Opinion ID: 4534794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: newton’s claim for

Text: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FAILS ¶19 Newton asserts an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 8 He argues specifically that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to the following jury instruction: “‘Rape’ as defined in the law means the actor knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly has sexual intercourse with another without that person’s consent.” ¶20 A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires Newton to show “(1) that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient, and (2) a reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial.” State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. ¶21 We first explain how the jury instruction was arguably ambiguous, without reaching the question of whether Newton’s counsel was objectively deficient. And then we explain that, even __________________________________________________________ 8 Newton argues that this court should also review the rape jury instruction for plain error. The court of appeals reviewed this argument and held that, because the district court did not err in giving the instruction, there was no plain error. Newton, 2018 UT App 194, ¶ 17 n.6. Without opining on whether the court of appeals was correct in holding there was no error, we reject Newton’s plain-error argument because “[p]roving plain error . . . requires proving that any errors by the trial court . . . prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McNeil, 2016 UT 3, ¶ 25, 365 P.3d 699 (footnote omitted). This prejudice test is “the same whether under the claim of ineffective assistance or plain error.” State v. Beverly, 2018 UT 60, ¶ 37, 435 P.3d 160 (citation omitted). And we hold below in our ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis that Newton was not prejudiced by any alleged error in the rape jury instruction. See infra ¶¶ 30–36. His plain-error argument consequently fails. 7 STATE v. NEWTON Opinion of the Court if Newton could show that counsel was objectively deficient, Newton cannot show that he was prejudiced by it. For that reason, his trial counsel was not ineffective.
Performance Was Deficient ¶22 Newton argues that his trial counsel was objectively deficient by virtue of not objecting to the rape jury instruction. By failing to object, contends Newton, counsel did not make sure that the jury was “clearly and accurately instructed” about consent. And “no reasonable lawyer would have found an advantage in understating the mens rea requirement as applied to the victim’s nonconsent.” State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 27, 349 P.3d 676. Ultimately, we do not reach this issue. Although the jury instruction could have been clearer, Newton’s ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim fails for lack of prejudice. ¶23 To establish deficient performance, Newton must show that his counsel’s “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. ¶24 The court of appeals held that Newton’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel failed because Newton did not show that trial counsel performed deficiently. State v. Newton, 2018 UT App 194, ¶ 29, 437 P.3d 429. Specifically, Newton did not “demonstrate that counsel’s objection to the rape instruction would not have been futile.” Id. ¶ 23; see State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 26, 1 P.3d 546 (“Failure to raise futile objections does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). In coming to that conclusion, the court of appeals examined two Utah cases about jury instructions for rape: Barela, 2015 UT 22, and State v. Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, 219 P.3d 75. Newton, 2018 UT App 194, ¶¶ 24– 29. Because these cases are relevant to our analysis here, we set out their pertinent facts and holdings. ¶25 The court of appeals held in Marchet that the rape instruction “accurately identified each element of the crime of rape and correctly stated the applicable mental state.” 2009 UT App 262, ¶ 22. The instruction in that case required the jury to find the defendant guilty of rape if it found the following: 1. “That [the defendant] had sexual intercourse with [the victim];” 2. “That said act of intercourse was without the consent of [the victim];” and 8 Cite at: 2020 UT 24 Opinion of the Court 3. “That the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly or recklessly.” Id. ¶ 21. This instruction, said the court of appeals, was an “accurate statement of the law” because it required a finding that the defendant “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly had nonconsensual sexual intercourse with” the victim. Id. ¶ 22. ¶26 We fielded a similar ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in Barela and held—in contrast to Marchet—that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the jury instruction for rape. 2015 UT 22, ¶ 2. The instruction there required the jury to convict the defendant of rape if it found the following:

