Opinion ID: 3190115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Exclude/Suppress

Text: Before trial, Gemma moved to suppress the physical and testimonial evidence derived from the search of his vehicle. The district court granted the motion in part, but declined to suppress evidence from A.L.'s cell phone. The defendant later filed a motion to exclude evidence derived from A.L.'s cell phone, reiterating, inter alia, that the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court summarily denied this claim. Gemma contends that the district court erred because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, A.L. lacked authority to consent to the seizure of her phone from the vehicle, and the phone should be suppressed as fruits of Trooper Morris' initial, unlawful search. Although the parties battle at length - 11 - over the proper standard of review,3 we would find no error in the district court's decision even if our review were de novo. United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009). The evidence supports the denial of Gemma's motion to suppress. United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 2008) (If any reasonable view of the evidence supports the denial of a motion to suppress, we will affirm the denial.). A.L.'s phone was not seized during the initial search, which the court found unlawful. Instead, at the time A.L.'s phone was retrieved so that she could call her mother, Morris found himself on the side of a major interstate highway facing a now-unoccupied vehicle, an 3 The government argues that Gemma's motion to exclude on the basis of the Fourth Amendment is better understood as a motion to reconsider the court's prior denial of his motion to suppress. In his motion to exclude, Gemma specifically request[ed] leave . . . to raise this constitutional issue late because counsel was not fully aware of the significance of . . . A.L.'s cell phone . . . at the time of the litigation of [the] motion to suppress. A motion for reconsideration is not to be used as a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures. United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 104 (1st Cir. 2006)). Instead, such motions are appropriate only if the moving party presents newly discovered evidence, if there has been an intervening change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that the original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust. Id. Because the defendant's motion did little more than introduce an argument that was readily available at the time of the motion to suppress, the government contends that we should review the district court's summary dismissal based on a waived argument for abuse of discretion. Id. In response, Gemma argues that an error of law is, by definition, an abuse of discretion, United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599, 608 n.8 (1st Cir. 2015), and that we should therefore review the merits of his Fourth Amendment argument de novo. - 12 - arrested driver, and an unidentified and seemingly underage girl in a potentially unsafe situation. In these circumstances, the government is right to rely on the Fourth Amendment's general reasonableness command. United States v. Rodriguez-Morales, 929 F.2d 780, 783 (1st Cir. 1991). The Supreme Court recognized several decades ago that [l]ocal police officers, unlike federal officers, frequently . . . engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). Apart from investigating crime, police are expected to aid those in distress, combat actual hazards, prevent potential hazards from materializing and provide an infinite variety of services to preserve and protect public safety. Rodriguez– Morales, 929 F.2d at 784–85. Here, Morris encountered the unfolding of unexpected circumstances present[ing] [a] transient hazard that he had to deal[] with on the spot. Id. at 787. Viewed objectively, Morris had solid, noninvestigatory reasons for retrieving A.L.'s cell phone from the vehicle so that she could call her mother. Id. A.L. did not have identification, could not make use of the defendant's vehicle, and was now effectively stranded. Gemma's and A.L.'s conflicting answers suggested that A.L. might be in a potentially compromised position and require assistance separate and apart from an investigation into any crime. Id. at 784. - 13 - Finally, A.L.'s hesitation with respect to her age and her response that she lived with her mother all suggested that she was a minor who should be returned to the care of a confirmed legal custodian, whoever and wherever that person may be. We will not find the officer's extempore actions unreasonable in circumstances such as existed here. See id. at 786 (There is no requirement that . . . officers must select the least intrusive way of fulfilling their community caretaking responsibilities.). Because Morris retrieved the phone and witnessed the text messages suggestive of sex trafficking activity in the course of his community caretaking duties, the evidence was properly admissible. Id. at 785 ([E]vidence which comes to light during the due execution of the caretaking function is ordinarily admissible at trial.). Although Morris' original search of the car may have been unlawful, Gemma introduced no evidence or testimony suggesting that Morris' later retrieval of A.L.'s phone was a pretext for conducting an additional search of the vehicle or of the phone itself. Id. at 787 (holding that, so long as an officer's actions are not a mere subterfuge for investigation, the coexistence of investigatory and caretaking motives will not invalidate the [search or] seizure). On this record, Gemma's constitutional challenge, whether couched as a motion to suppress, to exclude, or to reconsider, would fail any applicable standard of review. - 14 -