Opinion ID: 197507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Refusal to Grant Immunity.

Text: 51 At trial, the petitioner attempted to call as a defense witness Joseph DeDominicis, one of the youths present during the brawl. DeDominicis refused to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds. The petitioner asked the court to immunize the witness, alleging that DeDominicis would then testify that he saw a person named Muzzone standing over the victim with a bat in his hand. 5 The prosecution opposed the grant of immunity, asserting that it would interfere with an ongoing grand jury investigation. The trial court declined the request and the SJC affirmed. See Curtis I, 448 N.E.2d at 348-50. 52 The petitioner's claim that he was entitled to DeDominicis' immunized testimony encompasses both the effective defense theory--which draws its essence from the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process--and the prosecutorial misconduct theory--which draws its essence from the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. See United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190-93 (1st Cir.1990) (limning both theories). On these facts, neither approach takes wing. 53 The effective defense theory originated in the Third Circuit. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir.1980). Under its mantra, a trial court has the power to grant immunity based on a defendant's need to present exculpatory evidence. See id. Thus, a trial court should grant immunity when it is found that a potential defense witness can offer testimony which is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and when the government has no strong interest in withholding use immunity. Id. 54 Notwithstanding the Third Circuit's pronouncement, the effective defense theory has been roundly rejected by other courts, most of which have agreed that the power to grant immunity properly belongs to the Executive Branch. See, e.g., United States v. Quintanilla, 2 F.3d 1469, 1483 (7th Cir.1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1017 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Tindle, 808 F.2d 319, 325 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 526-29 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773-74 (2d Cir.1980). We, ourselves, in a case decided only recently, explicitly rejected the effective defense theory. See United States v. Mackey, 117 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that, in general, courts have no power to compel immunity in the face of a good faith refusal by the prosecutor [to grant it]). 6 55 The prosecutorial misconduct theory fares no better here. That theory is grounded in the notion that the due process clause [constrains] the prosecutor to a certain extent in her decision to grant or not to grant immunity. Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1191. But this constraint comes into play only when a prosecutor intentionally attempt[s] to distort the fact-finding process. Id. A defendant can demonstrate such distortion in two ways: by showing an attempt to harass or intimidate potential witnesses, or by showing that the prosecutor deliberately withheld immunity for the purpose of hiding exculpatory evidence from the jury. See id. at 1192. 56 Neither of these circumstances obtain here. The petitioner does not argue, and there is no evidence to suggest, that the prosecutor sought to silence DeDominicis through harassment or intimidation. And although the petitioner does argue that the prosecution intended to withhold exculpatory evidence from the jury, this argument comprises sheer speculation. On this record, we cannot peer behind the prosecution's plausible assertion of a legitimate interest in keeping the way clear for a possible future prosecution of DeDominicis. See Mackey, 117 F.3d at 27-28; Turkish, 623 F.2d at 776-77. Hence, the petitioner's professed reliance on the prosecutorial misconduct theory is unavailing.