Opinion ID: 59430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statistically Significant Disparate Impact in Promotions

Text: Lufkin maintains that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a statistically significant disparate impact against black employees in promotions. At trial, plaintiffs provided statistical evidence of discrimination through the report of their expert, Dr. Richard Drogin. After constructing hypothetical pools of employees who would be eligible for promotion, Dr. Drogin found that during the class period, black employees received 127 fewer hourly promotions and 8.85 fewer salaried promotions than should have been expected given their representation in these pools. Dr. Drogin determined that these differences were statistically significant at 7.61 standard deviations for hourly promotions and at 2.02 standard deviations for salaried promotions. In rebuttal, Lufkin offered the statistical analysis of Dr. Mary Baker. Dr. Baker conducted her calculations using bid data from Lufkin's paper bid sheets, and concluded that there was no statistically significant disparity in the promotion of blacks to hourly or salaried positions. Faced with this battle of experts, the district judge credited the testimony of Dr. Drogin over that of Dr. Baker. Our role in reviewing this decision is limited. An appellate court owes great deference to the findings of the trial court with respect to duly admitted expert testimony. Cleveland ex rel. Cleveland v. United States, 457 F.3d 397, 407 (5th Cir. 2006). We review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to credit one expert over another. Id. And we reverse a district court's factual finding that an employment decision was the product of unlawful discrimination only if it is clearly erroneous. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 398, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). With these standards in mind, we turn to Lufkin's specific contentions. First, Lufkin argues that Dr. Drogin's analysis is legally insufficient because he did not use actual applicant lists and bid sheets to: (1) construct the availability pools; (2) consider potentially non-discriminatory explanations for the promotions; and (3) factor in qualifications of potential applicants. Lufkin is correct, of course, that actual applicant flow data are superior, and should be used if available. See Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1286-87 (5th Cir.1994). But as discussed above, the district court expressly found that the bid data were incomplete and unreliable, noting that more than half of the promotions were missing from the bid database which Lufkin prepared in anticipation of this litigation. Where actual data are unreliable, courts often permit parties to analyze potential applicant flow data. See, e.g., Malave v. Potter, 320 F.3d 321, 326-27 (2d Cir.2003); Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1414 (D.C.Cir.1988); Hameed v. Iron Workers Local 396, 637 F.2d 506, 512 n. 6 (8th Cir.1980); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 568 (4th Cir.1985). The district court did not err in allowing plaintiffs to do so in this case. Lufkin argues that even if the bid sheets were unavailable, Dr. Drogin's regression analysis would still be insufficient because his hypothetical applicant pools do not take into account other minimum qualifications of applicants, such as education. However, in selecting an appropriate pool and performing regression analysis in Title VII cases, the Supreme Court has taught that a plaintiff's regression analysis need not include all measurable variables. See Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400, 106 S.Ct. 3000 ([I]t is clear that a regression analysis that includes less than `all measurable variables' may serve to prove a plaintiff's case.); see also Mozee v. Am. Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1045 (7th Cir.1991). A plaintiff in a Title VII suit need not prove discrimination with scientific certainty; rather his or her burden is to prove discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 400, 106 S.Ct. 3000. We are satisfied that Dr. Drogin's regression analysis was sufficiently refined for plaintiffs to meet this burden. Finally, Lufkin argues that a disparity in salaried promotions of only 2.02 standard deviations does not support the district court's finding of disparate impact. This court has rejected the contention that a disparity of two or three standard deviations is categorically insufficient to support an inference of adverse impact. See Rendon v. AT&T Techs., 883 F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir.1989). [6] And Lufkin has not persuasively explained why a standard deviation of this magnitude should be accorded reduced significance under the particular circumstances of this case. We therefore affirm the district court's finding of a statistically significant disparate impact in promotions.