Opinion ID: 3163630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actual Juror Bias Claims

Text: Boyd asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because two jurors failed to disclose information pertinent to his decision to retain them for jury service, thereby denying him a fair and impartial jury. The present appellate claim involves issues of fact considered and conclusions of law made by the circuit court. This Court employs a mixed standard in reviewing a postconviction court’s denial of postconviction relief, “deferring to the postconviction court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing legal conclusions de novo.” Victorino v. State, 127 So. 3d 478, 486 (Fla. 2013) (citing Sochor v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004)); Jackson v. State, 127 So. 3d -7- 447, 460 (Fla. 2013) (“This Court accords deference to the postconviction court’s factual findings following its denial of a claim after an evidentiary hearing.”). Boyd argues that jurors Tonja Striggles and Kevin Rebstock failed to disclose information concerning their criminal histories, which denied Boyd a fair and impartial jury at trial. According to Boyd, the presence of Juror Striggles and Juror Rebstock—one, a convicted felon who had not timely had her civil rights restored; the other, a former misdemeanor defendant for whom adjudication had been withheld—on the jury of his criminal trial was inherently prejudicial to his legal interests. Consequently, Boyd asserts, because his constitutional right to a fair trial was denied when he was convicted by a jury that consisted of said jurors, a new trial must be granted without any further showing of actual bias or prejudice. We disagree. As an initial matter, Boyd’s reliance on our decision in Lowrey v. State, 705 So. 2d 1367 (Fla. 1998), is misplaced. In Lowrey, the First District affirmed the defendant’s conviction for carrying a concealed firearm but certified for review the following question as one of great public importance: MUST A CONVICTED DEFENDANT SEEKING A NEW TRIAL DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL HARM FROM THE SEATING OF A JUROR WHO WAS UNDER CRIMINAL PROSECUTION WHEN HE SERVED BUT THOUGH ASKED, FAILED TO REVEAL THIS PROSECUTION? -8- Id. at 1368 (emphasis added) (quoting Lowrey v. State, 682 So. 2d 610, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)). In answering the question in the negative, we distinguished our decision in State v. Rodgers, 347 So. 2d 610, 613 (Fla. 1977), where we held that the presence of a minor on the criminal defendant’s jury did not require a new trial absent a showing that the minor’s age affected the verdict or prevented a fair trial. Specifically, we explained that in Rodgers, “no evidence or perception existed to indicate that the disqualified juror rendered an unfair or impartial vote,” whereas in Lowrey, “there [was] a clear perception of unfairness, and the integrity and credibility of the justice system [was] patently affected.” Lowrey, 705 So. 2d at 1369-70. In concluding, we emphasized that we were not overruling Rodgers, but “simply carving out an exception based on the unique circumstances presented.” Id. at 1370. Accordingly, we quashed the First District’s decision and remanded with directions to grant a new trial. Id. Juror Striggles’ criminal history consisted of the following incidents: (1) making a bomb threat and committing extortion (August 1979); (2) making a threatening phone call (December 1980); (3) twice pleading guilty to reporting false bombings (August 1983 and October 1986), and violating the probation order associated with each conviction; (4) pleading guilty to the misdemeanor of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in Georgia (March 1986); and (5) pleading guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and -9- one count of carrying a concealed firearm (March 1988). According to the record, Striggles was about nineteen years old at the time of her first false-bombing reporting in August 1983, and twenty-four at the time of her last known adjudication in March 1988. Certified records indicate that Striggles’ civil rights were restored on April 4, 2008—more than six years after she served on the jury of Boyd’s 2002 trial. When asked by the trial court how long ago she was involved with the criminal justice system, Striggles responded that she was a juvenile. She did not otherwise apprise the court or counsel of her series of convictions as an adult (beginning in August 1983). The record also reflects that Juror Rebstock was arrested in Broward County in November 1991 and charged with misdemeanor solicitation of prostitution; however, the presiding court withheld adjudication. During voir dire in the present case, Rebstock reported on the voir dire questionnaire form that he did not have any family or friends involved in the legal system. He did not report his own encounter with law enforcement, and no further inquiries were made by the trial judge or counsel for either party concerning Rebstock’s answer to this question. The circumstances found in the present case do not implicate the “clear perception of unfairness” as contemplated in Lowrey. As the Second District cogently explained, “[t]he purpose of disqualifying a person who has a pending prosecution is to avoid the possibility that that person might vote to convict in the - 10 - hope of getting more favorable treatment from the prosecution in [his or her] own case.” Thompson v. State, 300 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Conversely, persons who have already undergone criminal prosecution and been convicted are no longer in a position to curry favor from the State. This is especially true with regard to Juror Striggles since her last known adjudication was approximately fourteen years before Boyd’s trial, and with Juror