Opinion ID: 2212940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The remaining issue for review concerns alleged errors in the court's instructions.

Text: Before discussing this issue attention is called to certain rules applicable to the preservation of error in regard to instructions which were repeated in State v. Baskin, 220 N.W.2d 882, 884-886 (Iowa 1974). Under section 780.35, The Code, rule 196, Rules of Civil Procedure, is made applicable to criminal prosecutions. Rule 196, R.C.P., requires that objections to instructions set out the grounds for complaint. A party objecting has the duty to state what he complains of so the trial court has an opportunity to rule or correct the error which is now argued in this court. The right of a defendant in a criminal case to attack the court's instructions for the first time in motion for new trial is subject to two exceptions: (1) a party may expressly waive the right or (2) if the instruction was correct as given but not as explicit as a party may have desired he must request an additional instruction before the jury is charged. A party may not rely on a mere refusal to give requested instructions. Rule 196, R.C.P., is just as definite in requiring objections to the refusal of requested instructions to specify the grounds thereof as is required of objections to instructions actually given. The rule requires, in order to predicate error for review upon the trial court's refusal to give requested instructions, proper exceptions must be preserved by the party timely specifying the part of the instruction requested and refused and the particular point or points of law or questions of fact in dispute which the court supposedly erred by omission to instruct. In one way or another this court has frequently said an objection to an instruction given to a jury should reveal to the trial judge the purported defect to which the objecting party makes complaint and may wish to make the subject matter of attack upon appeal. The objection should be as specific and as penetrating as the stress of the trial permits. The purpose of requiring clarity of objections is not to gratify any possible whim of the trial judge, but to afford the trial judge an opportunity to catch exactly what is in counsel's mind and thereby determine whether the objection possesses merit to an extent the instruction should be recast. In short, a party, upon objecting, must make known to the trial judge the specific objection which he may wish to urge upon appeal. If his objection then taken possesses merit and induces the trial judge to recast his words, a subsequent appeal is avoided. But if he does not disclose what is then in his mind, a needless appeal may be the ultimate result. When a defendant undertakes to except to instructions at trial, as here, he must rest on those exceptions. He cannot in a post-verdict motion amplify or add new ones since it avails a trial court nothing for a defendant to save part of his exceptions for a motion for new trial when the court can no longer change its instructions before reading them to the jury. State v. Buchanan, 207 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Iowa 1973). Defendants contend instruction 13 expanded the Iowa statute beyond what was intended. In this instruction the jury was told: A price fixing conspiracy may consist in any mutual agreement or arrangement or understanding between two or more competitors or others, knowingly made, to sell at a uniform price, or to raise, or lower, or stabilize prices. So, a common plan or understanding, knowingly made, or arranged, or entered into between two or more competitors, to adopt or follow or adhere to any pricing formula which will result in raising, or lowering, or maintaining at fixed levels, prices charged for goods, such as tractor or machinery parts, would constitute a price fixing conspiracy. Defendants urge the words stabilize and pricing formula extend the statute illegally. They cite Rohlf v. Kasemeier, 140 Iowa 182, 118 N.W. 276, for the proposition section 553.1 must be strictly construed. They infer the phrase regulate or fix does not entail stabilization or pricing formulas. The word fix is defined in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 694 (Second Ed. 1964) as (1) to make stable, firm, or secure    (2) to establish, set, to arrange definitely, as he fixed the rent at forty dollars. (Emphasis in original). Regulate, likewise, is defined as (1) to control, direct, or govern according to a rule, principle, or system    (4) to make uniform, methodical; orderly, etc. Id., page 1522. Undoubtedly, the definition employed by the trial judge reasonably falls within the meaning of regulating or fixing. While self-explanatory terms need not be defined, the fact that the court makes an unnecessary explanation of a correct instruction is not an abuse of discretion, if the explanation is not prejudicial to accused. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1191, p. 487. In defining an offense the court may fit the definition to the facts in the case as the evidence tends to show such facts to be. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1194, p. 495. See also State v. DiPaglia, 247 Iowa 79, 86-87, 71 N.W.2d 601, 605. Since the court did not define something not included within the meaning of price regulating or fixing, but simply made clearer what the terms entail, it is difficult to comprehend how defendants were prejudiced. We find no error here. XII. Defendants also contend instructions 15, 16, 17 and 18 were erroneous and sealed the fate of defendants. Basically, these instructions dealt with the propositions: (1) there was no need to prove intent to disobey the law, (2) knowledge of such law violation is unnecessary, (3) laudable motive is irrelevant, and (4) the carrying into effect of the conspiracy is immaterial. Admitting these are not defenses to the crime, defendants assert such instructions were unnecessary, as these concepts were not asserted as defenses. This argument is without merit. Even if defendants did not raise these ideas as defenses, the instructions define what conspiracy is not. They do not give the impression a conspiracy did in fact exist or that defendants were guilty. Furthermore, such evidence was adduced by defendants. It was pointed out the books were handed out in broad daylight, no letters concerning the books were stamped secret and the books were normally in plain sight at dealerships. Defendants testified their profit margins were down due to various factors. Thus, the trial court was correct in putting this evidence in its proper perspective as to the law of conspiracy. Otherwise the jury might have been misled into thinking these were valid defenses. Defendants' argument is not persuasive. The giving of the instructions under attack in this division does not warrant a reversal. The instructions in the third trial were the same as in the first with the following exceptions: the final paragraph of 14 relating to dealer price-study exhibits was omitted; 19 and 20 were renumbered 21 and 22 and a new instruction 19 was added relating to hearsay testimony. In reaching the conclusion defendants' complaints as to the court's instructions do not require reversal, only those objections and exceptions which have been properly preserved for review have been considered. Those matters raised for the first time in this court present nothing for review. Every contention and assertion of defendants preserved for review have been considered whether specifically mentioned in this opinion or not. Both cases are Affirmed. All Justices concur except REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ., who take no part.