Opinion ID: 1590463
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the district court err by failing to instruct on the defense of parody or opinion?

Text: a. Parody. Bantz argued in the district court that the altered photograph was not libelous per se and could be reasonably understood to be a parody. Kiesau argued the altered photograph was clear and unambiguous, and the court should have found as a matter of law the photograph is libelous per se. Had the district court agreed with Kiesau's position, the court would only need to instruct the jury on the elements of publication and damages for Kiesau to recover on her claim of libel per se. Under this scenario, the district court would also be required to instruct the jury on Bantz's affirmative defense of parody. Andreas, 157 Iowa at 47, 137 N.W. at 1006. The district court did not submit Kiesau's case in this manner. Instead, the court concluded the altered photograph was susceptible of more than one meaning and refused to instruct the jury the altered photograph was libelous per se. The district court required Kiesau to prove the altered photograph would reasonably be understood to be an expression which would attack a person's integrity or moral character. This language encompasses the concept of parody with the burden on Kiesau to prove the altered statement was not a parody. To be a parody, the jury must find the altered photograph could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts about Kiesau or actual events in which Kiesau participated. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57, 108 S.Ct. 876, 882, 99 L.Ed.2d 41, 53 (1988). Although the instructions did not specifically mention the word parody, the concept that the altered photograph was a parody was contained in the instructions when the district court required the jury to determine whether the altered photograph would reasonably be understood to be an expression which would attack a person's integrity or moral character. The instructions as a whole correctly stated the law, did not mislead the jury, or prejudice Bantz. b. Opinion. Bantz also argued in the district court that the altered photograph was not libelous per se and could be reasonably understood to be an expression of his low opinion of Kiesau. Opinion is absolutely protected under the First Amendment. Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Iowa 1989). We have adopted various factors to determine whether a statement is fact or opinion. Id. These are: 1. The precision and specificity of the statement; 2. The verifiability of the statement; and 3. The literary context in which the statement was made. Id. The third factor, literary context, includes the social context, which focuses on the category of the publication, its style and intended audience, and the political context in which the statement was made. Id. at 891-92. In applying these factors, the altered photograph is precise and specific in its representation of Kiesau. A person could easily verify the truth or falsity of the altered photograph by a simple inquiry of Kiesau. Finally, Bantz did not publish the altered photograph in any political context. He sent the altered photo to fellow employees without any disclaimer. At times, he sent it anonymously. Under these circumstances, it was not opinion. Failure to submit an instruction on opinion was not an abuse of discretion because the evidence did not support the proposed instruction. See State v. Langlet, 283 N.W.2d 330, 336 (Iowa 1979).