Opinion ID: 572644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Raised by Kerridan and LaPorta

Text: 66 Kerridan and LaPorta each essentially raise four issues, none of which persuade us to reverse their convictions or sentences. Kerridan challenges the evidence supporting the verdict on the conspiracy count and two findings of fact made by the district court at the defendant's sentencing hearing. Specifically, Kerridan argues that there were a series of narrower conspiracies rather than the one, all-encompassing conspiracy found by the jury, and that the district court erred by enhancing his offense level for his role in the offense, see Guideline 3B1.1(b), and by finding that he possessed with the intent to distribute 5806.65 grams of cocaine. Suffice it to say that these challenges cannot overcome the substantial deference given to the jury and the district court on factual findings. See United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir.1990) ([T]he jury gets first crack at deciding whether there is one conspiracy or several.... [On review,] the question for us simply is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's determination. (quotations omitted)); Brown, 900 F.2d at 1101 (A sentencing court's determination concerning a defendant's role in the offense is a finding of fact, subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review on appeal.); United States v. Ross, 905 F.2d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir.1990) ([T]he quantity of a controlled substance involved in a cocaine transaction is a sentencing determination to be made by the sentencing judge.... [T]hus our standard of review is one of clear error.). Given the strong evidence in the record supporting the jury's and the district court's determinations, we find no error. 67 Kerridan also argues that his sentence on Count 28 for using a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence and drug trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, because the statutory amendment that provides for the imposed sentence did not take effect until after the charged conduct had taken place. Based on his involvement in a plot to murder one of Cappas' rivals, the district court sentenced Kerridan to a consecutive five-year prison term authorized by the current version of § 924(c). Prior to the amendment included in Chapter X of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (the Act), Pub.L. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat. 2138, the penalty was a consecutive term of imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten. Because § 235 provides that the ostensible effective date for the Act was November 1, 1987, and because the murder plot took place in October 1987, Kerridan claims that the sentencing amendment should not have been applied. 68 The flaw in Kerridan's argument is that the effective date provision of § 235 is limited expressly to Chapter II of the Act. The relevant amendment is contained in Chapter X. In the absence of an explicit effective date provision, an act becomes effective on the date it is signed into law. United States v. Cirrincione, 600 F.Supp. 1436, 1438 (N.D.Ill.), aff'd, 780 F.2d 620 (7th Cir.1985). The Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held that the effective date provision of the Act does not apply to the amendment to § 924(c), and that the amendment became effective when signed by the President on October 12, 1984. See United States v. Holloway, 905 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir.1987). Because the murder plot occurred well after that date, the amendment to § 924(c) properly was applied to Kerridan's conduct. His sentence on Count 28 is affirmed. 69 LaPorta similarly offers meritless claims, most of which we have already resolved. LaPorta's most significant argument is that the Guidelines should not have been used to calculate his sentence because he withdrew from the conspiracy prior to November 1, 1987, the Guidelines' effective date. We note that withdrawal from a conspiracy is a question of fact, which was found by the district court (LaPorta pleaded guilty), and, therefore, is not reversible unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Wilkens, 659 F.2d 769, 775 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1102, 102 S.Ct. 681, 70 L.Ed.2d 646 (1981). Also, when we review the evidence to determine if the district court erred, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir.1988). 70 As we discussed when we resolved Bafia's claims, it is not easy to withdraw from a conspiracy. See supra at 1477. To establish that he withdrew from a conspiracy, the defendant must prove that he undertook affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objects of the conspiracy, to disavow or to defeat the conspiratorial objectives, and either communicated those acts in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators or disclosed the illegal scheme to law enforcement authorities. United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 589 (11th Cir.1987). Although LaPorta claimed that he achieved withdrawal by informing Cappas that he no longer wished to participate, the district court was entitled to disbelieve that testimony and instead rely on the testimony of another cocaine purchaser and federal undercover agents who described events demonstrating Kerridan's involvement in the Cappas conspiracy well beyond the date of his alleged withdrawal. Simply put, the district court found that Kerridan did not meet his burden of proving withdrawal. We can see no error in that determination. The remaining claims of LaPorta and Kerridan are similarly without merit.