Opinion ID: 1809453
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tolling or Saving Provision

Text: ¶ 20. O'Quinn argues that Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995) provides that the statute of limitations does not run against a person who is under a legal disability. That, however, is not completely accurate. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 states that: If any person entitled to bring any of the personal actions mentioned shall, at the time at which the cause of action accrued, be under the disability of infancy or unsoundness of mind, he may bring the actions within the times in this chapter respectively limited, after his disability shall be removed as provided by law. However, the saving in favor or persons under disability of unsoundness of mind shall never extend longer than twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis added). ¶ 21. Melson was determined to be mentally competent by the Wilkinson County Chancery Court on February 9, 1988, in her divorce proceedings. Melson's conservatorship in Mississippi continued based solely on her physical incapacity. Furthermore, on October 8, 1991, O'Quinn was appointed Melson's permanent conservator based solely on her physical disability. The Massachusetts court did not determine Melson to be of unsound mind in establishing O'Quinn as conservator. Melson had a permanent conservator in Massachusetts protecting her financial affairs. Therefore, USF & G contends that the Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 is not applicable to the facts at bar. We agree. ¶ 22. Melson does not fall under the saving clause provided in Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 allows the statute of limitations to be tolled in favor of persons under the disability of unsound mind until the disability is removed. However, the saving in favor of persons under the disability of unsound mind shall never extend longer than twenty-one years. The facts do not support that Melson was of unsound mind during the time that Tolliver served as conservator. [1] Therefore, we find that Melson does not fall within the tolling provisions of § 15-1-59. Melson's conservatorships in Mississippi and Massachusetts both exist for the sole reason of her physical incapacity. ¶ 23. Miss.Code Ann. § 1-3-57 (1998) defines the term unsound mind when used in any statute to reference idiots, lunatics, and persons non compos mentis. The test for determining whether a person is of unsound mind for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations was provided by this Court in Shippers Exp. v. Chapman, 364 So.2d 1097, 1104 (Miss.1978), which held: The test as to whether the claimant is so mentally incompetent as to toll the running of the statute of limitations, is this: Is his mind so unsound, or is he so weak in mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that he cannot manage the ordinary affairs of life? ¶ 24. This Court in Rockwell v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 710 So.2d 388, 391 (Miss.1998), further provided that: The purpose of the savings statute is to protect the legal rights of those who are unable to assert their own rights due to disability. ¶ 25. USF & G argues that Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 is also not applicable to tolling Melson's claim since O'Quinn, as Melson's conservator, had full authority under Massachusetts law to bring suit for Melson to recover any assets. See §§ 20, 37 and 38 C. 201, Annotated Laws of Massachusetts. USF & G cites Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-53 (1995) in support of its argument. ¶ 26. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-53 provides: When the legal title to property or a right in action is in an executor, administrator, guardian, or other trustee, the time during which any statute of limitations runs against such trustee shall be computed against the person beneficially interested in such property or right in action, although such person may be under disability and within the saving of any statute of limitations; and may be availed of in any suit or actions by such person. ¶ 27. Therefore, under Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-53, if a person who is subject to infancy or unsoundness of mind does in fact have a guardian or conservator appointed for them, then the action may be brought in the name of that guardian or conservator, without the consideration of any savings clause. Where a guardian or conservator has been court appointed for a ward, there is no logical or equitable reason to prevent the running of the statute of limitations inasmuch as that guardian or conservator is fully authorized to employ attorneys and bring actions on their behalf. McCain v. Memphis Hardwood Flooring Co., 725 So.2d 788 (Miss.1998)(statute of limitations is not tolled when a person of unsound mind has a guardian). ¶ 28. USF & G argues that the statute of limitations began to run from the date of the last disbursement made by Tolliver which occurred on March 20, 1992. The lawsuit against Tolliver was filed on May 30, 1995, and amended to include USF & G on June 16, 1997. USF & G argues that with no savings clause to toll the running of Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49, Melson faces the same limitations as O'Quinn. As previously noted, all of the questioned transactions occurred between February 13, 1989, and March 20, 1992. USF & G contends that, at the very least, statute of limitations on all of these claims expired on March 20, 1995. ¶ 29. The problem with USF & G's argument, that being the statute of limitations runs from the date of the last disbursement, is that it conflicts with existing holdings of this Court. This Court in Bell v. Rudolph, 70 Miss. 234, 12 So. 153, 154 (1892), held that: The statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of a surety on a guardian's bond against the ward from the time he is discharged from liability for future acts of the guardian but from the time the guardian accounted to the wards. See also Nunnery v. Day, 64 Miss. 457, 1 So. 636 (1887). ¶ 30. In Pattison v. Clingan, 93 Miss. 310, 47 So. 503, 504 (1908), this Court stated that: When the functions and authority of the guardian over the person and estate of the ward for the future ends, and his obligation to make [a] final account and settlement for the past begins, and he remains guardian for such purpose, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run in favor of him, or the sureties on his bond, until this is done. ¶ 31. The Court in Pattison further stated that: The general rule is that the office of a trustee ceases only with the execution of his trust, and the duty of a guardian, as trustee, to account and settle, continues until he has done so and is discharged by order of the proper court. Henderson v. Winchester, 31 Miss. 290; Davis v. Cheves, 32 Miss. 317; Denson v. Denson, 33 Miss. 560. 47 So. at 504. ¶ 32. Tolliver filed his first and final accounting with the lower court on June 5, 1992. Tolliver was then discharged on August 10, 1992. On September 28, 1994, the lower court granted O'Quinn's motion dated August 4, 1994, to set aside Tolliver's accounting. O'Quinn filed suit against Tolliver on May 30, 1995. The suit against Tolliver was amended on June 16, 1997, to add USF & G as a party defendant. The last disbursement made by Tolliver without court approval occurred on March 20, 1992. [2] ¶ 33. Since Tolliver's first and final accounting was not filed until June 5, 1992, we find that O'Quinn satisfied the statute of limitations by filing suit on May 30, 1995, within the three year statute of limitations. Therefore, this issue is without merit.