Opinion ID: 1298503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: lobbying and ballot proposition campaign expenses

Text: PERB concluded that Cumero's nonmember service fees could not be used to support or oppose political parties or individual candidates for public office. (5) It approved, however, the use of Cumero's fees for the union's expenses of lobbying, and of ballot proposition campaigns, for or against measures affecting public school teachers' interests with respect to employer-employee relations, regardless of whether the measures pertain to matters on which the union is obliged or entitled to negotiate or consult with the public school employer. In support of this position, PERB and the union point out that many matters affecting the terms and conditions of public school teachers' employment are beyond the control of the local school districts. The districts' powers are conferred by the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 14.) Though the powers thus conferred are broad (see, e.g., Ed. Code, §§ 35160, 35160.1), the local districts are denied control over many aspects of teachers' terms of employment by detailed provisions in the Education Code governing such matters as initial employment (Ed. Code, § 44830 et seq.), resignations, dismissals and leaves of absence ( id., § 44930), computation of salaries ( id., § 45022 et seq.), health and welfare benefits ( id., § 7000 et seq.), and retirement ( id., § 22000 et seq. [State Teachers' Retirement Law]). Since section 3540 subjects the EERA to other provisions of the Education Code, the employees' representative is prohibited from negotiating with a school district over any contract proposal whereby Education Code provisions would be `replaced, set aside, or annulled.' ( San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 33 Cal.3d 850, 864-866.) [12] The Education Code also directly affects the representative's right to consult on educational objectives, curriculum, and textbooks because that right is expressly limited to consultation on matters within the discretion of the school district (§ 3543.2) and the scope of that discretion is controlled by numerous provisions of the code. (See, e.g., Ed. Code, §§ 51000 et seq. [general instructional programs], 60000 et seq. [instructional materials and testing].) Finally, since the adoption in June 1978 of Proposition 13, limiting local taxation of real property (Cal. Const., art. XIII A), school districts have become more dependent on appropriations by the Legislature for a major part of their revenue. [13] Moreover, increases in a district's revenue from local taxation may require approval by the electorate. (See Cal. Const., art. XIII A, §§ 1, subd. (b) [two-thirds vote for taxes to pay off bonds for acquisition or improvement of real property], 4 [two-thirds vote for special taxes].) Hence, a district's ability to finance salaries and benefits for which its teachers' exclusive representative seeks to negotiate, or improvements in its educational programs as to which the representative exercises its right to consult, depends to a considerable extent upon decisions by the Legislature or by the local or statewide electorate. PERB and the union contend that in authorizing organizational security arrangements, under which nonmember teachers may be required to pay the union as exclusive representative a service fee not to exceed the regular member initiation fees, periodic dues, and general assessments (§ 3540.1, subd. (i)(2)), the Legislature intended that the nonmember contribute not merely to the costs of negotiating and administering collective bargaining agreements with the district, but also to the expenses of other activities necessary to make the collective bargaining process effective on behalf of all the teachers in the bargaining unit. It is claimed that without union lobbying and electioneering on matters affecting school employee interests, the union's bargaining position would be eroded in the face of political activity on behalf of school employers or taxpayer groups. On the other hand, it is argued, benefits won through effective union lobbying and electioneering will enhance labor peace and stability because unions will not have to bargain with the individual districts to obtain those benefits. The flaw in PERB's position with respect to lobbying and electioneering is its lack of grounding in the EERA itself. With seeming disregard for its own admonition that [t]he fact that the Constitution does not prohibit certain uses of the service fee does not mean that EERA permits them (PERB Dec. No. 197, supra, at pp. 10-11 [6 PERC ¶ 13065 at p. 231]), PERB proceeds to cite Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209, and other cases as bar[ring] the use of fees only for such activity whose ideological purpose is unrelated to the representational process and as acknowledg[ing] that union involvement in some political activity may be required in pursuit of representational objectives. [14] (PERB Dec. No. 197, supra, at pp. 14-15 [6 PERC ¶ 13065 at p. 231].) PERB then concludes that the test of chargeability to nonmember fees is not simply the presence of political action but whether employee representation is the underlying purpose of such action. ( Id. at p. 15 [6 PERC ¶ 13065 at p. 232.) This broad test conflicts with PERB's own holding, with which we agree, that the objecting nonmember should not be required to support activities which are beyond the Association's representational obligations ( id. at p. 10 [6 PERC ¶ 13065 at p. 231]). Those representational obligations are defined by the EERA itself. [15] The EERA's organizational