Opinion ID: 3135592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Foundational Challenge The defendant argues generally before this court that the trial court committed reversible error when it permitted Lambatos to testify that the defendant’s DNA profile matched the male DNA profile of the semen in L.J.’s vaginal swabs. The defendant specifically argues that the trial court erred in admitting Lambatos’ testimony regarding the match because a sufficient foundation was not established. The defendant additionally argues that Lambatos’ testimony violated his sixth amendment confrontation right under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). We begin with the foundational argument. We apply the -7- abuse of discretion standard to the defendant’s foundational challenge to the trial court’s admission of Lambatos’ expert testimony. People v. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d 97, 141 (2009); People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 281 (2006). The defendant contends that the trial court should not have permitted the State’s forensic analyst to testify because of a lack of sufficient testimony that the Cellmark report was reliable. According to the defendant, when expert testimony relies upon data obtained from electronic or mechanical equipment, the proponent of the testimony must offer foundational proof that the equipment was calibrated and functioning properly at the time the data was presented in order to establish that the expert’s testimony is reliable. The State responds that Lambatos’ testimony that Cellmark’s testing was done according to valid scientific theory and reliable methodology provided a sound basis upon which Lambatos could formulate her opinion. Therefore, the State asserts that it was not obliged to present additional testimony regarding the calibration and functioning of Cellmark’s equipment to admit Lambatos’ expert opinion pursuant to Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981). We agree with the State. In Wilson v. Clark, this court adopted Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning an expert’s testimony at trial. Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 196. Former Rule 703 states in part: “The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted.” Fed. R. Evid. 703 (amended 2000). The court in Wilson noted that, in a trial context, “[b]oth Federal and State courts have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow opinions based on facts not in evidence.” Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 193. Rule 705 states: “The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” Fed. R. Evid. 705. -8- Following Rule 705, we held in Wilson that, at trial, “an expert may give an opinion without disclosing the facts underlying that opinion.” Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194. “Under Rule 705 the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit the facts underlying the expert opinion.” Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194. Thus, an expert testifying at trial may offer an opinion based on facts not in evidence, and the expert is not required on direct examination to disclose the facts underlying the expert’s opinion. Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 334 (2002). This court applied Wilson v. Clark to DNA evidence in People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187 (2006). There, the defendant filed a motion during trial to bar testimony from Terry Melton, the president of Mitotyping Technologies, concerning human mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Melton did not complete the actual laboratory “bench work” on the evidence. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 281. The defendant argued that, without the lab technician’s testimony, Melton’s testimony regarding the mtDNA results was improper. We rejected that argument, holding that it was enough that Melton relied upon data reasonably relied upon by other experts in her field. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 282. Here, the trial court correctly denied defense counsel’s objection to the foundation for Lambatos’ expert opinion. It is undisputed that Lambatos was qualified as an expert in forensic biology and DNA analysis; Lambatos testified that it is the commonly accepted practice in the scientific community for a forensic DNA analyst to rely on the work of other analysts to complete her own work; and Lambatos based her opinion on information reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. As in Sutherland, Lambatos testified that Cellmark’s work on the vaginal swabs in this case and the results of the PCR analysis conducted by Kooi are the types of data reasonably relied upon by experts in her field. Lambatos testified that, because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory, calibrations, internal proficiencies, and controls had to be in place for the DNA analysis to be completed in this case. These internal controls were, according to Lambatos’ testimony, ones that she personally developed. Lambatos herself reviewed Cellmark’s data, including the electropherogram, and did not have any question about the match. Rather, she used her own expertise to compare the two profiles before her. She also did not observe any problems in the chain of custody or any signs of contamination or degradation of the -9- evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with Cellmark’s results regarding the male DNA profile, and then made her own visual and interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the electropherogram and the table of alleles to conclude there was a match to the defendant’s genetic profile. See P. Gianelli & A. Imwinkelreid, Scientific Evidence §18.04(b), at 54 (4th ed. 2009) (“in STR testing, the analyst can visually compare the two electropherograms or rely on a computerized comparison”). We also reject the defendant’s specific complaint that there was no testimony that the instruments used by Cellmark were calibrated and functioning properly. The defendant principally relies on People v. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d 703 (2001). Raney held that where the expert testimony is based upon an electronic or mechanical device, the expert must provide some foundational proof that the device was functioning properly at the time it was used. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710. The defendant there argued that the State failed to establish a proper foundation for the admission of scientific results from the gas chromotography mass spectrometer (GCMS) machine. The court agreed, finding that the record contained no evidence regarding whether the GCMS machine was functioning properly at the time it was used to analyze the substance. Further, the Raney court stated an expert should be able to explain how the GCMS machine was calibrated or why she knew the results were accurate. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710, citing People v. Bynum, 257 Ill. App. 3d 502 (1994). Finding a lack of such an explanation, the court concluded that the State failed to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because of the lack of foundation. Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 711. The Raney court acknowledged, however, that “[i]t may not be feasible for each expert to personally test the instrument relied upon for purposes of determining what is a suspected controlled substance.” Raney, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 710. We find that the testing of narcotics using a GCMS machine is not comparable to the scientific process at issue in this case. At the defendant’s bench trial, Lambatos did not merely regurgitate results generated by a machine, as the witness in Raney did. Lambatos conducted an independent evaluation of data related to samples of genetic material, including items processed at both Cellmark and the ISP Crime Lab. Lambatos used her expertise and professional judgment to compare the DNA profiles. Her examination of the different alleles from the blood sample and from the semen sample -10- indicated a match with the defendant. She also determined the statistical probability of the match by examining the alleles and entering them into a frequency database to determine how common they are in the general population. Further, this case is distinguishable from Raney because Lambatos maintained that Cellmark necessarily met the threshold of proper DNA analysis because Cellmark was an accredited laboratory and followed guidelines that she had personally developed. We therefore do not accept the defendant’s invitation to broadly interpret Raney to find an insufficient foundation where an analyst merely relies upon data obtained from electronic or mechanical equipment. Finally, under Wilson, the burden is placed upon the adverse party during cross-examination to elicit facts underlying the expert opinion. Wilson, 84 Ill. 2d at 194, citing Fed. R. Evid. 705. The record reveals substantial cross-examination of Lambatos’ comparison of the DNA profile from the database to the DNA profile from the sexual assault kit. The record also reveals that the trial court, sitting as a fact finder, appropriately weighed the testimony. It stated: “The DNA expert that testified, the last witness, was in my view the best DNA witness I have ever heard. Under detail [sic], lengthy complex cross-examination by the defense on every single part of her report she explains, she told what was the basis of her opinion, she was an outstanding witness in every respect. There is the issue of she didn’t do the actual test. The testing is farmed out to other labs. Some did the testing, some are an accredited lab. That was part of the playback you might say of the Illinois state police forensic division at that time, and I agree with the State that there is no misidentification here. This is a match, this is 1 in 8.7 quadrillion, 50 times the population for the last 2000 years. It’s an absolute match.” Accordingly, the issue of Lambatos’ reliance on Cellmark’s report went to the weight of her opinion and not its admissibility. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, ___ n.1, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 322 n.1, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 n.1 (2009) (stating that it was not the case that “anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case”). The trial court assessed the weight of Lambatos’ testimony and found it convincing. -11- We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding a sufficient foundation for Lambatos’ testimony and therefore turn to the defendant’s Crawford argument. Sixth Amendment The trial court rejected the defense objection that his sixth amendment right was violated by Lambatos’ testimony concerning Cellmark’s report. The appellate court affirmed this decision, finding that the complained-of statements regarding Cellmark’s report by Lambatos were not used for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore the sixth amendment was not implicated. The defendant’s claim that his sixth amendment confrontation right was violated involves a question of law, which we review de novo. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 141-42. The sixth amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right  to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const., amend. VI. This part of the sixth amendment is called the confrontation clause and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 264 (2007). In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment’s “primary object” is with “testimonial hearsay.