Opinion ID: 178401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing of Mr. Lewis:

Text: In preparation for Mr. Lewis's sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR), which calculated an advisory sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (USSG) (2008). After determining that Mr. Lewis's offenses involved crack totaling 4.5 kilograms or more, the PSR established a base offense level of 38. See USSG § 2D1.1(c)(1). After adjustments, including a two-level enhancement for possession of a firearm, the total offense level was calculated to be 37. With a criminal history category of III, Mr. Lewis's advisory guidelines sentencing range was 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. Mr. Lewis objected to the drug quantity, arguing that the relevant quantity of crack was between 500 and 1500 grams, which yielded a base offense level of 34. He also objected to the enhancement for possession of a firearm. Additionally, Mr. Lewis filed a sentencing memorandum, in which he stated that defendants convicted of crack cocaine offenses ... endure[ ] sentences 100 times more harsh than their powder cocaine counterparts. Sent. Mem. at 1-2. He further argued that, under Kimbrough, a sentencing court may consider the disparity in the sentencing guidelines between crack cocaine and powder cocaine in determining a reasonable sentence. Sent. Mem. at 3. Mr. Lewis also alleged that under Spears, a court has the ability to impose a variant sentence based on the disparity based on the District Court's own policy disagreement with the guidelines. Sent. Mem. at 4. He thus concluded that a sentencing court must now decide whether, solely as a matter of policy, it disagrees with the way the crack offense levels are calculated under the guidelines, and whether, in all crack cocaine sentencing cases, it will eliminate the disparity by applying to crack cocaine offenses the offense levels that are applicable to powder cocaine offenses. Id. at 5-6. Mr. Lewis accordingly sought a downward variance from the advisory guidelines range, which would result in a sentence of 120 months, the statutory mandatory minimum. At the sentencing hearing, the parties by agreement asked the court to sustain Mr. Lewis's objection to the PSR's calculation of drug quantity, and Mr. Lewis withdrew his objection to the firearm possession enhancement. The district court therefore made findings regarding those two facts and, without objection from either party, determined the total offense level to be 33. With Mr. Lewis's criminal history category of III, this yielded an advisory guidelines range of 168 to 210 months' imprisonment. The district court then invited Mr. Lewis to comment on the sentence to be imposed. He again argued that a variance was appropriate, making his offense level the same as if he had been convicted of offenses involving powder cocaine. The government opposed any variance, and argued for a sentence within the guidelines range as already calculated, noting that the government had revoked Mr. Lewis's pretrial release because of repeated drug usage. The government also addressed particular factors in this case, including Mr. Lewis's possession of a firearm and his extensive criminal history. The government recognized that there could be policy disagreements and that the court could, under Spears, impose a variant sentence based on the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. It further noted, however, that the facts of this case did not warrant a variance. In imposing sentence, the court recognized Mr. Lewis's lengthy criminal history, which included convictions for battery on law enforcement officers and obstruction. Tr. of Sentencing Hr'g at 27, R. Vol. 2 at 30. The court also considered Mr. Lewis to be a significant distributor of crack in his community. Id. at 28, R. Vol. 2 at 31. The court then refused to grant a downward variance, explaining: In regards to the variance, the court for the record would state it understands it has the right to issue a variance, it has the authority to do so. The court's considered the statutory factors as well as the law that's in effect at this time, and... I would find that ... the law right now is not that [the crack/cocaine disparity] should be one to one. Presently, there's legislation pending in congress that would make that the case. But [government counsel] was correct, there's also legislation pending that would increase the penalties. Until congress actually acts, the court would consider the law that's presently in effect. It's true that there is some Department of Justice spokes people, including the attorney general himself, who spoke out in regards to their position as well as the administration's position. That's something this court's aware of. But again, in regards to the weight the court gives that, their arguments, their statements are not the law at this time.... In regards to the variance, well, I don't believe that there's been a sufficient basis shown for this court to grant a variance as it relates to the guideline range that the court finds was accurately and correctly calculated. The court's considered the reasons and the basis offered by defendant in regards to that, but again, at this time, upon review and consideration, it does not grant the variance. Id. at 30-31, R. Vol. 2 at 33-34. In selecting the particular sentence for Mr. Lewis, the court told Mr. Lewis that it was concerned with his criminal history and the nature of that history. The court also noted Mr. Lewis's continued drug use while on pretrial release. The court then determined that a tentative sentence of 168 months would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to satisfy the sentencing objectives, and the court discussed the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). When the court asked Mr. Lewis if he had any objections to the court's proposed findings of fact and tentative sentence, defense counsel responded: No, Your Honor. Well, we object based on the argument that I had made previously concerning the propriety of the variance, I think it would have been appropriate in this case, but we understand the court's ... rationale. Id. at 36. The court then sentenced Mr. Lewis to 168 months' imprisonment on each of the four counts, to be served concurrently. This appeal followed, in which Mr. Lewis argues the District Court failed to properly consider the variance as a matter of policy which constitutes an abuse of discretion and a procedurally [and substantively] unreasonable sentence. Appellant's Br. at 4.