Opinion ID: 2197540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adoption Act Amendments

Text: The Does' standing to seek custody of Baby Richard is further recognized in the recent amendments to the Adoption Act (Pub.Act. 88-550, eff. July 3, 1994). This legislation was enacted while the Does' adoption case was pending before this court upon petition for rehearing. The amendments modify the Adoption Act to explicitly grant standing to nonbiological parents whose adoption request has been denied or vacated. In pertinent part, section 20 of the Adoption Act was amended to read as follows (the new language is shown in italics): Proceedings under this Act shall receive priority over other civil cases in being set for hearing. No matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of a proceeding under this Act shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim or otherwise. An appeal from a judgment order for adoption or other appealable orders under this Act shall be prosecuted and heard on an expedited basis, unless good cause for doing otherwise is shown. In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a petition for adoption is denied, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the temporary and permanent custody of the minor child who is the subject of the proceedings pursuant to Part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The parties to said proceedings shall be the petitioners to the adoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological parents whose parental rights have not been terminated, and other parties who have been granted leave to intervene in the proceedings. This Act shall be liberally construed, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed shall not apply to this Act.       This amendatory Act of 1994 applies to cases pending on and after its effective date. (Pub.Act 88-550, eff. July 3, 1994, adding 750 ILCS 50/20(b).) The referenced part VI of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides in pertinent part that a nonparent may seek custody of a child when the child is not in the custody of a parent. 750 ILCS 5/601 et seq. (West 1992). The amendments to the Adoption Act contain mandatory language reflecting the plain intent of the legislature, to provide for expedited custody hearings when adoption petitions are denied or adoption judgments are vacated. Necessary parties to such proceedings are the petitioners in the adoption proceeding and any biological parent whose rights have not been terminated. These unambiguous provisions grant the Does direct standing to participate in a hearing regarding Richard's custody. Therefore, unless the amendments do not apply or are held to be constitutionally infirm, Kirchner's challenge to the Does' standing in a custody hearing is wholly foreclosed. The majority rules that the amendments cannot be constitutionally applied retroactively to the instant case. The majority posits that the amendments do not apply because they took effect after this court had finally adjudicated the parties' rights in the adoption case, on June 16, 1994. The amendments became effective on July 3, 1994. Although the Does' avenues of appeal had not been exhausted until well after July 3, the majority holds that, because the petitions for rehearing and petitions for writ of certiorari in the adoption case were denied, the effective date of the final judgment was June 16, 1994, the date on which this court entered judgment in the prior appeal. This reasoning lacks merit and supporting authority. The appeal in the adoption case was not final, but was still pending, when the new enactments relating to custody hearing procedures following failed adoptions went into effect. With respect to when a case was finally decided, for purposes of applying new legislation, this court has held, Where the legislature changes the law pending an appeal, the case must be disposed of by the reviewing court under the law as it then exists, not as it was when the judgment was entered in the lower court. ( Bates v. Board of Education, Allendale Community Consolidated School District No. 17 (1990), 136 Ill.2d 260, 268-69, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1.) The court in Bates also held: [A]n appeal is a continuation of the same case [citation] [and] it follows that until either the time to appeal has expired or, if an appeal is being pursued, until the court of review has rendered a decision, the judgment is not a final adjudication. Bates, 136 Ill.2d at 269, 144 Ill.Dec. 104, 555 N.E.2d 1. Based on the Bates holding, the case involving the Does' adoption order was still pending on July 3, 1994, when the amendments to the Adoption Act became effective. On that date, the Does' petition for rehearing was still pending, and the time in which to seek further review from the United States Supreme Court had not yet passed. Until rehearing was denied and the United States Supreme Court denied review by certiorari, the case was still pending in the courts and was not yet final for the purpose of applying the recent amendments to the Adoption Act. In addition, this court stayed its mandate in the instant case pending review by the United States Supreme Court. Unless and until the mandate issues, there is no final or enforceable judgment. The majority cites one case in support of its holding that the filing of a petition for rehearing does not alter the effective date of the judgment of a reviewing court if the petition is later denied. ( PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Investment Co. (1981), 86 Ill.2d 291, 305, 56 Ill.Dec. 368, 427 N.E.2d 563.) However, PSL Realty has no application to the instant case. That case did not consider or decide the issue presented here, which is simply whether legislation that is enacted while an action is pending before this court on petition for rehearing may be applied to the case that is pending. The proper view of the issue before this court is that expressed in Bates, which held that a suit is still pending, for the purpose of applying recently enacted legislation, so long as the time for requesting appellate review has not yet been exhausted. The rationale of Bates is also consistent with precedent of the United States Supreme Court, which has held that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary. ( Bradley v. School Board of the City of Richmond (1974), 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476, 488; see also United States v. Schooner Peggy (1801), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 2 L.Ed. 49.) These principles apply whether the intervening change in the law derives from a constitutional amendment, a statutory amendment, or a judicial decision by a court of greater authority. ( Bradley, 416 U.S. at 715, 94 S.Ct. at 2018, 40 L.Ed.2d at 490.) A judgment is final, thus taking it beyond the effect of a change in the law, when the `availability of appeal' has been exhausted or has lapsed, and the time to petition for certiorari has passed. Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 2016 n. 14, 40 L.Ed.2d at 488 n. 14, quoting Linkletter v. Walker (1965), 381 U.S. 618, 622 n. 5, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1734 n. 5, 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 604 n. 5. In light of this precedent, the Does' appeal from the vacation of the adoption was still pending, and was not yet final when the amendments to the Adoption Act became effective. The majority does not refer to any of the above cases in its determination that the retroactive application of the Adoption Act amendments to the case at bar is constitutionally prohibited. Instead, the majority suggests that the application of the amendments would alter the vested rights of parties. (164 Ill.2d at 496, 208 Ill.Dec. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 337.) Again, the majority views the vacatur of the adoption on June 16, 1994, as the vesting of rights in Kirchner, who had been improperly denied a most fundamental right, the right to the case, custody and control of his son. (164 Ill.2d at 496, 208 Ill.Dec. at 281, 649 N.E.2d at 337.) Kirchener's right to custody of Richard could not have vested when this court's decision was announced last summer, since that ruling did not pertain to, consider, or decide custody of Richard. The Illinois Attorney General filed a brief in this court, defending the constitutionality of the amendatory legislation. The Attorney General's argument is largely premised on the fact that the circuit court's application of the custody hearing procedures of the new amendments would not alter or reverse this court's opinion, which set aside the adoption. Instead, the amendments clarify the procedures that are to be followed after an adoption is vacated, which thereby obviates the need to rely on section 601(b)(2) or habeas corpus to commence a custody hearing. However, according to the majority, the attempt to distinguish the vacation of the adoption of Richard from what happens after the vacation of the adoption is meritless because the separation of powers analysis does not turn upon inconsequential distinctions. Earlier in this opinion, we noted that prior to the instant amendment, the vacation of an invalid adoption results in the automatic reversion of custody to any fit parent who has not otherwise consented to the relinquishment of his or her rights to the care, custody and control of the child. (Emphasis added.) 164 Ill.2d at 498, 208 Ill.Dec. at 282, 649 N.E.2d at 338. My research reveals no Illinois case, prior to the majority's instant opinion, which stands for the proposition that when an adoption is vacated, custody of a child automatically reverts to an unwed biological father who never had custody of the child in the first place. Indeed, all of the law I have reviewed is to the contrary. (See, e.g., Sullivan v. People ex rel. Heeney (1906), 224 Ill. 468, 477, 79 N.E. 695 (it does not follow    from the invalidity of the [adoption] decree, that the relator is entitled to the custody of the child).) Any automatic reversion of custody following the vacation of the adoption was not in Kirchner, who never had custody, but to the guardian ad litem, whose court-appointed role was to represent Richard, who was, and is, a ward of the court. It was not until the majority granted the instant writ that Kirchner's right to immediate custody of Richard can be said to have vested by any order of this court. Before that date there was in effect a valid order of the circuit court, which granted temporary custody to the Does, to maintain the status quo pending the best-interests hearing. A further consideration militates against the argument that application of the Adoption Act amendments would violate principles of separation of powers. It is well established that the legislature may not enact a statute that dictates the resolution of facts in a pending action, but may enact legislation that mandates which law the court is to apply to the facts in pending cases. ( Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill.2d 563, 570, 17 Ill.Dec. 801, 376 N.E.2d 1382.) The amendments to the Adoption Act at issue here do not attempt to dictate any factual resolutions with respect to pending issues regarding whether the Does should retain custody of the child. Rather, the purpose of the amendments is to clarify applicable legal principles, so that parents who have been granted adoption, but are divested of this adoption right on appeal, nevertheless retain standing to seek custody of the child. Although Illinois case law recognized the right of these nonbiological parents to seek custody after an adoption has been set aside, and section 601 of the Marriage Act may be construed to apply to such nonbiological parents, the enactments are important because they explicitly recognize and accord to such parents the statutory right of necessary party status under the Adoption Act. Where, as here, an amendment is enacted soon after controversies have arisen regarding the statute [that was] amended, it is logical and reasonable to regard the amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original statute. [Citation.] ( People v. Badoud (1988), 122 Ill.2d 50, 56, 118 Ill.Dec. 407, 521 N.E.2d 884.) From this analysis it is apparent that the amendments to the Adoption Act, as applied to the instant cause, do no violence to principles of separation of powers. A strong presumption of constitutionality attaches to the General Assembly's laws, and the burden rests on the party who seeks to invalidate the statute. ( General Telephone Co. v. Johnson (1984), 103 Ill.2d 363, 83 Ill.Dec. 133, 469 N.E.2d 1067.) In the case at bar, Kirchner did not satisfy his burden, and the majority's efforts to aid him are unpersuasive.