Opinion ID: 2634399
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dustin's asserted waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination

Text: Defendant claims the prosecution failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Dustin was unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(1). But if the trial court properly determined Dustin was entitled to assert his privilege against self-incrimination, the prosecution necessarily carried its burden, because a witness is unavailable if he or she is entitled to invoke the privilege. (Evid.Code, งง 240, subd. (a)(1), 1291.) In substance, defendant's claim is that the trial court erred in concluding Dustin properly asserted rather than waived his privilege. It is a fundamental principle of our law that witnesses may not be compelled to incriminate themselves, and the scope of a witness's privilege is liberally construed. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118; People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see Evid.Code, ง 940.) To invoke the privilege, a witness need not be guilty of any offense; rather, the privilege is properly invoked whenever the witness's answers `would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute' the witness for a criminal offense. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 617, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635, quoting Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. at p. 486, 71 S.Ct. 814; see also People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) A witness may assert the privilege who has `reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer.' ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) Moreover, `[t]o sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.' [Citation.] To deny an assertion of privilege, `the judge must be ` perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate.' ( Id. at pp. 304-305, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see Evid.Code, ง 404 [such evidence is inadmissible unless it clearly appears to the court that the proffered evidence cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege].) Given the broad protective scope of the privilege, waiver of a nonparty witness's privilege is not to be lightly inferred. ( Klein v. Harris (2d Cir. 1981) 667 F.2d 274, 287; see also U.S. v. Seifert (9th Cir.1980) 648 F.2d 557, 561.) Under the circumstances of the present case, we independently review the question whether the court properly permitted Dustin to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742.) Defendant does not dispute that Dustin had reasonable cause to apprehend danger from answering questions concerning his activities and observations on the night of the murder, or that he properly invoked his privilege as to the bulk of the questions posed to him at the in limine hearing. Indeed, defendant claims the police and the prosecution should have treated Dustin as a suspect from the outset of their investigation and prosecution. Defendant claims, nonetheless, that, for the purpose of the trial, Dustin waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to the entire subject matter of his activities and observations during the period related to the murder. According to defendant, the waiver occurred during the in limine hearing when Dustin, after repeatedly invoking the privilege, failed to invoke it when he testified that his testimony at the preliminary hearing was truthful. Defendant reasons that Dustin's claim that he testified truthfully at the earlier hearing constituted a ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony, and that it essentially repeated his testimony at that hearing concerning his activities during the period surrounding the crimes. Defendant claims Dustin waived or failed to assert the privilege as to the entire subject matter of his preliminary hearing testimony and that as a consequence, he was not unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a)(1) and 1291. A nonparty witness may elect to waive his or her privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, in some instances a waiver may be implied when a witness has made a partial disclosure of incriminating facts. It is well established that a witness, in a single proceeding, may not testify voluntarily about a subject and then invoke the privilege against self-incrimination when questioned about the details. [Citation.] The privilege is waived for the matters to which the witness testifies, and the scope of the `waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-examination.' [Citation.] ( Mitchell v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 314, 321, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 ( Mitchell) ; see Rogers v. United States (1951) 340 U.S. 367, 374, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344 ( Rogers ) [a witness may not invoke the privilege as to details after voluntarily disclosing incriminating facts].) On the other hand, a witness's failure to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during one hearing within a proceeding does not necessarily constitute a waiver for the purpose of subsequent hearings. Thus the failure of a witness to claim the privilege at a preliminary hearing does not prevent the witness from refusing to testify regarding the same incriminating material at the trial. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 23, 252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249, citing Overend v. Superior Court (1900) 131 Cal. 280, 284, 63 P. 372; People v. Maxwell (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 562, 570-571, 156 Cal.Rptr. 630.) Similarly, a witness's incriminating admission at an in limine hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence ordinarily does not prevent the witness from invoking the privilege against being compelled to give testimony regarding the matter at the trial. ( People v. Lawrence (1959) 168 Cal. App.2d 510, 517, 336 P.2d 189; see also 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, ง 500, p. 808; 31A Cal.Jur.3d (2002 ed.) Evidence ง 574, p. 122.) Applying these principles, we observe that any waiver of the privilege that occurred by virtue of Dustin's statement that he had told the truth at the preliminary hearing ordinarily would be binding upon Dustin only within the context of the in limine hearing. Even if we assume without deciding that Dustin essentially ratified his preliminary hearing testimony when he asserted he had been truthful at that hearing, he did so only