Opinion ID: 75485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: lucas' ada discrimination claim

Text: The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled; (2) he was a qualified individual at the relevant time, meaning he could perform the essential functions of the job in question with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) he was discriminated against because of his disability. See Reed v. Heil Co., 206 F.3d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir.2000). An employer unlawfully discriminates against a qualified individual with a disability when the employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations for the disability—unless doing so would impose 1 Lucas has abandoned his unlawful harassment claim by not raising it in his initial brief on appeal. See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1317 n. 17 (11th Cir.1999). undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). An accommodation can qualify as reasonable, and thus be required by the ADA, only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. See LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir.1998). The plaintiff bears the burden of identifying an accommodation, and of demonstrating that the accommodation allows him to perform the job's essential functions. See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir.1997); Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 283 (11th Cir.1997). The ADA lists as examples of reasonable accommodations job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, ... and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). As the list indicates, the ADA may require the employer to reassign, i.e., transfer, the disabled employee to a vacant position as a reasonable accommodation. The reassignment duty, however, does not require the employer to bump another employee from a position in order to accommodate a disabled employee. See Willis, 108 F.3d at 284. Nor does it require the employer to promote a disabled employee. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir.2000); Cravens v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 214 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir.2000); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir.1998); Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 832 (3d Cir.1996); see also Terrell v. USAir, 132 F.3d 621, 626 (11th Cir.1998) (citing White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir.1995)); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(o) (It should also be noted that an employer is not required to promote an individual with a disability as an accommodation.). The district court determined that Lucas had not established a triable issue as to whether he was disabled, and granted summary judgment in favor of Grainger on his discrimination claim. We need not decide whether the district court properly resolved that issue if there is another basis for affirming its judgment, because we may affirm its judgment on any ground that finds support in the record. Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280, 281, 77 S.Ct. 307, 308, 1 L.Ed.2d 314 (1957); see Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1286. Assuming, without deciding, that Lucas' back impairment rendered him disabled, the district court's grant of summary judgment is still due to be affirmed, because Lucas has failed to put forth evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Grainger discriminated against him because of his disability. Lucas contends that Grainger discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability. According to Lucas, the ADA required Grainger to accommodate his disability by doing one of the following: (1) reassigning him to a Customer Service Representative position at the Marietta Boulevard facility; (2) giving him one of the three positions for which he interviewed; (3) reassigning him to the Distribution Representative position at the Distribution Center; or (4) restructuring the Bins Sorter position in accordance with Dr. Clare's changes on the Job Description form and offering him that position.2
Lucas contends that Grainger discriminated by not reassigning him to the Customer Service Representative position at the Marietta Boulevard facility. We find no merit to this argument, because even if we assume (as we probably should not) that Lucas was otherwise qualified to perform the duties of that position notwithstanding the prior customer complaints about his lack of interpersonal skills, there were no vacancies in that position, or in any other position involving desk work, at the Marietta Boulevard facility. Indeed, the lack of vacancies there is what prompted Stewart to set up interviews for Lucas at Grainger's other Atlanta facilities. Because there was no vacancy at the Marietta Boulevard facility for Customer Service Representative, reassigning Lucas to that position would have required Grainger to bump another employee from it, and that is not required by the ADA.3 See Willis, 108 F.3d at 284. Even if there had been an opening for Customer Service Representative at the Marietta Boulevard facility, Grainger would not have been required under the ADA to reassign Lucas to that position. Customer Service Representative is a step up from Material Handler and from Will-Call Service Representative; it 2 Lucas contends that Grainger failed to engage him in an interactive process with the aim of identifying an accommodation that might allow him to continue working at Grainger after he became disabled. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2(o)(3). However, where a plaintiff cannot demonstrate 'reasonable accommodation,' the employer's lack of investigation into reasonable accommodation is unimportant. See Willis, 108 F.3d at 285 (citation omitted); accord Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir.1999) (summary judgment is appropriate where the plaintiff fails to identify a reasonable accommodation that the defendant refused to provide). In other words, regardless of whether the ADA required Grainger to engage Lucas in an interactive process, Lucas' discrimination claims fail unless he can show that an accommodation reasonably could have been made. The ADA is not intended to punish employers for behaving callously if, in fact, no accommodation for the employee's disability could reasonably have been made. Willis, 108 F.3d at 285. 