Opinion ID: 2266754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: declaration of lee coleman, md

Text: ¶ 29 1. The following declaration is based on my review of records pertaining to David McCuistion and his status as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under the laws of the State of Washington. ¶ 30 2. I am familiar with the statutory requirements in Washington, having participated in several such cases in the past, and several dozen similar cases in California, where the laws are virtually identical. ¶ 31 3. The primary focus of this declaration concerns the question of whether there is current evidence that Mr. McCuistion continues to meet the statutory requirement for SVP status. Regardless of estimated risk for re-offending, such status requires that the individual be judged to suffer from a mental abnormality (defined as a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others). Furthermore, adjudication of this issue shall be based on the findings of a professionally qualified person. ¶ 32 4. Given these statutory requirements, I have reviewed institutional records and professional evaluations of Mr. McCuistion and I have formed the opinion that his evaluators have not presented any evidence that such a mental abnormality exists, or has ever existed. Instead, they have relied on his past crimes: the required mental abnormality has been determined by simply summarizing his past behavior, and the evidence for the alleged disorder is a recitation of the details of his past behavior. As such, this information is not an expert finding worthy of credibility in the determination required by the Washington statute. ¶ 33 5. The above pattern may be seen from the very first SVP evaluation, performed in 1992 by Ronald Page. Nowhere does Dr. Page discuss any expert findings demonstrating that Mr. McCuistion has the required deficit of emotional or volitional capacity. Instead, he simply cites a history of alcohol dependence and immature personality traits. Such factors are clearly far too broad to fulfill the requirements of the SVP statute, since only a tiny percentage of individuals like this commit criminal sexual acts. Dr. Page offers nothing other than Mr. McCuistion's criminal record as justification for finding him to fit the SVP requirement. If this were sufficient, there would of course be no statutory requirement that a professionally qualified person offer opinions to the Court. ¶ 34 6. Dr. Savio Chan in 1995 likewise summarized Mr. McCuistion's criminal history, which now included a 1993 conviction for third degree rape and third degree assault. He described Mr. McCuistion's behavior during an interview, and reported that an MMPI was considered invalid. Based on this and nothing else, he wrote, ... the nature and pattern of his offenses, the number and age range of his victims, and his inability to control himself suggest the presence of sexual deviancy of paraphilia, NOS, and a personality disorder with antisocial features. In other words, Dr. Chan announces an alleged deficit of emotional or volitional capacity but demonstrates no methods or findings to support this conclusion. The crimes become the evidence, and this clearly violates the legal requirements for SVP status, which require a determination that a particular violent sexual offender has something more the congenital or acquired conditionthat is not always present in such offenders. ¶ 35 7. The next evaluation I have seen is from the End of Sentence Review Subcommittee in 1998. Once again, criminal history is reviewed, and the aforementioned conclusions of Drs. Page and Chan were cited. Dr. Chan was asked to do another evaluation and he concluded that Paraphilia and Antisocial Personality Disorder constitute, congenital or acquired conditions affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes McCuistion to the commission of criminal sex acts in a degree constituting him a menace to the health and safety of others. This conclusion is completely without any basis because the label paraphilia does not represent an expert finding, but simply a restatement of the fact that Mr. McCuistion's crimes involved sexual behavior outside the norm: para meaning beyond the ordinary and philia meaning attraction to or preference for. Likewise for antisocial personality disorder, obviously nothing more than a restatement of a pattern of criminal conduct. There is nothing expert here, as required by the statute. ¶ 36 8. Furthermore, the linking of any mental disorder, even if one had been demonstrated, to an alleged deficit in volitional control is something specifically addressed in the American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense (1982), which has concluded that any attempt by mental health professionals to make such a determination is beyond their special skills. What this means is that legislatures that have mandated that experts determine whether such a disorder is present in a particular offender have ignored consensus opinion from the relevant profession that such examinations do not exist. ¶ 37 9. Psychologist Richard Packard also performed an evaluation in 1988. He concluded that the correct diagnosis for Mr. McCuistion was paraphilia, not otherwise specified, i.e., sexual activity with non-consenting females. Can there be a more obvious example of doublespeak? Sexual activity with a non-consenting person is the crime of rape; this fact does not fulfill the legal requirement for SVP