Opinion ID: 2103729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the commission authorized to subpoena the plaintiff prior to the issuance of a formal complaint by the attorney discipline board?

Text: The power to discipline members of the State Bar is reserved to the Supreme Court. Const 1963, art 6, § 5. In re Hague, 412 Mich 532, 560; 315 NW2d 524 (1982). The license to practice law in Michigan is, among other things, a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court that the holder is fit to be entrusted with professional and judicial matters and to aid in the administration of justice.... MCR 9.103(A). While responsibility for attorney discipline is ultimately ours, all members of the bar share in the duties imposed by this responsibility. Thus, the court rules themselves provide that [a]n attorney shall assist the administrator in the investigation, prosecution, and disposition of a request for investigation or complaint filed with or by the administrator. MCR 9.103(C). As we have acknowledged on prior occasions, attorney discipline is designed for the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. See, e.g., State Bar Grievance Administrator v Baun, 395 Mich 28, 37-38; 232 NW2d 621 (1975). Of those three interests, the protection of the public is paramount. Unless a profession is ultimately devoted to public service, the privileges of its membership cannot be reconciled with principles of a democratic society. Internal regulation of a profession is a most significant privilege. It is, commensurately, the greatest responsibility attached to any profession. It is with this understanding that we must approach all problems of attorney discipline. As, the Washington Supreme Court has explained: The practice of law has been a profession of the highest order since its inception and it must continue to be so. Internal investigation and self-discipline are at the very heart of a profession, as distinguished from a trade or business. The bar association's investigation of a complaint is an integral part of the machinery for handling charges regarding the ethics and conduct of the attorneys admitted to practice before this court. Public confidence in the legal profession, and the deterrence of misconduct, require prompt, complete investigations. The process of investigating complaints depends to a great extent upon an individual attorney's cooperation. Without that cooperation, the bar association is deprived of information necessary to determine whether the lawyer should continue to be certified to the public as fit. Obviously, unless attorneys cooperate in the process, the system fails and public confidence in the legal profession is undermined. If the members of our profession do not take the process of internal discipline seriously, we cannot expect the public to do so and the very basis of our professionalism erodes. [ In re Del H Clark, 99 Wash 2d 702, 707-708; 663 P2d 1339 (1983).] The plaintiff in this action challenges the authority of the administrator to require his testimony, as well as the production of his records, by issuing a subpoena duces tecum subsequent to a request to investigate, but prior to the filing of a formal complaint. As in all matters of attorney discipline, we must construe the relevant rules liberally for the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. MCR 9.102(A). MCR 9.114 is entitled Action by Administrator or Commission after Answer. MCR 9.114(C)(1) provides: On request of the administrator or the respondent, the commission may issue subpoenas to require the appearance of a witness or the production of documents and other tangible things before the administrator or an investigator concerning matters then under investigation. [Emphasis added.]. Despite the reference to matters then under investigation and despite the requirement of a liberal construction explicitly set forth in MCR 9.102(A), the plaintiff would construe this rule to preclude the use of an investigative subpoena in the investigative stage of grievance proceedings. The plaintiff urges this construction by comparing the use of the word respondent in MCR 9.114(C)(1) with the use of the word witness. Adopting a narrow construction of the rule, the plaintiff submits that only witnesses may be subpoenaed under the rule, not respondents such as himself. We find no persuasive reason for concluding that the two words are mutually exclusive so that a respondent may not also be a witness. We first observe that the professional disciplinary rules define respondent as an attorney named in a request for investigation or complaint. MCR 9.101(6). The word witness is not defined in the rules. Thus, the rules themselves do not expressly preclude a respondent from also being a witness. As the plaintiff notes, the professional disciplinary rules do use both the word respondent and witness in numerous instances. We agree that this use suggests that the two words have different meanings. However, the fact that words have different meanings does not necessarily, or even commonly suggest, that their relationship is antonymous. It is, of course, an elementary rule of construction that words must be given their commonly accepted meanings. Production Credit Ass'n of Lansing v Dep't of Treasury, 404 Mich 301, 312; 273 NW2d 10 (1978). [5] We are aware that a number of our sister states have adopted rules which expressly state that investigative subpoenas are available in attorney grievance proceedings prior to the filing of a formal complaint. [6] In fact, a number of states have authorized random audits of client trust accounts. [7] Since the Michigan rule is not as explicit, it might be argued that the use of investigative subpoenas in this manner was not intended. We are not, however, presented with any evidence that these rules were considered at the time that MCR 9.114(C)(1) was drafted. It seems plausible that the rules were drafted without reference to these states. [8] The structure and organization of the rules also support the conclusion that investigative subpoenas are available prior to the filing of a formal complaint. The rules sequentially set forth the procedure that governs