Opinion ID: 2598312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Seizure and inevitable discovery

Text: Camacho argues that NRS 179.1165 (the civil forfeiture statute) does not provide an exception to the warrant requirement. He further argues that because police knew from the time of the first undercover drug deal they would eventually seize his vehicle, they should have obtained a seizure warrant in the interim twenty-one days. Thus, the seizure of the vehicle was infirm since there were no exigent circumstances to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant. Because the initial seizure was invalid, argues Camacho, and therefore police would not have conducted an inventory of his car, the State could not rely upon the inevitable discovery rule to admit the evidence. The State contends that the seizure was proper because Camacho used his vehicle to traffic a controlled substance and the drugs would have inevitably been discovered in a later inventory search pursuant to established police policy. NRS 179.1165(1) states that property that is subject to forfeiture may only be seized by a law enforcement agency upon process issued by a magistrate having jurisdiction over the property. However, section two of that statute delineates several exceptions to the requirement of process. NRS 179.1165(2)(d) permits a seizure of property without process if the law enforcement agency has probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture. And NRS 453.301(5) provides for the forfeiture of vehicles used to transport illegal substances. [19] Accordingly, in A 1983 Volkswagen v. County of Washoe, [20] this court examined NRS 453.306(2)(d) (the predecessor statute to NRS 179.1165(2)(d)) and concluded that the warrantless seizure of a vehicle was proper because police had probable cause to believe that the defendant used his vehicle to transport a controlled substance. In the present case, police conducted a warrantless seizure of Camacho's vehicle because they had probable cause to believe that Camacho used the vehicle to transport illegal drugs. Police observed Camacho sell drugs to their informant three times. Camacho arrived in his vehicle with the drugs in the vehicle with him. Therefore, the conduct of the police fell within the language of NRS 179.1165(2)(d). Additionally, police conducted a legitimate inventory search of Camacho's vehicle following its seizure. Police towed the vehicle from the Wal-Mart parking lot and conducted an inventory search the next day pursuant to police policy. [21] The inevitable discovery rule provides that `evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution [can] still be admitted at trial if the government [can] prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.' [22] In Carlisle v. State, [23] this court concluded that, even assuming an initial search of a vehicle was illegal, the evidence obtained from the search was nevertheless admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. [24] We reasoned that because police arranged to tow the vehicle from the place where they arrested the defendant, they would have been justified in conducting a later legitimate inventory search during which they would have found the same evidence. [25] Here, if police did not recover the contraband in their initial search, they would have recovered it during their later inventory search. Thus, the drugs seized from Camacho's car would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery rule. Since police would have inevitably discovered the drugs when they performed an inventory search of Camacho's vehicle pursuant to established police policy following seizures, the district court did not err by admitting the evidence under this exception to the warrant requirement.