Opinion ID: 718644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: History of the Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: 19 Griffin has pursued the ineffective assistance claim which is the subject of this appeal through numerous state court proceedings. Griffin first presented the claim in his direct appeal of his conviction. In that appeal, Griffin relied on Mr. Goldenhersh's failure to present a non-participating bystander defense as grounds for the ineffective assistance claim. Griffin Direct App. Br. He noted that Mr. Goldenhersh was aware that Griffin had made statements to the police indicating that he had been present at the scene and knew who had done the shooting, but that Mr. Goldenhersh, in spite of this, still did not pursue an innocent bystander defense. 20 In addition, Griffin argued that the joint representation left Mr. Goldenhersh completely unable, without compromising his representation of Smith, to impress upon the jury that the eyewitness testimony was much less conclusive with respect to Griffin than it was with respect to Smith. Instead, Mr. Goldenhersh was forced to attempt to discredit completely the testimony of these witnesses, including testimony, such as that of Trooper Rice. Rice reported Walker as saying that it was Lee's friend who shot him. Of the same ilk was the testimony of Robinson that Griffin was not in the apartment when Kellick and Sims entered. This evidence would have tended to exonerate Griffin at Smith's expense. 21 Griffin pointed out on direct appeal that Mr. Goldenhersh not only failed to pursue lines of inquiry which would have aided him at Smith's expense, but actively pursued a defense strategy which was highly prejudicial to Griffin alone. By presenting the scapegoat theory, Griffin argued, Mr. Goldenhersh succeed[ed] in [his] opening statement in giving the jury a motive for Griffin to kill the victims that the State would not have been able to elicit ... [and in] taking a defendant with no record and involving him by implication in dope traffic and a 'dope-involved killing'. Griffin Direct Appeal Br. at 13. 22 Finally, Griffin pointed out various other shortcomings in Mr. Goldenhersh's representation, such as his attack on the morals of the victims on grounds of drugs and inter-racial sex; his suggestion that Kellick was involved in a cover-up when after being shot in the head he took three days to identify the perpetrators; Mr. Goldenhersh's complete failure to present any evidence in support of his scapegoat theory; and his failure to object to various bits of damaging argument such as the State's Attorney's assertion that Walker identified Lee Griffin as his killer. 23 The Illinois Appellate Court, on May 14, 1984, ruled that the proposed alternative bystander defense was too speculative to constitute the actual conflict required ... for ineffective assistance. The court noted that there was nothing in the record to indicate that defendant Griffin presented his attorney with any facts other than those supportive of the alibi defense. Finally, the court stated that [t]he failure of counsel to adopt a defense inconsistent with his client's testimony cannot reasonably be characterized as incompetent. Griffin, 79 Ill.Dec. at 508, 463 N.E.2d at 1062. 24 While waiting for his appeal to be resolved, Griffin filed a state post-conviction petition. That petition was heard on October 12, 1982. In the hearing on that petition, Griffin testified that he had told both Derango and Mr. Goldenhersh that he had been present at the time of the attacks but that he had not shot anyone nor condoned the shooting. He stated that Mr. Goldenhersh had told him that if he said he was present he would be found guilty on an accountability theory. Griffin testified that he had lied at his trial when he stated that he and Smith were playing cards at the tavern while the shootings took place. He explained that he had lied because he believed that if he put himself at the scene of the crime he would be held accountable. Griffin also testified that Mr. Goldenhersh never talked to him about having his case tried separately from Smith's and that he and Smith and Mr. Goldenhersh had agreed that, because of Smith's prior record, Griffin would have to be the one to take the stand and testify to the alibi. 25 In the post-conviction proceeding, Griffin's attorney argued that the joint representation presented a conflict, for some of the same reasons argued on direct appeal, and that it constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial judge denied the post-conviction petition, saying: 26 The Court is very familiar with the case, and of course what the defendant is asking me to do is disregard his prior perjured testimony and to say now that he has seen the light, and he's in to tell the truth. I don't know whether he's telling the truth or not. I don't know whether he told his attorney Mr. Goldenhersh that or not. He was afforded a defense according to the defendant's own testimony on the stand under oath. There was no conflict in the defense between the defendant and his co-defendant. Motion will be denied. 27 Resp. App. Exh. C at 21-22. 