Opinion ID: 805822
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Ownership

Text: The Copyright Act provides that copyright protection extends to the individual who actually created the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (Copyright in a work . . . vests initially in the author or authors of the work.). To show ownership of a true copyright, a plaintiff must prove that the work as a whole is original and that the plaintiff complied with applicable statutory formalities. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995); see also T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber Works, -12- Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 108 (1st Cir. 2006) (the claimant bears the burden of proving a valid copyright and its infringement). It is generally accepted that a certificate of copyright registration constitutes prima facie evidence of copyrightability and shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate why the copyright is not valid. Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation mark omitted). The Monastery has met its prima facie burden of establishing ownership of the copyrights to all the Works, as it holds a certificate of registration issued by the U.S. Copyright Office for each religious text.8 See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Situation Mgmt. Sys., 560 F.3d at 58 (stating certificates of copyright are prima facie evidence of [a plaintiff's] ownership of valid copyright interests in its works). Thus, it now falls to the Archbishop to carry the burden of establishing the invalidity of the Monastery's copyrights. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813; CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1513 (1st Cir. 8 According to the record, the St. Isaac, Psalter, Prayer Book, and Horologion Works were registered with the U.S. Copyright Office as published works within approximately five years of their first publication dates. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Brown v. Latin Am. Music Co., 498 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating a registration within five years of first publication is accompanied by a presumption of validity of the copyright). As previously noted, the remaining works, the Pentecostarion, Dismissal Hymns, and Octoechos, were registered with the U.S. Copyright Office as unpublished works. -13- 1996). Although the Archbishop sets forth several arguments challenging the Monastery's ownership of the copyrights, he fails to so bear his evidentiary burden. We address each of his ownership challenges in turn.
The cornerstone of the Archbishop's argument is that the Monastery's works are in fact owned by a third party, ROCOR. The Archbishop argues that the Monastery was once a part of ROCOR and its secession in 1986 had the effect of transferring its copyrights in the Works to ROCOR. There are two ways under governing law by which a transfer of copyright may be effectuated. The first manner is by an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, [that] is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The Archbishop does not allege, nor does the record reveal, any writing or instrument by the Monastery showing such an intent to transfer ownership of the Works' copyrights to ROCOR or another entity. Because there is no signed writing or instrument establishing a transfer of copyright to ROCOR, we turn to the second means of copyright transfer, i.e., by operation of law, with the governing law in this case being the Monastic Statutes for Monasteries of ROCOR (the Monastic States) and the Regulations of ROCOR (the Regulations). -14- The Archbishop rests the yoke of his persuasive burden on this latter means of copyright transfer. Specifically, he contends a transfer by operation of law occurred here because, pursuant to the Monastic Statutes (to which all member monasteries must agree on joining ROCOR) the Monastery expressly accepted that if it ever ceased to be a ROCOR monastery, all of its property would transfer to ROCOR. The Archbishop cites to the following language from the Monastic Statutes for support: The articles of incorporation of the monastery, convent or community must make it clear that it will always be in the jurisdiction of the Synod of Bishops of [ROCOR] and that, in case of its closing or liquidation, its possessions will be handed over to the diocese subject to the Synod of Bishops of [ROCOR], or directly to the Synod of Bishops. (Emphasis added.) The Archbishop's argument leads us into a desert of case law on the issue of copyright transfers by operation of law. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2005) ([T]he Copyright Act does not define the phrase 'by operation of law,' and sparse case law addresses the transfer of copyright by operation of law.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Valdez v. Laffey Assocs., No. 07-CV-4566 (BMC)(LB), 2010 WL 1221404, at  (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (noting sparsity of case law on transfer of copyright ownership by operation of law); Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same). Indeed, -15- not even the Copyright Act defines what constitutes a transfer by operation of law. See Taylor, 403 F.3d at 963. The few cases addressing this question generally concern a transfer by operation of state law, with the transfers at issue typically arising from a corporate merger or dissolution, bankruptcy, foreclosure, and the like. See id. at 963-64; Valdez, 2010 WL 1221404, at . Such cases also focus on whether the author of the transfer provided express or implied consent to such change of ownership. Taylor, 403 F.3d at 963; Brooks, 781 F. Supp. at 205 (stating transfers of copyrights by operation of law . . . depend upon circumstances which establish the author's express or implied consent); see also Time, Inc. v. Kastner, 972 F. Supp. 