Opinion ID: 848615
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sewell v. Clearing Machine Corp., 419 Mich. 56, 347 N.W.2d 447 (1984)

Text: Despite the clear and unambiguous directive set forth in MCL 418.841, Sewell, supra, overrode the statute and declared that the courts and the WCB shared jurisdiction. The Sewell Court held that the bureau has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether injuries suffered by an employee were in the course of employment. The courts, however, retain the power to decide the more fundamental issue whether the plaintiff is an employee (or fellow employee) of the defendant. [ Sewell, supra at 62, 347 N.W.2d 447 (emphasis supplied).] There is no authority cited for this assertion of power. Indeed, the judiciary is powerless to modify unambiguous statutory language in order to inject its own policy preferences. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 473 Mich. 457, 703 N.W.2d 23 (2005). Nonetheless, Sewell dictated that courts and the WCB would effectively share the power to decide whether an injured party is an employee within the meaning of the WDCA. The WCB, however, would retain exclusive jurisdiction over determining whether an injury occurred in the course of employment. Although Sewell cited MCL 418.841, it provided no analysis of that section's sweeping directive that all questions arising under [the] act shall be determined by the WCB. Indeed, the opinion is devoid of any analysis of any WDCA provisions whatsoever. Moreover, the perfunctory decision in Sewell swept away almost fifty years of precedent in which this Court and the Court of Appeals had consistently held that courts lack jurisdiction to determine employment status. Szydlowski, supra ; Jesionowski v. Allied Products Corp., 329 Mich. 209, 45 N.W.2d 39 (1950); Dershowitz v. Ford Motor Co., 327 Mich. 386, 41 N.W.2d 900 (1950); Morris v. Ford Motor Co., 320 Mich. 372, 31 N.W.2d 89 (1948); Munson v. Christie, 270 Mich. 94, 258 N.W. 415 (1935); Houghtaling v. Chapman, 119 Mich.App. 828, 327 N.W.2d 375 (1982); Buschbacher v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 114 Mich.App. 833, 319 N.W.2d 691 (1982); Dixon v. Sype, 92 Mich.App. 144, 284 N.W.2d 514 (1979); Herman v. Theis, 10 Mich.App. 684, 160 N.W.2d 365 (1968). Sewell wholly disregarded this extensive body of case law, stating: Taken alone, those general statements suggest that the bureau's jurisdiction takes precedence over that of the circuit court whenever there is an issue concerning the applicability of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. The rule is not so broad, however. [ Sewell, supra at 62, 347 N.W.2d 447.] Again, the Court cited no authority for that proposition. It is hard to imagine a broader rule than the one established by the Legislature in the WDCA, i.e., one covering  all questions. This Court's usurpation of legislative power in Sewell is nothing short of breathtaking. This Court has stood firm against just such usurpations of legislative power by this branch of government. Warda, supra; Halloran v. Bhan, 470 Mich. 572, 576, 683 N.W.2d 129 (2004); Lapeer Circuit Judges, supra ; Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002); Massey v. Mandell, 462 Mich. 375, 379-380, 614 N.W.2d 70 (2000); DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000); Omne Financial, Inc. v. Shacks, Inc., 460 Mich. 305, 311, 596 N.W.2d 591 (1999). I fully agree with Justice Levin's statement in Sewell. He pointed out that the majority's more fundamental test was proffered without analysis, explanation, or justification and that it offers no guidance for the resolution of future cases and does not satisfactorily explain the result reached. . . . Id. at 65, 347 N.W.2d 447. He argued that [t]he issue whether [defendant] was [plaintiff's] employer is no more `fundamental' than the issue whether [plaintiff's] injuries were suffered in the course of employment. Id. at 70, 347 N.W.2d 447. In announcing a shared jurisdiction paradigm when determining whether the WDCA applies to a claim, Sewell overruled Szydlowski, supra . In Szydlowski, we held that a plaintiff's remedy against an employer based on an injury allegedly arising out of an employment relationship properly belongs within the workmen's compensation department for initial determination as to jurisdiction and liability.  [ Szydlowski, supra at 359, 245 N.W.2d 26, quoting Herman, supra at 691, 160 N.W.2d 365 (emphasis supplied).] This Court explained in Szydlowski that the procedures for workmen's compensation cases have been statutorily established. [ Herman ] properly cautions us against a shortcut or circumvention of those procedures. Szydlowski, supra at 359, 245 N.W.2d 26. The WDCA scheme is a complete departure from the common law and equity jurisprudence, as this Court recognized in Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298, 302-303, 148 N.W. 684 (1914): The act in question, like all similar acts, provides for compensation, and not for damages, and in its consideration and construction all of the rules of law and procedure, which apply to recover damages for negligently causing injury or death, are in these cases no longer applicable, and there is substituted a new code of procedure fixed and determined by the act in question. [Emphasis supplied.] The shared jurisdiction paradigm established in Sewell not only contradicts the plain language of the WDCA, but it also does violence to the legislative scheme.