Opinion ID: 77161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard of Review for Sufficiency of the Evidence Is Constitutional.

Text: 25 In the light of the failure of his latter argument, Hernandez argues that the standard of review used in this Circuit to consider a motion for judgment of acquittal is unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to him. He argues that the standard of review violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and due process of law. This argument also fails. 26 Contrary to Hernandez's protestations, our standard for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence preserves the right to trial by jury and due process of law. A jury determined Hernandez's guilt, and we respect that determination. Under our standard, we are bound by the jury's credibility determinations, and by its rejection of the inferences raised by the defendant. United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir.2005). The evidence does not have to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt[.] Bell, 678 F.2d at 549. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). C. Any Error Committed by the District Court in Denying the Motion for a New Trial Was Harmless. 27 On a motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence, the court need not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. It may weigh the evidence and consider the credibility of the witnesses. United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297, 1312 (11th Cir.1985). If the court concludes that, despite the abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for determination by another jury. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 28 Hernandez argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial because the district court erroneously applied the wrong standard and resolved all the evidence in favor of the government when it considered his motion. Hernandez contends that if the district court had applied the correct standard to his motion for a new trial the district court would have granted him a new trial. 29 We agree that the district court applied an incorrect standard when it considered Hernandez's motion for a new trial. In its order denying Hernandez's motion, the district court only iterated and applied the standard of review appropriate for a motion for judgment of acquittal; that is, the district court viewed all the evidence, made all inferences, and resolved all credibility issues in the light most favorable to the government. As articulated above, that is the not the appropriate standard to apply to a motion for a new trial. 30 Before we remand this case to the district court to consider the motion for new trial under the appropriate standard, we must determine whether the error of the district court affected Hernandez's substantial rights or was harmless. An error that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). In determining whether the error of the district court was harmless, we consider what would have happened on appeal if the district court had granted Hernandez's motion for a new trial. Cf. Butcher, 368 F.3d at 1294-95. It is clear that the grant of a new trial could have been appealed by the government, 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and Hernandez did not contest at oral argument that the government would have appealed the grant of a new trial. If on appeal, we would have reversed the grant of a new trial, then the error of the district court did not affect Hernandez's substantial rights. 31 In our evaluation of whether the error of the district court was harmless, we are informed by our opinion in Butcher. In that case, the district court granted habeas corpus relief on the ground that trial counsel had been ineffective for failure to file a timely motion for a new trial. Id. at 1292-93. The district court concluded that the failure of trial counsel prejudiced the petitioners because the trial court would have granted the motion for new trial if it had been timely filed. Id. at 1294. We reasoned that, in determining the prejudice element of the Strickland test, we must consider what would have happened on appeal: the fairness and reliability of the criminal proceeding ... is not served by deciding the issue without regard to what would have happened on appeal. Id. at 1295. We reversed the grant of habeas relief because it would have been an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial. Id. at 1300. 32 The logic of Butcher applies as well to our review of whether the error of the district court was harmful. To explain whether we would have reversed the grant of a new trial on appeal, we first consider the standard for our review of such decisions. We then review the evidence presented at trial. 33 Although we ... review a court's denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion, we more closely scrutinize a court's grant of a new trial. United States v. Cox, 995 F.2d 1041, 1044 (11th Cir.1993). [T]he grant of new trial based on the weight of the evidence is more closely scrutinized than the grant of new trial on other grounds. Butcher, 368 F.3d at 1297. [W]hile we do not conduct pure de novo review in these circumstances, the review that we do conduct is not much different because we want `to assure that the judge does not simply substitute his judgment for that of the jury.' Id. (quoting Conway v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360, 363 (5th Cir.1980)). We may conclude that the district court overreached its authority by granting a new trial if our review of the record reveals that the evidence did not preponderate heavily against the jury's verdict. Cox, 995 F.2d at 1044. 34 Applying that standard, our review of the evidence convinces us that it did not preponderate heavily against the verdict. The testimony of the witnesses at trial produced two conflicting stories, either of which the jury could have believed. Lopez and Benavides testified, on the one hand, that Hernandez was not part of the conspiracy but was only present at the drug transfer because the car belonged to Hernandez's employer. Lopez and Benavides's account was supported by the testimony of Rivas and Rodriguez that Hernandez was not present at any meetings before the May 28 drug transfer. Rivas and Rodriguez described, on the other hand, events from which a jury could infer that Hernandez was familiar with the purpose and details of the conspiracy. 35 The testimonies of Rivas and Rodriguez provided ample support for the charges by the government. Rivas testified that Hernandez was holding the money bag and was aware of the amount of cash present. Rivas also testified that Lopez told him some of the cocaine was for Benavides and Hernandez. Both Rivas and Rodriguez testified that they heard Hernandez say bring us ours. 36 The jury chose to believe the latter account of the drug transaction. The jury found Hernandez guilty. That verdict implicitly rejected the testimonies of Lopez and Benavides and credited the testimonies of Rivas and Rodriguez. 37 Although the district court was unimpressed with the case presented by the government, the district court may not reweigh the evidence and set aside the verdict simply because it feels some other result would be more reasonable. Martinez, 763 F.2d at 1313-14. The verdict reached by the jury was reasonable, and the evidence does not preponderate heavily against the verdict, such that it would be a miscarriage of justice to let the verdict stand. Id. at 1313. Motions for new trials based on weight of the evidence are not favored. Courts are to grant them sparingly and with caution, doing so only in those really `exceptional cases.' Martinez, 763 F.2d at 1313. This case is not the exceptional one that would warrant a new trial. Because the grant of a new trial would have been an abuse of discretion, the error of the district court in employing the wrong standard for a new trial was harmless.