Opinion ID: 2980834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Order Granting New Trial on Damages

Text: We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 450 (6th Cir. 2005); Brooks v. Toyotomi, Co., 86 F.3d 582, 588 (6th Cir. 1996). “Abuse of discretion is defined as a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, or when it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362 F.3d 882, 891 (6th Cir. 2004). -6- No. 10-6459 Acuity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Frye Under Rule 59, after a jury trial a court may grant a new trial on all or some of the issues “for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Generally, courts have interpreted this Rule to permit a new trial in circumstances where: 1) the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; 2) the damages are excessive; or 3) the trial proceedings were influenced by prejudice, bias, or some other unfairness to the moving party. Conte v. General Housewares Corp., 215 F.3d 628, 637 (6th Cir. 2000). A trial court may not grant a new trial on the ground of insufficient damages unless the jury verdict is one that could not reasonably have been reached. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 674 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1996); TCP Indus., Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 661 F.2d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1981)). “The remedy of a new trial for inadequate damages is appropriate only where the evidence indicates that the jury awarded damages in an amount substantially less than unquestionably proved by the plaintiff’s uncontradicted and undisputed evidence.” Id. (citing Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1021 (6th Cir. 1996)). Thus, if the verdict is supported by some competent, credible evidence, the motion for new trial should be denied. Id. The district court articulated and applied the proper standard in considering the Fryes’ motion. In concluding that a new trial on the issue of damages was warranted, the district court summarized the Fryes’ proof as follows: When all of the[] estimates are added together, Darrell Frye has presented evidence that the fire loss and damage to his building exceeds the insurance policy limit of $218,500. Lawson Electric Company $27,000 Millwright Construction and Maintenance $26,677 Jones Construction $162,444 -7- No. 10-6459 Acuity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Frye J.D. Helton Roofing Company, Inc. $10,256 Total $226,377 Acuity at trial did not dispute the accuracy and validity of these estimates for repairing the fire damage to the insured building. Instead, Acuity concentrated its efforts on seeking to prove that Darrell Frye deliberately set fire to the building. After reviewing the evidence, the Court concludes that the jury’s verdict and award of $35,000 is unreasonable and against the clear weight of the evidence. The uncontroverted evidence established that the loss and damage to the insured building exceeded the maximum coverage limit of $218,500 in the insurance policy. A reasonable jury could not reach the verdict that the fire loss and damage to the insured building is an extremely low $35,000. The verdict of $35,000 is inadequate to compensate Darrell Frye because it is substantially less than the amount of damages that was unquestionably proved by the undisputed evidence. A new trial on the issue of damages to the building is appropriate because the jury’s award of $35,000 bears no reasonable relation to the uncontroverted evidence. The district court essentially found that because Acuity did not present its own estimates of the fire damage to the building, the Fryes’ proof with respect to damages was conclusive. In other words, if the jury found that Acuity was liable, it was required to award the Fryes damages in the amount of their estimates in the absence of any other evidence regarding the cost of repairs. On appeal, Acuity acknowledges that it did not dispute the dollar amounts of the Fryes’ estimates, but argues that “the reasonableness of the dollar amounts was clearly brought into question by the totality of the evidence presented at trial.” In particular, Acuity argues that the testimony it elicited from the Fryes’ contractors on cross-examination suggested potential bias, the Fryes’ failure to mitigate damages, and the contractors’ failure to account for pre-existing damage to the building in their estimates. All of this, Acuity argues, called the credibility of the Fryes’ contractors and the reliability of their estimates into question and provided the jury with sufficient information from which it could reasonably render a verdict in the amount of $35,000. -8- No. 10-6459 Acuity Mutual Ins. Co. v. Frye Acuity’s argument fails because there is simply no evidence in the record to support a jury verdict of $35,000. The Fryes presented evidence that the fire damage to the building totaled $226,337. While a reasonable jury could perhaps find that the Fryes were entitled to less than this, the amount of the jury’s award, to be reasonable, still must be supported by some competent, credible evidence. Acuity offered neither argument nor evidence at trial with regard to the dollar amount it would actually cost the Fryes to repair the fire damage to their building. Moreover, the verdict form gives no indication of the breakdown of the award, i.e., an explanation of how the jury arrived at the figure of $35,000. Upon review of the record, the figure appears to be arbitrary, bearing no relation to the Fryes’ estimates, which were the only evidence produced at trial of the actual cost to repair the fire damage. Thus, while Acuity may have, in the eyes of the jury, successfully discounted the reliability of the Fryes’ witnesses and evidence, it failed to produce any evidence of its own. In light of this absence of evidentiary support for the jury’s award of $35,000, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on the issue of damages to the building.