Opinion ID: 2429565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of Mahler

Text: Close analysis of Mahler , however, reveals that Wallen's situation is distinguishable from Mahler's. Mahler apparently had no prior convictions but was willing to be treated as if he did, in order to get the benefit of a lower sentence to a lesser included offense. By contrast, Wallen's bargaining position was negatively affected by prior convictions that later turned out to be invalid. Assuming that the state has not successfully reprosecuted Wallen on the 1975 forgery charges, I am convinced that his three life sentences should be set aside and the case remanded for resentencing within Range I. It seems to me that in finding a Mahler waiver in this case, the majority misapprehends the posture of Wallen's challenges. Undoubtedly, Wallen's armed robbery guilty pleas were voluntarily entered. The trial judge scrupulously advised Wallen of the rights he was waiving by entering the pleas of guilt. Wallen indicated he understood those rights and, based on the circumstances existing at the time of the entry of the pleas, felt his best interest would be served by agreeing to the plea bargain. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept the majority's conclusion that the pleas were the product of informed choice, given the dramatic shift in circumstances after the pleas were entered. To the majority's credit, it does not repeat the intermediate court's error of relying on Mahler for the proposition that issues challenging the length of sentences imposed on a defendant can only be raised on direct appeal and are not reviewable in post-conviction proceedings. In Mahler , the post-conviction sentencing challenge could and should have been raised on direct appeal. In this case, Wallen could not challenge his facially valid sentencing as a persistent and especially aggravated offender until he successfully challenged the underlying convictions that provided the basis for those classifications. See State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, 851 (Tenn. 1989); State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tenn. 1987). Moreover, at the time Wallen could have subjected the armed robbery sentences to challenge on direct appeal, the underlying convictions had not yet been reversed and no grounds then existed on which to attack the validity of the enhanced sentences. In order to subject the allegedly improper sentences to review, and because the sentencing issues raised by Wallen are collaterally connected to the constitutional deficiencies in the underlying forgery convictions, I believe Wallen's challenges are cognizable in post-conviction relief proceedings. In fact, because habitual criminal status is not an actual offense in Tennessee but is merely a basis for enhancement of sentences, see, e.g., Evans v. State, 571 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tenn. 1978), Wallen's situation is analogous to the classic post-conviction habitual-criminal challenge. It is, of course, well-accepted that a prisoner may challenge the propriety of his conviction as an habitual criminal in post-conviction proceedings after successfully challenging the predicates for the enhancement. Similarly, Wallen should now be able to challenge the legitimacy of the enhanced sentences imposed upon him after proving that the convictions which provided the basis for such enhancement are invalid. See Johnson v. Mississippi, supra, 486 U.S. at 587-89, 108 S.Ct. at 1987-88 (discussing analogous situation presented in Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476 (Miss. 1982)). An examination of cases from other jurisdictions does not support the majority's ruling that a different analysis is applicable in situations involving defendants who have entered guilty pleas rather than proceed to trial and subsequent sentencing. Although well-established legal principles do recognize that entry of a guilty plea waives certain defects in the sentence, as Mahler makes clear, such cases involve situations in which the defendant could make an informed choice based upon full knowledge of the situation presented. In this case, by contrast, certain crucial facts were not known by Wallen, or by anyone else, at the time of the entry of the guilty plea. In accepting the guilty plea, therefore, the trial court considered evidence that has been revealed to be materially inaccurate. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. at 590, 108 S.Ct. at 1988. The response of courts faced with a request to modify a sentence enhanced by convictions later held invalid has been virtually uniform. See, e.g., State v. Petty, 596 So.2d 421 (La. App. 1992); People v. Dozier, 78 N.Y.2d 242, 573 N.Y.S.2d 427, 577 N.E.2d 1019 (1991); United States v. Davis, 753 F. Supp. 529 (D.Vt. 1990); United States v. Paleo, 738 F. Supp. 611 (D.Mass. 1990); Domegan v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 166 (D.Mass 1989); State v. Gibson, 34 Ohio App.3d 146, 517 N.E.2d 990 (1986); State v. Stackhouse, 194 N.J. Super. 