Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cumulative instructional error

Text: Defendant asserts the combined effect of the many and critical instructional lacunae was to preclude the jury from considering any coherent theory of defense and to eliminate[ ] from the jury's consideration any alternative to a verdict of death eligibility, in violation of defendant's rights to due process, a fair jury trial, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. To the extent this claim simply restates defendant's claim under Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. at page 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382, it fails for the same reason the Beck claim fails: because the jury properly was instructed on implied malice second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter under a heat-of-passion theory, there was at least one applicable lesser included offense presented to the jury related to the Clark count. Thus the instructions in combination neither precluded the jury from considering any coherent theory of defense, nor eliminated from the jury's consideration any alternative to a verdict rendering defendant death eligible. To the extent defendant contends the combined prejudicial effect of the instructional errors identified above resulted in the denial of a fundamentally fair trial in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee (see People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844-848, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673) or brought about a miscarriage of justice (see People v. Jackson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1670, 1681, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 778), we disagree. We have found only the following errors or assumed errors related to the Clark count: the failure to instruct on express malice second degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, and error in the concurrence instruction. We already have considered the effect of the erroneous concurrence instruction on the failure to instruct on express malice second degree murder and have found these errors in combination to be harmless. The assumed error in the failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter was independent of the second degree murder and concurrence instruction errors. Under these circumstances, the errors and assumed errors in combination did not render defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. (See People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 572-573, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 56, 252 Cal.Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 356, 233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802.) We have found the following errors related to the Benintende count: the failure to instruct on circumstantial evidence, and error in the concurrence instruction. The latter of these errors was harmless, because the issue posed by the incorrect instruction was resolved adversely to defendant under other instructions and because the erroneous instruction at worst imposed a burden on the prosecution more onerous than the law required. This error thus did not result in any prejudice to defendant that could cumulate. The error in the circumstantial evidence instruction was harmless because the circumstantial evidence supporting a finding defendant killed Benintende was not reasonably susceptible of an interpretation consistent with innocence, whereas the evidence supporting a finding defendant did not kill Benintende was weak or nonexistent. Because this error standing alone did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, reversal is not required. ( People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 572-573, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417; People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 56, 252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249; People v. Bloyd, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 356, 233 Cal.Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802.)
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct that the multiple-murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), required a finding of intent to kill for both murders. He points out that these crimes took place in the window period between People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669 and People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, and therefore an intent to kill was required in order to impose the death penalty. He acknowledges the jury necessarily found he intended to kill Clark when it convicted him of deliberate and premeditated murder, but he asserts the implied malice instructions did not require the jury to find he intended to kill Benintende. In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153-154, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, we construed the felony-murder special circumstance of the 1978 death penalty law, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), to require an intent to kill in all instances, even when the defendant was the actual killer. We did so in part to avoid potential Eighth Amendment and equal protection problems that might result from a construction not requiring such intent. ( Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 147-153, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, discussing Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140.) In People v. Turner, a case involving two murders tried solely on a felony-murder theory, we applied the rationale of Carlos to hold that the multiple-murder special circumstance also requires an intent to kill. ( People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 328-329, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669.) In light of intervening United States Supreme Court authority ( Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 106 S.Ct. 689, 88 L.Ed.2d 704 and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127), we partially overruled Carlos and Turner in People v. Anderson. We held in Anderson that intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder or multiple-murder special circumstances, but that when the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent to kill must be proved. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1150, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) We since have held that due process and ex post facto principles preclude applying Anderson to defendants who committed their crimes in the window period between Carlos and Anderson. ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 309, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) We similarly have applied Turner in cases involving crimes committed between the decisions in Turner and Anderson. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 430, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 45, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) This is a window period case: the Benintende and Clark homicides occurred in January 1986 and February 1987, respectively, after we decided Turner but before our decision in Anderson. Accordingly, for the special circumstance of multiple-murder to be found true, the jury was required to find intent to kill for at least one of the murders. As defendant acknowledges, however, we previously have rejected the precise contention he now makes: that Turner required an intent-to-kill finding for both murders. ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 515-517, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) As we explained: We have never held that the multiple-murder special circumstance requires a jury to find the defendant intended to kill every victim. We also have never held that the intent to kill one victim and the implied malice murder of a second victim is insufficient to establish a multiple murder special circumstance. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 516, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Dennis disposes of defendant's claims. Our state law never has required a jury to find intent to kill both victims in order for the multiple-murder special circumstance to be found true. [32] Defendant asks us to reconsider Dennis in light of federal constitutional principles, but we perceive no conflict between those principles and Dennis. Because the jury necessarily found defendant intended to kill Clark when it found him guilty of her premeditated murder, none of Turner's Eighth Amendment concerns about imposing the death penalty for an unintentional killing is involved. ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 517, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.)
