Opinion ID: 1298375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the return transportation statute

Text: Vail argues that the superior court erred in concluding that AS 23.10.380(a) requires Coffman to pay return transportation expenses only for Vail. Coffman contends that the superior court correctly interpreted the statute. The extent of an employer's statutory obligation to provide return transportation presents a question of law. Because the definition of return transportation does not require special agency knowledge or expertise, we will apply the independent judgment standard of review. See Matanuska-Susitna Borough v. Hammond, 726 P.2d 166, 175 (Alaska 1986); National Bank of Alaska v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 642 P.2d 811, 815 (Alaska 1982). Even under this standard, we may give some weight to a longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation of the statute. 642 P.2d at 815 n. 5. The interpretation of a statute begins with an examination of the language of the statute construed in light of its purpose. J & L Diversified Enter. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 736 P.2d 349, 351 (Alaska 1987). Public policy dictates that an employer must provide return transportation to an employee's place of recruitment upon termination of employment. AS 23.10.375. Accordingly, when an employee terminated for good cause makes a timely request, [a]n employer who furnishes, finances, agrees to furnish or finance, or in any way provides transportation for a person from the place of hire to a point inside or outside the state to employ the person shall provide the person with return transportation to the place of hire from which transportation was furnished or financed, or to a destination agreed upon by the parties... . AS 23.10.380(a). This statute is considered a part of every contract of hire involving transportation of an employee to and from this state. AS 23.10.390. It was enacted to provide a remedy for seasonal employees who might otherwise be stranded at remote job sites and become a burden on the economic resources of the state. Letter from Lew L. McFarren, Assistant Commissioner of Labor (Sept. 24, 1969). The Department argues that AS 23.10.380 is a remedial statute; therefore, it should be liberally construed. See State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 528 & n. 20 (Alaska 1980). However, we believe that the statute imposes on the employer a minimal obligation to provide return transportation to any employee it paid to relocate at the time of hire. This result serves the statutory purpose without subjecting employers to onerous and unbargained-for obligations to their former employees.