Opinion ID: 2182951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Striking testimony of a defense witness.

Text: The trial court struck the entire testimony of Robert Gage, a defense witness, when he refused to answer certain questions on cross-examination. Defendant argues that this was an abuse of discretion on two grounds: (1) The unanswered cross-examination questions were irrelevant to the subject matter of the prosecution, and to the questions answered on direct examination, and (2) striking the entire testimony of Gage deprived defendant of due process by denying him the right to present witnesses in his defense. In State v. Monsoor [16] this court held that the trial court had discretion as to striking the testimony of a witness who has refused to answer questions on cross-examination. Consonant with the policy of setting forth specific guidelines for the exercise of discretion, this court indicated that this decision should depend upon whether the questions not answered were relevant and material to the subject matter of the inquiry. In Monsoor, the defendant was charged with sale of marijuana to an undercover agent. The prosecutor asked a defense witness roommate of the defendant whether he or others had ever smoked marijuana at their residence. When the witness refused to answer, the trial court struck his entire testimony. This court found this to be an abuse of discretion, since these questions were unrelated to whether or not the defendant had made the illegal drug sale. But the trial court was still upheld because striking the direct testimony had not probably affected the result of the trial, [17] since this testimony did not in any way counter previous testimony that defendant had made the sale. Defendant's due process claim regarding his right to present witnesses reveals a distinction between this case (and Monsoor ) and the federal cases relied upon for the Monsoor rule. In all of those cases, [18] and in more recent federal cases, [19] prosecution witnesses have refused to answer cross-examination questions, thus raising the question of whether the accused has been deprived of his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses. In those cases it is the defendant who seeks striking of the testimony in order to preserve this fundamental right. In this case (and in Monsoor ) where the testimony of a defense witness has been stricken, a different constitutional right of the defendant comes into playhis right to present witnesses in his own behalf. [20] Yet this difference does not render invalid or insufficient the test of whether the answered questions are relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry. The defendant's right to present witnesses in his behalf is, as said in Chambers v. Mississippi , [21] qualified by the necessity of compliance with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. The Monsoor rule is such a rule because denial of prosecutorial cross-examination or relevant and material matters would detract substantially from the reliability of the testimony in question and from the accurate determination of guilt or innocence. In this case it cannot be said that the answers sought by the prosecutor were irrelevant and immaterial either to the subject matter of the inquiry or to the subject matter of the previous direct examination. Gage testified on direct that, after getting the car keys from the defendant, he picked up another fellow who was not Peters. Cross-examination questions regarding the identity of this person, which Gage refused to answer, were directly related to this testimony given on direct. Gage also testified on direct that, after getting the car keys from the defendant, he did not see him again that night or the next morning. Cross-examination questions about his activities that night and the following morning (specifically what he was doing at the time of the burglary and whether he was later at the Rodriquez house), all of which defendant refused to answer, were designed to probe this prior testimony, and were closely related to it. The language in Monsoor to the effect that questions about credibility are collateral [22] refers to questions unrelated to the events constituting the crime charged, going to the general credibility of the witness, and not to questions testing the truthfulness of specific testimony of the witness about facts and circumstances relative to the commission of the crime.