Opinion ID: 2107342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decrease in Number and Assignment of Taxicab Licenses

Text: 196A-1. In the event that a sufficient number of taxicab licenses shall be surrendered by licensees under the ordinance of May 18, 1934, to reduce the number of taxicabs within the city of Chicago to 3,000 on or before March 31, 1938, no taxicab licenses shall thereafter be issued except upon transfer to permit replacement of a taxicab or in the annual renewal of any such license or upon assignment of any such license or upon assignment of the right to apply for such license as hereinafter provided or upon revocation for cause or termination in any other manner of any such license. 196A-2. Notwithstanding section 1 of this ordinance, taxicab licenses in excess of 3,000 may be issued when authorized by general ordinance without consent of licensees under the ordinance of May 18, 1934; provided that such licensees who shall have voluntarily surrendered any taxicab licenses or their right to renewal of any taxicab licenses on or before March 31, 1938, shall have the right to such number of taxicab licenses as were so surrendered, and such right shall be prior to the right of any persons, firm or corporation until such licensees who have so surrendered their taxicab licenses shall have either released their right to apply for taxicab licenses or shall have failed to make application therefor within thirty days after publication of notice of public hearing upon the question of public convenience and necessity for the issuance of licenses for taxicabs as provided by ordinance. As between such licensees who have so surrendered taxicab licenses and who have not released or waived their right to apply for their substitution as herein provided such licenses shall be issued ratably in the proportion which the number voluntarily surrendered by each such licensees bears to the number voluntarily surrendered by all other such licensees. 196A-3. Each taxicab license or the right to apply for such license shall be assignable subject to the power of the city of Chicago to determine the qualifications of the assignee. No taxicab license shall be issued to any assignee unless and until such assignee shall have assumed all liabilities of the assignor arising from the maintenance and operation of any taxicab. 196A-4. Subject to the conditions and limitations of this ordinance and an ordinance granting permission and authority for the operation of taxicabs within the city and for the appointment of a public vehicle license commissioner, passed May 18, 1934, and appearing in the journal of the proceedings of the city council of that date on pages 2271 and 2273, inclusive, the permission and authority granted to the licensees under said ordinance of May 18, 1934, to operate taxicabs upon the public streets and other public ways within the corporate limits of the city is hereby extended to December 31, 1945, unless sooner terminated or revoked as provided in said ordinance of May 18, 1934. (Extended to 12-31-50  Coun. J. 6-26-45, p. 3743.) 196A-5. Nothing in this ordinance shall be construed to abrogate or modify the ordinance of May 18, 1934, or any of its provisions except insofar as this ordinance is inconsistent with said ordinance of May 18, 1934, and except that the city council may provide for the installation and operation of an electric call system for taxicabs for the purpose of reducing the number or capacity of cab-stands in the city. 196A-6. This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage provided one or more licensees under the ordinance of May 18, 1934, shall within thirty (30) days after passage of this ordinance file with the city clerk formal written acceptance of this ordinance and shall have surrendered at least 616 taxicab licenses. (Italics ours) Pursuant thereto Yellow Cab Company surrendered 571 licenses and Checker Taxi Company, Inc., surrendered 500. Other licenses were surrendered sufficient to bring the outstanding licenses down to 3000. On June 26, 1945, an ordinance was passed extending the expiration date of the 1934 ordinance to December 31, 1950, by amending the applicable section in the 1937 ordinance. Thereafter the expiration date was extended from time to time until December 31, 1951. On January 16, 1946, the city council passed a resolution directing the issuance of an additional 250 licenses to individuals within the city and adopted an ordinance which authorized the issuance of 275 additional taxicab licenses and found that the present demand for taxicab service in the city of Chicago exceeded that provided by 3000 taxicabs licensed for operation. Section 2 thereof provided: Subject to the provisions of Chapter 28 of the Municipal Code of Chicago and the provisions of this ordinance, the Public Vehicle License Commissioner is authorized to issue not to exceed 275 additional taxicab licenses as public convenience and necessity may require. Said licenses shall be purely personal