Opinion ID: 2772304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Muhammad Claim

Text: Sparre argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not calling the proffered witnesses as its own after the defense team informed the trial court that Sparre forbade it from putting on a mitigation case. The State argues that Sparre cannot waive the presentation of mitigation evidence during the trial, and then raise the claim during his direct appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by not calling its own witnesses that had knowledge of mitigation. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude there is insufficient evidence in the record to support Sparre’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by violating our holding in Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 343.
(some weight); (12) Sparre loves his family (some weight); and (13) Sparre’s family loves him (some weight). - 19 - When a capital murder defendant waives his or her right to present a mitigation case, if the trial court is alerted to the probability of significant mitigation, the court has discretion to call its own witnesses or to appoint special counsel for purposes of introducing such evidence. Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 364. A trial court’s “ ‘[d]iscretion is abused only “when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Ocha v. State, 826 So. 2d 956, 963 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Trease v. State, 768 So. 2d 1050, 1053 n.2 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990))).’ ” This Court will only disturb the trial court’s discretionary judgment when the record shows that the judgment was an abuse of discretion.
Sparre asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not calling its own witnesses from a list of twenty-five people, including four clinicians, that defense counsel proffered would provide substantial mental mitigation evidence. In Muhammad, this Court established the existing policy requiring preparation of a comprehensive PSI report when a capital murder defendant waives the presentation of mitigation evidence. [W]e have now concluded that the better policy will be to require the preparation of a PSI in every case where the defendant is not - 20 - challenging the imposition of the death penalty and refuses to present mitigation evidence. To be meaningful, the PSI should be comprehensive and should include information such as previous mental health problems (including hospitalizations), school records, and relevant family background. In addition, the trial court could require the State to place in the record all evidence in its possession of a mitigating nature such as school records, military records, and medical records. Further, if the PSI and the accompanying records alert the trial court to the probability of significant mitigation, the trial court has the discretion to call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses. . . . If the trial court prefers that counsel present mitigation rather than calling its own witnesses, the trial court possesses the discretion to appoint counsel to present the mitigation as was done in Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991) or to utilize standby counsel for this limited purpose. Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363-64 (footnotes omitted). For more than a decade, we have upheld the Muhammad policy, which requires that comprehensive PSI reports be prepared and filed with the trial court whenever a capital defendant facing the death penalty waives his or her right to present a mitigation case. See, e.g., Russ v. State, 73 So. 3d 178 (Fla. 2011) (discussing Muhammad requirements); McCray v. State, 71 So. 3d 848, 879-80 (Fla. 2011) (citing Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363). Here, we reemphasize that the trial courts should take the necessary steps to ensure that the PSI reports that they order are indeed prepared in a comprehensive manner. Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 363. To that end, we emphasize that the record on appeal must be comprised of PSI reports that are meaningful in - 21 - circumstances in which a competent defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives the presentation of mitigation evidence. We think it is prudent that trial court orders contain language that does not leave to chance that PSI reports, prepared by non-lawyers, will satisfy the Muhammad standard. Rather, such orders should specify the kind of information the trial judge needs to consider. Trial court orders that provide sufficient guidance for the preparers of PSI reports will invariably operate to ensure that in every case the PSI reports will provide the trial courts with meaningful information about the defendant’s background and personal history. In Muhammad, we contemplated that comprehensive PSI reports and their accompanying records would put the trial court on notice about any potentially significant mitigation that exists. Sparre now claims that he is entitled to relief because the trial court violated the Muhammad standard because without hearing testimony from the proffered witnesses, the guilt phase evidence and the PSI provided the only basis for finding the mitigating circumstances against imposing the death penalty. The PSI report addressed Sparre’s physical and mental health as follows: When interviewed at the Pre-Trial Detention Facility on December 28, 2011, the defendant stated he was in good physical health and denied being depressed or suicidal. The defendant showed no obvious signs of impairment to this officer. The defendant’s grandmother disagreed with the defendant’s self-assessment. She stated the defendant was - 22 - “mentally challenged and had mental problems,” in addition to suffering from ADHD. And, regarding Sparre’s alcohol and drug abuse, the PSI report stated: The defendant admits to both heavy drinking and extensive drug use since an early age. The defendant states he has been using pills since age 14. He stated he had illegally used Xanax, Ecstasy, Hydrocodone and Percocet pills. He stated his drug of choice is alcohol. He admits that he preferred vodka, and was a blackout type of drinker, on average blacking out two times per month. He stated he was normally non-violent and laid back under the influence of alcohol. He stated he did not prefer bourbon, because he did not like the effect as it was the opposite of feeling laid back. He admitted he blacked out on his 18th birthday when drinking and partying with his mother. We observe that neither party raised any objection on the record or otherwise informed the trial court that the PSI report filed is inadequate under Muhammad or any other legal standard. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances present in Sparre’s case, we are unpersuaded that the PSI report the trial court considered lacked meaningfulness to the point of violating the Muhammad standard that it be a comprehensive document. Id. Moreover, there is insufficient information in the record showing that the trial judge’s declination to call any witnesses alleged to have knowledge of mitigation evidence pertaining to Sparre’s sentence reflects a departure from the Muhammad standard. In its sentencing order, the trial court entered findings from which it concluded that Sparre was not under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The trial court addressed evidence that Sparre had planned - 23 - the crime several days before meeting Pool in Jacksonville. Next, the trial court addressed Sparre’s numerous actions to conceal his involvement after he murdered Tiara Pool.10 The record also reflects that the trial court properly found that Sparre’s age of nineteen years at the time of the crime was established under the statutory requirements. See § 921.141(6)(g), Fla. Stat. (2010). And, the trial court’s discretionary judgment to assign this statutory mitigating factor moderate weight in Sparre’s case is supported by existing case law. See Spann v. State, 857 So. 2d 845, 859 (Fla. 2003) (“[T]he weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the trial court’s discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard.”); see also Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 661 (Fla. 2003) (“The determination of whether age is a mitigating factor depends on the circumstances of each case, and is within the trial court’s discretion.”); Hurst v. State, 819 So. 2d 689, 697-98 (Fla. 2002) (“[W]here the defendant is not a minor, i.e., under eighteen, ‘no per se rule exists which pinpoints a particular age as an automatic circumstance in mitigation. Instead, the trial judge is to evaluate the defendant’s age based on the evidence 10. The record shows the following evidence in support of the trial court’s judgment: (1) Sparre cleaned the murder scene and bragged to detectives about doing so; (2) Sparre tried to establish an alibi by sending a text to Tiara Pool; (3) Sparre parked Tiara Pool’s car away from the hospital and its surveillance cameras; (4) Sparre burned the clothes he wore on the day of the murder; and (5) Sparre made statements in a letter dated September 16, 2011, stating “I slumped [i.e., killed] that b[]tch.” - 24 - adduced at trial and at the sentencing hearing.’ ” (quoting Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837, 843 (Fla. 1997))). Furthermore, we determine that there is competent, substantial evidence in this record for the thirteen nonstatutory mitigating factors for which the trial court assigned some, little, and slight weights. See Spann, 857 So. 2d at 854 (“[T]he trial court must consider all mitigation anywhere in the record to the extent it is believable and uncontroverted even when a defendant waives the presentation of mitigating evidence.” (citing Overton v. State, 801 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 2001))). The record shows that the trial court cautioned Sparre about the risks involved with his decision to forbid defense counsel from putting on mitigation evidence. The trial court also cautioned Sparre that there were risks in declining to exercise his right to testify on his own behalf. The trial court informed Sparre that under the circumstances there could be insufficient evidence in the record for finding mitigation that potentially counterbalances any aggravating factors in support of the death penalty. An argument can be made that Sparre’s proffered mitigation evidence would have rebutted the PSI report’s entry stating: “The defendant showed no obvious signs of impairment to this officer.” However, Sparre has the burden to show that the trial court’s judgment to forego calling mitigation witnesses after Sparre - 25 - waived introducing such evidence “is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Ocha, 826 So. 2d at 963. In light of the trial court’s findings and the reasons it provided for how it judged the alleged mitigation, there is no showing that the trial court failed to follow established procedure or engaged in actions that were arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable with regard to its judgment that it was unnecessary to call any of the mitigation witnesses proffered by Sparre’s defense team.11 Russ, 73 So. 3d at 190 (“Further, we have stated that ‘[p]roffered evidence is merely a representation of what evidence the defendant proposes to present and is not actual evidence.’. . . 11. The trial court performed the requirements set forth in Koon to assess Sparre’s waiver of presenting mitigation evidence: (1) Sparre testified under oath that he consulted with his lawyers about his decision to refuse putting on mitigation evidence; (2) the court informed Sparre that it would instruct the jury about aggravating and mitigating circumstances; (3) the court informed Sparre about the statutory basis for aggravation and the rationale on whether it would be applied in his case; (4) the court also informed Sparre about statutory mitigation, and the risks of not having it applied if the experts did not testify; (5) the court also informed Sparre about the risks of not having testimonial evidence in support of nonstatutory mitigators; (6) after this exchange with the court, Sparre personally informed the court that he fully understood everything that it explained and declined the court’s invitation to ask questions; (7) defense counsel stated for the record that it did not believe that Sparre lacked competence to make the decision to refuse to put on a mitigation case; (9) at the prompting of the State, the court asked Sparre whether he was under the influence of any medication—to which Sparre responded that he had been prescribed Thorazine and Celexa, but he stopped taking them because they gave him “the shakes”; and (10) the court commented on the record that Sparre appeared to be lucid and confirmed with counsel that there was an absence of competency with respect to Sparre’s involvement with all aspects of the trial. - 26 - Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to consider the proffered mitigation evidence that was presented during the Koon hearing.”). The trial court’s detailed sentencing order provides sufficient evidentiary bases that would discourage a reasonable person from rejecting its judgment. Id. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence in the record showing a probability of substantial mitigation that the trial court should have further considered by calling its own witnesses in accordance with the governing standard. See Muhammad, 782 So. 2d at 364; Russ, 73 So. 3d at 191 (“Here, the PSI report did not alert the court to the probability of significant mental mitigation.”). The trial court’s order reflects that under the totality of circumstances surrounding Sparre’s case, it judged that the trial evidence and the PSI report provide sufficient grounds for the mitigation found and the weights it assigned to each factor. We agree and conclude that Sparre simply fails to establish by competent, substantial evidence in the record how the trial court abused its discretion in declining to call its own mitigation witnesses.
