Opinion ID: 1446440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity and Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Claims

Text: Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in dismissing his § 1983 suit inasmuch as his complaint states a claim for violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, finding that Defendants each had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and, at any rate, were protected by qualified immunity. Having scrutinized with special care the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's claims, we hold that the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. Qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). As a threshold matter, we first consider whether the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If, upon review, we determine that the officer in question violated the claimant's constitutional rights, we proceed to a second question: whether at the time of the alleged violation that right was clearly established. Id. Accepting Plaintiff's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, we find that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Hains and McShane. We approach the question within the framework of qualified immunity analysis, and first conclude that, on the facts alleged, Defendants Hains and McShane each violated the Fourth Amendment in arresting Plaintiff absent a warrant inasmuch as they lacked probable cause. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to be free from improper arrest and detention. U.S. Const. amend. IV (The right of people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures . . . shall not be violated.). [A] warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed, Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160 L.Ed.2d 537 (2004), and the validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). Accordingly, [i]n order for a wrongful arrest claim to succeed under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the police lacked probable cause. Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 569 (6th Cir.1999)). Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense has been committed. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The inquiry depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest, Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, where supported by reasonably trustworthy information. Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S.Ct. 223. No overly-burdensome duty to investigate applies to officers faced with the prospect of a warrantless arrest. In initially formulating probable cause, they need not investigate independently every claim of innocence. Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 318 (6th Cir.2000). And after the officer determines, on the basis of the facts and circumstances known to him, that probable cause exists, the officer has no further duty to investigate or to search for exculpatory evidence. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir.1999); Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir.1988). However, the initial probable cause determination must be founded on both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence known to the arresting officer, Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318 (emphasis in original); Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999), and the officer cannot simply turn a blind eye toward potentially exculpatory evidence. Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 372; see also id. at 371 (noting that officers may not make hasty, unsubstantiated arrests with impunity); Fridley, 291 F.3d at 873 (The officer may not ignore information which becomes available in the course of routine investigations.). In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. Fridley, 291 F.3d at 872 (quotation marks omitted). Whether an officer is authorized to make an arrest ordinarily depends, in the first instance on state law. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 36, 99 S.Ct. 2627. Defendants each arrested Plaintiff for criminal trespass. [3] In Ohio, an individual commits criminal trespass by [k]nowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] on the land or premises of another absent privilege to do so. Ohio Rev.Code § 2911.21(A)(1). The Ohio Code defines privilege as an immunity, license, or right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity. Id. at § 2901.01(A)(12). Ohio courts construe the lack-of-privilege requirement as an element of the offense of criminal trespass, and not an affirmative defense. State v. Newell, 93 Ohio App.3d 609, 639 N.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (In a criminal trespass charge, the state is required to prove lack of privilege.); State v. Keegan, 67 Ohio App.3d 824, 588 N.E.2d 928, 929 (1990) (classifying absence of privilege as an essential element of trespass). Accordingly, Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff if, on the basis of the facts known to them, they could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff knowingly entered CWS's property without privilege. At the time Defendant Hains arrested Plaintiff, Hains knew only that Jackson called the Cincinnati Police to complain that Plaintiff had entered the CWS property. [4] Upon arriving at the scene, Defendant Hains refused to listen to an eyewitness account of the incident, directing the witness to Tell it to the judge. Although Plaintiff admits that he knowingly entered the premises of CWS to retrieve his sign on October 28, 2003, on the facts alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant Hains did not observe this conduct, nor did Plaintiff admit such conduct to Defendant Hains at the scene. Similarly, the facts and circumstances known to Defendant McShane, as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, were that someone at CWS called the City of Cincinnati Police Division alleging that [Plaintiff] had trespassed. (J.A. at 13) Like Hains, McShane did not witness the alleged trespass. Also like Hains, Defendant McShane declined to hear a sidewalk counselor's attempted explanation of the incident. ( Id. at 12-13) Reading Plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to him, Defendants failed to reasonably determine whether they had probable cause. In the course of initially assessing whether probable cause to arrest Plaintiff existed, Defendants respectively turn[ed] a blind eye to potentially exculpatory evidence when they refused to listen to the witnesses at the scene. A prudent officer must draw reasonable conclusions from the facts and circumstances known to him as supported by reasonably trustworthy information. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, 85 S.Ct. 223. It appears that Defendants deliberately excluded from a totality of known facts and circumstances information that might bear on the accuracy, reliability, or trustworthiness of the report that Plaintiff had trespassed on CWS's property. To that extent, Defendants did not act as prudent officer[s] and their conclusions cannot be deemed reasonable. Rather, potentially conflicting explanations from these eyewitnesses would have informed Defendants' probable cause analyses, giving them reason to question the reliability of reports that Plaintiff had committed criminal trespass. [5] Cf. Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 370. Although our Circuit's precedent does not mandate that law enforcement operatives should conduct quasi-trials as a necessary predicate to the warrantless arrest of suspects, Painter, 185 F.3d at 571 n. 21, it does require that warrantless arrest follow consideration of the totality of the circumstances reasonably known to the arresting officers. Because officers initially assessing probable cause to arrest may not off-handedly disregard potentially exculpatory information made readily available by witnesses on the scene, there is a set of facts consistent with the pleadings in which Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. See Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318; Ahlers, 188 F.3d at 371-72; cf. Painter, 185 F.3d at 571. At oral argument, Defendants argued that officers need not entertain any exculpatory evidence to the contrary when they receive a call from a reliable source reporting purportedly criminal activity. Defendants' argument is undermined as a result of Defendants' failure to offer a persuasive explanation of what constitutes a reliable source. For purposes of this discussion, we shall limit our definition of reliable source to someone with respect to whom there is no apparent reason to question the person's reliability. Probable cause assessments depend on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer. Here, the totality should have encompassed readily available eyewitness accounts, but did not because Defendants refused to listen. We express no opinion as to whether, where the totality of the circumstances consists solely of a report of criminal activity from a reliable source, probable cause exists to arrest. That case is not before us. [6] Even assuming that CWS constitutes a reliable source here, Defendants deliberately disregarded available evidence and, consequently, failed to reasonably formulate probable cause. Accordingly, Defendants' argument has no merit in this case. Our conclusion is only that sufficient facts have been alleged to avoid dismissal on the pleadings. We conclude that Plaintiff has stated a claim that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and, therefore, that they violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. We next consider whether Plaintiff's rights were clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 207, 121 S.Ct. 2151. On this point, we determine whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Qualified immunity cannot be invoked to shield an officer from liability where in light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of his conduct was apparent. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Pre-existing law need not address the very question at hand; rather, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 830 (6th Cir.2007). In June 2004, the law was clearly established that, absent probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed, was being committed, or was about to be committed, officers may not arrest an individual. Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 313 (quoting Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012) (internal quotation marks omitted). There has been no sea change in this body of law since Plaintiff's arrest in June 2004. As a result, the district court erred in finding Defendants protected by qualified immunity. We note that on remand, after sufficient discovery, the district court quite obviously retains its discretion to entertain motions for summary judgment. Without the benefit of discovery, we express no opinion on the ultimate merits of Plaintiff's case. We simply find, having scrutinized Plaintiff's case with special care, that the district court improvidently dismissed Plaintiff's claims. See Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1064. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims.