Opinion ID: 859212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualifications of State’s expert

Text: ¶14 Boyston argues the superior court erred in admitting the testimony of the State’s expert, Dr. Seward, because he did not meet § 13-753(K)(2)’s requirements. This Court interprets statutes de novo. State v. Arellano, 213 Ariz. 474, 477 ¶ 9, 143 P.3d 1015, 1018 (2006). “We review the decision to admit or exclude [expert testimonial] evidence for abuse of discretion.” 6 State v. Grell (Grell II), 212 Ariz. 516, 528 ¶ 55, 135 P.3d 696, 708 (2006). ¶15 After a prescreening evaluation indicates a need for further assessment of mental retardation, § 13-753(D) directs the trial court to “appoint one expert in intellectual disabilities nominated by the state and one expert in intellectual disabilities nominated by the defendant.” An “expert in intellectual disabilities” is defined as “a psychologist or physician licensed pursuant to title 32, chapter 13, 17 or 19.1 with at least five years’ experience in the testing or testing assessment, evaluation and diagnosis of intellectual disabilities.” A.R.S. § 13-753(K)(2) (footnote omitted). ¶16 Boyston does not contest that Dr. Seward was properly licensed, but contends that he lacked the requisite experience. The record, however, rebuts this contention: [PROSECUTOR]: So during the time you have been in Arizona, have you been doing testing and assessments and diagnoses of retardation? [DR. SEWARD]: Yes. It came up -- it would come up occasionally with my employment in the county for the Rule 11 process. . . . . [PROSECUTOR]: How long have you been doing testing, testing/assessment, evaluation, diagnosis of mental retardation? [DR. SEWARD]: Well, on and off since I was licensed in 1991. 7 . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So what you said on direct is, that in your capacity as an appointed psychologist to determine competency and even state of mind of an accused at the time of the offense, you have, as part of that evaluation, considered possible mental retardation as an Axis II diagnosis. Is that what your testimony is? [DR. SEWARD]: That’s correct. Although more competency than state of mind at the time of the offense. . . . . [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only experience . . . you have with evaluating children . . . with mental retardation was when you were doing consulting work with the St. Edmond’s home for children in 1991 [to 2002]? [DR. SEWARD]: Correct. ¶17 Viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court’s ruling, the record supports a finding that Dr. Seward had at least five years’ experience not only in testing, but also in evaluation and diagnosis of intellectual disabilities. See State v. Keener, 110 Ariz. 462, 465-66, 520 P.2d 510, 513-14 (1974) (“Whether a witness is qualified as an expert witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and that decision will not be reviewed unless there is a showing of abuse of discretion.”). ¶18 Boyston suggests that § 13-753(K)(2) requires not only five years’ experience, but also regular — as opposed to occasional — testing, evaluation, and diagnosis during the five- 8 year period. But the statute only requires “five years’ experience” and does not specify any additional requirements for establishing a minimum level of expertise. Consistent with the general standard for admissibility of expert testimony, we find that the extent of Dr. Seward’s experience goes to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 210 ¶ 70, 84 P.3d 456, 475 (2004); see also Ariz. R. Evid. 702 (2009).4 ¶19 Dr. Seward indicated that he had occasionally performed testing, evaluation, and diagnoses of mental retardation for at least fifteen years, and on average did so at least once a week from 1991 to 2002. Although he acknowledged that this was his first mental retardation evaluation in a capital case, the statute does not require prior experience in capital cases. Dr. Seward’s level of experience satisfies § 13753(K)(2).