Opinion ID: 76461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Grand Jury Transcripts in Aisenbergs' Case

Text: 79 At the outset, we note that the district court did not rule on the Aisenbergs' requests for grand jury transcripts until its attorney's fees order of January 31, 2003. By this time, the indictment had been dismissed, the government had conceded that attorney's fees were due under the Hyde Amendment, and the district court had determined the amount of those fees. The district court even acknowledged that it had deferred ruling on the Aisenbergs' grand jury request until after the fee award was made because liability was conceded and the grand jury discovery was most likely unnecessary. Aisenberg, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1322. Nonetheless, the district court ordered disclosure. We conclude that the district court erred in ordering disclosure of all grand jury transcripts for several reasons. 34 80 First, the district court's order relies heavily on the fact that Hyde Amendment attorney's fees have been awarded in this case and that public taxpayers must pay them. Based on these facts, the district court concluded that the public has a strong interest in inspecting this troubled prosecution through the Aisenbergs gaining access to the grand jury materials. Aisenberg, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1323-24. Although acknowledging the Aisenbergs' burden to show entitlement to grand jury materials, the district court in effect used its Hyde Amendment award as the principal means to justify grand jury disclosure. The district court suggested in a footnote that [p]erhaps an award under the Hyde Amendment ought to tilt decisively the balance of considerations under Rule 6(e)... to the extent that public disclosure of grand jury proceedings is the presumptive consequence absent some persuasive reason for non-disclosure of all or part of the grand jury transcript. Aisenberg, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1324 n. 34. In essence, this shifts the burden to the government in Hyde Amendment cases to show a compelling and particularized need for non-disclosure of grand jury transcripts, as opposed to the Aisenbergs having the burden to show such a need for disclosure. 81 We decline to carve out new rules for Hyde Amendment cases. Nothing in the Hyde Amendment itself modifies the above well-established legal standards for discovery of sealed grand jury materials. See Gilbert, 198 F.3d at 1304-05 (addressing failure to introduce exculpatory evidence before the grand jury and stating that [n]othing in the text or legislative history of the Hyde Amendment indicates that Congress intended to modify the law relating to discovery in criminal cases, to expand the Brady doctrine, or to categorize as prosecutorial misconduct actions which clearly were not misconduct under existing law). If anything, the Hyde Amendment furthers the protection of grand jury secrecy. Specifically, the Hyde Amendment allows the government to defend itself against Hyde Amendment motions and protect confidential information by submitting certain evidence ex parte, in camera, and under seal, such as the names of confidential informants and evidence of matters occurring before the grand jury. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, historical and statutory notes); see United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 907 (5th Cir.2000) (stating that the provision [in the Hyde Amendment] for in camera review of evidence was included to enable the government to defend itself against Hyde Amendment motions and at the same time protect confidential information). 82 Second, to the extent that the district court properly left the burden on the Aisenbergs, the district court abused its discretion by failing to follow the well-established and demanding legal standards regarding what the Aisenbergs must show to be entitled to secret grand jury material. As outlined above, whether relying on the court's inherent authority or Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i)(I), the Aisenbergs have the burden to show: (1) that the material they seek is needed to avoid a possible injustice in another proceeding; (2) that the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy; and (3) that [the Aisenbergs'] request is structured to cover only material so needed. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674. The Aisenbergs did not satisfy any of these three prongs, and the district court erred in not requiring them to do so. 83 For example, the Aisenbergs have not shown a compelling and particularized need for any portions of the grand jury transcripts for their civil lawsuit. Instead, the Aisenbergs already have a wealth of evidence about the government's conduct. 35 Indeed, the overwhelming nature of this evidence apparently led even the government to move to dismiss the indictment and to concede that attorney's fees were owed under the Hyde Amendment. 36 84 Third, the district court also erred in concluding that the government's interest in grand jury secrecy was minimal (in its attorney's fees order) and constituted no interest (in its stay order), and that the government's only interest was to avoid a full airing of the episode. Aisenberg, 247 F.Supp.2d at 1324. Although the prior grand jury's deliberations are concluded, this case involves an unsolved, serious crime — the mysterious disappearance of a five-month old child from a private home with no forced entry. Even if the government's investigation is, as the district court aptly said, essentially at a standstill, id., the government still has a substantial interest in keeping the grand jury material secret until this serious crime is solved and while its investigation continues. Release of grand jury transcripts will tell the perpetrator precisely what the government has and what it lacks. Even if, as the Aisenbergs argue, much of this information is already public through other means, release of the sealed grand jury materials will give the perpetrator a virtual roadmap to evade detection and capture. 85 In addition, future prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come forward and would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, knowing that the prior grand jury testimony about this same missing child has been made public. Those witnesses would anticipate that those against whom they testify may similarly later be made aware of their testimony. As the Supreme Court has explained, in considering the effects of disclosure on grand jury proceedings, the courts must consider not only the immediate effects upon a particular grand jury, but also the possible effect upon the functioning of future grand juries. Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 222, 99 S.Ct. at 1674. The Supreme Court further instructed that [p]ersons called upon to testify will consider the likelihood that their testimony may one day be disclosed to outside parties, and because [f]ear of future retribution or social stigma may act as powerful deterrents to those who would come forward and aid the grand jury in the performance of its duties, the interests in grand jury secrecy, although reduced, are not eliminated merely because the grand jury has ended its activities. Id. The government, as well as the public and the Aisenbergs, have a strong interest in solving this serious, missing child crime, in future witnesses not being reluctant to testify about this crime before the grand jury, and thus in the secrecy of the grand jury not being broken. The unique circumstances of this case strongly counsel in favor of grand jury secrecy in the interest of solving this serious crime. 86 Fourth, and most importantly, we agree with the district court that the public and the Aisenbergs have a strong interest in any bad faith prosecution being fully exposed. We also agree that the insulation of such prosecutions forms no part of the justification for grand jury secrecy. However, the conduct in this prosecution already has been publicly aired at great length not only in extensive hearings before the magistrate judge and district court, but also by the comprehensive orders and reports entered by the magistrate judge, the district court, and the state special prosecutor. Those orders and reports exhaustively examine the evidence of the government's conduct and elucidate in great detail the troublesome events in this case. Further, as recounted above, the Aisenbergs already have a wealth of evidence exposing the government's conduct in this case. Given that the government's conduct already has been revealed and publicly aired, the district court erred in concluding that the grand jury transcripts must be disclosed so that the public can know about this misdirected prosecution. The public already knows. 87 For all these reasons, the district court erred in ordering disclosure of the grand jury transcripts.