Opinion ID: 1264793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Specific to Each Case

Text: C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop First, we must decide whether the alleged sexual misconduct of Fathers Scully and Calhoun (the Priests) constitutes childhood sexual abuse within the meaning of the statute. See RCW 4.16.340 (defining childhood sexual abuse as an act that would have been a violation of RCW 9A.44, RCW 9.68A.040, or prior laws of similar effect at the time the act was committed). C.J.C. argues the Priests communicated with him for an immoral purpose as proscribed under former RCW 9A.44.110 (1981) (Any person who communicates with a child under the age of seventeen years of age for immoral purposes shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor....). The Priests, who allegedly masturbated C.J.C, argue that RCW 4.16.340 does not apply to claims against them because their conduct was not proscribed under the then applicable criminal code. At the time in question, 1980 through 1981, RCW 9A.44 was the applicable statute then in effect. Finding the alleged conduct did not fall under any of the definitional sections of the statute, the trial court dismissed all claims against the Priests. See RCW 9A.44.010 (defining sexual intercourse as penetration or contact between sexual organs of one person and vagina, mouth, or anus of another). Relying on State v. McNallie, 120 Wash.2d 925, 846 P.2d 1358 (1993), the Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the claims. Under McNallie, the Court of Appeals reasoned a jury could find that an act not specifically proscribed by statute could nevertheless constitute communication with a child for immoral purposes, so long as the communication was for the predatory purpose of promoting their exposure to and involvement in sexual misconduct. C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop, 88 Wash.App. 70, 75, 943 P.2d 1150 (1997) (quoting McNallie, 120 Wash.2d at 933, 846 P.2d 1358). The Priests now argue that the Court of Appeals should not have applied the reasoning of McNallie because that case interpreted RCW 9.68A, a later enacted statute. In essence, the Priests would have this court ignore McNallie and reverse the Court of Appeals on the basis that their conduct was not then a crime and, therefore, they could not have engaged in communications for an immoral purpose. See, e.g., State v. Luther, 65 Wash.App. 424, 428, 830 P.2d 674 (1992) (no communication for immoral purpose if underlying sexual conduct not illegal). The Priests' argument is not well taken. In 1979, we construed the very statute at issue here and concluded it applied to misconduct of a sexual nature whether or not precisely defined within the statute itself. See State v. Schimmelpfennig, 92 Wash.2d 95, 101-04, 594 P.2d 442 (1979) (construing RCW 9A.88.020). [7] We gave the phrase communication with a minor for immoral purposes a commonsense understanding, holding that any spoken word or course of conduct with a minor for purpose of sexual misconduct is prohibited. Schimmelpfennig, 92 Wash.2d at 103-04, 594 P.2d 442 (emphasis added). We upheld the conviction of a man who had merely attempted to entice young girls into the back of his van for sexual purposes. Here, defendants allegedly engaged in actual sexual misconduct. We find the Priests' conduct meets the definition of childhood sexual abuse as defined in RCW 4.16.340. We affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue. Second, we must decide whether two communications sent from the Priests' mental health providers to the Diocese are privileged and undiscoverable. C.J.C. moved the trial court to compel discovery of certain communications between mental health counselors and the Diocese regarding the treatment of Fathers Calhoun and Scully. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. C.J.C. v. Corporation of the Catholic Bishop, No. 37632-2-I, slip op. at 20-22 (Wash.Ct.App. Sept. 22, 1997). In reversing in part, the court reasoned that two reports sent from the Priests' mental health counselors to the Diocese were discoverable because they were not confidential communications between patient and counselor. See C.J.C, No. 37632-2-I, slip op. at 21. The fact that the Priests participated in counseling at the insistence of the Diocese and consented to the Diocese receiving reports of their progress is undisputed. Nevertheless, they argue the client-psychologist privilege was not waived because of their unique relationship with their church. The Priests liken this relationship to a husband and wife attending joint counseling. Alternatively, they argue this court should fashion a rule similar to the joint defense or common interest rule under which communications exchanged between multiple parties engaged in a common defense remain privileged under the attorney-client privilege. Defendants' argument does not persuade us to amalgamate various evidentiary privileges in order to create the protection they seek. Legislative grants of testimonial privilege conflict with the inherent power of the courts to compel the production of relevant evidence and are, therefore, strictly construed. See, e.g., State v. Latta, 92 Wash.