Opinion ID: 2598794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Anti-Dedication Clause and Its Interpretation

Text: Section 7 of article IX provides in relevant part that [t]he proceeds of any state tax or license shall not be dedicated to any special purpose. [6] The drafters of the anti-dedication clause adopted it to preserve control of and responsibility for state spending in the legislature and the governor. `[T]he more special funds [that] are set up the more difficult it becomes to deny other requests until the point is reached where neither the governor nor the legislature has any real control over the finances of the state.' [7] The anti-dedication clause helps preserve the state's annual appropriation model and ensures that governmental departments will not be restricted in requesting funds from all sources. [8] We have twice considered whether an appropriation violated the anti-dedication clause, but neither case presented a question similar to the one presented here. In State v. Alex , we decided that an act purporting to dedicate a special assessment, rather than a tax or license, violated the anti-dedication clause because the clause applied to any source of public revenue. [9] In Sonneman v. Hickel , we held that an act violated the anti-dedication clause because it limited the ability of one state agency to request funding from revenues produced by the Marine Highway System. [10] In both cases, the unconstitutional acts dealt clearly with future allocation of future revenues; neither case involved a reduction to present value and outright sale of a future revenue stream. Accordingly, neither Alex nor Sonneman directly resolves the more complex question in the present case. The Alaska anti-dedication clause is almost unique among state constitutions. Only Georgia has a similar provision, which indirectly was the source of the Alaska provision. [11] The relevant portion of the Georgia anti-dedication clause provides: [N]o appropriation shall allocate to any object the proceeds of any particular tax or fund or a part or percentage thereof. [12] The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted its anti-dedication provision only once. In State Ports Authority v. Arnall, the Georgia legislature passed a bill appropriating all of the rentals received from a lease of the Western & Atlantic Railroad to the State Ports Authority for the purpose of paying bond debt. [13] The Georgia Supreme Court held that the appropriation was unconstitutional for two independent reasons: because it violated the provision concerning the creation of state debt and because it violated the provision prohibiting the dedication of funds. [14] Arnall, however, is of limited use in resolving the present case. Like our earlier cases, Arnall dealt with the appropriation of future revenues and did not decide whether the sale of a future income stream reduced to present value violated the anti-dedication clause. The state argues that Arnall favorably cited Wright v. Hardwick [15] and that this supports the constitutionality of the sale of a stream of revenue. In Wright, the Georgia legislature made an outright sale of rentals to be received from the lease of the Western & Atlantic Railroad. [16] The Georgia Supreme Court approved of the sale because the `legislative act [did] not seek to authorize the creation of debt.' [17] The state's argument is unconvincing because it misconstrues Arnall and overstates the scope of Wright. First, Arnall did not favorably cite Wright. Arnall distinguished Wright in its creation-of-debt analysis and made no mention of Wright in its anti-dedication analysis. [18] Second, Wright did not support the contention that the sale of rentals from the railroad lease was constitutional under Georgia's anti-dedication provision, for Wright was decided before Georgia adopted its anti-dedication provision. [19] Wright was decided in 1921, well before the anti-dedication provision first appeared in the Georgia Constitution of 1945. [20] In fact, the appellant in Wright argued that the sale of the right to future rents violated the annual appropriation model of the Georgia constitution, but the court stated, No scheme or fiscal policy for the state appears in any direct or express language of the Constitution limiting all expenditures for the state in any one year to the revenues of the state derived from all sources during that year, and declaring that the revenues shall not be anticipated. [21] Thus, Wright did not, and could not, support the validity of a sale of future lease revenues with respect to Georgia's anti-dedication provision. In sum, neither the text of our anti-dedication clause nor the relevant case law provides a direct answer to the question before us.