Opinion ID: 2384032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Joyce's Entitlement

Text: We conclude, contrary to both the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals, that Joyce Cano is entitled to $10,000 of uninsured motorist coverage in addition to Jesse's entitlement, on account of her judgment for loss of consortium. Joyce Cano's claim was included in the uninsured motorist coverage. Travelers is wrong when it says that the fact that she was not occupying the insured automobile rendered her ineligible for coverage. The contract includes her as a Person Insured when it concludes: 3. any person with respect to damages he is entitled to recover because of bodily injury to which this insurance applies sustained by an insured under... 2. above because Jesse was a person... occupying an insured highway vehicle. Furthermore, the language goes ahead at once to say, The insurance applies separately with respect to each insured, except with respect to the limits of The Travelers' liability. [2] This language buttresses the inclusion of Joyce's claim in the uninsured motorist coverage. The Court of Appeals held, however, that the policy provisions which limit the insurance company's liability to a total of $10,000 for all damages because of bodily injury sustained by any one person as a result of any one accident mean that Jesse, for his personal injuries, and Joyce, for loss of consortium, may not recover together more than $10,000 on account of the accident for which they recovered judgments. We do not agree. There is a problem of interpretation in the policy language just quoted. If the participle sustained is read as referring to damages then Joyce's damages, as well as Jesse's, would be covered, inasmuch as a person entitled to damages on account of bodily injury to another is explicitly named as an insured in the policy. If sustained is to be read as modifying bodily injuries, then the conclusion of the Court of Appeals would be correct. It is not unusual to speak both of damages sustained and of injuries sustained. One circumstance is that the participle is closer to injuries than it is to damages. This might indicate that it modifies the nearest noun. But this circumstance is not a very strong one, especially when one considers that Joyce is clearly within the third insured classification of the policy and that a limiting construction might dilute or eliminate any effective coverage for persons in her position. A construction which may render a portion of the policy illusory should not be indulged in. We conclude that there is an ambiguity which should be resolved against the insurer. Bellamy v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 651 S.W.2d 490 (Mo. banc 1983), is the most recent of the many cases expounding this proposition. We hold, therefore, that Joyce is entitled to recover $10,000 of uninsured motorist benefits, in addition to Jesse's entitlement. The judgment is affirmed insofar as it limits Jesse to one coverage of $10,000 on account of uninsured motorist benefits. Those portions allowing the defendant to offset workers' compensation payments to Jesse, and denying Joyce a separate $10,000 uninsured motorist benefit, are reversed and the case is remanded for the entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion. RENDLEN, C.J., HIGGINS, GUNN, BILLINGS and DONNELLY, JJ., and MORGAN, Senior Judge, concur. WELLIVER, J., not sitting.