Opinion ID: 6345898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Case Law on FMLA Interference

Text: Despite the broader statutory language, opinions of this court and others have sometimes phrased the test for FMLA interference in terms that seem to require an actual denial of beneﬁts. See, e.g., Lutes, 950 F.3d at 363 (“his employer denied him FMLA beneﬁts to which he was entitled”); Guzman v. Brown County, 884 F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2018) (“her employer denied her FMLA beneﬁts to which she was entitled”); Thompson v. Kanabec County, 958 F.3d 698, 705 (8th Cir. 2020) (requiring plaintiﬀ to show “the reason for the denial was connected to the employee’s FMLA leave”). But judicial opinions are not statutes. Treating them as if they were is “a common source of erroneous predictions concerning the scope and direction of the law.” All-Tech Telecom, Inc. v. Amway Corp., 174 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir. 1999). There have been variations in how to word the test for FMLA interference, but there is no genuine intraor inter-circuit split on whether denial is essential and whether the requirement that plaintiﬀ show prejudice precludes claims based on interference alone. 6 § 2615(a), must present evidence that the employer ‘denied’ FMLA benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled, or merely ‘interfered with’ those benefits.” We thank the department for its views. 6 Our interpretation of § 2615(a)(1) is consistent with other circuits’ decisions, albeit sometimes via non-precedential opinions or in dicta. See, e.g., Diamond v. Hospice of Florida Keys, Inc., 677 F. App’x 586, 593 (11th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff offered enough evidence for jury to conclude employer violated § 2615(a)(1) by “discouraging her from taking FMLA leave in order to care for her seriously ill parents”); Hurtt v. Int’l Services, Inc., 627 F. App’x 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating five-part FMLA interference test in terms of denial of benefits, but concluding that FMLA interference includes “discouraging an employee from using FMLA leave” (cleaned up)); Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting in dicta 16 No. 19-3435 The only time this court squarely confronted whether FMLA interference requires actual denial of beneﬁts, we said no. In Preddie this court determined that § 2615(a)(1) allows FMLA interference claims based on discouragement. 799 F.3d at 818 (noting that interference includes “discouraging an employee from using” FMLA leave (internal citation omitted)). In Preddie, a teacher took time oﬀ to care for his son, who suffered serious episodic side eﬀects from sickle cell anemia. Id. at 810. The teacher never actually applied for FMLA leave, so we considered whether § 2615(a)(1) required denial and decided that it did not. Id. at 811, 818. We reversed summary judgment, ﬁnding that the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to ﬁnd that the school interfered with the teacher’s FMLA rights by discouraging and threatening him. Id. at 818. We also noted that a jury could ﬁnd the teacher was injured by the school’s discouragement because he showed evidence that he consciously chose not to take additional leave based on the principal’s threats. Id. Other opinions by this court appear to conﬂict with our view and Preddie, but those concerns dissipate on closer that “FMLA interference includes not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave” (internal quotes and citation omitted)); McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that plaintiff could succeed in her FMLA interference claim without showing her employer denied leave request as long as she showed interference with exercise of her FMLA rights and prejudice from violation); Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d 1041, 1050 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b) for idea that FMLA interference can include discouragement, but not relying on this theory); Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment in part; pressuring employee to reduce leave time violated FMLA interference provision). No. 19-3435 17 inspection. We said in Lutes that a plaintiﬀ must show “his employer denied him FMLA beneﬁts to which he was entitled,” but our legal analysis did not focus on denial. 950 F.3d at 363. Instead, we determined that the metal worker could survive summary judgment on remand if he could show “that he would have structured his leave diﬀerently had he received the proper information.” Id. at 368, citing Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 90. Similarly, in Guzman we aﬃrmed summary judgment against a plaintiﬀ’s FMLA interference claim because she was not “denied FMLA beneﬁts to which she was entitled,” but the precise phrasing of the ﬁfth part of the test for FMLA interference did not matter to the result. 884 F.3d at 640. The employee’s claim failed because (i) she could not show a serious health condition and was not eligible for FMLA protections; and (ii) her employer decided to terminate her before she gave notice of an attempt to exercise FMLA rights. Id. at 639–40, citing Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 636 (7th Cir. 2009) (aﬃrming summary judgment against an FMLA interference claim when employee failed to show he would have kept his job if he had not taken FMLA leave). Thus, we see no genuine intra-circuit split on whether a violation of § 2615(a)(1) requires actual denial of beneﬁts. The Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce argues that we should follow the approach of the Eighth Circuit and read § 2615(a)(1) to require denial because the plaintiﬀ must “connect the FMLA request with a concrete negative job consequence.” Appellees’ Br. at 9, citing Thompson, 958 F.3d at 705–06. The Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce is correct that a violation of the FMLA on its own is not enough to establish an interference claim—a plaintiﬀ must also show that the violation prejudiced him. Lutes, 950 F.3d at 368, citing 18 No. 19-3435 Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89. But this prejudice question is used to decide whether § 2617 provides relief for a proven violation. It does not set the threshold for what constitutes a violation of § 2615(a)(1) in the ﬁrst place. See Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89. The best reading of Thompson and similar cases is that they focus on whether the employee suﬀered prejudice from the employer’s actions. They do not stand for the proposition that plaintiﬀs who show interference without denial of FMLA rights cannot