Opinion ID: 788147
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Switching Evidence

Text: 199 Lambert argues that she is nonetheless entitled to relief due to the Commonwealth's misconduct at the PCRA hearing. Specifically, Lambert argues that at the PCRA hearing, the Commonwealth offered into evidence sweatpants that were different than those offered into evidence at trial. In other words, she argues that the Commonwealth switched evidence and produced different sweatpants than those used at trial. Lambert Br. 41. The PCRA Court rejected Lambert's argument, because it found that there was no proof that the sweatpants admitted into evidence as Commonwealth's Exhibit 9 in 1992 have ever been altered, changed, or substituted. PCRA Decision 209. 200 To support her switching claim before the PCRA Court, Lambert offered testimony that the sweatpants at the trial tested positive for blood, while the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing did not. In addition, a textile expert opined that the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing were sized boy's extra large and that a 6'1 individual who weighed one hundred and ninety pounds-Yunkin's approximate height and weight at the time of the murder-could not fit into them. Lambert's trial counsel, Roy Shirk, also testified at the PCRA hearing that, to the best of his recollection, the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing were smaller than those at trial. He also opined that the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing would not fit Yunkin. 201 On the other hand, the Commonwealth offered evidence that the officer who logged the contents of the bag found in the dumpster behind K-Mart listed the sweatpants that were eventually admitted into evidence at the trial as ladies dress `black' sweatpants (appears small size). App. 7015. This would tend to contradict Lambert's bald assertion that the sweatpants at trial were so huge that she could not wear them. The forensic scientist who performed the test to check for blood prior to the trial, Donald P. Bloser, Jr., testified that the markings he made on the sweatpants from trial still appeared (albeit faded) on the sweatpants at the PCRA hearing. Bloser also testified that the sweatpants tested very weak for blood prior to trial in 1992 and that he found no presence of blood when he retested other evidence (such as the ski hats) that had also tested very weak for blood in 1992. App. 2759. 28 In addition, an investigator from the Commonwealth, James Gallagher, testified about a photograph he took using the sweatpants in evidence at the PCRA hearing. He took a photograph in which he laid the sweatpants against cardboard box lids that had also appeared in a photograph of the sweatpants from trial. The Court concluded that the two photographs looked substantially similar. 202 Given the record before it, the PCRA court's factual determination that the sweatpants were not switched is reasonable. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion, and the evidence to the contrary is considerably weaker. 203 More important, Lambert's switching claim provides no basis for habeas relief. She argues that the Commonwealth's attempt to uphold Lambert's conviction on evidence contradictory to that used to convict her violates `the most basic notions of due process.' Lambert Br. 41. In support of this proposition, she cites Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 99 S.Ct. 2190, 60 L.Ed.2d 743 (1979), Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000), and Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.1997). 204 In Dunn, the Court of Appeals had affirmed a conviction based on facts that had been adduced at trial but that neither supported the offense charged in the indictment nor provided the foundation for the jury's conviction. The Supreme Court held that appellate courts are not free to revise the basis on which a defendant is convicted simply because the same result would likely obtain at trial. 442 U.S. at 107, 99 S.Ct. 2190. In other words, a defendant's due process rights are violated when his conviction is affirmed on an offense that he was not charged with and that was not presented to the jury or court that tried him. 205 Smith and Thompson involved instances where the government offered contradictory theories in two separate trials to convict two individuals for the same crime. The Thompson court held that when no new significant evidence comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts regarding the same crime. 120 F.3d at 1058. The Smith court concluded that the State's use of factually contradictory theories constituted `foul blows' and deprived [the defendant] of due process and rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. 205 F.3d at 1051. 206 To a certain degree Dunn and Smith/Thompson represent different sides of the same coin. Dunn requires a certain degree of vertical consistency (between trial and appeal) in the theories the government offers, while Smith and Thompson require a certain degree of horizontal consistency (between two trials). Both lines of cases are inapposite, however, because they do not provide a basis for habeas relief here. 207 Lambert's argument suffers from the same fundamental flaw that we identified in the petitioner's argument in Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.2002). There, we explained: 208 The fundamental flaw in Gattis' argument is that in the decisions of which he complains the state courts did not uphold [his] conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to a jury at trial. [ Dunn, 442 U.S. at 106, 99 S.Ct. 2190]. The allegedly different theory of guilt was not presented on direct appeal in support of his conviction but in the course of a post-conviction hearing held in connection with his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony concerning the implausibility of the state's account of the murder. The Superior Court and Delaware Supreme Court did not affirm his conviction based on the state's theory but merely found his ineffectiveness claim unpersuasive. The state's theory played a small role, if any, in the courts' reasoning. In this context Dunn and [ Cola v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 681 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 398, 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986)] are simply not applicable. 209 Id. at 238. 210 Similarly, and more importantly, habeas proceedings are not the appropriate forum for Lambert to pursue claims of error at the PCRA proceeding. As we explained in Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941 (3d Cir.1998): 211 The federal courts are authorized to provide collateral relief where a petitioner is in state custody or under a federal sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255. Thus, the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation. We have often noted the general proposition that habeas proceedings are hybrid actions; they are independent civil dispositions of completed criminal proceedings. Federal habeas power is limited ... to a determination of whether there has been an improper detention by virtue of the state court judgment. 212 Id. at 954-55 (internal citations omitted); see also Morris v. Cain, 186 F.3d 581, 585 n. 6 (5th Cir.1999); Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314, 317 (8th Cir.1990). To be sure, error in state collateral proceedings may affect the deference we owe the court's findings under § 2254(d) and 2254(e)(1). But, as we admonished in Hassine, alleged errors in collateral proceedings, such as Lambert's claim that the prosecution switched the sweatpants, are not a proper basis for habeas relief from the original conviction. It is the original trial that is the main event for habeas purposes. 213