Opinion ID: 333140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Compelled Psychiatric Examination

Text: 8 Appellant argues first, that since insanity negates an element of the crime, the lower court's order forcing him to submit to an examination by psychiatrists selected by the government to determine his sanity at the time of the commission of the crime violated his privilege against self-incrimination and second, that he was entitled to an attorney during the examination. This circuit has often recognized a district court's inherent authority to admit psychiatric testimony about a defendant's mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense based on information obtained at an examination ordered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1970) to determine the accused's capacity to stand trial, 9 although we have never reached the issue of whether a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination is violated per se by a court-ordered psychiatric examination solely to determine the accused's mental condition at the time of the commission of the offense. Several other circuits have rejected this unconstitutionality-per-se argument on various grounds, 10 while one has indicated approval of it. 11 Relying on a balancing test, 12 we choose to follow the former line of cases and permit compelled psychiatric examinations when a defendant has raised the insanity defense. Since any statement about the offense itself could be suppressed, 13 a rule forbidding compelled examinations would prevent no threatened evil, and the government will seldom have a satisfactory method of meeting defendant's proof on the issue of sanity except by the testimony of a psychiatrist it selects--including, perhaps, the testimony of psychiatric experts offered by him--who has had the opportunity to form a reliable opinion by examining the accused. 14 To hold that compelled psychiatric examinations are forbidden because sanity is an element of the offense and that the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits compulsory elicitation of statements going to an element of the offense would be confining ourselves within an analytical prison. Given the defendant's power to have any incriminating factual statements resulting from the examination suppressed, we think the proper analogy is to the required furnishing of handwriting exemplars by the defendant and similar procedures. 9 Likewise, we reject appellant's claim of a constitutional right to have an attorney present at the psychiatric examination since that might defeat the purpose of the examination 15 and since the examination is not the kind of critical stage at which assistance of counsel is needed or even useful. 16 There would be no need for counsel to instruct the accused not to answer questions for fear of factual self-incrimination, for any such matter is subject to suppression; and interference with the examination by counsel on other grounds would be improper.