Opinion ID: 164300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: An Attempted Execution

Text: 14 The government argues the Companies' entire course of conduct was an attempted execution of a scheme to obtain money by false pretenses because there is no doubt that a scheme to obtain money by false representations is executed when it is completed, that is, when money is obtained. According to the government, the collective steps leading to obtaining a sum of money by false representations will be a single attempt, until the money is obtained and the attempt merges with the substantive offense. Under the facts of this case, the government believes the Companies'attempt offense was first committed not later than the filing of the claim and was underway at the time of the June 28, 1995 ... meeting. We reject the government's argument. 15 The language of the Major Fraud Act does not support the government's cramped definition of an execution of a scheme to obtain money by false pretenses. 6 In relevant part, the Act punishes [w]hoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, any scheme or artifice with the intent ... to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2). The Act does not define an execution as the receipt of money by false pretenses. Instead, the Act punishes the execution of a scheme with the intent to obtain money. Id. If we were now to conclude an execution requires the receipt of money, the phrase with the intent to obtain money would become largely superfluous with respect to executed schemes. We must avoid this result. See United States v. Collins, 313 F.3d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 2002). 7 16 The government nevertheless argues [t]he bank-fraud cases are consistent with [its] view. 8 For example, it extracts language from a Seventh Circuit case stating [t]he execution of the fraudulent scheme is complete upon the movement of money, funds, or other assets from the financial institution. United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 580 (11th Cir.1997)). The Seventh Circuit also recognized in this case, however, the crime of bank fraud is complete when the defendant places the bank at a risk of financial loss, and not necessarily when the loss itself occurs. Anderson, 188 F.3d at 888. In any event, we believe the cases cited by the government are inapposite. While the movement of money may be a useful factor to consider in determining whether an indictment is multiplicious, see United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 847-48 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir.1994); Lilly, 983 F.2d at 305; United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1519, 1526 (5th Cir. 1992), and may be evidence indicating an execution is complete under the facts of a particular case, Anderson, 188 F.3d at 891; Christo, 129 F.3d at 580, these cases do not go so far as to hold a movement of money must occur in order for an individual to execute a scheme under the Bank Fraud Act. Consequently, these cases do not support the government's offered definition of an execution under the Major Fraud Act. In any event, we continue to believe the government's argument is contrary to the plain language of the Major Fraud Act. The Companies did not need to receive money to execute a scheme to obtain money by false pretenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2). 17 The government also suggests the Companies' conduct was an attempt to execute a scheme to defraud the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1). We reject this argument for substantially the same reasons we reject the government's attempted execution argument under 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(2). The Act does not require an individual to actually obtain money in order to execute a scheme to defraud the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1), and this reading of the statute is supported by case law in the bank fraud context which consistently holds an individual need only put a bank at a risk of loss in order to execute a scheme to defraud, see, e.g., United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252, 1257 (10th Cir.1991) (To support a § 1344 conviction the government does not have to prove the bank suffered any monetary loss, only that the bank was put at potential risk by the scheme to defraud.). 18 We conclude the Companies did not need to actually obtain any money in order to execute their scheme to defraud the United States or obtain money by false pretenses. Under the facts of this case, the Companies executed their scheme to defraud or obtain money when they first placed the government at a risk of financial loss upon filing their claim for equitable adjustment in 1994. 9 No further conduct was necessary for the Companies to execute their scheme. Accordingly, we decline the government's invitation to interpret the Companies' filing of the claim and subsequent actions as a single attempt to violate the Major Fraud Act. 10