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979); Phipps v. Sasser, 74 Wash.2d 439, 444, 445 P.2d 624 (1968); Cook v. King County, 9 Wash.App. 50, 52, 510 P.2d 659 (1973). Even were we inclined to recognize a unity of interest between a cleric and his or her church and protect communications made in furtherance of that interest against compulsory disclosure, this is not the case in which to do so. Where childhood sexual abuse is at issue, even long established privileges do not apply. See, e.g., State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash.2d 730, 735-37, 539 P.2d 86 (1975) (client-psychologist privilege does not apply to any judicial proceeding regarding a child's injury, neglect, or sexual abuse); Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash.2d 1, 11, 448 P.2d 490 (1968) (attorney-client privilege is not absolute and exceptions to the privilege may result from a balancing of the privilege against the public interest in full disclosure of all the facts). See also State v. Waleczek, 90 Wash.2d 746, 751, 585 P.2d 797 (1978) (husband-wife privilege may be subordinated to the overriding and paramount legislative intent to protect children from physical and sexual abuse). Accordingly, we limit our discussion to the specific parameters of the client-psychologist privilege. [8] RCW 18.83.110 governs the client-psychologist privilege. [9] It prohibits compulsory disclosure of confidential communications only. The privilege is strictly construed. In re Welfare of Henderson, 29 Wash.App. 748, 752, 630 P.2d 944 (1981). A person may not claim a privilege as to communications that do not originate in the confidence that they will not be disclosed. State v. Post, 118 Wash.2d 596, 612, 826 P.2d 172, 837 P.2d 599 (1992). A patient's intent that the communication be confidential must be reasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the communication. Post, 118 Wash.2d at 612, 826 P.2d 172. The patient's subjective expectations of confidence, while relevant, should not be given more weight than the objective evidence of the situation and circumstances in which the communication was made. Post, 118 Wash.2d at 612, 826 P.2d 172. Here, the Court of Appeals limited discovery to only those reports actually communicated to the Diocese; it did not require disclosure of actual treatment records. While the Priests may have believed their communications would remain confidential, they clearly intended that a third party, the Diocese, would be kept informed. The courts of this state have long held that communications intended for the purpose of providing a third party with the results thereof are not confidential. See, e.g., In re Henderson, 29 Wash.App. at 752-53, 630 P.2d 944; J.N. v. Bellingham Sch. Dist. No. 501, 74 Wash.App. 49, 63, 871 P.2d 1106 (1994). As a result, we find the communications at issue are not protected under RCW 18.83.110. We affirm the Court of Appeals and permit discovery of the two reports sent to the Diocese because they were not confidential patient-psychologist communications. Third, C.J.C. appeals the dismissal of his respondeat superior and strict liability claims. Under the facts alleged here, these claims are governed by our recent decision in Niece v. Elmview Group Home 131 Wash.2d 39, 48, 52-58, 929 P.2d 420 (1997). Following an extended discussion, we concluded in Niece that neither current Washington case law nor considerations of public policy favor the imposition of respondeat superior or strict liability for an employee's intentional sexual misconduct. We specifically stated, [vicarious liability for intentional or criminal actions of employees would be incompatible with recent Washington cases rejecting vicarious liability for sexual assault, even in cases involving recognized protective special relationships. Niece, 131 Wash.2d at 55, 929 P.2d 420 (emphasis added). C.J.C.'s argument that the Priests were, from his perspective, acting within the scope of their authority does not persuade us to establish a contrary rule. Our courts have never before adopted such an approach in the present context and we decline to do so now. Compare, e.g., Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 71 Wash.App. 548, 860 P.2d 1054 (1993) (doctor was not acting within scope of employment or apparent authority when he misled patient into believing sperm sample was required and normally obtained by manually stimulating the patient to ejaculation). See also Taylor v. Smith, 13 Wash.App. 171, 177, 534 P.2d 39 (1975) (apparent authority is determined by objective test and the authority of an agent is not `apparent' in contemplation of law, merely because it looks so to the person with whom [the agent] deals). For these same reasons we decline to impose strict liability on a theory of quid pro quo sexual harassment. See Thompson v. Berta Enters., Inc., 72 Wash.App. 531, 538, 864 P.2d 983 (1994) (employer strictly liable for supervisor's quid pro quo sexual harassment because such harassment is impossible absent the actual or apparent authority to make employment decisions), superseded by statute on other grounds by Schonauer v. DCR Entertainment, Inc., 79 Wash.App. 808, 905 P.2d 392 (1995). On this point, we simply disagree with C.J.C.'s contention that there is no basis for distinguishing between supervising an employee who wants to keep her job and supervising an altar boy who wants to get into heaven. C.J.C. Answer to Pet. for Review at 19. Unlike the former, the latter relationship is formed entirely by religious doctrine and, in this case, by C.J.C.'s personal religious beliefs. While C.J.C. may have sincerely believed Fathers Calhoun and Scully had the power to gain him entry into heaven, and while he may have exchanged sexual favors believing it would help him get into heaven, the notion that legal liability may be premised on such beliefs is unprecedented. We affirm the dismissal of C.J.C.'s respondeat superior and strict liability claims.