Opinion ID: 2068009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Violation.

Text: Norman first contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to exclude Dr. Mechanick's psychiatric evaluation and testimony from the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Specifically, Norman claims that evidence of Dr. Mechanick's opinion must be excluded because of the State's deliberate violation of Norman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the Delaware charges. We review a claim alleging the denial of a constitutional right de novo. [23]
The Sixth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense. [24] The accused's right to counsel attaches when the adversarial judicial proceedings are commenced and continues throughout all critical stages of the proceedings, [25] including the deliberate elicitation by law enforcement officers (and their agents) of statements pertaining to the charge. [26] Therefore, the examination of an accused by a psychiatrist arranged by the State is considered a critical stage which implicates the Sixth Amendment. [27] Although there is no constitutional right to have counsel present during such an examination, counsel must be given advance notice of its nature and scope, as well as an opportunity to consult with the accused. [28] At the time the State sent Dr. Mechanick to examine Norman, Norman had been indicted in Delaware. Consequently, the judicial proceedings against Norman in Delaware had commenced and Norman's right to counsel had attached. Although Norman had not yet been appointed counsel, we agree with the Superior Court's conclusion that the State should have put the Court on notice of its desire to participate in the evaluation [of Norman] with Maryland. Because it did not do so, the court properly found that the State did violate [Norman's] Sixth Amendment right to counsel [when it] jumped the gun in its participation with the Maryland prosecutor in obtaining [Dr. Mechanick's] report. [29]
Once the right to counsel has attached with respect to a particular charge, law enforcement officials may not use as evidence at trial incriminating statements deliberately elicited from the accused without the presence or waiver of counsel. [30] Any statements obtained in violation of the accused's right to counsel are inadmissible as evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief. [31] The purpose of this exclusionary rule is to preserve society's interest in deterring police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections. [32] The rule, however, is not a blanket prohibition on admissibility: statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment are nonetheless admissible if certain exceptions apply. [33] Two closely-related exceptions to the exclusionary rule flow from the premise that, although the government ought not profit from its own misconduct, it also should not be made worse off than it would have been had the misconduct not occurred. [34] First, where the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion would put the police in a worse position than they would have been absent any error or violation. Thus, under the independent source doctrine, even if police engage in illegal investigatory activity, evidence will be admissible if it is discovered through a source independent of the illegality. [35] Second, exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered would similarly put the government in a worse position, because the police would have obtained that evidence even if no misconduct had occurred. Thus, under the inevitable discovery doctrine, a court may admit illegally obtained evidence if the evidence would inevitably have been discovered through independent, lawful means. [36] The United States Supreme Court adopted the independent source doctrine in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States. [37] In that case, the Court held that knowledge garnered from copies of illegally seized documents could not be used to frame an indictment or secure a subpoena for the originals. [38] The Court added, however, that facts thus obtained [do not] become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others.... [39] More recently, the Court applied the doctrine in Murray v. United States. [40] In that case, the police unlawfully entered a warehouse without a warrant and observed numerous burlap-wrapped bales later found to contain marijuana. They left without disturbing the bales, kept the warehouse under surveillance, and did not reenter until they had a search warrant. [41] The police did not disclose the prior entry or rely on any observations made during the illegal entry in their warrant application. [42] The Court allowed admission of the evidence because the evidence had been obtained independently of the initial illegality. [43] The United States Supreme Court adopted another exception, the inevitable discovery doctrine, in Nix v. Williams. [44] In that case, the defendant was arrested for the kidnapping and murder of a ten-year-old. While transporting the defendant, a police officer violated the defendant's right to counsel by interrogating him, thereby discovering the location of the body. By that time, the police had independently begun an exhaustive search that (subsequent testimony revealed) would have discovered the body within hours of the defendant's disclosure of the location. [45] Thus, the Court held that the improperly acquired information could be admitted because the body would have inevitably been discovered during the course of the lawful search already underway. [46]
Although the Superior Court analyzed the admissibility of Dr. Mechanick's evaluation using a harmless error standard, the court's finding comports with an analysis under the independent source and inevitable discovery exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Dr. Mechanick examined Norman on January 28, 2006, pursuant to an order from the Maryland Circuit Court, and issued two psychiatric evaluations, one for Maryland authorities and one for Delaware authorities. Dr. Mechanick's opinion as to whether Norman satisfied the Maryland definition of not criminally responsible did not violate Norman's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Norman's Maryland defense counsel was given advance notice of Dr. Mechanick's examination and had an opportunity to consult with Norman regarding it. Thus, Dr. Mechanick's opinion regarding whether Norman was not criminally responsible under Maryland law was discovered through a source independent of the illegality and was admissible in his Delaware trial pursuant to the Independent Source Doctrine. Moreover, the Maryland evaluation was neither confidential nor privileged, and its use was not limited to the proceedings in Maryland. [47] Each expert that examined Norman in Maryland likewise became a potential expert witness in the Delaware case. Even if Delaware prosecutors had not been involved in Dr. Mechanick's evaluation, they could have later asked him to apply Delaware law to the information he gathered in his evaluation.
