Opinion ID: 3052302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inception

Text: For a T.L.O. search2 to be reasonable, it must be justified at its inception and reasonable in its scope. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. Generally, such a search will be “ ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.” Id. at 342. Following the lead of the Second and Seventh Circuits, the majority holds that the level of suspicion required for a search to be justified at its inception varies with the intrusiveness of the search. Majority at 8436–37 (citing Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 2006); Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. 2 Hereafter, this dissent refers to a public school official’s search of a student that is based on individualized suspicion as a “T.L.O. search.” Such a search can be distinguished from an “Acton search” in which school officials conduct a systematic search without any individualized suspicion, and for which courts (should) use a different balancing test. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (distinguishing T.L.O. because the search approved in that case, “while not based on probable cause, was based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing”); see also Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 261 F.3d 1160, 1166–68 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining the distinction between the two types of searches), vacated, 536 U.S. 953 (2002), reinstated, 323 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2003). But see Brannum v. Overton County Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 495 (6th Cir. 2008) (conflating the two types of searches and applying the T.L.O. two-step test to evaluate suspicionless use of video surveillance in school locker rooms). 8464 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993)). This holding finds no support in the text or reasoning of T.L.O., and it is by no means certain that the Supreme Court would approve.3 Cf. 5 Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 10.11, at 501 (4th ed. 2004) (noting with regret that “the reasonable suspicion test of [T.L.O.] is nowhere confined to searches of only limited intrusiveness”). I see the searches in T.L.O. somewhat differently than the majority. That case did not define those two searches by their level of intrusiveness; the searches were discrete because objects from unrelated infractions were sought. Had the Court employed the majority’s standard, it might have said that the case involved a first search—opening and peering into the 3 It may be simpler to analyze the intrusiveness of the search under the “scope” prong of the T.L.O. inquiry. This would allow the two T.L.O. prongs to be meaningfully distinct. The “justified at its inception” prong would inquire whether, based on all the circumstances, officials have a reasonable suspicion “that the particular individual being [searched] is engaged in wrongdoing.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Gould Dissent at 8454. The “reasonable in scope” prong, by contrast, would focus on the nature and intrusiveness of the search, including the locations (such as underwear) that officials searched for evidence. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682–83, 686 (1985) (holding that law enforcement officers’ decision to pull over specific vehicles on suspicion of drug trafficking was clearly justified at its inception based on those vehicles’ characteristics and driving patterns; analyzing whether investigative stop was “too long in duration” under the reasonably-related-in-scope prong). For example, a tip that “Redding is hiding stolen cash” would justify at its inception a decision to conduct some form of search of Redding because it created a reasonable suspicion that she, as opposed to someone else, was engaging in prohibited conduct. That tip alone, however, might be insufficient to permit a particularly intrusive search. By contrast, a tip that “some student hid stolen cash in her bra” would not justify at its inception a search of Redding because it gave no indication that she was hiding cash in her bra. Once officials gathered additional information that indicated Redding was the one with the cash, then a search of the bra would likely be reasonable in scope because of the specific information in the tip. REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8465 purse—providing suspicion that gave rise to the second search —rummaging through the purse. Instead, the Court explained that the case “involved two separate searches, with the first— the search for cigarettes—providing the suspicion that gave rise to the second—the search for marihuana.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343–44. Looking at the facts of T.L.O., it is not difficult to determine why the Court identified the two searches in this way. When T.L.O. was first presented to the assistant vice principal, she was suspected only of violating the school’s cigarette smoking policy. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. Once those cigarettes were found, it would have been unreasonable to continue searching T.L.O.’s purse for evidence of other wrongdoing, absent some newly discovered grounds for suspicion. This would be true even if the further search was less intrusive.4 It was therefore sensible to identify the initial search for cigarettes as a single, limited search. Because rolling papers were found during the cigarette search, though, the assistant vice principal had reasonable suspicion justifying a second search—whether more or less intrusive. Further, nothing in T.L.O. suggests that the assistant vice principal would not have been able to rummage through T.L.O.’s purse looking for cigarettes if they had not happened to be in sight when the purse was opened. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how the search for marijuana in the main compartment of the purse was meaningfully more intrusive than the search for cigarettes.5 4 See infra note 17 and accompanying text. 5 When, in the midst of looking for evidence of marijuana trafficking, the assistant vice principal read some letters he found in T.L.O.’s purse, he arguably conducted a more intrusive search than when he merely opened and looked into the purse for cigarettes. The Court’s opinion indicates, though, that it was the further search of the purse—and not the reading of the letters—that marked the beginning of the second search. