Opinion ID: 3064928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiffs’ Protected Speech

Text: Plaintiffs contend that they engaged in protected speech on four occasions: (1) Huppert’s speech during his investigation into corruption at the public works yard in 1997 and 1998; (2) Huppert’s speech during his cooperation with the FBI in its investigation into corruption in the police department sometime prior to 2001; (3) Huppert and Salgado’s speech during their investigation into police corruption at the city-owned golf course beginning in late 2001; and (4) Huppert’s subpoenaed speech to the grand jury in 2004 during its investigation into corruption in the police department. I agree with the majority that the district court’s summary judgment with respect to Huppert’s speech on the first occasion should be affirmed. In my view, Huppert has provided insufficient evidence that his speech on that occasion was not uttered pursuant to his official duties to survive summary judgment. 9360 HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG However, I disagree with the majority with respect to Huppert’s speech on the second, third, and fourth occasions, and with respect to Salgado’s speech on the third occasion. In my view, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Plaintiffs’ speech on the second and third occasions was uttered pursuant to their official duties and, therefore, whether it was protected under the First Amendment. Further, in my view, Huppert’s speech on the fourth occasion was protected, as a matter of law, under the First Amendment. A. Huppert’s Speech During the FBI Investigation into Corruption in the Pittsburg Police Department Huppert states in his declaration that sometime prior to 2001 he began cooperating with the FBI in its investigation of corruption in the Pittsburg Police Department (“PPD”). Huppert specifically states that his cooperation was “outside [his] duties as a member of the PPD.” Huppert states that in 2001, when Police Chief Baker learned of his cooperation with the FBI, he retaliated by transferring Huppert to the Code Enforcement unit of the PPD, otherwise known as the Penal Colony. In my view, Huppert has created a genuine issue of material fact as to the scope of his official duties. Huppert has specifically, and not implausibly, stated that his speech during his cooperation with the FBI’s investigation into corruption in the PPD was not part of his official duties as a member of the PPD. I therefore conclude that the scope of Huppert’s official duties, and the motivation for Baker’s assignment of Huppert to the Penal Colony, are questions of fact to be resolved by a jury, not an issue of law to be resolved on summary judgment. B. Huppert and Salgado’s Speech During the Investigation into Police Corruption at the City-Owned Golf Course Huppert and Salgado state in their declarations that the City Manager asked them to conduct the investigation into police HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG 9361 corruption at the city-owned golf course. Commander Hendricks, states in his declaration that Police Chief Baker told Huppert and Salgado to stop their investigation after only one day. Hendricks states that Baker explicitly ordered Huppert and Salgado not to write a report. Huppert states that, in direct disobedience to Baker’s order, he and Salgado continued their investigation and that he wrote a report of their “initial findings.” Huppert and Salgado state that they were retaliated against for this speech. Huppert and Salgado contend that because they continued their investigation, and because Huppert wrote the report in direct contravention of orders from Police Chief Baker, the speech contained in the report was not made pursuant to their official duties. I recognize that Huppert and Salgado continued their investigation with the knowledge and encouragement of Commander Hendricks. But any encouragement from Hendricks conflicted with the direct order of Police Chief Baker. In my view, a direct order from the Chief of Police is a more authoritative source for determining the scope of a police officer’s official duties than the encouragement of a lower-ranking officer in the department to disobey that order. At most, Hendricks’ encouragement of Huppert and Salgado creates a factual question as to the scope of their official duties. This is precisely the type of question that we saved for fact-finding proceedings in Freitag, Eng, and Robinson. Huppert and Salgado’s version of the facts “plausibly indicates that [they] had no official duty” to prepare the report on their public golf course corruption investigation. Eng, 552 F.3d at 1073. Consequently, we must “assume the resolution of this dispute in the non-moving part[ies’] favor.” Robinson, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 8844 at . Police Chief Baker, who is a defendant in this suit, may be able to provide evidence that would help a jury determine the scope of Huppert and Salgado’s official duties. For example, Baker could testify that in directing them not to prepare the report, he was defining the contours of their official duties. If 9362 HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG this is so, Huppert was not acting pursuant to his official duties when he wrote the report, and his (and Salgado’s) speech is protected under the First Amendment. On the other hand, Baker could testify that writing the report was part of their official duties, and that Baker was directing them not to perform their duty. If this is so, Baker may have been behaving improperly by attempting to cover up corruption in his police force, but Huppert and Salgado were acting pursuant to their official duties in preparing the report, and their speech was not protected. C. Subpoenaed Testimony Before the Grand Jury Investigating Corruption in the Pittsburg Police Department Huppert was subpoenaed to appear before a civil grand jury investigating corruption in the Pittsburg Police Department. He appeared before the grand jury in compliance with the subpoena. We do not know his actual testimony, but we know that he testified concerning corruption in the PPD. Huppert states that after he testified he was subjected to various retaliatory actions. The majority relies on Christal v. Police Commission of San Francisco, 92 P.2d 416, 419 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939), to conclude that police officers in California have an official duty to testify pursuant to a subpoena before grand juries investigating corruption in their department. Christal states, “When police officers acquire knowledge of facts which will tend to incriminate any person, it is their duty to disclose such facts to their superiors and to testify freely concerning