Opinion ID: 2994430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bias of the Hearing Officer

Text: Amundsen initially accuses the hearing officer of being biased in favor of the Park District as it is apparent that a hearing officer who consistently rules against the Park District will not continue to enjoy his place on the Park District payroll. Thus, he claims, [a]s a paid agent of the [Park District] deciding a dispute over the propriety of the actions of the Defendant, the hearing officer can hardly be relied upon to be impartial in such a situation. [But a contention of bias] must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, . . . [there is] such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196-97 (1982) (citation omitted); Scott v. Department of Commerce, 416 N.E.2d 1082, 1089 (Ill. 1981) (Without a showing to the contrary, State administrators ’are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)). This presumption can be rebutted by a showing of conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 195-96; see Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973). To establish bias that is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, the asserting party would need to prove that the adjudicator had a pecuniary interest in the outcome . . . [or had] been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. But the burden of establishing a disqualifying interest rests on the party making the assertion. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 196. The plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of actual bias on the part of the hearing officer. Amundsen’s bald accusation is based solely on the fact that the hearing officer was employed by the Park District, which of itself is insufficient to establish actual bias. Cf. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971); Cannon v. Apfel, No. 99-1578, 2000 WL 684688, at  (7th Cir. May 24, 2000); Van Harken v. Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that even when an administrative or adjudicative body derives a financial benefit from fines or penalties that it imposes is not in general a violation of due process). Thus, we hold that Amundsen has failed to satisfy his burden of overcoming the well-established presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47; see also Kloman v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 674 N.E.2d 38, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).