Opinion ID: 2634607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Significance of the Ex parte Young Doctrine

Text: {12} The Alden exception most important to our analysis of Gill's claim is Ex parte Young, which permits certain suits against state officers, but only for prospective injunctive or declaratory relief, or for monetary relief that is not sought from the state treasury. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60, 28 S.Ct. 441). Our Court of Appeals rejected Gill's Ex parte Young claim based on its understanding of the Supreme Court holding in Kimel, that Congress lacked the authority to abrogate state constitutional sovereign immunity through the ADEA. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91, 120 S.Ct. 631; see Gill, 2003-NMCA-038, ¶ 12, 133 N.M. 345, 62 P.3d 1227. {13} According to the Court of Appeals, [i]f the purpose of the Ex parte Young doctrine is to ensure the Constitution's supremacy, then a congressional act that is constitutionally outside of Congress's power to enact as against the states should not be permitted to be enforced against the states in any way, either in state or federal court. Gill, 2003-NMCA-038, ¶ 12, 133 N.M. 345, 62 P.3d 1227. We respectfully disagree. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the Ex parte Young doctrine directly conflicts with Alden and Cockrell. If left intact, that analysis would inappropriately extend our state constitutional sovereign immunity beyond what is necessary to protect New Mexico's core sovereign interests, and beyond the bounds of good faith and the federalist compact, as described by the United States Supreme Court in Alden and by this Court in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 28, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876 ([C]onstitutional sovereign immunity `does not bar certain actions against state officers for injunctive or declaratory relief.') (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 757, 119 S.Ct. 2240). {14} Although a state's constitutional sovereign immunity prevents individual enforcement of certain federal statutes against a state, such as the FLSA claims at issue in Alden and Cockrell, that immunity does not undermine the basic validity of the legislation. Federal statutes enacted by Congress under its constitutional authority remain valid and in effect, even if they may not be enforced in all instances and against all defendants. See Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 27-28, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876 (noting that the application of constitutional sovereign immunity may sometimes result in federal rights without remedies); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, 116 S.Ct. 1114. Although the Supreme Court held in Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78, 120 S.Ct. 631, that individuals may not bring ADEA suits against states, the Court did not invalidate the ADEA or declare it unconstitutional. {15} The ADEA was duly enacted under Congress' Commerce Clause authority. See id. States are subject to suit by the federal government for noncompliance. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374, 121 S.Ct. 955. Individuals are subject to suit for damages under the ADEA. It remains valid legislation. Kimel did not overrule this authority, as we discussed in Cockrell, 2002-NMSC-009, ¶ 27, 132 N.M. 156, 45 P.3d 876 ([T]he state is bound by the substantive provisions of the FLSA and is not free to disregard its obligations under federal law.). The only remaining question is what remedy is available when state officials violate federal law. We find nothing in Alden, Kimel, or Cockrell to support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that all ADEA claims are barred by state constitutional sovereign immunity, especially when they may fall into one of the limitations or exceptions recognized in Alden. This is particularly true of the Ex parte Young doctrine.