Opinion ID: 2122312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Speculation About Events at the Time of the Murder

Text: Swaney argues that during closing argument the State improperly speculated about the events that occurred at the time of Nelson's murder. We said in State v. Bradford that [a]rguments of counsel must not speculate about events occurring at the time of the killing absent a factual basis in the record. 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn.2000). But we have also said that the State need not make [its] argument entirely colorless and may state conclusions and inferences which the human mind may reasonably draw from the facts in evidence. State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 511, 57 N.W.2d 419, 422 (1953); see also State v. Wahlberg, 296 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Minn.1980) (Counsel have the right to present to the jury all legitimate arguments on the evidence, to analyze and explain the evidence, and to present all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.). Swaney argues that the State violated the Bradford rule that counsel may not speculate or make arguments absent a factual basis in the record when it claimed that Nelson was in the restroom when Swaney entered the contact station and when it suggested that Swaney may have stolen a wristwatch. See 618 N.W.2d at 799. The State asserts that it properly based the assertions it made during its closing argument on evidence admitted at trial. During closing argument, the State stated that when Swaney entered the contact station on the day of the murder, he was able to catch Nelson off guard because she was in the restroom. Evidence at trial, including the condition of Nelson's body, supported an inference that Nelson may have been in the restroom when Swaney entered the contact station. We conclude that because the assertion was an inference[] which the human mind may reasonably draw from the facts in evidence, it was a permissible inference rather than improper speculation. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. at 511, 57 N.W.2d at 422. During closing argument, the State also attempted to address the fact that the pictures it introduced into evidence showed Swaney wearing a field ranger wristwatch both before and after the date of Nelson's murder. The State suggested that Swaney wore his field ranger watch on the day of the murder, lost it while struggling with Nelson in the contact station, and then obtained an identical watch as a replacement. During closing argument, the State also reiterated testimony from trial that established retailers had field ranger watches in stock and for sale both before and after Nelson's murder. The State then acknowledged that it was unable to find any record that Swaney had purchased a replacement watch from one of these retailers and stated, [c]ertainly one could question from the evidence you've heard in this case whether the defendant when he got that replacement watch even paid for it. Maybe he decided to steal the watch so there'd be no record of that purchase. We conclude that the assertion that Swaney might have stolen a replacement watch was a permissible inference made by the State because the inference could be reasonably draw[n] from the facts in evidence. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. at 511, 57 N.W.2d at 422. The State established at trial that Swaney wore a field ranger watch before May 20, 2001, a broken watch with DNA that matched Swaney's DNA was found near Nelson's body, Swaney wore an identical watch after the murder, and the State was unable to find a record of Swaney's purchase of a replacement watch. From these facts, one could reasonably draw the inference that Swaney [m]aybe ... decided to steal the watch so there'd be no record of that purchase.