Opinion ID: 1174938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: illustrative holdings

Text: Other state courts have considered variations on the question whether government may speak out or whether it must refrain from speaking. In tracing the development of the government speech cases, one finds the analyses shifting from demands for explicit authority for a particular government activity to concerns with an authorized action's conflict with other laws, both statutory and constitutional. In the earlier cases in this area, courts placed limitations on municipal spending power by narrowly defining corporate purpose and municipal function, and uniformly prohibited expenditures for government speech. This early view of municipal authority, also known as Dillon's rule, [3] appears in Elsenau v. City of Chicago, 334 Ill. 78, 165 N.E. 129 (1929), a taxpayer suit to enjoin expenditures by the city for advertisements in support of a proposed bond measure. The court recited the popular maxims of the day, that municipal corporations possess no inherent power, and that statutes granting powers to municipal corporations are strictly construed, and ruled that [t]he conduct of a campaign, before an election, for the purpose of exerting an influence upon the voters is not the exercise of an authorized municipal function and hence is not a corporate purpose of the municipality. 334 Ill. at 81-82, 165 N.E. 129. In State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Sup'r Ct., 93 Wash. 267, 160 P. 755 (1916), the court enjoined port commissioners from spending public money to campaign in opposition to a referendum increasing their number and placing a debt limit on the port. The court found no authority for such an expenditure. It stated that municipal corporations possess only those powers expressly granted or such as are necessarily implied. 93 Wash. at 269, 160 P. 755. Though the court did not articulate the constitutional issues underlying such government speech activities, it noted the similarities between the instant case and the possibility that [t]he commissioners might determine that the best interests of the business of the port required that the individual members of the commission be perpetuated in office, and, because of that reason, use the funds of the port to insure their own election, 93 Wash. at 273, 160 P. 755. Shannon v. City of Huron, 9 S.D. 356, 69 N.W. 598 (1896), presents a similar analysis. In Mines v. Del Valle, 201 Cal. 273, 257 P. 530 (1927), the court found the Board of Public Service Commissioners liable for funds expended for printing cards, banners, automobile windshield stickers, automobile banners, labels, circulars, hand bills, dodgers, and postal cards; for distributing and circulating the same; for constructing a float; and for advertising in certain newspapers in support of a bond measure. 201 Cal. at 276, 257 P. 530. The court found that the commissioners' claimed authority to promote a utility bond was neither given to them by any express provisions of the charter, nor can it be implied from any of the terms thereof. 201 Cal. at 288, 257 P. 530. In Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education, 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953), the New Jersey Supreme Court found implied power for the school board to expend funds to publish an informational booklet about a bond proposal requiring voter approval. The court interpreted the school board's authority more broadly than older cases had done. Nonetheless, the expenditure was held unlawful because the school board had presented only one side of the issue, thereby shutting out those with dissenting views. In the court's words:    the board made use of public funds to advocate one side only of the controversial question without affording the dissenters the opportunity by means of that financed medium to present their side, and thus imperilled the propriety of the entire expenditure. The public funds entrusted to the board belong equally to the proponents and opponents of the proposition, and the use of the funds to finance not the presentation of facts merely but also arguments to persuade the voters that only one side has merit, gives the dissenters just cause for complaint. 13 N.J. at 180-81, 98 A.2d 673. The power of local governments has expanded in recent times. Our own statutes illustrate the trend. Under the General Laws 1862, section 870 county courts and boards of county commissioners were given authority and powers    to transact county business, by means of a specific enumeration of the types of business they were authorized to transact. They were authorized, for example, to erect and repair county public buildings such as jails and courthouses, to repair, establish and vacate county roads and bridges, and to grant and revoke licenses for dance halls and groceries. The specificity with which these authorities are listed by statute indicates the degree to which the legislature perceived local government authority to be circumscribed. In 1958, the Oregon Constitution was amended to permit county home rule. Or. Const., Art. VI, § 10. In 1973, ORS 203.035 was added to authorize all counties to exercise authority within the county over matters of county concern, to the fullest extent allowed by the Constitution and laws of the United States and of this state, as fully as if each particular power comprised in that general authority were specifically listed   . ORS 203.035(1). In recent times, the judicial demand for explicit expressions of authority and a recognition of only attendant authorities necessarily implied by those expressed has given way to an interpretation that local governments have broad powers subject only to constitutional or preemptive statutory prohibitions. Thus, it is more often possible to find some source of authority for a government speech-related expenditure. As the first inquiry  whether a particular expenditure is authorized  is more often answered in the affirmative, courts have proceeded to consider whether the government action, even though authorized, conflicted with some other law or constitutional provision. Some recent state cases deserve attention, as much as for what they fail to say as for what they say. The courts struggle, often unsuccessfully, to identify the legal premises for what Stanson v. Mott, 17 Cal.3d 206, 217, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1 (1976), described as a uniform judicial reluctance to sanction the use of public funds for election campaigns. In Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc.2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), taxpayers sought to enjoin the Division of Human Rights from supporting the passage of a state equal rights amendment. The court held that despite broad statutory authority to promote and protect human rights, the agency was prohibited from advocat[ing] their favored position on any issue   . So long as they are an arm of the state government they must maintain a position of neutrality and impartiality. 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239. The court reasoned: The spectacle of state agencies campaigning for or against propositions or proposed constitutional amendments to be voted on by the public,   , can only demean the democratic process. Id. The court alluded to restraints on the democratic process, id., to the proper function of a state agency 375 N.Y.S.2d at 237, and to the need to construe the agency's authority in the context of the State and Federal constitutions. Id. The agency was not enjoined from informing and educating the public concerning the proposed amendment, but it could not advocate a positive or negative vote on the amendment. 