Opinion ID: 2975896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance of Counts 1 and 2 from Counts 5 and 6

Text: Defendant Zirker claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever Counts 1 and 2, relating to the April-July drug conspiracy and possession charges, from Counts 5 and 6, relating to the November possession and firearms charges. Zirker correctly concedes that Counts 1 and 2 were properly joined together, as were 2 Pitts also lists a host of other claims, but has waived these arguments by not supporting them with any argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9); McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 99596 (6th Cir. 1997). -6- Counts 5 and 6, but he objects to the joinder of all four of these counts in a single indictment under both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8 and 14. Even assuming that Zirker is correct and Rule 8 was violated, any such error was harmless.3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) allows for reversal only where trial errors “affect substantial rights.” United States v. Chavis, 296 F.3d 450, 461 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)). “[A]n error involving misjoinder ‘affects substantial rights’ and requires reversal only if the misjoinder results in actual prejudice because it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing Lane, 474 U.S. at 449). “The burden of persuasion in demonstrating that an error is harmless under Rule 52(a) rests with the government.” Id. (citing United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1994)).4 3 Under Rule 8(a), which generally governs the joinder of offenses, an offense can be joined in an indictment if it is of “the same or similar character” as another joined offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). Thus, the parties here dispute whether Counts 1 and 2 were similar to Counts 5 and 6. It should be noted, however, that the weight of authority from outside of this Circuit suggests that Rule 8(b) applies in most cases involving more than one defendant. See United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 389 (6th Cir. 1997). This Circuit has yet to decide whether it will follow the majority rule. See id. Should the majority rule apply, the joinder of Counts 5 and 6 to the indictment would certainly be improper, since Rule 8(b) lacks the “same or similar character” provision of Rule 8(a). Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Nevertheless, because this Court concludes that any error in joinder was ultimately harmless, the question of the applicability of Rule 8(b) in these circumstances is left for another day. 4 Zirker alternatively alleged error under Rule 14 if the Court found that joinder was technically proper. Nevertheless, because Zirker did not suffer prejudice under Rule 52(a), he cannot demonstrate prejudice sufficient to meet Rule 14's more rigorous standards. See, e.g., -7- In this case, the government has carried its burden and shown that any error was harmless. First, due to the differences between the two sets of counts, it seems unlikely that the jurors would have confused any issues or that any evidence would have spilled over from one case into another. While both sets of counts dealt with drug transactions, they did occur several months apart, thus making the cases more distinct. Therefore, it would be unlikely that jurors would incorrectly apply the firearm evidence in their deliberations on the charges relating to the April-July conspiracy charges. Even absent such differences, however, “a jury is presumed capable of considering each count separately. . . .” United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 781 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1391 (6th Cir. 1994)). Second, the lack of prejudice stemming from improper joinder is powerfully bolstered by Zirker’s acquittal on the later drug and firearm counts. In fact, the existence of an acquittal virtually guarantees a finding of no prejudice. See Cope, 312 F.3d at 781; United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 513 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Rule 14 and noting that acquittal constitutes “proof that the jurors were able to distinguish between the drugs and weapons evidence . . .”); United States v. Moreno, United States v. Hang Le-Thy Tran, 433 F.3d 472, 478 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that severance motions under Rule 14 are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and reversal is warranted only after a strong showing of prejudice). -8- 933 F.2d 362, 370 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1526 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lykes, 71 Fed. Appx. 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that defendant’s acquittal on one count of carjacking made “‘any argument that he was prejudiced [on the other count] difficult, if not impossible, to support’”). Zirker’s case is no exception. As such, this Court finds that any error in the joining of offenses against Zirker was harmless.