Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Hearsay Testimony by Fahey's Psychotherapists and Friends under the State of Mind Exception

Text: In challenging the admission of the hearsay testimony presented by Fahey's psychotherapists and friends, Capano raises two related issues. First, he argues that certain of the statements do not fit within the hearsay exception for statements of the declarant's then-existing state of mind. This issue centers on the elements of Rule 803(3), particularly the provision excluding statement[s] of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed. Second, he argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Fahey's statements of her fear of Capano during the State's case-in-chief because the State may present evidence of the victim's fear of the defendant only in rebuttal after the defense raises an issue making the evidence relevant. [124] This issue assumes that Rule 803(3) is satisfied, and focuses on relevance and prejudice concerns under Rules 401 and 403. The State contends that the contested hearsay evidence is admissible because it reveals Fahey's state of mind  that is, why Fahey wanted to end her relationship with Capano  and because it rebuts Capano's contention that they had a good ongoing relationship. [125] According to the State, the hearsay evidence therefore supports the prosecution's theory that Capano formulated a plan to kill Fahey because she was attempting to break off their relationship. Agreeing with the State, the Superior Court admitted the hearsay testimony under D.R.E. 803(3) because the court viewed the change in the relationship between Fahey and Capano as relevant to Capano's motive to murder Fahey and, consequently, to the State's theory of the case. The trial court thus concluded that [Fahey's] state of mind becomes important [126] and that the hearsay evidence was admissible evidence on that issue. The trial court was concerned with both the State's need to present a coherent theory of the case and the fact that Capano had raised an accident defense during opening statements that the State needed to rebut.
D.R.E. 803(3) provides a hearsay exception for: A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of the defendant's will. [127] The exclusion of statements of memory or belief derives from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shepard v. United States , in which a witness testified that the victim had stated, Dr. Shepard [the defendant] has poisoned me. [128] The Shepard Court held that this declaration was not admissible under the state of mind exception because it was a statement of memory. [129] Specifically, the Court stated: Declarations of intention, casting light upon the future, have been sharply distinguished from declarations of memory pointing backwards to the past. There would be an end, or nearly that, to the rule against hearsay if the distinction were ignored. The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This at least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important, it spoke to a past act, and more than that, to an act by some one not the speaker. Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be disentangled by a jury. [130] Following Shepard and the text of Rule 803(3), a statement that I am afraid is admissible. This statement fits within the justification for the hearsay exception, namely, the declarant's unique perspective into his own feelings and emotions. [131] Similarly, the statement that I am afraid of D  is generally admissible. [132] The case is different with respect to a statement that I am afraid of D because he is a maniac  or I am afraid of D because he threatened me  or I am afraid of D because he is going to kill me.  [133] Such statements are simply perceptions or beliefs a victim has of events, and their admission is not justified under the rationale for the state of mind exception. There is substantial authority holding that such statements of memory or belief are not admissible under Rule 803(3). [134] Thus, the statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind would not include anything but the assertion that I am afraid. The reasons why she was afraid cannot be characterized as assertions ( i.e., statements) of her state of mind. [135] The State argues that the hearsay evidence admitted against Capano nevertheless falls within the state of mind exception. The State also argues that, by stipulating to their admission before trial, Capano waived any hearsay objections with respect to Fahey's diary, the Capano-Fahey emails, and testimony by Kim Lynch-Horstmann. We address this fact, along with the State's argument that the trial court appropriately limited the jury's consideration of the evidence to the state of mind of Miss Fahey at or about the time when the alleged incidents occurred, as part of the harmless error analysis below. The State maintains that it did not offer the contested testimony to prove the fact remembered or believed  i.e., that Capano actually engaged in the conduct described or that Capano is a controlling, jealous person. Instead, the State argues that it offered the testimony to prove that Fahey believed that these things were true and, as a result, wanted to end her relationship with Capano. The State therefore argues that the testimony of Fahey's friends and psychotherapists does not fall within the definition of hearsay because the testimony was not offered to prove that the events and opinions described were actually true. Under the State's theory, to the extent that the proffered testimony is prejudicial, the trial court (as the court did in this case) must determine whether the testimony is admissible under the balancing test of D.R.E. 403. Although one could plausibly interpret the state of mind exception to authorize the admission of testimony of memories or beliefs for some purpose other than proving the fact remembered or believed, [136] this interpretation places a difficult burden on the jury. In particular, the jury must confine its consideration of the declarant's memories and beliefs, including memories of potentially serious misconduct by the defendant, to the limited issue of a person's state of mind. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the jury to make such an abstract distinction, even when properly defined by the trial court's limiting instructions. [137] In practice, the broad reading of the state of mind exception proposed by the State relies heavily on the balancing test of Rule 403 to ensure that the defendant is not unfairly prejudiced by testimony describing the declarant's memories or beliefs. Thus, where the danger of unfair prejudice from the admission of these statements substantially outweighs the probative value of the statements, the trial court may exclude the statements under D.R.E. 403. This reliance on Rule 403 presents a potential problem because it replaces hearsay limitations with the more lenient Rule 403 prejudice balance. The hearsay rule is designed to exclude statements untested by cross-examination that are insufficiently reliable due to possible defects in the declarant's memory, perception or veracity. The Rule 403 analysis, on the other hand, assumes that these reliability concerns are overcome and focuses on balancing the effects of the statement on the jury. In view of the wide range of untested, and potentially unreliable, out-of-court statements that would be admissible under the State's broad interpretation of the state of mind exception, we conclude that Rule 803(3) authorizes the admission of hearsay statements by Fahey to her friends and psychotherapists [138] reflecting her fear of the defendant (that is, her state of mind), but not the memories or beliefs giving rise to that fear. Applying the above analysis to the present case, we conclude that Fahey's description of specific events involving Capano and her opinion of Capano reflect not on Fahey's state of mind, but on her beliefs and memories of facts as she expressed them to her friends and psychotherapists. [139] For example, Jill Morrison testified that Fahey told her about being locked in a garage by Capano while they argued, an experience Fahey found extremely frightening. [140] The narrative of this incident is not a state of mind  it is a memory of an event  and does not fall under Rule 803(3) as we interpret that rule. [141] In contrast, Fahey's statements that she was upset, that she was afraid of Capano, or that she intended to break off her relationship with Capano are admissible as statements revealing Fahey's emotional or mental state. [142] Accordingly, the evidence going solely to Fahey's state of mind was admissible. The portions of the testimony describing Fahey's beliefs or memories of facts were inadmissible.
