Opinion ID: 1095990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants I.P. and Carboline

Text: This Court conducts de novo review of a lower court's grant of summary judgment. Short v. Columbus Rubber and Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss. 1988); Pearl River County Bd. of Supervisors v. South East Collections Agency, Inc., 459 So.2d 783, 785 (Miss. 1984) Dennis v. Searle, 457 So.2d 941, 944 (Miss. 1984). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of I.P. and Carboline based on the learned intermediary defense to products liability actions which provides that a manufacturer's duty to warn may be discharged by providing information to a third person upon whom it can reasonably rely to communicate the information to the ultimate users of the product or those who will be exposed to its hazardous effects. Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453, 1456 (6th Cir.1984); Note, Failures to Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense, 74 Va.L.Rev. 579 (1988). The relevant portion of the court's ruling reads as follows: [I]'m satisfied that in  particularly in the  I think as the expressions were, in the Martinez case, citing the restatement of torts, section 388, and also the provisions concerning 402(a) that the reasoning behind this case and also taking into account the Helene Curtis decision which is recited in there, that this manufacturer of the product is placing a product not in the stream of commerce for the consumer to use themselves without any forewarning of the propensities of the product, but is placing this in the hands of professionals who are trained and experienced in the application of the product; that this manufacturer is not required to go further than to furnish information to the applicator or the professional who is going to use the product itself. I can't think of a better analogy to use in this case than the facts in the Helene Curtis case of where a beautician is using a product and [sic] is put out for professional use only. How would the warnings get to the ultimate consumer? There has to be a reliance by the manufacturer at some stage in a product such as this that the professionals who are making the application, that they make it properly and use the precautions that are necessary and also to warn the consumer. (R.V. 902) Swan's claims against I.P. and Carboline are based on negligent failure to warn and strict liability. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to its property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to its property if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and, (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. Lack of an adequate warning is a defect which makes a product unreasonably dangerous for strict liability purposes. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 515 (5th Cir.1984); Gordon v. Niagra Machine & Toolworks, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir.1978). This Court has extended this duty to bystanders, holding that the duty imposed by § 402A exists in favor of anyone who may reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product's probable use and to be endangered by it if it is defective. Coca Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Reeves, 486 So.2d 374, 378 (Miss. 1986). I.P. and Carboline contend that they had no duty to warn Miri or Swan about any possible hazards associated with their products because Miri was an experienced, knowledgeable applicator of these products and is therefore charged with knowledge of the properties of the products. This argument stems from § 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Comment k under § 388. This section provides: One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. Comment k to § 388 provides in part: k. When warning of defects unnecessary. One who supplies a chattel to others to use for any purpose is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous character in so far as it is known to him, or of facts which to his knowledge make it likely to be dangerous, if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved... . The learned intermediary theory developed in cases involving prescription drugs. Courts have held that the manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers involved in the use of prescription drugs was fulfilled by warning physicians instead of the ultimate user, since the physician was in the best position to evaluate the needs of the patient along with the risks of a particular drug in order to determine the proper treatment for the patient. Am. Law Prod.Liab.3d § 32:34 (1987). This Court has applied the learned intermediary theory in prescription drug cases. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So.2d 688 (Miss. 1988). Generally, the cases discussing the learned intermediary theory which do not involve prescription drugs involve products which have injured employees on the job and the manufacturer's reliance on the employer to warn the employee of the dangers of the product. See Note, 74 Va.L.Rev. at 596-600; R. Burpee, Manufacturers' Reliance on Employers' Duty to Warn, 33 For the Defense 22 (Oct. 1991). I.P. and Carboline rely on several cases. In Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1976), the widow of a worker, who died when he was overcome by noxious fumes while cleaning the tank of a barge which had been carrying a petrochemical mixture, filed suit against the owner of the barge and the manufacturer of the mixture alleging inadequate warning. The manufacturer had placed a warning card on the main deck of the barge which set out the hazards associated with the chemicals. Id. at 462. The court held that the manufacturer was not liable for negligent failure to warn or strict liability. The court noted that the manufacturer marketed the chemical mixture only to industrial users and not to the general public, Id. at 463, and the manufacturer could reasonably anticipate that only professionals familiar with the precautions necessary for the safe handling of the chemicals would come into contact with the chemicals. The card placed on the barge was an adequate warning to the limited class of professionals, of which the plaintiff's husband was a member, who were experienced in the stripping and cleaning of chemical storage tanks. Id. at 467; see also Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F.2d 904, 908 (5th Cir.1985); Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, Inc., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir.1981); Thibodaux v. McWane Cast Iron Pipe Co., 381 F.2d 491, 495 (5th Cir.1967). In Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir.1984), the plaintiff, an employee of General Motors, filed suit against Union Carbide alleging that she suffered respiratory problems as a result of Union Carbide's failure to adequately warn the employees of General Motors of the hazards associated with toluene diisocyanate (TDI), which Union Carbide manufactured and supplied to General Motors for use in the automotive assembly process. Union Carbide had prepared a manual for General Motors which addressed the hazards associated with exposure to TDI and also included information on the safe use and handling of TDI and a chemical safety data sheet. Id. at 1454-55. Officials from Union Carbide and General Motors had also met to discuss the handling of TDI to minimize personnel exposure. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Union Carbide, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court relied on Comment n to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 which states that the manufacturer's duty to warn may be discharged by providing information of the dangerous propensities of the product to a third person upon whom it can reasonably rely to communicate the information to the ultimate users of the product or those who will be exposed to its hazardous effects. Id. at 1456. The court held that the fact that General Motors repeatedly updated its information about TDI from Union Carbide, along with the fact that General Motors itself had a duty to its employees to provide them with a safe place to work, supported the conclusion that it was reasonable for Union Carbide to rely upon General Motors to convey the information about TDI to its employees. Id. at 1457; see also Kennedy v. Mobay, 84 Md. App. 397, 579 A.2d 1191, 1206 (1990). In Smith v. Walter C. Best, Inc., 927 F.2d 736 (3rd Cir.1990), the plaintiff was injured as a result of his inhalation of silica dust contained in sand supplied by various parties to his employer. He claimed that the suppliers had a duty to warn him directly about the hazards of the dust. The court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the suppliers, finding that the plaintiff's employer was a knowledgeable industrial purchaser of silica sand familiar with its dangers. Id. at 741. The court analyzed whether it was reasonable for the suppliers of the sand to rely on the plaintiff's employer to warn its employees about the hazards of the sand under the factors set out in Comment n to § 388 of the Restatement: (1) the dangerous condition of the product; (2) the purpose for which the product is used; (3) the form of any warnings given; (4) the reliability of the third party as a conduit of necessary information about the product; (5) the magnitude of the risk involved; and (6) the burdens imposed on the supplier by requiring that he directly warn all users. Id. at 739-40. The court held that it was reasonable for the sand suppliers to rely on the plaintiff's employer to warn the plaintiff of the dangers. Id. at 741. The court listed several facts which led it to this conclusion: (1) common medical knowledge of the hazards; (2) there were various statutes and regulations governing silica; (3) the employer was a member of a non-profit foundation which provided information to its members relative to occupational diseases, including silicosis, and their prevention; and (4) the duty of the employer to provide its employees a safe working environment. Id. The court therefore held that the suppliers did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff directly of any hazards associated with the sand. Id.; see also Tasca v. GTE Products Corp., 175 Mich. App. 617, 438 N.W.2d 625, 629 (1988). In its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court referred to Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.1967). In Helene Curtis, the plaintiff's scalp and ears were burned by a mixture of two bleaching products purchased from a beauty parlor and applied to the plaintiff's hair by a friend. Id. at 847. The plaintiff alleged that she was not adequately warned. The label on the Helene Curtis product stated: FOR PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY  NOT FOR PUBLIC SALE. Id. at 857. It also warned against mixing the product with any products other than one recommended by Helene Curtis. Id. at 852. The 5th Circuit Court held that Helene Curtis was not liable, and that the warning was sufficient because it need only be reasonably calculated to reach and be understood by the person likely to use the product, the professional beautician. Id. at 861. The sale of the product by the beauty parlor to the plaintiff's friend was an intervening cause of the plaintiff's injuries, as was the mixing of the two bleaching products by the plaintiff's friend. Id. These cases are distinguishable. Unlike Helene Curtis, the polyurethane foam and coating were applied by an intended, professional user. In Martinez, the manufacturer of the chemicals placed a warning on the barge and it was unlikely that anyone but professional tank cleaners would come into contact with the chemicals. Swan received no warnings concerning the hazards associated with the chemicals and it is not certain that Miri received warnings from the manufacturers. Also, the likelihood that someone not knowledgeable about the hazards of the chemicals would come into contact with the chemicals was more likely in this case because the chemicals were being sprayed at a school. In Adams and Smith, the plaintiffs' employers had knowledge of the hazards associated with TDI and the silica dust. Here, although James English and Miri had much experience spraying polyurethane foam and coating, they both testified that they were not aware of any hazards associated with the spraying. In other cases, courts have held that the presence of an intermediary did not relieve the manufacturer of its duty to warn. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.1973), an insulation worker brought an action against the manufacturers of insulation which contained asbestos. The court rejected the manufacturers' argument that it was the responsibility of the insulation contractors to warn the insulation workers of the risk of harm. Id. at 1091. The court noted that under the Restatement, a seller may be liable to the ultimate user or consumer for failure to give adequate warnings. The seller's warning must be reasonably calculated to reach such persons and the presence of an intermediary party will not by itself relieve the seller of this duty. Id.; see also Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill.2d 195, 73 Ill.Dec. 350, 357, 454 N.E.2d 210, 217 (1983). In Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515 (D.Conn. 1986), a widow brought suit against a manufacturer of benzene who sold benzene to her deceased husband's employer. The manufacturer filed a motion for summary judgment based on the learned intermediary theory, arguing that when a product is sold in bulk to an industrial user for use by its employees, the supplier's duty to warn extends only to the employer as a learned intermediary. Id. at 1518. Further, that a supplier's duty to warn an industrial purchaser is excused where the purchaser is held to know of the risks independently. Id. The court held that even if the learned intermediary theory were to be applied to cases involving the sale of chemicals in the industrial workplace, that theory alone would not relieve the supplier of a duty to warn. Id. at 1520. The court noted that the prescription drug cases which apply the learned intermediary theory merely shift the direction that such a warning must take, by requiring the manufacturer to provide an adequate warning to the intermediary. Id. The court held that the facts were disputed as to whether the manufacturer supplied any warnings to the deceased's employer and as to whether the deceased's employer could be considered knowledgeable of the health risks associated with benzene. Id. at 1520-21; see also Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629, 641-42 (5th Cir.1989); Frazier v. Continental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 385 (5th Cir.1978). In Adkins v. GAF Corp., 923 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.1991), the supplier contended that § 388 of the Restatement relieved it of its duty to warn since it sold the asbestos to a sophisticated user, the plaintiff's employer, which had full knowledge of the hazards associated with the use of asbestos and which could be relied upon to take the appropriate precautions. Id. at 1229. The court stated that the pivotal inquiry in determining whether this defense is available is a fact-specific evaluation of the reasonableness of the supplier's reliance on the intermediary to provide the warning. Id. at 1230. In a similar case, the Fourth Circuit stated that Comment n to § 388 of the Restatement clearly focuses on what the product manufacturer knew and the reasonableness of its reliance on the intermediary prior to and during the time the plaintiff was exposed. Willis v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 905 F.2d 793, 797 (4th Cir.1990); see also Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238, 253-54 (3rd Cir.1984); Russo v. Abex Corp., 670 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D.Mich. 1987); East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1120-22 (D.C.App. 1990). In Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.1992), the Court of Appeals held that the bulk seller doctrine provides that a bulk seller, who sells a product to another manufacturer or distributor which in turn packages and sells the product to the public, is required only to warn the intermediate distributor, and not each individual consumer, that the product is dangerous. Id. at 850. The bulk seller may rely on an informed distributor to pass information concerning the dangers of the product to the consumer. Id. at 850-51. However, the bulk seller's reliance upon the intermediate distributor must be reasonable, Id. at 851, and it fulfills its duty to the ultimate consumer only if it ascertains (1) that the distributor to which it sells is adequately trained, (2) that the distributor is familiar with the properties of the product and the safe methods of handling it, and (3) that the distributor is capable of passing this knowledge to the consumer. Id. I.P. and Carboline contend that because they sold the foam and coating to Miri, a professional applicator chargeable with knowledge of the properties of the products, they had no duty to warn. Miri and James English indeed are experienced applicators of polyurethane roofing products. Miri's primary business was insulation and polyurethane roofing and the company had been involved in this business since 1977. This Court recognized that James English was a qualified and experienced roofer in Anchor Coatings, Inc. v. Marine Industrial Residential Insulation, Inc., 490 So.2d 1210, 1217 (Miss. 1986). The learned intermediary defense does not relieve the manufacturer of its duty to warn, however, unless the manufacturer's reliance on the intermediary is reasonable. Material issues of fact exist in this case as to whether I.P.'s and Carboline's reliance on Miri was reasonable. From this record we do not know whether James and Robert English, the principal sprayers of the foam and coating, had knowledge of the hazards associated with the foam and coating. James English testified that had he known of any hazards associated with the products, he would not have sprayed them while school was in session. Robert English testified that at the time the foam and coating were sprayed on the roof of the school, he had no knowledge of any hazards associated with the foam or the coating. From this record we cannot know whether it was reasonable for I.P. and Carboline to assume that Miri was knowledgeable about the hazards because the facts are in dispute as to whether I.P. and Carboline ever sent Miri any information concerning the chemical properties of the products and the hazards associated with them. Frank E. Livingston testified that I.P. did not send Miri, James English or the Long Beach school system any material data safety sheets for the foam or any other warnings at any time prior to Swan's alleged exposure. Also, because the evidence was insufficient to conclude that Miri was a sophisticated user, the learned intermediary doctrine still required I.P. and Carboline to furnish information and warnings to Miri. See Hall, 625 F. Supp. at 1518. The trial court recognized this in its ruling: [T]his manufacturer is not required to go further than to furnish information to the applicator or the professional who is going to use the product itself. Because of these disputed material issues of fact, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of I.P. and Carboline.