Opinion ID: 827973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “residence” and “domicile”

Text: To comply with the statute’s registration requirements, sex offenders must provide information regarding their “residence” or “domicile.”28 SORA defines “residence” for “registration and voting purposes” as that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging. If a person has more than 1 26 See MCL 28.725a(6). Law enforcement “shall verify the individual’s residence or domicile and any information required to be reported” under MCL 28.724a. (Emphasis added.) 27 MCL 28.725a(8). 28 See MCL 28.725(1), MCL 28.725a(4), and MCL 28.725a(8). 8 residence, or if a wife has a residence separate from that of the husband, that place at which the person resides the greater part of the time shall be his or her official residence for the purposes of this act.[29] Thus, a person’s “residence” under SORA is a combination of three things: that place where a person (1) habitually sleeps, (2) keeps personal effects, and (3) has a regular place of lodging. The words that the Legislature used to define “residence” have a broad scope and contemplate a wide array of “residences.” However, the definition of “residence” does not include every location where a person might sleep, regardless of the length of the stay. A “residence,” for purposes of SORA, is only that place where an offender habitually sleeps and establishes regular lodging. The Court of Appeals panel in this case held that defendant was relieved of any obligation to comply with SORA because “the concepts of habitually and regularity are antithetical to the circumstances of homelessness,” because homeless people do not “have the security of a customary place of lodging” and do not live “within a home.”30 The Court of Appeals panel erroneously concluded that the homeless were definitionally incapable of having a habitual “residence.” This assumption is belied by the facts of this very case, in which the record shows that, at least for a time, defendant’s “residence” was listed as the VOA. Nevertheless, the panel’s legal conclusion equating a “residence” with a “home” is inconsistent with the statutory definition of “residence” in 29 MCL 28.722(g) (emphasis added). 30 Dowdy, 287 Mich App at 282. 9 SORA. Nothing in the relevant statutory provision suggests that “residence” is synonymous with a home, a specific street address, or even a physical structure. Rather, the definition of “residence” merely contemplates a “place.”31 Moreover, the Court of Appeals panel presumed that all homeless individuals sleep in a different location every night and can never have a regular place of lodging. Such a broad overgeneralization is unjustifiable and factually unsupported, even by the record in this case. It is entirely consistent with SORA for a sex offender to identify, for example, a vacant house or a park as a “residence” if it is, in fact, “that place at which” the sex offender “habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging.” Unlike “residence,” “domicile” is not defined in SORA. Although this Court has, in several circumstances, treated the terms “residence” and “domicile” as synonymous,32 31 Contrary to the dissent’s assertions, our discussion of a “place” is not a “judicially derived shorthand definition,” post at 8; rather, it is simply an application of SORA’s plain language. MCL 28.722(g) explicitly defines “residence” as “that place at which a person habitually sleeps, keeps his or her personal effects, and has a regular place of lodging.” Thus, far from committing an “egregious error,” post at 8, our analysis simply gives effect to the Legislature’s intent by applying the statute’s unambiguous language. The dissent misconstrues SORA; although the dissent believes that some homeless sex offenders can be required to register, the dissent would require only those offenders who live in a home, apartment, or homeless shelter to comply with SORA. However, the dissent’s analysis ignores the fact that nowhere in SORA exists a requirement that offenders live in a home, or, indeed, any structure at all. 32 See, e.g., Gluc v Klein, 226 Mich 175, 178; 197 NW 691 (1924) (“In this State, the words ‘domicile’ and ‘residence’ are treated as synonymous terms. In our statutes relating to voting, eligibility to hold office, taxation, probate and administration of estates, etc., no distinction is pointed out.”). 10 the terms were accorded different meanings under the common law.33 In SORA, the Legislature used both “residence” and “domicile” to describe what a sex offender can register. Therefore, construing the two terms as synonymous in this case would effectively render one of the terms nugatory—an outcome courts avoid when construing the language of a statute.34 Accordingly, it is necessary to differentiate between “residence” and “domicile” for purposes of SORA. Michigan courts have defined “domicile” as “‘that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.’”35 Similarly, a domicile is “the place where a person has his home, with no present intention of removing, and to which he intends to return after going elsewhere for a longer or shorter time.”36 More significant to the instant case is that it has long been the law of this state that “[e]very person must have a domicile somewhere.”37 A person may have only one domicile, which continues until the person 33 Id. at 177-178 (“Under the common law, there was a distinction between ‘domicile’ and ‘residence.’ . . . ‘[A]ny place of abode or dwelling place,’ however temporary it might have been, was said to constitute a residence. A person’s domicile was his legal residence or home in contemplation of law.”). 34 Omelenchuk v City of Warren, 466 Mich 524, 528; 647 NW2d 493 (2002). 35 In re Servaas, 484 Mich 634, 679; 774 NW2d 46 (2009) (MARKMAN, J., dissenting), quoting Henry v Henry, 362 Mich 85, 101-102; 106 NW2d 570 (1960). 