Opinion ID: 1822646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Assignment of Error G: Duty to Move for Trial Judge's Recusal

Text: Lotter assigns, restated, that the district court erred when it failed to grant an evidentiary hearing and vacate the convictions based on the Nebraska Supreme Court's creation and retroactive application of a duty to move for the trial judge's recusal because of ex parte communications, in violation of the right to proper notice of the law provisions of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and the decisions in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), and Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001), and their progeny. In Lotter's direct appeal, we did not reach the issue of whether the trial judge was required to recuse himself because Lotter did not request recusal. State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), modified on denial of rehearing 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999). Lotter claimed in the second ground of his operative postconviction motion that his constitutional rights were violated because our opinion creat[ed] a duty on the part of trial counsel to move for the trial judge's recusal ... when then existing statutory and case law imposed no such duty on a litigant or his counsel. The district court denied this postconviction claim without an evidentiary hearing. The basic premise of Lotter's claim that we created a new duty in his direct appeal is simply incorrect. The rule we applied in the direct appeal was clearly stated in at least two prior opinions involving the issue of recusal of a trial judge in a criminal case based upon ex parte communications with the prosecution. That rule, first articulated in State v. Barker, 227 Neb. at 847, 420 N.W.2d at 699, provides that a judge, who initiates or invites and receives an ex parte communication concerning a pending or impending proceeding, must recuse himself or herself from the proceedings when a litigant requests such recusal. (Emphasis supplied.) We reiterated this rule in State v. Jenson, 232 Neb. 403, 440 N.W.2d 686 (1989), holding that recusal was not required in that case because the record did not establish that an ex parte communication had taken place and that even if it had, the defendant made no request for recusal. With respect to the lack of a request, we cited the well-established principle that [o]ne cannot know of improper judicial conduct, gamble on a favorable result by remaining silent as to that conduct, and then complain that he or she guessed wrong and does not like the outcome. State v. Jenson, 232 Neb. at 405, 440 N.W.2d at 688. We cited and relied upon Barker and Jenson in Lotter's direct appeal and thus clearly did not create a new rule with constitutional implications. Moreover, as noted, the Barker rule does not confer a constitutional right in and of itself. State v. Ryan, 257 Neb. 635, 601 N.W.2d 473 (1999). In our supplemental opinion in Lotter's direct appeal, we specifically determined that Lotter's constitutional rights were not impaired by virtue of the fact that the trial judge did not recuse himself. State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999). For these reasons, this assignment of error is without merit.