Opinion ID: 1579528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression and Deceit

Text: The Jays allege that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the Peoples Bank defendants and Alabama Catfish on the Jays' suppression and deceit claims. [1] In order to establish a cause of action for fraudulent suppression, the plaintiff must show 1) that the defendant had a duty to disclose material facts, 2) that the defendant concealed or failed to disclose those facts, 3) that the concealment or failure to disclose induced the plaintiff to act; and 4) that the defendant's action resulted in harm to the plaintiff. Interstate Truck Leasing, Inc. v. Bender, 608 So.2d 716 (Ala.1992). A duty to communicate can arise from a confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, from the particular circumstances of the case, or from a request for information, but mere silence in the absence of a duty to disclose is not fraudulent. Dodd v. Nelda Stephenson Chevrolet, Inc., 626 So.2d 1288 (Ala.1993); Hardy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, 585 So.2d 29 (Ala. 1991); King v. National Foundation Life Ins. Co., 541 So.2d 502 (Ala.1989); [s] ee, McGowan v. Chrysler Corp., 631 So.2d 842 (Ala.1993); Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-102. Jewell v. Seaboard Indus., Inc., 667 So.2d 653, 658 (Ala.1995). The Jays argue that [t]he question as to whether a duty to disclose exists is for the jury, citing Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. McAllister, 675 So.2d 1292, 1296 (Ala.1995). However, as we explained in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834, 840 (Ala. 1998): The judge should decide whether, assuming as truth all of the plaintiff's factual assertions, they are sufficient to give rise to a legal duty. If, even presuming that all of the plaintiff's facts are true, the judge determines that, as a matter of law, no duty was owed, then a summary judgment ... is appropriate. The Jays allege that the Peoples Bank defendants and Alabama Catfish had superior knowledge, i.e., they knew Coleman and Lawson were both loan officers at Peoples Bank and principals in Alabama Catfish, and they note that this Court has stated: [W]hen one party has superior knowledge of a fact that is unknown to the other party, and the lack of knowledge will induce the other party to act in a manner in which he otherwise might not act, the obligation to disclose is `particularly compelling.' McAllister, 675 So.2d at 1296 (citing Baker v. Bennett, 603 So.2d 928, 935 (Ala.1992)). However, `[s]uperior knowledge of a fact, without more, does not impose upon a party a legal duty to disclose such information.' State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 729 So.2d at 843 (quoting Surrett v. TIG Premier Ins. Co., 869 F.Supp. 919, 925 (M.D.Ala.1994)). The Jays allege that the existence of confidential and fiduciary relations and special circumstances gave rise to a duty to disclose. They also allege that under the law of Alabama Coleman and Lawson, because of their superior knowledge of material facts under all the circumstances, were required to disclose to the Jays certain facts regarding Coleman and Lawson's relationship with Alabama Catfish. However, the Jays do not support their allegations with citations to caselaw or to other authority. `Where an appellant fails to cite an authority, we may affirm, for it is neither our duty nor function to perform all the legal research for an appellant.' Henderson v. Alabama A & M Univ., 483 So.2d 392, 392 (Ala.1986) (quoting Gibson v. Nix, 460 So.2d 1346, 1347 (Ala.Civ.App.1984)). Moreover, we have already held that Peoples Bank, Lawson, and Alabama Catfish were not involved in a fiduciary relationship with the Jays. Therefore, the Jays did not present substantial evidence indicating that the Peoples Bank defendants or Alabama Catfish was under any duty to disclose material facts, and we affirm the summary judgment on these claims. [2]