Opinion ID: 2602415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of search incident to arrest

Text: ¶ 20 The ultimate question on certiorari review is whether the police lawfully searched Trane in a search incident to arrest. [1] If the police lawfully arrested Trane, then the search incident to the arrest that produced the cocaine was valid and the court of appeals properly affirmed the trial court's denial of Trane's motion to suppress. ¶ 21 It is axiomatic that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures embodied in the Utah and United States Constitutions is one of the most fundamental and cherished rights we possess. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 303 (Utah 1998) (footnote omitted). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Utah Constitution provides virtually identical protections: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. Utah Const. art. I, § 14. [2] ¶ 22 These constitutional provisions prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Under these provisions, [w]arrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Brown, 853 P.2d at 855; see also State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 294 (Utah 1995) (stating that search without approval of judge is unreasonable unless subject to one of `a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990))); State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1986) ([W]e note that the warrant requirement is an important check upon the power of the State to subject individuals to unreasonable searches and seizures and is not to be lightly disregarded.). One such recognized exception is a search incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable cause under exigent circumstances. [3] Brown, 853 P.2d at 855; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); Banks, 720 P.2d at 1383-84; Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(3)(a) (Supp.2001). ¶ 23 Pursuant to the search incident to a lawful arrest exception, an arresting officer may, without a warrant, search a person validly arrested. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121-22 (Utah 1976). For a search incident to arrest to be constitutional, the underlying arrest must be lawful, but it does not need to be supported by an arrest warrant. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963). The United States Supreme Court explained: A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (emphasis added); see also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627 (stating that constitutionality of a search incident to an arrest does not depend on whether there is any indication that the person arrested possesses weapons or evidence. The fact of a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search. (emphasis added)). Under this exception, any evidence, including all evidence discovered by serendipity of crimes other than that for which the suspect is arrested, is admissible in a criminal trial. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399 (1947), overruled on other grounds by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034. However, if an arrest violated a defendant's constitutional rights under either the Fourth Amendment or the Utah Constitution or was otherwise unlawful, then any evidence secured incident to that arrest must typically be excluded from a criminal trial pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Ker, 374 U.S. at 35, 83 S.Ct. 1623; Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 292; State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). ¶ 24 In this case, Officers Bushman and Dobrowolski arrested Trane for interfering with a peace officer, public intoxication, and disturbing the peace. After Trane was arrested and transported to the jail, officers searched Trane and discovered cocaine on his person. Unmistakably, this was a search incident to an arrest, see United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974) (holding that full search of person incident to arrest can take place after accused arrives at place of detention); Curd v. City Ct. of Judsonia, Ark., 141 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir.1998) (same); Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997) (same), but the remaining question is whether the arrest was lawful, State ex rel. K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981). ¶ 25 The underlying arrest is lawful if it is supported by probable cause and authorized by statute. State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199-1204 (Utah 1995); see also United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989). The United States Supreme Court explained, [W]hile a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); see also State v. White, 577 P.2d 552, 554 (Utah 1978) (explaining that arrest justified by probable cause supports search incident to arrest). ¶ 26 Under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, an officer must have probable cause before the officer can effect a warrantless arrest. [T]he [United States] Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627. However, a suspect does not need to be guilty of the offense for which the officers arrested the suspect for the officers to have probable cause to arrest. Id.; see also Henry, 361 U.S. at 102, 80 S.Ct. 168 (stating that [e]vidence required to establish guilt is not necessary for probable cause to arrest); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (noting that probable cause to arrest is less than that which is required to justify conviction). ¶ 27 The United States Supreme Court defined probable cause justifying an arrest as facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302. Similarly, this court explained that in Utah the determination of whether the police had probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant `should be made on an objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the inferences [that can] fairly... be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense.' State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 320, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972)); see also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1232-33 (Utah 1996). ¶ 28 A law enforcement officer has probable cause whenever the crime is committed in the presence of that officer because the observing officer knows of sufficient facts to believe that the suspect committed the crime alleged. The United States Supreme Court explained, If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S.Ct. 1536, 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976) (The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or felony committed in his presence ....); United States v. Lugo, 170 F.3d 996, 1003 (10th Cir.1999) (holding that officer's observation of suspect committing misdemeanor offense afforded officer probable cause and legitimate basis to arrest suspect). ¶ 29 In harmony with this case law regarding probable cause for an officer to arrest an individual, the Utah Code sets forth circumstances under which an officer can effectuate an arrest: A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: (1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer; presence includes all of the physical senses or any device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses[.] Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (1999) (emphasis added); see also Lugo, 170 F.3d at 1003; cf. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n v. Wooras, 97 Utah 351, 361-62, 93 P.2d 455, 460 (1939). The term public offense under section 77-7-2(1) generally includes misdemeanors. Oleson v. Pincock, 68 Utah 507, 511-12, 251 P. 23, 24-25 (1926). Accordingly, the officers had probable cause and were authorized to arrest Trane if Trane committed an offense in their presence.
¶ 30 The officers arrested Trane for interfering with an officer in violation of section 76-8-305, which provides: A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: ... (2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: (a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and (b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention[.] Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). ¶ 31 In this case, the officers had probable cause and statutory authorization to arrest Trane for interfering with an officer because Trane committed the offense in their presence. As the officers arrived, they noticed that Trane smelled of alcohol, swayed, had slurred speech, and otherwise appeared intoxicated. They also noticed that Trane was loud, acting in a tumultuous-type manner, angry, and uncooperative. Both officers believed that Trane was intoxicated and possibly disturbing the peace. As a result, the officers began seeking to lawfully arrest or detain Trane for these crimes. While detaining Trane to investigate, Dobrowolski requested that Trane submit to a frisk because Dobrowolski feared for his and Bushman's safety and wanted to ascertain whether Trane had any weapons on his person. Nevertheless, Trane refused to comply with Dobrowolski's order to turn around, place his hands on his head, and submit to a frisk. The officers then attempted to arrest Trane. ¶ 32 Trane, having been informed of the officers' intentions to frisk and arrest him, began to physically struggle with the officers to prevent them from frisking or arresting him. Again, Trane's physical resistance interfered with the officers' orders given to effect the arrest and detention. These acts were sufficient to justify the officers' arrest of Trane under the interfering statute. See State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1991). Not only did these events occur in the officers' presence, but they were directed toward the officers. Because these events occurred in the presence of the officers, they had probable cause and were statutorily authorized to arrest Trane under Utah Code section 77-7-2(1). ¶ 33 Despite the foregoing, Trane contends that an individual should not be arrested for violating the interfering statute when the individual refuses to follow an unlawful order. Because Trane struggled with the officers in this case, Trane's argument presupposes that an individual can resist, even physically, an unlawful arrest or order. However, in Utah there is no right to physically resist either an arrest or an order of the police, irrespective of the legality of the arrest or order, so long as the officers are within the scope of their authority. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574; see also State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1006-08 (Utah Ct.App. 1997). ¶ 34 In Gardiner, a case involving physical resistance, we noted that the justification for the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest or seizure had disappeared and that therefore the right has been repudiated in Utah. 814 P.2d at 573-74 (stating that right to resist unlawful police conduct rejected as defense to crime when common law defenses were supplanted by specifically codifying recognized defenses). Quoting the New Mexico Supreme Court, we stated: Self-help measures undertaken by a potential defendant who objects to the legality of the search can lead to violence and serious physical injury. The societal interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and their government outweighs any individual interest in resisting a questionable search. One can reasonably be asked to submit peaceably and to take recourse in his legal remedies. Id. at 572 (quoting State v. Doe, 92 N.M. 100, 583 P.2d 464, 466-67 (1978)). ¶ 35 The law prefers judicial settlement of disputes over street brawls and altercations, even when the lawfulness of police conduct is in question. Suspects should not be the judges of the lawfulness of police action, and redress of an unlawful search or seizure, e.g., an arrest not supported by probable cause or a detention not supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, is to be obtained in a court of law. Accordingly, the lawfulness of an officer's order or arrest is not determinative of whether an officer is authorized to arrest an individual under the interfering statute. ¶ 36 To determine when an officer is within the scope of the officer's authority, a court must decide whether the officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or is `engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] own.' Id. at 574 (quoting United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir.1967)). In this case, Bushman and Dobrowolski were acting within the scope of their authority. They were called just after 4:00 a.m. by dispatch to conduct an investigation in response to a call from the clerk of a convenience store, complying with their duties as peace officers. The officers arrived in their patrol cars. Although it is unclear from the record whether the officers were in uniform, Trane knew that Bushman and Dobrowolski were police officers conducting a routine investigation and pursuing official police business. Accordingly, Trane had no right to physically resist the order to submit to a search, and the officers therefore properly arrested Trane on that basis. [4]
¶ 37 The officers also arrested Trane for public intoxication in violation of section 76-9-701(1) of the Utah Code. The court of appeals did not reach the trial court's alternate holding that the officers had probable cause or close to probable cause to arrest Trane for intoxication and that therefore the search incident to arrest that uncovered the cocaine was valid. Trane contends that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Trane for intoxication because the officers did not believe that Trane posed a danger to himself or anyone else. A person commits the crime of public intoxication under the Utah Code when that person is under the influence of alcohol . . . to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a public place . . . where he unreasonably disturbs other persons. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (1999). ¶ 38 In this case, the officers had probable cause and statutory authorization to arrest Trane for intoxication because Trane committed the offense in the presence of the officers. Both officers heard the call from dispatch that a man was harassing or disturbing customers at a convenience store. When Bushman arrived at the store, the clerk indicated that Trane was the individual who had been disturbing others. Trane was in a public place: he was outside the convenience store near a bank of public telephones. ¶ 39 As the officers approached Trane, they each individually and independently noticed that Trane smelled of alcohol and exhibited signs of intoxication. For example, Bushman noticed that Trane was loud and behaving in a tumultuous-type manner. Dobrowolski noticed Trane was swaying, Trane's speech was slurred, and Trane appeared intoxicated. ¶ 40 The officers also noticed that Trane was intoxicated enough to potentially pose a danger to himself and others. The officers feared for their safety, recognizing from past experiences with intoxicated individuals that they could become violent. In this case, Trane was angry, was uncooperative, had puffed his chest out [and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer, and initially would not release his identification card upon Bushman's request. Under such circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for intoxication. Therefore, because the officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for both interfering with a peace officer and intoxication, the search incident thereto did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.