Opinion ID: 1699092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Habeas Corpus Juror Dismissal

Text: Hodges contends that his due process rights were violated when the trial court struck for cause juror Alvarez-Gil based on her views regarding the death penalty. Hodges argues that he was denied a jury that represented a fair cross section of the community, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. This Court has held that a challenge to dismissal of a juror who expresses a general objection to the death penalty is not preserved for review where there is no objection at trial. See Maxwell, 490 So.2d at 930. Hodges and the State disagree regarding whether trial counsel properly preserved the issue regarding the dismissal of Alvarez-Gil. To preserve an issue for review, counsel must timely raise an objection that is sufficiently precise that it fairly apprised the trial court of the relief sought and the grounds therefor. § 924.051(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). In Cannady v. State, 620 So.2d 165 (Fla.1993), defense counsel lodged a general objection to the dismissal of four potential jurors based on what the State characterized as the philosophy that no anti-death penalty jurors should be excused. Id. at 169. Expressly noting that trial counsel had failed to object to the excusal of the jurors individually, this Court determined that the issue of juror dismissal was not preserved for review. See id. As in Cannady, trial counsel in the instant case did not lodge a specific objection to Alvarez-Gil's dismissal, but did state for the record that she vacillated in her opposition to the death penalty. When the State sought to strike a second potential juror for the same reason, trial counsel stated that the State is striking every one [sic] who has reservations about the death penalty. Trial counsel further stated, I think it's going to invalidate our defendant's right to a fair cross-section of the community. After the State successfully struck a third juror for the same reason, trial counsel objected and stated that he had the [s]ame objection for all of those [the State] struck concerning death penalty. The record shows that trial counsel made a generalized objection to the dismissal of jurors based on their death penalty views. As in Cannady, the objection was not specific to the challenged dismissal. Thus, under controlling precedent, the objection cannot be given retroactive effect to encompass the removal of Alvarez-Gil. Therefore, we conclude that the issue of Alvarez-Gil's dismissal was not properly preserved for review and cannot serve as a basis for an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.