Opinion ID: 2365068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Lassiter Due Process

Text: In this case, the record reflects that both parents were served personally with the petition to terminate their parental rights. Both parents also received actual notice of the hearing. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the parents were not advised in the notice that if they were indigent they might have a right under the United States Constitution to the appointment of legal representation at State expense. The question then becomes whether, in the absence of such notice, the Family Court violated the parents' due process rights under the United States Constitution, as described in Lassiter, by proceeding to conduct a hearing on the merits and then deciding to grant the termination petition as to both parents? It is argued that the Family Court should have sua sponte appointed an attorney to represent these parents at the termination hearing because the private attorney who represented them in the dependency and neglect proceedings had developed a conflict of interest. There are several problems with that argument. First, while a conflict of interest might have resulted in a disqualification of that attorney, it would not ipso facto have resulted in the appointment of an attorney for the parents at State expense. Second, the ability to retain private counsel during the dependency and neglect proceedings is at least prima facie evidence that the right to counsel afforded by Lassiter would not have been available to these parents. Third, and most importantly, the Family Court never had an opportunity in this case to rule on any of these issues. The parents did not appear at the termination hearing, despite knowing full well that their failure to appear would probably result in a termination of their parental rights. In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court held that the failure of the parents to appear for a hearing was a valid consideration. [58] More recently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that before the constitutional right to counsel attaches, a parent must first come forward and appear, or in some way indicate a desire to be heard or to contest the petition, and must demonstrate his or her indigence. [59] The record reflects that present at the December 21, 2000 hearing was a representative from the DFS with her attorney and a CASA with her attorney. The parents were not in attendance. The Family Court Judge noted that personal service had been made on both parents. The Deputy Attorney General, representing the DFS, advised the Family Court that the Father was aware of the hearing. The CASA testified that the Father was quite aware of today's hearing, and he had planned to come. Before beginning the hearing, the Family Court Judge instructed a judicial assistant to ascertain whether the parents were mistakenly waiting outside the courtroom. The record reflects that when the termination hearing was convened in this case, the Family Court Judge knew several things: the parents had retained private counsel to represent them in the prior dependency and neglect proceedings, the parents knew that the State had changed its focus from reunification to termination, the parents had been served personally with the termination petition, the parents had actual knowledge of the hearing date and the parents failed to appear. There was no record basis for the Family Court Judge to believe that the parents were either indigent and eligible to have counsel appointed for them at State expense pursuant to Lassiter or that they were interested in contesting the termination petition on the merits. Accordingly, the Family Court Judge went forward with the termination hearing. The Father called the Family Court on December 22, 2000 in the mistaken belief that the termination hearing was set for that day. We now know from the parents' appointed counsel on appeal, however, that both parents were interested in contesting the termination petition and that they might be eligible to have counsel appointed for them at State expense. If the Father had appeared on the day of the hearing, requested counsel and demonstrated indigency, his request would have been granted by the Family Court. Given these facts, we conclude that the parents should be given the opportunity to request counsel and demonstrate indigency, and if successful have counsel represent their interests at a new termination hearing. Mindful of the impact that such delay has on the children, we instruct the Family Court to schedule this matter on an accelerated, priority basis.