Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Other Crimes and Bad Acts Evidence

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to cross-examine penalty phase witnesses Chaplain Lelia Miotzek by asking her whether she was aware of defendant‘s many financial misdeeds and whether those past crimes changed her opinion of defendant‘s character. The applicable law is settled: ―In general, the prosecution may not present evidence of a defendant‘s bad character during its penalty phase case unless the evidence is admissible as one of the aggravating factors listed in section 190.3.‖ (People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 141.) ― ‗[W]hen the defense presents mitigating evidence of a defendant‘s good character, it has put the defendant‘s character in issue, thus opening the door to prosecution evidence tending to rebut that ―specific asserted aspect of [the defendant‘s] personality.‖ [Citation.] Such rebuttal evidence, however, must be specific and ―must relate directly to a particular incident or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 912.) ―The admission of rebuttal evidence is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court.‖ (Ibid.) Asked to describe defendant‘s character, Chaplain Miotzek testified that defendant ―is a person who I could trust to be consistent in Bible study, in church, in any type of activity that I might assign to her. She would be consistent in doing a Bible study or completing that.‖ In addition, the witness opined: ―There‘s commitment. There‘s a hunger within [defendant] to know the Lord of God and to 102 let God‘s word administer to her heart and her life.‖ Over a defense objection that it was beyond the scope of the direct testimony, the prosecutor asked Miotzek whether she had heard that when defendant worked for Aetna Sheet Metal Company in 1972, she stole money from her employer, did the same thing in 1973 when she worked for Franklin Sales Company, and in 1986 embezzled more than $33,000 from her employer, Edith Ann. The prosecutor also asked Miotzek whether she had heard defendant forged her husband‘s name on a deed of trust, that she represented herself to be the victim‘s former wife to obtain a loan, obtained a driver‘s license and Social Security card in a different name in 1990 and used them to create a new identity for herself, falsified a letter from a fictitious trust company to obtain a loan, falsely changed the title on a Rolls Royce that belonged to someone else and sold it, and wrote a letter in 1974 to the court, seeking lenient treatment by falsely claiming she had had a kidney removed and needed dialysis. Miotzek said these incidents did not change her opinion of defendant. We perceive no abuse of discretion. Defense counsel asked the witness to describe defendant‘s character, and the evidence of her good character thereby opened the door to legitimate cross-examination about her bad character. Defendant argues the prosecutor‘s questioning went beyond the scope of the direct testimony because the witness had not testified as to defendant‘s honesty, but addressed only her dependability and reliability. (See People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1072 [―Generally, the scope of bad character evidence offered in rebuttal must relate directly to the particular character trait concerning which the defendant has presented evidence.‖].) In support of her argument, defendant contends that ―[t]rustworthiness and reliability, while somewhat synonymous, identify distinctly different characteristics.‖ We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion—that is, acted in an ― ‗ ―arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd 103 manner‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Lucas, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 240)—in concluding the defense opened the door to bad character evidence by eliciting ―an opinion from [the witness] that [defendant] would be a good, trustworthy, rule-abiding prisoner should she be confined to the state prison for the rest of her life.‖ Having found no abuse of discretion, we reject defendant‘s argument the court erred by admitting evidence of her past crimes to impeach Chaplain Miotzek. 2. Alleged Instructional Error at the Penalty Phase
