Opinion ID: 614205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The PLRA's three-strikes provision

Text: To determine whether Silva may proceed with this appeal without prepayment of the filing fee, we must interpret the three-strikes rule under the PLRA. See § 1915(g). Specifically, we must consider whether a district court's dismissal of a prisoner's case counts against the prisoner as a strike under § 1915(g) immediately upon the entry of the district court's order, or not until it becomes final, that is, after the prisoner has waived or exhausted his opportunity to appeal. As in all statutory construction, we begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1133 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990)). Section 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner from proceeding IFP if he is an unsuccessful frequent-filer or has a history of malicious or frivolous litigation: In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. § 1915(g). Section 1915(g) does not expressly state whether a prior dismissal of an action or appeal must be final before it can be considered a strike, but we think this conclusion is fairly implied. Thompson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 492 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C.Cir.2007). The dissent suggests that our reading of the statute assumes all district court dismissals under § 1915(g) were erroneous. But we assume nothing more than what is assumed by § 1291, which grants an appeal as of right from all final district court decisions. In other words, reading the statute otherwise would be a departure from the usual practice under the Federal Rules and would, in certain cases, effectively eliminate our appellate function. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (granting an appeal as of right from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court); Fed. R.App. P. 3 (setting forth procedures for taking an appeal as of right). Congress's silence on this issue is strong evidence that the usual practice should be followed. . . . See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212, 216, 127 S.Ct. 910, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (interpreting another section of the PLRA and stating that when Congress meant to depart from the usual procedural requirements, it did so expressly). We therefore agree with Silva that a dismissal must be final before it counts as a strike for § 1915(g) purposes. In so holding, we join the majority of circuits that have addressed this issue. In Thompson, the D.C. Circuit held that § 1915(g) only applies to final dismissals and that, accordingly, [d]ismissals do not count as strikes until an appeal has been either waived or resolved. 492 F.3d at 440. The court acknowledged that section 1915(g) nowhere expressly states that dismissals must be final to count as strikes. Id. at 432. It reasoned, however, that [a] contrary rule would, within those narrow set of cases in which the third strike is appealed, effectively eliminate our appellate function. Id. According to the court, [h]ad Congress intended such an unusual result, we expect it would have clearly said so. Id. In Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.1996), the Fifth Circuit held that dismissals under § 1915(g) include only those for which appeal has been exhausted or waived. Id. at 388. The court stated that [a]ny other reading of the statute poses a risk of inadvertently punishing nonculpable conduct. Id. at 387. Like the D.C. Circuit, the Fifth Circuit worried that [a] hyper-literal reading of the statute might . . . bar a prisoner's appeal of an erroneous third strike, since the appeal would follow three prior dismissals. Id. at 388. Similarly, both the Tenth and Eighth Circuits have concluded that a dismissal does not count under § 1915(g) until the appeals process is completed. Jennings v. Natrona Cnty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 779-80 n. 3 (10th Cir.1999); Campbell v. Davenport Police Dep't, 471 F.3d 952, 953 (8th Cir.2006) (holding that three of the plaintiff's prior dismissals could not be counted as strikes when the district court cited them (or when th[e] appeal was filed), because [the plaintiff] had not yet exhausted or waived his appeals in those cases); [4] see also Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 169 (2d Cir.2010) (recognizing that the weight of authority holds that when a district court has dismissed a suit in what could be a prisoner's third strike, the presumption would seem to be for the reviewing court to give that dismissal no weight as of yet). Only the Seventh Circuit has held otherwise. See Robinson v. Powell, 297 F.3d 540, 541 (7th Cir.2002) (holding that a district court dismissal can count as a strike before the prisoner's appeal from the dismissal has concluded). [5] We note that the legislative history of the PLRA also supports our reading of the statute. While it is clear that Congress enacted § 1915(g) to curb frivolous prisoner complaints and appeals, see Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir.2002) (The PLRA filing fee provisions were enacted to deter the large number of frivolous inmate lawsuits that were `clogging' the federal courts and `draining' limited judicial resources), the PLRA's reforms were designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good. Jones, 549 U.S. at 204, 127 S.Ct. 910. Congress intended section 1915(g) only to penalize litigation that is truly frivolous, not to freeze out meritorious claims or ossify district court errors. Adepegba, 103 F.3d at 388; see also Jennings, 175 F.3d at 780. Thus, our reading of the statute not only respects Congress' intent to curb meritless lawsuits, but ensures that meritorious lawsuits are not swept away in the process. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S146110-01, S14267 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995)) (As chief sponsor of the PLRA, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch made the following statement: `I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims. This legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised.'). We must heed the Supreme Court's warning not to depart from the usual practice under the Federal Rules on the basis of perceived policy concerns. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 212, 127 S.Ct. 910 (holding that, despite legitimate policy reasons to the contrary, because the PLRA itself does not require prisoners to plead exhaustion, the normal pleading rules apply). Accordingly, we hold that a district court's dismissal of a case does not count as a strike under § 1915(g) until the litigant has exhausted or waived his opportunity to appeal. This means that a dismissal ripens into a strike for § 1915(g) purposes on the date of the Supreme Court's denial or dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari, if the prisoner filed one, or from the date when the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired, if he did not. Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir.2011); [6] cf. Clay v. U.S., 537 U.S. 522, 525, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) (holding that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2255's one-year limitations period, a judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction). Applying this rule to the three dismissals at issue here King County, Bush and Goddard we conclude that none count as a strike against Silva in this appeal. In King County, the district court dismissed Silva's case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and stated that the dismissal shall count as a strike under § 1915(g). The district court's order of dismissal, however, was dated January 29, 2009over nine months after Silva filed his notice of appeal in this case. Thus, this dismissal did not take place on a prior occasion and cannot count against him here. See Campbell, 471 F.3d at 952-53 (Section 1915(g) does not apply unless the inmate litigant has three strikes at the time he files his lawsuit or appeal); cf. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that prisoners qualify for the imminent danger exception in § 1915(g) based on the alleged conditions at the time the complaint was filed). In Bush, the district court dismissed Silva's complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and directed the clerk to count the dismissal as a strike under § 1915(g). Silva appealed the dismissal to this court and the district court certified that the appeal was not taken in good faith. See Fed. R.App. P. 24(a)(3)(A). We affirmed the district court's judgment on November 19, 2007, and denied Silva's petition for rehearing on June 10, 2008. The record does not reflect whether Silva petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari. The district court's dismissal in Bush therefore ripened into a strike once the time for filing a certiorari petition expiredninety days after we denied his petition for rehearing. See Supreme Court Rule 13.3. That was well after Silva took his appeal in this case. Thus, the dismissal does not count against Silva here. For the same reason, the district court's dismissal in Goddard also does not count against Silva in this appeal. In that case, the district court dismissed Silva's complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim and instructed the clerk to dismiss the case with prejudice and count the dismissal as a strike under § 1915(g) if Silva did not file an amended complaint. Silva then appealed. We affirmed the district court's order on November 6, 2008, eight months after Silva filed his notice of appeal in this case. Accordingly, this dismissal cannot count as a strike against him here. Because three of the five dismissals on which the Defendants rely were not final at the time Silva took this appeal, they cannot count against Silva in this case. We therefore reject the Defendants' request that we revoke Silva's IFP status, and we allow him to continue in this appeal IFP. [7]