Opinion ID: 2582746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Litigation Privilege Applies to Postjudgment Collection Activitiesthe Conflict in the Case Law.

Text: Earlier cases have upheld actions for abuse of process involving allegedly improper collection practices without addressing the applicability of the litigation privilege. (See, e.g., Barquis, supra, 7 Cal.3d at pp. 103-104, 101 Cal.Rptr. 745, 496 P.2d 817 [collection agency's alleged practice of filing actions in multiple improper venues]; Kappel v. Bartlett, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1463-1467, 246 Cal. Rptr. 815 [process server's filing false declaration of service of process to obtain default judgment]; Czap v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 1, 5, 86 Cal.Rptr. 417 [collection agency's levy executed on exempt wages and threatened subsequent levies]; Arc Investment Co. v. Tiffith (1958) 330 P.2d 305, 164 Cal.App.2d Supp. 853, 856 [levy executed on judgment debtor's exempt wages].) However, later cases applying the litigation privilege have narrowed the tort's reach in the context of court-sanctioned enforcements of judgments. ( Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at pp. 46-50, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 891; O'Keefe v. Kompa (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 130, 134-136, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 ( O'Keefe ); Merlet v. Rizzo (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 53, 64-66, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83 ( Merlet ).) In Merlet, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th 53, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83, the plaintiff sued for abuse of process after the defendants filed a motion for a writ of sale against a property owned by the plaintiff and a motion for reconsideration after the trial court denied the issuance of the writ. The Court of Appeal held that defendants' acts were covered by the litigation privilege because they were clearly permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding. ( Id. at pp. 65-66, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 83.) In O'Keefe, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 130, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, the plaintiff sued for abuse of process after the defendants had attempted to enforce a judgment for attorney's fees while the action was on appeal and arguably stayed. One of the defendants levied on a bank account while the other defendant filed an allegedly fraudulent abstract of judgment with the recorder's office. The Court of Appeal held that those efforts to enforce the judgment were privileged because they were an extension of th[e] judicial process and were logically and legally related to the realization of a litigation objectivethat is, collection of a judgment. ( Id. at pp. 134-135, 100 Cal. Rptr.2d 602.) The court reasoned that the fact the conduct occurred outside the courtroom and after trial (rather than before or during trial, as in the vast majority of litigation privilege cases) was immaterial. ( Id. at p. 134, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) In Brown, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 40, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891, the plaintiff sued for abuse of process against the defendant, a judgment creditor's attorney in the underlying action. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had enforced an invalid judgment by applying for and obtaining a writ of execution and levying on exempt funds. The Court of Appeal noted that, generally, judgment enforcement efforts are considered to be within the litigation privilege because they are an extension of a judicial proceeding and related to a litigation objective. ( Id. at pp. 49-50, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891.) Nevertheless, the plaintiff contended that his abuse of process claim arose from the wrongful levy, which was neither a statement nor a communication within the litigation privilege. ( Ibid. ) In rejecting the argument that the levy was not a communication within the litigation privilege, the court stated: The act of applying for a writ is privileged. The privilege extends to torts arising from the privileged statement or publication. As such, not only does the privilege protect the application for the writ of execution, it also extends to the act of carrying out the directive of the writ. ( Id. at p. 50, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 891, fns. omitted.) In contrast, the Drum court later held that wrongfully levying on property pursuant to a writ of execution is not subject to the litigation privilege. ( Drum, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1028, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 602.) The plaintiff there sued for abuse of process against the defendants, the judgment creditor's attorneys in the underlying action. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants wrongfully levied on a writ of execution against him after the underlying judgment had been stayed. The trial court dismissed the complaint for abuse of process after granting the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion, but the Court of Appeal reversed. ( Id. at p. 1017, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) Although the Court of Appeal in Drum agreed with Merlet, it criticized O'Keefe and Brown for failing to distinguish between conduct and publications. Drum agreed that, as in those cases, the filings of motions for a writ of sale and reconsideration and an abstract of judgment, and an application for a writ of execution were privileged. But it disagreed that levying on exempt funds was also privileged because its essential nature was action, not communication. ( Id. at pp. 1027-1028 & fn. 12, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) [I]t does not follow that, merely because the application for the writessentially the statement by the judgment creditor to the clerk that the creditor has a judgment and requests the issuance of a writis a privileged communication, subsequent acts in levying on property are likewise privileged. ( Id. at pp 1027-1028, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.) The line is crossed when the levying officer, on behalf of the judgment creditor, actually levies on the property. That is a taking: the act of removing property from one source (here a financial institution) and depositing it in a place controlled by the levying officer. ( Id. at p. 1026, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 602.)