Opinion ID: 2182224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: determinations

Text: This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent misappropriated the entire PIP money ($537.70) received on behalf of his client, Jefferson.
It is undisputed that he failed to pay Mercy Hospital its bill of $107.70. Respondent admits this. He has no explanation for why he so failed to pay. Suddenly, he announces, in his Post Trial Memorandum (filed on July 22, 1983) that he had paid the hospital by his money order dated July 8, 1983. It is undisputed that he received the PIP draft on February 22, 1979, endorsed it, cashed it and failed to pay the hospital bill. He kept the hospital's $107.70 from February 22, 1979 through the time that he was brought before the Inquiry Panel, through the time that the AGC petitioned the Court of Appeals on April 4, 1983, charging him with violation of various Disciplinary Rules as the result of his failure to pay the hospital, and through the time that the Court of Appeals designated, on April 8, 1983, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to hear and determine the charge, and through the hearing by the undersigned on July 6, 1983. It was not until two days after this last hearing that he finally paid the hospital. Thus he kept improperly the PIP money for his own use from February 22, 1979 until July 6, 1983  a period of almost three and one-half years.
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent never ever paid Dr. Holt his medical bill of $430. The doctor testified that he had not been so paid. The testimony of the Respondent is that he did pay the doctor by virtue of an agreement with the doctor that resulted in the Respondent setting-off a part of the money due him (Respondent) in unrelated legal matters where the doctor was the Respondent's client. I find this to be totally untrue. Moreover, the evidence that the Respondent paid $100 to the doctor (on February 23, 1979) I find to be totally false and indeed, fabricated. First, as to the agreement to offset. The only evidence of an agreement comes from the testimony of the Respondent. The doctor, in his testimony, never mentioned anything whatsoever about any such agreement. He testified that he had not been paid. Significantly the Respondent never asked the doctor any questions about such agreement. Nor did he question him about payments to him. In fact, he never asked the doctor any questions at all. Nor did he call the doctor as his witness. As to the so-called offset the Respondent did not even know how much the doctor's bill was with respect to the Second Case. At first, he testified that it was $235 but he had previously admitted that it was $430. He later admitted it was $430. The Respondent could produce no writing to evidence the agreement. As to what the doctor owed him for the unrelated work that he had done for the doctor, the Respondent had no bills whatsoever. Nor could he even tell what his (unwritten) bills were to the doctor. He testified that at different times, we would agree on how much he could afford to pay me. As to the so-called payment of $100 to the doctor, I find that it simply did not exist. The Respondent testified that he paid $100 to the doctor for Jefferson's case (the Second Case) on February 23, 1979 and proved it by Respondent's Exhibit 23, a paper which purports to be a copy of a letter under date of February 23, 1979, sent by Respondent to the doctor. I find that no such letter was ever sent. I find that there was no such letter written. I find it to be a complete fabrication. The letter mentions that the Respondent encloses a check in the amount of $300 to be distributed as follows: ... $100 on fee for Stanley Jefferson. However the date of the check is not mentioned, nor the check number, nor the bank upon which it was drawn, and most significantly, the cancelled check was never produced by the Respondent. The Respondent never asked the doctor whether or not he had received any such check. The copy of the letter allegedly sent by the Respondent is typed but it bears no indication of the initials of the secretary who typed it. It may not have been typed by any secretary  it may have been typed by the Respondent himself  but the Respondent conceded that he had a secretary at the time in question  in fact he blamed her for mistakes as to other typings emanating from his office (for example, his assigning a mistake to his secretary when faced with a question as to why he failed to put both accident dates on his Respondent's Exhibit 7). Finally, the Respondent testified that the source of the $100 used to pay the doctor came out of my pocket, that is out of my pants. This court finds that Dr. Holt was never ever paid anything.
