Opinion ID: 2794292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Vindictiveness

Text: [¶33] Mr. Custis argues bar counsel displayed “prosecutorial vindictiveness” in pursuing discipline against him, citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law allows is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”) In support of his argument, he cites facts which we will not consider because they were not presented to the BPR. See Disciplinary Code § 21(c)(iv). Nevertheless, a brief explanation of the role of bar counsel in disciplinary proceedings is warranted. 10 [¶34] Section 6(b)(i) of the Disciplinary Code gives bar counsel the power and duty “[t]o review and investigate any complaint to determine whether a prima facie violation exists[.]” “The determination of whether or not to initiate an investigation is vested within the sound discretion of Bar Counsel[.]” Id. at § 6(b)(iii). This discretion is limited by the Peer Review Panel, which provides “general supervision of, guidance to, and oversight of the office of Bar Counsel[,]” and ultimately “[d]etermine[s] whether probable cause exists, justifying the filing of a formal charge[.]” Id. at § 7(c)(iii), (vi). Here, the Peer Review Panel issued a Finding of Probable Cause prior to bar counsel filing the Formal Charge. Bar counsel adhered to the procedural rules in the Disciplinary Code and Mr. Custis provides no admissible support for his contentions that bar counsel acted vindictively. [¶35] We find no due process violation in the entry of default against Mr. Custis and therefore adopt the BPR’s entry of order of default. II. Is there a factual basis for finding Mr. Custis violated the Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct? [¶36] As discussed above, see supra ¶¶ 20-21 and 30-31, in disciplinary proceedings we do not rely on default alone to determine that a rule violation has occurred. In addition to the allegations deemed admitted by default, Disciplinary Code §11(m) requires us to find a factual basis for the violation. In the context of attorney discipline, a “factual basis” exists when “the record contains evidence in sufficient quantum to persuade a fairminded, rational person of the truth of a declared premise.” In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Bonet, 29 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wash. 2001) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Although this is sometimes referred to as “substantial evidence,” we reject bar counsel’s contention that we should apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the BPR’s findings and conclusions. The Court conducts a de novo review of all aspects of attorney discipline. A. Violations of Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct 1. Candor toward the tribunal—Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a) [¶37] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a) provides: “A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;” and “(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.” Comment 5 to Rule 3.3 provides in part: “Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false . . . . This duty is premised on the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence.” 11 [¶38] The following allegations from the Formal Charge are deemed admitted: (1) Mr. Custis filed a brief with the Wyoming Supreme Court in Ortiz v. State, 2014 WY 60, 326 P.3d 883 (Wyo. 2014), containing material misrepresentations; (2) the State filed a motion for stay calling this Court’s attention to the misrepresentations; (3) Mr. Custis responded to the motion contending the misrepresentations were unintentional typographical errors; (4) pursuant to an order by this Court, Mr. Custis corrected the error and submitted a revised brief to the Court; and (5) in response to a disciplinary inquiry regarding the misrepresentation, Mr. Custis claimed to have no knowledge of the misrepresentation and explained the incident as a drafting error by his paralegal. Mr. Custis’s brief and the opinion of this Court in Seward provide a factual basis for these allegations. We agree with the BPR’s conclusion on this issue: 18. With regard to Respondent’s insistence that the misrepresentation contained in the Ortiz brief he signed and submitted to the Wyoming Supreme Court was simply a typographical error of which Respondent was unaware at the time the brief was filed, Rule 1.0(g) provides, “A person’s knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.” Rule [3.1(c)][4] provides in relevant part, “The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other court document; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well-grounded in fact[.]” There is a factual basis for concluding Mr. Custis violated Rule 3.3(a). 2. Responsibilities regarding nonlawyer assistants—Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 5.3 [¶39] Rule 5.3(c)(2) provides in pertinent part: [A] lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such person that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by the lawyer if . . . the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take remedial action. 4 In its Report and Recommendation, the BPR mistakenly cited Rule 3.3(c). 12 Comment 1 to Rule 5.3 provides: “The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.” While the record contains no basis to conclude that Mr. Custis had actual knowledge of his paralegal’s misrepresentations, Mr. Custis’s signature on the brief certified “that to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . [t]he . . . factual contentions have evidentiary support[.]” W.R.C.P. 11(b)(3). When Mr. Custis signed the brief, he took responsibility for knowing the accuracy of the contents of the document. Mr. Custis cannot simply claim ignorance to avoid his responsibility for his paralegal’s work product. We conclude that a factual basis exists to find Mr. Custis violated Rule 5.3(c). 3. Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation—Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) [¶40] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(c) provides: “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.” It is undisputed that the Ortiz brief contained portions of the Seward opinion, without citation, which misrepresented the testimony of an important witness. We conclude there is a factual basis to conclude Mr. Custis violated Rule 8.4(c). See Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility v. Stith, 2011 WY 69, 262 P.3d 847, 851 (Wyo. 2011) (attorney violated Rule 8.4 when he signed discovery pleading which failed to provide required insurance coverage information); In re Finestrauss, 32 A.3d 978, 982 (Del. 2011) (violation of Rule 8.4(c) for submitting to the Court documents with misrepresentations relating to tax obligations). 4. Conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) [¶41] Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Mr. Custis admits that he submitted a brief to this Court containing material misrepresentations, and the misrepresentation is apparent on the face of the brief. If this Court had relied on these misrepresentations it would have impacted a central issue in the Ortiz appeal. Furthermore, addressing the misrepresentation caused undue delay and wasted resources of the State and this Court. We find a factual basis for concluding that the misrepresentation was prejudicial to the administration of justice and Mr. Custis violated Rule 8.4(d). III. What are the appropriate sanctions? [¶42] When a respondent defaults on the charges, but appears at the sanction hearing, as Mr. Custis did, we determine the sanctions based on clear and convincing evidence. “Clear and convincing evidence is ‘that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact 13 that the truth of the contention is highly probable.’” Richard, 2014 WY 98, ¶ 53, 335 P.3d at 1052 (quoting SMH v. State, 2012 WY 165, ¶ 19, 290 P.3d 1104, 1109 (Wyo. 2012)); see also Mendicino, 565 P.2d at 475. [¶43] To determine the appropriate sanctions, we look to the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (ABA Standards). In In re Discipline of Longacre, 122 P.3d 710 (Wash. 2005), the Washington Supreme Court explained this process: [T]he court engages in a two-step process utilizing ABA Standards. First, the presumptive sanction is determined by considering: (1) the ethical duty violated, (2) the lawyer’s mental state, and (3) the extent of the actual or potential harm caused by the misconduct. Second, the court considers any aggravating or mitigating factors that may alter the presumptive sanction or affect the duration of a suspension. Id. at 719 (citation omitted); see also ABA Standards 3.0 and In re Shea, 273 P.3d 612, 622 (Alaska 2012).
[¶44] The ABA Standards define three levels of mental states: “Intent” is the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. “Knowledge” is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. “Negligence” is the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. ABA Standards, III. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: Black Letter Rules. [¶45] The BPR did not reach any conclusions regarding Mr. Custis’s mental state. With regard to Mr. Custis’s violations of Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a), 5.3, 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), we conclude Mr. Custis’s violations comport with the ABA’s definition of a negligent mental state: “when a lawyer fails to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that 14 a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.” ABA Standards, Theoretical Framework. The testimony of Mr. Custis, his paralegal, and Ms. Domonkos indicates that Mr. Custis was not aware of the misrepresentation until the State filed its motion for stay. 2. Potential or actual injury caused by misconduct [¶46] The ABA Standards define “injury” as follows: [H]arm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession which results from a lawyer’s misconduct. The level of injury can range from “serious” injury to “little or no” injury; a reference to “injury” alone indicates any level of injury greater than “little or no” injury. ABA Standards, III. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: Black Letter Rules. “Potential injury” is: [H]arm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s misconduct, and which, but from some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer’s misconduct. Id. [¶47] We find clear and convincing evidence supporting the BPR’s determination that Mr. Custis caused actual injury to the State and the judiciary, and adopt its finding: 23. Based upon the clear and convincing evidence . . . Respondent’s misconduct caused actual injury to the judicial system. Because of the misrepresentations contained in the brief filed by Respondent, the State expended significant time researching, drafting and filing the Motion for Expedited Stay. The Court expended its resources in reviewing the motion, Respondent’s response and ruling on the motion. 3. Duties violated and presumptive sanction [¶48] Mr. Custis’s violation of Rule 5.3 falls under the ABA Standards 7.0, “Violations Of Other Duties Owed As A Professional.” Considering Mr. Custis acted negligently and caused actual injury to the judiciary, our presumptive sanction is reprimand. ABA Standards 7.3. 15 [¶49] Mr. Custis’s violation of Rules 3.3(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) fall under the heading “Violations of Duties Owed to the Legal System,” specifically, ABA Standard 6.1, “False Statements, Fraud, and Misrepresentation.” Because Mr. Custis acted negligently and caused actual injury to the judiciary, our presumptive sanction determination is reprimand. 6.13 Reprimand is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent either in determining whether statements or documents are false or in taking remedial action when material information is being withheld, and causes injury or potential injury to a party to the legal proceeding, or causes an adverse or potentially adverse effect on the legal proceeding. ABA Standards 6.13. 4. Aggravating and mitigating factors warranting adjustment of presumptive sanction [¶50] “Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” In re Johanning, 111 P.3d 1061, 1065 (Kan. 2005). ABA Standard 9.22 lists factors which may be considered in aggravation:

