Opinion ID: 531037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: juror misconduct issue

Text: 6
7 The guilt phase of Case's trial lasted five and one-half trial days, beginning Tuesday, October 19, 1982 and ending at midday on Tuesday, October 26, 1982. The alleged incident of juror misconduct occurred Monday afternoon, October 25, apparently after court had recessed for the day. However, it did not come to light until after the guilt phase of Case's trial had concluded and the jury had returned a guilty verdict. 8 Deloris Reich, an individual unconnected with the trial, testified that between 4:20 p.m. and 4:40 p.m. Monday afternoon she observed maybe a few more than twelve people, in various groupings, cross the street during a period spanning a few minutes. R.Vol. XI at 2236, 2238, 2243-44. At another point Reich stated that people started coming across the street, quite a few people. I don't have any idea how many. They just kept coming. R.Vol. X at 1902. They were crossing from the direction of the courthouse toward the vicinity where the jurors' cars were parked. R.Vol. XI at 2249-50. After viewing the jury the following day Reich was able to state positively that at least some members of the jury were among the people she observed crossing the street. R.Vol. X at 1903-07, 1911; R.Vol. XI at 2236-37. 9 As one group consisting of three or four men passed, Reich heard one of them say [t]hat little gal was lying on the stand this afternoon, that was obvious. R.Vol. X at 1902; R.Vol. XI at 2237. At the time Reich's back was turned to the group and her attention was directed to her daughter who was in a parked vehicle, and with whom Reich had been conversing. Thus, Reich was not able to state who made the remark or who was in a position to hear it. R.Vol. X at 1902-03; R.Vol. XI at 2245. 10 A few minutes later as Reich was crossing the street to get to her own vehicle she passed two women, one of whom was heard by Reich to remark [h]e will be found guilty, there is no other way it can go. R.Vol. X at 1908; R.Vol. XI at 2238. Reich's back was to the women when the remark was made, R.Vol. XI at 2246, and her attention was directed toward getting across the street. R.Vol. X at 1908. However, she turned upon hearing the remark and looked at the women, observing the side of one woman's face. R.Vol. XI at 2246. 11 Reich testified I will not and cannot swear that the lady on the jury is the one that said those words, nor a man on the jury said those words. R.Vol. X at 1911. However, as indicated, Reich was firm in her conclusion that jurors were among those crossing the street, and she felt that the two ladies, one of whom made the remark in question, were members of the jury, but simply was unable to say for absolutely sure. R.Vol. XI at 2248-49. She expressed similar feelings with respect to at least one of the men in the group from which the other remark in question had been heard. Id. 12 Reich, who was aware that a trial was going on, thought the two remarks in question were odd, R.Vol. X at 1914, R.Vol. XI at 2246, but did nothing about the matter until the following day, Tuesday, when she called Pam Thompson, a radio reporter friend of hers. Reich asked Thompson about the trial and was told that the jury had found Case guilty. Reich told Thompson she was not surprised by a guilty verdict because of what I heard. R.Vol. XI at 2247. 13 The sentencing phase of Case's trial commenced the following day, Wednesday, October 27. Apparently Thompson had Reich come to the courthouse that morning to see if she could identify members of the jury as those whom Reich had observed crossing the street. Reich was able to identify at least eight of the jurors (inclusive of the two alternates). R.Vol. X at 1907. Thompson then broadcast an account of what Reich had overheard. The matter came to the attention of Case's counsel, who brought it up with the trial court immediately following the noon recess that same day. The court informed counsel that he had learned of the incident the previous evening, and had spoken to Reich on the telephone, but decided not to pursue the matter when Reich stated that she did not know if any jurors were involved. 14 Since Reich had purportedly identified some of the jurors that morning the trial court permitted representatives of the two sides to go to Reich's home to record an interview with her. R.Vol. X at 1900. A motion by defense counsel for an immediate voir dire of the still-impaneled jury was denied. 15 At 3:30 p.m. that same afternoon, Wednesday, October 27, one of Case's counsel, and an investigator for the state, returned to court with a tape of an interview with Reich in which she substantially recounted the events already described. The tape was played to the court and counsel in chambers. Case's counsel then moved again for a voir dire of the jury and the motion was once again denied. R.Vol. X at 1917. 16 The following afternoon, Thursday, October 28, after the jury had retired to deliberate on Case's sentence, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the jury misconduct issue. As the following exchange between the court and Case's counsel indicates, the defense was not limited in any way as to what it could present in that hearing, with the exception of a voir dire of the jury: 17 MR. MITCHELL: ... And I think the first thing that comes first is presenting whatever evidence I may have in that regard, Your Honor, in addition to what was submitted to the Court yesterday on the record [referring to the tape recording of Reich's interview.] 18 THE COURT: I'll be frank with you, nothing was submitted to the Court yesterday insofar as I could tell. But you may submit any other evidence. And I told you at that time you could. 19 R.Vol. XI at 2231 (emphasis added). 20 Case's counsel then produced Reich, who was examined and cross-examined under oath in open court, generally repeating what she had stated in the recorded interview. No other evidence was proffered. 