Opinion ID: 727331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pregnancy Discrimination Claims Under Title VII

Text: 8 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In 1978, the Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) which amended the definition of sex as follows: 9 The terms because of sex or on the basis of sex include but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.... 10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The PDA did not amend Title VII in any other way. Therefore, in analyzing a claim of pregnancy discrimination we apply the same rules used for discrimination claims in general. 11 There are different theories by which a plaintiff can make out a claim of discrimination under Title VII. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971), the Supreme Court held that Title VII bans not only intentional discrimination (so-called disparate treatment), but also those employment practices that result in disparate impact. Disparate impact claims, the Court stated, involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group and cannot be justified on business necessity. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). A plaintiff proceeding under this theory need not offer proof of discriminatory motive to make out her prima facie case. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-32, 91 S.Ct. at 853-54. She must, however, isolate and identify a particular employment practice which is the cause of the disparity and provide evidence sufficient to raise an inference of causation. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2788-89, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). At this point the employer can respond with evidence that the challenged practice is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 12 At trial, Garcia pointed to the Hospital's lifting requirement as the employment practice that was the cause of the disparity. She must also prove causation, however, and for this needed testimony to the effect that the 150-pound lifting requirement would cause pregnant women as a group to be forced onto unnecessary medical leave and, because of the six-month limit on medical leave, to be terminated. It would, of course, be insufficient for a claim under Title VII if Garcia were the only pregnant woman adversely affected; she must show that pregnant women as a group would be subject to this medical restriction. If all or substantially all pregnant women would be advised by their obstetrician not to lift 150 pounds, then they would certainly be disproportionately affected by this supposedly mandatory job requirement for LVN's at the Hospital. Statistical evidence would be unnecessary if Garcia could establish this point. Should she establish her prima facie case, the burden would then shift to the Hospital to prove that the lifting requirement was job related and consistent with business necessity. The PDA does not mandate preferential treatment for pregnant women and that is not what Garcia is seeking. If the lifting requirement is found to be bona fide, then Garcia loses. 13 The district court granted the Hospital's Rule 50 motion on the basis that Garcia had not made out a claim for disparate treatment. As the preceding discussion makes plain, however, Garcia can proceed under a number of theories, including disparate impact. The district court erred by not considering this theory, among others, in granting the Hospital's Rule 50 motion. 2 However, the district court committed additional error as well.