Opinion ID: 613740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strickland Framework

Text: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the framework of Strickland v. Washington : First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under the first prong of the analysis, review of counsel's performance is based on an objective standard of reasonableness, and measured against prevailing professional norms. Rickman v. Bell, 131 F.3d 1150, 1154 (6th Cir.1997) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). These professional norms are judged by reference to the time of representation, and cannot be based on hindsight. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (stating that a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.). The burden lies with the petitioner to identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the Supreme Court has recently reiterated: To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show that `counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a `strong presumption' that counsel's representation was within the `wide range' of reasonable professional assistance. Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787 (internal citations omitted) In order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland inquiry, a petitioner need not prove to a certainty that but for counsel's deficiencies he would have been acquitted, but instead, must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In determining whether there exists a reasonable probability that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, this Court may examine the combined effect of all acts of counsel found to be constitutionally deficient, in light of the totality of the evidence in the case. Mackey v. Russell, 148 Fed.Appx. 355, 364 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1186 (6th Cir.1987)).