Opinion ID: 2537905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Provocation as reducing the degree of murder instructions

Text: In a related claim, defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on CALJIC Nos. 8.73 and 8.44, and that this error, combined with the prosecutor's misleading argument, was prejudicial. As noted above, CALJIC No. 8.73 would have informed the jury that it could consider whether evidence of provocation not sufficient to reduce the homicide to manslaughter had any bearing on whether defendant killed with premeditation and deliberation. CALJIC No. 8.44 provides that the heat of passion referred to in the law of manslaughter is composed of no particular emotion. There was no error in refusing to give these instructions. We have previously held, in a case that like this one lacked substantial evidence of provocation, that the court was not required to sua sponte instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.73. ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1250-1251.) Although the court did not use the word `provocation' in regard to the degree of murder, it did instruct on `heat of passion.' It told the jury that for the killing to be first degree murder, it must not have been committed `under a sudden heat of passion or other condition precluding the idea of deliberation.' (CALJIC No. 8.20.) By specifically referring to heat of passion and generally referring to any other condition precluding deliberation, the court fully instructed on the law relevant to the actual evidence. It did not also have to refer to `provocation' regarding the degree of murder, which would not have fit the evidence. ( Id. at p. 1251.) For these reasons, there was no error in failing to instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.73 on request or, as defendant suggests, to give this instruction as modified by deleting the reference to manslaughter. [8] ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1251 [rejecting claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request CALJIC No. 8.73].) Similarly, because there was no substantial evidence defendant committed manslaughter, the trial court properly refused to instruct in the language of CALJIC No. 8.44, which refers to the law of manslaughter. While defendant notes here that CALJIC No. 8.44 could have been modified to refer to the law of premeditation, as defined in CALJIC No. 8.20, rather than to manslaughter, he did not request this modification below, and the claim is therefore forfeited. (See People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 757 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) Moreover, such a modified instruction was not necessary because, as noted above, the language of CALJIC No 8.20 adequately instructed the jury. ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) Defendant contends the trial court evidenced bias by refusing instructions on voluntary manslaughter and instructions that would have allowed the jury to convict defendant of second degree rather than first degree murder. Because the trial court properly declined to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, and adequately instructed on heat of passion as it related to defendant's premeditation and deliberation, no error, let alone bias, is demonstrated.
Defendant claims the trial court erred and demonstrated its bias when it instructed the jury on lying in wait as a basis for a finding of first degree murder. The prosecutor proceeded on two theories of first degree murder, lying in wait and premeditated murder. The jury was instructed that if it found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and was unanimous on a theory or theories of murder, it was to specify on the verdict forms which theory or theories it chose. As to both victims, the jury expressly found the murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated, but did not find the murders were also by means of lying in wait. Therefore, even if the trial court erred in instructing on lying in wait, defendant suffered no possible prejudice. Nor would the mere giving of an instruction demonstrate bias. (See People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.)
Defendant contends the court erred and demonstrated its bias by instructing the jury in the language of CALJIC No. 2.06. [9] Here, the evidence indicated that the perpetrator used a knife during the attacks. The knife was not found at the murder scene. (13) Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to permit the inference that [defendant] hid or concealed evidence. Even assuming error, there was no prejudice under any standard. ( People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1020.) The jury was also instructed that [w]hether some instructions apply will depend on what you find to be the facts. Disregard any instruction which applies to facts determined by you not to exist. Do not conclude that because an instruction has been given, I am expressing an opinion as to the facts. We see no prejudice in light of these instructions. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1153 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384].) Moreover, the instruction does not impermissibly lessen the prosecutor's burden of proof even when erroneously given. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 138-139 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].) While we assume without deciding that giving the instruction was error, so instructing does not demonstrate judicial bias, nor, as defendant asserts, that the instructions were so one-sided in favor of the prosecutor, that a fair trial within the meaning of the federal Constitution was impossible.
Defendant contends the flight instruction was improper under the circumstances of this case, and demonstrates judicial bias. Not so. (14) The court gave the jury the standard language of CALJIC No. 2.52. [10] In general, a flight instruction is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 345 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]; see ง 1127c.) Flight requires `a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.' ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) Here, following the capital crimes, defendant fled the scene, and police searched unsuccessfully for him in 1991 and 1992. He was ultimately arrested more than four years after the crimes at the Los Angeles International Airport. This is sufficient evidence to warrant instructing the jury to determine whether flight occurred, and, if so, what weight to accord such flight. [Citation.] Moreover, the instruction given adequately conveyed the concept that if flight was found, the jury was permitted to consider alternative explanations for that flight other than defendant's consciousness of guilt. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544].) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the instruction properly allowed the jury to determine to which offenses, if any, the inference [of consciousness of guilt] should apply. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 180 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].) Likewise, and also contrary to defendant's assertion, a flight instruction does not create an unconstitutional permissive inference or lessen the prosecutor's burden of proof, and is proper even when identity is at issue. ( Id. at pp. 179-181; People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 942-943 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].)