3. “Had sexual intercourse with [the alleged victim];” and 4. “That said act of intercourse was without the consent of [the alleged victim].” Id. ¶ 13. This instruction was erroneous, we explained, because it “implied that the mens rea requirement (‘intentionally or knowingly’) applied only to the act of sexual intercourse, and not to [the alleged victim’s] nonconsent” and “conveyed that idea by coupling the mens rea requirement directly with the element of sexual intercourse, and by articulating the element of [the alleged victim’s] nonconsent without any apparent counterpart requirement of mens rea.” Id. ¶ 26 (footnote omitted). We distinguished the instruction from the one in Marchet without opining on whether the Marchet instruction was correct: “[T]he instruction in [Marchet] differed from the one here in a crucial respect: the mens rea element was listed last, after both the ‘sexual intercourse’ and ‘nonconsent’ elements. That instruction at least arguably suggests that the mens rea element applies to all of the above-listed elements.” Id. ¶ 26 n.3 (citation omitted). Then we held that “reasonable trial counsel should have objected to” the Barela instruction, since “no reasonable lawyer would have found an advantage in understating the mens rea requirement as applied to the victim’s nonconsent.” Id. ¶ 27. ¶27 The court of appeals in Newton’s case ultimately concluded that Newton’s trial counsel was not deficient because an objection would have been futile under Barela and Marchet. Newton, 2018 UT App 194, ¶¶ 28–29. Unlike in Barela, said the court of appeals, the rape instruction here “did not separate the 9 STATE v. NEWTON Opinion of the Court mens rea from the act or the element of non-consent.” Id. ¶ 26. And the court of appeals believed that Newton’s instruction was even better than the Marchet instruction because, “[r]ather than providing the culpable mental state as a catch-all at the end of the instruction, Newton’s instruction seamlessly provided that the applicable mens rea applied to both the act of sexual intercourse and Victim’s non-consent.” Id. ¶ 28. ¶28 Because Newton’s claim for ineffective assistance fails for lack of prejudice, infra ¶¶ 30–36, we need not decide whether the court of appeals was correct in holding that an objection to the jury instruction would have been futile. We write only to say that the jury instruction is more ambiguous than acknowledged by the court of appeals. A correct jury instruction on rape should require a finding “not only that a defendant ‘knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly had sexual intercourse,’ but also that he had the requisite mens rea as to the victim’s nonconsent.” Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 26 (citation omitted). But using a purely grammatical interpretation, the mental state in Newton’s jury instruction could arguably be read as applying to either the act of sexual intercourse or the victim’s nonconsent, or both. On that basis, the jury perhaps could have interpreted the instruction to mean that there was no mens rea requirement as to the victim’s nonconsent. That being said, we do not opine on whether trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the instruction, since Newton was not prejudiced by any potential misstep. 9 __________________________________________________________ 9 There is a strong argument that a reasonable attorney could have concluded that the instruction was correct under controlling precedent. At the time of trial, Newton’s counsel did not have the benefit of Barela, since that opinion had not been issued yet. Trial counsel thus would have been able to rely on Marchet only—and not Barela—for guidance. See Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ¶ 76, 344 P.3d 581 (“Importantly, in assessing whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we must look at the facts and law available to counsel at the time of the representation.”). And this court has said that the Marchet “instruction at least arguably suggests that the mens rea element applies to all of the . . . elements [of rape].” Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 26 n.3. Because the instruction here was somewhat similar to the instruction upheld in Marchet, there is a strong argument that a reasonable attorney at that time would not have objected to it. But we ultimately need (continued . . .) 10 Cite at: 2020 UT 24 Opinion of the Court ¶29 Going forward, however, district courts should ensure that jury instructions for rape clearly require a finding that a defendant “had the requisite mens rea as to the victim’s nonconsent.” Id. They can accomplish that task simply by using Model Utah Jury Instruction 1605: (DEFENDANT’S NAME) is charged [in Count__] with committing Rape [on or about DATE]. You cannot convict [him][her] of this offense unless, based on the evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 1. (DEFENDANT’S NAME); 2. Intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly had sexual intercourse with (VICTIM’S NAME);

knowledge or recklessness that (VICTIM’S NAME) did not consent. MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRS. 2d CR1605 (Advisory Comm. On Criminal Jury Instructions 2015), https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/inc_list.asp?action=s howRule&id=44#1605. There is no wiggle room in that instruction as to whether the mens rea requirement applies to the act of sexual intercourse, the victim’s nonconsent, or both. We thus endorse its use.
