Opinion ID: 2604333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecution Consent Requirement

Text: When evaluating limitations on the right to waive trial by jury, we have recognized that the General Assembly may only interpose reasonable restrictions on the right to waive trial by jury. Davis, 794 P.2d at 211 (citing People v. Brisbin, 175 Colo. 428, 488 P.2d 63 (1971)). In limited situations, we have recognized as reasonable a prosecution consent requirement. For example, in Davis we upheld a prosecution consent requirement where the common law was the source of the defendant's right to waive trial by jury in a class 1 felony case. We noted that there was no statute purporting to define the scope of the right to waive trial by jury in a capital case. Davis, 794 P.2d at 211. We have upheld prosecution consent requirements in the context of trials on the issue of sanity. People ex rel. Iuppa v. District Court, 731 P.2d 720, 722 (Colo. 1987) (defendant was charged with second degree murder); Brisbin, 175 Colo. at 429, 488 P.2d at 64 (defendant was charged with first degree murder). In Iuppa, the defendant contested a statutory scheme requiring both the court and the prosecution to consent to waiver of trial by jury in class 1, 2, and 3 sanity trials. Iuppa, 731 P.2d at 722. The statutory scheme did not require consent of either the court or the prosecution in class 4 and 5 sanity trials. Id. The statutory scheme did not involve a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence. We concluded that the statutory scheme governing sanity trials had a rational foundation. Id. None of our decisions recognizing the consent requirement as reasonable, however, has required us to jointly evaluate sections 18-1-406(2) and 16-10-101. When considered together, we find that the due process guarantee of section 25 of article II of the Colorado Constitution compels the conclusion that the prosecution alone cannot compel trial by jury where an accused may not receive a fair jury trial. Section 18-1-406(2) purports to give defendants an unqualified right to waive trial by jury. Davis, 794 P.2d at 211. Section 16-10-101, however, nullifies section 18-1-406(2) by giving the prosecution an absolute right to trial by jury. We again note that section 16-10-101 provides: The right of a person who is accused of an offense ... to have a trial by jury is inviolate and a matter of substantive due process of law as distinguished from one of practice and procedure. The people shall also have the right to refuse to consent to a waiver of a trial by jury in all cases in which the accused has the right to request a trial by jury. The first sentence recognizes a substantive right of the accused to trial by jury. The language is derived from section 23 of article II of the Colorado Constitution. [5] We have stated that [t]his right contemplates a fair and impartial jury to hear the case. Oaks v. People, 150 Colo. 64, 68, 371 P.2d 443, 446 (1962). This is also the mandate of section 16 of article II of the Colorado Constitution. [6] The second sentence, however, attempts to create a right to jury trial in the prosecution in all cases where an accused is entitled to a jury trial but elects trial before the court. We find no constitutional guarantee buttressing such a right in favor of the prosecution. We have stated that a prosecutor has no constitutional right to either demand or waive a trial by jury. Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413, 415, 615 P.2d 698, 699 (1980). We have further noted that the United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution only guarantee the right to a jury trial to an accused. Id. The second sentence, however, is tempered by the first; we must thus measure the prosecution consent requirement against substantive due process. Adams County Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. Dickey, 791 P.2d 688 (Colo.1990) (statutes must be construed as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of their parts). Section 25 of article II of the Colorado Constitution provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. We have observed that [f]irmly embedded in both federal and state due process is the fair trial concept in criminal cases. Antithetical to constitutional due process is the subjection of an accused to an unfair trial. Oaks, 150 Colo. at 70, 371 P.2d at 447. We have accordingly provided for change of venue in criminal cases to ensure that an accused's due process right to a fair adjudication of guilt or innocence is protected. People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 240 (Colo.1983). Directed by our interpretation of section 25, article II, we cannot uphold the unqualified prosecution consent requirement where an accused may be subjected to an unfair proceeding before a biased jury. [7] In such cases, the accused's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by due process would be violated. While we have previously deferred to the General Assembly with respect to the waiver of trial by jury, Davis, 794 P.2d at 211, due process takes precedence over legislation. White v. Davis, 163 Colo. 122, 125, 428 P.2d 909, 911 (1967). Thus, where the prosecution objects to defendant's waiver of trial by jury, [8] and a defendant contends that trial by jury would result in a due process violation, the decision as to waiver then rests with the trial court. [9] It is incumbent upon a defendant, in seeking waiver, to raise due process concerns in the trial court. The trial court must subsequently determine whether a jury trial would be fair and impartial in accord with the accused's right to due process of law. [10] Stapleton v. District Court, 179 Colo. 187, 193, 499 P.2d 310, 312 (1972) ([T]he trial judge ..., by the nature of our judicial process, is in the best position to assure that a defendant's right to a fair trial ... will be substantially protected.). The trial court may consider the extent to which a change in venue may cure biases or prejudices against the accused. [11] In the present case, the defendant did not clearly articulate due process concerns that would preclude a fair and impartial trial by jury such that a change in venue would be ineffective as a remedy. We make the rule absolute. ERICKSON, J., specially concurs, and LOHR, J., joins in the special concurrence.