Opinion ID: 4539973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: TRG as a “Public Body”

Text: The plaintiff first argues that the TRG is a “public body” because it is an “advisory committee,” and, therefore, its meetings must be open to the public. See RSA 91-A:2, I (defining a “meeting” as “the convening of a quorum of the membership of a public body”); II (stating that “all meetings . . . shall be open to the public”). The definition of “public body” includes five categories. See RSA 91-A:1-a, VI(a)-(e) (2013). Relevant to this appeal is the category defining a “public body” as: “Any legislative body, governing body, board, commission, committee, agency, or authority of any county, town, municipal corporation, school district, school administrative unit, chartered public school, or other political subdivision, or any committee, subcommittee, or subordinate body thereof, or advisory committee thereto.” RSA 91-A:1-a, VI(d). The statute defines an “advisory committee” as: [A]ny committee, council, commission, or other like body whose primary purpose is to consider an issue or issues designated by the appointing authority so as to provide such authority with advice or recommendations concerning the formulation of any public policy or legislation that may be promoted, modified, or opposed by such authority. RSA 91-A:1-a, I (2013). The plaintiff argues that the TRG is an “advisory committee” because its primary purpose is to consider land use applications and provide advice or recommendations on them to the planning board, a member of which is the city manager, the TRG’s appointing authority. We are not persuaded. Although TRG members make comments on permit applications that may be helpful to the planning board, it does not, as a group, render advice or make recommendations. Rather, each member reviews the application for compliance with the respective department codes and concerns. The record makes clear that, in considering land use applications, the TRG’s role is to apprise applicants of the relevant concerns of the municipal departments represented by its members. This process is meant to assist the applicant in preparing the application for the planning board, consistent with the city’s constitutional obligation to provide assistance to all its citizens. See Richmond Co. v. City of Concord, 149 N.H. 312, 314 (2003); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 1. The plaintiff, however, reads the phrase “primary purpose” in RSA 91- A:1-a, I, as relating only to the TRG’s role in “considering” an application, not necessarily “advising” on it. Under this reading, the plaintiff contends that the TRG’s primary purpose is to consider whatever “subject matter . . . the city manager has designated for consideration.” We disagree with the plaintiff’s reading of the statute. 5 Pursuant to the statute’s plain meaning, the phrase “primary purpose” limits which committees, councils, commissions, or other like bodies are advisory committees under the statute. The legislature has accomplished this limitation with the use of the phrase “so as to,” which qualifies the verb “consider” that precedes it. Thus, a body’s consideration of issues designated by the appointing authority in and of itself is not determinative of whether the body is an advisory committee. Rather, it is the purpose of the body’s consideration that is the deciding factor — i.e., whether the body’s primary purpose is to consider issues “designated by the appointing authority so as to provide such authority with advice or recommendations concerning the formulation of any public policy or legislation . . . .” RSA 91-A:1-a, I (emphasis added). Because the TRG, as a committee, does not provide such advice or recommendations, it is not an advisory committee. As the city points out, even if the TRG were to be dissolved, its work would still take place by way of a more burdensome process involving a series of individual meetings between applicants and municipal department officials. The city further observes, and the plaintiff does not dispute, that those individual meetings would not be subject to the Right-to-Know Law’s openmeeting requirement. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues that streamlining this process by gathering the municipal officials and the applicant in the same room triggers the open-meeting requirement. See RSA 91-A:2, II. In illustration of his position, the plaintiff contends that the TRG is no different from the industrial advisory committee that we concluded was subject to the Right-to-Know Law in Bradbury v. Shaw, 116 N.H. 388, 389-90 (1976). He contends that both the TRG and the committee in Bradbury “merely gathered and disseminated information to get it ready for submission . . . in a more efficient way,” and that the industrial advisory committee did not have “any more influence on decisions of the mayor or city council than the TRG has on the Planning Board.” We disagree with the plaintiff’s characterization of the committee in Bradbury. The Bradbury committee considered matters of policy, including the extension of city water and sewer lines and the construction of new streets, and advised the mayor — the committee’s appointing authority — on the sale of city-owned land. Bradbury, 116 N.H. at 389-90. Indeed, the mayor submitted one proposal for the sale of city-owned land to the city council with a statement that the committee had approved it. Id. at 389. On that record, we concluded that “the trial court properly found that the committee’s involvement in governmental programs and decisions brought it within the scope of the rightto-know law.” Id. at 390. By contrast, the TRG, as the trial court explained, “is not constituted to advise or make recommendations concerning formulation of public policy or legislation.” Rather, the TRG members consider land use applications and apprise each applicant of the concerns of particular municipal departments that are represented by members of the TRG. This process is meant to assist the applicants in preparing their applications for presentation 6 to the planning board. The TRG simply is not involved in “governmental programs and decisions” as was the committee in Bradbury. Id. Therefore, we conclude that the TRG is neither an “advisory committee” nor a “public body,” as defined by RSA 91-A:1-a, I, and RSA 91-A:1-a, VI(d), respectively. Accordingly, meetings of the TRG are not subject to the openmeeting requirement contained in RSA 91-A:2, II.