Opinion ID: 2981954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: R.S., 451 F. App’x, 509, 513 (6th Cir. 2011).

Text: Moreover, Sumner was deprived of the opportunity to identify evidence through discovery in support of his claims. See Excel Energy, 246 F. App’x at 960 (a losing party must show that remanding the case would not “merely entail an empty formality with no appreciable possibility of altering the judgment”). “A losing party is prejudiced where the court’s entry of summary judgment deprived it of its ability to develop the record or to present legal arguments that would disturb the prevailing party’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Turcar, 451 F. App’x at 515 -9- Nos. 12-6178/12-6255 Sumner v. Armstrong Coal Co. (citations omitted); see Smith v. Perkins, 708 F.3d 821, 831 (6th Cir. 2013). Moreover, without the benefit of a more developed record, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review to determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to Sumner’s claim that Armstrong acted in bad faith. See Chance v. Mahoning Cnty., 105 F. App’x 644, 649–50 (6th Cir. 2004). As we stated in Wausau: Courts of Appeal are courts of review. It would normally be impossible to determine whether there is a disputed issue of material fact when a party has not had the chance to develop the record below. This would force an appeals court to serve as a sounding board for facts not properly in the record, simply because a party never had a chance to develop them. 69 F.3d at 105. Accordingly, under the abuse of discretion standard, the district court erred in sua sponte granting summary judgment to Armstrong without the opportunity for discovery on Sumner’s breach of good faith and fair dealing claim.