Opinion ID: 2976177
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Flynn

Text: Flynn argues that he lacked the specific intent to defraud the investors in Access and that he himself was a victim of Marcusse’s fraud. The evidence belies this assertion. As accurately recounted in the government’s brief, the evidence showed that Flynn actively solicited investors for Access; he falsely told them that he had heavily invested in Access and had been highly successful; he set up some of the “church” accounts; he embezzled investor funds for his own use and did not place them in Access accounts; and he wired thousands of dollars to Nigeria, telling the agent that he was a pastor doing missionary work there. Flynn too failed to file any tax returns during the years he was involved with Access. The jury thus had before it sufficient evidence on which to find Flynn guilty on all counts. D. The Testimony of IRS Special Agent James Flink Buffin and Flynn assert as error on appeal the district court’s rulings allowing IRS Special Agent James Flink to testify in rebuttal. 22 A trial judge’s determinations regarding the order of proof and scope of rebuttal testimony are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Benedict v. United States, 822 F.2d 1426, 1428 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Caraway, 411 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 2005). “Evidence introduced on rebuttal serves to rebut new evidence or new theories proffered in the defendant’s case-in-chief, and is not limited by the fact that the plaintiff could have introduced the proffered evidence in his case-in-chief.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Buffin complains that Flink was allowed to testify about theories that were raised in his counsel’s opening statement but about which Buffin never testified due to his change in heart about taking the stand. After the prosecution had rested, Buffin’s attorney gave his opening statement during which he explained to the jury what Buffin would “tell them” when he took the stand as his “main witness.” Counsel stated that Buffin would tell the jury that he had truly believed in Marcusse and that Access was “genuine,” and that Marcusse had made him “the fall guy.” Buffin’s attorney thereafter cross-examined Marcusse, conveying the same theme. As it turned out, however, Buffin did not testify. The government called Agent Flink in rebuttal. The court allowed some of Flink’s testimony but also sustained some of defendants’ objections thereto. Through Flink, 23 the government introduced pleadings filed by Buffin expressing anti-government and anti-tax views to rebut the assertion that he had held a good faith belief in the legitimacy of Access’s activities. The court’s ruling allowing such testimony was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Goodapple, 958 F.2d 1402, 1407 (7th Cir. 1992) (not error for government to introduce in rebuttal evidence refuting defense raised in defendant’s opening statement). The court likewise did not abuse its discretion in allowing Flink to testify in rebuttal to Flynn’s evidence. Flynn took the stand and testified on his behalf, asserting various justifications for his involvement with Marcusse and Access and his use of funds procured through the Access scheme. In rebuttal, Agent Flink testified how he had traced various transactions made by Flynn using Access funds and how that evidence showed that Flynn had used Access funds for his own benefit. This is clearly proper rebuttal, and the court did not err in permitting this testimony. E. Exclusion of Testimony as to Marcusse A trial court’s ruling excluding evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 445 (6th Cir. 1984). Marcusse argues that the district court improperly denied her request to exclude testimony by one of the victims of the Access scheme. This testimony, Marcusse argues, constituted improper hearsay because the victim repeated statements made by 24 the Bosses, Marcusse’s co-defendants, in which they placed blame for the fraud on Marcusse. In fact, however, Marcusse’s counsel objected before the witness gave the anticipated testimony. Recognizing the direction in which the examination was headed, the trial judge sustained counsel’s objection. Thus, the court’s ruling on this issue did not prejudice Marcusse and was not an abuse of discretion. F. Marcusse’s Request for Subpoena Expenses Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the court shall order that a subpoena issue for service on a witness sought to be called by an indigent defendant upon a satisfactory showing that the witness’s testimony is necessary to an adequate defense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b). In making its determination of whether or not issuance of a subpoena is warranted, “the district court is vested with wide discretion.” United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 230 (6th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). A reviewing court “should not reverse unless the exceptional circumstances of the case indicate that defendant’s right to a complete, fair and adequate trial is jeopardized.