Opinion ID: 4271642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶23 Having interpreted the term “public employee,” we now turn to the question of whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Holland was a public employee within the meaning of section 18-9-110(1). ¶24 As an initial matter, we note that the People contend that Rediger’s sufficiency claim should be reviewed only for plain error. This issue has divided divisions of our court of appeals, both as to whether a defendant must make a motion for a judgment of acquittal to preserve a sufficiency claim and whether unpreserved sufficiency claims should be reviewed de novo or only for plain error. Compare Rediger, ¶¶ 9–14, 411 P.3d at 910–11, and Lacallo, ¶¶ 4–24, 338 P.3d at 444–49, with People v. McCoy, 2015 COA 76M, ¶¶ 6–36, ___ P.3d ___, and People v. Randell, 2012 COA 108, ¶ 30, 10 297 P.3d 989, 997–98. Indeed, we have granted certiorari to resolve this division split.3 We, however, need not wade into this dispute here because reviewing either de novo or under the form of plain-error review on which the division relied, see Rediger, ¶¶ 12–13, 411 P.3d at 910, leads to the same result, namely, that Rediger’s conviction under section 18-9-110(1) must be reversed. ¶25 Under the division’s view, when analyzing the evidence requires the preliminary interpretation of a statute, the court must first decide whether the error was obvious. Id. at ¶ 12, 411 P.3d at 910. The division indicated that an error of this nature would not be obvious if determining the meaning of the operative statutory terms under then-existing Colorado authority would be difficult. Id. Conversely, the error would be obvious if the statutory language was unambiguous, even if the operative statutory terms had not yet been interpreted and no previous case law would have alerted the trial court to the error. Id. at ¶ 13, 411 P.3d at 910. Applying this analysis to the case before it, the division concluded that the term “public employee” was unambiguous and that Holland was not a public employee. Id. at ¶¶ 16–19, 28–37, 411 P.3d at 911–913. Accordingly, Rediger’s conviction under section 18-9-110(1) could not stand. Id. at ¶ 27, 411 P.3d at 912. ¶26 Here, whether we were to apply the division’s analysis or to review this issue de novo, our analysis is functionally the same and produces the same result. As noted above, we believe that the term “public employee” is unambiguous and means a person 3 See People in Interest of T.B., 2016 COA 151M, ___ P.3d ___, cert. granted, No. 17SC66, 2017 WL 3593888 (Colo. Aug. 21, 2017); McCoy, 2015 COA 76M, cert. granted, No. 15SC1095, 2016 WL 5723893 (Colo. Oct. 3, 2016). 11 who works in the service of a governmental entity under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the governmental entity has the right to control the details of the person’s work performance. In this case, Holland testified, without contradiction, that she was employed by the Academy, the nonprofit school that she also owns, and not by a governmental entity. Moreover, no evidence showed that any governmental entity had the right to control the details of Holland’s work performance. Accordingly, like the division, we conclude that Holland was not a public employee within the meaning of section 18-9-110(1) and that, therefore, sufficient evidence did not support Rediger’s conviction on that count. ¶27 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the People urge us to conclude that Holland was a public employee for purposes of the statute because she was employed not only by the Academy but also, effectively, by the various governmental entities that accredit, license, monitor, audit, and inspect the Academy, including the Colorado Department of Education, the Colorado Department of Human Services, and the Colorado Department of Health. For three reasons, we are unpersuaded. ¶28 First, regulatory activities like those on which the People rely do not suffice to create an employment relationship at common law, and the People cite no applicable law to the contrary. In an ordinary employment relationship, an employer must possess the right to control the details of its employee’s performance. Norton, 949 P.2d at 567. Here, although governmental entities may have had the authority to “check” the Academy’s curriculum, to perform unannounced audits, and to send students for placement in the school (subject to the Academy’s right to refuse those students), they 12 were not involved in the Academy’s daily operations and did not control the details of Holland’s or any other Academy employee’s performance. Id. at 568 (concluding that the director of a county department of social services was not a state employee because the director served under the supervision of the county board and although the board “operate[d] within the regulatory framework established by the State, the State [was] not involved in [its] daily operations”); see also Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 530 (1973) (concluding that federal regulations requiring county jail employees to abide by specific standards of treatment for federal prisoners did not render the county employees employees of a federal agency; although the federal government retained the right to inspect the county jail at reasonable hours, it did not have the authority to supervise the conduct of the jail’s employees). ¶29 Second, the People point to no one governmental entity that they deem to be Holland’s employer. Instead, they rely on the piecemeal involvement of various governmental entities to cast Holland as a generalized “public employee.” The People cite no applicable law supporting such a notion of an employee, and we have seen none. ¶30 Finally, in our view, the People’s definition is overbroad because it would deem virtually all employees of regulated employers to be “public employees,” contrary both to our precedents and to the common understanding of the distinction between public, governmental entities and private, regulated entities. See Colo. Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 804 P.2d at 143 (“Private nonprofit corporations are corporations formed by private individuals for a public purpose . . . . In contrast, public corporations are created as 13 subdivisions of the state as an expedient device to carry out the functions of government.”); cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 273 (2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[P]rivate entities are different from public ones: They are private.”); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (“The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State . . . . Nor does the fact that the regulation is extensive and detailed.”) (citation omitted). ¶31 For these reasons, we agree with the division that sufficient evidence did not support a finding that Holland was a “public employee.” Accordingly, like the division, we conclude that Rediger’s conviction under section 18-9-110(1) cannot stand.