Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument Regarding Life Without Possibility of Parole as an Ultimate Penalty; References to Religion; Characterizing Mitigating Factors as Aggravating

Text: (35) Defendant complains of several other aspects of the prosecutor's argument, the first being that the prosecutor repeatedly argued the jury could find life without possibility of parole, rather than death, was the ultimate penalty. The prosecutor did indeed ramble on at some length about how different persons from diverse cultural, philosophical, and religious backgrounds might not agree on what is the ultimate penalty for murder. He kept returning to the point that this jury had a choice between two ultimate penalties, death or life without possibility of parole. Defendant asserts this argument minimized and distorted the nature of the choice facing the jury. No objection was made to these remarks and, in any event, they lack merit. Obviously death is qualitatively different from all other punishments and is the ultimate penalty in the sense of the most severe penalty the law can impose. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 329 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 239-240, 105 S.Ct. 2633]; Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961-962, 96 S.Ct. 2978].) It is simply inconceivable, however, that the prosecutor's disjointed remarks could have affected the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriate penalty in this case. At worst, the prosecutor's remarks told the jurors that determining what penalty was most severe in this case was something for each of them to decide based on his or her own background. Given the voir dire the jury had been through regarding attitudes toward the death penalty, given defense counsel's arguments and the pleas of defendant's adoptive mother, uncle, and father to spare defendant's life, and given common sense, no juror would have been persuaded by the prosecutor's remarks that death was similar to life without parole in its severity or that the gravity of the decision to be made was lessened in any respect. Indeed, many of the prosecutor's references to ultimate penalty seem synonymous with final penalty and may have been understood by the jurors as instructing them that the case had come down to two final choices. (36) Defendant objects to the prosecutor's references to defendant's religion. He argues the prosecutor was making the subtle argument that perhaps because of defendant's religious beliefs, death would be a preferable penalty. (Cf. Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 885 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 255, 103 S.Ct. 2733].) We do not agree. The prosecutor's discussion of this subject was certainly not gratuitous, as defendant's adoptive mother had testified that her son's life should be spared because he had some good things that he can contribute, even if he is in prison for the rest of his life. She agreed with defense counsel's suggestion defendant might be saved due to his religious principles, but the context was in terms of life without possibility of parole, not death. The prosecutor's remarks responded to this argument in mitigation by asserting, in essence, that defendant's religious beliefs might save him anyway, and hence defendant's alleged religious beliefs did not constitute a reason not to impose the death penalty. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 790 [propriety of arguing inapplicability of a mitigating factor].) The prosecutor certainly did not argue religion as an aggravating factor of itself militating in favor of the death penalty. (37) Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor argued factors (a) through (k) could be considered in aggravation or mitigation whereas factors (d) through (k) can only be mitigating. We disagree with both parts of this claim. The prosecutor, after reciting the statutory factors, did say: Now, these are the guidelines and the factors by which we tell our representatives of our community that they are to decide in a particular case the choice to make between life without parole or the death penalty. [ถ] Viewing these various factors, one can see that, from the different philosophical, religious or moral view, one can consider a factor in aggravation or a factor in mitigation. It's up to the jury, the representatives of this community, to decide that. [ถ] [Y]ou can go through a lot of these factors in mitigation and in aggravation, and depending upon your philosophical view and background consider it one way or the other. It is obvious from the record that his specific remarks were devoted to the factor of age, an issue we have dealt with above. He did not go through each factor in mitigation and say either that its absence was an aggravating factor or that a particular mitigating factor should be considered aggravating. For some factors this would have been not only incorrect but nonsensical โ some factors obviously did not apply to this case (e.g., factor (j)), while others are written as exclusively mitigating (e.g. factor (k).) Section 190.3 contemplates that we trust the jury to decide for itself which factors are applicable and which are not ( Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 619-620; People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]), and that seems to have been the overall tenor of the prosecutor's remarks. Certainly defense counsel had every opportunity to and did argue the mitigating factors he felt applicable. We find no reasonable possibility that any potential error in the prosecutor's remarks affected the jury's sentencing decision.