Opinion ID: 675149
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Subsequent Modifications

Text: 43 Brandt argues that the District Court should have permitted him to offer evidence of subsequent modifications made to the gratings in the Titzel Tower. Because Vulcan was not the party who made the alterations, Brandt contends, the public policy that typically requires exclusion of subsequent repairs does not pertain here. That is, unlike a defendant, a third-party will not be discouraged from implementing necessary modifications. See, e.g., Pau v. Yosemite Park, 928 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir.1991) (subsequent remedial measure should have been admitted where non-defendant took the measure, since admission of this type of evidence will not inhibit third parties from taking such action); O'Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th Cir.1990) (recognizing same exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 407). 44 While there is authority for Brandt's position, Vulcan points out that (1) evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court, (2) Brandt failed to make an offer of the proof he hoped to admit and has thus failed to preserve this point for appeal, and (3) it is hard to see what bearing post-accident modifications made in the 1980's could have on design negligence that allegedly took place in 1965. 45 Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) provides that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which the questions were asked. Here, Brandt failed to respond to the exclusion with an offer of proof, and the substance of the excluded testimony is not readily apparent from the context in which it was raised. Although Brandt now suggests that the redesigned grates had connecting plates twenty times larger than the tabs that were used at the time of the accident, Brandt did not offer evidence at trial as to what materials were used in the redesign, what motivated the alteration, or when it occurred. Without this information, the District Court had no way of evaluating how relevant this evidence would have been to Brandt's case--particularly given the lengthy time gap between the design and the modification. Likewise, we lack sufficient knowledge to conclude that the District Court's ruling on this matter undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial. See Young v. Rabideau, 821 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 915, 108 S.Ct. 263, 98 L.Ed.2d 221 (1987).