Opinion ID: 2826649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board’s Anticipation Rejections

Text: Proceedings of the board are governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, which “establishes a scheme of reasoned decisionmaking,” Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154–65 (1999). Under the APA, the board is obligated not only to come to a sound decision, but to fully and particularly set out the bases upon which it reached that decision. In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1997). To permit effective appellate review, the board’s patentability analyses must be both “clearly disclosed and adequately sustained.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943); see In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphasizing that the board is required to “document its reasoning on the record to allow accountability” and to facilitate “effective judicial review”); Gechter, 116 F.3d at 1457 (explaining that the board’s reasoning must be set out with sufficient specificity to enable this court, “without resort to speculation,” to effectively evaluate an anticipation rejection); Mullins v. POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE 9 Dep’t of Energy, 50 F.3d 990, 992 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“It is well established that agencies have a duty to provide reviewing courts with a sufficient explanation for their decisions so that those decisions may be judged against the relevant statutory standards, and that failure to provide such an explanation is grounds for striking down the action.”). Here, however, the board fundamentally miscon- strued Power Integrations’ principal claim construction argument and failed to provide a full and reasoned explanation of its decision to reject claim 1 of the ’876 patent as anticipated. Before this court, the district court, and the board, Power Integrations has consistently argued that claim 1, when read in light of the specification and surrounding claim language, requires that the counter itself—not a pre-programmed memory—controls the digital to analog converter’s output to vary the switching frequency. 1 Br. of Plaintiff-Appellant 9, 18–20; Power Integrations I, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 455; J.A. 817–19, 876–77, 896–98. In its view, the “coupled” limitation in claim 1 requires that the counter be connected to the digital to analog converter in a manner that allows it to pass voltage, current, or control signals to instruct the digital to analog converter. See Power Integrations I, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (“Power Integrations contends that two circuits are coupled when they are connected such that voltage, current, or control signals pass from one to another,” with “the recited coupling . . . present for the purposes of control” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); J.A. 896 (“[Power Integrations] respectfully submits that 1 In Habetler, Wang, and Martin, the prior art ref- erences cited by the board, a memory (either a ROM or an EPROM) separates the digital to analog converter and the counter. See Power Integrations III, 2010 WL 5244756, at –5. 10 POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE the proper claim interpretation by one skilled in the art of the term ‘coupled to’ in the context of the surrounding claim language and the specification would result in two circuits being coupled when they are connected such that voltage, current or control signals pass from one to another for the purposes of control.”). Power Integrations has repeatedly made clear, however, that its proposed claim construction does not preclude the presence of intervening components between the counter and the digital to analog converter. See Power Integrations I, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (emphasizing that Power Integrations’ proposed interpretation of the term “coupled” did not require a “direct connection” between the counter and the digital to analog converter); J.A. 897 (“[Power Integrations] wishes to clarify that [its] construction of the term ‘coupled’ should not be read to imply or necessitate a direct, physical connection, as . . . the specification [does not] require a direct connection or . . . preclude the use of intermediate circuit elements.”). The district court adopted Power Integrations’ proposed construction of the term “coupled,” concluding that it was “consistent with the claim language and the context of the specification which describes the purpose for which various parts of the claimed invention are coupled.” Power Integrations I, 422 F. Supp. 2d at 456. During reexamination, however, the board failed to acknowledge the district court’s claim construction or to assess whether its interpretation of the term “coupled” was consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term. Instead, the board devoted a substantial portion of its analysis to resolving the question of whether the term “coupled” requires a direct connection between the counter and the digital to analog converter. Power Integrations III, 2010 WL 5244756, at –5. Relying on a generalist dictionary definition, the board concluded that no such direct connection is required because “the plain POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE 11 and customary meaning” of the term “couple” is simply to “join[] devices into a single circuit.” Id. at . As noted above, however, when Power Integrations was before the board it repeatedly acknowledged that the term “coupled” does not preclude the presence of intervening components between the counter and the digital to analog converter. Thus, a significant portion of the board’s opinion is devoted to rejecting an argument that Power Integrations not only never made, but instead expressly disavowed. Because so much of the board’s analysis is focused on a red herring—the issue of whether there can be intervening components between the counter and the digital to analog converter—it failed to adequately evaluate Power Integrations’ primary argument, which is that the “coupled” limitation requires that the counter pass control signals, voltage, or current to the digital to analog converter to control it, and that the presence of a memory programmed with data specifying how to vary the switching frequency “uncouples” the counter and the digital to analog converter and severs the requisite control relationship between them. 2 See J.A. 782–83; 814–17, 2 When it petitioned the board for rehearing, Power Integrations argued that the board had “misapprehended or overlooked” its principal argument regarding the proper interpretation of the term “coupled.” J.A. 935. It pointed out that, contrary to the board’s assertions, it had never contended that claim 1 precluded the presence of intervening components between the counter and the digital to analog converter. J.A. 935. The board summarily rejected this argument, however, stating that even accepting Power Integrations’ “contention that elements are ‘coupled’ with the presence of ‘intervening components’ . . . and further assuming that [Power Integrations’] assertion that Habetler discloses an intervening element (i.e., an EPROM) between a counter and a con12 POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE 828, 858. In short, the board failed to straightforwardly and thoroughly assess the critical issue of whether claim 1, when viewed in light of the specification and the surrounding claim language, requires the counter itself—and not the counter and a memory functioning together—to drive the digital to analog converter to adjust the control input and to vary the switching frequency of the power supply. 