Opinion ID: 1435553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The taking of the blood sample.

Text: In considering defendant's first contention the facts are important, as they appear from the record of the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the blood alcohol test results. Officer Bailey was the first police officer at the scene of the accident, arriving at 4:23 a.m. He found that defendant's car had left Cornell Road at a point where he found no skidmarks and had ploughed the dirt off the road for 57 feet before striking a power pole and then continuing on for another 163 feet before striking and breaking another power pole, where the car had come to rest on its side, wrapped around the power pole, with its top smashed in and with defendant and his passenger trapped inside. Officer Bailey called for a rescue unit of firemen. It then took them one hour and forty minutes to remove defendant from the wreckage. While defendant was lying on a stretcher and prior to his being put into an ambulance, Officer Bailey asked him if he had been drinking and was told yes    he had been drinking beer earlier. The officer also testified that defendant had a moderate odor of alcohol about his breath and bloodshot eyes. [1] A second officer, Officer Owsley, arrived at the accident scene at 5:29 a.m., before the rescue unit had extricated defendant from the wreckage. He surveyed the scene and took pictures, but did not talk to the defendant at that time. Defendant was then taken by ambulance to St. Vincent's Hospital, the hospital closest to the point of the accident. Officer Owsley testified that he went to the hospital to investigate the case as a negligent homicide because a person had been killed and he had been told by Officer Bailey that the defendant had admitted that he had been drinking. At the hospital Officer Owsley talked to the defendant. He testified that he bent down close to defendant and could smell a strong odor of  sour odor of alcohol beverage on his breath and also noticed that he had very bloodshot eyes. Officer Owsley also testified that at the hospital he formed the opinion that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, based upon the strong, sour odor of alcoholic beverages on his breath, the manner of his driving (i.e., the indications at the scene that defendant's car was going at a tremendous rate of speed) and defendant's admission that he had been drinking. At 6:32 a.m. Officer Owsley taped a conversation with defendant which was paraphrased as follows: We would like to draw blood for the purpose of a blood alcohol test. Will you consent to that? Okay, and you have nodded your head. Okay, thank you very much. Officer Owsley testified that defendant appear(ed) to be able to understand (the) question and that he was lucid and aware and nodded his head, but that he probably did not understand the implication that the blood test could be used against him in a criminal case. The officer then prepared consent forms, as required for the hospital to draw the blood, and which were witnessed by two nurses, who testified that they would not have done so if they had felt that defendant had not consented, but that defendant was in pretty bad shape at that time. The consent form was not read to defendant or signed by him. A blood sample was then taken by a hospital technician. A second blood sample was taken at 7:32 a.m. At no time prior to the taking of these blood samples was defendant formally placed under arrest. According to the doctor in the emergency room at the time the blood samples were taken from defendant, he was then in serious condition. He had a fractured arm, a compound fracture of the leg, a concussion, and numerous head and scalp lacerations. There were three or four people working on him. He had oxygen tubes in his nose, catheters in his bladder and veins and was being fed intravenously. Officer Owsley testified that to secure a search warrant for the drawing of the blood at that time, he would have had to get back to the office and would have had to dig out a typist, apparently to type the affidavit necessary to secure the warrant; that if he had believed that he needed a search warrant he would have secured one, but that he was not sure that (he) would have had time to do so. A warrant was later secured, however, to obtain the two blood samples from the hospital. On this record the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, holding that in this case consent was irrelevant because there was probable cause and exigent circumstances sufficient to justify drawing of the blood; that there was no need to make an arrest before doing so, and that an arrest might even have caused some kind of psychological or medical damage to the patient at that particular time    which might have jeopardized    defendant's life or his ability to get well   . The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that:    A warrantless search is permissible if there was probable cause for a search and exigent circumstances. Defendant's admission that he had been drinking is substantial evidence of probable cause. There were exigent circumstances as a matter of law because of the medical fact that alcohol in the blood dissipates with the passage of time. 34 Or. App. at 178, 578 P.2d at 448. Defendant contends in his petition for review that: The Court of Appeals' decision condoning the warrantless seizure of defendant's blood, without his consent, and while he was not under arrest, is inconsistent with and contradictory to the overwhelming majority of cases interpreting the United States Supreme Court decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Schmerber, as in this case, the defendant was involved in an auto accident. The patrolman arriving at the scene shortly after the accident smelled liquor on defendant's breath and noticed his eyes appeared bloodshot. The defendant was taken to a hospital for treatment. While in the hospital, he was arrested for driving under the influence. After the arrest, a sample of the defendant's blood was withdrawn by a physician at the police officer's request. The officer