Opinion ID: 787203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Challenges to Hunter's Sentence

Text: 38 Hunter challenges his 87-month sentence on the grounds that the District Court (1) was precluded under the mandate rule from imposing enhancements to his sentence that were not imposed at the initial sentencing or on the first appeal; but, if not so precluded, the Court, (2) improperly imposed (a) a five-level enhancement for brandishment or possession of a firearm, and (b) a two-level enhancement for the loss to the victims resulting from his offense.
39 Hunter principally argues that the District Court exceeded the scope of our mandate when it applied, on remand, enhancements not imposed at the initial sentencing proceeding. Hunter's argument relies on our general mandate rule under the doctrine of the law of the case: that resentencing should be limited when the Court of Appeals upholds the underlying convictions but determines that a sentence has been erroneously imposed and remands to correct that error. United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1228 (2d Cir.2002). Hunter argues that the District Court overstepped the bounds of this general rule when it added the firearm and loss-to-the-victim enhancements at the resentencing hearing. 40 The general mandate rule can be avoided by specific instructions of this Court — for example, where we explicitly instruct the district court to resentence de novo. See, e.g., id. at 1227 (noting that the court should look to the specific dictates of the remand order). Here, there were no such instructions. See Mulder, 273 F.3d at 119 (noting only that we vacate Hunter's sentence and remand for resentencing at an offense level that does not take into account Riddick's murder). 41 Even without a specific instruction to resentence de novo, however, there may be circumstances when we reverse a sentence in which[, contrary to the mandate rule,] the `spirit of the mandate' requires de novo sentencing, for example when the reversal effectively undoes the entire `knot of calculation.' Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1228. 42 The Government argues that our remand on the first appeal effectively undid the Quintieri knot of calculation that determined Hunter's sentence. See Government's Br. at 74. Because the District Court chose to apply the Riddick murder enhancement at Hunter's initial sentencing — thereby guaranteeing that Hunter's Guidelines sentence was at the statutory maximum — the Government now claims that, as of that first proceeding, it had no incentive to raise or address other enhancements. Id. at 70; see also Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1229 (An issue is not considered waived, however, if a party did not, at the time of the purported waiver, have both an opportunity and an incentive to raise it....); id. ([I]f a sentencing determination had no practical effect on a defendant's sentence at the original sentencing ..., a defendant is free to challenge that sentencing determination on remand....). By arguing that it had no incentive to argue for other enhancements at Hunter's initial sentencing, the Government effectively invokes an exception to the mandate rule explained in United States v. Whren, 111 F.3d 956 (D.C.Cir.1997) — that the district court may consider only such new arguments or new facts as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals' decision, id. at 960 — which we cited with approval in Quintieri. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1228 n. 6. 43 In support of its claim that it had no incentive or opportunity to address other enhancements at Hunter's initial sentencing, or, alternatively, that the other enhancements were entirely irrelevant at the initial sentencing, the Government argues that the PSR's recommendation that the District Court apply the Riddick murder enhancement rendered irrelevant any discussion of other enhancements. See Government's Br. at 74-75. We disagree. A district court is under no obligation to accept a recommendation made in a PSR. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 140 F.3d 453, 457 (2d Cir.1998) ([A] sentencing judge is not obliged to accept all unchallenged findings and recommendations made in the PSR.). The Government cannot enjoy immunity from waiver solely on the basis of a recommendation in a PSR. 44 However, the Government's broader claim — that our remand to correct a sentencing error undid a knot of calculation, and hence merited de novo resentencing — is well supported by the record of the initial sentencing proceeding. The Government submitted a letter to the District Court two days before sentencing. See August 26, 1999 Transcript, at 69. In this letter, the Government addressed the possibility of several other enhancements that might apply should the Riddick murder enhancement not apply. See id. at 86. At the very least, the Government's letter, and the subsequent discussion of the contents of that letter by the Court and Hunter's counsel, 12 support the view that the Riddick murder enhancement was part of the knot of calculation of the Court's initial sentence. While this part of the record confirms that the Government did have an incentive to address other enhancements — and did so, to a limited extent — the issue of other enhancements was put aside, owing to the murder enhancement, and became newly relevant only upon remand. Accordingly, we find that the District Court was permitted to resentence Hunter de novo on remand, and did not exceed the scope of our mandate in doing so.
45 Hunter argues in the alternative that, even if we hold — as we do — that the District Court did not exceed its mandate from this Court on remand, the District Court nevertheless clearly erred 13 by imposing two new enhancements on remand.
46 Hunter challenges the District Court's application of a five-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(iii) for brandishment or possession of a firearm. He asserts that the evidence in the record established, at most, that he brandished or possessed only a dangerous weapon (as opposed to a firearm), thereby meriting only a three-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(v). 47 The District Court chose to credit the testimony of Frank Fallon, who testified that he saw the tip, or approximately two to three inches, of the handle of a gun protruding from the pocket of Hunter's trousers. Hunter responds to this testimony by drawing to our attention a firearm expert's testimony that the handle seen by Fallon could have been the handle to some dangerous weapon other than a firearm. 48 As previously noted, we owe a district court particularly strong deference when reviewing fact-findings based upon credibility determinations. See Monzon, 359 F.3d at 119. Furthermore, we have held that, upon reviewing findings subject to the even more stringent beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, eyewitness testimony may be sufficient for the government to meet its burden of proof [that a defendant had a firearm] so long as it provides a rational basis for the [fact-finder] to find that the object observed by eyewitnesses was, in fact, a firearm. United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 490 (2d Cir.1994). 49 Because eyewitness testimony may provide a basis for a finding that a firearm was brandished or possessed and because we defer to the District Court's judgment that Fallon's testimony was convincing and credible, we find no clear error in the District Court's decision to enhance Hunter's sentence five levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3)(A)(iii).
50 Hunter also contests the District Court's imposition of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.2(b)(2) and 2B3.1(b)(7)(C) for having caused a loss to his victim between $50,000 and $250,000. 51 The District Court agreed with the Probation Office's estimate that the loss that Hunter caused Felix was approximately $144,000. The Probation Office calculated this amount by multiplying $1000, an estimated amount that Hunter received on a weekly basis from Felix, by the estimated duration of Hunter's extortion, 144 weeks. Hunter argues that there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for this calculation. 52 The Government concedes that the evidence at sentencing was insufficient to justify this $144,000 calculation, but argues nonetheless that any error was harmless. The Government notes that documents produced by Hunter establish that Felix paid Hunter's company between $1,600 and $1,700 per month from approximately 1994 to January of 1998 — enough to meet the $50,000 threshold required for a two-level enhancement. Thus, in the Government's view, the miscalculation adopted by the District Court was harmless error. See Government's Br. at 85; see also United States v. Saunders, 129 F.3d 925, 932 (7th Cir.1997) (holding that a loss-to-the-victim miscalculation was harmless error because it did not affect the Guideline determination). 53 The record does indicate some monthly $1,600 to $1,700 payments, but in an imprecise fashion. There is nothing in the record to suggest the regularity or consistency of the monthly payments, or their precise duration. 14 Absent some evidence on that point, we are unable to determine whether the District Court's error in accepting the $144,000 calculation was harmless. Accordingly, we direct the District Court, upon remand, to reconsider the question of the total loss caused by Hunter to Felix before imposing an enhancement on that basis. 54