security provisions are intended to ensure that nonmembers pay their fair share of the obligations which the EERA imposes on the union, not to require the nonmembers to finance all union activities which could constitutionally be charged against them. What are the obligations imposed by the EERA on the union as exclusive representative? As already explained, the union must meet and negotiate with the public school employer (§ 3540.1, subd. (k); fn. 9, ante ) on certain terms and conditions of employment within the scope of representation, and also is entitled to consult with the employer on certain educational and curricular matters insofar as they are within the employer's discretion. (§§ 3543.2, 3543.6.) The union may not, however, negotiate with the employer over matters outside the scope of representation, and in particular, may not negotiate over any contract proposal that would conflict with the Education Code. (§ 3543.2, subd. (a); San Mateo City School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., supra, 33 Cal.3d 850, 864-866.) The employer, however, may consult any employee or employee organization on any matter outside the scope of representation. (§ 3543.2, subd. (a).) Thus, the EERA assigns no role to the union in seeking to improve conditions of employment that are not under the control of the local school employer with whom it meets and negotiates. Accordingly, with one possible exception, the costs of efforts to change the law by lobbying before the Legislature, or by campaigning for or against local or state ballot propositions, are outside the union's representational obligations under the EERA and therefore cannot be charged against the fees of objecting nonmembers. The exception may arise if the employer consults with the union and thereby seeks the union's help in bringing about a legislative change that would affect the employer's powers or resources with respect to some matter within the scope of representation. Since such consultation is contemplated by section 3543.2, subdivision (a), the union has a representational obligation to respond in a manner that in its judgment best serves the interests of all the employees it represents. If some of those employees are nonmembers who are required to pay a service fee under an organizational security arrangement, the costs of such a response, pursuant to representational obligation, may be charged proportionately to those nonmember fees. For example, if the school employer places on the ballot a proposal for a tax increase that would enable the employer to increase employee compensation, or for a bond issue to build facilities that would affect class sizes or safety conditions of employment, and if the employer enlists the union's help in promoting community support for the proposal, the union's cost of providing such assistance may well be sufficiently related to its representational obligations to be chargeable to the nonmembers. The same might be true of union efforts to support or oppose a measure before the Legislature or the statewide electorate to the extent (1) the efforts are wholly in response to the employer's request for assistance and (2) the measure would affect the employer's powers or resources with respect to one or more matters within the scope of representation. (6) Cumero claims that charging him with any sort of lobbying or electioneering expense would violate his First Amendment rights. To the contrary, the constitutional limitations laid down in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, supra, 431 U.S. 209, and Ellis v. Railway Clerks, supra, 466 U.S. 435, would not forbid requiring him to contribute to the costs of a response by the union to the employer's plea to support or oppose legislation or a ballot measure directly affecting matters within the scope of representation. In Abood, the court drew a constitutional distinction between collective-bargaining activities, for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is prohibited (431 U.S. at p. 236 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 285], italics added). Moreover, the court recognized that decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process ( id. at p. 228 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 280]) and suggested that related budgetary and appropriations decisions might be seen as an integral part of the bargaining process ( id. at p. 236 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 285]). The Ellis court, in rejecting First Amendment objections to charging dissenting employees with expenses of publications and conventions, concluded that those expenses were adequately supported by a governmental interest [in industrial peace] and `relat[ed] to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining.' [Citation.] The very nature of the free-rider problem and the governmental interest in overcoming it require that the union have a certain flexibility in its use of compelled funds. (466 U.S. at p. 456 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 447].) Under these guidelines, the union's cooperation with the employer at the employer's request on political activities in furtherance of the union's representational obligations could constitutionally be charged to nonmember service fees. (7a) PERB and the union contend, on the other hand, that a legislative intent to allow unions to use nonmember fees, collected under EERA organizational security arrangements, for lobbying or ballot proposition electioneering on any matter that affects school employees' interests is demonstrated by a 1982 amendment to the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA) (§ 