Opinion ID: 1262796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to Suppress Incriminating Statements

Text: Stewart argues that the court should have sustained his motions to suppress the following incriminating statements he made to police officers after he was arrested. 1. In his first statement, made to Sergeant C. Raymond Mayhew of the Bedford County Sheriff's Department on the night he was arrested, Stewart admitted shooting his wife and child. He contends that before Mayhew began to tape record his statement, Stewart asked to speak to an attorney after Mayhew informed him of the rights accorded him under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), yet Mayhew continued to question him. Mayhew denied that Stewart had requested an attorney, produced Stewart's signed waiver of his Miranda rights, and played the tape recording, in which Stewart made no mention of any previous request for an attorney. The trial court has resolved this conflict in the evidence against Stewart. And, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this statement. 2. Stewart's next two statements were made to George Anderson, a Bedford County jailor, on September 2 and 3, 1991. In one statement, Stewart told Anderson that it was `premeditated to kill my wife,' because he couldn't handle her leaving him. Stewart acknowledges that when a suspect initiates a conversation, as he did, it is immaterial that counsel appointed for an accused at his request is not present when he makes his statement. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). [2] However, Stewart contends that the severe stress and trauma [he] was experiencing, exemplified by his beg[ging] for the `electric chair' in one of the statements and evidenced by the fact that he was being given medication for anxiety, established that his mental condition had overborne his will and his ability to waive his right to counsel. The question here is not whether there was coercive police activity resulting in statements that were not voluntary. Rather, the issue is whether Stewart made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. And, whether the waiver was valid is a question of fact on which the trial court's finding is entitled to a presumption of correctness on appeal. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 581-82, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992). Anderson testified that Stewart didn't seem impaired at all and had no trouble understanding his Miranda warnings. Although Anderson also testified that he might have detected a little anxiety at the time the statements were made, this is clearly insufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness attached to the trial court's finding that Stewart had waived his Miranda rights before he made the statements. See Harrison, 244 Va. at 583, 423 S.E.2d at 164 (visible depression alone insufficient to overcome presumption of correctness of trial court's finding of Miranda waiver). 3. Stewart argues that his final statement, also initiated by him and made to Mayhew on September 4, 1991, was coerced and, therefore, inadmissible because Mayhew made a promise to help Stewart get medication and receive the death sentence. We do not agree. The transcript of this interview demonstrates that Stewart's incriminating statements were made as a part of his unsuccessful efforts to obtain a promise by Mayhew that his requests would be honored. Indeed, the evidence indicates that Stewart's proposed inducement for this promise was that he would give a full ... account, you know, of step by step about what happened that day because in the last few days ... it's come back to me ... what took place on that Sunday, Mother's Day when this crime was committed. Mayhew responded only that he can say something to [the jailor] but to guarantee that it would be done, I cannot and that you are charged with capital murder and it can carry the death penalty. So your wishes may be carried out. Whereupon, Stewart terminated the interview with the remark, Well, I guess at that time then, that's, that's all I have to say about it. Two inferences may fairly be drawn from this exchange. First, that Mayhew did not coerce Stewart into making the incriminating statements which were a part of Stewart's efforts to obtain concessions before he gave his alleged full account. Second, that Stewart had not gotten assurances satisfactory to him and that he terminated the conversation without giving his full account. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting Stewart's several incriminating statements.