Opinion ID: 161910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Deportation of Manuel Silva

Text: 5 The Caballeros contend that their indictment should be dismissed because the government deprived them of material exculpatory evidence when it deported Manuel Feliciano Silva in February 1999. 6 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that when a witness has been deported prior to a criminal trial, the defendant can demonstrate a denial of the right to due process and compulsory process if he makes a plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses. 458 U.S. at 873. Further, sanctions will be warranted for deportation of alien witnesses only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact. Id. at 873-74. To obtain an order dismissing their indictment, the Caballeros must show more than the mere potential for favorable testimony. United States v. Iribe-Perez, 129 F.3d 1167, 1173 (10th Cir. 1997). It is not enough that the Caballeros merely point to any conceivable benefit from Silva's testimony. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867. They must instead describe a benefit so great, its absence affected the outcome of the trial. 7 But the Caballeros only allege that by examining Silva, they could have shown jurors that Silva was a polished con artist with a long history of...swindling strangers...[and] duping and deceiving innocent business partners. Aplts. Reply Br. at 3. The Caballeros contend that a firsthand assessment of Silva's demeanor and character would have lead jurors to conclude that Silva was the criminal mastermind who duped the Caballeros into participating in his criminal schemes. Id. 8 Beyond this, the Caballeros offer no inkling of exonerating facts that Silva's testimony might have unearthed. Even assuming Silva made the unlikely decision not to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege and remain silent, nothing in his potential testimony as described would reduce the culpability of the Caballeros. We acknowledge the difficulty in describing would-be testimony of absent witnesses, but the required showing is not eliminated entirely just because the Caballeros lacked access to Silva. Though we do not require detailed descriptions of what has been lost, the Caballeros must still make a plausible showing that the lost testimony was material and favorable. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873. While the Caballeros suggest some vague benefit from Mr. Silva's presence on the stand, they offer no adequate explanation of how [Silva's] testimony would have been favorable and material. Id. at 872. 9 Even assuming arguendo that Silva's testimony would have supported the Caballeros' defense that they were Silva's unwitting dupes, the testimony would not have been material in light of the substantial evidence of the Caballeros' guilt, including the victim-witness accounts, self-incriminating statements, and business records that indicated their firsthand knowledge of the scope and nature of the criminal operation. 10 In addition to materiality, defendants must demonstrate governmental bad faith in order to obtain an order dismissing their indictment. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988); Iribe-Perez, 129 F.3d at 1173. The Caballeros' failure to show the materiality of Silva's lost testimony absolves us of examining the bad faith prong. Iribe-Perez, 129 F.3d at 1173. Nonetheless, a review of the entire record reveals no evidence that would even suggest bad faith.