Opinion ID: 322177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Administration Issues

Text: 7 On appeal from their convicton in the District Court, appellants raise numerous assignments of error. Of primary importance are three alleged errors of judicial administration and procedure. 8 The genesis of each of these three alleged errors is appellants' claim that they were moved 'from pillow to post' within the Eastern District of Kentucky with no regard to their convenience or the convenience of witnesses. The following table presents a summary of relevant actions taken in this case, the date, and the location within the district at which the action was taken. 9 Action Date Location ------ ---- -------- 1. Indictment returned November 8, 1972 Jackson 2. Arraignment November 15, 1972 Pikeville 3. Action transferred from December 15, 1972 Jackson docket to Pikeville docket 4. Hearing on suppression February 15, 1973 London motion 5. Further hearing on suppression motion May 14, 1973 Pikeville 6. Action transferred from Pikeville docket to Lexington docket August 1, 1973 7. Jury trial resulting in hung jury; Action subsequently reassigned to Pikeville docket Sept. 10-12, 1973 Lexington 8. Jury trial resulting in conviction Oct. 29-31, 1973 Pikeville 10 (A) Appellants contend that the District Court violated the following venue requirement of Fed.R.Crim.P. 18: 'The court shall fix the place of trial within the district with due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses.' Prior to the beginning of their first trial in Lexington, on September 10, 1973, appellants moved to dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, for an order 'staying all proceedings against them in any division of this Court except the Jackson Division, and staying any trial by any jury other than a jury drawn from the counties comprising the Jackson Division of this Court.' Appellants maintain throughout their brief and oral argument that Jackson is a division of the Eastern District of Kentucky. As more fully discussed in II(b) below, this contention is erroneous. 28 U.S.C. 97(a). 11 Although the District Court later overruled the motion to dismiss the indictment, it did not rule on the alternative motion to stay all proceedings except those at Jackson. In support of their alternative motion, appellants stated that they were residents of Perry County, that the alleged offense occurred in Perry County, that practically all of the witnesses resided in Perry County, and that Perry County was some 30 miles from Jackson and some 120 miles from Lexington. Pikeville, the location of the second trial, is said to be some 80 miles from Jackson. 12 Appellants rely on Dupoint v. United States, 388 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1967), in which a conviction was reversed where the prosecution of a federal crime was transferred 42 miles farther from the scene of the alleged offense for the convenience of the prosecution, and not for the convenience of the defendant or witnesses. The Government asserts that Dupoint is distinguishable on the ground that the Middle District of Georgia, where the Dupoint case arose, is divided by statute into several divisions, 28 U.S.C. 90(b), unlike the Eastern District of Kentucky where there are no divisions. 28 U.S.C. 97(a). 13 We regard this as a relatively close issue and do not believe that the distinction between this case and Dupoint cited by the Government is dispositive. The existence or nonexistence of division lines within a federal judicial district cannot be held to determine a question of whether venue properly exists at a particular location within the district. Indeed, a 1966 amendment of Fed.R.Crim.P. 18 deleted a provision reading, 'but if the district consists of two or more divisions the trial shall be had in a division in which the offense was committed.' In eliminating the requirement of division venue, the 1966 amendment recognized that the presence of venue at a particular place is controlled by numerous factors, e.g., proximity of defendant's residence, proximity of witnesses and counsel, docket conditions which bear on whether a defendant receives a speedy trial, and proximity of records and documents, and should not be hemmed in by artificial boundary lines drawn by Congress. 3 14 Rule 18 merely states the traditional rule of 'forum non conveniens' and vests discretion in the District Court to determine the proper place of trial. Houston v. United States, 419 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1969). Trial judges traditionally have been held to have wide discretion in disposing of change of venue motions. Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245, 84 S.Ct. 769, 11 L.Ed.2d 674 (1964); United States v. Projansky,465 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S.Ct. 432, 34 L.Ed.2d 299 (1972); Wagner v. United States, 416 F.2d 558, 561-562 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 923, 1015, 90 S.Ct. 915, 25 L.Ed.2d 104 (1970); United States v. Aronson, 319 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 375 U.S. 920, 84 S.Ct. 264, 11 L.Ed.2d 164 (1963): However, that discretion cannot be used as an excuse not to give 'due regard to the convenience of the defendant and the witnesses' in fixing the place of trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 18. 15 Within the circumstances of this case, we hold that the District Court did not violate appellants' rights secured by Rule 18 in trying appellants at Lexington and Pikeville instead of at Jackson. The assignment of cases within a district is a matter within the exclusive domain of the local district judges. Transfer of a particular case from one place within the district to another place within the district is a matter for the local district judges to decide, and the assent of a defendant to such a transfer is not required. 