Opinion ID: 2814246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial shackling

Text: Defendant claims he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial when he was ―repeatedly and unnecessarily‖ restrained during pretrial proceedings without an adequate showing of manifest need and without employing less restrictive alternatives. He argues the shackling rendered his trial structurally unsound and resulted in prejudice. This claim is meritless. a) Background During the initial hearing on defendant‘s motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers, defense counsel objected to defendant‘s being shackled in the courtroom. The trial court ordered defendant‘s waist chains removed and his hands placed in regular handcuffs in front of his body. After counsel continued to object to the handcuffs, the prosecutor placed on the record various reasons justifying the shackling, including that defendant was being tried for three capital murders and had specialized military training. The court ultimately ruled the ―limited restraints‖ would remain for purposes of the current proceedings. At the next hearing, defense counsel objected to any shackling of defendant, indicating defendant would ―waive all appearances if he has to go through this shackling business.‖ The court stated it was willing to order defendant not be restrained in the courtroom and to be restrained only during transit in the public halls of the courthouse, a routine security measure in the San Bernardino courthouse not limited to defendant. The prosecutor concurred and the court ordered defendant ―not be shackled in the courtroom.‖ 19 Defendant subsequently filed a motion objecting to the use of restraints in the holding areas of the courthouse, where he might be kept for several hours before a court appearance, and further requesting the case be transferred back to the Rancho Cucamonga courthouse, where the preliminary hearing had been held and where intransit shackling apparently was not required. The trial court ultimately ordered that defendant not be restrained in the holding facilities or the courtroom. However, it found the standard procedure of shackling prisoners during public transit between the holding cell and the courtroom to be a reasonable security precaution and denied without prejudice the request to transfer the case to Rancho Cucamonga. Later, defendant appeared in court to personally waive his presence at that and all future pretrial hearings. Although his legs were shackled at the time, the court assured defendant the shackles would be removed in the courtroom if he chose to participate in the proceedings. After defendant waived his presence, counsel asked he not be transported to court again until the penalty phase jury trial or transfer of the case to Rancho Cucamonga. The balance of pretrial proceedings as well as the guilt phase bench trial took place in San Bernardino. Thereafter, defendant filed a written request to have the penalty phase tried in Rancho Cucamonga with jurors from its West End Judicial District. The trial court denied the request in part, ordering that jury selection occur in San Bernardino but that the panel be drawn exclusively from the West End. Defendant was ordered to personally appear to address jury selection issues but his counsel objected, claiming that the court‘s promises concerning shackling had not been kept and again objecting to the in-transit shackling. The court overruled the objection, finding it had accommodated defendant throughout the proceedings. Subsequent pre-penalty-phase proceedings and the initial portion of jury selection (primarily hardship excusals and challenges for cause based on the juror questionnaires) took place in San Bernardino, but the remainder of jury 20 selection and the penalty phase trial took place in Rancho Cucamonga, after which there were no further shackling objections. b) Analysis No defendant ―may be subjected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary for his [or her] detention to answer the charge.‖ (§ 688.) However, an appellate court will not overturn a trial court‘s decision to restrain a defendant ―absent ‗a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion.‘ ‖ (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1050 (Wallace).) The jurisprudence on shackling primarily concerns situations that might prejudice a jury. Such cases hold that under state law, in light of the potential harm to the constitutional presumption of innocence and right to be present and participate in one‘s defense, ― ‗[a] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury‘s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.‘ ‖ (Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1050, quoting People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290–291; see People v. Harrington (1871) 42 Cal. 165, 168–169; see also Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 624.) Defendant incorrectly assumes the propriety of shackling a defendant while in transit through the public hallways of a courthouse to attend a pretrial hearing, the factual scenario presented here, should be assessed under the same standards used to determine whether a defendant can be shackled while in the courtroom. Not so. The considerations of public safety and the need for restraints are different during prisoner transport than when a defendant is seated in a secured courtroom. We have long observed that a defendant may be restrained while in transit between a jail and the courtroom without reference to any particularized showing of need. (See, e.g., People v. Ross (1967) 67 Cal.2d 64, 72 [―It was a reasonable practice for the sheriff to keep prisoners handcuffed while in transit, and the fact that the handcuffs were removed inside the courtroom rather 21 than outside added to the security.