Opinion ID: 162747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Remarks Invoking Sympathy For the Victims

Text: 44 The prosecutors made a number of remarks during both stages of the trial that appear to have been meant to elicit sympathy for the victims. These remarks include comments contrasting the state of the Nguyen family before and after Mr. Nguyen's death, 4 comments repeating Mr. Nguyen's dying words, 5 comments suggesting the victims—and not Mr. Le— deserve the jury's sympathy, 6 and comments highlighting the impact on Mrs. Nguyen and her daughter. 7 In addition, Mr. Macy contrasted Mr. Nguyen's death with the life Mr. Le would live if given anything other than a death sentence: 45 Next year [Mr. Le] will be a year older and Hai Nguyen will be 34 years old from now until eternity. He will always be 34. Tr. vol. IV, at 729-30. And: 46 Ladies and gentlemen, justice needs to be done in this case. Defense counsel asked you to sentence [sic] a punishment of life imprisonment or life without parole, but do you really think that justice would be done if this man goes to prison, gets three meals a day and a clean bed every night and regular visits from his family while Hai Nguyen lays cold in his grave[?] 47 Id. at 743. 48 It is a hallmark of a fair and civilized justice system that verdicts be based on reason, not emotion, revenge, or even sympathy. Arguments that improperly encourage the jury to impose a sentence of death based on considerations of sympathy for the victims may constitute due process error. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1172 (10th Cir.1999) (This court does not condone prosecutorial remarks encouraging the jury to allow sympathy [for the victim] to influence its decision.); cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (If, in a particular case, a witness' [victim impact] testimony ... so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.) (O'Connor, J., concurring). It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (emphasis added). 49 Certainly, states may choose to allow victim impact testimony, see Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, and Oklahoma allows testimony about a crime's impact on the victims so long as the testimony does not violate due process. See Cargle v. Oklahoma, 909 P.2d 806, 826 (Okla.Crim.App.1995). To the extent that Mr. Macy's comments attempted to convey to the jury the impact of the murder on the victim's family, such comments comport with due process absent a showing that they rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597. 50 On the other hand, some of these comments, especially in conjunction with those discussed below, would not assist a jury in rendering a just verdict based on reason. Mr. Le argues that all murder trials—by definition—have a victim who will forever remain dead and that it is error for a prosecutor to overly—assert this fact to the jury. In addressing Mr. Le's argument on this point, the Court of Criminal Appeals admonished: 51 The State should not encourage the jury to impose the death penalty out of sympathy for the victims. This Court has specifically condemned many of the comments made in [the] second stage [of this case and in another case involving the same prosecutor], stating [t]here is no reason for them and counsel knows better and does not need to go so far in the future. Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 19 ([Okla.Crim.App.] 1995). Le persuasively argues that the State's contention—it is unfair for Le to live since Nguyen is dead—creates a super-aggravator applicable in every death case. No amount of mitigating evidence can counter this argument, and if the jury agrees they may not even consider mitigating evidence. 52 Le I, 947 P.2d at 554-55 (citations omitted and emphasis added). The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that these arguments were certainly error[.] Id. at 555. 53 While testimony by witnesses about the impact on victims may be proper, a prosecutor should not seek to inflame the jury through needless repetition of testimony already presented. And as noted by the Oklahoma court in Le I, over-emphasizing the permanency of the victim's death may constitute error because all homicides, by definition, have a victim who will forever remain dead. Repeated attempts by the prosecution to contrast the living defendant with the dead victim might encourage the jury not to consider mitigating evidence, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994) (noting the requirement that the jury consider mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence). 54 Nevertheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the error was harmless in light of the overall record. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 555. That court noted defense counsel's failure to object to most of the prosecutors' comments at trial and referenced both the overall circumstances of the case and the trial as a whole. See id. at 556. Hence, it appears that the Court of Criminal Appeals considered the correct factors in reaching its determination. See Trice, 196 F.3d at 1167 (discussing the proper analysis in determining whether a trial was fundamentally unfair). Moreover, Mr. Le admits that his attorney failed to object to many of the prosecutor's comments at issue. 55 Of much greater significance in the present context is the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Le's guilt and evidence of the aggravating factors supporting the death sentence. Further, the trial court instructed the jury that, as alternatives to the death penalty, it could impose a sentence of life or life without parole. Mr. Le's counsel reminded the jury of that fact in his closing argument, and he added that the prosecutor does not make the law. These instructions and arguments effectively countered Mr. Macy's emphasis on what the Court of Criminal Appeals called the super-aggravator. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 554-55. Since Oklahoma allows victim impact testimony so long as it does not violate due process, and since the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the appropriate federal law in determining that the prosecutors' comments did not make the trial fundamentally unfair, we cannot conclude that court's judgment was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Therefore, Mr. Le is not entitled to relief on this basis.