16 Other circuits have reached results consistent with our decision of the Rule 18 issue. For example, in United States v. Clark, 416 F.2d 63, 64 (1969), the Ninth Circuit held that after one federal trial ended in a mistrial and a second trial was held 90 miles away at another location in a district not divided into divisions, the change in place of trial was not an impermissible change in venue. The Second Circuit in United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726, 730 (1973), relying on the 1966 amendment to Rule 18 which eliminated division venue, stated that it follows a fortiori that when a district is not separated into divisions that trial at any place within the district is allowable under the Sixth Amendment 4 and Rule 18. See also, United States v. Wilson, 368 F.2d 842, 843 (1966), in which the Second Circuit held that because the District of Connecticut was not divided into divisions no order of transfer was required for trial at a location within the district different from the location at which the defendant was arraigned. 17 ( b) Appellants next contend that the District Court's transfer of this case to Pikeville violated the following provision of 18 U.S.C. 3240: 18 'Whenever any new district or division is established, or any county or territory is transferred from one district or division to another district or division, prosecutions for offenses committed within such district, division, county, or territory prior to such transfer, shall be commenced and proceeded with the same as if such new district or division had not been created, or such county or territory had not been transferred . . ..' 19 In an order, entitled 'In The Matter of Reassignment of Counties to The Catlettsburg, Lexington and Pikeville Jury Divisions,' 5 the three District Judges of the Eastern District of Kentucky on December 15, 1972, transferred all pending cases on the Jackson docket which arose in Perry County to the Pikeville docket. The judges indicated that transfer of these cases, then 17 in number, would provide for more expeditious disposition of the business of the District Court. 20 Appellants' contention that 3240 required that thet be tried at Jackson is meritless. Their argument is premised on the mistaken belief that Jackson is a division of the Eastern District of Kentucky. 28 U.S.C. 97(a) merely names Jackson as one of eight locations in the Eastern District for the holding of court. The statute does not create divisions in the Eastern District of Kentucky as they exist in some other federal judicial districts. Thus when the District Court on December 15, 1972, transferred all pending cases on the Jackson docket that arose in Perry County to the Pikeville docket (including the instant one), it did not transfer the cases from one division to another division within the meaning of 3240. 21 ( c) Appellants also contend that their trials at Lexington and Pikeville by panels of jurors selected at large from the Eastern District of Kentucky violated the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. 1861 et seq. The gravamen of their claim here is that the selection of jurors from the district at large contravenes provisions in the Jury Selection Plan of the Eastern District of Kentucky (the Plan), which was promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1863. 22 The Jury Selection Plan of the Eastern District of Kentucky was drafted by the judges of that court. It was approved as of September 23, 1968, by the Reviewing Panel provided for in 28 U.S.C. 1863(a), which panel included the members of the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit. 23 Section Seven is the primary provision in the Plan challenged by appellants. It provides as follows: 24 'On individual request, any judge of the court may excuse a juror on finding that such service would entail undue hardship or extreme inconvenience if the juror resides at a distance more than 70 miles from the place of holding court.' 25 This provision of the Plan is entirely consistent with 28 U.S.C. 1863(b)(7) which directs the District Court to establish a plan which would 'fix the distance, either in miles or in travel time, from each place of holding court beyond which prospective jurors residing shall, on individual request therefor, be excused from jury service . . ..' There is nothing in the record of this case to indicate that any of the jurors selected at large from the district who heard this case requested to be excused from jury duty or that any such request was denied. 26 Further, appellants' claim that Section Seven of the Jury Selection Plan violates the 28 U.S.C. 1861 declaration of policy that juries be selected at random from a fair cross section 'of the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes' is equally meritless. A paragraph in Section Five of the Plan provides as follows: 'Jurors from any part of the district may be required to serve at any of the places where court is held.' Thus the Plan specifically sanctions the practice of selecting jurors from the district at large. 27 The present case, by an order dated August 1, 1973, was transferred from the Pikeville docket to the Lexington docket to be tried by a jury panel drawn from the district at large. After noting the large number of cases pending on the Pikeville docket and the defendants' interest in a speedy trial, 6 the District Court in that order stated: 'The Court's schedule is such that a more orderly and efficient disposition of these cases could be experienced at a central location and with a jury panel drawn from the district at large.' 28 Accordingly, we hold that the provision in Section Five of the Jury Selection Plan permitting jurors to be drawn from the district at large does not violate any of appellants' rights and is compatible with the 28 U.S.C. 1861 requirement that the jury be drawn from 'the community in the district or division wherein the court convenes.' The Section Five provision does not in practice operate in a vacuum. It operates in conjunction with Section Seven of the Plan which under certain circumstances permits prospective jurors to be excused if they reside more than 70 miles from the place of holding court.