Opinion ID: 1540695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the dswa is an agency of the state for purposes of the tort claims act

Text: The issues raised in this appeal present questions of statutory construction, which are reviewed by this Court de novo. Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, Del.Supr., 632 A.2d 63, 66 (1993). In the construction of a statute, this Court has established as its standard the search for legislative intent. Where the intent of the legislature is clearly reflected by unambiguous language in the statute, the language itself controls. Spielberg v. State, Del.Supr., 558 A.2d 291, 293 (1989) (citation omitted). The Tort Claims Act does not define the term agency of the State as used in 10 Del.C. § 4001. There is also no decision of a Delaware Court (other than the Superior Court's opinion in this action) specifically addressing whether the DSWA is an agency for purposes of section 4001 of the Tort Claims Act. Nevertheless, an analysis of the nature of the DSWA shows that the Superior Court was correct in concluding that the DSWA is a state agency under the Act. The purpose, structure, powers, and other attributes of the DSWA are set forth in Chapter 64 of Title 7 of the Delaware Code. Various provisions in Chapter 64 illustrate the connection between the DSWA and the State. For example, the Governor appoints the seven directors who constitute the DSWA. 7 Del.C. § 6403(a). Each director is indemnified by the State for expenses and amounts paid in any suit or proceeding in which the director is a party by reason of his or her being a director of the DSWA. 7 Del.C. § 6426(a). Furthermore, all members of the staff of the DSWA are covered by the state's pension plan. 7 Del.C. § 6405(e). The DSWA is described in 7 Del.C. § 6403(a) as a body politic and corporate constituting a public instrumentality of the State established and created for the performance of an essential public and governmental function.... This language is similar to that used by the General Assembly to describe other Authorities under the Delaware Code. E.g., 2 Del.C. § 1304(a) (describing the Delaware Transportation Authority as a public instrumentality of the State and a body corporate and politic which exercises public and essential governmental functions); 16 Del.C. § 9204(a) (stating that the Delaware Health Facilities Authority constitutes a public instrumentality and a body politic and corporate that performs an essential public function). The General Assembly's description of the DSWA in 7 Del.C. § 6403(a) strongly suggests that the General Assembly intended it to be considered a state agency. In Wilmington Housing Auth. v. Williamson, Del. Supr., 228 A.2d 782 (1967), this Court addressed whether the Wilmington Housing Authority (the WHA) constituted a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity or a municipal corporation which is not so entitled. In holding that the WHA was a state agency, Chief Justice Wolcott explained: The [WHA] is described by law as a body both corporate and politic, exercising public powers. It is nowhere described as a municipal corporation. The terms public corporate body and public corporation are generic; they describe any corporate instrumentality created by the State for public purposes and with the object of administering a portion of the powers of the State.... We think it clear that the [WHA] is a state agency created to discharge a public object essential to the public interest. As such, it may raise the defense of sovereign immunity to suit unless that defense has been waived by act of the General Assembly. Id. at 787 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). [2] This reasoning and conclusion are equally applicable to the DSWA. The terms agency and state agency are broadly defined for other purposes in a number of provisions of the Delaware Code. One such definition states: State agency means any office, department, board, commission, committee, court, school district, board of education and all public bodies existing by virtue of an act of the General Assembly or of the Constitution of the State.... 29 Del.C. § 5804(9). Another statutory definition provides as follows: The term agency, as used in [Chapter 61 of Title 29], shall include every board, department, bureau, commission, person or group of persons or other authority created and now existing ... to execute, supervise, control and/or administer governmental functions under the laws of this State.... 29 Del.C. § 6101. Although these definitions do not control the meaning of the term agency of the State as used in the Tort Claims Act, they demonstrate the General Assembly's intent to ascribe an expansive meaning to the term state agency. Sandt relies on the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware Solid Waste Auth., 600 F.Supp. 1369 (1985), where Chief Judge Stapleton held that the DSWA was not an arm of the State for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. That issue, however, is distinct from the one presented here. The fact that the DSWA is not an arm of the State does not control whether or not it is an agency of the State. This distinction is highlighted by the test used to determine whether an agency is an arm of the State under the Eleventh Amendment. Specifically, the test looks at the relationship between the agency and the state and the degree of autonomy that an agency exercises over its operations. Id. at 1373-74 (emphasis added). It is therefore evident that a state organization can be an agency even though it is not an arm of the State under the Eleventh Amendment. Finally, this Court has previously characterized the DSWA as a state agency in Delaware Solid Waste Auth. v. News-Journal Co., Del.Supr., 480 A.2d 628 (1984). When describing the issue presented in that case, the Court stated that [t]he principal issue is whether standing committees of a State agency are public bodies under section 10002(a) of the [Freedom of Information] Act, and thus subject to its open meeting provisions. Id. at 628 (emphasis added). Although the issue before the Court in that case was whether or not the DSWA was a public body, which it was found to be, the description of the DSWA as a state agency is consistent with the Superior Court's decision and our holding herein. Therefore, in light of the nature of the DSWA, the reasoning of the WHA v. Williamson decision, and the legislative intent gleaned from definitions of agency elsewhere in the Delaware Code, we hold that the DSWA is an agency of the State for purposes of the Tort Claims Act.