Opinion ID: 856641
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Junior’s Psychiatric Evaluation

Text: Before Byrom’s trial, the court ordered psychiatric evaluations for Byrom, Junior, and Gillis. The same doctor, Dr. Criss Lott, conducted each evaluation, and the results were transmitted to the trial court for in camera review. To date, Byrom has not seen Dr. Lott’s evaluation of Junior. However, Byrom contends that Junior confessed sole responsibility for Edward’s murder to Dr. Lott. Byrom makes this inference on the basis of information gleaned from two sources. First, in a newspaper article about Gillis’s trial, an Assistant District Attorney purportedly stated that, while preparing to try Gillis, the government learned of statements Junior made to Dr. Lott that conflicted with his anticipated testimony. Second, Dr. Lott has apparently confirmed Junior’s statement to Byrom’s counsel. Dr. Lott was even preparing to share Junior’s evaluation before the trial court forbade him from doing so. However, Byrom was aware of Junior’s alleged statement to Dr. Lott before her state court appeal 16 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 and yet did not challenge the evidence’s suppression. Having failed to raise these claims previously, they are procedurally barred. Nevertheless, Byrom seeks discovery of Dr. Lott’s report in order to establish three constitutional claims: (1) a Brady violation; (2) her actual innocence under Schlup; and (3) her ineligibility for the death sentence under Sawyer. Discovery is permitted only if good cause is found. Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 2000). Good cause may be found when a petition for habeas relief “establishes a prima facie claim for relief.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969)). As explained below, Byrom has not met this standard.
“Under Brady, a defendant’s due process rights may be violated when exculpatory or impeachment evidence, which is both favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment, is concealed by the government.” Id. In this context, “materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Rather, the defendant need only show a reasonable probability of a different result. Id. A Brady violation is established by “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435. Here, Byrom has not made a prima facie showing of a Brady violation because Dr. Lott’s report does not create a reasonable probability of a different result at Byrom’s trial. According to Byrom, Junior’s evaluation would demonstrate that Junior took responsibility for Edward’s death when interviewed by Dr. Lott. She seizes on this in order to claim that, had the report been produced before trial, it would have discredited Junior’s testimony and aided Byrom’s case. This may be true, but, through cross-examination 17 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 concerning the jailhouse letters, Junior’s testimony was already discredited at trial and in precisely the fashion Byrom describes here. While Byrom was restricted from showing Junior’s letters to the jury, her attorney questioned Junior about the letters’ contents and elicited testimony that undermined Junior’s testimony broadly and his statements regarding his mother’s role in the murder specifically. He has already admitted to giving multiple inconsistent statements regarding who was responsible for Edward’s murder. The inclusion of one additional instance of such a statement thus does not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Dr. Lott’s report would merely bolster Byrom’s initial attempt at discrediting Junior’s testimony; it would not “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. Since this does not amount to good cause, we deny Byrom’s claim.
As discussed previously, raising an actual innocence claim requires showing “that ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). This test “does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty.” Id. at 329. Byrom characterizes the aforementioned Brady claim as the constitutional violation underpinning her actual innocence claim. However, for the same reasons discussed above, Dr. Lott’s report does not establish a prima facie case of actual innocence. Byrom would have used Dr. Lott’s report in precisely the way she used Junior’s jailhouse letters. The effect of the report thus falls well short of the requisite standard. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (requiring that new evidence make it “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Having failed to show good cause, Byrom’s claim is denied. 18 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026
In order to contest her eligibility for the death penalty, Byrom must show, based on the evidence proffered and all record evidence, that there is a fair probability that a rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the facts which made her eligible for the death penalty. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346–47 (1992). Here, Byrom claims that the evidence produced at trial—taken together with Dr. Lott’s report—would create a fair probability that no rational juror would have found her guilty of participating in a murder-for-hire scheme, the capital crime for which she was convicted. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(d). Byrom has not, however, made the requisite showing. While Dr. Lott’s report would have supported Byrom’s theory of the case, in light of the other evidence produced at trial—including Byrom’s own confessions—it cannot be said that a rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of a murder-for-hire scheme. According to Byrom, the parties planned to murder Edward. Junior implicated Byrom, Gillis, and himself; and Byrom separately implicated herself on more than one occasion. Even with Dr. Lott’s report, it cannot be said that a rational trier of fact would harbor a reasonable doubt as to Byrom’s guilt. Byrom has thus failed to show good cause, and we deny her claim accordingly. Having disposed of Byrom’s motion for an expanded COA and Byrom’s motion for additional discovery, the Court will next address those issues for which the district court granted a COA.