Opinion ID: 529953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: grounds for a new sentencing

Text: 134 Since we will acquit Furst of the charges on counts III, IV, and IX, and inasmuch as we are unable to determine the effect his conviction under those counts may have had on his sentence under counts V, VI, VII, X, and XI, we will vacate the sentence on those counts and remand for a new sentencing. See United States v. Salamone, 869 F.2d 221, 234 (3d Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 415 & n. 2 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 725, 98 L.Ed.2d 673 (1988)). We will also direct that on the remand that the case be assigned to a different district judge for resentencing. 135 As noted above, Furst filed a motion to have the district judge disqualify himself from presiding over his sentencing. In a supporting affidavit, his attorney recited that the judge initiated an ex parte conversation on the day following the opening and expressed surprise that no plea agreement had been reached and that he did not think a serious or severe sentence was warranted. The attorney further recited that about one week later during the trial the judge renewed the conversation about the plea agreement in another ex parte conversation in which he indicated that if a plea agreement could be reached a prison sentence would be imposed which would not be severe and which would be served in pleasant circumstances but that the situation would be entirely different if Furst was convicted at trial. The district court denied the motion, primarily because it regarded it as untimely, but secondarily because it found no merit in the motion. 136 Ordinarily, a district judge's decision with respect to recusal may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir.1983). To the extent, however, that the judge's decision rests on an incorrect view of the law our review is plenary. See United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d 231, 234 (3d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118, 103 S.Ct. 3086, 77 L.Ed.2d 1348 (1983). 137 Furst's motion was based exclusively on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455, the pertinent part of which provides: 138 (a) Any ... judge ... of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 139 (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 140 (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; 141 .... 142 (e) No ... judge ... shall accept from the parties to the proceeding a waiver of any ground for disqualification enumerated in subsection (b). Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification. 143 The motion did not expressly state whether it sought to have the district judge disqualify himself under section 455(a) or section 455(b), and the district court did not clearly identify under which subsection it analyzed the motion. 144 In denying the motion for recusal, the court explained: 145 There was never an objection initiated by defense counsel at the time of these alleged improprieties, immediately thereafter or at any time prior to the April 3rd filings on the threshold of sentencing scheduled for April 7, 1989.... [A]nd no motions for new trial were filed which could have included claims for bias in the proceedings. 146 The history of this motion suggests to us that it was untimely, and the tardiness amounts to a waiver. In United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1519 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1012, 106 S.Ct. 1188, 89 L.Ed.2d 304 (1986), the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that Section 455 provided no time limits by concluding that time limits were already so firmly fixed in both statute and common law that there was no need to add another [to Sec. 455]. In the present case, counsel's recitation of events on which his motion is based all occurred in the first half of January 1989.... All legal cultures recognize that timely objections, especially in criminal cases, are essential to allow the objection to be addressed and to permit immediate correction so that correctable prejudice can be erased. 147 Appellant's app. at 824 (citation omitted). 148 The district court further indicated that the court in United States v. Murphy had cited United States v. Nobel, 696 F.2d at 231. 149 Though we do not question the authority of those cases, we do not regard Murphy and Nobel as particularly helpful here. In Murphy the defendant filed a motion for disqualification of the trial judge in a post-sentencing motion. See 768 F.2d at 1537. The only basis for the motion was under section 455(a) and the court found that there was no waiver under section 455(e) inasmuch as the defendant had not learned all the relevant facts until after sentence had been imposed. See 768 F.2d at 1537-39. Nonetheless, the court of appeals affirmed stating: 150 [T]he absence of a waiver is not dispositive. The question here is not really whether Judge Kocoras was required to recuse himself when Murphy filed his motion. Judge Kocoras already had imposed sentence; there were no further proceedings from which Judge Kocoras could be recused. What Murphy wants is not recusal from future proceedings but the nullification of everything that went before. We conclude that this is not the appropriate consequence of a recusal for appearance of impropriety. 151 In cases decided under Sec. 455(a), disqualification runs from the time the motion was made or granted.... 152 .... 153 ... At all events any appearance of impropriety under Sec. 455(a) is not actual impropriety, so that recusal does not retroactively invalidate judicial acts that preceded the motion Murphy filed. 154 Id. at 1539-41 (emphasis added). 155 The situation in Murphy was unlike that here. Furst filed his motion for disqualification while there remained some proceeding over which the judge would preside and the motion was directed only to that proceeding. 156 Nobel is equally inapplicable. In Nobel the district judge held a pretrial conference at which he disclosed the ground on which a party later faulted him for not recusing himself. See 696 F.2d at 233. At the pretrial conference the judge expressed his view that there was no basis for recusal and he requested the views of counsel. See id. Counsel agreed with the judge's conclusion. See id. After a judgment of conviction in the district court, Nobel asserted on appeal that the judge had erred in not recusing himself. See id. at 234. 157 This court rejected Nobel's interpretation of section 455(b)(4), see 696 F.2d at 234, so that the only other argument for recusal arose under section 455(a). See 696 F.2d at 235. Inasmuch as section 455(e) allows the waiver of section 455(a) grounds for recusal, we held that the district judge did not err in failing to recuse himself since the judge had obtained such a waiver at the pre-trial conference. See 696 F.2d at 236. 158 Our analysis in Nobel did not address the situation when a motion for disqualification is filed in the district court while some proceeding remains over which the judge will preside. We merely construed the waiver provision of section 455(e) to preclude a party from raising for the first time on appeal the argument that a judge should have recused himself when the judge had disclosed potential grounds for recusal under section 455(a). 159 The situation here is quite different. Although it could have been presented sooner, the motion was presented to the district court prior to a proceeding over which the judge would preside. 