status, and the use of this meaningless diagnosis is obviously an attempt to give the appearance that the legal requirements have been met. ¶ 38 10. Dr. Packard also opined that it was more likely that outside of an institution Mr. McCuistion would re-offend, but based this opinion on the above diagnosis and the absence of evidence to the contrary. Despite many well-intended efforts by countless professionals, the fact is that no inmate can produce such evidence to the contrary. This is because no reliable association between participation in the sex-offender treatment programs and reduced recidivism has been shown. Kelley Blanchette of the Research Division of the Canadian Correctional Services has summarized current knowledge on this question: Having recognized the potential shortcomings, a foregone response to the question `Does sex offender treatment work?' is this: We are still uncertain. There is disagreement even amongst the most prolific and knowledgeable researchers in the area. (Sex Offender Assessment, Treatment and Recidivism: A Literature Review Kelley Blanchette Research Division Correctional Services Canada August, 1996) ¶ 39 11. Dr. Packard also supported his conclusions with a risk assessment despite admitting that Some of these risk assessment instruments are still considered as experimental and may have limited applicability specifically to Washington State sex offenders. In fact, all such instruments are strictly experimental, as has been repeatedly acknowledged by their most influential proponents, such as Karl Hansen of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. Dr. Packard also argues that these instruments underestimate risk and mentions several factors that may do this. He fails to recognize other factors that may overestimate risk, such as inclusion of uncharged arrests in some studies, or unconvicted charges in others. He even includes an instrument called the Sexual Violence Risk-20, which includes factors which have been mentioned in clinical literature. In other words, it includes a catch-all of factors that may have been excluded in more controlled analyses, but are nonetheless to be included in Mr. McCuistion's risk analysis. ¶ 40 12. The most important factor, however, concerning these risk analyses is the fact that unless the individual has been found to have the requisite congenital or acquired condition, risk analysis is moot. ¶ 41 13. The opinions of Dr. Gollogly, based on record review, are based on the same circular reasoning as the preceding. He summarizes Mr. McCuistion's criminal past, summarizes his sexual crimes with the label Paraphilia NOS (Rape), and his other crimes with Antisocial Personality Disorder, and then summarily states that these diagnoses predisposes (sic) him to act out sexually deviant urges without regard to the rights of his victims ...' There is no mention of the legal requirement of a disorder of volitional control, undoubtedly because mental health professionals have no means to make such a determination. In his conclusion, Dr. Gollogly writes that My opinion is based on my clinical judgment and the fact that instruments utilized in this assessment, commonly relied upon by experts in this field, indicate that Mr. McCuistion is at a high risk of sexually re-offending. These are flimsy supports indeed, given the consensus opinion in Psychiatry and Psychology that clinical judgment cannot determine volitional control and considering that SVP evaluators may rely on risk assessment procedures but SVP evaluators are but a tiny minority in the mental health community and the mainstream of specialists in the field of sex offender evaluation and treatment do not accept such procedures. (See Dangerous Sex Offenders. A Task Force Report of the American Psychiatric Association, American Psychiatric Press, Washington, D.C., 1999) ¶ 42 14. Finally, the October 31, 2004 Annual Review of Carole DeMarco demonstrates the identical problems as previous evaluations. The majority of her report is simply a repetition of previous records. In the section labeled diagnosis and mental abnormalities, she writes that Consistent diagnoses across time from a variety of doctoral-level clinicians are a strong indicator of diagnostic accuracy. This ignores, of course, the virtually universal practice in institutions whereby succeeding evaluators routinely apply whatever diagnostic labels were used by earlier evaluators. Consensus is not science and the fact that consensus is held out as evidence is revealing in itself. ¶ 43 15. Next, she writes that Residents of the SCC usually suffer from a paraphilia. (!) Once again, citing the very fact that an institution that holds sex offenders would have a lot of sex offenders (the term paraphilia means nothing more) speaks volumes about the emptiness of this diagnostic process. Paraphilias, according to the DSM-IV-TR are said to be chronic and lifelong but there is nothing in the DSM that corresponds to the legal requirements for SVP status. The fact that evaluators almost universally try to boot-strap the DSM into these evaluations does nothing to alter this fact. ¶ 44 16. Then, in a classic example of circularity, Dr. DeMarco writes that Individuals with mental disorders and/or personality disorders that impair the ability to inhibit impulses are often at a disadvantage to control his/her urges to engage in paraphilic behavior. This ignores the fact that the SVP law requires that a distinction be drawn, through the