Opinion ID: 1843643
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Possession of a Precursor With Intent.

Text: The operative element of the possession of a precursor crime under examination in this case requires the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Truesdell possessed the cold relief medication with the intent to use the product to manufacture any controlled substance. Iowa Code § 124.401(4). Truesdell argues that the State was required, and failed, to present evidence that he intended to manufacture meth. Before tackling this issue, it is necessary to examine the intent element in section 124.401(4). Although we have found sufficient evidence to support the intent element of the statute in a prior case, we have never fully considered the meaning of the intent to use the product to manufacture any controlled substance language. See State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2003); Iowa Code § 124.401(4). Our goal in construing statutes is to ascertain ... legislative intent. Locate.Plus.Com., Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2002). We apply statutes as written by our legislature, and resort to our rules of construction in the event of an ambiguity. State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003). An ambiguity in a criminal statute is normally resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Maher, 618 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 2000). In this case, we observe that our legislature very recently amended section 124.401(4). See 2004 Iowa Acts ch. ___ (S.F. 2101, 80th General Assemb., effective July 1, 2004). Under the amendment, the intent element is changed to prohibit possession of a product with the intent that the product be used to manufacture any controlled substance. Id. The legislature removed the phrase to use the product and replaced it with the phrase that the product be used. Id. A change in a statute can indicate either intent by the legislature to change the law or intent to clarify the original statute. Tiano v. Palmer, 621 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 2001). This observation is important in this case because an intent to change the statute under consideration in this case would be consistent with the view that the intent element of the prior statute was limited to an intent that the defendant use the product to manufacture a controlled substance. Generally, a material modification of the language of a statute gives rise to a presumption that a change in the law was intended. Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002); see 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 22.1, at 240-41 (6th ed.2002). The existence of this presumption is enhanced when the amendment follows a contrary... judicial interpretation of an unambiguous statute. Midwest Auto. III, LLC, 646 N.W.2d at 425. In this case, the Iowa Court of Appeals filed an unpublished decision on January 29, 2003, that held the intent element of section 124.401(4) is limited to an intent by the accused to use the product to manufacture a controlled substance. See State v. Pickerell, 662 N.W.2d 371 (Iowa Ct.App.2003) (unpublished table decision, full text available at 2003 WL 183392). Moreover, the court of appeals specifically found that the statute was unambiguous. See id. We think these factors support a presumption that our legislature intended to change the statute by the subsequent amendment. We also observe that the State in this case did not argue on appeal that section 124.401(4) should be broadly read to include an intent that the product be used to manufacture a controlled substance. [2] As a legislative change, the amended statute is applied prospectively. See Iowa Code § 4.5; Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1995). This means the conduct of Truesdell in this case must be judged under the statute that existed at the time of the offense. We conclude this statute required the defendant intend to use the product to manufacture a controlled substance. See Iowa Code § 124.401(4). We acknowledge the quantity of cold relief medication possessed by Truesdell was indicative of criminal activity. The quantity was strong circumstantial evidence that the product was to be used to manufacture meth. However, the statute under which Truesdell was charged is directed at the intent of the possessor to use the product to manufacture a controlled substance, not the mere knowledge or belief of the possessor that the product would be used to manufacture a controlled substance. This is a critical distinction because the evidence in this case equally supports two reasonable inferences pertaining to the possessor's state of mind, yet only one is covered under the statute. First, the quantity of cold medication possessed in this case is circumstantial evidence that Truesdell himself intended to manufacture meth. Second, the quantity of cold medication possessed is circumstantial evidence that Truesdell reasonably knew the cold medication would be used by another to manufacture meth. [3] The first inference is evidence that supports a conviction under the statute, but the second is not. Inferences drawn from the evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt on each essential element, including the element of intent. See State v. Speicher, 625 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Iowa 2001). Inferences that do no more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture do not create a fair inference of guilt. State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 76 (Iowa 2002). Under these standards, when two reasonable inferences can be drawn from a piece of evidence, we believe such evidence only gives rise to a suspicion, and, without additional evidence, is insufficient to support guilt. See Holder v. State, 124 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ark.2003); Commonwealth v. Williams, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 236, 764 N.E.2d 889, 897-98 (2002). In such a situation, a jury would necessarily be required to rely upon conjecture to reach a verdict of guilt. See Speicher, 625 N.W.2d at 742-43 (presence of two individuals together at the scene of a meth lab sufficient to infer knowledge of manufacturing, but insufficient to infer conspiracy to manufacture). Some other evidence of guilt is required to support a conviction. We found substantial evidence to support a conviction of possession of a precursor with intent to manufacture meth in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(4) based upon the possession of a large quantity of cold relief tablets containing pseudoephedrine in State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d at 166. However, there was also evidence in the case that the defendant possessed lithium batteries, another common product used in meth manufacturing. Id. Additionally, there was evidence that the defendant purchased the cold relief products in a surreptitious manner. See id. Some of the boxes of medicine in his possession had also been opened. See id. at 160. Although there was no direct evidence of manufacturing, we found all the circumstances in the case constituted substantial evidence to support the element of intent to manufacture. Id. at 166. On the other hand, evidence of possession of a precursor, without more, is insufficient to support the essential element of intent to manufacture. In United States v. Weston, 4 F.3d 672 (8th Cir.1993), the court found insufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession with intent to manufacture meth based solely upon the defendant's possession of a gallon container of a chemical used to manufacture meth. Although the possession was highly suspicious, and the circumstances revealed the chemical was most likely going to be used to make illegal drugs, the court found the act of possessing the chemical reasonably indicated the defendant either intended to be involved in the manufacture of meth or intended to supply the product to another to use in the manufacture of meth. Id. at 674-75. Consequently, without additional evidence, the jury would have had to speculate to find intent to manufacture. Id. at 675. In this case, Truesdell's possession of a large quantity of the cold relief products supports an inference that some person would use the product to manufacture meth, but there was no additional evidence to show he intended to use the product to manufacture meth. Without additional evidence of intent, the jury would have had to guess to reach the conclusion that Truesdell intended to manufacture meth. It was just as likely under the evidence that Truesdell intended for the product to end up in the hands of another person who would manufacture the meth. See id. Thus, we conclude that the possession of a large quantity of product, without additional evidence, either direct or circumstantial, is insufficient proof of intent to manufacture under the statute. There was no additional evidence in this case. Accordingly, we find there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction under section 124.401(4). As a matter of law, counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue and prejudice resulted.