Opinion ID: 2394956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Husband's Appeal

Text: Before he awarded the primary custody of the couple's three children to Mrs. Jacobs, the Superior Court justice expressly determined, as a result of carefully weighing all the relevant factors, [2] that such allocation of parental rights and responsibilities would be in the best interests of the Jacobs children. He also expressly eschewed any preconceived preference either for or against either party. Although the divorce court justice recognized that both parties had a strong and abiding interest in their children and were capable of caring for them, he found that Mrs. Jacobs, to whom he awarded the family home, offered the kind of stability the children needed at that time. At the same time, the divorce decree gave Dr. Jacobs substantial time with the children and other rights with regard to them. Dr. Jacobs' attack is not upon those findings. He, instead, asserts that the federal and state constitutions required the Superior Court to award custody jointly and equally to him and Mrs. Jacobs since the record did not show by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody would be harmful to the children. In other words, he contends that both constitutions mandate a preference for joint custody, or shared parental rights and responsibilities as it is called in 19 M.R.S.A. § 752 (Supp.1985-1986), and that a joint custody arrangement may constitutionally be rejected in favor of allocating the parental responsibilities between the parents in the way the Superior Court justice did in the case at bar, only upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that the constitutionally preferred arrangement would harm the children. We can find nothing in the authorities or in any latent command of our constitutions that supports Dr. Jacobs' contention. It is unquestionable that any decision terminating or limiting the right of a parent to physical custody of his child affects his constitutionally protected liberty interest in maintaining his familial relationship with the child. Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1029 (Me.1980). See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978); Danforth v. State Department of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 796-97 (Me.1973). There is, however, nothing in the United States or the Maine Constitution that requires a divorce court to give a preference to joint custody over other allocations of parental rights and responsibilities. Dr. Jacobs does not cite a single case, from Maine or any other jurisdiction, that has decided the child custody issue as he urges us now to decide it. In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), one of the cases he relies upon, the Supreme Court held that before the State may terminate all rights of a mother or father in a child, it must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 769, 102 S.Ct. at 1403. A divorce action, however, is fundamentally different from an action to terminate parental rights. In a divorce action, where the court cannot avoid deciding the question of post-divorce custody of minor children, the contest is between the parents who stand before the court on an equal footing. In sharp contrast, an action to terminate parental rights involves an unequal battle between a parent and the State, which with its inherently greater resources seeks to cut off forever all legal and physical ties between that parent and the child. The State is not a party litigant in a divorce proceeding, [3] and the public interest is represented there by the divorce court itself, which in its parens patriae role, must resolve the custody dispute between the parents in a way to do what is best for the interest of the child. Ziehm v. Ziehm, 433 A.2d 725, 728 (Me. 1981) (quoting Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (Cardozo, J.)). The Maine statutes assure divorcing parents equal footing in the custody contest. Neither parent has any rights paramount to the rights of the other with reference to any matter affecting [their] children. 19 M.R.S.A. § 211 (1981). Nor may the divorce court apply a preference for one parent over the other in determining parental rights and responsibilities because of the parent's sex or the child's age or sex. 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(7) (Supp.1985-1986). Unlike the situation in cases like Santosky, where a parent is at risk of irretrievably losing all rights to a child in an action prosecuted by the State, in a divorce case there is no need to provide special protection for the familial relation interest of one parent against the other who has the identical interest. There is no reason, as between the contending parents, to give a substantive preference to one post-divorce custodial arrangement over another or to enforce such a preference by the procedural device of requiring an enhanced burden of proof. The standard of proof in a civil case between two private parties is ordinarily preponderance of the evidence, a rule that is departed from only in those rare circumstances where a higher standard of proof is clearly justified for constitutional or other significant policy reasons. See Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139, 149-52 (Me.1984). We are not persuaded that we should strike off on a course that, as far as either we or counsel can find, no other court has seen fit to pursue. Under our Maine statute, 19 M.R. S.A. § 214(6) (Supp.1985-1986), the Superior Court was required to award allocated parental rights and responsibilities, shared parental rights and responsibilities or sole parental rights and responsibilities, according to the best interests of the child. (Emphasis added) After fully hearing the testimony of both Dr. Jacobs and Mrs. Jacobs themselves as well as their witnesses, the Superior Court justice decided that the best interests of the Jacobs children would be served by awarding allocated, rather than shared, parental rights and responsibilities to their parents. Neither that order nor the statute under which it was entered infringes upon any constitutional rights of Dr. Jacobs.
Dr. Jacobs urges on appeal that the Superior Court erred in setting the financial arrangements between the parties. The court ordered Dr. Jacobs to pay Mrs. Jacobs weekly alimony [4] and child support. In addition, the court divided the marital property and set apart for Mrs. Jacobs the family home subject to a first mortgage indebtedness of $25,000. While the divorce was pending, Dr. Jacobs had tried to encumber the home further by a second mortgage. The court ordered Mr. Jacobs to assume the aggregate indebtedness minus the sum of $25,000. Dr. Jacobs argues that the total financial burden imposed by the alimony obligation on top of that debt and the child support payments is unjust because in total it consumes by his computation 80% of his net income. A divorce court is vested with broad powers to order one spouse to pay the other alimony so long as the amount is reasonable and the court's decree has regard to [the payor] spouse's ability to pay. 19 M.R.S.A. § 721 (1981); Bryant v. Bryant, 411 A.2d 391, 395 (Me.1980). The judgment as to what is reasonable `must be the result of the exercise of sound judicial discretion.' Id. (quoting Capron v. Capron, 403 A.2d 1217, 1218 (Me.1979)). This appellate court pays great deference to the trial court's determination: Unless the Law Court can determine that the court has violated some positive rule of law or has reached a result which is plainly and unmistakably an injustice that is so apparent as to be instantly visible without argument, the ruling appealed from must be approved. Id. (quoting Capron, 403 A.2d at 1218). Under that standard we cannot say that the Superior Court exceeded its discretion in setting the amount of the alimony and other financial obligations of Dr. Jacobs. Specifically, Dr. Jacobs contends that the divorce court failed to take into consideration Mrs. Jacobs' ability to contribute to the support of the children and herself. The record, however, discloses that the Superior Court justice did expressly consider Mrs. Jacobs' earning capacity both currently and in the future. In the proceedings in the Superior Court, neither party asked the court to make specific findings of fact as to Dr. Jacobs' ability to pay. Therefore, on appeal we must assume that the Superior Court found for [Mrs. Jacobs] upon all issues of fact necessarily involved in [its] ultimate decision which was favorable to [her]. Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d 978, 981 (Me.1981). The court heard conflicting evidence as to Dr. Jacobs' actual income, and there was no evidence regarding the payment schedule on the second mortgage because he had not yet made any payments. We thus must assume that the divorce court properly took into account Dr. Jacobs' ability to pay in determining his financial obligations to Mrs. Jacobs. See Smith v. Smith, 419 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me.1980). In the absence of any pertinent factual findings, either requested by the parties or volunteered by the court, we must assume that the divorce court properly resolved the conflicting evidence of Dr. Jacobs' ability to pay. Dr. Jacobs therefore demonstrates no reversible error in the financial arrangements set by the court.