Opinion ID: 3152383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Policy

Text: Appellants argue that the railroads that operated trains using the corridor in question in this case occupied and used the corridor under rights of way that were easements, that is, rights to use the strips of land for railroad purposes only. According to this argument, when the corridor stopped being used for railroad purposes and was in effect abandoned, unencumbered title to the land reverted to the abutting landowners as successors in title to the owners who granted the railroad the right to run trains over their property.6 Subsection (4) of the statute 6. Some courts have cautioned against using the term “reversion” to refer to the interest of an owner of land subject to an easement whose servient estate is later unburdened by reason of the abandonment or discontinuation of the easement. [A] “reversion” is a future interest remaining in the transferor following the conveyance of certain lesser estates to a transferee, typically when the transferee takes a possessory estate of freehold, for example a life estate. An easement is not such a possessory estate of freehold. . . . Therefore labeling the retained interest a “reversion” is not consistent with the traditional classification scheme, which views - 15 - quoted above provides that a railroad company may “take as much land as may be necessary for the proper construction, operation, and security of the road . . . making compensation therefor.” Appellants argue that, even if the deeds by which the landowners granted land to the railroad appeared to convey fee simple title, the various parcels of land making up the corridor used by the railroad should nevertheless be treated as though they were taken by eminent domain. Appellants cite cases from other jurisdictions holding that when a railroad obtains property by eminent domain for use as a railroad right of way, it receives only such interest as is needed to fulfill the purpose of the taking, which is an easement. We need not address the nature, quality, or character of the title or estate in land a railroad obtains when it takes land for a right of way by eminent domain under Florida law, because the deeds in question in this case conveyed fee simple title and were obtained by bargain and sale, not eminent domain. Appellants argue that the deeds show that the railroad paid only nominal consideration for the land and that the recitation of nominal consideration in a deed the retained interest as a present estate in fee simple, subject to the burden of the easement. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also Brown, 152 S.W.2d at 655 (Mo. 1941) (“[I]n the grant of an easement no title passes but . . . continues in the holder of the servient estate so that when the easement ceases there can be no such thing as a reversion of title. . . . [T]he servient estate is merely freed from the burden of the use . . . .”). - 16 - can be evidence that the grantor intended to grant something less than full title. Appellants suggest that the amounts of consideration stated in the deeds show that the deeds were meant to convey easements rather than fee simple title. Appellants cite Craft v. Craft, 76 So. 772 (Fla. 1917), to support this argument. In Craft, certain lots were conveyed without any consideration under circumstances where the grantee had agreed to sell the lots and remit the proceeds to the grantors. The Court held that while the grantee received legal title, his undertaking created a trust enforceable in a court of equity. Id. at 772-73. The agreement of the parties resulted in the grantee holding the proceeds of the sales in trust for the grantors. The case is inapplicable here because the facts are distinguishable. Appellants also cite Ogg v. Mediacom LLC, 142 S.W.3d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), where a Missouri court found nominal consideration to be a factor in discerning the grantor’s intent to convey an easement rather than fee simple title. The law of Florida, however, is that the amount of consideration stated in a deed provides no basis for questioning the validity of the deed. See, e.g., Kingsland v. Godbold, 456 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Venice East, Inc. v. Manno, 186 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). The language of the deed determines the nature of the estate conveyed. Here the deeds were clear in their language and conveyed fee simple title. - 17 - Appellants argue that the deeds should be construed as having granted easements because the law of Florida disfavors recognition of fee simple title to “strips and gores” of land which become isolated due to changes in their use or other circumstances. As applied to railroad rights of way, Appellants argue, this principle of law would operate so that upon abandonment of a railroad corridor, title would “revert” to the adjoining landowners. To support this argument, Appellants cite cases dealing with street and road easements created by subdivision plats, such as Paine v. Consumers’ Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 F. 626 (6th Cir. 1895), in which the court explained the principle as follows: The existence of “strips or gores” of land along the margin of nonnavigable lakes, to which the title may be held in abeyance for indefinite periods of time, is as great an evil as are “strips and gores” of land along highways or running streams. The litigation that may arise therefrom after long years, or the happening of some unexpected event, is equally probable, and alike vexatious in each of the cases, and that public policy which would seek to prevent this by a construction that would carry the title to the center of a highway, running stream, or nonnavigable lake that may be made a boundary of the lands conveyed applies indifferently, and with equal force, to all of them. Id. at 629-30 (quoting Lembeck v. Nye, 24 N.E. 686, 689 (Ohio 1890)). Paine involved a subdivision plat by which strips of land had been designated for use as