Opinion ID: 1744995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance: Failure to Present Mitigation Evidence

Text: Jones next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase because counsel failed to investigate or prepare mitigation evidence. Specifically, Jones contends counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to hire a mental health expert and failing to present mental health mitigation; and (2) failing to call witnesses who would have testified about Jones's childhood. We analyze each of these claims below. We have repeatedly held that to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that his counsel's performance was deficienti.e., unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced the defensei.e., that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 965-66 (Fla.2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In these circumstances, to determine whether counsel was ineffective, a court must examine not only counsel's alleged failure to investigate and present possibly mitigating evidence, but the reasons for doing so. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) ([S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052); Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 572 (Fla.1996) (stating that in evaluating the competence of counsel the actual performance of counsel in preparation for and during the penalty phase proceedings, as well as the reasons advanced therefor, must be considered). Moreover, here, Jones must prove his counsel's performance actually deprived [him] of a reliable penalty phase proceeding. Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 223 (Fla.1998). Regarding counsel's investigation and preparation of mitigation evidence at the penalty phase, the circuit court concluded that Jones proved neither deficiency nor prejudice. We must now independently review the trial court's legal conclusions, while deferring to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence. See State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 350 (Fla.2000). Analyzing Jones's claims under this standard of review, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Jones contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare and present evidence of his mental impairment as a mitigating factor. Although we conclude that counsel was deficient in failing to conduct a reasonable investigation of Jones's mental health mitigation, Jones fails to prove prejudice.
While we do not require a mental health evaluation for mitigation purposes in every capital case, Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 34 (Fla.2005), and  Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence ... [or] present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case, Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, an attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence. Riechmann, 777 So.2d at 350. Where available information indicates that the defendant could have mental health problems, such an evaluation is `fundamental in defending against the death penalty.' Arbelaez, 898 So.2d at 34 (quoting Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 74 (Fla.2001) (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Here, counsel was aware of possible mental mitigation. When counsel inherited Jones's case from the public defender's office, the file contained a letter discussing the results of a psychological test (a Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, or MMPI) conducted on Jones by forensic psychologist Dr. Robert Berland. While the letter suggested not running out and getting medical testing done, it clearly indicated that Jones suffered from mental illness and needed neuropsychological testing. The letter stated that Jones has a long-standing psychotic disturbance. It referred to the psychosis as a biological problem with the brain that is either ... genetic or due to brain damage. Counsel failed to further investigate this potentially mitigating evidence. Despite Dr. Berland's suggestion that Jones suffered from mental impairments, Jones was not evaluated by a mental health expert, and at the penalty phase no expert testimony was presented regarding Jones's psychotic disturbance. Trial counsel, at a minimum, did not follow up with Dr. Berland; in fact, he could not specifically recall speaking with anybody about Jones's mental health. Trial counsel could only speculate that his decision not to pursue mental health mitigation was based on his review of the record combined with his own observations of Jones. Trial counsel's own testimony makes evident that the decision to abandon mental mitigation was not informed or strategically made after considering the alternatives. Cf. Bowles v. State 979 So.2d 182, 188 (Fla.2008) (finding that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to present an expert to testify to mental mitigation because the decision was reasonable) (citing Gaskin v. State, 822 So.2d 1243, 1248 (Fla.2002) (Trial counsel will not be held to be deficient when she makes a reasonable strategic decision to not present mental mitigation testimony during the penalty phase because it could open the door to other damaging testimony.)). Because this is not a case where trial counsel was aware of, but rejected, possible mental mitigation in favor of a more favorable strategy, and instead demonstrates a serious lack of effort by trial counsel, we find counsel's performance unreasonable under the prevailing professional norms. Compare