Opinion ID: 2347610
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of the Defendant's Reputation

Text: While testifying on re-direct examination, Martin Coyne explained that his initial reluctance to testify was due to his fear of the McDonough family, to their reputation for getting into fights and stuff. The defendant, who objected to this line of questioning, established during re-cross examination that the defendant had never actually threatened the witness. The defendant now claims that the evidence of his unsavory reputation was improperly admitted for two reasons: first, because the State failed to provide any foundation upon which the witness could have based his opinion, and secondly, that, since evidence of character may not be admitted to show that the defendant acted in accordance therewith, the evidence tended to prejudicially substantiate the witness's testimony by suggesting the defendant's reputation for violence. It is of course true that a witness who testifies as to reputation must demonstrate to the court the basis which supports his testimony. Poff v. State, 3 Md.App. 289, 239 A.2d 121 (1968). In the present case, however, the witness's statement about the reputation of the defendant was not admitted to suggest his propensity for committing violent crimes or for any other purpose that brought the truth or reliability of the witness's beliefs into issue. Rather, his testimony was elicited to explain his prior inconsistent statements and was therefore intended only to rehabilitate the witness, not to establish the guilt of the accused. A witness against whom prior inconsistent statements have been introduced may explain those inconsistencies, even though his explanation paints the defendant in unfavorable hues. Commonwealth v. Carr, 436 Pa. 124, 259 A.2d 165 (1969). See State v. Hudson, Me., 325 A.2d 56 (1974). Evidence inadmissible for one reason may be admissible for another and is properly subject to a limiting instruction. State v. Brown, 142 Me. 106, 48 A.2d 242 (1946). The presiding Justice gave no limiting instruction, but no such instruction was requested. The opponent of evidence must request an instruction limiting its application to a certain purpose or he is deemed to have waived his right to the instruction. State v. Mosley, 133 Me. 168, 175 A. 307 (1934). Neither the initial admission of the evidence nor its submission to the jury without an appropriate instruction prejudiced the defendant.