Opinion ID: 1953412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sales Agreement

Text: Within a few months, Jenkins secured a buyer, Jacqueline Brooks, who offered to purchase the property for $130,000, an offer that Benjamin accepted on behalf of William. Benjamin testified that not only had Jenkins never presented him with a listing agreement, but he had also never seen what was produced at trial as the sales contract for the property until after the sale, when the attorney that he had hired to look into this matter showed it to him. Like the listing agreement, Jenkins was unable to produce the sales contract used as the basis for the settlement and testified that he was unsure that he had ever given a copy of it to Benjamin. To explain his inability to produce either the listing agreement or the sales contract, Jenkins asserted that before this lawsuit was filed, all of his documents and other papers had been destroyed by tenants living in one of his rental properties. Indeed, he testified that they threw all [his] records away, threw everything in the house out. In its order, the trial court specifically rejected that testimony, noting: The Court sees no reason why tenants would destroy a landlord's personal records and rejects this bald assertion as incredible. Additionally, the Court notes that the manner in which Mr. Jenkins delivered this statement demonstrated his own lack of belief in these words. [Order at 2, n. 3] While no listing agreement was ever produced, a copy of the sales contract was located in the files of CV Title Group, a real estate title and settlement company located in Silver Spring, Maryland, that had handled the settlement. Following Jenkins' original testimony, Evans, the Strausses' expert, testified that the standard of practice in the real estate business is that the seller (or the person holding the seller's power of attorney) must sign a sales contract. As he explained, it is generally the agent who will prepare the sales contract and who has the responsibility to explain the terms and conditions of the sale to the seller. The sales contract, dated April 10, 1998, bears what purports to be the signatures of the buyer, Jacqueline Brooks, as well as of William Strauss and Benjamin Strauss. Jenkins Realty was listed as the real estate agent and Jenkins admitted that Jenkins Realty was synonymous with him. Benjamin testified that the signatures of himself and his brother at the bottom of this contract were invalid. As he explained with respect to William's signature, First thing, he was in a [nursing] home at that time. And also, he doesn't write his name in that manner right there. He doesn't write it W-I-L-L-I-A-M. He writes his name W-m. D. Strauss. . . . That's not his signature at all. Benjamin also testified that he took no papers to William for his signature. As he put it, My brother was not able to sign anything. He was in a home and he had Alzheimer's a few years. So, I wouldn't take any papers to him for him to sign anything. With respect to his own signature, he testified that it was not his signature either, clarifying, I don't make H's that way. I don't make my J's that way. And I don't make my N's. . . . That's not my signature. In addition to what Evans testified were standard terms for such a sales contract, the contract included several terms that he described as not being standard. First, the contract provided, Seller agrees to pay Purchaser[']s accounts with Sears, Wards and Norwest in full. Benjamin testified that he never agreed to this provision. Indeed, as Evans testified, the provision for payment of Brooks' outstanding accounts was not in accord with real estate standards, particularly since it was open ended and had no cap on the amount of money the seller might have to pay. Under this provision, Evans explained, Brooks could have incurred substantial additional obligations to Sears, Wards and Norwest between the date the sales contract was signed (April 10, 1998) and the date of settlement (May 26, 1998), and William, despite his costly medical needs, would have had to pay them from the proceeds of the sale. In fact, he ultimately did pay these accounts from the proceeds. The sales agreement also included a term that the seller agrees to pay 6% of sales price toward costs. Benjamin testified that he never would have agreed to take money from the proceeds of the sale of William's home to pay Brooks' consumer accounts, nor to allow 6% of the sales price to be applied to her costs. In fact, Benjamin testified that if Jenkins could not secure a buyer without such terms, then he would not sell and would find another agent/broker, since both brothers were elderly and William was in a nursing home needing care. The contract also provided: The purchaser is to assume, give, place, take title subject to, a first deed of trust secured on the premises of 4247 Nash Street, N.E. in the amount of . . . $97,500. Further, it provided that [t]he balance of deferred purchase money is to be secured by a second deed of trust on sale property, to be paid in monthly installments . . . per agreement between Seller and Purchaser. Ultimately, the second deed of trust placed on the Nash Street house was for $32,500, an amount that was deducted from the proceeds of the sale. Benjamin testified that he had never agreed to this trust being placed on the Nash Street house. Moreover, he testified that had he known that Jenkins was not able to arrange a sale that resulted in receiving the proceeds from the house in a lump sum  that is, all cash  he would have gone to a different agent given the needs of his brother. As the expert Evans testified, if there is a trust, it is not an all cash transaction.