Opinion ID: 452180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the cost of obtaining the presence of inmate-witnesses

Text: 8 To assist the presentation of his defense, Garmany filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for several inmates scattered throughout the federal prison system. As a condition for production of these inmate-witnesses at trial, the district court required that Garmany, who made no claim of indigency, tender the cost of transporting these inmates from their respective prisons to the place of trial, Birmingham, Alabama. Garmany requested the presence of five witnesses who were incarcerated at the federal correctional institute in Talladega, which the United States marshals stated would cost approximately $1,000. Another inmate imprisoned in Lexington, Kentucky, could be produced for $2,000. Two prisoners from Leavenworth, Kansas would cost Garmany $4,000, and an inmate from El Reno, Oklahoma, could be present if Garmany tendered $3,000. 2 9 Appellant argues that the costs imposed to obtain the presence of the inmates violated his sixth amendment right to compulsory process. In effect, Garmany states that due to his limited resources, he was forced to be selective in choosing among several essential defense witnesses. This in turn hindered the defense Garmany was able to present at his trial and, according to the appellant, requires reversal of his convictions. 10 To be sure, a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process is a fundamental component of due process itself. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1922-1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); United States v. Garner, 581 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir.1978). 3 To effectively implement this constitutional guarantee, the accused has the right to subpoena witnesses on his or her own behalf to testify at a trial. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv.L.Rev., 567, 587 (1978). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 governs the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases, and Rule 17(d) prescribes that service of any subpoena, except those issued on behalf of the United States, must be accompanied by payment of witness fees and travel expenses. 4 For a defendant who is financially unable to pay these costs, Rule 17(b) requires the court to subpoena witnesses on that defendant's behalf upon a satisfactory showing ... that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense. In such instances, the government bears the cost of securing the attendance of the witnesses. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b). Appellant does not challenge the requirement that financially able criminal defendants must bear the cost of bringing their own witnesses to the trial, but rather he alleges that the amounts he was charged here were excessive, and thereby inhibited his right to compulsory process. We cannot agree. 11 First, appellant never raised this contention in the district court. We do not ordinarily consider claims raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Silva, 611 F.2d 78, 80 (5th Cir.1980). Garmany's failure to pursue this claim in the district court also leaves us without a record for evaluating the factual basis for his contentions. As noted above, Rule 17(b) provides that a defendant who is unable to pay associated costs of producing witnesses can still avail himself of the court's subpoena power. As a threshold matter, however, there must be a satisfactory showing of financial hardship. United States v. Sprouse, 472 F.2d 1167 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 2164, 36 L.Ed.2d 693 (1973). In the court below, not only did Garmany's attorney fail to make any proffer of inability to pay, he stated that Garmany was prepared to tender approximately $8,000 to obtain the necessary inmate-witnesses. As far as we can deem from the record, Garmany in fact paid this amount. Moreover, Garmany was represented at trial by retained counsel, indicating at least that he was not indigent. 12 Aside from this deficiency, appellant's argument does not warrant reversal of his convictions. In United States v. Valenzuela, 458 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), the Supreme Court held that deportation of potential witnesses who had entered the United States illegally did not violate a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to compulsory process, where the defendant failed to make some possible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense. 102 S.Ct. at 3446-47 (footnote omitted). In the present case, appellant's argument suffers from a similar defect. There is no allegation that the court's action deprived him of any particular witness. Thus, it is not even clear that the costs of producing the witnesses forced Garmany to be selective. Nor do we find any indication as to what any absent witnesses might have testified to. Without this, we cannot say that appellant was deprived of his right to compulsory process. 5 We hold, therefore, that the imposition of the expenses did not abridge appellant's constitutional right. 6