Opinion ID: 6227007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rebutting the presumption of prejudice

Text: ¶86 While this court and the court of appeals have been more or less consistent in applying the presumption of prejudice, we have not consistently articulated a standard for rebutting the presumption.16 Nor have we suggested how the State might go about doing so. As a result, district courts have taken an ad hoc approach to applying and rebutting the presumption. Typically, the court interviews the jurors, and potentially the individuals who contacted them, and asks things like: ―What did you hear?‖ and ―will this affect your decision?‖ (to which the jurors almost invariably respond, ―no‖). Cf., e.g., State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 620–21 (Utah 1987); State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985); Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Cardall, 982 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1999). Or the court may request affidavits to the same effect. See, e.g., State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 194 (Utah 1943); State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 757 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Here, the court interviewed the jurors and issued a curative instruction. Accordingly, the State argues, it already bore its burden below to rebut the presumption if the presumption applied in the first instance (which it did). ¶87 Our ―strict approach in assuring that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be compromised by improper [jury] contacts,‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 279, becomes less strict when the standard for enforcing that guarantee is lax. We now address this concern and first hold that the State can rebut the presumption by proving that the contact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We applied this standard in the same context well over one hundred years ago, and it is consistent with how we evaluate other constitutional challenges to a defendant‘s conviction. Second, we suggest how, in the case at bar, the State may prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt—by calling the persons who engaged with the jurors to testify to allow the defendant his confrontation right and/or by showing that the weight of its evidence eliminates ___________________________________________________________ 16 Except to say that once the presumption is triggered, the State bears the burden of rebutting it, see, e.g., State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279–80 (Utah 1985), a proposition that the State concedes. 30 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court any meaningful prejudice. Finally, we remand to the district court for further proceedings in light of these clarifications. A. Rebutting the Presumption Requires Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ¶88 The State may rebut the presumption of prejudice only by showing that the improper jury contact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.17 ¶89 In 1901, this court, relying on authorities from our sister states, pronounced that jury misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice that ―vitiates the verdict, unless the prosecution shows beyond reasonable doubt that the [defendant] has received no injury by reason thereof.‖ State v. Morgan, 64 P. 356, 360 (Utah 1901) (emphasis added). Lamentably, subsequent opinions have not so clearly stated this standard of proof. They do make clear, however, that the burden of proving harmlessness is a heavy one. See, e.g., State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 69 n.56, 299 P.3d 892 (―[T]he burden is on the prosecution to prove that the unauthorized contact did not influence the juror.‖ (quoting Pike, 712 P.2d at 280)); State v. Anderson, 237 P. 941, 943 (Utah 1925) (requiring a new trial ―unless it is made to appear affirmatively that the judgment of the juror was in no way affected by such relationship‖); State v. Thorne, 117 P. 58, 66 (Utah 1911) (holding that once prejudice is presumed, ―the burden [is] cast on the state to show what the communication was, and that it was harmless and could not have influenced or affected the deliberations of the juror or his verdict‖). In essence, our holding today—that the State must show that the prejudicial contact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt—simply makes explicit what was already implicit in our post-Morgan jurisprudence. ¶90 The harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is consonant with the approach we take when evaluating other constitutional violations pertaining to a defendant‘s conviction. As we have explained, ―[f]or us to hold a constitutional error harmless, it must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the side which benefited by the error (the prosecution) ___________________________________________________________ 17 At oral argument, both parties suggested that supplemental briefing on the standard of proof might be helpful. Accordingly, we ordered them to provide such supplemental briefing. We appreciate their input. 31 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict (or sentence) obtained.‖ State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 359 (Utah 1993) (footnote omitted); see also Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 56 (―[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ (citation omitted) (alteration in original)); State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ¶ 54, 174 P.3d 628 (―If prosecutorial misconduct is established, the State must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖); State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, ¶ 15, 61 P.3d 1019 (―In most cases, if the reviewing court finds that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it need not reverse.‖). ¶91 Again, we look to federal jurisprudence interpreting the Sixth Amendment and find it generally consistent with our state standard. As early as 1892, the United States Supreme Court stressed that improper jury contacts ―invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to appear.‖ Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892). In 1954, the Court added that ―the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.‖ Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).18 Indeed, the general proposition that a constitutional violation must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to survive a challenge is deeply rooted in Supreme Court precedent. ―[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005). ___________________________________________________________ 18 As mentioned above, there is a circuit split in the federal courts regarding the presumption of prejudice. See supra ¶ 38 n.8. Among the courts of appeal that follow Remmer and apply the presumption, there is a loose consensus that the prosecution bears a heavy burden in rebutting the presumption of prejudice, even if not the precise manner of rebuttal. See, e.g., United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Rutherford, 371 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 1996). 