Opinion ID: 1834705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: First, we turn to the issue of whether DMV complied with the notice requirement set forth in § 60-507(1). On February 27, 1992, DMV sent notice by certified mail to Wollenburg that his license was suspended effective March 18 for failure to establish financial responsibility. Section 60-507(1) provides in part: Notice of such suspension shall be sent by the Department of Motor Vehicles by certified mail to such operator not less than twenty days prior to the effective date of such suspension and shall state the amount required as security and the requirement of proof of financial responsibility. As stated, the return receipt bore the signature of Marie A. Wollenburg as Agent. It is Wollenburg's contention that DMV did not comply with the statutory requirement because the notice sent to him was not properly addressed and receipted. The purpose of addressing a letter is to assure that the letter is mailed to its intended receiver. Seeking a receipt for a letter is to prove that the letter was received by the intended receiver. In this case, there is absolutely no question that Wollenburg received the February 27 notice. It was sent by certified mail and receipted for by Wollenburg's mother, who had her son's permission to sign for the letter. The plain language of § 60-507(1) requires only that notice be sent by DMV by certified mail to such motor vehicle operator. It does not require that a return receipt be requested. Moreover, notice may be waived in writing or may be implied from unequivocal conduct. Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251, 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974). In Versch, this court held that the voluntary appearance by the city of Omaha when it was joined in the action and filed a petition was an unequivocal waiver of notice. Here, the record is clear that Wollenburg filed suit in the district court on March 19, the day after DMV's suspension of his license became effective. In doing so, Wollenburg waived any defect in service of the notice that DMV had suspended his driver's license by his unequivocal act of appealing that decision to the district court. Wollenburg also challenges the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act as not complying with the Due Process Clauses of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Nebraska. It is Wollenburg's contention that by not requiring a hearing at the departmental level at which the licensee may present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, the licensee's due process rights are not protected. Wollenburg relies upon the safeguards set forth in this state's Administrative Procedure Act. This reliance is misplaced. Section 60-503(2) provides that [t]he appeal procedures described in the Administrative Procedure Act shall not apply to this [appeal procedure] section. Wollenburg also relies upon Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that Georgia's motor vehicle responsibility law failed to provide an uninsured motorist procedural due process. The Court held that before a state may deprive a motorist of his driver's license and vehicle registration, a state must provide a forum for the determination of the question and a meaningful hearing `appropriate to the nature of the case.' 402 U.S. at 542, 91 S.Ct. at 1591. Following the Burson opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court found, in Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 180, 30 L.Ed.2d 146 (1971), that the district court afforded the appellant procedural due process when it stayed the suspension order of the director of Utah's financial responsibility division pending completion of judicial review, and provided a hearing at which the appellant was afforded the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. In this case, Wollenburg's due process rights were similarly protected. He was given adequate notice, the suspension of his driver's license was stayed, and he was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses at the hearing held in the district court for Gage County prior to the final suspension of his license. Under these circumstances, Wollenburg was afforded due process as required by Burson and Jennings. The due process requirements of Nebraska's Constitution are similar to those of the federal Constitution. Finally, we turn to whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the DMV transcript. Our holding in Hehn v. State, 206 Neb. 34, 290 N.W.2d 813 (1980), is dispositive of this issue. In that case, we stated: It is elementary that, if the District Court is to determine whether the director's action was correct and if the director is required by [§ 60-507(3) ] to consider all such reports and information filed in connection with the accident, then the record made before the director must be available to the District Court. To hold otherwise would ... in effect, be requiring the court to review a record without permitting that record to be admitted into evidence.... The fact is that the record made before the director is admissible as evidence in the District Court because [§ 60-507(3) ] plainly suggests that it is admissible. 206 Neb. at 36, 290 N.W.2d at 814-15. See, also, Wroblewski v. Pearson, 210 Neb. 82, 85, 313 N.W.2d 231, 233 (1981) (citing Hehn and holding that `[u]pon a petition for review of an order of suspension of an operator's license by the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, the District Court is required to consider the record made before the director'). Wollenburg's complaint concerning the district court's admitting the DMV transcript into evidence is without merit. In addition to considering the transcript of the DMV's proceedings, the district court must give the appellant who is challenging the suspension of his driver's license an opportunity to adduce evidence. Moreover, the district court must consider any additional facts developed in the hearing before that court. See, Hehn v. State, supra ; Berg v. Pearson, 199 Neb. 390, 259 N.W.2d 275 (1977). Wollenburg's appeal in the district court was conducted in accordance with these principles. The issue before DMV is whether the evidence supports a finding that there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment. Wroblewski v. Pearson, supra . The scope of review of cases of this nature is a review of DMV's determination that there exists a reasonable possibility of a judgment. Id. It is uncontroverted in the evidence that at the time of the accident, Wollenburg was operating his pickup with only one lighted headlight and that he drove the pickup into a BN railroad car at a crossing on a county road after several railroad cars had already passed. The train was either moving slowly, at approximately 10 miles per hour, as indicated by a state patrolman's report, or stopped entirely, as reported by Wollenburg himself. The record does not reveal any obstructions which would have affected a driver's view at the time of the collision. Wollenburg was given an opportunity at the hearing in district court to rebut the facts set forth in the reports but presented no evidence contradicting them. In Crewdson v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 234 Neb. 631, 452 N.W.2d 270 (1990), we held that a motorist approaching a railroad crossing has a duty to look and listen at a time and place when looking and listening will be effective to prevent an accident. Such motorist also has a duty to stop when a reasonably prudent person would have considered a stop necessary under the circumstances. Id. Moreover, a driver ordinarily has a duty to drive an automobile on a public street at night in such a manner that he or she can stop in time to avoid a collision with an object within the area lighted by his or her vehicle's headlights, and the driver is negligent if he or she fails to do so. See Mantz v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 228 Neb. 447, 422 N.W.2d 797 (1988). It is not the function of the Director of Motor Vehicles to weigh the alleged negligence or comparative negligence of the parties involved but to determine, based on reports, whether a reasonable possibility of liability exists. The facts contained in the reports before the director support a finding of a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against Wollenburg. In the case at bar, the director considered the reports made in connection with the accident. Wollenburg was required to file an accident report form with DMV, and his report failed to set forth any figure for damages for which he might be liable. Therefore, the only estimate before the director was that of the state patrolman. The patrolman's estimate of the property damage to the railroad was $10,000, the amount the director set for the required security. The evidence presented to the district court did not contradict the patrolman's estimate. Therefore, DMV and the district court could properly conclude that there was a reasonable possibility of a $10,000 judgment against Wollenburg.