Opinion ID: 2900176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severity of the Burden on the Right to Vote

Text: Common Cause contends that the Statute imposes a severe burden on the right to vote. Essentially, Common Cause contends that the Statute works exactly as intended—it ensures that all candidates nominated by the two major parties, the Republicans and the Democrats, will be elected in an uncontested general election, guaranteeing partisan balance between the parties. Therefore, voters are denied an effective and 10 No. 14-3300 meaningful vote because their vote is irrelevant to the outcome of the general election. The State maintains that the Partisan Balance Statute does not burden the right to vote, or if it does, that such a burden is justified by the State’s regulatory interests—namely, to ensure partisan balance on the Marion Superior Court—and that the constitutional right that Common Cause seeks to assert is illusory. The central issue in this case is whether the Statute burdens “the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.” Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 441 (“[T]he right to vote is the right to participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of the democratic system.”) In particular, we must consider how the Statute’s restrictions on the number of seats each party may seek burdens the right of voters to have an effective voice in the general election. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193 (1986) (“Restrictions upon the access of political parties to the ballot impinge upon the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes, as well as the right of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively.”); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88 (the “exclusion of candidates … burdens voters’ freedom of association, because an election campaign is an effective platform for the expression of views on the issues of the day.”); id. at 787 (“The right to vote is ‘heavily burdened’ if that vote may be cast only for major-party candidates at a time when other parties or other candidates are ‘clamoring for a place on the ballot.’”). No. 14-3300 11 In Storer v. Brown, the Supreme Court discussed the correlation between primary elections and general elections and their relationship to the voters’ selection of the ultimately successful candidate, noting that: The direct party primary … is not merely an exercise or warm-up for the general election but an integral part of the entire election pro- cess, the initial stage in a two-stage process by which the people choose their public officers. It functions to winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates. 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974) (recognizing California’s compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of its political processes and upholding California’s statutory provisions that denied ballot access to an independent candidate if the candidate had been affiliated with any political party within one year prior to the immediately preceding primary election). Here, the Statute preserves the role of the primary election as the first stage of the election process, whereby “contending forces within a party employ the primary campaign and primary election to finally settle their differences” and select their nominee for the general election. Id. In the normal course, the general election would then give the full electorate the opportunity to consider and choose between the available candidates, id. (“The people, it is hoped, are presented with understandable choices and the winner in the general election with sufficient support to govern effectively.”), but the Statute does not contemplate a contested general election. Instead, the Statute burdens the vote by essentially removing all competition and electoral choice 12 No. 14-3300 before the general election, severely undercutting the second stage of the “two-stage process by which the people choose” the judges for the Marion Superior Court. In order to achieve partisan balance, the Statute restricts the two major parties’ access to the general election ballot by prohibiting them from nominating candidates for more than half of all available positions. In effect, this guarantees that the two major parties cannot compete against each other in the general election. Stated differently, the Statute removes electoral choice and denies voters any effective voice or ability to choose between candidates of the two major parties. In fact, absent a possible third party or independent candidate on the ballot, the general election is guaranteed to be uncontested, rendering any vote meaningless because there is no choice to be made. It is of no consequence whether voters approve or disapprove of the candidates. So long as each candidate votes for himself or herself, as he or she presumably will, actions taken by other voters in the general election are meaningless, as they lack any opportunity to affect the outcome. The candidate will win, whether he gets a vote from every voter or no voters at all.5 Thus, the winning candidates for judge have 5 A prime example of the predetermined nature of the general election is a blog post from the Indiana Law Blog, dated two months before the general election, that listed the changes in the Marion Superior Court assignments, effective January 1, 2015, including the yet unelected judicial candidates. Ind. Courts—Changes in Marion County Court Assignments, Indiana Law Blog (Sept. 5, 2014, 4:18 PM), http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2014/09/ind_ courts_chan_16.html; see also Marion County Court Assignments Made for 2 0 1 5 , Indi anapo l i s Bar A s s o c i a t i o n , ( S e p t . 1 0 , 20 1 4) , (continued...) No. 14-3300 13 effectively been determined in the primary election without the participation of the full electorate, because all the major party nominees who successfully obtained their parties’s nomination are virtually guaranteed to win, with an even split between the parties.6 According to the State, there is no constitutional right to a contested election, nor a right to vote for a preferred party candidate for every available seat in an election. To support its position, the State relies on New York State Board of Elections v. 5 (...continued) http://www.indybar.org/news/indybar-news/ 2014/271 (showing the court assignments to the Marion Superior Court decided by the Marion County Executive Committee, including the new judge assignments in the criminal courts). 6 Considering that the party primary elections are often contested, the Statute allows major party voters the ability to effectively cast a vote for half (and only half) of the available seats in their party primary. However, if the party’s leadership agrees on the slate and no other potential judicial candidates seek to challenge the slate, resulting in an uncontested primary, there would be no electoral choice in the primary as well. Voters who cannot vote in a primary would have no opportunity to cast an effective or meaningful vote. That primary voters generally have the ability to at least effectively vote for half of the candidates, by virtue of them running unopposed in the general election, as opposed to voters who cannot vote in the primary and have no effective vote, also raises concerns about the equality of their votes. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (noting “the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively”); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (establishing the principle of “one person, one vote” and finding that electoral districts must be substantially equal in population “so that the vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen”). 