Opinion ID: 306709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: absence of adequate record support for board determination

Text: Checkman's application states a prima facie case for conscientious objector (CO) status, and its core element of an opposition to war in any form, 2 derived from religious training and belief. Checkman's application sets forth that his opposition derives from moral and ethical beliefs that, while not specifically identified to any organized religion, 3 or necessarily to a belief in a supreme being, 4 were drawn in part from the tenets of various recognized creeds 5 and occupied the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of [others], 6 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187, 85 S.Ct. 850, 865, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965). It was the CORB's position that Checkman failed each of the three tests for Congressionally-recognized conscientious objection: that his objection to war was (a) selective, (b) derived from political expediency and (c) not sincere, insofar as it purported to be other than (a) and (b). A. Doctrine of judicial review of basis-in-fact for conscientious objector decisions This case calls for an application of the doctrine that a court, in reviewing a decision denying conscientious objector (CO) status, will ascertain whether there is a basis in fact for the decision. This standard emerged in judicial doctrine in selective service classification matters, see Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122-123, 66 S.Ct. 423, 90 L.Ed. 567 (1946), was reaffirmed in the conscientious objector context, see United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965), and incorporated by the legislature in the Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C.App. Sec. 460(b)(3). It has also been applied in the cases involving an in-service conscientious objector application. See United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, 436 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1971) (the standard is the same as in draft cases); Lovallo v. Resor, 443 F.2d 1262, 1265 (2d Cir. 1971); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1968). Decisions in this area often turn on the contours of the individual case. However, this court has rejected the notion that a penetrating reconstruction of it decisions reveals that while this court purports to apply the same standard as the other circuits it in fact applies a more narrow standard of review, and in fact requires upholding of an Army denial of an in-service CO application as long as there is a mere scintilla of evidence in support. Dix v. Resor, 449 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1971). Indeed, in Lovallo v. Resor, supra, we took pains to note our congruence with the approach of other circuits, including notably Kessler v. United States, 406 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1969), and we said that although the military is not required to accept the prima facie case for discharge made out in the applicant's statement, and may determine that he is not to be believed,- Where the applicant has stated his beliefs with apparent sincerity and no adverse demeanor evidence has been introduced, the Conscientious Objection Review Board must predicate any finding of insincerity upon objective evidence affording a rational basis for the Board's refusal to accept the validity of the applicant's claims.  Absent such evidence, the military's administrative determination lacks a basis in fact and is, therefore, rendered in violation of its own directive.    [What is required is] the kind of evidence that substantially blurs the picture painted by the [applicant] . . . (443 F.2d at 1264-1265). The central question is whether the record contains the objective basis requisite for rejection of the application. B. Existing law requires statement of reasons for adverse decision on CO application. The military regulations require a statement of reasons to be supplied to the applicant when a CO application is denied. This pertinent Department of Defense Directive, Number 1300.6, Sec. VI, F, states: The reasons for an adverse decision will be made a part of the record and will be provided to the individual. The Army's implementing regulation, AR 135-25, promulgated in its present form on April 11, 1969, provides as follows (para. 10): Upon determination that neither I-O or I-A-O classification is appropriate, the individual requesting discharge will be advised by his commanding officer that his request has been denied, giving reasons for such denial. In the earlier cases involving review of denials of CO status, the courts staked out that there existed a judicial jurisdiction-a matter once bitterly contested-and a judicial review to assure that there was a basis in fact in the record for the decision. In the earlier cases the courts did not focus on the need for or content of reasons in the administrative process. There has emerged an increasing awareness, that while the basis in fact standard implies a narrower judicial review than the conventional substantial evidence rule so far as facts are concerned, and that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether a particular classification is justified, see Estep v. United States, supra, 327 U.S. at 122, 66 S.Ct. 423, the courts cannot shirk the review necessary to consider whether there was a deviation from requirements of law. In conscientious objector cases, the need for attentive judicial review has been enhanced by the Seeger decision, with its departure from the prior construction of the religious requirement, a construction more easily understood, applied and enforced than Seeger's rule. The courts have come to reject decision-making in conscientious objector cases on unarticulated premises and to adhere to what is now the substantially universal rule that selective service decisions denying prima facie claims of conscientious objection cannot be sustained when the record does not sufficiently disclose the board's reasons for its finding. 