Opinion ID: 776746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Has Poe Alleged a Violation of a Clearly Established Right?

Text: 39 First, we must determine whether Poe alleges sufficient facts to show a violation of her constitutional rights. Poe must show a violation of a right secured by either the Constitution or a federal statute. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 475 (2d Cir.1995) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). That said, the question arises: what law must be proven to have been violated and by whom? May Poe defeat Leonard's qualified immunity defense by showing only that Pearl violated her right to privacy or must she show that Leonard is liable under a theory of supervisory liability, or both? Although we previously have recognized this ambiguity, we did not resolve it. See Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 163 n. 4 (2d Cir.2001). 10 As we will discuss, the violation of Poe's right to bodily privacy by the subordinate, Pearl, on the facts alleged is clear, the right violated was clearly established at the time Pearl acted, and his conduct can only be viewed as objectively unreasonable. Whether the precise theory under which Leonard may be held liable was clearly established is a much closer question. Thus, unlike in Ford, we must resolve the ambiguity. 40 We conclude that Poe must show that both laws were clearly established to lay the predicate for demonstrating that Leonard lacked qualified immunity: the law violated by Pearl and the supervisory liability doctrine under which she wishes to hold Leonard liable. We thus join with the Circuits that have addressed this question and have held that a supervisor may not be held liable unless both legal theories were clearly established, see Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105, 119 S.Ct. 872, 142 L.Ed.2d 773 (1999); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lankford v. Doe, 513 U.S. 815, 115 S.Ct. 70, 130 L.Ed.2d 25 (1994); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 801 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994) and 513 U.S. 814, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994), but write to explain our reasoning. 41 The qualified immunity analysis depends upon an individualized determination of the misconduct alleged. Because the establishment of both the violation and the defense depend upon evaluating the harm inflicted and the individual responsibility of the accused public official, both the subordinate's and the supervisor's actions (or lack thereof) are relevant. For example, to establish liability, Poe must prove proximate causation. Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir.1999); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable ...). Poe's alleged harm certainly results from Pearl's misconduct in surreptitiously videotaping her. But, according to Poe, this harm might not have occurred had Leonard supervised Pearl more closely. See Camilo-Robles, 151 F.3d at 7 (holding that the plaintiff must affirmatively connect the supervisor's conduct to the subordinate's violative act or omission) (internal quotation marks omitted). 42 To find Leonard ineligible for immunity solely because Pearl acted unlawfully seems patently unfair as well as illogical. See Blyden, 186 F.3d at 264 (The sadistic and malicious standard articulated in Hudson [v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992) for excessive force claims arising under the Eighth Amendment] makes little sense, therefore, in the context of supervisory liability under Section 1983 based on, inter alia, failing to remedy a known wrong or being grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Just as Leonard's liability depends in part upon his actions and choices, his eligibility for immunity must depend upon those same choices. See, e.g., Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 635 (2d Cir.2000) (concluding that police supervisors who relied on allegedly false reports of arresting officers at the scene did not act objectively unreasonably in determining that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff); Camilo-Robles, 151 F.3d at 7. Moreover, a focus on both officers' conduct complements the policies behind permitting public officials the refuge of qualified immunity in their public functions. Qualified immunity exists in part to protect society from the substantial social cost[] that governmental officials, fearing personal monetary liability and harassing litigation[,] will unduly [be inhibited] in the discharge of their duties. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Thus, our focus must be on the behavior of the governmental official in question, who will be shielded from civil damages liability as long as [his] actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights [he is] alleged to have violated. Id. We conclude that we must determine whether both laws, the law violated by Pearl and the specific supervisory liability theory under which Poe wishes to hold Leonard liable, were clearly established by March 1993, the time of the incident. 43 If we find that Poe has sufficiently alleged a violation of her constitutional rights by both Pearl and Leonard, we must determine whether Leonard may be held liable for his actions. To do so, we must examine whether these actions were objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time he acted. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court has directed us to define the relevant legal rule at the appropriate level of particularity. See id. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (explaining that, for example, the right to due process of law is quite clearly established by the Due Process Clause, and thus there is a sense in which any action that violates that Clause (no matter how unclear it may be that the particular action is a violation) violates a clearly established right, but at this level of generality, [p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights). The Court has instructed that the right allegedly violated must be defined 44 in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. 45 Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (citation omitted). As we noted in Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged School District, the 46 recurring difficulty with this general directive, however, lies in reasonably articulating the right in relation to the factual situation at hand. Characterizing the right too narrowly to the facts of the case might permit government actors to escape personal liability, while doing so too broadly risks permitting unwarranted imposition of monetary liability. 47 239 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.2001) (citation omitted). 48
49 At oral argument, Leonard conceded for purposes of this appeal that Poe has sufficiently alleged a violation of her constitutional right to privacy, Tr. of Oral Argument at 9, although he had fully briefed the issue. 11 Even with this concession, we discuss this aspect of Poe's claim in order to clarify that there is a right to privacy in one's unclothed body. Although our prior cases have held that there is such a right in the context of prison confinement and search or seizure by the government, those cases did not limit the right to a Fourth Amendment setting. Accordingly, we conclude that the right to privacy in one's unclothed body extends beyond a Fourth Amendment context to the case at hand. 50 The Fourth Amendment is not the proper source of Poe's constitutional right because Pearl's objectionable conduct occurred outside of a criminal investigation or other form of governmental investigation or activity. Cf., e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 66-67 & n. 11, 113 S.Ct. 538, 121 L.Ed.2d 450 (1992) (recognizing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to a sheriff's unlawful seizure of a mobile home during eviction proceedings); Skinner v. Ry. Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (holding that federal regulations requiring employees of private railroads to provide urine samples for drug testing are subject to Fourth Amendment strictures); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714-15, 723, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (plurality opinion) (holding that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies to governmental conduct whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards) (internal quotation marks omitted); Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (applying Fourth Amendment to governmental inspection program). In all of these cases, the challenged conduct occurred either during an investigation conducted by the government as an employer or during a law enforcement official's performance of a traditional governmental function. But there is no allegation here that Pearl videotaped Poe during the course of any investigation or other governmental endeavor of the sort implicating the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir.) (The types of non-law enforcement conduct to which the [Supreme] Court has extended the scope of the [Fourth] [A]mendment are thus typically motivated by some sort of investigatory or administrative purpose designed to elicit a benefit for the government.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961, 111 S.Ct. 393, 112 L.Ed.2d 403 (1990). Although Pearl invited Poe to film a training video to benefit the police academy, his surreptitious videotaping of her during his assigned duties was for his personal reasons and not to advance any governmental purpose. The Fourth Amendment simply is not implicated by his misconduct. 51 Instead, Poe's claim is appropriately analyzed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of substantive due process. See, e.g., Johnson, 239 F.3d at 251-52 (analyzing a student's claim that gym teacher used excessive force under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantee because the assault occurred in non-seizure, non-prisoner context); Haberthur v. City of Raymore, 119 F.3d 720, 723-24 (8th Cir.1997) (concluding that the plaintiff, who was not under arrest or under suspicion of criminal activity, adequately alleged that police officer's sexual assault violated her substantive due process right to bodily integrity or privacy); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 628 (4th Cir.1997) (holding that claim brought by a plaintiff, who was not arrested or a criminal suspect but was raped by a police officer, was properly viewed as asserting a violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than as a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights); cf. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) ([I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision... the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 52 We discuss cases analyzing such a privacy interest under the Fourth Amendment in addition to those cases applying the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process standard to demonstrate that the type of privacy claim Poe asserts has been previously raised and accepted. Although the Fourth Amendment cases are not on all fours with Poe's claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, they are instructive because they reveal that individuals retain significant privacy interests even in situations where privacy expectations are diminished. 53 Several of our cases involve viewings of unclothed or partially unclothed individuals for penological purposes. In Forts v. Ward, for example, we recognized that female inmates had a privacy interest in protecting themselves from the involuntary viewing of private parts of the body by prison guards of the opposite sex. 621 F.2d 1210, 1217 (2d Cir.1980). 12 In Security and Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187, 192, 204-09 (2d Cir. 1984), we examined the constitutionality of two forms of warrantless disrobe searches of correctional officers for contraband. Although holding that most of the policies governing the warrantless strip and visual body-cavity searches 13 of correctional officers violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, we concluded that if prison officials had reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search of a correctional officer, that search would not violate the Constitution. Id. We recognized that correctional officers, just like visitors to a prison, retain an expectation of bodily privacy. Id. at 202. That expectation was diminished in that case by the notice to the officers of the Department of Correctional Services' policy and the legitimate penological needs of a correctional facility. Id.; see also Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir.1992) (holding that inmate subject to visual body cavity searches retained a limited right of bodily privacy even in the prison context). We have also recognized a privacy interest in cases where arrestees charged with misdemeanors were strip-searched without reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.1988); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir.1986). Poe, however, is not a correctional officer, whose duties include confiscating contraband and providing prison security and who is informed that, when at work, she could be searched. Thus, she has no reason to be aware of the potential for such a search. Nor is she a misdemeanor arrestee housed with a general jail population or with arraigned inmates. She is a private individual, not suspected of any criminal activity, who was invited by a police officer to assist in filming a police academy training video. Her expectation of bodily privacy, were we applying Fourth Amendment standards, would be high. 54 We have also indicated, although we have not held, that the publication of a photograph of a criminal suspect in the nude would violate the suspect's constitutional right to privacy. See Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 525 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872, 94 S.Ct. 102, 38 L.Ed.2d 90 (1973). In support of this proposition, we cited to the Ninth Circuit's decision in York v. Story, which held that a plaintiff, who went to the police department to file assault charges and was photographed by a police officer who told her that she would have to be photographed while in the nude, stated a violation of her right to privacy as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939, 84 S.Ct. 794, 11 L.Ed.2d 659 (1964). Notably, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 55 We cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield one's unclothed figure from view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.... We do not see how it can be argued that the searching of one's home deprives him of privacy, but the photographing of one's nude body, and the distribution of such photographs to strangers does not. Nor can we imagine a more arbitrary intrusion upon the security of that privacy than for a male police officer to unnecessarily photograph the nude body of a female citizen who has made complaint of an assault upon her.... 56 Id. at 455. We find that these cases, read together, are sufficiently clear in establishing that there is a right to privacy in one's unclothed or partially unclothed body, regardless whether that right is established through the auspices of the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. 57 Moreover, even if we did not have these cases on which to rely, we would find that Poe has independently asserted a violation of her substantive due process rights because Pearl's behavior, if proven, shocks the conscience. The core protection provided by the Due Process Clause is protection against arbitrary government action. Thus, the touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against ... the exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 845-46, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We must determine, therefore, whether Pearl's behavior is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience. Id. at 848 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708. 