Opinion ID: 2045911
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Heading: Does Chapter 229A Violate Morrow's Right to Equal Protection?

Text: A. General principles governing our review. This court reviews constitutional claims de novo. See Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Iowa 1999). Statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality and, thus, a party challenging a statute carries a heavy burden of rebutting this presumption. Glowacki v. State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 501 N.W.2d 539, 541 (Iowa 1993). `A person challenging a statute must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be upheld as constitutional.' Id. (quoting Schroeder Oil Co. v. Iowa State Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 458 N.W.2d 602, 603 (Iowa 1990)). B. Principles of equal protection. The United States and Iowa Constitutions guarantee the equal protection of the law to all persons. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 6. We apply the same analysis in considering the state equal protection claim as we do in considering the federal equal protection claim. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 1998). The Equal Protection Clause essentially requires that similarly-situated persons be treated alike. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313, 320 (1985); Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 196. If people are not similarly situated, their dissimilar treatment does not violate equal protection. See Bruns v. State, 503 N.W.2d 607, 610 (Iowa 1993); Hack v. Auger, 228 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Iowa 1975). To meet constitutional standards, it is sufficient if all members of the same class be treated the same. See Hack, 228 N.W.2d at 43. The classification itself must, however, be reasonable. [1] See id. The following discussion summarizes the appropriate analysis in determining the reasonableness of a classification: A classification is reasonable if it is based upon some apparent difference in situation or circumstances of the subjects placed within one class or the other which establishes the necessity or propriety of distinction between them. A classification does not deny equal protection simply because in practice it results in some inequality; practical problems of government permit rough accommodations.... State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 792 (Iowa 1999) (citations omitted). The legislature is given wide discretion in defining the limits of classes when a statute involves classification of persons or things. State v. Hall, 227 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa 1975). C. Application of law to facts. We turn now to a determination of whether Morrow is similarly situated to others who are not subject to the commitment procedures of chapter 229A. Morrow claims that he is treated differently than other violent offenders with ... antisocial personality disorder[s] who have served their prison sentences and are due for release. We conclude, however, that sexually violent predators are not similarly situated to other violent offenders. In order to be committed under chapter 229A, a person must (1) be convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense, (2) suffer from a mental abnormality, and (3) be likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if not confined. See Iowa Code § 229A.2(8). Although Morrow argues that the same findings could be made upon any other group of violent offenders, this conclusion is not true. If the same findings could be made, the person would fall within the class of a sexually violent predator and be subject to chapter 229A. It is true that other prisoners may have committed violent offenses, may suffer from a mental disorder, and may be likely to repeat their prior offenses, but such prisoners are still dissimilar because their offenses are not sexual in nature. This difference in the nature of the prisoners' offenses is an adequate basis upon which to conclude that sexually violent predators and other violent offenders are not similarly situated and may be treated differently without violating the Equal Protection Clause. See In re Hay, 263 Kan. 822, 953 P.2d 666, 675 (1998) (rejecting equal protection challenge to similar statute, holding that there exist clear distinctions between this class [of sexually violent predators] and other classes which are not similarly treated); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.1994) (rejecting equal protection challenge to similar statute, noting that there are genuine and substantial distinctions between the sexual predator and other criminal recidivist types, such as murderers and arsonists). In addition, we think the classification of sexually violent predators is reasonable. The legislature, in enacting the Sexually Violent Predator Act, found that such persons were a small but extremely dangerous group who were not amenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities. Iowa Code § 229A.1. The general assembly also found that sexually violent predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high and that the existing involuntary commitment procedure under chapter 229 is inadequate. Id. The legislature is free to single out sexually violent predators from other violent offenders. The particularly devastating effects of sexual crimes on victims, and the offenders' need for specialized treatment provide a rational basis for the classification. See State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115, 130 (1995) (upholding similar statute against equal protection challenge, noting the heightened level of dangerousness and the unique treatment needs of sexually violent persons as distinctions justifying the classification). The fact that the Act does not address potentially similar problems with other violent offenders does not detract from the reasonableness of the current classification. See In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675; see also Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 987 P.2d 779, 798 (Ct.App.1999) (upholding similar statute against equal protection challenge, finding it reasonable to treat sexually violent predators differently than persons suffering from other mental disorders committed under existing involuntary commitment procedures); see generally Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270, 275, 60 S.Ct. 523, 526, 84 L.Ed. 744, 750 (1940) (stating that the legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may confine restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest). The discussion of the Kansas Supreme Court is particularly enlightening: The legislature has broad constitutional authority to adopt statutory programs to confine and treat people who might be dangerous to themselves or others and who suffer from some mental ailment, whether a mental abnormality, a personality disorder, or a mental illness as statutorily defined. The legislature, however, is under no duty to act to the fullest extent of its authority. The Act focuses on the narrow problem of mental abnormality and violent predatory sex crimes. The legislative history shows the target group was a small number of habitual sex offenders, who, because of their psychological makeup, pose an immediate danger to the public. Equal protection of the law does not require the State to choose between attacking every aspect of public danger or not attacking any part of the danger at all. In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 675. Similarly here, the Iowa legislature focused on the risks of recidivism by sexually violent predators. The legislature was not required to enact a law that encompassed the risks of recidivism by all violent criminals. Consequently, the classification of sexually violent predators is reasonable and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.