Opinion ID: 2066505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Two weeks prior to trial, court-appointed defense counsel filed a motion for the appointment of additional counsel stating: 3. That prior to said trial, or during the trial of these charges, a conflict of interest may arise by virtue of said attorney representing both of these Defendants. 4. That said attorney believes another attorney should be immediately appointed to represent one of the Co-Defendants in order that should these Defendants develop a conflicting position, the trial of this case will not be postponed. 5. That said attorney also believes that he could not (if he found it necessary or was requested to do so) actively engage in plea-bargaining on behalf of one Defendant, when such plea-bargaining may be detrimental to the other Defendant. After hearing arguments on the matters set forth in the motion and examining the records in the cause, the trial judge stated that he could find no adequate reason for the appointment of additional counsel and the motion was denied. These proceedings apparently were not recorded, as there is no transcript thereof in the record. The defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion, relying on Holloway v. Arkansas, (1978) U.S., 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426, as authority for their position. In Holloway the trial court appointed a public defender, Harold Hall, to represent three defendants charged with robbery and rape. Hall filed a pre-trial motion for the appointment of separate counsel for each defendant stating that there was a possibility that a conflict of interest might arise. After a hearing held on the motion, the transcript of which was not included in the record, it was denied. Three weeks later, before the jury was empaneled, Hall renewed the motion on the grounds that one or two of the defendants may testify and if they do, then I will not be able to cross-examine them because I have received confidential information from them. Once again, the motion was denied. Thereafter, throughout the trial, Hall made repeated attempts to bring the situation to the court's attention, such as in the following instance: When Welch (a co-defendant) denied, from the stand, that he was at the restaurant the night of the robbery, Holloway (a co-defendant) interrupted, asking: `Your Honor, are we allowed to make an objection? `THE COURT: No, sir. Your counsel will take care of any objections. `MR. HALL: Your Honor, that is what I am trying to say. I can't cross-examine them. `THE COURT: You proceed like I tell you to Mr. Hall. You have no right to cross-examine your own witnesses anyhow.' 98 S.Ct. at 1177. On appeal from the Arkansas Supreme Court's affirmance of the defendants' convictions, the United States Supreme Court held that the trial court's failure, either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of conflict was too remote to warrant separate counsel, was reversible error where trial counsel had made repeated motions and objections. In discussing what constitutes an adequate inquiry into the remoteness of the risk of conflict, Defendants draw our attention to the Supreme Court's determination in Holloway that the trial judge had not taken adequate steps, despite his having held a hearing upon the motion prior to its denial, as was done in the instant case. While this is true, it must also be pointed out that the adequacy of the inquiry must be judged in the light of the individual situation and the likelihood that a conflict will arise. As the Court stated at 98 S.Ct. 1180: When an untimely motion for separate counsel is made for dilatory purposes, our holding does not impair the trial court's ability to deal with counsel who resort to such tactics    Nor does our holding preclude a trial court from exploring the adequacy of the basis of defense counsel's representations regarding a conflict of interests without improperly requiring disclosure of the confidential communications of the client    In this case the trial court simply failed to take adequate steps in response to the repeated motions. In the case at bar, the defendants made one motion prior to trial, which was denied after hearing. They have failed to provide us with a transcript of the hearing, and nowhere in their brief do they make reference to the actual existence of a conflict warranting the appointment of separate counsel. Unlike Holloway, where counsel's inability to cross-examine the defendants who testified in their own behalf was readily apparent from a reading of the record, as well as from counsel's repeated representations to the court, no such conflict is apparent here. Although Holloway does hold that once the reviewing Court has found that the trial court has improperly required joint representation over timely objection, reversal is automatic without a showing that the defendant has been prejudiced by the alleged conflict of interests, it must first be shown that the trial court's actions were improper. This, the defendants have failed to do.