Opinion ID: 2549808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: r.cr.p. 32(a)(3)(c)

Text: [¶ 8] The appellant's complaints are related, but distinct. First, he faults the district court for considering controverted material contained in the PSI. Second, he contends that the district court should not have considered victim impact testimony from someone who was not the victim of the crime to which he pled guilty. Assessment of these claims must begin with a review of relevant statutes and court rules. [¶ 9] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-407(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003) directs state probation and parole agents to investigate cases referred by any court and to report to the court in writing. W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) implements this directive in regard to PSI's. At issue in the instant case is W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C), which establishes the procedure that is to be followed when a defendant contests matters contained in the PSI: If the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make: (i) A finding as to the allegation; or (ii) A determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. A written record of such findings and determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence investigation report thereafter made available to penal institutions. [¶ 10] As indicated above, the district court explicitly relied upon the contested charges that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. The appellant's primary grievance is that the district court did so without making the findings required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C)(i). The appellant contends that this case is distinguishable from Blankinship v. State, 974 P.2d 377, 380 (Wyo.1999) (district court did not rely on the contested information); Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 823 (Wyo.1996) (disputed matters either not factual or not crucial to sentencing); Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117-18 (district court either did not rely on the contested matters or resolved them against the defendant on the record); and Christy v. State, 731 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Wyo.1987) (defendant did not deny or object to the PSI information). See also Van Riper v. State, 999 P.2d 646, 648-49 (Wyo.2000) (due process not violated where district court considered defendant's corrections and noted them in writing on the PSI). [¶ 11] The basis of the appellant's argument is not that the district court took into account crimes other than the one to which he pled guilty. Indeed, he concedes that we have previously recognized that W.R.Cr.P. 32(a) authorizes the admission at sentencing of criminal history and character evidence. Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1116. The appellant's argument is, instead, that by considering other crime evidence without making the findings required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C), the district court has violated his due process right to be sentenced only on accurate information. See Swingholm v. State, 910 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Wyo.1996); Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117; and Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo.1989). [¶ 12] The State counters the appellant's arguments by citing to several cases where, despite a technical violation of W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C), this Court affirmed the conviction and sentence because no prejudice had been shown or because the appellant had not proved that the sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper premises. See Blankinship, 974 P.2d at 379; Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo.1996); Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990); and Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo.1989). In addition, the State contends that the district court complied with W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) by making the finding that it did not believe the appellant's denials. [¶ 13] Before we can determine whether the district court abused its discretion, we must evaluate how W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) is supposed to work. In particular, we need to know what obligation or burden a defendant carries and, in turn, what is to guide the exercise of the court's discretion. The cases relied upon by the parties and cited previously herein reflect Wyoming's developing jurisprudence in that regard. [¶ 14] In Christy, 731 P.2d at 1207-08, we determined that the trial court may consider filed reports and information at sentencing, so long as the defendant is given the opportunity to deny, dispute, or disprove. Two years later, in Smallwood, 771 P.2d at 802, we described this as an opportunity to rebut pre-sentence information which is materially false or which furnishes invalid premises for the sentence which the judge is imposing. In Clouse, 776 P.2d at 1015, we made clear that it is the defendant's obligation to object to any sentencing information he contends is inaccurate. And in Johnson, 790 P.2d at 236 ( quoting Christy, 731 P.2d at 1208), we stated that objecting is not alone sufficient and we reiterated that a defendant must challenge the accuracy of the information and has the duty to deny, dispute, or disprove it. [¶ 15] Although these cases all declare that it is the defendant's burden to contest what he considers inaccurate information in the PSI, none of the cases directly addresses the issue of the specific burden of proof or, for that matter, the appropriate procedure for disproving such information. In Smallwood, 771 P.2d at 802 n. 2, we noted some interesting articles concerning this problem, but we made no attempt to resolve it. In the instant case, neither party has suggested an appropriate resolution. [¶ 16] How contested PSI information issues are handled in the trial court will affect their disposition on appeal. We have identified the appellant's burden in this Court as follows: Having demonstrated procedural error, however, Wayt remains obliged to show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo.1990) (quoted with approval in Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo.1993)). Further, it is his burden to establish that the sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper premises. Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo.1989). Johnson and Smallwood, although decided prior to adoption of the current Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, apply to review of due process challenges brought under the current W.R.Cr.P. 32. Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1115. Wayt, 912 P.2d at 1109. See also Van Riper, 999 P.2d at 649. It goes without saying that there must be some evidentiary basis for the district court's findings under W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C)(i). Logically, that evidence must be developed in the district court, before the findings are made. How that is to be accomplished is beyond the scope of this opinion inasmuch as it has not been addressed by the parties. [2] [¶ 17] Once a defendant has alleged a factual inaccuracy in the PSI, the district court must either make a finding as to the contested matter or make a determination that no finding is necessary because the matter will not be considered for sentencing. In the instant case, the district court clearly did not follow the latter route because he specifically relied upon the dismissed charges in sentencing the appellant. Consequently, before relying on that information, the district court was obligated to make a finding based on sufficient evidence that the information was reliable, to develop a written record supporting that finding, and to append that record to the PSI. None of that was done in this case. [¶ 18] This is not a case where the district court either disregarded the contested matters or simply failed to append the findings to the PSI. In this case, the district court relied upon the contested matter in sentencing without making a record or a finding as to the reliability of the information. Further, the contested matter, being the charges dismissed in the plea agreement, was particularly relevant to sentencing. Neither the fact that the charges were bound over for trial after a probable cause hearing nor the fact that the district court did not believe the appellant is a sufficient finding that the appellant committed the contested offenses. This is particularly so because the plea agreement was reached before any trial testimony was heard. Simply put, there was no evidentiary basis for the district court's determination, meaning such was an abuse of discretion.