Opinion ID: 864856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: SCS's Ore Tenus Motion

Text: ¶17. SCS does not appeal the trial court's decision as to the merits of the case related to dismissal of Hanson's claims with prejudice. Rather, SCS appeals the trial court's denial of its ore tenus motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses associated with its defense. Further, Hanson does not appeal the decision of the trial court. ¶18. SCS maintained that it should not have been named as a defendant by Hanson as it was not the parent company of MPC and had no easements or fiber optic telecommunications lines in Mississippi. At the hearing conducted by the trial court regarding Hanson's motion to 7 dismiss with prejudice, SCS made an ore tenus motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses associated with its defense.1 ¶19. The trial court granted Hanson's motion to dismiss the claims against SCS with prejudice. The trial court found the dismissal with prejudice to be a final adjudication of the issues, stating: [A]s to defendant SCS it . . . owns no easement or fiber optic lines across plaintiff's property and has not entered into any contracts to lease communication or fiber optic lines or communication equipment to any third parties and that SCS is not responsible for the actions of MPC... ¶20. On appeal, SCS argues that: The circumstances that would justify an award of attorney's fees and expenses to a defendant as a condition to a court granting a plaintiff's motion to dismiss with prejudice is a case of first impression in Mississippi. [Fn. 31, See Shaw v. Shaw, 603 So.2d 287, 293 (Miss. 1992) (In the absence of clear precedent in past decisions by this Court, we look to the federal courts for guidance in interpreting the Rules of Civil Procedure).] Several federal courts have held that where a plaintiff has moved for the voluntary dismissal of an action, with prejudice, a defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and expenses in cases presenting exceptional circumstances. See Aerotech, Inc. v. Estes, 110 F.3d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1997); Steinert v. Winn Group, Inc., 2000 WL 1466178,  (D. Kan. 2000); Nippy, Inc. v. Pro Rok, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 41, 43 (D.P.R. 1996); John Evans Sons, Inc. v. Majik-Ironers, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 186, 191 (E.D.Pa. 1982). The exceptional circumstances in this case justify an award of attorney's fees, costs and expenses to SCS. From the very beginning and during every stage of this litigation, SCS informed Hanson and his attorneys and presented evidence that SCS was not the parent company of MPC, that SCS did not own any interest in fiber optic telecommunication lines in Mississippi and that SCS did not own any easements in Mississippi. The comments to Rule 41 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure state that the imposition of conditions upon the granting of a plaintiff's motion to dismiss should be issued in order to protect the defendant. 1 SCS did not request attorney's fees in its answer to Hanson's claims. 8 ¶21. SCS also references M.R.C.P. 11 on appeal is support of attorney's fees, costs and expenses when there is no good faith ground to support the pleadings or arguments. See Vicksburg Refining, Inc. v. Energy Resources, Ltd., 512 So. 2d 901, 902 (Miss. 1987) (Courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions to protect the integrity of their processes.). M.R.C.P. 11(b) provides that: If any party files a motion or pleading which, in the opinion of the Court, is frivolous or is filed for the purpose of harassment or delay, the Court may order such a party, or his attorney, or both, to pay the opposing party or parties the reasonable expenses incurred by such other parties and by their attorneys, including reasonable attorneys' fees. ¶22. Hanson argues on appeal that: In 1986, SCS entered into a Fiberoptic Facilities and Service Agreement with MPX Systems, Inc., the predecessor to IFN, in the State of Georgia. By 1995, SCS and other members of the Southern Electric System, including MPC, had agreed to join together and consolidate into a single document an agreement to provide for the creation of additional fiberoptic lines along Southern Electric System electricity transmission distribution lines in various states, including Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. ®. 2176- 2278) (1995 Fiber Optic Services Agreement) With the creation of the 1995 Fiber Optic Service Agreement, SCS, MPC, and IFN's predecessor in interest, would begin to use MPC electricity transmission easements in Mississippi, not for the purpose of providing electrical power to Mississippi customers, but for the purpose of providing telecommunications services to the general public. This activity, i.e., subleasing fiberoptic capacity on electricity transmission easements for telecommunications purposes, was condemned by the Mississippi Supreme Court in the case of McDonald v. Mississippi Power Company, 732 So.2d 893 (Miss. 1999). Ultimately, MPC lost McDonald because MPC was unable to demonstrate to the Mississippi Supreme Court that it had obtained the appropriate easements and land rights to install and operate a fiberoptic telecommunications system for purposes other than the transmission of electricity. Since losing McDonald, MPC, IFN, SCS, ITC, and/or other entities which were parties to the 1995 Fiber Optic Services Agreement have argued before various state court judges, federal court judges, and engaged in interlocutory appeal before this Supreme Court, all without success, in an effort to advance their position that they should be 9 entitled to use electricity transmission easements in Mississippi for purposes of operating an unregulated fiberoptic telecommunications system. ¶23. Hanson also cites Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So.2d 1201 (Miss. 1986), in support of the trial court's denial of SCS's motion for attorney's fees. In Grisham, this Court stated: With the sole exception of punitive damages cases, in the absence of a contractual provision or statutory authority therefore, this Court has never approved awarding trial expenses and attorneys' fees to the successful litigant. It has consistently been our view that such expenses are not allowable as part of the costs. Id. at 1205 ¶24. In the case sub judice, the trial court denied SCS's ore tenus motion for attorney's fees and cost, stating: Defendants' ore tenus motion for attorney fees and costs is not well taken. When a lawsuit is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, it has been held that the court lacks the power to require the payment of attorney's fees unless the case is of a kind in which attorney's fees otherwise might be ordered after termination on the merits, i.e., when there is independent statutory authority for such an award, or perhaps as defendants assert exceptional circumstance. There is no independent statutory authority and I am of the opinion that although the circumstances may be unusual, they are not exceptional to the extent that an award of attorney's fees would be appropriate. The motion is denied. (emphasis added). ¶25. The distinction addressed by the trial court in granting Hanson's motion to dismiss was that Hanson's claims were dismissed with prejudice rather than without prejudice. The trial court determined the dismissal with prejudice to be a final adjudication of the issues. Therefore, SCS obtained a favorable final adjudication on the merits of the case. ¶26. The record reflects that the trial court considered SCS's ore tenus motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses. We find that the trial court granted the dismissal of Hanson's claims 10 with prejudice and determined the dismissal of Hanson's claims to be a final adjudication in favor of SCS. The trial court was in the best position to consider SCS's motion, and the record does not reflect the trial court abused its discretion in denying SCS's motion for attorney's fees, costs and expenses. Therefore, we find SCS's assignment of error to be without merit.