Opinion ID: 1929271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Relationship to Health, Safety, and General Welfare And Delegation of Legislative Power

Text: Under Section 19-4-7(b) of the Cape Elizabeth zoning ordinance, one of the criteria that has to be satisfied before a conditional use application is approved is that [t]he proposed use will not adversely affect the value of adjacent properties. Gorham, under the due process clause, challenges the constitutionality of the ordinance's adverse affect criterion in two respects. First, he contends that the criterion does not bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare. See Warren v. Municipal Officers of Town of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624, 627 (Me.1981). Gorham also contends that Section 19-4-7(b)(4) constitutes an improper delegation of legislative authority. We are unpersuaded by either contention. The constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is presumed. Gorham, in attacking the ordinance, has the burden of proof of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. Warren, 431 A.2d at 627-28. Contrary to Gorham's first contention, the maintenance of property values is a legitimate interest served by zoning restrictions. Id. at 628; Barnard v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Yarmouth, 313 A.2d 741, 745 (Me. 1974). Therefore, the Cape Elizabeth zoning ordinance meets the due process requirement that it bear a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Warren, 431 A.2d at 627. Gorham also contends that the adverse affect criterion set out in Section 19-4-7(b)(4) constitutes a constitutionally impermissible delegation to the Board of discretionary authority not sufficiently limited by legislative standards, see Stucki v. Plavin, 291 A.2d 508, 510 (Me.1972), and argues that the criterion is too subjective and not measurable, leading to favoritism and discrimination. See Wakelin v. Town of Yarmouth, 523 A.2d 575, 577 (Me.1987). Because conditional uses are those uses that the legislature has determined to be ordinarily acceptable in a particular zone, in order to withstand attack as an impermissible legislative delegation of authority, ordinances that establish criteria for acceptance of a conditional use must specify sufficient reasons why such a use may be denied. Bass v. Town of Wilton, 512 A.2d 309, 310 (Me.1986). A conditional use standard must be sufficiently specific to guide both an applicant in presenting his case ... and the Board in examining the proposed use.... Wakelin, 523 A.2d at 577. In this case, the Town has determined that in order for multi-family use of property to be allowed in an R-A zone, the Board must determine, among other criteria, that such use will not adversely affect the value of adjacent properties. [3] Although we have not previously decided whether such a criterion is sufficiently specific to survive constitutional scrutiny, see Cope v. Town of Brunswick, 464 A.2d 223, 225 n. 3 (Me.1983), we conclude that Section 19-4-7(b)(4) gives sufficient guidance to a conditional use applicant, such as Gorham, as to what facts must be presented to gain the Board's approval and to the Board itself in examining the proposed use. Wakelin, 523 A.2d at 577. Gorham and the parties opposing his application presented a substantial amount of evidence directed to the precise issue addressed in Section 19-4-7(b)(4), namely, whether the proposed multi-family use of Gorham's property would adversely affect values of surrounding property. In Bass, the constitutionality of the conditional use criterion devalue adjacent property was raised by the parties but, because the case was decided on other grounds, was not addressed by the court. 512 A.2d at 311. We agree with the Superior Court, however, that the reasoning of Justice Scolnik in his dissent in Bass, urging that such a standard was sufficiently specific to be constitutional, is persuasive when applied to the instant case. The plain meaning of the term devalue is sufficient to guide the Board in its application of [that section of the zoning ordinance] to a requested conditional use permit. The term devalue, in this zoning context, obviously means to cause the reduction or loss in the value of adjacent property. By the employment of this objective standard, the Board does not assume for itself an unfettered discretion to grant or deny the permit. As this case illustrates, evidence may be presented by expert appraisers as well as the owners of the adjacent land. Such evidence provides a sufficient basis for an evaluation of whether the proposed project would cause a reduction in the value of the adjacent properties. If so, [the section] requires that the permit be denied. In short, the standard of whether adjacent property is devalued is a sufficient guide for the Board to employ in its decision-making process, and it enables those to whom the law is to be applied reasonably to determine their rights thereunder. Bass, 512 A.2d at 312 ( Scolnik, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See R.M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d § 21.14 at 689 (1986) ([A] board of zoning appeals may deny a special permit where the record discloses that the proposed use will depreciate surrounding property). Contrary to Gorham's contention that his application must be approved unless there is present some characteristic of his property, such as changes to the building's exterior, apart from its use as a multi-family dwelling, that adversely affects neighboring properties, the ordinance plainly states that a single family dwelling can be converted to multi-family use in an R-A zone only if such use will not adversely affect the value of adjacent property. The wording of the ordinance does not require that the conversion be allowed unless the property has unique characteristics that impact property values. Gorham also argues, relying on our decision in Cope, that the ordinance is based on a presumption that the conditional uses allowed will not adversely affect the value of adjacent property and that the burden should have been on those opposing Gorham's application to demonstrate such an adverse effect. We disagree. In Cope we concluded that whether an exceptional use under the ordinance would generally comply with the health, safety and welfare of the area is a legislative question that could not be delegated to the board of appeals. 464 A.2d at 227. Although uses that are classified as exceptions or conditional uses may result from a legislative determination that such uses will not ordinarily be detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood, id. at 226-27, Cope does not prohibit a zoning ordinance from requiring compliance with specific and measurable criteria, including the criterion that the conditional use of the property will not adversely affect the values of adjacent properties. Although an ordinance could be written to allow the conditional use absent a showing that the use will adversely effect the values of adjacent properties, in effect placing on the opponents of the conditional use the burden to demonstrate that certain conditions have not been met, under this ordinance the burden to show compliance with all conditions is on the applicant. Moreover, this case did not turn on a failure to meet the burden of proof. The Board's finding was not that it was not persuaded that there was no adverse affect on property values. Rather, the Board made an affirmative finding that the use by Gorham of his home as a multi-family unit would actually adversely affect the values of adjacent property. The Board heard the evidence and made a factual conclusion in accordance with the ordinance that Gorham's use of his property as a multi-family dwelling would adversely impact the property value of an adjacent property. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 19-4-7(b)(4) of the zoning ordinance, the Board denied his application. Because the maintenance of property values is a legitimate interest served by zoning restrictions, and because Section 19-4-7(b)(4) specifically required the Board to determine the effect of the conditional use on property values, a specific and discernible standard that the evidence addressed, Gorham's constitutional challenge must fail.