Opinion ID: 1625379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: right to counsel and an independent test

Text: The evidence is undisputed that, prior to the taking of his blood sample for testing, McNamara did not receive any information regarding his right to counsel (Miranda rights [3] ) or his right to an independent test. The only information McNamara received from Nelson following his arrest was that his license would be suspended for one year if he refused to take the test (the implied consent law). McNamara now asserts that due to the failure of Nelson to advise McNamara of these rights, we should reverse the administrative hearing officer's decision. We disagree. While we agree with McNamara that individuals do have the right to an independent chemical test in addition to the test taken at the direction of the law enforcement officer, we must remind McNamara that an officer has no duty to inform a person of the right. We have held that police have no duty to inform a person of the right to an additional test. State v. Rambousek, 358 N.W.2d 223, 230 (N.D. 1984). State v. Messner 481 N.W.2d 236, 239 (N.D.1992). Our discussion of Miranda rights in an administrative setting is two-fold. First, the issue of whether chemical tests should be excluded in an administrative hearing because of failure to give the suspect Miranda warnings has previously been answered by this Court. In Pladson v. Hjelle, 368 N.W.2d 508, we said: In State v. Fields, 294 N.W.2d 404 (N.D.1980), we stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to implied-consent matters and, furthermore, that if a driver consents to a blood-alcohol test, the results are not `testimonial' and are admissible into evidence. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (the results of a blood test are `physical' or `real' evidence, unprotected by the Fifth Amendment privilege). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983); State v. Mertz, 362 N.W.2d 410 (N.D.1985); State v. Kimball, 361 N.W.2d 601 (N.D.1985). Id. at 513-14 (footnote omitted). Thus, the mere failure to give McNamara his Miranda warnings will not result in the suppression of his blood-test evidence in the administrative hearing, nor will it command that his driving privileges be reinstated by the DOT. [4] Further, any other physical evidence, such as his performance on the field sobriety tests, will not be excluded from evidence. See State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761 (N.D.1990). However, our inquiry cannot end here because not all of the evidence introduced at the administrative hearing was physical. There was also evidence introduced by Nelson concerning McNamara's admission that he had been drinking on the night in question. This admission is testimonial in nature, and is the type of evidence that falls under the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., id. at 763 (defining and distinguishing physical evidence, to which the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply, and testimonial evidence, to which the privilege against self-incrimination does apply). Even though evidence may be testimonial in nature, law enforcement officials are only required to give suspects their Miranda warnings when the suspects are faced with custodial interrogations. Id. at 763-65. For the purpose of this opinion we will assume, without deciding, that the admission in this case occurred during custodial interrogation. The admission by McNamara was offered into evidence by Nelson as one of the many factors he used to develop probable cause to arrest McNamara for driving under the influence. See section I of this opinion. Further assuming, again without deciding, that such an admission should have been suppressed at the administrative hearing due to Nelson's failure to give McNamara his Miranda warnings, there were still numerous other factors remaining which supported the hearing officer's finding of probable cause to arrest. Thus, even if there is an administrative law requirement of advising suspects of their Miranda rights, the failure of Nelson to give the warning in these facts amounted to harmless error because probable cause existed without the inclusion of McNamara's admission.