Opinion ID: 1264766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Denied Taylor's Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint.

Text: Taylor argues that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint to include a battery claim because Ferris obtained his consent to the cervical injections by fraud. Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) provides that, after responsive pleadings have been filed, leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires. But [i]f the proposed change clearly is frivolous or advances a claim or defense that is legally insufficient on its face, the court may deny leave to amend. [12] In deciding a motion to amend a complaint, the trial court must balance the degree of prejudice to the opposing party against the hardship to the movant if the amendment is denied. [13] Ferris asserts that the trial court correctly concluded that justice did not require allowing the amendment because allowing the amendment would have resulted in significant delay, time and expense for an amendment that on its face would not withstand a motion to dismiss. In particular, Ferris claims that [t]he additional battery claim would have substantially changed the theory of the case and required additional discovery and preparation for trial. In denying the motion to amend, the trial court focused on the futility of the battery claim rather than the potential prejudice to Ferris. The trial court found that no cause of action for battery existed because Ferris performed the procedure with the intent of curing Taylor: Taylor alleges that the performance by Ferris of the injection upon Taylor constitutes a battery as Ferris was not a validly licensed physician .... Taylor, however, has provided no indication whatsoever that Ferris intended to commit a harmful contact with Taylor. To the contrary, given the proffered materials, it is clear that Ferris intended to help Taylor through the injection, and it was anything but his intention to harm Taylor. Relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 18, 21, and 34 comment a, we recognized in Merrill v. Faltin [14] that motive is not a critical element of a battery claim: To make one liable for an assault and battery it is not necessary that he be inspired by malicious motives. If one acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another, and if the latter is put in imminent apprehension of such a contact, and an offensive contact results, one is liable for an assault and battery even though he acted with no feeling of hostility or ill will or enmity toward the other.[ [15] ] We reemphasized this reasoning in Lowdermilk v. Lowdermilk, [16] when we again noted that an actor may be liable for an assault and battery despite a lack of intent to cause injury. [17] Thus, under Alaska law, an assault and battery claim turns not on the motive of the actor but on the consent of the victim. We have not had an occasion to address a medical battery claim in which a physician obtains a patient's consent by fraud. But the commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B states that if [a person] is induced by the fraud, mistake or duress to consent to a harmful or offensive contact with his person, he may maintain an action for battery. [18] The Restatement specifically notes that fraud may negate the element of consent between a patient and a doctor, providing the following example: A, a physician, called to attend B in childbirth, takes C, a layman, with him. B, believing as C knows, that he is a physician, permits him to attend her during her confinement. C, under A's direction, holds B's hands. C is subject to liability to B. [19] In a factually analogous Connecticut case, Khouri v. Koloniaris, [20] the plaintiff alleged that the removal of his teeth by the defendant constituted an assault and battery because the defendant had falsely claimed to be a licensed dentist. [21] The plaintiff claimed that he would not have consented to the act if he knew the defendant was not a licensed dentist. [22] The defendant moved to strike the claim because the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant intended to cause the injuries. [23] In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Connecticut superior court reasoned: [I]ntent is gist of action only where battery is committed in performance of act not otherwise unlawful; if cause of action is battery committed in performance of unlawful or wrongful act, intent of wrongdoer to injury is immaterial; he is answerable for what directly and actually results from his conduct, even though he did not intend the particular injury which follows.[ [24] ] While the court noted that medical battery has generally been reserved for situations in which a physician fails to obtain any consent to the particular treatment, [25] it nevertheless concluded that [b]ecause the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant fraudulently misrepresented himself as a licensed dentist and that the plaintiff allowed the defendant, based on that misrepresentation, to provide dental treatment . . ., the plaintiff has indeed alleged sufficient facts to support an action for battery. [26] Because we find these authorities convincing, we conclude that a battery claim may lie if a person falsely claiming to be a physician touches a patient, even for the purpose of providing medical assistance. But here, Taylor was not treated by someone who was falsely representing himself as licensed. In fact, Ferris had a medical degree, was certified by the American Board of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, and was licensed to practice in Alaska. Accordingly, Ferris's representations to Taylor that he was a licensed and board-certified doctor were accurate. Thus, Taylor may not sue for battery on the basis that Ferris falsely claimed to be a licensed doctor. Taylor does not dispute that Ferris is licensed; instead, he contends that Ferris improperly obtained his license by misrepresenting his credentials. But as Ferris argues, the superior court and the jury lack authority to declare Dr. Ferris' license to be void or voidable. Alaska's statutory scheme confers exclusive authority to grant or revoke licenses to the Alaska State Medical Board. [27] Such a delegation makes sense because [m]edicine is a complex subject and ... [t]he Board is a competent body equipped with the necessary medical knowledge to determine whether a doctor's license to practice should be revoked. [28] And as Ferris notes, [i]f a plaintiff could bring a fraud claim by simply alleging a licensed physician was not properly licensed, nearly every medical negligence action would include a fraud claim. For these reasons, we choose not to look behind the Board's decision to license Ferris. Taylor could have requested a stay of the case in order to apply to the licensing board for an action on Ferris's license or a declaration that Ferris's license was void from its issuance, but he did not do so. The fact that Ferris was licensed in Alaska at the time of the procedure defeats Taylor's claim for medical battery based on fraud.