Opinion ID: 2338408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the scope of our constitutional provisions relating to indictment and trial by jury

Text: We do not have to rely, however, solely on uniform acquiescence, even though such acquiescence has continued for more than a century, to demonstrate that charges of disorderly conduct are not subject in New Jersey to indictment and trial by jury. The legislation and the decisions, though the decisions are few in number, in two related fields of the summary jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and of his successor, the municipal magistrate, confirm our conclusions. A. Summary Jurisdiction Under the Vice and Immorality Act. This jurisdiction found its beginning in An Act for Suppressing of Immorality passed in 1704, Allinson's Acts 3, which gave the justice of the peace summary power over any person guilty of drunkenness, cursing, swearing, or Breaking the Lord's Day, and over any public housekeeper who shall suffer any tippling or drinking in his house on the Lord's day, punishable by a fine of six shillings and costs. There is no mention in the act of trial by jury. It was not until 1798, however, that New Jersey enacted its version of the Blue Laws which had been prevalent from a much earlier date in most of the American colonies, 2 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 600 (1930), in An Act for suppressing vice and immorality, Paterson's Laws 329. It prohibited in much detail a wide variety of offenses such as work, diversions, selling of goods and travelling on the Sabbath; swearing; cursing; drunkenness; exhibiting plays and shows, unless licensed by three justices, and the like. The jurisdiction given to the justice of the peace was exercised in summary fashion without indictment or trial by jury and the punishment authorized was a specified fine, or in default of payment thereof the defendant was publicly placed in the stocks or in some instances committed to jail. The act was frequently supplemented as new developments in the mode of living required, e.g., L. 1854, c. 160, p. 398, prohibited the transportation of freight, except milk, on Sunday and authorized the justice of the peace to stop and detain any canal boat or railroad car transporting freight on Sunday in violation of the act; L. 1873, c. 563, p. 138, authorized each railroad company to run one passenger train each way over its roads on Sunday for the accommodation of the citizens of this State; and L. 1927, c. 116, p. 218, prohibited the operation of barbershops on Sunday. Many of the provisions of the Vice and Immorality Act had long fallen into disuse and it was not reenacted in the revision of Title 2, L. 1951, c. 344, although certain provisions thereof were carried forward, N.J.S. 2 A :171-1 to 12, supra. As in the case of the act of 1704, Allinson's Acts 3, supra, and as in the case of the various acts relating to disorderly persons, there was no provision for trial by jury. A claim to such a right was raised in one case, Johnson v. Barclay, 16 N.J.L. 1 ( Sup. Ct. 1837), which was brought to reverse a conviction for profane swearing under the act for suppressing vice and immorality. To the objection that the justice of the peace refused the defendant a trial by jury Chief Justice Hornblower replied succinctly: In doing so, the justice was right. Convictions before a justice, were in practice in this state, long before the Constitution was formed  by the twenty-second article of that instrument, the trial by jury was to `remain confirmed' as a part of the law of this (then) colony; but it was not introduced as a new mode of trial, in all cases  it was adopted, or rather continued, as it was then used in England and in this colony, and was not at that time, either there or here, resorted to in cases of summary proceedings and convictions for petty offences. p. 6. It was not until 1839 that the Legislature provided for the first time that a defendant might demand a trial by a jury of six for any offense under the Vice and Immorality Act, except where the justice of the peace tried the case upon his own view or personal knowledge, L. 1839-40, pamph. 4. This provision was carried forward into R.S. 2:211-9, but not into the present revision of N.J.S. 2 A. Except for the vain argument made in Johnson v. Barclay, supra , it has never been urged that there is any right of indictment or trial by jury in summary proceedings before a justice of the peace under either the Vice and Immorality Act or the Disorderly Persons Act in the absence of statutory authorization therefor. B. Summary Jurisdiction Under Ordinances. If the varieties of disorderly conduct and of violations of the Vice and Immorality Act seem large, the number of offenses created by municipal ordinances passed pursuant to power granted to municipalities by statutes is beyond cataloguing, for no attempt has ever been made to collate them on a statewide basis and, indeed, it is often difficult to locate all that have been passed in any given municipality. Violations of ordinances relating to petty offenses cognizable before a justice of the peace or a municipal magistrate differ from disorderly conduct and offenses against the Vice and Immorality Act only in the source of their authorization. All are tried summarily before