Opinion ID: 2276467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Invited Response Doctrine

Text: Mitchell contends that the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal calling attention to the defendant's subpoena power improperly shifted the burden of proof. In reply, the State responds that the prosecutor's remarks were justified, under either the invited response doctrine or as a matter of fundamental fairness. (Resp.'s Br. 18). We first address the prosecutor's remarks under the invited response doctrine. In so doing, however, we must necessarily begin by discussing the scope of permissible closing argument. This Court addressed the scope of permissible closing argument in Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 326 A.2d 707 (1974). We stated: As to summation, it is, as a general rule, within the range of legitimate argument for counsel to state and discuss the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn from the facts in evidence; and such comment or argument is afforded a wide range. Counsel is free to use the testimony most favorable to his side of the argument to the jury, and the evidence may be examined, collated, sifted and treated in his own way.... Generally, counsel has the right to make any comment or argument that is warranted by the evidence proved or inferences therefrom; the prosecuting attorney is as free to comment legitimately and to speak fully, although harshly, on the accused's action and conduct if the evidence supports his comments, as is accused's counsel to comment on the nature of the evidence and the character of witnesses which the prosecution produces. Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 412, 326 A.2d at 714 (citations omitted); see also Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 429, 722 A.2d 887, 901 (1999) (noting the general rule that attorneys are afforded great leeway in presenting closing arguments to the jury). Recognizing the broad scope of permissible closing argument, we have held that [w]hat exceeds the limits of permissible comment or argument by counsel depends on the facts of each case. Smith and Mack v. State, 388 Md. 468, 488, 880 A.2d 288, 299-300 (2005). Because the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the propriety of argument in light of such facts, we have also held that [a]n appellate court should not disturb the trial court's judgment absent a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court of a character likely to have injured the complaining party. Grandison v. State, 341 Md. 175, 225, 670 A.2d 398, 422 (1995); see Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 231, 596 A.2d 1024, 1038 (1991) (noting that [t]he inference of any impropriety occurring in closing arguments `must of necessity rest largely in the control and discretion of the presiding judge' (quoting Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 413, 326 A.2d at 714-15)). Nevertheless, we have acknowledged certain boundaries that counsel may not exceed in delivering his or her closing argument. For instance, counsel may not comment upon facts not in evidence or ... state what he or she would have proven. Smith and Mack, 388 Md. at 488, 880 A.2d at 299. It is also improper for counsel to appeal to the prejudices or passions of the jurors, Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 652, 65 A.2d 316, 320 (1949), or invite the jurors to abandon the objectivity that their oaths require, Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 594, 886 A.2d 876, 890 (2005). Grounded in the idea that the scope of permissible closing argument is quite broad, and the attendant rule that the propriety of closing argument must be judged contextually, on a case-by-case basis, is the invited response doctrine. Lee v. State, 405 Md. 148, 163, 950 A.2d 125, 134 (2008). In Lee, a recent case, we defined the invited response doctrine as follows: `where a prosecutorial argument has been made in reasonable response to improper attacks by defense counsel, the unfair prejudice flowing from the two arguments may balance each other out, thus obviating the need for a new trial.' 405 Md. at 163-64, 950 A.2d at 137 (quoting Spain v. State, 386 Md. 145, 157 n. 7, 872 A.2d 25, 32 n. 7 (2005)). The Supreme Court of the United States has also addressed the invited response doctrine. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 11 (1985), the Court stated: In order to make an appropriate assessment, the reviewing court must not only weigh the impact of the prosecutor's remarks, but must also take into account defense counsel's opening salvo. Thus the import of the evaluation has been that if the prosecutor's remarks were invited, and did no more than respond substantially in order to right the scale, such comments would not warrant reversing a conviction. Thus, from Lee and Young it is evident that the invited response doctrine applies only when defense counsel first makes an improper argument. See, e.g., Lee, 405 Md. at 169, 950 A.2d at 137 ([B]ecause the `invited response doctrine' calls for the prosecutor's invited response to be considered in context with the defense counsel's own impropriety, it is not applicable when defense counsel has made no improper argument.). [6] An improper argument by defense counsel sufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine is one that goes outside the scope of permissible closing argument and invite[s] the jury to draw inferences from information that was not admitted at trial. Lee, 405 Md. at 166, 950 A.2d at 135. In Young, during closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly attacked the integrity of the prosecution, charg[ing it] with `reprehensible' conduct in purportedly attempting to cast a false light on [the defendant's] activities. 470 U.S. at 4, 105 S.Ct. at 1041, 84 L.Ed.2d at 6. The Court held that defense counsel's conduct was sufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine because [d]efense counsel ... must not be permitted to make unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the opposing advocate. Young, 470 U.S. at 9, 105 S.Ct. at 1043, 84 L.Ed.2d at 8; see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 864, 869 n. 5, 99 L.Ed.2d 23, 32 n. 5 (1988) (opining that, under Young, a prosecutor's reference to a criminal defendant's failure to testify may be contextually proper); United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112, 121-22 (1 st Cir.1992) (holding that defense counsel's argument that the prosecution was trying to railroad his client was sufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine). This Court has not yet had the opportunity to address an improper argument by defense counsel sufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine. In Lee, involving a handgun assault, the defendant called the victim to the stand. 