Opinion ID: 2142011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limitations and Repose Periods for Attorney Malpractice

Text: Prior to the adoption of Public Act 89-7, section 13-214.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure established a two-year limitations period and a six-year repose period for attorney malpractice actions. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 1994). Subsection (d) of the statute contained an exception to the repose period: When the injury caused by the act or omission does not occur until the death of the person for whom the professional services were rendered, the action may be commenced within 2 years after the date of the person's death unless letters of office are issued or the person's will is admitted to probate within that 2 year period, in which case the action must be commenced within the time for filing claims against the estate or a petition contesting the validity of the will of the deceased person, whichever is later, as provided in the Probate Act of 1975. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(d) (West 1994). Public Act 89-7, effective March 9, 1995, removed subsection (d), but otherwise left intact the balance of section 13-214.3. With the removal of subsection (d), the statute then requiredwithout exceptionthat all legal malpractice actions be brought within two years from the date the complaining party knew or reasonably should have known of the injury, but in any event, not more than six years after the act or omission occurred. 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(b), (c) (West 1996). On December 18, 1997, this court entered its decision in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). In Best, we held certain core provisions of Public Act 89-7 violated the separation of powers clause and the prohibition against special legislation. Best, 179 Ill.2d at 416, 433, 449, 467, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057. Because the core provisions were inseparable from the remainder of Public Act 89-7, we concluded that the act must fail in toto. We thus declared Public Act 89-7 void in its entirety. Best, 179 Ill.2d at 467, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057. That portion of Public Act 89-7 which removed the exception to the statute of repose for attorney malpractice actions set forth in section 13-214.3(d) was not one of the core provisions held substantively unconstitutional. Nonetheless, because we held Public Act 89-7 void in its entirety, that portion of the act was also rendered invalid. Against this statutory backdrop, we consider the nature and timing of the malpractice action at issue here.