Opinion ID: 2250034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Being Personally in Jeopardy

Text: In addition, the State contends that Stefan was not personally in jeopardy during the Village of Addison proceedings. Stefan counters that he was personally in jeopardy. We set forth the State's arguments first. The State asserts that only the corporation, L & S Industries, Inc., and not defendant personally, was a party to the ordinance violation actions. Rather, Stefan appeared only in his capacity as president of L & S Industries, Inc. Accordingly, the State argues, there is no double jeopardy bar to the State's action against Stefan in the instant case. The State's argument was raised in the appellate court but was not addressed by that court. The State asserts that the captions and wording of the documents in the Village of Addison actions show that the defendant was being named only in his capacity as a representative of the corporation and not personally. For instance, the State asserts that it was L & S Industries, Inc., which pleaded guilty to the ordinance violations and was fined in May 1984. In addition, it was L & S Industries, Inc., which, on February 13, 1985, entered into an agreed order regarding the second set of ordinance violation actions. The State contends that the agreed order does not operate to bar the State's later prosecutions because the agreed order is similar to a consent decree under which the parties merely recite the agreement they have reached. Further, because there was no trial in the instant case, jeopardy would attach only if the defendant entered a guilty plea, which Stefan did not do in the second set of ordinance violation actions. The State cites People v. McCutcheon (1977), 68 Ill.2d 101, 11 Ill.Dec. 278, 368 N.E.2d 886, in support of this last argument. Stefan first replies that McCutcheon is distinguishable from the instant case. Stefan asserts that McCutcheon holds that where the defendant entered a guilty plea which later was vacated, the defendant was not in jeopardy as to the charges and later could be prosecuted on the charges. Stefan also notes that Corbin involved an initial judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea. Stefan contends that a judgment entered after a guilty plea or stipulated finding of guilt are enforceable to the same extent as a judgment following a trial, and is binding for double jeopardy purposes. We agree. In McCutcheon, the court made a distinction between a guilty plea and a jury verdict for double jeopardy purposes within a certain context. The court stated that a finding of guilt by a trier of fact on a lesser charge is presumptively a finding of not guilty on the greater offense because the trier of fact had the opportunity to find the defendant guilty of the greater offense. However, where the defendant pleads guilty to the lesser offense, there is no verdict on the greater offense. ( McCutcheon, 68 Ill.2d at 105-06, 11 Ill.Dec. 278, 368 N.E.2d 886.) In the instant case, there is no assertion that Stefan pleaded guilty to a lesser offense than that charged in the ordinance violation actions and that now the State is charging him with the greater offense for which no verdict was rendered. Rather, Stefan was adjudged guilty and punished for the conduct charged in each of the Village of Addison complaints. We reject the State's argument regarding McCutcheon. Further, Stefan replies that he was personally at jeopardy in the ordinance prosecutions. Stefan asserts that the complaints themselves, in addition to the manner in which the Village of Addison sought to bring him before the court, show that Stefan himself was a defendant in those actions. Initially, Stefan notes that the ordinance violation complaints identify the defendant on the complaint form as L & S IndustriesMr. Larry Stefan, Pres. The second set of ordinance violation complaints and all but one of the first set of complaints also had a check mark in the box on each complaint form identifying defendant as a male. Further, a notice to appear directed to Larry Stefan was issued for each complaint in both sets of prosecutions. In addition, Stefan asserts that no summons was issued or served upon the corporation, L & S Industries, Inc., in the first set of ordinance violation actions. The only service was upon Larry Stefan individually, by a separate notice to appear issued for each of the complaints. In the second set of complaints, both the corporation and Larry Stefan individually were servedthe corporation via summons, and Larry Stefan by way of notices to appear. Further, Stefan points out that he was the only defendant properly served in the first set of ordinance cases; and no order was entered dismissing him from the action before the adjudication of guilt and imposition of fines. Further, the final order entered in the second set of ordinance violation actions explicitly names Lawrence Stefan, in addition to the corporation, as a party subject to the penalty imposed. The order states, in part, that L & S INDUSTRIES, INC., an Illinois Corporation or any successor organization, LAWRENCE J. STEFAN, individually and any other corporation or business entity which he may control or be a majority shareholder in, shall not hereafter engage in the business of metal plating within the confines of the Village of Addison, State of Illinois. We agree with Stefan that he was a party to the ordinance violation actions who was personally subjected to punishment as a result of the final orders in those actions. Accordingly, we hold that double jeopardy bars the State's prosecution on the basis that Stefan already was put in jeopardy for the same offense. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the appellate court and circuit court are reversed. Judgments reversed.