Opinion ID: 3004537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Statute Authorized the Disclosure

Text: Having determined that there was a disclosure, we now turn to whether the police department’s disclosure of Mr. Senne’s motor vehicle record violated the statute. This task also is basically one of statutory construction. We focus on the language of the statute, turning to § 2721(b), which contains the universe of required and permissible disclosures: (b) Permissible uses.--Personal information referred to in subsection (a) shall be disclosed for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emis- sions, motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories, performance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manu- facturers to carry out the purposes of titles I and IV of the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, the Automo- bile Information Disclosure Act (15 U.S.C. 1231 et seq.), the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), No. 10-3243 13 and chapters 301, 305, and 321-331 of title 49, and, subject to subsection (a)(2), may be disclosed as follows:
including any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions, or any private person or entity acting on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in carry- ing out its functions.
motor vehicle or driver safety and theft; motor vehicle emissions; motor vehicle product alterations, recalls, or advisories; performance monitoring of motor vehicles, motor vehicle parts and dealers; motor vehicle market research activities, includ- ing survey research; and removal of non-owner records from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufacturers.
by a legitimate business or its agents, em- ployees, or contractors, but only-- (A) to verify the accuracy of per- sonal information submitted by the individual to the business or its agents, employees, or contractors; and (B) if such information as so sub- mitted is not correct or is no longer correct, to obtain the correct infor- 14 No. 10-3243 mation, but only for the purposes of preventing fraud by, pursuing legal remedies against, or recover- ing on a debt or security interest against, the individual.
criminal, administrative, or arbitral pro- ceeding in any Federal, State, or local court or agency or before any self-regulatory body, including the service of process, investigation in anticipation of litigation, and the execution or enforcement of judg- ments and orders, or pursuant to an order of a Federal, State, or local court.
use in producing statistical reports, so long as the personal information is not pub- lished, redisclosed, or used to contact individuals.
support organization, or by a self-insured entity, or its agents, employees, or contrac- tors, in connection with claims investiga- tion activities, antifraud activities, rating or underwriting.
ers of towed or impounded vehicles.
gative agency or licensed security service for any purpose permitted under this subsection. No. 10-3243 15
insurer to obtain or verify information relating to a holder of a commercial driver’s license that is required under chapter 313 of title 49. (10) For use in connection with the opera- tion of private toll transportation facilities. (11) For any other use in response to re- quests for individual motor vehicle records if the State has obtained the express con- sent of the person to whom such personal information pertains. (12) For bulk distribution for surveys, marketing or solicitations if the State has obtained the express consent of the person to whom such personal information per- tains. (13) For use by any requester, if the re- quester demonstrates it has obtained the written consent of the individual to whom the information pertains. (14) For any other use specifically autho- rized under the law of the State that holds the record, if such use is related to the operation of a motor vehicle or public safety. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). Against the backdrop of the general rule prohibiting disclosures in subsection (a), subsection (b) provides 16 No. 10-3243 both a category of mandatory disclosures and several categories of permissive disclosures. See Graczyk v. West Publ’g Co., 660 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 2011) (identifying the statute’s “countervailing purpose” as “allow[ing] legitimate users to access the records”). The permissive disclosures number fourteen in total and cover a range of purposes and recipients including public entities, insurers, licensed private investigators and certain commercial users such as bulk marketers. On appeal, the Village contends that the placement of the citation on Mr. Senne’s windshield was permitted under the statute either because the disclosure was “[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement agency[] in carrying out its functions,” id. § 2721(b)(1), or “[f]or use in connection with any civil[] . . . [or] administrative[] . . . proceeding . . ., including the service of process,” id. § 2721(b)(4). 