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, a transfer by operation of law is a voluntary transfer done on the part of the copyright owner to another. See Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (D. Md. 2006) ([T]ransfers by operation of law are expressly limited to voluntary transfers, except in bankruptcy proceedings.). The Archbishop's argument differs from the few cases that address transfers of copyright ownership by operation of law. To begin with, the underlying law which the Archbishop asks us to interpret and apply -- ROCOR's Monastic Statutes and Regulations -- contrasts with the aforementioned cases in which state law predominantly served as the guiding light. -16- Generally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that where parties seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts[,] there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church et al., 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (If civil courts undertake to resolve [church property litigation disputes triggering religious doctrine and practice] . . . the hazards are ever present . . . of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.). Against this concern must be weighed the obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). The Supreme Court often has echoed that civil courts may resolve church property disputes, so long as [such resolution] involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith. Id. (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)). Where such resolution is possible, the Supreme Court has advocated a neutral principles of law approach, developed for use in all property disputes. Presbyterian Church, -17- 393 U.S. at 449; see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368-70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). A review of the record confirms that we may apply the Monastic Statutes' plain terms without treading upon religious doctrine, church governance, and ecclesiastical laws -- territory that the Supreme Court has made clear lies beyond our civil court jurisdiction. The specific section of the Monastic Statutes that the Archbishop asks us to apply provides in part: The articles of incorporation of the monastery [here, appellee] . . . must make it clear that it will always be [under ROCOR] jurisdiction . . . and that, in case of its closing or liquidation, its possessions will be handed over to the diocese . . . . Neutrally applying this plain language, we conclude that the Archbishop's position as to ROCOR's ownership holds little water. We first examine the Monastic Statute language to which the Archbishop expressly directs us. We split the statutory language in two and turn first to its requirement that a monastery's articles of incorporation clearly state ROCOR jurisdiction.
Monastery's Articles of Incorporation Expressly Affirm ROCOR Jurisdiction An examination of the Monastery's various articles of incorporation and by-laws9 does not show language to the effect 9 Most of the copies of the Monastery's by-laws and articles of incorporation in the record do not contain a date, making it -18- that, from the date of its spiritual affiliation onward, the Monastery would permanently be under ROCOR jurisdiction or that it agreed to have its property continually fall under ROCOR's dominion and control. In fact, a review of all such articles and by-laws reveals no reference whatsoever to ROCOR or to the entities' ecclesiastical affiliation. The same holds true for a review of the certificates of registration (dating from 1986, the year the Monastery ceased its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR, on through 1997) for each of the respective Works. Each certificate expressly lists under Name of Author, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, with no mention of or reference to ROCOR. The absence of a clear or implicit agreement on the Monastery's part (whether in its articles of incorporation, by-laws, the Works' certificates of registration, or otherwise) to be permanently bound by ROCOR statutory law or to relinquish title in its property to ROCOR does not constitute the type of express or implied consent to transfer copyright ownership that courts have held sufficient to support the finding of a transfer by operation of law. Valdez, 2010 WL 1221404, at ; see also Taylor, 403 F.3d at 963.
Closing or Liquidation, the Monastery's Possessions Cede to ROCOR unclear as to how recent or old the various versions are and where they fall in relation to the period of the Monastery's spiritual affiliation with ROCOR. -19- The Archbishop argues that when the Monastery ceased commemorating the bishops of ROCOR, this act constituted a closing or liquidation under the statutes, and thus, all of the Monastery's ownership claims and property interests were transferred to ROCOR. The Archbishop likens the Monastery's termination of ecclesiastical affiliation to a corporate dissolution, merger, bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or the like, the latter of which courts have held may indicate a transfer of copyright by operation of law. Cf. Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding transfer of copyright by operation of law where corporation merged into another, leaving one surviving company that then transferred copyright to subsidiary); U.S. Home Corp. v. R.A. Kot Homes, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (D. Minn. 2008) (similar); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (concluding copyright transfer occurred where assets from dissolving corporation were transferred to sole shareholder). In contrast to these cases -- and even more telling, in contrast to the specific language of the statute -- the Monastery here continued to exist after it terminated its commemoration of the ROCOR bishops; it did not close, liquidate, dissolve, merge into another religious institution, or otherwise discontinue its existence. Instead, it continued to operate as it had prior to its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR, as an independent monastery. The -20- express terms of the Monastic Statutes are clear: in case of [a monastery's] closing or liquidation, its possessions will be handed over to the diocese (emphasis added). Because the Monastery never closed, liquidated, or otherwise ceased its existence, no such hand[ing] over of its possessions to ROCOR could have taken place, unless it authorized otherwise. And as we have explained, we find no such authorization or agreement in the record.
