Opinion ID: 711041
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Instructions Impermissibly Shift the Burden of Proof?

Text: 14 The first argument advanced by the appellant is that by instructing the jury that a reasonable doubt is one for which some good reason can be given, the trial court shifted the burden of proof onto the defense to provide reasons. In earlier decisions we have warned that jury instructions that imply that jurors should be ready to give a reason for their doubts are not approved and perhaps unwise but have never held such an instruction to be reversible error. United States v. Davis, 328 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir.1964); see also Barber v. Scully, 557 F.Supp. 1292, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (upholding a similar charge), aff'd, 731 F.2d 1073 (2d Cir.1984). The danger in such an instruction is that a jury will take it to mean that they must be ready to articulate a reason for their doubts. Thus, it is argued that the jury might believe it should look to the defendant to articulate the reason for the doubt, in essence requiring him to prove his innocence. We acknowledge that the good reason language might mislead a jury into looking to the defendant for an explanation. However, we conclude that in the context of the whole instruction in this case it is not reasonably likely that the jurors misunderstood the proper burden of proof. The trial court made it clear in the closing of its instruction that the burden of proof never shifts to the defendant and that no defendant is ever required to prove his innocence. 15 2. Did the Instructions Impermissibly Raise the Quantum of Doubt Necessary to Acquit From Reasonable to Good? 16 The second argument raised by Chalmers is that by instructing the jury that a reasonable doubt is one for which some good reason can be given, the trial court impermissibly, and unconstitutionally, raised the level of doubt needed for acquittal from a reasonable reason to a good reason. It is no doubt true that if the trial court plainly said a reasonable doubt is not enough to acquit the defendant, a good reason is required, it would be reversible error unless saved by strong correcting language. Such a statement would clearly lower the prosecution's burden. This is not what happened in this case, however. In context, the use of the word good by the trial court was intended to mean doubt based on the existence or non-existence of evidence, as opposed to based on conjecture or imagination. The trial court's next sentence after mentioning the contested good reason explained that [t]he doubt, to be reasonable, must therefore arise because of the nature and quality of the evidence in the case, or from the lack or insufficiency of the evidence in the case. Thus the trial court's use of the word good was intended, and likely understood, to mean that the proper foundation of a reasonable doubt was in fact rather than fantasy. 17 Chalmers relies on Dunn v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910, 98 S.Ct. 3102, 57 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1978), as support for his contention that the good reason instruction violated due process. As Chalmers pointed out in his brief, the instruction in Dunn described reasonable doubt as doubt as for the existence of which a reasonable person can give or suggest a good and sufficient reason. Id. at 23. The Dunn Court noted that the good reason portion of the instruction, standing alone, was improper but not reversible error. Id. Instead, the Dunn Court focused on the following portion of the instruction which told the jury that: 18 [Reasonable doubt] does not mean a trivial or a frivolous doubt nor one which can be readily or easily explained away, but rather such a strong and abiding conviction as still remains after careful consideration of all the facts and arguments against it and would cause a fair-minded person to refrain from acting in regard to some transaction of importance and seriousness equal to this case. 19 Id. at 23-24 & n. 1 (emphasis added). The court clearly, and correctly, held this portion of the instruction to be the reversible error in the case because it dramatically increased the amount and quality of doubt required for acquittal rather than illustrating the proper foundation of a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24. 20 Furthermore, the use of good in this case to qualify reason is similar to the jury instruction upheld in Victor, which stated in pertinent part: 21 A reasonable doubt is an actual and substantial doubt arising from the evidence, from the facts or circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part of the state, as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture. 22 Victor, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1249. The Court in Victor held that substantial did not raise the quantum of doubt requiring acquittal because it was clear from the context that substantial would have been taken by the jury to mean the opposite of doubt based on fanciful conjecture, and not taken to mean that a substantial amount of doubt was required. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1250. 23 Because the Victor standard asks what standard the jury actually applied, we cannot end our inquiry after deciding that the challenged portion of the jury instructions, in the context of the whole charge, does not offend due process. We must view the challenged portions of the instructions in the context of the whole trial as observed by the jury. Just as a trial court's cogent explanation of reasonable doubt can correct an earlier erroneous definition, a combination of independently non-reversible errors that taken together lead the jury to convict under a standard less than that required by the Due Process Clause is grounds for overturning a conviction. 24 3. Did the Prosecutor's Misstatements Aggravate the Instruction's Errors to the Level of a Due Process Violation? 25 The aggravating circumstance that confronts us in this case stems from the prosecutor's repeated use of the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of a moral certainty when discussing the case against the appellant during his summation. 2 Analytically, we must approach the issue in three steps. First, were the prosecutor's statements during summation erroneous statements of the law? Second, if they were erroneous, did they add to any misunderstanding held by the jury of the level of doubt that constitutes reasonable doubt? Third, if they were erroneous, did they add to any misunderstanding held by the jury of the proper burden of proof? If we find that the prosecution misstated the law during summation in a way that made it reasonably likely that the jury applied a standard inconsistent with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, either in quantitative terms or in terms of the burden of proof, then we must overturn the conviction. 