Opinion ID: 1727617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lornson's Constitutional Claims

Text: ¶ 67 Lornson contends that any interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 that denies Lornson's claim as personal representative of Joseph Sanders' estate would render the statute unconstitutional. First, Lornson argues that Joseph Sanders' statutory right to recover damages for the death of his wife became a vested property right as of the date of his wife's death and, therefore, denial of Lornson's claim deprives Joseph Sanders and his estate of a vested property interest without due process of law. Second, Lornson argues that denial of Lornson's claim in her capacity as personal representative of Joseph Sanders' estate deprives Joseph Sanders of equal protection of the law. ¶ 68 As we address these constitutional arguments, we begin with the presumption that a statute is constitutional[,] and [we] will continue to preserve a statute's constitutionality if there is a reasonable basis for the exercise of legislative power. Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 27, 613 N.W.2d 120. We uphold the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 and conclude that denial of Lornson's claim in her capacity as personal representative of Joseph Sanders' estate does not deprive Joseph Sanders or his estate of a vested property interest without due process of law. Contrary to Lornson's argument, Joseph Sanders did not acquire a vested property right in a wrongful death cause of action as of the date of Janice Sanders' death. A cause of action for wrongful death is purely statutory. No right of recovery was recognized at common law. Chang, 182 Wis.2d at 560, 514 N.W.2d 399: As the right is created by statute, the right to recover damages for wrongful death and the terms of the recovery are confined to what is specified in the statute, and the right to recover damages is limited to members of those groups, or classes, of beneficiaries listed in the statute. Id. (internal citation omitted). As noted previously, a wrongful death cause of action has always abated upon the claimant's death and will continue to do so unless the legislature provides for its survival. See Kranz, 155 Wis. at 42, 143 N.W. 1049. At the time of Janice Sanders' death, the statutory scheme did not allow Joseph Sanders' claim to survive his death. Thus, Joseph Sanders was not deprived of a vested property right. [9] ¶ 69 We also conclude that Joseph Sanders and his estate were not deprived of equal protection of the law. We will uphold a statute under an equal protection analysis [i]f a rational basis exists to support the classification, unless the statute impinges on a fundamental right or creates a classification based on a suspect criterion. Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 27, 613 N.W.2d 120 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). We affirm the conclusion in Czapinski and Strykowski that Wis. Stat. ch. 655 does not deny any fundamental right. Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 28, 613 N.W.2d 120; Strykowski, 81 Wis.2d at 507, 261 N.W.2d 434. ¶ 70 Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)( o ) and 895.04(2) does not create a classification based on a suspect criterion. [A] suspect class is one that involves `immutable personal characteristics or historical patterns of discrimination and political powerlessness.' Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 28, 613 N.W.2d 120 (quoting Strykowski, 81 Wis.2d at 507, 261 N.W.2d 434). Lornson argues that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 creates two classes of wrongful death claimants: (1) those spouses who survived until the trial and entry of judgment on their causes of action and; (2) those who died prior to trial and entry of judgment. We hold that these different classes of claimants do not have immutable personal characteristics and have not experienced a historical pattern of discrimination and political powerlessness. See id. Therefore, Wis. Stat. § 655.007 does not create a classification that would be based on a suspect criterion. See id.; see also Ferdon v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2005 WI 125, ¶ 65, 284 Wis.2d 573, 701 N.W.2d 440. Because Wis. Stat. § 655.007 is not based on a fundamental right and does not involve a suspect class, we use the rational basis standard of review. Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 28, 613 N.W.2d 120. ¶ 71 In applying rational basis review to equal protection challenges, we are not concerned with the wisdom or correctness of the legislative determination. Id., ¶ 29, 613 N.W.2d 120. Rather, we determine whether the legislature relied on a reasonable basis in enacting the statute. A statute must meet five criteria of reasonableness. (1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from another. (2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law. (3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only and must not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers within a class. (4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof. (5) The characteristics of each class should be so far different from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation. Strykowski, 81 Wis.2d at 509 n. 8, 261 N.W.2d 434. ¶ 72 In this case, Lornson is challenging our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 in conjunction with Wis. Stat. §§ 895.01(1)(o) and 895.04(2), in which we conclude that an eligible claimant's wrongful death cause of action does not survive the claimant's death should the claimant die before judgment. A rational basis exists for the distinction between claimants who die before judgment and those who do not die before judgment. A wrongful death cause of action belongs to the beneficiaries and is designed to compensate for the loss of the relational interest existing between the beneficiaries and the decedent. Weiss v. Regent Props., Ltd., 118 Wis.2d 225, 230, 346 N.W.2d 766 (1984). One of the purposes of the statute is to compensate the survivors for the pecuniary benefits which they would have derived from the earning power of the decedent had he or she lived. Id. Thus, the rule that a wrongful death cause of action does not survive is reasonable. It allows the legislature to expand the scope of potential recovery to certain named beneficiaries, while ensuring that only those who actually survive and continue to suffer loss from the wrongful death are compensated. The legislature may have thought it unfair that a beneficiary who dies before judgment should be entitled to recover for wrongful death and thus limit recovery to the living beneficiaries. We acknowledge that in this case Wis. Stat. § 655.007 eliminates Lornson, in her capacity as an adult child, as an eligible claimant; however, as we held in Czapinski, classifications distinguishing between adult and minor children do not violate equal protection of the law. Czapinski, 236 Wis.2d 316, ¶ 33, 613 N.W.2d 120. ¶ 73 Furthermore, we note that our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 655.007 in conjunction with §§ 895.01(1)( o ) and 895.04(2) has equal effect on all claimants, including spouses, who die before judgment. ¶ 74 We therefore find that the classifications of spouses who survive final judgment and spouses who do not survive final judgment are not arbitrary or irrational, but are based on reasonable criteria. Thus, Lornson's equal protection argument fails.