Opinion ID: 1829631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Instructions Defining Proximate Cause

Text: The railroad claims that the trial judge used the term proximate cause continuously, but did not define it. The trial judge instructed the jury: Such violation or negligence must be the proximate cause, in whole or in part, of the injuries or damages claimed ... [T]he injury or damages must be caused, in whole or in part, as a result of or as a direct result of violations or negligence [complained of]. (Emphasis added.) In a FELA case, the jury should be instructed that if the alleged injury to the plaintiff ... resulted `in whole or in part' from defendant's negligence the plaintiff has a right to recover from the defendant. Salotti v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 293 Ala. 1, 299 So.2d 695, 708 (1974). This instruction concerning proximate cause is different from the classic common law definition in a common law tort case, and its use in FELA cases, appears to have arisen in the United States Supreme Court's case of Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957). In Rogers, the Court did not consider how juries should be instructed; it only considered when a FELA case should be submitted to the jury, but the Court held that in a FELA action the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the [employee's injury]. Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506, 77 S.Ct. at 448. See Salotti, 293 Ala. at 9, 299 So.2d at 701. In Salotti, this Court held that the rule of Rogers must be given to the jury in the jury instruction defining proximate cause in a FELA action. The trial judge in Salotti gave several instructions using the rule of Rogers and several instructions using the classic common law definition of proximate cause. This Court found that [r]epeated instructions correctly stating the rule of the Rogers case may render harmless the error in giving a common law proximate cause instruction. Salotti, 293 Ala. at 16, 299 So.2d at 708. Therefore, in the case at bar, the trial judge correctly did not use the common law definition of proximate cause and properly instructed the jury, based on the rule of Rogers, that the plaintiff's injury must be caused, in whole or in part, by the defendant's negligence. We find no prejudicial error here. Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HORNSBY, C.J., and SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and INGRAM, JJ., concur.