1 1 The Village does not describe in any length how all the information printed on the ticket served either purpose; instead, it maintains, in effect, that the statute does not require that analysis. In the Village’s view, as long as it can identify a subsection of the law under which some disclosure is permitted, any disclosure of information otherwise protected by the statute is exempt, whether it serves an identified purpose or not. We cannot accept the Village’s position. As we already have explained, it is necessary to view each provision in context, with an eye toward its contribution to the 11 On appeal, the Village no longer asserts that any disclosure was permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(2). No. 10-3243 17 “overall statutory scheme.” See Smith, 255 F.3d at 448 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the statute’s purpose, clear from its language alone, is to prevent all but a limited range of authorized disclosures of information contained in individual motor vehicle records. It is necessary that we respect this textually explicit purpose as we evaluate the coverage of the exceptions within the statute’s broad mandate. Both of the exceptions that the Village identifies, along with most of the other exceptions in the statute, begin with the phrase “[f]or use.” In the Village’s view, these words supply no meaning to the statutory text other than to link grammatically the “may be disclosed” language in the introductory paragraph of § 2721(b) to the specific purposes and recipients identified in its subsections. We believe that this explanation is unsatisfactory. A basic canon of construction requires us to give meaning to every word of a statute. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001). Moreover, and especially in light of the particular statutory structure here that sets forth such a broad prohibition against disclosure, the exceptions should not be read to eviscerate the rule they modify. The words “[f]or use” perform a critical function in the statute and contain the necessary limiting principle that preserves the force of the general prohibition while permitting the disclosures compatible with that prohibition. Specifically, when the statutory language says that a disclosure is authorized “[f]or use by a[] . . . law enforcement agency[] in carrying out its functions,” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1) (emphasis added), that language means 18 No. 10-3243 that the actual information disclosed—i.e., the disclosure as it existed in fact—must be information that is used for the identified purpose. When a particular piece of disclosed information is not used to effectuate that purpose in any way, the exception provides no protection for the disclosing party. In short, an authorized recipient, faced with a general prohibition against further disclosure, can disclose the information only in a manner that does not exceed the scope of the authorized statutory exception. The disclosure actually made under the exception must be compatible with the purpose of the exception. Otherwise, the statute’s purpose of safeguarding information for security and safety reasons, contained in the general prohibition against disclosure, is frustrated. Another part of the statutory language supports our conclusion. As we have noted, the statute provides even greater protection to a special class of data referred to as “highly restricted personal information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a)(2). Such information includes an individual’s social security number, photograph and medical or disability information. Id. § 2725(4). For this class of information, the statute allows for access under only four of the listed fourteen exceptions, including both the government function exception and the court process exception at issue in this case. Id. § 2721(a)(2) (listing as permissible uses those described in § 2721(b)(1) and (4)). Clearly, this section recognizes the government’s legitimate need for broader access to personal information than the statute otherwise provides. Nevertheless, it does not provide unlimited authority for law enforcement to access or No. 10-3243 19 disseminate the information. Instead, the statute merely allows that certain entities, including law enforcement, may both need and use more kinds of information than other authorized users, within the limitations of the existing exceptions. The fact that the statute maintains for highly restricted personal information the existing exceptions for use and dissemination provides further support for the view that the exceptions must be read narrowly. If, instead, we were to read the exceptions as broadly as the Village asserts, the effect of the “highly restricted personal information” section would be that the officer could have printed Mr. Senne’s photograph and social security number on the citation and left it open to public view. We decline to read this statute, with a chief aim of privacy protection, to allow such a dangerous result. See City of Chicago v. United States Dep’t of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 423 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that we will not read a statute to thwart Congress’s manifest intent). We conclude that the text of the statute limits the content of authorized disclosures of protected information in motor vehicle records through its requirement, clear on its face, that any such disclosure be made “[f]or use” in effecting a particular purpose exempted by the Act.12 12 We pause to emphasize that we do not read “use” to mean “necessary use,” nor do we require the Village to adopt some form of “best practices” not commanded by the statute. 20 No. 10-3243
