Opinion ID: 181300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the Life Sentence

Text: Finally, Tanner argues that his sentence of life imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. The advisory guideline sentencing range here was life imprisonment, effectively rendering any prison sentence presumptively reasonable on appeal by the defendant. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (concluding that a court of appeals may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper application of the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir.2009) (below-guideline sentence presumed reasonable on appeal by defendant); United States v. Trice, 484 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir.2007) (within-guideline sentence presumed reasonable on appeal). This presumption may be overcome only if Tanner demonstrates the sentence's unreasonableness in light of the sentencing factors found in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Juarez, 454 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir.2006), citing United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). Tanner has failed to meet this burden. He gives a number of reasons his lack of prior convictions, his youth, his young son, and his prowess as a boxer that he believes make life imprisonment unreasonable, but none of these reasons is sufficient to make this the rare case in which a guidelines sentence is inappropriate. See United States v. Hall, 608 F.3d 340, 347 (7th Cir.2010). Although Tanner had no prior convictions, the advisory guidelines took that lack of criminal history into account and nevertheless deemed a life sentence appropriate, given the high total offense level resulting from the scope of Tanner's crime and his role in it. The guidelines are presumed reasonable on appeal, Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, and it would be odd if that presumption might be undermined merely by reference to one of the two factors (offense level and, here, the defendant's criminal history) that the guidelines take into account in every case. Tanner's emphasis on his youth is simply misleading. He is not a child or even a teenager, but an adult able to understand the consequences of his actions. Although the indictment charged that the conspiracy began when Tanner was a teenager, Tanner's criminal conduct occurred largely, if not entirely, during his adulthood. As for Tanner's prowess as a boxer, the district court had no obligation to impose a lower sentence just so Tanner might pursue the boxing career he had already eschewed for a more lucrative life of crime. (We assume a much lower sentence would have been needed to allow Tanner to box outside prison while he is still young and healthy enough.) We sympathize with Tanner's young son, who undoubtedly deserved a better chance to have a father play a meaningful role in his life. But the district court reasonably concluded that Tanner's decision to pursue a life of crime showed his apparent disregard for his son's welfare, as well as for the welfare of those who were harmed by the cocaine Tanner helped distribute, and justified adherence to the guideline recommendation of life imprisonment. AFFIRMED.