Opinion ID: 1791143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compensability of Fibromyalgia Condition

Text: Kmart argues that the Court of Civil Appeals' reversal of that portion of the trial court's judgment holding that Ridlespurge's fibromyalgia was not a compensable condition under the Act was improper. Kmart argues that in reversing the trial court's decision the Court of Civil Appeals ignored the evidence in the record that supported that decision. In its order, the trial court wrote: [T]here is insufficient evidence to conclude that the fibromyalgia condition, if it exists at all, was either caused or contributed to ... by [Ridlespurge's] on-the-job injury. In fact, the substantial evidence leads this Court to conclude that the fibromyalgia condition developed as a result of the stress associated with the criminal charges filed against [Ridlespurge] and her husband. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the fibromyalgia condition is not a compensable condition under the Workers' Compensation Act and the Defendant is not responsible for providing workers' compensation benefits, including medical benefits to the Plaintiff for the treatment of said condition. The Court of Civil Appeals stated that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that Ridlespurge's fibromyalgia is not compensable under the Act. Ridlespurge, 812 So.2d at 1201. We disagree. Section 25-5-51, Ala.Code 1975, a part of the Act, provides that a compensable injury is one caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of [the employee's] employment. That language requires a causal connection between the injury and the employment. Ex parte Trinity Indus., Inc., 680 So.2d 262, 267-68 (Ala.1996). The phrase in the course of refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. Id. In cases involving a sudden and traumatic event, such as the one here, an employee must produce substantial evidence tending to show that the accident occurred and also that the accident caused or was a contributing cause of the injury for which benefits are being sought. Id. at 266 n. 3. The record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Ridlespurge's fibromyalgia is not a compensable injury under the Act. Dr. Douglas Bell, the doctor who diagnosed Ridlespurge's fibromyalgia, stated in his deposition that the impact of the TV/VCR combination that fell on Ridlespurge's right shoulder was causally related to her fibromyalgia. [2] Dr. Bell, however, also testified that emotional stressors can be a contributing cause of fibromyalgia [3] and that a criminal indictment could be an emotional stressor that would trigger the condition. [4] Dr. Bell admitted in his deposition, however, that when he was treating Ridlespurge he was unaware of Ridlespurge's criminal indictment and that the existence of the indictment was not a factor in his diagnosis. [5] Dr. Ronald Rivard, who performed an independent medical examination of Ridlespurge, testified by deposition that fibromyalgia is a painful condition and that its symptoms are vague. (R. 181.) He stated that the condition is recognized by some [medical professionals], not recognized by others. (R. 182.) Finally, Claude Franklin Peacock, Ridlespurge's vocational expert, agreed at trial that fibromyalgia is a condition the existence of which is disputed and that stressful events can be a contributing cause of the condition. [6] Clearly, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Ridlespurge's fibromyalgia is not compensable under the Act. The Court of Civil Appeals' reversal of that portion of the trial court's judgment to the compensability of Ridlespurge's fibromyalgia was improper. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals as to this issue.