Opinion ID: 3030093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 2 – Rehabilitation Act Claim5

Text: In her Amended Complaint, Montanye alleges that Appellees violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in conducting the Loudermill hearing and issuing the subsequent June 2002 letter. Section 504 provides that no “otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). This section, as the District Court properly noted, also dictates that the “standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment 5 In her brief on appeal, Montanye refers to a claim against the School District for “interference with . . . students’ protected rights” under the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). However, this claim was neither raised in Montanye’s Amended Complaint nor in her brief below in opposition to Appellees’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Montanye’s claim is not properly before us now. 8 discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). The ADA states, in relevant part, that no “person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this [Act] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). Finally, we have previously held that we will “analyze ADA retaliation claims under the same framework we employ for retaliation claims arising under Title VII.” Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). Given this framework, the District Court properly determined that, to state a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, “‘a plaintiff must show: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s action.’” Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 567-68 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500). The District Court concluded that Montanye failed to allege that she engaged in protected employee activity under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. We agree with the District Court that Montanye has not alleged that she “opposed any act or practice made unlawful by” the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, nor has she asserted that she “made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. 9 Though Montanye argues that the Rehabilitation Act prohibits retaliation against individuals who “provide special assistance, advocacy and support,” the District Court correctly concluded that this is not the type of employee activity protected by the relevant statutes. It is clear from the case law that protected activity does not include mere assistance of special education students, but, rather, requires affirmative action in advocating for, or protesting discrimination related to, unlawful conduct by others. See, e.g., Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that “protected conduct” contemplates such activity as “making complaints to management,” “writing critical letters,” “protesting against discrimination,” and “expressing support of co-workers”). Indeed, the concept of “protected activity” at issue here is necessarily limited to, if not speech in the strict sense, at least the sort of expressive conduct which conveys a message. Therefore, Montanye’s Rehabilitation Act claims fail for the same reasons that her First Amendment claims fail: Montanye has not sufficiently alleged that her actions in helping K were expressive or communicative. Accordingly, we will not disturb the District Court’s conclusion that Montanye failed to set forth a claim under the ADA and/or Rehabilitation Act.6 6 Appellees argue that Montanye’s claims under Count I and Count II are procedurally barred and not properly before us. With respect to Count I, Appellees argue that Montanye’s Notice of Appeal refers only to Count II and, therefore, that we should not consider her appeal as to Count I. With respect to Count II, Appellees argue that Montanye has waived her Rehabilitation Act claim because she failed to defend that claim in her brief below in opposition to Appellees’ motion to dismiss. At oral argument, counsel for Appellees urged that we rule in their favor on these bases. Rather than rely on these arguably technical “procedural” grounds, however, we prefer to base our ruling on 10