Opinion ID: 1247709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonable Certainty.

Text: Hashimoto's next three issues concern the phraseology of jury instructions. Hashimoto alleges error in giving three instructions: INSTRUCTION NO. 13 The defendants in this case have admitted liability and therefore you must fix the amount of money which will reasonably and fairly compensate Hashimoto for those elements of damage proved by the evidence to have been caused by the negligence of the Defendants, taking into consideration the nature, extent and duration of the injury. The claimed elements of damage are: (a) The pain and suffering experienced as a result of the injuries and those reasonably certain to be experienced in the future. (b) Disability. (c) Loss of enjoyment of life. The award for this specific element should not duplicate the award given for any other element of damage, and any loss of enjoyment of life reasonably certain to be experienced in the future. Whether any of the elements have been proved is for you to determine. [Emphasis added.] INSTRUCTION NO. 14 The objective sought in awarding damages is to compensate the Plaintiff for loss, and although damages can not always be calculated with absolute certainty, they must be susceptible of ascertainment with a reasonable degree of certainty to be recoverable. Remote, uncertain and conjectural or speculative damages are not allowed. [Emphasis added.] INSTRUCTION NO. 15 There is no formula the court can give you for the determination of damage for pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life or disability, or any future damages as may be reasonably certain to arise. It is not necessary that any witness shall have expressed any opinion as to the dollar amount of damages therefor. Your award, if any, should be such sum as will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff. Furthermore, the arguments of counsel as to the amount of damages is not evidence of reasonable compensation. The amount awarded, if any, rests within your sound discretion and is for you to determine, taking into consideration all the evidence in this case and from your knowledge, observation, and experience in life. Your award, if any, should be for what damages are reasonable and just. It is insufficient for the litigant in objection to merely state that the instruction is not complete or an accurate statement of the law. Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo. 1975). See also Condict v. Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., 743 P.2d 880, 885 (Wyo. 1987); Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 400 P.2d 488 (Wyo. 1965); Com. v. Duke, 750 S.W.2d 432 (Ky. 1988); and W.R.C.P. 51. Error may not be assigned unless objection has been made thereto with a distinct statement of the matter to which objection is made and the grounds for this objection, and indicating with definiteness and particularity the error asserted,   . Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963, 968 (Wyo. 1973). In reviewing alleged errors in jury instructions, a finding of error is not alone sufficient to reverse; prejudicial error must be found. Walton v. Texasgulf, Inc., Wyo., 634 P.2d 908 (1981). Prejudicial error is never presumed; it must be established by the parties. Pure Gas and Chemical Company v. Cook, supra [526 P.2d 986 (Wyo. 1974)]. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1292 (Wyo. 1985) (quoting from Cervelli v. Graves, 661 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Wyo. 1983)). In order to hold an improper instruction reversible, the record must show that substantial rights were affected. Rule 7.04, W.R.A.P. For an error to be harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that, in the absence of error, the verdict might have been more favorable to a party, and the burden is on the appellant to show where the error is prejudicial. ABC Builders, Inc. v. Phillips, Wyo., 632 P.2d 925 (1981). Merely showing an error occurred does not create a presumption of prejudice as injury to an appellant. Anderson v. Bauer, Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984). Condict, 743 P.2d at 885. Hashimoto's claimed error with the jury instructions pertains to the burden of proof and that the future damages had to be proven on a basis of reasonable certainty rather than reasonable probability or reasonable medical probability. The issue as to the burden of proof was properly dealt with in the preceding section and thus, there was no error giving the instructions that required Hashimoto to prove his own damages. Initially, we note that Instruction No. 15 was not objected to by Hashimoto. W.R.C.P. 51 mandates in part that [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection. Thus, this court is precluded from reviewing any potential error with this instruction unless the giving of it amounted to plain error. Cutbirth v. State, 663 P.2d 888 (Wyo. 1983); Morris v. State, 644 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1982); Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447 (Wyo. 1982). Instruction Nos. 13 [4] and 14 [5] were properly objected to below; therefore, the propriety of giving these two instructions which utilized the reasonable certainty