Opinion ID: 1115988
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the reindictment of graves the result of prosecutorial vindictiveness?

Text: Graves was first indicted for murder on May 15, 1984, and he entered into plea bargaining with the district attorney. The district attorney recommended that the murder charge be reduced to manslaughter in the event a plea of guilty was entered. The district attorney recommended a 20-year sentence with 10 years suspended, with 5 years probation, and the sentence to run consecutive to any other sentence Graves was serving. Graves then gave his version of the events leading to Miller's death. The court then asked Graves if he understood his sentence to be 20 years, with 10 suspended, and with 10 years to serve and it to run consecutive to any sentence Graves was serving. Graves responded that he understood his sentence to be, If I wanted to plead guilty to manslaughter, that I would get 20 years with 10 years suspended and 10 years running with the remainder of the 15 years. The trial court then allowed Graves all the time he needed to see if he wanted to proceed with the plea of guilty. All of this occurred on August 8, 1984, and on August 27, 1984, Graves was reindicted as an habitual criminal. For this assignment of error, Graves relies upon North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In Pearce, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 12 to 15 years in prison. Several years later, his conviction was reversed because of an involuntary confession. At the second trial, the defendant was again convicted and sentenced to 8 years in prison, which, when added to the time he had already served, would have amounted to a longer sentence than his sentence under the first conviction. The United States Supreme Court in Pearce interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting, in certain situations, a defendant who is given a harsher sentence on retrial than in his first trial. It was reasoned that it would be a flagrant violation for a trial court to impose a harsher sentence on retrial merely because a defendant succeeded in setting the original conviction aside, because penalizing those who choose to exercise constitutional rights would be patently unconstitutional. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581, 20 L.Ed.2d 138, 147, 88 S.Ct. 1209. 395 U.S. at 724, 89 S.Ct. at 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d at 668. The court went further and found that the above rule applies even if the first conviction is set aside for non-constitutional error, reasoning that appeal rights should be free and unfettered. In order to assure the above rule being followed, the court then stated, [W]e have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d at 670. Graves would have this Court apply Pearce to the situation at hand. We are not persuaded by this argument. In Rufus v. State, 402 So.2d 874 (Miss. 1981), Rufus entered a guilty plea prior to being brought to trial and was sentenced to 25 years in prison with 13 years suspended. Rufus withdrew his guilty plea and, after a trial on the merits, was convicted and sentenced to 25 years in prison with 5 years suspended. Rufus argued that Pearce should have applied to his situation. We affirmed the conviction of Rufus and reasoned that the case materially differs from Pearce and that what was done here did not deprive ... Rufus of due process of law. 402 So.2d at 876. We further reasoned that when the defendant entered the guilty plea the trial court imposed the sentence without hearing the evidence adduced against him at trial. Finally, we stated: To adopt the position of appellant would be no more nor less than to grant leave to an indicted defendant to play games with the court; he might plead guilty, be sentenced, then withdraw his plea and demand a trial, having thus made certain in advance that no matter how the trial might turn out or what aggravating circumstances might be developed by the evidence, no greater sentence could be imposed upon him in the event of conviction. We do not believe that such a result is within the scope of the rule laid down in Pearce. 402 So.2d at 875-76. Furthermore, in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), the United States Supreme Court had the occasion to discuss whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a state prosecutor carries out a plea bargaining threat to reindict the accused on more serious charges if he does not plead guilty. The court reasoned that a prosecutor could do this. Although the court pointed out that the prosecutor had clearly informed the defendant, at the outset of the plea bargaining negotiations, that he would be indicted under Kentucky's recidivism statute if he did not plead guilty  and thus this case is distinguishable from the case at bar  the court nevertheless stated: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, at 738, 33 L Ed 2d 656, 89 S Ct 2072 (opinion of Black, J.), and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is patently unconstitutional. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, at 32-33, n 20, 36 L Ed 2d 714, 93 S Ct 1977. See United States v. Jackson, 390 US 570, 20 L Ed 2d 138, 88 S Ct 1209. But in the give-and-take of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer. 434 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 668, 54 L.Ed.2d at 610-11. This assignment of error is without merit. THE CONVICTION OF JERRY DONNELL GRAVES OF MURDER AND HIS SENTENCE AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT PROBATION OR PAROLE IS AFFIRMED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.