Opinion ID: 3049023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Pattern of Activity” Enhancement

Text: [1] Garner argues that the district court erred by applying a five-level enhancement for “pattern of activity,” because the prior conduct of sexually abusing his own children occurred at least thirty-five years earlier. Section 2G2.2(b)(5) of the Guidelines permits a five-level increase in offense level “if the defendant engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” The Commentary to this Guideline defines “pattern of activity” as “any combina- 1 The sentencing range was 262 to 327 months. UNITED STATES v. GARNER 7215 tion of two or more separate instances of the sexual abuse or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether or not the abuse or exploitation (A) occurred during the course of the offense; (B) involved the same minor; or (C) resulted in a conviction for such conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, cmt. n.1. [2] Garner does not contest the district court’s finding that he had previously engaged in sexual abuse of a minor; rather, he argues only that the conduct is too remote in time to be considered. We have previously held that the application note to § 2G2.2 makes clear that the sentencing court may properly consider “expanded relevant conduct,” that is, conduct that did not occur during or in connection with the offense of conviction. United States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ashley, 342 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir. 2003). In Williamson, however, we did not consider whether there is any temporal restriction on the use of such prior conduct. [3] The plain language of the Commentary to § 2G2.2 eliminates the need for any temporal or factual nexus between the offense of conviction and any prior act of sexual abuse or exploitation; the provision obviously intends to cast a wide net to draw in any conceivable history of sexual abuse or exploitation of children. And indeed, in applying this section, other circuits have affirmed the enhancement even when the prior acts were quite temporally remote. United States v. Gawthrop, 310 F.3d 405, 413-14 (6th Cir. 2002) (eleven years earlier); United States v. Woodward, 277 F.3d 87, 89-91 (1st Cir. 2002) (twenty to twenty-three years earlier); United States v. Lovaas, 241 F.3d 900, 901 (7th Cir. 2001) (twentysix years earlier). Recognizing the broad sweep of this provision, Garner argues that to expand relevant conduct to include thirty-fiveyear-old actions violates due process. Substantive due process, however, requires only that a sentencing scheme be 7216 UNITED STATES v. GARNER rational and not based on “arbitrary distinction.” Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991). Garner does not explain how the use of older but admittedly relevant conduct is “arbitrary” or “irrational.” The courts have, for some time, recognized that such prior conduct demonstrates an increased danger of recidivism. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27 (1992) (recidivism statutes repeatedly upheld against due process and other challenges); United States v. Bredy, 209 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2000) (eighteen-year-old and twenty-seven-year-old prior robbery convictions used to support three-strikes conviction not arbitrary and did not violate due process). [4] Moreover, the particularly high danger of recidivism of sex offenders is well-known and has been used to support various other laws, such as sex-offender registration requirements. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102-03 (2003); see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002) (risk of sex-offender recidivism is “frightening and high”). Thus, the Sentencing Commission could easily have a rational basis for increasing the sentences of defendants who have previously sexually abused or exploited children, and then later receive, possess, or distribute material involving the sexual exploitation of children, even if years later. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s application of the § 2G2.2(b)(5) enhancement.