Opinion ID: 4582075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Terry’s Verdict Is Legally Impossible

Text: ¶14 The City charged Terry with the offense of domestic violence assault, UTAH CODE § 76-5-102(1)(c) (2003),3 and the offense of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, UTAH CODE § 76-5-109.1(2)(c). These two offenses are related because the latter offense is predicated on the commission of the former. Defining the latter offense, Utah Code section 76-5-109.1(1)(b) states that ―‘[d]omestic violence‘ has the same meaning as in Section 77-36-1.‖ Utah Code section 77-36-1(4), in turn, defines ―[d]omestic violence‖ to ―include commission‖ of ―assault, as described in Section 76-5- 102,‖ ―when committed by one cohabitant against another.‖ Thus, the offense of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child is a compound offense that is predicated on the commission of domestic violence assault. A ―compound offense‖ is an ―offense composed of one or more separate offenses. For example, robbery is a compound offense composed of larceny and assault.‖ Compound _____________________________________________________________ 3 The statute was amended in 2015, after Terry‘s charging, and section (1)(c) became (1)(b). 6 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court Offense, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And a ―predicate offense,‖ also known as a ―lesser included offense,‖ is a ―crime that is composed of some, but not all, of the elements of a more serious crime and that is necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime.‖ Lesser Included Offense, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Id., Predicate Offense. 4 ¶15 ―[I]t is impossible to convict a defendant of the compound [offense] without also convicting the defendant of the predicate offense.‖ Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 807 (footnote omitted); see also Md. Stewart, 211 A.3d 371, 384 (Md. 2019) (Opinion by Watts, J. (commanding majority for its analysis)) (―[A] guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict are legally inconsistent where the crime of which the jury finds the defendant not guilty is a lesser-included offense of the crime of which the jury finds the defendant guilty.‖). Yet the jury in Terry‘s case did the impossible. It convicted Terry of the compound offense (domestic violence in the presence of a child), while acquitting him of the predicate offense (domestic violence assault). ¶16 Legally impossible verdicts are verdicts that include an inconsistency ―as a matter of law because it is impossible‖ to reconcile different determinations that the jury made in them. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 807. And here, it is impossible to reconcile a conviction with an acquittal on ―essential elements . . . identical and necessary‖ to sustain the conviction. State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Shavers v. State, 86 So. 3d 1218, _____________________________________________________________ 4 This case involves an exception to the general rule that a ―defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense.‖ UTAH CODE § 76-1-402(3). This rule does not apply ―where the Legislature has designated a statute as an enhancing statute,‖ State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 70, 361 P.3d 104, which ―single[s] out particular characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting harsher punishment,‖ State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 615. Such designation requires an ―explicit indication of legislative intent.‖ Id. ¶ 11. Utah Code section 76-5-109.1(4) includes such indication: ―A charge under this section is separate and distinct from, and is in addition to, a charge of domestic violence where the victim is the cohabitant. Either or both charges may be filed by the prosecutor.‖ Thus, charges (and convictions) on both predicate and compound offenses are permissible in this case. 7 PLEASANT GROVE v. TERRY Opinion of the Court 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (―[L]egally [impossible] verdicts . . . arise when a not-guilty finding on one count negates an element on another count that is necessary for conviction.‖); Price v. State, 949 A.2d 619, 634 (Md. 2008) (Harrell, J., concurring in the judgment) (―A legal inconsistency . . . occurs when ‗an acquittal on one charge is conclusive as to an element . . . [of] a charge on which a conviction has occurred.‘‖ (citation omitted)) (adopted in McNeal v. State, 44 A.3d 982, 984 (Md. 2012)). ¶17 At oral argument, the City conceded the relationship between the offenses in this case and acknowledged the illogic embedded in Terry‘s verdict. Yet it still maintains that Terry‘s verdict is not legally impossible, for two reasons. First, in the City‘s view, there can be no legal impossibility when there is sufficient evidence, as Terry concedes is the case here. Second, according to the City and the dissent, because we evaluate every count separately, the contradicting results the jury reached are not legally impossible. See infra ¶¶ 57, 66, 69, 74. Both arguments do not persuade us. ¶18 First, the argument that there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the compound offense is of no moment to our holding that the verdict is legally impossible. Given that both the compound offense and the predicate offense were based on the same evidence and the same event, the jury also had sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the predicate offense. Yet they did not do so. And that acquittal was fatal to the jury‘s ability to convict on the compound offense, because ―an acquittal of [a predicate offense] effectively holds the defendant innocent of a [compound] offense involving that same [predicate offense],‖ Naumowicz v. State, 562 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), and ―negates a necessary element for conviction on‖ the compound offense, State v. Kelley, 109 So. 3d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). ¶19 Second, the argument that verdicts like Terry‘s are not legally impossible because we review claims that the State has not met its burden of proof on a particular count of conviction, on each count independently, see infra ¶¶ 57, 66, 69, 74; see also State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), is likewise unavailing. We do not deny that this our general rule, but it is not an inexorable mandate. If it yields absurd results—or in this case, legally impossible results—we should not blindly follow it.5 See, e.g., A.K. & _____________________________________________________________ 5 The dissent seems to be focused on this argument as the ultimate reason for us to affirm a legally impossible judgment, see infra ¶¶ 57, (continued . . .) 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court R. Whipple Plumb. & Heat. v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d 270 (describing with approval how our Court of Appeals refused to strictly apply our ―net judgment rule‖ because it led to ―absurd results‖); State v. Springer, 121 P. 976, 979 (Utah 1911) (refusing to submit a plea of former acquittal ―to the jury to be passed on by it as a question of fact‖ although past case law suggested ―courts have no alternative,‖ because it would ―lead to an absurd result.‖). If the State chose to intertwine the offenses, it cannot then disentangle them atwill when it‘s convenient. Here, the City repeatedly discussed the predicate and compound offenses together and explicitly relied on the same evidence for the two offenses. Similarly, the jury instructions also linked the two offenses—explaining that the basis for the compound-offense charge was that Terry allegedly ―committed an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child‖ by committing the predicate offense (assault) ―while the nine year old child was less than three feet away.‖ The City cannot have its cake and eat it too. Its prosecutorial choices show that the jury was presented with the compound offense predicated on the occurrence of the predicate offense. We cannot and should not review them separately in such circumstances. See, e.g., Streeter v. State, 416 So. 2d 1203, 1206 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting an ―exception to the proposition that separate counts must be viewed independently‖ when ―what the jury fails to find in one count vitiates a guilty verdict on a separate count to the benefit of the defendant‖). The dissent calls our approach ―novel,‖ infra ¶ 57, but this approach is practiced in every jurisdiction that refuses to accept legally impossible verdicts, see supra ¶¶ 15–16. ¶20 Thus, the verdict here—convicting Terry of a compound offense while acquitting him of the predicate offense—is legally impossible.