Opinion ID: 1427943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Hidden Leg Restraint

Text: Mr. Zink asserts that the motion court clearly erred in failing to find trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to the sheriff's requirement that Mr. Zink wear a leg restraint under his pants during trial. The motion court found there was no credible evidence that the jury ever saw the restraint. Mr. Zink did walk with an altered gait throughout the trial, however, because the device prevented him from fully straightening his leg. The jurors who testified via deposition explicitly stated that the restraint was not visible but that, because of his gait, they believed he was wearing a shackling device that was not openly visible. Defense counsel stated he did not object because he thought the shackling device did not impair Mr. Zink's movement substantially. The motion court found there was no violation of Mr. Zink's rights. In support of his claim, Mr. Zink cites a recent holding of the United States Supreme Court, Deck v. Missouri , where the Court addressed the shackling of the defendant during trial. 544 U.S. 622, 630-33, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). In Deck , from the first day of the defendant's proceeding and throughout, he was shackled with visible leg irons, handcuffs and a belly chain. Id. at 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007. The Court found that the due process clause prohibits the routine use of visible shackles during guilt and penalty phases of trial but that shackling may be justified based on the particulars of the circumstance Id. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007 The Court emphasized that where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. Id. at 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's decision in Deck does not aid Mr. Zink's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. First, the nature of the restraint of Mr. Zink differs significantly from that in the Deck case. Mr. Zink was required to wear a knee brace that was not visible to the jury because it was concealed by his pants, whereas Mr. Deck was visibly restrained by a belly chain, leg irons and handcuffs. Mr. Deck's shackles were blatant and strongly implied to the jury that Mr. Deck was a dangerous man who needed to be restrained. In contrast, Mr. Zink was well dressed, and his appearance did not convey that he was dangerous; one juror who testified by deposition stated that Mr. Zink looked as though he could have been appearing on a bad check charge. Mr. Zink argues that a due process violation still occurs when a defendant is forced to wear a leg brace under his pants and the jury sees the effects of the restraint. The Supreme Court's decision in Deck is not authority for that proposition. In Deck , the Supreme Court discussed the historical development of the law regarding the shackling of a criminal defendant in the guilt phase of a criminal trial. In its discussion, it noted that [t]he law has long forbidden the routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special need. Id. at 626, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (emphasis added). In its principle holding, the Supreme Court ruled that: [T]he Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. Such a determination may of course take into account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial. Id. at 629, 125 S.Ct. 2007. There is further indication that the Court's ruling was limited to restraints that are visible, in that it expressly noted that the trial court did not explain why, if shackles were necessary, [the trial court] chose not to provide for shackles that the jury could not seeapparently the arrangement used at trial. [9] Id. at 634-35, 125 S.Ct. 2007. More importantly, Deck does not support Mr. Zink's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object to the shackling of Mr. Zink because Mr. Zink was tried in July 2004, prior to the Deck decision. It was not until October 2004 that the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, Deck v. Missouri, 543 U.S. 942, 125 S.Ct. 360, 160 L.Ed.2d 253 (2004), and not until 2005 that the Court ruled, as discussed, that a criminal defendant shall not be visibly shackled during a jury trial unless there are particular concerns regarding the individual defendant, such as security concerns, that demonstrate the special need for shackling. Deck , 544 U.S. at 633, 125 S.Ct. 2007. In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, counsel's conduct is measured by what the law is at the time of trial. Glass v. State, 227 S.W.3d 463, 472 (Mo. banc 2007). Counsel will generally not be held ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law. Id. (citing State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Mo. banc 1994)). Mr. Zink's trial occurred prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Deck that changed the law regarding visible shackles. [10] Trial counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for failing to object to Mr. Zink's concealed leg brace.