Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: individual voir dire (# 20 & 57)

Text: Although Appellant raised no objection at the time of trial, he argues on appeal that the trial court violated his fundamental constitutional guarantees when it excused prospective jurors whose personal beliefs prevented them from imposing a sentence of death. This argument, which we see raised in virtually every capital case appealed to us, has been consistently rejected by the United States Supreme Court, Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 838 (2000) (collecting cases), and by this Court, which has repeatedly and consistently held [it] to be without merit. McKinney, 60 S.W.3d at 512. It is a fully adequate response to Appellant's argument to state simply that: [d]eath qualification of jurors is not unconstitutional. Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 678 (2003). Appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously limited the scope of individual voir dire examination. We find the scope of voir dire in this case constitutionally adequate. The trial judge has broad discretion in the area of questioning on voir dire[,] Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104, 116 (2001) (citing Ward v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 404 (1985)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 145, 154 L.Ed.2d 54 (2002), and, in particular, [t]he extent of direct questioning by counsel during voir dire is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 44. During individual voir dire, the trial court asked the following questions, with slight variations from time to time and follow-up questions as necessary, of each prospective juror: If the Defendant is found guilty of Murder as charged and of certain aggravating circumstances the Commonwealth intends to seek the death penalty. However, there are a range of penalties the jury may consider. They include the death penalty, imprisonment for life without the benefit of parole for twenty-five years, imprisonment for life, and a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years. Would your personal beliefs prevent you from imposing any of those four punishments, if the court instructed you to consider then and if warranted by the evidence? Would you automatically vote either for or against: Death? Life without the possibility of consideration of parole for at least 25 years? Life imprisonment? A term of not less than 20 years in prison? Mitigation is evidence about a person's character, background, or circumstances that may be considered as a reason for imposing a less severe punishment than otherwise would be imposed. A mitigating circumstance is the opposite of an aggravating circumstance, which may be a reason for imposing a more severe punishment than otherwise would be imposed. Would you consider any evidence offered to you in mitigation of punishment, if instructed to do so by the court? Would you consider any evidence offered in aggravation of punishment, if instructed to do so by the court? Have you read or heard anything about this case before today? Has anything you may have read or heard caused you to form an opinion concerning this case? Are you able and willing to disregard anything you may have read or heard, and decide this case solely on the evidence introduced during the trial? Appellant submits a list of topics upon which he attempted to question prospective jurors but was prevented from doing so when the trial court sustained objections from the Commonwealth. We find that the trial court properly curtailed questions that were not proper and only confused the panel. Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 44. The trial court was well within its discretion to prohibit Appellant from repeating questions already posed by the trial court, Woodall, 63 S.W.3d at 118, inquiring generally how prospective jurors felt about the death penalty, Id. at 117, what they considered a proper case for the death penalty, Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 839, and whether they believed fewer heinous crimes would occur if the death penalty were employed more often. Woodall, 63 S.W.3d at 117. The mere fact that more detailed questioning might have somehow helped the accused in exercising peremptory challenges does not suffice to show abuse of the discretion in conducting the examination. Id. at 116. Here, [b]oth parties were able to thoroughly voir dire the panel[,] Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 44, and we find no error in the trial court's rulings as to the scope of individual voir dire questioning.