Opinion ID: 1166412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Outstanding Debts.

Text: The trial court ordered appellant to assume all outstanding debts incurred by respondent prior to the May decree. Appellant contends that this order is so vague and uncertain as to be void, thereby providing a basis for reversal. We cannot agree. Here, the trial court, in its partial decree of divorce of January 29, 1976, ordered appellant to continue to pay respondent's necessary expenses, which, as the record reflects, he had done for several years previous, and further ordered appellant to pay $300 per month until the date of the supplemental decree of May 17, 1976. It was on this later date that appellant was ordered to pay all of the outstanding bills incurred by the parties hereto including monies borrowed by the plaintiff (respondent herein) up to May 1, 1976. In Smith v. District Court, 63 Nev. 249, 167 P.2d 648 (1946), this Court stated: A judgment or decree may be so uncertain and indefinite as to be impossible of administration, unenforceable and void. And a judgment may be partly valid and partly void. Id. at 257, 167 P.2d at 651. That case is distinguished, as the Smith court stressed that in water rights cases, greater certainty was required. In Kittle v. Lang, 107 Cal. App.2d 604, 237 P.2d 673 (1951), a case whose facts are somewhat allied to ours, a judgment was entered requiring the defendant to pay all sums of money ... for and on behalf of plaintiff... . Id. at 678. That judgment was reversed for uncertainty with the court stating: As to the finding and judgment for the payment of money, a stricter rule seems to prevail, i.e., that a judgment of money must be stated with certainty and should specify the amount. Id. As stated in 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 72: A judgment must be definite and certain in itself, or capable of being made so by proper construction. It must fix clearly the rights and liabilities of the respective parties to the cause, and be such as defendant may readily understand and be capable of performing, and such as to admit of enforcement . . Where the record entry is wholly uncertain, repugnant, or contradictory, the judgment is at least erroneous, and it may be void. An obscure judgment entry may, however, be construed with reference to the pleadings and record, and, where on the whole record its sense can be clearly ascertained, the judgment will be upheld. (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted.) As already mentioned, appellant for the several years preceding commencement of the divorce action had assumed responsibility for all the bill paying for the parties. Throughout the transcript there are numerous references to ordinary and fixed expenses of the parties. Appellant was thoroughly familiar with the bills and all creditor information, including the names of creditors, the nature of the obligations, the balances, when the debts were payable, and the like. Moreover, respondent testified, without contradiction, that she had not purchased any extraordinary or luxury items since the January hearing. Although the decree may be uncertain on its face, a review of the record demonstrates sufficient clarity and definiteness to enable appellant to comply with the decree's requirements. Here, appellant took no steps in the court below to either set aside or amend the judgment, NRCP 59(e), or to clarify the decree, NRCP 60(a) [2] . Had he, such action may have averted appellate review. Finally, respondent has moved for attorney's fees on appeal. The awards given respondent in community property and alimony show that she is sufficiently capable of financing her own appeal. We have allowed fees on appeal when a clear showing of entitlement has been presented and circumstances so warrant. Reid v. Reid, 89 Nev. 460, 514 P.2d 1294 (1973); Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 490 P.2d 342 (1971). Here, such a showing is absent, and we accordingly deny the request for fees. Appellant's remaining claims of error, being without merit, are rejected. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for redistribution of the two community property automobiles. BATJER, C.J., MOWBRAY and GUNDERSON, JJ., and HOWARD W. BABCOCK, [3] District Judge, concur.