Opinion ID: 844223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subjective Test

Text: As noted earlier, implied malice for second degree murder contains not only an objective test but also a subjective test. The subjective test asks whether the defendant `kn[ew] that his conduct endanger[ed] the life of another.' ( Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 143.) According to the majority, a reasonable jury could infer this subjective knowledge from evidence presented in this case, namely, the circumstances on which the majority, in its discussion of the objective test for implied malice, relies in concluding that death was a natural consequence of defendant's single blow. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 511.) As I have discussed, I do not agree with the majority that those circumstances made death a natural consequence of the blow. (See pt. II.A., ante. ) Consequently, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that those same circumstances establish defendant's subjective knowledge that his conduct endangered Kauanui's life. The majority also relies on three additional circumstances in support of its conclusion that defendant knew that his single blow endangered Kauanui's life, thus satisfying the subjective test for implied malice. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 511.) None, however, sheds any light on defendant's knowledge at the time of the blow. The majority points out that defendant had earlier urged his friend, House, to fight Kauanui. That fact, however, is irrelevant to whether defendant knew, when he later hit Kauanui, that his single blow endangered Kauanui's life. The other two circumstances cited by the majority pertain to defendant's not seeking medical help for Kauanui immediately after the blow, and defendant's trivializing the incident the next day. ( Ibid. ) But defendant's behavior after the blow does not tend to establish his knowledge at the time of the blow that his act endangered Kauanui's life. My conclusion that such knowledge was not shown is supported by the following two circumstances: First, defendant, who is right-handed, hit Kauanui with his left fist, and therefore had less reason to suspect that the blow would endanger Kauanui's life. Second, as the Court of Appeal noted, defendant's past conduct in four instances of hitting other people with unexpected blows  without inflicting any life-threatening injury tends to negate an inference of subjective knowledge that his sudden, unexpected blow to Kauanui would endanger Kauanui's life. For the reasons expressed above, I agree with the Court of Appeal that, because of insufficient evidence of implied malice, defendant's conviction of second degree murder cannot stand.