Opinion ID: 1138780
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adoption of Prima Facie Tort Is Consistent with New Mexico Jurisprudence.

Text: Contemporary scholarship recognizes that there exists a residue of tort liability, which has escaped categorization in the forms of tort action, that is available for development into recognized torts as the need arises. Brown, 54 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 573; Porter, 611 S.W.2d at 268. In recognizing the tort of prima facie tort, this court is acting well within the tradition of the development of tort law in this jurisdiction. New Mexico has recognized that tort law is not staticit must expand to recognize changing circumstances that our evolving society brings to our attention. Thus, in other areas, we have recognized that intentional, malicious conduct that injures another, even though it may not have been recognized by the heretofore accepted areas of intentional tort, can serve as a basis for tort liability. We have also been very willing to adopt the view of the Restatement of Torts to assist our development of new tort areas. Accordingly, New Mexico has recognized as tortious inducing a breach of contract, adopting the view promulgated in Restatement of Torts § 766 (1939). Wolf v. Perry, 65 N.M. 457, 461, 339 P.2d 679, 681 (1959) (requiring that one who, without justification or privilege to do so, induces a third person not to perform a contract with another, is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby); see also Williams v. Ashcraft, 72 N.M. 120, 381 P.2d 55 (1963) (recognizing the tort of wrongful interference with another's business relations). We have adopted the cause of action of intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, relying on the tort as articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766(B) (1977). M & M Rental Tools, Inc. v. Milchem, Inc., 94 N.M. 449, 452-54, 612 P.2d 241, 244-46 (Ct.App. 1980) (one who, with bad motive, intentionally interferes with another's prospective contractual relations, is subject to liability); Anderson v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 97 N.M. 155, 158-59, 637 P.2d 837, 840-41 (1981). These torts reflect the underlying theory of prima facie tort as applied to contractual relationsthe underlying malicious motive of a defendant's actions, done without justification, makes an otherwise lawful act, competition, tortious. New Mexico has also recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, relying on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965), Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 479-80, 505 P.2d 68, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1972); Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 673 P.2d 822 (1983), and we have recognized that the intentional and wrongful deprivation of the right to vote or hold public office creates tort liability. Valdez v. Gonzales, 50 N.M. 281, 176 P.2d 173 (1946). In light of this prior jurisprudence, it becomes evident that we have traditionally afforded relief for wrongs intentionally and maliciously committed, giving credence to the maxim of prima facie tort theory: prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law,    requires a justification if the defendant is to escape. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204, 25 S.Ct. 3, 5, 49 L.Ed. 154 (1904).