Opinion ID: 196338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the nature of mandamus

Text: 12 Federal appellate courts are empowered to issue prerogative writs that are necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651(a) (1988). Because such writs disrupt the mechanics of the judicial system--by accelerating appellate intervention, prerogative writs foster piecemeal review and disturb the historic relationship between trial and appellate courts--they should be used stintingly and brought to bear only in extraordinary situations. Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 6 F.3d 856, 865 (1st Cir.1993). Mandamus is such a writ. It is strong medicine, and should neither be prescribed casually nor dispensed freely. 13 Consistent with these principles, the standards for issuance of the writ are high. A petitioner seeking mandamus must show both that there is a clear entitlement to the relief requested, and that irreparable harm will likely occur if the writ is withheld. See United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754, 769 (1st Cir.1994); Doughty, 6 F.3d at 866; In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653, 657 & n. 4 (1st Cir.1993). Sometimes, even these specific showings are not enough to justify a court's use of its mandamus power. In the final analysis, a writ of mandamus is an exceptional remedy and is to be granted only in the exercise of sound discretion. Whitehouse v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 349 U.S. 366, 373, 75 S.Ct. 845, 850, 99 L.Ed. 1155 (1955). In this context, equity informs the court's discretion. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2124, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); United States v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543, 57 S.Ct. 855, 857, 81 L.Ed. 1272 (1937); United States v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359, 53 S.Ct. 614, 617, 77 L.Ed. 1250 (1933); Doughty, 6 F.3d at 866; United States v. Patterson, 882 F.2d 595, 600 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1027, 110 S.Ct. 737, 107 L.Ed.2d 755 (1990); In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 860 F.2d 135, 139-40 (4th Cir.1988); Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1978). 14 We have held that, in an appropriate case, an issue of judicial disqualification may present a sufficiently extraordinary situation to justify the unsheathing of our mandamus power. See In re Allied-Signal, Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 969 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 957, 110 S.Ct. 2561, 109 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990); In re Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 834 (1st Cir.1987); In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir.1981); see also In re International Business Mach. Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 927 (2d Cir.1980). However, the usual prerequisites to mandamus relief--a showing of both clear entitlement to the requested relief and irreparable harm without it, accompanied by a favorable balance of the equities--do not vanish merely because judicial disqualification is the business of the day. See, e.g., Allied-Signal, 891 F.2d at 969; Cooper, 821 F.2d at 834; In re United States, 666 F.2d at 694. In other words, the mere fact that a petition for mandamus is directed at securing the trial judge's removal does not ensure that the higher court will entertain the petition.