Opinion ID: 895106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Property damage or bodily injury caused intentionally ...

Text: We have not construed this precise policy language before. [11] At the outset, however, we emphasize this critical point: intentionally as used in the exclusion speaks to the resulting damage or injury, not to the actions that led to it. That is, the language is effect-focused and not cause-focused, voiding coverage when the resulting injury was intentional, not merely when the insured's conduct was intentional. A contrary reading of the exclusion that reckless acts absent deliberate injury are sufficient to forfeit coveragewould render insurance coverage illusory for many of the things for which insureds commonly purchase insurance. [12] For example, Texas mandates liability coverage for drivers, [13] but if ordinary Texans are unprotected from those who intentionally speed or run red lights, but intend no harm to others by doing so, then Texas is replete with noncoverage notwithstanding its mandatory-coverage requirement. As one leading commentator puts it, coverage can still exist when the injury was unintended, even if the act which gave rise to the injury was intentional. [14] We construed similar language in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. S.S. [15] In that case, a summary-judgment appeal, the plaintiff in an underlying suit claimed she contracted a sexually transmitted disease from the insured. [16] The insured's homeowner's policy contained an intentional-injury exclusion applicable to bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of the Insured. [17] The insurer contested coverage based on this exclusion. [18] In deciding what intentionally meant in the exclusion, we drew guidance from the Restatement (Second) of Torts and a leading treatise. [19] Reading the exclusion under these authorities, we reasoned that an insured intends to cause harm if he intends or desires the consequences of his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to occur. [20] Accordingly, we held that although the insured intentionally had sexual relations with the plaintiff without informing her of his condition, this conduct did not establish as a matter of law that he intended to give her an STD or knew that transmission was substantially certain to follow. [21] A similar analysis applies to the Nationwide policy, which, like the policy in S.S., excludes coverage where the injury is caused intentionally by the insured. The evidence at trial does not indicate, as the jury charge puts it, that the property damage or bodily injury to the Tanners was caused intentionally, much less indicate such intent as a matter of law. On the contrary, Gibbons slammed on his brakes hard enough to skid before impact, showing he actively tried to avoid the collision. The insured in S.S. only hoped to avoid causing harm while Gibbons actually, if belatedly, tried to avoid causing harm. Nor does the evidence establish as a matter of law that Gibbons believed his conduct was substantially certain to injure the Tanners. While leading police on a protracted high-speed chase is not merely reckless but reprehensible, we cannot say on this record that no reasonable juror could resist finding that injury to others was unavoidable. In fact, the chase could have ended in any number of ways: with Gibbons rolling his vehicle, with Gibbons hitting a fixed object, with officers using preventive techniques to stop Gibbons' vehicle, or even with officers discontinuing the pursuit, rather than with Gibbons crashing into the Tanners. Nationwide therefore did not establish as a matter of law that the Tanners' injuries were caused intentionally under the exclusion.