identification of a congenital or acquired condition between offenders who are simply repeat sex offenders and those who have an alleged disorder of impaired volitional control. Because there is no such mental disorder, and the DSM includes nothing like this, and because mental health professionals cannot distinguish between those who commit such crimes as part of a mental abnormality and those who commit such crimes for other reasons, this type of circularity is offered instead. ¶ 45 17. Dr. DeMarco claims that Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified (Nonconsent) is an accepted diagnosis among practitioners knowledgeable about sexual offenders. I believe it would be more accurate to say that the only practitioners who use this label are those who perform SVP evaluations. But regardless of how many use it, the so-called diagnosis is obviously nothing more than doublespeak for the crime of rape. If this is the best the evaluators are capable of doing, when seeking the congenital or acquired condition, surely it means that the entire evaluation process is a sham created to fulfill legal and legislative agendas. ¶ 46 18. Dr. DeMarco comes to the heart of the matter, writing that While many, if not most, cases of rape are not considered a mental abnormality per se, there is a small proportion of rapists who repetitively engage in rape behavior and display significant arousal to nonconsenting sexual activity. Such individuals report having recurrent, repetitive, and compulsive urges and fantasies to commit rapes, and at times they find it difficult to resist such urges. If there were established procedures (the penile plethysmograph notwithstanding) for distinguishing between those who rape by choice and those driven to it by a mental disorder that impairs volitional control, wouldn't we expect this to be part of the DSM? The only mental health professionals who insist they can identify such a disorder are those who perform SVP evaluations. ¶ 47 19. Dr. DeMarco calls as well on actuarial risk assessment instruments, and I have commented on the unproven nature of these attempts, as well as the fact that they are moot if the legally required congenital or acquired condition cannot first be demonstrated. She also repeats the claim that such instruments underestimate risk, and I have already discussed this false idea as well. ¶ 48 20. As a dynamic risk factor (characteristics that could change over time, as opposed to the static nature of one's criminal past), she wrote that Mr. McCuistion continues to associate with individuals who have an antisocial attitude and engage in a high level of fault finding with SCC rules and policies indicating an antisocial lifestyle. Given the universal recognition by SVP inmates that the evaluation and treatment program is based on a law that has no recognized basis in science or psychology, it is totally unacceptable to equate fault finding with SCC rules and policies with risk of sexual reoffending. ¶ 49 21. Finally, I believe it is important to recognize that it is impossible for any person, whether mental health professional or lay person, to become familiar with past behavior such as exhibited by Mr. McCuistion without feeling revulsion. This is precisely why it is crucial to recognize how easy it is for mental health evaluators, expected as they are to have something special, to repackage this typical and perfectly expectable reaction as a diagnosis, risk assessment, etc. In reality, there is no recognized congenital or acquired condition that fits the desires of the legislature of Washington, California, or any of the other states with these laws. The findings of each of Mr. McCuistion's evaluators amount to no evidence whatever. ¶ 50 22. The above has been written by me in Berkeley, California, on September 21, 2005, and is offered under penalty of perjury. (Signed) Lee Coleman Lee Coleman, MD OWENS, J. (dissenting). ¶ 51 A `[s]exually violent predator' (SVP) is a person who has already been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. RCW 71.09.020(18). Rejecting the careful determination of the Washington legislature, the majority essentially creates a situation in which a single doctor, without ever examining the SVP in question, can put an SVP one step closer to release. The majority even allows this when there is no evidence that an SVP has changed in the years since his underlying commitment. This greatly undermines the legislature's careful decision that the 2005 amendments to section 71.09.090 of the sexually violent predators statute (the SVP statute), chapter 71.09 RCW, were necessary to promote the `very long-term' needs of the sexually violent predator population for treatment and the equally long-term needs of the community for protection from these offenders. Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 1. ¶ 52 The majority makes two glaring legal errors. First, it mischaracterizes a procedural due process issue as a substantive due process issue, inappropriately subjecting the law to heightened scrutiny. When we properly apply the procedural due process standard to the 2005 amendments to the SVP statute, due process is not violated. Second, even if substantive due process were warranted, the majority also fails to use the proper strict scrutiny test to determine the constitutionality of the 2005 amendments. Because the 2005 amendments to the SVP statute readily pass constitutional muster, I must respectfully dissent.
