Opinion ID: 1188554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the position of the plaintiffs

Text: Most of the cases thus far considered relate to suits by an alien enemy. The defendants contend that the claimants were subjects of the Kingdom of The Netherlands with which the United States was not at war, and that they were therefore not alien enemies. The Osbourne case, however, suggests the answer. In that case, the running of the statutory limitation was suspended for the benefit of an American citizen imprisoned by the enemy. As indicated in the Osbourne case, it would be the height of unreasonableness to grant redress to a Japanese alien enemy by reason of the war at the same time that we denied it to a citizen. The identical question was considered in a lengthy opinion in the House of Lords. In Sovfracht v. Van Undens Scheepvaart, All E.R., Vol. 1 (1943) 76, the court reviewed British and American decisions and held that a Dutch company, with principal place of business in Rotterdam, was in the position of an alien enemy as to whom the courts were closed by reason of the belligerent occupation of the Kingdom of The Netherlands by Germany during the second World War. In the course of a lengthy opinion, Viscount Simon, L.C., said: It is not irrelevant to bear in mind the reason why a resident in enemy-occupied territory is in certain circumstances subject to the same disability as a resident in enemy territory. Lord Reading, L.C.J., in Porter v. Freudenberg (1), referring to the denial to alien enemies of a right to sue, said at p. 867: `This law was founded in earlier days upon the conception that all subjects owing allegiance to the Crown were at war with subjects of the state at war with the Crown, and later it was grounded upon public policy, which forbids the doing of acts which will be or may be to the advantage of the enemy state by increasing its capacity for prolonging hostilities in adding to the credit, money or goods, or other resources available to individuals in the enemy state.' This consideration equally applies to a claim sought to be established in our courts by a resident in enemy-occupied territory, for, if the claimant succeeds, an asset in the form of an award or a judgment is created which the occupying power can appropriate and which is calculated to increase the enemy's resources. We hold that, by reason of the belligerent occupation of the Kingdom of The Netherlands by Germany, the plaintiffs, who were residents within, and subjects of that kingdom, were in the position of alien enemies, and as such, were barred from bringing suits in the courts of this state, and that the same facts which closed the courts to them, also operated to suspend the running of the period of limitation for their benefit. The closing of the courts to persons in the position of alien enemies is not the only limitation upon their rights. From the Basic Field Manual, Rules of Land Warfare of the War Department of the United States, we read the following at Chapter 7, section 215, page 60: All intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent armies, whether by traffic, by letter, by travel, or in any other way, ceases. This is the general rule to be observed without special proclamation. (Italics ours.) The conclusion at which we have arrived is supported in the monumental work of Charles Cheney Hyde on International Law, Vol. 3, where he says, at page 1699: It is inconsistent with a state of war that the inhabitants within territory controlled by one belligerent should hold intercourse with those within territory controlled by the enemy, primarily because of the danger of the communication of information of military or political value, and secondarily, because of the neutralizing effect of any commercial transactions tending to increase the resources of the enemy upon hostile operations undertaken against it.    (Italics ours.) Again the author says at 1715: A consequence of closing the courts to a class of alien enemies is to remove from them certain penalties which might otherwise be incurred through failure to initiate proceedings during the period of disability. Thus the statute of limitations does not run against such individuals while they are being deprived of their judicial remedies. In H.P. Drewry, S.A.R.L., v. Onassis, supra, 42 NYS 2d 74, 266 App Div 292, it was held that the plaintiff, a French corporation residing in France during the belligerent occupation of that state by Germany, should be considered an alien enemy under the Trading with the Enemy Act. The decision relied, not alone upon federal statute, but also upon English and American decisions. See also Von Hofmannsthal v. Wolfe, 93 NY Supp 2d 550, 276 App Div 223.