Opinion ID: 779089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Commerce Clause Challenge

Text: 142 The Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although the power to enact laws under the Commerce Clause is subject to judicially enforceable outer limits, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), the power is `complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution,' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824)). Due respect for the decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). 143 The Supreme Court has made clear that the commerce power extends not only to `the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce' and to `protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... or persons or things in commerce,' but also to `activities affecting commerce.' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 276-77, 101 S.Ct. 2352 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971)). In determining whether Congress has exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause, we may look to, inter alia, whether the activity regulated is economic in nature, whether there are discernible ties to commerce, whether the type of activity as a whole has an effect on commerce, and what congressional findings have been made with respect to the activity's effects on commerce. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-63, 115 S.Ct. 1624; see also Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 765, 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 868, 120 S.Ct. 166, 145 L.Ed.2d 140 (1999). A federal statute will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if it regulates activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction when the transaction and the activities, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to federal statute regulating production and consumption of home-grown wheat because wheat farming as a whole substantially affects interstate commerce); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (upholding Commerce Clause challenge to federal statute prohibiting possession of firearm in school zone, where prohibition was not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated). `[E]ven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.' Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 277, 101 S.Ct. 2352 (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547, 95 S.Ct. 1792, 44 L.Ed.2d 363 (1975)). 144 Further, when Congress has enacted a statute creating a program to regulate aspects of commercial transactions that, viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce, it is not necessary that each element of the regulatory scheme have a substantial connection with commerce when viewed in isolation. An individual provision will survive a Commerce Clause challenge if it is an integral part of the regulatory program[,] and ... the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole can be shown to be independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 n. 17, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981); see also Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982). 145 The FRCD is part of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. The stated purpose of CERCLA, which defines the term environment to include ambient air and navigable waters of the United States, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(8), is [t]o provide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites, Pub.L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 2767 (1980). See also Report of the House of Representatives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.Rep. No. 96-1016(I) (1980) (CERCLA House Rep.), at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-20 (bill that became CERCLA was designed to give the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authority to deal effectively with spills of hazardous substances as well as with the tragic consequences of improperly, negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices known as the inactive hazardous waste site problem (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120 (In 1979 the EPA estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 sites existed, of which between 1,200-2,000 present a serious risk to public health.). 146 In furtherance of its purposes, CERCLA permits the government to address environmental emergencies by removing hazardous substances immediately, see 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a); authorizes a national plan establishing procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous substances, see id. § 9605(a); authorizes the President to issue administrative orders, or to seek court orders, directing responsible entities to clean up hazardous waste sites, see id. § 9606(a); imposes liability for clean-up costs on entities responsible for the disposal of hazardous wastes, see id. § 9607(a) (permitting the government and private parties to recover the costs involved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their creation); and imposes liability for damage to natural resources, see id. § 9607(f) (permitting the government to recover for such damage). These and other provisions are directed toward Congress's goals of, inter alia, provid[ing] for liability of persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such sites, CERCLA House Rep. at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6119, and  induc[ing] such persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites,  id. at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120 (emphasis added). 147 Accordingly, it is recognized that CERCLA is principally designed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites [and] to compensate those who have attended to the remediation of environmental hazards, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483, 116 S.Ct. 1251, 134 L.Ed.2d 121 (1996), and that the `two ... main purposes of CERCLA' are `prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of all cleanup costs on the responsible party,' id. (quoting General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation Systems, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937, 111 S.Ct. 1390, 113 L.Ed.2d 446 (1991)). 148 In passing CERCLA, Congress did not include legislative findings with respect to the statute's relationship to interstate commerce. However, it is clear that the generation and disposal of waste material by companies in connection with the manufacture or processing of products is a business activity, and that the storage of such wastes by others is economic activity. See generally Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (Solid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of commerce.); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S.Ct. 2531, 57 L.Ed.2d 475 (1978). And it is clear that such wastes are commonly transported in interstate commerce. See generally Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at 337, 112 S.Ct. 2009 (in 1992, only 16 states had commercial hazardous waste landfills); cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 150, 159-60, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (because few states have disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste, and space in those sites is frequently sold by residents of one state to residents of another, [r]egulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is ... well within Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause). Further, even wholly intrastate disposal of hazardous wastes can threaten interstate and foreign commerce, as those wastes can contaminate streams that run through landfills and feed into tributaries of navigable waters. Thus, Congress has substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders. Id. at 149, 112 S.Ct. 2408. 149 In considering legislation to promote safer containment of hazardous wastes and to decrease pollution of the ambient air and navigable waters by such materials, Congress plainly sought to deal with matters that substantially affected interstate commerce. As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit observed in USA v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir.1997), 150 [w]hen the Senate considered S. 1480, a bill containing cleanup liability provisions later substantially incorporated into CERCLA, its Committee on Environment and Public Works (the Committee) took notice of many facts that show a nexus between all forms of improper waste disposal and interstate commerce. First, the Committee noted the growth of the chemical industry and the concomitant costs of handling its waste. See S.Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, at 309 (1983).... It also cited a 1980 report by the Office of Technology Assessment which gauged agricultural losses from chemical contamination in six states at $283 million. Id. at 310. The Committee reported that the commercial damages resulting from unregulated waste management were not attributable solely to interstate trafficking in hazardous materials for disposal, but also arose from accidents associated with purely intrastate, on-site disposal activities, such as improper waste storage in tanks, lagoons and chemical plants. Id. at 312. Thus, CERCLA reflects Congress's recognition that both on-site and off-site disposal of hazardous waste threaten interstate commerce. 151 107 F.3d at 1511 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Clearly, CERCLA itself was enacted as a response to a national problem, was directly related to a valid congressional concern, and was within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., id. 152 Indeed, defendants do not contend that CERCLA exceeds Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. Rather they argue that the FRCD alone is unconstitutional. ( See Defendants-Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants' brief on appeal at 74-75 n.23 (the FRCD may be severed and the remainder of CERCLA may be left in force).) However, defendants' Commerce Clause challenge to the FRCD ignores the FRCD's function in furthering the goals of CERCLA. 153 As noted, one of CERCLA's goals was to induce companies generating, transporting, dumping, and storing, etc., hazardous wastes voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites, CERCLA House Rep. at 17, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120. We think it plain that the FRCD provides such inducement. As discussed in Part II.A.2. above, the FRCD was adopted in response to findings, made in a study required by § 301(e) of CERCLA, that state-law dates of accrual of claims for injuries caused by exposure to hazardous substances — especially injuries having a long latency period, such as cancer — frequently resulted in such claims becoming time-barred even before the injured person knew the cause of his injury. In requiring that the courts apply instead, if later than the state-law date, an objective accrual date, to wit, the date when the plaintiff reasonably should have known the injury's cause, § 9658 gives companies responsible for hazardous wastes greater incentives to clean up the waste sites, for it exposes those companies to a longer period of liability for the harms those sites cause to human health and the environment. The longer the period of liability, the more likely it is that a responsible company will bear the expense of the harms it has caused. The greater the potential cost to the company, the greater the likelihood that the company will strive to avoid liability by taking appropriate remedial actions with respect to its hazardous waste sites. And the more remedial action that is undertaken voluntarily, the less the need for government intervention, and the cleaner the environment. 154 In sum, we conclude that the FRCD is an integral part of the regulatory scheme established by CERCLA, furthering CERCLA's goals in various ways, and that the enactment of the FRCD constituted a valid exercise of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.