Opinion ID: 1119911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Investigation and Presentation of Alibi Evidence

Text: (6) As noted, the referee found counsel's investigative efforts inadequate. He found that counsel spent less than one-half hour in El Pilon and went nowhere in El Pilon other than the Marquez house. Counsel interviewed three potential witnesses in Mexico and eventually called only one, Dr. Godinez. The referee found that competent counsel would have interviewed petitioner's brothers, sisters, and neighbors in El Pilon, and the sister in nearby Los Reyes. Competent counsel would have interviewed potential alibi witnesses not only as to their general recollection of petitioner's presence in El Pilon but would have made specific inquiries as to whether their recollections could be tied to extrinsically verifiable events such as local festivals. Competent counsel would also have made arrangements for such witnesses to testify. The referee further found that there were potential alibi witnesses whose testimony at the hearing was straightforward and credible and that their testimony would have added great strength to petitioner's alibi defense. We agree that the record supports the referee's assessment of trial counsel's performance as being inadequate. (7) We do not agree, however, with the referee's assessment of prejudice. To prove prejudice petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698]. To determine whether prejudice has been established, we compare the actual trial with the hypothetical trial that would have taken place had counsel competently investigated and presented the alibi defense. ( In re Fields, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1071.) This requires knowledge of all of the evidence that was presented at trial, not just the evidence that was presented at the habeas corpus hearing. Since the referee had not made a full review of the evidence that was presented at trial, we do not find his recommendation persuasive. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we are convinced that there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result had it heard the testimony of all 17 alibi witnesses mentioned in the referee's report. Granted that the referee found their testimony solid and credible, but it was also vague as to specific times. These witnesses tied petitioner's presence to certain events, but their recollection of these events was also somewhat vague. For example, the father of the bride could not remember when the wedding was. Petitioner's mother said he came in January and that he got sick about the time of Rigoberto's wedding. Petitioner's father said he was cutting rice when petitioner and Martina arrived. Moreover, the referee's finding of credibility was made in a vacuum without knowledge of the contradictions presented by trial testimony. Furthermore, the alibi evidence presented at the habeas corpus proceeding was cumulative to that presented at trial. Petitioner's attempt to explain away his confession is unconvincing. Petitioner's knowledge of the details of the two crimes is too extensive and specific to have been learned from others. It strains credulity to assert that petitioner learned the extensive details of both crimes from conversations with other people. As to the 1979 murder, petitioner knew where it occurred, the type of weapon used, and the location of the wound. As to the 1981 murder, petitioner knew the victim was watching television, knew the approximate time of the incident, knew that there was a woman, as well as a little girl, speaking English in the house, knew how people were dressed, and described the vehicle used in the crime. To accept petitioner's explanation that the officers fed him the information would require us to conclude that Detective Johnston, Detective Parrott, and Detective West each lied in his or her testimony. The officers' version is far more believable than petitioner's. Moreover, petitioner's testimony was fraught with inconsistencies and alleged lapses of memory. Petitioner could not even remember whether he returned from Mexico with Martina or alone. Petitioner denied having a relative named Mario, but his sister Ana Maria knew of such a relative. In short, the nature of petitioner's trial testimony was not such as to engender confidence in his credibility. If the jury determined he was not credible, it is hard to believe they would have accepted his trial recantation of the statements made to the investigating officers. In such a case, the number of alibi witnesses presented or not presented becomes irrelevant. The referee was also unaware of the strong identification testimony presented by three eyewitnesses: the victim's wife, Connie Hernandez, and the victim's stepdaughters, Sandra and Tina de la Fuente. Each separately identified petitioner from a live lineup and at trial. Each had sufficient opportunity to observe petitioner and had a strong recollection of his appearance. Finally, each testified that she recognized petitioner as soon as he entered the lineup area. We must contrast the vague recollections of the new alibi witnesses, on the one hand, with the strong and detailed identification testimony and comprehensive confession given by petitioner. After comparing the two, we conclude that the new alibi testimony would have made no difference at trial and would not undermine confidence in the result of the guilt phase of the trial.