streets. Later one of the streets was abandoned, and the court held that the deeds to the lots adjacent to the land designated for a street had conveyed title that extended to the center line of the street. It was clear that the court was applying a - 18 - presumption as to the grantor’s intent, which would not have been appropriate or necessary had a different intention been made clear in the deeds. Id. at 629, 632, 634-35. As applied to a railroad right of way, the “strips and gores” doctrine has been explained as follows: The presumption is that a deed to a railroad or other right of way company (pipeline company, telephone company, etc.) conveys a right of way, that is, an easement, terminable when the acquirer’s use terminates, rather than a fee simple. Transaction costs are minimized by undivided ownership of a parcel of land, and such ownership is facilitated by the automatic reuniting of divided land once the reason for the division has ceased. If the railroad holds title in fee simple to a multitude of skinny strips of land now usable only by the owner of the surrounding or adjacent land, then before the strips can be put to their best use there must be expensive and time-consuming negotiation between the railroad and its neighbor—that or the gradual extinction of the railroad’s interest through the operation of adverse possession. It is cleaner if the railroad’s interest simply terminates upon the abandonment of railroad service. A further consideration is that railroads and other right of way companies have eminent domain powers, and they should not be encouraged to use those powers to take more than they need of another person’s property—more, that is, than a right of way. But all this said, there is nothing to prohibit a farmer or other landowner from selling outright to the railroad a strip of land for the railroad’s tracks; and if that is how the matter was handled with respect to some or all of the parcels in this case, Penn Central remains their owner today, save as its rights may have been extinguished by adverse possession. Penn Central Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158, 1160 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). This explanation supports our conclusion that since the deeds in question here were clear as to the title conveyed, presumptions that are used when the intent is unclear do not apply. - 19 - Appellants also cite certain decisions of this Court in support of their “strips and gores” argument. In Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Southern Investment Co., 44 So. 351 (Fla. 1907), and Florida Southern Ry. v. Brown, 1 So. 512 (Fla. 1887), this Court recognized that when a street or highway is the boundary of a lot or piece of land, the owner of the lot owns to the center of the street or highway, subject to the right of the public to use the public street or highway. “The rule seems to be based on the supposed intention of the parties, and the improbability of the grantor desiring or intending to reserve his interest in the street when he had parted with his title to the adjoining land.” Id. at 513-14. In Smith v. Horn, 70 So. 435 (Fla. 1915), a subdivision plat was mapped out showing blocks and lots with spaces for streets running in between them. The plat showed the owner’s intent to create public easements for the streets. The purchasers of the lots were presumed to have received title to the land extending to the center of the street abutting their lots. Upon the subsequent abandonment or surrender of a street easement, the abutting owners owned the property to the center of the street free of the easement. Id. at 436-37. This outcome was based on the presumed intent of the grantor in the absence of a contrary showing. Servando Bldg. Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1956), recognized that the rule applied in Horn, Southern Investment, and Brown is a rule of construction that is employed to aid in determining the grantor’s intent. Under this body of caselaw, a conveyance of a lot bordered by a street is - 20 - presumed to carry title to the center of the street. This rule of construction does not apply if a contrary intention is made clear by the language of the deed. To the same effect is the decision in United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land, 342 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1977). The presumption is also inapplicable if the strip of land being claimed is titled in someone else. See Paine, 71 F. at 629. These cases on subdivision plats are distinguishable. Moreover, the presumption that an owner of a lot abutting a street owns to the center of the street will not prevail over clear language in a deed showing contrary intent.7 The Appellants claim to be the successors in title of landowners whose land was subject to an easement for a railroad right of way. But the Appellants in the present case cannot be equated to purchasers who took title to land subject to an easement for a street or road for the benefit of the public whose land was later unburdened due to the discontinuation or abandonment of the street or road easement. The Appellants’ predecessors were the grantors, and if they intended to grant only easements their deeds would have said so. The record shows that the claimants’ predecessors in title did not grant mere easements to the railroad while retaining title to the land underlying the easements. It shows instead that the owners sold 7. We need not discuss whether or to what extent this “center line presumption” rule still applies to property adjacent to streets and highways in Florida today. We hold that it has no application in this case. - 21 - their land to the railroad and conveyed to it fee simple title. We therefore find that the decisions Appellants cite in support of their “strips and gores” argument are inapplicable to this case. We answer the second part of the question by holding that no policy of the State of Florida limits the railroad’s interest in the property regardless of the language of the deed.