Opinion ID: 543816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: 12 Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal: (1) whether construction of the Montano bridge is a major federal action subject to the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act; (2) if construction of the bridge is not a major federal action, whether the bridge project was properly segmented from the federally funded I-25/Los Angeles project, which is a major federal action; (3) whether construction of the bridge requires compliance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act; and (4) whether construction of the bridge requires compliance with section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act or Executive Order 11990. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 13 Plaintiffs argue that the federal defendants' improper approval of the EIS for the Montano bridge violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332 et seq. NEPA provides in pertinent part: 14 The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-- 15 .... 16 (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-- 17 (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 18 (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 19 (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 20 (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 21 (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 22 Section 4332 (emphasis added). 23 The requirements of NEPA apply only when the federal government's involvement in a project is sufficient to constitute major federal action. Plaintiffs contend that the bridge project is a major federal action because of (1) the local defendants' eligibility for federal funding or (2) the FHWA's participation in and approval of the EIS. We disagree. 1. Eligibility for Federal Funding 24 Federal courts have not agreed on the amount of federal involvement necessary to trigger the applicability of NEPA. In La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 337 F.Supp. 221 (N.D.Cal.1971), cert. denied 409 U.S. 890, 93 S.Ct. 105, 34 L.Ed.2d 147 (1972) (prematurely filed), supplemented by 57 F.R.D. 94 (attorney's fees), aff'd 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968, 94 S.Ct. 3171, 41 L.Ed.2d 1138 (1974), the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California addressed the issue of whether the federal regulations and statutes apply to a highway project upon location approval, construction approval, or some intermediate point when federal participation is assured[.] Id. at 226. The court analyzed the problem by dividing highways into three categories: (1) highways for which federal funds have been approved or are immediately sought; (2) state highways constructed without federal funds, and for which federal participation has never been sought; and (3) those projects that may eventually receive federal funds. Id. at 226-27. The court said that there is no question that highways in the first category are major federal actions, and highways in the second category clearly are not; the troublesome category is the third. The court concluded that highways in the third category are major federal actions and require compliance with federal rules because [a]ny project that seeks even the possible protection and assistance of the federal government must fall within the statutes and regulations. Id. at 227. 1 25 The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut recognized the flaws in the approach taken in La Raza, and, instead of requiring all highways in La Raza's third category (state highways that may eventually receive federal funds) to submit to federal requirements, rejected La Raza and held that no highways in that category should be subject to federal requirements: 26 Though recognizing the force of the argument developed in La Raza Unida, this Court concludes that while Congress no doubt has power to require NEPA compliance in such circumstances, the existing legislation simply does not do so. 27 .... 28 The contentions in [La Raza ] are all sound, but with deference I do not understand how they establish that such an option [to apply for federal funding] on the part of a state constitutes the highway a Federal action within the meaning of NEPA. Solicitude for the environment cannot substitute for legislation. Congress has not applied NEPA to all highways that the states are eligible to fund with federal dollars. 29 .... 30 The State's option to use federal dollars, though open virtually until the concrete is poured, is nonetheless an option, and the State's choice should not be restricted simply because one alternative of the option (using state dollars) might result in less adequate assessment of environmental considerations. If the highway is not a federal action, then a state's decision to avoid federal involvement cannot have the paradoxical effect of establishing federal involvement. 31 Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F.Supp. 806, 812-13 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 601 (2nd Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870, 96 S.Ct. 135, 46 L.Ed.2d 100 (1975) (emphasis in original). 32 We are persuaded by the analysis of Citizens and adopt its conclusions. Therefore, because the State of New Mexico, the City of Albuquerque, and the County of Bernalillo here (hereinafter collectively referred to as the state) are only eligible for federal assistance, that eligibility in itself is not sufficient to establish a major federal action requiring the FHWA to comply with the requirements of NEPA. 2. Approval of the EIS 33 Plaintiffs also argue that FHWA's assistance in and approval of the EIS is sufficient to make the bridge project a major federal action. 2 The district court rejected this argument on the following grounds: 34 Clearly, the state in the instant case did not initially need any type of federal approval, assuming that they chose not to seek federal money, in order to proceed with the river crossings project. The fact that the state did voluntarily request a federal EIS, though they were not legally bound to do so, should not, without more, constrain the state to make the entire project federal. Unless the state is actually receiving or is planning to receive federal funding for a project, mere preparation and approval of an EIS is not major federal action. 35 (Memorandum Opinion and Order at 9, June 9, 1987.) We agree with the district court and would only add that an EIS is what is required once a project is deemed to be a major federal action. