Opinion ID: 2177335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sandra Ann Craig Case

Text: On 16 October 1986, a Howard County grand jury returned an indictment charging Sandra Ann Craig with child abuse, first and second degree sexual offense, perverted practice, assault, and battery. A jury in the Circuit Court for Howard County convicted her on all counts, and she was sentenced to terms of imprisonment totalling 10 years. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments on direct appeal. Craig v. State, 76 Md. App. 250, 544 A.2d 784. We reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on grant of her petition for a writ of certiorari. Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 560 A.2d 1120 ( Craig I ). The Supreme Court of the United States vacated our judgment on grant of the State's petition for certiorari, and remanded the case to us for consideration in the light of its opinion. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157. In compliance with the direction of the Supreme Court, we ordered the case to be re-briefed and re-argued, and it is now again before us.
Craig owned and operated a kindergarten and prekindergarten center. The center was the site of the offenses of which she was convicted, and the alleged victim was a child six years of age who was entrusted to her care at the center. When the case was about to go to trial, the State sought to invoke § 9-102. The section's protection was desired not only with respect to the victim named in the indictment, seven years old at the time of the trial, but also as to other children who had, according to the State, been abused by Craig. Despite Craig's confrontation-based objections, the named victim and three other children testified via one-way closed circuit television. The young witnesses, of course, could not see Craig while so testifying.
In Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157, the Supreme Court reviewed our opinion in Craig I. It looked at § 9-102 in the light of federal constitutional dictates: This case requires us to decide whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment categorically prohibits a child witness in a child abuse case from testifying against a defendant at trial, outside the defendant's physical presence, by one-way closed circuit television. Id. at 3160. The Supreme Court summarized our holdings: The Maryland Court of Appeals held, as we do today, that although face-to-face confrontation is not an absolute constitutional requirement, it may be abridged only where there is a `case-specific finding of necessity.' 316 Md., at 564, 560 A.2d, at 1126 (quoting Coy, supra, 487 U.S., at 1025, 108 S.Ct., at 2805 (concurring opinion)). Given this latter requirement, the Court of Appeals reasoned that [t]he question of whether a child is unavailable to testify ... should not be asked in terms of inability to testify in the ordinary courtroom setting, but in the much narrower terms of the witness's inability to testify in the presence of the accused. 316 Md., at 564, 560 A.2d, at 1126 (footnote omitted). [T]he determinative inquiry required to preclude face-to-face confrontation is the effect of the presence of the defendant on the witness or the witness's testimony. Id., at 565, 560 A.2d, at 1127. The Court of Appeals accordingly concluded that, as a prerequisite to use of the § 9-102 procedure, the Confrontation Clause requires the trial court to make a specific finding that testimony by the child in the courtroom in the presence of the defendant would result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child could not reasonably communicate. Id., at 566, 560 A.2d, at 1127. This conclusion, of course, is consistent with our holding today. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3170 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court went on to say: In addition, however, the Court of Appeals interpreted our decision in Coy to impose two subsidiary requirements. First, the [C]ourt [of Appeals] held that § 9-102 ordinarily cannot be invoked unless the child witness initially is questioned (either in or outside the courtroom) in the defendant's presence. [316 Md.] at 566, 560 A.2d, at 1127; see also Wildermuth, 310 Md., at 523-524, 530 A.2d, at 289 (personal observation by the judge should be the rule rather than the exception). Second, the court asserted that, before using the one-way television procedure, a trial judge must determine whether a child would suffer severe emotional distress if he or she were to testify by two -way closed circuit television. 316 Md., at 567, 560 A.2d, at 1128. 110 S.Ct. at 3170 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court observed: Reviewing the evidence presented to the trial court in support of the finding required under § 9-102(a)(1)(ii), the Court of Appeals determined that the finding of necessity required to limit the defendant's right of confrontation through invocation of § 9-102 ... was not made here. [316 Md.] at 570-571, 560 A.2d, at 1129. The Court of Appeals noted that the trial judge had the benefit only of expert testimony on the ability of the children to communicate; he did not question any of the children himself, nor did he observe any child's behavior on the witness stand before making his ruling. He did not explore any alternatives to the use of one-way closed circuit television. Id., at 568, 560 A.2d, at 1128 (footnote omitted). The Court of Appeals also observed that the testimony in this case was not sharply focused on the effect of the defendant's presence on the child witnesses. Id., at 569, 560 A.2d, at 1129. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded: Unable to supplement the expert testimony by responses to questions put by him, or by his own observations of the children's behavior in Craig's presence, the judge made his § 9-102 finding in terms of what the experts had said. He ruled that `the testimony of each of these children in a courtroom will [result] in each child suffering serious emotional distress ... such that each of these children cannot reasonably communicate.' He failed to find  indeed, on the evidence before him, could not have found  that this result would be the product of testimony in a courtroom in the defendant's presence or outside the courtroom but in the defendant's televised presence. That, however, is the finding of necessity required to limit the defendant's right of confrontation through invocation of § 9-102. Since that finding was not made here, and since the procedures we deem requisite to the valid use of § 9-102 were not followed, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. Id., at 570-571, 560 A.2d, at 1129 (emphasis added). Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3070-3071. The Supreme Court stated: The Court of Appeals appears to have rested its conclusion at least in part on the trial court's failure to observe the children's behavior in the defendant's presence and its failure to explore less restrictive alternatives to the use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure. See [316 Md.] at 568-571, 560 A.2d, at 1128-1129. Although we think such evidentiary requirements could strengthen the grounds for use of protective measures, we decline to establish, as a matter of federal constitutional law, any such categorical evidentiary prerequisites for the use of the one-way television procedure. 110 S.Ct. at 3171. The Court commented: The trial court in this case, for example, could well have found, on the basis of the expert testimony before it, that testimony by the child witnesses in the courtroom in the defendant's presence will result in [each] child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate, § 9-102(a)(1)(ii). See [316 Md.] at 568-569, 560 A.2d, at 1128-1129; see also App. 22-25, 39, 41, 43, 44-45, 54-57. So long as a trial court makes such a case-specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a State from using a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child witness in a child abuse case. 110 S.Ct. at 3171. But, the Court opined: Because the Court of Appeals held that the trial court had not made the requisite finding of necessity under its interpretation of the high threshold required by [ Coy ] before § 9-102 may be invoked, 316 Md., at 554-555, 560 A.2d, at 1121 (footnote omitted), we cannot be certain whether the Court of Appeals would reach the same conclusion in light of the legal standard we establish today. 110 S.Ct. at 3171. This led to the vacating of our judgment and the remand. As ordered by the Supreme Court, we have now assessed our opinion in Craig I in light of its Maryland v. Craig.