Opinion ID: 2978443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relying on Acquitted Conduct at Sentencing

Text: Vassar disputes the district court’s decision to find a fact that differed from a jury-found fact. Specifically, the district court found that he “was involved in the distribution or conspiracy to distribute between 3.5 to 5 kilos of cocaine,” while the jury found Vassar not guilty of conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams. According to Vassar, this amounted to sentencing him “for an incorrect conspiracy offense of conviction” in violation of both the Sixth Amendment and the principles of issue preclusion. Appellant’s Br. at 65–68. We disagree. As for his Sixth Amendment jury-trial right challenge, Vassar fundamentally misunderstands the meaning of a jury’s acquittal. An acquittal is not a finding of innocence, but merely a negative statement that the evidence fell short of purging the jury’s reasonable doubts and therefore could not sustain a conviction. United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). For Sixth Amendment purposes, this is the important point: The jury found Vassar guilty of conspiring to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine, and that verdict alone exposed Vassar to a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. Although the district court, - 19 - No. 07-5299 United States v. Vassar in selecting a sentence within the range authorized by the statute of conviction, not only relied on acquitted conduct but also used a preponderance standard, this does not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment. The district court neither sentenced Vassar for acquitted conduct nor imposed its sentence under an incorrect statute of conviction. See White, 551 F.3d at 385. Thus, Vassar’s Sixth Amendment challenge fails. Vassar is correct that sentencing courts “cannot rely on a finding that directly conflicts with the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Cockett, 330 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 2003). But here, given the differing standards of proof, there is no conflict. Again, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy involved more than 500 grams of cocaine, while the jury found that the evidence did not overcome its reasonable doubt. These findings do not conflict. The differing standards of proof also doom Vassar’s issue-preclusion argument. According to Vassar, “issue preclusion and collateral estoppel prohibit[ed] Judge Greer from acting as a trier of fact to find a conspiracy object different from the object found by the jury.”1 This argument is flawed. Issue preclusion, which bars the relitigation of a previously decided issue, only operates if, among other requirements, the previously decided issue is “identical” to the current issue. N.L.R.B. v. Master Slack and/or Master Trousers Corp., 773 F.2d 77, 81 (6th Cir. 1985). Here, because the standards of proof differed, the issue at trial was not identical to the issue at sentencing, and the 1 Vassar’s brief wrongly implies a distinction between issue preclusion and collateral estoppel; those are merely different names for the same doctrine. Dodrill v. Ludt, 764 F.2d 442, 443 (6th Cir. 1985). - 20 - No. 07-5299 United States v. Vassar jury’s acquittal therefore did not preclude the district court’s drug-weight finding.