Opinion ID: 31937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficient Evidence to Support Washington's Conviction

Text: 49 [T]he standard of review for sufficiency of evidence is whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 362 (5th Cir.1998)(citing United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir.1996)). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, [the court] consider[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in support of the verdict. Id. (citations omitted).
50 For a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), the government must prove that: (1) the defendant previously had been convicted of a felony; (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm traveled in or affected interstate commerce. See United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). 51 Here Washington challenges the third prong. Washington concedes that the firearms at issue were manufactured outside of Texas and, therefore, traveled interstate prior to him possessing them in Texas. He argues, however, that proof that the firearm previously crossed state lines is insufficient to meet the interstate commerce element of § 922(g)(1). In support of his position, Washington cites two Supreme Court cases: United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). 52 In United States v. Daugherty, this circuit upheld a conviction of a felon in possession of a firearm after the government proved that the firearm at issue was manufactured in Egypt and imported through Tennessee before reaching Texas. 264 F.3d 513, 514 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1150, 122 S.Ct. 1113, 151 L.Ed.2d 1007 (2002). The defendant argued that the government failed to prove that he possessed a firearm `in and affecting' interstate commerce — essentially the same argument that Washington makes here. Id. at 518. The Daugherty court stated that we repeatedly have said that evidence similar to that presented in Daugherty's case suffices to maintain a § 922(g)(1) conviction. Id. (citing United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming a § 922(g)(1) conviction where the weapon was manufactured in Belgium and possessed in Texas); United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240 (5th Cir.1996) (affirming a § 922(g)(1) conviction where the weapon was manufactured in Massachusetts and possessed in Texas)). Thus, his constitutional challenge to § 922(g) fails, because `the constitutionality of § 922(g) is not open to question.' Id. (quoting United States v. DeLeon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir.1999)). 53 Daugherty asked the court to reconsider the interstate commerce prong of § 922(g)(1) under two Supreme Court cases, Morrison and Jones — the same two cases Washington asks this court to consider. In Daugherty, we stated [b]oth [ Morrison and Jones ], however, are distinguishable from the present case, because a plain jurisdictional element exists in § 922(g), and there is stipulated evidence showing that the gun traveled in interstate commerce. Neither Jones nor Morrison affects or undermines the constitutionality of § 922(g). 264 F.3d at 518. 54 This court has already considered and denied Washington's attacks of the interstate commerce prong of § 922(g) in the Daugherty opinion. We agree that the evidence the government presented was sufficient to support Washington's conviction.