Opinion ID: 1375458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to exclude witnesses

Text: Defendant's second assignment of error involves the trial court's denial of his motion to exclude witnesses from the courtroom. Defendant made that motion after direct examination of the second witness during the state's case-in-chief. At that time, the following exchange occurred: [DEFENDANT]:    Actually, that's another thing I forgot. Should I make a motion to exclude the witnesses out of the courtroom? THE COURT: You could have, but you haven't. [DEFENDANT]: Okay, can I make that motion now? [PROSECUTOR]: I'd object, Your Honor. It's too late. Those are supposed to be made before trial starts. [DEFENDANT]: There has only been two witnesses.      THE COURT: It's true, it is late. It's not timely. Very well, we'll follow the rules. It's not timely. It has to be made at that point, and it's too late. (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his motion to exclude witnesses was an error that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. By contrast, the state makes two arguments as to why the trial court did not err: because it was within the trial court's discretion to deny the motion as untimely and because defendant suffered no demonstrable prejudice from the denial. We agree with the state's latter argument. Rule 615 of the Oregon Evidence Code (OEC) governs exclusion of witnesses. It provides in part: At the request of a party the court may order witnesses excluded until the time of final argument, and it may make the order of its own motion. (Emphasis added.) The purpose of an exclusion order  `is to prevent any possibility that the testimony of one witness may be influenced or tainted by what he learned from hearing the testimony of another.' State v. Cooper, 319 Or. 162, 165 n. 2, 874 P.2d 822 (1994) (quoting State v. Burdge, 295 Or. 1, 9, 664 P.2d 1076 (1983)). In addition, an exclusion order helps to prevent witnesses from learning in advance the types of questions that the opposing lawyer is likely to ask on cross-examination. Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 395 (3d ed. 1996). The use of the word may in OEC 615 suggests that the trial judge has discretion whether to exclude witnesses. Compare Federal Rule of Evidence 615 (providing that witnesses shall be excluded at the request of a party). See Burdge, 295 Or. at 9, 664 P.2d 1076 (pointing out difference between federal and state rules); Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, at 395 (same). Because the decision whether to grant a motion to exclude witnesses is discretionary, we generally review such a decision for an abuse of discretion. Cf. State v. Kendrick, 239 Or. 512, 518, 398 P.2d 471 (1965) (when the trial court denies a motion for a mistrial following a witness' violation of an exclusion order, the allowance or denial of the motion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion). But in the present case, the trial court did not exercise the discretion that the rule grants. The state's only objection to defendant's motion to exclude witnesses under OEC 615 was that it was made too late. The prosecutor asserted that a motion to exclude witnesses is supposed to be made before trial starts. The trial court agreed with that assertion when denying defendant's motion and stating, It's true   . [W]e'll follow the rules.    It has to be made at that point, and it's too late. By so ruling, the trial court acted on what it believed was a legal requirement, rather than a matter on which it had the authority to rule either way. In declining to exercise its discretionary authority, the trial court committed a legal error. OEC 615 does not contain a temporal requirement. That is, that rule does not require that a motion to exclude witnesses be made before trial or at any other specific time. Therefore, the fact that defendant did not move for exclusion of witnesses under OEC 615 until after the direct examination of the state's second witness did not, by itself, provide a basis for denying the motion. We do not mean to suggest that the timing of a motion to exclude witnesses under OEC 615 is irrelevant. In deciding whether to grant such a motion, a court may consider any fact that bears on the purposes of an exclusion order. A delay in making the motion, for example, may lessen the utility of exclusion, because the remaining witnesses already may have heard parts of other witnesses' testimony. That weighing process is not what occurred here, however. In the circumstances, the trial court erred in failing to consider defendant's motion to exclude witnesses under the proper discretionary standard. Because the trial court erred, we next consider whether that error requires reversal. As this court stated in State v. Busby, 315 Or. 292, 299, 844 P.2d 897 (1993): Even if error occurs during trial, this court will not reverse a conviction if the error is harmless. In State v. Walton, 311 Or. 223, 230, 809 P.2d 81 (1991), this court reiterated the rule for testing harmless error under the Oregon Constitution, found in State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587, 595-96, 761 P.2d 524 (1988), as follows: `Under Oregon law, a verdict against a criminal defendant may be affirmed notwithstanding trial error if the error did not affect a substantial right of the defendant. OEC 103(1). [3] This court has interpreted this to mean that the verdict may be affirmed if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. State v. Hansen, 304 Or. 169, 180-81, 743 P.2d 157 (1987); see also State v. Miller, 300 Or. 203, 220-22, 709 P.2d 225 (1985) [cert. den. 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 1793, 90 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986)].' This record contains no showing that defendant was prejudiced, either by the trial court's failure to exercise discretion or by the ruling that the court made. The record does not contain any indication that we can find (and defendant does not suggest) that any witness tailored testimony to conform with that of any earlier witness or even communicated with any earlier witness about questions by trial counsel, about trial testimony, or about the facts of the case. Indeed, because of the nature of the proof, even the possibility of such tailoring was very remote. The state's case was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. More than 40 witnesses testified for the state. Each of those witnesses testified about a different occurrence or event and, thus, provided a different link in the state's theory of the case. For the most part, their testimony was not cumulative or corroborative. We conclude that defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's error, described above, prejudiced him. Accordingly, that error does not require reversal. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.