Opinion ID: 78615
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of a Common Policy of Discrimination

Text: Pursuant to Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364, Plaintiffs presented four categories of commonality evidence that the district court subjected to a rigorous analysis: (1) facts supporting the existence of company-wide policies and practices that, in part through their subjectivity, provide a potential conduit for discrimination; (2) expert opinions supporting the existence of company-wide policies and practices that likely include a culture of gender stereotyping; (3) expert statistical evidence of class-wide gender disparities attributable to discrimination; and (4) anecdotal evidence from class members throughout the country of discriminatory attitudes held or tolerated by management. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 145-66. Wal-Mart contends this evidence is insufficient to suggest a common factual or legal question related to the existence of discrimination.
As factual evidence, Plaintiffs presented evidence of the following: (1) uniform personnel and management structure across stores; (2) Wal-Mart headquarters's extensive oversight of store operations, company-wide policies governing pay and promotion decisions, and a strong, centralized corporate culture; and (3) consistent gender-related disparities in every domestic region of the company. Such evidence supports Plaintiffs' contention that Wal-Mart operates a highly centralized company that promotes policies common to all stores and maintains a single system of oversight. Wal-Mart does not challenge this evidence.
Plaintiffs presented evidence from Dr. William Bielby, a sociologist, to interpret and explain the facts that suggest that Wal-Mart has and promotes a strong corporate culture  a culture that may include gender stereotyping. Dr. Bielby based his opinion on, among other things, Wal-Mart managers' deposition testimony; organizational charts; correspondence, memos, reports, and presentations relating to personnel policy and practice, diversity, and equal employment opportunity issues; documents describing the culture and history of the company; and a large body of social science research on the impact of organizational policy and practice on workplace bias. Dr. Bielby testified that he employed a social framework analysis to examine the distinctive features of Wal-Mart's policies and practices and evaluated them against what social science shows to be factors that create and sustain bias and those that minimize bias. [21] In Dr. Bielby's opinion, social science research demonstrates that gender stereotypes are especially likely to influence personnel decisions when they are based on subjective factors, because substantial decisionmaker discretion tends to allow people to seek out and retain stereotyping-confirming information and ignore or minimize information that defies stereotypes. Id. at 153(internal quotation marks omitted). Dr. Bielby concluded that: (1) Wal-Mart's centralized coordination, reinforced by a strong organizational culture, sustains uniformity in personnel policy and practice; (2) there are significant deficiencies in Wal-Mart's equal employment policies and practices; and (3) Wal-Mart's personnel policies and practices make pay and promotion decisions vulnerable to gender bias. See id. at 153-54. The district court reviewed Plaintiffs' and Wal-Mart's competing claims as to Wal-Mart's uniform culture and determined that the evidence indicates that in-store pay and promotion decisions are largely subjective and made within a substantial range of discretion by store or district level managers, and that this is a common feature which provides a wide enough conduit for gender bias to potentially seep into the system. Id. at 152. Having evaluated this evidence in detail, the court determined that given the evidence regarding strong uniform culture and policies, the degree and impact of this practice is a significant question of fact common to the class as a whole. Id. at 153. Such a reasoned determination is what our standard for Rule 23 requires. Wal-Mart vigorously challenges Dr. Bielby's third conclusion as vague and imprecise because he concluded that Wal-Mart is vulnerable to bias or gender stereotyping but failed to identify a specific discriminatory policy at Wal-Mart. Specifically, Wal-Mart contends that Dr. Bielby's testimony does not meet the standards for expert testimony set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), which held that a trial court must act as a gatekeeper in determining whether to admit or exclude expert evidence. Wal-Mart made an identical argument to the district court and the district court properly rejected it. A close reading of the district court's order demonstrates its correct understanding of its role at the Rule 23(a)(2) certification stage  to make factual determinations regarding evidence as it relates to common questions of fact or law but not to decide which parties' evidence is ultimately more persuasive as to liability. The court stated, Dr. Bielby presents enough of a basis, both in his review of the scientific literature and on the facts of the case, to provide a foundation for his opinions. