Opinion ID: 1885856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the chancellor manifestly wrong in awarding quantum meruit to appellees?

Text: Initially, it must be noted that appellees never asked for an award of quantum meruit. They relied upon a claim of inter vivos gift, which was denied by the chancellor. The holdings of this Court relating to establishment of a claim for quantum meruit have stated in the recent case of Liddell v. Jones, 482 So.2d 1131 (Miss. 1986) the following quote from Collins' Estate v. Dunn, 233 Miss. 636, 644-645, 103 So.2d 425 (1958), stating: This Court has said, however, many times, that claims of the character mentioned above, brought up for the first time after the death of the decedent, are looked upon by the courts with disfavor; and in order to maintain such a claim the evidence must clearly establish a contract, express or implied, between the claimant and the decedent, for the payment of compensation for such service. Bell v. Oates, 97 Miss. 790, 53 So. 491; Ellis v. Berry supra [145 Miss. 652, 110 So. 211]; Wells et al v. Brooks, 199 Miss. 327, 24 So.2d 533. In the Liddell case, there was testimony that the decedent, Madison Liddell, did intend to will his property to Leroy Liddell because Leroy had taken care of him. However, this Court determined that there was no proof that Leroy Liddell had ever rendered services with the expectation that something would be given to him in return. Thus, an important element required for a contractual agreement was missing, and Leroy Liddell was entitled to no compensation. There was no issue of violation of a fiduciary relationship in that case. In the case now before this Court, it is apparent from the testimonies offered by defendants/appellees that any services they may have performed for Mr. and Mrs. Van Ryan were performed with no expectation for remuneration. Mr. McMurtray testified that neither Mr. or Mrs. Van Ryan ever owed him any money and that he had never expected any compensation for his services as trustee or for the various errands he ran for the Van Ryans. He also stated that he had informed the Van Ryans that he had not earned the sum he alleges was given to him. Mrs. Bauman testified that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Van Ryan was ever indebted to her. Although the chancellor found that both Mr. McMurtray and Mrs. Bauman had violated their fiduciary duties by taking money to which they were not entitled, he nevertheless, awarded them a substantial portion of the money which they had taken. Clearly, the conduct of both Mr. McMurtray and Mrs. Bauman was so willful and inequitable that their hands were unclean. Thus, the learned chancellor violated the long standing rule that to be entitled to equitable relief, one must come into court with clean hands. In Re: Stoball's Will, 211 Miss. 15, 50 So.2d 635 (1951); Parker v. Ainsworth, 233 Miss. 806, 103 So.2d 389 (1958). That doctrine would have been applicable in situations much less serious than the one presented to the chancellor in this case. The unclean hands doctrine may be invoked even when the conduct charged is not of such a nature to justify legal proceedings. Thigpen v. Kennedy, 238 So.2d 744 (Miss. 1970). In fact, this Court has held that when it is evident by the facts of the case that the unclean hands doctrine is applicable, the chancellor has a duty to apply that doctrine of its own motion. Id. In this case, the chancellor determined that the appellees here, defendants below, breached their fiduciary duty and actually took funds which had been part of a trust and/or conservatorship and applied those funds to their own interest. However, the chancellor then awarded a large portion of those converted funds to the appellees based upon equitable principles. This Court holds, as appellants assert, manifest error was committed and such quantum meruit award must be reversed and the appellees receive no sums in the form of quantum meruit.