Opinion ID: 3037622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Miranda Issues.

Text: Thai first submits that the deferential standard of § 2254(d) does not apply to the state court determinations on his Miranda claims because of factual errors made in the Iowa state courts. We respectfully disagree. While the Iowa Court of Appeals on direct appeal made a mistake in recounting the facts introduced at trial by stating that the written Miranda form was ninety-nine percent correct, there is no evidence that the Iowa District Court had a mistaken view of the facts, nor was there any argument in Thai's state postconviction proceedings that a material mistake of fact had been made at trial. Furthermore, the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded that Thai understood the verbal Miranda warning. We agree with the district court that the error made by the Iowa Court of Appeals in recounting the facts was not material and does not affect our application of § 2254(d). Thai also maintains that the state court's finding that he understood the Miranda warning as it was explained to him was not a presumptively correct factual finding under § 2254(d) and (e), but was instead a mixed question of law and fact to be reviewed de novo by our court. The United States District Court rejected his argument, holding that [w]hile the ultimate question of whether a Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary is one of law . . . the underlying question of whether Thai understood the Miranda rights explained to him is one of fact. (D. Ct. Order at 11; R. at 88). We agree with the district court. In the § 2254(d) context, the Supreme Court has provided that a case's basic, primary, or historical facts are the factual issue[s] to which the [§ 2254] statutory presumption of correctness dominantly relates. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110 (1995) (alteration in original) (internal marks and citation omitted). These are facts in the sense that they are a recital of external events and [concern] the credibility of their narrators. Id. At the same time, the Court has recognized that the proper characterization of a question as one of fact or law is sometimes slippery because some factual issues considered to be within the scope of the § 2254(d) presumption of correctness extend[] beyond the determination of 'what happened.' Id. at 110-11. For example, state court -7- determinations of juror impartiality and whether a defendant is competent to stand trial fall into this category. Id. at 111. While these issues encompass more than 'basic, primary, or historical facts,' their resolution depends heavily on the trial court's appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor. Id. We hold that the state court determination at issue here also falls within this factual category. The Iowa District Court's determination that Thai understood the Miranda warning was based on the court's reading of the 1995 interview transcript and the court's evaluation of the witnesses' testimony. See State v. Thai, Cr. No. 93541, at 9-10 (Iowa D. Ct. Jan. 2, 1996) (Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress). As to the merits of his Miranda arguments, Thai argues that the Iowa state courts' conclusion that Thai knowingly and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. In Miranda, the Court held that police officers must inform a suspect of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prior to initiating a custodial interrogation. A suspect may then waive these rights provided that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 475. A waiver is knowing and intelligent where it is made with full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of abandoning the right, and a waiver is voluntary where the court can determine that the waiver was a product of the suspect's free and deliberate choice, and not the product of intimidation, coercion, or deception. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). We review de novo a state court's legal conclusion that a Miranda waiver was valid. Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 420 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1021 (2000); see also Everett v. Barnett, 162 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 1998). Thai's assertion is that he did not make an express waiver of his Miranda rights. Although Thai acknowledges that the Supreme Court has recognized implied waiver of Miranda rights, see North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979), Thai -8- argues that the circumstances of this case do not support a finding of implied waiver because Thai had a limited understanding of English, he was scared during the interview, and Detective O'Donnell lied to Thai about the evidence that the police had against him at the time of the interview. In our view, these factors do not render the state court determination unreasonable. First, the Court has recognized that there are no magic words that automatically satisfy Miranda's constitutional concerns. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2610 (2004). Instead, the appropriate inquiry is whether the warning that Thai received reasonably conveyed his constitutional rights as required by Miranda. Id. Although the written waiver form had language errors, Thai does not dispute the accuracy of the oral Miranda warning. The Supreme Court has never held that an accurate oral warning may not suffice to inform a suspect of his constitutional rights. Instead, the Court has held that waiver is not a question of form, but of substance. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Furthermore, the Iowa District Court held that Thai understood the Miranda warning as it was explained to him, and Thai has not presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the presumed correctness of this factual finding, a finding affirmed on appeal. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Second, after reviewing the interview transcripts, we conclude that Thai has not shown that his waiver was involuntary because he has not demonstrated that he was subjected to deceptive or coercive police tactics. See Colorado v Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1987). Thai has also failed to demonstrate that his waiver was not knowingly and intelligently made because he has not shown that he did not understand that he had a right to remain silent or that his statements could be used against him. See id. As Police Cadet Tran translated the Miranda warning into Vietnamese, Tran asked Thai repeatedly whether Thai understood. Thai verbally indicated that he understood each portion of his Miranda rights. We conclude that the Iowa courts' determination that Thai waived his Miranda rights by thereafter -9- making a statement was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.3