Opinion ID: 1172193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of State Double Jeopardy Principles to Sentence Enhancement Allegations

Text: As the lead opinion concedes, we recently determined double jeopardy principles precluded retrial of a firearm use enhancement allegation, charged pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.5, where the defendant's jury had previously found the allegation not true. ( People v. Superior Court ( Marks ) (1991) 1 Cal.4th 56, 78, fn. 22 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 389, 820 P.2d 613] (hereafter Marks ); cf. People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 910 [35 Cal. Rptr.2d 624, 884 P.2d 81] [The parties agree(d) that the jury's `not true' finding on the knife-use enhancement allegation precludes retrial of that allegation].) Noting the jury had found the allegation the defendant personally used a firearm not true, we held [t]he jury's rejection constituted an express acquittal on the enhancement and forecloses any retrial. ( Marks, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 22.) Because Marks is but a few years old and applied double jeopardy principles to a finding on a sentence enhancement, one might assume it provides relevant authority to decide this case. The lead opinion, however, posits two reasons why it believes Marks is irrelevant to the proper resolution of this case. First, the lead opinion opines that Marks relies on a line of cases that are based on a state constitutional rule of double jeopardy that precludes penalizing a defendant with a longer sentence following a successful appeal of his or her conviction. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 843.) [5] Second, the lead opinion asserts that because Marks included no analysis of the complex issues we address in this case, we think a narrow reading of Marks is appropriate. ( Ibid. ) The lead opinion's attempt to cabin the rationale in Marks founders because it fails to account for the Marks decision's emphasis on the fact the jury in that case found the enhancement allegation not true, and Marks 's characterization of this finding as an acquittal. The concept of an acquittal clearly implicates the historic constitutional double jeopardy bar to retrial. Indeed, if the federal double jeopardy clause protects against anything, it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.  ( North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S. 711, 717 [89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076], italics added, fn. omitted.) [I]t has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant's jeopardy.... ( Green v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at p. 188 [78 S.Ct. at pp. 223-224], italics added.) By emphasizing the jury found the enhancement allegation not true and characterizing the finding as an acquittal, the Marks court was clearly invoking this long-settled constitutional doctrine. Moreover, the Henderson-Collins-Hood line of cases (see fn. 5, ante ) cited in Marks, does not prohibit any retrial at all, but merely limits the aggregate sentence to no more than was achieved in the first trial. Thus, in Henderson, supra, 60 Cal.2d 482, where the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment following his first trial, we did not purport to prevent any retrial whatsoever; we merely held he could not be given the greater sentence of the death penalty following retrial. Invoking the same rule in People v. Hood, supra, 1 Cal.3d 444, we permitted a retrial but limited the aggregate sentence to that achieved in the first trial. ( Id. at p. 459.) If, as suggested by the lead opinion, Marks was based solely on the state constitutional right against imposition of a greater sentence on retrial following a successful appeal, the Marks opinion should have permitted a retrial. Instead, Marks concluded [t]he jury's rejection [of the enhancement] constituted an express acquittal on the enhancement and forecloses any retrial.  ( Marks, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 78, fn. 22, italics added.) The lead opinion's belated attempt to redefine the meaning of Marks is thus unpersuasive. Moreover, the lead opinion's restrictive reading of the double jeopardy clause of the California Constitution fails to address the following authorities, which pose analogous sentence enhancements and conclude double jeopardy applies: People v. Brookins (1989) 215 Cal. App.3d 1297, 1309 [264 Cal. Rptr. 240] (double jeopardy precludes retrial of Penal Code section 667.7 habitual offender enhancement because it was reversed for insufficient evidence); People v. Pettaway, supra, 206 Cal. App.3d at page 1332, reversed on other grounds sub nom., Pettaway v. Plummer (9th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1041 (state constitutional double jeopardy provision prohibits retrial of Penal Code section 12022.5 [personal firearm use] and Penal Code section 12022.7 [personal infliction of great bodily injury] enhancements following jury verdict enhancements were not true as to murder charge); People v. Jones (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 456, 460 [249 Cal. Rptr. 840], disapproved on another point, People v. Tenner, supra, 6 Cal.4th at page 566, footnote 2 (double jeopardy precludes retrial of Penal Code section 667.5 prior felony conviction enhancement); People v. Raby (1986) 179 Cal. App.3d 577, 591 [224 Cal. Rptr. 576] (double jeopardy precludes retrial of prior felony enhancement); and People v. Bonner (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d 573, 575 [158 Cal. Rptr. 821] (double jeopardy prohibits reprosecution of narcotics weight enhancement allegation following appellate reversal for insufficient evidence); see also People v. Guillen (1994) 25 Cal. App.4th 756 [31 Cal. Rptr.2d 653] (reaffirming Bonner, but finding mistrial on weight enhancement does not preclude retrial); People v. Reynolds (1989) 211 Cal. App.3d 382, 390 [259 Cal. Rptr. 352] (double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of serious felony enhancement under Penal Code section 667 because it was reversed for trial error and not for insufficient evidence). It bears repeating that the double jeopardy clause is no mere `technicality'; it is an integral part of `the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial.' ( United States v. Jorn [(1971)] 400 U.S. [470,] 479 [91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543, 553] (plur. opn.).) Effectuating the spirit as well as the letter of its liberality, courts have `disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in [its] interpretation.... [Citation.]' ( Serfass v. United States [(1975)] 420 U.S. [377,] 390 [95 S.Ct. 1055, 1063-1064, 43 L.Ed.2d 265, 267].) In animating our own independent `vital safeguard,' we have expressly refused to perpetuate `spurious distinction[s]' at the risk of `giving our constitutional prohibition against twice in jeopardy a narrow, grudging application unsupported by either logic or reason.' ( Gomez v. Superior Court [(1958)] 50 Cal.2d [640,] 649 [328 P.2d 976]....) ( Marks, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 78-79.) Perhaps a bit uncomfortable with its decision  understandably, since the specter of a defendant being retried innumerable times on the same allegations until the People finally succeed in proving them true is indeed disturbing  the lead opinion concludes by detailing a long list of what it is not deciding. It explains that although the People are not prohibited by double jeopardy principles from retrying the prior felony conviction enhancement, other limits might curtail the ability of the People on retrial to obtain a true finding. The lead opinion opines, for example, that on retrial the People cannot rely solely on the same evidence as initially presented, for even if the bedrock principle of double jeopardy does not apply to bar retrial, the more amorphous prudential principles of law of the case will apply. The lead opinion, although it declines to elaborate, also suggests unspecified limitations might restrict such required additional evidence. Similarly, the lead opinion hints there may be due process limits in such a retrial. (Lead opn., ante, at p. 845.) One can only guess what these intimations mean for future cases; what is clear is that for this defendant, on the facts of this particular case, retrial following acquittal is permitted. Such legal contortions are unnecessary. Not only does this court have a long history of relying on the state constitutional double jeopardy clause rather than its federal counterpart, there is in this state an unbroken line of cases applying the double jeopardy principles to noncapital sentence enhancement allegations. The majority breaks from this history without persuasive reasons for doing so. Accordingly, I would find the Court of Appeal's decision that the People adduced insufficient evidence to prove the enhancement alleged pursuant to Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)-(d), prohibits retrial of the same enhancement allegation pursuant to article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. The People having had one good chance to prove the truth of the prior conviction allegation, they should now be barred by the state constitutional double jeopardy clause from a second chance to prove the same charge.