Opinion ID: 781970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Neither of Teague's Exceptions Applies to Apprendi

Text: 48 There are two narrow exceptions to Teague 's general bar against retroactive habeas relief for procedural errors. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486, 494-95, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990); see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. 49 Under Teague, new rules of constitutional criminal procedure do not apply retroactively on collateral review unless they fall into either of two categories: (1) new rules that place an entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of the criminal law, or new rules that prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense; or (2) new watershed rules of criminal procedure that are necessary to the fundamental fairness of the criminal proceeding. 50 Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 525 (quoting Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42, 110 S.Ct. 2822). 51 Coleman rightly concedes that the first exception does not apply to Apprendi. Apprendi did not alter the relationship between the quantity of cocaine base and the severity of punishment under section 841. It therefore plainly did not prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense, id. at 241, 110 S.Ct. 2822, let alone place an entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of criminal law, Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Goode, 305 F.3d at 383-84 n. 8 (holding that Teague 's first exception does not apply to Apprendi 's new rule); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 668 (same); McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1256-57 (same); Jones, 231 F.3d at 1237 (same); Sanders, 247 F.3d at 148 (same); Mora, 293 F.3d at 1218 (same). 52 Coleman does contend, however, that Apprendi announced a watershed rule that falls within Teague 's second exception, and thus applies retroactively on habeas review. He argues principally that it is the second aspect of Apprendi 's new rule — the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard — that qualifies as a watershed rule because it promotes the objectives of accuracy and fairness in sentencing proceedings. 53 We disagree. In order to be watershed under Teague 's second exception, a rule must not only improv[e] the accuracy of criminal proceedings, Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242, 110 S.Ct. 2822, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of those proceedings, id. at 241, 110 S.Ct. 2822; accord Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528. In short, it must be a `groundbreaking occurrence.' Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528 (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994)). 54 The Supreme Court has emphasized, through words and example[s], that the exception is exceedingly narrow, applying `only to a small core of rules requiring the observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Id. (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993)) (ellipsis in original). To underscore the rarity of watershed rules, the Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked the sweeping rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants have the right to court-appointed counsel in all criminal prosecutions), as a quintessential watershed rule, see Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 528-29 (citing O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997); Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257; Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996)), and has repeatedly remarked that it seems unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge, see Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 109 S.Ct. 1060; Graham, 506 U.S. at 478, 113 S.Ct. 892; Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 243, 110 S.Ct. 2822; Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990)). Indeed, since 1989, [b]eginning with the rule at issue in Teague, the Court has measured at least eleven new rules, or proposed new rules, of criminal procedure against the criteria for the second exception and, in every case, has refused to apply the rule at issue retroactively on habeas review. Mandanici, 205 F.3d at 529 (collecting cases). 55 Clearly, then, Apprendi did not announce a watershed rule. See Goode, 305 F.3d at 384-85 (holding that Teague 's second exception does not apply to Apprendi 's new rule); accord Curtis, 294 F.3d at 843-44; Mora, 293 F.3d at 1218-19; Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 668-71; McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1257-58; Moss, 252 F.3d at 998-1001; Sanders, 247 F.3d at 149-51; Jones, 231 F.3d at 1237-38. Unlike Gideon, Apprendi did not cut a new rule from whole cloth. It merely clarified and extended the scope of two well-settled principles of criminal procedure: the defendant's right to a jury trial and the government's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219. 56 Before Apprendi, it had been clear for over a century that these jury and proof requirements applied to `every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged.' In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); accord Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895). In Apprendi, these two principles were extended to facts that are not formally defined as elements by criminal statutes, but are nonetheless the functional equivalent of ... element[s], Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n. 18, 120 S.Ct. 2348, because they increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. 10 Although Apprendi altered certain aspects of indictments, trials, and sentencing proceedings, it did not alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of criminal proceedings at all. See Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241, 110 S.Ct. 2822. 57 This conclusion is buttressed, finally, by a series of cases in which we have held that Apprendi violations are not structural errors that merit automatic reversal in most situations. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 127-28 (2d Cir.2002) (holding that Apprendi error was harmless), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1785, 155 L.Ed.2d 672 (2003); Outen, 286 F.3d at 639-40 (holding that Apprendi error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 1786, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (holding that Apprendi error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings); cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (holding omission of materiality element from jury instructions was harmless); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (holding that omission of materiality element from indictment did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings) (internal quotation marks omitted). As several other circuits have observed, it would be anomalous to say, on the one hand, that Apprendi errors are not structural — i.e., that they do not inherently deprive defendants of basic protections, Neder, 527 U.S. at 8-9, 119 S.Ct. 1827, or substantial rights, Outen, 286 F.3d at 639-40 — and then to say, on the other hand, that Apprendi announced a watershed rule of criminal procedure. See Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 670; Sanders, 247 F.3d at 150-51; accord Goode, 305 F.3d at 385; Curtis, 294 F.3d at 843-44; Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219; Moss, 252 F.3d at 1000-01.