Opinion ID: 1755512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: juvenile record of witness

Text: Until the adoption of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence January 1, 1986, the general credibility of any adult witness could be attacked by questioning him as to any previous conviction, whether a felony or a misdemeanor, with the sole exception of traffic offenses. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-13 (1972); Miss. Code Ann. § 63-9-15 (1972) (now repealed); Breland v. State, 221 Miss. 371, 73 So.2d 267 (1954); Brown v. State, 96 Miss. 534, 51 So. 273 (1910). A different rule applied, however, as to youth court offenses. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-561(5) (Supp. 1979) provided: (5) No adjudication upon the status of any child shall operate to impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed on an adult because of a criminal conviction, nor shall any child be deemed a criminal by reason of adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a conviction. A person in whose interest proceedings have been brought in the youth court may deny, without any penalty, the existence of those proceedings and any adjudication made in those proceedings. Except for the right of a defendant or a prosecutor in criminal proceedings and a respondent or a youth court prosecutor in youth court proceedings to cross-examine a witness, including a defendant or a respondent, to show bias or interest, no adjudication shall be used for impeachment purposes in any court. As can be seen from this statute, a youth court adjudication can be used to cross-examine a witness in a criminal proceeding to show bias or interest. And, as to adult witnesses, M.R.E. 609 removes the absolute, carte blanche right to use prior convictions for impeachment purposes, substituting a balancing test explicated in Peterson v. State, 518 So.2d 632 (Miss. 1987). As to youth court adjudications, M.R.E. 609(d) and the comment thereto provides: Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission into evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. The official comment to Rule 609(d) provides: Subsection (d) prohibits impeachment based on juvenile adjudications. Reasons for this rule include the wish to free an adult from bearing the burden of a youthful mistake, the informality of youth court proceedings, and the confidential nature of those proceedings. In pre-rule Mississippi practice, the use of juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes has been governed by M.C.A. § 43-21-561 which provides that no adjudication against a child shall be deemed a criminal conviction. Indeed, the juvenile offender is permitted by statute to deny the fact of the prior adjudication. However, the statute permits cross-examination by either the state or the defendant in a criminal action or the respondent in a juvenile adjudication proceeding regarding prior juvenile offenses for the limited purpose of showing bias and interest. In short, the evidence could be used in these limited circumstances but not to attack the general credibility of the witness. Under Rule 609(d) the court has the discretion to allow impeachment of a witness, other than a criminal defendant, by a prior juvenile adjudication if the judge determines that it is necessary. The court's discretion extends only to witnesses other than the accused in a criminal case. This rule authorizes cross-examination of a youth court offender if it would have been admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission of the evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-561(5) and Rule 609(d) serve the same purpose, have the same objective, and although worded differently, provide the same general criterion for a trial judge in exercising his discretion to determine whether or not a previous youth court adjudication shall be admissible in the cross-examination of a minor witness. The only difference is that under the Rule an accused may not be cross-examined as to his prior youth court adjudications. The right to cross-examine as to prior convictions in order to show bias or interest was given Constitutional dimension in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Because the rule announced in that case is a right guaranteed an accused under the Sixth Amendment, it should be interpreted liberally to favor the accused. Davis v. Alaska , however, does not give the accused the absolute right under Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-13 or pre-rules case law to require a witness to disclose any prior convictions to attack his credibility simply because he had been convicted of a criminal offense. In Davis v. Alaska a 16-year-old boy named Green spoke to two men beside a parked car near his house as he was leaving on an errand. When he returned they were still there, and one had a crowbar. Later, a safe from the Polar Bar restaurant was found near the spot where Green had seen the two men. These men were subsequently indicted for burglary and larceny of the restaurant. At the time of their trial, Green was on probation by order of a juvenile court as a delinquent for having burglarized two cabins. The State moved the trial court for a protective order to prevent any reference during Green's cross-examination to his juvenile court record. The U.S. Supreme Court noted: In opposing the protective order, petitioner's counsel made it clear that he would not introduce Green's juvenile adjudication as a general impeachment of Green's character as a truthful person but rather, to show specifically that at the same time Green was assisting the police in identifying petitioner he was on probation for burglary. From this petitioner would seek to show  or at least argue  that Green acted out of fear or concern of possible jeopardy to his probation. Not only might Green have made a hasty and faulty identification of petitioner to shift suspicion away from himself as one who robbed the Polar Bar, but Green might have been subject to undue pressure from the police and made his identifications under fear of possible probation revocation. Green's record would be revealed only as necessary to probe Green for bias and prejudice and not generally to call Green's good character into question. 415 U.S. at 311, 94 S.Ct. at 1108, 39 L.Ed.2d at 351. The Court then noted: Although prevented from revealing that Green had been on probation for the juvenile delinquency adjudication for burglary at the same time that he originally identified petitioner, counsel for petitioner did his best to expose Green's state of mind at the time Green discovered that a stolen safe had been discovered near his home. Green denied that he was upset or uncomfortable about the discovery of the safe. He claimed not to have been worried about any suspicions the police might have been expected to harbor against him, though Green did admit that it crossed his mind that the police might have thought he had something to do with the crime. 