Opinion ID: 786370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: preemption of the vegetation claim

Text: 18 Norfolk argues that the district court, in holding that Shanklin's vegetation claim was not preempted, improperly limited the scope of the Supreme Court's ruling in Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). Norfolk contends that the same federal regulations that preempt inadequate warning device claims also preempt vegetation negligence claims. We review the district court's decision de novo because it involves a question of law. 19 Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act in 1970, partially to maintain a coordinated effort to develop and carry out solutions to the railroad grade crossing problem. 49 U.S.C. § 20134(a). The statute broadly states that all [l]aws, regulations, and orders related to railway safety... shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable, but it includes a savings clause provision that reads, [a] State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order... covering the subject matter of the State requirement. Id. at § 20106. Three years later, Congress created the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program, see 23 U.S.C. § 130, giving the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the power to promulgate 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b), which concerns the design of grade crossings. 20 Most pertinent to this appeal, 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4) addresses the circumstances under which automatic gates and flashing signals are required and clarifies that when gates and signals are not mandated, the FHWA has the power to approve or disapprove the alternative type of warning device recommended by a state agency or a railroad. Importantly, no part of 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) addresses the clearing of vegetation. 3 21 The Supreme Court first considered the preemptive power of the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) in 1993. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The Court held that for a regulation issued by the secretary of Transportation under FRSA to preempt the duties imposed upon the railroads by common law, that regulation must more than touch upon or relate to the subject matter raised by the common law claim because pre-emption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume the subject matter of the relevant state law. Id. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732. The Easterwood Court concluded that 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4) preempted the plaintiff's claim that CSX was negligent for failing to maintain adequate warning devices because the regulations cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law on which respondent relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings. Id. at 671, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (emphasis added). 22 Later, in reviewing our first Shanklin decision, the Court further analyzed 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4) to determine whether the regulations `are applicable' to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds. Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 353, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000). The Supreme Court did not hold that the warning device regulations preempted all state common law claims stemming from a grade crossing accident, but rather held only that the federal regulations displaced Tennessee common law addressing the same subject. Id. at 359, 120 S.Ct. 1467. The Court noted: What states cannot do — once they have installed federally funded devices at a particular crossing — is hold the railroad responsible for the adequacy of those devices. Id. at 358, 120 S.Ct. 1467. 4 23 Because the Supreme Court ruling in Shanklin does not explicitly extend the preemptive reach of § 646.214(b) to Shanklin's vegetation claim, the issue before this Court is whether the warning device regulations can be read to cover the vegetation claim, such that the common law of Tennessee that imposes a duty upon railroads to clear vegetation on their rights of way near railroad grade crossings that prevents motorists from seeing and/or hearing trains approaching those crossings is preempted. 24 Section 646.214(b)(3) describes under what conditions certain types of warning devices are required; in other words, it  `cover[s] the subject matter' of the adequacy of warning devices installed with the participation of federal funds. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 358, 120 S.Ct. 1467. Section 646.214(b)(4) mandates that the FWHA determine what types of warning devices should be installed when the circumstances laid out in § 646.214(b)(3) are not present. The regulations do not appear to focus on vegetational blockage or sight line limitations. At best, they relate to or touch upon vegetational growth; we cannot conclude that they cover, in the sense of substantially subsume, claims of negligence due to failure to clear away vegetation near a railroad bed. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732. 25 Norfolk argues that plaintiff's sight distance claim was plainly encompassed by 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4), because the regulation requires the DOT to consider, in assessing the need for automatic gates and flashing signals, the presence of high-speed train operation combined with limited sight distance, 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i)(C), and the presence of unusually restricted sight distance, 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i)(E). However, this argument takes the regulation's language out of context. While a visual encumbrance, be it overgrown vegetation, a structure, or the contour of the land, triggers the regulatory mandate for certain warning devices, and accordingly preempts common law claims regarding the adequacy of warning signals, it does not follow that the warning device regulations preempt an action based on the alleged failure to eliminate such a visual impediment. The regulations govern warning signals, not vegetation growth. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4) do not define the terms limited or unusually restricted sight distance, indicate that any sight distance obstructions should be removed, set standards as to how much sight distance should be provided to motorists approaching a grade crossing, contain any guidelines relating to a railroad's obligation to maintain its grade crossings, or even mention vegetation or right of way. 26 Additionally, the DOT has promulgated other regulations governing the growth of vegetation, demonstrating that when the Department wants to regulate issues concerning vegetation, it has no problem doing so. In particular, 49 C.F.R. § 213.37 states: Vegetation on railroad property which is on or immediately adjacent to roadbed shall be controlled so that it does not... (b) [o]bstruct visibility of railroad signs and signals... 49 C.F.R. § 213.37(b). This regulation preempts any state-law claim regarding vegetative growth that blocks a sign immediately adjacent to a crossing, but it does not impose a broader duty to control vegetation so that it does not obstruct a motorist's visibility of oncoming trains. O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 960 F.Supp. 1411, 1422-23 (W.D.Mo.1997); see also Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 833 F.2d 570, 577 (5th Cir.1987)(rejecting ruling that § 213.37(b) controlled a railroad's right of way in its entirety); Bowman v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 832 F.Supp. 1014, 1020-21 (D.S.C.1993), aff'd 66 F.3d 315 (4th Cir.1995)(federal regulations do not preempt claims concerning vegetation outside the area immediately next to the railbed). The comparison of 49 C.F.R. § 213.37 and the adequate warning regulation persuasively shows that 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) does not cover actions based upon a negligent failure to clear vegetation. 27 Norfolk calls to the panel's attention two out-of-circuit district court decisions that allegedly preempt sight distance claims based upon the regulations at issue in Shanklin. Norfolk misconstrues these decisions, which are unpersuasive. In a pre- Shanklin case, Bryan v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 21 F.Supp.2d 1030 (E.D.Mo.1997), the district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on a plaintiff's claim that a railroad crossing was extraordinarily hazardous because the terrain obscured the approach of trains and because there were no automatic gates or flashing signals guarding the crossing. Id. at 1038. The court refused to create an exception to preemption ... based on an ultrahazardous condition, id., but Bryan is distinguishable because, unlike Shanklin, the plaintiff did not articulate a stand-alone vegetation claim, and instead lumped its visual obstruction claim together with a preemptable claim concerning the failure to provide proper warning devices. Id. Norfolk's citation to Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Deatherage, No. 3:95CV116-B-A, 1997 WL 33384269, (N.D.Miss. May 21, 1997), is equally unavailing, because the plaintiff did not even file a vegetation action in that case. The district court only considered the issue of unlimited sight distance in determining the applicability of the FRSA's savings clause. Id. at -4. 28 On the other hand, the Third Circuit has specifically addressed the issue of whether sight distance claims are preempted by 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)-(4), and has found that they are not. See Strozyk v. Norfolk So. Corp., 358 F.3d 268 (3d Cir.2004). Christopher Stozyk was killed at a railroad crossing when a train owned and operated by Norfolk Southern collided with the truck he was driving. Subsequently, Strozyk's parents filed suit against Norfolk, alleging, inter alia, the railroad's negligence for failure to provide proper sight lines for motorists crossing the track. The district court held that 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) preempted plaintiff's limited visibility claim, and concluded that because 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) lists `unusually restricted sight distance' as a factor mandating the installation of active warning devices, it followed that the standard set by the regulation encompasses not just the ultimate selection of a warning device but [also]... `the appropriate response to limited sight distance or unusually restricted sight distance.' Id. at 272. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that, even after the Supreme Court's decisions in CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993), and Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000), state law duties to maintain a safe grade crossing remain viable. Strozyk, at 276. The court continued: 29 While, as Easterwood and Shanklin make clear, §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) substantially altered the landscape of railroad liability, by restricting tort plaintiffs from interposing state law obligations concerning appropriate warning devices, the regulations do not eclipse those duties ensuring safe grade crossings that are unrelated to warning devices, such as the duty to keep visibility at grade crossings free from obstructions. As those regulations cover the subject matter of warning devices, the Strozyks' claims that Norfolk failed to maintain a safe grade crossing, apart from the warning devices, and relatedly failed to ensure clear sight lines of oncoming trains are not preempted. 30 Id. at 276-77. 31 Accordingly, because we find that the Supreme Court has neither explicitly nor implicitly preempted state common law vegetation claims, and because the adequate warning regulations contained in 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) do not cover state common law vegetation/sight distance claims, it follows that the district court correctly reasoned that Shanklin's vegetation claim is not preempted.