Opinion ID: 1201361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: respondent's motion to continue or stay the proceedings

Text: A hearing was held before the trial panel on July 1, 1992. Respondent was present with counsel, and asserted that he was making a special appearance at the hearing. Before any evidence was presented or witnesses called the Respondent presented three motions, two for a continuance and one to quash subpoenas issued by the Professional Responsibility Commission. The Bar Association also made a motion to have the allegations against Respondent deemed admitted because of the Respondent's failure to answer the allegations. Respondent's first motion was for a continuance based upon the argument that one of the three trial panel members was not available for the hearing, and the panel lacked jurisdiction to proceed. A trial panel is composed of three members called Masters, and Two of the three Masters shall constitute a quorum for the purposes of conducting hearings, ruling on and receiving evidence, and rendering Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Rule 6.6, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1, App. 1-A. A trial panel possesses the discretion to continue a date for a hearing when good cause is shown. Id. at Rule 6.7. The trial panel did not abuse its discretion when it denied this motion for a continuance. The second motion for continuance was based upon the statement made by Respondent's counsel that a week prior to the hearing: ... a criminal case or two cases were filed against Mr. Gasaway, which it is my understanding, and I've not looked at the information, that the allegations in those counts in those criminal cases concern the same matters that may be contained in the complaint filed by the Bar Association. He argued that he could not be compelled to give evidence against himself, and that the Complaint sought to impose discipline because he refused to give evidence against himself. Counsel later explained that Mr. Gasaway, as we've stated earlier under Fifth Amendment Rights, is effectively precluded from testifying in this proceeding because there's a criminal case pending. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that simultaneous civil and related criminal proceedings do not constitute unfairness and want of consideration for justice so as to require the reversal of a criminal conviction. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11, 90 S.Ct. 763, 769, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970). It would stultify enforcement of federal law to require a governmental agency such as the FDA invariably to choose either to forego recommendation of a criminal prosecution once it seeks civil relief, or to defer civil proceedings pending the ultimate outcome of a criminal trial. Id. 397 U.S. at 11, 90 S.Ct. at 769. This view was also expressed in Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229-230, 80 S.Ct. 683, 692-693, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) where the Court explained that the Constitution did not require an irrevocable choice on the part of the Government between pursuing an I.N.S. investigation and an F.B.I. investigation against an individual. Consistent with this rule of not requiring the Government to choose between using a civil or criminal proceeding against a defendant, courts have explained that simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings do not necessarily run afoul of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. One state court stated: There is nothing inherently repugnant to due process in requiring plaintiff to choose between giving testimony at the disciplinary hearing and keeping silent, even though giving testimony at the hearing may damage his criminal case and keeping silent will most likely lead to loss of his employment. Giampa v. Illinois Civil Service Commission, 89 Ill. App.3d 606, 44 Ill.Dec. 744, 750, 411 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 (1980). In United States v. Kordel, supra , a defendant, as does the Respondent herein, argued for a stay of the civil proceeding because of a pending criminal proceeding. Courts have cited Kordel as support for the proposition that the sole fact of simultaneous proceedings is insufficient to constitutionally require a stay. For example, in Oznemoc v. Alcoholic Beverages Cont. Comm., 412 Mass. 100, 587 N.E.2d 751 (1992) that court explained that: Courts generally reject claims by parties to administrative proceedings that they are entitled to continuances until after their criminal trials because they will not testify for fear of self-incrimination. Id. 587 N.E.2d 751. Numerous cases from other jurisdictions support this rule. [14] The rule has also been recognized in the context of lawyer discipline proceedings. For example in State v. Horton, 561 A.2d 488 (Me. 1989) that court explained: Contrary to Horton's contention, the fact that a lawyer's decision to invoke the privilege and remain silent can be used as evidence in the disciplinary proceeding does not render the lawyer's decision to speak involuntary. Disciplinary proceedings are civil in nature, and a lawyer has no constitutional right to prevent the fact finder in that proceeding from considering the implication of his silence, along with other evidence against him, in making a determination. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Dineen, 481 A.2d 499, 503 (Me. 1984). If he chooses to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and remain silent, a lawyer might be disciplined for the underlying misconduct charged by the Board, but that does not mean he is compelled to speak rather than assert his privilege. Id. 561 A.2d at 491. Thus, simultaneous Bar disciplinary proceedings and related criminal proceedings do not necessarily require the staying of the disciplinary proceeding. It is true that a court may exercise its discretion and grant a stay when a strong public interest in proceeding expeditiously on a civil case is absent. [15] This policy is reflected in Disciplinary Rule 5.6 allowing the Professional Responsibility Commission to stay the processing of a grievance. [16] The high court has stated circumstances that may call for granting relief from simultaneous proceedings: We do not deal here with a case where the Government has brought a civil action solely to obtain evidence for its criminal prosecution or has failed to advise the defendant in its civil proceeding that it contemplates his criminal prosecution; not with a case where the defendant is without counsel or reasonably fears prejudice from adverse pretrial publicity or other unfair injury; nor with the any other special circumstances that might suggest the unconstitutionality or even the impropriety of this criminal prosecution. United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. at 11-12, 90 S.Ct. at 769-770. None of those circumstances have been alleged or raised by the Respondent in his request for a continuance. The Respondent was suspended from the practice of law after the trial panel hearing and pending the outcome of this proceeding. This circumstance could weigh in favor of this Court granting a requested stay when related criminal charges have been filed and are pending against a lawyer subject to professional discipline. Although disciplinary proceedings may result in the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer this result is not the exclusive purpose of the disciplinary process. Thus, an interim suspension does not, by itself, show that the interests of the Bar Association and public in the disciplinary proceeding have been satisfied so as to require a continuance or stay of the disciplinary proceeding. We decline to issue a stay under the circumstances of this case.