Opinion ID: 4548033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wife’s Cross-appeal

Text: Wife argues that the trial court erred in awarding her no parenting time with the children, even at a visitation center. We interpret this argument as a challenge to the court’s suspension of supervised visitation as distinct from the challenge to reimplementation of the Garber Plan discussed below. The trial court has wide discretion in matters involving parenting rights and responsibilities, and “[o]ur review is limited to determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Miller & Todd, 161 N.H. 630, 640 (2011) (quotation omitted). “This means that we review only whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will not disturb the trial court’s determination if it could reasonably be made.” Id. (quotation omitted). 12 The trial court heard testimony from the parenting coordinator regarding Wife’s previous supervised therapeutic visitation sessions with the children. Based on that testimony, the court found that, although Wife at first made progress in those sessions, she eventually “had a great deal of difficulty receiving parenting feedback” from the supervisor and the parenting coordinator and ultimately refused to work with either of them. As a result, Wife had no contact with the children from approximately June 2017 through March 2018. In March, the court appointed Tucker “to monitor therapeutic, scripted, supervised visits.” The court found that when such visitation resumed, the parties’ daughter “felt a lot of anxiety” and their son “started acting out” as seeing their mother again after a lengthy absence “was confusing and difficult for them.” That period of supervised visitation ended on May 30, 2018. Both the parenting coordinator and Husband testified that both children were doing better at the time of trial. The trial court concluded, in accordance with recommendations of the parenting coordinator and Tucker, that “therapeutically supervised visits need to stop” and that Wife “needs to refocus and work on her own issues in individual therapy.” The court stated: I find it is not in the children’s best interest to have even supervised contact with their mother until [she] can demonstrate to Tracey Tucker’s professional satisfaction that [she] has acquired the skills in individual therapy to always be present for the children in an emotionally safe capacity, on a regular and committed fashion, indefinitely. [Wife] needs to be able to demonstrate to Tracey Tucker that she is prepared to accept therapeutically supervised, scripted visitation until she has gained the right to unsupervised visits and eventually more. On our review of the record, we conclude that it “establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment” to suspend Wife’s supervised visitation. Id. Because the trial court’s determination is one that could reasonably be made, we do not disturb it. Id. Wife’s next challenge relates to the court-ordered involvement of Tucker discussed above. Wife argues that the trial court “erred in requiring [her] to demonstrate to a non-judicial third party’s . . . satisfaction that she has acquired certain skills in order to have any visitation with the children.” Wife asserts that “[p]lacing Ms. Tucker in the role of fact finder and decision maker as to how and when [she] may progress towards seeing her children constitutes an avoidance of official judicial responsibility and an impermissible delegation of it to a private citizen.” 13 Although we have never ruled on this precise issue, we have held in other contexts that judicial authority cannot be delegated to a non-judicial third party. See, e.g., State v. Canelo, 139 N.H. 376, 378-79, 382-83 (1995) (issuance of anticipatory search warrant constituted an inappropriate delegation of magistrate’s constitutional function to prosecuting authority); McMullin v. Downing, 135 N.H. 675, 680-81 (1992) (where “plaintiff object[ed] to the trial court empowering investigation by a court expert, and delegating its fact finding and decision making authority, all outside the adversary crucible,” we agreed that trial court “erred in this course of resolution”); see also Kidder v. Prescott, 24 N.H. 263, 265 (1851) (noting, in holding that magistrate could not delegate authority to sign a writ of summons, that “[w]hen the law confers upon an individual an authority to do an act, . . . in general, the power cannot be delegated to others” and that “[s]uch is the uniform rule where the exercise of the power involves the exercise of any discretion”). Courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed issues similar to the one before us “have held that the authority to determine the custody and visitation of a minor child cannot be delegated to a third party, because it is a judicial function.” Walters v. Walters, 673 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004); see also Larocka v. Larocka, 43 So. 3d 911, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that Florida appellate courts “have consistently agreed with th[e] principle” that a “trial court may not delegate its statutory authority to determine visitation to third parties”). As the Colorado Court of Appeals explained, “The statutory scheme requires that the trial court itself make decisions regarding parenting time, and it may not delegate this function to third parties.” In re D.R.V-A., 976 P.2d 881, 884 (Colo. App. 1999). We agree with the foregoing principles. It is the trial court’s responsibility, under RSA chapter 461-A, to determine parental rights and responsibilities in cases of divorce and legal separation, see RSA 461-A:3 (2018), :4, :6 (Supp. 2018), and we now hold that the court may not delegate that responsibility to a third party. Here, after suspending Wife’s “[t]herapeutic, supervised visits,” the court ordered Wife to continue her individual therapy to address issues related to the children, encouraged the children’s therapists, Wife’s therapist, and Tucker to “interact” with each other, requested Tucker “to monitor and participate in the process outlined above,” and, finally, ordered: “If and when [Wife] can demonstrate to Tracey Tucker’s professional satisfaction that both [Wife] and the children are prepared to restart their supervised, scripted visitations, Tracey Tucker shall restart the process as originally envisioned by Dr. Garber.” Although the final decree merely reinstitutes a supervised visitation plan that the trial court had already ordered (the Garber Plan), it also gives Tucker the sole discretion to determine when and if the parties would resume following that plan. We conclude that the latter aspect of the decree constitutes an improper delegation of judicial authority. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of 14 the final decree dealing with Wife’s visitation and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Wife next argues that the trial court erred in failing to bifurcate the divorce and issue temporary, as opposed to final, parenting orders. Wife notes that the final divorce decree “did not set forth a graduated parenting schedule,” but rather, utilized a reunification process “originally envisioned by [Dr.] Garber” subject to the involvement of Tucker as discussed above. (Quotation omitted.) Wife contends that “[a]s a result of the Trial Court’s failure to establish a graduated schedule, any changes in the schedule set forth in the Final Divorce Decree would require an order of modification” subject to the requirements of RSA 461-A:11 (2018). Because we vacate the visitation portion of the final decree for the reasons discussed above, we find it unnecessary to address this issue on appeal.
Finally, Wife argues that the trial court erred by “failing to make findings or provide a rationale for its orders” on the issues she now appeals. Although Wife concedes that the trial court “made findings and explained its reasons for making the unequal [property] division,” in accordance with RSA 458:16-a, IV (2018), she argues that it erred by failing to “make findings [or] provide a rationale for” its denial of her requests to “reconsider and change the orders she challenged” on reconsideration. Wife cites no authority for the proposition that a trial court that has made the requisite findings and rulings under RSA 458:16-a, IV in its final divorce decree is nevertheless also required to explain its reasoning for denying a motion to reconsider that decree. Having found no authority for such a requirement ourselves, we reject Wife’s argument on appeal. Cf. Matz v. Matz, Docket No. 298424, 2011 WL 149970, at  (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2011) (noting that “[n]o rule requires a court to state its reasons for denying a motion for reconsideration” of its custody order and distinguishing “cases cited by defendant . . . [that held] only that a trial court must make explicit findings regarding the statutory best interest factors when making its original custody determination, and not that it must repeat this procedure when faced with a motion for reconsideration”). Affirmed in part; reversed in part; vacated in part; and remanded. BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred. 15