Opinion ID: 865464
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in determining

Text: THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE FROM THE SALE OF THE MARINA WAS MARITAL PROPERTY. ¶34. Joe argues that the record lacks substantial evidence to show that the promissory note 15 was a marital asset. Further, Joe argues that the trial court made findings of fact in its original judgment of divorce and in its order granting the motion to reconsider that are not supported by the evidence. Specifically, Joe cites certain findings by the chancellor: 1. Joe Bowen used income from his marina operations and other sources to improve the marina substantially during the marriage. 2. Mrs. Bowen gave some assistance during the marriage in helping to make improvements to the marina project. 3. An increased value of the marina resulted from improvements made during the marriage. 4. Joe’s financial declaration did not disclose his investments or the value of the marina. 5. The parties did not provide enough documentary evidence to be of much assistance to the court regarding respective accumulations of assets during cohabitation, before and after marriage. ¶35. Joe argues that “Betty presented no testimony to show any increase in the value of the Bay View Marina from the date of the marriage, November 22, 1995, to the date of the sale in December of 1996.” The property was on the market before the marriage at the price of $1,000,000; the property sold for the listing price. Joe’s tax returns do not reflect any capital improvements during 1995 or 1996; Joe completed the capital improvements in 1994. Thus, according to Joe, the chancellor’s finding that Betty was entitled to ten perecent of the promissory note due to improvements in the property during the thirteen months that Joe and Betty were married before the sale of the marina is clearly erroneous and is arbitrary and capricious. ¶36. On the other hand, Betty argues that Chancellor Steckler did not award her a portion of the promissory note; instead, he awarded Betty “lump sum alimony in the amount of $60,000.00, an amount equal to 10% of Joe’s mortgage note of $600,000.00.” (Emphasis 16 added). Betty further argues that the chancellor found that she made some contributions to the marina that entitled her to this lump-sum alimony. Additionally, Betty states that “[w]hether family use or commingling or simply her contribution to the increase of value in the marina, [she] acquired an equitable interest in the marina and promissory note.” ¶37. Joe, in his reply brief, argues that it is apparent that the chancellor created marital property from separate property in order to wrongly compensate Betty for the period of cohabitation. ¶38. Where a party commingles non-marital assets or uses them for familial benefit, those assets become marital assets. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1286 (Miss. 1994). Clearly, after the marriage, Joe and Betty lived and worked at the marina. Thus, the chancellor did not err in finding that Betty was entitled to share in the benefit of the marina note. This issue is without merit.