Opinion ID: 2405707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligence in Physical Incapacity Circumstances

Text: Perhaps surprisingly, this Court has not previously dealt with the liability of one who suddenly loses consciousness or control from a known medical disorder while driving. The Court of Appeals has faced the issue, but in only a limited number of cases, many of which are unpublished. In the earliest case, Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn. App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452, cert. denied, (Tenn.1936), a passenger in a taxicab was injured when the driver suddenly, and without warning, suffered an epileptic seizure. The driver had been experiencing such attacks, which caused unconsciousness, for several years prior to the accident. Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 97 S.W.2d at 453. With little analysis, the Court of Appeals merely concluded that there was no negligence immediately connected with the accident. Id. In the only other relevant reported Tennessee decision, Robinson v. Moore, 512 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn.App.), cert. denied, (Tenn.1974), a bus driver, who had slipped into a diabetic coma, ran a red light and caused an accident, The Court of Appeals found in favor of the employer and noted that the driver had been driving the bus for twenty-one years, had received numerous driving safety awards, and had never experienced a sudden blackout, although he knew he had diabetes and was receiving treatment for it. Robinson v. Moore, 512 S.W.2d at 577. Additionally, the court focused on the absence of medical proof finding that plaintiff adduced no medical testimony to the effect that the physical diseased condition of [defendant] rendered [defendant] incompetent [to drive.] Id. at 578. [1] The unreported cases focus similarly on the substance of the medical evidence. In one, a driver experienced an epileptic seizure while driving. Though he knew he had epilepsy, the driver was under a physician's care, faithfully took his medication, had not had a seizure in the last two and one-half years, and had been advised by his physician that there was no reason to refrain from driving. A finding of no liability was affirmed. In another case involving an accident caused by an epileptic seizure, the injured plaintiff relied on the fact that defendant had not taken her prescribed medication and had not asked her physician what the effect might be. Nonetheless, the judgment for plaintiff was reversed because plaintiff had not established that defendant's failure to take her medication had caused plaintiff's damages nor that defendant's driving with the epileptic condition was an unreasonable risk. The court deemed the absence of medical testimony establishing a foreseeable risk of danger by driving as critical because of the impossibility of evaluating the reasonableness of the risk without a medical evaluation of the severity of the condition, the effectiveness of the medication, and the likelihood of seizures with or without medication. Our case law, as reflected in these few opinions, is generally consistent with the approach of other jurisdictions faced with similar situations. The generally accepted approach is to accept as a defense the sudden loss of physical capacity or consciousness while driving provided that the loss of capacity or consciousness was unforeseeable. See e.g., Walker v. Cardwell, 348 So.2d 1049 (Ala.1977); Goodrich v. Blair, 132 Ariz. 459, 646 P.2d 890 (Ct.App.1982); Ford v. Carew & English, 89 Cal. App.2d 199, 200 P.2d 828 (1949); Renell v. Argonaut Liquor Co., 148 Colo. 154, 365 P.2d 239 (1961); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64 (Del.1975); Watts v. Smith, 226 A.2d 160 (D.C.App. 1967); Malcolm v. Patrick, 147 So.2d 188 (Fla.Ct.App. 1962); Hoggatt v. Melin, 29 Ill. App.2d 23, 172 N.E.2d 389 (1961); Holcomb v. Miller, 149 Ind. App. 46, 269 N.E.2d 885 (1971); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa 1978); Rogers v. Wilhelm-Olsen, 748 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Brannon v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 194 (La. 1987); Moore v. Presnell, 38 Md. App. 243, 379 A.2d 1246 (1977); McGovern v. Tinglof, 344 Mass. 114, 181 N.E.2d 573 (1962); Soule v. Grimshaw, 266 Mich. 117, 253 N.W. 237 (1934); Storjohn v. Fay, 246 Neb. 454, 519 N.W.2d 521 (1994); Savard v. Randall, 103 N.H. 234, 169 A.2d 276 (1961); Wallace v. Johnson, 11 N.C. App. 703, 182 S.E.2d 193 (1971); Jenkins v. Morgan, 57 Ohio App.3d 40, 566 N.E.2d 1244 (1988); Parker v. Washington, 421 P.2d 861 (Okla. 1966); van der Hout v. Johnson, 251 Or. 435, 446 P.2d 99 (1968); Howle v. PYA/Monarch, Inc., 288 S.C. 586, 344 S.E.2d 157 (Ct.App. 1986); Durham v. Wardlow, 401 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966); Witt v. Merricks, 210 Va. 70, 168 S.E.2d 517 (1969); Kaiser v. Suburban Trans. Sys., 65 Wash.2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 (1965); Keller v. Wonn, 140 W. Va. 860, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955); & Eleason v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 Wis. 134, 35 N.W.2d 301 (1948). The rule recognized by these cases has been succinctly summarized as follows: The operator of a motor vehicle is not ordinarily chargeable with negligence because he becomes suddenly stricken by a fainting spell or loses consciousness from an unforeseen cause, and is unable to control the vehicle. In other words, fainting or momentary loss of consciousness while driving is a complete defense to an action based on negligence if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable. ..... If the operator of a motor vehicle knows that he [or she] is subject to attacks in the course of which he [or she] is likely to lose consciousness, such a loss of consciousness does not constitute a defense in an action brought by a person injured as a result of the operator's conduct. 7A Am.Jur.2d Automobiles and Highway Traffic, § 773 (1980). See also Travers, Annotation, Liability for Automobile Accident Allegedly Caused By Driver's Blackout, Sudden Unconsciousness, or the Like, 93 A.L.R.3d 326 (1979) ([C]ases decided under negligence theories have uniformly held that a sudden loss of consciousness while driving is a complete defense to an action based on negligence ... if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable.). The rule covers accidents caused by, among other incapacitating events, actual loss of consciousness, dizziness, temporary loss of vision, stroke, heart attack, or seizure. The key to establishing the physical capacity or loss of consciousness defense is foreseeability. Consequently, the defense would be inappropriate if the driver was aware of facts sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to anticipate that his or her driving might likely lead to an accident. Courts differ, however, in the strictness of the approach. For example, some courts hold that any driver suffering from a medical disorder capable of producing a seizure or unconsciousness is liable, as a matter of law, for driving at all. See Malcolm v. Patrick, 147 So.2d 188 (Fla.Ct.App. 1962); accord Eleason v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 Wis. 134, 35 N.W.2d 301 (1948). Other courts recognize that such knowledge creates a question for the jury as to whether there was a breach of the standard of care. See e.g., Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64 (Del. 1975); Freese v. Lemmon, 267 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa 1978); Murphy v. Paxton, 186 So.2d 244 (Miss. 1966). Still other courts hold that the mere knowledge of past incapacitating medical episodes or a history of an incapacitating medical condition is insufficient notice to warrant a finding of negligence. See e.g., Goodrich v. Blair, 132 Ariz. 459, 646 P.2d 890 (1982); Durham v. Wardlow, 401 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966). These courts often require symptoms on the day of or immediately before the accident.