‖]; People v. Metzger (1904) 143 Cal. 447, 449 [―In many cases it is proper, and it is often necessary as a precaution, to manacle a prisoner to secure his safe conduct and guard against an escape while on the way from the jail to the courtroom.‖]); see also People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 180; accord, People v. Jacobs (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1140–1141; People v. Du Bose (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 544, 549–550; U. S. v. Leach (8th Cir. 1970) 429 F.2d 956, 962.].) Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion in the use of physical restraints during defendant‘s transit through the public hallways of the San Bernardino courthouse without any particularized showing of need. The shackling was a reasonable and limited precaution taken to retain custody of an accused and was no more restraint than was necessary for his detention. The in-transit physical restraints in no way affected the conduct or outcome of the trial, whether before judge or jury, nor did they impinge upon the presumption of innocence or defendant‘s right to present a defense. In his reply, defendant argues that given the necessity of shackling him for transport through the halls to his courtroom in San Bernardino, ―the unreasonable burden placed on this defendant should have been ameliorated by moving the proceeding to a different courtroom or to Rancho Cucamonga.‖ He cites no authority to support this proposition, nor are we aware of any. As noted, defendant‘s shackling for security during transport was a limited and reasonable imposition. The trial court was not required to move the proceedings to a different courtroom or to the Rancho Cucamonga courthouse simply to obviate this precaution. 2. Waiver of the right to be present at pretrial and guilt phase proceedings Defendant claims the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial when it excused him from numerous pretrial proceedings and the guilt phase of his trial based on a waiver of his personal presence that allegedly was coerced by ―painful, excessive, and unnecessary shackling.‖ He additionally 22 contends the trial court violated sections 977 and 1043 by accepting involuntary waivers of his right to be personally present at the guilt phase of his capital murder trial without adequate justification. a) Constitutional right to be present ―Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant has the right to be personally present at any proceeding in which his appearance is necessary to prevent ‗interference with [his] opportunity for effective cross-examination.‘ [Citations.] Due process guarantees the right to be present at any ‗stage . . . that is critical to [the] outcome‘ and where the defendant‘s ‗presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure.‘ ‖ (People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861.) The state constitutional right to be present at trial, which is guaranteed by article I of the California Constitution, ― ‗is generally coextensive with the federal due process right.‘ ‖ (Butler, at p. 861.) As a matter of both federal and state constitutional law, however, a defendant may validly waive his or her right to be present during a critical stage of the trial, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 20–21 (Moon); People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1210 (Jackson).) Defendant premises his challenge to the voluntariness of his right to be present waivers entirely on the argument that the waivers were induced and coerced by improper shackling. He contends he was forced to waive his presence ―simply because he could not endure the effects of the wrist, waist and leg chains every day for more than eight hours a day.‖ (Italics added.) The record demonstrates, however, that the trial court relieved defendant of all physical restraints in the courtroom and holding cell prior to any evidentiary hearings or critical phases of the postarraignment proceedings. Thereafter, defendant remained subjected to physical restraints only for the time it took to transport him to and from the holding cell and the courtroom. Having concluded that this limited in-transit shackling was not an abuse of the trial court‘s discretion, we further conclude 23 the use of restraints in transit did not improperly coerce defendant to waive his presence at the pretrial and guilt phase proceedings, particularly as the court permitted him to remain completely unrestrained in the courtroom. An analogous situation was presented in People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324 (Price). After a hearing outside the presence of the jury during which the evidence established the defendant had committed multiple acts and threats of violence against officers at the jail or while being transported to court, the court ordered he be secured to his chair in the courtroom by a single belly chain not visible to the jury. The defendant then stated ―he would rather be absent from the trial than appear before the jury in chains. The trial court allowed defendant to leave the courtroom and return to the jail, after informing defendant that his leaving would be construed as a voluntary waiver of presence. After giving the matter further thought, the court directed jail officers to bring defendant back to the courtroom, but defendant refused to dress in civilian clothing for the court appearance. The court then concluded that defendant had effectively waived his presence. The remainder of the guilt phase proceeded in his absence.