Opinion ID: 1160456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Buch's Motion for Mental Examination of the Complaining Witness

Text: Buch's final argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mental examination of the complaining witness. We review the denial of Buch's motion for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Vincent, 51 Haw. 40, 450 P.2d 996 (1969); State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126, 93 S.Ct. 944, 35 L.Ed.2d 258 (1973). In Vincent, we agree[d] with courts of other jurisdictions that a trial judge in his [or her] discretion may order a psychiatric examination of a witness on the question of credibility when a movant shows a compelling reason for such examination. Id. at 42, 450 P.2d at 998. We held, however, that mere allegation by the appellants that the key witness had certain physical defects and that he was fabricating his story to get into the limelight was neither sufficient nor compelling ground for such examination. Id. In Kahinu, the defendant was convicted of burglary in the first degree and assault with intent to rape. 53 Haw. at 537, 498 P.2d at 637. On appeal, he argued, inter alia, that the circuit court's refusal to order the complaining witness to submit to a psychiatric examination was an abuse of discretion because such an examination becomes imperative in the absence of any evidence corroborating the complainant's testimony because in such circumstances the accused may fall victim to the groundless fantasies or vindictiveness of a pathological female. Id. at 545, 498 P.2d at 641. This court rejected the argument and held that the circuit court properly exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's motion based upon nothing more compelling than a bald allegation that the complainant may be mentally ill. Id. at 547, 498 P.2d at 642-43. The Kahinu court, quoting with approval from Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal.2d 159, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 849 (1966), stated: We submit ... that a general rule requiring a psychiatric examination of complaining witnesses in every sex case or, as an alternative, in any such case that rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness would, in many instances, not be necessary or appropriate. Moreover, victims of sex crimes might be deterred by such an absolute requirement from disclosing such offenses. Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. [Citation omitted.] Id. at 546-47, 498 P.2d at 642 (brackets and ellipses in original). Buch argues that a subsequent California case, People v. Russel, 69 Cal.2d 187, 70 Cal.Rptr. 210, 443 P.2d 794 (1968), expanded the Ballard compelling need test by holding that a trial court's discretion to order a mental examination of a complaining witness is liberally exercised for defendants in sex abuse cases. This argument, however, is specious. The issue in Russel was the admissibility of a psychiatrist's testimony based on his court ordered examination of the complaining witness. The court expressly stated that, [i]n the instant case, however, we are not concerned with the propriety of psychiatric examination [.] Id. 70 Cal.Rptr. at 215, 443 P.2d at 799 (emphasis in original). See also id. 70 Cal.Rptr. at 217, 443 P.2d at 801 (that order [for a mental examination of the complaining witness], the propriety of which is not here questioned .... Although the order is not now under attack and does not require our reappraisal, . . . (Emphasis added.)). [12] In this case, Buch asserts that he is raising the issue of the effect of the victim's mental and/or emotional condition upon his or her credibility based on his claim that the victim is a homosexual and that the victim's accusation was part of an attempt to gain money from the defendant. Thus, Buch maintains there was a compelling reason for the mental examination of the complaining witness. These claims are even less compelling than the bald allegations of physical defects or mental illness that the court held were insufficient to warrant court-ordered examinations in Vincent and Kahinu because, even if true, neither homosexuality nor desire for money would affect the witness's credibility in ways the jury would not be able to detect without the aid of psychiatric knowledge. We hold, therefore, that the denial of Buch's motion to compel a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness was not an abuse of discretion.