21 At the conclusion of the hearing Case's counsel moved in the alternative for a mistrial on the ground of jury misconduct, and, for the third time, that permission be granted to voir dire the jury because of the evidence presented by Reich. Both motions were denied without explanation, R.Vol. XI at 2250, although the trial court had explained at the outset of the evidentiary hearing that: 22 THE COURT: I'm willing to listen to see if there was jury misconduct. And if there is jury misconduct and you can prove it to the Court, you are entitled, depending on when it occured, [sic] to a new trial, maybe to a new sentencing hearing. I don't know. 23 R.Vol. XI at 2232-33. See also R.Vol. IX at 1818-20. And, earlier, the court stated: 24 But this is the way the lady sounded to me, and it just--we don't know how many people are crossing the street.... She doesn't know anything about this as to who said what to whom, and there isn't any sense in pushing it. 25 R.Vol. X at 1917 (emphasis added). Thus, it is a fair inference that the trial court found no factual basis for the claim of juror misconduct sufficient to justify a voir dire of the jurors. 26 Following the evidentiary hearing and the denial of Case's motions to interrogate the jury or for a mistrial, the jury was brought back into the courtroom and announced their verdict that Case not suffer the death penalty. R.Vol. XI at 2252. The court then pronounced sentence and the jury was discharged. 27 On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court the issue was stated as whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to declare a mistrial or voir dire jurors following an allegation of juror misconduct. State v. Case, 676 P.2d at 246. The court declared the standard to be: If there is no evidence of probable juror impropriety, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to voir dire the jury. Id. The court made the following findings with respect to Reich's testimony: 28 A review of the record indicates that Reich was crossing the street with a group of people when she overheard the remarks but that she had no idea who made the remarks.... [S]he would not say positively that any comment she overheard was made by a juror or overheard by members of the jury. She admitted that she could not say that any juror said anything.... Reich was equivocal as she could not say that any juror made or heard the remarks in question. 29 State v. Case, 676 P.2d at 246-47 (emphasis added). Based on its findings, the Supreme Court concluded: 30 There was insufficient proof of juror misconduct to overcome the presumption that the jury obeyed its instructions. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to voir dire the jury, nor by denying a motion for mistrial. 31 Id. at 247. 32 Case's initial appeal to this court was remanded to the United States District Court (Nos. 85-2937 and 86-1042, unpublished, March 6, 1987), for an evidentiary hearing at which either party could supplement the record on the jury misconduct issue. A hearing was held, but neither Case nor the state offered anything further. Thus, Case's claim stands solely on the state court record and findings. 2 33
34 Our review of the district court's decision centers on the effect and the deference, if any, to be accorded to the findings of the state courts. The magistrate's report, adopted by the district court, omitted any discussion of the state court findings. The state argues that the district court improperly failed to accord a presumption of correctness to those findings. Case contends that his petition presents only a constitutional question of law, or one of mixed fact and law, requiring a de novo review of the record. More particularly, Case argues that the issue requires an independent federal review to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to compel a voir dire of the jurors: 35 The issue in this case is not whether the jury was biased or even whether jury misconduct occurred but rather whether there was sufficient evidence of jury misconduct and the prejudicial nature of that misconduct to mandate voir dire of the jury on that subject. The ultimate issue of what amount of evidence is enough to require under the federal constitution an inquiry of the jurors is a question of law. 36 Case's Answer and Reply Brief at 12-13. 37 Sufficiency of the evidence can be considered to be a mixed question of law and fact. See Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1035, 98 L.Ed.2d 999 (1988); Herring v. Blankenship, 662 F.Supp. 557, 565 (W.D.Va.1987). Thus, according to Case, the state court findings are entitled to no deference. 38 The general rules are not in doubt. Explicit and implicit findings by state trial and appellate courts shall be presumed to be correct, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d), unless one of seven factors listed in section 2254(d) are present, or the federal court concludes that the state court findings are not fairly supported by the record. 3 Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432, 103 S.Ct. 843, 849, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983); Sumner v. Mata (Sumner I), 449 U.S. 539, 545-47, 550, 101 S.Ct. 764, 768-769, 770, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1482 (10th Cir.1987); Redford v. Smith, 543 F.2d 726, 729-30 (10th Cir.1976). 39 The presumption applies to basic, primary, or historical facts and the inferences that can properly be drawn regarding them. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 431-32, 103 S.Ct. at 849-50; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) ( '[I]ssues of fact' refers 'to what are termed basic, primary, or historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators.... '  (emphasis added) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 745, 755 n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963))); Phillips v. Murphy, 796 F.2d 1303, 1306 (10th Cir.1986). 40 No presumption of correctness attaches to legal conclusions or determinations on mixed questions of law and fact. Those are reviewed de novo on federal habeas review. Sumner v. Mata (Sumner II), 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1306, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982); Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1346 (10th Cir.1984). However, the presumption of correctness will continue to apply to any findings of fact underlying mixed questions, typically ultimate constitutional issues such as due process. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 431-32, 103 S.Ct. at 849-50; Sumner II, 455 U.S. at 597, 102 S.Ct. at 1306; Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2108, 104 L.Ed.2d 669 (1989); Hunt v. Oklahoma, 683 F.2d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir.1982). This will even be the case when, as here, those findings might resolve or dispose of the ultimate mixed question. See, e.g., Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d at 1482; Phillips v. Murphy, 796 F.2d at 1306. 41 In the broadest terms, the issue presented here is whether Case's due process rights were infringed when the trial court refused permission to voir dire the jury regarding the alleged juror misconduct. This ultimate issue of due process is a mixed question of law and fact. Cf. Chaney, 730 F.2d at 1346; Hunt, 683 F.2d at 1309. Thus, the section 2254(d) presumption does not apply to this ultimate issue. 42 However, whether or not the jurors made or heard the comments in question is unquestionably a matter of basic, primary, or historical fact. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. at 120, 104 S.Ct. at 456. That is especially true where, as here, the fact determination necessarily included an evaluation of the demeanor and credibility of the sole witness, Deloris Reich. Questions of witness credibility are usually considered to be issues of fact. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506, 73 S.Ct. 397, 445, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). The state trial court was in a far better position than any other tribunal to assess the credibility of Reich, having taken her live testimony. Such practical considerations are relevant to distinguishing issues of fact and law. As the Supreme Court suggested in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14, 106 S.Ct. 445, 451-52, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985):[T]he decision to label an issue a 'question of law,' a 'question of fact,' or a 'mixed question of law and fact' is sometimes as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis. [Citation omitted]. At least in those instances in which Congress has not spoken and in which the issue falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question. 43 See also Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069, 108 S.Ct. 1035, 98 L.Ed.2d 999 (1988). 44 As our summary of the record discloses, the state courts both explicitly and implicitly determined that at best Reich's testimony was equivocal and uncertain. [S]he could not say that any juror made or heard the remarks in question. State v. Case, 676 P.2d at 247. 45 Case urges that the testimony was enough to trigger a constitutional requirement for further investigation by way of a voir dire of the jurors. We disagree. Giving full deference to the state's findings, Reich's testimony supports nothing more than speculation and conjecture. No constitutional duty to resort to the drastic step of a post-verdict voir dire of a jury can arise on evidence which raises nothing more than a mere possibility of misconduct. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2750, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). 46 Although Case invokes virtually all of the exceptions to the presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d), we conclude that none apply. Other than the fact that the trial judge declined to voir dire the jurors regarding the alleged misconduct, Case can identify absolutely no shortcomings in the procedure by which the material facts were investigated, developed, and resolved. The judge gave Case every opportunity to investigate the incident, using nonjuror sources. Case received a full, fair, and adequate evidentiary hearing to present his arguments. After hearing all the testimony and arguments presented on the issue, the trial judge ruled against Case on the merits, and that was affirmed by the state supreme court. On federal habeas review Case was given a further chance to present evidence on the jury misconduct issue and chose not to do so. With respect to the final exception under section 2254(d), despite Case's argument to the contrary, our independent review of the state court record satisfies us that the factual determinations by the state courts are fairly supported. In short, no section 2254(d) exception applies to diminish or avoid the statutory presumption of correctness which we must accord to the state court findings. 47 Finally, if a federal court seeks to avoid the presumption under one of these eight exceptions, it must explain its reasons in writing. Sumner I, 449 U.S. at 551, 101 S.Ct. at 771 ([W]e now hold that a habeas court should include in its opinion granting the writ the reasoning which led it to conclude that any of the first seven factors were present, or the reasoning which led it to conclude that the state finding was 'not fairly supported by the record.' ). The federal magistrate failed to explain clearly, as required by Sumner I, the reasons why he chose to overlook the section 2254(d) presumption. In fact, no reference to section 2254(d) is made at all. Even assuming the magistrate did consciously consider the import of section 2254(d) but found the presumption not to apply because of one of the enumerated exceptions, we are unsure which exception the magistrate intended. We do not believe the magistrate's findings, adopted by the district court, fulfilled the directives of Sumner I, and Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). 48 According the full presumption of correctness to the state court findings on the basic and primary facts from which this issue arises we cannot conclude that the state trial court violated Case's constitutional rights when it refused to conduct a post-verdict voir dire of the jury. The district court's decision to the contrary, and which failed to set forth reasons why the presumption of correctness should not apply, is erroneous.