Opinion ID: 1450589
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendants' Responsibility for Barfield's Overtime

Text: After discovery concluded, the parties cross-moved for summary judgment on the question of liability. The district court observed that, because Barfield was paid, and in that sense employed, by the nursing referral agencies, the critical liability question was whether Bellevue was also Barfield's `employer' under the terms of the FLSA. Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d at 392; see also 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (stating that individual may be employed by more than one entity at same time). In addressing this issue, the district court looked to six factors identified in Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir.2003) (identifying factors relevant to determining whether entity has functional control over workers even in the absence of ... formal control so as to qualify as employer). See Barfield v. N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 432 F.Supp.2d at 392-94. [4] With regard to the first four factors, the district court concluded that it was undisputed that (1) Barfield performed her work on Bellevue's premises using Bellevue's equipment; (2) no referral agency shifted its business as a unit from one putative joint employer to another, but, instead, each agency assigned the same agency employees to the same hospitals whenever possible  in Barfield's case, to Bellevue  in order to promote more continuity of care and to increase the productivity of the nurses and the value of their services; (3) Barfield performed work integral to Bellevue's operation; and (4) Barfield's work responsibilities remained the same regardless of which agency referred her. Id. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). With regard to Zheng 's supervision factor, the district court concluded that the evidence established as a matter of law that (5) Bellevue demonstrate[d] effective control on the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment in light of Bellevue's degree of control over Barfield's schedule. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Bellevue disputed that it scheduled shifts directly with agency health care employees, the district court noted that Bellevue conceded its frequent communication of tentative work shifts to referred employees, requiring them to call the hospital a few hours before the start of these shifts to confirm the assignments. See id. In addition, the district court found that, on several occasions, Bellevue solicited Barfield to work a double shift even before she began the first assignment. See id. The district court further observed that it was undisputed that (6) Barfield worked exclusively for Bellevue. See id. at 394. Thus, the district court concluded that all of the Zheng factors point, to a greater or lesser degree, toward plaintiff's being employed by Bellevue. Id. To the extent Zheng advised further consideration of any other factors that a court deems relevant to its assessment of the economic realities of a given employment situation, id. (quoting Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d at 71-72), the district court found it undisputed that Bellevue exercise[d] at least some control over which agency nurses are permitted to work for the hospital because it regularly evaluated the performance of agency employees and could prohibit particular employees from working further at Bellevue and receive overtime either because it determined that the individual had violated a hospital rule or because it was generally dissatisfied with the individual's performance. Id. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the circumstances of the whole activity viewed in light of economic reality demonstrate[ ] that Bellevue exercised functional control over plaintiff and was her joint employer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants asserted that, even if the district court concluded that Bellevue was Barfield's joint employer under the FLSA, plaintiff was not entitled to recover overtime wages for two reasons: (1) at least one of Barfield's referral agencies had specifically informed her that she could not work more than 40 hours per week at Bellevue, and (2) Barfield's use of multiple referral agencies to secure assignments to Bellevue prevented defendants from determining how many hours she had worked at the hospital. See id. In rejecting these arguments, the district court determined that Bellevue could not rely on the agency's notice of limited temporary work hours at the hospital to avoid FLSA liability because Bellevue itself had never informed Barfield of any such restriction on her overall employment at the hospital. See id. The district court further observed that Bellevue did not dispute that Barfield had filled out the sign-in sheets Bellevue provided for temporary workers, that the hospital had collected these sheets and cross-referenced them against work verification forms signed by supervising nurses after each shift, and that Bellevue employees had encouraged Barfield to work extra shifts beyond those scheduled in advance. See id. at 394-95. Finally, the court noted undisputed evidence that at least one Bellevue supervisor was aware that temporary health care workers were sometimes referred to the hospital by multiple agencies. See id. at 395. On this record, the district court determined that no other conclusion was possible than that Bellevue knew or had reason to know the total number of hours Barfield worked for them each week, making them responsible for overtime compensation when those hours exceeded 40. See id. at 394-95.