Opinion ID: 854149
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sources of construction for Indiana constitutional claims

Text: Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides that [n]o person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself. [6] Neither party cites any directly controlling precedents, and Ajabu conceded in his motion to suppress that there appear to be none. [7] In the absence of relevant Indiana cases, a variety of sources may be taken into consideration. There are analogous precedents under the federal constitution and those of a few other states. We also have an extensive history of decisions of this Court on various self-incrimination issues under the Indiana and United States Constitutions. In construing the Indiana Constitution, we recently noted that it is appropriate to look to the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). This case involves a federal constitutional analog that applies in state proceedings by virtue of Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. In that circumstance, we have found Indiana case law construing the Indiana provision prior to the date of incorporation to be most helpful in determining whether the Indiana Constitution demands more than its federal counterpart. Moran v. State , [8] 644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.1994); see also Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 533-34 (Ind.1996) (reviewing pre-incorporation case law in assessing whether standing is required to challenge constitutionality of search or seizure under Section 11 of the Indiana Bill of Rights), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 858, 139 L.Ed.2d 757 (1998). More generally, [e]arly decisions of this Court interpreting our Constitution ... have been accorded strong and superseding precedential value. Prior cases construing and applying [the Indiana provision] independently from federal [doctrine] are important sources for our consideration. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 77 (Ind.1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As elaborated below, both the federal and Indiana self-incrimination provisions look to a common interwoven history. Common roots and a history of coextensive construction may support the conclusion that the Indiana and federal constitutions protect the same bundle of rights and the same constitutional values. However, past reliance on federal case law in construing an Indiana constitutional provision does not preclude formulation of an independent standard for analyzing state constitutional claims. Id. at 75. Even where an Indiana constitutional provision is substantially textually coextensive with that from another jurisdiction, as in this case, we may part company with the interpretation of the Supreme Court of the United States or any other court based on the text, history, and decisional law elaborating the Indiana constitutional right. [9]