Opinion ID: 170276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The introduction of Mr. Brown's warrantless arrest

Text: Mr. Brown filed a motion to suppress his statements regarding his involvement in the murder arguing they were the product of an illegal arrest. After the authorities confronted Mr. Brown with evidence that his codefendant Mr. Wilson confessed to the crime and implicated Mr. Brown, he too confessed involvement in the crimes. The OCCA did determine that Mr. Brown's four-hour detention and subsequent interview were illegal. It concluded that it was the intention of the officers to first obtain: a confession from [a codefendant] while the other [codefendants] were in custody and then use Wilson's confession to prod the others into making incriminating statements. We find that this purposeful and flagrant violation of Brown's basic constitutional rights tainted his statement to police. 989 P.2d at 926. After the OCCA determined that the illegal arrest tainted the confession, it considered whether the error was harmless. The OCCA examined whether the State shouldered its heavy burden to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the illegally obtained statement did not contribute to the conviction. Id. at 927. However, rather than shouldering, the State shrugged: it refused to concede that the arrest was illegal, and made no argument as to harmless error. As the OCCA stated, Mr. Brown's statement revealed the following: First, he stated that he was at his girlfriend's house at the time the crime occurred. Then, after being confronted with Wilson's confession, he confessed to being involved in the crime. Brown stated that he arid the other codefendants attacked Yost while he was near the freezer area. They took Yost to the back room where he held Yost's arm down while Harjo beat him to death with a baseball bat, striking him fifteen to twenty times. Brown stated that he stayed in the back room the whole time so that no one would enter the back room. Brown stated that Wilson and Alverson planned the robbery two weeks in advance. 989 P.2d at 927. Despite the State's failure to argue harmless error, the OCCA undertook a sua sponte harmless error analysis and determined that the remainder of the evidence regarding Mr. Brown's involvement was substantial. Id. The State presented the video surveillance tape which captured the defendants attacking Yost and dragging him into the back room. Brown was positively identified on the video surveillance tape and on a thermal image made from the tape. Brown, in the video, is seen dragging Yost into the back room and not coming out during the time the video is running. The diagrams indicate that there is no other way in or out of the back room other than the door shown in the surveillance video. The State presented evidence that Brown was with Wilson and the other two defendants within twelve hours of the crime when officers stopped Alverson's vehicle. Id. The OCCA then held: The video alone was sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Brown was an accomplice in the first degree murder of Yost. When viewing all of the evidence, excepting Brown's confession, we can honestly say that the introduction of the confession during the first stage of trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Brown's convictions must not be disturbed based on this proposition. Id. (emphasis added). Although we note Judge Chapel's observation that the illegal arrest was a very serious constitutional violation, id. at 936 (Chapel, J., dissenting), Supreme Court precedent precludes us from addressing this contention directly. Although in general our habeas jurisdiction addresses violations of the United States Constitution, we may not overturn a state criminal conviction because of a violation of the Fourth Amendment if the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this claim. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ([W]e conclude that where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment Claim, a state prisoner may not be, granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial. (footnote omitted)); Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.2d 51, 55 (3d Cir.1986) ([F]or purposes of the Stone v. Powell rule, a habeas petitioner's claim that a state appellate court improperly found a Fourth Amendment violation to be harmless does not have a separate identity and may not be raised in a habeas petition in federal court.). Mr. Brown does not contend that he did not have such an opportunity. Instead he pointlessly seeks a ruling that Stone does not apply to capital cases, although we have previously applied it in such cases. See, e.g., Cannon v. Gibson, 259 F.3d 1253, 1260-62 (10th Cir.2001); Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 1999). Because the OCCA thoughtfully considered the facts underlying [Mr. Brown's] Fourth Amendment claim and rejected the claim on its merits, applying the appropriate Supreme Court precedent, we agree with the district court that Stone bars us from considering this clam. Smallwood, 191 F.3d at 1265.