Opinion ID: 2789949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Admission and Finding of Malice

Text: Petitioners urge this Court to “avoid the constitutional clash” purportedly created by the application of the LGTCA in this case, and hold the County liable “as it has multiple times represented it is.” Petitioners aver that the County’s opening statement before the jury, in which counsel explained that “if the plaintiffs’ theory is true about Officer Jackson . . . then Prince George’s County is going to be [liable] for it” is judicially binding on the County. Essentially, Petitioners contend that because the County said it would be liable for Jackson’s conduct, the County must now pay the entire amount awarded in favor of the Espinas. Petitioners’ argument is devoid of any merit. The County correctly realized that, in accordance with the LGTCA, it would be liable for Jackson’s conduct committed within the scope of employment. Having stipulated to the scope of employment, the County knew it 35 would be liable up to the limit imposed by the LGTCA upon a verdict against Jackson and the County. We decline the invitation to take counsel’s opening remarks as binding the County to the entirety of a then-unknown multimillion dollar verdict. We also address Petitioners’ apparent confusion over two related concepts: “scope of employment” and “malice.” Under the LGTCA, a local government is required to defend and indemnify, up to certain limits, its employees acting within the scope of employment. CJP § 5-302(a) (“Each local government shall provide for its employees a legal defense in any action that alleges damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by an employee within the scope of employment[.]”) (emphasis added); CJP § 5-303(b)(1) (“[A] local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment[.]”) (emphasis added). In other words, whether the employee acts within the scope of employment is the lynchpin of the local government’s liability. Petitioners appear to suggest that the local government’s liability is dependent upon the employee’s malice or lack thereof. This is plainly incorrect. If the employee acts with malice, the employee is also liable. CJP § 5-302(b)(2) (“(i) An employee shall be fully liable for all damages awarded in an action in which it is found that the employee acted with actual malice. (ii) In such circumstances the judgment may be executed against the employee and the local government may seek indemnification for any sums it is required to pay[.]”) (emphasis added). In other words, theoretically, Petitioners may (1) enforce the judgment entered 36 against the County, up to the limit imposed by the LGTCA because it stipulated that Jackson acted within the scope of his employment, and (2) enforce the judgment entered against Jackson in its entirety, less any amount the County pays, because he acted with malice.