Opinion ID: 1361063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: process and judgment in main case.

Text: The judgment against Jo E. Fletcher and John B. Shaw in favor of the plaintiff recited: the Court having before it the records and files in this case, and the plaintiff having presented his evidence and produced the promissory note sued upon in his petition, and having heard the testimony of plaintiff, and the record showing that service had been made upon one of the partners, John B. Shaw of the partnership firm doing business as Fletcher and Shaw, and that said defendants failed to answer the petition of the plaintiff, and the Court being fully advised in the premises DOTH FIND: That plaintiff secured proper service upon the defendants and that defendants failed to answer the petition of the plaintiff on or before the 30th day of April, 1949, and have been and now are in default. Judgment accordingly was entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants, and each of them, and the Superior Oil Company was directed to pay into court a sufficient amount to satisfy the judgment. Counsel for the plaintiff herein contends that in view of the recitals of the judgment, it is not subject to an attack herein, which is a collateral attack upon the judgment. We think counsel goes too far in his contention. It is stated in 31 Am. Juris. 201 that: In most jurisdictions, the rule is that a recital in a judgment of the presence of a jurisdictional fact may be impeached in a collateral proceeding by a positive contrary showing of the remainder of the record upon which the judgment is based. In 31 Am. Juris. 203 it is stated: According to the weight of authority, a recital in a judgment of due service of process may be impeached or contradicted upon collateral attack by an officer's return appearing in the record. See also Mahan vs. Wyopa Co., 27 Wyo. 17, 189 P. 633. And there can be no doubt that since the garnishee would be adversely affected, it can raise the point. 31 Am. Juris. 179, Section 581. The summons in this case was directed as hereinbefore mentioned, to Jo E. Fletcher and John B. Shaw as individuals. The return of the summons shows that it was served by delivering to ____ at his usual place of residence leaving with Mrs. John B. Shaw, a party over the age of 16, a copy of the same, together with copy of petition. Counsel apparently, without authority of the court, had the officer amend the return six months later by adding being also the usual place of doing business of Fletcher and Shaw in Natrona County, Wyo. This addition to the return, even though lawfully made, was (together with all testimony relating thereto) wholly immaterial, in view of the fact, as hereinbefore mentioned, that this was not an action against the partnership as an entity but an action against two individuals. It is elementary that a party to be affected by a personal judgment must have a day in court or an opportunity to be heard. 31 Am. Juris. 74; Dillard vs. McKnight, 34 Cal.2d 209, 209 P.2d 387. There can be no pretense that the return of the summons in the case shows that there was any service of any kind whatever on Jo E. Fletcher, one of the individuals sued in this action, even though the judgment recites generally that the defendants were served. The judgment itself shows that there was service only on John B. Shaw. Thus the general recital above mentioned, and any presumption of regularity, is contradicted not only by the return on the summons but also by the judgment itself. Hence, the judgment against Jo E. Fletcher as an individual was totally void. 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), Section 108; 1 Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) Section 233. It is said in 31 Am. Juris. 73-74: Although there are statutes authorizing judgments against two or more joint debtors upon service of summons on but one of them, the general rule is that it is improper to render judgment against all the obligors where the court has not acquired jurisdiction over some of them. A judgment so rendered is void as against the parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction. The situation is somewhat different in connection with the service on John B. Shaw, although not beyond doubt or controversy. It is contended that there was not even any service upon him. We are cited, for instance, to Scott vs. Ray (Tex. Civ. App.), 141 S.W. 1002; Bugbee vs. Thompson, 41 N.H. 183; Chamblee vs. Huffsmith (Tex. Civ. App.), 44 S.W. 616; Kellam vs. Trail (Tex. Civ. App.) 185 S.W. 988. None of these cases are in point, for the reason that in these cases the attack on the judgment was direct, while in the case at bar the attack is collateral. The rule applicable in this case is that stated in 49 C.J.S. 829 where it is stated: A defect in the form or matter of the summons or other process not absolutely destructive of its validity, or an irregularity or defect in the service of the process on defendant