Opinion ID: 1057580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Propriety of Mr. Henretta's Transfer From Leavenworth

Text: The next questions presented for our review pertain to the means by which Mr. Henretta was transferred from Leavenworth to the Bradley County jail for arraignment in 1997. By letter dated August 26, 1997, Assistant Attorney General Sandra Donaghy advised the Records Office at Leavenworth that indictments were pending against Mr. Henretta in Bradley County and that temporary custody is needed for service of process and disposition of the charges pending against him. The letter further states that this temporary custody is being sought through Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum. The letter requests that Bradley County be allowed to assume custody of Mr. Henretta on October 3, 1997. This letter was accompanied by a document entitled WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD PROSEQUENDUM entered by the trial court on August 28, 1997, and addressed to Mr. Henretta; Bradley County Sheriff Dan Gilley; and the Records Office at Leavenworth. The document recites that the trial court has been advised that Leavenworth and the Attorney General's Office have agreed to honor this Writ of Habeas [C]orpus Ad Prosequendum and that arrangements have been made between [Leavenworth] and the Bradley County Sheriffs Department for the latter to take custody of Mr. Henretta. The document orders the Bradley County Sheriff's Department to take temporary custody of Mr. Henretta at Leavenworth and, thereafter, to bring him before the trial court for purposes of service of process and disposition of pending charges. The letter was also accompanied by an August 28, 1997, order directing the trial court clerk to issue the writ of habeas corpus prosequendum to Sheriff Gilley to receive Mr. Henretta into custody and bring him before the trial court. The record shows that in accordance with these documents, Leavenworth temporarily relinquished custody of Mr. Henretta to Bradley County officials on or about October 3, 1997; that he was incarcerated in the Bradley County jail for one month, during which time he was arraigned on the charges in this case; and that he was transferred back to Leavenworth on or about November 5, 1997. Mr. Henretta contends that the letter from Assistant Attorney General Donaghy, the document designated to be a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and the associated order addressed to the trial court clerk collectively constituted a detainer. Consequently, Mr. Henretta argues, the transfer of custody to Tennessee authorities was subject to the Interstate Compact on Detainers (the Compact), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections XX-XX-XXX to -108 (2006). The Compact is an agreement among the states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the United States, see Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985), which, through cooperative procedures, seeks to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of ... charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-31-101, art. I. The so-called anti-shuttling provision of the Compact provides as follows: If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Id. § 40-31-101, art. IV(e). Mr. Henretta argues that the charges against him should have been dismissed pursuant to this provision because he was returned to Leavenworth without having been tried. The State contends, in accordance with the ruling of the Court of Criminal Appeals, that Mr. Henretta was transferred pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum not subject to the Compact. In support of his contention that he was transferred from Leavenworth by detainer, Mr. Henretta cites State v. Moore, 774 S.W.2d 590 (Tenn. 1989). In that case, the defendant pled guilty to multiple counts of a presentment returned against her in Tennessee, charging her with various offenses, including forgery and passing forged checks. She reserved the question of whether the charges should be dismissed upon the ground that the State had violated Article III of the Compact, which provides in pertinent part as follows: Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, the person shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after having been caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of the person's imprisonment and request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint. ... Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-31-101, art. III(a). A warrant for the arrest of the defendant was issued by Tennessee officials in October of 1982; however, it was never served and no action was taken until May 1985 when Tennessee officials learned that she was incarcerated in Florida. Tennessee officials then sent Florida prison officials a certified copy of the warrant and a cover letter requesting that the warrant be placed as a detainer against her. Before receipt of this request, Florida officials had received similar requests from Indiana and other states. Florida officials notified the defendant of the pending Tennessee charges, and, on August 21, 1985, the defendant executed documentation requesting a final disposition of the Tennessee charges. However, this and other detainer forms were not sent to Tennessee until May 23, 1986, after the defendant was tried and convicted of charges also pending in Indiana. Consequently, Tennessee officials did not learn of her request for final disposition of the Tennessee charges until receipt of the detainer forms from Florida on June 2, 1986. On June 26, 1986, the defendant permanently left the custody of Florida and was transferred to Indiana to begin serving her sentence there. After her transfer to Indiana, Tennessee obtained custody of the defendant under Article IV of the Compact, and the charges against her in Tennessee were properly disposed of in accord with Article IV of the Compact. Upon review, we found no merit in the defendant's argument that the 180-day period for disposition of the Tennessee charges following her request commenced on August 21, 1985, the day she signed the request, and that by the time Tennessee officials were notified of her execution of this request, the 180 day period had already expired. Instead, we determined that it is the prisoner's responsibility and burden to give notice of a request for disposition of charges under Article III, and [t]he receiving state cannot be charged with the burden of requesting or compelling temporary custody from the sending state until it has received notice that the prisoner has made his or her request. Moore, 774 S.W.2d at 594. In arriving at our decision in Moore, we discussed whether an unserved arrest warrant, as was implemented in that case, would trigger the provisions of the Compact. Acknowledging that the Compact itself contains no definition of detainer, we observed that detainer has