Monastic Statutes Lastly, immediately preceding the statutory language referenced and discussed above, the statute states that [t]he possessions of a monastery, convent or community are its property and registered in its name, which is why each monastery, convent and community must take steps to become incorporated as an entity (emphasis added). Reading this language, it seems clear that a monastery, on joining ROCOR, remains the owner of its possessions unless and until it becomes incorporated as an entity of ROCOR. Stated differently, if a monastery never so incorporates itself as dictated by the Monastic Statutes, its possessions will remain under the monastery's domain. Notably, a review of the record reveals no such incorporation on the part of the Monastery. The most the evidence shows is that the Monastery was founded in 1960 independently of ROCOR -- i.e., not at the order or request of ROCOR -- and incorporated in Massachusetts as a non-profit corporation on -21- January 12, 1961, before its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR. In 1965, the Monastery commenced its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR, but the only act it seems to have taken reflecting such an affiliation (the Archbishop pointing us to no contradictory evidence) is acceptance of an antimension,10 which the Monastery returned when it discontinued its affiliation with ROCOR. We are far from being authorities as to the weight the giving of an antimension to another religious body might hold under church law and offer no ruminations on the matter. But a review of the evidence reveals no other act or document confirming that the Monastery reincorporated itself under ROCOR law. The giving of a consecrated cloth does not, under civil law, ring of the type of alteration in corporate structure that a transfer in authority over the Monastery's possessions may properly be deemed to have occurred. In sum, with no evidence in the record showing a transfer of copyright ownership by operation of law, we hold that the Monastery, and not ROCOR, holds title to the copyrights at issue in this dispute.
The Archbishop casts his next lot and contends that certain of the Monastery's Works became a part of the public domain 10 The Monastery defines an antimension as a cloth signed by a bishop that is kept on an altar table to indicate that the bishop has consecrated the cloth to be served on as an altar. -22- because they were published without copyright notice prior to 1989. There were three paths under the common law pursuant to which a work could be exposed to the public or enter the public domain: (1) exhibition or performance of the work; (2) limited publication; and (3) general publication. Burke v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 598 F.2d 688, 691 (1st Cir. 1979). Only one such path, however, would extinguish the creator's copyright in a work; the road to such loss was general publication. Id.; see Brown, 498 F.3d at 23. For the most part, the Copyright Act of 1976 abolished the common law of copyright, but even under the 1976 Act, general publication without notice could cause a work to enter the public domain if the copyright owner failed to register the work within five years of the date of first publication. Brown, 498 F.3d at 23; see also Charles Garnier, Paris v. Andin Int'l, Inc., 36 F.3d 1214, 1224 (1st Cir. 1994). The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 transformed this legal landscape, and notice is no longer mandatory for works published after that Act's March 1, 1989 effective date. See Pub. L. No. 100-568, sec. 7, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 2583, 2857 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 401(a)); Garnier, 36 F.3d at 1219. But the Berne Act does not apply to works published before 1989, so a work published without proper notice prior to 1989 would still become part of the public domain if the copyright owner failed to cure the defective notice in time. Id. at 1224-26. -23- On appeal, the Archbishop does not clarify whether his position is that all of the disputed Works passed into the public domain or that only some did. Moreover, he does not clarify which of the three copyright regimes -- the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act, or the Berne Act -- apply to which works. Regardless, under all three regimes, lack of proper notice definitely would not render the Works part of the public domain if there had been no general publication of the Works. Because the Archbishop has not established that general publication without notice has ever occurred for any of the disputed Works, we may reject his publicdomain claim without having to untangle the web of statutory regimes. A general publication is when a work is made available to members of the public at large without regard to who they are or what they propose to do with it. Burke, 598 F.2d at 691. That is, a general publication consists of such a level of circulation within the public sphere that a work may be deemed dedicated to the public and rendered common property. Id. Conversely, a limited publication occurs when tangible copies of the work are distributed, but to a limited class of persons and for a limited purpose. Id. at 692. The Archbishop's brief arguments on appeal do little to show such a dispersal of the Works that they could be deemed to have entered the public domain. At most, the Archbishop contends -24- that the Monastery allowed the disputed Works to pass into the public domain and provided the court with evidence of the same, and therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment against him. The evidence to which the Archbishop directs our attention, however, does not show the wide distribution typically associated with a general publication; instead, it simply shows the Archbishop's unsupported assertions that translations of certain Works were disseminated into the public, with a vague reference to