Opinion ID: 2977206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer of the Court.

Text: Okros himself could not have committed fraud on the court because he is not (and was not) an officer of the court. The same cannot be said of Mr. Hardin or his co-counsel, Ms. Teresa Gorman, however, as they are most definitely officers of the court. See Comp. Leasco, Inc. v. NTP, Inc., 194 F. App’x, 328, 338 (6th Cir. 2006) (“A lawyer is an officer of the court while preparing her 12 W e have also held that “intentional, fraudulent non-disclosure during discovery can form the basis of a claim of fraud upon the court.” Buell, 48 F. App’x. at 499 (citing Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 338). In the present case, Iafrate contends that Mr. Hardin’s co-counsel, Ms. Teresa Gorman, misrepresented to them — off the record, at Okros’s deposition — that she had subpoenaed AT&T for Okros’s phone records, but that AT&T had responded that those records were unavailable. Iafrate never submitted any formal discovery, however, or obtained any formal response from Mr. Hardin or Ms. Gorman. It is unclear whether an informal (perhaps even unsolicited) misrepresentation made during the discovery period (even if intentional and fraudulent) is enough to establish fraud on the court. But, we find that we need not resolve this question at this time. Our present “fraud on the court” inquiry is directed at Mr. Hardin’s (mis)representations at trial, and we will leave for another day this question regarding informal discovery. 12 client’s case.”) (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947)). This distinction merits further mention, in that it helps explain why surprise and due diligence are not elements of this test. Mr. Hardin argues — and the district court agreed — that Iafrate was at fault for failing to exercise due diligence during discovery, and this argument ably rebuts a claim of newly discovered evidence.13 Similarly, Mr. Hardin argues that Iafrate was aware prior to trial — i.e., it could not have been surprised — that Okros intended to testify that the call happened but he had no record of it, and this argument ably rebuts a claim of false testimony.14 The standards for newly discovered evidence and false testimony are based, at least in part, on the fact that witnesses are subject to cross-examination, “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quotation marks and citation omitted). But, unlike a witness, opposing counsel is not subject to cross-examination; opposing counsel is instead obliged to operate in conformity with the oath he or she has taken as an officer of the court. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978). Thus, counsel is entitled to rely on opposing counsel to be forthright, and is not obligated to ferret out the truth of opposing counsel’s statements or satisfy due diligence in protecting against an opposing counsel’s hoax. 2. Positive Averment (or Concealment when One is Under a Duty to Disclose) The second element — positive averment — was clearly satisfied and is not in any dispute. 13 “In order to merit a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish four elements: (1) that the evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) that the evidence could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence; (3) that the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) that the evidence would likely produce [a different outcome] if the case were retried.” United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 966 (6th Cir. 1982). Iafrate cannot satisfy this standard, as it did not conduct discovery with due diligence. 14 “A new trial should be granted where the court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false; that, without it, a jury might have reached a different conclusion; that the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after trial.” Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1949). Iafrate cannot meet this standard. 13 Mr. Hardin’s representations to the jury at trial are quoted in the record. When Iafrate attempted to cross-examine Okros about the phone records, Mr. Hardin spontaneously objected, arguing: MR. HARDIN: Your Honor, I’m going to place an objection to this because counsel knows that the EEOC, both he and myself have tried to get the phone bills and they are not available. I object to this line of questioning. JA 603. On redirect examination, Mr. Hardin led Okros through the following testimony: [Mr. Hardin]: There were questions [by Iafrate] about the phone bill, your telephone bill from October of 2001, correct? [Okros]: Yes. [Mr. Hardin]: You are aware that I have subpoenaed those? [Okros]: Yes. [Mr. Hardin]: And the EEOC subpoenaed these? [Okros]: Yes. [Mr. Hardin]: And you are aware that the phone company has dispositively said they don’t exist? [Okros]: Yes. [Mr. Hardin]: They don’t retain those, correct? [Okros]: Yes. [Mr. Hardin]: So to your knowledge, is there any way possible that anyone other than myself and the EEOC and I believe [Iafrate] could get those records? [Okros]: No. JA 663-64. These are “positive averments.” In its arguments on appeal, Iafrate asserts that Mr. Hardin essentially made a three-part averment: (1) that the call actually occurred; (2) that he had sought (indeed, subpoenaed) the records to prove that it had occurred; and (3) that those records “don’t exist,” and that AT&T could not produce the records because “they don’t retain those.” The pressing question, which we will address in some detail, is whether these averments are untrue. 