Opinion ID: 2635293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Investigatory Stop Was Unlawful.

Text: In Coleman, we articulated the standard for investigatory stops in Alaska: a police officer may make an investigatory stop only if he has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred. [2] We recently reaffirmed our adherence to the Coleman standard in Saltz v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles. [3] We also explained that a reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts and a totality of the circumstances. [4] We have held that a sufficient imminent public danger exists for which an officer may make an investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person is driving while intoxicated. [5] But we have never considered whether a person who has ceased driving while intoxicated continues to pose an imminent public danger under Coleman. That case requires an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists, not that imminent public danger existed at some point in the past. [6] In a series of cases  Larson v. State , [7] Romo v. Municipality of Anchorage , [8] and Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage [9]  the court of appeals addressed whether, and under what circumstances, a person who was formerly driving while intoxicated but is no longer doing so continues to pose an imminent public danger under Coleman. In Larson, a police officer observed a car stopped in the middle of the road, and then watched as the driver of the car (Larson) drove on the wrong side of the road, tried to pick up pedestrians, and almost hit a second group of pedestrians. [10] The officer then witnessed Larson pick up two pedestrians, one of whom took over driving the vehicle Larson had been operating. [11] The officer stopped the car, immediately contacted Larson (who was then a passenger), observed that he appeared intoxicated, and arrested him for DWI. [12] Larson argued that the stop was unlawful and that therefore evidence of his intoxication should be suppressed. [13] The court of appeals rejected his argument. The court first reasoned that the officer's suspicion that Larson had been driving while intoxicated was reasonable given Larson's erratic driving. [14] The court then addressed whether the requisite element of imminent danger terminated when Larson allowed an apparent stranger to drive the car in his place. [15] The court concluded that the district court had not clearly erred when it found that it was likely that Larson would have resumed driving at some later point, and that [the officer] was not unreasonable in believing that the change of drivers did not eliminate the need to make an investigatory stop. [16] In Romo, a police officer followed a truck after he recognized a known prostitute in the truck's front passenger seat. [17] The truck pulled into a parking lot and the driver (Romo) voluntarily exited the truck and approached the officer. [18] The officer noticed that Romo smelled of alcohol and Romo admitted to the officer that he had been drinking. [19] The officer then asked Romo to perform field sobriety tests; Romo failed the tests. [20] The court of appeals concluded that the investigatory stop commenced when the officer asked Romo to perform the field sobriety tests and that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion at that point to warrant that request. [21] As the court explained: The fact that Romo was driving just prior to his encounter with [the officer] demonstrated Romo's willingness to drive in his current [intoxicated] condition. At the time of the encounter, Romo retained possession of his car and it remained immediately accessible for him to drive. Under these circumstances there was a sufficient risk of imminent public danger to warrant an investigatory stop. [22] In Shearer, an off-duty police officer observed a Jeep speeding on the Glenn Highway and swerving between lanes without signaling. [23] The officer telephoned Anchorage Police Department dispatch for a check on the Jeep's license plates, determined where the owner lived, and followed the Jeep to the owner's residence. [24] The driver (Shearer) opened his garage door, parked the Jeep in his driveway, and exited the Jeep. [25] As Shearer headed into his house through the garage, the officer contacted him. [26] The officer noticed that Shearer smelled of alcohol and arrested him for DWI after he had difficulty performing field sobriety tests. [27] On appeal, Shearer conceded that he arguably posed an imminent public danger while he was driving home, but claimed that because he parked his Jeep in his driveway, exited the vehicle and was headed towards his home when [the officer] contacted him, [the officer] had no basis to reasonably suspect that Shearer continued to pose an imminent danger to the motoring public. [28] The court of appeals rejected Shearer's argument because, as the court explained, at the time of his encounter with the officer, Shearer retained possession of the vehicle and it remained immediately accessible for him to drive. [29] Thus, under Larson, Romo, and Shearer, an officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a