Opinion ID: 852348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent to Search of the Vehicle

Text: The defendant's second claim is that the subsequent search of his vehicle was illegal because his consent was invalid. Under Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution, a person who is asked to give consent to search while in police custody is entitled to the presence and advice of counsel prior to making the decision whether to give such consent. Pirtle, 263 Ind. at 29, 323 N.E.2d at 640; Sims, 274 Ind. at 499-500, 413 N.E.2d at 558. It is undisputed that Officer Lackey did not issue this advisement. See Appellant's App'x at 23. Whether the evidence must be suppressed turns on whether the defendant was in custody at the time consent was requested. In distinguishing between custodial encounters (where Pirtle and Sims apply) and non-custodial encounters (where they do not), the ultimate inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a `restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Luna v. State, 788 N.E.2d 832, 833 (Ind.2003) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983)). In answering this question, courts consider all circumstances surrounding the encounter and largely appl[y] an objective test asking whether a reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that she was under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the police. Jones v. State, 655 N.E.2d 49, 55 (Ind.1995). One factor courts have considered is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would feel free to leave, Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 601 (Ind. 2008), but the law is clear that in the context of an investigatory stop a person is, at least temporarily, not free to leave. Established law allows an officer making a traffic stop to detain a person upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and to ask questions to determine identity and verify or disprove the officer's suspicions. Washington, 898 N.E.2d at 1204 (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 334 (1984)). A person stopped by police, while seized and momentarily not free to go, is ordinarily not considered in custody. Clarke v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1114, 1118-19 (Ind.2007); Jones, 655 N.E.2d at 55. Pirtle and its progeny police the line between ordinary investigative detentions and full-blown custodial interrogations by examining the circumstances for objectively overpowering, coercive, or restraining police behavior, such that the facts demonstrate a degree associated with a formal arrest. Melton v. State, 705 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). A non-exhaustive list of relevant factors our cases have identified includes: whether the defendant was read his Miranda rights, handcuffed, restrained in any way, or told that he was a suspect in a crime, e.g., Torres v. State, 673 N.E.2d 472, 474 (Ind.1996); how vigorous was the law enforcement interrogation, e.g., Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 363-65 (Ind. 2006); whether police suggested the defendant should cooperate, implied adverse consequences for noncooperation, or suggested that the defendant was not free to go about his business, e.g., id.; Clarke, 868 N.E.2d at 1120-21; and the length of the detention, e.g., Cooley v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1277, 1279 (Ind.1997). Here, the record reveals nothing more than a conventional traffic stop. Viewed most favorably to the trial court's decision, the record shows only that Officer Lackey stopped the defendant for a traffic infraction (permitted in: Lockett v. State, 747 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind.2001)); asked the defendant for his license (permitted in: id. at 541); based on his perception of the smell of alcohol and the defendant's red eyes and nervousness, asked the defendant to perform a sobriety test (permitted in: id.; Wilson v. State, 745 N.E.2d 789, 791 (Ind.2001)); and then asked for consent to search the vehicle (permitted in: Clarke, 868 N.E.2d at 1120-21). Absent anything in the record pointing the other way, [t]reatment of this sort cannot fairly be characterized as the functional equivalent of formal arrest. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138. Compare, e.g., Conwell v. State, 714 N.E.2d 764 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (finding detained motorist in custody when officer immediately ordered driver out of car, handcuffed him, and placed him in a choke hold). Officer Lackey testified at the suppression hearing that he himself believed the defendant wasn't free to go. Appellant's App'x at 23. Nevertheless, [w]hether a person was in custody depends upon objective circumstances, not upon the subjective views of the interrogating officers or the subject being questioned. Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied. The record reveals no clues that Officer Lackey conveyed this belief to the defendant. The only inference we can draw from this record is simply that, had the defendant refused the search, Officer Lackey would have done no more than issue a citation for the license plate violation, and the defendant would have then been free to leave. See Washington, 898 N.E.2d at 1204 ([T]he detainee is not obligated to respond, and `unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released.' (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138)); see also Jones, 655 N.E.2d at 56. The defendant was not in custody, and thus no Pirtle/Sims warning was necessary. The trial court did not err in refusing to exclude the evidence on this basis.