Opinion ID: 1196411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Smith's Statements

Text: The Inspectors contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to their failure to disclose Smith's statements. They argue that Sanders discharged his duty by placing his memo regarding her statements in his file because Butterworth had access to the file, and that Plaintiffs were aware of the same `essential facts' that Sanders learned from Smith. They further contend that there are no disputes of material fact regarding this claim, that they did not act in bad faith, and that it was not clearly established that a police officer violates Brady by failing to take comprehensive interview notes. Placing the notes regarding Smith's statements in the police file did not fulfill the Inspectors' duty to disclose exculpatory information to the prosecutor. Evidence that a person, known to the officers, has told the officers that they have arrested the wrong people, has identified the people involved, including the shooter, and described the cars and the chase in a manner consistent with the evidence, should not have been buried in a file, but should have been made known to the prosecutor. Moreover, Smith's statements contradicted the account of their key witness, and the notes included a hand-drawn map of the incident, based on her statements. The Inspectors cite Raley v. Ylst, 444 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir.), amended by 470 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.2006), cert. denied sub nom. Raley v. Ayres, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 59, 169 L.Ed.2d 50 (2007), for the proposition that Brady is not violated where the defendant is aware of exculpatory evidence. Raley is distinguishable from the instant case. The evidence allegedly withheld in Raley was evidence contained in the petitioner's medical records from his pretrial confinement. We reasoned that the petitioner knew that he had made frequent visits to medical personnel at the jail, and knew that he was taking medication that they prescribed for him. Raley, 470 F.3d at 804. Thus, in Raley, we concluded that [t]hose facts were sufficient to alert defense counsel to the probability that the jail had created medical records relating to Petitioner. Id. A defendant's awareness of his own medical history, however, is not analogous to Plaintiffs' awareness that Smith might have information helpful to their case. Tennison and Goff had heard that Smith might have information about the shooting, but, even at Tennison's hearing on his new trial motion, Adachi thought that her last name was White. Thus, not only did defense counsel not even know Smith's name, but he certainly did not know the extent of the information that Smith had given to Sanders. Smith contradicted Masina's account of where the chase started, gave the names of many of the people involved, including Ricard, and exonerated Tennison and Goff. In United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir.2000), the government argued that its failure to notify defense counsel of errors in police reports before trial was not a Brady violation because the defendant knew the truth and could have informed his counsel. Id. at 625. We held that [t]he availability of particular statements through the defendant himself does not negate the government's duty to disclose. Id. Defendants cannot always remember all of the relevant facts or realize the legal importance of certain occurrences. Consequently, `[d]efense counsel is entitled to plan his trial strategy on the basis of full disclosure by the government. ...' Id. (citation omitted). Even if Goff had heard that Smith had information about the murder, this knowledge is not the same as Smith's extensive statements to the police. We agree with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, which rejected as untenable a broad rule that any information possessed by a defense witness must be considered available to the defense for Brady purposes. Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 740 (7th Cir.2001). The court reasoned that it is simply not true that a reasonably diligent defense counsel will always be able to extract all the favorable evidence a defense witness possesses. Sometimes, a defense witness may be uncooperative or reluctant. Id. This is precisely the situation that Plaintiffs confronted in the instant case. Although both Tennison and Goff informally asked Smith to help them, she was unwilling to become involved because she was afraid, and because she did not want to have to testify at the trial. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment to the Inspectors with respect to Smith's statements. [6]