Opinion ID: 3011783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: On August 21, 1997, the Tuckers issued yet

Text: another press release. It again failed to disavow any claim arising out of Mr. Tucker's impotency or injury to the Tuckers' sexual relationship. Instead, the release confirmed the existence of such a claim and expressed the Tuckers' frustration that too much of the media's attention was focused on that aspect of the case:  `All the media gleefully jumped on the so-called sex part in the suit that called attention to loss of consortium, which was put in there by my husband Bill, not by me,' [Mrs. Tucker] added, obviously nettled. (App. 464). IX. The Tuckers have admitted that neither they, nor Mr. Angino, nor anyone on their behalf, ever called Fischbein, at any time, to correct his misunderstanding of the Tuckers' loss of consortium claim. (App. 571, 1968). The Tuckers have failed to provide any evidence, other than the language in their Amended Complaint, to suggest that they did not intend to claim loss of sexual r elations. Instead, it is obvious to me that the statements made by the Tuckers and their attorney were deliberately cagey and equivocal so that they could, if they wished, intr oduce evidence of impotence and sexual dysfunction at trial.8 In spite of substantial evidence to the contrary, the Tuckers still claim that all of Fischbein's statements were made with actual malice; that is, with the knowledge that _________________________________________________________________ 8. Another way of approaching this issue is to ask whether at trial, given the general loss of consortium that the Tuckers originally alleged, it would have been proper for the District Court to allow introduction of evidence of Mr. Tucker's sexual dysfunction. The answer clearly is yes. 22 [they were] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they were] false or not. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. According to the Majority, the Tuckers present two independent arguments in support of their position. Although I remain unconvinced that they clearly articulate even one, I will, for the sake of discussion, addr ess both arguments in turn. First, the Tuckers seem to suggest that Fischbein's legal training put him on notice that loss of consortium does not always imply harm to sexual relations. According to their brief: Fischbein, who is a lawyer who knows the definition of consortium, knew at the time that he talked to the Los Angeles Times and the Philadelphia News and all of the other newspapers, including Time and Newsweek, that Mrs. Tucker did not claim in the Tucker I complaint that her sex life had been destroyed by the lewd lyrics of Tupac Shakur . . . Certainly a jury could find that Mr. Fischbein's uttering his sexual spin thr oughout this period constituted malice as defined by the Supreme Court. (Appellants' Br. at 46-47). The Majority quickly dismisses this argument, and there is no need to consider it further, except that I question the Majority's suggestion that Fischbein may have been negligent during the period prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint. Again, I emphasize that all of the evidence before the court indicates that the Tuckers, at least originally, did intend to pursue damages for loss of sexual relations. It is har d for me to imagine how Fischbein may have been negligent in any way. Until this point, my concerns with the Majority's opinion have been fairly minor. I strongly disagree, however, with its disposition of the Tuckers' second main argument. According to the Majority, the Amended Complaint clearly disavowed any intent to pursue damages for loss of sexual relations. As such, a jury could find that Fischbein had read the complaint, and that his subsequent comments to Time magazine constituted actual malice.9 Although I _________________________________________________________________ 9. I agree with the Majority that a r easonable jury could find, in light of the high stakes surrounding the law suit, that Fischbein had read the 23 readily admit that this position is mor e compelling than the Tuckers' first argument, I still cannot agr ee. The language of the Amended Complaint, by itself, is simply insufficient to convince a reasonable jury, under a clear and convincing evidence standard, that Fischbein had actual knowledge that the Tuckers were not seeking to recover damages for loss of sexual relations Before explaining my position, I want to be absolutely clear about two points. First, I agree with the Majority that, other than the Amended Complaint, there is no evidence that Fischbein acted with actual malice.10 Thus, even under _________________________________________________________________ Amended Complaint prior to his interview with T ime. I disagree, however, with the Majority's conclusory statement that it would be hard to interpret the First Amended Complaint any other way. In light of the Tucker's previous statements, and their penchant for ambiguity, I do not believe that a reasonable jury could establish actual malice based solely upon the Tuckers' five line paragraph. 10. The Tuckers contend that they indicated, thr ough personal interviews and statements by their attorney, that they did not intend to allege loss of sexual relations. This is simply not supported by the record. For example, in their Second Amended Complaint, they claim that their attorney told a Newsweek Reporterunequivocally that the complaint did not allege . . . that the actions of Defendants related in the [original] complaint had anything to do with their sex life. (App. 24). Their attorney's signature appears on this complaint. During his deposition, however, Mr. Angino admitted that, I said only in the rarest of cases would you have a count that actually involves sex. I'm under oath, so I cannot say to you that I said specifically, this case does not involve sex. (App. 646). This is but one of many examples where The Tuckers were vague and ambiguous in their public statements and in their declarations to this Court. The Tuckers also argue that the Webster's dictionary definition of consortium supports their case. (App. 25). I did a quick check to verify this claim. Using the Internet (see www.dictionary.com, accessible via www.websters.com), I obtained the following definition of consortium: 3. Law. The right of a spouse to the company of, help of, affection of, and sexual relations with his or her mate. Unless this definition has changed radically in the past three years, Webster's cuts strongly against the Tuckers. In sum, none of this evidence is sufficient to persuade a r easonable jury that any of the defendants acted with actual malice in misinterpreting the Tuckers' claims. 