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indifference to making restitution; (k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances. [¶51] ABA Standard 9.32 lists the following factors that may justify reduction of the degree of discipline: 16 (a) absence of prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; (e) full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; (f) inexperience in the practice of law; (g) character or reputation; (h) physical disability; (i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug abuse . . . ; (j) delay in disciplinary proceedings; (k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (l) remorse; (m) remoteness of prior offenses. [¶52] The BPR found three aggravating factors: (1) prior disciplinary record, (2) multiple offenses, and (3) substantial experience in the practice of law. In addition, the BPR found one mitigating factor, the previously imposed $500 sanction from this Court. [¶53] There is clear and convincing evidence of Mr. Custis’s prior disciplinary record. In Custis I, Mr. Custis offered a $15,000 “inducement” to the mother of a sexual abuse victim in exchange for the mother’s agreement to recommend to the sentencing court that Mr. Custis’s client receive a suspended sentence and no prison time for his guilty plea to first-degree sexual abuse of a minor. 2012 WY 142, 295 P.3d at 336. Mr. Custis was publicly censured, and required to take a continuing education in ethics course as sanctions in that matter. Id. at 351. [¶54] We do not agree there were “multiple offenses” in the Ortiz matter. Rather, Mr. Custis committed one offense which violated several rules. The Washington Supreme Court has explained the distinction: Longacre’s conduct, as limited and discrete as it was, viewed as a whole, does not rise to the level of egregiousness justifying a finding of “multiple offenses.” In virtually any attorney discipline case, multiple counts are commonly charged simply because most discrete behaviors violate more than one [rule of professional conduct]. Surely, the ABA Standards and this court never intended that all attorneys 17 charged with multiple counts of misconduct be subject to the “multiple offenses” aggravating factor. The test for “multiple offenses” must require something more. In re Discipline of Longacre, 122 P.3d at 726 (emphasis in original). Mr. Custis filed a brief containing material misrepresentations. Though this conduct violated more than one rule of professional conduct, it does not constitute “multiple offenses.” [¶55] Mr. Custis has been licensed to practice law since 1994, providing clear and convincing evidence of his substantial experience in the practice of law. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ferguson, 246 P.3d 1236, 1250 (Wash. 2011) (“substantial experience” factor applicable when lawyer has practiced 10 or more years at the time of misconduct). [¶56] “[T]here is no magic formula for determining how aggravating and mitigating circumstances affect an otherwise appropriate sanction.” In re Disciplinary Matter of Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 633 (Alaska 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the appropriate sanction, we must balance the rehabilitative and deterrent purposes of attorney discipline. “[W]e view discipline as assisting, if possible, in the rehabilitation of an errant lawyer.” In re Scholl, 25 P.3d 710, 712 (Ariz. 2001). “[T]he discipline must be fair to the attorney, with the object of correcting the wayward tendency in the accused lawyer while offering . . . a fair and reasonable opportunity for rehabilitation.” The Florida Bar v. Cox, 794 So.2d 1278, 1286 (Fla. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although attorney discipline can serve to improve the performance of attorneys who have strayed in performing their ethical obligations, when an attorney continues to engage in professional and ethical misconduct in spite of previous sanctions, our concern weighs more heavily toward deterrence, maintaining the integrity of the legal system, and protecting the public. This Court’s decision in Custis I was published on November 7, 2012. Even assuming he made no changes in his office procedures until that date, some of Mr. Custis’s misconduct occurred after, he contends, he made improvements to his procedures to avoid any further discipline. [¶57] We adopt the BPR’s recommendation of a public censure for Mr. Custis’s rule violations. We adopt the BPR’s recommendation on fees and costs, ordering Mr. Custis to pay $500.00 in administrative fees and $1,827.72 in sanction hearing costs. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: [¶58] 1. The Report and Recommendation for Public Censure, filed by the BPR on June 17, 2014, is hereby approved and adopted, as modified by this order; and 2. Dion J. Custis shall receive a public censure; and 18 3. By June 1, 2015, Dion J. Custis shall pay costs of $1,827.72 associated with the disciplinary proceedings and an administrative fee of $500.00. [¶59] DATED this 16th day of April, 2015. BY THE COURT: /s/ E. JAMES BURKE