Opinion ID: 3152753
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tacit Agreements

Text: Prior to Morgan’s trial, Crosby was arrested and charged with bank fraud. The bank fraud scheme involved Crosby submitting invoices to a bank which falsely alleged that he had purchased cattle. The invoices allowed Crosby to draw on the line of credit he had with the bank. He also sold the cattle he had used to secure the line of credit without notifying the bank and kept the proceeds. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled guilty to one count of making a false statement to a bank. The government disclosed the investigation documents, the charge, and the subsequent plea agreement to the defense. 19 The jury instructions in Ford did describe “intending to be influenced” as Ford’s intent. 435 F.3d at 212. However, the Second Circuit found these instructions lacking because, among other things, they allowed the jury to find such intent simply if Ford was aware of the payee’s intent to give something of value for the purposes of influencing her. Id. at 213. The court held that while this awareness “might well constitute strong circumstantial evidence” of the requisite intent, it alone was not enough. Id. Here, in contrast, the jury was specifically told it had to find Morgan “solicited, demanded, accepted, or agreed to accept anything of value from another person” and he did so “with the intent to be influenced in connection with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the State of Oklahoma.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 179.) - 21 - The disclosure revealed the participation of Crosby’s daughter who accepted some cattle from him and then gave her father the proceeds after she sold them in her own name. The disclosure also included allegations, in the form of an affidavit from one of the victims, that Crosby fraudulently sold securities in the form of “Preferred Membership Interests” (PMIs) in 2005.20 (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 1 at 340.) During jury selection, the defense requested Crosby’s presentence report (PSR), which the government supplied (with the court’s permission). The report included information about Crosby’s bank fraud scheme, his daughter’s involvement, and the loans he received from various individuals in the form of PMIs.21 Despite these disclosures, Morgan sought an 20 After trial, the defense learned that in 2011 another victim of Crosby’s PMI scheme had contacted a Colorado lawyer who in turn contacted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC transferred the matter to the Oklahoma Department of Securities, which brought an action to enjoin Crosby from offering and selling unregistered securities in Oklahoma. Two months after the verdict against Morgan, Crosby stipulated and consented to the injunctive relief requested. 21 Morgan complains the information contained in Crosby’s PSR concerning the PMI scheme was simply that Crosby had incorrectly listed the money he received from the scheme as equity when he obtained his line of credit from the bank. He contends this information gave him no basis to investigate the PMI scheme further. But the report did outline the scheme: Agents also received information from the defendant’s previous accountant that [Crosby] was receiving loans from various individuals in the form of Preferred Member Interest (PMIs) in his numerous business interests and that the defendant guaranteed investors 10% on their investments. The accountant believed these investments began in 2003 or 2004 and estimated [Crosby] received approximately $3,000,000 from investors. (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 8 at 4.) This information, in conjunction with the previous disclosure from one of the victims, was sufficient notice of the need to investigate. Morgan also complains he did not receive the PSR until jury selection, giving him insufficient time to investigate or verify what was said in the report. But, prior to jury (Continued . . .) - 22 - evidentiary hearing and, in a motion for a new trial, claimed the government failed to disclose tacit agreements it made with Crosby in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and knowingly presented false evidence in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The court denied Morgan’s requests. It determined the government timely provided all relevant material. Further, it concluded any undisclosed agreements, if they existed, were immaterial because defense counsel fully addressed Crosby’s credibility at trial and additional information would not change the result. Morgan repeats his trial court arguments here. He claims the government knew Crosby was subject to significant additional criminal charges, including bribery (this case), securities fraud, money laundering, and mail fraud. Further, it knew Crosby’s daughter was involved in the bank fraud scheme. In addition, Morgan contends Crosby lied about his assets, employment, and income in his presentence investigation interview. According to Morgan, the government’s failure to prosecute either Crosby or his daughter for any of this conduct should inescapably lead one to conclude the government agreed to much more than was stated in Crosby’s plea agreement. He further claims the government’s failure to seek forfeiture of the assets Crosby received from his criminal activities demonstrates an undisclosed tacit agreement not to do so. selection, Morgan did have the affidavit from one of the victims of the PMI scheme. Moreover, jury selection occurred on February 13, 2012; Crosby was not cross-examined until February 24. In any event, Morgan never requested a continuance. - 23 - Finally, Morgan maintains the government allowed false testimony to go uncorrected at trial. Crosby’s plea agreement stated it protected him only from prosecution for false statements to the bank from January 2003 through