Opinion ID: 2594248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Our Holding in Eklutna II Applies to this Case.

Text: The Railroad argues on appeal that a reading of AS 42.40.390 allowing the Railroad to promulgate rules that conflict with local ordinances is not inconsistent with this court's opinion in Eklutna II. The Railroad focuses on the following portion of our discussion of AS 42.40.390: This provision presents some evidence that the legislature intended to exempt the Railroad from local zoning laws. Its reference to exclusive rules might indicate that no other government's rules would apply on Railroad land. But the term exclusive could also be read as a choice-of-law provision  if the Railroad Board promulgated rules conflicting with local ordinances, the Railroad's regulations would govern, but in the absence of a conflict, local rules are unaffected.[ [35] ] The Railroad also points to two footnotes  one included in this court's decision, the other in the dissent  and argues that taken together, the footnotes indicate that AS 42.40.390 must be read as allowing the Railroad, at a minimum, to adopt land use rules that would trump conflicting local ordinances. The dissent examined a 1984 meeting of the Senate Transportation Committee at which the committee considered whether to repeal AS 42.40.390. In particular, the dissent considered a memorandum that Tamara Cook, Deputy Director of the Division of Legal Services of the Legislative Affairs Agency, wrote to the committee. [36] Cook concluded that AS 42.40.390 was either intended to grant zoning authority to the Railroad or to exclude railroad property from zoning regulations. [37] In a footnote, the dissent suggested that the court had offered a third alternative  namely, that AS 42.40.390 was a choice-of-law provision mandating that rules promulgated by the Railroad would govern in the event of a conflict. [38] The court responded in a footnote of its own, stating that [t]he Railroad Board has not promulgated any such regulation. Contrary to the dissent's assertion ... a choice-of-law rule does not grant any immunity or authority, but only resolves conflicts between laws. [39] Based on these footnotes, the Railroad argues that both the majority and the dissent agreed that if the Railroad was not immune, it could, at a minimum, adopt rules that would govern over conflicting local ordinances. But the Railroad's argument neglects an important portion of our opinion in Eklutna II. Examining the same legislative history considered in the dissent, we analyzed some possible interpretations of AS 42.40.390. [40] We noted that various members of the Senate Transportation Committee agreed that the provision was not intended to shield the Railroad from local regulation. [41] We observed that one senator stated that the provision was originally added to ensure that Railroad bonds would be tax exempt under a federal law, and another senator advocated retaining the provision because the Railroad's status as a tax-exempt bonding authority was again in question. [42] Thus, our discussion in Eklutna II of AS 42.40.390 considered a number of possible interpretations of the statute. But we did not decide which, if any, of these interpretations was correct. Regarding the possibility that the statute was intended as a choice-of-law provision, we stated only that the term `exclusive' could also be read as a choice-of-law provision and concluded that AS 42.40.390 is not a clear indication of legislative intent to exempt the Railroad from local zoning. [43] The dissent's view [44] is that no plausible alternative to its interpretation of the term exclusive rules in AS 42.40.390 remains once we reject the theoretical interpretation of the term exclusive we posited in Eklutna II. Yet in this appeal, the Municipality has offered yet another possible interpretation of AS 42.40.390: that it was intended to grant the Railroad independent authority to convey Railroad land to third parties. [45] The Municipality's interpretation reminds us that too much attention has been focused on the term exclusive rules in the first sentence of AS 42.40.390 without examining the entire context of the provision. [46] The entirety of AS 42.40.390 reads as follows: The board may adopt exclusive rules governing land use by parties having interests in or permits for land owned or managed by the corporation. The power conferred by this section is exercised for the common health, safety, and welfare of the public and to the extent constitutionally permissible, may not be limited by the terms and conditions of leases, contracts, or other transactions. (Emphasis added.) This language expressly grants the Railroad power to authorize and regulate activities by others on its land. If this passage were concerned with the relationship between the Railroad and other government entities, then it would have stated that the Railroad may adopt exclusive rules governing its own conduct on its land, rather than exclusive rules governing land use by other parties having interests in or permits for Railroad land. And if this section were intended to confer immunity from compliance with local land use regulations, the second sentence, stating that the Railroad's power is not to be limited by the terms and conditions of leases, contracts, or other transactions, would presumably also have mentioned local regulations, ordinances, or statutes. The lack of such language, not to mention the absence of the word immunity or any derivative or equivalent, lends further weight to the inference that this passage is not concerned with the resolution of conflicts between rules adopted by the Railroad and local land use regulations. It is instead concerned with ensuring that the Railroad has the power to control activities on its land even when its wishes to deviate from those of its permittees. The dissent argues that this interpretation  that AS 42.40.390 is concerned with regulating the relationship between the Railroad and third parties on its land  dispenses with the term exclusive. [47] But when the term exclusive is read in the context of the entire provision, it appears that the provision was aimed at ensuring that the Railroad's power over its own land is exclusive in the sense that it cannot be abrogated by the terms and conditions of leases, contracts, or other transactions entered into with parties having interests in or permits for land owned or managed by the corporation. Merely because the Railroad's powers over its own land are exclusive with regard to third parties, in contrast to the usual situation where contracting parties are free to bargain away their rights, does not imply that the Railroad's powers are exclusive with regard to other government entities. Far from being absurd, as suggested by the dissent, [48] government entities must commonly contend with conflicts of jurisdiction, whether it be in matters of property law, commercial law, or environmental law. [49] We have observed that issues previously adjudicated can only be reconsidered where there exist exceptional circumstances presenting a clear error constituting a manifest injustice. [50] The law of the case doctrine precludes consideration of issues that have been adjudicated in a previous appeal in the same case. [51] Even issues not explicitly discussed in the first appellate opinion, but directly involved with or necessarily inhering in the decision will be considered the law of the case. [52] The doctrine is grounded in the principle of stare decisis. We will overrule a prior decision only when clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent. [53] The Railroad argues that this court did not decide whether AS 42.40.390 is a choice-of-law provision in Eklutna II because the Railroad had not yet adopted a land use regulation. But the Railroad is asking us to reconsider arguments that we considered in Eklutna II. After analyzing the meaning and legislative history of AS 42.40.390 at length, we concluded that the meaning of the statute was not clear. [54] This conclusion is in keeping with our overall holding in the case: that ARCA provides no clear indication of the legislature's intent with regard to local land use authority over the Railroad and that Alaska law does not presume state immunity to local zoning. [55] The lack of clarity in AS 42.40.390 and other ARCA provisions led us to adopt a balancing of interests test, as courts in at least fourteen other jurisdictions have done when faced with unclear statutes under similar circumstances. [56] It does not appear that there are any changed circumstances that shed new light on the meaning of the statute as it was originally enacted. Nor are we convinced that there exist exceptional circumstances presenting a clear error constituting a manifest injustice. We decline to revisit the issue here. The Railroad also argues that our requirement that the Railroad apply for a conditional use permit is clearly dicta with respect to AS 42.40.390. But in fact, the requirement that the Railroad must attempt to comply with local zoning laws is a central element of the balancing of interests test that we adopted in Eklutna II. [57] The proper interpretation of AS 42.40.390 was adjudicated at length in Eklutna II. At the least, the meaning of AS 42.40.390 was directly involved with or necessarily inhering in this court's decision in Eklutna II. [58] For these reasons, we apply the law of the case doctrine to this appeal and affirm the superior court's grant of summary judgment to Eklutna.