Opinion ID: 1744348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the chancery court erred by terminating the mother's parental rights.

Text: ¶ 15. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-15-109 (Supp.2000) sets forth the standard to be applied in the termination of rights of unfit parents as follows: After hearing all the evidence in regard to such petition, if the chancellor, family court judge or county court judge is satisfied by clear and convincing proof that the parent or parents are within the grounds requiring termination of parental rights as set forth in this chapter, then the court may terminate all the parental rights of the parent or parents regarding the child, and terminate the right of the child to inherit from such parent or parents. The termination of the parental rights of one (1) parent may be made without the parental rights of the other parent, should circumstances and evidence ever so warrant. (emphasis added). The mother asserts that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that she had so failed to comply with DHS's requests that it was impossible to return custody of the children to her. DHS, however, argues that clear and convincing evidence was presented to the court and that the best interests of the children were served by terminating the mother's parental rights. We find that the chancery court properly terminated the mother's parental rights. ¶ 16. To best illustrate the circumstances surrounding this case, the following factual history is necessary: In both January and July of 1994, unsubstantiated abuse referrals on K.P.'s family were conducted which revealed an atmosphere of domestic violence. On March 27, 1995, Jack and Jill were placed in the custody of the Hinds County DHS until such time as their mother could obtain adequate housing for the children and herself. On August 17, 1995, DHS proposed a case plan which the mother could complete to regain custody of her children. She refused to sign the case plan. DHS then offered her parenting classes which she also refused to attend. DHS also recommended that she obtain counseling. She attended one counseling session but never returned for any of the following appointments. ¶ 17. Additionally, the mother failed to secure housing for a period of at least 18 months. At trial, she described her living conditions as follows: And after that I was just absolutely homeless. I lived in an abandoned apartment one time for about a year and a half with no electricity. I had no running water. The kids were not anywhere with me. They hadn't been with me since y'all (sic) took them in March. She further explained that her reason for being homeless was because God told me that he was going to use me in the ministry, and I became a street minister. On October 30, 1996, the children had been in foster care for 19 months and DHS filed a petition to terminate parental rights. During this litigation, DHS offered the mother another chance to regain custody of her children. She obtained the pro bono legal services of a Jackson attorney. On May 29, 1997, she signed a case plan which required her to complete psychological evaluations, attend individual and family counseling, complete parenting classes, secure and maintain housing and employment, and visit with DHS and her children twice a month. With the exception of counseling, she complied with the agreement, and Jack was returned to her physical custody on a trial basis by an Agreed Order entered on December 16, 1997. The Agreed Order reiterated her need to complete the counseling. She returned twice to the counseling sessions, but then failed to return for any other appointments. At trial, the mother explained that counseling was a big, big, big waste of her time, a big, big, big waste of my time, my gas, my energy and my efforts.... ¶ 18. In In re T.A.P., 742 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Miss.1999), this Court expressed concern about DHS's failure to effectively implement a plan before it initiated termination proceedings. In the present case, however, DHS made diligent efforts to assist the mother in the return of her children. Perhaps it may best be described by Paul Davey, the expert psychotherapist, who testified, I've been extremely impressed by Ms. Roark and her efforts that are wayin my opinion, way above and beyond the call of duty. I've just been very impressed by what I've seen documented, what she's tried to do and by my phone contacts with her, too, just in terms of the effort, the sheer lengths that she's gone to to try and give the mother the opportunity to regain custody of these children if she could. The mother's social worker, Elsie Roark, provided constant supervision and even went so far as to transport Jack back and forth from school when the mother did not have working transportation. Roark also provided the mother with her home phone number. When the family was later evicted from their home because the mother had not paid the rent, Roark made arrangements for the family to stay at a local motel until other housing arrangements could be made. She also assisted the mother in obtaining HUD housing. Moreover, the mother entered into her fourth marriage with an immigrant from Russia after the termination action was filed by DHS. The new husband could not secure employment because of immigration problems, and DHS offered money towards resolving the citizenship conflict. However, the mother refused to accept the money. ¶ 19. In May of 1998, Jill was also returned to the mother on a trial basis. At this