Even if it can be later shown that the trial court’s declination to call its own mitigation witnesses or appoint special counsel to put on a mitigation case under the circumstances was an abuse of discretion, such judgment by the trial court was - 27 - not reversible error. In light of the two very weighty aggravators: HAC12 and murder committed during the course of a burglary,13 any error that occurred by the trial court’s abuse of discretion concerning this issue is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally Orme v. State, 25 So. 3d 536, 548 (Fla. 2009) (“We find that although the trial court’s treatment of this mitigator was improper, the error was harmless given the severity of the three aggravators in the case and other relatively weak mitigation.”); Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940, 959 (Fla. 2003) (determining “that even if any error occurred in not admitting the letters [during the penalty phase], which it did not, such error was harmless”). Based on the aggravating factors that the trial court found and assigned great weight, and notwithstanding any weight assigned to the proffered mitigating factors, there was no reasonable probability the finding of such mitigating factors would have changed the jury’s death penalty recommendation or the trial court’s judgment to impose the sentence of death. See Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 867 (Fla. 2009) (“The trial court expressly stated that any one of the aggravators found (except felony probation) was sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors due to the totality of the aggravating factors that we uphold and affirm today. There is no possibility that any erroneous finding on this issue affected the sentence 12. See § 921.141(5)(h), Fla. Stat. (2010). 13. See § 921.141(5)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010) - 28 - imposed.”). Under the circumstances found in this case, if the trial court’s exercise of discretion in declining to call its own mitigation witnesses regarding these statutory mitigating factors could be deemed an abuse of discretion, such a judgment constituted harmless error. We note that the trial court found that no evidence was introduced for the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance “the Defendant’s judgment was impaired.” However, in a portion of the redacted video-recording of Sparre’s interview with detectives on July 24 that was replayed for the jury, Sparre made a statement that could be deemed evidence of his impaired judgment. The jury heard the detectives ask why he killed Pool, and Sparre’s response. The record reflects that Sparre responded by stating that when he went into the kitchen he retrieved the large knife and returned to the bedroom where Pool was lying supine and nude across her bed. Sparre states that he began massaging her at first, but then he started stabbing her and described his experience during the attack as “tripping out.” Sparre did not, however, explain what he meant by his self-assessment that he was “tripping out.” The record shows that when the detectives asked him about whether he had taken any drugs prior to committing the crime, Sparre denied that he was under the influence of any drugs during his fatal attack of Pool. Sparre’s “tripping out” expression could be viewed as constituting some evidence that “he was not in a state of mind where he could make clear and rational decisions.” - 29 - On the other hand, the ambiguous meaning of “tripping out” is not in itself competent, substantial evidence that warrants a finding of the nonstatutory mitigating factor. In light of this aspect of the video-recording evidence from Sparre’s interview with detectives, if the trial court erred by ruling there was no evidence presented in support of the defendant’s impaired judgment nonstatutory mitigating factor, its error was in not exploring what Sparre meant by his assertion that he began “tripping out” during his attack on Pool. Even if the trial court should have found evidence that Sparre’s “judgment was impaired,” a failure to find this nonstatutory mitigating factor would constitute harmless error in light of the overwhelming weight of evidence that he was guilty of committing first-degree murder and the findings of very serious aggravating circumstances. See Hojan v. State, 3 So. 3d 1204, 1210 (Fla. 2009) (“The test for harmless error is set out in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). Under DiGuilio, ‘[t]he question [for harmless error analysis] is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.’ Id. at 1139.”). Accordingly, we reject this claim and deny Sparre any relief thereto.