Opinion ID: 1711856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusions for Cause

Text: In his thirteenth and fourteenth assignments of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erroneously denied challenges for cause against two jurors, Funk and Motley, who the defendant claims were in favor of the death penalty. The defendant argues these jurors should have been excused for cause because they were unable to consider a life sentence. An accused has the constitutional right to challenge jurors peremptorily, with the number of challenges fixed by law. La. Const. art. 1, § 17. Louisiana Code Crim. P. art. 799 provides the defendant in a death penalty case with twelve peremptory challenges. Therefore, when a defendant uses all of his or her peremptory challenges, a trial court's erroneous ruling depriving of a peremptory challenge constitutes a substantial violation of constitutional and statutory rights, requiring reversal of the conviction and sentence. State v. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 2 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1280; State v. Monroe, 366 So.2d 1345, 1347 (La.1978); State v. McIntyre, 365 So.2d 1348, 1351 (La.1978). Prejudice is presumed when a challenge for cause is erroneously denied and the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. To prove there has been reversible error warranting a reversal of the conviction and sentence, the defendant need only show: (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2) the use of all his peremptory challenges. Robertson, 92-2660, p. 3 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d at 1280-1281, citing State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993); State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 225 (La.1993); State v. Lee, 559 So.2d 1310, 1317 (La.1990); State v. Comeaux, 514 So.2d 84, 93 (La. 1987); State v. Brown, 496 So.2d 261, 263-64 (La.1986). In this case, the defendant exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. Therefore, we must ascertain whether any of the trial court's denials of challenges for cause were erroneous. Reasons a juror may be challenged for cause are set forth in La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 797. The article provides: The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that: (1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law; (2)The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his impartiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence; (3)The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror at arriving at a verdict; (4)The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court; or (5)The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense. Moreover, the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). The basis of the exclusion under La. Code. Crim. Proc. art 798(2)(a)(b), which incorporated the standard of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), as clarified by Witt, is that the juror would either automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him..., or that the juror's attitudes towards the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision... in accordance with his instructions and his oath... In a reverse- Witherspoon  context, the basis of the exclusion is that the juror will not consider a life sentence and... will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him... State v. Robertson, 92-2660, 630 So.2d at 1284. Furthermore, if a prospective juror's inclination toward the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties, a challenge for cause is warranted. State v. Ross, 623 So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993). The substantial impairment applies to the reverse Witherspoon challenges. In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the Supreme Court held that venire members who would automatically vote for the death penalty must be excluded for cause. The Court reasoned that any prospective juror automatically voting for death would fail to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, thus violating the impartiality requirement of the Due Process Clause. Id. 112 S.Ct. at 2229. The Morgan Court adopted the Witt standard for determining if a pro-death penalty juror should be excluded for cause. In other words, if the juror's views on the death penalty are such that they would prevent or substantially impair the performance of duties in accordance with the instructions on the oath, whether those views are for or against the death penalty, he or she would be excluded for cause. A defendant in a capital murder case is entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to an impartial jury in both the guilt and penalty phases. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). The party seeking to exclude the juror has the burden to demonstrate, through questioning, that the juror lacks impartiality. State v. Miller, 776 So.2d 396, 402 (La.2000), citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879). Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his challenge for cause to strike venire member Carol Funk because initially Ms. Funk's responses indicated that she would be unwilling to consider a life sentence for intentional murder. When examined by the state, Ms. Funk stated that she would consider the circumstances of the case, including mitigation evidence when deciding whether to vote for death or a life sentence. She specifically stated: Well, if they proved that something like that really happened Somebody really had control or you know, alcohol, I really couldn't say that. If it was alcohol, he'd really have to be completely out of his mind with alcohol to put that as something causing him to do it. The totality of Ms. Funk's colloquy states that she would be able to consider both mitigating and aggravating circumstances in deciding the appropriate penalty. When she was directly asked