Opinion ID: 3014074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability for Kotor’s assault

Text: considers four prongs indicative of Matsko’s first argument is that the conduct within the scope of employment: District Court erred when it held that, (1) the conduct is of the kind the employee because of sovereign immunity, it lacked is employed to perform; (2) the conduct subject matter jurisdiction to hear the occurs within the time and space of claim that the United States is liable for employment; (3) the conduct is actuated at Kotor’s assault. Matsko refers to various serving the employer; and (4) any force FTCA sections that he asserts waive the used is foreseeable by the employer. United States’ sovereign immunity. Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon, 410 A.2d 1270, Unfortunately for Matsko, none of these 1272 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (citing § 228). provisions encompasses situations like the Unless the litigant satisfies each prong, the one presented here. We will affirm, court will conclude that the act in question therefore, the District Court’s dismissal of was not within the scope of employment. Matsko’s claim that the United States is liable for Kotor’s actions. First, we must articulate what “act” The first question resolved by the we are contemplating. Matsko argues that District Court was whether Kotor was the District Court erred when it defined within his job duties when he assaulted Kotor’s assault as the “act in question.” Matsko. The Court concluded he was not. He asserts that the relevant act was Kotor’s Because the United States is only liable for retrieval of his chair, the use of which was negligent or wrongful acts of government integral to his job as a MSHA inspector. employees acting within their scope of Simply stated, Matsko characterizes the act employment, the conclusion that Kotor was incorrectly. We will not focus on the not within his job duties meant that minimally offensive conduct—retrieval of sovereign immunity precluded the suit. the chair—when it was the aggregate of See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Kotor’s actions that caused Matsko’s injury. The retrieval of the chair would Our task is to decide whether have been the act in question only if no Kotor’s outburst was within the scope of assault had occurred. Plainly, an assault his government employment. We assess happened. Therefore, to determine whether Kotor was acting within the scope whether Kotor was acting within the scope of his employment under the law of of his employment, the relevant “act” Pennsylvania, because that is where the began when Kotor approached Matsko and incident occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § ended when Kotor assaulted him, using 1346(b)(1); see also Aliota v. Graham, 984 excessive force. See Costa v. Roxborough F.2d 1350, 1358 (3d Cir. 1993). In Mem’l Hosp., 708 A.2d 490, 494 (Pa. P e n n s y l v a n i a, c o u r t s a p p l y t h e 4 Super. Ct. 1998) (defining the conduct in a waiver of the United States’ sovereign question to be the intentional assault). immunity to create liability for Kotor’s assault.9 That the § 228 test is applicable is uncontested, as is the fact that Kotor’s Next, Matsko asserts that his claim conduct occurred within the time and fits within the FTCA’s special treatment of space of his employment. Like the District assau lts by investigativ e or la w Court, however, we are not persuaded that enforcement officers. The United States is Matsko has satisfied, or could satisfy, the not liable for claims involving assault, other three prongs of § 228. Defying both battery, or other intentional torts by federal the first and fourth prongs, Kotor’s mine employees, unless the government actor inspector job description does not involve was an investigative or law enforcement or even contemplate violence.7 Contrary officer. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). to the third prong, Kotor’s act was As we are bound by our earlier motivated by personal animus, rather than precedent, we conclude that Kotor should any intent to serve the United States.8 not be treated as an “investigative or law Even reading the facts in the light enforcement officer” for purposes of most favorable to Matsko, as we are determining whether sovereign immunity required to do, we cannot conclude that attaches. While Kotor was an inspector Kotor was acting within the scope of his for the MSHA, which included authority to employment when he assaulted Matsko. inspect mines and investigate possible Thus, the District Court was correct that § violations, the FTCA did not intend to 2679(b)(1) of the FTCA does not provide bring within its scope actions by “officers” not within the bounds of an investigation. See Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868, 7. The cases that Matsko cites from 872 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that Congress Pennsylvania state courts to show that intended the investigative officer force is sometimes within the scope of exception to apply only to conduct “in the employment are distinguishable because course of a search, a seizure, or an arrest”). each involved a job description in which force was implicit. See Orr v. William J. Burns Int’l Detective Agency, 12 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1940) (guard); Pilipovich v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 172 A. 136 (Pa. 9. 1934) (industrial policeman). Judge W eis would hold that Kotor’s conduct was within the scope of his 8. After assaulting Matsko and taking back employment. However, recovery would the chair, Kotor commented: “I be denied because the exception to the remember the last time I talked to you – waiver of sovereign immunity for you hung up on the phone on me.” App. “assault and battery” under 28 U.S.C. § at R61. 2680(h) would apply. 5 Matsko suggests that under Carlson negligent by not preventing his injuries. v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), we must The Court stated that the FTCA did not read the § 2680(h) exception more broadly waive sovereign immunity for such a claim than in Pooler to encompass all activities and “[p]laintiffs . . . failed to cite any law undertaken by investigative officers. See or precedent to support their argument that Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, this matter is encompassed in a statutory 1034 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to limit the provision, other than the FTCA.” App. at exception to the context of a search, R-14. We conclude that the District Court seizure, or arrest); Sami v. United States, prematurely dismissed this claim, and will 617 F.2d 755, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1979) reverse. (same). We need not determine whether The fact that a government Pooler’s narrow reading was mistaken, employee acting outside the scope of his because employees of administrative employment committed an injurious agencies, no matter what investigative assault or battery will not preclude liability conduct they are involved in, do not come against the government for negligently within the § 2680(h) exception. See, e.g., allowing the assault to occur. Sheridan v. EEOC v. First Nat’l Bank of Jackson, 614 United States, 487 U.S. 392, 401-02 F.2d 1004, 1007-08 (5th Cir. 1980) ( 1988) (con siderin g w hethe r the (refusing to apply the exception to an intentional tort exception to waiver Equal Employment Opportunity precluded a separate claim for liability Commission agent). Because Kotor is not based on the government’s negligence). covered by the FTCA’s investigative or “In a case in which the employment status law enforcement officer provision, the of the assailant has nothing to do with the District Court was correct that no waiver basis for imposing liability on the of sovereign immunity applied to Kotor’s Government, it would seem perverse to intentional tort. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). exonerate the Government because of the In sum, because Kotor was not happenstance that [the assailant] was on acting within the scope of his employment the federal payroll.” Id. at 402. during the intentional assault, nor does he The alleged negligence in this claim qualify as an investigative or law stems from the United States’ undertaking enforcement officer, the District Court was a duty to protect Matsko when it invited correct that the FTCA does not apply. him to a meeting at the MSHA offices. 10 Thus, we affirm the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.