Opinion ID: 1906270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the lower court err in its application of law?

Text: The thrust of this argument by Mrs. Muse is that it was error to apply the case of Olson v. Flinn, 484 So.2d 1015 (Miss. 1986), rather than the Grandparents Visitation Rights Act, amended on March 4, 1986. Olson v. Flinn, 484 So.2d at 1018, held that an adoption by a step-parent after the death of one of the child's natural parents terminates the visitation rights of those natural grandparents, except as to the natural parent who is the spouse of the adopting parent. § 93-16-1, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), states: (1) Any court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters shall have jurisdiction to grant visitation rights with a minor child or children to the grandparents of such minor child or children as provided in this chapter. After the Olson decision, § 93-16-3, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), was amended to provide, in pertinent part: ... whenever one (1) of the parents of a minor child dies, either parent of the child's parent ... who has died may, ... petition the chancery court in which the child resides, and seek visitation rights with such child. Up to this point in the proceedings under her theory of law, Mrs. Muse would have been entitled to petition for visitation. However, § 93-16-7, Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1989), was also amended and serves to limit the application of the above statutes, as follows: This chapter shall not apply to the granting of visitation rights to the natural grandparents of any child who has been adopted by order or decree of any court unless one (1) of the legal parents is also a natural parent of such child. This chapter shall apply to persons who become grandparents of a child by virtue of adoption. Our recent decision of Howell v. Rogers, 551 So.2d 904 (Miss. 1989), did involve an application of the amended Grandparents Visitation Statutes. However, in that case, the natural mother and father had divorced and the custody of the child was awarded to the natural mother. The natural mother and step-father then adopted the child and subsequent to the adoption, the natural father died. We held that an adoption by a step-parent after the termination of parental rights does not terminate the visitation rights of the natural grandparents, the parents of one of the natural parents whose parental rights were terminated. Unfortunately for Mrs. Muse, in the current case, these amended statutes do not afford her the same right of action. By its own terms the Grandparents Visitation Rights Act does not apply to Mrs. Muse in that when Mrs. Hutchins adopted the children she was not a parent of either of them and the adoption terminated the parental rights of her son, Michael Lee Hutchins. Whatever rights to visitation Mrs. Muse may have acquired under the Grandparents Visitation Rights Act were terminated by the decree of adoption. Our recent decision of In the Matter of the Adoption of a Minor Identified in the Petition Hill v. Smith, 558 So.2d 854 (Miss. 1990), an equally tragic situation led to the same result that must occur here. There a very young couple were married and were the parents of a child. They lived next door to the wife's parents when the young husband chased his young wife into her father's yard threatening her with a shotgun. Her father shot and killed the young husband. Thereafter, the maternal grandparents adopted the child of their daughter and her deceased husband. The paternal grandparents, like Mrs. Muse here, were not made parties to the adoption petition or proceeding and apparently knew nothing about it until some time after it had taken place. There, the paternal grandparents sought to set aside the adoption and to obtain visitation rights. They were met by a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the chancery court and upheld by this Court. We are constrained to follow the wording of the statute as it is written in the Grandparents Visitation Rights Act, the statutory scheme of adoption, and our own precedent. For this reason we find that the chancellor did not err in his application of the law but followed it faithfully and there is no merit to this assignment or this appeal.