privilege of the licensees for the license period, unless sooner revoked as provided in said Chapter 28 of the code. Said licensees shall not acquire any rights under or by virtue of an ordinance granting permission and authority for the operation of taxicabs within the city and for the appointment of a public vehicle license commissioner, passed by the City Council on May 18, 1934, as subsequently amended, nor shall said licenses vest in the licensees any contractual or property rights whatever, or any right to the renewal of any of said licenses upon expiration of the license period thereof. Said licenses shall not be subject to assignment, lease or voluntary or involuntary transfer except to permit replacement of a taxicab for that licensed. (Italics ours.) Yellow Cab and Checker then sought and obtained an injunction forever restraining the city from issuing licenses in excess of the total number of 3000 without holding hearings as to the public convenience and necessity and without first affording plaintiffs and other surrendering licensees opportunity to apply for and obtain licenses to the number they had surrendered. We affirmed the issuance of this injunction in Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 396 Ill. 388, upon which intervenors now strongly rely. In that case it was decided that the city of Chicago has the power to regulate and restrict the operation of taxicabs on its streets ( People ex rel. Johns v. Thompson, 341 Ill. 166;) that the city ordinances of 1934, 1937, and 1945 are not invalid as creating a monopoly; that the rights given by the 1937 ordinance to surrendering licensees were for a valuable consideration; and that the ordinance, when accepted, created a valid and binding contract between the city and the licensees. These determinations are pertinent here. This court must construe the applicable ordinances to determine the nature of the rights created by them. Plaintiffs argue that in construing a contract ordinance we are limited strictly to its terms, and the rights granted must be clearly defined and not raised by inference or presumption, citing Blair v. City of Chicago, 201 U.S. 400, 50 L.ed. 801; St. Clair County Turnpike Co. v. People ex rel. Bowman, 82 Ill. 174. However, in construing many cases involving contracts created by the acts of municipalities, Illinois courts have applied the standard rules of construction. (See City of Chicago v. Peck, 196 Ill. 260; City of Chicago v. Weir, 165 Ill. 582; City of Chicago v. Sexton, 115 Ill. 230; Warner Const. Co. v. Lincoln Park Comrs. 278 Ill. App. 42; North v. City of Rockford, 237 Ill. App. 305.) In the case of Florida Central Railroad Co. v. Schutte, 103 U.S. 118 at 140, 26 L.ed. 327 at 335, Chief Justice Waite furnishes guidance in the construction of contract ordinances as well as contract statutes, in these words: And here it is proper to say that contracts created by or entered into under the authority of statutes, are to be interpreted according to the language used in each particular case to express the obligation assumed. Where the State is concerned the words employed are sometimes to be taken most strongly against the other party, but in this as in other cases of contracts, language is to be given, if possible, its usual and ordinary meaning. The object is to find out from the words used what the parties intended to do. Every statute, like every contract, must be read by itself, and it no more follows that one statutory contract is like another than that one ordinary contract means what another does. Of course, general rules of construction may and should be called into use when required    still, in the end, it must be determined from the language used in each particular case what has been done, or agreed to be done, in that case. Under the provisions of the regulatory ordinance of 1934, the city proposed to issue licenses for a period expiring December 31, 1940, to those persons who agreed to abide by its terms. The ordinance became binding upon the city, when accepted by the licensees. The reciprocal rights of the parties were simple and clear, and the duration specific. Thereafter the ordinance of 1937 was enacted, by which the city sought to reduce the number of licenses to 3000, and to extend the licenses under the 1934 ordinance for five more years. This ordinance contained two separate and distinct offers, which, when accepted by the offerees, became binding contracts. 