Opinion ID: 767785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice

Text: 27 O'Dell maintains the district court committed three errors in sentencing. His first argument is that the district court erred in increasing his offense level by two levels for obstructing justice at a pretrial release revocation hearing. We review a district court's factual findings in support of an obstruction of justice enhancement for clear error and its application of the sentencing guidelines to the facts de novo. United States v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1058 (8 th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 221 (1999). 28 The sentencing guidelines provide for a two level enhancement in a defendant's offense level [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1995). 4 A defendant who commits perjury is subject to this enhancement, United States v. Berndt, 86 F.3d 803, 810 (8 th Cir. 1996), as is a defendant who provides materially false information to a judge or magistrate. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 commentary 3(f). A defendant commits perjury if, under oath, she gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1116, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). The act of providing materially false information to a judicial officer also includes a requirement of willful intent to deceive the fact finder. Molina, 172 F.3d at 1058. The government bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to support a finding of obstruction of justice, Berndt, 86 F.3d at 810, and the standard of proof is the preponderance of the evidence. Molina, 172 F.3d at 1058. 29 The district court found that O'Dell committed perjury when he testified before a magistrate in a bond revocation hearing on May 11, 1998. The magistrate held the hearing after O'Dell was apprehended and later charged with a drug crime while he was out on pretrial release in the present case. Police had stopped O'Dell on March 16, 1998, for a traffic violation when they discovered a substance hidden in his jacket that field-tested positive for methamphetamine. The substance turned out to be a caffeine mixture, and O'Dell was charged with possession with intent to distribute a simulated controlled substance under Iowa law. At the hearing before the magistrate, O'Dell testified that he had mistakenly put on a jacket that belonged to someone else, and that he did not know that the simulated drugs were in the jacket. The magistrate found this testimony to be entirely lacking in credibility. At sentencing, the district court made its own independent findings and concluded that O'Dell had committed perjury. We cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in doing so. 30 Nor are we impressed with O'Dell's other argument: that the perjury must be material to the underlying offense. The word material is defined in the commentary to section 3C1.1 to mean evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 commentary 5 (emphasis added). Consistent with this definition, our cases have repeatedly upheld an enhancement under section 3C1.1 where the perjurious testimony did not go to the underlying charge, but the issue being decided. See United States v. Lank, 108 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant who committed perjury at a suppression hearing--by claiming that his statements made following his arrest were involuntarily given--was subject to an enhancement under § 3C1.1 in his sentence for bank robbery); United States v. St. James, 38 F.3d 987, 987-88 (8th Cir. 1994) (defendant who lied about his identity to a magistrate and law enforcement officers could have his sentence for bank robbery enhanced for obstructing justice under § 3C1.1); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1258-59 (8 th Cir. 1990) (drug defendant's use of an alias during a detention hearing and a pre-trial hearing qualified him for an obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1). Indeed, as the Sixth Circuit has said, the test is not whether the false statement was about the actual crime charged, but whether it was made during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 'instant offense.' United States v. Crousore, 1 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 1993). 31 Here, the issue under determination was whether O'Dell's pretrial release should be revoked. O'Dell's perjurious testimony had the potential to influence or affect that determination. Enhancing O'Dell's offense level was therefore proper.