Opinion ID: 1831969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion for denying the Ventons' Motion to Compel Production of Documents.

Text: ¶ 15. In regard to matters relating to discovery, the trial court has considerable discretion. The discovery orders of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So.2d 1232, 1234 (Miss.1992). See also Mallet v. Carter, 803 So.2d 504, 506 (Miss. Ct.App.2002). ¶ 16. The Ventons argue that the trial court erred by denying them the opportunity to add another expert. The Ventons wanted Dr. Hans Gideon (Dr. Gideon), a document expert from Georgia, to inspect Dr. Beckham's medical records and a note written by Terri Hill (Hill), a nurse who participated in Pamela's care. According to the Ventons, they believed that the medical records contained errors. [1] Dr. Gideon was to examine and determine when the notations were made to the documents. In order to perform this examination, Dr. Gideon would need to examine the original documents, not copies, for 10 days in Atlanta. The purpose of Dr. Gideon's testimony was to impeach the testimony of Dr. Beckham and Hill. ¶ 17. The Ventons filed suit against Dr. Beckham on May 4, 1998. Dr. Beckham and Hill were deposed in October 1998. During Hill's deposition, it was revealed that she had written a personal note concerning the events of Pamela's case. The note was written after the cesarean section. ¶ 18. An Agreed Amended Scheduling Order was enter on November 24, 1998, stating that all discovery shall be completed by April 30, 1999, and all expert witnesses shall be designated no later than March, 17, 1999. In fact, the Ventons designated two experts on November 19, 1998. The Ventons filed a motion for pretrial conference and/or for a trial setting on January 11, 1999. On January 13, 2000, the trial was set for June 26, 2000. On March 8, 2000, the Ventons filed a motion for disclosure of Dr. Beckham's original medical records. A subpoena duces tecum was issued on the same day to Hill for production of her note. Prior to trial on May 3, 2000, the Ventons filed a motion to compel and show cause for the failure to produce the note. ¶ 19. Dr. Beckman contended that inspection of his original medical records and a copy of the medical records were provided to the Ventons at his deposition in October 1998. Further, Dr. Beckham filed a certificate of compliance with the trial court which stated that he had provided the Ventons a true and correct copy of Hill's note. The trial was continued and rescheduled on May 17, 2000, by an agreed order. ¶ 20. A hearing was conducted on May 24, 2000. The trial judge denied the Ventons' request on August 31, 2000. In the order the trial judge stated: The parties agreed to extend discovery until April 30, 1999, and to designate expert witnesses by March 17, 1999. Depositions of Dr. Beckham and Ms. Hill were taken in October, 1998, at which time the existence of Ms. Hill's personal note came to light. Plaintiffs have had copies of Dr. Beckham's records since July, 1998. Plaintiffs did not request that this Court extend the discovery deadline or the date for the designation of expert witnesses, and they have not shown good cause for the lengthy delay in designating ... Mr. Gideon in May, 2000, more than a year after the expiration of the March 17, 1999, deadline. Plaintiffs previously designated Dr. Fields and Dr. Channell in November, 1998. This Court orders that plaintiff's Motion for Disclosure of Dr. James Beckham's Original Medical Records and the Motion to Compel/and to Show Cause are not well taken and are both hereby DENIED. Furthermore, defendant's Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash are GRANTED. The subpoena issued for Ms. Hill's note shall be quashed, and the requested discovery shall not be had.... ¶ 21. The Ventons argue that the trial court erred when it denied the request to list their expert on August 2000, more than 10 months before the trial finally occurred in June 2001. Further, the Ventons claim that the ruling ignores Rule 4.04 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court and precedent. Rule 4.04(A) pertains to discovery and states: All discovery must be completed within ninety days from service of an answer by the applicable defendant. Additional discovery time may be allowed with leave of court upon written motion setting forth good cause for the extension. Absent special circumstances the court will not allow testimony at trial of an expert witness who was not designated as an expert witness to all attorneys of record at least sixty days before trial. (emphasis added). ¶ 22. Dr. Beckham argues that the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 4.04(a) does not take precedence over a scheduling order. He asserts that the Ventons initiated the agreed order with the designated deadlines, counsel for all parties agreed to the order, and no motion for extension of the deadline was made by the Ventons. Further, Dr. Beckham contends that Rule 4.04(A) does not provide for arbitrary designation of expert witnesses 60 days before the trial. The Ventons did not provide any special circumstances in regard to Dr. Gideon's testimony. ¶ 23. The first time that Dr. Beckman was aware that the Ventons were even considering Dr. Gideon as an expert was in the motion to compel/motion to show cause and in the Ventons' rebuttal to the defendant's response to motion for disclosure of original medical records on May 3, 2000, less than 60 days before the June 26, 2000, originally scheduled trial date. In addition, Dr. Beckham maintains that the Ventons waited a year and a half after he and Hill were deposed and more than one year after the expiration of the discovery deadline to make new allegations which were never part of the complaint, amended complaint or responses to interrogatories. At the hearing and in his brief, Dr. Beckham argued that the trial was not postponed to 2001 to re-open the discovery process, rather the rescheduling was done because the trial was a third sitting and experts were traveling from out of state. Also, Dr. Beckham argues that the record contains no evidence that the medical records contained any errors, additions or alterations. ¶ 24. Each party cites to case law in their briefs that allowed varying times in which to perform discovery. The Ventons cite Motorola Communications & Electronics, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713, 717 (Miss.1989), a case in which an interrogatory response delivered three days after the discovery deadline and 10 days before trial was considered to be a seasonable supplement. The facts of the case sub judice are distinguishable from Wilkerson. The discovery period in this case closed more than one and half years before trial and new allegations were made by the Ventons. These allegations were never part of the complaint or amended complaint. Further, the Ventons knew of the note and the medical records in October, 1998, yet offered no reason why there was a delay in implementing research and assistance by an expert document examiner until May 2000. Dr. Beckham relies upon Mallet, 803 So.2d at 506, in which an expert witness was not allowed by the trial court. The designation of the witness exceeded the discovery deadline by more than seven months with the only excuse that finding a local expert was more difficult than anticipated. ¶ 25. A trial court has the authority and indeed a duty to maintain control of the docket and ensure the efficient disposal of court business. Harris v. Fort Worth Steel & Mach. Co., 440 So.2d 294, 296 (Miss.1983). In addition, the trial court has considerable discretion in matters pertaining to discovery. Dawkins, 607 So.2d at 1234. The standard is an abuse of discretion. Id. The trial judge heard arguments by each side, including the requirements of Rule 4.04. The judge concluded that the Ventons were aware of the documents since October 1998. No extension of the deadline for discovery or designation of an expert was requested by the Ventons. Further, the trial judge determined that there was no good cause shown for the delay. This Court finds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial judge carefully considered the facts of the case and the lack of good cause shown for the lengthy delay in this matter. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.