Opinion ID: 3053475
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Medical Personnel. — The FTCA is the exclu-

Text: sive remedy for medical or dental malpractice on the part of the medical personnel of most federal employees. H.R. Rep. No. 100-700, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5948 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 233). The same Report noted the “sharp distinction between common law torts and constitutional or Bivens torts” and suggested that a constitutional tort involves “a more serious intrusion of the rights of an individual that merits special attention.” Id. at 6, 5948 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5950. The Report emphasized that the “ ‘exclusive remedy’ provision . . . [was] intended to substitute the United States as the sole[ ] permissible defendant in all common law tort actions,” id., but declared that the provision “expressly does not extend to . . . constitutional torts,” id. at 5949. Testifying before the House Committee on the Judiciary, a senior Justice Department official stated: [T]he exclusive remedy provision [of § 2679(b)(1)] 14 Cf. Carlson, 446 U.S. at 19-20 (examining legislative history of subsequent amendments to the FTCA to determine whether Congress viewed it as a substitute or complementary remedy). 14008 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD is based on a very well-established precedent. Seven such exclusive remedy provisions already exist. They apply to drivers of vehicles, to physicians employed by various agencies, and to Department of Defense attorneys. [The LRTCA] simply extends those provisions to all Federal employees. Because of this precedent, we have considerable experience with such exclusive remedy provisions. They work well and fairly, have been widely accepted, and are not controversial. Legislation To Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 58 (1988) (testimony of Robert L. Willmore, Deputy Assistant Attorney General) (hereinafter Willmore Testimony). In the very next breath, however, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General agreed that “we want to avoid the constitutional torts issue.” Id.; see also id. at 76 (statement of Willmore) (“H.R. 4358 would do nothing more than extend the protection now enjoyed by doctors, drivers, and [Defense Department] attorneys to all federal employees.”), 78-79 (describing legislation to make the FTCA exclusive of Bivens claims as “controversial”). The PHS Defendants argue that to construe § 233(a) to preempt only common law and statutory tort actions would render it superfluous, since, post-LRTCA, PHS officers and employees are already immune from those actions under § 2679(b)(1). Even if § 233 were now superfluous because of the subsequent enactment of the LRTCA some 18 years later, it unquestionably was not superfluous at the time it was enacted. We would certainly hesitate to read a statute in a manner that would leave an entire subsection superfluous, and we do not do so here. See Christensen v. Comm’r, 523 F.3d 957, 961 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14009 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We should avoid an interpretation that would render [entire] subsections redundant.”). The canon against redundancy is rooted in the notion (perhaps aspirational) that Congress would not do anything as preposterous as to pass a statute that was, in part or in whole, a nullity ab initio. Cf. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. BF Goodrich Aerospace Aerostructures Group, 387 F.3d 1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (“ ‘[A]bsent clear congressional intent to the contrary, the legislature did not intend to pass vain or meaningless legislation.’ ”) (quoting Coyne & Delany Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 102 F.3d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1996)) (alterations omitted). The presumption applies more weakly in situations, like this one, in which the provision is potentially rendered superfluous by language contained in a separate, later statute. Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1991) (we must “mak[e] every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, “[r]edundancies across statutes are not unusual events in drafting,” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992), and it would not be surprising to a frequent reader of federal statutes that Congress might pass a later, more comprehensive statute that has the effect of rendering an earlier statute redundant, at least in part.15 The Supreme Court has already held that § 2679(b) applies to all federal employees, 15 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 256 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I think it far more likely that Congress inadvertently created a redundancy than that Congress intended to withdraw appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory bankruptcy appeals by the roundabout method of reconferring jurisdiction over appeals from final bankruptcy orders.”); Zorich v. Long Beach Fire Dep’t & Ambulance Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a later, more general statute did not render a prior one superfluous because they provide “two separate means of qualifying for coverage”); cf. 2B Normal J. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51:5 (7th ed. 2007) (“A later general act may be held to supercede a prior narrower one where the later act purports to deal comprehensively with the subject to which it pertains.”). 