Opinion ID: 2974716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim for Asylum

Text: Requests for asylum require a two-step inquiry: “(1) whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee as defined in [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(42)(A), and (2) whether the applicant merits a favorable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General.” Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A refugee is defined as: any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). It is the applicant’s burden to establish that he qualifies as a refugee “‘either because he . . . has suffered past persecution or because he . . . has a well-founded fear of future persecution.’” Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 451 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)). 11 If the applicant fails to show that he suffered past persecution, he does not obtain the benefit of the presumption under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) of a well-founded fear of suffering future persecution and “retain[s] the burden of proof on that issue.” Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. That burden requires that the asylum applicant show: that “persecution is a reasonable possibility” should he be returned to his country of origin. A well-founded fear of persecution has both a subjective and an objective component: an alien must actually fear that he will be persecuted upon return to his country, and he must present evidence establishing an “objective situation” under which his fear can be deemed reasonable. A well-founded fear of persecution does not require the applicant to show that he probably will be persecuted if he is deported; “[o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.” Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31, 440 (1987)). “Because a well-founded fear of persecution can be based upon what has happened to others who are similarly situated, it is ‘necessary, in considering an applicant’s asylum petition, to weigh evidence of general conditions in the country of origin and the foreign government’s history of treatment of others engaged in similar activities.’” Ali, 366 F.3d at 411 (quoting Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 621).
The BIA did not err in upholding the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. Despite Grijalva’s arguments to the contrary, substantial evidence supports the finding that Grijalva was not credible. First, the gang rape reported in his 1997 asylum application was never mentioned in the 1995 asylum application. Grijalva’s argument, that the 1995 application has no probative value because it was prepared by a notario and signed by Grijalva, who cannot read, lacks merit. It ignores Grijalva’s testimony that a friend read him the contents of the 1995 application and that he signed 12 it knowing that it did not say anything about his homosexuality or the alleged gang rape by Guatemalan soldiers. Second, Grijalva’s testimony about the gang rape by Guatemalan soldiers was inconsistent with his 1997 asylum application and with what he reportedly told his clinical psychologist, Dr. Zenger. In both, Grijalva reported that the gang rape occurred in 1990; four years before he escaped to the United States. His direct testimony at the immigration proceedings was significantly different; that he escaped to the United States only a few months after the gang rape. Grijalva’s reliance on Ileana v. INS, 106 F. App’x 349, 354 (6th Cir. 2004), is misplaced. Unlike in Ileana, the inconsistencies the IJ and BIA relied upon were not inconsequential or dubious, and, because he was represented by counsel, there was less reason for Grijalva to feel nervous, intimidated, or confused. Finally, despite Grijalva’s claims to the contrary, the inconsistencies relied upon by the BIA go to the heart of Grijalva’s claim that he was persecuted in Guatemala for being an effeminate homosexual and can be viewed as attempts by him to enhance his claims of persecution. Inconsistencies about how long Grijalva remained in Guatemala after his alleged gang rape -- four years or a few months -- reasonably give rise to the question why he would remain in Guatemala for four years if he lived in constant fear of similar abuse as well as the suggestion that the gang rape might never have occurred. These inconsistencies are sufficient to support the BIA’s adverse credibility determination. Thus, there is no need to address Grijalva’s additional arguments about other inconsistencies. See Xhamxhi, 2006 WL 2873390 at  (observing that “[o]ther circuits hold that a single inconsistency may support an adverse credibility finding.”). 3. Whether Grijalva Merited A Favorable Exercise of Discretion 13 Although the IJ did not make a finding whether Grijalva established a well-founded fear of persecution, thus allowing him to be defined as a “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the IJ did consider his corroborating evidence of future persecution. Despite that consideration, the IJ found that, because of his lack of credibility, Grijalva did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion by the Attorney General. The IJ has the authority to do so even when there is a finding that the applicant qualifies as a refugee. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(a) (providing that an immigration judge may “deny asylum in the exercise of discretion to an applicant who qualifies as a refugee under section 101(a)(42) of the Act.”). It was not clear error to find that Grijalva’s lack of credibility doomed his claim for asylum. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 247 (6th Cir. 2003) (observing that “[a]n alien’s credibility, by itself, may satisfy his burden, or doom his claim [for asylum].”). Grijalva concedes that a grant of asylum is discretionary. B. Claims For Withholding of Removal and Protection Under the CAT Although the IJ did not make a finding whether Grijalva had established a well-founded fear of persecution so as to satisfy the statutory definition of a “refugee,” the IJ did find that Grijalva satisfied the higher burden for a withholding of removal by establishing that it would be more likely than not that he would be persecuted if he returned to Guatemala. The BIA reversed this determination because it did “not find substantial evidence to conclude that it is more likely than not that [Grijalva] would be persecuted in Guatemala on account of his homosexuality.” The BIA based this finding on its application of a legal standard requiring that Grijalva show a pattern and practice of persecution “adopted by the government” of Guatemala and its examination of the July 30, 2003 Andrew Reding affidavit that the IJ relied upon in its grant of Grijalva’s request for withholding of removal. 