Opinion ID: 1702605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure of Taylor Coal Company to Timely Assert Claim of Disqualification

Text: In Judge Junkin's detailed memorandum opinion, it is strongly suggested that the motion for disqualification in this case was filed for purposes of delay. After an exhaustive search of the records, we cannot conclude that this suggestion is not without merit. Some of the federal courts will not entertain an interlocutory appeal based on refusal to disqualify counsel. On the other hand, they will allow an interlocutory appeal where counsel has been disqualified. The reason given is that many motions to disqualify are made for purposes of delay. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2nd Cir. 1980); Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977); W. T. Grant Company v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976); Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Company, 527 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1975); J. P. Foley & Co., Inc. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975). Taylor Coal Company first hired Mr. Moore to render a title opinion concerning the lands which are the subject of this litigation in September of 1975. The first action in this case was commenced on November 12, 1976, when Willis Crocker filed a bill to quiet title to certain mineral lands in Fayette County. Mr. Moore filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of all of the defendants in the case on December 17, 1976. Taylor Coal Company filed a complaint in intervention on January 14, 1977, and at this time knew that Mr. Moore was representing an interest inconsistent with the subject matter of his employment of September, 1975. They had to know this because a corporation can only act through its officers and agents. Their lawyers were their agents. Birmingham Boys' Club, Inc. v. TransAmerica Insurance Company, 295 Ala. 177, 325 So.2d 167 (1976). Taylor Coal Company filed its motion to disqualify on May 29, 1980, over three years and three months from the time that it knew that Mr. Moore was representing an interest hostile to the subject matter of its employment of him in September, 1975. Furthermore, Taylor Coal Company knew on November 18, 1977, that Moore was representing an interest hostile to its interest when he filed a suit in trespass for Mr. Sigler and the Pearson Heirs in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. It again knew about Moore's hostile representation when he re-filed the action making the same charges in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. As early as October 15, 1976, Taylor Coal Company knew of Moore's representation of conflicting interests when he notified Charles Tweedy, an attorney of record for Taylor Coal Company and Drummond Coal Company, and a director of Drummond Coal Company that he was representing the Pearson Heirs and Mr. Sigler in connection with their trespass claim. Taylor Coal Company again knew of Mr. Moore's alleged conflict of interest when in May of 1976, William B. Long, an officer of Drummond Coal Company, referred in a letter to the fact that a Fayette lawyer was representing Pearson Coal and Iron Company against Taylor Coal Company. Mr. Long was seeking indemnity for Drummond Coal Company from Taylor Coal Company against the claims of Mr. Sigler and the Pearson Heirs. This claim eventually resulted in litigation in federal court. It is simply not true that Taylor Coal Company only learned of Mr. Moore's alleged conflict of interest when Tommy Wells of the firm of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas and O'Neal discovered a title opinion written by Louis Moore, dated March 6, 1976, which had been misfiled. To round out the entire picture, we do take note that after the Court below ordered the joinder of necessary parties requested by Mr. Moore, Taylor Coal Company refused to make the joinder after three extensions of time for the purpose of doing so. We also note that the Fayette case was dismissed on July 22, 1977, for want of prosecution and on August 15, 1979, Taylor Coal Company filed an amendment to its intervention in the Fayette action, despite the July 22, 1977, order of dismissal. The dismissal order was appealed by Taylor Coal Company, but we were compelled to dismiss the appeal on April 5, 1980, because Taylor Coal Company failed to file a brief! Although laches is not a defense unless prejudice has resulted to the other party, the trial court found that there was prejudice to the other party and we cannot say that its conclusion was palpably wrong. Smith v. McNaughton, 378 So.2d 703 (Ala.1979); Gertz v. Allen, 376 So.2d 695 (Ala.1979). Having concluded that there was no violation of Canons 4 and 9, Code of Professional Responsibility of the Alabama State Bar, on the part of Mr. Moore, Mr. Sam Phelps, or their law firms, or any reason to preclude Mr. Sigler as a party in this case, and Judge Junkin having found that the parties represented by Mr. Moore and his co-counsel would be severely prejudiced by disqualification of counsel at this late hour, we must deny the petition for writ of mandamus. WRIT DENIED. FAULKNER and ALMON, JJ., concur. TORBERT, C. J., and EMBRY, J., concur in result.