3 See J.A. 817–19, 823; see also ’876 patent col.1 ll.62–63 (explaining that adding “extra components” to reduce electromagnetic interference is “undesirabl[e]” because it “increase[s] the size and weight of the power supply”). Because the board’s opinion provides us with an inadequate predicate upon which to evaluate its decision to reject claim 1 of the ’876 patent as anticipated, we vacate and remand. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947) (“It will not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency’s action.”); Thrift, 298 F.3d at 1366 (vacating a verter is also true, it follows that Habetler would disclose a counter ‘coupled to’ a converter under [Power Integrations’] proposed analysis.” Power Integrations IV, 2011 WL 1821718, at . 3 Before the board, Power Integrations argued that in the prior art the counter itself does not send any signals to the digital to analog converter. J.A. 818–29. Instead, the counter’s signals are sent to the memory. Thus, in Power Integrations’ view, in prior art systems the digital to analog converter is “coupled to” receive the output of the memory, not the output of the counter. J.A. 352, 358. The board, however, failed to adequately address whether the counter can be deemed “coupled to” the digital to analog converter to “caus[e]” it to adjust the control input and to vary the switching frequency of the power supply, ’876 Patent col.8 ll.51–53, even if the counter does not directly—or even primarily—control the digital to analog converter’s output. POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE 13 board decision because it “failed to provide an adequate ground” for rejecting a claim); see also Walls v. United States, 582 F.3d 1358, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (remanding a personnel decision to the military board and requiring it to act on a completed record). Relying in part upon its construction of the term “coupled” in claim 1, the board determined that claims 17, 18, and 19 were anticipated by Habetler. See Power Integrations III, 2010 WL 5244756, at . Because we vacate the board’s construction of the “coupled” limitation in claim 1, we likewise vacate and remand its anticipation rejections of claims 17, 18, and 19. Perhaps recognizing the deficiencies in the board’s analysis, the solicitor on appeal advances a number of arguments as to why the disputed claims of the ’876 patent should be rejected as anticipated. As a general proposition, however, our review of a patentability determination is confined to “the grounds upon which the Board actually relied.” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curiam) (emphasizing that under the APA, “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court”). We have no warrant to “accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action,” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962), or to supply a reasoned justification for an agency decision that the agency itself has not given, Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (emphasizing that a board decision “must be justified within the four corners of [the] record”). We conclude, moreover, that under the circumstances presented here, the board erred in failing to address the district court’s previous interpretation of the term “cou14 POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE pled.” There is no dispute that the board is not generally bound by a prior judicial construction of a claim term. See In re Trans Tex. Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Indeed, in reexamination it applies a different claim construction standard than that applied by a district court, affording claims “their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.” In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The fact that the board is not generally bound by a previous judicial interpretation of a disputed claim term does not mean, however, that it has no obligation to acknowledge that interpretation or to assess whether it is consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term. 4 Before the board, Power Integrations repeatedly argued that the district court’s claim construction was the only reasonable interpretation of claim 1’s “coupled” limitation when it was viewed in light of the surrounding claim language and the specification. J.A. 817 (“[T]he patent owner respectfully submits that a reasonable person having ordinary skill in the art would understand that when the claim is interpreted [in] the context of the specification and surrounding claim language, as required, two circuits are ‘coupled to’ each other when there is a connection defined between the two circuits such that a voltage, current or control signal passes from one circuit to the other[,] which is the manner in which 4 Fairchild did not appeal the district court’s construction of the term “coupled” in claim 1 of the ’876 patent. In 2013, after the board had denied Power Integrations’ request for rehearing, this court affirmed a jury verdict finding, based on the district court’s claim construction, that claim 1 of the ’876 patent was not invalid for obviousness. See Power Integrations II, 711 F.3d at 1366–68. POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC. v. LEE 15 the claim terms were construed by the District Court.”); see also J.A. 720, 722, 808, 818, 821, 832, 876–77. The board, however, declined to address—or even acknowledge—the district court’s claim construction. Given that Power Integrations’ principal argument to the board about the proper interpretation of the term “coupled” was expressly tied to the district court’s claim construction, we think that the board had an obligation, in these circumstances, to evaluate that construction and to determine whether it was consistent with the broadest reasonable construction of the term. We do not hold that the board must in all cases assess a previous judicial interpretation of a disputed claim term. Nor do we express any view on the merits of Power Integrations’ proposed construction of the term “coupled to.” We hold only that the board on remand should carefully and fully assess whether the disputed claims of the ’876 patent are anticipated by the prior art, setting out its reasoning in sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review. See Lee, 277 F.3d at 1346 (emphasizing that remand is required where a board decision “is potentially lawful but insufficiently or inappropriately explained” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (vacating and remanding a district court’s claim construction determination because the court did “not supply the basis for its reasoning sufficient for a meaningful review”).