Opinion ID: 1350669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: federal obscenity doctrine overview

Text: As a preliminary matter, we address defendants' contentions that RCW 9.68.140 and 7.48A.010 violate the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In beginning our analysis with federal law, we do not retreat from our general position that in resolving a constitutional law question we should turn first to the provisions of our own state constitution. State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); see also State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 67, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). Nevertheless, we commence here with First Amendment analysis under the belief that an overview of the United States Supreme Court's position on obscenity will provide helpful background for the state constitutional analysis which follows. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that obscenity is not protected under the First Amendment. This holding was based on a historical analysis suggesting that the First Amendment was never intended to protect all expression, but only expression containing some slight social importance. Under the Roth definition, as elaborated upon, a work was considered to be obscene when: (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. A Book Named John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 418, 16 L.Ed.2d 1, 86 S.Ct. 975 (1966). The Supreme Court has further modified the Roth definition in several respects. First, in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 93 S.Ct. 2607 (1973), the Court abandoned the utterly without redeeming social value part of the test and held that the State must instead show that the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Miller Court also held that, in determining whether a work appeals to the prurient interest, the trier of fact must apply contemporary community standards and further, that state law must specifically define the type of sexual conduct which, if depicted or described in a patently offensive manner, will be obscene. Miller, at 24. Later, in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 301, 52 L.Ed.2d 324, 97 S.Ct. 1756 (1977), the Court clarified the Miller test so as to require application of contemporary community standards to the determinations of both prurient interest and patent offensiveness. Finally, in a decision issued earlier this year the Court held that contemporary community standards may not be applied to the third prong of the test; rather, the question of literary, artistic, political or scientific value must be determined solely on the basis of what a reasonable person would conclude. See Pope v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 95 L.Ed.2d 439, 444-45, 107 S.Ct. 1918 (1987). [1] Although Miller required state law to specify the type of sexual acts which may be obscene, state courts are allowed to construe state statutes so as to cure any facial deficiencies. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 771, 52 L.Ed.2d 738, 97 S.Ct. 2085 (1977). This court has twice construed a former obscenity statute, RCW 9.68.010, so as to conform to the federal obscenity test. See State v. Regan, 97 Wn.2d 47, 54, 640 P.2d 725 (1982); State v. J-R Distribs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 584, 512 P.2d 1049 (1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 949 (1974). The present statute, RCW 9.68.140, may also be so construed. RCW 9.68.140 provides that a person is guilty of promoting pornography if he or she for profit-making purposes and with knowledge, sells, exhibits, displays, or produces any lewd matter as defined in RCW 7.48A.010. RCW 7.48A.010 provides, in pertinent part: (2) Lewd matter is synonymous with obscene matter and means any matter: (a) Which the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; and (b) Which explicitly depicts or describes patently offensive representations or descriptions of: (i) Ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; or (ii) Masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, bestiality, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the genitals or genital area; or (iii) Violent or destructive sexual acts, including but not limited to human or animal mutilation, dismemberment, rape or torture; and (c) Which, when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Since the magazines at issue here are of the bondage and discipline type, depicting sexual violence, coercion, and torture, these cases are exclusively governed by subsection (2)(b)(iii). [2] As can be seen, RCW 7.48A.010 generally conforms to the obscenity definition found in Miller and Smith. Defendants claim error in the fact that the statute does not refer to contemporary community standards in the subsection on patent offensiveness. However, the jury instructions in Reece supplied this missing element and thereby cured any facial deficiency in the statute. See Ward, at 771; Regan, at 51, 54. Defendants also claim error in the fact that subsection (2)(c) of the statute contains language, not found in Miller, that the suspect matter be considered in the context in which it is used. However, context considerations are permissible in obscenity cases. See Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595, 598-99, 52 L.Ed.2d 606, 97 S.Ct. 1987 (1977); J-R Distribs., at 599. Defendants further argue that the statute is defective in light of Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 86 L.Ed.2d 394, 105 S.Ct. 2794 (1985). Brockett held that the definition of prurient interest contained in RCW 7.48A.010 was overly broad to the extent it could be construed to include a normal and healthy interest in sex and not merely an interest that was morbid or shameful. However, the Court declined to strike down the statute in its entirety, reasoning that a limiting construction was possible. Brockett, at 504. Here, jury instructions given in Reece properly limited the statute. Defendants also argue that the listing of [v]iolent or destructive sexual acts in RCW 7.48A.010(2)(b)(iii) is improper because it goes beyond the types of acts expressly contemplated in Miller. Miller gave a few plain examples of what a state could define for regulation. See Miller, at 25. However, Miller made clear these examples were not all encompassing and that the states were free to regulate, within constitutional guidelines, any form of hard core sexual conduct. Miller, at 27; see also Ward, at 773. Nor is there any merit to defendants' argument that sadomasochistic materials must be combined with depictions of ultimate sex acts in order to qualify as obscene. It is sufficient that the material, taken as a whole, obscenely suggests intimate sexual activity. See Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 505-10, 16 L.Ed.2d 56, 86 S.Ct. 958 (1966); see also State v. Randall Book Corp., 53 Md. App. 30, 452 A.2d 187 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 919 (1983). The types of sadomasochistic materials proscribed by RCW 7.48A.010(2)(b)(iii) are encompassed by the federal definition of obscenity. We conclude that RCW 9.68.140 and 7.48A.010 withstand scrutiny under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendants' main contention, however, is that even if these provisions can withstand scrutiny under the federal constitution, they are invalid under our state constitution. Defendants argue that Washington's free speech clause is broader than the First Amendment and must be independently construed. See Const. art. 1, § 5. In Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wn.2d 503, 512, 445 P.2d 602 (1968), this court rejected this argument, reasoning that Const. art. 1, § 5 and the First Amendment were in pari materia and inferentially interchangeable. However, in more recent years the court has in several instances given effect to textual differences between the two provisions. See, e.g., Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 233-34, 242-46, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 93 L.Ed.2d 990 (1987); State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 375, 679 P.2d 353 (1984); Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Coun., 96 Wn.2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981); Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d 51, 615 P.2d 440 (1980). In light of these decisions, the validity of Washington's criminal obscenity statute under Const. art. 1, § 5 is truly a matter of first impression.