Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chapman v. California

Text: 162 According to the dissent, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) establishes that the burden in each case rests squarely on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (the) error was harmless. 54 I have no quarrel with that interpretation of Chapman : once a constitutional error is proven the burden of proceeding does shift to the government to prove that the error is harmless. But it begs the question for the dissent to rely on Chapman here because Chapman does not address who has the burden of proof with respect to whether a constitutional error has been committed. 163 Before the burden of proof shifts to the government under Chapman, whatever prejudice the constitutional error involves must first be established by the claimant. Thus, in Chapman itself, the Government was not required to show that the error was harmless until the defendants had shown that a prejudicial error had been committed. Mr. Justice Black wrote: 164 Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. 165 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 (emphasis added). Chapman, therefore, only supports the dissent's position if one assumes that counsel's alleged breach of duty alone constitutes a constitutional violation. Since that is the question at issue in this case, such an assumption is obviously inappropriate.