Opinion ID: 1255546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Assault Convictions

Text: Mierz argues that the State was required to charge him under subsection (a) of RCW 9A.36.031(1) rather than subsection (g) because subsection (a) is a special statute, which must be used where both it and a general statute (here, allegedly subsection (g)) encompass the conduct in question. RCW 9A.36.031(1) provides for the crime of assault in the third degree: (1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree if he or she ...: (a) With intent to prevent or resist the execution of any lawful process or mandate of any court officer or the lawful apprehension or detention of himself [or herself] or another person, assaults another; or .... (g) Assaults a law enforcement officer or other employee of a law enforcement agency who was performing his or her official duties at the time of the assault. Mierz contends that if he were charged under subsection (a), he would have had the opportunity to more readily argue the lawfulness of the Wildlife agents' actions. [12] [11] Where conduct falls within the scope of two criminal statutes, the accused only may be charged under the more specific (or special) statute and may not be charged under the more general statute. State v. Shriner, 101 Wn.2d 576, 580-81, 681 P.2d 237 (1984). RCW 9A.36.031(1)(a) is not a special statute relative to RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g), because subsection (g) is not violated in each instance where subsection (a) is violated. Indeed, a violation of subsection (a), which plainly could involve private citizens, would not be a violation of subsection (g), which protects only law enforcement officers and employees of law enforcement agencies. State v. Belleman, 70 Wn. App. 778, 784, 856 P.2d 403 (1993). Because subsection (a) is not a special statute relative to subsection (g), it was not error for the State to charge Mierz under subsection (g). [12] Mierz also argues that RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) only may be violated by an assault while an officer of the law is engaged in official duties other than an arrest, because RCW 9A.36.031(1)(a) covers any arrest situation. Pet. for Review at 9. In Hoffman, we determined that the term official duties in the aggravated homicide statute encompassed conduct within the scope of the officer's employment, including authority to make an arrest. Hoffman is equally persuasive in the context of the thirddegree assault statute. Mierz also claims that an officer is not performing official duties under subsection (g) when making an illegal arrest, citing State v. Little, 116 Wn.2d 488, 806 P.2d 749 (1991). Pet. for Review at 11. Little does not stand for such a proposition. Little, in fact, supports the view that if officers stop a person for investigative purposes, that person's flight from the officer may be punished as the obstruction of a public servant in the performance of duties under RCW 9A.76.020. Little, 116 Wn.2d at 496-97. [13] Mierz presents an overly restrictive definition of the term official duties. We hold that official duties as used in RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) encompass all aspects of a law enforcement officer's good faith performance of job-related duties, excluding conduct occurring when the officer is on a frolic of his or her own. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d at 99-100. RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g) includes assaults upon law enforcement officers in the course of performing their official duties, even if making an illegal arrest. Mierz was properly charged under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g).