Opinion ID: 2123936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision To Make a Ruling Based on the Transcript of the Original Trial.

Text: The Hunters' first contention is that on remand the district court abused its discretion by (1) not granting them a new trial, and (2) not allowing them to recall witnesses. They believe these omissions run afoul of the requirements of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 367(b). In support of this contention, the Hunters argue that (1) the issues in the case are very complex, (2) the credibility of witnesses is of paramount importance, and (3) too much time elapsed between the original trial and review of the transcript on remand (two and one-half years). Without a new trial and the concomitant ability to recall witnesses, the Hunters believe the district court on remand was unable to make a fair and rational decision and based its conclusion on hearsay. The bank and Kniep counter that the district court's actions on remand were a proper exercise of the wide latitude given trial courts in such situations. We agree. In pertinent part Rule 367(b) provides: In the event of the death ... of a judge who has under advisement ..., [a] case tried to him without a jury, any other judge of the district may be called in, ... to consider the same, and, if by a review of the transcript or a reargument he can, in his opinion, sufficiently inform himself to enable him to render a decision, he shall do so ; otherwise he may order a continuance, declare a mistrial, or order a new trial of all or any of the issues, or direct the recalling of any witnesses, or make such disposition of the matter as the situation warrants. Iowa R.Civ.P. 367(b) (emphasis added). In Hunter I, we explained Rule 367(b) this way: Subsection (b) of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 367 addresses the situation where the judge has died after a case tried to the court is under advisement. Another judge may then review the transcript or order a reargument and decide the case. If the case is not concluded in this manner, the judge may order a continuance, declare a mistrial or order a new trial. The judge may also direct the recalling of witnesses or make such disposition of the matter as the situation warrants. Hunter I, 468 N.W.2d at 457-58 (emphasis added). We concluded the intent of Rule 367(b) mandated that the ultimate decision in the case be that of the successor judge. We were also convinced that by such mandate the parties are afforded a certainty of continuity to a decision without the presence of hearsay however reliable it may be. Id. at 458. Because we concluded the decision as presented to us was that of the deceased judge rather than the successor judge, we vacated the decision. We determined that the decision was not reviewable by us because of the successor judge's procedural misinterpretation of Rule 367(b). Id. On remand Judge James W. Brown was assigned to hear the case. After hearing arguments from the parties on how to proceed under Rule 367(b), the judge reviewed the transcripts and exhibits in the case. He ruled that the record as it existed was complete to submit and decide the case. He entered an order in which he deemed the case submitted on the record made and set a hearing to permit the parties to make final arguments on the facts and law. In the initial hearing on remand on the question of how to proceed under Rule 367(b), Judge Brown's comments explain his subsequent ruling to decide the case on the record made: But until I review the transcript and [decide how to proceed], I think it would be premature in deciding exactly where we are going to go.... The case should be decided on the facts as they existed at the time of the trial and the fact that time has gone by since that time I think perhaps suggests a stronger argument for deciding the case on a transcript rather than a retrial because ... memories fade and witnesses become unavailable. We have a complete transcript of what everybody said and we know what the exhibits were at the time of the trial. There is no mistake. There is no question about different testimony. There is no question about missing witnesses. There are no memories fading. We have what they said. Now if ... we get into a problem of credibility of the witnesses and if that is a big problem, and I don't think I can determine that until I have reviewed the transcript; that would favor a retrial. If I have to determine this case on who the trial court believes, that is a strong argument for having the trial court see those people and observe their testimony and weigh the conflicting stories by seeing them in life. It is not conclusive but it is an argument for doing it that way. [Defendant's counsel] suggests that many of the facts in this case are undisputed and what we are trying to determinewhat the Court is trying to determine is how do I interpret those facts and it's more of a mixed fact law situation or what conclusion you should draw from those facts rather than a credibility situation. I might change my mind after I review the transcript but that is my initial thought. We too have reviewed the record and agree entirely with Judge Brown's reasoning. Evidently credibility was not that crucial to the court's decision. And we agree with that assessment. Because we find a reasonable basis in the record for Judge Brown's decision to decide the case on the existing record, we find no abuse of discretion in refusing to order a new trial and permitting parties to recall witnesses. See State ex rel. Miller v. National Dietary Research, Inc., 454 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Iowa 1990) (abuse of discretion found when district court gave no reasons to support its discovery protective order).