¶ 53 McCuistion argues that the 2005 amendments to RCW 71.09.090 violate due process. The majority holds that these amendments violate substantive due process because they divorce the annual review inquiry from the standard set out in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). The majority especially highlights the constitutional significance that we have attached to the SVP statute's annual review process. Majority at 1149-50. ¶ 54 An examination of substantive due process indicates that it is not the appropriate standard here. The substantive component of the due process clause protects against certain government actions `regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.' In re Pers. Restraint of Bush, 164 Wash.2d 697, 706, 193 P.3d 103 (2008) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986)); see Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). Substantive due process, in essence, prevents the government from performing certain actions no matter how many procedural protections there are or how fair those procedural protections may be, unless the governmental action meets strict scrutiny. Examples of activities protected by substantive due process include consensual sex within one's home, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), and the use of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Foucha establishes that McCuistion has a substantive due process right to not be held unless he is currently mentally ill and dangerous. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780. ¶ 55 McCuistion does not contest the State's power to detain him under any circumstances; he argues only that the procedures used were inadequate. He does not argue that the State does not have the power to continue to detain him. In contrast, he merely asks for procedural safeguards at a particular hearing. This type of challenge is governed by principles of procedural due process, which require that the State must not deprive an individual of a protected liberty interest without appropriate procedural safeguards. Bush, 164 Wash.2d at 704, 193 P.3d 103. The majority implicitly acknowledges that this case concerns only what procedures are necessary to deprive an SVP of liberty, given that the remedy it provides is additional procedures. The majority mandates that a trial court consider additional types of evidence at the annual show cause hearing beyond merely (1) evidence of an identified physiological change and (2) evidence of a change in an SVP's mental condition brought about through positive response to continuing participation in treatment. See majority at 1148-49. Substantive due process analysis requires that there be no possible procedures sufficient to excuse a governmental action, yet the majority requires additional procedures to ensure that liberty is protected. For this reason, it is self-evident that this is not an issue of substantive due process. Since McCuistion asks for additional procedural safeguards at the annual review hearing, this is an issue of procedural due process.