58 Taking the facts most favorably to Poe, as we are required to do on a motion for summary judgment, it seems clear that Pearl manipulated the situation to ensure that Poe would be videotaped unclothed from the waist up: he told Poe to wear provocative clothing for her role in order to distract the trooper candidates and create a better training video; he encouraged her to bring several different outfits; even though she was already dressed provocatively, he encouraged her to change outfits; he told her to lose the bra; and he instructed her to change clothes in his office and then directed her to a precise spot to stand while doing so. Pearl did all this while purporting to act for the benefit of the police academy. Pearl's conduct certainly qualifies as conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any governmental interest, which rises to the conscience-shocking level. County of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708; see also Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that a gym teacher's violent physical assault of a student was sufficiently conscience-shocking to constitute a violation of the student's substantive due process right to be free of excessive force). 59 We hold that Poe has alleged sufficient facts to raise a triable issue whether Pearl violated her constitutional right to privacy in her unclothed body and that her right to privacy in her unclothed body was clearly established at the time Pearl videotaped her. Although our prior cases have not presented exactly the same facts and the Supreme Court has advised that for qualified immunity purposes the right must be established in a more particularized, and hence more relevant sense, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), we conclude, as we did in Johnson, that for claims based on intentionally tortious harmful conduct employed in the absence of any legitimate government interest, the requisite degree of particularity is lessened, Johnson, 239 F.3d at 253. Our cases have sufficiently detailed the existence of such a privacy right and we independently find that Pearl's alleged behavior is shocking enough to qualify as a violation of Poe's substantive due process rights. Thus, it would be objectively unreasonable for a police officer to believe that Pearl's misconduct did not violate Poe's clearly established rights. Let us be clear: a police officer violates a person's constitutional right to bodily privacy when that officer manipulates the circumstances to view, to photograph, to videotape or otherwise to record that person's unclothed or partially unclothed body without his or her consent where, as here, there is no conceivable investigative or otherwise proper law-enforcement interest advanced by such a viewing.
60 A supervisor may not be held liable under section 1983 merely because his subordinate committed a constitutional tort. See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir.1999) (explaining that because section 1983 imposes liability only upon those officials who actually cause a violation, the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable). We have held that a supervisor may be found liable for his deliberate indifference to the rights of others by his failure to act on information indicating unconstitutional acts were occurring or for his gross negligence in failing to supervise his subordinates who commit such wrongful acts, provided that the plaintiff can show an affirmative causal link between the supervisor's inaction and her injury. 14 See, e.g., Johnson, 239 F.3d at 254; Blyden, 186 F.3d at 264-65; Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323-24 (2d Cir.1986) (concluding that a prisoner stated a section 1983 claim against the prison superintendent asserting a violation of his rights at a prison disciplinary hearing because the evidence could show either that the superintendent was directly responsible for the conduct or that he allowed an unconstitutional policy or custom to continue despite the frequency of violations during hearings); Meriwether v. Coughlin, 879 F.2d 1037, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming finding of supervisory liability when evidence showed that supervisors knew or should have known that plaintiff inmates' reputations as alleged planners of a violent insurrection would expose them to extreme hostility from the guards, yet took no precautions for the inmates' safety). Thus, as a general proposition, Leonard may be found liable if, in supervising Pearl, he exhibited gross negligence or deliberate indifference to a high risk that Pearl would violate Poe's constitutional rights, and Leonard's neglect caused Pearl to violate Poe's rights. 61 Leonard contends, however, that it has not been clearly established that a supervisor is required to review the personnel files of his subordinates. In addition, Leonard argues that it was not clearly established that a supervisor's failure to provide special training to a subordinate in order to ensure that the subordinate would not commit a bizarre and possibly criminal act would violate the law. Finally, he asserts that our Circuit's case law applying a gross negligence standard in the supervisory context is spartan and thus not something of which a reasonable supervisor would be aware. 62 Although we have held that a supervisor may be liable for either his gross negligence or deliberate indifference in supervising a subordinate who violates a person's constitutional rights, we must determine whether it has been clearly established that Leonard's failure to supervise Pearl more closely would violate Poe's rights in the particularized context of the facts at hand. The essence of Poe's claim rests on the concept of notice: either that Leonard had notice of sufficient facts to require him to do more or that he should have, by virtue of his supervisory position, investigated Pearl's past further before permitting him to continue with the video assignment. 