Opinion ID: 2104012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Have the Defendants Here Established Good Faith as a Matter of Law?

Text: We next consider whether the defendants have met their burden to conclusively prove good faith under Chambers and Wadewitz. We conclude that, in University of Houston, Sergeant Williams and Officer Stewart proved good faith as a matter of law. We conclude in Ener, however, that Deputy Ener did not conclusively establish good faith because his summary judgment evidence did not sufficiently substantiate his testimony that he acted in good faith.
The court of appeals held that Sergeant Williams and Officer Stewart did not establish good faith as a matter of law because their affidavits did not adequately discuss Wadewitz's risk and need elements. Specifically on the need element, the court of appeals held that neither affidavit adequately discussed the seriousness of the suspect's alleged assault or alternatives to immediately apprehending the suspect. 979 S.W.2d at 712. The court of appeals also held that neither affidavit adequately considered the risk to the public, including the nature and severity of the risk to the public and whether a reasonably prudent officer would perceive a clear risk of harm. 979 S.W.2d at 712. We disagree with the court of appeals. Both Williams' and Stewart's affidavits sufficiently discuss both need and risk under Wadewitz and conclusively prove that a reasonable officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have balanced need and risk as these officers did.
Sergeant Williams' affidavit discusses all Wadewitz's need factors. On the seriousness of the situation he was responding to, Williams stated: When I made the decision to stop the ... jeep, I knew that the driver was a suspect in assaultive conduct and that he fled police officers who were attempting to detain him and had committed the criminal offense of evading detention which is a class B misdemeanor. Furthermore, the suspect had not been identified before he fled the foot patrol officers.... The manner in which the suspect operated his vehicle and the high rate of speed at which he traveled caused me to believe that the suspect posed a danger to the public. Williams further stated that when he parked his patrol car in the suspect's way to stop him, the suspect drove around Williams' vehicle at a high rate of speed. Therefore, although Williams does not detail the seriousness of the assault allegedly committed on campus, he does discuss the seriousness of the situation as a whole, as Chambers and Wadewitz require. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467; Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. On whether his presence was immediately necessary to apprehend the suspect and on the availability of alternatives to pursuit, Williams stated that he knew that the suspect had not been identified. Thus, Williams' affidavit discussed the seriousness of the situation he was responding to, the need to immediately apprehend the suspect, and the availability of alternative actions to apprehend the suspect. Williams also considered the Wadewitz risk factors in assessing the risks to the public of his pursuit. He stated that when the pursuit occurred, around 2:00 a.m., the weather was clear and the pavement was dry and the traffic was light. He observed that the area was commercial and that there were no cars other than the suspect vehicle and Officer Stewart's on the roadway. Williams further stated: When the suspect vehicle proceeded onto M.L.K. Blvd., I knew that the street was divided by a median and that to the left was a green belt and to the right was a park; therefore, no traffic would be intersecting M.L.K. Blvd. There was no traffic from the point of entrance one (1) to M.L.K. Blvd. and no traffic from M.L.K. to Old Spanish Trail. From my professional experience, I was aware that suspect vehicles will often appear to flee but stop after having time to observe emergency lights and siren behind them. When I decided to pursue the suspect vehicle, I believed that at that time of night with the minimal traffic on the street and the nature of the area in which I traveled, diminished the risk from the pursuit itself, while the suspect and the manner in which he operated his vehicle posed a significant risk to the public. I believed, and in my opinion any reasonably prudent police officer in my position would also have believed, that during the pursuit, the need to stop the suspect vehicle was essential to insure the safety of the public by way of attempting to follow the suspect vehicle. Although Williams did not use the exact language Wadewitz employs, we cannot agree with the court of appeals that Williams' affidavit does not assess the nature, severity, likelihood, and obviousness of his pursuit's risks to the public, namely the risk of a collision with a third party. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. Summary judgment requires that a movant establish facts upon which the court could base its legal conclusion, not that the parties use particular words. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467; Siders v. State, 970 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. denied); Pena v. Neal, 901 S.W.2d 663, 668 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied). Just because Williams's affidavit did not explicitly mention the risk of colliding with a third party does not mean that he did not assess this risk. This risk is present to some degree in every police pursuit. In assessing such facts as the time of day and traffic, weather and road conditions, Williams was assessing the specific circumstances present that affected this risk. And, the summary judgment record does not indicate that there were other circumstances that increased or decreased this risk or that presented a different risk to the public. We agree with Justice Edelman's dissent in the court of appeals that an officer should not be required in his affidavit to affirmatively negate the existence of all circumstances or risks that did not actually exist. 979 S.W.2d at 719 (Edelman, J., dissenting). Further, we conclude that Williams' affidavit established that he acted in good faith. His affidavit includes facts upon which a reasonably prudent officer in the same or similar circumstances could agree that the need to pursue the suspect (considering that the suspect had allegedly committed an assault and was driving recklessly) outweighed the pursuit's risk to the public (considering that there was very little traffic at that time of night, that the area was primarily commercial, that the weather and road conditions were good, and that there were few roads intersecting the road where the pursuit occurred).
