Opinion ID: 2070830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implied Right of Action Under the FHSA.

Text: The Sparkses contend the earlier dismissal of that portion of their suit based on violation of the FHSA, 15 U.S.C.A. sections 1261-1276 (West Supp.1986), was error because there is an implied right of action under the Act. [1] Whether Congress intended a right of action in a federal statute when none is expressly provided depends on an examination of the following four inquiries set out in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, 36 (1975): First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enactedthat is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? (Citations omitted.) Since Cort v. Ash , only one appellate federal court has considered the precise issue confronting us. [2] See Riegel Textile Corp. v. Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894 (2d Cir.1981). In Riegel, the court undertook an exhaustive analysis of the FHSA in light of the four Cort inquiries and concluded the Act does not imply a private right of action. Id. at 903. As to the first Cort inquiry, the court noted that by its terms section 1263 does not provide a private judicial remedy to a party injured by the introduction into interstate commerce of a banned or misbranded hazardous substance. The language simply prohibits such introduction. Thus, the language of section 1263 contrasts markedly with that of other statutes which the Supreme Court has stated expressly identify the classes Congress intended to benefit. Id. at 900. The court conceded that other sections of the Act, particularly section 1261(q)(1), which defines a banned hazardous substance, demonstrate an intent to protect buyers of household products, and especially children for whom toys are purchased, but quickly concluded the plaintiff [3] was clearly not within such a class. Id.; see Doane v. Metal Bluing Prods., Inc., 568 F.Supp. 744, 746 (N.D.N.Y.1983) (holding that Riegel foreclosed private right of action under FHSA as to all plaintiffs mother of infant son who was poisoned had no implied right of action against manufacturer of product that son allegedly ingested causing his death). Moving to the second inquiry under Cort, the Riegel court focused its attention on the legislative history of the FHSA to determine whether Congress intended to create or deny a private remedy. [4] The court found that the purpose of the FHSA was to achieve nationwide uniformity in the regulation of certain hazardous products and that its emphasis was preventive, not remedial. Riegel, 649 F.2d at 901. The court concluded the history of the FHSA demonstrates Congress' intent that the FHSA enforcement provisions parallel those of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Section 1263, which specifies that certain acts are prohibited, is largely patterned after the corresponding section of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The FHSA, as originally enacted, focused on the labeling of certain products, with enforcement solely through agency action, as in the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In expanding the FHSA to allow for a direct ban on certain products where a cautionary label would not suffice to protect consumers, the legislative history does not indicate a change in the Congressional intent that enforcement be by the agency. Id. at 901 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Turning to the third inquiry under Cort, whether a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, the court envisioned that multiple and unconstrained private suits under the FHSA would undermine the goal of a coordinated regulatory program. Id. at 901. Allowing courts in private suits to determine on a case-by-case basis what is a banned hazardous substance would, in the court's view, result in inconsistency in enforcement. Id. at 902. Finally, under the fourth Cort inquiry, the court noted that the plaintiff's claims, grounded in product liability, negligence and breach of warranty, are traditionally the concern of state law and are no less viable because the products may also be regulated, factors militating against implying a private cause of action under the FHSA. Id. at 902-03. We concur in the foregoing analysis and conclude the Sparkses have no implied right of action under the FHSA. Moreover, we doubt whether the FHSA has any applicability to this case. The petition alleges the solvents were used in the work place. The legislative history and wording of the statute make clear that the purpose of the statute is to require labeling for substances that will, in the ordinary course, be found in homes. See Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1186-87 (4th Cir.1977); 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261(q)(1), 1261(p), 1263 (West Supp.1986). Finding no error as to either ruling of the district court, we affirm. AFFIRMED.