Opinion ID: 557798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims of Ethnic Discrimination

Text: 61 Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part, that all persons shall have ... the full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. Section 1982 provides that [a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. Id. Sec. 1982. Section 1982 applies to official action of t[he] kind that would prevent [non-whites] from exercising the same property rights as whites ...[,] that depreciated the value of property owned by [non-white] citizens ...[, or] hampered [non-whites] in the use of their property. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123, 101 S.Ct. 1584, 1598, 67 L.Ed.2d 769 (1981). Both Secs. 1981 and 1982 and equal protection concepts protect against discrimination on the basis not only of race, but also of ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2028, 95 L.Ed.2d 582 (1987) (Sec. 1981); see also Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188 (2d Cir.1987) (same); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-79, 74 S.Ct. 667, 669-71, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954) (equal protection); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 107 S.Ct. 2019, 95 L.Ed.2d 594 (1987) (Sec. 1982). 62 Assuming that these provisions forbid selection of search targets on the basis of the ethnicity of their owners, see, e.g., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237, 90 S.Ct. 400, 404, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969) (Sec. 1982 should not be given unduly narrow construction in light of the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by Sec. 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 ... from which Sec. 1982 was derived); Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1027-30 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3122, 57 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1978) (Sec. 1981 prohibits racially-motivated seizures and searches), we nonetheless conclude that the district court properly summarily dismissed plaintiffs' claims that the searches of their homes were the product of racial or ethnic discrimination. These claims require proof of intentional discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (Equal Protection Clause); General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-91, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3145-50, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (Sec. 1981); Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Association, 685 F.2d 184, 187-89 (7th Cir.1982) (Sec. 1982), and plaintiffs did not come forward with sufficient facts from which ethnic animus might be inferred. 63 Plaintiffs contend that their claim of ethnic discrimination is supported by the fact that the only targets of the searches at 143 Bruce, an integrated building, were persons with Hispanic surnames, and they assert in this Court that every Hispanic-surnamed resident was so targeted. They did not, however, submit support for the latter proposition. The affidavit of their attorney stated only that it may be that every Hispanic-surnamed resident of the building was so targeted. To avoid summary judgment, it was incumbent on plaintiffs to come forward with more than merely the speculation of their attorney. The fact that plaintiffs' discovery requests were stayed with respect to government witnesses does not excuse this failure, for the stay did not prevent them from pursuing information through informal routes or from persons other than the defendants. Information as to the building's demographics was hardly exclusively in the possession of the law enforcement agents. For example, plaintiffs noted that their own names appeared on their mailboxes in the building's lobby; they could have examined the other mailboxes and informed the court, if it were true, that no other Hispanic-sounding names appeared. As it stands, however, the record contains no factual support for plaintiffs' contention. 64 Plaintiffs' allegations of ethnic slurs during the searches were also insufficient to fend off summary judgment. Even acknowledging the sincerity of Arce's and the Mendezes' subjective responses to the officers' queries about financial resources and roaches, these questions, either standing alone or in the context of the record as a whole, did not provide evidence of ethnic animus on the part of the officers.