Opinion ID: 36088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: of the denial of a motion for [j.m.l.].” Id. To

Text: Plaintiffs requested a new trial by urging warrant a new trial, improper comments by that opposing counsel’s alleged misconduct at counsel must impair substantial rights and cast trial caused the jury to be influenced by pas- doubt on the verdict. Bufford v. Rowan Co., sion and prejudice. Courts possess the inher- 994 F.2d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 1993). The conent power “to vacate their own judgments on duct must be such as gravely to impair the proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon jury’s calm and dispassionate consideration of the court.” Fierro v. Johnson, 197 F.3d 147, the case. Dixon v. Int’l Harvester Co., 754 152 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Chambers v. Nas- F.2d 573, 586 (5th Cir. 1985). co, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)). To establish fraud on the court, it is necessary to show an Plaintiffs rely on Anheuser-Busch and Bufunconscionable plan or scheme designed to in- ford as illustrative of cases where attorney fluence the court improperly in its discretion. misconduct resulted in the necessity for a new Id. trial. These cases, however, are distinguishable from the case at bar. In Anheuser-Busch, Generally speaking, only the most egre- 69 F.3d at 350, plaintiff repeatedly lied to degious misconduct, such as bribery of a judge fendant and the court throughout discovery, or members of a jury, or the fabrication of evi- opposition to discovery motions, the trial, and 6 evidentiary hearings concerning the existence of documents. In addition, plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly and impermissibly elicited testimony regarding matters previously ruled inad- missible. Id. at 346. This misconduct was found to have sufficiently prejudiced the jury. Id. Next, in Bufford, 994 F.2d at 157, defense counsel claimed that plaintiff’s counsel, in his opening statement and consistently over the course of the proceedings, had sought to pro- secute fraudulent claims. In addition, the trial judge, in the presence of the jury, had threat- ened plaintiff’s counsel with jail. Id. This combination led to an unacceptable risk of a tainted verdict. Id. at 159. In contrast, in this case, defendants’ coun- sel’s actions did not rise to the level of egre- gious conduct necessary to constitute fraud on the court. Specifically, plaintiffs cite testimony in which defendants’ counsel mentions a police report, recounts the fact that plaintiffs’ experts were being paid, notes that plaintiffs had also brought suit against James, and states that Powers had become unhappy with the doctors whom his lawyer helped him to find. These actions by counsel do not illustrate an unconscionable plan or scheme. Defendants’ counsel’s actions can be seen as zealous advo- cacy but did not rise to the level of impairing the consideration of the case by the jury. Therefore, a new trial was not warranted. AFFIRMED. 7