Opinion ID: 891654
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Expedited Procedural Schedule Deprived ABCWUA and NMIEC of Procedural Due Process of Law

Text: {27} ABCWUA and NMIEC next argue that the expedited procedural schedule deprived them of procedural due process of law. Specifically, they claim that the PRC granted them an insufficient period of time in which to conduct adequate discovery and to prepare and file the expert testimony needed to rebut PNM's application for an [E]mergency FPPCAC. {28} In general, the right to due process in administrative proceedings contemplates only notice of the opposing party's claims and a reasonable opportunity to meet them. Archuleta, 2005-NMSC-006, ¶ 32, 137 N.M. 161, 108 P.3d 1019 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, due process is flexible in nature and may adhere to such requisite procedural protections as the particular situation demands. U S West Commc'ns, Inc., 1999-NMSC-016, ¶ 25, 127 N.M. 254, 980 P.2d 37 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A reviewing court's determination of what process is due in an administrative proceeding results from a balancing of (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. ¶ 26 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). In balancing these interests, we must consider the proceedings as a whole. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {29} PNM averred that it was facing an immediate and critical financial crisis due, at least in part, to the lack of appropriate recovery of rapidly escalating fuel and purchased power costs. Indeed, PNM claimed that its financial condition was so severe that it was experiencing difficulties in dealing with counterparties to procure power supplies and natural gas to serve customers. Thus, PNM's application for an Emergency FPPCAC implicated the substantial public interest in an efficient and uninterrupted supply of electric power and natural gas. See NMSA 1978, § 62-3-1(A)(1) (1967, prior to 2008 amendments) (recognizing that public utilities affect the public interest in that they render essential public services to a large number of the general public). {30} However, this public interest must be balanced against ABCWUA's and NMIEC's private interest in just and reasonable utility rates. See § 62-3-1(B) (recognizing the private interest in reasonable and proper service at fair, just and reasonable rates). Accordingly, we turn to the second prong of the Mathews test to determine the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. {31} We conclude that additional extensions of time would have had little, if any, probative value in the present case. First, the record reflects that the parties had ample opportunity to present evidence regarding PNM's entitlement to an FPPCAC under Section 62-8-7(E)(1) and Rule 550 in the underlying rate case and that the PRC took administrative notice of this evidence. Second, the PRC granted ABCWUA and NMIEC two extensions of time, extending the time period in which they were required to file their responsive testimony from twelve to forty-two days. This was substantially longer than the three-day time period in which PNM was required to file its direct testimony, and only eighteen days shy of the sixty-day time period originally requested by ABCWUA and NMIEC in their Joint Motion for an Extension of Procedural Schedule. Under the present circumstances, we cannot conclude that the PRC's denial of a third extension of time was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. See Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins. v. N.M. State Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 286, 756 P.2d 558, 566 (1988) (The presumption . . . is that the [agency's] decision was reasonable.).