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154. The court correctly explained that whether the jury was ultimately persuaded by those opinions was a question on the merits. For the class certification, however, Dr. Bielby's opinions, for which Wal-Mart did not challenge the methodology, raised a question of corporate uniformity and gender stereotyping that is common to all class members. Id. We cannot say that considering Dr. Bielby's opinions in this method was an abuse of discretion. This conclusion is furthered by the fact that Wal-Mart did not (and does not) challenge Dr. Bielby's methodology or contend that his findings lack relevance because they do[ ] not relate to any issue in the case, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wal-Mart challenges only whether certain inferences can be persuasively drawn from his data. But because Daubert does not require a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its persuasiveness, but rather requires a court to admit or exclude evidence based on its scientific reliability and relevance, id. at 587-92, 113 S.Ct. 2786(relevance standard is a liberal one, under which evidence is relevant if it has `any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence' (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 401)), testing Dr. Bielby's testimony for  Daubert reliability would not have addressed Wal-Mart's objections. It would have simply revealed what Wal-Mart itself has admitted and courts have long accepted: that properly analyzed social science data, like that offered by Dr. Bielby, may support a plaintiff's assertions that a claim is proper for class resolution. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235-36, 255, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (considering similar evidence offered by expert social psychologist). Accordingly, Wal-Mart's contention that the district court was required to strike Dr. Bielby's testimony under the Daubert test at the class certification stage, simply because the conclusion he reached seemed unpersuasive absent certain corroborating evidence, is misplaced. [22] See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.). While a jury may ultimately agree with Wal-Mart that, in the absence of a specific discriminatory policy promulgated by Wal-Mart, it is not more likely than not, based solely on Dr. Bielby's analysis, that Wal-Mart engaged in actual gender discrimination, that question must be left to the merits stage of the litigation (and presumably will not have to be decided as there will be other evidence). At the class certification stage, it is enough that Dr. Bielby presented scientifically reliable evidence tending to show that a common question of fact  i.e., Does Wal-Mart's policy of decentralized, subjective employment decision making operate to discriminate against female employees?  exists with respect to all members of the class. [23] This he did and, thus, we find no error in the district court's acceptance of Dr. Bielby's evidence to support a finding of commonality.
It is well established that plaintiffs may demonstrate commonality by presenting statistical evidence, which survives a rigorous analysis, sufficient to fairly raise a common question concerning whether there is class-wide discrimination. See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n. 15, 161, 102 S.Ct. 2364; Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292; [24] see also Stastny v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 278 (4th Cir.1980) (recognizing that statistical data showing comparable disparities experienced by protected employees may indicate a policy or practice that commonly affects the class members and raises a common question concerning whether the pattern or practice is discriminatory). A careful reading of the district court's treatment of the competing statistical evidence demonstrates that, in conducting its analysis, the district court followed the correct standard as explained in Falcon and our earlier cases, and clarified today. Dr. Richard Drogin, Plaintiffs' statistician, analyzed data at a regional level. He ran separate regression analyses for each of the forty-one regions [25] containing Wal-Mart stores. [26] He concluded that there are statistically significant disparities between men and women at Wal-Mart in terms of compensation and promotions, that these disparities are wide-spread across regions, and that they can be explained only by gender discrimination. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 154. Dr. Marc Bendick, Plaintiffs' labor economics expert, conducted a benchmarking study comparing Wal-Mart with twenty of its competitors, concluding Wal-Mart promotes a lower percentage of women than its competitors. [27] See id. Wal-Mart challenges Dr. Drogin's findings and faults his decision to conduct his research on the regional level, rather than analyze the data store-by-store. [28] However, the proper test of whether workforce statistics should be viewed at the macro (regional) or micro (store or sub-store) level depends largely on the similarity of the employment practices and the interchange of employees at the various facilities. See Kirkland v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 425 (2d Cir.1975) (recognizing that the focus of analysis depends on the nature of a defendant's employment practices); 2 Barbara Lindemann & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 1598, 1723 (3d ed.1996). Here, Dr. Drogin explained that a store-by-store analysis would not capture: (1) the effect of district, regional, and company-wide control over Wal-Mart's uniform compensation policies and procedures; (2) the dissemination of Wal-Mart's uniform compensation policies and procedures resulting from the frequent movement of store managers; or (3) Wal-Mart's strong corporate culture. