Opinion ID: 1907829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was it error for the trial court to allow Darwin Maples to testify?

Text: ¶ 23. This is the one argument by Graves which is not procedurally barred, as the objection made at trial preserved it for our review. See McLemore, 669 So.2d at 24 (Having made an objection at trial, the objection was preserved for appellate purposes despite its failure to appear in the appellant's motion for a new trial). Graves argues that it was reversible error to allow Darwin Maples, the brother and attorney of Dudley, to testify at trial. ¶ 24. The landmark Mississippi case on this subject is Pittman v. Currie, in which we examined the general undesirability of attorneys testifying in cases wherein they are counsel, a practice which we have said should be avoided if possible. 414 So.2d 423 (Miss.1982); see Miss. R. Prof'l Conduct 3.7. We explicitly noted that permitting [an attorney's testimony at trial is not a ground for reversal.] Id. at 427. We further expounded that the rationale of the rule rests on the premise that there exists a conflict of interest when an advocate is asked to be a witness. The rule disqualifies a lawyer where there is a likelihood that the lawyer will be a necessary witness. This rule then is not an immunity from testifying by the advocate witness, but it is a limitation on advocacy. Pearson v. Parsons, 541 So.2d 447, 452 (Miss.1989). Allowing an attorney to testify as a witness may result in his or her disqualification as an advocate, but not as a witness with relevant testimony. Id. at 452 (withdrawal from representation of both counsel who were to be witnesses on contested issues was required); see also West v. State, 519 So.2d 418, 423 (Miss. 1988) (The court may admonish an attorney when it appears that he knew in advance that he would be called upon to testify in a case, for taking active part in the trial of a case, but the court cannot refuse an accused the right to introduce competent evidence in his favor because it may appear that an attorney has violated an ethical rule). ¶ 25. In spite of our clear precedent prohibiting reversal in these types of cases, Graves urges reversal is warranted because Darwin Maples was allowed to testify. The record is clear that Darwin Maples immediately ceased his advocacy on behalf of his brother when he was brought in to testify. Further, Graves omits an important fact. In Pittman and Pearson, the attorney-witnesses sought to testify for their clients. In the case at hand, Darwin Maples testified not for his brother and client, but for the Dantzler Trust. Mr. Watt [ attorney for the Dantzler Trust ]: So that the record is amply clear, the plaintiff calling this witness to testify [is] Hancock Bank, trustee for A.F. Dantzler, Jr. Trust. . . . This is the oldest witness who has knowledge of the road . . . I have interviewed many, many people to establish the relationship with the Dantzler family to establish the use of the road, and the prescriptive easement, which has been created over at least 70 years. And this witness goes further back than anyone else. . . . I don't care whether anyone else asks him any other questions, but the Dantzler Trust should not be prohibited from using [his testimony]. . . . [H]e is not counsel for Dantzler. . . . This is our primary witness. We have two witnesses . . . and this is one of them. It is clear from the record that the trial court expressly examined the Pittman case and grappled with the underlying doctrine (stating that it is frowned upon by the Court to have someone try to serve as both counsel and as a witness), and also that Maples was disqualified as an attorney for his brother. This is in accordance with our precedent and has never been the basis for a reversal. The judge acted within his discretion in allowing Darwin Maples to testify.