Opinion ID: 2448565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tolling of the Statute of Limitations by the Request for Mediation

Text: ¶ 30 Even though the statute of limitations was tolled due to Unruh's minority and her 90-day notice of intent to sue, she still needs the tolling provided by her request for mediation in order for her action to be timely. [10] Cacchiotti does not dispute that, as a general proposition, a request for mediation under RCW 7.70.110 tolls the statute of limitations for one year. He argues, however, that Unruh's request was defective because she served it on his insurance representative rather than on him personally. This argument requires us to interpret RCW 7.70.110 to decide whether a request for mediation can toll the statute of limitations when it is not served directly on the defendant. ¶ 31 In any question of statutory construction, we strive to ascertain the intention of the legislature by first examining a statute's plain meaning. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then we give effect to that meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Id. Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citing Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 9-12, 43 P.3d 4). ¶ 32 RCW 7.70.110 states in its entirety: The making of a written, good faith request for mediation of a dispute related to damages for injury occurring as a result of health care prior to filing a cause of action under this chapter shall toll the statute of limitations provided in RCW 4.16.350 for one year. Cacchiotti argues that it would be unreasonable to interpret RCW 7.70.110 to permit a request for mediation on anyone other than the defendant. Unruh counters that, because the statute does not specify to whom a request must be made, it is reasonable to interpret RCW 7.70.110 to allow a request on the defendant or the defendant's authorized agent. ¶ 33 The unstated but apparent purpose of RCW 7.70.110 is to facilitate settlement of disputes through mediation. Implicit in this purpose is the notion that the defendant receives notice of the request for mediation. Nothing in the plain language of the statute restricts the method of giving notice to personally serving a request for mediation on the prospective defendant. Cacchiotti's argument thus requires us to stray from settled principles of statutory construction and read into RCW 7.70.110 a limiting requirement that is not present. Cf. Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003) (noting that we will not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them). ¶ 34 We construe RCW 7.70.110 to toll the statute of limitations when a request for mediation is made on the defendant or the defendant's authorized agent. Under this interpretation, the defendant will receive notice that the plaintiff has requested mediation under RCW 7.70.110 and will have an opportunity to assent to the request. This reading of RCW 7.70.110 is also consistent with the procedural informality of the statute. Unlike its companion provision, former RCW 7.70.100, which outlined specific procedures for serving the 90-day notice of intent to sue, RCW 7.70.110 does not contain detailed service procedures. It requires only that the request for mediation be written and be made in good faith. RCW 7.70.110. ¶ 35 Cacchiotti contends that, even if a request served on a defendant's agent is proper under the statute, no agency relationship existed here. Whether an agency relationship exists is generally a question of fact for the jury. O'Brien v. Hafer, 122 Wash. App. 279, 281, 93 P.3d 930 (2004). But the record convinces us that Cacchiotti's insurance representative took responsibility for the defense of the suit from the very beginning. Unruh initially directed her correspondence to Cacchiotti by serving him with the 90-day notice of intent to sue under former RCW 7.70.100. Shortly after, Cacchiotti's insurance representative contacted Unruh's counsel purporting to act on Cacchiotti's behalf, and they began discussing resolution of the case. [11] Unruh's counsel followed up on their discussions by directing a letter to the representative and requesting mediation under RCW 7.70.110. The insurance representative then responded by letter stating, You have requested mediation based on RCW 7.70.100 and, therefore, we agree that the statute of limitations is tolled for one year by RCW 7.70.110. CP at 318 (emphasis added). The parties later agreed to a mediation date, but Cacchiotti ultimately decided not to mediate. ¶ 36 Unruh persuasively argues that the only reasonable conclusion, based on the course of correspondence and Cacchiotti's assent to the mediation, is that the insurance representative was acting as Cacchiotti's agent. Cacchiotti counters that authority to act as an agent cannot be inferred from the acts of the insurance representative alone. But, Cacchiotti's argument would essentially require Unruh to prove what only Cacchiotti knowswhether the agent who initially responded to Unruh's notice of intent to sue was actually representing Cacchiotti. We reject Cacchiotti's attempt to undermine the agency relationship between him and the insurer responsible for providing his defense. Unruh's request for mediation tolled the statute of limitations for one year, and her filing of the lawsuit in September 2007 was therefore timely. [12]