Opinion ID: 1379698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: little

Text: When the police first observed him, Little and a friend were walking across the apartment complex grounds. At the time Officer Colman was chasing several other individuals. Colman did not recognize Little as being one of the people in the group he was sent to investigate. At the moment Colman saw him, Little was doing nothing suspicious. In fact, Colman testified that at first he was not interested in Little. Little Fact-Finding Hearing, at 13. Colman only became interested in him when Little started running. Colman then followed Little and ordered him to stop. At the moment Colman ordered him to stop, Little was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. State v. Friederick, 34 Wn. App. 537, 541, 663 P.2d 122 (1983). The question before this court is whether that seizure was reasonable. United States v. Cortez, supra , establishes that reviewing courts must look at the totality of the circumstances presented to the arresting officer to determine whether a stop is reasonable. Under Cortez, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Little stop reveals that the stop was not reasonable. The majority holds that the criminal trespass investigation agreement, the report concerning loitering juveniles, the numerous posted signs warning against loitering, and Little's flight justified the stop. Majority, at 496. These factors simply do not support the stop. [2] First, the criminal trespass investigation agreement is a private agreement between the owners of the complex and the police department. That private agreement cannot be the basis for a stop that is prohibited by the constitution. It is a very dangerous idea to assert that constitutional protections can be subverted by such agreements. Under the constitution the police need articulable suspicion in order to stop someone. The State argued that the criminal trespass agreement gives the police the power to stop with less than an articulable suspicion. That agreement cannot give the police authority that the constitution forbids them. The agreement itself does not provide articulable suspicion that any particular individual is engaged in criminal activity. Absent articulable suspicion, the stop is not justified. Second, there is no evidence to indicate that Little was part of the group that the police were called to investigate. That group dispersed when the police arrived. Colman admitted that he did not know if Little had been a member of that group. Colman also admitted he did not know if Little lived in the complex. At the time he ordered Little to stop, Colman had no reason to believe Little was a part of the group the police were sent to investigate, and therefore the original call to the police cannot be part of the justification for stopping Little. Third, the No Loitering signs have no bearing on the legitimacy of the stop. Little was not loitering when Colman first saw him. When Colman first saw him, Little was walking with a friend. Colman did not know if Little was a resident or the guest of a resident. At that moment he had no reason to suspect Little of loitering. [3] Finally, Little's flight cannot, by itself, justify the stop. As outlined above, none of the other reasons given by the majority could have legitimately played a part in the officer's decision to seize Little. Colman stated that all he knew about Little was that he was a black male in the area. Little Fact-Finding Hearing, at 21. The officer only became interested in Little when Little ran. Little Fact-Finding Hearing, at 13, 23. From the officer's testimony, it is clear that if Little had not run away the officer would not have stopped him. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the only factors the officer could have considered when he decided to seize Little were: (1) Little is a black male, and (2) Little ran. Surely race cannot be a factor in justifying a stop. That leaves the majority only with flight as possible justification for the stop. This court has never held that flight alone justifies a Terry stop. In State v. Sweet, 44 Wn. App. 226, 721 P.2d 560, review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1001 (1986), the Court of Appeals stated: Courts have generally regarded flight in the presence of police officers to be a circumstance that may be considered along with other factors. ... (Italics mine.) 44 Wn. App. at 230-31. Flight alone is not enough. In Sweet, the police saw a man standing flattened against a building late at night in an area where there was little or no traffic and all of the businesses were closed. He was near a truck that had been reported to the police as a suspicious vehicle. Under those circumstances, the fact that the suspect also ran when he saw the police could be considered in determining whether there was articulable suspicion that the man was engaged in criminal activity. 44 Wn. App. at 230. There simply are no circumstances like that in Little's case. Little was simply walking with a friend. As he was walking the police chased a group of people past him. His friend took off running. The police officer looked at him. Under those circumstances it may have been entirely reasonable for Little to run. Whatever Little's motivation for running, the act itself does not justify the stop. People v. Thomas, 660 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Colo. 1983); People v. Aldridge, 35 Cal.3d 473, 674 P.2d 240, 198 Cal. Rptr. 538, 541 (1984); 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(c), at 453 (2d ed. 1987); 1 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 13.4(b)(3), at 13-35 (1990).
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises of another. RCW 9A.52.080(1). A person enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises of another if he is not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to be there. RCW 9A.52.010(3). The State must prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). Therefore, to find Little guilty of criminal trespass, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Little was not licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to be at the Lakeshore Village Apartments. The trial court made no finding of fact that Little was unlawfully on the property, yet it convicted him of criminal trespass. In so doing the trial court relied on the fact that Little ran, that there were No Loitering signs posted, and that Little ran into a building and tried to shut the door on the officer. Little Fact-Finding Hearing, at 30. None of these factors support a finding that Little was unlawfully on the property. The trial court relieved the State of its burden by convicting Little without any evidence that at the time he was observed by the officer, Little was unlawfully on the property. Even if the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the group of youths congregated in the complex, when the officer happened upon Little walking through the complex, he did not know whether Little was part of the original group. Thus, he had no specific suspicion with respect to Little. See State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838, 841, 613 P.2d 525 (1980) (the mere proximity to others independently suspected does not justify the stop). The officer admitted he had no idea whether Little might be trespassing. Little Fact-Finding Hearing, at 22. The only reason he had for ordering Little to stop is that Little ran away when he saw the officer. Leaving the presence of a police officer, by itself, is not suspicious. State v. Larson, 93 Wn.2d 638, 645, 611 P.2d 771 (1980). Since the officer could articulate no specific, objective facts from which it could be reasonably inferred that Little was trespassing at the time the officer ordered him to stop, Little's detention violated the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7. There was no competent evidence presented that Little was unlawfully on the premises. No rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore the State failed to sustain its burden of proof and Little's conviction for criminal trespass should be reversed. A person is guilty of obstruction if he knowingly hinder[s], delay[s], or obstruct[s] any public servant in the discharge of his official powers or duties. RCW 9A.76.020. Refusing to obey a police officer's order to stop may constitute obstruction. However, a person's refusal to stop cannot be the basis for criminal liability unless the officer has a legal basis for stopping that person. As discussed above, an officer may not stop an individual unless the officer has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968); State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4-6, 726 P.2d 445 (1986). In this case the officer did not have specific and articulable facts to warrant a Terry stop. Therefore, Little had the right to refuse to cooperate with the officer. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (1980). Little's refusal to cooperate cannot provide the basis for his arrest or detention. Terry v. Ohio, supra at 34 (White, J., concurring); State v. White, 97 Wn.2d 92, 106, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982). It is illogical to maintain that a person has a right to refuse to cooperate with an officer and then to hold that the person who exercises that right is guilty of obstruction. Since the officer lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to detain Little, Little's refusal to obey the officer's order cannot be obstruction. The obstruction conviction should be reversed.