the fact that certain Works were sent to people for use in their churches. The Monastery does not contest this latter proposition. In fact, it concedes it authorized St. Nectarios Press to distribute booklets –- composed of in-progress translations of certain of the Works at issue on appeal expressly attributing copyright ownership to the Monastery –- to certain parishes for their use and editorial critiques. Any such promulgation though, according to the Monastery, was restricted and should be deemed a limited publication not requiring such notice. We agree. Delivery of these booklets to selected religious congregations for the circumscribed purpose of literary feedback rings more of a limited publication (distribution to a limited class of persons and for a limited purpose) – than of a general publication (distribution to the public at large without regard to who they are or what they propose to do with [the -25- work]). Burke, 598 F.2d at 691; see also Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584, 593 (8th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between a general publication and a limited publication). The Archbishop directs us to nothing more than his own unsubstantiated contentions that certain Works were passed around in the public sphere for decades without notice. Even accepting this statement as true, we face the reality that not just any publication of the Works without notice will insert them into the public realm; instead, any such injection must be authorized by the copyright holder, i.e., the one effectively relinquishing its copyright. Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer, 92 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 1996) (A finding of forfeiture of copyright protection cannot be based on an unauthorized distribution of the work without notice because the notice requirement applies only to copies of works published 'by authority of the copyright owner,' pursuant to § 401(a).); see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 401(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2577 (amended 1988) (Whenever a work protected under this title is published in the United States or elsewhere by authority of the copyright owner, a notice of copyright as provided by this section shall be placed on all publicly distributed copies . . . . (emphasis added)); Cipes v. Mikasa, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 2d 371, 374-75 (D. Mass. 2004); Zito v. Steeplechase Films, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. -26- 2003) (citing 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 4:04 at 4-22 to 4-23 (2002)) (hereinafter 1 Nimmer). Here, the only copyright holder that could have authorized such publication without notice is the Monastery. We find no evidence of such authorization in the record, nor does the Archbishop direct us to any material showing to the contrary.11 Because any authorized publication of the Works that took place was only to a select group (specific religious congregations) for a particular purpose (editorial feedback), only a limited publication took place. Thus, the Monastery did not lose its copyright ownership via a general publication. If any copies of the Works were circulated outside the targeted circle of parishes, it was unauthorized and did not affect the Monastery's ownership.
The Archbishop next asserts that the Works here were not original, and therefore, not copyrightable.12 See Johnson v. 11 The Monastery points to the Archbishop's undeveloped references to booklets lacking a copyright notice during the course of this dispute, but which he contended supported the conclusion of a publication without notice. The Monastery counters the Archbishop's argument with a sworn affidavit from the publisher of St. Nectarios Press stating that the versions the Archbishop references are inaccurate copies of those actually distributed to the public. Such evidence falls far short of supporting the conclusion that the Monastery authorized publication without notice of the underlying Works and relinquished its copyright. 12 The Archbishop brings additional challenges to the Works' originality. Because these arguments better fall into the analytical category of whether copying of the Works occurred, we turn to these points infra. -27- Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (to establish ownership of a valid copyright, a plaintiff must show that the work, viewed as a whole, is original); Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813 (showing ownership of a true copyright requires that a plaintiff prove that the work as a whole is original). Principally, the Archbishop alleges that the underlying Works are derivative of other works, that is, they are merely a commixture of various ancient religious works that had previously been translated into English, with the Monastery making only minor edits, insignificant changes, or negligible additions or subtractions to the translations it relied upon. To bolster this argument, the Archbishop proffers affidavits from a colleague, Bishop John.13 The Bishop's sworn statements compare various texts to the Works and claim that the former texts clearly demonstrate the duplicative nature of the latter. Thus, so the Archbishop postulates, because the Monastery's translations are nothing more than a nearly identical, cobbling together of already translated religious texts, the Monastery cannot claim copyrights to the contested Works. The Monastery retorts that its translations are both unique and entitled to copyright protection, citing to the Copyright Act's express acknowledgment of the copyrightability of 13 According to his sworn affidavit, Bishop John is a hierarch in the Genuine Orthodox Church of America, who was ordained to the holy priesthood by Metropolitan Valentine, First Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church and [f]or more than 20 years . . . ha[s] been a student of Orthodox Christianity. -28- derivative works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103. Moreover, it notes that courts repeatedly have recognized the validity of copyrights to works that the Monastery claims are comparative to those at issue here. See, e.g., Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (recognizing copyrightability of translations of religious texts). The Copyright Act provides that [c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. 