Opinion ID: 561224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Willfulness and Attorney Fees

Text: 34 Kinkead claims that the district court erred in finding its infringement to be willful and in finding the case to be exceptional, and thus subject to the award of attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 285. These are both questions of fact, subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See State Industries, 883 F.2d at 1581, 12 USPQ2d at 1032 (willfulness is a question of fact); Reactive Metals and Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582-83, 226 USPQ 821, 824 (Fed.Cir.1985) (exceptional nature of case question of fact). 35 There is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of willfulness with respect to Type I infringement alone. Furthermore, the existence of willful infringement alone can justify a finding of exceptional circumstances. Ryco Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1429, 8 USPQ2d 1323, 1332 (Fed.Cir.1988). However, the district court's incorrect assumption that Kinkead did not avoid infringement when they developed the Type II door certainly influenced its findings concerning willfulness and the exceptional nature of the case. Therefore, we direct the district court on remand to re-determine whether the facts of this case, in light of our holding of no infringement with respect to the Type II door, still merit a finding of willfulness and a finding of exceptional case under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 285. 36 Assuming the district court still finds the case to be exceptional, we urge the district court to reconsider its position on the adequacy of the attorney fee documentation. [I]nsufficient documentation may warrant a reduction in fees. PPG Industries Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co. Inc., 840 F.2d 1565, 1570, 6 USPQ2d 1010, 1015 (Fed.Cir.1988) (emphasis added). See also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). But [w]here documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation to award a reasonable fee.... Norman v. Housing Authority of the City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir.1988). In fact, the Norman case recognizes that a district court itself has experience in determining what are reasonable hours and reasonable fees, and should rely on that experience and knowledge if the documentation is considered inadequate. Id. Further, while Slimfold's fee application certainly had its flaws, it is fairly detailed and extensive, and we note the Supreme Court's admonition that an attorney fees determination should not result in a second major litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. 37 Finally, if the district court determines that the case is still exceptional, the district court must take into account, in determining the amount of fees to be awarded, the extent to which Slimfold, having lost on the Type II door infringement issue, can be considered a prevailing party under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 285. See Beckman Instruments Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1553-54, 13 USPQ2d 1301, 1306-07 (Fed.Cir.1989); see also, Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939.