Opinion ID: 1099410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probable Cause in the Present Case

Text: We note initially that the present case requires the drawing of a very fine line. On one hand, the law is now well settled that simple non-obscene [4] nudity in photographs or films is a protected form of expression under the first amendment. [5] New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3359, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 2755, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). Nor is it a crime in Florida for a parent simply to appear unclothed in front of a child in the family home, or a child in front of a parent, with no lewd or abusive intent. Far too many entirely innocent situations would be criminalized by a contrary determination. [6] Thus, in such matters, families and home-dwellers have a legitimate privacy interest that the law must respect. On the other hand, the Court must be mindful that sexual exploitation of children is a particularly pernicious evil that sometimes may be concealed behind the zone of privacy that normally shields the home. The state unquestionably has a very compelling interest in preventing such conduct. The two pertinent statutes recited in the probable cause affidavit clearly are aimed at rooting out the sexual exploitation of children. First, section 827.071 (prohibiting sexual performances by a child) requires not merely nudity but depictions or representations of actual sexual intercourse, deviate sexual acts, bestiality, masturbation, sadomasochism, lewd exhibition of the genitals, the touching of a person's clothed or unclothed privates or buttocks, [7] or actual or simulated sexual battery. § 827.071(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987). Of these requisite acts, the only relevant one is lewd exhibition of the genitals. We believe the affidavit did in fact create a substantial basis for the magistrate below to conclude that probable cause existed as to this particular crime. Under Florida criminal law the terms lewd and lascivious are synonymous: Both require an intentional [8] act of sexual indulgence or public indecency, when such act causes offense to one or more persons viewing it or otherwise intrudes upon the rights of others. [9] Rhodes v. State, 283 So.2d 351, 356-57 (Fla. 1973) (citing Chesebrough v. State, 255 So.2d 675, 678 (Fla. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976, 92 S.Ct. 2427, 32 L.Ed.2d 676 (1972)). The terms lewd and lascivious thus mean something more than a negligent disregard of accepted standards of decency, or even an intentional but harmlessly discreet unorthodoxy. See Chesebrough, 255 So.2d at 678. Acts are neither lewd nor lascivious unless they substantially intrude upon the rights of others. By the same token, it is evident beyond all doubt that any type of sexual conduct involving a child constitutes an intrusion upon the rights of that child, whether or not the child consents and whether or not that conduct originates from a parent. [10] As noted earlier, society has a compelling interest in intervening to stop such misconduct. Thus, if Schmitt's true purpose was the intentional exploitation of his daughter for a sexual purpose, then his conduct was lewd within the meaning of Florida law and is punishable as such. While it is conceivable that one might view the allegations in the present affidavit as depicting simple nudity, we believe the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding otherwise. The affidavit's factual allegations indicated that Schmitt did not treat the nudity of himself, his daughter, and others in the offhand, natural manner that might be expected if the conduct were purely innocent  for example, if they were nudists. Rather, the affidavit shows he made nudity a central and almost obsessive object of his attention. Thus, the magistrate reasonably could have believed that Schmitt's conduct toward his daughter included the lewdness element required by the statute. While nudity alone would not have sufficed, this overall focus of Schmitt's conduct tended to show a lewd intent and thus created a substantial basis for believing that the search would fairly probably yield evidence of a violation of section 827.071. Thus, the magistrate must be upheld. Gates, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. Second and for the same reasons, the affidavit justified the magistrate's conclusion that a violation of section 800.04 had occurred. In pertinent part, that statute requires a lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child. Once again, we must construe the terms lewd and lascivious in light of our earlier precedent. Rhodes; Chesebrough. Here, we believe the affidavit created a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that Schmitt had participated in an intentional indecent act intruding upon the rights of his daughter. That is, Schmitt's conduct as described in the affidavit made nudity the focus of his attention, creating a reason to believe he was acting with a lewd and lascivious intent. This created a substantial basis justifying the magistrate's conclusion that probable cause existed of a violation of section 800.04. For the above reasons, the decision of the magistrate to issue a warrant may not be disturbed on appeal. The warrant and all that flowed from it was lawful, because the magistrate had a substantial basis for believing that a search of Schmitt's home would disclose evidence of a violation of sections 827.071 and 800.04. Gates.