Opinion ID: 2539046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Model Instruction on Mitigating Factors

Text: Miller contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in submitting the model instruction on mitigating circumstances (Form 2) because it included all six of the circumstances listed in the statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-605 (Repl.2006), when there was no evidence presented that some of these factors were present. As an example, he points out that there was no evidence of accomplice liability in his case, that his age was thirty years so there was no evidence of his youth presented, and that since he did have a criminal record, it worked against him to have the absence of a criminal record listed as a mitigating circumstance on the instruction form. He points out that defense counsel below did not submit an instruction on mitigating circumstances that was individualized to fit his case. He contends that the instruction given should have been individualized for him to include diminished capacity, special education, and low intelligence quotient as mitigating circumstances. Ordinarily, this argument would be precluded from appellate review as it is raised for the first time on appeal; however, we conclude that Rule 10(b)(ii) and Wicks, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366, require our review of this issue as one concerning whether the trial court failed in its obligation to bring to the jury's attention a matter essential to its consideration of the death penalty. See Anderson, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (concluding that the erroneous completion of sentencing forms in a death case involves a matter essential to the consideration of the death penalty). Accordingly, we address this issue to the limited extent that it is likely to arise on resentencing. In support of this argument, Miller relies on Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), stating that it is error to refuse to consider mitigating circumstances when evidence of them is presented, and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), stating that to be constitutional, a state statute must not preclude a jury from considering any mitigating evidence that is offered by a defendant. We read these cases to speak in terms of precluding a jury from considering evidence of mitigating circumstances that was presented, rather than, as Miller contends, imposing an affirmative obligation on the part of a trial court to draft an individualized instruction for a defendant when none is proffered by his counsel. The State responds that the model instruction at issue gives the jury an openended option to find as many other mitigating circumstances as any of the jurors believed existed. Thus, continues the State's response, when the model Form 2 was used, the jury was not necessarily precluded from considering Miller's diminished capacity, special education, and low intelligence quotient as mitigating circumstances. In Dansby v. State, 319 Ark. 506, 893 S.W.2d 331 (1995), this court relied on language from Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993), and concluded that the submission of Form 2 to a jury instead of a form proffered by the defendant was not an impermissible exclusion of relevant mitigating factors when the judge instructed the jury that they could consider any other mitigating circumstances they saw fit and write them in the blank spaces on the form. We likewise conclude that no error occurred in the giving of the model instruction in the present case. Whether prudential considerations counsel against the giving of the model instruction rather than an individualized one proffered by defense counsel will of course be a matter for both counsel to determine according to the facts and evidence as they exist on resentencing.