Opinion ID: 675208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: as applied to lind

Text: 8  It is clear that the speech restricted by section 11-216(d) does not fall into any of the traditional categories, such as fighting words and obscenity, that are undeserving of full First Amendment protection. Nonetheless, Hawaii contends that the First Amendment does not protect individuals who divulge the fact that they have filed a complaint with its Campaign Spending Commission. It relies on Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 111 S.Ct. 2513, 115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991). In Cowles, the Supreme Court considered whether the First Amendment barred a plaintiff from recovering damages under Minnesota's promissory estoppel law when a newspaper breached its promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information. The Court held that the First Amendment did not bar recovery, for two reasons. First, it noted that promissory estoppel is a law of general applicability, and its application to the press posed only an incidental and constitutionally insignificant burden on speech. Id. at 670-72, 111 S.Ct. at 2519. Second, the Court observed that the agreement between Cohen and the newspaper was in the nature of a contract, and that any legal obligations and restrictions on publication of truthful information therefore were self-imposed. Id. The State argues that Lind similarly struck a bargain with the Commission when he filed a complaint knowing that, by doing so, he would be subject to section 11-216(d)'s confidentiality provisions. The State contends that he therefore imposed section 11-216(d)'s restrictions on himself, and like the newspaper in Cowles, cannot now complain that those restrictions violate his First Amendment rights. 9 This novel argument is based upon a dramatic misconception of both the import of Cowles and the effect of section 11-216(d). Section 11-216(d) is not a content-neutral law of general applicability, but one intended to impose direct and significant restrictions on speech. Thus, the State is not relieved of its burden (as was the plaintiff in Cowles ) of demonstrating that the challenged provisions are necessary to serve a compelling interest. As we point out below, it has failed to carry that burden. Furthermore, the restrictions placed on Lind's speech, embodied in section 11-216(d), are state-created, and existed independently of, and prior to, any interaction between Lind and the Campaign Spending Commission. Therefore, the interaction between Lind and the Commission cannot be characterized as a simple bargain in which Lind obtained use of the Commission's investigatory machinery in exchange for his silence. The State may not condition Lind's ability to trigger an investigation on the theory that by filing a complaint he bargained away his First Amendment rights. Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). Cowles, in short, is irrelevant to the case at hand. 10 We conclude that section 11-216(d) regulates fully protected speech. 2 Unless it is narrowly tailored and necessary to promote compelling state interests, it cannot stand. B 11 According to Hawaii, section 11-216(d) promotes its interest in the free functioning of the electoral system, and in fostering an 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate out in the political arena. We have no doubt that these are compelling interests. We conclude, however, that prohibiting disclosure that a complaint has been filed does little to serve these interests, and indeed in many ways is antithetical to them. 12  The State is concerned primarily that, without section 11-216(d), candidates might be discouraged from entering political races; they are not paid public servants, who can be expected to endure the slings and arrows of criticism in the press and elsewhere. The State acknowledges that section 11-216(d) does not prevent anyone from publicly charging candidates or their supporters with violations of spending regulations, and that it does not prevent people from publicly airing whatever evidence they may have to support their allegations. It contends, however, that disclosure of the fact that a complaint has been filed somehow lends the State's imprimatur to such charges, dramatically increasing their effectiveness. In the State's words, At its core, the confidentiality requirement precludes the Commission's credibility from being invoked to buttress scandalous charges in the heat of a campaign. 13 These concerns are insufficient to justify restrictions on Lind's speech. The effect that the State fears can be countered by the truthful assertion that anyone can file a complaint with the Commission, for any reason, regardless of its merit. Because the State has no influence over when or whether a complaint is filed, the fact of filing simply cannot signal the State's approval of a complainant's charges. 3 As Justice Brandeis observed nearly seventy years ago, If there be time to ... avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377, 47 S.Ct. 641, 649, 71 L.Ed. 1095 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 14 In fact, what the State is attempting to do is exactly the sort of thing that the First Amendment is designed to guard against. See Landmark, 435 U.S. at 845, 98 S.Ct. at 1544. Hawaii argues, in effect, that it is justified in restricting political speech about complaints before the Campaign Spending Commission in order to promote other political speech. However, it is not the function of government to promote speech it deems more valuable and to suppress speech it deems less valuable. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-376, 47 S.Ct. at 648. The speech that Hawaii seeks to restrict may have a discouraging effect on certain candidates and their supporters. And as the State observes, some of those affected by that speech may not (yet) be paid public servants. But they surely are public figures, and therefore they must be prepared to endure a heightened level of criticism--including charges of campaign spending improprieties--precisely in order to promote First Amendment values. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273, 84 S.Ct. 710, 722, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Candidates' supporters, by injecting themselves into public debate and attempting financially to influence its outcome, also must be prepared to suffer what to them may be unpleasant discussion of their contribution practices. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). 15 With regard to the danger that people knowingly may bring unmeritorious charges of campaign spending improprieties in order to harass, the State has not shown that the victim will be without civil tort remedies. See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Moreover, even if criminal sanctions were necessary to discourage vexatious complaints, section 11-216(d) is not narrowly drawn to achieve that purpose; it also prohibits disclosure of complaints legitimately and truthfully alleging serious improprieties. 2 16 Secondarily, the State asserts that confidentiality facilitates the Commission's work. It predicts that permitting disclosure that a complaint has been filed would encourage people to lodge unmeritorious complaints, stimulate public inquiries concerning the status of pending investigations, and bring public pressure to bear in attempts to influence the Commission's investigations, all of which will overburden and distract the Commission. The State also contends that disclosure that a complaint has been filed would remove an important incentive for cited parties to settle, thereby further increasing the Commission's work load. 17 In Landmark, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prevented third parties from divulging truthful information regarding proceedings before the state Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Virginia advanced many of the arguments that Hawaii presses here, claiming that its statute was necessary to preserve the orderly administration of justice. Landmark, 435 U.S. at 843, 98 S.Ct. at 1543. In rejecting Virginia's position, the Court noted that, although the state asserted a compelling interest, it had failed to produce a solidity of evidence showing that the proscribed speech posed a sufficiently imminent threat to that interest. Id. at 845, 98 S.Ct. at 1544. Hawaii similarly has failed to carry that burden here. It has offered little more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that without criminal sanctions the objectives of the statutory scheme would be seriously undermined. Id. at 841, 98 S.Ct. at 1542. 18 In the event that the Commission becomes overburdened with unmeritorious complaints, public inquiries, or cases that fail to settle, 4 it could solve this problem without impairing First Amendment rights by streamlining its investigatory processes or hiring more staff. See id. at 843, 98 S.Ct. at 1543 (requiring consideration of less restrictive alternatives). As for public pressure's influencing the Commission's decisions, such possibilities rarely justify abridgment of First Amendment rights. See Landmark, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S.Ct. 1535; Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). The vast majority of deliberative bodies undertake investigations with full exposure to the public, and with no apparent ill effects. The State offers no reason to doubt that the situation would be any different here. 19 We conclude that to the extent Haw.Rev.Stat. Sec. 11-216(d) prevents an individual from disclosing the fact that he filed a complaint with the Campaign Spending Commission, it is unconstitutional. 5