Opinion ID: 706026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability for discrimination under federal law.

Text: 13 The PUC asserts that the trial court prejudicially erred by allowing the Plaintiffs to proceed on a disparate impact theory of discrimination. 1 Although disparate impact is an appropriate theory under Title VII, the PUC contends it is inappropriate in an age discrimination context. A failure to submit a proper jury instruction is a question of law reviewable de novo, but an error in instructing the jury in a civil case does not require reversal if it is more probably than not harmless. Benigni v. City of Hemet, 879 F.2d 473, 479 (9th Cir.1988) (citations omitted). 14 A plaintiff alleging discrimination under ADEA may proceed under two theories of liability: disparate treatment or disparate impact. Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Palmer v. United States, 794 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir.1986)).Disparate treatment is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, or other protected characteristics. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. 15 Claims that stress disparate impact by contrast involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive is not required under a disparate-impact theory. 16 Hazen Paper Company v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1705, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (citations, brackets and ellipses omitted). 17 Although the Supreme Court applies disparate treatment to the ADEA, the Court acknowledged in Hazen Paper that it has never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA, and we need not do so here. 507 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1706 (citation omitted). Further, there is some indication that the theory should not apply. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1710 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (nothing in the Court's opinion should be read as incorporating in the ADEA context the so-called 'disparate impact' theory of Title VII ... and there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA.). 18 Here, the PUC argues that disparate impact is improper in light of Hazen Paper. At least one circuit appears to have so held. See EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2577, 132 L.Ed.2d 828 (1995). 2 However, existing Ninth Circuit precedent approves of a disparate impact theory under the ADEA. E.g., Rose, 902 F.2d at 1421; see also EEOC v. Local 350, 998 F.2d 641, 648 n. 2 (9th Cir.1993) (in this circuit a plaintiff may challenge age discrimination under a disparate impact analysis). 19 We need not address here whether disparate impact is a proper theory under the ADEA because the jury found intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment theory. 3 True, the verdict form combined two theories into one interrogatory: Using the disparate treatment or disparate impact theory of age discrimination, did the [PUC] violate the ADEA federal law and/or the FEHA state law by discriminating against plaintiffs on the basis of age? However, the jury also found that the plaintiffs' ages were motivating factors in the PUC's employment decisions. It found that the PUC would not have made the same employment decisions regardless of plaintiffs' ages. It found retaliation. It found that some individual defendants violated FEHA by aiding, abetting, inciting, compelling, or coercing an act forbidden by FEHA. It found that the PUC violated fundamental public policy under state law. It found that certain individuals conspired to fail to promote plaintiffs. And it awarded liquidated damages under the ADEA to both plaintiffs. An award of liquidated damages means the jury found that the violation was intentional because the court instructed: 20 If you find that the PUC violated the ADEA federal law and you have calculated plaintiffs' damages, you must then decide whether the violation was willful. The PUC acted willfully if it intentionally and voluntarily denied promotions to plaintiffs because of age. ... If the PUC willfully violated the law, plaintiffs are entitled to have their damages doubled. This means that you should award them the damages you calculated and add an equal amount of money as liquidated damages under the law. (emphasis added). 21 Substantial evidence supports the jury's findings. For example, Mr. Crommie testified that a PUC director told him Maurice, you know we want fresh young blood in this group. After he informed her that he had completed certain graduate courses, she said You're still too old. A former supervisor of Mr. Mangold testified that duty statements and the examination process were altered to allow younger people to be placed on promotion lists. Another former supervisor of Mr. Mangold testified that high profile assignments were given to younger employees. A memorandum of August 4, 1992 from Division Directors stated: The CPUC's overall effort should be to keep as many of our younger, talented staff employed within the constraints of civil service rules. Previous raters of Mr. Mangold testified that other review committee members pressured them to lower Mr. Mangold's ratings after submission. Similar testimony was elicited regarding Mr. Crommie. One rater admitted hat he was asked to lower the evaluation of Mr. Crommie, while raising the evaluation of a younger employee. 22 There was ample similar testimony from plaintiffs, coworkers and other raters. There was testimony that the subjective oral examinations consisted of questions that could only be answered correctly by those who held certain positions given to younger people. There was additional testimony that performance evaluations of older workers had been changed to influence promotion ratings. Further, the jury was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from Exh. 126, a letter from the PUC President/Executive Director Weisser to Mr. Mangold responding to a complaint of age discrimination. 4 The letter resulted from a speech to the PUC, where, according to Mr. Crommie, Weisser said We're going into a bright new future in which we have an excellent staff of young professional people who will be able to carry us into this bright new future by virtue of their superb education and training. In response to a question, Weisser allegedly responded with words to the effect of The older employees, unfortunately, don't take advantage of all the opportunities that are offered to them. In sum, substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict of age discrimination under a disparate treatment theory. 23