Opinion ID: 1722608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: on motion to remand for hearing and motion to repay advanced cost.

Text: We have considered the motion of appellant Aaron Henry, requesting this Court to require the proper official of the State of Mississippi to refund to him costs alleged to have been incurred in the Supreme Court of the United States by order of a mandate dated March 2, 1965. The answer of the State of Mississippi to this motion has an attached copy of the motion filed by the Attorney General of Mississippi in the Supreme Court of the United States requesting that Court to vacate or modify its previous mandate. We have also considered a motion filed by the Attorney General asking this Court to enter an order remanding the foregoing case to the County Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County, Mississippi, for a hearing to determine whether or not there was a waiver of the right to object to the testimony of Clarksdale Chief of Police, Ben Collins, with reference to the search of appellant's automobile, in accordance with Rule 37B of the Mississippi Supreme Court. An examination of the record in this case reveals that this Court determined (July 12, 1963, 253 Miss. 263, 154 So.2d 289) that the knowledge obtained by the witness Ben Collins with reference to the interior of appellant's automobile was obtained in violation of the Mississippi Constitution, and we also determined that defendant waived his right to object to the admission of such evidence by failing to object at the time it was offered in evidence. The judgment and sentence of the trial court was affirmed in this Court. An appeal was taken from the judgment of this Court to the United States Supreme Court. On January 18, 1965, the opinion of the Supreme Court was rendered, wherein it was held that: We vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a hearing on the question whether the petitioner is to be deemed to have knowingly waived decision of his federal claim when timely objection was not made to the admission of the illegally seized evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) Henry v. State, 85 S.Ct. 564, 566-67 (1965). The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out that it had no power to revise judgments on questions of state law but stated that: These justifications have no application where the state ground is purely procedural. A procedural default which is held to bar challenge to a conviction in state courts, even on federal constitutional grounds, prevents implementation of the federal right. Accordingly, we have consistently held that the question of when and how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal question is itself a federal question. 85 S.Ct. at 567. The opinion also points out that: The Mississippi rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the introduction of illegal evidence clearly does serve a legitimate state interest. Ibid. The Supreme Court was of the opinion, however, on the record in this case that: ... it appears that this purpose of the contemporaneous-objection rule may have been substantially served by petitioner's motion at the close of the State's evidence asking for a directed verdict because of the erroneous admission of the officer's testimony. For at this stage the trial judge could have called for elaboration of the search and seizure argument and, if persuaded, could have stricken the tainted testimony or have taken other appropriate corrective action. For example, if there was sufficient competent evidence without this testimony to go to the jury, the motion for a directed verdict might have been denied, and the case submitted to the jury with a properly worded appropriate cautionary instruction. 85 S.Ct. at 568. (Hns. 16-21) Inasmuch as the Mississippi Circuit Courts do not have the authority to grant instructions to the jury, except those requested in writing, the circuit judge could not have given the jury a well-worded cautionary instruction as suggested in the opinion, supra. Miss. Code Ann. § 1530 (1956). However, the trial judge could have stricken the evidence and advised the jury verbally not to consider the evidence introduced. This procedure is not in violation of the foregoing code section. Welch v. Morgan, 225 Miss. 154, 82 So.2d 820 (1955). It is also true that the trial court could have sustained a motion to dismiss at any time, however there must be some method of orderly procedure in the trial of cases. In the case of Lewis v. State, 155 Miss. 810, 125 So. 419 (1930), this Court pointed out at p. 421 that: We need only to say as to this that it is the business of courts to adjudicate cases according to established and necessary general and practical rules of procedural as well as of substantive law. We have no dispensing power, and can assume none, to bend those essential rules to fit the exigencies of a particular case, else there would soon be no rules and no orderly enforcement of the law. One who claims his constitutional rights have been violated, state or federal, and desires to object to such illegally obtained testimony being introduced before the jury must make his objection known to the trial court in such a manner and at such a time as to give the court an opportunity to sustain or overrule the objection before such illegal testimony has been given to the jury. The party claiming the right to object cannot wait until the testimony has been introduced, and also introduce the same testimony in his own right, and at the conclusion of the testimony expect the court to suppress such evidence and dismiss the case on the constitutional ground