Opinion ID: 1279406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arrest of Witness

Text: Deral maintains he was prejudiced when Richard was arrested and sent to jail, and then later returned to reverse his prior testimony. This assertion is meritless. It is the duty of the court to exercise supervision and control over the witnesses in attendance at the trial. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1191 (1989). In South Carolina, it is firmly settled that the presiding judge has the right to order the arrest of a witness in open court who has made contradictory statements amounting to perjury. The supreme court addressed this issue in State v. McKay, 89 S.C. 234, 71 S.E. 858 (1911): When the witness Purvis came off the stand, the solicitor ordered the sheriff, in open court, to arrest him and take him to jail to answer an indictment for perjury. This was done against defendant's protest. It is alleged that this was prejudicial to defendant, because it was calculated to intimidate any other witness from varying the testimony which he had given at the preliminary investigation. There is nothing in the record tending to show any such prejudice. It is purely conjectural and barely possible, but highly improbable. Therefore it affords no ground for reversal. On the contrary, we are inclined to commend prompt action by those charged with the administration of the law, when it has been flagrantly violated; and we are of the opinion that if perjurers were more invariably and promptly and vigorously prosecuted and punished, there would be fewer miscarriages of justice in our courts. Id. at 236, 71 S.E. at 859. Thereafter, in State v. Campbell, 150 S.C. 449, 148 S.E. 472 (1929), the supreme court explained: The second question is as to the right of the presiding judge to order the arrest of a witness in open court who, in the opinion of the trial judge, has made contradictory statements, which in fact amount to perjury. This question has been settled against the appellant by the case of State v. McKay, 89 S.C. 234, 71 S.E. 858 [(1911)]. The trial judge is present in the atmosphere of the trial, and he must, in the administration of justice, uphold the dignity of the courts, and he would be derelict in his duty if he did not take such steps as he conceives it his duty to see that justice is administered in accordance with sound principles of law. It might be said in passing that it does not appear in the case for appeal that the judge actually had the witness arrested, and under the rules of this court no exception can be considered which does not find substantiation in the printed case. Id. at 450-51, 148 S.E. at 473; see also H.D. Warren, Annotation, Statements, Comments, or Conduct of Court or Counsel Regarding Perjury as Ground for New Trial or Reversal in Civil Action or Criminal Prosecution Other Than for Perjury, 127 A.L.R. 1385 (1940) (citing McKay and Campbell and noting that South Carolina courts have used language which seems to indicate the mere fact that a commitment for perjury is made or ordered is insufficient to establish prejudice or constitute reversible error, but indicating that such a result may be shown in a proper case). In Graves v. State, 309 S.C. 307, 422 S.E.2d 125 (1992), our supreme court articulated: Petitioner also alleges that the trial judge's comments on credibility about a defense witness denied him an impartial jury and violated his due process rights. Again, the PCR judge found this issue to be without merit. At the PCR hearing, petitioner alleged that the trial judge's threats of perjury to a witness prejudiced him. Petitioner argues that the trial judge's comments amounted to comments on the credibility of a witness. During cross-examination, the trial judge reminded the witness: You are under oath subject to perjury. I need to warn you, so you must answer the questions truthfully. Further, he stated: The jury can hear. They can find out whether or not you are straightforward or not. Those are matters for the jury. Petitioner argues that this Court should adopt the holding of the North Carolina case of State v. Rhodes, 290 N.C. 16, 224 S.E.2d 631 (1976), where the court held that any intimation by the judge in the jury's presence that a witness had committed perjury would be reversible error. Rhodes, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In Rhodes, the trial judge made a long statement regarding the witness' testimony and he clearly thought she had committed perjury. In Rhodes, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that a judge may caution a witness regarding perjury outside of the jury's presence. However, the court cautioned that any intimation that a witness had committed perjury in the jury's presence is reversible error. In Rhodes, the court set forth several reasons for its holding. The court saw several dangers including the fact that a judge is unlikely to warn a witness about perjury unless he has determined that the witness has committed perjury which is a fact solely for the jury's determination. Secondly, a witness may change his testimony after being threatened with perjury charges. Third, a warning may discourage questioning the witness further. As to whether the comments could be construed as a factual determination by the judge, the trial judge stated whether the witness committed perjury was for the jury to determine. From a review of the testimony of the witness, the trial judge's comments did not cause her to change her testimony or discourage further questions. While these reasons set forth in Rhodes are valid, we decline to apply the holding to the present case. Although the trial judge should have refrained from cautioning the witness regarding perjury in the presence of the jury, under the circumstances of this case, we do not think it is reversible error. We find the trial judge's comments do not amount to prejudice which denied petitioner an impartial jury or violated his due process rights. Id. at 311-12, 422 S.E.2d at 127-28; see also State v. Cooper, 334 S.C. 540, 546, 514 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1999) ([T]here is generally no prejudice when the trial court's hostile comments are made outside the jury's presence.). All courts have inherent power to punish for contempt. Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 287 S.E.2d 915 (1982); State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568, 611 S.E.2d 273 (Ct.App.2005). This power is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and the due administration of justice. Id. The trial judge acted within his discretion to warn Richard and to take action to prevent the miscarriage of justice by his perjury.