Opinion ID: 778253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the ADA to Parole Decisions

Text: 22 The district court determined that the ADA does not apply to parole decisions because it does not extend to the substantive decision making process in the criminal law context. We find no basis for concluding that Title II of the ADA contains such a broad exception. 23 Although the power to fashion and enforce criminal laws is reserved primarily to the States, many functions traditionally reserved to the states are subject to the ADA, including quarantine laws and, significantly, prison administration. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1024-25 (9th Cir.1997) [hereinafter Armstrong I ]. The Supreme Court recently affirmed our holding that the ADA applies to prisons in Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998). Nonetheless, Defendants argue that the courts have applied the ADA only to logistical matters of prison administration, including access to parole hearings, but not to substantive decision-making processes. See Armstrong I, 124 F.3d at 1025, and Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir.2001) [hereinafter Armstrong II ] (collectively holding that the ADA requires reasonable accommodations to give disabled prisoners access to parole hearings). We are not convinced that a per se rule immunizing the States' substantive decision-making processes is consistent with the language of the ADA as interpreted in case law and agency law. 24 First, case law indicates that the ADA applies in contexts that involve substantive criminal law decisions. For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that the ADA applies to arrests, which involve substantive decision making. Gohier v. Enright, 186 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir.1999) ([A] broad rule categorically excluding arrests from the scope of Title II ... is not the law.). Likewise, the EEOC guidelines state that, under the ADA regulations, law enforcement is obligated to modify policies that result in discriminatory arrests or abuse of individuals with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A § 35.130 (2000). 25 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit, in Rosen v. Montgomery County Maryland, has indicated that arrests do not come within the ADA's ambit. 121 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.1997). However, the Rosen decision was not based upon a concern that the ADA would impermissibly interfere with the substantive decisions involved in arrests. Rather, reasoning that the statutory text implied voluntariness on the part of the individual, it held that an arrest was not a program or activity of the defendant County. Id. at 157-58. This reasoning has now been discredited by the Supreme Court. Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 211, 118 S.Ct. 1952 ([T]he words [of § 12132] do not connote voluntariness.). 26 The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the question of whether the ADA applies to arrests. However, the weight of authority on the applicability of the ADA to arrests suggests that a state's substantive decision-making processes in the criminal law context are not immune from the anti-discrimination guarantees of federal statutory law. 27 Another flaw in the district court's reasoning is its failure to recognize that state powers in the parole context are already curtailed by federal anti-discrimination guarantees. For example, circuit courts have long held that parole boards may not exclude an inmate from consideration for parole based on race. See, e.g., White v. Bond, 720 F.2d 1002, 1003 (8th Cir.1983); Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868, 870 (10th Cir.1981). Although these cases of racial discrimination were based directly on constitutional violations while this case is based on a violation of the ADA, Congress passed the ADA to enforce similar constitutional promises of equal protection. This court has noted: If a prison may not exclude blacks from the prison dining hall and force them to eat in their cells, and if Congress thinks that discriminating against a blind person is like discriminating against a black person, the prison may not exclude the blind person from the dining hall unless allowing him access would unduly burden prison administration. 28 Armstrong I, 124 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir.1997)). Concluding that Congress did in fact liken disability discrimination to racial discrimination, we held that the ADA applies to state correctional systems. Id. 29 The same holds true in the parole context: since a parole board may not categorically exclude African-Americans from consideration for parole because of their race, and since Congress thinks that discriminating against a disabled person is like discriminating against an African-American, the parole board may not categorically exclude a class of disabled people from consideration for parole because of their disabilities. 4 The fact that considering a prisoner for parole is a substantive, criminal law decision does not license the decision-maker to discriminate on impermissible grounds. 30 Finally, the plain language of the ADA extends its anti-discrimination guarantees to the parole context. Title II of the ADA provides: 31 Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 32 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Like state prisons, state parole boards fall squarely within the statutory definition of `public entity,' which includes `any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.' Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954-55 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)). 33 Plaintiffs contend that the Board has denied them the benefit of full and fair consideration for parole by reason of their disability. We have found that prison programs or activities include such things as parole and disciplinary hearings. See Armstrong I, 124 F.3d at 1024, and Armstrong II, 275 F.3d at 856 (collectively making clear that parole proceedings are programs or activities within the meaning of the ADA); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir.1996) (holding the same with respect to prison disciplinary hearings); Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 562 (9th Cir.1988) (same). In addition, we have interpreted Title II's programs and activities to include `all of the operations of' a qualifying local government. Bay Area Addiction Research and Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch, 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir.1999). In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the legislative history of the ADA strongly suggests that § 12132 should not be construed to allow the creation of spheres in which public entities may discriminate on the basis of an individual's disability. Id. Indeed, we found that Congress specifically rejected an approach that could have left room for exceptions to § 12132's prohibition on discrimination by public entities. Id. at 732. Given the breadth of the statute's language, parole proceedings constitute an activity of a public entity that falls within the ADA's reach. IV.