Opinion ID: 1801861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Double Jeopardy Protection

Text: (4) The double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution provide that a person may not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The double jeopardy bar protects against a second prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or conviction, and also protects against multiple punishment for the same offense. [Citations.] ( Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 660.) Although some differences in application arise, both federal and California law generally treat greater and lesser included offenses as the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. ( Id. at pp. 660-661; see Brown v. Ohio (1977) 432 U.S. 161, 165-169 [53 L.Ed.2d 187, 97 S.Ct. 2221].) It is upon this treatment that defendant's argument both relies and ultimately founders. (5) The constitutional protection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an acquittal. ( Arizona v. Washington (1978) 434 U.S. 497, 503 [54 L.Ed.2d 717, 98 S.Ct. 824].) The same is true when a conviction is reversed or set aside because of insufficient evidence. ( Hudson v. Louisiana (1981) 450 U.S. 40 [67 L.Ed.2d 30, 101 S.Ct. 970]; Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1 [57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141].) The United States Supreme Court has held that an acquittal barring a second prosecution may be implied where a jury convicts on a lesser included offense after having `a full opportunity to return a verdict' on the greater charge ( Price v. Georgia (1970) 398 U.S. 323, 328-329 [26 L.Ed.2d 300, 90 S.Ct. 1757]; see Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 191 [2 L.Ed.2d 199, 78 S.Ct. 221]), and California law has long recognized that such an implied acquittal bars retrial. ( People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 299 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832] ( Fields ); Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 511, 518-519 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].) (6) However, when a trial produces neither an acquittal nor a conviction, retrial may be permitted if the trial ended without finally resolving the merits of the charges against the accused. ( Arizona v. Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 505.) In general, if a jury is discharged without returning a verdict, the double jeopardy bar applies unless manifest necessity required the discharge or the defendant consented to it. ( Green v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at p. 188.) From the time of the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Perez (1824) 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 [6 L.Ed. 165], it has been established that the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict is an instance of manifest necessity permitting retrial of the defendant because `the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated' ( Richardson v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 317, 323-324 [82 L.Ed.2d 242, 104 S.Ct. 3081]). California's application has long been the same. Like its federal counterpart, the state rule permits retrial following discharge of a jury that has been unable to agree on a verdict. [Citations.] The rule is codified in sections 1140 and 1141, which permit retrial following discharge of a jury after the court has determined `there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree.' (§ 1140; see People v. Tong (1909) 155 Cal. 579, 581 [102 P. 263].) Section 1160 implements the legal necessity doctrine in the multiple count situation by permitting the trial court to receive a verdict on one count and to discharge the jury with respect to another count on which the jury deadlocked without jeopardy attaching as to that charge. [Citation.] ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 300.) (7) The jury in this case convicted defendant of committing a lewd act but deadlocked on the One Strike kidnapping allegation attached to that offense. [9] These procedural facts raise questions about whether and in what manner this sentencing allegation could be retried. If a substantive crime is charged against a defendant and the prosecution alleges additional facts bearing on sentencing, does that collective allegation of substantive crime plus sentencing factors constitute a greater offense than a charge of the substantive crime standing alone? We conclude a count alleging a crime plus sentencing factors is not a greater offense for double jeopardy purposes. Thus, if a defendant is convicted of the substantive crime but the jury deadlocks on attached factual sentencing allegations, neither federal nor state double jeopardy principles bar a retrial of those sentencing allegations.
In Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th 652, the defendant was charged with attempted murder. It was further alleged that the murder he attempted was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. A true finding on this allegation would have elevated his sentence from five, seven, or nine years to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. (§ 664, subd. (a).) The jury convicted the defendant of attempted murder but could not reach a finding on the premeditation allegation. ( Bright, at p. 658.) We considered whether federal or state double jeopardy principles prevented retrial. We held that the answer depends on the nature of the allegation. A conviction on a lesser degree of an offense is generally considered to be an implied acquittal of the greater degree. However, a jury's failure to return a verdict on a penalty allegation does not constitute an acquittal, and thus retrial of the allegation does not implicate double jeopardy principles. ( Id. at pp. 661-662.) After much analysis, we concluded the allegation under section 664, subdivision (a) did not create a greater offense, i.e., of attempted premeditated murder, but rather constituted a penalty provision. ( Bright, at pp. 662-669.) Accordingly, double jeopardy principles did not bar retrial of the allegation. ( Id. at p. 671.) We revisited this holding after the United States Supreme Court questioned the constitutional significance of the distinction between penalty provisions and elements of offenses. In Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466, the high court ruled that, with the sole exception of facts relating to a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 490, italics added.) The court explained that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict? ( Id. at p. 494.) If so, regardless of whether a state labels the fact a sentencing factor or an element of an offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that it be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Apprendi, at pp. 494-495; see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania (2003) 537 U.S. 101, 111 [154 L.Ed.2d 588, 123 S.Ct. 732] (lead opn. of Scalia, J.) ( Sattazahn ).) Thus, the high court reasoned, when the term `sentence enhancement' is used to describe an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 494, fn. 19; see also People v. Sengpadychith (2001) 26 Cal.4th 316, 326 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 27 P.3d 739] ( Sengpadychith ) [ Apprendi treated the crime together with its sentence enhancement as the `functional equivalent' of a single `greater' crime.].) Citing the functional equivalen[ce] language from Apprendi, defendant here argues that a factual allegation charged in connection with an underlying felony effectively transforms the underlying felony into a greater offense. He then maintains that a conviction of the underlying offense alone bars retrial on state and federal double jeopardy grounds of an attached penalty allegation on which the jury has deadlocked. We have not previously discussed Apprendi 's effect on mistried sentencing allegations, nor has United States Supreme Court spoken to the issue directly. In Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, we considered whether Apprendi undermined our holding in Bright that section 664, subdivision (a) is a penalty provision to which double jeopardy protections do not apply. Seel involved not a hung jury, but a reversal on appeal. Seel was convicted of attempted murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with true findings on allegations that he acted with premeditation (§ 664, subd. (a)) and intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) during the offense. ( Seel, at p. 540.) However, the Court of Appeal reversed the premeditation finding as unsupported by substantial evidence. It then remanded for a retrial of the allegation based on our holding in Bright. ( Seel, at p. 540.) We held that a retrial of the allegation would violate double jeopardy. Because proof of the premeditation allegation exposes a defendant to significantly greater punishment than a jury's verdict of attempted murder without premeditation, we concluded Apprendi required the allegation to be treated as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense and not simply as a penalty provision without constitutional significance. ( Seel, at pp. 548-550.) We rejected the Attorney General's argument that Apprendi 's reasoning extends only to Sixth Amendment jury trial protections, noting the high court has indicated that the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause on the one hand, and the ... right to jury trial on the other, are not wholly distinct. [Citations.] ( Seel, at p. 547; see, e.g., Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 111.) Seel did not completely overrule Bright, however, because for double jeopardy purposes the procedural posture of the cases differed in an important way. In Seel, the section 664, subdivision (a) finding was reversed because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. In Bright, on the other hand, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the premeditation allegation. ( Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 550; Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 658.) We described