Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to move to exclude testimony of Beverly Son

Text: Defendant contends that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to exclude the testimony of Beverly Son, defendant's girlfriend at the time of the murder, on the basis that it was improperly induced by the police and was substantially more prejudicial than probative. Following Son's testimony, defense counsel acknowledged that they had intended but neglected to object to the admission of her testimony and to request a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 for the purpose of determining whether Son's testimony had been coerced by the police. The trial court, noting Son was not under subpoena to testify, indicated that a hearing to determine whether her testimony was coerced was unnecessary. Defendant bases his assertion of police intimidation upon Officer Baroni's interview with Son on July 18, 1988. The officer inquired whether defendant ever had taken Son to his apartment on 126th Street, and when she responded affirmatively, Baroni commented, That's kind of scary. When she asked why, Baroni responded that that was where defendant dropped the last body. When Son asked whether that had in fact happened, Baroni answered affirmatively. Baroni also asked whether defendant had said anything about hating women. Son responded that the officer was scaring her and asked that her address not be provided to defense counsel. [I]f the defendant seeks to exclude a third party's testimony on the ground the testimony is somehow coerced or involuntary, `[a]ny basis for excluding [the third party's] testimony must be found in a federal constitutional right personal to defendant.' [Citation.] Further, the basis of the claim must be that coercion has affected the third party's trial testimony.... [ถ] ... When a defendant seeks to exclude evidence on this ground, the defendant must allege that the trial testimony is coerced [citation], and that its admission will deprive him of a fair trial [citation]. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 344, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) Defendant asserts that by falsely informing Son that the prior murder victim had been dropped at defendant's apartment and making other comments suggesting that Son should be fearful, Officer Baroni induced the witness to testify at the trial, and thus to remember details not reported in an earlier interview she had furnished the police. The alleged police misconduct here is not of the type that would rise to the level of coercion. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th 330, 344, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877.) Defense counsel therefore did not render ineffective assistance in failing timely to seek a hearing to explore that allegation. In addition, the evidence was not otherwise subject to exclusion on the ground that it was substantially more prejudicial than probative. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1200-1201, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The trial court's discretion to exclude evidence pertaining to the circumstances of the present offense, pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, was more circumscribed at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase. ( Box, at pp. 1200-1201, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 349-350, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) The jury previously had found defendant present at, and guilty of, the shooting of Treto. Son merely testified that the next morning, defendant had arrived late, informing her that he had been at the location where a shooting had occurred but denying culpability. Finally, given the nature of Son's testimony, it is not reasonably probable that even had defense counsel successfully excluded her testimony, the outcome would have been more favorable to defendant. ( People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th 692, 728, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.) Defendant also contends that defense counsel's failure to obtain a reporter's transcript of the prior murder trial kept the defense from learning that Officer Baroni had misstated the location where the body had been dropped. Deputy Sheriff Kushner, however, testified to the actual location of the body, and therefore defense counsel could infer that a possible misstatement had been made by the officer at the interview, even in the absence of the reporter's transcript. Defendant further contends that defense counsel improperly acquiesced to the trial court's order that they contact Son through the police because she was fearful and did not want the defense to have her address. (ง 136.2.) Nothing in the record, however, establishes that the ruling actually prevented defense counsel from contacting the witness.