Opinion ID: 164283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of the New Prison Sentence

Text: Mr. Turner argues that any violations of his supervised release were “technical or non-willful” and should not have resulted in the revocation of his supervised release and the imposition of a new prison sentence. Aplt’s Br. at 15. The government’s Petition for Action of Supervised Release listed six separate violations of the terms and conditions of the supervised release committed by Mr. Turner. At the evidentiary hearing on the revocation of the supervised release, the district court found that “[t]he testimony clearly supports the violations and failure to comply with the reporting [requirements], leaving the state without permission, failure to file, [and failure to] provide the financial statements as requested by the probation officer.” Rec. vol. III, at 94 (Tr. of Revocation Hr’g, dated May 29, 2003). The court went on to note that “[t]he failure to pay restitution also is a failure” to comply with the terms of the supervised release. Id. “This court reviews a district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for abuse of discretion. Legal questions relating to the revocation of supervised -10- release are reviewed de novo.” United States v. Disney, 253 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). “The district court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of his supervised release.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Turner characterizes each of the six violations alleged by the government as either misunderstandings or non-willful acts. In response to the allegations, he argues: 1) that he did not pay restitution due to lack of funds; 2) that he did not realize that he lacked permission to leave the state on a business trip and that he reported back to the Probation Office and submitted hotel receipts from the trip upon his return; 3) that his failure to submit monthly reports was due to his poor health; 4) that he denied having a roommate because he thought of the alleged roommate as a caretaker; 5) that his transaction with Moody’s Jewelry involved bartering for roofing services and was therefore not a credit transaction; and 6) that he did not submit requested financial documents because he was too sick to dig through the boxes to find them. The district court heard and rejected each of these excuses after a thorough revocation hearing involving six witnesses. The court chose not to credit Mr. Turner’s testimony, concluding “[i]t seems somewhat confusing or a mystery that Mr. Turner has a fiancee, he was going to buy a $20,000 ring but he was so depressed that he can’t work, he can’t make a report, [and] he can’t get it to the probation office. In fact, it’s so conflicting that -11- it’s not believable.” Rec. vol. III at 94-95. The district court did not abuse its discretion in drawing such a conclusion. As Mr. Turner points out, his offenses consisted entirely of Grade C violations, 2 the least serious of the three grades of supervised release violations. However, a district court does have the discretion to revoke a defendant’s supervised release and sentence him to a term of imprisonment for a Grade C violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The court may revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release . . . if the court, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure applicable to revocation of probation or supervised release, finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release. Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2) (policy statement) (“Upon a finding of a Grade C violation, the court may (A) revoke probation or supervised release; or (B) extend the term of probation or supervised release and/or modify the conditions of supervision.”). Thus, while the district court could have chosen to extend the term of Mr. Turner’s supervised release rather than sentencing him to prison time, the court was well within its discretion to revoke the release despite the fact that the violations all fell within the Grade C category. 2 A “Grade C” violation is defined as “conduct constituting (A) a federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less; or (B) a violation of any other condition of supervision.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3). -12- We recognize that Mr. Turner’s twelve-month prison sentence does exceed the range suggested in the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) (policy statement) (recommending a sentence of three to nine months’ imprisonment for Grade C violations of supervised release committed by defendants with a criminal history category of I). However, his sentence is well within the statutory maximum of thirty-six months’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We have previously held that “the policy statements regarding revocation in Chapter 7 of the U.S.S.G. are advisory rather than mandatory in nature.” United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 773 (10th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Brooks, 976 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming a sentence exceeding the range suggested in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a)). As in Lee and Brooks, the sentencing judge demonstrated awareness of the range recommended in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), see Rec. vol. V, at 4 (Sentencing Tr., dated June 23, 2003), but chose to sentence Mr. Turner to a longer twelve-month term of imprisonment as a “result of the defendant’s ongoing pattern of violations which precluded the probation office from effective supervision.” Id. at 5. Given the numerous violations committed by Mr. Turner, we find that the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable. C. Appropriateness of the Occupational Restriction Mr. Turner’s new supervised release, to follow his twelve-month prison -13- sentence, contains a special condition requiring him to “refrain from any form of self employment during the term of supervised release.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 115, at 3 (Judgment, dated July 1, 2003). He contends that the district court wrongfully imposed this serious occupational restriction, that it is “unreasonable,”and, curiously, that it “will not prohibit him from engaging in bank fraud.” Aplt’s Br. at 21. “The district court generally enjoys broad discretion in setting a condition of supervised release.” United States v. Erwin, 299 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002). We review the imposition of such conditions for abuse of discretion. Id. The sentencing court has the statutory authority to order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent that such condition– (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),
(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a); any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other condition it considers to be appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Section 3563(b)(5) authorizes the court to order, as a condition of supervised release, that the defendant refrain, in the case of an individual, from engaging in a specified -14- occupation, business, or profession bearing a reasonably direct relationship to the conduct constituting the offense, or engage in such a specified occupation, business, or profession only to a stated degree or under stated circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5). Prior to imposing an occupational restriction, the court must determine that: (1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant’s occupation, business, or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and (2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted. U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a). The plain language of the United States Code and the Sentencing Guidelines clearly requires a connection between the occupational restriction and the underlying offense for which the defendant was convicted. Mr. Turner pleaded guilty to defrauding three financial institutions with which he held checking accounts through his roofing