Opinion ID: 900517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dismissal Under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5)

Text: [¶ 13.] As habeas proceedings are civil in nature, the rules of civil procedure apply to the extent they are not inconsistent with SDCL chapter 21-27. SDCL 15-6-81(a). Motions to dismiss, therefore, are appropriate to dispose of nonmeritorious applications. A court may dismiss a habeas corpus petition for failure to state a claim under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5) only if it appears beyond doubt that the petition sets forth no facts to support a claim for relief. See Schlosser v. Norwest Bank South Dakota, 506 N.W.2d 416, 418 (S.D.1993). Fact allegations must be viewed in a light most favorable to the petitioner. Stumes v. Bloomberg, 1996 SD 93, ¶ 6, 551 N.W.2d 590, 592 (citations omitted); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1363, at 656 (1969). A motion to dismiss under § 12(b)(5) challenges the legal sufficiency of the petition. Stumes, 1996 SD 93, ¶ 6, 551 N.W.2d at 592 (citation omitted); see also Thompson v. Summers, 1997 SD 103, ¶ 5, 567 N.W.2d 387, 390 (citations omitted). As the United States Supreme Court noted, when a court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence ... its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test. Scheuer; 416 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. at 1686. Motions to dismiss in civil actions are generally disfavored, Thompson, 1997 SD 103, ¶ 5, 567 N.W.2d at 390, but a habeas petition may be more susceptible to dismissal because the remedy it seeks is limited, being in the nature of a collateral attack on a final judgment. Lien v. Class, 1998 SD 7, ¶ 10, 574 N.W.2d 601, 606 (citing Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, 560 N.W.2d 544). To survive a motion to dismiss under § 12(b)(5), an application for habeas corpus must pass a minimum threshold of plausibility. Cf. Dellenbach v. Hanks, 76 F.3d 820, 822-23 (7th Cir.1996) (applying this standard under federal habeas corpus). If an applicant's allegations are unspecific, conclusory, or speculative, the court may rightfully entertain a motion to dismiss. See SDCL 21-27-5 (writ may be denied if it appears from the application itself that no relief can be granted). Also, if pleadings fail to allege a requisite element necessary to obtain relief, dismissal is in order. See 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 12.07[2.5], at 12-68 & n. 19 (2d ed 1987). [¶ 14.] Under § 12(b)(5), whether an applicant fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be ascertained from the face of the application. Once a court considers matters outside the application, the § 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss converts into a motion for summary judgment. When matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in § 15-6-56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by § 15-6-56. SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5). We have held that consideration of matters beyond the pleadings under Rule 12 triggers the notice provision of Rule 56(c). Eide v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 1996 SD 11, ¶ 5, 542 N.W.2d 769, 770. Failure to convert and provide litigants with reasonable notice to permit addition to the record can constitute reversible error. Id.; see, e.g., Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671-72, 92 S.Ct. 1232, 1234, 31 L.Ed.2d 569 (1972). Nonetheless, despite consideration of matters outside the pleadings, a court's error in failing to convert the motion and to comply with Rule 56 is harmless if the dismissal can be justified under § 12(b)(5) standards without reference to matters outside of the pleadings. See 2A Moore, supra, ¶ 12.09[3], at 12-82 n. 8 (citing Medina v. Rudman, 545 F.2d 244 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 266, 54 L.Ed.2d 177 (1977); R.J.R. Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir.1989)). Moreover, the failure to give notice that the matter is being converted to a summary judgment proceeding does not necessarily mandate reversal where nothing else could have been raised to alter the entry of summary judgment. See Malak v. Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d 277, 281 (7th Cir.1986). [¶ 15.] In dismissing Debra's application, the habeas court went far beyond the pleadings, apparently reviewing the trial record and considering the facts as set forth in this Court's opinion in her direct appeal and in the decisions from her federal habeas proceedings. Although it is generally held that the court cannot go beyond the pleadings in a motion to dismiss under § 12(b)(5), there is at least one exception. In addition to the pleadings and exhibits attached to the pleadings, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. 2A Moore, supra, ¶ 12.07[2.