Opinion ID: 2357961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Respondent's Motions and Legal Objections.

Text: Respondent presented to the hearing committee a large number of motions and objections to hearing committee procedures and rulings. The Board affirms the hearing committee's rulings on these matters, which were set forth in its Pre-Hearing Order Number One, dated October 20, 1982, and in the Hearing Committee's January 24, 1983, Report and Recommendation. We adopt and incorporate herein the hearing committee's rulings on these points, and will merely add a few words on some of the issues that Respondent presses before us. First, Respondent argues at length that Bar Counsel's subpoena for Respondent's bank records failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422, as interpreted in a July 8, 1982, District Court decision in John Doe v. Board on Professional Responsibility, D.D.C., C.A. No. 81-2683 [July 8, 1982]. We agree with the hearing committee's holding that there is no basis for an exclusionary rule prohibiting the introduction into evidence of these bank records, even assuming arguendo that Bar Counsel had failed to comply with applicable procedural requirements of the Act. We must emphasize, however, that the District Court decision in question was vacated upon reconsideration on February 3, 1983, and the District Court's most recent decision on this point holds that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and its Board on Professional Responsibility are not agencies of the federal government subject to the terms of the Right to Financial Privacy Act.[ [1] ] Second, Respondent argues that he was deprived of due process by the hearing committee's refusal to allow a voir dire of the hearing committee members before Respondent decided whether to seek recusal of any hearing committee members pursuant to Chapter VIII, Section 3(1)(c) of the Internal Rules of this Board. There is no general right to a voir dire of hearing committee members  who serve this Board, and the Court of Appeals, in a quasi-judicial capacity  any more than there is any such right before a party files a motion to recuse a trial judge about to hear his or her case. Moreover, when the hearing committee chairman asked Respondent what issues or questions he would raise in a voir dire, if allowed to conduct one, the matters set forth by Respondent made it clear that he had no particular factual basis for a challenge to any hearing committee member or for a voir dire on any specific area of inquiry. See Tr. 3-4. Third, Respondent argues to this Board that he was deprived of due process because Bar Counsel submitted certain proposed documentary exhibits to the hearing committee in advance of the hearing. Respondent neglects to note that the procedural rule in question allows both Bar Counsel and Respondent to submit their documentary evidence to the hearing committee in advance of the hearing date. See Chapter VIII, Section 1(4), Internal Rules of the Board on Professional Responsibility. The purpose of this rule, of course, is to allow the parties to exchange exhibits in advance of the hearing so as to determine whether there are any objections as to admissibility of particular exhibits, and also to allow the hearing committee members to begin reviewing the frequently voluminous record in advance of the hearing date. This procedure is quite similar to the practice in many courts which require the submission of pretrial briefs and proposed exhibits in advance of the trial so as to expedite proceedings. Respondent's constitutional challenge to the Board rule allowing advance submission of proposed exhibits is frivolous. Finally, Respondent argues that the charges at issue here should be dismissed because the petition in this matter was the result of Bar Counsel's improperly reopening a matter which had previously been the subject of inquiry. The record in this matter reveals that Docket No. 224-79 was initially based upon a rather vague, handwritten complaint filed by Ms. Loreta Pailin. Respondent answered this complaint on December 15, 1979, and the complainant failed to respond to the explanation furnished by Mr. Burton. Nothing in the complaint or in Mr. Burton's response suggested any commingling of funds, and Bar Counsel on February 1, 1980, dismissed Ms. Pailin's complaint. However, on March 1, 1982, Bar Counsel wrote to Mr. Burton and indicated that he was reopening this investigation, because recent information concerning this case indicates that you misappropriated and converted the funds you were holding in your client trust account on behalf of Mr. Nathaniel Pailin and Ms. Loreta Pailin. Respondent was offered an opportunity to answer this additional charge, and subsequently Bar Counsel filed the formal petition leading to these proceedings. Under Court rules Bar Counsel is obligated to investigate allegations of unethical conduct which come to his attention, via complaint or otherwise. Rule XI, § 6(1)(b), D.C.App. Rules. Consequently, Bar Counsel was free unilaterally to open a new investigation of Respondent based upon new information suggesting commingling. Simply because Bar Counsel chose to term this a reopening of a previously docketed and closed case does not result in any prejudice to Respondent. Bar Counsel's closing of an investigation without filing a formal petition or initiating hearings of any kind hardly constitutes an action to which the doctrine of res judicata may be applied, nor does it provide a basis for Respondent's argument that he can never be charged with disciplinary violations which could have been, but were not, spelled out in a citizen's complaint.