Opinion ID: 1201361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the motion to quash the subpoenas

Text: The Respondent also requested the panel to quash the subpoenas issued pertaining to his bank records. The Bar Association asked the Respondent to provide information and documents relating to the financial transactions between himself and clients whom had filed grievances against him. Respondent declined to respond. The Bar again requested the records, and again the Respondent declined to respond. The subpoenas were issued May 14, 1991, to the First Bank of Catoosa and Community Bank and Trust, and notice of the subpoenas was mailed to Gasaway on the same date. The Respondent mailed his motion to quash to the Professional Responsibility Tribunal on May 22, 1991. During a regularly scheduled meeting of the Commission on May 31, 1991 the motion to quash was denied by the Commission and the Respondent was informed of the denial. On June 19, 1991 the Bar Association informed Respondent's counsel that the banks would comply with the subpoenas on July 2, 1991 unless the Respondent obtained a judicial order prohibiting the banks from proceeding. The Bar stated in its notice: This agreement will allow Mr. Gasaway, if he has a legitimate objection to the subpoena, to raise it. Counsel for the Bar also provided the Respondent a copy of an order where this Court had assumed original jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute between a lawyer and the Bar Association concerning the scope of a similar subpoena issued by the Professional Responsibility Commission. The Respondent did not seek judicial review, and the banks complied with the subpoenas. At the hearing before the trial panel the Respondent moved to quash the subpoenas, and objected to the introduction of evidence obtained by the subpoenas. He argued that (1) the subpoena were overbroad, (2) the Bar had not sought to enforce the subpoenas in a District Court, (3) no hearing was provided on the motion to quash, and (4) that the same entity that issued the subpoenas also adjudicated the motion to quash. In Nichols v. Council on Judicial Complaints, 615 P.2d 280 (Okla. 1980) we stated that a subpoena duces tecum may be overbroad in scope and thus an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. 615 P.2d at 284. A Fourth Amendment claim is founded upon a person's privacy interest in the material sought by the subpoena. [17] However, no Fourth Amendment privacy interest exists with regard to the bank records. [18] The Respondent argued that the subpoenas were overbroad in scope under the Oklahoma Financial Privacy Act, 6 O.S. 1991 1991 §§ 2201-2206, and that they sought material that is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial for the purposes for which it is sought. [19] We find otherwise. Administrative subpoenas are to be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1739, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967). In United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 254-255, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) the Court examined the relevant statutory authority for the agency issuing the subpoena, and stated that in order to obtain enforcement of a subpoena the agency must have a legitimate purpose for the investigation, the inquiry must be relevant to that purpose, the agency must not possess the information sought, and the agency must have adhered to the administrative procedures. The subpoenas requested bank records from April 12, 1990 to May 1991. The record before us shows pre-subpoena complaints to the Bar Association involving financial transactions occurring in April and May 1991, April and November 1990, and the status of trust accounts during the period between April and November 1990. The Commission is given the authority to investigate any alleged ground for lawyer discipline. 5 O.S. 1991 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, Rule 2.8. The Commission as a part of this investigation may issue subpoenas upon approval of the Commission by the chairman or vice-chairman of the Commission. Id. The subpoenas were not overbroad in scope with regard to the complaints. They were relevant to a legitimate inquiry by the Commission in its role of investigating lawyer misconduct. The Respondent argued that the Oklahoma Financial Privacy Act, 6 O.S. 1991 §§ 2201-2206, required quashing the subpoenas. He argued that under the Act the proper authority to hear the motion to quash was the District Court. This assertion is incorrect. Section 2204 of the Act states in part: If the subpoena was issued by the district court, the motion to quash the subpoena shall be filed in the district court that issued the subpoena. If the subpoena was issued by a state agency or a legislative committee, the motion to quash the subpoena shall be filed with the state agency or legislative committee that issued the subpoena. Under the Act the entity that issues the subpoena hears the motion to quash. However, as explained hereafter this provision does not apply to the Commission. The Respondent also argued that a procedure is unconstitutional when the same entity issues a subpoena and also hears a motion to quash that subpoena. Standard agency practice appears to allow an agency to hear a motion to quash its own subpoena. 1 C. Koch, Administrative Law and Practice, § 5.36 (1985). See e.g., 75 O.S.Supp. 1992 § 315(B)(2); 6 O.S. 1991 § 2204(c). But we need not examine this argument because the controversy before us is a Bar disciplinary proceeding, and the procedures in this proceeding satisfy due process. The Professional Responsibility Commission is a part of the Oklahoma Bar Association and exercise a rule-granted power to consider and investigate alleged grounds for lawyer discipline. 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, Rules 2.1, 2.8(a). The Oklahoma Bar Association was created by this Court, and the Association is an official arm of the Court acting for and on behalf of the Court in lawyer-discipline matters. 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1, App. 1, Preamble; 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1, App. 1, Art. 1 § 1. See also Stamper, Otis & Barrage v. Shaffer, 813 P.2d 1043 (Okla. 1991); Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Association, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-1055 (Okla. 1981). This Court possesses exclusive and original jurisdiction in disciplinary proceedings. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Perkins, supra . This jurisdiction includes authority to adjudicate the propriety of subpoenas issued by the Professional Responsibility Commission to examine lawyer bank records for the purpose of a disciplinary proceeding. The Respondent was provided with time to seek relief in this Court prior to the banks' divulging the information. Counsel for the Bar informed the Respondent of a case where this Court assumed original jurisdiction and adjudicated a similar claim in a similar procedural context, and he was provided a copy of this court's order in that case. The Respondent did not pursue that opportunity for judicial review, and cannot now successfully complain that he was denied an opportunity to be heard via judicial review when such was the result of his own inaction. The Respondent also argued that the Oklahoma Financial Privacy Act required the Bar Association to enforce the subpoenas in the District Court before the banks complied with the subpoenas, because he filed a motion to quash with the Professional Responsibility Commission. The Respondent relied upon language in 6 O.S. 1991 § 2204 providing that: A subpoena issued by a state agency or legislative committed shall be enforced pursuant to Section 315 of Title 75 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section 315 is part of the Administrative Procedures Act (75 O.S. 1991 §§ 250-323), and provides a procedure for enforcing agency subpoenas in the District Court of the county where the recalcitrant witness resides. The Oklahoma Supreme Court is not an agency for the purpose of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures Act. 75 O.S. 1991 § 250.3, nor is the Bar Association, as an arm of this court, such an agency for the purpose of that Act. This Court is amply empowered to enforce a subpoena issued in the course of Bar disciplinary proceeding. The Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings provide an enforcement procedure in the Supreme Court with the Chief Justice assigning a judge of the district court to try a contemptuous refusal to comply with a Commission subpoena. 5 O.S. 1991, Ch. 1, App. 1-A, Rule 2.8. Respondent argued that the motion to quash should be sustained by the trial panel because he received no hearing on his motion to quash before the Professional Responsibility Commission, and argued that Failure to have a hearing is a denial of the minimum standards of due process. Not so, as we explained in Mott v. Carlson, 786 P.2d 1247, 1251 (Okla. 1990) and State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Hornung, 813 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Okla. 1991). Prior to the information being released in compliance with the subpoenas, the Respondent was afforded an opportunity to seek original-jurisdiction relief in this court, and present any legal arguments and facts he desired in support of quashing the subpoenas. The availability of this procedure satisfied due process. Mott v. Carlson, supra . Additionally, the Respondent was provided with an opportunity to make any legal arguments he desired by his motion to quash before the Commission, and he took that opportunity. Later when the Respondent was making his arguments before the trial panel he did not allege or argue that a material fact was in dispute on one of the grounds urged to quash, or that a hearing to adjudicate a fact had been necessary before the Commission or later before the trial panel. See State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Hornung, supra . We also note that in the exercise of this court's exclusive and original jurisdiction we have addressed the substance of the Respondent's claims on the motion to quash. The Respondent did not avail himself of his opportunity to present facts to the trial panel on the motion to quash or submit legal arguments by brief in this court after the panel report was filed. The Respondent was not denied procedural due process. Mott v. Carlson, supra , State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Hornung, supra . The Respondent also argued that the trust account records necessarily included information concerning clients other than those filing grievances, and the trust account records were not subject to subpoena because lawyers are required to keep confidential the affairs of their clients. The Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings and the Rules of Professional Conduct require a lawyer to maintain a trust account for the deposit of clients' funds entrusted to the lawyer. 5 O.S.Supp. 1992 Ch. 1, App. 1-A, Rule 1.4 and 5 O.S. 1991 Ch. 1, App. 3-A, Rule 1.15. A lawyer is required to maintain the records during representation of the client and continuing until five years after the termination of the representation. Rule 1.15. The mandated record-keeping is part of a State regulatory scheme for those licensed to practice law, and the regulation serves important public purposes in the administration of justice and the protection of the property of the citizens of the State. The regulatory nature of a Bar Association over these accounts for the purpose of lawyer discipline has been recognized when courts have determined that no Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege could be invoked by a lawyer with respect to the records of such accounts. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Chatelain, 513 So.2d 1178,1181 (La. 1987). Cf. Baltimore City Dept. of Social Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 556, 110 S.Ct. 900, 905, 107 L.Ed.2d 992 (1990), (the Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment could not be invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory scheme unrelated to the enforcement of criminal laws). We hold that when the Commission is acting in an investigation relating to a lawyer's rule-mandated trust account, and issues a subpoena to examine the trust account, the lawyer may not resist the subpoena solely on the ground that the record may reveal information concerning the lawyer's clients.