Opinion ID: 2599854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Marsden Motion

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion to relieve his attorney and appoint new counsel. ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden ).) As we explain, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant moved on September 18, 1997, to relieve his appointed trial attorney, Antonio Bestard, and have new counsel appointed. After closing the hearing, the trial court heard defendant's motion, which consisted primarily of four complaints: (1) Counsel was overly concerned with convincing defendant to accept a plea bargain of life without the possibility of parole and dismissal of the sex crime charges. According to defendant, for the last 17 months that is all counsel talked about. (2) Counsel discussed the case with his (counsel's) teenage son. (3) Counsel was disrespectful and sarcastic. According to defendant, counsel doesn't talk with me; he talks at me. (4) Counsel had not discussed the defense witnesses with him. Defendant admitted he did not believe counsel had failed to do anything that should have been done. After listening to defendant's complaints, the trial court asked counsel for a response. Regarding his urging defendant to take the plea bargain offered by the prosecutor, Bestard said he thought the prosecutor's offer was not the most generous but that it had the advantage of striking charges related to the sexual assault on the victim, which would inure to defendant's benefit in prison as other prisoners don't take too kindly about prisoners sodomizing women. Bestard suggested that if defendant had a sexual jacket in state prison, he would be victimized by fellow prisoners. Although he did not say so explicitly, implicit in Bestard's discussion was that he thought defendant's prospects at trial were dim, noting that people with whom he had discussed the case were all appalled at the facts. The trial court made the point explicit for counsel, informing defendant: I think what Mr. Bestard is saying to you is, look, there are significant risks in this case. There is a high danger if you take the case to trial. Defendant replied that he understood. Regarding having discussed the case with his teenage son, counsel explained: One night ... I was preparing for this case and my son happened to be in my study and looked at the charges, particularly the sodomy charges, and asked about them and I said this is a guy who is being accused of sodomizing his mother and then killing her, and my son said, `God, dad, that is really ugly' and I just shared that with [defendant] ... to tell him that the reaction to this case particularly is one of shock. Counsel used this example to bolster his argument to defendant that the case in defense was not a strong one, explaining that he had discussed the case (without giving defendant's name) with other lawyers, judges, public defenders, [and] probation officers, [a]nd they are appalled at the charges, they are appalled at the factual situation. Regarding defendant's allegation that counsel was disrespectful and sarcastic, counsel explained: I don't believe so, but then everyone has their own sensitivity levels. I have talked to Mr. Abilez in a very straightforward, brusque manner at times and that is my personality. I told him at the beginning of this case, which I tell most defendants, is that I am not here to tell you you have got a great case. I am your sparring partner, and if I am going to be your sparring partner, I am going to take my best shots at you, because the district attorney is going to be twice as hard on you and I want to make sure that you understand, so I am very critical of things that Mr. Abilez has said. Counsel's assertion that he was very critical of things was an apparent reference to defendant's claim that he had been an altar boy at St. Margaret's Catholic Church and had been in the Cub Scouts. Counsel told the court that he had investigated both claims for potential mitigating evidence and found no evidence to support either one. Finally, regarding defendant's claim that counsel had failed to discuss the defense witnesses with him, counsel admitted that defendant has mentioned witnesses to me and I told him to talk to Mr. Royce who is the investigator. [Defendant] asked me to talk to witnesses. I don't talk to witnesses and the reason for that is that I don't like to be called to the stand [by the prosecutor], so I ... have Mr. Royce talk to them and then we  we take it from there. Counsel continued: I mentioned all these witnesses. If [defendant] has any others that we haven't gotten to, I would like to know who they are. Counsel averred that defendant knows of the witnesses that we have been talking to. In fact, not only did I see him last night, but Mr. Royce saw him last night, too, to discuss this case. When the trial court asked defendant whether he had had an opportunity to discuss the witnesses with the defense investigator and whether he provided you with information regarding what he has learned from the witnesses, defendant answered in the affirmative. After hearing from both defendant and defense counsel, the trial court denied the Marsden motion, explaining to defendant: Well, it does appear to me that there are some conflicts which have developed between counsel and the defendant, but frankly, in the court's view, they are the sort of conflicts that I would expect in a situation which is high-tension, high-stress, high-anxiety, and not the sort of thing that I believe would warrant granting the motion. [¶] ... I don't think that Mr. Bestard has done anything that would be detrimental to your case. On the contrary, I think he has very aggressively pursued your defense in all aspects. [¶] I think that there may be some tension as a result of the communication, but I think ultimately you are better off with a lawyer that tells you like it is than one who tells you what you want to hear until it is too late. Also: I don't see that there has been a breakdown in the relationship between the two of you of such a kind that would make it impossible for [counsel] to represent you in this case. The court then denied defendant's Marsden motion.
