Opinion ID: 169086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Damages Claim under Privacy Protection Act

Text: 58 Mink also seeks damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act. The Act creates a right of action for the improper seizure of media materials: 59 Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a government officer or employee, in connection with the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to search for or seize any work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce; but this provision shall not impair or affect the ability of any government officer or employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable law, to search for or seize such materials, if . . . there is probable cause. 60 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa. 61 Mink alleges his statutory rights were violated when Greeley police entered his home and seized materials relating to The Howling Pig. He does not, however, name any of the officers who conducted the search. 9 Instead, he seeks a judgment against the deputy district attorney for her role in reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant, which he claims lacked probable cause. Relying on the text of the statute, which makes it unlawful to search for or seize any work product materials, the district court dismissed the claim. Here, Mink did not allege the district attorney directed, controlled or participated in the search or seizure. Since the statute includes no language covering predicate acts by other officials, such as the legal review of the warrant application, the district court concluded no liability attached to the district attorney. 62 We agree. The plain language of the statute precludes liability for a person who did not engage in a search. In an analytically similar case, Citicasters v. McCaskill, 89 F.3d 1350 (8th Cir.1996), the Eighth Circuit concluded the statute covered only a defendant who directed, supervised, or otherwise engaged in the execution of the warrant to such an extent that a finding can be made that she `searched for or seized' the [materials]. Id. at 1356 (emphasis added). In Citicasters, the facts centered around the prosecutor's actions taken after the search warrant was issued and involved an allegation that the prosecutor actively assisted in the search. Here, by contrast, Mink has not alleged any conduct that could be construed as assisting in the warrant's execution. 63 Accordingly, we affirm dismissal of this claim against the deputy district attorney. 64