possessed no search warrant, nor did the defendant consent. Schmerber objected to the admission in evidence of the blood alcohol test results at trial, asserting they were the product of an unconstitutional search and seizure. The United States Supreme Court rejected the contention and held the blood test results to be admissible, stating that: Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. Defendant construes Schmerber as holding that before blood can be taken from a defendant under such facts, there must first be an arrest of the defendant in the absence of consent by him. Some state courts have so held, as contended by defendant. [2] In this case, however, at the time of the taking of the sample of blood from this defendant, he was in a hospital in such a serious condition as to be unable to give knowing consent to the taking of such a sample. Indeed, defendant concedes in his petition for review that: Several courts acknowledge a prior arrest requirement in Schmerber, but deem that requirement satisfied where the accused's state of consciousness is such that he could not be made aware he was under arrest.    As stated in Mercer v. State, 256 Ark. 814, 510 S.W.2d 539, 541 (1974), under similar facts:    [I]t would be absurd and ridiculous to hold that an officer would have to be so inhumane as to invariably arrest a person teetering on the brink between life and death before his blood alcohol content would be admissible in evidence.    To the same effect, it was held in People v. Fidler, 175 Colo. 90, 485 P.2d 725, 727 (1971), that: In Schmerber, the defendant, on advice of counsel, refused to consent. Here, the defendant was in a semiconscious condition and was unable to consent or to refuse to give his consent. These differences do not affect the Schmerber principle. Also, in Schmerber, it appears that the defendant was arrested prior to the time the police officer directed the doctor to withdraw the blood. The record here does not disclose when Fidler was arrested. This is not a controlling fact under the circumstances of this case. The patrol officer, given the facts as to the collision, the smell of alcohol on defendant's breath and the finding of two half-emptied wine bottles in defendant's vehicle, had probable cause to direct the withdrawal of the blood.    Similarly, it was held in Carrington v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App.3d 635, 641, 107 Cal. Rptr. 546, 549-550 (1973), although a case in which the defendant was completely unconscious, that:    [D]ue to the fact that the defendant was unconscious, the officer was incapable of communicating to him the fact of arrest. (Penal Code § 841.) Talking to an unconscious person has never been looked upon as productive of a meaningful exchange of ideas. Even were he to engage in this ritualistic incantation of words, they would not be communicated to the defendant due to his unconscious state.    See also, to the same effect, State v. Deshner, 158 Mont. 188, 489 P.2d 1290 (1971); State v. Findlay, 259 Iowa 733, 145 N.W.2d 650 (1966). See generally Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 325, 327 (1976). We need not decide whether these cases were rightly decided, because we believe that this case is controlled by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), which case arose in Oregon and was decided subsequent to Schmerber. In Cupp, the wife of the defendant (the respondent in that case) had been strangled in her bed. Defendant voluntarily came to the police station for questioning. The police noticed a dark spot on one of his fingers and asked if they could take a sample of scrapings from his fingernails. Defendant refused consent and the sample was taken over his protest, but without a formal arrest of defendant and without a search warrant. It contained traces of skin and fabric from the victim's nightgown. The court noted (at 294, 93 S.Ct. at 2003) that although the police did not obtain an arrest warrant or formally `arrest' the respondent, as that term is understood under Oregon law (which at that time defined arrest in ORS 133.210 as the taking of a person into custody so that he may be held to answer for a crime), the detention of the defendant nevertheless constituted a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The court then stated that there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the murder, and held (at 295, 93 S.Ct. at 2003) as follows: We believe this search was constitutionally permissible under the principles of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685. Chimel stands in a long line of cases recognizing an exception to the warrant requirement when a search is incident to a valid arrest.    The court (at 296, 93 S.Ct. at 2004) limited its holding as follows:    We do not hold that a full Chimel search would have been justified in this case without a formal arrest and without a warrant. But the respondent was not subjected to such a search.    The rationale of Chimel, in these circumstances, justified the police in subjecting him to the very limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails, cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. The court concluded (at 296, 93 S.Ct. at 2004): On the facts of this case, considering the existence of probable cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken incident to the station house detention, and the ready destructibility of the evidence, we cannot say that this search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.    Similarly, in this case it is clear, in our opinion, that the police had sufficient probable cause both to arrest the defendant (if not for negligent homicide or DUII, at least for reckless driving) and to believe that a test of a sample of his blood would reveal alcohol. Further, since the time of Cupp, the definition of arrest has been changed in Oregon. ORS 133.005(1) now provides that an arrest includes the placing of a person under actual or constructive restraint. [3] We believe that when the police officer in this case directed that blood be taken from the defendant at the hospital after the fatal accident, defendant was under actual or constructive restraint so as to be under arrest for purposes of ORS 133.005(1). See State v. Groda, 285 Or. 321, 325-26, 591 P.2d 1354 (1979), and cases cited therein. In addition, the intrusion that took place under the facts and circumstances of this case to preserve the evidence was a limited one. