Opinion ID: 8870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Thirteenth Amendment--Involuntary Servitude Claim

Text: 10 Brooks alleged that his choice between staying in jail or working when he was not supposed to be in jail amounted to involuntary servitude. We begin by asking whether the record contained substantial evidence to create a jury question on involuntary servitude. Boeing v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir.1969). 11 The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides that [n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the states or in any place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fifth Circuit defines involuntary servitude as an action by the master causing the servant to have, or to believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement. Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir.1990). When the employee has a choice, even though it is a painful one, there is no involuntary servitude ... A showing of compulsion is thus a prerequisite to proof of involuntary servitude. Id. 12 In Watson, this Circuit held that two inmates who requested to work outside of jail made such a choice voluntarily and presented no Thirteenth Amendment claim. Id. at 1552-1553. The prison context made this choice no less voluntary. Examining the record, we find Brooks's situation to be similar to that of the inmates in Watson. 13 The county held Brooks as a pretrial detainee. In that status, Brooks was entitled only to be confined until trial; the Appellants were under no obligation to allow Brooks the freedom he enjoyed. Brooks made the request for trusty status. He desired to leave the jail and chose to work as the price for that right. Since Brooks was not being punished by being detained until trial, the choice between this confinement and work as a trusty cannot be considered coercive because the benefits he received for working were not benefits for which he was otherwise entitled. Admittedly, the choice described might have been a painful one, but it was nonetheless a choice. 14 The district court granted Appellants partial summary judgment on Brooks's claims relating to unlawful incarceration, absolving Appellants of legal liability. To find the Appellants liable for involuntary servitude based on a nolle prosequi order which provides no basis for liability under unlawful incarceration would defy common sense. Like the inmates in Watson, Brooks had a choice, albeit a painful one. He was, however, not subject to involuntary servitude and thus presented no claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. 3 15