Opinion ID: 490521
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Coercion of Mesa

Text: 19 The remainder of Giraldo's challenge to the Mesa testimony appears to be twofold. First, he contends that it is improper for a court to use any coercion whatever to induce a recalcitrant witness to testify against a defendant in a criminal trial. Second, he contends that, even if some coercion is permissible, Judge Duffy's coercive measures exceeded the bounds of propriety. The first contention borders on the frivolous. The court and the jury are entitled to know the relevant evidence possessed by any witness, so long as that person is not privileged to withhold it. The only privilege invoked by Mesa was that against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. Having foreclosed the invocation of that privilege by granting Mesa use immunity for his testimony, see, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-59, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1658-64, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), the court was empowered to order him to testify. Mesa's disobedience of this lawful order constituted a contempt of court for which he could lawfully be subjected to civil sanctions, including imprisonment, designed to compel him to obey the court's order. See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1535, 16 L.Ed.2d 622 (1966); United States v. Hughey, 571 F.2d 111, 114-15 (2d Cir.1978). 20 We have somewhat greater difficulty, however, with Giraldo's contention that Judge Duffy's coercive measures went too far, and we would be quite concerned if this argument were before us on an appeal by Mesa himself from the sentence originally imposed on him. Several sets of principles inform our concern. First, the authority of the court to impose civil contempt sanctions is limited by the concept that such sanctions are by their nature coercive rather than punitive. See, e.g., Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 36 (2d Cir.1983). This principle is reflected in both standard and ad hoc temporal limitations imposed on the use of the sanction. Thus, the duration of a witness's civil confinement for refusing to testify in court is not permitted to exceed the life of the court proceeding or 18 months, whichever is shorter. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826(a) (1982). And if, during this maximum period, it becomes clear that there is no realistic possibility that the sanction imposed for civil contempt will have the desired coercive effect, the sanction should be ended. See, e.g., Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d at 37. 21 Second, the sentencing court has wide discretion in imposing sentence, and, under the law applicable to Mesa's sentencing, if a sentence is within the permissible statutory limits and it does not appear that the court took into account any improper factor, the sentence may not be reviewed on appeal. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1284, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958); United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435, 447 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847, 98 S.Ct. 154, 54 L.Ed.2d 115 (1977); United States v. Hendrix, 505 F.2d 1233, 1235 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897, 96 S.Ct. 199, 46 L.Ed.2d 130 (1975). The proper purposes of the sentencing of criminal offenders are generally thought to encompass punishment, prevention, restraint, rehabilitation, deterrence, education, and retribution. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law 21-25 (1972). A sentence imposed for an improper purpose is subject to vacation on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932, 937-39 (1st Cir.1978); United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. Brown, 479 F.2d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir.1973). 22 Third, it is not improper for the sentencing court to take into account a defendant's refusal to cooperate with the government and to impose on him a harsher sentence than would have been imposed had he cooperated. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1362-63, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). 23 Viewed in isolation, each facet of the district court's treatment of Mesa appears consistent with one or another of these principles. The court stated that six months' confinement was imposed for civil contempt, a period within the limits allowed by Sec. 1826(a). Its two consecutive 20-year sentences on the criminal charges did not exceed the maxima allowed by the statutes under which Mesa had pleaded guilty. The court took into consideration Mesa's refusal to cooperate, as it was entitled to do under Roberts v. United States. 24 Yet given closer scrutiny and viewed as a whole, the court's treatment of Mesa suggests a circumvention of the most pertinent principles. First, the designation of the six-month period as confinement for civil contempt has an earmark of mere window-dressing since those six months were to follow, not precede, Mesa's 40-year imprisonment on the criminal charges. Presumably the court did not believe the Giraldo trial would still be going on 40 years hence, and thus there was no prospect that the civil sanction could have any coercive effect. 