Opinion ID: 1867606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Nexus or Connection

Text: Because habeas corpus relief and the care and custody of one's child are fundamental rights, before we apply the disentitlement doctrine to Searle's petition, we must determine whether Searle's fugitive status has a considerable connection to the pending matter. The Supreme Court has expressed doubt about a rule that would require automatic dismissal of an appeal for conduct by a defendant having no connection with the appellate proceedings. In re Prevot, 59 F.3d at 566 (citing Ortega-Rodriguez v. U.S., 507 U.S. at 246-47, 113 S.Ct. 1199 (1993)). Because a fundamental right is involved we will require a nexus before applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Relying on March v. Levine, 249 F.3d 462, 470 (6th Cir.2001) and Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 216 (1st Cir.2000), Searle contends that applying the fugitive disentitlement doctrine would impose too severe a sanction in a case involving parental rights. While March and Walsh both present issues concerning parental rights, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case. Walsh and March both involved an international custody dispute in which one party sought dismissal based on the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. Walsh, 221 F.3d at 208; March, 249 F.3d at 469. The March court found that the father's particular non-criminal contempts were patently insignificant grounds to disentitle the father from arguing an ICARA [1] petition. March, 249 F.3d at 470. In Walsh , the court concluded that barring a parent from access to the court based on fugitive status is too harsh particularly in the absence of any showing that the fugitive status has impaired the rights of the other parent. 221 F.3d at 216. The underlying facts of the Walsh court's rationale, however, are inapposite to the facts of Searle's case because it was Searle's behavior that interfered with the rights of the minor child's father, and it was that same behavior that caused the court to find her in contempt. To distinguish further, both March and Walsh involved claims of child abduction brought under international law, and the issue was custody. March, 249 F.3d at 462; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 216. In both cases, the court found that the alleged fugitive's status was not sufficiently connected to the pending matter to apply the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. March, 249 F.3d at 470; Walsh, 221 F.3d at 215. Unlike the relief sought in March and Walsh , Searle's petition is for habeas corpus relief. Her reliance on cases involving fundamental parental rights is misplaced because she seeks to challenge, indirectly, a judgment of incarceration. Additionally, Searle's fugitive status stems from her refusal to abide by the judgment of the Juvenile Court of Williamson County. The Juvenile Court sentenced Searle for contempt, and the sentence that Searle presently evades is the same that she attempts to vacate on appeal. Accordingly, we find that Searle's habeas corpus petition has a direct connection to her current fugitive status. Because Searle is a fugitive and because her fugitive status is directly connected to her pending appeal, we will not allow Searle to refuse to obey a court order and then seek to obtain a favorable conclusion on appeal regarding the same matter. Thus, we conclude that Searle is not entitled to a hearing on the merits of her habeas corpus petition.
We conclude that under the facts of this case, the defendant was and remains a fugitive from the State of Tennessee, and her fugitive status is significantly connected to the pending appeal. Because we find that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies to this case, we hold that the defendant is not entitled to a hearing on the merits of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The costs of this appeal are taxed to the plaintiff-appellee, Tammy Searle and her surety, for which execution may issue if necessary.