Opinion ID: 2100144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transferred Negligence

Text: This court recognized that a nonpatient third party plaintiff who was injured as a result of a negligent act performed by the hospital against a patient could maintain an action against the hospital, because there was a special relationship between the plaintiff and the patient. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d 348, 10 Ill. Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). In Renslow, a 13-year-old patient with Rh-negative blood was given a transfusion of Rh-positive blood by the hospital, thereby sensitizing her blood to the Rh-positive factor. The hospital did not inform the patient of the medical error or its effects. The patient did not learn of the medical error until she became pregnant eight years later. As a result of the error, her daughter was born with permanent damage to her brain, internal organs, and nervous system. This court determined that the defendant's duty of care to the patient should be transferred to the patient's infant daughter because of the special relationship between the infant and her mother and because the injury to the infant was the direct result of negligent treatment rendered to the mother. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d at 356-57, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250. The Renslow court recognized the concept of transferred negligence, but it limited its reach to circumstances where there was a special, intimate relationship. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d at 357, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250. The defendants argue that a nonpatient third party plaintiff can bring a medical negligence lawsuit only if the plaintiff has a special relationship with the patient, citing Kirk. As discussed earlier, in Kirk plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries he sustained while he was a passenger in a vehicle operated by a patient who had been recently released from the defendant hospital. The Kirk court considered decisions from a number of foreign jurisdictions, the social and public policy of Illinois, and this court's own holdings, and concluded that the preferable view, and the one consistent with this court's holdings and with legislation based on social and public policy, is that a plaintiff cannot maintain a medical malpractice action absent a direct physician-patient relationship between the doctor and plaintiff or a special relationship, as present in Renslow, between the patient and the plaintiff. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill.2d at 531, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387. In the course of reaching its holding, the Kirk court stated:  Renslow, it would appear, is the only medical malpractice action in which this court recognized that a nonpatient third party with no patient-hospital or patient-doctor relationship was allowed to maintain a cause of action against a hospital and doctor.    Obviously, that type of relationship does not exist between McCarthy, the patient who allegedly received negligent care, and Kirk, the passenger in his car. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill.2d at 528, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387. Plaintiffs contend that Doe redefined the definition of transferred negligence to require that the injuries are physical, traceable to the negligent treatment of the patient, and not adverse to the patient's interests. Plaintiffs then conclude this case provides the precise type of injury that the Doe court held gives rise to transferred negligence because Teresa's injuries were physical, traceable to defendants' negligence and not adverse to her husband's interests. In Doe the defendant psychologist treated the plaintiff's daughter, and plaintiff alleged the defendant induced his daughter into falsely believing plaintiff had sexually abused her when she was a child. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's treatment of his daughter deprived him of his daughter's society and companionship and was an intentional interference with the parent-child relationship. The Doe court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case stating: [W]e decline to apply Renslow 's concept of transferred negligence here. The relationship between a mother and a fetus is perhaps singular and unique, and it is demonstrably different from the relationship that exists between a parent and an adult child. Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill.2d at 280-81, 233 Ill.Dec. 310, 700 N.E.2d 1018. The Doe court did note that the injuries to the plaintiff were not physical, they were not traceable to the negligent treatment of the patient, and that the interests of plaintiff and his daughter were adverse. The crux of the Doe case, however, is the statement: The relationship between a mother and a fetus is perhaps singular and unique, and it is demonstrably different from the relationship that exists between a parent and an adult child. Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill.2d at 280-81, 233 Ill.Dec. 310, 700 N.E.2d 1018. Kirk reaffirmed the Renslow decision to limit the scope of transferred negligence to cases involving a special relationship between the patient and the nonpatient plaintiff. See also Estate of Johnson v. Condell Memorial Hospital, 119 Ill.2d 496, 509, 117 Ill.Dec. 47, 520 N.E.2d 37 (1988); Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill.2d 272, 280-81, 233 Ill.Dec. 310, 700 N.E.2d 1018 (1998). After our decision in Kirk, the appellate court was reluctant to find that other types of relationships are of the same intimate nature as that presented in Renslow. See Charleston v. Larson, 297 Ill.App.3d 540, 231 Ill.Dec. 497, 696 N.E.2d 793 (1998); Britton v. Soltes, 205 Ill.App.3d 943, 150 Ill.Dec. 783, 563 N.E.2d 910 (1990); Heigert v. Riedel, 206 Ill.App.3d 556, 151 Ill. Dec. 789, 565 N.E.2d 60 (1990). Plaintiffs and amicus Illinois Trial Lawyers Association assert, however, that the Renslow court itself held the marital relationship is a special relationship. This assertion is based on the following from Renslow : [D]erivative actions, such as those of a husband or parent for the loss of the wife's or child's services, demonstrate that the law has long recognized that a wrong done to one person may invade the protected rights of one who is intimately related to the first. (See Dini v. Naiditch (1960), 20 Ill.2d 406[, 170 N.E.2d 881].) In these cases, because of the nature of the relationship between the parties harmed, the law recognizes a limited area of transferred negligence. Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 67 Ill.2d at 357, 10 Ill.Dec. 484, 367 N.E.2d 1250. [5] Plaintiffs argue that because Renslow has specifically identified the husband-wife relationship as the type that gives rise to transferred negligence, defendants' argument that Teresa and Richard did not have a special relationship would require us to overturn over 30 years of precedent. The appellate court considered whether the plaintiffs alleged the existence of an intimate special relationship shared by Richard and Teresa comparable to that found in Renslow. The court stated: In this case, the plaintiffs have alleged that Teresa and her husband shared an intimate, marital relationship and that Teresa was an active participant in his medical care, providing the defendants with information regarding her husband's changeable moods and behaviors and consulting with the defendants regarding her concerns about whether her husband would act on his ideas and threats and do her harm. In our view, the relationship, as alleged, between Teresa and Richard reaches the level of personal, familial intimacy that was present in Renslow. The injury inflicted on Teresa was physical and traceable to the allegedly negligent treatment of Richard's mental health conditions. The allegations of the complaint do not indicate that interests of the plaintiffs and Richard Street are adverse to each other.    We conclude that the special relationship between husband and wife, under the circumstances of this case, is comparable to that found in Renslow   . 373 Ill. App.3d at 772, 311 Ill.Dec. 747, 869 N.E.2d 421. We believe that treating the marital relationship as a special relationship for purposes of a derivative loss-of-consortium action does not mean the marital relationship should be treated as a special relationship for purposes of the direct personal injury actions brought by plaintiffs. There are different legal consequences between a derivative loss-of-consortium action and a direct personal injury action. Thus, this court has held that the general five-year statute of limitations, rather than the two-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for damages for an injury to the person, applies in an action brought for loss of consortium; that the consortium action is not based on an injury to plaintiff's person but on an injury to the personal relationship established by the marriage contract; and that the consortium action is legally distinct from a personal injury action. Mitchell v. White Motor Co., 58 Ill.2d 159, 162-63, 317 N.E.2d 505 (1974). We conclude that the marriage relationship of Richard and Teresa is not comparable to the relationship between a mother and fetus. Accordingly, we disagree with the holding by the appellate court to the contrary.