Opinion ID: 1881719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether barbara's claim is actionable

Text: Both the common-law right of publicity and the statutory right created by KRS 391.170 can be read broadly to protect a wide variety of uses of a person's (or public figure's) identity. But the right of publicity is fundamentally constrained by federal and state constitutional protection of the freedom of expression. [12] Thus, the use of a person's identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person's right of publicity. [13] In order to determine whether a person's right of publicity has been appropriated, the context and nature of the use is of preeminent concern. [14] In this case, Harold's name, image, and voice were used in a music video. Music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment. [15] Likewise, [e]ntertainment ... is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee. [16] Therefore, we have little difficultly in concluding that the music video in question is protected free expression under the U.S. and Kentucky Constitutions. Thus, under the general rule, Barbara's right of publicity claim is not actionable. Like all rules, an exception exists, but it does not apply in this instance. The use of a person's name or likeness or other interest protected by the right of publicity may be actionable when used within a work that enjoys First Amendment protection, if the use is not sufficiently related to the underlying work, [17] or, if the otherwise constitutionally-protected work is simply disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services. [18] In this case, the use of Harold's likeness is intimately related to the underlying work (the song and music video are both a tribute to him) and the music video itself is not a disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of compact discs of either the single, I Miss You A Little, or the album upon which it appears. This remains true even though music videos can be and are viewed as promotional films for the sale of music. [19] Most creative works are produced for sale and profit. This, of course, includes the songs that underlie music videos. While music videos are not produced primarily for the sale of the video but, rather, the underlying song, this does not strip them of their First Amendment protection. Music videos are in essence mini-movies that often require the same level of artistic and creative input from the performers, actors, and directors as is required in the making of motion pictures. [20] Moreover, music videos are aired on television not as advertisements but as the main attraction, the airing of which, consequently, is supported by commercial advertisements. Simply put, the commercial nature of music videos does not deprive them of constitutional protection. The fact that a person's likeness is used in a constitutionally-protected work to create or enhance profits does not make the use actionable. [21] Nor does the use of that person's name or likeness in an advertisement or promotion for the underlying work infringe upon a person's right of publicity. [22] To put it another way, John Michaelwithout either the consent or approval of Harold's estatecould have produced a film biography of his father [23] and promoted the film using Harold's name and likeness [24] without violating Harold's estate's right of publicity (assuming it exists under the statute). He can do the same in a music video. Accord, Parks v. LaFace Records . [25] In Parks , the music group Outkast included a song entitled Rosa Parks on one of its albums, without Ms. Parks' permission. [26] In 1955, Parks made a famous and heroic stance against racial inequality by refusing to give up her seat to a white person and move to the back of a bus. This single act of defiance sparked a bus boycott that ended segregation on public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama, which in turn was an important precursor to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. Parks brought suit alleging inter alia that the use of her name violated her common-law right of publicity. [27] After concluding that both the song and the song's title were entitled First Amendment protection, the district court stated, The right of publicity is ... inapplicable under the First Amendment if the content of an expressive work bears any relationship to the use of a celebrity's name. [28] Upon review of the song, the district court found that there was an obvious metaphoric and symbolic relationship between the lyrics of the song, which contained numerous references to going to the back of the bus, and its title, Rosa Parks. [29] The district court then found, as a matter of law, that Parks' right of publicity claim was not applicable. [30] The district court further concluded the fact that Outkast profited from the sale of the song and album and heavily promoted the single, Rosa Parks, did not affect this result. [31] Like the song title Rosa Parks and its lyrics, there exists a genuine connection between the use of Harold's name likeness in the music video I Miss You a Little and the song of the same name. Thus, we hold as a matter of law that Barbara Montgomery's right of publicity claim, which was brought under KRS 391.170 on behalf of Harold Montgomery's estate, is inapplicable in this case. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Court of Appeals. LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, GRAVES, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with STUMBO, J., joining that dissenting opinion.