Opinion ID: 1629240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Open-and-Obvious Defense

Text: A condition is open and obvious when it is known to the [plaintiff] or should have been observed by the [plaintiff] in the exercise of reasonable care. Quillen v. Quillen, 388 So.2d 985, 989 (Ala. 1980). The entire basis of [a store owner's] liability rests upon [its] superior knowledge of the danger which causes the [customer's] injuries. Therefore, if that superior knowledge is lacking, as when the danger is obvious, the [store owner] cannot be held liable. Id. (citation omitted). In this connection, Mercantile argues: To prevail, ... the Plaintiffs must also establish that Mrs. Denmark was ignorant or should have been ignorant of the condition she alleges to have been dangerous. Mercantile's Brief, at 22. However, Mercantile's argument that the condition that caused Mrs. Denmark's fall was open and obvious is an affirmative defense, on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Ex parte Neese, 819 So.2d 584 (Ala.2001); Furgerson v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 438 So.2d 732, 734 (Ala.1983); see also Hale v. Sequoyah Caverns & Campgrounds, Inc., 612 So.2d 1162, 1165 (Ala. 1992) (the traditional common-law `open and obvious danger' defense ... completely bars recovery if the danger is known by, or is obvious to, the plaintiff) (Hornsby, C.J., concurring in the result); Vick v. H.S.I. Mgmt., Inc., 507 So.2d 433, 435 (Ala.1987) (`[T]he evidence, including evidence bearing on the defense of open and obvious danger, viewed in light of the applicable substantive law, presents genuine issues of fact.'); Coggin v. Starke Bros. Realty Co., 391 So.2d 111, 113 (Ala. 1980); Ford v. Bynum Livestock & Comm'n Co., 674 So.2d 600, 603 (Ala.Civ. App.1995) (dispositive issue [is] whether the evidence conclusively showed that [the plaintiff] knew of, and appreciated, a dangerous condition so as to give rise to the `open and obvious danger' defense). Only `[w]hen there is no genuine issue of material fact as to any element of an affirmative defense, ... and it is shown that the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' is a summary judgment proper. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Smitherman, 743 So.2d 442, 445 (Ala.1999) (quoting Bechtel v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 495 So.2d 1052, 1053 (Ala.1986)). `If there is a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of the affirmative defense, summary judgment is inappropriate.' Id. Moreover, `[t]he manner in which the movant's burden of production is met depends upon which party has the burden of proof ... at trial.' Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 909 (Ala.1999) (quoting Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686, 691 (Ala.1989) (Houston, J., concurring specially)). If, as is the case when the movant is the defendant asserting an affirmative defense, `the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant must support his motion with credible evidence, using any of the material specified in Rule 56(c), [Ala.] R. Civ. P. (pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits).' 769 So.2d at 909. `The movant's proof must be such that he would be entitled to a directed verdict if this evidence was not controverted at trial.' Id. In other words, when the movant has the burden [of proof at trial], its own submissions in support of the motion must entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Albee Tomato, Inc. v. A.B. Shalom Produce Corp., 155 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir.1998) (emphasis added). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.2002); Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir.1999); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.1986); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.1986). Whether a condition is open and obvious is generally a question for the jury. Howard v. Andy's Store for Men, 757 So.2d 1208, 1211 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000). Thus, Mercantile states the respective burdens backwards. More properly stated, Mercantile must establish that Mrs. Denmark was [ not ] ignorant or should [not] have been ignorant of the condition she alleges to have been dangerous. Mercantile's Brief, at 22. This it did not do. The mere testimony of the Denmarks' children that Mrs. Denmark could have seen the roll of bags under certain circumstances does not satisfy Mercantile's burden of proof on its affirmative defense. This is especially true in light of evidence indicating that Mercantile had superior knowledge of the location of the roll of bags. Indeed, the record contains the deposition testimony of Brian Hastings, Mercantile's loss-prevention specialist, who stated that the roll on which Mrs. Denmark allegedly tripped would [n]ormally ... be on a pole, designed to hold the rolls beside the checkout stand, and that the stock boys or receiving crews were mostly responsible for placing the roll on the spool. By contrast, there was no evidence indicating that Mrs. Denmark knew the roll existed or that she expected it to be in the area in which she was shopping.