Opinion ID: 1667146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The application of Ring v. Arizona

Text: ś 43. Thorson argues that the recent cases of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), require that his sentence be vacated. This issue is raised for the first time on appeal by Thorson and is thus, procedurally barred. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this issue is without merit. ś 44. Thorson argues that Ring prohibits the duplicative use of the kidnapping aggravator as the sole selection factor at the penalty phase when the jury had previously found that Thorson committed the crime at the culpability phase. Thorson also argues that Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) is unconstitutional in that it permits the jury to apply the death penalty where murder was committed during the course of certain felonies, but does not authorize the death penalty in cases of simple murder. Finally, Thorson contends his indictment was improper as it failed to enumerate the aggravating factors. This Court has previously discussed all of these issues as they relate to the recent cases of Ring and Apprendi. As we have continuously held that these case have no application to Mississippi's capital murder sentencing scheme, we find these issues to be without merit. See Berry v. State, 882 So.2d 157, 170-73 (Miss.2004) (We have previously discussed these cases at length and concluded that they address issues wholly distinct from our law, and do not address indictments at all.) ś 45. In Berry v. State, 882 So.2d 157 (Miss.2004), we held that: Mississippi's capital scheme is distinct from Arizona's in the single, most relevant respect under the Ring holding: that it is the jury which determines the presence of aggravating circumstances necessary for the imposition of the death sentence. See Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (2000). Likewise, the Ring court considered Mississippi's scheme to be part of a majority of states who have responded to its Eighth Amendment decisions and require that juries make the final determination as to the presences of aggravating circumstances. Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Berry, 882 So.2d at 173. In Stevens v. State, 867 So.2d 219 (Miss.2003), the defendant argued that his death sentences should be vacated because the aggravating circumstances which charged capital murder were not included in his indictment. This Court held that: The State is correct in its assertion that a defendant is not entitled to formal notice of the aggravating circumstances to be employed by the prosecution and that an indictment for capital murder puts a defendant on sufficient notice that the statutory aggravating factors will be used against him. Smith v. State, 729 So.2d 1191, 1224 (Miss.1998) (relying on Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss.1984)). We believe that the fact that our capital murder statute lists and defines to some degree the possible aggravating circumstances surely refutes the appellant's contention that he had inadequate notice. Anytime an individual is charged with murder, he is put on notice that the death penalty may result. And, our death penalty statute clearly states the only aggravating circumstances which may be relied upon by the prosecution in seeking the ultimate punishment. Id. at 804-05. This issue is without merit. Stevens v. State, 867 So.2d at 227. See also Puckett v. State, 879 So.2d 920 (Miss.2004); Holland v. State, 878 So.2d 1, 9 (Miss.2004). ś 46. In Wilcher v. State, 697 So.2d 1087, 1108 (Miss.1997), this Court held: Wilcher also argues that the use of the underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment in that it does not genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Wilcher did not raise this issue at trial, and therefore, is procedurally barred from doing so on appeal. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 612, (Miss.1995) (citing Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1270; Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 369 (Miss.1987)). Furthermore, even if the issue were not procedurally barred, this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument raised by Wilcher: The use of the underlying felony ... as an aggravator during sentencing has been consistently upheld in capital cases. This Court has stated: The argument is the familiar stacking argument that the state can elevate murder to felony murder and then, using the same circumstances can elevate the crime to capital murder with two aggravating circumstances. As pointed out in Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1337 (Miss.1987), this Court has consistently rejected this argument. Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d at 96-97. The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that this practice does not render a death sentence unconstitutional. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). See also, Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 763 (Miss.1991). Walker, 671 So.2d at 612.       Wilcher's final argument on this point is that the felony murder aggravator is disproportionate within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Wilcher argues that unintentional felony murder is punishable by death, while premeditated murder, standing alone, is not. Our precedents make clear that a State's capital sentencing scheme must ... genuinely narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so. If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1216 (Miss.1996) (quoting Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1542, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993)) (emphasis in original). Not every defendant eligible for the death penalty will have committed murder while in the course of robbery or kidnapping or the other statutorily enumerated felonies. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19. Therefore, the felony murder aggravator genuinely narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Furthermore, [t]he legislature has a very great latitude in prescribing and fixing punishment for crime. Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 567 (Miss.1982), overruled on other grounds, Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss.1991). Moreover, the aggravating factor for murder committed during the course of a robbery is constitutional. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). See also Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888, 897 (Miss.1992) [This Court has previously determined that Mississippi's capital sentencing scheme, as a whole, is constitutional.]. For these reasons, Wilcher's argument fails. Wilcher, 697 So.2d at 1108-09. Therefore, this issue is without merit.