Opinion ID: 1871526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Specific Intent

Text: In the guilt phase, the only contested issue was whether defendant deliberately fired the gun at the storeowner during the robbery (in which case he is guilty of first-degree murder) or whether defendant fired the gun accidentally during the robbery (in which case he is guilty of second degree murder). [4] The evidence of the path of the bullet indicated that defendant fired the gun directly at the victim's head, contradicting defendant's statement in his confession that the gun fired as it was pointing upward when he pulled it from his waistband. [5] The evidence of the force necessary to pull the trigger also suggested a deliberate act. On the other hand, defendant left the store without taking the money in the cash register, the victim's wallet, or the liquor on the counter, suggesting that defendant may have fled in panic after the gun fired accidentally. This suggestion, of course, may be explained away in part by the fact that the register was difficult to open. Nevertheless, there was evidence which the jury could have accepted to support either theory. [6] Thus, the instruction on specific intent was particularly significant. In instructing the jury on this essential element of the crime, the judge stated: Specific intent is, you have heard a lot about that, specific intent. The law with reference to the specific intent to kill or the specific intent to inflict great bodily harm is as follows: First of all the time element. The law knows no specific time within which an intent to kill or an intent to inflict great bodily harm must be formed, so as to make a homicide murder. If the will of the person accompanies the act, a moment antecedent to the act which causes the death, it will be as completely sufficient to make the offense murder, as if it were a day or any other time. It is sufficient if there was a design or a determination to kill or a design or determination to inflict great bodily harm formed in the mind of the slayer at any moment before or at the time of the fatal blow. If an assault is made upon a person not with the intent of killing him, but with the specific intent of inflicting great bodily harm upon him and death is caused by such assault, it is murder. The law holds that a sane person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own deliberate acts. Consequently it is murder if the sane person intentionally assaults another in such a manner as would likely cause death or likely cause serious bodily harm. In such case it is necessary that the assault be of such a nature as would likely cause death or likely cause serious bodily harm, and the death that resulted must have been the natural an (sic) probable consequences of the intentional act or intentional acts. A specific intent to kill may be implied where there are no external signs of the intent beyond the mere fact of the homicide itself. If there were no just grounds for the killing, when the killing was without provocation or upon so slight a provocation as not to justify the killing. A specific intent to commit a crime, to do bodily harm would also be implied in any deliberate cruel act, consciencely (sic) committed by one person against another. If for instance a man armed with a deadly weapon should suddenly, with little or no apparent cause or provocation, kill another, the law would presume that such a killing was deliberate and intentional, and done for the purpose of killing or inflicting great bodily harm. A specific intent to inflict great bodily harm may sometimes manifest itself by external circumstances capable of proof. For instance where it is established that a person lay in wait for his victim, where the accused had made previous threats against the deceased, where there existed beyond the parties former grudges, and when a party arms himself beforehand, et cetera, or any other facts susceptible of proof, which shows a prepreconcerted (sic) scheme to carry out the unlawful. (emphasis supplied) Defense counsel did not object to the instruction. [7] On appeal, defense counsel argues that the instruction created a presumption of specific intent in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). In Sandstrom, the defendant, charged with the crime of deliberate homicide, admitted in his confession that he killed the victim. At trial, two mental health experts described defendant's mental state at the time of the incident, and defense counsel argued to the jury that defendant, because of his personality disorder aggravated by alcohol consumption, did not purposely or knowingly cause the death, as required by the statutory definition of the crime. The trial judge instructed the jury that [t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the instruction violated the constitutional prohibition against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of the crime. The majority reasoned that since the jurors were not told that they had the choice to decide whether defendant acted purposely or that they might infer such a conclusion, a reasonable juror could easily view that instruction as a mandatory direction to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption. A conclusive presumption unconstitutionally relieves the state of its burden of persuasion because the presumed element is removed from the case upon proof of the predicate facts. [8] See Francis v. Franklin, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). Alternatively, the Court reasoned that the jurors could have interpreted the instruction as directing the finding of intent upon proof of a voluntary action and its ordinary consequences unless the defendant proved the contrary, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant. A mandatory rebuttable presumption, which relieves the state of its affirmative burden of persuasion, is less onerous to the defendant than a conclusive presumption, but is no less unconstitutional. See Francis v. Franklin , above. The Court accordingly reversed the judgment of the state court that had affirmed the conviction, but noted that the state court was free on remand to consider issues such as harmless error. The Court's leaving open the harmless error issue is particularly significant in the present case. Intent is a fact which usually must be proved by showing circumstances from which the requisite intent may be inferred. Generally, the jury makes the determination of intent by drawing inferences from the proved circumstances. It is logical for the jury to draw the inference that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts. The jury must be free, however, to draw such an inference or not, as the jury sees fit according to the circumstances. The constitutional problem arises when the jury is instructed that it must find the factual element of intent when the evidence simply establishes the performance or omission of an act. In the present case, the judge told the jury that the law presumes that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his own deliberate acts. [9] While the instruction contained a conclusive presumption of intent prohibited by Sandstrom, the presumption did not come into play unless the jury had already found that the act of the defendant in firing the gun was deliberate. The instruction simply told the jurors to presume that defendant intended the consequences of his act if the evidence established that the act was deliberate. Inasmuch as the deliberateness of the act was the only disputed issue before the jury in the guilt phase, defendant was not prejudiced by an instruction concerning the presumption of intended consequences (killing or causing of great bodily harm) once the jury found that the act was deliberate. There was no question in this case that the consequences were intended if the act was deliberate. [10] Moreover, the judge told the jury, immediately after the improper instruction, that [c]onsequently it is murder if a sane person intentionally assaults another in such a manner as would likely cause death or likely cause great bodily harm. (Emphasis supplied) We conclude that the instruction did not lessen the state's burden of proving that defendant fired the gun intentionally. The trial judge's error in giving the instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gibson, 391 So.2d 421 (La. 1980).