Opinion ID: 1698626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Continuing Omission

Text: We recently held that for there to be a continuing tort there must be a continuing duty owed to the plaintiff and a continuing breach of that duty by the defendant. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 177 (1987). Crump, 98-2326 at p. 10, 737 So.2d at 728. Rejecting the contention that the continuing breach of duty could consist of the defendant's failure to remedy the harm caused by the initial tortious conduct, we stated that the breach of the duty to right a wrong and make the plaintiff whole simply cannot be a continuing wrong which suspends the running of prescription, as that is the purpose of any lawsuit and the obligation of every tortfeasor. 98-2326 at p. 10, 737 So.2d at 729. An exception, however, has been recognized when a special relationship, such as patient-physician or attorney-client, exists between the parties; the continuation of a special relationship offers the possibility of correction of an injury and thus may postpone the running of prescription. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 177 (1987). As long as the patient remains in [the physician's] care, she could reasonably expect a correction of the diagnosis or treatment, so again, the defendant in a sense continues to be negligent. Dobbs, supra § 220 at 561. In Taylor v. Giddens, 618 So.2d 834 (La.1993), we noted the possibility that continued treatment combined with a continued professional relationship could result in a suspension of prescription. We further noted that two appellate cases have recognized this principle, which is based on the fact the continuing relationship is likely to hinder the patient's inclination to sue. 618 So.2d at 843 (citing Trainor v. Young, 561 So.2d 722 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writs denied, 567 So.2d 1124, 1125 (La.1990), and Abrams v. Herbert, 590 So.2d 1291 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991)). Because the record before us in Taylor revealed that the malpractice victim's relationship with the doctor was no more than perfunctory, we declined to address the issue of whether prescription could be suspended based on the doctor's continued treatment of the patient. As a matter of semantics, Louisiana appellate courts have indicated that this type of tolling of prescription that possibly arises out of the continuation of such a special relationship is not based on the continuing tort concept; rather, it is based on the third category of contra non valentem where the defendant himself has done some act effectively preventing the plaintiff from availing himself of his cause of action. See Wang v. Broussard, 96-2719 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/20/98), 708 So.2d 487, writ denied, 98-1166 (La.6/19/98), 720 So.2d 1213 (citing Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson and Talley, 565 So.2d 990, 995 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 1125 (La.1990)); see also Acosta v. Campbell, 98-2538 (La.App. 4th Cir.8/11/99), 744 So.2d 112, writ denied, 99-2651 (La.11/19/99), 749 So.2d 683 (noting that no Louisiana case has held that prescription can be extended solely, or primarily, because of continued relationship and describing this argument as falling squarely within third category). Dissenting in Whitnell v. Silverman, 95-0112 (La.12/6/96), 686 So.2d 23, Justice Lemmon explained how the continuing tort doctrine can apply in this context under this third category of contra non valentem, stating: [T]he doctor, who is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, has a continuing duty to disclose the known material information, not only on the day that the doctor learns of the information, but also on every day thereafter until the patient learns the information from another source. Breach of this continuing duty is analogous to a continuing tort, and a new cause of action (with a new prescriptive or peremptive period) arises each day that the doctor fails to disclose... the material information known by the doctor but not by the patient, and thereby effectually prevents the patient from availing himself or herself of the cause of action. 95-0122 at p. 5-6, 686 So.2d at 34. This was the historical basis for the rule that tolled prescription until the relationship terminated; particularly: [A]s long as the relationship of physician and patient continues, the physician is guilty of malpractice if he does not right any wrong he has committed or undo any harm he has inflicted. Under this latter theory, the cause of action against the physician would arise at the conclusion of the relationshipthe conclusion of the last opportunity to cure effects of the wrongful act.... [T]he malpractice is regarded as a continuing tort because of the persistence of the physician in continuing and/or in repeating the wrongful treatment. Louissell & Williams, supra ¶ 13.02[4] at 13-61. Under the termination rule, when the health care provider continues to treat the patient after making an error and failing to discover it, the health care provider is deemed negligent both at the time of the malpractice and at all subsequent examinations; thus, the limitation period does not commence until the termination of the patient's relationship with the health care provider. Clay B. Tousey, Jr., Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 Duke 1417, 1431. The termination rule was traced to a 1902 Ohio Supreme Court case involving a sponge left in the patient's abdomen following an appendectomy. See Dana David Peck, Comment, The Continuous Treatment Doctrine: A Toll on the Statute of Limitations for Medical Malpractice in New York, 49 Albany L.Rev. 64, 68 n. 19 (1984)(citing Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865 (1902)). In Gillette, the court rejected the argument that the case involved a single act of malpractice, reasoning that the defendant-surgeon's duty to remove the sponge was a continuous obligation, and recognized by the law, and it was alive and binding so long as the relation of physician and patient subsisted... Neglect of this duty imposed by continuous obligation was a continuous and daily breach of the same, and as the facts show caused continuous increasing, daily, and uninterrupted injury. 67 Ohio St. at 127, 65 N.E. at 870. The court thus cited two justifications for finding a continuing tort: (i) the continuing contractual relationship between the parties, and (ii) the theory that the plaintiff was continually damaged during the time the sponge was in her abdomen. [11] The termination rule theorizes that the continuing injury is a tort that continues beyond the time of the occurrence until it is either discovered or the relationship terminates, whichever occurs earlier. Under the termination rule, a single negligent act is conceptualized as giving rise to a continuing tort by view[ing] the injury as continuing and perceiv[ing] the injury as not accruing [and prescription thus not commencing to run] until a damaged party discovers the wrong. Susan S. Septimus, The Concept of Continuous Tort as Applied to Medical Malpractice: Sleeping Beauty for Plaintiff, Slumbering Beast for Defendant, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 71, 89 (1986). Given its focus on the principle that the injury continues beyond occurrence until when the harm is discovered or when the relationship of the parties is terminated, the termination rule is, in essence, a particularized application of the discovery rule. The rule presumes, for policy reasons, that a patient has not discovered an injury during the time medical treatment continues. Stanbury v. Bacardi, 953 S.W.2d 671, 676 (Tenn.1997)(concluding rule outlived necessity given comprehensive medical malpractice statute of limitation). By statute, however, the Legislatures in many jurisdictions, including Louisiana, have placed overall limitations for asserting a claim based on such discovery rule. These statutes of repose run from the specific date of occurrence and serve to limit the concept of continuing injury. Septimus, supra at 78 (emphasis supplied). Such repose rules serve to set a fixed time period, three years in Louisiana, after which a plaintiff's right to be compensated for such not immediately knowable injuries is cut off. By their nature, statutes of repose reimpose on some plaintiffs the hardship of having a claim extinguished before it is discovered, or perhaps before it even exists. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 30 at 168 (5th ed.1984). This is especially so with foreign objects. While some state legislatures have carved out an express discovery rule exception for foreign objects, the Louisiana Legislature has not. While harsh, Section 5628 precludes our recognizing the termination rule type continuing tort as a basis for enlarging the three-year cutoff on the discovery rule based on the theory of a continuing injury to plaintiff. Attempting to avoid the three-year cutoff, plaintiff urges, supported by the court of appeal, that this case involves a continuing trespass; specifically, she contends that the continued presence of the remaining stitches on her cervix acted as an ongoing wrong, causing continuous daily harm until discovered and removed. Until then, she urges prescription did not commence to run. While we conclude that the appellate court in this case, and in Bellard, supra, erroneously applied a form of continuing tort theory based on the termination rule and a theory of continuing omission, for completeness sake, we address plaintiff's continuing trespass argument.