Opinion ID: 1588587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fourth successive postconviction motion

Text: On appeal from the denial of his fourth successive postconviction motion, Marek raises two claims. He argues that newly discovered evidence demonstrates (A) that  based on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Caperton  Marek's right to due process was violated when Judge Kaplan presided over Marek's 1984 sentencing and the 1988 evidentiary hearing on his initial motion for postconviction relief; and (B) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. The postconviction court summarily denied these claims without holding a case management conference or an evidentiary hearing. Even if we assume that the postconviction court should have held a case management conference pursuant to rule 3.851(h)(6), any error was harmless. The failure to hold a hearing on a successive postconviction motion that is legally insufficient on its face is harmless error. See Davis v. State, 736 So.2d 1156, 1159 n. 1 (Fla.1999); see also Groover v. State, 703 So.2d 1035, 1038 (Fla.1997) ([E]ven if a Huff [ v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993),] hearing had been required in the instant case, the court's failure to do so would be harmless as no evidentiary hearing was required and relief was not warranted on the motion.). As explained below, Marek's fourth successive postconviction motion was legally insufficient on its face and without merit. The postconviction court summarily denied the two claims Marek raised in his fourth successive postconviction motion. Postconviction claims may be summarily denied when they are legally insufficient, should have been brought on direct appeal, or are positively refuted by the record. Connor v. State, 979 So.2d 852, 868 (Fla.2007). Because a postconviction court's decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.851 motion is ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003).
Marek argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated under Caperton when Judge Kaplan presided over Marek's 1984 sentencing and the 1988 evidentiary hearing on his initial motion for postconviction relief. Marek raised a substantially similar claim in his recent appeal, arguing that when Caperton was issued, it would apply to his claim. In our previous opinion, we agreed with the postconviction court that Marek's due process claim was legally insufficient and meritless, and we found it likely that any decision in that case would be irrelevant to Marek's case. Marek, 8 So.3d at 1131. In Caperton, the Supreme Court determined on the basis of extraordinary facts regarding a litigant's campaign contributions to a state supreme court justice that the Constitution required the justice to grant the opposing party's motion to disqualify him in the case. Caperton, 129 S.Ct. at 2257. Now that Caperton is final, we are certain that it is irrelevant to Marek's case. The claim is procedurally barred. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.851(d). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying this claim in Marek's fourth successive postconviction motion.
Marek contends that the postconviction court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on his claim that newly discovered evidence reveals that his trial counsel, Hilliard Moldof, provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Marek's claim is based on the State's cross-examination of Moldof during the most recent evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Moldof expressed the opinion that his performance during Marek's penalty phase was deficient. Marek is not entitled to relief on this claim. We have previously explained that trial counsel's own admission that he or she was ineffective is not evidence of counsel's performance and thus fails to form the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 877 n. 3 (Fla.1997) (noting that an attorney's own admission that he or she was ineffective is of little persuasion in determining whether trial counsel was ineffective); Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397, 401 n. 4 (Fla.1991); Kelley v. State, 569 So.2d 754, 761 (Fla.1990). Moreover, in this claim, Marek wholly fails to address how Moldof's opinion could possibly establish the prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the postconviction court did not err in summarily denying this claim.