Opinion ID: 2396134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Purpose and Scope of Regulation 5014

Text: The ethics commission assumed and advocated in its brief to this Court that the framers of the 1986 State Constitution intended to empower the commission to adopt regulations to prevent abuses and misuses of public office and to target the abuses when legislators serve on or appoint members to governmental public boards, commissions, or agencies. The commission further asserted that all such boards, commissions, and agencies are in reality executive agencies, excepting those that function solely in an advisory capacity or exercise legislative functions exclusively, and that appointments thereto can be made only by the Governor as chief executive. We should first note that if Regulation 5014 is valid, it would have the unexpected consequence of declaring the membership of the ethics commission itself illegal and violative of the proposed regulation. It is undisputed that the ethics commission consists of nine members. Four of these members are appointed by the Governor without participation by any other body, and five of the members are appointed by the Governor from lists submitted by the leadership of the General Assembly. Section 36-14-8(a). In In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 17, we deemed this method of appointment salutary as well as valid: The sharing of appointment responsibilities over a majority of members ensures fair consideration and independence should the commission be called upon to investigate officials responsible for their appointment. In making this observation, we cited the case of Parcell v. State, 228 Kan. 794, 620 P.2d 834 (1980), in which the Supreme Court of Kansas approved the appointment of members of an ethics commission, consisting of eleven members, of which five were appointed by the governor, and the remainder were appointed by the Legislature. The Kansas Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine of separation of powers admits to some extent the blend of powers and concluded that the appointment of the majority of the commission members by the Legislature did not usurp the executive power of appointment. Id. at 837. This opinion by the Kansas Supreme Court assumed that the doctrine of separation of powers generally existed in that jurisdiction. It appears somewhat paradoxical that the ethics commission's regulation prohibiting the service by members of the General Assembly upon a public board and prohibiting General Assembly participation in the appointment except through advice and consent would, wittingly or not, subject its own status to immediate challenge as invalidly composed. Our colleague, who writes separately, suggests that the ethics commission would not fit within the definition of an executive board or agency. With this assertion we must vigorously disagree. It is the function of the commission to receive and investigate complaints. If probable cause is found, the commission through its executive director will prosecute the complaint before members of the commission. This function is clearly executive and is remarkably similar to the functions performed by the Attorney General or public prosecutors in other states who would clearly fall within the executive branch. The commission then adjudicates the complaint and thus performs a judicial function, though subject to review by the courts. Therefore, the ethics commission combines the functions of a legislative body in adopting and promulgating an ethical code, of an executive body in prosecuting violations of the code, and of a judicial body in adjudicating alleged violations. If our colleague's suggestion were to be accepted and Regulation 5014 were approved, the ethics commission would also sit as a continuing constitutional convention in which capacity it would have the power to alter the structure of government to comport with its views in respect to the type of governmental structure least likely to give rise to ethical problems. We are of the opinion that the people of this state in adopting the 1986 Constitution had no intention of creating a body so limitless in its power as to constitute a paramount fourth branch of government. Moreover, Regulation 5014, if authorized by our Constitution, would invalidate scores of other boards and commissions that currently exist and perform a number of important and sometimes vital functions. The number of public boards whose composition would be invalidated by this regulation cannot be precisely ascertained, but the briefs filed by certain amici estimate the number as ranging from 65 to 140. See post. This regulation, then, would have a sweeping effect and would create a wall of separation high and impenetrable between the appointment power of the Executive and the power of the Legislature. Could such a wall be justified by our case law and constitutional history, especially given that the 1986 State Constitution delegated to the commission only specific, limited ethics authority, taken from the otherwise vast panoply of rights and powers that for centuries has been vouchsafed in the General Assembly? Indeed, article 6, section 10, of the 1986 Constitution specifically reaffirms the General Assembly's unfettered right and power to continue to exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution. See also Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, 