Opinion ID: 2183832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Post-Conviction Relief in Indiana

Text: The care which Indiana courts take to protect the rights of criminal defendants has advanced considerably since the nineteenth century, when one who had pleaded guilty in open court was simply presumed to know what he was doing. The trial judge before whom such a plea was made had little duty with respect to advising the defendant of his rights or making findings about the defendant's plea. Confronted with a claim that a convicted felon was entitled to withdraw his plea because the trial court had not found him guilty, this Court said: The prisoner, by his confession, has made a finding unnecessary. The court may take the prisoner at his word, and proceed accordingly. Griffith v. State (1871), 36 Ind. 406, 408. Although there was a presumption that one who pleaded guilty had done so voluntarily and intelligently, our courts did not hesitate to set aside convictions when it appeared that a defendant pleaded guilty through coercion or misapprehension of the nature of the proceedings. Several generations before the U.S. Supreme Court held that states were required to do so, [3] Indiana resurrected the ancient common law writ of coram nobis as a vehicle by which to provide relief to defendants whose rights had been violated. Sanders v. State (1882), 85 Ind. 318 (prisoner whose plea is induced by fear of a lynch mob entitled to withdraw his plea and have a trial); Myers v. State (1888), 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (plea induced by false promises rendered to a defendant acting without legal representation should be set aside). Having perceived the obligation to provide a way to correct manifest injustice imposed in earlier proceedings, Indiana courts have struggled with competing values: (1) the need to vindicate federal and state rights by correcting errors, and (2) the need to bring proceedings to a rest, especially where the passage of time reduces the possibility that a new trial will be reliable. Note, Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis in Indiana, 26 Ind.L.J. 529 (1951). In the twentieth century, this Court acted to require transcription of all guilty pleas and developed case law governing post-conviction proceedings. Rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana, Rule 1-11 (1946 rev.); State v. Lindsey (1952), 231 Ind. 126, 106 N.E.2d 230; Crooks v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 505, 15 N.E.2d 359. Thus, long before the leading federal cases on guilty pleas, Indiana courts recognized that fundamental fairness required something more than a docket sheet notation that the defendant appeared and pleaded. In an effort to provide a uniform framework, the General Assembly enacted Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3, specifying the information which a trial judge must impart to a defendant before accepting his plea of guilty, and Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-4, requiring that a trial judge make certain findings. 1973 Ind. Acts, Public Law 325. Although the statute required that the trial judge address the defendant and inform him that by pleading guilty he was waiving certain rights, this Court concluded that a defendant was not entitled to post-conviction relief where the record showed that he actually knew about the rights he was waiving. Neeley v. State, 269 Ind. 588, 382 N.E.2d 714 (defendant who testified at post-conviction hearing that pleading guilty meant he was giving up his right to confront his accusers was advised of his right). Subsequently, this Court overruled Neeley and held in German that the failure of the trial judge personally to inform the defendant of each of the advisements listed in Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 at the time he entered his plea of guilty required that the conviction be vacated and the plea set aside. Giving the same advisements through written plea bargain agreements was held to be not an adequate substitute for a personal advisement of so fundamental a matter as the concept of waiver. German, 428 N.E.2d at 236. The meaning of this decision was clear. Since Gary German and his co-defendant, Larry Jackson, had each signed plea agreements acknowledging the waiver of his rights, it was not ignorance which made their pleas unintelligent and involuntary. Rather, they were entitled to relief because the trial judge had not followed the Code by personally reciting the right they were waiving. In his dissent, Chief Justice Givan (with whom Justice Pivarnik joined) wrote: The entire matter of informing defendants of their constitutional rights should be used as a safeguard to see that persons are not misled or tricked into entering pleas of guilty without full knowledge of the circumstances. I do not think the system should be perverted to the extent that a person who is demonstrably fully informed must be granted a new trial simply because the trial judge did not engage in redundancy concerning warnings to the defendants. German, 428 N.E.2d at 237. The Indiana General Assembly responded to the German decision by passing Public Law 179, 1984 Ind. Acts, which added subsection 35-35-1-2(c) to the Code section on advisements: Any variance from the requirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty. This action of the General Assembly cut at the heart of the German decision, which had described the judge's obligation to advise defendants as statutory. 428 N.E.2d at 237. Asked by the Attorney General to give effect to the legislature's enactment, the German majority announced in Austin v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1027, that the State had misconstrued the German decision as being grounded in statute. The Court now declared that strict compliance with the list of advisements was constitutionally required. The legislature's harmless error amendment was a nullity, the Court held, because all of the advisements listed in the Indiana Code were of constitutional dimension. The Austin majority declared: An accused's entitlement to such advisements, therefore, flows from his due process right to be sheltered from the consequences of a guilty plea entered on less than an informed judgment and not from the legislative inclusion of it in its codification. The legislature may, as a matter of public policy, require advisements that are not of such dimension, but it could not eliminate the requirements of those essential to an informed judgment, which includes the one omitted by the court that accepted the guilty plea. Id. at 1028. Was the constitution which required each of these advisements the United States Constitution or the Indiana Constitution? Most of the advisements listed in Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-3 do not have a basis recognized in federal constitutional law. Although the Austin majority cited Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), that case does not stand for the broad proposition espoused in Austin. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, identified only three federal constitutional rights which the record must disclose the defendant knew he was waiving before a reviewing court can affirm a finding that the plea was voluntary and intelligent: the right to a trial by jury, the right to confront one's accusers, and the right against self-incrimination. While some members of the U.S. Supreme Court have suggested that the Boykin list is not exhaustive, they have not prevailed. Neely v. Pennsylvania, 411 U.S. 954, 93 S.Ct. 1934, 36 L.Ed.2d 416 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting, with whom Stewart and Marshall, JJ., concur) (asserting that the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt is a Boykin right); Johnson v. Ohio, 419 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 200, 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting, with whom Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concur) (asserting that speedy trial is a Boykin right). If the right to be told each of the advisements listed in the Indiana Code did not derive from the federal constitution, then the due process right cited by the majority in Austin could only be understood to come from the Indiana Constitution. It is difficult to know from what provision of the Indiana Constitution this right to be told was drawn since the opinion rendered in Austin makes no reference to the Indiana Constitution. Moreover, examination of our constitution reveals that the words due process do not appear, much less terms like the trial court is not bound by the agreement. [4] Nevertheless, the Austin Court reviewed the Code sections on guilty plea advisement and determined that the legislative enactment had added little to their legal standing. Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2(a) and (b) merely codified certain specific advisements, a knowledge of which is essential to an informed judgment, without which a waiver may not be said to be voluntary. 468 N.E.2d at 1028. The majority cited with approval Jones v. State (1984), Ind. App., 467 N.E.2d 757, in which the Court of Appeals reviewed this Court's declarations that only strict compliance with the statutory advisements would support a finding that a defendant waived his fundamental constitutional rights and said: Implicit in this clear language are two logical conclusions. First, failure to inform the defendant of any of the rights enumerated in the guilty plea statute results in an invalid waiver of rights. And second, all of the items included in the guilty plea statute are of equal weight. All are of constitutional dimension. Id. at 759. By declaring that Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2(a) and (b) merely codified the advisements required by the Indiana Constitution, the Austin decision appeared to give clear guidance. As they existed at the time Austin was handed down, these subsections read as follows: Sec. 2. (a) The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, without first determining that the defendant: (1) understands the nature of the charge against him; (2) has been informed that by his plea he waives his rights to: (A) a public and speedy trial by jury; (B) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; (C) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and (D) require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself; (3) has been informed of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the crime charged and any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and (4) has been informed that if: (A) there is a plea agreement as defined by section 1 of this chapter; and (B) the court accepts the plea; the court is bound by the terms of the plea agreement. Section 2. (b) A defendant in a misdemeanor case may waive the rights under subsection (a) by signing a written waiver. At first glance, one can see that subsection 2(b) did not codify certain specific advisements. Instead, it provided that those pleading guilty to misdemeanors could be advised in writing rather than by the judge in open court. However, the very decision which Austin reaffirmed, namely German, held that written advisements would not be considered an adequate substitute for a personal advisement of so fundamental a matter as the concept of waiver and specifically rejected the notion that advisement of rights could be met by something short of a direct statement. 428 N.E.2d at 236, 237. At least one subsequent case treated subsection 2(b) as though it might be valid. French v. State (1984), Ind. App., 472 N.E.2d 210. If the Austin announcement that subsection 2(b) codified the constitution was not fully reliable, one is naturally led to examine the declaration that each of the advisements in subsection 2(a) were of constitutional dimension. Among the difficulties with this declaration was that Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2 was not enacted until after Dotsie Austin pleaded guilty to committing rape and voluntary manslaughter. [5] Thus, it would be impossible to judge the voluntariness of Dotsie Austin's plea by examining compliance with § 35-35-1-2. Perhaps the Austin Court meant to say that § 35-4.1-1-3 codified the constitution. It called § 35-35-1-2 a recodification of the earlier statute, namely § 35-4.1-1-3, which read: The court shall not accept a plea of guilty from the defendant without first addressing the defendant and (a) Determining that he understands the nature of charge against him; (b) Informing him that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment or information