Opinion ID: 3180361
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hunt’s Arguments

Text: Hunt’s remaining arguments are unpersuasive. Hunt contends the absence of Mr. Ford’s testimony made it appear “like Hunt had something to hide, or, in the alternative, that Hunt just did not care,” particularly because counsel suggested during opening statements that Mr. Ford might appear, and at least one witness referenced Mr. Ford’s 10 We question the admissibility of this testimony because the record suggests he was speculating and lacked personal knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). 11 The converse is not true. Mr. Mize and Mr. Gentry did testify to facts not included in Mr. Ford’s deposition testimony. For example, Mr. Gentry’s testified regarding the signaling effect of Mr. Ford’s initial stop, and Mr. Mize offered inconsistent testimony regarding Jimmy’s exact position at the moment of impact. This testimony is immaterial for the purposes of our cumulative evidence analysis because it extends beyond the scope of Mr. Ford’s testimony and is therefore irrelevant to whether Mr. Ford’s testimony was cumulative of testimony offered at trial. - 23 - deposition. Aplt. Br. at 41.12 Hunt relatedly argues “the jury was angered by not hearing from Hunt’s participant in the ‘affray,’ and took any frustration or anger out on Hunt.” Id. To show the exclusion of Mr. Ford’s deposition affected its substantial rights, Hunt must do more than make speculative and unsubstantiated assertions of juror anger. It must show how Mr. Ford’s deposition testimony might have affected the outcome in light of other evidence in “the record as a whole.” McInnis, 458 F.3d at 1142. It fails to do so. For this same reason, Hunt’s conclusory assertion that Mr. Ford’s “appearance would be a human face on the allegations of liability against Hunt, a corporate entity” is unavailing, Aplt. Br. at 33, an argument that makes even less sense as applied to use of the deposition. Hunt also contends it was prejudiced because Mr. Ford was the “only witness with ‘on-site’ knowledge of the specific conditions, actions and movements of those present, and decisions made at the time of the accident.” Id. at 32. But Mr. Gentry and Mr. Mize testified to specific conditions, actions, movements, and decisions made at the time of the 12 In Mr. Hill’s opening statement, counsel stated, “We hope Troy Ford is going to be here. We were told that he maybe didn’t want to come, but hopefully he will come and tell us what happened.” App. at 591. In Hunt’s opening statement, counsel stated, “Troy Ford will tell you” certain facts. Id. at 595. Finally, Mr. Hill’s expert witness Jason Jupe, a forensic engineer, indicated he reviewed various eyewitnesses’ depositions—including Mr. Ford’s—to reconstruct the accident. Hunt additionally asserts, “Ford’s deposition testimony was used as the basis for testimony from other witnesses, including . . . Gentry.” Aplt. Br. at 41. But Mr. Gentry’s testimony does not contain references to Mr. Ford’s deposition testimony. - 24 - accident based on personal knowledge. Hunt’s assertion is further belied by Mr. Ford’s series of answers, stating “I don’t know.”13 Finally, Hunt argues Mr. Ford’s deposition would have addressed “how the morethan-sufficient training Hunt provided him figured into his conduct.” Id. at 32-33. Mr. Ford testified he received four days of training in Dallas, including a road test, and weeks of additional Moffett training in Oklahoma, including videos. He said that he passed every test during training and drove a Moffett in front of his supervisor. Hunt does not explain, nor can we discern, how this testimony could have influenced the outcome in light of the other evidence admitted at trial. Hunt fails to explain how Mr. Ford’s testimony about his training “figured into his conduct,” id., or affected the outcome of trial. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the record does not show the exclusion of Mr. Ford’s deposition testimony prejudiced Hunt. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Hunt’s Rule 59 motion on this issue because the court did not abuse its discretion.