Arbelaez, 898 So.2d at 34-5 (finding counsel's performance deficient due to lack of a serious and sustained effort in pursuing mental health mitigation), with Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 222 (finding counsel's decision to humanize defendant and not pursue mental health mitigation was a reasonable strategy under the circumstances of the case). At the evidentiary hearing, Jones established the existence of mental mitigation evidence through Dr. Berland. After conducting the MMPI, reviewing relevant documentation, and interviewing Jones and other lay witnesses, Dr. Berland concluded that Jones was psychotic at the time of the homicide, and thus the statutory mitigating circumstances of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and inability to conform to the requirements of the law would have applied. He explained that although it was hard to differentiate to what extent Jones's actions were a result of mental illness and to what extent they were the product of criminality, the biological mental illness is a more salient, more persistent adverse influence on his behavior. Dr. Berland also testified that Jones suffered from brain impairment. He could not definitively rule out Jones's post-homicide accident as the cause of the brain injury, but he opined that the brain impairment existed at least two years before his 1991 evaluation. In rebuttal, the State presented Dr. Albert McClaren, also a forensic psychologist. His conclusions were based solely on Jones's medical and prison records, and a review of the MMPI Dr. Berland conducted in 1991. From the test results, Dr. McClaren opined that Jones had difficulty with close emotional relationships, distrusted others, was socially withdrawn, and was dissatisfied with his relationships with other people. Jones demonstrated anger and resentful qualities that served to exacerbate his alienation from others. Jones's test scores place him in a category of people who see the world as dangerous and other people as rejected and unreliable. People like Jones have a history of criminal activity, are frequently arrested, and their crimes are often poorly planned and executed. Dr. McClaren ultimately concluded that Jones did not suffer from brain impairment or a major mental illness, but he likely suffered from antisocial personality disorder. While Dr. McClaren conceded that Jones's MMPI profile could be associated with someone who is quite mentally ill, he also said it could be associated with somebody who is principally a personality disordered. It is clear from the testimony that there was available expert testimony that would have supported mental health mitigation but was never presented.
While we conclude that trial counsel's performance was deficient, Jones has failed to prove prejudice. He offers nothing more than the blanket assertion that [h]ad the evidence been presented, the result of the penalty proceedings would have been different. A mere conclusory allegation that the outcome would have been different is insufficient to state a claim of prejudice under Strickland; the defendant must demonstrate how, if counsel had acted otherwise, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been differentthat is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See Holland v. State, 916 So.2d 750, 758 (Fla.2005) (defendant's claim that he was prejudiced because penalty phase counsel's deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the proceedings is merely conclusory and must be rejected); Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 160 (Fla.2004); Armstrong v. State, 862 So.2d 705, 712 (Fla.2003) (finding that a mere conclusory allegation of prejudice was legally insufficient). Notwithstanding the insufficiency of the claim, we are confident that had the additional mitigation evidence been introduced, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been differenti.e., our confidence in the outcome remains. Prejudice, in the context of penalty phase errors, is shown where, absent the errors, there is a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different or the deficiencies substantially impair confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 516 n. 14 (Fla.1999). Here, the mental mitigation evidence presents a double-edged sword and is not sufficient to overcome the substantial aggravation. See Reed v. State, 875 So.2d 415, 437 (Fla.2004) (An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present mitigation evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.). The mitigating evidence at issue would likely have proved more harmful than helpful. There was ample evidence in the record to impeach Jones's mental health mitigation. The only psychological diagnosis the experts could agree upon was that Jones suffered from antisocial personality disorder. Moreover, every other mental health evaluation Jones underwent confirms that he suffers not from mental illness but antisocial personality disorder. This Court has acknowledged that antisocial personality disorder is a trait most jurors tend to look disfavorably upon. Freeman v. State, 858 So.2d 319, 327 (Fla. 2003). Additionally, the only mental evaluations Jones underwent before the murder and before the accident in which he suffered brain injury indicate that he did not suffer from mental illness. The Department of Corrections evaluated Jones's mental status in 1978. At that time, chief psychiatrist Laura Parado and psychiatrist Eduardo Infante both opined that Jones did not suffer from mental