Opinion ID: 164398
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request for Release

Text: Roble seeks release pending removal, claiming his incarceration for an indefinite period is unlawful. The law provides that the Attorney General shall detain an alien during the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). If the alien is not removed during this period, he is entitled to release, subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General. Id. § 1231(a)(3). For purposes of this case, the removal period is ninety days from the date the IJ’s order of removal became administratively final, or August 9, 2000, the date on which the BIA affirmed the IJ’s order. See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i). 3 We therefore conclude the ninety-day “removal period” began running for Roble on August 9, 2002, and expired November 7, 2002. Section 1231(a)(6) empowers the DHS to detain an alien beyond the end of the removal period, if he is a “risk to the community” or “unlikely to comply with the order of removal.” Id. § 1231(a)(6). The DHS admits the record does not specify under which of these criteria it continues to hold Roble. The DHS nevertheless contends subsection (a)(6) provides it with authority to continue 3 Although Roble requested review of the IJ’s removal order in his § 2241 petition, the district court did not enter a stay of his removal; therefore § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not extend the date on which the removal period began. -5- detaining Roble. Section 1231(a)(6), however, does not give the DHS carte blanche to detain Roble indefinitely. In Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court discussed the constitutional limitations on indefinite detention under subsection (a)(6). 4 The Supreme Court began by observing that the detention requirement of § 1231(a)(6) has two purposes: (1) assuring the appearance of aliens at immigration proceedings, and (2) protecting the community from dangerous aliens. Id. at 690. As the possibility of removal becomes remote, the first justification drops out. The second justification–protecting the community–is sustainable “only when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections.” Id. at 691. The Court reasoned that 4 The Supreme Court expressly extended the protections in Zadvydas only to aliens who have “effected an entry into the United States.” 533 U.S. at 693. Circuit cases have reached differing results on what constitutes an “entry into the “United States” sufficient to trigger the due process protections discussed in Zadvydas. Compare, e.g., Borrero v. Aljets , 325 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (8th Cir. 2003) (rejecting application of Zadvydas to inadmissible Mariel Cuban paroled into the United States) with Rosales-Garcia v. Holland , 322 F.3d 386, 404-08 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (permitting Mariel Cubans to assert Zadvydas ), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct 2607 (2003). In view of the apparent circuit split, the Supreme Court has agreed to decide a case raising this issue. Benitez v. Wallis , 337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. granted , 124 S. Ct. 1143 (2004). Here, however, we need not reach the issue. Although the DHS mentions the fact that Roble was ordered removed “as an alien inadmissible at the time of his entry into the United States,” Aplee Br. at 3, it does not argue that Zadvydas is thereby inapplicable to this case, see id. at 26-29. We do not foreclose DHS from making this argument on remand. -6- § 1231(a)(6) neither applies narrowly to such “specially dangerous individuals” nor does it provide such “strong procedural protections.” Interpreting the subsection “to avoid a serious constitutional threat,” the Court held that “once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699. The Court created a rebuttable presumption that an alien should be released if he has been detained for six months and provides good reason to believe no significant likelihood exists he will be removed in the foreseeable future. Id. at 701. 5 Here, Roble has been detained for more than six months and because of the injunction barring removal to Somalia, his removal to Somalia does not appear imminent. Whether Roble may be removed to Kenya in the foreseeable future is another matter. The district court avoided this question, concluding Roble’s removal to Kenya was not at issue. Because the IJ ordered Roble removed to Kenya in the alternative, however, Roble’s possible removal to that country is very much in issue. We therefore remand to the district court 5 Roble has undoubtedly been detained for more than six months. We reject the DHS’s argument that the permanent injunction in the Ninth Circuit tolls the six-month period. DHS cites Akinwale v. Ashcroft , 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 n.4 (11th Cir. 2002) in support of its tolling argument. Akinwale , however, reasoned that an alien unjustifiably interferes with his own removal, within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C), by seeking a judicial stay. Nothing suggests the Ninth Circuit stay resulted from Roble’s efforts. -7- to address the issue of whether Roble might be removed to either Somalia or Kenya in the foreseeable future. On remand, the district court must first determine whether a significant likelihood exists that Roble will be removed to Somalia or Kenya within the reasonably foreseeable future. If the court so finds, then the DHS may be entitled to further detain Roble for a reasonable period of time pending removal. Roble’s continued detention would be authorized, however, only if the district court determines that Roble is a flight risk or a risk to the community–factors justifying confinement within that reasonable removal period. See id. at 700. The record presently contains neither a judicial finding concerning the likelihood of Roble’s removal to Somalia or Kenya, nor a judicial finding concerning his flight risk or the risk he may pose to the community if he is released pending removal. The district court should make such findings, as necessary. 6