Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Convictions for RICO Conspiracy Under 18

Text: U.S.C. § 1962(d) The jury convicted the Defendants of conspiring, in violation of RICO, to “conduct or participate … in” the affairs of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce “through a pattern of racketeering activity[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); id. § 1962(d) (making it “unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection … (c)”). RICO lists dozens of federal crimes and incorporates many state crimes that qualify as predicate “racketeering activit[ies.]” Id. § 1961(1). To constitute a “pattern[,]” there must be “at least two acts of racketeering activity[.]” Id. § 1961(5). Here, that meant, to be guilty of the conspiracy, each Defendant had to have agreed that he or his co-conspirators would perform two or more of the predicate acts listed in § 1961(1). The jury found, in response to special interrogatories, that Pelullo and Scarfo each agreed to the commission of eight such predicate acts, that William Maxwell agreed to the commission of seven, and that John Maxwell agreed to the commission of six. The Defendants raise claims of error related to the RICO conspiracy charge, but none is persuasive. hearing either. 84
Indictment49 Scarfo complains to us about the verdict form’s special interrogatories. 50 According to Scarfo, the District Court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by constructively amending the indictment in the verdict form when it specified 49 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s determination of whether to submit special interrogatories to a jury. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 663 (3d Cir. 1993). While a properly preserved claim of constructive amendment or variance receives plenary review, we review for plain error when it is raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010). The test for plain error requires the appellant to show “(1) an ‘error’; (2) ‘that is plain’; (3) ‘that affect[ed] substantial rights’; and (4) that failure to correct the error would ‘seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Defreitas, 29 F.4th 135, 144 (3d Cir. 2022) (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). 50 Pelullo and John Maxwell both specifically adopt Scarfo’s argument “as to … shifting of RICO[.]” (SP Opening Br. at 223; JM Opening Br. at 49.) To the extent they intend to refer to Scarfo’s constructive amendment argument, their claims fail for the same reason as does Scarfo’s – namely, that the verdict form did not expand the potential bases for liability under the RICO charge beyond those listed in the indictment. William Maxwell, meanwhile, does not specifically adopt Scarfo’s argument, so he has forfeited it. 85 a particular group of racketeering activities applicable to each defendant. Separately, he suggests that the special interrogatories made him seem comparatively more culpable than the codefendants for whom fewer predicate acts were listed, prejudicing him in the eyes of the jury and causing juror confusion. He did not raise those issues at trial, so we review for plain error.51 United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 352 (3d Cir. 2011). Eleven of the thirteen defendants were charged with engaging in a RICO conspiracy. That count in the indictment 51 Scarfo argues that his constructive amendment claim was preserved when his attorney raised the following concern in the District Court: [G]iven that it is a RICO conspiracy charge I think it would be worth reiterating with the jurors that all defendants are charged with the same RICO conspiracy charge because I think it is – I think it was a little bit unclear, given your remarks to them about the verdict form, that they may have concluded that some defendants are charged with different forms of – with different kinds of RICO conspiracy and I think that may generate some confusion. (JAC at 12498.) The District Court responded that the “verdict form itself” showed that all defendants were charged with the same RICO conspiracy and that the only difference among them was “in the predicate qualifying acts.” (JAC at 12498.) Scarfo at no point referenced the indictment nor mentioned constructive amendment or prejudice, so plain-error review is appropriate. 86 listed eight specific predicate acts, namely, mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, obstruction of justice, extortion, interstate travel in aid of racketeering, money laundering, and securities fraud. The verdict form asked the jury to first indicate whether it found Scarfo and his alleged co-conspirators guilty or not guilty of RICO conspiracy. Below that, special interrogatories appeared under each defendant’s name, asking if the jury “unanimously find[s] that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt” that the named defendant agreed to commit specified predicate acts. (GSA at 409-15.) The form provided “yes” or “no” spaces for the foreman to check for each predicate act. Some defendants were charged with different and fewer predicate acts than others were. For example, Scarfo’s name on the verdict form included all eight potential predicate acts (as it did in the indictment), while some of his co-conspirators had fewer predicate acts listed. The District Court instructed the jury that they needed to unanimously find an answer on the interrogatories regarding acts of racketeering activity but that they should not “answer these interrogatories until after [they] ha[d] reached [their] verdict.” (JAC at 12390.) The Fifth Amendment requires that a defendant be tried only for crimes for which he has been indicted. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960). Accordingly, a court cannot later amend an indictment – either formally or constructively – to include new charges. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1887). A constructive amendment occurs when the court “broaden[s] the possible bases for conviction from th[ose] which appeared in the indictment.” United States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2007) 87 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For instance, an indictment is constructively amended if the jury instructions “modify essential terms of the charged offense” such that “the jury may have convicted the defendant for an offense differing from the offense the indictment returned by the grand jury actually charged.” United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 25960 (3d Cir. 2006). That did not take place here. The interrogatories required the jury to support their decision by identifying at least two predicate acts for each defendant, after determining whether the defendants were guilty of RICO conspiracy. Those interrogatories did not, as Scarfo argues, turn the predicate acts into elements of the RICO conspiracy. The indictment alleged that each defendant agreed to commit at least two predicate acts and listed all the predicates that later appeared in the interrogatories. If anything, the District Court narrowed, rather than “broaden[ed,] the possible bases for conviction” by instructing jurors to find each predicate act unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt and by removing certain predicate acts for some defendants. McKee, 506 F.3d at 229; cf. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136 (1985) (“[T]he right to a grand jury is not normally violated by the fact that the indictment alleges more crimes or other means of committing the same crime [than are proven at trial].”). Scarfo, in fact, had the same eight predicate acts listed under his name on the verdict form as were charged in the indictment. For him, then, there was no difference at all between the indictment and the potential bases for conviction listed in the verdict form. Scarfo also argues that listing more predicates under his name than under his codefendants’ names was unfair and caused prejudice and juror confusion. The District Court’s 88 instructions remedied any potential problem, however, by clarifying to the jurors that they first needed to find each defendant guilty or not guilty before turning to the interrogatories as a check on their verdict. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 663 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “an instruction to the jury to answer the [special] interrogatories [regarding RICO predicates] only after it votes to convict” “alleviat[es] the danger of prejudice to the defendant”). Moreover, any disparity between Scarfo and the other defendants was of his own making. There was evidence that he engaged in more criminal wrongdoing than some of his codefendants. Given his own conduct, he cannot now complain that he may have appeared more culpable before the jury than others did. We thus detect no error, much less plain error, in the formulation of the special interrogatories accompanying the RICO conspiracy charge.
Evidence Next, the Defendants challenge the jury instructions and the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to the RICO conspiracy convictions, but they do so by attacking only one predicate act: extortion under the federal Hobbs Act.52 Their 52 Pelullo and William Maxwell set forth the challenges to the RICO conspiracy convictions that are addressed in this section. Their arguments were specifically adopted by each other and by John Maxwell, so the claims in this section apply to all three of those Defendants. Though Scarfo did not specifically adopt the other Defendants’ arguments and thus forfeited them, see supra note 19, we nonetheless refer to the 89 challenges thus fail for a simple reason: they do not address any of the other predicate acts that support those convictions, and each convicted Defendant had more than two such acts to their discredit, so the elimination of the Hobbs Act predicate makes no difference.53 Even if we agreed with their Hobbs Act arguments (which we do not), their convictions for RICO conspiracy are still supported by the other predicate acts found by the jury. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1107 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Thus, even if we deleted the [extortion] act, we would affirm the convictions” for RICO conspiracy.). Their convictions for RICO conspiracy thus stand.