Opinion ID: 2635616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did The District Court Err When It Sentenced Trautloff To Life In Prison Without The Possibility Of Parole?

Text: Trautloff initially contends that he did not meet the prerequisite prior convictions required by statute for enhancing his sentence to life without the possibility of parole. This issue turns on the meaning of the statutory phrase prior conviction event. On July 24, 1996, in case number 96CR122, Trautloff was convicted of one count of aggravated indecent liberties with a 9-year-old child, one count of aggravated indecent liberties with an 8-year-old child, and one count of rape of an 8-year-old third child. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed one of the two convictions of aggravated indecent liberties and the rape conviction but reversed the second aggravated indecent liberties conviction. State v. Trautloff, No. 77,772, 960 P.2d 267, unpublished opinion by the Court of Appeals filed April 24, 1998, rev. denied 265 Kan. 889 (1998). In the present case, the district court relied on the two prior convictions that were upheld on appeal to sentence Trautloff to terms of life imprisonment without parole. The question presented on appeal is whether the prior convictions constituted a single conviction event or multiple conviction events, as defined by the legislature. K.S.A. 21-4642(a) provides that aggravated habitual sex offenders shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole. The statute defines an aggravated habitual sex offender to be a person who, on and after July 1, 2006:(A) Has been convicted in this state of a sexually violent crime . . .; and (B) prior to the conviction of the felony under subparagraph (A), has been convicted on at least two prior conviction events of any sexually violent crime. K.S.A. 21-4642(c)(1). The statute defines prior conviction event as one or more felony convictions of a sexually violent crime occurring on the same day and within a single count. These convictions may result from multiple counts within an information or from more than one information. K.S.A. 21-4642(c)(2). Resolving this issue requires understanding the meaning of the words within a single count. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. State v. Storey, 286 Kan. 7, 9-10, 179 P.3d 1137 (2008). An appellate court's first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature's intent through the statutory language it employs, giving ordinary words their ordinary meaning. State v. Stallings, 284 Kan. 741, 742, 163 P.3d 1232 (2007). When a statute is plain and unambiguous, this court will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read the statute to add something not readily found in it. In that situation, the court does not need to resort to statutory construction. It is only if the statutory language or text is unclear or ambiguous that the court moves to the next analytical step, applying canons of construction or relying on legislative history to construe the statute to give effect to the legislature's intent. In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 79, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007). As a general rule, criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt as to the meaning of the statute is decided in favor of the accused. Nevertheless, this rule of strict construction is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent. State v. Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 662, 175 P.3d 840 (2008). The difficulty in the present case is the lack of harmony between two parts of the statutory definition of a prior conviction event. Trautloff's prior convictions were for multiple felonies involving sexually violent crimes contained in the same information; these convictions occurred on the same day but not within a single count. Because it is not possible for more than one felony conviction to occur within a single count, as the statute posits, it is appropriate to look into the history of the legislation and to apply the canons of statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent. A review of the legislative minutes relating to the enactment of K.S.A. 21-4642 in 2006 reveals no discussion of section (c)(2). It is likely that the legislature drew the conviction event language from older versions of the sentencing guidelines. See K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4703; K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4720(b)(4). K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4720(b)(4) provided in part: The total sentence assigned for a current conviction event cannot exceed twice the base sentence. A conviction event was defined as one or more felony convictions occurring on the same day and within a single court. These convictions may result from multiple counts within an information or from more than one information. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A.1993 Supp. 21-4703(c). The legislature deleted these references to conviction events in 1994. See L.1994, ch. 291, secs. 49 and 59. As a general rule, courts should read statutes to avoid unreasonable results and should presume that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. Board of Sumner County Comm'rs v. Bremby, 286 Kan. 745, 754, 189 P.3d 494 (2008). We conclude that the wording of K.S.A. 21-4642(c)(2) is the product of a typographical error and that the legislature intended to include convictions occurring on the same day and within a single court. We are confirmed in this conclusion by the legislature's correction of the statute in L.2009, ch. 70, sec. 3, changing count to court. Trautloff clearly has two prior convictions, but the statute specifically addresses conviction events, not convictions. The legislature could have written the statute to define an aggravated habitual sex offender as an offender convicted of two prior crimes. The legislature instead chose to define the aggravated habitual sex offender as one who is convicted on at least two prior conviction events. The language of 21-4642(c)(1) and (c)(2), when the sections are read together, supports a reading that a conviction on a single day of multiple counts, even involving multiple victims, constitutes only one prior conviction event. This interpretation is supported by this court's prior analysis of K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4703(c) in State v. Roderick, 259 Kan. 107, 114, 911 P.2d 159 (1996), holding that repealing the 1993 Supp. 21-4703(c) same-day, same-court rule changed the double rule in sentencing to a same-day, same-information rule. The State argues that Trautloff failed to object to his criminal history at sentencing. While it is true that Trautloff conceded at sentencing that he had two prior convictions of sexual crimes, he did not concede that he had two prior conviction events. This court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. K.S.A. 22-3504(1); State v. McCarley, 287 Kan. 167, 172, 195 P.3d 230 (2008). An illegal sentence, as contemplated by K.S.A. 22-3504(1), is a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; a sentence that does not conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or the term of the punishment authorized; or a sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served. State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 767, 769, 156 P.3d 665 (2007). Trautloff had only one prior conviction event for sexually violent crimes, and the district court erred in sentencing him to life terms without the possibility of parole. The district court determined that Trautloff had a criminal history classification of E. The nature of the crimes, however, will possibly make him subject to K.S.A. 21-4643(b)(1), requiring a life sentence with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 40 years, subject to certain mitigating circumstances. Because Trautloff is currently 43 years old, the difference between mandatory life and mandatory 40-year sentences is unlikely to be great.