Opinion ID: 3183055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attorneysʹ Fees Under the Agreement

Text: We agree with the district court that Steinerʹs acceptance of the Offer fully resolved the claim for attorneysʹ fees under the Agreement. First, the plain wording of the Offer supports the conclusion that claims for attorneysʹ fees under the Agreement are covered. The Offer provided for the dismissal with prejudice of ʺall claims that have been made or could have been made concerning . . . the Agreement.ʺ Joint App. at 97. The Agreement provides that with respect to any dispute arising out of the Agreement, the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorneysʹ fees. Any contractual claim for reasonable attorneysʹ fees brought pursuant to the Agreement necessarily ʺconcern[s]ʺ the Agreement. Hence, the language of the Offer unambiguously includes a claim for attorneysʹ fees under the Agreement. ‐11‐ Second, the context makes clear that the parties intended to include contractual claims for attorneysʹ fees. See Law Deb. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Maverick Tube Corp., 595 F.3d 458, 466 (2d Cir. 2010) (ʺAn ambiguity exists where the terms of the contract ʹcould suggest more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business.ʹʺ (quoting Int’l Multifoods Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 309 F.3d 76, 83 (2d Cir. 2002))). In determining whether the contract is ambiguous, a court looks at the contract as a whole ʺin light of the circumstances present when the contract was entered.ʺ Turner Constr. Co. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Natʹl Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995)). Steiner had made claim for attorneysʹ fees at the time of the Offer, as Steiner had sought attorneysʹ fees in a motion for prejudgment remedy. See Appelleesʹ Suppl. App. at 145. In an affidavit accompanying the motion, Steiner asserted that Lewmar continued to act ʺin clear violation of the intent and terms of the Agreement.ʺ Id. at 155. In the same paragraph, Steiner stated that the ʺ[a]ttorneysʹ fees and costs to date on my ca[s]e are approximately $220,314 and ‐12‐ are projected to total $350,000 through trial and any post‐trial proceedings.ʺ Id. The motion for prejudgment remedy sought a total of $1,065,000 against Lewmar, which included actual and projected attorneysʹ fees of $350,000. Id. at 155‐56. When attorneysʹ fees are sought by motion, the act of seeking them is fairly embraced in the word ʺclaim.ʺ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A) (instructing that a ʺclaim for attorneyʹs feesʺ be made by motion); Omega Engʹg, Inc. v. Omega, S.A., 432 F.3d 437, 446 (2d Cir. 2005) (ʺIn determining whether the language in a contract is ambiguous, the words must be given ʹtheir natural and ordinary meaning.ʹʺ (quoting United Illuminating Co. v. Wisvest‐Conn., LLC, 259 Conn. 665, 670 (2002))). Therefore, Steinerʹs demand for attorneysʹ fees was a claim concerning the Agreement that had already been made at the time of the Offer, and both parties were acutely aware of Steinerʹs pending claim for fees at the time of the Offer. In opposing the motion for a prejudgment remedy, Lewmar specifically contested the attorneysʹ fee claim. Furthermore, the Rule 68 Offer was made just ten days before the scheduled hearing on the motion for prejudgment remedy. Under all the circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the parties intended to resolve the case for $175,000 while leaving open the significant possibility of litigation over some $383,000 in attorneysʹ fees. The primary goal ‐13‐ of contract interpretation is to ʺeffectuate the intent of the parties as manifested by the language used in the contract.ʺ Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 598 (2d Cir. 2005). A fair and natural reading of the language ʺdismissed with prejudice including all claims that have been made or could have been made concerning . . . the Agreementʺ conveys the partiesʹ attempt to settle all the pending claims related to the Agreement. See Lee v. BSB Greenwich Mortg. Ltd. Pʹship, 267 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2001) (ʺ[T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and . . . the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract.ʺ) (quoting Barnard, 214 Conn. at 110)). Steiner argues that because attorneysʹ fees under the Agreement could be claimed only after one party becomes the ʺprevailing party,ʺ it was not a claim that ʺha[d] been made or could have been madeʺ at the time of the Offer, and therefore was not encompassed by the Rule 68 judgment. This ripeness argument is not convincing, and is belied by the fact that Steiner had already made a claim for attorneysʹ fees in his motion for prejudgment remedy. See Arronwood Indem. Co. v. King, 699 F.3d 735, 739‐40 (2d Cir. 2012) (ʺ[A] court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no ‐14‐ room for ambiguity. . . . Similarly, any ambiguity in a contract must emanate from the language used in the contract rather than from one partyʹs subjective perception of the terms.ʺ (quoting Conn. Med. Ins. Co. v. Kulikowski, 286 Conn. 1, 6 (2008))). Because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer, Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount.