Opinion ID: 4542698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Neither party filed exceptions to the referee’s report and recommendation. In those circumstances, the court may, at its discretion, adopt the findings of the referee as final and conclusive. 4 We therefore adopt the referee’s findings that clear and convincing evidence establishes that Argyrakis violated § 3-508.4(b) and his oath of office as an attorney. The only issue remaining for this court’s consideration is the appropriate sanction. [2-6] Under Neb. Ct. R. § 3-304, this court may impose one or more of the following disciplinary sanctions: (1) disbarment; (2) suspension; (3) probation, in lieu of or subsequent to suspension, on such terms as the court may designate; (4) censure and reprimand; or (5) temporary suspension. 5 To determine whether and to what extent discipline should be imposed in an attorney discipline proceeding, we consider the following factors: (1) the nature of the offense, (2) the need for deterring others, (3) the maintenance of the reputation of the bar as a whole, (4) the protection of the public, (5) the attitude of 3 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Gast, 296 Neb. 687, 896 N.W.2d 583 (2017). 4 Neb. Ct. R. § 3-310(L) (rev. 2014). 5 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Nimmer, 300 Neb. 906, 916 N.W.2d 732 (2018). - 403 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. ARGYRAKIS Cite as 305 Neb. 396 the respondent generally, and (6) the respondent’s present or future fitness to continue in the practice of law. 6 Each attorney discipline case must be evaluated in light of its particular facts and circumstances. 7 For purposes of determining the proper discipline of an attorney, we consider the attorney’s actions both underlying the events of the case and throughout the proceeding, as well as any aggravating or mitigating factors. 8 Furthermore, the propriety of a sanction must be considered with reference to the sanctions imposed in prior similar cases. 9 We will proceed to consider each of these issues in turn. Consideration of Traditional Sanction Factors. In Walz, we discussed how the factors we regularly consider in formulating an appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct apply when an attorney is convicted of a crime of violence. 10 In the course of discussing the nature of the offense and the need for deterrence, we observed that offenses involving violence require discipline and that the sanction must be tailored to maintain public confidence in the bar. 11 We also noted that the factor requiring consideration of protection of the public is not merely concern for a physical danger to the public, but also requires consideration of whether it is in the public interest to allow an attorney who has committed a crime of violence to keep practicing law. Finally, we emphasized that even if no clients are harmed, “an attorney’s conviction of a felony for a crime of violence requires a severe sanction.” 12 6 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Jorgenson, 302 Neb. 188, 922 N.W.2d 753 (2019). 7 Nimmer, supra note 5. 8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Walz, supra note 1. 11 Id. (citing § 3-508.4, comment 2). 12 Id. at 576, 869 N.W.2d at 77. - 404 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. ARGYRAKIS Cite as 305 Neb. 396 The foregoing discussion from Walz regarding the appropriate sanction when an attorney is convicted of a crime of violence is applicable in this case. We classified the conviction at issue in Walz as a crime of violence when it did not involve actual physical violence, but the threat to commit such violence. Here, the factual basis offered for Argyrakis’ no contest plea, to which Argyrakis did not object, was that Argyrakis committed an act of actual physical violence by repeatedly punching his 83-year-old father in the face. This case is similar to Walz with respect to another traditional factor bearing on the appropriate sanction—the attitude of the respondent. In Walz, the attorney insisted on her innocence despite entering a no contest plea to making terroristic threats. We stated that it was not our task to review a criminal conviction in attorney disciplinary proceedings and that because the respondent insisted on her innocence, she had not accepted responsibility for her actions. For similar reasons, we cannot say that Argyrakis has accepted responsibility in this case. Although Argyrakis seems to concede that he did, in fact, inflict physical violence on his elderly father, throughout the proceedings, he has attempted to minimize his culpability by insisting that he was not the aggressor in the encounter and that his actions were in self-defense. As in Walz, it is not our task to review the conviction. And rather than accepting responsibility for that conviction, Argyrakis is attempting to assign at least partial responsibility for it to others. Consideration of Mitigating Factors. Also relevant to the appropriate sanction in an attorney discipline case is the existence of any mitigating factors. Here, the referee found one mitigating factor: the absence of any prior disciplinary issues in Argyrakis’ over 25 years of practice. We agree with the referee that this is a factor to be considered in mitigation. We also do not disagree with the referee’s conclusion that Argyrakis’ mental health issues were entitled to little weight in - 405 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. ARGYRAKIS Cite as 305 Neb. 396 mitigation. In Thompson, we held that in order for depression to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, the respondent must show (1) medical evidence that he or she is affected by depression, (2) that the depression was a direct and substantial contributing cause to the misconduct, and (3) that treatment of the depression will substantially reduce the risk of further misconduct. 