Opinion ID: 599219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: impact of reprosecution on administration of act and justice

Text: 30 In concluding dismissal with prejudice serves the administration of the Act and justice, the district court relied primarily on two arguments. First, the district court explained, [t]o grant dismissal without prejudice would sanction the conduct described herein and undermine the Act. The Supreme Court, however, has specifically rejected this notion. If the deterrent effect of barring reprosecution could alone support a decision to dismiss with prejudice, the consideration of the other [statutory] factors ... would be superfluous, and all violations would warrant barring reprosecution. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342, 108 S.Ct. at 2422. The Supreme Court also emphasizes that dismissal without prejudice is not a toothless sanction but forces the Government to obtain a new indictment and raises potential statute of limitations problems. Id. 31 Second, the district court also emphasized the importance of the § 3161(h)(8)(A) findings on the administration of justice. The court concluded mandatory dismissal serves the administration of justice but never addressed whether dismissal with or without prejudice better served the administration of justice with reference to the facts in this particular case. 32 We conclude the administration of justice in this instance is best served by dismissing without prejudice and allowing reprosecution. In making this determination, a court should consider the prejudice suffered by the defendant from the delay. Kottmyer, 961 F.2d at 573. The district court neglected to evaluate whether the delay caused any prejudice to the Defendant. Although the Supreme Court clarifies that prejudice to the defendant should not be the dispositive factor, the Court notes there is little doubt that Congress intended this factor to be relevant for a district court's consideration. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 334, 108 S.Ct. at 2418. 33 Saltzman suffered no prejudice as a result of the seven-month delay prior to the filing of his information. Because his cooperation with the Government led to a reduced charge, the delay proved beneficial to Saltzman. In his brief, Saltzman claims he suffered prejudice from his incarceration, and did not receive a favorable plea agreement. Because Saltzman was released after thirty-three days of incarceration, he suffered minimal prejudice as a result of the failure to file an indictment within thirty days. Although Saltzman waived his right to contest pretrial detention, any prejudice endured resulting from an unknowing waiver of this right cannot be converted into prejudice resulting from not obtaining a speedy indictment. Speedy indictment prejudice would not commence until the thirtieth day, and in this case is held to be minimal. Further, the plea agreement reduced the Defendant's potential sentence in half. See supra n. 3. Finally, the defendant has a burden under the Act to show specific prejudice other than that occasioned by the original filing. United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir.1987); Peeples, 811 F.2d at 852. Because the Defendant failed to sustain his burden, the administration of justice is best served by dismissal without prejudice. 34 Therefore, the totality of the factors considered under § 3162(a)(1) leads us to conclude dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate remedy. 35 AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. The matter is REMANDED to the District Court for such further proceedings as may be appropriate in accordance with this opinion.