Opinion ID: 161852
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timing of the Allen Instruction

Text: 73 Because of the failure to incorporate the Allen charge with the other jury instructions and the flawed language employed in the instruction (the omission plus the embellishments), our confidence in the integrity of the deliberation process has been substantially undermined. In spite of these considerations, the government still argues that the jury's verdict was not a product of coercion because of the timing of the instruction, that is, the length of deliberations after the Allen charge was issued. We cannot agree. 74 As a preliminary matter, we note that the record does not support the government's contention that the jury deliberated for six hours after having received the supplemental Allen charge. All that is known is the following: (1) The jury first informed the district court of the deadlock at approximately 10:30 a.m.; (2) at some point, the jury was called into the courtroom during which the district court asked it to deliberate until noon; (3) at 12:17 p.m., the jury sent a second note to the district court, asking to review some evidence; (4) the jury shortly thereafter had its lunch break; (5) at 1:50 p.m., the jury sent yet another note to the district court, again asking to reconsider more evidence (i.e., a readback of Mr. Hawley's testimony); (6) the readback did not take place for another two hours; (7) the readback lasted for an hour; and (8) ten minutes after the readback i.e., at 5:00 p.m. a verdict was returned. 75 The record does not reveal such facts as (1) precisely when the jury began its deliberations after receiving the Allen charge; (2) how long the lunch break lasted; and (3) whether the jury deliberated during the time the readback was being prepared for their reconsideration (i.e., from 1:50 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.). Given these missing facts, we estimate that, in the very best case scenario itself unlikely the jurors could only have deliberated for four hours (from 10:30 a.m. to 12:17 p.m., from 1:50 p.m. to 3:50 p.m., and from 4:50 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.), and, in the worst case, for one-and-a-half hours (from 10:30 a.m. to 12:17 p.m. and from 4:50 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.). 76 The government points out, however, that in prior cases this court has approved Allen charges in which the timing was as short as an hour and twenty minutes. See, e.g., McKinney, 822 F.2d at 950 (noting that the district court gave the jury a full-fledged Allen instruction after which [t]he jury again resumed its deliberation, and an hour and twenty minutes later returned a unanimous verdict); see also United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that two hours after the Allen charge was given the jury returned a verdict of guilty). But see Due Process, 53 Va. L. Rev. at 133 (noting that there are no consistent standards when it comes to timing i.e., some courts have affirmed a verdict in instances in which the jury deliberated for only a short time after receiving an Allen instruction while other courts have reversed). 77 The government is correct in noting the timing of these cases. But what the government fails to recognize is that, in these cases, the trial court did not employ any faulty language, certainly none comparable to the case at hand. Most importantly, in these cases, the trial court did not omit the all-important cautionary language that the jurors should not yield any convictions conscientiously held simply to reach a verdict. See McKinney, 822 F.2d at 950 (noting that the Allen charge admonished the jurors not to yield any conscientious convictions they may have as to the weight or the effect of the evidence; also stating that the charge contained cautionary language remind[ing] the jurors that they must acquit the defendant if the evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Butler, 904 F.2d at 1488 (noting that Allen charge instructed jury that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence and that it is your duty to agree on a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction; also noting that instruction contained cautionary language reminding jury of the burden of proof). 78 Given this distinction, we cannot place much stock in the cases on which the government relies. Instead, we look to cases such as Smalls and Mason. In both of these decisions, the timing of the instruction did not overcome the coerciveness arising from the flawed language of the charge. See Smalls, 191 F.3d at 281 ([T]he jury charge . . . lacked any such cautionary language and failed to inform the jurors of the possibility that they could remain deadlocked rather than surrender their conscientiously held beliefs. The length of deliberations in this case did not diminish the coerciveness of the supplemental jury charge.); Mason, 658 F.2d at 1265 (noting that the jury did not return a verdict until an hour and a half after the Allen instruction but ultimately concluding that the instruction was impermissibly coercive). 79 Finally, we are not convinced by the government's argument that, because the jury deliberated beyond noon in response to the district court's suggestion of an additional deliberation period until noon, the Allen charge had no coercive effect. We agree with the government to the extent that, if the jury had rendered its verdict by noon in these circumstances, there would be a strong argument that the jury was coerced. 80 In fact, cases such as Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966), and Goff v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971), suggest that setting a time deadline exacerbated the coercive effect of the Allen charge. We point to this court's comments in Burroughs: 81 [I]t is one thing to recall the jury to beseech them to reason together, and it is quite another to entreat them to strive toward a verdict by a certain time. When these admonitions are considered in their context, they are subject to the clear inference that the judge was unduly anxious to conclude the lawsuit, and we think it entirely reasonable to infer that the jury was aware of his anxiety. This type of verdict-urging on the part of the court tends to undermine the proper function of the common law jury system . . . . 82 365 F.2d at 434. To put the matter more succinctly, [a] court's attempt to secure [a] quick verdict prevents fair and thoughtful deliberation by [a] jury. 75B Am. Jur. 2d 1601, at 367-68; see also Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (criticizing the trial court for suggesting to the jury that it was more important to be quick than to be thoughtful); Goff, 446 F.2d at 626 (concluding that [i]t was impermissibly suggestive and coercive for the Court to place a time fuse [i.e., a deadline] on the period of jury deliberation).