Opinion ID: 2253500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DEJ is the Equivalent of Probation

Text: In several reported cases the trial court found a defendant was eligible for Proposition 36 probation after violating the terms of his deferred entry of judgment program. (See, e.g., People v. Hinkel (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 845, 848, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 895; People v. O'Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1065, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 665.) In none of these cases, however, did the trial court, or appellate court for that matter, discuss the specific question whether a refusal to comply with drug treatment terms under a grant of DEJ resulted in the defendant's becoming ineligible for drug treatment under a Proposition 36 grant of probation. A case cannot be considered authority for a proposition it does not consider. ( People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 903, 46 P.3d 372.) It appears the issue is one of first impression. In order to answer the question whether DEJ is the equivalent of probation, we must first look to the language of the statute. ( People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266, 1276-1277, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 P.3d 1168.) If it is clear what is meant we need look no further. If the Legislature has provided an express definition of a term, that definition ordinarily is binding on the courts. ( Curle v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, 103 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 16 P.3d 166.) Although Penal Code sections 1210 and 1210.1 do not define what is meant by probation when that word is used in the phrase drug treatment as a condition of probation ( id., §§ 1210, subd. (c), 1210.1, subd. (a)), Penal Code section 1203 does define the term. As used in this code, `probation' means the suspension of the imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the community under the supervision of a probation officer. (Pen.Code, § 1203, subd. (a).) When appellant was granted DEJ no sentence was imposed and he was ordered to report to the probation department immediately and thereafter report as directed. Thus, appellant was released into the community under the supervision of a probation officer under specified conditions, including that he enter into drug treatment and test when requested. This type of program would appear to fall within the definition of probation. Several courts have commented' upon the similarities between DEJ and probation, including probation under Proposition 36. The deferred entry of judgment statutes ( [Penal Code,] § 1000 et seq.) are in some ways analogous to Proposition 36. [Citation.] Pursuant to [Penal Code] section 1000, a defendant who has been charged with specified drug offenses and has not committed a crime of violence or threatened violence may undergo a drug education and treatment program in lieu of undergoing a criminal prosecution, and upon satisfactory completion may obtain dismissal of the criminal charges. [Citation.] ( People v. Canty, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1285, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 90 P.3d 1168.) [D]iversion may also be viewed as a specialized form of probation, available to a different class of defendants but sharing many similarities with general probation and commitment for addiction. ( People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho ) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 66, 113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405.) Moreover, the precise language of Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (b)(4), the refusal exception, does not appear to limit ineligibility only to those who specifically refuse Proposition 36 drug treatment probation. As stated, Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (a) requires that a defendant who commits specified crimes must be placed on probation and participate in a drug treatment program. The refusal exception applies when the defendant refuses drug treatment as a condition of probation. (Pen.Code, § 1210.1, subd. (b)(4).) The language of this exception does not state refuses drug treatment as a condition of probation under subdivision (a). In contrast, several other subdivisions do specifically refer to probation under subdivision (a). (See, e.g., Pen.Code, § 1210.1 subds. (e) & (e)(2), (3)(A).) And several other subdivisions, pointedly do not refer to probation under subdivision (a) and are clearly meant not to do so by referring simply to probation. (See, e.g., Pen.Code, § 1210.1 subd. (e)(3)(D).) Thus, if the intent was to preclude eligibility for only those defendants who refused drug treatment probation under Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (a), i.e., Proposition 36, it could and would have been so stated. We find, therefore, that by refusing drug treatment as a condition of his DEJ, appellant refused drug treatment as a condition of probation and thereby became ineligible for Proposition 36 drug treatment probation. The court did not have discretion to admit him to Proposition 36. ( In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1139, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 619, 70 P.3d 1037 [there is no provision in section 1210.1 for the exercise of judicial discretion to admit an otherwise ineligible defendant to Proposition 36's mandatory drug treatment program.].)