14010 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD regardless of whether they were covered by pre-LRTCA immunities. See United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1991) (“The Liability Reform Act’s plain language makes no distinction between employees who are covered under preAct immunity statutes and those who are not.”).16 [12] In any event, we disagree that our reading makes the text of § 233(a) superfluous, post-LRTCA. A review of the rest of § 233 reveals why: subsection (a) remains the lynchpin of the entire balance of the section. See Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006) (“Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis.”). Other subsections of § 233 have extended subsection (a) protection to private persons and entities (who are not otherwise “employees” covered by FTCA) by stating that they are to be “deemed to be an employee of the Public Health Service.”17 Still other subsections involve the administration and 16 In Smith, the pre-LRTCA immunity in question was the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a), which, like § 233(a), provides that the FTCA is the exclusive remedy for personal injury caused by armed forces physicians. Below, this court, joining the Eleventh Circuit, held that § 1089(a) granted immunity only for torts occurring in the United States. See Smith v. Marshall, 885 F.2d 650, 652-54 (9th Cir. 1989); Newman v. Soballe, 871 F.2d 969, 974 (11th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, regardless of whether the Gonzalez Act would immunize foreign conduct, the LRTCA did, and the individual defendants were therefore immune. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. at 172. Smith thus presented the opposite question from that posed here: in Smith, the pre-LRTCA immunity statute purportedly contained an exception to immunity not present in the LRTCA; in our case, PHS Defendants argue that the LRTCA contains an exception to immunity not in the preLRTCA immunity statute. Because we hold that § 233(a) does not provide an immunity for Bivens torts, Smith is of little relevance to us here beyond the proposition for which we cite it in the text above. 17 See § 233(g) (operators of health centers receiving federal funds under 42 U.S.C. § 254(b), (j) (officers, employees, or contractors of health center operators), (m) (managed care plans entering into contracts with health centers), (o) (health professionals volunteering at free clinics), (p) (professionals carrying out smallpox countermeasures in the event of “bioterrorist incident” or other emergency). CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14011 limitation of this preemption.18 Section 233(a), by defining the scope of immunity granted uniquely to PHS employees (respecting only “the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions”), allows PHS and the Attorney General to provide a limited grant of immunity to volunteers and recipients of federal funds. After the LRTCA, then, the ongoing function of § 233, read as a whole, is to extend the FTCA exclusivity to private entities, much like many other statutes scattered throughout the U.S. Code. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 510(g)(1) (immunizing official acts by employees of National Academy of Sciences carrying out the future strategic highway research program); 42 U.S.C. § 5055(f)(1)(A) (volunteers of the Domestic Volunteer Services); 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a(d)(2)(A) (Health and Human Services contractors involved in research and development activities related to “qualified countermeasures” against certain weapons of mass destruction); 50 U.S.C. § 2783(b)(1) (government contractors under Atomic Testing Liability Act). It would, indeed, be superfluous to add an explicit exemption for such “deemed” employees from Bivens actions because such private actors are not subject to Bivens actions. Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). c. Context [13] In addition to historical context, individual statutes are located within a greater statutory and remedial context. We must “find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested.” United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984)). As we have noted, § 233(a) is not the 18 See, e.g., § 233(h) (qualifications for designation under subsection (g)), (k) (estimation of annual claims and establishment of fund), (n) (reports to Congress detailing United States’ risk exposure by virtue of deemed employees). 14012 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD only statute that makes the FTCA the exclusive remedy for injuries committed by certain classes of federal employees (although their meaning is not before us here). Most, like § 233(a), concern federal medical personnel. Some expressly limit themselves to actions involving “malpractice or negligence.” 22 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1) (State Department medical personnel); 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1)(A) (Veterans Health Administration). Others specify in the text only a “negligent or wrongful act or omission.” 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a) (Department of Defense, Armed Forces Retirement Home, and Central Intelligence Agency medical personnel); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2458a (NASA). Additionally, Department of Defense lawyers are given immunity for any “negligent or wrongful act or omission” connected with their provision of legal services. 10 U.S.C. § 1054(a). All, like § 233(a), mention “malpractice” in their title. All of these classes of employee might, absent § 2679(b)(1), face substantial common law and statutory malpractice liability.19 Granting these individuals, along with all federal employees driving motor vehicles (the former function of § 2679(b)), immunity from state negligence actions served a very real, obvious common purpose.20 PHS Defendants and amicus the United States, however, have provided no explanation for why Congress would want to provide these persons with the privilege, shared with no other federal employees, to violate the Constitution without 19 Notably, all the above statutes were passed well before the LRTCA gave a general grant of immunity to federal employees, with the exception of 38 U.S.C. § 7316, which was added in 1991. Department of Veterans Affairs Health-Care Personnel Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-40, 105 Stat. 187 (1991). As we have seen, however, that statute was itself simply a recodification of the much older pre-LRTCA immunity formerly located at 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a). See id. § 402, 105 Stat. at 238 (renumbering § 4116 as § 7316). 