Counsel’s Failure to Object to the Jury Instruction for Rape ¶30 Newton claims that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the rape jury instruction, arguing that because Newton admitted to having sexual intercourse with M.F., “consent was the only element at issue.” And, he urges, “[g]iven the totality of the evidence . . . , a reasonable jury could have concluded that the truth about the incident was somewhere in the middle of Newton’s version and [M.F.]’s version.” We disagree. The totality of the evidence—including Newton’s and M.F.’s testimony and her extensive injuries—does not support a finding not decide the issue because Newton’s ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim fails on the prejudice prong. See infra ¶¶ 30–36. 11 STATE v. NEWTON Opinion of the Court that Newton was mistaken as to M.F.’s nonconsent. So even if Newton’s counsel were deficient in failing to object to the jury instruction, Newton has not shown that he was prejudiced by the error. ¶31 Under the second prong of an ineffective-assistance-of counsel-claim, “the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel’s errors actually had an adverse effect on the defense and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Beverly, 2018 UT 60, ¶ 30, 435 P.3d 160 (citation omitted). To show a reasonable probability, the defendant must show “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation omitted). When a court considers whether the defendant has cleared this high hurdle, it “must consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury.” Id. (citation omitted). And thus, “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶32 We held in Barela that the defendant was prejudiced when trial counsel failed to object to a jury instruction misstating the requirement of mens rea as applied to the elements of rape. 2015 UT 22, ¶ 2. In Barela, the defendant, a massage therapist, had sex with his client at a massage studio. Id. ¶ 4. He said that the woman initiated the conduct and that it was consensual. Id. ¶ 5. In contrast, she said the defendant unexpectedly began rubbing her inner thigh, pulled her to the end of the massage table, dropped his pants, and began having vaginal sex with her. Id. ¶ 6. In response she neither physically resisted nor verbally told the defendant “no.” Id. ¶ 7. She instead said and did nothing; she “just froze.” Id. We held that the defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the jury instruction because, if the instruction “had clearly and correctly required the jury to find mens rea as to [the alleged victim’s] nonconsent, the jury could reasonably have acquitted [the defendant] on the basis of a determination that he mistook [the alleged victim’s] reaction for consent.” Id. ¶ 28. And thus, “a reasonable jury . . . could have acquitted [the defendant] if correctly instructed—on the basis of a 12 Cite at: 2020 UT 24 Opinion of the Court determination that [he] had neither knowledge nor recklessness as to [the alleged victim’s] nonconsent.” Id. ¶ 32. 10 ¶33 Unlike the defendant in Barela, Newton has not shown that, but for his counsel’s errors, the jury could have reasonably acquitted him on the basis of a determination that he mistook M.F.’s reaction for consent. To be sure, the record contains two competing versions of what happened on the morning of the assault. But neither supports a finding that Newton mistook M.F.’s actions for consent. That is because, in Newton’s version, M.F. unambiguously consented to—and even initiated—sexual intercourse. In M.F.’s version, however, M.F. unambiguously resisted by “fighting back” and “screaming and crying and pushing [Newton].” In her version, Newton even choked her and threatened her with a gun to force her to have sex with him. ¶34 Neither version gave the jury evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that M.F. did not consent but that Newton mistook her reaction as consent. Unlike in Barela, there is no evidence that M.F., for example, “froze” during the encounter, neither physically resisting Newton nor verbally telling him “no.” See id. ¶ 7. And Newton points to no other evidence that he mistook M.F.’s actions for consent. Indeed, the evidence shows only that she either fought back or initiated the sex. As a result, the jury could not “easily have thought that the truth fell somewhere in between the two accounts,” id. ¶ 30, as Newton argues. So in convicting Newton, the jury must have found that M.F. did not consent and, by extension, must have concluded that Newton “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly had nonconsensual sexual intercourse” with M.F. See Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, ¶ 22 (emphasis added). ¶35 Besides there being no testimony as to ambiguous consent, M.F.’s version was also corroborated by M.F.’s extensive injuries. The record contains evidence that M.F. had been strangled and evidence that M.F. had a genital injury that would __________________________________________________________ 10 In finding prejudice in Barela, we relied on the fact that the alleged victim “just froze,” and we distinguish Newton’s case, in part, on that basis. But by so doing, we do not intend to endorse the premise that when a victim responds to a sexual advance by “freezing,” the defendant automatically has a viable defense to rape (mistake as to the victim’s nonconsent). 13 STATE v. NEWTON Opinion of the Court have been so painful that she would have stopped any consensual sexual intercourse. Plus, she had multiple bruises on her legs and arms. Newton’s evidence at trial did not account for those injuries; 11 M.F.’s did. As a result, this evidence supports a finding that Newton used force during the sexual intercourse and, in turn, a finding that he knew that M.F. did not consent to the intercourse. ¶36 In the end, even if the jury instruction were clearer as to mens rea for nonconsent, a reasonable jury could not have acquitted Newton based on “a determination that [he] had neither knowledge nor recklessness as to [the alleged victim’s] nonconsent.” Barela, 2015 UT 22, ¶ 32. Thus Newton has not shown “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” Beverly, 2018 UT 60, ¶ 30, and his ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim fails for lack of prejudice.