Opinion ID: 670306
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Heading: Coverage for Other Invasion of Right of Private Occupancy

Text: The phrase other invasion of the right of private occupancy is ambiguous. It is unclear whether the phrase extends beyond deprivation of the right to physically occupy and possess property to include interference with comfortable use and enjoyment of property by means such as noise, leaky roofs, obstruction of access, obnoxious fumes, . . . actionable on a variety of theories such as . . . nuisance, or trespass. Nirschberg v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas., 795 F.Supp. 600, 604 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Under the well-established California law, we must resolve this ambiguity in favor of coverage. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal.2d 263, 269 (1966). Contrary to the Insurer's argument, Titan Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 22 Cal.App. 4th 457 (1994), does not preclude coverage. First, the policy in Titan specifically excluded the acts of contamination for which the insured faced liability. No similar exclusion applies to Rozet's conduct. Second, Titan involved the duty to indemnify, not the duty to defend. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 603 F.2d 780, 786 (9th Cir. 1979) (Under California law, the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify.); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hubbard, 162 Cal.App.3d 939, 944 (1984) (same). Titan expressly distinguished a federal case holding other invasion of the private right of occupancy potentially included the selling of a machine containing hazardous chemicals which spilled onto the victim's property on the ground that the federal case dealt only with the duty to defend. 22 Cal.App.4th at 475. Finally, Titan's statement that other invasion should be restricted to a personal injury (as distinguished from an injury to property) that is the functional equivalent of wrongful entry or eviction, id., is fully consistent with allowing coverage in this case. Rozet's failure to maintain Tyler House in a habitable condition as required by Washington, D.C. law, unlike the conduct at issue in Titan, was the functional equivalent of constructive eviction. See Beltway Mgmt. Co. v. Lexington-Landmark Ins., 746 F.Supp. 1145, 1155 (D.D.C. 1990) ([T]he rights protected by the tort of constructive eviction and those assured under the warranty of habitability are functionally indistinguishable under District of Columbia law . . . . [C]onstructive eviction assures a tenant of a premises fit for possession, which is precisely what the warranty of habitability assures.)