if she would automatically vote for the death penalty, she stated she would have to look at the whole circumstances. Defense counsel attempted to exercise a challenge for cause to Ms. Funk based upon her statement that she could only consider the death penalty if the murder was intentional. The trial court denied the challenge. We agree with the trial court. Ms. Funk did state that she would consider the circumstances of the case in determining whether to vote for death or a life sentence. This court has held that prospective jurors in capital cases who expressly agree to consider both death and life sentences and to consider any mitigating evidence are properly not excluded for cause. State v. Miller, 99-0192 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396. The same issue presented by Ms. Funk in this case was presented in Miller, and as in that case, we find that the trial court did not err in denying the cause challenge. Additionally, when examined by the state, prospective juror Paulette Motley responded that she could impose both the death penalty and life imprisonment and that she could consider both aggravating and mitigating circumstances to reach her verdict in the penalty phase. She said that she would not be influenced in her sentencing decision by the fact that it was an intentional killing, and that her sentencing decision would be based solely on the evidence. The trial court denied the challenge for cause based on Ms. Motley's responses concerning defendant's failure to testify, stating although Ms. Motley expressed doubts regarding defendant's failure to take the stand, she didn't say it would make her vote one way or the other. We do not believe that the evidence when reviewed as a whole substantiates the defendant's claim that Ms. Motley would not accept the law as given to her by the court. A juror in a capital case must be willing to consider the imposition of both the death sentence and of a life sentence based on all the instructions given by the judge. The party seeking to exclude the juror has the burden to demonstrate, through questioning, that the juror lacks impartiality, and the defense has not met its burden in proving that Ms. Motley lacks impartiality. Additionally, we conclude that the trial court refusing to accept challenges for cause against Carol Funk and Paulette Motley is permissible in light of State v. Chester, 97-2790 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276, which applies the appropriate basis for review. This court recently rejected, in Chester, the capital defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it denied his challenge for cause based on a prospective juror's inability to return a life sentence in a case of intentional murder. The circumstances involving the challenges in the present case to prospective jurors Funk and Motley are very similar to those in Chester regarding prospective juror Helen Galloway. In Chester, we summarized the juror's responses during voir dire as follows: ....Ms. Galloway responded to the State's questioning that she would listen to both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in an appropriate case return a life sentence. Later, when questioned by defense counsel, she replied that there was a contradiction between specific intent and mitigating circumstances. When defense counsel attempted to explain mitigating circumstances, she replied that she understood them; however, her responses indicated that she was confused about the application of mitigating circumstances in a specific intent crime because she thought mitigating circumstances could apply only when the crime was accidental. However, she also stated in her colloquy that she would listen to both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and make a judgment based on what is presented. 97-2790, pp. 14-15, 724 So.2d at 1285-86. We decided that based on the entire colloquy, we did not find that the juror expressed an unconditional willingness to impose a death penalty under any and all circumstances. Id. Accordingly, we determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the cause challenge. Id. The voir dire in Chester resembled that conducted in this case in that the state did not rehabilitate jurors after the defense elicited testimony indicative of their commitment to vote for the death penalty. This court follows Chester, and finds that there is no abuse of discretion in that all the challenged jurors expressed the ability to consider mitigating circumstances before deciding on a sentence, and accordingly, did not demonstrate an unconditional willingness to impose the death penalty under any and all circumstances. 97-2790, pp. 14-15, 724 So.2d at 1285-86. In light of Chester, the defendant's arguments that Ms. Funk and Ms. Motley should have been excluded have no merit. Similarly, in assignments of error eleven and twelve, the defendant claims that the court erred when it denied cause challenges to prospective jurors Aimee Bonomolo and Carol Eaton. The defendant argues that Eaton and Bonomolo allegedly indicated in their initial responses during voir dire that they may be unwilling to impose a life sentence based on the possibility that the sentence would someday be commuted. The record reveals that at the outset of voir dire, both Aimee Bonomolo and Carol Eaton indicated they could consider both life imprisonment and death when deciding the appropriate penalty for a defendant convicted of first degree murder. Also, when questioned by defense counsel, Eaton answered affirmatively when asked whether she could consider a penalty less than death in a case in which the state introduced evidence of at least three aggravating circumstances present in the defendant's case. Although Eaton stated that the possibility of a commuted sentence would weigh on her mind in determining the penalty, and that she might decide on a death sentence to avoid a pardon, she also stated, as did