Opinion ID: 2013396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: from established precedent to the new standard

Text: ¶ 61. The majority rejects the distinction between the two exceptions and collapses the known danger exception into the ministerial duty exception. It does so by departing from the has no discretion not to act standard associated with the known danger exception and replacing that standard with its own new standard. The majority makes three leaps in the law of public officer immunity to accomplish this transformation. These leaps are contrary to precedent and without authority. ¶ 62. As a first leap, the majority begins the process of collapsing one exception into the other by questioning whether the ministerial duty exception is itself a distinct exception to immunity. The majority makes this announcement: The ministerial duty exception is not so much an exception as a recognition that immunity law distinguishes between discretionary and ministerial acts, immunizing the performance of the former but not the latter. See Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 91. Majority op. at ¶ 25. ¶ 63. Although the majority is correct that Kierstyn states that the law has drawn a distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts, 228 Wis. 2d at 91, the majority is incorrect in citing Kierstyn (or any authority) for the proposition that the performance of ministerial acts is not actually an exception to immunity. Our precedent, including Kierstyn, clearly states the contrary. Willow Creek, 2000 WI 56, ¶ 26 ([t]his court has recognized four exceptions ... (1) ministerial duties ...); Kierstyn, 228 Wis. 2d at 90 (this court has recognized four exceptions to public officer immunity); Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 10 (doctrine of immunity is not without exception, however, the most common of which is ... ministerial duty). ¶ 64. The second leap the majority makes is to graft the time, mode and occasion test of the ministerial duty exception onto the known danger exception. Citing C.L., the majority explains that the known danger must be of such force that the time, mode and occasion for performance is evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and discretion. Majority op. at ¶ 38. However, when C.L. cited Cords for this proposition, it did so incorrectly. Cords, which left it to the park manager's discretion to either post signs indicating the danger or inform his superiors, cannot be read for this proposition that C.L. attributes to it. Indeed, elsewhere in C.L., the court correctly recognized that the time, mode and occasion test of the ministerial duty exception does not apply to the known danger exception. 143 Wis. 2d at 715. ¶ 65. Finally, in the third leap, the majority magnifies C.L. `s erroneous citation to Cords by concluding, without citation to authority, that for the known danger exception to apply, the danger must be such that a self-evident, particularized, and non-discretionary action is required and that [t]he focus is on the specific act the public officer or official is alleged to have negligently performed or omitted. Majority op. at ¶ 40 (emphasis added). Thus, the majority requires a level of particularity heretofore unknown and accomplishes the collapse of the known danger exception into the ministerial duty exception. ¶ 66. The crux of the majority's rationale for transforming the has no discretion not to act standard into a new standard appears in a footnote, again, without citation to authority: We acknowledge that there is language in some of the cases referring generally to a duty to act instead of a duty to perform a particular act.... Despite the sometimes generalized language, the cases finding a known danger sufficient to pierce immunity are premised on conclusions that particularized government responses were required by the dangerous circumstances in question. Majority op. at ¶ 44 n. 7. ¶ 67. The final effect of the majority's analysis is to eliminate the known danger exception as envisioned by Cords and subsequent precedent. The majority opinion renders essentially meaningless the case law's distinction between the known danger exception and the ministerial duty exception. ¶ 68. That the majority is eliminating one of the recognized exceptions to immunity is underscored by an application of its new standard to the facts of Cords. Was the park manager's duty to either post signs or inform his superiors sufficiently particularized for the majority test? It seems that the answer may be no. Was the manager's duty one whose time, mode and occasion for performance is evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and discretion? Again, the answer seems to be no. What was the specific act in Cords that the manager negligently performed or omitted? Was it the failure to inform his superiors or the failure to post signs? ¶ 69. Cords shows that the degree of particularity the majority requires before the known danger exception will apply is too particular. It seems that under the majority analysis here, the result in Cords would have come out differently. ¶ 70. In addition, the majority's new conception of the known danger exception requiring a particularized specific act has uncertain consequences. Most importantly, by eliminating one of four exceptions to immunity, it expands immunity. However, there may be other consequences as well, and the majority's approach leaves fundamental questions unanswered in the pleading and practice of cases involving public officer immunity. ¶ 71. For example, how must plaintiffs plead and assert the known danger exception in order to survive motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment? At what stage must a plaintiff first identify the particularized specific act required of the defendant? What if the plaintiff identifies one specific act (for example, manual traffic control), but it turns out that it was a different specific act that was required in the face of the known danger? Does the plaintiff have the burden to show which specific act was required, or does the defendant have the burden to show that no specific act was required? ¶ 72. Unlike the majority, I apply the known danger exception as it exists in our precedent, and in doing so, I reach the same conclusion as the court of appeals. The situation herea failed traffic light that left a high-speed intersection uncontrolled during a nighttime stormis a known danger. I also agree with the court of appeals that this danger is not unlike the danger presented by a path open for night-time hiking that runs within inches of a precipitous drop into a gorge. Finally, as the court of appeals determined, summary judgment was granted improperly because the question of whether Officer Fredericks took action when confronted with a known danger hinges upon the resolution of genuinely disputed questions of fact. ¶ 73. In sum, I cannot join the majority opinion because it eliminates the known danger exception as a distinct exception to immunity. Rejecting precedent, the majority equates the two exceptions, then adds a new specific act requirement. Like the court of appeals, I would apply the known danger exception as it existed in our precedent until today. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.