405 Md. at 154, 950 A.2d at 128. The victim testified that the defendant did not shoot him; nor did the victim recount any prior altercation with the defendant. Id. During his closing argument, defense counsel commented that the testimony of the State's only eyewitness was unreliable because it had changed over time, and that the jury instead should believe the testimony of the victim, whom the State did not call because `[h]e didn't prove their case.' Lee, 405 Md. at 155, 950 A.2d at 129. The prosecutor then responded in rebuttal closing argument that the jurors should not believe the victim because he was following the law of the streets.... Lee, 405 Md. at 156, 950 A.2d at 130. We held that defense counsel's argument regarding the veracity of the victim's testimony was not improper, and, therefore, the prosecutor's law of the streets argument could not be justified under the invited response doctrine. Lee, 405 Md. at 170, 950 A.2d at 138; see also Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 519, 601 A.2d 1093, 1097 (1992) (determining that the prosecutor's improper remarks in rebuttal closing argument could not be justified because defense counsel's closing argument was not improper). In the instant case, like in Lee, defense counsel's closing argument was insufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine. Maurice Turner was listed as a potential witness in the State's proposed voir dire, and the prosecutor acknowledged in his opening statement that the jury would hear from Mitchell's alleged cohorts Antonio Corprew and Lewis Man-Man Cochran. In addition, the jury heard about Wali Henderson, the driver of the Hummer, an initial suspect in the shooting, and the jury also learned of Darnell Carter and Andre Chase, the two men who led police to the shotgun. Because it is within the scope of permissible closing argument for counsel to draw inferences from the evidence admitted at trial, which includes the ability to comment on an absence of such evidence, defense counsel's closing argument was not improper. See Eley v. State, 288 Md. 548, 553, 419 A.2d 384, 386-87 (1980) (holding that defense counsel may call attention to the State's failure to produce evidence); Wise v. State, 132 Md. App. 127, 146, 751 A.2d 24, 33 (2000) (recognizing the right of a defendant to comment upon the failure of the State to produce evidence), cert. denied, 360 Md. 276, 757 A.2d 811 (2000); Eastman v. State, 47 Md.App. 162, 167, 422 A.2d 41, 43 (1980) (noting that it is not unreasonable to permit the defense to comment upon the State's shortcomings in producing prosecutorial evidence). Further, the State contends that defense counsel's closing argument was improper, and therefore sufficient to invoke the invited response doctrine, because it made an impermissible missing witness inference. In other words, according to the State, defense counsel's closing argument drew the inference that witnesses not called by the State would have testified unfavorably to the prosecution. We addressed the propriety of a missing witness inference in Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 633 A.2d 867 (1993), stating: The failure to call a material witness raises a presumption or inference that the testimony of such person would be unfavorable to the party failing to call him, but there is no such presumption or inference where the witness is not available, or where the testimony is unimportant or cumulative, or where he is equally available to both sides. Davis, 333 Md. at 48, 633 A.2d at 877 (quoting Christensen v. State, 274 Md. 133, 134-35, 333 A.2d 45, 46 (1975)). In addition, we noted that [t]he missing witness inference may arise in one of two contexts. A party may request that a trial judge instruct the jury on the operation and availability of the inference where all the elements of the rule are present. Additionally, a party may wish to call the jury's attention to this inference directly during closing arguments. Davis, 333 Md. at 52, 633 A.2d at 879 (citations omitted). In the instant case, generally, defense counsel mentioned in closing argument that the jury did not hear from Corprew, Cochran, Henderson, Chase, Carter, and Turner. By this argument, defense counsel pointed out that the prosecutor failed to call these potential witnesses. As to the significance of their absences, defense counsel indicated that the State's case was significantly weak on the issue of identification of Mitchell as the shooter. Specifically, according to defense counsel, the jury was never given an opportunity to see and compare for themselves whether certain of these witnesses corresponded to the descriptions of the suspects in the case. [7] As such, Defense counsel stated, in closing argument: Now, we heard  or rather we never heard from Mr. Cochran, and I'm not sure who Mr. Cochran was. We never heard from Mr. Corprew, although there was mention of his name, and Mr. Turner also, but we never saw them. And that's important. We also never saw Wal[i] Henderson. And I believe he was identified as the individual who was operating the Hummer. We never saw him.     [C]learly you have a situation where a misidentification could take place.... Let's bring Wal[i] Henderson here so we can see if he's a heavyset, dark-skinned man. Let's bring Antonio Corprew here so we can gauge his stature. Let's look at Man-Man, what does he look like? Get that hat out of the car. Does that hat fit his head? To be certain, defense counsel did not infer that Corprew, Cochran, Henderson, Chase, Carter, and Turner would have testified unfavorably to the prosecution. Rather, defense counsel argued to the jury the sufficiency of the State's evidence, pointing to gaps in the State's case  notably a failure to corroborate the identification of Mitchell  and contending that additional evidence was necessary. Clearly, defense counsel suggested that the State needed to produce more witnesses to prove its case against Mitchell, thereby implying that every witness, whether material or not, no matter how cumulative the evidence might be, should have been heard or seen. Such an argument is not tantamount to an improper missing witness inference and does not invoke the invited response doctrine. In response to defense counsel's argument, the prosecutor did not contend that defense counsel inferred that any witnesses that were not called would have testified unfavorably to the State. Instead, the prosecutor stated that the inference drawn by defense counsel was that the State was holding back something. An inference that the State is holding back does not amount to a statement that witnesses not called by the State would have testified unfavorably to the prosecution. A party may have any number of reasons to hold back and not call a potential witness. For instance, the witness's testimony might be cumulative, or the existence of impeaching evidence may detract too greatly from the probative value of the testimony and taint the party's case.