415 U.S. at 312, 94 S.Ct. at 1108, 39 L.Ed.2d at 351. By specific questions Green was asked if, following discovery of the safe, he was upset that it was found on his property; whether he felt that he might be a suspect; whether he was uncomfortable; whether he suspected that the police thought he was involved; and if he was somehow connected with the theft. He was asked again if there was a possibility somehow that the police might think he was connected with the theft, and he testified that this had crossed his mind. Finally, he was asked if he had ever been questioned before by law enforcement officers, and he answered no. The Court sustained an objection to this question, and then noted: Since defense counsel was prohibited from making inquiry as to the witness' being on probation under a juvenile court adjudication, Green's protestations of unconcern over possible police suspicion that he might have had a part in the Polar Bar burglary and his categorical denial of ever having been the subject of any similar law enforcement interrogation went unchallenged. The tension between the right of confrontation and the State's policy of protecting the witness with a juvenile record is particularly evident in the final answer given by the witness. Since it is probable that Green underwent some questioning by police when he was arrested for the burglaries on which his juvenile adjudication of delinquency rested, the answer can be regarded as highly suspect at the very least. The witness was in effect asserting, under protection of the trial court's ruling, a right to give a questionably truthful answer to a cross-examiner pursuing relevant line of inquiry; it is doubtful whether the bold No answer would have been given by Green absent a belief that he was shielded from traditional cross-examination. It would be difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly illustrating the need for cross-examination. 415 U.S. at 313-14, 94 S.Ct. at 1109, 39 L.Ed.2d at 352. The Court then held: Cross-examination is the principle means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness' character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful in his testimony. The introduction of evidence of a prior crime is thus a general attack on the credibility of the witness. A more particular attack on the witness' credibility is effected by means of cross-examination directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' ... We have recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. (Emphasis added) 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d at 353-354. The Court then concluded that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on Green's testimony, which was crucial to the State's case. 415 U.S. at 317, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354. The Court noted that while defense counsel was permitted to ask Green if he was biased, he was not permitted to make a record from which to argue why Green might have been biased or otherwise lacked the degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355. The Court then held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation had been denied because the defense had not been permitted to show a possible bias on the part of Green. 415 U.S. at 320, 94 S.Ct. at 1112, 39 L.Ed.2d at 356. Because it is a polestar decision, and because of the similarities between Davis v. Alaska and this case, we specifically have given careful attention to the facts and trial records of that case, and quoted at length from the Court's opinion. As can be seen from the extended excerpts from Davis v. Alaska and the record in this case, there is a great similarity between the two. There are also differences. In Davis v. Alaska , Green, the 17-year-old witness, was on probation; in this case Thompson was brought from the training school to testify for the state. This in and of itself is not dispositive. In Davis v. Alaska the state sought and obtained a protective order to keep the defense from questioning Green about his youth court record. No such protective order was sought here, although the State did object to cross-examining Thompson about his youth court record, which was sustained by the circuit court. Neither is this difference dispositive. In Davis v. Alaska defense counsel specifically informed the court that the reason he wanted to question Green was not for general impeachment of his character, but to show his state of mind when he was questioned by the police. Specifically, he wanted to show that Green was himself on probation for burglary, from which defense counsel wished to show, or at least be able to argue to the jury, that Green's cooperation with the police was brought on by his fear of probation revocation or himself being suspected of the burglary. No such basis was offered by the defense in this case. Counsel simply told the court that they wished to cross-examine Thompson about all his convictions to show bias or interest. In Davis v. Alaska Green had himself been sent to reform school for burglary. He was questioned about a burglary when the safe was found on his parents' property. There were no eyewitnesses to the burglary, and Green thought he might himself be suspected of the crime. Thompson had no reason to think in this case he might be suspected of the assault and robbery. In this case the circuit court clearly told defense counsel they could cross-examine Thompson to show special treatment, offers or concessions, or to show any bias or interest, but could not just ask him about his juvenile court record. The trial court in Davis v. Alaska offered no such opportunity to the defense. In Davis v. Alaska , following the trial court's ruling, defense counsel did on cross-examination seek to probe Green's state of mind when he was questioned by the police, and asked him if he had ever been questioned by the police before, to which he answered no, and the court sustained the objection thereto. In this case defense counsel neither in chambers nor out of the presence of the jury made any profert of what they expected to show by cross-examining Thompson as to his youth court record, except a generalized statement to show bias or interest. Did they expect to show he had been promised anything to testify? Did they expect to show he wanted to return home from the training school, and thought if he testified for the state he would be shown leniency? None of this was brought to the attention of the circuit judge. Finally, in this case, counsel did not, as was done in Davis v. Alaska , attempt before the jury to explore Thompson's state of mind when he was questioned by the police or the state. In this case, weeks in advance of trial defense counsel was furnished the name of Thomas as a potential witness for the State and received a copy of his written statement to the police department. They had ample opportunity to interview him, question him in advance of trial, and learn enough about him, explore his background and test the credibility of what he proposed to testify, and to give the court some specific reason or basis, if they had one, why they wished to ask him about his juvenile court record. This was not done. Circuit judges should not be sandbagged into committing error. M.R.E. 103(a)(2); Johnson, 416 So.2d at 681.