Opinion ID: 1694928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: standard of review

Text: ¶ 20. The standard of review for a JNOV and a directed verdict are the same and implicate the sufficiency of the evidence. Sheffield v. State, 749 So.2d 123, 125 (Miss.1999). This Court in McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993) held that a motion for JNOV, motion for directed verdict and a request for peremptory instruction challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See also Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 787 (Miss.1997)(standard of review for denial of directed verdict, peremptory instruction, and JNOV are identical). Since each requires consideration of the evidence before the court when made, this Court properly reviews the ruling on the last occasion the challenge was made in the trial court. This occurred when the Circuit Court overruled [the] motion for JNOV. McClain, 625 So.2d at 778 (citing Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 807-08 (Miss.1987)). On the issue of legal sufficiency, this Court held in Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 353 (Miss. 1988), that reversal can only occur when evidence of one or more of the elements of the charged offense is such that `reasonable and fair minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. (citations omitted). The elements of burglary are (1) the unlawful breaking and entering; and (2) the intent to commit some crime when entry is attained. Harrison v. State, 722 So.2d 681, 685 (Miss.1998); Washington v. State, 753 So.2d 475, 478 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). ¶ 21. Edwards cites Carr for the holding that each element of the burglary of the dwelling must be proven. Carr, 770 So.2d at 1029. In addition, Edwards relies upon Carr for the holding that [p]roof that the structure was, at the time of the alleged crime, a dwelling house was an essential element of the crime as to which the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. See also Pool v. State, 764 So.2d 440, 443 (Miss.2000). ¶ 22. This Court has interpreted the scope of a dwelling house in prior case law as discussed in the previous issue. Edwards, however, merely asserts that the State's proof was legally insufficient as to whether the shed was a dwelling. Since Edwards raised the sole issue of whether there was sufficient proof that the shed was a dwelling, this Court will not have an extended analysis on the issue presented. Without reiterating the findings and case law in the prior issue, this Court finds that the shed is part of the dwelling and therefore, the argument is without merit. ¶ 23. The jury made a determination as to Edwards's guilt of burglary of a dwelling notwithstanding additional instructions given for a burglary and petit larceny. In addition, the statutory scheme was not unconstitutionally vague in defining a dwelling versus an outbuilding pursuant to the applicable statutes. Finally, this Court finds that because the statute was not vague and the fact that the shed is considered to be a part of the dwelling within the meaning of the statutes, Edwards's argument that the State failed to prove an element of the crime, namely that a dwelling was not entered, is illogical under the interpretation and without merit. In addition, Edwards's assertion that his case should be reversed and rendered hinges upon a finding that the State failed to prove a dwelling was entered. This Court finds that the issue is without merit in light of the factual findings and our determinations in this case.