Opinion ID: 2301899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the complaint state a cause of action for libel upon which relief can be granted?

Text: In Rice v. Simmons, 2 Harr. 417, the former Court of Errors and Appeals considered at length the general nature of written defamation. In that case an action for libel was brought seeking damages for the publication of a writing in substance cautioning the public against receiving from the plaintiff or his agent any papers relating to the defendant's business, since such papers had been purloined from the defendant and had fallen into the hands of the plaintiff who had endeavored to collect upon them, although the obligations thereby evidenced had been discharged by the defendant. After reviewing at considerable length the then existing authorities, the court unanimously held the writing before it to be libelous. It is clear from the opinion in Rice v. Simmons that spoken defamation to be actionable per se must impute to the plaintiff the commission of a punishable crime, the having of an infectious disorder such as would tend to injure a person in his office, trade or business, or produce special damage. With respect to written defamation, however, a publication affecting character may be libelous even though it does not impute a punishable crime. Written defamation will be actionable if it imputes something which tends to disgrace a man, lower him in, or exclude him from, society, or bring him into contempt or ridicule. The publication before the court in Rice v. Simmons was held to be libelous per se because it represented the plaintiff as a dishonorable, if not a dishonest, man and because it contained a derogatory imputation to his reputation and standing. In discussing the publication before it, the court stated that it was not necessary to support an action for libel that the writing contain a direct and open charge. It was sufficient if by the general tenor of the language a degrading imputation, however indirect, is conveyed. The language used must be construed in its ordinary sense, but the surrounding facts and circumstances may give the actual language used a very different implication which may be presented by proper averments capable of proof. In this connection, the court said: Though the law requires the imputation of something that will dishonor or degrade a man, or lessen his standing in society, it does not require that such imputation should be in express terms, nor does it afford any countenance or refuge for covert and insidious slander. If it did so, it would extend but little protection to reputation. The character of a libel is to be charged of by the effect it produces on the mind; it does not always happen    that you can at once put your finger on the libelous matter, and the attempt to show in what it consists may depend much on inferential reasoning;  . The rules thus announced in Rice v. Simmons have consistently been followed and applied by the Delaware courts. Cf. Layton v. Harris, 3 Harr. 406; Todd v. Every Evening Printing Co., 6 Penn. 233, 66 A. 97; Snavely v. Booth, 6 W.W.Harr. 378, 176 A. 649; Gordon v. News-Journal Co., 6 W. W. Harr. 396, 176 A. 657. Under the circumstances, we think Rice v. Simmons is controlling authority in the cause now before us. The court below dismissed the complaint upon the authority of Zanker v. Lackey, holding that the alleged facts of the instant case could not be distinguished from the facts alleged in the declaration in the Zanker case, and that therefore, the decision in the Zanker case under principles of stare decisis required the dismissal of the complaint in the cause at bar. Zanker v. Lackey was an action for libel. The alleged libel was that the defendant had stated to a newspaper reporter that while he, a stockbroker, had been charged with a technical violation of the rules of the stock exchange (bucketing orders of customers), although he had not personally done so, the charge had been made because some one in his employ had violated the rules. It was specifically alleged in the declaration that the defendant in referring to some one in his employ meant the plaintiff. The declaration was demurred to and the demurrer was sustained. The court recognized the rules respecting libel laid down in Rice v. Simmons, but, in discussing the question of whether the words complained of were libelous per se, the court said: No particular person was named in the publication, and when the words named in the declaration as defamatory are considered alone, it is impossible to tell to whom they were intended to apply, consequently, they cannot be considered defamatory of the plaintiff. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the words were not actionable per se.  We think the foregoing statement from the opinion in the Zanker case is erroneous in law. Under the rules announced in Rice v. Simmons, it is not necessary that the individual defamed in writing need be positively identified in the defamatory language itself, for it seems clear that defamatory language may be made applicable to the plaintiff by extraneous evidence showing that the plaintiff was intended to be referred to by the maker and was understood to be referred to by the reader. Indeed, under the rules of common-law pleading prevailing in this state at the time the Zanker case was decided, the function of the inducement and colloquium was to allege extraneous facts in addition to the alleged libelous statement which would explain the libelous nature of the language and connect it to the plaintiff. We think the court in Zanker v. Lackey did not bear this clearly in mind. As we read the opinion, it seems reasonable to conclude that the holding precluded the maintenance of an action for libel upon the words charged in the declaration, even though they impute dishonest conduct, irrespective of what the proof may have shown as to the understanding of the public concerning the identity of the employee referred to. If that be