Opinion ID: 754147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Persons with the Necessary Authority Actually

Text: 34 Approve the Amended Plan? 35 Having identified the persons with the necessary authority to amend CW's retirement benefits Plan, we must decide whether a person so situated actually exercised that authority in 1983. The record, as described above, shows that the analysis must focus on the authority delegated to Mr. Ehinger in his capacity as the corporation's Executive Vice President. We now turn to that record. 36 It is not disputed that Mr. DuBois, the Corporate Manager for Benefits, and Mr. Carr, CW's labor counsel, initially drafted the 1983 SPD amendment at issue providing for the termination of health benefits for a closed plant's retirees. As the parties agree, it is quite clear that if Mr. DuBois and Mr. Carr acted without the specific authorization of Mr. Ehinger, then the SPD amendment, without more, cannot be considered a valid corporate act on any delegation theory. The question then is primarily factual in nature--did Mr. Ehinger actually authorize the amendment to the Plan in 1983 terminating benefits? Once again, the district court denied summary judgment to CW on this question because, in its view, the only evidence in the record on this issue is the deposition testimony of Ehinger [and] questions of credibility remain. 37 We reiterate at the outset that the burden of showing the unauthorized nature of the SPD amendment falls squarely on the plaintiffs. See Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163 (3d Cir.1990). In support of its motion for summary judgment, CW points to Mr. Ehinger's testimony that he approved the SPD termination language during its drafting. App. at 207-208. In addition to the deposition testimony of Mr. Ehinger, Mr. Carr also submitted an affidavit that Mr. Ehinger approved the decision to terminate benefits. App. at 421. Further, it is not disputed that the decision to amend the Plan was the result of similar issues raised by litigation that occurred over the earlier closing of CW's Marquette facility in Cleveland. App. 35. Indeed, plaintiffs do not deny that Mr. Ehinger and the benefits group played a significant role in that litigation and anticipated a change in the present Plan description to avoid future litigation. App. at 115. 38 Against this evidence, plaintiffs point to only two relevant instances in the record which they claim would allow a reasonable jury to conclude in their favor and therefore render the issue genuine. First, plaintiffs again emphasize that there is no documentation--whether a memorandum, resolution, or otherwise--reflecting Mr. Ehinger's actual exercise of authority. As we have stated before, however, the law recognizes an oral delegation or exercise of authority, which may be proved by parol evidence. See, e.g., 2 Fletcher, supra, § 444, at 398 (citing Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 226 A.2d 708 (Del.1967)); Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 26, 33 (1958). Thus, while we agree that CW's record keeping is not a paragon of desirable corporate practice, the plaintiffs have offered no reason why the absence of documentation, when the law requires none, should be subject to suspicion or provide a basis for a reasonable inference in their favor, particularly in view of the corporation's established practices to the contrary. Cf. Ansin v. River Oaks Furniture, Inc., 105 F.3d 745, 755 (1st Cir.1997) (where a transaction would ordinarily leave a heavy paper trial, an inference of fact arises from a complete absence of contemporaneous documentation); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165-66 (3d Cir.1990) (where a memorandum written in contemplation of a merger does not include a new ERISA benefits schedule, a factual inference is created because the author had personal knowledge of the transaction and the omission seemed odd from the circumstances of the case). But on the undisputed evidence of CW's corporate practice, we conclude that the absence of record documentation reflecting the nature and exercise of Mr. Ehinger's authority is not sufficiently probative that it provides, without more, a basis for a reasonable inference in favor of the plaintiffs. 39 Plaintiffs also point to Mr. Ehinger's deposition testimony in 1986 where he stated: 40 It had been the policy of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation, which was put in practice in closing the East Paterson facility in 1971 ... [and] the Marquette facility, that post-retirement insurance would terminate at the closing of the facility. 41 I expected my personnel to reflect such policy in such documents. I did not myself read the individual policies or question them where does it say what in it. 42 App. at 136 (emphasis added by plaintiffs). Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Ehinger's admission of not having read the individual benefits policies supports their contention that he did not specifically authorize the Plan amendment in 1983. We believe plaintiffs' conclusion is a non sequitur. Simply because Mr. Ehinger did not read the individual retirement health benefits policies does not mean that he did not authorize the change in the language of the amendment. In fact, Mr. Ehinger specifically states that he expected [his] personnel to reflect such[a] policy in [the] documents, which at least raises an inference that he authorized any changes in the Plan that would conform to his expectations. Id. We therefore do not find this deposition testimony to create a genuine issue of material fact in the plaintiffs' favor. 43 Beyond these two arguments, which lack merit, plaintiffs do not identify any other instance in the record developed on remand that would render the question of Mr. Ehinger's exercise of authority a genuine dispute. This is not a case where a material issue of fact cannot be resolved without observation of the demeanor of witnesses in order to evaluate their credibility. Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The record points in but one direction and, as a result, summary judgment for CW was proper.