Opinion ID: 1111172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disputed Issues of Material Fact Remain Unresolved

Text: ¶ 9 Because of our analysis of the law concerning the requisite showing necessary to support a summary judgment we reject Alliance's argument that the failure of Oklahoma Business Agency to describe the nature of Travel Stop's interest in the property other than as lessor entitles Alliance to judgment as a matter of law. Travel Stop was named in the binders prepared by Oklahoma Business Agency but the nature of Travel Stop's interest was ambiguously stated. These ambiguities could be resolved by the trier of fact in a way to support the inference that Travel Stop and Oklahoma Business Agency had agreed to include Travel Stop as a loss payee, mortgagee, or additional insured on the Alliance policy. These ambiguous facts would also support the inference that the paper work submitted by Oklahoma Business Agency to Alliance put Alliance on notice that Travel Stop had an insurable interest in the property that the insurance policy should protect. Such a determination by the trier of fact would support a judgment either against Alliance for reformation of the policy or against Oklahoma Business Agency for negligently failing to see that Travel Stop's interest was protected by the Alliance policy. ¶ 10 Alliance relies on Stephens v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., Japan, 1981 OK 42, 627 P.2d 439 in support of its contention that summary judgment was proper here. In Stephens we held that the trial court had properly granted summary judgment for Conoco Oil Company in a case where a motorcyclist was injured as the result of claimed negligence of the operator and employees of a service station. The station was a Conoco station, but the undisputed proof was that Conoco had no right to control the station's operations, and did not do so. The only property at the station owned by Conoco was its sign. In that case there was no fact, disputed or undisputed, that a trier of fact could have used to impose liability on Conoco. Here, however, there is evidentiary material that could support the trier of fact's conclusion either that Oklahoma Business Agency had negligently failed to provide Alliance with the necessary information for Travel Stop to be protected or that there was an agreement among the parties that the policy would protect Travel Stop's rights. ¶ 11 In Shebester v. Triple Crown Insurers, 1992 OK 20, 826 P.2d 603 we answered a question certified to us by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. There, an agent had insured a horse in his own name that belonged to the plaintiff. The horse died and the plaintiff made a claim to the insurance company. The insurer paid the agent, although it was on notice of plaintiff's claimed ownership of the animal. We recognized the principle that payment to the named beneficiary with notice of another person's adverse claim renders an insurer liable to the legally entitled claimant for the amount it wrongfully paid. 1992 OK 20 ¶ 19, 826 P.2d 603. ¶ 12 Alliance seeks to distinguish Shebester because it claims that the record is devoid of evidence that would show Alliance's knowledge of Travel Stop's insurable interest. As noted above, there is evidence in the record that would support a conclusion by the trier of fact that Alliance knew of Travel Stop's insurable interest in the property. ¶ 13 In Conner v. Northwestern National Cas. Co., 1989 OK 85, 774 P.2d 1055 plaintiff, a mortgagee, was not named as a loss payee in a policy of insurance but the policy contained a contract of sale clause that named the mortgagee as the seller of the property. The insurance company settled with the named insured for significantly less than the amount of the loss. The mortgagee was not a party to the settlement. We rejected the insurance company's argument that because the contract of sale clause was not the equivalent of a loss payable clause the mortgagee had no rights under the policy. We held that the contract of sale clause clearly operated as notice to the Company that Conner had an insurable interest in any loss proceeds payable under the policy. 1989 OK 85 ¶ 4, 774 P.2d 1055. ¶ 14 Alliance resists Conner on the ground that the contract of sale clause there expressly stated that the mortgagee was an insured under the policy, while Travel Stop was not named in the Alliance policy. Alliance's suggested distinction ignores the fact that the application and binders submitted to it contained Travel Stop's name and stated that it was lessor of the property. Alliance claims that this information did not put it on notice to determine the nature of Travel Stop's interest in the insurance. We disagree because the fact that Travel Stop was named in the binders, coupled with the other facts discussed above, creates a question of fact as to whether an agreement had been reached among the parties, including Alliance, to insure Travel Stop's interest in the property. Such a factual finding by the trier of fact would entitle Travel Stop to judgment against Alliance for reformation of the insurance policy. ¶ 15 Alliance correctly observes that 36 O.S.1996 Supp. § 1443.B provides that a surplus lines insurance broker, such as Westphalen shall be regarded as representing the insured or the insured's beneficiary and not the insurer. Thus, argues Alliance, Oklahoma Business Agency could not have acted as Alliance's agent, and Alliance could not be liable for Oklahoma Business Agency's alleged transgressions. While this may be true, it does not answer the inquiry here: what was the objective agreement of the parties as shown by the evidence. This question must be answered by the trier of fact. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED, COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED, SUMMARY JUDGMENT REVERSED, AND MATTER REMANDED TO THE TRIAL COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS. KAUGER, C.J., SUMMERS, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur. SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., dissent.