Opinion ID: 795998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law on ADA Claim

Text: 18 American Eagle asserts the district court erred by denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law, arguing Pittari failed to offer sufficient evidence showing American Eagle regarded Pittari as disabled. We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Pittari, the prevailing party. See Knutson v. Ag Processing, Inc., 394 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). In doing so, we examine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's verdict. Ollie v. Titan Tire Corp., 336 F.3d 680, 685 (8th Cir.2003) (citation omitted). We will uphold the jury's verdict unless we conclude a reasonable jury could not have found for Pittari. See Knutson, 394 F.3d at 1050 (citation omitted). 19 The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) his condition qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he has suffered an adverse employment action due to his disability. Samuels v. Ks. City Mo. Sch. Dist., 437 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). Being regarded as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities qualifies as a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). The Supreme Court has defined two ways in which an individual may fall within this statutory definition: (1) the employer mistakenly believes the individual has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) the employer mistakenly believes an actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more of the individual's major life activities. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). The case at bar presents the second scenario: whether American Eagle believed Pittari had a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment was not so limiting. 20 As an initial matter, Pittari contends the major life activity for the jury's consideration was his cognitive abilities, arguing the district court instructed the jury to consider whether American Eagle unlawfully discriminated against Pittari because of an alleged defect in his cognitive skills. Such an argument is wholly contradicted by a reading of Pittari's complaint 3 and the jury instructions, 4 both of which indicate the major life activity for the jury's consideration was working. Pittari's argument on this point mistakenly conflates the major life activity at issue with the impairment he suffered. We therefore consider whether American Eagle regarded Pittari as disabled in the major life activity of working. 5 21 [F]inding a plaintiff is substantially limited in working requires a showing that his overall employment opportunities are limited. Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir.2006) (internal quotation omitted). [T]he statutory phrase `substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, [Pittari show he is] unable to work in a broad class of jobs. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i); e.g., Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) ([T]o be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be regarded as precluded from more than a particular job.). Instead, Pittari must show, in light of his expertise, background, and job expectations, he has suffered a significant reduction in meaningful employment opportunities due to his impairment. See Cooper v. Olin Corp., Winchester Div., 246 F.3d 1083, 1089 (8th Cir.2001). 22 Pittari failed to meet this burden. An impairment that disqualifies a person from only a narrow range of jobs is not considered a substantially limiting one. Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir.1995) (quotation omitted). Although American Eagle restricted Pittari from performing safety-sensitive duties, Pittari admitted he could have worked in other capacities with American Eagle. Pittari testified at trial he could have performed the role of a gate agent, ticket agent, or baggage handler, or could have performed other duties, such as directing passengers who needed assistance, or performing administrative or secretarial computer work. Such evidence refutes Pittari's assertion he suffered a significant reduction in meaningful employment opportunities. If American Eagle regarded Pittari as temporarily unable to perform one particular job, no violation of the ADA occurred. See Wenzel v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2005). 23 As an additional basis for overturning the jury's verdict, we find the evidence demonstrates American Eagle did not regard Pittari's impairment as substantially limiting. In determining whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity, we consider (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or anticipated duration, and (3) its actual or expected long-term impact. Samuels, 437 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted); see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii). Under the ADA, a temporary impairment with little or no long-term impact does not constitute a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii). Rather, [t]he impairment's impact must . . . be permanent or long term. Williams, 534 U.S. at 198, 122 S.Ct. 681. 24 Guided by these considerations, we note Pittari agreed Medical had legitimate concerns about Pittari's cognitive functions based upon the first MicroCog test results. Pittari understood his cognitive functions could be reevaluated if his medications or medical condition changed. Indeed, Medical allowed Pittari to take another MicroCog after Medical was notified Dr. McCollum had altered Pittari's medications. Pittari also recognized a successful neuropsychological exam would enable him to return to his flight attendant position. A review of Medical's documentation of Pittari's restriction indicates Medical deemed the restriction only temporary in nature. While Pittari disputes whether American Eagle or Medical ever explicitly informed him the restrictions were merely temporary, our review of the record convinces us American Eagle did not regard Pittari's impairment as more than a temporary condition. Pittari offers no evidence to the contrary. 25 Furthermore, we repeatedly have recognized the provision addressing perceived disabilities is intended to combat the effects of archaic attitudes, erroneous perceptions, and myths that work to the disadvantage of persons with or regarded as having disabilities. Breitkreutz, 450 F.3d at 784 (quoting Brunko v. Mercy Hosp., 260 F.3d 939, 942 (8th Cir.2001)); see, e.g., Wooten, 58 F.3d at 385 (citing Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, Fl. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279, 285, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987)). Restrictions based upon the recommendations of physicians are not based upon myths or stereotypes about the disabled and thus do not demonstrate a perception of disability. Breitkreutz, 450 F.3d at 784. In this case, the decision to temporarily restrict Pittari from safety-sensitive duties was based upon the results of two MicroCog screening tests and upon the recommendations of Dr. Moreault, the independent psychologist who interpreted Pittari's MicroCogs. 26 On the record before us, there is insufficient evidence to indicate American Eagle regarded Pittari as disabled in the major life activity of working. We therefore reverse the district court's denial of American Eagle's motion for judgment as a matter of law.