Opinion ID: 1874198
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Present Sense Impression: KRE 803(1).

Text: At trial, Davidson related an incident in which Roberts called her on the telephone and told her that she (Roberts) had gone to the basement and was startled to find Appellant sitting in the basement in a lawn chair. Appellant objected on grounds of hearsay, not relevancy. Presumably, this evidence was offered to show that Appellant did not feel himself confined to that part of the house that Roberts had leased to him.
The present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule permits admission of a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. KRE 803(1). Although the rule says immediately thereafter, KRE 803(1) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 803(1); and the Advisory Committee's Note to that rule clarifies that the substitution of immediacy for contemporaneity was not intended as a departure from the traditional requirement that such statements be substantially contemporaneous with the event perceived. FRE 803 Advisory Committee's Note ([I]n many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not possible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable.). Cf. Jarvis, 960 S.W.2d at 469-70 (but finding that the proponent of the evidence had failed to offer any evidence to prove contemporaneity). Though Davidson could not know for sure how much time elapsed between the event and when Roberts called her, she believed Roberts called her shortly after the event because there was a telephone extension in the basement and it was Roberts's custom to tell her about any unusual events occurring within the house as soon as they happened. [4] The burden of proof that evidence falls within a hearsay exception is on the party seeking its admission. Noel, 76 S.W.3d at 926; Slaven, 962 S.W.2d at 854. Davidson's testimony that she believed the statement was made shortly after the incident occurred and why she so believed was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the statement satisfied the contemporaneity requirement of the hearsay exception for present sense impressions.
Usually, the testifying witness will have been present when the statement was made and in a position to corroborate the accuracy of the declarant's perception, or at least that the declarant was in a position to make such a perception. Here, of course, that was not the case. Some courts have held that corroboration is an absolute prerequisite to admission of evidence under this exception. E.g., Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820, 827 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977) ([The hearsay] was not admissible as a present sense impression because the witness did not have an equal opportunity to observe and check a possible misstatement....), superseded by Tex.R. Evid. 803(1) as stated in Rabbani v. State, 847 S.W.2d 555, 560 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The better view, however, is that corroboration is not an absolute prerequisite to admissibility, and that its absence affects only the weight of the evidence, so long as the declarant is shown to have personal knowledge of the matters described in the statement. United States v. Ruiz, 249 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir.2001) (permitting witness to repeat perceptions declarant relayed to him via walkie-talkie: The lack of another witness who could independently verify [the declarant's] observations ... bore upon the weight owed to this evidence but did not bar its admission.); United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir.1998) ([T]he record here is devoid of circumstances indicating by a preponderance that the author of the anonymous note actually saw Mitchell change cars. Thus, the requirement of personal perception necessary for both the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule is not satisfied.); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387, 390 (1974) (permitting homicide victim's mother to repeat statements victim made to her over the telephone describing defendant's conduct relevant to claim of self-defense). See generally Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 8.60(3), at 669-70 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003). Davidson was the declarant's sister and she knew that Appellant also resided at the declarant's residence. That was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the declarant had personal knowledge of Appellant's activities within the residence to admit the statement without corroboration.