Opinion ID: 4556721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: A defendant bears a “heavy burden” when he attacks a criminal conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence. United States v. Tanner, 942 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2019). This is because in this procedural posture our “standard of review is exceedingly deferential.” United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2018). In evaluating a sufficiency challenge, we are required to “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have been drawn in the government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.” United States v. Babilonia, 854 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2017). We must sustain a jury’s verdict, moreover, unless the “evidence that the defendant committed the crime is nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury 13 could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 130 (2d Cir. 2019). Thus, “[t]he ultimate question is not whether we believe the evidence adduced at trial established [the] defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any rational trier of fact could so find.” United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 250 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).
We begin by considering whether the evidence supports the government’s theory that Anastasio aided and abetted the murders of Young and MacDonald. To resolve this question, we must consider the scope of accomplice liability under both New York and federal law. This is because the Murder Enhancements of the RICO Conspiracy Count charged Anastasio as an aider and abettor under New York Penal Law § 20.00, whereas the VCAR Murder Counts charged Anastasio as an aider and abettor under both New York Penal Law § 20.00 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 8 As we discuss below, moreover, these two aiding-and-abetting provisions are not coextensive. Accordingly, we assess Anastasio’s criminal liability under each statute separately, starting with 18 U.S.C. § 2.
The general federal aiding-and-abetting statute provides in relevant part that “[w]hoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. 8The VCAR Murder Counts incorporated New York’s accomplice law because they charged Anastasio with murder in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 125.25(1) (“Murder in the second degree”) and 20.00 (“Criminal liability for conduct of another”). See United States v. Mapp, 170 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 1999) (observing that the VCAR murder statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1959, requires “the government to prove that the defendant committed murder—however that crime is defined by the underlying state or federal law”). 14 § 2(a). 9 As the Supreme Court recently explained in Rosemond v. United States, “[this] provision derives from (though simplifies) common-law standards for accomplice liability.” 572 U.S. 65, 70 (2014). Thus, “[a]s at common law, a person is liable under § 2 for aiding and abetting a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance of that offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.” Id. at 71. Here, we conclude that the government’s evidence regarding Anastasio easily satisfies the “intent requirement”—i.e., the mens rea element—of federal accomplice liability. Id. at 77. According to the Cooperators’ testimony at trial, Anastasio was present when the Gang planned its attack on 155 Pennsylvania Street. Knowing full well the murderous intentions of the assembled group, Anastasio nonetheless attempted to acquire a firearm of his own so that he could join the shooters. Based on this conduct, a rational jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Anastasio “wishe[d] to bring about” the murders of Young and McDonald—an entirely foreseeable consequence of the retaliatory shooting. Id. at 76; see also United States v. 9The accompanying subsection, § 2(b), provides relatedly that “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(b). The government does not appear to pursue the § 2(b) theory of accomplice liability on appeal. See Gov’t Br. 80-81 (arguing that Anastasio “intentionally aided” the shooters). In any event, we find no evidence in the record to suggest that Anastasio was the “cause in fact” of the murders of MacDonald or Young. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1992) (“§ 2(b) adopts the general princip[le] of causation in criminal law that an individual (with the necessary intent) may be held liable if he is a cause in fact of the criminal violation, even though the result which the law condemns is achieved through the actions of innocent intermediaries.”). 15 Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a jury may infer that “a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts”). Indeed, Anastasio admitted as much when, after the shooters returned to the apartment and started talking about the shooting, Anastasio complained, “[W]hy didn’t you let me go? Why didn’t you let me go?” Smith App’x 4812. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the trial evidence leaves us with no doubt that Anastasio possessed the mens rea necessary to be an accomplice to murder under § 2. The more challenging question is whether Anastasio’s conduct satisfied the “affirmative-act requirement”—that is, the actus reus element—of federal accomplice liability. Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 74. In urging that it does, the government highlights that Anastasio was present when the Gang planned its retaliatory attack; that he participated in the assault of Maldonado and her boyfriend at the park; that at the apartment he twice attempted to take control of one of the Gang’s weapons for his own use; and that he handed the .44 caliber gun to Harville. Anastasio responds that none of this conduct actually facilitated the commission of the two murders. He asserts, for example, that although he was present for the planning session, he did not offer any suggestions or make any contributions to forming the Gang’s plans. He further maintains that his decision to relinquish the .44 caliber gun to Harville did not advance the commission of the murders at all—stressing, in particular, Harville’s unchallenged testimony that the handgun malfunctioned during the shooting and that, as a result, Harville was unable to fire a single bullet. Thus, Anastasio submits, although he may have been an accomplice to attempted murder, he did not aid and abet the crimes that the Indictment charged him with: the murders of MacDonald and Young. The affirmative act requirement for accomplice liability raises no more than a low hurdle for the government’s proof to clear, it is true. See United States v. Garguilo, 16 310 F.2d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 1962) (Friendly, J.) (“[E]vidence of an act of relatively slight moment may warrant a jury’s finding participation in a crime.”). “In proscribing aiding and abetting,” the Supreme Court has observed, “Congress used language that comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence.” Rosemond, 572 U.S. at 73. For their part, “courts have never thought relevant the importance of the aid rendered.” Id. at 75. Thus, a defendant’s acts need “not advance each element of the offense” to support federal accomplice liability; “all that matters is that they facilitated one component.” Id. at 74-75. Nor must a defendant provide more than a “minimal” amount of aid to qualify as an aider and abettor. Id. at 73. Indeed, as one venerable treatise put it, “‘the quantity of assistance [is] immaterial,’ so long as the accomplice did ‘something’ to aid the crime.” Id. (quoting R. Desty, A Compendium of American Criminal Law § 37a, p. 106 (1882)) (emphasis in original). This is because, as the Supreme Court has explained, “every little bit helps— and a contribution to some part of a crime aids the whole.” Id. At the same time, however, the actus reus element of federal accomplice liability is not so capacious as to encompass any act taken in relation to some identified criminal activity. Rather, our case law imposes at least two limitations. First, we have repeatedly emphasized that, to convict a defendant of aiding and abetting a crime, the government must prove that the defendant’s “efforts contributed towards [the] success” of the crime, even if only at the margins. See, e.g., United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 179 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 23 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091, 1097 (2d Cir. 1985). The government must prove that the defendant “furthered the criminal act.” United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1996) (“To be convicted of aiding and abetting, the defendant must 17 have taken some conscious action that furthered the commission of the underlying crime.”). Said another way: while the quantum of assistance provided by an accomplice may be trifling, it cannot be zero. Rather, to impose criminal liability under the federal aiding-and-abetting statute requires proof that a defendant performed some act that “directly facilitated or encouraged” the commission of a substantive crime. United States v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1994). Second, to support accomplice liability, the assistance rendered by a defendant must contribute to the success of “the specific underlying crime” for which the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting. Pipola, 83 F.3d at 562. This is because “aiding and abetting does not constitute a discrete criminal offense but only serves as a more particularized way of identifying persons involved.” Smith, 198 F.3d at 383. In other words, “when a person is charged with aiding and abetting the commission of a substantive offense, the ‘crime charged’ is . . . the substantive offense itself.” United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Smith, 198 F.3d at 383 (same). For this reason, a defendant who has been indicted for aiding and abetting a particular crime cannot be convicted based on evidence that he aided and abetted a second, separate crime, even if related to the first. See United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 641-42 (6th Cir. 1994) (reversing a defendant’s conviction for possession with the intent to distribute where the defendant was involved in shipping drugs, but did not aid or abet the particular shipment that the indictment charged him with possessing); see also Wiley, 846 F.2d at 155 (refusing to infer from his participation in one fraudulent scheme that the defendant aided and abetted another “distinct,” but related, fraudulent scheme). Instead, the government must prove that “the defendant consciously assisted the commission of the specific crime [charged in the indictment] in some active way.” Medina, 32 F.3d at 45. 18 Several of our decisions help illustrate the impact of these two limitations on the types of acts that can support federal accomplice liability. In Garguilo, for example, we considered whether a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of a crime could render him liable for aiding and abetting that crime. 