Opinion ID: 548468
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactivity of Jim

Text: 20 This court's decision that Sec. 111 was a general intent crime, Jim, 865 F.2d at 214-15, was issued January 10, 1989, after Sanchez's trial in November of 1988. Sanchez now argues that it was incorrect to instruct the jury that no specific intent was necessary because Jim should not apply retroactively to his case. Sanchez's counsel explicitly agreed that Sec. 111 was a general intent crime, and concurred in the decision not to give a specific intent instruction. Because the defense concurred in the formation of instructions, the standard of review is plain error. See United States v. Solis, 841 F.2d 307, 309 (9th Cir.1988). 21 In Jim, this court held that Sec. 111 required only general intent, despite decisions to the contrary in other circuits and some indications in earlier Ninth Circuit decisions that a specific intent to injure was an element.  'The only issue would be whether a reasonable man would find that the defendant's actions should have put a federal officer in apprehension of bodily harm.'  Jim, 865 F.2d at 213 (quoting United States v. Staggs, 553 F.2d 1073, 1076 (7th Cir.1977)). 22 Although not constitutionally required, retroactive application of judicial decisions is the rule not the exception. United States v. Kane, 876 F.2d 734, 735-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 173, 107 L.Ed.2d 130 (1989). We need not decide whether Jim applies retroactively, however, because as discussed above, Sanchez's defense did not depend on his intent during the encounter with Macias. As a result, even if the decision in Jim that Sec. 111 required only general intent does not apply retroactively to Sanchez, there was no plain error likely to have materially affected the jury's verdict.