Opinion ID: 2517841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Death Penalty Law and Related Claims

Text: Defendant raises numerous challenges under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme under which he was sentenced to death, and the manner in which it was applied to him. Many of these claims concern standard instructions given at his penalty trial (including some incorporating the statutory language itself), or involve instructions that the court declined to give on request. Other claims attack statutory features or sentencing procedures on grounds unrelated to the instructions. However framed, such claims have been rejected before. We do so again here. It appears defendant presents these issues, at great length, primarily to preserve and relitigate them in other court proceedings. (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303-304, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451 [discussing presentation and preservation of claims routinely rejected in prior cases].) The trial court did not err in declining defendant's request to define life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as meaning that he would stay in prison for the rest of his natural life. Such an instruction is inaccurate given the Governor's commutation and pardon powers. On the other hand, the concept of life in prison with no possibility of parole is clear. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 172, 173, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) We are not persuaded by empirical claims made outside the appellate record and untested at trial suggesting the contrary is true. We also find nothing in Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178, undermining the standard instruction insofar as it lacks the definition that defendant sought here. The Shafer jury never learned that a life term carried no possibility of parole, while defendant's jury was so informed. ( People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 103, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622 ( Cornwell) .) The trial court properly instructed on which guilt phase instructions apply at the penalty phase. In particular, the standard instructions did not mislead the jury as to its responsibility to consider sympathy, mercy, and any other aspect of defendant's character and record in mitigation. (See CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1, 8.85, factor (k); People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1255-1257, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) The sentencing factors in section 190.3, and the closely related instructions in CALJIC No. 8.85, do not suffer from the flaws urged by defendant. Our reasoning is as follows. First, section 190.3, factor (a) (circumstances of the capital crime) is not vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 980, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) The same facts (e.g., felony murder) may be used for conviction, special circumstance, and aggravating purposes given the distinct role such facts play at each phase, The court need not instruct sua sponte against such use. ( Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th 50, 103, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622; Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 358, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Second, section 190.3, factor (b) (violent criminal activity) is not vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. 967, 980, 114 S.Ct. 2630.) Nothing bars use of the same crime under factor (b) and factor (c) (prior felony convictions). No sua sponte instruction against such double-counting is required. ( Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1154, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1180, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Contrary to what defendant suggests, the prosecutor did not tell the jury to count such factors twice for the same purpose. He said that factors (b) and (c) were different, and accurately explained why this was so. Third, as to defendant's remaining challenges to CALJIC No. 8.85 and the statutory factors, the trial court was not compelled to delete inapplicable factors, designate factors as aggravating or mitigating, or state when the balance of factors warrants death. ( Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 574, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 355-356, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Defendant argues that the court erred in failing to give a lingering doubt instruction at the penalty phase, and thereby caused jury confusion over use of the concept as a permissible factor in mitigation. However, no lingering doubt instruction was required. ( Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th 96, 165-166, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990.) The concept is encompassed in section 190.3, factor (k) and related instructions. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 615, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) Defendant engages in a broad and misguided attack on CALJIC No. 8.88, a standard instruction defining the scope of the jury's sentencing discretion under section 190.3. As we have made clear, the instruction does not prevent either the proper weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, or an individualized sentencing determination. ( People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 42-44, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591 ( Moon) .) The presumption that jurors understood such instructions, and particularly the concept of mitigation, is not rebutted by extraneous empirical claims. ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 772-773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Likewise, the statute and related instructions (see § 190.3; CALJIC No. 8.88) are not infirm insofar as they fail to require a reasonable doubt determination as to both aggravating factors (except factor (b)) and the penalty determination. Nor are the statute and instructions unconstitutional in not demanding juror unanimity on aggravating factors, or a presumption favoring the imposition of a life sentence. The decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, do not change these conclusions. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1068, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775; Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 44, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) Other alleged flaws in the machinery of capital punishment do not require invalidation of California's statutory scheme in the following areas: (1) scope of the class of death-eligible first degree murderers, (2) failure to require written findings of aggravating factors, (3) exercise of prosecutorial discretion to invoke the law, (4) clarity of the law and instructions to lay jurors, including lack of guidance on death being the greater penalty, and use of such terms as extreme and substantial for certain mitigating factors, and (5) any delay in executing the death sentence. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1068, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775; Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th 1, 42, 43, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Ochoa (1999) 19 Cal.4th 353, 478, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) The death penalty scheme withstands constitutional scrutiny even though it fails to require intercase proportionality review. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed.2d 29; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1182, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Defendant's death sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his individual (i.e., intracase) culpability. (See People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697.) He planned to visit his family in Missouri around Christmas. Broke and on parole, he robbed and shot a young woman as she departed work alone at night. In the process, he sexually assaulted her. Defendant left the victim to die in degrading circumstances with no regard for either her or her loved ones. Defendant had raped and robbed before, and sustained convictions for such crimes. His later attacks were more violent than the earlier ones. Defendant acted on his boast to a friend, and used the murder weapon to shoot a police officer in order to avoid arrest. Under the circumstances, defendant's death sentence does not shock the conscience or offend basic notions of human dignity. ( People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 967, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736.) Execution by lethal injection does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment per se. ( Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412, 484, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581.) Any failure of corrections officials to adopt proper standards for the administration of lethal injection does not affect the validity of defendant's death judgment. (See § 3604, subd. (a).) Alleged imperfections and illegalities in the execution process that may or may not exist when his death sentence is implemented are premature. ( Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 485, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 133 P.3d 581.) Defendant asserts that constitutional violations occurring during his capital trial deprived him both of a fair hearing before an independent tribunal, and of minimum guarantees for the defense under customary international law. But international law does not bar a death sentence that complies with state and federal constitutional law and statutory requirements. ( People v. Hillkouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion for sentencing under the Three Strikes law (§ 667, subds.(b)(i)), and concluded that such legislation has no retroactive ameliorative effect. As we have explained, the Three Strikes law did not abolish the death penalty for defendants who are convicted of first degree murder with special circumstances, and who have one or more prior violent or serious felony convictions. ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 246-247, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) We decline to reconsider this determination. ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 739, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248.)