Opinion ID: 4345323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicability of the sentencing enhancement

Text: In sentencing appeals, we generally review a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Davis, 372 F. App’x 628, 629 (6th Cir. 2010)). Whether the facts found by the district court satisfy a sentencing enhancement’s requirements is a mixed question of law and fact, which we also review de novo. United States v. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235, 237 (6th Cir. 2001). B. Enhancement for Use of a Computer under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii) The district court correctly applied the two-level enhancement for use of a computer under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii). Based on the record, Turner’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. As an initial matter, we assume, because Turner does not dispute these points, that Turner’s cell phone is a “computer” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1),1 and similarly that Facebook is 1 The Sentencing Guidelines incorporate the definition of “computer” from 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.1. That statute, in turn, defines “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions . . . 5 No. 17-4061, United States v. David Turner an “interactive computer service” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).2 See Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, Turner’s argument centers on (1) the fact that “Turner’s text message of the video to another adult was not a communication to another minor or to a person who exercised custody, care or supervisory control over the minor,” Appellant Br. at 9; and (2) the lack of evidence of his purpose to produce sexually explicit material, id. at 10–11; see also id. at 10 (“The mere fact that a computer was used to entice a minor victim and a computer was later used to videotape a sexual encounter . . . does not automatically support the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii). The plain language of this Guidelines provision requires the Court to find that the solicitation of the minor was ‘for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material.’”). The enhancement here requires “the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to communicate directly with a minor.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.4 (now note 6 in the current Guidelines, but the language is unchanged from the 2015 version in effect when Turner was first sentenced). This provision does not require that the sexually explicit material itself be directly sent to the minor, as Turner suggests. It is undisputed that Turner communicated directly with N.M. over the internet to “solicit [her] participation . . . in sexually explicit conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii); see also R. 43 (First Sent’g Tr. at 11–12) (Page ID #376–77). This leads to but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device[.]” 2 The Guidelines incorporate the definition of “interactive computer service” from 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1 cmt. n.1, which defines the term as, “any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 6 No. 17-4061, United States v. David Turner the real issue, as well as Turner’s second argument—whether Turner’s communication directly with the minor was “for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material or for the purpose of transmitting such material live.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6). A preponderance of the evidence suggests that Turner had such a purpose. First, the presentence investigation report for both sentencings stated: [I]nvestigation revealed that the victim had sent nude images of herself to the defendant and the defendant had also sent her nude images of himself. According to the victim, the defendant told her that he sent her nude images to another female with whom they were planning to have a threesome. The victim’s mother informed law enforcement personnel that the victim confided in her that the defendant took a video with his phone of himself and the minor engaged in sexual activity. R. 21 (PSR at ¶ 18) (Page ID #207); R. 52 (Revised PSR at ¶ 24) (Page ID #430). Turner did not object to this particular paragraph in the PSR. True, Turner’s ultimate plan was to engage in sexual activity with N.M. and to have a threesome sexual relationship with N.M. and Erian. But the totality of Turner’s conduct also points to a purpose of producing sexually explicit material. In particular: Turner and N.M. exchanged nude pictures of themselves; Turner then sent N.M.’s pictures to Erian; Turner texted Erian on June 27, 2015, “I will let you talk to her as soon as I get to Ohio and get her”; and then again on June 28, “Are you gonna like watching me [have sex with N.M.]?” R. 52 (Revised PSR at ¶ 25) (Page ID #430–31). Notably, Turner’s phone also contained sexually explicit images of Erian, which Turner appears to have solicited from Erian. Id. at 8–9 (Page ID #431–32). On July 9, 2015, Turner and N.M. met and Turner videotaped the two engaging in sexual activity. Id. at ¶¶ 35–36 (Page ID #432). The same night, Turner sent the video to Erian, along with the following text message: “Hey baby I sent you a video . . . . We thought you might [like it]. Did it make you horny?” Id. These facts show that, prior to making the video, 7 No. 17-4061, United States v. David Turner Turner had already exchanged sexually explicit material with Erian and that Turner planned to contact Erian again once he and N.M. met in Ohio. Turner’s conduct leading up to July 9, as well as his message to Erian after sending the video, could lead a court to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that Turner communicated with N.M. for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material. The district court, therefore, properly added the two-level enhancement under this provision. Though precedent addressing, in detail, the specific “purpose prong” of this sentencing enhancement is sparse, our analysis of the provision in this case is consistent with our sister Circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Zagorski, 807 F.3d 291, 293–94 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (concluding that the district court properly applied § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) when a defendant sent sexually explicit material of a minor to another person and also solicited that person to engage in sexual activity with a minor); United States v. Roman-Portalatin, 476 F. App’x 868, 869–70 (1st Cir. 2012) (Souter, J.) (concluding that, as an alternate enhancement, § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B) could have been applied when the defendant used a computer to induce a minor to have sex with him and to send the defendant explicit photos of herself).3 Likewise, here, Turner used a computer to induce N.M. both to have sex with him and to send Turner sexually explicit material of herself; Turner then sent 3 For an example of how this court analyzed a prior, differently worded, version of this enhancement for use of a computer, see United States v. Brown, 237 F.3d 625, 628–29 (6th Cir. 2001) (“In using the computer to desensitize his victims to deviant sexual activity, [the defendant] was using it to solicit participation in that activity.”). As we explained in Brown, Congress had a particular concern in mind when it directed the Sentencing Commission to add the enhancement for use of a computer: “that pedophiles may use a child’s fascination with computer technology as a lure to drag children into sexual relationships.” Id. at 629 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 104-90, at 4 (1995)). The prior version of this enhancement read, “If a computer was used to solicit participation by or with a minor in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) (1998). In this case, Turner’s conduct falls well within the current § 2G2.1(b)(6) provision and the concerns originally contemplated by Congress. 8 No. 17-4061, United States v. David Turner those pictures to Erian and solicited Erian to engage in sexual activity with him and N.M. R. 52 (Revised PSR at 7–9, 12) (Page ID #430–32, 435). Although the district court could have been clearer in its specific application of § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)’s requirements, we conclude that Turner’s conduct meets the requirements here. Next, we turn to Turner’s second challenge, that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.