Opinion ID: 2570367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Colorado's Sentencing StatuteSection 18-1.3-401(6) and the Presence of Extraordinary Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstances

Text: Colorado's sentencing system provides for separate classes of offenses and different sentencing options in a complex scheme of interlocking statutes, premised upon the segregation of felony offenses into six levels or classes, each with its own presumptive sentencing range. Under various circumstances, courts are permitted to sentence convicted felons in a mitigated range, as little as half the minimum presumptive sentence, or in an aggravated range, as great as twice the maximum presumptive sentence. Likewise, under various circumstances, courts may be limited to specified portions of the statutorily prescribed range for a given class of felony. Martinez v. People, 69 P.3d 1029, 1031-32 (Colo.2003)(internal citations omitted). This case does not concern the state's separate statutory sentencing provisions, such as special provisions for habitual offenders or special offenders. See, e.g., §§ 18-1.3-801, C.R.S. (2004)(habitual offender statute); XX-XX-XXX, C.R.S. (2004)(special offender statute). Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.3-401(6). Colorado's general sentencing statute provides four ways a sentence might be increased over the presumptive range. First, the minimum sentence must be raised to at least the midpoint in the presumptive range and the judge may sentence up to twice the mandatory maximum term authorized in the presumptive range if one of several offender-based, enumerated extraordinary aggravating circumstances are present. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a), (9). For example, this range applies if: (I) The defendant is convicted of a crime of violence under section 18-1.3-406; (II) The defendant was on parole for another felony at the time of the commission of the felony; (III) The defendant was on probation or was on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for another felony at the time of the commission of the felony; (IV) The defendant was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution for another felony at the time of the commission of a felony. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a). Second, the floor must again be raised to the midpoint of the presumptive range and a sentence up to double the maximum of the presumptive range is authorized if a certain type of crime is committed. § 18-1.3-401(8)(d). For example, if defendants are convicted of class two or three felony child abuse or class three or four felony vehicular homicide during immediate flight from another felony, the court must sentence within the new range. § 18-1.3-401(8)(d)(I), (8)(g). A third way in which a sentence can be increased is when the crime committed is one that the General Assembly has found present[s] an extraordinary risk of harm to society. § 18-1.3-401(10). For these crimes, the maximum penalty in the presumptive range must be increased by a specific number of years and the minimum is not affected. For example, if a particular class three felony is on the statutory list, the maximum term in the presumptive range shall be increased by four years. § 18-1.3-401(10)(a). The crimes that the General Assembly has included on this list of extraordinary risk crimes include: (IX) Aggravated robbery ...; (X) Child abuse ...; (XI) Unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale, or possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, distribute, manufacture or dispense ...; (XII) Any crime of violence.... § 18-1.3-401(10)(b). The fourth type of sentencing, and the only one at issue in this case, is departure from the presumptive range based on the presence of extraordinary aggravating or mitigating circumstances under section 18-1.3-401(6): In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subsection (1) of this section unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the sentencing hearing and the presentence report, and support a different sentence which better serves the purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in section 18-1-102.5. If the court finds such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which is lesser or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the offense. § 18-1.3-401(6). In sentencing under section 18-1.3-401(6), a judge may consider factors related to the offender and the offense. The sentencing judge may consider as extraordinary aggravating circumstances facts that tend to establish an element of an offense as long as they are clearly related to the particular defendant and the circumstance of the crime. Leske, 957 P.2d at 1044; For example, in Leske, we determined that the aggravated sentence based on the nature of the victim and her relationship to the defendant was permissible because it was not based upon `generic' circumstances common to all child sexual assault crimes. Id. at 1045. When a judge imposes an aggravated or mitigated sentence under the authority of section 18-1.3-401(6), he or she must make specific findings on the record of the case, detailing the specific extraordinary circumstances which constitute the reasons for varying from the presumptive sentence. § 18-1.3-401(7). Section 18-1.3-401 requires enhanced sentences in certain cases and authorizes them in other cases. We have interpreted the statute to: mandate a sentence within the aggravated range whenever any of the extraordinary aggravating circumstances specifically enumerated... are present, and to permit a sentence outside the presumptive range whenever any extraordinary mitigating factors, or any extraordinary aggravating factors not specifically listed ... exist. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 922 (Colo.1986)(emphasis in original). We have not characterized section 18-1.3-401(6) sentencing as a legally distinct procedure from presumptive range sentencing. For example, the fact that a judge must specifically record the extraordinary aggravating circumstances considered does not necessarily make section 18-1.3-401(6) sentencing distinct and separate from any other sentencing decision. People v. Walker, 724 P.2d 666, 668 (Colo.1986)(noting that the legislature requires a trial court to explain its reasons for imposing any sentence, whether within or beyond the presumptive range, for purposes of appellate review, fostering rationality and consistency, and providing information to defendants and correctional authorities). Also, some kinds of factors a judge may consider for section 18-1.3-401(6) sentencing are the same kinds of factors that are considered in imposing a sentence in the presumptive range. § 18-1.3-401(1)(b)(I)(the court shall consider the nature and elements of the offense, the character and record of the offender, and all aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender). We have called our sentencing system a spectrum beginning at one-half the presumptive minimum and extending to twice the presumptive maximum. People v. Phillips, 652 P.2d 575, 581 (Colo.1982)(Lohr, J., specially concurring and Erickson, Dubofsky and Quinn, JJ., joining in the concurrence). This spectrum of sentencing effectuates an important legislative intention. In the context of the determinate sentencing system, the General Assembly intended to provide trial judges with discretion that would maximize defendants' chances for a fair and individualized sentence. Id. The flexibility of presumptive and mitigated or aggravated sentencing effectuates the legislative intent by allowing judges to weigh the multitude of [relevant] factors in arriving at an individualized and fair sentence. Id.; see also Leske, 957 P.2d at 1044-45 (the General Assembly intended the trial judge to maintain discretion to distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary factors and exercise its independent judgment in making that distinction).