Opinion ID: 4530962
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The failure to disclose Dr. Gordon’s judicial

Text: reprimand was not prejudicial In a prior case involving child molestation,27 Dr. Gordon, as part of the Sexual Assault Response Team, interviewed a child who had allegedly been sexually assaulted. The interview was taped, but the tape was destroyed. The court determined that the tape recording had contained exculpatory statements, and declared that it was “utterly unconvinced that Dr. Gordon failed to recognize that the statement was exculpatory at the time it was made.” In an order entered approximately six months before Benson’s trial, the court ruled that “law enforcement including Dr. Gordon, acted in bad faith regarding the tape.” The minute order meets the first prong for a Brady violation. It tends to show that Dr. Gordon is an unreliable witness who may obfuscate or lie in order to convict an alleged sex criminal. On this record, we accept that the prosecution did not bring the minute order to the attention of Benson’s counsel, and that it was suppressed.28 27 See footnote 26, supra. 28 The state argues that there is “no evidence [the impeaching evidence] was not available as part of the prosecution’s open file discovery policy.” The state’s argument is not persuasive. Although the state had an open file policy, Benson’s trial counsel reported that he “made a strategic decision that [he] would not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to provide discovery by inspecting the District Attorney’s files themselves to determine whether they had been provided everything to which they were entitled.” Moreover, while the information was BENSON V. CHAPPELL 71 Nonetheless, we affirm the denial of relief on the alleged Brady violation. To set aside Benson’s conviction and sentence, there must be a “reasonable probability” that impeaching Dr. Gordon with evidence of his prior judicial reprimand would have altered the jury’s “conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. Benson has not made such a showing. The evidence both of guilt and of aggravation was so overwhelming that there is no reasonable probability of a different result had Dr. Gordon’s testimony been impeached. The evidence of guilt included not only Benson’s confessions to Bolts and Hobson but also the presence of his fingerprints at the scene and evidence that he owned the steel jeweler’s mandrel found at the home. The aggravating evidence is similarly overwhelming. Dr. Gordon was tasked with presenting forensic evidence of molestation, and he recounted Benson’s description of his acts. But Benson also admitted, in graphic detail, to the police officers his molestation of both young girls as well as his killing of all four members of the family. Thus, Dr. Gordon’s testimony was cumulative. Given the overwhelming nature of the aggravating evidence, and that Benson’s confession to Dr. Gordon was not the only evidence of molestation, it was reasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude that the conviction and sentence would have been the same had Dr. Gordon been impeached or his testimony excluded. contained in a public record, we have held that under some circumstances, this does not diminish the state’s obligation to produce documents under Brady. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2013). Here, the record indicates that the information regarding Dr. Gordon was not produced and that counsel would have used it if he had had it. 72 BENSON V. CHAPPELL 2. Benson has failed to show that the suppression of the lab report was prejudicial Benson claims that the government withheld “a lab report [which] indicated Mr. Benson had methamphetamine in his urine three days after his arrest and during the time he was being interrogated.” This is the whole of Benson’s argument. He does not explain why the report matters or how this information could have been used at trial. That Benson had been a drug addict and had used methamphetamine was not in dispute. Benson’s counsel had presented evidence and had argued at trial—without dispute by the state—that Benson was under the influence of drugs over the weekend in question. The inclusion of a lab report showing the presence of methamphetamine in Benson’s urine three days after his arrest would not have significantly added to the information that was before the jury. 3. Benson has failed to show that the reduction of pending charges against three witnesses had any effect on his conviction or sentence Benson argues that prosecutors failed to disclose criminal charges against several lay witnesses and suggests that their charges were subsequently reduced. The criminal records of the witnesses were of marginal relevance because none of the witnesses testified as to where Benson was or what he did over the weekend in question. Benson does not indicate what the defense would have accomplished with this information, how it would have aided the defense at trial, or even that the information was unknown to trial counsel. Benson has not made the requisite showing of prejudice for relief on this issue. BENSON V. CHAPPELL 73 4. Benson has not shown that the failure to disclose a statement by a lay witness was prejudicial Finally, Benson argues that the prosecution withheld notes from a police officer indicating that a teenage lay witness had stated that she visited Laura Camargo and her three children on Sunday evening. Benson’s assertion that the witness had told the police that Laura and the children were alive on Sunday is of little weight when placed in context. It appears that Benson knew of the statement because during his discussion with the officers, he described having heard that a teenage girl claimed that she had “talked to Laura about 8:15 the night before the fire.” Benson intimated to police that the girl should not be believed, because she was a “champion airhead.” Moreover, as noted, any testimony by the witness would have been undercut by testimony from others who saw no signs of activity in Laura’s residence on Sunday, the testimony of the forensic pathologist that by Monday Laura had been dead for several days, and Benson’s own statement that he murdered Laura on Saturday night. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that “it would have served no purpose other than to diminish the defense’s credibility to attempt to inject [the girl’s] faulty memory into the proceedings to challenge the prosecution’s case that petitioner committed the crimes, a tactic defense counsel reasonably decided not to pursue in any event.” In sum, on this record, even if some Brady materials were withheld, Benson’s claim must be rejected because he cannot show prejudice from the alleged non-disclosures. The Supreme Court recently explained: 74 BENSON V. CHAPPELL Petitioners and the Government, however, do contest the materiality of the undisclosed Brady information. “[E]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” “A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result” is one in which the suppressed evidence “‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” In other words, petitioners here are entitled to a new trial only if they “establis[h] the prejudice necessary to satisfy the ‘materiality’ inquiry.” Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (internal citations omitted). Benson has failed to show a “reasonable probability” that presentation of any or all of the alleged suppressed materials—the prior judicial reprimand of Dr. Gordon, the lab report, the witnesses’ criminal records, and the teenage girl’s statement—would have changed his conviction or sentence. Accordingly, even though the state court denied Benson’s Brady claims without explanation, a review of the record reveals sound reasons for the denial.