person who is no longer driving but is suspected of driving while intoxicated when (a) the driver just demonstrated his willingness to drive while intoxicated, and (b) the driver retains possession of his vehicle and it remains immediately accessible for him to drive. [30] The second prong of that analysis provides assurance that the officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger continues to exist even though the intoxicated driver was no longer driving. [31] The court's opinion correctly reasons that Trooper Tuckwood had a reasonable suspicion for thinking that Hartman had been driving while intoxicated. But there is no justification for concluding that Hartman posed an imminent public danger at the moment he was contacted by Trooper Tuckwood. Trooper Tuckwood could not then have reasonably suspected that Hartman would again operate a vehicle that day. The Honda owned by Hartman's father was disabled and Trooper Tuckwood was having it towed. And there was no evidence Hartman might operate the tan Taurus in which he was now a passenger. Trooper Tuckwood never testified that he thought Hartman might drive the Taurus. As Hartman argues, the Taurus did not belong to him and he had manifested a non-driving intention as a passenger in the Taurus. Moreover, there was no indication the Taurus driver was impaired or might ask or permit Hartman to drive. Because Hartman was not in possession of a vehicle and no vehicle was immediately accessible for him to drive, Trooper Tuckwood could not have reasonably suspected that imminent public danger existed when he stopped the Taurus, contacted Hartman, and saw that Hartman was merely a passenger in someone else's car. [32] The court's opinion discusses Larson, Romo, and Shearer. [33] But in my view, the opinion recognizes but ultimately misapplies the factual justification that permitted the court of appeals to uphold the stops in those cases: the availability of a vehicle the defendant might drive and some likelihood he might actually drive it. [34] To uphold the stop here given the complete absence of any evidence and any administrative finding that there was any likelihood Hartman might drive the Taurus misapplies the court of appeals's decisions. And, given the circumstances here, it would mean police could find imminent public danger justifying an investigatory stop whenever a vehicle driver gives a ride to an intoxicated passenger, on a theory, unsupported by any evidence supporting a reasonable belief, the driver might relinquish the wheel to the visibly intoxicated passenger. No doubt such a relinquishment of control can occur. But absent evidence justifying some reason to think it is likely to occur, a DUI investigatory stop would not be sustainable in that case, nor is it in this case. It is not just that those three court of appeals decisions uphold stops for reasons absent here. Our own case, Coleman, requires us to hold that the absence of any evidence that the trooper actually thought Hartman might drive the Taurus, and the absence of any evidence that would have made such a notion reasonable, is fatal to this stop. Coleman requires the officer to suspect that imminent public danger exists, not simply that it existed in the past. [35] The state also argues that Trooper Tuckwood's investigatory stop was lawful because Trooper Tuckwood had a reasonable suspicion that serious harm to persons or property ha[d] recently occurred. [36] The state suggests that Trooper Tuckwood may have stopped the Taurus to investigate whether a theft had been committed. But the Honda was never reported stolen, and Trooper Tuckwood never expressed any concern in his police report or his testimony that he thought the Taurus was stolen. And the only damage to the car that Trooper Tuckwood reported was that the Honda was dented and leaking water or antifreeze. The state cites Gutierres v. State [37] and argues that an officer may investigate a crime before he or she has specific knowledge that a crime has been committed. But an officer must still have specific and articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that serious harm to property has recently occurred. [38] In Gutierres, an officer was patrolling a residential area in the middle of the night when he saw a man jump into the passenger side of a car in a back alley as the officer approached; the driver then swiftly backed the vehicle down the alley. [39] The court of appeals held that these were sufficiently suspicious circumstances to warrant an investigatory stop on the theory that there had been a potential burglary. [40] But here, Trooper Tuckwood did not testify that he had witnessed any suspicious circumstances suggesting a car theft. Instead, he reported and testified that he knew the Honda belonged to John Hartman; his report and testimony implied that he thought Morgan Hartman (John's son) had been driving the car because Morgan's friend lived nearby. Because Trooper Tuckwood did not have a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger existed or that serious harm to property had recently occurred, the investigatory stop was unlawful under Coleman. [41]