Opinion ID: 779052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Electronic Communications Privacy Act Claims

Text: 13 We first turn to the difficult task of determining whether Hawaiian violated either the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000) or the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2000), 2 when Davis accessed Konop's secure website. In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), Pub.L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, which was intended to afford privacy protection to electronic communications. Title I of the ECPA amended the federal Wiretap Act, which previously addressed only wire and oral communications, to address[] the interception of ... electronic communications. S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557. Title II of the ECPA created the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which was designed to address[] access to stored wire and electronic communications and transactional records. Id. 14 As we have previously observed, the intersection of these two statutes is a complex, often convoluted, area of the law. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.1998). In the present case, the difficulty is compounded by the fact that the ECPA was written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modern forms of communication like Konop's secure website. Courts have struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology within the confines of this statutory framework, often with unsatisfying results. See. e.g., Robert A. Pikowsky, Legal and Technological Issues Surrounding Privacy of Attorney Client Communication Via Email, Advocate, Oct. 2000, at 17-19 (discussing the uncertainty over email privacy caused by the ECPA and judicial interpretations thereof); Lieutenant Colonel LeEllen Coacher, Permitting Systems Protection Monitoring: When the Government Can Look and What It Can See, 46 A.F. L.Rev. 155, 171-74 (1999) (same); Tatsuya Akamine, Note, Proposal for a Fair Statutory Interpretation: E-mail Stored in a Service Provider Computer Is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7 J.L. Pol'y 519, 521-29, 561-68 (1999) (criticizing the judiciary's interpretation of the ECPA). We observe that until Congress brings the laws in line with modern technology, protection of the Internet and websites such as Konop's will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the law.
15 The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers that allows millions of people to communicate and exchange information. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F.Supp.2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y.2001). The World Wide Web, the best known category of communication over the Internet, consists of a vast number of electronic documents stored in different computers all over the world. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 852, 117 S.Ct. 2329. Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can publish information on the Web in the form of a web page or website. See id. at 853 & n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 2051. A website consists of electronic information stored by a hosting service computer or server. The owner of the website may pay a fee for this service. Each website has a unique domain name or web address ( e.g., Amazon.com or Lycos.com), which corresponds to a specific location within the server where the electronic information comprising the website is stored. A person who wishes to view the website types the domain name into a computer connected to the Internet. This is essentially a request to the server to make an electronic copy of the website (or at least the first page or home page) and send it to the user's computer. After this electronic information reaches the user's computer, it is downloaded for viewing on the user's screen. See generally Preston Gralla, How the Internet Works (1999). 16 While most websites are public, many, such as Konop's, are restricted. For instance, some websites are password-protected, require a social security number, or require the user to purchase access by entering a credit card number. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 852-53, 856, 117 S.Ct. 2329. The legislative history of the ECPA suggests that Congress wanted to protect electronic communications that are configured to be private, such as email and private electronic bulletin boards. See S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 35-36, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3599 (This provision [the SCA] addresses the growing problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to ... electronic or wire communications that are not intended to be available to the public.); H.R.Rep. No. 99-647 at 41, 62-63 (1986) (describing the Committee's understanding that the configuration of the electronic communications system would determine whether or not an electronic communication was readily accessible to the public). The nature of the Internet, however, is such that if a user enters the appropriate information (password, social security number, etc.), it is nearly impossible to verify the true identity of that user. Cf. Reno, 521 U.S. at 855-56, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (discussing the difficulty of verifying the age of a website user by requiring a credit card number or password). 17 We are confronted with such a situation here. Although Konop took certain steps to restrict the access of Davis and other managers to the website, 3 Davis was nevertheless able to access the website by entering the correct information, which was freely provided to Davis by individuals who were eligible to view the website.