this difference as [s]ignificant[], noting `[a] mistrial does not constitute a termination of jeopardy, and accordingly double jeopardy does not arise from the legal necessity of a mistrial. [Citation.]' ([ Bright, ] at p. 662.) ( Seel, at p. 550; see also Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 516.) As the Supreme Court made clear in United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 130-131 [66 L.Ed.2d 328, 101 S.Ct. 426], the double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial after a conviction has been reversed for evidentiary insufficiency but allows it after a mistrial occasioned by manifest necessity. Because Apprendi required the premeditation allegation to be resolved by the jury, and because the appellate court's finding of evidentiary insufficiency was a classic example of a termination of jeopardy barring retrial ( Burks v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. 1), we concluded in Seel that federal double jeopardy principles barred retrial of the allegation. ( Seel, at pp. 548-550.) We expressed no opinion on the application of these principles when, as in Bright, the trial court has declared a mistrial on the penalty allegation due to juror deadlock. Defendant in this case was charged with the substantive crime of lewd and lascivious conduct on a child under age 14. (§ 288, subd. (a).) It was also alleged, as a question of fact to be proven under Apprendi, that he kidnapped the victim in order to commit the substantive offense. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(1).) [10] As discussed, the One Strike law sets forth an alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain sex crimes, including the lewd act offense alleged here (§ 667.61, subd. (c)(8)). ( People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 41 P.3d 556].) The One Strike law applies if the defendant has previously been convicted of one of seven enumerated offenses or if the current offense was committed under one or more specified circumstances. ( Ibid. ) Section 667.61, subdivision (e)(1), the allegation at issue in defendant's first trial, provides for an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life imprisonment if the jury finds that the defendant kidnapped the victim while committing an enumerated offense. (See § 667.61, subd. (b).) Without a true finding on the section 667.61, subdivision (e)(1) allegation, a defendant can only be sentenced to a lower determinate term. (§ 288, subd. (a).) Thus, like the premeditation allegation at issue in Bright and Seel, a One Strike allegation exposes a defendant to greater punishment than would be authorized by a verdict on the offense alone. (See Seel, 34 Cal.4th at p. 548.) Accordingly, unless a defendant waives its protection, the Sixth Amendment requires that a One Strike allegation be tried to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.) Our inquiry does not end here, however, because the factual sentencing allegation in this case did not result in an acquittal or its legal equivalent (see ibid. ), but in a mistrial. The next question is whether the double jeopardy clause permits retrial of such a factual sentencing allegation when the first trial did not result in an express or implied acquittal.
(8) In general, the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from prosecuting a defendant for a greater offense after it has convicted him of a lesser included offense. ( Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at pp. 168-169.) However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized several exceptions to this rule. In Jeffers v. United States (1977) 432 U.S. 137, 151-152 [53 L.Ed.2d 168, 97 S.Ct. 2207], the court held that the Brown rule does not apply when the defendant expressly asks for separate trials on greater and lesser offenses. The high court likened this situation to others in which double jeopardy protection does not bar a retrial, for example, after a defendant's successful appeal for reasons other than insufficiency of the evidence, or after a mistrial has been granted at the defendant's request. ( Jeffers v. United States , at p. 152.) Both the trial after the appeal and the trial after the mistrial are, in a sense, a second prosecution for the same offense, but, in both situations, the policy behind the Double Jeopardy Clause does not require prohibition of the second trial. ( Ibid. ) The same is true when the court enters a mistrial on a greater offense based on the manifest necessity of a juror deadlock. [W]ithout exception, the courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to society's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. ( Arizona v. Washington, supra, 434 U.S. at p. 509.) The high court has explained that the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy, and the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy. ( Richardson v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 325, italics added.) The Government, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury, and jeopardy does not terminate when the jury is discharged because it is unable to agree. ( Id. at p. 326.) When a jury expressly deadlocks on a greater offense and, at the same time, convicts on a lesser included offense, we have interpreted the federal authorities to mean that the conviction on the lesser offense does not operate as an implied acquittal of the greater. ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 302.) The same principle applies under the California Constitution. ( Id. at p. 303 [under the double jeopardy principles embodied in the California Constitution, when jurors deadlock on a greater offense, an acquittal on that charge will not be implied by the jury's verdict of guilty on a lesser included offense].) Thus, defendant's conviction of the underlying lewd act offense cannot be construed as an implied acquittal of the One Strike allegation because the jury expressly declared it was unable to reach a verdict on the allegation. Ohio v. Johnson (1984) 467 U.S. 493, 494-496 [81 L.Ed.2d 425, 104 S.Ct. 2536], involved greater and lesser included offenses, not factual sentencing allegations. There, the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument that the double jeopardy clause precludes continued prosecution on greater offenses simply because a defendant has been convicted and sentenced on lesser included offenses. Johnson was indicted for murder and aggravated robbery and their lesser included offenses of involuntary manslaughter and grand theft. ( Ohio v. Johnson , at p. 495.) At his arraignment, Johnson offered to plead guilty to the lesser offenses only. ( Id. at p. 496.) The trial court accepted Johnson's guilty pleas over the state's objection and dismissed the more serious offenses on the ground that they were barred by double jeopardy. ( Id. at pp. 494-496.) Although this ruling was upheld by Ohio's appellate courts, the United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit the state from continuing to prosecute Johnson on the murder and aggravated robbery charges. ( Ohio v. Johnson , at pp. 496, 502.) The high court explained that continued prosecution did not implicate the prohibition on multiple punishments for the same offense (see Brown v. Ohio, supra, 432 U.S. at p. 165) because this protection is only meant to prevent the government from imposing cumulative punishment, not to halt all proceedings that might ultimately lead to a cumulative punishment. ( Ohio v. Johnson, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 499-500.) In addition, the court strongly disagreed with Johnson's claim that continued prosecution of the greater offenses would violate the double jeopardy bar against a second prosecution following a conviction. ( Id. at pp. 500-502.) The court stated, Respondent's argument is apparently based on the assumption that trial proceedings, like amoebae, are capable of being infinitely subdivided, so that a determination of guilt and punishment on one count of a multicount indictment immediately raises a double jeopardy bar to continued prosecution on any remaining counts that are greater or lesser included offenses of the charge just concluded. We have never held that, and decline to hold it now. ( Id. at p. 501.) Because Johnson had not yet been tried or exposed to a conviction on the murder and aggravated robbery charges, and the trial court's acceptance of guilty pleas on the lesser charges had none of the hallmarks of an implied acquittal, no interest protected by the double jeopardy clause was implicated by a continuing prosecution. ( Ohio v. Johnson , at pp. 501-502.) On the other hand, ending prosecution now would deny the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. [(] Arizona v. Washington, [ supra, ] 434 U.S. [at p.] 509 ....[)] ( Ohio v. Johnson , at p. 502.) Defendant here did not try to manipulate the system by entering preemptive guilty pleas, and unlike the defendant in Johnson he was required to face trial twice on the One Strike allegation. However, a more recent Supreme Court decision suggests the overriding lesson is that double jeopardy does not bar retrial of sentencing facts when there is not an implied acquittal. In Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. 101, 103-104, the jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder but could not reach a verdict at the penalty phase of trial. The trial judge discharged the jury as hung and sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment, as was required by Pennsylvania law in the absence of a unanimous verdict for death. ( Id. at pp. 104-105.) The murder conviction was reversed on appeal, however, and when the case was remanded for a new trial the prosecution alleged an additional aggravating circumstance and again sought the death penalty. At the second trial, the jury convicted the defendant of first degree murder and imposed a death sentence. ( Id. at p. 105.) The United States Supreme Court concluded the double jeopardy clause did not prevent the state from seeking the death penalty at the second trial. ( Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 105.) Although double jeopardy principles do apply to capital sentencing proceedings that have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence ( Bullington v. Missouri (1981) 451 U.S. 430, 439 [68 L.Ed.2d 270, 101 S.Ct. 1852]), the court stressed in Sattazahn that it is not the mere imposition of a life sentence that raises a double-jeopardy bar ( Sattazahn, at p. 107). Rather, what matters is whether the procedures governing the jury's verdict of life imprisonment signify that it acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose death. ( Id. at pp. 106-107; Bullington