Opinion ID: 891686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Judicial Stay of SORNA

Text: {41} The Court of Appeals concluded that district judges have the authority to stay SORNA registration pending appeal of a conviction. Myers III, 2010-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 31-33, 147 N.M. 574, 226 P.3d 673. The Court characterized a stay of SORNA registration as part of Defendant's conditions of release pending appeal. Id. ¶ 31 (citing Rule 12-205(B) NMRA). [B]ecause SORNA does not explicitly deprive a trial court of its discretion to stay the registration requirement pending appeal, and [New Mexico] rules and statutes otherwise vest such discretion in the trial court, id. ¶ 29, Myers III held that the district judge retains discretion to grant a stay, id. ¶¶ 31-33 (citing NMSA 1978, § 31-11-1(C) (1988) and quoting Rule 5-402(C) NMRA). We are not persuaded. {42} A district judge does not have discretion to stay SORNA registration. SORNA registration is not a sentence, nor is it a condition of release. Rather, registration and notification provisions under SORNA are immediate and automatic, [but] they do not constitute punishment for a crime. State v. Moore, 2004-NMCA-035, ¶ 24, 135 N.M. 210, 86 P.3d 635. Unlike sentencing and release conditions, SORNA is primarily remedial in purpose and effect. Id.; see also § 29-11A-2(B) (stating that the purpose of SORNA is to assist law enforcement agencies' efforts to protect their communities); State v. Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, ¶ 20, 133 N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268 (SORNA has a remedial purpose, namely, to protect communities from sex offenders.). {43} In Moore, the Court of Appeals was persuaded by the rationale of the majority of jurisdictions, which hold sex offender registration law consequences to be collateral consequences of a plea. 2004-NMCA-035, ¶ 24, 135 N.M. 210, 86 P.3d 635. Thus, SORNA is a collateral consequence of the plea, which most certainly is not under the discretionary control of the court. See id. In fact, the Court of Appeals has recognized for years now, and we agree, that the district court does not impose SORNA provisions or have discretion to modify them in accepting a plea. Id. ¶ 24. {44} While SORNA mandates a sex offender to register, the court plays no role in imposing that mandate. See § 29-11A-4(B); see also Brothers, 2002-NMCA-110, ¶ 22, 133 N.M. 36, 59 P.3d 1268 (The duty to register [as a sexual offender under SORNA] arises by legislative mandate, not by court order. SORNA requires the court to give notice, not to order a defendant to comply with SORNA. The duty to register is an independent statutory duty with a remedial purpose and is not terminated by dismissal of criminal charges. (internal citations omitted)). {45} Just as the district court does not impose SORNA provisions or have discretion to modify them, the court does not have the power to stay a defendant's required compliance. Although counsel was required to advise Defendant regarding the collateral SORNA consequences of a potential plea, see State v. Edwards, 2007-NMCA-043, ¶ 31, 141 N.M. 491, 157 P.3d 56, just as counsel is required to advise a client of collateral deportation consequences, see id. ¶ 26 (citing State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 18, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799), that responsibility does not relate to a court's power to stay those consequences.