Opinion ID: 1059529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Divorcement Clause and Grandfather Clause

Text: Code § 59.1-21.16:2(A), referred to as the divorcement clause, prohibits a producer or refiner of petroleum products from operating a retail gasoline outlet within one and one-half miles of a retail outlet operated by a franchised dealer. Beach Robo, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 236 Va. 131, 132, 372 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1988). However, Code § 59.1-21.16:2(E), referred to as the grandfather clause, states that the provisions of this section shall not be applicable to retail outlets operated by producers or refiners on July 1, 1979. The parties agree that one of the issues on appeal concerns the meaning of the word operated in the grandfather clause. Frank Shop maintains that the term must be interpreted by utilizing the language of a different section of the Act, namely Code § 59.1-21.10. This section defines [o]peration of a retail outlet as the ownership or option to buy a properly zoned parcel of property for which a permit to build a retail outlet has been granted. Utilizing its interpretation, Frank Shop contends that Crown has not proved that, on July 1, 1979, a producer or refiner owned or had an option to purchase the Property; consequently, a retail outlet was not operated on the Property on July 1, 1979 and the grandfather clause does not apply. Crown maintains that our prior opinions and the opinions of the Attorney General do not require ownership or an option to purchase the premises as a definitive factor in the interpretation of the word, operated, in the grandfather clause. Irrespective of the definition of operated, Frank Shop maintains that, in order to benefit from the grandfather clause, a producer or refiner must have been the operator on July 1, 1979. Our resolution of the evidentiary issues presented on appeal makes it unnecessary to address the definition of operated in the grandfather clause.