Opinion ID: 1743598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.

Text: ¶ 9. Spann argues that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to grant a mistrial during Ms. Su's testimony. The applicable standard of review for denial of a motion for mistrial is abuse of discretion. McGilberry v. State, 741 So.2d 894, 907 (Miss.1999). ¶ 10. Ms. Su, who speaks only broken English, testified with the aid of an interpreter. On direct examination by the State, while the State was attempting to lay a foundation to support an in-court identification of Spann by Ms. Su, Ms. Su, apparently in an emotional state, pointed at Spann. The court instructed the jury to leave the courtroom, at which time the State proffered the testimony of Ms. Su. During the proffer, Ms. Su again pointed in Spann's direction. Because Ms. Su was having difficulty describing the person to whom she was pointing, the trial judge allowed Ms. Su, outside the presence of the jury only, to walk over to Spann and point him out. The trial judge explained that he did not want Ms. Su to walk over to Spann in the presence of the jury, but stated that because the jury was out, if she identifies him to my satisfaction outside the presence of the jury, then I don't have any objection to her at the appropriate time pointing to the defendant and saying what he's got on if, in fact, she has identified him. The trial judge explained that, based upon Ms. Su's identification of Spann on proffer, he would allow her to identify Spann in open court, but told the prosecutor that Ms. Su was not to leave the witness stand and that she must not point to Spann until the prosecutor asked Ms. Su if she could identify Spann. The interpreter explained this to Ms. Su. At that time, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the request, and, upon the jury's return to the courtroom, issued a precautionary instruction: I'm going to instruct you at this particular time that any previous or prior gestures made by this witness, i.e. the same as pointing in any direction, should be totally disregarded by you as a jury and would be of no evidentiary value. The prosecutor then laid the appropriate foundation for Ms. Su's identification of Spann, following which the prosecutor asked Ms. Su whether she saw in the courtroom the man who shot her. Ms. Su then pointed Spann out and described his clothing. ¶ 11. Spann argues that the precautionary instruction was not enough to rectify the prejudicial nature of Ms. Su's testimony. Spann relies on Goggins v. State, 529 So.2d 649 (Miss.1988). In Goggins, a witness identified the defendant during a pretrial lineup. During the identification suppression hearing and outside the presence of the jury, the witness was permitted, over defense counsel's objection, to leave the stand to make a dramatic identification of the defendant. The trial judge permitted the witness to do the same in the presence of the jury. This Court held that the reenactment of the witness' original incourt identification of the defendant was cumulative and possibly prejudicial, requiring reversal. Id. at 654. ¶ 12. Goggins is not persuasive in the case at hand. As the State submits, the trial judge in Goggins overruled the objection to the witness' demonstration, and no admonishment was given by the trial judge. Furthermore, the witness in Goggins left the witness stand and walked over toward the defendant to make an dramatic identification. Though Ms. Su left the witness stand to do the same in the case at hand, she did so only outside the presence of the jury. Once the jury had returned and the trial judge had instructed the jury to disregard any prior gestures made by Ms. Su, Ms. Su made an admissible in-court identification of Spann by gesturing only at the appropriate time and without leaving her seat. Also, there was no prior identification by Ms. Su of Spann as the man who shot her. Thus, the incourt identification in the case at hand was not cumulative. ¶ 13. The State contends that the remedial measures taken by the trial judge in the case sub judice were sufficient to preclude any harm flowing from Ms. Su's initial gesturing. This Court has stated that where an objection is sustained and the jury is admonished to disregard the objectionable matter, absent unusual circumstances, this Court will find no error. Wright v. State, 540 So.2d 1, 4 (Miss.1989) (citing Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 810 (Miss.1987); May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 783 (Miss.1984); Herron v. State, 287 So.2d 759, 766 (Miss.1974)). The State submits that Ms. Su's spontaneous gesturing is analogous to the outburst analyzed in Crosswhite v. State, 732 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1998). Crosswhite was convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance. On appeal, Crosswhite argued that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a mistrial when a witness, who was on the stand to establish probable cause for the search warrant of the house, spontaneously stated she had used drugs with Crosswhite. As in the case at hand, the jury was instructed to disregard the comment. In analyzing the assignment of error, this Court stated: It is a common occurrence for witnesses to blurt out impermissible evidence while testifying. Lay witnesses are not generally acquainted with the rules of evidence which safeguard against unduly prejudicing the defendant. It is true that in cases where impermissible testimony has reached the ears of the jury, the trial judge has the option of granting a motion for a mistrial if the judge feels the testimony is so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial. However, this Court has repeatedly held the trial judge may remedy such situation by admonishing the jury to disregard the statement. Id. at 861 (citing Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452, 456 (Miss.1997) (This Court on numerous occasions has held that where the trial judge sustains an appellant's objection to the testimony of a witness and instructs the jury to disregard the same, prejudicial error does not result from that testimony.); McNeal v. State, 658 So.2d 1345, 1348 (Miss.1995) ([W]here an objection to such impermissible testimony is sustained and the jury is admonished by the trial court to disregard the statement, this Court has repeatedly held that refusal to grant a mistrial is proper.)). ¶ 14. The in-court identification in the case at hand was probative, and any prejudice caused by Ms. Su's initial gestures toward the defendant was cured by the judge's cautionary instruction. Spann's first assignment of error is without merit. II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED DENYING SPANN'S MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE A PEREMPTORY INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY REQUIRING THEM TO RETURN A VERDICT OF NOT GUILTY. ¶ 15. Spann's motion for directed verdict made at the end of the case for the prosecution, the request for a peremptory instruction at the end of all of the evidence, and, finally, his motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict all are procedural vehicles for challenging the sufficiency of the case for the prosecution. Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 807-08 n. 3 (Miss.1987). As this Court explained in Wetz, when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court properly should review the circuit court's ruling on the last occasion when the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged before the trial court. Id. at 808 n. 3. In this case, that was when the circuit court denied Spann's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thus, Spann's second and third assignments of error are here properly considered together. ¶ 16. In considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict, this Court will consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. at 808 (citing Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d 365, 370 (Miss.1986); Callahan v. State, 419 So.2d 165, 174 (Miss.1982); Sadler v. State, 407 So.2d 95, 97 (Miss.1981)). Credible evidence which is consistent with the guilty verdict must be accepted as true. Id. (citing Spikes v. State, 302 So.2d 250, 251 (Miss.1974)). The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Id. (citing Hammond v. State, 465 So.2d 1031, 1035 (Miss.1985); May v. State, 460 So.2d at 781; Glass v. State, 278 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss.1973)). Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. Id. (citing Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 758 (Miss.1984); Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980)). This Court may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Id. (citing Harveston v. State, 493 So.2d at 370; Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 17. The heart of Spann's attack on the jury's verdict is his claim that the prosecution failed to prove the underlying felony necessary to make the crime of murder a capital crime. The indictment originally charged Spann with the underlying crime of robbery in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-73 (Rev.1994). However, the indictment was later amended to reflect that the crime of robbery was committed in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-79 (Rev.1994). To be convicted of armed robbery in violation of § 97-3-79, one must feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon. (emphasis added). It is undisputed that there was no evidence that either Spann, Horne, or McLaurin actually removed property from Uncle Guy's Quick Stop. The argument lies in whether the State demonstrated that Spann, Horne, or McLaurin attempted to take property from the Quick Stop. ¶ 18. Spann contends that the State offered no evidence that the crime was an attempt to deprive the Quick Stop of property. This contention is erroneous. The State offered into evidence the statement given by Spann to the Hattiesburg Police in which Spann stated as follows: Q: Why did the three of you go to the store? A: We were going to get cigarettes, and Ba-Ba said that he was going to rob the store. Q: Who gave you the revolver that was used in the shooting? A: I got the gun from Ba-Ba while walking to the store. It is well settled in Mississippi that an attempt to commit a crime consists of three elements: (1) an intent to commit a particular crime; (2) a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission; and (3) the failure to consummate its commission. Greenwood v. State, 744 So.2d 767, 769 (Miss.1999) (citing Edwards v. State, 500 So.2d 967, 969 (Miss.1986); Bucklew v. State, 206 So.2d 200, 202 (Miss.1968)). Regarding Spann's intent to commit armed robbery, Spann stated in his confession to police that Horne told him he was going to rob the store. Spann then accepted a gun from Horne and participated in the crime. Regarding the overt act towards the commission of the crime, Spann and Horne entered the store with their faces masked and brandishing the weapons. ¶ 19. The State argues that Greenwood v. State, 744 So.2d 767 (Miss.1999), is similar to the case at hand. Greenwood was convicted of attempted armed robbery. On appeal, he argued that the evidence presented by the State did not support a conviction of attempted armed robbery. A witness for the State testified that Greenwood told him that he was thinking about robbing the victim. The witness also testified that Greenwood told him that he had planned to knock on the victim's door and hold a pistol to his head once he opened the door. Greenwood did not, however, go through with the plan to hold a gun to the victim's head, but instead asked the victim for gasoline when he opened the door. The State also introduced Greenwood's voluntary statement in which he admitted to shooting the victim through a window and throwing a rock through the door of the victim's house. The Court found that although Greenwood did not carry out the initial plan to hold the gun to the victim's head and rob him, his actions of shooting the victim and throwing the concrete block were clearly sufficient overt acts to support his conviction for attempted armed robbery. The Court noted that the jury was free to infer that the only reason no robbery was consummated was because the victim returned gunfire, causing Greenwood and his cohorts to flee. ¶ 20. In the case at hand, the State introduced Spann's confession that on the way to the store, Horne stated that he intended to rob the store. Spann accepted the revolver from Horne, masked his face, and walked into the store wielding the revolver. As in Greenwood, though Spann, Horne, and McLaurin did not carry out the initial plan to rob the Quick Stop, their actions of entering the store with weapons, faces masked, and shooting Son and Ms. Su were clearly sufficient overt acts to support the underlying felony of armed robbery. The jury was free to infer that the plan to commit the robbery broke down when Ms. Su recognized Spann and Horne, despite their masked faces. The State also presented the testimony of Bud Witherspoon that Spann, Horne, and McLaurin fled the store as Witherspoon approached. As in Greenwood, the jury was also free to infer that the only reason no robbery was consummated was that Witherspoon entered the parking lot, causing Spann and his cohorts to flee. Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, it cannot be said that reasonable and fair minded jurors could not find that Spann had attempted to commit the underlying felony of armed robbery.