Opinion ID: 215941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: EEOC & Mr. Watson's Discrimination Claims

Text: Congress enacted the ADA with the goal of assuring `equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for [individuals with disabilities].' Chaffin v. Kan. State Fair Bd., 348 F.3d 850, 858 (10th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)). The purposes of the Act include, inter alia, provid[ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities and provid[ing] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2). In accordance with these purposes, § 102(a) of the ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. Id. § 12112(a) (2008). [9] Under our case law, in order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he (1) is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by an employer or prospective employer because of that disability. Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 527 F.3d 1080, 1086 (10th Cir. 2008); accord Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2003); Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir.1999). In order to demonstrate discrimination, a plaintiff generally must show that he has suffered an adverse employment action because of the disability. [10] Mathews v. Denver Post, 263 F.3d 1164, 1167 (10th Cir.2001); see also Butler v. City of Prairie Village, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 748 (10th Cir.1999) (stating that the third element of the prima facie case ... requires the plaintiff to come forth with evidence showing that the adverse employment decision was because of his disability (emphasis added)); Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1454 (11th Cir.1998) (Under the third prong of his prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove... that he has suffered an adverse employment action because of his HIV status ( i.e., that the [employer] has discriminated against him because of his disability).); cf. Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir.2007) (The [Supreme] Court [has] made clear the substantive discrimination provisions of Title VII are limited `to [adverse] actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace.' (third alteration in original) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006))). [11] If a plaintiff offers no direct evidence of discrimination, which is often the case, the court applies the burden-shifting analysis articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See, e.g., MacKenzie v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir.2005). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination, as described above. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. After the plaintiff has made the requisite showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817. If the defendant proffers such a reason, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's stated reasons are merely pretextual. Id. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817. [A] plaintiff can establish pretext by showing the defendant's proffered non-discriminatory explanations for its actions are `so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude [they are] unworthy of belief.' Johnson v. Weld Cnty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 (10th Cir.2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir.2008)); see also Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1166 (10th Cir.2007) (A plaintiff demonstrates pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. (quoting Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
EEOC and Mr. Watson argue that C.R. England unlawfully discriminated against Mr. Watson by requiring his trainees to sign a form consenting to be trained by an HIV-positive driver. EEOC Opening Br., No. 09-4207, at 37; see also Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 40-41. More specifically, EEOC argues that the acknowledgment-form requirement violated ADA § 102(b)(1), which prohibits discrimination by limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the disability of such applicant or employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). As noted above, as part of their prima facie case of discrimination, the appellants must demonstrate that Mr. Watson suffered from an adverse employment action. Mathews, 263 F.3d at 1167. In fact, § 102(b)(1) explicitly limits the discriminatory prohibition to employer actions that  adversely affect[] the opportunities or status of the employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (emphasis added). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on this claim, based on its conclusion that Mr. Watson had not suffered from an adverse employment action. As the district court explained: Watson was not reassigned or denied the ability to become a driver-trainer. Nor was he limited in his opportunity to drive, or segregated from others who did not want to work with him. His training responsibilities were the same as other England driver-trainers, and he suffered no significant change in his compensation as a driver-trainer as a consequence of England's use of the acknowledgment form. EEOC v. C.R. England, No. 2:06-CV-00811BSJ, slip op. at 20. The court further stated that [t]he adverse employment consequence asserted by the EEOC..., namely that trainees were discouraged from working with [him] because of his disability as disclosed by the acknowledgment form, lacks evidentiary support in th[e] record. Id. at 21. We agree with the district court that EEOC and Mr. Watson have not stated a viable claim under ADA § 102(b)(1). At the outset, we acknowledge that an employer's accommodation of the discriminatory preferences of other employees, clients, or customers could, under certain circumstances, expose the employer to liability for discrimination. [12] However, as stated above, a viable claim of discrimination in this context must still be predicated on an adverse employment action. The Tenth Circuit has liberally define[d] the phrase `adverse employment action,' Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir.1998), and takes a case-by-case approach, examining the unique factors relevant to the situation at hand, Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1031 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 531) (internal quotation marks omitted). In general, [o]nly `acts that constitute a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits' will rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Haynes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir.2006) (quoting Dick v. Phone Directories Co., Inc., 397 F.3d 1256, 1268 (10th Cir.2005)); accord Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1032-33 (citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). However, the term adverse employment action is not necessarily limited to such acts. Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1032-33; see, e.g., id. at 1031 (noting that an employer's action that causes harm to future employment prospects, such as a negative job reference, can be considered an adverse employment action (quoting Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986-87 (10th Cir.1996))). But although the term is not confined to, for example, monetary losses in the form of wages or benefits[,]... `a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities' does not constitute an adverse employment action. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). Accordingly, a plaintiff must show that the alleged adverse action caused more than  de minimis harm to or a  de minimis impact upon an employee's job opportunities or status. Hillig, 381 F.3d at 1033. In this instance, as noted, EEOC and Mr. Watson allege that C.R. England discriminated against Mr. Watson by requiring potential trainees to sign an HIV-acknowledgment form before training with him. However, C.R. England did not deny Mr. Watson the opportunity to become a trainer, demote him, or reassign him due to his HIV status. Indeed, Mr. Watson's training responsibilities, duties, and compensation were the same as other driver-trainers, and there is no evidence that he was ever segregated from other employees or trainees. Furthermore, as discussed infra, the mere act of disclosing Mr. Watson's HIV status did not in and of itself amount to an actionable adverse action under the ADA. See infra Part II.B. Nevertheless, EEOC argues that the acknowledgment form constitutes an actionable adverse action because it condition[ed] [Mr. Watson's] opportunity to be a trainer upon the disclosure of [his HIV status], limited his pool of trainees to only those students... willing to work with an HIV-positive trucker, and allow[ed] potential trainees to refuse to work with him because of his HIV. EEOC Opening Br., No. 09-4207, at 47-48; see also Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 40-41 (arguing that the disclosure [form] was improper because it allowed Defendant England to deny Plaintiff Watson the ability to train drivers, and [a]ny employer policy which grants the employees veto power over working with the disabled should be viewed as per se discrimination under the ADA). Yet, EEOC and Mr. Watson have failed to put forth any evidence that Mr. Watson's opportunities as a trainer were actually limited in any respect. Only one potential trainee, Mr. Seastrunk, was presented with the acknowledgment form, and he willingly signed it and was subsequently trained by Mr. Watson. Furthermore, C.R. England established by its evidence that there were abundant trainees in the training poolseveral hundred at any one time. Oral Argument at 22:21. And appellants do not dispute this. Therefore, even if a potential trainee had declined to work with Mr. Watson which, again, did not occur in this instancethat fact alone would not have impaired Mr. Watson's ability to function as a trainer, nor would it have prevented him from taking on another trainee. [13] In the end, the appellants' arguments are insufficient to support this discrimination claim. EEOC and Mr. Watson have not demonstrated that the acknowledgment form had any meaningful impact or effect upon Mr. Watson's employment opportunities or status; the potential that the acknowledgment form could have adversely affected his employment at some unknown time in the future, at least on this record, is not enough to support a claim under the ADA. Even though some might frown upon C.R. England's actions in effectively allowing trainees to decline to work with Mr. Watson because he has HIV, not every perceived indignity will rise to the level of an adverse employment action. Haynes, 456 F.3d at 1222; see also Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568, 575-76 (7th Cir.2001) (The idea behind requiring proof of an adverse employment action is simply that a statute which forbids employment discrimination is not intended to reach every bigoted act or gesture that a worker might encounter in the workplace. (alteration omitted) (quoting Hunt v. City of Markham, Ill., 219 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The authorities cited by EEOC do not convince us that a different outcome is warranted. EEOC cites Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park, 133 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir.1998), in support of its claim. In Duda, a school custodian who suffered from a mental disability brought an ADA discrimination claim against the school board when the employer, inter alia, forced [him] to transfer to a new location and to work alone, under orders not to speak to others. 133 F.3d at 1059. By contrast, C.R. England did not transfer Mr. Watson to a separate location, and there is no evidence that Mr. Watson was ever isolated from other employees. Furthermore, in each of the cases cited by EEOC, the employeeas required under ADA jurisprudencehad been shown to have suffered an adverse impact or effect in relation to his employment opportunities or status. See id. at 1056 (addressing a situation where the plaintiff was forced to transfer to an entirely separate work location, was told not to have conversations with others at the new location, and when he expressed an interest in applying for a better position, ... he was told not to apply); Lam, 40 F.3d at 1554, 1559 (indicating that the plaintiff had suffered from an adverse employment decision when the employer rejected her employment applications allegedly due to her race, sex, and national origin); Diaz, 442 F.2d at 385-86 (presenting situation where employer refus[ed] to hire appellant ... solely on the basis of [his] sex). The appellants have not demonstrated that Mr. Watson has suffered any such adverse impact in this instance. As discussed above, Mr. Watson was not demoted, reassigned, or refused a promotion; his job responsibilities, duties, and compensation remained unchanged; and his opportunities and status as a trainerin terms of availability of trainees and opportunities to trainwere not shown to have been limited in any way. Moreover, the acknowledgment form, which was only given to one potential trainee, did not carr[y] a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment prospects. Berry, 74 F.3d at 986. In concluding that Mr. Watson did not suffer from an actionable adverse employment action in this instance, we do not foreclose the possibility as a matter of law that a co-worker consent policyi.e., a policy that gives co-workers a veto on whether they work with or around a disabled employeemight under certain circumstances result in or bring about an adverse employment action under the ADA. We simply hold that EEOC and Mr. Watson have failed to make such a showing on the record before us. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on this claim.