been defined by the federal courts on various occasions. Id. at 596-97. In United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court observed that House and Senate reports related to the Compact explain that [a] detainer is a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction. (internal quotation omitted) (alteration in original). In Carchman v. Nash , detainer was defined as a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent. 473 U.S. at 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401. And in United States v. Dixon, 592 F.2d 329, 332 n. 3 (6th Cir.1979), the Sixth Circuit presented the following definition of detainer: A detainer is simply a notice filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that the prisoner is wanted to face pending criminal charges elsewhere, and requesting the custodian to notify the filing jurisdiction prior to releasing the prisoner. Filing a detainer is an informal process that generally can be done by any person who has authority to take a prisoner into custody. Furthermore, a detainer remains lodged against a prisoner without any action being taken on it. We also noted in Moore that throughout the Compact, there is reference to untried indictments, informations or complaints and to detainers based thereon, 774 S.W.2d at 595, and we stated that the better view and the more consistent interpretation of the Compact is that an untried `indictment, information or complaint' is a charging instrument upon which the requesting state may proceed to trial, and not merely a warrant of arrest, id. at 597. However, in consideration of the general practice of prosecuting officials in this and other states, id., we concluded that an unserved arrest warrant will suffice as a detainer, triggering provisions of the Compact. Alluding to our analysis in Moore and our conclusion that the warrant in that case constituted a detainer, Mr. Henretta asserts that in the instant matter, [t]he Order and Writ together with the letter were simply a notice filed with the Federal Penal Institution in Kansas advising that the prisoner was wanted in Tennessee and that, like the warrant in Moore, these constituted a detainer. We do not agree and find that the procedure that was utilized to transfer the defendant in Moore is readily distinguishable from that employed in the present matter. In Mauro, the Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of the Compact, 436 U.S. at 361, 98 S.Ct. 1834, and Tennessee courts agree. See State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 285 (Tenn.Crim. App.2000); Metheny v. State, 589 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1979). The Mauro Court distinguished a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum from a detainer as follows: Unlike a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum ..., a detainer may be lodged against a prisoner on the initiative of a prosecutor or law enforcement officer. Rather than requiring the immediate presence of the prisoner, a detainer merely puts the officials of the institution in which the prisoner is incarcerated on notice that the prisoner is wanted in another jurisdiction for trial upon his release from prison. 436 U.S. at 358, 98 S.Ct. 1834 (footnote omitted). The Court explained that the Compact was implemented to expedite disposal of detainers and thereby address problems arising from the fact that unresolved detainers create psychological difficulties for the prisoner and administrative obstacles for prison administrators, as well as sentencing dilemmas for the courts. It explained: [P]rison administrators were thwarted in [their] effort[s] toward rehabilitation [because t]he inmate who has a detainer against him is filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not respond to a training program. Furthermore, the prisoner was often deprived of the ability to take advantage of many of the prison's programs aimed at rehabilitation, merely because there was a detainer lodged against him. ... [T]he existence of detainers [also] presented problems in sentencing; when detainers had previously been filed against the defendant, the sentencing judge would hesitate to give as long a sentence as he thought might otherwise be indicated, there being a possibility that the defendant would be required to serve subsequent sentences. ... The adverse effects of detainers that prompted the drafting and enactment of the Agreement are thus for the most part the consequence of the lengthy duration of detainers. ... For these reasons the stated purpose of the Agreement is to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. Id. at 359-60. 98 S.Ct. 1834. (citations omitted). The Court noted that because a writ of habeas corpus is executed immediately, the problems associated with a detainer  which, but for the requirements of the Compact, might linger unresolved for long periods of time  do not arise. In Moore, Tennessee officials specifically requested that the warrant mailed to prison officials in Florida be treated as a detainer against the defendant. See 774 S.W.2d at 592. By contrast, Ms. Donaghy's letter to prison officials at Leavenworth specifically stated that temporary custody of Mr. Henretta was being sought through a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for purposes of service of process and disposition in the case against him and set forth a date and time, October 6, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., that he would be taken before the Bradley County trial court. Her letter was accompanied by a document entered by the trial court that is specifically entitled WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD PROSEQUENDUM, the contents of which are consistent with its title. The second document that accompanied the letter was an order directing the clerk of the court to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to the Bradley County sheriff. It is clear from the letter and the two documents that accompanied it that the procedure utilized to obtain temporary custody of Mr. Henretta sought to bring about his immediate transfer and, therefore, the procedure employed was not fraught with the lengthy indeterminacy that the Compact is intended to prevent. By its nature, the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was to be executed expeditiously. There is nothing in the procedure implemented in the instant matter, either in the format of the documents used or in their effect, that warrants their being construed as a detainer subject to the Compact. Accordingly, Mr. Henretta's argument is without merit. It appears that Mr. Henretta argues in the alternative that if he was transferred from Leavenworth pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the writ was void and without effect because 1) the trial court did not have constitutional or statutory authority to issue a writ against an individual in Kansas; 