Opinion ID: 3201249
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: classified in Schedule III, IV, or V and

Text: which is not a narcotic drug, except subdivision (g) of Section 11056, (2) specified in subdivision (d) of Section 11054, except paragraphs (13), (14), (15), (20), (21), (22), and (23) of subdivision (d), (3) specified in paragraph (11) of subdivision (c) of Section 11056, (4) specified in paragraph (2) or (3) of subdivision (f) of Section 11054, or (5) specified in subdivision (d), (e), or (f), except paragraph (3) of subdivision (e) and subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (f), of Section 11055, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison. Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11378 (2010). We have previously held that § 11378 is a divisible statute. See Padilla-Martinez v. Holder, 770 F.3d 825, 831 n.3 (9th Cir. 2014). We reasoned that § 11378 lists five alternative categories of controlled substances in the disjunctive and that under California law the type of controlled substance is a separate element of a drug offense. See id. As we recognized in Coronado, the text of the statute is not particularly helpful to our analysis because it defines offenses through reference to other statutes. See 759 F.3d at 983. We noted that the text of California Health & Safety UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 9 Code § 11377 is virtually identical to the language of the Federal Controlled Substances Act. See id. & Appendix 1. Similarly, the language of § 11377 is virtually identical to the language of § 11378. Compare Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11377 with Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11378. In Coronado, we concluded that § 11377 is divisible because it “effectively creates several different crimes . . .” 759 F.3d at 985 (citations omitted); see also Ruiz-Vidal v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2015) (assuming the divisibility of California Health & Safety Code § 11379). No principled basis exists for distinguishing this case from our holdings in Coronado and Padilla-Martinez and our reasoning in RuizVidal. Nevertheless, Vega-Ortiz rests his challenge to the divisibility of § 11378 primarily on the existence of a federal regulation he describes as excluding a particular product containing L-meth from the definition of methamphetamine salts, isomers and salts of its isomers. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.12(d)(2); 1308.22. According to Vega-Ortiz, this discrepancy precludes application of the modified categorical approach to § 11378. We disagree. The conclusion that § 11378 is divisible is consistent with our analysis in Rendon, where we explained that “the Supreme Court regards elements as those circumstances on which the jury must unanimously agree . . .” 764 F.3d at 1086 (emphasis in the original). In keeping with this analysis, § 11378 has been interpreted to require a jury to specify the substance a defendant possessed. See e.g., 2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law § 102 (4th ed. 2012) (“The possession offenses all involve the following elements: (a) A specified controlled substance in a sufficient quantity and in a usable form . . . ”); see also California Criminal Jury Instruction 2302 (“The defendant is charged in [Count __] with possession for sale 10 UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ of ____ . . .). The California courts adhere to this instruction. See e.g., People v. Montero, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1170, 1175–77 (2007). Therefore, it is well-settled that California treats the identity of a controlled substance as an element that must be found by the jury, further supporting the conclusion that § 11378 is divisible. See Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1088–89. Vega-Ortiz nevertheless maintains that the federal regulation excluding a particular product containing L-meth from the schedule of federal controlled substances renders California’s definition of methamphetamine broader than the definition of controlled substances in the Controlled Substances Act. However, in addressing a similar argument regarding an exemption for “administering” controlled substances that existed under federal law but not Washington state law, we focused on whether the defendant showed a “realistic probability” that a person would be prosecuted for the offense that assertedly rendered the state statute overbroad. United States v. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d 1054–55 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (“[T]o find that a state statute creates a crime outside the generic definition of a listed crime in a federal statute requires . . . a realistic probability . . . that the state would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. . . .”). Applying this analysis to the facts here, to succeed on his claim Vega-Ortiz would need to show a “realistic probability” that he would be prosecuted under § 11378 for possession of the excluded product containing L- meth. Burgos-Ortega, 777 F.3d at 1054. He has failed to do so. As in Burgos-Ortega, § 11378 is not “overbroad on its face” and “does not expressly include conduct not covered by the generic offense, but rather is silent as to the existence of UNITED STATES V. VEGA-ORTIZ 11 a parallel [L-meth] exception.” 777 F.3d at 1055. Thus, Vega-Ortiz’s overbreadth arguments are unavailing, and we conclude that the district court properly applied the modified categorical approach to § 11378.