Opinion ID: 2149972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dismissal of the indictment

Text: Because we reverse the trial court's order dismissing the indictment against defendant, we will address an issue concerning count II of the indictment which was raised by the parties on appeal. Count II of the indictment charged defendant with the unlawful possession of 100 segregated parts of a substance containing LSD, which is a violation of section 402(a)(7)(A)(ii) of the Act. In count II, however, the indictment erroneously cited section 401(a)(7)(A)(ii) of the Act, which proscribes unlawful delivery of LSD. Defendant contends that the trial court properly dismissed count II based upon its constitutional analysis but that, in any event, count II is invalid because it fails to properly charge defendant with any violation of the Act. The State responds that count II of the indictment charges defendant with unlawful possession of LSD. The State contends that count II contains merely a formal defect in that it erroneously cites section 401(a)(7)(A)(ii) (unlawful delivery) instead of the appropriate section, section 402(a)(7)(A)(ii) (unlawful possession) of the Act. The State argues that this error is merely typographical and that it should be allowed to amend the count and insert the proper statutory citation. In response, the defendant contends that the State waived its right to amend the indictment by failing to move to amend in the trial court. A formal defect in an indictment may be corrected at any time upon motion by either party. ( People v. Campbell (1968), 40 Ill.2d 463, 465, 240 N.E.2d 635.) The legislature has specifically provided: An indictment, information or complaint which charges the commission of an offense in accordance with Section 111-3 of this Code shall not be dismissed and may be amended on motion by the State's Attorney or defendant at any time because of formal defects, including: (a) Any miswriting, misspelling or grammatical error. (725 ILCS 5/111-5 (West 1992).) Accordingly, if the defect in the indictment is merely a formal defect and amendment would not constitute a substantive change, the waiver rule does not apply and amendment at any time is proper. In the instant case, count II of the indictment specifically charges defendant with possession in both the type of charge listed as well as in the language of the charge itself. Thus, it is clear that the citation to a delivery provision was merely a formal defect or a typographical error. Under these circumstances, the State may properly amend the indictment on remand and insert the proper statutory provision. We now turn to an issue concerning count III of the indictment. Count III charges defendant with possession of 0.4 grams of LSD in violation of section 402(c) of the Act. This count charges defendant with possession based upon grams. In count II, however, defendant was also charged with possession of 100 segregated parts of a substance containing LSD in violation of section 402(a)(7)(A)(ii) of the Act. Count II charges defendant with possession based upon objects. We have previously construed the statutory provisions, however, as requiring that a defendant who allegedly possessed/delivered LSD reduced to carrier form, as in defendant's case, must be charged based upon the objects classifications. Therefore, we find that the trial court's dismissal of count III was proper and affirm that portion of its order dismissing count III of the indictment. For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's order finding the LSD provisions of the Act unconstitutional. We also reverse the trial court's dismissal of counts I and II of the indictment. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of count III of the indictment and we remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.