Opinion ID: 2977636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: When a court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, “the critical inquiry . . . [is] to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979). “[T]his inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 318-19 (quotations omitted). Instead, the court should review the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. Boring challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the element of intent. Because intent to defraud is difficult to prove by direct evidence, “a jury may consider circumstantial evidence of fraudulent intent and draw reasonable inferences therefrom.” United States v. Davis, 490 F.3d 541, 549 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). At trial, the jury was presented with evidence indicating that: (1) Boring had been president of the union and consequently understood the details of the worker’s compensation program; (2) he was familiar with the restrictions placed on people receiving worker’s compensation; (3) from a previous stint on limited duty (resulting from a back injury), he was aware of an array of limited-duty jobs that were available; (4) he volunteered his time and earned a small salary as a baseball and football coach while he was receiving worker’s compensation; (5) while coaching, he was filmed throwing a football, taking snaps under center, repositioning players, and performing a straight-arm block; (6) he was also filmed putting a sling on his arm after discovering that he was being videotaped; (7) during this time, he was not performing even limited work at the Postal Service; and (8) he indicated — on forms, in response to a formal letter, and in person — that he was not engaged in any other employment (including volunteer employment) and that he did not engage in any sports or hobbies. No. 07-4363 United States v. Boring Page 4 On appeal, Boring argues that it was the Postal Service’s duty to offer him a limitedduty assignment — which he would have accepted if offered — and that the Postal Service’s failure to do so vitiates any inference of criminal intent on his part. To support this, he points to his own testimony at trial, where he stated that he had told his supervisor that he would work a limited-duty assignment if it were offered to him and his doctor approved it, but that his supervisor had refused to offer him one. However, the jury also heard testimony from the supervisor, who directly contradicted Boring’s version of the conversation and testified that he had asked Boring if he was able to answer phones, and that Boring had replied that the doctor had ordered him not to work at all. The jury also heard from Boring’s doctor, who testified that Boring had told him that the only limited-duty assignment available was casing mail (an activity that involves filing mail into a large bookcase-like structure), which the doctor concluded he could not do, and hence checked the “Off Work” box on the form. (The prosecution charged Boring with one count of worker’s compensation fraud based on this statement to his doctor, but the jury acquitted him on that charge.) When faced with conflicting testimony, “[t]he trier of fact, not the appellate court, holds ‘the responsibility . . . fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts,’” Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45 n. 21 (1982) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319) (ellipsis in Tibbs), and we are “loath to override [the factfinder’s] conclusion.” Davis, 490 F.3d at 550. Under this “highly deferential standard,” id. at 549, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented. Thus, Boring’s conviction is affirmed.