Opinion ID: 1695318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether sufficient evidence was presented on which the jury could base a verdict for mr. tschirn's damages.

Text: Terrell contends that the jury was presented insufficient evidence on which to assess damages and that the evidence that was presented was uncertain and speculative. The jury found for Tschirn and awarded him damages in the amount of $14,500. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof as to the amount of damages. Puckett Machinery Co. v. Edwards, 641 So.2d 29, 36 (Miss. 1994); City of New Albany v. Barkley, 510 So.2d 805, 808 (Miss. 1987); Harper v. Hudson, 418 So.2d 54 (Miss. 1982). Although the measure of those damages does not have to be exact, the most accurate and reliable evidence available should be presented. Puckett Machinery Co., 641 So.2d at 36; Barkley, 510 So.2d at 807; Harrison v. Prather, 435 F.2d 1168, 1174 (5th Cir.1970). In a suit for conversion, the value of the personal property at the time and place of conversion must be shown to prove the extent of damages. PACCAR Financial Corp. v. Howard, 615 So.2d 583, 590 (Miss. 1993); Masonite Corporation v. Williamson, 404 So.2d 565 (Miss. 1981); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Blakeney, 353 So.2d 769, 773 (Miss. 1978). In his case in chief, Tschirn put on no evidence of the value of his car when it was stolen. The sales receipt for the car was put into evidence. It showed the car plus tax and license cost $22,489.99 when it was bought in March of 1988. The car was stolen some 16 months later in July of 1989. Tschirn testified that he had put on different tires, but the cost of the new tires was not given. He also stated he had installed a $600.00 stereo. There was no evidence as to the mileage on the car or to car's condition at the time it was stolen. Tschirn did state he took good care of the car and that there was a cigarette burn on the passenger seat. There was absolutely no testimony or other evidence introduced as to any expenses incurred because to the loss of the car. At the close of Tschirn's case in chief, Terrell moved for a directed verdict because there had been no proof as to the value of the car or other damages. The Court reserved his ruling until the defendant put on his case in order to see if any evidence as to the value of the car would be presented. Tschirn tried to establish the worth of the stolen car through Terrell's testimony on cross-examination. The evidence presented to the jury from which to assess damages was speculative at best. Tschirn put on no evidence as to damages in his case in chief and so on cross-examination he badgered Terrell into stating that a fourteen month old car, fully loaded and in mint condition might be worth about half of its value new. Tschirn also tried to get Terrell to say that such a Camaro would cost around $24,000 new, making half around $12,000. Terrell repeatedly stated that he could not give an answer without seeing the car. In trying to get Terrell to make his case for him, Tschirn's attorney more or less tried to testify before the jury. He asked Tschirn if a new Camaro would cost around $24,000 when the sales receipt into evidence showed that the car cost around $22,500, fifteen hundred dollars less. He also asked Terrell about the value of a fourteen month old Camaro, fully loaded and in mint condition. The car was sixteen months old when it was stolen, there was no evidence about the optional features on the car or what condition it was in when stolen. Terrell never gave a definite answer as to the value of such a car as described by Tschirn's attorney and even if his answer is considered reliable there was not enough evidence present to show that it reflected the value of a car with the same characteristics as the stolen car. This is not a case were the amount of damages would be extremely difficult to prove. Tschirn had available to him sources and means whereby damages could have been ascertained with a fair degree of certainty. Norman Sandifer, one of the Tschirn's witnesses, was a salvage dealer and could have been asked about the value of the car. Tschirn could have further testified about the mileage and condition of his car at the time it was stolen and to the expenses he incurred because of its loss. For example, Tschirn could have presented receipts for rental cars if any. The price listed in the National Automobile Dealers Association's Blue Book could have been introduced. No doubt there were other ways to better determine the extent of damages than badgering the defendant into making a less than definite guess. This is an occasion where the trial judge probably should have directed a verdict for Terrell. However, Terrell chose to put on further evidence and did not raise in this appeal the issue of the trial court's denial of directed verdict. Because the speculative nature of the damages in this case, we find the jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.