Opinion ID: 216984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Vazquez-Villa’s Sentence

Text: Finally, Vazquez-Villa challenges the reasonableness of his 25-year sentence. He contests the PSR’s factual findings, as adopted by the district court, and he argues his sentence was too severe, in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. These arguments are unavailing. Our review for reasonableness encompasses both a procedural component, where we assess the district court’s application of the USSG and its calculation of the sentencing range, as well as a substantive component, where we consider the length of the sentence imposed. See United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006). Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
The PSR held Vazquez-Villa accountable for 18.32 kilograms of methamphetamine, which corresponded to a base offense level of 38. In addition, the PSR added a two-level enhancement because Vazquez-Villa’s offense involved the importation of methamphetamine from Mexico, USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4)(A), and a four-level enhancement because Vazquez-Villa was an “organizer or leader” of criminal activity that involved five or more participants, -11- id. § 3B1.1(b). The district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings and recommendations, and it accordingly calculated Vazquez-Villa’s total offense level as 43, which resulted in an advisory sentence of life imprisonment. Nevertheless, the district court applied a significant downward variance under § 3553(a) and sentenced Vazquez-Villa to 25 years’ imprisonment. During sentencing, Vazquez-Villa did not object to his sentence or the facts found in the PSR, but he now claims the district court’s offense-level and guidelines calculations were factually unsupportable. Specifically, Vazquez-Villa claims he should have been held liable for at most 9.03 kilograms of methamphetamine—and perhaps fewer than 5 kilograms—and further that neither of the enhancements applied by the district court were based in fact. Because Vazquez-Villa did not contest the district court’s factual findings during sentencing, he has waived his right to appeal this issue. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 “requires the defendant to affirmatively point out any fact in the PSR that he contends is inaccurate. Absent an objection to the PSR, the district court may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact.” United States v. Harris, 447 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). Thus, if a defendant fails to object to the facts stated in the PSR, we “will deem him to have waived any dispute regarding the facts set forth in the PSR.” United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 957 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds as recognized in United States v. -12- McConnell, 605 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, it is clear that “factual disputes regarding sentencing not brought to the attention of the district court do not rise to the level of plain error.” United States v. Lewis, 594 F.3d 1270, 1288 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3441 (2010). “While we have reviewed sentencing errors that were not raised in the district court under a plain error standard, plain error review is not appropriate when the alleged error involves the resolution of factual disputes.” United States v. Smith, 531 F.3d 1261, 1270 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). We have recognized an exception to this rule only “when the appellant can establish the certainty of a favorable finding on remand.” Lewis, 594 F.3d at 1288. The present case is paradigmatic of the logic behind this waiver rule. If Vazquez-Villa had raised his sentencing objections below, the district court could have heard evidence and made findings regarding the factual questions at issue. Because he did not object, however, the government did not present evidence and therefore we are faced with an insufficiently developed record that provides us no basis to call into question the district court’s approach to sentencing. Further, Vazquez-Villa has not come close to showing with certainty that he would benefit from a favorable finding on remand. For these reasons, we find Vazquez-Villa’s -13- procedural challenges raise factual questions unsusceptible to appellate review. Plain error review is inappropriate and Vazquez-Villa’s argument is waived. Moreover, even if we were not to consider Vazquez-Villa’s arguments waived, we would still conclude, under plain error analysis, that the district court did not err in adopting the factual findings of the PSR. As explained, the record on appeal is sparse and does nothing to call into question the PSR’s detailed account of the drug quantity attributable to Vazquez-Villa. Likewise, nothing in the record calls into question the PSR’s findings, which were supported by intercepted conversations and witness testimony, that Vazquez-Villa was a leader in a significant drug organization that imported methamphetamine from Mexico. 3 For these reasons, Vazquez-Villa’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Without offering any analysis, Vazquez-Villa contends his 25-year sentence is substantively unreasonable because it “is more than what should have been 3 Despite conceding that “there may have been more than five participants involved in [his] criminal activity,” Aplt. Br. at 26, Vazquez-Villa argues that he should have been classified only as a “manager or supervisor,” which merits a two-level enhancement under USSG § 3B1.1(c), rather than as an “organizer or leader,” which merits a four-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(a). This is a factually dependent claim, and because Vazquez-Villa did not object at sentencing, the record is insufficiently developed to give us any basis to say that the district court committed plain error on this point. We also have no reason to question the district court’s finding that Vazquez-Villa imported methamphetamine, such that he was subject to a two-level enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4)(A). Indeed, the court heard ample evidence that VazquezVilla obtained methamphetamine from Mexico. -14- calculated under the guideline range and is simply unreasonable.” Aplt. Br. at 28. This contention is belied by the record, which shows Vazquez-Villa received a sentence tailored to the facts of his crimes, based on a conscientious consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. We review the substantive reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mancera-Perez, 505 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2007). Under this deferential standard, we may overturn VazquezVilla’s sentence only if the district court’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). In this regard, we assess whether Vazquez-Villa’s sentence is reasonable “given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quotation omitted). A sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumed to be reasonable. United States v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884, 898 (10th Cir. 2008). Vazquez-Villa’s sentence was outside the guideline range—but this worked to his advantage. Indeed, even though the suggested sentence for a level-43 offense is life imprisonment, the district court applied a significant downward variance and sentenced Vazquez-Villa to only 25 years’ imprisonment. The court applied this variance because it concluded the PSR failed to account for the appellant’s “lack of criminal history, put[] undue weight on the quantity-driven Guideline -15- calculations, and overstate[d] the seriousness of the offense due to the nature of the investigation and due to the attenuated links with an independent drug distribution operation.” R., Vol. VI at 989. This was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.