Opinion ID: 1433951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of the Sentence Imposed

Text: In reviewing a sentence post- Booker, the court of appeals is required to determine whether the sentence is reasonable. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 594 (internal quotation marks omitted); Booker, 543 U.S. at 261-62, 125 S.Ct. 738. As adverted to in the preceding section, in making that determination, we use the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review, Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 594, regardless of whether the sentence was within or outside the Guidelines-recommended range, see id. at 591; United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir.2008). This standard of review applies as well to our review of a sentence imposed after a Crosby remand. See Williams, 475 F.3d at 474. Reasonableness review has both a procedural and a substantive component. See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 71-72 (2d Cir.2009); United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d at 170; United States v. Canova, 485 F.3d 674, 679 (2d Cir.2007). Review for procedural reasonableness requires us to ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. In determining whether the district court has considered the appropriate factors, we do not require robotic incantations by the sentencing judge. United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 270 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 549 U.S. 882, 127 S.Ct. 192, 166 L.Ed.2d 143 (2006); Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113. In the absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, we presume that the district court has faithfully discharged its duty to consider the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d at 264; United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 30. In reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we are guided by the § 3553(a) factors that the sentencing court is required to apply. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 261, 125 S.Ct. 738; Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114-15 & n. 13. In the present case, Carr contends that his sentence is unreasonable, arguing principally that the district court unjustifiably relied on certain sec. 3553 factors, while not giving due weight to others, and that it committed an error of law in characteriz[ing] subsection (2) of that statute (setting forth the goals of sentencing) as the principal one. ... As a matter of law, no single factor in sec. 3553(a) is controlling, and no single factor is the principal one. (Carr brief on appeal at 16 (quoting (S.Tr. 21)).) He also argues that his new sentence is greater than necessary to accomplish the statutory sentencing goals. ( Id. ) The record belies these contentions. The statute directs the sentencing court to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Other than concerns for training and treatment, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(D), which Carr has not suggested have any relevance whatever here, the sentencing purposes spelled out in paragraph (2) of § 3553(a) are (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; [and] (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant[.] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court clearly considered these factors. The issue that received the most attention from the court and the parties in this case was the degree of Carr's culpability in killing Morton, as the court sought to arrive at a sentence which justly and fairly takes into account the gravity of the killing that Mr. Carr perpetrated (S.Tr. 21)an act that the court found impossible ... to understand except as an act of sheer cruelty (Aug. Tr. 27). But while using the phrases the principal one, or the two main factors, the court in fact expressly cited four of the above § 3553(a)(2) factors, stating that the principal one is the seriousness of the offense and to have an appropriate punishment of that offense and also protect society from any occurrence of criminal behavior by Mr. Carr. Those are the two main factors also to be a deterrent to other criminal activity .... (S.Tr. 21 (emphases added).) And, as set forth in detail in Part I.B. above, the district court expressly noted its oblig[ation] to give specific attention to the factors listed in 18 United States Code Section 3553(a) (S.Tr. 17), and stated although I might not go down them doggedly one by one, I certainly have them in mind ( id. at 21). Thus, the record does not support Carr's contention that the district court ignored any of the § 3553(a) factors. Nor is there merit in Carr's suggestion that the district court lost sight of its obligation to impose a sentence no greater than necessary to accomplish the statutory sentencing goals (Carr brief on appeal at 16). Having mentioned the above factors ( see S. Tr. 21), the court noted that Carr had proposed that he be given a 30-year prison term, but the court stated I do not think that that is sufficient ( id. ); it stated, however, that a very substantial penalty does not need to be endless ( id. ); and in concluding that Carr's prison term should be 40 years, the court stated, I cannot do less and be fair to the community ( id. at 22). The court plainly followed the statutory mandate to impose a sentence that it deemed sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to accomplish the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). In sum, it is abundantly clear in this case that the court considered the appropriate factors and rendered a thoughtful judgment that complied with the requirements of § 3553(a). We see no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion or that the sentence it imposed is unreasonable.