Opinion ID: 1191292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admission of testimony concerning indictment of mrs. jakoski's son

Text: Judge Davis permitted defense counsel, over objection by plaintiffs' counsel, to question Mrs. Jakoski about her 19-year-old son's having been indicted in April 1968 on two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon. The Jakoskis argue that the mere introduction of such evidence is a patently prejudicial, indirect and irrelevant attack on Mrs. Jakoski's integrity. They concede that, prejudicial impact notwithstanding, the evidence would be admissible if it contained sufficiently great counterbalancing probative value. But because Holland had not adduced medical evidence relating Mrs. Jakoski's condition to the indictment of her son, the Jakoskis contend that the evidence has no probative value whatever to counter its prejudicial impact. They support their position by citing Smith v. German. [5] Plaintiff Smith alleged that he suffered a severe personality change as a result of injuries sustained in a 1962 automobile accident. Defendant German introduced, over objection, testimony which Smith had given in his own 1964 divorce proceeding, for the purpose of showing that Smith's personality change was caused by his marital difficulties, not the accident. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered this evidence to be highly prejudicial and held that its admission  without any expert testimony to establish a causal connection between the marital difficulties and the personality change  was improper. Citing a 1957 decision, the court said: Where there is no obvious causal relationship [between the event demonstrated and the result sought to be proved], unequivocal medical testimony is necessary to establish the causal connection. [6] Only where the event and the result are so closely connected and so readily apparent that a layman could diagnose (except by guessing) the causal connection may expert testimony be dispensed with. [7] Returning to the instant case, the Jakoskis argue that the admission of questions concerning the son's indictment encouraged the jury to speculate on its effect. They argue that, absent expert testimony establishing a causal connection, such speculation is clearly improper, because the connection is not so readily apparent that a layman could diagnose it. We are not persuaded. Placing the challenged line of questioning into somewhat fuller perspective, we note that plaintiffs' counsel told the jury in his opening statement that prior to the accident the Jakoskis had led a normal, happy home life but that one of the sons had been troublesome. Several of the witnesses corroborated the Jakoskis' happy home life, but none apparently knew of the troublesome son. Most importantly, in her direct testimony, Mrs. Jakoski discussed her home and family life and her children. Alaska Civil Rule 43(g)(7) specifically allows an adverse party to cross examine a witness as to any matter stated in the direct examination or connected therewith ... (emphasis added). Patently, Mrs. Jakoski's testimony on direct examination invited further inquiry into her home and family life on cross-examination. Turning to the issue of probative value, we are satisfied that the indictment of her 19-year-old son and his subsequent trial in July 1968 bore directly on the central question of whether the November accident or other events caused her headaches and accompanying mental and physical disabilities. The crux of our inquiry then is whether the defense should have been required to adduce expert testimony to establish a causal connection. We think that such testimony was not required. This is not to say that we completely reject the test set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Smith and Florig. Rather, we think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied its test too rigorously and in so doing needlessly excluded relevant testimony. The probative value of the son's criminal prosecution is merely a variation on the theme which has already been treated in this appeal: when does ordinary experience suffice as a basis for a witness's testimony concerning medically-related matters? [8] Wigmore argues that, Great liberality should be shown by the [c]ourts in applying [the] principle [that the ordinary experience of everyday life is entirely sufficient], so that the cause of justice may not be obstructed by narrow and finical rulings. [9] We agree with Wigmore's prescription. [10] The indictment of a child, especially in the context of a closely-knit family unit, is so potentially disruptive of the parent's emotions that a layman could reasonably discern a causal connection. Hence we might restate the Smith-Florig test to require expert medical testimony to establish a causal connection only where there is no reasonably apparent (as distinguished from obvious) causal relationship between the event demonstrated and the result sought to be proved. Measured against this standard, the lower court did not err in allowing the challenged questions.