Opinion ID: 1202753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Point 9. Excessive Penalties

Text: VECO also argues that the aggregate of fines against it amounts to an excessive penalty in violation of the due process clauses of the Alaska and United States Constitutions. The standard here is one of obvious unreasonableness. The penalty cannot be so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable. St. Louis Iron Mountain & Southern Ry Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67, 40 S.Ct. 71, 73, 64 L.Ed. 139, 141 (1919). We are unable to say that the penalty imposed is obviously unreasonable. One of the primary purposes of the disclosure requirement is achievement of a fully informed electorate. VECO furnished substantial support to candidates in the 1984 election. The public was not informed of this support and to that extent the statutory purpose was frustrated. In Ferre v. State ex rel. Reno, 478 So.2d 1077, 1082-83 (Fla.App. 1985), the court upheld the imposition of a fine in an amount equal to twice the amount of money unlawfully accepted and retained, against a claim that the fine was unconstitutionally excessive. The court found that increasing fines in direct relation to the amount of money unlawfully accepted was rationally related to the purposes of the statute. Here, VECO has been assessed fines that are nearly double the amount of unreported campaign contributions which it made. The cost of failing to report increases in direct relation to delay in reporting. The penalty structure is rationally related to the goal of timely disclosure.