The Respondent testified that he held two-thirds of the PIP money ($537.70) to protect the medical amount and that Jefferson received the other third. Jefferson testified that he (Jefferson) had indeed received $179.23 from the Respondent but he also testified that he returned that sum (or rather $178.23  a one dollar mistake on his part that he freely admitted) one day later, on February 23, 1979. His reason was that by this time he was not satisfied with the Respondent's services, did not trust him and wanted to give all of the PIP money back so that when the (Second Case) got settled, I could see everything at one time and I know that I was being treated fairly. Unlike the Respondent's method of doing business, Jefferson paid for and procured a written money order payable to himself dated February 23, 1979 and endorsed it over to the Respondent. The Respondent admits that he endorsed it. So I find by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has had that sum of money ($178.23) from February 23, 1979 to the present. The Respondent seeks to avoid this fact by saying that he (Respondent) returned this $178.23 (in cash) to the Respondent because he (Jefferson) was out of work. This testimony simply does not make sense and this court does not believe the Respondent. What would be the sense of a man paying $178.23 over to another man and then the other man repaying it immediately to the original man? There is documentation for the payment of this sum by Jefferson (the money order) to the Respondent (Respondent's admission that he endorsed it) but there is no documentation that the Respondent paid it back to Jefferson  only the testimony of the Respondent that he paid it (in cash). There was no letter of confirmation by the Respondent, no receipt by Jefferson, nothing in writing whatsoever. The Respondent testified that he merely assisted Jefferson in cashing the money order. However, when asked why Jefferson would buy a money order just to ask the Respondent to cash it, the Respondent testified that Spell influenced Jefferson to do so. At first, he testified that Jefferson and Spell came in together to return their PIP monies to him but later he testified that they were not together. When confronted with the fact that the money orders were numbered consecutively (Jefferson's money order was XXXXXXXXX and Spell's was XXXXXXXXX. Petitioner testified that Spell did not negotiate his money order at the same time Jefferson did because Spell carried (his) money order around for quite a time. However, he also testified that both Jefferson and Spell came in and that he accommodated them by cashing these money orders and giving them his money, both of them. He testified that he gave Jefferson back his money because Jefferson was out of work. What was his reason for giving Spell back his money? He did not testify as to any need on Spell's part. This sort of testimony is unbelievable.
The Respondent admitted that he never deposited the PIP money into a separate bank account. He simply cashed the PIP check and I find by clear and convincing evidence that he kept all of the cash ($537.70) for himself despite his testimony to the contrary.
Hence this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent has violated: Disciplinary Rule 9-102(A) and Article 10, Sec. 44 of the Annotated Code of Maryland, See AGC v. Garson, 287 Md. 502 [413 A.2d 564] (1980); AGC v. Bailey, 286 Md. 630 [408 A.2d 1330] (1979) [Failure to place funds into a separate account]. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3)(4)(5) and (6), Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(3), Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(8) and Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3) [the Respondent illegally and fraudulently converted all the PIP monies to his own use thereby prejudicing his client, Jefferson  these monies were not held in escrow]. See AGC v. Bonnin, 294 Md. 507 [451 A.2d 326] (1982); AGC v. Boehm, 293 Md. 476 [446 A.2d 52] (1982) [Respondent provided Jefferson with no records nor accounting of Jefferson's money. In fact, when the Respondent settled the Second Case with Jefferson, he retained improperly the $179.23 by subtracting it from the amount properly due Jefferson. This amounts to a misappropriation. See AGC v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599 [441 A.2d 328] (1982); AGC v. Cooper, 279 Md. 605 [369 A.2d 1059] (1977); Bar Association v. Marshall , [269] 264 Md. 510 [307 A.2d 677] (1973)]. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3)(4)(5) and (6), Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(1), Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(8) and Disciplinary Rule 9-102(B)(3) and (4) [Illegally failed to distribute all the funds to which Jefferson was entitled; See Marshall and Boehm, supra; AGC v. McIntire, 286 Md. 87 [405 A.2d 273] (1979) [failure to seek Jefferson's lawful objectives through reasonably available means permitted by law; failure to keep complete records of funds of Jefferson coming into the Respondent's possession and render appropriate accounting to Jefferson].
