Opinion ID: 782294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instructions on Uncharged Offenses

Text: 18 In relation to the conspiracy count, the district court instructed the jury as follows: Count One of the first superceding indictment accuses the defendants of a conspiracy to commit the crime of distribution of cocaine and cocaine base in violation of federal law.... For you to find any one of these defendants guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count One, the Government must prove each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 First, that two or more persons did conspire or agree to commit the crime of distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. In other words, the conspiracy, itself, has to be proven first, or the agreement.... 20 With regard to the first element — I want to put some flesh on the bone. With regard to the criminal agreement, the Government must prove that two or more persons conspired or agreed to cooperate with each other — to cooperate with each other to commit the crime of possession with intent to distribute or to distribute. 21 Brown argues that the district court violated the Fifth Amendment by referring to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute when the indictment only charged him with conspiracy to distribute. He claims that the added reference to possession with intent substantially prejudiced him by constructively amending the indictment. 22 Because Brown failed to object to this instruction in the district court, we are again confined to plain error review. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781. The Fifth Amendment protects defendants from being convicted of an offense different from that which was included in the indictment. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (holding that a conviction cannot stand if based on an offense that is different from that alleged in the grand jury's indictment). We have held that a constructive amendment to the indictment violates that Fifth Amendment right; [a] constructive amendment occurs when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment. United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir.1986). 23 In order to prevail, Brown must show that the jury instruction created a substantial likelihood that he was convicted of an offense separate and distinct from the ones charged in the indictment. At least one circuit has held that the crime of possession with intent to distribute is distinct from the crime of distribution. See United States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir.1978). Even assuming that this is good law, Brown's argument fails because he cannot show a substantial likelihood that he was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, rather than conspiracy to distribute. First, the district court stated three times that the underlying offense of the conspiracy was distribution. Second, the special verdict form specifically indicated that the jury voted to convict of conspiracy to distribute. The court even walked the jury through the form, line by line. Third, the indictment clearly indicated that the conspiracy was only related to distribution, and the jurors were given a specific instruction to limit their verdict to crimes charged in the indictment. 24 These facts are clearly distinguishable from the case which Brown cited, United States v. Solis, 841 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.1988). In Solis, the defendants were charged with the crime of distribution, but the jury was given an additional instruction that it could convict for the uncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 308. The jury merely returned a verdict of guilty as to count 4. Id. at 309. Although count 4 was distribution, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the verdict as stated was unenlightening as to whether the jury was under the impression, due to the additional instructions, that they could convict on count 4 if they found possession with intent to distribute. Id. In the instant case, considering the instructions as a whole and the specificity of the special verdict form, there is very little chance that the jury mistakenly convicted Brown of the wrong conspiracy. Therefore, there is no Fifth Amendment violation or, certainly, no plain error affecting substantial rights.