Opinion ID: 177345
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Giving Full AEDPA Deference, What is the Effect of Almendarez-Torres?

Text: The decision in Almendarez-Torres has played a minor role in this litigation until now. None of the New York sentencing courts in the present petitions mentioned it, much less attempted to distinguish evidence or facts sheltered by Almendarez-Torres from those not sheltered. In Rivera, the Court of Appeals mentioned Almendarez-Torres only with regard to proving the existence of prior convictions. 5 N.Y.3d at 67, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. Certainly the original panel's remand would have allowed the district courts to consider whether facts found by New York sentencing courts in each of appellants' sentencing hearings were sheltered by Almendarez-Torres. My colleagues' discussion of Almendarez-Torres concerns in part the breadth of that decision with regard to what facts are sheltered by it. There are many variations here: e.g., (i) it shelters only the existence of the fact of the prior convictions; or (ii) it shelters only the existence of prior convictions and matters proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant in connection with the convictions; or (iii) it shelters the existence of the convictions, matters proven or admitted, and matters relating to the convictions not proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant; and (iv) inferences drawn from any of the above. My colleagues give AEDPA deference to (iv). Maj. op. 92-93. I will not quarrel with their conclusion because it is largely irrelevant at this stage. Even if AEDPA deference were shown to (iv), it disposes of none of the appeals before us, except perhaps for Phillips, as to whom the failure to rehabilitate may be an inference drawn solely from the predicate convictions. In the other sentencing proceedings before us, evidence was proffered and mentioned by the sentencing judges that was not even arguably covered by Almendarez-Torres. While consideration of Almendarez-Torres might identify some sheltered facts and then lead to a conclusion that other findings were harmlessa difficult conclusion perhaps in Morris's casethe panel left that to the remand. I must also note that my colleagues' discussion of Almendarez-Torres implies that the PFO statute at the second step limits consideration, or findings, of facts to matters sheltered by that decision. Maj. op. 92 (addressing only the situation where a sentencing judge ... consider[s] subsidiary facts respecting a defendant's criminal history before imposing a PFO sentence). Again, they fail to address appellants' claims of what actually happened at their sentencing hearings, where facts going beyond matters relating to the prior convictions were allegedly found.