Opinion ID: 2521453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does an Exception to the Warrant Requirement Apply to the Facts in This Case?

Text: A Terry investigative stop is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement under article I, section 7. State v. Acrey, 148 Wash.2d 738, 746-47, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Courts generally apply the less exacting Terry standard to define the constitutional limits of a police encounter during a traffic stop. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138. A Terry inquiry involves (1) whether the police `officer's action was justified at its inception' and (2) whether `it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 350, 979 P.2d 833 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). Here, there is no question that the officers' actions were justified at their inception because both vehicles were stopped legally. However, the scope of the officers' actions with the passengers in this case was not reasonably related to the circumstances that justified interference in the first place because Rankin and Staab were not the subjects of the traffic stops. As passengers, they were merely bystanders. Rather than applying a Terry analysis to this case, the majority applied Larson. I concur with the majority that Larson is the seminal Washington case that applies to these factual circumstances. Larson held that a stop based on a violation committed by a driver does not reasonably provide law enforcement with grounds to request identification from a passenger unless other circumstances give independent cause to question passengers. Larson, 93 Wash.2d at 642, 611 P.2d 771. The officer must stop short of asking for identification unless some other circumstance makes such action permissibly related to the stop or necessary for other reasons. Officers must be able to engage passengers in a vehicle in conversation as well as observe all the vehicle occupants to determine if criminal activity is occurring or the passengers have weapons in their possession that could pose a risk to the officer. In addition, the circumstances of the stop can change quickly and the officer must be able to respond to those circumstances. We recognize that officers have a difficult job; nevertheless, we must remember that Washington's Constitution grants broad privacy and personal autonomy rights to individuals. Officers must have good reason to infringe those rights by asking a person who is merely a passenger in a car for identification. Many circumstances that might be reasonably related to the original circumstances for the stop can justify an officer's request for a passenger's identification. For example, if a vehicle is stopped because a passenger or passengers are not wearing seatbelts, a request for the passenger's identification would be appropriate. Similarly, if an officer observed a passenger acting in a way that suggested involvement in criminal activity (using drugs, hiding something, or pulling out a weapon), the officer would be justified in asking for identification. If an officer felt his safety was at risk, he might need to know with whom he is interacting. However, none of these circumstances existed in this case. Neither Rankin nor Staab committed any traffic infractions. The officers in both cases testified that neither Rankin nor Stabb did anything suspicious during the stops. The officers were unaware of any criminal activity until they checked Rankin's and Staab's records after obtaining their identification. Both officers expressed no concern about their safety during the stops. Examples of other reasons that might justify an officer's request for identification are the need to obtain witnesses to an infraction, the need to know whether the driver of the vehicle is permissibly driving with another of suitable age and authority (i.e., minors), or the need to determine if anyone in the vehicle has a valid license to remove the vehicle from the premises. None of those circumstances existed in this case. I would, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals because of specific factual circumstances presented in this case. IRELAND, J. (dissenting). In this consolidated case, petitioners James Rankin and Kevin Staab contend that their right to privacy pursuant to Washington Constitution article I, section 7 was violated when, as passengers in vehicles that had been lawfully stopped, the officers in their respective cases asked them for identification in the absence of evidence that Rankin or Staab was engaged in criminal activity. I disagree with the majority that the passengers were seized and would find that the inquiry for identification, by itself, did not infringe on Staab's or Rankin's right to privacy because, under the totality of the circumstances in each case, a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer's request. I therefore dissent.