Opinion ID: 1059208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of evidence of vileness and future dangerousness

Text: Green asserts that the circuit court erred in overruling his motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence regarding both the vileness and future dangerousness predicates and also in overruling his motion to set aside the jury verdict fixing the death penalty. As to the vileness factor, Green argues that, since three of the four gunshot wounds sustained by Mrs. Vaughan were lethal, she died almost instantaneously without any other battery to her. He also relies on the forensic pathologist's testimony that Mrs. Vaughan died within seconds to minutes after she was first shot. Thus, in Green's view, the Commonwealth failed to prove either an aggravated battery to the victim or depravity of mind of the defendant. He also contends that the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Green would probably commit criminal acts of violence in the future that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. According to Green, the testimony of Dr. Sautter and Dr. Pasquale established that Green would not be a future danger if confined to prison. Green points to Dr. Sautter's opinion that Green's behavior would be appropriate in a maximum-security situation and to Dr. Pasquale's statement that, in a prison setting, the risk of misbehavior by Green would be low. In asserting that the Commonwealth failed to establish the future dangerousness predicate, Green also relies on the fact that he had no record of convictions for criminal offenses that pre-dated the present offenses involving the Vaughans. Finally, he characterizes the Commonwealth's evidence of unadjudicated prior bad acts as `benign' run-ins with friends, family and employers. With regard to the vileness predicate, the term aggravated battery means a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of murder. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978). Contrary to Green's assumption that Mrs. Vaughan died instantly, the forensic pathologist stated that he could not determine in what sequence Green had fired the four gunshots at Mrs. Vaughan. He did opine, however, that the bullet that penetrated two lobes of her right lung caused hemorrhaging in the thoracic cavity, the effect of which he likened to suffocation. A killing inflicted by multiple gunshot wounds. . . when there is an appreciable lapse of time between the first shot and the last, and when death does not result instantaneously from the first constitutes an aggravated battery. Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 379, 392, 464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (1995). Likewise, multiple gunshot wounds, any one of which could have been fatal, constitute an aggravated battery. Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 71, 515 S.E.2d 565, 575 (1999). We have construed the term depravity of mind to mean a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation. Smith, 219 Va. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149. Green's conduct established depravity of mind when he repeatedly shot Mrs. Vaughan in front of her husband and left them both to die merely so he could rob them. The killing of Mrs. Vaughan was unprovoked and Green showed no mercy for her when he walked back over to where she was lying on the floor and emptied his gun at her. See Walker, 258 Va. at 72, 515 S.E.2d at 575-76. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to strike the Commonwealth's evidence or to set aside the jury verdict finding the aggravating vileness factor. As to the future dangerousness predicate, we reach the same conclusion. The circumstances surrounding the murder of Mrs. Vaughan, including the shooting of Mr. Vaughan, are alone sufficient to establish Green's future dangerousness. See Code § 19.2-264.4(C) (future dangerousness can be based on the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 423, 508 S.E.2d 57, 66 (1998). In addition, Cleaton, an acquaintance of Green, testified that Green had threatened to rob and kill him and had shot in Cleaton's direction on one occasion even though Cleaton had specifically asked Green not to do so. Cleaton also stated that he had heard Green threaten to rob a man selling ice cream. Finally, several correctional officers who had supervised Green's incarceration testified about Green's disruptive behavior and his threats to the officers.