Opinion ID: 854149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Findings required for a (b)(1) aggravating circumstance

Text: Ajabu contends that the first aggravating circumstance is not supported by the evidence because he claims there was no showing that he took a life, attempted to take a life, or intended to take a life. His principal argument in requesting a lesser sentence was that he was at most an accomplice and did not himself kill the victims. The (b)(1) aggravating factor required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Ajabu committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim[s] while committing or attempting to commit burglary or robbery. IND.CODE §§ 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(B) & (G). In applying the (b)(1) aggravating circumstance to the facts of this case, the trial court concluded that the statute's culpability requirementsboth mens rea and actus reus were coextensive with the minimum requirements of the Eighth Amendment. The court drew on Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987) for the proposition that Ajabu could constitutionally be sentenced to death under the statute, and a fortiori life without parole, if the State proved that he was a major participant in the murders and displayed a reckless indifference to human life. The court then made detailed factual findings in support of its conclusion that both Tison elementsmajor participation and reckless indifference to human lifewere met here.
The trial court applied the major participation required by Tison as the standard for actus reus necessary for imposition of the death penalty or life without parole under subsection (b)(1) of the Indiana statute. We agree that the major participation required by Tison as a matter of Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment law is also the requisite actus reus under subsection (b)(1). We reach that conclusion based on the language of the statute illuminated by its legislative history in light of Tison. Because the jury was instructed on accomplice liability in this case, it may have convicted Ajabu of murder under an accomplice theory. By its terms, the accomplice statute specifies one means by which a person can commit an offense. IND.CODE § 35-41-2-4 (1993). By virtue of the accomplice statute, mere tangential involvement in the killing can be sufficient to commit murder. See generally Johnson v. State, 687 N.E.2d 345, 349 (Ind.1997) (person who comforted or assisted the perpetrator after the offense may be convicted as an accomplice). However, the actus reus element of subsection (b)(1) is not that the defendant commits murder in the course of one of the listed felonies. Rather, the death penalty (b)(1) standardcommit[s] the murder by intentionally killingis somewhat more restrictive than the acts needed for commission of the crime. Ajabu correctly points out that the intent and actions of confederates cannot be imputed to the defendant in determining whether the (b)(1) aggravating circumstance has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Landress v. State, 600 N.E.2d 938 (Ind.1992). He is not correct, however, in contending that a non-triggerman can never be subjected to the death penalty statute by reason of subsection (b)(1). A person who substantially participates but does not deliver the fatal blow may still fall within the statute's scope. Concerted action that produces death can rise above simple accomplice liability and render the defendant eligible for death or life without parole even if someone else delivers the fatal blow. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 623 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.1993) (defendant's plan that the victim would be killed and participation in the abduction and assault of the victim was an intentional killing within subsection (b)(1) even though a co-conspirator fired the fatal gunshot). We conclude that the trial court correctly applied the major participation test as the standard for the required act under subsection (b)(1). If major participation is shown under subsection (b)(1), it is irrelevant whether the defendant commits the crime by reason of the murder statute or by reason of the accomplice statute. Tison declined to elaborate the precise circumstances or conduct constituting major participation, but the facts of that case make clear that the term includes at least (1) active involvement in any crimes surrounding the commission of the murder; and (2) physical presence during the entire sequence of criminal activity culminating in the murder and flight from the scene. Tison, 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. at 1688. As discussed below, the trial court's careful analysis of Tison and findings on participation satisfy subsection (b)(1). Although this case involves life without parole, death penalty jurisprudence is instructive in construing subsection (b)(1) because subsection (b)(1) applies equally and without differentiation to both sentences. Tison establishes that major participation in the killing, coupled with a culpable mental state, is needed for a death penalty to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, vicarious liability in the capital context raises concerns about proportionality: While an accomplice may be found guilty of the crime largely executed by his principal, it does not follow that the same penalty is appropriate. Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 735 (Ind.1989). The perpetrator who delivers the fatal blow or shot is plainly a major participant, but not all accomplices are necessarily major participants. It is also clear that accomplice liability in some casesfor example, where the defendant's involvement consists only of driving the getaway car, cf. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) may not rise to the level of major participation so as to satisfy subsection (b)(1) or the Eighth Amendment. Although the intentionally killing phrase of subsection (b)(1) appeared in the Indiana death penalty statute before Tison was decided in 1987, the General Assembly has amended that subsection three times since 1987, and each time left that language unchanged in light of Tison . [18] Because we presume the General Assembly did not intend to legislate in conflict with the federal constitution, [19] this federal constitutional backdrop, in concert with our recognition of non-triggerman eligibility under subsection (b)(1), fortifies our conclusion that the conduct required to satisfy that aggravating circumstance is coextensive with Tison major participation in the killing. The legislature presumably could impose life without parole on a broader range of participants than Tison permits for the death penalty. [20] However, by inserting life without parole into the death penalty statute the legislature chose to impose life without parole as an alternative punishment applicable only to death penalty eligible convictions. It is therefore subject to the same construction as in death penalty cases. Other state supreme courts have reached similar conclusions where the relevant statute provided that life without parole was subject to the same proof required to impose a death sentence. See, e.g., People v. Estrada, 11 Cal.4th 568, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 590, 904 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1995) (Tison does not stand for the proposition that reckless indifference to human life must be shown to impose life without parole, but that element was required because the statute at issue mimicked Tison `s language).
The sentencing in this case must comport not only with the Eighth Amendment but also with the terms of subsection (b)(1). The State contends that Tison culpability is all that need be shown to prove the (b)(1) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. [21] We do not agree. A person engages in conduct `intentionally' if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so. IND.CODE § 35-41-2-2(a) (1993). In contrast, reckless indifference to human life, as used in Tison, 481 U.S. at 150-51, 107 S.Ct. at 1684-85, is akin to the definition of recklessly in the Indiana criminal code: A person engages in conduct `recklessly' if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result.... IND. CODE § 35-41-2-2(c) (1993). In requiring a showing that the defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim, the General Assembly therefore clearly mandated a higher degree of mental culpability than that permitted in Tison. Our cases have repeatedly emphasized that the (b)(1) aggravating factor requires a finding of intentional killing. [22]