Opinion ID: 609180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER IDEA's MAINSTREAMING REQUIREMENT

Text: 50 Before we apply the two-part analysis discussed above to the facts in this case, we must address the School District's argument that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof under the Act on it. In the School District's view, while it may have had the initial burden at the state administrative level of justifying its educational placement, once the agency decided in its favor, the burden should have shifted to the parents who challenged the agency decision in the district court. Courts must place the burden on the party seeking to reverse the agency decision, the School District argues, in order to effectuate IDEA's requirement that due weight shall be given to [the state administrative] proceedings, Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)). We disagree. 51 IDEA instructs district courts and state trial courts reviewing the decisions of state educational agencies to receive the records of the administrative proceedings.... hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, ... grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). As construed by the Supreme Court in Rowley, § 1415(e)(2) requires courts to give due weight to the agency proceedings. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. However, neither Rowley nor the Act itself specifically addresses which party bears the burden of proof at the district court level, an issue which we believe is quite different from the district court's obligation to afford due weight to the administrative proceedings. 52 The School District points to several cases that hold, either directly or implicitly, that even if the school district bears the burden of proving compliance with IDEA in the state administrative proceedings, the burden of proof shifts to the party challenging the agency decision at the district court level. See Roland M. v. Concord School Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 991 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1122, 113 L.Ed.2d 230 (1991); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C.Cir.1988); see also Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir.1989) (placing burden on parents challenging state agency decision to prove that their child's educational needs could be met in a less segregated setting). We find these cases unpersuasive. 53 In reviewing the decision of a state agency under IDEA, the district court must make an independent determination based on a preponderance of the evidence. Geis v. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir.1985). Given that the district court must independently review the evidence adduced at the administrative proceedings and can receive new evidence, we see no reason to shift the ultimate burden of proof to the party who happened to have lost before the state agency, especially since the loss at the administrative level may have been due to incomplete or insufficient evidence or to an incorrect application of the Act. 54 The purpose of the due weight obligation is to prevent the court from imposing its own view of preferable educational methods on the states. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. Accordingly, the due weight is owed to the administrative proceedings, not to the party who happened to prevail in those proceedings. Moreover, the amount of deference to be afforded the administrative proceedings is an issue left to the discretion of the district court.... [T]he district court must consider the administrative findings of fact, but is free to accept or reject them. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 853 F.2d 853, 857 (11th Cir.1988). The district court can give due weight to the agency proceedings (i.e., refrain from imposing its own notions of educational policy on the states), while the ultimate burden of proof remains on the school. 55 Underlying the Act is an abiding concern for the welfare of handicapped children and their parents. Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1188; see 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). 26 Requiring parents to prove at the district court level that the school has failed to comply with the Act would undermine the Act's express purpose to assure that the rights of children with disabilities and their parents are protected, 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c), and would diminish the effect of the provision that enables parents and guardians to obtain judicial enforcement of the Act's substantive and procedural requirements, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). In practical terms, the school has an advantage when a dispute arises under the Act: the school has better access to the relevant information, greater control over the potentially more persuasive witnesses (those who have been directly involved with the child's education), and greater overall educational expertise than the parents. See Lascari, 560 A.2d at 1188 (placing burden of proof on school is consistent with the proposition that the burdens of persuasion and production should be placed on the party better able to meet those burdens.); Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities, 1991 Duke L.J. at 187-94 (arguing that parents are generally at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the school when disputes arise under IDEA because parents generally lack specialized training and because their views are often treated as inherently suspect due to the attachment to their child). 56 In light of the statutory purpose of IDEA and these practical considerations, we believe that when IDEA's mainstreaming requirement is specifically at issue, it is appropriate to place the burden of proving compliance with IDEA on the school. Indeed, the Act's strong presumption in favor of mainstreaming, 20 U.S.C. § 1422(5)(B), would be turned on its head if parents had to prove that their child was worthy of being included, rather than the school district having to justify a decision to exclude the child from the regular classroom. See supra Part II. We therefore hold that the district court correctly placed the burden on the School District to prove that the segregated placement proposed for Rafael was in compliance with the mainstreaming requirement of IDEA. 57