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). The showing that a witness is “necessary” to a defendant’s case is not met by general statements of need lacking in particular facts concerning the substance of the 25 witness’s proposed testimony. United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 (6th Cir. 1972). Thus, the mere allegation that a witness is necessary for “alibi as well as impeachment purposes” is insufficient. Id. (citation omitted). On May 19, 2005, after trial began, Marcusse filed a request for payment of witness fees for thirty individuals, but without explanation as to their necessity. She subsequently filed an amended request, adding contact information but again providing no facts regarding the witnesses’ proposed testimony. These lists included such individuals as Attorney General John Ashcroft, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and other federal officials. The court denied Marcusse’s request. Subsequently, Marcusse submitted another request, this time with explanations of the proposed testimony. The district court granted in part and denied in part this request. On appeal, Marcusse challenges the denial of her subpoena request only as to three people: Dr. Reede Hubert, Ed Terlesky, and Richard Williams. However, the court correctly concluded that, inasmuch as these individuals were involved in matters collateral to the Access scheme at issue in the case, their testimony was not necessary to Marcusse’s defense. The testimony of Williams, who actually ultimately did testify, bore this out, as the government accurately explains in its brief. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Marcusse’s request 26 for payment of fees as to these individuals. G. The District Court’s Sentencing Determinations This court reviews the district court’s sentencing determination under an abuseof-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We “first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error,” and we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Id. To review for procedural error, this court examines the sentencing transcript to ensure that the sentencing judge adequately considered the relevant factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that he clearly stated his reasons for imposing the chosen sentence. United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Section 3553(a) provides, in relevant part: The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2).... [and] shall consider – (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed – (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 27 (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for -- (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines – [and] .... (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Finally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sentencing judge “is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597 (internal quotations and citation omitted). When a defendant’s challenge is to the amount of loss under the sentencing guidelines, this court reviews the district court’s calculation for clear error. United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 28 Further, the district court’s interpretation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Kosinski, 480 F.3d 769, 774 (6th Cir. 2007). Defendants Marcusse, Besser, and Buffin appeal various aspects of their sentences. Besser argues that the district court improperly found him accountable for the loss caused to all victims. As outlined above, however, Besser actively participated in the fraudulent activities of Access. As this court has held, it is clear under the sentencing guidelines that “a conspirator is liable for the acts and omissions of his coconspirators that are reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Id. (citation omitted). The total loss incurred by the victims of the conspiracy is thus properly attributable to Besser. Id. Likewise, Besser’s contention that the court erred in finding that he was an “organizer or leader” is not well taken. As noted, Besser was a signatory on many of the Access accounts, appeared personally at sales meetings where he was identified as Marcusse’s “partner,” and dealt personally with large investors. Besser’s objection that the scheme did not involve “sophisticated means” is likewise belied by the evidence of the complex, carefully planned scheme involving numerous bank accounts and financial transactions. Finally, Besser’s objection that his sentence is unreasonable is without merit. 29 The district court found Besser’s guideline level to be 43, which calls for a life sentence. The court, noting Besser’s ill health and age and the need for proportionality with the sentences imposed on his co-defendants, instead varied downward and sentenced him to 20 years imprisonment. Marcusse too argues that her sentence was unreasonable. Again, however, the guideline calculation called for a sentence of life imprisonment, but the district court sentenced Marcusse to 25 years imprisonment. The court reached this determination after reviewing the pertinent factors under § 3553(a) and noting particular characteristics of Marcusse’s situation. Its determination was not unreasonable. Finally, Buffin challenges his sentence. He argues that he should have been held responsible only for the money he actually received from the fraudulent scheme rather than for the total loss incurred by the victim investors. Such an argument has been rejected by this court. See United States v. Wolfe, 71 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 1995). The record shows that the district court adequately calculated the loss attributable to Buffin based on the time period during which he was involved in the scheme. The court also correctly determined that Buffin was a “leader” based on his role in the activities of Access. On the basis that Buffin was not as culpable as Marcusse and Besser, however, the district court sentenced him to 15 years 30 imprisonment, substantially below the guideline range of 324 to 405 months. This sentence clearly withstands “reasonableness” review.