Opinion ID: 1948185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Demonstrative Evidence

Text: During their investigation, and with Boobar's permission, the State Police took custody of Boobar's car. They pinpointed a dent on the vehicle's left-side mirror and hypothesized that this dent might correspond to a fresh-appearing gouge they had discovered in a tree beside the tote road near the crime scene. The investigators also found particles of black paint in the tree, noting that the mirror had a dent in the bottom left-hand corner from which some black paint had apparently been scraped off. The tree in question was a balsam fir; particles of vegetative matter found on the mirror proved to be not inconsistent with balsam fir. The investigators cut down the tree and took it to the State Police crime lab for analysis. The detectives then took the car to the scene, moved the vehicle into the position indicated by tire tracks they had identified there, replaced a four-foot section of the tree with the gouge in it on the stump from which it had been cut, and drove the car past the tree stump while videotaping the proceedings. At the trial, over Boobar's objection, the State introduced evidence of this demonstration, including the videotape, to suggest to the jury that it had been Boobar's car that had caused the gouge in the tree. Boobar argues that the admission of this evidence was error, maintaining that pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403, the danger of creating unfair prejudice to the defendant outweighed any probative value, and that the testimony concerning the demonstration was inadmissible pursuant to the standard for expert testimony articulated in M.R.Evid. 702. [1] We review a trial court's evidentiary rulings for clear error or an abuse of discretion. State v. Schuman, 622 A.2d 716, 718 (Me.1993). The results of an evidentiary experiment such as the one at issue here are admissible if the experiment is conducted under circumstances that bear a substantial similarity to those surrounding the event at issue. State v. Hardy, 489 A.2d 508, 511 (Me.1985). Even experiments that are not entirely similar to the event in question may be enlightening to the jury; variations between the experimental and actual conditions go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Id. In Hardy, the refusal by the trial court to admit a demonstration involving a candle, offered by the defendant to suggest that he could not have committed an arson as charged, was an abuse of discretion. Id.; but see State v. Philbrick, 436 A.2d 844, 859-60 (Me.1981) (trial court erred by admitting in-court demonstration involving front seat and dashboard of car, along with mannequins representing victim and defendant, to show bullet trajectories; detective who conducted experiment lacked requisite expertise in such analyses, mannequins were too dissimilar to the actual persons involved, and exact measurements between seats and dashboard could not be pinpointed). The videotaped demonstration involving Boobar's car at the crime scene is far more similar to the candle experiment sought to be admitted in Hardy than the bullet experiment that was erroneously admitted in Philbrick. The experiment was substantially similar to what would have been the actual occurrences at the time of Rebecca Pelkey's death according to the version of events asserted by the State. Dr. Charles W. Smith, a physics professor who testified on Boobar's behalf, suggested that there were certain flaws in the demonstration, i.e., that the removed section of the tree could not be returned to its original location with complete accuracy, and that the vehicle that actually caused the gouge would have been traveling at a greater speed than in the reenactment, thus varying the gouge that the vehicle would have made in the tree. These questions, however, go to the weight rather than the admissibility of this evidence. Hardy, 489 A.2d at 511. Detective Ronald Richards of the State Police testified that this demonstration proved that Boobar's car could have caused the gouge in the tree. We have no reason to conclude that the trial court erred or abused its discretion by admitting this conclusion as expert testimony, supported by a properly laid foundation as to Richards' qualifications pursuant to Rule 702. Richards testified that he had spent ten years as a fingerprint examiner and crime-scene investigator for the State Police crime laboratory. This testimony of specialized knowledge was a sufficient basis from which the trial court could conclude that Richards had sufficient expertise to state the limited conclusion that Boobar's car could have been the source of the gouge in the tree. See State v. Herbest, 551 A.2d 442, 445-46 (Me.1988); State v. Atkinson, 458 A.2d 1200, 1204 (Me.1983); Philbrick, 436 A.2d at 860-61; Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 702.1 at 7-12 (1992). The same principles apply to the footprint evidence, which Boobar also challenges as inadmissible pursuant to Rules 403 and 702. Investigators found seven identifiable footprints on the exterior of Boobar's car, and identified marks that resembled footprints on the victim's neck. They took impressions of the car footprints and photographs of the footprint on the body. Detective Craig Handley of the State Police crime lab laid a sheet of acetate over the photograph of the neck and copied the footprint onto the acetate with a black marker. He then took another acetate sheet and made ink impressions of the soles of the sneakers found in Boobar's car. He compared the two acetate sheets, as well as acetate sheets made from the exterior car footprints, and, over the objection of Boobar, testified at trial as to the results of this comparison. The photographs and acetate overlays were introduced in evidence. Handley concluded that the sneakers could have made the footprints on the car, and that the left sneaker shared class characteristics with the footprint on the victim's neck. Handley specifically stated that he could not conclude that the sneaker was definitely the one that had caused the footprint on the body. Handley testified at length as to his extensive training in footprint analysis. His investigation and comparisons of the footprints were based in sound police techniques rather than scientific speculation or conjecture. The lack of absolute conclusiveness in his findings goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not err, nor did it abuse its discretion in permitting the State to present this evidence to the jury. [2]