3. Directed to the Judicial Machinery Itself. 14 The third element — directed to the “judicial machinery” itself — is a matter of materiality, and there can be no doubt, in the context of this case, that these representations were material. Simply put: if the telephone call never happened (as Michael and Iafrate contend), then Mr. Hardin and Okros had no evidence of discrimination and no reasonable jury could find in their favor. The evident purpose (and effect) of Mr. Hardin’s representations was to overcome this glaring deficiency in his evidence — to persuade the jury that he had conducted an exhaustive search and, but for AT&T’s obviously deficient records-retention policies, would have produced the records and proved conclusively that the call had indeed happened. The associated implication was that Iafrate was unfairly attempting to portray Okros as a liar when Iafrate knew that Mr. Hardin had attempted to get the records and that the records were unavailable for reasons beyond his control. 4. Deceives the Court The fourth element — deceives the court — is a matter of prejudice, and there can be no doubt, in the context of this case, that these representations were prejudicial. Without Mr. Hardin’s representations about his purported search, the jury would have been left to question why Okros did not keep his phone bill and why Mr. Hardin did not obtain a record of it from the phone company when confronted with Dave Michael’s emphatic denial that the call had even occurred. Certainly, if the jury had seen the record disproving the existence of the call, it would have decided the case differently. Moreover, the jury was aware that the burden was on Mr. Hardin, as counsel for the plaintiff, to produce evidence that the alleged call had actually occurred. Had the jury known, or reasonably suspected, that Mr. Hardin had not even searched for (or had suppressed) the phone record that would have shown conclusively the existence or non-existence of the critical telephone call, then there can be little doubt that the jury would have decided the case differently. 15 5. Intentionally False, Wilfully Blind, or In Reckless Disregard This final element concerns Mr. Hardin’s state of mind and, in this case, the proper inquiry is whether he either knew his statement was false, or he was wilfully blind to the truth or acted in reckless disregard for the truth. See Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348. As noted in the foregoing sections, Iafrate contends that Mr. Hardin made a three-part misrepresentation: (1) the call actually occurred; (2) he sought (indeed, subpoenaed) the records to prove it; and (3) the records “don’t exist,” or AT&T could not produce them because “they don’t retain those.” But, the record before us shows that the call did not occur — at least not as Okros described it. And, by all appearances, Mr. Hardin certainly did not subpoena the records, and likely conducted no search for them — at least not in the way he represented. Finally, the phone records in question do exist — as was proven when Iafrate obtained them from AT&T after trial, merely by submitting a subpoena. The falsity of this third representation is, by this point in time, beyond dispute, but the other two warrant some further discussion. As for the second representation — that Mr. Hardin sought, indeed subpoenaed, these records — Iafrate explains that there is every reason to suspect this is untrue and no reason to suspect it is true. Foremost is the simple fact that when Iafrate subpoenaed the records after trial, AT&T provided them. AT&T did not allege, as Mr. Hardin had claimed, that the records did not exist or that they did not retain them. Assuming, however, that Mr. Hardin might have been misled by either Okros or AT&T, it is notable that there is no documentation to support the claim that Mr. Hardin, Ms. Gorman, or anyone else at their law firm ever subpoenaed any records, and this otherwiseunexplained absence of any documentation is amplified by the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1) that a party serving a discovery subpoena notify the other parties. Because Mr. Hardin did 16 not notify Iafrate or the court that he or his firm had served any such subpoenas, one can reasonably presume — absent evidence to the contrary — that this failure to comply with Rule 45(b)(1), means that Mr. Hardin served no such subpoenas and his assertion at trial that he had served these subpoenas was untrue. There is also no evidence that the EEOC ever subpoenaed the records. In looking for evidence to the contrary, we find it telling that Mr. Hardin has still produced no documentation of a subpoena or evidence of any search for the records, despite numerous opportunities to do so. In fact, since Iafrate first accused Mr. Hardin of lying about this search or subpoena, Mr. Hardin has never again asserted that he did, in fact, search for or subpoena those records. That is, Mr. Hardin has never denied this accusation, which raises an additional adverse inference. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(b) (failure to deny an accusation can serve as an admission); Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing adoptive admissions). Mr. Hardin continues to represent Okros on appeal and appeared before this court for oral argument, during which he made yet another telling admission by omission. In an unprompted statement at the conclusion of his argument, Mr. Hardin said: “And, also when, post-trial, when Iafrate did subpoena the records, he used the 810 area code on the subpoena, so the 810 586 change — it changed from 810 to 586 — I don’t believe that was of any consequence.” That is, Mr. Hardin argued to this court that Iafrate could have and should have obtained the records earlier because the records were available even by serving a subpoena with the wrong area code, and he supported this argument by citing to the fact that Iafrate obtained the records by submitting a subpoena for phone number (810) 792-4979. Notably absent from this argument is any assertion that he or his firm had subpoenaed these records or any explanation as to why AT&T would have told him that the records were unavailable, but then provided those same records to Iafrate. Based on this evidence, a finder 17 of fact could conclude that Mr. Hardin’s averment that he searched for the records is untrue. We are left with only the first part of the three-part averment — the question of whether Okros actually called Dave Michael. For our present purpose, we consider whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to suggest that Mr. Hardin either knew his statement was false or he was wilfully blind to the truth or acted in reckless disregard for the truth. See Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348. The question of whether Mr. Hardin actually knew his statement was false leads ineluctably into questions of Mr. Hardin’s veracity and credibility. Certain statements are telling. During oral argument before this court on appeal, Mr. Hardin seized the opportunity to insist that the call had actually occurred and explained the apparent discrepancy in the phone records this way: The Court: Are you still maintaining that Okros called Iafrate? Mr. Hardin: Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. The Court: Then what’s your explanation . . . Mr. Hardin: This phone call happened. And I want to make one thing very clear because it was raised in the reply brief that at no point did we say we disagree with their position that this phone call didn’t happen. Unequivocally, this phone call happened. The Court: Okay, that’s really great to have a lot of conviction about it. What’s your explanation for the phone records. Mr. Hardin: . . . The phone call could have occurred on any one of probably five telephones that were in that apartment at the time; on October Fourth of 2001. If you want my opinion, I’ll give it to you. It’s not in the record, but it was probably Rich Moore’s telephone. “[A]ny one of probably five telephones . . . probably Rich Moore’s [cell phone].” This certainly appears to be a conceivable explanation and Mr. Hardin certainly expressed “a lot of conviction about it.” And, as Mr. Hardin forewarned, this explanation is not in the record. But that is because, in the record, Mr. Hardin was unequivocal about which phone Okros used in making the alleged call to Dave Michael. During his opening statement to the jury, Mr. Hardin proclaimed — with 18 recognizable vigor — that he knew exactly which phone Okros used and why: John Okros went home to his apartment . . . [a]nd he picked up his phone and he put it on speaker phone, for two reasons: One, Rich Moore worked for the UAW as a committeeman and he instructed [Okros] to do so because he thought it would be good for people to hear this. Secondly, the phone wasn’t working. The receiver, the part that you listen to was, you couldn’t hear from it, so in order to hear what somebody was saying, you actually did have to put him on speaker phone. JA 423-24. So, according to Mr. Hardin’s earlier version of the story — also recounted with “a lot of conviction” — Okros used “his phone” and put it on speaker because it was broken. So, then, Okros used his own phone, now Okros probably used Rich Moore’s phone — these two contradictory statements cannot both be true. Either way, this is sufficient to impugn Mr. Hardin’s credibility. During cross-examination, Iafrate pressed Okros about the phone call and the records, which led to Mr. Hardin’s objection on the basis that he had subpoenaed the records: Iafrate: And you dialed Dave Michael, is that correct? Okros: I dialed Iafrate Company. Iafrate: Okay, you dialed the main number? Okros: Yes, I did. Iafrate: And that was on speaker phone, correct? Okros: Yes, it was. Iafrate: And it was the phone in your bedroom? Okros: Yes, it was. Iafrate: Now the phone in the dining room, which is much larger, is there any reason you didn’t use that phone? Okros: I don’t even remember if