Opinion ID: 2428536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In a different category are these questions:

Text: (1) Have you been sued by any other user of `Cheer' washing powders in any court in the United States? If so, give name of parties, court in which suit was brought, name and address of attorneys representing injured persons. (2) Have you received complaints from the users of `Cheer' washing powder prior to the date of the filing of this action, if so, list the names and address of all persons from whom such correspondence has been received along with the date same was received with a short summary of the contents of each piece of correspondence. The trial court had previously ruled the defendant was not required to answer an interrogatory as to whether it had received complaints from users of their product and, if any, to file the complaints in their original form. The appellee contends the information sought would reveal whether or not the defendant had or should have had prior knowledge of the dangerous character of its product alleged to have caused her injury. She argues that it is within the terms of CR 26.02 as it relates to the existence of other tangible things relevant to the subject matter of her case. The rules in relation to discovery are indeed broad. It has been said that the way for fishing expeditions has been opened. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 392, 91 L.Ed. 451. But that opinion says discovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate and necessary boundaries. Whatever the complaints  well founded or baseless, or involving persons of various allergies or sensitiveness, or different circumstances and conditions  they have no relevancy to the merits of the case at bar, nor do the records of other suits based upon such complaints. We do not construe the rule as being so broad and unlimited in range as to reasonably require discovery where there are so many divergent and immaterial elements and factors, which, of necessity, must appear in other complaints and litigation. III. The defendant answered an interrogatory stating that Proctor and Gamble Company had conducted experiments calculated to determine the physical effects that the product had upon users of it. Coupled to that part of the interrogatory was the demand that the defendant file all data that you have concerning these experiments. The court did not require the filing of detailed data but ruled the defendant should state what the physical effects of such experiments were. The defendant did not claim the information was not available to it. The response was that the data is very voluminous and entailed much work and was not in the defendant's possession but in the possession of the Proctor and Gamble Company. Fifteen days were given for response. Motion for fifteen days further time was overruled. We are of opinion that in the absence of a showing of nonavailability of the results of the experiments, the court's ruling on this question was proper although further time might well have been granted. IV. In response to an interrogatory, the defendant gave the chemical contents of its product but respectfully declined to disclose the exact proportions or percentages of these ingredients, the same being a trade secret. Another inquiry was whether the chemical content had been changed since it was first manufactured and if so, what the changes were. The defendant answered that the content had not been changed except to a more pleasing perfume and a very small amount of a nonreactive blue pigment was added to give it a blue color. The court ruled that the percentage that each ingredient bore to the total product need not be disclosed unless it shall be shown by the evidence that the use of a large proportion of any one of the ingredients used in the manufacture of the soap powder `Cheer' would have an injurious effect upon the skin of its users, in which event the defendant shall be required to state the percentage of such ingredient. The right to discovery and inspection of matters which constitute trade secrets and the corresponding right to maintain them, or, in some instances, to safeguard them, present difficult questions of definition and of limitation on the court's discretion. 17 Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, Suppl. Sec. 205; Annotations, 17 A.L.R.2d 383, op. cit. 404; Moore's Federal Practice, Sec. 26.22(3); 30.12. In the instant case the court did not require present disclosure. It will be time enough to review any definite ruling when it is made. We cannot concur in the rulings of the trial court requiring answers to the foregoing interrogatories which are of major importance. Nor can we concur in his view that the delay in conforming to the demands of the plaintiff for answers to others within the time allowed manifested a wilful refusal. It seems to us good faith and an honest effort were being made, insofar as possible, to answer the interrogatories except such as the defendant contended it should not be required to answer. This conclusion takes the ground from under the judgment rendered as by default under the provisions of CR 37.05. This section is construed in Armstrong v. Biggs, an opinion delivered today, reversing a judgment rendered as by default against defendants in an action for not having appeared at the time and place designated to give their oral depositions. The judgment is reversed.