Opinion ID: 2210585
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause

Text: Rondon argues that the statutory exemption for mentally retarded individuals must apply retroactively to comport with the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Indiana Constitution provides that the General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23. Since Rondon did not develop a cogent Fourteenth Amendment argument as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7), we will discuss only his equal privileges and immunities claim under the Indiana Constitution. Rondon argues that in amending the death penalty statute, the legislature created two classes of mentally retarded individuals: those who were convicted before the July 1, 1994, effective date, and those who were convicted after that date. Rondon claims that the date draws an arbitrary and discriminatory distinction between two similarly situated classes in violation of the equal privileges and immunities clause. When analyzing an equal privileges claim under Article 1, Section 23, this Court applies a two step analysis as established in Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind.1994). First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Id. In other words, Rondon argues that the statute distinguishing between mentally retarded individuals convicted prior to and after July 1, 1994, must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the two groups of mentally retarded defendants. However, we do not agree with Rondon's characterization of the distinguished classes. The unequally treated classes here are mentally retarded and non-mentally retarded defendants convicted after July 1, 1994. Thus, the issue is whether the statutory exemption of mentally retarded defendants from the death penalty is reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish mentally retarded and non-mentally retarded defendants. The General Assembly enacted this legislation to exempt from the death penalty mentally retarded defendants whose cognitive, volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty is now questioned. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 338, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2957, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, 291 (1989). The exemption for mentally retarded defendants is reasonably related to their inability to act with the requisite culpability sufficient to warrant the death penalty and reasonably justifies the distinction between mentally retarded and non-mentally retarded defendants. We find that Rondon's claim with respect to the first prong of the test in Collins must fail. Even if Rondon prevailed under the first prong of the Collins test, we nonetheless find that Rondon's claim that he is similarly situated to those mentally retarded defendants convicted after July 1, 1994, fails under the second prong. Amendments to a law that are coupled with a savings clause [6] do not create two similarly situated groups of people. Rivera v. State, 179 Ind.App. 295, 385 N.E.2d 455, 457 (1979). Criminal statutes apply exclusively to one class of people, those who violate the law, and they relate to the specific point in time that a violation occurs. Upon alteration of the criminal law, individuals subsequently convicted are not similarly situated and cannot be equated to those previously convicted. [7] Id. at 457. Also, as we noted in State v. Alcorn , the time of a crime is selected as an act of free will by the offender. 638 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (Ind.1994). The criminal, not the State, chooses which statute applies. Rondon is bound by the laws in effect at the time he committed the crime. In 1984, the time of this crime, mentally retarded individuals were included within the group of persons eligible to receive the death penalty. We find that Rondon is not similarly situated to mentally retarded defendants convicted after July 1, 1994, and therefore, he has no viable equal privileges and immunities claim.