Opinion ID: 768725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reckless Disregard for the Truth

Text: 20 With these precepts in view, we must first consider whether Wilson adduced sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude that Russo made statements or omissions that he knew [were] false, or would have known [were] false except for his reckless disregard for the truth. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). In Franks, the Court held that where a defendant showed by the preponderance of the evidence that a false statement necessary to the finding of probable cause was made knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, the constitution requires that any evidence derived from the exercise of that warrant had be excluded from a criminal trial. Id. at 155. But as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has lamented, [u]nfortunately, the Supreme Court in Franks gave no guidance concerning what constitutes a reckless disregard for the truth in fourth amendment cases, except to state that `negligence or innocent mistake[is] insufficient.'  United States v. Davis , 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). This case, with its hybrid allegation (Russo purportedly doctored some facts and failed to inform the judge of others) requires us to acknowledge that reckless disregard for the truth means different things when dealing with omissions and assertions, and to explain the different methodologies for dealing with each.
21 All storytelling involves an element of selectivity. We cannot demand that police officers relate the entire history of events leading up to a warrant application with every potentially evocative detail that would interest a novelist or gossip (. . . the witness blushed when I mentioned the gun, and blinked six times while studying the photographic array. I noticed his hand crept up to his lips (which were chapped) . . .). On the other hand, one of the reasons for requiring a neutral magistrate to evaluate probable cause is that an uninterested party is presumably better suited to review and evaluate the facts than an officer pursuing a lead. The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980)). It follows that a police officer cannot make unilateral decisions about the materiality of information, or, after satisfying himor herself that probable cause exists, merely inform the magistrate or judge of inculpatory evidence. 22 Recognizing the tension between the extreme models that could arise if either of these competing concerns were taken alone--requiring a police officer to tell all, and permitting a police officer to independently determine materiality--we follow the common sense approach of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and hold that omissions are made with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his ken that [a]ny reasonable person would have known that this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know. United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 1993). In Jacobs, the court concluded that the officer acted with reckless disregard when he told the magistrate that a drug sniffing dog showed interest in the bag of the defendant but failed to inform the magistrate that it had not gone into alert. Id. at 1234.Because of the highly relevant nature of the omitted information, the court held that the omission occurred at least with reckless disregard of its effect upon the affidavit. Id. 23 Wilson alleges that Rosso made the following omissions in his warrant application: (1) he did not tell the judge that although Officer Lipp's investigative report stated that the robber was between 6'3 and 6'5, Wilson's driver's abstract indicated that he was 5'11; (2) he did not tell the judge that Druce did not pick Wilson out of an array; (3) he did not tell the judge that in the photo array, Wilson looked ethnically different from the others; and (4) he did not mention that height and weight were not indicated on the photo array. 24 Applying the test adopted above, we address these contentions in turn. Any reasonable person would know that the significant height differential, and the fact that an eyewitness-victim did not identify Wilson, were the kind of thing[s] the judge would wish to know. Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1235. On the other hand, we do not believe that an officer can be expected to communicate the apparent ethnicity of the victim, or slight variations in appearance on the photographic line-up absent circumstances making these factors more important or prejudicial. Finally, the fact that height and weight were not listed on the photo array is so routine as to be unremarkable to a judge. Although these latter facts could be used for impeachment at trial, a police officer cannot be expected to present a judge with complete background.
25 Unlike omissions, assertions can be made with reckless disregard for the truth even if they involve minor details-recklessness is measured not by the relevance of the information, but the demonstration of willingness to affirmatively distort truth. In applying the reckless disregard test to assertions, we have borrowed from the free speech arena and equated reckless disregard for the truth with a high degree of awareness of [the statements'] probable falsity. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1501 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)); see also United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 1995) (reckless disregard for the truth is exhibited when expressing that which was not believed or appropriately accepted as true). An assertion is made with reckless disregard when viewing all the evidence, the affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the information he reported. Clapp, 46 F.3d at 801 n.6. 26 Applying these tests to this case, Russo had reasons to doubt the accuracy of his intimation that he had personally investigated the entire case and interviewed the witnesses after the robbery. More importantly, a jury could conclude that Russo must have entertained serious doubts about the truth of his statement that the dental worker had seen Wilson around 3:00, instead of around 3:30. Because he told the judge about DaVila's identification, Russo must have learned of DaVila's statement from somewhere; a jury could infer that he learned of it from the transcript of DaVila's statement or a complete report, either of which would include her statement that she saw Wilson about a half an hour before the police arrived, which would place her sighting at about 3:30. If Russo knew of the time difference, he had obvious reasons to doubt his assertion to the judge that a witness saw Wilson around 3:00. 27 As to the other information from the other officers' reports, Wilson did not adduce any evidence that Russo would have examined these reports as a matter of course or policy, or any evidence from which a jury could infer knowledge of their content. Moreover, there is no evidence that Russo knew that the array was developed from Wilson's photo alone. Therefore, a jury could not conclude that his representation that the array was made as a result of the physical descriptions was made with reckless disregard of the truth. 5