Opinion ID: 186000
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the Contempt

Text: 61 A contempt proceeding is either civil or criminal by virtue of its character and purpose, not by reason of the trial judge so denominating the proceeding. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441, 31 S.Ct. 492, 498, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911). Civil contempt is ordinarily used to compel compliance with an order of the court, Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2557, although in some circumstances a civil contempt sanction may be designed to compensate[ ] the complainant for losses sustained. Id. at 829, 114 S.Ct. at 2558. By contrast, criminal contempt is used to punish, that is, to vindicate the authority of the court following a transgression rather than to compel future compliance or to aid the plaintiff. Id. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2557. 62 In this case the nature of the contempt is obscured by the lack of any clear sanction. Although it did, under the heading Further Relief, expand the scope of the plaintiffs' discovery, Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 159, the district court itself noted that 63 much of the relief granted is not dependent on the Court's conclusion that the defendants committed several frauds on the Court. Rather, the Court has fashioned much of the relief granted today (such as future proceedings and the appointment of a special master) simply because of the current status of trust reform. 64 Id. at 135. In fact, other than an award of expenses the plaintiffs incurred in the contempt trial, 226 F.Supp.2d at 162 — which cannot be considered relief for the underlying contempt — the only relief granted that could conceivably be based upon the findings of contempt are the initiation of the Phase 1.5 proceeding and the appointment of the Special Master. On its face, that is, the Contempt Order appears to find the defendants in contempt, and then to impose no sanction. 65 Clearly, however, the district court did not intend its decision to be without effect. The exceedingly strong words it used in finding the defendants in contempt — in particular its statement that Secretary Norton was unfit — suggest the court intended the adjudication and accompanying opinion to serve as a reprimand to Secretary Norton and Assistant Secretary McCaleb. Indeed, the defendants reasonably characterize the decision as having impose[d] opprobrium upon them. Norton and McCaleb in particular believed the district court's adjudication to be so injurious to their reputations that they engaged private counsel and sought to intervene as appellants and to present arguments in their respective personal capacities. We see no reason a district court may not impose a reprimand as the sole sanction for an adjudication of contempt, particularly when the contemnor is a public official acting in her official capacity. 66 Examining this sanction in light of the principles set forth in Gompers and Bagwell, therefore, it is clear the proceeding was, and should have been treated as being, for criminal contempt. In specifications two through five, the district court cites completed conduct of the defendants (or of their predecessors in office), making the proceeding criminal in nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829, 114 S.Ct. at 2558 (When a contempt involves the prior conduct of an isolated, prohibited act, the resulting sanction has no coercive effect and is therefore punitive in nature); id. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2558 (describing a sanction as criminal if it is imposed retrospectively for a `completed act of disobedience' (quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443, 31 S.Ct. at 498-99)). Moreover, in each of those four specifications the district court held the defendants in contempt for [c]ommitting a fraud on the Court, Contempt Opinion, 226 F.Supp.2d at 20, citing as authority a Supreme Court opinion assimilating fraud on the court to criminal rather than to civil contempt. Id. at 26 (citing Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 63 S.Ct. 268, 87 L.Ed. 368 (1943)). We have been unable to find any authority for, let alone any reason to believe, the proposition that fraud on the court constitutes a civil contempt. We therefore treat the district court's contempt citations on specifications two through five as criminal in nature. 67 We also note that, although the district court said in the Contempt Opinion it was not issu[ing] a contempt citation at this time with respect to Specification 1, id. at 118, the accompanying Contempt Order is ambiguous on this score and the court later interpreted it otherwise. The statement that the defendants had engaged in litigation misconduct appeared under the heading Contempt Specifications. 226 F.Supp.2d at 161. In a later opinion addressing a motion to disqualify the District Judge, Special Master-Monitor Kieffer, and another special master from participation in contempt proceedings against certain non-parties, the district court further muddied the waters, stating that on September 17 it indeed had held the defendants in contempt for, among other things, engaging in litigation misconduct by failing to comply with the Court's Order as described in specification one. Memorandum and Order, at 5-6 (Jan. 17, 2003). We therefore treat specification one as a finding of contempt, also criminal in nature. 68 Although one may be held in civil contempt for refusing to comply with a court order, a sanction for one's past failure to comply with an order is criminal in nature. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29, 114 S.Ct. at 2557-58; Gompers, 221 U.S. at 443-44, 31 S.Ct. at 498-99. The district court clearly intended to punish the defendants for failing to comply with the Court's Order of December 21, 1999, to initiate a Historical Accounting Project, Contempt Order, 226 F.Supp.2d at 161, which is no doubt why its opinion lacks any suggestion that the defendants could yet comply and thereby purge themselves of the contempt. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828, 114 S.Ct. at 2558 (contempt is civil if the contemnor is able to purge the contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket). 69 The contempt proceeding being criminal rather than civil in nature, and the allegedly contumacious behavior occurring outside the presence of the court, the defendants were entitled to the usual protections of the criminal law, such as trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 826-27, 114 S.Ct. at 2556-57. Because the Department has not objected upon any such procedural ground, however, and explicitly disavowed any such objection at oral argument, we treat the same as waived. 70 In addressing the merits of the contempt specifications, we start with the elementary principle that, subject to certain exceptions clearly not relevant here, and absent respondeat superior liability, one person cannot be held criminally liable for the conduct of another. We further note that a finding of criminal contempt requires both a contemptuous act and a wrongful state of mind. In re Farquhar, 492 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.Cir.1973).  71 With these principles in mind, we can dispose quite readily of some of the district court's findings of contempt. Secretary Norton took office in January, Assistant Secretary McCaleb in July, 2001. Because specifications two and three concern conduct that took place prior to their taking office, the district court erred as a matter of law in holding either official in criminal contempt on those counts. The district court also erred in holding Assistant Secretary McCaleb in contempt on all five counts without having identified in the Contempt Opinion any specific act or omission whatsoever on his part. We address the other specifications of contempt, therefore, with reference to Secretary Norton alone.