(15) Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in pervasive prejudicial misconduct. Defendant did not object below to any of these portions of the argument or other challenged statements, no exception to the general requirement of an objection is applicable, and the claims are therefore forfeited. ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 286 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451] ( Schmeck ).) They are also meritless. A prosecutor commits misconduct when his conduct either infects the trial with such unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, or involves deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the trier of fact. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 283-284 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3].) (16) Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly involving himself with the selection of counsel to replace Aquilina, and that this misconduct warrants either dismissal of all charges or a new trial. Contrary to defendant's assertion, while the prosecutor noted nonpanel attorneys had been appointed in other cases, he never mentioned who was appointed in those cases, or otherwise suggested which attorney should replace Aquilina. More critically, the prosecutor, like the defendant, has a right to a speedy trial. (Cal. Const., art. I, ง 29; see Pen. Code, ง 1050, subd. (a). [11] ) While defendant claims the prosecutor did not assert this right until the prosecutor's own trial schedule cleared, he fails to demonstrate the prosecutor was thereby estopped to object to a continuance of at least 12 months in a case already more than seven years removed from the date of the capital crimes. Far from engaging in misconduct, the prosecutor properly urged the court to explore avenues, including replacement of counsel, that would bring this long-delayed case to trial. (17) Defendant further contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued what evidence the jury could rely on in finding there was intent to kill Montoya. First, defendant contends the prosecutor relied on false testimony and thereby committed misconduct by arguing the jury could find intent to kill based on the number of times defendant lunged at Montoya with the knife, and in describing Montoya's injuries, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process and fair trial rights. Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was not intentionally submitted. ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 647 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175].) Montoya testified that defendant lunged at him with the knife at least 20 times, and that, following the attack, he could not use his arm for six or seven months. Defendant asserts that Montoya's testimony was inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony and statement to Clark, [12] statements of which defendant was aware. Any inconsistency between Montoya's pretrial statements and trial testimony does not ineluctably demonstrate his trial testimony was false, or that the prosecutor knew it was false. (See People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1211-1212 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969] [the prosecutor is not responsible for a witness's erroneous testimony so long as he provided discovery contradicting that testimony and the defendant was given the opportunity to point out the discrepancy to the jury].) Indeed, defendant did not even attempt to impeach Montoya with any prior inconsistent statements regarding the severity of his injury or the number of times he was stabbed. In any event, defendant's intent to kill was demonstrated by his repeated attempts to stab Montoya, and his immediately ensuing murders of Moncada and Navarro by the same means. The precise number of times he attempted to stab Montoya, or the length of Montoya's rehabilitation, was irrelevant. Defendant also asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct when he argued that defendant's conduct in killing Moncada and Navarro demonstrated his intent to kill Montoya. As discussed above, these murders were pertinent to the issue of defendant's intent when he attacked Montoya; hence, there was no misconduct. Nor, for this reason, did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury that defendant's post-crime conduct was `irrelevant to ascertaining defendant's state of mind.' Defendant asserts the prosecutor also committed misconduct when he argued there was no evidence of a fight before defendant's violent attacks. The prosecutor actually argued that the killings were not justified: There's no assertion of self-defense. There was no fight taking place. This statement was supported by the record. No misconduct is apparent. [13] Defendant contends the prosecutor falsely argued [t]here's no evidence whatsoever that there [were] two people stabbing. This statement was a reasonable inference from the record. Officer Foy testified that when she very briefly interviewed Montoya across the street from the scene of the attack he told her two Mexican males stabbed him. The interview then ceased abruptly because a female ran across the street screaming hysterically that someone had been stabbed. Hence Officer Foy had no opportunity to allow Montoya to elaborate on this statement. Montoya, who testified regarding only one attacker, had no recollection of making the statement. Moreno, who testified that one person came to the side of his Prelude, was asked on cross-examination whether he told police the night of the incident that `I think it was two guys that came to the car.' Moreno agreed he had made this statement, but said, I wasn't sure, but I can only confirm that there was one, and that was the one that was doing the attacking that broke the window. On redirect, Moreno clarified that he thought that maybe there were two assailants when he heard what sounded like a gunshot, and he wasn't sure if it was one or two people that were doing the shooting. When he got out of his car, however, he saw only one person. Nor did the prosecutor mislead the jury by arguing that both Montoya and Moreno provided explanations for their earlier inconsistent statements. Rather, the prosecutor recounted his redirect examination of