Opinion ID: 3135213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: In January 2004, Leon appeared before respondent and pled guilty to the offense of driving while license suspended (enhanced). See 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2002). Because Leon had three previous convictions for the same offense, his conduct constituted a Class 4 felony, for which the Illinois Vehicle Code requires that he “must serve a minimum term of imprisonment of 180 days.” 625 ILCS 5/6–303(d–3) (West 2002). Respondent sentenced Leon to180 days in jail and 24 months of probation. The State argued that the court’s order should provide that Leon was not eligible for any good-behavior allowance. The State based its argument on the Good Behavior Act, which provides in pertinent part that “The good behavior of any person  in a county jail  shall entitle such person to a good behavior allowance, except that:  (2) a person sentenced for an offense for which the law provides a mandatory minimum sentence shall not receive any portion of a good behavior allowance that would reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum.” 730 ILCS 130/3 (West 2002). The State reasoned that because Leon only received a 180-day sentence, any good-behavior allowance would reduce his sentence below the 180-day mandatory minimum, which would run afoul of the Good Behavior Act. Leon responded that it was ambiguous whether the “minimum term of imprisonment” set out in section 6–303(d–3) of the Vehicle Code was a “mandatory minimum sentence” within the meaning of the Good Behavior Act. Leon noted that, as a general rule, ambiguity in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Therefore, Leon concluded, he must be permitted to earn good-conduct credit. Respondent ruled in Leon’s favor and refused to order that he was ineligible for good-behavior credit. Respondent acknowledged that the legislative history indicated that the legislature intended the Good Behavior Act to preclude any good-behavior credit for Leon’s crime, but concluded that the legislature did not correctly articulate its intent in the statute. In so ruling, respondent attached dispositive significance to the fact that the Vehicle Code referred to a “term of imprisonment” which a defendant must serve , rather than a “sentence” which the court must impose . As previously noted, the State instituted this original mandamus action in this court to request that we compel respondent to change her sentencing order. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 381(a). (footnote: 1)