the same local judge without indictment or trial by jury, and all result, in the event of conviction, in the same kind of limited punishment without branding the defendant as a criminal. The same principles of constitutional law with reference to indictment and trial by jury are applicable to all three classes of cases. There are three decisions relating to petty offenses under municipal ordinances that have a direct bearing on our problem. In State v. Zeigler, 32 N.J.L. 262, 266 ( Sup. Ct. 1867), a case involving a violation of an ordinance regulating oyster cellars and beer shops, Mr. Justice Elmer by way of dictum expressed doubt as to the power of a justice of the peace to impose a penalty exceeding $16, that being the largest sum that could be tried by a justice without a jury before the Constitution of 1776: Many of the charters of municipal corporations in this state authorize the enforcement of their by-laws and ordinances by proceedings of a nature more or less summary, so that the questions so well argued by the counsel in this case, have become of great general importance. The proper construction of those provisions of our constitution, which require that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, deserves the most careful consideration. Speaking for myself, I entertain strong doubts whether a pecuniary penalty exceeding sixteen dollars  that being the largest sum which could be tried by a justice without a jury before the constitution of 1776  can now be enforced otherwise than by the verdict of a jury, if demanded by the defendant; but it is not necessary to decide this question now, and no opinion is intended to be expressed in regard to it. Since the decision in the case of Johnson v. Barclay, 1 Harr. 1, the legislature has authorized jury trials in cases arising under the vice and immorality and bastardy acts, and will probably find it expedient, if not constitutionally necessary, to allow the same privilege in the enforcement of the numerous ordinances, so minutely regulating every man's business, in our incorporated cities and boroughs. If his views as above expressed had been accepted, the right of trial by jury in every suit at law involving more than $16 would perforce have been triable only with the aid of a jury, unless the defendant waived jury trial. The same line of argument would have restricted the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace to the precise kinds of controversies that were cognizable before him prior to the Constitution of 1776, and would have effectually precluded the expansion of the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace which has characterized disorderly conduct, offenses involving vice and immorality, and proceedings under municipal ordinances. Fortunately, the narrow view of the constitutional provisions put forward by him did not prevail. Whatever doubts were raised by the dictum in the Zeigler case as to the authority of Johnson v. Barclay, supra , and so as to the scope of the constitutional provisions under review here, were put to rest by Mr. Justice Depue's opinion in McGear v. Woodruff, 33 N.J.L. 213, 215-217 ( Sup. Ct. 1868). That case brought up by certiorari the conviction of McGear under a municipal ordinance providing for imprisonment not exceeding seven days or a fine not exceeding $20. The right of the defendant below to a trial by jury was denied and the authority of Johnson v. Barclay, supra , upheld in the following language: The next reason relied on is, that the mayor, before whom the action was brought, refused to issue a venire to summon a jury for the trial of the cause, although the defendant applied for a trial by jury; and proceeded to try the complaint without a jury. In this he was right. The tenth section of the act incorporating the city of Bridgeton, (Acts of 1864, p. 538) gives the mayor or any justice of the peace of the city as a magistrate, cognizance to try complaints for violations of the ordinances of the city. It was urged then that the tenth section of the charter, authorizing the common council to provide for the enforcement of its ordinances by imprisonment, not exceeding seven days, or by a fine not exceeding twenty dollars, without providing for trial by jury, is unconstitutional. The language of the seventh section of article first of the constitution of 1844, that `the right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate,' is not substantially different from that of the twenty-second article of the constitution of 1776, `that the inestimable right of trial by jury, shall remain confirmed as part of the law of this colony, without repeal, forever.' By that section it was not intended to introduce trial by jury in cases where it did not exist before, but merely to preserve it inviolate in cases where it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution. Prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1776, convictions before magistrates for petty criminal offences, and violations of police regulations were of frequent occurrence, and were recognized as part of the laws of England. Since the adoption of that constitution, and prior to the adoption of the constitution of 1844, that practice was pursued in this state without objection. It was not intended, by the seventh section of the first