Opinion ID: 836142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Victim-Impact Evidence

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting victim-impact evidence in the form of a statement that the victims' mother had read to the jury during the penalty phase. At the outset of the proceedings, the law did not provide specifically for the admission of victim-impact evidence during the penalty phase of an aggravated murder trial. See ORS 163.150 (1993) (outlining penalty-phase procedures prior to allowance of victim-impact evidence consideration by Oregon juries). Thus, the trial court granted defendant's motion to limit victim-impact evidence and ordered the state to notify defendant of any victim-impact evidence that it intended to present. Defendant's motion did not raise any federal or state issues regarding prohibitions on ex post facto laws. Effective July 7, 1995, the legislature amended ORS 163.150(1)(a) to permit a jury to consider, during the penalty phase, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family[.] State v. Hayward, 327 Or. 397, 412, 963 P.2d 667 (1998). As a result of the legislature's enactment of the new statute, the trial court reversed its prior ruling and decided to permit the state to offer victim impact evidence. In accordance with that ruling, the state offered a written statement from the victims' mother that the defense had reviewed. The victims' mother read the following statement to the jury: Jeffrey Ray Brown, 23 and a half years, Dale Archie Brown, 22 years, I had the privilege of being their mother. Jeffrey was my first born, my obedient child. After all, he was told to get off the table before he fell and broke something in our nursery, so he did fall off the table and [break] his arm. Dale was my baby. My loving child. He would be outside playing, suddenly stop, come running inside to say, `Mommy, I love you,' and run back outside to continue to play. They will never marry, have children, grow old. They will walk with God forever. They made that choice as young children. I will miss seeing them grow, but this I know, I will be with them in God's good time. Jeffrey Ray Brown, 23 and a half years, Dale Archie Brown, 22 years, I had the privilege of being their mother. This past year at family gatherings as I listened to my sister-in-law talking about their daughters-in-law, grandchildren, and even a great grandchild, I delighted in hearing the stories and I hope they will always continue. And yet at the same time I was greatly saddened as I will never enjoy the pleasure of a daughter-in-law. I will never enjoy the pleasure of a grandchild and I will never enjoy the pleasure of a great grandchild. Mr. Terry, you took those opportunities from me when you murdered my sons, Jeffrey and Dale. During this past year, as my brothers and I rallied around my mother to lend her emotional and physical support in dealing with her first year as a widow, I was pleased and proud of our willing ability to do so, and yet at the same time I was greatly saddened as I realized that when either my husband or I reached that stage in life, we will be truly alone, no children to lift us up as my brothers and I lifted my mother. Mr. Terry you have taken that from us when you murdered our sons, Jeffrey and Dale. Afterwards, defendant renewed his objection to the victim impact testimony: I believe that earlier in the case that there was a motion regarding victim impact. I am certainly aware of the recent statute. We'll stand on our previous objections over the impact. The trial court then overruled the objection in light of the amended statute. On appeal, defendant maintains that the victim impact evidence at trial violated the ex post facto prohibitions set out in Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, [8] and Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution. [9] The ex post facto clause of the Oregon Constitution, for example, forbids the retroactive application of certain types of criminal statutes. See generally State v. Fugate, 332 Or. 195, 211, 26 P.3d 802 (2001) (discussing doctrine). In this instance, however, defendant failed to preserve the issue for review, because he made no objection in the trial court that referred to either the federal or state ex post facto doctrine. [10] Ordinarily, this court will not consider any matter assigned as error unless it was preserved in the lower court. ORAP 5.45(4)(a); see State v. Montez, 324 Or. 343, 356, 927 P.2d 64 (1996) (claim of error not preserved when defendant failed to object to testimony on grounds asserted on appeal). Indeed, defendant admits that [i]t does not appear on the record    that defendant specifically asserted that application of the 1995 version of ORS 163.150 violated the ex post facto provisions of the Oregon and U.S. Constitutions. Defendant suggests, without citing a basis in the record, that the issue may have been raised off the record. This court, however, will not look outside the record to find objections. We also reject defendant's alternative argument that his more generalized objections preserved the issue for review, when those objections did not include a citation or other reference either to Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, or to Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution, or otherwise suggest that applying the new statute somehow was constitutionally impermissible. Defendant failed to preserve the ex post facto issue. See State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 188, 766 P.2d 373 (1988) (stressing justifications for raising issues before trial court). Defendant next requests that this court review his ex post facto arguments as error apparent on the face of the record. Even if a party fails to preserve a claim of error, appellate courts nonetheless possess discretion to consider it if it is plain error, also known as error `apparent on the face of the record.' State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or. 431, 435-36, 7 P.3d 522 (2000). The elements of error apparent on the face of the record are that: (1) the error is one of law; (2) the point of law is obvious, i.e., is not reasonably in dispute; and (3) the error is not one respecting which the court must go outside the record or select among competing inferences. Lotches, 331 Or. at 472, 17 P.3d 1045. [11] The first and third elements are present here, because the issue is whether the mother's testimony should have been admitted into evidence. Thus, the only issue is whether the error was obvious, assuming that admitting the evidence in question was error at all. At the time of trial in this matter, and even now, the purported error is not obvious. Ex post facto claims frequently require an intricate constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Fugate, 332 Or. at 211, 26 P.3d 802 (engaging in ex post facto analysis). When the victims' mother testified in October 1995, no case from this court or the Court of Appeals had determined whether the retroactive application of a statute permitting victim-impact evidence at trial would violate either Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution, or Article I, section 10, of the United States Constitution. The first such case was not decided until four years later. See State v. Metz, 162 Or.App. 448, 461, 986 P.2d 714 (1999) (1995 revision to ORS 163.150 fundamentally changed what evidence may be relevant to the issue before the jury and thus violated the ex post facto provision of Article I, section 21, of the Oregon Constitution). Deciding whether an error even occurred would require this court to engage in the same kind of extensive analysis that the Court of Appeals undertook in Metz. As a result, we conclude that the alleged error is not obvious. Defendant failed to preserve his ex post facto argument for purposes of appeal, and we decline to address that argument as error apparent on the face of the record.