Opinion ID: 2735430
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Heading: facts

Text: ¶4 The defendant, Brent Sorenson Stevenson, was arrested in Layton City on February 18, 2009, and charged in Second District Court with patronizing a prostitute. He initially pled not guilty to the charge but later changed his plea to no contest after negotiating a 1Throughout this opinion we refer to this type of condition as a ―no violations of law‖ condition. 2 Layton City v. Stevenson, 2013 UT App 67, ¶ 9, 298 P.3d 1267. 2 Cite as: 2014 UT 37 Opinion of the Court plea in abeyance agreement with the prosecution.3 Before entering his no contest plea, Mr. Stevenson signed a Defendant‘s Rights Sheet informing him of his various individual rights. The district court confirmed that he was entering the plea freely, voluntarily, and without the influence of alcohol or drugs. The district court also confirmed that he understood that by entering the plea he waived certain constitutional rights.4 ¶5 The minutes of the plea hearing, along with the sentencing sheet signed by Mr. Stevenson, list the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. Additionally, the district court verbally confirmed the terms of the agreement during the plea hearing. Under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement, Mr. Stevenson pled no contest to patronizing a prostitute. In exchange, Layton City agreed to have his plea held in abeyance for eighteen months. The plea in abeyance 3 A plea in abeyance is ―an order by a court . . . accepting a plea of guilty or of no contest from [a] defendant but not, at that time, entering judgment of conviction against [the defendant] nor imposing sentence upon [the defendant] on condition that [the defendant] comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.‖ UTAH CODE § 77-2a-1(1). As is the case in other plea settings, judges are charged with ensuring that defendants understand they are waiving important rights by entering a plea in abeyance. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11(e). 4 Mr. Stevenson has not argued that his plea was either unknowing or involuntary. Indeed, his reply brief expressly states that he is not ―seeking in any way to collaterally attack the underlying plea in abeyance.‖ But at oral argument, Mr. Stevenson‘s counsel suggested the plea colloquy between the district court judge and Mr. Stevenson may not have perfectly conformed to rule 11. Additionally, Mr. Stevenson‘s reply brief asserts that ―there is no [r]ule 11 colloquy which could constitute a waiver applicable to the claimed violation of law which formed the basis of Layton‘s claim that the [plea in abeyance] [a]greement should have been terminated for failure to substantially comply with its terms.‖ Regardless of what Mr. Stevenson intended with these inconsistent statements, because he has not preserved a challenge that the no contest plea was either unknowing or involuntary, we need not address the validity of his no contest plea. Further, based on the record before us, there is nothing to suggest that Mr. Stevenson did not know he was waiving important constitutional rights by entering the plea. 3 LAYTON CITY v. STEVENSON Opinion of the Court agreement contained the following conditions: (1) the plea would be held in abeyance for eighteen months, (2) Mr. Stevenson could commit ―[n]o violations of law, except minor traffic, or like kind violations,‖ (3) he had to pay a fee of $400 with forfeiture of bail applied to the fee, and (4) he had to submit to HIV testing within thirty days and report the results to Layton City. If Mr. Stevenson failed to substantially comply with the conditions in the agreement, the court could terminate the plea in abeyance agreement.5 ¶6 About six months after Mr. Stevenson entered into the plea in abeyance agreement for the Layton City charge, he was charged in Sunset City Justice Court with sexual solicitation. Approximately six months later, he entered into a diversion agreement with the Sunset City prosecutor. Under this agreement, if Mr. Stevenson complied with certain conditions, the prosecution would dismiss the sexual solicitation charge. But if Mr. Stevenson failed to comply, the court could authorize the prosecutor to proceed with prosecution.6 Mr. Stevenson complied with the diversion agreement, and on May 5, 2011, the prosecution dismissed the Sunset City action.7 ¶7 On October 14, 2010, after learning of the Sunset City charge, Layton City filed a motion for an order to show cause with the Second District Court and alleged that Mr. Stevenson violated the condition in the plea in abeyance agreement requiring that he commit no further violations of law. The district court issued an order to show cause, and Mr. Stevenson moved to strike the order and also requested an evidentiary hearing. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Stevenson violated the plea in abeyance agreement. 5 UTAH CODE § 77-2a-4(1) (―If, following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction. . . .‖). 6 Id. § 77-2-8 (―If . . . the magistrate finds the defendant has failed to comply with any terms or conditions of the diversion agreement, he may authorize the prosecuting attorney to proceed with prosecution.‖). 7 Both parties agree that the diversion agreement in the Sunset City action is not a conviction. Further, Utah law expressly states that a diversion agreement is not a conviction. Id. § 77-2-7 (―Diversion is not a conviction and if the case is dismissed the matter shall be treated as if the charge had never been filed.‖). 4 Cite as: 2014 UT 37 Opinion of the Court ¶8 At that hearing, the court heard testimony from three witnesses. The first, Jennifer Ben, testified that Mr. Stevenson was her landlord and that he offered rent relief in exchange for sex. According to Ms. Ben, she and Mr. Stevenson had two phone conversations about the proposed exchange. On cross-examination, she also testified that she waited approximately one week to report Mr. Stevenson‘s proposition, that he allowed her to remain in the apartment for several months without paying rent, and that she had a felony conviction for attempted forgery. ¶9 Corporal Brett Jameson also testified. He testified that he was with Ms. Ben when she called Mr. Stevenson regarding the rent and that Mr. Stevenson suggested that Ms. Ben engage in sexual relations with him. Corporal Jameson admitted that he never specifically identified Mr. Stevenson as the person on the other end of the call. He also admitted that the call between Ms. Ben and Mr. Stevenson was not recorded and that there are no phone records of the call. ¶10 Mr. Stevenson testified last. He denied the allegations that he offered rent relief for sex. He also testified that Ms. Ben owed him for six months of rent. ¶11 After the evidentiary hearing, the district court sought supplemental briefing from the parties on several issues, two of which are relevant to this appeal: (1) what must be proven to establish a violation of a plea in abeyance agreement, and (2) what is the proper standard of proof in order to demonstrate a defendant‘s failure to comply with a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement. ¶12 After supplemental briefing, the district court agreed with Mr. Stevenson that the ―no violations of law‖ condition in the plea in abeyance agreement required a conviction and not merely an allegation of misconduct. It further agreed with Mr. Stevenson that entering into the diversion agreement with Sunset City did not constitute a conviction. As a result, the district court dismissed with prejudice the patronizing a prostitute charge pursuant to the plea in abeyance agreement. ¶13 Layton City appealed the district court‘s ruling to the Utah Court of Appeals. That court reversed and held that a ―conviction is not a prerequisite to finding that a defendant has violated the law in contravention of a condition in a plea in abeyance agreement.‖8 8 Layton City v. Stevenson, 2013 UT App 67, ¶ 10, 298 P.3d 1267. 5 LAYTON CITY v. STEVENSON Opinion of the Court Mr. Stevenson petitioned for writ of certiorari, which we granted. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(a).