Opinion ID: 2052605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proceedings and Decision of the Circuit Court

Text: The plaintiff is a wholesale tobacco distributor. It brought this action as a challenge to the Tobacco Products Tax Act of 1995 (Tobacco Tax Act) (35 ILCS 143/10-1 et seq. (West 1996)), which was enacted as part of Public Act 89-21. The plaintiff originally argued that the Tobacco Tax Act violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, and also violated the uniformity requirement and the special legislation prohibition of the Illinois Constitution. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on those four counts in July of 1996. The circuit court denied that motion on July 3, 1997. Meanwhile, on June 27, 1997, the plaintiff obtained leave to amend its complaint to add a fifth count. The plaintiff then alleged that Public Act 89-21 is invalid because it does not comply with the single subject requirement of the Illinois Constitution. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on this claim. The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion and held Public Act 89-21 unconstitutional in its entirety because it violates the single subject rule. In rendering its decision, the court conceded the possibility that the provisions of Public Act 89-21 are related in some fashion to balancing the state budget. Nonetheless, the court stated, the single subject rule requires more, namely, that the provisions be related to each other. The court concluded that the provisions within Public Act 89-21 are not related to each other. As an example, the court discussed the Tobacco Tax Act, which, the court found, stands alone and apart from every other provision, unrelated to the first amendment in the Act,    unrelated to the last amendment in the Act,    and    unrelated to most if not all of the numerous provisions in between. Lastly, the court rejected the defendants' argument that its decision invalidating Public Act 89-21 be given prospective effect only. The court stated that its decision was not based on a new principle of law. Although the court admitted that the wide-ranging effects of declaring Public Act 89-21 to be unconstitutional are indeed chilling and contrary to the critical public interest in the orderly administration of government, it concluded that this factor alone did not warrant limiting the effect of its decision. Based on its conclusion that Public Act 89-21 is invalid in its entirety for violating the single subject rule, the court entered a final judgment for the plaintiff. That judgment was appealed directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a), which provides for direct appeal from final judgments of the circuit courts in cases in which an Illinois statute has been held invalid. See 134 Ill.2d R. 302(a).