Opinion ID: 1205031
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substitution of a juror.

Text: The jury retired to deliberate at 3:40 p.m. on December 15, 1982, recessing for the day after less than one hour of deliberations. The following morning, before further deliberations, the court announced that one of the jurors had become ill, and both parties stipulated to his replacement by an alternate juror. After the alternate was sworn, the trial judge advised the jury to resume its deliberations, stating it would be helpful and in connection with commencing your deliberations again, that you kind of start, start from scratch, so to speak, so that Mr. Rhoades has the benefit of your thinking as well as give him an opportunity for his input also. The jury deliberated two and one-half days after substitution of the alternate juror before returning its verdict. (19a) Defendant contends the court's admonition did not embody all elements of the instruction required by People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687 [131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742]. In Collins, this court directed that the court instruct the jury to set aside and disregard all past deliberations and begin deliberating anew. The jury should be further advised that one of its members has been discharged and replaced with an alternate juror as provided by law; that the law grants to the People and to the defendant the right to a verdict reached only after full participation of the 12 jurors who ultimately return a verdict; that this right may only be assured if the jury begins deliberations again from the beginning; and that each remaining original juror must set aside and disregard the earlier deliberations as if they had not been had. ( Id., at p. 694; see also People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 482-483 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107].) Defendant's contention must be rejected. By instructing the jury to kind of start, start from scratch, so to speak, the court implied that the jury should disregard its previous deliberations. ( People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 405 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184].) By providing this directive in the context of advising the jurors to give the alternate the benefit of the other jurors' thoughts, as well as to give the jurors the benefit of the alternate's input, the court further emphasized that deliberations were to begin anew with the full participation of the alternate. Furthermore, the court did not suggest that the jury might not have to reconsider any matter already considered or decided. (Compare People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d 386, 405 [court's comments erroneously implied that the alternate should be brought up to speed on matters already discussed and possibly decided].) Finally, even assuming the court erred, no prejudice occurred. (20) In determining whether Collins error was prejudicial, we may consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternate juror. ( People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d 386, 405; Griesel v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 578, 585 [153 Cal. Rptr. 213, 591 P.2d 503].) In People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d 386, we concluded there was no prejudice where the case against the defendant was overwhelming and where the jury deliberated only part of one afternoon prior to substitution of the alternate juror and two and one-half days thereafter. ( Id., at p. 406.) In People v. Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d 687, itself, we determined the error was not prejudicial where the case against the defendant was very strong, and the jury had deliberated little more than one hour prior to substitution of the alternate and had returned a verdict after several additional hours. ( Id., at pp. 690, 697.) (19b) In the present case, the evidence against defendant was extremely strong. The jury had deliberated less than one hour prior to substitution of the alternate, and continued to deliberate for two and one-half days thereafter. It is not reasonably probable the outcome of the trial would have been different had the jury been instructed, in more exact language, to begin its deliberations anew. (See People v. Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d 687, 697; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)