Opinion ID: 530543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NFL's Objections to Elements of the Fee Application

Text: 24 The NFL challenges the district court's failure to exclude certain elements that the USFL claimed in its fee application. Specifically, the NFL objects to the district court's failure to exclude attorney's fees for time devoted to the (1) television contract claim and consequent damages; (2) allegations dismissed before trial; and (3) unsuccessful collateral matters. 25 In Hensley, the Supreme Court noted that work on an unsuccessful claim that is based on different facts and legal theories than a successful one may not be included in the fee award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. However, a plaintiff's diverse claims for relief may involve a common core of facts or ... be based on related legal theories. Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. In that instance, [m]uch of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Id. The Court held that under those circumstances, the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff. Id. Where a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, full compensation for attorney's fees would not be reasonable. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. The district court may either attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. Id. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. 26 In the instant case, all of the USFL's claims involve a common core of facts and are based on related legal theories. Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. However, the USFL was successful on only one of its claims. To compensate for this limited success, the district court exercised its discretion by reducing the amount of the award. Because the district court took into account the USFL's lack of success by reducing the overall attorney's fees award by a certain percentage, allowing compensation for time spent on all of the claims was correct. 27 Here, as previously discussed, the television damages claim was related to the general claim of monopolization of the professional football market in the United States. See supra. Therefore, the NFL's objection to the inclusion of time spent in relation to this claim must fail. 28 The NFL also objects to the district court's failure to exclude time spent by the USFL's attorneys on allegations that were dismissed prior to trial--namely, allegations concerning NFL conduct regarding stadium leases, disparagement and game officials. The work done in relation to those allegations was properly included in the fee award because it was related to the same claim upon which the USFL eventually prevailed. That those allegations were dismissed before trial does not necessitate their exclusion from the basis of the fee award. The development of factual allegations and theories to support a claim is part of the normal litigation process and should be compensable. 29 The same reasoning holds true for the NFL's contentions that the USFL should not receive attorney's fees for work related to unsuccessful collateral matters, such as attempts to introduce evidence of prior judgments against the NFL and evidence of congressional testimony by NFL personnel. The district court opined that to the extent that this time was spent on alternative ways to obtain relief for the NFL's illegal monopolization of professional football, it is fully compensable. United States Football League, 704 F.Supp. at 481. We agree. These collateral issues all stem from and are related to a common core of facts--the alleged antitrust violations. We have previously held that the evidence of the prior judgments was at best marginally probative with respect to the issues in this litigation. United States Football League, 842 F.2d at 1372. We also agreed with the Third Circuit's declaration that in this context, legislative process evidence was  'irrelevant.'  Id. at 1375 (quoting Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 784 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2657, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984)). Thus, time spent by USFL attorneys on these issues is not fully compensable. While the district court did not specifically exclude time spent on these issues, it did reduce the lodestar. Because it was within the district court's discretion to do so, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, and we see no abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the fee award because of the inclusion of time spent on these matters. 30 In sum, because the USFL was successful in proving an antitrust injury, all that is required under section 4 of the Clayton Act, it is entitled to attorney's fees for all work done in relation to the common core of facts that resulted in that injury. The district court correctly included these amounts in the fee award. 31