Opinion ID: 457791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Individualized Sentencing

Text: 11 Few legal principles are either as ancient 4 or deeply etched 5 in the public mind as the notion that punishment should fit the crime. This familiar maxim, however, is only half-true. [I]n the present century the pendulum has been swinging away from ... the philosophy that the punishment should fit the crime and toward one that the punishment should [also] fit the criminal. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law Sec. 5 at 25 (1972). 12 While we do not suggest that this trend has been without reverses, past or present, the concept of individualized sentencing is firmly entrenched in our present jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has observed, 13 [p]unishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime. The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender. 14 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (citation omitted); United States v. Foss, 501 F.2d 522, 527 (1st Cir.1974); Wardlaw, 576 F.2d at 938. In each case, a criminal sentence must reflect an individualized assessment of a particular defendant's culpability rather than a mechanistic application of a given sentence to a given category of crime. As we said in Lopez-Gonzales, 688 F.2d at 1276-77, 15 [t]he exercise of sound discretion requires consideration of all the circumstances of the crime.... The sentencing judge is required to consider all mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved. There is a strong public interest in the imposition of a sentence based upon an accurate evaluation of the particular offender and designed to aid in his personal rehabilitation. Thus, appellate courts have vacated sentences reflecting a preconceived policy always to impose the maximum penalty for a certain crime. 16 Accord Foss, 501 F.2d at 527; United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 529 (3d Cir.1973). 17 In Lopez-Gonzales, the district court had stated that it automatically imposed the maximum sentence whenever an illegal alien is apprehended after flight and pursuit. 688 F.2d at 1275; see Thompson, 483 F.2d at 529. Although the court here did not announce a fixed or predetermined policy to sentence drug offenders to the maximum statutory term, a full reading of the record does reveal that the court sentenced defendants as essentially undifferentiated units, ignoring both their differences from one another, and from others who might be charged under the same statute. This failure adequately to individualize sentences ignores the goal that punishment fit the criminal. 18 This is not to suggest that any, or even all, of the defendants here could not legitimately have been sentenced to the maximum statutory term. Our concern is less the appropriateness of a given criminal sentence than the propriety of the process through which sentence was imposed. Specifically, do the four corners of the record indicate that the district court actually and adequately considered the factors necessary to insure that each individual defendant was assessed and sentenced as an individual? 19 While the duty of the sentencing courts to individualize is clear, it may well be impossible to propound for purposes of review a single test or standard sufficient to insure individualized sentencing. Cf. Solem, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 n. 17 (no single criterion can identify when a sentence is constitutionally disproportionate). The danger in specifying sentencing standards is the potential for any such test to become as mechanistic in application as the mechanized sentencing which we seek to avoid. To require the exercise of sound discretion is not to fall into that trap, however. See Lopez-Gonzales, 688 F.2d at 1277 (requiring exercise of discretion need not lead to hollow ritual). Whether sound discretion has been exercised must be answered in each case through a thorough review of the record. Here, we cannot answer in the affirmative. 20 To begin with, the record is replete with comments suggesting that it was the category of crime, rather than the culpability of each individual criminal, that led the court to impose the maximum statutory term. Typical, for example, was the court's statement upon sentencing Jason Engle. Although Engle had demonstrated remorse and rehabilitation, the court observed 21 Well, if I could ever chastise the government [for its sentencing recommendation] it would be in this case here. I never saw anything so ridiculous ... with a crime of this magnitude. I have been a judge for 17 years and I never saw a crime with such an amount of marijuana in my life and with such a lenient sentence for this massive of a conspiracy is incomprehensible, how a person could be involved in such a plague on society that involves so much marijuana, and the defendant has contributed to the spread of that plague. 22 At the sentencing hearing, counsel stressed (and the presentence report confirmed) that Jason's brother Jeffrey did not realize the boat was involved in smuggling marijuana until after they were at sea. He had apparently boarded the boat because his older brother had indicated they would be going fishing. Although he did eventually help load and unload the marijuana, when he learned of the indictment he immediately turned himself in and was consistently contrite. Nevertheless, the court observed, after the government's recommendation of one year in prison, 23 Well, there again, if I could chastise the government more fully, I would certainly do so. This is a terrible crime, tons and tons of marijuana coming into the country and people being sorry and your life and what-have-you. What about the lives of the other people that have been affected by the young people taking the stuff; just because you want to have a good time and make some money out of it. 24 The court made similar statements in sentencing the three defendants who contributed money to the scheme, first criticizing the government's recommendations and then commenting on the severity of the crime. There is no indication that the court seriously considered arguments made in mitigation. 6 Instead, the record suggests that in imposing sentence, the court was overwhelmingly motivated by its assessment of the crime rather than its individual evaluation of each defendant. 25 In addition, several factors support the inference that, in this case, the district court's imposition of sentence was more mechanistic, Foss, 501 F.2d at 522, than measured. First, the court chastised the government for its recommendations and imposed sentences more than three times as long. Although this fact alone would not justify appellate intervention, Wardlaw, 576 F.2d at 938, it does reinforce the impression created by the court's comments before sentencing, that usual individual considerations played little if any part in its thinking. 26 Second, the district court imposed the same maximum statutory prison term upon each defendant, despite the differences in their levels of involvement. Although imposition of a maximum term does not alone justify appellate intervention, the district court's failure to differentiate among defendants ignores that defendants were entitled to have their sentences set primarily in terms of the seriousness of their own crimes and associated individual factors. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d at 939. Cf. Solem, 103 S.Ct. at 3011 (relative culpability relevant in assessing sentence challenged under eighth amendment). 27 Similarly, although the district court correctly noted that it is not required to harmonize its view of appropriate sentencing with that of other district courts, 7 the court's statements at sentencing suggest that it was motivated by the desire to deter this profitable business ... involving millions and millions of dollars to the exclusion of determining what these particular defendants deserved. See note 9 infra; Wardlaw, 576 F.2d at 936. 28 Finally, we point out that 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B), which provides for a maximum sentence of five years for a marijuana offense involving less than one thousand pounds,  'is an express legislative sanction ... of meting out sentences substantially less than five years in prison ... where there are appropriate mitigating circumstances.'  Hartford, 489 F.2d at 655 (citing United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967, 971-72 (6th Cir.1971)). Although the establishment of a maximum sentence for offenses involving up to one thousand pounds does not require that defendants involved in smuggling lesser amounts receive sentences proportionally reduced, from this express legislative authorization there is clearly evidenced an 'implied legislative will to impose a lesser sentence where appropriate.'  Id. at 655. By routinely entering the maximum sentence without differentiating among defendants, the district court failed to abide by the implied congressional mandate to frame the punishment to address the particular circumstances of the individual defendant. Id. 29 We emphasize that neither the court's comments nor these additional factors, taken alone, would necessarily justify appellate intervention. Taken together, however, they leave us with the clear impression that the sentences imposed by the district court reflect more its personal view of the opprobrium of the crime charged--its view that this is a terrible crime, tons and tons of marijuana coming into the country.... a plague on society.... --than a careful weighing of mitigating factors and the relative levels of culpability and involvement of each defendant. 8