Opinion ID: 2805593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Virginia's Legal Standard for Missing Wills

Text: Over the past century, this Court has decided numerous cases involving missing wills, and the law controlling this case is well-established. The most recent case this Court decided involving this issue was Brown v. Hardin, 225 Va. 624, 304 S.E.3d 291 (1983), where we stated: Where an executed will in the testator's custody cannot be found after his death there is a presumption that it was destroyed by the testator animo revocandi. This presumption, however, is only prima facie and may be rebutted, but the burden is upon those who seek to establish such an instrument to assign and prove some other cause for its disappearance, by clear and convincing evidence, leading to the conclusion that the will was not revoked. Id. at 626, 304 S.E.2d at 292 (citations omitted). Neither party in this appeal disagrees that, where an executed will in the testator's custody cannot be found after his death, there is a presumption that it was destroyed by the testator with the intent of revoking it. In this case, the 2002 Will was traced to Edmonds' custody, but could not be found at his death. Accordingly, the trial court properly applied the presumption in this case that the 2002 Will was destroyed by Edmonds. The parties also do not appear to disagree that the presumption of revocation can be overcome by the proponent of the will upon presentation of clear and convincing evidence, 10 leading to the conclusion that the will was not revoked by the testator. Instead, the dispute in this case involves what the proponent of the will must prove to meet her burden of proof, and whether she met her burden of proof in this particular case. Christopher argues that to meet her burden of proof, Elizabeth was required to prove some other cause for the disappearance of the will, and that evidence of general intent and affection alone is not clear and convincing evidence, sufficient to overcome the presumption of revocation. Christopher contends that the only case that supports Elizabeth's position, Bowery, is an outlier and should not have been relied on by the trial court. A review of our decisions over the past century on the issue of missing wills is informative. In 1913, we provided a synthesis of the operation of the lost will presumption and the evidence sufficient to rebut it, in deciding the case of Jackson v. Hewlett, 114 Va. 573, 77 S.E. 518 (1913). In Jackson, the evidence proved that the decedent had made a will in which he devised the bulk of his estate to his illegitimate daughter, and left only a few minor devises to others, including his legitimate daughter. Id. at 575, 77 S.E. at 519. The will was kept in an unlocked drawer, but after decedent's death the will could not be located. Id. at 576, 77 S.E. at 11 519. The proponent of the will introduced numerous declarations by the testator regarding his intentions to leave the bulk of his estate to her, and not to his other relatives. Id. at 576-77, 77 S.E. at 519. We explained that these declarations were not introduced for the purpose of proving the will, its due execution, or its contents. Rather, [t]hey were introduced as evidence showing a strong and unvarying adherence by the testator to his purposes with respect to the disposition of his estate, which had obtained for years prior to his death, both as to the beneficiaries thereunder and as to those omitted therefrom; and for the purpose of rebutting the presumption that this testator deliberately destroyed, with intent to revoke, a will he had so carefully prepared, and to which he had so firmly adhered. Id. at 578, 77 S.E. at 520. We held that, in a case like Jackson, the presumption could only be overcome by this type of evidence, since [i]t is impossible for the beneficiaries under the will to say what became of it; they can only assert that, whatever may have happened to it, the testator did not revoke it. Id. at 580, 77 S.E. at 521. We concluded that: It must be generally the case, in such a status, that the best evidence, if not the only evidence, that can be adduced to rebut the presumption of revocation is that the testator's mind for many years contemplated a certain disposition of his property; that 12 when he disposed of that property by will his mental attitude was precisely the same that it had been during the previous years, and that after he made such disposition his mind remained in the same state practically until his death, supplemented by the consistency of his mental attitude towards his various relatives. Id. at 581, 77 S.E. at 521. Our decision in Jackson recognizes that it may very well be impossible for the proponent of a missing will to explain what happened to the will, and therefore the statements of the testator regarding his testamentary intentions may be the best evidence to rebut the presumption of revocation. The next case we decided involving a missing will was Bowery, handed down in 1943 – the decision that appellant contends is an outlier, but which in fact gave another concrete illustration of the nature of the evidence required to rebut the presumption of revocation for a lost will. In Bowery, the decedent had prepared a will which left her estate to her step-granddaughter, whom she had raised as her daughter, but excluded other relatives. 181 Va. at 35, 23 S.E.2d at 766. At the time of the testator's death, the will could not be found, and the proponent of the will filed a bill to establish the will, alleging that the will had become lost or misplaced, but that it had not been revoked. Id. The proponent of the will put on evidence that the decedent repeatedly stated to her 13 intimate associates that she desired and intended to leave all of her property to her adopted daughter. Id. at 37, 23 S.E.2d at 767. In contrast, there was no evidence of any such affection or intention toward her other relatives. Id. There was also no evidence of any incidents occurring which would have induced the decedent to revoke or change her will. Id. We held that this evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the testator did not destroy her will with the intent to revoke it. Id. at 39, 23 S.E.2d at 768. Three years after Bowery, we decided Tate v. Wren, 185 Va. 773, 40 S.E.2d 188 (1946), holding that the evidence presented in that case was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of revocation. We explained that, unlike the record before the trial court in Bowery, there was no evidence in Tate of declarations by the testator that his 1933 will was still in effect. Id. at 785-86, 40 S.E.2d at 194. To the contrary, there was evidence that the testator had made numerous statements that he intended to change his 1933 will, and that he had actually prepared a new holographic will. Id. at 786, 40 S.E.2d at 194. It is important to note, however, that in distinguishing the facts in Tate from the facts in Bowery, we never indicated that Bowery was an outlier or no longer correct. 