the holding in Zanker v. Lackey, we think it erroneously decided and overrule it. If, however, the Zanker case be considered as having been decided because of the strict requirements of common-law pleading, and if it be assumed that the colloquium was insufficient to connect the slanderous language with the plaintiff, then the decision is no authority in the case at bar since the requirements of common-law pleading in the Superior Court of this state were abolished by the present rules of the Superior Court. [1] Under the present rules of the Superior Court a cause of action need not be set forth with all the technical exactitude of allegation necessary under the rules of common law pleading. The present rules adopt a system of notice pleading rather than fully informative pleading as was theretofore required. The theory underlying the present rules is that a plaintiff must put a defendant on fair notice in a general way of the cause of action asserted, which shifts to the defendant the burden to determine the details of the cause of action by way of discovery for the purpose of raising legal defenses. 2 Moore's Federal Practice, (2d Ed.), § 8.03. Pfeiffer v. Johnson Motor Lines, Del.Super., 89 A.2d 154. Thus, a complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff could not recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof. 2 Moore's Federal Practice, (2d Ed.), § 12.08; Morgan v. Wells, Del.Ch., 80 A.2d 504; Costello v. Cording, Del. Super., 91 A.2d 182. The complaint in the instant case sets forth as an exhibit the exact language allegedly libelous. It states that the language was intended to refer to the defendant and was understood by the recipients of the letter as referring to the defendant. Conceivably, the proof might well show this to be the fact and if such is the fact, a cause of action would be made out justifying judgment for the plaintiff, if the language of the letter is libelous. Certainly, the complaint gives fair notice to the defendant of the general nature of the cause of action asserted against it. It is not unreasonable to assume that the plaintiff's proof might show that the recipients of the letter in Delaware knew that the plaintiff had been sued by the defendant in a Fair Trade suit then pending in the courts, and that they believed after reading the letter that the defendant accused him of conducting his defense to that suit in a shady, underhand manner by obtaining falsely-colored affidavits. If upon trial the plaintiff's proof establishes that assumption, then it seems to us the language falls squarely within the rule of Rice v. Simmons, since it is an imputation that the plaintiff is a dishonorable, if not a dishonest, man. We think, therefore, that it cannot be said that under no reasonably conceivable set of circumstances, which might be proven in the event of a trial, can the plaintiff's complaint be said to be clearly without merit. If the proof shows that the recipients of the letter in Delaware believed it to refer to the plaintiff and if they reasonably drew from the language an imputation degrading the character of the plaintiff as a business man, then we think that the letter is libelous. It follows, therefore, that the motion to dismiss the complaint should have been denied. The defendant argues that it is necessary in a complaint for libel to allege that the statement was made maliciously unless the language is sufficient to impute to the plaintiff the commission of an indictable crime. We do not think that such is the law with respect to actions for libel. As we have seen, any imputation of a degrading nature is libelous and, we believe, under the Delaware authorities is libelous per se. Rice v. Simmons; Gordon v. News-Journal Co.; Todd v. Every Evening Printing Co.; Layton v. Harris The defendant cites in support of its argument with respect to the requirement of an allegation of malice Parke v. Blackiston, 3 Harr. 373; Kinney v. Hosea, 3 Harr. 397; Pleasanton v. Kronemeier, 6 Boyce 81, 97 A. 11. All of these cases were actions for slander. Whether the defendant is correct in its interpretation of the cited cases dealing with the necessity of either express or implied malice in an action for slander, or whether the question of malice is one bearing upon the amount of damages to be awarded and not to the existence of a cause of action, we do not have to decide. The question is not before us. We are concerned solely with an action for libel and with respect to it the presence or absence of malice is a question of fact to be determined by the jury in awarding damages. Rice v. Simmons; Delaware Fire & Marine Ins. v. Croasdale, 6 Houst. 181, 210. The defendant finally argues that the language in question was made in the course of the defendant's business and is therefore a privileged communication. In the law of libel, privileged communications are divided into two classes, those absolutely privileged and those conditionally privileged. The class of absolutely privileged communications is limited to legislative and judicial proceedings. 33 Am.Jur. 123. Qualified privilege is extended to communications made under circumstances casting on the writer the duty of making the facts known to third persons, or to communications made in good faith on a subject in which the writer has an interest made to a person having a corresponding interest. 33 Am.Jur. 124. In any event, we think the question of qualified privilege is a matter for defense depending upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of the publication. Star Publishing Co. v. Donahoe, 3 Penn. 545, 53 A. 1028, Id., Del., 58 A. 513, 65 L.R.A. 980. Since it is a matter of affirmative defense it may not be raised by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) but should be made a matter of answer to be supported by proof at the trial. The judgment of the court below dismissing the complaint will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceeedings not in conflict with this opinion.