Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the offense of murder.

Text: ś 208. When reviewing challenges to jury instructions denied by a trial court, this Court utilizes the following standard: Where the jury could, based on the evidence presented find [Evans] not guilty of the crime charged, but guilty of the lesser included offense, a lesser included offense instruction is warranted. Toliver v. State, 600 So.2d 186, 192 (Miss.1992); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793 (Miss.1984). Where [Evans] has requested the jury be instructed on a lesser charge, this Court will look at the evidence in the light most favorable to [Evans] in determining whether such was warranted. Taylor v. State, 577 So.2d 381, 383 (Miss.1991). If a rational or a reasonable jury could find [Evans] not guilty to the principal offense charged in the indictment yet guilty of the lesser-included offense, then the lesser included offense instruction should be granted. Monroe v. State, 515 So.2d 860, 863 (Miss. 1987). Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 656-7 (Miss. 1996). ś 209. Evans argues that a murder instruction was warranted because Beatrice's mother consented to Beatrice accompanying Evans for the purpose of performing sexual acts for money. Evans argues that Giles' consent negated the elements of the underlying felony of kidnapping. This Court has repeatedly held that a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted only where there is an evidentiary basis for it. Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643 (Miss.1996); Mease v. State, 539 So.2d 1324, 1330 (Miss.1989). Because there was no evidentiary basis for a instruction on the offense of murder, the trial court did not err. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Evans, clearly demonstrated that a kidnapping occurred. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53 sets forth the offense of kidnapping. In Hughes v. State, 401 So.2d 1100 (Miss.1981), this Court restated the statute to clearly set forth the elements of kidnapping: Every person who shall, without lawful authority (1) forcibly seize and confine any other; (2) or shall inveigle or kidnap any other (3) with intent (a) to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned in the state against his will, (b) or to cause such other person to be sent out of this state against his will, (c) or to cause such other person (1) to be deprived of his liberty, (2) or in any way held to service against his will ... Under the statute the state must prove that a person, without lawful authority either (1) forcibly seized and confined another person, or (2) inveigled or kidnapped another person, intending to subject such person to either (a), (b), or (c) above. Id. at 1105. (emphasis added). ś 210. Evans' confession clearly establishes the requisite elements of kidnapping. In his confession, Evans stated: I led them to believe that I was going to the store to pick up some bar-b-que items that we could bar-b-que on the beach. And ah I told them I also had to stop and make some phone calls, to try to help them get situated in an apartment, I was gonna try to get them some gas money, cause they were out of gas. When I went to the store I went under the, when I left, with them feeling that I had the intention to go to the store and buy some other stuff and do some other errands.... ś 211. When he continued driving rather than stopping at the store, Evans told investigators that: Beatrice kept on asking where are you going, where are you going. And I also told Beatrice at this time that I was gonna buy her some t-shirts and stuff. We stopped at the store and I bought her an ice cream cone and it was at this time that I purchased some duct tape. It was a store en route to 1-10. At this time Beatrice asked concerned where we were going, she kept on asking where we are going, I, I deluded her into thinking and believing that ah the way we were going was a round-about way, it was like a loop of the Gulfport area. ś 212. In Wilcher v. State, 455 So.2d 727, 731 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1034, 105 S.Ct. 1411, 84 L.Ed.2d 794 (1985), vacated in part, 635 So.2d 789 (1993), this Court held that the crime of kidnapping may be accomplished by trickery and deceit. Wilcher intentionally gave the victims the wrong directions to his home in order to lead them to a deserted place where he intended to rob them. Here, as in Wilcher, the evidence showed that Evans led Giles and Beatrice to believe that he was going to the store to purchase groceries for a barbecue. Moreover, Evans unequivocally stated that his intentions were to rape and kill from the time he left Jones Park with Beatrice. ś 213. Despite his present claims, there is simply no evidence that Giles understood that Evans intended to rape and murder her daughter. Evans stated in his confession that Giles and the others understood that Evans was only taking Beatrice to buy groceries and that they would return in approximately one hour. Moreover, Evans indicated that they did not know my intentions at the time and that he and Giles made no agreements regarding her offer for Beatrice to perform sexual acts for Evans. ś 214. Although Evans cites Giles v. State, 650 So.2d 846 (Miss.1995), in arguing that he was denied an opportunity to present his defense theory to the jury, Giles is distinguishable. Giles was indicted for capital murder with the underlying felony of sexual battery. However, at the time of trial, Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-99 provided that a person was not guilty of sexual battery if the alleged victim was that person's legal spouse and at the time of the alleged offense such person and the alleged victim were not separated and living apart. The evidence that Giles was married to the victim at the time of the offense was uncontradicted. Although the evidence at trial demonstrated that Giles and the victim were living apart, this Court held the instruction was warranted. ś 215. Unlike Giles, there is no evidence to support a murder instruction in the case sub judice. Given the evidence in this record, a reasonable jury could not have found Evans not guilty of capital murder. The jury was instructed that they were required to find each element alleged by the State in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the jury was given the opportunity to sentence Evans to life imprisonment rather than the death penalty. See Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643, 657 (Miss.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1170, 117 S.Ct. 1437, 137 L.Ed.2d 544 (1997). This issue is without merit.