Opinion ID: 1344706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury instructions on intent to commit sexual assault

Text: The first issue that we must resolve is whether three of the trial court's jury instructions regarding the intent element of burglary were erroneous. Although the trial court did not number these instructions, the parties have done so for purposes of this appeal, and we will follow that numbering in this opinion. Rudolph specifically assigns error to instruction 5, instruction 1, and instruction 3. We consider each of these assignments of error in turn. Rudolph's first assignment of error is that instruction 5 erroneously stated that to convict Rudolph of aggravated burglary, the jury must find that [he] entered with the intent to commit a sexual assault on any person. (Emphasis added.) He asserts that this instruction was erroneous because sexual assault is not a statutorily defined crime in Utah. The State, however, correctly points out that Rudolph did not object to this instruction in the court below and that rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure precludes Rudolph from raising this issue for the first time on appeal. That rule provides: (c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions to avoid a manifest injustice. Utah R.Crim. P. 19(c) (emphasis added). Under the guidance of this rule, we have been very reluctant to review jury instructions and other matters not preserved for appeal by means of an objection at trial. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996). In light of the foregoing, we hold that Rudolph has not preserved his right to appeal instruction 5. Rudolph argues that we may nevertheless review this instruction for manifest injustice. He relies heavily on our decision in State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993) (per curiam), where we reviewed Haston's attempted second degree murder conviction for manifest injustice because he might have been convicted of a crime not recognized in Utah. See id. at 1277. We had previously held in State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Utah 1992), that Utah law does not recognize the crime of attempted depraved indifference homicide. Therefore, because the jury instruction at issue in Haston permitted the jury to consider depraved indifference homicide, we reviewed Haston's conviction for manifest injustice. See Haston, 846 P.2d at 1277. Rudolph contends that we must also review his claim for manifest injustice because sexual assault is not a statutorily defined crime in Utah. However, he was not convicted of sexual assault; he was convicted of aggravated burglary, which definitely is a crime in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203. Thus our decision in Haston is inapposite to this case. When reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, we generally use the same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists under rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). That standard is two-pronged. First, the error must be `obvious.' Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. We conclude that Rudolph cannot meet the first prong of this standard. Under the Utah burglary statute, [a] person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1). The State points out that this section includes the crime of assault as one of the possible offenses that the actor must intend to commit to be guilty of burglary. It argues further that sexual assault is merely a narrower type of assault and, therefore, meets the underlying intent requirement for burglary. We agree. We hold that the term sexual assault merely qualifies the factual circumstances in which the assault occurred or was intended to occur. The trial court's own instructions defining the term sexual assault further support this holding. The trial court instructed the jury that [a] sexual assault is an assault committed in the course of a forcible sexual act. The court then instructed the jury that [a]ssault is (a) an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or (b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or (c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence that causes bodily injury to another. Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. This instruction recites Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1) verbatim, which defines the crime of assault. Because the court properly defined the term sexual assault and instructed the jury on the statutory elements of assault, we conclude that instruction 5 did not constitute obvious error. Thus, we refuse to review Rudolph's first assignment of error for manifest injustice. Rudolph's second assignment of error is that instruction 1 failed to conform to the information filed in this case charging him with aggravated burglary and did not put him on notice that he was charged with intending to commit simple assault, rather than sexual assault. Instruction 1 instructed the jury that `[b]urglary' is defined as entering or remaining unlawfully in a dwelling... with the intent to commit a felony, or theft or assault on any person. (Emphasis added.) We first note that this assignment of error is wholly inconsistent with the one Rudolph made above. He argued above that instruction 5 was erroneous because sexual assault is not a statutorily defined crime in Utah. Now he argues that instruction 1 was erroneous for exactly the opposite reason: It does not use the term sexual assault. For the reasons set forth above in the discussion of Rudolph's first assignment of error, we conclude that his second assignment of error is also without merit. Instruction 1 correctly states the statutory elements of burglary. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1). Although Rudolph is correct that the information charged him with entering or remaining unlawfully in the victim's home with the intent to commit a sexual assault, we have already stated that the term sexual assault merely qualifies the factual circumstances in which the assault occurred or was intended to occur. In other words, a sexual assault, as charged in the information and as stated in instruction 5, constitutes an assault under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102(1). Therefore, both instruction 1 and instruction 5 were correct. Instruction 1 correctly defined the crime of burglary, and instruction 5 correctly instructed the jury that Rudolph was guilty of aggravated burglary, as charged in the information, if he entered or remained in the victim's home unlawfully with intent to commit a sexual assault. Accordingly, we find no error in instruction 1. Rudolph's final assignment of error with respect to the jury instructions is that instruction 3, which defined sexual assault as an assault committed in the course of a forcible sexual act, was erroneous because it failed to further define forcible sexual act. He contends that lack of consent is a necessary element of a forcible sexual act. We first note that although Rudolph objected to this instruction in the trial court, he did so on a different basis than that which he asserts now on appeal. He objected to this instruction on double jeopardy grounds, contending that he had been acquitted of sexual assault in his first trial. As set forth above, rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that in order to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction, the objecting party must make an objection in the trial court,  stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.  Utah R.Crim. P. 19(c) (emphasis added). This rule therefore requires that (1) an objection be made in the trial court to the particular instruction, and (2) that the objecting party state all the grounds for his or her objection. Accordingly, absent a showing of manifest injustice, not only will we refuse to review jury instructions to which the party did not object in the trial court, but we will also refuse to consider grounds for error which were not raised or asserted in the court below. We therefore hold that Rudolph failed to properly preserve the basis for his objection to instruction 3, and we will review it for manifest injustice only. Applying the manifest injustice standard to this assignment of error, we hold that Rudolph has not met his burden. Like instruction 5, above, Rudolph cannot show that the court's failure to define forcible sexual act constitutes obvious error. This is so because the ordinary meaning of the term forcible implies the lack of consent, and ordinary jurors would commonly understand the term forcible to include the lack of consent. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the court to include an instruction further defining the term. Cf. State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1977) (It is presumed that jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand the meaning of ordinary words like `depraved' and `indifference.'). On the basis of the foregoing, we affirm the challenged jury instructions. Rudolph failed to properly preserve his objections to instructions 3 and 5 and did not meet the manifest injustice standard required to allow us to review those instructions. As for instruction 1, it correctly defined the crime of burglary and thus was not erroneous.