Opinion ID: 1796846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying petitioner a hearing to determine his competency to participate in the evidentiary hearing ordered by this court.

Text: Neal contends that the trial court erred in not granting him a hearing to determine his competence to participate in the evidentiary hearing. When this Court remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing, Neal filed a motion requesting a competency hearing. The trial court denied the motion, finding it did not have jurisdiction over the matter. This Court originally denied a request by Neal for an interlocutory review of this issue. Neal then filed with this Court a Supplemental Application for Leave to File Motion to Vacate Judgment and Death Sentence. In denying this application this Court held: Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Lawrence County in this cause extends to the issue of Neal's present competence vel non, and that court may entertain such a claim at any stage of the proceedings, and may conduct an evidentiary hearing in response to a claim that Neal is presently incompetent to proceed if satisfied that such a hearing is warranted under the applicable facts and legal standards. Neal v. State, No. 03-DP-0036 (Miss., July 11, 1990) (unpublished order) (emphasis added). Subsequently, Neal again filed with the lower court a motion for hearing on competency to proceed. The Circuit Court again denied the motion in an order stating in part: After having considered the holding of the Mississippi Supreme Court in this matter and the reports received from the experts that have examined petitioner, the Court finds that no hearing is warranted under the factual circumstances and legal standards applicable in such cases. Neal renewed the motion at the evidentiary hearing. The trial court allowed into evidence the Third Supplemental Affidavit of June Kaufman, Ph.D., but once again denied the motion stating in part: [T]he Court does agree with Mr. White's assessment that it would take a psychologist or psychiatrist to say there has been some change of mental ability and competency since the trial to date. And that has never been done. It is still the same grounds that were alleged to have been present at the time of trial. The Supreme Court has in their opinion satisfied themselves that he was at that time competent even though it was admitted he is mentally retarded. The Court finds no new evidence of new psychiatric and/or psychological problems which have evolved since the date of the conviction to the date of today. So those motions be and the same are hereby overruled. Neal correctly argues that a defendant must be competent at all stages of the criminal process, whether trial, Gammage v. State, 510 So.2d 802 (Miss. 1987); appeal, Tarrants v. State, 231 So.2d 493 (Miss. 1970); post-conviction, Rumbaugh v. Procunier, 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.1985); or at the point of execution, Billiot v. State, 478 So.2d 1043 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098, 106 S.Ct. 1501, 89 L.Ed.2d 901 (1986). In his brief, Neal cites authority concerning when a hearing should be held on a defendant's competency to stand trial. See Emanuel v. State, 412 So.2d 1187, 1188 (Miss. 1982). He also points out the test to be used to determine if a defendant is competent to stand trial. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960); Gammage v. State, 510 So.2d 802 (Miss. 1987); Jaquith v. Beckwith, 248 Miss. 491, 157 So.2d 403 (1963). Neal goes on to cite numerous other authority as to a defendant's right to a hearing on his competence to stand trial. However, he gives no authority concerning a petitioner's right to a competency hearing at a later stage in the criminal process when that person was given a pretrial competency hearing and found competent to stand trial. That is the situation that concerns us here. Neal was given a competency hearing prior to his murder trials and found competent to stand trial despite his mental retardation. In both his direct appeal and his application for post-conviction relief before this Court, Neal attempted to put on proof of his lack of mental capacity. This Court held, The problem with these charges is that they are substantially redundant or cumulative when compared with the evidence Neal offered at trial. Specifically, Neal now wants to present evidence of his lack of mental capacity, a fact said to go to the voluntariness of his confession and to be in mitigation of sentence. But he went into these same matters at trial... . Because it is cumulative, what Neal alleges and purports to show now that counsel should have developed and proved simply does not amount to a substantial showing of denial of a state or federal right. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5). Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1282-83 (Miss. 1987). The situation here is similar to that in Billiot v. State, 478 So.2d 1043 (Miss. 1985) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985). There Billiot claimed he was presently insane and therefore could not be executed. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-57(2)(b) (Supp. 1995), states: For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed insane if the court finds the convict does not have sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, what he was tried for, the purpose of his punishment, the impending fate which awaits him, and a sufficient understanding to know any fact which might exist which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful and the intelligence requisite to convey such information to his attorney or the court. Billiot's claim lacked merit because he failed to show supervening present insanity as required under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-57(2)(a). All Billiot's evidence went to show that his mental condition existed prior to trial. He did not even argue that his mental condition developed after his trial. This Court held, It follows in these circumstances that the action of the trial court in determining that Billiot was sane and competent is also res judicata as to the issue of his present sanity, as the matter is raised in this petition. These issues were thoroughly litigated at trial and upon direct appeal and may not be litigated again by way of post conviction writ. Billiot, 478 So.2d at 1045. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(2)(3) (Supp. 1993); See also Mitchell v. State, 179 Miss. 814, 176 So. 743 (1937); Johnson v. State, 508 So.2d 1126 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. Cabana, 818 F.2d 333, 340 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1061, 107 S.Ct. 2207, 95 L.Ed.2d 861 (1987). Neal makes no assertion that there has been any change in his mental condition since the trial in this case. In fact, the evidence presented shows that he had been diagnosed as mentally retarded as early as age eleven when he was admitted to the Ellisville State School. Neal was found competent at a pretrial competency hearing, and he has offered no evidence that his condition has changed in any way since that time. This issue is therefore without merit.