Opinion ID: 2789341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Party Responsibility

Text: Sullivan first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that AboveNet actually did the work alleged in this case. He claims that the full record definitely included evidence that the “work had been performed under AboveNet‟s permit and direction.” We agree. 14 At the end of trial, the following evidence was presented to the jury for deliberation. First, Sullivan had proffered into evidence DDOT permits establishing that between December 1, 2008 and May 5, 2009, AboveNet was granted a permit by the city to perform work at “50 F Street, [N.W.], Washington, D.C. 20001.” AboveNet was to excavate the road and construct a trench to install electrical conduits and a telecom connection, and install a new manhole. Second, during the District‟s defense, the District called DDOT supervisor Henry, who testified that the manhole cover bore AboveNet‟s name, and confirmed that “AboveNet did the work.” Third, the District also read into evidence AboveNet‟s own interrogatory responses stating that the DDOT permits covered the excavation of North Capitol Street and F Street, and that AboveNet had contracted Jones Utilities Construction to do the work. There is no doubt that under normal circumstances there was enough evidence for the jury to reason that AboveNet was the party responsible for the condition.7 7 The fact that there was somewhat conflicting evidence as to whether contractor Jones Utilities Construction or AboveNet itself was responsible for the roadwork is irrelevant in determining AboveNet‟s potential liability. First, all inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and so we view the evidence in favor of holding AboveNet personally responsible for creating the condition. See Majeska, supra, 812 A.2d at 950. Second, during AboveNet‟s opening statement, counsel admitted that AboveNet had a project manager, Kris Kobylski, “on this site the entire time the work was being done from early January until late April.” Consequently, even if Jones Utilities Construction was contracted to do the work, AboveNet, as the on-site managing entity, still (continued…) 15 However, this was not one of those normal circumstances because it appears the trial court expressly limited its decision to grant AboveNet‟s motion for judgment as a matter of law to the evidence produced at the end of Sullivan‟s case (i.e., solely to the permits), even though it had waited until after the jury rendered a verdict to make its decision. AboveNet counters that the trial court had the authority to make this decision but cites to no direct or persuasive case law. Based on its brief, it also seems that AboveNet believes that this court‟s review should similarly be limited to the evidence presented as of the close of Sullivan‟s case. Both assessments are incorrect. First, we are not bound by the trial court‟s decision to limit its ruling to the evidence presented by Sullivan. See, e.g., Silva v. Worden, 130 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1997) (“We consider all evidence offered during trial, including evidence introduced by the defendants. We do this notwithstanding the defendants‟ motion for directed verdict at the end of [the plaintiff‟s] case and the court‟s statement that it would rule, although at the close of all evidence, only on the plaintiff‟s evidence.”). On appeal, this court conducts a de novo review of the record, (…continued) owed a duty to pedestrians. See Traudt v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326, 1334-35 (D.C. 1997) (approving a theory of negligence liability whereby employer of independent contractor retained “supervisory control” of the work). 16 viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party in deciding whether a motion for judgment as a matter of law was appropriate. See, e.g., Scott, supra, 731 A.2d at 403; see also Boyrie v. E & G Prop. Servs., 58 A.3d 475, 477 (D.C. 2013). Here, our review of the record indicates that there was evidence that AboveNet did the work. Second, although we do not dispute that the trial court may reserve ruling on a Rule 50 (a) motion made at the close of the plaintiff‟s case until after the jury verdict,8 we disagree that the trial court may decide the reserved motion based solely on the record as it existed at the close of the plaintiff‟s case. As explained in Teneyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 214, 229, 365 F.3d 1139, 1154 (2004), with regard to the equivalent Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (a):9 [Rule 50 (a)] does not authorize a trial judge, after the defense has presented its case (in whole or in part), to 8 Contrary to Sullivan‟s claim, there is no requirement that a party raise a Rule 50 (b) motion after the jury renders its verdict when the trial court has not entered judgment and instead conducts a hearing on a reserved Rule 50 (a) motion. See Marcel Hair Goods Corp. v. Nat’l Sav. & Trust Co., 410 A.2d 1, 5 (D.C. 1979) (“To hold a party accountable for failing to interject a [Rule 50 (b)] motion when the trial court conducts a post-verdict hearing on a reserved [Rule 50 (a)] motion would be irrational. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 1 directs that the rules be „construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.‟”). 9 Although not binding, this court looks to decisions of the federal courts as persuasive authority when interpreting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50. Street v. Hedgepath, 607 A.2d 1238, 1243 n.5 (D.C. 1992). 17 revisit, and grant, a defense motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of the plaintiff‟s case without considering, in addition to the evidence presented in the plaintiff‟s case, the evidence presented by the defense. (quoting Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1305 n.31 (11th Cir. 1998)). We are persuaded by the federal interpretation of Rule 50 (a). To hold otherwise would unacceptably exalt “form over substance,” whereby the trial court‟s decision to take a case away from the jury is based more on procedural formalities than fairness and facts on the ground. See, e.g., District of Columbia Office of Tax & Revenue v. Shuman, 82 A.3d 58, 67-69 (D.C. 2013). Moreover, such a holding is inherently incompatible with this court‟s standard of review on appeal to conduct a de novo review of the full record. See Hill, supra, 933 A.2d at 322. Therefore, to clarify, we hold that when a motion for judgment as a matter of law is made at the close of the plaintiff‟s case but a decision is reserved until after the defense had presented its case, the trial court must consider the full record as it exists at the time in deciding the reserved motion.10 10 Alternatively, AboveNet‟s own counsel may have judicially admitted to backfilling the road where Sullivan had fallen during his opening statement. Specifically, during AboveNet‟s opening statement made immediately after Sullivan presented its opening at the start of trial as to why AboveNet and the District were liable for his injuries, AboveNet‟s counsel stated openly that “[m]y client [i.e., AboveNet] had done work in that area. They had done it according to the permits with [the District of Columbia], and they had done it properly.” AboveNet‟s counsel further explained to the jury that AboveNet was “not done (continued…) 18