Opinion ID: 7265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Larry West

Text: 9 Larry West was convicted of both conspiracy to defraud the United States and two counts of attempting to evade federal gasoline excise tax. On appeal, the defendant alleges that the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the indictment against him because of pre-indictment delay. Although West acknowledges that he was indicted within the five year statute of limitations period, West argues that the government's delay in initiating the prosecution against him caused substantial prejudice to his defense in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 10 As this Court recently noted in United States v. Crouch, although the primary protection against undue delay prior to arrest, indictment, or information is the appropriate statute of limitations, the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment offers some protection from prejudice to a defendant's case arising from this delay. 2 Thus, a defendant who establishes a violation of Due Process may be entitled to have the indictment against him dismissed. The defendant, however, bears the burden of establishing a violation of due process and, as a threshold matter, must establish that he suffered actual and substantial prejudice as a result of the government's delay. 3 11 In this case, West argues that he suffered actual prejudice because Bryson, a potential witness and alleged co-conspirator, was murdered and was, therefore, unavailable to testify at trial. In addition, West alleges that the memories of unidentified witnesses faded and various records were lost. The defendant, however, does not identify specific evidence or testimony regarding a material fact that became unavailable because of the pre-indictment delay. Further, the defendant offered no evidence that Bryson's testimony was exculpatory in nature and would have aided the defense. 4 Contrary to the defendant's arguments, [v]ague assertions of lost witnesses, faded memories, or misplaced documents are insufficient to establish a due process violation from pre[-]indictment delay. 5 West has failed to meet his burden of establishing that he suffered actual prejudice because of the government's delay in pursuing an indictment. We, therefore, affirm the district court's refusal to grant the defendant's motion for a dismissal of the indictment.
12 On appeal, West challenges three aspects of his sentence. First, West argues that his offense level should not have been increased by four points under U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(a) for his role in the offense. Although West concedes that some enhancement was appropriate, he argues that the evidence supports only a three-level increase under Sec. 3B1.1(b). Second, West contends that U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 should not have been applied to enhance his offense level by two points for obstruction of justice. Finally, West alleges that the criminal category assigned to him under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1(c) based on a previous conviction for possession of gambling paraphernalia was erroneous. 13 We review the application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. 6 And, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. 7 Due deference is given to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 8 And, [i]f the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that, had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. 9 14 The Pre-sentence Investigation Report (PSI) concluded that a four-level increase in West's offense level was appropriate under Sec. 3B1.1(a) because West was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. This conclusion was based on West's ownership of Dispetco. As detailed by the PSI, Dispetco would purchase gas tax-free from MBO based on its valid form 637. The gas was then sold to retailers with tax included but the tax was never remitted to the IRS. 15 West points to his employment as a truck-driver for Gatten at Gatson Oil, Inc. as well as to the testimony regarding his illiteracy and argues that he did not occupy a leadership role, but rather relied on the guidance of others involved, including Gatten. As detailed in the PSI, however, West was directly involved in concealing the transactions between Dispetco and the retailers by the use of fictitious company names and the preparation of false invoices. The PSI estimates that over 100 retailers were involved in Dispetco's activities. Clearly, the attempted concealment of these transactions required an established organization and a staff of truck drivers instructed by West on which type of invoice to use. 16 In the light of these facts, we cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous when it determined that West occupied a leadership role and, therefore, a four-level enhancement was appropriate. We, therefore affirm the district court's enhancement of West's sentence under Sec. 3B1.1(a). 17 Next, West argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the district court's determination that a two-level increase in West's offense level for obstruction of justice was warranted. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 provides for an enhancement when the defendant willfully obstructed ... the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the underlying offense. This enhancement was based on the testimony of a special agent of the IRS at the post-trial detention hearing, as well as factual conclusions in the PSI, that West attempted to intimidate several witnesses and that he may have been involved in the murder of Bryson. 10 18 West argues on appeal that since there was no direct testimony regarding his alleged intimidation of witnesses, Sec. 3C1.1 should not have been applied to him. In addition, West argues that the testimony of Larry Noakes at trial regarding West's alleged involvement in Bryson's murder was disregarded by the district court at sentencing and cannot now be used to support the enhancement for obstruction of justice. 