Opinion ID: 2622602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chapter 10.77 RCW

Text: Petitioners may seek release two different ways under our statutory scheme. They may petition the secretary of Department of Social and Health Services for conditional release under RCW 10.77.150. If the secretary agrees that conditional release is appropriate, the petition will be forwarded to a trial court for a full adversarial hearing. If the secretary declines to recommend release, the trial court may still schedule a hearing. In that instance, the issue to be determined is whether or not the person may be released conditionally without substantial danger to other persons, or substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security. RCW 10.77.150(2). Alternately, a detainee may seek final or conditional release under RCW 10.77.200. Again, the detainee may apply to the secretary, and if the secretary agrees release is appropriate, the application will be forwarded to the court for a hearing. In that instance, the petitioner (the secretary or the detainee) must: [S]how by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner no longer presents, as a result of a mental disease or defect, a substantial danger to other persons, or a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security, unless kept under further control by the court or other persons or institutions. RCW 10.77.200(2). However, RCW 10.77.200(3) explicitly lays out that a petitioner may petition the court directly. The issue to be determined is the same. The trial court correctly read the statute. By its plain terms, final release is inappropriate unless the petitioner demonstrates either that he no longer presents as a result of a mental disease or defect, a substantial danger to other persons or that he no longer presents a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security. RCW 10.77.200(2). While the trial judge found Reid was not currently suffering from a mental disease or defect, she clearly found he had failed to demonstrate he no longer presented a substantial likelihood of committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety by the presence, albeit latent, of a mental disease or defect. That was sufficient to deny final release. Further, reading the statute any other way creates a logical inconsistency. All a detainee needs to show to receive conditional release under RCW 10.77.150 is that, given the conditions of his release, he is no longer dangerous. However, under the majority's reading, to receive final release, all he needs to show is either that he is no longer dangerous or that he is not currently insane. It strains credulity to read the statute to mean it is easier to receive final release than conditional release. While holding a person who is currently sane might run afoul of Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992) standing alone, in the context of the entire statutory scheme, it is constitutionally acceptable, because Reid has the option of seeking conditional or final release at any time, and a very real chance of release once his situation improves. While the majority's reading of the statute is permissible under Foucha, Foucha does not require it. We therefore turn now to Foucha.