Opinion ID: 2335436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Respondent's Mental State

Text: The Panel finds that by preparing estate planning documents for Estep's clients prior to October 30, 2006 without proper supervision by a Delaware attorney, Respondent failed to heed a substantial risk that his practice would be deemed to constitute the unauthorized practice of law and/or the assistance of a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of law. A reasonable lawyer in his positiondrafting estate planning documents as a non-Delaware lawyer for Delaware clients where he knew the question of the propriety of such activity in Delaware was unsettled  would have taken greater steps to ensure that a Delaware attorney exercised appropriate supervision. The ODC stipulated that as of June 6, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court has not addressed whether the drafting of will and trusts or probating of estates by a non-lawyer constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Delaware. ODC-7 at 10. See also Tr. at 76-77. The ODC was hoping that eventually the Estep case would make its way to the Supreme Court so that it might issue a definitive ruling. Id. In that context, it appears that the practice of a non-Delaware lawyer drafting estate planning documents to be reviewed by a Delaware lawyer was similarly unsettled. Following his conversation with counsel for the ODC, Respondent testified that he acted with Estep to change their practice to cure what he understood the ODC's objection to be by ensuring that a Delaware attorney not only reviewed all of his work but also was present at the signings of all documents to discuss the documents with the clients. While as the Delaware Supreme Court found, the mere presence of the Delaware attorney was insufficient, the ODC did not present clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knew that the Delaware attorney performed so minimal a role at the closings. Stated differently, the Board finds an absence of clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knew, as the Delaware Supreme Court later found, that the Delaware attorneys abdicated their ethical responsibilities by failing to play a meaningful role when they met with the clients prior to signing the documents drafted by Kingsley. Thus, there was insufficient documentary evidence or testimony from Kingsley or the Delaware attorneys or Estep that, following the conversation between Kingsley and the ODC, Kingsley was aware of the minimal role played by the Delaware lawyers in presenting the documents he drafted to the clients. In similar circumstances the Delaware Supreme Court and other courts have rejected a finding of a knowing violation. See In Re Doughty, 832 A.2d 724, 734 (Del. 2003) (accepting Board's finding that Respondent, while out of compliance, did not knowingly violate a court rule); In Re Mekler, 669 A.2d 655, 666-67 (Del. 1995) (Respondent's genuine but erroneous belief that he had been granted a continuance supported finding that he did not knowingly violate a Court's scheduling order). See also In Re Mitchell and In Re Hilaire, 901 F.2d 1179, 1189 (3d Cir. 1990)(discharging rule to show cause regarding suspended lawyer and attorney who failed to supervise him because rules governing suspended attorneys were unclear, even though conduct failed to meet even the most lenient applicable standards). Having said that, the Board notes that Kingsley's conduct at least after June 30, 2006 presents a close question of whether his conduct went beyond negligence to a knowing violation. Unlike in Counts VIII and IX below, in Counts 1-IV and VI the ODC did not allege that Kingsley knowingly acted in violation of a disciplinary rule. Accordingly, it was its burden at the sanctions hearing to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he acted knowingly. In that regard, the deemed admission that his activities in rendering legal advice were in violation of the disciplinary rules (Petition, ¶ 6) does not allege a state of mind. We note as well the absence of a written record as to what was communicated to Kingsley in his conversation with the ODC in June. Had he done nothing following that conversation, we might find differently. But he ceased working for Estep and he worked to change the practice to require the Delaware lawyers in a memorandum of understanding to be present prior to signing to ensure that the client's wishes were being carried out. On the record presented, we cannot conclude that the ODC has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knew that the Delaware lawyers, as later found by the Delaware Supreme Court, would abdicate theft responsibilities. Thus, as to Counts I-IV and VI, the Board finds that the ODC has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent knowingly violated Rules 5.5(a) or 5.5(3)(1). [4] As to Counts V and VII, the Board similarly finds that Kingsley acted negligently in using his home address to identify his law firm Kingsley Law Firm, P.C. in a listing with the Philadelphia Estate Planning Council. The ODC introduced no evidence that any of the 75 clients for whom Kingsley had drafted estate planning documents had relied on Kingsley based on their having seen this or any other listing of his law firm with a Delaware address. Respondent testified that he never communicated with any of the clients identified in the Petition using a Delaware address. Id. at 48. Kingsley testified that the Philadelphia Estate Planning Council is not a marketing organization and that its website is for members only. Tr. at 47. He further testified that he listed the home address as the place where he preferred to receive mailings from the organization. Id. The record reflects that Kingsley's letterhead and business card make no mention of a Delaware address. Id. at 47-48. The Board finds that the evidence establishes that Kingsley negligently identified his law firm as having a Delaware address in violation of Rule 5.5(b)(2) without knowingly or consciously intending to market himself to the public as being a Delaware law firm. Finally, the ODC's allegation that Kingsley knowingly violated the Cease and Desist Order as alleged in Counts VIII and DC has been deemed admitted. We do note that the Cease and Desist Order was not directed to Kingsley. The ODC acknowledged that it had no authority that an attorney could be found to have violated an order not directed at him. Tr. at 20-21. Its argument is that Kingsley knowingly facilitated Estep in disobeying an order of the tribunal by continuing to draft estate planning documents and not taking steps to stop Estep's conduct. Respondent's failure to ensure, following the entry of the Cease and Desist Order on October 30, 2006, that his arrangement with McCracken was working to provide active involvement by Delaware counsel reflects a conscious disregard for a known risk. From the beginning of his association with Estep to the conduct of the disciplinary proceeding, Respondent has disregarded known risks. In undertaking his role initially, he researched the law and found no definitive case law that authorized his conduct. He sought no formal opinion from Delaware counsel. When the ODC contacted him directly and advised that he cease his employment with Estep because he was in violation of the Delaware Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct, Respondent called and then cancelled an appointment with Delaware counsel. He then resigned from Estep's employ and negotiated a memorandum of understanding with Delaware counsel, first Bialecki and then McCracken, to be present when the clients signed the documents so that it would not be Estep alone who presented the documents Respondent drafted to the clients. Again, he sought no opinion from Delaware counsel that the new arrangement would comply with Delaware law and the record reflects no effort by Respondent to ascertain whether the Delaware lawyers were in fact acting to ensure that all the documents complied with what the client wanted done in terms of testamentary provisions. ODC-3 at 251.When served with the Petition in this action, Respondent chose not to answer in a timely manner or to retain Delaware counsel. As a consequence, the ODC's allegations that he knowingly disobeyed a Supreme Court Order in violation of Rule 3.4 (c) are deemed admitted. See Petition at ¶¶ 27 and 29; In re Fountain, 913 A.2d at 1181. Due to the unsettled nature of Delaware law and the failure of proof by clear and convincing evidence that Kingsley knowingly assisted in the unauthorized practice of law prior to October 30, 2006, the Panel finds that his violations reflected negligence. But his deemed admission that he knowingly violated a Supreme Court Order after October 30, 2006 requires the Panel to conclude that his violations after October 30, 2006 were knowing.