Moreno, in which Moreno clarified why he originally thought there were two assailants, and noted that Montoya only saw one person over there, and it was the defendant. Moreover, the jury was instructed that [s]tatements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence. Defendant also contends the prosecutor misled the jury by arguing that one knife caused all of the injuries. The prosecutor said that there was circumstantial evidence in the form of the pathologist's testimony that one knife did injuries to these individuals [that] is consistent with it being inflicted by one knife. He measured the wounds in the heart and in the organs of Bobby Navarro and Raul Moncada, and the size of that knife by those slits is consistent with it being made by the same knife.... And it's not just by coincidence that that scar on David Montoya's arm is approximately one to one and a half inches. It's the same knife. The pathologist testified that one knife could have caused the injuries to Navarro and Moncada, a knife approximately five inches in length and one inch wide was consistent with both victims' stab wounds, and that one of Moncada's stab wounds measured an inch and one-half in length. Montoya testified that his scar was [a]bout an inch. The prosecutor's argument that the size of Montoya's scar demonstrated the same knife used to kill the murder victims was also used on Montoya was a reasonable inference based on the record. Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by arguing that Quintana, Mesa, and Olsen could not have fabricated statements on the night of the crimes. The prosecutor simply argued that following examination of what the witnesses said, and how they said it, and the time that they said it, you're going to see it could not have been fabricated. This was legitimate argument. We further reject defendant's claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his argument regarding defendant's state of mind. Viewing the argument as a whole instead of the portions defendant cites in isolation, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the prosecutor's argument. ( People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 208 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 196, 158 P.3d 763].) Hence we reject defendant's contention that the combination of the court's failure to instruct and the prosecutor's misleading argument means that the jury likely convicted [defendant] of first degree murder without properly considering the question of his subjective mental state. First, defendant contends that the jury was misled when the prosecutor stated that the words premeditated and deliberate mean essentially the same thing. Prior to making this statement, the prosecutor quoted the definitions of these terms in CALJIC 8.20, with which the jury had already been instructed. He then made the statement challenged by defendant: Premeditated and deliberate murder. The words go together. They mean essentially the same thing. Considered beforehand, thought and considered, arrived or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against a proposed course of action. This argument, which tracked the standard definitions of the relevant terms, was not improper or misleading. Second, contrary to defendant's assertion, case law did not prohibit the prosecutor from arguing that the jury could find defendant premeditated and deliberated based on the totality of the circumstances, including the circumstance defendant obtained a weapon before the attacks; his choice of weapon; the manner in which he held the weapon; the number of wounds he attempted to inflict on Montoya; the circumstance that defendant was undeterred in his course of violent conduct by Montoya's rolling up the window or the seriousness of Montoya's wound; the circumstance that Moncada and Navarro were stabbed in the heart; the passage of time from the end of the argument until the attacks, during which defendant was not threatened, there was no fight taking place, and no one spoke to him; and defendant's flight following the attacks. (See, e.g., People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 421-422 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512] [absence of provocation and location of gunshot wounds in head or neck were circumstances in support of premeditation and deliberation finding]; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 28 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591] [rejecting claim that evidence of flight was irrelevant to whether the defendant premeditated and deliberated]; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 863 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305] [the jury could have concluded that during the time it took to run 178 feet from the first victim to the second, defendant considered his options]; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 957 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574] [execution-style murder demonstrated premeditation and deliberation]; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101] [jury could have inferred defendant went to his car for a weapon before the killings].) Defense counsel was free to argue the same circumstances indicated defendant did not premeditate or deliberate, but instead counsel argued defendant was not the perpetrator. Thus, defendant did not even proceed on a theory that he was guilty of second, but not first, degree murder. Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, did the prosecutor argue that the `cold, calculated' judgment of murder is the equivalent of deciding whether to stop at a yellow light or proceed through the intersection. Rather, the prosecutor used the example of assessing one's distance from a traffic light, and the location of surrounding vehicles, when it appears the light will soon turn yellow and then red, and then determining based on this information whether to proceed through the intersection when the light does turn yellow, as an example of a quick judgment that is nonetheless cold and calculated. He then immediately said, Deciding to and moving forward with the decision to kill is similar, but I'm not going to say in any way it's the same. There's great dire consequences that have a difference here.
