Opinion ID: 1405600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The jury's finding of fraud is supported by substantial evidence.

Text: Allianz and Wohlers argue that Bartgis failed as a matter of law to prove the elements of her fraud claim. Specifically, Allianz contends that it never made or intended any misrepresentation, and that Bartgis failed to prove that she relied on any of Allianz's representations. We disagree. As an initial matter, Allianz and Wohlers assert that the jury instruction defining clear and convincing evidence, upon which the jury predicated its finding of both fraud and punitive damages, was erroneous. [4] Specifically, they assert that the definition provided by the district court offered little guidance to the jury as to the meaning of the clear and convincing evidence standard. We disagree. In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), the Supreme Court explained that in order to satisfy due process, instructions on the clear and convincing standard need only inform the factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applicable to other categories of civil cases. Consistent with this teaching, in Topaz Mutual Co. v. Marsh, 108 Nev. 845, 850-51, 839 P.2d 606, 610 (1992), we concluded that the identical clear and convincing instruction at issue in the present case was sufficient to ameliorate an otherwise erroneous instruction that suggested that damages for fraud could be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the clear and convincing evidence instruction used in this case was sufficient, and that the district court did not err in so instructing the jury. Turning to the substance of Allianz's and Wohlers's fraud argument, we have previously held that fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence as to each of the following elements: (1) a false representation made by the defendant; (2) defendant's knowledge or belief that the representation is false (or insufficient basis for making the representation); (3) defendant's intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation; (4) plaintiff's justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage to the plaintiff resulting from such reliance. Bulbman, Inc. v. Nevada Bell, 108 Nev. 105, 111, 825 P.2d 588, 592 (1992). Further, this court will not overturn the jury's verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence, unless, from all the evidence presented, the verdict was clearly wrong. Bally's Employees' Credit Union v. Wallen, 105 Nev. 553, 555-56, 779 P.2d 956, 957 (1989). The reviewing court must assume that the jury believed the evidence favorable to [the prevailing party] and made all reasonable inferences in [that party's] favor. Id., 105 Nev. at 555, 779 P.2d at 957. Here, by way of Wohlers's November 1990 and January 1991 letters to Bartgis, which concealed the ancillary charges limitation provision and which misrepresented the Allianz policy as being comparable to Bartgis' previous MONY policy, the jury could have concluded that Wohlers and Allianz had deliberately misrepresented the policy and had concealed the ancillary charges limitation in order to induce Bartgis' enrollment in the policy. In assuming that the jury believed the foregoing evidence in favor of Bartgis, and made all reasonable inferences from such evidence in her favor, we conclude that the jury could have found that Allianz and Wohlers were liable for fraud. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury's finding of fraud is supported by substantial evidence.