310 F.2d at 253. Generally, we said, the answer is no, because accomplice liability requires a defendant to “do[] something to forward the crime.” Id. at 254. We recognized, however, that in some cases, a defendant’s presence may advance the commission of the crime: an example would be “the attendance of a 250-pound bruiser at a shakedown as a companion to the extortionist, or the maintenance at the scene of crime of someone useful as a lookout.” Id. at 253. We therefore drew a distinction between those cases in which a defendant’s presence “help[s]” or “positively encourage[s]” the commission of a crime and those cases in which a defendant’s presence merely marks him as “a companion” to the actual perpetrator of the crime, observing that the former, but not the latter, can serve as a basis for accomplice liability under § 2. Id. Later, in Labat, we addressed whether a defendant could be convicted as an accomplice for possession of cocaine based on his unsuccessful efforts to procure drugs for a co-conspirator. See 905 F.2d at 20-21, 22-23. The trial evidence showed that the defendant (Labat) told his co-conspirator (Moon) that he would try to obtain and personally deliver one kilogram of cocaine to Moon in New York. See id. at 20-21. While Labat worked to acquire and transport the drugs, however, Moon and one of his associates (Ray) obtained that same amount of cocaine from another source (Dentel) at a lower price. Id. at 21. Moon then sold those drugs to an undercover police officer, and on the basis of that sale, the government charged Labat with one count of possession with intent to distribute. Id. Upon reviewing the trial record, however, we found no evidence that Labat intended Moon to possess the specific kilogram of cocaine that formed the basis of Labat’s possession charge—i.e., the cocaine obtained from Dentel 19 and sold to the undercover officer. See id. at 23. “Nor,” we continued, “was there any evidence that Labat’s efforts made any contribution whatever to Moon’s obtaining the cocaine from Dentel.” Id. Thus, although Labat plainly intended for Moon to possess a kilogram of cocaine (and took steps to facilitate that criminal objective), we reversed Labat’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute, concluding that insufficient evidence supported the specific possession charge set forth in the indictment. See id. For purposes of Anastasio’s appeal, however, our decision in Medina offers perhaps the most relevant illumination of the affirmative act requirement for federal accomplice liability. See 32 F.3d at 45-46 (Jacobs, J.). In that case, a jury convicted the defendant (Medina) of, among other crimes, aiding and abetting the use or carriage of firearms during an attempted robbery, in violation 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and (2). See id. at 42. According to the government’s evidence, Medina devised a plan for three of his associates (Lopez, Villanueva, and Delgado) to rob Medina’s former employer. Id. at 42. In the days before the heist, Medina asked Lopez whether he had a gun. Id. at 43. When Lopez responded that Villanueva had a firearm (but Lopez apparently did not), Medina gave Lopez a revolver and instructed him on how to use it. Id. Lopez turned out to be a confidential informant, however, and he handed Medina’s revolver over to a government agent before the robbery was attempted. Id. Reviewing this evidence, we reversed Medina’s § 924(c) conviction on sufficiency grounds, concluding that “Medina performed no act that specifically aided and abetted the use or carrying of a gun during the attempted robbery.” Id. at 42. His conviction could not rest on the revolver that Medina gave to Lopez, we explained, because that firearm “was not carried or used by anyone during the attempted robbery.” Id. at 45. Nor was it supported by the fact that “Villanueva and Delgado each carried a semi-automatic weapon to the attempted robbery,” since we saw “no evidence that Medina acted in any way to facilitate or encourage the use or carrying of those 20 weapons.” Id. We further observed that, while Medina was the mastermind behind the robbery, “his plans did not entail a gun that was actually used or carried during the attempted robbery.” Id. at 42. Thus, because nothing in the factual record suggested that Medina aided or abetted the use or carriage of a firearm by any of the robbers, we reversed his conviction under § 924(c). See id. at 45. 10 Applying this case law to the record before us, we conclude that Anastasio’s conduct is not enough to satisfy the affirmative act requirement of federal accomplice liability. Although Anastasio was present while members of the 10th Street Gang discussed and formulated its scheme for revenge, nothing in the record suggests that Anastasio spoke during—much less contributed to—this planning process. Nor has the government offered evidence that Anastasio’s mere presence at Thurmond’s apartment 10We also rejected the notion that Medina aided and abetted the commission of a § 924(c) offense merely because he “performed an act to facilitate or encourage the robbery.” Medina, 32 F.3d at 45. In doing so, we reasoned that the “specific crime” prohibited by § 924(c) is the use or carriage of a firearm during and in relation to a predicate crime (e.g., a robbery), not the predicate crime itself. Id. Later, in Rosemond, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation of § 924(c). See 572 U.S. at 75. Characterizing § 924(c) as a “double-barreled crime” that involves both “the use or carriage of a gun” and “the commission of a predicate (violent or drug trafficking) offense,” id. at 71, the Rosemond Court concluded that an individual could aid and abet a § 924(c) violation “by facilitating either [the predicate offense] . . . or the firearm use (or of course both),” id. at 74. Thus, had Rosemond been handed down before we decided Medina, we likely would not have reversed Medina’s conviction in light of his contributions to the attempted robbery (i.e., the predicate offense). Rosemond casts no doubt, however, on Medina’s requirement that an aider-and-abettor must actually contribute to the success of the underlying offense. Indeed, the majority opinion in Rosemond repeatedly acknowledges that federal accomplice liability requires a defendant to “d[o] something to aid the [substantive] crime.” Id. at 73 (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., id. at 74 (“[W]e approved a conviction for abetting mail fraud even though the defendant had played no part in mailing the fraudulent documents; it was enough to satisfy the law’s conduct requirement that he had in other ways aided the deception.”); id. at 74–75 (“It is inconsequential . . . that [a defendant’s] acts did not advance each element of the offense; all that matters is that they facilitated one component.”). 