Opinion ID: 2711534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of the Portland Ordinance

Text: Our threshold task is to interpret the meaning and reach of the contested ordinance. As noted, PCC 14A.60.010(A) provides: “It is unlawful for any person to knowingly possess or carry a firearm, in or upon a public place, including while in a vehicle in a public place, recklessly having failed to remove all the ammunition from the firearm.” The ordinance sets out 14 exceptions to the prohibition, including an exception for persons who are licensed by the State of Oregon to carry a concealed weapon. Other exceptions include police officers and members of the military in the performance of their official duties, licensed hunters while engaging in hunting activities or traveling for that purpose, and persons traveling to and from established target ranges.5 5 The exceptions, which also constitute affirmative defenses to a violation of the ordinance, are as follows: Cite as 354 Or 22 (2013) 27 Many terms in the ordinance have plain meanings that the parties do not dispute. The term “public place” is defined within the Portland City Code in a manner consistent with the legislative grant of authority “to regulate, restrict or prohibit the possession of loaded firearms in public places as defined in ORS 161.015.” ORS 166.173(1); see also ORS 161.015 (defining “public places”); PCC 14A.10.010(O) (providing definition of “public places” that parallels ORS 161.015). PCC 14A.20.040 further provides that the city code “shall be construed so as to render it consistent with state criminal law.” Because the city code does not define the terms “knowingly” and “recklessly,” those terms are to be defined as provided for under state criminal law. By incorporating state law, “knowingly” is therefore defined as follows: “1. A police officer or other duly appointed peace officers, whether active or honorably retired. “2. A member of the military in the performance of official duty. “3. A person licensed to carry a concealed handgun. “4. A person authorized to possess a loaded firearm while in or on a public building under ORS 166.370. “5. A government employee authorized or required by his or her employment or office to carry firearms. “6. A person summoned by a police officer to assist in making arrests or preserving the peace, while such person is actually engaged in assisting the officer. “7. A merchant who possesses or is engaged in lawfully transporting unloaded firearms as merchandise. “8. Organizations which are by law authorized to purchase or receive weapons from the United States or from this state. “9. Duly authorized military or civil organizations while parading, or their members when going to and from the places of meeting of their organization. “10. A corrections officer while transporting or accompanying an individual convicted of or arrested for an offense and confined in a place of incarceration or detention while outside the confines of the place of incarceration or detention. “11. Persons travelling to and from an established target range, whether public or private, for the purpose of practicing shooting targets at the target ranges. “12. Licensed hunters or fishermen while engaged in hunting or fishing, or while going to or returning from a hunting or fishing expedition. “13. A person authorized by permit of the Chief of Police to possess a loaded firearm, clip, or magazine in a public place in the City of Portland. “14. A security guard employed at a financial institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation while the security guard is on duty.” PCC 14A.60.010(C). 28 State v. Christian “ ‘Knowingly’ or ‘with knowledge,’ when used with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so described exists.” ORS 161.085(8). “Recklessly” is likewise defined as follows: “ ‘Recklessly,’ when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(9). In light of those definitions, the parties agree that the only ambiguity in the text of the ordinance relates to the meaning of the word “recklessly,” based on the placement of that word. The Court of Appeals concluded that “recklessly,” which appears in the second clause of the provision, modified the phrase “knowingly possess or carry a firearm” in the first clause of the provision. Christian, 249 Or App at 5-7. That interpretation requires that a person have knowledge that the firearm that he or she possesses in public is loaded and nevertheless recklessly proceed with an awareness that doing so creates an unreasonable and unjustifiable risk of harm. In contrast, the parties and the dissents below interpret the word “recklessly” to modify the phrase “having failed to remove all the ammunition from the firearm” and, as a result, adopt a broader construction of the ordinance. Under that construction, a person violates the ordinance if that person knowingly possesses or carries a firearm in public and is aware of and disregards a substantial risk that the firearm is loaded. A grammatical reading of the ordinance is that “recklessly,” an adverb, modifies the phrase that immediately follows it. See Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or 122, 132, 46 P3d 729 (2002) (interpretation of anti-stalking statute where placement of adverbs “intentionally,” “knowingly,” and “recklessly” immediately before the verb “engage[ ]” demonstrated Cite as 354 Or 22 (2013) 29 that the adverbs modified the verb). The first clause of the ordinance includes the adverb (and mental state) “knowingly,” to modify the verbs “possess” and “carry.” To also modify those verbs with “recklessly” unnecessarily creates ambiguity with respect to the required mental state for a conviction under the ordinance. We therefore conclude that the proper interpretation of the ordinance is the meaning agreed to by the parties. Therefore, a person violates the ordinance when he or she knowingly possesses or carries a firearm in a public place except under circumstances specifically exempted. Based on that construction, we make several ini- tial observations about the reach of the ordinance. First, the ordinance is not directed in any way to the manner of possession or use of firearms for self-defense within the home. By definition, the areas that the ordinance regulates are public places only. Second, the ordinance does not prohibit the mere possession of firearms in public places but specifically regulates only the manner of possession, namely, knowingly possessing or carrying a loaded firearm in public and recklessly failing to remove all of the ammunition. Third, with the exceptions noted, the ordinance prohibits possessing or carrying of loaded firearms in all public places. Significantly, the ordinance does not prohibit a person from knowingly possessing or carrying a loaded firearm in a public place if the “person [is] licensed to carry a concealed handgun.” PCC 14A.60.010(C)(3). With those points in mind, we return to the parties’ arguments on review. Defendant challenges the ordinance under Article I, section 27, as facially overbroad. Defendant’s overbreadth challenge is based on the contention that the individual right to bear arms for the purpose of defense guaranteed by Article I, section 27, includes an unlimited right to carry a loaded firearm in all public places in a manner that would allow a person to immediately use the firearm to resist a deadly attack. In response, the city and amicus curiae League of Oregon Cities (amicus) make a principled argument that overbreadth challenges that question the validity of all conceivable applications of a challenged law should not be 30 State v. Christian cognizable in Article I, section 27, cases. To inform our decision in this case, we first turn to a brief review of our Article I, section 27, jurisprudence. We then examine the justification for overbreadth challenges in Article I, section 27, cases.