Defendant contends that he was denied the right to a fair trial due to pervasive judicial misconduct. As can be seen above, defendant asserts judicial misconduct in connection with nearly every substantive claim raised on appeal. But in fact, his arguments are merely of judicial error; he does not come close to showing misconduct. In addition to arguments already discussed, defendant also contends that jury voir dire was so permeated with error it reach[ed] the level of structural error, and that the court demonstrated its proprosecution bias by approving a constitutionally impermissible in-court identification procedure. We have reviewed each contention, and find no error or evidence of bias. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) Defendant contends that during voir dire the trial court improperly defined mitigating evidence as good things about defendant, forcing defendant to prove `good things' in order to save his life, and making it impossible for the jury to apply the law and the facts because it was completely misinformed regarding what constituted mitigation. Not so. The court also informed prospective jurors that they would be given guidelines to follow in making the penalty decision. Moreover, here the court was conducting voir dire, not instructing the jury; its comments `were not intended to be, and were not, a substitute for full instructions at the end of trial.' ( People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 636.) At the penalty phase, the jury was instructed in the language of CALJIC Nos. 8.85, which listed the relevant factors for the jury to consider, and 8.88, which defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. By these instructions, the jury was fully aware what evidence could be considered mitigating. Next, defendant contends that during voir dire, the trial court asked the jury to not find defendant guilty of second degree murder. Not so. Read in context, the trial court simply urged the jury not to find defendant guilty of second degree murder, or something less or maybe not guilty, solely to avoid a penalty phase of the trial. This was proper. Defendant further contends that the trial court demonstrated a bias in favor of Christian jurors by using biblical principles. First, during voir dire, the court noted that a prospective juror had stated on the questionnaire a refusal to follow the law if it conflicted with religious beliefs. The court said to the prospective juror, We have a saying you render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and the things to God the things that are God's. This is Caesar's court here, all right? The prospective juror answered, Right. The court inquired, Do you think that you would be able to impose the death penalty under the appropriate circumstances as I've indicated them? The prospective juror answered, Yes, I can. Likewise, the court asked a different prospective juror about a notation on the jury questionnaire regarding the commandment Thou shalt not kill. The court stated that there are two conflicting sayings that generally come out in questionnaires when we do capital cases .... One is `Eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth,' which some jurors mentioned, and the other is `Thou shalt not kill,' and they're biblical commandments and they kind of conflict, don't they? How important is that commandment to you? After further discussion with the prospective juror, the court again used the saying regarding Caesar, noted [t]his is Caesar's court, the people's court basically, and [w]e go by the rule of law, not by biblical rules. Can you make the distinction between the two? Nothing in either this or the preceding exchange demonstrates an improper court bias toward Christian jurors. (See People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1242 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254] [prosecutor's argument invoking the familiar passage regarding Caesar was not an argument for using Biblical or religious criteria of justice, but rather quite the oppositeโan appeal to use secular standards mandated by law to judge defendant].) Nor did the trial court exhibit such a pro-Christian bias by suggesting to counsel outside the presence of the prospective jurors that a prospective juror who was a Jehovah's Witness might be impeded by her religion's tenet that she could not judge others. Nothing in this comment demonstrates judicial bias. Next, defendant contends the trial court demonstrated an extreme hostility and bias against young people who were college students. Not so. During hardship voir dire, the court excused six full-time students. The court then said, I should warn those of you who are sticking your hands up in the air if you're not a full-time student and we check, you're under oath. This is called lying to the Court, otherwise known as perjury, which I'm sure you've heard about recently. The court then excused two full-time students at the University of California, Riverside. After doing so, the court noted that my husband is the academic dean at UCR also, so it's not that hard to check. The next prospective juror was a full-time student at California State University, San Bernardino. The court said, All right. Different institution. After excusing the prospective juror, and another full-time student, the court commented, Now you see why democracy is so hard to preserve. These comments, while perhaps somewhat intemperate, do not demonstrate a bias against young college students, but a frustration with the inherent difficulty of finding prospective jurors who have the time to hear a capital trial, and a desire to avoid false hardships. They do not rise to the level of judicial misconduct. Finally, defendant contends the trial court's eagerness to allow Moreno to conduct an unconstitutionally suggestive lineup demonstrates its proprosecution bias. Not so. During Moreno's testimony, he stated that before trial he had never been shown any photographs by police, but he believed he could identify defendant. The prosecutor started to show Moreno a set of 12 photographs. Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor ultimately withdrew the request. When Moreno's examination was completed, the court excused the jury for lunch and asked Moreno to return after lunch in case we need you back. It then suggested to counsel, in the event either of you wishes to proceed with this procedure, that Moreno be asked if he could identify the assailant in the courtroom, and, if he could not, the prosecutor would then show him the photo lineup. Defense counsel said I would elect not to do it. The court expressed the view that whether Moreno could identify defendant could be helpful to either side. The prosecutor then said he was disinclined to follow this procedure because of raising an issue [on appeal] that probably doesn't need to be raised. The court said, Fair enough. I don't know your case as well as you do, which is why I leave it in your hands. Nothing in this discussion demonstrates improper eagerness or judicial bias. (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1155 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1] [Insofar as defendant contends that an in-court identification not preceded by a lineup is impermissibly suggestive and prejudicial as a matter of law, he is wrong.].) In sum, we conclude there was no error, and no evidence of judicial misconduct.
