Opinion ID: 1205031
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trial court's comments on defendant's testimony.

Text: The jury continued its deliberations on Friday, December 17, 1982, at one point requesting that the instructions be reread. At 4:20 p.m. that day, the court was informed that one of the jurors sought to disqualify herself on the ground she was the one, that is, the person not in agreement with the other eleven. After explaining that this circumstance afforded no basis for disqualification, the trial judge commented on the complexity of the case and the relatively brief period the jury had deliberated, reread the instruction as to defendant's entitlement to the individual opinion of each juror, and, noting the lateness of the hour, recessed the deliberations of the jury. Prior to the resumption of jury deliberations on Monday morning, December 20, the court delivered the following comments: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury and the alternates, for the purpose of assisting you in deciding this case, I am permitted by the Constitution of California to comment on the issues, the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness. And it occurred to me that before you retired to continue your deliberations this morning that some comment along those lines might be of some assistance to you. Now, you should keep in mind that my comments are intended to be advisory only, and are not binding on you, as you are the exclusive judges of the questions of fact submitted to you and of the credibility of the witnesses. You should disregard any or all of the comments, if you do not agree, if they do not agree with your views of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. After outlining the difference between lawful and unlawful killing, the court stated there was no question in this case but that the killing of the victim was unlawful. The court then indicated the issues before the jury were whether the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was legally responsible for the killing, and, if so, in what degree, and, if in the first degree, whether the prosecution had proved the special circumstances. The court also stated the jury must determine whether the prosecutor had proved the rape and burglary charges beyond a reasonable doubt. The court continued: Now, in that connection, there have been several statements attributed to the defendant out of court concerning his whereabouts and activities on the night of April the 21st and the early morning hours of April the 22nd. These statements attributed to him are inconsistent with one another and are also inconsistent with his testimony here in court concerning his activities that evening and in the early morning hours of April the 22nd. Now, the district attorney has placed him in the house of Bonita Bergh Stendal through three palm prints; one bloody right palm print, which I think Mr. Collins testified to, was created by blood being on the palm first and then transferred to the booklet. In addition to that, Mr. Collins has testified there were two dry palm prints. By that, they were latent, there was a left palm print, which was latent, by that it had a chemical, had to be applied to one of the booklets to raise that palm print to where it could be seen. And another dry palm print of the right palm. Again, one that could only be seen after being treated with chemicals, and that was on a different booklet. Now, the defendant has testified and given you an explanation as to what he did in that house that morning which explains the presence of the bloody palm print, but does not explain the presence of the two dry or latent palm prints. Under those circumstances, I have difficulty in believing the testimony of the defendant. Now, again, my comments are intended to be advisory only and are not binding on you as you are the exclusive judges of the questions of fact submitted to you and of the credibility of the witnesses. You should disregard any or all of the comments that I've made if they do not agree with your views of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. The jury then commenced its deliberations for that day. After recessing for lunch and reconvening at 2:55 p.m., it informed the court it had reached a verdict. Prior to the seating of the jury, defendant's counsel stated he had an objection to the court's comments. The court admonished counsel that he should have made his objection earlier. (23) Defendant contends his right to due process of law was violated because he was not apprised in advance of the court's intention to comment, and that the content of the court's comments fell outside the range permitted by our decisions. We do not agree that defendant's right to due process of law was violated by the court's failure to provide advance notice of its intended comments. Although, as pointed out by defendant, the trial court was required by statute to afford advance notice of intended jury instructions, defendant has not directed our attention to any similar statutory or judicial requirement pertaining to judicial comment. In fact, because the statutory provision authorizing judicial comment is contained in the same section as that governing jury instructions (§ 1127; see § 1093, subd. (f)), and the Legislature, while expressly providing that courts are to afford notice of jury instructions (§ 1093.5), has declined to impose such a requirement in the case of judicial comment, we may presume no such requirement was intended by the Legislature as to the latter subject. Defendant relies primarily on People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, in which the trial court provided the parties with advance notice of its intended comments, and indeed, numerous drafts of the comments ultimately made in that case were prepared by the prosecutor and discussed at length by court and counsel in advance. ( Id., at p. 774, fn. 13.) Although it would be better practice to afford counsel advance notice, we decline defendant's suggestion that we elevate our recitation of the particular procedural aspects of the Rodriguez case to the status of a legal requirement. (24a) Next, defendant challenges the substance of the trial court's comments. Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution permits the court to make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. (Italics added.) (25) The purpose of this provision is to allow the court to utilize its experience and training in analyzing evidence to assist the jury in reaching a just verdict. [Citations.] ( People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 407 [189 Cal. Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].) In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 765-770, we overruled that portion of People v. Cook, supra, 33 Cal.3d 400, 413, which held that a trial court may not make any comment on the evidence once the jury has announced it has reached an impasse in deliberations, and concluded that although a trial court may not directly express an opinion on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence of the accused at any stage of the trial, it is not prohibited from appropriate comment simply because the jury has indicated an initial deadlock in its deliberations. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 769-770; see People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 735 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) In generally summarizing the permissible contours of constitutionally authorized judicial comment, we observed in People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, that the decisions admonish that judicial comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment, withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power. [Citations.] ( Id., at p. 766; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1207 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) In People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, we also noted that a trial court has broad latitude in fair commentary, so long as it does not effectively control the verdict. For example, it is settled that the court need not confine itself to neutral, bland, and colorless summaries, but may focus critically on particular evidence, expressing views about its persuasiveness. [Citations.] ( Id., at 768, italics added.) Therefore, the circumstance that in the present case, the trial court chose to single out for particular emphasis the evidence concerning the presence of defendant's fingerprints at the crime scene, and defendant's inconsistent testimony, did not render its comments improper. As noted in Rodriguez, `[A] judge may restrict his comments to portions of the evidence or to the credibility of a single witness and need not sum up all the testimony, both favorable and unfavorable. [Citations.]' ( Id., at p. 773, italics added.) (24b) In the present case, the trial court essentially observed that defendant had made inconsistent statements concerning his whereabouts during the pertinent period, and that defendant's testimony as to his presence in the residence, while explaining the presence of the bloody palm print, did not explain the presence of the two dry or latent palm prints, causing the trial court to entertain doubts as to defendant's credibility. The trial court did not inaccurately state or distort any testimony ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 766, 769; People v. Cook, supra, 33 Cal.3d 400, 408), and its comment that defendant's testimony explains the presence of the bloody palm print permitted an inference more helpful to defendant than the jury might have drawn in the absence of the comment. Although the court commented upon defendant's credibility in a specific context, it did not comment on defendant's guilt or innocence, nor did it direct that the jury reach a given verdict. [8] Moreover, both prior to and after its comments, the court admonished the jury that it was free to disregard those comments. We conclude that the trial court's remarks fell within the scope of the constitutional privilege.