Opinion ID: 1690126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: did the trial court commit reversible error by permitting the state to engage in repeated prosecutorial misconduct?

Text: ś 87. Jordan alleges in this assignment of error that it was improper for the prosecutor to refer to facts not in evidence during closing argument. [5] This assignment of error is procedurally barred inasmuch as no contemporaneous objection was made during trial. However, out of an abundance of caution, we will address the merits of Jordan's claim. ś 88. Prosecutors are allowed to make reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence. As we have stated: This Court has held that attorneys have a right and duty to deduce and argue reasonable conclusions based upon the evidence, which are favorable to their clients, and they may do so whether the conclusions are weak or strong so long as they are legitimate, and it is the function of the jury to determine the logic and weight of the conclusion. Harvey v. State, 666 So.2d 798, 801 (Miss. 1995). ś 89. Owen referred to Jordan as a scam artist and con man. We find that Owen's characterization of Jordan was based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. Jordan's crime consisted of nothing but one big scam. He searched for an appropriate mark, Charles Marter, cased his house, and gained entry to the house under false pretenses, posing as a utility repairman. After he killed Edwina, he lied to Charles several times when he said that Edwina was alive and well and asking about how her children were. ś 90. Besides, we have approved of the State referring to the criminal defendant as evil. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 298 (Miss.1999). The two references Owen made were isolated incidents. We cannot say that calling Jordan a con man or a scam artist were so highly inflammatory as to unduly prejudice the jury against him. ś 91. Owen also argued that Jordan intended to shoot Edwina Marter again if she had not been dead. Jordan avers that this statement is completely unsupported by the record. As stated above, prosecutors are allowed to make reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence, and we find that Owen's statement is a reasonable inference therefrom. It is clear that Jordan carefully planned his crime before he put it into action. He played the role of a General Electric representative by wearing a coat and tie and holding a clipboard which he had purchased and altered to make him appear official. He called the bank to acquire the name of a loan officer. He found the loan officer's residence and waited until he had the opportunity to seize the loan officer's wife. He then drove her to a remote area and killed her execution style. Jordan says that he did not intend to kill her, but a reasonable inference from the facts is that he did intend to kill her. After such careful planning prior to taking action, why did he not have the materials at hand with which to secure a victim for ransom such as rope, a blindfold, food and water, a safe house, etc.? The only thing he took with him and Edwina was his gun which had two bullets in it. Jordan said he intended to tie her up with his tie, but a tie alone would not secure anyone very well. No doubt that he was planning to use his gun just like he had used every other item that he had with him in the commission of the crime. Owen argued that if the first bullet did not kill Edwina, he would have used the second bullet, but after seeing that she was dead, he did not have to use the second bullet. The second bullet was in the firing chamber when the gun was fished out of the Big Biloxi River. ś 92. Jordan alleges that it was improper for Owen to make personal references and bolster himself before the jury. Owen stated: I stand before you today as a special prosecutor. This is not my profession. I gain nothing from it. I profit nothing from it. I am a private practitioner. I'm not salaried by the District Attorney's office. I'm not salaried by the Attorney General. I don't get one penny. I don't want one penny. I want justice, the State of Mississippi wants justice.    If you feel that I am harsh on Richard Gerald Jordan then I apologize. But I've been in this case a long time. ś 93. Jordan cites United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9, 10, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1043, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), in support of his claim of improper closing argument. While the Supreme Court did state that a prosecutor should refrain from interjecting personal beliefs into the presentation of his case, id. at 9, 105 S.Ct. at 1043, 84 L.Ed.2d at 8, the main thrust of its opinion was to prohibit attorneys from commenting on a defendant's guilt and offering their unsolicited personal views on the evidence. Id. Accordingly, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b) (2d ed.1980), states, It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence of the guilt of the defendant. The conduct in question involved a defense counsel who personally attacked the prosecutor. Owen's comments, which consisted of a brief recitation of his personal involvement in Jordan's prosecution, did not rise to this level and did not unduly prejudice Jordan. ś 94. Finally, Jordan complains that Owen improperly argued facts which were not in evidence when Owen suggested that Jordan had financially benefitted from his time in Parchman by attempting to sell his wind tunnel and his collection of short stories. Again, a prosecutor is permitted to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. It is reasonable to state that Jordan entered into negotiations with the TVA to sell his wind tunnel to them, rather than to give it to them. In fact, Jordan hired an attorney to insure that TVA did not obtain any ownership rights to the wind tunnel, but to study the device for evaluation purposes only. The same rationale applies to his collection of short stories. ś 95. This issue is without merit.