Opinion ID: 739683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insanity of Jerry Dotey

Text: 40 Second, Appellants both assert that the Government withheld information showing that Jerry Dotey was insane. Appellants assert that, subsequent to trial, they unearthed evidence that Dotey had been clinically diagnosed as a pathological liar with serious psychological problems and a multiple personality disorder. Specifically, Dotey apparently suffered from delusions that he had a second German identity, and believed that he had been born in Nazi Germany to a Gestapo spymaster, smuggled into the United States, and switched at birth with an American baby. He professed to have been kidnapped, brainwashed, and tortured by the Group, a neo-Nazi cabal seeking to take over the world and create a Fourth Reich through, among other methods, genocide, mind control, genetic engineering, and state-sponsored slavery. 12 41 Throughout the years, Dotey has been investigated by federal agents for assorted conduct. For example, Dotey claimed to have murdered witnesses to the assassination of President Kennedy. He sparked an FBI investigation after stealing money from the Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO), his former employer, then staging his own kidnapping, alleging that black, Puerto Rican and Cuban terrorists beat him up, took [the] money and held him prisoner on a boat off the coast of South Carolina, and forging a ransom note to President Carter demanding the release of Cuban prisoners. He later asserted that ARCO agents, dressed in SS regalia, had tortured, drugged and hypnotized him, programming him to massacre President Reagan and everyone else at the 1985 inauguration via germ warfare. 42 Dotey, his lawyer and his psychologist memorialized all these comments in complaints, letters and videotapes to agencies including the Justice Department and the Secret Service. ARCO also forwarded Dotey's personnel file to the FBI. The Secret Service personally interviewed Dotey, his lawyer and his psychologist in connection with the Reagan assassination plot. The record also indicates that the Secret Service knew of a Dotey-related plot to kill President Bush in 1991, two years after investigation of the Matamoras site case began. 43
44 Upon discovery of the evidence relating to Dotey's alleged insanity, Appellants moved for a new trial, claiming that the Government suppressed information relating to the alleged insanity in violation of Brady. The district court rejected Appellants' motion as lacking sufficient evidentiary basis. The court found that the statements were corroborated by independent sources, including federal and state law enforcement agencies and documents, as well as the consensually recorded statements of certain defendants. On appeal to this court, Appellants maintain that a remand is necessary to explore whether the Government suppressed information in violation of Brady. They further challenge the trial court's finding that the evidence they presented on this point was not material. 45 [T]he government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976); and Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196). A grant of a new trial is warranted if this obligation is not fulfilled. United States v. Wong, 78 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir.1996). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.). We conduct an independent examination of the record to determine whether Brady has been violated in a nondisclosure claim, and we likewise make an independent review of a district court's determination of materiality, which is a mixed question of fact and law. United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1209 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1056, 134 L.Ed.2d 201 (1996). Nevertheless, the trial judge's conclusion as to the effect of nondisclosure on the outcome of the trial is 'entitled to great weight.'  United States v. Rivalta, 925 F.2d 596, 597 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1980)). 46 We first hold that the Government here did not suppress information so as to violate its obligation under Brady. Brady cannot be violated if the defendants had actual knowledge of the relevant information or if the documents are part of public records and defense counsel should know of them and fails to obtain them because of lack of diligence in his own investigation. Payne, 63 F.3d at 1208 (citing United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 100 (2d Cir.1975) (state investigative files were available to defense with the exercise of due diligence)). Here, Appellants had actual knowledge of the witnesses with information about Dotey--the defense admittedly knew of Scott and Rosenbaum, and had contacted Scott prior to trial. 13 47 In addition, we agree with the trial court that the evidence here was not material to Appellant's convictions. Certainly, several of Dotey's assertions are alarming: His statement that the Group routinely (virtually daily) implicates many, many innocent people all over this country in crimes they have not committed, as well as his apparent anti-Semitism, provides a strong evidence of lack of credibility and of potential bias against Herzog, who is Jewish. Had the jury's verdict relied solely or largely upon Dotey's testimony and had his testimony been otherwise unimpeached, we might have considered the evidence to be material, although we note the principle of cases such as United States v. Reyes, 49 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir.1995) (New evidence that is merely impeaching will not ordinarily justify a new trial.) Id. (citing Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9, 77 S.Ct. 1, 5, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 (1956)); see United States v. Aguillar, 387 F.2d 625, 626 (2d Cir.1967) (The discovery of new evidence which merely discredits a government witness and does not directly contradict the government's case ordinarily does not justify the grant of a new trial.). 