Opinion ID: 1407896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mitigating Factor Charge

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating circumstance provided in § 16-3-20(C)(b)(7): The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime. We disagree. In State v. Victor, 300 S.C. 220, 224, 387 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1989), we set forth the proper procedure for submission of statutory mitigating factors to the jury in the penalty phase of a capital case: Once the trial judge has made an initial determination of which statutory mitigating circumstances are supported by the evidence, the defendant shall be given an opportunity on the record: (1) to waive the submission of those he does not wish considered by the jury; and (2) to request any additional mitigating statutory circumstances supported by the evidence that he wishes submitted to the jury. Absent a request by counsel to charge a mitigating circumstance at trial, the issue of whether the mitigator should have been charged is not preserved for review. State v. Evans, 371 S.C. 27, 32, 637 S.E.2d 313, 315 (2006). In this case, after the trial court informed the parties that it would charge the mitigating factors in §§ 16-3-20(C)(b)(2) and (6), Appellant stated that he had no objection to the decision and did not request that the court charge any additional statutory mitigating factors. Moreover, after charging the jury, Appellant indicated he had no objection to the charge. Accordingly, this issue is not preserved for our review. Notwithstanding any preservation issues, we note that Appellant was not prejudiced by the absence of this statutory mitigating factor. Appellants mental condition was the focus of the guilt phase and was also a main issue in the penalty phase. The jury heard extensive expert testimony regarding Appellants alleged mental disorders, and the trial court charged the jury on two other mitigating factors through which they could consider Appellants mental condition. Thus, the jury was clearly aware that they could consider Appellants mentality in determining whether the death sentence was warranted. In spite of this evidence, the jury found the existence of five statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt and recommended Appellant be sentenced to death. Therefore, the absence of this statutory mitigating factor did not preclude the jury from considering Appellants mentality in the penalty phase, and there is no reasonable probability that had the trial court charged the jury on this additional mitigating factor, the jury would have returned a different recommendation. [3] See Jones v. State, 332 S.C. 329, 339, 504 S.E.2d 822, 827 (1998) (finding no prejudice by the absence of an additional statutory mitigating factor on mental state where the issue of defendants mental condition was clearly before the jury, the trial court charged several other mitigating factors relating to mental condition, and the jury found the existence of five aggravating factors).