Opinion ID: 1164042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurors' memberships in exclusive fraternal organizations

Text: A more difficult question is presented by Malvo's argument that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to refuse to disqualify for cause those prospective jurors who were members of the Elks, Moose, or Shrine lodges since these organizations allegedly adhere to a Caucasian-only admission criterion. Civil Rule 47(c)(2) provides for a challenge based on bias. Civil Rule 47(c)(4) provides that a person may be disqualified where the trial judge finds that he has opinions or conscientious scruples which would improperly influence his verdict and Civil Rule 47(c)(3) provides as a ground for challenge for cause That the person shows a state of mind which will prevent him from rendering a just verdict... . In the first trial, Malvo was forced to use two of her peremptory challenges to disqualify prospective jurors who were members of the Elks or Moose lodges; and in the second trial, was forced to use peremptory challenges with respect to a member of the Shrine and a juror married to a member of the Elks. In addition, she alleges in her brief that on the jury were persons who were members of organizations which systematically exclude and discriminate against members of the race ... of Plaintiff although it is not clear from the record what members of the jury were referred to. We recognize that mere membership in an organization which adheres to a Caucasian-only membership policy is not per se grounds for challenge for cause. [11] For example, a person might very well be a member of such an organization with the sole intent of changing its membership criteria, and thus harbor no prejudice towards the classes of persons excluded by that policy. [12] However, membership in such an organization is some indication that the challenged juror may be incapable of discharging his duties free from improper influences or bias, where one of the parties in the case is a member of a class excluded by such a restrictive criterion. Where such a prospective juror is challenged for cause, it is incumbent on the trial judge to satisfy himself by appropriate questions and by observing the juror's demeanor, that the person is in fact capable of rendering an impartial and just verdict. Such a determination is then within the discretion we spoke of in Mitchell v. Knight, supra , and where there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that the trial judge has adequately performed this duty, we will not interfere. In the instant case, there is evidence that in the first trial the judge had a rational and factual basis for denying the challenges. One of the challenged jurors stated that although he was a member of the Elks, he was in specific disagreement with its Caucasian-only policy. The other testified that he was an inactive member of the Moose, was unaware of any racially restrictive policy, and that he himself has been married to a non-Caucasian for 18 years. In the second trial, however, there is no such reflection in the record. The juror who was a member of the Shrine refused to describe the type of oaths he had taken when he joined the organization and stated that he considered blacks as an equal, in some aspects, but not as far as the Masonic belief, ... Although he testified that he felt that he would be impartial in a trial involving a member of the black race, he also testified that if he was a black plaintiff and knew that there was someone on the jury with his state of mind, that he would be concerned. On further questioning, he was evasive as to the racial nature of the membership oath he had taken. People do not readily admit to bias, states of mind that prevent the rendering of a just verdict or opinions which would improperly influence their verdicts. Generally it is only from nuances derived from the jurors' testimony that a judge may ascertain whether grounds for such challenges for cause exist. Particularly when a prospective juror belongs to an organization which systematically excludes members of the race of a party to the suit, the trial judge must be sensitive to sometimes subtle inferences indicating bias, opinions or states of mind which could affect the juror's ability to render the just verdict. In this light we hold that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the challenge for cause as to the juror to whom we last referred.