Opinion ID: 1161831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 42 u.s.c. ง 1983, and article ii, ง 25, of the colorado constitution

Text: The plaintiffs argue that the trial court improperly dismissed their claim based on the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. ง 1983 (1982), for deprivation of federal constitutional and statutory rights under color of state law. It is well established that section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights; it merely provides a remedy for deprivations of federal rights protected by the United States Constitution or federal laws. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). However, not all federal statutory rights may be enforced through section 1983. In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981), the United States Supreme Court noted two exceptions to the applicability of section 1983 to statutory violations. First, when the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under ง 1983. Id. at 20, 101 S.Ct. at 2626. Second, a section 1983 remedy may be foreclosed when the statute at issue does not create rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the ... laws that are enforceable under section 1983. Id. at 19, 101 S.Ct. at 2625. See also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545-46, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-51 n. 5, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604-05 n. 5, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The plaintiffs claim that the defendants deprived the class members of rights guaranteed under the Federal Rehabilitation Act. The trial court determined that a deprivation of rights under section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act cannot be vindicated through a section 1983 action. Federal courts that have considered this issue disagree over whether an action pursuant to section 504 is possible within the framework of 42 U.S.C. ง 1983. Compare Manecke v. School Bd. of Pinellas County, 553 F.Supp. at 790-91 (concluding that a damages remedy under either ง 504 or ง 1983 would be inconsistent with the purposes of the Federal Rehabilitation Act) and Ruth Anne M v. Alvin Independent School Dist., 532 F.Supp. at 475-76 (same); with Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir.1981) (recognizing that a ง 1983 claim may be based on ง 504) and Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F.Supp. at 1112-13 (damages are not available under ง 504, but such a claim could be asserted under ง 1983). At least one court has suggested that since most courts have recognized a private right of action for injunctive or declaratory relief under section 504, and many courts have recognized a damages action, the Federal Rehabilitation Act provides a comprehensive range of remedies for enforcement and an action to enforce the act under section 1983 is unnecessary. See Miener v. Special School Dist. of St. Louis County, 580 F.Supp. 562, 567-68 (E.D.Mo.1984), rev'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 749 (8th Cir.1986). However, since federal courts disagree on this issue and further developments, including resolution of the related question of the types of relief available for violation of section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act, may clarify the law before the trial court considers this question on remand, we decline to make a definitive ruling at this point. On remand, the trial court will be free to consider any applicable holdings by the United States Supreme Court and the other most recent court decisions before resolving this issue. The plaintiffs also assert that there is a federal constitutional due process right to community based mental health services for certain members of the plaintiff class, [24] and that a corresponding state right also exists under article II, section 25, of the Colorado Constitution. The plaintiffs urge this court to address the existence of a federal or state constitutional right to treatment in the community. They anticipate that there will not be adequate funding to implement the state's remedial plan [25] and they ask this court to determine whether the United States and Colorado Constitutions require that the remedial plan be more fully implemented. However, at this point the question is premature. It is not clear how much money is available to fund any court-approved remedial plan. In addition, if the amount appropriated is not sufficient, the defendants must first request that the legislature provide the funding required to implement the plan fully. See Blaney v. Comm'r of Correction, 372 N.E.2d at 774 (the defendants have not shown that they could not fulfill the mandate of [the statute] within the appropriations of the department or that the Legislature has declined to appropriate funds necessary to permit the defendants to fulfil their statutory duty). Only after the defendants have attempted to implement the plan fully and are unable to do so should this court reach the issue of whether Senate Bill 120 has placed an unconstitutional limit on the rights of the members of the plaintiff class. We conclude that the plaintiffs' claims under section 1983 and the state constitution were properly dismissed but that the dismissal should be without prejudice to the right to reassert the due process claims based upon the care and treatment actually provided to the relevant class under the Care and Treatment Act as amended by Senate Bill 120.