Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion of Marsden Motion

Text: Defendants in capital cases often express dissatisfaction with their appointed counsel, affording us ample opportunity to address the contours of the rule set forth in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44. The rule is well settled. `When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 204, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would substantially impair the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Applying these standards here, we conclude the trial court acted well within its discretion by denying all three of defendant's Marsden motions. At the outset, we agree with defendant that, to the extent any part of the trial court's decision to deny the three Marsden motions was based on untimeliness, it erred. A criminal defendant is entitled to raise his or her dissatisfaction with counsel at any point in the trial when it becomes clear that the defendant's right to effective legal representation has been compromised by a deteriorating attorney-client relationship. Because the trial court heard defendant's complaints in connection with each of the three Marsden motions, however, any reliance on the purported untimeliness was harmless under any standard. Turning to the merits, we find no abuse of discretion. First, there was sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that defense counsel was providing adequate legal assistance. Responding to the first two Marsden motions, the trial court explicitly noted that counsel was doing an exemplary job, was a death penalty specialist, was doing an excellent job, and was a diligent advocate on defendant's behalf. Defendant argues these characterizations of counsel's skill and experience were incorrect, noting counsel did not make an opening statement at the guilt phase [10] and did not call any defense witnesses at the guilt phase. But these events had not yet occurred at the time of defendant's first two Marsden motions and thus were unknown to the trial court. More to the point, defense counsel had a difficult task at the guilt phase because the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. [11] Although defense counsel did not call any witnesses for the defense, he raised on cross-examination the possibility that defendant was intoxicated when he committed the crime and that the shooting was an accident. Second, the trial court acted within its discretion when it concluded the purported conflict between defendant and his lawyer was not `such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 204, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) As the record shows, defendant himself created the conflict. Defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel stemmed from counsel's failure to convince the district attorney to agree to a plea bargain sparing defendant's life and counsel's decision to contact defendant's family against his express wishes. These incidents, while evidently disquieting to defendant, do not rise to the level of a substantial impairment of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. To begin with, counsel actively sought a plea bargain to allow defendant to plead guilty in return for a sentence of life imprisonment, but was rebuffed by the district attorney's office. Moreover, counsel's decision to contact defendant's family over his express wishes was a tactical decision counsel was entitled to make. A defendant does not have the right to present a defense of his own choosing, but merely the right to an adequate and competent defense. [Citation.] Tactical disagreements between the defendant and his attorney do not by themselves constitute an `irreconcilable conflict.' `When a defendant chooses to be represented by professional counsel, that counsel is captain of the ship and can make all but a few fundamental decisions for the defendant.' ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 728-729, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) The mitigating evidence presented in defendant's defense at the penalty phase is an indication of the wisdom of counsel's tactical choice in this regard. Although defendant emphasizes that defense counsel himself several times asserted that he could not be an effective advocate, those assertions stemmed in part from defendant's refusal to speak to counsel. As we explained, ante, a criminal defendant cannot willfully refuse to cooperate with his appointed attorney, thereby possibly hampering his own defense, and then claim he is entitled to a new attorney because counsel has not been effective. The trial court reasonably deduced from the circumstances, including defendant's serial Marsden motions and his considered choice not to speak to counsel, that defendant was merely attempting to inject error and delay into the proceedings. Under the circumstances, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the three Marsden motions. We further find no Sixth Amendment violation and reject defendant's attempt to equate the denial of his Marsden motions with the outright denial of counsel.