Opinion ID: 581194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 3 The federal appellees have pointed out a potential defect in our subject matter jurisdiction over this case. The federal appellees note that Clark County, in response to the trustees complaint in the district court, pled both counterclaims and cross-claims. Clark County sought (1) general, special, and punitive damages, (2) nullification of the trustees' claimed interest, (3) indemnification, and (4) attorneys' fees and costs of suit. 4 The district court issued an order on February 21, 1991, which stated the January 14, 1991 summary judgment order applies to all defendants in the above-entitled action. The federal appellees argue the summary judgment order, despite the February 21, 1991 order applying the analysis to all parties, is not final because it did not resolve the counterclaims or cross-claims. A decision is final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Arizona State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir.1991) (quotations omitted). Naturally, a judgment is not final if it leaves active claims unresolved. See Sierra Club v. Dept. of Transp., 948 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir.1991) (summary judgment only partially disposed of claims and was not appealable until Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) was complied with); Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A., 721 F.2d 660, 662 (9th Cir.1983) (judgment did not consider two claims which remained live, therefore the summary judgment was not final). 5 Contrary to Clark County's assertion, the counterclaims and crossclaims were not moot but were ripe for decision. Clark County would not be entitled to damages for vexatious litigation or interference with property until it was determined that the trustees asserted homestead interest was invalid. Clark County's entitlement to damages was not addressed in the district court's summary judgment orders. Because the summary judgment order did not conclusively terminate the litigation on all issues, it merely constituted a partial summary judgment. The district court did not certify the partial summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Without certification, the order would ordinarily be unreviewable. 6 We nonetheless conclude we have jurisdiction to hear the trustees' appeal. A partially dispositive order may be treated as final when that portion of the case that remained in the district court has subsequently been terminated. Uniol, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 809 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987). We have previously noted the lack of finality can be avoided by simply dismissing [the] remaining claim and defenses without the option to pursue them should this court reverse. Cheng v. Commissioner, 878 F.2d 306, 311 (9th Cir.1989). 7 Although we have previously dismissed appeals where the order is not final, we choose in this case to follow the approach of the Second Circuit. In Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 794 F.2d 835, 837 (2d Cir.1986), the court allowed a counterclaim to be withdrawn in the district court after oral argument in the case, thereby terminating the non-final issues. 8 At oral argument, Clark County manifested a willingness to dismiss the claims in the district court. 1 We twice deferred submission of the case to facilitate this action. We have received notification that Clark County has dismissed the claims that remained active in the district court. The exception to finality for subsequent termination of non-final claims is therefore applicable. We now have jurisdiction to determine the substantive aspects of this case.