Opinion ID: 403539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Basis for Petitioner's Dismissal and Security Clearance Revocation

Text: 13 Under the applicable statutory provisions, the Army is entitled to remove a civilian employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Petitioner conceded before the MSPB and again in his argument on appeal that, given the need for a Top Secret clearance to perform his job, the Army's decision to terminate his employment was lawful if the revocation of his security clearance was lawful. Conversely, if the Army unlawfully revoked his clearance, his removal from the service was also unlawful, since his removal was based entirely on his failure to retain the security clearance. See Petitioner's Brief at 5, 26-27, 41-42. The issue before the court, then, is the lawfulness of petitioner's security clearance revocation. 14 The Army revoked petitioner's security clearance pursuant to Army Regulation AR 604-5, P 3-1 (May 4, 1972) (hereinafter Regulation), which establishes the criteria for granting, denying and revoking security clearances. 6 The Regulation states in part: 15 The ultimate determination of whether the granting of a clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall commonsense determination based upon all available information, both favorable and unfavorable. The granting, denial, or revocation of a security clearance may be a matter of far-reaching consequences to the Department of the Army as well as to the individual concerned. Therefore, arbitrary and perfunctory decisions must be avoided. 16 Id. P 3-1a. 7 The Regulation lists twenty-three factors that may, depending upon the degree of seriousness, be the basis for denial of access to classified defense information, or revocation of clearance. Id. Lt. Colonel Koslosky explained to the MSPB that the revocation of petitioner's security clearance was based upon several of the listed factors. According to his testimony, petitioner's alleged breaches of security constituted a (w)illful violation or disregard of security regulations under subsection 14 of the Regulation. Id. P 3-1a (14). Petitioner's alleged sexual misconduct and other incidents of indiscretion were viewed by Koslosky as immoral, or notoriously disgraceful conduct, a relevant factor under subsection 17. Id. P 3-1a (17). 8 Finally, according to Koslosky, the allegations in petitioner's psychiatric evaluation indicated poor judgment and a lack of reliability. These latter factors are cited in a number of subsections of the Regulation, specifically subsection 20, which covers 17 (a)ny illness, including any mental condition, of a nature which in the opinion of competent medical authority may cause significant defect in the judgment or reliability of the individual, with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case. 18 Id. P 3-1a (20). 9 See Tr. 104-06.