Opinion ID: 425952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bordenkircher and Prosecutorial Discretion

Text: 41 The Supreme Court's next word on the subject was in the prosecutorial discretion mode. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), held that there was no violation of due process when a prosecutor filed more severe charges after the defendant refused to plead guilty to lesser charges. Bordenkircher did not purport to overrule Blackledge, but rather chose to emphasize some factors Blackledge mentioned only in passing and to deemphasize some of the key points I just discussed from Blackledge. 42 Thus, in Bordenkircher the Court emphasized the societal interest in plea bargaining and the prosecutor's need for discretion in charging decisions. As a corollary, the Court placed less emphasis on the need to promote due process. In fact, the Court went so far as to state a slightly revisionist view of the thrust of Blackledge: 43 The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, see Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction. See Blackledge v. Perry, supra, 417 U.S., at 26-28, 94 S.Ct., at 2101-02. 44 Id. 434 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 668. Needless to say, this is perhaps a less-than-faithful account of what Blackledge actually says on the cited pages. In any event, Bordenkircher quite clearly is a decision in the prosecutorial discretion mode.