567 A.2d 358, 361 (R.I. 1989). In Kass, we began our analysis by reenunciating a principle expounded by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349, 41 S.Ct. 506, 507, 65 L. Ed. 963, 983 (1921), `[A] page of history is worth a volume of logic' in determining the extent of state as well as federal constitutional limitations. Kass, 567 A.2d at 360. We went on to address the historic power of the Rhode Island General Assembly: Historically, the power of the General Assembly in this state, as in other states, has been plenary and unlimited, save as this authority may have been limited by the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d at 553; Opinion to the Governor, 101 R.I. 203, 206, 221 A.2d 799, 801 (1966); Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 31 R.I. 295, 315, 77 A. 145, 153 (1910). It has been set forth in Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., supra , that from the granting of the charter of King Charles II, July 8, 1663, to the date of the acknowledgment of our independence by the British Crown, the Rhode Island Legislature possessed the complete powers conferred by the royal charter and thereafter from the time of independence the Legislature had the combined powers of crown and Parliament, which included all attributes of sovereign authority. Id. After May 29, 1790, when this state in convention ratified the Federal Constitution, those powers were limited by that Constitution. Thereafter, until May 1843, the Legislature retained all residual powers of sovereignty, save those delegated to the federal government. Id. at 315, 77 A. at 153-54. In 1843 these powers were again diminished by limitations set forth in our State Constitution. Unlike the United States Congress, the Rhode Island General Assembly does not look to our State Constitution for grants of power. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d at 553; Payne & Butler, 31 R.I. at 316, 77 A. at 154. Accordingly, this court has consistently adhered to the view that the General Assembly possessed ` all of the powers inhering in sovereignty other than those which the constitution textually commits to the other branches of our state government and that those that are not so committed    are powers reserved to the general assembly.' Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 525-26, 238 A.2d 758, 762 (1968). The 1986 electorate reaffirmed the plenary legislative power of the Rhode Island General Assembly, as encapsulated in art. VI, sec. 10: `The general assembly shall continue to exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution.' (Emphasis added.) This provision must be construed to constitute a reaffirmation of the powers historically exercised by the Legislature under the prior constitution. Kass, 567 A.2d at 360-61. In recognition of the centuries-old historic and constitutional origins of the General Assembly's recognized authority to make appointments  authority that Regulation 5014 now seeks to remove from the General Assembly and relocate exclusively in the executive department of our state government  we begin with a brief summary of the structure of early government of Rhode Island. [2] The royal charter obtained from Charles II of England by Dr. John Clarke of Newport in 1663 delegated virtually unlimited power to govern to the General Assembly. A portion of that power was often utilized by the General Assembly to appoint persons, including from its own membership, to various ad hoc committees to address colonial administrative governmental functions and needs. For 170 years under the charter government, the governor, deputy governor, and ten assistants, were engaged in legislative affairs as the Upper House of the General Assembly, while the deputies from the various towns constituted the Lower House. Charter of King Charles II (July 8, 1663) reprinted in Rhode Island Manual 108 (1994). These officials also engaged in judicial affairs as the Superior Court of Judicature. Id.; Chief Justice Edmund W. Flynn, Judicial History in Rhode Island, in 1 West's Rhode Island Digest XV-XVI (1952). The governor was a member of the Legislature and served in a limited executive capacity, whereas the General Assembly exercised legislative power, judicial power, and unlimited power of appointment. In its legislative capacity, the General Assembly was immune even from veto power by the governor, and more important, the Crown retained no discretionary power to repeal laws made in this colony. Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations in New England, vol. IV, 461 (John Russell Bartlett ed.1859). So long as the laws were not contrary to, but were agreeable to the laws of England, the General Assembly's power was untrammeled: In this charter, no negative voice is given to the Governor, nor any power reserved to the crown of approving or disapproving the laws to be made in this colony. Id. In 1841 when our first state Constitution was proposed and drafted, its convention members elected to continue to vest in the now constitution-based General Assembly all of the powers it had exercised to that point, unless prohibited by the Constitution. R.I. Const. art. 6, sec. 10. This Court later assessed those powers to be not simply the authority of the English crown emanating from the 1663 royal charter, but of both crown and parliament, except so far as it has been limited by the Constitution of the State, or by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Clarke v. City of Providence, 16 R.I. 337, 341, 15 A. 763, 765 (1888). We particularly note that the drafters of our first state Constitution opted not to include in the proposed 1842 Constitution any provision such as that found in Article I, section 6, of the Federal Constitution prohibiting dual office holding or some of the appointments contemplated by Regulation 5014. Instead, the 1842 convention delegates chose to recommend what would be later ratified as article 9, section 6, of the Constitution, a section that did not prohibit dual office holding. Cf. Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 15-16, 186 A. 832, 841 (1936) (Landholders Constitution rejected rigid separation of powers formulation). Although the complete commingling of governmental duties was significantly modified after the May 1843 effective date of the Constitution and by the case of G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856), the Legislature continued to exercise substantial executive functions by electing all judicial officers as well as many officers who might be considered part of the executive branch. Moreover, legislative appointment of executive-type boards has been a long-standing practice in this state even under the first Constitution as early as 1844, when the Legislature appointed all members of the board of railroad commissioners as well as virtually all other state officers. P.L. 1844, § 6 at 339. Thus, Rhode Island's history is that of a quintessential system of parliamentary supremacy. The parliamentary system of government obtains throughout much of the continent of Europe and in over fifty countries throughout the world. In Great Britain, for example, the Prime Minister (the equivalent of our executive), who is a member of Parliament and plays a leading role in parliamentary proceedings, must be approved by the House of Commons (the Legislature) and may be forced to resign at any time by a vote of no confidence by the Commons. Sydney D. Bailey, British Parliamentary Democracy 8, 22-23 (2d ed.1964). Governmental power is placed in the hands of members of the cabinet (executive officers) who are nominated by the Prime Minister from among the members of the House of Commons and House of Lords. William A. Robson, The British System of Government 21-22 (1940). Acting on the advice of the Prime Minister and The Lord Chancellor, the queen appoints all High Court judges. The Lord Chancellor serves as head of the Judiciary as well as The Speaker of The House of Lords. L.W. White & W.D. Hussey, Government in Great Britain, The Empire and the Commonwealth 128-29 (1958); Bailey, at 170. The highest court in Great Britain is the High Court of Parliament which exercises its power through The House of Lords. White & Hussey, at 133. While this system is completely different from the structure adopted by the framers of our federal Constitution, such statesmen as William Gladstone, Benjamin Disraeli, and Winston Churchill would have been horrified at the suggestion that the British government was structurally unethical. The question of the structure of the government is not an ethical question, but a constitutional one. It has been suggested that the people of Rhode Island rebelled from a parliamentary system at the time of the Revolution. Nothing could be further from historical fact. Rhode Island not only did not rebel from a parliamentary system, it retained the charter which created such a system from 1776 until 1843, a period of sixty-seven years. The parliamentary system was modified in 1843 so that ultimately the judicial power was declared separate in the famous case of G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856). In that opinion, in which Chief Justice Ames declared the judicial power to be independent from interference by the General Assembly, he stated: the executive power had been nominal, merely, under the charter; and the constitution extends it very little. Id. at 349-50. It is notable that the Constitution of 1843, just as did the Constitution of 1986 by specific provision, authorized the General Assembly to continue exercising the powers that to that time were exercised under the charter form of government. R.I. Const. art. 6, sec. 10. Consequently, given the affirmative grant of such power in the Constitution, the General Assembly could exercise and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries did exercise its appointive power in respect to members of the Supreme Court until the adoption of article 10, section 4, in 1994, and in respect to administrative agencies, until the present time. The General Assembly elected judges of the Superior Court from the time of the court's establishment in 1905 until the power of appointment was conferred upon the governor by P.L. 1935, ch. 2254, § 7. The General Assembly also elected judges of the District Court from the time of that court's founding in 1886 until the power of appointment was conferred upon the governor by statute in P.L. 1935, ch. 2253, § 1. Both statutes provided for appointment of these judges by the governor with advice and consent of the Senate. Thus, the appointive power of the General Assembly continued well into the 20th century. Rhode Island's tradition of legislative supremacy has been modified significantly by the Legislature itself, but