Opinion ID: 2519654
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Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Used One of Acosta's Two Prior Convictions as a Strike, as a Basis for Referencing the One Strike Law in Calculating His Minimum Term Under the Three Strikes Law, and to Impose an Enhancement Under Section 667, Subdivision (a).

Text: The final issue before us is whether the trial court properly used one of Acosta's two prior convictions as a strike, as a basis for referencing the One Strike law in calculating his minimum term under the Three Strikes law, and then to impose an enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). As we have noted, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred. It relied principally on section 667.61, subdivision (f), of the One Strike law, which provides in relevant part: If only the minimum number of [triggering] circumstances ... have been pled and proved, that circumstance or those circumstances shall be used as the basis for imposing the term provided in subdivision (a) or (b) rather than being used to impose the punishment authorized under any other law, unless another law provides for a greater penalty. However, if any additional [triggering] circumstance or circumstances ... have been pled and proved, the minimum number of circumstances shall be used as the basis for imposing the term provided in subdivision (a), and any other additional circumstance or circumstances shall be used to impose any punishment or enhancement authorized under any other law. Based on this provision, the Court of Appeal reasoned that one of Acosta's prior convictions is consume[d] in bring[ing] him within section 667.61, leaving only the other prior conviction to count as a prior strike and to impose an enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). Thus, the court concluded that Acosta should have been sentenced to a term of 25 years to life under the One Strike law, that this term should have been doubled under the provision of the Three Strikes law applicable to second strike offenders, and that a single enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a), should have been imposed. The court found that this result harmonizes the Three Strikes law and the One Strike law in that it obey[s] the limiting language of subdivision (f) of the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (f)), while honor[ing], within those limits, the statutory command that [notwithstanding any other law, the provisions of the Three Strikes law shall be applied in every case in which a defendant has a [qualifying] prior felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (f)(1).) A contrary result, the court reasoned, would ignore[ ] the limiting language of section 667.61, subdivision (f), and render it surplusage. The concurring and dissenting opinions here, also relying principally on section 667.61, subdivision (f), agree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion. We conclude that the Court of Appeal was incorrect and that the trial court correctly applied the relevant statutes. Under the language of the One Strike law, a triggering circumstance may be used either as the basis for imposing the term provided in the One Strike law or to impose the punishment authorized under any other law, whichever is the greater penalty. (§ 667.61, subd. (f).) Here, the punishment authorized under the Three Strikes law is the greater penalty, because the Three Strikes law requires that qualifying prior convictions used as strikes also be used (1) to calculate the term a defendant would be subject to absent the Three Strikes law, which is then tripled (excluding enhancements) under option 1 and included (with enhancements) under option 3 in setting the minimum term of a third strike offender's indeterminate sentence under the Three Strikes law, and (2) to impose enhancements under applicable provisions, including section 667, subdivision (a). (See Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 154-159, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129 [prior convictions used as strikes also used to determine term to be tripled under option 1]; Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 554-560, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56 [prior convictions simultaneously used as strikes, to calculate under option 3 the minimum term of third strike offender's indeterminate life sentence, and to impose enhancements under § 667, subd. (a)].) Moreover, as we have already explained, Acosta's indeterminate life sentence is not being imposed under both the One Strike law and the Three Strikes law; it is being imposed only under the Three Strikes law, with the minimum term of that indeterminate term set by reference to the One Strike law. Thus, the trial court's calculation does not, in contravention of subdivision (f) of the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (f)), use a single triggering circumstance to impose punishment under both the One Strike law and another penalty provision. This analysis is consistent with our decision in Dotson. There, each of the defendant's four prior convictions qualified as a strike and for enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a). ( Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 551, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.) As previously explained, the latter provision provides that a person convicted of a serious felony (as defined) shall receive a five-year enhancement for each prior serious felony conviction on charges brought and tried separately. (§ 667, subd. (a)(1).) However, it also specifies that [t]his subdivision shall not be applied when the punishment imposed under other provisions of law would result in a longer term of imprisonment. (§ 667, subd. (a)(2).) Despite this limitation, we treated the defendant in Dotson as a third strike offender, calculated the minimum term of his indeterminate life sentence under option 3 of the Three Strikes law by including four five-year enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a), for his four prior convictions, and added four separate five-year enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a), for those same prior convictions. ( Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 553-560, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.) That is, despite the limiting language of section 667, subdivision (a)(2), we used two of the defendant's prior convictions first as strikes, then under option 3 to set the minimum term of his indeterminate life sentence as a third strike offender, and then under section 667, subdivision (a), to impose five-year sentence enhancements. In support of this result, we relied largely on the Three Strikes law's command that its sentencing provisions be applied `in addition to any other enhancements or punishment provisions which may apply.' ( Dotson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 554, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.) A contrary interpretation, we explained, would be inconsistent with [this] language. ( Id. at p. 558, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 423, 941 P.2d 56.) Here, we similarly conclude that using one of Acosta's prior convictions first as a strike, then under option 1 to set the minimum term of his indeterminate life sentence as a third strike offender, and then under section 667, subdivision (a), to impose a five-year enhancement, conforms to the language of the Three Strikes law and does not contravene subdivision (f) of the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (f)). (Cf. People v. Cartwright, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1137-1138, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 351 [because Three Strikes law includes enhancements in calculating the term imposed, using single conviction as a strike and to impose enhancement does not contravene limiting language of § 667, subd. (a)(2)].) This conclusion is consistent with our decision in Murphy. There, we considered the interplay of the Three Strikes law and section 667.71, which prescribes a prison term of 25 years to life for a person convicted