Opinion ID: 1662359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion to quash jury

Text: Appellant's final argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the petit jury and the jury venire on the grounds that blacks were systematically excluded from jury participation. Appellant argues that the Arkansas system of using voter-registration records to summon potential jurors results in the deprivation of a fair cross-section of the community, depriving an accused of a trial by a jury of his peers. Appellant acknowledges in his brief that this court's previous rulings have consistently upheld our system of selecting potential jurors, but he urges us to abandon those holdings and declare the system unconstitutional. This we are unwilling to do. The selection of a petit jury from a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). There is no requirement, however, that the petit jury actually seated in a defendant's case mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Id; Mitchell v. State, 299 Ark. 566, 776 S.W.2d 332 (1989). Appellant puts much emphasis on the fact that, although there were blacks on the jury venire, there were none seated on his petit jury. Appellant urges this court to conclude that this demonstrates a systematic exclusion of black jurors. Our case law does not support this position. In Walton v. State, 279 Ark. 193, 650 S.W.2d 231 (1983), we held that, [m]erely because no member of a party's race is on a jury is not in itself cause to quash a jury. Id. at 202, 650 S.W.2d at 235 (1983) (citing Lewis v. Pearson, 262 Ark. 350, 556 S.W.2d 661 (1977)). Further, in Mitchell , we stated that the mere fact that there were no black persons on the jury panel from which Mitchell's jury was selected did not mean the jury was selected in a way that would not result in a fair cross-section of the community. Thus, the fact that no black jurors were seated in appellant's case is of little significance, provided that potential jurors were selected in a nondiscriminatory way. Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to require that the State not deliberately or systematically deny to members of his race the right to participate, as jurors, in the administration of justice. Sanders v. State, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334 (1989); Waters v. State, 271 Ark. 33, 607 S.W.2d 336 (1980). Nevertheless, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated unless the State has engaged in the purposeful or deliberate denial to blacks, on the basis of their race, of participation in the administration of justice by selection for jury service. Sanders, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334. Correspondingly, it is well established that the appellant carries the burden of proving the systematic exclusion of black jurors from the venire. Walker v. State, 314 Ark. 628, 864 S.W.2d 230 (1993). The United States Supreme Court set the standard for such cases in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), and this court has adhered to that standard. See, e.g., Walker, 314 Ark. 628, 864 S.W.2d 230; Sanders, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334. In Duren , the Court stated that in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement of the Sixth Amendment, an appellant must show the following: (1) The group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which the juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S.Ct. at 668-69. Once the appellant makes a prima facie showing of racial discrimination in the jury-selection process, the burden shifts to the State to justify its procedure. Sanders, 300 Ark. 25, 776 S.W.2d 334. In the case at hand, the first prong of the Duren test is clearly met, as blacks represent a distinctive group in the community. As for the second prong of the test, Appellant has failed to offer any proof, other than counsel's conflicting assertions before the trial court [1] and several judicially noticed facts concerning the composition of the population and the number of registered voters in Union County. [2] Appellant has not provided this court with any credible evidence as to the composition of the jury venire called in his case, let alone the entire jury pool or master list from which each venire is chosen. The test provided in Duren requires a fair and reasonable representation of the distinctive group in every venire from which juries are selected, not just the particular venire summoned at a defendant's trial. 439 U.S. at 364-66, 99 S.Ct. at 668-70. Without such data, we are left to speculate as to the number of blacks on every jury venire in Union County, and we decline to do so. Lastly, Appellant has produced no evidence which demonstrates that the alleged underrepresentation of blacks is due to a systematic exclusion in the jury-selection system itself. To the contrary, Appellant argues that it is the nature of the charge of capital murder and the fact that the death penalty is an available punishment that systematically excludes blacks from jury participation. Appellant argues that black persons as a group are more inclined to oppose the death penalty than white persons. Appellant did not provide the trial court, nor does he provide this court, with any evidence or data in support of this argument; he merely points to the fact that each black person called during voir dire was not seated on the petit jury due to concerns about the death penalty. During voir dire, eight blacks were selected to participate in the examination process, seven of which were ultimately excused for cause (without objection from Appellant) because of their inability to consider the death penalty as a punishment. The remaining black person was peremptorily struck by the State because she expressed some hesitancy to impose the death penalty. Appellant made a Batson challenge to the juror struck; however, the trial court was convinced that the State had struck the juror for racially neutral reasons concerning her personal opposition to the death penalty. Excusing jurors because of their refusal to consider the death penalty in capital cases is not evidence of systematic exclusion of a distinctive group in the community. The United States Supreme Court held: Death qualification, unlike the wholesale exclusion of blacks, women, or Mexican-Americans from jury service, is carefully designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175-76, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986). Thus, even had Appellant provided this court with persuasive authority that blacks as a group more often refuse to impose the death penalty in capital cases, we would nonetheless affirm the trial court's ruling because of the State's legitimate interest in seating only those jurors who can follow the provisions of the law, including the consideration of imposition of the death penalty. Appellant has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that his constitutional rights were violated, and therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to quash Appellant's jury. We have further reviewed the record in accordance with Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4-3(h), and we have found no errors with respect to rulings on objections or motions adverse to Appellant. Affirmed. DUDLEY, BROWN, and ROAF, JJ., concur.