after he clearly and justifiably had asserted his privilege as to his conduct and observations during the period related to the crimes. And even if his asserted ratification could have opened him to further questioning during the in limine hearing despite his assertion of the privilege, it does not follow that the asserted ratification constituted a waiver of his privilege for the purpose of trial. Dustin's statement did not occur at trial, nor did it occur when the trial court was acting in a factfinding capacity. As noted, waiver of the privilege is not lightly inferred ( Klein v. Harris, supra, 667 F.2d at p. 287), and there can be little justification for compelling a witness to incriminate himself concerning a whole series of events as to which he has invoked the privilege, when there is no need to do so to ensure the integrity of the factfinding process. Significantly, application of the waiver doctrine depends upon the purpose of the hearing at which the statements are made and the impact upon the integrity of the factfinding process if assertion of the privilege is permitted. The justifications for the rule of waiver in the testimonial context are evident: A witness may not pick and choose what aspects of a particular subject to discuss without casting doubt on the trustworthiness of the statements and diminishing the integrity of the factual inquiry. As noted in Rogers, [supra, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438] a contrary rule 'would open the way to distortion of facts by permitting a witness to select any stopping place in the testimony,' [citation] ... [and] `make of the Fifth Amendment not only a humane safeguard against judicially coerced self-disclosure but a positive invitation to mutilate the truth a party offers to tell' [Citation.] ( Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 322, 119 S.Ct. 1307; see also 1 McCormick on Evidence (6th ed.2006) ง 133, p. 562 [the waiver rule rests primarily ... on the need to avoid leaving triers of fact with the limited version of relevant information that would be before them if a witness was permitted to at will pick a point at which to invoke the privilege].) In the context of a claim that a statement made by a defendant at a proceeding in which a guilty plea was entered constituted a waiver of the privilege at the ensuing sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, examined the nature of the two proceedings and determined that the defendant's guilty plea and concession that she did some of it, during discussion of the factual basis for her plea, did not constitute a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination for the purpose of the sentencing hearing. The high court in Mitchell explained that had the petitioner testified at a trial that she did some of it, she would have subjected herself to cross-examination at sentencing on related subject matter. ( Mitchell, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 322, 119 S.Ct. 1307.) On the other hand, [t]he concerns which justify the cross-examination when the defendant testifies are absent at a plea colloquyโa hearing the high court characterized as one protecting the defendant from an involuntary or unintelligent plea. ( Ibid. ) There is no convincing reason why the narrow inquiry at the plea colloquy should entail such an extensive waiver of the privilege. Unlike the defendant taking the stand, who `cannot reasonably claim that the Fifth Amendment gives him ... an immunity from cross-examination on the matters he has himself put in dispute,' [citation] the defendant who pleads guilty puts nothing in dispute regarding the essentials of the offense. Rather, the defendant takes those matters out of dispute, often by making a joint statement with the prosecution or confirming the prosecution's version of the facts. Under these circumstances, there is little danger that the court will be misled by selective disclosure. In this respect a guilty plea is more like an offer to stipulate than a decision to take the stand. Here, petitioner's statement that she had done `some of the proffered conduct did not pose a threat to the integrity of fact-finding proceedings, for the purpose of the District Court's inquiry was simply to ensure that petitioner understood the charges and that there was a factual basis for the Government's case. ( Id. at pp. 322-323,119 S.Ct. 1307.) As the high court suggested in the Mitchell decision, we consider the purpose of the hearing at which it is claimed Dustin waived his privilege against self-incrimination. The purpose of the in limine hearing in the present case was to permit the trial court to determine whether the witness was entitled to invoke the privilege during testimony at the trial, thereby rendering him unavailable as a witness for the purpose of Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291. Dustin's testimony, at the conclusion of his direct and cross-examination at the in limine hearing, that he told the truth at the preliminary hearing did not cast doubt on the trustworthiness of his other statements at the in limine hearing. The concerns that would justify application of the waiver doctrine to permit cross-examination at a trial were absent at the in limine hearing, at which Dustin consistently invoked his privilege as to specific questions and merely concluded with a general assertion that he had told the truth at the prior hearing. In view of the broad protection afforded to potential witnesses by the privilege against self-incrimination, we cannot conclude that Dustin's general ratification caused this nonparty witness to lose the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege he just had invoked repeatedly. Moreover, as in the Mitchell case, in which the defendant had made incriminating statements at a plea colloquy rather than at trial in the presence of the jury, when Dustin assertedly ratified his prior testimony at the in limine hearing, the trier of fact was not present and the testimony had no impact upon the factfinding process at trial. Accordingly, even if Dustin had made an incriminating admission at the in limine hearing, his asserted waiver of the privilege would be effective solely for the purpose of that hearing. Contrary to defendant's assertion, neither U.S. v. Rosario Fuentez (10th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3d 700, 707, nor U.S. v. Seifert, supra, 648 F.2d 557, 561, assists him. Both cases are distinguishable, because they concern a witness's partial disclosure of incriminating matter during testimony at trial โa forum