Opinion ID: 473618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deterrence and Punishment

Text: 26 The third and most common rationale for dismissal in cases of attorney misconduct or delay has been the District Court's expressed need to sanction conduct that is disrespectful to the court and to deter similar misconduct in the future. See, e.g., Jackson, 569 F.2d at 120-21; Butler v. Pearson, 636 F.2d 526, 528 (D.C.Cir.1980). Indeed, in this case, the District Court explained that an order of dismissal is a necessary and appropriate sanction ... not only because of plaintiff's blatant disregard of this court's orders ... but as a general deterrent to future neglect of pending litigation. Order, Civil Action No. 84-2865, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. May 3, 1985). 27 These goals are clearly legitimate ones. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) (strict sanctions serve to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent); see generally Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1044-54 (1978). Nonetheless, unlike dismissals that are geared to remedying some prejudice, see supra at 7-12, they call for careful evaluation to ensure that the proper individuals are being sanctioned (or deterred) and that the sanctions or deterrent measures are not overly harsh. 28 Specifically, where attorney misconduct is involved, this court has been notably reluctant to affirm dismissal under the punishment or deterrence rationale unless the client himself is shown to deserve the sanction. 5 See Beech, 636 F.2d at 837 (Default judgments were not designed as a means of disciplining the bar at the expense of the litigants' day in court.); Jackson, 569 F.2d at 123 (Dismissals for misconduct attributable to lawyers and in no wise to their clients invariably penalize the innocent and may let the guilty off scot-free.); Butler, 636 F.2d at 531 (concept of proportionality demands that plaintiffs not be unfairly penalized for negligence of their attorney). When the client's only fault is his poor choice of counsel, dismissal of the action has been deemed a disproportionate sanction. Rather, we have frequently said, the District Court should first attempt to sanction the attorney at fault. See Jackson, 569 F.2d at 123 & n. 24 (discussing available sanctions); Butler, 636 F.2d at 531 (Plaintiffs themselves suggest that an award of reasonable attorney's fees would be a more appropriate sanction than dismissal. We agree.). As Judge Robinson explained in Jackson: Public confidence in the legal system is not enhanced when one component punishes blameless litigants for the misdoings of another component of the system. Jackson, 569 F.2d at 123-24. 29 Our reluctance to penalize an innocent client only applies, of course, where the client is in fact innocent, i.e., he is unaware of his attorney's dereliction and not negligent in his own right in not reasonably keeping in contact with the attorney in his case. When the client is aware, or should be aware, of his attorney's misconduct, it is not unjust to penalize him. Unfortunately, issues of when a reasonably diligent client should know about his attorney's negligence are difficult and time consuming to litigate. We recognize that clients typically, and in most cases justifiably, rely on their attorneys to proceed with their case without needing to be reminded of important filings and appearances. Therefore, in an effort to eliminate the guesswork in this area, and to promote fairness to clients without compromising the efficiency of the district court, we are adopting a rule of decision that we believe will afford the district courts more concrete guidance in the matter. We look disfavorably upon dismissals as sanctions for attorney misconduct or delay unless the client himself has been made aware of the problem, usually through notice from the trial court. We advise strongly the district courts themselves directly notify the client when attorney misconduct has occurred to a degree that the court is contemplating dismissal if a recurrence occurs. That communication should notify the client, in clear and unequivocal terms, that his case is in danger of dismissal due to his lawyer's dereliction; that the court will no longer tolerate the attorney's current course of conduct; and that the client is advised to be in touch with his lawyer to ensure future compliance with court orders, or to make arrangements for new counsel. If after this notification the attorney persists in the errant conduct, then the client shares in the responsibility for that conduct, and dismissal will generally be upheld. See Note, Inryco, Inc. v. Metropolitan Engineering Co.: Inexcusable Neglect by Whom?, 45 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 695, 716-17 (1984) (suggesting this type of approach and pointing out paradox of informing only the delinquent counsel); Comment, The Plaintiff's Plight, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 929-37 (advocating dismissal conditioned on future compliance with the terms of an order which the client has been informed about). 30 This notice procedure is advised principally for cases where dismissal is contemplated for punitive or deterrent purposes. And, of course, the district courts would continue to have at their disposal the traditional variety of less severe penalties for dealing with attorneys who engage in misconduct. In Jackson, we suggested a number of sanctions that might be appropriate in order to ensure compliance with court orders: 31 The alternatives include an assessment to the delinquent lawyer of costs and counsel fees generated by the delinquency.... The court's disciplinary authority is available, and its contempt powers may also be.... Communication of the lawyer's action to the client or the bar association is another alternative. 32 Jackson, 569 F.2d at 123 n. 24. 6 The District Court has the authority to take these disciplinary actions under a variety of statutes and doctrines including its inherent power to protect the orderly administration of justice, see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463-64, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980); its statutory contempt power, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 401 (1982); local court rules, see, e.g., Local Rules 4-3 (IV), 4-3(V)(e); and, under some circumstances, the federal cost statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927. See generally R. Rodes, K. Ripple & C. Mooney, Sanctions Imposable for Violations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 70-79 (1981). As a general matter, these alternatives are likely to prove not only more just to the innocent client, but also more effective as a deterrent since they penalize the wrongdoer directly. See Comment, The Plaintiff's Plight, 34 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 937 (if costs were frequently assessed against derelict attorneys ... the deterrent effect would be increased). 33 In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever of client complicity, or even awareness that the status calls were being missed. For purposes of this appeal, we need not decide whether the unfortunate events that occurred were a result of one, two, three, or all of the four attorneys' gross ineptitude, or, rather, were caused by a series of unfortunate misunderstandings. Indeed, we assume as correct the District Court's determination that the only 'justification' proffered for the repeated failure to appear ... is the negligence or untimeliness of one or more counsel. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Civil Action No. 84-2865, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1985). The fact remains that if anyone was derelict, it was not William Shea. There is nothing in the record to show any fault whatsoever on Shea's part--not even an extended course of delay that might have put him on notice that something was awry. Nothing indicates that Shea even knew what a status call was--much less that his attorney and the local counsels missed three of them. The memorandum in support of the Rule 60(b) motion for reinstatement stressed that the accompanying affidavits demonstrated that Shea was blameless. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Order of Dismissal and Reinstate His Cause of Action at 9. As our discussion makes clear, dismissal is inappropriate under these circumstances. 7 The District Court may, of course, take direct action against the derelict attorneys or notify the client that the case will be dismissed if there is any recurrent action or do both.