Opinion ID: 1800883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 2: Whether signs erected after December 3, 1965, pursuant to the Commissioner's and the Board's interim policies requiring a permit containing provisions for removal of signs without compensation, were lawfully erected under State law, requiring just compensation for damages upon removal

Text: After the passage of the Federal Act, the Highway Commissioner moved rapidly to impose limitations upon outdoor advertising. His reasons are not fully stated in the record, but perhaps he was concerned over the ultimate cost of removal of signs which might be lawfully erected before the effective date of the Federal Act. At any rate, he took action to restrict the construction of new outdoor advertising signs which might be erected along interstate highways. He first obtained an opinion of the Attorney General that he had the authority to issue rules on the subject, and he then promulgated Rule and Regulation Governing Control of Billboard Advertising Along Interstate and Primary Highways, dated December 2, 1965, and filed in the office of the Attorney General on December 3, 1965. The rule became effective on the latter date, pursuant to Section 28-32-03, N.D. C.C., a part of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, Chapter 28-32, N.D.C.C. The Commissioner's rule provided: The establishment of billboard advertising along interstate and primary highways in the State of North Dakota shall be prohibited within 660 feet from the nearest edge of the right of way unless permission to so establish billboard advertising within 660 feet from the nearest edge of the right of way along interstate and primary highways is requested in writing and the permission requested is granted in writing by the North Dakota State Highway Commissioner. Section 28-32-03, N.D.C.C., provides that rules and regulations promulgated and adopted by an administrative agency, when filed with the Attorney General, shall have the force and effect of law until amended or repealed by the agency or until the same is declared invalid by a final court decision. Thus there is a presumption of validity of a rule or regulation of an administrative agency, comparable to the presumption of validity of a statute. Any person adversely affected by the Commissioner's rule could have petitioned for reconsideration under Section 28-32-04, N.D.C.C. Newman did not seek a rehearing, nor did it bring any proceeding by way of appeal or declaratory judgment or otherwise. Instead, it made application for permits to the Commissioner, and accepted the benefits of such permits by constructing signs. By so doing, it estopped itself from attacking the constitutionality of the rule and regulation of the Commissioner. We have held repeatedly that one who seeks and obtains the advantage of a statute is estopped from challenging the constitutionality of that statute. The rule goes back at least to 1893, where we said in Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry. Co. v. Nester, 3 N.D. 480, 483, 57 N.W. 510, 512 (1893): He went before the commissioners, and sought the benefit of this law. Subsequently, he voluntarily chose to pursue a remedy provided by the statute in preference to a common-law remedy that was open to him. By these acts he has waived any benefit of the constitutional provision. Such should be the law in reason, and such is the law upon authority. Cooley, Const. Lim. 216; End.Interp.St. § 537, and cases there cited. In State v. Mundy, 53 N.D. 249, 255, 205 N.W. 684, 686 (1925), we said: Both on principle and authority one who voluntarily enters into an engagement for the purpose of enjoying certain benefits and advantages and by virtue thereof reaps these advantages is precluded from denying the validity of his engagement or undertaking. In Cofman v. Ousterhous, 40 N.D. 390, 402, 168 N.W. 826, 829, 18 A.L.R. 219 (1918), we said: It is clear, indeed, that a person who obtains a license under a law, and seeks for a time to enjoy the benefits thereof, cannot afterwards question the constitutionality of the act when the license is sought to be revoked. And see Ethen v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 62 N.D. 394, 244 N.W. 32 (1932). We therefore hold that the construction of signs within the terms of the Commissioner's rule during the period in question was subject to that rule and to the terms of permits issued under that rule. If a permit issued by the Commissioner during the period in question contains an undertaking to waive any right to compensation upon removal of the sign, such a provision would be valid and binding. If no such waiver is contained in the permit, the sign constructed under the permit would be lawfully erected under State law and the owner of the sign would be entitled to compensation upon removal to the extent permitted by the subsequent legislation, to be discussed later in this opinion. On April 28, 1966, the Commissioner issued an interim policy which allowed the erection of new signs under certain circumstances after obtaining a permit. The policy included this language: The permittee must agree to save the State harmless from any costs or liabilities arising from the removal of the sign and cancellation of the lease between sign owner and the land owner. It provided that permits would be granted for a term extending to January 1, 1970, unless sooner invalidated by agreement between the Commissioner and the Secretary or by standards adopted by the Secretary, at which time the sign must be removed by the permittee unless extended by the Commissioner. It also provided that the location of signs within municipalities was to be in accordance with city zoning regulations, and outside municipal limits, the size, spacing, and location of signs would be in accordance with a proposal submitted by the Outdoor Advertising Association of North Dakota at a hearing held on March 1, 1966. Permits issued under this policy stated, in capital letters: UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THE PERMITTEE BE PAID JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE REMOVAL, CHANGING, ALTERING OR MODIFICATION OF ANY SIGN, DEVICE OR DISPLAY ERECTED BY VIRTUE OF THIS PERMIT AND THE PERMITTEE EXPRESSLY