Opinion ID: 767938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The contours of the right allegedly violated

Text: 48 In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Supreme Court observed that the outcome of the clearly established rights inquiry in each case depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant`legal rule' is to be identified. See id. at 639. The Court directed that the inquiry into whether rights were clearly established should be conducted in a particularized manner, rather than a general one. See id. at 640. This court followed that directive in Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993), in which an HIV-positive prison inmate argued that being separated from the general prison population violated his rights to freedom of association under the First Amendment. See id. at 640. We concluded that the proper question was not whether the First Amendment was clearly established, but whether it was clearly established that inmates [were ] entitled to be free from prison regulations that restrict their association with members of the general prison population. Id . 49 Not surprisingly, the parties propose rather different formulations of the right at issue in this case. LSO contends that the right at issue is the right to be free from content-based discrimination. The Officials state that the issue is whether there was law clearly establishing that they would violate LSO's freedom of expression by advising LSO of the existence of the ABC regulations, and further advising that said regulations apply to conduct on ABC-licensed premises. 50 LSO's proposed formulation is too general, for as we have said, the right referenced by the [qualified immunity] test is not a general constitutional guarantee . . . but its application in a particular context. Todd v. United States, 849 F.2d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1988). Likewise, the Officials' formulation is too particularized. To phrase the right allegedly violated in such detail and in terms so closely paralleling what allegedly happened here would be to allow[the Officials], and future defendants, to define away all potential claims. Kelly v. Borg, 60 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 1995). 51 Our goal is to define the contours of the right allegedly violated in a way that expresses what is really being litigated. In this case we are not called upon to decide if, in 1997, the Government generally had the power to censor speech based on content, or whether an official generally could inform someone of the existence of a particular state law without violating the First Amendment. Indeed, the Officials here do not seriously dispute that content-based regulation of expression by the Government, even of indecent expression, is prohibited unless necessary to meet a compelling government interest, see e.g., Sable Communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989), or that prior restraint of speech is strongly disfavored and rarely upheld, see, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975); Collins v. Jordan, 110 F.3d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1996). Nor does LSO contend that its rights were violated merely because the Officials informed them of the content of Section 143.4. Instead, the Officials argue that they could reasonably have believed in 1997 that liquor regulations were subject to an exception to the general rules of the First Amendment, such that LSO's right to display artwork that violated Section 143.4 on the premises of an ABC licensee was questionable. Thus, we are asked to decide whether, under the circumstances, it was clear that LSO had the right to exhibit non-obscene art on the premises of an ABC licensee free of interference from state officials, even though some of the art fell within the proscriptions of a state liquor regulation governing expressive content at licensed establishments.