Opinion ID: 736252
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coverage C

Text: 27
28 We further agree with the district court that the exclusion to the Civil Rights and Assault and Battery endorsement to Coverage C precludes coverage for Officer Waymire's actions. The endorsement amends Coverage C to include within the list of offenses for which the insurer will pay damages: (D) Any violation of the Civil and Constitutional Rights of any person which creates a cause of action for damages by or on behalf of such person under ... United States Code, Title 42, Section 1983. R.17, Ex.B. The endorsement also provides an additional exclusion that applies to subpart (D): The insurance provided by subpart[ ] (D) ... of Coverage C shall not apply to: (1) Fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts. Id. Courts have given the phrase criminal act in insurance policy exclusions its plain meaning. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 16 F.3d 222, 225 (7th Cir.1994) ([A]n act is criminal if it violates the State's criminal code.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Norris, 795 F.Supp. 272, 275-76 (S.D.Ind.1992) (holding that, under the plain meaning of the criminal act exclusion, a Class C felony under Indiana law was not covered by the policy; collecting Indiana cases). Officer Waymire pleaded guilty to five counts of child molestation (felonies under the Indiana penal code), which constitute the core of Ms. West's action. Therefore, National Fire would not have a duty to indemnify or defend Officer Waymire for his acts of child molestation because such acts clearly fall within the meaning of the exclusion. 6 29
30 Moreover, we note that, even absent the exclusion to the civil rights rider to the policy, the policy provides no coverage for Officer Waymire because his actions would be excluded by the willful violation of a penal statute exclusion, an exclusion that affects the scope of coverage for all of Coverage C, including the civil rights endorsement. Officer Waymire's actions fall squarely within this coverage exclusion. Coverage C excludes from coverage any personal injuries arising out of the willful violation of a penal statute or ordinance committed by or with the knowledge or consent of any insured. LGGL Policy at 6. The allegations relating to Officer Waymire's conduct clearly speak of intentional acts that violated penal statutes. Cf. Carney v. White, 843 F.Supp. 462, 476 (E.D.Wis.1994) (finding that, under Wisconsin law, because the complaint alleged intentional conduct that violated penal statutes, the insurer was under no obligation to defend the insured officer), aff'd, 60 F.3d 1273 (7th Cir.1995). The underlying conduct for which Ms. West seeks damages involves intentional acts of child molestation and false imprisonment. Both offenses clearly are prohibited by the Indiana penal code. See Ind.Code § 35-42-4-3 (child molestation); Ind.Code § 35-42-3-3 (criminal confinement). 7 Therefore, under the clear and unambiguous language of the policy, no coverage would apply to Officer Waymire's actions. See Carney v. Village of Darien, 60 F.3d 1273, 1280-81 (7th Cir.1995) (finding that identical policy language excluded coverage of officer's actions in instance in which officer detained individuals and offered to void traffic citations in exchange for sexual favors; holding that insurer had no duty to defend officer).