Opinion ID: 2218579
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: bad acts

Text: The bad acts testimony of M.K. and P.B. was admissible under SDCL 19-12-5, which provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The challenged testimony demonstrates a consistent pattern of molesting young girls with whom Perkins was long acquainted, when they were within his home. In each instance, Perkins approached the victim, and began fondling their breasts. Between the charges stemming from the D.J.K. incidents, and the four acts involving the other girls, a total of seven sexual encounters were presented. In four of the seven, the victim was present in the home as a baby-sitter staying overnight. In a fifth, the P.B. incident, the victim was spending the night after staying late to help Perkins' wife with a new baby, i.e. babysitting. Although Perkins asserts that the incidents involving M.K. and P.B. were so different as to be irrelevant, the factual patterns are remarkably similar. The only real difference between the bad acts and the rape incidents is that D.J.K. made no physical act to stop Perkins, whereas P.B. and M.K. did. Circumstances which surrounded the various acts and Perkins' behavior up to the point of physical resistance (which D.J.K. did not offer) are virtually the same. Perkins was not charged and convicted with a singular crime, based upon prior criminal or wrong conduct as the dissent of Sabers, J., postulates; rather, Perkins was charged with a series of criminal acts reflecting a plan to engage in sexual activity with very young girls. These acts typified the same plan toward underage victims which this Court determined was admissible in State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 816 (S.D.1983). This defendant has no more valid complaint about evidence of his other acts than Roden did in State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669 (S.D.1986). [2] Roden sexually assaulted little girls within his household. Perkins sexually attacked little girls in his house. This evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because its effect resulted from legitimate probative force of the evidence; there was no unfair advantage from persuasion by illegitimate means. State v. Kerkhove, 423 N.W.2d 160, 163 (S.D.1988). As in State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565 (S.D.1985), Perkins preyed on those whose families trusted him. Nor does Perkins have grounds for reversal because of temporal remoteness. Determining the remoteness of other acts must realistically depend upon their nature. In Means, 363 N.W.2d at 568-69, this Court affirmed introduction of a prior bad act three years prior to the act charged, a greater time lapse than presented here, where the charged acts occurred in 1982, 1984, and 1985, whereas the other bad acts occurred in 1984, 1985, and 1986. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The issue of intent was raised, through Perkins' statements to police that he may have been unconscious when the events took place (sleepwalking or trance state). Even if rape is a general intent statute, State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788 (S.D.1978), a claim of unconsciousness would be a defense making intent an issue (the trial court gave instructions on unconsciousness). Where a defendant claims innocence by a mitigating factor, he thus begets the establishment of intent as a material issue in the crime of rape. State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 198 (S.D.1985). Common features show a plan or scheme, and are relevant to intent. Id. [3] The trial court found the testimony of M.K. and P.B. to be relevant, State v. Pedde, 334 N.W.2d 41 (S.D.1983), a relevance not outweighed by unfair prejudice, Thomas, 381 N.W.2d 232, 237 (S.D.1986), and not too remote. State v. Johnson, 316 N.W.2d 652 (S.D.1982). We find no abuse of discretion here. [4] The standard of review on abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of other criminal wrongs, or other bad acts, was set forth in State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982). As recently written by Justice Sabers, on behalf of this Court, in State v. Titus, 426 N.W.2d 578 (S.D.1988), bad acts evidence is to be admitted in proper cases, for proper use (eight-year-old previous burglary conviction admitted).