Opinion ID: 3165718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy Generally

Text: “To establish a drug conspiracy, the government must prove: 1) an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective; and 2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Barragan, 263 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)). The government “can prove the existence of a conspiracy through circumstantial evidence that defendants acted together in pursuit of a common illegal goal.” United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). “Express agreement is not required; rather, agreement may be inferred from conduct.” United States v. Hegwood, 977 F.2d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). Thus, evidence of past transactions can constitute circumstantial evidence of a preexisting agreement, because 18 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR it can be inferred that the defendants agreed to carry out those transactions. Circumstantial evidence of a drug distribution conspiracy is not limited to evidence of past completed transactions. See, e.g., United States v. Rosales, 516 F.3d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering evidence of a hydraulic press and metal molds that could be used to produce kilogram bricks of cocaine in determining that sufficient evidence supported a conviction of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine). Moreover, a conspiracy conviction does not require “the delivery, presence, or even existence of actual contraband.” United States v. Macias-Valencia, 510 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2007). But in order for the defendant to be subject to a mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A)(i), the government still must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an agreement to distribute one kilogram existed before the expiration of the period alleged in the indictment. As we explain below, the government failed to meet its burden of proof.