Opinion ID: 2552688
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court of Common Pleas' Decision

Text: In vacating Anderson's status as an habitual driving offender, the Court of Common Pleas concluded that it had properly exercised its authority to remedy what it had found to be a patently unfair exercise of prosecutorial discretion. [34] The wrong, the trial court found, was that the State did not offer Anderson a standard six-month continuance to improve her driving record as was done for other drivers similarly situated. [35] To remedy that wrong, the trial court vacated its previous order declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender. In finding that the State's refusal to offer a continuance to Anderson constituted a legal wrong, the Court of Common Pleas erred. The State is not required to request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender prosecution. [36] Nor did the State, in fact, request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender case presented the same day Anderson's petition was heard. It is well-recognized that the State's decision to offer, agree to, or reject a continuance involves the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. [37] To be sure, where the State does request a continuance, it is within the trial judge's discretion to grant or deny that request. [38] A trial court may also offer a continuance sua sponte, although neither party is required to accept the court's offer. [39] Thus, if the Court of Common Pleas believed that Anderson was wronged because the State did not offer her the continuance it had offered to other respondents, the court could have remedied any perceived wrong by making its own offer to continue the case. The Court of Common Pleas did not do that, however. Instead, it vacated its earlier judgment declaring Anderson an habitual driving offender, thereby effectively dismissing the State's petition against Anderson. That dismissal remedy bore no logical relationship to the supposed procedural wrong ( i.e., no continuance being offered). [40] A court cannot impose a remedy that bears no relation to the wrong it seeks to redress. [41] As the United States Supreme Court has explained, remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the . . . violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. [42] Here, no logical relationship existed between the remedy (effectively denying the State's petition) and the supposed wrong (the State's decision not to offer Anderson a continuance).