act of the constitution of 1844, to introduce trial by jury in these cases where by law and by long practice the right did not previously exist. In State v. Zeigler, S.C., June Term, 1867 [32 N.J.L. 262], Mr. Justice Elmer expressed a doubt whether a pecuniary penalty exceeding sixteen dollars, that being the largest sum which could be tried by a justice without a jury, before the constitution of 1776, can now be enforced, otherwise than by the verdict of a jury, if demanded by the defendant. In Johnson v. Barclay, 1 Harr. 1, this court held in a case where a conviction, under the act for the suppression of vice and immorality was had for penalties above the sum of Sixteen dollars, that the defendant was not entitled to a trial by jury. And that the twenty-second article of the constitution then in force, did not extend to proceedings before magistrates under that act. Indeed, extensive and summary police powers are constantly exercised in all the states of the Union for the repression of breaches of the peace and petty offences, and these statutes are not supposed to conflict with the constitutional provisions securing to the citizen a trial by jury. Sedg. Stat. Constr. 548; see also 1 Bish. Cr. Prac., note 7 to § 758, and cases there cited. This constitutional provision does not prevent the enforcement of the by-laws of a municipal corporation without a jury trial. Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509; Floyd v. Eatontown, 14 Ga. 354. That the remedy under the charter of the city is by an action of debt, instead of a summary conviction, can make no difference. The action was adopted only as a convenient form for the enforcement of ordinances; nor does it alter the case that the legislation that called the ordinance into existence, was that of a municipal corporation, under powers conferred upon it by the legislature, and not by the legislature of the state. Ordinances adopted by a municipal corporation under delegated powers in its charter, become part of the police regulations of the state  local in their operation  but, nevertheless, authorized by the supreme authority in the state; and it is competent for the legislature to authorize the enforcement of them by a form of proceedings that would be lawful if the ordinances were legislative acts. In principle, the case of Johnson v. Barclay covers this point. The authority of that case should control the decision of this court in the present case. (Emphasis supplied.) Howe v. Treasurer of City of Plainfield, 37 N.J.L. 145 ( Sup. Ct. 1874) is of importance not only for its approval of McGear v. Woodruff, supra , and its cogent statement of the sound grounds on which that decision rests, but also for its analysis of the relation between an offense against a municipal ordinance and a misdemeanor against the State, a distinction which becomes important in the consideration of the cases with which we shall next have to deal: The ordinances being strictly within the terms of the city charter, if we reverse the judgment below on the ground stated, we must necessarily hold that the charter, in the particular under consideration, is void. This we are asked to do, because, as alleged, it is in violation of that provision of our state constitution, which ordains that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. It was held in the case of McGear v. Woodruff, 4 Vroom 213 [33 N.J.L. 213], that the constitutional provision above referred to was substantially the same as that upon the same subject contained in the Constitution of 1776, and that neither was intended to extend the right of trial by jury to cases to which it did not previously attach. In that case, as well as in the case of Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89, it is clearly shown that prior to 1776, the legality of convictions before magistrates for petty offences and for violations of police regulations without trial by jury, was unquestioned. In the latter case, Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the court, says: `It is the old right, whatever it was, that we previously enjoyed that must remain inviolate alike in its mode of enjoyment and in its extent. What, then, was this right thus cherished and thus perpetuated? We inquire not now after the mode in which such trial was conducted. Our business at present is to ascertain how far the right to a trial by jury extended  to what controversies it was applicable. It was a right  the title to which was founded upon usage  and its measure is therefore to be sought in the usage which prevailed at the time when it was asserted. But never in England was there any usage, and, consequently, was there any right in the subject that every litigated question of fact should be submitted to a jury. In all that large class of cases which are cognizable in courts of equity, there never was any right of trial by jury, nor did the right extend to many other civil and criminal proceedings. Summary convictions for petty offences against statutes were always sustained, and they were never suffered to be in conflict with the common law right to a trial by jury. The ancient as well as the modern British statutes at large, are full of acts of Parliament authorizing such convictions, without referring to those which have been passed against non-attendance