Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting jury instruction s-1 and in denying jury instruction d-17.

Text: ¶ 173. Beckwith argues that Jury Instruction S-1, granted over defense objection, erroneously included the phrases not in necessary self-defense and without the authority of law. The instruction reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that murder is the killing of a human being, not in necessary self-defense, and without the authority of law, by any means or by any manner, when done with the deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed. The Court further instructs you that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Byron De La Beckwith on or about June 12, 1963, killed Medgar Evers, a human being, without authority of law, with deliberate design to effect the death of Medgar Evers, and not in necessary self-defense, then Byron De La Beckwith is guilty of murder, and it is your sworn duty to so find. (emphasis added). ¶ 174. Beckwith points out that not in necessary self-defense was not an element of the crime charged under the statute nor was it referred to in the indictment, and thus the phrase was surplusage. He cites cases which hold that an instruction should not be given to the jury submitting a theory which is not supported by the evidence. See Strong v. State, 600 So.2d 199, 203 (Miss. 1992); Wadford v. State, 385 So.2d 951, 954 (Miss. 1980). Beckwith argues that because he did not claim self-defense and there was no evidence to support such a theory, the trial court erred in including such language in the instruction. ¶ 175. Critical to our determination of this issue is whether Beckwith was prejudiced by the inclusion of the surplusage, not in necessary self-defense. In Swanier v. State, 473 So.2d 180, 188 (Miss. 1985), the trial court instructed the jury that it must find that the defendant did unlawfully, willfully and feloniously and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the victim in the commission of a crime or felony or armed robbery in order to find the defendant guilty. On appeal, the State admitted that the phrase and of his malice aforethought was surplus as it was not required under the statute, but argued that the phrase served only to raise the State's burden of proof and could in no way have prejudiced the defendant. Swanier, 473 So.2d at 188. We agreed, ruling that the defendant failed to show how the surplus language prejudiced him whatsoever. Id. ¶ 176. Beckwith contends the instruction permitted the prosecution during closing argument to make the following irrelevant remarks: Not in necessary self-defense was this done. Medgar Evers didn't do anything of a violent nature to this defendant. As we have often stated, however, counsel may draw upon the facts in evidence when arguing a case, and thus the prosecutor could have made these comments with or without the disputed instruction, for the evidence clearly showed that Medgar Evers was threatening no one when he was shot in the back. We fail to see how the phrase not in necessary self-defense, which served only to raise the State's burden of proof, could have prejudiced Beckwith. ¶ 177. Beckwith also argues the phrase without the authority of law was an abstract statement of law which left the jury to speculate at its meaning and rendered the instruction fatally defective in the absence of proper explanation. However, the phrase without authority of law was taken directly from the statute under which Beckwith was charged. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19 (1972). We have held that instructions are proper when they track the language of the statute. Deal v. State, 589 So.2d 1257, 1260 (Miss. 1991); Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 34 (Miss. 1990); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1140 (Miss. 1985). Furthermore, we have approved the use of the phrase without authority of law in jury instructions, ruling that the phrase is synonymous with feloniously. Mackbee, 575 So.2d at 34; Johnson, 475 So.2d at 1140. This argument therefore is without merit.
¶ 178. Beckwith argues the trial court erred in denying Jury Instruction D-17, which set out the elements of the charge of murder and instructed the jury that before Beckwith could be found guilty, the prosecution was required to prove each and every one of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 405). He points out that a defendant is entitled to have the jury clearly instructed that the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each and every material element of the offense. Watson v. State, 465 So.2d 1025, 1031 (Miss. 1985). ¶ 179. When determining the sufficiency of jury instructions, this Court reads them together and if the jury is fully and fairly instructed by other instructions, the refusal of any similar instruction does not constitute reversible error. Laney v. State, 486 So.2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1986). [A] trial court need not grant an otherwise valid instruction if the subject matter contained in the proposed instruction is adequately covered by an instruction already granted. Griffin v. State, 610 So.2d 354, 356 (Miss. 1992). In Watson, cited by Beckwith, the trial court granted Instruction S-1, which set forth the elements of the crime charged, and Instruction C-13, which instructed the jury on the State's burden of proving every material element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Watson, 465 So.2d at 1030-31. We affirmed on appeal, holding that when read together, the two instructions made the State's burden of proof apparent, and thus no reversible error was committed in refusing to grant Instruction D-4 on the State's burden of proof. Id. at 1031. ¶ 180. Likewise, in the case sub judice, Instruction S-1 set forth the elements of the crime charged. The trial court also granted Instruction D-7, which reads: The Court instructs the jury that the law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This presumption places upon the State of Mississippi the burden of proving Mr. Beckwith guilty of every material element of the crime with which he is charged. Before you can return a verdict of guilty as to Mr. Beckwith the State must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty. The presumption of innocence attends Mr. Beckwith throughout the trial and prevails at its close unless and until it is overcome by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Beckwith is not required to prove his innocence. We find that taken together, these instructions fully and fairly instructed the jury on the State's burden of proving every material element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus no reversible error was committed in denying Instruction D-17.