Opinion ID: 2630479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction regarding the duty to obtain assistance from law enforcement or medical personnel

Text: Moyle next takes issue with the following jury instruction: There can be no liability for civil damages against a person at the scene of a crime for failure to obtain assistance from law enforcement or medical personnel. Therefore you may not find in favor of the plaintiff and against either or both defendants in this case even if you find that one or both defendants failed to obtain assistance. A person cannot be sued for failure to summon assistance under Hawai[']i law. Moyle first argues that the circuit court's instruction misled the jury into focusing on an issue not at hand, namely the personal duty of the bartender or employee to render assistance, when the correct issue was that of the duty of the employer . . . to provide adequate security that could have rendered assistance to Moyle . . . pursuant to an innkeeper's and a public club's tort duty to protect its patrons from reasonably foreseeable danger. The ICA disagreed, stating that: the individuals who had been working at [the club] elected not to call the police or medical assistance upon becoming aware of the ongoing assault against [Moyle]. Premises liability, and liability of an individual bystander for failure to act, are two separate issues, and this instruction effectively and appropriately explained to the jury that civil liability cannot be based on the latter. Moyle, 116 Hawai`i at 401, 173 P.3d at 548. The jury instruction was modeled after HRS § 663-1.6 (1993), [4] a Good Samaritan statute. Moyle claims that the issue is not the duty of an innocent bystander to come to the aid of a crime victim, but the duty of the Respondents, a business establishment in a `special relationship' to Moyle, to come to Moyle's aid. As the ICA noted, Moyle fails to proffer any authority to support this contention, in violation of Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b)(7). [5] Moyle, 116 Hawai`i at 401, 173 P.3d at 548. Nevertheless, in light of this court's policy of hearing cases on the merits when possible, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Moyle's argument. See O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 77 Hawai`i 383, 386, 885 P.2d 361, 364 (1994). First, Moyle's argument seems to claim that HRS § 663-1.6 only applies to uninvolved bystander[s], or, in the alternative, that HRS § 663-1.6 does not apply to business establishments in a `special relationship' to a patron. A plain reading of the statute does nothing to suggest such inclusivity or exclusivity, and, in fact, demonstrates that it clearly applies to the actions of [a]ny person, see supra note 6, which includes the Respondents. Moyle also repeatedly raised the issue of whether the Respondents came to his aid. Moyle's complaint stated that [t]he incident was observed by management and other employees of [the club] immediately nearby, who nevertheless did nothing, failed to render any aid or assistance to him whatsoever or even to call the police, in violation of its duty to the general public and to its patrons, including Moyle. Moyle's counsel elicited direct testimony from Moyle that an alleged Club employee, upon seeing Moyle lying on the ground following the assault, close[d] the door and pulled the curtains. In light of Moyle's having raised the issue of the Respondents' duty to render aid, it was not an issue not at hand, and it was not error for the circuit court to instruct the jury on the Respondents' liability stemming from a failure to render aid. In addition, the ICA correctly noted that [p]remises liability, and liability of an individual for failure to act, are two separate issues, and that the circuit court's instruction properly delineated that civil liability could not be based on the latter. Moyle, 116 Hawai`i at 401, 173 P.3d at 548.