Opinion ID: 379127
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Heading: Failure to Obtain a Search Warrant

Text: 16 Defendants also contend that the heroin should have been excluded because the search of Vargus' car was made without a warrant. We find that, under the circumstances that existed when the search was made, no warrant was required. 17 Because automobiles are extensively regulated by the state, are in large part open to public view, and are primarily used for purposes of transportation and not for the storage of personal effects, the reasonable expectation of privacy that persons may have in their autos is usually of a lesser magnitude than privacy expectations that inhere in other types of property. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2591, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2469, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality opinion); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2542, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). This lessened expectation of privacy, when coupled with the fact that the inherent mobility of an automobile often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant before the automobile and its contents are removed or hidden, has resulted in the doctrine that the search of an automobile is often permissible despite the fact that no warrant has been obtained. Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285; see Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, 442 U.S. at 759, 99 S.Ct. at 2591; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2034, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1980, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). The need to proceed without a warrant is strikingly present where the automobile's owner is alerted to police intentions and, as a consequence, the motivation to remove evidence from official grasp is heightened. Cardwell v. Lewis, supra, 417 U.S. at 590, 94 S.Ct. at 2469 (plurality opinion); see Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S. at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981. When faced with such exigent circumstances, there is, (f)or constitutional purposes, . . . no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981; see Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68, 96 S.Ct. 304, 305, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975) (per curiam). 18 In the instant case, the car itself 3 and the tow truck to which it was attached were mobile. Defendants Vargus and Garza, as well as tow truck driver Chavez, were alerted to police intentions by the actions of the DEA agents and the arrival of uniformed Chicago police. To assure that the car itself and the evidence believed to be in it would not be removed or destroyed, it was necessary either to search the car immediately or to seize it until a warrant could be obtained. As probable cause to search was present, Chambers v. Maroney, supra, indicates that either course would have been reasonable; the decision to search the car without a warrant did not, therefore, violate the Fourth Amendment. 19 We note also that Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, in which the Supreme Court invalidated the search of an automobile conducted without a warrant, listed five factors not present in that case that might justify a warrantless search of an automobile. These factors are the presence of an alerted criminal bent on flight, the presence of a fleeting opportunity on an open highway to search, the fact that the object of the search is contraband or stolen goods or weapons, the presence of confederates waiting to move the evidence, and the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the immobilized automobile. 403 U.S. at 462, 91 S.Ct. at 2035-2036. Four of these factors are obviously satisfied in the case at bar, and the fifth, the fleeting opportunity to search on an open highway, is satisfied except to the extent that the car was stopped in a service station and not on the highway. We do not think this slight deviation from the Coolidge factors invalidates the search. Cf. Texas v. White, supra. 20 The defendants have argued, however, that DEA agents had ample opportunity to obtain a warrant while the Buick was stationary in the shopping center parking lot. Even if we were to assume that probable cause existed when the car was parked in the parking lot, we agree with the statement made by the plurality in Cardwell v. Lewis, supra: 21 (W)e know of no case or principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are foreclosed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable moment. Exigent circumstances with regard to vehicles are not limited to situations where probable cause is unforeseeable and arises only at the time of arrest. . . . The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action. 22 417 U.S. at 595-96, 94 S.Ct. at 2472 (citation omitted). The soundness of this view is apparent when it is considered that a contrary view would force police to seek warrants before they are certain that probable cause is present in order to be sure that they had acted at the first practicable moment. Moreover, a warrant obtained too early may become stale before it can be used, and the necessity of obtaining a warrant before the time is ripe for action would require that police direct their energies toward what may prove a fruitless procedure when those energies might better be spent in the investigation of the case. The Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness imposes no such restriction on police investigative activities. Accordingly, the warrantless search of the automobile was constitutional, and the heroin was properly admitted into evidence at trial.