Opinion ID: 771663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Ongoing Violations

Text: 64 Next, Defendant argues that the district court erred in concluding that it had committed ongoing violations  of requirements in its storm water permit. We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Russian River Watershed Prot. Comm. v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998). We review de novo a district court's interpretation of an NPDES permit when its terms are unambiguous. Id. at 1141. 65 The CWA does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations; rather, the statute confers jurisdiction over citizen suits when the citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 64. Here, the district court properly concluded that Plaintiffs had made such good-faith allegations and thereby had satisfied Gwaltney's threshold requirement for jurisdiction. 66 To prevail at trial, a citizen-plaintiff must prove that ongoing violations actually have occurred. [A ] citizen plaintiff may prove ongoing violations `either (1) by proving violations that continue on or after the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations.'  Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988)). This court also has adopted the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that  `[i]ntermittent or sporadic violations do not cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no real likelihood of repetition .' [Chesapeake Bay Found., 844 F.2d] at 172 (emphasis added). Id. 67 Defendant groups three arguments under this heading. First, Defendant argues that the district court erred in holding that it had violated any condition of its storm water permit. We disagree. As noted, the district court found that Defendant had failed to make -or had failed to keep records of -numerous daily inspections of its facility. Those daily inspections -and records of the inspections -were required by Defendant's 1992 and 1996 SWPPPs. The SWPPPs, in turn, were required by Defendant's storm water permit, which contemplated that Defendant would inspect its facility and keep records of its inspections. The district court also found that the inspection reports that Defendant did produce revealed a pattern of poor housekeeping. Defendant's own inspection reports showed that the good housekeeping standard was not met uniformly and that violations were not always remedied quickly. 68 Moreover, the district court found that Defendant's failure adequately to implement its SWPPP led to significant contributions of pollutants to the Bay from Defendant's discharges. The court further found that those discharges contributed to the contamination of Defendant's marine leasehold and that the leasehold is devoid of life. Those findings are supported by evidence and, accordingly, are not clearly erroneous. Each of Defendant's successive storm water permits has specifically prohibited discharges that cause adverse effects on the environment. For example, Defendant's current storm water permit prohibits discharges that degrade marine communities, cause adverse effects on the environment, or result in harmful concentrations of pollutants in marine sediments. Because the district court found that Defendant's failure to implement its storm water plans led to discharges that violated those standards, the court's conclusion that Defendant violated its storm water permit was not error. 69 Second, Defendant argues, [e]ven assuming arguendo that Southwest Marine did not, at some point in time, implement its storm water plans adequately, it was legal error for the district court to find an ongoing violation of that permit requirement. (Emphasis in original.) As a threshold matter, we reject Defendant's argument that we review this question for legal error. The district court's conclusion that Defendant's violations were ongoing was a finding of fact, which we must affirm unless clearly erroneous. See Union Oil , 853 F.2d at 671 (stating that a plaintiff could prove a continuing violation by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations). 70 Here, the district court found that Defendant had failed to implement its plans adequately even after Plaintiffs filed their complaint. As the district court noted, there is evidence of incidents of poor housekeeping during the pendency of this action. Defendant argues that the district court's finding of an ongoing violation improperly combines several discrete and unrelated workplace incidents. But the district court found that the ongoing violations present[ed] a picture of overall inadequacies, not mere snapshots. Notwithstanding Defendant's argument, we may not disturb that finding if it is supported by evidence. And it is; the evidence on which the district court relied was sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic violations. Union Oil, 853 F.2d at 671. Accordingly, the district court's finding of a continuing violation was not clearly erroneous. 71 Third, Defendant argues that, even if there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish an ongoing violation of the permit, we should nevertheless remand for the district court to explain further the factual and legal basis for its decision. Because we conclude that the district court has provided sufficient factual and legal support for its decision, we do not agree that remand is necessary or appropriate.