Opinion ID: 466301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: district court's granting of directed verdict in fdic's favor

Text: 14 The primary difficulty encountered by this Court stems from the district court's granting a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff FDIC before the defendant SIC had rested its case. The FDIC had not moved for a directed verdict, and even if the FDIC had done so at the close of its own evidence, granting such a verdict would not have been proper here. A motion for a directed verdict is generally made only after the close of the evidence offered by an opponent. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) (emphasis added). 6 Here, the district judge entered a directed verdict in favor of the plaintiff FDIC, with only a motion of defendant SIC before the court; instead, it granted the directed verdict for the plaintiff FDIC during--but before the close of--defendant SIC's evidence. However, it is generally the defendant's motion for directed verdict [which] may be made at the end of plaintiff's opening statement, at the end of plaintiff's case, and by either or both parties at the close of the entire case. 6 Moore's Federal Practice p 56.02, at 56-43 (comparing motion for directed verdict to motion for summary judgment). Moreover, even where the motion is made at these procedural instances, granting the motion is proper only  '[i]f the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict....'  Thornton v. Gulf Fleet Marine Corp., 752 F.2d 1074, 1076 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.1969) (en banc)). 15 Under the facts of the instant case, the district judge's action was an improper sua sponte entry of judgment in favor of the FDIC. See Panotex Pipe Line Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 457 F.2d 1279, 1283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845, 93 S.Ct. 48, 34 L.Ed.2d 86 (1972) (directed verdict in defendant's favor during defendant's presentation of issue not error where there is nothing of record to support any denigration of procedural due process or the essence of a fair trial). While it is within the power of the trial court to direct a verdict at any point in the trial where it is apparent that there is a complete absence of any question to send to the jury, the Court has noted that this power must nonetheless be exercised with great restraint in order to avoid the possibility that a party will be precluded from presenting facts which make out a question for the jury. United States v. Vahlco Corp., 720 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir.1983). While this Court has affirmed a directed verdict against a defendant at the close of plaintiff's evidence, where it was clear that a party's defenses are inadequate, this Court has sounded a note of caution in doing so. Where there is any doubt at all as to the propriety of a directed verdict, district courts should not jump the gun but should wait until both sides have presented their evidence before ruling on motions for directed verdict. Id. Reflecting this same concern, the First Circuit has noted, It is ... clear that neither in the rules nor in the case law is there any basis for rendering a directed verdict against a defendant before he has had a chance to present evidence. Gonzalez v. La Concorde Compagnie D'Assurances, 601 F.2d 606, 608 (1st Cir.1979). This is particularly true where a defendant attempts to introduce legally admissible evidence. See id. & n. 4. 16 The FDIC asserts that any procedural error was harmless and that entry of judgment in its favor was proper since it was entitled to judgment under its federal statutory protections, see 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e), 7 or its federal common law protections. See, e.g., D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 62 S.Ct. 676, 86 L.Ed. 956 (1942). Given the limited record on this appeal, however, this Court does not have a sufficient record to determine whether section 1823(e) should be extended to preclude SIC's defense that Clara Jones was not authorized to sign the bond in question. Cf. FDIC v. Blue Rock Shopping Center, 766 F.2d 744, 754 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that section 1823(e) directed at side agreements between bank and obligor). Further, SIC's proffered evidence would have been at least relevant in showing that the FDIC took the Whitlock note with notice of SIC's defense. 8 Nor can we say that SIC waived any opportunity to present such evidence since this Court's careful reading of the trial court record inevitably leads to the conclusion that SIC was not given a fair opportunity to do so. See Panotex Pipe Line Co., 457 F.2d at 1283. This Court does not wish to encourage the extension of useless trials. However, the district court judge's summary disposition was improper here. The district court's allowance of proffered summaries of the evidence inhabits this Court's review of whether a directed verdict was proper. Given this error, the judgment in this respect must be vacated and remanded to the district court. 17 The Court emphasizes that no opinion as to the merits of this cause is stated. The Court does not decide the applicability of 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1823(e) to the facts presented here, nor does the Court decide the creation or application of principles of federal common law. These questions are reserved to the trial court in the first instance. 9