Opinion ID: 1199825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: The underlying facts of this case are presented in Bredthauer I and need not be repeated here. See Bredthauer I, 824 P.2d at 560-61. However, parts of the procedural history leading up to this second summary judgment are important and thus need mention. In the fall of 1990, after the Bredthauers filed their original complaint in this action, both TSP and CSSA filed motions to dismiss. TSP's motion to dismiss was premised on the two-year statute of limitations. CSSA's motion to dismiss, however, was based on both the two-year statute of limitations and W.S. 1-3-111, the statute of repose. On February 7, 1991, after a hearing on these motions to dismiss, the trial court issued an order granting TSP's and CSSA's motions and dismissing them both from the case. That order stated, in part: The parties agree that the provisions of W.S. § 1-3-107 state the applicable period of limitations with respect to all claims against the Defendants CSSA and TSP.          The plaintiffs did not file their complaint in this action within two years after the plaintiffs knew or should have known of the existence of a cause of action against the Defendants CSSA and TSP. Therefore the Defendants CSSA and TSP should be dismissed from this action. Around the same time that CSSA and TSP presented these motions to dismiss, another defendant, Davis Surveying, filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, in addition to the two-year statute of limitations, that the statute of repose applied to bar the Bredthauers' claim against them. On February 15, 1991, the trial court issued an order dismissing Davis Surveying based on the two-year statute of limitations. In this order the trial court commented on the applicability of the statute of repose by stating: 15. The plaintiffs have asked this court to apply the ten year statute of limitations set forth in W.S. 1-3-111 to their claims against Defendant Davis. However, the court finds that W.S. 1-3-111 has no application to the facts of this case.    The Bredthauers appealed to this court the February 7, 1991 order dismissing CSSA and TSP and presented as their only issue: The Trial Court erred by finding that the causes of action against the surveyors    accrued to the Plaintiff-Appellants on June 9, 1988, and as such barred their claims filed on July 2[0], 1990, by operation of    W.S. 1-3-107(a)(i). Bredthauer I, 824 P.2d at 561. As a result of this appeal, we held in Bredthauer I: [A]s a matter of law, the Bredthauers' cause of action did not accrue before July 28, 1988, the date on which they received their land surveyor's report advising them that the surveys conducted by the appellee surveyors [CSSA and TSP] were, in its opinion, in error.       The district court's finding that the cause of action accrued not later than June 9, 1988, is incorrect as a matter of law. Bredthauer I, 824 P.2d at 562-64. In the spring of 1992, after remand from Bredthauer I, TSP and CSSA both filed motions for summary judgment arguing that the statute of repose applies to bar the Bredthauers from bringing their action. The Bredthauers responded with a motion opposing CSSA's and TSP's motions, arguing that the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel preclude CSSA and TSP from raising the statute of repose and asserting that this court's Bredthauer I opinion ruled that the two-year statute of limitations controls. On June 23, 1992, the trial court heard oral arguments upon CSSA's and TSP's motions for summary judgment. During these arguments, the Bredthauers briefly mentioned the law of the case doctrine and specifically declined to argue the merits of applying the statute of repose to the facts of this case. In an order, filed on November 6, 1992, the district court rejected the Bredthauers' res judicata and judicial estoppel arguments, granted CSSA's and TSP's motions for summary judgment based on the statute of repose, and certified the order as final under W.R.C.P. 54(b). The Bredthauers now appeal this order.