Opinion ID: 2567337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of wayment's evidence opposing summary judgment

Text: ¶ 41 A party opposing a summary judgment motion may submit depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits to refute the moving party's assertions by set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). In order to defeat the moving party's motion, the allegations contained in such submissions must be admissible in evidence. Id. Summary judgment may thus not be denied based solely on inadmissible hearsay. See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., 2003 UT 23, ¶¶ 50-51, 70 P.3d 904; see also Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (statements that are not . . . admissible in evidence . . . may not be considered on summary judgment under Rule 56(e)). ¶ 42 Here, Wayment relied on deposition testimony to oppose Clear Channel's summary judgment motion. As indicated above, the district court concluded that the only evidence in this testimony that Fischer made any of the alleged defamatory statements was inadmissible hearsay. The court recognized that Jeremy Castellano's deposition testimony regarding statements Benedict allegedly made to him was admissible nonhearsay. [17] The court nevertheless granted summary judgment with respect to Benedict as well as Fischer on the grounds that Benedict's statements, as reported by Castellano, did not match the defamatory statements alleged in Wayment's complaint. ¶ 43 Wayment now asks that we overturn the district court's rulings on both these points, arguing that the evidence of Fischer's defamatory statements is not hearsay, that Fischer's refusal to refute others' defamatory remarks is an adopted admission sufficient to defeat summary judgment with respect to Fischer, and that the evidence Benedict made defamatory statements is sufficiently similar to the statements alleged in Wayment's complaint. We address these arguments in turn.
¶ 44 Whether proffered evidence meets the definition of hearsay in Utah Rule of Evidence 801 is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding hearsay determination is a legal issue); see also D.A. v. State, 2002 UT 127, ¶ 8, 63 P.3d 607 (explaining that we generally consider the admissibility of evidence to be a question of law). Nevertheless, because application of the hearsay rules in a specific case is so highly fact-dependent, a district court's conclusions on such issues are entitled to some measure of deference. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 (Utah 1994); N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215, ¶ 11, 73 P.3d 971 (applying Pena to hearsay determinations); State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, ¶ 9, 32 P.3d 976 (same); cf. Boren v. Sable, 887 F.2d 1032, 1033 (10th Cir.1989) (The need for deference to a trial court ruling on a hearsay objection is particularly great because the determination of whether certain evidence is hearsay rests heavily upon the facts of a particular case. (internal quotation omitted)). ¶ 45 Wayment points to the following deposition testimony as evidence that Fischer made the allegedly defamatory statements in question: (1) Adam Rodriguez's testimony that Fischer's secretary, M'Lissa Holt, told him that Fischer told her that Wayment was fired because she was on the payroll with the Huntsman Institute; and (2) Jeremy Castellano's testimony that Adam Rodriguez told him that M'Lissa Holt told him that [Wayment] was receiving money from Huntsman and that she was on their payroll and that's why she was fired. ¶ 46 Wayment asserts that the statement by M'Lissa Holt, referred to in both Rodriguez's and Castellano's testimony, is not hearsay because it is a representative admission by a party-opponent under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). We reject this argument. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) allows admission into evidence of an out-of-court statement by a party-opponent's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D); see State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 847 (Utah 1988). Although Holt is an employee of Fischer and of Clear Channel, there is no indication that Wayment's departure, or Fischer's alleged statements concerning the reasons therefor, fell within the scope of Holt's employment. Cf. United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 322 (4th Cir.1982) (holding a secretary's account of her employer's statement was admissible under federal rule 801(d)(2)(D) where, in the course of performing her job duties, she had relayed a message from her employer to an associate on the telephone); McCallum v. CSX Transp., Inc., 149 F.R.D. 104, 110 (M.D.N.C.1993) ([E]mployee comments on employment decisions will not bind the organization if the individual had nothing to do with the decision.). Significantly, Holt made the alleged statement to Rodriguez while outside the office on a cigarette break, not while carrying out any aspect of her job. Rule 801(d)(2)(D) therefore does not apply. ¶ 47 Since Holt's statement does not qualify as a representative admission, Wayment's only purpose in offering Rodriguez's and Castellano's testimony on this point is to prove the truth of Holt's statement that Fischer told her Wayment had received money from Huntsman. The testimony thus meets the definition of hearsay, [18] and Wayment suggests no applicable exception that would render it admissible.
¶ 48 Wayment also points to Fischer's testimony that he knew there were false rumors in the newsroom that Wayment had accepted money from Huntsman but had remained silent regarding the actual reasons for Wayment's departure. Wayment claims that Fischer's failure to refute newsroom rumors constitutes an adopted admission under Utah Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) and therefore serves as admissible evidence that Fischer is liable for defamation. ¶ 49 This argument, however, misconstrues the operation of this evidentiary rule. Rule 801(d)(2)(B) excludes from the definition of hearsay a statement that is offered against a party who has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). Failure to contradict someone else's statement may, in some circumstances, constitute an adopted admission. See State v. Carlsen, 638 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1981) (holding that a criminal defendant's silence while someone else indicated his involvement in a criminal act constituted an adopted admission); see also United States v. Ward, 377 F.3d 671, 675-76 (7th Cir.2004) ([A] statement may be adopted as long as the statement was made in the defendant's presence, the defendant understood the statement, and the defendant has the opportunity to deny the statement but did not do so.). ¶ 50 Here, arguably, Fischer's silence in the face of newsroom rumors may be admissible into evidence as an adopted admission under rule 801(d)(2)(B). Even if so, however, such evidence would not suffice to sustain Wayment's defamation claim with respect to Fischer because an individual's adopted admission of an allegedly defamatory statement does not equate to the individual's own publication of the statement, an essential element of a defamation cause of action. Wayment argues that such an adopted admission constitutes circumstantial evidence that Fischer made such statements himself. We disagree. The inferential leap from Fischer's failure to refute rumors, on the one hand, to his active initiation of or participation in these rumors, on the other, is too great. We therefore uphold the district court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Wayment's claims against Fischer.
¶ 51 As described above, the district court viewed the statements that, according to Castellano's deposition testimony, Benedict made directly to Castellano, to be too unlike those alleged in Wayment's complaint to avoid summary judgment. We perceive no such difficulty. According to Castellano, Benedict told him that Wayment abused her contacts as a reporter to start this foundation and she was in charge of a large sum of money and it's unethical. Castellano further reported that Benedict said: You can't do stories on a place that you receive money from. This formulation appears essentially similar to, if less detailed than, the allegation contained in Wayment's complaint that Benedict made false accusations that [Wayment] was terminated because she was taking money from The Huntsman Cancer Institute, was in bed with the Institute and had used her reporting contacts to try to set up a foundation for her benefit. We therefore reverse the district court on this issue and overturn its grant of summary judgment with respect to Benedict.