Opinion ID: 887137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 15 Did the District Court err in calculating the amount of time due Erickson, as credit against his sentences, for time served in jail prior to judgment? ¶ 16 Relating to credit for time served in DC-02-048, Erickson argues that the District Court miscalculated the number of days credit he earned between his arrest on September 19, 2002, and sentencing. The District Court calculated that Erickson had been incarcerated for 430 days between September 19, 2002, and December 19, 2003, but Erickson was actually incarcerated for 457 days during this period. The State concedes that the District Court miscalculated the proper amount of credit for time served on this charge. Erickson must receive credit for the additional 27 days actually served. ¶ 17 Erickson insists that he must be given additional credit against his sentence in DC-01-055, for the time he spent in jail from September 19, 2002, the date of his re-arrest, until December 19, 2003, the date of sentencing. Erickson argues that his incarceration after September 19, 2002, was directly related to the initial possession charge from November 1, 2001, because the bond he had posted was revoked on September 18, 2002, and he was in jail awaiting trial on both charges. Thus, he argues that, pursuant to § 46-18-403(1), MCA, and State v. Kime, 2002 MT 38, 308 Mont. 341, 43 P.3d 290, overruled in part on other grounds by Eaton, ¶ 11, he must receive credit for pre-judgment incarceration on both charges. ¶ 18 The State argues that additional credit for time served in DC-01-055 should not be granted, because Erickson's incarceration after September 19, 2002, was not related to the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, as the District Court had entered no order revoking his bail on that charge. The State also argues that Erickson's counsel acknowledged at the sentencing hearing that Erickson was not entitled to credit in DC-01-055 for the time he served following his arrest on September 19, 2002. ¶ 19 It is not clear how the District Court decided that Erickson was entitled to be credited with 289 days served on DC-01-055. The plea agreement only mentions credit for the time Erickson spent in jail awaiting trial in DC-02-048, and it makes no mention of the time Erickson was incarcerated pursuant to the first charge, DC-01-055. Also, it is not clear what charge the District Court and Erickson's counsel were talking about when credit for time served was discussed, in part because the number of days being discussed was vague, that is, 400-some or 700-some. While the State suggests that the 289 days that was credited on DC-01-055 was meant to apply to Erickson's incarceration from November 1, 2001, until bond was posted on July 25, 2002, such period of incarceration was 267 days. The record before this Court shows that the actual periods of Erickson's pre-judgment incarceration are: 267 days from November 1, 2001, until July 25, 2002; and 457 days from September 19, 2002, until December 19, 2003, for a total of 724 days. ¶ 20 In determining credit for pre-judgment time served, the applicable statute reads as follows: A person incarcerated on a bailable offense and against whom a judgment of imprisonment is rendered must be allowed credit for each day of incarceration prior to or after conviction, except that the time allowed as a credit may not exceed the term of the prison sentence rendered. Section 46-18-403(1). In Kime, the defendant was arrested on November 26, 2000, and placed in the Gallatin County Detention Center on multiple charges. Kime, ¶ 3. The defendant was in a supervised release program at that time because of a prior felony assault conviction, and was transferred from the Gallatin County Detention Center to the Montana State Prison on December 5, 2000, to serve the remainder of his sentence for felony assault. Kime, ¶ 4. The defendant was sentenced on the charges stemming from his November 26, 2000, arrest on April 2, 2001, and he received credit on this charge only for the time he spent in the Gallatin County Detention Center from November 26, 2000, until December 5, 2000. He did not receive credit for his incarceration in the Montana State Prison from December 5, 2000, until April 2, 2001. Kime, ¶ 5. The defendant appealed, arguing that he should have received credit for all of his incarceration, including his incarceration in the Montana State Prison. Kime, ¶¶ 5, 8. ¶ 21 We concluded that the credit given by the District Court at sentencing was correct, because the defendant's incarceration at Montana State Prison, from December 5, 2000, until April 2, 2001, was related only to his prior felony assault conviction, not to the charges stemming from his arrest on November 26, 2000. Kime, ¶ 16. We noted that the purpose of § 46-18-403(1), MCA, was to insure that indigent and nonindigent defendants did not receive disparate treatment, and [t]hat purpose is not served by crediting a defendant's sentence for time served where the defendant would not have been released from custody had he or she been able to post bail in any event as a result of being held on a sentence related to an earlier offense. Kime, ¶ 15. Thus, after Kime, pursuant to § 46-18-403(1), MCA, a defendant's sentence may be credited with the time he or she was incarcerated only if that incarceration was directly related to the offense for which the sentence is imposed. Kime, ¶ 16. ¶ 22 In the present case, it is clear that § 46-18-403(1), MCA, requires that Erickson receive credit on his sentence in No. DC-01-055 for his incarceration from November 1, 2001, until bond was posted on July 25, 2002. If it is indeed true that Erickson's $5,000 bond was revoked by his bondsman on September 18, 2002, he would upon such revocation no longer have met the condition of his release on bail that he post a bond, and he would have been subject to immediate arrest on the possession charge, DC-01-055. Section 46-9-505, MCA. Likewise, if it is true that Erickson was surrendered to the Dawson County Sheriff in connection with DC-01-055, the Sheriff had the obligation to detain him in custody on that charge, and to notify the District Court that he was in custody on such charge. Section 46-9-510(2), MCA. The failure of the Sheriff to notify the District Court that he was in custody cannot be attributed to Erickson. ¶ 23 Erickson's arrest on DC-01-055 was unnecessary, however, because he was already in jail after his arrest on the DC-02-048 charge on September 19, 2002. Thus, the County Attorney had no incentive whatever to petition the District Court to formally revoke his bail in DC-01-055, and have an arrest warrant issued for a man that was already in jail. ¶ 24 It is clear under the circumstances of this case that, if Erickson's $5,000 bond was revoked by his bondsman pursuant to § 46-9-401(3), MCA, on September 18, 2002, and he was surrendered to the Sheriff, he was then incarcerated awaiting trial on the charges in DC-01-055 as well as those in DC-02-048. His incarceration was, in such instance, directly related to the charges in DC-01-055, and § 46-18-403(1), MCA, would require that he receive credit for the time between his arrest and when judgment was entered on that charge. ¶ 25 If the truth of the matter is that Erickson's bond in DC-01-055 was never revoked, the District Court would be correct that he was not incarcerated on that charge after his release on July 25, 2002, and he need not receive credit for such time served. ¶ 26 While the record on appeal includes a copy of the bond revocation, it has never been established in the District Court that Erickson's bond in DC-01-055 was revoked. Therefore, remand is necessary to determine whether Erickson's bond was in fact revoked in DC-01-055. ¶ 27 In considering this issue, we are aware that Erickson did not object at the sentencing hearing to the District Court's calculation of time served in DC-01-055. While there was no timely oral objection by Erickson, we have established an important exception to the rule that failure to timely object to a sentence risks waiver of a sentencing issue on appeal. In State v. Lenihan (1979), 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000, we held where a sentence was imposed in a criminal case, and the defendant appeals on the basis that the sentence is illegal or exceeds statutory mandates, [i]t appears to be the better rule to allow an appellate court [jurisdiction] to review . . . even if no objection is made at the time of sentencing. Eaton, ¶ 14 (citations omitted). In this case, the issue is the proper amount of time to credit Erickson for his incarceration. According to § 46-18-403(1), MCA, such credit must be allowed. As such, giving Erickson less credit than he is entitled to would violate statutory mandates, and thus the exception as stated in Eaton applies. It is not fatal to his appeal that Erickson did not timely object at sentencing.