Opinion ID: 203821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Paret-Ruiz argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his drug conspiracy convictions because there was no evidence produced at trial that he reached an agreement to import or possess cocaine with anyone other than a government agent. We review Paret-Ruiz's sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 105 (1st Cir. 2005). We will not overturn a guilty verdict unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no reasonable jury could have rendered [it]. United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 27 (1st Cir.2003). Further, we will not assess the credibility of witnesses, as that is a role reserved for the jury. United States v. Nishnianidze, 342 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir.2003). To establish that the defendant is guilty of participating in a narcotics conspiracy, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that `an agreement existed to commit the underlying substantive offense, and that the defendant elected to join the agreement, intending that the underlying offense be committed.' Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d at 105 (quoting United States v. Medina-Martinez, 396 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2005)). The essence of the crime is the conspirators' agreement to act in concert to import, possess, and distribute illegal drugs. United States v. Cruz, 568 F.2d 781, 782 (1st Cir.1978); see United States v. Rodríguez, 525 F.3d 85, 104 (1st Cir.2008). The agreement must exist between two or more persons, and as a matter of law, there can be no conspiracy between a defendant and a government agent. United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35, 51 n. 11 (1st Cir.2004); United States v. Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st Cir.1987). An agreement between coconspirators may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and it may be tacit. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d at 107; United States v. Portela, 167 F.3d 687, 695 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 950 (1st Cir.1992) ([A]n agreement ... may be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.) (internal quotation marks omitted). A conspiratorial agreement, therefore, need not be express so long as its existence can plausibly be inferred from the defendants' words and actions.... Concemi, 957 F.2d at 950. Further, the conspiracy need not succeed for the conviction to stand. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d at 28. The indictment in this case charged an agreement among Paret-Ruiz, Santana, Coriano, and other known and unknown individuals to import, possess, and distribute cocaine. [4] The evidence presented by the government to support the conspiracy charges consisted of the testimony of Agent González, audio recordings of conversations between Agent González and Paret-Ruiz, and an audio recording of a conversation between Paret-Ruiz and Santana which Agent González overheard. [5] Because a conspiracy cannot exist between a government agent and an individual, these conversations are not direct evidence of the charged conspiracy. The conversations may, however, constitute circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy among Paret-Ruiz, Santana, and Coriano if they show that these individuals agreed to work together to import and possess, with an intent to distribute, five or more kilograms of cocaine in violation of United States law. See Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d at 28; United States v. Elledge, 723 F.2d 864, 866 (11th Cir.1984). Agent González testified that Paret-Ruiz was involved in discussions with numerous unidentified individuals regarding cocaine loads in Antigua, and that several discussions fell through for a variety of reasons. He also testified that Paret-Ruiz had discussions with individuals he later identified as Santana and Coriano, who had cocaine contacts in St. Maarten and Antigua. At the March 16, 2004, meeting, Agent González overheard Paret-Ruiz's side of a phone conversation Paret-Ruiz had with an individual later identified as Santana, in which he told Santana that he was with the people who had the boat, and asked if Coriano was still interested. Santana called Paret-Ruiz back and he confirmed that Coriano was still interested. However, they could not agree on the fee which Paret-Ruiz and Agent González would collect because Paret-Ruiz insisted upon a twenty percent fee. Following this meeting, Paret-Ruiz stated that Santana and Coriano were still interested, but that he wanted to wait because some individuals had recently been arrested on drug charges. Agent González had no further conversations with Paret-Ruiz. In August of 2004, Coriano met with Agent González and the FBI CI regarding the transportation of cocaine loads into Puerto Rico. In October of 2004, the FBI CI met with Santana, who told the FBI CI that the discussions with Paret-Ruiz fell through because they could not agree on the fee. This is a close case. While there is evidence of numerous discussions between Paret-Ruiz and several unidentified individuals regarding