28 Griffin's appeal of the denial of his post-conviction petition was decided by the Illinois Appellate Court on the same day as was his direct appeal. That court reversed the trial court and granted Griffin's post-conviction petition on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Griffin, 124 Ill.App.3d 169, 79 Ill.Dec. 509, 463 N.E.2d 1063 (5 Dist.1984). The court relied on the principle that in some instances, however, the choice of treating co-defendants differently is more than a mere possibility; it is forced on counsel by the difference in evidence offered against co-defendants. Id. 79 Ill.Dec. at 517, 463 N.E.2d at 1071. The court pointed out that: 29 In order to take full advantage of the inconsistencies in the identification of Griffin, Goldenhersh would have had to distinguish between the uncontradicted assertions that Smith killed the girl and shot Kellick and the uncertainties about the identity of the man in the bathroom who shot Sims and the man or men who shot Walker. As it was, he only pointed to the inconsistencies and ambiguities as matters going to the credibility of the State's witnesses. Counsel could not give Griffin the best possible defense under the circumstances because to do so would have been disloyal to Smith, his original client. Because of this conflict of loyalties, he remained silent when independent counsel would have spoken out on Griffin's behalf. 30 Id. at 518, 463 N.E.2d at 1072. For these reasons the Appellate Court granted Griffin's petition. 31 On the State's appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, however, the decision of the Appellate Court was reversed. People v. Griffin, 109 Ill.2d 293, 93 Ill.Dec. 774, 487 N.E.2d 599 (1985). The Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that the Appellate Court was not in a position to judge the credibility of Griffin's testimony regarding what he had told Mr. Goldenhersh about whether he was present at the scene of the shooting. The Illinois Supreme Court also was unconvinced that Mr. Goldenhersh's failure to closely explore the discrepancies in the identification testimony of the various state witnesses was ineffective assistance. The Court said that [b]ased on these discrepancies, trial counsel did attack the credibility of the witnesses. His attack, however, was probably somewhat deflected by the fact that the defendant was testifying to the joint alibi that he and Smith were at the tavern.... It would seem incongruous to permit a defendant to perjure himself and then benefit from that perjury by successfully contending that his attorney, because of the perjury, did not most effectively explore grounds for his advantage. Id. 93 Ill.Dec. at 779, 487 N.E.2d at 604.
32 Griffin's federal petition for writ of habeas corpus continued to argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Mr. Goldenhersh due to the joint representation. Mr. Goldenhersh was deposed in connection with the habeas corpus proceedings. The magistrate judge found that [i]n his deposition, Marvin Goldenhersh stated that only facts relating to the alibi defense were given to him while preparing for trial. He also found that Mr. Goldenhersh further stated that he never discussed the theory of accountability with the petitioner and did not tell him that he would be found guilty if he admitted being at the scene. On this basis, the district court denied the habeas corpus petition. Resp. App. Exh. A at 11. 33 On appeal, however, this court noted apparent inconsistencies between the district court's factual findings and the record. In particular, we pointed out that Mr. Goldenhersh testified in his deposition that he did discuss accountability with Griffin and that he stated that there was the possibility that [Griffin] could be found guilty on the basis of accountability. Griffin v. Camp, 40 F.3d 170, 174 (7th Cir.1994). We also noted that [a]lthough Goldenhersh unequivocally stated that Griffin only gave him one version of the events--the version supporting the alibi defense--Goldenhersh's other statements indicate that he had access to a significant amount of evidence which pointed to another potential defense. Id. 34 Finally, we pointed out that the district court neglected to explain how the law, when applied to these facts, led to the conclusion that Griffin had effective assistance of counsel. Id. We thus remanded the case to the district court for clarification. 35 On remand, the district court reviewed the record and found that an actual conflict of interest existed. The district court relied on two grounds for this conclusion. First, the court acknowledged that Mr. Goldenhersh testified in his deposition that Griffin never told him facts which were at odds with the alibi defense. However, the court noted that the record shows that Mr. Goldenhersh was aware before trial of facts suggesting the availability of a viable innocent bystander defense. The district court also stated that only Jimmy Smith would have benefited from an alibi defense, noting that Jimmy Smith, as a convicted felon was unable to testify so that [i]n a joint trial, only [Griffin] was able to take the stand in their behalf. Finally, the court pointed out that the alibi defense provided the only way in which Mr. Goldenhersh could have represented both clients. Dist.Ct. Order at 12-14. 36 Based on these considerations, the district court found that a conflict of interest existed between Griffin and Smith such that joint representation of the two was precluded. The court also recognized that the record clearly showed that Griffin had never waived any conflict of interest between Smith and him with respect to their respective defenses. The district court thus granted Griffin's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.