Opinion ID: 1391867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claim for attorney and expert witness fees

Text: The Petersens' appeal is principally concerned with the denial of their claim to $41,500 as attorney and expert witness fees. In 1974, when this action was commenced, RCW 8.25.075 provided that a successful plaintiff in an inverse condemnation suit could recover reasonable attorney and expert witness fees without qualification. Laws of 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 72, § 1, p. 296, amended the statute to provide  that fee awards are contingent upon a plaintiff's obtaining a judgment exceeding by at least 10 percent any written settlement offer of the defendant which was made 30 or more days before trial. The Petersens first contend their claim for fees is founded upon their constitutional right to just compensation. The prerequisites to recovery of fees imposed by the 1977 amendment are therefore alleged to be unconstitutional. We reject this contention. [6] Just compensation, in a constitutional sense, is defined as fair market value. While the determination of market value must be fair and equitable, absent a statute, fees are not recoverable as an aliquot part of just compensation under the constitution. Lange v. State, 86 Wn.2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976); Annot., Eminent Domain  Attorney Fees, 26 A.L.R.2d 1295 (1952). The legislature has recognized that awards in eminent domain proceedings, though constitutional, may fall short of complete compensation because of litigation expenses. Consequently, it has enacted laws designed to encourage settlement and limit extended litigation expense. State v. Roth, 78 Wn.2d 711, 479 P.2d 55 (1971). Because the right to fees is determined by the legislature, any such right granted by the legislature may be reasonably conditioned as is done by the requirements of RCW 8.25.075, as amended. [7] The Petersens next argue that RCW 8.25.075, in its original form, applies because this action was initiated in 1974, before the 1977 amendment. In re Bellingham, 10 Wn. App. 606, 608, 519 P.2d 1330 (1974), considered a similar contention and the Court of Appeals stated: the right to ... attorney fees, as well as the determination of the amount thereof, is governed by the statute in force at the termination of the action, rather than at the time of its commencement. We agree with this statement and, therefore, RCW 8.25.075 in its amended form applies here.  The Port's March 10 offer was within 10 percent of the judgment eventually entered for the Petersens. The question then becomes: Was the offer made 30 days before trial? As above noted, the proceedings beginning on February 27, 1978, decided, adversely to the Port, issues of defense involving both a statute of limitation and acquisition of a prescriptive right. Thereafter, on March 10, the Port made a settlement offer in writing to the Petersens. The offer was refused. Trial to determine the amount of compensation was scheduled for August 7, but it was not held. A judgment on agreed facts was entered October 19, 1978. The trial court, in its judgment on agreed facts, concluded that the offer was made more than thirty days prior to the trial date scheduled to commence on August 7, 1978. The court, however, in rendering its oral opinion following the hearings which began February 27, stated: This is the first of the hearings on bifurcated issues in which the plaintiffs sue for compensation for the alleged taking of a portion of their real property ... While the trial court concluded that the Port had met the requirements of RCW 8.25.075 and was not liable for attorney and expert witness fees, a majority of this court is inclined to disagree. [8] It is our view that the February 27 proceeding was the first portion of a bifurcated trial. Both parties, during the proceeding, referred to it as a trial and reserved opening statements. Several witnesses were called and subjected to direct and cross-examination resulting in four volumes of report of proceedings. Closing arguments were made to the court and the court rendered an oral opinion. The Port's written offer was not made 30 days before the start of trial on February 27 and it is therefore liable for attorney and expert witness fees under RCW 8.25.075. This is in keeping with the legislative encouragement to avoid trials. In light of the legislative objective of settling rather than trying matters such as this, it seems anomalous to  contend that the evaluation of defenses requiring the taking of testimony for several days is not at least a portion of a trial. As stated above, the parties have stipulated $41,500 to be the reasonable, recoverable attorney and witness fees and costs in this matter. The trial court's order of May 30, 1978, is affirmed. The denial of attorney and expert witness fees is reversed. Remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. UTTER, C.J., and ROSELLINI, STAFFORD, WRIGHT, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, DOLLIVER, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. Reconsideration denied November 18, 1980.