Opinion ID: 761049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ellick's Statements to Officers at his Residence

Text: 28 Ellick argues that his conversation with law enforcement officers at his residence constituted custodial interrogation in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He further argues that his statements were involuntary. Ellick made both of these arguments in a pretrial suppression motion; it was denied by the district court after an evidentiary hearing where the court heard testimony from Agent Woodson and Mr. Ellick. The court determined that Woodson was credible and that Ellick was not credible. The court held that Ellick was not in custody when he made the statements and that therefore Miranda did not apply. The court made no specific finding as to voluntariness. Ellick later renewed the motion and it was denied without further findings.
29 Whether Ellick was in custody for purposes of Miranda is a legal issue which we review de novo, with proper deference to the district court's findings of historical fact and credibility determinations. United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.1998). A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda only if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation as the functional equivalent of formal arrest. Id. at 1246-47 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ) (internal quotes and alterations omitted). 30 Because the district court determined that only Agent Woodson was credible, we refer to his testimony. Woodson testified that officers repeatedly told Ellick that he could leave at any time and that he was not under arrest. They recommended that he go to his doctor's appointment if that was what he wanted to do. No officers drew guns and none were in uniform. A reasonable person might hesitate to leave when law officers are searching his house, but after being told that he could leave and that he would not be arrested that day, he would not perceive the situation as tantamount to formal arrest. Therefore Ellick was not in custody and his statements were properly admitted.
31 A determination of voluntariness is based on the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1466 (10th Cir.1993). We examine several factors including the characteristics of the suspect, such as his age, intelligence, and education, and the details of the interrogation, such as whether the suspect was informed of his rights, the length of the detention and the interrogation, and the use or threat of physical force. United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir.1998). Because the district court did not make specific findings on the issue of voluntariness, we must uphold its ruling if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it. United States v. Morgan, 936 F.2d 1561, 1565 (10th Cir.1991). 32 We conclude that there is evidence to support the district court's ruling. While Ellick claims to be of less than average intelligence, Reply Br. at 3, according to Woodson, Ellick gave detailed statements that were corroborated by several other persons investigated. Although Ellick testified that he was taking numerous medications at the time, Woodson stated that Ellick was [c]oherent, competent, [and] understood exactly what the questions were and the answers. He would state certain things, and then other things he would hedge on. Supp. Tr. at 7. Woodson testified that although Ellick was never informed of his rights and even though he spoke with Ellick for about an hour, there were no threats of force. Under these circumstances Ellick's statements can reasonably be viewed as voluntary and we therefore refuse to disturb the district court's ruling.