Opinion ID: 1143317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Protective Role of the Grand Jury

Text: Under the ancient English system.... the most valuable function of the grand jury was not only to examine into the commission of crimes, but to stand between the prosecutor and the accused, and to determine whether the charge was founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal ill will. ( Hale v. Henkel (1906) 201 U.S. 43, 59 [50 L.Ed. 652, 659, 26 S.Ct. 370], quoted in Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 485 [95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123, 71 S.Ct. 814].) (2) The Fifth Amendment guarantee that a civilian may not be held to answer in a federal prosecution for a capital or otherwise infamous crime `unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury' presupposes a grand jury `acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge,' whose mission is to clear the innocent, no less than to bring to trial those who may be guilty. ( United States v. Dionisio (1973) 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 [35 L.Ed.2d 67, 81, 93 S.Ct. 764]; citation omitted.) The grand jury's historic role as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor ( United States v. Dionisio, supra, at p. 17 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 81]) is as well-established in California as it is in the federal system. If [exculpatory] evidence exists, and [the grand jury] have reason to believe that it is within their reach, they may request it to be produced, and for that purpose may order the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses ([former] § 920, Pen. Code), to the end that the citizen may be protected from the trouble, expense, and disgrace of being arraigned and tried in public on a criminal charge for which there is no sufficient cause. A grand jury should never forget that it sits as the great inquest between the State and the citizen, to make accusations only upon sufficient evidence of guilt, and to protect the citizen against unfounded accusation, whether from the government, from partisan passion, or private malice. ( In re Tyler (1884) 64 Cal. 434, 437 [1 P. 884].) The protective role traditionally played by the grand jury is reinforced in California by statute. The forerunner of section 939.7 was former section 920 of the Penal Code, the section cited in In re Tyler, supra . Section 920 provided: The grand jury is not bound to hear evidence for the defendant; but it is their duty to weigh all the evidence submitted to them, and when they have reason to believe that other evidence within their reach will explain away the charge, they should order such evidence to be produced, and for that purpose may require the district attorney to issue process for the witnesses. (Enacted by Stats. 1871-1872, ch. 288, § 1, p. 391; repealed by Stats. 1959, ch. 501, § 1, p. 2443.) Section 920, in turn, was a word-for-word reenactment of a statute passed by the first session of our Legislature. (Stats. 1850, ch. 119, § 232, p. 292.) The People contend the proper construction of section 939.7 is that the impetus for the presentation of exculpatory evidence must originate in the grand jury, not the district attorney. However, unless so informed by the district attorney, the grand jury ordinarily has no reason to believe that other evidence within its reach will explain away the charge. The defendant is not entitled to appear before the grand jury in person ( People v. Foster (1926) 198 Cal. 112, 120 [243 P. 667]) or by counsel ( People v. Dale (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 370, 376 [179 P.2d 870]). The defendant's right to bring exculpatory evidence to the attention of the grand jury by letter ( In re Tyler, supra, 64 Cal. at p. 437) is illusory unless he knows his case will be under consideration by them. Because the proceedings of the grand jury are held in secret without notice to the defendant, the construction of section 939.7 urged by the People would nullify its protective role. (See Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, p. 167.)