Opinion ID: 4562748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Framework, And Their Relevant Provisions The California State Board of Education (State Board) develops model curriculum outlines to provide standardized guidance to individual school districts. These outlines, known as Content Standards and Curriculum Frameworks, are used by individual school districts to design more tailored course curricula. See Cal. Educ. Code § 60000(b). The State Board first issues Content Standards, which are broad guidelines for each major subject area, such as history and math. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 60602.5(a)(1), 60605, 60618. The State Board then issues Curriculum Frameworks which fill in more detail lacking in each of the Standards. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 60000, 60005, 60200(c). The local school districts in California decide the precise contours of what is taught in their public school classrooms, and can supplement the materials or omit content contained in them. See Cal. Educ. Code § 60000(b). The State Board, in 1998, adopted the Content Standards for history and social science that Appellants challenge in this lawsuit. In just a few pages, the Content Standards outline the history of the world’s first major civilizations and religions, and invite sixth grade students to engage in critical analysis of the “geographic, political, economic, religious, CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON 9 and social structures” of each civilization, including Ancient India. The State Board then adopted the Curriculum Framework for history and social science in 2016 after a lengthy comment process that solicited feedback from the public. Like the Content Standards, the Curriculum Framework calls for students to analyze ancient civilizations from a social science perspective, with materials to include, among other subject matter, “the birth and spread of religious and philosophical systems.” The Curriculum Framework provides the additional detail and context lacking in the Content Standards.
Appellants here are a non-profit organization, CAPEEM, and three parents on behalf of themselves and their children enrolled in California’s public school system. CAPEEM is a membership organization that exists to promote fair and accurate depictions of Hinduism in the public school system. This is not the first time that CAPEEM has challenged the constitutionality of information about Hinduism provided to public school students. In 2006, CAPEEM filed a lawsuit claiming that California’s recently adopted text books had content that was anti-Hindu, and that the use of such text books violated the Establishment clause. The district court in that case determined that the text books did not contain any information that disparaged Hinduism, and granted summary judgment to the state. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials v. Noonan, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2009). CAPEEM did not appeal. In this case, Appellants, instead of challenging text books, challenge certain aspects of 10 CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON the descriptions of Hinduism in the 1998 Standards and 2016 Framework. Appellants first assert that the Standards and Framework do not describe the divine origins of Hinduism or discuss the sacred texts of their religion, while, at the same time, describing the divine origins of the other major religions. As an example, they point to language in the Standards that describes Hinduism as consisting of “beliefs and practices,” and they point as well to a characterization of one of Hinduism’s sacred texts, the Bhagavad Gita, as an important piece of literature in Ancient India. Appellants additionally highlight a phrase in the Framework that describes Hinduism as a “culture that emerged as a belief system.” They argue that these are secular descriptions of Hinduism that are disparaging when read alongside the descriptions of other religions covered by the education materials. Appellants object as well to the Standards’ instruction directing the students to “[d]iscuss the significance of the Aryan Invasions.” Appellants assert that this instruction references a now-debunked theory that invaders from the north entered ancient India, leading to the creation of Hinduism. Also causing Appellants concern is the Framework’s description of the caste system in Ancient India; in particular, Appellants object to the description of caste as a religious belief. Appellants point to a passage in the Framework, which says that “Teachers should make clear to students that [caste] was a social and cultural structure as well as a religious belief.” Appellants argue that the association with the caste system singles out Hinduism for negative treatment CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON 11 when compared with the other religions discussed in the Standards and Framework. These three objections form the basis of most of Appellants’ constitutional claims.