that the evidence should have been excluded from the jury. The rule in the Federal court as to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence is set out under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. at p. 212. There are many Federal cases cited under this rule in 18 U.S.C.A. holding that the right to object to evidence on the grounds of illegal search is waived unless there is a timely motion to suppress the evidence. A form for this motion may be found in the Appendix of Forms to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court of the United States has said in the instant case that: Only evidence extrinsic to the record before us can establish the fact of waiver, and the State should have an opportunity to establish that fact. The Court then pointed out that in cases from Federal Courts, the Supreme Court had vacated judgments on condition and remanded them for a hearing suspending the determination of the validity of the conviction pending the outcome of the hearing... . By permitting the Mississippi courts to make an initial determination of waiver, we serve the causes of efficient administration of criminal justice, and of harmonious federal-state judicial relations. 85 S.Ct. at 570. Finally, the Court said: It has been suggested that this friction (federal habeas corpus procedure) might be ameliorated if the States would look upon our decisions in Fay v. Noia, supra, (372 U.S. 391, 439) and Townsend v. Sain, supra, (372 U.S. 293, 312-319), as affording them an opportunity to provide state procedures, direct or collateral, for a full airing of the Federal claims ... Therefore, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Mississippi Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 85 S.Ct. at 570. (Hn 22) In an effort to comply with the suggestion of the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion, supra, and in an effort to find a procedural method whereby the state constitutional questions and the federal constitutional questions may be brought to the attention of the trial judge and will be effectively preserved, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the person who desires to suppress evidence alleged to have been wrongfully seized may do so by making a motion similar to the motion permitted in the federal court at any time after the indictment and prior to the trial  asking the trial court to suppress the evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of rights under the United States Constitution. (Hns. 23, 24) If, however, a motion is not made prior to the trial, asking the trial court to suppress the wrongfully obtained evidence, the person desiring to have the evidence stricken may nevertheless object to the introduction of the evidence upon the federal ground and then upon the state ground, or either, during the trial and before the defendant has offered his evidence or defense. The court will then examine the federal and state claims raised by the objection so as to give a complete and effective airing of the objection, in the absence of the jury. The failure to object to the testimony and the failure to move to suppress it until after the introduction of all of the evidence for the State and defense will be considered a waiver of both federal and state questions of constitutional rights to exclude the tainted evidence. Nevertheless if it appears to the trial judge that the foregoing rule of procedure would defeat justice and bring about results not justified or intended by substantive law, the rule may be relaxed and subordinated to the primary purpose of the law to enforce constitutional rights in the interest of justice. Dogan v. Cooley, 184 Miss. 106, 185 So. 783 (1939). (Hn 25) The United States Supreme Court has returned the instant case to this Court to determine whether the defendant Aaron Henry consciously waived his rights to object to the introduction of the testimony of Ben Collins with reference to the evidence obtained by the wrongful search of defendant's automobile on the grounds that it violated the United States Constitution. The motion of the Attorney General of Mississippi requesting this Court to remand this case to the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County, Mississippi, and thence to the County Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County for a hearing to determine whether or not the defendant consciously, knowingly and intentionally waived his right under the United States Constitution to have excluded from the consideration of the jury evidence unlawfully obtained, is hereby granted. The Clerk of this Court will certify a mandate to the County Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County, Mississippi, through the Circuit Court of that District, in which the County Court is directed to proceed  on reasonable notice to Aaron Henry  to determine whether or not he consciously and intentionally waived his right to object to the illegally obtained evidence offered by the witness Ben Collins. After having heard the evidence and determined the issue, the County Court will certify its findings and determination to this Court for further proceedings in compliance with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court. The motion of appellant Aaron Henry, asking this Court to require the proper authorities of Mississippi to repay him the cost advanced in his behalf in the Supreme Court of the United States, is hereby continued and suspended pending the determination of the issue submitted to the County Court in the previous paragraphs of this opinion. Motion to remand for hearing sustained; and motion to repay cost continued.