Defendant sought to introduce evidence about how a person would die in the gas chamber. In discussing the question of admissibility of the evidence, the trial court noted a new law would soon go into effect, allowing a condemned person to opt for lethal injection. The prosecution objected to defendant‘s proposed evidence, asserting that if defendant were allowed to present such evidence, it intended to introduce evidence concerning the conditions of confinement for a life prisoner. The trial court ruled that if the parties stipulated to each other‘s evidence, it would not intervene, but it would otherwise sustain the prosecutor‘s objection.16 The parties did not stipulate and the evidence about the gas chamber was excluded. Thereafter, in closing argument, the prosecutor addressed testimony defendant had presented from the two jail chaplains, both of whom suggested defendant was a compassionate person. The prosecutor argued defendant was like a Nazi soldier who worked in the crematoriums and gas chambers during the day 16 The trial court‘s ruling was correct. ―Our cases make clear that information about administration of the death penalty does not aid the jury in making an individualized determination of the appropriate penalty in a particular case.‖ (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 260.) 104 but otherwise led an apparently normal and unexceptional life. In rebuttal, defense counsel replied: ―I found it exceptionally ironic that [the prosecutor] talks about an analogy of Cathy Thompson and Nazis who gas Jews in World War II since that is precisely what they want to do with Cathy Thompson is death by lethal gas.‖ Defense counsel continued: ―I leave for your consideration and thought [that] even in . . . the Gulf War where the task is to kill your enemy. The one thing that we think of as unconscionable is the use of lethal gas.‖ Defense counsel mentioned lethal gas once more, saying: ―Perhaps it‘s beneficial to ask yourself if you vote for death, would you travel to San Quentin to witness the execution? If you vote for death, would you have the guts to push the button to drop the cyanide pellets?‖ Following the close of argument, the prosecutor argued that because defense counsel had raised the issue of execution by lethal gas in her closing argument, the trial court should instruct the jury that, should it vote for death, defendant would be able to elect lethal injection instead of gas as a method of execution. The trial court agreed, and over defense objection, instructed the jury: ―During the defense argument reference was made to the death penalty being carried out by lethal gas. Effective the 1st of January, 1993, the law will change allowing the condemned to select between lethal gas or lethal injection.‖ The trial court thereafter denied defendant‘s motion for a mistrial. Defendant contends the trial court‘s instruction violated her right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Citing Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 in support, she argues that by informing the jury that she would be entitled to elect an alternative to lethal gas as a method of execution, the instruction diminished the jury‘s sense of responsibility for its sentencing decision. In Caldwell, the high court reversed a Mississippi death sentence because the prosecutor had argued to 105 the jury that it should not view its verdict as the final word because an appellate court would review the jury‘s decision for correctness. In reversing the judgment, the high court explained that ―it is constitutionally impermissible [under the Eighth Amendment] to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant‘s death rests elsewhere.‖ (Caldwell, supra, at pp. 328–329.) As we explained in People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, later high court cases have suggested that Caldwell should not be given an expansive reading: ―Caldwell simply requires that the jury not be mis[led] into believing that the responsibility for the sentencing decision lies elsewhere.‖ (Ledesma, supra, at p. 733, discussing Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1.) To determine whether the jury was misled, we must ask how a reasonable juror would have understood the challenged instruction. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 476; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [―in reviewing an ambiguous instruction . . . , we inquire ‗whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way‘ that violates the Constitution‖].) We find the trial court‘s instruction regarding the method of execution could not reasonably have misled the jury into believing ultimate responsibility for its penalty decision lay elsewhere. The court truthfully informed the jury that execution by lethal gas was no longer the only option because a new law would enable defendant to elect an alternative method of execution. Nothing about that information suggested responsibility for the jury‘s life-or-death decision lay anywhere other than with the 12 jurors. Although the instruction communicated to the jury that the method of execution would, to some degree, be defendant‘s choice, such information is not equivalent to informing the jury that it should consider its role in any way diminished. We thus reject as unreasonable defendant‘s claim the instruction told ―the jurors that the final 106 decision on [defendant‘s] execution rested with [her] . . . thus diminishing their sense of responsibility for their penalty decision.‖ Accordingly, we find the instruction did not violate defendant‘s rights under the Eighth Amendment.
