Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Riley's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Text: Riley asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had already attached when he was arrested during the early morning hours of September 9 because the government had filed a criminal complaint charging him with first-degree murder in order to obtain an arrest warrant on September 7. Relying on this assertion, Riley maintains that he should have been informed by the police that a lawyer had telephoned the police station on his behalf before the police made any further attempts to question him. These arguments fail because, under controlling Supreme Court precedent, Riley's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached when he was arrested on September 9. It has been settled law for thirty-five years that a person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against that person by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); accord, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984); United States v. Moore, 122 F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir.1997); see United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 18-19 (2d Cir.1976). Riley contends nevertheless, relying on D.C.Code § 23-113(c)(3) (2001), that as soon as an Assistant United States Attorney filed a complaint charging him with murder to obtain an arrest warrant on September 7, the government had committed itself to prosecuting him, and he was faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877. There is no denying that D.C.Code § 23-113(c)(3) does state that the prosecution of an individual commences with the filing of a complaint to obtain an arrest warrant. [11] However, obtaining an arrest warrant has never been deemed to be the point at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877; see Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 190, 104 S.Ct. 2292 (stating that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has never been held to attach at the time of arrest); Beck v. Bowersox, 362 F.3d 1095, 1102 (8th Cir.2004) (this court and other circuits have repeatedly held that the [Sixth Amendment right to counsel] does not attach with an arrest, [or] even an arrest preceded by the filing of a complaint); State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Mo.1985) (stating that an arrest warrant is not a formal charge as that term is used in Kirby ); see also Martinez v. United States, 566 A.2d 1049, 1051-1052 (D.C.1989) (grand jury indictment of the defendant was the first formal charge against him even though arrest warrants had previously been issued). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against [the defendant]. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (citations omitted). Though filing a complaint to obtain an arrest warrant involves criminal charges, these are not the same formal charges of which Kirby speaks. The phrase charged by the United States attorney has different meanings in different contexts. See Marrow v. United States, 592 A.2d 1042, 1046 n. 9 (D.C.1991). If this court were to hold that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when the government files a complaint to obtain an arrest warrant, we would be granting greater protection to persons arrested with warrants than without, thus discouraging the use of warrants in making arrests. Moore, 122 F.3d at 1156; see Duvall, 537 F.2d at 18-19. Moreover, holding that . . . the issuance of an arrest warrant is akin to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings would result in swinging the pendulum of criminal justice far too distant from society's interest in effective and meaningful criminal investigations. State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d at 160. Thus we conclude that the filing of a complaint containing a criminal charge in order to obtain an arrest warrant does not give rise to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. What matters is the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings  whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (emphasis added); accord, e.g., United States v. Rorie, 518 A.2d 409, 412-413 (D.C.1986) (citing Kirby ). Because no adversary judicial criminal proceedings were initiated against Riley until after September 9, no Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached on September 9, the date on which he was arrested. The police therefore had no obligation to inform Riley that they had received a telephone call on September 9 from someone claiming to be his attorney or to terminate their interrogation. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422-423, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (police are not required under the Sixth Amendment to inform a suspect of his attorney's efforts to reach him (citing, inter alia, Kirby and Gouveia )). The trial court was correct when it ruled that the police were not constitutionally required to suspend their interrogation of Riley when they received the call from Mr. O'Brien, or even to advise him of Mr. O'Brien's call. [12]