Opinion ID: 1831063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to scott while denying it to brent.

Text: ¶ 12. This case is before us pursuant to a Miss. R. Civ. P. 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. We recognize that motions for summary judgment challenge the legal sufficiency of all or part of an opponent's case. Dawkins & Co. v. L & L Planting Co., 602 So.2d 838, 841 (Miss. 1992). This Court utilizes a de novo standard in reviewing a grant of summary judgment. Allen v. Mac Tools, Inc., 671 So.2d 636, 640 (Miss.1996); Owen v. Pringle, 621 So.2d 668, 670 (Miss.1993). A trial court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Roussel v. Robbins, 688 So.2d 714, 725 (Miss.1996). The motion for a summary judgment challenges the very existence of legal sufficiency of the claim or defense to which it is addressed; in effect, the moving party takes the position that he is entitled to prevail as a matter of law because his opponent has no valid claim for relief or defense to the action, as the case may be. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983). When reviewing an award of summary judgment, this Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, including `admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc.' and will presume that all evidence in the non-movant's favor is true. Allen, 671 So.2d at 640. Where there is doubt whether a fact issue exists, the non-moving party is the beneficiary of that doubt. Id. at 640. If any triable issues of fact exist, the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed. Id. at 640. Otherwise, this Court affirms the decision. Id. at 640. Notwithstanding our respect for and deference to the trial judge, on matters of law it is our job to get it right. That the trial judge may have come close is not good enough. Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d 236, 239 (Miss.1991) ( quoting UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987)). ¶ 13. Brent claims on appeal that Scott breached the contract between the parties by defaulting on the contract for two and one-half years. Brent argues it fostered a foreclosure action under the promissory note and security agreement that led to the Agreed Order and Scott's payment pursuant thereto. Scott counters that the contract is satisfied and valid because all monies required thereby have been tendered Brent. Thus, Scott argues, the full payment renders Brent obliged to satisfy the environmental indemnity provision located in contract ¶ 6. Scott couches the situation as one in which Brent chose repayment, or cure, over rescission, thus it feels Brent has repudiated the contract by stating it will no longer abide by ¶ 6. Hence, Scott feels that Brent's choice of repayment coupled with no obligation to meet the contract provisions would place Brent in a better position than it would have been but for the breach. ¶ 14. This Court acknowledges that [i]t is said to be the general rule that where a contracting party, with knowledge of a breach by the other party, receives money in the performance of the contract, he will be held to have waived the breach. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 663, at 669 (1991) (footnote omitted). Further, in Mariana v. Hennington, 229 Miss. 212, 90 So.2d 356 (1956), we stated: In 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 491, p. 992, it is said A party to a contract may waive provisions for his benefit; and likewise there may be a waiver of conditions precedent or severable stipulations. See also Moore v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 176 Miss. 65, 166 So. 395; Tower Underwriters, Inc., v. Culley, 211 Miss. 788, 53 So.2d 94; Oden Construction Co. v. Helton, 218 Miss. 41, 65 So.2d 442; 12 Am.Jur. pg. 918, Sec. 354. A waiver may be inferred from the actions and conduct of the parties. Waiver usually results when there is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 492, p. 995. Id., 229 Miss. at 226, 90 So.2d at 362. See also Canizaro v. Mobile Communications Corp. of America, 655 So.2d 25, 29 (Miss. 1995); and Gannaway v. Toler, 122 Miss. 111, 138, 84 So. 129, 131 (1920). In Matheney v. McClain, 248 Miss. 842, 161 So.2d 516 (1964), we further stated: It is said as a general rule that Strict and full performance of a contract by one party may be waived by the other party. 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 353, at p. 919. Again it is said: A party to a contract who, after discovery or knowledge of facts which would entitle him to rescind, treats the contract as a subsisting obligation and leads the other party to believe that the contract is still in effect waives his right to rescind. 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 449, at p. 1031.... Id., 248 Miss. at 848, 161 So.2d at 519. ¶ 15. In the instant case, Brent accepted payment by Scott. Such acceptance was an effective waiver of any breach by Scott. Brent chose to rectify the situation by completing the contract. Brent may not now change its mind and eschew the contract. To so do would be contra justice because such action would give license to future parties to do whatever they want when their opposite parties breach any respective contract. Hence, the trial court properly decided this case. There are no genuine issues of material fact as Brent accepted Scott's cure. The contract at issue is valid and must be honored. In light of our decision, it is appropriate to quote the circuit court, which deftly dealt with the instant case when it stated: The Court finds that any breach by Scott was cured by the payments made by Scott to Brent pursuant to the settlement of the Foreclosure Action and that Brent waived the material breach of Scott, if any by accepting Scott's payment of One Hundred Thirty-six Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Dollars and Fifty Cents ($136,720.50). Having accepted said payment, as opposed to rescinding the contract for non-payment, Brent cannot now refuse to honor the full and complete terms of the contract. Brent was paid interest and its attorneys' fees as well as the principal amount due and owing. There is no indication that Brent has been at all prejudiced as a consequence of the breach.