Opinion ID: 181682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress.(i) Fourth Amendment claim

Text: Puc-Ruiz seeks to suppress all statements and documentation regarding his national origin and citizenship obtained by ICEincluding the Form I-213 prepared by ICE Agent Othicas a result of his arrest by the St. Charles police. [1] He argues that St. Charles police officers egregiously violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause, and, therefore, the use of any evidence resulting from that arrest would render his removal proceedings fundamentally unfair under the Fifth Amendment. Without the Form I-213, Puc-Ruiz contends, the government cannot meet its burden of proving his alienage and removability, and so his removal proceedings should be terminated. The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule generally does not apply in civil deportation hearings because the likely costs of excluding probative evidence outweigh the likely social benefits. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-42, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984). Important as it is to protect the Fourth Amendment rights of all persons, there is no convincing indication that application of the exclusionary rule in civil deportation proceedings will contribute materially to that end. On the other side of the scale, the social costs of applying the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings are both unusual and significant. Id. at 1046, 104 S.Ct. 3479. The costs of suppression in this context are unusual and significant because a deportation hearing's purpose is not to punish past transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws by provid[ing] a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country. Id. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 3479. Thus, suppression would require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law by compelling them to release from custody persons who would then immediately resume their commission of a crime through their continuing, unlawful presence in this country. Id. at 1046-1050, 104 S.Ct. 3479. Even the objective of deterring Fourth Amendment violations should not require such a result. Id. at 1047, 104 S.Ct. 3479. However, the Court limited its holding to circumstances that do not involve egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained. Id. at 1050-51, 104 S.Ct. 3479. [2] Puc-Ruiz argues that the Lopez-Mendoza Court's reasoning applies in the instant case because the deterrent value of applying the exclusionary rule in a federal civil deportation proceeding is at least as great when the target of the rule's deterrent effect is state criminal enforcement officers rather than federal immigration agents. [3] The government counters that application of the exclusionary rule in this context is precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976). In Janis, the Court held that evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment by state police should not be excluded in a federal civil tax proceeding because common sense dictates that the deterrent effect of the exclusion of relevant evidence is highly attenuated when the `punishment' imposed upon the offending criminal enforcement officer is the removal of that evidence from a civil suit by or against a different sovereign. 428 U.S. at 457-58, 96 S.Ct. 3021. Puc-Ruiz contends that Janis is distinguishable. It is unnecessary for us to decide this issue because, regardless, we conclude that the police conduct at issue in this case does not rise to the level of an egregious Fourth Amendment violation. 468 U.S. at 1046, 104 S.Ct. 3479. What constitutes an egregious Fourth Amendment violation under Lopez-Mendoza is a matter of first impression for this Court. The probative value of the evidence obtained as a result of Puc-Ruiz's arrest is undisputed; we therefore examine whether the alleged Fourth Amendment violation was sufficiently egregious to transgress notions of fundamental fairness. In introducing the egregiousness exception, the Lopez-Mendoza Court cited Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), as an example of an egregious constitutional violation. In Rochin, police officers recovered narcotics, which the defendant had swallowed, by forcing the defendant to swallow an emetic solution to induce vomiting. Id. at 166, 72 S.Ct. 205. The Rochin Court held that such brutal conduct, which shocks the conscience and offend[s] the community's sense of fair play and decency, constitutes an egregious constitutional violation. 342 U.S. at 172-73, 72 S.Ct. 205. While egregious violations are not limited to those of physical brutality, Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1449 (9th Cir.1994), Lopez-Mendoza requires more than a violation to justify exclusion, Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir.2006) ([W]hile the lack of any valid basis whatsoever for a seizure sets the stage for egregiousness, more is needed.). There is no evidence in the record that the St. Charles police employed an unreasonable show or use of force in arresting and detaining Puc-Ruiz. Cf. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051, 104 S.Ct. 3479 (finding that credible evidence gathered in connection with peaceful arrests by INS officers need not be suppressed in an INS civil deportation hearing). Additionally, Puc-Ruiz has not argued that the decision to arrest him was based on his race or appearance. See, e.g., Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 237 (holding that deciding to stop an individual solely on the basis of his race is an egregious constitutional violation); Gonzalez-Rivera, 22 F.3d at 1449-52 (same). This is not an exhaustive list of the conduct that could constitute an egregious constitutional violation. However, Puc-Ruiz has made no allegations of police misconduct beyond his assertion that the arresting officers lacked probable cause at the time of his arrest. Moreover, this is not a case in which police officers invaded private property and detained individuals with no articulable suspicion whatsoever. The record indicates that the arresting officers were acting on information provided to them by the wife of one of the arrestees that alcohol was being consumed on the premises of Mexico on Main, in violation of a municipal ordinance. Based on the record before us, therefore, we are unable to conclude that the St. Charles police perpetrated an egregious violation of Puc-Ruiz's Fourth Amendment rights.