Opinion ID: 2070042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mental Illness Defense.

Text: Appellant argues that the evidence presented in Part II of the trial was sufficient to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that appellant was not guilty by reason of mental illness. This court reviews evidence concerning a defendant's sanity in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Bouwman, 354 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.1984). Defendant has the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Linder, 304 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn.1981). In the second part of the bifurcated trial, the only witness was Dr. Carl Malmquist, the court-appointed psychiatrist. He reviewed the statements of witnesses and officers connected with the shooting, reviewed a psychological test given to appellant, and spoke with appellant. With respect to the night of the shooting, Dr. Malmquist testified on direct examination that appellant suffered from a depersonalization disorder, causing him to have a split personality, and that appellant was also intoxicated. Dr. Malmquist explained appellant's thought processes as follows: In that sense, you've got a two-track kind of thinking process going on, and that's what I think happened with Mr. Jackman. As he's walking along, part of him is saying, Guy what are you doing, slow down, indicating there is some cognitive functioning going on for sure. He's not unconscious. He's not in a coma. He's intoxicated in my opinion but he's got certain effects, and his perceptual functioning at that point.    He's walking along and part of himself is like warning with [sic] another part, if you will. The effect on cognition and disassociation is that one part of your regular cognition is going on, you're thinking. Part of him is saying, Guy, what are you doing? and another part of himself is observing himself as though there is a separate part of himself doing some other thinking. As a result of the depersonalization which Dr. Malmquist described as a mental illness, Dr. Malmquist concluded that appellant knew the nature of the act but because of that depersonalized state related to the alcohol intoxication, that he would not have registered that act as wrong. Dr. Malmquist modified his opinion, however, by indicating: It becomes impossible to deliniate what part of himself was seeing it as wrong and what part wasn't. Part of him was and part of him wasn't, and I think the jury is in a very difficult situation of trying to assess how that comes out, what percent was which. I think both were there. In light of Dr. Malmquist's latter testimony, it is apparent that the jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant failed to prove his insanity defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Malmquist indicated that part of appellant knew his actions were wrong and part of him did not, and acknowledged the jury would have a difficult determination. The circumstances surrounding the shooting, such as (1) the appellant's argument with the victim; (2) driving to get the shotgun; (3) firing of four shots; (4) only hitting the victim; and (5) flight from the scene, all support the jury's determination that appellant was not legally insane when he killed Thomas Kohrt. Appellant also contends that the jury found that appellant had not met his burden of proving insanity because the trial court erroneously read a portion of Dr. Malmquist's testimony in response to the jury's question: Did the prosecutor ask if depersonalization was caused by intoxication in this case? Appellant argues that by reading only portions of the testimony the trial court gave undue prominence to the evidence reviewed. We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to review a portion of Dr. Malmquist's testimony. Minn.R.Crim.P. 26.03, subd. 19(2), authorizes the trial court to have requested testimony read to the jury. The trial court in the present case had the court reporter read portions of testimony from appellant's direct examination of the witness, as well as portions of the cross-examination by the state. The trial court also carefully instructed the jury not to take the reviewed testimony out of context, nor highlight the parts of the testimony that will be read back to you, but to consider the testimony as a whole. The record supports the jury conclusion that appellant failed to prove mental illness by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Affirmed. WAHL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.