rarely as a result of constitutional limitations as occurred with the adoption of article 10, section 4, in 1994. The framers of our Constitution in 1842 and in 1986 have treated the executive power quite differently than did the framers of the federal Constitution. First, they included no specific appointment clause similar to that contained in the federal Constitution. Secondly, they deliberately fragmented and distributed the executive power among four elected general officers. The Governor is designated as Chief Executive. However, the Attorney General exercises the vast powers of public prosecution, which under the federal Constitution are implemented by a presidentially appointed Attorney General. The Secretary of State exercises a significant number of executive functions, including the implementation of election statutes, the keeping of records, the oversight of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the promulgation of a myriad of reports. The General Treasurer is the custodian of the funds of the state and also performs a number of executive functions relating to investments, management of the victims' indemnity program, and a number of other duties which would be performed in the federal system by an official appointed by the President. An amendment to include specific language curbing the well-known appointive power of the General Assembly was proposed at the Constitutional Convention of 1986 (convention), only to be tabled in committee. Constitutional Convention Committee on Ethics, minutes of May 22, 1986, at 89. In light of this governmental history, it seems very doubtful indeed that the convention intended to confer upon the ethics commission the power to amend the constitutional framework of government when the convention itself was unwilling to do so. It is far more reasonable to infer from the proceedings of the convention that the ethics commission was designed to deal with individual conduct and not governmental structure. We view the authority conferred by article 3, section 8, of the 1986 State Constitution as empowering the ethics commission to draft, adopt, and enforce ethics codes that proscribe certain conduct by state and local government personnel subject to its regulation. That, in our considered opinion, is the Constitution's delineated charge from the people to the commission. In order to enable the commission to effectively carry out that charge, the Constitution also provides that the General Assembly enact legislation to establish the commission on a non-partisan basis and delegate to the commission authority to investigate violations of any code it might promulgate, along with authority to impose penalties for violations thereof. This charge was fulfilled by the Legislature through the enactment of G.L. 1956 §§ 36-14-12, 36-14-13, and 36-14-14. If and when any legislator who presently serves on, or who in the future may serve on, any governmental public board, commission, or agency is charged with or suspected of any conduct amounting to or resulting in a conflict of interest, the commission has clear authorization pursuant to article 3, section 8, and §§ 36-14-12 and 36-14-13 to investigate, charge, and try that legislator or any other board, commission, or agency member or any public employee for having allegedly engaged in prohibited conduct under the code of ethics. In such a case, a hearing must be conducted in accordance with the procedural safeguards set forth in § 36-14-13. If the commission should find that the code of ethics has been violated, the commission can then enter a cease and desist order against the violator, impose a civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each violation, refer the matter to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution if appropriate, § 36-14-13, or finally, remove the violator from his or her public office or position pursuant to § 36-14-14. [3] Nothing contained in article 3, section 8, of the 1986 Constitution authorizes or empowers the ethics commission to adopt a regulation that presumes and predetermines a priori, without any evidence of violation and without providing a hearing, that every member of the General Assembly who now serves or will in the future serve on any public board, commission, or agency, or who has nominated, or who hereafter should nominate any person for appointment to such governmental entity is automatically guilty of a conflict of interest or abuse of position. Moreover, nothing contained in article 3, section 8, authorizes the ethics commission, acting solely upon a predetermined assessment that a conflict of interest exists, to impose as a penalty the global exclusion of General Assembly members from all public governmental boards, commissions, and agencies. Neither does article 3, section 8, authorize the commission to remove from the General Assembly all power to appoint persons  including legislators  to public governmental boards, agencies, and commissions. The regulation before us is violative of at least two basic constitutional principles. The first is the basic constitutional right to which all persons including members of the General Assembly are entitled. A state regulation that assumes and prejudges the guilt of a particular class or segment of persons who are subject to the regulation is not valid. We continue to honor the ancient and venerable principle of justice that is