Opinion ID: 1366157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the separation of powers problem

Text: As I read LJuCR 7.14(b), it does not require a showing of prejudice to the ability to defend. Its plain terms require no more than a finding of unreasonable delay. The majority arrives at a different conclusion primarily because it fears this plain meaning construction of the rule may violate the separation of powers. There are, of course, substantial separation of powers considerations in a dismissal for preinformation misconduct. Such a dismissal, whether pursuant to a court rule or not, risks encroachment on the Legislature's power to set limitations periods and on the executive's discretion in initiating criminal proceedings. Therefore, aside from statutes of limitations, a court can dismiss only on independent constitutional grounds; that is, for a violation of due process. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 52 L.Ed.2d 752, 97 S.Ct. 2044 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L.Ed.2d 468, 92 S.Ct. 455 (1971). The majority concludes that a dismissal for unreasonable delay is not a dismissal for a violation of due process. Consequently, in order to avoid a separation of powers problem, the majority reads into LJuCR 7.14(b) the requirement that the defendant show prejudice to the ability to defend. This seems to make sense, since our cases require a showing of prejudice before a due process violation will be found. In State v. Calderon, 102 Wn.2d 348, 352-53, 684 P.2d 1293 (1984) we held: The defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the delay and, in making its due process inquiry, the court must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused. ... Simply establishing prejudice is not enough, however. To find a due process violation, the court must also consider the State's reasons for the delay. If the State is able to justify the delay, the court must undertake a further balancing of the State's interest and the prejudice to the accused. (Citations omitted. Italics mine.) Calderon, at 352-53. The majority reasons that, since the trial court can dismiss only for a due process violation and since Calderon requires a showing of prejudice, dismissal under LJuCR 7.14(b) requires a showing of prejudice to the ability to defend. However, prejudice within the meaning of Calderon is not limited to prejudice in the ability to defend. We recognized in that case that prejudice sufficient to violate due process may consist solely of the loss of the special benefits of the juvenile justice system. Calderon, at 352-53. Because one of the prime values of the juvenile justice system is the prompt disposition of charges, unreasonable delay standing alone may constitute a due process violation, including the prejudice required by Calderon. A plain meaning reading of LJuCR 7.14(b) does not violate the separation of powers because the rule merely guides the trial court in determining whether due process has been violated by a delay in charging.