upon public worship of the established church, against refusal to take oaths of allegiance, against profaneness and embezzlement, all of which provided for conviction and punishment of offenders without the intervention of a jury, it may suffice to notice the vagrant acts and the proceedings under them.' The charter of Bridgeton, which was under consideration in the case of McGear v. Woodruff , authorized the common council to provide for the enforcement of its ordinances by imprisonment not exceeding seven days, or a fine not exceeding $20, and made the offense cognizable before a justice of the peace or mayor of the city; and the authority thus conferred, was held to be within the constitutional power of the legislature. I cannot distinguish that case, in principle, from the present, unless it may be upon the ground urged, that the case before us is one of conviction for an offence of selling intoxicating drinks by less measure than one quart without license, for that purpose first had and obtained, which is an offence indictable by general state law, and not, as in the case of McGear v. Woodruff , for violation of a city ordinance, by doing an act not indictable by the state law. I do not think that this feature of the case now under consideration, takes it without the principle adjudicated in the case of McGear v. Woodruff . I am aware that there is a want of harmony in the laws relating to the power of the legislature to delegate to a municipality the right to punish by law, as an offence against the laws of the municipality, an act which, by the law of the state, is a crime or misdemeanor. It is argued, with some force, that such punishment is in violation not only of the constitutional guaranty of trial by jury, but of those other provisions of the constitution which ordain that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury; and that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. It could serve no useful purpose to refer to and comment on the many adjudged cases in which the question now presented to us is discussed. Judge Cooley, in his Treatise on Constitutional Limitations, p. 199, advances the doctrine that the same act may constitute an offence, both against the state and the municipal corporation, and that both may punish without violation of any constitutional principle; and I think he is abundantly supported, in principle as well as authority. If this be so, the arguments urged in behalf of the position taken by counsel of defendant, lose their force. I do not think the test, as Judge Dillon, in his work on Municipal Corporations, § 361, inclines to hold, is whether the act prohibited by ordinance is embraced in and made indictable by the criminal code of the state, but rather whether it may not be an act not only against the peace and dignity of the state, but also subversive of, or dangerous to the peace, good order, safety or health of the municipality. If the prohibited act may have this double aspect and prove injurious in its consequences to both jurisdictions, I do not see why it may not be prohibited and punished as well by municipal ordinance as by state law. The offence against the municipality is a different one from that against the state, though both offences proceed from the same act. In the case of Moore v. People of State of Illinois, 14 How. 13 [14 L.Ed. 306], it was held that the same act may be an offence against a state and against the United States. In that case it appears that one Eels was indicted and convicted under the statute of Illinois, for unlawfully secreting a certain negro slave, owing service to a citizen of the state of Missouri. A writ of error was brought to the Supreme Court of the United States and the legality of the conviction questioned, on the ground that the statute of Illinois was void, because it subjected the offender to a double punishment for a single offence. The argument urged was, that inasmuch as the act for which the defendant stood indicted in the state court was one for which he was punishable by act of Congress, if proceedings under both statutes were allowed to stand, double punishment would be inflicted. The court denied both the fact assumed in the proposition and the inference sought to be drawn from it. Justice Grier, delivering the opinion of the court, says: `But admitting that the plaintiff in error may be liable to an action under the act of Congress for the same act of harboring and preventing the owner from retaking his slave, it does not follow that he would be twice punished for the same offence. An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law. A man may be compelled to make reparation in damages to the injured party, and be liable also to punishment for a breach of the public peace in consequence of the same act; and may be said, in common parlance, to be twice punished for the same offence. Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a state or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.' These views of the learned judge, so clearly expressed, seem to me to embrace and settle the whole subject matter under consideration. The defendant in the case before us, has been summarily prosecuted and convicted, not for a criminal offence against the state, but for an offence committed against the city, in violation of its internal police regulations. The same legal principles adjudicated in the case of McGear v. Woodruff , and Byers v. Commonwealth , above referred to, underlie and sustain the judgment under review. There are undoubtedly many criminal offences, the prohibition and punishment of which, cannot constitutionally be delegated by the legislature to a municipality as offences cognizable by it under the powers of police, but I do not think the retailing of intoxicating drinks, or the keeping of tippling houses, is included within that category. The defendant below was not entitled to a trial by jury. (at 147-151) These two cases, which have never been questioned, establish the scope of the summary jurisdiction of local judges over petty offenses covered by ordinances, and all that is said in these cases is equally applicable to disorderly persons and offenses under the vice and immorality act. C. The Doctrine of State v. Anderson and the Right to Indictment in Summary Proceedings. State v. Anderson, 40 N.J.L. 224 ( Sup. Ct. 1878), requires particular attention not only because of the unusual statutory scheme that the court had to deal with, but because of the reliance placed on the decision  improperly it seems to us on analysis  in subsequent cases, for the Anderson case cannot be understood alone but must be read in the light of Meyer v. State, 41 N.J.L. 6 ( Sup. Ct. 1879), affirmed 42 N.J.L. 145 ( E. & A. 1880), which followed closely on it. The statute under review in this Anderson case, Rev. (1877) 493, provided that the clauses in the earlier statute: making it an indictable offense to sell ardent spirits without a license, shall not thereafter apply to offences committed in any of the incorporated cities of this state, the ordinances of which shall provide for the punishment of the unlicensed sale of spiritous liquors, and for the punishment of the same on Sunday. The second section of the same statute enacts, that where the ordinances of such cities provide for the punishment of the offense of keeping a disorderly house, it shall not thereafter be lawful to prosecute, by indictment, any person accused of keeping a disorderly house in such city, where the alleged offence consists only of the continuous or frequent violation of the provisions of the laws above mentioned inhibiting the sale of ardent spirits by unqualified persons. (at 224, 225) There were two indictments before the court, one for the sale of ardent spirits without a license and the other for keeping a disorderly house wherein ardent spirits were habitually sold contrary to law. Chief Justice Beasley thus stated the issues for adjudication: As it is manifest that the two indictments in this case, the one being for the unlicensed sale of ardent spirits, and the other for repetitions of the same offence, contravene, with perfect directness, the prohibitions of this last cited statute, the only questions to be solved are  First. Whether such act is in force; and, Second. Whether it is constitutional. On the first question he concluded that the act was in effect and he then proceeded to consider the constitutionality of the act and of the indictments. As to the first indictment the court held: The offence of selling liquor without a license is a purely statutory offence. Independently of a prohibition by the legislature, such a sale is neither immoral nor illegal, and the law-maker, therefore, can put it under such control as may be thought best. Not being in its nature an indictable offence, it can be made punishable by a penalty, without indictment. (at 228) On the other indictment, however, the Chief Justice ruled otherwise: The keeping of a disorderly house is a crime indictable at common law, and in this state it is punishable by fine and imprisonment in the state prison. Therefore, it is clear that if this offence can, for the purpose of crimination, trial and punishment, be put into the hands of these municipal authorities, it follows that all common law offences of the same grade can be, in like manner, so deposited. This, I think, cannot be conceded. Such an arrangement would, in a very plain way, infringe an important provision of the constitution of this state. Article I., section 9, of that instrument declares that `No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in cases cognizable by justices of the peace,' etc. The purpose of this clause was to prevent the bringing of any citizen under the reproach of being arraigned for crime before the public, unless, by a previous examination taken in private, the grand inquest had certified that there existed some solid ground for making the charge.    