38 Am.Jur., sec. 501, p. 176. First it was an offer to all accepting licensees, whether surrendering or nonsurrendering, to extend their existing licenses to December 31, 1945, provided one or more licensees under the 1934 ordinance shall have surrendered at least 616 taxicab licenses. Secondly, it was an offer to those licensees who would surrender a sufficient number of licenses to bring the total number down to 3000, that no additional licenses would be issued except by general ordinance, and that surrendering licensees shall have the right to such number of taxicab licenses as were so surrendered, and such right shall be prior to the right of any persons, firm or corporation until such licensees who have so surrendered their taxicab licenses shall have either released their right to taxicab licenses or shall have failed to make application therefor within thirty days after publication of notice of public hearing upon the question of public convenience and necessity for the issuance of licenses for taxicabs as provided by ordinance. The acceptance of the first offer could be made by the surrender of only 616 licenses; but the acceptance of the second required the surrender of 1108 licenses. The offer of a prior right to future licenses was not in terms limited as to time of duration. It was not, however, so unlimited as to constitute a monopoly, ( Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 396 Ill. 388,) since the preference only extended to the number of licenses surrendered by the licensee, and was to be exercised within 30 days after publication of notice of public hearing upon the question of public convenience and necessity. While the right to a preference in the issuance of new licenses is not limited in its terms, the plaintiffs earnestly argue that the entire ordinance of 1937 is specifically restricted in duration, first to December 31, 1945, and subsequently by amendment to December 31, 1951. The fallacy of that argument, in our view, is that it overlooks the dichotomy of the 1937 ordinance, which consists first of an extension of licenses then in existence for an additional five years, provided that only 616 licenses were surrendered. The second aspect of the ordinance consisted of an offer which, when accepted, by the surrender of 1108 licenses, constituted a contract which bound the city to grant certain future preferences to surrendering licensees in exchange for the yielding of such valuable right or rights. In this respect it did not propose to extend licenses. If only 616 licenses were surrendered, then the prior-right-to-future-licenses phase of the ordinance would never have become operative. We think it clear that either aspect of the offer contained in the ordinance was separable and could stand alone. We see no reason why the extension of all licenses, as granted by the ordinance, must be considered as an integral part of the promise to grant a preference in the issuing of any future licenses. Nor do we find any language in the ordinance itself to call for such a conclusion. On the contrary we think that logic requires a construction that the provision of the 1937 ordinance granting a preference to surrendering licensees is separate and distinct from the license-extension provisions of the 1934 ordinance, as from time to time amended. It must be noted that the original licenses granted in 1934 were extended to December 31, 1951, without regard to whether their respective owners had surrendered licenses under the 1937 ordinance. The new 1952 regulatory ordinance provided that former licensees may renew their licenses from year to year. If the plaintiffs' contentions are sustained, then the surrendering licensees received no beneficial consideration for their surrender of valuable rights. From the legislative history, it is readily apparent that the surrendering licensees gave up their licenses in an effort to alleviate an economic crisis in the taxicab business. To induce this sacrifice of legally valuable rights, the city, by ordinance, promised a preference in regaining the rights surrendered. This it did in clear terms, without limit as to time. Had the city waited until December 31, 1940, the license termination date under the 1934 ordinance, to reduce the number of licenses, its action would not have been discriminatory; but the economy of the time and its attendant strife would not permit delay. As we said in Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 396 Ill. 388, at 400, Conditions demanded that the number of licenses be reduced immediately and in order to secure their reduction, this ordinance granting a preference to people who voluntarily surrendered licenses was enacted. We there held that the proviso gave to surrendering licensees the right to regain their licenses, when the city of Chicago determines that additional licenses are to be authorized,   . Neither the terms of the 1937 ordinance, nor its logical construction, limits this preferential right to any expiration date. While this right to preference is not in perpetuity, it does subsist until such time as the surrendering licensees are afforded the opportunity to regain such licenses when issued by the city. It therefore follows that the injunction affirmed in Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 396 Ill. 388, is still in force, and the trial court was correct in entering judgment against the plaintiffs. The judgment of the Appellate Court is accordingly reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Appellate Court reversed; circuit court affirmed.