Opinion ID: 815532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of United Fire’s Experts

Text: We turn first to the district court’s decision to exclude the testimony of United Fire’s two experts on the basis that neither expert’s testimony was grounded in a reliable methodology. We review decisions about the admissibility of an expert’s testimony on an abuse of discretion standard. Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a witness “who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may offer opinion testimony if (1) the expert’s specialized knowledge “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence”; (2) “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data”; (3) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods”; and (4) “ the expert has reliably applied the 5 Case: 11-15011 Date Filed: 01/17/2013 Page: 6 of 12 principles and methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. “[T]he task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand” is assigned to the district court. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 US 579, 597 (1993). To guide district courts’ assessments of the reliability of an expert’s testimony, the Supreme Court has identified four factors that district courts should consider when assessing the reliability of an expert’s testimony: (1) whether the expert’s methodology has been tested or is capable of being tested; (2) whether the theory or technique used by the expert has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a known or potential error rate of the methodology; and (4) whether the technique has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. See id. at 593-94. At the same time, the Court has emphasized that these factors are not exhaustive and are intended to be applied in a “flexible” manner. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. V. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
The district court excluded all of Mr. Arms’s testimony on the ground that his ignition theory did not satisfy the minimum indicia of reliability required by Daubert. We agree with the district court’s holding with regards to Mr. Arms’s testimony about the ignition sequence that started the fire. However, our inquiry 6 Case: 11-15011 Date Filed: 01/17/2013 Page: 7 of 12 into the reliability of Mr. Arms’ testimony does not end with a discussion of his ignition theory. Despite only discussing Mr. Arms’ testimony with regards to the specific ignition sequence, the district court excluded all of Mr. Arms potential testimony, including his testimony relating to the location of the fire’s origin. This sweeping exclusion constituted an abuse of discretion. Mr. Arms’s testimony that the fire originated from the dryer was rooted in his investigation of the scene of the fire and an examination of the dryer in accordance with the principles of the “NFPA 921” guide for fire and explosion investigations, a peer reviewed fire investigation guide that is the industry standard for fire investigation. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 150 F. Supp. 2d 360, 366 (D. Conn. 2001) (NFPA 921 is “a peer reviewed and generally accepted standard in the fire investigation community”). By applying these principles to the distinctive burn patterns and other physical evidence he examined first-hand at the scene of the fire, Mr. Arms concluded that the fire began in the dryer area. Mr. Arms pointed to several specific pieces of evidence that supported his conclusion that the dryer was the origin of the fire to the exclusion of other possible sources of the fire in the laundry room. First, he noted that the burn patterns in the room in which the dryer was located indicated that the dryer was the center of the fire. Specifically, he observed that the wall directly behind the dryer was totally consumed and the wires in that wall had melted, suggesting that the fire 7 Case: 11-15011 Date Filed: 01/17/2013 Page: 8 of 12 was centered in the dryer area. Second, he noted there was a lack of arcing, which suggested that an electrical fault was not the cause of the fire. Third, and perhaps most persuasively, he observed that the linoleum floor directly beneath the dryer had had burned and stuck to the bottom of the dryer. This evidence suggested that the fire was located in the bottom part of the dryer. That the linoleum stuck to the bottom of the dryer ruled out the possibility that the fire started adjacent to the dryer or in the washing machine, as no other part of the floor, including the area directly under the washer, showed burns of remotely similar levels of severity as the floor under the dryer. As there was no other potential source of heat that could have damaged the linoleum under the dryer besides a fire in the dryer and no other part of the floor suffered similar levels of damage, Mr. Arms concluded that the origin of the fire came from inside the bottom part of the dryer. But the district court’s order did not address any of Mr. Arms’ testimony as it related to where the fire started. Contrary to what the district court held, Mr. Arms’ testimony regarding the physical origin of the fire was based on a widely accepted methodology and grounded in the available physical evidence. For these reasons, we hold that excluding that part of Mr. Arms’ testimony on Daubert grounds was an abuse of discretion. See City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chem, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 564 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that “the district court abused its discretion in excluding admissible portions of [the expert’s] testimony by ruling 8 Case: 11-15011 Date Filed: 01/17/2013 Page: 9 of 12 that [the expert’s] testimony in its entirety was inadmissible”); see also Weisgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 518 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that although fire investigation expert was not qualified to opine on whether heater had malfunctioned, he could testify about the origin of the fire), aff'd on other grounds, 528 U.S. 440 (2000). We reverse as to the exclusion of the part of Mr. Arms’ testimony that related to origin of the fire.
The second expert whose testimony was categorically excluded by the district court was Dr. Clarke, a metallurgy expert with a master’s degree in extractive metallurgy, and a doctorate in fracture mechanics. United Fire retained Dr. Clarke as a metallurgist, not as a cause and origin expert. The sole purpose for which he was retained was to examine the metal exhaust tube within the dryer and estimate the temperature it reached during the fire. Pointing to Dr. Clarke’s failure to cite some type of publication supporting his testimony that the metal in the tube melts at 2800 degrees, the district court ruled that the testimony did not satisfy the minimum indicia of reliability outlined in Duabert. However, reference to a published study involving dryer ducts is not necessary to demonstrate minimum scientific reliability. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (“Publication (which is but one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate with reliability . . . .”). Indeed, 9 Case: 11-15011 Date Filed: 01/17/2013 Page: 10 of 12 given that the scientific literature on dryer ducts or low carbon steel may not be extensive, the fact that Dr. Clarke was not aware of any literature finding that dryer ducts have reached temperatures of 2800 degrees Fahrenheit hardly suggests that the methodology underlying Dr. Clarke’s conclusion was not minimally reliable. Dr. Clarke gave an extensive explanation of his methodology and explained how his education assisted him in reaching his conclusions. Dr. Clarke is an engineer with advanced degrees and a specialty in metallurgy. He applied his advanced training and used several metallurgy imaging tools including an electron microscope to analyze the microstructural properties of the metal tube. Dr. Clarke’s specialized knowledge included familiarity with the temperatures at which different types of metal melt and the microstructural properties of metal that has been exposed to high temperatures. While his ultimate conclusions may be contested, it was an abuse of discretion to conclude that the basic methodology Dr. Clarke applied to analyze the metal dryer duct lacked minimum scientific reliability. We therefore reverse the exclusion of Dr. Clarke’s testimony. 2