Opinion ID: 195094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Particularity of the Indictment.

Text: Two appellants challenge the particularity of the indictment as it applies to them. While we comment separately on each challenge, we first lay out the black-letter rule: in general, an indictment is sufficiently particular if it elucidates the elements of the crime, enlightens a defendant as to the nature of the charge against which she must defend, and enables her to plead double jeopardy in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (collecting cases); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). 1. Arline Welch. Defendant Arline Welch argues that,
as it applies to her, the indictment transgresses the Hamling guidelines. The gravamen of her complaint is that the indictment neither contains the elements of the crime charged nor limns the date, time, and place of her ostensible criminal activity. We think her reading of the charging papers is colored by selfinterest. The grand jury indicted Welch for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 846. To 57 convict her, therefore, the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a drug-trafficking conspiracy existed about which Welch knew and in which she voluntarily participated. See David, 940 F.2d at 735 (explaining elements of conspiracy under 846); Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d at 852 (similar). The indictment specifies the law which Welch is alleged to have violated and elaborates that she, with others, knowingly and intentionally agreed to act in contravention of that law. The indictment also provides a temporal framework, asserts that Welch's residence was used as a packaging center for the drug distribution ring, and states that she worked as a runner and a street-level dealer. We think this information sufficiently spelled out the crime, apprised Welch of the charge against which she had to defend, and protected her from the boggart of double jeopardy. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117; Paiva, 892 F.2d at 154. In the last analysis, indictments need not be infinitely specific. 2. Kevin Cullinane. Defendant Kevin Cullinane also
challenges the indictment's particularity. Notwithstanding the pervasive proof of his complicitous conduct adduced at trial, see supra Part II(B), Cullinane points out that the indictment itself only mentions him twice, asserting that he purchased cocaine from David Sepulveda and that, on one specific occasion, he distributed cocaine to another coconspirator. But the frequency with which a person is (or is not) mentioned in an indictment is an insufficient indicium of the indictment's particularity. Here, the charging papers contained considerable contextual 58 detail. Given the indictment's general description of the conspiracy and identification of the alleged coconspirators, we find that it put Cullinane on fair notice and contained information sufficient to allow him to prepare his defense. See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117. The drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. 846, does not require the government to plead or prove any particular overt acts in furtherance of a charged conspiracy. See United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1019-20 (1st Cir. 1992); Paiva, 892 F.2d at 155.