Opinion ID: 2584137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Our Decision in Lopez to Uphold New Mexico's Sentencing Scheme

Text: {18} After Booker, but while Frawley's case was still pending, we published Lopez, a case in which the defendant challenged, inter alia, his aggravated sentence for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. See Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶¶ 18, 29, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754. Citing the California case of Black I, we stated that [a]fter Booker, we are not persuaded Frawley was correctly decided. Id. ¶ 36 (citing Black I, 35 Cal.4th 1238, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d 534). The California sentencing scheme analyzed in Black I resembled our own in that a California judge was required to sentence a defendant to a precise middle term, unless there [were] circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, in which case the judge could impose an upper or lower term. See Black I, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, although certain aggravating factors were listed in the governing statute, the judge [was] free to consider any additional criteria reasonably related to the decision being made. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Ultimately, the court in Black I held that the upper term was the relevant statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes since the only thing limiting a judge's ability to impose the upper term was the requirement that the exercise of his or her discretion be reasonable. See id. 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d at 545. Although we recognized that the majority of the few state courts reaching the issue had held that Blakely requires a state court to equate the presumptive sentence in a determinate sentencing scheme with the punishment authorized by the jury's verdict, we explicitly rejected that position and sided with Black I. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 53, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754. {19} We agreed with Black I that the United States Supreme Court cases ought not be viewed as `draw[ing] a bright line.' Id. ¶ 46 (quoting Black I, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d at 547) (alteration in original). Important to our reliance on Black I was that court's view that Blakely and Booker `established a constitutionally significant distinction between a sentencing scheme that permits judges' to exercise judicial discretion within a range and one `that assigns to judges the type of factfinding role traditionally exercised by juries in determining the existence or nonexistence of elements of an offense.' Id. ¶ 54 (quoting Black I, 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d at 542). Ultimately, just as the Court of Appeals did in Wilson, in holding our sentencing scheme constitutional we relied on what we believed our Legislature intended by the 1979 amendments. Id. ¶ 55. Specifically, we concluded that our Legislature's intent behind the amendments was only to limit the trial court's discretion to punish within a range by taking into consideration a wide range of circumstances, and to provide for meaningful appellate review. Id. ¶ 55 (emphasis added). Thus, we concluded that our sentencing scheme so construed posed no constitutional problem because, under this analysis, the statutory maximum for Blakely purposes would be the basic sentence plus one-third. See id.