36 Hartzler v Radeka, 265 Mich 451, 452; 251 NW 554 (1933). 37 Beecher v Common Council of Detroit, 114 Mich 228, 230; 72 NW 206 (1897); see also Gluc, 226 Mich at 179. 11 acquires a different one.38 Thus, the essential characteristic of a “domicile” that separates it from a “residence” is that, under Michigan law, every person has a “domicile.”39 Even if a homeless sex offender with transient sleeping arrangements cannot establish a “residence” as SORA defines it, the offender is still capable of reporting sufficient information regarding where the offender lives for purposes of identifying a “domicile.” Although it may be difficult to verify where an offender is domiciled, as noted, difficulties in verifying an offender’s information do not excuse the offender from complying with SORA’s requirements. Moreover, SORA enables the Michigan State Police to respond to such situations by empowering it to “specify other satisfactory proof of domicile or residence.”40 Indeed, the Michigan State Police has exercised this statutory authority by promulgating an order that permits homeless sex offenders to register their domicile as “123 Homeless.”41 An offender thus satisfies the offender’s statutory obligation by appearing at a law enforcement agency and advising the authorities of where the offender lives. Pursuant to SORA and the Michigan State Police 38 Beecher, 114 Mich at 230, quoting Cooley, Taxation (2d ed), p 369. 39 The dissent’s critique of our “domicile” analysis is erroneous. In Beecher, the issue was whether the petitioner’s residence was located in Detroit or Negaunee. Beecher, 114 Mich at 229. Thus, far from equating domicile with a street address, Beecher described domicile in terms similar to the Michigan State Police order cited in note 41 of this opinion: by reference to a city. Additionally, the dissent conflates “residence” and “domicile” although the Legislature plainly used the terms in the disjunctive, indicating that the Legislature sought to give the terms discrete meanings. 40 MCL 28.725a(8). 41 Michigan State Police, Official Order No. 79, April 27, 2007, p 2. 12 order, the law enforcement agency can accept as “satisfactory proof” of the offender’s “domicile” the state, city, zip code, and county in which the offender lives and must add that information to the “123 Homeless” designation in the registry. Thus, when the homeless sex offender’s “domicile” is registered as “123 Homeless” in the city in which the offender lives, that is the offender’s statutory domicile for purposes of SORA.42 Therefore, homelessness in no way prevents a sex offender from complying with the notification obligation pursuant to MCL 28.725(1) either because every person must have a legal domicile or, for practical purposes, because the Michigan State Police has promulgated an order to accommodate homeless sex offenders for the purposes of registration. The Michigan State Police order does not contravene SORA, and the dissent’s arguments to the contrary misapprehend the order’s purpose. Although “123 Homeless” is not an actual address, an offender does not violate MCL 28.727(6) when law enforcement records the offender’s address in this manner.43 The offender complies with 42 Our analysis simply explains how homeless sex offenders may comply with their registration obligations under the framework created by SORA. Regardless of whether a homeless sex offender is nomadic or has a consistent place of residence, SORA ensures that the homeless sex offender is capable of providing sufficient information to comply with SORA’s registration requirements. Our construction is consistent with SORA’s stated purpose of creating a comprehensive system to monitor sex offenders and is far more faithful to the statute than the dissent’s construction, which would defeat this basic goal by categorically allowing offenders who merely claim homelessness to opt out of complying with SORA. The dissent would clearly incentivize this conduct. 43 MCL 28.727(6) provides that “[a]n individual shall not knowingly provide false or misleading information concerning a registration, notice, or verification.” 13 SORA when the offender truthfully reports to the appropriate law enforcement agency that the offender is homeless. The law enforcement agency, in turn, records the reported information in a manner that facilitates the statutorily mandated verification obligation so that the offender’s residence or domicile can be confirmed later. Thus, the Michigan State Police order does not subject homeless sex offenders to further prosecution. The order is both authorized by and in compliance with SORA. The Court of Appeals panel did not address whether defendant had a domicile. Instead, the Court noted that “[d]omicile is not an issue in this case because the parties agree that as a homeless person, defendant has no ‘true, fixed, principal, and permanent home.’”44 Because this Court has long acknowledged that “[e]very person must have a domicile somewhere,”45 it was error for the panel below to conclude otherwise. Because the determination of where an individual is domiciled is generally a question of fact,46 we cannot determine where defendant was domiciled and leave this question for resolution on remand. The offender’s obligation is to truthfully inform police regarding where the offender’s residence or domicile is located, and the police have the separate obligation of verifying that information.47 44 Dowdy, 287 Mich App at 281, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed). 45 Beecher, 114 Mich at 230. 46 See, e.g., Servaas, 484 Mich at 680 (MARKMAN, J., dissenting). 47 We recognize the practical difficulties of registering an offender who is homeless, claims to be homeless, or otherwise has a nontraditional residence. That any of these circumstances exist, however, does not provide license for an offender to flout the mandates imposed by SORA. Additionally, as noted, the burden of accommodating these 14