Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Jury Selection Issues

Text: One of the prospective jurors was a retired law enforcement officer with substantial experience in homicide cases who had testified in court over a thousand times. At one point in the voir dire, he expressed the opinion that the death penalty was too seldom [used] due to legal obstructions. Later the defense challenged the juror for cause. The court initially denied the motion but agreed to ask follow-up questions regarding the juror's ability to be fair. The court then asked the juror if he could be fair to both sides. The juror responded, To be perfectly honest, your honor, I think it would be unfair to the defense based on my knowledge of how these trials are conducted. After a few more questions, the court conducted the rest of the questioning of this juror outside the hearing of the rest of the prospective jurors. Eventually, the court excused the juror for cause pursuant to stipulation. Cleveland argues that the prospective juror's statements that the death penalty was too seldom used due to legal obstruction, and that he would be unfair to the defense based on his knowledge of how these trials were conducted, tainted the entire venire. The issue is not cognizable on appeal because defendants did not ask the court to dismiss the venire or even admonish the jury. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 743-744, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Defendants cannot proceed with the jury selection before this same panel without objection, gamble on an acquittal, then, after they are convicted, claim for the first time the panel was tainted. (See People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093; People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048.) We also find no error. Many prospective jurors express many different general opinions regarding the judicial system. These expressions of opinion do not taint the jury. The comments here did not give the other prospective jurors information specific to the case, but just exposed them to one person's opinion about the judicial system. (Cf. Mach v. Stewart (9th Cir.1997) 137 F.3d 630.) The circumstance that this particular opinion came from a retired peace officer with experience in homicide cases and trial proceedings does not change matters. It would no more prejudice a jury panel to hear that a retired (or active) peace officer believes the system is tilted in favor of defendants than to hear a criminal defense attorney express the opposite view. To the extent defendants argue the court should have held voir dire out of the hearing of the rest of the panel, the issue is not cognizable because they did not so request at trial. Moreover, the court had discretion to proceed as it did. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) The court did conduct the remainder of the questioning of this prospective juror out of the hearing of the panel. Veasley also suggests the court should have reinforced the concept of the presumption of innocence. As he recognizes, defendants did not so request. Moreover, earlier in the voir dire of this same prospective juror, the court did just this. Defendants also assert that the prospective juror's statements implicated their right of confrontation. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) However, the prospective juror was not a witness against them. They also assert the prospective juror's comment about the death penalty's being too seldom used improperly reduced the jurors' sense of responsibility. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.) It did not do so. Again, the statement was just one person's opinion, not a judicial pronouncement or even a comment by the prosecutor. (Cf. People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 743-744, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Veasley challenges other aspects of the jury selection. At the time this jury was selected, the trial court bore primary responsibility to conduct voir dire. (Code Civ. Proc., former § 223; see People v. Johnson, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1328, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1178, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) Veasley faults the way in which it carried out this responsibility. He claims the court improperly examin[ed] the venire members for the purpose of rehabilitation rather than to disclose bias and prejudice. At trial, defendants objected on essentially this basis and asked the court to confront the [prospective juror] with what he or she has said [in the jury questionnaire], ask them to explain that. We find no error. Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 was adapted from federal practice. ( People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1309, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 676.) Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court are especially persuasive in this area. They have made clear that the conduct of voir dire is an art, not a science, so `[t]here is no single way to voir dire a juror.' ( People v. Taylor, supra, at p. 1313, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 676, quoting Mu'Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 451, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (dis. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) The Constitution ... does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, quoted in People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1179, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) The high court has stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and in other areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias. ( Mu'Min v. Virginia, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899 [trial court is not required to ask content-based questions regarding pretrial publicity]; see also People v. Taylor, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 676.) Accordingly, the trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions should be asked on voir dire,  and `content' questions, even ones that might be helpful, are not constitutionally required. ( Mu'Min v. Virginia, supra, at pp. 424, 425, 111 S.Ct. 1899.) To be an abuse of discretion, the trial court's failure to ask questions must render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. ( Id. at pp. 425-426, 111 S.Ct. 1899.) Such discretion is abused `if the questioning is not reasonably sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality.' ( People v. Box, supra, at p. 1179, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) We have examined the voir dire, including the court's questioning of five prospective jurors that Veasley specifically challenges, and find no abuse of discretion. The court did sometimes ask follow-up questions at defense request, such as the questions that elicited the response from the retired peace officer discussed above. As to the five specific prospective jurors, either the defendants requested no follow-up questions or the court did ask such questions. Four of the five were excused, either peremptorily or for cause. The court asked the remaining juror to state her feelings regarding the death penalty in terms of whether it's used too often or not often enough. This question was certainly designed to disclose bias rather than to rehabilitate. The jury selection of this case was far from fundamentally unfair. Some of the jurors expressed the view that the death penalty was not actually carried out very often. In response to one such comment, the court noted that some of the jurors had distinguished between the jury finding the death penalty is appropriate and the death penalty actually being applied. It explained that the jury must assume that if it comes back with a death verdict, that sentence would be imposed. In other words, the court explained, a juror can't simply say to themselves, well we can come back with the death penalty because it will never happen. You can't do that. Outside the presence of the jury, defendants expressed concern about the general feeling of some prospective jurors that the death penalty is rarely carried out. One of the defense attorneys said that just because the death penalty has not been imposed in the past, he did not want the jurors going into this proceeding thinking that it isn't going to be used. The court agreed to further admonish the jury. It asked what the defense proposed because this is a touchy area and I want to make sure that we have an agreement as to what should be said to the jury. Counsel wanted the court to state that it strongly believe[s] that the imposition of death sentences will commence. As a result of this discussion, the court explained to the jury panel that anything the court had said should not in any way be construed that I believe the death penalty will not be imposed.... The expectation, the assumption that you need to operate from, and it's the only reasonable assumption you can make, is that if the jury at the penalty phase, if we get to the penalty phase, determines that the appropriate sentence should be the death penalty, the assumption is that it will be imposed. The jurors indicated they understood. Veasley claims this admonition inadequately advised the jury panel that any death judgment returned in the penalty phase would be carried out, and hence it improperly led the jury to believe[ ] that the ultimate responsibility for determining the suitability of the defendant for execution rests elsewhere. (See Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 847, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) He distinguishes between the term imposed and the term carried out and asserts that when the court told the jury to assume the death penalty would be imposed, the jury would understand the court to refer only to death being the sentence, not to its being carried out. However, when the court asked defense counsel exactly what instruction they wanted, even they asked the court to tell the jury to assume the death penalty would be imposed. Defendants did not ask for further clarification and hence cannot complain on appeal of the court's doing what they requested. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 743-744, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) In any event, the instruction was fully adequate. The jury would clearly understand that the court was telling it to assume the death penalty would be imposed in the sense of actually being carried out, not just imposed in the sense of it being the sentence. This was the whole point of the explanation. The jury panel never expressed concern that if it returned a verdict of death, the court would impose some other sentence. Its concern was solely directed to whether a death sentence would actually be carried out. In context, no reasonable juror would believe the court was just telling it to assume the death sentence would be imposed but not necessarily carried out. Finally, Veasley claims the court improperly instructed the jury panel regarding the burden of proof. The court told the jury that the burden of proof in a criminal case is beyond a reasonable doubt and not the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of a civil trial. Later, outside the jury's presence, defense counsel expressed concern that the court did not also mention the concept of lingering doubt. The court invited them to submit an instruction on lingering doubt but they did not do so. Veasley now claims that the court should also have told the jury about lingering doubt. We disagree. The prosecution burden of proving guilt in a death penalty trial is the same as in any criminal trial  beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 846, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Although a jury may consider lingering doubt as to guilt in its penalty decision, the court need not so instruct. ( People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 903-904, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 77-78, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) Contrary to Veasley's implication, the court here never suggested that the jury should disregard lingering doubt in its penalty determination. It merely made sure the jury understood that the reasonable doubt standard applied rather than preponderance of the evidence.