Opinion ID: 1060738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Privilege from Discovery

Text: We now consider whether the Peer Review Law grants the hospital a privilege barring discovery of the peer review process. The trial court initially allowed Eyring an opportunity to depose peer review participants for the limited purpose of discovering whether the committees acted in good faith and without malice and on the basis of facts reasonably known or reasonably believed to exist. However, the trial court eventually sustained Parkwest's objections that Eyring was not entitled to inquire about the deliberative process of the peer review committee, its conclusions, or about the basis or reasons for its conclusions. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court was correct in denying Eyring the ability to conduct discovery concerning the peer review process. Eyring argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant further discovery of the peer review committee members. Parkwest claims that such information is privileged under the Peer Review Law. We first examine the policy and language of the statute. The relevant portion of the Peer Review Law states the policy in Tennessee: that confidentiality is essential both to effective functioning of these peer review committees and to continued improvement in the care and treatment of patients. Id. § -219(a)(1). In order to promote this policy, the Peer Review Law states that: All information, interviews, incident or other reports, statements, memoranda or other data furnished to any committee ... and any findings, conclusions or recommendations resulting from the proceedings of such committee are declared to be privileged. The records and proceedings of any such committees are confidential ... and shall not be ... available for court subpoena or for discovery proceedings. ... The disclosure of confidential, privileged peer review committee information ... to the affected physician under review, does not constitute either a waiver of confidentiality or privilege. Id. at § -219(d) (emphasis added) (now codified at § -219(e)). This statute creates a broad privilege from disclosure for [a]ll information, interviews, incident or other reports, statements, memoranda or other data ... and any findings conclusions or recommendations resulting from the [committees'] proceedings. Id. In our view, this broad language encompasses any and all matters related to the peer review process itself. We reject Eyring's contention that the statute grants an implicit right to any information furnished to or resulting from the proceedings of the peer review committees. It appears, however, that the broad language extending the privilege from discovery must be reconciled with the statutory requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of producing evidence of malice and bad faith. We therefore agree with the trial court's ruling allowing Eyring to conduct discovery for the limited purpose of investigating the committee members' good faith, malice, and reasonable knowledge or belief, but prohibiting any inquiry into the peer review process itself. Cf. Alexander v. Memphis Individual Prac. Ass'n, 870 S.W.2d 278 (Tenn.1993). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was correct and that the broad language of the statute encompasses any and all matters related to the peer review process.