Opinion ID: 2623531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Due Process Claim

Text: {9} Because we decline to address Petitioner's new state constitutional argument, we next decide whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the federal due process clause does not require a hand-delivered notice of license revocation be printed in both English and Spanish. [1] As noted, Petitioner, in the course of arguing for greater protections under the state constitution essentially conceded that the federal constitution would not require the notice be printed in Spanish. We agree. {10} Due process requires notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the State can suspend or revoke a person's driver's license. State v. Herrera , 111 N.M. 560, 562, 807 P.2d 744, 746 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). Due process does not require the same form of notice in all contexts; instead, the notice should be appropriate to the nature of the case. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Actual notice is not required, so long as the notice given is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Id. at 314; see also City of Albuquerque v. Juarez, 93 N.M. 188, 190, 598 P.2d 650, 652 (Ct. App. 1979) (requiring notice that is reasonably calculated to be effective without imposing unrealistically heavy burdens on the party charged with the duty of notification) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted), overruled on other grounds by Herrera, 111 N.M. at 565, 807 P.2d at 749. {11} As is required by the Implied Consent Act, see § 66-8-111.1, Petitioner was personally served at the time of his arrest with the notice of revocation which informed him, in English, that his license would be revoked in twenty days unless he requested a hearing within ten days. He does not complain that the notice was untimely or that the content of the notice would be insufficient to apprise an English-speaker of the right to a pre-deprivation revocation hearing upon request. [2] Thus, unlike those cases where the notice was achieved by publication or a mailed letter which never arrived, Petitioner received actual notice of the revocation proceeding. The very narrow question we face in this case is whether the hand-delivered notice whose contents would sufficiently apprise an English-speaker of the revocation hearing violates the federal due process clause because it is not also printed in Spanish. Because of the nature of the hearing at issue, and because we agree with the Court of Appeals that a reasonable person in Petitioner's situation would have the notice translated, we conclude that the hand-delivered English-only notice is appropriate to the nature of the case, and reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14. {12} A license-revocation proceeding is distinct from a criminal trial for driving under the influence. Under the Implied Consent Act, the purpose of the revocation proceeding is to protect the public by promptly removing from the highways those who drive while intoxicated. Bierner v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 113 N.M. 696, 699, 831 P.2d 995, 998 (Ct. App. 1992). Thus, findings made in revocation hearings are not given preclusive effect in a subsequent criminal trial because doing so would slow down what should be a summary administrative proceeding designed to handle license revocation matters quickly. State v. Bishop, 113 N.M. 732, 735, 832 P.2d 793, 796 (Ct. App. 1992). A license-revocation hearing must be held no later than ninety days after the notice of revocation, NMSA 1978 § 66-8-112(C) (1993, prior to 2003 amendments), and that time limit has been interpreted as mandatory and not waivable, Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Bargas, 2000-NMCA-103, ¶ 15, 129 N.M. 800, 14 P.3d 538 (Ct. App. 2000). The hearing itself was limited by Section 66-8-112(E) to the following issues: (1) whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person had been driving a motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor; (2) whether the person was arrested; (3) whether this hearing is held no later than ninety days after notice of revocation; and either (4) (a) whether the person refused to submit to a test upon request of the law enforcement officer; and (b) whether the law enforcement officer advised that the failure to submit to a test could result in revocation of the person's privilege to drive; or (5) (a) whether the chemical test was administered pursuant to the provisions of the Implied Consent Act; and (b) whether the test results indicated an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths or more in the person's blood or breath if the person is twenty-one years of age or older, or an alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths or more in the person's blood or breath if the person is less than twenty-one years of age. Although a party may raise constitutional issues to the district court which the hearing officer could not address, review of the statutory issues is typically limited to whether reasonable grounds exist for revocation or denial of the person's license or privilege to drive based on the record of the administrative proceeding. § 66-8-112(H). {13} Given the summary nature of a license-revocation hearing, and its limited effect, we agree with the Court of Appeals that an English-language notice of the proceeding which was personally served satisfies due process, even if that person does not read English. Specifically, such notice satisfies due process because a reasonable person who has received the notice during an arrest for driving while intoxicated would inquire further and have the notice translated. In a different administrative context, the Court of Appeals has rejected a claim of inadequate notice of a planned billboard where the claim was based on the fact that the landowners objecting to the billboard could not understand the description of its location in the notice provided them. See Bogan v. Sandoval County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 119 N.M. 334, 890 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1994). In so doing, the Court of Appeals held that where circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person should make inquiries, that person is charged with knowledge of the facts reasonable inquiry would have revealed. Id. at 341, 890 P.2d at 402. Likewise, we hold that where a person has been arrested for driving while intoxicated and has been personally served with papers, a reasonable person who did not understand those papers would seek to have them translated or explained. {14} We therefore agree with those cases from other jurisdictions that have held that an English-language notice puts the non-English-speaker on inquiry notice to have the notice translated and, for that reason, satisfies due process. See, e.g., Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1983); Guerrero v. Carleson, 512 P.2d 833, 835-37 (Cal. 1973); People v. Villa-Villa, 983 P.2d 181, 182-83 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); Alonso v. Arabel, Inc., 622 So. 2d 187, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Hernandez v. Dep't of Labor, 416 N.E.2d 263, 266-67 (Ill. 1981); Vasquez v. State, 700 N.E.2d 1157, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). Like the Court of Appeals, however, we do not accept all the reasoning advanced in some of those cases, particularly the argument that English is always adequate because this is an English-speaking country. See, e.g., Guerrero, 512 P.2d at 835. Indeed, our state constitution and statutes recognize the need for Spanish in some circumstances and the use of Spanish in other contexts. See N.M. Const. art. XII, § 8 (providing that the legislature shall provide for the training of teachers in public schools in English and Spanish to qualify them to teach English to Spanish-speaking students); N.M. Const. art. XX, § 12 (For the first twenty years after this constitution goes into effect all laws passed by the legislature shall be published in both the English and Spanish languages and thereafter such publication shall be made as the legislature may provide.); NMSA 1978, § 14-11-11 (1923) (requiring publication of certain local proceedings and providing that when the local population is not less than seventy-five percent Spanish speaking publication in Spanish is sufficient). None of those provisions require Spanish-language notice in this context, and for that reason they do not alter the federal constitutional analysis.