Opinion ID: 2051368
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Heading: Strict Liability Under Iowa Code Section 351.28.

Text: Iowa Code section 351.28 imposes strict liability for damages done by a dog: The owner of a dog shall be liable to an injured party for all damages done by the dog, when the dog is caught in the action of worrying, maiming, or killing a domestic animal, or the dog is attacking or attempting to bite a person, except when the party damaged is doing an unlawful act, directly contributing to the injury. This section does not apply to damage done by a dog affected with hydrophobia unless the owner of the dog had reasonable grounds to know that the dog was afflicted with hydrophobia and by reasonable effort might have prevented the injury. Id. At common law, one who harbored a dog knowing it to be vicious, as well as the owner in possession, was liable for the injuries committed by the dog. Alexander v. Crosby, 143 Iowa 50, 51, 119 N.W. 717, 717 (1909). At the time this court decided Alexander, there was a statutory provision similar to our present dog-bite statute, section 351.28. See Iowa Code § 2340 (1907). In Alexander, this court concluded that section 2340 changed the common law by (1) dispensing with proof of scienter, and (2) imposing liability only on the owner in possession of the dog and not on one who simply harbors it. In interpreting the statute, the court observed: It will be noted that two changes from the common law are involved in this statute: (1) The owner alone is made liable, and (2) proof of scienter is dispensed with. The word owner is not of technical significance and is to be construed according to the context and approved usage of the language. As employed in this statute it evidently signifies the person to whom the dog legally belongs, for under the modern decisions the dog is recognized as a species of property. Alexander, 143 Iowa at 53, 119 N.W. at 718 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court held that while liability is imposed on the legal owner, ownership could be shown by establishing that the defendant had the dog in his possession, and was harboring [it] on his premises as owners usually do with their dogs. Id. (quoting O'Hara v. Miller, 64 Iowa 462, 463-64, 20 N.W. 760, 761 (1884)). The court attempted to explain why the legislature based liability on ownership alone: The owner may be assumed to be familiar with the nature of his animal, and, if he elects to retain a dog whose manners are such as are likely to be corrupted by listening to the call from the wild, this may well be at his own risk; but to charge one who does no more than furnish shelter to a wanderer and food to the stranger at his gate without knowledge of the bad character of his guest and render him liable might well be thought an ungracious recompense for kindness to man's best friend. Alexander, 143 Iowa at 54-55, 119 N.W. at 718. At the time this court decided Alexander, there were taxation and licensing provisions of dogs which were not part of the chapter that imposed liability on a dog owner. See Iowa Code §§ 457, 458 (1897). For the purposes of these provisions, any person keeping or harboring a dog was deemed to be an owner. See Iowa Code § 457. In 1924, the legislature combined the taxation and licensing provisions (sections 457 and 458) and the liability provision (section 2340) into one chapter, Iowa Code chapter 276 (1927). Several years thereafter, this court held that the definition of owner ([a]ny person keeping or harboring a dog) in the licensing and taxation provisions also defined an owner under the liability provision. Bigelow v. Saylor, 209 Iowa 294, 296, 228 N.W. 279, 280 (1929). Bigelow did not define keeping or harboring. We defined those terms in Collins v. Kenealy to apply to any person who keeps permanent possession and custody of dogs on their premises with or without a showing of legal title. 492 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1992) (interpreting Iowa Code section 351.2 (1989), which defined owner of a dog to include in addition to its ordinary meaning... any person who keeps or harbors a dog) (emphasis added). In Collins, the defendants brought their dog to the plaintiff to be groomed. The dog bit the groomer, and the groomer sued the owners. The district court sustained the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that the groomer, who had exclusive control of the dog, became an owner by statutory definition and could not recover from the dog's real owner. We reversed, concluding that the term `any person who keeps or harbors a dog' does not apply to a temporary custodian such as the plaintiff dog groomer in this case. Id. at 682. In short, because the dog groomer did not have permanent possession of the dog, we did not consider the groomer an owner. In 1994, the legislature repealed Iowa Code sections 351.1 through 351.24, the licensing and taxation provisions. That repeal carried with it the definition of owner found in section 351.2. We conclude the repeal narrowed the meaning of owner in the strict liability statute, Iowa Code § 351.28. See Holding v. Franklin County Zoning Bd., 565 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 1997) (holding that if a provision is not in the statute, the court must assume the omission was deliberate); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. De Gooyer, 379 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1985) (holding that in construing a statutory change, a court must assume that the legislature was aware of the court's prior construction of the statute). Here, the district court acknowledged the repeal and the repeal's legal effect but nevertheless assumed for the purposes of the case that the pre-1994 definition would control. Even though there was evidence that Barker, walked, fed, and petted the dog, the court found these actions were not enough to constitute harboring or keeping. In applying the pre-1994 definition of owner, the district court erred. The meaning of the word owner in section 351.28 is more narrow than its meaning before the 1994 repeal of the section 351.2 definition of owner, which, as mentioned, included keeping or harboring. The word owner in section 351.28 now means legal owner as the court in Alexander had concluded. As we shall see, however, the district court reached the right result on this issue. With the repeal of the statutory definition of owner, we have come full circle to Alexander. As mentioned, in Alexander, this court held that while liability is imposed on the legal owner, ownership could be shown by establishing that the defendant had the dog in his possession and was harboring it on his premises as owners usually do with their dogs. Alexander, 143 Iowa at 53, 119 N.W. at 718. Presumably, establishing legal title in these circumstances is not an absolute requirement. Thus, where there is no evidence of legal ownership, the plaintiff can still prove the defendant is the owner of the dog by showing that (1) the dog was in the defendant's possession, and (2) the defendant was harboring the dog on the defendant's premises as owners usually do with their dogs. Applying the Alexander test, we conclude reasonable minds would not differ on whether the evidence shows that Barker was the owner of the dog; we hold as a matter of law she was not. Mason, not Barker, held legal title to the dog, a fact that was uncontroverted. This is as far as we need go on this issue.