Opinion ID: 1742807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the lower court erred in permitting improper rebuttal.

Text: The appellant testified in his own behalf at the trial about the hospitals to which he was admitted subsequent to the accident, and stated the following: Q Was it a psychiatric hospital, is that what you're saying? A Yeah, psychiatric treatment. Q Now, let me ask you one question right now. Did you go to any of these hospitals because you was an alcoholic? A No, I went because they sent me for that. On cross-examination, the State, without objection, questioned appellant as to whether or not he had ever been treated for alcoholism, and appellant denied ever having been admitted to a hospital for alcoholic abuse, except on one occasion. His testimony follows: Q Well, have you ever been treated in a V.A. hospital for alcohol abuse? A Yes. Q You have, haven't you, Mr. Whitley? A I started one one time. Q And, Mr. Whitley, you have constantly been treated for alcohol abuse for years and years and years, haven't you? A No.       Q And I'll ask you real clearly, have you ever been a patient for alcohol abuse in any hospital in the United States of America? A Yeah. Q Okay, now tell us where that was, please, sir, and how many. A I wasn't in there very long for it. It was in Gulfport. After the appellant rested his case-in-chief, the State sought to call in rebuttal one of appellant's treating physicians to testify that appellant had a history of alcohol abuse. Appellant, out of the jury's hearing, made a motion in limine, objecting to the proposed rebuttal testimony. The court ruled that when the appellant voluntarily took the stand and testified in his own defense, the State, contending that the statements were untruthful and in violation of appellant's oath, could use otherwise privileged matters solely for the purposes of impeachment. The court further ruled that the medical privilege was waived insofar as the State using testimony in rebuttal to contradict or impeach the testimony of the appellant. Dr. Claro Onate was called by the State in rebuttal, and he testified that he had treated appellant in May of 1984 for alcohol dependence continuance, a pathological use of alcohol which impairs the ability to care for one's self; that appellant's medical history given to him and his staff, indicates that appellant had this problem for the previous fifteen (15) years. Appellant contends that the lower court committed error in that (1) the information was privileged; (2) it was hearsay; and (3) it related to collateral and remote issues. He cites Carlisle v. State, 348 So.2d 765 (Miss. 1977), to the effect that, although impeachment is proper when the evidence is relevant, it is not admissible for impeachment on a collateral matter. In Quinn v. State, 479 So.2d 706 (Miss. 1985), a prosecution for the sale of a controlled substance, the defendant took the stand and, on direct examination, testified that he had never sold marijuana to anyone at any time. The prosecution introduced evidence of a prior marijuana sale. The Court held: Without doubt, testimony that Quinn was involved in a November 4 marijuana sale was not admissible to establish the truth of the facts there asserted. When, however, in response to questions by his own attorney, Quinn testified on direct examination that he did not sell marijuana and had never sold marijuana to anyone at any time, he opened the door. Evidence of the prior marijuana sale was still not admissible to establish the truth of those facts. Such question were, however, permissible for purposes of impeaching Quinn's credibility. This question has been considered in Pierce v. State, 401 So.2d 730, 732-33 (Miss. 1981) which holds that in similar circumstances cross-examination questions such as those put by the state were legitimate for impeachment purposes. 479 So.2d at 708. See also Pierce v. State, 401 So.2d 730 (Miss. 1981). Appellant's principal argument for error under this assignment is based upon Mississippi's medical privilege, Mississippi Code Annotated § 13-1-21 (Supp. 1986). In response, the State relies upon Ashley v. State, supra , for the proposition that it may be, and was, waived in the present case. See also Dennis v. Prisock, 254 Miss. 574, 584, 181 So.2d 125, 128 (1965). Assuming, but not deciding, that the rebuttal evidence went to a collateral matter, and that there had not been an effective waiver of the medical privilege, we are of the opinion that the evidence is overwhelming as to appellant's guilt, and that the error, if any, did not result in a miscarriage of justice. [1] Therefore, the assigned error is rejected.