Rebstock, for whom adjudication had already been withheld on his misdemeanor charge approximately a decade before Boyd’s trial. Moreover, we see no practical reason to believe that those who, for instance, have not become rehabilitated since being prosecuted over a decade before serving on the jury of a criminal trial are more likely than similarly situated persons—but who have also had their civil rights restored—to favor the State over the defense. See Oregon v. Benson, 384 P.2d 208, 210 (Or. 1963) (“Many [jurors who were convicted of felonies or misdemeanors] have become morally rehabilitated. And we have no reason to believe that those who have not become rehabilitated and are called to jury duty are more likely to show partiality for the state than for the defendant.”). We, therefore, reiterate that our decision in Lowrey is limited to its unique set of circumstances and, thus, refuse to extend our ruling therein to Boyd’s case and similarly situated cases. Next, case law—both from this Court and from other appellate courts throughout the nation—supports our rejection of Boyd’s claim that he is entitled to - 11 - a new trial by virtue of the fact that his jury included a statutorily disqualified convicted felon who had not had her civil rights restored. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons that affect a juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of a trial.” McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984); see also United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing McDonough, 464 U.S. at 553). Specifically concerning a juror’s status as a convicted felon, many appellate courts throughout our nation have echoed this precise viewpoint. For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan explained: Although a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by an impartial jury, a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to be tried by a jury free of convicted felons. Instead, the right to be tried by a jury free of convicted felons is granted by statute. And by statute, a violation of this “right” only requires a new trial if the defendant demonstrates that such a violation “actual[ly] prejudice[d]” him. Michigan v. Miller, 759 N.W.2d 850, 855-56 (Mich. 2008) (footnotes omitted); see also Hunt v. Maryland, 691 A.2d 1255, 1266-67 (Md. 1997) (“What is required of jurors is that they be without bias or prejudice for or against the defendant and that their minds be free to hear and impartially consider the evidence and render a fair verdict thereon.”); Washington v. Cleary, 269 P.3d 367, 370 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (“The disqualification criterion [for convicted felons addressed] here is by - 12 - statute, not the state or federal constitution. The assignment of error does not then implicate constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Humphreys, 982 F.2d 254, 261 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that one juror was previously convicted on embezzlement charge; defendant did not pursue questioning of subject juror on voir dire or further investigate or raise any challenge during trial, and there was no evidence of either bias or unfairness as a result of the seating of juror); United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“W[hile] [w]e think, therefore, that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial trial does not mandate a per se invalidation of every conviction reached by a jury that included a felon[,] . . . there is still the question whether appellants were entitled to a hearing to determine whether the juror was in fact biased.” (internal citations and footnotes omitted)); United States v. Uribe, 890 F.2d 554, 562 (1st Cir. 1989) (denying defendants’ claim of entitlement to a new trial in narcotics prosecution because one juror was a convicted felon; explaining “the statutory violation—allowing a convicted felon to serve—did not implicate the fundamental fairness of the trial or the defendants’ constitutional rights,” and defendants did not otherwise demonstrate a “plausible link between the predicate facts and the prejudice claimed”). - 13 - We acknowledge the contemplated reasons why felon-jurors sitting in criminal trials may harbor bias in favor of the defense as well as the State. Compare Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 739 (Fla. 2011) (“In fact, juror Robinson’s positioning as a prior defendant makes bias against Johnston especially unlikely.”) (emphasis in original), and Uribe, 890 F.2d at 562 (“The district court found not the slightest basis to conclude that the juror’s prior conviction, sentence, or subsequent dealings with the court rendered him more prone to convict a defendant in an unrelated case. We agree.”), with Companioni v. City of Tampa, 958 So. 2d 404, 413 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (outlining reasons why convicted felons serving as jurors in criminal trials could be bias both in favor of and against defendants) (citing Humphreys, 982 F.2d at 260-61; Rubio v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin Cnty., 593 P.2d 595, 600 (Cal. 1979) (en banc)). However, if a criminal defendant has failed to establish that a particular juror could not be fair and impartial and follow the law as instructed by the trial court, then it is unreasonable to further ascertain whether the juror’s status as a convicted felon rendered him or her more favorable to the State or the defense. In other words, we do not see the efficacy in belaboring the direction in which a felonjuror’s bias cuts in the absence of legally sufficient evidence showing that the juror was actually biased against the defendant. See United States v. Boney, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Even if this Court did not credit the Juror’s explanation as - 14 - to why he