Opinion ID: 1034078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross-Examination of Mike Bishop

Text: In its opening statement, the government told jurors that Paul Bishop would testify about a meeting in his house prior to the 2002 primary election.39 R. 868 (02/03/2010 Trial Tr. at 44) (Page ID #8109). The alleged meeting was called by Adams, and the purpose was to pool money for defendants’ vote-buying scheme. Paul Bishop did not testify at trial; instead, other witnesses verified that the meeting occurred, that some of the defendants were present, and that money was pooled. Relevant here, Mike Bishop gave testimony that his father, Paul, told Mike that between $150,000 to $200,000 was put on the table at that meeting. R. 849 (03/01/2010 Trial Tr. at 61) (Page 38 Furthermore, this court has not determined whether plain errors can be factored into cumulative-error analysis. See United States v. Warman, 578 F.3d 320, 349 n.4 (6th Cir. 2009). 39 Paul Bishop was named in the original indictment in this case, pleaded guilty, and agreed to cooperate with the government’s investigation. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 58 5336/ 5337/ 5366 ID #6469). Although Mike Bishop stated that he was present for some of the meeting, he was not present when money was placed on the table. On cross-examination of Mike Bishop, defendants attempted to question Mike about his father’s problems with his short-term memory, which were well documented in a 2002 report provided to defense counsel from the government. The government objected, and the district court sustained the objection. Id. at 95 (Page ID #6503). Defendants replied: “I understand that you allowed Mike Bishop to testify about what his father said over our objection because it’s a co-conspirator statement, but I think it’s fair game for him to testify if he has personal knowledge that his father has issues with his memory.” Id. at 95–96 (Page ID #6503–04). The district court adhered to its ruling, stating that “[i]t is a collateral matter” and that defendants are “attempting to attack the character of one witness through another witness.” Id. at 96, 98 (Page ID #6504, 6506). The district court, however, did permit Mike Bishop to be questioned about his father’s memory issues outside the presence of the jury. Id. at 98–100 (Page ID #6506–08). Mike Bishop acknowledged that his father did have serious issues with his short-term memory in 2002. Id. at 100 (Page ID #6508). “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). However, “trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. at 679. Although Paul Bishop did not testify at trial, defendants correctly note that Federal Rule of Evidence 806 enables them to challenge Paul Bishop’s credibility: “When a hearsay statement—or a statement described in Rule 801(d)(2) . . . (E)—has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked, and then supported, by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 59 5336/ 5337/ 5366 had testified as a witness.” FED. R. EVID. 806. Mike Bishop’s statement that Paul Bishop told him that between $150,000 to $200,000 was put on the table at the votebuying meeting qualifies as both hearsay and as a coconspirator statement made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). As part of their attack on Paul Bishop’s credibility, defendants sought to introduce Mike Bishop’s understanding of his father’s memory problems. This is the exact type of inquiry that the Confrontation Clause guarantees. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (“It is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness’ bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime objective of cross-examination . . . ) the very fact that he has a bad memory.”). The government responds that even if Paul Bishop had testified, evidence of his mental illness and memory problems would still not be admissible because “‘the decision of whether or not to allow in evidence of a witness’s mental illness falls within the broad discretion of trial courts as they balance possible prejudice versus probative value.’” Gov’t Br. at 102 (quoting Boggs v. Collins, 226 F.3d 728, 742 (6th Cir. 2000)). Although district courts do retain such broad discretion, for the reasons discussed in Vasquez v. Jones, 496 F.3d 564, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2007), Boggs is not dispositive in the present case. Furthermore, as defendants point out, this court determined in Boggs that there was no Confrontation Clause violation in part because there was “considerable cross-examination of [the victim’s] past mental condition and treatment.” Boggs, 226 F.3d at 743. Here, no cross-examination (in front of the jury) was permitted. Finally, it is unclear whether Paul Bishop’s memory problems are related to mental illness; thus, our cases restricting such a line of questioning are beside the point. Therefore, the district court erred by limiting defendants’ cross-examination of Mike Bishop regarding his father’s memory issues. Such a line of questioning is appropriate on remand. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 60 5336/ 5337/ 5366