Opinion ID: 686788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seniority List Claim

Text: 7 Following a motion to reconsider the denial of defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, 2 the district court found that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Sec. 1981 because they failed to prove that moving from the casual seniority list to regular employee status would be a promotion under the test in Patterson, 491 U.S. 164, 109 S.Ct. 2363. We review the district court's decision de novo and hold that this question must be submitted to a jury. 8 The Supreme Court laid out the original test in Patterson: Only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer is such a claim actionable under Sec. 1981. Id. at 185, 109 S.Ct. at 2377. 3 Finding this language difficult to apply, the Seventh Circuit has further developed the test. Through the last five years the court has produced three tests: the contract test, the outsider test, and the job requirements test. The contract test focuses on whether the alleged promotion would alter the contractual relationship between the employee and employer. Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305, 1311 (7th Cir.1989). See also Mozee v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1055 (7th Cir.1991) (determining that the promotions in that case would not create new and distinct relationships), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 207, 121 L.Ed.2d 148 (1992). The outsider test accounts for the occasional fact situation in which a stranger could sue a company under Sec. 1981 if he was denied a position on racial grounds but an employee of the same company could not sue even if his application for the position was denied on the same grounds. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1311. The job requirements test looks to see whether there was a substantial change in the employee's job duties and responsibilities. Id. at 1317 n. 6 (J. Cudahy concurring). The court also has emphasized the requirement of a qualitative change in the relationship, Taylor v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1201 (7th Cir.1992), and, in a few cases, has specified facts that would or would not be classified as a promotion, Von Zuckerstein v. Argonne Nat'l Lab., 984 F.2d 1467, 1473 (7th Cir.) (neither an increase in pay alone ... nor a simple change in status involving no additional responsibilities ... constitutes a new and distinct relation....) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 419, 126 L.Ed.2d 365 (1993); Partee v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. of Wash. Township, 954 F.2d 454, 457 (7th Cir.1992) (assuming supervisory duties plus other factors might create a new employer-employee relationship); Luddington v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 796 F.Supp. 1550, 1560 (S.D.Ind.1990) ([A]n employee must assume responsibilities that are distinctly different from the previous job, along with an increase in the level of the job.), aff'd on other grounds, 966 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1641, 128 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). 9 The district court (J. Randa) applied the outsider test and the job requirements test, reasoning that the Seventh Circuit has moved away from the original contract test. R. 94 at 8-10. To the contrary, we hold that the contract test is alive and well in the Seventh Circuit, as are the outsider test and the job requirements test. See, e.g., Mojica v. Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552, 560 (7th Cir.1993) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1643, 128 L.Ed.2d 363 (1994); Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 702 (7th Cir.1993); Partee, 954 F.2d at 457. The outsider test does not apply to the facts of the instant case since only those persons on the casual seniority list were eligible for promotion to regular employee status. Under the contract test and the job requirements test, plaintiffs presented enough evidence of the changes a promotion would entail to present a disputed material issue that survived defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. 10 Upon the first consideration of this issue the district court (J. Stadtmueller) found that elevation from casual to regular employee involves a new and distinct relation between employer and employee. R. 43 at 13. The court considered many factors in reaching its decision. It noted that casual employees could be terminated at will, while regular employees could be terminated only for cause and also had review procedures available to them. The regular employees earned contractual seniority rights that casual employees did not earn. Regular employees earned better salaries and enjoyed fringe benefits that the casuals did not. Id. at 12-13. These considerations most easily fit under the contract test. 11 When the district court (J. Randa) reconsidered the issue it primarily focused on factors that would fall within the confines of the job requirements test. The court noted that the only qualification for becoming a regular employee was being the next in line on the casual seniority list when a position became available. R. 94 at 10. The court continued, stating that casual employees who had earned regular employee status often performed the same jobs in the same departments and for the same supervisor. Such an employee did not gain any supervisory responsibilities, his wage remained an hourly wage, and he stayed within the same collective bargaining unit. Id. 12 In the final analysis it appears that the promotion from casual to regular employee does not survive Patterson using the job requirements test. However, application of the contract test and the evidence of increased job security, seniority rights, better salary, and more fringe benefits present disputed material issues of fact that require submission to a jury.
13 Generally a plaintiff may not bring claims under Title VII that were not originally brought among the charges made to the EEOC. 4 This rule serves two purposes: affording an opportunity for the EEOC to settle the dispute between the employee and employer and putting the employer on notice of the charges against it. Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.1992). However, the Seventh Circuit has allowed claims in a plaintiff's complaint that are like or reasonably related to the EEOC charges and that reasonably can be expected to grow out of an EEOC investigation of the charges. Id. at 1111. See also Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500; Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Despite the liberality afforded Title VII plaintiffs the district court dismissed plaintiffs' seniority list claims under Title VII. R. 95 at 20-23 (citing Witherspoon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 782 F.Supp. 567 (D.Kan.1992)). 5 We affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' seniority list claim under Title VII but do so on other grounds. 14 To include a discrimination claim in a federal district court complaint that was not brought in the charges filed with the EEOC a plaintiff must pass the two prong test of Jenkins: (1) the claim is like or reasonably related to the EEOC charges, and (2) the claim in the complaint reasonably could develop from the EEOC investigation into the original charges. 538 F.2d at 167. The district court found that the seniority list claim reasonably could have grown out of the allegations made in the EEOC charges by plaintiffs regarding their layoffs, R. 95 at 20 (Conclusions of Law 2), and we will not disturb that finding. However, the district court did not analyze the claim under the first prong of the test. 15 The claims are not alike or reasonably related unless there is a factual relationship between them. This means that the EEOC charge and the complaint must, at minimum, describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals. Cheek, 31 F.3d at 501 (emphasis in original). See also Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312 (time period is another factor). All three plaintiffs claimed in their EEOC charges that Godfrey discriminated only with respect to their layoffs. The layoffs were not connected with the ordering of the seniority list. Nor were the same individuals involved; Jim LeClaire prepared the seniority list, while Ed Urban laid off plaintiffs. Furthermore, the ordering of the seniority list took place in August 1985 whereas the layoffs took place early in 1986. Since the seniority list claim in plaintiffs' complaint is not reasonably related to the layoff claim in their EEOC charges, we hold that the seniority list claim pursuant to Title VII was properly dismissed.