Opinion ID: 764768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Facial Classification

Text: 15 The sole allegation set forth in appellants' complaint as to their Equal Protection claim is that [b]y designing, administering and scoring the Exam in a race-conscious way, with the intent of solely or primarily benefitting one racial group to the detriment of other racial or ethnic groups, Defendants have violated ... the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.... In the briefs submitted to this Court, appellants further argue that this allegation should be construed as a facial classification which expressly distinguishes between applicants on the basis of race. Appellants reason that since Nassau County designed the 1994 exam with racial factors in mind (i.e., with the intent to diminish the adverse effects suffered by minority applicants), Nassau County has expressly treated applicants differently because of their race. Accordingly, they argue a strict scrutiny standard of review should be applied. 16 We find this argument wholly without merit. A statute or policy utilizes a racial classification when, on its face, it explicitly distinguishes between people on the basis of some protected category. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (invalidating a miscegenation statute which, on its face, prohibited interracial marriages); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1851-52, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (invalidating a school board plan which expressly utilized race-based preferences in teacher lay-offs); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 115 S.Ct. at 2112-13 (concluding that a federal set-aside program which, on its face, provided financial incentives to hire minority subcontractors would be subject to strict scrutiny). 17 The district court concluded, and appropriately so, that appellants' allegations do not support a claim that the 1994 exam was discriminatory on its face. Nassau County's entrance exam did not differentiate between applicants on the basis of race or gender. It is undisputed that the exam was administered and scored in an identical fashion for all applicants. The exam was not scored differently on the basis of a candidate's ethnicity or gender, nor were differential cut-off points used for applicants of different races or sexes. 18 In fact, the only manner in which race was implicated is that Nassau County set out to design an entrance exam which would diminish the adverse impact on black applicants. This desire, in and of itself, however, does not constitute a racial classification. Since the exam was administered in a race-neutral fashion which did not expressly distinguish between applicants on the basis of race, Nassau County's intent, without anything more, does not implicate an express, racial classification. Rather, 19 the plaintiffs are mistaken in treating 'racial motive' as a synonym for a constitutional violation. Every antidiscrimination statute aimed at racial discrimination, and every enforcement measure taken under such a statute, reflect a concern with race. That does not make such enactments or actions unlawful or automatically 'suspect' under the Equal Protection Clause.... The term [racial classification] normally refers to a governmental standard, preferentially favorable to one race or another, for the distribution of benefits. 20 Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 44, 142 L.Ed.2d 34 (1998); see also Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F.Supp. 1227, 1241 n. 11 (E.D.N.Y.1993) ([E]qual protection proscribes race based classifications, not all statutes whose purpose it is to protect certain racial or ethnic groups.... The statute [prohibiting the use of the name Crazy Horse on any alcoholic product] was enacted on behalf of protecting a specific ethnic group [Native Americans]; however, it requires no differential treatment on the basis of race.) (emphasis added). 21 Because appellants misconstrue the County's race-conscious efforts to redesign its entrance exam as a racial classification, appellants unpersuasively cite to numerous reverse discrimination cases. In particular, appellants heavily rely on widely known affirmative action cases such as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978), City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989), and Adarand. We find these cases distinguishable from the case at bar. Our reading of those cases suggests that they are concerned with select affirmative action tools, such as quota systems, set-aside programs, and differential scoring cutoffs, which utilize express racial classifications and which prevent non-minorities from competing for specific slots or contracts. 22 For example, in Bakke, the Supreme Court invalidated a medical school admissions program where 16 slots out of 100 were reserved for minority and disadvantaged applicants. The Court rejected the use of this quota system because non-minority candidates were prevented from competing for a specific percentage of seats in the incoming class. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20, 98 S.Ct. at 2763. Likewise, in its decision in Croson, the Court rejected a local set-aside program which required prime contractors awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the contract with minority businesses. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 477, 511, 109 S.Ct. at 713, 731. Regardless of the benign intent behind such minority set-aside programs, the Court clarified that the use of an express racial classification, whether benign or invidious, would be subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at 493-94, 109 S.Ct. at 721-22. The Court reasoned that this result was warranted even for benign racial classifications because the set-aside program denie[d] certain citizens the opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based solely upon their race. Id. at 493, 109 S.Ct. at 721; see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-36, 115 S.Ct. at 2112-17 (holding that facial racial classifications imposed by the federal government should also be subject to strict scrutiny review). 23 Cases such as Bakke, Croson and Adarand are plainly distinguishable from the matter currently before us. A touchstone of equal protection is that the government may not subject persons to unequal treatment based on race. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 115 S.Ct. at 2111 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to any racial classification subjecting [a] person to unequal treatment). Here, unlike in the above cited cases, although Nassau County was necessarily conscious of race in redesigning its entrance exam, it treated all persons equally in the administration of the exam. Cf. Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 164 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming consent decree requiring that school board develop an exam that minimizes racially disparate impact, and stating that nothing in Adarand requires the application of strict scrutiny to this sort of race-consciousness). As such, Nassau County's desire to design an exam which would lessen the discriminatory impact on black applicants is simply not analogous to a quota system or a minority set-aside where candidates, on the basis of their race, are not treated uniformly. Accordingly, appellants have failed to demonstrate that the 1994 exam represented an improper racial classification. 24