Opinion ID: 788656
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rodriguez's Conviction Under a Constructive Possession Theory

Text: 34 Having failed to provide sufficient proof of [Rodriguez's] specific knowledge and intent regarding the crimes charged through circumstantial evidence, Samaria, 239 F.3d at 238, the government argues that the jury could have convicted Rodriguez of the substantive charge on a constructive possession theory of liability as well. We disagree. 35 We first note that at trial the government did not differentiate the roles Rodriguez and Cruz played in the transaction, and on appeal in Cruz the government affirmatively represented that it sought to convict Cruz only on an aiding and abetting theory. See Cruz, 363 F.3d at 197 (In this case, the government concedes that it sought to convict Cruz of possession with intent to distribute a substance containing heroin on the basis of `an aiding and abetting theory.'); id. at 200 (holding that the government did not offer proof sufficient to convince a reasonable jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Cruz was guilty of aiding and abetting the drug transaction at issue in this appeal). Nonetheless, perhaps in response to our holding in Cruz, the government now argues that Rodriguez could have been convicted under either theory. 36 To establish constructive possession, the government must demonstrate that Rodriguez had the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the heroin. United States v. Payton, 159 F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1998). [M]ere presence at the location of contraband does not establish possession. United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam). Thus, in Samaria, we held that although an individual rode as a passenger in his own car while it contained contraband, he was not in constructive possession of stolen goods because [t]here is no evidence that [the defendant] handled any of the boxes or directed where they were to be taken or what was to be done with them. 239 F.3d at 239. Mere proximity or presence is therefore insufficient to support a finding of constructive possession. See United States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir.1992). 37 Here, as a threshold matter and as previously discussed, the government did not present evidence to permit a rational jury to conclude that Rodriguez sat in the back of the Town Car. Rather, the evidence merely showed that just before Medina and Cruz pulled into the Boston Market parking lot three individuals had been in the car. Yet, even if the jury reasonably could have inferred that Rodriguez was in the back seat of the car, this only would establish his proximity to a box that had heroin concealed inside of it. Similar to the situation we considered in Samaria, the government did not offer evidence to show that Rodriguez exercised dominion or control over the box containing the heroin, a necessary predicate to a constructive possession finding. See Samaria, 239 F.3d at 239. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence on which a reasonable factfinder could have found Rodriguez guilty under a constructive possession theory. 38 Because we decide that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction on both the conspiracy and substantive counts, we need not address the other issues raised on appeal. See, e.g., Glenn, 312 F.3d at 60.