Opinion ID: 1813007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Statement about Theft of the Murder Weapon

Text: In Hudson's second issue on appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to elicit hearsay testimony from Hudson on cross-examination relating to the theft of the murder weapon, a handgun that had been stolen from Peller's apartment several months before the murder. The following colloquy occurred: Q [Prosecutor] Where did you see that gun before, Lance's house? A Yes, sir. Q You know Lance's gun got stolen; right? A Yes, sir. Q No idea who stole that gun? A I have ideas. Q Do you know? A Um Q Do you know? A Now I do. Q Now you do? Who stole the gun? A Ernesto Gonzalez. Q How do you know that? A Through reading discovery, his statement. Q His statement? Ernesto Gonzalez admits to stealing that gun in his statement? A He admits to burglarizing Lance's apartment. Q With who? Defense counsel objected at that point, but the trial court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then continued: Q Ernesto Gonzalez admits to burglarizing that house with who? A He claims it was with me. Q With you? A He claims it was with me, it wasn't. Q Okay, but that's in his statement, too; right? A Sure. Defense counsel again objected that the question called for information that should not come before the jury and had nothing to do with the case, and moved for mistrial. The trial court stated that the question was a natural follow-up to Hudson's testimony and the motion for mistrial was denied. As previously mentioned, the standard of review of a trial court's ruling on the admission of the evidence is abuse of discretion; however, that discretion is abused if the ruling is contrary to the rules of evidence. We will, therefore, determine if the out-of-court statement was properly admitted under the circumstances of this case. In this case, the State was engaging in a legitimate area of cross-examination by asking Hudson if he knew who stole the victim's gun, which was also the murder weapon. It was Hudson who volunteered that he knew that Gonzalez stole the gun because he read it in Gonzalez's discovery statement, in which Gonzalez admitted to burglarizing the victim's apartment and stealing the gun. No objection was made to that series of questions and it is indisputable that it was to Hudson's benefit to claim that Gonzalez, a confederate of Mejia, stole the gun. By Hudson's limited answer it is apparent that he wanted the jury to hear only that part of the hearsay statement implicating Gonzalez and not the second part implicating Hudson. It was only when the prosecutor was permitted to ask the question with who that Hudson admitted that the statement also implicated him in the burglary of Peller's apartment. We agree with the State that in this case Hudson opened the door by volunteering Gonzalez's hearsay statement as the basis for his answer. Once only a portion of the statement was introduced and essentially presented an incomplete picture, it was fair for the State to follow up in order to clarify Hudson's response and make it complete. [T]he concept of `opening the door' allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible testimony to `qualify, explain, or limit' testimony or evidence previously admitted. Lawrence v. State, 846 So.2d 440, 452 (Fla.2003) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 42 (Fla. 2000)). The concept of `opening the door' is `based on considerations of fairness and the truth-seeking function of a trial' and without the fuller explication, the testimony that opened the door would have been incomplete and misleading. Lawrence, 846 So.2d at 452; see also Overton v. State, 801 So.2d 877, 900-01 (Fla.2001) (agreeing that the State is permitted to fill in the gaps in the testimony to correct a false impression left by the defendant). Here, the prosecutor's question that elicited the subject of Gonzalez's sworn statement did not clearly call for hearsay and was otherwise proper. Once Hudson opened the door by his answer and implied by his responses that Gonzalez alone stole the gun, thereby raising the inference that Gonzalez alone committed the murder, the prosecutor was entitled to elicit a full and fair account of the Gonzalez statement to clarify that impression. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to further question Hudson about Gonzalez's sworn statement in order to qualify or explain his earlier reference to the contents of the statement.