24 the Majority's decision, the Tuckers' entir e claim rests solely upon the language in the Amended Complaint. As the Tuckers admit in their brief, only two paragraphs, out of the seventy-one contained in the complaint, addr ess the question of sexual relations: 45. Defendant [Fischbein] has continued to defame and harass plaintiff by holding her up in a false light even after the complaint in this matter was filed on June 21, 1997. 46. Defendant Fischbein made false and misleading statements regarding the claim [asserted in the original complaint], through published statements that C. Delores Tucker filed suit because of a loss of her sex life. The statement was untrue, and defendant Attorney Fischbein should have known it was untrue. (App. 1711-12). Second, the Tuckers filed the Amended Complaint on August 27, 1997. The only statements made by Fischbein after that date, and thus the only potentially actionable comments, were those to T ime magazine reporter Belinda Luscombe. I agree with the Majority that all other comments were made without actual malice. Thus, the question over which the Majority and I disagr ee is a fairly narrow one, and I would characterize it in the following manner: After all of the Tuckers' actions and comments to the contrary, did the language in the Amended Complaint sufficiently clarify the parameters of the loss of consortium claim so that a reasonable jury could find that Fischbein's comments to Time magazine were made with a reckless disregard for the truth? I strongly believe the answer is no. The language of the Amended Complaint, in the context of the Tuckers' previous statements and actions, was insufficient to indicate a change in their attitude toward alleging a loss of sexual relations. In spite of all the media attention, and all the harm that it supposedly caused, the complaint failed to contain a simple, categorical statement that the Tuckers were foregoing any claim for interference with sexual relations. Instead, it continued to allege that Mr. Tucker had suffered a loss of . . . consortium, using the very same language that was contained in the original 25 Tucker II complaint. (App. 1713). The only addition was a short paragraph stating that Mrs. Tucker did not file the original suit because of a loss of sexual relations. It said nothing about Mr. Tucker, who had originally filed the loss of consortium claim. And, as their own attor ney testified, when you damage one spouse, you damage the other spouse in each and every way. (App. 566). My conclusion is underscored by the fact that one month later , and simultaneous with the filing of the complaint at issue in this appeal, the Tuckers filed a Second Amended Complaint to Tucker II, in which they unequivocally stated, for the first time, that they were not seeking damages for interference with sexual relations. This came far too late to serve as an effective form of notice to Fischbein. 11 Even if the language of the complaint did clearly communicate the Tuckers' position, as the Majority so holds, it is not clear to me that this evidence by itself is enough to support a jury's finding of actual malice. I am _________________________________________________________________ 11. With regard to the gravamen of this Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs' attorney responded as follows in his deposition: Q. And why did you feel there was a need to have -- to file a Second Amended Complaint?
Q. And in the Second Amended Complaint, you placed a dictionary definition of consortium; is that correct? A. That was a joke. It was really a joke. Q. Well, wait a minute, sir. Ar e you saying that you were perpetrating a joke in a Federal Court Complaint; is that what you are telling me? A. That's what I'm telling you. I said if I had to actually give you a dictionary definition. . . Q. So you were -- you were playing ar ound a little bit in a Federal Court Complaint; is that correct? A. I was saying look consortium means this. Q. So you were playing around a little bit. A. You -- you might say that. App. 829-30. 26 deeply troubled by the fact that, in spite of intense media scrutiny and its concomitant pressures, the Tuckers never publicly clarified the nature of their suit or contacted Fischbein directly, until they filed the complaint in this case. In short, they did nothing to curb public scrutiny other than amend their original complaint to include new claims. After the numerous public comments and accusations by the Tuckers, it is simply unr easonable to require Fischbein to infer solely fr om the language of the Amended Complaint that the Tuckers had changed their position. Finally, even if the Amended Complaint by itself was enough to support a jury finding of actual malice, I do not believe that Fischbein's comments were r eckless. As previously discussed, the only comments made subsequent to the filing of the Amended Complaint wer e those to Time magazine on September 12, 1997. According to Luscombe's uncontradicted notes and testimony, Fischbein stated only that Tucker II was brought for emotional distress and that part of that was that her sexual relationship with her husband was affected. (App. 2197). T ime magazine did not quote Fischbein, and Luscombe's article relied heavily upon seven previous articles, all published in r espected sources from Rolling Stone to The W ashington Post prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint. I find it ironic that the Majority believes there could be actual malice in a statement so similar to one attributed to Mr. Tucker in The Philadelphia Tribune (my emphasis): Pointedly asked how the lyrics could affect his sex life, he said, `That's just a brief reference[in the lawsuit] - a small part of it. We have to r epresent the situation as accurately as we can and the only way to experience it is to have it happen to you.' As previously discussed, in addition to this statement, there is a substantial amount of evidence that indicates that the Tuckers originally did bring their suit, at least in part, to recover for loss of sexual relations. Regardless of whether they later changed their position, a literal r eading of Fischbein's statement to Time r eveals no reckless disregard for the truth. 27 The record demonstrates that Fischbein, at the time of his conversation with Time magazine, (1) was not aware that the Tuckers intended to relinquish their claims for interference with sexual relations, and (2) even if he was, his comments were not reckless. As a r esult, I conclude that the Tuckers cannot meet their burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to show that Fischbein made any statements that he suspected were false. As such, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in its entirety. A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 28