Defendant attacks the constitutionality of California's death penalty statute on a number of grounds. We have rejected most of these claims, and we decline to revisit these holdings. Specifically, we have held: section 190.2  setting out the special circumstances that, if found true, render a defendant eligible for the death penalty  adequately narrows the category of death-eligible defendants in conformity with the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 752, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1179, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) The multiple-murder special circumstance, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), is not overly broad and does not focus improperly on the nature of the act rather than on the defendant's mental state. ( People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 740, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; see also People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require that a jury unanimously find the existence of aggravating factors or that it make written findings regarding aggravating factors. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 571, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417.) [N]either the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist or that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or that death is the appropriate penalty. [Citations.] Indeed, the trial court need not and should not instruct the jury as to any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 571, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417.) That certain noncapital sentencing proceedings may require jury unanimity or proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean the death penalty statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (See People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 754, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 571-572, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417.) Further, the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee ( Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 961, 125 S.Ct. 21, 159 L.Ed.2d 851; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) do not compel a different answer to these questions. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753, 31 Cal. Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 572, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417.) The use of the qualifier extreme in section 190.3, factors (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and (g) (extreme duress) does not unconstitutionally limit the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments and does not render those factors unconstitutionally vague. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 753-754, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Nor does the term reasonable belief in section 190.3, factor (f) (reasonable belief in moral justification) unconstitutionally restrict the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence. ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1055, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1037, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) There is no requirement under the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment, the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, or the due process or equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment that a jury find the existence of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b), unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Davis, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 571, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 96, 115 P.3d 417; see also People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 262-265, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123 [ Ring does not require that jury unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that unadjudicated criminal acts involved force or violence].) Use of the same jury that has adjudged a defendant guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances to determine at the penalty phase whether he or she committed unadjudicated criminal acts does not violate the impartial-jury requirement of the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 821-822, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) The consideration of unadjudicated criminal acts does not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial. (See People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Nor did such consideration here violate defendant's right to confront the witnesses; defendant was able to confront both Butler and Martinez when they testified against him. (Cf. People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1161, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [no confrontation violation from use of unadjudicated criminal act at penalty phase where defendant was able to confront the witnesses who were available].) The discretion given to prosecutors to decide when to seek the punishment of death does not render the death penalty statute arbitrary or vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment, nor does it violate the equal protection or due process clauses. ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 366, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1280, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544; People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1179, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Contrary to defendant's contention, intercase proportionality review is not required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 602, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) On the other hand, a capital defendant is entitled under the California Constitution to intra case proportionality review to determine whether the penalty of death is disproportionate to the defendant's culpability. ( People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 913, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1130, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498.) Defendant argues no meaningful intracase proportionality review was conducted at trial. We interpret defendant's argument as a request to perform such review on appeal. (See People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 913, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228.) To determine whether defendant's sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability, we examine the circumstances of the offense, including its motive, the extent of defendant's involvement, the manner in which the crime was committed, the consequences of defendant's acts, and defendant's personal characteristics including age, prior criminality, and mental capabilities. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1269, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Here, the jury found that defendant, acting alone, shot to death two young women, one of whom was only 15 years of age, in part to save himself from embarrassment and the adverse personal and employment consequences that might have ensued had his involvement with prostitutes become known. Defendant not only was a mature man in his forties at the time of the crimes; he also was a deputy sheriff who was knowledgeable concerning the law and was charged with protecting the public. The jury rejected defendant's mental state defense. These circumstances do not demonstrate that defendant's death sentence is disproportionate. ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 361, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; see also People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1269, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Defendant makes two new arguments. First, defendant contends section 190.3, factor (h), which allows the jury to consider whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, unconstitutionally limits the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence, because the jury would understand it to mean the defendant's mental illness may not be considered unless it caused the commission of the crime. We disagree. First, we do not believe the jury would understand the factor to be so limited. Even if it did, section 190.3, factor (k) and its corresponding instruction allow a jury to consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record that calls for a sentence less than death, including, in this instance, mental illness of the defendant that did not cause the crime in question. (See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 405, fn. 33, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [use of temporal language in factor (h) does not preclude jury from considering constitutionally relevant evidence]; cf. People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1055, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Factor (h) therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Second, defendant asserts section 190.3, factor (g), which allows the jury to consider whether the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person, is an illusory factor because it never could apply under any set of facts in a first degree murder case. Even were we to accept this argument, defendant would not benefit from such a holding, for duress was not even arguably an issue in his case. Defendant acted alone in killing Benintende and Clark. Thus, a finding that factor (g) is somehow deficient would not cause us to upset the penalty judgment. (Cf. People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 75, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 338 [trial court's response to jury question concerning the meaning of extreme duress did not prejudice defendant, where no evidence of duress was offered].)