Opinion ID: 1423334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The sleep-talk statements.

Text: The victim's great-grandmother testified that the victim screamed, Don't daddy, don't, in her sleep the night after she returned from visiting her father. The victim's mother also testified that the victim screamed, Don't daddy, during her sleep. Two other witnesses testified that they had heard the victim scream, Don't daddy, don't, and, No, daddy no, during her sleep. Zimmerman objected to the admission of these statements on hearsay grounds. The trial court admitted these out-of-court statements pursuant to I.R.E. 803(24) and I.C. § 19-3024. As we discussed above, the trial court should not have admitted these statements under I.C. § 19-3024. The trial court found that the statements were trustworthy because they were spontaneous, indicating that the victim could not have fabricated the statements. The trial court should not have admitted these out-of-court statements. Courts have long held that sleep talk is inadmissible. Gough v. General Box Co., 302 S.W.2d 884 (Mo.1957); People v. Colon, 52 P.R.R. 399 (1937); Martinez v. People, 55 Colo. 51, 132 P. 64 (1913); Plummer v. Ricker, 71 Vt. 114, 41 A. 1045 (1898); Reavis v. State, 6 Wyo. 240, 44 P. 62 (1896); People v. Robinson, 19 Cal. 40 (1861). While courts differ in the technical reasoning for holding that sleep-talk is inadmissible, the overriding belief is that: The operation of the human mind is an enigma, and its expressions in the unconsciousness of sleep are frequently vagaries and fictions, but sometimes born of reality. Chadwick v. United States, 141 F. 225, 239 (6th Cir.1905), quoting State v. Morgan, 35 W.Va. 260, 266, 13 S.E. 385, 387 (1891). Our understanding of dreams has advanced little since these early cases. Our knowledge about dreaming indicates that, while dreams are to some degree connected to waking-hour desires and anxieties, there is no indication that dream sequences accurately mirror actual events. Therefore, sleep talk contains no probative value regarding actual events or the identities of actual participants. Since sleep talk makes the existence of a fact neither more probable or less probable, it is [ir]relevant [It appears that this is a typographical error in the opinion. The context appears to indicate that this word should be irrelevant.], as defined by [Evidence Rule] 401. Assuming arguendo that such evidence were relevant at all, its inherent unreliability would lead to its exclusion because its probative value is more than substantially outweighed by the dangers of prejudice. State v. Posten, 302 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn.1981) (Wahl, J., concurring specially). Indeed, it is the utter irrelevance of such evidence that leads to its inadmissibility. People v. Jones, 165 A.D.2d 103, 109, 566 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593 (1st Dept.1991) In addition to being utterly irrelevant, the circumstances surrounding sleep talk detract from its reliability. Godfrey v. State, 258 Ga. 28, 365 S.E.2d 93 (1988); People v. Smith, 104 A.D.2d 160, 481 N.Y.S.2d 879 (2d Dept.1984); People v. Knatz, 76 A.D.2d 889, 428 N.Y.S.2d 709 (2d Dept.1980). We agree that in addition to being irrelevant, sleep talk is not reliable and is inadmissible as evidence.