Opinion ID: 2390222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Seatbelt Sleeve Negligence Claim

Text: Branham alleged Ford was negligent [i]n selling the Bronco II with a defective rear occupant restraint system. The amended complaint contains no specifications of Ford's purported negligence. At trial, Branham claimed Ford was negligent in failing to adequately test the seatbelt sleeve, but he did not challenge the seatbelt sleeve design. Branham filed a companion strict liability claim concerning the seatbelt sleeve. Ford successfully moved for a directed verdict on the strict liability seatbelt sleeve claim. The trial court dismissed the strict liability claim on the ground that the seatbelt sleeve was not as a matter of law in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user at the time of manufacture. Based on this premise, Ford contends the companion negligence claim must fail, for all products liability actions, regardless of the stated theory, have common elements. Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct.App.1985) (In a products liability action the plaintiff must establish three things, regardless of the theory on which he seeks recovery: (1) that he was injured by the product; (2) that the product, at the time of the accident, was in essentially the same condition as when it left the hands of the defendant; and (3) that the injury occurred because the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.). Ford, therefore, concludes that the negligence claim (which required Branham to prove that the seatbelt sleeve was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user) should have been dismissed. We agree. When an element common to multiple claims is not established, all related claims must fail. A negligence theory imposes the additional burden on a plaintiff of demonstrating the defendant (seller or manufacturer) failed to exercise due care in some respect, and, unlike strict liability, the focus is on the conduct of the seller or manufacturer, and liability is determined according to fault. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 539, 462 S.E.2d 321, 326 (Ct.App.1995). The fault-based element is of no moment where, as here, there is no showing in the first instance of a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. In addition, Ford asserts there is no separate failure to test claim apart from the duty to design and manufacture a product that is not defective and unreasonably dangerous. We agree, for if a product is not in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, an alleged failure to test cannot be the proximate cause of an injury. The failure to establish that the seatbelt sleeve was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user for purposes of the strict liability claim requires the dismissal of the companion negligence claim. Relying on Bragg, the trial court determined it appropriate to grant a directed verdict on the strict liability claim, while at the same time allowing the negligence claim to go forward. We find the trial court's reliance on Bragg misplaced. In Bragg, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the manufacturer with respect to the strict liability claim, but refused to grant a directed verdict on the negligence claims. 319 S.C. at 538, 462 S.E.2d at 325. Bragg alleged two negligence claims: negligence in failing to place appropriate warnings on the product and another negligence claim in supplying [a product] that was defective[ly] [designed]. Id. at 537-38, 462 S.E.2d at 325. The jury returned a verdict against Bragg on the negligence claims. Bragg appealed the dismissal of the strict liability claim, contend[ing] the court's decision to grant the motion for directed verdict on strict liability, while denying the motion for directed verdict on negligence, was logically inconsistent and reversible error because those claims are virtually identical and require the same proof. Id. at 538, 462 S.E.2d at 325. The court of appeals in Bragg affirmed the trial court and noted that [s]trict liability and negligence are not mutually exclusive theories of recovery; that is, an injury may give rise to claims that can be established either under principles of strict liability or negligence, and failure to prove one theory does not preclude proving the other. Id. at 539, 462 S.E.2d at 326. While we agree that strict liability and negligence are not mutually exclusive theories of recovery, we caution against a broad reading of Bragg in this regard. An analytical framework that turns solely on whether strict liability and negligence are mutually exclusive theories of recovery may miss the mark. As noted, the negligence claim must have a fault-based element, which is not required for a strict liability claim. Where one claim is dismissed and a question arises as to the continuing viability of the companion claim, the critical inquiry is to ascertain the basis for the dismissal. If one claim is dismissed and the basis of the dismissal rests on a common element shared by the companion claim, the companion claim must also be dismissed. In the present case, because the strict liability claim was dismissed due to the absence of an element shared by the companion negligence claim, the negligence claim should have been dismissed as well. The trial court determined as a matter of law that the seatbelt sleeve was not in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. Consequently, the absence of this common, shared element required the dismissal of the strict liability claim and the companion negligence claim. [5] The trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict as to the negligence seatbelt sleeve claim. [6]