Opinion ID: 885360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to object to the preparation and use of the Montana State Hospital psychiatric evaluation.

Text: ś 24 Dawson asserts that the District Court erred when it concluded that his counsel did not render ineffective assistance when they failed to object to the methods used to prepare and subsequently disseminate the Montana State Hospital psychiatric evaluation to the District Court and the State, as well as the defense. Dawson contends that his counsel failed to secure the confidential psychiatric evaluation and assistance to which he was entitled pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma (1985), 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53. ś 25 In response, the State contends that Dawson's counsel's actions were in accord with §§ 46-14-201 to -213, MCA (1985), the relevant Montana statutory scheme in effect at the time of Dawson's counsel's request for the mental health evaluation, and at the time of Dawson's trial. Additionally, the State asserts that Dawson's counsel's actions were in accord with the Montana Supreme Court's recent decision at that time in State v. Smith (1985), 217 Mont. 453, 705 P.2d 1110, which was based on the Ake decision, and upheld Montana's statutory scheme. The State argues that the 1990 interpretation of Ake by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Smith v. McCormick (9th Cir.1990), 914 F.2d 1153, is not a valid basis for an ineffective assistance claim, because it would require this Court to judge the actions of Dawson's counsel on the basis of hindsight. ś 26 In concluding that Dawson's counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the psychiatric evaluation procedure, the District Court found that Dawson's counsel acted appropriately according to the status of the law at that time. ś 27 The relevant statutory scheme in April 1986, at the time Dawson's psychiatric evaluation was ordered, included the following relevant provisions: XX-XX-XXX. Psychiatric examination of defendant. (1) If the defendant or his counsel files a written notice of his intent to rely on a mental disease or defect under XX-XX-XXX or raises the issue of his fitness to proceed, the court shall appoint at least one qualified psychiatrist or shall request the superintendent of the Montana state hospital to designate at least one qualified psychiatrist, which designation may be or include himself, to examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. .... XX-XX-XXX. Report of the examination. (1) The report of the examination shall include the following: (a) a description of the nature of the examination; (b) a diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant; (c) if the defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect, an opinion as to his capacity to understand the proceedings against him and to assist in his own defense; and (d) when directed by the court, an opinion as to the capacity of the defendant to have a particular state of mind which is an element of the offense charged. .... (3) The report of the examination shall be filed in triplicate with the clerk of court, who shall deliver copies to the county attorney and to counsel for the defendant. .... XX-XX-XXX. Psychiatric testimony upon trial. (1) Upon the trial, any psychiatrist who reported under XX-XX-XXX and XX-XX-XXX may be called as a witness by the prosecution or by the defense.... (2) When a psychiatrist or other expert who has examined the defendant testifies concerning the defendant's mental condition, he may make a statement as to the nature of his examination, his diagnosis of the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the commission of the offense charged, and his opinion as to the ability of the defendant to have a particular state of mind which is an element of the offense charged. The procedure followed and the use of Dawson's psychiatric evaluation were consistent with the statutory procedure in effect at that time. ś 28 Nevertheless, Dawson argues that, regardless of Montana's statutory scheme, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ake, he was entitled to an evaluation by an independent psychiatrist who would assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. Moreover, Dawson asserts that, pursuant to Ake, his counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the procedure because the evaluation he received was available for use by both the prosecution and the defense, and because it was done by a neutral psychiatrist, rather than one assigned to assist solely in his defense. ś 29 In Ake, the United States Supreme Court held as follows: [W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the State the decision on how to implement this right. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Ake, referred to the Montana statutory scheme in a footnote to the following sentence: Many States, as well as the Federal Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial burden so great as to preclude this assistance. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79, 105 S.Ct. at 1094. ś 30 Finally, this Court's decision in State v. Smith (1985), 217 Mont. 453, 705 P.2d 1110, while distinguishing Ake on several grounds, concluded that Smith was afforded the rights set forth in Ake, through the appointment of a neutral psychiatrist. Although the Ninth Circuit Court subsequently concluded, in Smith v. McCormick (9th Cir. 1990), 914 F.2d 1153, that our holding in State v. Smith did not satisfy due process as contemplated in Ake, that opinion was not issued until 1990, four years after Dawson's evaluation and three years after his trial. ś 31 In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court stated: A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. ś 32 We conclude that at the time of Dawson's evaluation it was reasonable for Dawson's counsel to believe that Montana's statutory scheme was consistent with the Ake decision. Additionally, because there was no language in Ake which addressed the dissemination or utilization of the psychiatric evaluation, Dawson's counsel had no reason to question Montana's statutory scheme in that regard. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it found that Dawson's counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel because they failed to object to the procedures for and use of Dawson's psychiatric evaluation. ś 33 It is also important to note that Dawson did have access to a second mental health expert, Dr. John Watkins, who was chosen by Dawson. Dr. Watkins was an independent psychiatrist, who was appointed prior to trial solely to assist the defense and none of the information developed through or by Dr. Watkins was furnished to the State or the District Court.