Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Delete Inapplicable Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: (36) Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously refused to delete inapplicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, thus allowing the prosecutor to argue that the absence of mitigation established aggravation. ( Post, pt. IV.B.2.) The court directed the jury to consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable. ... (See CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (1984 rev.), italics added.) The court further advised that [t]he absence of evidence concerning a particular mitigating circumstance does not constitute an aggravating circumstance. In addition, the jury received the standard direction to disregard any instruction not sustained by the facts and not to infer any opinion of the court from the giving of any particular instruction. (See CALJIC No. 17.31.) We adhere to our determination that the court had no further obligation: [T]he jury's knowledge of the full range of factors provides a framework for the exercise of its discretion and can assist the jury in placing the particular defendant's conduct in perspective. [Citation.] ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 104-105; see also People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 932 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 776-777.) The statutory language itself contemplates the trier of fact will determine the relevancy of the listed factors; to permit otherwise would invite endless, often irresolvable, controversy at trial and on appeal as to which were applicable and which inapplicable under the facts. Defendant offers no persuasive argument for reconsidering the soundness of our conclusions. For similar reasons, the court did not err in failing to identify each factor as either aggravating or mitigating. As a matter of law, some factors can only be considered in mitigation, e.g., moral justification. (See People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1034.) Others depend upon the circumstances of the crime, e.g., the defendant's age. (See People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052] [the word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty]; see also People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 229, fn. 5 [276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323]; cf. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861] [`whether-or-not' and `presence-or-absence' phrase used in eight of the [factors] suggests there might be either a presence or an absence of the factors].) In the latter situation, each side may have its own theory for assessing the same factor in its favor. For example, although the prosecution may argue the defendant was not a callow youth and thus was fully responsible for the consequences of his reprehensible conduct, the defense might point to evidence of his psychological immaturity. (See, e.g., People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 153 [255 Cal. Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32]; see also People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 865-866 [258 Cal. Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]; cf. People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 488 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697] [felony-murder conviction disproportionate for 17-year-old youth in light of ample evidence that because of his immaturity he neither foresaw the risk he was creating nor was able to extricate himself without panicking].) Given the nature of the jury's normative function, neither the prosecution nor the defense should be arbitrarily constrained from urging the jury to find life or death more appropriate according to its respective interpretation of the facts. To require the trial court to attach one label or the other would lead to unproductive, insoluble debates and would unduly hamper a meaningful examination of the full range of relevant considerations. As we explained in People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d at page 316, with respect to the 1977 death penalty law, the aggravating or mitigating nature of these various factors should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case.