Opinion ID: 1360016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Prosecutorial Vouching of John Wilder's Credibility

Text: The final basis upon which the District Court granted habeas relief was improper vouching by the prosecutor for the testimony of John Wilder. Because Davis failed to object at trial to the prosecutor's statements, this claim is procedurally defaulted unless Davis can show cause and prejudice to excuse the default. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The District Court held that ineffective assistance of trial counsel constituted cause because the improper nature of the prosecutor's conduct was obvious and apparent. Davis, 594 F.Supp.2d at 826. It is unclear what the District Court believed was improper vouching. Prosecutorial vouching is said to occur when the prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the witness's credibility[,] thereby placing the prestige of a [prosecutor's office] behind that witness through comments that imply that the prosecutor has special knowledge of facts not in front of the jury. United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir.1999). That did not occur here. During the trial, the prosecutor told the jury that Wilder did not receive favorable treatment for testifying against Davis: [W]ilder got a no charge reduction. That is, he pleaded guilty as charged to the crime of accessory after the fact because that's what he did. Davis, 594 F.Supp.2d at 833. According to the District Court, this constituted improper vouching because [t]he circumstances surrounding the crime in this case certainly would have supported a second-degree murder charge [for Wilder] based upon an aiding and abetting theory. Id. at 826. Thus, by failing to charge Wilder initially with a higher crime, the prosecutor attempted [an] end run around the plea-agreement-disclosure requirement, concealing Wilder's true motives for testifying and making the repeated reference to the `minimal' benefit afforded Wilder for his testimony improper. Id. The prosecutor's statements do not fall under the rubric of improper vouching: the prosecutor did not indicate a personal belief of Wilder's veracity based on special knowledge of facts not before the jury. Rather, the District Court essentially concluded that the prosecutor committed some other form of misconduct by undercharging Wilder for the purpose of bolstering his credibility at Davis's trial. But nothing remained undisclosed. The prosecutor charged Wilder as an accessory because presumably he did not have proof that Wilder thought that Davis was likely to shoot Prewitt or anyone else. In this case, Wilder's charge was in evidence: he testified at the very beginning of direct examination that he had pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact. (Trial Transcript, Part A, 6/22/99, 162). As the Michigan Court of Appeals wrote: Whether Wilder could have been charged with a more serious offense does not change the fact that he was only charged with being an accessory after the fact, to which he pleaded guilty. Therefore, the prosecutor's comments that the witness did not receive a charge reduction were accurate, and did not deceive the jury or deny defendant a fair trial. . . . The witness's interest in the matter was clear. Id. at 825. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is reversed.