Opinion ID: 2518323
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: university texaco's motion to intervene

Text: ¶ 13 University Texaco moved for intervention as of right pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under rule 24(a), a court must allow a party to intervene if that party can establish that (1) its motion to intervene is timely, (2) the party has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, (3) the party's interest is or may be inadequately represented, and (4) the party is or may be bound by a judgment in the action. Moreno v. Bd. of Educ., 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1996) (internal quotations omitted); see Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a). Denials of intervention as of right under rule 24(a) are subject to de novo review on appeal. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 16, 1 P.3d 1074. ¶ 14 The district court denied University Texaco's motion to intervene on the ground that University Texaco did not meet three of the four requirements of rule 24(a). First, the district court held that University Texaco's motion to intervene was not timely, reasoning that University Texaco should have sought intervention before the district court issued its August 21, 2001 memorandum decision awarding the insurance proceeds to the Buchi survivors. The court also rejected University Texaco's claim that compelling circumstances justified its delay. Second, the district court held that University Texaco had failed to demonstrate any legitimate interest in the proceedings because there was no evidence that Buchi intended University Texaco to receive the insurance proceeds. Third, the district court held that, even if University Texaco had an interest in the proceeds, the existing parties to the litigation adequately represented that interest. On appeal, University Texaco challenges these holdings, asserting that it met all the requirements of rule 24(a). ¶ 15 We agree with the district court that University Texaco's motion to intervene was untimely. Our cases have treated postjudgment motions to intervene unfavorably, articulating a general rule that intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgment. Jenner v. Real Estate Servs., 659 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1983). We will make an exception only where an applicant for intervention makes a strong showing of entitlement and justification, or such unusual or compelling circumstances as will justify the failure to seek intervention earlier. Id. (footnotes omitted). ¶ 16 University Texaco argues that unusual or compelling circumstances exist in this case because, prior to Parduhn I, it could not have anticipated its potential equitable stake in the proceeds. It asserts that it became aware of its potential equitable interest only when we remanded the case to the district court for an equitable distribution in Parduhn I. ¶ 17 We are not persuaded. The possibility that University Texaco was entitled to an equitable interest in the proceeds under section 31A-21-104 did not first materialize when we handed down our decision in Parduhn I. Rather, that possibility was extant from the inception of this litigation. At any stage, University Texaco could have read the statute, realized that it provided the basis for an equitable distribution, and sought to intervene, arguingas Parduhn does nowthat Buchi's insurance policy was partnership property. Its failure to do so renders its motion to intervene untimely. ¶ 18 Having concluded that University Texaco's motion to intervene was untimely, we can affirm the district court's ruling on intervention without addressing the other requirements of rule 24(a). Moreover, because the district court properly denied University Texaco's motion to intervene, University Texaco lacks standing to challenge the propriety of the equitable distribution itself. Cf. State v. Sun Sur. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, ¶ 9 n. 1, 99 P.3d 818 (Rather than an independent direct appeal, the proper remedy for a non-party surety who seeks to appeal a bail bond forfeiture order is an extraordinary writ.). We therefore decline to address University Texaco's attacks on the equitable distribution and instead move to Parduhn's claims.