which, although material and available on a direct attack, is sufficient to give notice of the proceedings, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction and therefore does not expose the judgment to collateral impeachment, particularly where the defect or irregularity is amendable, and is cured by a failure to object thereto in time. Where, however, the defect in the process is so radical that it amounts to no process at all, as where it wholly fails to give the party the information it is expected to convey, or where the attempted service is so faulty that it does not constitute a legal service on defendant or amounts to no service at all, there is a want of jurisdiction and the judgment will be impeachable collaterally. So the question here is whether the defect in the service on John B. Shaw is so radical that we must say he had no notice at all. It does not appear directly on the return of the summons that service was made on John B. Shaw. On direct attack, the service would probably have been quashed, unless amended, as might have been done. 42 Am. Juris. 114, Note 8. But it does appear that a copy of the summons and a copy of the petition was left with Mrs. John B. Shaw at his usual place of residence. That is such service, if made on a member of the family of defendant, as is permitted to be made on a party to an action, according to Section 3-1009 of the Wyo. Comp. St. 1945. The crude return of the sheriff may be simplified as follows: I received the within summons    and served the same    by leaving with Mrs. John B. Shaw, a party over the age of 16 a copy of the same together with a copy of the petition  at his usual place of residence. It is said in the late case of Troy Lumber Co. vs. State Sewing Mach., Corp., (N.C.) 64 S.E.2d 415, 418 that when the sheriff returns that he has `served' the summons, this implies that he has discharged his official duty in that respect, that is, that he has served it according to law. Several cases are cited, and it stated that this shows service at least prima facie. In view of the fact that the summons was to serve Jo E. Fletcher and John B. Shaw the foregoing statement seems to imply that prima facie there was service according to law on both parties. However, we have seen that there was no valid service on Fletcher. So the prima facie case must be limited, and can apply only, if at all, to John B. Shaw. That Mrs. John B. Shaw was not intended to be served is clear from the petition and the summons, in which John B. Shaw is one of the defendants named therein. Counsel for appellant say without offering any proof of any kind that Mrs. John B. Shaw may have been a cousin, a mother-in-law, or a daughter-in-law. That of course is possible, but would be the exception. Usually we would understand thereby that she was the wife of John B. Shaw. And if Mrs. Shaw actually was the wife of John B. Shaw, living with him, we may be almost certain that John B. Shaw received a copy of the petition and the summons, and in such case there would not seem to be the total absence of information which would justify a collateral attack. It is the fact of service and not the proof thereof that confers jurisdiction. 42 Am. Juris. 113, Note 1; 42 Am. Juris. 115, Note 11; Goodman vs. Order of United Workmen, 211 Minn. 181, 300 N.W. 624. Now in the case at bar, the judgment in the main action states that the court received evidence and that John B. Shaw was duly served. For aught we know the evidence submitted to the court may have fully clarified the situation, and it may have been shown that Mrs. John B. Shaw was in fact the wife of John B. Shaw, living with him, and that the papers were left at their usual place of residence. There would not, in such case be any contradiction of the return on the summons, but merely a clarification thereof. In 31 Am. Juris. 199, it is stated: A collateral attack upon a judgment on the ground of the absence of jurisdiction may be precluded by statements in the record in regard to jurisdiction or in regard to the presence of particular jurisdictional facts. Under this rule, the jurisdictional facts will be deemed to have been properly ascertained on collateral attack even though the court may have misjudged the facts, so that a recital in the record as to the presence of jurisdictional facts may not be impeached or contradicted in a collateral proceeding by evidence outside the record. In Note at 68 A.L.R. 390 it is said: There is a long line of authorities to the effect that a recital in a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction as to service of process is, upon a collateral attack, conclusive, and not subject to impeachment. In 49 C.J.S. 844 it is stated: Where a judgment or decree of a domestic court recites that proper notice of the action was given, that process was duly served, or that the parties were duly summoned or cited, such recital generally is conclusive on collateral attack, even though there may have been defects in some of the documents constituting part of the judgment roll and relating to the service of process. These statements seem to be confusing when read in connection with the citations from 31 Am. Juris. 