Opinion ID: 170256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reverse Sex-Based Discrimination Barry Adamson.

Text: As previously stated, Barry Anderson claims the board discriminated against him on the basis of sex by applying the anti-nepotism policy to target him and out of a discriminatory concern that he, as a man, would exercise undue influence over his wife and daughter as women. The district court approached this claim without reference to Notari or the heightened standards a plaintiff who is not a member of the traditionally disfavored class must meet to make a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. Instead, the district court presumed the existence of a prima facie case and entered summary judgment against Adamson based on the failure of his evidence to create an inference of pretext. We conclude Barry's reverse discrimination claim premised on the company's selective application of the anti-nepotism policy falls with his claim based on familial status. While Barry incants the phrase as a man in his claim, he makes clear his purpose in targeting the company's application of its anti-nepotism policy is not to demonstrate reverse discrimination under Notari, but to reveal the company's true purpose was to terminate him on the basis of his familial status as Patricia's husband and Jessica's father. According to Barry, the anti-nepotism policy was applied to fire him, his wife and daughter while a father and son also working at the company were not fired. Because discriminating against him as husband and father is not actionable discrimination under Title VII, direct evidence of such an intent states no cognizable claim for relief. Viewing Barry's allegations through the McDonnell Douglas paradigm as stating a claim for reverse gender discrimination under Notari is similarly to no avail. In Notari v. Denver Water Dep't., 971 F.2d 585 (10th Cir.1992), we noted the presumption of invidious intent created by establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas arises precisely because the plaintiff belongs to a disfavored group. Id. at 589 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978))(A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on consideration of impermissible factors.). When plaintiff is a member of a historically favored group, by contrast, an inference of invidious intent is warranted only when `background circumstances support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.' Id. at 588-89, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (quoting Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d, 1012, 1017 (D.C.Cir.1981)). See also Livingston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 802 F.2d 1250 (10th Cir.1986)(adopting Parker standard in reverse disparate impact cases and assuming, in dicta, that the standard would apply in disparate treatment cases, as well). Mr. Adamson's facts fall far short of demonstrating background circumstances sufficient to create an inference of reverse discrimination under Notari 's standards. In Notari, as in Greene, we recognized that plaintiffs are not limited to the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove intentional discrimination. A plaintiff may rely either upon circumstantial evidence and the McDonnell Douglas presumption that arises from it or present direct proof of discriminatory intent. 971 F.2d at 589. Thus, Barry is entitled to prove, through direct evidence and without reference to McDonnell Douglas, that his termination was, in fact, motivated by the fact that he is a man. It is not enough, however, for a plaintiff merely to allege that he was a qualified man who was treated differently than a similarly situated woman. See id. Instead, he must allege and produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference that, but for his status as a man, the challenged decision would not have occurred. Id. To the extent statements that Mr. Adamson might exert, undue influence over his wife and daughter are offered as direct evidence of discriminatory intent, they fall short of the standard because they are not linked, in any direct manner, to the characteristic upon which any actionable sex-based claim would be based, i.e., Adamson's gender. They are, if anything, tied to Adamson's familial status and assumed supervisory role over his wife and daughter, neither of which implicate Title VII's prohibitions. To the extent Adamson relies on this statement as evidence of MCDS's bias against men, it is circumstantial evidence that does not, without additional background circumstances within our contemplation in Notari and Livingston, give rise to any inference that MCDS terminated him on the basis of his sex. To the contrary, it suggests only that Adamson, an at-will employee who was terminated from his job, happened to be a man. Absent evidence tending to demonstrate that but for his being a man he would not have been terminated, no inference of sex-based discrimination is raised. Mr. Adamson's Title VII claims fail as a matter of law without reference to MCDS's stated reasons for terminating him.