Opinion ID: 2602185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether, Under the Federal Constitution, the Superior Court's Failure to Readvise Defendant of His Right to Counsel Was Error

Text: Turning first to the question whether the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel requires that the superior court readvise a defendant of his or her right to counsel and obtain a waiver, we observe that the weight of federal authority concludes that it does not. The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel applies at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake. ( Mempa v. Rhay (1967) 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336.) The right to counsel may be waived by a defendant who wishes to proceed in propria persona. (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562.) By such waiver, a defendant surrenders many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. (Id., at p. 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) In view of these consequences, a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel is required before a criminal defendant is permitted to proceed in propria persona. (Ibid.) Federal authority holds that once a defendant gives a valid waiver, it continues through the duration of the proceedings unless it is withdrawn or is limited to a particular phase of the case. While it is true that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at all critical stages of the prosecution, including the sentencing stage, it does not follow that once the assistance of counsel in court has been competently waived, a new waiver must be obtained at every subsequent court appearance by the defendant. A competent election by the defendant to represent himself and to decline the assistance of counsel once made before the court carries forward through all further proceedings in that case unless appointment of counsel for subsequent proceedings is expressly requested by the defendant or there are circumstances which suggest that the waiver was limited to a particular stage of the proceedings. ( Arnold v. United States (9th Cir.1969) 414 F.2d 1056, 1059.) In federal practice, a waiver of counsel has been held to remain in effect despite various breaks in the proceedings. In U.S. v. Springer (9th Cir.1995) 51 F.3d 861, for example, the court held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel carried over from a first trial, which ended in a mistrial, to a retrial of the same matter. (Id., at pp. 864-865.) The retrial was obviously a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and the waiver was obviously intended to stand absent an attempt to withdraw it. The matter of representation was in [the defendant's] hands alone. After his earnest and insistent request, he had been granted the right to represent himself. If he found himself wavering in his resolve so to do, he or his advisory counsel could have so informed the court. (Id., at p. 865.) White v. United States (9th Cir. 1965) 354 F.2d 22 similarly held that a waiver remained effective when a defendant continued to represent himself at resentencing following the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Although the court at the resentencing did not ask defendant whether he wished to continue representing himself, the reviewing court concluded that the trial court had no sua sponte obligation to readvise the defendant of his right to counsel. (Id., at pp. 22-23; see also U.S. v. Unger (1st Cir.1990) 915 F.2d 759, 761-762 [waiver at arraignment in state juvenile court continued through two subsequent dispositional and sentencing hearings]; U.S. v. Fazzini (7th Cir.1989) 871 F.2d 635, 641-644 [waiver before trial extended through sentencing, and court had no duty to re-inquire absent substantial change in circumstances].) Defendant contends that the present case does not resemble the federal decisions, cited above, in which substantial breaks in the proceedings were deemed insufficient to eliminate the continuing validity of a defendant's waiver, but is more akin to those decisions in which a court completely fails to advise a defendant of the risks of self-representation. The court in Sohrab drew a similar distinction. (See People v. Sohrab, supra, 59 Cal.App.4th 89, 100-102, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 [citing and relying upon People v. Hall (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1102, 1108-1109, 267 Cal.Rptr. 494].) We find defendant's contention unpersuasive. Unlike the cases relied upon by defendant, the instant matter involves a defendant who was clearly and fully admonished of the risks involved in representing himself at both the preliminary hearing and trial stages and who nonetheless elected to represent himself throughout the proceedings; the only error that occurred was the superior court's failure to readvise defendant of such risks prior to the commencement of trial. Under these circumstances we conclude that the trial court's error was not of federal constitutional magnitude, and that the prejudicial error standard applicable to federal constitutional error does not apply.