Opinion ID: 1129992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: rodriguez' issues on appeal of claims for postconviction relief

Text: 1. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING THAT MR. RODRIGUEZ HAD ALREADY HAD APPELLATE REVIEW OF MANY CLAIMS IN HIS POSTCONVICTION MOTIONS WAS ERRONEOUS. [] 2. MR. RODRIGUEZ DID NOT FORFEIT HIS RIGHT TO POSTCONVICTION REVIEW BY NOT RAISING THE SAME CLAIMS ON DIRECT APPEAL. 3. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING THAT THIS COURT DECIDED SEVERAL OF MR. RODRIGUEZ' CLAIMS AGAINST HIM IN PEOPLE V. TENNESON, 788 P.2d 786 (Colo.1990), AND PEOPLE V. DAVIS, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo.1990), IS INCORRECT. 4. THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GRANT THE MOTION TO DEATH QUALIFY THE JUDGE. 5. THE DEATH PENALTY IN THIS CASE AND THE STATE'S DECISION TO SEEK IT ARE BASED UPON INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION, ARE UNGUIDED BY RATIONAL, RELEVANT AND CONSISTENT STANDARDS, AND ARE BASED ON IRRATIONAL AND ILLEGAL CRITERIA. 6. THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO SENTENCES IMPOSED IN OTHER CASES. THIS DEATH SENTENCE IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS AND VIOLATES THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND THE DEATH STATUTE. 7. THE APPELLATE REVIEW PURSUANT TO C.R.S. § 16-11-103(7) MUST BE ADVERSARIAL IN NATURE OR THE STATUTE VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS, AND COLORADO'S RIGHT TO APPEAL CLAUSE; THUS, THE NON-ADVERSARY PROCEEDING IN THIS CASE VIOLATED THOSE PROVISIONS. 8. THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTE AND THE DEATH PENALTY ITSELF IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN MR. RODRIGUEZ' MOTIONS TO STRIKE DEATH PENALTY AND THE ACCOMPANYING PLEADINGS AND MATERIALS. 9. COLORADO'S DEATH PENALTY STATUTE MUST PROVIDE FOR TRIAL COURT AND APPELLATE PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES OR IT VIOLATES THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW MR. RODRIGUEZ TO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE OR TO EVEN CONSIDER THE ISSUES VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, COMPULSORY PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND THE DEATH STATUTE. 10. JUDGE PHILLIPS WAS BIASED AGAINST MR. RODRIGUEZ AND MR. RODRIGUEZ' LAWYERS. 11. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO DISCLOSE THE COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN JUDGES PETERSON, PHILLIPS AND ALVAREZ ABOUT THIS CASE, THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO RULE ON THE MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGE PETERSON, CHIEF JUDGE PETERSON'S SIGNIFICANT INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE, AND THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO HAVE A JUDGE FROM A DIFFERENT DISTRICT HEAR MR. RODRIGUEZ' MOTIONS, WERE ALL PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 12. THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO STRIKE THE DEATH PENALTY, FOR APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, AND FOR ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATE RELIEF WITHOUT A HEARING AND WITHOUT INTELLIGIBLE FINDINGS WAS ERROR, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE COURT APOLOGIZED FOR ITS FAILURE TO HURRY THE PROCESS ALONG WHERE ONE OF THE ISSUES WAS THE VITRIOLIC CHARGES MADE AGAINST IT AND THE SUPREME COURT ABOUT THIS CASE IN THE MEDIA BY EX-GOVERNOR LAMM AND THE PROSECUTION. THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED DESPITE THE DENIAL OF A HEARING. 13. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE FIRST DEGREE MURDER AND TWO CONSPIRACY CONVICTIONS REQUIRES THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED UPON THEM BE VACATED. THE MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT AND CRIME OF VIOLENCE CONVICTIONS, AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED ON THEM, ARE ALSO ILLEGAL SINCE THEY ARE BASED ON THE MURDER CONVICTION. 14. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND HIS OTHER RIGHTS DURING APPEAL AND POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS DUE TO THE LACK OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE STATE'S OBSTRUCTION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. 15. THE DENIAL OF MR. RODRIGUEZ' CRIM.P. 35(B) MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING WAS ERROR. 16. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY REASONS FOR REDUCING THE DEATH SENTENCE WHICH WERE OR WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE ORIGINAL SENTENCER IN ITS DECISION ON THE CRIM.P. 35(B) MOTION, WAS ERRONEOUS. 17. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF ANY ASSISTANCE FOR MR. RODRIGUEZ IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF HIS CRIM.P. 35(B) MOTION WAS ERRONEOUS. 18. THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS ERROR ON ITS MERITS AND BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT HAVE THE MOTION BEFORE IT WHEN IT RULED. 19. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS, EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EQUAL PROTECTION, COMPULSORY PROCESS AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER CRIM.P. 35(C) AND THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES BY THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE HIM WITH ADEQUATE OUT-OF-STATE INVESTIGATION FUNDS, ITS REFUSAL TO ALLOW HIM ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL RECORDS, AND ITS REFUSAL TO ALLOW HEARINGS ON MOTIONS. 20. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW MR. RODRIGUEZ TO REBUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESS AT THE HEARING WAS ERROR. 21. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS COMMITTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER TRIAL AND DURING POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDINGS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 22. THE COURT APPLIED AN INCORRECT STANDARD IN RULING ON MR. RODRIGUEZ' MOTION FOR RELIEF BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 23. [OMITTED.] 24. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO REQUIRE THAT THE STATE PROVIDE DISCOVERY REGARDING JOSEPH COUNCIL VIOLATED RULE 16 AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES. 25. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO REVEAL THAT THE EXTREMELY LENIENT PLEA BARGAIN IT AFFORDED TO DAVID MARTINEZ WAS DONE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THE TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA THOMAS, AND ITS MISREPRESENTATION THAT SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE, DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS CONFRONTATION RIGHTS. 26. THE UNJUSTIFIABLE FAILURE OF THE POLICE TO OBTAIN APPARENTLY MATERIAL AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE FROM DAVID MARTINEZ AND PATRICIA THOMAS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS, CONFRONTATION AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. THE POLICE REFUSED TO FOLLOW STANDARD PROCEDURES DURING THE ARREST OF PATRICIA THOMAS AND DAVID MARTINEZ, AND REFUSED TO COLLECT THAT EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE OF THAT ARREST. 27. THE STATE'S DESTRUCTION OF THE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAVID MARTINEZ, SHOWING BRUISES AND CUTS SUSTAINED DURING HIS RAPE AND KILLING OF THE VICTIM, VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION, DUE PROCESS, COMPULSORY PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIM.P. 16. 28. THE STATE'S DESTRUCTION OF THE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OF THE PHOTOGRAPH OF PATRICIA THOMAS' BRUISES, CAUSED BY HER PARTICIPATION IN THE MURDER, VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, CONFRONTATION, COMPULSORY PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIM.P. 16. 29. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ORDER THE STATE TO PROVIDE MR. RODRIGUEZ WITH ORAL STATEMENTS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, CONFRONTATION, COMPULSORY PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIM.P. 16. 30. THE COURT'S UNJUSTIFIABLE REFUSAL TO GRANT A CONTINUANCE IN ORDER FOR DAVID MARTINEZ TO BE AN AVAILABLE WITNESS, OR TO ASSIST MR. RODRIGUEZ IN OBTAINING HIS PRESENCE FOR TRIAL, OR TO ALLOW THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE OF HIS STATEMENTS TO THE POLICE AND OTHERS THROUGH OTHER MEANS, VIOLATED MR. RODRIGUEZ' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, DUE PROCESS, COMPULSORY PROCESS AND THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 31. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, COMPULSORY PROCESS, CONFRONTATION AND THE PROHIBITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT BY THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW A CONTINUANCE SO THAT MR. RODRIGUEZ COULD OBTAIN THE PRESENCE AND TESTIMONY OF A CRITICAL, SUBPOENAED WITNESS AT TRIAL. 32. THE NUMEROUS DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS BY THE STATE AND THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO IMPOSE ANY SANCTIONS AS A RESULT DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL AND HIS RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND THE PROHIBITIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AS WELL AS HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE RULES AND STATUTES GOVERNING DISCOVERY. 33. THE SUPREME COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW MR. RODRIGUEZ AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO PREPARE AND FILE A COMPLETE AND ADEQUATE BRIEF ON APPEAL DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL, AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES AND COLORADO STATUTES. 34. THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S GIVING PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT TO THE PROSECUTION AND ITS SUPPORTERS DURING ORAL ARGUMENTS IN THIS CASE, ARRANGING EXPANDED MEDIA COVERAGE OF THOSE ARGUMENTS CONTRARY TO ITS OWN RULES AND PROCEDURES, WHICH COVERAGE NATURALLY FOCUSSED ON THE PROSECUTION, DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIBUNAL, A FAIR APPEAL AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 35. THE COURT'S RULING THAT SEVERAL CLAIMS CONCERNED ONLY CREDIBILITY OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THUS THAT THEY WERE NOT AVAILABLE WAS ERROR. 36. THE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY GRANTED BY THE PROTECTION TO PATRICIA THOMAS WAS ILLEGAL. HER TESTIMONY WAS THUS OBTAINED BY ILLEGAL MEANS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED. THE LICENSE TO LIE SUBVERTED THE TRIAL PROCESS AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS MOST FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 37. THE TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA THOMAS WAS THE RESULT OF MANIFEST PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND ITS USE AGAINST MR. RODRIGUEZ DENIED HIS DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 38. THE RESTRICTIONS ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AND IMPEACHMENT OF PATRICIA THOMAS VIOLATED THE CONFRONTATION, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 39. THE GRANTING OF THE STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE RE: PROPER IMPEACHMENT OF PATRICIA THOMAS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS TO CONFRONT, CROSS-EXAMINE AND IMPEACH THE STATE'S EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM, AND HIS RIGHT TO PRESENT MITIGATION EVIDENCE, ALL UNDER THE U.S. AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 40. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW PATRICIA THOMAS TO BE IMPEACHED WITH THE VIDEOTAPE OF HER INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION, COMPULSORY PROCESS, DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL, AND DEMONSTRATED A DOUBLE STANDARD BY THE COURT ON SUCH MATTERS. 41. THE COURT'S RULING THAT SEVERAL CLAIMS CONCERNED ONLY INADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR EXHIBITS AND THUS THAT THEY WERE NOT AVAILABLE WAS ERROR. 