Opinion ID: 472148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Foreclosure Proceeding

Text: 30 The district court also decided in conclusory fashion that even if the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel were inapplicable, the instant case should be dismissed because the foreclosure action pending in the bankruptcy court raised similar issues. 12 We hold, however, that since the Sec. 1983 suit is not duplicative of the foreclosure action, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the instant case. 31 It is well established that as between federal district courts, ... the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976); see also Hoover v. United States Department of the Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (5th Cir.1980). This doctrine rest[s] on considerations of '[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.'  Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183, 72 S.Ct. 219, 221, 96 L.Ed. 200 (1952)). Although no precise test has been articulated for making this determination, see, e.g., Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817, 96 S.Ct. at 1246, the general rule is that a suit is duplicative of another suit if the parties, issues and available relief do not significantly differ between the two actions. See, e.g., Complaint of Bankers v. Chatterjee, 636 F.2d 37, 40 (3d Cir.1980); Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1137; Ridge Gold Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 572 F.Supp. 1210, 1213 (N.D.Ill.1983). Trial courts are afforded broad discretion in determining whether to stay or dismiss litigation in order to avoid duplicating a proceeding already pending in another federal court. See, e.g., Kerotest Mfg., 342 U.S. at 183-84, 72 S.Ct. at 221-22; Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55, 57 S.Ct. 163, 165-66, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936); CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173, 103 S.Ct. 820, 74 L.Ed.2d 1017 (1983); Hoover, 611 F.2d at 1136-37. 32 Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the Sec. 1983 suit. First, the parties are substantially different in the two proceedings. In the foreclosure action, the plaintiff is Bank and appellants are the defendants. In the Sec. 1983 action, appellants are the plaintiffs, but the defendants, in addition to Bank, include Deputy Gilheany, the Bank's vice-president Gary Burman, the locksmith Leroy Metz, the Bank's law firm (Stuzin & Camner, P.A.), and the attorneys allegedly involved in the replevin of the household furnishings (Paul Friedman, Juan Gonzalez and James Smith). 33 Moreover, the issues in the Sec. 1983 suit differ significantly from those in the state foreclosure action. For example, in order for appellants to recover in the Sec. 1983 action, they must show that appellees were acting under color of state law. See generally Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Cobb v. Georgia Power Co., 757 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir.1985). This requirement is satisfied by a showing that the deprivation of the federal right resulted from the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible, and that the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor either because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. at 2754. See also Scott v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1545 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 122, 83 L.Ed.2d 64 (1984). There is of course no such requirement in the foreclosure action. 34 In addition, we cannot ascertain from the present record whether the foreclosure action will involve appellants' Fourth Amendment or due process claims. 35 Since the parties and issues in the two actions are significantly different, we find that the dismissal of the damage claims constituted an abuse of discretion. 13 36