Opinion ID: 1350403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: For the Purpose of Opposing A Motion For Summary Judgment, The Affidavit of Dr. Weeks Raised Genuine Issues of Material Fact.

Text: We first note that the affidavits of Dr. Lindsay and Dr. Montgomery offered in support of the motion for summary judgment are both devoid of statements indicating actual knowledge of the standard of practice in the Blackfoot community. Both affidavits refer only to the knowledge of the standards of practice in the state of Idaho. While I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 address only the plaintiff's burden of proof, if a defendant seeks summary judgment in a medical malpractice case, the supporting affidavits or other evidence must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). Merely filing a motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to place the burden on the adverse party to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact. The motion must be supported as provided in I.R.C.P. 56 in order to invoke the requirement that an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Here, since the affidavits of Dr. Lindsay and Dr. Montgomery did not indicate actual knowledge of the standard of practice in the Blackfoot community, the burden never shifted to Emily's parents to show that there was a genuine issue for trial. However, even if Emily's parents had been required to set forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial, the affidavit of Dr. Weeks was sufficient for that purpose. Since the trial court did not address the insufficiency of the defense affidavits, and since this issue has not been raised on appeal, we will proceed to address the issue framed by this appeal. This Court has held that in order to preclude summary judgment in medical malpractice cases, plaintiffs must show that expert testimony has been offered by either the plaintiff or defendant which when viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs indicates that the defendant has negligently failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the community. Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 102 Idaho 53, 56, 625 P.2d 407, 410 (1981). In other types of cases where we have reviewed the standards applicable to summary judgment motions we have held: Those standards require the district court, and this Court upon review, to liberally construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the nonmoving party, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1982)... . [A]ll doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69, 593 P.2d 402, 404 (1979). The motion must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom and if reasonable [people] might reach different conclusions. Id. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 469-70, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241-42 (1986). These standards are applicable to motions for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases as well. When viewed in light of the standards set forth in Maxwell and Durtschi, the affidavit of Dr. Weeks was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and to defeat the motion for summary judgment of Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson. A review reveals that when measured by these standards the affidavit fulfilled the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 and should have been considered by the trial court, even though Dr. Weeks was not board-certified in either pediatrics or surgery. 1. Dr. Weeks demonstrated that he was judging Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson in comparison with similarly trained and qualified [physicians] in the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of medical specialization. I.C. § 6-1012. (Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson did not comply with the applicable standard of practice for physicians of their specialties in Blackfoot, Idaho. Weeks' affidavit, final paragraph, supra. ) 2. He was a knowledgeable, competent expert witness. I.C. § 6-1013. (I am a practicing doctor of medicine. Weeks' affidavit, paragraph 1, supra. ) 3. He actually held an opinion about the applicable standard of practice and the failure of Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson to meet the standard. I.C. § 6-1013(a). ([I]t is the opinion of your Affiant ... that the recommendation that a child be brought back for re-examination should significant improvement not occur in the child's condition and/or should the child become worse, is not the standard which is to be followed by a practicing physician and that under the circumstances, a recommendation to bring the child back in twenty-four (24) hours was in error since the twenty-four (24) hour waiting period in an appendicitis case in a juvenile is an excessive amount of time ... that the child should have been brought back in the afternoon of the 24th of December, 1984, for a re-examination and re-test of the blood count of the minor child .. . [and] that Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson did not comply with the applicable standard[s] ... in the care and treatment they rendered to Emily Pearson on or about December 24, 1984. Weeks' affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 8 and final paragraph, supra. ) 4. His opinion was rendered with reasonable medical certainty. I.C. § 6-1013(b). ([I]t is the opinion of your Affiant, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty... . Weeks' affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 8 and final paragraph, supra. ) 5. He possessed professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable . .. community standard to which his ... expert opinion testimony is addressed. I.C. § 6-1013(c). (I am also familiar with the standards of the community regarding the diagnosis and treatment of suspected and actual appendicitis. Weeks' affidavit, paragraph 3, supra. ) Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson also contend that the affidavit of Dr. Weeks failed to present any proof of proximate cause and that summary judgment was properly granted for that reason also, although not mentioned by the trial court in its decision. In a medical malpractice case a plaintiff has the burden of proving not only that a defendant failed to use ordinary care, but also that the defendant's failure to use ordinary care was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. Hall v. Bacon, 93 Idaho 1, 3, 453 P.2d 816, 818 (1969). Here there is no dispute that Emily died from acute gangrenous appendicitis. Drawing all reasonable inferences from the affidavit of Dr. Weeks and resolving all doubts against the moving parties, we conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged negligence of Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson was the proximate causation of Emily's death, and that the motion should have been denied on that ground also.