Opinion ID: 373838
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Market Evidence

Text: 54 Earlier it was noted that CalComp sought to define three relevant product markets: (a) a general purpose computer systems market; (b) an all disk drive and associated controller market; and (c) a plug-compatible disk drive and associated controller market (which excluded disk products for use with the CPU's of other manufacturers). 15 Several experts and industry executives testified, and a great deal of documentary evidence was admitted, in an effort to support each of these market definitions. Not only did the evidence concerning the various market definitions often conflict, but also the testimony and documents purportedly supporting a single market were sometimes internally inconsistent. Still, we assume Arguendo that the third category is an appropriately defined product market. As noted earlier, it is the only market about which CalComp has standing to sue. See Part II Supra. 55 The evidence of IBM's share of the product markets was similarly irresolute. For example, CalComp introduced the testimony of employees of IBM and other industry members concerning IBM's share of the loosely defined general purpose computer systems market; their estimates ranged from as low as 60% To as high as 80%, while IBM's proof was designed to show that none of these figures was even based on the particular market alleged. CalComp offered expert testimony that in 1970, 1971 and 1972, IBM's share of the all disk drive and associated controller market was 79.4%, 70.1% And 67.6% Respectively, while IBM's evidence was that its share was under 30% During these years: CalComp's figures reflected cumulative shipments of disk products, while IBM's data was based on annual shipments. IBM contended that because its share of market was rapidly declining (from 100% When it invented disk products in 1960 to 25% In 1975), cumulative measures were misleading. In the plug-compatible market, IBM again, because it invented these products began with a 100% Share; here too, CalComp's own evidence showed that IBM's share of market declined steadily. 56 While the district judge expressly made no finding on the adequacy of proof of share of a relevant market, he noted in passing that he was not inclined to direct a verdict solely on that ground. Because we conclude that there was no substantial evidence that any of IBM's alleged acts both constituted unreasonable conduct for a monopolist and produced causal antitrust injury to CalComp, we need not become enmeshed in the hundreds of pages of conflicting and complex evidence on this element of CalComp's claim. For purposes of this decision, we assume that IBM possessed monopoly power in the third purported market during the period 1963 to 1972. 57 We may therefore accept, with one important addition, CalComp's statement in its brief that the main issue of this appeal is whether the Acts and Practices of IBM . . . constitute a violation of either the monopolization or attempt to monopolize clauses of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or both. Should we decide this question in the affirmative, the additional question we must answer would be whether any loss CalComp suffered actually resulted from the asserted § 2 violation (as opposed to lawful competitive practices).