Opinion ID: 1822567
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of a Cause Challenge

Text: Kearse alleges first that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's denial of Kearse's cause challenge to juror Matthews. Kearse's resentencing, like the 1991 trial, was held in Indian River County instead of St. Lucie County. During jury selection, defense counsel moved to strike Matthews for cause based on her knowledge of facts of the case and her relationship to a testifying detective. [7] After the court denied the strike, defense counsel took the necessary steps to preserve the issue by requesting additional peremptories and renewing the motion before the jury was sworn. See Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1990) (explaining the requirements for preserving a cause challenge). On direct appeal, appellate counsel raised the denials of other cause challenges, but did not raise the preserved claim regarding Matthews, who actually served on the jury. See Kearse II, 770 So.2d at 1128-29. Accordingly, contrary to the State's argument, this claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is properly raised by habeas petition in this Court. Nevertheless, we deny the claim. During individual questioning by the attorneys, Matthews indicated that she remembered a media report from several years before in which a Fort Pierce officer was shot about 14 times and [t]here was like a trail where he tried to get away. She repeated that she was uncertain these facts concerned this case and had made the tentative connection based on the questioning during jury selection. Matthews also volunteered that, the night before, she learned from her husband's parents that her father-in-law's half brother, a retired Fort Pierce police officer, was coming to Florida for Christmas and to testify at a trial involving the murder of an officer. Matthews stated that she had not seen Detective Raulerson in three years and did not know him well. She assured the court that this would have no effect on her impartiality in the resentencing proceeding. At the resentencing, Raulerson, who was lead crime scene detective in the investigation of Officer Parrish's murder, testified regarding the gathering of physical evidence in the case. We find that neither Matthews's vague memories about the crime, nor her attenuated relationship to a testifying detective, either separately or cumulatively, raises a reasonable doubt about her ability to be fair and impartial in light of her unwavering statements during voir dire of the need for a fair sentencing proceeding and her ability to be impartial. See Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038, 1041 (Fla.1984) (The test for determining juror competency is whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him by the court.); Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7, 24 (Fla.1959) (announcing test for juror competency). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the cause challenge, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the preserved claim.