Requests for Investigation, MCR 9.112, Answer by Respondent, MCR 9.113, Action by Administrator or Commission after Answer, MCR 9.114, Hearing Panel Procedure, MCR 9.115, and Review of Order of Hearing Panel, MCR 9.118. This structure describes discrete steps in the disciplinary process. In context, it thus appears clear that reference in Rule 9.114 to matters then under investigation was intended to allow the use of subpoenas in the investigative phase of disciplinary proceedings. Under the Michigan rules, either the commission, the grievance administrator, or hearing panels of the Attorney Discipline Board may issue subpoenas, though all subpoenas must be issued in the name and under the seal of the Attorney Discipline Board, MCR 9.115(I)(1). Under MCR 9.115(B), the issuance of a complaint begins proceedings before a hearing panel. Since there is no time in which a complaint has been issued and a hearing panel is unable to issue a subpoena, once a complaint has been filed, the administrator may simply have a subpoena issued through the grievance panel. Thus, the position advanced by the respondent would render the subpoena power of the commission and its administrator redundant. Although it might be argued that the individual subpoena power of the commission is a matter of convenience and thus analogous to the power of an attorney of record under the rules of civil procedure, see MCR 2.506(B)(1), unlike the rules of civil procedure, the professional disciplinary rules do not require that a matter be pending [9] at the issuance of the subpoena. The nature of discovery under the professional disciplinary rules also indicates that strict limitations on the commission's precomplaint subpoena power is both unwarranted and unwise. Discovery under the professional disciplinary rules, unlike discovery under the rules of civil procedure, is extremely limited during the postcomplaint period. MCR 9.115(F)(4). A demand for written documentation within the control of a respondent must be filed within twenty-one days of service of a formal complaint. MCR 9.115(F)(4)(a). The objects of discovery are limited to the documentary evidence to be introduced by the opposing party and to witness lists. MCR 9.115(F)(4)(a), (b). A deposition may only be taken of a witness living outside of the state or physically unable to attend the hearings. MCR 9.115(F)(4)(c). This scheme indicates that, unlike ordinary civil proceedings, there is little convenience to be gained in disciplinary proceedings by allowing a party to issue a subpoena after service of the complaint. More significantly, the professional disciplinary rules require any meaningful investigation by the commission to be completed prior to the service of the complaint. A thorough and efficient investigation of these matters is necessary, not only for the protection of the public, but also for the protection of those attorneys who might otherwise be faced with insufficiently investigated accusations. A liberal construction of the commission's subpoena powers in disciplinary proceedings is consistent with other licensing schemes employed in this state. The Attorney General, for example, has the authority to issue a precomplaint, investigative subpoena under § 16235(1) of the Public Health Code. MCL 333.16235(1); MSA 14.15(16235)(1). See Attorney General v Bruce, 422 Mich 157; 369 NW2d 826 (1985). Although we have not had occasion to consider it previously, similar powers appear to be granted to the Michigan Social Welfare Commission under § 8 of the Social Welfare Act. MCL 400.8; MSA 16.408. There is nothing extraordinary about such authority, [10] nor in our view is it unduly burdensome in a licensing regulatory scheme. [11] Although the plaintiff has not raised any constitutional challenge to the subpoena, we have considered the possibility that the commission's exercise of its investigative subpoena power might be inconsistent with a respondent's right against self-incrimination under US Const, Ams V, XIV. In our view, however, the very existence of this right weighs against a narrow construction of the commission's power. It is well established that the Self-Incrimination Clause extends to protect attorneys in the course of disciplinary proceedings. Spevack v Klein, 385 US 511; 87 S Ct 625; 17 L Ed 2d 574 (1967). Indeed, in Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441; 92 S Ct 1653; 32 L Ed 2d 212 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be asserted in any proceeding. The right to subpoena a witness must not be confused with the right to compel testimony. Only the former is at issue in this matter. Finally, we are unpersuaded by the suggestion that, if a respondent may also be deemed a witness, we would be faced with the prospect of paying witness fees and mileage to a respondent who is subpoenaed. The professional disciplinary rules provide, in pertinent part, simply that [a] subpoenaed witness must be paid the same fee and mileage as a witness subpoenaed to testify in the circuit court. In turn, the rules of civil procedure provide that either a witness or a party may be subpoenaed, though a subpoena is not required to compel a party to attend a hearing. MCR 2.506(A)(1). Furthermore, it has long been held that a party may be entitled to a witness fee and mileage. Smith v Smith, 146 Mich 686; 110 NW 59 (1906). [12] Thus, we find nothing in the rules of professional disciplinary proceedings which provides, nor do we find any policy reason which persuades us, that a respondent may not also be a witness or that a respondent may not be subpoenaed prior to service of a complaint. Absent a compelling reason for doing otherwise, we are constrained by the rules themselves to adopt a liberal construction for the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. MCR 9.102(A). We are satisfied that our acknowledgment of the commission's investigative subpoena power over this plaintiff effectuates those purposes and therefore correctly applies the rules in this context. Most importantly, we believe that this conclusion is consistent with the constitutional duty of this Court and the professional responsibilities of all members of the Michigan Bar.