Opinion ID: 2971868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal Probation Act applies.

Text: Hurley’s jurisdictional argument turns on which of the two federal probation statutes applies to his 1995 sentence—the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) or the Federal Probation Act (“FPA”). Given the dates of Hurley’s offenses, the FPA rather than the superseding statute, the SRA, controls here. Hurley argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke probation under the SRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3564, and if that Act ruled our analysis, he might be correct. The SRA, however, applies only to cases in which the defendant committed the underlying offense after November 1, -2- No. 03-6451 United States v. Hurley 1987. 18 U.S.C. § 3564 note (Effective and Applicability Provisions); see also United States v. Silver, 83 F.3d 289, 291 (9th Cir. 1996). Hurley’s indictment charged him with crimes occurring in February 1986 and March 1987. Therefore we do not look to the SRA in determining whether the district court properly revoked probation. Instead, we look to the applicable earlier-enacted probation statute, the FPA, former 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656. Hurley asserts our review must apply the SRA because, by defending the court’s jurisdiction at the district court under the SRA, the government waived the argument that the FPA should apply on appeal. We, however, apply the correct law regardless. See Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is the district court’s responsibility to apply the proper legal standard, regardless of the misconceptions by the parties.”).