Opinion ID: 468829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: collateral attack on the predicate felony conviction

Text: 11 Engesser next argues that his 1980 state conviction for criminal mischief is invalid and thus cannot serve as the predicate felony for a federal felon-in-possession-of-firearms conviction under Sec. 1202(a)(1). He collaterally attacks the 1980 predicate felony on the ground that he did not knowingly or intelligently enter his guilty plea or waive his right to counsel in the 1980 state court proceeding. Whether one may collaterally attack a predicate felony conviction in order to assert a defense to a charge of violating the federal firearms laws is a question of law. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 63-65, 100 S.Ct. 915, 919-21, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). Questions of law are subject to de novo review. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). 12 Generally, a defendant may not collaterally attack the validity of his predicate felony conviction in defense of a federal charge of being in possession of a firearm. Lewis, 455 U.S. at 67; see United States v. Nicholas-Armenta, 763 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.1985). In Lewis, the Supreme Court stated that 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1) is a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent [of Congress] to require the Government to prove the validity of the predicate conviction. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 63, 100 S.Ct. at 920. Lewis overruled the law in this circuit regarding the permissibility of collaterally attacking the validity of predicate convictions. See generally United States v. Goodheim, 651 F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir.1981). Prior to Lewis, it was the law in this circuit that an invalid state conviction could not support a federal firearms conviction, and collateral attack of the invalid conviction was permitted in the course of the federal firearms prosecution. Id. at 1298. Thus, Lewis enlarged the scope of criminal liability under 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1). 13 Engesser contends he should be permitted to collaterally attack his 1980 predicate felony conviction notwithstanding Lewis because he entered his guilty plea to the predicate felony in January 1980 and the Supreme Court did not issue its decision in Lewis until February 27, 1980. 14 In Goodheim, we held that due process requires fair warning that particular conduct was criminal and that any judicial enlargement of the scope of criminal liability as a result of Lewis would be applied prospectively only. Id. at 1297-98. We stated that the criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred. Id. at 1298 (emphasis added) quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1703, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964). We thus refused to apply Lewis retroactively to a defendant who had no notice of the subsequently revised judicial view of the federal firearms statutes at the time he purchased the firearms. Goodheim, 651 F.2d at 1298. 15 In the present case, Engesser's conduct of possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1) occurred in August 1984 when he aimed a loaded shotgun at two Montana police officers. Lewis was decided in 1980, over four years before Engesser's conduct which led to his subsequent federal firearms conviction. Therefore, Lewis applies in this case and Engesser is precluded from collaterally attacking the 1980 predicate felony. 1 III. STATE EXPUNCTION LAW 16 Engesser finally argues that his 1980 state criminal mischief conviction cannot serve as the predicate felony for a firearms conviction under 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1) because (a) prior to the 1984 shotgun incident, he had served his sentence for the 1980 conviction and had been restored all civil rights under state law, including the right to bear arms, and (b) the restoration of his civil rights under state law had been equivalent to a pardon. 17 Article II, Section 28 of the Montana Constitution provides that [f]ull rights are restored by termination of state supervision for any offense against the state. The state constitution also provides that Montana citizens shall have the right to bear arms. Mont. Const. art. II, Sec. 12. The restoration of Engesser's civil rights under Montana law, however, did not preclude the federal government from regulating his possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. See United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir.1979). Congress did not intend that the federal firearms statutes would be applied in a patchwork fashion with enforcement dependent on the law of the state in which the predicate conviction occurred. Id. at 537. A state expunction law such as that contained within the quoted portions of the Montana Constitution can determine the status for the purposes of state law, [but] it [can]not 'rewrite history' for the purposes of 'the administration of the federal criminal law or the interpretation of federal criminal statutes.'  Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 980-81 (9th Cir.1978) quoting United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 887 (9th Cir.1975) (Sneed, J., concurring in result); see also Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 114-15, 103 S.Ct. 986, 992-93, 74 L.Ed.2d 845 (1983) (enforcement of federal firearms statutes is not subject to the vagaries of different state expunction laws); United States v. McCroskey, 681 F.2d 1152, 1153 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (state expungement does not affect defendant's status under Sec. 1202(a)(1), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1019, 103 S.Ct. 383, 74 L.Ed.2d 515 (1982). 18 Engesser's contention that the state's expunction of his 1980 felony conviction constituted a pardon, and therefore that his possession of the shotgun was lawful under 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1203, is also without merit. While Sec. 1203 provides that the federal firearms statute Engesser was convicted of violating shall not apply to any person who has been pardoned by the President of the United States or the chief executive of a state and who has been expressly authorized by the President or such chief executive to possess a firearm, neither the President of the United States nor the chief executive of any state has granted Engesser a pardon for the 1980 predicate felony conviction. Furthermore, a state's expunction of a conviction alone does not satisfy the pardon exception of 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1203. United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir.1982); Bergeman, 592 F.2d at 537 n. 11.