Opinion ID: 1058814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. Kelley

Text: Because this case must be remanded, we will address one additional issue that could arise during the new proceeding in the circuit court, i.e., whether the circuit court erred by refusing to allow Dr. Kelley to testify. See Holley v. Pambianco, 270 Va. 180, 185, 613 S.E.2d 425, 428 (2005). Atkins sought to introduce testimony from Dr. Kelley as an expert in the field of pediatrics and genetics. Upon objection by the Commonwealth, the circuit court held that Dr. Kelley's testimony was not relevant to the determination of mental retardation. We agree. During a proffer of his testimony, Dr. Kelley explained that Atkins was born with a number of physical abnormalities that could predispose him to have cognitive or developmental disabilities. Because of the physical abnormalities, Dr. Kelley opined that Atkins suffers from a genetic syndrome. The syndrome, which Dr. Kelley called Atkins Syndrome, is a private syndrome, meaning that he could not find a syndrome that had been described as a genetic disorder with exactly the same combination of abnormalities. Dr. Kelley nevertheless testified that Atkins' physical abnormalities are significant because more than half of the children who have multiple physical abnormalities will also have some developmental abnormalities. Dr. Kelley noted that it is necessary, however, to probe further to ensure that this is a genetic abnormality as opposed to just an extreme abnormal [sic]. Consequently, Dr. Kelley performed genetic testing on Atkins to see if he had any chromosomal abnormalities that would confirm a genetic syndrome. Dr. Kelley was unable to find any. But, he stated the lack of chromosomal evidence was not uncommon and did not rule out a genetic syndrome. Finally, Dr. Kelley opined about whether Atkins suffers from a genetic syndrome and was at risk for developing a cognitive disability: Q. Now, were you able to determine to a medical certainty whether ... Daryl Atkins suffers from a genetic syndrome? A. I could not identify a specific genetic syndrome. Given the findings, I think any geneticist would pursue further by trying to identifydoing other genetic studies on the family with the assumption that there is a genetic lesion explaining the family'sthe constellation of the abnormalities. So we stopped at a certain point, but certainly it would be indicated to pursue this further with modern techniques to try to identify what gene or group of genes is abnormal. Q. Again, taking into account the physical findings and the finding about the difficulty in retaining bike riding skills  A. Right. Q. do you have an opinion to a medical certainty about whether this constellation of information created a risk factor in Daryl Atkins' life for the development of a cognitive disability? A. Yes, indeed. That the association of risk factorsthe physical findings being a risk factor for brain involvement and the history of a very unusual type of learning disability. It is evident from this testimony that Dr. Kelley assumed that, because Atkins has certain physical abnormalities, he suffers from a genetic syndrome causing cognitive disabilities. But, Dr. Kelley did not confirm this assumption through genetic testing or any other accepted method of scientific proof. As Atkins admitted during a colloquy with the circuit court, the most that Dr. Kelley could opine within a reasonable degree of medical probability was that Atkins' physical abnormalities are risk factors that could lead to developmental and cognitive disabilities. Such an opinion was speculative and without an adequate factual foundation. Expert testimony is inadmissible if it is speculative or founded on assumptions that have an insufficient factual basis. Tittsworth v. Robinson, 252 Va. 151, 154, 475 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1996). Dr. Kelley also attempted to compare Atkins with individuals having both physical abnormalities and developmental abnormalities without foundation evidence that actually placed Atkins in that category of individuals. See Keesee v. Donigan, 259 Va. 157, 162, 524 S.E.2d 645, 648 (2000) (expert testimony about principles relating to an average driver was inadmissible in the absence of evidence placing the defendant in the category of the average driver). Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow Dr. Kelley to testify.