Opinion ID: 2604128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Hylton's Responsibility for Mistrial

Text: The state claims that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct calculated to necessitate the granting of a mistrial. An important factor to be considered is the need to hold litigants on both sides to standards of responsible professional conduct in the clash of an adversary criminal process. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485-86, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557-58, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). A defendant who actively engages in a course of conduct calculated to necessitate the granting of a mistrial, but who does not actually request a mistrial, is similarly barred from relying on a double jeopardy defense at a second trial. McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1151 (5th Cir.1973). If the act of a defendant aborts a trial, he or she should not be allowed to erect a constitutional shelter based on double jeopardy by frustrating the trial. People v. Paquette, 31 N.Y.2d 379, 339 N.Y.S.2d 959, 292 N.E.2d 17 (N.Y. 1972). Defendant should not benefit from difficulties of his own creation. Id. The record does not support a finding that the defense counsel engaged in a course of conduct calculated to necessitate a mistrial. Hylton's constitutional right not to be put in jeopardy twice precludes further prosecution against him of the alleged offenses. We hereby order that an appropriate writ of prohibition be issued.