Opinion ID: 2365068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Termination Proceeding Representation

Text: In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, [29] the United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding. [30] After reviewing its precedents on the question of the right to appointed counsel, the United States Supreme Court concluded that as a litigant's interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does his right to appointed counsel. [31] The Supreme Court determined a presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he [or she] loses, he [or she] may be deprived of his [or her] liberty. [32] Accordingly, in termination proceedings, the presumption against a right to appointed counsel, except where the litigant's personal liberty is at stake, is weighed against the sum total of the three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process requires, viz., the private interests at stake, the government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions. [33] These three elements were formulated by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. [34] They are now commonly referred to as the Eldridge factors. In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, although in some termination proceedings, the Eldridge factors could be weighted in such a manner that their sum total was greater than the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, which would not always be the case. [35] Therefore, rather than require that counsel be provided in all cases, the Supreme Court held that a determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. [36] While adopting a case-by-case standard, the Supreme Court refused `to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements.' [37] Pursuant to Lassiter's holding, the decision whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings must be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject ... to appellate review. [38] When Lassiter was decided, however, the United States Supreme Court thought it was [m]ost significant[] [that] 33 States and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases. [39] Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded by stating that its holding in Lassiter in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise. [40] As a consequence of the holding in Lassiter, the seventeen states that did not provide indigent parents with a right to counsel in termination proceedings were required to examine the matter on a case-by-case basis. Delaware was one of those seventeen states. Since 1981, twelve of the seventeen states have enacted a broad variety of statutes that require [either] the provision of counsel for indigent parents in every termination proceeding or at the request of the parents involved. [41]