Opinion ID: 6324061
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Federal Carjacking Statute

Text: The federal carjacking statute punishes [w]hoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm[,] takes a motor vehicle . . . from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (emphasis added). Like much of federal criminal law, Congress enacted the carjacking statute pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 136 (2010) (describing the sources of congressional authority to make federal criminal law); Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. 452, 457 (2016) (identifying an interstate commerce nexus as a common jurisdictional hook in federal criminal law); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (limiting the statute's application to vehicles involved in interstate or foreign commerce). Although Congress's authority to regulate interstate commerce is broad, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995), it may not regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate - 13 - commerce, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000). Instead, so as not to infringe on the states' police power -- the broad authority to enact legislation for the public good that is reserved to the states, Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014) -- the Constitution requires that federal criminal law distinguish between conduct that is truly national and what is truly local. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617; see also id. at 618 ([W]e can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.). In its decisions policing the boundary between federal and state criminal law, the Supreme Court has cautioned that 'unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance' in the prosecution of crimes. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)); accord Bond, 572 U.S. at 860. The Court has stringently construed the mens rea requirement of federal criminal statutes to ensure that expansive interpretations of those statutes' intent provisions do not transform relatively minor state offenses into federal felonies. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); see also Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 684 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (cautioning against construing a federal - 14 - statute's mens rea requirement in a way that would federalize crimes that lack a federal nexus). The federal carjacking statute reflects congressional intent to target a particular type of robbery with the goal of deterring especially violent crime. Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1999); United States v. Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing congressional intent to narrowly define § 2119's mens rea element). To ensure that federal jurisdiction does not extend beyond the point envisioned by Congress and intrud[e] into realms specifically left to the states and territories, the mens rea element is narrow in two respects. United States v. Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d 116, 125 (1st Cir. 2017) (Torruella, J., concurring). First, by requiring that a defendant specifically intend to cause serious bodily harm or death,6 the federal statute criminalizes vehicle theft only where the risk of violence is real. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11 (While an empty threat, or intimidating bluff, would be sufficient to satisfy the [force or intimidation] element, such conduct, standing on its own, is not enough to satisfy § 2119's specific intent element.); see also Rosario- 6The Supreme Court has held that this specific intent encompasses both unconditional and conditional intent at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the vehicle. Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11-12. In other words, the government must prove that a defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car. Id. at 12. - 15 - Díaz, 202 F.3d at 63 (citing Holloway, 526 U.S. at 1). State and territorial governments retain the authority to criminalize nonviolent car theft. Second, mere intent to harm is not enough to bring a car theft within the reach of federal criminal enforcement. By requiring intent to cause at least serious bodily harm, the statute ensures that federal prosecutorial authority extends only to those car thefts where a defendant possessed particularly violent intent. See Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d at 126 (Torruella, J., concurring) (suggesting that the level of harm contemplated by the statute involves extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of bodily function). We have held that touching or threatening a victim while brandishing a firearm is sufficient evidence of intent to cause death or serious bodily harm within the meaning of § 2119. E.g., United States v. Catalán-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 474 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d at 126 (Torruella, J., concurring) (citing cases). Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Felder, 993 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. Lake, 150 F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490, 499-500 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Adams, 265 F.3d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Wright, 993 F.3d 1054, 1065 (8th Cir. 2021); United States v. - 16 - Vallejos, 421 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (10th Cir. 2005). But proof of intent to cause serious bodily harm or death does not require proof of the involvement of a weapon. Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d at 121; United States v. Rodríguez-Berríos, 573 F.3d 55, 66-67 (1st Cir. 2009). Just as one can use brute force or a variety of items to kill or cause serious harm, one can also use such force or items to manifest an intent to cause death or serious harm if necessary. Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d at 121. Generally, the key fact distinguishing a situation in which a defendant possesses the requisite specific intent from a situation in which a defendant merely makes an empty threat, Holloway, 526 U.S. at 11, is the defendant's actual and willing use of force in carrying out the carjacking. E.g., Díaz-Rosado, 857 F.3d at 121; Rodríguez-Berríos, 573 F.3d at 66-67. Even plac[ing] a 'cold and hard' item to [a victim's] neck -- behavior that the victim likely would interpret as a threat involving a weapon -- and sa[ying] '[d]rive, drive, drive, drive' has been held insufficient to establish § 2119's requisite intent, absent evidence that the defendant actually had a weapon or threatened to harm the victim. United States v. Bailey, 819 F.3d 92, 97 (4th Cir. 2016) (third alteration in original).7 7 The district court relied on Bailey to conclude that Guerrero-Narváez's threat was a textbook bluff. GuerreroNarvaez, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 292. Bailey appears to be the only reported case in which a court has vacated a conviction under - 17 -