Opinion ID: 2607251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: today's dismissal of the stites' appeal as untimely and an explanatory comment upon the extent of its bar

Text: Appellate review is commenced by bringing a petition in error within thirty days of the date the trial court's judgment or its final order is filed at nisi prius. [35] Timely commencement is jurisdictional. [36] Failure to file an appeal within the statutory time is fatal. [37] In appeals lodged from an adverse order entered in a postjudgment vacation proceeding, errors which may be reviewed are confined to those in granting or denying relief sought upon the grounds advanced and the evidence presented. [38] No postjudgment quest for relief  other than one made by a timely new-trial motion  will operate to extend the time for appellate review of errors made in a nisi prius judgment or in a final order. [39] The First Order. The trial court's vacation order, entered September 25, 1991, directed that any and all money received on the judgment which remained in the trust account of Stites' lawyer be deposited in court. At that time the garnishee (ODOT) had paid into court two checks, both of which had been remitted to Stites' lawyer. The September 25 order is an effective exercise of the trial court's vacation power and of its ancillary cognizance over DUIT's restitutionary counterclaim then before the court. It was appealable at once under 12 O.S. 1991 § 952(b)(2). [40] Since neither Stites (nor his lawyer who was also affected by the order) appealed from the September 25 order or timely sought its modification or vacation, that order became binding (on both Stites and the lawyer) thirty days after its filing below. The Second Order. The March 26, 1992 nisi prius decision from which Stites lodged his appeal (1) overruled Stites' motions to quash DUIT's application to pay funds into court and to strike DUIT's response to the motion to quash and (2) ordered Stites to deposit the same funds as those he was already under a duty to remit. At first glance the March 27, 1992 appeal from the March 26 order would appear timely. The issue we decide today is whether that disposition is merely a reaffirmation of the earlier September 25, 1991 order (and hence no longer within this court's reviewing cognizance) or whether it constitutes a new (appealable) determination reached under circumstances materially changed from those in September. [41] If the first order in this case is to be regarded as appealable, but the appeal's commencement was untimely, today's dismissal of this appeal would constitute an affirmance of the first order. [42] On the other hand, if this appeal were deemed to be prosecuted in advance of some appealable order in the case, its dismissal would be no bar to another appeal for review of errors sought to be tendered here. [43] In short, an affirmance by dismissal bars appellate relitigation of those issues which escape review because of a jurisdictional defect in lodging the appeal. We hold that the nisi prius order of March 26 represents but a reaffirmation or reiteration of the court's earlier September 25 disposition. It merely declares that the earlier order has survived the disposition of the motions that challenged its validity. The original September 25 ruling giving DUIT restitutionary relief is now beyond the reach of our reviewing cognizance. This is so because this appeal was not brought here within thirty days of that order's filing. [44] Once an appealable event has occurred, a trial judge is utterly without authority to extend appeal time by any means or in any manner, direct or oblique. Any attempt by the court's March 26, 1992 order to breathe new life into the unappealed September 25 ruling must hence fail. The appeal's time trigger is a law-driven mechanism which is beyond the reach of human tinkering by judge or counsel. [45]