Opinion ID: 1228498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asset values.

Text: This court has often held that the findings of a trial court without a jury will not be upset on appeal unless they are contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Milbauer v. Transport Employes' Mut. Benefit Society (1973), 56 Wis. 2d 860, 862, 203 N. W. 2d 135; Peabody Seating Co. v. Jim Cullen, Inc. (1972), 56 Wis. 2d 119, 127, 128, 201 N. W. 2d 546. The weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses are primarily for the trial court and where more than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the credible evidence, the reviewing court must accept the one drawn by the trier of fact. Precision Service Co. v. Schill (1973), 60 Wis. 2d 346, 348, 210 N. W. 2d 706; Milbauer v. Transport Employes' Mut. Benefit Society, supra, page 865. In applying the law to the facts of this case, a review of the record reflects that the trial court based its findings of value of the marital estate upon those set forth in Exhibit 1A as offered by the respondent. Exhibit 1A sets forth the assets, liabilities and net worth of the estate as follows: Assets: Cash..........................................$ 220.00 Residence, furniture and fixtures therein .... 25,000.00 Cottage, furniture and fixtures therein ...... 6,500.00 Hunting camp, furniture and fixtures therein 7,500.00 U. S. Bonds .................................. 3,250.00  Accrued interest on U. S. Bonds .............. 586.25 Plymouth automobile .......................... 500.00 Dodge Automobile ............................. 500.00 Snowmobile ................................... 300.00 Cash value life insurance (N. W. Mutual #3084962) ................................... 689.00 Loans receivable (Carver Boat Corp.) ......... 1,517.10 Wisconsin income tax refund due1970 ......... 206.02 Carver Boat Corp. stock ...................... 99,386.00 W. J. Markham Co. (½ interest) ............. 6,216.44 ____________ Total Assets $152,370.81 ======================= ============= Liabilities: Installment notes on Carver Boat Corp. stock: Charles Carter, Sr. ................ $12,082.10 Charles Carter, Jr. ................ 958.95 Gary Carter ........................ 958.95 Bank of Black Creek ................ 3,977.77 Accounts payable: Carver Boat Corp. .................. 2,561.69 Laney Mfg. Co. ..................... 1,661.30 Darwing Electric, Inc. ............. 1,185.87 University of Wisconsin Extension... 416.85 Wedding Expenses (various vendors).. 250.00 Carver Boat Corp. for split dollar insurance .......................... 200.00 Loans due Glen Nordin ....................... 3,750.00 Residence mortgage .......................... 1,575.00 ____________ Total Liabilities $ 29,578.48 ================= ============ Net Worth $122,792.33 ========= ============ Residence. This item was the subject of a stipulation by the parties, in open court, accepted by the court, and properly  transcribed in the record. By stipulation, the value was set at $23,500. Relying on the value set forth in Exhibit 1A, the court found that it was worth $25,000. Respondent asserts that the property was subject to a mortgage of $1,575, which the trial court found, and that the difference between the stipulated value and the judgment value is explained by the trial court's order that respondent satisfy this mortgage. This attempt to reconcile the amounts is without merit. The stipulated market value of the property remains the same whether or not encumbered. Only the equity in the residence is affected by the mortgage. At the time the stipulation was adopted, there had been no mention of the outstanding mortgage, and the testimony and stipulation were in terms of market value, not equity. This court has held that a stipulation made between the parties in open court is binding on the parties and should be honored by the court. General Automotive Mfg. Co. v. Singer (1963), 19 Wis. 2d 528, 535, 536, 120 N. W. 2d 659. We find the value of the residence to be $23,500, not $25,000. Cottage. The trial court, adopting the figure in Exhibit 1A, valued this property at $6,500. The respondent stated that the value in Exhibit 1A is what it cost him to purchase the property. Respondent called Walter Heise, a real estate broker from the immediate area, who contradicted the respondent stating that respondent had purchased the property in 1961 for $6,700; that property values had gone up since then; and that the cottage was now worth $7,500. The parties then stipulated that Heise should immediately sell the property for $7,500 and deposit the proceeds, minus a $450 brokerage fee, in court. No other testimony was offered on the value of this asset. The finding by the trial court is against the great weight  and clear preponderance of the evidence. This asset was actually sold for $7,500 less the brokerage fee. On that basis, its value is $7,050, instead of $6,500. Hunting Camp. Respondent testified that he included this item at $7,500 based on what he paid for it eight years ago, plus the cost of the improvements he had made to the property. The trial court accepted this value. However, both the respondent and appellant introduced written appraisals of the property as conducted by two different real estate appraisers. Respondent's expert appraised the property at $13,500, and appellant's expert at $19,500. There was evidence that respondent's expert was low by $1,000 (undervalued furniture by $500 and did not include $500 lawn tractor), and that appellant's expert was high by an even greater amount (appraisal included a $1,000 well which was not on the property, overvalued the septic system, and there is no bath or running water as assumed). This finding of the trial court was also against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. We are of the opinion the record contains credible evidence to support a finding that the clear market value of the hunting camp was $15,000. We here determine such to be the value of this asset. Government Bonds. Appellant and respondent had been saving by purchasing bonds since 1957. The bonds were kept in a joint safety-deposit box. On July 29, 1970, respondent removed the bonds from the box and, by his own testimony, cashed some of them on July 21, 1971, and March 10, 1972. The value of those cashed was $1,774.32. Respondent testified that the value recorded in Exhibit 1A was the value of the bonds, plus interest, remaining in his possession. On challenge by appellant, respondent produced the remaining  bonds and gave them to his own expert for valuation. That expert, Donald Arlyn Glynn, later called by respondent, testified that the remaining bonds were worth $4,264.64 as of the day of the trial. The trial court found the bonds to be worth $3,836.25 (bonds plus interest). No other testimony was introduced showing a value less than $4,264.64. Again, this finding of the trial court is against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The value should be $4,264.64, instead of $3,836.25. We have reviewed the record in regard to the values determined by the trial court as related to the Carver Boat Company, Inc., stock, the Markham-Nordin debt, and the cash values of life insurance. There was conflicting testimony as to the value of these assets. As the trier of fact, the trial court had the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve the conflict in their testimony. Wahl v. Wahl (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 510, 520, 159 N. W. 2d 651. As we view the record in this case, it could be said that another trier of fact might have arrived at different values on these three items when resolving the conflict in the evidence. However, it cannot be said that the findings of the trial court are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Since we reach this conclusion, no useful purpose will be served by herein setting forth a detailed analysis of the conflicting testimony on the values of the Carver Boat Company, Inc., stock, the Markham-Nordin debt, or the cash values of the life insurance.