Opinion ID: 440538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Villanueva and Fernandez

Text: 123 A. The interview of Fernandez by a United States Attorney outside the presence of Fernandez's counsel. 124 Prior to trial, with the knowledge and assent of Fernandez's attorney, a United States Attorney offered not to oppose Fernandez's motion to reduce bond, in return for the opportunity to speak with Fernandez privately, outside the presence of his counsel. Fernandez agreed. The government's objective was to investigate what was suspected to be the improper representation of Fernandez and James by their principal attorney, a suspicion subsequently confirmed, resulting in disqualification of the lawyer involved. 125 On the basis of this incident, Fernandez moved the district court to dismiss the indictment. The district court ruled that the communication was improper, but could be remedied by means less extreme than dismissal: 126 Assuming the United States Attorney's behavior amounted to misconduct, the remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered .... United States v. Morrison, [449 U.S. 361, 364, 101 S.Ct. 665, 668], 66 L.Ed.2d 564, 568 (1981).... Fernandez complain(s) of two injuries. One is that the United States Attorney's actions poisoned their relationship with their lawyer. That complaint is mooted by their lawyer's disqualification. The other is that through his conversations with them the United States Attorney gained evidence and leads to even more evidence. The United States Attorney quite properly states he does not intend to introduce in his case in chief any evidence given him in the meetings and that the conversations were not used to obtain evidence. Even if, as defendants allege, evidence were procured through the conversations, the prejudice can be cured by suppression of the evidence. 127 On appeal, Fernandez acknowledges that the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in United States v. Morrison explicitly held that absent demonstrable prejudice, dismissal of an indictment for violation of a defendant's sixth amendment rights is unnecessary. 101 S.Ct. 665, 449 U.S. 361, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981). Inexplicably, however, Fernandez does not challenge the district court's conclusion that the potential for prejudice could be eliminated by means stopping short of dismissal, but instead is content to argue that the government's conduct requires per se dismissal. In effect, the appellant invites us to overrule Supreme Court precedent. We decline. 128 The agreement negotiated by the United States Attorney, wherein Fernandez was to barter his right to counsel in return for his freedom, constituted a coerced rather than voluntary waiver of the appellant's sixth amendment rights, and as such was wholly improper. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977). Nevertheless, we are in complete agreement with the district court that suppression of information obtained from Fernandez in defense counsel's absence assured that the government's misconduct would not prejudice the appellant in any way. Fernandez is unable to point to any evidence admitted at trial that was secured as a result of the improper interview. Accordingly, we affirm its ruling. 129 B. The sufficiency of the evidence supporting Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction. 130 Under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848, a person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of ten years to life. A person is considered to have engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if he violates any provision of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 801 et seq. governing drug abuse prevention and control, in the course of a continuing series of like violations undertaken in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, as a result of which that person obtains substantial income or resources. Villanueva challenges his conviction under this statute, on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he was an organizer or supervisor of the enterprise. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Villanueva's conviction. 131 Evidence supporting Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction came largely from the testimony of two of Villanueva's former co-conspirators: Bill Cobb and Dan Abbey. Cobb testified that from the time of his first involvement in the conspiracy, Acosta, Bascaro, and Villanueva were the ones principally responsible for bringing marijuana into the United States. Cobb testified that Villanueva was involved in overseeing the purchase of suitable vessels, was present at storage sites when marijuana arrived, and participated in planning meetings. Cobb further testified that Villanueva furnished the money to purchase the properties where marijuana was stashed (v. 38 at 152-63); Villanueva together with Acosta were responsible for approving the sites where marijuana was to be offloaded (v. 38 at 183); and the enterprise deferred to Villanueva's judgment as to when the offloading was to occur (v. 38 at 195). 132 Abbey testified that the standard operating procedure of the enterprise was for him to collect the proceeds from various drug sales and turn them over to Villanueva and Acosta. (v. 40 at 15-17; 48-49; 57). Abbey further indicated that Villanueva was one of several members of the organization who would prepare the weight sheets, records reflecting the quantity of marijuana transferred to particular buyers. Weight sheets were reproduced in triplicate, and upon completion of a sale, one copy would go to the buyer, another would be retained by Abbey, and a third would be returned to either Acosta or Villanueva. (v. 40 at 42-44). At the conclusion of his direct examination, Abbey was asked to describe the various roles of the individuals about whom he had testified. He responded, without objection from defense counsel, that Villanueva was in charge of the complete operation initially. (v. 40 at 65-66). 133 The foregoing testimony furnishes an adequate basis for the conclusion that Villanueva occupied a supervisory role in the conspiracy. Certainly the most conclusive evidence of this fact is Abbey's testimony that Villanueva was in charge of the complete operation, and again that he was the top man. (v. 40 at 65-94). Such conclusions were amply supported by Abbey's previous testimony concerning Villanueva's financial control of the enterprise. United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.1978). 134 C. Double jeopardy and Villanueva's convictions for both continuing criminal enterprise and underlying conspiracy counts. 135 In affirming Villanueva's continuing criminal enterprise conviction, we must simultaneously vacate his convictions on counts three and five for conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, on double jeopardy grounds. The conspiracy provisions of the Controlled Substances and Controlled Substances Import and Export Acts proscribe conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined in those acts. 21 U.S.C. Secs. 846; 963. Similarly, the crime of continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in the Controlled Substances Act and construed by the Supreme Court in Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977), includes as one of its elements a conspiracy to violate the provisions of the Controlled Substances or Controlled Substances Import and Export Acts. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(b). In other words, one cannot be guilty of continuing criminal enterprise without also being guilty of conspiracy--the latter is a lesser included offense of the former. Jeffers; United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 1001 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Graziano, 710 F.2d 691, 699 (11th Cir.1983). Where, as here, a defendant is convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise as well as the lesser included offenses of conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, the proper remedy is to vacate both the convictions and sentences of the lesser included conspiracy offenses. Graziano, 710 F.2d at 699.