Under Mr. Watson's next discrimination claim, he asserts that he was discriminated against, in violation of the ADA, when C.R. England misdirected [him] on several loads on his first training assignment. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 38. More specifically, Mr. Watson claims that C.R. England sent him contradictory messages regarding his loads, which led him criss-crossing Omaha during rush hour while towing his trainee along. Id. at 42. He asserts that this is an adverse employment action giving rise to a viable claim under the ADA. We disagree. We have held that a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities does not constitute an adverse employment action. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532. The misdirection of loads that occurred in this case was nothing more than a mere inconvenience that does not constitute an actionable adverse employment action. Accordingly, Mr. Watson has failed to assert a prima facie case. The district court therefore committed no error in granting summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on this claim. [14]
Mr. Watson claims that he was terminatedin his capacity as a trainer and as a driverbecause he was HIV-positive. See Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 44 (Once the upper management for Defendant England learned of Plaintiff Watson's disability, they moved to terminate Plaintiff Watson.). Because Mr. Watson has offered no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to each claim of discriminatory termination. MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Mr. Watson can make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1165 (assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff had established a prima facie discriminatory termination claim under the ADA (citing Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1235, 1237 (10th Cir.2004); McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2001))). Applying the burden-shifting test, we conclude that both of Mr. Watson's termination claims fail as a matter of law, and therefore the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in C.R. England's favor.
When C.R. England removed Mr. Watson from his trainer position, the stated reasons for the removal were: (1) he sat up with [his] student and burned up [his] h[ou]rs; (2) he refused a load; and (3) he deadheaded ... over 1000 miles home. EEOC App. at 432. The supervisor further conveyed to Mr. Watson that she would remove any trainer[,] especially a brand new trainer for any one of th[o]se reasons, and that he did not use good judgment[,] especially knowing that [he] w[as] on an automatic 90 day probation. Id. These stated reasonswhich on their face are legitimate and non-discriminatorysatisfy C.R. England's exceedingly light burden. Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1013 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363 (10th Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden, therefore, shifts to Mr. Watson. In attempting to demonstrate that C.R. England's proffered reasons for the removal are pretextual, Mr. Watson asserts that the company's justifications are not supported by the record. Specifically, he argues that (1) there is no evidence that Plaintiff Watson improperly allocated hours for his student; (2) he refused the load because he was extremely frustrated with at least three load cancellations in a row; and (3) although [he] deadheaded home, Defendant England cites no rule or company policy which would require the termination of a trainer for deadheading home. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 44-45. [15] In determining whether the proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision,  Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Watts v. City of Norman, 270 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2001)); we do not look to the plaintiff's subjective evaluation of the situation, see McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir.1998). Regarding the supervisor's belief that he had inappropriately burned up his hours, Mr. Watson had told the driver manager that he had run out of hours. When asked why this was the case, Mr. Watson did not explain and instead simply refused the load. Moreover, regardless of whether Mr. Watson actually misallocated his hours, we are only concerned with whether the employer held a good-faith belief that he had done so; the evidence before us demonstrates that it did. See Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.2005) (indicating that the relevant inquiry concerns the belief of the employer that the employee engaged in misconduct, not whether the actual facts, as shown by evidence extrinsic to the employer's assessment, may have been otherwise.). In the end, Mr. Watson has not put forth any evidence that undermines the sincerity of C.R. England's stated justificationthat is, he has not demonstrated it is unworthy of belief. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2004). In regard to Mr. Watson's load refusal, he does not dispute that he refused the load, and the evidence confirms that he did. Instead, Mr. Watson attempts to demonstrate pretext by giving a justification for his refusal, stating that he was extremely frustrated with at least three load cancellations in a row. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45. However, we fail to see how this excuse demonstrates pretext. [A]n employer's exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment does not constitute pretext. Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th Cir.1995). And Mr. Watson's [m]ere conjecture that the employer's explanation is pretext is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.1999). As to C.R. England's final justification that he deadheaded home while training a new driverMr. Watson asserts that this is pretextual because the company cites no rule or company policy which would require the termination of a trainer for deadheading home. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45 (emphasis added). However, Mr. Watson cites no controlling precedent that in any way supports the proposition that an employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification must be based upon an official company rule or policymuch less be required by such a rule or policyand we are not aware of any such precedent. See Medlock v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 608 F.3d 1185, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2010) (rejecting the argument, asserted by the plaintiff in an age discrimination case, that an otherwise reasonable justification for a business decision somehow loses its legitimacy simply because it reflects an exercise of managerial judgment rather than a ministerial execution of written policyas if a manager could not legitimately fire an employee for vandalizing property, stealing from co-workers, or assaulting a customer absent a formal company policy specifically addressing such misconduct). It is true that a failure to follow company policy can support a finding of pretext in some circumstances. See Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir.2007) (It is well-established that pretext can be shown by `evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances.' (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir.2000))). However, we discern no basis for concluding that an otherwise reasonable justification by an employer should be deemed pretextual merely because it is not directly reinforced by an official rule or policy. This facially untenable idea... is belied by countless employment discrimination cases decided on the basis of legitimate business justifications without any reference to formal policies necessarily legitimizing those justifications. Medlock, 608 F.3d at 1193. Accordingly, Mr. Watson's argument does nothing to cast doubt on C.R. England's otherwise legitimate and non-discriminatory justification. In sum, Mr. Watson has not met his burden to demonstrate that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Stinnett, 337 F.3d at 1218) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Watson next argues that C.R. England terminated his employment as an independent-contractor driver for the company due to his HIV status. As discussed above, after Mr. Watson deadheaded to Florida he remained there for a period of more than two weeks with his leased truck; he did not accept new loads, generate any income, or make lease payments on his truck. During this time, C.R. England attempted to contact Mr. Watson, but received no response. On March 4, 2003, C.R. England terminated Mr. Watson's Lease Agreement, and Opportunity Leasing repossessed his truck. In justifying the severance of the relationship, C.R. England cites Mr. Watson's (1) poor performance, which includes failing to respond and accept loads, and (2) the fact that he defaulted on his lease (i.e., falling too far in the []hole to recover, EEOC App. at 435). C.R. England Br., No. 09-4217, at 41. Again, these justifications satisfy C.R. England's exceedingly light burden, Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1013, which shifts the burden to Mr. Watson to demonstrate pretext. Mr. Watson does not attempt to undermine the justifications regarding his poor performance or his failure to make required payments under the lease agreement; therefore, he has not shown that these legitimate, non-discriminatory justifications are unworthy of belief. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071. Because Mr. Watson has not demonstrated that these justifications were pretext masking discriminatory animus, Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1198) (internal quotation marks omitted), this claim is without merit. Although Mr. Watson does not attempt to undermine the justifications discussed above, he does attack an alleged third justificationthat he abandoned his vehicle. Mr. Watson argues that he never abandoned his vehicle, which clearly shows pretext. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45. However, the record demonstrates that C.R. England never justified the termination on the ground that Mr. Watson had abandoned his truck. The record evidence that Mr. Watson identifies related to vehicle abandonment is unavailing. Specifically, Mr. Watson points to the deposition of Kimberly Cage, the manager of training operations, who testified that another C.R. England employee had told her four years prior that Mr. Watson had abandoned his truck. Watson App. at 619 (Dep. of Kimberly Cage, dated July 11, 2007). Examined in context, this single statementwhich was not otherwise used to justify the terminationis not enough to establish pretext, particularly in light of the above-cited justifications, which we find to be legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1178 ([T]his Court frequently examines statements and events in context to determine their legal effect or whether they genuinely create a disputed question of material fact.). Accordingly, Mr. Watson cannot demonstrate that C.R. England's justifications for terminating the lease agreement were pretextual, and the district court committed no error in entering judgment in the company's favor.