Opinion ID: 469813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admissibility of the Antecedent Cocaine Transaction

Text: 22 Pelaes also contends that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence against him proof of the alleged cocaine transaction that underlay the abduction of Luis. He contends that since he had no role in that transaction and no interest in the cocaine, the probative value of this evidence to show the motive for the kidnaping was outweighed by its prejudicial effect on him, and the trial court therefore could not properly admit it. We disagree. 23 This argument was made before us in Pedroza and we rejected it, noting that the evidence was relevant to defendants' motive for the abduction of Luis, and concluding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that some detail as to the events involving the cocaine was necessary to the jury's understanding of, for example, whether a kidnapping was intended, why a kidnapping might have been thought desirable, and why the person abducted was Luis. 750 F.2d at 201. We have been given no reason to alter that view. 24 We also stated in Pedroza that since there was no indication that Pelaes or most of the other defendants had been involved in the cocaine transaction, those defendants were entitled to a clearly limiting instruction stating not only that the defendants [were] not being tried for violations of the narcotics laws, but also that there was no evidence that [they] participated in those antecedent events. Id. The court at retrial gave the required instruction as to the limited purpose for which the jury was allowed to consider the antecedent narcotics transaction, and we find no error in the admission of this evidence.