Although an analysis of the statutory text provides us with a clear answer to our inquiry, we note that the limited legislative history provides significant support for our conclusion. Specifically, it is clear that safety and security concerns associated with excessive disclosures of personal information held by the State in motor vehicle records were the primary issue to be remedied by the legislation. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. H2526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Porter Goss) (“The intent of this legislation is simple--to protect the personal privacy and safety of all American licensed drivers.”). In hearings held in the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, numerous witnesses testified regarding the grave consequences of open access to government records of personal information. Not surprisingly, many witnesses mentioned the murder of an actress, Rebecca Schaeffer, by a stalker who had obtained her unlisted home address through the California DMV, a crime that was viewed as a catalyst for both state law privacy protections and the DPPA itself.13 Other witnesses testified about the impact of the availability of DMV records on the safety of domestic 13 See, e.g., The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (“Hearing on H.R. 3365”), 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 1994 WL 212698 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. James P. Moran); Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212813 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Janlori Goldman, Director, Privacy and Technology Project, American Civil Liberties Union). No. 10-3243 21 violence victims 14 and law enforcement officers and their families15 targeted for retribution. Also mentioned, however, were more random acts of violence, including a crime spree of home invasion robberies in Iowa that began when teenagers took down license numbers of expensive vehicles and then obtained the registered owners’ home addresses from DMV records. 1 6 The bill, it seems, was viewed predominantly as a public safety measure. Not surprisingly, the Act’s expanded authority for law enforcement was an important part of the same narrative. Providing law enforcement with records as a tool in carrying out their mission was viewed as an appropriate piece of the crime-control strategy the bill 14 Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212822 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of David Beatty, Director of Public Affairs, National Victim Center). 15 Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212833 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Donald L. Cahill, Legislative Chairman, Fraternal Order of Police). 16 Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212698 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. James P. Moran); see also, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 3365, 1994 WL 212701 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement of David F. Snyder, Assistant General Counsel, American Insurance Association) (“We support this legislation because it may, at least to some extent, prevent violent crime.”); 139 Cong. Rec. S15,762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (citing similar incidents). 22 No. 10-3243 would create. 17 Speaking on the Senate floor in support of the bill, Senator Harkin noted that the bill allowed not only access to information by law enforcement but, “[i]n appropriate circumstances,” disclosure “to a citizen or group of citizens [that] will assist in carrying out the function of the agency,” such as a neighborhood watch organization. 139 Cong. Rec. S15,962 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993) (statement of Sen. Harkin). However, he qualified that the exception for law enforcement use “is not a gaping loophole in this law.” Id. The exception “provides law enforcement agencies with latitude in receiving and disseminating this personal information,” when it is done “for the purpose of deterring or preventing crime or other legitimate law enforcement functions.” Id. (emphasis added); see also 139 Cong. Rec. S15,764 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. John Warner) (“There are specific exceptions of course for law enforcement individuals and other areas where proven ex- perience shows that this information should flow. But in 17 Looking at all of the available history, there is no question that the exception for law enforcement access to records was viewed as a critical element in the bill’s attempt to “balance . . . the legitimate governmental and business needs for this information[] and the fundamental right of our people to privacy and safety.” 139 Cong. Rec. S15,763 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer). The existence of an exception related to law enforcement functions was mentioned by numerous supporters of the bill. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. H2522 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. James Moran). No. 10-3243 23 those instances we have to presume it is somewhat protected.” (emphasis added)). The legislative history confirms what a careful and thorough reading of the statute already has revealed: Congress did not intend that the statutory exceptions be divorced, logically or practically, from the purpose of the statute. With respect to the law enforce- ment-related exceptions in particular, there is support in the legislative history for the view that the exceptions not only were compatible with the overall purpose, but indeed supported it. Consistent with the textual interpretation that we already have made, the legislative history reflects the view that law enforcement has a legitimate need for information contained in state records and the authority to use that information to effectuate the purposes identified in the Act without fear of liability.