WAIVERS [ sic ] HIS RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO SUCH REDRESS. This policy was not submitted to the Attorney General for approval. However, we hold that it is within the terms of the prior rule of December 3, 1965, which was approved by the Attorney General, which required a written request for permission to construct outdoor advertising signs and written permission from the Commissioner to do so. The authority to impose terms in giving a permit is necessarily implied from the right to grant the permit. On February 28, 1967, the North Dakota Highway Beautification Act was signed by the Governor and the Highway Corridor Board was created. Section 24-17-09 provides that the Board shall enact suitable regulations to carry out the purposes of the statute. The regulations are to be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and design for several purposes, including the placement of signs within 660 feet of the right-of-way and adoption of standards relating to size, lighting, and spacing, the issuance of permits for signs within 660 feet of the right-of-way and visible from the highway, the establishment of fee schedules for permits and prescribing of regulations for issuance thereof by the Commissioner, and determination of unzoned commercial or industrial areas by agreement between the Board and the Secretary pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 131. The first action by the Board was the adoption of an interim policy on March 21, 1967. This was reasonably expeditious action. During the short interval between the adoption of the North Dakota Act and the adoption of the interim policy by the Board, the language of the Commissioner's interim policy governed, except to the extent, if any, that it was inconsistent with the Act. The Board's interim policy adopted a so-called ring theory advocated by the billboard industry. It allowed signs near cities, the distance from each city varying according to the size of the city, from one-half mile for cities with less than 100 population to three miles for cities over 10,000 population. It provided for size limitations and spacing requirements. The policy also provided: The permittee must agree to save the state harmless from any costs or liabilities arising from the removal of the sign and cancellation of the lease between sign owner and landowner. Newman applied for and received a substantial number of permits under this policy. Beginning in 1971, its applications for permits were accompanied by written protests as to the limitations of the policy. The protests were rejected. The Board's interim policy was submitted to the Attorney General for approval under the Administrative Agencies Practice Act, supra, and the approval was given on April 6, 1967. Apparently all parties concerned were unaware of the fact that the North Dakota Highway Beautification Act contains a specific provision making the Administrative Agencies Practice Act inapplicable, except as to appeals, to proceedings under the Highway Beautification Act. The nullification of the other aspects of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act is hidden under the heading Appeals to district court of Section 24-17-15, which reads: Any person, or persons, jointly and severally, aggrieved by a decision of the board under this chapter, may appeal therefrom to the district court and to the supreme court in accordance with sections 28-32-15 through 28-32-21, provided, however, that no other sections in chapter 28-32 shall be applicable to any proceedings of the board. [Emphasis added.] The effect of the italicized portion, of course, is to make the Administrative Agencies Practice Act inapplicable to the Highway Beautification Act, except as to appeals. Not surprisingly, this provision was overlooked in the application of the Highway Beautification Act. The Act contains its own (somewhat inconsistent) provisions for the adoption of rules and regulations. In Section 24-17-10 it provides that rules and regulations shall be filed with the commissioner and shall have the force and effect of law upon such filing. But later in the Act, in Section 24-17-13, it provides that the Board may propose rules or regulations for promulgation and shall hold public hearings thereon. Such proposed rules or regulations shall be published in the official county newspaper of each county in which land may be affected by the rule or regulation. Section 24-17-14 then provides that the Board may adopt the proposed rules or regulations with such changes as it deems advisable. Upon adoption of the rule or regulation, the Board shall cause it to be published for three weeks in the official newspaper of each affected county, and proof of publication shall be filed in the office of the county auditor and with the Highway Commissioner, and thereupon the resolutions, rules or regulations shall take effect. The conflict between rules and regulations which may be adopted without notice and are effective upon filing with the Commissioner, and rules and regulations which are adopted only after hearing and publication and filing with the Commissioner and the county auditor, is apparent. Since the provisions are in hopeless conflict, we hold that the more specific [Sections 24-17-13 and 24-17-14] govern the more general [Section 24-17-10]. In any case, the internal requirements of the statute were not complied with, no doubt because of the assumption that the Administrative Agencies Practice Act governed. The result of the failure to follow the internal requirements of the Highway Beautification Act is that the rules and regulations were not properly adopted. The Board had a hearing on rules and regulations on January 24, 1968, but no rules and regulations were adopted by the Board until August 1, 1973, and the rules adopted then were written so as to conform to an agreement between the Board and the Secretary of Transportation on January 19, 1972. However, Newman is in no position to raise the question of the validity of the regulations because it sought and accepted the benefits of the permit system which it now attacks. This it cannot do, for reasons stated previously in this opinion. So far as it is concerned, the rules and regulations were binding.