Opinion ID: 1390176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: .Whether Williams Breached the Plea Agreement

Text: In determining whether Williams breached his plea agreement, we examine the plain meaning of the agreement itself and construe any ambiguities in the agreement against the government as drafter. See United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 545 (3d Cir.2002) (Plea agreements are contractual in nature, so we begin our analysis as we would with any contract. We examine first the text of the contract . . . [the] plea agreement.); Floyd, 428 F.3d at 516 (construing ambiguities in the plea agreement against the government). The essential question is whether the alleged breaching party's conduct is consistent with the parties' reasonable understanding of the agreement. United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir.2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, paragraph 7 of the plea agreement stated that [t]he parties agree not to seek or argue for any upward or downward departure or any upward or downward adjustment not set forth herein. App. at 31. Although the parties recognized in paragraph one of the agreement that the United States Sentencing Guidelines were no longer binding, Williams nevertheless agreed to the stipulations set forth in the plea agreement. App. at 30. Even though, as the parties recognized in the agreement, the Guidelines are not mandatory, the stipulations in the agreement unambiguously prohibited Williams from making downward departure motions. Therefore, Williams breached the plea agreement at the August 2, 2005 sentencing and in counsel's July 26, 2005 sentencing memorandum. First, Williams argued that a criminal history category III overstated his criminal history, and asked the Court to grant him a U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 departure so that he could be treated as a category II offender. Second, although Williams agreed that his Guideline range was 168-210 months imprisonment, he argued that the District Court should depart downwardly from that range because of his troubled background, poor health, and family issues, under U.S.S.G. § § 5H1.4, 5H1.5, 5H1.12, and 5K2.0 (Chapter Five departure). Third, Williams asked for a Booker variance under § 3553, arguing that a more reasonable sentence is one below the heartland range. App. at 70-71. Finally, Williams specifically requested a sentence of 120 months, which was below the sentence of any Guideline range resulting from an offense level of 33. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Sentencing Table (2003). In each instance, Williams breached the plea agreement which unambiguously prohibited him from asking for a downward departure or adjustment and which provided that Williams agreed that a sentence resulting from an offense level 33 was reasonable. Williams makes two arguments why he did not breach the plea agreement. First, he states that in a post- Booker sentencing regime, defendants should be able to argue for departures and non-Guideline sentences, especially because the sentencing courts are required to consider the factors set forth in § 3553 to determine whether a non-Guideline sentence is appropriate. Second, he contends that he was not precluded from arguing what the appropriate criminal history category should have been because the plea agreement did not stipulate to a specific criminal history category. Both arguments fail. First, nothing in the plea agreement prevented the District Court from departing downwardly or imposing a non-Guideline sentence on its own accord. The plea agreement did not purport to restrict the Court's duty to consider the section 3553 factors. Rather, the agreement merely prohibited Williams from making arguments regarding those issues. If Williams wanted to make a departure argument, it would have been prudent to negotiate a different agreement with the government. Nor can he rely on Booker because he agreed to the plea agreement three months after Booker was decided. The District Court advised Williams during his guilty plea colloquy that the Guidelines were advisory and not mandatory, and that the Court could impose a sentence higher or lower than that to which the parties stipulated in the agreement. Thus, the fact that Booker made the Guidelines advisory, and therefore enabled district courts to depart from the Guidelines, has no bearing on the fact that Williams agreed not to make such arguments. Second, Williams' argument regarding criminal history is unpersuasive. He did not dispute that his criminal history was correctly calculated under the Guidelines to be a category III. Rather, he argued that, notwithstanding that proper calculation, he was entitled to receive a departure under the Guidelines on the ground that a criminal history category III overstated his criminal history. Thus, when Williams argued about his criminal history, he was explicitly seeking a departure notwithstanding that the plea agreement unambiguously prohibited departure requests. Indeed, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 is entitled  Departures Based on Inadequacy of Criminal History Category. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, at 347 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, Williams had agreed that a sentence imposed under offense level of 33 was reasonable. The dissent states that there was no stipulation with respect to the criminal history and emphasizes that the agreement only made specific reference to a stipulation regarding total offense level. However, the Guideline sentence is the result of the criminal history and the offense level. No criminal history category when paired with the agreed upon offense level of 33 produces a sentence as low as that which Williams requested, 120 months. Indeed, even if Williams were a criminal history category I, his sentencing range under the Guidelines would have been 135-168 months imprisonment. The dissent also reasons that the District Court invited and allowed Williams' counsel to make arguments regarding departures at the sentencing hearing. In that respect, it is significant that counsel, on behalf of Williams, made arguments for departure even before the sentencing hearing. Williams' sentencing memorandum dated July 26, 2005 argued that Williams should receive departures for overrepresentation of criminal history, under Chapter 5, and under Booker. The District Court did not invite Williams' counsel to make those arguments in the sentencing memorandum. Williams' position at the sentencing hearing, therefore, was simply a continuation of that which he had already initiated in the sentencing memorandum. It is thus indisputable that, in doing so, Williams breached the plea agreement. Finally, we emphasize again that our decision in no way reflects upon the discretion of the sentencing judge to issue a sentence the judge deems reasonable. This decision does not address the overall reasonableness of the sentence imposed, but simply addresses, under principles of contract law, the defendant's obligation to carry out the requirements of a plea agreement.