Opinion ID: 366386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Order's Breadth and Definiteness of Terms

Text: 22 Petitioners argue, nevertheless, that this order is too broad because it covers all of the myriad of its products when only six were shown to have been deceptively represented. 13 Petitioners also contend that the order is too vague and imprecise. 23 The broadness attack can be dealt with quickly. First, the order covers only safety and performance representations, the specific characteristics that petitioners are wont to exaggerate. See note 2 Supra. Second, as to the order's coverage of items other than those as to which deception has been specifically found, it is well settled that this agency, like others, may fashion its relief as a prophylactic and preventive measure, FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 392-93, 79 S.Ct. 818, 824, 3 L.Ed.2d 893 (1959), to restrain other similar or related acts, at least where the misrepresentations have been so extensive and so substantial in number. Where misrepresentation is not restricted to an isolated instance but (is) found in numerous advertisements . . . courts have often upheld FTC orders encompassing all products or all products in a broad category, based on violations involving only a single product or group of products. ITT Continental Baking Co. v. FTC, supra, 532 F.2d at 223 (collecting cases). In this case, all product coverage is particularly appropriate because the six particular products specifically mentioned in the complaint are random samplings of Norris's inventory, See note 10 Supra, which is constantly changing and which petitioners could manipulate to avoid the substantiation requirement if the order were directed only against specific products. As the Supreme Court said in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 395, 85 S.Ct. 1035, 1048, 13 L.Ed.2d 904 (1965), it (is) reasonable for the Commission to prevent . . . similarly illegal practices in future advertisements. So, too, in tailoring a remedial order to fit future proclivities, the Commission may take into account petitioners' past history of noncompliance. See Motion Picture Studio Mechanics, Local 52 v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 197, 200-01 (2d Cir. 1979), Following NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 436-37, 61 S.Ct. 693, 85 L.Ed. 930 (1941); See also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 8.19 (1958 & 1970 Supp.). 24 Petitioners' argument that the order is vague and imprecise must stand or fall with the same arguments regarding the relationship of the order to the unlawful practices found. Thus, although the Supreme Court quoted from cases holding that an order's prohibitions 'should be clear and precise in order that they may be understood by those against whom they are directed,'  especially because of the severe penalties to which violators may be subject, Citing FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 726, 68 S.Ct. 793, 92 L.Ed. 1010 (1948), and FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 368 U.S. 360, 367-68, 82 S.Ct. 431, 7 L.Ed.2d 353 (1962), the Court reiterated in the same breath that it does not seem 'unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line.'  FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra, 380 U.S. at 392-93, 85 S.Ct. at 1046, Quoting from Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952). The Court in Colgate implied that justified broadness did not make an order too vague; and as noted above, it upheld an order prohibiting similar practices with respect to Any product that the company advertised. 25 Petitioners' vagueness fears can be assuaged by resort to the Commission's rules. 26 If . . . a situation arises in which (petitioners) are sincerely unable to determine whether a proposed course of action would violate the present order, they can, by complying with the Commission's rules, oblige the Commission to give them definitive advice as to whether their proposed action, if pursued, would constitute compliance with the order. 27 Colgate-Palmolive, supra, 380 U.S. at 394, 85 S.Ct. at 1047 (footnote omitted). Accord, Fedders Corp. v. FTC, supra, 529 F.2d at 1404; See 16 C.F.R. § 3.61(d). 28