Opinion ID: 426349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board's Interpretation

Text: 20 Petitioner first claims that the Board improperly interpreted sections 3(h)(3), 3(h)(4), and 3(h)(6). More specifically, petitioner argues that: (1) the Board was bound by the Gebbie interpretation of sections 3(h)(3) and 3(h)(4); (2) Gebbie established entitlement for the entire group of similarly situated railroad retirees; and, (3) section 3(h)(6) should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Gebbie decision in order to avoid the grandfathering of an improper construction. After careful consideration of these arguments, we affirm the Board's interpretation and application of section 3(h)(6). 21 Petitioner overestimates the force and scope of Gebbie. First, the dispositive effect of Gebbie was clearly limited to the three petitioners involved in that case. The Gebbie court specifically refused to certify a class for the reason that the court was not an appropriate forum for such action. Gebbie, supra, at 516 n. 9. In Frock, supra, the Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that Gebbie decided only the entitlement of the individual petitioner in that case. Id. at 1046. 22 Secondly, Gebbie was only the decision of one circuit court and, although it must be given deference, it need not be taken by the Board as the law of the land. The Seventh Circuit rejected this role of the ultimate decisionmaker when it stated that to conclude otherwise would be to make decisions of the Seventh Circuit binding on all other circuits simply because it was the first court presented with the issue. Id. (footnote omitted). Federal appellate courts can, and do, differ in their conclusions as to the law affecting agency action. Id. That is what makes horseraces and Supreme Court cases. 23 As noted by the Frock court, the Gebbie petitioners had three choices as to the circuit in which they could bring their claims. 4 Id. Gebbie bound the Board only as to the three named petitioners. Subsequent petitioners could continue to challenge the Board's interpretation as in Shuff v. United States Railroad Retirement Board, No. 80-2791 (7th Cir. Apr. 9, 1981), where, in an unpublished order, the Seventh Circuit summarily reversed the Board, followed Gebbie, and determined the entitlement of the petitioner to dual benefits. However, until the appearance of more far-reaching precedent, the Board was free to continue to apply its interpretation of sections 3(h)(3) and 3(h)(4). 24 Finally, the subsequent legislative history connected with the OBRA and section 3(h)(6) makes it clear that Congress believed the Board's interpretation of 3(h)(3) and 3(h)(4) to be correct. 25 The Board, as required by the 1974 Act, reduced the annuity of these employees by the amount of the newly awarded social security benefits. The Board determined that the Social Security Act as in effect in 1974 (which is the measure of the windfall component) is zero because such nondependent males could not have qualified for a husband's social security benefit in 1974. The Court in Gebbie reversed the Board's determination in the case, saying, in effect, that the Social Security Act as in effect in 1974 should be interpreted in the light of the 1977 decisions. The House bill thus amended the law to make clear that the phrase the Social Security Act as in effect on December 31, 1974 is intended to mean the Social Security Act as it was in effect and being administered on December 31, 1974. 26 H.Conf.Rep. No. 97-208, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 863, reprinted in [1981] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1010, 1225. 27 In conclusion, we believe that the Seventh Circuit in Frock, in denying dual benefits to individuals whose entitlement to them had not been determined prior to August 13, 1981, applied section 3(h)(6) precisely as Congress intended.B. The Due Process Claims 28 Petitioner argues that the Board's failure to provide him with a favorable determination of entitlement prior to the running of the time limits imposed by section 3(h)(6) violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. We do not agree. 29 As discussed above, the Board was under no obligation to give petitioner a favorable determination of entitlement. Therefore, the question we here address is whether the Board violated petitioner's due process rights by not making some type of determination prior to August 13, 1981, the cutoff date provided by section 3(h)(6). 30 Petitioner relies primarily on Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982). In Logan, the Court held that the failure of a state agency to hold a statutorily mandated hearing within the time limits imposed by that statute deprived Logan of a property right without due process. 31 The major difference between Logan and this case is that in Logan, the state agency was required by statute to hold a hearing within 120 days. Thus, Logan had an entitlement interest in having his claim heard within the statutory time limit. Here, however, section 3(h)(6) imposes no such obligation on the Board. Section 3(h)(6) only provides that in order to receive dual benefits, an individual must have been determined prior to August 13, 1981, to be entitled to such benefits. Thus, section 3(h)(6) does not provide petitioner with a due process right to have had his entitlement determined prior to the cutoff date. Therefore, there was no procedure or process denied petitioner which was due him. Frock, supra at 1047. 