Bonomolo, that she could hold out for a life sentence in the face of opposition. Eaton specifically indicated that she could consider mitigating circumstances. Bonomolo also directly affirmed that she could impose a sentence other than death in a first degree murder case and that she would be interested in all of the factors surrounding [defendant's] life before she determined the appropriate sentence. Later during voir dire, defense counsel asked Eaton and Bonomolo whether they would return a death verdict to satisfy the victim's family members and both responded in the negative. Defense counsel later challenged these two jurors for caused based on his belief that they would be more likely to impose a death sentence as a result of the possibility that the defendant's life sentence be commuted. The trial judge denied the challenges, stating that prospective jurors only talk[ed] about the possibilities of the parole system influencing their verdict. In capital cases, the trial judge makes personal observations of potential jurors during the entire voir dire, and a reviewing court should accord great deference to the trial judge's determination and should not attempt to reconstruct voir dire by microscopic dissection of transcript in search of magic words or phrases that automatically signify juror's qualification or disqualification. See generally, State v. Miller, 99-0192 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396. Likewise, a prospective juror who indicates his or her personal preference for the death penalty need not be stricken for cause. State v. Lucky, 96-1687 p. 6 (La.4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845, 850. Not every predisposition or leaning in any direction rises to the level of substantial impairment. Id. at 850. We find that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that either Bonomolo or Eaton should have been excluded for cause. Finally, in his fifteenth assignment of error, the defendant complains about the trial court's denials of his cause challenges to prospective jurors Robert Lacher and Donna Stogner based on their inability to consider mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase. The record reveals that Lacher indicated it would be very difficult for him to return a life sentence in a case with the three aggravating factors present in the defendant's case. Throughout his entire voir dire colloquy, Robert Lacher continuously stated that his decision would be based on all the evidence and circumstances of the case. Although Lacher stated it would be difficult to consider both sentences for an intentional murder, he assured the court that he was not predisposed one way or the other to either a life sentence or death penalty. Lacher stated that he would be able to base his decision on the evidence, consider mitigating circumstances, and would not automatically vote for the death penalty. The juror indicated that although he would like to consider the defendant's upbringing in a violent environment as a mitigating circumstance, it wouldn't mean much to him. Counsel challenged Lacher for cause, stating: ...He said that he doesn't believe on blaming society, couldn't consider the mitigating circumstance of environment, and that for an intentional murder The trial court denied the challenge. As to Donna Stogner, when questioned by the defense about the mitigating circumstances of a violent upbringing, the prospective juror indicated she would have trouble considering it at sentencing because [juror has] been there. Ms. Stogner indicated that she would base her decision on mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances, and would not automatically vote for the death penalty in the case of intentional murder. After a line of questioning by the defense, Ms. Stogner again reiterated that she would not automatically decide against a life sentence. Again, the district court denied the cause challenge based on her inability to consider the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Peremptory challenges were used against both Lacher and Stogner. As this court previously noted: There is no statutory or legal presumption in favor or any penalty or any mitigating circumstance, and individual jurors often, if not always, have their own inchoate or unarticulated predispositions. Such personal predispositions do not offend the law, provided that they do not substantially impair the juror's duty to follow the law. Not every predisposition or leaning in any direction rises to the level of substantial impairment. Significantly, it is in the determination of substantial impairment that the trial judge's broad discretion plays the critical role. Lucky, 96-1687, p. 7, (La.4/13/98), 755 So.2d at 850. A juror may assign little weight or importance to any mitigating circumstance he does not consider significant in light of the fact that a defendant has been convicted of first degree murder. Ms. Stogner did not reject consideration of a specific mitigating circumstance, but simply stated that he or she might not assign much weight to that mitigator. A party seeking to exclude a juror has the burden to demonstrate, through questioning, that a juror lacks impartiality. The determination is not how much weight a juror is willing to give any mitigating and aggravating circumstances established by the evidence, it is whether the juror is willing to consider mitigating evidence relevant to character and propensities of the defendant, which is the focus of capital sentencing hearing, and must be willing to fairly consider a life sentence. See Miller, 99-0192 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d at 402. A review of the entirety of the voir dire colloquies of these prospective jurors shows no abuse of the trial judge's discretion in denying the cause challenges against Mr. Lacher and Ms. Stogner. In light of the aforementioned rules, the challenges for cause to Mr. Lacher and Ms. Stogner lack merit.