Opinion ID: 1632866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in granting the state's instruction s-4 and in refusing the defendant's instruction d-13?

Text: Sayles argues that Instruction S-4 was improper because the evidence did not support it and the instruction stated abstract principals of law and was not tied to the facts of the case. Instruction S-4 was as follows: The court instructs the Jury that one who aids, abets or otherwise assists another person or others in the commission of a crime is just as guilty as if he committed the crime himself. If the Jury from the evidence believes beyond a reasonable doubt that Jerome Sayles the Defendant did aid, abet or otherwise assist another in the breaking and entering of Reed's Grocery the property of Clovis Reed then you shall find the Defendant Jerome Sayles guilty of burglary. Sayles' first contention is that this instruction is an accessory-before-the-fact instruction normally given when there is evidence that the Defendant, while not actually present at the scene of the crime, somehow helped plan the crime or otherwise aided or abetted another in the commission of the crime. The principal danger that Sayles asserts is that the jury could wrongfully construe that Sayles was guilty of burglary on his testimony that he assisted Lee after the burglary had already been committed. The general rule is that all instructions should be supported by evidence. Brazile v. State, 514 So.2d 325 (Miss. 1987). On this record the evidence suggests that Sayles may have been guilty of three possible courses of criminal conduct; principal, accessory after the fact to burglary, or receipt of stolen property. Elbert testified that he saw Sayles boost Lee into the store and then go to the front of the store. Sayles' testimony was he helped carry the stolen goods, and two of the state's witnesses testified that Sayles sold them stolen property. There was no evidence to support an instruction of accessory-before-the-fact. However, Sayles' assertion that instruction S-4 is an accessory-before-the-fact instruction is not correct. An accessory-before-the-fact is one who procures, counsels or commands another to commit a felony for him, but is not himself present, actually or constructively, when the felony is committed. Huff v. Edwards, 241 So.2d 654 (Miss. 1970). S-4 is an instruction dealing with aiders and abettors. Any person who is present at the commission of a criminal offense and aids, counsels, or encourages another in the commission of that offense is an aider and abettor and is equally guilty with the principal offender. Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601 (Miss. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 931, 101 S.Ct. 3068, 69 L.Ed.2d 432 (1981). S-4 merely instructs the jury about anyone who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime. It does not instruct the jury about one who procures, counsels, commands, or aids and who is not present at the commission of a crime. The primary distinction between the accessory-before-the-fact and an aider and abettor is the actual or constructive presence of the party. If a person was actually or constructively present at the offense, due to his participation he is an aider and abettor. Walters v. State, 218 Miss. 166, 65 So.2d 465 (1953). If he was not present, he is an accessory-before-the-fact. Clemons v. State, 482 So.2d 1102 (Miss. 1985). See generally Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law, Sec. 6.6(b) at 128 (West, 1986); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, Sec. 132 (1989). The facts in this case support the prosecution's aiding and abetting instruction. Elbert's testimony placed Sayles at the scene of the crime. As to the contention that the jury could incorrectly apply the instruction to convict him on his testimony that he helped Lee after the burglary, instruction D-9 should have dealt with this contention. However, D-9 was confusing and did not properly address the fact that Sayles could not be found guilty based on his testimony. The problem is with D-9 and not S-4. D-9 states in part as follows: Even though you, the jury, may be able to say from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant, Jerome Sayles, is guilty of being an accessory after the fact of burglary or that of receiving stolen property, you may not return a guilty verdict in this case ... Sayles' second contention is that S-4 is couched entirely in terms of abstract principals of law, and does not set forth any facts at all upon which the jury could apply the rule of law announced therein. See Kidd v. State, 258 So.2d 423 (Miss. 1972). However, the instruction did apply the facts to the law in the second paragraph. Furthermore we have held in Pickett v. State, 443 So.2d 796 (Miss. 1983), that when abstract instructions could not confuse or mislead the jury the granting of such does not constitute reversible error. S-4 is not totally couched in abstract terms and when read with all the other instructions is not confusing or misleading. The trial court was not in error in its decision on Instructions S-4 and D-9.