Opinion ID: 3150837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Allegation of Partiality

Text: Stanford claims that he was deprived of both due process under the Fifth Amendment and a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment because the district court was partial to the government throughout the trial process. More specifically, Stanford claims that the district court disqualified his counsel of choice; improperly deemed him competent to stand trial; and made numerous adverse rulings against him and in favor of the government. Stanford first claims that he was denied his “counsel of choice” to represent him in his criminal case. We review the district court’s decision to disallow substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 733 F.3d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 2013). In 2009, Stanford sought access to the proceeds of a Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policy held by his company (“D&O Policy”), in order to fund his defense. At the time, the D&O Policy was subject to the asset freeze imposed by the Northern District of Texas, which had jurisdiction over the civil proceedings. As a result, Stanford made a motion to permit Michael Sydow (“Sydow”) to appear in the criminal case “for the limited purpose of resolving whether Mr. Stanford will be granted access to monies to pay for his legal fees and expenses.” The district court denied Stanford’s motion and this court denied his petition for a writ of mandamus because the D&O Policy itself was the subject of simultaneous civil proceedings. See generally Pendergest-Holt v. Certain Underwriters, 600 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2010). Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Sydow’s limited appearance in the criminal case because the same issue was already being litigated in a different forum. 15 Case: 12-20411 Document: 00513252078 Page: 16 Date Filed: 10/29/2015 No. 12-20411 Stanford also claims he was denied his counsel of choice when a separate attorney, Stephen Cochell (“Cochell”), was denied “in-person access” to him at the detention center. In fact, Cochell was representing Stanford in a civil case, rather than the criminal case, and the district court found that his public statements about Stanford might impact the criminal prosecution and impending jury trial. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s order to preclude Cochell from in-person access to Stanford prior to the criminal trial, because Cochell was not part of the criminal defense team. Stanford next challenges the district court’s order finding him competent to stand trial. The standard applied on review is whether the district court’s finding of competence was “clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.” United States v. Dockins, 986 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir. 1993). Here, the district court initially found that Stanford was unable to effectively and rationally assist his attorneys and ordered him committed to the custody of the Attorney General to undergo medical treatment on January 26, 2011. Stanford’s condition at the time primarily arose from head injuries he sustained in a prison assault in September 2009 and his subsequent overmedication. Stanford entered treatment at the Bureau of Prisons Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”) on February 18, 2011. On November 4, 2011, after eight months of evaluation and treatment, the Mental Health Department at FMC Butner deemed Stanford competent to stand trial. In late December 2011, the district court held a comprehensive competency hearing lasting two-andone-half days. After reviewing all of the medical evaluations submitted by both parties, weighing the credibility and reliability of all expert testimony presented, and considering all other testimony and arguments, the district court found that FMC Butner successfully withdrew Stanford from his prescription drug dependence; that Stanford possessed the necessary cognitive 16 Case: 12-20411 Document: 00513252078 Page: 17 Date Filed: 10/29/2015 No. 12-20411 ability to assist his counsel; and that reliable scientific evidence demonstrated that Stanford was feigning retrograde amnesia. The district court further highlighted the extensive and comprehensive period of evaluation conducted by the impartial staff of FMC Butner over a period of eight months, prior to their determination of competency and release. Finally, the district court noted that throughout the seven-week-long trial Stanford was attentive, fully engaged with counsel, and actively made notes and reviewed exhibits, further demonstrating his competency to stand trial. Upon review, we first note that the initial determination of incompetency was based in large part on Stanford’s prescription-medication dependence, from which he was successfully withdrawn before December 2011. Second, before the district court hearing, Stanford was deemed competent by the medical staff of FMC Butner, who had engaged in extensive observation and treatment of Stanford over an eight-month period. Finally, Stanford actively participated in an intensive, seven-week long trial without any indication of cognitive difficulty. In conclusion, we do not find that the district court’s determination was arbitrary or unwarranted. Stanford concludes his challenge to the impartiality of the district court by alleging favoritism towards the government on various jury charges and evidentiary rulings. Stanford’s objections fail for inadequate briefing, lacking citations to authority and the record and failing to explain why relief is merited. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). As we have stated previously, “we liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants” but we “also require that arguments must be briefed to be preserved.” Id. For example, Stanford objects to the district court’s rulings on jury charges but does not identify which jury charges were improper or why. Stanford further claims he was precluded from offering various rebuttal evidence but does not identify 17 Case: 12-20411 Document: 00513252078 Page: 18 Date Filed: 10/29/2015 No. 12-20411 where in the record such adverse rulings occurred. Stanford concludes this portion of his argument by stating that “[i]n short, through the court’s rulings in Motions in Limine and its later rulings, the Government was permitted to conceal from the jurors, the fact that SIB was a foreign bank . . . .” Yet the trial record reveals that the government freely revealed this fact to the jury. Based on all of the foregoing, we find no evidence that the district court was partial to the government in derogation of Stanford’s right to a fair trial under the Constitution.