Opinion ID: 803168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alford Plea

Text: Dempsey also argues that the district court could not revoke his supervised release based on a charge to which he entered an Alford plea because the conditions of his release required that he refrain from “committing” an offense, not from being “convicted” of one. We disagree. 2 Decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit before the close of business on September 30, 1981 are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 5 A court may revoke a term of supervised release if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a term of his supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). A certified copy of a conviction is proper evidence that a defendant violated the terms of his supervised release by committing another criminal offense. See United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357, 363 (11th Cir. 1996). In Alford, the U.S. Supreme Court held that trial courts could accept a defendant’s guilty plea despite his protestation of innocence. 400 U.S. at 31-39. The trial court nonetheless must determine that there is a factual basis supporting the Alford plea. Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1140 (11th Cir. 1991); see also McKiernan v. State, 702 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ga. 2010) (noting that a defendant may enter an Alford plea where the defendant decides a guilty plea is in his best interests and the trial court inquires into the factual basis for the plea). Under Georgia law, an Alford plea is “a guilty plea and places the defendant in the same position as if there had been a trial and conviction by a jury.” Morrell v. State, 677 S.E.2d 771, 773 n.3 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). The crux of Dempsey’s argument is that he was innocent of the charges and thus did not “commit” a state offense under the terms of his supervised release. But revocation proceedings are “not the proper forum in which to attack a 6 conviction giving rise to the revocation.” Hofierka, 83 F.3d at 363. In any event, under Georgia law, an Alford plea is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea for purposes of collateral consequences. See. e.g. Morrell, 677 S.E.2d 773 n.3. Accordingly, because the district court considered a certified copy of Dempsey’s convictions, it properly revoked his supervised release. For the reasons stated, we affirm the revocation of Dempsey’s supervised release. AFFIRMED. 7