Opinion ID: 1215513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Section 1126

Text: (2) It is axiomatic that the fundamental goal of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent, and that in determining such intent we look first to the words of the statute themselves. ( People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895 [231 Cal. Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288]; Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 601, 607 [224 Cal. Rptr. 631, 715 P.2d 590].) (1b) Turning to the language of section 1126, we are confronted at the outset with a patent ambiguity. Subdivision (a) of section 1126 declares a sweeping prohibition against any activity or employment which is incompatible with the duties of a local agency officer or employee: [A] local agency officer or employee shall not engage in any employment, activity, or enterprise for compensation which is inconsistent, incompatible, in conflict with, or inimical to his or her duties as a local agency officer or employee or with the duties, functions or responsibilities of his or her appointing power or the agency by which he or she is employed. (Italics added.) Commensurate with the broad proscription set forth in subdivision (a), the statute proceeds in subdivision (b) to confer seemingly plenary authority upon the local appointing power to define and proscribe those activities which are inconsistent with the duties and responsibilities of its officers and employees. The first sentence of subdivision (b) provides:  Each appointing power may determine, subject to approval of the local agency, and consistent with the provisions of Section 1128 where applicable, those outside activities which, for employees under its jurisdiction, are inconsistent with, incompatible to, or in conflict with their duties as local agency officers or employees. (Italics added.) The second sentence of subdivision (b), however, signals a marked shift in emphasis from the first. Hard on the grant of seemingly plenary authority to the local agency to determine ... those activities which ... are inconsistent with the duties and responsibilities of its officers and employees, the statute enumerates four specific areas of activity which may be prohibited. [4] Though each of the activities specified in subdivision (b), subsections (1) through (4) is defined in terms which are fairly broad, the parties agreed at trial that Officer Peterson's off-duty employment as a process server within the City of Long Beach did not fit within any of them. The City argued, however, that the activities specified in subsections (1) through (4) were merely exemplary, and did not preclude the Department from imposing additional and different restrictions on the off-duty activities of its officers. The Association, apparently invoking the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, contended that the statute's enumeration of specific activities impliedly precluded the Department from proscribing any others. As these differing interpretations suggest, it is not altogether self-evident whether the statute's specification of activities which may be prohibited was intended to be exclusive or merely exemplary. On the one hand, the Association suggests that the phrase should be interpreted as an affirmative grant of limited powers, thus negating by implication any powers not specifically mentioned. (See Wildlife Alive v. Chickering (1976) 18 Cal.3d 190, 195-196 [132 Cal. Rptr. 377, 553 P.2d 537]; Martello v. Superior Court (1927) 202 Cal. 400, 405 [261 P. 476].) The City, on the other hand, asserts that the phrase represents merely a legislative attempt to define certain discretionary criteria for the guidance of the local authorities, not an effort to preempt the field altogether. (See, e.g. People v. Durbin (1963) 218 Cal. App.2d 846, 849 [32 Cal. Rptr. 569] [`The ordinary meaning of shall or must is of mandatory effect, while the ordinary meaning of may is purely permissive in character.'], quoting 27A Words and Phrases (permanent ed.) p. 674; see also California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Board (1977) 70 Cal. App.3d 833, 842 [139 Cal. Rptr. 155].) Because the words of the statute themselves provide no definitive answer, it is appropriate to refer to extrinsic sources for evidence of legislative intent. [5] (3) `Where [statutory language] is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained.'... To discern legislative intent, we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny. ( Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 570 [194 Cal. Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787].)