Opinion ID: 1210141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Tape Recordings of the Conversations with the Carnes Brothers

Text: Defendant initially contends that the tape recordings of the conversations between him and the Carnes brothers made on September 18 and 19 were obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and were erroneously and prejudicially received at trial. We disagree. Citing Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507], defendant argues that prior judicial approval was required in order to lawfully record his conversations with the Carnes brothers. [7] It is beyond dispute that Katz requires a narrowly drawn search warrant to be obtained prior to surreptitious surveillance of a conversation between persons exhibiting a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect thereto. It is equally clear, however, that the requirements outlined in Katz were intended to protect such persons only from the uninvited ear ( Katz v. United States, supra, 389 U.S. 347, 352 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582]), not from a breach of trust by one of the parties to the conversation (see United States v. DeVore (4th Cir.1970) 423 F.2d 1069, 1073-1074; Koran v. United States (5th Cir.1969) 408 F.2d 1321, 1323-1324; United States v. Kaufer (2d Cir.1969) 406 F.2d 550, 551-552; Holt v. United States (10th Cir.1968) 404 F.2d 914, 920). In Hoffa v. United States (1966) 385 U.S. 293 [17 L.Ed.2d 374, 87 S.Ct. 408], Lopez v. United States (1963) 373 U.S. 427 [10 L.Ed.2d 462, 83 S.Ct. 1381], and On Lee v. United States (1952) 343 U.S. 747 [96 L.Ed. 1270, 72 S.Ct. 967], the Supreme Court upheld convictions based on evidence obtained by or with the consent of persons in whom the defendants had confided. [8] Recently the plurality opinion of United States v. White (1971) 401 U.S. 745 [28 L.Ed.2d 453, 91 S.Ct. 1122] reaffirmed the vitality of those cases, stating, Katz. ... [did not] indicate in any way that a defendant has a justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police. ( Id. at p. 749 [28 L.Ed.2d at p. 457].) It therefore concluded that a search warrant for the purpose of secret surveillance is not required in such circumstances. [9] Defendant insists, however, that although he may not have had a reasonable expectation that Jerry or Richard Carnes would not testify to their conversations with him in court (see United States v. White, supra, 401 U.S. 745, 751 [28 L.Ed.2d 453, 458-459]), he at least had an expectation that their conversations were not simultaneously being heard and recorded by the police. We, as the plurality in White, perceive no distinction between the risk one faces that the person in whom he confides will later breach that trust by testifying about the conversation and the risk that such person has already betrayed him and is instantaneously transmitting their conversation electronically to police equipped with radio receivers. ( Id. ) Facing a somewhat similar claim, Mr. Justice Harlan in Lopez v. United States, supra, 373 U.S. 427, 439 [10 L.Ed.2d 462, 471], stated: Stripped to its essentials, petitioners's argument amounts to saying that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the [Internal Revenue] agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility without being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible to impeachment. For no other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation that the agent could testify to from memory. We think the risk that petitioner took in offering a bribe to [the agent] fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording. ( Id. at p. 439, fn. omitted [10 L.Ed.2d at p. 471].) [10] Defendant attempts to distinguish Lopez because there the Internal Revenue agent was openly that at all times and the defendant therefore assumed a substantial risk that the agent would refuse the bribe and later reveal it. Under the facts of this case that distinction is not compelling. Here, defendant was well aware of the risk involved in conversing with the Carnes brothers. In fact, the thrust of his conversation was to persuade Jerry and Richard Carnes to stick to their stories and not to break under police questioning. Defendant also urges that Lopez may be distinguished on the ground that the tape recording there was not used to supply testimony incapable of cross-examination; rather, it was used to corroborate the testimony of the government agent. He adds that although the Carnes brothers testified, they did not testify to the statements in the recordings and the tapes therefore were not truly corroborative of their testimony. We reject such a wooden approach. When the Carnes brothers testified at trial they were subject to cross-examination about any aspect of the case, including the recorded conversations. While the informant in White did not testify the court observed that [n]o different result should obtain where ... the informer disappears and is unavailable at trial; for the issue of whether specified events on a certain day violate the Fourth Amendment should not be determined by what later happens to the informer. ( United States v. White, supra, 401 U.S. 745, 754 [28 L.Ed.2d 453, 460].) (2, 3) Since Jerry Carnes requested that his telephone conversation with defendant be recorded and since Richard Carnes consented to wear a transmitter during his conversation with his brother and defendant on September 19, the trial court properly received both recordings. Defendant argues that the recordings were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]) and Sixth Amendment ( Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [12 L.Ed.2d 246, 84 S.Ct. 1199]) rights. The Miranda decision was prompted in part by a recognition of the dangers inherent in incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere. (384 U.S. at p. 445 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 707].) Its main concern is with the psychological impact upon the in-custody suspect whose liberty is being restrained ( id. at pp. 448, 449, 455, 457 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 708, 709, 712-714]) and its requirements of warning become operative only when the suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation. [11] ( Id. at pp. 444, 478 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706, 726].) Thus when he is taken into actual or constructive custody for the purpose of questioning prior to or after being charged with a crime, the police are required to admonish him in accordance with the guidelines set forth in that decision. Following Miranda (384 U.S. at p. 444, fn. 4 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 706]), some California cases have determined that a suspect is considered to have been taken into custody at least when suspicion focuses on him to the degree that there is reasonable cause for his arrest (see, e.g., People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal. App.2d 653, 667 [74 Cal. Rptr. 423]) and known police officers thereafter engage him in questioning. At that point in time, it is reasoned, the suspect may be led reasonably to believe that he is being deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. (See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 444 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706]; People v. Arnold (1967) 66 Cal.2d 438, 448 [58 Cal. Rptr. 115, 426 P.2d 515].) (4) Although suspicion had focused on defendant at the time of the recordations in the instant case he was not deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. His statements were voluntary and he was entirely free to refuse to engage the Carnes brothers in a conversation about the crime. (See Doty v. United States (10th Cir.1969) 416 F.2d 887, 894 (on rehg.); Hurst v. United States (5th Cir.1967) 370 F.2d 161, 165; United States v. Beno (2d Cir.1964) 333 F.2d 669, 671; Todisco v. United States (9th Cir.1961) 298 F.2d 208, 210.) The setting in which this case arises simply does not involve the custodial interrogation with which Miranda is concerned. (5) We additionally reject defendant's contention that according to Massiah his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Defendant appears to make the same argument that was made in Hoffa v. United States, supra, 385 U.S. 293, namely, that because the People had sufficient grounds to arrest him  at which point they were required to observe his Sixth Amendment rights  they should not have been allowed to obtain incriminating statements prior to such arrest without observance of his right to counsel. We note and agree with the observation of the majority in Hoffa that the principles expressed in Massiah do not apply in a pre-indictment setting. ( Hoffa v. United States, supra, 385 U.S. at pp. 309-310 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 386-387]; see also Wallace v. United States (1969) 412 F.2d 1097, 1101 [134 App.D.C. 50]; Hurst v. United States (5th Cir.1967) 370 F.2d 161, 165; Rogers v. United States (10th Cir.1966) 369 F.2d 944, 947; People v. Mabry (1969) 71 Cal.2d 430, 441 [78 Cal. Rptr. 655, 455 P.2d 759]; Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 170 [49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416].) In sum, we hold that the procedures employed in obtaining the recorded conversations in this case withstand constitutional scrutiny.