Opinion ID: 1998222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Total Exclusion or Preemption

Text: Now that we have determined that the City has the power to prescribe the 90-day mandatory minimum sentence in section 8-4-080, we must next determine whether the legislature has specifically limited the concurrent exercise of this power or specifically declared that the state's exercise of this power is exclusive. See Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, §§ 6(h), (i). Defendant points to, inter alia, the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) and the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West 1992)). Defendant notes that section 5-1-15 of the Code of Corrections defines an offense as conduct for which a penalty is provided by any state law or, inter alia, by any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this State. 730 ILCS 5/5-1-15 (West 1992). Defendant cites several provisions of the Code of Corrections that regulate the character, nature, and extent of punishment under the Code. One such provision is section 5-5-3, which lists authorized dispositions for [e]very person convicted of an offense. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(a) (West 1992). The list of sentencing options include probation, conditional discharge, fine, an order to clean up and repair damage, and restitution to the victim. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(b) (West 1992). According to defendant, state legislation specifically defines the offense of assault against the elderly in the form of aggravated assault and defines the offense as a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/12-2(a)(12), (b) (West 1992)), which is punishable by imprisonment for up to 364 days (730 ILCS 5/5-8-3(a)(1) (West 1992)) and also by a sentence of probation or conditional discharge (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1 (West 1992)). Describing these statutes as comprehensive, defendant contends that state criminal law evinces the legislative intent to preempt the City's home rule power to establish a mandatory minimum sentence for an ordinance violation. We cannot accept defendant's contention. Section 6(h) of the Illinois Constitution states: The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit   . Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(h). Section 6(i), previously quoted, provides that home rule units may exercise any power of the sovereign concurrently with the state to the extent that the General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's exercise to be exclusive. Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, § 6(i). In Scadron, this court observed: The purpose of section 6(i) `is to eliminate or at least reduce to a bare minimum the circumstances under which local home rule powers are preempted by judicial interpretation of unexpressed legislative intention.' [Citation.]    If the legislature intends to exclude local action, it must do so in a specific manner. `If it does not, then section 6(i) makes clear that the home rule units may exercise any nonexclusive power concurrently with the state,' provided such power has not been specifically limited. Scadron, 153 Ill.2d at 186, 180 Ill.Dec. 77, 606 N.E.2d 1154, quoting D. Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part II): Legislative Control, Transition Problems, and Intergovernmental Conflict, 1972 U. Ill. L.F. 559, 571, 568. The court in Scadron held: Under section 6(i), the General Assembly can restrict the concurrent exercise of a home rule unit's power by enacting a law which specifically limits such power. But, unless a State law specifically states that a home rule unit's power is limited, then the authority of a home rule unit to act concurrently with the State cannot be considered restricted. This interpretation supports the home rule provisions of our constitution `which favor concurrent exercise of power by the state and by home rule units and attempt to avoid implied preemption by judicial decisions. The Illinois approach places almost exclusive reliance on the legislature rather than the courts to keep home rule units in line.' [Citation.] (Emphasis in original.) Scadron, 153 Ill.2d at 187-88, 180 Ill.Dec. 77, 606 N.E.2d 1154. Further, comprehensive legislation is insufficient to declare the state's exercise of power to be exclusive. To meet the requirements of section 6(h), legislation must contain express language that the area covered by the legislation is to be exclusively controlled by the State. [Citations.] It is not enough that the State comprehensively regulates an area which otherwise would fall into home rule power. Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co., 158 Ill.2d 133, 138, 198 Ill.Dec. 389, 632 N.E.2d 1000 (1994). After Citizens Utilities, comprehensive scheme preemption is no longer the law of this state. Board of Trustees of the Barrington Police Pension Fund v. Village of Barrington Ethics Board, 287 Ill.App.3d 614, 619, 222 Ill.Dec. 799, 678 N.E.2d 671 (1997). The General Assembly cannot express an intent to exercise exclusive control over a subject through coincidental comprehensive regulation. American Health Care Providers, Inc. v. County of Cook, 265 Ill.App.3d 919, 928, 202 Ill.Dec. 904, 638 N.E.2d 772 (1994). When the General Assembly intends to preempt or exclude home rule units from exercising power over a matter, that body knows how to do so. In many statutes that touch on countless areas of our lives, the legislature has expressly stated that, pursuant to section 6(h) or 6(i), or both, of article VII of the Illinois Constitution, a statute is declared to be an exclusive exercise of power by the state and that such power shall not be exercised by home rule units. E.g., 20 ILCS 3960/17 (West 1992) (Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act); 215 ILCS 5/2.1 (West 1992) (Illinois Insurance Code); 220 ILCS 10/21 (West 1992) (Citizens Utility Board Act); 225 ILCS 60/6 (West 1992) (Medical Practice Act of 1987); 235 ILCS 5/6-18 (West 1992) (Liquor Control Act of 1934); 325 ILCS 55/7 (West 1992) (Missing Children Registration Law); 410 ILCS 5/2 (West 1992) (Burial of Dead Bodies Act); 410 ILCS 80/11 (West 1992) (Illinois Clean Indoor Air Act); 520 ILCS 5/2.1 (West 1992) (Wildlife Code); 625 ILCS 5/11-208.2 (West 1992) (Illinois Vehicle Code); 625 ILCS 5/13A-114 (West 1992) (Vehicle Emissions Inspection Law). Applying these principles to the present case, neither the Criminal Code nor the Unified Code of Corrections specifically excludes home rule units from establishing criminal penalties. Further, the comprehensiveness of these codes is irrelevant to this conclusion. Certainly, the Code of Corrections is, and was intended to be, comprehensive. Section 5-1-15 promotes this comprehensiveness by including municipal ordinance violations within the scope of the Code. However, as this court held in Citizens Utilities, and as the legislature has repeatedly shown, even a high degree of comprehensiveness does not equal an express statement that home rule units are excluded from exercising power. Such a statement is lacking in the Code of Corrections. Therefore, home rule units may act concurrently with the state. Some might believe that the courts play an important role in invalidating home rule ordinances that are inconsistent with statutes or that invade a field fully occupied by state legislation. By applying judicial doctrines relating to conflict, inconsistency, and occupation of the field, the courts can, inter alia, promote uniformity of law. However, for several reasons, the 1970 Constitutional Convention was strongly opposed to judicial `preemption' and sought a means to reduce its importance. 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 572. Of course, home rule as provided in the Illinois Constitution will not remove all disagreements between state government and home rule units. As Professor Baum explained: Some difficult, perhaps insoluble, problems remain. It may happen that a state statute and a home rule ordinance are in direct and immediate conflict and cannot reasonably stand together.       Since the state always can vindicate its interests by legislating in the proper form, it seems unwise to sustain state legislation at the expense of home rule ordinances except when a state statute is in the required form or in those few cases where vital state interests would be sacrificed by permitting the local legislation to prevail until the next session of the General Assembly. 1972 U. Ill. L.F. at 572-73. We hold that the Unified Code of Corrections does not preempt section 8-4-080 of the Chicago Municipal Code.