Opinion ID: 203433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Xiomi Morales-Morales's Testimony

Text: Famania-Roche challenges as hearsay the admission of Morales-Morales's testimony that her customers had confirmed that they had purchased cocaine from Famania-Roche when she did not have any available. The challenged exchange was as follows: Government: Let's take it one by one. Rincón Taíno, what did Mr. Jerry Famania sell in Rincón Taíno? Morales-Morales: He sold cocaine. Well, I know for a fact because when I didn't have material I would send my customers to him to buy from him and they would say to me that he was the one that had sold them the drugs that day. Government: Okay. Now, let's talk about Cemí, what did Jerry Famania sell in Cemí? Morales-Morales: Cocaine. Also told to me by my customers. Government: Okay. By your customers, you mean people who bought cocaine from you; is that correct? Morales-Morales: Exactly. Yes, when I didn't have any I would send my customers to their drug points. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that statement[s] by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy are not hearsay. The predicate for admitting testimony under this rule is a conclusion by the trial court that it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977). This determination is referred to in our circuit as a Petrozziello ruling. United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 257 (1st Cir.2003). When a timely objection is made, the trial court makes a provisional Petrozziello ruling, subject to a final ruling as to whether the coconspirator requirement is satisfied at the close of all the evidence. Id. Whether Morales-Morales's customers were members of the Santiago-Bez conspiracy, along with Famania-Roche, is a question of fact. United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.1995) (Whether a conspiracy's customers are also members of the conspiracy is a fact-based question....). Because Famania-Roche did not object to the testimony at trial, the district court did not make a Petrozziello ruling and did not make a factual finding as to whether the customers were coconspirators. When Famania-Roche first raised hearsay concerns in his Rule 29 motion, the district court responded: The problem is that rulings that I made are in the context of the objections that are presented.... There was no issue ever raised as to the preliminary rulings that must be made in those cases, nothing of that sort. But even if I had made preliminary rulings, I would have said now that the evidence allowed me to do the conditional  to change the conditional admission to an actual admission. As the district court aptly noted, Famania-Roche's failure to object at trial explains the inadequacy of the record. There is no evidence of who the customers were, how often they purchased drugs, and for what purpose those purchases were made. Without this information, we cannot determine whether Morales-Morales's customers were coconspirators. In any event, Famania-Roche has failed to meet any of the prongs of the plain error test. Aside from the conclusory assertion that Morales-Morales's customers were not part of the conspiracy, Famania-Roche does not muster any evidence, or even argue, that the predicate for admitting the testimony was not satisfied here. He also does not explain how the admission of this testimony prejudiced him. Morales-Morales testified that she had seen him selling drugs at both Rincón Taíno and Cemí and that she would send her customers to him when she did not have cocaine available. There is no hearsay involved in this testimony. The confirmation offered by her customers that they had successfully purchased cocaine from him adds little to this account. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in admitting Morales-Morales's testimony. Famania-Roche also challenges the admission of Morales-Morales's testimony that Famania-Roche controlled the Cemí drug point and her description of the quantities of drugs sold at the various drug points on a weekly basis. [4] He claims that this testimony lacked a foundation in personal knowledge. See Fed.R.Evid. 602. We perceive no such weakness in the testimony. Morales-Morales operated her own drug point and explained that she was present at the Coco Bongo Bar where members of the conspiracy regularly gathered to discuss the quantities of drugs they had sold at the various drug points. She also testified that she had personally seen Famania-Roche selling drugs and sent her customers to him. No more foundation was required to show that her testimony was based on personal knowledge of the inner-workings of the conspiracy of which she was a member. [5]