Opinion ID: 2632884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Joe Bryant's Statement to Sergeant Allen

Text: At the guilt phase of trial, the prosecution called Joe Bryant, the Hailses' neighbor. He testified he last saw them on Thursday or Friday (July 9 or 10), but he was not sure which day. The prosecutor asked Bryant whether he had told an officer he had seen them on Friday, July 10, and Bryant replied he did not think so, and if he did say that, he was mistaken. To impeach Bryant, defense counsel then called Sergeant Brown, who related that Bryant told him he had last seen Hubert Hails on Friday afternoon. On rebuttal, the prosecution sought to call Sergeant Allen. Over defense objection, as discussed below, the court admitted Allen's testimony that he interviewed Bryant on July 11, before Sergeant Brown had arrived, and that Bryant told him he saw the Hailses either Thursday or Friday afternoon. The trial court upheld Allen's testimony on several grounds, including its being a prior consistent statement (Evid. Code, § 791) that was used to rehabilitate Bryant. Under Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (a), a witness's prior consistent statements are generally inadmissible to support his or her trial testimony unless evidence of a prior inconsistent statement has already been introduced to impeach that witness, and the consistent statement was made before the inconsistent one. The exception applies here, as Bryant's statement to Sergeant Brown was indeed inconsistent with Bryant's trial testimony, while Bryant's earlier statement to Sergeant Allen was entirely consistent with it. Defendant first argues that Bryant was not impeached with a prior inconsistent statement because his original testimony (last seeing the Hailses either Thursday or Friday) was more in the nature of a failure of memory than an assertion of fact subject to impeachment. (See People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998.) To the contrary, Bryant's trial testimony was factual in nature, reciting the words that he told an unidentified officer. Those words were sufficiently factual to justify impeachment with proof of a prior inconsistent statement to Sergeant Brown. And in turn, the supposed statement to Sergeant Brown was sufficiently inconsistent with Bryant's trial testimony to warrant introduction of the prior consistent statement to Sergeant Allen. Defendant also complains of the prosecution's failure to disclose Sergeant Allen's testimony in a timely manner. During pretrial discovery, defendant was provided with a report by Detective Madril relating Sergeant Allen's information that Bryant told the officers he had seen the victims either Thursday or Friday afternoon. Sergeant Allen himself gave defendant no written report, because evidently no such report existed. Defendant nonetheless asked the trial court to impose discovery sanctions for failing to identify precisely the officer (Allen) to whom Bryant gave this information. The court denied sanctions, finding that Madril's report adequately identified Allen as at least knowledgeable about Bryant's statement. Indeed, defense counsel interviewed Allen before trial, evidently without discussing Bryant's statement with him. Defendant repeats his claim the prosecution withheld information regarding the officer who spoke with Bryant, but the claim fails in light of the information that was contained in Madril's report. In any event, the defense suffered no prejudice from the nondisclosure given Bryant's trial testimony and the impeachment of it by Sergeant Brown.