Opinion ID: 2263509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process of Law The Void for Vagueness Doctrine.

Text: The lower court found that the Ordinance was replete with phrases and words that have no common meaning to men of reason and that it was therefore so vague and indefinite that it is a violation of the due process provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. It held that [t]his unconstitutional vagueness is so pervasive that the severability [clause] in Section 11 of [Chapter] 20A cannot save the Act. In so concluding, the lower court focused on four specific provisions of the Ordinance: (1) § 20A-3(b)(11) requiring that financial disclosure statements be filed by County employees in decision-making jobs; [6] (2) § 20A-3(d) exempting certain officials within a designated class from disclosure, but not specifically setting out who will grant the exemption; (3) § 20A-5 requiring a valuation to be placed on real and personal property without specifying the method of valuation, e.g., market value, purchase price, etc.; (4) §§ 20A-1 and 20A-10 requiring public officials to file financial statements, without defining that term. It is true, of course, that a statute which requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). Recognizing that there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief and that statutory language may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, the Supreme Court recently restated the standard for vagueness by saying: the statute must be set out in terms the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest. United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, supra, 413 U.S. at 578-79. Measured by these tests, we think the lower court was plainly wrong in holding that the Ordinance was void for vagueness. The Ordinance makes provision for a procedure whereby persons in doubt about its application in particular situations may obtain a ruling from the County Attorney, the officer primarily responsible for its enforcement. The County Attorney is required by the Ordinance to issue advisory opinions with respect to any matter involving its applicability, and he is responsible for determining exemptions under § 20A-3 (d), and resolving uncertainties that might arise under § 20A-3 (b) (11). [7] As to the valuation provisions of § 20A-5, the County Executive is authorized to adopt rules and regulations to implement the Ordinance; in the absence of such regulations, we think any reasonable good faith attempt at a fair market valuation will satisfy the plain intention of the County Council in enacting the Ordinance. We also think that the provisions of § 20A-3 sufficiently identify those persons required to file financial statements under the Ordinance and that no further definition of local official is required.