42. THE ADMISSION OF THE PROBABILITY AND RELIABILITY EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE HAIRS AND FIBERS WAS IMPROPER. THAT EVIDENCE WAS MANIFESTLY UNRELIABLE AND OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE WITNESS' AREA OF KNOWLEDGE. THERE WAS NOT A SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION FOR THE RELIABILITY OF THAT EVIDENCE, AND IT WAS IN FACT COMPLETELY UNRELIABLE. ITS ADMISSION DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY, AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES, UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 43. THE ADMISSION OF THE STATE'S IRRELEVANT, BASELESS EVIDENCE CONCERNING HOW DAVID MARTINEZ COULD HAVE OBTAINED THE TWO CUTS ON HIS HANDS VIOLATED THE RULES OF EVIDENCE REQUIRING A FOUNDATION, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND RELEVANCE FOR EVIDENCE, AND CRE 403 AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 44. OFFICER BROWN'S TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE LIKELIHOOD OF WHETHER THERE WAS SEMINAL FLUID ON MR. RODRIGUEZ' UNDERSHORTS WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED. IT WAS IRRELEVANT AND LACKED ANY FOUNDATION OR RELIABILITY. ITS ADMISSION ALSO DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. 45. THE ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS G-13, G-14, AND G-15 WAS ERROR. THERE WAS NO ADEQUATE FOUNDATION FOR THE EXHIBITS AND THEY WERE IRRELEVANT AND MISLEADING. 46. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO MAKE MOTIONS, OBJECTIONS AND RECORDS ON THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF A HEARING ON THESE MATTERS AND ITS FINDINGS ON THE ISSUES ARE ERRONEOUS. 47. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH BATSON AND FIELDS WHEN MR. RODRIGUEZ MADE AN OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S EXCUSAL OF BLACK JURORS VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, TRIAL BY JURY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES, AS DID THE STATE'S USE OF ITS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN THAT FASHION. 48. THE UNREASONABLE RESTRICTIONS PLACED ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S VOIR DIRE REGARDING THE DEATH PENALTY, AND THE ORDER THAT HE COULD NOT OBJECT TO THE COURT'S CONDUCTING OF VOIR DIRE, DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS UNDER RULE 24, HIS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY, TO APPEAL, TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, TO COUNSEL, TO BE ABLE TO INTELLIGENTLY EXERCISE HIS PEREMPTORY AND CAUSE CHALLENGES, AND RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 49. THE DEATH QUALIFICATION OF THE JURY DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY, A JURY DRAWN FROM A FAIR CROSS-SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY, AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW, AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES AND THE STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING JURY SELECTION IN COLORADO. 50. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW TWO JURIES, ONE DEATH-QUALIFIED AND ONE NOT DEATH-QUALIFIED, DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A RECORD IN THE MATTERS RELATING TO THE EFFECTS OF DEATH-QUALIFICATION. 51. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS ORDER THAT ANY RECORD OF A JUROR'S DEMEANOR BY COUNSEL MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT IN WRITING. 52. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO EXCUSE FOR CAUSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WHO KNEW THAT CHRIS RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN CONVICTED FOR, AND/OR SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON FOR, THE SAME CASE. THIS INCLUDED SEVERAL JURORS WHO ACTUALLY SAT AS JURORS ON THE CASE. THE COURT ALSO REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THOSE JURORS AND PROSPECTIVE JURORS NOT TO DIVULGE THAT INFORMATION TO OTHERS AND NOT TO CONSIDER THAT INFORMATION IN DECIDING THE CASE. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS THEREBY DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 53. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO HAVE THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS TAKE THEIR OATH TO TELL THE TRUTH BEFORE THEY WERE GIVEN AND TOLD TO FILL OUT THE JURORS QUESTIONNAIRES, AND ITS COMPLETE FAILURE TO HAVE MANY PROSPECTIVE JURORS EVER TAKE THEIR OATH, VIOLATED THE CONTROLLING STATUTE AND RULE AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. 54. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ORDER MANY OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS NOT TO BE EXPOSED TO, OR BE AFFECTED BY, ANY PUBLICITY IN THE CASE, NOT TO DISCUSS THE CASE THEY WERE INVOLVED IN WITH ANYONE ELSE, ON THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL BEFORE THOSE PROSPECTIVE JURORS WENT HOME, VIOLATED THE CONTROLLING RULES AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. 55. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO EXCUSE FOR CAUSE PROSPECTIVE JUROR [R.K.] BECAUSE, INTER ALIA, HE WAS AWARE OF THE ALLEGED CONFESSION OF MR. RODRIGUEZ, WAS ERROR AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY. 56. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW INDIVIDUAL SEQUESTERED VOIR DIRE ON DEATH PENALTY ISSUES DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY SO IN LIGHT OF THE INADEQUATE AND UNREASONABLE TIME ALLOWED FOR DEFENSE COUNSEL'S VOIR DIRE ON THOSE ISSUES. 57. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO VIDEOTAPE THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS, RIGHT TO APPEAL, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DEPRIVED OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE RECORD ON THE DEMEANOR OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE COURT PREVENTED HIM FROM MAKING A CONTEMPORANEOUS ORAL RECORD ON THAT MATTER. 58. THE GROUNDS AND ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE OBJECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS, MOTION TO QUASH JURY PANEL AND MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL SPECIFIED AND OTHER APPROPRIATE RELIEF, ENTITLE MR. RODRIGUEZ TO HAVE THE DEATH SENTENCE AND CONVICTIONS VACATED, AS DOES THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOW A HEARING AND THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT RELIEF. 59. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO RE-OPEN VOIR DIRE OF THE PANEL OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS FIRST QUESTIONED BY MS. DESMOND WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR SINCE THE ORIGINAL VOIR DIRE WAS INADEQUATE DUE TO THAT COUNSEL'S INEXPERIENCE AND MENTAL AND PHYSICAL STATE. 60. THE TRIAL COURT'S UNDISCLOSED COMMUNICATIONS WITH JURORS DURING TRIAL VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AS DID THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW MR. RODRIGUEZ A HEARING AND A RECORD ON APPEAL ON THIS MATTER. 61. MR. RODRIGUEZ ASSERTS ALL OF THE CLAIMS PRESENTED IN HIS MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION, MOTION TO QUASH JURY PANEL, MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS, MOTION FOR HEARING, FILED NOVEMBER 25, 1986. THE DEATH SENTENCE AND CONVICTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE VACATED DUE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S INEXCUSABLE FAILURES TO ALLOW HEARINGS ON THE ISSUES RAISED THEREIN AND TO GRANT RELIEF AT THE TIME. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE ACCUSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE AN ADEQUATE RECORD OR SHOWING CONCERNING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE JURY PANEL WAS SELECTED AND CHOSEN, INCLUDING THE DECISIONS OF THE JURY COMMISSIONER EXCUSING PROSPECTIVE JURORS, DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. THE JURY SUMMONING AND SELECTION PROCESS IN THIS CASE VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE CONTROLLING STATUTES. 62. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT EMPLOYED INCONSISTENT STANDARDS FOR EXCUSING PROSPECTIVE JURORS WHO WERE SUPPOSEDLY UNABLE TO FOLLOW THE LAW BECAUSE THEY WERE OPPOSED TO THE DEATH PENALTY AND THOSE WHO WERE UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF SOME BIAS IN FAVOR OF THE DEATH PENALTY. THE COURT TENDED TO EXCUSE THOSE WHO WERE OPPOSED TO DEATH MORE EASILY THAN THOSE PRONE TO KILL. 63. THE JURY SUMMONING AND SELECTION PROCESS IN THIS CASE VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CONTROLLING STATUTES. 64. MR. RODRIGUEZ' RIGHTS UNDER THE TRIAL BY JURY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS, AND CRIM.P. 24 WERE VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S TOTAL PRECLUSION OF VOIR DIRE BY DEFENSE COUNSEL ON CLAIMED HARDSHIPS, AND BY THE COURT'S INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE ON CLAIMED HARDSHIPS. 65. THE EXCLUSION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM VOIR DIRE ON PUBLICITY AND CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE ISSUES AND THE TRIAL COURT'S OWN INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE AND INSTRUCTIONS ON THOSE ISSUES WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 66. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO VOIR DIRE ON THE MATTER OF THE FRONT-PAGE NEWS OF THE GOVERNOR OF NEW MEXICO'S COMMUTATION OF ALL DEATH ROW INMATES IN THAT STATE WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS, A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES AND CRIM.P. 24. 67. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO EXCUSE JUROR [J.A.] FOR CAUSE WAS ERROR WHERE VOIR DIRE ESTABLISHED THAT THE POTENTIAL JUROR REFUSED TO BELIEVE THAT LIFE IN PRISON MEANT AT LEAST 20 YEARS OF INCARCERATION UNDER THE LAW. 68. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR J.B.] WHERE VOIR DIRE ESTABLISHED THAT THAT POTENTIAL JUROR WAS BIASED AGAINST MR. RODRIGUEZ. 69. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR D.L.]. 70. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR D.G.] 71. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR R.M.]. 72. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR R.K.]. 73. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR K.G.], AND ITS REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO QUESTION HER AGAIN. 74. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR A.R.]. 75. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO [JUROR J.D.]. 76. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ITS DENIAL OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE TO JUROR [G.P.], AND BY ITS REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT HER AND THE OTHER JURORS NOT TO DISCUSS OR CONSIDER THAT FACT IN THEIR DELIBERATIONS. 77. THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCUSALS OF JURORS FOR THEIR VIEWS CONCERNING THE DEATH PENALTY WERE IMPROPER AND CONTRARY TO THE LAW, AND MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS THEREBY DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 78. THE COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO EXCUSE FOR CAUSE THE JURORS WHO WERE AWARE OF THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF MR. RODRIGUEZ' BROTHER FOR THE SAME CHARGES. 79. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE SEVERAL PROSPECTIVE AND ACTUAL JURORS WHO WERE AWARE OF THE CONVICTION OF MR. RODRIGUEZ' BROTHER NOT TO CONSIDER THAT FACT AND NOT TO DISCUSS THAT CONVICTION WITH OTHER JURORS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 80. THE UNREASONABLE TIME AND SUBJECT MATTER LIMITATIONS PLACED ON DEFENSE COUNSEL'S VOIR DIRE VIOLATED CRIM.P. 24 AND THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS, AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO THE INTELLIGENT EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY AND CAUSE CHALLENGES. THE COURT'S ORDER THAT NO CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTIONS TO THE LIMITATIONS COULD BE MADE PREVENTED THE ACCUSED FROM MAKING A RECORD ON THE EFFECTS OF THE COURT'S ORDERS AND DENIED THE ACCUSED HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 81. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY, DUE PROCESS, A JURY DRAWN FROM A RANDOM CROSS SECTION OF THE COMMUNITY, AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE JURY SELECTION ACT, BY THE COURT'S MANNER OF ARBITRARILY AND UNFAIRLY DISTRIBUTING JURORS WHO UNSUCCESSFULLY CLAIMED HARDSHIPS AMONG THE PANELS OF THOSE WHO HAD NOT, BY ITS FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ADVISE THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS OF THE MEANING OF AND MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS OF A HARDSHIP MERITING AN EXCUSE FROM JURY DUTY BEFORE ASKING THE ENTIRE VENIRE TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES ON THE BASIS OF CLAIMED HARDSHIPS, AND BY ITS FAILURE TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS OF EXAMINING AND QUALIFYING POTENTIAL JURORS WHO CLAIMED HARDSHIPS. 82. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO STRIKE THE PANEL OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS TO WHOM THE STATE ARGUED THAT MR. RODRIGUEZ TRIED TO GET SENTENCED AROUND CHRISTMAS FOR SYMPATHY PURPOSES, OR TO GRANT ANY OTHER RELIEF WAS ERROR. 83. THE TRIAL COURT USED AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN ITS DECISIONS TO EXCLUDE JURORS BECAUSE OF THEIR SCRUPLES AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY. THE DEATH SENTENCE MUST THUS BE VACATED. 84. THE TRIAL COURT'S USE OF AN IMPROPER STANDARD FOR EXCUSING SCRUPLED PROSPECTIVE JURORS VIOLATED MR. RODRIGUEZ' RIGHTS TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE PROHIBITIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 85. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PRECLUDE THE PROSECUTION FROM ARGUING OR PRESENTING EVIDENCE ON THEORIES INCONSISTENT WITH FACTS OR THEORIES ARGUED WITH RESPECT TO THE CO-DEFENDANTS. 86. THE EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OF DAVID MARTINEZ' PHYSICAL CONDITION AFTER HIS ARREST VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, COMPULSORY PROCESS, CONFRONTATION AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 87. THE DUE PROCESS, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE DEATH STATUTE, WERE VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PUT A BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT MITIGATING FACTORS DID NOT EXIST. 88. THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLOWING DR. OGURA TO TESTIFY AS TO PHOTOGRAPHS NOT OFFERED OR ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WAS ERROR. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS THUS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES, ALL UNDER BOTH THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 89. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS NOT ADEQUATELY ADVISED OF AND DID NOT MAKE ADEQUATE WAIVERS OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TESTIFY AT ANY OF THE THREE PARTS OF THE TRIAL IN THIS CASE. 90. THE ADMISSION OF THE CUMULATIVE, INFLAMMATORY PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM AND THE SCENE WHERE THE CAR WAS LOCATED VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE. THE SHOWING OF THOSE PHOTOS TO THE JURY BEFORE THEY WERE ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE WAS ALSO ERROR. 91. THE COURT'S PERMITTING OF THE STATE'S EXAMINATION OF MARGIE MARQUEZ AS TO THE STYLE OF LETTERS FROM MR. RODRIGUEZ, AFTER SUSTAINING THE STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE SAME INQUIRY BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, IS INDICATIVE OF THE COURT'S BIAS AND WAS ONE-SIDED AND UNFAIR. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND COMPULSORY PROCESS AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION. 92. THE STATE'S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF [DENVER COUNTY JAIL CHAPLAIN], AN IMPORTANT MITIGATION WITNESS, CONCERNING HIS TESTIMONY IN THE TRIAL OF MR. RODRIGUEZ' BROTHER, CHRIS, THE LAWYER WHO REPRESENTED CHRIS, AND THE PHYSICAL CONDITIONS OF THE DENVER COUNTY JAIL, WAS IMPROPER, ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF PREJUDICIAL AND IRRELEVANT MATTERS, AND WAS UNFAIR BECAUSE THE COURT HAD SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE OF THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS IN PRISON OFFERED BY MR. RODRIGUEZ. 93. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE STATEMENTS OF MR. RODRIGUEZ WERE VOLUNTARY WAS ERRONEOUS AND ALSO DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO TESTIFY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE AND AT THE PENALTY PHASE. 94. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO REQUIRE DAVID MARTINEZ TO CO-OPERATE WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION UNDER PENALTY OF CONTEMPT DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHTS TO COMPULSORY PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION AND THE PROHIBITIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 95. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW THE JAIL PSYCHIATRIST TO TESTIFY CONCERNING THE PSYCHOTROPIC DRUGS MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS TAKING DURING TRIAL, WHICH AFFECTED HIS DEMEANOR, WITHOUT A TOTAL WAIVER OF THE DOCTOR-PATIENT PRIVILEGE, AND WITHOUT ALLOWING THE STATE TO INQUIRE INTO THOSE PRIVILEGED MATTERS, VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND THE DEATH STATUTE. 96. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW MR. RODRIGUEZ TO CALL THE PROSECUTOR AS A WITNESS AFTER THE STATE INTENTIONALLY CREATED A FALSE AND EXTREMELY PREJUDICIAL IMPRESSION OF COLLUSION AND MISCONDUCT BY DEFENSE COUNSEL THROUGH ITS QUESTIONING OF MARGIE MARQUEZ, DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 97. MR. RODRIGUEZ' STATEMENTS AND LETTERS TO MARGIE MARQUEZ WERE INVOLUNTARY AND WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF MR. RODRIGUEZ' RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, COUNSEL AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION, ALL UNDER BOTH THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 98. THE COURT'S ACTIONS RESULTING IN MR. RODRIGUEZ NOT BEING REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS OF LAW, A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY, AND HIS RIGHTS TO COUNSEL, EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS, AND THE PROHIBITIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 99. THE COURT'S ORDER RE: TRIAL SCHEDULE AND AMENDED ORDER VIOLATED MR. RODRIGUEZ' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN ALL OF THE RESPECTS NOTED IN THE OBJECTIONS TO ORDER REGARDING TRIAL SCHEDULE AND AMENDED ORDER, AND IN ADDITION THOSE ORDERS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ ALL OF THE RIGHTS NOTED HEREIN. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW A HEARING ON THOSE CLAIMS ALSO VIOLATED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS NOTED HEREIN. 100. THE ORDER PROHIBITING [DENVER COUNTY JAIL CHAPLAIN] FROM WEARING HIS ECCLESIASTICAL COLLAR IF HE SAT WITH THE FAMILY OF MR. RODRIGUEZ DURING TRIAL WAS AN OUTRAGEOUS EXHIBITION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FAVORITISM TOWARD THE PROSECUTION AND BIAS AGAINST THE ACCUSED. THIS FAVORITISM AND BIAS WAS DEMONSTRATED THROUGHOUT THE TRIAL BY THE COURT'S DISPARATE TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY OF MR. RODRIGUEZ AND THE SUPPORTERS OF THE PROSECUTION. 101. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SENTENCE MR. RODRIGUEZ ON THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL COUNTS BEFORE THE PENALTY PHASE WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. THIS DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN MITIGATION VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES AND THE DEATH STATUTE. 102. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT'S ORDER REGARDING THE FIRST DAY OF TRIAL, AFTER THE COURT CONFESSED THE SHOW CAUSE ORDER ARISING FROM THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDING, VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS, TRIAL BY JURY AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL CLAUSES, AS WELL AS THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT. 103. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPOSING AN UNREALISTIC AND UNDULY HARSH TRIAL SCHEDULE. THE TRIAL COURT'S MANNER OF PROCEEDING DURING JURY SELECTION, FORCING DEFENSE COUNSEL TO WORK 12 TO 14 HOURS DAILY IN COURT, WITH NO OPPORTUNITY FOR EVEN A DECENT MEAL, INTERFERED WITH AND DESTROYED DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ABILITY TO BE PREPARED AND TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR MR. RODRIGUEZ AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ THOSE RIGHTS AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 104. THE CHARGES AND DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE PROSECUTIONS VIOLATIONS OF DUE PROCESS. 105. THE PROSECUTION'S OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT REGARDING ITS DEALINGS WITH MARGIE MARQUEZ WHEN SHE WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL FOR MR. RODRIGUEZ VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL CLAUSES. 106. THE STATE'S EGREGIOUS AND PERVASIVE MISCONDUCT DURING CLOSING ARGUMENTS AT THE GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS, TRIAL BY JURY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMBINED WITH THE COURT'S ORDER THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL NOT OBJECT AND THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS. 107. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REQUIRING THAT THE JURY FIND THAT MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS NOT GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER AFTER DELIBERATION BEFORE IT WAS PERMITTED TO CONSIDER WHETHER HE WAS GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER. THIS COERCED THE JURY INTO RETURNING A VERDICT OF GUILTY OF THE GREATER CHARGE AND VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN BECK V. ALABAMA, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). 108. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS PERMITTED THE JURY TO FIND MR. RODRIGUEZ GUILTY FOR CONDUCT HE WAS NOT CHARGED WITH COMMITTING. THIS VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES. 109. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO EXPLAIN SEVERAL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT, AND THE INSTRUCTIONS ALLOWED A GUILTY VERDICT AND DEATH SENTENCE BASED UPON AN UNCHARGED CRIME SUPPLIED TO THE JURY BY THE COURT IN THE INSTRUCTIONS. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS THEREBY DENIED HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. THE FELONY MURDER, KIDNAPPING AND MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTIONS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY BASED UPON ALL OF THOSE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE VACATED. 110. THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES BECAUSE THE JURY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO UNANIMOUSLY DECIDE ON EITHER THE FACTS OR LEGAL THEORY BEHIND THE CHARGE. THE SEXUAL ASSAULT CONVICTION, AND THE FELONY MURDER, KIDNAPPING, AND FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTIONS PRESUMABLY BASED THEREUPON, ARE ALSO INVALID, AS IS THE DEATH SENTENCE. 111. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS FAILED TO EXPLAIN SEVERAL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS THEREBY DENIED DUE PROCESS. THE FELONY MURDER, KIDNAPPING AND MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTIONS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY BASED UPON THE SEXUAL ASSAULT, FELONY MURDER AND OTHER CONVICTIONS SHOULD ALSO BE VACATED, SINCE THEY ALSO VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 112. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. THE CONVICTION FOR THAT OFFENSE, AND THE MURDER, KIDNAPPING AND MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTIONS BASED ON THAT ALLEGATION SHOULD ALSO BE VACATED. THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD ALSO BE VACATED, SINCE IT WAS BASED ON ALL OF THESE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTIONS. 113. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY OMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING CHARGE. FURTHER, MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES BY THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL KIDNAPPING CONVICTION AS TO THE PENALTY. 