Opinion ID: 2130437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: intrinsic analysis

Text: I agree that the incident in the instant case is not so clear cut as to allow us to conclude that there was no occurrence. Thus, I believe that the next logical step is to determine whether such bodily injury unambiguously falls within the exclusion of § 1(f). [6] I am assisted in this task by this Court's own opinions and the policy language at issue. In Raska v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co, 412 Mich 355, 361-362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982), we explained: Any clause in an insurance policy is valid as long as it is clear, unambiguous and not in contravention of public policy.    A contract is said to be ambiguous when its words may reasonably be understood in different ways. If a fair reading of the entire contract of insurance leads one to understand that there is coverage under particular circumstances and another fair reading of it leads one to understand there is no coverage under the same circumstances the contract is ambiguous and should be construed against its drafter and in favor of coverage. Yet, if a contract, however inartfully worded or clumsily arranged, fairly admits of but one interpretation it may not be said to be ambiguous or, indeed, fatally unclear. To emphasize the relevant policy language, it excludes: Bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. There are no complex or contradictory provisions in this exclusion. Moreover, it is difficult to justify a search for ambiguity in this provision as a whole, since neither party nor either of the other opinions of the Court suggests one which might preclude coverage. [7] The Chief Justice reasons that the use of both intended and expected un ambiguously requires an objective construction of expected in order to avoid a superfluous reading of the latter. However, this reading ignores the phrase from the standpoint of the insured which, by the absence of a comma following expected, presumably modifies both expected and intended. [8] Cf. Buntz v General American Life Ins Co, 136 Pa Super 284; 7 A2d 93 (1939). See, generally, 2 Couch, Insurance, 2d (rev ed), § 15:13, pp 156-157 (the punctuation in an insurance policy may be resorted to as an aid in construction, although the construction according to strict rules of grammar does not prevail over the intent of the parties as shown by the whole instrument). See also 3 Corbin, Contracts, § 549, pp 183-186 (contracts are to be interpreted and their legal effects determined as a whole). Indeed, the Chief Justice does not dispute that the phrase from the standpoint of the insured modifies both words, but instead reasons that the phrases expected and intended are alternatives and `[p]robing one's state of mind is an elusive task....' Ante, p 677. Quoting with approval Truck Ins Exchange v Pickering, 642 SW2d 113, 116 (Mo App, 1982). Again, I find the case law instructive, but of little use in an intrinsic analysis for ambiguity. Perhaps most instructive is a comparison of Metropolitan's exclusion with one which all members of this Court agree creates an objective standard. The Allstate exclusion specifies: We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured person. [Emphasis added.] In the Allstate exclusion, the addition of the word reasonably clearly imparts an objective standard in contrast to in fact intended. In contrast, the absence of the word reasonably coupled with the modifying clause from the standpoint of the insured clearly imparts a subjective standard in the Metropolitan exclusion. I do not believe that a fair reading of the Metropolitan exclusion would support an objective standard and therefore conclude that the policy language is unambiguously subjective. Moreover, given that all members of this Court agree that the exclusion is unambiguous, I believe that it is unnecessary to belabor the point. I would therefore apply the exclusion in its plain and easily understood sense. Wertman v Michigan Mutual Liability Co, 267 Mich 508, 510; 255 NW 418 (1934). To apply the exclusion in its plain and easily understood sense, we need only determine whether Gravenmier's injury was either expected or intended from the standpoint of DiCicco. In doing so, we must apply the facts as found by the trial court. See the opinion of the Chief Justice, ante, p 664. Most relevant in this regard are the following findings of the trial court: DiCicco denies any intent to use the knife, claiming that he went to get the knife merely to scare away the other persons he considered to be a threat. No one observed him make a gesture of moving the knife as though to stab Gravenmier. The knife was held in his right hand and the poking was done with his left. DiCicco denies knowledge of in fact stabbing. Immediately following the stabbing, DiCicco looked shocked. Gravenmier obviously did not expect DiCicco would use the knife or he would not have engaged in his act of bravado. It is obvious that these findings will not require the conclusion that DiCicco expected or intended to injure Gravenmier. I therefore conclude that the plaintiff insurer has failed to establish that the § 1(f) exclusion is relevant. Metropolitan is bound, by the general coverage provision, the unambiguous language of its own policy, to provide a defense to DiCicco in the underlying claim. [9] Again, I emphasize that this disposition of the declaratory judgment claim involves no determination of Metropolitan's duty to indemnify. If it is established in the underlying claim that DiCicco intended or expected to injure Gravenmier, Metropolitan may yet have a defense to indemnification.