Opinion ID: 2982493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Severing the Trial

Text: Before trial, Coffman moved to sever his trial from Milby’s pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. Rule 14 permits the court to grant a severance if “consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. The district court denied his motion. We review a district court’s denial of a severance motion “for a clear abuse of discretion.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 237. Although Coffman moved for severance before trial, he failed to renew his motion at the close of the evidence. Therefore, he has waived the claim that he was entitled to severance. See United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1476 (6th Cir. 1991). Coffman argues that his wife, Megan, renewed her motion for severance at the close of the evidence, and that this renewal was joined by the other co-defendants because of the district court’s standing order that all defendants were presumed to join in the motions of the other defendants. This argument fails because a motion for severance is particular to the individual making the motion and cannot be joined by other defendants. Even if Coffman did not waive the issue, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to sever the trials of the defendants. The Supreme Court has stated that, “a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” Zajiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539 (1993). Even where the risk of prejudice is high, “less drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” Id. at 534. For Coffman to prevail on his severance 23 Nos. 12-5574/5611.6090, United States v. Coffman, et al. argument, he must show “compelling, specific, and actual prejudice from [the] court’s refusal to grant the motion to sever.” United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 885 (6th Cir. 2012). The district court provided limiting instructions designed to mitigate any potential for prejudice, and Coffman fails to point to any specific or actual prejudice resulting from the joint trial, let alone any compelling prejudice. Coffman’s claim of error is meritless.