Opinion ID: 1661771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Threshold

Text: Defendants raise contentions on appeal that amount to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. One further ground raised was the allegedly improper closing arguments by plaintiffs' counsel. However, this matter was not sufficiently preserved in the record for us to consider it. Defendants moved for summary judgment and for directed verdicts at the close of plaintiffs' cases. The motions were denied. After verdicts for plaintiffs, defendants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts (JNOV) and, in the alternative, for new trials. These motions remained pending for 90 days and were denied perforce by Rule 59.1, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure (A.R.C.P.). To test the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, a party must have moved at trial for JNOV under Rule 50(b), A.R. C.P. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company v. Sealy, 374 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979). A motion for directed verdict is a prerequisite for a motion for a JNOV. Id. Here, defendants moved for directed verdicts at the close of plaintiffs' cases, but not at the close of all the evidence. Rule 50(b). Defendants did, however, submit the following written jury instruction to the trial court: The Court charges the jury that you must find for the Defendant. Under prior practice, such an instruction was known as an affirmative charge. Williams v. First Farmer & Merchants National Bank of Troy, 237 Ala. 132, 185 So. 737 (1938). This Court has noted that a request for an affirmative charge is the substantial equivalent of a motion for directed verdict. Pruitt v. Pruitt, 343 So.2d 495, at 500 (Ala.1976). Defendants point out that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in construing the Federal Rule 50(b), has held that a request for an affirmative charge satisfies the requirement for a directed verdict motion. Jack Cole Company v. Hudson, 409 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1968). In Jack Cole, supra, the court considered defendants' appeal of a denial of their motion for JNOV, despite plaintiff's contention that defendants failed to lay the predicate for the motion by moving for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. The Fifth Circuit noted that defendants had made and argued a motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence and had requested that the jury be instructed to find for them. The court considered the merits of the denial of the motion for JNOV after holding that: There can be no doubt that the trial judge was well aware of the reasons for the requested jury instruction, and, under the circumstances, we hold that this constitutes a sufficient predicate for the subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Roberts v. Pierce, 398 F.2d 954, 956 (5th Cir. 1968). Jack Cole, at 191. In the cases at bar, defendants Boykin and Perdue moved for summary judgments on the ground that the undisputed facts show that the plaintiffs herein have no cause of action. The motion was denied. At the close of plaintiffs' cases, defendants orally moved for directed verdicts, and the parties argued the motions. The court denied the motions, stating that there is a glimmer of a scintilla, which under the law requires the Court to leave the case before the jury. (Defendants argue here that a glimmer of a scintilla is arguably less than a glimmer or a scintilla, the proper standard. We pretermit discussion of this alleged error because we reverse on other grounds.) When defendants submitted the affirmative charge set out above, they gave no grounds therefor and did not object to the trial court's failure to give the charge. If they were appealing the refusal to give this charge, we would hold against them under Rule 51, A.R.C.P. In this posture the equivalence of a request for the affirmative charge to a motion for directed verdict is somewhat dubious, especially in light of Rule 50(a)'s requirement that a motion for directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. The Fifth Circuit has observed that The rule [that a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite for a motion for JNOV] is a strict one, however, and we and other courts have taken a liberal view of what constitutes a motion for directed verdict for these purposes. Quinn v. Southwest Wood Products, 597 F.2d 1018, at 1025 (5th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted). Because defendants had repeatedly made their arguments against the sufficiency of plaintiffs' evidence, we choose to follow the rationale of Jack Cole, supra, and conclude that this case is in an appropriate posture for consideration of the denial of defendants' motions for JNOV. A further peculiarity arises here, in that defendants' motion was denied not by affirmative act of the trial judge, but by operation of Rule 59.1, A.R.C.P., which provides that a post-trial motion pending for more than 90 days is deemed to be denied. The parties here argue whether such a denial of a JNOV and new trial carries the usual effect of strengthening the presumption in favor of a jury verdict. See, e. g., Walker v. Cardwell, 348 So.2d 1049 (Ala. 1977). If such is not the case, the purpose of Rule 59.1 will be undercut, in that denial of post-trial motions by operation of law will probably receive less respect than other final judgments. On the other hand, the rationale for strengthening the presumption of correctness is that the trial judge, who has observed the proceedings, issues an order that the jury verdict is indeed not contrary to the great weight of the evidence and the law; we have no such affirmative statement here. Both Perdue and Boykin filed on December 17, 1979, motions for JNOV, or, in the alternative for new trial. On March 13, 1980, they filed motions for special setting on the motions for new trial. These later motions noted that the 90-day period prescribed by Rule 59.1 was about to expire. The motions recited that the JNOV/new trial motion had been argued on Thursday, February 28, that the judge had been out of town the following day, and that he had been out of the office due to illness for the week of March 3. The motion further notes that the court reporter told counsel for defendant that the judge had denied the motion on Thursday, February 28, 1977, but that there was neither a minute entry nor a written note by the judge of such an order. Under the circumstances, we feel compelled to give great deference to the jury verdict and to the evidence in plaintiff's favor. Nevertheless, Evidence which affords nothing more than mere speculation, conjecture, or guess is wholly insufficient to warrant the submission of a case to the jury. Headrick v. United Insurance Company of America, 279 Ala. 82, 181 So.2d 896 (1966).