32 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court ¶92 In sum, we hold nothing new by clarifying that the State must prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption of prejudice triggered by improper jury contacts. B. Proving Harmlessness Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ¶93 Having determined that the State must prove an unauthorized jury contact was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we now address how the State might do that. ¶94 It is not possible or prudent for us to prescribe a clear path to rebutting the presumption of prejudice in every possible case. Whether a court should apply the presumption is a fact-specific inquiry. How the State might rebut it is equally fact-specific, and the State must have flexibility in proving harmlessness. ¶95 But before we offer some suggestions of what might be sufficient to rebut the presumption, we use this case to highlight what is not sufficient. The judge‘s brief questioning of the jurors and their optimistic averments as to their own lack of bias alone are insufficient to rebut the presumption. We have said as much before: ―[E]ven if the jurors had denied that they were influenced by the encounter in the post-trial hearing, that is not enough to rebut the presumption of prejudice.‖ See Pike, 712 P.2d at 281; see also Erickson, 749 P.2d at 621 (citing this holding from Pike and concluding that the ―same result is mandated in the instant case‖). The whole point of applying a presumption of prejudice is to mitigate the unconscious bias that commonly results from improper jury contacts. See, e.g., Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (noting ―[t]he possibility that improper contacts may influence a juror in ways he or she may not even be able to recognize‖); Anderson, 237 P. at 943 (mentioning that contact between a juror and a party to the action ―might, consciously or unconsciously, tend to influence the judgment of the juror‖); State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (―Because of the possible subconscious effect on the juror, the court stated that even a denial by a juror that he or she was affected by the contact is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of prejudice.‖). If we could simply and reliably ask jurors whether or not they were, in fact, prejudiced, we would never need to presume prejudice. For the same reasons, a curative instruction alone is insufficient to combat potential implicit jury bias once the presumption is triggered. ¶96 Still, all is not lost for the State. In this case, we offer two suggestions of how the State might rebut the presumption. First, the State might call to testify the third parties who communicated with the jury. In this way, the court essentially treats the third33 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court party communicators as testimonial witnesses whom the defendant can confront and cross-examine. See UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 (―[T]he accused shall have the right . . . to be confronted by the witnesses against [him or her] . . . .‖); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (―[T]he accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖). The United States Supreme Court has suggested this approach, explaining that the presumption of prejudice is rooted in a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right: ―[T]he evidence developed against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant‘s right of confrontation, of crossexamination, and of counsel.‖ Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (per curiam) (quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472– 73 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). And in Parker, the Court reversed because the bailiff, ―an officer of the State,‖ made sensitive comments to the jury when ―he was not subjected to confrontation, cross-examination or other safeguards guaranteed to the petitioner.‖ Id. ¶97 As applied here, the district court could have treated the patrolman and IT technician as the State‘s witnesses—compelling them to submit affidavits or testify to the jury as to the inappropriateness of their comments and their unfitness to say anything regarding the defendant‘s case. Here, we do not think that the judge‘s curative instruction was equivalent to allowing Soto to confront those individuals and glean directly from them, in front of the jury, how much they did or did not know about the case. For example, the judge‘s conclusory instruction that the patrolman ―would have absolutely no knowledge of any part of this trial‖ ignores the patrolman‘s (and bailiff‘s) official character as an officer of the State. See supra ¶¶ 44–49, 76–77. And the curative instruction downplayed the severity of what was said, simply saying that the patrolman and IT technician ―were trying to be funny‖ by making ―off the cuff‖ remarks. We agree with the court of appeals that this euphemistic instruction ―may have done as much harm as good.‖ State v. Soto, 2018 UT App 147, ¶ 21, 427 P.3d 1286. ¶98 As a second option, the State might argue that its evidence of the defendant‘s guilt was so strong that the improper contacts made no difference in the jury‘s verdict. Ordinarily, when we determine prejudice and its effects, we look, inter alia, at the strength of the evidence the State presented: [I]n a case with less compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of 34 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through [the conduct]. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict. State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); see also State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402–03 (Utah 1986); State v. Stephens, 946 P.2d 734, 737 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Tenney, 913 P.2d at 755. ¶99 The federal courts likewise use the strength of the evidence in considering whether a presumption of prejudice was adequately rebutted. See, e.g., United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2001) (―We have further recognized that a heavy ‗volume of incriminating evidence‘ also can undermine a claim of prejudice.‖ (citation omitted)); United States v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654, 657 (11th Cir. 1990) (―In recognizing the degree of prejudice required and the government‘s burden to establish harmless error, the strength of the government's case has a bearing on the issue of prejudicial error.‖); see also United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045–46 (10th Cir. 1988). ¶100 Having explained how the State might go about rebutting the presumption of prejudice in a case like this, we now explain why we remand to allow the State to do so. C. We Remand to the District Court to Determine If the State Has Rebutted the Presumption of Prejudice ¶101 In this case‘s current posture, the question of the evidence‘s strength is clearly the most plausible path for the State to argue harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the parties made arguments about the strength of the State‘s case against Soto. However, we think that the district court is better suited to address this matter. ¶102 We acknowledge that the court of appeals found that the State did not rebut the presumption and accordingly reversed Soto‘s conviction and remanded for a new trial. Soto, 2018 UT App 147, ¶ 24. However, in this opinion we have clarified the standard for rebutting the presumption. Supra ¶¶ 88–92. And we have explained that whether the State has met its burden of rebuttal is a fact-intensive inquiry, supra ¶ 94, best left to the district court 35 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court when possible. Accordingly, we find it more prudent to allow the district court to examine the State‘s arguments in light of this opinion and to determine if the State has successfully rebutted the presumption. Our decision to remand the case for review of the State‘s strength-of-the-evidence argument should not be seen as approving or disapproving of the court of appeals‘ reversal, or otherwise opining on the merits of the State‘s rebuttal of the presumption.