Defendant contends CALJIC No. 8.88 was constitutionally flawed because it ―did not adequately convey several critical deliberative principles, and was misleading and vague in crucial respects.‖ We have considered and rejected these precise claims many times before, and defendant presents no persuasive reason why we should reconsider our precedents. (See, e.g., People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 141 [―We repeatedly have held that the standard version of CALJIC No. 8.88 is adequate and correct.‖].) Thus: • The instruction‘s use of the phrase ―so substantial‖ is not unconstitutionally vague under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 854.) • CALJIC No. 8.88 does not ―impermissibly fail to inform the jury that it must find death was an appropriate, not just an authorized, penalty.‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 980.) • CALJIC No. 8.88 does not impermissibly fail to define the meaning of aggravation or mitigation. (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th 96, 124 [― ‗ ―There is no need to instruct the jury . . . regarding the meaning of the term ‗mitigation‘ ‖ ‘ ‖]; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 862.) • The instruction is not constitutionally defective despite failing to inform jurors they could impose a life sentence even if they concluded that aggravation outweighed mitigation. (People v. Bivert, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 124.) 107 • CALJIC No. 8.88 does not impermissibly fail to inform the jury that neither party bears the burden of persuasion regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty. (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal.4th 891, 943.) 3. Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Law Defendant contends section 190.3, the statute setting forth the death penalty in this state, is, for several reasons, constitutionally defective. We have considered and rejected these precise claims many times before, and defendant presents no persuasive reason why we should reconsider settled law. Thus: • ― ‗Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.‘ ‖ (People v. Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1376 (Seumanu).) • Neither the state nor federal Constitution requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase of a capital trial, or requires the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors have been proved, the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or death is the appropriate sentence. ―Moreover, none of the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) require a different result [citation].‖ (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1376.) • Section 190.3 is constitutional despite failing to require the jury to find the truth of aggravating circumstances by unanimous vote. (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 56.) 108 • ―Neither ‗the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment require[s] written findings or other specific findings by the jury regarding the aggravating factors.‘ ‖ (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1376.) • ― ‗The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th, 14th Amends.), do not require intercase proportionality review on appeal.‘ ‖ (Seumanu, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 1376.) • ― ‗The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b)‘ [citation], and need not first decide the prior criminal activity was true beyond a reasonable doubt by unanimous vote [citation]. Further, permitting the jury to consider prior unadjudicated criminal activity as aggravating evidence did not unconstitutionally allow it to impose the death penalty on unreliable, undiscussed, or undebated evidence, especially because the jury was instructed that no juror could consider such evidence unless he or she found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had committed the crime or crimes.‖ (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 980.) • ―Assertedly denying some procedural protections to capital defendants that would apply to noncapital defendants,‖ such as disparate sentence review, requiring written findings, and requiring unanimity on aggravating factors does not violate equal protection. (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 981.) 4. International Law Defendant contends the ―California death penalty procedure violates the provisions of international treaties and the fundamental precepts of international human rights,‖ citing, specifically, article VII of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). We have rejected this exact claim many times in previous cases. (See, e.g., People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 881; 109 People v. Abel, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 942.) As we have explained, ―[a]lthough the United States is a signatory [to the ICCPR], it signed the treaty on the express condition ‗[t]hat the United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 403–404.) Defendant does not persuade us we should reconsider these decisions. 5. Cumulative Prejudice Finally, defendant contends that ―[e]ven assuming that none of the errors identified . . . are prejudicial by themselves, the cumulative effect of these errors undermines the confidence in the integrity of the guilt phase proceedings.‖ As explained, we have found all of defendant‘s claims of error lack substantive merit, save two: (1) Regarding her claim the trial court committed Griffin error by commenting on her failure to take the stand and testify (Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609), we reject the claim without reaching its merits because no prejudice resulted from the trial court‘s comment; and (2) Regarding her claim the trial court violated her constitutional rights by excluding her (and her attorneys) from the hearing to discuss Phillip Sanders‘s discovery obligations concerning the jail letters, we similarly decline to reach the merits of the claim because no prejudice resulted from the absence of the defense team from the hearing. As each of those claims was individually harmless, we conclude their aggregate effect was also harmless. Accordingly, we reject defendant‘s claim of cumulative prejudice. 110