Opinion ID: 766185
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Insulation from Political Influence.

Text: 27 Mishler's primary argument is that the Board Members are not as independent as the federal administrative hearing officers discussed in Butz. This argument deserves some consideration. In Butz, the Court noted that, under the Administrative Procedure Act: the hearing examiners could not perform duties inconsistent with their duties as hearing examiners; the hearing examiners are not responsible to agents engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecutorial functions for the agency; the hearing officers could not consult another party regarding a fact in issue without providing notice and opportunity to participate; the hearing officers are assigned in rotation as far as is practicable; and the officers can be removed only for cause. See Butz , 438 U.S. at 514. 28 Here, there is no general prohibition against board members' performing duties that are inconsistent with their duties as hearing officers. The only specific prohibition is that members of the investigative committee cannot participate in the decision as to whether the Board should bring charges against a physician. See Nev. Rev. Stat. SS 233B.122, 630.311. However, just as in Cleavinger, Board Members participating in the disciplinary hearings work with the fellow [Board Members] who lodge[ ] the charge against the [licensee] upon whom they sit in judgment. Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 204. Thus, while there is some separation of the investigatory, prosecutorial and judging functions, the Nevada Board is not as insulated as the medical board in Watts where the investigatory and charging functions are performed by a separate state agency. See Watts, 978 F.2d at 277 (noting that the Tennessee medical board does not bring charges or conduct the investigation that led up to the issuance of the charges). 29 In addition, six of the nine board members must be doctors who actually practice medicine in Nevada. See Nev. Rev. Stat. S 630.060. This circumstance raises thespecter that board members may achieve personal financial gain by revoking the licenses of other doctors and presents the strong potential for conflicts of interest which would not be present with federal hearing officers. However, in Watts, the medical board was composed entirely of physicians. See Watts , 978 F.2d at 275. There, the court determined that the risk of self interest economic regulation was not enough to deny absolute immunity. Id. at 276. Here, the risk of Board Members' acting out of their own self-interest is further diminished because of the presence of three non-physicians on the Board. 30 There is no prohibition against consulting other parties regarding the facts in issue. The regulations state only that evidence and investigation documents may be kept confidential. Nev. Rev. Stat. S 630.336 (emphasis added). Board Members are not prohibited from communicating and cooperating with any other licensing board or agency or any agency which is investigating a licensee. Id. 31 Board Members are appointed by the governor for four year terms. See Nev. Rev. Stat. SS 630.050-630.060. Board Members must be selected without regard to their individual political beliefs and only may be removed by the governor for good cause. Id. SS 630.060-630.070. No Board Member may serve more than two consecutive full terms, but he may be reappointed after the lapse of [four] years. Id. S 630.050. 32 Thus, the Board Members lack some characteristics of independence of a judge or federal hearing officer: the investigatory, prosecutorial and judging functions of the Nevada Board are not entirely separate; two-thirds of the Board Members are themselves physicians, raising the potential for self interested decisions; and the evidence is not fully confidential. Despite these differences, however, the structure of the Nevada Board and the procedural requirements of their decision-making process show that the Board Members are sufficiently insulated from political influence. 33