Opinion ID: 1811743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Larrison Prong

Text: In its order denying postconviction relief, the postconviction court concluded that even if Quantez had not testified at Turnage's trial, the jury would still have had a sufficient factual basis to reach the same verdict. Turnage argues that the court applied an incorrect legal standard for the second Larrison prong. Specifically, Turnage argues that it does not follow from the postconviction court's sufficient factual basis finding that the jury might not have reached a different verdict without Quantez's testimony, which is the correct focus of the second Larrison prong. We review the postconviction court's legal determinations de novo. Williams, 692 N.W.2d at 896. We agree with Turnage that the postconviction court's formulation of the second Larrison prong was erroneous insofar as it seemed to focus its inquiry on whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Turnage even without Quantez's testimony. Under the second Larrison prong, the court is to ask whether the petitioner has demonstrated that without the [recanting witness's] testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion. Williams, 692 N.W.2d at 896; see also Hooper, 680 N.W.2d at 96 (affirming the postconviction court's holding that second prong not met because even without [the recanting witness's] testimony, the strength of the other evidence presented at trial was such that the jury would not likely have reached a different conclusion); cf. Opsahl II, 677 N.W.2d at 424 (holding that second prong was met because of the seven witnesses who testified for the state in a largely circumstantial case, the testimony of five of them was either formally recanted or otherwise called into doubt in postconviction proceedings). As these cases make clear, the second Larrison prong does not ask whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant in the absence of the recanted testimony. The question instead is whether the jury might have found the defendant not guilty if the recanting witness had not testified. Before turning to an analysis of this question, we first address the point raised in the dissent. The dissent concludes that Quantez's recantation needs to be analyzed under both the Larrison test for recanting witnesses and under the test for newly discovered evidence set forth in Rainer v. State, 566 N.W.2d 692, 695 (Minn.1997). The dissent also seems to suggest that we should reconsider our reliance on Larrison by noting that several jurisdictions do not follow it, and arguing that Larrison does not adequately address circumstances created where there is a recantation plus the addition of new exculpatory evidence. The dissent's thoughtful approach is not applicable to this case. Thus, we need not, and we do not, decide whether this approach should be followed if we were presented with a case where the petitioner provides evidence that a trial witness has recanted trial testimony and, in addition, offered a new version of the facts. The dissent's conclusion that this case needs to be analyzed under Larrison and Rainer is premised on the dissent's conclusion that it is undisputed that Quantez was present at the commission of the murder and that his recantation testimony provides new eyewitness exculpatory testimony. But Turnage has the burden on postconviction to set forth facts entitling him to the relief requested. We have said that to carry this burden petitioners must do more than offer conclusory, argumentative assertions, without factual support. See Rainer, 566 N.W.2d at 695 (holding that anonymous letter was insufficient to entitle petitioner to hearing); see also Morrissey v. State, 286 Minn. 14, 16, 174 N.W.2d 131, 133-34 (1970) ([P]ostconviction procedures    do not comprehend that a petitioner may have a full evidentiary hearing on the basis of bald assertions   .). The desire for finality in the criminal justice system is one reason it is appropriate to place this burden on the petitioner who seeks to set aside a conviction. See Pederson v. State, 649 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Minn.2002) (A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a judgment which carries a presumption of regularity and which, therefore, cannot be lightly set aside.). We conclude that Turnage has not demonstrated that his petition should be analyzed under Rainer because the recantation and petition do not include specific facts that would constitute exculpatory evidence. Cf. Wilson, 726 N.W.2d at 107 (concluding that evidentiary hearing was warranted because newly discovered evidence included affidavits from three new witnesses who swear that they witnessed the shooting and that [the petitioner] was not the shooter.). [2] Indeed, Turnage does not even argue in his brief to this court that he is entitled to relief because Quantez would have, had he testified truthfully, exonerated Turnage by testifying that while Quantez was at the scene of the murder, Turnage was not. Rather, Turnage argues that he is entitled to relief because Quantez recanted, and asks us to assess whether the jury might have reached a different verdict without Quantez Turnage's false testimony. In light of Turnage's burden on postconviction to set forth specific factsnot conclusionsthat would entitle him to relief, we conclude that the only test applicable to the recantation is the Larrison test. We turn now to the question of whether Turnage is entitled to relief under the second prong of the Larrison test. Without Quantez's testimony, the jury still heard an eyewitness account of the murder through Robinson's testimony. Robinson testified that he saw Turnage stab Vang multiple times. It seems that the state's case against Turnage would have been even stronger without Quantez's testimony, because the inconsistency between Quantez and Robinson's version of events would have been removed from the case. Furthermore, Robinson's account of events leading up to Vang's murder was corroborated in several aspects by M.E. and S.R.M.E. testified that he received a phone call requesting knives and delivered those knives to Robinson's car. S.R. testified that she saw Turnage in Robinson's car, contradicting Turnage's testimony that he was not with Robinson and Quantez during the car ride. Separate from Robinson, the jury heard testimony from inmates housed with Turnage that Turnage implicated himself in the murder. Finally, Turnage's phone calls made from the Ramsey County Workhouse provided further evidence of his involvement in the murder of Vang. From our review of the record we cannot say that the jury might have found Turnage not guilty had it not heard from Quantez. Based on this record, we hold that while the postconviction court did not articulate the correct legal formulation of the second Larrison prong, the postconviction court's denial of the petition was not an abuse of discretion. Because Turnage did not meet the second prong of the Larrison test, the postconviction court did not err in denying Turnage's petition and his request for an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.