Defendant asserts that even if the errors alleged above are not in themselves reversible, they are so cumulatively. We disagree. We have assumed error only in the instruction of the jury on concealment of evidence and on lying in wait as a theory of first degree murder. For both of these claims, we concluded there was no prejudice under any standard. Therefore no cumulative prejudice is demonstrated. Defendant has merely shown that his `trial was not perfectโfew are.' .... ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 839 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865], citation omitted.)

Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during his closing argument. Defendant did not object below to any of the cited portions of the argument. Other than as noted below, no exception to the general requirement of an objection is applicable, and the claims are therefore forfeited. ( Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 286.) Nor was there prejudicial misconduct, either as to the individual contentions or cumulatively. Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly stated that defendant was arrested in September 1995 whereas he in fact turned himself in. The parties stipulated defendant was arrested on September 19, 1995, and defense counsel expressly declined to introduce evidence that defendant voluntarily surrendered. No misconduct appears. For the same reason, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when he asked Navarro's father and sister respectively what it was like for them during the years before defendant was arrested or caught. Nor can misconduct be attributed to the prosecutor when Montoya testified, [w]hen they finally caught him, ... it brought back so much. It was hard. (Italics added.) Likewise, the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when he argued, Don't forget about David Montoya. His injuries, the months of therapy and recovering that he had to go through, his physical injuries, his mental injuries. Think about it. The anguish of surviving and the guilt that he felt. While there was no testimony that Montoya had received therapy for his injuries, he did testify he was told by doctors he would never use his arm again, and that he in fact could not use it for six to seven months. The prosecutor's statement about therapy neither so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process ( Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 12 [129 L.Ed.2d 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004] ( Romano )) nor involved deceptive or reprehensible methods employed to persuade the trier of fact ( People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 284). Defendant contends the prosecutor referred to facts not in evidence when he argued that the victims suffered before they died, and that the knife made an audible sound when it entered their bodies. These were reasonable inferences from the record. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing at the guilt phase, It's time that [defendant's] held accountable after all these years for the mayhem, for the murder that he created that night. He further challenges the prosecutor's opening statement at the penalty phase in which he said, after noting he anticipated that the families of the murder victims would testify, and describing the attacks on Gonzalez and Lopez, that [t]he accomplishments of [defendant] in his life ha[ve] been murder and mayhem. Defendant contends there is no evidence defendant committed mayhem, and that the argument suggested the prosecutor had knowledge that [defendant] had committed heinous conduct not supported by any facts in the record. If the jurors believed that [defendant] had disfigured someone, they would have been more likely to sentence him to die. For this reason, the sentence of death should be set aside. (18) There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would be misled by these brief remarks. The jury was instructed that [s]tatements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence, and that [i]f anything concerning the law said by the attorneys in their arguments or any other time during the trial conflicts with my instructions on the law, you must follow my instructions. We presume the jury followed these instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 684 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) Moreover, jurors not instructed on mayhem were unlikely to attribute to that word its legal definition, [14] or, in particular, to focus on its mention of disfigurement. In any event, we reject defendant's argument that in a case in which defendant murdered two individuals and stabbed another causing an injury that took months to heal, and in which there was aggravating evidence he had stabbed and caused severe debilitating injury to two other individuals, there is any reasonable possibility a different penalty verdict would result from any belief on the part of the jury defendant may have also disfigured one of these individuals. Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed Davenport error by arguing that the lack of mitigating evidence proved defendant's life was not worth sparing. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) The prosecutor argued: He's had eight years ... since the commission of these brutal murders since 1991. Eight years. Over three years since the time of his arrest in September of '95. He's had an attorney, investigators preparing his case, going to Mexico to find witnesses and bring them here to court to testify for you. And what you saw is the best that they could do to give you a reason to spare his life.... Nothing about the defendant's childhood, his mother, or good behavior in some particular circumstances in Mexico, overcomes the evidence in aggravation. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury understood the prosecutor to argue that the lack of mitigating evidence was aggravating, but rather that the evidence as a whole warranted death. The same analysis applies to the prosecutor's other challenged comments. Nor did the prosecutor mislead the jury by saying defendant had an attorney for three years, when in fact he had three attorneys over that period of time, or by referring to investigators, when defendant only had one investigator at the time of trial. (19) Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that mitigating factors were actually aggravating factors. We have held that a prosecutor may not argue that a defendant's section 190.3, factor (k) character and background evidence is an aggravating factor. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1].) No such mischaracterization occurred here. Rather, the prosecutor merely argued that defendant's lack of prior felony convictions deserved little weight in mitigation, that defendant, who was 21 years of age at the time of the offense, was [o]ld enough to be held personally accountable and responsible for his actions, and that [w]hen you look at the evidence in this case, the evidence in aggravation, and you compare it to the evidence that's been presented in so-called mitigation, there is no comparison. Such argument is entirely appropriate. (See People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 184 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960].) Nor, contrary to defendant's contention, did the prosecutor's reference to defendant's age tell the jury defendant's age should not be considered or preclude the jury from determining whether 21 years was youthful. Defendant also contends the prosecutor misled the jury with respect to the consideration of mitigating evidence. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor did not argue that mercy and sympathy had no place in a capital case. Rather, he properly argued that defendant had not earned the jury's pity or sympathy, and that a death verdict was compelled by the evidence. Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, did the prosecutor during penalty argument characterize mitigating evidence as good things about defendant. Rather, he told the jury it could consider things like sympathy and pity for the defendant, and that the expanded section 190.3, factor (k) instruction was a catchall. Anything they want to present to you falls into this category. (20) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor did not make an improper biblical reference, or commit Caldwell error [15] ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 336 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633]), when he said: You are not here to forgive. That is for some other authority. You are here to impose punishmentโthe appropriate punishment based on what this defendant deserves by his conduct, by his actions. Nothing in these statements misled the jury `as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that allow[ed] the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision.' ( Romano, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 9.) Nor did the prosecutor improperly testify by arguing that if defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, he would be fed, have his medical and dental needs attended to, and be able to read, write, and enjoy friendships. These circumstances are matters of common knowledge. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 1063-1064 [it is a matter of common knowledge that women are employed as state prison guards].) In People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 838 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673], on which defendant relies, we did not elaborate on what argument the prosecutor made regarding prison conditions that while brief and mild, contributed to the overall unfairness of the trial. Nor, contrary to defendant's contention, were the prosecutor's discussion of punishment, his statement that a death verdict takes great courage, or his argument that defendant's crimes warranted death, [i]nvitations to the jury to perform a greater social purpose or to consider prejudicial and irrelevant matters as aggravating factors. (See People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1177-1179 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4].) Likewise, arguing that life imprisonment is not sufficient punishment does not mislead the jury that it is no punishment at all. [16]
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give three proposed instructions. Not so. (21) The first proposed defense instruction [17] was properly refused because it duplicated other instructions given. ( People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].) Thus, the jury was instructed on the definition of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, [18] and that [i]n determining penalty, the jury shall take into consideration pity and sympathy for the defendant. In addition, instructions in the language of CALJIC No. 8.85 allowed consideration of any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. Moreover, a trial court is not required to instruct the jury that mitigating evidence need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 862 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].) Defendant further contends the trial court improperly refused to use the word mercy that appeared in a proposed prosecution instruction. The trial court expressed concern that the word mercy indicated the jury can do what they like regardless of the guided discretion that factors (a) through (k) provide. . . . Therefore, I'm not going to use the word `mercy.' I prefer the words `sympathy,' `pity,' et cetera. As set forth in the previous paragraph, the jury was adequately instructed on the treatment of mitigating evidence. Nor, contrary to defendant's contention, did the trial court forbid the parties from using the word mercy during argument. Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously refused to instruct the jury that: The factors in the above list which you determine to be aggravating circumstances are the only ones which the law permits you to consider. You are not allowed to consider any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. We recently rejected the same claim in People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 471-472 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64]. While the prosecution introduced on rebuttal Lira's testimony regarding defendant's jail misconduct, the jury was also instructed that, other than evidence of the assaults on Gonzalez and Lopez, [y]ou may not consider any evidence of any other crime as an aggravating circumstance. That was sufficient.
Defendant contends that cumulative penalty and guilt phase error requires reversal. We have assumed error only in the instruction of the jury on concealment of evidence and on lying in wait as a theory of first degree murder. For both of these claims, we concluded there was no prejudice under any standard. Therefore no cumulative prejudice is demonstrated.
Defendant contends the death penalty statute violates the United States Constitution in numerous respects. We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, and likewise conclude defendant's contentions lack merit. Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1, does not, as applied, violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because those circumstances differ from case to case. ( People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976, 978-979 [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing or deprive defendant of the right to a jury trial, because it does not require written findings, unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances, or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than ง 190.3, factor (b) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1297-1298; People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 971-972 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277].) Nor must a jury be instructed which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 152-153 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) [U]se of unadjudicated criminal activity during the penalty phase is permissible . . ., and does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130].) Defendant claims in the alternative that a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is compelled for the findings that an aggravating factor exists, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and that death is the appropriate sentence. The jury here was instructed that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. That is sufficient. ( People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; see Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 979.) Unlike the guilt determination, `the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual' [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification. ( People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118].) Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], affects our conclusions in this regard. ( People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 212; People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972.) The failure to require intercase proportionality does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871]; People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 970.) Nor does the circumstance that intercase proportionality review is conducted in noncapital cases cause the death penalty statute to violate defendant's right to equal protection and due process. ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 209 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 690-691 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) [C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law . . . . ( Manriquez, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 590.) We reject defendant's argument that the death penalty statute is contrary to international norms of humanity and decency, and therefore violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant points to no authority that prohibit[s] a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].)
