Opinion ID: 1918274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Determination of Domicile

Text: We begin by reviewing the decisions of the tribunals that addressed the issue of domicile. The administrative hearing officer, in an August 2, 1996 decision on tax years 1992 and 1993, reasoned that [t]he taxpayers have friends, family and business relationships in Rhode Island. Those relationships are not gradually being severed. They are (understandably) continuing and rich.    The taxpayers have not relocated a business in Florida. They do not remain in Florida on important family occasions. In the October 6, 1997 decision on the 1991 tax year, the administrative hearing officer wrote, The taxpayers have lived in Rhode Island for many years. Their business connections to Rhode Island are still substantial, and their intent to return is evidenced by the fact that they do return to Rhode Island everyyear. In response to both of these rulings by the hearing officer, the tax administrator issued two brief decisions in which he approve[d], adopt[ed] and incorporate[d]    the findings of fact and conclusions of law as made by the hearing officer. The District Court judge affirmed and upheld the decision of the Tax Administrator, reasoning, in part, that [w]hile the [c]ourt finds that these petitioners tried mightily to break their ties to this state to the extent that they would not be subject to taxation as a resident, the court finds they simply did not do enough to succeed in their attempt. Moreover, he wrote, Arthur DeBlois investigated the tax advantages of becoming a Florida domiciliary and with the advice of a tax expert, he deliberately sought to sever a sufficient number of his ties with the State of Rhode Island so as to avoid the substantially higher income tax rate for Rhode Island residents. The issue before this Court for decision was whether the steps DeBlois and his wife took in this regard were sufficient to accomplish this end. In sum, while Mr. and Mrs. DeBlois have established other contacts outside of Rhode Island, the court believes their most enduring, most substantive, contacts remain here; and it is a telling fact that    they have picked their final resting place to be here in Rhode Island.    Unlike previous settlers who pulled up stakes, went west and established a new home in a new place and unlike those millions of immigrants, starting with the Pilgrims, who abandoned the old work and their old home for the new worlds and a new home, the court finds that Mr. and Mrs. DeBlois didn't ever truly abandon their old home in Rhode Island.    [T]hey did not and would not break their deep and compelling ties with this state. [6] We held in Flather, that in order to establish domicile, a person must have an `actual [place of] abode in the state with the intention in good faith to live [t]here permanently and without any present intention of changing the home in the future.' 119 R.I. at 281, 377 A.2d at 228 (quoting Nevin v. Nevin, 88 R.I. 426, 433, 149 A.2d 722, 725 (1959)). Generally, the controlling factor in determining a person's domicile is whether he or she possesses the requisite domiciliary intent. Id. Because it is not disputed here that petitioners have an actual place of abode in Florida, the only issue is whether they possess the requisite domiciliary intent. This Court has most explicitly addressed establishing a domicile in Rhode Island in the case of McCarthy v. McCarthy, 45 R.I. 367, 369, 122 A. 529, 531 (1923): To establish a domicile and become a domiciled inhabitant there must be an actual abode in the state with the intention in good faith to live here permanently and without any present intention of changing the home in the future. Actual residence without such intention does not suffice. In the absence of constitutional or statutory requirement in regard to domicile the length of the residence is immaterial provided the other elements are found to exist. The general concept of domicile has been defined as: [t]he permanent residence of a person or the place to which he intends to return even though he may actually reside elsewhere. A person may have more than one residence but only one domicile.    The established, fixed, permanent or ordinary dwelling place or place of residence of a person, as distinguished from his temporary and transient, though actual, place of residence. It is his legal residence, as distinguished from his temporary place of abode; or his home, as distinguished from a place to which business or pleasure may temporarily call him. Black's Law Dictionary 484-85 (6th ed.1990). Applying these principles to this case, it is our opinion that an individual may retain contacts to Rhode Island, where he or she may spend significant time, but become domiciled in another state, provided the prerequisites of domicile are met. Moreover, a person may have more than one residence,Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 20 cmt. b (2) (1971), and may even maintain a residence in the former domicile. See Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 18 cmt. e (1971) (It is    possible for a person to retain his old dwelling place and to cease to regard it as his home. In that case, if he regards the new dwelling place as his home, his domicil changes to the new dwelling place); see also Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 368 F.Supp. 51, 58 (S.D.N.Y.1973), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1974). [7] In