I had a phone . . . in that room or not, I can’t remember. I lived in the apartment. I had a couple of phones but I don’t remember exactly. Iafrate: Okay, and that was your apartment, correct? Okros: Yes, it was. 19 Iafrate: Did you pay the phone bill? Okros: Yes, I did. Iafrate: . . . When you made a call back in 2001, in fact, on October 4th, 2001, when you pick up the phone from your apartment building, which is where? Okros: My apartment was on Union Lake Road, Harrison Township. Iafrate: When you dial from that number to the Iafrate headquarters in Warren, Center Line, when you get the phone bill at the end of the month doesn’t it show that as a toll call? [Objection] Mr. Hardin: Your Honor, I’m going to place an objection to this because counsel knows that the EEOC, both he and myself have tried to get the phone bills and they are not available. I object to this line of questioning. JA 602-03. This is a peculiar objection for several reasons. First, the content of the testimony and the construction of the objection demonstrate that, at that point at least, it was a foregone conclusion that the phone line in question, and the critical phone record, was Okros’s home phone line. There was no question as to whether it was Okros’s phone line, no indication that there was any other phone line (e.g., five or more possible phone lines), and no suggestion that the call might have been made from anyone else’s phone (e.g., Rich Moore’s cell phone). It was clearly Okros’s phone line. Second, this is not merely an objection to Iafrate’s questioning; it is a frank statement to the court that Mr. Hardin had “tried to get the phone bills and they [we]re not available.” Third, the objection is framed as a statement of what Iafrate’s “counsel knows”; yet, Mr. Hardin attested to this court, at oral argument on appeal, that “I was never asked for those phone records; not in an interrogatory, not informally, not in any way, shape, or form did counsel for Iafrate ever ask me for those phone records.” This begs the question of how Iafrate would have “known” that Mr. Hardin 20 had searched for the records, if counsel had never asked, not even informally. And, fourth, this objection suggests — and it is made explicit later in the transcript — that Mr. Hardin subpoenaed AT&T for this particular record, i.e., the record for the particular phone on which Okros claims he called Iafrate; yet, as discussed previously, this is insupportable and almost certainly untrue. Based on the foregoing, we have doubts about Mr. Hardin’s veracity and reservations about assuming that Mr. Hardin did not know that Okros lied about placing the call. But, the standard — “intentionally false, wilfully blind to the truth, or [] in reckless disregard for the truth,” Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348 — does not require a finder of fact to decide whether Mr. Hardin actually knew. The finder of fact will need only decide whether Mr. Hardin had cause to know; i.e., whether Mr. Hardin acted in reckless disregard for the truth, given the information available. Unless there is significant, material evidence as of yet unadmitted, Mr. Hardin had clear cause to know that he did not actually subpoena the records, conduct a search, or receive the alleged response from AT&T, and this would likely be sufficient to satisfy this element. But, it also appears from the record that Mr. Hardin also had cause to know that Okros had lied to him about placing the call. First, Dave Michael vehemently denied that it ever happened. As was discussed earlier in this opinion, this is an odd denial, deserving of some consideration. But this is certainly not all. Okros’s former live-in girlfriend, Carmen Preston (n.k.a. Carmen Dean) — who was a receptionist at Iafrate and the only potential witness, other than Okros, who actually knew Dave Michael and could recognize his voice — testified at deposition that the call did not occur and that she considered Okros the type of person who would fabricate the story, even accusing him of having engaged in insurance fraud in the past. Ms. Preston’s testimony was also noteworthy because it directly contradicted Okros’s prior assertion that she had been present to hear the call. This could 21 have given Mr. Hardin cause to question whether Okros had been truthful about the call. Finally, we note the inconsistent and contradictory testimony of the defense witnesses, concerning such significant issues as who was present and what was said. Okros and Kempkens testified that four witnesses were present; Davis testified three were present; Watts testified to only two; and no two of them testified consistently about the events preceding the call or the content of the call. This could have given Mr. Hardin cause to question whether the call actually occurred. Based on the available facts and the proper standard, as set forth in Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 348, we find that a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that Mr. Hardin committed fraud on the court. That is, one could find that Mr. Hardin, an officer of the court, made material averments that deceived the court, which he knew or should have known were untrue.