Opinion ID: 173410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jensens' Procedural Due Process Rights

Text: [P]rocedural due process does not prevent the state from depriving an individual of liberty or property. It only requires that a fair procedure be provided for the deprivation. Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1569 (10th Cir.1993). As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must show that he possesses a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property interest before he can allege an unconstitutional deprivation of that interest. Id. To be constitutionally cognizable, the interest must rise to more than an abstract need or desire and must be based on more than a unilateral hope. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, to satisfy the threshold requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate a legitimate claim of entitlement to the asserted interest which may arise either from the Due Process Clause itself or state law. Id. `A state creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.' Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1569 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)) (alteration omitted). State law, however, does not generally create a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest simply by establishing substantive predicates to govern official decision-making; rather, the state must also mandat[e] the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 109 S.Ct. 1904 (quotations and citations omitted). If state law establishes a substantive predicate without mandating an outcome, the law creates nothing more than a right to process which is not a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1570 (The mere expectation of receiving a state afforded process does not itself create an independent liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.). Once a procedural due process plaintiff establishes a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property interest of which she has been deprived by the state, we examine[] whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904. Although the exact procedures required by the Constitution depend on the circumstances of a given case, [t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). The Jensens allege procedural due process claims only against Dr. Wagner and Ms. Cunningham. [4] They base their claim against Dr. Wagner on misrepresentations he allegedly made to the juvenile court and to others involved with the custody dispute. The Jensens appear to argue that these misrepresentations infected the juvenile proceedings to the point that they did not afford the Jensens the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. Although we can conceive of circumstances in which false testimony may infect a judicial proceeding to the point that the proceeding itself becomes constitutionally deficient, Cf. United States v. Vaziri, 164 F.3d 556, 563 (10th Cir.1999) (concluding that a criminal conviction obtained by perjured testimony violates due process under certain circumstances), the Jensens have not demonstrated that any statements by Dr. Wagner had such a degenerative effect on the juvenile court proceedings in this case. Accordingly, the Jensens have not met their burden of showing that Dr. Wagner violated their procedural due process rights. The Jensens base their procedural due process claim against Ms. Cunningham on her failure to independently investigate the medical neglect allegations made by Dr. Wagner before filing the verified petition in the juvenile court. Specifically, the Jensens argue that Utah statutes required Ms. Cunningham to interview the Jensens and obtain an independent medical examination of P.J. before filing the verified petition. Thus, the Jensens claim a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest in an independent investigation by DCFS. As discussed above, however, a right to process under state law is not itself a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause; rather, state law must also mandate a specific outcome upon a finding that certain criteria are met. Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1570. The Jensens do not point to any Utah statutes that mandate a specific outcome upon completion of the required DCFS investigation and a finding that certain criteria are met during that investigation. Accordingly, the Jensens fail to establish any constitutionally cognizable liberty interest and thus fail to meet the threshold requirement for a procedural due process claim against Ms. Cunningham.