Opinion ID: 1058136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to Admit Guilt

Text: This brings us to Carroll's argument that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's revocation of [his] probation because [he] refused to accept responsibility in sex-offender treatment by admitting to rape based upon his Alford plea as a matter of law. Carroll contends that the probation of one who has entered an Alford plea cannot be revoked for refusing to admit to the offense, thereby accepting responsibility for the offense, after entering the plea and that this is particularly the case when the trial court does not warn the defendant prior to or at the time of entering the plea that he/she will be required to admit to the offense at a later time, such as, in treatment. [4] Carroll cites our decision in Parson v. Carroll , quoted previously herein, which involved a defamation action brought by Thomas Parson against Robert Carroll. 272 Va. at 562, 636 S.E.2d at 452. Parson had entered an Alford plea to six counts of sexual battery with Carroll as the victim and then filed a defamation action against Carroll for telling others what Parson had done to him. Id. at 562, 636 S.E.2d at 453. The trial court granted Carroll's motion for summary judgment, holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred the defamation action. This Court reversed, holding that when Parson entered his Alford plea, he conceded only that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of the offenses and did not admit as a factual matter that he had participated in the acts constituting the crimes, and this concession of law did not provide a basis for applying judicial estoppel. Id. at 566, 636 S.E.2d at 455. Further, [b]ecause the material facts of Parson's motion for judgment were still in dispute at this stage of the proceedings, the circuit court further erred in awarding Carroll summary judgment. Id. Parson is not controlling. In Parson, a civil case, this Court decided that a concession made in an Alford plea is a concession of law and not of fact and is not a bar to a post- Alford proceeding in which the issue is whether, as a matter of fact, the accused participated in the acts constituting the offense. Here, the Commonwealth has not claimed that Carroll's concession in his Alford plea should be treated as an admission of factual guilt. Rather, the Commonwealth correctly points out that Parson did not discuss or hold anything with respect to the effect an `Alford plea' has in a criminal case or that it guarantees a defendant special rights with respect to probation conditions. The important point to be made here is that nothing in the Alford opinion, the Parson opinion, or any other Virginia opinion indicates that an Alford plea is a bar to a post- Alford proceeding in which a sex offender is required to admit his guilt during treatment. Carroll cites two decisions from other jurisdictions in support of his position. In State v. Birchler, 2000 WL 1473152, at , 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4622, at  (Ohio Ct.App.2000) (unpublished), the court reversed the judgment revoking the defendant's probation because he was not given notice when he offered his Alford plea that he would be required to admit he had a victim in order to complete his probation. In People v. Walters, 164 Misc.2d 986, 627 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (N.Y.Cnty.Ct.1995), the judgment revoking the defendant's probation was reversed because he was not informed when he entered his Alford plea that he would be required to admit his guilt to the underlying crime during therapy. Later, however, the Court of Appeals of New York held directly opposite to Walters. Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 741 N.E.2d 501, 504 (2000). In addition to this decision of the Court of Appeals of New York, the decisions of one United States Court of Appeals and the highest courts of three other states support the Commonwealth's position. See Warren v. Richland Cnty. Cir. Ct., 223 F.3d 454 (7th Cir.2000); People v. Birdsong, 958 P.2d 1124 (Colo.1998); State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 842 A.2d 567 (2004); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis.2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). We will follow their lead. The two Warren cases, involving the same defendant, are of special interest. In the case decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Philip I. Warren was charged with the sexual assault of a child. He entered an Alford plea, was placed on probation, participated in sex offender treatment, refused to admit his guilt, and had his probation revoked. He argued that the revocation of his probation because he refused to admit his guilt violated his right to due process. In response, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held as follows: [W]hen the State required Warren to admit to the sexual assault in this case, it did not act inconsistently with the `bargain' it had made to `induce' his guilty plea. A defendant's protestations of innocence under an Alford plea extend only to the plea itself. A defendant may choose to enter an Alford plea for various reasons. He may wish to take advantage of the state's offer for a reduced sentence. He may wish to spare himself or his family of the expense and embarrassment of a trial. Whatever the reason for entering an Alford plea, the fact remains that when a defendant enters such a plea, he becomes a convicted sex offender and is treated no differently than he would be had he gone to trial and been convicted by a jury. . . . . [W]e hold that the revocation of Warren's probation for failure to admit his guilt after acceptance of his Alford plea did not violate his right to due process. 579 N.W.2d at 706-07. Warren then filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court challenging the revocation his probation. In rejecting the challenge, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated as follows: Warren believes that the acceptance of an Alford plea is an assurance that a defendant will not have to admit guilt during either conviction or punishment. He is wrong. He can maintain his innocence at the drug store, the grocery store and any other public place he desires. But, when in the private setting of sex offender counseling that is ordered as a condition of probation, and his admission is necessary for rehabilitation, he must admit responsibility for his conduct. 223 F.3d at 459. Carroll attempts to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on the ground that before the trial court accepted the Alford plea it advised Warren that if he was placed on probation he would very likely... be ordered to undergo counseling and he would have an obligation to enter into counseling in good faith with the counselor, the psychiatrist, or doctor. Warren, 579 N.W.2d at 703. In his case, Carroll says, he had no warnings that his refusal to admit to a rape would be cause for his probation to be revoked. However, the good faith statement by the trial court in Warren falls far short of a warning that [a defendant's] refusal to admit to a rape would be cause for his probation to be revoked, so that part of Warren provides Carroll little comfort. Indeed, Warren himself did not consider it sufficient. He argued separately that the circuit court's failure to inform him at the time of his Alford plea that he would be required to admit his guilt during treatment rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin responded as follows: [I]t is well-established that in informing defendants of their rights, courts are only required to notify them of the `direct consequences' of their pleas. Defendants do not have a due process right to be informed of consequences that are merely collateral to their pleas. . . . . [W]e conclude that the circuit court was not required to inform Warren that his probation could be revoked for failing to take responsibility for his actions because it was only a collateral consequence of his conviction. 579 N.W.2d at 708-09 (citations omitted). We hold that the record in this case fully supports the conclusion that Carroll violated the terms of his probation by refusing to admit his guilt during sex offender treatment. We hold further that Carroll's failure to receive warning at the time he entered his Alford plea that such a refusal could result in the revocation of his probation is a collateral and not a direct consequence of his plea and does not render the revocation improper.