Opinion ID: 1267676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: liability of bittenbender

Text: The plaintiff's eight-count amended motion for judgment contained three counts against Bittenbender: Count IV, captioned SCOUTMASTER'S recklessness and/or Conscious Disregard of BOY SCOUT'S Welfare, Count V, captioned Gross Negligence of SCOUTMASTER, and Count VI, captioned Negligence of SCOUTMASTER. As stated above, the court struck all three counts and dismissed Bittenbender as a party on the grounds that the proof offered against Bittenbender showed that his conduct was intentional, that intentional torts cannot be proved under allegations of negligence, and that all three counts of the amended motion for judgment alleged only negligent conduct. Count IV reads, in pertinent part: ( SCOUTMASTER'S Recklessness and/or Conscious Disregard of BOY SCOUT'S Welfare ) 71. Plaintiff BOY SCOUT re-alleges and incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 56 above. 72. At all relevant times SCOUTMASTER owed the duty to BOY SCOUT to use reasonable care under the circumstances for the health and safety of BOY SCOUT. 73. SCOUTMASTER was reckless, consciously disregarded BOY SCOUT's welfare and breached his duty of reasonable care under the circumstances for the health and safety of BOY SCOUT. 74. SCOUTMASTER breached his duty of reasonable care under the circumstances when he, among other acts and omissions: [Eighteen subparagraphs follow, describing specific acts, including criminal conduct] 75. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant's aforesaid recklessness and conscious disregard of BOY SCOUT's welfare, BOY SCOUT suffered and will continue to suffer the aforementioned damages. In Booth v. Robertson, 236 Va. 269, 273, 374 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1988), we held that punitive damages are warranted not only by malicious conduct, but also by  negligence which is so willful or wanton as to evince a conscious disregard of the rights of others (emphasis added). In Booth, we followed Friedman v. Jordan, 166 Va. 65, 184 S.E. 186 (1936), where we said, Wilful or wanton conduct imports knowledge and consciousness that injury will result from the act done. The act done must be intended or it must involve a reckless disregard for the rights of another and will probably result in an injury. Ill will is not a necessary element.... Id. at 68, 184 S.E. at 187 (emphasis added). The tort alleged under Count IV is given various labels by the authorities, e.g., such recklessness or negligence as evinces a conscious disregard of the rights of others, Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 909, 114 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1960) (quoting Wood v. Amer. Nat. Bank, 100 Va. 306, 316, 40 S.E. 931, 934 (1902)); a spirit of mischief, criminal indifference, or conscious disregard of the rights of others, Baker, 201 Va. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621; wilful or wanton conduct, Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 660, 174 S.E. 837, 839 (1934) and Friedman, 166 Va. at 68, 184 S.E. at 187; willful or wanton negligence, Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 230-31, 89 S.E.2d 32, 34-35 (1955); negligence which is willful, wanton, and reckless, Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212 (1984); reckless disregard of the safety of another. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965). However they may be phrased, the foregoing labels all designate tortious conduct of a single species. In order that one may be held guilty of wilful or wanton conduct, it must be shown that he was conscious of his conduct, and conscious, from his knowledge of existing conditions, that injury would likely or probably result from his conduct, and that with reckless indifference to consequences he consciously and intentionally did some wrongful act or omitted some known duty which produced the injurious result. Thomas, 162 Va. at 660, 174 S.E. at 839 (citation omitted). Willful and wanton negligence is acting consciously in disregard of another person's rights or acting with reckless indifference to the consequences, with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would cause injury to another. Griffin, 227 Va. at 321, 315 S.E.2d at 213, (citing Friedman, 166 Va. at 68, 184 S.E. at 187). The hallmark of this species of tortious conduct is the defendant's consciousness of his act, his awareness of the dangers or probable consequences, and his reckless decision to proceed notwithstanding that awareness. Because such consciousness and awareness are prerequisites, the use of the term negligence, in defining the tort, is a misnomer, to the extent that negligence is equated with inadvertent neglect of a duty. Gross negligence and ordinary negligence differ from one another only in degree, but the species of tortious conduct which the authorities have variously labelled willful and wanton conduct, or reckless misconduct, or willful and intentional