Opinion ID: 846980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the legislature intended a continuing offense in mcl 750.165(1)

Text: Whether a continuing violation exists is a matter of statutory interpretation. As in all such matters, our goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. People v. Tombs, 472 Mich. 446, 451, 697 N.W.2d 494 (2005). Our starting point is the language that it chose. MCL 750.165(1) provides: If the court orders an individual to pay support for the individual's former or current spouse, or for a child of the individual, and the individual does not pay the support in the amount or at the time stated in the order, the individual is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both. [Emphasis added.] Here, the Legislature has created two distinct ways of committing the crime: (1) failing to pay support in the required amount or (2) failing to pay at the time stated in a court order. I believe that the or used in this statute is significant. The Legislature intentionally placed it there to create two separate ways of committing the offense. Wherever possible, every word of a statute should be given meaning, and no word should be treated as surplusage or made nugatory by court interpretation. People v. Warren, 462 Mich. 415, 429 n. 24, 615 N.W.2d 691 (2000). By reading MCL 750.165(1) as not providing for the possibility of a continuing violation, the majority has rendered the Legislature's use of the word or nugatory. The majority interprets the statute as if it reads: the individual does not pay the support in the amount at the time stated in the order[.] But this changes its meaning. The majority has replaced the two ways to commit the offense of felony nonsupport with one. As the majority reads the statute, a person is guilty of the offense whenever that person fails to pay the full amount ordered at the time ordered. It does not matter if the defendant pays a partial amount or nothing at all. All that matters is that the failure to pay occurs at the time for payment stated in the support order. The majority acknowledges that the Legislature intended two separate ways to violate the statute. But its analysis strays from its acknowledgement. Because the Legislature intended two separate ways to commit the offense, or cannot be read out of the statute as the majority has done. The majority's reading effectively replaces or with and. [T]he individual does not pay the support in the amount and at the time stated in the order[.] Again, I cannot agree with departing from the language of the statute as the majority has done. And is conjunctive. Or is disjunctive. They do not mean the same thing. Nothing in the text of the statute indicates that the Legislature intended and but inadvertently used or in its place. The choice appears intentional. The Legislature sought to create two means of committing felony nonsupport, and it did so by use of the disjunctive or. Without good cause to conclude otherwise, we must assume that the Legislature chose the words of the statute purposely and intentionally. Detroit v. Redford Twp., 253 Mich. 453, 456, 235 N.W. 217 (1931). Because nothing in the statute contradicts the conclusion that the choice was intentional, the Court should honor the Legislature's use of or in MCL 750.165(1). The first way to violate the statute is by failing to pay the amount ordered. There is no limitation in the statute on when the failure to pay must occur. Therefore, nothing prevents it from continuing past the date for payment specified in the order. In fact, an individual, such as defendant in this case, fails to pay support in the amount ordered not only each pay period but each day he is in arrears. In this case, defendant continuously failed to pay the amount he owed as his arrearage mounted. Thus, he continued to commit the crime of felony nonsupport. Accordingly, the amount-owed part of MCL 750.165(1) should be read as providing for a continuing offense. The majority points to MCL 750.161 as evidence that the Legislature did not have that intention. In MCL 750.161(6), [3] the Legislature indicates that violation of MCL 750.161(1) is a continuing offense. The majority argues that the failure to include a provision similar to MCL 750.161(6) in the felony-nonsupport statute demonstrates an intent not to create a continuing violation. I disagree. By enacting MCL 750.161(6), the Legislature indicated that each and every offense contained in MCL 750.161(1) is a continuing offense. This is despite the fact that, by their nature, certain of the offenses could be interpreted otherwise. For instance, without the instruction to view it as a continuing offense, desertion [4] normally would be a one-time event. While a person may repeatedly abandon his or her spouse or children, the act is not continuous. The Legislature's inclusion of MCL 750.161(6) changes this noncontinuous event into a continuous event. By contrast, the failure to pay support is by its nature continuous. Applying Toussie and given the nature of felony nonsupport, the Legislature must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, even a single unsatisfied child support payment will grow because the court periodically adds a surcharge to it. For these reasons, the Legislature may not have seen the need to include a section such as MCL 750.161(6) in order to tell us that felony nonsupport is a continuing offense. In any event, the language of the amount owed portion of the statute speaks for itself. I would allow it to do so in this case. Here, defendant did not pay court-ordered support continuing over a period of years and resulting in an accumulated arrearage of over $57,000. The Court of Appeals was right when it found that it was because of defendant's continuing failure to pay support that the lower court correctly bound defendant over for trial. I do not make this finding of a continuing violation lightly. I recognize the extra scrutiny required under Toussie. But I believe that the explicit language of the substantive criminal statute compels this conclusion. Toussie, 397 U.S. at 115, 90 S.Ct. 858. In MCL 750.165(1), the Legislature explicitly and intentionally used the word or. In so doing, it created an amount owed offense that, by its nature, constitutes a continuing offense. By effectuating the intent of the Legislature, my interpretation meets the requirements articulated by the Supreme Court in Toussie.