Opinion ID: 1172535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Petitioner was Guilty of Misconduct in Connection with the Dorff Matter

Text: In June 1970 Mrs. Robert Dorff retained petitioner to represent her in a divorce action. On July 29, 1970, Robert Dorff came to petitioner's office and a fist fight ensued between Mr. Dorff and petitioner, following which petitioner made a citizen's arrest and preferred criminal charges of assault and battery against Mr. Dorff. Petitioner estimated that as a result of the fight he incurred $200 property damage and $70 medical expenses. A few days after the fight the Dorffs signed a marital settlement agreement, which called for the payment by Mr. Dorff of his wife's attorney's fee of $1,000 to petitioner following certain events. Between the date of the fight and the commencement of the criminal trial against Mr. Dorff on September 28, 1970, the Dorffs reconciled. During this period petitioner had certain conversations with Mrs. Dorff and the attorneys for Mr. Dorff, Raymond Denenberg and Bruce Friedman. The evidence regarding those conversations may be summarized as follows: Mrs. Dorff testified: After her reconciliation with her husband, she asked petitioner if he would drop the criminal charges against her husband, and petitioner agreed to do so. On September 14, 1970, she asked petitioner why he had not dropped the charges as he had agreed to do, and he replied,  Well, you tell your husband to deposit $1,000 with his attorney and then I'll drop the charges.  (Italics added.) Petitioner indicated that the $1,000 was for his attorney's fee, as provided in the marital settlement agreement. Denenberg testified: Before the criminal trial he asked petitioner if he would be willing to drop the criminal charges against Mr. Dorff. Petitioner replied in substance that  if we would see to it that his attorney's fees were paid for the divorce ... that he would consider dropping the criminal charges.  (Italics added.) Friedman testified that on September 21, 1970, he telephoned petitioner, that he did not electronically record the conversation but made notes immediately upon its conclusion, and that the conversation was as follows: [Friedman]: `... I'm calling because ... I'm supposed to be defending Bob Dorff next week in a criminal trial. I've heard rumors that you're planning to drop the charges, is this true?' [Petitioner]: ` Yes, if he pays me the money. ' [Friedman]: ` What money are you talking about?' [Petitioner]: ` Well, I was originally supposed to get a thousand dollars attorney's fees from Dorff in the divorce case but the parties have now reconciled. If Mr. Dorff will pay me $700 before the trial I'll drop the criminal charges. ' [Friedman]: `Well, if Bob Dorff owes you money for the divorce case that's an entirely separate matter. What does the payment of $700 have to do with the criminal charges? ' [Petitioner]: ` Nothing, except that that's the only way I can make Dorff pay me now that the parties have reconciled. ' (Italics added.) On the other hand, petitioner testified that he never told anyone that he would dismiss the criminal action if Mr. Dorff would pay [him] a thousand dollars. His version of his conversations with Denenberg and Friedman does not include the statements they testified he made, but even under his version it appears he made remarks which suggest he was seeking payment of his attorney's fee in the divorce action, as well as for his injuries, as a precondition to his advising the prosecution that he had been compensated for his injuries and they can dismiss it if they want under [Pen. Code, §] 1377 [which section permits the compromising of certain misdemeanors.]. The $700 or $1,000 was not paid to petitioner by Mr. Dorff, and the criminal trial proceeded. At the trial Mr. Dorff was acquitted. The local committee and board found, inter alia, that the September 21, 1970, conversation between Friedman and petitioner contained a specified colloquy, which colloquy is substantially identical to that stated by Friedman in his testimony quoted above, and that petitioner also told Denenberg that petitioner would drop the criminal charges against Mr. Dorff if petitioner's $1,000 attorney's fee was paid by Mr. Dorff. The board further found that petitioner wilfully and wrongfully attempted to use criminal proceedings in order to collect a legal fee in a civil matter. Petitioner contends that the foregoing findings are not supported by the evidence. (1) Findings by the local committee and disciplinary board are not binding on this court, and we will weigh the evidence and pass upon its sufficiency. (2) Charges of unprofessional conduct on the part of an attorney should be sustained by convincing proof and to a reasonable certainty, and reasonable doubts must be resolved in the attorney's favor. ( Skelly v. State Bar, 9 Cal.3d 502, 508 [108 Cal. Rptr. 6, 509 P.2d 950]; Himmel v. State Bar, 4 Cal.3d 786, 793, 794 [94 Cal. Rptr. 825, 484 P.2d 993].) The burden, however, is on the petitioner to show that the findings are not supported by the evidence. ( Brody v. State Bar, 11 Cal.3d 347, 350 [113 Cal. Rptr. 371, 521 P.2d 107].) Petitioner has not sustained that burden. In attacking the findings as to the content of his conversations with Friedman and Denenberg, petitioner points to his own testimony regarding what was said. (3) The above recited testimony of attorneys Friedman and Denenberg, however, differs from that of petitioner and supports the challenged findings except for immaterial details. The fact that their testimony and that of Mrs. Dorff regarding what petitioner told them contain similar statements by him tends to support their version