Opinion ID: 173685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: The Brief identifies two appealable issues, which Counsel believes to be frivolous: (1) that Malinsky’s sentencing was not legal; and (2) that the two-point enhancement, based on more than ten but less than fifty victims, was improper. Malinsky filed, pro se, an informal brief in which he states his belief that there are four appealable issues in this case: (1) whether the Government improperly withheld evidence favorable to Malinsky, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) whether any of the amount of loss taken into account by the District Court in calculating Malinsky’s total offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G) occurred outside of the time frame of the offense of which he is convicted; (3) whether Malinsky’s total offense level was incorrectly enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A); and (4) whether Malinsky’s total offense level was incorrectly calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(G). The Government filed (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the United States. The United States must file a brief in response. Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se. . . . If [the court] finds arguable merit to the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court in its review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing and restore the case to the calendar. 6 a brief concurring with Counsel’s conclusion that Malinsky’s appeal is wholly frivolous.5 We find that the Brief is insufficient to satisfy Anders’s requirements. However, because the frivolousness of Malinsky’s appeal is patent, we will discharge Counsel’s obligations to Malinsky and this Court. Coleman, 575 F.3d at 321. The Brief contains only two pages of legal argument. Those two pages do not cite to any legal authority, other than the Sentencing Guidelines, in support of Counsel’s arguments. This scant effort does not satisfy this Court that Counsel has “explain[ed] why the issues are frivolous.” Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780. The requirements imposed on Counsel seeking to withdraw from representation under Anders are “grounded in the Constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process, which the [Supreme] Court notes ‘can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client.’” Youla, 241 F.3d at 299 (quoting Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). Counsel’s brief argument, supported by the almost complete absence of any authority, hardly represents the “conscientious examination” required by Anders. Marvin, 211 F.3d at 780; see also Youla, 241 F.3d at 300 (finding counsel’s two-page analysis of the merits of the potential appealable issues, which cited no case law, insufficient). The inadequacy of the Brief is made more profound by its failure to “satisfy the court that [Counsel] scoured the record in search of appealable issues.” Id. The 5 Malinsky also filed a supplemental brief to which the Government, but not Counsel, filed a response. 7 statement of appealable issues in the Brief is arguably broad enough to encompass all of Malinsky’s stated grounds for appeal, but the Brief does not “assure us that [Counsel] has considered them and found” all of the issues raised by Malinsky to be “patently without merit.” Id. at 781; see also Youla, 241 F.3d at 300-01 (contrasting the defendant’s twenty-six page pro se brief, which presented three issues for appeal, with counsel’s twopage discussion of fewer appealable issues). For instance, the Brief does not respond to the new information presented to this Court by Malinsky in his supplemental brief, regarding a civil complaint against Malinsky by one of the defrauded insurers, which Malinsky argues supports his argument that the District Court erred in its determination of the losses caused by his fraud. The presentation of “what amounts to a no-merit letter devoid of analysis will not suffice” to fulfill counsel’s obligations under Anders. Youla, 241 F.3d at 299 (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 745). The Brief is, essentially, just such a “no-merit” letter. Even though we hold that the Brief is insufficient to discharge Counsel’s obligations to Malinsky and to this Court, we will not appoint new counsel where, as here, the frivolousness of the appeal is patent. Marvin, 211 F.3d at 781. Regarding the calculation of the enhancement to Malinsky’s sentence based on the losses suffered by the defrauded insurers, the District Court substantially adopted Malinsky’s own estimate of the losses suffered by the defrauded insurance companies. Malinsky argued that the losses were about $200,000, rather than, as specified in the PSR, more than $400,000. 8 The District Court determined that the losses were $211,318.28, and, based on that determination, reduced the total offense level by two points from that recommended in the PSR. This renders moot Malinsky’s first, second, and fourth grounds of review stated in Malinsky’s brief. The District Court’s decision to base the losses on Malinsky’s proposed amount also undermines Malinsky’s argument that the Government violated Brady. Under Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1967). Malinsky alleges that the Government improperly withheld a copy of its correspondence with the defrauded insurance companies. The correspondence, however, stated losses of only $211,318.28—essentially the same amount as the $200,000 in losses Malinsky argued should be considered. Additionally, while Malinsky claims that he had no way to determine how much of the $211,318.28 claimed by those four companies was related to fraud, as opposed to services actually rendered, Malinsky did not challenge the PSR’s finding that he admitted to the FBI that he received approximately $250,000 as a result of the fraudulent billing scheme. Failure to object to a fact in the PSR is an admission of that fact. United States v. Siegel, 477 F.3d 87, 93 (3d Cir. 2007). Malinsky’s other stated ground for appeal—that the total offense level was 9 wrongly enhanced based on the District Court’s finding that it was a crime involving more than ten but fewer than fifty victims—is also frivolous. He failure to object to the PSR’s finding that thirty insurance companies were defrauded is an admission of that fact. Id.