June 2008 (bank fraud) and “does not provide any protection against prosecution for any crime not specifically described above.” (Morgan’s App’x, Vol. 7 at 2729.) The agreement further provided: “[T]his document contains the only terms of the agreement concerning [Crosby’s] plea of guilty in this case and that there are no other deals, bargains, agreements, or understandings that modify or alter these terms.” (Id. at 2730.) Morgan argues these assertions were false because there were other deals the government was well aware of and it failed to correct the contrary false statements to the jury.22 Morgan also faults the government for not fully explaining the agreement’s statement: “It is the expectation of the United States that its criminal investigation of the defendant’s conduct (as opposed to the wrongdoings of others) will cease upon the signing of this plea agreement.”23 (Id. at 2723.) 22 Morgan also complains that when his counsel attempted to point out to the jury that Crosby had not been charged with bribery, the court sustained the government’s objection. But the question posed was improper because it indicated the punishment for bribery was fifteen years. See Chapman v. United States, 443 F.2d 917, 920 (10th Cir. 1971) (no error in prohibiting jury from being informed of the mandatory minimum sentence); see also United States v. Peña, 930 F.2d 1486, 1491-92 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Unless a specific statute permits the jury to play a part in meting out punishment, the jury’s sole role in a criminal case is to determine whether a defendant is guilty of the crime charged.”). Defense counsel elected not to re-phrase the question. 23 Morgan says the government rewarded Crosby for his testimony with a sentence of five years of probation. Actually Crosby was sentenced to “zero months” imprisonment, which was the result of a downward variance from the advisory guideline (Continued . . .) - 24 - But, except for his claim about Crosby’s lies during his presentence interview, Morgan knew prior to trial (from the government’s disclosures) about the underlying facts he now suggests prove tacit agreements. He could have cross-examined Crosby on these issues but did not. He chose instead to focus on Crosby’s need to cooperate in this case in order to avoid a harsh sentence in his bank fraud case. While he may have had a tactical reason for not inquiring further, Morgan, in fact, had the information and could have used it rather than lying behind the log in order to create issues for appeal. In any event, he has failed to establish that either a Brady or Napue violation occurred. Brady “established the principle that criminal convictions obtained by . . . suppression of exculpatory or impeaching evidence violates the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1172 (10th Cir. 2009). “The government’s obligation to disclose exculpatory [or impeaching] evidence does not turn on an accused’s request” and “the duty to disclose such information continues throughout the judicial process.” Id. at 1172-73. range of 41 to 51 months imprisonment. (Government’s Supp. App’x, Vol. 2 at 980.) While the government did seek a departure for Crosby’s cooperation, it still recommended Crosby be sentenced to a year and a day. It appears the sentencing judge (a different judge than the judge in this case) varied downward based on Crosby’s cooperation as well as his significant health issues. In any event, we will not automatically “infer a preexisting deal subject to disclosure under Brady” merely because the government chooses to treat a witness favorably following a trial. Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 234 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (post-trial favorable treatment of a witness, standing alone, is insufficient to establish that the prosecution promised leniency to the witness prior to trial). - 25 - “Brady requires disclosure of tacit agreements between the prosecutor and a witness. A deal is a deal—explicit or tacit. There is no logic that supports distinguishing between the two.” Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1186; see also Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 233 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “A conviction based on testimony implicating concealed incentives to an important witness is potentially tainted.” Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1216 (10th Cir. 2003). “[P]articularized impeachment through possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives arising in connection with as-yet uninitiated or uncompleted criminal prosecution” may be important because it suggests “why the witness might by lying.” Id. at 1215 & n.18 (quotations omitted). “And such impeachment increases in sensitivity in direct proportion to the witness’s importance to the state’s case.” Id. at 1215 (quotations omitted). Under Napue, “criminal convictions obtained by presentation of known false evidence” also violate due process. Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1172; see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (“[D]eliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice.”) (quotations omitted). “The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269). Crosby was the key witness for the government as to Count 63. But Morgan merely speculates about undisclosed tacit agreements prior to his trial. He points to no solid evidence of any such agreement. The government’s failure to prosecute either Crosby or his daughter or to seek civil forfeiture of his assets is simply not enough. See - 26 - Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 552 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he fact that both [witnesses] were not prosecuted for particular crimes, without more, is insufficient . . . to establish that an undisclosed deal existed.”). The cases relied on by Morgan illustrate this point. Each case involved evidence demonstrating an undisclosed agreement was reached between the government and a witness prior to trial. For example, in Cargle, the witness to a murder was promised immunity in exchange for his testimony. 