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion, asserting the jurors commented on his failure to testify. There was no prejudicial juror misconduct, and the motion was properly denied.
On March 2, 1999, a month after the penalty verdict, defendant filed a motion to release juror identifying information, or, in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing regarding alleged juror misconduct in discussing defendant's failure to testify. The parties stipulated, and the court approved, a procedure in which all 13 jurors were subsequently summoned to court and examined individually under oath. [19] At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, Juror No. 8 recalled that a comment regarding defendant's failure to testify was made only after we had put in our verdict. [20] Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 11 testified that after the penalty phase deliberations, when the verdict had been reached, and the bailiff either called or the verdict was given to the bailiff, someone, identified by Jurors Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 11 as Juror No. 8, made a comment wondering why defendant had not testified. Juror No. 3 apparently agreed with the comment or made a similar comment. Juror No. 11 testified she said that was not a factor to consider, and Juror No. 12 agreed with her. Juror No. 9 could not recall whether the comment about defendant's failure to testify was made after the verdict was signed and the jury was waiting to go back into the courtroom, or later when the jurors spoke with the attorneys. Juror No. 10 testified that at the beginning of the guilt phase deliberations, a male juror questioned why defendant did not take the stand. Juror No. 11 responded, We're not supposed to even consider that and [i]t was in our instructions not to consider it. The issue was not raised again. Later, someone mentioned that the subject had been brought up, and someone said, [A]gain, we're not supposed to consider that. Juror No. 12 testified that during a break at the end of the guilt phase deliberations, Juror No. 8 made a comment to the effect that, If it had been me, I would have got[ten] on the stand to defend myself. Another juror said, Yeah, me too. Juror No. 12 said, we were told that's not supposed to be considered. After either the guilt or penalty verdict was read and the jury polled, Juror No. 12 returned to the jury room and Juror No. 8 said, I feel we made the right decision because I didn't see any remorse. Juror No. 12 believed the comment was made after the guilt phase, because while she returned to the jury room after the penalty verdict was delivered to collect her belongings, she did not stay to speak to the attorneys. Juror No. 5, who served only at the guilt phase, heard no comment about defendant's failure to testify, and Juror No. 13, who served only at the penalty phase, heard no such comment prior to the time the penalty verdict was entered. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, finding there was no substantial likelihood that the vote of any juror was influenced by the comments, because the comments made during the guilt phase elicited appropriate statements . . . that such matters must not be considered, and those in the penalty phase were made after the jury had reached a verdict. The court stated that any presumption of prejudice was clearly rebutted by evidence of the responses made by the other jurors, the context of the comments, the timing of the comments, and the fact that the jurors were unanimous in stating that the comments were not ever made at a time when they were actually engaged in deliberations.
(22) [B]y violating the trial court's instruction not to discuss defendant's failure to testify, the jury committed misconduct. [Citations.] This misconduct gives rise to a presumption of prejudice, which `may be rebutted . . . by a reviewing court's determination, upon examining the entire record, that there is no substantial likelihood that the complaining party suffered actual harm.' ( People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1425 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368, 157 P.3d 973].) `Whether prejudice arose from juror misconduct . . . is a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court's independent determination.' ( People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 303 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249].) However, `[w]e accept the trial court's credibility determinations and findings on questions of historical fact if supported by substantial evidence.' ( Id. at p. 304.) Here, at the guilt phase, the circumstance that only two jurors recalled that any juror had commented on defendant's failure to testify indicates that the discussion was not of any length or significance. In addition, the offending juror was immediately reminded he could not consider this factor and the discussion ceased. ( People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 749 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 188 P.3d 580] ( Loker ).) Transitory comments of wonderment and curiosity about a defendant's failure to testify, although technically misconduct, are normally innocuous, particularly when a comment stands alone without any further discussion. ( People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711, 727-728 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 55].) At the penalty phase, the comment was not made until the verdict was reached and the bailiff contacted. While the jury had not yet been dismissed, we conclude there is no substantial likelihood a passing comment at this stage of the proceedings regarding the failure to testify prejudiced defendant in any manner. Moreover, the offending juror was reminded that this consideration was not permitted. Under these circumstances, the purpose of the rule against commenting on defendant's failure to testify was served, and the presumption of prejudice is rebutted. ( Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 749.) Defendant further contends that his death sentence should be vacated because a juror stated, after either the guilt or penalty verdict was read, that the jury had made the right decision because he did not see defendant express remorse. The trial court found, however, that the comment regarding remorse recounted by Juror No. 12 was consistent with the testimony of other jurors that such a comment was made after the penalty verdict had been signed, sealed and delivered. Substantial evidence supports that finding. Defendant contends the trial court's questioning was not even-handed, and that the court did not adequately question jurors as to the actual statements made, while delving into the deliberative process questioning them in a leading manner [and] minimizing the misconduct at every opportunity. Defense counsel agreed to the trial court's intended scope of questioning before the jurors were examined, and all but one request he made for further questioning following a juror's voir dire was honored. [21] Indeed, after the first 12 jurors had testified, the parties were asked if they wanted to recall any juror for further questioning, but neither counsel requested to do so. Rather, defendant requested that Juror No. 5, who had served only at the guilt phase, be examined, a request the court granted. Defendant has therefore forfeited any claim the questioning was inadequate. Nor does our examination of the record reveal any such inadequacy, lack of evenhandedness, or an attempt on the part of the court to improperly lead the jurors or minimize any misconduct. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court never warn[ed] the jurors that unfavorable testimony could result in the reversal of [defendant's] conviction. We also reject defendant's claim the trial court was biased in its ruling. Our review of the record, set forth above, demonstrates no evidence of bias. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1111-1112.)