Officer Stewart's affidavit also established good faith as a matter of law. On the need element, Stewart stated: While I was ordered by ... Sergeant Williams to stop the suspect vehicle, I was ... aware that the driver of the speeding vehicle was believed to have engaged in a fight on the University campus and evaded detention by University police officers. He further stated: After hearing Sergeant Williams' radio transmission, I looked over my shoulder and saw a green Suzuki jeep rocket passed [sic] my patrol vehicle. I activated my emergency overhead lights and siren and attempted to follow the speeding vehicle. The suspect vehicle merged onto M.L.K. Boulevard and continued at a high rate of speed which I estimated to rise to 80 to 90 m.p.h. The posted speed limit was 35 m.p.h. He thought that the suspect vehicle's speed was a clear indication that the driver of the suspect vehicle had no regard for the safety of the public and needed to be stopped. On alternatives to pursuit, Stewart stated that he followed the suspect at a distance and was not able to get close enough to the suspect vehicle to obtain its license plate number. I had expected the suspect vehicle to stop when the driver observed my overhead lights and siren behind him, but he did not. On risk to the public, Stewart stated that he was familiar with the streets upon which he was traveling, that the area was primarily commercial, and that there was very light traffic at that time, about 2:00 a.m. He stated that he observed no car other than the suspect's and Williams' when he started the pursuit. He stated that he did not proceed through red lights or stop signs until it was safe to do so and that he did not go as fast as he could have to keep up with the suspect vehicle because he recognized the risk to the public. Further, when the suspect approached the intersection where the collision actually occurred, Stewart decided to end the pursuit and began slowing his vehicle. Stewart also stated: When I decided to pursue the suspect vehicle, I believed that at that time of night with minimal traffic on the street and the nature of the area in which I traveled, diminished the risk from the pursuit itself, while the suspect vehicle was operated by a person that engaged in an assault and fled the police and that posed a significant risk to the public. I believed, and in my opinion any reasonably prudent police officer in my position would also have believed, that during the pursuit the need to stop the suspect vehicle was essential to insure the safety of the public by way of attempting to follow the suspect vehicle. Stewart's affidavit shows that he considered all Wadewitz's need and risk factors and supports his claim that a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed risk and need as he did. Therefore, Stewart met his summary judgment burden on good faith.
In response to the defendants' motions for summary judgment, Clark submitted the affidavit of expert Richard H. Turner, the chief executive officer of the National Academy for Professional Driving. Turner contends that Williams and Stewart were not acting in good faith and that another reasonably prudent law enforcement officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could not have believed the need to immediately apprehend [the suspect] outweighed a clear risk of harm to other members of the public who may be using the highway during the pursuit. Further, Turner stated that Williams' and Stewart's actions did not meet industry standards for the University of Houston, City of Houston, Harris County, State of Texas, or the United States of America and violated the University of Houston policies regarding pursuit. Turner bases his opinion on his review of facts surrounding the pursuit, numerous documents including, but not limited to depositions taken, and policies and procedures presented in the discovery process, and his visit to the pursuit scene. Because Turner's testimony on good faith is not substantiated with reference to each aspect of the need and risk balancing test, it is conclusory and is insufficient to controvert the defendant's proof on good faith. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. Therefore, we conclude that Williams and Stewart established good faith as a matter of law.
In Ener, the court of appeals held that Deputy Constable Ener's affidavit did not establish good faith because it did not substantiate Ener's assessment of the risks of his pursuit, or of the need to pursue, specifically the availability of alternatives to pursuit. The court of appeals also held that Ener's expert affidavits were conclusory and therefore were not competent summary judgment evidence. We agree with the court of appeals that Ener's affidavit does not contain facts showing that Ener adequately assessed the need to pursue, specifically, whether there were any alternatives to pursuit. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. On the need to pursue, Ener explained in his affidavit that while on patrol, he saw a vehicle speeding. His radar indicated that the vehicle was going 71 miles per hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone. He put on his overhead lights and siren and pursued the vehicle for approximately one-fourth to one-half mile before approaching the intersection where the accident ultimately occurred. He further states: At this time I believed the speeder was acting recklessly and was a danger and that I should definitely apprehend him. Nowhere in his affidavit does Ener mention facts to show that he assessed whether there were any alternatives to pursuit. Ener does not mention the viability of identifying the suspect and apprehending him later or any other alternative. To establish good faith under Wadewitz, Ener was required to show that he assessed the availability of alternatives to pursuit as part of balancing the need to pursue and the pursuit's risk to the public. See Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. Without assessing the availability of alternatives, Ener did not have a suitable basis for concluding that a reasonable officer in his position could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656 (emphasis added); see Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 467. Therefore, we agree with the court of appeals that Ener's affidavit does not adequately substantiate his claim of good faith. We express no opinion on whether, if Ener had assessed the availability of alternatives to pursuit, his affidavit would have established good faith. Nor do we mean to imply that had Ener's affidavit shown that he had a viable alternative to pursuit and decided to pursue the suspect anyway, we would conclude that he did not establish good faith. The availability of alternatives to pursuit is just one factor of the need/risk balancing test and the existence of alternatives to pursuit does not alone determine good faith. Therefore, just because an officer has identified a suspect and could apprehend him later but decides to pursue the suspect anyway cannot alone defeat good faith. We disagree with the dissent, therefore, that our opinion relieves an officer of the duty to apprehend a suspect whenever there is an alternative to pursuit. 22 S.W.3d at 925. In addition to his affidavit, Ener also submitted the affidavits of experts Assistant Chief Rick Sadler and Captain Jim Sumner of the Harris County Constable's office. But like Ener's affidavit, these affidavits omit any reference to the availability of alternatives to pursuit. Therefore, they cannot establish good faith, either. Because we conclude that Ener did not meet his initial burden to prove good faith, we need not consider whether Thomas and Roarke controverted Ener's summary judgment evidence.