such facts when called upon to do so before any duly constituted court or grand jury.” I do not regard Christal as relevant to the question before us. In my view, if a public employee is subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, he or she has a duty as a citizen that is independent of any duty he or she might also have as an employee. In testifying pursuant to a subpoena, the HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG 9363 employee is therefore not performing an official duty within the meaning of Ceballos. The majority’s conclusion that Huppert’s subpoenaed speech before the grand jury is not protected under the First Amendment conflicts with two recent decisions by our sister circuits. In Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007), Milwaukee police officer Morales testified in a deposition pursuant to a subpoena. The substance of his testimony concerned evidence that the Chief and Deputy Chief of Police had harbored a fugitive, the brother of the Deputy Chief, and that the Chief had retaliated against another officer in another matter. Morales claimed in a § 1983 suit that the Chief of Police and the Deputy Chief retaliated against him for his deposition testimony. The Seventh Circuit held that Morales’ speech during the deposition was protected under the First Amendment. The court wrote, Being deposed in a civil suit pursuant to a subpoena was unquestionably not one of Morales’ job duties because it was not part of what he was employed to do. Nonetheless, Morales testified about speech he made pursuant to his official duties and we must determine whether that fact renders his deposition unprotected. We hold that it does not. . . . Id. at 598. In Reilly v. Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 220 (3d Cir. 2008), Atlantic City police officer Reilly testified in a criminal trial against a fellow officer accused of corruption. A high-ranking Atlantic City police officer who was a friend of the allegedly corrupt officer had been a suspect but had not been charged. Reilly claimed in a § 1983 suit that the Chief of Police and the high-ranking officer retaliated against him for his trial testimony. The Third Circuit held that Reilly’s testimony was protected under the First Amendment. The court wrote: 9364 HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG [T]he act of offering truthful testimony is the responsibility of every citizen, and the First Amendment protection associated with fulfilling that duty of citizenship is not vitiated by one’s status as a public employee. That an employee’s official responsibilities provided the initial impetus to appear in court is immaterial to his/her independent obligation as a citizen to testify truthfully. Id. at 231. A recent district court decision in our own circuit is even more directly on point. In Evans v. Housing Authority of Benicia, 2008 WL 4177729 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008), Evans was an accountant for the Benicia Housing Authority (“BHA”). Evans observed that Peterson, one of his supervisors, was working “reduced hours” and was not collecting certain past due rents. Evans reported his observations to the Chairperson of the BHA. He later testified about his observations before a civil grand jury investigating the BHA. The court held that Evans’ testimony before the grand jury was protected, both as to the hours worked by Peterson and to her failure to collect rents. The court wrote: Testifying before the Grand Jury was not in any way part of Evans’ official job duties. It was clearly not within the scope of Evans’ official job duties to testify before the Grand Jury about Peterson’s alleged failure to collect past due rents . . . . Nor was it within the scope of Evans’s duties to testify before the Grand Jury about Peterson’s reduced work hours. Rather, it was Evans’ duty as a citizen to expose such official malfeasance to broader scrutiny. Id. But see Deprado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that “[i]n accordance with the [Miami] Police Department’s regulations, and the Plaintiff ’s HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG 9365 obligations as a State-certified law enforcement officer,” grand jury testimony by a Miami police officer was not protected speech under the First Amendment). Morales, Reilly, and Evans hold that where there is an independent legal duty to speak (in our case, to testify before the grand jury pursuant to a subpoena), the employee has First Amendment protection for truthful speech uttered in performance of that independent legal duty. The fact that the employer may require its employees to obey a law that exists independent of the employment relationship does not allow the employer to retaliate against an employee for obeying that law. This holding comports with sound policy. There are strong reasons to avoid holding that police officers have an official duty, within the meaning of Ceballos, to testify before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena about corruption among their fellow officers. Such a holding would result in a Catch 22. If a police officer were subpoenaed to testify, he or she would have two choices. One choice would be to testify before the grand jury. In that event, the officer could lawfully be fired in retaliation for his or her testimony. The other choice would be to refuse to testify. In that event, the officer would face contempt (and possibly other adverse consequences) for failing to comply with a subpoena. The subject of Huppert’s testimony before the grand jury was, in the words of our decision in Marable, “high level corruption in a government agency,” which “has all the hallmarks that we normally associate with constitutionally protected speech.” 511 F.3d at 932. When he appeared before the grand jury, Huppert acted “as a citizen,” exercising a right “guaranteed to any citizen in a democratic society regardless of his status as a public employee.” Freitag, 468 F.3d at 545. He also appeared pursuant to his duty as a citizen, independent from his duty as a public employee, to comply with the subpoena. That Huppert’s speech concerned “the subject mat9366 HUPPERT v. CITY OF PITTSBURG ter of [his] employment . . . is nondispositive.” Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421. Sound policy counsels us not to conclude that his speech was made pursuant to his official duties. So do Morales and Reilly, the only opinions by courts of appeals on this issue. I think we are fully justified in following these cases and holding that when an officer testifies before a grand jury pursuant to a subpoena concerning corruption of his or her fellow officers, the officer is not performing an official duty within the meaning of Ceballos.