Appellants filed their complaint in 2017. It alleges that the content of the Standards and Framework, and the process leading up to the Framework’s adoption, violate several provisions of the constitution. The complaint includes two Equal Protection claims. The first is that the content of the Standards and Framework describes Hinduism in derogatory terms and from the perspective of a skeptic, whereas the same material describes other religions with respect. Appellants also allege that the Department of Education violated their Equal Protection rights when it refused to accept all of CAPEEM’s proposed edits to the Framework, while at the same time, accepting edits from other religious groups during the notice and comment process. With respect to the Free Exercise clause, the complaint alleges that the content of the challenged provisions of the Standards and Framework denigrates Hinduism and is therefore not neutral with respect to religion and violative of their rights to free exercise. As with their Equal Protection claims, Appellants also assert that occurrences in the process leading up to the Framework’s adoption violated their Free Exercise rights. 12 CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON Bias against Hinduism in the content of the Standards and Framework is the basis for the alleged substantive due process violation as well. The complaint alleges that the Standards and Framework “indoctrinate children with beliefs biased deeply against Hinduism and in favor of the Abrahamic religions,” and thereby interfere with the liberty interests of the parent Appellants to control the upbringing and education of their children. Finally, the complaint contains two Establishment clause claims. It alleges that the content of the Standards and Framework unconstitutionally endorse Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, because the content calls for the teaching of religious events, significant to those religions, as historical fact. The complaint then alleges in the second Establishment clause claim that the content of the challenged materials has the primary effect of disparaging or denigrating Hinduism. All of Appellants’ constitutional claims thus relate to the particular passages in the Standards and Framework that they find objectionable. None challenge the Department of Education’s overall policy of providing students with an introduction to the major world religions and none relate to material students actually see in the classroom.
The district court in a published opinion in 2017 dismissed all of Appellants’ claims, with the exception of the Establishment clause claim relating to disparagement of Hinduism. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials v. Torlakson, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2017). The district court later, also in a published opinion, granted summary judgment to the State Board on that claim. See Cal. CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON 13 Parents for Equalization of Education Materials v. Tolarkson, 370 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1067–1083 (N.D. Cal. 2019). In its first opinion dismissing most of CAPEEM’s claims, including the Equal Protection claims, the district court extensively examined our circuit’s leading case on Equal Protection challenges to educational materials, Monteiro v. Tempe Union School District, 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998). In that case, Kathy Monteiro brought suit on behalf of her daughter, and argued that the curriculum’s inclusion of literary works containing racially derogatory terms, such as The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and A Rose For Emily, violated their Equal Protection rights. Id. at 1024–25. Our opinion in Monteiro held that objections to curriculum assignments cannot form the basis of a viable Equal Protection claim, because curriculum decisions must remain the province of school authorities. Absent an allegation of an underlying racist policy, plaintiffs cannot challenge “the assignment of material deemed to have educational value by school authorities.” Id. 1031–32. We explained that permitting such Equal Protection challenges would infringe on other students’ First Amendment interests in reading the contested materials. Id. at 1028. We saw the role of the school district in selecting curricula to be equally important. Permitting such challenges would “significantly interfere with the [school district]’s discretion to determine the composition of its curriculum.” Id. at 1029. We observed that the desire to avoid such lawsuits could “lead many school districts to ‘buy their peace’ by avoiding the books or other materials that express messages . . . that could be argued to cause harm to a group of students.” Id. In other words, permitting Equal Protection 14 CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON claims seeking removal of works from curriculum would have a significant chilling effect on the types of materials assigned by our public schools. Id. This would, in turn, damage the quality of public education offered to students. “[T]he function of . . . education itself is to stimulate thought, to explore ideas, to engender intellectual exchanges. Bad ideas should be countered with good ones, not banned by the courts.” Id. at 1032. We therefore held that the Equal Protection clause is not a vehicle for challenging curriculum content choices. The district court in this case concluded that the reasoning of Monteiro with respect to curricula applied equally to the materials challenged here that provide the general outlines for curriculum content. Following Monteiro, the district court ruled that Appellants’ objections to the content of the Standards and Framework did not state a plausible Equal Protection claim. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1232; see also Noonan, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 1111 (holding that CAPEEM’s challenges to public school text books were barred by Monteiro). The court also concluded that Appellants’ indirect challenge to the content, through allegations of differential treatment in the Framework adoption process, was necessarily barred. