Opinion ID: 2638704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Procunier and the Demise of Harrell

Text: The Harrell standard had a limited lifespan, thanks to prodding from the United States Supreme Court. Although the Court of Appeal, citing Harrell, had allowed the censoring of inmate mail to parties other than counsel ( Yarish v. Nelson (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 893, 898, 104 Cal. Rptr. 205), the high court restricted this practice in Procunier v. Martinez (1974) 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 ( Procunier ), [5] which found former section 2600 inadequate to protect the constitutional rights at stake. ( Procunier, at pp. 403-04, 94 S.Ct. 1800.) The Procunier court, considering the First Amendment rights involved, barred censorship of mail for the purpose of suppressing criticism of prison authorities. Instead, the court required that prison officials must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved. ( Procunier, at p. 413, 94 S.Ct. 1800.) Thus, prison regulations involving mail had to be generally necessary to protect security, order or rehabilitation. (Id, at p. 414, 94 S.Ct. 1800.) [6] Notably, the decision rested not on the free speech rights of the inmate (the court declined to decide the extent to which these rights survived incarceration) but on the rights of those relatives and friends outside the prison who wished to correspond with the inmate. ( Procunier, at pp. 408-409, 94 S.Ct. 1800.) The Procunier court also addressed the state rule that limited defense investigators' access to the prisoner-clients whom they served. This restriction inhibited prisoners' access to the courts. The rule did not flatly infringe on a federal constitutional right (like the mail rule), however, and the standard for evaluating the rule was more deferential. [P]rison administrators are not required to adopt every proposal that may be thought to facilitate prisoner access to the courts. The extent to which that right is burdened by a particular regulation or practice must be weighed against the legitimate interests of penal administration .... ( Procunier, supra, 416 U.S. at p. 420, 94 S.Ct. 1800.) Procunier thus required a strict scrutiny standard for the infringement of rights protected by the United States Constitution, but affirmed the Harrell standard to protect other prisoner interests. After Procunier, the state Legislature amended section 2600 to provide that A person sentenced to imprisonment ... may, during any such period of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution in which he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public. (Stats. 1975, ch. 1175, § 3, p. 2897.) The Legislature answered the question expressly reserved by Procunier, namely to what extent the rights of inmates could be infringed. The amendment generally followed the Procunier standard except in two respects: (1) the statute omitted rehabilitation from the list of permitted goals; [7] and (2) the statute provided for the same strict scrutiny regardless of whether the right was protected by the United States Constitution. Additionally, the Legislature added section 2601, which, in former subdivision (d), granted prisoners the right to have personal visits, subject to reasonable security restrictions. [8] (Stats. 1975, ch. 1175, § 3, pp. 2897-2898.) These statutory amendments formed the basis for De Lancie's invalidation of the formerly lawful practice of monitoring and recording custodial conversations.