3 The record reveals that when Stewart provided Lucas with a temporary office position in June of 1996, which was just before Lucas first requested to be accommodated with a permanent desk job, Stewart displaced two other employees from their office duties and had them perform Lucas' Will-Call job duties. That was more than the ADA required. Good deeds ought not be punished, and an employer who goes beyond the demands of the law to help a disabled employee incurs no legal obligation to continue doing so. See Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626 n. 6 (An employer that bends over backwards to accommodate a disabled worker ... must not be punished for its generosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching an accommodation.) (internal marks and citation omitted). would have been a promotion for Lucas. The ADA does not mandate that employers promote disabled employees in order to accommodate them, see, e.g., Humiston-Keeling, 227 F.3d at 1029, so Grainger's failure to reassign Lucas to that job was not discrimination under the ADA. 2. The Three Positions for Which Lucas Interviewed Lucas next contends that Grainger discriminated against him by not reassigning him to one of the three positions he interviewed for in June and July of 1996. He insists that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was qualified to do those jobs. Be that as it may, as we have already explained, the ADA does not require an employer to promote a disabled employee in order to accommodate him. The individuals who interviewed Lucas for the three jobs, as well as Stewart, all testified that the jobs would have been promotions from the Will-Call Service Representative position, and Lucas offered no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, Grainger did not discriminate against Lucas by failing to reassign him to one of the three positions for which he interviewed.4 3. The Distribution Representative Job Lucas also contends that Grainger discriminated against him by not reassigning him to the Distribution Representative position at the Distribution Center.5 That position became vacant sometime in the summer of 1996, when the person who held it was promoted to Branch Support Specialist, which was one of the jobs Lucas had interviewed for but had not gotten. Gary Powers, who managed the Distribution 4 Grainger's motion for summary judgment characterized the three positions as alternative employment opportunities that were reasonably available.... Lucas maintains that, as a matter of policy, Grainger's characterization of the three positions in its summary judgment motion ought to preclude it from arguing on appeal that placing him in those positions was not required under the ADA. But Grainger's characterization of the positions simply acknowledges that they were reasonably available in the sense that there was a vacancy in each one, and it does not speak to the issue of whether a promotion of Lucas to any of those three positions was an accommodation Grainger was required to provide under the ADA. 5 Lucas also argues that Grainger was required under the ADA to reassign him to several other positions that were available at the Distribution Center, but he does not identify any of them. Instead, he cites in his brief to the deposition testimony of Gary Powers, who managed the Distribution Center. Powers testified that he was sure there were several positions open at the Distribution Center in the summer of 1996, including warehousing, night crew, receiving, picking, [and] packing, and that the majority of those jobs were part-time. This testimony, which consists solely of Powers' speculation regarding the existence of vacant positions at the Distribution Center, falls far short of the evidence needed to establish that a specific reasonable accommodation, in the form of a vacant position, actually existed at the Distribution Center. See Willis, 108 F.3d at 286 ([E]stablishing that a reasonable accommodation exists is a part of an ADA plaintiff's case.). Further, Lucas offered no evidence that he was otherwise qualified for those unidentified jobs; he put forward no evidence that he could have performed the essential functions of whatever jobs there were with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Center, testified in his deposition that the Distribution Representative job involved some office duties ... as well as ... performing some of the duties on the packing station line, including [p]reparing orders for shipment, [and] so forth. According to Powers, the job required physical labor. In order to have survived Grainger's motion for summary judgment on his discrimination claim, Lucas must have put forth evidence sufficient for a jury to find that he was a qualified individual with a disability—i.e., that he was otherwise qualified for the Distribution Representative job. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285; Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d at 1222, 1225 (11th Cir.1997). He was otherwise qualified for that job if he could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.); Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.2000). Our first task is to identify the essential functions of the Distribution Representative job. Essential functions are the fundamental job duties of the employment position the [disabled employee] holds or desires. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Determining whether a particular job duty is an essential function involves a factual inquiry to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. See Davis, 205 F.3d at 1305. We have previously stated that, in conducting this inquiry, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment ... and if an employer has prepared a written description ... for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (listing additional factors to consider in determining whether a particular job function is essential). The evidence establishes without dispute that performing some of the duties on the packing station line, which includes preparing orders for shipment, is one of the essential functions of the Distribution Representative job. Performing those duties requires physical labor.6 Lucas has failed to show he was otherwise qualified for the Distribution Representative position, because he has not satisfied his burden of 6 In his brief, Lucas insists that physical labor is not essential to performing the duties of the Distribution Representative position, but he has failed to provide any evidence in support of that argument, and Granger has put in evidence to the contrary. See Martinson v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 104 F.3d 683, 687 (4th Cir.1997) (adopting employer's judgment of essential function where plaintiff did not offer any evidence at the summary judgment stage to contradict that judgment); Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir.1995) (same). putting forth evidence that he could, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the essential function of engaging in the physical labor necessary to prepare orders for shipment on the packing line. Not only that, but there is a bushel basket of evidence to the contrary: (1) in June of 1996 Lucas requested to be accommodated with a permanent desk job because he felt he was unable to perform physical labor in Grainger's warehouse due to his back injury; (2) Lucas testified in his deposition that he applied for the three jobs that Stewart had set up interviews for in June and July of 1996 because those jobs didn't require physical labor; (3) in July of 1996 Lucas informed Stewart that he would never work in Grainger's warehouse again—even if he became physically able to do so—because he did not want to risk further injury to his back; and (4) in September of 1997, Dr. Clare, Lucas' physician, modified the Job Description form for the Bins Sorter position to eliminate the duties of squatting, kneeling, lifting, and carrying because he felt that Lucas could not perform those duties with his back impairment. Viewing all of this evidence in the light most favorable to Lucas, we conclude that he has not created a triable issue about whether he was otherwise qualified for the Distribution Representative position.7 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); Duckett, 120 F.3d at 1225; Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 619 (5th Cir.1999) (The law in this area is crystal clear: an otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of the [job's] requirements in spite of his handicap.) (internal marks and citation omitted). 4. The Bins Sorter Position Finally, Lucas contends that Grainger should have restructured the Bins Sorter position and offered it to him. He correctly points out that job restructuring is an accommodation the ADA may require the employer to make in some cases, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); but job restructuring is required only where it is reasonable, see Terrell, 132 F.3d at 626. Lucas says that if Grainger had restructured the Bins Sorter position in accordance with the changes Dr. Clare entered on the Job Description form, and had offered him that job, he would have accepted it. An accommodation is reasonable and necessary under the ADA only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. See LaChance, 146 F.3d at 835; Willis, 108 F.3d at 284. The 7 Powers did testify that he believed there was a possibility Lucas was minimally qualified for the Distribution Representative job. Putting aside questions about the insubstantiality of a mere possibility, the context in which this statement was made shows that Powers was talking about whether Lucas had developed the requisite job skills and experience to perform the Distribution Representative job, not whether he could physically withstand the demands of the job and thereby perform all of its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. essential functions of the Bins Sorter position are described on the Job Description form that Grainger sent to Dr. Clare. The form states that the position's Essential Job Functions include sorting items from a cart and placing them on racks. According to the form, those functions required occasionally—meaning from 1 to 3 hours per shift—lifting or carrying items that weigh up to 40 to 50 pounds, as well as squatting or kneeling, and frequently—meaning from 4 to 6 hours per shift—lifting or carrying items that weigh up to 10 to 25 pounds. In Dr. Clare's opinion, Lucas' back impairment precluded him from doing any of those things, which is why Dr. Clare struck squatting, kneeling, lifting, and carrying from the list of job functions or activities on the form. But those were essential functions of the Bins Sorter position. While it is true that the ADA may require an employer to restructure a particular job by altering or eliminating some of its marginal functions, employers are not required to transform the position into another one by eliminating functions that are essential to the nature of the job as it exists. See Earl, 207 F.3d at 1367; Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir.1997); Wells v. Shalala, 228 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir.2000); Donahue v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir.2000); Lloyd v. Hardin County, 207 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir.2000); Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 161 F.3d 292, 295-96 (5th Cir.1998); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 642 (2d Cir.1991). The difference between the accommodation that is required and the transformation that is not is the difference between saddling a camel and removing its hump. Restructuring the Bins Sorter position by eliminating squatting, bending, lifting, or carrying bin items would have changed the nature of the beast, and that is not something the ADA requires.8