63 Case law 15 clearly establishes that a supervisor may be liable for failing to screen or otherwise inquire about his subordinates or into their actions. See, e.g., Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 329-31 (2d Cir.1986) (finding sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that a police chief was deliberately indifferent to his officers' use of excessive force because the evidence showed that the chief failed to exercise reasonable care in investigating several claims of police brutality and instead conducted only a superficial questioning of the accused officers), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 1384, 94 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987). As we explain in greater detail below, that precedent clearly establishes that for a supervisor to be liable under section 1983 for his failure to inquire, he must first have been on notice that his subordinate was prone to commit some unconstitutional or unacceptable behavior. Such notice could be actual (for example, awareness of prior deprivations in a related context), or it could be constructive (for instance, notice arising from a preexisting duty). See, e.g., McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that Commissioner of Corrections could not be held liable for damages for a violation of the plaintiff's due process rights at a prison hearing because there was no evidence that he participated directly in the hearings, that he had knowledge of what occurred at the hearings, that he had any reason to suspect that there had been wrongdoing, or that he had direct responsibility or control over the hearing committee), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087, 98 S.Ct. 1282, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 134-35 (2d Cir.) (rejecting immunity defense for prison warden who had knowledge, both through actual notice and by virtue of his position, of inhumane treatment in the prison's strip cells), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S.Ct. 115, 34 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972). Combining the teachings of these cases with our generalized explanation of the gross negligence standard in Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cir.1991), we conclude that the appropriate inquiry is as follows: Poe must allege sufficient facts to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Leonard knew or should have known that there was a high degree of risk that Pearl would behave inappropriately with a woman during his assignment, but either deliberately or recklessly disregarded that risk by failing to take action that a reasonable supervisor would find necessary to prevent such a risk, and that failure caused a constitutional injury to Poe. See, e.g., Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d at 454 (establishing a similar test for supervisory school officials whose subordinate sexually abused a student); McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 125 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that a prison commissioner and superintendent could be held liable for their gross negligence and deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of inmates, as indicated by their having actual or constructive notice that unconstitutional practices were taking place, and their failure to act on the basis of this information); cf. Meriwether, 879 F.2d at 1047-48 (upholding a compensatory damage award for a § 1983 violation when the evidence showed that the commissioner and superintendent should have known that the plaintiff inmates' violent reputation (which was fostered in part by the commissioner's press secretary's statement to the media and by the descriptions of the inmates in their transfer orders) would provoke extreme hostility from correctional officers, yet the commissioner and superintendent took no precautions for the inmates' safety). Poe's difficulty, however, is that she has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to meet this standard. 64 To establish that Leonard's conduct violated the clearly established requirements we have just summarized, Poe relies primarily on Leonard's failure to review Pearl's personnel file, his failure to supervise Pearl more closely after viewing the static crime scene video, and Dr. Mayo's opinion that these failings fell short of proper police management standards. 16 65 First, we address whether Leonard's failure to review Pearl's personnel history, upon assuming his supervisory command, by itself, establishes a deliberate or reckless disregard of a high risk of a constitutional violation by Pearl. Prior case law indicates that a supervisor is not liable for failing to review an inherited subordinate's personnel history upon assuming command, absent some independent reason for him to do so. 66 Rather than examining what a supervisor could have learned had he reviewed his subordinate's personnel history, most courts have instead evaluated how the supervisor responded to the knowledge he possessed. In Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994) and 513 U.S. 814, 115 S.Ct. 68, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994), for example, the Fourth Circuit evaluated the immunity claims of two police supervisors who had differing degrees of knowledge regarding their subordinate's proclivity for using excessive force on arrestees. The court concluded that Sergeant Stroud's motion for summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, was properly denied because there was evidence that he knew of numerous prior complaints involving this subordinate, responded callously or with amusement to at least three of these reports, and failed to investigate the incidents. See id. at 795-96, 800, 802. In contrast, the court found that Sergeant Smith, who replaced Stroud approximately one year before the subordinate shot and killed the plaintiff's husband, was entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because he responded (although somewhat ineffectively) to the third-party complaints of which he was informed. 