Opinion ID: 1251685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Sam S. Case

Text: In June 1978, Sam S. retained petitioner to represent him in two pending cases. The first was a dissolution case involving the custody of two minor children. The second was a criminal case in which Mr. S. was charged with misdemeanor violations of Penal Code sections 243 and 245, subdivision (a). In the criminal case, petitioner failed to appear at five scheduled court appearances without notifying either Mr. S. or the court of the reasons for his absence. On three of these dates, the case was either set for jury trial or was on calendar for trial setting. (On two of these three dates, according to the court's minute orders, Mr. S. was absent as well.) Subsequently, on April 4, 1979, petitioner appeared in court with Mr. S., who entered a negotiated plea to a reduced charge of simple battery. (Pen. Code, § 242.) Petitioner failed to appear in court for sentencing on May 17, 1979, and again on May 24th. Petitioner failed to return Mr. S.'s phone calls when Mr. S. telephoned to ask why he had been absent. On May 31st, when petitioner appeared late for the continued sentencing hearing, the court appointed substitute counsel to represent Mr. S. In the dissolution case, petitioner failed to appear without notice or explanation at a hearing on March 29, 1979, at which the court considered a supplemental probation officer's report concerning arrangements for Mrs. S.'s visits with the children. (Mr. S. had physical custody of the children.) At the hearing Mr. S. retained physical custody with no substantial modification of his former wife's visitation rights. At the State Bar hearing, petitioner explained that his pre-plea absences in the criminal case were with the consent of the deputy district attorney and the court clerk. Since the criminal charges arose from an assault by Mr. S. on his wife, petitioner and Mr. S. had agreed that it was best to continue this case until the dissolution proceedings  which involved a dispute about child custody  were completed. The deputy district attorney agreed to this. The pre-plea court dates were mere formalities since all parties understood that the case would be continued. Petitioner admitted that his absences at the sentencing hearings in May of 1979 and at the child custody hearing in March of 1979 were unintentional. They were due either to illness or to the fact that he was in the process of closing his Oakland office. Petitioner observed, however, that in each case Mr. S. received the most favorable disposition under the circumstances. The hearing panel found that in both cases petitioner violated his oath to discharge his duties as an attorney (§ 6067); that he violated his duty to maintain the respect due to courts and judges (§ 6103); that he failed to use reasonable diligence to accomplish the purpose for which he was employed (rule 6-101(2)); and that he withdrew from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to his client (rule 2-111(A)(2)). Though petitioner does not challenge these findings, a review of the record shows that the last finding is not supported by the evidence. Petitioner's failure to appear without notice cannot be condoned, but it did not amount to withdrawal from either case. Accordingly, this finding will be set aside.
(11a) Petitioner maintains that the recommended discipline of one year of actual suspension is too severe in light of the mitigating circumstances. This court agrees. (12) Although the State Bar's recommendation as to discipline is entitled to great weight ... we exercise our independent judgment in determining the appropriate punishment for professional misconduct.... ( Gordon v. State Bar, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 757, citations omitted.) Our principal concern is always the protection of the public, the preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the highest possible professional standard for attorneys. ( Jackson v. State Bar, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 514.) (11b) All of petitioner's violations occurred within a relatively short time period, mid-1978 to mid-1979. For several reasons, this appears to have been aberrant behavior, not typical of his performance during his career both before and after these incidents. (13) (See fn. 10.) Prior to 1978-1979, petitioner had practiced law for nearly 20 years with no disciplinary record. [10] (11c) Petitioner was ill during much of 1978 and 1979 (see Doyle v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 973, 979 [126 Cal. Rptr. 801, 544 P.2d 937]), and this undoubtedly compounded the difficulties he encountered maintaining a law practice consisting mainly of low-fee cases. (See Jackson v. State Bar, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 514; Vaughn v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 857-858.) Certainly, the loss of a full-time secretary in the fall of 1978 added to his problems. Furthermore, petitioner was attempting to relocate his practice, and he did move his office to Hayward in the spring of 1979. This move caused a disruption in his mail service. Also, the last violation complained of occurred nearly five years ago. While the delay in initiating formal proceedings against petitioner is not a bar to the imposition of discipline, it is a factor to consider in deciding what discipline is appropriate. ( Hawkins v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 622, 628 [153 Cal. Rptr. 234, 591 P.2d 524].) The panel noted petitioner's testimony that at least three of the complaining clients were unpleasant, self-serving, disreputable, and/or dishonest. (14) The difficulty of dealing with such clients has been acknowledged as a mitigating factor. ( Bernstein v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 909, 918 [101 Cal. Rptr. 369, 495 P.2d 1289].) (11d) Thus, while petitioner's offenses  particularly in the case of Annette A.  are serious and compel discipline, [t]he imposition of penalty does not issue from a fixed formula but from a balanced consideration of the relevant factors. ( Bernstein v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 919.) In light of the factors in mitigation, it appears that 30 days actual suspension is sufficient. Accordingly, it is ordered that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for three years; that the execution of this order of suspension be stayed; that petitioner be placed on probation for a three-year period with conditions of probation to include actual suspension for the first thirty days, and restitution to Annette A. in the amount of $100. Petitioner is also ordered to comply with the other conditions of probation set forth in the review department's order. Petitioner is required to take and pass the Professional Responsibility Examination by June 9, 1985. REYNOSO, J., Concurring and Dissenting. Petitioner, I agree, should be disciplined. The panel's recommendation, including one year actual suspension, is appropriate. I would accept that recommendation rather than the 30 days actual suspension imposed by the majority. BACKUS, J., [] Concurring and Dissenting. I agree with the majority that petitioner should be disciplined and I further agree that in light of the mitigating circumstances the recommended discipline of one year's actual suspension is too severe. I cannot, however, ignore the hearing panel's finding that in three instances petitioner testified falsely before the hearing panel when such findings are based upon substantial objective evidence in the record. This court has recognized that such false testimony is a serious aggravating factor to be taken into consideration in imposing discipline. ( Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 23 [126 Cal. Rptr. 801, 544 P.2d 937]; Worth v. State Bar (1978) 22 Cal.3d 707, 711 [130 Cal. Rptr. 712, 551 P.2d 16].) Taking such factors into consideration, it is my view that a 30-day period of actual suspension is insufficient and amounts to no more than an enforced vacation. I would impose an actual period of suspension of 90 days.