Opinion ID: 778595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there a Fourth Amendment violation?

Text: 7 To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV; United States v. Sayakhom, 186 F.3d 928, 934 (9th Cir.1999). The particularity requirement protects the individual from a general, exploratory rummaging in [his] belongings. United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746 n. 7 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)). It does so both by limit[ing] the officer's discretion and by inform[ing] the person subject to the search what items the officers executing the warrant can seize. United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1997) (emphasis removed). 8 We addressed the particularity requirement in McGrew, where federal agents searched the home of a suspected drug trafficker. The warrant itself did not specify the evidence sought. Rather, in the space provided for that information, it referred to the attached affidavit which is incorporated herein. Id. at 848. However, agents never served McGrew with a copy of the affidavit, either during or after the search. Id. at 849. 9 According to the well settled law of this circuit, a warrant may be construed with reference to the affidavit ... if (1) the affidavit accompanies the warrant, and (2) the warrant uses suitable words of reference which incorporate the affidavit. Id. (quoting United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir.1982) (internal quotation marks omitted)). When officers fail to attach the affidavit to a general warrant, the search is rendered illegal because the warrant neither limits their discretion nor gives the homeowner the required information. Id. at 850. 10 Appellees concede that the warrant here was facially defective because it provided no description of the evidence sought. It also didn't refer to or incorporate the application or affidavit. Groh attached no documents to the warrant when he served it on Mrs. Ramirez. Nonetheless, appellees argue that McGrew does not control and that the search was lawful because Groh's words remedied the defect. According to Groh, he spoke at length with the Ramirezes during the search — Mrs. Ramirez in person, Mr. Ramirez on the telephone — and listed all of the items sought. However, the Ramirezes claim that Groh spoke only to Mrs. Ramirez, and told her simply that the officers sought an explosive device in a box. 11 This factual dispute is immaterial: Groh could not have cured the flaw because he lacked the authority to amend the warrant. As a law enforcement officer, Groh was empowered only to execute the warrant. Therefore, he could no more have supplemented it verbally than he could have amended it by crossing out the terms approved by the magistrate and scribbling new ones in the margins. The only way Groh could have remedied the defect in the warrant was to ask a magistrate to issue a corrected version. McGrew therefore controls and the warrant failed to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 1 12 Our holding is consistent with the goals of the particularity requirement, which went unfulfilled here despite Groh's alleged oral statements. First, the absence of a sufficiently particular warrant increased the likelihood and degree of confrontation between the Ramirezes and the police. The presence of a comprehensive and valid warrant greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct, by assuring the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 Second, the invalid warrant deprived the Ramirezes of the means to be on the lookout and to challenge officers who might have exceeded the limits imposed by the magistrate. Citizens deserve the opportunity to calmly argue that agents are overstepping their authority or even targeting the wrong residence. United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir.1999). Such a dialogue is impossible if citizens must rely on officers' verbal representations of the scope of their authority. To stand a real chance of policing the officers' conduct, individuals must be able to read and point to the language of a proper warrant. 14 Third, permitting officers to expand the scope of the warrant by oral statements would broaden the area of dispute between the parties in subsequent litigation. The parties' disagreement over exactly what Groh said during the search, and to whom he said it, is immaterial because the warrant must contain all authorizations and limitations in writing. 15