102(a). Assessing whether a work is original is a matter of law. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 34 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001). Courts assessing the applicability of the Copyright Act's protections to allegedly unique works frequently note that the originality bar is set quite low. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 ([T]he requisite level of creativity [required to show originality] is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark . . . .); Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 430 (4th Cir. 2010) (Establishing originality implicates only a light burden.). The Copyright Act makes clear that translations may be original and copyrightable, despite being derivative of another product. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation . . . .); id. § 103 (The subject matter of copyright -29- as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works . . . .) (emphasis added). The originality standard for such derivative works is, as set forth above, far from a high one. Specifically, courts have held there is a 'minimal,' 'low threshold,' Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 824 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980)), that is modest at best, Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1970), for establishing the originality of a compilation or derivative work. With this framework in mind, we have two responses to the Archbishop's argument that the Monastery's Works cannot be original or copyrightable because they are composed of an amalgamation of different English translations of religious texts. First, the law does not support the Archbishop's argument that such a derivative work or compilation cannot be copyrightable. Courts consistently have held that such works may be copyrighted provided that there is originality in [the works'] arrangement or selection. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 438 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1984) (The mere fact that component parts of a collective work are neither original to the plaintiff nor copyrightable by the plaintiff does not preclude a determination that the combination of such component parts as a separate entity -30- is both original and copyrightable. (citing 1 Nimmer §§ 3.02, 3.03)). Indeed, in a case that is at least comparable to the Archbishop's framing of the Monastery's Works, the Seventh Circuit held that flashcards containing standard, publicly-known mathematical equations and their solutions were protected under copyright law because the arrangement, the plan and the manner in which [the equations and answers] were put together by the author, does constitute originality. Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1963); see also M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 439 (citing examples of copyrightable compilations and noting that [i]n each case the copyright depended on the fact that the compiler made a contribution - a new arrangement or presentation of facts - and not on the amount of time the work consumed).14 Thus, even if the Monastery's translations of the religious texts may be deemed nothing more than a blend of various pre-existing English versions, this, in and of itself, does not make the Monastery's gathering of such texts automatically unoriginal. Second, the record does not support the Archbishop's argument. The only evidence the Archbishop offers to show a lack of originality in the Works are Bishop John's affidavits, stating the Works contain insignificant changes or negligible additions or subtractions to other sources he has examined, assessed, and 14 Even Bishop John concedes that the Monastery has expended some effort in their copyrighted work. -31- compared to the Works.15 However, the Monastery examined the same sources the Bishop attested to having compared with the Works. The Monastery created a detailed comparison in which it placed its translations along-side those materials cited by Bishop John, as well as the Archbishop's translations, effectively demonstrating notable differences between the Bishop's referenced texts and the Monastery's (and nearly identical similarities between the Archbishop's translations and the Monastery's). Although the comparison shows certain similarities between the Monastery's Works and those referenced by the Bishop, the differences in the same reflect a creativity in the Monastery's word usage, structure, and overall translation. Cf. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (stating [o]riginality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying). It is well-accepted that [o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. Id. at 345 (citing 1 Nimmer §§ 2.01[A],[B]). The evidence in the record satisfies us that the Monastery has cleared the extremely low 15 Bishop John's affidavits do not go into great detail as to the methodology he utilized to analyze the translations of the Archbishop's and Monastery's works, its comparison of the latter to other translations, or the process behind the selection of these other texts. -32- creativity bar. Id. We therefore affirm the district court's determination that the Monastery's Works were original and thus copyrightable. Having concluded our traversal of the ownership prong of a copyright infringement claim, we proceed to the second prong of our analysis, i.e., whether copying of the Works occurred. Situation Mgmt. Sys., 560 F.3d at 58.