Opinion ID: 2980807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Similarly situated” Instruction

Text: The City argues that the district court committed reversible error in instructing the jury regarding whether other employees were to be deemed “similarly situated” to McDole. The district court instructed the jury as follows: The plaintiff does not have to produce direct evidence of intentional discrimination. Intentional discrimination may be inferred from the existence of other facts. For example, evidence that other employees engaged in conduct that was similar to the plaintiff’s conduct and were disciplined by similar decision makers as the plaintiff may support an inference of discrimination to the extent that the difference in treatment can reasonably be related to race. (R. 119 at 117.) 15 Case Nos. 10-1420/1789 McDole v. City of Saginaw The City argues that the district court erred because “[b]y requiring only similar conduct and similar decisionmakers, the instruction established a broader group of potential comparable employees than is supported by the relevant case law.” (Def.’s Br. at 40-41.) The City asked for the following instruction: The plaintiff does not have to produce direct evidence of intentional discrimination. Intentional discrimination may be inferred from the existence of other facts. For example, evidence that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than the plaintiff for the same or similar conduct may support an inference of discrimination to the extent that the difference in treatment can reasonably be attributed to race. To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff and the employees to whom he compares himself do not have to be exactly the same, but they must be similar in all relevant aspects. What aspects are relevant depends on the facts and circumstances of this case. Generally speaking, relevant aspects include whether the plaintiff and the other employees dealt with the same decisionmakers, were subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without different or mitigating factors that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them for it. (R. 62 at 2.) On appeal, the City argues that the district court erred by not instructing the jury that the same decisionmakers must be involved and by not instructing the jury that comparable employees must have been engaged in the “same conduct” without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the City’s treatment of them for it. The district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction is reviewed under an abuse-of- discretion standard. Nolan v. Memphis City Schs., 589 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2009). “Appellate courts do not review jury instructions for technical error.” Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 234 (6th Cir. 1996). Instead, we “‘review the jury charge as a whole to determine whether it fairly and adequately submits the issues and the law to the jury.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d 986, 992 (6th Cir. 16 Case Nos. 10-1420/1789 McDole v. City of Saginaw 1993)). A new trial is required only when “the instructions, taken as a whole, are misleading or give an inadequate understanding of the law.” Arban v. West Publ’g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 2003). A refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reversible error only if three conditions are satisfied. First, the omitted instruction must be a correct statement of the law. Second, the instruction must not be substantially covered by other delivered charges. Third, the failure to give the instruction must impair the requesting party’s theory of the case. Cox, 75 F.3d at 234 (citing Carr, 5 F.3d at 992). The City’s proposed instruction is largely quoted from our decision in Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992). This language has been used in some cases in the summary-judgment context, as a standard for determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied the fourth element of a prima facie case or whether the plaintiff has shown pretext. We have never held that it is required as a jury instruction, however. Whether a plaintiff has made out a prima facie case or has shown pretext are aspects of the McDonnell-Douglas framework for allocating the burden of production, and we have held that a district court is not required to instruct the jury as to McDonnellDouglas. See, e.g., Williams v. Eau Claire Pub. Sch., 397 F.3d 441, 446 (6th Cir. 2005). Once a discrimination case has proceeded to trial, the core issue before the jury is “whether it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff,” not whether the plaintiff has made a prima facie case or has shown pretext. Brown v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 338 F.3d 586, 597 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)). The City does not contend that, as a whole, the 17 Case Nos. 10-1420/1789 McDole v. City of Saginaw district court’s instructions did not properly instruct the jury as to “the ultimate issue of discrimination vel non.” Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714. Indeed, the district court was not required to give a “similarly situated” instruction to the jury at all. None of our sister circuits’ pattern jury instructions for Title VII cases include instructions on how the jury should determine whether other employees are similarly situated. See Third Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions §§ 5.0, 5.1.1, 5.1.2 (2011); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil § 11.5.1 (2009); Seventh Circuit Federal Civil Jury Instructions § 3.01 (2009); Eighth Circuit Civil Jury Instructions § 5.01 (2012); Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions §§ 10.1A-10.1C (2012); Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil § 1.2.1 (2005); see also Michigan Civil Jury Instructions § 105.01 (2011). Although we do not have pattern civil jury instructions in this circuit, we have approved jury instructions in Title VII cases that do not contain “similarly situated” instructions. See, e.g., Williams, 397 F.3d at 444. Even in the summary-judgment context where it normally appears, the language in Mitchell is not an “inflexible requirement.” Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 741, 751 (6th Cir. 2012). Contrary to what the City argues, for example, there is no mandatory requirement that a plaintiff deal with the same decisionmaker as those deemed “similarly situated.” McMillan, 405 F.3d at 414. The “same conduct without different or mitigating factors” language that the City uses in its proposed instruction is best suited for situations in which the plaintiff and a fellow employee engaged in identical conduct but with different consequences, see, e.g., Clayton v. Meijer, Inc., 281 F.3d 605, 612 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2002), but that is not the only situation in which the conduct of other 18 Case Nos. 10-1420/1789 McDole v. City of Saginaw employees is comparable. Other cases have required conduct that is of “comparable seriousness” or is “similar in kind and severity.” Bobo, 665 F.3d at 751. We have consistently held that “exact correlation” is not required. Id.; Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998). When comparing employee conduct, “‘precise equivalence in culpability’ is not required.” Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 370-371 & n.9 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n. 11 (1976)). Finally, we note that the jury instructions that were given substantially covered the omitted instruction. The jury instructions said that “similar” conduct can be compared to McDole’s “to the extent that a difference in treatment can reasonably be attributed to race.” This instruction covers situations where employees engaged in similar conduct, but with differentiating or mitigating circumstances. By complying with these instructions, a juror would not “reasonably” attribute the difference in treatment to race, but would do so because of the differentiating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, this language covers the instructions that the City argues that the district court omitted. Moreover, the instructions simply indicate that “similar” conduct should be compared, and jurors can decide for themselves what they believe to be “similar” conduct to that of McDole’s. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by omitting the jury instructions that the City requested.