Opinion ID: 2517913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Establishing the standard

Text: Holt initially contends that courts do not possess the authority to impose any filing restrictions. We disagree. We have generally recognized that courts have the powers necessary for the administration of justice: [A] court has certain inherent powers it may exercise, those reasonably necessary for the administration of justice, provided these powers in no way contravene or are inconsistent with substantive statutory law. [Citations omitted.] Such powers may be exercised as a means of enforcing obedience to a law which the court is called on to administer. Wilson v. American. Fidelity Ins. Co., 229 Kan. 416, 421, 625 P.2d 1117 (1981). See also Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood v. Kline, 287 Kan. 372, 429, 197 P.3d 370 (2008) (Davis, J., concurring) (inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion). Included in a court's inherent power is the ability to control its docket. Air Line Pilots v. Miller, 523 U.S. 866, 879 n. 6, 118 S.Ct. 1761, 140 L.Ed.2d 1070 (1998); Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). As a means of controlling the docket, federal courts have recognized the inherent power of a court to impose reasonable filing restrictions to curb abusive filing practices. See, e.g., Cromer v. Kraft Foods North America, Inc., 390 F.3d 812 (4th Cir.2004); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.1982); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254 (2d Cir.1984); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C.Cir.1981); Gordon v. United States Dept. of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir.1977); see also Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir.2008) (`Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.') (quoting Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1077 [10th Cir.2007]). Such limitations are consistent with the principle that the right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, [citation omitted] and there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious. [Citations omitted.] Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir.1989). The power to impose filing restrictions is not without limitations, however. See, e.g., Tripati, 878 F.2d at 352. (conditions cannot be so burdensome, however, as to deny a litigant meaningful access to the courts); Cromer, 390 F.3d at 819 (order preventing plaintiff from ever filing documents in a particular case was overbroad); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 810-11 (6th Cir.1996) (absolute bar to further litigation is too broad); Matter of Davis, 878 F.2d 211, 212 (7th Cir.1989) (absolute bars violate constitutional and statutory rights of access to the courts); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir.1986) (district courts have a variety of options, but cannot completely foreclose a party from any access to the court). The majority of appellate decisions on this issue involve reviews of filing restrictions imposed by district courts. But when a party engages in abusive practices in the appellate courts, even those courts have imposed their own restrictions, both on a party's ability to appeal and to file original actions. For example, in In re Winslow, 17 F.3d 314 (10th Cir.1994), the Winslows appealed from the district court's affirmance of bankruptcy court orders allowing sale of certain realty and a stipulated settlement with two estate creditors. The Tenth Circuit determined that the Winslows' complaints are the same allegations which the Winslows have raised [on 17 occasions] over the last ten years. 17 F.3d at 315. The court then imposed enumerated restrictions on future filings because of the Winslows' history of repetitive filings and abuse of the judicial process. 17 F.3d at 314-15. In essence, the court prohibited the Winslows from filing future pro se appeals or original actions unless they first obtained permission from the Circuit's Chief Judge. The Chief Judge was to review all proposed filings and, if all the restrictions were met and the pleadings approved, the clerk would be directed to file the document(s). 17 F.3d at 315-17. The court also provided the Winslows with an opportunity to object to the proposed filing restrictions. 17 F.3d at 317. In another case concerning abusive filing practices with the Tenth Circuit, that court imposed both monetary sanctions and filing restrictions on future appeals that raised claims decided by appellants prior appeals or were related to the claims brought in those appeals. Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir.2008). The Kansas Court of Appeals opinion in State ex rel. Stovall v. Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 975 P.2d 813 (1999), is consistent with this federal jurisprudence. While Lynn's direct appeal of his numerous criminal convictions was pending, he filed multiple civil causes of action in district court arising out of his convictions. The State filed a petition seeking reasonable filing restrictions. After a hearing, which Lynn attended via telephone from prison, the court granted a permanent injunction and placed conditions on filing. These included, among other things, filing with the court an application for leave to file a petition or pleading except for notices of appeal; providing a list of all lawsuits currently pending or previously filed involving the same claims or parties and their disposition; providing an affidavit certifying that the claims had not been previously asserted, that the claims were not frivolous or made in bad faith, and that they complied with all civil and appellate procedures and rules. Finally, the administrative judge would review the proposed pleadings and would allow them to be filed only if they were not lacking in merit, were not duplicative and were not frivolous. 