Opinion ID: 2555770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Witman Testimony

Text: In Appellant's third issue, he contends that the trial court erred in barring the testimony of one Thomas Witman, and that Mr. Andrews was ineffective for failing to argue in favor of the admissibility of this testimony and for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. The factual background to this issue is as follows. Evidence admitted at trial indicated that, on the day of Ms. Amstutz's murder, a man named Charles Carothers engaged in drug use with Appellant in the hotel room secured with Ms. Amstutz's credit card and also drove her car from the hotel. N.T. Trial, 5/13/96, at 797-801, 815-820. On April 3, 1996, Thomas Witman, who was in custody for an unrelated crime, made a statement to police to the effect that he had overheard Mr. Carothers admit to the murder of Ms. Amstutz. More specifically, Mr. Witman represented that, sometime between May and July of 1995, when he was in the Cumberland County prison, he had overheard a conversation between two other inmates, Mr. Carothers and someone named Vernon, who was subsequently identified as Vernon Robinson, in which Mr. Carothers admitted shooting Ms. Amstutz. [14] Statement of Thomas Witman, dated 4/3/96. The trial court refused to admit the testimony of Mr. Witman regarding Mr. Carothers's statement, determining that it was hearsay to which no exception applied. Appellant argues that Mr. Witman's testimony was admissible both under the hearsay exception for a statement against interest and also pursuant to federal constitutional law as set forth in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). At the PCRA hearing, both Mr. Witman and Mr. Robinson testified; however, Mr. Carothers, through his attorney, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and did not appear. N.T. PCRA Hearing, 5/10/07, at 62. Mr. Witman testified that his 1996 statement to police concerning the overheard confession was accurate, and that he had attempted to contact the district attorney's office regarding the matter. Id. at 66-67, 73-75. Mr. Witman had an extensive record, including prior convictions for crimen falsi, and he acknowledged that he was cooperating with the police on other crimes of which he had knowledge because he wanted to help himself. Id. at 87. Vernon Robinson, the inmate to whom Mr. Carothers allegedly confessed, testified that he remembered a conversation with Mr. Carothers as follows: Defense Counsel: Do you remember what [Mr. Carothers] said about why he was in [prison]? Mr. Robinson: About him getting high with some guy riding around with a lady in the trunk.    Defense Counsel: Did he say whether the lady was alive? Mr. Robinson: He basically said that she was alive when they put her in the trunk, you know what I'm saying, and later on he said that she was dead.    The Court: Did he say anything more about [Appellant]? Mr. Robinson: Yeah. That pretty much he was going to let him fry for what he had done. That's when I ended the conversation....    Defense Counsel: At some point did you talk to prison officials or guards about Mr. Carothers being in your cell? Mr. Robinson: Yes, I did. When we went to dinner and after we came back from dinner, this is when I found out that he was telling on [Appellant]. So I went to the guard at the time. .... [T]he next morning ... C.O. Durnin moved him out the cell. Id. at 98-100. Mr. Robinson also testified that he would have testified at Appellant's trial if Appellant's counsel had asked him. Id. at 100-04. Appellant's claim of trial court error in Issue 3 is both waived and not cognizable under the PCRA because it could have been raised on direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9543(a)(3) and 9544(b). With regard to the ineffective assistance claims in Issue 3, the PCRA court relied in part on this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 855 A.2d 726, 736-38 (2004), to hold that Appellant was precluded from raising any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel from the guilt phase of his trial because he had elected to exercise his right to self-representation during that period. PCRA Court Opinion at 12-14. The PCRA court also concluded that Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel had no arguable merit because Mr. Witman's testimony concerning Mr. Carothers's alleged confession was properly excluded as hearsay. Id. at 14-22. We agree with the PCRA court, and address these conclusions in more detail below. In Faretta v. California, supra , the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense; however, a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of `effective assistance of counsel.' Id. