Opinion ID: 1180973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the photographic lineup

Text: Appellant contends that his conviction should be reversed because the court allowed two witnesses, who had selected appellant's picture from a photographic lineup several days after his arrest and incarceration, to identify appellant in court and to testify regarding their previous identification of the photograph. In support of his contention, appellant cites Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704, cert. denied 396 U.S. 893, 90 S.Ct. 189, 24 L.Ed.2d 170 (1969). In that case, no one was sure that the photographs, other than appellant's, were the same photographs which were used at the pretrial identification. The difficulties of cross-examination and the possibilities of irreparable suggestion [were] apparent. Id. at 139, 451 P.2d at 707. We held in Thompson that, under such circumstances, the absence of counsel for appellant at the photographic lineup required exclusion of trial identification by the witnesses unless the court determined that the in-court identification was independent of the photographic identification. Furthermore, we held that reversal was mandated when testimony regarding the photographic identification itself was admitted, unless such admission were determined to be error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the court in Thompson was careful to limit such consequences to situations such as the one before it. In the present case, the police practices employed fully met the guidelines established by the court in Thompson. Id. at 139, 451 P.2d 704. A permanent photographic display was prepared on which eight photographs, including one of appellant, were displayed. The display was available in court, was admitted into evidence, and defense counsel was able to cross-examine the police officer who created and presented the display, as well as each of the witnesses, about the display and the manner of its presentation. [3] Thus, the witnesses' identification of appellant at trial and the initial photographic display were properly admitted. We conclude therefore that the denial of appellant's motion for treatment of his alleged amnesia did not constitute a violation of his right to due process of law, and the witnesses' identification of appellant after viewing a photographic lineup was admissible. Consequently, we affirm. THOMPSON, GUNDERSON, MANOUKIAN and BATJER, JJ., concur.