Opinion ID: 3047483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining What is “Jurisdictional” after

Text: Kontrick and Eberhart [1] With respect to the timing for filing a notice of appeal, FRAP 4 provides, in relevant part: Rule 4. Appeal as of Right — When Taken (a) Appeal in a Civil Case. (1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal. (A) In a civil case, except as provided in Rules 4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(4), and 4(c), the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. ... (b) Appeal in a Criminal Case. (1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal. (A) In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 10 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government’s notice of appeal. . . . Fed. R. App. P. 4. Until recently, our caselaw was clear that compliance with the provisions of Rule 4 regarding the time 2314 UNITED STATES v. SADLER for filing a notice of appeal was both mandatory and jurisdictional. See, e.g., United States v. Arevalo, 408 F.3d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing Rule 4(b)’s time requirement as “mandatory and jurisdictional”); George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“It is a well-settled principle that this court cannot hear an appeal that was not timely filed, as we have no jurisdiction to do so.”); Smith v. United States, 425 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1970) (“[I]t is settled that compliance [with Rule 4(b)’s timing requirements] is both mandatory and jurisdictional.”); see also 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3901 (2d ed. 1992) (“The rule is well settled that failure to file a timely notice of appeal defeats the jurisdiction of a court of appeals.”). The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Kontrick and Eberhart, however, have called that long-standing assumption into question. [2] In Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454, the Supreme Court expressed displeasure with the too-prevalent practice of applying the label “jurisdictional” loosely. Specifically, the Court explained that courts have tended to “classify[ ] time prescriptions . . . under the heading ‘subject matter jurisdiction,’ ” a practice which “can be confounding.” Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Admitting culpability for being “less than meticulous in this regard” itself, the Court went on to declare that [c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label “jurisdictional” not for claim- processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court’s adjudicatory authority. Id. Applying the distinction it had drawn, the Court held that Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 4004(a), (b) and 9006(b)(3), UNITED STATES v. SADLER 2315 which together govern the timing for the filing of a complaint opposing a debtor’s discharge, did not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Id. at 448, 453-54. Accordingly, under the more careful construction of the term “jurisdictional,” the Court determined the rules in question to be nonjurisdictional but mandatory claim-processing rules — that is, subject to forfeiture but obligatory if not forfeited. The Court came to this conclusion by comparing different sections of the statutory code governing the bankruptcy courts. Noting that under Article III of the Constitution “[o]nly Congress may determine a lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” id. at 452, the Court distinguished between bankruptcy statutory provisions that contain “built-in time constraints” and those that do not, id. at 453. It then noted that because “[t]he provision conferring jurisdiction over objections to discharge . . . contains no timeliness condition,” such filings were governed by the time constraints contained in the Bankruptcy Rules, promulgated by the Court itself. Id. Because “it is axiomatic that such rules do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction,” id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), the Court concluded that the timeliness provisions in question did not affect subject matter jurisdiction and were, instead, forfeitable claim-processing rules, id. at 454. [3] Building on Kontrick, the Court in Eberhart, 126 S. Ct. at 405, addressed once again the distinction between rules prescribing the adjudicatory authority of the courts and “nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules,” this time outside the bankruptcy context. Eberhart concerned whether a new trial motion that fails to comply with the timing requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 33 and 45(b)(2) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, even though the government did not assert the motion’s untimeliness in the district court. The Court compared Rules 33 and 45(b)(2) with the bankruptcy provisions at issue in Kontrick and concluded that “[i]t is implausible that the Rules considered in Kontrick can 2316 UNITED STATES v. SADLER be nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules, while virtually identical provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure can deprive federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 405. Eberhart therefore declared that Rules 33 and 45 were nonjurisdictional and thus forfeitable. Id. at 407.