Opinion ID: 1494066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: As this Court stated in the landmark decision Legislative Research Commission ex rel. Prather v. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907, 914 (1984), quoting Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2784, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983): The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted. The wisdom of these words is particularly evident in circumstances such as these, when the Court is weighing actions taken by the judiciary. Given that there is no other limitation on the judiciary's power within the checks and balances of our system of government, the Court must be especially careful to restrain its own exercise of power. Our state Constitution specifically gives the General Assembly the exclusive power to determine the subject matter jurisdiction of the state's district and circuit courts. Ky. Const. §§ 112(3) and 113(3). The only exception to this exclusive power is contained in § 110(5)(b) of the Constitution, which provides that the Chief Justice shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment necessary for the prompt disposition of causes . . . . Our state Constitution also contains explicit provisions which, on the one hand, mandate separation among the three branches of government, and on the other hand, specifically prohibit incursion of one branch of government into the powers and functions of the others. LRC v. Brown, supra, 664 S.W.2d at 912, citing Ky. Const. §§ 27 and 28. This Court has recently been extremely vigilant in upholding those provisions. See id.: [I]t has been our view, in interpreting Sections 27 and 28, that the separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to Kentucky's tripartite system of government and must be `strictly construed.' (Citation omitted.); Kentucky Ass'n of Realtors, Inc. v. Musselman, Ky., 817 S.W.2d 213, 216 (1991); Diemer v. Commonwealth, Ky., 786 S.W.2d 861 (1990). Here, the Chief Justice in March 1991 assigned judges to a new Family Court, and without any legislative authorization, gave the judges elements of the subject matter jurisdiction of both district and state courts. The Chief Justice did not set any limit on the length of time these special judges would serve. Some of them have now served more than three and one-half years with no end in sight. The Chief Justice also did not explain why he made these appointments, much less whether he deemed these assignments necessary for the prompt disposition of causes. On the contrary, when the 1988 General Assembly authorized the Family Court Feasibility Task Force in House Concurrent Resolution 30, the legislature indicated it hoped the Family Court might achieve two objectives entirely unrelated to prompt decision making: continuity of judicial decision-making in situations involving multiple family issues, and development of expertise in the management and disposal of family law cases by the Kentucky judiciary. 1988 Ky.Acts Ch. 128, HCR 30. The majority's opinion concludes that the Chief Justice's appointments are simply to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, op., supra, at 684, and under that deferential standard, the appointments are constitutionally permissible as part of a a temporary `joint research project' of the judiciary and General Assembly. Id., at 685. I cannot agree with either conclusion. First, while it may be appropriate to adopt the abuse of discretion standard toward routine administrative actions the Chief Justice takes as executive head of the Court of Justice, Ky. Const. § 110(5)(b), that deferential standard of review is completely inconsistent with the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. Applying the abuse of discretion standard in this case squarely contradicts the fundamental doctrine that conduct by one constitutional actor involving the possible incursion of one branch of government into the powers and functions of the others must be strictly construed. LRC v. Brown, supra, 664 S.W.2d at 912. Second, even applying the abuse of discretion standard, there is no support in the record for the Chief Justice's actions, and the majority's ruling makes the restrictive language of § 110(5)(b) meaningless. Indeed, the majority's decision is made even more unnerving by its suggestion that the Family Court is constitutionally permissible because it is simply a joint research project. So far as I know, there is no precedent for the contention that the Constitution can be suspended for a research project, no matter how praiseworthy its aims.