Opinion ID: 2614563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Inadequacy of the Specific Intent Standard

Text: We agree with the reasoning and analysis of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Breit and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Bauder II. In our view, the specific intent standard does not adequately afford criminal defendants protection from prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, to be meaningful, the protection against double jeopardy must be analyzed with an objective standard. Bauder I, 880 S.W.2d at 504-05 (Butts, J., dissenting). [8] As Justice Stevens aptly observed in Kennedy, [i]t is almost inconceivable that a defendant could prove that the prosecutor's deliberate misconduct was motivated by an intent to provoke a mistrial instead of an intent simply to prejudice the defendant. The defendant must shoulder a strong burden to establish a bar to reprosecution when he has consented to the mistrial, but the Court's subjective intent standard would eviscerate the exception [to the general rule that a retrial after reversal on appeal is not barred by double jeopardy]. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 688, 102 S.Ct. 2083 (Stevens, J., concurring). [9] Indeed, a defendant will seldom be able to prove that the prosecutor had the specific intent to goad him or her into moving for a mistrial with the purpose of obtaining a better chance of obtaining a conviction. In our opinion, determining the prosecutor's subjective intent inherently requires a guess, not appropriate for purposes of determining a defendant's double jeopardy interests. Moreover, the prosecutor's subjective intent is irrelevant for purposes of determining a defendant's constitutional double jeopardy rights. As one commentator has stated, regardless of the prosecutorial motive, the defendant suffers severe deprivation of his rights. Constitutional rights are to be protected irrespective of the motive or intent of the actor whose conduct has occasioned an infringement of them[.] James F. Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreaching as a Bar to Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy Clause After Oregon v. Kennedy, 69 Cornell L.Rev. 76, 98 (1983) (quoting Comment, Double Jeopardy and Reprosecution After Mistrial: Is the Manifest Necessity Test Manifestly Necessary?, 69 Nw. U.L.Rev. 887, 888 (1975)). The Kennedy test therefore misdirects the focus of the double jeopardy protections on the harboring of bad intentions as opposed to the prevention of unacceptable behavior by the prosecution. Finally, we are mindful of the fact that when egregious prosecutorial misconduct results in a reprosecution either by mistrial or a reversal on appeal, the burden of another trial cannot be attributed to defendant's preference to start anew rather than to complete the trial before the original tribunal. On the contrary, the burden of retrial in such a case is attributable to the prosecution's misconduct or overreaching, though perhaps not specific intent, designed to force the defendant to such a choice. See Green v. United States, 451 U.S. 929, 931 n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 2005, 68 L.Ed.2d 316 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (questioning the validity of the lower court's assumption that the Government in such cases tailors its misconduct to achieve one improper result as opposed to another ... [but that] [i]t is far more likely that ... where the prosecution is concerned that the trial may result in an acquittal, that the Government engages in misconduct with the general purpose of prejudicing the defendant); see also State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d at 1326. In such a case, the prosecution has intentionally exposed the defendant to multiple trials for the same crime and has subverted his or her right to complete the proceeding before the original tribunal. It is therefore the very type of situation the double jeopardy provision sought to prevent. Given the inadequacy of the specific intent standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy, we take this opportunity, as the ultimate judicial tribunal with final unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution, to give broader protection under the Hawai`i Constitution than that given by the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 36, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994) (citation omitted) (declining to follow Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994)); State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 414 n. 30, 910 P.2d 695, 727 n. 30 (1996). Accordingly, we hold, under the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution, that reprosecution of a defendant after a mistrial or reversal on appeal as a result of prosecutorial misconduct is barred where the prosecutorial misconduct is so egregious that, from an objective standpoint, it clearly denied a defendant his or her right to a fair trial. [10] In other words, we hold that reprosecution is barred where, in the face of egregious prosecutorial misconduct, it cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received a fair trial. [11] Our holding is consistent with our previous interpretations of the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai`i Constitution. We have often interpreted our double jeopardy clause to provide broader protections than the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution where the federal interpretation did not adequately preserve the rights and interests sought to be protected. See State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 12, 950 P.2d 1201, 1212 (1998) (Ramil, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 865 P.2d 150 (adopting the same conduct test and rejecting the current federal standard based on the same elements test); Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 414 n. 30, 910 P.2d at 727 n. 30 (holding that double jeopardy clause of state constitution precludes retrial of defendant whose conviction has been set aside because of insufficient evidence and that sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed based only on the evidence that was properly admitted at trial); Quitog, 85 Hawai`i at 149, 938 P.2d at 580 (holding that retrial barred under state constitution when government's deliberate trial strategy accompanies the termination of the first trial without the jury passing upon that charge); contra, e.g., Tuipuapua, 83 Hawai`i at 151, 925 P.2d at 321 (adopting the federal standard applied in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), regarding administrative forfeitures). Because we have determined, for the reasons discussed above, that the specific intent standard adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy is inadequate to protect the rights and interests of the defendant sought to be protected, we have taken this opportunity to balance the interests of society and the criminal defendant.