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 157. In conducting its rigorous analysis of these claims, the district court first restated its standard of review. Its decision makes clear that the district court made determinations that Plaintiffs' statistics raised common questions of fact or law only after it rigorously analyzed them, probing significantly behind the pleadings and resolving facts necessary to make determinations on Rule 23(a)(2). Discussing the proper standard for evaluating the statistics, the district court said it rejected a full-blown merits evaluation of the evidence but had to view[ ] the statistical evidence and testimony through the proper lens of the standards applicable to a class certification motion. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 155. Though noting it would not decide the actual merits of the claims, the court did delve[ ] into the substance of the expert testimony ... to the extent necessary to determine if it [wa]s sufficiently probative of an inference of discrimination to create a common question as to the existence of a pattern and practice of gender discrimination at Wal-Mart. Id. This is the precise inquiry that cases such as IPO have required, and it clearly meets the standard we outline above, particularly given the depth of the district court's review, the evidentiary posture of the case as a Title VII pattern and practice case, and the underlying procedural standard where the district court here was reviewing evidence under Rule 23(a)(2), to raise a common question, rather than, like the cases Wal-Mart cites, Rule 23(b)(3), to determine predominance. See Hnot, 241 F.R.D. at 210. In addition to formulating a review that complied with Falcon and our precedent, the district court, contrary to Wal-Mart's claims, did not improperly rely on out-of-circuit cases the Second Circuit overruled in IPO. Specifically, Wal-Mart cites Visa Check and Caridad as decisions IPO rejected, noting the district court's supposed reliance on this reasoning renders its decision error. As an initial matter, the district court did not cite Visa Check at all. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. 137 passim. While it did cite to Caridad, nothing about its citation to Caridad was erroneous. The district court cited Caridad five times. Two instances of this reliance can be immediately set aside as unproblematic because they relied on Caridad 's holding that excessive subjectivity in corporate policies can contribute to a finding of commonality. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 149-50, 154. IPO neither addressed nor overruled this holding in Caridad, and it still remains controlling authority in the Second Circuit. Hnot, 241 F.R.D. at 210. A third citation to Caridad supported the district court's statement that, although some inquiry into the substance of a case may be necessary to ascertain satisfaction of the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a), it is improper to advance a decision on the merits to the class certification stage. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 144(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292). This statement is entirely consistent with Falcon, our precedent, and our ruling today. The two other citations to Caridad equally show that the district court did not adopt the some showing standard that the Second Circuit properly rejected. Instead, the district court refused to consider the merits  it would not conclusively find whether Wal-Mart had discriminated  but it analyzed the evidence to the extent, under Rule 23(a)(2), that it had to determine whether there are questions of law or fact common to the class. Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2); Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143. [29] Critically, the district court did not shy away from issues overlapping with the merits; rather it devoted fifteen pages of its opinion to probing the parties' statistics. The district court merely refused to decide the underlying merits themselves and examined evidence only to the extent necessary to satisfy itself under Rule 23(a)(2) that Plaintiffs raised common questions. In doing so, it joined dozens of other district courts in this circuit that have engaged the proper analysis, all using different wording, but all probing behind the pleadings to make determinations on the Rule 23 requirements. See, e.g., In re Cooper Cos. Sec. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 628, 641 n. 7 (C.D.Cal.2009); Bishop v. Petro-Chem. Transp., LLC, 582 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1305 (E.D.Cal.2008); Alexander v. JBC Legal Group, P.C., 237 F.R.D. 628, 629(D.Mont.2006); Westways World Travel, Inc., 218 F.R.D. at 230. Turning to the factual assertions in Plaintiffs' evidence, the court made a preliminary determination, based on the following largely uncontested statistics: [W]omen working in Wal-Mart stores are paid less than men in every region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, that the salary gap widens over time even for men and women hired into the same jobs at the same time, that women take longer to enter into management positions, and that the higher one looks in the organization the lower the percentage of women. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 155. Importantly, and as instructed by Falcon, these factual determinations were arrived at after looking beyond the pleadings to Plaintiffs' expert's deposition. Id. Correctly noting that descriptive statistics do not address causation, the district court then analyzed not the pleadings, but Plaintiffs' and Wal-Mart's statistics, finding, In short, all of Dr. Drogin's regressions show that gender is a statistically significant variable in accounting for the salary differentials between female class members and male employees at Wal-Mart stores. Id. at 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364. The court specifically analyzed whether aggregation of statistics for regional units was proper or whether Wal-Mart was correct to insist upon a store-level evaluation. The district court first stated the relevant sub-standard: The proper test of whether workforce statistics should be viewed at the macro (regional) or micro (store or sub-store) level depends largely on the similarity of the employment practices, and the interchange of employees, at the various facilities. Id. at 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (citation omitted). It continued, Dr. Drogin contends that it is proper to conduct the analysis on a regional level because the subjective decision-making in compensation and promotions takes place within parameters and guidelines that are highly uniform.... Plaintiffs also have shown, as discussed above, that the primary salary decision-makers, Store Managers, experience frequent relocation among the various stores. Id. at 157, 102 S.Ct. 2364. On appeal, Wal-Mart contends that the district court erred by not finding Wal-Mart's statistical evidence more persuasive than Plaintiffs' evidence because, according to Wal-Mart, its analysis was conducted store-by-store. However, contrary to Wal-Mart's characterization of its analysis, and the dissent's concerns regarding statistical aggregation, [30] Wal-Mart's own research was not conducted at the individual store level. Dr. Joan Haworth, Wal-Mart's expert, did not conduct a store-by-store analysis; instead she reviewed data at the sub-store level by comparing departments to analyze the pay differential between male and female hourly employees. [31] Moreover, our task here is to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that, based on all the evidence presented, there existed common questions of fact sufficient to justify class certification. See Gonzales v. Free Speech Coal., 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th Cir.2005); Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 867. We are not to re-examine the relative strength or persuasiveness of the commonality evidence ourselves. Thus, even if we were to find, based on an independent review of the record, that Wal-Mart's statistical evidence was more persuasive than Plaintiffs'  which we do not, in any event  this alone would not allow us to find that the district court improperly relied on Dr. Drogin's testimony as a valid component of its commonality analysis or that the district court erred in its ultimate conclusion that the commonality prerequisite was satisfied. That the jury might later find Wal-Mart's statistical evidence more persuasive does not detract from the district court's determination, after extensive review, that Dr. Drogin's regional analysis raises common issues appropriate for class adjudication. Here, again, the district court followed the Supreme Court's guidance to thoughtfully probe behind the pleadings, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, and did not abuse its discretion when it relied on Dr. Drogin's use and interpretation of statistical data as a valid component of its determination that Plaintiffs raised common questions. It considered Wal-Mart's challenges to Dr. Drogin's statistics and made the specific determination that the Court is not persuaded that Dr. Drogin's aggregated statistical analysis should be rejected because he did not choose to utilize the Chow test, as Wal-Mart had urged. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 158. In other words, for the purposes of class certification, the district court reasonably made the determination to credit Plaintiffs' statistics. Wal-Mart also claims the district court erred in determining that Wal-Mart provided little or no proper legal or factual challenge to Dr. Drogin's analysis, [32] and that, contrary to Wal-Mart's contention, Dr. Haworth's Store Manager survey evidence  which was stricken for failing to satisfy the standards of Rules 702 and 703 of Evidence [33]  did not undermine or contradict Dr. Drogin's evidence. In rejecting the inclusion of Wal-Mart's Store Manager surveys as a challenge to Dr. Drogin's statistics because they were not based on a scientifically valid reasoning or methodology, Dukes II, 222 F.R.D. at 197-98 (discussing Rules 702 and 703), see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. 