Opinion ID: 1673940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. validity of search warrant?

Text: Polk argues Mayor Beesley was not a neutral and detached magistrate because the mayor actively participated in the investigation of the crimes by suggesting that the law enforcement officers get the bloodhounds from Simpson County and by interviewing witnesses. We find the search warrant was valid. The mayor did view the scene and suggested that the officers get the bloodhounds from Simpson County. He and Police Chief Miller testified at the pre-trial suppression hearing that he did not participate in the investigation. He had left when the bloodhounds were brought to the scene. Chief Miller testified that he asked Mayor Beesley to come to the crime scene because there had been a very serious crime committed, and neighbors and family members who had gathered at the Thomas home were aroused. Beesley talked to them in an effort to calm things down. He denied that he interviewed anyone. In his brief Polk also alleges that the only reason the mayor issued the warrant was because the crowd was chanting, Get Willie Polk. The record supports no such charge. Mayor Beesley testified that he left the Thomas house around 9:00 p.m., after informing the chief he would be glad to sign a warrant when they had sufficient evidence to identify the perpetrator of the crime. The United States Supreme Court has said that [p]rior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 at 318, 92 S.Ct. 2125 at 2137, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 at 767 (1972). We have reiterated that the individual issuing the search warrant must be a neutral and detached magistrate. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1323 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988); McCommon v. State, 467 So.2d 940 (Miss. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 984, 106 S.Ct. 393, 88 L.Ed.2d 345 (1985); Birchfield v. State, 412 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1982). Polk avers that Beesley acted merely as a rubber stamp for the police, in direct violation of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964). Polk argues that Mayor Beesley had never denied Chief Miller a warrant when requested to issue one. Mayor Beesley had issued approximately ten warrants over a nine-year period. He said that he had never refused to issue a warrant because the chief was usually pretty thorough and that they would discuss it pretty thoroughly. The record shows that the chief went to the mayor's house at 10:00 p.m., told Mayor Beesley about the tracks leading from the back of the Thomas house to the creek and then to a point near Polk's house; about Officer Hamberlin seeing Polk lying in bed; and about Hamberlin seeing the wet, muddy clothing in Polk's bedroom. Mayor Beesley read the affidavit, and put Miller under oath; Miller swore to the truthfulness of the facts in the affidavit and warrant. Mayor Beesley determined that the police had probable cause, and signed the search warrant. The trial judge correctly found at Polk's suppression hearing that any neutral and detached magistrate being presented with the evidence herein would have issued a search warrant... . Law enforcement officers must act in the world in which we live, frequently far from ideal. In Bevill v. State, 556 So.2d 699, 713 (Miss. 1990), a circuit judge who had gone to the crime scene and saw the victim subsequently issued a search warrant. The crime in that case occurred in one of our state's more populous cities, and while we cautioned trial judges to avoid any appearance of partiality, especially when another magistrate could be easily found, we nevertheless saw no reason that the judge's view of the scene and victim, and nothing more, prevented his being a neutral and detached magistrate. Nor is there anything in this record other than the supposition of Polk to support any conclusion but that Mayor Beesley was impartial, and that he required Chief Miller to give reasonable cause before executing the warrant. Polk finally argues Beesley could not act, because a mayor as part of the executive branch of government cannot serve in a judicial function, namely as a magistrate. Port Gibson is a municipality of less than 10,000 population. Beesley as mayor had the statutory authority to act under both Miss. Code Ann. §§ 21-25-5 (1972), and 21-23-7(3) (Supp. 1991). Moreover, Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1-37 (1972), states in pertinent part: The official acts of any person in possession of a public office and exercising the functions thereof shall be valid and binding as official acts in regard to all persons interested or affected thereby... . See Upchurch v. Oxford, 196 Miss. 339, 17 So.2d 204 (1944); Bird v. State, 154 Miss. 493, 122 So. 539 (1929); Powers v. State, 83 Miss. 691, 36 So. 6 (1904). The issuance of the search warrant in this case was a valid and lawful act.