illness. The doctors described him as well-oriented, well-developed, and well-nourished. He exhibited well-organized speech patterns, no evidence of thought disorders, and no hallucinations. Jones scored in the upper average range of intelligence on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Also, Jones's mental health records are replete with his own admissions that he did not suffer from mental illness or the accompanying symptoms. Moreover, while there was clearly mental health mitigation available, damaging evidence accompanied it. For example, at the evidentiary hearing the State's expert, reading from various treatises, profiled a defendant with mental health scores similar to Jones. Those sharing Jones's profile demonstrated characteristics frequently found in child molesters and rapists. Their behavior is unpredictable and erratic and may involve strange sexual obsessions and responses. These individuals are typically aggressive, cold, and punitive and have a knack of inspiring guilt and anxiety in others. The State would certainly have seized the opportunity to expose these negative characteristics in addition to highlighting Jones's lengthy criminal history. Such a showing would not have proved favorable to Jones. Further, in recommending death, the trial court found three aggravating factors: (1) prior violent felony; (2) commission during the course of a robbery; and (3) HAC. In mitigation the court found: (1) Jones's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform this conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; (2) Jones has suffered from a traumatic and difficult childhood; and (3) Jones had the love and support of his family. Thus, in light of the significant aggravation, Jones has not demonstrated how the enhanced mitigation would create a probability sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome. See Singleton v. State, 783 So.2d 970 (Fla.2001) (upholding a death sentence where the trial court found the prior violent felony and HAC aggravating factors and substantial mitigation, including extreme mental or emotional disturbance, impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to requirements of law, age of sixty-nine at time of offense, under the influence of alcohol and possibly medication at time of offense, mild dementia, and attempted suicide); Spencer v. State, 691 So.2d 1062, 1066 (Fla.1996) (affirming a death sentence where the trial court found the prior violent felony and HAC aggravating factors and the mitigation included extreme mental or emotional disturbance; impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to requirements of law; drug and alcohol abuse; paranoid personality disorder; sexual abuse; honorable military record; good employment record; and ability to function in structured environment); see also Offord v. State, 959 So.2d 187, 191 (Fla.2007) (HAC is a weighty aggravator that has been described by this Court as one of the most serious in the statutory sentencing scheme.); Sireci v. Moore, 825 So.2d 882, 887-88 (Fla.2002) (noting that prior violent felony conviction and HAC aggravators are two of the most weighty in Florida's sentencing calculus.). Because Jones could not demonstrate prejudice, we affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.
Jones also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present additional witnesses to corroborate his sister's testimony about his traumatic childhood. During the penalty phase, Jones and his sister, Betty Stewart, testified at length about his difficult childhood. After trial counsel personally interviewed Jones's family, he selected Stewart to testify to the exclusion of other family members. Trial counsel decided on Stewart because, in addition to helping raise Jones while their mother was incarcerated, she was a 16-year veteran of the Miami-Dade County Police Department and was articulate, measured, and very knowledgeable about Jones's upbringing. In trial counsel's opinion, Stewart was the best person to explain ... the family dynamics as they were when [Jones] was growing up. Trial counsel's strategic decision to call Stewart to testify about Jones's childhood was made after considering alternative witnesses. Therefore, Jones has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in finding counsel's performance was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. See Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000) ([S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.) Even if we were to find counsel's performance deficient, Jones cannot demonstrate prejudice. At the evidentiary hearing, Jones presented several witnesses, including family members and his youth football coach, to support his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to present sufficient background mitigation. The testimony, however, was cumulative to that presented at the penalty phase. We have repeatedly held that counsel is not ineffective for failing to present cumulative evidence. See, e.g., Darling v. State, 966 So.2d 366, 377-78 (Fla.2007); Whitfield v. State, 923 So.2d 375, 386 (Fla.2005). Furthermore, based on testimony presented at trial, the trial court found, as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance, that Jones suffered from childhood trauma and a difficult childhood. The additional testimony would only have added to this mitigation. In light of the aggravation in this case, Jones's sentence would not have been different had the court given more weight to the nonstatutory mitigator.