Opinion ID: 159841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Characterization of the Facts

Text: 31 Plaintiffs first contend that the district court relied on an inaccurate and internally inconsistent characterization of the facts in reaching its decision. They argue that the district court placed too much emphasis on the agreement between Dr. Matthews and Cottonwood Ob/Gyn, and ignored other evidence of conversations and agreements involving the defendants. Although the district court did not specifically mention the substance of every relevant conversation in which the defendants engaged in the months leading up to the agreement between Dr. Matthews and Cottonwood Ob/Gyn, the district court did discuss several meetings and conversations involving the defendants that preceded the Matthews/Cottonwood Ob/Gyn agreement. Plaintiffs have failed to show how any of the evidence they cite that was not mentioned in the district court opinion would alter the horizontal group boycott analysis. 8 32 Plaintiffs also claim that the district court erred in giving credence to the alleged concerns about their obstetrical anesthesiology skills. They argue that because Dr. Matthews offered Drs. Diaz and Diehl two non-double covered shifts per month, any concern about their skills was merely a red herring argument. Dr. Matthews, however, offered Drs. Diaz and Diehl those shifts on an experimental test basis to allow them to prove that concerns about their skills were unwarranted. Thus, the fact that Dr. Matthews offered Drs. Diaz and Diehl non-double covered shifts is not indicative of a lack of concern about their skills. In addition, the record contains evidence that there was some basis for concern about the obstetric anesthesiology skills of the plaintiffs. 33 Plaintiffs also point to what they consider a fundamental contradiction within the district court's rendition of the facts. The district court opinion contained the following two statements: (1) [T]he ob/gyn doctor or patient had no realistic choice but to use the anesthesiologist on call when an obstetric case presented itself, Diaz, 15 F. Supp.2d at 1147; and (2) The agreement enables the patient or ob/gyn doctor performing a procedure to choose which anesthesiologist he or she will use rather than requiring the doctor to use whichever anesthesiologist happens to be on call, Id. at 1148. The statements are not fundamentally contradictory; rather, they are easily reconciled. In the first statement, the district court describes the situation as it existed prior to the Matthews/Cottonwood Ob/Gyn agreement; and in the second statement, the district court describes the situation as it existed after the agreement. Before the agreement, neither the ob/gyn doctor nor the patient could choose an anesthesiologist. After the agreement, Cottonwood Ob/Gyn doctors could tell Dr. Matthews which anesthesiologists they preferred for their patients. Then, whenever a non-preferred anesthesiologist was on the labor and delivery schedule, a preferred anesthesiologist could be scheduled as well to provide services for the Cottonwood Ob/Gyn patients. The district court made these observations in support of its conclusion that the agreement increased user choices. 34 Thus, plaintiffs' first argument fails. They have not demonstrated that the district court relied on an inaccurate or inconsistent characterization of the facts in reaching its decision.