Opinion ID: 1174683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conflicting obligations

Text: Frequently an attorney is confronted with legitimate but competing considerations, and we have recently recognized a latitude granted the attorney engaged in litigation in choosing between alternative tactical strategies. ( Smith v. Lewis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 349, 359; see Banerian v. O'Malley (1974) 42 Cal. App.3d 604, 613 [116 Cal. Rptr. 919].) (2) In addition to competing strategies, an attorney is often confronted with clashing obligations imposed by our system of justice. An attorney has an obligation not only to protect his client's interests but also to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice. In absence of a specific rule of conduct governing the situation before him, determination of the attorney's duty of care when conflicting interests arise is made by balancing those interests, keeping in mind that it would be unfair to require the attorney to pay damages merely upon a showing of a mistake in choice. To hold the attorney responsible in damages whenever in retrospect it appears he mistakenly sacrificed his client's interests in favor of his public obligations would place an impossible burden on the practice of law. Moreover, awarding damages against the attorney would violate sound public policy, because an attorney frequently faced with the question whether vigorous advocacy in favor of a client must be curtailed in light of public obligation would tilt in favor of the client at the expense of our system of justice. When apparent conflict exists between the attorney's duty to his client on the one hand and his public obligation on the other, it is not sufficient to show that some or many prudent attorneys would not have made the mistake. The attorney's choice to honor the public obligation must be shown to have been so manifestly erroneous that no prudent attorney would have done so. Here, defendant was confronted with a choice between his duty to advance his client's cause by continuing to prosecute the action and his duty to fair administration of justice to refuse to maintain actions believed to lack merit. An attorney's duty is to maintain only such actions as appear to him legal or just. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (c).) When an attorney loses faith in his cause he should either retire from the case or dismiss the action. ( Larimer v. Smith (1933) 130 Cal. App. 98, 101 [19 P.2d 825].) Rules of Professional Conduct rule 2-110(2) provides that a member of the State Bar shall not accept employment to present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Rule 2-111(C) provides for permissive withdrawal when the client insists upon presenting a claim that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of the law. The judgment before us may not be upheld on the basis of asserted erroneous evaluation of the merits of the cause of action. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence available to defendant at the time he determined the action lacked legal merit reflected that several doctors believed plaintiff's ailment resulted from something other than negligence. There was no direct evidence that the airplane splint was faulty. The one doctor who first believed that the injury was due to a defective splint, in a subsequent letter of December 1964, questioned his own initial opinion. Furthermore, that doctor's attempt to treat by surgery had in large part, if not entirely, failed. Based on the materials available to defendant, the possibility of recovery was remote; certainly the determination that the action was not meritorious cannot be characterized as manifestly erroneous.