Opinion ID: 2498646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion of 17 Witnesses

Text: Landowner challenges the trial judge's exclusion of the testimony of 17 witnessesBramhall, Debbie Saroff, Crubel, Wherrel, Ballou, Roger Schultz, Tim Schultz, any representative of Schultz Construction Company, Gleason, Warner, Ince, Mills, McCallum, any representative of Dial Realty, Fehr, Hilgers, Williamsas irrelevant. The first question we must examine is whether this issue was adequately preserved for appeal. When the district judge granted the City's motion to exclude the testimony of these witnesses, landowner submitted supplemental responses to the City's first set of interrogatories as a written proffer of the witnesses' testimony. Those responses contained the substance of the testimony, and we therefore agree that the issue of admission of the testimony of these witnesses was preserved for appeal. See K.S.A. 60-405; State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 99, 62 P.3d 220 (2003) (The proponent of excluded evidence has the duty of making known the `substance' of the expected evidence in a proffer. [Citation omitted.] A formal offer of proof in question and answer form is not required if an adequate record is made in a manner that discloses the evidence sought to be introduced.). Despite preservation for appeal, the issue of whether testimony from 14 of the 17 witnesses should have been permitted has now been abandoned. Landowner's brief to this court identified only three of the witnessesMarsden, Bramhall, and a representative of Schultz Construction Companyas exemplary of the trial judge's alleged exclusion error. No explanation was offered on how the testimony of these 3 related to that of the 14 others. Without such an explanation, our review of the merits on the 14 witnesses is rudderless and, ultimately, impossible. This is precisely why a `point raised only incidentally in a brief but not argued there is deemed abandoned,' and we will not address the exclusion of those 14 witnesses' testimony here. National Bank of Andover v. Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 290 Kan. 247, 281, 225 P.3d 707 (2010) (quoting Cooke v. Gillespie, 285 Kan. 748, Syl. ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 144 [2008]). We can address the merits on Marsden, Bramhall, and the representative of Schultz. Landowner's proffer on Marsden indicated that he would testify about the meat processing plant meeting United States Department of Agriculture regulations on food safety. Landowner contends this evidence supported its theory that the property had a special use relevant to the replacement cost method of valuation. Although it is true that the existence of a property's special use may be relevant to a party's argument that replacement cost is the most appropriate method of valuation, in this case, landowner appears to use the phrase special use as a synonym for the more general best and most advantageous use. The descriptor special use is intended to convey that there is no comparable market data an appraiser might use to value a property. See Eisenring v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 183 Kan. 774, 779, 332 P.2d 539 (1958). And it was essential that the descriptor be applicable before the 1999 amendment to K.S.A. 26-513 if a party wanted to use an appraisal method other than comparable sales. See City of Wichita v. Eisenring, 269 Kan. at 774, 7 P.3d 1248. Now, however, the concept of best and most advantageous use or highest and best use is used in both K.S.A. 26-513(d) and PIK Civ. 4th 131.05 as the use an eminent domain jury should consider when awarding just compensation. If property can be used for more than one purpose, the tract should be valued at its highest and best use. See 4 Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12B.13, p. 12B-113 (3d. ed. 1997). In this case, landowner never argued that there was no ascertainable market for the property; instead, it merely argued that the best and most advantageous use of the property was as a meat processing plant. Regardless, there was no dispute at trial that landowner operated a meat processing plant on the subject property. And Saroff testified that the plant was complying with and would comply with USDA regulations. While Marsden's testimony was potentially relevant to the viability of either a special use or a highest and best use, we see nothing in the proffer that would have added to what Saroff's testimony already provided. Although the trial judge's exclusion of Marsden's testimony as irrelevant may have been erroneous, its exclusion as cumulative would not have been. State v. Reed, 282 Kan. 272, 280, 144 P.3d 677 (2006) (court has power to exclude evidence that is cumulative); see also Robbins v. City of Wichita, 285 Kan. 455, 472, 172 P.3d 1187 (2007) (if district court reaches correct result, decision will be upheld even if it relied upon wrong ground or assigned erroneous reasons for its decision). There is no prejudice from any error in analysis; and landowner is not entitled to reversal because of the exclusion. Turning to Bramhall, landowner intended to call him to testify about a February 18, 2004, proposal he had prepared on the cost of refrigeration equipment for the meat processing plant. Bramhall also would have testified that the existing refrigeration system would be less expensive to operate than a new one. Landowner intended for Heavey to use Bramhall's proposal in calculating the value of the property. The district judge excluded Bramhall's testimony because his proposal was too remote in time from the date of the taking. The question of whether evidence concerns material too remote in time to be admissible lies within the discretion of the trial court. Adrian v. Elmer, 178 Kan. 242, 247, 284 P.2d 599 (1955); see also Miller v. Glacier Development Co., 284 Kan. 476, 480, 161 P.3d 730 (2007) (discretion abused when comparable sales from 7 to 8 years earlier admitted). Temporal remoteness is one of the factors a district court should consider when acting as a gatekeeper for admission of evidence in an eminent domain trial. See Mooney, 283 Kan. at 619, 153 P.3d 1252 (remoteness of comparable sale considered). Here, landowner does not present any argument on appeal to respond to the trial judge's assessment of Bramhall's report as too remote. Instead, landowner focuses only on the importance of Bramhall's report and how it would have factored into Heavey's replacement cost valuation. We hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion when he ruled that the 3-year-old proposal for refrigeration equipment was too remote in time from the date of the taking to be admissible in the trial of this eminent domain action. There was no dispute about either date, and thus the only factual finding necessary to the judge's decision was supported by substantial competent evidence; the judge did not rely on an erroneous interpretation of the governing law; and we cannot say that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same decision. See State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-57, 234 P.3d 1 (2010) (multiple possibilities for abuse of discretion standard discussed). This holding makes reaching the argument actually advanced on appeal by landownerthat Bramhall's testimony about his proposal would have provided critical support to Heaveyunnecessary. Even if landowner believes the evidence was important, it was properly excluded as too remote in time. Finally, we address landowner's assertion on appeal that the trial judge should not have excluded testimony from a representative of Schultz Construction Company. The company prepared an estimate to rebuild the meat processing plant, which landowner intended Heavey to rely upon. Landowner argues that testimony from a representative of Schultz also was relevant and essential to support Saroff's testimony on replacement cost, because Saroff's valuation was based, in turn, on Heavey's report. Landowner did not identify a representative from the company as an expert, and any representative would therefore have to have been treated as a lay witness. Even if the type of testimony landowner desired to admit from the representative could have been characterized theoretically as compliant with the statutory requirements in K.S.A. 60-456(a) and K.S.A. 60-419, no particular person responsible for preparation of the rebuild proposal was ever identified by landowner. Without a proffer as to a particular individual, we are not in a position to review the decision of the trial judge on relevance. Landowner bore the burden of making and preserving a record sufficient to support its claims on appeal. See K.S.A. 60-405; Evans, 275 Kan. at 99, 62 P.3d 220. Without such a record, this claim of error fails.