21 encouraged or otherwise influenced the Gang to commit the murders. Indeed, as far as we can tell from the record, Anastasio played no “role” in the execution of the retaliatory shooting “beyond that of a companion” to the shooters, and even that he did at a distance from the shooting. Garguilo, 310 F.2d at 253. He did not, for example, supply any of the firearms used during the shooting; provide any information on the location of the 7th Street Gang; serve as a look-out during the shooting; transport any of the shooters to or from 155 Pennsylvania Street; or, after the crime, help shield the shooters from police investigation. The government points out that Anastasio attempted to acquire a firearm of his own, and that he later held the .44 caliber handgun and relinquished it to Harville. But the attempt to acquire a gun failed; 11 and as to the gun at issue, Anastasio did not bring it to the apartment. Rather, he found it in a common pile of guns that others had brought, and he unwillingly yielded it to a more senior member of the Gang. His conduct therefore had no more impact on the event than Medina’s delivery of a gun to a confidential informant, or Labat’s unsuccessful efforts to procure cocaine for Moon. See Medina, 32 F. 3d at 45-46; Labat, 905 F.2d at 23. In those cases and in this one, the defendant did nothing to “further[] the criminal act” or “contribute[] toward[] its success.” Nusraty, 867 F.2d at 766; Zambrano, 776 F.2d at 1097. The Young and MacDonald murders were—at least with respect to Anastasio—a “foregone conclusion.” Medina, 32 F.3d at 46. The gun was always going to be available, and a Gang member (likely Harville) was always going to bring it to the ambush. 11The government did not charge Anastasio with attempted aiding and abetting, a putative crime that some of our sister circuits have suggested does not even exist under federal law. See, e.g., United States v. Jayavarman, 871 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Samuels, 308 F.3d 662, 669 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1990). 22 2. Aiding and Abetting under New York Penal Law § 20.00 We need not tarry long on whether Anastasio aided and abetted the two murders under New York Penal Law § 20.00. 12 Although the principles of accomplice liability under New York law differ somewhat from the corresponding federal law, 13 they impose at least two overlapping requirements that, together, resolve Anastasio’s appeal. First, consonant with our interpretation of the federal aiding-and-abetting statute, New York courts have held that under § 20.00, a defendant’s “mere presence at the scene of a crime, even with knowledge that the crime is taking place, or mere association with the perpetrator of a crime, is not enough for accessorial liability.” E.g., People v. Lopez, 137 A.D.3d 1166, 1167 (2d Dep’t 2016); In re Tatiana N., 73 A.D.3d 186, 190-91 (1st Dep’t 2010); see also People v. Cabey, 85 N.Y.2d 417, 422 (1995) (“[A] defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, alone, is insufficient for a finding of criminal liability.”). Indeed, at least one Appellate Division has gone further and found no accomplice liability where a defendant was both present at the scene of the crime and uttered words of encouragement to the perpetrator—conduct that would likely qualify as aiding and abetting under federal law. Compare People v. Fonerin, 159 A.D.3d 12 Section 20.00 provides: When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct. N.Y. Penal Law § 20.00. 13 For example, § 20.10 of the New York Penal Law provides that a person is not criminally liable for an offense committed by another person “when his own conduct, though causing or aiding the commission of such offense, is of a kind that is necessarily incidental to the commission of the offense.” People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561, 569 (1992). As the New York Court of Appeals has noted, however, the United States Code does not appear to contain a comparable exception for federal aiding-and-abetting liability. See id. at 572. 23 717, 719 (2d Dep’t 2018) (no accomplice liability where a defendant said, “Do that shit, man,” right before his co-defendant set the victim on fire), with Garguilo, 310 F.2d at 253 (“[I]t is enough if the presence of the alleged aider and abettor has . . . positively encouraged the perpetrator . . . .”). Second, just as we have said that a defendant must actually contribute to the success of a crime to qualify as an aider and abettor under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the New York Court of Appeals has interpreted the state’s accomplice statute as requiring evidence that “a defendant exhibited [some] calculated or direct behavior that purposefully affected or furthered the [substantive crime].” People v. Bello, 92 N.Y.2d 523, 526 (1998). This requirement, New York courts have explained, is “integral” to criminal liability under § 20.00. E.g., id.; People