Opinion ID: 1217682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: propriety of sentence

Text: Appellant argues that § 6-1-101(c), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), is applicable to this case. It reads: In a case pending on or after the effective date of this act, involving a crime committed prior to the effective date, if the penalty under this act for the crime is different from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose the lesser sentence. Section 6-1-101(c) is part of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, a recodification of most of the crimes. It became effective on July 1, 1983. Section 6-1-101(c) is, thus, applicable to this case. The information charged a violation of § 6-2-101, the forgery statute which was in effect at the time of the crime. The information charged the unlawful forgery of the name of Edward Brian to a check drawn on the American National Bank and an attempt to pass it. Section 6-2-101 provided in pertinent part: Every person who shall falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any    check    or shall utter, publish, pass or attempt to pass as true and genuine    any of the above-named false, altered, forged or counterfeited matters as above specified and described (knowing the same to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited) with intent to prejudice, damage or defraud any person or persons    shall be deemed guilty of forgery, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not more than fourteen (14) years. The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 provides in pertinent part: § 6-3-602. Forgery; penalties. (a) A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud, he:       (ii) Makes, completes, executes,    issues or transfers any writing[ [1] ] so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act  ;       (b)    [F]orgery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both. Inasmuch as appellant's sentence was three to seven years, the sentence was within the lesser of the penalties provided for the crime of forgery under the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 and the crime of forgery as defined when the crime was committed. Accordingly, appellant's argument that § 6-1-101(c) makes improper the sentence in this case is without merit. Incidental to appellant's contention on this issue is his argument that he should have been charged under the check fraud statute rather than under the forgery statute since the check fraud statute is a more specific statute and is, therefore, an exception to the general statute, citing McArtor v. State, Wyo., 699 P.2d 288 (1985); and Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148 (1984). At the time of the crime, §§ 6-3-110 and 6-3-111, W.S. 1977, made it a misdemeanor to, (a)    with intent to defraud by obtaining money, merchandise, property, credit, or other thing of value,    make, draw, utter or deliver any check, draft or order for the payment of money    upon any bank    knowing at the time of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering that the maker or drawer has not sufficient funds in such bank    for the payment of such check   in full upon its presentation   . Section 6-3-110(a). Similarly, § 6-3-702(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), of the Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982 provides in pertinent part: (a) Any person who knowingly issues a check which is not paid because the drawer has insufficient funds with the drawee, has issued a fraudulent check and commits fraud by check unless the check is paid by the maker within five (5) days of receiving notice, personally given or sent to the address shown on the instrument of dishonor or nonpayment.    It made the crime a misdemeanor if the check was for a sum of less than $2,000 and a felony if it was for $2,000 or more. The legislative intent at all times was obviously to create two separate crimes, one for forgery and one for check fraud. The forgery prohibition is against the making of a deceptive document per se, and that of the check fraud is against the making of a document having validity other than the fact that the funds against which it is drawn are insufficient. The check fraud statute concerns a genuine instrument although not collectible. The forgery statute concerns an instrument which is not genuine. Capwell v. State involved a situation not here present. In Capwell, we held the attempt of sexual assault could be properly charged only under the statute specifically dealing with attempted sexual assault and not under the general attempt statute. The latter carried a greater penalty. Nor is the other case relied upon by appellant of support to his position. In McArtor v. State , we recognized that a special statute would govern where a general statute is inconsistent with a special statute pertaining to the same subject matter, but we also pointed out that, in that case, the legislative intent was to address different conditions in the two statutes. We said that:    Both statutes involve sexual activity, but they are not mutually exclusive. It is not uncommon for two valid statutes to prohibit the same type of conduct, or for the prosecutor to decide under which statute to charge a defendant. [Citations.] McArtor v. State, 699 P.2d at 293-294. So it is here. Both statutes involve fraudulent documents, but one (check fraud) primarily concerns the element of insufficient funds in the bank upon which the check is drawn. The other (forgery) primarily concerns the element of fabrication or falsity of the instrument itself. Appellant attempted to pass a check which was not genuine. It was signed by him under a fictitious name and was on a bank in which appellant did not have an account and in which there was no account under the fictitious name. Appellant was properly charged. Affirmed.