Opinion ID: 2099674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Scope of Pleadings

Text: The appellants' first two assignments of error, although distinct, both involve examination of Trieweiler's operative petition against Campagna. The appellants first assign that the district court erred in permitting Trieweiler to present evidence of excess revenues when he pled specific acts of misappropriation. The appellants claim that Trieweiler pled specific acts of misappropriation from Varsity Investments by Campagna, but failed to prove those allegations, and instead only presented evidence of missing corporate revenue. The essence of the appellants' argument is that Trieweiler's evidence did not conform to, or support, the allegations made in his pleadings. [15,16] The appellants correctly identify the controlling proposition of law, that a party will not be permitted to plead one cause of action and upon trial rely upon proof establishing another. Abdullah v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 246 Neb. 109, 517 N.W.2d 108 (1994). Proof must correspond with the allegations in the pleadings, and relief cannot be granted upon proof of a cause substantially different from the case made in the pleadings. Id. However, the appellants' argument is premised upon a misrepresentation of Trieweiler's petition. In his operative amended petition, Trieweiler alleged that corporate funds were misappropriated and/or wasted by [Campagna] or by employees of the Corporation due to [Campagna's] mismanagement, and/or monies of the Corporation were excessively and unfairly paid, awarded or distributed, in an amount of at least $264,000, including but not limited to the following respects and particulars : . . . . . . . misappropriation of cash monies of the Corporation in an amount yet to be ascertained. (Emphasis supplied.) The petition contained specific allegations of misappropriation totaling $110,556.93, but also identified several acts of misappropriation for amounts of money yet to be ascertained. Because of that uncertainty, Trieweiler concluded in his operative petition that [a]ccordingly, the Corporation has been damaged in the amount of profits, monies and other assets misappropriated, wasted and/or excessively and unfairly paid, awarded or distributed in a total amount yet to be ascertained and an accounting is necessary to ascertain said amount. It is evident from even a casual reading of Trieweiler's petition that the evidence presented at trial of missing corporate revenues was relevant to prove Trieweiler's general allegations of misappropriation. In other words, the evidence presented at trial adequately conformed to the allegations in the pleadings, see Abdullah, supra, and the appellants' first assignment of error is without merit. Second, the appellants assign that Trieweiler should not have been allowed to bring a derivative action. Their argument is that since Trieweiler sought damages to be awarded to him individually, instead of to the corporation, Trieweiler was not acting in a representative capacity for the corporation. See Meyerson v. Coopers & Lybrand, 233 Neb. 758, 448 N.W.2d 129 (1989). The appellants claim that Trieweiler consistently pled and maintained that the purpose of these lawsuits was to obtain payment to himself . . . . He was not bringing an action seeking recovery on behalf of the corporation. Brief for appellant Campagna at 18. [17] However, the appellants have again misrepresented Trieweiler's operative petition, which concludes as follows: WHEREFORE, [Trieweiler], individually, and on behalf of Varsity Investments, Inc., prays for a judgment against [Campagna] in favor of Varsity Investments, Inc. in an amount of at least $264,000.00 for damages due to [Campagna's] breaches of fiduciary duty, mismanagement and/or misappropriation, or, alternatively, a judgment against [Campagna], in favor of . . . Trieweiler, for 30% of the damages to Varsity Investments, Inc.; for reasonable attorney's fees; the costs of this action and any other relief this Court deems is just and equitable under the circumstances. Trieweiler's operative petition clearly seeks damages on behalf of the corporation, and individual damages are sought only in the alternative. Furthermore, as previously noted, there are circumstances in which individual damages may be appropriately awarded in connection with a derivative action. See id. See, generally, 13 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 6028 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1995). We will discuss whether those circumstances were present in this case in more detail below. For purposes of resolving this issue, it is necessary only to note that seeking individual damages in a petition alleging a derivative action is not fatal to that cause of action. See, e.g., Chambrella v. Rutledge, 69 Haw. 271, 740 P.2d 1008 (1987). See, generally, 13 Fletcher, supra, § 6011 at 279 ([w]hen a plaintiff pleads multiple theories of relief, the assertion of one theory does not necessarily imply or amount to waiver of any other theory). [18-20] Under our former system of code pleading, the nature of an action is determined not by the prayer for relief but from the character of the facts alleged. Waite v. Samson Dev. Co., 217 Neb. 403, 348 N.W.2d 883 (1984). (The petitions in this case were filed prior to the effective date of the Nebraska Rules of Pleading in Civil Actions. See Neb. Ct. R. of Pldg. in Civ. Actions 1 (rev. 2004).) The prayer of a petition is not a part of the allegations of fact constituting the cause of action; thus, where the facts alleged state a cause of action and are supported by the evidence, the court will grant proper relief, although it may not conform to the relief requested. Bowman v. City of York, 240 Neb. 201, 482 N.W.2d 537 (1992). A prayer for general relief in an equity action is as broad as the pleadings, and the equitable powers of the court are sufficient to authorize any judgment to which a party is entitled under the pleadings and the evidence. Sullivan v. General United Life Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 872, 312 N.W.2d 277 (1981). The prayer is no part of the pleading, tenders no issue, and neither adds to nor takes from the evidence required of either party. Standard Reliance Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal, 171 Neb. 490, 106 N.W.2d 704 (1960). [21] Consequently, while the ad damnum clauses of Trieweiler's petitions sought individual damages, even had that request not been made in the alternative, Trieweiler's standing to maintain a derivative action would not have been undermined. A derivative action sounds in equity, and a court may rely on a general prayer for relief for the purpose of granting the relief to which the plaintiff is actually entitled. See Chambrella, supra . In short, the appellants' second assignment of error is based on a misrepresentation of Trieweiler's petitions and would have been meritless regardless.