Opinion ID: 2544415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Collateral Crime Evidence as Feature of Trial

Text: Hodges concedes that pursuant to Williams, the trial court properly allowed the State to present evidence of a collateral homicide in his trial for the Belanger homicide. Hodges contends, however, that the collateral crime evidence impermissibly became a feature of his trial. A trial court's decision regarding the admission of collateral crime evidence is subject to an abuse-of-discretion review. LaMarca v. State, 785 So.2d 1209, 1212 (Fla.2001). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in Hodges' trial. This Court has explained that relevant evidence of collateral crimes impermissibly becomes a feature of the trial when the evidence `transcend[s] the bounds of relevancy to the charge being tried' and the prosecution `devolves from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant.' Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 945 (Fla.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. State, 117 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla.1960)). This Court stated that it is not solely the quantity but also the quality and nature of collateral crimes evidence in relation to the issues to be proven that determines whether the collateral crime evidence was a feature of the trial. Id. at 946. This Court noted that it had previously affirmed the admission of extensive collateral crimes evidence where that evidence was wholly probative of material issues, see, e.g., Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1006-07 (Fla. 1994) (affirming admission of evidence of six collateral murders), and that where the Court had reversed the admission of extensive collateral crime evidence it did so because the evidence lacked relevance, see, e.g., Steverson v. State, 695 So.2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1997) (holding admission of evidence of resisting arrest was reversible error because blow-by-blow account of law enforcement officer's injuries and recovery was irrelevant to charged offense). In Conde, this Court found no error where the trial court allowed the State over the course of three days to present evidence concerning five collateral murders in the prosecution of a sixth murder. This Court explained that the length of this testimony was unavoidable given the fact that five collateral crimes were involved. 860 So.2d at 946-47. We further explained that the evidence did not constitute a feature of the trial because the trial court repeatedly instructed the jury on the proper purpose of Williams rule evidence and the State limited its presentation by calling witnesses who could summarize the evidence and by introducing only noncumulative photographs of each crime. Id. at 947. Similarly, in Peterson v. State, 2 So.3d 146 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 208, 175 L.Ed.2d 144 (2009), this Court found that evidence of three collateral robberies did not impermissibly become a feature of Peterson's murder trial. This Court reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because (1) all of the collateral robberies were sufficiently similar to the charged crime to be probative of identity, which rendered the evidence relevant and admissible; (2) the State limited its presentation to witnesses that were unavoidable due to the number of collateral crimes involved; (3) the State limited the emotional impact of its presentation by having only four victims testify and by cooperating with the trial court and the defense to ensure that unduly prejudicial evidence was not admitted; (4) none of the evidence was offered merely to demonstrate Peterson's criminal propensity; and (5) the trial court scrupulously instructed the jury on the proper use of Williams rule evidence before each collateral crime witness. Peterson, 2 So.3d at 156. The collateral crime evidence presented in the instant case was not nearly as voluminous as that presented in Conde and Peterson. Moreover, each of the factors discussed in Peterson was present in Hodges' trial. The defense does not dispute on appeal that the collateral crime evidence was relevant and admissible. The State called relatively few witnesses who testified about the collateral crime. For example, the State relied on Officer Jennifer Luke to explain virtually the entire Jansen investigation rather than calling the numerous law enforcement officers who were involved. The State appears to have taken steps to ensure that the evidence was not emotionally charged and unfairly prejudicial. For example, the State played a 911 call recording rather than presenting the neighbor who saw Jansen's attacker and called a bank records custodian to testify about Jansen's trip to the bank the morning of the homicide rather than calling the relative who drove Jansen to the bank. Next, all of the evidence presented about the collateral homicide was relevant to establishing either how that crime was similar to the charged offense or was relevant to establishing that Hodges was the person who killed Jansen. None of the evidence was offered merely to impugn Hodges' character. And finally, the trial court scrupulously instructed the jury on the proper use of Williams rule evidence before each collateral crime witness. Based on the foregoing, Hodges has not established that the trial court abused its discretion. The collateral crime evidence did not become a feature of his trial.