Opinion ID: 1994761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror's Comment

Text: On the first day of jury selection, the trial justice questioned prospective jurors on whether any circumstances existed that would affect their ability to be fair and impartial in this case. After questioning a number of prospective jurors, the trial justice asked Juror 29 whether she had heard the questions already asked and did she have a response to any of them. She replied in the affirmative. The trial justice then asked whether she would like to be heard at sidebar or, alternatively, what was the question to which she would like to respond. Instead, she replied, Well, I'm a college professor. I have had three students killed by drunk drivers. [2] The trial justice then promptly excused her without further questioning. Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial. The trial justice gave a cautionary instruction to the jurors, telling them to disregard those comments made by Juror 29, and then he dismissed them for the day. [3] Defense counsel argued that the comment was highly prejudicial, apparently assuming that Juror 29 was a University of Rhode Island professor and that her deceased students had been killed in the same geographic area as pertinent in this trial. [4] Defense counsel further disputed that a curative instruction would be effective because the inflammatory statement had contaminate[d] the panel by suggesting that we have to do something about these drunk drivers driving around, and    here is your opportunity. Defense counsel also stressed that, as a practical matter, the motion to pass should be granted given the early stage of the trial. The trial justice observed, however, that there were not enough available jurors to simply begin anew the next day if the motion was granted. The state maintained that a mistrial was not warranted and that the trial justice's curative instruction to the jury to disregard the comment was sufficient because the comment did not point any finger at this defendant. The next day, before the jurors were brought into the courtroom, the trial justice denied the motion to pass. Even in doing so, he characterized Juror 29's unresponsive comment as emotionally and almost vindictively delivered. Nonetheless, he ruled that the comment would not prevent[] [the jurors'] calm and dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. [5] However, the trial justice acknowledged on the record that he may revisit the issue after he asked the jurors whether they could follow his cautionary instruction to disregard the comment. The trial justice then addressed the jury panel as a group, rather than individually, precipitating another objection from defendant. The trial justice asked the prospective jurors whether they would be able to follow his cautionary instruction from the day before, and he received an affirmative response. [6] The trial then proceeded until its conclusion on February 14, 2007. On appeal, Nelson argues that the trial justice erred when he denied her motion to pass the case because Juror 29's comment was incendiary and prejudicial because it encouraged the jury to convict the defendant. Nelson further contends that the trial justice should have conducted individual voir dires with the jurors to discuss privately with them whether they were able to follow his cautionary instruction, rather than question the panel as a group. Nelson also argues, however, that no instruction could cure the prejudicial effect of the statement on the jury because the statement was particularized to suggest that Nelson was guilty, and therefore it was not possible for the jurors to disregard it. The state argues that the trial justice did not err when he denied the motion to pass because Juror 29's comment merely reiterated facts that were already known to the prospective jurors, namely, that the case was about driving under the influence of alcohol. Moreover, the state contends that it was unnecessary that the trial justice conduct a voir dire of each juror individually, and thus the trial justice's collective questioning of the panel was not error. We hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he denied the motion to pass following the prospective juror's inappropriate remark during the voir dire that she had had students who had been killed by drunk drivers. A new trial is not necessary every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Ramirez, 936 A.2d at 1267-68 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). To warrant a new trial, the prejudicial effect of extraneous information that has reached the jury improperly turns on the probable effect that such information would have on an average reasonable juror. State v. Hartley, 656 A.2d 954, 962 (R.I.1995). The prejudicial evidence must be of a nature to inflame the jurors' passions to preclude their calm and dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. State v. Luciano, 739 A.2d 222, 228 (R.I.1999) (citing State v. Mastracchio, 672 A.2d 438, 444 (R.I.1996)). If the trial justice determines that the evidence is prejudicial, the trial justice has a duty to attempt to dispel the taint with a proper warning or cautionary instruction. Carmody, 471 A.2d at 1366. Here, it is our opinion that the prospective juror's statement would not influence an average reasonable juror because the jurors already knew that defendant was charged with operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. See State v. Coleman, 909 A.2d 929, 937 (R.I.2006) (holding that judge did not abuse her discretion in refusing to grant the motion to pass when defendant himself admitted the prejudicial fact stated in the witness's improper comment); see also