regarding what he said. Also, as we have seen, Friedman made notes of his conversation with petitioner immediately thereafter. Furthermore, since the credibility of witnesses is in issue, we must give great weight to the action of the local committee which heard and saw the witnesses. ( Ridley v. State Bar, 6 Cal.3d 551, 559 [99 Cal. Rptr. 873, 493 P.2d 105].) (4) The other challenged finding (i.e., that petitioner wilfully and wrongfully attempted to use criminal proceedings in order to collect a legal fee in a civil matter) is likewise supported by the recited evidence. Petitioner, in arguing to the contrary, points to testimony by himself as to what occurred during a conference in chambers with the judge at the criminal trial. [3] It appears from petitioner's testimony that the trial judge asked for an explanation after commenting that he understood there is a civil matter . . something about attorney's fees and that the court is not going to be a collection agency. Petitioner informed the judge that if this money, whatever the sum was, $500 or $700 or $1000 ... was paid to [petitioner], [he] would represent to the District Attorney ... that [petitioner] felt [he] had been adequately compensated ... under [Pen. Code, §] 1377. The judge asked if petitioner had been compensated for his injury, and when petitioner replied he had not the judge said, All right, then we will proceed. It does not appear from petitioner's testimony that he informed the judge that the sum referred to by petitioner was for his attorney's fee in the divorce action. Other evidence that may be viewed as conflicting was received as to whether petitioner told the judge that petitioner told Friedman that the money was in part for the divorce fee. The findings of the local committee and board differ as to what petitioner told the judge. We need not resolve that matter. Irrespective of what was said in chambers and the fact that the case then proceeded to trial, the heretofore recited evidence that was introduced at the instant proceeding shows that petitioner wilfully and wrongfully attempted to use criminal proceedings in order to collect a legal fee in the divorce action. The next question is whether petitioner's acts involved moral turpitude (see Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106) [4] or on some other basis warrant the imposition of discipline. The local committee concluded that those acts did not involve moral turpitude but were a violation of petitioner's oath and duties as an attorney (see Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6103, 6067 & 6068) and therefore warranted discipline. The board drew no express conclusions. The State Bar now argues, inter alia, that petitioner's acts involved moral turpitude, and petitioner argues to the contrary. Various oppressive methods of attempting to collect legal fees have been held to involve moral turpitude. ( Lindenbaum v. State Bar, 26 Cal.2d 565, 573 [160 P.2d 9]; McGrath v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 737, 741 [135 P.2d 1]; see 1 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed.) pp. 211-212.) (5) The fact that the attorney may be entitled to the fee he sought to obtain or to a fee does not exonerate him. ( Lindenbaum v. State Bar, supra ; McGrath v. State Bar, supra . ) In McGrath the attorney intentionally withheld his client's funds in an attempt to coerce payment of a fee. In Lindenbaum the attorney, in an attempt through fear to force the payment of his bill for legal services, made threats of action injurious to his client and another. Lindenbaum, in holding that the attorney's conduct involved moral turpitude, noted that his acts constituted the crime of attempted extortion. (6) Even if the acts of petitioner did not constitute attempted extortion (see Pen. Code, §§ 518-524), it is clear that his making the heretofore recited statements indicating he would drop, or consider dropping, the criminal charges against Mr. Dorff if Mr. Dorff paid petitioner the attorney's fee in the divorce action constituted an oppressive method of attempting to collect that fee [5] and involved moral turpitude. Such a method of attempting to collect an attorney's fee cannot be countenanced. (7) Petitioner also asserts, without elaboration, that [i]f any law[s] proscribed his conduct they are so vague and overbroad that they fail to give lawyers notice that the conduct is proscribed. ( Rabe v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313 [31 L.Ed.2d 258, 92 S.Ct. 993].) The assertion was not made in the petition for review but instead in a letter received after oral argument. The assertion thus was untimely. (See rule 952(a), Cal. Rules of Court.) [6] Furthermore, the assertion is general in nature; petitioner points to no particular language in the statutes and rule involved in the instant charges as assertedly impermissibly vague, nor does he even specifically refer to those statutes and rule in connection with the above contention. Rabe involved a statute totally dissimilar to those involved here. The assertion does not sustain petitioner's burden of showing that the board's action is erroneous or unlawful. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6083, subd. (c); cf. Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal.3d 676, 684 [103 Cal. Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968] [general allegation that the findings are not supported by the evidence does not sustain petitioner's burden].) Several other assertions made by petitioner in the letter were not made in the petition for review and were thus untimely. Furthermore, these assertions also are not of such a character as to sustain petitioner's burden.