26 Chalmers contends that the prosecutor's repeated use of the phrase beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of a moral certainty during summation was a misstatement of the law. We agree. The use of moral certainty language in jury charges has a long and criticized history, and similar language in a jury instruction was reversed by us only three years ago. Perez v. Irwin, 963 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.1992). In Perez, the trial court's instruction defined reasonable doubt as doubt to a moral certainty of the defendant's guilt three times. Id. at 502. We granted habeas corpus relief stating: 27 In the instant case the phrase moral certainty was used not to emphasize the prosecution's burden of proof, but rather incorrectly to define the degree of doubt necessary to entitle petitioner to an acquittal. By using the expression in this fashion the trial court placed the burden of the moral certainty requirement on the defendant rather than on the prosecution. As a consequence, in order for the jury to acquit the defendant, he was required to establish doubt of his guilt to the level of moral certainty, clearly contrary to the teachings of In re Winship. 28 Id. (citation omitted). In appellant's trial, the prosecutor equated reasonable doubt and the exclusion of moral certainty, similarly, although less strongly, insinuating that a reasonable doubt was a doubt of guilt held with moral certainty. Indeed, in one instance, the prosecutor pointed out that the defense had not provided any evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of a moral certainty, that the defendants were innocent. 3 Before discussing the impact of these statements on the jury's deliberations, we must address their procedural posture. The history of this case differs from Perez in that Chalmers in his petition to the district court failed to raise an independent claim based on the prosecutor's statements. Therefore, the only ground on which these comments properly are before us is as context. We examine these statements by the prosecutor to determine if they created a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the trial court's doubt for which some good reason can be given instruction to mean they could convict even if the prosecution had not proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Victor, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1248. 29 As we discussed above, the trial court's instruction that a reasonable doubt is one for which some good reason can be given was not itself reversible error either as an impermissible increase of the level of doubt necessary for acquittal or as an impermissible shifting of the burden of proof. This becomes a closer question in light of the prosecutor's erroneous statements of law during summation, statements that were twice objected to unsuccessfully. Nevertheless, we hold that it is not reasonably likely that the jury applied the incorrect standard. Id. 30 Of the five times the prosecutor paired reasonable doubt and the exclusion of a moral certainty, four stated, in essence that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of a moral certainty the existence of some element of the crimes charged. But in the fourth of the five instances, the prosecutor stated that there's no evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, to the exclusion of any moral certainty, that these four men weren't working together, because they were. This confusing portion of the prosecutor's summation suggests, incorrectly, that the defendant had the burden of providing the reasonable doubt to the jury. We now re-examine the propriety of the for which some good reason can be given portion of the instructions in light of the prosecutor's misstatements of law. 31 With regard to the argument that the word good raises the quantum of doubt necessary for acquittal to a level higher than reasonable, the prosecutor's repeated equating of reasonable doubt with to the exclusion of a moral certainty aggravates that statement. Perez, 963 F.2d at 502. The trial court improperly overruled each of the appellant's two objections to this language. Language of moral certainty is rarely enlightening in the reasonable doubt context, and as used here, was a misstatement of the In re Winship standard. Nevertheless, we cannot say that this repeated error likely imprinted the prosecutor's misstatements in the minds of the jurors. First, the phrase as employed is extremely confusing as to exactly what it means. Second, the defense counsel never had a chance to articulate the argument that it lowered the burden of proof because the court interrupted. Furthermore, the defense did not object to the prosecutor's fourth, and most erroneous, use of the moral certainty language, and thus the court did not stamp its imprimatur on the prosecutor's statement that the defense did not prove that the defendants did not commit the crimes. 32 Had the misstatements of law made here by the prosecutor appeared in the trial court's instructions, we would order that the writ issue as the district court did in Perez. Unlike Perez, though, the improper moral certainty language was used by the prosecutor in arguing the facts to the jury. The trial court then gave its own reasonable doubt instruction where it described, correctly, a reasonable doubt as a doubt that would make a person hesitate from acting in an important matter and as a doubt based in the evidence. 4 We hold that the trial court's proper instructions were sufficient to render it not reasonably likely that the jury required more doubt to acquit than proper under In re Winship. 33 The fact that the prosecutor, and not the court, introduced the moral certainty language is crucial to the argument that the doubt for which some good reason can be given language in the instructions shifted the burden of producing reasonable doubt onto the defendant. 5 We note that unlike Perez, the judge in the present case gave the proper instruction regarding the burden of proof, and ensured that the jury knew the proper standard to apply. The jury was instructed that the arguments of counsel were not binding and that it was required to apply the language given to them by the court. Furthermore, the proper instruction was nearly the last thing the jury was told before deliberating, making it more likely that it is what they remembered. The court stated, in pertinent part: 34 You must start by saying that he must be innocent; and only if the evidence which you accept and believe convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumption must be discarded and a verdict of guilty returned, only then is the presumption destroyed.... This burden remains on the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts to the defendant. No defendant is required to prove his innocence, and each element of the crime submitted to you, as I will define the elements, must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 35 (emphasis added). This language by the trial court likely corrected any misperception the jury may have held as a result of the standard suggested by the prosecutor's summation. 36 We caution trial courts that defining reasonable doubt as a doubt for which some good reason can be given only complicates matters and adds little to the jury's understanding of reasonable doubt. Variations from language that is tried and true, like the variation in this case, illustrate that in some circumstances the plodding repetition of approved language is the better course to follow. Perez, 963 F.2d at 500. Appellate courts will not hesitate to overturn convictions obtained where the circumstances indicate that the trial court has not corrected an otherwise erroneous definition of reasonable doubt made in summation or during instructions through the use of strong corrective language describing the correct standard as articulated in In re Winship.