State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1034 (R.I.2004) (holding jurors would not be unduly surprised or prejudiced by defendant's daughter angrily rushing from the stand toward defendant because they already knew of the daughter's allegations of defendant's sexual abuse). Further, the statement is not of the type that would inflame the passions of the jury because it did not refer to the specific defendant nor did it imply her guilt. See Carmody, 471 A.2d at 1367 (highly prejudicial for jurors to overhear prospective juror give an opinion as to defendant's guilt); State v. Massey, 119 R.I. 666, 667-68, 382 A.2d 801, 802-03 (1978). In Massey, a prospective juror who had been at the scene of the alleged crime recounted his belief that he bet it was a Massey, implying that defendant Massey's family was likely to commit crimes and had committed crimes before. Massey, 119 R.I. at 667, 668, 382 A.2d at 802, 803. This Court held that the trial justice abused his discretion in refusing to pass the case because the statement was prejudicial in that it implied that the defendant was guilty and nontestimonial statements linking a defendant to a particular crime and inferring the commission of others are most difficult to disregard. Id. at 671, 382 A.2d at 804. Unlike the situation in Massey, the prospective juror's statement in this case did not refer to defendant at all or even intimate that defendant might be guilty. After careful review of the transcript, it appears to us that the prospective juror, after observing the trial justice's interactions with other jurors of whom the trial justice asked whether there was anything that would prevent them from considering the case in a fair and impartial manner, simply anticipated the question once it was her turn and jumped the gun, so to speak, in alerting the trial justice that she didn't consider herself able to evaluate the case fairly and impartially. In an emotional moment, she blurted out why she believed that she was unable to fulfill the role of a juror. Her comment concerned herself and her qualifications to be a juror, not defendant in particular. Indeed, even statements in evidence that are directed to defendant may be palliated by a prompt curative instruction, just as that which the trial justice employed in this case. Coleman, 909 A.2d at 936-37. For example, in Coleman, the witness testified that he knew the defendant through being in jail, you know, since we was kids. Id. at 935. The trial justice promptly gave a cautionary instruction and told the jury to disregard the statement. Id. She asked the juror whether they were able to disregard the statement, and every juror responded affirmatively. Id. This Court held that the cautionary instruction was sufficient to purge any harmful effect as a result of the testimony because the instruction highlighted the testimony's irrelevance and impropriety and took the extraordinary step of ensuring that the entire jury was capable of disregarding the witness's response. Id. at 936-37. The instruction in Coleman and by the trial justice in this case are very similar. Both instruct the jury to disregard the prejudicial statement and emphasize that the statement does not relate to the case or defendant's guilt or innocence. See Coleman, 909 A.2d at 936 n. 7 (comparing trial justice's instruction favorably to that employed in State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 207 (R.I.2003), which, like the instruction here, used the phrase put [the statements] out of your mind). In contrast, the curative instruction given in Massey, held by this Court to be ineffective, did not inform the potential jurors that they were not to consider the statement. Massey, 119 R.I. at 671, 382 A.2d at 803; see also State v. Disla, 874 A.2d 190, 199, 199-200 (R.I.2005) (holding comprehensive instruction including direction to disregard that statement was sufficient    to fend off any prejudice); Carmody, 471 A.2d at 1367 (holding curative instruction insufficient where jurors not told to disregard juror's comments). Here, the trial justice's curative instruction was prompt and comprehensive. It mirrored the instruction that was held to be sufficient in Coleman and likewise was sufficient to avoid any possible prejudicial effect of the prospective juror's statement about her deceased students. Therefore, it can be fairly said that the instruction erased consideration of the statement from the jury's mind. State v. Manfredi, 118 R.I. 144, 149, 372 A.2d 975, 977 (1977) (citing State v. Costa, 111 R.I. 602, 609-10, 306 A.2d 36, 40 (1973)). As Coleman further illustrates, an individual voir dire of each juror is not necessary for the curative remedy to be effective. Coleman, 909 A.2d at 935 (defense feared that individual voir dire would cause additional prejudice to the defendant by emphasizing comment); see also Gomes, 690 A.2d at 316 (holding that trial justice properly questioned prospective jurors as a group concerning whether the sexual abuse charges or their personal experience would prevent them from being impartial). Individual voir dire is appropriate when it is unclear whether the jurors heard or read certain prejudicial statements or material and it is necessary to determine their exposure while at the same time insulating the rest of the jurors who may not have heard or read the prejudicial information. See, e.g., Figueroa, 673 A.2d at 1087-88 (voir dire conducted to determine whether jurors thought the witness said heard or hurt); State v. Pusyka, 592 A.2d 850, 852 (R.I.1991) (voir dire conducted to determine if jurors had been exposed to newspaper article about the trial). We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion when he declined to conduct an individual voir dire of each juror in this case.