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S.Ct. at 1836, in approving the taking of a blood sample in a hospital environment as a minor intrusion    under stringently limited conditions, as in this case:    Such tests are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.    Finally, it is also clear that alcohol in blood after drinking is highly evanescent evidence (412 U.S. at 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000) in that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. at 1836. Defendant attempts to distinguish Cupp on the grounds that whereas the defendant in that case was not formally under arrest, the search in that case was nevertheless justified as an incident to a lawful arrest; that the defendant in Cupp, upon being apprised of his suspected role in the crime, made an attempt to destroy some evidence, which was not possible in this case because only the passage of time could destroy the alcohol content of defendant's blood, and that the taking of blood is sufficiently more intrusive than the scrapings in Cupp to make the search illegal. We are of the opinion, however, that the facts in Cupp and in this case are sufficiently similar to warrant our application of the rule in that case to the facts of this case. In both cases, the important factors were that the police not only had probable cause to make an arrest, but that the defendant was seized in such a manner as would now constitute an arrest under ORS 133.005(1); that the evidence in both cases was highly evanescent (as held in Schmerber ), and that the intrusion in both cases was not only a minor intrusion (as also held in Schmerber ), but was no more intrusive than was necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence. In addition, and as previously noted, there is the important additional factor that at the time of the taking of the blood sample, defendant was in the hospital in serious condition. Since the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Cupp v. Murphy, supra , it has been held under similar facts that the taking of a blood sample is proper under the rationale of that case without either express consent or an arrest, at least when the defendant is in a medical environment in a hospital and in a serious physical condition. Thus, as held in State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 1978): Under the theory of Cupp v. Murphy, supra , then, a warrantless body search may be conducted in spite of the fact that the person searched is not formally under arrest when (1) the character of the search is highly unintrusive, (2) the evidence sought will be forever lost absent the search, and (3) sufficient probable cause exists to support a formal arrest.       [T]he Cupp v. Murphy doctrine can serve an important function in criminal negligence prosecutions. Alcohol-related accidents often produce unconscious or uncommunicative victims. We think it would be absurd to demand the performance of an arrest ritual in the presence of such persons as a prerequisite to the admission of probative blood-alcohol evidence against them. Rather, it seems eminently more sensible to allow the admission of such evidence where probable cause would plainly have supported the arrest of such persons had they been fully conscious. We therefore adopt the rule of Cupp v. Murphy, supra , for criminal negligence prosecutions in Minnesota. On the facts of this case, we are convinced that the Cupp v. Murphy requirements have been fulfilled.    To the same effect, as held in Com. v. Funk, 254 Pa.Super. 233, 385 A.2d 995, 999 (1978):    We recognize that as a blood test is a search, its administration on a suspect unable to refuse it must pass the test of constitutionality. In Commonwealth v. Quarles, supra [229 Pa.Super. 363, 324 A.2d 452 (1974)], applying this test, we looked to Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 36 L.Ed.2d 900, 93 S.Ct. 2000 (1973), and held that a blood test may be taken against a suspect's wishes and without an arrest, where the police have probable cause to believe the suspect was driving while intoxicated, in order to get evidence of the blood alcohol level, evidence that is particularly evanescent. Thus the test here was constitutional.    We need not decide whether these cases were correct in dispensing with the arrest requirement under such circumstances, however, because as previously noted we find that defendant was under arrest for purposes of ORS 133.005(1) at the time the blood sample was taken. As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439, 77 S.Ct. 408, 412, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), although in a somewhat different context:    Modern community living requires modern scientific methods of crime detection lest the public go unprotected. The increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield. The States, through safety measures, modern scientific methods, and strict enforcement of traffic laws, are using all reasonable means to make automobile driving less dangerous. As against the right of an individual that his person be held inviolable, even against so slight an intrusion as is involved in applying a blood test of the kind to which millions of Americans submit as a matter of course nearly every day, must be set the interests of society in the scientific determination of intoxication, one of the great causes of the mortal hazards of the road.    Again, see Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S. at 771, 86 S.Ct. 1826, as previously quoted, to the same effect. For these reasons, and under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we affirm the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the taking of the blood samples from the defendant was not an unreasonable search or seizure. [4]