Opinion ID: 3151680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Officer Coleman

Text: The district court held that Officer Coleman’s conduct could be unconstitutional and that the law was clearly established by Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1152. 12 As with Officer Jones, we need not decide whether Officer Coleman violated Mr. Ashley’s constitutional rights because the law was not clearly established. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the following facts with regard to Officer Coleman. The struggle had already begun when Officer Coleman arrived. When he arrived, Officer Jones and three zoo employees were holding Mr. Ashley on the ground. Officer Coleman perceived that Mr. Ashley continued to resist; at the least, he was flailing his arms. After Officer Coleman’s arrival, Officer Jones deployed his Taser on Mr. Ashley’s side. During the struggle, Officer Coleman deployed his Taser twice. In his opinion, “Mr. Ashley seemed extremely strong,” and he heard Mr. Ashley say “something to the effect of ‘help me Grandma. I don’t want to go.’” Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 539 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court stated that these were “both signs of a physiological condition known as excited delirium” and that officers receive training on how to recognize the symptoms of excited delirium and respond appropriately. Id. In light of these facts, then, the question is whether case law existing as of July 2011 would alert any reasonable officer that it would be excessive force to join in a struggle between an officer and civilians on the one hand and a detainee on the other hand and to deploy a Taser twice, where the detainee appears to be resisting but may be suffering from excited delirium. We conclude that the law in this circuit as of July 2011 would not have put a reasonable officer on notice that such conduct could be considered excessive. 13 Again, the key fact is that the struggle was ongoing when Officer Coleman applied the force that is complained of. Officer Coleman perceived that Mr. Ashley seemed very strong and continued to resist. Therefore, the cases cited above with regard to Officer Jones also support applying qualified immunity to Officer Coleman. Moreover, even if the officer was mistaken in his belief that Mr. Ashley was resisting, the belief was not unreasonable under the circumstances. It is wellestablished that “[i]f an officer reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that a suspect was likely to fight back the officer would be justified in using more force than in fact was needed.” Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 415 (10th Cir. 2004) (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). In discussing the state of the law, the district court relied solely on Weigel: [I]n Weigel v. Broad, 544 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2008) an officer “applied pressure to [the decedent’s] upper body, including his neck and shoulders, by using either one or both knees and his hands” despite [the facts that] the decedent’s “apparent intoxication, bizarre behavior, and vigorous struggle made him a strong candidate for positional asphyxiation.” Id. at 1152, 1148. There, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant because holding the decedent in this manner “was constitutionally unreasonable due to the significant risk of positional asphyxiation associated with such actions.” Id. at 1155. The incident at issue here occurred in July 2011, nearly three years after the Tenth Circuit decided Weigel. Accordingly there was sufficient precedent to put the Defendants on notice that a reduced use of force is appropriate for an individual suffering from excited delirium. Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 544-45 (footnote omitted). What the district court failed to recognize, however, is that this court did not consider all the force in Weigel 14 unconstitutional. Rather, if the Weigel plaintiffs’ version of the facts were proved, a constitutional use of force evolved into excessive force. During the first phase of the incident in Weigel, the detainee was struggling with officers. This court did not consider this initial use of force unconstitutional; rather, we recognized that “up to a point, the troopers were protecting themselves and the public from [the detainee] and [the detainee] from himself.” Weigel, 544 F.3d at 1155; see also id. (Hartz, J., concurring) (“I do not think that the defendants violated [the detainee’s] constitutional rights before his legs were bound.”); id. at 1156 (O’Brien, J., dissenting) (“[The detainee’s] acts, not those of these troopers, escalated the violence to an extremely dangerous level. His behavior fully justified the restraints employed as well as their duration.”). During the second phase, the detainee was subdued and under control, yet officers continued to apply pressure to his back for a significant period after he was no longer a threat and no longer struggling. Id. at 1152. The second-phase behavior was what this court held could be considered to be excessive force. See id. at 1152-53, 1155. Officer Coleman’s actions occurred before Mr. Ashley was restrained and therefore his conduct is analogous to Weigel’s first phase, not its second phase. Accordingly, Weigel does not clearly establish that Officer Coleman’s actions could be considered excessive.3 3 With regard to Officers Coleman and Gasca and Lieutenant Conner, Ms. Waters also relies on Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2001). The conduct at issue in Cruz was “the tying of the decedent’s arms behind his back, (continued) 15 For these reasons, we conclude that in July 2011 it was not clearly established that the force used by Officer Coleman could be considered excessive in these circumstances. Officer Coleman is entitled to qualified immunity.