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1234–35. Those allegations faulted the State Board’s rejection of Appellants’ proposed amendments to the Framework during the comment process, and acceptance of suggested edits of another group Appellants deemed hostile to Hinduism. The district court reasoned that it would render our decision in Monteiro meaningless if plaintiffs could make out an Equal Protection claim when a state official refuses to adopt plaintiffs’ content preferences during the comment process. Id. Constitutional challenges to the content of CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON 15 curricula on religious grounds must be adjudicated under the religion clauses of the First Amendment, not Equal Protection. Id. at 1235. The district court also ruled that Appellants had failed to allege a plausible Free Exercise claim, because our case law requires Appellants to allege a substantial burden on their religious practice or exercise. Id. at 1226–27 (citing and discussing Am. Fam. Ass’n Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2002)). In American Family, we rejected the argument that the Supreme Court had eliminated the need for plaintiffs to allege a substantial burden on their religious exercise where, as here, no law or other regulatory government conduct is involved. Am. Fam. Ass’n Inc., 277 F.3d at 1123–24. Dismissal of the complaint in American Family was appropriate because “the complaint did not . . . allege any specific religious conduct that was affected by the Defendants’ actions.” Id. Finding no such allegation in this case, the district court dismissed Appellants’ Free Exercise clause claims. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1227. The district court additionally held that under our decision in Fields v. Palmdale School District, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), it was required to dismiss Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1224. In Fields, we explained that, under cases going back to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), once parents select a school for their child, parents cannot “compel public schools to follow their own idiosyncratic views as to what information the schools may dispense.” Fields, 427 F.3d at 1206. Parents have only a limited substantive due process right “to be free from state 16 CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON interference with their choice of the educational forum itself.” Fields, 427 F.3d at 1197, 1207. The district court concluded that the parents did not allege they were unable to send their children to the school of the parents’ choosing, and therefore did not state a plausible substantive due process claim. Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1224–25. The district court dismissed one of Appellants’ Establishment clause claims, concluding that an objective reading of the curriculum materials revealed no unconstitutional endorsement of Christianity, Judaism, or Islam. Id. at 1228. The materials permissibly called for students to learn about the major events and figures of various world religions. The district court did not, at the same time, dismiss Appellants’ other Establishment clause claim, that the curriculum materials had the primary effect of disparaging Hinduism, but later ruled against Appellants on that claim at summary judgment. See Cal. Parents for Equalization of Educ. Materials, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 1067–1083. In that later opinion, the district court concluded that neither the allegations of the complaint, nor any additional materials adduced on summary judgment, reflected content that disparaged Hinduism. First, the district court explained that, contrary to Appellants’ contentions, the Standards and Framework do in fact describe the divine origins of Hinduism and the divine significance of the Bhagavad Gita and other sacred texts. Id. at 1070. Although Appellants had asserted that the Standards and Framework promote an outdated theory that Hinduism was the result of an Aryan invasion, the district court explained that the Standards and Framework, read together, refer to a migration of people speaking Indic languages southward into the region. Id. at 1074–75. The CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON 17 materials also acknowledge a competing theory that the language spread northward. Neither theory suggests a connection between invasions and the development of Hinduism. Id. at 1075. The theories refer to historical events. As the district court summed it up, “[w]hether or not there was an influx of Aryans into South Asia in 1500 BCE is appropriately the subject of a history and social science curriculum, and not actually a positive or negative statement about Hinduism.” Id. The district court also dealt specifically with Appellants’ argument that the material contains a description of the caste system as a Hindu religious belief and that the description has the primary effect of disparaging Hinduism. Id. at 1071–73. The court pointed out that the Framework expressly acknowledges that all early civilizations had social class systems. The Hindu religion was thus not singled out for criticism of its caste or class system. The district court, after examining the Standards and Framework, concluded that an objective, reasonable observer would not conclude that the materials have the primary effect of disparaging Hinduism. Id. at 1079. At summary judgment, Appellants offered an expert report to explain the significance of certain terms from the perspective of an academic religious scholar. The district court declined to consider the expert report. Id. at 1070 n.8. The court explained that the report was not relevant to the court’s analysis of the critical issue. Id. The question was whether the materials primarily communicate a message of disparagement from the perspective of a reasonable observer, and not from the perspective of an expert. The court cited Brown v. Woodland Joint School District, where we held that 18 CAPEEM V. TORLAKSON expert testimony was irrelevant to the effect of challenged material on a child. Id.