Opinion ID: 1536017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Biased Jurors

Text: Defendant contends that three deliberating jurors were biased. They are included in the group of jurors defendant should have excused for cause. Defendant argues that Almyer Neigh believed that the system was too lenient on criminals and that the constitutional protections of the accused serve to help the accused and that courts do nothing to help victims, leading to unjust results. According to defendant, Neigh said that he would impose death unless defendant could convince him that there was a reason for the shooting. Of the three allegedly biased deliberating jurors, Neigh was among the first sixteen jurors seated. Although defendant had originally challenged Neigh for cause during voir dire, he by-passed him twentyfive times after Neigh was seated in the jury box. Thus, his claim of bias is certainly belied by the record. DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 471-73, 645 A. 2d 734. Apart from that, the trial court did not err by failing to excuse him for cause. Neigh told the court that he did not think that death should be automatic for killing a police officer. He stated that all circumstances should be considered and that he would be willing to vote against the death penalty if the mitigating factors equaled or outweighed the aggravating factors. With regard to Diane Laudenbach, defendant argues that she was not impartial as indicated by her answer on the jury questionnaire which said that she would automatically impose a death sentence for the purposeful and willful murder of an innocent person. Defendant further contends that Laudenbach gave inconsistent answers regarding whether she would vote for the death penalty if after considering all the evidence she was convinced that defendant willfully killed an innocent person. Again, defendant's claim of bias is belied by the record because defense counsel passed her by twenty-three times to peremptorily challenge twenty-three other people. Furthermore, it is clear that Laudenbach should not have been excused for cause. Laudenbach stated that she believed the death penalty should not be automatic and that she would be willing to consider defendant's background and character. As for Carlin, defendant contends that she placed the burden of proof on defendant to prove that death was not the appropriate punishment for an intentional killing. Defendant argues that her statements that she could set aside that belief were merely her attempts to search for the right answer. We disagree. Carlin stated that she believed that the death penalty should only be used for some cases. She further indicated that each case had to be treated individually and that information about defendant's background was relevant to her evaluation of the appropriate sentence. Importantly, Carlin stated that she was open-minded and that given the information she had at that point in time, she was not leaning in one direction or the other, but was somewhere in the middle. In addition, a review of the record reveals that defendant could have used his twenty-fifth and last peremptory challenge to remove Carlin, but instead he chose to remove Michelle Strano. Defendant removed Strano because her husband was removed for cause on the basis that he believed death should be automatic for someone who has killed more than one time. Defendant felt that Strano might feel some kind of pressure from her husband to vote for death based on his views. The trial court, however, properly rejected this argument because each juror has to be qualified on his or her own merits, and because there was no basis or reason to think that Strano would not comply with the court's instruction not to discuss the matter with her husband. Therefore, since neither Carlin nor Strano should have been removed for cause, the record does not support defendant's assertion that Carlin was biased. This Court simply cannot sanction defendant's point of view. To do so would allow a defendant to gain a new penaltyphase trial by simply arguing that while one juror was objectionable, another was more objectionable. Our system is designed for a defendant to have a fair jury, not the perfect jury. Therefore, we cannot grant relief where a defendant has had more than the twenty peremptory challenges Rule 1:8-3(d) allows and the jurors to which defendant objects were not required to be removed for cause. Thus, we reject defendant's contention that three biased jurors sat on his jury.