Opinion ID: 1969537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: hunter's due process claim

Text: The judge's ruling on Hunter's motion appears to reflect a belief on her part that if she entertained concerns regarding actual or perceived discrepancies in the complaining witnesses' testimony, the appropriate remedy was to suppress the evidence and thus to preclude the jury from hearing it. We do not agree with this approach. On the contrary, except in a very narrow class of cases which differ in decisive respects from the present record, it is the function of the jury to determine whether eyewitness identification is reliable. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2254, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977) (evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill); Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 673 (D.C.1993) (discrepancy between descriptions by witness and police officer of the suspect's pants was for the jury to weigh). If, at trial, the judge is of the opinion that the identification testimony, together with all of the other evidence, is insufficient to permit an impartial jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge mayindeed, he or she mustgrant a motion for judgment of acquittal. See, e.g., Beatty v. United States, 544 A.2d 699, 701-03 (D.C.1988). In this case, however, we are dealing with admissibility, not with sufficiency, and suppression on due process grounds is warranted only where the circumstances of an identification were so unduly suggestive that there is a very substantial danger of irreparable misidentification. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972-73, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). There were no such circumstances in this case. Both Juame and Jones identified Hunter at a showup about ten minutes after the robbery, a block or so from the spot where it took place. This court has repeatedly upheld the validity of showup procedures carried out, as in this case, soon after the commission of the crime and the apprehension of suspects. See, e.g., Turner, supra, 622 A.2d at 672-73; Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1068 (D.C.1978); Russell v. United States, 133 U.S.App. D.C. 77, 81, 408 F.2d 1280, 1284, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 928, 89 S.Ct. 1786, 23 L.Ed.2d 245 (1969). The admission of evidence of such identification is consistent with common sense and sound practice; a prompt showup enhances the reliability of an identification and may, as in this case, exonerate an innocent person who has been mistakenly apprehended. Russell, supra, 133 U.S.App. D.C. at 81, 408 F.2d at 1284. Although a degree of suggestibility is inevitable in the context of every pretrial confrontation between a witness and a suspect, a defendant is not denied due process of law unless ... in the totality of circumstances, the on-the-scene confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.... In considering the totality of the circumstances, an immediate on-the-scene confrontation has uniquely powerful indicia of reliability which more than counterbalance any suggestivity, absent special elements of unfairness .... Furthermore, something more egregious than mere custodial status is required in order to establish such special unfairness. Singletary, supra, 383 A.2d at 1068 (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Turner, supra, 622 A.2d at 672. In the present case, there was no undue suggestivity. The trial judge expressly so found with respect to Juame, and Hunter has not challenged that determination. We conclude that there was likewise no undue suggestivity as to Jones. [4] As the government correctly argued in the trial court and reiterated in this court, the absence of any showing of undue suggestivity is dispositive of Hunter's due process claim. In Greenwood v. United States, 659 A.2d 825 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 326, 133 L.Ed.2d 227 (1995), this court summarized the appropriate judicial inquiry where the admissibility of an eyewitness identification is at issue: First, the trial court must determine whether the procedures are so impermissibly suggestive that they give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196, 93 S.Ct. 375, 380-81, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972); see Stewart [ v. United States ], 490 A.2d 619, 622 [ (D.C.1985) ]. If the trial court finds undue suggestivity, it must then determine whether the identification was nonetheless reliable. If the identification is reliable, it is admissible, as is evidence relating to the identification procedures that were found to be suggestive. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. On the other hand, if the identification procedures are not unduly suggestive, the details of those procedures are admissible and no reliability finding is necessary. Id. at 828 (emphasis added). [5] We reiterated only a few months ago that [n]o reliability determination is required unless the trial court has determined that the eyewitness identification was unduly suggestive. Scales v. United States, 687 A.2d 927, 937 n. 15 (D.C.1996); see also Wilkerson v. United States, 427 A.2d 923, 926 (D.C.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 852, 102 S.Ct. 295, 70 L.Ed.2d 143 (1981) (where a showup has not been shown to be unduly suggestive, the court need not evaluate its reliability). In light of these authorities, we agree with the government that undue suggestivity is a necessarybut not sufficientcondition for any finding that an identification procedure violates the Due Process Clause.... [I]f a showup identification procedure has no special elements of unfairness beyond the suggestivity inherent in any showup, the procedure does not offend due process, regardless of the court's views concerning the reliability of the identification. The trial judge's rationale for suppressing the identification testimony in this case cannot be reconciled with the controlling legal principles as we have summarized them. Accordingly, her order cannot be sustained.