Opinion ID: 677327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutional Claims Against the Federal Agents

Text: 34 The court's dismissal of the claims against the individual defendants on the ground that they have qualified immunity was flawed both procedurally and substantively. First, qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of pleading in his answer. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-37, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923-24, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). A plaintiff, in order to state a claim of constitutional violation, need not plead facts showing the absence of such a defense. See, e.g., id.; Oliver Schools, Inc. v. Foley, 930 F.2d 248, 253 (2d Cir.1991). Thus, even if good faith were the test for qualified immunity, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 815-20, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-39 (proper standard is objective reasonableness, not subjective good faith), the court erred in dismissing, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Castro's claims against the individual defendants on the ground that she had failed to plead that they acted in bad faith. 35 Second, while defendants moved in the alternative for summary judgment, the granting of that relief would have been no more appropriate, given the posture of the case and the substance of the affidavits. Although a defense of qualified immunity should ordinarily be decided at the earliest possible stage in litigation, Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, ----, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646-47 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042-43 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), and it is a defense that often can and should be decided on a motion for summary judgment, see, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 536-37; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, some limited and carefully tailored discovery may be needed before summary judgment will be appropriate, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 646-47 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3042-43 n. 6. Where the claimant's description of the events suggests that the defendants' conduct was unreasonable, and the facts that the defendants claim are dispositive are solely within the knowledge of the defendants and their collaborators, summary judgment can rarely be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity for discovery as to the questions bearing on the defendants' claims of immunity. See generally id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Here, Castro represented that her attempts to obtain information from the federal defendants and the county sheriff had fallen on deaf ears, and she asked for an opportunity to conduct discovery. The court erred in taking the federal agents' affidavits at face value and denying discovery. 36 Third, on a motion for summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, the defendants bear the burden of showing that as to that defense there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried. See generally Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d Cir.1987). Here, though defendants submitted a statement that referred to Local Rule 10(j), they did not even assert that there was no genuine issue as to the facts they alleged. Further, the submission of an unsigned, unsworn, corroborating document in the name of the sheriff, with the representation that an executed original would be submitted, followed by the unexplained failure ever to submit an executed document, may raise a question as to whether the federal agents' description of the events and their responsibility for them was accurate. 37 Finally, even if the case had been procedurally ripe for a summary judgment motion on the ground of qualified immunity, the federal agents' affidavits, even taken at face value, did not suffice to establish their right to that defense. Though a mere mistake in the performance of an official duty may not deprive the officer of qualified immunity, that doctrine does not shield performance that either (a) was in violation of clearly established law, or (b) was plainly incompetent. See, e.g., Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 537 (The qualified immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'  (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986))). With respect to both the legal question and the matter of competence, there is a component of objective reasonableness to be assessed in the officials' actions. Thus, the doctrine shields officers from suit for damages if  'a reasonable officer could have believed'  his action  'to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information [he] possessed.'  Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 536 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40 (emphasis ours)). Officials are entitled to qualified immunity [when] their decision was reasonable, even if mistaken. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 537 (emphasis added); see also id. (test is whether the agents acted reasonably under settled law in the circumstances (emphasis added)); Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1994) (probable cause exists even where it is based upon mistaken information, so long as the arresting officer was reasonable in relying on that information (emphasis added)). 38 Here, defendants' affidavits did not proffer details from which either the doctrinal or the factual reasonableness of their actions would have been established. For example, though it was the federal agents' burden to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries, Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2098, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), their bare-bones affidavits did not provide information from which exigent circumstances could be found for entry into even the correct apartment. Bologna's affidavit stated that he had received and relayed a tip that heroin was being sold in the Amsterdam area; but it did not reveal whether the tip had been given hours, days, or weeks before the raid. Nor did the federal agents' affidavits reveal any details as to the information given by the informant, such as whether the apartment in question was a temporary or a relatively permanent sale site, or whether the drug dealer had posted lookouts. The affidavits did not provide any information suggesting that if the officers had taken the time to obtain a search warrant, flight or destruction of evidence was likely to occur in the interim. The affidavits simply stated that the officers planned to enter as soon as the informant signaled them that he had seen heroin in the apartment. We know of no authority for the proposition that exigent circumstances for a warrantless entry into a residence exist solely on the basis of a sighting of heroin therein. [N]o exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a serious crime has been committed. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S.Ct. at 2099. Consequently, there are factual questions as to whether the officials could have had a reasonable belief that their actions with respect to the correct apartment were not in violation of clearly established law. 39 Further, there were factual questions as to whether targeting Castro's apartment was a mistake that bespoke plain incompetence. There was no indication in the affidavits as to what the confidential informant had told the officials to identify either the seller of the drugs or the apartment in which they were being sold. Nor was there any statement as to whether prior to the raid there had been any surveillance of the correct apartment. Castro asserted in her affidavit that the correct apartment had been under surveillance for a month; though she did not cite any supporting evidence, defendants made no effort to contradict that assertion. 40 For all of the above reasons, the dismissal of Castro's claims against the individual defendants was error. 41 We also reject the federal agents' argument that the district court could properly have dismissed the complaint against them on the ground that it simply failed to state a claim of constitutional dimension. Defendants rely on cases such as Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not assert a constitutional claim by alleging a merely negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property, id. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 663 (emphasis in original). The Daniels Court, emphasizing that the primary purpose of allowing damages for constitutional violations is to prevent abuse of power, held that no constitutional claim was stated by the allegation that the plaintiff tripped over a pillow that defendant prison officials had negligently left on a prison stairway. Id. at 332, 106 S.Ct. at 665-66. Here, Castro's complaint in no way indicated either that the agents had probable cause to enter even the right apartment or that exigent circumstances would have justified their warrantless entry into that apartment. Construed liberally in her favor, see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), the complaint alleged that the federal agents, acting without a search warrant or probable cause, entered and searched Castro's home, a potential abuse of power that rises above mere negligence. The district court properly did not dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim of constitutional dimension.