Opinion ID: 891688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficient Evidence of Deliberation to Support First-Degree Murder

Text: {15} Defendant claims the record is insufficient to support a first-degree murder conviction. In applying our standard of review, we first `view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, resolving all conflicts. . . and indulging all permissible inferences. . . in favor of the verdict.' State v. Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶ 6, 137 N.M. 197, 109 P.3d 285 (quoting State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988)). We then `determine[ ] whether the evidence, [when] viewed in this manner, could justify a finding by any rational trier of fact that each element of the crime charged has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. (quoting State v. Sanders, 117 N.M. 452, 456, 872 P.2d 870, 874 (1994)). We are at all times mindful of the jury's fundamental role as factfinder in our system of justice and the independent responsibility of the courts to ensure that the jury's decisions are supportable by evidence in the record, rather than mere guess or conjecture. State v. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 2, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641. {16} Our Legislature has defined first-degree murder as any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Section 30-2-1(A)(1). Deliberate intention is intention that is arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and against the proposed course of action. [ State v. ] Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 25, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We have emphasized that circumstantial evidence alone can amount to substantial evidence. Id. ¶ 29; see also [ State v.] Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 23, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. Indeed, [i]ntent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the case. . . . [ State v.] Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 7-8, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (Deliberate intent may be inferred from the particular circumstances of the killing. . . .). Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 19, 147 N.M. 542, 226 P.3d 641. {17} To demonstrate that he did not act with the requisite deliberate intent, Defendant emphasizes that he was not at Elias Romero's shack when the plot to kill Victim was likely hatched and that there is no direct evidence showing Elias Romero passed along instructions for Defendant to harm Victim in any way. Defendant also argues that, after Trujillo and Tollardo returned to Anaya's home with Michelle Martinez, Martinez immediately pulled out a syringe and injected Victim with heroin, leaving Defendant with no opportunity to weigh the consequences of his actions. Defendant additionally claims that his multiple attempts to kill Victim in the church parking lot were not the legal cause of death and, therefore, do not support his conviction for murder. Even assuming the fire could have been the cause of death, Defendant insists that he did not intend to kill Victim but only meant to destroy incriminating evidence by setting the fire. {18} The State responds that Defendant is engaged in a classic case of divide-and-conquer, whereby each piece of evidence is viewed in isolation, ignoring reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances that support guilt. See Graham, 2005-NMSC-004, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 197,109 P.3d 285. We agree with the State. {19} The jury reasonably could have concluded that Defendant possessed a deliberate intent to kill throughout the evening. First, the jury could have determined that Defendant possessed a deliberate intent to kill even before Michelle Martinez arrived at Anaya's home and that his intent continued through Victim's death. Such a finding is supported by the timing of the phone calls placed between Anaya's home and Ivan Romero's cell phone; Defendant's participation in the initial, unprovoked assault; and his subsequent acts of clearing witnesses from the area, covering up evidence of the assault, and preparing the house for subsequent criminal conduct. See State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 (Intent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the case, as it is rarely established by direct evidence. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {20} The jury could have also determined that Defendant continued to possess a deliberate intent to kill when Martinez injected Victim with heroin. By this time, Defendant had been standing guard over the bound Victim with a knife while awaiting the return of Tollardo and Trujillo. Defendant continued his menacing conduct as a gloved Martinez struggled to inject the heroin. Then, when Victim began to cry in fear for his life, Defendant taunted him. {21} Defendant's actions at Anaya's home, which actually took place over the course of a few hours, clearly support the jury's conclusion that Defendant had a sufficient opportunity to weigh the consequences of his actions. See id. Of course, Defendant's culpability did not end with the events at Anaya's home. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Defendant's subsequent conduct in the church parking lot, including his attempt to snap Victim's neck and strangle him with a shoelace, further supports a reasonable finding by the jury that Defendant continued to possess a deliberate intent to kill as the evening unfolded. {22} Defendant's contention that he did not intend to kill Victim when starting the fire is also unavailing. The jury reasonably could have found that Defendant and his coconspirators knew Victim was alive and returned to the church parking lot to finish the task. Indeed, Martinez testified that Victim was alive when they initially left him in the car at the church parking lot. Furthermore, a forensic pathologist testified that Victim was breathing when the fire started. The jury could have used this evidence to conclude that after several, less-than-successful attempts to kill Victim, Defendant, along with Tollardo and Trujillo, returned to the church parking lot with the deliberate intent to finish the job. {23} Typically, criminal liability is premised upon a defendant's culpable conduct, the actus reus, coupled with a defendant's culpable mental state, the mens rea. State v. Padilla, 2008-NMSC-006, ¶ 12, 143 N.M. 310, 176 P.3d 299; accord United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). Here, the forensic pathologist opined that Victim's death was caused by drug intoxication with inhalation of smoke and soot as a significant contributing condition[ ]. Based on this testimony, the jury reasonably could have concluded that both the heroin overdose and the fire killed Victim. See State v. Simpson, 116 N.M. 768, 772, 867 P.2d 1150, 1154 (1993) (General principles of criminal law do not require that a defendant's conduct be the sole cause of the crime. Instead, it is only required that the result be proximately caused by, or the natural and probable consequence of, the accused's conduct. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Substantial evidence in this case supports a finding of concurrence between Defendant's actus reus and requisite mens rea for willful, deliberate murder of Victim. See State v. Lopez, 1996-NMSC-036, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 63, 920 P.2d 1017.