Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cumulative Prejudicial Effect

Text: Because the court admitted evidence that Setiawan committed the murder, we hold that under the Constitution or, failing that, under the court's supervisory power to make the rules of evidence just and fair in application, Setiawan must be permitted to offer evidence to show that he did not commit the murder. Under the current record, the district court erred by precluding Setiawan from doing so by excluding the testimonies of Ramos and Colon. In a nutshell, it is not appropriate that prejudicial and highly inflammatory evidence -- here, that Setiawan killed Teton in the course of the conspiracy -- could be admitted without giving Setiawan an opportunity to show by reasonable evidence that - 23 - he did not commit the murder. The rules of evidence are instituted not for the splendor of their being but rather to make courts administer fair and just trials. See Fed. R. Evid. 102 (These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.). Where the stakes are very high, it is a court's job to make sure that the rules themselves are not made an instrument of injustice. We should not be read to overly fault the highly capable trial judge. In the high-speed context of trial, a trial judge can do little else than make quick rulings and go where the proceedings lead him or her. But with the time and space to see the whole trial in context, we are not merely free but bound to prevent a manifest injustice. Cf. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1195–96 (1st Cir. 1993). And while appeals courts do not often have to exercise this function, they do it when they must, offering various explanations depending on what occurred at the lower-court proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Sanabria, 645 F.3d 505, 516–19 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Dwyer, 843 F.2d 60, 65 (1st Cir. 1988). The matter can be put in many different ways, and one way may be more apt than others depending on the precise issue. A perfectly admirable example is our ruling in United States v. - 24 - Lombard in which the combined application of individually wellaccepted sentencing doctrines violated the Due Process Clause. See United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 175–87 (1st Cir. 1995). The opinion in that case invoked the common-sense adage that the whole is sometimes greater than the sum of its parts and that the whole is what matters. See, e.g., id. at 175, 177. We think the most certain basis for ordering a new trial, albeit a basis that rarely has to be invoked, is what we have just said: that reexamined in the leisure of an appeal, to allow evidence that Setiawan murdered Teton and disallow plausible evidence that he did not based on erroneous rulings is an unacceptable result. On that basis, Setiawan's convictions must be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.