Opinion ID: 2130275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: lerner's contract with gould

Text: Although there was no formal agreement signed by Lerner and Gould, there is no dispute that a contract existed between Lerner and Gould, which called for Lerner's compensated services as a physician and consultant on occupational medicine relative to Gould's smelter operations, wherever those activities were conducted in Gould's business network. As far as Nebraska was concerned, the Lerner-Gould contractual relationship existed from 1975 until Gould closed its Omaha smelter in 1982, although the James workers' compensation claim indicates Lerner's medical involvement with a Nebraska resident as late as 1983. Obviously predicated on Lerner's expertise in occupational medicine, one of Lerner's contractual obligations was: Assist company physicians in the medical management and evaluation of [Gould's] employees with increased absorption of lead with and without clinical effects. Gould encouraged its plant physicians, involved in the treatment or evaluation of company employees, to draw on Lerner's special knowledge about toxins encountered in Gould's smelter operations. In discharging his obligation to render professional services pursuant to the Gould contract, Lerner actually discussed medical questions over the telephone with Fitzgibbons, Gould's company physician in Omaha. In the industrial context of the Lerner-Gould contract, the conclusion is inescapable that Fitzgibbons incorporated Lerner's expertise and advice into Fitzgibbons' medical care and treatment to employees of Gould, Inc., in Omaha. For his medical consultations and advisory services for Gould's company physicians, Lerner received an annual retainer and a daily fee. Nebraska's long-arm statute, § 25-536, provides: A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person: (1) Who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person: ... (b) Contracting to supply services or things in this state.... In Lupton Assoc. v. Northeast, 105 A.D.2d 3, 482 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1984), a Massachusetts corporation contracted with a New York corporation that the latter would  `use its best efforts to promote, develop and extend the sale of [defendant's] products' in the northeastern United States in exchange for a commission on the net sale price of all goods sold. Id. at 4, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The New York long-arm statute provided for personal jurisdiction by acts of nondomiciliaries, when a cause of action arose from the enumerated acts in the statute, viz, transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state. Id. at 5, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The court concluded: New York courts may now exercise jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who contracts outside this State [New York] to supply goods or services in New York even if the goods are never shipped or the services are never supplied in New York, so long as the cause of action, as here, arose out of that contract.... Id. at 6, 482 N.Y.S.2d at 650. See, also, Drake America Corp. v. Speakman Co., 144 A.D.2d 529, 534 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1988). South Carolina's long-arm statute was involved in Kimbrel v. Neiman-Marcus, 665 F.2d 480 (4th Cir.1981), when Kimbrel, a South Carolina resident, commenced an action in South Carolina against Neiman-Marcus, a Texas corporation, concerning a contract with Neiman-Marcus for paintings owned by Kimbrel. The South Carolina long-arm statute, in pertinent part, provided that a court in South Carolina may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's  `entry into a contract to be performed in whole or part by either party in this state.'  665 F.2d at 481. In Kimbrel, the court concluded that the South Carolina long-arm statute afforded personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. See, also, Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil & Plant Lab., Inc., 20 Ariz.App. 517, 514 P.2d 270 (1973) (service of process upheld under Arizona's long-arm statute, which provided a corporate defendant  `which has caused an event to occur in this state out of which the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose,'  id. at 519, 514 P.2d at 272; a California laboratory sent its horticultural recommendations and advice to the Arizona plaintiff, which used the information to its damage in raising nursery stock in Arizona); Wolpert v. N. Shore University Hosp., 231 N.J.Super. 378, 555 A.2d 729 (1989) (a New Jersey court had personal jurisdiction over a New York physician who issued a report and intended that the report would be the basis for action in New Jersey). Under the contract between Lerner and Gould, Lerner assumed the obligation to consult with and advise Gould's company physicians, who included Fitzgibbons in Omaha. The contract also obligated Lerner to [p]articipate in the implementation of the industrial hygiene and safety aspects of the health program for lead at Gould's plants, which included the Omaha smelter operations. If Lerner's special knowledge was his stock in trade, Lerner contracted to market his product in Nebraska when he agreed to supply, and actually did supply, medical information to a Nebraska physician for the health care of Gould's Omaha employees. Although Lerner did not contract to deliver a tangible product in Nebraska, nevertheless, Lerner's expertise and professional advice, supplied to a Nebraska physician for the care and treatment of Gould's Omaha employees in fulfillment of the Lerner-Gould contract, constituted Lerner's [c]ontracting to supply services or things in Nebraska. § 25-536(1)(b). Therefore, we conclude that the Nebraska long-arm statute, § 25-536(1)(b) and (2), applies on account of Lerner's conduct and activity under his contract with Gould; hence, the first requisite for a court's assertion or exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant has been satisfied. See, Sherburne Cty. Social Serv. v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d 866 (Minn.1988); Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.1987); Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 536 A.2d 740 (1987); Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.1983).