Opinion ID: 2431316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: use of a speeding ticket to impeach plaintiff lewis

Text: James Daly Wahl, defendant ad litem for defendant Douglas Travagliante, deceased, claims that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant Travagliante to impeach plaintiff by showing plaintiff's prior conviction of the misdemeanor of speeding. Plaintiff's offer of proof shows that plaintiff testified at his deposition that, at some time prior to the accident at issue, he received a speeding ticket on Highway 44 from a state trooper, pled guilty and paid a fine. The conviction of speeding was offered as bearing on plaintiff's credibility as a witness. The statute relied on by the defendant for his position that it was error to exclude the speeding conviction is § 491.050, RSMo 1986, which was last amended in 1981. The statute provides: Any person who has been convicted of a crime is, notwithstanding, a competent witness; however, any prior criminal convictions may be proved to affect his credibility in a civil or criminal case and, further, any prior pleas of guilty, pleas of nolo contendere, and findings of guilty may be proved to affect his credibility in a criminal case. Such proof may be either by the record or by his own cross-examination, upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer. (Emphasis added to identify words added or modified in 1981.) [1] Cases of this Court construing § 491.050 prior to the 1981 amendment consistently held that the statute permitted evidence of any felony or misdemeanor conviction, including traffic convictions, to be proved on the question of witness credibility. State v. Morris, 460 S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo.1970); Hoover v. Denton, 335 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Mo. 1960); State v. Cox, 333 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Mo.1960); Brown v. Anthony Mfg. Co., 311 S.W.2d 23, 28 (Mo. banc 1958); State v. Johnson, 293 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Mo.1956); and State v. Blitz, 171 Mo. 530, 71 S.W. 1027, 1030 (1903). See also State v. Busby, 486 S.W.2d 501 (Mo.1972); State v. Meyer, 473 S.W.2d 374 (Mo.1971); Fisher v. Gunn, 270 S.W.2d 869 (Mo.1954); and Forbis v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 513 S.W.2d 760 (Mo.App.1974). Arguably, the 1981 amendment might serve as a basis from which to undertake a new construction of § 491.050. It may also be argued that the 1981 amendment only served to reinforce the pre-1981 construction of the statute. See Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Director of Revenue, 766 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 1989). However, the issue of how the amended statute should be construed need not and is not decided in this case. For the purpose of this opinion, it will be assumed, without deciding, that the trial court erred in excluding the single misdemeanor speeding conviction. The question of error does not resolve the question of whether reversal is mandated on this claim. By both statute and rule, an appellate court is not to reverse a judgment unless it believes the error committed by the trial court against the appellant materially affected the merits of the action. § 512.160.2; Rule 84.13(b). The exclusion of evidence which has little, if any, probative value is usually held not to materially affect the merits of the case and hence, error in rejecting such evidence is not grounds for reversal. Johnson v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 261 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Mo.1953). The exclusion of a single misdemeanor conviction of speeding that is unrelated to any issue other than witness credibility is of such little consequence that no reversal of a judgment will be made on that basis. The first claim, involving impeachment, is without merit. In Forbis, supra , the court of appeals reversed a judgment on the basis of a trial court's exclusion of a single speeding conviction, asserting that the exclusion of the conviction was contrary to the absolute right afforded plaintiff by § 491.050. 513 S.W.2d at 766 (emphasis in original). The court did not consider the equally compelling language of § 512.160.2 and Rule 84.13(b) forbidding appellate courts from reversing judgments for errors that do not materially affect the outcome of a case. To the extent of any inconsistency with the decision here, Forbis is overruled.