Opinion ID: 1510213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Books of Account and the Testimony of Brink.

Text: Certain summaries of the books of plaintiff, showing the sales accounts of the meat and the expenses incurred in connection with the same, were introduced in evidence. It is conceded that the summaries were correct reflections of the books, but it is contended by defendant that the books themselves and the testimony of Brink relative thereto were not competent, and therefore the summaries were not competent. As already stated, the evidence showed that the sales of the meat were made through the sales department of plaintiff under the supervision of Lloyd's agent, who was adopted by defendant as its agent; that by agreement of said agent the proceeds of the sales were collected by, and the accounts were kept by, the bookkeeping department of plaintiff; that by agreement, also, the expenses incurred were paid by plaintiff, and the accounts thereof kept. All of this was done by authority and under the supervision of said Lloyd's agent. The books were thus kept by persons who were agents both of plaintiff and of defendant. These books of account were kept by or under the immediate supervision of Mr. Brink, an accountant and an employé of plaintiff, during most of the time when the meat was being sold. For a short part of the period they were kept by or under the supervision of Mr. McLeod, an auditor and employé of plaintiff. Both of these men testified that the books were properly and accurately kept, and in the usual course of business. The data of the sales from which invoices, and afterwards entries on the books, were made, came to the bookkeeping department of plaintiff from the sales agents, sometimes by telephone, sometimes by telegram, sometimes by mail. An invoice with draft attached and a delivery order directed to one of the freezing establishments, where the meat was, would then be made out by the bookkeeping department and sent to a bank for collection, and the purchaser was notified. Upon payment of the draft, the invoice and delivery order were given to the purchaser. Upon presentation of the delivery order to the freezing establishment, the purchaser received the meat. Report was made by the freezing establishment to the bookkeeping department of plaintiff, and the transaction was entered upon the books of plaintiff. If the exact number of pounds was not delivered, owing to the fact that the meat was in quarters, adjustment was made, and correction entries followed. Expenses were entered upon the books from vouchers received from the various parties to whom the money was paid. The sales agents who sent in the original orders were not produced as witnesses; nor in many instances were the parties to whom the expenses had been paid. It was mainly because of the absence of these witnesses that objection was made to the introduction in evidence of the books and the vouchers. The identification of books of account and the foundation which should be laid for their introduction in evidence is an intensely practical matter, and one that must generally be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The vital questions are: Do the books probably represent truly the facts which they purport to show? Are they the best and most available evidence? The increasing complexity of the conditions under which modern business is carried on has called for a liberal construction of the rules governing the introduction in evidence of books of account and entries in the course of business. This is clearly recognized by leading authorities. Professor Wigmore in his work on Evidence (section 1530) says: Suppose an offer of books representing transactions during several months in a large establishment. In the first place, the employees have in many cases changed and the former ones cannot be found; in the next place, it cannot always be ascertained accurately which employee was concerned in each one of the transactions represented by the hundreds of entries; in the third place, even if they could be ascertained, the production of the scores of employees, to attend court and identify in tedious succession the detailed items of transactions, would interrupt and derange the work of the establishment, and the evidence would be obtained at a cost practically prohibitory; and, finally, the memory of such persons, when summoned, would usually afford little real aid. If unavailability or impossibility is the general principle that controls, is not this a real case of unavailability? Having regard to the facts of mercantile and industrial life, it cannot be doubted that it is. In such a case, it should be sufficient if the books were verified on the stand by a supervising officer, who knew them to be the books of regular entries kept in that establishment, and the production on the stand of a regiment of bookkeepers, salesmen, shipping clerks, teamsters, foremen, or other subordinate employees should be dispensed with. No doubt much should be left to the discretion of the trial court; production may be required for cross-examination, where the nature of the controversy seems to require it. But the important thing is to realize that upon principle there is no objection to regarding this situation as rendering in a given case the production of all the persons practically as impossible as in the case of death. The conclusion is, then, that where an entry is made by one person in the regular course of business, recording an oral or written report, made to him by one or more other persons in the regular course of business, of a transaction lying in the personal knowledge of the latter, there is no objection to receiving that entry under the present exception, provided the practical inconvenience of producing on the stand the numerous persons thus concerned would in the particular case outweigh the probable utility of doing so. Why should not this conclusion be accepted by the