20 See Willmore Testimony at 76 (describing pre-LRTCA immunities as allowing “the United States . . . to develop a consistent and uniform approach to medical malpractice and automobile tort litigation—two of the most common types of common law torts”). CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14013 consequence. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Nor have we ever suggested that a category of federal agents can commit Eighth Amendment violations with impunity.”). Why should the physicians who treat our soldiers’ families21 be immune from constitutional torts while the physicians who treat our veterans are not? Why distinguish the Bureau of Prisons medical personnel who allowed a man in federal custody to die in Carlson from the PHS personnel who allegedly relegated a man in immigration detention to a similar outcome here? What is it about Department of Defense attorneys, alone among our government’s legions of legal personnel, that they deserve such solicitude? The LRTCA was passed to abolish such arbitrary distinctions. In his written statement to Congress, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General noted the absurdity of treating doctors, drivers, and Defense Department lawyers differently from all other federal employees. “For example, lawyers involved in Department of Commerce contracting should be protected from personal liability for their professional advice, just like their counterparts in the Department of Defense.” Willmore Testimony at 76. Yet twenty years later, his successors at the Justice Department would have us re-introduce the exact same disparity in miniature, immunizing one set of doctors and lawyers from Bivens liability, and leaving the rest on the hook. [14] Had Congress intended this result, it surely would have said so—in the statute itself, in its title, or in the legislative history. Instead, the statute is silent as to the Constitution, and both the title and contemporary and subsequent legislative 21 Military personnel themselves are generally unable to bring Bivens actions for injuries that “ ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.’ ” United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683 (1987) (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). Notably, although it was ultimately disposed of on other grounds, at no point in the Stanley litigation, which involved U.S. Army physicians’ secret experimentation with LSD on unsuspecting soldiers, does it appear that it occurred to anyone to invoke 10 U.S.C. § 1089. 14014 CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD history suggest that Congress intended to preclude only common law malpractice claims. This cannot be what the Supreme Court meant by an explicitly declared substitute. We therefore hold that § 233(a) does not explicitly declare the FTCA to be a substitute remedy for Bivens actions against PHS officers and employees. 3. Cuoco v. Moritsugu We recognize that our holding in this case conflicts with the Second Circuit’s decision in Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99. In Cuoco, the court relied on dicta in Carlson which it read to imply that § 233(a) was an expressly declared substitute for Bivens. Id. at 108. In Carlson, the Supreme Court wrote that its conclusion that the FTCA complements Bivens, rather than replaces it, is buttressed by the significant fact that Congress follows the practice of explicitly stating when it means to make FTCA an exclusive remedy. See 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a), 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2458a, 10 U.S.C. § 1089(a), and 22 U.S.C. § 817(a) (malprac- tice by certain Government health personnel); 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (operation of motor vehicles by federal employees); and 42 U.S.C. § 247b(k) (manufacturers of swine flu vaccine). 446 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added). In the middle of a discussion about Bivens preemption, it is easy to skip over what, buried in a string citation, the Supreme Court actually said was preempted under § 233(a), et al., i.e., actions for “malpractice.” Indeed, the Court also cited 38 U.S.C. § 4116(a) (1980), which by its terms expressly limited Veterans Health Administration medical personnel’s immunity to actions “allegedly arising from malpractice or negligence.”22 Moreover, 22 Cuoco found this express limitation in § 4116(a)’s modern successor, 38 U.S.C. § 7316(a)(1), to be meaningful for interpreting § 233(a). CASTANEDA v. HENNEFORD 14015 before the passage of the LRTCA’s general “exclusive remedy” provision, the enumerated statutes were the only statutes that provided that the FTCA to be exclusive of any remedy. We believe that the better reading of the Court’s dictum in Carlson is that just as Congress, through certain statutes, made the FTCA a substitute remedy for medical malpractice actions, so it could—but did not—declare the FTCA to be a substitute remedy for federal constitutional claims. Cuoco also failed to discuss whether Congress viewed the remedies provided under the FTCA as “equally effective” as those provided under Bivens, a question that the Carlson Court explicitly answered in the negative. Because, under Carlson, compliance with its “equally effective” prong is a necessary pre-condition for holding a statutory remedy to be a substitute for a Bivens cause of action, Cuoco’s failure to address that prong or the answer provided by Carlson is contrary to governing Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit’s analysis or application of Carlson.