Opinion ID: 1160484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Clark's Prior Acts of Violence

Text: As previously stated, police were called to the Clark residence on April 17, 1993, after Diana suffered an injury during an argument with Clark. Diana subsequently maintained, as she does in this case, that Clark was not responsible for the injury. The second incident occurred on August 8, 1993, when the police were again called to the Clark residence after Diana and Clark had argued. On that date, Clark had become violent during the argument with Diana, causing substantial damage to their property. Diana initially lied to the police, telling them that a burglar had damaged the property; however, she later admitted that Clark had damaged the property after the police challenged her story. Clark contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to question Diana regarding these two prior incidents, arguing that those events should have been precluded under HRE Rule 404(b) or Rule 403. HRE Rule 404(b) provides: Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible where such evidence is probative of another fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the date, location, and general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. In criminal cases, the proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the date, location, and general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. HRE Rule 403 provides: Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. In State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 778 P.2d 704 (1989), we stated: [HRE] 404(b) prevents the introduction of [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a person in order to show that he [or she] acted in conformity therewith. The framers of the rule recognized that such evidence tends to distract the trier of fact from the main question of what actually happened on the particular occasion. [HRE] 404, Commentary (quoting Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed.R.Evid.) 404 advisory committee's note). It ... permits the trier... to reward the good [person] and to punish the bad [person] because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened. Id. [HRE] 404(b) thus codifies the common law rule that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of other criminal acts of the accused unless the evidence is introduced for some purpose other than to suggest that because the defendant is a person of criminal character, it is more probable that he [or she] committed the crime for which he [or she] is on trial. E.W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 557-58 (3d ed.1984) (footnotes omitted). . . . Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may, however, be admissible where [it] is probative of any other fact that is of consequence to the determination of the [case], such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident. [HRE] 404(b). But its acknowledged tendency to distract the trier of fact compels the trial court to weigh the evidence and to exclude it if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. [HRE] 403. Id. at 517-18, 778 P.2d at 710 (some brackets in original). In State v. Castro, 69 Haw. 633, 756 P.2d 1033 (1988), we explained that, when evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts is offered by the prosecution, the problem for the trial court is one of classifying and then balancing[, if necessary]. If its purpose is only to show some propensity to commit the crime at trial, there is no room for ad hoc balancing. The evidence is then unequivocally inadmissible[.] If it is probative of any other fact of consequence in the determination of the case, the court must then consider whether the prejudicial impact of the evidence would be substantially greater than its probative worth. Id. at 644, 756 P.2d at 1042 (quoting E.W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190 (3d ed.1984)); see also State v. Renon, 73 Haw. 23, 32, 828 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1992) ([T]he court must first determine if the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is relevant and `probative of any other fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident.' HRE 404(b). If such evidence is determined to be relevant, the court must then balance the probative value of the relevant evidence against its prejudicial impact. Rule 403. (footnote omitted)).
The list of permissible purposes in Rule 404(b) is not intended to be exhaustive for the range of relevancy outside the ban is almost infinite. E.W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 448 (Cleary ed.1972). In United States v. Miller, 895 F.2d 1431 (D.C.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 79, 112 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990), the United States District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained: [Rule 404(b)] was intended not to define the set of permissible purposes for which bad-acts evidence may be admitted but rather to define the one impermissible purpose for such evidence. `Only one series of evidential hypotheses is forbidden in criminal cases by Rule 404: a [person] who commits a crime probably has a defect of character; a [person] with a defect of character is more likely than [people] generally to have committed the act in question.' 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger ¶ 404(8) at 404-52. In other words, under Rule 404(b), any purpose for which bad-acts evidence is introduced is a proper purpose so long as the evidence is not offered solely to prove character. The Government's right to introduce bad-acts evidence for purposes other than showing a defendant's criminal propensity is by no means unlimited. But the limits derive from the `general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules 402 and 403,' not from Rule 404(b). Huddleston [v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 688], 108 S.Ct. [1496] at 1500[, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988)]. Id. at 1436. In this case, the prosecution contends that: The testimony [regarding the two prior incidents] was relevant to establish that [Diana], as an individual in an abusive relationship, could be expected to protect [Clark] by taking blame for the injuries she suffered as a result of the attack at issue in the instant matter. The testimony regarding the incident on August 8th, also demonstrated [Diana's] tendency to take the blame to protect [Clark]. That [Diana] would take the blame to protect [Clark] appears to be a characteristic common to individuals in abusive domestic relationships. The inquiry into the circumstances of the two prior incidents was only part of the testimony the prosecutor sought to elicit to establish that as a victim of domestic violence, [Diana] would recant her earlier statement that [Clark] had stabbed her and blame herself to protect him. The prior incidents of domestic violence between Diana and Clark showed the jury the context of Diana's relationship with Clark. The context of Diana's relationship with Clark was relevant because the relationship was offered as the basis for Diana's recantation at trial. In State v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 468 (Minn.Ct.App.1994), defendant was charged with sexual assault for having inserted a metal hanger into his girlfriend's rectum and vagina. Within two days following the incident, the victim told her roommate, her sister, at least two police officers, and a domestic abuse counselor that the defendant had sexually assaulted her. Id. at 470. However, a few