Opinion ID: 3064457
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act

Text: James argues that the FJDA does not allow the trial of a juvenile as an adult on charges that have not been the subject of a transfer hearing. We review compliance with the requirements of the FJDA de novo. United States v. D.L., 453 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006). [1] Whether the FJDA requires every charge brought against a juvenile tried as an adult to be the subject of a juvenile transfer hearing appears to be an issue of first impression. We conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 5032 of the FJDA allows additional charges to be brought against a juvenile who has already been transferred to adult status without requiring another juvenile transfer hearing. [2] We look first to the statutory language. Section 5032 of the FJDA, which sets forth the procedures for transferring a juvenile to adult status, also states: 1 James’s other challenges do not merit a lengthy discussion. First, the district court did not plainly err by admitting James’s prior adjudications because a finding of intent for the priors can be inferred from the record, and the priors were alternatively admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Second, the district court’s remedial steps of requiring the government to put all of the information it learned from Violet Tsosie on the record, and ordering it not to use any of this information, were sufficient to protect James’s right to counsel. See United States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1980) (explaining that the right to counsel is only violated where the government uses wrongfully acquired information to gain an unfair advantage). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the right had been violated. See, e.g., United States v. Hagege, 437 F.3d 943, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2006). UNITED STATES v. JAMES 2345 Whenever a juvenile transferred to district court under this section is not convicted of the crime upon which the transfer was based or another crime which would have warranted transfer had the juvenile been initially charged with that crime, further proceedings concerning the juvenile shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of this chapter. 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (emphasis added). This sentence describes two groups of crimes for which a juvenile may be convicted: “the crime upon which the transfer was based” and “another crime which would have warranted transfer.” The first group covers those crimes that were the subject of a transfer hearing. The second group—those crimes that “would have warranted transfer”—presupposes that a minor may be convicted as an adult for an offense that had not been the subject of a transfer hearing. If every charge required a transfer hearing and determination, there would be no need for this second group because every crime would be one upon which “transfer was based.” The logic of the juvenile transfer process supports our reading of the statute. To determine if a transfer to adult prosecution is in the “interest of justice,” the district court is required to consider and make findings as to six factors: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; the juvenile’s present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. [3] Once the court has determined that a juvenile should be tried as an adult, requiring an additional hearing to determine 2346 UNITED STATES v. JAMES whether related charges added later meet the same standards would serve little purpose. It does not require a hearing to identify the newly added offenses or to ascertain the juvenile’s age, both currently and at the time he allegedly committed the offenses. The remaining factors that the district court must consider primarily concern the individual characteristics of the juvenile himself rather than the details of the offenses, and those characteristics were already the subject of the first hearing. If the added charges arise from the same series of acts as the original charges, as they did here, the “interest of justice” analysis should remain unchanged. Indeed, if additional charges had any effect, it would seem to be to tip the balance even further away from juvenile treatment. The decision to transfer a juvenile to adult status represents a determination that “the risk of harm” posed by that juvenile “outweighs the . . . chance for rehabilitation.” United States v. Juvenile, 451 F.3d 571, 575 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Juvenile Male, 245 Fed. Appx. 597 (9th Cir. 2007). It is implausible that a juvenile would be less of a threat or more amenable to rehabilitation because of additional charges. In his appeal, James has challenged the process, but he has not presented a substantive argument that the counts subsequently added against him should not have been included within his adult prosecution. A new hearing on that subject by the district court would not have led to any different result. [4] If there are reasons why charges added later should be dealt with separately and as part of a juvenile proceeding rather than being included within an adult prosecution, those reasons can be presented to the district court. The court could decide not to permit the juvenile to be tried as an adult on any or all of the added counts. But it would not make sense to require another juvenile transfer hearing when it would almost always produce an obvious result. The district court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss the charges added UNITED STATES v. JAMES 2347 against James on the ground that they had not been the subject of a juvenile transfer hearing.