19 West is correct that at the sentencing hearing, the district court sustained West's objection to the use of Noakes' testimony to support the enhancement. The district court decided that since Noakes was unavailable and the district court had no opportunity to evaluate his credibility, West's allegation that he was an inherently unreliable witness would be accepted and Noakes' testimony would not be considered for sentencing purposes. Even without Noakes' testimony, however, there was sufficient evidence to support the enhancement for obstruction of justice under Sec. 3C1.1. 20 The IRS agent, Susan Wong, 11 testified that at least three government witnesses made allegations that West had threatened or intimidated them regarding their testimony. Agent Wong testified that: 21 Several of the witnesses that testified at trial had indicated to us, or in fact told us, and also told the Grand Jury that they were in fear of their life, they were scared, one of the witnesses that testified in the trial was actually scared to come to the courthouse the day of the trial, the day it started--he--without an agent accompanying him to the building, and staying with him at all times. We had to keep him pretty much out of sight on a different floor. 12 22 At sentencing, the district court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. 13 This Court has previously determined that for sentencing purposes, even uncorroborated hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable. 14 In addition, a PSI generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered by the trial court as evidence in making the factual determinations required by the sentencing guidelines. 15 23 In this case, the district court had before it sufficient competent evidence to indicate that a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice was warranted. West's contention that testimony regarding the statements of others cannot be used to support the enhancement is not correct. We find no error in the district court's decision to credit the testimony of Agent Wong and accept the factual conclusions of the PSI. We, therefore, affirm the enhancement of West's sentence for obstruction of justice. 24 Finally, West contends that a prior misdemeanor conviction for possession of gambling paraphernalia in Texas should not have been considered in determining his criminal history category. Under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(c), a prior misdemeanor conviction is considered in determining a defendant's criminal history category unless it is an exempted offense or similar to one of the exempted offenses listed in the Sentencing Guidelines. These excluded offenses, and any similar offenses, are only considered in determining a defendant's criminal history category if the sentence was at least one year in prison or thirty days probation or if the prior offense is similar to the offense for which the defendant is currently being sentenced. 25 Sec. 4A1.2(c)(1) lists gambling as one of the excluded offenses. West argues that possession of gambling paraphernalia is similar to the offense of gambling and, therefore, his prior offense should be considered an excluded offense. If possession of gambling paraphernalia is found to be similar to the offense of gambling, this prior misdemeanor conviction would not be considered because West's sentence was only three days imprisonment and the prior offense is not similar to the current offenses of tax evasion. Thus, the issue is whether the offense of possession of gambling paraphernalia is similar to the offense of gambling under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2. 26 In United States v. Hardeman, this Court set up a common sense approach to determine whether a prior offense is similar to an exempted offense. 16 We determined that all possible factors of similarity should be considered, including: 27 a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses, the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment, the elements of the offense, the level of culpability involved, and the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. 17 28 We engage in an analysis of these factors while keeping in mind that Sec. 4A1.2(c) is designed to take into account the seriousness of the past offense and the degree to which it suggests the possibility of future criminality. 18 29 As noted by the district court, Texas law defines possession of gambling paraphernalia as a class A misdemeanor with a possible fine of up to $3000 and a prison term of up to one year. 19 Gambling, on the other hand, is defined as a class C misdemeanor with the possibility of a fine of up to $500 and no possibility of imprisonment. 20 The elements of gambling require only that the accused placed a bet while possession of gambling paraphernalia requires proof of intent to further gambling. 21 Thus, Texas law defines possession of gambling as a more serious offense with a more serious punishment. Further, the crime of gambling apparently targets individuals who place illegal bets while possession of gambling paraphernalia seems to target individuals who make these illegal activities available to others. 30 In the light of the more serious punishment and higher level of culpability required for possession of gambling paraphernalia, we agree with the district court that West's offense is not similar to gambling under Sec. 4A1.2. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, West's prior conviction should be included in determining his criminal history category. We, therefore, reject West's argument and affirm the district court's inclusion of West's prior conviction for possession of gambling paraphernalia in relevant conduct used to determine his sentence.