14 Andrew Reding’s affidavit avers that: (1) he is a Senior Fellow for Hemispheric Affairs at the World Policy Institute, New School University, New York, New York; (2) he was currently completing a report on Treatment of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Persons in Latin American and the Caribbean for the Department of Homeland Security; (3) some of the findings that were to be stated in that report were summarized in his affidavit; (4) “[t]he situation for homosexuals in Guatemala, and particularly for those with effeminate tendencies, has worsened since the publication of the INS Resource Information Center report”; (5) that “Guatemala has become a ‘killing zone’ for such individuals”, (6) that “[o]penly identified homosexuals are ending up dead on the streets as the deliberate victims of ‘social cleansing’ campaigns”, (7) “[i]t is widely believed that vigilante groups that engage in the ‘social cleansing’ of homosexuals are comprised of former members of the state counterinsurgency network”, (8) “[t]he Guatemalan government has turned a deliberate blind eye to the activities of vigilantes who conduct ‘social cleansing’ campaigns against homosexuals”, (9) “[h]omosexuals are widely reviled among the Guatemalan public, and the Guatemalan government has no incentive or desire to bring the murderers to justice”, (10) with the exception of one instance related to the murder of a United States citizen, journalist Larry Lee, “the government has not investigated or prosecuted any of the cases in which a homosexual has been murdered,” (11) “[t]here are no opportunities for internal relocation in Guatemala for a homosexual, particularly one with effeminate tendencies”, (12) “such an individual would be discriminated against and would be subject to violence and possible execution no matter where he lived in that country”, and (13) based on his studies of the area, “Guatemala would be one of the most difficult places for a homosexual to survive.” 15 The BIA found that, although the Reding affidavit made general assertions about the mistreatment of homosexuals, Reding “fail[ed] to corroborate his statements or provide specific data to show a pattern and practice of persecution of homosexuals in Guatemala.” The BIA further observed that, although Grijalva presented evidence of “societal prejudice and isolated incidents of violence directed towards homosexuals in Guatemala”, this evidence did “not show a pattern and practice adopted by the government towards homosexuals.” (Emphasis added). The BIA thus reversed the IJ’s decision to grant Grijalva’s request for a withholding of removal to Guatemala. Grijalva argues here that the BIA’s reversal was in error because it applied the wrong legal standard. Accordingly, we first set out the proper legal standard for a withholding of removal and then examine whether the BIA properly applied that standard. 1. Legal Standard While there is discretion to grant asylum, “withholding of removal is mandatory if an alien can show that his life or freedom would be threatened” because he is a member of a “particular social group.” Namo v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A) and 1231(b)(3)(A)). “To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant must show a ‘clear probability of persecution,’ which is a stricter standard that the ‘well-founded fear’ standard that applies with respect to applications for asylum.” Ali, 366 F.3d at 411 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984) and 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)). “‘Persecution’ entails ‘punishment or the infliction of suffering or harm,’ but ‘harassment or discrimination without more does not rise to the level of persecution.’” Ali, 366 F.3d at 410 (quoting Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389-90). Moreover, “if the government itself is not responsible for the persecution,” it must be shown that the government “is 16 unable or unwilling to control the group responsible.” Patel v. INS, 22 F. App’x 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 967 n.9 (9th Cir. 1998)). “We review the BIA’s decision on a request for withholding of removal under the same standard regardless of whether the request was made pursuant to the INA or the CAT. . . . We will reverse the BIA’s determination against withholding of removal if it is ‘manifestly contrary to law.’” Almuhtaseb v Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(C)). 2. BIA Applied Improper Legal Standard Reding attested in his affidavit that the Guatemalan government has turned a deliberate blind eye toward vigilantes who conduct social cleansing campaigns against homosexuals in that country and has no incentive or desire to bring them to justice as evidenced by their failure to do so in all but one instance that involved a journalist and United States citizen. Reding’s affidavit is consistent with earlier statements in a United States State Department letter addressed to the IJ and contained in the record. Based on its analysis of conditions in Guatemala, the State Department reported that the Guatemalan police reflect that country’s cultural bias against homosexuals, including those who may be victims of police harassment and extortion. The BIA concluded that, because Grijalva had not shown a pattern and practice “adopted by the government” towards homosexuals, Grijalva could not establish that it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted in Guatemala because he is a homosexual. That is an improper legal standard. It ignores the decision in Patel where this Court observed that “if the government itself is not responsible for the persecution,” the applicant may show that the government “is unable or unwilling to control the group responsible.” Patel, 22 F. App’x at 480 (citing Singh, 134 F.3d at 967 17 n.9). It likewise fails to credit the observations in the Reding affidavit and the State Department letter that the Guatemalan government turns a blind eye toward the persecution of homosexuals in that country. Accordingly, because the BIA applied the incorrect legal standard, we vacate its decision as to Grijalva’s claim for withholding of removal and remand this matter to the BIA for a decision consistent with this opinion.2 3. Relief Under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) Grijalva also argues that he satisfied his burden of showing that it was more likely than not that he would be tortured if he was deported to Guatemala and is thus entitled to relief under the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (placing the burden on an applicant seeking relief under the CAT to prove “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal”). “Protection under the CAT is given in the form of withholding of removal.” Namo, 401 F.3d at 457. “An applicant must show that if he is returned to his country of origin, he would be subjected to an act of torture, as defined in 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a).” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(1)). Torture, so defined, requires that it be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). This Court recently clarified that “willful blindness” falls “within the definition of “acquiescence.” Amir v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 921, 927(6th Cir. 2006). The BIA erred when it failed to consider this definition of “acquiescence” in light of averments in the Reding affidavit and the statements in the earlier State Department letter that the Guatemalan police turn a deliberate blind eye toward the persecution of homosexuals in that country. Accordingly, we vacate the BIA’s 2 Reding’s Report for the Department of Homeland Security is now available and thus may supply additional support for the relief Grijalva seeks. 18 decision affirming the denial of Grijavla’s claim for protection under the CAT and remand this matter to the BIA for a decision consistent with this opinion. C. Due Process Claims Finally, Grijalva argues that he was denied due process and a full and fair hearing because of interpreter error and government counsel’s alleged misconduct. The BIA found Grijalva’s due process arguments to be without merit. It concluded that the interpreter’s errors cited on appeal were insignificant, that Grijalva had failed to show that the IJ’s decision relied on any incorrect interpretation, and that Grijalva failed to show that he was prejudiced. It observed that Grijalva was represented by counsel, and his counsel did not request a different interpreter. Grijalva apparently did not raise his arguments about government counsel’s conduct with the BIA. 1. Standard of Review and Legal Standard “We review de novo alleged due process violations in removal hearings.” Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 872 (6th Cir. 2005). To the extent Grijalva’s arguments are based on a February 27, 2006 affidavit of David Garcia, a translator recently hired by Grijalva, they cannot be considered in connection with this appeal. This Court must decide Grijalva’s petition for review only on the administrative record. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). See also Bejjani v. INS, 271 F.3d 670, 676 (6th Cir. 2001) (observing that the “Court is prohibited from considering facts not in the administrative record.”). Aliens in removal proceedings are entitled to the due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, including a full and fair hearing. Id. “To constitute fundamental unfairness, however, a defect must have been such as might have led to a denial of justice.” Id. (internal quote and citation omitted). Proof of prejudice is required. Id. “A showing of prejudice is essentially a 19 demonstration that the alleged violation affected the outcome of the proceedings; we will not simply presume prejudice.” Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quote and citation omitted). The Court thus reviews whether (1) “there was a defect in the removal proceeding;” and (2) “the alien was prejudiced because of it.” Vasha, 410 F.3d at 872. 2. Interpreter Error The interpreter errors Grijalva points out are minor, insignificant, and do not go to the heart of his asylum claims. The adverse credibility determination rested principally on Grijalva’s testimony (1) that he signed his 1995 asylum application after it was read to him, knowing that it did not state that he was a homosexual or that he had been gang raped by Guatemalan soldiers because he was a homosexual or that he was seeking asylum in the United States to escape the threat of harm because of his homosexuality; and (2) that he left Guatemala a few months after the gang rape as opposed to the four year time-period he provided in his 1997 asylum application and in his conversations with Dr. Zenger. It also rested on Grijalva’s changing testimony and demeanor when asked whether it was his signature on the 1995 asylum application. It was ultimately determined that it was his signature. Thus, any interpreter errors as to whether he signed before or after the document was prepared are insignificant and cannot establish prejudice. Additional interpreter errors cited by Grijalva are similarly insignificant and cannot establish prejudice. Moreover, as the BIA observed, Grijalva was represented by counsel during his immigration proceedings, and his counsel did not request a different interpreter. Grijalva complained of prejudicial interpreter error for the first time in his administrative appeal to the BIA. See Gishta, 404 F.3d at 978-79 (denying a due process argument based on interpreter error because the issue was raised “for the first time in their 20 administrative appeal.”). The BIA did not err when it determined that the interpreter errors Grijalva cites are insignificant and do not establish the requisite prejudice. b. Alleged Misconduct by Government Counsel and Judicial Bias Grijalva further claims that he was denied a full and fair hearing because the IJ allowed opposing counsel to badger him, to repeatedly ask questions that he had already answered, to raise too many objections, to misrepresent his testimony on cross-examination, to make inappropriate comments about his time being wasted and thus allowed opposing counsel to prejudice the IJ against Grijalva. It is not enough to point to alleged defects in his removal proceedings. Grijalva must show that he was “prejudiced because of it.” Vasha, 410 F.3d at 872. This Court has consistently observed that, although “the IJ is afforded broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth,” the IJ must remain neutral as this “is one of the most basic due process protections.” Id. (internal quotes and citations omitted). Grijalva has not shown that the IJ “crossed the line from impartial arbiter to government advocate.” Id. at 873. The IJ overruled the vast majority of government counsel’s objections, and granted Grijalva’s request for a withholding of removal. The finding that Grijalva lacked credibility was based on substantial evidence, not interpreter error, government counsel’s misconduct, or judicial bias.