Opinion ID: 2105037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: testimony about the child sexual abuse syndrome

Text: Testimony concerning typical behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused children is also referred to as the Sexually Abused Child Syndrome, the Child Abuse Syndrome, and the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome) [1] . This Court has long recognized that in order for an expert to testify about a matter, the subject about which the expert will testify must have been sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 101, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (1981), quoting Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.1923) (the so-called Frye standard). In its brief, the Commonwealth refers to the Child Abuse Syndrome. This syndrome is an attempt to construct a diagnostic or behavioral profile about sexually abused children. The existence of such a syndrome as either a generally accepted diagnostic tool or as relevant evidence is not supportable. Several commentators note that the so-called sexual abuse syndrome is not specific enough to sexually abused children to be accurate. The principal flaw with the notion of a specific syndrome is that no evidence indicates that it can discriminate between sexually abused children and those who have experienced other trauma. Because the task of a court is to make such discriminations, this flaw is fatal. In order for a syndrome to have discriminant ability, not only must it appear regularly in a group of children with a certain experience, but it also must not appear in other groups of children who have not had that experience. [2] According to the literature on the subject, there is no one classical or typical personality profile for abused children. [3] The difficulty with identifying a set of behaviors exhibited by abused children is that abused children react in a myriad of ways that may not only be dissimilar from other sexually abused children, but may be the very same behaviors as children exhibit who are not abused. Researchers have been unsuccessful in their attempts to find common reactions that children have to sexual abuse. In fact, research has indicated that children react in incredibly diverse ways to sexual abuse. [4] As another commentator aptly notes: [O]ne cannot reliably say that a child exhibiting a certain combination of behaviors has been sexually abused rather than, for instance, physically abused, neglected, or brought up by psychotic or antisocial parents. Although future research may support identification of victims by their behaviors, such identification is currently not possible. [5] In the case sub judice, the expert testified that the victim usually experiences initially a lot of fear of the offender, a lot of anger towards the alleged offender. The victim is usually very confused, the children initially feel very very guilty. The expert also testified that the child is usually very confused over the relationship. The child frequently expresses many of the positive things that weren't in the relationship. Child victims of sexual abuse usually have a very low self esteem. Additionally, children frequently withdraw after the disclosure of sexual abuse, they will isolate themselves [and] not want contact with other people. [T]hey are not performing as well as they did at school, they are disassociating themselves with common practices or common friends at the school, they're [sic] grades frequently will fall, they have [an] inability to concentrate on their school work. While all of these behavior patterns may well be typical of sexually abused children, even a layperson would recognize that these behavior patterns are not necessarily unique to sexually abused children. They are common to children whose parents divorce [6] and to psychologically abused children. [7] In one study about children whose parents divorce, the author described many behaviors exhibited by children of divorced parents. [8] Some clung to the remaining parent, whimpering or crying when the parent left. . . . [9] Regression was a common response among the youngest children. [10] Lapses in toilet training and increased masturbatory activity were noted. [11] The author also noted a marked rise in aggression, guilt, bewilderment and macabre fantasy. [12] In another study of sexually abused children, the authors remark that all maltreated children may react similarly  whether the victims of sexual abuse or another type. The degree to which sexually abused children differ from other maltreated children or children from chaotic and violent households may be small (Erickson & Egeland, 1987; Wolfe & Mosk, 1983; Wolfe, Wolfe, & LaRose, 1986). In the best study to date (Erickson & Egeland, 1987; Erickson, Egeland, & Pianta, 1989), 267 children were followed prospectively, and 60 to 86 were identified as maltreated at different ages through age 6 years, including 11 sexually abused children. [The study concluded]: There are more similarities than differences among the groups of maltreated children. . . . All have difficulty meeting task demands at school, all seem to have an abiding anger, all are unpopular with their peers, and all have difficulty functioning independently in school and laboratory situations. The problems are not abuse-specific; [the authors go on to state] [t]he common problems. . all can be tied to the lack of nurturance . . all [parents] failed to provide sensitive, supportive care for their child. [13] Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the testimony about the uniformity of behaviors exhibited by sexually abused children is not sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 101, 436 A.2d 170, 172 (1981) and should have been excluded. [14] Intertwined with the notion of general acceptance in the particular field is the understanding of what constitutes relevant and therefore admissible evidence. We have long held that [a]ny analysis of the admissibility of a particular type of evidence must start with a threshold inquiry as to its relevance and probative value. Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 218, 360 A.2d 914, 918 (1976). Relevant evidence is evidence that in some degree advances the inquiry. . . . Id., quoting McCormick, Evidence § 185 at 437-38 (2d ed. 1972). Further, as we stated in Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 361 A.2d 282 (1976), [i]t must be determined first if the inference sought to be raised by the evidence bears upon a matter in issue in the case and, second, whether the evidence `renders the desired inferences more probable than it would be without evidence.' 468 Pa. at 284, 361 A.2d at 292, quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 461 Pa. 274, 278, 336 A.2d 282, 284 (1975). The expert testimony about the behavior patterns exhibited by sexually abused children does not meet this threshold determination. While it may bear upon a matter in issue, it does not render the desired inference more probable than not. It simply does not render any inference at all. Rather, it merely attempts  in contravention of the rules of evidence  to suggest that the victim was, in fact, exhibiting symptoms of sexual abuse. This is unacceptable. The expert witness also testified that sexually abused children exhibit the following behaviors: Runaway behavior, anger, rebellion, acting out, becoming promiscuous, getting involved with drugs, alcohol, not doing school work, regression to earlier behavior, suicide attempts or thoughts of suicide, depression, eating disorders, nightmares, and bed wetting. It is virtually impossible to clinically describe the elements of the child abuse syndrome with any realistic degree of specificity. [15] We do not believe that the testimony in question was probative. Clearly, drug and alcohol abuse, eating disorders, low self-esteem and not doing school work are common phenomena not solely related to child abuse. To permit the jury to speculate that they might be, however, violates every notion of what constitutes probative and relevant evidence. It is neither scientifically supportable nor legally supportable. Such a laundry list of possible behaviors does no more than invite speculation and will not be condoned. [16] Perhaps the lack of probative value of this evidence is best understood in comparison to the so called battered child syndrome, a diagnostic tool used by physicians to determine whether a child is the likely subject of intentional abuse or accidental injury. In the battered child syndrome, physicians look for the following characteristics: The diagnosis of battered child syndrome is used in connection with young children and is based upon a finding of multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily multiple fractures, soft tissue swelling or skin bruising. Also pertinent to the diagnosis is evidence that the child is generally undernourished, with poor hygiene, and that the severity and type of injury is inconsistent with the story concerning the occurrence of the injuries offered by the parents or those who were caring for the child. Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa.Super. 477, 486, 528 A.2d 610, 614 (1987), appeal denied, 518 Pa. 638, 542 A.2d 1368 (1988). In Rodgers, the physician discussed the physical findings of the child at issue and stated a belief as to whether that child's injuries appeared to have been intentionally inflicted. [17] See also, Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 255, 301 A.2d 837, 840 (1973). That type of testimony  explicit, probative and relevant  stands in stark contraposition to the type of testimony admitted in the case before us. The battered child syndrome evidence is unique to physically abused children and is not overly general. Thus, it can be argued that such testimony can make it more likely than not that the injuries were intentionally inflicted. The damage created by this testimony was also compounded by the testimony about those who knew the child in question. There was testimony admitted about the behaviors exhibited by the child after the alleged incident. As such, the prosecution's introduction of the testimony by those who observed the child served to confirm certain behavior patterns that the expert suggested were exhibited by abused children. Permitting an expert to testify about an unsupportable behavioral profile and then introducing testimony to show that the witness acted in conformance with such a profile is an erroneous method of obtaining a conviction. For this reason, we hold that the expert should not have been permitted to testify about behavior patterns generally exhibited by abused children and that the error requires reversal.