32 In addition, we note that the time between the filing of Givens' appeal on April 15, 1980, and the Board's decision on November 10, 1981, was not so unreasonable as to violate due process. See Frock, supra, at 1047 n. 13. Cf. Kelly v. Railroad Retirement Board, 625 F.2d 486 (3d Cir.1980) (delay of three years, nine months, in processing disability claim without valid reason held to violate due process guarantees). Our conclusion in this regard is further supported by a lack of evidence that the Board deliberately delayed action on [Givens' application] in anticipation of the passage of section 3(h)(6), Frock, supra, at 1047 n. 13, or as an attempt to take advantage of the running of the time limits in that section. In sum, the Board's actions did not violate Givens' due process rights. C. Equal Protection: Rational Line Drawing 33 Petitioner next argues that section 3(h)(6) violates the equal protection principle of the Fifth Amendment 5 by creating a classification system based upon the determination of entitlement by a specific date. Petitioner's claim focuses on the fact that an award of dual benefits under section 3(h)(6) is dependent upon the actions of the Board rather than upon some type of work-related criteria conceivably within the control of the retiree. Thus, petitioner argues, Congress and the Board have drawn an irrational line between those persons who are and are not entitled to dual benefits. 34 Much of lawmaking is inherently a process of line drawing. Inevitably, when such a line is drawn, there will exist persons who have fallen just short of the mark and who are not eligible for the protection or benefits provided by the law. 35 Here, in an attempt to preserve the economic stability of the railroad retirement system by phasing out dual benefits, Congress chose to draw a line based upon whether entitlement to dual benefits had been determined before August 13, 1981, the date of the enactment of section 3(h)(6). After having analyzed this line drawn by Congress, we cannot say that it violates the equal protection principle. 36 [U]nlike most private pension plans, railroad retirement benefits are not contractual. Congress may alter, and even eliminate, them at any time. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 575, 99 S.Ct. 802, 805, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (footnote omitted). See Fritz, supra, 449 U.S. at 174, 101 S.Ct. at 459. Therefore, we must recognize that the due process clause can be thought to impose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification. Goldfarb, supra, 430 U.S. at 210, 97 S.Ct. at 1028. See Fritz supra, 449 U.S. at 174-77, 101 S.Ct. at 459-60. 37 With this standard of review in mind, we find ourselves in agreement with the Frock court that section 3(h)(6) does not establish a wholly irrational classification. As discussed above, Congress sought to protect the railroad retirement system. Arguably, Congress could have eliminated all dual benefits. However, instead, it chose to recognize and protect expectations created by court decisions and Board actions. Consideration of such expectations is a legitimate concern of Congress. Frock, supra, at 1047. 38 D. Equal Protection: Gender Based Discrimination 39 In his last substantive claim, Petitioner argues that 3(h)(6) violates the equal protection principle in that it improperly insulates the dependency requirements found unconstitutional in Goldfarb. We do not agree. 40 In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979), the Court articulated a two-part test to determine if such a statute improperly discriminated on the basis of sex. The Court stated: 41 The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.... In this second inquiry, impact provides an important starting point, ... but purposeful discrimination is the condition that offends the Constitution. 42 Id. at 274, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. (citations omitted) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 19, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 1277, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)). 43 Here, it is apparent this section 3(h)(6) has a nondiscriminatory purpose and is, thus, not covertly gender-based. Frock, supra, at 1048. By way of section 3(h)(6), Congress sought to preserve the solvency of the railroad retirement system by phasing-out dual benefits and by limiting the application of Gebbie. Frock, supra, at 1049. 44 Nor do we conclude that section 3(h)(6) reflects invidious, gender-based discrimination. Feeney, supra, 442 U.S. at 274, 99 S.Ct. at 2293. In order to achieve its economic purpose, Congress sought to phase out dual benefits for both men and women. The record simply does not support the argument that Congress selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Id. at 279, 99 S.Ct. at 2296. E. Request for Class Certification 45 Petitioner requests that this Court certify a class defined as follows: 46 All past and present male railroaders who have had or will have their Railroad Retirement benefits reduced by the amount of the Social Security benefits received by them, and who meet the requirements imposed under Secs. 3(h)(3) or 3(h)(4) of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. Secs. 231b(h)(3) or (h)(4), for entitlement to a dual benefit, but who have been, or will be, denied this benefit by the Railroad Retirement Board based on its interpretation of Sec. 3(h)(3), (4) or (6). 47 Motion of Petitioners Givens, Wells, and Robbins for an Order Certifying the Class and Memorandum in Support at 1-2. 48 In light of our recent decision in Burns v. United States Railroad Retirement Board, 701 F.2d 189 (D.C.Cir.1983), we deny petitioner's motion. There, in response to a similar request for class certification, we noted that the structure and duties of United States Courts of Appeals makes them inadequate to provide the type of supervision necessary for class actions. As we stated: 49 Rather, we decline to fashion a class action vehicle because our appellate mode of proceeding is not compatible with designation and management of a class. We hear cases in three-judge panels and generally schedule a single argument session. Our province is the law; we do not hold hearings to explore fact questions. Class action certification, however, entails continuing court activity, and multiple decisions, some of them fact-based. 50 Id. at 191. 51 The rationale of Burns applies equally to the case at hand. As such, the motion for class certification is denied.