Opinion ID: 1230723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Principles

Text: (5a) Wholly apart from the provisions of section 25602, imposition of civil liability in the present case is fully compatible with general negligence principles. It is true that in Vesely we based the requisite duty to the plaintiff upon the provisions of section 25602 alone. (5 Cal.3d at pp. 164-165.) However, as we recently explained in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (1976) 16 Cal.3d 313 [128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719], Although we chose to impose liability on the Vesely defendant on the basis of his violating the applicable statute, the clear import of our decision was that there was no bar to civil liability under modern negligence law.  (P. 325, italics added.) It has long been a fundamental principle of California law that a person is liable for the foreseeable injuries caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care. ( Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 32 A.L.R.3d 496]; Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728, 739 [69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316]; see Civ. Code, § 1714.) Although we have, on occasion, described the foregoing rule as having civil rather than common law origins ( Rowland, supra, at p. 112), the principle has most frequently been expressed in the negligence formulation that the defendant owes the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care. (6a) The existence of a duty is primarily a question of law, and dependent upon a variety of relevant factors, of which foreseeability of the risk is a primary consideration.... ( Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 46 [123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36].) (5b) We think it evident that the service of alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person by one who knows that such intoxicated person intends to drive a motor vehicle creates a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury to those on the highway. (See Vesely, at p. 164.) Simply put, one who serves alcoholic beverages under such circumstances fails to exercise reasonable care. (6b) We have previously identified certain factors other than foreseeability in determining the ultimate existence of a duty to third persons. These factors include: ... the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. ( Rowland v. Christian, supra, at p. 113.) (5c) Application of several of the Rowland elements to the circumstances herein alleged fully supports a rule establishing a duty of care and imposing civil liability. Plaintiffs' injuries are asserted to be substantial, a fact we must presume as a certainty for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint under well established pleading rules. (E.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 468 P.2d 216].) Where such circumstances exist, as are herein alleged, it is not difficult to discern a close connection between defendant's conduct and the injury suffered by plaintiffs. Unquestionably, as we amplify below, there exists a strong public policy to prevent future injuries of this nature, and we may assume that insurance coverage (doubtless increasingly costly) will be made available to protect the social host from civil liability in this situation. While, traditionally, no moral blame attaches to the social host who entertains his guests by serving cocktails to them, it is not unfair to ascribe such blame to anyone who increases the obvious intoxication of a guest under conditions involving a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others. In this connection, we further note that it is small comfort to the widow whose husband has been killed in an accident involving an intoxicated driver to learn that the driver received his drinks from a hospitable social host rather than by purchase at a bar. The danger of ultimate harm is as equally foreseeable to the reasonably perceptive host as to the bartender. The danger and risk to the potential victim on the highway is equally as great, regardless of the source of the liquor. Finally, we do not conclude that the burden upon the noncommercial suppliers of intoxicating beverages and the consequences to the community of imposing civil liability are so serious as to justify a contrary holding. Doubtless, the spectre of civil liability may temper the spirit of conviviality at some social occasions, especially when reasonably observant hosts decline to serve further alcoholic beverages to those guests who are obviously intoxicated and perhaps becoming hostile. Nonetheless, in this context, we must surely balance any resulting moderation of hospitality with the serious hazard to the lives, limbs, and property of the public at large, and the great potential for human suffering which attends the presence on the highways of intoxicated drivers. In doing so we need not ignore the appalling, perhaps incalculable, cost of torn and broken lives incident to alcohol abuse, in the area of automobile accidents alone. The dimensions of this cost and its catastrophic personal and economic impact in terms of vehicular accidents, are profoundly disturbing social phenomena of our time. In the year 1976 there were 257,846 adult misdemeanor arrests for drunk driving reported in California. (Cal. Dept. of Justice, Crim. Justice Profile  1976 (1976) p. 25.) Considering the fact that this number, large as it is, represents arrests only, and does not include the marginal or undetected drivers who have imbibed, the figure may well represent only the tip of a statistical iceberg. For the year 1976, alcohol was described as the primary collision factor in 28.3 percent of all fatal motor vehicle accidents, and in 11 percent of injury accidents. (Dept. of Cal. Highway Patrol (1976) Ann. Rep. of Fatal and Injury Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents, p. 68.) Nationally, alcohol has been associated with over half the deaths and major injuries suffered in automobile accidents each year. (Coleman, Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life (5th ed. 1976) p. 414.) Children are not excluded from this numerical avalanche of intoxicated drivers. F.B.I. statistics show that more than 17,000 young people under 18, including 51 children, aged 10 or younger, were arrested for driving under the influence in 1975. The increase over 1970 is estimated at about 160 percent. (U.S. News and World Report (July 11, 1977) at p. 33.) In the light of the foregoing statistics, it seems readily apparent that, drained of all humor, the host's well intentioned offer of one more for the road may frequently bear ominous and deadly overtones. We think, in short, that the policy of preventing future harm identified by us in Rowland is served by requiring the exercise of reasonable restraint by the social host under the circumstances herein presented. (7) Defendants have argued that the term obviously intoxicated is too broad and subjective to serve as a satisfactory measure for imposition of civil liability. However, the phrase is contained in section 25602, a criminal statute, and the courts have experienced no discernible difficulty in applying it. (See Samaras v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1960) 180 Cal. App.2d 842, 844 [4 Cal. Rptr. 857]; People v. Smith (1949) 94 Cal. App.2d Supp. 975 [210 P.2d 98]; People v. Johnson (1947) 81 Cal. App.2d Supp. 973, 975-976 [185 P.2d 105].) As described in Johnson, The use of intoxicating liquor by the average person in such quantity as to produce intoxication causes many commonly known outward manifestations which are `plain' and `easily seen or discovered.' If such outward manifestations exist and the seller still serves the customer so affected he has violated the law, whether this was because he failed to observe what was plain and easily seen or discovered, or because, having observed, he ignored that which was apparent. (Pp. 975-976, italics in original.) We think the Johnson observations made in the context of a sale of liquor have equal application when the liquor is served by a noncommercial social host. We conclude that defendants' demurrer was improperly sustained as to plaintiffs' first cause of action. (8) The second cause of action, however, fails to survive a demurrer for that cause alleged only that (1) defendant Schwartz & Reynolds & Co. (the apartment owners) permitted Williams to drink on their premises, and that (2) defendant Montgomery (the apartment manager), in some unspecified manner, aided, abetted, participated and encouraged Williams to drink to excess. Since neither of these allegations asserted that defendants or their agents actually furnished liquor to Williams, no liability is imposed under the principles hereinabove set forth. (See Bennett v. Letterly (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d 901, 904-905 [141 Cal. Rptr. 682] [furnish within the meaning of § 25658, subd. (a), implies some affirmative action]; Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chap. of Alpha Tau Omega Frat. (1971) 258 Ore. 632 [485 P.2d 18, 22] [no liability for merely providing a room where alcoholic beverages are served].) (9) Moreover, we find misplaced plaintiffs' reliance upon section 315 of the Restatement of Torts to uphold the second cause of action. That section imposes upon a defendant a duty to control the conduct of another party only if the defendant bears some special relationship either to the party alleged to be dangerous or to the potential victim. (See Nipper v. California Auto. Assigned Risk Plan (1977) 19 Cal.3d 35, 46-47 [136 Cal. Rptr. 854, 560 P.2d 743].) Plaintiffs have alleged no facts which would support a finding that defendants stood in any special relationship with either Williams or plaintiffs. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent court to overrule defendants' demurrers to the first cause of action of plaintiffs' complaint.