The reputation of every man was thus put under the care of a single specified body. The language of the constitutional clause is very comprehensive, and the specified exceptions show conclusively that it was intended to cover the residue of the entire field of criminal accusation. In the presence of such a prohibition how then is it permissible to put a man on trial before a city court, charged with this common law offence, without the preliminary sanction of a grand jury? If it be said the punishment is only a fine, the answer is, the restraining clause in question has nothing to do with the result or effect of the trial, its object being to save from the shame of being brought before the bar of a criminal court, except in the authorized method after an antecedent inquisition. I am clearly of opinion that a trial of a person for this offence before the municipal court would be an act utterly void. (at 227) (Emphasis supplied) In contradistinction to the McGear and Howe cases, supra, which involved no intermingling of statutes and ordinances, the court was here confronted with a novel statutory attempt to delegate the extent of the punishment of a crime, which is an offense against the State, to each municipality that might see fit to legislate thereon. The offense remained a crime, but the punishment was to be regulated by ordinance  a unique kind of local option as to the extent to which the crime would be punished or tolerated. The defendant, having committed a crime against the State, would have a criminal record, even though his punishment was fixed by ordinance. Such a statutory device, if extended to all crimes, would have spelt the end of the enforcement of the criminal law of the State as a state system and would have resulted in the substitution therefor of the prevailing mores of each community. One can well understand Chief Justice Beasley's repugnance to such a novel and destructive method of criminal law enforcement. It is important to observe that throughout his opinion he dealt with the offenses before him as crimes, as they were in fact, and not as disorderly conduct or an offense under the Vice and Immorality Act or a violation of a municipal ordinance setting up a summary jurisdiction over some petty offense. Nowhere in his opinion did he treat petty offenses or the constitutional requirements relating to the trial thereof, but he dealt solely with the problem before him as a crime. The Anderson case did not go to the Court of Errors and Appeals, but a similar case, Meyer v. State, 41 N.J.L. 6 ( Sup. Ct. 1879), came before the Supreme Court the next year. There the defendant had been convicted of keeping a disorderly house wherein liquor was habitually sold on Sundays under the same legislative scheme as in the Anderson case. There was also an ordinance in Newark prohibiting, with a penalty, the sale of liquor on Sunday. After referring to his decision in the Anderson case, Chief Justice Beasley sustained the conviction of the defendant and the validity of the ordinance fixing the penalty for the crime for which the defendant had been indicted on a rationale entirely different from that set forth in the Anderson case: In the present instance this subject is presented in a new aspect. The contention at this time is, that the ordinance in the city of Newark forbidding the sale of liquor on Sunday, has superseded the provisions of the state law prohibitive of such sale.    It is certainly indisputable that, by force of the law, wherever the municipal ordinance provides a punishment for the sale, on Sunday, of liquors of the kind specified, the punishment denounced against such act by the general law is not applicable. For the act of making a single forbidden sale on Sunday, the seller is amenable only under the law of the city; he is, for such an offence, dispunishable under the law of the state.    The contention is, that a series of such prohibited acts is nothing more, nor worse, than multiplied violations of a municipal ordinance, and that such violations, however numerous or continued, cannot become an indictable offence at common law. But this argument is founded on an assumption, the truth of which cannot be conceded. This traffic in sales of spirituous liquor on a Sunday is obviously something more than the disregard of a local ordinance. It is the general statutory law of the state that prohibits it everywhere, and it is this law that everywhere provides for its punishment. The legislature has not seen fit to leave it to the city of Newark to decide whether the practice in question shall be permitted or forbidden within its corporate bounds, but it has imperatively required that it shall be forbidden alike in this city as within the state at large. The statutory situation in this respect is this: in the state generally the act makes the offence punishable by indictment; in cities the same punishment follows the crime, unless in those cases in which an ordinance prescribes the punishment. Thus, by the general law, provision is made that this traffic shall be penal in the city of Newark; the people of that locality cannot dispense with such penal consequence, for all they can do is to declare how great such penalty shall be. By this adjustment the state prohibits the traffic, the local ordinance fixes the extent of the punishment; consequently, when the illegal traffic is practiced, the state law is violated and the penalty of the ordinance is incurred. When the rule of universal cessation of this traffic on Sundays is established by legislation, it is altogether a superficial view of the matter that regards an habitual violation of such policy in the light of a mere infringement of local police; for by such traffic the legislative policy of the state at large is infringed, and such series of acts becomes, upon general principles, an indictable offence. (at 7-8) (Emphasis supplied) Here both the state statute and the municipal ordinance permitting local option as to punishment for a crime stand.