Defendant contends the trial court improperly imposed a $10,000 restitution fine under former section 1202.4 without considering his ability to pay. Defendant concedes he is liable for the minimum statutory amount, and seeks a reduction to that amount under the current statute, which is $200. (23) At the time the crimes were committed, former section 1202.4, subdivision (a) provided that the fine shall be ordered regardless of the defendant's present ability to pay, and Government Code former section 13967, subdivision (a) set the fine at a range from $100 to $10,000. (See Stats. 1990, ch. 45, ง 2, pp. 256-257, 261; People v. Saelee (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 27, 30 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 790] [A restitution fine qualifies as punishment for purposes of the prohibition against ex post facto laws.]; People v. Hanson (2000) 23 Cal.4th 355, 361-363 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 1 P.3d 650] [restitution fines are punishment for purposes of double jeopardy]; People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 819 P.2d 861] [restitution fine qualifies as punishment for purpose of enforcing plea bargain].) Defendant asserts, however, that he should receive the ameliorative benefit of a 1992 amendment to Government Code former section 13967, subdivision (a) that required the court to consider defendant's ability to pay. Defendant is not entitled to benefit from the 1992 amendment because it was repealed prior to sentencing in his case. (See People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 305 [25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990] ( Vieira ).) We have, however, also held that because the current restitution statute provides that when imposing a fine in an amount greater than the statutory minimum the trial court should consider a defendant's inability to pay (along with other relevant factors), a defendant on appeal is entitled to benefit from the ameliorative effect of that statute. (ง 1202.4, subd. (d); People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1038; Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 305-306.) In Richardson and Vieira, we remanded the case to the trial court `for reconsideration of the question of a restitution fine under the currently applicable statute.' ( Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1038, quoting Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 306.) Defendant does not rely on Vieira, which was decided before he filed his reply brief, and which was cited in respondent's brief. Moreover, in 1999, when defendant was sentenced, former section 1202.4 contained language regarding a trial court's consideration of the defendant's ability to pay similar to that contained in the current statute. (Stats. 1998, ch. 587, ง 5.5.) Defendant did not assert below that he should benefit from the ameliorative effect of this amendment. Defendant contends, however, that because he did not have the ability to pay, the $10,000 fine was an unauthorized sentence, thus exempting him from having to bring his claim to the court's attention. (See People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040].) Not so. Had defendant brought his argument to the court's attention, it could have exercised its discretion and considered defendant's ability to pay, along with other relevant factors, in ascertaining the fine amount. Under the current statute, and that in existence in 1999, a fine in any amount greater than the statutory minimum, and up to $10,000, is subject to the court's discretion. (ง 1202.4, subds. (b)(1), (d).) Moreover, under the statute in 1999 and now, a defendant bears the burden of demonstrating his inability to pay, and express findings by the court as to the factors bearing on the amount of the fine are not required. (ง 1202.4, subd. (d); see People v. Romero (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 440, 449 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 26] [the statute impliedly presumes a defendant has the ability to pay, and leaves it to the defendant to adduce evidence otherwise].) In People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302-303 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 741, 992 P.2d 1109], we held that a prosecutor's failure to object to the trial court's not stating on the record its reasons for not imposing a section 1202.4 restitution fine waived that argument on appeal. Likewise here, in failing to assert below that he should benefit from intervening legislative amendments and in not adducing evidence of his inability to pay, defendant has forfeited the argument. Under these circumstances, no remand is required.
The judgment is affirmed.