Opinion ID: 3174929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merger of Threats With Robbery

Text: Appellant also contends that the threats alleged in this instance were a part of the robbery and were included in that offense. Even after applying the test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), appellant argues that we should conclude that the legislative intent was to include threats as a component of robbery. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment “protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). We review merger issues de novo. Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 532 (D.C. 2012). To determine legislative intent regarding merger, we have stated in Simms v. United States, 634 A.2d 443, 446-47 (D.C. 1993), “The test 7 to be applied in assessing whether convictions merge for double jeopardy purposes turns on the statutory elements of a particular violation rather than the evidence adduced at trial.” (citation omitted); see D.C. Code § 23-112 (2012 Repl.). In Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1991) (en banc) we reaffirmed the application of Blockburger. Id. at 390 (“We do not think the pure fact-based analysis . . . can survive the recent affirmation by the Supreme Court . . . .”). If offenses violate two distinct statutory provisions we consider whether each requires proof of an element that the other does not. Id. at 389. We do not merge the offenses if each offense has an element that the other does not. Norris v. United States, 585 A.2d 1372, 1374 (D.C. 1991). Clearly a greater offense will include a lesser offense. In such a situation, the lesser-included offense contains the same elements as the greater offense, but the greater offense has at least one additional element. With regard to robbery, D.C. Code § 22-2801 provides: Whoever by force or violence, whether against resistance or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in fear, shall take from the person or immediate actual possession of another anything of value. . . . 8 D.C. Code § 22-407 provides that threats to do bodily harm is a misdemeanor offense. We have defined the offense as follows: (1) The defendant uttered words to another person; (2) . . . of such a nature as to convey fear of bodily harm or injury to the ordinary hearer; and (3) . . . defendant intended to utter the words . . . . Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762, 764 (D.C. 2006). Thus as we concluded in Joiner-Die, robbery requires offensive conduct to obtain something of value from a person, whereas threats requires a menacing communication or utterance to a person. Thus there is no merger of offenses. See Joiner-Die, 899 A.2d at 767. Moreover, in Kaliku v. United States, 944 A.2d 765 (D.C. 2010) we declined to merge threats with kidnapping because the “coincidental[] overlap” of one offense during the commission of another offense “cannot be imputed as an inherent element of the crime,” id. at 788. Robbery essentially requires that the government prove larceny and assault. Williams v. United States, 113 A.3d 554, 560 (D.C. 2015). Thus, it is not possible to commit robbery without also 9 committing assault, and assault accordingly merges as a lesser-included offense. See Norris, supra, 585 A.2d at 1374. However, it is possible to commit a robbery without committing verbal threats—that is, through the use of violence or conduct that puts one in fear. Appellant’s rub, however, is not that the offenses should merge under Blockburger, as he concedes they do not, but that the offenses should merge because of the presumption that the legislature acts rationally and logically in crafting its statutes to prevent “absurd results.” See Haney v. United States, 473 A.2d 393, 394 (D.C. 1984) (citation omitted). “The courts are to construe statutes in a manner which assumes that [the legislature] has acted logically and rationally.” Id. at 395 (citation omitted). This presumption functions as a safety valve to the issue of merger. See Thomas v. United States, 602 A.2d 647, 650 (D.C. 1992) (declining to merge when it would “produce absurd results”). Thus, appellant argues the “absurd result” is punishing someone who uses threats to effectuate a robbery more severely than someone who commits an assault to effectuate a robbery. This argument misses the mark because it fails to appreciate that someone who commits a robbery necessarily commits an assault, and the additional punishment here is because he not only committed an assault but also committed threats. 10 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s suppression ruling and deny merging threats with robbery. So ordered.