As discussed above, the statement I fear Defendant falls within the proper scope of Rule 803(3). Due to concerns over relevancy and prejudice, however, courts limit the admissibility of such statements by victims. [143] The concern is that a victim's statement that I fear Defendant leads to an inference that the defendant deserves to be feared. [144] Courts are wary of allowing jurors to draw this inference because it may be based on subjective impressions but have great impact. [145] In light of these concerns, courts have developed limitations on the admissibility of statements describing the victim's state of mind. United States v. Brown, the leading case on this issue, requires that the trial court must find a substantial degree of relevance to a material issue or a manifest need for such evidence before the court may admit statements describing the victim's fear of the defendant. [146] While not limiting admissibility to any predetermined set of facts, Brown observed that statements of the victim's mental state are generally admissible only to rebut the defendant's claim of self-defense, suicide, or accidental death. [147] The majority of courts have adopted this rebuttal requirement in one form or another. [148] The holding of the Superior Court in State v. Porter that a victim's statements of fear of the defendant could come in under 803(3) only ... in rebuttal after evidence of accident, self-defense, suicide or extreme emotional distress has been presented by the defense is broadly in line with this prevailing view. [149] In State v. Wood, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld admission of statements made by [the victim] about her fear of Defendant and her desire to end their relationship. [150] The rationale for admissibility was as follows: The statements about [the victim's] fear and desire to end the relationship helped explain Defendant's motive. The disputed trial issues were Defendant's motive and mental state  whether Defendant acted with premeditation or as a result of a sudden impulse. The prosecution theorized that Defendant was motivated by anger or spite engendered by [the victim's] termination of the relationship. [The victim's] statements were relevant because they showed her intent to end the relationship, which in turn provided a plausible motive for premeditated murder. In addition, [the victim's] statements were also relevant to refute Defendant's assertion that he and [the victim] had secretly maintained their relationship after July 4, 1989. [151] It thus appears that Wood did not key admission solely to rebuttal of the defense case; rather, Wood recognizes the prosecution's need to present evidence that is material to the elements of its prima facie case. [152] In a slightly different context, this Court has held that the State may introduce evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts in its case-in-chief only where the evidence is independently relevant to an issue or fact that the State must prove as part of its prima facie case. [153] Before admitting the contested evidence during the State's case-in-chief, the trial court must determine whether the evidence is sufficiently relevant to an element of the charged crime or whether the evidence must be presented in rebuttal after the defense raises an issue to which the evidence is relevant during its case-in-chief. Following the cases discussed above, we conclude that a victim's statements of fear of the defendant are admissible (1) during the State's case-in-chief to prove the State's prima facie case or (2) during the State's rebuttal case to counter a defense theory that places the victim's own actions squarely at issue. [154] Applying this rule to the present case, we find that testimony describing Fahey's state of mind was relevant to prove (1) that Fahey sought to end her romantic involvement with Capano and (2) that Capano, as the spurned lover, therefore had a motive to kill her. Since this theory of admissibility is material to a disputed element of the State's prima facie case for first degree murder (that is, intent and/or premeditation), the State could properly present this evidence in its case-in-chief. [155] Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting during the State's case-in-chief hearsay evidence that was properly admitted under the state of mind exception.
The next question is whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment operates to bar admission of the hearsay statements by Fahey that are admissible under the state of mind exception. [156] The Confrontation Clause provides defendants in criminal cases with the right to confront witnesses who testify against them. [157] Where hearsay statements by an unavailable declarant are admitted into evidence, the accused has no opportunity to test the veracity of those statements through cross-examination. [158] Before the State may present hearsay statements against the accused in a criminal prosecution, the State [159] must therefore establish (1) that the hearsay was admitted under a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule or (2) that the contested statements possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness `such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statements' reliability.' [160] Where hearsay testimony is admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted exception, it is not necessary to make a particularized assessment of the statement's reliability. [161] To determine whether an exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted, the Court must find that the statements admissible under the exception are invariably trustworthy. This finding depends in part on the longevity and widespread acceptance of the hearsay exception by courts and legislatures. [162] Based on the longstanding judicial precedent establishing the propriety of admitting statements under the state of mind exception, [163] this Court declared the state of mind exception, as defined in Derrickson, to be firmly rooted for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. [164] Following this established jurisprudence, we find that D.R.E. 803(3) is a firmly rooted hearsay exception under the Confrontation Clause. [165] We therefore conclude that the admissible hearsay testimony concerning Fahey's emotional state is admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception and satisfies the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.