Opinion ID: 2481410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Portion of Testimony by Defense Expert Witness

Text: At his first trial, defendant raised an insanity defense. Dr. Conroe testified as a defense expert that defendant met the second prong of the insanity statute in that he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the offense. The trial court applied an amended version of the statute that was in effect at the time the crimes were committed. The statute, as amended, narrowed the definition of insanity to eliminate the inability to conform prong and increased a defendant's burden of proof for an insanity defense to one of clear and convincing evidence. Ramsey, 192 Ill.2d 154, 248 Ill. Dec. 882, 735 N.E.2d 533; 720 ILCS 5/6-2 (West 1996). This court subsequently found that the act amending the statute in this manner violated the single subject rule of the state constitution. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill.2d 1, 237 Ill.Dec. 74, 708 N.E.2d 1114 (1999). Thus, defendant was entitled to a new trial at which he would be allowed to present an insanity defense based on his inability to conform his conduct to the law and required to prove his insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Ramsey, 192 Ill.2d at 159, 248 Ill.Dec. 882, 735 N.E.2d 533. Instead, defendant elected to enter a plea of guilty in return for dismissal of certain charges. Defendant notes in his brief that [o]ne of the central themes of mitigation presented by the defense was that death was not an appropriate penalty because at the time of the crimes, defendant suffered from several mental disorders. This theme was intended to provide support for the jury's consideration of one of the seven mitigating factors enumerated in the statute: the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1996). At the sentencing hearing, Dr. Conroe again testified as an expert witness for the defense. He testified that defendant had a long history of several chronic mental disorders, including Asperger's Disorder, Borderline Personality Disorder, and ADHD, and that he had a history of Conduct Disorder as a youth. In combination, these disorders affected his ability to make judgments and to manage his feelings. Conroe opined that as a result of these disorders, defendant was under extreme duress at the time he committed the crimes. In an effort to clearly bring Conroe's opinion within the scope of the statutory mitigating factor, defense counsel asked the witness whether the diagnosed disorders could be characterized as mental disturbances. Conroe replied yes. The State objected and, following a sidebar discussion, the trial court sustained the objection and informed the jury to disregard the question and the answer. At a hearing the following day, the parties made a record of the basis for the objection and the court's ruling. The State objected to the witness's opinion on the basis that it had not been disclosed previously, either in his written report or his discovery deposition. Defense counsel argued that there had been no discovery violation, because it was implicit in Conroe's opinion and earlier testimony that defendant suffered from an extreme mental disturbance. That is, because Conroe opined that defendant's mental state prevented him from conforming his conduct to the law, he necessarily opined that defendant's condition met the lesser standard of extreme mental disturbance. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that because Conroe had opined on other matters, including whether defendant was insane at the time of the offenses, his disclosure of this opinion at trial was a discovery violation and would not be allowed. In closing argument, defense counsel spoke at length about defendant's history of mental illness and suggested that the evidence showed that when he committed these crimes, defendant wasn't completely in his right mind. He reviewed the diagnoses reached by Drs. Conroe and Killian, including ADHD, and discussed the bases for these diagnoses. Counsel emphasized the effect of ADHD on defendant's problem solving, coping, and thinking through decisions. He discussed defendant's frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment and impulsivity, both related to Borderline Personality Disorder, an identity disturbance. Counsel noted that Conroe characterized the mental illnesses as extreme at the time of the crimes. He argued that the defense witnesses on the mental health issues were more credible, based on their professional credentials and the depth of their evaluations, than the State's witnesses. The remainder of closing argument recounted the details of defendant's birth and childhood, including the traumatic discovery of his adoption and the repeated recommendations that he receive various forms of therapy that were rejected by his adoptive parents. The jury was instructed to consider mitigating factors if supported by the evidence, including whether the murders were committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. In addition, the jury was instructed that [w]here there is evidence of a mitigating factor, that fact that such mitigating factor is not a factor specifically listed in these instructions does not preclude your consideration of the evidence. Defendant asserts that excluding Conroe's answer to this question is error entitling him to a new sentencing hearing. He argues that: (1) there was no discovery violation because the answer to the question was not a matter of Conroe's opinion, (2) there was no discovery violation because Conroe's opinion regarding defendant's mental disturbance was adequately disclosed, (3) if there was a discovery violation, the exclusion of Conroe's answer was an abuse of discretion, and (4) if the sanction imposed for the discovery violation was within the trial court's discretion, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain Conroe's opinion on this question prior to trial and to make a timely disclosure of this opinion to the State.