Opinion ID: 421796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Case Law Interpretation of the Discretionary Function Exception

Text: 69 We now turn to the case law interpretation of section 2680(a)'s scope. As will become clear, courts have gradually developed [229 U.S.App.D.C. 198] a functional approach to the statute that--consistent with common law principles embodied within it--permits immunity only where interference with the conduct of government is threatened. 70 The seminal Supreme Court case on the discretionary function exception is Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). Dalehite involved an FTCA action for personal injuries and deaths arising from a cataclysmic explosion in Texas City, Texas, of nitrate fertilizers manufactured by the government for shipment to occupied Europe. Damages were sought for alleged negligence in drafting and adopting the fertilizer export plan, manufacturing the fertilizer, and supervising dockside loading. The Supreme Court denied all liability, ruling each of these activities to be a protected discretionary function. 71 The Court began its construction of the discretionary function exception with a reminder that sovereign immunity remains a vital principle subject to abrogation only by clear legislative statement. After examining the legislative history of section 2680(a), the Court noted that the statute protects the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best course, a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law. Id. at 34, 73 S.Ct. at 967. But the Court did not attempt a precise definition of the boundaries of the concept of discretion in light of this ancestry, preferring to say only that: 72 It is unnecessary to define, apart from this case, precisely where discretion ends. It is enough to hold, as we do, that the discretionary function or duty that cannot form a basis for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. 73 Id. at 35-36, 73 S.Ct. at 967-968 (footnote omitted). The broad suggestion that where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion was limited with an analysis aimed principally at the level of the decisionmaker. That the cabinet-level decision to institute the fertilizer program was a discretionary act is not seriously disputed, the Court observed. Id. at 37, 73 S.Ct. at 969. And because all of the decisions executing that initial determination were ... responsibly made at a planning rather than operational level and involved considerations more or less important to the practicability of the Government's fertilizer program, id. at 42, 73 S.Ct. at 971, they too were ruled to be discretionary acts. 68 74 This court's early application of the discretionary function exception used the planning/operational distinction of Dalehite, but, at the same time, took care to relate that distinction to its common law origins. In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C.Cir.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907, 76 S.Ct. 192, 100 L.Ed. 799 (1955), for example, we found the negligence of air traffic controllers in causing an aircraft disaster to be actionable operational activity. The question for decision was framed as whether the activities alleged fell within the  'historic principle that the courts will not, in private action, revise or review executive conduct involving the exercise of judgment or discretion of a public character.'  Id. at 74 (quoting, without citation, contention of the United States). Noting that Dalehite 's [229 U.S.App.D.C. 199] distinction between non-actionable planning and actionable negligence in carrying out the plan could be traced to this principle, id. at 77, the court observed that a similar line had traditionally been drawn between discretionary decisions  'involving the exercise of deliberate judgment and large discretion ... and depending upon considerations affecting the public health and general convenience throughout an extensive territory,'  and  'simply ministerial duties'  involving implementation  'according to the general plan so adopted.'  Id. at 78 (quoting Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19, 21, 6 S.Ct. 923, 924, 30 L.Ed. 75 (1886)). The court then upheld a finding of liability, concluding that the activities alleged were not 'decisions responsibly made at the planning level' and did not involve any considerations important to the practicability of the Government's program of controlling air traffic at public airports. 221 F.2d at 78. 75 More recent decisions by this court and other lower federal courts under the discretionary function exception have gradually dispensed with strict application of the operational/planning distinction. In its place has emerged a functional approach focusing on the nature and quality of the discretion involved in the acts complained of. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841, 88 S.Ct. 76, 19 L.Ed.2d 106 (1967). 69 One discernible theme in these recent decisions is to hold[ ] the government responsible for any negligent execution of admittedly discretionary policy judgments where the decisions required for the execution did not themselves involve the balancing of policy factors. Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C.Cir.1979). 70 Government decisions will thus be protected only if they are fraught with foreign relations or other public policy considerations. Id. at 767. The aim of the analysis, consonant with common law principles embodied in the statute, is to preserve an immunity broad enough to  'prevent[ ] tort actions from becoming a vehicle for judicial interference with the conduct of government. Id. at 766 (quoting Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1170 (E.D.Pa.1978)). 76