17 See id. at 796, 801; see also Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 11-15 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that various supervisors and psychiatrists were not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity because the evidence showed that they were reckless and wanton in re-arming a police officer they knew had an extensive history of violent and bizarre behavior who had then beaten and wrongfully arrested the plaintiff), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1105, 119 S.Ct. 872, 142 L.Ed.2d 773 (1999); Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (8th Cir.1997) (concluding that a police chief was entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff failed to adduce evidentiary support for the assertion that the police chief received notice that his subordinate was prone to using excessive force when the plaintiff offered evidence that the subordinate had previously fired warning shots contrary to department policy and that there was a prior but undated complaint of excessive force); McCann, 698 F.2d at 125 (prison supervisory officials may be liable if they fail to act when they have actual notice that unconstitutional practices are occurring). Because Leonard was unaware of Pearl's troubled past, there is insufficient evidence for us to conclude that, based on what Leonard knew about Pearl, Leonard's failure to review Pearl's personnel file was reckless or deliberately indifferent toward Poe's rights. 67 We, however, have also found the existence of constructive notice dispositive. In Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496 (2d Cir.1994), the plaintiff inmate sued the commissioner of New York's Department of Correctional Services under section 1983, alleging that his extended confinement without a hearing in a prison's special housing unit violated his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Id. at 497. Wright argued that the commissioner was personally involved in the violation of his rights because the commissioner had received his letter, addressed to the governor of New York, in which Wright complained generally about the conditions of his confinement but did not state that he was being confined without a hearing or indicate that he had been deprived of the rights connected with a hearing. We found that the commissioner was not put on actual or constructive notice of the violation by that letter. Id. at 501. In contrast, we found that the prison superintendent received constructive notice because a copy of the plaintiff's habeas corpus petition was served on the superintendent. Id. at 502. Although the petition did not allege that the plaintiff had been denied a hearing, it alleged that the plaintiff was denied many rights connected with a hearing. We concluded that the superintendent should therefore not have been granted qualified immunity on summary judgment. Id. But here there are no facts indicating that Leonard had constructive notice of Pearl's problematic history or knowledge of any facts that should have compelled him to inquire into Pearl's background. 68 In some cases, notice will also be imputed to an individual because of the particular duties he is assigned by virtue of his position. See Wright, 460 F.2d at 135. In King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Vinzant v. King, 464 U.S. 965, 104 S.Ct. 404, 78 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983), the First Circuit dismissed an argument by a prison superintendent that he neither knew nor should have known that the plaintiff had been denied his constitutional rights in his disciplinary hearing because the plaintiff's complaint was too general. The First Circuit responded, 69 Defendant confuses a lack of knowledge of the failure of other officials to ensure plaintiff's constitutional rights with a lack of duty on his part to assure that the proceedings below were constitutionally sound. As the official designated to hear prisoners' appeals, he had a duty to conduct at least a minimal investigation to determine whether there was any merit to plaintiff's appeal. 70 Id. The court contrasted this defendant's situation with that of a warden who had no responsibility to review the findings and procedures of a disciplinary committee and was thus found to have fulfilled his supervisory responsibilities. Id. at 21 n. 3. Because the reports the defendant supervisor requested as part of his duties were sufficient to have put the defendant on notice of the alleged constitutional violations, the defendant had recklessly disregarded the plaintiff's rights by failing to investigate his complaint. Id. at 21; see also Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 839-40 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of summary judgment for a prison warden because, as warden, he was primarily responsible for staffing the prison, and thus should have been aware of the understaffing problem with the prison's psychiatric care and its resulting effects); Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir.1986) (finding that a jury could infer that a prison superintendent was directly responsible for the constitutional violations occurring during prison disciplinary hearings or that he permitted an unconstitutional policy or practice given the frequency with which inmates' rights were violated). In this case, however, Poe does not point us to any CSP policy requiring Leonard to review Pearl's personnel file upon assuming command or to any responsibility encompassed in his supervisory role that would have caused him to be aware or become aware of a subordinate's indiscretions that occurred at least three years prior to his assumption of command. 