courts? Such entries are dealt with in that way in the most important undert kings of mercantile and industrial life. They are the ultimate basis of calculation, investment, and general confidence in every business enterprise; nor does the practical impossibility of obtaining constantly and permanently the verification of every employee affect the trust that is given to such books. It would seem that expedients which the entire commercial world recognizes as safe could be sanctioned, and not discredited, by courts of justice. When it is a mere question of whether provisional confidence can be placed in a certain class of statements, there cannot profitably and sensibly be one rule for the business world and another for the courtroom. Jones in his work on Evidence (volume 3, p. 569) states the rules as follows: The former strict idea of what constituted original entries has been modified to fit the necessities of new business conditions. Inasmuch as under the modern methods of extensive business houses the information relative to the transactions constituting the accounts must pass through various hands before being permanently recorded, some system of temporary memoranda preparatory to the permanent records is necessary to insure convenience as well as accuracy. It would be impracticable to preserve for any great length of time the tags, slips, or tokens constituting such original memoranda, and impossible, in view of the changing of employees, to obtain the testimony of the person who made the temporary memoranda or conducted the transaction. Hence, following the rule of necessity, the courts do not regard such temporary memoranda as the originals, but look to the permanent records as such original entries when properly verified by a suppletory oath. In this particular, every case must be made to depend very much upon its own peculiar circumstances, having regard to the situation of the parties, the kind of business, the mode of conducting it, and the time and manner of making entries. [1] Many of the courts also have evinced the same liberal spirit in respect to the introduction in evidence of books of account and entries in the course of business. Miss. River Logging Co. v. Robson, 69 F. 773, 781 (C. C. A. 8); United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F.(2d) 705, 732 (C. C. A. 8); Matson Nav. Co. v. United Eng. Works (C. C. A.) 213 F. 293; Rutan v. Johnson & Johnson (C. C. A.) 231 F. 369, 378; E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Tomlinson (C. C. A.) 296 F. 634; Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co. (C. C. A.) 297 F. 791; Cub Fork Coal Co. v. Fairmont Co. (C. C. A.) 19 F. (2d) 273. In the Du Pont de Nemours Case the court said (page 640): In recent years the conditions, of necessity, justifying the use of a record without the supporting testimony of the entrant have been extended beyond the circumstances of death and absence from the jurisdiction. The courts have recognized other cases of unavailability as sufficient. This is particularly true of records of modern industrial activities, in which the facts are complex and the persons concerned so numerous that no one of them has an accurate recollection of the whole chain of events, or indeed, ever had a complete knowledge of it. The record itself in these cases is in effect the best and only evidence of the transaction. If it is identified, and its correctness and regularity are established, there is no sound reason why it should not be accepted as proof of great value. In the case at bar the regularity is fully approved. The records were made contemporaneously with the facts, by persons employed for the purpose by the railroad company in the regular course of business, as part of a system habitually employed, in order that the railroad might have an accurate account to which reference might thereafter be made in the conduct of its affairs. The identity and correctness of the record is proved by the supervising agent and clerk who was charged with the duty to cause the record to be made, and to preserve it for future reference and use. In the Straus Case the court said (page 805):    Courts must keep pace with the problems of administration developed by large business enterprises. We know and appreciate the difficulty of proving the actual mailing of a letter by an office boy, when hundreds of letters daily issue from large business houses. We likewise know and appreciate the impracticability of producing so-called common-law proof of every detail of purchase or sale in a large business like that of plaintiffs. The progress of men and affairs constantly presses on the common law, and makes it yield with traditional elasticity, to the requirements of the times. In the case at bar the entries were made in the books from various data  telegrams, letters, statements. These data were furnished largely by persons who made the sales, agents of defendant as well as of plaintiff. Some were furnished by the several freezing establishments. The entries were made in the usual course of business by bookkeepers, who testified that the data were correctly entered. These bookkeepers were agents of both parties. All of the transactions were under the supervision of an agent of defendant. The books of account were originally kept at Christiana; they were subsequently brought to Chicago, and were produced at the trial in Arkansas. The persons who had furnished the original data from which the entries in the books were made were not available as witnesses. Under all these circumstances we think the court was justified in finding the existence upon the record of the two elements requisite to the introduction of the books of account in question; viz. necessity, and circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness. We conclude that there was no error in admitting in evidence the books of account, the summaries, the expense vouchers, and the testimony of the witnesses McLeod and Brink.