Opinion ID: 2286987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence Regarding Howard's Background

Text: The City claims it was error for the trial court to refuse to admit evidence from certain council members that would have been probative as to a non-race-based motive behind their decision to reject the panel. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the City could not offer testimony about an unsubstantiated story in a blog about Howard's past that allegedly raised concerns for at least two of the council members who voted to reject the panel. A court may exclude evidence that may have a prejudicial effect, even though the evidence is logically relevant, when the risk of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value. State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Mo. banc 2000), overruled on other grounds by Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. banc 2010). It has been well established that [t]he admissibility of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Mitchell, 313 S.W.3d at 674-75. This standard gives the trial court broad leeway in choosing to admit evidence, and... [i]n part, such broad leeway is granted to ensure that the probative value of admitted evidence outweighs any unfair prejudice. Id. The evidence at issue was unconfirmed hearsay. During the City's offer of proof, its witnesses admitted that they did not have any personal knowledge as to whether the information about Howard was true. Moreover, the evidence at issue relates only to Howard and had nothing to do with the other two panelists. Therefore, regardless of whether certain council members had concerns about Howard, these concerns did not extend to the other panelists. The council's rejection of the entire panel does not support a claim that the council's decision was motivated by a concern that Howard was not a suitable candidate.