7 See United States v. Lenhard, 437 F.2d 936, 937 (2d Cir. 1970); Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169, 1175 (2d Cir. 1970). Cases from other circuits are collected in Note, Due Process in Selective Service Appeals, 39 U.Chi.L. Rev. 331, 357, n. 144 (1972). And we take note that the Solicitor General has confessed error in a case of a denial of a concededly prima facie claim without reasons. Joseph v. United States, 405 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 1274, 31 L.Ed.2d 473 (1972). That the Court's thinking was in accord with the Solicitor General's is indicated by Fein v. Selective Service System, 405 U.S. 365, 92 S.Ct. 1062, 31 L.Ed.2d 298 (1972), decided the week before Joseph, where the Court referred to the fact that even prior to the 1971 Act the Government had acknowledged the appearance of a relatively recent line of authority exemplified by United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (CA9 1969), to the effect that the failure of a local board to articulate in writing the reason for its denial of a conscientious objector classification is a fatal procedural flaw when the registrant has made a prima facie case for such status. Brief 52-53. The rationale is that some statement of reasons is necessary for meaningful review of the administrative decision when the registrant's claim has met the statutory criteria or has placed him prima facie within the statutory exemption, and his veracity is the principal issue. (405 U.S. at 380, 92 S.Ct. at 1072, footnotes omitted) The Fein opinion noted that the Government's Joseph memorandum said it would not challenge this newly evolved judicial rule. And Fein continues (405 U.S. at 381, 92 S.Ct. at 1072): The Government also notes that the requirement for an administrative statement of reasons seems fully consistent with the new statutory . . . and regulatory . . . provisions on this point.    [Joseph's] obvious significance for Fein is that if the doctor is ever again called for induction, the rule of Haughton will provide a defense for him unless and until the requirements of the new statute and regulations are fulfilled. The requirement of reasons has roots in a judicial rule. It has been fortified by the directive in military regulations that reasons accompany an adverse decision on a claim of in-service conscientious objection. These regulations, consistent with the underlying statute, had the force and effect of law, and the officials governed by the regulations were without legal authority to ignore or violate them to the detriment of the interests of the applicant. This is a settled rule that has been enforced in a wide variety of contexts, 8 and has full vitality for draft cases and in-service CO issues. See, e. g., Hammond v. Lenfest, supra, 398 F.2d at 715, where we said, in discussing the regulations here involved, a validly promulgated regulation binds the government as much as the individuals subject to the regulation; and, this is no less so because the governmental action is essentially discretionary in nature. See, also, United States ex rel. Donham v. Resor, supra, 436 F.2d at 754, quoting United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, 706 (4th Cir. 1969): Such regulations [for discharge of conscientious objectors] once issued must be followed scrupulously. Certainly this provision of these regulations did not go beyond what Congress permitted; indeed not long afterward, in the 1971 amendment to the 1967 Military Selective Service Act, this provision was affirmatively required. 9 When there is a requirement of law that reasons be stated by executive officials or administrative agencies responsible for decisions, there is an implicit corollary that the decision must stand or fall on the basis of the reasons stated. This is a general doctrine of administrative law. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943). See generally 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Sec. 16.01. It has significance for conscientious objector cases, where the decisions reflect the court's increasing awareness of this requirement, both in selective service cases (even before enactment of the 1971 amendments) 10 and in cases of in-service claims. 11 Otherwise a court, if it sustains a decision by recourse to reasons outside those specified, opens the door to an improper substituting of the court's judgment and evaluation of evidence in place of that of the agency (here the CORB) or official with responsibility. The court's judgment, its reasons and approaches, may not be acceptable to and may even have been discredited by the administrative officials responsible. Of course, if the reviewing court concludes that the claimant was ineligible for the relief sought as a matter of law-on some ground not dependent on a weighing of evidence, for example if the application on its face showed that the applicant's beliefs had fully crystallized prior to entry into the service-then the appeal would be rejected even though that ground was not articulated by the officer or board involved. But where the range of executive responsibility embraces the latitude to find in favor of the claimant on an issue, the matter must be considered, and if the conclusion is adverse, reasons must be stated, with support in a record basis in fact. The basis in fact doctrine was intended to limit the freedom of a court to substitute its judgment for that of an official or board-by interposing its own weighing of the evidence. That doctrine does not undercut, it rather underlines, the rule that focuses on the reasons assigned by the official or board-for that also is a rule that emphasizes executive responsibility, and limits judicial substitution. The rule focusing on the reasons stated in the execution or administrative disposition calls for good sense and reasonableness, and for full awareness that local boards and military officials, who have been assigned the primary responsibility for these basically discretionary decisions in CO cases, cannot be expected to express themselves with the elaboration of expert regulatory agencies. Paszel v. Laird, supra, 426 F.2d at 1175. We will respect the agency's determination as long as we can discern its path. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 595, 65 S.Ct. 829, 89 L.Ed. 1206 (1945); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 418 F.2d 1153, 1156 (1969). What we contemplate is that the CORB will identify, and be reviewed on the basis of the identification of, the salient underlying considerations and type of evidence relied on, for example letters from associates, reports of personal demeanor, and lateness in filing an application. This is not a hypertechnical requirement. It is rather the basic pre-condition of any intelligible administrative scheme that has as an important constitutent element a provision for judicial review. If indeed it is to be the administrative decision that is reviewed, the administrators must focus the court's attention on the reasons for the decision and the court must review it on those reasons. The court is not a hostile stranger to the official or agency, but rather the two act, in conjunction, with roles in furtherance of justice and the public interest. 12 The Government contends that a court is not limited to ascertaining whether there is a basis in fact to support the reasons given in the CORB's decision, but may search the record for other factual evidence in support of the denial. The Government relies on Rosengart v. Laird, 449 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1971), and this language (at pp. 528-529): The standard by which we must be guided on this appeal is whether there exists within the four corners of the record affirmative objective evidence constituting a basis-in-fact for the Review Board to conclude as it did that Rosengart's purported conscientious objective [sic] beliefs are not truly held. 11