standard will be addressed. [6] While we note that the phrase reasonable certainty is used in many of the pattern civil damage instructions, [7] we find the standard to be illogical and thus improper. [8] McElroy v. Luster, 254 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953) provides a discussion of the three views and differentiated approaches. The first comes from jurisdictions which adopt the reasonable probability rule, the second view as an acceptance by some jurisdictions of the reasonable certainty rule with a liberal interpretation of the phrase which equates reasonable certainty with reasonable probability, and the third view utilizes the reasonable certainty rule with a strict requirement that reasonable certainty means free from doubt or reasonably free from doubt. [9] Wyoming's view of apparently accepting the reasonable probability rule can be traced back to an early case of Mahoney v. Pearce, 38 Wyo. 151, 265 P. 446, 449 (1928), interpreting the phrase reasonably compensate in a jury instruction involving personal injury to not be prejudicial because future annoyance and pain was probable   . See Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 805 (1952) where Chief Justice Blume was faced with a situation where the trial court refused the requested instruction which included the reasonable certainty terminology, and one issue on appeal was whether the deletion of the phrase reasonable certainty was in error in the future pain and suffering jury instruction. This court found no error because the instruction amounted to the Mahoney requirement. Borzea, 258 P.2d at 806. The use of the terms `reasonably certain' in defining the degree of proof required of the defendant, was clearly objectionable. `Certain' means `free from doubt,' (Webst. Dict. word `certain;') and to say that proof of a fact must be made reasonably certain is by the literal import of the words tantamount to saying the proof must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. This has been expressly held as to the phrase `moral certainty,'    which we take it is equivalent to the words `reasonable certainty,'   . McElroy, 254 S.W.2d at 895 (quoting from St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Burns, 71 Tex. 479, 9 S.W. 467, 468 (1888)). The phrase with reasonable certainty went far beyond the simple requirement of a preponderance of the evidence. It put the unwarranted burden on plaintiff of proving defendant's negligence by a much higher degree of proof. To require plaintiff to prove defendant's negligence to a reasonable certainty was to require him to prove it to such degree as to leave no reasonable doubt, which was equivalent to saying that he must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. It is of course well known that in prosecutions by the State the guilt of a defendant must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt but that requirement has no place whatsoever in a civil action. Payne v. Reed, 332 Mo. 343, 59 S.W.2d 43 [(1933)]. Stephens v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 215 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Mo. App. 1948). We note in DeLuna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 (Wyo. 1972) that this court used the terms reasonable certainty and reasonable probability interchangeably in a case involving exhibit tampering. However, the concepts behind the two phrases are not the same, and we hold that the words reasonable probability should more precisely be the standard employed in civil personal injury jury instructions to avoid confusion. As the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut in Johnson v. Connecticut Co., 85 Conn. 438, 83 A. 530, 531 (1912) aptly phrased it: Reasonable certainty and reasonable probability bear no resemblance to each other, and judicial construction which brings them into apposite relation seems to us forced, perhaps, to save the appearance of a rule which violates a fundamental of the theory of evidence. This attempt has been aided by text-book writers who no doubt saw that the requirement of proof of future injuries to a reasonable certainty was an exception to the ordinary requirement of proof. Justice Rose, dissenting in Olson v. Federal American Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 719 (Wyo. 1977), pointed out the difference between possible and probability, as both terms are used in a medical setting: We are involved in an area which does not lend itself to medical certainties  only to probabilities and likelihoods. Id. at 724. Consequently, with damages in a personal injury situation dependent upon medical testimony as much as worker's compensation injuries are dependent upon medical certainty, [10] it makes no sense to hold injured parties to a standard of reasonable certainty. See Ortkiese v. Clarson & Ewell Engineering, 126 So.2d 556 (Fla. 1961) for a case finding error with the phrase reasonable medical certainty in the worker's compensation arena. From Hippocrates to the Mayos and the Oschners, the medical profession has progressed by research and experimentation, by chasing the guinea pig through the laboratory. In this manner it has progressed so rapidly to new and better methods of treatment, if it knew any such rule