Opinion ID: 1802406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Iowa Case Law

Text: In State v. Ayers , a defendant stole a handgun and subsequently sold it to a minor, in violation of Iowa Code section 724.22 (1989). Ayers, 478 N.W.2d at 607. The minor then accidentally shot and killed his girlfriend with the weapon. Ayers was convicted of involuntary manslaughter for his role in the girl's death. In reversing Ayers' conviction, we determined that although his conduct was reckless, there nevertheless was a failure to show that his act was a proximate cause of the girlfriend's death. We noted: It is not enough that Ayers' conduct was outrageous and criminal. A more direct and specific foreseeability was required. Id. at 608. Appellant attempts to distinguish Ayers on the ground that it involved a criminal sanction, as opposed to civil liability. But we have consistently noted that proximate cause has the same meaning in both criminal and civil cases. See State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Iowa 1982) (Defendant has suggested no specific policy differences, nor can we think of any, that would justify a different standard of proximate causation under our involuntary manslaughter statute than under our tort law); State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 584 (Iowa 1980) (The basic perspectives of proximate cause ... [are] the same in both civil and criminal cases.). Similarly, in Poland v. Earhart , the defendant sold a revolver to a fifteen-year-old boy, which was a misdemeanor under Iowa law at the time. Poland v. Earhart, 70 Iowa 285, 30 N.W. 637 (1886). The minor then accidentally shot himself in the hand, causing permanent disability. In denying his parents' claim for damages, we said: The immediate cause of these injuries was not the sale of the weapon by defendant, but the accident which subsequently occurred while the boy was handling it, whereby he was wounded. If plaintiff has a cause of action ... it must be founded on the fact that the accident ... might reasonably have been anticipated by the defendant as a consequence of the sale of the weapon to him.... It is not alleged that [the minor] was ignorant of the character of the weapon sold him; or that he was inexperienced in the use of such weapons; neither is it shown there was anything in his character or disposition that rendered it dangerous to place a weapon of that kind in his hands. Id. at 287, 30 N.W. at 637-38. Although Poland was decided at a time when firearms-related violence was not as prevalent as it is today, we nevertheless do not believe that its reasoning is outdated. Based on our analysis of the elements required to prove proximate cause and the cited authorities, we hold that proof of the proximate cause of death in the case at bar has failed because the conduct of Wal-Mart was not a substantial factor in bringing about the harm to decedent.