Opinion ID: 784093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: wheeler's cross-appeal

Text: 14 Wheeler argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by dictating the theory of Wheeler's case and wrongfully excluding evidence that Wheeler needed to prove his case. Wheeler also argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying Wheeler's motions to amend his pleadings to include declaratory and injunctive relief, and in calculating his attorney fee award. 15
16 Wheeler cites in a rambling brief, which is difficult to understand, a great number of instances in which he believes the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence and dictating the theory of his case. For purposes of our analysis, these alleged abuses may be divided into two categories: 1) those abuses relating to the discrimination phase of the case, and 2) those relating to the same decision verdict. 17
18 There is no reason to discuss Wheeler's numerous allegations of erroneously excluded evidence and unfair adverse rulings regarding discrimination for the simple reason that Wheeler prevailed on that issue. The jury, in fact, found discrimination. Therefore, even if meritorious, Wheeler's allegations of abuse of discretion would not warrant a new trial because the admission of additional evidence or other rulings in Wheeler's favor would not change the outcome on this issue. See Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire and Safety Servs., 327 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.2003) (Ultimately, Appellants must show two things to gain relief from a faulty evidentiary ruling: (1) that the district court abused its discretion, and (2) that the evidentiary ruling was prejudicial to the point of producing a different verdict.). 19 We are not persuaded by Wheeler's argument that additional evidence regarding discrimination would have also influenced the jury's same decision finding. Additional evidence regarding discrimination could not have influenced the same decision verdict, because the relevant inquiry for the jury on that issue was whether, in the absence of discrimination, Wheeler would or would not have been hired. 2 20
21 MHTC can avoid liability, even where a jury finds that there was discrimination, by showing that it would have made the same decision without discrimination. See, e.g., Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska, 234 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir.2000) ([O]nce plaintiff introduces direct evidence of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, `that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's [gender] into account.') (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)). In the instant case, the jury found that even without discrimination, MHTC would not have hired Wheeler. Wheeler argues that this verdict was based substantially on two erroneous evidentiary rulings: 1) MHTC was unfairly allowed to bring up, and Wheeler was prevented from rebutting, ranking evidence of applicants other than Wheeler and Williams; and 2) the district court wrongfully excluded Wheeler's rebuttal testimony of MHTC's sole witness, Scott Stone, as hearsay. 22
23 The district court consistently instructed the parties to focus on Williams and Wheeler, and not the other applicants. The primary issue was to be whether Williams or Wheeler was more qualified. Consistent with this theory of the case, the district court granted MHTC's motion in limine prohibiting Wheeler from introducing any evidence concerning the qualifications of other applicants, thereby limiting the proof as to the other applicants in order to prevent the jury from hearing evidence that was not relevant. Wheeler argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting testimony in violation of its previous order without allowing Wheeler to address the issue on rebuttal or correct the matter in a jury instruction. 3 24 Wheeler argues that this testimony violated the district court's in limine ruling and created a pregnant negative that there was someone ranked above Wheeler. Wheeler contends that this testimony contributed substantially to the jury's same decision verdict, as evidenced by the jury's question on this issue to the court during its deliberations. 4 25 MHTC argues that there was no abuse of discretion for three reasons. First, Wheeler was the first to bring up evidence of ranking by asking whether Barton recommended Wheeler as better qualified than Williams. Second, the testimony did not violate the district court's in limine order because MHTC asked Barton only about Wheeler and Williams. Third, the ranking evidence did not play a significant part in the same decision determination by the jury, because the evidence of Wheeler's bad demeanor during the interview was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 26 At the hearing on the post-trial motions, the district court went into great detail with counsel as to why he felt there was no prejudicial error in his rulings. The district court found that the jury's findings on the same decision instruction were consistent with the Defendant's theory of the case. 5 27 Based upon the district court's explanation and the fact that Wheeler's counsel was given an opportunity to go further and to offer rebuttal evidence to show that Wheeler was more qualified than Mr. Watson, who was ranked number one, we find the district court committed no error. 28