13 We see no reason not to require the same showing in order to consider other mental health conditions as a mitigating circumstance. Argyrakis attempted to introduce evidence of his mental health issues through Schulze. And though Schulze testified that she had diagnosed Argyrakis with mental health conditions, that she believed those conditions caused his misconduct, and that treatment of those conditions would reduce the risk of further misconduct, we agree with the referee that there are compelling reasons that this testimony should be accorded little weight. Schulze did not begin seeing Argyrakis until after the incident underlying his criminal conviction. And despite Argyrakis’ acknowledgment that he had been treated by multiple doctors for mental health issues several years before the incident and that he had undergone mental health evaluations before and after the incident, Schulze did not consider any of this information in forming her opinions. Rather, she admitted that her opinions were based solely on information reported by Argyrakis. Because Schulze’s opinions were formed without considering what would seem to be highly relevant information and mindful of the fact that the referee heard and observed Schulze during her testimony and determined that it should be given little weight, 14 we find that Argyrakis has not made the required showing to allow his mental health issues to be considered in mitigation. 13 Thompson, supra note 2. 14 See State ex rel. NSBA v. McArthur, 257 Neb. 618, 599 N.W.2d 592 (1999) (while attorney discipline proceeding is trial de novo on record, court may give weight to referee’s findings on matters of disputed fact). - 406 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. ARGYRAKIS Cite as 305 Neb. 396 In his brief before us and at oral argument, Argyrakis contended that other factors should be considered in mitigation. He claimed that he was not the aggressor in the incident with his father and that the decision to prosecute him was politically motivated. We see no other mitigating factors. As noted above, it is not our function to review his conviction. Further, there is no evidence in the record supportive of his theory of a politically motivated prosecution. Comparison to Prior Cases. Each attorney discipline case must be evaluated individually in light of its particular facts and circumstances. 15 In addition, the propriety of a sanction must also be considered with reference to the sanctions imposed in prior similar cases. 16 Walz appears to be the only truly similar prior case for us to consider here. In Walz, we noted that there are few Nebraska cases of attorney discipline involving felony convictions of any kind and that Walz was the first case to involve a crime of violence. 17 In Walz, the respondent was first charged with second degree domestic assault and use of a weapon to commit a felony. The State alleged that she assaulted her husband with a knife. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the respondent pleaded no contest to one count of making terroristic threats. The respondent maintained her innocence. We found that her felony conviction for a crime of violence damaged the reputation of the bar and threatened public confidence in the profession. We disbarred the respondent from the practice of law. This case bears a number of similarities to Walz. Like the respondent in Walz, Argyrakis pleaded no contest to a felony crime of violence. And like the respondent in Walz, Argyrakis did not accept responsibility for his conviction. 15 State ex rel. Counsel for Dis. v. Riskowski, 272 Neb. 781, 724 N.W.2d 813 (2006). 16 Id. 17 Walz, supra note 1. - 407 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. ARGYRAKIS Cite as 305 Neb. 396 There are, to be sure, differences between this case and Walz. As Argyrakis points out, the respondent in Walz also had no prior disciplinary history, but we pointed out that she had been in practice for only about 6 months before the misconduct occurred. This is obviously entitled to less weight than Argyrakis’ over 25 years of practice without discipli­ nary issues. In addition, there was explicit testimony from the respondent’s psychologist in Walz that she was not, at that time, fit to practice law. No similar testimony was offered in Argyrakis’ case. But not all of the differences between this case and Walz tilt in Argyrakis’ favor. As we have previously noted, the conviction in Walz was for making threats to use violence, while the conviction here involves actual physical violence on an elderly person. Further, the conviction in this case was for a Class IIIA felony, more serious than the Class IV felony in Walz. In addition, although both the respondent in Walz and Argyrakis did not accept responsibility for their convictions, the respondent in Walz was found to be fully cooperative with the Counsel for Discipline. The same cannot be said for Argyrakis. Argyrakis failed to notify the Counsel for Discipline that he had entered a plea and been sentenced in his criminal case, despite the request to keep the Counsel for Discipline informed. In sum, this case is highly similar to Walz and any differences that cut in favor of a less serious sanction are counterbalanced by differences that cut in the opposite direction. Sanction. In Walz, we observed that while we have not stated a “‘bright line rule,’” 18 our cases regarding the appropriate discipline for felony convictions have generally concluded that such convictions reflect adversely upon a lawyer’s fitness to practice law and that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. As in Walz, we believe it is necessary to convey the serious consequences 18 Id. at 575, 869 N.W.2d at 77. - 408 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. COUNSEL FOR DIS. v. ARGYRAKIS Cite as 305 Neb. 396 that attach to a conviction for a crime of violence. Such a conviction damages the reputation of the bar and threatens public confidence in the profession. For these reasons, we conclude, after considering the appropriate factors, that disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case.