Opinion ID: 2390511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffectiveness Assistance of Counsel

Text: The first assignment of error raised by the appellant is that his trial counsel was ineffective. [5] As to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has articulated the following standard: In the West Virginia courts, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be governed by the two-pronged test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984):(1) Counsel's performance was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Syllabus Point 5, State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995). This Court further explained in Miller that, [i]n reviewing counsel's performance, courts must apply an objective standard and determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the broad range of professionally competent assistance while at the same time refraining from engaging in hindsight or second-guessing of trial counsel's strategic decisions. Thus, a reviewing court asks whether a reasonable lawyer would have acted, under the circumstances, as defense counsel acted in the case at issue. Syllabus Point 6, State v. Miller, id. Finally, this Court has indicated that, [w]here a counsel's performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive of his client's interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused. Syllabus Point 21, State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). On appeal to this Court, the appellant alleges that a review of his trial counsel's acts and omissions demonstrate an undisputable pattern of legal unpreparedness and strategic uncertainty which resulted in the appellant's failure to receive a fair trial. In order to prove his trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the appellant alleges several areas in which trial counsel was deficient. We will now proceed to evaluate the appellant's claims. 1. Counsel failed to conduct effective cross examination of the State's witnesses. It is the position of the appellant that his trial counsel failed to conduct effective cross-examinations of the State's witnesses. Specifically, the appellant avers that counsel failed to bring out in cross-examination and in her closing argument that only one witness, Rodney Nelson, testified that he saw the appellant strike the victim in the head. After examining all of the evidence introduced against the appellant, we believe that counsel's omission is not significant. The medical evidence indicated that Mr. Caldwell had three head injuries as well as numerous skull fractures, and that he died as a result of multiple blunt force injury to the head. Also, according to the witnesses of the attack, the appellant was the only person who struck Mr. Caldwell. Specifically, Mr. Starkey and Mr. Miller testified that they saw the appellant strike Mr. Caldwell with the bat although they did not specify where the appellant hit the victim. Mr. Lambert testified that he saw the appellant bringing the bat away from Mr. Caldwell's arm, and Mr. White testified that he saw the appellant standing over Mr. Caldwell with a bat in his hands. Finally, Mr. Mosley testified that he heard the appellant yell at the victim to lay down, and he heard a big pop. In light of this evidence, we find that trial counsel's failure to emphasize to the jury that only one witness actually saw the appellant strike Mr. Caldwell in the head does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, the appellant complains of his counsel's failure to convey to the jury a discrepancy between Carl Starkey's statement to a State Police officer on the night of the incident and his testimony at trial. We likewise find no merit to this claim. In his initial statement, Mr. Starkey indicated that, When we got down to the creek, close to Dehue Road, I saw about five guys jumping out of the weeds. I was driving the four wheeler. While we were still moving they started hitting us with ballbats. I knew two of the guys, Max Kitchen and Hank Mosely (sic). Hank and Max both were telling us that we had stole their pot. They hit me a bunch of times. I really don't know how many. I know there were at least three more guys, but I don't know who they were. After they beat me and Andrew, they took my four wheeler, a 1993 Kawasaki, black in color. Contrary to the appellant's assertion, trial counsel did cross examine Mr. Starkey regarding the statement he gave to the State Police officer on the night of the incident. Specifically, the record reflects the following: Q. Mr. Starkey, do you recall talking to a Trooper J.B. Schoolcraft on the evening of the incident, night of the incident? A. Yes, ma'am, at the hospital. Q. Did you tell him that you saw five guys jumping out of the weeds? A. Yes, ma'am. Q. And the only two that you knew were Max Kitchen and Hank Mosley? A. Yes, ma'am. Q. Did you on that evening know Brian Lambert? A. I've heard his name. I don't know. Q. So you wouldn't know him if you saw him, until on that evening. You wouldn't have known him if you saw him. Right? A. I never looked at anybody else's face, ma'am. Q. Did you know on that evening Rodney Nelson? A. I've heard the name, you know. I used to live up there in that area. Q. James Jake White, did you know him? A. I know Jake. Q. Thomas Miller? A. Yes, Thomas. Q. To this day, would you know Brian Lambert if you saw him? A. Yes. Q. You've met him or talked with him since the incident? A. No. I haven't met him or talked with him. I've seen him. Q. Seen him since the incident? A. Just to go by. Q. What about Mr. Nelson? A. No, ma'am. Q. You still don't know him? A. No. Based on the above portion of the trial transcript, we conclude that trial counsel did not fail to convey to the jury that Mr. Starkey provided an initial statement to the State Police that placed most or all of the eyewitnesses at the scene with the appellant and Mr. Mosley when the attack occurred. Finally, the appellant avers that his trial counsel failed to establish, through the statements given to the State Police, that the appellant actually pulled Mr. Mosley off of Mr. Starkey because the appellant feared that Mr. Starkey may drown. Again contrary to the appellant's contention, trial counsel did question Mr. Mosley about this incident during cross examination. Specifically, the following conversation occurred during trial counsel's cross examination of Mr. Mosley: Q. And was that after Mr. Kitchen came and pulled you off of