201 and 203 already given, and see 31 Am. Juris. 202, Section 607, where it is said: In most jurisdictions, the rule is that a recital in a judgment of due service of process may be impeached in a collateral proceeding by a positive contrary showing of the remainder of the record upon which the judgment is based. See also 68 A.L.R. 390-405. We shall not attempt to entirely harmonize these various statements. Some light on the subject is thrown by the case of Kaufmann vs. California Mining & Dredging Syndicate, 16 Cal.2d 90, 104 P.2d 1038 where the court stated: In the present case it appears from the judgment in the other action that oral and documentary evidence was introduced and that the trial court there made its findings with respect to the validity of the service of process and the entry of the default. It does not affirmatively appear that these findings were based solely upon any particular document or documents, relating to service of summons and, under these circumstances, the presumptions in favor of the validity of the judgment make said findings conclusive upon collateral attack even though there may have been defects in some of the documents constituting part of the judgment roll and relating to the service of summons. The case quotes from Hahn vs. Kelly, 34 Cal. at page 431, 94 Am. Dec. 742 where it was said: `But if the judgment for proof of service refers generally to a paper or papers on file, or to a summons and Sheriff's return thereon without specifying any particular paper, summons or return, and if there be found on file papers showing a defective and void service, and nothing further appears, the law to support the judgment would presume that the Court had other sufficient proof of service than that which remains on file; and it would not in that case appear affirmatively from the record that the recitals in the judgment were untrue. The recitals would therefore be conclusive proof of service. But if the judgment recites a due service of process without specifying how the service was made or referring to any paper as proof of it, the recital is conclusive on the parties in a collateral proceeding   .' That case is in line with what is said in 31 Am. Juris. 202, Section 607 that: The recital (in the judgment) is conclusive upon collateral attack, however, unless the contradiction is direct, explicit, and irreconcilable. In 50 C.J. 577 it is stated that under a more liberal rule it is held that omissions in a return may be supplied or ambiguities explained by parol evidence, as where the return is so indefinite and uncertain as to render its meaning doubtful. Such evidence does not constitute a contradiction of, or attack upon, the return; etc. And see Brusie vs. Gates, 80 Cal. 462, 22 P. 284, hereafter quoted, that the written return of an officer is not the only evidence of the fact that a writ was properly served. In 68 A.L.R. 392 it is stated in a note: Where there is a defective service of process, as distinguished from lack of service, a recital or finding by the court in its judgment that there was due service of process is conclusive and cannot be attacked in collateral proceedings. Thus the courts  probably most of them  make a distinction between a case where there was a total lack of service and one where the return shows the service to be defective. We think that in the case at bar the return of the service upon John B. Shaw, can be said only to show service that was defective. If that is correct, as we believe it to be, then the court had the right to take evidence supplementing the return and finding that, as a matter of fact, service was made upon John B. Shaw by serving his wife, Mrs. John B. Shaw, a member of the former's family, and at the usual residence of the defendant, Shaw. We are inclined to believe, accordingly, that in view of the collateral attack herein, we cannot say that the finding of the court that John B. Shaw was duly served is incorrect. It is true that, in the absence of a statute permitting it, separate and independent judgments cannot be rendered against defendants sued jointly. 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.) page 177; 2 Williston on Contracts, Section 329. The debt herein was joint. Section 61-307, Wyo. Comp. St. 1945. The rule mentioned has probably been materially modified by Section 3-3901, Wyo. Comp. St. 1945 hereafter quoted. In any event, the better rule seems to be that at best, the judgment against John B. Shaw would be erroneous only and not subject to collateral attack. Douglass's Lessee vs. Massie, 16 Ohio 271; Newburg and Goldsmith vs. Munshower, 29 Ohio St. 617; Capper vs. Short, 226 Ky. 689, 11 S.W.2d 717; 1 Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) Sections 211 and 234. See 49 C.J.S. 78, Note 95.