Opinion ID: 1817827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Referee's Consideration of the Circumstances Surrounding the Conviction

Text: Cohen first argues that the referee improperly assessed the evidence surrounding his conviction and, based on this assessment, made factual determinations contrary to those in Cohen's federal plea agreement. Cohen argues that the referee was bound by the stipulation in his plea agreement that he did not know the funds received from Taylor were proceeds of illegal activity. We agree with the Bar, however, that in determining the appropriate discipline, the referee could consider aggravating factors, including Cohen's knowledge of the illicit nature of the cash he concealed for Taylor. Although a referee may not go behind a conviction to determine the attorney's guilt, see Fla. Bar v. Kandekore, 766 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Fla.2000), a referee may consider evidence concerning the circumstances behind a conviction in determining the recommended discipline. In State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Evans, 94 So.2d 730, 735 (Fla.1957) (emphasis omitted), the Court explained why attorneys may introduce such evidence in disciplinary proceedings: [I]n a disbarment proceeding based on conviction of a crime, the proof of conviction and an adjudication of guilt are sufficient to establish a prima facie case for disciplinary action. Due process, however, requires that the accused lawyer shall be given full opportunity to explain the circumstances and otherwise offer testimony in excuse or in mitigation of the penalty. . . . . We are of the view that when a lawyer is found guilty of a felony the adjudication of guilt is sufficient to justify setting in motion the disciplinary process. It may not, of itself, always prove him unfit to practice law. However, when not adequately controverted or explained after a full and fair hearing, the judgment of guilt may then constitute the basis for disciplinary action. Thus, the Court has allowed attorneys facing Bar discipline to introduce evidence of circumstances behind their convictions to establish mitigation in favor of less severe discipline. For example, in Florida Bar v. Pavlick, 504 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 1987), attorney Pavlick was indicted for conspiracy to import marijuana, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and distribution of marijuana. Pavlick ultimately entered an Alford [2] plea to the crime of being an accessory after the fact to the concealment of a felony. 504 So.2d at 1232. During the subsequent Bar disciplinary proceedings, Pavlick maintained that he was innocent of the crime to which he pled, and he only entered the plea because his obligations to his family prevented him from risking the imposition of a more severe punishment should he be convicted at trial. Id. at 1233. Citing Evans, the Court held that the referee properly considered Pavlick's testimony and evidence regarding the underlying case, as well as his reasons for entering the plea, to mitigate the recommended penalty. Id. at 1234. Similarly, in past cases the Bar has been permitted to present evidence of the underlying case to support assertions that more severe discipline is warranted due to aggravating circumstances. In Florida Bar v. Jahn, 509 So.2d 285, 286 (Fla.1987), attorney Jahn pled nolo contendere to the felonies of delivery of cocaine to a minor and possession of cocaine. Jahn's convictions were based on two separate incidents, one in which he injected himself and a nineteen-year-old female with cocaine, and the other in which he engaged in the same conduct with a fifteen-year-old female. Id. At the disciplinary hearing, in an effort to show that Jahn's behavior was even more reprehensible than his convictions indicated, the Bar presented the females' testimony that Jahn had injected them against their will. Id. The referee ultimately concluded that the females' testimony was highly unreliable and that their cocaine use was consensual. Id. On review before the Court, the Bar argued that, by not accepting the testimony of the females as credible, the referee was attempting to refute the facts underlying Jahn's plea, thereby going behind his convictions. Id. The Court disagreed, noting that the referee specifically found Jahn admitted the felony convictions and accepted responsibility for his conduct. Id. The Court found that the referee's decision to accord the females' testimony little weight did not constitute an improper attempt to refute the convictions. Id. The Court ultimately approved the referee's finding that the females' cocaine use was consensual. Id. In this case, the referee did not consider evidence concerning Cohen's knowledge of the illicit nature of the concealed money to find Cohen guilty of a more severe crime. In fact, the referee accepted Cohen's plea agreement and conviction as conclusive proof that Cohen was guilty of the underlying crime and, therefore, guilty of violating the above-mentioned rules of professional conduct. See also R. Regulating Fla. Bar 3-7.2(i)(3) (providing that where the underlying criminal charges constitute felony charges, determinations or judgments of guilt shall . . . constitute conclusive proof of the criminal offense(s) charged). Instead, the referee properly considered the circumstances surrounding the crime to determine potential aggravating and mitigating factors for purposes of discipline. We also approve of the referee's use of common sense and logic in making his factual findings based on the evidence presented. We agree that it strains credulity that an attorney would believe that $640,000 in cash delivered in plastic-wrapped $10,000 bundles for storage in a safety deposit box was legitimately acquired. Cf. Fla. Bar v. Massari, 832 So.2d 701, 703-05 (Fla.2002) (approving referee's finding that client's signature on a document was a forgery where referee found it belie[d] common sense that [the client] would transpose his signature onto [the document] rather than sign the document). Even though a respondent attorney may have stipulated with another entity about certain facts, a referee assessing the credibility of a respondent attorney's testimony at a disciplinary proceeding may draw his or her own conclusions. Nor is the Bar, which was not a party to the other proceeding, precluded from presenting evidence of such underlying circumstances to aid the referee in determining the appropriate discipline.