Opinion ID: 6855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assessment of Fees under Section 26

Text: 18 Boland Marine's first contention is that the BRB improperly disregarded substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's determination that the Director instituted or continued the proceedings in this case without reasonable ground. As a consequence, Boland Marine asserts that the BRB should have affirmed the ALJ's award of attorney's fees from the Special Fund pursuant to Section 26 of LHWCA. Regardless of the propriety of the BRB's review, we cannot support Boland Marine's position because we find, as did the Ninth Circuit in Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v. Brickner, 11 F.3d 887 (9th Cir.1993), that Section 26 vests neither the ALJ nor the BRB with the power to award attorneys fees. Section 26 of LHWCA states that: 19 If the court having jurisdiction of proceedings in respect of any claim or compensation order determines that the proceedings in respect of such claim or order have been instituted or continued without reasonable ground, the costs of such proceedings shall be assessed against the party who has so instituted or continued such proceedings. 20 33 U.S.C. Sec. 926. This section grants the power to assess costs only to courts, not to administrative agencies. Thus, while in the past, the BRB has assumed that Section 26 allowed ALJs to assess costs, Toscano v. Sun Ship, Inc., 24 B.R.B.S. 207, 211-13 (1991), see, e.g., Medrano v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 23 B.R.B.S. 223, 225-26 (1990), we cannot ... disregard the plain meaning of the statute or its legislative history, nor may we create rights not given or implied by the terms of the Act. Brickner, 11 F.3d at 889. 21 As the Ninth Circuit noted in Brickner, it is clear from other provisions of LHWCA that Congress knew the difference between the ALJ, the BRB, and the federal courts when it parceled out the power to award attorney's fees in LHWCA's various provisions. Id. at 890. For example, Section 28 of LHWCA provides for an award of attorneys fees to a successful claimant in an amount approved by the deputy commissioner, Board, or court, as the case may be. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 928(a); see also Brickner, 11 F.3d at 890 (discussing the powers granted by Section 28). Conversely, Section 26 does not provide administrative agencies with such power; instead, that section specifically grants the power to assess costs only to the court having jurisdiction of the claim or the proceeding. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 926. 22 The legislative history of LHWCA further buttresses the notion that the power to assess costs under Section 26 rests only with courts. The original bill provided that [i]f the deputy commissioner or the District Court before whom any proceedings are brought determines that such proceedings have been brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable ground, the whole cost of the proceedings shall be assessed upon the party who has so brought, prosecuted or defended them. Compensation for Employees in Certain Maritime Employments: Hearings on S. 3170 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1927). When the bill was passed, however, the power to assess costs was given only to the courts. See 33 U.S.C. Sec. 926; Brickner, 11 F.3d at 890. 23 Moreover, although other sections of LHWCA have been amended in the more than sixty years since it was passed, Section 26 has not been changed. Notably, in 1972, Congress altered the procedures for adjudicating claims under LHWCA, transferring formal adjudication responsibilities from deputy commissioners to ALJs. Brickner, 11 F.3d at 890. At the same time, Congress also moved the forum for initial review proceedings from the district courts to the BRB. Id. Despite these changes, Congress did not alter Section 26. As the Ninth Circuit concluded, [i]f Congress wanted to confer cost awarding power upon the Board, it could easily have done so when it amended the statutory scheme. Instead, it continued the prior division between court and administrative proceedings. Id. Thus, while we note that it is somewhat unusual that costs for unreasonably instituting an action cannot be assessed in the forum where the action is instituted or continued, we cannot ignore the plain language of the statute. Simply, neither the ALJ nor BRB is a court, and Section 26 provides only courts with the power to award costs. Consequently, we find no reversible error in the BRB's decision vacating the ALJ's award of attorney's fees under Section 26. 3 24