Opinion ID: 770104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enactment of the PLRA Exhaustion Requirement

Text: 6 As a general matter, exhaustion of state remedies, whether administrative or judicial, is not a prerequisite to maintaining an action under § 1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 508 (1982); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994); Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1998). Statutory purpose and legislative intent support this presumptive rule of non-exhaustion. The very purpose of § 1983, the precursor of which first was enacted during Reconstruction as part of the Ku Klux Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.' Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1880)); see Patsy, 457 U.S. at 503. 7 Nevertheless, exhaustion of state remedies may be required in those limited circumstances in which Congress has carved out a specific exception to the general rule that exhaustion is not required. Doe, 148 F.3d at 78. The inmate exhaustion provision at issue in this case, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), is an exception of this sort. This provision first was enacted in 1980 as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), Pub. L. No. 96 247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997, 1997a 1997j (1994 & Supp. 2000)), and was intended to be only a narrow exception to the general rule of non-exhaustion in § 1983 actions. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508 (1982) (refusing to require exhaustion for § 1983 claims not covered by the CRIPA exhaustion provision); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149 (1992) (declining to extend § 1997e(a)'s exhaustion provision to Bivens actions). The pre-PLRA version of § 1997e(a) provided a discretionary mechanism by which courts could (but were not obligated to) require prisoners to exhaust state administrative remedies before asserting claims under § 1983. 3 8 Section 803(d) of the PLRA added teeth to the § 1997e(a) exhaustion provision, affirmatively requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies, whether federal or state, before bringing any federal claims with respect to prison conditions. 4 The PLRA strengthened the § 1997e(a) exhaustion provision in three relevant respects. First, by its own terms the pre-PLRA exhaustion provision applied only to § 1983 claims, not to actions brought under other federal laws. See, e.g., McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 150. The amended provision, by contrast, applies to any federal claim brought with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Second, the pre-PLRA provision was not mandatory upon courts. Rather, it simply authorized courts to invoke exhaustion, at their discretion, if requiring exhaustion would be appropriate and in the interests of justice. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)(1) (1994) (amended 1996). In so doing, a court was permitted only to continue the action for up to 180 days, not to dismiss the action outright. See McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 150; Patsy, 457 U.S. at 510 11. The PLRA, however, requires exhaustion of available administrative remedies before inmate-plaintiffs may bring their federal claims to court at all. Third, exhaustion under the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e only could be required if two conditions were met: (1) if the available administrative procedures were plain, speedy, and effective; and (2) if the Attorney General certified, or the court itself determined, that the prison's grievance provisions substantially complied with minimum acceptable standards set forth by the Attorney General or were otherwise fair and effective. See Patsy, 457 U.S. at 510 11. The PLRA, on the other hand, does not make effectiveness of administrative remedies a precondition to the exhaustion requirement. 9 At the same time that it expanded the scope of CRIPA's exhaustion provision, the PLRA also explicitly limited its applicability only to federal actions that are brought with respect to prison conditions-a qualification on the scope of the exhaustion provision not found in the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e(a). Therefore, analysis of whether the amended version of § 1997e(a) applies to excessive force or assault claims must account for the manner in which the PLRA broadened the scope of this provision as well as the manner in which it simultaneously limited that scope. Both aspects of this amendment, in other words, must be presumed to have real and substantial effect, Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995), so as not to render statutory language superfluous. See Baskerville v. Goord, No. 97 Civ. 6413, 1998 WL 778396, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1998); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 41 (1994) (courts should avoid interpreting statutory language in a manner that renders other textual provisions superfluous or unnecessary). 10 We interpret the amended version of § 1997e(a) against the background principles that govern exhaustion of administrative remedies generally, see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our traditional legal concepts); United States v. Figueroa, 165 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998), and in light of the interpretive principle that statutory exceptions are to be construed narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the [general rule]. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989); see also Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508 (exhaustion provision in § 1997e(a) is intended to be only a narrow exception to the general rule of non-exhaustion in § 1983 cases); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 32 (1995) (narrowly interpreting statutory exception in Fair Housing Act); Tasini v. New York Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2000) (narrowly interpreting statutory exception in Copyright Act). 11