Opinion ID: 4563583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Our Court’s Prior Precedential Opinion

Text: On August 28, 2018, our Court, inter alia, reversed the District Court’s denial of Geness’s motion for leave to amend his complaint to add the Commonwealth as a defendant. We remanded the case for amendment of the Complaint and reinstitution of his Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim. In addressing whether the District Court should have permitted Geness to amend his Complaint, we analyzed whether his proposed Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Commonwealth would be futile, thus applying the same standard as a motion to dismiss (as we do here). 6 We held that Geness’s proposed claim was not futile and should be permitted. In the course of the analysis, we addressed each requirement of a Title II claim: To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, Geness must establish: “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to 6 “The standard for assessing futility is the ‘same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6).’” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.2000)). 10 discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). We found that Geness met all four requirements of a cognizable Title II claim against the Commonwealth. Specifically, we noted that [r]egulations promulgated under the ADA require that the Commonwealth “shall ensure that inmates or detainees with disabilities are housed in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individuals,” 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(2) (emphasis added), and “[s]hall not place inmates or detainees with disabilities in inappropriate security classifications because no accessible cells or beds are available,” id. § 35.152(b)(2)(i). Id. at 361–62 (discussing several procedural protections “designed to avoid undue delays and safeguard the fair and efficient functioning of the criminal justice system,” the denial of which gives rise to a cognizable ADA claim). With respect to the Title II claim, we concluded that “[a]s alleged, these multiple, protracted, and inexcusable delays in the handling of Geness’s examinations, transfers, and motions—resulting in nearly a decade of imprisonment and 11 civil commitment before a hearing was finally held on his habeas petition—are more than sufficient to state a claim under the ADA.” Id. at 362. We went on to find that the same circumstances gave rise to a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment: [T]he constitutional claims Geness seeks to bring against the Commonwealth as to both the length of his pretrial imprisonment and the length of his civil commitment would not be futile. After his first psychological evaluation indicated that he “remain[s] incompetent to stand trial,” . . . Geness was incarcerated for an additional three years before civil commitment proceedings and a second examination were even requested. And once institutionalized, Geness was left to languish for another four years before he was granted a hearing on his habeas petition and the charges against him were dismissed. There is no question this exceeded the “reasonable period of time necessary” under Jackson to ascertain whether there was a substantial probability Geness would attain competency in the foreseeable future. 12 Id. at 363–64 (citation omitted). When we published this opinion, however, AOPC was neither a party nor a contemplated party. Thus, it is our task to square our prior holding that Geness stated a Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Commonwealth with Geness’s pleadings against AOPC. 7