Defendants in capital cases often express dissatisfaction with their appointed counsel, affording us ample opportunity to address the contours of the rule set forth in Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44. The rule is well settled. `When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.' ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173. 204, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302.) The decision whether to grant a requested substitution is within the discretion of the trial court; appellate courts will not find an abuse of that discretion unless the failure to remove appointed counsel and appoint replacement counsel would `substantially impair'' the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 681, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.) Defendant presents no issue that counsel was failing to provide adequate legal representation. Indeed, there was considerable evidence that counsel's investigator had been active on the job and that counsel had prepared three full binders of trial material, including a 110-page synopsis of his investigator's work. Although defendant now argues there was no verification counsel had in fact completed such work, the trial court was entitled to accept counsel's description of the amount of work he had completed. ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1245, 131 Cal. Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762.) Moreover, although defendant disputed counsel's claim they had met for one hour and 35 minutes in the week preceding the hearing on the Marsden motion, claiming they had met for only 45 minutes, the discrepancy is de minimis. Defendant similarly fails to establish that the trial court's inquiry into his complaint was deficient. The record demonstrates the court allowed defendant to explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel and permitted counsel to respond. Nor has defendant demonstrated an irreconcilable conflict had developed. Counsel had adequate explanations for all of defendant's complaints, and `[t]o the extent there was a credibility question between defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court was entitled to accept counsel's explanation.' ( People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1245, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762.) Defendant was given full opportunity to air all of his complaints, and counsel to respond to them. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 606, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) We perceive no abuse of discretion. Defendant now raises several additional reasons to support his claim that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Marsden motion, but none has merit. He first argues the trial court improperly denied his motion by relying solely on its courtroom observations of defense counsel, without permitting defendant to relate the basis for his unhappiness. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1091, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 753, 196 Cal. Rptr. 382.) The record belies this claim. The trial court gave defendant ample opportunity to explain the basis of his unhappiness and then denied the motion based in part on counsel's explanations of his conduct. Second, defendant argues he could no longer trust Bestard, noting he had breached confidentiality by discussing the case with his son and by discussing a plea offer with defendant while the prosecutor was on the speakerphone listening in; he had suggested he thought defendant was untruthful; and he had prejudiced the court by characterizing defendant as a gang member. We disagree. Counsel adequately explained the circumstances concerning his son, and the incident with the prosecutor on the speakerphone was also aired, revealing it to be an apparently routine plea negotiation and not a breach of lawyer-client confidentiality. Counsel's suggestion that defendant was untruthful came when he told the court he had been working hard on the case but that defendant had sent him off on two fruitless investigations (involving defendant's alleged participation as an altar boy and as a Cub Scout). The mention of defendant's gang affiliation came during counsel's explanation that the prosecutor's offer to drop the sodomy charge was in defendant's best interest, noting that defendant's familiarity with the Mexican Mafia should confirm counsel's belief that other gang members would not look kindly on defendant's sex crime. In short, none of defendant's complaints is substantial. Defendant's mere allegation that he did not trust his defense attorney, without more, was insufficient to compel the trial court to replace him. If a defendant's claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment, and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law. ( People v. Jones, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1246, 131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762.) Defendant's effort to support his loss of trust in Bestard by citing counsel's attempt to have him placed in solitary confinement is unavailing. Because this issue was not raised until after the trial court had denied defendant's Marsden motion, it cannot be used to undermine the trial court's exercise of discretion in denying the motion. Moreover, counsel's actions were