Opinion ID: 1709406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Instructions Allowed Consideration of the Separate Conduct of Each Defendant.

Text: ¶ 47. Mariner claims that the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury to consider the separate defenses and standards of care applicable to the nursing home, the parent company and its subsidiaries, and the officers of those companies. The trial court denied Mariner's proposed instruction D-35, which stated: Although there is more than one Defendant in this suit, it does not follow from that fact alone that if one is liable all are liable. Each Defendant is entitled to a fair and separate consideration of that Defendant's defense and is not to be prejudiced by your decision as to the others. Unless otherwise stated, the instructions apply to the case of each Defendant. Decide each Defendant's case separately. See also Miss. Pract. Model Jury Instr. Civil 1:18, Mississippi Judicial College (West 2007). The trial court held that the proposed instruction was misleading and that Mariner could argue its point in closing argument. ¶ 48. A party is entitled to a jury instruction so long as it concerns a genuine issue of material fact and there is credible evidence to support the instruction. DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So.2d 818, 824 (Miss.1992); see also Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 973 (Miss.1989). However, this Court will not reverse based on the denial of an instruction unless it is shown that the instructions, taken as a whole, do not fairly present the applicable law. Whitten, 799 So.2d at 16. ¶ 49. We find that the trial court erred in denying Mariner's proposed instruction on separate consideration. The statement was neither misleading nor an incorrect statement of the law, and the issue of which Defendant was liable for what conduct was the pivotal issue in the case. The negligence alleged by Edwards's estate was multiple and varied, extending from the actions of the nursing assistants in an individual facility to the institutional polices set at the highest levels of the corporation. The standard of care applicable to the nursing staff and the director of nursing was not the same as that applicable to corporate officers who set budgetary guidelines for the parent corporation. Issues of material fact supported by credible evidence justified the instruction. ¶ 50. The denial of the proposed instruction, taken together with the ambiguity of several instructions regarding the separate conduct of each Defendant, failed to adequately present the law of the case. Instructions Nine and Ten, outlining the standards of neglect and abuse, were properly granted as correct statements of the law. Each instructed the jury that if it found for Edwards's estate as to neglect or abuse, the verdict should only be against those Defendants whose neglect or abuse proximately caused Edwards's injuries. The trial court did not err in granting these instructions. ¶ 51. However, other accepted instructions left the question of separate consideration opaque. For example, in outlining the elements of Edwards's negligence claim, Instruction Five stated as an element of the tort that the Defendants should have been reasonably aware of Charles Edwards'[s] condition. While such an instruction is proper as to Greenwood Health, it is not a proper instruction against other defendants such as National Heritage Realty, which owned the nursing home but presumably had little if anything to do with patients' medical records, or even Mariner Health Care, which as a parent corporation, could not reasonably be expected to be aware of the specific medical needs of one of its patients. ¶ 52. In cases involving service providers and their parent corporations, the just adjudication of claims demands that parties be held responsible for any breaches of the duties imposed upon them by law. But a plaintiff must carefully establish what duty was owed by whom and how it was not met, and the trial court must insure that the jury is equipped to consider distinct claims and to assess liability judiciously. Because that was not done in this case, the jury's verdict must be reversed.