Opinion ID: 739316
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of the Bribery Count

Text: 85 Appellants also argue that the dismissal of the substantive bribery count renders their conspiracy convictions infirm. They reason that the jury may have convicted them of either conspiracy to commit mail fraud or conspiracy to commit bribery. They assert that a conspiracy conviction premised on the target offense of bribery would be improper in light of Manges' acquittal on the facts and law of the substantive offense of bribery under § 666. 86 This argument is doubly flawed. First, the jury could not possibly have convicted appellants of conspiracy to commit bribery. The district court carefully instructed the jury to consider only two offenses: mail fraud, and conspiracy to commit mail fraud. It is immaterial that one object of the alleged scheme, to deprive Texas citizens of their right to honest government services, bears a passing resemblance to bribery. Second, appellants are grievously misinformed if they believe that they cannot properly be convicted of conspiracy once they or their co-defendant has been acquitted of a related substantive offense. To be convicted of conspiracy, defendants need not ... have committed the crime that was its object. United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 975 (5th Cir.1988) (citing Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53, 63 S.Ct. 99, 101, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942)). 87 The district court held the evidence insufficient to submit the bribery count against Manges to the jury. This holding does not provide Manges and his co-defendants an avenue of escape from criminal liability for the distinct offense of conspiracy.