¶ 56 When reviewing claims of violations of due process, we must remember that due process is a flexible concept. In re Det. of Stout, 159 Wash.2d 357, 370, 150 P.3d 86 (2007). Procedural due process requires, at minimum, notice and an opportunity to be heard, but its requirements vary depending on the context. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). In determining what procedural due process requires in a given context, we [have] employ[ed] the Mathews test, which balances: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through existing procedures and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the governmental interest, including costs and administrative burdens of additional procedures. Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893). ¶ 57 The first factor, the private interest affected, weighs in McCuistion's favor. The continuation of civil commitment without a release trial is certainly a significant deprivation of liberty and also is likely to create a stigma in the broader society. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). ¶ 58 The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through existing procedures and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards, weighs strongly in the State's favor. Stout, 159 Wash.2d at 370, 150 P.3d 86. By the time of the review hearing, an SVP has already gone through a full civil commitment trial, where the State has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an `individual suffers from a mental abnormality which renders him a danger to the community.' In re Det. of Petersen, 138 Wash.2d 70, 78, 980 P.2d 1204 (1999) (quoting In re Personal Restraint of Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 39, 857 P.2d 989 (1993)). Notwithstanding the 2005 amendments to the SVP statute, additional procedural safeguards also arise automatically every year. The secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) must provide the committed person with an annual written notice of the person's right to petition the court for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative or unconditional discharge over the secretary's objection. RCW 71.09.090(2)(a). DSHS is required to allow a qualified professional to perform an annual current examination of the mental condition of each defendant in order to determine whether the defendant still meets the definition of an SVP. RCW 71.09.070. Each defendant also has the right to have an expert of his choosing examine him. Id. Furthermore, each defendant has the right to a show cause hearing each year, at which if the State fails to prove a prima facie case that he has so changed that he no longer meets the definition of an SVP or if the defendant presents a prima facie case that he has so changed that he no longer meets the definition of an SVP, a release trial will be ordered. RCW 71.09.090(2)(a)-(c). A defendant has the right to counsel at each of these show cause hearings. RCW 71.09.090(2)(b). ¶ 59 Additionally, defendants are often able to challenge their commitments through other means, such as CR 60(b), personal restraint petitions, and writs of habeas corpus. These numerous protections already minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty and provide adequate assurances that McCuistion would not be unfairly held in civil commitment if he truly no longer met the definition of an SVP. This factor weighs heavily in the State's favor. ¶ 60 The third factor, the governmental interest, including costs and administrative burdens of additional procedure, also weighs very strongly in the State's favor. It is well established that the State has an interest in detaining mentally unstable individuals who present a danger to the public. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Indeed, we have noted that SVPs are even more dangerous to others than other mentally ill individuals. Young, 122 Wash.2d at 45, 857 P.2d 989. We have also stated that it is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions. Id. at 26, 857 P.2d 989 (emphasis added). ¶ 61 If McCuistion prevailed in his position, the costs and administrative burdens that would arise would also be unacceptably high. Here, McCuistion obtained an out-of-state expert who did not even interview him, but merely perused his records and then wrote a declaration stating that McCuistion never had a mental illness to begin with. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 616-24. Under the standard that McCuistion advocates, any expert anywhere could force a new release trial for every SVP every single year by declaring that the defendant never met the commitment definition in the first place. This is contrary to the statute's intention that SVP commitment be for an indefinite period, until that person's condition has changed sufficiently that he or she is safe to be either at large or in a less restrictive setting. Petersen, 138 Wash.2d at 82, 980 P.2d 1204. Dr. Lee Coleman did not even attempt to show that anything about McCuistion had changed in the years since the underlying commitment. CP at 616-24. In another Court of Appeals case, Dr. Coleman unsuccessfully made the exact same argument. In re Det. of Reimer, 146 Wash.App. 179, 184, 190 P.3d 74 (2008). Under this standard, one doctor could easily create a problematic backlog in the courts with innumerable unmerited release trials every year. Where the State has a compelling interest in treating SVPs and protecting society from their crimes, the third factor weighs strongly in the State's favor. ¶ 62 When applying the Mathews test, we look at all three factors and balance the interests against each other. It is clear that in similar circumstances a compelling interest in promoting public safety can outweigh an individual's private liberty interest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, in determining that it was acceptable to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant at an insanity acquiteee's release hearing, held that [t]he state's interest in preventing the premature release of individuals who have already demonstrated their dangerousness to society by committing a criminal act outweighed the acquittee's interest in avoiding continued confinement. United States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1267 (9th Cir.1992). This theory applies even more strongly to SVPs. ¶ 63 Taken together, the Mathews factors weigh strongly in favor of the State. While McCuistion does have a strong private liberty interest at stake, existing procedural safeguards are already adequate to prevent erroneous deprivation of his liberty interest. Furthermore, the State has compelling interests in protecting the public and treating SVPs, and heavy costs and administrative burdens would arise in the absence of the amendments. As such, I would hold that procedural due process is not violated. The 2005 amendments to the SVP statute limit the creation of a new release trial to when there is significant reliable evidence that an SVP has truly changed. These procedures do not offend procedural due process.
