Opinion ID: 2639222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr Spindle's Failure To Complete the Application Process Was Fatal to His Claims.

Text: Although requested by the committee, Dr. Spindle failed to provide Providence with ten percent of the discharge diagnoses and discharge summaries that it had requested from his previous work. Dr. Spindle also failed to submit a plan for surgical coverage of his patients and a plan to have a Class I neurosurgeon assist him with all major cases. Dr. Spindle claims that his failure to complete the application process was a direct result of the appellees' anticompetitive conduct. Appellees respond that Dr. Spindle's failure to furnish the necessary information renders any claim he might have ineffective because he never finished his application for medical privileges at Providence. We proceed cautiously when asked to review the actions of a hospital's governing body. Courts are in general agreement that the decisions of a hospital governing body regarding applications for hospital privileges are to be accorded great deference, and that judicial review should be limited to factors which are within the expertise of courts. [10] The evaluation of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the specialized expertise of their peers, subject only to limited judicial surveillance. [11] We recognize that the governing body of a hospital must be given great latitude in establishing standards which an applicant must meet before privileges will be granted. [12] At the same time, we may require a hospital's procedures and standards to be fair and reasonable as well as ensure that they are not applied in an arbitrary or capricious fashion. [13] Appellees' actions with respect to the discharge records comfortably satisfy the deferential review that we apply in these situations. In requiring the discharge diagnoses and discharge summaries, appellees merely required verification that Dr. Spindle maintained current clinical competence in the procedures for which he sought privileges. We have previously recognized that it may be difficult for a hospital to establish a set of objective criteria to determine whether an applicant is qualified for every medical privilege applied for. [14] Especially in light of the telephone conversation with Dr. Godersky, in which Dr. Spindle admitted that his practice was limited in contrast with the number of privileges he applied for at Providence, the committee's request for the discharge diagnoses and discharge summaries was unquestionably reasonable and within its discretion. Furthermore, Providence decreased the initial requirementfrom all Downey discharge diagnoses and discharge summaries to ten percent of those records to ensure that its request was reasonable. And Dr. Spindle signed the consent and release in his initial application, acknowledging that he had the burden to produce adequate information for a proper evaluation of the above criteria and for resolving any doubts about such qualifications. Finally, in creating a provision regarding the civil liability of hospitals for certain physicians, the Alaska legislature specifically found that a hospital is responsible for exercising reasonable care in granting privileges to practice in the hospital, for reviewing those privileges on a regular basis, and for taking appropriate steps to revoke or restrict privileges in appropriate circumstances. [15] Under all of these circumstances, Dr. Spindle's failure to provide the credentials committee with the discharge summariesinformation that the committee needed to assess his applicationis fatal to his claims. The committee, denied the information that was necessary to determine his fitness to practice the broad range of neurosurgical procedures that Dr. Spindle sought privileges to practice at Providence, was justified in retiring his file as incomplete. Thus, without even considering Dr. Spindle's anticompetitive conduct claims, which related to his failure to obtain coverage for his patients when he was not available and his failure to obtain Class I neurosurgeon assistance on his major cases, there was a sufficient basis for the grant of summary judgment. The requirement to provide the committee with ten percent of his discharge diagnoses and discharge summaries was within Dr. Spindle's control and he failed to meet it. [16] Thus, despite Dr. Spindle's arguments to the contrary, this case is analogous to Evers v. Edward Hospital Ass'n. [17] In Evers, the court held that an applicant must provid[e] all information deemed necessary by the hospital ... as a condition precedent to the hospital's obligation to process the application. [18] Dr. Spindle argues in response that this case is inapplicable because it is a breach of contract action as opposed to an antitrust claim. But while Dr. Spindle argues that the appellees prevented him from competing for privileges, they did not prevent him from supplying the discharge records that were requested. It was within Dr. Spindle's power to obtain the discharge summaries but he failed to do so. Based on the undisputed evidence before us from Stoner, the only inference that can be drawn from the record is that he simply chose not to do so. We conclude, as in Evers, that the hospital's requirement that a sample of discharge records be supplied was a reasonable condition precedent to any required action by the hospital. The failure of Dr. Spindle to comply with this request renders his claim of anticompetitive conduct and conditions in the application process premature. Until and unless Dr. Spindle complies with the clearly reasonable conditions he may not be heard to complain that other acts and practices are unreasonable and monopolistic. [19]
Because there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court granting appellees' motion for summary judgment.