Opinion ID: 1090899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court was correct in assessing the statutory penalty on the entire attorney's fee.

Text: ¶ 7. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-3-23 (Rev.2002) provided for a mandatory penalty for pursuing an unsuccessful appeal. [1] Section 11-3-23 provided in pertinent part: In case the judgment or decree of the court below be affirmed, or the appellant fails to prosecute his appeal to effect, the supreme court shall render judgment against the appellant for damages, at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) as follows: If the judgment or decree be for a sum of money, the damages shall be upon such sum. If the judgment or decree be for the possession of real or personal property, the damages shall be assessed on the value of the property. Where an appeal is filed claiming a portion of an asset or sum of money, the statutory penalty should only be applied to the portion claimedi.e. the amount in controversy. Holliman v. Dale, 578 So.2d 271 (Miss.1991). The statute providing damages to the appellee after an unsuccessful appeal is penal in nature and ought to be strictly construed against the party invoking it; the statute should not represent a windfall to the appellee. Lowicki v. Lowicki, 429 So.2d 917, 919 (Miss.1983). Because of judicial estoppel, a party cannot assume a position at one stage of a proceeding and then take a contrary stand later in the same litigation. Banes v. Thompson, 352 So.2d 812, 812 (Miss.1977). The statutory penalty is applied to both real and personal property. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-3-23. ¶ 8. The heart of this issue is the amount in controversy on appeal. The trial court, at Allred's urging, set the amount in controversy at 21.53% of the attorney's fee. Allred stated, the amount of cash in controversy is the difference between 28.47% and 50%. Because of the firm's argument at the hearing to set the amount in controversy, Allred cannot now assert that the amount in controversy was greater than the 21.53% of the fee the firm claimed. Judicial estoppel precludes a party from asserting a position, benefitting from that position, and then, when it becomes more convenient or profitable, retreating from that position later in the litigation. Dockins's claim that the entire amount was in controversy (to the extent such a claim was made) does not face such a bar. [W]hen the party making the prior statement, which is inconsistent with his position in the present action, has not benefitted by the assertion, the doctrine should not be applied. Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259, 265 (Miss. 1999) (citing Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So.2d 1049, 1053 (Miss.1979)). Dockins did not benefit from his assertion that there was more than 21.53% of the fee in controversy. Allred, however, did benefit from its stance, and it is estopped from asserting a contrary position in a later proceeding involving the same controversy. ¶ 9. Another issue is the amount claimed by Dockins. If [the appellant] loses, however, he must pay the price, a price he well knows and may easily calculate before giving his notice of appeal. Walters v. Inexco Oil Co., 440 So.2d 268, 275 (Miss.1983). The basis for Dockins's calculation surely must have been the amount determined to be in controversy by the trial court before the appeal. If we were to allow the penalty to be assessed on a different amount after the appeal has been rejected, we would deny the appellant the definitive knowledge of the costs of appeal Walters praises. ¶ 10. While Dockins did assert, at times, that he should be entitled to more than 50% of the attorney's fee, this was a speculative claim based on actions which he alleged were fraudulent and could allow punitive damages to be assessed. If Dockins had claimed that Allred's actions were sufficiently egregious to warrant $100 million in punitive damages, would the trial court have assessed the statutory penalty at $15 million? We think the answer is no. Dockins's speculative claim for damages cannot be the basis for assessing the mandatory penalty. The assertion that he was entitled to 50% of the fee is a more accurate reflection of the issue that was appealed. Several times during the proceeding to determine the amount in controversy, Dockins stated this as his view: [T]he highest percentage that we thought we were entitled to is at least half the amount of money that's involved. [O]f all the money involved, at least 50% of that is definitely in controversy. [W]e have claimed at least 50%, very close to 50% of that money[.] Dockins's attorney did point out that, if summary judgment were reversed, a jury could award any amount to Dockins. Again, this is totally speculative. Only a definite, final judgment should be subject to the statutory penalty. As the trial court correctly determined in its hearing to set the supersedeas bond, the actual amount in controversy is 21.53% of the fee. Therefore, the trial court erred in applying the appeal penalty to the amount of the entire attorney's fee.