Opinion ID: 711056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutorial Counts

Text: 106 Mr. Nash cries foul because the Government, during closing argument, characterized the Defendants as bank robbers and drew parallels between their scheme and the classic take-the-money-and-run bank robbery. Mr. Nash did not object to these references at the time. We therefore review for plain error. 107 We acknowledge that the prosecutor's remarks were certainly less than kind to Mr. Nash. Hard blows are, however, often the essence of argument and, standing in isolation, do not constitute grounds for reversal unless the remarks impermissibly prejudice a defendant. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) ([W]hile [the government] may strike hard blows, [it] is not at liberty to strike foul ones.); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 665 (9th Cir.1988) (Hard blows are permissible in closing arguments and even when statements go beyond reasonable inferences made from the evidence, reversal is proper only if they were likely to have prejudiced the defendant.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030, 109 S.Ct. 1164, 103 L.Ed.2d 222 (1989). 108 We do not see that the prosecutor's comments added a great deal to the Government's case other than emphasizing the somewhat obvious point that a wrongfully obtained loan harms a bank no less than does a bank robbery. However, we also do not think that the remarks prejudiced Mr. Nash to the extent necessary for plain error. It seems wildly implausible that the jury convicted Mr. Nash because it was inflamed by the talk of guns and notes and getaway cars.
109 The record indicates that on at least three occasions during closing argument the prosecution characterized statements made by the Defendants as lies. No objection was made to these comments. We therefore review for plain error. We find none. The comments were made during closing argument, and the jury was properly instructed to treat the prosecution's statements as argument and not as evidence. It is hardly surprising that, in a case turning upon the falsehood of certain representations, the prosecution would attempt to persuade the jury that those representations were in fact lies. See United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1991) (In a case that essentially reduces to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that one of the two sides is lying.); cf. United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, 672 (9th Cir.) (prosecution's characterization of defense theory as a fabrication well within the bounds of acceptable comment), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 943, 104 S.Ct. 1926, 80 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984). We therefore fail to see what prejudice Mr. Nash suffered that would support a finding of plain error.
110 Mr. Nash contends that the Government vouched for three of its witnesses. We review accusations of vouching under the multi-faceted balancing test set forth in United States v. Necoechea: 111 [W]e consider a number of factors including: the form of vouching; how much the vouching implies that the prosecutor has extra-record knowledge of or the capacity to monitor the witness's truthfulness; any inference that the court is monitoring the witness's veracity; the degree of personal opinion asserted; the timing of the vouching; the extent to which the witness's credibility was attacked; the specificity and timing of a curative instruction; the importance of the witness's testimony and the vouching to the case overall. 112 986 F.2d 1273, 1278 (9th Cir.1993). No objection was made at trial to the allegedly improper remarks. We therefore review for plain error. We again find none. 113 Mr. Nash first contests the propriety of four comments made during rebuttal argument in reference to the testimony of Mr. Brourman (an attorney who represented Mr. Knapp's ex-wife during divorce proceedings): 114 You actually, ladies and gentlemen, heard a much truer and more candid view or statement of how the defendants viewed the Circle C transaction from Mr. Brourman. 115 .... 116 ... There is no reason for him to make this up. You heard him, he came to the FBI with this information. 117 Now, you also now [sic] that Mr. Brourman is telling the truth because you heard Mr. Goldberg testify yesterday.... 118 So, if the defendants are right and Mr. Brourman is just making it up, then he started four years ago, ladies and gentlemen, and I suggest to you that is not what's happening. Mr. Brourman told you he remembered that conversation because [sic] and he was shocked by it and he came in here and he told you the truth. 119