Opinion ID: 2785010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Martens Affidavit

Text: Ritchie finally argues the bankruptcy court erred in admitting an affidavit from forensic accountant Theodore Martens because the affidavit had not gone through the disclosure process mandated by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7026—which applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) to bankruptcy proceedings. This court “review[s] the admission of expert testimony . . . for abuse of discretion.” Shuck v. CNH Am., LLC, 498 F.3d 868, 873 (8th Cir. 2007). The bankruptcy court reasoned, Rule 26’s requirements, while technically not met, had been met in spirit because the trustee disclosed early in the process he would be relying on Martens’s Petters executed these liens in the face of Polaroid’s cash shortage and over the objection of Jeffries—although not a listed badge—is certainly a relevant “factor[] bearing upon the issue of fraudulent intent.” Sholdan, 217 F.3d at 1010. 8 We note the bankruptcy court’s finding of several badges of fraud was not the end of the inquiry, but merely shifted the burden to Ritchie to prove it took the liens in good faith and for value. See id. The bankruptcy court, however, concluded Ritchie could not meet its burden—a decision Ritchie did not appeal to the district court and does not appeal now. -15- testimony, and Ritchie was able to depose Martens, questioning him about the affidavit. Under these circumstances, Ritchie suffered no prejudice because of the lack of formal Rule 26 disclosure. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Martens affidavit. See Crump v. Versa Prods., Inc., 400 F.3d 1104, 1110 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding a district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony that had not been disclosed under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) because the parties suffered “no prejudice from [the] inadequate disclosure”).