Opinion ID: 1962876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Meaning of Invitee

Text: The Bank also argues that paragraph 20 is ambiguous because it is circular. The Bank argues that a customer of the Bank is also, logically, an invitee of Lauvetz. [34] Therefore, the Bank contends that a customer of the Bank is an invitee of both the Bank and Lauvetz, and the parties would be required to indemnify one another. The Bank argues that because this is an illogical result, paragraph 20 must be unenforceable. We disagree. As noted above, a contract must be given a reasonable construction, which, if possible, gives effect to every part of the contract. [35] The Bank's construction of paragraph 20 is contrary to that well-established proposition. To begin with, even if paragraph 20 was ambiguous about whose injuries were to be indemnified, it would still be clear about the duty to indemnify, and the inclusion of Lauvetz' negligence within that duty. In other words, paragraph 20 would still be unambiguous on the points that are necessary in order for it to be enforceable. But more fundamentally, we disagree with the premise of the Bank's argument, that paragraph 20 is circular. An invitee, in the common sense of the word, is simply one who is invited. [36] More particularly, in tort law, an invitee is a person who goes on the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the business of the owner or occupant or for their mutual advantage. [37] (We note that the lease in this case was executed before the tort-law distinction between invitees and licensees was abolished in Nebraska. [38] ) A landlord has a duty to keep the common areas of leased premises, such as areas under his or her control and areas used by more than one tenant, reasonably safe. [39] And guests and invitees of the tenant derive their right to enter upon the premises leased through the tenant and have the same but no greater right to proceed against the landlord for personal injuries resulting from alleged defects than the tenant has. [40] In this case, there is no dispute that Hasebrook was primarily a customer and invitee of the Bank. Any status he might have had as an invitee of Lauvetz was derived through the Bank. [41] And this is not a tort actionthe question is not the scope of Hasebrook's right to sue, but the meaning of paragraph 20 of the lease. Even if an invitee of the Bank has derivative status as an invitee of Lauvetz for purposes of premises liability, it is entirely possibleand reasonableto distinguish primary invitees of the Bank from primary invitees of Lauvetz when construing paragraph 20. The obvious intent of paragraph 20 is to require each party to be responsible for injuries to its own visitors. Except for the rare instance in which the same visitor has business with both Lauvetz and the Bank, it should not be difficult to determineas in this case who an injured person was in the building to see. Under such circumstances, paragraph 20 is not difficult to apply. Simply put, paragraph 20 is part of a lease agreement that was negotiated at arm's length between sophisticated business entities. [42] The Bank was certainly capable of examining the lease and recognizing paragraph 20 as an indemnity clause. The lease, in fact, connotes the unmistakable intent of the parties to indemnify, [43] excepting only claims arising from the Bank's ordinary negligence, Lauvetz' gross negligence, or the willful misconduct of either. We find no merit to the Bank's argument that paragraph 20 is ambiguous. And accordingly, we find merit to Lauvetz' argument that the district court erred in that regard.