Opinion ID: 998961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accrual of the Claims

Text: Although the applicable limitations period for a federal civil rights claim is determined by reference to state law, the question of when a cause of action accrues under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 remains one of federal law. Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955 (emphasis in original). [F]or purposes of a § 1983 claim, a cause of action accrues either when the plaintiff has knowledge of his claim or when he is put on notice -- e.g., by the knowledge of the fact of injury and who caused it -- to make reasonable inquiry and that inquiry would reveal the existence of a colorable claim. Id. Thus, the applicable statute of limitations begins running when the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action. Id.; see also Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). The Estate suggests that Knight's father did not possess sufficient knowledge to bring a claim until Young revealed Hoggard's identity 6 to him, confirming that Avant had truthfully asserted that Hoggard and Everett discharged their weapons during the pursuit. In view of the record, we find these contentions unpersuasive. The Estate has had evidence since 1990 that a police officer in plain clothes without identifying himself fired shots at Knight as he chased Knight near Met Park. There was obviously, also, knowledge of Knight's death. This evidence was without question enough to put the Estate on notice of both the fact of injury and, under the Estate's theory of the case, knowledge as to who caused it. The statute of limitations began running right then. The new evidence obtained by the Estate which precipitated the lawsuit seven years later was the identification of Hoggard as the particular officer who had allegedly fired the shots, along with the corresponding testimony of Young. This evidence might have made the Estate's case stronger, but given the information available to the Estate from the beginning, its discovery did not affect the running of the statute of limitations. Since the initial incident, the Estate had known it was a Norfolk police officer who had chased Knight. Knowledge of the name of the officer was not determinative of the accrual of the action, particularly in light of the fact that it was easily attainable. Young's testimony was only corroborative of Avant's testimony and, consequently, was not necessary to establish an element of the claim since Avant's testimony had been available to the Estate from the beginning. Perhaps the Estate did not believe its evidence was strong enough to bring an action in 1990, but that with the addition of Young's testimony in 1997 it was. Regardless, the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has knowledge of his claim, not when the plaintiff obtains evidence that is strong enough to convince him that he can prevail. We conclude that, as of March 16, 1990, the Estate had sufficient knowledge that a reasonable inquiry would have revealed its potential cause of action. Therefore, this claim accrued no later than that date, and the filing of the § 1983 claim was well past the twoyear statute of limitations.
In Virginia, a right of action [is] deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury 7 is sustained in the case of injury to the person. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-230 (Michie Supp. 1998). Virginia does not follow the discovery rule under which the limitations period does not begin to run until an injury has been discovered or should have been discovered. See Nunnally v. Artis, 492 S.E.2d 126, 129 (Va. 1997). Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations began running at the time of the Estate's injury, i.e., at the time of Knight's death. Since Knight died no later than March 16, 1990, the statute of limitations for these claims expired long before this action was filed.