Opinion ID: 1842233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Board's Standing to Intervene

Text: In Bennett v. Krupkin, 01-0209 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2d 940, we addressed the issue of whether the Board has standing to appeal a trial court judgment granting a doctor's exception of prematurity, where the Board claims the doctor is not a QHCP under the Act. We noted that under the Act, the Board is responsible, and has full authority for the management and defense of the PCF. Krupkin, at p. 6, 798 So.2d at 943-944. La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.44 A(5)(b) provides: The functions of collecting, administering, and protecting the fund, including all matters relating to establishing reserves, the evaluating and settlement of claims, and relating to defense of the fund, shall be carried out by the board. La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.44 D(2)(a) provides: The board shall be responsible, and have full authority under law, for the management, administration, operation and defense of the fund in accordance with the provisions of this Part. La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.44 D(2)(b)(x) expressly grants the Board authority to: Defend the fund from all claims due wholly or in part to the negligence or liability of anyone other than a qualified health care provider regardless of whether a qualified health care provider has settled and paid its statutory maximum or has been adjudged liable or negligent. (Emphasis added). In Krupkin we found La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.44 D(2)(b)(x) specifically gives the Board authority to defend the PCF from all claims due to the negligence of a non-covered health care provider and this included opposing an exception of prematurity filed by a doctor on the grounds that the doctor is not a QHCP. Id. at p. 7, 798 So.2d at 944. There, as in the matter sub judice, the Board argued the doctor did not satisfy the second prong of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 40:1299.42 A, which requires that to be a QHCP, the provider must pay a surcharge in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 40:1299.44. If the Board was not allowed to appeal the trial court's grant of the exception of prematurity in favor of Dr. Krupkin finding that he was a QHCP, the Board would have been prevented from undertaking its responsibility to defend the PCF and would have been subject to exposure for the claims involved in that suit. Id. at p. 8, 798 So.2d at 945. In the present case, the Board argues that if it is not allowed to intervene and seek review of the appellate court's granting of the exception of prematurity, that decision could become a final judgment not appealable by the Board. Therefore, it is only reasonable that the Board has authority under the Act and Code of Civil Procedure articles 1091, [5] 2083 [6] and 2086 [7] to seek review in this Court of the appellate court's judgment. We agree. Louisiana jurisprudence declaring that the Board has no standing to involve itself in a medical malpractice action relating to issues of liability unless there is a judgment or settlement pursuant to the provisions of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 40:1299.44 C(5) is simply not applicable when the Board is seeking to intervene on the narrow issue of qualification of the health care provider for the protections afforded by the Medical Malpractice Act. Our decision in Krupkin recognized that the Board had standing to determine the threshold issue of whether the health care provider has met the requirements of the Act to be qualified under the Act. Although the procedural postures of this case differs somewhat from Krupkin, i.e. Krupkin arose as appeal of the district court's grant of the exception of prematurity, while the case herein arises from a writ seeking review of the court of appeal's denial of the Board's petition to intervene on rehearing of its decision reversing the denial of the exception, Krupkin's analysis is equally applicable herein. Therefore, we find the court of appeal should have granted the Board's petition of intervention in which the Board argued the court erred in finding the defendants qualified pursuant to the Act. Having granted the Board's writ application, we now address the remaining issue concerning whether the defendants were qualified under the Act.