as reasonable medical certainty today, it would be discarded for a different one tomorrow,   . Id. at 564. For cases clearly finding fault with proving damages to a reasonable certainty as exceeding the burden of proof in civil cases, see Leggett v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 72 Ill. App. 577 (1897); and St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Burns, 71 Tex. 479, 9 S.W. 467, 468 (1888). In applying the English language as it is written, we would not find the phrases reasonable probability and reasonable certainty to be equivalent. State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain, 350 Mo. 316, 165 S.W.2d 428, 430 (1942); Johnson, 83 A. at 531. The term reasonable probability is equivocal, and is not synonymous with reasonable certainty. Hallum v. Village of Omro, 122 Wis. 337, 99 N.W. 1051, 1053 (1904). For a case that refers to reasonably certain in an instruction for damages for future consequences of the injury as not equating with reasonable probability, and finding the appropriate standard to be reasonable probability, see Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Harriett, 80 Tex. 73, 15 S.W. 556, 558-59 (1891). See Brown v. Forrester & Nace Box Co., 243 S.W. 330, 331 (Mo. 1922) for the proposition that changing the word likely in a jury instruction to reasonable certain caused the meaning of the instruction to substantially change, since likely referred to probable injury which would be one more reasonably expected to happen than not to happen, and a reasonably certain injury would be one that human experience shows nearly always results from such a defect. Contrarily, some authorities have construed the phrases reasonable certainty and reasonable probability to be equivalent which redefinition we choose not to follow. See Lane v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 396, 308 N.W.2d 503, 512 (1981); Marion v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 192 Neb. 457, 222 N.W.2d 366, 368 (1974); Wilkinson v. Dunbar, 149 N.C. 20, 62 S.E. 748, 750 (1908); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hughes, 53 Ohio App. 255, 4 N.E.2d 700, 705 (1935); and Holt v. School District No. 71 of King County, 102 Wash. 442, 173 P. 335, 338 (1918). For a case finding the words reasonably certain to be the same as probable, see Swift & Co. v. Raleigh, 54 Ill. App. 44 (1894). We find error in the standard utilized to prove future earnings in both instructions given and the substitute instruction proposed by Hashimoto; however, we fail to see where Hashimoto has demonstrated a prejudicial error. Although we find the use of reasonable certainty as an improper phrase, borrowed from the criminal context into the civil context, we do recognize the jury in this case still found for Hashimoto even when applying this greater burden of proof. See St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Burke, 81 S.W. 774, 775 (Tex. App. 1904), where the court construes the phrase reasonable degree of certainty to mean a higher degree of evidence than is furnished by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, for the jury to have concluded that the damages were proven to a reasonable certainty they necessarily had to find implicitly that they were proven well over the reasonable probability standard. As such, Hashimoto was not prejudiced by this error of instructing on the improper standard. The evidence was relatively specific and generally uncontroverted. The $4,500 jury compensatory award was solely general damages. The apparent medical expenses of $428 had been advanced in behalf of Marathon and Dixon, and by Instruction No. 13A, the jury was instructed not to include that amount in any award. Medical testimony referencing injury from the first impact considered as physically minor in force, indicated that Hashimoto was asymptomatic and essentially healed from the first impact until the second significantly more severe impact occurred causing substantial aggravation as well as new injury. Considering the record presented, we do not find prejudicial error in the instructions since all evidence was available and the jury accorded a substantial verdict considering the relatively minor impact and injury. [11] In summary, the phrase reasonably certain or reasonable certainty connotes freedom from doubt. Since none of us can see into the future, it appears quite illogical to attach such a standard to proving future pain and suffering in a personal injury case. The law is encumbered by human infirmities and thus should not reflect a standard that can only be met by a mind reader. Therefore, we find error in the standard of proof utilized in the jury instructions, but also find that Hashimoto was not prejudiced with respect to Instruction Nos. 13 and 14. Concerning Instruction No. 15, Hashimoto did not appropriately preserve this issue as a challenge in appeal for which reversal of the jury verdict is justified. Likewise, a plain error premise [12] for reversal is not denominated by the injury testimony presented to the jury as sufficient to demonstrate the miscarriage of justice character of a jury verdict decision. Goggins, 704 P.2d at 1291; Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1169 (Wyo. 1981).