Opinion ID: 1390955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Right to a Fair Hearing

Text: The Ohio Supreme Court said in Sorin v. Board of Education, 39 Ohio Misc. 108, 315 N.E.2d 848, 851 (March 1974): In accordance with the decisions of various jurisdictions and the Supreme Court of the United States, an unbiased tribunal is a constitutional necessity in a quasi-judicial hearing, and a denial of the same is a denial of due process. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749; In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942. The requirement of an impartial tribunal applies to administrative proceedings no less than criminal trials. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287. Section 9-276.30, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum. Supp., provides that hearings under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act shall be conducted in an impartial manner and § 9-276.29 of the act recognizes the possibility of impropriety and seeks to safeguard against bias and prejudice. We addressed the problem of the fair-hearing requirements of due process in administrative proceedings in Fallon v. Wyoming State Board of Medical Examiners, Wyo., 441 P.2d 322, 327, when Justice Gray, speaking for the Court, said: With respect to a fair hearing, it is fundamental that principles of justice and fair play require `an orderly proceeding appropriate to the case or adapted to its nature, just to the parties affected, and adapted to the ends to be attained, one in which a person has an opportunity to be heard, and to defend, enforce, and protect his rights before a competent and impartial tribunal legally constituted to determine the right involved; representation by counsel; [and] procedure at the hearing consistent with the essentials of a fair trial according to established rules which do not violate fundamental rights.' 2 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 353, pp. 166-167. Referring to Board of Medical Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 102 A.2d 248, and New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. Nemitz, 21 N.J. Super. 18, 90 A.2d 740, 745, 749, Justice McIntyre, concurring with Justice Gray, observed in Fallon, supra: In the Steward and Nemitz cases cited ... recognition was given to the fact that the due process clause of constitutions guaranteeing to every person a fair hearing before a fair and impartial court applies to administrative agencies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions ... We were concerned with the same question when Mr. Justice Parker, writing for the Court in Lake De Smet Reservoir Company v. Kaufmann, 75 Wyo. 87, 96, 292 P.2d 482, 484, said: ... The necessity for disqualification is not relieved by the fact that there may be no actual interest of the official in conflict with the duties of his office, because the best administration of our laws requires not only that the officers be fair, impartial, and disinterested, but that they do not give an appearance to the contrary. We have, therefore, formerly held, and I would here reaffirm, that embraced by the appellee's constitutional and statutory guarantee to a fair hearing in the administrative process, is his right to be heard before an unbiased, fair and impartial tribunal  one which is free from bias and prejudice and imbued with the desire to accord to the parties equal consideration .. . Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 7 Cir.1940, 109 F.2d 9, 20. Even though the appellant-Board of Trustees ruled that it would not stand for voir dire inquiry, the District Court held that Mr. Spiegel's counsel should have been permitted to voir dire the board members in an effort to ascertain if they were possessed of such prejudice or bias as would prevent their according his client a fair hearing. [2] I would agree with the District Court.