available cocaine loads as well as evidence of Paret-Ruiz's desire to effectuate a cocaine deal, there is a lack of sufficient evidence showing that he actually reached an agreement to act in concert with Santana and Coriano. Cruz, 568 F.2d at 782. Contrary to the government's assertion, the evidence often does not indicate which individuals Paret-Ruiz is referring to in his discussions with Agent González. [6] The government argues that there is evidence that Paret-Ruiz, Santana, and Coriano agreed on the specific amount of cocaine and the specifics regarding the pick-up and transportation of the cocaine by boat. Agent González's testimony regarding his conversations with Paret-Ruiz, however, establishes that an agreement existed only between Paret-Ruiz and Agent González. Although Agent González testified that Paret-Ruiz, Santana, and Coriano had generally agreed, he did not testify as to what they agreed on, and in the same statement, Agent González recalls that they [Santana and Coriano] were still seeking transportation for the drug shipments, which indicates that they had not reached an agreement with Paret-Ruiz. The government also cites to Nelson-Rodriguez, and argues that a completed transaction is not necessary in proving the existence of a conspiracy. In Nelson-Rodriguez, three of the defendants appealed from their drug conspiracy convictions and argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the existence of a conspiracy because many of the drug importation plans never came to fruition and their negotiations failed to produce a complete `meeting of the minds' on issues such as the exact location for the handover of the drugs at sea or the division of the proceeds. 319 F.3d at 28. Noting that a conspiracy conviction does not require that the conspiracy succeed, nor that the underlying act even be attempted, we held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that an agreement existed among the defendants to work together to buy and sell illegal narcotics. Id. The evidence in Nelson-Rodriguez showed that the defendants had agreed to import several loads of cocaine from Columbia and heroin from St. Maarten. Their agreement was evidenced by their plans to procure a boat, navigational charts, and radios, and by the designation of boat captains, coordinators, security monitors, and drug distributors. An undercover agent also met with two coconspirators on several occasions, at which they agreed to work together to import 1,100 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia, although the transaction ultimately fell through for numerous reasons. There was also evidence that a few of the coconspirators successfully imported 250 kilograms of cocaine into Puerto Rico. In the present case, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Paret-Ruiz wanted to make a deal to transport drugs into Puerto Rico. A reasonable jury could also find that Coriano had cocaine connections in St. Maarten and Antigua, that he and Santana were looking for someone to transport and deliver the cocaine to them in Puerto Rico, and that Paret-Ruiz and Santana had discussions regarding the transportation of cocaine. The evidence was insufficient, however, for a reasonable jury to conclude that Paret-Ruiz had an agreement with anyone other than Agent González to work together to import and possess illegal drugs. Unlike the evidence presented in Nelson-Rodriguez, which showed that the coconspirators had agreed to work together to import drugs, here there was only evidence of Paret-Ruiz's failed attempts to make a deal with Santana and Coriano. The government further argues that by reaching a guilty verdict after hearing Paret-Ruiz's testimony, the jury necessarily rejected it as untruthful, which provides further evidence of his guilt. See United States v. Restrepo-Contreras, 942 F.2d 96, 99 (1st Cir.1991). While we have applied this principle before when upholding convictions, it has been in cases where there was, independent of the defendant's testimony, sufficient evidence of guilt. See United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 999 (1st Cir.1990) (finding evidence of guilt was further bolstered by what the jury could have found to be a tall tale). Here, Paret-Ruiz's testimony notwithstanding, there is insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Paret-Ruiz reached an agreement with Santana and Coriano to import, possess, and distribute cocaine. Therefore, because we find that the evidence, `viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict[,] gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged,' we must reverse the conviction. United States v. Reyes, 352 F.3d 511, 518 (1st Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir.1998)). Before concluding, we add a final note regarding the trial court's statements to Paret-Ruiz at sentencing. When Paret-Ruiz requested that the court consider a sentence below the guideline range, the court responded that the government may agree to such a departure if, for example, you waive your right to appeal. Paret-Ruiz declined to waive his right to appeal. However, we caution the trial court against engaging in such discussions with the defendant.