Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Capacity to Perceive and Recollect

Text: Defendant argues that Pridgon did not have the necessary capacity to perceive and recollect in order to testify under Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a). To testify, a witness must have personal knowledge of the subject of the testimony, i.e., a present recollection of an impression derived from the exercise of the witness' own senses. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code (1995 ed.) foll. § 702, p. 300; Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a).) In order to have personal knowledge, a witness must have the capacity to perceive and recollect. (See People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 525, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) The capacity to perceive and recollect is a condition for the admissibility of a witness's testimony on a certain matter, rather than a prerequisite for the witness's competency. ( Ibid. ) [4] Upon a party's objection, a witness's personal knowledge must be shown before the witness may testify regarding the matter. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a); see also id., § 403, subd. (c)(1) [upon a party's request, a court must instruct the jury as to whether a preliminary fact exists before it may consider the proffered evidence].) `[I]f there is evidence that the witness has those capacities, the determination whether [he] in fact perceived and does recollect is left to the trier of fact.' [Citations.] ( People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 526, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035; 2 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Witnesses, § 46, p. 297 [the capacity to perceive and recollect is only preliminarily determined by the trial judge, and ultimately redetermined by the jury].) A trial court should allow a witness's testimony unless no jury could reasonably find that he has such [personal] knowledge. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. § 701, p. 284.) The fact that a witness has made inconsistent and exaggerated statements does not indicate an inability to perceive [or] recollect. . . . ( People v. Willard (1983) 155 Cal.App.3d 237, 240, 202 Cal.Rptr. 100.) Nor does a witness's mental defect or insane delusions necessarily reflect that the witness lacks the capacity to perceive or recollect. ( People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420, 317 P.2d 974; People v. La Rue (1923) 62 Cal.App. 276, 284, 216 P. 627 [`It is admissible . . . in order to affect the credibility of the witness, to prove that he was or is subject to insane delusions; that his mind and memory are impaired by disease' ].) A witness's uncertainty about his or her recollection of events does not preclude admitting his or her testimony. ( People v. Avery (1950) 35 Cal.2d 487, 492, 218 P.2d 527 [uncertainty of recollection goes to the weight and not admissibility of a witness's testimony].) Defendant did not timely object to Pridgon's incapacity to perceive and recollect to limit the admissibility of Pridgon's testimony before he testified. Thus, without an objection, the trial court was not required to determine whether Pridgon had personal knowledge before he testified. (Evid.Code, § 702, subd. (a).) Although a party may move to strike a witness's testimony when lack of personal knowledge is shown on cross-examination (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 2 West's Ann. Evid.Code, supra, foil. § 702, p. 300), defendant did not challenge Pridgon's testimony on this basis. Rather, defendant agreed that Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was a matter of impeachment, and proceeded to impeach his capacity through cross-examination and expert testimony. (Evid.Code, § 780, subd. (c); see also People v. Cooks (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 224, 302, 190 Cal.Rptr. 211 [A witness may be cross-examined about his mental condition or emotional stability to the extent it may affect his powers of perception, memory (recollection), or communication].) Thus, defendant's failure to object timely on the basis of Evidence Code section 702, subdivision (a), constitutes a waiver of this claim on appeal. (See People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 622, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 [party must object to witness's lack of testimonial competence to preserve this claim on appeal].) Even assuming, however, that defendant had timely and specifically objected on this ground (see Evid.Code, § 353), we find no substantial basis for the trial court to have excluded Pridgon's testimony. Although Pridgon's testimony may have consisted of inconsistencies, incoherent responses, and possible hallucinations, delusions and confabulations, Pridgon presented a plausible account of the circumstances of [Simms's] murder. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 [witness who suffered from delusions was not incompetent to testify].) Pridgon testified to many details of the crime, which were unlikely to be known by anyone not present, and which were independently corroborated by the evidence. He also led police to the place where the two-by-four was discarded. Moreover, despite instances of Pridgon's incomprehensible testimony (often on cross-examination), he also testified lucidly, albeit simply, throughout trial. For instance, after Pridgon testified he saw defendant get on top of Simms after striking her, the prosecution asked if defendant did anything to her. Pridgon replied, Yeah, he had his hand right here. (Indicating.) Q[:] All right. Now you said he had his hand `right here'? A[:] On her throat. Q[:] `On the throat,' okay. And you showed me something with your hand. Whatwhat was it that you saw him doing with his hand? A[:] He tore her blouse up, and stick his hand up there in her bosom. In short, there was no substantial basis for the court to exclude Pridgon's testimony; rather, it was up to the jury to determine whether Pridgon's recollections were true. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 574, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; see also People v. McCaughan, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 420, 317 P.2d 974; People v. Avery, supra, 35 Cal.2d at p. 492, 218 P.2d 527; People v. Willard, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 240, 202 Cal.Rptr. 100.) Although defendant maintains that Pridgon's intimate knowledge of the crimes indicated that Pridgon and not defendant committed the crimes, this is a separate issue from whether Pridgon had the capacity to perceive and recollect. Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, we cannot conclude that Pridgon's testimony about hearing blood flow was improbable as a matter of law. (See, e.g., People v. Crowell (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 1053, 1057, 244 Cal.Rptr. 296 [stabbing victim `could hear the air and the blood bubbling out my back']; People v. Fernandez (1950) 301 N.Y. 302, 316, 93 N.E.2d 859 [defendant `could hear blood dripping' from victim who was lying flat on the floor]; State v. Oslund (1985) 71 Or.App. 701, 704, 693 P.2d 1354 [defendant heard [shooting victim's] blood dripping on the floor].) Nor can we conclude as a matter of law that Pridgon could not hear the sound of money. The rustling of paper money is an audible sound. (See, e.g., Rushing v. State (Ind.1983) 449 N.E.2d 597, 598 [witness to robbery did not see defendant take money from the cash register but heard the sound of money rustling and cash drawer clips flopping].) Indeed, in ruling on defendant's subsequent motion for a new trial, the trial court stated: The Court sat approximately four to six feet from Pridgon during his entire trial testimony. The Court had an ample opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner in which Mr. Pridgon testified. In addition, the Court had an opportunity to observe the attitude of Mr. Pridgon toward this action and toward the giving of testimony in general. It is clear that Mr. Pridgon suffers from some type of mental problem. At the very least it can be said that he is a slow learner, [¶] However, the Court believed [Pridgon's testimony regarding the murder]. The trial court rejected defendant's contention that Pridgon hallucinated the death and the manner of killing. Although the court noted that Pridgon's testimony included inconsistencies (and did not attempt to reconcile them), it stated that, The Court can only reiterate that at no time has the Court questioned the credibility of Mr. Pridgon on the fact that the Defendant killed Sandra Simms and took money from her person at the time of the killing. As noted, because defendant failed to object that Pridgon had the capacity to perceive and recollect in order to testify, the trial court had no occasion to consider this issue. However, based on the record before us, we conclude that the trial court's statements regarding Pridgon's credibility strongly suggest that the court would have overruled defendant's objection and rejected his argument on this claim. To that end, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court erroneously believed that Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect was an issue relating only to impeachment. The trial court's statements noted above reflect that it believed Pridgon had such capacity. Plainly, Pridgon fell well short of being an ideal witness. As the prosecution's psychologist testified, it would be easy to inadvertently confuse Pridgon, given his limited intellectual abilities. Inevitably, his confusion mounted when someone motivated to make him look incredibleas defense counsel wasasked the questions. As a reviewing court, we confront a cold record without the trial court's benefit of observing firsthand the appearance and demeanor of the witness. Here, both the jury and trial court found that Pridgon was a credible witness, and we must give proper deference to such findings. ( People v. Jones (1968) 268 Cal. App.2d 161, 165, 73 Cal.Rptr. 727.) Thus, we reject defendant's constitutional challenges based on his right of confrontation protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, his rights to due process, to present a defense, to a trial by jury, and to a reliable conviction afforded under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right to a reliable, individualized capital sentencing determination guaranteed under the Eighth Amendment. For similar reasons, we reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely object to Pridgon's capacity to perceive and recollect, or for otherwise conceding Pridgon's capacity was a matter of impeachment. Where there was no sound legal basis for objection, counsel's failure to object to the admission of the evidence cannot establish ineffective assistance. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 616, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.)