29 Wheeler also argues that he should be granted a new trial on the basis that the district court wrongfully excluded Wheeler's rebuttal of the testimony of Scott Stone, an interviewer. Stone testified that Wheeler raised his voice in the 1998 interview, and that this reminded him of a similar incident in a 1997 meeting where Wheeler, as a temporary employee, had also raised his voice. Wheeler wished to take the stand in rebuttal to testify that, in 1997, Mr. Stone had mistaken Wheeler for someone else and that there was another gentleman who made a sarcastic remark that Mr. Stone got mad about. However, during a sidebar conference before Wheeler took the stand, MHTC's attorney objected to this anticipated testimony on the grounds of hearsay. The district court agreed, allowing Wheeler to testify about the meeting, but not about the other gentleman's sarcastic remark. 30 Wheeler's proposed rebuttal testimony regarding the other gentleman's sarcastic remark was not hearsay. Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974); Fed. R.Evid. 801(c). Evidence of the sarcastic remark, even if Wheeler could have remembered the content of the remark (which he could not), was not offered to prove the truth of that remark, but only to show that Stone was mistaken about who had raised his voice in the 1997 meeting. 31 As previously noted, however, [a] new trial is not warranted on the basis of an evidentiary ruling unless the evidence was so prejudicial that a new trial would likely produce a different result. Bevan, 118 F.3d at 612. Wheeler was not prohibited from testifying about the 1997 meeting or from denying Stone's assertion that Wheeler had appeared angry at this meeting. We believe that this afforded Wheeler a sufficient opportunity to rebut Stone's testimony and that being prevented from testifying about the substance of the sarcastic remark is not reversible error. 32
33 Both pre-trial and post-trial, Wheeler moved to amend his complaint to add appropriate injunctive relief. Post-trial, Wheeler also moved to include a prayer for declaratory relief. The district court denied these motions. 34 We review the district court's denial of leave to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. Mouser v. Caterpillar, Inc., 336 F.3d 656, 666 (8th Cir.2003). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that amendments to pleadings should be allowed with liberality where necessary to bring about the furtherance of justice and where the adverse party will not be prejudiced. Corsica Livestock Sales, Inc. v. Sumitomo Bank, 726 F.2d 374, 377 (8th Cir.1983). However, the decision to allow or deny an amendment is a discretionary matter for the district court to resolve. McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.1994). 35 We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Wheeler's motion to amend the complaint. Wheeler makes little argument that the district court abused its discretion other than to state that such relief would [have been] appropriate and that the district court fail[ed] to explain a reason to not grant the relief. This is not accurate. The district court did, in fact, explain that the requested amendment was untimely filed and unduly prejudicial, and not supported by the evidence at trial and the applicable case law. Since Wheeler points to no abuse of discretion by the district court, and we find none, we affirm on this issue.
36 Wheeler argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining its award of attorney fees by: 1) crediting only 510 (from 1,664.62) hours worked by Wheeler's attorney on the case; 2) reducing counsel's hourly rate from $150 to $125; and 3) reducing counsel's fee award based on his limited success. 37 We review a district court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Peanick v. Morris, 96 F.3d 316, 323 (8th Cir.1996). The method for determining attorney fees is well established. The starting point in determining attorney fees is the lodestar, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rates. Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir.2002) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)). The district court should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The onus is on the party seeking the award to provide evidence of the hours worked and the rate claimed. Id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Finally, the district court should adjust the fee upward or downward on the basis of the results obtained. Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Fish, 295 F.3d at 852. 38 Regarding the number of hours Wheeler's attorney spent on the case, the district court appears to have considered the time and labor required and the novelty and difficulty of the issues and reduced the hours accordingly. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933; see also Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (8th Cir.1981). The district court found that counsel had taken some thirty-seven depositions, many of which were not warranted. 39 Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the hourly fee. The burden is on the moving party to provide evidence supporting the rate claimed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Here, Wheeler provided no evidence that the $150 per hour rate was the prevailing rate or otherwise reasonable. Furthermore, the $150 per hour figure seems suspect, given that earlier in the proceedings Wheeler's attorney had represented his rate to be $125 per hour. 40 Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing Wheeler's attorney fee based on his degree of success. In awarding attorney fees, the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Here, as the district court explained, the reduction correctly reflected the same decision verdict. 41 The appeal and cross-appeal are both denied. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.