This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent neglected the legal matter entrusted to him by his client Jefferson, i.e., the First Case. This court further finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent failed to carry out the agreement that he made with Jefferson, i.e. to represent Jefferson properly in the First Case. All the Respondent did as concerns the First Case was to file suit on behalf of Jefferson, against the Macks and send out a certified letter enclosing the suit to the Macks. The Macks did not acknowledge nor sign for the letter. The first accident occurred on April 25, 1978 but the Respondent did not file suit until January 18, 1979. The evidence does not show that the Respondent did anything further. In the Second Case, the Respondent had used a private process server and was successful in achieving service in that case. In the First Case he did not use a private process server. He attempted to explain why not by saying that Jefferson wanted to take back the First Case from him. If that were the case, that would indicate that Jefferson was unhappy with the lack of progress being made by the Respondent and that fact should have spurred the Respondent to do something to alleviate the situation  at least to hire a private process server. But I do not find that the Respondent's explanation (that he did not use a process server because Jefferson wanted the file back) rings true. Respondent waited almost nine months before he even instituted suit in the First Case. Even if Jefferson was unhappy and wanted to take back the case, the Respondent would not give back the cases. Jefferson tried to get rid of the Respondent in about August of 1979 and all through 1980 and 1981 and all through the present day but the Respondent would not let go of the First Case (or the Second Case) unless Jefferson paid him $750. When Jefferson could not pay $750 to the Respondent, as the Respondent well knew that meant that the Respondent was still the lawyer for Jefferson. Hence he could and should have utilized a private process server. Moreover the Respondent represented Spell in the very same accident (First Case) and had achieved service in Spell's case. He was in touch with the attorney who represented Spell, filed answers to interrogatories on behalf of Spell and still was unable to achieve service against the very same Defendants. Perhaps Milton Mack, Jr. was in the military but there is no indication that Jocelyn T. Mack was. In fact, the Respondent knew her address which was 2400 Loyola Southway  right in Baltimore City. He did not ever reissue any summons for her. Coming back to his reason for failing to reissue and failing to use a private process server, Respondent testified that he would have released the file (or files) if Jefferson had paid him for work he had done, money he had spent and money that Jefferson owed him. I do not find this explanation to be true. He wants to explain his neglect of the First Case by arguing that he was having a problem with Jefferson. But I find that any problem that existed was caused by Respondent's neglect of the First Case. So his argument is circular. Even if this were not so, he was still Jefferson's lawyer despite Jefferson's attempt in August of 1979 to get rid of him (this was merely the first attempt by Jefferson to do so). An analysis of the evidence shows that the Respondent's explanation that his neglect was caused by Jefferson's wanting the file back, is spurious. As to being paid for work done, the evidence shows that the Respondent and Jefferson had consummated a retainer agreement. So Respondent was entitled to a one-third percentage of whatever he recovered for Jefferson and if he recovered nothing he was entitled to nothing. As to money he had spent, the only money that the Respondent had spent as regards the First Case was $19. Even though the Respondent was assured in writing that his expenses would be protected he failed to turn over his file to Jefferson's new attorney, one Michael H. Simons, Esq. The Respondent admitted that he had received Simons' letter dated January 2, 1980 which enclosed a letter from Jefferson discharging the Respondent. In the Simons letter, Simons informed the Respondent that Jefferson wanted him (Simons) to represent him and sought information as to the First Case. However, the Respondent did not correspond with Simons. Simons then wrote a second letter (dated January 28, 1980) which confirmed a phone conversation with the Respondent. The second letter indicated that Simons would protect the Respondent's itemized expenses but noted that the Respondent would not discuss that matter further. So the net result was that although the Respondent says that he would turn over the file if he were paid for the money he had spent yet he would not communicate with Jefferson's new attorney with respect to what money he had spent. Actually Respondent gave varying explanations of what it would take before he would release the files. Jefferson wanted back the files with respect to both accidents. At one point, the Respondent said that he wanted $750 for both files. Yet at another point, he testified that the proof of what the $750 was for was supplied by his Exhibit Seven (for identification). This was a To Whom it May Concern memorandum advising that I release the papers concerning this accident (obviously the First Case since it says accident date April 25, 1978) ... in consideration of payment of advanced costs and a nominal fee. Petitioner testified that a nominal fee meant $300 or $350. Whatever version one accepts, the fact is that the Respondent never returned either file to Jefferson or his new attorney. Hence the Respondent remained Jefferson's attorney. His attempt to explain his inaction and neglect by the excuse that Jefferson wanted back the cases is simply a smokescreen and totally unconvincing. DISCIPLINARY RULES VIOLATED This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated: Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(2) and (3) See AGC v. Willcher, 287 Md. 74 [411 A.2d 83] (1980)