18 Konop argues that Davis' conduct constitutes an interception of an electronic communication in violation of the 19 Wiretap Act. The Wiretap Act makes it an offense to intentionally intercept[] ... any wire, oral, or electronic communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). We must therefore determine whether Konop's website is an electronic communication and, if so, whether Davis intercepted that communication. 20 An electronic communication is defined as any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system. Id. § 2510(12). As discussed above, website owners such as Konop transmit electronic documents to servers, where the documents are stored. If a user wishes to view the website, the user requests that the server transmit a copy of the document to the user's computer. When the server sends the document to the user's computer for viewing, a transfer of information from the website owner to the user has occurred. Although the website owner's document does not go directly or immediately to the user, once a user accesses a website, information is transferred from the website owner to the user via one of the specified mediums. We therefore conclude that Konop's website fits the definition of electronic communication. 21 The Wiretap Act, however, prohibits only interceptions of electronic communications. Intercept is defined as the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. Id. § 2510(4). Standing alone, this definition would seem to suggest that an individual intercepts an electronic communication merely by acquiring its contents, regardless of when or under what circumstances the acquisition occurs. Courts, however, have clarified that Congress intended a narrower definition of intercept with regard to electronic communications. 22 In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir.1994), the Fifth Circuit held that the government's acquisition of email messages stored on an electronic bulletin board system, but not yet retrieved by the intended recipients, was not an interception under the Wiretap Act. The court observed that, prior to the enactment of the ECPA, the word intercept had been interpreted to mean the acquisition of a communication contemporaneous with transmission. Id. at 460 ( citing United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir.1976)). The court further observed that Congress, in passing the ECPA, intended to retain the previous definition of intercept with respect to wire and oral communications, 4 while amending the Wiretap Act to cover interceptions of electronic communications. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462; S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 13; H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 34. The court reasoned, however, that the word intercept could not describe the exact same conduct with respect to wire and electronic communications, because wire and electronic communications were defined differently in the statute. Specifically, the term wire communication was defined to include storage of the communication, while electronic communication was not. 5 The court concluded that this textual difference evidenced Congress' understanding that, although one could intercept a wire communication in storage, one could not intercept an electronic communication in storage: 23 Critical to the issue before us is the fact that, unlike the definition of wire communication, the definition of electronic communication does not include electronic storage of such communications.... Congress' use of the word transfer in the definition of electronic communication, and its omission in that definition of the phrase any electronic storage of such communication ... reflects that Congress did not intend for intercept to apply to electronic communications when those communications are in electronic storage. 24 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62; Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F.Supp. 375, 386 (D.Del.1997) ([B]y including the electronic storage of wire communications within the definition of such communications but declining to do the same for electronic communications ... Congress sufficiently evinced its intent to make acquisitions of electronic communications unlawful under the Wiretap Act only if they occur contemporaneously with their transmissions.), aff'd, 172 F.3d 861 (3d Cir.1998); United States v. Reyes, 922 F.Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Taken together, the definitions thus imply a requirement that the acquisition of [electronic communications] be simultaneous with the original transmission of the data.); Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F.Supp. 1232, 1236-37 (D.Nev. 1996) (requiring acquisition during transmission). The Steve Jackson Court further noted that the ECPA was deliberately structured to afford electronic communications in storage less protection than other forms of communication. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462-64. 25 The Ninth Circuit endorsed the reasoning of Steve Jackson Games in United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051. The question presented in Smith was whether the Wiretap Act covered wire communications in storage, such as voice mail messages, or just wire communications in transmission, such as ongoing telephone conversations. Relying on the same textual distinction as the Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games, we concluded that wire communications in storage could be intercepted under the Wiretap Act. We found that Congress' inclusion of storage in the definition of wire communication militated in favor of a broad definition of the term intercept with respect to wire communications, one that included acquisition of a communication subsequent to transmission. We further observed that, with respect to wire communications only, the prior definition of intercept — acquisition contemporaneous with transmission — had been overruled by the ECPA. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n. 11. On the other hand, we suggested that the narrower definition of intercept was still appropriate with regard to electronic communications: [I]n cases concerning electronic communications — the definition of which specifically includes transfers and specifically excludes storage — the narrow definition of intercept fits like a glove; it is natural to except non-contemporaneous retrievals from the scope of the Wiretap Act. In fact, a number of courts adopting the narrow interpretation of interception have specifically premised their decisions to do so on the distinction between § 2510's definitions of wire and electronic communications. 26 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 (citations and alterations omitted). 27 We agree with the Steve Jackson and Smith courts that the narrow definition of intercept applies to electronic communications. Notably, Congress has since amended the Wiretap Act to eliminate storage from the definition of wire communication, see USA PATRIOT Act § 209, 115 Stat. at 283, such that the textual distinction relied upon by the Steve Jackson and Smith courts no longer exists. This change, however, supports the analysis of those cases. By eliminating storage from the definition of wire communication, Congress essentially reinstated the pre-ECPA definition of intercept — acquisition contemporaneous with transmission — with respect to wire communications. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n. 11. The purpose of the recent amendment was to reduce protection of voice mail messages to the lower level of protection provided other electronically stored communications. See H.R. Rep. 107-236(I), at 158-59 (2001). When Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, it was aware of the narrow definition courts had given the term intercept with respect to electronic communications, but chose not to change or modify that definition. To the contrary, it modified the statute to make that definition applicable to voice mail messages as well. Congress, therefore, accepted and implicitly approved the judicial definition of intercept as acquisition contemporaneous with transmission. 28 We therefore hold that for a website such as Konop's to be intercepted in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage. 6 This conclusion is consistent with the ordinary meaning of intercept, which is to stop, seize, or interrupt in progress or course before arrival. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 630 (1985). More importantly, it is consistent with the structure of the ECPA, which created the SCA for the express purpose of addressing access to stored ... electronic communications and transactional records. S.Rep. No. 99-541 at 3 (emphasis added). The level of protection provided stored communications under the SCA is considerably less than that provided communications covered by the Wiretap Act. Section 2703(a) of the SCA details the procedures law enforcement must follow to access the contents of stored electronic communications, but these procedures are considerably less burdensome and less restrictive than those required to obtain a wiretap order under the Wiretap Act. See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 463. Thus, if Konop's position were correct and acquisition of a stored electronic communication were an interception under the Wiretap Act, the government would have to comply with the more burdensome, more restrictive procedures of the Wiretap Act to do exactly what Congress apparently authorized it to do under the less burdensome procedures of the SCA. Congress could not have intended this result. As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Steve Jackson Games, it is most unlikely that Congress intended to require law enforcement officers to satisfy the more stringent requirements for an intercept in order to gain access to the contents of stored electronic communications. Id.; see also Wesley Coll., 974 F.Supp. at 388 (same). 29 Because we conclude that Davis' conduct did not constitute an interception of an electronic communication in violation of the Wiretap Act, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment against Konop on his Wiretap Act claims. 7
30 Konop also argues that, by viewing his secure website, Davis accessed a stored electronic communication without authorization in violation of the SCA. The SCA makes it an offense to intentionally access[] without authorization a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided ... and thereby obtain[] ... access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1). The SCA excepts from liability, however, conduct authorized ... by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or intended for that user. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2). The district court found that the exception in § 2701(c)(2) applied because Wong and Gardner consented to Davis' use of Konop's website. It therefore granted summary judgment to Hawaiian on the SCA claim. 31 The parties agree that the relevant electronic communications service is Konop's website, and that the website was in electronic storage. In addition, for the purposes of this opinion, we accept the parties' assumption that Davis' conduct constituted access without authorization 8 to a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided. 32 We therefore address only the narrow question of whether the district court properly found Hawaiian exempt from liability under § 2701(c)(2). Section 2701(c)(2) allows a person to authorize a third party's access to an electronic communication if the person is 1) a user of the service and 2) the communication is of or intended for that user. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2). A user is any person or entity who — (A) uses an electronic communications service; and (B) is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(13). 33 The district court concluded that Wong and Gardner had the authority under § 2701(c)(2) to consent to Davis' use of the website because Konop put Wong and Gardner on the list of eligible users. This conclusion is consistent with other parts of the Wiretap Act and the SCA which allow intended recipients of wire and electronic communications to authorize third parties to access those communications. 9 In addition, there is some indication in the legislative history that Congress believed addressees or intended recipients of electronic communications would have the authority under the SCA to allow third parties access to those communications. See H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 66-67 (explaining that an addressee [of an electronic communication] may consent to the disclosure of a communication to any other person and that [a] person may be an `intended recipient' of a communication ... even if he is not individually identified by name or otherwise). 34 Nevertheless, the plain language of § 2701(c)(2) indicates that only a user of the service can authorize a third party's access to the communication. The statute defines user as one who 1) uses the service and 2) is duly authorized to do so. Because the statutory language is unambiguous, it must control our construction of the statute, notwithstanding the legislative history. See United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1174 (9th Cir.1999). The statute does not define the word use, so we apply the ordinary definition, which is to put into action or service, avail oneself of, employ. Webster's at 1299; see Daas, 198 F.3d at 1174 (If the statute uses a term which it does not define, the court gives that term its ordinary meaning.). 35 Based on the common definition of the word use, we cannot find any evidence in the record that Wong ever used Konop's website. There is some evidence, however, that Gardner may have used the website, but it is unclear when that use occurred. At any rate, the district court did not make any findings on whether Wong and Gardner actually used Konop's website — it simply assumed that Wong and Gardner, by virtue of being eligible to view the website, could authorize Davis' access. The problem with this approach is that it essentially reads the user requirement out of § 2701(c)(2). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Konop, we must assume that neither Wong nor Gardner was a user of the website at the time he authorized Davis to view it. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to Hawaiian on Konop's SCA claim.