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. Accordingly, “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. The Supreme Court added an explicit logical corollary to this statement by pointing out, in a footnote, that the confrontation clause does not bar the admission of testimonial statements that are admitted for purposes other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 431, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1985); see also Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142. Stated another way, we need only consider whether a statement was testimonial if the statements at issue were, in fact, hearsay statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 197 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9; see also Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142; People v. Johnson, 389 Ill. App. 3d 618, 631-32 (2009); People v. -12- Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d 24, 34-35 (2007) (vacating appellate court judgment and remanding with instructions to consider the hearsay exception first before proceeding to the sixth amendment issue). The hearsay rule generally prohibits the introduction of an out-ofcourt statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 145; People v. Tenney, 205 Ill. 2d 411, 432-33 (2002). Underlying facts and data, however, may be disclosed by an expert, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but for the purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143. Moreover, it is well established that an expert may testify about the findings and conclusions of a nontestifying expert that he used in forming his opinions. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143. The defendant argues that the State introduced the Cellmark report to establish the truth of the matter asserted and it is therefore hearsay. Without Cellmark’s report, according to the defendant, Lambatos could not have given her testimony that the defendant’s DNA matched the profile deduced by Cellmark. The State counters that Lambatos testified about the Cellmark tests only to explain how she formed her own opinion. Therefore, the only statement that the prosecution offered for the truth of the matter asserted was Lambatos’ own opinion. According to the State, presentation of the person who prepared the DNA profile at Cellmark was not necessary for confrontation purposes. We agree with the State. This court has long held that prohibitions against the admission of hearsay do not apply when an expert testifies to underlying facts and data, not admitted into evidence, for the purpose of explaining the basis of his opinion. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 142. In Lovejoy, a medical examiner testified that another toxicologist detected six different types of drugs in the victim’s body after conducting blood tests, indicating that poisoning caused the victim’s death. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 141. The medical examiner testified that he was trained in toxicology interpretation and that the toxicology report showed lethal amounts of several medications in the victim’s blood. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 141. He explained how the toxicology report added to his own physical observations during the autopsy and that it aided him in determining the cause of death. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 144. Following Wilson v. Clark and its progeny, we noted that experts may not only consider the reports commonly relied upon by experts in their particular field, but also to testify to the contents of the underlying records. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143, citing Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d -13- 186 (1981), People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133 (1992). Quoting People v. Pasch, we explained: “ ‘While the contents of reports relied upon by experts would clearly be inadmissible as hearsay if offered for the truth of the matter asserted, an expert may disclose the underlying facts and conclusions for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for his opinion. [Citation.] By allowing an expert to reveal the information for this purpose alone, it will undoubtedly aid the jury in assessing the value of his opinion.’ ” Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143, quoting Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 176.3 Accordingly, we held that the medical examiner’s testimony repeating the nontestifying analyst’s conclusions was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather was introduced “to show the jury the steps [the examiner] took prior to rendering an expert opinion in this case.” Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 144. Consequently, there was no confrontation clause violation. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 145. Our appellate court addressed a similar factual situation in People v. Johnson, 394 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2009). In Johnson, the defendant challenged an expert’s testimony regarding DNA test results, arguing that he had no opportunity to cross-examine the analysts who conducted the testing. The court observed that experts are permitted to disclose underlying facts and data to the jury in order to explain the basis for their opinions. It concluded that the State offered the DNA report at issue as part of the basis for the expert opinion and no confrontation violation occurred. 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1034. Like Lovejoy and Johnson, Lambatos’ testimony about Cellmark’s report was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. The State introduced this testimony, rather, to show the underlying facts and data Lambatos used before rendering an expert opinion in this case. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 144. The evidence against the defendant was Lambatos’ opinion, not Cellmark’s report, and the testimony was introduced live on the witness stand. Indeed, the report was not admitted into evidence at all. Rather, Lambatos testified to 3 As we noted in Lovejoy, Federal Rule of Evidence 703, upon which the Wilson opinion was based, has been amended. Illinois has not adopted the amended version of Rule 703, and the defendant does not ask us to consider the amended version of the rule in this case. -14- her conclusion based upon her own subjective judgment about the comparison of the Cellmark report with the existing ISP profile. Cf. P. Gianelli & A. Imwinkelreid, Scientific Evidence §18.04(b), at 57 (4th ed. 2007) (“when technical problems materialize, it can be very difficult to interpret the electropherograms.  Thus, there is room for subjective judgment”). For instance, at trial, the defense attorney questioned her if she confused the defendant’s DNA with L.J.’s DNA. He asked Lambatos if the alleles were not more consistent with the victim than the defendant at several loci. When asked about a specific locus called “T-POX,” Lambatos responded: “In my opinion with this profile, it is a mixture so when we have a mixture you are looking at the profile as a whole  and it’s important to note that the alleles at each locus on a DNA molecule that we look at are very common. It is not uncommon for you and I to have the same alleles at a locus or you and I to have the same alleles. The power of this DNA comes with looking at all 13 areas of the DNA because it’s that uniqueness looking at all 13 that’s going to give us numbers. And here like a T-POX and in the other two that you mentioned, there are only two alleles and like I say in my opinion there are only two people in this profile and it just may so happen that they share an 8 or that they share an 11 or it may so happen that she is an 8 and 11 and he is just an 11, 11, or he is an 8, 11 and she is an 8, 8. There’s only certain possibilities that can be attributed at each locus.” After defense counsel stated that Lambatos’ interpretation could have erred because of a degraded sample, she stated: “Yes, it’s possible to have a degraded sample but if the sample was degraded, that would be known by our earlier examination of the evidence [by Hapack]. We determine the quantity and the DNA that we have and the quality of the DNA and also after we look at the electropherograms, you can see the degradation, their specific patterns, and the data looks a certain way when it is degraded. The peaks aren’t as defined. They slope off missing here and there. Different things happen with degradation, and I didn’t see any evidence of degradation in this particular fraction.” The defendant’s suggestion that Lambatos was merely a “conduit” for Cellmark’s report and that the report was entirely dispositive of -15- Lambatos’ opinion, and thus hearsay, is not compelling. Her testimony consisted of her expert comparison of the DNA profile in the ISP database with the DNA profile from the kit prepared by Cellmark. She used her own expertise to compare the two profiles before her: the blood sample prepared by Kooi and the semen sample prepared by Cellmark. She also did not observe any problems in the chain of custody or any signs of contamination or degradation of the evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with Cellmark’s results regarding the male DNA profile. But Lambatos additionally made her own visual and interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the electropherogram and the table of alleles to make a conclusion on the critical issue: that there was a match to the defendant’s genetic profile. Accordingly, Cellmark’s report was not used for the truth of the matter asserted and was not hearsay. The defendant further asserts that the instant matter is “directly analogous” to the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d 314, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). In Melendez-Diaz, the Court considered whether a certification by a forensic lab analyst as to the nature and weight of a controlled substance was a testimonial statement, and thus its admission in lieu of live testimony by the analyst violated the sixth amendment right to confrontation. The defendant in that case, Luis Melendez-Diaz, was charged with cocaine trafficking in an amount between 14 and 28 grams. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. At trial, the prosecution placed into evidence white plastic bags containing a substance that resembled cocaine. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 319-20, 129 S. Ct. at 2530. It also submitted three “certificates of analysis” showing the results of forensic analysis performed on the seized substances. The certificates reported the weight of the substances and stated that the bags “ ‘[have] been examined with the following results: The substance was found to contain: Cocaine.’ ” MelendezDiaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. The certificates were sworn to before a notary public by analysts at the State Laboratory Institute of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health as required by Massachusetts law. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. Massachusetts law permitted the use of such affidavits to provide prima facie evidence of the analyzed substance’s composition, quality and net weight. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 320, 129 S. Ct. at 2531. -16- In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that, following Crawford, the analyst’s certificates “were testimonial statements and the analysts were ‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to “ ‘ “be confronted with” ’ the analysts at trial.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 322, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194, 124 S. Ct. at 1365. The Court found the “case involves little more than the application of our holding in Crawford.