Opinion ID: 456170
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unavailability or Impropriety of Collateral Estoppel Against the State Government

Text: 110 In United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 104 S.Ct. 568, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984), the Supreme Court held that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel may not be invoked against the government. While the collateral estoppel sought in this case is defensive and the petitioner seeks to invoke it against a state government rather than the federal government, we hold that the policy rationale behind Mendoza applies to the facts of this case. 111 Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the resolution by a court of an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment precludes the relitigation of that issue in a subsequent suit based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. 13 See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). As stated by the Supreme Court: 112 Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. 113 Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. at 571, quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (footnote omitted). 14 The courts have broadened the scope of this doctrine in recent years by abandoning the requirement of mutuality of parties. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971). 114 However, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the government is not in the same position as a private litigant, given the geographical breadth of government litigation and the nature of the issues litigated by the government. See Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. at 572. In ruling that nonmutual collateral estoppel should not be applied against the government, the Supreme Court in Mendoza cited several considerations. The Court noted that not only is the government frequently involved in legal questions of substantial public importance but that the government is more likely than private litigants to be involved in lawsuits against different parties that involve the same legal issues. Moreover, the Court noted that given the government's frequent involvement in litigation that its conduct in such litigation differs from that of a private litigant because while a private litigant will rarely forego an appeal if there is a chance of ultimately prevailing, the government traditionally considers a variety of factors before appealing, such as limited government resources and the crowded dockets of the courts. Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. at 573. The Court found that applying the doctrine of nonmutual estoppel against the government would force it to abandon its policy of limited appeal and force it to appeal every adverse decision to prevent foreclosure of further review. The concern of the Supreme Court as to this matter is reflected in the present case as the DPR chose not to appeal the final order of the Board of Pilot Commissioners. 115 The Court was also cognizant of the fact that the Executive Branch over the course of time may find it prudent to take differing positions with respect to resolution of a given issue, stating: 116 [T]he panoply of important public issues raised in governmental litigation may quite properly lead successive Administrations of the Executive Branch to take differing positions with respect to the resolution of a particular issue. While the Executive Branch must of course defer to the Judicial Branch for final resolution of questions of constitutional law, the former nonetheless controls the progress of government litigation through the federal courts. It would be idle to pretend that the conduct of government litigation in all its myriad features, from the decision to file a complaint in the United States District Court to the decision to petition for certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of Appeals, is a wholly mechanical procedure which involves no policy choices whatever. 117 Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. at 573. 118 We hold that the rationale outlined by the Supreme Court in Mendoza for not applying nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government is equally applicable to state governments. Indeed, we take notice that the Supreme Court in reaching its holding did not differentiate between federal governmental interests and state governmental interests, nor was there anything to suggest that the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court were peculiar to the federal government. Nor do we see any substantive difference between nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel which the Supreme Court addressed and nonmutual defensive collateral estoppel; in each instance the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court are applicable here: 119 The conduct of government litigation in the courts of the United States is sufficiently different from the conduct of private civil litigation in those courts so that what might otherwise be economy interests underlying a broad application of collateral estoppel are outweighed by the constraints which peculiarly affect the government. We think that our conclusion will better allow thorough development of legal doctrine by allowing litigation in multiple forums. Indeed, a contrary result might disserve the economy interests in whose name estoppel is advanced by requiring the government to abandon virtually any exercise of discretion in seeking to review judgments unfavorable to it. The doctrine of res judicata, of course, prevents the government from relitigating the same cause of action against the parties to a prior decision, but beyond that point principles of nonmutual collateral estoppel give way to the policies just stated. 120 Mendoza, 104 S.Ct. at 574 (footnote omitted). 121 The petitioner tries to distinguish Mendoza by claiming that mutuality is present in this case even though Hercules was not a party to the revocation proceeding because Hercules under the doctrine of respondeat superior is vicariously liable for any negligence of Lerro. Although we note that this argument is inconsistent with Hercules' claim in Appeal No. 82-5733, even assuming that Hercules and Lerro are the same parties for collateral estoppel purposes, we find that the State of Florida DPR and DOT are not the same parties and therefore the assertion of collateral estoppel is nonmutual. The Florida DPR initiated the license proceeding, while the Florida DOT is the party involved in the civil proceeding. We find that these two agencies had different functions and interests and should not be considered privies to one another for purposes of collateral estoppel. 122 First, the DPR in the license revocation proceeding was not acting as a party seeking affirmative relief from Lerro. Rather, the DPR was acting as a regulatory body to insure that a person holding a license was competent to serve the public and that if such person was incompetent, the DPR had the responsibility to seek revocation of his license in the public interest. Thus, the state in the license revocation proceeding was carrying out its function as parens patriae to insure that those authorized by it to serve the public were competent to do so. On the other hand, in its civil action, where it sought monetary damages, the state, through the DOT, was performing its function as protector of the public fisc and its interest in establishing the negligence of Pilot Lerro was not penal in nature but rather sought monetary recovery for the damage caused by his negligence. The policy reasons for not applying the doctrine of nonmutual collateral estoppel to these two state agencies are obvious. Collateral estoppel would cast doubt on the ability of the DPR to follow its usual procedures in regulating pilots, for the risk of collateral estoppel would cause it to consult with the DOT, and perhaps postpone the proceedings or change its strategy to accommodate the DOT. These concerns would necessarily impair the proper functioning of the state government and would hinder it in fulfilling its duties to the state citizenry. 