Opinion ID: 804543
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: enters a habitation, or a building (or any por-

Text: tion of a building) not then open to the public, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault; or (2) remains concealed, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or an assault, in a building or habitation; or (3) enters a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony, theft, or an assault. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a). As is apparent from the face of the statute, with intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault is an element of the offenses set out in § 30.02(a)(1) and § 30.02(a)(2). Bonilla, however, was charged with and UNITED STATES v. BONILLA 13 pleaded guilty to a violation of § 30.02(a)(3), which replaces the with-intent element with the requirement that the defendant committed or attempted to commit the specified crimes. Bonilla argues on appeal that Taylor’s intent-to-commit-a- crime element requires contemporaneous intent — intent that accompanies or coincides with the commission of the other elements. Because § 30.02(a)(3) only requires that the defendant unlawfully enter and thereafter commit or attempt to commit a felony, the intent necessary for conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) need not have existed at the moment of entry. Bonilla thus contends that his conviction under § 30.02(a)(3) is not a conviction for generic burglary as defined by Taylor. For its part, the government argues that § 30.02(a)(3) in substance prohibits the same conduct as generic burglary, which is all that Taylor requires. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 ([A]n offense constitutes ‘burglary’ for purposes of a § 924(e) sentence enhancement if . . . its statutory definition substantially corresponds to ‘generic’ burglary. . . . (emphasis added)). The government notes that because Taylor defines generic burglary to include offenses involving unlawful remaining on the premises, generic burglary necessarily encompasses offenses where the intent to commit a crime is formed while the defendant remained in the building. The government thus contends that, contrary to Bonilla’s assertion, generic burglary does not require that the intent exist at the moment of entry. And because proof of the completed or attempted crime required by § 30.02(a)(3) necessarily shows that the defendant formulated the requisite intent either before entering the building or while he remained in the building, the government asserts that the crime set out in § 30.02(a)(3) substantially corresponds to generic burglary.