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(C)(i). It would be anomalous indeed to say that in a case such as this, where there is no showing that the local defendants were involved in a sham transaction to evade federal environmental requirements, that the preparation and approval of an EIS is a major federal action for which an EIS must be prepared and approved. 36 Plaintiffs also point to the fact that the federal government contributed nearly $59,000 of the $75,000 cost of the location study. Although $59,000 is indeed a large portion of that cost, it was incurred in connection with the preparation of the EIS and it is minuscule in comparison with the cost of the total bridge project. 3 Cf. Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F.Supp. 806, 810 (D.Conn.) (The only other federal funding indicated is a sum less than $50,000 of federal highway planning and research funds that were used in connection with the planning of the proposed road. The size of this expenditure and the totally preliminary purposes of the funds are too insignificant to render the proposed multi-million dollar highway a federal action.) (footnote omitted), aff'd, 503 F.2d 601 (2nd Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870, 96 S.Ct. 135, 46 L.Ed.2d 100 (1975). 37 For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the district court that federal involvement with the bridge project[ ] was minimal, and, as a matter of law, did not rise to the level of 'major federal action' so as to bring the project within the purview of federal environmental laws. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2, (June 9, 1987). 38 We draw guidance from Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir.1988), as to the meaning of the phrase major federal action. In that case we analyzed whether and to what extent the Bureau of Land Management (the BLM) could exercise control over a county's major road improvement project, and then we addressed whether such input or control by the BLM constituted major federal action. First, we observed that the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations have defined major federal action to encompass not only actions by the federal government but also nonfederal actions  'with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 1508.18.'  Id. at 1089. However, we went on to state that: 39 [T]he distinguishing feature of 'federal' involvement is the ability to influence or control the outcome in material respects. The EIS process is supposed to inform the decision-maker. This presupposes he has judgment to exercise. 40 .... 41 The touchstone of major federal action, in the context of the case before us, is an agency's authority to influence significant nonfederal activity. This influence must be more than the power to give nonbinding advice to the nonfederal actor.... Rather, the federal agency must possess actual power to control the nonfederal activity. 42 Id. at 1089 (quoting W. Rodgers, Environmental Law 763 (1977) (citation omitted). 43 Given the decision of the state to proceed with the bridge project without federal assistance beyond the initial location study and EIS preparation, we conclude that there is no evidence that the federal government had the actual power to control this project. At most, it gave advice as to the location of the bridge. Thus, we do not here have any major federal action. SEGMENTATION 44 Plaintiffs argue that even if the participation in, and approval of, the EIS alone is not enough to make the project federal, the bridge project was improperly segmented from the I-25/Los Angeles Interchange project, which is a major federal project subject to the requirements of NEPA. The district court rejected that argument, holding that the evidence is undisputed that the projects are, at best, only peripherally related, and have not been improperly segmented from one another. (Memorandum Opinion and Order at 10, June 9, 1987.) We agree. 45 As a general rule under NEPA, segmentation of highway projects is improper for purposes of preparing environmental impact statements. Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 439 (5th Cir.1981). However, a local project closely related physically to a federal project may be deemed independent for NEPA purposes after consideration of whether the proposed segment: 46 (1) has logical termini, (2) has substantial independent utility, (3) does not foreclose the opportunity to consider alternatives, and (4) does not irretrievably commit federal funds for closely related projects. Id. 4 47 Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in determining that they had failed to present any issues of material fact. 5 Specifically, they argue that an affidavit submitted by one of their transportation consultants demonstrates that the eastern terminus of the bridge project, Edith Avenue, is not logical: 48 8. The ... Wilson & Company [traffic] report addresses a Montano Corridor with termini at Coors Road and Edith Boulevard. Figure 2 in that report indicates that 30% of the estimated year 2005 bridge traffic (or 5,070 vehicles per day) will use the section of Montano between Edith Boulevard and I-25. 49 9. Since nearly a third of all bridge traffic will use Montano Bridge east of Edith Boulevard, this strongly suggests that the logical eastern terminus for consideration of bridge traffic impacts and related improvements would be I-25, which is the next major intersecting, regional route east of Edith Boulevard. 50 10. An I-25 terminus for Montano Corridor improvements also has basis according to the Environmental Assessment (EA) for the I-25 Frontage Road improvements. Section O of the EA notes that among the assumptions behind the traffic forecasts used in the I-25 Frontage Road analysis was the following: 51 ... a new Montano corridor bridge and roadway (two-lane limited access facility) from Coors Road to Interstate 25 via Montano Road/Montgomery Boulevard. 52 Affidavit of Harvey R. Joyner, Doc. 111 at p 8-10) (emphasis added). 53 We do not read that evidence to say that Edith Boulevard is not a logical terminus. Rather, the affidavit, at most, merely asserts that the I-25 terminus would be more logical. That a terminus is the most logical is not mandated by the segmentation analysis--that analysis requires only that a terminus be logical. Because plaintiffs point us to no evidence in the record indicating the Edith Boulevard is not a logical terminus, we agree with the district court that there is no question of material fact on that issue. 