Opinion ID: 184636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Chedick's Cross-Appeal

Text: 1. Exclusion of Evidence Concerning Emotional Distressand Attorneys' Fees At the trial, the district court prohibited Ms. Chedick fromintroducing evidence of either the attorneys' fees she hadincurred or the mental anguish she had suffered as a consequence of Capital City's conduct. Ms. Chedick contends thatshe should have been allowed to present both types of evidence in support of her claim for punitive damages. CapitalCity argues that the district court correctly applied the Rulesof Evidence to bar her from introducing such evidence. Wereview the district court's decision to exclude evidence forabuse of discretion. See United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257,267 (D.C. Cir. 1994). When Ms. Chedick sought to testify about the amount ofher attorneys' fees, Capital City objected on the ground thatshe had not provided any discovery or any exhibits on that. The court sustained the objection. Because Ms. Chedickfailed to produce documentary evidence in support of herclaim, the court's exclusion of her testimony was not an abuseof discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (mandatingdisclosure of a computation of any category of damagesclaimed by the disclosing party); Fed. R. Evid. 801(a)-(c),802 (hearsay). The district court also sustained Capital City's objection toMs. Chedick's testifying to her emotional distress. The courtstated: I'm not going to let you pursue [emotional damages], then. What I will do is ... if early next week you're [Ms. Chedick's counsel] going to find something about emotional damages being recoverable, even though there's no specific claim in the complaint, a separate claim in the complaint about it, I may let you reopen with this plaintiff [Ms. Chedick] to have to go on the witness stand.... But at the moment, I'm sustaining the objection. Ms. Chedick did not seek to reopen the court's ruling andfailed to present any legal arguments in support of her rightto present evidence of emotional distress in support of a claimfor punitive damages. In her opening appellate brief, however, she argues that emotional damages may be introduced tosupport a claim for punitive damages. By failing to presentthose arguments to the district court, Ms. Chedick forfeitedher opportunity to present them on appeal. Singleton v.Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). In her reply brief, Ms. Chedick attempts to defend herright to testify concerning her attorneys' fees and emotionaldistress by pointing out that these issues were noted in themagistrate judge's pretrial order. See United States v.Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 315 (1960) (That pretrial order, asauthorized by Rule 16, conclusively established the issues offact and law in the case....); Smith v. Washington Shera- ton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Johnson v.Geffen, 294 F.2d 197, 199-200 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Because shemade this argument for the first time in her reply brief, it isforfeited. See McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding argumentsfirst raised in reply brief are forfeited). Under the circumstances, the district court's exclusion of Ms. Chedick's testimony concerning these matters was not an abuse of discretion. 2. Damage Award Both Ms. Chedick and Capital City agree that the districtcourt erred when it reduced aggregate damages by $42,000,the amount of the loan, without addressing the value ofCapital City's remaining lien on the property. Ms. Chedickseeks to have the computation of the lien remanded to thedistrict court. Capital City claims that no remand is necessary but that we should offer Ms. Chedick the choice betweeneither a judgment of $123,097.85 (which the jury evidently accepted as the amount due on the note) with the propertysubject to a lien in the same amount or an offset of$123,097.85 against the original jury verdict with the propertyfree and clear of the lien. Because Capital City did not file across-claim for enforcement of its lien, that remedy is notproperly before us, and we decline to consider that element ofCapital City's argument. The jury apparently awarded Ms. Chedick $123,097.85 onthe basis of her exhibit XXX, which was a Capital City ledgerstatement indicating that she owed that amount on the mortgage as of May 15, 1996. At the trial, however, Capital City'sattorney claimed that $97,000 was sufficient to cover theprincipal and interest due on the note, as well as taxes andinsurance and foreclosure costs. While it is apparent that thejury intended to award Ms. Chedick the amount then owingon the note, there appears to be some question as to whatwas actually owed. We therefore vacate the award of compensatory damages for fraud and remand it to the districtcourt for a determination of the amount due on the mortgage. As there is no dispute that Ms. Chedick received $42,000 fromCapital City at the outset, she has had the benefit of thatpayment. Therefore, in awarding compensatory damages onremand, the district court should again subtract $42,000 fromwhat it finds to have been due.