371, 476 A.2d 1268 (A.D. 1984); Lee v. State, 673 P.2d 892 (Alaska App. 1983); and People v. Dugger, 673 P.2d 351 (Colo. 1983). In all these cases, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, the courts have recognized that principles of due process will not tolerate the continued enhancement of a sentence imposed at a time when the accused was unaware that the predicate convictions were invalid. Such a sentence, in the words of New Jersey's Appellate Division, rests on an insufficient factual basis, Stackhouse 476 A.2d at 1269, and resentencing is constitutionally required. To hold otherwise would only serve to compound whatever constitutional wrong has already occurred. Domegan at 169. In People v. Dugger, supra , the prosecution made an argument similar to that advanced in the majority opinion in this case. In the Colorado case, the defendant entered a guilty plea to a forgery charge and received an enhanced sentence because of a previous forgery conviction. As part of the plea agreement, however, Dugger, like Wallen, received the added benefit of having certain habitual criminal counts dismissed. Subsequently, Dugger challenged the previous forgery conviction in a post-conviction proceeding and that previous conviction was invalidated. Dugger then claimed that the second forgery sentence must be reduced because the conviction upon which the enhanced sentence was predicated had been overturned. The government argued, however, that the defendant somehow reaffirmed his invalid prior conviction (or in Mahler terms, waived that invalidity) by agreeing to a guilty plea imposing an enhanced sentence for a subsequent conviction. The Colorado Supreme Court summarily rejected that argument, based on federal and state constitutional grounds. The Dugger decision notes that the appellate court has already declared the [previous forgery] conviction to be invalid, and its decision constitutes a final judgment which is binding on the [trial] court. People v. Dugger, supra, 673 P.2d at 353. In a footnote, the court then explained, [W]e are at a loss to understand the People's claim that somehow the defendant could `reaffirm' the validity of his [previous] conviction when the court of appeals has decreed by final judgment that the [previous] conviction was a nullity.  Id., 673 P.2d at 353 n. 5 (emphasis added). For reasons of fundamental fairness, I believe that the holding in Dugger should be adopted and applied in this case, rather than the inapposite holding in Mahler . Put simply, Mahler involved a best interest guilty plea in which all the cards, so to speak, were on the table at the time the plea was entered. In order to avoid a looming first-degree murder conviction, Mahler entered a plea to the lesser included offense of second-degree murder and was sentenced in the high end of the upper range for that offense, even though there was no proof to show that he had a prior criminal record that would justify Range II sentencing. It is true that no one told Mahler that a Range II sentencing would not have been applicable had he gone to trial and been found guilty of second degree murder, because the state had failed to file notice that the prosecution would seek enhanced punishment in the event of such a conviction. Because the indictment charged first-degree murder, the possible punishments for which were death or a life sentence, Range II sentencing was irrelevant, and statutory notice of intent to seek enhancement was not required. Moreover, the transcript of the submission hearing apparently showed that Mahler would have pleaded guilty in any event, in order to avoid conviction of the more serious offense. State v. Mahler, supra, 735 S.W.2d at 227. Here, by contrast, the guilty pleas were entered in exchange for a promise by the state to drop the habitual criminal counts, which were ostensibly based on Wallen's prior forgery convictions. But in Wallen's case, the cards were not all on the table  indeed, they had not even been dealt. It is quite clear that if Wallen had known that the 17 forgery convictions were voidable and were eventually going to be invalidated, thus obliterating the legal basis for the habitual criminal charges, he would not have pleaded guilty in exchange for voluntary dismissal of the recidivist counts, even though he might have pleaded guilty for some other concession. Importantly, however, the only concession he was offered for his pleas in this case involved dismissal of the habitual criminal counts. He thus settled for three concurrent life sentences, rather than three life sentences without possibility of parole, which conviction on the habitual criminal counts would have required. Now that the underlying felony convictions have been invalidated, the basis for the negotiated pleas in this case has disappeared. Thus, the situation here is different from that in Mahler , where the factual predicate for the guilty plea was the same on post-conviction as it was at the time Mahler entered his plea. Mahler reaped considerable benefit from his bargain. Because of post-guilty plea developments, Wallen ends up with no benefit at all. Wallen asks this Court to set aside his guilty pleas entirely, based on his contention that they were not voluntarily and knowingly entered. What taints the convictions however, is the impropriety of the sentence when viewed from hindsight, and not the lack of effective assistance of counsel, non-compliance with Boykin , or like constitutional defect that would invalidate the pleas. It thus appears that Wallen's rights can be protected simply by correcting the error in sentencing that has come to light post hoc. Hence, the proper remedy is to remand the case for resentencing.