Opinion ID: 2623278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Case complexity, the ability to represent oneself, and trial fairness

Text: The district court further concluded that the instant case was so complex that permitting Vanisi to represent himself would deny him a fair trial. In two of our own cases, this court has cited the complexity of the case and fair-trial concerns as a basis for denying a defendant's request for self-representation. [14] We now clarify that though this factor is relevant on the issue of whether a defendant's decision to waive counsel was made understanding the potential consequences of the decision, it is not an independent basis for denial of a motion for self-representation. The Ninth Circuit has pointed out: In deciding whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently decided to represent himself, the trial court is to look not to the quality of his representation, but rather to the quality of his decision. [15] The district court should inquire of a defendant about the complexity of the case to ensure that the defendant understands his or her decision and, in particular, the difficulties he or she will face proceeding in proper person. But to regard the complexity of the case and related fair-trial concerns as considerations independent of this inquiry, we conclude, does not comport with the law on self-representation. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation. [16] This court has similarly stated that [t]he relevant assessment examines the accused's competence to choose self-representation, not his ability to adequately defend himself. [17] Accordingly, if a defendant willingly waives counsel and chooses self-representation with an understanding of its dangers, including the difficulties presented by a complex case, he or she has the right to do so. We discern no Faretta exception where a defendant's assertion of the right to self-representation would be especially unwise. [18] The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that although the defendant `may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored,' even though it is undeniable that in most cases a defendant is better represented by counsel. [19]
Vanisi claims that the aggravating circumstance of mutilation does not apply in this case. We reject this claim. NRS 200.033(8) provides for an aggravating circumstance where [t]he murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim. Here, the State proceeded on a theory of mutilation. This court has approved a jury instruction that defines mutilate as to cut off or permanently destroy a limb or essential part of the body or to cut off or alter radically so as to make imperfect. [20] Mutilation requires an act beyond the act of killing itself. [21] There is compelling evidence establishing mutilation here. Dr. Clark, who performed the autopsy, testified to the extensive and severe injury inflicted on Sullivan's body. Clark identified at least twenty separate and distinct impacts to Sullivan's face and head. Sullivan had many, many lacerations and some of Sullivan's teeth were actually found outside of the body. Clark testified that the weapon used in the offense was wielded in different fashions, that some of the injuries are coming this direction, some are coming this direction, some are coming towards the back, and other injuries are made with a sharp portion of the blade. Clark also found that some injuries to Sullivan's chin and jaw and to the back of his head were more consistent with broad flat impact, possibly stomping. Sullivan sustained skull fractures, fractures to virtually all of the facial bones, and damage to the brain. This physical evidence is consistent with the testimony of one of Vanisi's relatives concerning Vanisi's description of the murder. According to this account, even after Sullivan was knocked out by Vanisi's initial assault, Vanisi proceeded to kick Sullivan over and over, stomping on Sullivan's head. Given the weight of this evidence, we conclude that Vanisi's assault went well beyond the act of killing itself and resulted in mutilation of the victim's body. [22] Although Vanisi does not specifically challenge the jury instruction on appeal, we note that it included some language no longer mandated by the statutory aggravating circumstance. The jury was instructed: The term `mutilate' means to cut off or permanently destroy a limb or essential part of the body, or to cut off or alter radically so as to make imperfect, or other serious and depraved physical abuse beyond the act of killing itself. [23] This instruction is largely the same as the one we have approved. However, the emphasized language appears to come from an instruction based on a former version of NRS 200.033(8), which referred to depravity of mind as well as torture and mutilation. [24] In 1995, the Legislature amended the statute to delete depravity of mind. [25] Use of the instruction here was not prejudicial since the State did not argue depravity of mind and there was compelling evidence of mutilation, as discussed above. We take this opportunity, however, to clarify that language referring to other serious and depraved physical abuse should no longer be included in a definition of mutilation.
NRS 177.055(2) requires this court to review every death sentence and consider in addition to any issues raised on appeal: (b) Whether the evidence supports the finding of an aggravating circumstance or circumstances; (c) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factor; and (d) Whether the sentence of death is excessive, considering both the crime and the defendant. First, there is evidence to support each of the aggravating circumstances. We have already discussed mutilation. The remaining aggravating circumstances are also supported by the evidence. With regard to the aggravating circumstance of robbery or attempted robbery, the evidence shows that Vanisi took Officer Sullivan's gun belt and gun. With regard to the aggravating circumstance of killing a peace officer, there is evidence that Sullivan was on duty, in uniform, and in his police car when he was attacked. Further, Vanisi's statements to various individuals about his intent to kill and rob a police officer support the jury's finding of both aggravating circumstances. Second, we have reviewed the record and conclude that Vanisi's death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor. Vanisi makes one contention in this regard. Because the jury made no findings with respect to mitigating circumstances, he argues that the jury improperly rejected persuasive mitigating evidence. This contention lacks merit. Here, the jury was not asked to detail its findings concerning mitigating circumstances, and there is no requirement that a jury receive a form to specify the mitigating circumstances it has found. [26] NRS 175.554(3) provides that the jury need only state that there are no mitigating circumstances which outweigh the aggravating. [27] We perceive no basis to conclude that the jurors did not duly consider the mitigating evidence before them. Third, we conclude that the death penalty is not excessive. The instant crime was a cold, calculated, and brutal killing. Vanisi had planned to kill a police officer well in advance of the murder, and he carried that plan into action, going so far as to disguise himself before the killing. The actual act of killing was completely unprovoked and particularly violent. Vanisi indicated afterwards that he enjoyed it and would like to kill again. It is true that this case is not without mitigating evidence, including testimony by Vanisi's family and other evidence indicating that he has mental health problems. Nevertheless, despite these problems, the level of planning behind this killing shows that it was more than a rash impulse acted on during a psychotic episode arising from bipolar disorder.
Finally, Vanisi claims that the district court erred in rejecting his proffered instruction on reasonable doubt and instructing the jury pursuant to NRS 175.211. The court did not err in using the mandatory statutory instruction. [28]