Opinion ID: 1118538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadequate Time for Discovery

Text: Additionally, the trial court should have granted Shriners' request for an extension of time in which to pursue discovery. This case involves claims of fraud and conspiracy. In claims of this type, the defendants often possess information crucial to a full factual presentation of the plaintiff's cause of action. Adequate discovery was therefore essential to Shriners' response in summary judgment posture. In Pace v. Hadley, 742 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 1987), we reversed summary judgment entered where the plaintiffs did not have adequate time to respond to a 12(b)(6) converted motion. In that case, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, on December 23, 1986, only 40 days after the plaintiffs had filed their complaint. The plaintiffs notified the court that insufficient discovery had occurred and that they could not as yet respond to the defendants' motion. On February 9, 1987, the trial court nevertheless entered an order converting the motion to one for summary judgment and granting the plaintiffs only 21 more days in which to file any additional affidavits in opposition to the motions. On appeal, we held that the plaintiffs had not been given adequate opportunity to respond to the motion for summary judgment. We reversed the entry of summary judgment and remanded to permit the parties a reasonable time to complete discovery. Also relevant to the facts of this case is Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1985). In Gay, the plaintiff filed his civil rights complaint on March 12, 1984. On April 3, 1984, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), with accompanying affidavits. Plaintiff initiated discovery on April 6, 1984. He filed some affidavits with the court, but was unable, after requesting extra time which was denied, to complete discovery before summary judgment was entered against him. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit stated as follows: In this case summary judgment was granted when the plaintiff had barely begun discovery. Gay's initial interrogatories were only partially answered by the defendants. The defendants claimed that much requested discovery was privileged. While Gay filed four affidavits, he was ill-equipped to counter the defendants' affidavits because of the defendants' objections to his preliminary discovery.    It was the lack of a reasonable opportunity for discovery which made conversion of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion wholly inappropriate. Because Gay was not afforded an opportunity for reasonable discovery, the district court's treatment of the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment was an abuse of discretion. Gay, at 177-78. See also e.g., Whiting v. Maiolini, 921 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1990); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 424, 429 (N.D.Cal. 1989). The trial court's refusal to grant a continuance for further discovery, coupled with its failure to clarify the nature of the motion before it and the delay caused by the Banks' having previously sought protective orders, prevented Shriners from developing through discovery the facts needed to respond in summary judgment posture. Under the circumstances of confusion and surprise involved here, neither the automatic conversion nor the presumptive ten-day notice requirement should be permitted to defeat the nonmovant's right to develop a response. Having reviewed Shriners' complaint, we cannot say that there is no state of facts on which [Shriners] could conceivably recover. See Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 285 (3rd Cir.1991), cert. denied sub nom. Altran Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 373, 116 L.Ed.2d 324 (1991), and cases cited therein. Therefore, adequate notice and opportunity to respond were essential. The proper action, as in Pace, is to remand to allow further time for Shriners to complete discovery and respond to the motion in summary judgment posture.