Opinion ID: 3133306
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Post-Conviction Phase

Text: A post-conviction relief petition initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding. Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). Like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). “An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action[.]” Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)) (internal quotations omitted). The “application must contain much more than ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that would suffice for a complaint under [Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.)] 8(a)(1).” Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628. The application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. I.C. § 194903. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443–44, 180 P.3d 476, 482–83 (2008) (first alteration in original). Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court’s own initiative. Summary dismissal of an application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant’s evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant’s favor, would entitle the applicant to the relief requested. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991). However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not controvert the applicant’s evidence because the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). On the other hand, “[w]hen appellate review of a district court’s denial of post-conviction relief follows an evidentiary hearing, rather than a summary dismissal, the evidence must be 19 ‘viewed most favorably to the trial court’s findings.’” McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 849, 103 P.3d 460, 462 (2004) (quoting State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 304, 986 P.2d 323, 327 (1999)). “[T]his Court will not disturb the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (citing I.R.C.P. 52(a)). “This Court exercises free review of the district court’s application of the relevant law to the facts.” McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 849–50, 103 P.3d at 462–63. “Constitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006). “If a district court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, this Court will affirm the order upon the correct theory.” McKinney, 133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. A majority of Abdullah’s post-conviction claims involve allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. “The right to counsel in criminal actions brought by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution.” Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014) (quoting Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011)). This Court utilizes the Strickland two-prong test to determine whether a defendant in a criminal case received effective assistance of counsel. Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 383, 313 P.3d at 39 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). See also State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306, 986 P.2d at 329. To establish deficient performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). The defendant also must overcome a strong presumption “that counsel ‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1407 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Thus, strategic 20 decisions are “virtually unchallengeable” if made after a “thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options.” Id. at 690. Decisions “made after less than complete investigation” are still reasonable to the extent “reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 691. Counsel is permitted to develop a strategy “that was reasonable at the time” and may “balance limited resources in accord with effective trial tactics and strategies.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 789.