Opinion ID: 2832672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Statement Count

Text: The government next contends the district court erred by granting Knight's motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement count. This charge arose under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3), which provides that [a] person who knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury . . . in or in relation to any case under title 11 is guilty of making a false oath or statement. 18 U.S.C. § 152(3). Although Barber's bankruptcy filings allegedly contained several false statements, the Indictment clarifies that the false statement count against Knight is 14 Each of the money laundering counts in the Indictment charged Knight with knowingly engaging in a monetary transaction involving funds that were derived from § 152(7) bankruptcy fraud. Because we agree with the district court that the evidence heavily preponderates against a finding that Knight's use of his IOLTA constituted bankruptcy fraud, we also affirm the district court's decision to grant Knight a new trial on the money laundering counts. -31- based solely on Barber's alleged failure to disclose on his SOFA over $1 million of income that he received in 2008. Although the government seemingly concedes that only Barber signed the SOFA under oath, it nonetheless contends the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Knight aided and abetted Barber's allegedly false disclosure about his income. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). We review questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government's favor, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict. United States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 986 (2015). The verdict should be overturned only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 783. The district court cited several reasons for granting Knight's motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement count. The district court first determined there was insufficient evidence that Knight independently influenced Barber's income disclosures or committed any other affirmative act in furtherance of Barber's false income disclosure. In support of this conclusion, the district court noted that Knight advised Barber that he would rather have too much income disclosed than not enough and that none of the parties involved in the bankruptcy proceeding made a criminal referral regarding Knight. The district court also, for reasons that are not entirely clear, believed that the government's case as to the false statement count relied on the fact that Barber's income was under-reported as a result of not including income to his entities. The district court further noted that both parties' experts agreed that there was a reasonable basis in the law for not reporting entity income as personal income on the SOFA. The court thus held that the government had failed to prove that Barber made a false statement related to his income on the SOFA. -32- Having closely reviewed the record, we hold the district court erred in granting Knight's motion for judgment of acquittal on the false statement charge. Contrary to the district court's framing of the legal theory, the government directly attempted to prove that Barber personally received income for his role in the Spring Creek and Executive Plaza transactions, not that Barber fraudulently under-reported entity income. Granting the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to it, the government offered sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Knight knew that Barber received $314,000 of personal income from the Executive Plaza Transaction. See id. at 78283. Although Knight testified that he believed this money was a loan and provided circumstantial evidence in support of this claim, the jury could have disbelieved Knight's testimony, and his circumstantial evidence was not overwhelming enough to compel a finding that he believed the $314,000 was a loan. See United States v. Reed, 297 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 2002) ([W]hen there is other corroborative evidence of guilt, the jury can properly draw an inference of guilt from its disbelief of the defendant's denials.) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, the district court's grant of judgment of acquittal on the false statement count must be reversed.
The government next contends the district court erred by conditionally granting Knight a new trial on the false statement count. The district court cited two justifications in support of its decision to grant a new trial on this count. The district court first concluded that its false statement instruction to the jury was so defective that by giving the instruction the court committed plain error that affected Knight's substantial rights.15 The district court alternatively held that Knight was entitled to a new trial on this count based on the weight of the evidence. We review the district 15 Knight did not object to the jury instruction at issue. -33- court's decision to grant a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Campos, 306 F.3d at 579. Having closely reviewed the record, we agree that Knight is entitled to a new trial on the grounds that the false statement instruction was defective. The instruction stated that the jury could convict Knight if he knowingly and fraudulently made a material false statement in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding. The Indictment, however, charged Knight with making a specific false statement regarding Barber's income for 2008. At trial, the government offered evidence of numerous additional false statements that Barber, with Knight's knowing assistance, allegedly made in relation to the bankruptcy proceeding. In granting Knight's motion for a new trial, the district court expressed concern that the jury convicted Knight based on uncharged false statements that were included in Barber's bankruptcy filings. The district court's reasoning is sound, and we affirm its decision to grant Knight a new trial on the basis of a defective jury instruction. We therefore need not address the district court's alternative grounds for granting Knight a new trial on the false statement count.16