Opinion ID: 2520026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: judicial discipline in utah

Text: ¶7 Because matters of judicial discipline rarely reach the level of discussion and dispute necessary for us to render an opinion, and because only three such instances have occurred since the creation of the Judicial Conduct Commission, [1] we exercise our prerogative to describe, more broadly than may be absolutely necessary to resolve Judge Anderson's case, the law as it relates to judicial discipline. We do so as a guide to the Judicial Conduct Commission to the degree that doing so is our responsibility, and for the reassurance of the public and judges that we recognize, and take most seriously, our role in the process. ¶8 With the modification and re-enactment of the Judicial Article to the Utah Constitution in 1984, the people of Utah vested responsibility for judicial discipline in three separate, and independent, processes. The first is reserved to the voters by article VIII, section 9, that of uncontested retention elections held periodically, by which the people may remove any judge at their pleasure by majority vote, for any reason. The second is vested in the legislature by article VI, sections 17-20, under which a judge may be impeached for high crimes, misdemeanors, or malfeasance in office by a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives, and removed from office after trial by the Senate, again by a two-thirds vote. The third is charged to the Judicial Conduct Commission and this court, under article VIII, section 13. [2] ¶9 The people, through their constitution, have established the Judicial Conduct Commission for the express purpose of investigating and conducting confidential hearings on complaints against any justice or judge of this state. Utah Const. art. VIII, § 13. For any one or more of five enumerated reasons, [3] the Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of any judge. Id. These sanctions are limited in two important ways by the language of the constitution. First, they may only be imposed for one of the enumerated reasons set out in the constitution. Second, no order of the Judicial Conduct Commission is implemented until the Supreme Court has reviewed the Commission's proceedings as to both law and fact. Id. In this review, the court is empowered by the people to permit the introduction of additional evidence as it deems necessary and helpful. Id. Once the review is complete, the court must, as it finds just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the Commission's order. Id. ¶10 As a consequence of this constitutionally mandated process, it ultimately rests with this court to render a final decision on the propriety and nature of any sanction imposed on a judge. The Judicial Conduct Commission acts in a role more akin to an independent advisory committee to the court in this important process, and not as an independent body with the power to impose consequences on a judge that are simply subject to appellate review by this court. Matters raised before, and acted upon, by the Judicial Conduct Commission have no disciplinary effect on a judge until and unless this court agrees that discipline is warranted, and sets the level of discipline to be applied. The Judicial Conduct Commission can insist that the court review a matter by entering an order of discipline, but its recommendation as to discipline remains just that, a recommendation. ¶11 Because of the nature of the relationship between the court and the Judicial Conduct Commission as established in the constitution, the court is obligated neither to accept the judgment of the Judicial Conduct Commission on matters of law or fact nor to adopt any recommended sanction. However, as a matter of constitutional deference, the court has treated, and most certainly will continue to treat, the findings and recommendations of the Judicial Conduct Commission with a significant degree of respect. ¶12 In addition, the purview of the Judicial Conduct Commission is necessarily limited to the scope of complaints made against a judicial officer. The court, on the other hand, responsible as it is for selection of the Chief Justice, the presiding administrative officer of the state judiciary, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(1)(3) (2002), and the State Court Administrator, the senior non-judge in the state judiciary, Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 3-301(3), has a unique relationship to both the judges and the judiciary as a whole. Given that perspective, the scope of exposure of the court is naturally greater than that of the Judicial Conduct Commission when considering the impact of alleged judicial misconduct on both the judiciary as a whole, and on the individual judge and his or her ability to function as a public official. The positioning of the court as the final arbiter of matters of judicial conduct by the constitution obligates us to consider, where essential to a resolution of the issue presented to the Judicial Conduct Commission, facts and evidence of ongoing difficulty directly resulting from or arising out of the matters upon which the Judicial Conduct Commission has deliberated and made its recommendation for sanctions to the court. [4] In most cases, the act or acts for which a judge is subjected to discipline through this process have been and will be discrete, specific behaviors. However, in rare cases, the behavior for which the Judicial Conduct Commission recommends discipline is of an ongoing nature that itself requires correction. In such cases, given the process of the Judicial Conduct Commission, only this court is in a position to consider and resolve any lingering difficulty. This we do not, and will not, undertake lightly. Only when such ongoing conduct presents both a serious problem for the judge in question, and also reflects a lack of correction of the problem addressed by the Judicial Conduct Commission, are we even remotely likely to involve ourselves at that level of inquiry. The case of Judge Anderson presents just such a difficulty, demanding the reluctant exercise of our constitutional authority and responsibility.