firmly embedded in our state's jurisprudence, which proclaims that a person's innocence is presumed until proven otherwise before an impartial tribunal. We believe that members of the General Assembly, contrary to what the ethics commission's Regulation 5014 appears to presume, remain within the class of our citizenry who are entitled to the benefit of that venerable presumption. The ethics commission cannot relegate legislators  and only legislators  to the category of status offenders. We are not alone in commenting on the regulation's self-executing presumption of universal conflict of interest and conclusive guilt based on status as a legislator. On August 9, 1996, Professor Hazard, prior to the commission's adoption of Regulation 5014, advised the chairperson of the ethics commission, in pertinent part as follows: In my opinion proposed Section 5013A [enacted as Regulation 5014] exceeds the authority conferred on the Commission by the Rhode Island Constitution. If that authority is challenged in legal proceedings, as it may well be, the Rhode Island Supreme Court could reach the same conclusion.    In arriving at this opinion I have reviewed the text of the enabling Constitutional provision, set forth above: the discussions of this provision in the convention at which it was adopted; the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, In Re Opinion to the Governor: M.P. 91-577, 612 A.2d 1 (1992); the comments submitted to the Ethics Commission concerning proposed Sections 5013 and 5013A; and certain other materials provided to me by [the commission's legal counsel]. Proposed Section 5013A addresses the problems of ethics in government in terms of a prophylactic restriction rather than a prohibition or limitation on specified types of conduct. That is, proposed Section 5013A debars a member of the Assembly from assuming a position on quasi-public boards from which the member could engage in ethically improper conduct, without regard to whether the member actually engages in such conduct. In contrast, proposed Section 5013 defines various kinds of ethically improper conduct on the part of members of the Assembly and prohibits them from engaging in such conduct. In my opinion there is a great difference in the concept of such a prophylactic restriction and the concept of specific prohibitions, particularly where the prophylactic restriction is applicable to elected legislative representatives. The text of article 3, Section 8, [of the R.I. Constitution] empowers the Commission to address `conflicts of interest, confidential information, use of position, contracts with government agencies and financial disclosure.' These are categories familiar in the field of government and professional ethics. As such they are the basis of prohibitions, limitations and requirements of disclosure in ethical codes and statutes adopted at various levels of government in this country. In connection with proposed Section 5013A particular note should be taken of the term `use of position' in Section 8. This term clearly connotes authority on the part of the Commission to prohibit conduct that involves wrongful `use of position.' However, wrongful use of position in government necessarily contemplates incumbency in such a position.  (Emphases added.) Our colleague in his individual advisory opinion chides us for alluding to the opinion of Professor Hazard regarding the scope of permissible regulation by the ethics commission. We recognize that this Court is not bound by the opinions of outstanding academics, and we note that our colleague cites in profusion numerous secondary sources including law review articles, treatises, and even various quotations from the Bard of Avon whose unparalleled literary talents were not matched by his exposition of political or jurisprudential theory. Indeed, in his famous tragedy Richard II, he expresses through John of Gaunt his lyrical and unalloyed admiration for England with the following panegyric: This royal throne of kings, this sceptered isle, This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, This other Eden, demi-paradise, This fortress built by Nature for herself, Against infection and the hand of war, This happy breed of men, this little world, This precious stone set in the silver sea, Which serves it in the office of a wall, Or as a moat defensive to a house Against the envy of less happier lands; This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England   . William Shakespeare, Richard II, act 2, sc. 1. It is even more remarkable that this lyrical praise was sung by the Bard at a time (1595) when England was an autocracy. This was long before her parliamentary system of government was admired by political philosophers in the age of the enlightenment. Without in any way diminishing our admiration for the noble Shakespeare, Professor Hazard is perhaps the most outstanding expert in the field of ethics. He has not only written copiously on this subject, but has recently completed a term as Director of the American Law Institute. Professor Hazard served as reporter for the committee which prepared the Model Rules of Professional Conduct from 1978 to 1983. He served as consultant on the Code of Judicial Conduct for the American Bar Association from 1970-1972. He served as Executive Director of the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation from 1964 to 1970. He has served as a Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, as Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, and as Sterling Professor of Law at Yale University from 1986 to 1994. He is currently serving as a Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania. It is rare that one has the benefit of a specific opinion of such a persuasive secondary source that is directly applicable to the question at hand. By contrast the numerous references of our colleague to various articles apply only by analogy and are not specifically addressed to the question that we must answer. We would suggest that Professor Hazard's qualifications are at least equal to those of any of the authors cited by our colleague. We concede that he does not write in blank verse, but his commentary is eloquent and persuasive. The second and perhaps more crucial flaw in Regulation 5014 is its intended scope. By clear directive, the regulation serves to summarily remove from the General Assembly any authority to appoint or to recommend appointees, from within or without its membership, to any state government board, commission, agency, quasi-public board, authority, corporation, or council, except to any such entity that functions solely in an advisory capacity or exercises solely legislative functions. The 1986 State Constitution in no manner empowers or authorizes the ethics commission to restructure and reorganize the constitutional framework of our state government. The ethics commission simply lacks constitutional authority to modify the structure of Rhode Island's government. Rather, article 3, section 8 of our constitution grants to the ethics commission the limited and concurrent power to enact substantive ethics laws[,] In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 14, and to investigate and sanction violations thereof. Id. at 10-11. Like any other administrative agency, the commission may promulgate regulations not inconsistent with its delegated authority, subject to review by the judiciary, the final arbiter of the validity of such regulations. Clarke, 714 A.2d at 600 (citing & quoting DeAngelis v. Rhode Island Ethics Commission, 656 A.2d 967, 970 (R.I.1995)). See also § 36-14-9(a)(15)(b) (Administrative Procedures Act applicable to the ethics commission); § 36-14-15 (any action by ethics commission shall be subject to judicial review); G.L.1956 § 42-35-7 (The validity or applicability of any rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment in the superior court   .). Moreover, the commission may not act inconsistently with the constitution. See R.I. Const. art. 1, sec. 1. The commission, like any other governmental body, is subject to many of the usual checks and balances associated with our tripartite form of government   . In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 18. The commission, for example, may not create regulations that seriously impinge upon the executive or the legislative branch's ability to perform their duties, id. at 19, or assume powers that are central or essential to the operation of the Governor's office or of the General Assembly. In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 675. Nor may the commission interpret the constitution and enforce its interpretation via regulation. The judicial branch, not the ethics commission, is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I.1995) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211, 82 S.Ct. 691, 706, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 682 (1962)). Accordingly, it has been our long-standing and consistent opinion that questions concerning the governmental structure of this state are constitutional issues that may be determined only by the judiciary. See G. & D. Taylor & Co., 4 R.I. at 361; see also In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 675 (This court has reserved the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether the actions of the [ethics] commission have violated the separation-of-powers doctrine.). [4] We must take issue with our colleague's assertion that Regulation 5014 is entitled to deferential review by this Court and that it must be presumed to be valid unless proven to be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. It is true that a legislative rule is binding on a court as would be a statute, but only if it is the product of an exercise of delegated legislative power. Lerner v. Gill, 463 A.2d 1352, 1358 (R.I.1983). In order to achieve validity, a legislative rule must be within the power granted by the General Assembly and must be within the parameters of statutes that define the powers of such agency. Id.; see also Parkway Towers Associates v. Godfrey, 688 A.2d 1289, 1293 (R.I.1997); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 627 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I.1993). This proposed regulation is obviously not authorized by an act of the General Assembly. Rather it purports to derive its authority directly from the constitution itself. In order to determine its validity, this Court must construe the constitution. It is well settled that this Court is the only body authorized to finally determine the constitutionality of a statute. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 58; Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 31 R.I. 295, 313, 77 A. 145, 153 (1910). A fortiori, it must exercise its independent judgment to determine the constitutionality of a regulation. This Court, therefore, must construe the constitution in order to determine the validity of the proposed regulation. We would abdicate our basic function if we gave deference to the interpretation by the ethics commission of the constitutional provision upon which its authority purportedly rests. The ethics commission contended that legislative appointments to executive agencies create an inherent conflict of interest. Given the commission's authority under article 3, section 8, of our constitution, to draft provisions that regulate conflicts of interest, the commission has argued that it acted well within its power to prohibit such a practice. We unequivocally disagree. Such an arrangement is not inherently unethical. It is all too obvious to emphasize that any system of government, whether it be the tripartite federal system adopted by the framers of the United States Constitution or a parliamentary system adopted by many nations, may be operated ethically. Likewise, any system may be operated in an unethical manner, depending upon the officials who may from time to time be placed in charge of the government. Members of the Legislature are not the only persons who may act unethically. Indeed, not only have Presidents of the United States been impeached by the House of Representatives for alleged unethical and illegal behavior, so too have legislators been accused of self-dealing and cronyism, but no more frequently than such accusations have been leveled against members of the executive department, including governors, gubernatorial appointees, and governmental employees. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Iain Crawford, The Profumo Affair: A Crisis in Contemporary Society (1963). In Davis v. Hawksley, 119 R.I. 453, 379 A.2d 922 (1977), this Court, in considering the question of whether dual office holding automatically constituted a conflict of loyalty, stated that the existence of a possible conflict of loyalty does not turn upon a determination of whether the offices are naturally incompatible but rather whether there is an `explicit prohibition in the constitution [which] makes them incompatible   .' Id. at 456, 379 A.2d at 924 (quoting Opinion to the Governor, 83 R.I. 370, 374, 116 A.2d 474, 475 (1955)). Again, the question of the structure of our state government is not an ethical question, but a constitutional one. We believe the ethical quality of a government is more affected by the individuals who serve from time to time in public office than by the structure of its government or the distribution of powers. Our constitution does not require a prophylactic ban on the historic exercise of appointive power and participation by the General Assembly. While acknowledging the continual hardships in discerning the theoretical requirements for what is defined as ethical[,] In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 667, we have historically eschewed prophylactic bans in favor of case-by-case determinations because [a] particular profession or occupation should not carry a stigma simply as a result of public perception, for it is the human spirit that is common to all, and that spirit can take on different faces, both praiseworthy and contemptible. Id. In Town of Lincoln v. Lincoln Lodge No. 22, 660 A.2d 710 (R.I. 1995), we reviewed the ethics commission's conclusion that the inclusion of any police chief in his or her police force's collective bargaining units was a per se violation of the Rhode Island Code of Ethics. The ethics commission reasoned that because police chiefs exercised supervisory power over all police officers in his or her command, membership in a collective bargaining unit with these same officers created inherent conflicts and problems that violated the code. Id. at 713-14. We rejected the commission's approach, reasoning that given the varying degrees of power and responsibility chiefs of differing locales possess, we cannot say that    including chiefs of police as members of local town and city police bargaining units    [is] per se violative [of the Code of Ethics]. Id. at 715. Rather, we held that whether such a labor classification results in a `severe conflict of interest'    ultimately turns on an evaluation of a particularized factual situation which requires a case-by-case type of analysis. Id. Moreover, in In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 667, we upheld ethics commission Regulations XX-XX-XXXX and 5007, requiring elected and appointed state officials to wait one year after leaving their position before seeking or accepting certain categories of public employment. But in so holding, we pointed out that we do not view the revolving-door legislation as [a] per se restriction, because the waiting period was a temporary, de minimis impediment, id. at 670, and the regulations allowed the ethics commission to grant case-by-case exceptions. [5] Id. at 672. Furthermore, we disagree with the commission's assertion that article 3, section 8, allows it to reach any conflict of interest. The commission defines conflict of interest as any circumstances where divided loyalties may result, whether the divided loyalty stems from personal or other interests, or any situation in which conflicting or divided loyalties may arise, whether or not the conflict involves financial interests or gains. If the commission is