point, the mother decided to go on a vacation trip to Florida. She failed to inform her social worker or seek permission from the court to leave the state, all in direct violation of the Agreed Order. She then contacted Roark and asked if she could remain in Florida permanently. Although Roark informed her that she should not have left the state without court permission, she agreed to see if it was possible for the mother and her children to remain in the government housing that they had secured there. Accordingly, Roark requested the Florida Department of Children and Family Services to do a home study. Before this home study was completed, however, the mother was arrested for stabbing her husband with a paring knife. The Florida authorities removed the children from the home and sent them back to the Hinds County Department of Human Services. The Florida authorities found the living conditions to be adequate, but were concerned about the mother's mental condition and the violent atmosphere in the home. At trial, the mother testified that America is full of domestic men that are pushing around women and described the stabbing incident between her and her husband as follows: [My husband] come (sic) in there ... and was angry, and started attacking me, and I just could not take it any more ... I don't know how it happened but he wrapped his legs around me, and he squeezed his legs as tight as he could, and I thought I was going to absolutely die. And I couldn't breathe ... And I said, I cannot take this anymore, and I went and picked up a paring knife, a blade about this big....And I was angry and upset, and so I pricked him, and that's all that happened. Nothing happened. The mother still lives in Florida with her husband. Pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-18-1 et seq. (1993), the Department of Human Services is prohibited from placing the children back in the mother's home without the approval of the state. Florida has denied placement of the children back in the home. ¶ 20. In the Order and Opinion, dated February 5, 1999, the chancellor determined that the mother had not terminated the ongoing behavior which needed to be eliminated before her children could be returned to her. The chancellor noted the ongoing behavior, which included: Continued homelessness, not putting her children first such as housing at Mississippi College which did not include her children, refusing to give an address to the Department, refusing to sign the initial service agreement, refusing parenting classes, erratic job history with no actual proof of employment, demanding disposition especially as to visitation times, complaining about her two older children who were with a maternal aunt. Further Ms. Leggett testified that the mother's behavior also included: displaying inappropriate behavior such as giving most of the attention to [Jill] at the visits, telling [Jack] God would send them a house, visiting in an evening gown on her way to church, examining [Jill's] vagina for sexual abuse after a prophecy from God that a family member was being abused, disrupting placement of the children, taking different men to Sunnybrook to see [Jack] and telling him that they were his father. (emphasis added). ¶ 21. Our decisions have always stated the cardinal principle to be applied to custody decisions is that which is in the best interests and welfare of the minor child. In re R.D., 658 So.2d 1378, 1386 (Miss.1995)(citing Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1004 (Miss.1983)). Therefore, the focus does not change in custody matters where it is not one parent vying against the other for custody of their child, but rather, DHS seeking to retain custody of a neglected or abused child rather than have him returned to a parent. Id. In the present case, the children have been in foster care for over five years. The chancellor was correct to be concerned about the length of time the children had been in foster care. All too often children seem to remain forgotten and permanently implanted into the foster care system. Id. at 1389. Although the mother partially complied with the case plan once and regained a second chance at rearing her children, she ultimately chose to place the children in a violent domestic situation. When asked if he wanted to return to Florida or remain in foster care, Jack answered foster care. Jill, now six years old, for all practical purposes has never had a mother and has never really bonded with anyone. At the end of Jill's one-hour session with Paul Davey, she was calling him daddy. ¶ 22. Although aware of the great responsibility placed upon any court when determining whether a parent's fundamental right to rear their offspring should be terminated, we think we would be remiss in our duties if we did not terminate the parental rights to safeguard the childrens' greater right to food, shelter, and opportunity to become useful citizens. Adams v. Powe, 469 So.2d 76, 78-79 (Miss.1985). As in Adams, the record is replete with evidence that the mother was given considerable opportunity and warning that she must change her lifestyle. Id. DHS required nothing more of the mother than asking that she provide her two minor children with the most basic necessities for a healthy life. In the present case, the best interest of the children would best be served by the termination of the mother's parental rights. For the foregoing reasons, we find that clear and convincing evidence was presented and that the chancellor was correct in terminating the mother's parental rights.