Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Instruction to View Defendant's Statement with Caution

Text: Defendant, repeating the argument he made with reference to the guilt phase, claims that the trial court erred at the penalty phase retrial in instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.71 that evidence of an oral admission of a defendant should be viewed with caution. As we have explained, ante, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d at pages 485-87, 47 P.3d at pp. 269-71, defendant could not have been prejudiced by the giving of this instruction.
During voir dire at the second penalty phase trial, the court questioned a prospective juror concerning one of his answers on the juror questionnaire: [Trial Court]: When you were asked, question number 27, express your views of the death penalty, you indicated, `Unless it was in self-defense or to retaliation [ sic ] against abuse that it should be the death penalty.' That of course is not the law. But do you feel you could follow the law as I would instruct you at the end of the case? A. Yes, I do. Q. Thisthe evidence I don't think will show either one of those situations took place, but could you listen to the evidence and depending upon what the evidence showed vote for the death penalty? A. Yes. Q. Could you listen to all the evidence and depending on what the evidence showed also vote for life imprisonment? A. Yes. Q. So you could vote either way depending upon the evidence which you would hear or see in this courtroom? A. Yes. Defendant asserts that the court's comment, that the evidence I don't think will show either self-defense or retaliation against abuse, constituted an erroneous and prejudicial comment on the evidence. The Attorney General asserts that defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object at trial to the court's comment, (See People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) Defendant responds that no objection was required, because Code of Civil Procedure section 647 provides that any statement or other action of the court in commenting upon or in summarizing the evidence is deemed to have been excepted to. ( Delzell v. Day (1950) 36 Cal.2d 349, 351, 223 P.2d 625.) Assuming, without deciding, that the issue may be raised on appeal, we conclude that the trial court's remark did not constitute an improper comment on the evidence. Article VI, section 10, of the California Constitution provides, in pertinent part: The court may make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. We examined this provision in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 766, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113, stating: On its face, the constitutional language imposes no limitations on the content or timing of judicial commentary, deferring entirely to the trial judge's sound discretion. The appellate courts have recognized, however, that this powerful judicial tool may sometimes invade the accused's countervailing right to independent jury determination of the facts bearing on his guilt or innocence. Hence, the decisions admonish that judicial comment on the evidence must be accurate, temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The trial court may not, in the guise of privileged comment, withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, distort the record, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power. [Citations.] (See also People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574 [In the present case, the trial court's questions and comments were within the bounds of propriety. Its role was one of clarification rather than advocacy.].) The trial court's single remark that it did not believe the evidence would show self-defense or retaliation against abuse was proper under the foregoing standard. The remark was accurate and did not distort the record. By convicting defendant of murder, the jury at the guilt phase had determined that the evidence did not establish self-defense. The remark was temperate, nonargumentative, and scrupulously fair. The court stated what it thought the evidence would demonstrate, but asked whether the juror could listen to the evidence and base his verdict upon what the evidence showed. The court did not withdraw material evidence from the jury's consideration, expressly or impliedly direct a verdict, or otherwise usurp the jury's ultimate factfinding power. To the contrary, the court concluded by posing the question: So you could vote either way depending upon the evidence which you would hear or see in this courtroom? Furthermore, the court clearly was attempting to protect defendant's rights by determining whether the juror could vote for either penalty, depending upon the facts to be presented. The court's isolated remark, made during jury selection and prior to the receipt of any evidence by the second jury, was not error. (Cf. People v. Flores (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 579, 588, 95 Cal.Rptr. 138.)
Defendant contends the trial court, in answering a question from the first penalty phase jury during deliberations, erred in referring to the Governor's power to grant a reprieve, pardon, or commutation. We need not determine whether the trial court erred in this regard, because any such error would be harmless. As we have discussed, the first penalty phase jury did not reach a verdict, a mistrial was declared, and a new jury was impaneled. The second jury returned a verdict that was unaffected by the alleged error upon which defendant now relies. Accordingly, even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in answering the jury's question, reversal of the judgment would not be warranted.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on lingering doubt at both the first and second penalty phase trials. As to the first penalty phase, any such error could not have affected the judgment for the reasons discussed above. As to the second penalty phase, we repeatedly have held that although it is proper for the jury to consider lingering doubt, there is no requirement that the court specifically instruct the jury that it may do so. ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 464, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 166, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990.)