recover under the FMLA. See Thompson, 958 F.3d at 706 (aﬃrming summary judgment against nurse’s FMLA interference claim when she could not show prejudice from an acknowledged delay in processing FMLA request); see also Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 246 (3d Cir. 2016) (aﬃrming summary judgment against police oﬃcer’s FMLA interference claim in part because he took the leave to which he was entitled and failed to show prejudice). Accordingly, we conclude there is no intra- or inter-circuit split on whether interference with FMLA rights without actual denial can violate § 2615(a)(1). Section 2615(a)(1) is not ambiguous on this issue—denial of FMLA beneﬁts is not required to demonstrate an FMLA interference violation. Interference or restraint alone is enough to establish a violation, and a remedy is available under § 2617 if the plaintiﬀ can show prejudice from the violation. B. Interference with Ziccarelli’s Attempt to Exercise FMLA Rights Accordingly, to show an FMLA interference violation under § 2615(a)(1), Ziccarelli must show that: (i) he was eligible for FMLA protections; (ii) the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce was covered by No. 19-3435 19 the FMLA; (iii) he was entitled to leave under the FMLA; (iv) he provided suﬃcient notice of his intent to take leave; and (v) the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce interfered with, restrained, or denied FMLA beneﬁts to which he was entitled. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Preddie, 799 F.3d at 816. To recover for a violation of § 2615(a)(1), Ziccarelli must also show he was prejudiced by the unlawful actions of the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce. § 2617(a); Lutes, 950 F.3d at 368, citing Ragsdale, 535 U.S. at 89. Only the ﬁfth element of the test for FMLA interference and prejudice are at issue in this appeal. Giving plaintiﬀ the beneﬁt of conﬂicts in the evidence and reasonable favorable inferences, he has presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce violated § 2615(a)(1) when Shinnawi allegedly discouraged him from taking leave and as to whether these actions prejudiced him. Ziccarelli had over one month of FMLA leave available when he called Shinnawi in September 2016 to request FMLA leave. According to Ziccarelli, though, when he asked to take “more” FMLA leave, Shinnawi responded by saying “don’t take any more FMLA. If you do so, you will be disciplined.” Ziccarelli’s Dep. 42. As noted, Shinnawi’s testimony is very diﬀerent, but determining which story is more credible is a job for the trier of fact. “[S]ummary judgment cannot be used to resolve swearing contests between litigants.” Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Goelzer v. Sheboygan County, 604 F.3d 987, 995 (7th Cir. 2010) (summary judgment on FMLA interference claim inappropriate where “we are left with two competing accounts, either of which a jury could believe”). We are required to give Ziccarelli the 20 No. 19-3435 beneﬁt of conﬂicting evidence about the substance of his conversation with Shinnawi. Lane, 835 F.3d at 694. Threatening to discipline an employee for seeking or using FMLA leave to which he is entitled clearly qualiﬁes as interference with FMLA rights. See Preddie, 799 F.3d at 818. A reasonable jury could believe Ziccarelli’s account and ﬁnd that the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce (through Shinnawi) interfered with his remaining FMLA leave hours for 2016 by threatening to discipline him for using them. See id. (deciding jury could conclude school interfered with teacher’s FMLA rights when principal threatened consequences for using more FMLA leave). There is a triable issue of fact as to whether Ziccarelli can meet the ﬁfth element of the test for FMLA interference. The Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce claims that it did not interfere with Ziccarelli’s access to FMLA leave because “[n]othing in the record indicates that Plaintiﬀ was prohibited from using his remaining FMLA time that he had previously been approved to take.” Appellees’ Br. at 13. As explained above, denial is not the only way that an employer can violate § 2615(a)(1). It is enough that Ziccarelli presents evidence allowing a reasonable jury to conclude that the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce discouraged him from exercising his FMLA rights. See Preddie, 799 F.3d at 818. There is also evidence in the record that Shinnawi’s statements prejudiced Ziccarelli by aﬀecting his decisions about FMLA leave. Ziccarelli had planned to use some of his remaining FMLA leave to seek treatment. After their conversation, Ziccarelli never submitted an FMLA request and did not use the remainder of his 2016 FMLA leave. Ziccarelli claims he was afraid of what would happen after Shinnawi threatened him with discipline for taking more FMLA leave. No. 19-3435 21 Evidence of a link between Shinnawi’s alleged discouragement and Ziccarelli’s decision not to take his remaining FMLA leave for 2016 is suﬃcient to require a trial. A reasonable jury that believed Ziccarelli’s account could ﬁnd that the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce violated § 2615(a)(1) and that the violation prejudiced Ziccarelli’s access to his remaining FMLA leave hours for 2016. See Lutes, 950 F.3d at 368. One feature of this case makes the prejudice analysis for plaintiﬀ’s interference claim more complicated: his decision to retire from the Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce shortly after his conversation with Shinnawi. As we explain below, even plaintiﬀ’s version of that conversation falls far short of evidence that could support a claim for constructive discharge. Plaintiﬀ knew that he had some remaining FMLA leave, sick leave, and annual leave available for 2016. He also knew that Shinnawi was the FMLA specialist, and she had said nothing to address his use of sick leave that he says he wanted to use up, along with FMLA leave, to take the eight weeks of leave for the treatment program his doctor recommended. We do not see how an employee in plaintiﬀ’s situation could reasonably just give up and walk away from his job, beneﬁts, and treatment plan entirely based on one conversation in which, under his version of the facts, the employer’s representative was simply wrong. The district court may have its hands full on remand, particularly if plaintiﬀ tries to blame snowballing consequences, including even early retirement, on his conversation with Shinnawi. As skeptical as we might be about those eﬀorts, we believe those issues need to be sorted out in the district court in the ﬁrst instance. 22 No. 19-3435