Opinion ID: 580893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 1991 Act and Its Legislative History.

Text: 32 The legislative history begins in 1990, when Congress passed a civil rights bill that retroactively overruled Patterson and certain Supreme Court Title VII decisions. 7 The President vetoed the 1990 bill, and Congress failed to override that veto. Among the reasons cited by the President for his veto was the bill's unfair retroactivity rules. 136 Cong.Rec. S.16562 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990). 33 When Congress took up this subject in 1991, the House again passed a bill retroactively overruling Patterson. 8 In the Senate, bi-partisan sponsors drafted a compromise bill, S.1745, during the summer of 1991. S.1745 deleted the 1990 bill's retroactivity provisions. See 137 Cong.Rec. S.15503-12 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991). S.1745 passed the Senate on November 5, 1991, and the House on November 7, see 137 Cong.Rec. H.9557-58 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991), and became law when the President signed it two weeks later. See President's Signing Statement, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768. 34 The text of the Act does not address whether it is generally to apply retroactively. Section 402(a) provides that, [e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment. Since many regulatory statutes contain a compliance grace period, a provision clarifying that the Act would be immediately effective is hardly evidence of congressional intent that it be applied retroactively, particularly when Congress deleted explicit retroactivity provisions from earlier bills. At most, this effective date section creates (or preserves) an ambiguity as to whether Congress intended the Act to be generally retroactive. 35 Two provisions of the Act are expressly made prospective. Section 109 specifically overrules EEOC v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1227, 113 L.Ed.2d 274 (1991), by providing that Title VII applies to U.S. citizens employed in foreign countries. This section is prospective with respect to all covered employers: 36 The amendments made by this section shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of the enactment of this act. 37 Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 109(c). Section 103 overrules Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989). It is subject to a more limited non-retroactivity provision: 38 Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, nothing in this Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1, 1975 and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983. 39 Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 402(b). Section 402(b) was intended solely to protect the Wards Cove Packing Company from any retroactive application of § 103 to its ongoing litigation. See 137 Cong.Rec. S.15963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Senator Kennedy). 9 40 Turning to the Act's legislative history, there were no legislative committee reports explaining S.1745. In the congressional floor debates, however, both proponents and opponents of retroactivity spoke extensively on the issue. They agreed that Congress was leav[ing] it to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment. 137 Cong.Rec. S.15963 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). But, not surprisingly, they disagreed as to how the courts should interpret this congressional abdication. Demonstrating a sophisticated understanding of how judges dissect legislative history, congressional proponents of retroactivity argued that Bradley's presumption of retroactivity would of course apply, while opponents argued with equal vigor that Georgetown Hospital's presumption of non-retroactivity would carry the day. The opposing sides also placed conflicting interpretive legal memoranda in the legislative record. 10 Though it appears that a greater number of legislators expressed the prospective-only view, that is hardly conclusive. 41 We think a rather clear picture emerges from this review of the Act and its legislative history. Proponents of retroactively overruling Patterson commanded a majority in both houses of Congress, but they could not override the President's veto of a 1990 bill that contained express retroactive provisions. Thus, proponents could do no better than send an ambiguous law to the judiciary. On the other hand, opponents of retroactivity who favored enactment of a prospective law (including the President) were also willing to hand this controversial issue to the judiciary by passing a law that contained no general resolution of the retroactivity issue. However, whenever a congressional majority could be marshalled, retroactivity opponents hedged their bets by expressly making specific provisions, such as § 109, prospective only. 42