Opinion ID: 2334723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Against Ward Parkway Group Defendants

Text: Plaintiff asserts traditional negligence claims against the Ward Parkway Group defendants. Ward Parkway Group obtained judgment in the trial court on the basis that the criminal acts committed against plaintiff were not foreseeable and defendants accordingly had no duty to plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that numerous violent crimes committed on the premises of the mall in the previous three years, as well as other evidence of foreseeability, indicate that crimes such as rape were foreseeable. She argues that Ward Parkway Group owed business invitees, such as herself, a duty to take reasonable measures to protect them from criminal acts occurring on the premises by unknown third parties.
Different states have devised at least four methods to frame the issue of business owners' liability in tort for criminal acts of unknown third persons. The most stringent method, the specific harm test, requires notice of specific dangers just prior to the assault. Burns v. Johnson, 250 Va. 41, 458 S.E.2d 448 (1995). A second method, the prior similar incidents rule, was the first to gain widespread support. Under that approach, duty is only found if plaintiff can prove that defendant had notice of a sufficient number of prior acts of similar violent crime occurring on the premises. Lauersdorf v. Supermarket Gen. Corp., 239 A.D.2d 319, 657 N.Y.S.2d 732 (N.Y.App.Div.1997). In recent years, the prior similar incidents test has given way to the less rigid balancing test approach, Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, 6 Cal.4th 666, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137, 863 P.2d 207 (1993); McClung v. Delta Square Limited Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn.1996), or the totality of the circumstances test. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 253 Kan. 540, 856 P.2d 1332 (1993); Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1988). See generally 31 A.L.R.5th 550; Prem Liab 2d s. 49:3; 57 Wash & Lee L.Rev. 611, 617, n. 42 (2000). Missouri set out its approach almost fifteen years ago in Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. banc 1988). Madden consisted of two consolidated cases: Madden and Decker v. Gramex Corporation. The plaintiff in Madden was kidnapped from the parking lot of a restaurant and later sexually assaulted. 758 S.W.2d at 60. The restaurant was found to have a duty to protect its business invitees, because over the three-year period preceding the assault, numerous crimes were committed on the premises. Id. These crimes included six armed robberies, six strong-arm robberies, one assault and one purse snatching. Id. Decker involved the abduction and murder of two customers. 758 S.W.2d at 61. A slightly lower level of criminal activity on the premises of a grocery store also established a duty of care to protect business invitees. Id. The plaintiffs in Decker submitted evidence of four armed robberies, assault, assault with a deadly weapon and flourishing a deadly weapon. Id. In Madden , the Court did not find it necessary to adopt any special test or method to analyze the issue. Instead, it merely followed traditional principles of the law of negligence. Tort law focuses on three basic elements: duty, breach and damages. Accordingly, [i]n any action for negligence, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, the defendant failed to perform that duty, and the defendant's failure proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. Lopez v. Three Rivers Electric Cooperative, Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 155 (Mo. banc 2000). Whether a duty exists is purely a question of law. Lopez, 26 S.W.3d at 155. The touchstone for the creation of a duty is foreseeability. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62 (Mo. banc 1988). A duty of care arises out of circumstances in which there is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or injury. Id. (citations omitted). Where the existence of a duty is established, however, it is not one to protect against every possible injury which might occur. Hoover's Dairy, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Mo. banc 1985) (citations omitted). Rather, it is generally measured by whether or not a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated danger and provided against it. Id. A duty to protect against the criminal acts of third parties is generally not recognized because such activities are rarely foreseeable. Generally, there is no duty to protect business invitees from the criminal acts of unknown third persons. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62. However, in situations where a special relationship exists, such as that between a business owner and invitee, and injury is foreseeable to recognizable third parties, a duty will be imposed. Hence, a duty to exercise care [to protect business invitees] may be imposed by common law under the facts and circumstances of a given case. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62. There are two special facts and circumstances exceptions to the rule that businesses generally have no duty to protect invitees from criminal acts of third persons. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272-73 (Mo.App.1987). Under the first exception, the duty may arise when a person, known to be violent, is present on the premises or an individual is present who has conducted himself so as to indicate danger and sufficient time exists to prevent injury. Id. The other exception recognizes a duty [on the part of business owners] to protect their invitees from the criminal attacks of unknown third persons under certain special circumstances. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62. A duty of care arises out of circumstances in which there is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or injury. Id. at 62. It is the second exception that is primarily at issue here. [8] There is no evidence in the record to establish that defendants knew the assailant to be a violent individual or a particular threat to the safety of other persons prior to this incident. Thus, in order to establish duty, plaintiff must show evidence that would cause a reasonable person to anticipate danger and take precautionary actions to protect its business invitees against the criminal activities of unknown third parties. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62. Specifically, plaintiff need not show that the very injury resulting from defendant's negligence was foreseeable, but merely that a reasonable person could have foreseen that injuries of the type suffered would be likely to occur under the circumstances. Smith v. Archbishop of St. Louis, 632 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo.App.1982). Violent crimes are foreseeable if the premises have been the site of other prior violent crimes, including robbery, assault, burglary, stealing, arson, abduction, murder, sexual assault and rape. Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62, n. 2. A number of subsequent commentators and Missouri courts have attempted to categorize the Madden decision, to mixed results, concerning the precise requirements of the second exception. Wood v. Centermark Properties, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 517, 523 (Mo.App.1998) (prior specific incidents); Becker v. Diamond Parking, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Mo.App.1989) (totality of the circumstances); Hunter M. Bagby, Recent Development: Premises Liability, 23 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 461, 464 (1999) (balancing test, citing Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. banc 1988)); See also William M. Corrigan, Jr. & Timothy W. Van Ronzelen, Liability for Criminal Acts of Third Parties, 52 J. Mo. B. 359 (1996). But see Timothy A. Reuschel, Here's Your Burrito and Watch Your Back: Does Missouri Really Want to Hold Businesses Liable for Attacks on Patrons?, 65 Mo. L.Rev. 255, 258 (2000) (In Madden , the court did not explicitly adopt the `totality of the circumstances' test or the `prior similar incidents' test for foreseeability.) Although Madden considered prior similar incidents, it used language implying a totality of the circumstances test (the facts and circumstances of a given case) Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62. As will be discussed below, this case does not require that we enter the fray concerning whether a prior similar incidents, totality of the circumstances or a balancing test be adopted because the evidence set forth by plaintiff would satisfy any of the three. Moreover, it may well be that adoption of any of these approaches is less helpful than simply utilizing traditional tort language as was done in Madden . A traditional tort approach recognizes that both duty and breach adapt to the precise situation of the case, and that duty does not imply strict liability or even breach.
IPC reports indicate that seventy-five violent crimes occurred on mall property in the three years preceding the attack on plaintiff. Of these, sixty-two percent of the crimes with identifiable victims involved solely female victims. [9] As detailed above, included in this number are some of the most violent, including abduction, sexual assault and a number of violent, armed and strong-arm robberies. Defendants attempt to argue that a number of these crimes occurred outside of the mall in the parking lot [10] or did not include common elements with plaintiff's rape, and were therefore not similar. Defendants' analysis in this regard is too restrictive. Foreseeability does not require identical crimes in identical locations. Violent crimes against women, particularly, serve sufficient notice to reasonable individuals that other violent crimes, including sexual assault or rape of women, may occur. Defendants argue that incidents involving escaping suspects, verbal and physical altercations, robbery and indecent acts are not sufficiently similar to the rape that is alleged to have occurred here. This is not realistic. These are precisely the type of criminal acts that would put reasonable and prudent people on notice that precautions should be taken, as is evidenced by the testimony of GG's corporate security director that: Q: My question, sir, is whether or not you were aware of the potential risk of a sexual assault occurring at Ward Parkway Mall? A: I was aware that it was possible for it to occur, yes.    Q: Do you believe that Ward Parkway Mall has a duty to protect its customers from criminal activity? A: I believe the owner of the property has a duty, yes.    Q: And that duty would apply to the type of crimes we're talking aboutassault, sexual assault, rape-correct? A: Correct. [objections omitted]; and IPC's executive vice president who answered affirmatively that rape in isolated areas of a mall is a security concern of the company and that rape is a crime that we are constantly vigilant for in all areas of the shopping center; and the conclusions of IPC's security audit that indicated that the crime scene was frequented by unruly youth and had been the site of a high level of incidents. Although this testimony cannot be taken as a binding legal position on the part of defendants, it certainly can be considered as evidence of foreseeability. The incident reports and the testimony of defendants' employees clearly establish that they were aware of a significant number of violent crimes at the mall prior to this occurrence. Continued violent crime, such as the alleged rape of L.A.C. was foreseeable. [11] Defendants had a duty to take reasonable measures to protect mall customers, and specifically L.A.C., from this type of violent criminal activity. [12]