Opinion ID: 1372176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Defendants' Contention of Superseding Cause.

Text: Defendants' final contention is that the act of Thompson as a third party was a criminal act and, as such, constituted a superseding cause which broke the chain of legal causation and relieved defendants from liability. [6] In support of that contention, defendants rely upon Restatement of Torts, supra, §§ 440, 441 and 442. [7] By supplemental brief defendants also cite § 302B and comments and illustrations under that section. § 302B states the following rule: An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such conduct is criminal. In my view, the rule as stated in § 302B gives greater support to plaintiff in this case than to defendants' contention that the criminal act of Thompson was a superseding cause. [8] As also previously noted, comment b under § 453, relating to the function of court, states as follows:    If    the negligent character of the third person's intervening act or the reasonable foreseeability of its being done (see §§ 447 and 448) is a factor in determining whether the intervening act relieves the actor from liability for his antecedent negligence, and under the undisputed facts there is room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether such act was negligent or foreseeable, the question should be left to the jury.  (Emphasis added) For reasons previously stated, I am of the opinion that under the facts as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, the likelihood that Thompson, in assisting his girl friend to escape from the detention center (itself a criminal act), might act in such a manner as to cause harm to a person encountered during the course of such an escape was one of the hazards which a jury could properly find to make negligent the conduct of the matron in allegedly permitting or assisting him to enter the detention center at night, with actual or constructive knowledge of his close personal relationship with the inmate and of the fact that they had previously stolen an automobile together and fled the county. Defendants' reliance upon concepts of superseding causation is also misplaced for another reason. Beginning with Dewey v. A.F. Klaveness and Co., 233 Or. 515, 379 P.2d 560 (1963), and culminating in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or. 603, 469 P.2d 783 (1970), this court has decided to no longer determine the limits of one's liability through concepts of proximate or legal causation. Rather the definition of negligence is used to determine the limits of liability. As stated by O'Connell, J., in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., supra, at 606, 469 P.2d 783, 784-785: The scope of the liability of an actor whose conduct is a substantial factor in causing an injury is frequently discussed under the rubric `proximate cause' or `legal cause,' and less frequently as a part of the definition of negligence. We have adopted the latter approach. For these reasons, I would affirm the holding by the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. I would not hold that there is liability in every case in which a jailer or jail matron permits a visitor to visit an inmate, followed by an escape in the course of which someone is injured. I would hold, however, that this plaintiff should have the opportunity under the allegations of her complaint to proceed to trial and to introduce evidence of facts and circumstances which may permit the jury to find that this matron should have reasonably foreseen that by permitting Thompson to enter the detention center at night and to visit his girl friend the two of them might well attempt to escape and that, as a result, a police officer might well be hurt. Cf. Mezyk v. National Repossessions, supra, 241 Or. at 340, 405 P.2d 840. [9]