71 One Circuit, however, found a supervisor ineligible for qualified immunity because he failed to conduct a background check on an applicant. See Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1477, 1480 (11th Cir.1989) (finding that a sheriff was ineligible for qualified immunity because he failed to conduct a background check on a mentally unstable person he hired, who then kidnapped and raped a pre-trial detainee), overruled on other grounds by Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir.1998) ( en banc ). Parker is distinguishable because it involved a supervisor's failure to screen a job applicant with a problematic history, rather than his failure to re-screen a problematic officer who was part of a pre-existing staff. In the case at bar, Leonard did not hire Pearl, but instead began to supervise him as part of the staff Leonard inherited from his predecessor. It is not unreasonable for a subsequent supervisor to rely on his predecessor to inform him of subordinates with problematic behaviors or histories. Supervisors cannot be expected to reinvent the wheel with every decision, for that is administratively unfeasible; rather, they are entitled to rely upon the decisions of their predecessors or subordinates so long as those decisions do not appear to be obviously invalid, illegal or otherwise inadequate. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 635 (2d Cir.2000) (finding that it was erroneous for the trial court to conclude that police supervisors had a duty to conduct an independent investigation before charging a suspect); Varrone, 123 F.3d at 81; Cecere v. City of New York, 967 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir.1992). 72 In addition to Leonard's failure to review Pearl's personnel file, Poe argues that once Leonard viewed the static crime scene video, with its overlong focus on the civilian victim's upper thigh region, and learned of Pearl's desire for Poe to show a lot of cleavage in her video, Leonard had sufficient notice of a problematic situation developing that his failure to supervise or train Pearl further amounted to gross negligence. But these facts simply do not provide the sort of actual or constructive notice that our cases, and those of other Circuits, have required. See, e.g., Wright, 21 F.3d at 501 (finding that a prison commissioner did not have actual or constructive notice that the inmate plaintiff had been denied a hearing when the letter the commissioner received only complained generally about the conditions of his confinement). There is nothing unduly sexually provocative about the static crime scene or the cleavage request in the situation presented here. In the context of a training video intended, in part, potentially to shock or distract trainees, they would not indicate to a reasonable supervisor that he, in failing to act, consciously disregarded a high degree of risk of harm to a woman such as Poe. This is especially true in the context at issue here: Pearl was preparing a realistic crime scene to test trooper candidates' observational skills, and crime scenes often contain disturbing details. There is also nothing in our case law to suggest that, absent notice of his subordinate's problematic proclivities, a reasonable supervisor would understand that his delegation of blanket or carte blanche authority to make a training video violated clearly established law. 73 Third, Poe relies heavily on Dr. Mayo's invocation of recommended national standards of police management to prove that Leonard was grossly negligent in his supervision of Pearl. Dr. Mayo relies on such standards to establish that supervisors should, for example, review the personnel files of their subordinates when assuming command. Because Dr. Mayo's testimony does not evince how Leonard acted or failed to act, but only how supervisors who follow his generalized principles of police management might act, it is of limited utility in assessing whether Leonard knew there was a high degree of risk that Pearl would behave inappropriately with a woman on assignment — a key question in the analysis we have identified. Construing the evidence most favorably to Poe, we find that the most she has established is that Leonard was negligent in not reviewing Pearl's personnel file when Leonard had no indication that Pearl had prior problems interacting with civilian women. But mere negligence is insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim under section 1983. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48, 106 S.Ct. 668, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (holding that negligence on the part of prison officials is insufficient to establish liability under section 1983). Poe's expert, unsurprisingly, decries Leonard's failure to do more: to review Pearl's personnel file, to discuss with Pearl how Pearl should interact with civilian women, to require Pearl to use only CSP troopers in filming his videos, etc. But a plaintiff is almost always able to point to what more an officer or supervisor could have done. That is not the issue. Under section 1983, the issue is whether the more that Leonard could have done was clearly established by law at the time he acted or failed to act so that it can be said that Leonard had notice that his actions or omissions rose to the level of a constitutional violation. While Dr. Mayo's standards may be relevant in establishing what a reasonable supervisor might do, they do not clearly establish the law in this Circuit. See Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1399 (11th Cir.1994) (finding that non-legally enforceable standards are not the law and cannot clearly establish it). Poe therefore may not rely solely on these standards to prescribe the level of conduct Leonard was required to meet unless these standards have been prescribed by statute or regulation or adopted by a court. But Poe has failed to call our attention to any case clearly establishing that a supervisor may be held liable, on facts similar to those Leonard confronted, for not following the generalized principles of police management that her expert espouses. 74 Even considering all of Leonard's failings together, construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Poe's favor, we conclude that Poe has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue regarding Leonard's alleged gross negligence or deliberate indifference. The facts Poe alleges are insufficient as a matter of law to have put a reasonable supervisor on notice that there was a high risk that one of his subordinates would violate another's constitutional rights. Accordingly, Poe fails to establish that Leonard acted with the sort of gross negligence or deliberate indifference necessary to support supervisory liability under clearly established law. 75 C. Was It Objectively Unreasonable for Leonard to Believe that his Conduct Did Not Violate the Law? 76 Even if we found that Poe demonstrated that Leonard's inactions violated clearly established law, we would conclude that Leonard was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct was not objectively unreasonable. When evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, the appropriate question is the objective inquiry of whether a reasonable officer could have believed that [his actions were] lawful, in light of clearly established law and the circumstances confronting [him] at the scene. Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds if a jury, viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could conclude that officers of reasonable competence could disagree on the legality of the defendant's actions. Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 202 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). [W]e have held that when the facts that bear on the circumstances are not in dispute, the issue of whether the defendant[] acted reasonably should be determined by the court on a motion for summary judgment. Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir.1998). The District Court erred in not conducting the legal inquiry necessitated by the defense of qualified immunity, which requires that a court determine whether, under the plaintiff's version of the facts, reasonable officers in the defendant's position could disagree as to the legality of his actions. 77 Reasonable supervisors confronted with the circumstances faced by Leonard could disagree as to the legality of his inaction. Indeed, even different circuits disagree about whether it is objectively reasonable for a supervisor, upon assuming his new post, to neglect to review his subordinates' personnel histories. Compare Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 802-03 (4th Cir.1994) (concluding that the actions of a newly appointed supervisor, who heard some informal complaints about a subordinate officer but conducted a minimal investigation into those complaints, were objectively reasonable) with Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1477 (11th Cir.1989) (affirming denial of qualified immunity after trial because a reasonable sheriff could not have concluded that hiring an individual with a troubled background, of which the sheriff knew or could have discovered with minimal investigation, would not violate the plaintiff's rights), overruled on other grounds by Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir.1998) ( en banc ). Although the lingering shot of the victim's upper thighs in the static crime scene might concern some supervisors, we conclude that a reasonable supervisor, who was unaware of Pearl's past misbehavior with women, would not have found anything unusual when viewing the videotape in the context of preparing a realistic crime scene for police candidates to observe closely, particularly given that such scenes are often violent or gruesome. Much of Poe's evidence derives from Dr. Mayo's testimony that Leonard's conduct did not meet recommended national standards. But Dr. Mayo's inability to identify one police department that follows the standards he advocates demonstrates that there is a range of supervisory conduct that reasonable officers believe is acceptable. Considering all of Leonard's alleged inadequacies together, we conclude that, at best, reasonable supervisors could disagree as to whether Leonard violated clearly established law.