v. Missouri , at p. 445; see also Arizona v. Rumsey (1984) 467 U.S. 203, 211 [81 L.Ed.2d 164, 104 S.Ct. 2305] [because jury's findings amounted to an acquittal on the merits, they barred a retrial seeking the death penalty].) Accordingly, the relevant inquiry for double-jeopardy purposes [i]s not whether the defendant received a life sentence the first time around, but rather whether a first life sentence was an `acquittal' based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sentence .... ( Sattazahn, at p. 108.) The Sattazahn court noted that whether there has been an `acquittal'  is the touchstone for double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing proceedings. ( Id. at p. 109.) (9) Sattazahn teaches that double jeopardy principles do not bar retrial of an aggravated sentencing allegation if the first trial did not produce an express or implied acquittal on the allegation. ( Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 106-110.) Sattazahn was originally sentenced to life, not because a jury acquitted him at the penalty phase, but because a state statute called for this sentence if the jury hung on the question of death. ( Id. at pp. 104-105.) Sattazahn 's reasoning guides the application of Fifth Amendment principles to other penalty allegations that must be tried to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sattazahn is also instructive because a plurality of the high court went on to consider the double jeopardy question in light of the court's ruling in Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466. With regard to the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the court had previously held that when an aggravating circumstance makes the defendant eligible for the death penalty it is `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.' ( Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 609 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428].) A plurality of the justices in Sattazahn found no principled reason to distinguish, in this context, between what constitutes an offense for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee and what constitutes an `offence' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. [Citation.] ( Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 111.) Applying Apprendi and Ring, the court explained first degree murder is properly understood to be a lesser included offense of `first-degree murder plus aggravating circumstance(s).' [Citation.] ( Sattazahn, at p. 112.) The court reasoned that double jeopardy would have prohibited the state from retrying the greater offense, i.e., from seeking the death penalty, if but only if the first sentencing jury had unanimously concluded the state had failed to prove any aggravating circumstance, a conclusion that would have operated as an acquittal of the greater offense. But, the court observed, that is not what happened. ( Ibid. ) Instead, because the jury deadlocked at the penalty phase and did not acquit the defendant of this greater offense, the high court concluded there was no double-jeopardy bar to Pennsylvania's retrying [him] on both the lesser and the greater offense; his `jeopardy' never terminated with respect to either. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 113.) We have rejected defendant's argument that the attachment of factual sentencing allegations to a substantive offense creates a new greater offense. But even if we were to accept this proposition, defendant's argument would fail under Sattazahn. Defendant's first jury could not agree on the truth of the kidnapping allegations. Just as in Sattazahn, the mistrial entered on these sentencing allegations did not constitute an acquittal, and thus they could be retried without offending the double jeopardy clause. (10) The procedural circumstances here parallel Sattazahn. The jury convicted defendant of a substantive offense but expressly deadlocked on an allegation that would have increased his penalty for that offense. Even if Apprendi requires us to consider the One Strike allegation as the equivalent of a greater offense, conferring a jury trial right, the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit retrial simply because a judgment was entered on the lewd act offense alone. Because the jury announced it could not reach a verdict on the One Strike allegation, its verdict on the underlying offense cannot be construed as an acquittal under either the federal double jeopardy clause or the California Constitution. (See Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 302-303, 305.) Moreover, under federal constitutional law, the mistrial due to jury deadlock was not an event that terminated jeopardy on the allegation. (See Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at p. 113; Richardson v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. at p. 325.) Accordingly, constitutional double jeopardy principles did not bar retrial of the One Strike allegation. (See U.S. v. Williams (5th Cir. 2006) 449 F.3d 635, 645-646 [when jury returned conviction on base offense but deadlocked on penalty factors, double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial of the penalty allegations]; U.S. v. Bordeaux (8th Cir. 1997) 121 F.3d 1187, 1191-1193 [verdict on lesser included offense did not bar retrial of greater offense on which jury had deadlocked].)