Opinion ID: 1058122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right Result for the Wrong Reason Doctrine

Text: Perry argues that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the right result for the wrong reason doctrine to hold that Trooper Weidhaas had probable cause to arrest Perry. The Commonwealth argues that our decision in Whitehead requires that we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We agree with the Commonwealth. Under the right result for the wrong reason doctrine, it is the settled rule that how[ever] erroneous ... may be the reasons of the court for its judgment upon the face of the judgment itself, if the judgment be right, it will not be disturbed on account of the reasons. Schultz v. Schultz, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 358, 384 (1853). In Whitehead, we properly embraced the correct focus of the right result for the wrong reason doctrine when we stated that cases are only proper for application of the right result for the wrong reason doctrine when the evidence in the record supports the new argument on appeal, and the development of additional facts is not necessary. 278 Va. at 115, 677 S.E.2d at 270. If the record does not support the arguments made for the first time on appeal, then application of the right result for the wrong reason doctrine is inappropriate and those new arguments will not be considered. We declined to apply the right result for the wrong reason doctrine in Whitehead because the legal methods of proof, offered for the first time before the Court of Appeals, required different presentation of facts in order to support the elements of the offense charged. Id. at 115, 677 S.E.2d at 270. Whitehead was charged with receiving stolen property-an offense for which there were several methods of proof. Id. In refusing to apply the right result for the wrong reason doctrine, we cited the Court of Appeals and explained: An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a trial court when it has reached the right result for the wrong reason. However, [t]he rule does not always apply.... [T]he proper application of this rule does not include those cases where, because the trial court has rejected the right reason or confined its decision to a specific ground, further factual resolution is needed before the right reason may be assigned to support the trial court's decision. Whitehead, 278 Va. at 115, 677 S.E.2d at 270 (citing Harris v. Commonwealth, 39 Va.App. 670, 675-76, 576 S.E.2d 228, 231 (2003)); Blackman v. Commonwealth, 45 Va.App. 633, 642, 613 S.E.2d 460, 465 (2005) (an appellee may argue for the first time on appeal any legal ground in support of a judgment so long as it does not require new factual determinations.) We further explained that because a conviction based upon the Commonwealth's alternative theories of guilt is predicated upon presentation of different facts that support the elements of the offense, we found that Whitehead was not on notice to present evidence to rebut any other method of proof possible. 278 Va. at 115-16, 677 S.E.2d at 270. Indeed, other cases we have decided express this limited principle as well. When the trial court has reached the correct result for the wrong reason, but the record supports the right reason, we will assign the correct reason and affirm that result. Mitchem v. Counts, 259 Va. 179, 191, 523 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2000); Chesterfield County v. Stigall, 262 Va. 697, 704, 554 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2001). Furthermore, an appellate court's examination is not limited to the evidence mentioned by a party in trial argument or by the trial court in its ruling. Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 147, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). Rather, an appellate court must consider all the evidence admitted at trial that is contained in the record. Id. In another aspect of the Whitehead opinion, we accurately summarized our holding in Eason v. Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1963), when we stated: However, cases in which the party seeking affirmance failed to present the argument in the trial court, such that the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on the argument, are not proper cases for the application of the doctrine. Whitehead, 278 Va. at 114, 677 S.E.2d at 270. However, upon reconsideration of the case law on this matter, we are of the view that this principle, adopted from Eason, is too broad and is inconsistent with case law that followed it. Failure to make the argument before the trial court is not the proper focus of the right result for the wrong reason doctrine. Consideration of the facts in the record and whether additional factual presentation is necessary to resolve the newly-advanced reason is the proper focus of the application of the doctrine. In this case, the facts necessary to resolve the issues of reasonable articulable suspicion for a Terry stop, reasonable articulable suspicion for a pat-down, and probable cause to arrest for possession were established in the record before the trial court. The Court of Appeals correctly held that [a]ll the facts required to consider [the Commonwealth's] legal argument [concerning probable cause to arrest] were presented to the trial court. Perry, 55 Va.App. at 130, 684 S.E.2d at 230. Additionally, both parties were aware that Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues were before the court. The Court of Appeals held that the parties here were aware at all stages of this case that the courts would look to the Fourth Amendment to determine if Trooper Weidhaas's actions were appropriateregardless of whether the question involved probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion. Id. at 130, 684 S.E.2d at 230. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized the distinction between reasonable articulable suspicion and probable cause, explaining that reasonable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less demanding than that for probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). However, the underlying facts required to prove that Trooper Weidhaas had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk Perry are the same as those required to consider whether he had probable cause to arrest Perry for possession. The factual record is complete; the conclusion to be drawn from these facts, namely, whether these facts support reasonable suspicion or probable cause, may be decided on this record. The United States Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals both support the rule that the record must support the right reason. The Supreme Court has held that the appellee [is] free to defend its judgment on any ground properly raised below whether or not that ground was relied upon, rejected, or even considered by the [trial court] or the Court of Appeals. Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 476 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). The Court has explained, it is likewise settled that the appellee may, without taking a cross-appeal, urge in support of a decree any matter appearing in the record, although his argument may involve an attack upon the reasoning of the lower court or an insistence upon matter overlooked or ignored by it. United States v. American Ry. Express Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that [a] prevailing party may urge an appellate court to affirm a judgment on any ground appearing in the record. Rosenruist-Gestao E Servicos LDA v. Virgin Enters. Limited, 511 F.3d 437, 447 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its decision, and it is entitled to affirm the court's judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds are apparent from the record. MM v. School District of Greenville County, 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir.2002) (emphasis added). Likewise, in the case before us today, we apply the right result for the wrong reason doctrine because the facts in the record establish that Trooper Weidhaas had probable cause to arrest Perry for possession of PCP before the pat-down search. Addressing the specific assignment of error, we cannot say that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the right result for the wrong reason doctrine to hold that the trooper had probable cause to arrest Perry before the pat-down search. Trooper Weidhaas noted the smell of drugs in the vehicle, verified the existence of PCP in the vial thrown on the ground, and identified Perry's behavior as being consistent with that of an individual under the influence of PCP. At that point, based on his training and experience as a police officer, Trooper Weidhaas had probable cause to believe that Perry possessed PCP. As a result, the subsequent search of Perry was a lawful search incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969); see also Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 193, 278 S.E.2d 849, 852-53 (1981) (Where, as here, the product of the search was not essential to probable cause to arrest and the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of [the defendant's] person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.) (internal quotation marks omitted).