Opinion ID: 2656246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of the Traffic Stop

Text: In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Trestyn, 646 F.3d 732, -5- 741 (10th Cir. 2011). The ultimate determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a question of law we review de novo. Id. A traffic stop is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and is analyzed under the framework set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), for investigative detentions. Trestyn, 646 F.3d at 741-42. That framework requires a stop to be justified by objectively reasonable suspicion that the person detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. De La Cruz, 703 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2013). We look first to whether the detention was justified at its inception, and second to whether the detention was “reasonably related in scope” to the circumstances justifying it. Trestyn, 646 F.3d at 742. Once an officer determines that a traffic violation has not occurred, the driver must be allowed to proceed without further delay. Id. Mr. Behrens does not challenge the reasonableness of the stop at its inception. Aplt. Br. 20. Instead, he argues that the stop became unreasonable when the trooper’s suspicions should have been dispelled—i.e., when the trooper saw that the car had a valid temporary tag in its rear window and learned that the tag was validly registered to Leslie Healy. Id. at 20, 23. We cannot agree. Mr. Behrens is correct that continued detention violates the Fourth Amendment when an officer’s suspicions are dispelled, and that we have more than once found as much in cases involving temporary registration tags or missing license plates. See Trestyn, 646 F.3d at 743-44; United States v. Pena- -6- Montes, 589 F.3d 1048, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d 1043, 1051 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 561 (10th Cir. 1994). But, given the district court’s factual findings, the trooper’s suspicion of a fraudulent temporary tag was not reasonably dispelled in these circumstances. The court credited the trooper’s testimony about his observations of the tag, its condition, and his experience with faded tags being illegally reused. 1 R. 75-76. As such, the trooper had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting” that the temporary tag was a fake, or that the car was stolen. See United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The registration to Leslie Healy was not enough to dispel the trooper’s suspicion, and he was justified in questioning Mr. Behrens to determine if he was Healy, or at least had some connection with Healy. Accordingly, continued detention and investigation was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.