Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding New Trial Motion

Text: Defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidencetestimony from Osborne that became available only after he pleaded guilty. Defense Attorney Swartz stated in a declaration that after Osborne's conviction I received information from Mr. Osborne that he is now willing to testify on behalf of Mr. Riel and that Mr. Osborne believes that his testimony would assist Mr. Riel in presenting his defense. Defendant presented no other information regarding the expected testimony. At a later hearing on the new trial motion, the defense had not yet produced a declaration from Osborne. Both defense attorneys stated they had a conflict regarding Osborne that they could not state on the record in the presence of the district attorney and public. The court then held an in camera hearing with the public and district attorney excluded. At the in camera hearing, Swartz told the court that he and O'Connor had spoken with Osborne, and he had given `Various statements regarding what had happened in the case. Swartz did not know what Osborne would say at the time of the hearing, but he did know that he has very definitely stated that he has testimony that he is willing to give and will give that will be very favorable to Mr. Riel ... on the issue of guilt. The problem, Swartz explained, was that Mr. Osborne also told us that, in giving that statement very favorable to Mr. Riel, that, to put it delicately, he would be lying. When he realized that Mr. O'Connor and I were not particularly interested in producing perjured testimony at any hearing, I then got additional signals from him that the favorable testimony might not be a lie. At this point I am not willing to go forward with the knowledge that I have because I feel that I may very will be producing and facilitating perjured testimony to the court. By the same token if you want to believe Mr. Osborne, he might be telling the truth. O'Connor added that he had gotten the distinct impression that Mr. Osborne might be lying or might be willing to lie under oath, and that kind of raised some red flags in my thoughts about presenting evidence from someone of that state of mind. Swartz said, We have tried to deal with that and we have not found a method of dealing with it that is ethically acceptable to us except appointing an attorney that could go in and question him independently and maybe come to ... a different opinion. He explained, I've gotten these mixed signals from Mr. Osborne and they are such that I am just not willing or able ethically to go forward. When the court invited Swartz to state specifically what Osborne told him, he said, I think it would be fair to say that Mr. Osborne has indicated that in a statement to the court or in testimony to the court that his testimony would be such that it would clear Mr. Riel of involvement in this case. By the same token I have received information from the same gentleman that leads me to believe that his actual view is that Mr. Riel was appropriately involved to support the conviction. Swartz did not get more specific but said he did not feel he was in an ethical position to present the statements to the court. And Mr. O'Connor and I sweated over this one a bit before we took that position. I have refused in the past to put on witnesses when I was convinced that they were lying and had good information that they were lying. I have put on witnesses that I thought were lying because I didn't have the proof of it, but in this particular case where I have the conflict in statements by the one person I don't feel comfortable doing it. The court suggested that counsel could simply provide all of Osborne's statements. Swartz answered, I wouldn't give them all. He later elaborated, I'm sure I could go to Mr. Osborne and tell him to say the right things and he would do it. And maybe those would even be the truth for all I know. But the state of it is now that I feel if I produce that type of declaration in my own mind I believe probably to be committing a fraud and I'm not willing to do it. Ultimately, the court denied the request to appoint a new attorney, stating that it would not solve the problem. Defense counsel did not produce a declaration or other evidence supporting the new trial motion on this ground. After the in camera hearing, in open court, the court denied the new trial motion. Defendant does not argue the court erred in denying a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Because the defense did not present the court with any specific newly discovered evidence, the court did not abuse its broad discretion when it denied the motion. ( People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811.) Instead, defendant claims his attorneys were ineffective in not presenting the evidence. On appeal, however, we must reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel if the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged ... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation... ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859; see People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Here, defense counsel explained enough to the court to try to get it to appoint new attorneys but, it appears, they were also intentionally vague about what Osborne actually told them so as not to harm their client's position affirmatively. Because we do not know exactly what Osborne told defense counsel, and we can easily hypothesize on this record that Osborne may have said something that fully justified their actions, we must reject the claim. We start with the proposition that an attorney owes no duty to offer on his client's behalf testimony which is untrue. ( In re Branch (1969) 70 Cal.2d 200, 210, 74 Cal.Rptr. 238, 449 P.2d 174; see Bus. & Prof.Code, § 6068, subd. (d).) Stated slightly differently, an attorney, including a criminal defense attorney, has a special duty ... to prevent and disclose frauds upon the court.... ( Nix v. Whiteside (1986) 475 U.S. 157, 168-169, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123.) Defendant recognizes this duty but argues that it extends only to a duty not to cooperate with planned perjury ( id. at p. 173, 106 S.Ct. 988, italics added); it does not apply if the attorney merely suspects but does not know the evidence is false. The distinction is valid. A `lawyer should not conclude that testimony is or will be false unless there is a firm factual basis for doing so. Such a basis exists when facts known to the lawyer or the client's own statements indicate to the lawyer that the testimony or other evidence is false.' ... [Counsel's belief in their client's guilt certainly cannot create an ethical bar against introduction of exculpatory evidence. ( Lord v. Wood (9th Cir.1999) 184 F.3d 1083, 1095, fn. 9.) It is the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts, not that of the attorney. ( United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson (3d Cir.1977) 555 F.2d 115, 122.) Although attorneys may not present evidence they know to be false or assist in perpetrating known frauds on the court, they may ethically present evidence that they suspect, but do not personally know, is false. Criminal defense attorneys sometimes have to present evidence that is incredible and that, not being naive, they might personally disbelieve. Presenting incredible evidence may raise difficult tactical decisionsif counsel finds evidence incredible, the fact finder may alsobut, as long as counsel has no specific undisclosed factual knowledge of its falsity, it does not raise an ethical problem. (See also People v. Gordon, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 472-474, 110 Cal.Rptr. 906, 516 P.2d 298, discussed ante, at pt. II.A.3.a.) Defendant argues that this case merely involves counsel's refusing to present evidence they think is incredible or conflicting rather than a genuine ethical problem. We disagree. Although counsel stated that Osborne made conflicting statements, and at some point Osborne indicated that the statement favorable to defendant was true, counsel stated at the outset of the hearing that Osborne said that in giving the statement favorable to defendant, he would be lying. Only when counsel said they did not want perjured testimony did Osborne change his story. Counsel were not more specific, possibly because they did not want to provide additional information harmful to their client. Because of this, we do not know exactly what Osborne said. But counsel's statements indicate they understood the difference between not presenting witnesses because they had good information that they were lying and presenting witnesses who they thought were lying because [they] didn't have the proof of it. They thought this case fell within the former category. On this record, we cannot say otherwise. The trial court invited counsel to provide all of Osborne's statements and let it decide what to do. Swartz replied, I wouldn't give them all. We have no doubt that counsel could ethically have presented all the statements to the court and let it decide which to believe. Doing so would not defraud the court. But if, as counsel indicated, Osborne had made some specific statement that any testimony favorable to defendant would be a lie, counsel had to choose between presenting the favorable testimony along with the statement that it was a lie, or presenting none of the evidence at all. They could not ethically present a favorable declaration and withhold the earlier statement that it was perjurious. The record is silent on why counsel chose not to present all the statements, but counsel apparently believed it was not in their client's best interests to do so. We cannot say this belief was unreasonable. On this record, we have no basis to find that counsel acted other than as diligent advocates consistent with ethical constraints. Moreover, we would have no basis to overturn the judgment even if we were to find counsel should have acted differently. The record contains no declaration from Osborne providing newly discovered evidence favorable to defendant.