Opinion ID: 2691259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double-Jeopardy Concerns

Text: {¶ 33} The January 27 opinion in this case does not address our recent decision in State v. Ross, 128 Ohio St.3d 283, 2010-Ohio-6282, 943 N.E.2d 992. In Ross, we addressed the issue whether a trial court may reconsider a ruling denying a timely filed Crim.R. 29(C) motion for acquittal and grant the motion based on a defendant’s renewed motion filed after the 14-day period in Crim.R. 29(C) has expired. We held that the trial court had erred in reconsidering its initial denial of Ross’s motion for acquittal, because the renewed motion was filed well outside the 14-day period established by Crim.R. 29(C) for filing such motions. Id. at ¶ 49. Most importantly, however, we did not reverse the judgment of acquittal. Instead, we held that pursuant to State v. Bistricky (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 555 N.E.2d 644, an appellate court cannot disturb a trial judge’s acquittal order, because that order, unlike the substantive legal rulings underlying it, is not appealable pursuant to R.C. 2945.67(A). Id. at ¶ 50. {¶ 34} While Ross involved an appeal pursuant to R.C. 2945.67 and this case involves a writ of prohibition, I would hold that the underlying rationale in Ross is applicable here. Ross and Bistricky were premised upon the fundamental principle that double-jeopardy protections preclude retrial of defendants after they have been acquitted. See Bistricky at 158. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of the United States has issued clear statements that acquittals cannot be disturbed. “Perhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has been that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal    could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution.’ United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 1195, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896).” (Emphasis added.) United States v. 10 January Term, 2011 Martin Linen Supply Co. (1977), 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642. {¶ 35} Indeed, in a case similar to the one before us, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a court of appeals’ judgment granting a writ of mandamus ordering that an acquittal be vacated. Fong Foo v. United States (1962), 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629. In Fong Foo, the government argued, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had agreed, that a writ of mandamus ordering a trial judge to vacate his judgment of acquittal was warranted because the trial court had been without power to direct the judgment of acquittal. Id. at 142. While noting that the First Circuit did have some basis for concluding that the acquittal was based upon an “egregiously erroneous foundation,” the Supreme Court held that the acquittal could not be reviewed without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 143. {¶ 36} These federal decisions support my conclusion that the principles of double jeopardy preclude disturbing the acquittal issued in the underlying case.