Opinion ID: 2813647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Nugen’s Statutory Claim

Text: The government argues Nugen’s superior-interest theory under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A) is time-barred. It contends Nugen failed to mention the superiorinterest theory in its timely § 853(n) petition, and the fact on which the theory was based, Nugen’s alleged unwritten agreement with Henry, was not mentioned until after the statutory 30-day period in which to file a factually accurate petition had expired. Nugen notes it asserted in its initial timely § 853(n) petition it had acquired legal title to the Audi, and Henry had not. 10 Case: 14-14522 Date Filed: 07/01/2015 Page: 11 of 18 A third party asserting a legal interest in property subject to forfeiture may petition the district judge for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of its alleged interest. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). The petition must “set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner’s right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the petitioner’s acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the property, any additional facts supporting the petitioner’s claim, and the relief sought.” Id. § 853(n)(3). Under § 853(n)(6), a claimant may assert it has a right, title, or interest in the property that renders the forfeiture order invalid because the claimant’s legal right, title, or interest in the property is (1) vested in the petitioner, rather than the defendant, or (2) superior to the defendant’s right, title, or interest. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). Alternatively, the claimant may assert it is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property. See id. § 853(n)(6)(B). In United States v. Soreide, 461 F.3d 1351, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2006), petitioner Lynn Soreide, ex-wife of the criminal defendant, filed two timely § 853(n)(2) petitions, both of which recounted the facts of her purchases of the subject properties and asserted she was a bona fide purchaser for value of right, title, or interest in them. See id. at 1352-53, 1355. In response to the government’s summary judgment motion three months later, Soreide asserted for the first time she had held an interest in one of the properties superior to her ex-husband’s 11 Case: 14-14522 Date Filed: 07/01/2015 Page: 12 of 18 interest in the property. Id. at 1353, 1355. The district judge addressed the arguments in a summary judgment order and found them to be meritless. Id. at 1355. On appeal, we determined Soreide’s superior-interest theory was asserted untimely, because it appeared in neither of her two timely § 853(n) petitions; instead, it first appeared in her response to the government’s summary judgment motion. Id. We explained we would not disturb a district judge’s summary judgment denying relief in a § 853(n) ancillary proceeding, where the claimant did not present her theory of ownership timely as required under § 853(n)(2) and (3): “We will not vacate the summary judgment nor provide relief from the final order of forfeiture based upon a claim that was not asserted as required by the statute.” Id. Notably, the factual nature of Nugen’s claim had evolved from its § 853(n) petition to summary judgment. In its timely § 853(n) petition, Nugen stated (1) it was a bona fide purchaser of the Audi; (2) it was the titled owner of the Audi; (3) it had acquired title on July 13, 2010, after purchasing the Audi from Triple M; and (4) Henry never had purchased the Audi or obtained any right, title, or interest in the Audi. On summary judgment, Nugen stated (1) it had purchased the Audi using business funds, and (2) Henry had entered into an unwritten agreement to purchase the Audi from Nugen, or Hue, taken possession of the Audi, and had begun making payments under that agreement. 12 Case: 14-14522 Date Filed: 07/01/2015 Page: 13 of 18 Although Nugen omitted important supporting facts from its timely § 853(n) petition and changed its position regarding the nature of its interest in the Audi, this case is distinguishable from Soreide. Nugen’s petition asserted theories under both § 853(n)(6)(A) (the superior-interest provision) and § 853(n)(6)(B) (the bona fide-purchaser provision), because Nugen stated (1) it held the title to the Audi, and Henry had no right, title, or interest in the Audi, and (2) it was a bona fide purchaser of the Audi. Unlike Soreide, Nugen did not switch from asserting only a claim under § 853(n)(6)(B) (the bona fide-purchaser provision) in its timely § 853(n) petition to asserting a belated claim under § 853(n)(6)(A) (the superiorinterest provision). See Soreide, 461 F.3d at 1355. Consequently, we decline to deem Nugen’s § 853(n)(6)(A) theory untimely or improperly raised.