days after the incident, the victim told her sister that she had lied about the assault, that she had used the hanger on herself, and that she did not want [defendant] to go to prison because of her false allegations. Id. The prosecution refused to drop the charges, basing its case on [the victim's] original statements and evidence that a battered woman often recants truthful accusations she has previously lodged against her abuser. Id. In addition, at trial, a police officer was allowed to testify that ... [defendant] had threatened [the victim] and her mother. Id. Defendant was convicted following a jury trial. On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals approved of the trial court's admission of evidence that defendant had previously threatened the victim and her mother. The court explained: Evidence of other acts or wrongs is not admissible to prove a person's character. Minn.R.Evid. 404(b). It is admissible, though, if relevant, to show the relationship between the defendant and the victim. State v. Thieman, 439 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 1989) (prior threat admissible to show strained relationship); ... In this case, the evidence was introduced to show Thompson's relationships with [the victim] and her mother, and it was relevant because the state claimed those relationships were the basis for [the victim's] retraction of her allegations. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the evidence. Id. at 471 (emphases added). In Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1 (Del.1995), the prosecution charged defendant with forcing his fiance to have intercourse. Following the incident, the victim told the police officers who responded to her 911 call and the doctor who treated her at the hospital that defendant had forced her to have intercourse. At trial, however, the victim admitted arguing and fighting with defendant on the night in question, but denied having been raped. [Victim] explained that, when she spoke to the police on [the date of the incident,] she was angry, tired and upset. [Victim] testified that she exaggerated a lot about what had happened because she wanted the police to remove [defendant] from the apartment. Id. at 3. To refute the victim's testimony, the prosecution sought the admission in evidence of several prior violent episodes between the defendant and the victim. The [prosecution] argued that the repeated acts of violence established a course of conduct that helped prove [the victim's] lack of consent to sexual intercourse. In addition, the fact that [the victim] was enduring an abusive relationship helped explain why, as the [prosecution] correctly anticipated, she would recant her prior statements and testify that the sexual relations were consensual. The trial judge agreed and allowed the [prosecution] to ask [the victim] about five other incidents where [defendant's] conduct resulted in [the victim] calling the police, going to a hospital emergency room for treatment, or both. Id. at 5. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge, noting that the evidence was material [and] introduced for a proper purpose[.] Id. In accordance with the foregoing authority, we hold that, where a victim recants allegations of abuse, evidence of prior incidents of violence between the victim and the defendant are relevant to show the trier of fact the context of the relationship between the victim and the defendant, where, as here, that relationship is offered as a possible explanation for the victim's recantation.
However, as previously stated, once the evidence of prior bad acts is determined to be relevant, the court must then balance the probative value of the relevant evidence against its prejudicial impact. Renon, 73 Haw. at 32, 828 P.2d at 1270 (citing HRE 403) (footnote omitted). With regard to whether Diana's testimony concerning the prior incidents was more probative than prejudicial, the trial court stated that, under the circumstances of a complaining witness who is recanting an original statement, the [c]ourt has made a determination that for these purposes, the probative value [of the prior instances of domestic discord] far outweighs any prejudice that may result as a consequence of introducing this evidence. We have stated that the determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence under HRE 403 is eminently suited to the trial court's exercise of its discretion because it requires a cost-benefit calculus and a delicate balance between probative value and prejudicial effect[.] Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai`i 14, 19, 897 P.2d 941, 946 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Kealoha v. County of Hawaii, 74 Haw. 308, 315, 844 P.2d 670, 674 (1993) (quoting Kaeo v. Davis, 68 Haw. 447, 454-55, 719 P.2d 387, 392 (1986))). In arguing that evidence concerning his prior misconduct should have been precluded, Clark relies upon Castro. In Castro, a jury convicted the defendant of attempted murder and assault in the first degree. At trial, the court allowed the victim, the defendant's former girlfriend, to recount prior incidents where [the defendant] slapped her, punched her, threatened her while wielding a knife, held a gun to her head, raped her, and threatened her on the telephone[.] Id. at 641, 756 P.2d at 1039-40. The trial court concluded that such evidence was admissible, pursuant to Rule 404(b), stating that the evidence was relevant in the establishment of intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and modus operandi and the probative value was much greater than the prejudicial impact. Id. at 644, 756 P.2d at 1041-42. On appeal, this court determined that the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting inquiry into the prior acts of violence between the victim and the defendant because the record demonstrated that the defendant did not dispute that he stabbed his ex-girlfriend. In fact, defendant testified that he knew what was happening but just `couldn't stop.' Id. at 639, 756 P.2d at 1039. Because identity was not at issue, we deemed unpersuasive the trial court's suggestion that the evidence was relevant to prove preparation, plan, and modus operandi, recognizing that each of these Rule 404(b) acceptable purposes ultimately go to the element of identity. Although we recognize that identity is not an issue in this case, Castro nevertheless underscores the importance of the need factor [4] when weighing probative value versus prejudicial effect under Rule 404(b). A. Bowman, Hawai`i Rules of Evidence Manual 112 (1990). The Castro court's emphasis on the need for the evidence warrants the admission of the evidence at issue in the present case. Here, the incidents of Clark's prior violence and Diana's behavior were admissible to show the trier of fact Diana's relationship with Clark, where that relationship was offered to explain a central fact of consequence  Diana's recantation. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's determination that the probative value of the prior incidents of domestic violence far outweights any prejudice that may result as a consequence of introducing this evidence. We therefore hold that, where the complaining witness recants his or her pretrial accusation against the defendant, evidence of prior acts of domestic violence involving the complaining witness and the defendant is admissible, subject to the HRE 403 balancing test, to show the jury the context of the relationship between the victim and the defendant, where the relationship is offered as a possible explanation for the complaining witness's recantation at trial.