¶ 64 Even accepting the majority's formulation of the issue as one of substantive due process, due process is not violated. This court has never before held that any element of the SVP statute violates due process. Here, the majority fails to properly apply strict scrutiny when it refuses to look at both of the State's compelling interests in protecting public safety and providing treatment to SVPs. ¶ 65 When a liberty interest is protected by substantive due process, state interference with this liberty interest is subject to strict scrutiny. In re Parentage of C.A.M.A., 154 Wash.2d 52, 60-61, 109 P.3d 405 (2005). Strict scrutiny means that governmental interference with the liberty interest `is justified only if the state can show that it has a compelling interest and such interference is narrowly drawn to meet only the compelling state interest involved.' Id. at 61, 109 P.3d 405 (quoting In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 15, 969 P.2d 21 (1998)). The State undoubtedly has compelling interests here. [S]exually violent predators generally have personality disorders and/or mental abnormalities which ... render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.... [Their] likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. RCW 71.09.010. [I]t is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions. Young, 122 Wash.2d at 26, 857 P.2d 989. The only question then is whether the 2005 amendments are narrowly drawn to meet only the compelling state interests involved. I would hold that they are. ¶ 66 The legislature, in enacting the 2005 amendments to RCW 71.09.090, intended to address the `very long-term' needs of the sexually violent predator population for treatment and the equally long-term needs of the community for protection from these offenders. Laws of 2005, ch. 344, § 1. The legislature specifically found that the mental abnormalities and personality disorders that make a person subject to commitment under chapter 71.09 RCW are severe and chronic and do not remit due solely to advancing age or changes in other demographic factors. Id. The legislature wanted to ensure that the statutory focus remains on treatment and did not want to remove the incentive for successful treatment participation. Id. It was fearful that the Young and Ward [1] decisions would subvert[ ] the statutory focus on treatment and reduce[ ] community safety by removing all incentive for successful treatment participation in favor of passive aging and distract[ ] committed persons from fully engaging in sex offender treatment. Id. The legislature also stated that persons committed as SVPs generally require prolonged treatment in a secure facility followed by intensive community supervision in the cases where positive treatment gains are sufficient for community safety. Id. ¶ 67 Where the State has a compelling interest in providing treatment and protecting public safety, the State's actions must be narrowly tailored to meet these interests. This `requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.' Young, 122 Wash.2d at 33, 857 P.2d 989 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368, 103 S.Ct. 3043, 77 L.Ed.2d 694 (1983)). The legislature has found that allowing evidence of actuarial models of decreased dangerousness would inhibit the incentive for committed SVPs to undergo treatment. It is vital for the legislature to ensure that committed SVPs are truly treated before their release into the community, as there is a great deal of literature discussing how recidivism rates for SVPs are considerably lower when they have completed treatment programs. See Resp't's Statement of Additional Authority (Grant Duwe et al., The Impact of Prison-Based Treatment on Sex Offender Recidivism, 21 Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research & Treatment 1, 12, 18 (June 2009); Friedrich Lösel et al., The Effectiveness of Treatment for Sexual Offenders: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, J. of Experimental Criminology 135, 138 (2005)). While some doctors, such as Dr. Coleman, clearly do not believe in the SVP statute, it is the legislature that must write laws that meet strict scrutiny, not Dr. Coleman. The legislature has determined, after extensive investigation, that committed SVPs only truly lose their dangerousness when they have gone through intensive treatment and that the best way to promote both treatment and public safety is to strongly incentivize treatment. We should not second-guess the legislature's judgment. Where an SVP is committed both to provide treatment and to protect the public, the 2005 amendments that incentivize treatment bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose for the commitment. Young, 122 Wash.2d at 33, 857 P.2d 989. Substantive due process is not violated. ¶ 68 When properly characterized as an issue of procedural due process, the procedures at the annual review hearing do not violate due process. Even framing the issue as one of substantive due process, the 2005 amendments to the SVP statute are narrowly tailored to meet the State's compelling interests. For both of these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.