Opinion ID: 1130470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Beneficiary's Individual Action for Intentional Misconduct

Text: Where fraudulent representations are made to a beneficiary of a life insurance policy at the time the application for the policy is made by the insured, the beneficiary may have standing to bring an action for fraud. North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Holley, 533 So.2d 497 (Ala.1987); see National States Insurance Co. v. Jones, 393 So.2d 1361 (Ala. 1980), and Old Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So.2d 726 (1976). In each of these cases, the representations were made to and directed at the individual plaintiffs; and in National States and Old Southern the consideration for the contracts was to and did flow from the plaintiffs. National States, at 1364. There is nothing in the record to show that any fraudulent representations were made to Ms. Smith or that the consideration for the insurance policy was to and did flow from Ms. Smith. Ms. Smith, individually, had no standing. Likewise, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Equifax and Ms. Puckett engaged in negligent ... or intentional misconduct which proximately caused delay in the collection, assembly and transmission or handling (emphasis added) of Mr. Smith's medical records or information. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Equifax and Ms. Puckett on Ms. Smith's claims of negligence and intentional misconduct. It is suggested that these were not the reasons expressed by the trial court in granting the motion for summary judgment, and that we should not consider these reasons in reviewing the trial court's action. An appellee can defend the trial court's ruling with an argument not raised below, for this Court will affirm the judgment appealed from if supported on any valid legal ground. Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263, 1265 (Ala.1983). There is a rather obvious fundamental difference in upholding the trial court's judgment and reversing it; this Court will not reverse the trial court's judgment on a ground raised for the first time on appeal, Costarides v. Miller, 374 So.2d 1335 (Ala.1979), even though it affirms judgments on bases not asserted in the trial court, Bank of the Southeast v. Koslin, 380 So.2d 826 (Ala. 1980). This difference is predicated on the long-standing, well-established rule that [in order to secure a reversal] the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the record. Tucker v. Nichols, supra, at 1264. We do not mean to imply that the reasons given by the trial court for granting the summary judgment on the negligence and intentional misconduct claims were wrong or insufficient, but merely that we do not need to address those reasons, because we can uphold the trial court's judgment on principles of survival, lack of standing, and inadequate allegation of intentional misconduct, without reaching the reasons specifically assigned by the trial court for granting summary judgment to these defendants.