Opinion ID: 4561171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: County Defendant

Text: We now turn to Faulkner County’s appeal from the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment. Unlike the individual officers considered above, municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity. Mogard v. City of Milbank, 932 F.3d 1184, 1192 (8th Cir. 2019). If we had held that no constitutional violation occurred -8- here, then Faulkner County may be correct in asserting that we would also have to conclude that the “inextricably intertwined” claim against the County fails as a matter of law. See Manning v. Cotton, 862 F.3d 663, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). But that is not our holding. Rather, we hold only that the individual jail employees are immune from suit because their actions did not violate clearly established law. This conclusion does not necessarily mean Faulkner County did not violate the rights of the plaintiffs, and so the determination of liability does not flow from the resolution of the qualified immunity issue.3 Because the determination of Faulkner County’s liability does not “flow ineluctably from a resolution of the qualified-immunity issue, the question of whether [the County] is liable for failing to train its officers is not inextricably intertwined with the matter of qualified immunity.” Ivey v. Audrain Cnty., No. 19-2507, 2020 WL 4458776, at  (8th Cir. Aug. 4, 2020). As such, we lack jurisdiction to hear the County’s appeal. Id.