conduct, differs in kind from both of them. See Kennedy v. McElroy, 195 Va. 1078, 1081, 81 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1954). Negligence conveys the idea of heedlessness, inattention, inadvertence; willfulness and wantonness convey the idea of purpose or design, actual or constructive. Boward, 197 Va. at 231, 89 S.E.2d at 35, (quoting Thomas, 162 Va. at 660, 174 S.E. at 839). Although the plaintiff's Count IV referred to Bittenbender's duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances for the health and safety of the plaintiff, it alleged that the duty was breached with reckless and conscious disregard of the plaintiff's health, safety, and welfare. Thus, although the allegations refer to a breach of duty, they do not charge that the breach was done with the heedlessness, inattention, [or] inadvertence which is the hallmark of negligence. Rather, they charge the recklessness and consciousness characteristic of willful and wanton conduct. Bittenbender successfully moved to strike on the ground that the plaintiff's proof had established an intentional tort, never alleged in the pleadings. There is a substantial difference between willful and wanton conduct, on one hand, and intentional misconduct on the other. An actor guilty of intentional misconduct must intend to cause harm to another. See, e.g., Johnson v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 232 Va. 340, 350 S.E.2d 616 (1986) (actor understood nature and consequences of his conduct and had purpose and volition to cause injury). An actor guilty of willful and wanton conduct intends his act, but not the resulting harm. See, e.g., Booth, supra (drunken driver guilty of willful and wanton conduct even though lacking ill-will, malice, or intention to cause harm). Intentional misconduct and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs from intentional wrongdoing in a very important particular. While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or, from facts which he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong probability is a different thing from the substantial certainty without which he cannot be said to intend the harm in which his act results. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 comment f (1965). Some of our prior decisions have incorporated the term intentional into the description of willful and wanton conduct. For example, the Court stated in Thomas that gross negligence falls short of being such reckless disregard of probable consequences as is equivalent to a wilful and intentional wrong. 162 Va. at 661, 174 S.E. at 839 (emphasis added). Similar expressions are found in Wright v. Osborne, 175 Va. 442, 445, 9 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1940), and Thornhill v. Thornhill, 172 Va. 553, 563, 2 S.E.2d 318, 322 (1939), and appear to derive from Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588, 121 N.E. 505 (1919), which we quoted with approval in Thornhill, Wright, and Thomas. Each of those cases involved an action by a guest passenger against a host driver under the former guest statute and employed the term intentional as a contrast in defining gross negligence. To the extent the term willful and intentional wrong served to distinguish gross negligence from a tortious act intended by the actor, it was sufficiently precise. But the gross negligence cases did not require that any distinction be made between an intentional act done without intending harm, on one hand, and an intentional act done with intent to harm, on the other. Resolution of the issue presented by the present case requires articulation of the difference, and we now make that distinction in accordance with the comment to the Restatement, quoted above. When the evidence in the present case is analyzed in light of the foregoing distinction, it falls short of showing any intention by Bittenbender to cause harm to Infant C. Instead, his motivation may be characterized, in the most unfavorable light, as deliberate self-gratification with a total disregard of the consequences to his victims. Called as an adverse witness by the plaintiff, Bittenbender sought to portray himself as a helpless victim of an illness he was unable to control. He stated that he would never have returned to scouting after his conviction in Rhode Island if he had not thought that his problem was under control. A psychiatrist who had examined him testified that he did not intend to harm his victims, although he realized that the risk of harm to the many boys he molested was a matter of Russian Roulette, in that he thought some boys might suffer harm from his acts and some would not. We conclude that the plaintiff, in Count IV, alleged willful and wanton misconduct on Bittenbender's part, and that the proof at trial conformed to those allegations. Because the trial court erred in striking the evidence under that count, we will reverse the judgment in part and remand the case for further proceedings with respect to Count IV only, consistent with this opinion.