Opinion ID: 774819
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: questioning of jurors about death penalty

Text: 147 In explaining the duty of the jury in a capital case to a prospective juror, the trial court posed this question: 148 [I]f the jury finds the State did prove beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, you will then be required to recommend to the Court that the Defendant receive the death sentence. 149 If you find yourself in that situation, could you make such a recommendation to the Court? That recommendation being, could you make the recommendation that the Defendant receive the death penalty? 150 Petitioner contends that the court misstates the standard, which should be whether a juror would consider imposing the death penalty. Other jurors were likewise excused for cause after they expressed reservations about the death penalty. 151 The Supreme Court has provided the following guidance on this point: We . . . take this opportunity to clarify 152 our decision in Witherspoon, and to reaffirm the . . . standard from Adams[v. Texas] as the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment. That standard is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to automatic decisionmaking, this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. 153 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26 (footnotes omitted). Nothing in Witt supports petitioner's position that the court must precisely phrase its instructions to a potential juror to include the word consider. In our view, the court followed the correct standard: it attempted to discern during voir dire whether a prospective juror could follow the law with respect to the death penalty.