justifiable. Counsel informed the court that defendant was addicted to pruno, an alcoholic drink brewed illicitly in county jail by inmates, and previously had come to court so intoxicated that he was unable to assist counsel. Bestard raised the possibility that defendant could be held in solitary confinement to prevent him from gaining access to any more pruno. The court declined the suggestion but ordered the bailiff to examine defendant for intoxication each time he appeared in court. As is apparent, counsel was not irrational in exploring the possibility of having defendant held in solitary confinement nor was he trying to punish him; he was merely attempting to ensure defendant maintained sobriety so as to permit him to assist in his own defense. Third, defendant contends three cases compel the conclusion the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant his Marsden motion, [1] but all three are distinguishable. In People v. Groce (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 292, 95 Cal.Rptr. 688, the defendant complained his defense attorney had failed to obtain the hospital records that might show the extent of the victim's injuries. The appellate court reversed for Marsden error because the trial court had failed to inquire into counsel's reason for not producing the physician or his hospital records. ( Id. at p. 297, 95 Cal.Rptr. 688.) In People v. Hill, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 196 Cal.Rptr. 382, the appellate court reversed for Marsden error because the trial judge had failed to question counsel regarding the defendant's complaints but instead undertook its own off-the-record investigation. ( Id. at pp. 754-755, 196 Cal. Rptr. 382.) In People v. Cruz (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 308, 147 Cal.Rptr. 740, the trial court similarly failed to ask the defense counsel to address the defendant's complaints. ( Id. at p. 317, 147 Cal.Rptr. 740.) In contrast to these cases, the trial court in the instant case questioned defendant about his reasons for desiring substitute counsel, asked counsel for his response and denied the motion based on the court's assessment that grounds for substitution did not exist. In sum, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's Marsden motion. ( People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 681, 27 Cal. Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289.)
Defendant also contends denial of his Marsden motion violated his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Of course, the denial of a defendant's motion to substitute counsel implicates the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 603, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683.) Although it is unclear whether defendant preserved this federal constitutional claim at trial, we assume for purposes of argument that he did. (Cf. People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 43-436, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) On direct review of the refusal to substitute counsel, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considers `the following three factors: (1) timeliness of the motion; (2) adequacy of the court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense.' [Citations.] It found, and we agree, that these elements are consistent with California law under People v. Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44, and its progeny. ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 606-607, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Defendant's Marsden motion was timely made, and as we explained, ante, the trial court's inquiry into the grounds of defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel was more than adequate. More importantly, the alleged conflict between defendant and his defense counsel was not so serious that we must conclude communication between them had become so poisoned defendant was effectively denied his right to counsel. These facts distinguish defendant's cited legal authority. For example, in U.S. v. Walker (9th Cir.1990) 915 F.2d 480, [2] the district court made virtually no attempt to discover the causes underlying [the defendant's] dissatisfaction with his attorney ( Walker, at p. 483), although the defendant `made a prima facie showing of an irreconcilable conflict between himself and his appointed attorney' ( id. at p. 484). Similarly, in U.S. v. Adelzo-Gonzalez (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3d 772, there were striking signs of a serious conflict ( id. at p. 778), yet the district court did not ascertain the extent of a breakdown in communication by asking specific and targeted questions ( id. at p. 777). Finally, in Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166, the federal appellate court concluded the state court that entertained the defendant's Marsden motion made no adequate inquiry into the cause of [the defendant's] dissatisfaction with his counsel ( id. at p. 1169). Because the trial court here undertook a sufficiently searching inquiry into the bases of defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel, and defendant's relationship with counsel was not so irreparably damaged that he was denied the right to counsel, we reject defendant's claim the trial court's denial of his Marsden motion violated his federal constitutional right to counsel.