Opinion ID: 4528547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rejection of Guilty Plea

Text: Jones first contends that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea agreement and erred in subsequently denying his request to proceed to sentencing on his guilty plea in the absence of an agreement. We reject this argument because Jones himself asked the district court to reject the plea agreement and because there was no error in the district court's decision to hold Jones's guilty plea in abeyance pending resolution of the charges against him that remained outstanding.
The plea agreement was filed with the district court on December 15, 2016, along with a Superseding Information. Although Jones had already been indicted for the relevant conduct (the First Superseding Indictment), the plea agreement contemplated that Jones would plead guilty to the Superseding Information -- which contained a lesser, non-mandatory-minimum conspiracy charge -- in exchange for the Government agreeing to dismiss the First Superseding Indictment at sentencing. The parties further agreed in the plea agreement, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), that the appropriate term of imprisonment for the district court to impose was 55 months. The district court accepted Jones's guilty plea that day, but deferred acceptance of the plea agreement until sentencing. 3 By the time sentencing was scheduled, however, Jones no longer wished to be bound by the plea agreement. In a memorandum submitted to the district court in advance of sentencing, Jones asked the district court to reject the plea agreement. See App'x at 59 ([T]he Court should reject the Plea Agreement pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 11(5).). According to Jones, he had entered into the plea agreement only because he thought that the Probation Office would apply the career offender enhancement to calculate his Guidelines range, which did not end up being the case. Even though the Probation Office's presentence report still calculated Jones's sentencing range at 77-96 months' imprisonment -- well above the 55 months contemplated in the plea agreement -- Jones maintained that enforcing the plea agreement would be fundamentally unfair. App'x at 59. He asked the district court to reject the plea agreement and instead impose a sentence of time served. At a hearing held on July 14, 2017, the district court rejected the plea agreement, finding too much dissension. App'x at 83. Jones was given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, but he declined to do so. The district court warned Jones that the Superseding Indictment, which contained a 5-year mandatory minimum conspiracy charge, was still outstanding and instructed him to take time to consider his options. Three days later, Jones filed a motion for clarification, asking whether he could proceed to sentencing on his guilty plea to the Superseding Information. The district court replied that he could not, stating: 4 Mr. Jones will not proceed to sentencing on his plea which is based on an information offered by the government as part of the rejected Fed. R. Crim. P 11(c)(1)(c) plea agreement. Had Mr. Jones pled 'straight up' to an indictment or information that was not part of a plea agreement, the option to proceed to sentencing would have been available. App'x at 97. By letter dated July 20, 2017, Jones requested that his case be set for trial at the Court's earliest convenience. App'x at 98. In the following three months, the grand jury returned a Second and Third Superseding Indictment against Jones. On October 20, 2017, trial commenced on the charges contained in the Third Superseding Indictment -- (1) conspiring with others to distribute heroin and cocaine, (2) distributing heroin, and (3) knowingly possessing with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of a cocaine base on or about July 13, 2015. Jones was convicted on all three counts. On November 27, 2018, the district court sentenced Jones to 85 months' imprisonment, concurrent on all counts, to be followed by 4 years of supervised release.
Jones first argues that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea agreement because too much dissension was not a reasonable reason to reject it. This argument is waived because Jones specifically asked the district court to reject the plea agreement. See United States v. Wellington, 417 F.3d 284, 290 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding an argument waived because a defendant cannot complain of an error that he himself invited). 5 Jones's second argument -- that the district court erred in refusing to immediately sentence him on the Superseding Information -- although not waived, lacks merit. Jones argues that it was reversible error for the district court to vacate his guilty plea because a plea agreement and a guilty plea are separate. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 385 F.3d 245, 251 (2d Cir. 2004); see also In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2004). But Jones's guilty plea to the Superseding Information was never vacated. The district court simply declined to proceed to sentencing on the Superseding Information while the outstanding charges remained pending. We see no abuse of discretion in that decision. See United States v. Booth, 996 F.2d 1395, 1397 (2d Cir. 1993) (A sentencing court has broad discretion respecting the scheduling of sentencing proceedings.). Finally, to the extent that Jones's argument can be construed as an objection to his continued prosecution on the ground of double jeopardy, we reject it as well. The Government does not dispute that the Superseding Information contained a lesser-included offense of the Third Superseding Indictment and that the double jeopardy clause barred the Government from seeking punishment on both convictions at sentencing. See Appellee's Br. at 29 (When Jones was ultimately convicted of the counts contained within the Indictment, the double jeopardy clause barred him from being sentenced on the Information, which charged a lesser included offense of the Superseding Indictment's conspiracy charge.). But it is permissible to prosecute a 6 defendant simultaneously on two or more counts charging offenses that are the same for double jeopardy purposes, so long as the prosecutions do not result in multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 76 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, Jones was only sentenced on his trial convictions stemming from the Third Superseding Indictment and the count to which he pled guilty under the Superseding Information, Count 1ss, was dismissed in the final judgment. As a result, there was no double jeopardy violation.