Opinion ID: 1774411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Why the Trial Court's Ruling Declaring the Ordinance Unconstitutional Should be Addressed

Text: This Court entertains this case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, invoked by the City of Baton Rouge pursuant to Article V, § 5(D)(1) of Louisiana's 1974 Constitution since it involves review of a trial court's determination that a municipal ordinance is unconstitutional. [1] The distinction between supervisory and appellate jurisdiction is a continuation of existing terminology, `supervisory' referring to the court's discretionary jurisdiction under which it has the power to select the cases it will hear, and `appellate' contemplating cases in which a party as a matter of right can demand that the court hear a case.  Lee Hargrave, The Judiciary Article of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 37 La.L.Rev. 765, 795 (1977) ( emphasis added ). As then-Chairman (now Justice) Dennis put it during the constitutional convention, Subparagraph (D) [of Article V] provides for cases which are appealable of right to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by virtue of its supervisory jurisdiction can hear any case that it chooses that arises in the Louisiana court system, however, Subparagraph (D) says that it must hear these kind of cases. It must grant the appeal and hear the case described in Subparagraph (D) .... State of Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 Verbatim Transcripts, August 15, 1973 at 51. The traditional rule in Louisiana was that when a case fell within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, this Court was entitled to review only those issues which had invoked its appellate jurisdiction and no others. See State v. Verret, 87 So.2d 297 (La.1956); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So.2d 798 (1953); State v. Bonner, 193 La. 400, 190 So. 625 (1939); City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Butchers' Co-op. Abattoir, 153 La. 536, 96 So. 113 (1923); Town of Ruston v. Fountain, 118 La. 53, 42 So. 644 (1906); State v. Marshall, 24 So. 186 (La. 1898); State v. Zurich, 21 So. 977 (La.1896); Municipality No. 3 v. Blanc, 1 La.Ann. 385 (La.1846). The Supreme Court's jurisdiction in such matters was exclusive, with review of any other issues presented by the case being conducted in the proper circuit or appellate tribunal after the Supreme Court had completed its appellate review. Id. This approach continued to be the rule until the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 was amended by La.Acts.1958, No. 561. That amendment added the following language to the final paragraph of Article VII, § 10 of the 1921 Constitution, the section addressing the Supreme Court's appellate and supervisory jurisdiction: If a case is appealed properly to the Supreme Court on any issue, the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all other issues involved in the case. The meaning of this amendment to the 1921 Constitution was explained by this Court in Tucker v. New Orleans Laundries, Inc., 241 La. 11, 127 So.2d 182, 183 (1961): The purpose of this provision is to prevent a division of appellate jurisdiction in any one appeal between this court and a court of appeal. What the provision means is that if an appeal is properly made to this court because the case falls within one of the categories stipulated in Article 7, Section 10, the whole appeal is before this court, and not just the issue which gives us appellate jurisdiction. Accord, Broussard v. National Food Stores of La., Inc., 258 La. 493, 246 So.2d 838 (1971) ( collecting cases ). Louisiana's 1974 Constitution generally continued this rule in Article V, § 5(F), which provides as follows: (F) Appellate Jurisdiction; Civil Cases; Extent. Subject to the provisions in Paragraph (C), [2] the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all issues involved in a civil action properly before it. See also Hargrave, supra, at 803. Under the current constitutional scheme, therefore, this Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction over all issues [3] in a civil action properly before it, which includes, as this Court has recognized, cases in which a supervisory writ has been granted. See Board of Comm'nrs of the Orleans Levee District v. Connick, 94-3161, p. 2 (La.1995); 654 So.2d 1073, 1074, citing Daily Advertiser v. Trans-La, 612 So.2d 7, 15 n. 14 (La.1993) ( citations omitted ). However, this provision expressly applies only to civil actions, i.e. to [e]very action other than a criminal action. Black's Law Dictionary, P. 312 (Rev. 4th ed., 1968) ( citations omitted ). The language of Article V, § 5(F) must be read in contrast to its predecessor in the 1921 Constitution, the last paragraph of Article VII, § 10, which applied to cases appealed properly to the Supreme Court on any issue.  Applying the interpretative maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, [4] I conclude that the practice of extending appellate jurisdiction to all issues in a criminal case properly before this Court is not sanctioned by the 1974 Constitution. Indeed, any argument that the broad rule of the 1921 Constitution, encompassing both criminal and civil actions, is retained in the face of the more specific language of Article V, § 5(F) of the 1974 Constitution would render the latter superfluous. It is not my view, however, that this Court is entirely without authority to address the nonconstitutional issues encompassed by the trial court's ruling. Rather, the 1974 Constitution grants this Court plenary power of discretionary review in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction. La. Const. Art. 5, § 5(A). The fact that this case has come to us under the rubric of an appeal does not prevent this Court from treating the City of Baton Rouge's pleadings regarding the nonconstitutional issues as an application for supervisory writs, granting the same and resolving those issues. Compare State v. Peacock, 461 So.2d 1040 (La.1984); State v. Alfred, 337 So.2d 1049 (La.1976). The distinction, however, is that in the absence of a corollary provision to Article V, § 5(F) in the criminal arena, any jurisdiction this Court exercises over the nonconstitutional issues in this case is discretionary supervisory jurisdiction and not mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Hargrave, supra, at 799. In the exercise of its discretion, this Court has traditionally shown some reluctance in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction until all mechanisms of judicial review available in lower courts are exhausted. [5] See State v. Wimberly, 414 So.2d 666, 670 (La.1982) ( on rehearing ), quoting State ex rel. City of New Orleans v. The Judge of the Sixth District Court, 32 La.Ann. 549 (La.1880). See also Albert Tate, Supervisory Powers of the Louisiana Courts of Appeal, 38 Tul.L.Rev. 429 (1964); Comment, Supervisory Powers of the Supreme Court of Louisiana over Inferior Courts, 34 Tul.L.Rev. 165 (1959). While admittedly the nonconstitutional issues presented by this case are res nova, not yet having been passed upon by any appellate court of this state, nonetheless the question of the preemptive reach of LSA-R.S. 14:143 is of such importance to the functioning of the criminal justice process statewide that I agree that it is prudent for this Court to entertain the issue at this time. This does not mean, however, that this Court is free to pretermit consideration of the trial court's declaration that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional. I believe that this Court must attempt to give some meaning to the language of our 1974 Constitution, and that the aforementioned discussion of the pertinent constitutional provisions reveals a design wherein, in criminal matters, mandatory appellate jurisdiction must be exercised in priority to discretionary supervisory jurisdiction. Since I am of the view that it is unwise to consider the distinctions drawn in the language of our Constitution meaningless, I feel that it is appropriate to reach the constitutional issues presented by this case, and proceed now to do so.