Opinion ID: 6107541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Invocation in the Car

Text: Defendant argues that even if he reinitiated conversations with the officers at San Quentin, he once again invoked his right to counsel during the drive, making any subsequent waiver at the station involuntary under Edwards . He cites the following exchange: Defendant: Can I ask you a question? Dudek: Sure. Defendant: They'll assign me a PD, right?  Dudek: Right. Defendant: I can sit down and talk to my PD first, then talk with you all? Dudek: Yeah. Defendant: Can I do that? Dudek: Yeah. I mean, that's one of your options and that's why we're here, you know. Defendant: That's, I would, I would (unintelligible). Although the transcript prepared for the suppression hearing identifies the relevant portion of the tape as unintelligible, defendant now argues on appeal that he actually said, I would  feel more comfortable . The claim was forfeited. Defense counsel did not advance this interpretation of the tape during the suppression hearing or ask Chicoine about it. Nor did she secure a finding of fact from the trial court regarding this portion of the tape, or argue that it amounted to a second invocation of counsel. For his part, the Attorney General states that, because of the poor quality of the tape recording, he cannot determine whether defendant actually said he would  feel more comfortable . We have independently reviewed the tape recording and did not make out the words feel more comfortable. Because the theory was never litigated and the relevant facts are subject to dispute, it is not properly raised for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , 602, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345 , 51 P.3d 224 .) Even overlooking forfeiture and assuming, as defendant asserts, that he said he would feel more comfortable if he spoke to a public defender first, the comment did not amount to a clear assertion of the right to counsel under our high court's precedent. ( Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452 , 460, 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 ( Davis ).) The applicability  of the ' rigid prophylactic rule' of Edwards requires courts to 'determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.'  ( Id . at p. 458, 114 S.Ct. 2350 .) Ambiguous or equivocal references to an attorney do not require cessation of questioning. ( Id . at pp. 458-459, 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350 .) As the high court has emphasized, we are unwilling to create a third layer of prophylaxis [beyond the holdings in Miranda and Edwards ] to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the suspect actually requests  an attorney, questioning may continue. ( Id . at p. 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350 .) Defendant's first reference to an attorney was phrased in equivocal language. He asked Dudek, I can sit down and talk to my PD first, then talk  with you all? and, Can I do that? Similar statements have been found not to be a clear request for counsel's assistance. ( Davis, supra , 512 U.S. at pp. 455, 462, 114 S.Ct. 2350 [ 'Maybe I should talk to a lawyer' ] ; People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082 , 1105, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 723 , 240 P.3d 204 [ 'I think it'd probably be a good idea for me to get an attorney' ]; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514 , 535, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 108 P.3d 182 [ 'I think it's about time for me to stop talking' ].) When Dudek affirmed that was one of defendant's options, defendant then allegedly said, That's, I would, I would [feel more comfortable]. Although this statement was not framed in the form of a question, it was also not a clear invocation of the right to an attorney. Most people would feel more comfortable with a lawyer present during interrogation. But that reality does not establish the converse: that defendant was unwilling to speak without counsel's assistance. In some respects, this statement is similar to that statement in People v. Sauceda-Contreras (2012) 55 Cal.4th 203 , 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 282 P.3d 279 . There, defendant was given his Miranda rights and asked if he would like to speak with the detective. Defendant said:  'If you can bring me a lawyer, that way I[,] I with who ... that way I can tell you everything that I know and everything that I need to tell you and someone to represent me.'  ( Id . at p. 216, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 282 P.3d 279 .) We held that because defendant's reference to an attorney was conditional, ambiguous, and equivocal, a cessation of questioning was not required. ( Id . at p. 219, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 282 P.3d 279 ; see also Delashmit v. State (Miss. 2008) 991 So.2d 1215 , 1219, 1221 [defendant's statement,  'I prefer a lawyer'  was ambiguous].) A similar conclusion follows here, though in Sauceda-Contreras and Delashmit the officers asked follow-up questions. ( Sauceda-Contreras , at pp. 216, 219-220, 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 282 P.3d 279 ; Delashmit , at pp. 1219-1221.) That did not happen here, at least in the car. But clarification, while advisable, is not required. ( Davis, supra , 512 U.S. at pp. 461-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350 .) [W]e decline to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. ( Id . at p. 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 .) Further clarification was ultimately sought by both the officers and the district attorney once defendant arrived at the police station and was formally Mirandized . Because defendant reinitiated conversation with the officers at San Quentin, and did not clearly invoke his right to counsel en route to the station, the officers were permitted to resume their questioning of defendant about the McKenna homicide. ( Edwards , supra , 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880 .)