2786, the court noted that even if the evidence were included, [t]he survey would not provide sufficient additional weight to Defendant's challenge to Dr. Drogin's analysis to sway the Court from its conclusion that his testimony supports an inference of discrimination, and thus the existence of substantial questions common to the class, Dukes II, 222 F.R.D. at 198 n. 9 (emphasis added). In so ruling, the district court went even further into the merits than necessary to make a reasoned, justifiable determination, after proper review under the correct standard, that Plaintiffs' claims were appropriate for class adjudication due to common questions. Thus, because Dr. Drogin adequately explained, and the district court rigorously analyzed, why his statistical method best reflected the alleged discrimination, the court did not abuse its discretion when it credited Dr. Drogin's analysis of statistical evidence of common discrimination questions. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion when it concluded that Dr. Drogin's analysis supported Plaintiffs' contention that there is a common core of facts flowing from Wal-Mart's corporate structure and policies that affects class members generally with regard to their discrimination claims. While Plaintiffs and Wal-Mart disagree on whose findings are more persuasive, the disagreement is not one of whether Plaintiffs have asserted common questions of law or fact. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 157, 159, 102 S.Ct. 2364. The disagreement is the common question, and deciding which side has been more persuasive is an issue for the next phase of the litigation. Requiring even more findings and further analysis from the district court would be to force a trial on the merits at the certification stage. Finally, and discussed further below, the district court's review of statistics showing discrimination regarding promotions was also not an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs and Defendant disagree over whether Dr. Drogin's analysis of internal promotion data was proper. Specifically, both sides agreed that Wal-Mart's actual applicant flow data for promotions during the class period was limited and contained significant gaps. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 162. Dr. Drogin's statistics estimated the applicant flow by tabulating `the incumbents in historical feeder jobs for each promotion.' Id. Wal-Mart argued that the data, while limited, is nonetheless sufficient to justify an extrapolation for all job openings during the entire class period. Id. The district court, addressing this statistical dispute, found Plaintiffs' statistics sufficient to create an inference of discrimination. Id. at 164. In doing so, the district court found Dr. Drogin's reasoning and methodology valid and applicable in the case. While the court noted in passing that Dr. Drogin's statistics were reasonable, the court also, and more appropriately, stated that it is well recognized that where actual applicant flow data is inadequate or unavailable, other measures of applicant flow  including but not limited to `feeder pools'  are deemed acceptable so long as they are used in a reliable manner. Id. at 162-63. In doing so the district court cited an evidence treatise, Ninth Circuit precedent, and a district court case that had accepted the same type of feeder pool methodology in a dispute of the very same experts  Dr. Drogin and Dr. Haworth. Id. at 163 & n. 37 (citing Hemmings v. Tidyman's Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1185-86 (9th Cir.2002); R. Paetzold and S. Willborn, The Statistics of Discrimination §§ 4.02-4.04 (2002); Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F.Supp. 259, 333-34 (N.D.Cal.1992)). Thus, properly considering Dr. Drogin's statistics, the court made a determination on the applicant pool data. It found that Defendant's assertion that its approach is necessarily superior does not withstand scrutiny. Rather, Defendant's arguments, which go to the weight of the evidence [i.e., the persuasiveness on the merits], merely highlight the presence of a significant issue affecting all class members which supports, rather than defeats, granting class certification. Id. at 164. This determination was thus made after a rigorous analysis of the parties' statistical claims. In short, the district court stated the legal standard, analyzed Plaintiffs' and Wal-Mart's competing claims to the propriety of aggregating statistics on a regional level and addressing Wal-Mart's missing applicant flow data, noted Plaintiffs have shown reasons to accept their statistics, dismissed Wal-Mart's statistical challenges, demonstrated these finding were supported by relevant Ninth Circuit precedent (and an identical dispute involving the same two experts), rejected Wal-Mart's reliance on a district court case purportedly explaining why the sub-store statistical analysis was proper, and, finally, determined that at the class certification stage all of this analysis was sufficient to support Dr. Drogin's analysis and raise questions of law or fact common to the class. This searching analysis was solid, well founded and in no way an abuse of discretion.
