Opinion ID: 202829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

Text: In the district court, Kansky filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, on numerous grounds, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). We review the lower court's denial of the motion for abuse of discretion. See Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). Rule 59(e) motions are granted only where the movant shows a manifest error of law or newly discovered evidence. Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n. 2 (1st Cir.2005) (stating that Rule 59(e) motions are generally unlikely to succeed because the movant must clearly establish a manifest error of law) or provide newly discovered evidence (quoting Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362 F.3d 143, 146 n. 2 (1st Cir.2004)). First, Kansky claimed that the district court erred because it relied on the opinions offered by Aetna's reviewing physicians, who he claimed were unqualified to provide medical opinions on his condition. The district court found that Aetna's reviewing doctors were certainly qualified to provide their medical opinions on whether Kansky's pre-existing schizo-affective disorder caused or contributed to his disability. On appeal, Kansky only points out that neither of these doctors' CVs mentions any research specifically focused on CFS. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the absence of CFS research did not render Aetna's reviewing doctors unqualified to give an opinion on the causes or contributors to Kansky's disability. Second, Kansky argued that the court erred in conducting its own medical research. This claim is unfounded. The district court provided a reasonable explanation for its use of a single medical article, which was not part of the Administrative Record, for background information. In denying Kansky's Rule 59(e) motion, the court explained that it had consulted the article because it played a significant role in an earlier district court decision, which Kansky had urged the court to consider. The court also noted that the article appeared to be the basis for the comments of Drs. Bell, Burton, and DeFoy [5] [in this case] to the effect that Kansky cannot be diagnosed [with CFS] according to the current research criteria put out by the Centers for Disease Control. Kansky, 2006 WL 1167781, at . There was no abuse of discretion in the court's use of this article in such a limited way. Finally, Kansky also claimed, in his Rule 59(e) motion, that the court erred in reaching an independent medical diagnosis, which he described as schizoaffective disorder `contributing to' his CFS. In reality, the district court found that Kansky's schizoaffective disorder contributed to his disability, and made no finding as to whether the schizoaffective disorder caused or contributed to the CFS or whether CFS contributed to the disability. The court did not abuse its discretion with its insistence that it did not make any independent medical diagnosis.