Opinion ID: 1136032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper July Instruction

Text: The home of James Ashley was burglarized on four separate occasions between March 26 and April 20, 1993. On April 25, Ashley's home was burglarized a fifth time, property was taken, and he was killed. On April 29, 1993, Mabel Price's home was burglarized, property was taken, and she was killed. The defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree premeditated murder and, in the alternative, first-degree felony murder based on the underlying crimes of aggravated robbery or aggravated burglary, in the deaths of Ashley and Price. At the instructions conference, the defendant's counsel objected to a jury instruction that all participants to an underlying felony are principals to a felony murder when death occurs. The court noted the defendant's objection and gave the instruction, which stated: All participants to an underlying felony are principals to a felony murder when death occurs. The rules of felony murder thus apply equally to all participants. This instruction quotes State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, Syl. ¶ 5, 759 P.2d 105 (1988). The defendant concedes on appeal that the instruction is a correct statement of the law and that the evidence required the giving of the instruction. However, the defendant contends the instruction was defective because it did not specify the underlying crime for the felony murder and its elements; therefore, the instruction relieved the State of its burden of proof and denied the defendant due process of law. In support of his argument on appeal, the defendant cites State v. Linn, 251 Kan. 797, 840 P.2d 1133 (1992). In Linn, the defendant was charged with aggravated burglary based on the underlying crime of a felony or theft. At trial, the defendant requested that the aggravated burglary instruction specify only theft as the underlying felony, but the State argued that the evidence was the defendant intended to commit the offenses of robbery, aggravated battery, and theft when he entered the dwelling. The aggravated burglary instruction given by the court stated that to find the defendant guilty, the jury must find the defendant entered or remained in a house `with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein.' 251 Kan. at 800. The specific felony intended was not set out. During deliberations, the jury asked the court to define felony. The court informed the jury that a felony is a crime for which punishment may be in excess of 1 year in a state penitentiary. On appeal, the defendant did not contend that the evidence was insufficient to find an intent to commit a theft, but argued that the jury's request for the definition of felony indicated that it found him guilty based on an intent to commit an undefined felony rather than a theft; therefore, reversal of that conviction was required. In determining that the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial, the Linn court stated: An instruction as to the offense of aggravated burglary is defective unless it specifies and sets out the statutory elements of the offense intended by an accused in making the unauthorized entry. Under the circumstances here, the trial judge's failure to state the specific underlying felony or felonies and their elements prevented the jury from rendering a lawful verdict and was an error of constitutional magnitude depriving the defendant of a fair trial. 251 Kan. at 802. In an effort to apply the rationale of Linn to this case, the defendant isolates the portion of the contested instruction which mentions participants to an underlying felony and then points out that the instruction did not include the underlying felony or the elements of the underlying felony. He asserts that under the instruction given, the jury could have found him guilty of felony murder based on his admission of possessing property stolen from the homicide victims rather than based on the felonies contained in the judge's instructions on felony murder and the verdict form. Jury instructions are to be considered together and read as a whole without isolating any one instruction. If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case, and if the jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, the instructions do not constitute reversible error even though they may be in some small way erroneous. State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 252, Syl. ¶ 4, 874 P.2d 623 (1994). We have reviewed the instructions and find that the defendant's argument is meritless. The jury was instructed in other instructions as to the elements of felony murder. Two instructions related to the felony murders based on the underlying crime of aggravated robbery, and another two related to felony murder based on the underlying crime of aggravated burglary. The elements of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary were set out in each of those instructions. Although the term underlying felony was not defined in the instruction contested here, the other felony-murder instructions required the jury to find that the killing of each victim was done while in the commission of aggravated robbery [or aggravated burglary], a felony. The jury would apply its common knowledge and understand that the term underlying felony related to the felonies specified in the felony-murder instructions and the term participants meant all persons involved in the underlying felony. Moreover, to convict the defendant of felony murder, the felony-murder instructions required the jury to find that the murder was committed during the commission of aggravated robbery or aggravated burglary. These instructions, and the accompanying verdict forms, did not allow the jury to convict the defendant of felony murder based on the underlying crime of possession of stolen property, as the defendant suggests.