Circumstantial and anecdotal evidence of discrimination is commonly used in Title VII pattern and practice cases to bolster statistical proof by bringing the cold numbers convincingly to life. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339, 97 S.Ct. 1843; see also Rudebusch v. Hughes, 313 F.3d 506, 517 (9th Cir.2002). Wal-Mart contends that the district court erred by concluding that the anecdotal evidence, presented by Plaintiffs in the form of sworn declarations, supported a finding of commonality. [34] Wal-Mart maintains that the declarations depict a handful of widely divergent events that cannot be deemed probative or representative of discrimination in pay or management-track promotions. In their declarations, the potential class members testified to being paid less than similarly situated men, being denied or delayed in receiving promotions in a disproportionate manner when compared with similarly situated men, working in an atmosphere with a strong corporate culture of discrimination, and being subjected to various individual sexist acts. The district court credited this evidence. Wal-Mart argues that 120 declarations cannot sufficiently represent a class of this size. However, we find no authority requiring or even suggesting that a plaintiff class submit a specific number of declarations for such evidence to have any value. Moreover, the district court did not state that this anecdotal evidence provided sufficient proof to establish commonality by itself, but merely noted such evidence provides support for Plaintiffs' contention that commonality is present. See Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 166 (This anecdotal evidence, in combination with the other evidence previously discussed, further supports an inference that [Wal-Mart's] policies and procedures have the effect of discriminating against Plaintiffs in a common manner.). [35] Because the combination of these declarations and Plaintiffs' other evidence, discussed below, raise an inference of common discriminatory experiences, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it considered Plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence. [36] Finally, in arguing against certification based on affidavits, Plaintiffs' personal allegations, statistics, and expert testimony, the dissent intersperses references of Falcon immediately with discussion of Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 879, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984), claiming individual stories do not constitute significant proof that Wal-Mart has adopted a general policy of discrimination or that such a policy prevails at Wal-Mart. Dissent at 635. This criticism, and particularly its temporary suspension of consideration of the statistical evidence, is indicative of the dissent's repeated attempts to go beyond the Supreme Court's concern with the need for more precise pleadings in class actions, Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364 (citing Johnson, 417 F.2d at 1125), and the Court's command that sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question, id. at 160, 102 S.Ct. 2364, in an effort to reframe the question as one on whether Plaintiffs can actually succeed on the merits. Cf. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78, 94 S.Ct. 2140(explaining that the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits is not part of deciding whether certification is proper). Contrary to the dissent's proposed standard, Plaintiffs here need not establish a prima facie case on the merits. Dissent at 643. Class certification in Cooper had already taken place and, in fact, the case had gone through a trial. 467 U.S. at 872, 104 S.Ct. 2794. The decision for the Supreme Court was whether the class's loss at trial precluded a class member from maintaining his own, separate civil action subsequent to the loss. Id. at 869, 104 S.Ct. 2794. This is an entirely different posture than the present case presents, and the standard for winning a claim under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), is, of course, different than that for certifying a class action. See Cooper, 467 U.S. at 875-76, 104 S.Ct. 2794; Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160-61, 102 S.Ct. 2364.