317 F.3d at 1214. However, a few years before the trial, the witness had been given a deferred sentence on an assault charge. Id. His current involvement in the murder would have “expos[ed] him to an immediate sentence of up to twenty years’ imprisonment on the pre-existing assault conviction.” Id. “When [later] asked by an investigator . . . whether non-acceleration of the deferred sentence had been a (tacit) part of his agreement to testify in petitioner’s case, [the witness] admitted that he had received an assurance from the district attorney that nothing would come up in court about the deferred sentence.” Id. at 1215 (emphasis added). We concluded “there evidently was an additional, and quite significant, quid pro quo for [the witness’s] cooperation, which was not recited in the [immunity] agreement and never disclosed to the jury.” Id. at 1214. Similarly, in Douglas, the witness testified at two murder trials and “provid[ed] the only direct evidence linking [the defendants] to the murder.” 560 F.3d at 1174. After the trials, the witness executed a handwritten affidavit recanting his trial testimony and “asserting that he had received the [prosecutor’s] assistance in exchange for his testimony, contrary to his denials at both trials.” 560 F.3d at 1167. We agreed with the - 27 - district court that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose his deal with the witness violated Brady and the violation was material. Id. at 1175; see also LaCaze v. Warden La. Corr. Inst. for Women, 645 F.3d 728, 735-36 (5th Cir.) (witness claimed he repeatedly received assurances his son would not be prosecuted prior to implicating defendant), amended by 647 F.3d 1175 (5th Cir. 2011); Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 2009) (witness testified the police promised he and his girlfriend would be released from custody if he implicated defendant); Graves v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 334, 340-44 (5th Cir. 2006) (prosecutor informed media five years after trial that star witness had admitted prior to trial that he had acted alone in murders yet prosecutor had failed to reveal this information to defendant; the witness’s trial testimony had the defendant involved in the murders). Unlike Cargle, Douglas, and the other cases relied upon by Morgan, neither Crosby nor the government has admitted to Crosby having been promised anything other than that to which he testified at trial—hopes for a lenient sentence in his bank fraud case. Morgan also relies on United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1986). Shaffer was convicted of drug and income tax violations. 789 F.2d at 684. The court affirmed Shaffer’s entitlement to a new trial due to, inter alia, “the government’s failure to disclose that [the key trial witness] did in fact have assets which were acquired through drug profiteering (i.e., a house in Palm Springs and funds to enter a health spa).” Id. at 689. It said this nondisclosure “coupled with the government’s failure to initiate asset forfeiture proceedings to acquire these assets, implies that a tacit agreement was reached - 28 - between [the witness] and the government that allowed [the witness] to avoid any asset forfeiture liability in exchange for his cooperation.” Id. The court rejected the government’s argument that “because there was no explicit agreement [on the forfeiture issue], it had nothing to disclose”: “While it is clear that an explicit agreement would have to be disclosed because of its effect on [the witness’s] credibility, it is equally clear that facts which imply an agreement would also bear on [his] credibility and would have to be disclosed.” Id. at 690. Morgan claims the government failed to disclose Crosby’s lies during his presentence interview, much like the government’s nondisclosure in Schaffer. But Morgan discovered the claimed misrepresentations after he conducted his own investigation and does not claim (let alone demonstrate) the government was aware of the lies during the relevant time. Evidence of misrepresentation or misleading on the part of the government is lacking and Morgan has failed to provide evidence of an agreement.24 Instead, he merely speculates about a possible agreement based on the government’s charging decisions. Speculation is not enough. “Without an agreement, no evidence was suppressed, and the 24 Morgan cites a string of Second Circuit cases wherein the prosecution deliberately withheld evidence or failed to correct perjured testimony. Neither circumstance is present in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 457 (2d Cir. 1991) (government “consciously avoided recognizing” that witness was lying and instead sought to rehabilitate him on redirect examination); Perkins v. Le Fevre, 691 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1982) (prosecutor deliberately withheld rap sheet of a key witness showing he had two prior felony convictions). - 29 - state’s conduct, not disclosing something it did not have, cannot be considered a Brady violation.” Bell, 512 F.3d at 234 (quotations omitted). We see no violation of Napue, which prohibits the presentation of known false evidence to the jury. Because Morgan has provided no evidence of any other deals, he has not demonstrated Crosby’s trial testimony concerning his plea agreement and the absence of any other deals was false. Not only that, but Morgan had the relevant facts from the government which he now uses to assign a sinister motive to the government. He could have inquired more thoroughly about these facts on cross-examination and let the jury decide the credibility issue rather than saving it for appeal.