Opinion ID: 3134365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Call Codefendant Duncan to Testify

Text: Defendant initially contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call codefendant Duncan to testify or to cross-examine him when he testified in his own defense. Defendant points to two areas of inquiry which, he maintains, should have been brought before the jury. Both were statements contained in discovery materials tendered to defense counsel before trial, but were not made part of the record on direct appeal. Defendant argues that the admission of these statements into evidence through Duncan's testimony would have buttressed his defense and undercut the testimony of the State's witnesses. The first statement was contained in an application for an eavesdropping device tendered to the circuit court on May 26, 1982, by a State's Attorney and a detective. The application recited that police had spoken with Duncan regarding a telephone conversation he claimed to have had with Kevin Anderson the day before the murders. According to the application, Duncan stated to police that Anderson had a drug dispute with both victims Adams and Stevens. Moreover, Anderson told Duncan that Anderson had a person there with him for the purpose of hurting people and that Anderson and the unnamed person were coming to Adams' house the next day in the morning to straighten the situation out. Anderson's purported statement to Duncan is hearsay. Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is generally inadmissible due to its lack of reliability unless it falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 557 (1991). Defendant submits that Anderson's statement was admissible as substantive evidence under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973), and its progeny. These decisions establish that an out-of-court declaration against the declarant's penal interest that the declarant committed the crime, and not the defendant on trial, may be admitted where justice requires and where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such statement. People v. Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 66 (1986) (and the cases cited therein). The Chambers Court considered four factors in making this determination: (1) whether the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) whether the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) whether the statement was self- incriminating and against the declarant's interest; and (4) whether there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 311-12, 93 S. Ct. at 1048-49. These factors are merely guidelines, however, and admissibility ultimately depends on whether the statement was made under circumstances that provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. Pecoraro, slip op. at 6. The statement at issue here was not made under circumstances providing a sufficient indicia of its trustworthiness. The only factor of the Chambers test met was that the statement tended to incriminate Anderson. None of the other factors were met. First, the statement was not made to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred. Not only does the record fail to reveal the relationship between Duncan and Anderson, but Anderson allegedly made this statement to Duncan before the homicides. Neither was the statement corroborated by other evidence. Defendant submits that the following evidence at his trial is corroborating: that Edward Stalder moved in with Kevin Anderson and Bill Mooney in April of 1982, and that Stalder had a history of criminal conduct and drug- related activity. Defendant is suggesting that Stalder was the unnamed person referred to in Anderson's statement. We are compelled to point out that there is nothing in Anderson's statement regarding the identity of the unnamed person. Without more, we may just as easily assume that the unnamed person was defendant. We thus find that the second factor was not met. The fourth factor, whether there was adequate opportunity to cross- examine the declarant, was also not met. Here, there was no opportunity to cross-examine Anderson because he was not called as a witness in defendant's case. Defendant has not presented any other indicia of reliability to support the admissibility of Anderson's statement. We conclude that Anderson's statement is not rendered admissible by the presence of the third factor alone. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 29-30 (1995) (sole presence of this factor did not render statement admissible). Therefore, the statement does not qualify to be admitted as substantive evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant also argues that Anderson's statement was substantively admissible under two other exceptions to the hearsay rule. He asserts that the statement was admissible to show that Anderson acted in conformance with his statement, citing People v. Grabbe, 148 Ill. App. 3d 678, 688-89 (1986), and People v. Reddock, 13 Ill. App. 3d 296, 303-05 (1973). Grabbe and Reddock are distinguishable. The hearsay statements involved in those cases were made by homicide victims to show that they acted in conformance with their stated intent. Defendant has cited no case where this exception was applied in the manner he is suggesting, and we are aware of none. We therefore conclude that this exception is not applicable here. Defendant last submits that Anderson's statement was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule contained in Rule 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)). This court has specifically declined to adopt this exception. People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 313 (1990). Consequently, this exception is not applicable in defendant's case. In conclusion, Anderson's statement was not substantively admissible at defendant's trial under any exception to the hearsay rule. As a result, defendant's trial counsel would not have been able to admit this statement through the testimony of Duncan. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel therefore fails because defendant has shown no deficiency in his counsel's performance. We note, moreover, that we agree with the State that there is no guarantee that Duncan would have relayed Anderson's statement on the witness stand. But even if Duncan had done so, the jury was not likely to have given it much weight. Duncan was a codefendant at defendant's trial. Duncan gave this statement to police a short time after the murders. The jury could well have concluded that Duncan was implicating Anderson at that time in an attempt to deflect suspicion from himself. The second statement referred to by defendant was contained in a police report. The report recited that Merle Merkle told police that Duncan told her that he saw a glimpse of the killer as he walked out the door and that this person was not at Adams' house when Merkle was there. Defendant claims his trial counsel should have questioned Duncan on whether he made this statement. Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to question Duncan regarding this alleged statement. The statement at issue amounts to a prior inconsistent statement by Duncan. A prior inconsistent statement is admissible solely for impeachment purposes; it is not admissible as substantive evidence of the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Bryant, 94 Ill. 2d 514, 522 (1983). At best, then, this prior inconsistent statement by Duncan could have been used to impeach Duncan's trial testimony that he slept through Adams' slaying. This impeachment of Duncan would not have benefitted defendant. To the contrary, impeachment of Duncan on this basis would have lent support to the State's theory that defendant and Duncan conspired together at Adams' house to murder Adams. Therefore, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly dismissed for failure to meet the prejudice prong of Strickland.