Opinion ID: 2320064
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pattern of improper conduct.

Text: Count Four of the formal complaint alleges that Judge Mathesius has engaged in a pattern of improper conduct that violate[s] Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct and has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, in violation of Rule 2:15-8(a)(6). According to that complaint, the pattern of improper conduct consists of seven discrete events. The first of these arose in respect of a public thank you letter to the editors of two local newspapers Judge Mathesius wrote while still a municipal court judge. In a July 11, 2001 letter of admonition, the Advisory Committee explained to Judge Mathesius that such actions were political in nature and, hence, inappropriate under the commentary to Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. [7] The second instance cited in the formal complaint arose on September 19, 2003, when, while imposing a sentence on a defendant who shot another, Judge Mathesius engaged in personal observations concerning the wisdom of owning firearms. Those personal observations led to the following statement: And the NRA says, well, everybody should have a gun, you know, and all that stuff. It's as stupid and as ignorant as people can be. In a May 11, 2004 letter of admonition, the Advisory Committee labeled those comments as inappropriate because they represented an expression of a personal opinion that could cause the public to think that you have preconceived views, a bias that would prevent you from being fair and impartial as a judge in such a case. In that letter of admonition, the Advisory Committee noted that it had prior dealings with [Judge Mathesius] concerning the public expression of [his] personal views. Despite certain misgivings, [t]he majority of the [Advisory] Committee . . . decided to resolve this matter privately in the hope that you will avoid repetition of such conduct. Presciently, Judge Mathesius was warned that [s]hould similar conduct recur, however, the Committee will have no choice but to institute formal proceedings. The third and fourth instances listed in the formal complaint as part of the alleged pattern of improper conduct arose in the context of an informal conference held between the Advisory Committee and Judge Mathesius on October 27, 2004. See R. 2:15-11 (providing that [a]t any time while a matter is pending before it, the Committee may conduct an informal conference with the judge and, in the discretion of the Committee, with the grievant that may result in dismissal of grievance, imposition of private discipline, or institution of formal proceedings). The earlier of those involved Judge Mathesius's comments to the defendant in State v. Anderson. In Anderson, the defendant was charged with first-degree aggravated sexual assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a, and second-degree sexual assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2c. As a result, if convicted, the defendant faced a presumptive period of incarceration. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1d (describing presumption of imprisonment for first  and second-degree crimes); N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6a (listing range of imprisonment term for first-degree crime as between ten and twenty years, and range of imprisonment term for second-degree crime as between five and ten years). At a status conference in that matter, Judge Mathesius, taking umbrage with the defendant's attire that day, engaged in the following colloquy: THE COURT: Put your hands behind you, Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson, if you go to trial, are you going to dress like this? This [is] like a court, not like a basketball court. Is that the way you're going to dress? THE DEFENDANT: I don't know. I just put this on today. THE COURT: Where do you think you're going? Shoot some hoops this afternoon? Because it's a nice day out. THE DEFENDANT: Play basketball. THE COURT: Yeah, because you look like you're ready to do some athletic stuff. Is that what the rest of your day [you are] going to be doing, watching the World Series? What are you going to be  don't look around. Next time you come in here, dress like you're going to court, like if you're convicted, you're going to come to jail for ten years. THE DEFENDANT: Why you coming down on me? THE COURT: Because you're dressed inappropriately. Don't look around. Would you advise your client the next time he comes in, dress like he's actually going to a court, that it's a major event in his life. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Every other time he showed up properly dressed. THE COURT: Maybe he has something to do, maybe it's a basketball game this afternoon. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I had no reason to comment before today. I will comment to him later on. THE COURT: I mean, folks, this is a courtroom. You're looking at people going to jail, probation. You're looking at serious stuff. You're not looking at shooting hoops or whatever else you might be doing. You understand what I'm saying, Mr. Anderson, or don't you. THE DEFENDANT: I don't, no. THE COURT: I'll tell you what. [Defense counsel] will clear up the picture when you go outside. If you don't know what's appropriate going to a Superior Court, think about doing 20 years in jail then, come back like that. Wear something like a Donovan McNabb shirt or something like that. That would be good. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I will take care of that, Judge. THE COURT: And don't mumble. And don't shake your head. THE DEFENDANT: Why are you attacking me? I haven't done anything. THE COURT: Because you're acting like a fool now. THE DEFENDANT: Just standing here? THE COURT: Standing there in your little outfit, yes. All right, I'll tell you what. Why don't you just leave, just go out of here. Get out of here. Get. [Defense counsel], would you explain to Mr. Anderson what his problem with me  don't go jacking your finger back here. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'll explain it to him. THE COURT: Go ahead. You got something else you want to say, Mr. Anderson, before you leave? End up in jail today. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I'll talk to Mr. Anderson. THE COURT: Please do. He has a little bit of a difficulty, and if we have him at trial, he will have more of a difficulty with me. At a later proceeding, and by way of plea bargain, the State had offered to dismiss these charges in exchange for the defendant's plea to the disorderly persons offense of lewdness, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:14-4a, [8] which carries a maximum penalty of six months imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8, and a presumption of non-incarceration, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1e. When the defendant rejected that plea offer at a later proceeding and insisted on proceeding to trial, Judge Mathesius exploded: Mr. Anderson, are you nuts? Do you know if you go  if you go down on this case, you're going to state prison and get an Avenel [sexual offender] examination. Are you aware of that, or is that something that doesn't occur to you? In response, the defendant immediately made his position clear: I'm not pleading guilty to something I didn't do. The latter of the two instances raised during the informal conference held on October 27, 2004 between the Advisory Committee and Judge Mathesius involved Judge Mathesius's ruling in respect of the post-conviction relief petition filed in State v. Harris , a ruling ultimately reviewed by this Court. State v. Harris ( Harris III ), 181 N.J. 391, 859 A. 2d 364 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2973, 162 L.Ed. 2d 898 (2005). In Harris III, we explained that: Review of an application for post-conviction relief in a capital case, eight years after the defendant's trial and sentencing, is a daunting task under any set of circumstances. It is made more difficult in this instance due to the conduct of the PCR trial court. That conduct requires us to determine initially whether we can place any confidence in the PCR court's findings and conclusions. We explain. Ordinarily our review would be based on the findings and conclusions of the PCR trial court. R. 3:22-11; R. 2:2-1(a)(3). However, certain written and in-court statements of that court complicate our review. We will not recount those statements in detail here, except to note their thrust. . . . The balance of the court's statements contain what only can be described as outrageous, sarcastic, and pejorative comments about this State's death penalty system and this Court's capital jurisprudence, including gratuitous personal attacks against current and former members of the Court. The court's statements reveal a disdain for defendant and a preordained view that its role in our capital-sentencing system is meaningless. The nature of its comments raise a Caldwell -like issue, namely whether we can affirm a post-conviction relief determination upholding a capital sentence when [a PCR court seems] to believe that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with [it] but with the appellate court which later reviews the case. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2636, 86 L.Ed. 2d 231, 235-36 (1985). [ Id. at 410-11, 859 A. 2d 364 (footnote omitted).] Because Judge Mathesius's rhetoric demonstrated a diminished sense of [his] unique responsibility in our capital sentencing process[,] id. at 414, 859 A. 2d 364, we determined to nullify [Judge Mathesius]'s findings and conclusions. Id. at 413, 859 A. 2d 364. Instead, we conduct[ed] a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal conclusions [reached by Judge Mathesius] . . . ensur[ing] that our resolution of [each] claim [wa]s based on objective evidence in the record, and not on any credibility determination made by [Judge Mathesius]. Id. at 419, 859 A. 2d 364. Judge Mathesius's explanation for his rejected reasoning in State v. Harris is that he had been on the Superior Court bench for only one year at the time of the Harris case and would not have written his decision in the same way if he had it to do over again. The fifth, sixth, and seventh instances of misconduct listed in the formal complaint and found by the Advisory Committee to be part of Judge Mathesius's pattern of improper conduct are the same instances which give rise to the allegations in Counts One, Two, and Three of the formal complaint, respectively. In its consideration of these instances, the Advisory Committee succinctly reasoned as follows: What those earlier matters have in common with the present matters is that they all reflect [Judge Mathesius]'s poor judgment, impulsiveness and lack of self-control, and tendency to act without sufficient regard for the propriety or the consequences of his actions. He was offended by the jury's decision in the McDaniels case because he considered it to be the wrong result, so he angrily went to the jury room and vented his emotions. Without sufficient reflection or understanding, he entered the jury room in the Byrd and Dean case during jury deliberations without advising counsel or bringing a court reporter, indifferent to the risk that jurors might spontaneously say something about the case itself. He snapped at defense counsel for objecting to that visit to the jury room and then showed his pique by returning to the jury room to dismiss the jurors for the day. His conduct in respect of the Fletcher case goes beyond impulsivity. In a lengthy, sarcastic, and personally insulting letter, he criticized the author of the Fletcher opinion; [and] he seized on a chance encounter with that judge's new law clerk to denigrate the judge. . . . The Advisory Committee thus concluded that Judge Mathesius's actions constitute[d] a pattern of improper conduct that calls into question his judgment, temperament, and ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the Code of Judicial Conduct.