-5], at 12-89; MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir.1986) (citations omitted); Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C.Cir.1979) (on motion to dismiss court can consider factual allegations of complaint and matters of general public record). Despite the language of Rule 12(b), when a court takes judicial notice of facts, it will not convert a dismissal motion into a motion for summary judgment. Only when a court goes beyond judicially noticed facts and pleadings will it be required to convert the motion and give both sides notice and an opportunity to supplement the factual record. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir.1986), abrogated on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 111 S.Ct. 2166, 115 L.Ed.2d 96 (1991).. In habeas actions a court may take judicial notice of an applicant's prior judicial proceedings. Alexander v. Solem, 383 N.W.2d 486, 489 (S.D.1986); see Boykin v. Leapley, 471 N.W.2d 165, 167 (S.D.1991); Lee v. DeLano, 466 N.W.2d 842, 843 (S.D.1991). These materials are not subject to reasonable dispute and their accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. SDCL 19-10-2 (Rule 201(b)). Moreover, [a] court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. SDCL 19-10-3 (Rule 201(c)). [¶ 16.] The habeas court properly considered the trial record and the prior opinions in ruling on the § 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. On review, we examine the same materials to decide if the court ruled correctly. This and the question whether trial counsel was ineffective are ultimately legal questions, reviewable de novo. Lykken v. Class, 1997 SD 29, ¶ 6, 561 N.W.2d 302, 304-05 (quoting Aliberti v. Solem, 428 N.W.2d 638, 640 (S.D.1988)). South Dakota has adopted the test for ineffective assistance of counsel announced in Strickland. See Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781, 784-86 (S.D.1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court stated: A convicted defendants' claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction ... resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also Phyle v. Leapley, 491 N.W.2d 429, 432 (S.D. 1992), as modified by Hopfinger v. Leapley, 511 N.W.2d 845, 846-47 (S.D.1994). A habeas applicant must rebut the strong presumption that counsel was competent. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). The burden is on the applicant to prove that counsel's substandard performance prejudiced the outcome. Hofer v. Class, 1998 SD 58, ¶ 9, 578 N.W.2d 583, 585; Phyle, 491 N.W.2d at 432; Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473, 475-76 (S.D.1990). Prejudice is found when there is a reasonable probability that, but for the unprofessional errors of counsel, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Phyle, 491 N.W.2d at 432; see Ashker, 457 N.W.2d at 476. A reasonable probability means proof sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Phyle, 491 N.W.2d at 432. We need not determine the sufficiency of counsel's performance before examining whether the defendant was prejudiced by alleged deficiencies, however. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, ... that course should be followed. Id. [¶ 17.] Here, we take the Supreme Court's suggestion and go directly to the second prong of the Strickland standard. The question is whether, as a matter of law, failure to counter the testimony of Dr. Randall prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Debra never alleged in her application or suggested in this appeal that there are any experts who would materially contradict Dr. Randall's opinions. In her reply brief in this appeal she pinpointed her primary complaint, contending that trial counsel should have either versed himself in forensic pathology sufficient to cross-examine Dr. Randall's new testimony [the `unique' mark the airplane made] or sought a rebuttal expert witness. Dr. Randall had not identified this wound for its uniqueness in his pathology report. He gave this opinion for the first time at trial. However, on cross-examination Dr. Randall admitted that this wound on Abby's body was only similar in shape. Dr. Randall did not testify that any of the wounds were in fact caused by the airplane found in the Jenner home. What could a counterexpert have said on this point that would be so impeaching as to have changed the outcome of this case? Debra's counsel gives us no suggestion. [¶ 18.] The child was stabbed approximately seventy times. Some of the injuries were caused by a knife, others by a different instrument having physical properties similar to the airplane. Assuming for argument's sake that trial counsel's practice was deficient, how the outcome could have been different seems inconceivable. As we said in her direct appeal, a mass of circumstantial and direct evidence convinced [the] jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she murdered her child. Jenner; 451 N.W.2d at 724. It was not only the pathologist's opinion. Indeed, [t]he evidence against Debra includes her own statements[ ] ...; and when she remarked that her hair was down, and Abby pulled it, this tallies with the hair samples taken from Abby's body. This is highly damning against her. Id. at 723. We conclude the habeas court properly dismissed her application under § 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.