Mr. Starkey? A. He tapped me on the shoulder and told me he had enough. It was after that. Q. When you entered your plea, did you not testify that after Mr. Kitchen [] tapped me on the shoulder, he told me to get off of Carl Starkey? A. It might be. Q. Is that what he did, told you to get off of him? A. It was either get off or he'd had enough. We conclude from the portion of the transcript quoted above that trial counsel effectively cross-examined Mr. Mosley. In sum, the transcript indicates that trial counsel attempted to reveal alleged inconsistencies between each witness's trial testimony and statements he previously gave to law enforcement authorities. Trial counsel also attempted to reveal discrepancies between the accounts testified to by the witnesses. Therefore, we find no merit in the appellant's claim that his trial counsel failed to conduct effective cross examination at trial. [6] 2. Trial counsel's first theory of defense was inconsistent with her self-defense theory, and counsel's self-defense theory was never developed or explained to the jury. According to the appellant, counsel utilized two inconsistent theories of defensethe appellant was not the individual who committed the murder, and self-defense. The appellant also makes the incongruous contention that counsel failed to develop and explain the theory of self-defense to the jury. The circuit court, in denying habeas relief to the appellant, found with regard to this issue that no substantive evidence was brought forth that supported a self-defense claim and that indicated that the incident was anything other than an unprovoked attack by the appellant and Mr. Mosley. We agree with the circuit court. Ordinarily, self-defense is not available to the aggressor in an affray who precipitates it without legal justification. State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 651, 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980) (citations omitted). The evidence at trial was that the appellant precipitated the affray without legal justification by obtaining a ball bat and lying in wait for the purpose of ambushing the victim. Considering this evidence, we find that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel not to develop a theory of self-defense. [7] Moreover, the appellant's argument that his trial counsel failed to develop a cogent and consistent theory of defense also is unavailing. This Court's review of the trial transcript indicates that counsel attempted to create reasonable doubt by revealing alleged inconsistencies in the witnesses' accounts of the murder as well as discrepancies between eyewitness testimony and the medical evidence. In addition, trial counsel attempted to show that those who were present when the murder occurred agreed to falsely accuse the appellant of the murder. 3. Failure to Effectively Represent the Appellant at the Appellate Level and Other Critical Stages. According to the appellant, trial counsel's performance at the appellate stage was deficient in that she failed to present any substantive factual or legal analysis to support the issues raised in her petition for appeal before this Court. The only specific example of this failure given by the appellant is trial counsel's failure to discuss State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. 147, 455 S.E.2d 516 (1994), to challenge the admission at trial of evidence of the appellant's marijuana cultivation. As this Court explains in section III.B., infra, however, admission of evidence of the appellant's marijuana cultivation was not improper. Therefore, counsel's failure to discuss McGinnis in the appellant's petition for appeal was not prejudicial. [8] The appellant next complains that counsel failed to advise or explain the implication of the State's plea offer of first-degree murder with a recommendation of mercy. According to the appellant's testimony at the second omnibus habeas hearing, however, trial counsel relayed the State's plea offer to him and explained that if he took the plea he would serve 15 years to life in prison. She further explained to the appellant that he could be convicted of life without mercy if he did not accept the plea offer. In light of this testimony, we find the appellant's claim on appeal that his counsel failed to explain the implications of the State's plea offer to be without merit. Finally, the appellant asserts that counsel's failure to demand a preliminary hearing for purposes of discovery was deficient. The record indicates, however, that the appellant waived his right to a preliminary hearing. Specifically, the waiver, which is signed by the appellant states that, [i]n the presence of my counsel ... who has fully explained the charges against me, and having received a copy of the charges, I hereby waive my right to a Preliminary Hearing. Having waived his right to a preliminary hearing, the appellant cannot now complain of his counsel's failure to demand such a hearing. 4. Trial Counsel's decision to not give an opening statement At the appellant's criminal trial, his counsel originally deferred giving her opening statement until after the close of the State's case. However, at the close of the State's case, counsel informed the court that she did not intend to deliver an opening statement. The appellant now contends that this constituted ineffective assistance of counsel for several reasons. First, counsel did not communicate to the appellant her decision to waive the opening statement despite the fact that this was the appellant's decision to make. Second, counsel failed to give a good reason for her decision to waive the opening statement at the habeas hearings below. Third, had counsel delivered an opening statement, she could have painted a favorable picture of the appellant by informing the jury that he had no prior criminal history and was a good son, father, friend, worker, and community member. [9] We find the appellant's argument to be unpersuasive. Courts have determined the decision whether to waive the opening statement to be essentially tactical in nature, and not objectively unreasonable, Huffington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 583 (4th Cir.1998) (citations omitted), and the appellant has provided us with no legal authority to the contrary. Also, we agree with the State's brief that [b]ecause an opening statement is of no evidentiary value and is little more than a preview of the evidence, the decision whether or not to offer