Opinion ID: 1136627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the lower court erred in reducing child support payable by $200 per month.

Text: In appeals from Chancery Court, our scope of review is limited. We will not reverse a Chancellor's findings of fact where they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 827 (Miss. 1992). Discretion is shown towards a chancellor's decision regarding modification of child support. However, this Court will reverse when there is shown manifest error in findings of fact or an abuse of discretion. Id. At the time of the divorce in 1991, John's yearly salary was $84,577. He lost his job in June of 1992 and began work in September making around $72,000 a year. That amount was later reduced because of a slump in business to roughly $48,000, with an increase later to approximately $54,000. From investments John receives close to $11,000 per year. For 1994 John's gross income was approximately $65,000. Therefore, applying the Child Support Guidelines [2] for one child of 14 percent, John should have to pay $700 per month. The chancellor's reduction of $200 per month still required John to pay $800 per month. This Court has held that the Child Support Guidelines are nothing more than suggested guidelines and should not bind chancellors in awarding child support. Thurman v. Thurman, 559 So.2d 1014, 1017 (Miss. 1990). The chancellor in reducing the amount of child support from $1000 per month to $800 per month made the following determination in his written opinion: Due to Husband's substantial decrease in income since the prior Decree of this Court and the increased expenses for college education of the oldest child, there has been a material change of circumstances requiring some reduction of child support being paid by Husband for the youngest child of the parties. Therefore, the former Decree of this Court will be modified as to child support paid by Husband reducing said amount to the sum of $800 per month. The father's ability to pay is but one factor to consider when modifying child support agreements because the paramount concern is the needs of the child. Hammett, 602 So.2d at 828; Cupit v. Cupit, 559 So.2d 1035 (Miss. 1990); Thurman, 559 So.2d at 1018. The material change in circumstances that necessitate the modification of child support must not have been reasonably foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Morris v. Morris, 541 So.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Miss. 1989). The changing of jobs and subsequent reduction of John Anderson's income certainly could not have been anticipated or foreseen at the time of the divorce in 1991. His salary decreased almost $3000 per month overall. This was a material change in circumstances that would suffice to allow the reduction in child support. Susan claims that the chancellor erroneously considered the increased expenses of John, Jr.'s college expenses as a material change in circumstances such that a modification of child support was justified. She argues that the parties anticipated John, Jr.'s attending college at the time of the divorce and had provided for the event in the separation agreement. The chancellor in his opinion stated that the reduction of John's income coupled with the increased college expenses of John, Jr. were material changes that required a reduction in child support. It would have been manifest error for the chancellor to have considered only the increased college expenses of John, Jr. as a material change in circumstances requiring modification of child support. However, the chancellor considered the increased college expenses together with the reduction of John's income. When taking the facts together as a whole, this Court finds they were sufficient to merit a material change in circumstances. Also, the chancellor labeled the college expenses as increased. This would indicate that the expenses were greater than anticipated at the time of the divorce. Alternatively, if the expenses were reasonably calculated and not unforeseen, we are of the opinion that any error committed by the chancellor was harmless. The reduction of John's income alone was sufficient to grant a modification in the amount of child support that was being paid. The amount that was to be paid even after the reduction in income was still greater than what is required according to the statutory guidelines. John was still required to pay $800 per month. The guidelines would have only required $700 per month. The chancellor's finding of a material change of circumstances was not an abuse of discretion and is affirmed.