order to effectuate a change of domicile, physical presence must concur with the intention of making the new location a permanent abode. Margani v. Sanders, 453 A.2d 501, 503 (Me. 1982); Lyon v. Glaser, 288 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.J. 1972); Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 15 cmt. a (1971). One need not abandon a former domicile  to the extent that means never or rarely returning  nor must one gradually sever or break ties to the state of origin. [8] Although choosing a final resting place may be considered, it should be considered very lightly, because many sentimental reasons influence the selection of burial places for our dead, having little reference to legal domicile. Cooper'sAdm'r v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 388, 93 S.E. 680, 683 (1917). Finally, a tax avoidance motive for changing one's domicile is permissible. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 18 cmt. f (1971) (Provided that [the] requirements [of domicile] are met, it is immaterial what motives led the person to go there. It makes no difference    whether the move to the new location was for purposes of health, to accept a job, to avoid taxation, [or] to secure a divorce.); but see Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 20 at 83 Special Note on Evidence for the Establishment of a Domicil of Choice (A person's motive in going to a certain locality may be important evidence as to whether he intends to make his home there.). Although a motive to avoid taxes without additional evidence to establish domicile may militate against finding a change in domicile, a person may move to a new state for tax reasons and have a bona fide intention to establish domicile in that state. The determination of domicile must be made on a case by case basis upon consideration of all the evidence. McCarthy, 45 R.I. at 370, 122 A. at 531; Lyon, 288 A.2d at 15. A person's intent with respect to domicile may be evidenced by his or her testimony and may  and often as a practical matter, must  also be evidenced by objective manifestations of that intent. McCarthy, 45 R.I. at 370, 122 A. at 531 (Actions as well as declarations are to be weighed in the determination of the intention.). Here, evidence that petitioners intended to change their domicile to Florida was substantial. The petitioners' condominium furnishings in Florida were valuated by an insurance company in excess of $150,000, compared to about $50,000 valuation of furnishings in Rhode Island. The Florida condominium also contains silverware, the valuables [and] some paintings. It is more expensive than their condominium in Warren. They filed for and were granted a homestead exemption in Florida, the application for which asked for the [d]ate you last became a permanent resident of Florida, to whichpetitioners responded 10/90. [9] The petitioners changed their drivers' licenses and car registrations to Florida and changed their wills to recite that they were of Vero Beach, Florida. Mr. DeBlois made repeated references to Florida as his permanent, official, and legal home in resignation correspondence to various Rhode Island civic and business groups to which he had belonged. [10] The petitioners filed Florida intangible tax returns and paid the taxes thereon. They registered to vote in Florida and since 1991 have only voted there. See Blount v. Boston, 351 Md.360, 718 A.2d 1111, 1115 ( 1998) (Our cases have characterized the place of voting as `the highest evidence of domicile.'). Moreover, petitioners have joined churches and country clubs in Florida and have made substantially greater donations to their church in Florida than their donations in Rhode Island after 1991. Mr. DeBlois has volunteered for a local Florida hospital, a battered women's shelter, Habitat for Humanity, and has been active in politics in Florida. When he returns to Rhode Island for board meetings of DeBlois Oil, Mrs. DeBlois remains in Florida. For federal income tax purposes, the petitioners treated the 1993 sale of the Vero Beach condominium as a sale of a principal residence ([T]he decision was that Florida was my home, and we treated the sale of the condominium that way.). Furthermore, all but one of their checking accounts are in Florida. [11] In addition to theseobjective manifestations of intent, when asked, So, it's fair to say as of August 1, 1990, you had intended to change domiciles at that point?, Mr. Deblois responded yes. [12] The aggregate of this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that petitioners in good faith inten[d] to live    [in Florida] permanently without any present intention of changing homes in the future. [13] In summary, we conclude that the tax administrator placed impossible barriers against establishing a change in domicile. The petitioners here acted reasonably and took sufficient steps in attempting to change their domicile. Moreover, it is our opinion that a change in domicile does not require abandonment of one's former state. Domicile is manifested by physical presence plus intent. Here, petitioners' actions demonstrated their intent to establish domicile in Florida. Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that petitioners have established by a preponderance of the evidence that they intended that Florida be their fixed, permanent [and] ordinary dwelling place, and thus their domicile, during the years in question.