Opinion ID: 2718298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Solomon’s Flexible Hours Accommodation Claim

Text: Survives Summary Judgment Like the plaintiffs in Breen and Woodruff, Solomon discharged her duty of coming forward with evidence from 17 which a reasonable jury could find that a strict work-hours regimen was not an essential function of her job. While the Secretary argues (Br. 43) that Solomon’s job involves “tight, unpredictable, and firm deadlines,” Solomon answered with evidence that short deadlines are infrequent and, when they arise, can be met with a maxiflex schedule. Indeed, Solomon showed—and it was not disputed by the Secretary—that she met every single work deadline through April 23, 2004, by working such a flexible schedule. Solomon, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 68. Solomon reinforced that record with evidence that the Department had permitted a fellow budget analyst to work similarly flexible hours. Id.; see also Langon v. Department of Health and Human Services, 959 F.2d 1053, 1060–1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (evidence undermined employer’s contention that the job had “short deadlines” and required “frequent faceto-face contacts,” creating “a genuine issue about whether, with the accommodation,” “Ms. Langon could perform the essential functions of her position”). The district court acknowledged that Solomon never missed “any actual deadline” during the period at issue. Solomon, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 71–72. But the court dismissed that evidence, surmising that “it may have merely been good luck that [Solomon] was able to meet [her] deadlines with such extensive absences.” Id. at 72. Summary judgment cannot rest on such speculation about evidence. “By weighing the evidence and reaching factual inferences” in the Secretary’s favor, the district court “failed to adhere to the axiom that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in h[er] favor.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863, 1868 (2014) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255) (first alteration in original). 18 In sum, Solomon discharged her summary-judgment duty of coming forward with sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor on all four elements of her accommodation claim, and for that reason we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. We need not decide whether Solomon’s additional accommodation requests—for a privacy curtain, relocation of her cubicle, advance sick leave, and a part-time, telecommuting schedule—independently created jury questions. Those additional requests may have been intended as alternative or temporary accommodations, or as complements to the flexible schedule. We leave for the trier of fact the question whether Solomon’s requests, individually or collectively, would have enabled Solomon to perform the essential functions of her position without undue hardship to the Department. See Breen, 282 F.3d at 843 n.6. 4