Opinion ID: 2334300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the exclusion of certain family court documents

Text: At trial defendant sought to introduce a Family Court consent decree regarding the custody of the minor child, Peter Germano. This evidence was offered in order to attempt to prove that at the time of the search, defendant did not reside at 5383 Post Road. The trial justice refused to receive the consent decree and supporting documents on the grounds that they were irrelevant on the subject of defendant's address at the time of the search. One of the supporting documents indicated that as of approximately September 18, 1985, James H. Germano resided at 5300 Post Road, Warwick, and Rosemary E. Germano resided at 5383 Post Road, East Greenwich, Rhode Island. The consent decree itself had stricken from its terms that portion of the order which stated that the parties shall be separated each from the other from the bed and board and future cohabitation each with the other. The trial justice, after examining the documents, found them to be irrelevant on the subject of defendant's residence at the time of the search, which occurred many months after the entry of the order. We have often stated that rulings on the question of relevancy are left to the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Alger, 545 A.2d 504 (R.I. 1988); State v. Ashness, 461 A.2d 659 (R.I. 1983). Such a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing that the trial justice abused his discretion to the prejudice of the objecting party. State v. Ashness, supra . In our opinion the exclusion of this evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. It was at best highly speculative to infer that information given to the Family Court in September of 1985 would be probative of defendant's address on April 22, 1986, particularly in light of the fact that defendant was the sole owner of the premises, and that he had the combination to the safe, which he opened at the request of the police. Further we are of the opinion that this evidence, even if relevant, would not have been competent in order to prove the location of defendant's residence. It requires no citation to enunciate the proposition that a defendant in a criminal case is not required to testify unless he chooses to do so. Further no inference may be drawn against him for failure to testify. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). This does not mean, however, that a defendant may testify in a criminal case by means of affidavits or unsworn statements given to official bodies. It is true that confessions offered by the state as full exhibits may contain exculpatory material that, once the exhibit is introduced by the state, may be considered by the trier of fact for all purposes. Admissions of a party opponent do not constitute hearsay and, if offered by the state, may be fully introduced into evidence. Here we have a completely different situation in which defendant seeks to offer affidavits and other statements made by him and/or his wife on Family Court documents. None of these statements could be tested by cross-examination and constitute hearsay since they were offered for the truth of the matter asserted. R.I.R. Evid. 801(c); see State v. Santos, 122 R.I. 799, 413 A.2d 58 (1980); State v. Angell, 122 R.I. 160, 405 A.2d 10 (1979). The defendant argues that such evidence should be admissible under the provisions of Rule 803(8) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, which reads as follows: Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement perconnel [personnel], or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the state in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. It should be noted that the portions of the public records that are admissible consist of (1) activities of the office or agency, (2) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law, and (3) factual findings resulting from an investigation by authorized personnel in civil actions and proceedings and against the state in criminal cases. The Family Court documents in issue meet none of the foregoing criteria. They contain no report of activities of the Family Court, matters observed by Family Court personnel, or evaluative reports by Family Court personnel. These documents contain only statements by defendant and/or his wife, save for the decree itself, which contained no information about residence. The defendant also cites the catchall provision, Rule 803(24), that allows a court to admit into evidence statements having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. This catchall provision is not to be used as a device for allowing a defendant to prove material facts through affidavit or unsworn statements as a substitute for his own testimony merely because such statements have found their way into an agency record, whether judicial or otherwise. The purpose of the exceptions set forth in Rule 803(8) and (24) is not to deprive the state of the right of cross-examination on crucial issues through the use of public records for a purpose for which they were not designed. Consequently we hold that the Family Court documents that were sought to be introduced into evidence were neither relevant nor competent for the purpose for which they were offered. The trial justice was correct in excluding them.