‖ (Id. at pp. 404– 405.) On appeal, we found ―no constitutional infirmity in the trial court‘s decisions . . . to accept defendant‘s actions as a voluntary waiver and to proceed with the guilt phase in defendant‘s absence.‖ (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 405.) Similarly here, we find no constitutional infirmity in defendant‘s waivers of his right to be present at pretrial proceedings and the guilt phase, even assuming such waivers were motivated in part by concerns about the in-transit shackling that would have accompanied his appearing in court. b) Statutory right to be present The issue of statutory error is another matter. As we have previously acknowledged, ―defendant‘s statutory ability to waive his presence in a capital case is 24 more circumscribed than the associated ability to waive his constitutional right.‖ (People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 135 (Rundle); see also Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211.) Specifically, section 977 requires any defendant charged with a felony to ―be personally present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his or her right to be personally present, as provided by paragraph (2).‖ (§ 977, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) Section 1043 provides that a felony defendant ―shall be personally present at the trial‖ (id., subd. (a)), but that the trial may continue in a defendant‘s absence if the defendant (1) persists in disruptive behavior after being warned (id., subd. (b)(1)); (2) is voluntarily absent in ―[a]ny prosecution for an offense which is not punishable by death‖ (id., subd. (b)(2), italics added); or (3) has waived his rights ―in accordance with Section 977‖ (id., subd. (d)). Read together, the statutes provide that a capital defendant cannot voluntarily waive his right to be present during the proceedings listed in section 977, including those portions of the trial in which evidence is taken, and he may not be removed from the courtroom pursuant to section 1043 unless he has been disruptive or threatens to be disruptive. Defendant correctly contends his absence during the guilt phase violated sections 977 and 1043. However, assuming defendant has not forfeited his claim of statutory error by failing to raise it below (see Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 135), the error does not warrant reversal of the judgment because it is not reasonably probable the result of the trial would have been more favorable to defendant absent the error. (See People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 968.) Defendant fails to explain how he could have effectively assisted counsel in subjecting the prosecution‘s case to meaningful adversarial testing. We therefore conclude the violations of sections 977 and 1043 were harmless. (See, e.g., Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 21.) 25 Relying upon Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, defendant also contends the statutory violation deprived him of his federal constitutional procedural due process rights because the ―arbitrary‖ violation of section 977 and section 1043 allegedly deprived him of a state-created ―liberty interest‖ in the proper application of state law. We have previously rejected this exact argument. (See Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 136.) 3. Waiver of the right to a guilt phase jury Defendant claims the ―wanton infliction of pain‖ caused by the daily courthouse shackling not only coerced a waiver of his right to be present at the guilt phase, but also resulted in the involuntary waiver of his right to a jury trial at the guilt phase in order to avoid the alleged ―embarrassment and prejudice‖ attendant to being tried by a jury while he was not present. He argues the failure to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial violated his state and federal constitutional right to due process and requires the reversal of his conviction. As with his claim concerning the waiver of his right to be present, this claim is without merit. At a pretrial status conference, the prosecutor informed the court he had discussed with defense counsel the possibility of having a bench trial for the guilt phase. Defense counsel confirmed, stating ―I am inclined to agree to recommend to my client that if he‘s agreeable, then we‘re agreeable to a court trial on the guilt phase[, although w]e would still want a jury trial in the penalty phase.‖ At the next status conference, defense counsel confirmed defendant had filed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial of the guilt phase, stating, ―[W]e don‘t wish to have a jury decide [the issue of defendant‘s guilt or innocence,] just the court.‖ The court indicated a personal appearance by defendant was required for the waiver to be effective. Defendant subsequently appeared in person via closed-circuit television to waive his right to a guilt phase jury trial. In response to questioning by the court, defendant 26 indicated he understood (1) he had an absolute right to a jury trial in both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, (2) in a jury trial, if one of the 12 jurors was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty, the jury could not return a guilty verdict, (3) if he waived his right to a jury trial, instead of 12 people deciding the issue of his guilt or innocence, the judge alone would make that decision, and (4) it could be easier for the prosecution to convince only one person, as opposed to 12, that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant nevertheless stated he wished to waive his right to a jury trial for the guilt phase, confirming he had discussed the issue with his