25 On the other hand, it strongly appears that the imposition of the 40-year prison term was designed, in large part, not for the customary purposes of criminal sentencing but rather for the purpose of coercing Mesa to testify. Had the court wished to sentence Mesa to 40 years merely as punishment for his crimes and his refusal to cooperate or to achieve any other traditional sentencing goal, it could have sentenced him after the Giraldo trial had ended as easily as during the trial. The actual timing of the sentencing, coming as it did in the middle of the Giraldo trial and without the customary delay for receipt of a presentence report, suggests that the court intended Mesa's sentence on the criminal offenses to have an impact on that trial. 26 This suggestion, implicit in the timing, is confirmed by the court's statements both before and after sentencing. Thus, in threatening Mesa with a long penal sentence, the court told him that he faced the possibility of going to jail for 40 years on the charges to which he had pleaded guilty, that the court would give it to [him], and that, as Mesa was then 34 years old, his chances of getting out of prison would be some time after most people retire. So you better think about whether you want to maintain your silence. In case you have any doubt about it, I'll sentence you today. (Trial Transcript, October 7, 1986 (Tr.), at 468-69.) The court did indeed sentence Mesa that day to more than 40 years in prison, without parole, to be served in Marion, Illinois, some 1,000 miles from his home. To add to the immediate impact of this, the court ordered the marshal to [m]ake sure he gets shipped out to Marion this week. (Tr. 476.) 27 Later that day, Mesa offered to testify in exchange for having the sentence vacated. The court indicated that the only way Mesa might achieve a reduction of his sentence was to make a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 after the close of the pending trial (Tr. 482-83), and to show some change of the situation. (Tr. 493.) 28 Finally, though in colloquy the next day the court urged the government not to recall Mesa, the strong initial impression that the court intended its 40-year sentence to be coercive is reinforced by the overall sequence of the court's actions: The court sentenced Mesa immediately after his refusal to testify, seeking and obtaining a waiver of a presentence report; it sentenced him to 40 years in a prison 1,000 miles from his home and recommended that he be ineligible for parole; and it ordered him shipped out to his new prison that very week; but soon after Mesa testified, the court reduced the 40-year sentence to four years, and withdrew the recommendations of distance and parole ineligibility. In all the circumstances, this Court is left with the firm impression that the district court improperly used its original 40-year sentence principally to coerce Mesa to testify, thereby subverting both the proper purposes of sentencing for criminal offenses and the temporal limitations on civil contempt sanctions. 29 Nonetheless, while these considerations would have carried considerable weight in an appeal by Mesa from the sentences originally imposed on him, they do not necessarily mean that Giraldo is entitled to relief from his conviction. All of the above restrictions on the powers of the sentencing court are intended as safeguards for the benefit of the person sentenced, not for a defendant against whom the sentenced person may testify, and unless we see some prejudice to the defendant, there is no basis on which to set aside the defendant's conviction. Here, though Giraldo plainly was disadvantaged by having Mesa testify against him, he obviously had no privilege to have Mesa's testimony withheld, and under the circumstances of this case, Giraldo has suffered no prejudice in the eyes of the law. Mesa's testimony against Giraldo at the trial was consistent with the statements he had made at his plea allocution, which inculpated Giraldo. Mesa's recantation of some of his plea allocution statements prior to Giraldo's trial was unrelated to Giraldo; in that recantation Mesa had sought to exonerate only Ramos--an exoneration Mesa adhered to at trial. Thus, it does not appear that the coercion in any way caused Mesa to express a view of Giraldo's role that he had ever contradicted. Finally, the jury was amply informed of the facts that Mesa had once had a cooperation agreement with the government but no longer had such an agreement, that the court had sentenced him to 40 1/2 years in jail, and that he was testifying with the hope that the court would reduce that sentence. 30 In sum, though we disapprove of the district court's initial sentencing of Mesa, we cannot conclude, in light of the facts that Mesa had already inculpated Giraldo, had never recanted that inculpation, and testified consistently with it, and that the jury was appropriately informed of the facts surrounding Mesa's decision to testify, that Giraldo was prejudiced by the district court's treatment of Mesa or that Giraldo's conviction should be set aside.