Opinion ID: 1940368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis of competency determination

Text: The criteria for determining competence to proceed is whether the prisoner has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the pending collateral proceedings. Hardy v. State, 716 So.2d 761, 763 (Fla.1998) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)); see also § 916.12(1), Fla. Stat. (2003); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.211(a)(1), 3.851(8)(A). It is the duty of the trial court to determine what weight should be given to conflicting testimony. Mason v. State, 597 So.2d 776, 779 (Fla.1992). The reports of experts are `merely advisory to the [trial court], which itself retains the responsibility of the decision.' Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.1995) (quoting Muhammad v. State, 494 So.2d 969, 973 (Fla.1986)). Thus, when the experts' reports or testimony conflict regarding competency to proceed, it is the trial court's responsibility to consider all the relevant evidence and resolve such factual disputes. See, e.g., Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764 (citing Hunter, 660 So.2d at 247). Where there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion of the lower court, [this Court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the trial judge. Mason, 597 So.2d at 779. A trial court's decision regarding competency will stand absent a showing of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764; Carter v. State, 576 So.2d 1291, 1292 (Fla.1989). Thus, the issue to be addressed by this Court is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in finding Alston competent to proceed in his postconviction proceedings. In addressing that issue, we are mindful that a trial court's decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion unless no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Scott v. State, 717 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1998). In determining Alston's competence to proceed, the circuit court addressed the issue and held as follows: By stipulation of the parties, the reports of the examining experts were admitted into evidence in order to expedite the oral testimony of the witnesses. In addition, the periodic reports from the Department of Corrections were admitted into evidence. Dr. Umesh Mhatre, a psychiatrist, found that Pressley Alston is competent to proceed and attributes his idiosyncracies to malingering. Dr. Wade Myers, also a psychiatrist, believes that the defendant is not competent to proceed as he suffers from a mild form of mental illness. Dr. Robert Berland, a clinical psychologist, had the opinion that the defendant suffers from severe mental illness. Lisa Wiley, a psychological specialist with the Department of Corrections who submitted the periodic reports to the court, had an opportunity to observe Pressley Alston regularly as she is the Department of Corrections employee who renders psychological services to all death-row inmates housed at Union Correctional Institution. She observed no behavior on his part which suggested mental illness. Dr. Calderon is a staff psychiatrist with Department of Corrections who works at Union Correctional and she also found no evidence of mental illness. Also testifying was Sergeant Mike Young who is the supervising Department of Corrections employee assigned to death row at Union Correctional Institution. He sees the defendant five days a week and knows him well. His observations lead him to conclude that Alston is a manipulative inmate who is malingering. Over objection of his lawyer, Pressley Alston made a statement to the court. He requested that the court find him competent to proceed. He further requested that the court schedule a hearing wherein he can waive his right to counsel, waive his right to collateral proceedings and request that the sentence of the court be carried out. In fact, he wanted a hearing on that matter right then but the court declined, explaining to Pressley Alston that the court preferred to enter an order on his competency and then proceed in an orderly fashion on his request. The court is confident in its conclusion that Pressley Alston is competent to proceed. He has sufficient present ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the pending collateral proceedings. State v. Alston, No. 95-0053260-CF-A, order at 1-2 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. order filed March 27, 2003). We find that evidence in the form of Dr. Mhatre's reports and testimony, the DOC reports, and the testimony by DOC personnel support the circuit court's conclusion that Alston is competent to proceed. Dr. Mhatre diagnosed Alston as suffering from antisocial personality disorder and mild depression, but rejected the conclusion that Alston also suffered from bipolar disorder. He concluded that Alston's symptoms of delusion were clear malingering and found none of the additional symptoms of bipolar disorder. Emphasizing Alston's very high level of functioning, Dr. Mhatre concluded that Alston is capable of assisting in his own defense, exhibiting appropriate courtroom behavior, and challenging State witnesses. The DOC reports indicated that UCI staff psychologists Dr. Calderon and Dr. McKinsey evaluated Alston on two different occasions, found no evidence of psychotic psycho-pathology, and diagnosed him with an adjustment disorder with mixed feature and antisocial personality disorder. The DOC reports further indicated that although Alston exhibited a rambling speech pattern on a number of occasions, he also exhibited rational thinking and conversation. Wiley testified that Alston's delusional speech could be redirected to rational conversation and that Alston appeared capable of turning his symptoms on and off. Finally, Sergeant Young testified that Alston appeared to purposely violate rules to ensure that he remained in disciplinary confinement, that Alston took on a different demeanor for mental assessments and legal calls, and that Alston was rational, coherent, [and] calm in his cell but exhibited delusional behavior when he was out of his cell and had a forum or audience. Although Dr. Myers concluded that Alston was incompetent to proceed, he also acknowledged that Alston's legal filings indicated a coherent and organized thought process, that Alston appreciated the nature of the legal process, and that Alston exhibited some elements of malingering. Dr. Myers' diagnosis was that Alston suffered from mild grandiose and paranoid delusional thinking and that his symptoms were consistent with a hypomanic episode, which was less severe than a manic episode. Only Dr. Berland found no evidence of malingering. However, he also found that Alston exhibited a factual, if not rational, appreciation of the nature of the proceedings. Given the evidence at hand and the applicable standard of review, we conclude that a sufficient basis exists to support the circuit court's resolution of the conflicting evidence and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding Alston competent to proceed. Cf. Hertz v. State, 803 So.2d 629, 640-41 (Fla.2001) (affirming circuit court finding of competency where defense experts found defendant incompetent, but other experts found defendant competent, capable of understanding charges against him and roles and functions of courtroom personnel, did not exhibit major mental illness, and presented behavior that could be evidence of malingering); Ferguson v. State, 789 So.2d 306, 315 (Fla.2001) (affirming circuit court finding of competency where circuit court's rejection of defense experts' opinions supported by testimony of three doctors who found evidence of malingering, by testimony of corrections officers that defendant only acted irrationally shortly before and after mental evaluations, and by neurological examinations revealing no organic brain disease); Bryant v. State, 785 So.2d 422, 427 (Fla.2001) (affirming circuit court finding of competency where two of three experts concluded defendant was competent and two supervising deputy sheriffs observed defendant providing legal advice to others and saw nothing indicating defendant suffered mental defect or infirmity); Hardy, 716 So.2d at 764 (affirming circuit court finding of competency where supported by testimony of three out of five experts, testimony from jail employees regarding prisoner's abilities to communicate and participate in activities, and circuit court's own observations of demeanor and ability to assist counsel).