Opinion ID: 1382882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The expert testimony was properly admissible upon application of the correct principle of law because it could have been of appreciable help, assistance or aid to the jury.

Text: This brings us to the fourth and final issue presented for decision in this case  one requiring a consideration of the facts of the case, as well as the nature of the proposed testimony by the expert witness. In considering the facts of this case it is important to bear in mind that this case involves a metal strip or carpet bar between the carpeting and the linoleum in a public place and extending one-half inch higher than the linoleum. In addition, it is important to bear in mind the concealed location of that protruding carpet bar. Thus, the carpeting extended to and slightly under the edge of the table at which plaintiff was seated, with a chair over the edge of the carpeting. The remaining space on the floor under the table was covered by linoleum, with the one-half inch carpet bar between the linoleum and the carpeting. Thus, when plaintiff, after being seated at the table and on that chair, attempted to push back her chair and rise, she caught her heel on the carpet bar and fell, according to her testimony. In considering the admissibility of the expert testimony under these facts it is also important to bear in mind defendant's explanation and defense, which was, among other things, to deny that this was improper construction or design and to contend that it is a common practice, familiar to everyone, to use such metal carpet bars at the edges of carpeting in public places; that plaintiff was familiar with that practice and that there was nothing improper in the construction or design of the bowling alley by the location of the carpet bar under the edge of the table at which plaintiff was seated. It was in this context that plaintiff offered the following testimony by an architect who was an admittedly qualified expert witness: Q Now, taking into consideration the type of construction here, the vinyl and the rug and the metal strip with these chairs over there, in your opinion is this a safe practice, to put that chair over that area? A No, it is not, because when you have an activity such as sitting at a table where chairs are moved and slid around, you wouldn't have a metal edge like this in your own home around a diningroom and certainly not in a public building where you have people unfamiliar with the premises coming and moving chairs around this metal edge; when they walk up to it, they go and sit down and may be aware of the difference in color, texture of the floor coverings and be aware there is a carpet there but they would certainly not recall this at the time they sat in this fifth chair at the end of the table and had been sitting at the table for a period of time; when they would rise to go from there they would not necessarily recall that there was an unevenness in the floor and turn and be careful. The act of rising from a chair in this case, the metal edge is about where a person would place their foot when they rose from the chair; that the act of rising and turning, especially on one foot, you could very conceivably be off-balance if that foot were on that metal edge.       Q Assume that the D & D Bowl had intended to use five chairs at these tables in this area and that it was designing the area for that purpose, would it have been good construction practice or a proper construction practice to have constructed the floor as shown here in these exhibits and as the floor is actually constructed at the present time?       A Definitely not          Q Are there any principles in construction practices in this area, Mr. Johnson, which do not permit or frown upon the use of uneven flooring in areas where people are sitting?       A In public areas, a person is charged with  an architect is charged with the responsibility of designing in such a manner that you do have level surfaces and avoid these hazardous conditions such as this. We do have code requirements on stairways, for example, where you have a 3/16ths of an inch variation maximum on risers which is a pretty strong requirement.   . [4] (Emphasis added) The majority quotes four full pages of the offer of proof (including this testimony) and then, without reference to or analysis of any specific testimony, would summarily dismiss the entire offer of proof by the statement that it offers nothing to aid or help the jury to conclude the ultimate question framed by the pleadings: Was this faulty construction, therefore, constituting negligence? In Naney v. Lane, 247 Or. 367, 428 P.2d 722 (1967), plaintiff's decedent fell down a flight of stairs. On the edge of one of the top steps was a raised aluminum strip, claimed to be the cause of the fall. The majority opinion concedes that under the facts of that case it was proper for the trial judge to permit an architect to testify that in his opinion such a condition could catch something, on the shoes of anyone going down the steps and was not a safe design. In numerous cases in other states involving safety of design and construction expert witnesses have been permitted to testify that such design or construction was, or was not safe, in the opinion of such experts. [5] None of these cases or other authorities on this question was referred to or given any consideration by the majority opinion. Indeed, the question presented by this case is similar to the question presented in Morgan v. Washington Trust Co., R.I., 249 A.2d 48, 51 (1969), in which the doors at the entrance of a bank were designed to swing outward and over a vestibule or platform and plaintiff, on entering the bank, fell when she pulled on one of these doors. In holding that the testimony of an architect was admissible in that case the court said (at p. 51): From the pictures which are in evidence, the entranceway to defendant's bank appears to the untutored eye to be perfectly safe. It is only when a trained individual such as plaintiff's architect compares the outward swing of the new doors with the depth of the platform, and when he explains the difficulty encountered by a person of short stature in reaching up and pulling open the door that the hazards that may surround entry into the bank become apparent.   . Thus, the admission of expert testimony in Naney v. Lane, supra , that the raised metal strip on the edge of the edge of the steps of a stairway was not a safe design and explaining the reasons why it was an unsafe design was consistent with the holdings of other courts in numerous similar cases. [6] Accordingly, it is my opinion that upon application to the facts of this case of the same correct principle of law for application in cases involving the issue of safety of design or construction, it follows that the testimony of the architect that the construction of the bowling alley involved in this case did not conform to safe or proper practice or to good architectural practices in the community and his explanation of why it was an unsafe and hazardous design should have been admitted in this case. It may be that a jury of ordinary persons could understand, without expert testimony, that the joining of a carpeted area to a linoleum area with a carpet bar one-half inch high would, or would not, be dangerous. It is my opinion, however, that the testimony of a qualified architect that such a manner of design or construction would or would not be considered by architects to be a safe or proper construction practice or one in accordance with good architectural practice in that community, together with his explanation of why it was or was not unsafe and hazardous, for reasons which might not occur to the ordinary person, would be of appreciable help to a jury in fully understanding the problem and in reaching a proper decision on that issue. [7] This result is also consistent with cases involving issues of care, reasonableness and safety, in which it has been held by this court that practices by other employers or operators, even though not so universal as to constitute an industry-wide practice or custom and even though limited in number, are nevertheless admissible as a matter of evidence assisting the jury to judge what is ordinarily safe by showing how other operators have dealt with similar problems. Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & Western Lumber Co., 149 Or. 126, 179, 40 P.2d 703 (1935). This is also consistent with the views of this court as stated in the more recent decision of this court in Rich v. Cooper, 234 Or. 300, at pp. 311-312, 380 P.2d 613, at p. 618 (1963), in which we said: It is stated generally that the admissibility of demonstrative evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. However, this does not mean that the trial court may arbitrarily exclude such evidence. If the evidence is material and relevant, it must be received unless there is some reason for excluding it.   . (Emphasis added) Thus, with all due respect to the views expressed by the majority, it is my opinion that if the trial judge had applied the correct principle of law in this case (which he clearly did not do), the testimony of the architect was admissible in this case. In concluding this opinion on this issue, however, the majority states: There are situations, such as Sandow, where a jury clearly is not equally well qualified and needs help to find the truth. There are also situations where a jury clearly is equally qualified without help from opinion testimony such as offered here. It is the area between the clearly qualified and the clearly unqualified where the trial judge should be granted a certain latitude of decision in excluding or receiving expert opinion testimony. We feel that the facts of this case present just such a situation, and the trial judge ruled correctly in excluding the expert's testimony. (Emphasis added) Assuming that the majority may be correct in the statement that in this area the trial judge should be allowed a certain latitude of decision, it still does follow that the trial judge ruled correctly in excluding the expert's testimony. This is because, as stated by the majority, the trial judge must apply the correct principle of law in deciding whether to admit or exclude such testimony. As previously demonstrated, the trial judge in this case did not exclude the testimony of this expert because he did not think that such testimony could not help, assist or aid the jury in understanding the extent of the hazards or in reaching a correct result upon the ultimate question whether there was faulty construction or design. Indeed, we do not know what the ruling of the trial judge would have been had he considered the offered testimony of this qualified architect by the application of that test  which the majority concedes to be the correct rule of law which a trial judge must apply in such a case. Instead, the majority holds that this court may decide for itself that it was proper to exclude the testimony of this qualified architect that the placing of the one-half inch carpet bar under the edge of a table, with a chair over it, was not proper or safe design or in accord with good architectural practice in the community, as well as his testimony explaining why this concealed carpet bar was unsafe and hazardous. Moreover, the majority does so upon the apparent ground that this court may properly hold and, as a matter of law, that such testimony could not help, assist or aid the jury in understanding the problem and reaching a correct decision whether the design or construction was unsafe. Not only is this decision by the majority contrary to previous and recent decisions by this court and other courts (as cited above), but it would have this court usurp what the majority says is the latitude to be granted to and exercised by the trial judge in this case. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the judgment in this case should be reversed and that this case should be remanded for a new trial, either with instructions to admit the offered testimony of the architect or with instructions that the trial judge must reconsider the admissibility of that testimony by proper application of what the majority holds to be the correct principle of law which the majority says must be applied by the trial judge in this case. The admission of expert testimony on matters involving safety of design or construction is not exclusively for the benefit of plaintiffs. Expert testimony that design or construction is safe or in accordance with good architectural practice, when offered by defendants, is subject to the same rule. It may be that the holding by the majority that the trial judge must be affirmed in this case for excluding almost the same identical expert testimony relating to the safety of construction or design of a raised metal strip that the trial judge in Naney v. Lane, supra , was affirmed for admitting may serve to bolster the prerogatives of trial judges. In my opinion, however, the more important consideration is that it is not in the best interests of either lawyers or litigants  or in the interests of the public in good judicial administration  to establish a precedent under which one judge will be affirmed for rejecting the same evidence that another judge was affirmed for admitting (in Naney v. Lane, supra ). Such a result is also directly contrary to the proper meaning of judicial discretion, expressly recognized by the majority and as previously defined by this court in State v. Lewis, supra . For all of these reasons, I most respectfully dissent from both the views expressed by the majority opinion and the result reached by the majority in this case. O'CONNELL, C.J., and HOLMAN, J., join in this dissent.