in which a party cannot be permitted to distort the factfinding process by allowing witnesses to give some testimony on a topic but to assert the privilege against self-incrimination to bar related questioning. We are not presented with a case in which a witness testifies to the jury that his prior testimony was truthful, and then invokes the privilege concerning the subject matter of the former testimony, which is then read to the jury. Such testimony would implicate confrontation rights that simply are not at stake when a witness testifies before the court at an in limine hearing. We conclude that the trial court properly determined it was not perfectly clear that Dustin's answers could not possibly have a tendency to incriminate him ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 304, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742), and that the witness's asserted ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony at the in limine hearing did not constitute a waiver of his right to invoke the privilege for the purpose of testifying at trial. The trial court did not err in finding Dustin was entitled to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, and as a consequence the court correctly determined that Dustin was unavailable as a witness within the terms of Evidence Code sections 240, subdivision (a)(1) and 1291. [17] Defendant nonetheless complains that his constitutionally guaranteed right to confront the witnesses against him was violated because Dustin was permitted to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, thereby avoiding cross-examination at trial. (See U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Pointer v. Texas (1965) 380 U.S. 400, 403-405, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923.) Although defendants `have the general right to confront the witnesses against them, this right is not absolute and properly gives way when a witness is entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the defendant had an appropriate prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742, citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.) The defendant `must not only have had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the previous hearing, he must also have had an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the [subsequent] hearing.' [Citation.] ... The recent [Crawford] decision ... although changing the law of confrontation in some respects, left these principles intact. ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 303, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742, italics omitted.) Significantly, [a] witness who successfully asserts the privilege against self-incrimination is unavailable to testify for these purposes. ( Ibid. ) Within the context of the in limine hearing, defendant was permitted to cross-examine Dustin, and defense counsel elicited the same ratification that Dustin provided on direct examination. Defendant cannot establish a violation of his confrontation rights at trial simply because a witness at an in limine hearing, after repeatedly invoking his privilege as to incriminating questions that clearly called for incriminating answers, answered a general question calling for his ratification of his preliminary hearing testimony. This answer had no impact on defendant's countervailing constitutional right to confront witnesses. Defendant claims a confrontationclause violation on the ground that he did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Dustin at the preliminary hearing. But defendant's trial counsel conceded the opportunity for cross-examination had been exploited fully at the preliminary hearing, and that defense counsel's examination at that hearing had been excellent. Defendant counters that he lacked an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Dustin at the preliminary hearing, because the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense, prior to the preliminary hearing, contacts the prosecution had had with the witness, particularly the prosecution's agreement to pay approximately $200 toward Dustin's living expenses and the prosecution's asserted secret or implicit promise to Dustin that he would not be prosecuted. [18] In defendant's view, defendant consequently did not have an interest and motive for cross-examination at the preliminary hearing similar to his interest and motive for cross-examination at trial. At trial, the defense did not object to the admission of Dustin's preliminary hearing testimony on this ground and did not bring to the court's, attention the circumstance that the prosecution had paid Dustin's living expenses while assertedly failing to disclose this or other information to the defense prior to the preliminary hearing. Rather, although by this time the defense had been made aware of the payments, defense counsel ultimately conceded that the cross-examination had been thorough and vigorous. Nor did the defense argue that Dustin's testimony should be excluded because there had been a secret or implied immunity agreement prior to the preliminary hearing. Under the circumstances, defendant failed to preserve the claim that Dustin's testimony should have been excluded at trial because the prosecution's asserted withholding of evidence prior to the preliminary hearing substantially impaired his ability to cross-examine Dustin at that hearing. We reach this conclusion because `questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal. [Citation.]' ( People v. Seijas, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 301, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 114 P.3d 742; see People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434-435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) In light of defendant's failure to object on this ground at trial, the trial court did not hold a hearing on defendant's factual assertion that the People improperly delayed discovery or failed to disclose potentially inculpatory evidence prior to the preliminary hearing, nor did the court consider any argument concerning the specific impact any omission may have had on the prior hearing. The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a `contrary rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.' [Citation.] ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 434, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765; see also id. at p. 435, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765 [recognizing a narrow exception inapplicable to the present case].)