Opinion ID: 200425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Failure to Read Back Testimony

Text: 45 At the start of its second day of deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the court stating that the jury would like to listen to the testimony of Marvin Kennedy. Assuming that the jury was asking the court to read back the testimony of Kennedy in its entirety, the court (outside the presence of the jury) informed counsel: I don't do that. I've never done it before. The court continued: 46 I'll certainly hear you before I make my final decision but it's been my practice in the past not to do that for two reasons. First, I don't think we have a transcript of the testimony of Marvin Kennedy. We have the notes. We have the stenographic notes from which a transcript could be prepared, but I don't believe that we have a transcript of Mr. Kennedy's testimony. 47 .... 48 Even if we did, I would hesitate to read it to them. It would tend to put, I believe, or at least would have the potential for putting undue emphasis on Mr. Kennedy's testimony in contrast to the testimony of Mr. Barrett or the testimony of the defendant or whatever. And so if I was going to do it, I would probably have to consider doing all the witnesses' testimony as well so there won't be any imbalance. 49 I'm sure it's frustrating to the jury to be told that they're not going to get what they're asking for, but this is what I've done in the past and this is what I am inclined to do in this case. 50 Before I make my final decision, I'd be happy to hear from counsel. Counsel for Boulerice then stated: 51 Well, I do know that from some past experience in other courts, the court reporter has read from the stenographic notes the testimony of the witness. Short of that, I would have no other possible suggestions, Your Honor. 52 The court then reiterated its concern that, even assuming an accurate transcript could be quickly assembled, there would still be the risk of inappropriately highlighting the testimony of Kennedy. After hearing from the prosecutor, who voiced his opposition to any read back, the court indicated that it would not read back the testimony. 53 Boulerice now assigns error to this decision. A district court's decision not to read back testimony is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir.1991). We find no abuse of discretion here. 54 Before the district court, Boulerice's counsel offered only one justification for reading back the testimony: other courts in which she has appeared have read back testimony. She failed, however, to respond to the two concerns articulated by the district court, both of which we have held to be valid considerations. See United States v. Aubin, 961 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir.1992) (indicating that risk of confusion and difficulty in compliance are proper considerations in ruling on request for read back of testimony). 55 Belatedly, Boulerice now maintains that of all the witnesses, Kennedy was the crucial one, that Kennedy's testimony was short and consisted of only seventy pages of trial transcript, and that the court reporter was capable of accurately reading back from her stenographic notes. Whatever the merits of any of these arguments, they do not alter our conclusion that the district court acted well within its discretion in denying the read back. 56 Boulerice also complains that the district court did not actually exercise any discretion in deciding not to read back the testimony. She claims that the district court, in a knee-jerk reaction, summarily dismissed the jury's request, without engaging in the thoughtful balancing of interests which normally goes into the exercise of a court's sound discretion. We disagree. While the district court did initially indicate its reluctance to read back the testimony (I don't do that. I've never done that before.), it subsequently explained why it was inclined to deny the jury's request. The court then gave counsel the opportunity to be heard and to present any counter-arguments before making a final decision. Only then did the district court render its final decision. We therefore reject Boulerice's claim that the district court failed to engage in the proper analysis.