Opinion ID: 1490004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Doctor Tanguay's Testimony

Text: The hearing justice next found that John Brown was ineffective because he failed to object to Dr. Tanguay's testimony about his counseling session with Brown on the grounds that Tanguay, who said that he had dealt with an awful lot of sex offenders, offered what amounted to expert testimony. Doctor Tanguay further testified that it is very typical in sexual abuse cases with the offender particularly, there's [ sic ] seems to be some minimization, minimizing of what happened. The hearing justice noted that John Brown compounded his failure to object to this material by his own cross-examination. The following exchange between John Brown and Dr. Tanguay occurred during the trial: JOHN BROWN: In your meeting with Mr. Brown, you discussed [Emily] and his interaction with [Emily]? DOCTOR TANGUAY: Yes. JOHN BROWN: Mr. Brown never stated anything about having sexual intercourse with [Emily], did he? DOCTOR TANGUAY: Not to my knowledge. I don't recall that detail. I know it's a very serious detail, but I don't recall that JOHN BROWN: Detail? DOCTOR TANGUAY: Yeah, but there was sexual contact, abuse. JOHN BROWN: I'm sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt you, Mr. Tanguay. Didn't Mr. Brown, in fact, inform you as regards a situation wherein [Emily] had come to him and touched him? DOCTOR TANGUAY: I don't recall that. JOHN BROWN: That's quite possible? DOCTOR TANGUAY: It's possible, but that would have been part of the denial pattern. I think that's the way I would have seen it, I mean. JOHN BROWN: The only information Well, strike that. Besides what you were informed by these two individuals, did you have any other information available to you prior to your speaking with Danny Brown and [Julie]? DOCTOR TANGUAY: Only possibly a conversation. I'm sure there was a conversation with [Janikuak] when she made the referral, and as I said, I knew when the couple came up what it was in regard to. JOHN BROWN: You would have considered Mr. Brown having stated to you that there was an incident wherein [Emily] had come to him and touched him a denial? DOCTOR TANGUAY: I believe that what was going on, as I recall it, was that there was a denial pattern going on, and that would be very typical of that type of an offense, that `I was seduced,' orI have dealt with an awful lot of sex offenders, and that would be to me, I would wonder about that and probably would have confronted that. JOHN BROWN: When you use the word denial, am I to understand you correctly that you perceive that the individual has committed an act in your mind for which they are not claiming up to? DOCTOR TANGUAY: Total. They're not claiming total responsibility, or the extent of the effect. It was like something like, well, that was no big deal, or something; whereas to the child it would be a very big deal[.] So, that type of confrontation is what typically goes on. I've been told by sex offenders that they have been seduced by a two year old, and that type of thing. That's what I'm saying. And I don't recall the exact details of it and of the conversations, it's three years ago. But I do recall that there was an admission of guilt, and when we say denial, it doesn't mean denial that he did it; it means a minimization, minimizing either the effect, or what happened, or JOHN BROWN: So, even Danny Brown telling you outright about the touching incident would still be, no matter what he stated to you, considered a denial? DOCTOR TANGUAY: Not necessarily, unless, uh, unlessno, I'm not understanding that this would be considered denial. Let's make it a `for instance.' If someone tells me, `Yes, I had sex with this child, but she seduced me,' that is typical denial pattern of the sex offender, and what I would do is I wouldI suppose that's a possibility, that's within the realm of possibility. JOHN BROWN: I don't want to talk about possibility. I want to talk about this particular meeting with my client, Danny Brown. DOCTOR TANGUAY: I do not recall. What I recall is that he made an admission of sexual abuse against his stepdaughter, and it was as the conversation unfolded it was more significant than I had been led to believe in the beginning. JOHN BROWN: When you say you were led to believe in the beginning, that was based on what you were informed by Elizabeth Janikuak? DOCTOR TANGUAY: And by him in the beginning; `Yes, we did have some sexual contact.' JOHN BROWN: And, are you saying that [Emily] at eight years of age having come up and touched my client, you have constituted being sexual abuse? PROSECUTOR: Objection. DOCTOR TANGUAY: Well, yes, I would, yes. JOHN BROWN: I have no further questions. The hearing justice found that [t]he failure to object to this material, and the elicitation of it by defense counsel, constitutes ineffective representation, because Dr. Tanguay's testimony proffered `expert' opinion concerning sexual abuse and the defendant's credibility, which constituted impermissible bolstering. Before this Court, Brown contends that the hearing justice correctly ruled that this was an error of sufficient magnitude to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because: (1) Dr. Tanguay never was qualified as an expert; (2) there was no foundation establishing the basis of his opinion; and (3) there is no indication that Dr. Tanguay's testimony would have survived a challenge based on a failure to satisfy the standard for the admissibility of scientific expert testimony. The state argues that it had no reason to question John Brown about his decision not to object to portions of Dr. Tanguay's testimony or the rationale behind his approach to Dr. Tanguay's cross-examination because the issue was not raised in Brown's application nor was it brought to light during his questioning of John Brown at the postconviction-relief hearing. The state argues that it should at least have the opportunity to inquire of John Brown on this issue. We, however, believe this is unnecessary for us to dispose of the issue. While we are mindful of the fact that Brown proceeded pro se in his application for postconviction relief, and that  [p]ro se litigants are often granted greater latitude by the court,    they `are not entitled to greater rights than those represented by counsel.' Jacksonbay Builders, Inc. v. Azarmi, 869 A.2d 580, 585 (R.I.2005) (quoting Gray v. Stillman White Co., 522 A.2d 737, 741 (R.I.1987)). Brown has failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his application should be granted. He never presented any evidence concerning John Brown's failure to object to Dr. Tanguay's testimony. Furthermore, even if Brown had presented some evidence on this issue and as a result we were to conclude that John Brown was deficient in this regard, there is no evidence that Brown was prejudiced by this deficiency because there was other compelling evidence of Brown's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As this Court said during Brown's direct appeal: Most tellingly, [Brown] admitted at trial that his stepdaughter had touched him sexually. Even more damning were [Brown's] admissions to Dr. Tanguay, in the presence of [Emily's] mother. At trial the mother testified that [Brown] told Dr. Tanguay in her presence that he had touched the girl `[t]wo to three times in a month' when Dr. Tanguay pointedly asked him whether there had ever been any sexual abuse. Indeed, [Brown] conceded on the witness stand that he had been referred to Dr. Tanguay for counseling `because of what happened between me and [Emily].' Brown, 709 A.2d at 475. Additionally, Emily testified at trial about the abuse visited upon her. There was a plethora of evidence from which the jury could conclude that Brown was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; this alone prevents us from reaching a conclusion that any potential errors by John Brown prejudiced Brown's defense. 4