Opinion ID: 550707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ground F--Racially Biased Jury Selection

Text: 23 Byrd was convicted by a all-white jury and has relied on various legal theories to support his claim that the prosecution unconstitutionally kept blacks off the jury. 24 In his Rule 27.26 petition, Byrd relied on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (Batson), which prohibited prosecutors from using peremptory strikes to create an all-white jury. Batson overruled Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24, 85 S.Ct. 824, 837-38, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) (Swain), which allowed prosecutors to use peremptory strikes to create an all-white jury in individual cases, as long as they did not systematically keep blacks off juries. The state courts rejected this claim, based on Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 2880, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986) (Allen ) (holding that Swain test still applies to pre-Batson trials, because (1) decisions such as Batson, which overrule precedent, are generally not applied retroactively, (2) Batson rule, unlike other rules which have been applied retroactively, serves ends other than integrity of jury factfinding, (3) prosecutors and judges have relied on Swain, and (4) retroactive application of Batson would seriously disrupt the administration of justice), and held that the Swain systematic exclusion test governed Byrd's claim. See Byrd v. State, 723 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Mo.App.) (applying Allen ), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 203, 98 L.Ed.2d 155 (1987). 25 In his first petition, Byrd requested discovery to ascertain whether blacks had been systematically excluded from St. Louis County juries. The district court denied Byrd's discovery request, and we held on appeal that the district court properly denied Byrd's discovery request ... [because] Byrd has offered no cause for his failure to present evidence in support of his Swain claim to the state courts, as he must to overcome the procedural bar created by that failure. Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d at 7; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) (where habeas petitioner has failed to raise his claim in state courts, he has committed procedural default and must show cause for default and prejudice from constitutional violation to avoid procedural bar). We then denied Byrd's Swain claim on the merits, because the evidence was insufficient to warrant relief under Swain. Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d at 7. 26 In his second petition, Byrd argues that he had good cause for failing to raise his Swain claim in state court, because Allen had not been decided until one day before his Rule 27.26 brief was filed. In our decision denying Byrd's first petition, we considered and rejected this argument. See Byrd v. Armontrout, 880 F.2d at 7 n. 6. 27 Byrd also claims that the procedural default doctrine is inapplicable because the Missouri courts in fact addressed his Swain challenge on the merits. The district court held that reconsideration of this claim was inappropriate because [p]etitioner alleges no new factual evidence. He does not allude to some intervening change in the law. He simply disagrees with this Court's determination that a Swain claim was procedurally barred. Byrd, 733 F.Supp. at 1338 (E.D.Mo.1990). As petitioner has raised no new arguments, we agree. See Williams v. Lockhart, 862 F.2d at 158 (new facts or legal developments must be raised). 28