or to an offense included thereunder and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and sentence; (c) Informing him that by his plea of guilty he waives his rights to a public and speedy trial by jury, to face the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself; (d) Informing him of the maximum possible sentence for the offense charged and of any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; (e) Informing him that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby. Although the Austin majority called Ind. Code § 35-35-1-2 a recodification, it is apparent on the face of the two statutes that there are important differences. First, the earlier statute required the trial judge to address the defendant directly and advise him. The later statute instructed the trial judge to determine whether the defendant understood, as when a defendant who has signed a written waiver is asked whether he understands the rights he is waiving. Of course, this was the very kind of procedure which the German Court had held inadequate. If only direct advice by the trial judge was adequate, then § 35-35-1-2(a) could not possibly codify the constitution. The General Assembly made other important changes when it repealed § 35-4.1-1-3 and enacted § 35-35-1-2. The legislature eliminated the requirement that the trial judge explain to the defendant that by his plea of guilty he is admitting the truth of all facts alleged in the indictment or information or to an offense included thereunder and that upon entry of such plea the court shall proceed with judgment and sentence. If the trial courts before whom Dotsie Austin and Gary German pleaded were required by the constitution to advise defendants in accordance with § 35-4.1-1-3, as the Austin decision said, how is it possible that § 35-35-1-2(a) could codify the Constitution? Two of the advisements present on the statutory list at the time German was written were no longer in the Code. Certainly the General Assembly's deletion of these advisements from the Code could have no effect on their constitutional dimension. [6] Finally, the earlier statute had required that the defendant be informed that the court is not a party to any agreement which may have been made between the prosecutor and the defense and is not bound thereby. If this was a constitutional right possessed by the defendant, certainly the legislature could not repeal it and thus § 35-35-1-2 could not be a codification of rights of constitutional dimension. On the other hand, if this piece of advice is required by the constitution, every guilty plea taken since September 1, 1982, by an Indiana trial judge following § 35-35-1-2 is voidable. If the right to be told of the rights one is waiving (as opposed to the right to know that one is waiving certain rights) does not arise from the Indiana Code, or the United States Constitution, or the Indiana Constitution, whence does it come? Perhaps, the answer was only to be provided later. The German rule was what courts call a prophylactic rule. Its purpose is preventative. In James v. State (1982), Ind., 433 N.E.2d 1188, this Court noted that Ind. Code § 35-4.1-1-4(a) was designed to protect defendants against improper coercion by police or prosecutors. Strict compliance has been an absolute prerequisite to finding a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Richards v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 74. Therefore, the procedural mandates of German must be satisfied before a due process inquiry will be made. The German rule also facilitates judicial review. The new strict rule [ German ] was designed to require the making of a clear and unmistakable record of statements during the guilty plea proceedings and to facilitate and expedite judicial review. Crocker v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 686, 688. These shared characteristics establish German as a prophylactic rule. Of course, the German approach was not the only curative available, as Judge Garrard noted in his excellent opinion in Ewing v. State (1976), 171 Ind. App. 593, 358 N.E.2d 204. Like all per se rules, the rule in German had the benefit of being easy to remember and easy to apply. If each of the advisements appeared, the defendant was presumed to have pleaded voluntarily and intelligently and he stayed in jail. If even one advisement was missing, he was said to have acted involuntarily and untelligently, and his conviction was set aside. Of course, this prophylactic rule has its disadvantages as well. It has required that convictions be set aside when the trial judge's omission was one which our common sense as human beings tells us was utterly harmless. Shaw v. State (1983), Ind. App., 456 N.E.2d 758 (Ratliff, J., concurring in result) (a defendant whom the trial judge did not inform of misdemeanor sentencing alternative before he pleaded guilty to felony drunk driving could not have possibly been harmed because the judge entered conviction as a misdemeanor). Finally, the German rule has exposed our post-conviction relief procedures to incredible abuse. It has created a virtual tidal wave of petitions by prisoners, some of whom have slumbered on their rights for five or ten years. It has, by definition, afforded relief only to prisoners who have asserted their guilt before the trial judge and never recanted. It has visited felony convictions with all the finality of default judgments in small claims court. These disadvantages are well illustrated by the history of Driver v. State (1985), Ind. App., 486 N.E.2d 664, transfer denied. Driver pleaded guilty in 1969 to a felony. When he committed his third felony in 1982, he found himself facing an habitual offender charge and losing. Within months of his arrival at the state prison, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his rights had been violated some thirteen years before. This sequence of events makes it apparent that his objective was singular: success in setting aside the earlier felony conviction would relieve him from the penalty associated with being an habitual offender. [7] The German rule has made it relatively easy to avoid the consequences of earlier convictions entered under circumstances which would not have suggested coercion or misapprehension to anyone standing in the courtroom at the time.