Opinion ID: 2320073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Sentence

Text: In his first Rule 35(a) motion, appellant assertedand he argues again on appealthat the trial court erroneously sentenced him to 24 months for marijuana distribution when the maximum permissible sentence, under the except that clause of D.C.Code § 48-904.01(a)(2)(B), [1] was 180 days. Appellant does not dispute that, at the time of his trial, he had previously been convicted of manufacturing, distributing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance, id., but he contends that because the amount of marijuana involved in the distribution charge had a net weight of only .92 grams (i.e., amounted to 1/2 pound or less of marijuana) and because his prior marijuana offense was a misdemeanor, the trial court had no authority to sentence him to more than 180 days. Appellant premises this argument on D.C.Code § 48-904.01(g), which defines the term offense as a prior conviction for a violation of this section or a felony that relates to narcotic or abusive drugs, marijuana, or depressant or stimulant drugs, that is rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in the United States. He reasons that subsection (g) allows the sentencing judge to consider only prior felony offenses in determining whether the exception clause applies. We reject appellant's argument. As the trial court recognized, the word offense, as defined in subsection (g), is not a word that's used in [subsection (a)(2)(B)], the subsection under which appellant was sentenced. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant's prior PWID conviction irrespective of whether it was classified as a felony or a misdemeanormade the exception clause inapplicable. [2] The fact that appellant was sentenced for his 2004 PWID conviction under the Youth Rehabilitation Act does not change our conclusion. Even when a conviction is set aside under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (and appellant's was not), the conviction still may be used [i]n determining whether an offense under § 48-904.01 is a second or subsequent violation, D.C.Code § 24-906(f)(2), and in determining whether a person has committed a second or subsequent offense for purposes of imposing an enhanced sentence under any provision of law, D.C.Code § 24-906(f)(1). We agree with the government that these provisions reflect a legislative intent to permit convictions for which youthful offenders are sentenced under the Young Rehabilitation Act to be considered in imposing a sentence under D.C.Code § 48-904.01(a)(2)(B).
Appellant argued in his second Rule 35(a) motion that his 24-month sentence was an enhanced sentence that was illegal because the government did not file the information and notice mandated by D.C.Code § 23-111(a)(1) (2001). [3] In denying the motion, the trial court agreed with the government that the motion was time-barred because, rather than presenting a claim that the sentence was an illegal one (which, per Rule 35(a), the trial court may correct ... at any time), the motion claimed that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, meaning that the motion was subject to the 120-day limit described in Rule 35(b). [4] For the reasons that follow, we uphold the trial court's ruling. First, appellant's motion was filed on April 21, 2010nearly two years after this court affirmed appellant's convictions on direct appeal and the mandate was issued. Rule 35 provides, however, that a motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner may be made within 120 days after an unsuccessful appeal of a conviction. Norman v. United States, 623 A.2d 1165, 1167 n. 9 (D.C.1993). Thus, if the motion pertained to a sentence imposed in an illegal manner rather than to an illegal sentence, the motion was untimely. Second, we agree with the trial court that the motion did indeed raise a claim about imposition of the 24-month sentence in an illegal manner rather than a claim that the sentence was illegal. An illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 35(a) is a sentence that is inconsistent with the defendant's conviction, United States v. Boyd, 591 F.3d 953, 956 (7th Cir.2010), and that exceeds the limits authorized by the relevant statute, Norman, 623 A.2d at 1165 n. 1, even if there was no irregularity in the sentencing proceeding. Boyd, 591 F.3d at 956 (construing the old Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedurethe version that allows for the correction at any time of an illegal sentence imposed for offenses committed before the [November 1, 1987] effective date of the [federal] Sentencing Reform Act). By contrast, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one that reflects defects in the process or proceedings prior to the imposition of the sentence. Id. at 957 (explaining that a Rule 35(a) motion based on a claim that a sentence was imposed without the jury's having made the findings required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), is beyond the reach ... after 120 days). Appellant's second Rule 35(a) motion focused entirely on the court's having sentenced him as a recidivist without the government having followed the procedure described in D.C.Code § 23-111(a)(1)i.e., on the government's not having filed, before trial, an information with the clerk of the court ... stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. A motion premised on such a claimed defect in the pre-sentencing proceedings is subject to the 120-day limit established by Rule 35. Cf. (Timothy) Robinson v. United States, 454 A.2d 810, 811-12 (D.C.1982) (holding that Rule 35(a) motion premised on sentencing judge's failure to inform defendant that any challenge to a previous conviction ... not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence, D.C.Code § 23-111(b), asserted a procedural irregularity, had the purpose to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, and therefore was subject to the 120-day time limit established by Rule 35(b)); see also id. at 813 (concluding that where a sentence is illegally imposed under a recidivist statute or generally, the remedy must be sought within the time stated in Rule 35(a), and explaining that where a court of competent jurisdiction imposes a sentence within the limits authorized by the relevant statute, but commits a procedural error in doing so, it is not an abuse of discretion nor unreasonablewhen balancing concepts of fairness and finalityto characterize this sentence as one imposed in an `illegal manner' under Rule 35(a) and therefore subject to the 120-day jurisdictional limitation for challenge). In upholding the trial court's ruling that appellant's second Rule 35(a) motion was time-barred, we decide only that appellant's claimthat the trial court improperly imposed a sentence under D.C.Code § 48-904.01(a)(2)(B) that was premised on a prior drug conviction without the government's having filed a D.C.Code § 23-111(a)(1) informationis a claim that the court imposed appellant's sentence in an illegal manner, and does not constitute a claim that the sentence is illegal. We need not and do not resolve whether, as appellant claims, the government was required to file an information, [5] or whether, absent the filing of such information, the trial court actually did impose the 24-month sentence in an illegal manner. [6] We note, however, that this appears not to be a case in which the statutory purposes of § 23-111 have gone unfulfilled. Norman, 623 A.2d at 1170. The purposes of the requirements set forth in § 23-111 are two-fold: (1) to give the defendant notice so that he may make an informed decision whether to proceed with trial or plead guilty, and (2) to avoid the unfairness of increasing the potential punishment after the trial has begun. (Flossie) Robinson v. United States, 756 A.2d 448, 454 (D.C. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lucas v. United States, 602 A.2d 1107, 1111 (D.C.1992) (noting that section 23-111 is designed to ensure defendants ... have notice of the government's intention to seek an enhanced sentence, and to provide the defendant with both a basis to evaluate the extent of his [or her] exposure to increased incarceration and to enable him [or her] to determine his [or her] options as to whether to plead or defend) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, despite the absence of a section 23-111 information, the record shows that appellant was on notice well before his trial commenced that his prior conviction was a material factor. [7] It appears that he was fully aware of the government's intention to seek a sentence that reflected his prior conviction; and that he had an adequate opportunity to determine whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial in light of that awareness. Arnold v. United States, 443 A.2d 1318, 1328 (D.C.1982).