Opinion ID: 852183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Conduct Adequate Jury Selection

Text: Baer asserts that several jurors susceptible to challenge for cause went unchallenged. In particular, he asserts that trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's misstatements and failed to educate the jury appropriately about relevant mitigation, the meaning of life without parole, and other issues. (Appellant's Br. at 53-57.) For example, Baer says his counsel did not adequately explore jurors' ability to follow the law. (Appellant's Br. at 53.) Baer does not direct us to any particular place in the record where more questioning was required, and the record is full of defense counsel's thorough questioning on the potential jurors' ability to follow the law. (Trial Tr. at 430, 435-38, 441-43, 511-12, 515, 526-27, 593-94, 597-602, 787-90, 834-36, 840-42, 845, 965-69, 973-75, 977-80, 1025.) Baer does argue that jurors Brown, Criss and Lewis were automatic death penalty jurors. (Appellant's Br. at 54.) During voir dire, juror Brown indicated that he would consider mitigating circumstances. (Trial Tr. at 769.) When Lockwood asked, I want to have a chance with you for a vote of life. Do I have that chance with you, Brown responded [y]es. (Trial Tr. at 790.) Juror Criss generally disfavored the death penalty but felt that it could be appropriate in some cases. (Trial Tr. at 658-59.) Further questioning revealed that juror Criss would base her decision on all the evidence. (Trial Tr. at 659-60.) Juror Lewis stated that he would decide the case based on the evidence. (Trial Tr. at 386.) Not even the most tortured reading of the transcript suggests that juror Lewis was an automatic death penalty juror. Baer also argues that jurors Criss, Hartman, Zurcher, and Huett were resistant to mitigation because they checked a box on their juror questionnaires that stated they [d]isagree[d] strongly with the statement: A person's upbringing and background are relevant to the punishment he should receive if he is committing a crime. [3] (Appellant's Br. at 54.) Baer also argues that his trial counsel did not discuss mitigation at all during voir dire and that there should have been an extensive discussion. Counsel's discussion with Criss, Hartman, Zurcher, and Huett refutes the notion that they were mitigation resistant. (Trial Tr. at 660, 752-57, 784, 786-90, 919-21, 938-40, 973, 978, 980-81.) The juror questionnaires present multiple messages about the jurors' feelings on mitigation. Jurors Hartman, Huett, and Zurcher all checked a box stating: Both a person's background and the nature and details of a particular crime should be considered in deciding appropriate punishment. Jurors Huett, Criss, and Hartman all checked a box on their questionnaires stating: I would seriously weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating factors in order to determine the appropriate penalty in this case. Those statements suggest that these jurors were open to mitigation. The jurors' answers during voir dire do not demonstrate that counsel were deficient in not challenging them for cause. Baer asserts that his trial counsel had a complete failure to discuss issues of mitigation with prospective jurors. (Appellant's Br. at 54.) The record, however, shows just the opposite. Baer's trial counsel believed that mental illness was the strongest mitigating factor in this case and, consequently, they discussed mental illness extensively during voir dire. We conclude that trial counsel adequately conducted jury selection.