Opinion ID: 798065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asylum Eligibility for Forced Abortion

Text: 11 Victims of coercive population planning policies, including those subjected to forced abortion, are statutorily eligible for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). Ding, 387 F.3d at 1136-37; see also Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (forced abortion); He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir.2003) (forced sterilization); cf. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that victim of female genital mutilation was entitled to asylum). Section 1101(a)(42)(B) applies to people who have been persecuted under such policies, including a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program[.] The BIA and this court have held that the spouses of victims of coercive population policies qualify for protection under § 1101(a)(42)(B). In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 918 (BIA 1997); see also He, 328 F.3d at 603-04. We have held that, at least for couples who do not meet the age requirements to marry under population control policies, the failure to have an official marriage ceremony does not preclude male partners of women who have had forced abortions from obtaining asylum under § 1101(a)(42)(B). Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 561 (9th Cir.2004); see also id. at 559 (observing that Congress intended to grant asylum to Chinese `couples' persecuted on account of an `unauthorized' pregnancy and to keep families together (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 104-469(I), at 174 (1996))). 12 Tang's asylum application was denied because the IJ determined that Li Zhen was not a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). The IJ's conclusion rested on the definition of the operative phrase has been forced. The IJ read the term forced as requiring three elements of proof. None is supported by the text of the statute, its legislative history, or our precedent. 13 First, the IJ stated that Li Zhen apparently . . . willfully went to the procedure because there was no indication that [Tang and Li Zhen] ever expressed any opposition or made any efforts to avoid the wife having to undergo the abortion procedure. The IJ erred in defining force as requiring that the victim demonstrate resistance. Force, as used in the statute and as interpreted in our precedent, is not so narrowly defined. 14 In Ding, we granted the petition of an asylum applicant who had an abortion under China's population control policies. 387 F.3d at 1140. We held that, contrary to the requirement imposed by the IJ, an asylum applicant need not demonstrate that she was physically restrained during an abortion procedure to show that the procedure was forced. Id. at 1139. Noting that the word force is not defined by the statute, we relied on the term's ordinary meaning to hold that, under § 1101(a)(42)(B), `forced' is a much broader concept, which includes compelling, obliging, or constraining by mental, moral, or circumstantial means, in addition to physical restraint. Id. at 1138-39. 15 The events, as described by Tang, are more than enough to establish that Li Zhen was forced to abort[her] pregnancy. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). Several events demonstrate that Li Zhen was compel[led], oblig[ed and] constrain[ed] by mental, moral, or circumstantial means. Ding, 387 F.3d at 1139. Tang testified that he and Li Zhen wanted to have a baby, and the IJ found his testimony credible. Whether Li Zhen could have or did express [ ] any opposition to the abortion does not affect the existence of the force that was demonstrated. The gynecological exam that detected her pregnancy was mandatory. It was performed by her employer, upon whom she was economically dependent. The policy of the company for which Li Zhen worked required her to have an abortion because she was not of marriage age and had not had an official marriage ceremony. The day after the examination, representatives from Li Zhen's company came to her home and took her to a clinic. Finally, the abortion was performed without anesthesia, a particularly barbaric exertion of authority. 16 Second, the IJ stated that neither [Tang] nor his wife tried to avoid an abortion by going into hiding. The IJ's imposition of a hiding requirement does not comport with our understanding of force under § 1101(a)(42)(B). In Ding, we explained that reading into the statute additional requirements to demonstrate that the procedure was forced contravene[s] the statute's purpose. 387 F.3d at 1139. Forced is a broad[ ] concept under the statute because the Chinese government's widespread use of `comprehensive and often intrusive family planning policies[ ]' includes `education, propaganda, and economic incentives, as well as . . . more coercive measures, including psychological pressure and economic penalties' imposed by local regulations. Id. (quoting U.S. Dep't of State, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 22, 21 (Feb. 25, 2000) (ellipsis in original)). In Ding we held that the petitioner had been forced to have an abortion although she, like Li Zhen, had not gone into hiding before the abortion. Id. at 1137-38. 17 Third, the IJ stated that the abortion was not performed pursuant to any official summons or by family planning officials, but rather was performed by Li Zhen's employer. This distinction does not support a conclusion that the abortion was not forced within the meaning of § 1101(a)(42)(B). The record in this case establishes that the structure of the Chinese population control program is a top to bottom system, involving coordinat[ion] of all departments and all fields in excellent implementation of `planned-birth work.' Forced Abortion and Sterilization in China: The View From the Inside: Before the Subcomm. on International Operations and Human Rights of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 105 Cong. (1998) (statement of Harry Wu, Executive Director, Laogai Research Foundation). Such coordination, including the dismissal or demotion of violators by [p]ersonnel departments, indicates that the structure of China's population control program involves actors other than official summoners and family planning officials. Id. In this case, the policy implemented by Li Zhen's employer required her to have an abortion because of her age and lack of official marriage. This policy corresponds exactly with the official Chinese population control policies and can only be seen as an implementation of those policies. 18 For the first time on petition for review, the government argues to us that the IJ made an erroneous factual finding in holding that Tang and Li Zhen were married within the meaning of § 1101(a)(42)(B). The evidence does not compel a result contrary to the finding of the IJ. See Gu, 454 F.3d at 1018-19. Indeed, the record supports his conclusion. For example, Tang testified that Li Zhen discovered that she was pregnant after they began living together as husband and wife. 19 Tang raised a separate claim for asylum eligibility based on his labor activities in Guam. Because we find that Tang is eligible for asylum under § 1101(a)(42)(B), we do not reach this second claim. 20