Opinion ID: 2823815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislative Purpose

Text: Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Even if we were to find the statutory language ambiguous, our conclusion would be the same because the legislative purpose supports our construction of section 18-3-203(1)(f). The provision resulted from a special session of the 1976 General Assembly, which focused on ways to curb inmate violence; the object sought to be attained is clearly deterrence of assaults on jail and prison staff. The Peopleâs suggested construction better facilitates this objective because that interpretation minimizes the potential for a concurrent sentence. Stated differently, it maximizes the potential for additional time based on assaultive conduct against detention personnel while a defendant is in confinement or custody. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Highlighting this legislative purpose, another division of the court of appeals has noted that â[i]nterpreting the statute to limit the requirement of consecutive sentences to only those offenders who commit assaults while confined after a conviction, as defendant suggests, is inconsistent with the clearly expressed intent of the legislature to deter any assaults against peace officers and other workers within custodial settings by mandating additional punishment.â Benavidez, 222 P.3d at 394. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â The majority distinguished this case from Benavidez, reasoning that â[u]nlike the situation in Benavidez, . . . the sentencing court in this case did not order the assault sentence to be served consecutively to any sentence imposed on a charge for which defendant was confined when he committed the first assault.â Diaz, Â¶11. This strikes us as a distinction without a difference. Granted, the procedural history of that case was differentâthe assault took place while the defendant was in custody awaiting the disposition of the other charges, to which the consecutive sentence was later appended. But the courtâs determination that âthe sentencing court was required, pursuant to section 18-3-203(1)(f), to make his sentence for second degree assault consecutive to the sentences he received upon conviction for those other charges,â see Benavidez, 222 P.3 at 394, did not rest on the timing of his offenses. It rested on the statuteâs plain language and the legislative purpose behind it. Neither is temporal. 5