54 Even if a local project terminates at a point of juncture with a federally funded project, that would not preclude segmentation. Congress has not purported to apply NEPA requirements to [e]very highway that connects with a federally-funded highway, and the fact that the connection here involves a three-mile overlap makes no difference. Citizens for Balanced Environ. & Transp., Inc. v. Volpe, 376 F.Supp. 806, 810 (D.Conn.), aff'd, 503 F.2d 601 (2nd Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870, 96 S.Ct. 135, 46 L.Ed.2d 100 (1975). Because all local projects must start and end somewhere, under plaintiffs' theory the entire highway network across the country could be considered one project. Such an implication is obviously indefensible. 55 Because the criteria advanced in Piedmont Heights are satisfied here, and because plaintiffs have not demonstrated any issues of material fact or raised any other arguments that would demonstrate that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, we affirm the district court's holding that defendants did not improperly segment the bridge project from the I-25 project. NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT 56 Plaintiffs argue that the construction of the bridge requires compliance with section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470 et seq. The NHPA provides in pertinent part: 57 The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State ... shall, prior to the approval of expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure or object that is included in the National Register. 58 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f (emphasis added). 59 As we held above, the participation in and approval of the EIS in this case did not render the bridge project federal in nature. Moreover, the bridge project is not under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of the FHWA. Therefore, we cannot say that it is a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking requiring the FHWA's compliance with the requirements of the NHPA. 6 See Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1056 (D.C.Cir.1989). 60 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ACT and EXECUTIVE ORDER 11990 61 Plaintiffs argue that the construction of the bridge requires compliance with section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act (DTA), 49 U.S.C. Sec. 303 and 23 U.S.C. Sec. 138, and Executive Order 11990. We disagree. 1. Section 4(f) 62 Section 4(f) provides that it is the national policy that special effort should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. To that end, Section 4(f) permits the Secretary of Transportation to approve a transportation project only if 63 (1) there is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and (2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the park, recreation area, wildlife or waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use. 64 49 U.S.C. Sec. 303; see 23 U.S.C. Sec. 138. Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary's actions in this case constituted approval of the project such that compliance with Section 4(f)'s requirements is necessary. 65 We hold that, like the NEPA and the NHPA, Section 4(f) is only applicable to federal projects. See Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v. Burnley, 896 F.2d 985, 988 (6th Cir.1989) (Section 4(f) is applicable only to federal projects, and not state projects); see also Quince Orchard Valley Citizens Ass'n v. Hodel, 872 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir.1989) (assuming, but not deciding, that Section 4(f) does not apply to a project that has received only federal planning funds); cf., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411, 91 S.Ct. 814, 821, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (The language of Section 4(f) is a plain and explicit bar to the use of federal funds for construction of highways through parks--only the most unusual situations are exempted.). Here, the district court properly explained that section 4(f) does not apply because it bars the use of federal funds to finance construction of highways through parks, without all possible planning to minimize harm to the park. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 13, June 9, 1987 (emphasis in original). 2. Executive Order 11990 66 Plaintiffs also argue that defendants have failed to comply with the requirements of Executive Order 11990. Specifically, appellants maintain that the defendants' action fall within the coverage of Section 1(a)(3) of Executive Order 11990. That section provides as follows: 67 (a) Each agency shall provide leadership and shall take action to minimize the destruction, loss or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial values of wetlands in carrying out the agency's responsibilities for ... (3) conducting Federal activities and programs affecting land use, including but not limited to water and related land resource planning, regulating, and licensing activities. 68 Executive Order 11990, 42 Fed.Reg. 26961 (May 24, 1977) (emphasis added). The district court held that the order was inapplicable to the challenged actions because there had not been any significant federal participation in the river crossings project. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 12, (June 9, 1987). 69 We agree with the district court that Section 1(a)(3) of Executive Order 11990 does not apply in this case. Plaintiffs argue that the preparation of the EIS constituted land resource planning. While that may be true, Executive Order 11990 only imposes obligations upon an executive agency in carrying out its responsibilities for land use planning. Giving that term its normal usage, 7 the federal defendants were not responsible for the land use planning here at issue because they did not have any ability to exercise control over the project unless the state elected to seek federal funding for the project. Because the state declined to seek such funding, it was free to reject whatever federal location advice was offered in connection with the preparation of the EIS. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that the defendants' limited involvement in this project is insufficient federal action to trigger the requirements of Executive Order 11990. CONCLUSIONS 70 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court in all respects.