Opinion ID: 1894988
Heading Depth: 1
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Heading: Michigan v. Summers

Text: Seizures of the person are judged under a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697, 699-700, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2591, 2593, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must be supported by probable cause. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700, 101 S.Ct. at 2593, 69 L.Ed.2d 340; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2254, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); see also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 120, 660 A.2d 447, 472 (1995) ([A] police officer has legal justification to make a warrantless arrest where he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed, and that the arrestee perpetrated the offense. (citing Md.Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol., 1994 Cum.Supp.), Art. 27, § 594B(c))). For Fourth Amendment purposes the Supreme Court has created certain exceptions to the probable cause requirement. For example, police officers may stop and frisk an individual if they have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity and presently armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975) (holding Border Patrol agents may lawfully stop persons they reasonably suspect of being illegal immigrants and question them about their citizenship); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (extending the holding of Terry to a stop based on a reliable informant's tip that the defendant might be armed and carrying illegal drugs). Another exception relevant to this opinion was created in Summers, 452 U.S. at 705, 101 S.Ct. at 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d 340, when the Supreme Court held that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. (Footnote omitted.) In Summers, the defendant was walking down the front steps of his own single family home just as officers approached to search it pursuant to a warrant. The officers asked Mr. Summers to open the door. Mr. Summers told the police that he had locked his keys inside. He rang the intercom, but the person answering refused to open the door. The police forced open the door. One officer brought Mr. Summers into the house and detained him. Eight other people in the house also were detained. The officers searched the house and discovered illegal drugs in the basement. The officers then arrested Mr. Summers and, upon a search incident to arrest, found an envelope containing heroin in his jacket. The Supreme Court initially noted that Dunaway reaffirmed the general rule that an official seizure of the person must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made. Summers, 452 U.S. at 696, 101 S.Ct. at 2591, 69 L.Ed.2d 340. Dunaway, however, recognized that some seizures significantly less intrusive than an arrest have withstood scrutiny under the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Summers, 452 U.S. at 697, 101 S.Ct. at 2591, 69 L.Ed.2d 340. The Supreme Court cited Terry, Adams, and Brignoni-Ponce as examples of less intrusive seizures. In those cases, the Supreme Court recognize[d] that some seizures admittedly covered by the Fourth Amendment constitute such limited intrusions on the personal security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity. Summers, 452 U.S. at 699, 101 S.Ct. at 2592-93, 69 L.Ed.2d 340. Turning to the circumstances in Summers, the Supreme Court first noted that detaining residents of a household during a search of their home was a limited intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because the detention was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Id. at 701, 101 S.Ct. at 2593, 69 L.Ed.2d 340. The Supreme Court reasoned that residents of a home being searched, unless they intended to flee, would want to stay in the premises to observe the search for their own protection. In addition, because the detention occurs in their own residence, there would be less public stigma than an investigative detention at the station house. Next, the Supreme Court examined the heightened law enforcement justifications for a detention during a search. The Court noted three particular interests: (1) preventing flight should contraband be found; (2) minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and (3) gaining the assistance of the occupants to facilitate an orderly and quick search, for example, by opening locked doors or containers. Id. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. at 2594, 69 L.Ed.2d 340. The Court also emphasized that because a search warrant had been obtained, the decision of whether sufficient probable cause existed to enter Mr. Summers' home had been made by a neutral, detached magistrate, not the officers in the field. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that as long as police interests justify a limited detention, [i]f the evidence that a citizen's residence is harboring contraband is sufficient to persuade a judicial officer that an invasion of the citizen's privacy is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require that citizen to remain while officers of the law execute a valid warrant to search his home. Id. at 704-05, 101 S.Ct. at 2595, 69 L.Ed.2d 340.