3512 et seq.). The SEERA, like the EERA, authorizes organizational security arrangements whereby a state employee who does not join the organization which exclusively represents his unit must pay the organization a fair share fee not to exceed the organization's standard initiation fee, dues, and assessments. (§§ 3513, subd. (j), 3515.7.) A 1982 amendment to the SEERA added section 3515.8, which provides: Any state employee who pays a fair share fee shall have the right to demand and receive from the recognized employee organization ... a return of any part of that fee paid by him or her which represents the employee's additional pro rata share of expenditures by the recognized employee organization that is either in aid of activities or causes of a partisan political or ideological nature only incidentally related to the terms and conditions of employment, or applied towards the cost of any other benefits available only to members of the recognized employee organization. The pro rata share subject to refund shall not reflect, however, the costs of support of lobbying activities designed to foster policy goals and collective negotiations and contract administration, or to secure for the employees represented advantages in wages, hours and other conditions of employment in addition to those secured through meeting and conferring with the state employer. (Italics added; see Champion v. State of Cal. (9th Cir.1984) 738 F.2d 1082, cert. den. 469 U.S. 1229 [84 L.Ed.2d 367, 105 S.Ct. 1230] [upholding constitutionality of § 3515.8].) The substance of the italicized provision of section 3515.8 coincides with PERB's decision in the present case upholding, under the EERA, the union's use of Cumero's service fee for lobbying in furtherance of the interests of the represented employees. Cumero contends that the omission of such a provision from the EERA establishes that the Legislature did not intend it to apply to public school employees. (8) This contention is consistent with the rule that where a statute contains a given provision with reference to one subject, the omission of such provision from a similar statute containing a related subject is significant to show that a different intention existed. ( People v. Drake (1977) 19 Cal.3d 749, 755 [139 Cal. Rptr. 720, 566 P.2d 622].) The union, on the other hand, points out that section 3515.8 was added to the bill by which it was enacted (Sen. Bill No. 1419) on March 22, 1982, less than three weeks after issuance of PERB's decision in the present case on March 3, 1982. (9) It is assumed that the Legislature has in mind existing laws when it passes a statute. [Citations.] ( Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 837 [122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 537 P.2d 874].) Moreover, the same Legislature enacted Education Code section 45061, providing for salary deductions by school districts of service fees owed under the organizational security provisions of the EERA. (10) `The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other aspects are made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not amended.' [Citations.] ( McDill, supra, 14 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838.) Thus, suggests the union, the Legislature may have intentionally refrained from adding the substance of section 3515.8 to the EERA because it considered PERB's present decision to have already accomplished that result. (7b) We think, however, that the EERA and the SEERA are too disparate to warrant drawing an inference that the 1982 Legislature deemed the SEERA amendment's provisions already incorporated in the EERA. The purposes of the EERA relevant here are essentially two: (1) [to improve] ... employer-employee relations within the public school systems in the State of California by ... recognizing the right of public school employees to ... be represented by [employee] organizations in their professional and employment relationships with public school employers and (2) to afford certificated employees a voice in the formulation of educational policy. (§ 3540, italics added; fn. 11, ante. ) The EERA implements the first of these two purposes by regulating employee relations with the local school board or school district (§ 3540.1, subd. (k) [defining public school employer]; fn. 9, ante ), within the scope of representation, unless the employer chooses to consult on other matters (§ 3543.2, subd. (a); fn. 10, ante ). The second purpose, to give certificated employees a voice in educational policy, is implemented simply by entitling the exclusive representative of certificated personnel to consult (as distinguished from being consulted) on certain aspects of educational policy to the extent such matters are within the discretion of the public school employer under the law. ( Ibid. ) Apart from activities stemming from requests for consultation by a school employer (see ibid. ), none of these provisions indicates or implies any representational obligation of a union to represent employees' interests through lobbying. The SEERA, on the other hand, declares as its purpose the improvement of employer-employee relations through recognition of the right of state employees to join organizations of their own choosing and be represented by those organizations in their employment relations with the state. (§ 3512, italics added.) Similarly, a fair share fee collected from nonmembers shall be used to defray the costs incurred by the recognized employee organization in fulfilling its duty to represent the employees in their employment relations with the state. (§ 3513, subd. (j), italics added.) The