Opinion ID: 2408492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent Failure to Supervise Clergy

Text: The Gibsons allege that after Brewer was hired/ordained, the Diocese had a duty to supervise his activities, which it failed to do. The Gibsons assert that the Diocese knew or reasonably should have known of prior sexual misconduct and/or a propensity to such conduct by Brewer. Negligent supervision implicates the duty of a master to control conduct of a servant: A master is under the duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them if (a) the servant (i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and (b) the master (i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and (ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 317 (1965). See also Conroy v. City of Ballwin, 723 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Mo.App.1986). Adjudicating the reasonableness of a church's supervision of a clericwhat the church should knowrequires inquiry into religious doctrine. Based on the authorities cited in section III.B.1, this would create an excessive entanglement, inhibit religion, and result in the endorsement of one model of supervision. See Agostini, ___ U.S. at ___, 117 S.Ct. at 2015; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. at 154-55; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16, 50 S.Ct. at 7-8; Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363; Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 720, 96 S.Ct. at 2385. Not recognizing the cause of negligent failure to supervise clergy is not an establishment of religion because it is a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1606, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). It achieves a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1412, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2867-68, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). Nonrecognition of this negligence tort preserves the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion. Walz, 397 U.S. at 672, 90 S.Ct. at 1413. This Court has considered the cases cited by the Gibsons. See Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1137, 114 S.Ct. 2153, 128 L.Ed.2d 880 (1994); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo.1988); Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind.App.1996); Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or.App. 104, 781 P.2d 383 (1989); Jones v. Trane, 153 Misc.2d 822, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup.1992). For the reasons stated, this Court finds other cases more persuasive. L.L.N. v. Chauder, 209 Wis.2d 674, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997); Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis.2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 920, 133 L.Ed.2d 849 (1996); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me.1997); Dausch v. Rykse, 1993 WL 34873 (N.D.Ill.1993), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir.1994); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F.Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y.1991); Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So.2d 206 (La.App.1994).