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Relying on Faretta, this Court has held that, when an appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently has chosen to exercise his right to self-representation, we will not consider any ineffective assistance claims that arose from the period of self-representation. Bryant, supra at 737; see also Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 586 Pa. 527, 896 A.2d 508, 522 n. 13 (2006) ( Fletcher II ) (explaining that the Court was applying the categorical approach of the Bryant majority in refusing to consider any claims of ineffectiveness arising from a period of self-representation); Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 604 Pa. 493, 986 A.2d 759, 774, 778 (2009) ( Fletcher III ) (refusing to revisit the holding of Fletcher II, and reiterating that a defendant who chooses to represent himself cannot obtain relief by raising his own ineffectiveness or that of standby counsel). However, we have also recognized that a defendant may withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel. When the defendant in Bryant claimed, in the midst of his trial, to be unable to continue his self-representation because of a dental problem, the trial court held a colloquy with the defendant, during which he affirmed that, going forward, he wanted his stand-by counsel to assume the role of trial counsel. Id. at 737-38. The trial court then permitted the defendant to withdraw his waiver, and once again be represented by counsel. Id. at 738. In the instant case, Appellant represented himself throughout the guilt phase of his trial. As discussed in Issue 2, after a thorough colloquy, the trial court determined that Appellant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel, and, accordingly, the court permitted him to proceed pro se. Throughout the guilt phase of his trial, Appellant continued to call and question witnesses, raise objections, and otherwise serve as his own counsel; at no point during the guilt phase did Appellant seek to withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel or to cease his self-representation. Nonetheless, Appellant now attempts to avoid the application of Bryant's bright-line rule by arguing that, with respect to the particular matter of the admissibility of Mr. Witman's testimony, he permitted Mr. Andrews to represent him. However, our review of the record, as presented in detail below, does not support Appellant's assertion that he withdrew his waiver of the right to counsel or abandoned his exercise of the right to self-representation at this or any other point during the guilt phase of his trial. When Appellant sought to call Mr. Witman to testify, Appellant himselfnot Mr. Andrews, his standby counselmade a proffer to the court, in the absence of the jury, as to Mr. Witman's proposed testimony. N.T. Trial, 5/14/96, at 1222-25. The court then addressed Mr. Witman, whom the sheriff had brought to the courtroom, and, after determining that Mr. Witman wished to speak with counsel before he spoke to the court, secured an attorney for Mr. Witman. Id. at 1225-26. Later in the same session, after his discussion with counsel, Mr. Witman was again brought to the courtroom, and the Commonwealth objected to his proposed testimony as hearsay. Id. at 1283. In response, Appellant himselfagain, not Mr. Andrewsargued that there had been testimony at trial as to the involvement of Mr. Carothers in the case. The court then asked Appellant if he was going to call Mr. Carothers as a witness, and Appellant himself answered I certainly don't know what he could say orwhat his statements say are nothing to help me. Id. at 1284. Following a discussion off the record between Appellant and Mr. Andrews, Appellant himself reiterated that he was not going to call Mr. Carothers. Id. at 1285. The court then indicated that it wanted additional time to consider the matter of Mr. Witman's proposed testimony. Id. at 1287. At the end of the day-long session, the court stated that it was ready to entertain argument about the admissibility of Mr. Witman's testimony, and the court asked Appellant if he wanted to make that legal argument or if he would trust Mr. Andrews to do so. Id. at 1424-25. After conferring with Mr. Andrews, Appellant stated the following: Mr. Andrews said that, has indicated that there is no argument to be made. Witman cannot be used unless ... Carothers would be an unavailable witness. Id. at 1425. The following dialogue then occurred: The Court: Well, I am ready to entertain any argument. [ Appellant ]: There is no argument to present. The Court: You are telling me that if there is any argument to present, Mr. Andrews will present it instead of yourself? Is that it? [ Appellant ]: That is fine. The Court: All right. [ Appellant ]: But Mr. Andrews indicated there is no argument. So if you find some, I guess that is fine, he can make it. The Court: I am looking at the whole issue. Mr. Andrews: I think [Appellant] has said that he would agree to me speaking to this. [ Appellant ]: Yeah, that is fine. Mr. Andrews: I don't thinkI hate to speak for the District Attorney, but we have exchanged cases, or at least they have given me their cases, and they are the same cases I had. I don't think there is a disagreement with the law. This statement could only be admitted if Mr. Carothers were unavailable. If he is unavailable, then there is a decision for the Court to make as to whether that renders the statement admissible. The Court: Well, I think, for openers, you have to call Carothers. [ Appellant ]: Call him as a witness? The Court: Yes. Because ... he is available and can be brought up here to testify. Mr. Andrews: In the absence of that, I think what [Appellant] is saying is accurate, I don't think there is an argument, a disagreement, a divergent point of view between the two tables.    The Court: At this point, you haven't done what I feel has to be done to get this statement in. [ Appellant ]: I will. The Court: So at this point [ Appellant ]: I will. The Court: you should know it is not going in. That could change, but that depends on the circumstances. All right. This part of the record is closed. Id. at 1425-29. Immediately following the above discussion, the court adjourned for the day. During proceedings the next morning, Appellant requested a break in order to speak with Mr. Carothers before calling him as a witness. The jury was escorted from the courtroom, and the following discussion transpired: The Court: Did you have something you wanted to say, Mr. Andrews? Or who is running the show? Mr. Andrews: I am going to sit down, Your Honor. The Court: .... Did you [Appellant] want to say something to me now? [Appellant I just ask for a few minutes to talk to my next witness before I never talked to him. He was originally a Commonwealth witness. The Court: Oh, you understand that Carothers wants to speak to you, is that what you are saying? [Appellant ]: Yes, sir. The Court: Is Mr. Carothers in the courtroom? Would you stand up so I can see you? You want to speak to [Appellant]? Mr. Carothers: (Shook head negatively.) The Court: He shakes his head no. [Appellant]: I had the law clerk ask himand she told meif he was willing to speak to me. And she said yes. That is why I ask. I guess now he changed his mind. The Court: Stand up again, Mr. Carothers. You are Charles Carothers? Mr. Carothers: (Nodded affirmatively.) The Court: Can you answer? Mr. Carothers: Yeah. The Court: Do you want to speak to [Appellant]? Mr. Carothers: If he needs to talk to me or something. The Court: Pardon me? Mr. Carothers: If he needs to talk to me, I guess. The Court: Do you want to talk to him? Mr. Carothers: If he needs to talk to me. The Court: Can you give me a yes or a no? Mr. Carothers: No. The Court: What? Mr. Carothers: No. The Court: No. Is that your answer? Mr. Carothers: Yeah. The Court: All right. Now, where else are we going here, [Appellant]? [Appellant]: I had asked to speak to him. He said if I want to speak to him, he will speak to me. He has no need to speak to me unless I have need to speak to him. And he said he will talk to me if I want him to. I want a chance to speak to him. The Court: Okay. Mr. Carothers, come on up. N.T. Trial, 5/15/96, at 1501-03. The sheriff then escorted Appellant and Mr. Carothers from the courtroom to allow Appellant the opportunity to consult with Mr. Carothers, and the court was in recess for approximately one-half hour. Id. at 1504. When all the parties were back in the courtroom, the following dialogue took place: The Court: .... Where are we on this business, [Appellant]? [Appellant]: The only thing left is to read in the transcripts of the witnesses that invoked their Fifth Amendment right, and the stipulation of Trooper Lander's The Court: You have had your opportunity to talk to Carothers, and you are not calling him, is that it? [ Appellant ]: No, I will let it go. The Court: All right. Then bring the jury down, and let's get these pieces of evidence read. Id. at 1504. The above excerpts of the notes of testimony make clear that Appellant did not withdraw his waiver of the right to counsel or change his mind about exercising his right to self-representation, but rather continued to prepare, direct, and present his own defense, including developing his own strategy, interviewing the witness, and deciding whether or not to call the witness. Therefore, Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial is precluded by the categorical rule promulgated by this Court in Bryant. Also in Issue 3, Appellant contends that Mr. Andrews was ineffective for not claiming on direct appeal that the trial court had erred by denying admission of Mr. Witman's testimony as hearsay. Appellant argues that Mr. Witman's testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception for a statement against interest, which reads as follows: (b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:    (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. In a criminal case, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3). Notably, by its unmistakably clear text, this hearsay exception requires not only that the statement be against interest, but also that there be corroborating circumstances clearly indicative of its trustworthiness, and that the declarant be unavailable. In the instant case, the trial court did not reach the issue of the trustworthiness of the statement in question because the declarant in the instant case, i.e., Mr. Carothers, was not unavailable. See N.T. Trial, 5/14/96, at 1427. In fact, as presented supra in the excerpts of notes of testimony, on the last day of trial, Mr. Carothers was physically present in the courtroom. Appellant actively contemplated calling Mr. Carothers as a witness, but, after conferring privately with Mr. Carothers, Appellant told the court that he was not going to call Mr. Carothers to the witness stand. The trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Carothers was not unavailable, and accordingly, did not err in refusing to apply the hearsay exception for a statement against interest to Mr. Witman's proffered testimony. Because Appellant's underlying claim of trial court error has no merit, his claim of direct appeal counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise the claim of alleged trial court error must fail. [15] Appellant also contends that appellate counsel should have argued that the exclusion of Mr. Witman's proffered testimony was unconstitutional, based on Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In considering Appellant's contention, the PCRA court concluded that the factual distinctions between Chambers and the instant case were too numerous for Chambers to be controlling. PCRA Court Opinion at 21-22. We agree. In Chambers, during the appellant's murder trial, he had sought to introduce testimony from three persons that an acquaintance, one Gable McDonald, had confessed to them that he had committed the murder. The trial court refused to admit this testimony, determining that it was hearsay. Id. at 298-99, 93 S.Ct. 1038. However, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the testimony rejected by the trial court bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and thus was well within the basic rationale of the exception for declarations against interest. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Specifically, the following circumstances of McDonald's confession provided assurance of its reliability: McDonald had spontaneously made three verbal confessions to close acquaintances shortly after the murder, and he had sworn and signed a confession at the offices of the appellant's attorney. Id. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The Supreme Court generally concluded as follows: [W]here constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Appellant attempts to rely on this general conclusion from Chambers, but it does not provide him relief in the instant case because the circumstances of Chambers bear little, if any, resemblance to his own circumstances. None of the assurances of trustworthiness concerning McDonald's confession in Chambers is present in Carothers's alleged confession in the instant case. Mr. Carothers's alleged jailhouse confession was overheard by one other individual, who was another inmate; it was not sworn and signed in counsel's office; and it was not repeated verbally to three acquaintances. In addition, it must be noted that the high Court's reversal of the appellant's judgment of sentence in Chambers was not based solely on the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence as hearsay. Rather, it was the concurrent application of two state rules of evidence, not only the hearsay rule but also the voucher rule, [16] that had deprived the appellant of due process and rendered his trial unfair: In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers [the appellant] of a fair trial. Id. at 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The above considerations make clear that the United States Supreme Court ruling in Chambers was highly dependent upon the facts and circumstances of that case, in which an unusual convergence of two state rules of evidence resulted in an injustice of constitutional proportions. Chambers cannot generally be relied upon to support common, straightforward challenges to hearsay rulings that have correctly applied state criminal procedure. The facts and circumstances of Chambers are very different from those presented in the instant case, and, accordingly, Chambers provides Appellant no relief. In the final part of Issue 3, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), concerning Mr. Carothers's involvement in another, unrelated murder more than two years earlier, for which he had not been prosecuted. [17] Appellant's assertion is frivolous. Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor has an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of an impeachment nature. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Strong, 563 Pa. 455, 761 A.2d 1167, 1171 & n. 5 (2000). To establish a Brady violation, an appellant must prove three elements: [1] the evidence [at issue] was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; [2] the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice ensued. Commonwealth v. Lambert, 584 Pa. 461, 884 A.2d 848, 854 (2005) (citation omitted). The evidence at issue must have been material evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563, 573 (2002). Favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)); see also Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) ( per curiam ) (holding that it was not reasonably likely that disclosure of the result of a key witness's polygraph examination, which was inadmissible under state law, would have resulted in a different outcome at trial). Brady sets forth a limited duty, not a general rule of discovery for criminal cases. Lambert, supra at 854 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) for the proposition that there is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, and Brady did not create one); Commonwealth v. Counterman, 553 Pa. 370, 719 A.2d 284, 297 (1998). The burden rests with the appellant to prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Porter, 556 Pa. 301, 728 A.2d 890, 898 (1999). There is no Brady violation when the appellant knew or, with reasonable diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in question, or when the evidence was available to the defense from non-governmental sources. Lambert, supra at 856; Commonwealth v. Paddy, 569 Pa. 47, 800 A.2d 294, 305 (2002). Here, Appellant contends that the Commonwealth withheld evidence that, more than two years before Ms. Amstutz's murder, Mr. Carothers was implicated in, but never charged with, the murder of one Samuel Thompson. Another individual, Phillip Devenshire, was convicted of Mr. Thompson's murder in 1993, although three witnesses at Mr. Devenshire's trial, including the defendant himself, testified that Mr. Carothers was the shooter. Mr. Devenshire was convicted nearly three years before Appellant's trial, and Appellant provides no evidence that Mr. Thompson's murder was in any way related to Ms. Amstutz's murder. Nonetheless, Appellant asserts that the evidence implicating Mr. Carothers in Mr. Thompson's murder was probative to show Mr. Carothers's motive and intent, as well as his violent propensities, including his propensity to commit the murder of Ms. Amstutz. Appellant's Brief at 24-25. Remarkably, Appellant further asserts the following as to the significance of the evidence implicating Mr. Carothers in Mr. Thompson's murder: [T]he suppressed evidence was clearly exculpatory and highly material. The prior murder accusations showed Carothers was the likely shooter. Id. at 26. The PCRA court did not address the above allegations as a Brady issue. However, the PCRA court did find Appellant's suggestion that evidence as to Mr. Thompson's murder could have been admissible at Appellant's trial for the murder of Ms. Amstutz to be totally without legal merit. Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925 of the PCRA Court, dated 8/7/08, at 8. We conclude that none of Appellant's allegations has any basis in fact or in law, and his assertion of a Brady violation is frivolous. First, the involvement of Mr. Carothers in the murder of Mr. Thompson is a matter of pure conjecture. Mr. Carothers was not arrested for, not charged with, not tried for, not convicted of the Thompson murder. The evidence that Mr. Carothers killed Mr. Thompson consists of some testimony presented at the trial of Mr. Devenshire. Three witnesses, one of whom was Mr. Devenshire himself, testified that Mr. Carothers was the shooter, but the jury must have concluded that the testimony was not credible, as it found Mr. Devenshire guilty of the first-degree murder of Mr. Thompson. Second, regardless of whether Mr. Carothers participated in Mr. Thompson's murder, it is simply unfounded, improper, and indeed outlandish to suggest, as Appellant does, that because Mr. Carothers committed one murder, he must also have committed a second, unrelated murder years later. There is literally no way that the evidence implicating Mr. Carothers in the murder of Mr. Thompson could possibly be exculpatory of Appellant for the murder of Ms. Amstutz. Finally, Appellant fails to suggest how the Commonwealth could have withheld, willfully or otherwise, testimony presented in a public trial. Appellant's Brady claim in Issue 3, like the other claims presented in this issue, is entirely meritless, and Appellant is entitled to no relief. [18]