an opening remains squarely in the category of trial strategy. Therefore, we find that trial counsel's decision to waive the opening statement is within the wide range of reasonable attorney conduct. [10] 5. Failure to present character evidence The appellant contends that trial counsel had a duty to mitigate his potential sentence with mitigating evidence. According to the appellant, the effect of trial counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence was exacerbated by the fact that he did not testify. Therefore, it was incumbent upon counsel to provide the jury with a favorable impression of the appellant. Specifically, the appellant asserts that it constituted ineffective assistance for his counsel to fail to call crucial character witnesses; to fail to move for bifurcation of the guilt and mercy phases of the trial; and to fail to raise the issue of mercy during closing argument. In its August 22, 2007, order, the circuit court found the appellant's trial counsel to be deficient in failing to present evidence in support of mercy under the first prong of this Court's test to determine ineffective assistance of counsel in State v. Miller, supra . In other words, the circuit court found that trial counsel's performance in failing to present evidence in mitigation of sentencing was deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness. However, the circuit court also found that the appellant failed to prove the second prong of the analysis. Specifically, the circuit court concluded that, due to the strength of the State's evidence and the brutality of the appellant's offense, there was not a reasonable probability that in the absence of these failures, the result of the appellant's trial would have been different. This Court implied in Leach v. Hamilton, ___ W.Va. ___, 280 S.E.2d 62 (1981), that generally counsel should introduce mitigation evidence in a murder case. In the instant case, however, we do not believe that the trial counsel's decision to not introduce character evidence was deficient. The primary evidence adduced by the appellant in support of the introduction of character evidence is the fact that at the time of his trial, the appellant was a single father to his five-year-old daughter and he had no prior criminal history. In addition, the appellant's mother, Nell Brown, testified at the second omnibus habeas hearing, that the appellant was a solid worker, and he befriended those less fortunate than he. We find that this evidence is not sufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel was deficient in failing to introduce it. Significantly, the appellant has referred this Court to no evidence of record indicating what kind of father the appellant was to his young daughter. As suggested by the State in its brief, the fact that the appellant cultivated marijuana and endangered his relationship with his daughter by killing a person does not speak highly of the appellant as a parent and provides ample rebuttal evidence to the State. In his brief to this Court, the appellant alludes to several friends and family members who he says would have provided favorable character testimony on his behalf. Trial counsel testified below, however, that many of the appellant's friends would not have been effective character witnesses because they had used marijuana with the appellant. With regard to the potential testimony of the appellant's family members, other than the appellant's mother, the appellant did not make a record through proffered testimony or affidavits as to the substance of family member testimony. Absent such evidence, this Court is unable to determine whether or to what extent the testimony of these potential witnesses would have been helpful to the appellant. With regard to the appellant's mother's testimony, generally when character witnesses are family members or friends, their credibility is more likely to be questioned given their relationship with the defendant. See Com. v. Hoffman, 403 Pa.Super. 530, 589 A.2d 737, 746 (Pa.Super.1991) (finding that counsel was not ineffective in failing to call a friend of the accused given that the witness's credibility would have been seriously questioned). For this reason, we believe that the weight accorded the testimony of the appellant's mother would have been limited. In addition, courts have found that the decision to call witnesses during a trial is a tactical one. See Goodson v. United States, 564 F.2d 1071, 1072 (1977) (referring to counsel's decision not to interview or call a witness as a tactical decision.). This Court has held: Where a counsel's performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive of his client's interests, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused. Syllabus Point 21, State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). The appellant's trial counsel testified below that the appellant was less than forthcoming with her prior to trial and, consequently, she feared potentially damaging rebuttal testimony if she introduced character evidence. Based on the foregoing considerations, this Court is unable to conclude that no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have acted as trial counsel in deciding not to call character witnesses on behalf of the appellant. [11] 6. Failure to ask for mercy in closing argument The appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to ask for mercy in her closing argument. We disagree. [12] This Court has found that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to introduce character evidence on behalf of the appellant. As a result of not having introduced character evidence, trial counsel had no basis to support a plea for mercy during closing argument. Notably, trial counsel did request a jury instruction on mercy which the trial court gave. [13] This instruction adequately informed the jury of the necessity of making a recommendation of mercy in order for the appellant to be eligible for parole. The instruction further indicated that eligibility for parole is not a guarantee of parole. Thus, the jury was fully informed of the option of recommending mercy as well as the implications of that option. [14] Having thoroughly evaluated all of the appellant's claims that his trial counsel was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result, for the foregoing reasons we conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying habeas relief to the appellant based on these claims. [15] B.