Opinion ID: 1124308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: proof of causation and disability

Text: Dr. McCarron determined that plaintiff was unable to work due to some residual soft tissue problems following the August 22, 1989 accident. This medical finding is not inconsistent with the findings of Drs. Bordelon and Shepherd who found no evidence of impairment from an orthopedic standpoint only. The fact that a foreign object was removed from plaintiff's foot is consistent with the opinion of Dr. McCarron who found plaintiff unable to work as a result of a residual soft tissue injury. The presence of the foreign object, with no evidence of its insertion post accident, casts great doubt on the conclusions and opinions of Drs. Shepherd and Bordelon with respect to disability and causation. It was Dr. McCarron's deposition testimony that plaintiff could not work if he was required to do manual labor or remain on his feet. Plaintiff attempted to return to work after compensation was terminated. Frank Pellerin, plaintiff's employer, testified that plaintiff did speak to him about returning to work, but that he could not take plaintiff back when he was claiming disability. As a result of plaintiff's having filed a workers' compensation claim, he was not offered work of any nature. Two witnesses were offered by defendant as impeachment witnesses. Morris Demouchet, who attends church with plaintiff, testified that plaintiff did attend church during the period at issue and that plaintiff used a cane at church. Demouchet further testified that although many church members dance during church services, he never saw plaintiff dancing during services during the period in question. Even though Demouchet was offered as a defense witness, his testimony did not impeach that of plaintiff, instead, it was supportive of plaintiff's testimony. Mike Breaux, a private investigator, made video recordings of plaintiff's activities during the period in question. He testified that he had observed plaintiff running errands in his van and that plaintiff was wearing normal leather shoes; however, later, he conceded that plaintiff was wearing orthopedic shoes. On one occasion, it is alleged plaintiff was seen wearing thongs. However, this is consistent with plaintiff's claims that he could not wear regular shoes due to swelling. The first hearing officer indicated on the record that plaintiff's right foot was larger than his left; this comment is indicative of the ability of even a person without medical training to discern a difference in the appearance of plaintiff's feet. This observation was made in January, 1991, after the wire had been removed from plaintiff's foot. State Farm contends that plaintiff is not entitled to compensation on the ground that his problems from April 20, 1990 through January 31, 1991 were not caused by the August 22, 1989 accident. Defendants who contest the cause-in-fact relationship between a traumatic incident and injury must show that some other particular incident must have caused the injury in question in order to overcome a plaintiff's case when some symptoms of injury appear shortly after a traumatic incident that are consistent with the incident and continually worsen. Davis v. Galilee Baptist Church, 486 So.2d 1021 (La.Ct.App. 2nd Cir.1986); Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., 221 So.2d 908 (La.Ct. App. 1st Cir.1969). In Davis, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and subsequently developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Defendant's orthopedist did not relate the syndrome to the accident because the symptoms appeared many months later and appeared in both hands. Because the syndrome is rarely reported following automobile trauma, the trial court found no relationship between the syndrome and the accident. The court of appeal held that the syndrome was caused by the accident as there was no evidence of intervening trauma. Likewise, in this case, there is no evidence of intervening trauma. Therefore, we find that the court of appeal and the hearing officer were clearly wrong in concluding that the symptoms exhibited by plaintiff after compensation was terminated were not related to the August, 1989 accident. In brief to this court, defendant argues that although the uncontradicted testimony of a witness who is a party should generally be accepted as true; the record in this case shows circumstances casting suspicion on the reliability of that testimony. The circumstances to which defendant refers are the medical records pertaining to plaintiff's visit to the University Medical Center Emergency Room. The records reflect that plaintiff did not give the August, 1989 accident date, indicating on one occasion that his injury occurred a few weeks ago and on another occasion that his injury occurred a few months ago. The cases relied upon by defendant, West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc., 371 So.2d 1146 (La.1979); Jones v. Alexander, 399 So.2d 216 (La.Ct.App. 2nd Cir.), writ denied, 400 So.2d 1383 (La.1981); Lemoine v. Parish Tire & Wheel, 532 So.2d 911 (La.Ct. App. 5th Cir.1988), all involve discrepancies relating to a plaintiff's attempt to establish that a work related injury occurred and are not applicable in this case. There is no dispute that Mr. Alexander was injured on August 22, 1989, while in the course and scope of his employment with Pellerin Marble & Granite. The hearing officer's conclusion that plaintiff was not disabled from April 26, 1990 through January, 1991 is manifestly erroneous in view of Dr. McCarron's testimony as to disability and causation which is supported by concrete evidencethe piece of wire which was removed from plaintiff's foot. The medical evidence in this case indicates that plaintiff should have been able to return to work shortly after removal of the wire from his foot. Based upon a review of the record in its entirety, we find that the court of appeal and the hearing officer were clearly wrong in so far as they found plaintiff not entitled to Temporary Total Disability benefits from April 20, 1990 through January 7, 1991 based upon the medical evidence and plaintiff's own testimony.