of one or more of certain specified sex offenses after having been previously convicted of one of those specified sex offenses. ( Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 139-140, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) In Murphy, the defendant had two prior convictions, both of which qualified as strikes and at least one of which was an offense specified in section 667.71. ( Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 140-149, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) The Court of Appeal held that for each of the defendant's current convictions, the Three Strikes law required an indeterminate life term with a minimum term of 75 years, i.e., three times the 25-year minimum term of section 667.71. ( Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 141, 159, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) Thus, it used at least one of the defendant's prior convictions both as a strike and under option 1 to set the minimum term of the defendant's indeterminate life sentence as a third strike offender. We agreed with the Court of Appeal's decision. ( Id. at pp. 159-160, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) We can think of no reasonand neither Acosta nor the concurring and dissenting opinions suggest onewhy the Legislature would have wanted to treat a prior conviction that is both a strike and a triggering circumstance under the One Strike law differently from a prior conviction that is both a strike and a specified prior offense under section 667.71. Nothing in the One Strike law's legislative history supports drawing this distinction. Finally, the construction of the Court of Appeal and the concurring and dissenting opinions does not properly harmonize the One Strike law and the Three Strikes law. Although Acosta unquestionably has two prior strikes, the Court of Appeal declined to apply the sentencing provision that, under the Three Strikes law, shall be applied to defendants with two prior strikes (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)); instead, it applied the sentencing provision that, under the Three Strikes law, shall be applied to defendants with only one prior strike. (§ 667, subd. (e)(1).) Thus, the Court of Appeal did notand the concurring and dissenting opinions would notfollow the statutory command that qualifying defendants be sentenced according to the terms of the Three Strikes law in every case and [n]otwithstanding any other law. (§ 667, subd. (f)(1).) This problem with the construction of the Court of Appeal and the concurring and dissenting opinions is perhaps more obvious in the context of a defendant with only one prior conviction. Under that construction, no provision of the Three Strikes law would apply to this defendant notwithstanding the prior conviction, because the conviction would be consumed in imposing the sentence of the One Strike law. This result would clearly be contrary to the language of the Three Strikes law, which commands that [notwithstanding any other law, the Three Strikes law shall be applied in every case in which a defendant has a [qualifying] prior felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (f)(1).) As we have explained in a prior decision, this statutory language eliminates potential conflicts between alternative sentencing schemes by providing that for defendants with a qualifying prior conviction, the Three Strikes law takes the place of whatever law would otherwise determine ... sentence for the current offense. ( People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 524, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.) Acosta and the concurring and dissenting opinions fail to explain how their contrary construction, which would render the Three Strikes law inapplicable to certain defendants with a prior strike, squares with the clear language of the Three Strikes law. [10] By contrast, our construction obeys the mandatory language of the Three Strikes law by applying to Acosta the provision that, under the Three Strikes law, shall be applied to defendants with two prior strikes (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)), and it applies that provision according to its plain meaning. As we have previously held, the common and ordinary meaning of the phrase in option 1, the term otherwise provided as punishment (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(A)(i)), is `the term that would be imposed in the absence of the Three Strikes law.' [Citation.] ( Murphy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 159, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) Here, the term that would be imposed in the absence of the Three Strikes law is the term the One Strike law prescribes. At the same time, our construction does not render any of the One Strike law surplusage. On the contrary, our construction gives effect to all of that statute's language, including the specification in subdivision (f) that punishment be imposed under the provision that provides for [the] greater penalty. (§ 667.61, subd. (f).) It is true that most of the offenses listed in the One Strike law as triggering circumstances are also strikes. Thus, under our construction, in most cases where the triggering circumstance is a prior conviction, the Three Strikes law will prescribe the greater penalty and sentence will be imposed under the Three Strikes law rather than the One Strike law. However, it appears that a few of the offenses listed in the One Strike law as triggering circumstances are not also strikes. Thus, in some instances where the triggering circumstance is a prior conviction, sentence will be imposed under the One Strike law rather than the Three Strikes law. Of course, the number of times this occurs may change in light of subsequent statutory amendments. [11] Moreover, as previously noted, a prior conviction is only one of the One Strike law's 11 triggering circumstances. (See § 667.61, subds. (d), (e).) In cases involving one of the other triggering circumstances, the Three Strikes law does not even come into play (unless the defendant also has strikes). In these cases, subdivision (f) of the One Strike law (§ 667.61, subd. (f)) will determine whether punishment is imposed under the One Strike law or some other statute. [12] Moreover, under our construction, even where the triggering circumstance is a prior conviction that is also a strike, although sentence is imposed under the Three Strikes law, the effect of the One Strike law will be felt through the formulae of the Three Strikes law for determining a defendant's minimum term. Finally, because our construction gives effect to all of the provisions of both the Three Strikes law and the One Strike law, the concurring and dissenting opinions, in adopting their contrary construction, run afoul of the rule regarding repeal by implication. As previously noted, all presumptions are against a repeal by implication, and we may find an implied repeal only where no rational basis exists to harmonize two potentially conflicting statutes and the statutes are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that they cannot operate concurrently. ( Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 487, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 28 P.3d 116.) Thus, we are bound, if possible, to maintain the integrity of both the One Strike law and the Three Strikes law if the two may stand together. ( Penziner v. West American Finance Co. (1937) 10 Cal.2d 160, 176, 74 P.2d 252.) If we can find a harmonious construction of the two statutes, we must adopt that harmonizing construction. ( City and County of San Francisco v. County of San Mateo (1995) 10 Cal.4th 554, 571, fn. 8, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 888, 896 P.2d 181, italics added.) The concurring and dissenting opinions violate this principle by rejecting our construction, which harmonizes the statutes, and instead adopting a construction that repeals the Three Strikes law insofar as it provides that its sentencing provisions shall be applied in every case in which a defendant has a [qualifying] prior felony conviction, [notwithstanding any other law. (§ 667, subd. (f)(1).) [13]