Opinion ID: 1180281
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: does allstate's policy cover the shooting during unloading of gun from vehicle

Text: Allstate contends that the negligently caused discharge of the pistol is not causally related to the use of the pickup and therefore the Allstate policy provides no protection to Bowles, an omnibus insured in that policy. The Allstate policy provides in pertinent part: Allstate will pay for an insured all damages which the insured shall be legally obligated to pay because of: A. bodily injury sustained by any person, and B.    arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use, including loading and unloading, of the owned automobile or a non-owned automobile. To briefly restate the record on this point, Bowles packed his loaded pistol in his bedroll, which, along with other gear, was carried in the pickup bed on their return to Boise. Bowles asked Viani to unload the bedroll during which the pistol was caused to discharge. The record shows that Bowles considered his pistol to be an ordinary item in his camping gear inventory. There is a sharp split of authority as to whether automobile liability policies such as the one here provide coverage for gunshot accidents. Judicial attempts at construing auto liability policies in gunshot cases have in turn been targets for scholarly marksmen. [8] For purposes of our analysis here we believe the only relevant cases for consideration are those which can be conceptually categorized as dealing with the firearm in terms of it being loaded on, or unloaded from, an automobile where the intent was to carry it therein like luggage, gear, or freight. [9] Appellant Allstate contends that in construing the terms of its policy we should limit coverage to occurrences where the vehicle was used in its functional sense or where there is some causal connection between the automobile and the occurrence. See Brenner v. Aetna Ins. Co., 8 Ariz. App. 272, 445 P.2d 474 (1968). Allstate stresses the ordinary or reasonable meaning and interpretation of the policy provision, relying on the reasoning employed in another automobile-gunshot case, National Union F. Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Bruecks, 179 Neb. 642, 139 N.W.2d 821 (1966). We note at the outset that this occurrence does reasonably comport to what an ordinary person would deem loading and unloading of the pickup truck. Loading or unloading, of course, must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Entz v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 64 Cal.2d 379, 50 Cal. Rptr. 190, 412 P.2d 382 (1966); Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., 414 P.2d 305 (Okl. 1966); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 85 Nev. 185, 452 P.2d 462 (1969). As phrased in this policy provision, loading and unloading expand the meaning or scope of what is intended by the term use of the insured automobile. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 108 Utah 500, 161 P.2d 423 (1945); Penley v. Gulf Ins. Co., supra . ( But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 245 Or. 30, 420 P.2d 66 (1966), where there was no loading or unloading phrase in the policy yet the acts of loading and unloading were held to constitute using the vehicle within the meaning of the policy.) Two federal court decisions have held the insurers liable on their policies for gunshot accidents in situations where the tortfeasors were in the process of loading the firearm into the vehicle. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 190 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Laviana v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F. Supp. 563 (D.Vt. 1963). In those cases the individuals involved were hunters and the guns were about to be placed inside the vehicles in the sense that one would stow luggage inside a vehicle. [10] In Morari v. Atlantic Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Ariz. 537, 468 P.2d 564 (1970, Udall, J., dissenting), the Arizona Supreme Court held the insurer liable where the driver of the vehicle, intending to shoot a deer, stepped out of the vehicle, reached into the car for his loaded gun, the gun then discharging causing injury to another. These cases seem factually analogous as here the pistol was part of the camping gear of the parties which had been loaded onto the pickup bed before the two men returned to Boise. We are especially persuaded by the reasoning of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Dorsey v. Fidelity Union Cas. Co., 52 S.W.2d 775 (1932). As in the latter federal cases, a hunter was preparing to load his firearm into the vehicle when it discharged. The issue before the Texas court was whether the injury resulted from the operation of the vehicle. We approve the following language from Dorsey, and consider it to be quite relevant here, especially considering the similarity of the factual situations. In order for an injury to be the result of operating or riding in an automobile, it is not necessary that the automobile be the agency that sets in motion the act which causes the injury. It is sufficient if the use of the automobile in the manner and for the purpose for which it is being used reasonably and naturally exposes the driver or occupant thereof to the danger of being so injured as a consequence of such use. There are certain well-known dangers, from wholly independent sources, to which everyone is naturally exposed, without fault on his part, in using an automobile. For example, he may be injured by gravel thrown into the car by other vehicles or he may be struck by other cars negligently operated. Automobiles and trucks are sometimes used for the transportation of freight, and the operator thereof or those riding therein may be injured as the result of the loading of the freight into the car or the unloading of the freight therefrom. Loading or unloading of freight is a part of the use of the conveyance, and, if one while so riding in or operating it is naturally exposed to such danger and is injured thereby, he is injured as the result of operating or riding in the conveyance. [Citations.] In the case at bar, the parties had gone to the country for the purpose of hunting ducks, and intended to return to the city. The automobile was being used as a mode of conveyance, and Dorsey was the operator thereof. It was contemplated that the car would be used not only to convey the parties but their guns and ammunition. It was necessary that the guns be loaded into the car if they were to be transported to the city. Dorsey was in the car waiting for it to be loaded and for the purpose of driving it to the city as soon as the guns had been placed therein. The companion who fired the gun was not a stranger to the transaction, and he did not appear on the scene by accident. He and Dorsey were engaged in a common purpose with a common design, and were working in co-operation with each other. The transportation of the guns was a part of the common purpose. The companion was removing the shells from the gun for the purpose of loading it into the car in keeping with the common design. The removing of the shells from the gun was so closely connected with the loading thereof into the car as to constitute a part thereof. Dorsey by riding in the car and operating it for the purpose for which it was being used, to wit, the hauling of the men and their guns, was thus brought into close proximity to the gun and exposed to the danger of being injured thereby while the guns were being prepared and loaded into the car. Such danger was necessarily incident to the use of the car for the purpose of which it was then being used, and the injury was one of the consequences of such use. We therefore hold that the insured was injured as the result of operating or riding in the car, and is entitled to recover the amount stipulated in the policy. 52 S.W.2d at 776-777. We conclude, then, that the Allstate policy does provide coverage to Viani for the gunshot accident as the occurrence arose during the loading and unloading of the pickup.