Opinion ID: 780186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apprendi Claim (Jefferson and Phelan)

Text: 14 Jefferson and Phelan both argue that the district court's failure to submit the drug type and quantity determination to the jury violates their constitutional rights in light of Apprendi. The Supreme Court held that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). Because the district court limited the defendants' sentences to twenty years, and the statutory maximum penalty for an unspecified quantity of any form of cocaine is twenty years, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the Apprendi ruling is not triggered and does not impact the sentence for either Jefferson or Phelan. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 258 F.3d 465, 478-79 (6th Cir.2001) ([A] violation of the principles set forth in Apprendi rises to the level of `plain error' only where the defendant's sentence exceeds the maximum possible sentence that could be imposed by statute absent the offending `sentencing factor' determined under the too-lenient `preponderance' standard.... [E]ven if a determination of a particular drug quantity is improperly made under the `preponderance' standard, there is no plain error in a sentence that lies within the applicable statutory sentencing range for the same offense involving an indeterminate amount of drugs.). 15 Defendants urge us to expand our application of Apprendi to disapprove of the imposition of a mandatory guideline minimum sentence unless a jury has made findings beyond a reasonable doubt as to the facts necessary to establish that guideline minimum. To support this argument, they rely on United States v. Ramirez, 242 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir.2001), which held that Apprendi was applicable when a defendant's penalty was increased from a nonmandatory minimum sentence to a mandatory minimum sentence, or from a lesser to a greater minimum sentence. Defendants claim that the logical extension of this decision would be to apply Apprendi to mandatory minimum sentences imposed under the sentencing guidelines even where the statutory maximum is not exceeded. 16 This contention is meritless in light of the recent decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), and we question whether Ramirez is still good law after that decision. According to the majority in Harris, 17 [w]hether chosen by the judge or the legislature, the facts guiding judicial discretion below the statutory maximum need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. When a judge sentences the defendant to a mandatory minimum, no less than when the judge chooses a sentence within the range, the grand and petit juries already have found all the facts necessary to authorize the Government to impose the sentence. The judge may impose the minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further authorization from those juries — and without contradicting Apprendi. 18 Id. at 2418 (emphasis added). Although it is true that the quantity determined by the district court elevated the mandatory guideline minimum sentence, Harris tells us that Apprendi does not invalidate that increase. See id; see also United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir.2001) (rejecting contention that Apprendi should apply to guideline enhancements even where the statutory maximum is not exceeded). 19 Contrary to defendants' arguments, their respective sentences do not trigger Apprendi because the drug type and quantity attributed to them does not affect the statutory maximum. Accordingly, we reject their argument proposing an extension of Apprendi and affirm their sentences.