Opinion ID: 596126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: General or specific intent?

Text: 40 Appellants 14 contend that a violation of § 1472(j) requires a specific, as opposed to general, intent. Appellants argue that the district court erred by giving only a partial specific intent instruction. 15 We observe that the court's charge essentially tracked the language of the statute, with the exception of requiring that the jurors find that appellants knowingly intimidated the crew members. The appellants argue that the district court nevertheless should have gone further and charged the jury that it could convict only if it also found that appellants knowingly intimidated with the specific intent to interfere with a crew member's duties. As the charge read, it only required a specific intent to intimidate, not a specific intent to interfere. 41 The only other court that has directly addressed this issue is the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Meeker, 527 F.2d 12, 14 (9th Cir.1975), the court held that § 1472(j) is a general intent crime. See also United States v. Brice, 926 F.2d 925, 929 (9th Cir.1991); cf. United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 21 (2d Cir.1978) (49 U.S.C.App. § 1472(i), a related statutory provision criminalizing air piracy, held to be general intent crime). We agree that § 1472(j) is a general intent crime. The paramount purpose of the statute, as we discussed supra, is to ensure that passengers do not impede airline crew members' duties, many of which are critical to the safe operation of the aircraft. As the Meeker court explained, we ... construe § 1472(j) as a general intent crime, in harmony with the [compelling] statutory purpose of safeguarding flight personnel from any statutorily described acts which would interfere with their duties. 527 F.2d at 14. 42 Whether a passenger specifically intends to interfere with those duties is irrelevant. General intent is all that Congress required, as is evident from the plain language of the statute--in particular, Congress' failure to use a term such as willfully, intentionally, or knowingly, and Congress' selection of the phrase so as to interfere. See United States v. Lewis, 780 F.2d 1140, 1143 (4th Cir.1986) (courts should presume statutes require only general intent [i]n the absence of an explicit statement that a crime requires specific intent). 16 43 Appellant Canty additionally argues that the court erred in giving the jury an aiding-and-abetting instruction that required specific intent, if the statute itself only requires general intent. This created an impermissible anomaly, Canty argues. We observe that Canty did not object to this aspect of the jury charge. Thus, we can only review this claim for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We find no such error. Indeed, if anything, such an instruction was salutary error, which likely benefitted Canty, as it may have led jurors to believe that they could convict Canty only if they found that he possessed a specific intent to violate § 1472(j).