48 Here, however, there is substantial reason to agree with the district court's opinion that the jury had information with which to evaluate Dotey's credibility, though perhaps not as much information as Appellants would have liked. Dotey was cross-examined as to lying about his association with the CIA, lying about being a licensed engineer, his false statements in civil litigation, his false statements on credit card applications, logical gaps in his claim that he had been shot at during the investigation, his falsification of professional credentials and engineering documents and Prosser lab reports, his prior inconsistent statements before the grand jury, his misstatements to the FBI about his personal background, the financial abandonment of his children, his enormous tax debt, his loss of relevant records, his own involvement in the charged crimes, the civil judgments against him, the foreclosure on his home, bad checks he had written, and his acceptance of expense money from the FBI. This alone might be enough to make the evidence of his bizarre statements cumulative and non-material. See United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1006-07 (2d Cir.1990) (newly discovered evidence that informant had stolen money from the Government would have provided redundant impeachment of a witness whose credibility had in fact been attacked repeatedly). 49 Still, however, were Dotey's evidence the only support for Appellants' convictions, we would be concerned that perhaps the evidence of his mental condition is material, particularly considering the prosecution's summation remarks relating to Dotey's credibility. 14 Yet we agree with the trial judge's assessment that as to the convicted counts, the jury did not rely entirely upon Dotey's testimony, but independent evidence corroborated all evidence. We thus hold that the evidence relating to Dotey's insanity and neo-Nazi leanings is not material, in that there is not a reasonable probability that the evidence, if presented to the jury at trial, would have affected the verdict. Although it does not appear that the Government suppressed this evidence, such a suppression would not warrant grant of a new trial because it is not material. 50
51 Appellants next assert that the district court improperly denied their request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Franks tells us that evidence obtained by the Government must be suppressed at trial if the Government concealed facts that were material to an informed probable cause determination, and that the defense is entitled to a hearing on this matter if it makes a substantial showing that a false statement was knowingly, intentionally or recklessly included in the warrant affidavit, and that the allegedly false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. 52 As part of its application to initiate Title III interception of certain communication devices during its investigation, the Government submitted the affidavit of Special Agent Marston of the FBI. That affidavit contained a disclosure that Special Agent Marston had had conversations with Dotey beginning in August of 1989, relating to Dotey's statements that he had conducted covert activities on behalf of the CIA. In the affidavit, Special Agent Marston noted that he had spoken with Dotey's former psychologist, a man who had also been retained as a consultant for the FBI on unrelated matters, and that the psychologist had determined, after independent verification of some of Dotey's CIA-related claims, that Dotey was a credible person from whom to receive information. Special Agent Marston further stated that [i]n dealing with Dotey, I have continually sought to independently verify the accuracy of the information that he has furnished. On each and every occasion I have found that his information has proven to be truthful, reliable, and accurate. 53 Prior to trial, Appellants filed motions for a Franks hearing seeking to suppress the recorded evidence gathered in the Title III investigation, asserting that Agent Marston had not revealed the existence of significant information impeaching Dotey's general credibility. The court denied the motion. Appellants maintain that remand is necessary to explore whether the Government's application for Title III interception was materially misleading. 54 We hold that the court correctly denied Appellant's motion for a Franks hearing. Agent Marston's affidavit does not represent that he undertook an exhaustive exploration of Dotey's personal background; rather, it states that he fully explored issues with Dotey himself and discussed some of his claims with Dotey's psychologist, who confirmed Dotey's statements. Marston made no claim that he attempted to verify Dotey's general credibility by conducting a complete investigation into his past. Nothing before us indicates that Agent Marston's representations were false or misleading, and there was therefore no basis for a Franks hearing. 55
56 When a trial court learns of newly discovered evidence after a conviction, it should grant a new trial if the defendant makes a showing that the evidence is in fact 'new', i.e., it could not have been discovered, exercising due diligence, before or during trial, and that the evidence is so material and noncumulative that its admission 'would probably lead to an acquittal.'  United States v. Siddiqi, 959 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Alessi, 638 F.2d 466, 479 (2d Cir.1980)). [A] district court must exercise 'great caution' in determining whether to grant a retrial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and may grant the motion only in the most extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Spencer, 4 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.1993) (emphasis in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted). On review, [a]n appellate court must weigh whether or not there is in reality a 'significant chance' that the disclosure would have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to prevent a conviction. United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir.1975) (citations omitted). 57 This standard is very similar to the Brady test, though it of course incorporates no element of Government action or inaction. We reject this argument for substantially the same reasons articulated in our discussion and rejection of Appellants' Brady argument. First, the evidence relating to Dotey's insanity is not 'new' because it could have been discovered by the defense before or during trial. Second, the evidence is not material, in that its admission does not cast doubt upon the verdict in light of the substantial other cumulative evidence against Shay and Herzog as well as the impeachment evidence against Dotey of which the jury was aware. The extraordinary circumstances of which Spencer speaks are not present here, and Judge Brieant did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.