Opinion ID: 1631810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendants' Merits Argument

Text: First, the defendants argue on appeal that the entire premise of the plaintiffs' actionthat the admission contract contains an undefined term as to priceis incorrect. Specifically, the defendants contend that the language in the admission contract stating that the plaintiffs will be charged in accordance with the regular rates and terms of the Facility specifically defines that the price that will be charged is in accordance with the particular hospital's chargemaster, a list that specifies charges for all procedures and treatments the hospital might administer. The defendants contend that it is impossible to know at the time an admission contract is executed what medical services might ultimately be required, but that, nevertheless, the actual charge for all medical treatments is defined in the chargemaster. See Murray v. Alfab, Inc., 601 So.2d 878, 886 (Ala.1992) (`It is not, therefore, necessary that the price should be fixed by the contract itself ... provided that the parties have settled upon some method by which the price may be determined with certainty.' (quoting 1 F. Mechem, The Law of Sale of Personal Property § 210 (1901))). In support of their argument, the defendants cite several cases from other jurisdictions interpreting hospital admission contracts as containing defined price terms. See DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir.2008) (holding that the phrase in an admission contract requiring the patient to pay all charges was a price term that was not in fact open because `all charges' unambiguously can only refer to [the hospital's] uniform charges set forth in its Chargemaster); Cox v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 279 Ga.App. 586, 589, 631 S.E.2d 792, 796 (2006) (rejecting the argument that an admission contract that provided that patients pay a hospital for medical services in accordance with the rates and terms of the hospital created an open price term for which a `reasonable' price must be substituted by the court); Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 179 N.C.App. 120, 125, 633 S.E.2d 113, 116 (2006) (holding that an admission contract calling for a patient to pay the regular rates and terms of the Hospital at the time of patient's discharge referred to the rates of service contained in the hospital's chargemaster and thus was definite and certain or capable of being made so); and Woodruff v. Fort Sanders Sevier Med. Ctr., (No. E2007-00727-COA-R3-CV, Jan. 16, 2008) (Tenn.Ct.App.2008) (not reported in S.W.3d) (holding that an admission contract specifying that a patient will pay a hospital's rates and terms was not an indefinite term). But see Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tennessee, Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191 (Tenn.2001) (holding that an admission contract specifying that the patient agrees to pay a hospital for all charges was not sufficiently definite). Because, the defendants maintain, the charges for medical services are in fact readily identifiable, the trial court erred in resorting to a determination of an implied reasonable charge without first addressing whether the admission contract contained an open term. In opposition to this argument, the plaintiffs cite several Alabama decisions holding that a determination on the ultimate merits of an action during class certification is improper. See Mayflower Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 894 So.2d 637, 641 (Ala.2004) (On a motion for class certification, the sole issue before the trial court is whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met. ...); Mitchell v. H & R Block, Inc., 783 So.2d 812, 816 (Ala.2000) (holding that a trial court should not make a determination of the merits of a plaintiff's case in a class-certification hearing); and Ex parte Government Employees Ins. Co., 729 So.2d 299, 303 (Ala.1999). The defendants do not argue that the cases cited by the plaintiffs should be overruled and do not offer a procedure for this Court to use in reviewing a challenge to the merits in an appeal from a class-action certification. [3] Further, the defendants did not seek to certify these issues for an interlocutory appeal under Rule 5, Ala. R.App. P. [4] Therefore, we decline to review the merits of the plaintiffs' claims.