Opinion ID: 470866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct--Vouching for Government Witnesses

Text: 54 Another assignment of error involves testimony elicited by the government from informants under grant of immunity testifying against Stanley. Following the testimony of one of the government's witnesses, defendant objected to the government eliciting any testimony about the terms of the government witnesses' immunity or plea agreements. The court asked whether defense counsel intended to bring out on cross-examination the fact that the witnesses were testifying under immunity, and defense counsel replied that that depended 'upon the context of each witness.' The court then said that if defense counsel would agree not to impeach the witnesses on the ground that they were testifying under immunity, the court would direct the government not to bring out the terms of the immunity agreements. When defense counsel declined that offer, the court refused to bar the government from eliciting the terms of the cooperation agreements. 55 The prosecutor then asked each of the government witnesses about the terms of his plea or immunity agreement, including a promise to testify truthfully. On cross-examination of each of the principal government witnesses, Nowicki, Jones, and Seaver, defense counsel attempted to impeach the witnesses by questioning them about favorable aspects of their immunity or plea agreements with the government. 56 In presenting this argument, defendant relies principally on United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 640 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942 (1981), which stated in dicta that eliciting from a government witness that a promise to testify truthfully, a condition to the grant of immunity, was improper vouching of that witness' credibility. Other courts have questioned such rule, and we do not find it persuasive. See, e.g., United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Brown, 720 F.2d 1059, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); United States v. Creamer, 555 F.2d 612, 617-18 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 833 (1977); United States v. Koss, 506 F.2d 1103, 1111, 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom., Layne v. United States, 420 U.S. 977 (1975). 57 We find no error under the circumstances in the district court's ruling and in the prosecutor's actions. 58 Defendant also argues that the district court erred by not instructing the jury, as he requested, that the witnesses' immunity agreements should not be construed as evidence of the facts set out therein. The court instead gave the jury a detailed instruction regarding the need to examine the testimony of immunized witnesses with great care. The court advised the jury that it should 'consider whether the testimony [of immunized witnesses] may be colored in such a way as to further the witness' own interest, for a witness who realizes that he may procure his own freedom by incriminating another has a motive to falsify.' We find that instruction sufficient to apprise the jury of the possible bias of the immunized witnesses, and it served to overcome any suggestion that those witnesses should be accorded special credence because of the terms of their immunity agreements. See United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d at 861-62. Stanley's requested instruction was accordingly unnecessary. 59