Opinion ID: 752354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purpose of Request

Text: 6 Courts have often commented that one of the main driving forces behind the enactment of FOIA was Congress's goal of opening up  'agency action to the light of public scrutiny.'  United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1481, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989) (quoting Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1604, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976)). Yet, according to the parties before us today, whether or not a requester's purpose for information is consistent with this congressional purpose is not a proper factor, in and of itself without any regard to the applicability of any of the exemptions, to deny a request for access to information under FOIA. Appellant's Br. at 13-15; Appellee's Br. at 14-15. Case law suggests that the parties are correct that the district court below committed another error of law. First, as mentioned above, the Supreme Court has clearly announced that [a] federal agency must disclose agency records [appropriately requested] unless they may be withheld pursuant to one of the nine enumerated exemptions listed in § 552(b). Julian, 486 U.S. at 8, 108 S.Ct. at 1611; see also Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 244 (6th Cir.1994). Basing a denial of a FOIA request on a factor unrelated to any of these nine exemptions clearly contravenes this dictate. In general, any member of the public may invoke FOIA to obtain disclosure of agency records without regard to whether the requester has shown a need for the information; the requester's intended use is also irrelevant in a FOIA action. See Parke, Davis & Co. v. Califano, 623 F.2d 1, 7 (6th Cir.1980) (It is settled that the rights of a FOIA requester are neither increased nor decreased by the fact that the requester has an interest in the documents which is greater than that of the general public.) (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1504, 1513 n. 10, 44 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975)); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1237 (3d Cir.1993); North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1096 (D.C.Cir.1989). Even in evaluating the applicability of various exemptions, courts have generally remained consistent with the notion that  '[t]he Act's sole concern is with what must be made public or not made public'  rather than with the identity 2 of the person requesting the information or the particular purpose for which the document is being requested. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 772, 109 S.Ct. at 1481 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L.REV. 761, 765 (1966-67)) (emphasis added); see also United Technologies Corp. v. FAA, 102 F.3d 688, 690 (2d Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2479, 138 L.Ed.2d 988 (1997) (noting that [i]t is a basic principle under FOIA that the individuating circumstances of a requester are not to be considered in deciding whether a particular document should be disclosed.). Moreover, regardless of how a requester's purpose or intended use of the requested information might affect a court's analysis under a particular exemption, the district court below certainly erred when it considered this factor in a vacuum without giving any thought to the applicability of any of the exemptions.