14 Later cases have confirmed the continued application of Jackson and Bowery in lost will cases. For example, in Sutherland v. Sutherland, 192 Va. 764, 66 S.E.2d 537 (1951), we referenced our decisions in Bowery and Jackson, and stated that, in our opinion, the facts in those two cases were clear and convincing. Id. at 774, 66 S.E.2d at 543. We determined that the facts in Sutherland did not measure up to the facts present in Bowery and Jackson, and therefore we held that the proponent of the missing will had failed to meet his burden of proof to overcome the presumption of revocation. Id. at 77475, 66 S.E.2d at 543-44. Our opinion in Sutherland makes clear that we viewed Jackson and Bowery to be correct, and to be examples of factual scenarios where the proponent of the missing will had met the necessary burden of proof to overcome the presumption of revocation. Where the will-proponent's proof fails to clearly and convincingly rebut the presumption of revocation, the burden is not met and the will cannot be probated. In Harris v. Harris, 216 Va. 716, 222 S.E.2d 543 (1976), for example, the proponents of the missing will argued that the will was not actually in the decedent's possession at the time of his death, and for that reason the presumption of revocation should not apply. Id. at 719, 222 S.E.2d at 545. However, we disagreed and held that the evidence proved that the will remained in the 15 decedent's house, and therefore the presumption of revocation applied. Id. at 719-20, 222 S.E.2d at 545. Further, we determined that the proponents had not met their burden of overcoming the presumption, because the only evidence presented was that other relatives were frequently in the house and could have had access to the will. Id. at 720, 222 S.E.2d at 546. We held that this evidence left the competing inferences equally probable, and was not enough to constitute clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked by the testator. Id. The most recent decision by this Court on the issue of a missing will was the Brown case. In Brown, there was no dispute that the decedent had made a will in which he left the majority of his estate to a family friend instead of his sister. There was evidence presented that the decedent had told numerous witnesses that he intended to leave everything to the friend, and that he was not leaving anything to his sister because she was already well off and did not need the money. 225 Va. at 636-37, 304 S.E.2d at 298. We emphasized that: The declarations of a testator, after he has made his will, as to its continued existence, its contents, or its revocation, where the will cannot be found after his death, [are] recognized under certain circumstances as entitled to great weight. 16 Id. at 636, 304 S.E.2d at 298 (quoting Shacklett v. Roller, 97 Va. 639, 644, 34 S.E. 492, 494 (1899)). Evidence was also presented that the sister had access to the decedent's personal papers within 36 hours of his death, which might have explained the disappearance of the will. Id. The Court stated that to overcome the presumption that the will was destroyed by the testator with the intention of revoking it, the burden was on [the proponent of the will] to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not destroyed by [the testator] but was destroyed or secreted by some other person with intent to prevent its probate or recordation, or was lost or misplaced; that it was not incumbent upon [the proponent] to prove that the [will] was destroyed or suppressed by any certain person nor specifically what became of said will; and that [the proponent] only had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the testator] did not destroy the will with the intention of revoking it. Id. at 637, 304 S.E.2d at 299 (emphasis added). It is clear from a review of our extensive caselaw on this topic that a proponent of a missing will is not required to specifically prove what became of the missing will. The language cited above from Brown demonstrates that we rejected the appellant's interpretation of our cases that a proponent is required to prove what happened to the will. Instead, the proponent is required to prove, by clear and convincing 17 evidence, that the testator did not destroy the will with the intention of revoking it. The evidence presented by a proponent of a missing instrument will take different forms depending on the facts and context of each individual case. In some cases, the proponent may present evidence regarding what could have happened to the will; and in other cases, there may be no evidence to explain why the will is lost or missing. The facts of each case are different, and the evidence in each case will therefore also be different. What remains the same is that each proponent of a missing will must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the testator did not destroy the will with the intention of revoking it. That is the standard that we have articulated in all our cases over the past century, and it remains the law of the Commonwealth today. It is clear from the transcript of the trial and the final order that in the present case the trial court applied the proper legal standard. The trial court recognized that, because the will was traced to Edmonds' possession but was not located at his death, the presumption of revocation applied. The trial court then stated that the presumption could be overcome by clear and convincing evidence that the will was not revoked by the defendant. Accordingly, with respect to 18 assignment of error one, we hold that the trial court did not err, and that it applied the proper legal standard.