123 Second, the circumstances of this case present stronger reasons than those present in Mendoza for not applying non-mutual collateral estoppel. In Mendoza, the relevant government agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), was a party to both proceedings, and in the second proceeding sought to litigate the identical issue involved in the first proceeding. As noted above, this case involves two wholly separate state agencies with different interests and functions. The distinction is a critical one given the varied interests a governmental body must pursue; if Mendoza stands for anything, it must stand for the proposition that a government's agencies in pursuing their stated goals must not be put in the untenable position of collaterally estopping one another when they pursue the same issue for wholly different purposes. 124 Finally, the most significant consideration in determining whether to invoke collateral estoppel is whether the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue to be estopped. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328, 99 S.Ct. 645, 650, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). Having reviewed the administrative proceedings before the Board of Pilot Commissioners, we conclude that the issues before the administrative agency and the district court were substantively distinct, making collateral estoppel inappropriate. 125 We have thoroughly reviewed the factual findings of the Administrative Hearing Officer and the approval of those findings by the Board of Pilot Commissioners. The administrative findings regarding Pilot Lerro's negligence were very narrowly drawn and in no way approximated the detailed findings of negligence made by the district court, which we have approved this day. 126 It is clear that the Administrative Hearing Officer focused almost exclusively on the events occurring just prior to buoys 1A and 2A and thereafter; and found nothing unusual about the SUMMIT VENTURE's speed or the weather conditions prior to reaching buoys 1A and 2A. For instance, the hearing officer found that: 127 The Summit Venture's inbound transit on the morning of May 9, 1980 was normal with weather conditions commonly encountered and normal traffic on the bay until the vessel reached a point in Mullet Key Channel .9 miles from the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, and .2 miles from the turning buoys # 1A and # 2A which mark the entrances to A Cut Channel. At that point the Summit Venture and Lerro encountered a sudden, unexpected and intense storm which reduced visibility to zero. R.E. at 131. 15 128 With regard to the so called sudden onset of the storm the hearing officer found: 129 Of the several expert pilots who testified on the question, all agree that when Lerro lost visibility and radar contact at the onset of the storm approximately .9 miles from the Sunshine Skyway Bridge, his choice to attempt to navigate through the bridge as opposed to turning port, starboard, or going full-astern was a reasonable, prudent choice. 130 R.E. at 132. 131 Given this expert testimony, the hearing officer concluded: 132 As established by the testimony of the expert pilots appearing in this cause, the speeds maintained by Lerro on the Summit Venture during her approach to the Sunshine Skyway Bridge were reasonable and prudent under the existing weather conditions. Slower speeds on the vessel would have risked control problems. 133 R.E. at 134. The hearing officer ultimately concluded: 134 Thus, construing the Administrative Complaint strictly, the Petitioner's own evidence establishes that up to the point of the storm Lerro had properly performed his duties as a pilot, that he should not have attempted to halt the way of the vessel, and that his only choice was to navigate blindly through the existing weather which he found himself in through no fault of his own. When the facts established by this strict view of the Administrative Complaint are measured against the standard of care required of a pilot it must be concluded that Petitioner has failed to prove that Lerro's actions were negligent. 135 R.E. at 139. 136 The above excerpts establish conclusively that while the legal issue negligence, may have been similar, the facts at issue before the two proceedings differed substantially. Most significantly, our affirmance of the district court's findings of negligence principally rests upon the failure of Pilot Lerro to slow sufficiently or anchor between buoys 14 and 16. A review of the administrative record shows that the hearing officer found nothing unusual about Pilot Lerro's actions at those points. The evidence adduced at trial indicated otherwise. The scope of the two proceedings was fundamentally different. 16 137 Moreover, at the limitation trial, the district court not only made findings as to the negligence of Pilot Lerro, but also made specific findings as to the negligence of Captain Liu, Chief Mate Chan and the crew members of the SUMMIT VENTURE. Clearly, the State of Florida is in no way collaterally estopped from asserting the liability of Hercules for the negligence of Captain Liu, Chief Mate Chan and the crew members of the SUMMIT VENTURE. These facts demonstrate the lack of identity in the proceedings and reveals the fundamental unfairness that would result from permitting collateral estoppel in this instance. 138 We find this case to be very similar to Frederick E. Bouchard, Inc. v. United States, 583 F.Supp. 477 (D.Mass.1984), where the court held that an Administrative Law Judge's ruling, in a license revocation proceeding, that the master of the subject tug was not negligent, did not preclude the United States from asserting a negligence claim against the tug and its owners and operators. As noted by the court: 139 The question of the movants' negligence was not actually litigated in the license revocation hearing. The movants correctly contend that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, they would be liable for the negligence of the master and mate of the tug. However, it does not follow that since these employees were not found negligent in relation to the specific charges there involved, the movants cannot be found negligent .... Moreover, it is not clear that the meaning of negligence in these different contexts is identical. In addition, the movants may have been negligent in ways unrelated to the conduct of the tug's master and mate. 140 Bouchard, 583 F.Supp. at 482. We are faced with the same situation here, the findings of negligence by the district court went well beyond Pilot Lerro and established the fault of both the crew members and owners of the SUMMIT VENTURE. We further note that as to Pilot Lerro the proof of negligence was different at the state administrative level given the penal nature of the proceeding and the requirement of substantial evidence. See Bowling v. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165, 171 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1981). 141 The trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding questions of fairness, and Hercules has not established that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to apply collateral estoppel in this case. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331, 99 S.Ct. 645, 651, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). The equities of the present case support the district court's refusal to allow Hercules the benefit of collateral estoppel. For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Hercules' motion to collaterally estop the State of Florida from relitigating the issue of negligence before the district court.