375 N.Y.S.2d at 240. California has had a series of cases since Mines v. Del Valle, supra , addressing the issue of government speech. In Stanson v. Mott, supra , the court explained why, in its view, other courts had not permitted expenditures of public funds for campaign purposes: Underlying this uniform judicial reluctance to sanction the use of public funds for election campaigns rests an implicit recognition that such expenditures raise potentially serious constitutional questions. A fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process is that the government may not `take sides' in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office   ; the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process. 17 Cal.3d at 217, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1. The court alluded as well to the need to protect the rights of dissenting taxpayers when public funds are spent to advocate an opposing position. However, the court found no need to resolve the serious constitutional question that would be posed by an explicit legislative authorization of the use of public funds for partisan campaigning   . 17 Cal.3d at 219, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1. The court resolved the question on authority grounds, requiring statutory authorization in clear and unmistakable language   , 17 Cal.3d at 219-20, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1, quoting Mines v. Del Valle, supra, 201 Cal. at 287, 257 P. 530. In Stanson v. Mott , the court attempted to distinguish between improper campaign expenditures and proper informational activities. The court concluded that the propriety of an expenditure depends upon a careful consideration of such factors as the style, tenor and timing of the publication; no hard and fast rule governs every case. 17 Cal.3d at 222, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1 (Footnote omitted). The court remanded the case for a factual determination whether the public funds were used for informational or advocacy activities. Following Stanson v. Mott , two related cases arose challenging expenditures of public funds by the California Commission on the Status of Women. The funds were used to promote ratification of the proposed federal equal rights amendment. In the first case, Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App.3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1978), the commission acknowledged that it actively promoted ratification of the equal rights amendment nationally and in the state of California. The court relied on Stanson v. Mott for the following analysis: First, was the commission's activity legislative lobbying and permissible, or was it election campaigning? [4] If the latter, was it clearly and unmistakenly authorized by statute? A third issue, which the court acknowledged but did not reach, raised the constitutionality of the expenditure regardless of legislative authorization. The court reversed summary judgment for the defendants and remanded the case for a factual determination whether the activities of the commission were informational or promotional. The court found that only informational activities were authorized by statute. The follow-up case of Miller v. California Com'n on Status of Women, 151 Cal. App.3d 693, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1984), arose after the legislature amended the commission's enabling statute expressly to authorize the commission to state its viewpoint on the issues it was responsible to examine. The court interpreted this amended statute as a legislative warrant to advocate and promote the commission's positions on these subjects. 151 Cal. App.3d at 698, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877. Plaintiffs were left with a constitutional attack which they framed in terms of impermissible compelled support (taxpayer dollars) for government advocacy with which plaintiffs disagreed. The court rejected the argument that government must be neutral on controversial topics and upheld the commission's advocacy. The court stated: That the imprimatur of government has conferred an advantage upon the commissioners is undeniable. That advantage, however, has not risen to the level of drowning out plaintiffs. 151 Cal. App.3d at 702, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877. It was also important to the decision that there was no claim that the statute would authorize advocacy of a position during an election campaign. Of greatest similarity to the instant case is the Massachusetts case of Anderson v. Boston, 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628 (1978), appeal dismissed 439 U.S. 1060, 99 S.Ct. 822, 59 L.Ed.2d 26 (1979). Some background on events leading up to the case is helpful. In 1907 Massachusetts enacted a statute that prohibited private corporate expenditures in connection with elections and referendums. Amendments over the years allowed some expenditures, but only if the issue before the voters was one materially affecting    [the] business    of the corporation. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 55, § 8 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1978). The interpretation of this statutory phrase was a subject of continuing dispute between the judiciary and the legislature, with the judiciary permitting corporate campaign expenditures. See Note, Municipal Free Speech: Banned in Boston?, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 1111, 1112-13, 1125-26. In 1975 the legislature amended the corporate expenditure statute to prohibit corporate election contributions solely concerning the taxation of the income    of individuals   . The corporations succeeded in having the statute declared unconstitutional on federal First Amendment grounds in First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978). The corporations then embarked on a publicity campaign to defeat the next taxation referendum proposal which appeared on the ballot in 1978. In response, the City of Boston, exercising its home rule authority, passed an ordinance authorizing the city to expend funds for such activities as staffing with city employes an Office of Public Information on Classification for the purpose of collecting and disseminating information about the tax proposal, organizing citizen volunteers and providing city offices and telephones at no cost, and contributing financially to a campaign organized by the Massachusetts Mayors' Association. Taxpayers obtained an injunction against these expenditures. The Massachusetts Supreme Court declined to read municipal authority to appropriate funds narrowly as older cases might have done. Rather, the issue as the court saw it was whether the city's purported home rule ordinance is inconsistent with any law enacted by the Legislature under the powers reserved to it under the Home Rule Amendment. 376 Mass. at 184-85, 380 N.E.2d 628. Massachusetts election laws restricted corporate expenditures in elections and forbade any municipal employe, among others, from soliciting or receiving any payment of money for any political purpose whatever. The court regarded these prohibitions as demonstrating a general legislative intent to keep political fund raising and disbursing out of the hands of nonelective public employees and out of city and town halls. 376 Mass. at 186-87, 380 N.E.2d 628 (Footnote omitted). The court held that the state statute regulating election financing preempted any right a municipality might otherwise have to appropriate funds for the purpose of influencing the result on a referendum question.