.

Text: 25 At the September 30 sentencing, after overruling Fahm's objection to the Sec. 4A1.3 departure ruling and denying his request to stay imposition of sentence, the court immediately proceeded to impose the twenty-month prison sentence but nonetheless allowed defense counsel two weeks within which to submit written opposition to the departure ruling. At the second sentencing hearing, on December 22, the district court declined to reconsider its Sec. 4A1.3 departure ruling, then indicated that it intended to correct an earlier oversight by increasing Fahm's ABOL by two levels for unlawful flight from prosecution. Defense counsel objected that the court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 but made no explicit reference to the seven-day limitation period in Rule 35(c). See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c); infra at p. 453. The court then increased the original prison sentence to twenty-one months, bringing it within the revised 21-to-27 month GSR. 26 On appeal, Fahm claims that the district court lacked jurisdiction to increase the sentence originally imposed on September 30. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c). The government, on the other hand, characterizes the December 22 hearing as a mere continuation of the first hearing, and accordingly contends that the seven-day limitation period in Rule 35(c) was not implicated. Alternatively, the government argues that the district court possessed inherent power to reconsider the original sentence notwithstanding the limitation period in Rule 35(c). We conclude that neither government theory is tenable. 27
28 The district court judgment and docket entry plainly reflect that the twenty-month prison sentence was imposed on September 30. See United States v. Morillo, 8 F.3d 864, 866 (1st Cir.1993) (noting likelihood that imposition of sentence, within meaning of Rule 35(c), occurs on date judgment entered) (dictum) (citing United States v. Zuleta-Molina, 840 F.2d 157, 158 n. 1 (1st Cir.1988)); United States v. Carr, 932 F.2d 67, 69 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 112, 116 L.Ed.2d 82 (1991); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1) (The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk. ). Moreover, the September 30 hearing transcript reflects that the court pronounced the original sentence after overruling Fahm's objection to the Sec. 4A1.3 departure. Later in the hearing, defense counsel sought to stay imposition of sentence pending submission of opposition to the Sec. 4A1.3 departure. Although the court categorically denied a stay--leaving its twenty-month sentence in place--it allowed defense counsel time to submit written opposition. The district court record thus belies any interpretation that sentence was not imposed on September 30. Consequently, we must decide whether the original sentence was subject to reconsideration by the district court on December 22, well beyond the time allowed under Rule 35(c). Rule 35(c) states: 29 (c) Correction of Sentence by Sentencing Court. The court, acting within 7 days after the imposition of sentence, may correct a sentence that was imposed as a result of arithmetical, technical, or other clear error. 30 (Emphasis added.) The advisory committee note explains that new Rule 35(c) recognizes the power of a sentencing court to correct certain types of sentencing errors discovered shortly after the sentence is imposed. Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c) advisory committee's note (1991 amendment). Compare Carr, 932 F.2d at 71 n. 5 (pre-Rule 35(c) case). The relevant case law likewise compels the conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction to correct its original sentence beyond the limitation period prescribed in Rule 35(c). Morillo, 8 F.3d at 869 ([Rule 35(c)'s] interval constitutes a limitation ... and the limitation is absolute) (dictum); United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 639, 126 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993). 31
32 The government alternatively contends, Rule 35(c) notwithstanding, that the district court possessed the inherent power to reconsider Fahm's ABOL to correct an obvious oversight. The government relies on United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943, 111 S.Ct. 352, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), and United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672 (4th Cir.1989). 6 Upon careful consideration of the rule, the advisory committee's note, and relevant case law, we conclude that the court had no inherent power to increase its original sentence. 33 The 1991 amendment to Rule 35(c) was intended to codify the result reached in Rico and Cook but requires as well that the sentencing court act within the time frame prescribed in the rule, see Morillo, 8 F.3d at 869 n. 8, so as to: (i) reduce the likelihood of jurisdictional questions in the event of an appeal from the original judgment; (ii) provide the parties ... an opportunity to address [on appeal] the court's correction of the sentence, or lack thereof; and (iii) reduce the likelihood of abuse of the rule by limiting its application to acknowledged and obvious errors in sentencing, Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(c) advisory committee's note (1991 amendment). 7 See United States v. Ross, 9 F.3d 1182, 1188-89 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 265 (7th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (exclusive authority for correction of obvious judicial errors and omissions derives from Rule 35(c)). 8 34 Since the narrow window of opportunity allowed under Rule 35(c) closed long before the district court reconsidered its original sentence, and the court lacked inherent power to do so, the original sentence must be reinstated. See Turner, 998 F.2d at 536 (The district court's inaction had the same effect as denying the motion, making the judgment final on the date the district judge's power to alter the sentence expired.). 35 The twenty-one month prison sentence imposed on December 22, 1992, is to be vacated; the original twenty-month prison sentence imposed on September 30, 1992, is to be reinstated. So ordered.