Opinion ID: 694028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Credit a Vocational Evaluation based on Delgado's Subjective Complaints

Text: 11 Delgado argues that the Secretary's finding that he is not disabled because he retains a residual functional capacity to perform sustained work disregards both his subjective complaints and the Aba Pacifica vocational assessment conducted in January 1991, which found that Delgado had significant problems concentrating on work because of pain and inability to stand or sit for prolonged periods. The ALJ, however, provided specific reasons for finding that Delgado's subjective complaints were not credible. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir.1989). The ALJ noted (1) significant gaps in medical treatment from 1979-1982, 1983-1986, and 1986-1989; (2) Delgado's inconsistent statements about his progress during the initial period when he received no medical treatment; (3) the fact that Delgado initiated the 1989 treatment with Dr. Hafezi after he was informed of the continuing disability investigation; and (4) Delgado's inconsistent statements reporting limitations on his daily activities, such as the amount of driving, fishing, and yard and household chores in which he engaged. See Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1464 (finding it appropriate to disregard unsupported, self-serving statements); Matney, 981 F.2d at 1020 (considering a claimant's accounts of daily activities in evaluation of the claimant's subjective complaints); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir.1989) (finding it appropriate to consider an unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment). The ALJ also indicated that he found no support in Dr. Lucach's treatment reports, 2 because Dr. Lucach reported prescribing medication for Delgado's subjective pain complaints after April 1989, but did not provide any objective medical findings. Even though Dr. Lucach purported to have examined Delgado twice monthly after July 1991, he documented only two actual visits--one in November 1991 and another in January 1992. The ALJ noted that both Dr. Hafezi's and Dr. Lucach's assessments were based to a large extent upon Delgado's own accounts of his symptoms and limitations. See Flaten, 44 F.3d at 1463-64; Brawner v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 432, 433-34 (9th Cir.1988). 12 The ALJ credited the extensive medical reports from Drs. Nelson, Kim, Kappeler, Woodard, Hafezi, and Mann that suggested that Delgado had medically improved to a point where he could do some kinds of sedentary work, within postural limitations. The ALJ discounted the February 1991 Aba Pacifica vocational assessment, which suggested that Delgado's decreased functional capacity was inconsistent with any sustained work based on his low level of concentration and inability to stand or sit, because it relied on Delgado's medically unsupported, subjective complaints. See Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 643-44 (9th Cir.1982). We agree that these observations--which are subject to a claimant's motivation to secure continued disability status--have little merit, whether conducted by an independent contractor or by an ALJ. See, e.g., Perminter v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 870, 872 (9th Cir.1985) (condemning consideration of an ALJ's personal observations of the claimant, not based on medical evidence, as sit and squirm jurisprudence). Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ's decision to discredit Delgado's subjective complaints and the Aba Pacifica vocational assessment. 13