26 Kan.App.2d at 81, 975 P.2d 813. The Lynn panel noted that `[T]he goal of fairly dispensing justice ... is compromised when the Court is forced to devote its limited resources to the processing of repetitious and frivolous [claims].' 26 Kan.App.2d at 82, 975 P.2d 813 (quoting In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179-80, 111 S.Ct. 596, 112 L.Ed.2d 599 [1991]). It also observed that litigiousness alone was insufficient reason to restrict access to the court, but that restrictions are appropriate where a party has `engaged in a pattern of litigation activity which is manifestly abusive.' 26 Kan.App.2d at 82, 975 P.2d 813 (relying on Johnson v. Cowley, 872 F.2d 342, 344 [10th Cir.1989]). The court cautioned that restrictions on a person's right to access to the courts must be carefully drawn and not be unnecessarily restrictive. 26 Kan.App.2d at 82, 975 P.2d 813. After concluding that the main purpose of the suits was to aid Lynn in his appeal, it also determined that he was using the suits to attempt to harass various personnel involved in his case. It then affirmed these reasonable restrictions imposed on Lynn. We generally agree with these authorities. Within the district court's inherent power to manage litigation is the ability to curb abusive filing practices that place a strain on the judicial system. Consistent with this inherent power, we additionally note that K.S.A. 60-211 authorizes courts to impose sanctions for pleadings, motions, and other papers that are presented for improper purposes and that are not warranted by existing law (unless making a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law). We further observe that when monetary sanctions are imposed under the statute against an inmate such as Holt, the Secretary of Corrections is authorized to disburse the money from the inmate's account. K.S.A. 60-211(f). The existence of a sanctioning statute or rule does not exclude invocation of the court's inherent power. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49-50, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). We also agree that when imposing filing restrictions, the restrictions shall be reasonable: for example, with enumerated prefiling conditions. See, e.g., In re Winslow, 17 F.3d 314; Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 975 P.2d 813. Blanket prohibitions, however, would deny a party's future access to the courts and constitute an over extension of the inherent authority. Blanket restrictions would also be contrary to certain Kansas statutory authority. For example, while motions under K.S.A. 60-1507 can be denied because they are successive, K.S.A. 21-2512 expressly permits a person in State custody to petition the court that entered judgment for forensic DNA testing at any time after conviction for murder. See, e.g., State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 644-45, 101 P.3d 1257 (2004) (court addressed DNA testing motion filed 9 years after conviction). Similarly, K.S.A. 22-3504 explicitly allows an illegal sentence to be corrected at any time. State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, Syl. ¶ 10, 218 P.3d 432 (2009). We further agree that before the court-imposed filing restrictions become effective, the party subject to them is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in opposition. See, e.g., Tripati, 878 F.2d at 354 (requiring the same and citing other jurisdictions imposing this requirement); Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 975 P.2d 813; Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir.2008); Cromer, 390 F.3d at 819. But the objecting party is not required to be physically present. See, e.g., Tripati, 878 F.2d at 354 (The notice and opportunity requirement does not, however, require an in-person hearing in the district court. Mr. Tripati is perfectly capable of reducing his objections to writing.); Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 975 P.2d 813 (inmate telephonically participated in hearing on proposed filing restrictions from prison); cf. In re Winslow, 17 F.3d at 316 (Winslows shall have ten days from the date of this order to file written objections to these proposed sanctions.). We now turn to Holt's next argument: that the court wholly lacked jurisdiction to order the clerk of the court not to file his prospective motions for any reason. We disagree. Chapter 20 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated governs courts, and 20-3102 provides that [t]he clerks of the district courts shall do and perform all duties that may be required of them by law or the rules and practice of the courts.  (Emphasis added.) Chapter 60 governs civil procedure, including 60-1507 motions, and 60-2601(a) provides:  General powers and duties. In the performance of their duties all clerks of record shall be under the direction of the court. In light of these statutes, we conclude that the district court has jurisdiction over the clerks and the authority to direct them to refrain from filing various items under appropriate circumstances. Cf. Lynn, 26 Kan.App.2d 79, 975 P.2d 813 (Court of Appeals affirmed injunction enjoining inmate from filing actions absent his compliance with reasonable restrictions).