14 No. 14-3300 Lopez-Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008), which involved a First Amendment challenge to New York State’s system for electing Supreme Court (trial court) justices. In Lopez-Torres, the plaintiffs challenged New York’s “delegate primary” convention system, in which each party nominated a single candidate to run for each judicial seat. Id. at 200–01. Despite this allowance, many of the races were uncontested because only one of the major parties chose to nominate a candidate, apparently because the other party decided it was not worth the time and effort to present a challenger. Id. at 207–08. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought their party’s nomination and brought a First Amendment claim alleging deprivations of their rights to ballot access and political association and arguing for the right to challenge the candidates favored by party leadership through a primary election. Id. at 201. The Supreme Court held that New York’s electoral system for Supreme Court judges did not violate the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to political association and ballot access. In particular, the Court determined that the plaintiffs’ real complaint was that the election process did not give them a realistic chance to secure the party’s nomination because party leadership enjoyed greater support and was able to garner more votes for its delegate slate in the convention. Id. at 204–05 (noting that none of the Court’s precedent establishes a constitutional right to a “fair shot” at winning a party’s nomination). Further, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that the entrenched “one-party rule” in the state’s general election demanded that the First Amendment be used to impose additional competition in the parties’ nominee-selection process. Id. at 207–08 (declining to impose a No. 14-3300 15 primary election and noting that while “[c]ompetitiveness may be of interest to the voters in the general election, … those interests are well enough protected so long as all candidates have an adequate opportunity to appear on the gen- eral-election ballot”). Despite the State’s comparisons, there are important differences in the facts of Lopez-Torres that distinguish it from the case at hand. First, the statute in Lopez-Torres allowed for each party to nominate one candidate for every available seat in the general election, whereas here the Statute prohibits the major parties from nominating candidates for more than half of the available seats. Second, although the plaintiffs in LopezTorres were unsuccessful in securing their party’s nomination in the convention, they could still get on the general election ballot by providing the requisite number of signatures of voters residing in the district. Id. at 207–08. Here, any candidate who fails to secure the party’s nomination in the primary is restricted from access to the general election ballot.7 Third, although many races in the general election went uncontested in Lopez-Torres, this was the result of private decisions in electoral politics, where, for example, the Republican party chose not to run a candidate in a heavily Democratic district, or vice versa, after assessing its chance for victory. See 7 In Indiana, any person who is defeated in a primary election or nominating convention is not eligible to be a candidate for the same office in the general election. Ind. Code § 3-8-1-5.5 (noting the exception, found in § 3- 13-2-10, whereby a defeated candidate may be appointed by his own political party to fill any vacancy on the party’s ticket as a candidate in the general election). 16 No. 14-3300 id. (noting that one-party entrenchment was the result of voter approval of the positions and candidates of that party within a voting district and the opposing party’s choice not to run a challenger). Each party still enjoyed the opportunity to field a candidate for each available position. Here, the Statute structurally guarantees that there will be no competition between the two major parties in the general election. Unlike LopezTorres, the parties are restricted from access to the ballot as to half of the seats. “The States can, within limits, … discourage party monopoly[, but] [t]he First Amendment creates an open marketplace where ideas … may compete without government interference.” Lopez-Torres, 552 U.S. at 208 (citation omitted). Critically, the uncontested elections in Lopez-Torres—and the lack of electoral choice for voters—was the result of electoral politics within the market. Here, the State interferes with the market by restricting each major party’s access to only half of the ballot, an act that “impinge[s] upon the rights of individuals to associate for political purposes, as well as the right of qualified voters to cast their votes effectively.” Munro, 479 U.S. at 193. When an election law reduces or forecloses the opportunity for electoral choice, it restricts a market where a voter might effectively and meaningfully exercise his choice between competing ideas or candidates, and thus severely burdens the right to vote. The State contends that where the Supreme Court has referenced a right to a meaningful or effective vote, it has been in the context of a right to vote in a system where candidates have reasonable access to the ballot. The State argues that the Statute provides an adequate opportunity to place independent and third-party candidates on the ballot, No. 14-3300 17 and that if voters wish to have a contested general election, it is their responsibility to field independent and third-party candidates to contest those seats.8 However, the possibility that an independent or third-party candidate appears on the ballot can only impact the last seat selected.9 It does not alter the fundamental nature of the Statute—to reduce electoral choice and the availability of what would otherwise be contested elections in the interest of preserving partisan balance.10 When a voter’s lack of electoral choice in an election is the consequence of electoral politics and private decisions without government interference, it is merely a function of the marketplace at work. However, where the electoral scheme interferes with the marketplace by restricting the number of candidates a party may nominate, and thus hinders electoral choice by 8 The State contends that the system created by the Statute is more favorable to independent and third-party candidates because they only have to compete against one of the major parties, as opposed to both. 9 For example, if one independent or third-party candidate appears on the ballot, only the last seat selected will be contested. 10 We find it relatively insignificant that a third-party successfully gained access to the general election ballot in 2000 and 2002, challenging five seats and one seat, respectively. The third-party showing was so weak as to not be competitive. The worst performing major party candidate, and last individual voted in, received more than three times the number of votes of the best performing third-party candidate (96,093 to 31,760 votes, respectively). State of Indiana 2000 Election Report, Supp. App. 14. In addition, a significant number of seats were still uncontested, as contemplated by the Statute outside the extremely rare and seemingly unlikely possibility that an independent or third-party candidate is on the general election ballot. 18 No. 14-3300 which voters would have the opportunity to choose between competing alternatives that would have otherwise existed, the State has severely burdened the voter’s ability to cast a meaningful and effective vote.