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347 (“The discovery of the rolling papers concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T. L. O. was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse. This suspicion justified further exploration of T.L.O.’s purse . . . .”). 8466 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 A final point on T.L.O.: If the majority is correct, then the Supreme Court erroneously stated that there were only two searches. After all, if opening and looking into a purse is one search, and looking further into the purse is a second, then surely the search of a separate zippered purse compartment would have been a third, and the reading of letters discovered therein would have a been a fourth. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347. Although the Supreme Court expressly considered the argument that the school official unreasonably read those letters, it did not identify that act, which was the most intrusive, as a separate search.6 Id. And we can fairly assume the reason it did not: Imagine how burdensome it would be for courts to conduct the two-step T.L.O. inquiry for every component of a search. If the majority faithfully applied its own standard, it would have separately analyzed each increasingly intrusive step in today’s search—(1) opening Redding’s backpack and peering inside, (2) subsequently rummaging in the backpack, (3) removing Redding’s shoes and peering inside, (4) reaching into the shoes, and so on with respect to Redding’s socks, pants, and shirt. So much for “spari[ing] teachers and school administrators the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause.” Id. at 343. School officials may find themselves having to contend with a “reasonable suspicion” doctrine that is becoming more complex than the probable cause doctrine rejected by T.L.O. 6 The Court did consider, though, whether “the scope of the search [for marijuana] . . . exceeded permissible bounds when [the official] seized and read” the letters. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347. The Court held that all the other evidence of marijuana trafficking found in the purse “was substantial enough to justify [the official] in examining the letters.” Id. By framing the issue as the “scope of the search,” it seems fairly clear that the Court was deciding whether the search for marijuana was “permissible in its scope,” and not whether the reading of the letters was “justified at its inception.” REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8467 All that said, because the search appears justified at its inception even under the majority’s standard, this dissent will assume that the majority is correct and that a heightened level of suspicion was required to justify this particular search of Redding. Even under the majority’s sliding scale approach, though, school officials would be able to proceed with searches on something less than probable cause, even for highly intrusive searches.7 Reasonable suspicion has been defined as “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, and probable cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Ornelas v. 7 The majority’s sliding scale approach is much like Justice Stevens’ preferred school search standard. In his T.L.O. dissent, Justice Stevens argued that school searches should only be permitted when there is reasonable suspicion that those searches would “uncover evidence that the student is violating the law or engaging in conduct that is seriously disruptive of school order, or the educational process.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 378 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Whereas today’s majority looks to the degree of the search’s intrusiveness to determine how much suspicion is required, Justice Stevens would have “varie[d] the extent of the permissible intrusion with the gravity of the suspected offense.” Id. at 379. Both standards would, in their own way, prohibit searches that “ ‘display[ ] a shocking lack of all sense of proportion.’ ” Id. at 380 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The T.L.O. majority explicitly rejected Justice Stevens’ standard because it would intrude too much upon school officials’ “comprehensive authority . . . to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” 469 U.S. at 342 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s insistence on a reasonable suspicion standard for searches that follow the most trivial infractions does not necessarily mean that the Court would reject a probable cause standard for the most intrusive searches. But I do think that our adoption of a probable cause standard for highly intrusive searches would violate the tenor of T.L.O. and create significant tension with that authority, and we should, therefore, prudently abjure such a rule absent a contrary indication from the Supreme Court. 8468 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because these are “fluid concepts,” and not “finely-tuned standards” that are “readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules,” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695–96 (internal quotation marks omitted), attempting to distinguish between a high level of reasonable suspicion and probable cause may be something of a fool’s errand. Nevertheless, we must not demand that school officials present too much independently corroborated evidence from unquestionably reliable sources; we must ensure that even highly intrusive searches do not stand or fall on the presence of probable cause.8 Under the reasonable suspicion standard, our goal is to ensure that Kerry Wilson, Helen Romero, and Peggy Schwallier (collectively, the Safford Officials) were not acting on the basis of “an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” but rather on “the sort of common-sense conclusio[n] about human behavior upon which practical people— including government officials—are entitled to rely.