Opinion ID: 2780845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: B.1-2, we disagree.

Text: Next, the Zeltser Group argues that the bankruptcy court (1) abused its discretion in denying a continuance, (2) erred in denying its Rule 52(c) motion for judgment on partial findings and its Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal, and (3) erred in basing the final judgment on factual findings unsupported by the record. First, the Zeltser Group argues that the denial of a continuance severely prejudiced its presentation of the direct testimony of its key witnesses in support of its case in chief. Second, the Zeltser Group contends the bankruptcy court applied 54 Case: 12-15595 Date Filed: 02/20/2015 Page: 55 of 57 the incorrect legal standard in ruling on the Rule 52(c) and Rule 41(b) motions by failing to weigh the evidence presented or consider witness credibility. Third, the Zeltser Group submits that the bankruptcy court clearly erred in ultimately finding that Davis had authority to act on behalf of Mutual Benefits. B. Analysis 1. Denial of Continuance The denial of a continuance is not an abuse of discretion unless it “severely prejudices” the moving party. Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). We consider four factors to determine whether the denial of a continuance constitutes an abuse of discretion: (1) the moving party’s diligence in its efforts to ready the case for trial; (2) the likelihood that the need for a continuance would have been remedied had the continuance been granted; (3) the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing party; and (4) the extent to which the moving party might have suffered harm as a result of the denial. Id. We agree with the district court’s thorough and reasoned analysis of these four factors. The record is utterly devoid of any indication that the bankruptcy court’s denial of a 60-day continuance, requested 10 days before the scheduled trial date, “severely prejudiced” the Zeltser Group. See id. Thus, we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 55 Case: 12-15595 Date Filed: 02/20/2015 Page: 56 of 57 2. Denial of Rule 52(c) and Rule 41(b) Motions Rule 52(c) provides as follows: Judgment on Partial Findings. If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a nonjury trial and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue. The court may, however, decline to render any judgment until the close of the evidence. A judgment on partial findings must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) (emphasis added). A prior version of Rule 41(b) contained similar discretionary language. See Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc., 993 F.2d 1500, 1503 n.7 (11th Cir. 1993) (substance of the former Rule 41(b) is found in the current version of Rule 52(c)). The Zeltser Group argues that, in ruling on its motions, the bankruptcy court was required to consider witness credibility and to weigh the evidence presented. However, even if the bankruptcy court applied the wrong legal standard (i.e., the standard for summary judgment), it ultimately found the Redmond Group’s testimonial and documentary evidence to be credible and persuasive, and entered final judgment on that basis. There is no indication that, had the bankruptcy court considered Davis’s credibility and weighed the Redmond Group’s evidence, the court would have exercised its discretion to grant either motion midway through trial. Thus, the bankruptcy court’s statement that a Rule 52(c) or Rule 41(b) motion was “in some way similar to a summary judgment motion” amounted, at 56 Case: 12-15595 Date Filed: 02/20/2015 Page: 57 of 57 most, to harmless error. See Club Assocs. v. Consol. Capital Realty Investors (In re Club Assocs.), 951 F.2d 1223, 1234 n.13 (11th Cir. 1992). 3. Final Judgment Here, all of the evidence at the Mutual Benefits trial came from the Redmond Group. Despite offering enough evidence to defeat summary judgment and submitting extensive witness and exhibit lists, the Zeltser Group failed put on any case whatsoever at trial as to any alternative ownership theory as to Mutual Benefits. Given the evidence in this record, we conclude the bankruptcy court did not err—much less clearly err—in finding that Davis, the president and sole director of Mutual Benefits, had the exclusive authority to retain counsel to represent Mutual Benefits, and that, pursuant to this authority, Davis retained the Redmond Group’s attorneys in the bankruptcy proceeding. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court did not err in entering final judgment on the ownership issue in the Mutual Benefits case.