160 Moreover, this case does not fit the practice we described in Smith v. Danyo, 585 F.2d 83 (3d Cir.1978). Furst was not a litigant with knowledge of circumstances suggesting possible bias or prejudice holding back, while calling upon the court for hopefully favorable rulings, and then seeking recusal when they are not forthcoming. Id. at 86. Rather, this case is like Danyo itself, in which the parties filed a motion for recusal prior to trial but three months after the facts giving rise to the allegation of bias. On those facts this court concluded that the filing before the [movant] had called upon the trial court for any new rulings, was timely. Id. 161 We thus conclude that the district court did not treat Furst's motion for disqualification under the correct criteria. While the district court acknowledged that its recusal from sentencing was all that Furst sought, it relied on authorities dealing with situations in which recusals were sought to upset what had already been done. Furthermore, the asserted bias was germane only on sentencing, as Furst did not suggest he could not get a fair trial before the judge. 29 Finally, it would have been possible for the trial judge to recuse himself from the sentencing. Thus, we cannot affirm the district court's denial of the motion for recusal on the basis that it was untimely and we will consider the merits of the motion. 30 162 Section 455, under which Furst filed his motion, does not establish any form of procedure for consideration of recusal motions. Cf. Nobel, 696 F.2d at 236-37 (stating that Sec. 455 does not provide express procedure for waiver). On the other hand, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 31 sets forth a procedure by which a party may seek a judge's recusal. Thus, we will look to section 144 and our case law under that recusal provision for guidance as to procedure. Cf. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290 (3d Cir.1980) (both statutes require the same type of bias for recusal), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999, 101 S.Ct. 1704, 68 L.Ed.2d 200 (1981); id. (Sec. 455(a) was intended only to change the standard the district judge is to apply to his or her conduct). 32 This seems particularly appropriate as Furst's attorney's affidavit filed with the motion for disqualification complied with the procedure set forth in section 144, and so, had the motion merely included a reference to section 144, we would have analyzed the motion directly under that section. 163 In Mims v. Shapp, 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir.1976), we held that a district judge faced with a motion for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144, must accept the allegations of the moving party as true, stating: 164 Probably the district court is right that there is no basis for the allegations made. That, however, is not the issue in deciding a motion made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144. On such a motion it is the duty of the judge to pass only on the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged to ascertain whether they support a charge of bias or prejudice. Neither the truth of the allegations nor the good faith of the pleader may be questioned, regardless of the judge's personal knowledge to the contrary. The test is whether, assuming the truth of the facts alleged, a reasonable person would conclude that a personal as distinguished from a judicial bias exists. 165 541 F.2d at 417 (citations omitted). 166 Here the district court concluded that section 455, unlike section 144, does not require the judge to accept all allegations by a moving party as true, appellant's app. at 820. Yet, its memorandum accompanying the order denying the motion to recuse acknowledged that there had been two meetings with Furst's attorney. The court explained that on January 10, 1989, after counsel had been invited into the judge's chambers, and after social conversation, the judge briefly offered to extend the cut-off date for plea bargaining in the event counsel had not had sufficient time to explore a plea agreement at a time he was preparing to move ahead with his wedding. This was received by defense counsel without a yea or a nay. Appellant's app. at 822. At the conclusion of a later trial day, the judge requested that Furst's attorney come to his chambers the following day. The court explained that at that second meeting. 167 counsel was asked if anything resulted from the earlier discussion when we offered to extend the cut-off for a plea bargain. We believe the response was in the negative without elaboration. We briefly discussed the progress in the case to include some assertion that the government would probably have no interest in bargaining once it had presented its case. Again, defense counsel responded without a yea or nay, and was not pressed in the matter. 168 Appellant's app. at 823. 169 Thus, the district court acknowledged that there were two ex parte communications with Furst's attorney. Moreover, the court acknowledged that in each of these communications one topic was the possibility of Furst entering into a plea bargain. The court merely disagreed with Furst's characterization of the communications as suggest[ing] plea bargaining or a plea of guilty, appellant's app. at 823, and with the attorney's conclusion that the statements reflect a judicial attitude based on private opinions and personal bias which might impinge on the court's ability to be impartial throughout the trial and into the sentencing phase. Appellant's app. at 823. 170 As a result of the extent to which the district court confirmed the underlying facts upon which the recusal motion relied, we need not resolve the issue of whether a judge need accept as true the allegations presented in a motion for disqualification under section 455 which asserts a basis as to which section 144 is applicable and which includes an affidavit sufficient under section 144. It is sufficient that we state that where the basic underlying facts as set forth in the affidavit supporting a recusal application are not in dispute, the district court should not minutely examine the movant's characterization of them, and weigh the court's memory of what happened against that of the affiant. We think it simply inappropriate in the circumstances here for the court to have made a credibility assessment of itself. Consequently, we hold that the district judge improperly considered the truth of the asserted grounds for his recusal. 171 Thus, our remaining inquiry is whether the allegations were legally sufficient for recusal. Here we are satisfied that the allegations of the motion and affidavit for disqualification were sufficient to have required recusal, as taking the allegations as true, the judge's impartiality, though only in sentencing, might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455(a). According to the attorney's affidavit, the judge made it clear that he was anxious for a guilty plea and would award a longer sentence to be served in unpleasant circumstances, following a conviction trial. Thus, it was reasonable to conclude, taking the attorney's affidavit as true, that the judge's attitude as to sentence was based at least to some degree on the fact that the case had to be tried, an exercise which the judge seemed anxious to avoid. 33