114. THE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING OMITTED SEVERAL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A TRIAL BY JURY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. FURTHER, MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES BY THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTION FOR SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING AND RELATED CONVICTIONS AS TO THE PENALTY. 115. THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY CONCERNING THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE OMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AND THUS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A TRIAL BY JURY. FURTHER, MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS, A TRIAL BY JURY AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES BY THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CONVICTION AND RELATED CONVICTIONS AS TO THE PENALTY. 116. THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY CONCERNING THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE OMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AND THUS DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. FURTHER, MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES BY THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CONVICTION AS TO THE PENALTY. 117. THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY REGARDING FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT OMITTED NUMEROUS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THAT OFFENSE, THUS DENYING MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS. THAT CONVICTION AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED THEREUPON SHOULD BE VACATED. 118. THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY CONCERNING FIRST-DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT OMITTED ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A TRIAL BY JURY UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. FURTHER, MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES BY THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FIRST-DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTION AND THE PRESUMABLY RELATED CONSPIRACY CONVICTION AS TO THE PENALTY. 119. THE CIRCULAR CHARGES AND CONVICTIONS FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER, FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING, AND FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT, AND THE CONSPIRACY CHARGES, VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THEY AND THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED. 120. THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FELONY-MURDER CHARGE FAILED TO PROVIDE MANY OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE; THUS, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES WERE VIOLATED AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED ON THAT CONVICTION SHOULD BE VACATED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS, TRIAL BY JURY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 121. THE FELONY-MURDER CONVICTION IS INVALID BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTIONS FAIL TO REQUIRE THAT THE JURY UNANIMOUSLY AGREE ON AT LEAST ONE OF THE THREE DIFFERENT THEORIES OF LIABILITY THAT WERE PUT FORTH BY THE STATE. THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED THEREUPON SHOULD THUS BE VACATED. 122. THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE FELONY-MURDER CHARGE FAILED TO PROVIDE MANY OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE; THUS, THE TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES WERE VIOLATED AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED ON THAT CONVICTION SHOULD BE VACATED UNDER THE DUE PROCESS, TRIAL BY JURY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 123. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FIRST DEGREE MURDER WERE DEFICIENT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY. THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED UPON THAT CONVICTION MUST ALSO BE VACATED. 124. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FIRST DEGREE MURDER WERE DEFICIENT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED UPON THAT CONVICTION MUST ALSO BE VACATED. 125. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING WERE DEFICIENT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY. 126. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING WERE DEFICIENT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 127. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT WERE DEFICIENT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY. 128. THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT WERE DEFICIENT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 129. THE COURT'S FAILURE TO DEFINE THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE THREE CONSPIRACY CHARGES OF ATTEMPT FOR THE JURY DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ DUE PROCESS AND HIS RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY AS TO THOSE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES, UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 130. THE ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTION ON COMPLICITY DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND TO A TRIAL BY JURY AND CAUSED THE JURY TO RETURN A DEATH VERDICT. 131. THE COMPLICITY INSTRUCTION GIVEN AT THE GUILT/INNOCENCE TRIAL WAS AN INCORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND ALLOWED THE JURY TO CONVICT MR. RODRIGUEZ WHEN HE WAS, IN FACT, NOT GUILTY OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS THEREBY DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, A TRIAL BY JURY, AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. THE CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES BASED THEREUPON, INCLUDING THE DEATH SENTENCE, SHOULD THUS BE VACATED. 132. THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES BECAUSE THE JURY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO UNANIMOUSLY DECIDE ON EITHER THE FACTS OR LEGAL THEORY BEHIND THE CHARGE. THE SEXUAL ASSAULT CONVICTION, AND THE MURDER, KIDNAPPING, AND MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTIONS, AND THE DEATH PENALTY PRESUMABLY BASED THEREUPON, ARE ALSO INVALID. 133. THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES BECAUSE THE JURY WAS NOT REQUIRED TO UNANIMOUSLY DECIDE ON EITHER THE FACTS OR LEGAL THEORY BEHIND THE CHARGE. 134. THE TRIAL COURT'S SUA SPONTE SUBMISSION OF THE UNCHARGED ALLEGATION THAT MR. RODRIGUEZ COMMITTED A CRIME OF VIOLENCE DURING THE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT, VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. THE RESULTING VERDICT AND SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED, AS SHOULD THE DEATH PENALTY WHICH IS BASED ON THAT CONVICTION FOR A SERIOUS CRIMINAL OFFENSE. 135. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE JURY FINDINGS ON THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE ALLEGATIONS, AND THE DEATH SENTENCE AND THE OTHER SENTENCES SHOULD THUS BE VACATED SINCE THEY VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 136. THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY THAT THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE ALLEGATION WAS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, DUE PROCESS AND TRIAL BY JURY CLAUSES AND COLORADO'S DEATH STATUTE. 137. THE TRIAL COURT'S ACTION IN PROVIDING FIVE VERDICT FORMS ON ONE CRIME OF VIOLENCE ALLEGATION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 138. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY OMITTED SEVERAL ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE ALLEGATIONS, THUS DENYING MR. RODRIGUEZ A TRIAL BY JURY AS TO THOSE ALLEGATIONS AND DUE PROCESS. THE SENTENCES AND DEATH SENTENCE BASED UPON THOSE CONVICTIONS FOR OFFENSES VIOLATE THOSE PROVISIONS AND THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES AND SHOULD BE VACATED. 139. THE CRIME OF VIOLENCE ALLEGATION WAS DUPLICITOUS AND VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES AND THE CONTROLLING STATUTE. 140. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS BECAUSE THE INFORMATION PURPORTING TO CHARGE HIM WITH CRIMES WAS DEFECTIVE, FAILED TO CHARGE HIM WITH OFFENSES, AND DID NOT GIVE JURISDICTION TO THE COURT. THE CONVICTIONS AND THE RESULTING DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD BE VACATED. 141. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTIONS OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND FELONY MURDER, AND THOSE CONVICTIONS AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED THEREUPON MUST BE VACATED, SINCE THEY VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES. 142. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. THE CONVICTION FOR THAT OFFENSE, AND THE MURDER, KIDNAPPING AND MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT CONVICTIONS BASED ON THAT ALLEGATION SHOULD ALSO BE VACATED. THE DEATH SENTENCE SHOULD ALSO BE VACATED, SINCE IT WAS BASED ON ALL OF THESE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONVICTIONS. 143. THE UNDERLYING FELONIES MERGED INTO THE FELONY MURDER. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIS CRITICAL FACT, AND BY IMPOSING LIFE SENTENCES FOR THE UNDERLYING FELONIES, AND THE CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES, AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED THEREON, SHOULD BE VACATED SINCE THEY VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, TRIAL BY JURY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE U.S. AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 144. THE SEXUAL ASSAULT CONVICTION MERGED INTO THE KIDNAPPING CONVICTION. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIS CRITICAL FACT, AND BY IMPOSING A LIFE SENTENCE FOR THE SEXUAL ASSAULT CONVICTION, AND THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE, AND THE DEATH SENTENCE BASED THEREON, SHOULD BE VACATED SINCE THEY VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS, DOUBLE JEOPARDY, TRIAL BY JURY AND CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAUSES OF THE U.S. AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. 145. THE FIRST DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION MERGED INTO THE CONVICTION FOR FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT, SINCE PRESUMABLY THAT FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS AN ELEMENT OF, AND AN INCLUDED OFFENSE TO, THE FIRST DEGREE AGGRAVATED MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT. THE SEXUAL ASSAULT AND KIDNAPPING CONVICTIONS ALSO MERGE. MR. RODRIGUEZ HAS THUS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES AND THE MURDER CONVICTION AND DEATH SENTENCE THUS SHOULD BE VACATED. 146. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY SHOULD NOT ENTER INTO THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLES RECOGNIZED IN ADAMS V. TEXAS, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) AND DENIED THE ACCUSED DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY. 147. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT IT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER SYMPATHY FOR THE VICTIM OR PREJUDICE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL ON THE NOT GUILTY PLEA WAS ERROR AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ A FAIR TRIAL BY IMPARTIAL JURY, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND VIOLATED THE PROHIBITIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS. THE DEATH SENTENCE AND THE CONVICTIONS SHOULD BE VACATED. 148. THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE MR. RODRIGUEZ WITH THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE OCTOBER 28, 1986, HEARING, IN THE FACE OF ORDERS FROM THIS COURT AND DESIGNATIONS OF RECORD DEMANDS AN INQUIRY FROM THIS COURT AND DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. 149. THE NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 150. JUDGE PETERSON'S BIAS AGAINST MR. RODRIGUEZ AND HIS COUNSEL DENIED MR. RODRIGUEZ HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 151. MR. RODRIGUEZ WAS NOT COMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL. HE WAS THUS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW, TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, TO THE PROHIBITIONS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, AND TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.