Opinion ID: 1262905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self-Government and Intramural Affairs Exception

Text: [T]he tribal self-government exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic relations from the general rule that otherwise applicable federal statutes apply to Indian tribes. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (citation omitted). Although these are not the only matters which could be covered by this exception, exemptions have been allowed only in those rare circumstances where the immediate ramifications of the conduct are felt primarily within the reservation by members of the tribe and where self-government is clearly implicated. Snyder, 382 F.3d at 895. The only case in this Circuit regarding the applicability of the FLSA to Indian tribes is the Snyder case. In Snyder, this court addressed whether tribal law enforcement officers who enforced the law on an Indian reservation were entitled to overtime payments pursuant to the FLSA. Id. at 894. This court held that law enforcement was an appropriate activity to exempt as intramural because it was a traditional governmental function, and the FLSA contained an express exemption for state and local law-enforcement officers in 29 U.S.C. §§ 207(k), 207(o). Id. at 895. This court also found that although the officers traveled outside of the reservation to provide information or to testify in a court, they did so because of a crime that occurred on the reservation or directly affected the interests of the tribal community. Thus, such services performed off-reservation nevertheless relate primarily to tribal self-government and remain part of exempt intramural activities. Such travel does not relate to any non-government purpose. Nor does it provide primary benefits to persons with no interest or stake in tribal government. Indeed, none of the officers' official travel is aimed at benefiting any private organization or nonmember. Employed by an arm of the tribal government, officers serve the tribe's governmental need for law enforcement to promote the welfare of the tribe and its members. Id. at 896 (citation omitted); see also Great Lakes, 4 F.3d at 495 (holding that law enforcement officers were exempt from overtime requirements of FLSA because they performed governmental functions). While there is no case directly on point in this Circuit, there are cases both from this Circuit and others deciding the applicability of other federal employment statutes to Indian tribes. In Coeur d'Alene, this court recognized that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) is a statute of general applicability, and that it applied to a farm wholly owned and operated by the Coeur d'Alene Indian Tribe, located entirely within the Indian reservation. Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1114. This court recognized that the Tribe had the inherent sovereign right to regulate the health and safety of workers in tribal enterprises. But neither [wa]s there any doubt that Congress has the power to modify or extinguish that right. Unlike the states, Indian tribes possess only a limited sovereignty that is subject to complete defeasance. Id. at 1115 (citations omitted). This court, therefore, found that none of the exceptions applied because the farm was a commercial enterprise that produced grain and lentils exclusively for sale on the open market in interstate commerce, and because the farm employed non-Indian workers. Id. at 1114, 1116. Thus, the farm's activities were neither profoundly intramural, nor essential to self-government. Id. The tribe in Coeur d'Alene had argued that under their rights to self-government and to exclude non-Indians, they could exclude OSHA inspectors as part of their `fundamental aspect' of tribal sovereignty that cannot be infringed without a clear expression of congressional intent. Id. at 1116-17. This court stated that it had never employed this fundamental aspect of sovereignty formulation of the tribal self-government exception to the general rule that federal statutes ordinarily apply to Indians, and declined to do so for the Coeur d'Alene tribe. Id. (internal quotation omitted). In EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, 260 F.3d 1071, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2001), this court found that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) did not apply to an employment relationship between the Karuk Tribe Housing Authority, a tribal governmental employer, and a tribe member, because it touched on `purely internal matters' related to the tribe's self-governance. [3] The dispute did not concern non-Karuks or non-Indians as employers, employees, customers, or anything else. Id. at 1081. This court noted that [t]he Housing Authority ... functions as an arm of the tribal government and in a governmental role. It is not simply a business entity that happens to be run by a tribe or its members, but, rather, occupies a role quintessentially related to self-governance. Id. at 1080. Unlike the housing authority in the Karuk Tribe case, NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995, 1000 (9th Cir.2003), involved a financially independent, nonprofit organization of the Rumsey Tribe that contracted to provide health services to members of the tribe as well as others, and operated outside of the reservation. The organization argued that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not apply to its activities because providing health care services to tribal members was purely intramural. Id. at 998-99. This court found that the activities were not exempt from provisions of the NLRA because the organization itself was not a tribe and even if the Rumsey Tribe terminated its funding of the organization, the organization would have other resources available to operate. Id. at 1000. In addition, the health care facilities were not located on Indian land, and nearly half of the patients and the nonprofessional employees involved in the controversy were non-Indian. Id. This court stated that the non-Indian patients and non-Indian employees cut against the organization's claim that its activities touch rights of self-governance on a purely intramural matter. Id. Finally, none of the organization's board members were members of the tribe and the organization did not argue that its labor relations were intramural activities related to self-governance. In light of these circumstances, this court held that applying the NLRA does not clearly appear to touch on purely intramural matters that affect the right to self-governance. Id. Other cases have similarly affirmed the application of OSHA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to tribal businesses. See U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182, 183-84 (9th Cir.1991) (finding tribal lumber mill employer subject to OSHA because it employ[ed] a significant number of non-Native Americans and [sold] virtually all of its finished product to non-Native Americans through channels of interstate commerce); Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 181 (finding that OSHA applied to tribe-owned construction business); Lumber Indus. Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Prods. Indus., 939 F.2d 683, 684-85 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that ERISA, as a statute of general applicability, applied to a tribally owned and operated sawmill because [t]he self-government exception applies only where the tribe's decision-making power is usurped[, and] [p]ermitting the Fund to sue the mill under ERISA ... will not usurp the tribe's decision-making power); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935-36 (7th Cir.1989) (applying ERISA to health care facility owned and operated by tribe and located on tribal land); Fla. Paraplegic Ass'n, Inc. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that ADA's public accommodation requirements could apply to restaurant and gaming business run by an Indian tribe because the business did not relate to the governmental functions of the Tribe, nor d[id] it operate exclusively within the domain of the Tribe and its members). The Mathesons rely on United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 124 S.Ct. 1628, 158 L.Ed.2d 420 (2004), asserting that it stands for the proposition that as sovereign entities with power over their members, tribes possess inherent power to control events that occur on their land. The Mathesons also assert that Lara stands for the proposition that Congress could not enact laws modifying tribal inherent power. The Mathesons' reliance is misplaced. The Lara case dealt with the inherent tribal authority to prosecute tribe members. See id. at 204-05, 124 S.Ct. 1628. The Supreme Court in Lara held that Congress possessed the power to lift restrictions on tribes' criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. Id. at 200, 124 S.Ct. 1628. The Lara case did not hold that tribes possess inherent power to control events that occur on their land or that Congress could not enact laws modifying that power. Indeed, as noted above, the Supreme Court has held that Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56, 98 S.Ct. 1670 (citation omitted). The Mathesons fail to provide an appropriate analogy between the Lara case and the instant case, and we find none. The Mathesons also assert that the Lara case aligns with the earlier case from the Tenth Circuit, NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir.2002). The Tenth Circuit in Pueblo of San Juan determined whether in light of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause and Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, the NLRA prevents [through pre-emption] the Pueblo from enacting a `right-to-work' law or entering into a lease with provisions making prohibitions similar to those in right-to-work laws. Id. at 1190. The Mathesons' reliance on this case is also misplaced because the general applicability of the NLRA was not at issue. Id. at 1191. Additionally, the Pueblo had exercised its sovereign authority by enacting a labor regulation. Id. at 1199. The Pueblo was not acting in a proprietary capacity, such as an employer or landlord. Id. at 1191. The Tenth Circuit found that as an Indian tribe, [the Pueblo] retain[ed] the sovereign power to enact its right-to-work ordinance, and to enter into the lease agreement with right-to-work provisions, because Congress has not made a clear retrenchment of such tribal power as is required to do so validly. Id. Here, although the Supreme Court has found that Indian tribes have a strong interest as a sovereign in regulating economic activity involving its own members within its own territory and ... may enact laws governing such activity[,] see Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1200 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982)), the Mathesons do not argue that the Puyallup Tribe enacted a different wage and hour law that applied in place of the FLSA, nor do they assert that the FLSA does not preempt any such law. See Great Lakes, 4 F.3d at 493 (stating that if the Chippewa had a treaty right to employ law enforcement officers on any terms, the Fair Labor Standards Act would be presumed not to abrogate the right by forcing the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission to pay time and a half for overtime). Thus, there is no evidence in the record that the Puyallup Tribe has acted on its right of self-governance in the field of wage and hours laws and specifically with respect to overtime. Because the Puyallup Tribe has not enacted wage and hour laws, the holdings of the cases discussed above lead this court to conclude that the overtime provisions of the FLSA apply to the Mathesons and the intramural affairs exception does not. Baby Zack's is a purely commercial enterprise engaged in interstate commerce selling out-of-state goods to non-Indians and employing non-Indians. See Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 181 ([E]mployment of non-Indians weighs heavily against its claim that its activities affect rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters. In general, tribal relations with non-Indians fall outside the normal ambit of tribal self-government.... When a tribal operation affects open markets, it is unlikely that the operation is purely intramural.). Unlike many of the businesses in the cases discussed above, Baby Zack's is not a tribal business, although it is owned by tribe members. Therefore, the district court's finding that the intramural exception does not apply because there is nothing profoundly intramural or involving self-governance about the employment of Indians and non-Indians by a retail business engaged in interstate commerce is affirmed.