Opinion ID: 789142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Ruling in Hobbs I

Text: 62 In an Opinion and Order dated December 23, 2002, the district court denied both parties' summary judgment motions. See Hobbs v. County of Westchester, 2002 WL 31873462, at  (S.D.N.Y. Dec.23, 2002) ( Hobbs I ). The court held that certain areas of Playland are public fora, that in those areas a total ban on solicitation could not stand, see id. at , and that [t]o the extent that Plaintiff sought a permit to perform in a public forum area of Playland Park ... he had a First Amendment right to do so, and did not need a permit, id. at : 63 While the amusement area of Playland Park is not a public forum and the County can prohibit Plaintiff from performing there, other parts of the park, which are removed from the amusement area, are no different from other public parks, which have consistently been held to be public fora in which the exercise of First Amendment rights may not be prohibited. 64 Id. Noting that defendants apparently relied on Westchester County Regulation § 765.261, Hobbs I, 2002 WL 31873462, at , a permit-requirement provision applying New York Correction Law § 752, the district court concluded that the permit provision cannot constitutionally be applied to preclude Plaintiff from performing his act in public forum areas within Playland Park, Hobbs I, 2002 WL 31873462, at . 65 As to the amusement section of Playland, however, the court found that that area 66 has all of the earmarks of a nonpublic forum. That area is run by the County with the intent of making a profit, whether or not it actually has succeeded in generating a profit in any given year. Since it is the only government owned amusement park in the United States, it cannot be argued that amusement parks are traditional public fora. 67 Id. at  (footnote omitted). The court also noted that 68 the amusement area is largely self-contained. It is surrounded by fences and gates, which, in most areas, create clear demarcations between the amusement area and the other areas within Playland Park, and it does not serve as a natural thoroughfare for persons walking from place to place either within Playland or between the surrounding parks, facilities, and nearby residential areas. 69 Id. Pursuant to the same analysis, the court found 70 that the picnic shelters, which are reserved for private use for parties and corporate events, the ice rink, Boardwalk Museum, pool, and miniature golf course are nonpublic fora.... Consequently, the County's restrictions on First Amendment expression are reasonable as applied to those areas. 71 Id. at . 72 The court concluded that the boardwalk, pier, paths, park, and unreserved picnic areas (as contrasted with the reserved picnic shelters) are, in fact, public fora: 73 Since sidewalks, streets and parks are quintessential public fora, the government bears the burden of establishing why some or all of these paths, park areas and the boardwalk should be considered different, and should not be open for First Amendment expression by the public. 74 Id. at . The court noted that the County ha[d] not distinguished between the amusement area, ice rink, miniature golf course, picnic shelters, boardwalk museum, beach, and pool on the one hand, and the park, pier, boardwalk and paths on the other. Id. It found that the County's restrictions on First Amendment activity in the public fora (the park, pier, boardwalk, paths, and unreserved picnic areas) did not survive strict scrutiny: 75 [T]he County has not articulated a compelling state interest that makes such a restriction necessary. As the Second Circuit stated in Loper, 76 [i]t does not seem to us that any compelling state interest is served by excluding those who beg in a peaceful manner from communicating with their fellow citizens. Even if the state were considered to have a compelling interest in preventing the evils sometimes associated with begging, a statute that totally prohibits begging in all public places cannot be considered narrowly tailored to achieve that end. 77 Id. at - (quoting Loper v. New York City Police Department, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir.1993)). The court concluded that 78 Westchester County Law § 712.5[1] banning solicitation in any County park and regulation § 765.41, banning any and all solicitation anywhere in Playland Park, and the April 2002 permit application procedure, which states that solicitation of any member of the Public is strictly forbidden at Playland, cannot withstand scrutiny and are unconstitutional as applied to the public forum areas within Playland. 79 Hobbs I, 2002 WL 31873462, at . 80 The court also held that the County's permitting scheme violated the First Amendment because [i]t le[ft] the decision whether to grant or deny a permit to exercise First Amendment rights at any location within Playland Park in the discretion of the commissioner, who must determine, without clear standards, whether the activity at issue would `substantially interfere with park use and enjoyment by the public.' Id. at  (quoting Westchester County Regulation § 765.261(1) (2001)). The court further noted that the regulation ... is not narrowly drawn to protect against a particular danger posed by a specific class of persons convicted of specific crimes. It is not limited, for example, to the regulation of specific conduct by convicted pedophiles, but rather gives the commissioner broad discretion to determine what classes of previously convicted persons should be generally prohibited from engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Moreover, the evaluation required by the standards set forth in these sections clearly involves an appraisal of subjective, content-based factors. 81 Hobbs I, 2002 WL 31873462, at  (emphasis added). 82 Having determined that the provisions of state and County law invoked by defendants could not bar solicitation in Playland's public areas, the court concluded that additional hearings were needed to resolve the issues of fact remain[ing] as to the nature of specific areas within Playland Park. Id. at . 83