business. After his initial sentencing, he failed to provide information about his business activities to the probation officer in violation of the terms of his supervised release. Based on these connections, the district court acted well within its discretion when it concluded that Mr. Turner’s occupation as a self-employed roofer bears “a reasonably direct relationship” to his offense of bank fraud, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a). See United States v. Smith, 332 F.3d 455, 461 (7th Cir. -15- 2003) (holding that “[t]he connection between [defendant’s] employment as a truck driver and his crime of theft of interstate freight” was sufficiently “obvious” for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(1)); cf. Erwin, 299 F.3d at 1232-33 (holding that the requirement of U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(1) was not satisfied where the district court restricted defendant’s commercial fishing license after he pleaded guilty to an unrelated possession of ammunition offense). Mr. Turner also argues that the district court failed to make findings regarding the necessity of the occupational restriction. In United States v. Smith, although the Seventh Circuit held that the connection between commercial truck driving and the crime of conviction (the theft of the very freight defendant was hired to transport) was “reasonably direct” for purposes of imposing an occupational restriction, it remanded the case in part because the district court failed to make “a finding that the restriction was necessary to prevent [defendant] from engaging in the same conduct.” 332 F.3d at 461-62. We agree that such findings are important and encourage district courts to make express findings concerning the necessity of occupational restrictions. However, this case is easily distinguishable from Smith, as much of the Seventh Circuit’s concern in that case stemmed from the district court’s “reliance on factors unrelated to the offense of conviction,” id., a concern indisputably not present here. Moreover, in Smith, the district court imposed an occupational restriction of unspecified duration; in this -16- case, the district court explicitly limited the duration of the occupational restriction to the period of supervised release. We hold, based on the facts of this case, that the district court provided an adequate basis for the restriction on self-employment. The court’s belief in the necessity of this restriction was reflected at the sentencing hearing, where the court stated in response to Mr. Turner’s objection to the occupational restriction, “[w]e are going to protect the public this time.” Rec. vol. 5, at 7. This statement, when considered alongside Mr. Turner’s failure to submit to less restrictive attempts to monitor his business activities during his initial supervised release, leads us to conclude that the district court was within its discretion to find that “imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(2). See United States v. Choate, 101 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding a prohibition on self-employment because it “seems a reasonable way to protect the public” from defendant’s business-related wire fraud). Contrary to Mr. Turner’s characterization of this issue, the restriction on self-employment will not necessarily prohibit him from earning a living as a roofer. He remains free to work for others, provided he does not continue to run his own roofing business. While we recognize that this restriction is significant, the district court determined that it is necessary to prevent Mr. Turner from -17- continuing to engage in business-related bank fraud. We hold that both requirements of U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a) have been satisfied, and that the district court was, therefore, within its discretion in imposing the restriction on selfemployment. D. Lack of Advance Notice of the Occupational Restriction Mr. Turner also claims that the occupational restriction was unreasonable because he did not receive advance notice of the restriction in the presentence report. He contends that the occupational restriction constitutes an upward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines and therefore requires advance notice under Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991). See id. at 136 (“[T]he textual and contextual evidence of legislative intent indicates that Congress did not intend district courts to depart from the Guideline sua sponte without first affording notice to the parties.”). The restriction on self-employment imposed on Mr. Turner is not an upward departure; rather, it is among the recommended conditions of supervised release set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5. In that sense, this case is easily distinguishable from Burns, in which the court sentenced the defendant to a term of imprisonment exceeding the maximum sentence reflected in Guidelines and the presentence report. See 501 U.S. at 132-35. This case is also distinguishable from United States v. Bartsma, 198 F.3d -18- 1191, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 1999), in which we extended the reasoning of Burns to require notice prior to imposing a requirement that a defendant register as a sex-offender as a special condition of supervised release. Our limited holding in Bartsma is evidenced by our narrow conclusion that “the Burns rationale applies when a district court is considering imposing a sex offender registration requirement as a special condition of supervised release, and the condition is not on its face related to the offense charged.” 3 Id. at 1199-1200. As the First Circuit has recognized, “requiring registration as a sex offender is different, in type and kind, from any of the usual conditions attached to supervised release.” United States v. Brown, 235 F.3d 2, 4 (1st Cir. 2000). We later noted the limits of the Bartsma holding and emphasized that “[b]y implication, presentence notice is not required for some other conditions of release–perhaps most conditions.” United States v. Barajas, 331 F.3d 1141, 1144 (10th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Mills, 959 F.2d 516, 518 (5th Cir. 1992) (“We do not believe it to be in the interest of justice . . . to extend the notice requirements of Burns to cases where the defendant’s term of confinement is not at stake. Requiring trial judges to give prior notice of their intent to impose an occupational restriction would only further encumber the lengthy sentencing 3 The defendant in Bartsma was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, an offense having no direct nexus to the sex offender registration requirement. 198 F.3d at 1194. -19- process without adding anything to defendants’ existing procedural protections.”). In any event, Mr. Turner’s challenge must fail because he had constructive notice of the occupational restriction. As in Barajas, “the challenged condition [is] among the recommended conditions set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines, and the factual predicates for [its] imposition were fully addressed in the PSR.” 331 F.3d at 1144; see also Brown, 235 F.3d at 4 (“[T]he guidelines contemplate (and give the appellant constructive notice) that the sentencing court will tailor supervised release conditions to fit the circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the offender.”). “Consequently, a defendant rarely, if ever, will be able to claim unfair surprise when the sentencing court establishes the conditions of supervised release.” Id. Both 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(e)(4) authorize the imposition of an occupational restriction as a condition of supervised release. As such, the challenged restriction is “among the discretionary conditions of supervised release to which all defendants are alerted.” Barajas, 331 F.3d at 1145 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 258 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir.2001)) (emphasis added by Barajas). We therefore conclude that the district court did not wrongfully deprive Mr. Turner of notice of the restriction on selfemployment. -20-