Opinion ID: 1105577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Motions to Suppress

Text: Defense trial counsel filed two pretrial motions to suppress. The first motion generally sought suppression of evidence seized at the trailer at the time of Strickland's arrest. The second motion sought suppression of the physical evidence seized at the trailer, Strickland's oral statements to McCormic, Dempsey and Atkins, telephone calls Strickland made to Atkins from prison, letters he wrote her and a lab report. Testimony at the first of two suppression hearings showed that, after the sheriff's department received the tip that Strickland and Boyd were in the trailer, armed and dangerous, officers with arrest warrants for the two men (but without a search warrant) surrounded the trailer. Officers at the front of the trailer knocked on the door and Amanda Dempsey opened it. Dempsey, Strickland and Boyd exited the trailer and were handcuffed. Because they heard noises in the trailer, the officers at the front of the trailer entered it. The noise (it was later discovered) came from other officers trying to open the back door. The officers who entered via the front door saw and seized a .380 automatic pistol from the master bedroom, visible upon entry, to prevent its use by anyone else in the trailer. When the officers discovered that no other persons were in the trailer, they replaced the gun, then photographed it. Officers then picked up the trailer's lessee, Jennifer McCormic, who consented to a search of the trailer. The officers recovered several items of physical evidence, including clothing and boots worn by Strickland and Boyd, a box of.380 ammunition from the kitchen, loose .380 shells from the master bedroom, and the gun. Later that night after talking to McCormic and Dempsey, officers returned to the trailer and discovered the bank bag in the garbage bin approximately 100-150 yards away. At the close of the hearing, the trial judge granted the motion to suppress insofar as it related to the gun itself, finding the officers' expressed reasons for entering the trailer unpersuasive and finding no other justification for it. However, the trial judge otherwise denied the motion and allowed for introduction of the items seized after the officers had consent to search. Since the first suppression hearing disposed of the physical evidence seized inside the trailer, the second suppression hearing was limited to the bank bag found in the garbage bin and the letters Strickland wrote to Atkins. The second motion to suppress was denied by the trial judge. At trial, the trial judge overruled objections about the letters and related testimony. By unargued assignments of error, trial counsel claimed that the trial judge erred in denying defendant's first and second motions to suppress except for the gun. In a related vein, trial counsel also complained of the admission into evidence of the letters written by the defendant. An unreasonable search and seizure is prohibited by La. Const. art. 1, § 5. [A] search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. One of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search conducted pursuant to consent. State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1205-1206 (La.1984) (citations omitted). The officers did not have a search warrant when they searched the trailer, however, the trailer's lessee, Jennifer McCormic, consented to the search. At the suppression hearing, defense trial counsel argued McCormic's consent was not freely given and was tainted by the officers' initial seizure of the gun. [I]f the consent was obtained after an illegal ... entry, the consent was valid only if it was the product of a free will and not the result of an exploitation of the previous illegality. Owen, 453 So.2d at 1206. The previous illegality argued by the defense was the officers' initial seizure of the gun. In fact, the trial judge may have erred in defendant's favor when he suppressed the gun, given that the circumstances of its seizure could qualify as exigent circumstances relaxing the warrant requirement. See e.g. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (officers' concern for safety justifies warrantless seizure of weapon). The state did not seek writs on this matter, that issue is not before us and is unnecessary to a determination of the voluntariness of McCormic's consent. The record shows McCormic's consent was a product of her free will and was not based on the officers' prior seizure of the gun. Among the factors considered in determining whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful conduct to be a product of a free will are whether the police officers adequately informed the individual that [s]he need not comply with the request, the temporal proximity of the illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening circumstance and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Owen, 453 So.2d at 1206. Officers went to McCormic's place of employment and told her Strickland and Boyd had been found in her trailer. She was read her rights and escorted back to the trailer. The officers did not tell McCormic about finding a gun while arresting Strickland and Boyd. When they returned to the trailer, the officers told McCormic she did not have to sign the consent to search form. McCormic testified she felt she had an option not to sign the form. When asked why she signed the form, McCormic replied: I didn't see any reason not to.... I just signed it because I didn't see why I should not sign it. Vol. 2, p. 485. Finally, the purpose of the officers' entry into the trailer and seizure of the gun was their fear that other unknown persons might cause them harm. McCormic's consent was voluntarily given. The trial judge thus properly denied the first motion to suppress evidence other than the gun seized from inside the trailer. The trial judge also properly denied the second motion to suppress. There is no constitutional prohibition against seizure of abandoned property by the police. State v. Mattheson, 407 So.2d 1150, 1158 (La.1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3571, 77 L.Ed.2d 1412 (1983). The bank bag was discovered in the trash bin located near McCormic's trailer. This evidence was clearly abandoned property and subject to seizure without a warrant. As to letters written by Strickland to Atkins both before and after the instant crimes, the record shows Atkins simply presented these letters to investigators. The letters thus fall outside the ambit of constitutional protections. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 408, 413, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966) (Fourth Amendment does not protect defendant's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it); State v. McCommons, 398 So.2d 1100, 1102 (La.1981) (same). At trial, defense counsel objected to the letters on the basis of hearsay, relevancy, lack of proper foundation, and because they were fruit of the poisonous tree. The trial judge overruled the objections. The trial judge had portions of the letters, either too inflammatory or inadmissible as relating to other crimes evidence, deleted from the letters shown to the jury. The letters, as Strickland's own statements, were not hearsay. La.C.E. art. 801(D)(2). The relevancy of the letters, in which Strickland urged Atkins to stick to the story and generally wrote about the crimes, is self-evident. Atkins testified about receiving the letters and also receiving telephone calls from Strickland discussing the fact that the letters were written; a proper foundation was laid for the letters' introduction. The letters were not fruit of the poisonous tree because no constitutional violations occurred in their procurement. The trial judge did not err in allowing the letters to be introduced in evidence.