word state is not expressly defined in the SEERA. For the limited purpose of the duty to meet and confer in good faith with recognized employee organizations on matters within the scope of representation, the state employer is defined as the Governor or his designated representative. (§§ 3513, subd. (i), 3517.) Thus, in enacting the 1982 amendment allowing unions to use nonmember state employee service fees to lobby for conditions of employment in addition to those secured through meeting and conferring with the state employer (§ 3515.8), the Legislature may well have had in mind the distinction, embedded in the SEERA since 1977, between a union's specific right and duty to meet and confer with the Governor or the Governor's representative (see §§ 3513, subd. (i), 3517, 3519.5, subd. (c)) and the union's broader right to represent its members in employment relations with the state (see §§ 3512, 3515.5), including not only the executive branch but also the Legislature. Moreover, the very process of meeting and conferring with the Governor's representative may well lead ultimately to union lobbying of the Legislature. If agreement is reached, the parties must jointly prepare a written memorandum of ... understanding, which shall be presented, when appropriate, to the Legislature for determination. (§ 3517.5.) Legislative approval is required if the memorandum of understanding requires the expenditure of funds or conflicts with any statute not specified in section 3517.6. Thus, even before the 1982 amendment, the SEERA appeared to contemplate that a union's representation of employees in their employment relations with the state (§§ 3512, 3515.5) would include attempts to persuade the Legislature, i.e., lobbying. In contrast, a school employee union's representational obligation under the EERA is confined to dealings with the local school employer and limited to matters over which that employer has authority. Accordingly, the schemes of the SEERA and the EERA are not sufficiently similar to warrant our inferring from the SEERA's authorization of the use of nonmember fees for lobbying that a similar use of nonmember fees is allowed under the EERA. [16] Justice Mosk's dissent, however, asserts that section 3515.8's provision authorizing use of state employees' nonmember fees for lobbying must be applied to school employees covered by the EERA because of the following provision in section 3540: It is the further intention of the Legislature that any legislation enacted by the Legislature governing employer-employee relations of other public employees shall be incorporated into this chapter [EERA] to the extent possible. That provision and the preceding statement of the EERA's purpose (see fn. 11, ante ) both appear in section 3540 as adopted in 1975. Justice Mosk apparently is of the view that the entire SEERA (§ 3512 et seq.), as enacted in 1977, as well as section 3515.8, added in 1982, was automatically incorporated into the EERA, to the extent possible, by virtue of section 3540. There are several answers to this novel, rather startling, theory. In the first place, the quoted provision appears to be an explanation of the Legislature's plans for future legislation, not a vague self-executing direction to incorporate any legislation governing public employees' employer-employee relations into the EERA insofar as possible. Indeed, the indicated legislative plan was implemented when the statute enacting the SEERA (Stats. 1977, ch. 1172) amended the EERA (§§ 3540.1, 3541) to change the name of PERB, which was then charged with administering both the SEERA and the EERA (see § 3513, subd. (g)). Moreover, even giving literal effect to the quoted provision of section 3540 would not require the application of section 3515.8 to school employees covered by the EERA. Section 3540 states an intention only to incorporate certain future legislation into the EERA. Section 3515.8, which Justice Mosk seeks to apply to school employees, applies by its own terms only to state employees, which section 3513, subdivision (c), carefully defines in a way that excludes school employees covered by the EERA. To be given the effect sought by Justice Mosk, section 3515.8 would have to be not merely incorporated into the EERA but adapted by changing the section's own reference to the employees whom it covers. Yet, as already demonstrated, there are basic distinctions between the respective statutory schemes of the SEERA and the EERA which could well cause the Legislature to regard the use of nonmember service fees for lobbying as appropriate in the case of state employees and inappropriate in the case of local school employees. Finally, section 3515.8, being confined by its own terms to state employees covered by SEERA, lacks the constitutional prerequisites for amending the EERA so as to cover local school employees. Article IV, section 9, of the California Constitution provides: A section of a statute may not be amended unless the section is re-enacted as amended. Thus, in Scott A. v. Superior Court (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 292 [103 Cal. Rptr. 683], a statute providing that whenever, in any provision of law, the term `21 years of age' or any similar phrase regarding such age appears, it shall be deemed to mean `18 years of age' was held ineffective to amend statutes that had not been re-enacted as amended (art. IV, § 9). To allow section 3515.8 to be deemed to have amended the EERA because of the vague intention expressed in section 3540 to incorporate future public employee labor legislation into the EERA to the extent possible would flagrantly violate article IV, section 9. [17]