omitted a California conviction from his District of Columbia jury questionnaire[,] . . . additional evidence would still be necessary to establish actual bias and to demonstrate prejudice to defendant’s case.”). Besides, we do not think that it is pragmatic to promulgate a per se rule that one’s status as a convicted felon denotes inherent bias against a criminal defendant’s legal interests. Otherwise, courts would be placed in the precarious position of ordering new trials based not on legally sufficient evidence of actual bias or prejudice, but wholly on gut reactions to sociological generalizations of human tendencies. See Uribe, 890 F.2d at 562 (“To be accorded weight, a bias claim requires more than subjective characterizations unanchored in the realities of human experience.”); Boney, 977 F.2d at 633 (“A per se rule [requiring a new trial whenever a felon serves on a jury] would be appropriate, therefore, only if one could reasonably conclude that felons are always biased against one party or another. But felon status, alone, does not necessarily imply bias.”). Indeed, such a categorical rule is repugnant to the actual bias standard established in our jurisprudence. As further analyzed below, for claims of juror bias this Court has repeatedly required that the defendant bear the burden of pointing to evidence on the face of the record which exhibits the subject juror’s lack of impartiality. See Lebron v. State, 135 So. 3d 1040, 1058 (Fla. 2014) (citing Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 323 (Fla. 2007)); see also Smithers v. State, 18 - 15 - So. 3d 460, 465 (Fla. 2009) (“Juror Collins’ statements did not show a biased unwillingness to consider potential sentences other than death. . . . Thus, the record does not demonstrate actual bias that would prevent juror Collins from serving as an impartial juror.”). Maryland’s highest state court has expressed a view of this issue that comports with our Carratelli line of cases. Specifically, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has instructed: “ ‘[B]ias on the part of prospective jurors will never be presumed, and the challenging party bears the burden of presenting facts . . . which would give rise to a showing of actual prejudice.’ ” Hunt, 691 A.2d at 1267 (emphasis in original) (quoting Davis v. Maryland, 633 A.2d 867, 873 (Md. 1993)); accord Miller, 759 N.W.2d at 857-58. Hence, in light of the court decisions discussed above, again, we refuse to accept Boyd’s position that a criminal defendant is per se entitled to a new trial where he or she was convicted by a jury that included a convicted felon whose civil rights had not been restored. Rather, we hold—as have many other appellate courts throughout this nation—that a criminal defendant is not entitled to relief under such atypical circumstances absent a showing, based on legally sufficient evidence, of actual juror bias against the defendant. In other words, a person’s disqualification from jury service by statute does not necessarily implicate a violation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights if that person somehow served as one of said defendant’s jurors. Thus, the only relevant issue presently - 16 - before this Court is whether there is legally sufficient evidence that either Juror Striggles or Juror Rebstock was actually biased against Boyd. Under the “actual bias” standard announced by this Court in Carratelli: A juror is competent if he or she “can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render his [or her] verdict solely upon the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given to him [or her] by the court.” Lusk[ v. State], 446 So. 2d [1038,] 1041 [(Fla. 1984)]. Therefore, actual bias means bias-in-fact that would prevent service as an impartial juror. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133-34 (1936) . . . . Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial—i.e., that the juror was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must be plain on the face of the record. See Carratelli [v. State], 915 So. 2d [1256,] 1260 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2005)] (citing Jenkins[v. State], 824 So. 2d [977,] 982 [(Fla. 4th DCA 2002))]; see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-40 (1984). Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 324. Here, Boyd has not alleged actual bias, nor has he pointed to any evidence in this record indicating that Juror Striggles or Juror Rebstock likely did not deliberate the question of his guilt fairly and impartially. In fact, the record is replete with evidence demonstrating facts that support the opposite conclusion. For instance, when asked during voir dire, Striggles informed the trial court that she was treated fairly by the juvenile system as a juvenile delinquent and that she, as previously noted, had gotten over whatever negative feelings she may have developed about that experience. Striggles also told the prosecutor during voir dire that she did not have a problem recommending a sentence of death where - 17 - appropriate because she expected the State to be fair in the presentation of its case against Boyd. Further, Striggles was not part of the group of venire members that expressed moral, religious, or personal beliefs that would have prevented them from returning a verdict of guilty if the State satisfied its burden of proof. She, however, was part of the group that affirmatively agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that the verdict reached should be one based solely upon the evidence presented, and not any juror’s personal biases or prejudices. Because this record evidence gives no indication that either Juror Striggles or Juror Rebstock harbored any bias against him, we conclude that Boyd has not shown that he is entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.