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 332, 129 S. Ct. at 2542, citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354.4 The Court based its holding on two rationales derived from Crawford. First, the forensic analyst’s certificates were within the “core class of testimonial statements” in Crawford. Because the critical issue was whether the substance was cocaine, the Supreme Court found that “[t]he ‘certificates’ are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct examination.’ ” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 314 L. Ed. 2d at 321, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 242, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006). Second, the Court stated, “not only were the affidavits ‘ “made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” ’ [citation] but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net weight’ of the analyzed substance.” (Emphasis in original.) Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 321, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, quoting Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §13. The majority explicitly rejected the suggestion that the prosecutors were required to call each person involved in the chain of custody to the witness stand. Responding to the dissent in a footnote, the majority stated: 4 Justice Thomas, in providing the fifth vote, “join[ed] the Court’s opinion in this case because the documents at issue in this case ‘are quite plainly affidavits,’ [citation]. As such, they ‘fall within the core class of testimonial statements’ governed by the Confrontation Clause. [Citation.]” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 333, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring). -17- “[We] do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.  ‘[G]aps in the chain [of custody] normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.’ It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be introduced live. Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial records.” (Emphasis omitted.) Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___ n.1, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 322 n.1, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1. Accordingly, the Court in Melendez-Diaz held that the defendant’s confrontation clause right had been violated. We find that Melendez-Diaz does not change our determination. In Melendez-Diaz, the disputed evidence was a “bare-bones statement” that the substance was cocaine, and the defendant “did not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 327, 129 S. Ct. at 2537. Here, Lambatos testified about her own expertise, judgment, and skill at interpretation of the specific alleles at the 13 loci, and confirmed her general knowledge of the protocols and procedures of Cellmark. Lambatos also conducted her own statistical analysis of the DNA match. She did not simply read to the judge, sitting as a fact finder, from Cellmark’s report. This is in contrast to Cellmark’s report, which did not include any comparative analysis of the electropherograms or DNA profiles and was not introduced into evidence. Cellmark’s electropherogram, rather, was part of the process used by Lambatos in rendering her opinion concluding that the profiles matched. Thus, Lambatos’ opinion is categorically different from the certificate in Melendez-Diaz. In sum, the State did not offer Lambatos’ testimony regarding the Cellmark report for the truth of the matter asserted and this testimony did not constitute “hearsay.” Thus, the trial court and appellate court properly concluded that Crawford considerations did not apply here. Lambatos disclosed the underlying facts from Cellmark’s report for the limited purpose of explaining the basis for her opinion on the -18- critical issue concerning whether there was a DNA match between the defendant’s blood sample and the semen sample recovered from L.J. By allowing the expert to reveal the information for this purpose alone, it undoubtedly aided the judge, sitting as the factfinder, in assessing the value of Lambatos’ opinion. Lovejoy, 235 Ill. 2d at 143, quoting Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 176; see also Johnson, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 1034 (“The Cellmark report was not offered to prove the truth of its contents”). Finally, the record demonstrates that the gaps in the chain of custody went to the “ ‘weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility’ ” (Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___ n.1, 174 L. Ed. 2d at 322 n.1, 129 S. Ct. at 2532 n.1, quoting United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir. 1988)), and our review of the record shows that Lambatos’ conclusion was tested “in the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 199, 124 S. Ct. at 1370; see also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 88 L. Ed. 2d 15, 19, 106 S. Ct. 292, 294 (1985) (the sixth amendment “guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish”(emphasis in original)). Sentencing We note that the defendant was subject to two mandatory natural life sentences for his aggravated criminal sexual assault convictions and a concurrent term of 15 years for the aggravated robbery conviction. The defendant was also convicted of aggravated kidnapping, for which the trial court imposed an extended-term sentence of 60 years in prison. The trial court ordered that the 60-year sentence was to run consecutively to the end of his natural life sentences. The appellate court vacated that portion of the circuit court’s order imposing the consecutive sentence, and instead modified the defendant’s sentence to impose concurrent sentences for those convictions. 385 Ill. App. 3d at 371. This court recently held in People v. Petrenko, No. 107503 (June 4, 2010), that a sentence consecutive to a natural-life sentence was proper. We therefore reverse the appellate court on this issue and do not disturb the trial court’s order.