Opinion ID: 72403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Banks Test Objection and Rollover Rate SUV Objection

Text: 5 At trial, Heath was given the opportunity to object to the jury instructions. In fact, Heath did object to the rollover rate charge. Heath, at trial, properly challenged the use of the word rate in the rollover rate jury charge because, Heath contends, proving a rate inherently requires the use of statistical evidence, and the trial court, through a pretrial order, barred the use of such evidence at trial. On the other hand, Heath never objected at trial 4 to the jury instructions on the specific grounds that the jury charges violated Banks. Similarly, Heath never objected to the language of the rollover rate instruction on the grounds that the charge improperly limited the comparison in the rollover rate charge to SUV's. Failure to object to the instructions on these grounds before the jury retired constituted a waiver by Heath of these objections; there is no indication in the record that Heath ever asked the trial court for a ruling on these legal issues or that the trial court was ever aware of the need for such a ruling. See McClow v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 842 F.2d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir.1988); Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 (No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.) (emphasis added). We will depart from this rule of waiver only in narrow circumstances when an error is so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or when the district court's instruction amounts to plain error. Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1533 (11th Cir.1987), aff'd sub nom., 489 U.S. 169, 109 S.Ct. 987, 103 L.Ed.2d 146 (1989) (citations omitted). We now turn our analysis to the question of plain error. 6 Heath's briefs to this court plainly indicate that the law in Georgia is not clear with regard to the requirements of the Banks risk-utility test. 5 It is for this reason that we decline to find the jury instructions drafted by the trial court constituted plain error. As we noted in Osterneck, a court's reasonable interpretation of the contours of an area of legal uncertainty hardly could give rise to plain error when those contours are, as they are here, in a state of evolving definition and uncertainty. See 825 F.2d at 1533, citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 256, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2754, 69 L.Ed.2d 616, (1981). There is every indication that the district court acted within the bounds of the Banks test in drafting the jury charges, 6 including the rollover rate charge. Accordingly, we find no plain error by the district court with regard to plaintiff's first two challenges to the jury instructions. 7