Opinion ID: 2635516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nast Decision

Text: ¶ 9 Koenig contends that this court should reconsider Nast entirely because its analysis was erroneous and because a recent amendment to the PRA has incorporated common law exceptions to public disclosure requirements. The principle of stare decisis `requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned.' Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wash.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004) (quoting In re Rights to Waters of Stranger Creek, 77 Wash.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970)). This respect for precedent promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). ¶ 10 Koenig argues that the Nast analysis erred because it failed to liberally construe the terms agency and public records. First, this argument was considered by the court in Nast, as evidenced by Justice Durham's dissent on this very issue. Nast, 107 Wash.2d at 311-12, 730 P.2d 54 (Durham, J., dissenting). Making the same arguments that the original court thoroughly considered and decided does not constitute a showing of incorrect and harmful. Brutsche v. City of Kent, 164 Wash.2d 664, 682, 193 P.3d 110 (2008). Second, the Nast court considered the full definition of agency and found that the judiciary was not included. Nast, 107 Wash.2d at 305, 730 P.2d 54. Indeed, the PRA definition of agency does not include any language referring to courts or the judiciary. The Nast court reasonably concluded that the legislature did not intend to include the judiciary, basing its ruling on a reading of the entire public records section of the [PRA]. Id. at 306, 730 P.2d 54. Koenig has failed to demonstrate that this holding was incorrect and harmful. Without such a showing, we will not overturn precedent. ¶ 11 Koenig also points out that the third basis for Nast (that the PRA did not include the statutory exemptions honed under the common law right of access to court files) no longer applies because the PRA now incorporates such statutory exemptions. See RCW 42.56.070(1). While Koenig is correct that the third basis for Nast no longer applies, the broader holding remains. As noted above, the fundamental basis for Nast  that the PRA's definition of agency does not include the judiciary  is sufficient to support Nast's holding. The fact that the third basis no longer applies is not enough to overturn Nast. ¶ 12 More notably, the legislature has declined to modify the PRA's definitions of agency and public records in the 23 years since the Nast decision. This court presumes that the legislature is aware of judicial interpretations of its enactments and takes its failure to amend a statute following a judicial decision interpreting that statute to indicate legislative acquiescence in that decision. Soproni v. Polygon Apartment Partners, 137 Wash.2d 319, 327 n. 3, 971 P.2d 500 (1999). By not modifying the PRA's definition of agency to include the judiciary, the legislature has implicitly assented to our holding in Nast that the PRA does not apply to the judiciary and judicial records. [2] ¶ 13 This court has already ruled on the issue of whether the judiciary is subject to the PRA, and Koenig has not demonstrated that the established rule is incorrect and harmful. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's holding that the PRA does not require the City to release the requested judicial records because the PRA does not apply to the judiciary. [3]