correct that it can regulate every case involving divided loyalties, then the commission has virtually limitless power over any decision made by members of state and local government, because decision-making is fundamentally about choosing one conflicting interest over another. Most assuredly, the ethics commission does not enjoy such plenary power and cannot act in ways inconsistent with the Rhode Island Constitution, including its attempt at restructuring government by enacting Regulation 5014. While we decline to sketch the boundary that delineates legitimate action by the ethics commission, as that question is not before us, we deem it clear that the function of the commission is to adopt regulations that would prevent improper conduct or self-dealing on the part of elected or appointed officials, not to create changes in the structure of government on the basis of the commission's belief that such change would lead to better ethical conduct. As we said in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d at 19, the commission may not set standards that seriously impinge upon the executive or the legislative branch's ability to perform the usual or ordinary duties for which each is elected, including the appointment of various officials to public office. The delegates to the 1986 convention that redrafted and revised the state's 1843 Constitution are presumed to have been aware of and to have considered what this Supreme Court said in Davis v. Hawksley, 119 R.I. 453, 379 A.2d 922 (1977), and Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 186 A. 832 (1936), see ante. Nevertheless, it chose not to redraft or revise the provision, originally adopted in the 1843 Constitution, that [t]he [G]eneral [A]ssembly shall continue to exercise the powers it has heretofore exercised, unless prohibited in this Constitution. R.I. Const. art. 6, sec. 10. Consequently, we discern no authority in our 1986 State Constitution suggesting that any of its provisions were intended to remove from the General Assembly its long acknowledged authority and practice to appoint individuals from its membership to state governmental public boards, commissions, or agencies. If, then, the people who constitute the electorate did not take that right and authority from the General Assembly, may the ethics commission do so by virtue of its limited authority to enact a substantive code of ethics? Our response is conclusively in the negative. In summary, we are of the opinion that the ethics commission lacks the power to enact Regulation 5014, which fundamentally alters the constitutional structure of this state. Rhode Island has a long history of legislative service on and appointments to executive boards and commissions. By prohibiting this practice, Regulation 5014 redraws the basic scheme of Rhode Island government by divesting the Legislature of its historically exercised appointive power and investing the same in the executive. On the other hand, the ethics commission can clearly adopt regulations pertaining to the conduct of public officials, subject as we have previously stated to review by this Court. A code of ethics must deal with an individual's behavior. The ethics amendment established an administrative agency to oversee the conduct of public officials; it did not establish an unelected, unaccountable, fourth branch of government. Nor did the amendment create an entity that could expand its powers beyond its specifically delegated authority. The commission, for example, cannot adopt a regulation that the Governor cannot appoint members of the National Guard because it would conflict with his powers under the constitution. The commission could, however, adopt a rule that a public official cannot be a shareholder of a private corporation engaged in certain business practices, a rule to which this Court would give some deference. No deference would be given to a regulation through which the commission expands its power beyond its constitutional or statutory authority. The ethics commission is not a constitutional convention. It does not have the power to amend the constitution of this state, nor could it be given such a power. It is not the function of this Court to determine whether the United States federal system is preferable to that of legislative supremacy. We take no position on that issue. It is our function to determine what the Rhode Island Constitution as interpreted by this Court permits or commands. When the language and history are clear and unambiguous, as they are with respect to our response to Your Excellency's first question, it is not the role of this Court to render an interpretation fabricated from interstitial constitutional modifications. As is clearly enunciated in article 1, section 1, of our state constitution, only the people of Rhode Island may change the structure of their government, having reserved to themselves such a fundamental and paramount function of government. Article 14, section 1, of the Rhode Island Constitution provides the exclusive means of amending the constitution and such an alteration requires approval by a majority of the electors voting thereon[.] We suggest that the sole and proper procedure for restricting legislators from serving on or appointing any other person to executive boards and commissions is through an amendment to the constitution approved by the electorate, not by an ethics regulation.