v. Slade, 133 A.D.3d 1203, 1204 (4th Dep’t 2015). In line, then, with our case law on federal accomplice liability, a defendant is not an aider-andabettor under New York law unless he “personally engaged in some voluntary act that was specifically connected to the [actual perpetrator’s] misconduct,” People v. Byrne, 77 N.Y.2d 460, 467 (1991), and in doing so, he “intentionally and directly assisted in achieving the ultimate goal of the [criminal] enterprise,” Bello, 92 N.Y.2d at 526. Here, as discussed in detail above, nothing in the record suggests that Anastasio’s conduct “affected or furthered” the murders for which he is charged with aiding and abetting. Id. Rather, the government’s evidence merely establishes that Anastasio associated with the perpetrators of those crimes in the hours leading up to and then following the shooting. Thus, for the same reasons that Anastasio did not aid or abet the two murders as a matter of federal law, we conclude that he did not act as an accomplice within the meaning of New York Penal Law § 20.00. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction that is based on the jury’s verdict as to the VCAR Murder Counts and the Murder Enhancements of the RICO Conspiracy Count. 24
In contrast, we find no merit in Anastasio’s sufficiency challenge to his conviction on the RICO Conspiracy Count. The conspiracy provision of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), “proscribes an agreement to conduct or to participate in the conduct of an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” United States v. Arrington, 941 F.3d 24, 36 (2d Cir. 2019). As the Supreme Court has explained, RICO’s definition of an “enterprise” is “broad”: it generally encompasses any “group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944, 946 (2009). An enterprise, in turn, engages in “a pattern of racketeering activity” when its members commit at least two racketeering acts—such as murder, narcotics trafficking, or robbery—that both “[are] related to one another” and “have a nexus to the enterprise” (the so-called “predicate acts”). United States v. Cain, 671 F.3d 271, 284 (2d Cir. 2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining “racketeering activity”). Importantly, the crime of RICO conspiracy “centers on the act of agreement.” United States v. Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 81 (2d Cir. 2011) (emphasis in original). Thus, in contrast to RICO’s substantive offenses, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), “the Government need not establish the existence of an enterprise” to “prove a RICO conspiracy,” Arrington, 941 F.3d at 36. Nor must it establish that a pattern of racketeering activity actually took place. See United States v. Zemlyansky, 908 F.3d 1, 11 (2d Cir. 2018) (“To prove the pattern element, the government must show that two or more predicate acts were, or were intended to be, committed as part of the conspiracy.”). Rather, the government “need only prove that the defendant knew of, and agreed to, the general criminal objective of a jointly undertaken scheme.” Arrington, 941 F.3d at 36-37. Here, a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Anastasio agreed with other members of the 10th Street Gang to function as a unit for 25 the common purpose of selling drugs. As the grand jury charged in the Indictment, and the government proved at trial, Gang members worked together to distribute drugs in their territory, organizing themselves into a loose hierarchy of roles and responsibilities. See Applins, 637 F.3d at 73 (“[A]n association-in-fact enterprise under RICO need not have a hierarchical structure, a chain of command, or other business-like attributes.”). In doing so, they viewed themselves as a single group united by a shared identity. To protect both the profits and “reputation” of the 10th Street Gang, Smith App’x 3810, members intended to—and did in fact—engage in a pattern of racketeering activity that included murder, robbery, and the distribution of drugs. The jury was entitled to find, moreover, that Anastasio knowingly agreed to join and facilitate this racketeering scheme. The Cooperators identified Anastasio as an active member of the Gang: one who served as a lookout during drug deals, sold marijuana, and fought rival gangs. Although Anastasio’s actions at the apartment where the murders were planned did not render him an accomplice to the murders, his conduct there certainly provides a reasonable basis for inferring that Anastasio knew about, and agreed to, “the general criminal objective” of the 10th Street Gang. Arrington, 941 F.3d at 36-37. In light of this and other evidence showing Anastasio’s efforts to facilitate the Gang’s racketeering activity, we have no doubt that a reasonable jury could convict him of RICO conspiracy. In arguing to the contrary, Anastasio faults the government for purportedly not proving that Anastasio himself engaged in—or intended to engage in—at least two acts of racketeering. As we have explained on multiple occasions, however, “[s]o long as [a] defendant knowingly agreed to facilitate the general criminal objective of a jointly undertaken racketeering scheme, the government need not prove that he or she knowingly agreed to facilitate any specific predicate act.” Zemlyansky, 908 F.3d at 11. Rather, we have said, “it suffices to show that [the defendant] intended that the broad 26 goals of the racketeering scheme be realized, along with evidence that some (or any) members of the conspiracy intended that specific criminal acts be accomplished.” Id. Because we conclude that the government’s evidence against Anastasio satisfies this standard, we reject Anastasio’s sufficiency challenge to his conviction on the RICO Conspiracy Count.