2) under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-102 (1980), Tennessee courts do not have jurisdiction over federal prisoners; 3) the writ and order were not granted pursuant to a notarized petition and affidavit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107 (1980); and 4) Mr. Henretta was never served with the writ pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-112 (1980). First, Mr. Henretta contends that Tennessee courts do not have authority to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum against an individual incarcerated in a federal prison in Kansas. We do not agree. As the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly stated, [t]he very purpose of the common law writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum requires that it be issued against the prisoner by a court located in a different jurisdiction. Henretta, 2009 WL 1025828, at . Long ago, in Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607 (1922), the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state has the right to obtain temporary custody of a federal prisoner by writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum as a matter of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due and orderly procedure. Id. at 259, 42 S.Ct. 309; see also Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611, 621, 81 S.Ct. 338, 5 L.Ed.2d 329 (1961) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is recognized as a matter of comity ... necessary between sovereignties in the administration of criminal justice in our federal-state system ... affording... respect and courtesy to the laws of the respective jurisdictions); Robinson v. Owens, C.A. 4:07-3118-H, 2008 WL 783782, at  (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2008) (Without relinquishing its priority, a sovereign may loan a defendant in its custody to another sovereign for criminal proceedings in the receiving jurisdiction by way of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.) (citing Causey v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 691, 693 (5th Cir.1980)). Furthermore, federal regulations specifically authorize federal prisons to entertain the transfer of a federal prisoner to state officials as follows: The Bureau of Prisons will consider a request made on behalf of a state or local court that an inmate be transferred to the physical custody of state or local agents pursuant to state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum or ad testificandum. The Warden at the institution in which the inmate is confined is authorized to approve this transfer in accordance with the provisions of this rule. 28 C.F.R. § 527.30 (1997). The Ponzi Court additionally noted that the voluntary transfer of custody by one sovereign to another provides a defendant with no ground for objection: One accused of crime has a right to a full and fair trial according to the law of the government whose sovereignty he is alleged to have offended, but he has no more than that. He should not be permitted to use the machinery of one sovereignty to obstruct his trial in the courts of the other, unless the necessary operation of such machinery prevents his having a fair trial. He may not complain if one sovereignty waives its strict right to exclusive custody of him for vindication of its laws in order that the other may also subject him to conviction of crime against it. . . . . But it is argued that when the prisoner is produced in the [state] superior court, he is still in the custody and jurisdiction of the United States, and that the state court cannot try one not within its jurisdiction. This is a refinement which if entertained would merely obstruct justice. The prisoner when produced in the superior court in compliance with its writ is personally present. He has full opportunity to make his defense. ... The trial court is given all the jurisdiction needed to try and hear him by the consent of the United States. ... This arrangement of comity between the two governments works in no way to the prejudice of the prisoner or of either sovereignty. 258 U.S. at 265-66, 42 S.Ct. 309. Mr. Henretta also argues that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum failed to comply with various sections of Chapter 21 of Title 29 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, which provides that [a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, except in cases specified in § 29-21-102, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-21-101(a). First, Mr. Henretta contends that Tennessee courts do not have habeas corpus jurisdiction over federal prisoners under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-102, which states as follows: Persons committed or detained by virtue of process issued by a court of the United States, or a judge thereof, in cases where such judges or courts have exclusive jurisdiction ... by the commencement of suits in such courts, are not entitled to the benefits of this writ. Next, Mr. Henretta contends that the writ was not granted pursuant to a notarized petition and affidavit, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, which provides in subsection (a) that [a]pplication for the writ shall be made by petition, signed either by the party for whose benefit it is intended, or some person on the petitioner's behalf, and verified by affidavit. Finally, Mr. Henretta contends that he was never served with a copy of the writ as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-112, which at subsection (a) states that [t]he proper mode of service is by leaving a copy of the original writ with the defendant. We believe Mr. Henretta misapprehends the nature of the writ of habeas corpus employed in this case and, therefore, the relevance of the cited statutes. In Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807), Chief Justice John Marshall clarified that although writ of habeas corpus is a generic term [ ] and includes every species of that writ[,] ... when used singly  when we say the writ of habeas corpus, without addition, we most generally mean that great writ [the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum]. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is the writ traditionally used to test restraint of liberty. Carbo, 364 U.S. at 615, 81 S.Ct. 338. As quoted above, Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 allows the prosecution of a writ of habeas corpus[ ] to inquire into the cause of ... imprisonment and restraint, and this Court has recognized that that section and the rest of Chapter 21 constitute statutory regulation of the great writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. May v. Carlton, 245 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Tenn.2008). Chapter 21 does not govern a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and, thus, Mr. Henretta's reliance upon sections 29-21-102, 29-21-107, and 29-21-112 is misplaced.