Opinion ID: 1333278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Williamson House

Text: With regard to the house in Williamson, the evidence is undisputed that Lewis spent $54,000 of her own funds to complete the construction thereof during the parties' marriage. By so doing, Chafin contends, Lewis converted the $54,000 into marital property. Thus, Chafin asserts that family law master Gallagher and the circuit court committed error in concluding that Lewis was entitled to reimbursement for that amount. As syllabus point 4 of Whiting, supra, cited by Mr. Chafin, holds: Where, during the course of the marriage, one spouse transfers title to his or her separate property into the joint names of both spouses, a presumption that the transferring spouse intended to make a gift of the property to the marital estate is consistent with the principles underlying our equitable distribution statute. Syl. pt. 2, Storrs, supra . See also, syl. pt. 1, Koontz v. Koontz, 183 W.Va. 477, 396 S.E.2d 439 (1990), stating that this State's statutory scheme concerning divorce actions suggests a preference for characterizing the property of the parties as marital property. Ms. Lewis contends, however, that the $54,000 was not converted into marital property and that, therefore, the reimbursement was warranted. As indicated above, the Williamson house was located upon a parcel of land purchased by Chafin prior to the marriage. The parties were married in October 1990, began construction of the house thereafter and separated in 1993. They also had a house in Charleston. The Williamson property was titled in Mr. Chafin's name only, and he was awarded the property and house pursuant to the final order. Consequently, the family law master and the circuit court concluded that, as an element of fairness, Lewis was entitled to the reimbursement, especially in view of the fact that the $54,000 had not been transferred to property titled jointly. Upon review, this Court is of the opinion that, under those circumstances, the presumption of gift mentioned in Whiting, supra, does not apply, since the separate property was not transferred into the joint names of both parties, as in Whiting. Accordingly, the $54,000 reimbursement ordered by the circuit court did not constitute an abuse of discretion.