Opinion ID: 1679544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was green denied equal protection by the failure to give him credit for presentence incarceration?

Text: Green argues that his indigency requires that he be given credit on both convictions for his presentence incarceration from January 21, 1993 (the date he was arrested in Denver) through June 1, 1993 (the date he was sentenced). While Green is entitled to credit for a portion of the time he served prior to sentencing, he is not entitled to the entire 130 days as he argues. [T]he Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause requires that credit be given for all presentence custody which results from indigency. Patino v. State, 331 N.W.2d 837, 838 (S.D.1983), quoting State v. Lohnes, 266 N.W.2d 109, 113 (S.D.1978). This rule applies in all cases involving sentences of less than life. State v. Graycek, 335 N.W.2d 572 (S.D.1983). The appointment of counsel is sufficient to establish a defendant as indigent prior to sentencing, and such indigency dates from the time the court approves an application for court-appointed counsel. Graycek, 335 N.W.2d at 574-75; State v. Tibbetts, 333 N.W.2d 440, 441 (S.D.1983). In addition, the inability of defendant to post bail while awaiting trial is also an indication of presentence indigency. Tibbetts, 333 N.W.2d at 441. In this case, Green's application for court-appointed counsel was approved on September 17, 1992. He was unable to post the original bond set on that date of $10,000 and was unable to post the $100,000 cash-only bond set after he failed to appear. The trial court granted credit for time served for only the 8 days he was jailed before the PR bond was issued on September 24, 1992. Green contends that he is entitled to credit for the entire 130-day time period of January 21, 1993 through June 1, 1993. During this time, he was jailed in Colorado for 34 days (from January 21 through February 24). He was jailed in South Dakota for 96 days (from February 25 through June 1, 1993). Green has not established indigence to be the cause of his incarceration in Colorado. In fact, there is no evidence in the record indicating the basis for Green's arrest in Colorado, whether he made any appearances in Colorado courts, or whether bail proceedings were had or bond was set while he was incarcerated in Colorado. As we noted in State v. Roth, 84 S.D. 44, 166 N.W.2d 564 (1969), the burden of establishing a basis for post-conviction relief rests upon the petitioner. Since Green has not established his indigent status while incarcerated in Colorado, credit for the time served there was not warranted under the holdings in Lohnes and Patino. Aside from indigence, there is no constitutional requirement that presentence incarceration be credited against the sentence imposed under any other circumstances. Patino, 331 N.W.2d at 838 (citation omitted). Thus, the trial court had no constitutional or statutory duty to grant Green credit for presentence incarceration served in another jurisdiction, and he is not entitled to credit for the 34 days he was incarcerated in Colorado (from January 21 through February 24). However, a separate analysis regarding Green's presentence incarceration in South Dakota from February 25 through June 1 reveals that he is entitled to credit for this 96-day period of presentence jail time. When Green's bail was previously set at $100,000 cash, he was unable to post bail. As indicated in Tibbetts, inability of a defendant to post bail which results in presentence incarceration establishes indigency which entitles defendant to credit for the jail time served before he is sentenced. 333 N.W.2d at 441. He also continued to be represented by court-appointed counsel, the other indicia of indigency. See Graycek, 335 N.W.2d at 574-75. Accordingly, Green is entitled to credit for the 96 days served in South Dakota prior to being sentenced. Affirmed in part, and reversed in part. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and SABERS, JJ., concur.