When Jefferson terminated the Respondent's employment, the Respondent failed to withdraw from the case as he was required to do. See AGC v. Kerpelman, 288 Md. 341 [420 A.2d 940] (1980). His reasons for not doing so have been set out infra. These reasons are totally unconvincing. Respondent advances another reason for his failure to withdraw, that is, that he wanted to be paid a $200 balance allegedly owed him when he represented Jefferson previously in a criminal case. Aside from the fact that he had previously sworn under oath that it was a civil case, his reason is totally unconvincing because I find as a fact and by clear and convincing evidence that the $200 was paid to the Respondent. Jefferson so testified and he said it was done before two witnesses (Clarence Bowman and Mr. Spell). What is more is that Jefferson testified that the Respondent would not represent him with respect to the two accidents unless he was paid in advance. Respondent testified that he and Jefferson agreed that the $200 would be taken out of any recovery made in the First Case. Yet this agreement is nowhere recorded. In fact, the Respondent had Jefferson sign two powers of attorney in connection with both the First Case and the Second Case but these documents do not mention any such agreement. I find by clear and convincing evidence that the $200 was paid to the Respondent by Jefferson before the Respondent undertook to represent Jefferson in the First Case. Hence, the Respondent's testimony to the effect that he would not withdraw until paid this $200 is not believed. The Respondent's demand that he be paid $750 before he would withdraw from the cases is found to be unreasonable and extortionate. I find that it was not based upon any substance or rationality. I find that he did not and would not account to either Jefferson or his later attorney (Simons) for this $750. His attempt to use his Exhibit 7 (for identification) is totally unpersuasive. His in-court accounting (work done, money spent, money owed) is suspect because he demanded the very same amount ($750) from Spell when Spell wanted him to withdraw from Spell's case. I find by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(4) D. RESPONDENT ENGAGED IN CONDUCT WHICH WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, WHICH ADVERSELY REFLECTED ON HIS FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW, AND INVOLVED DISHONESTY I find by clear and convincing evidence that while the Respondent knew that he was being investigated by the AGC, he got Jefferson to write a letter to be presented to the AGC, which letter was intended to fend off and block the investigation. I find further that this letter was induced by Respondent's representation to Jefferson that in exchange for the letter the Respondent would settle the First Case swiftly. However, I find that said representation was false. Jefferson testified that the Respondent more or less told him what to say in the letter and that it was to be sent to the AGC. He further testified that the Respondent told him that he had been having trouble with the AGC and that Jefferson had to get them off his back. As to why he wrote the letter, he testified that the Respondent told him that he (Respondent) could hurry up and settle the (First Case) if I wanted to get it settled. It is significant at this precise time, Jefferson needed money because he had lost his job. I find that the Respondent told Jefferson to say that he (Jefferson) was satisfied and that he (Jefferson) didn't want to press anymore further charges on him and I further find that as the result of the Respondent's direction, Jefferson wrote that he will take no further actions against (Respondent) involving either case. I also find that Jefferson really did not want to write such a letter  in fact, he testified that his wife said that she would not sign and so Jefferson did not sign the letter. But he did write the letter, I find, as the result of the Respondent's representation that in this way the First Case would be swiftly settled. I find that the Respondent never intended to settle the First Case swiftly. In fact the Respondent did nothing to settle the case and next to nothing to bring it to trial. Hence the Respondent made a false representation to a person whom the Respondent knew to be vulnerable in order to obtain an exculpatory letter  a letter designed to thwart a legitimate investigation of the Respondent. Hence he has violated: Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), (5) and (6) Disciplinary Rule 6-102(A) /s/ Marshall A. Levin Marshall A. Levin, Judge September 13, 1983 COLE, Judge, dissenting: The record in this case makes two conclusions indelibly clear: (1) this is basically a dispute between a single client and his attorney and (2) the evidence may have been cast in a more favorable light for respondent had he not elected to be his sole witness as well as well as his own counsel. In any event, I do not believe that respondent's misconduct calls for the ultimate sanction of disbarment. While the Court cannot overlook the fact of respondent's prior disciplinary experience before this Court, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Howard, 282 Md. 515, 385 A.2d 1191 (1978), a suspension for a lengthy period would be sufficient to protect the public interest as well as to impress the bar that respondent's conduct fell below the professional standards of this State. I, therefore, dissent from the Court's order of disbarment. Judge ELDRIDGE has authorized me to say that he concurs in the views expressed herein.