Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admission of Other Criminal Acts

Text: Evidence was produced showing defendant had participated in a number of crimes in addition to the robbery of Barney Pipkin and the murder of Roland Teal. He argues such evidence, to be admissible, must meet constitutionally-mandated indicia of reliability, that the evidence of other crimes did not meet this standard, and that its admission denied him the reliable penalty determination and fundamental fairness the Constitution requires for capital trials. As we explain, he is incorrect. As noted, the prosecution presented evidence that defendant, when he was 16 years old, participated with another man in the 1987 robbery of Juan Salazar by taking his car. Defendant contends that [a]t best, he was derivatively liable for a robbery and that a crime committed while [he] was still a juvenile, hardly serves as a reliable [indicator] of moral culpability. Defendant did not object on these grounds, however, and thus failed to preserve the claim for appellate review. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 172, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) The claim is also meritless. Although juvenile adjudications do not qualify as prior convictions under section 190.3, factor (c), and may not be admitted during the penalty phase, evidence of juvenile criminal conduct may be considered as an aggravating factor. Prior violent juvenile misconduct, regardless of conviction, may be admitted as evidence of `criminal activity ... which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.' (ง 190.3, factor (b)....) ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) Defendant next challenges the admission of evidence showing he stabbed inmate Price in county jail. He claims this evidence was inadmissible because, although he was charged with attempted murder, the charges were dropped and he was never prosecuted. We have held that unadjudicated violent criminal behavior is admissible under section 190.3, factor (b) [42] and its admission does not violate a capital defendant's constitutional rights. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) We decline to revisit that considered decision. We further find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 991, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Defendant next contends the prosecution was erroneously permitted to elicit evidence of his participation in other gun-related crimes. The prosecutor cross-examined defendant about his familiarity with firearms and whether he had fired other guns before. Defendant testified he once bought a machine gun and fired it in a park. The prosecutor characterized that act as the grossly negligent discharge of a firearm, a felony. Defendant objected, but the trial court correctly ruled that the line of questioning was permissible because, in earlier testimony, defendant had suggested Teal's shooting was an accident; thus, the People are allowed to inquire into the number of guns, if they are loaded, and the habit and custom of keeping them loaded or unloaded or negligently loaded. The trial court denied, however, the prosecutor's request that the jury be instructed on the grossly negligent discharge of a firearm as an unadjudicated violent crime under section 190.3, factor (b). The trial court did not err in overruling defense counsel's objection. (Cf. People v. Hill (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 727, 737, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 [evidence defendant intended to kill victim to eliminate witness of earlier crime admissible to refute claim of accidental shooting in earlier crime].) Moreover, because the trial court did not instruct the jury to consider the gun evidence as aggravating other-crimes evidence under section 190.3, factor (b), nor did the prosecutor urge the jury to consider the evidence as such, even if the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, no conceivable prejudice resulted. Defendant next argues the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of perjury as aggravating evidence. The matter arose on the prosecutor's cross-examination of defendant, when defendant admitted he had asked his girlfriend Jude Barrios and at least one other person to lie for him in his trial for the Sun Valley swap meet robbery. Defendant contends evidence of perjury was inadmissible because the crime did not involve violence or the threat of violence. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) He did not object, however, and thus failed to preserve the claim for appellate review. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1207, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969 [claim of improper admission of nonstatutory aggravating evidence forfeited by failure to object].) In addition, the evidence was admissible to impeach his credibility. In sum, we find that of the cited instances of alleged improper other-crimes evidence, defendant either forfeited the claim by failing to object or the evidence was properly admitted against him.