Opinion ID: 1728977
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court's finding of common law waiver is supported by the facts.

Text: ¶ 14. Addison next argues that, even if the Court determines that waiver of an arbitration provision is not governed by § 11-15-103, reversal is still appropriate as there are no facts to support the trial court's finding of common law waiver. The trial court made an express factual finding that Addison waived any objection to the deletion of the arbitration provisions by his conduct subsequent to the execution of the contract. The trial court found that Addison continually objected to the provisions in the contract regarding the schedule for construction, yet he never objected to the deletion of the arbitration clause. Further, the trial court noted that Addison proceeded with the construction of the elementary school under the contract as executed. These facts persuaded the trial court that Addison had waived his right to object to the deletion of arbitration provisions from the contract in accordance with Mississippi precedent. ¶ 15. The trial court cited numerous cases in support of this Court's long-standing principle that a party to a contract may by words or conduct waive a right to which he would otherwise have been entitled. Canizaro v. Mobile Communications Corp., 655 So.2d 25, 29 (Miss.1995) (citing Mariana v. Hennington, 229 Miss. 212, 90 So.2d 356, 362 (1956); Partee v. Pepple, 197 Miss. 486, 20 So.2d 73, 78 (1944)). Additionally, the trial court cited Eastline Corp. v. Marion Apartments, Ltd., 524 So.2d 582 (Miss.1988), where this Court found that parties to a construction contract may waive the stipulation that all changes in work be approved through written change orders. Sentinel Indus. Contracting Corp. v. Kimmins Indus. Serv. Corp., 743 So.2d at 964 (citing Eastline, 524 So.2d at 584). In Eastline, the Court stated that: Among the acts or conduct amounting to a waiver are the owner's knowledge of, agreement to, or acquiescence in such extra work, a course of dealing which repeatedly disregards such stipulation, and a promise to pay for extra work, orally requested by the owner and performed in reliance on that promise. 524 So.2d at 584. ¶ 16. The existence of a waiver is a factual determination to be made by the trial court, and this Court's scope of review is limited and governed by the manifest error/substantial evidence standard. Ewing v. Adams, 573 So.2d 1364, 1367-68 (Miss.1990) (citing Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Sklar, 555 So.2d 1024, 1031 (Miss. 1990)). ¶ 17. In light of this standard of review, the trial court did not err in finding that there was substantial evidence to support a finding that Addison waived his right to object to the deletion of the arbitration provisions. Subsequent to the signing of the contract, Addison had his lawyer write a letter to the School System regarding scheduling problems. Addison also engaged in a lot of correspondence with the architect concerning Addison's problems and concerns. Addison never sent a letter objecting to the deletion of the arbitration provisions, however. Furthermore, Addison did acquiesce to the contract by proceeding with the construction of the school. In granting the School System's Application to Stay Arbitration, the circuit court considered the evidence and testimony and found that Addison had waived his rights under the alleged arbitration provision. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court's holding was indeed substantiated by the evidence. ¶ 18. Addison further argues that in order for a waiver to take place, the right or advantage must not only be known, but it must also be in existence and available; in other words, the need to exercise or relinquish a right must be ripe. Addison claims that he objected to the scheduling provisions because scheduling problems were in fact occurring. He further claims that [w]hen scheduling and other problems reached the stage of dispute ripe for resolution, Addison seized on its right to arbitrate that dispute.... Essentially, Addison is arguing that he did not complain about the deletion of the arbitration clause because he had no need to rely on the arbitration provisions until a conflict arose. Addison cites no case law in support of his contention that the need to rely on arbitration must arise before objection to the deletion of the provisions may be raised. Mississippi law clearly holds that parties to a construction agreement, as a matter of right to contract, may in advance bind themselves to compulsory arbitration of disputes that arise between them, Craig v. Barber, 524 So.2d 974 (Miss.1988), and that arbitration provisions are now recognized to be valid even before a dispute arises. IP Timberlands, 726 So.2d at 105. If Addison ever had a right to arbitration, that right was in existence from the outset of the contract. Addison had no need to wait until the issue of arbitration became ripe to object to a deletion of the arbitration provisions. ¶ 19. Accordingly the trial court did not err in holding that Addison waived his right to object to the deletion of the arbitration provisions. This Court affirms the trial court on the issue of waiver, thereby rendering Addison's other issues moot.