Opinion ID: 617872
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Ata's Motion for Equitable Tolling Required an Evidentiary Hearing

Text: The State does not contest that Ata has made a threshold showing of mental incompetence. However, the State does argue, citing McSwain, 287 Fed.Appx. at 457, that Ata's conclusory assertions are insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing because they do not allege a causal connection between his illness and failure to file on time. We agree that Ata must establish such a causal connection. We conclude, however, that he has sufficiently set out the facts and the causal connection in his petition so that he is entitled to a hearing.
To reach this conclusion, the first step in our analysis is to determine whether Ata's factual allegations, accepted as true, show that he is mentally incompetent and that his mental incompetence prevented him from timely filing his petition. See McSwain, 287 Fed.Appx. at 458 (quoting Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933). The district court refused to accept Ata's allegations as true because it found them unsupported and conclusory. Ata's allegations, however, are not so conclusory as to be disregarded and, when they are accepted as true, entitle him to a hearing on equitable tolling. Although many of the instances in the record of his past medical treatment occurred before incarceration, Ata specifically alleged that his petition was untimely because he had been hospitalized on numerous occasions for paranoid schizophrenia, and because he has been and continues to be medicated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) for paranoid schizophrenia and other psychoses. Ata, thus, pointed to two specific waysbeing hospitalized and medicated in which his mental illness prevented him from understanding and complying with AEDPA's statute of limitations. Further, Ata provided in his affidavit that due to my mental incapacitation I did not understand the one-year limitation placed on habeas petitioners. [7] Given the applicable pro se standard, we read Ata's allegations to state that he was incapacitated for the period in question and that his incapacitation prevented him from timely filing his petition. While certainly not elaborate, Ata's allegations are specific enough to assert a causal link between his mental incompetence and his untimely petition. See McSwain, 287 Fed.Appx. at 456 (finding allegation of causal link required); Riva, 615 F.3d at 40; Bolarinwa, 593 F.3d at 231-32; Nara, 264 F.3d at 320; Laws, 351 F.3d at 923; Hunter, 587 F.3d at 1309-10. McSwain, which upheld the denial of an evidentiary hearing, is distinguishable from the present case. There, we determined that the prisoner did not assert that she was prevented from timely filing either her habeas petition or her response to the motion to dismiss because of her mental illness. 287 Fed.Appx. at 458. Unlike Ata's allegations, McSwain merely indicated that because she has been suffering from [Dissociative Identity Disorder] since childhood, she `likely suffers periods of incompetency which would effect [sic] her ability to file a timely habeas petition.' Id. McSwain's assertion of likely periods of incompetence that would affect her ability to timely file were too speculative. Thus, the allegations in McSwain undermined the existence of a causal link between her mental incompetency and untimely filing. On the other hand, Ata's allegations that he was mentally incompetent and that his mental incompetence did prevent him from timely filing are concrete. Other circuits have found allegations similar to those in this case to warrant an evidentiary hearing. For instance, in Bolarinwa, the Second Circuit concluded that similar causal allegations, supported by a record of mental incapacity, called for an evidentiary hearing to resolve a petitioner's equitable tolling claim. See 593 F.3d at 229-30, 232. The petitioner, Bolarinwa, asserted that she `was mentally incapable of functioning to do diligence in regard to legal remedy in a timely fashion'; her psychiatric problems made it impossible for her to timely file habeas corpus petition; she was `depressed, anxious, and grieving'; that her `mental condition, aggravated by the tragic death of her three children, father and grandfather, burdened her efforts to file her habeas petition'; and that she was admitted to psychiatric units on occasion or at various times. Id. at 229-30. Bolarinwa also submitted a letter from a prison social worker indicating that Bolarinwa had been `trying to become mentally stable' and that `the tragic death of her children... made it difficult for her to focus on filing a habeas petition.' Id. at 230. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Laws v. Lamarque , found that the petitioner had made a good-faith allegationspecifically, Laws's `psychotic d[y]sfunction' precluded his timely filingthat would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling[.] 351 F.3d at 921-22. It thus reversed the dismissal of the petition and remanded for further factual development. Id. at 924; see also Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.2006) (finding that petitioner had alleged factsincluding that lack of access to Spanish-language legal materials prevented him from learning about the AEDPA's deadline and thereby prevented his timely filingwhich, if true, could entitle him to equitable tolling and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on the tolling claim). As in Bolarinwa and Laws, the allegations here are sufficiently specific to satisfy the first step of our test to determine when an evidentiary hearing is warranted.
The second step of our analysis requires a review of the record to ensure it does not refute Ata's request for equitable tolling. See Schriro, 550 U.S. at 474, 127 S.Ct. 1933, McSwain, 287 Fed.Appx. at 457. Here, the record indicates a long history of mental illness. Medical records, admitted during the state court proceedings, reveal the existence and severity of Ata's mental illness even prior to his criminal offense. Moreover, the record contains no information inconsistent with Ata's claims of mental incompetency in the years between the end of his direct review and the initiation of his collateral review. If anything, the record corroborates Ata's allegations of mental incompetence preventing timely filing, as Ata's diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia presents a lifelong condition with an accompanying regimen of medication. Moreover, the fact that Ata sought direct review of his conviction does not support an inference that his mental incompetence was cured; he was represented by counsel at the time. Cf. McSwain, 287 Fed.Appx. at 457. Thus, Ata's allegations contain sufficient support in the record. [8]