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). Based on the record evidence, the Safford Officials possessed sufficient information to reasonably suspect Redding of possessing prescription-strength ibuprofen. Although Redding had no disciplinary record, there was reason to suspect that she had violated Arizona’s law regarding possession and consumption of spiritous liquor by a per- 8 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (explaining that school officials’ ability to respond swiftly would not “be possible if a teacher could not conduct a necessary search until the teacher thought there was probable cause for the search. A teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause”). REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8469 son under the legal drinking age just a few months before the October search. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4-101(18) (“ ‘Legal drinking age’ means twenty-one years of age or older.”); id. § 4-244(9) (providing that it is unlawful “for a person under the legal drinking age to buy, receive, have in the person’s possession or consume spiritous liquor”). At the August school dance, “several staff members noticed some unusually rowdy behavior from a small group of students, including Marissa . . . and Savana Redding,” and a bottle of alcohol and a pack of cigarettes were found in the girls’ bathroom. The majority points out that the staff found no specific link between Redding and the bottle, Majority at 8427, but there is undisputed testimony that the staff detected the smell of alcohol among Redding’s small group. A week before Redding’s search, Principal Robert Beeman and Assistant Principal Wilson sat down to meet with Jordan and his mother at her request. Jordan’s mother reported that he had become violent with her and sick to his stomach a few nights earlier, and Jordan explained that this occurred after he ingested some pills that he received from a classmate. He also advised the administrators that students were bringing weapons and drugs onto school grounds. As the meeting progressed, Jordan provided Beeman (Wilson had left the meeting) with “very detailed accounts regarding several students’ activities,” including Marissa and Redding. Jordan reported that Redding had hosted a party in her camper trailer before the August dance, and that she had served alcohol—“Jack Daniel’s, Black Velvet, vodka, and tequila”—that her mother had purchased. After the meeting, Beeman relayed the information to Wilson. We can pause at this point and review the evidentiary picture from the perspective of a reasonable school official. The eighth graders’ school year began inauspiciously when staff noticed signs of illegal alcohol consumption at the school 8470 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 dance. With Jordan’s report, the situation was ripening into something much more dangerous—the presence of drugs and weapons on campus. The description of Jordan’s reaction to his pill ingestion would have recalled to a reasonable school official’s mind an incident several years before in which a Safford Middle School student brought prescription pills to school and distributed them. In that incident, a student who took that drug had to be airlifted to an intensive care unit and almost died. While Redding’s role in all this was somewhat unclear at this point, certainly Jordan’s account of the pre-dance party, coupled with the staff’s report from that dance, supported a reasonable suspicion that Redding had been illegally serving and consuming alcohol less than a month and a half earlier. Further, the staff’s report suggested that Redding and Marissa were, to some extent, partners in this mischief.9 Although we accept as true Redding’s testimony that she did not serve or consume alcohol that night and that Jordan did not attend her party, there is no evidence that this was ever communicated to any official at Safford Middle School. To justify a reasonable suspicion, the officers’ factual determinations were not required to be correct, but only reasonable given the facts known to them. See Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Hartz, 458 F.3d 1011, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir. 1994). 9 When Beeman followed up with Redding’s mother, she “simply dismissed the account by saying that Savana would not have been involved.” The majority seems to give full credit to this statement. Majority at 8441. Based on Beeman’s affidavit, one can infer that Redding’s mother lacked personal knowledge of the party, given that she said that Redding “would not have been involved,” instead of “was not involved.” In light of this, one might question whether her denial should have carried much weight with the school officials in light of the mutually reinforcing observations of disinterested witnesses. REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8471 One week after the meeting with Jordan and his mother, Wilson was confronted with hard evidence that drugs were indeed on campus. On the morning of October 8, Jordan went to see Wilson and handed him a pill that he had just received from Marissa. According to Jordan, there were additional pills in the school that some students were planning on taking at lunch.10 Wilson consulted with Schwallier, the school nurse, who told him that the pill was Ibuprofen 400 mg, which could be obtained only with a prescription. Wilson called Marissa out of class and asked her to accompany him. As Marissa stood up, Wilson noticed a planner in the desk next to her and asked the classroom teacher to determine its owner. The teacher discovered several knives and lighters, a cigarette, and a permanent marker inside the planner, and shared this information with Wilson. Arriving at his office with Marissa and the planner, Wilson asked Romero, an administrative assistant, to observe as Marissa turned out her pockets and opened her wallet. Marissa complied, producing a blue pill (later discovered to be Naprosyn 200 mg), several pills identical to the one Jordan had possessed, and a razor blade. According to Wilson’s affidavit, the following exchange took place: “[Wilson] asked Marissa where the blue pill came from. Marissa responded, ‘I guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.’ [Wilson] asked ‘who is she?’ Marissa responded ‘Savana Redding.’ ” Wilson asked Marissa about the planner, and she denied 10 The majority points out that “the information provided by Jordan link- [ed] Marissa alone to the ibuprofen.” Majority at 8441. This is correct in that Jordan only specifically identified Marissa. To be clear, though, Jordan told Wilson that other students were planning on taking pills, so Wilson could have reasonably believed that students other than Marissa were in possession of pills. 8472 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 any knowledge of it and its contents. A subsequent search of Marissa conducted by Nurse Schwallier and Romero failed to produce any more pills. At this point, one can conclude that Wilson had sufficient evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that Redding had prescription-strength ibuprofen, Naprosyn, and possibly other drugs.11 Marissa expressly identified Redding as the supplier, and there was nothing to suggest that this was not true. The majority views Marissa’s statement with extraordinary skepticism. We are told that Marissa, a “frightened” girl, Majority at 8439, was “attempt[ing] to shift the school officials’ focus off herself,” Majority at 8429, with a “selfserving,” “self-exculpatory” explanation, Majority at 8439. Wilson’s affidavit is the only discussion in the record of Marissa’s behavior during the meeting.12 Notably absent from that discussion is any indication that Marissa was frightened. And the statement can hardly be characterized as exculpatory because it in no way reduced Marissa’s guilt; regardless of whether she brought the pills from home or received them from Redding, Marissa was caught with them in her possession and was known to have distributed one to Jordan. The only way the statement would be self-serving is if it somehow furthered Marissa’s interests. There is no evidence that she had any ulterior motive for implicating Redding, or that she would face a reduced punishment for cooperating. If, 11 Based on Marissa’s statement, one could reasonably speculate whether Redding possessed pills other than Naprosyn and ibuprofen. This is because Marissa suggested that Redding had only intended to give her ibuprofen, and that the Naprosyn had inadvertently “slipped in.” If Redding had possessed Naprosyn without intending to share it that morning with Marissa, it was an open question what other pills she may have had that were withheld from Marissa. 12 Romero’s affidavit also discusses Marissa’s statement, but it is identical to the language in Wilson’s affidavit. REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8473 for example, Marissa was facing a suspension for possession and distribution of the pills, there is no reason to believe that she would have escaped that punishment simply by naming her source. And even if Marissa did think she was helping herself out by blaming Redding, nothing put Wilson on notice that Marissa held such a belief. Further, even if we should assume that Marissa would have believed that there would be a quid pro quo for naming her source, it is difficult to see why Wilson should have suspected Marissa was lying. If Marissa knew that Redding actually had no pills, she also would have known that a search would have turned up nothing. A fruitless search that wasted Wilson’s time may have temporarily shifted the focus off of Marissa, but Marissa should not have thought that it would abate her inevitable punishment. Of course, the situation could be different if there were evidence that Marissa had been induced or intimidated into naming Redding. Had Wilson pressured Marissa into supplying other students’ names, one might wonder whether she had been making up a story simply to please him. Similarly, had Wilson suggested to Marissa that he suspected Redding—for example, “Honestly, Marissa, it was Savana who gave you the pills, wasn’t it?”—one might think Marissa was simply telling Wilson what he wanted to hear. According to the undisputed testimony, however, none of these circumstances were present. In spite of all the objections that the majority raises to Wilson’s reasoning, his suspicion of Redding simply does not appear to be “the product of a volatile or inventive imagination,” or a pretext for “an act of harassment.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). Because it was reasonable to conclude that Redding brought pills to school that morning, “it is irrelevant that other hypotheses”—including the hypothesis that Marissa was lying—“were also consistent with [Marissa’s] accusation.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 346. 8474 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 Returning to the events, Wilson’s immediate response to Marissa’s tip was sensible. He told Redding to leave her classroom and to bring her books and backpack with her. They returned to his office, where Wilson asked Redding whether she knew anything about the planner and the pills sitting on his desk. Redding admitted that the planner was hers and informed Wilson that she had lent the planner to Marissa a few days earlier. Like Marissa, however, she denied ownership of any of its contents. She also stated that she had never brought any prescription pills to school and that she had never distributed pills to other Safford students. Wilson asked Redding if he could search her “stuff,” and Redding consented. Romero was called in to assist, and a search of Redding’s backpack turned up nothing. Wilson now had to decide whether a further search of Redding was called for. Nothing in his exchange with Redding cast doubt on Marissa’s story. Nor did Redding offer any reason why another student would falsely accuse her. The meeting, in other words, failed to produce any information that should have removed Wilson’s reasonable suspicion. Indeed, information uncovered at the meeting actually increased the likelihood that Redding had supplied Marissa with the pills. By conceding that she had lent Marissa the planner, Redding established a crucial link between the two girls, enabling Wilson to reasonably conclude that Redding and Marissa were friends. The majority rejects this reasoning, asserting that Redding’s lending of the planner “does not make it significantly more likely that Savana had anything to do with the pills carried in Marissa’s pockets.” Majority at 8441. This is the “crabbed notion of reasonableness” that the T.L.O. Court rejected. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343. REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8475 [I]t is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse- quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at 345 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401). To be sure, the planner was only circumstantial evidence of Redding’s pill distribution, for it did no more than establish that there was a relationship between Marissa and Redding. Wilson had reason to believe Marissa and Redding were friends from the reports of their behavior at the school dance, and the planner corroborated that. Although the planner was not direct evidence of pill possession, common sense suggests that it is significantly more likely an eighth grader will receive contraband from a classmate who has lent her personal items than from someone with whom she has hardly any relationship at all. This does not suggest that the planner independently justified the search, and it is certainly not “guilt-byassociation.” Majority at 8441. If anything, it is “guilt” (or, more accurately, suspicion) by direct accusation and circumstantial corroboration. Redding’s denial itself deserves little weight.13 Everything the majority says to impugn Marissa applies with greater force to Redding, since her statement was truly exculpatory and wholly self-serving. See, e.g., Majority at 8439-40 (viewing skeptically “the self-serving statement of a cornered teenager facing significant punishment”). The majority would credit Redding over Marissa in this 13 Obviously, a confession by Redding would have conclusively established reasonable suspicion, so the absence of a confession is in that sense meaningful. 8476 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 “she said, she said” contest because Marissa’s “compounding number of school rule violations”—the objects concealed in the planner—should have left Wilson incredulous. Majority at 8441. Wilson, however, did not know that those objects belonged to Marissa, and not Redding. While both girls denied knowledge of the planner’s contents, Redding admitted to owning the planner. Although it would be perfectly reasonable for Wilson to surmise that Marissa placed the contraband in the planner without Redding’s knowledge, he could not be sure that Redding had not given Marissa the planner with those items in it. Redding’s discipline-free record is of limited probative value in light of the strong signs that she had recently been drinking liquor and serving it to her classmates. And, unless we think that the Fourth Amendment gives greater protection to good test takers, there is only so much weight we can give to Redding’s honor-student status. We are told that “Wilson should have conducted additional investigation to corroborate Marissa’s ‘tip’ ” before ordering an intrusive search—he could have had a discussion with Redding’s teachers, her parents, and other students. Majority at 8440. Although these options may be desirable in other contexts, they disregard the special needs of the school environment that were articulated in T.L.O. Pulling teachers and students out of class to question them about Redding’s behavior would be extraordinarily disruptive to the educational environment. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education.”). If Wilson had information that suggested specific students or teachers had knowledge relating to Marissa and Redding, then it may have been prudent to question those individuals. But REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 8477 without any specific leads, it would seem incredibly burdensome to require that Wilson conduct a full-scale investigation, speaking to every student and teacher, simply to corroborate Marissa’s tip.14 Cf. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837 (noting that a regime of individualized suspicion “place[s] an additional burden on public school teachers who are already tasked with the difficult job of maintaining order and discipline”). Moreover, these hypothetical investigations appear designed to amass enough evidence to supply Wilson with probable cause. If Wilson had lacked a specific tip from Marissa, then it would have been necessary for him to marshal a good deal of circumstantial evidence to justify the search of Redding. As it stands, though, it is hard to imagine what sort of additional evidence Wilson could have received that would supply him with a level of reasonable suspicion that was less than probable cause. Both the majority and this dissent discuss at length whether this search was justified at its inception. It is certainly a scenario about which entirely reasonable minds can differ. In scrutinizing this particular search, though, we should not lose sight of an important point: Today’s justified-at-its-inception holding is not limited to searches for ibuprofen. Had Marissa been caught with uncut cocaine or bullets for a small-caliber 14 Discussions with Redding’s parents certainly would have shown a level of respect for them and Redding, and their presence would have likely alleviated some of the stress and anxiety that Redding may have been feeling. For those reasons, we can encourage school officials to show compassion by involving parents in the searching and questioning of students. As a means of furthering the Redding investigation, though, discussions with Redding’s parents would have likely provided little useful information. Had Redding admitted to having the pills, but insisted that she had a legitimate reason for bringing them on campus (and handing them to Marissa), her parents may have been able to corroborate her story. But Redding insisted that she brought no pills to school, and unless her parents had searched her and her belongings that morning, it is difficult to envision what information they could offer to negate Wilson’s reasonable suspicion. 8478 REDDING v. SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 handgun, the analysis would necessarily be the same. Although the “nature of the infraction” is relevant to the overall reasonableness inquiry, T.L.O. makes clear that the infraction is relevant only to the “scope” analysis; it has no bearing on the quantum of suspicion necessary to justify a search. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42 & n.9. And, in today’s educational environment, students do bring guns and drugs into their classrooms.