Dr. Mechanick's opinion as to whether Norman satisfied the Delaware definition of NGRI or GBMI was also admissible under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine. To the extent Dr. Mechanick based his opinion on his review of the history given by Norman to his own psychiatric experts and his interviews with Norman in Delaware, Norman's statements would inevitably have been discovered during the course of a lawful investigation. Because the defense placed Norman's sanity in issue, the outcome in this case would have been no different even if Norman had the benefit of Delaware counsel at Dr. Mechanick's evaluation in Maryland. A mental health defense was the only reasonable defense strategy available in either Maryland or Delaware, given the overwhelming evidence against Norman. Consequently, Delaware counsel would likely have advised Norman to participate in the Maryland court-ordered evaluation by Dr. Mechanick, or else risk sabotaging his Maryland defense. Assuming counsel followed this course, nothing in the Delaware case would be different. At oral argument before this Court, defense counsel urged that Norman had the right to make the strategic, if foolhardy, choice to refuse to submit to the evaluation or refrain from answering certain questions. But, even if counsel gave such guidance, it would not have changed the outcome of Norman's Delaware trial. Assuming counsel could have threaded the eye of the needle and achieved an evaluation admissible in Maryland without any information regarding Norman's drug use, that finesse would have been short-lived. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 12.2, in order to assert the mental illness defense in Delaware, a defendant must submit to an evaluation of the State's chosen expert. [48] Thus, even if Norman had evaded questions regarding drug use during the Maryland evaluation, he would have been required either to answer them in Delaware, or else abandon his mental health defense completely, making Dr. Mechanick's evaluation irrelevant. Under either scenario, the end result of the Delaware trial would be the same guilty verdict. [49] Furthermore, Dr. Mechanick could have based his expert opinion upon other admissible evidence, specifically, the same history gathered in the evaluations of Dr. Brandt and/or Dr. Alizai-Cowan. [50] The Maryland court-ordered evaluations of Norman by Drs. Brandt and Alizai-Cowan were not confidential, privileged, or limited in use to the Maryland proceedings. [51] Both Maryland doctors presented their evaluation and testimony in the Delaware case on behalf of Norman, and Dr. Mechanick testified in rebuttal. There is substantial similarity in the information found in each report, including the evidence regarding Norman's drug use, medical history, and symptoms of psychosis. [52] Norman's answers to drug-use questions are consistent among all three doctors. [53] Thus, based on the information lawfully obtained by the Maryland experts, Dr. Mechanick had an independent evidentiary basis to evaluate whether Norman met Delaware's definition of not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill. Finally, Dr. Mechanick's subsequent examinations of Norman performed in Delaware did not violate the Sixth Amendment; thus, he could render an identical opinion based upon other admissible evidence. Accordingly, the Superior Court correctly admitted Dr. Mechanick's opinion notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment violation. [54]