Opinion ID: 2609843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Damages for defamation.

Text: K-Mart contends that any injury to Washington from defamation is subjective in nature and must be supported by expert medical testimony. K-Mart also argues that Washington did not prove any special damages; therefore, no recovery for general damages can be awarded. Only the latter argument merits serious discussion. As discussed previously, in an ordinary slander action, special damages must be proven, as an element of the cause of action, before any recovery will be allowed the plaintiff. Branda v. Sanford, 97 Nev. 643, 646, 637 P.2d 1223, 1225 (1981). Special damages are quantifiable monetary losses that flow directly from the injury to reputation caused by the defamation, e.g., loss of business. Id. at 647, 637 P.2d at 1226; see NRS 41.335. Once special damages are proven, general damages will be presumed. General damages in a defamation case represent the other effects of the defamation on the plaintiff, including loss of reputation, shame, mortification and hurt feelings. See NRS 41.334. Such damages need not be supported by expert medical testimony. A statement is considered slander per se, and thus actionable without a showing of special damages, if it imputes that the plaintiff has committed a crime, here shoplifting. Branda, 97 Nev. at 646, 637 P.2d at 1225. As noted by the United States Supreme Court: [T]he doctrine of presumed damages in the common law of defamation per se is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 [94 S.Ct. 2997, 3012, 41 L.Ed.2d 789] (1974). The doctrine has been defended on the grounds that those forms of defamation that are actionable per se are virtually certain to cause serious injury to reputation, and that this kind of injury is extremely difficult to prove. See id., at 373, 376 [94 S.Ct. at 3023, 3025] (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, statements that are defamatory per se by their very nature are likely to cause mental and emotional distress, as well as injury to reputation, so there arguably is little reason to require proof of this kind of injury either. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1051-52, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (footnotes omitted). Damages for slander per se include harm to the reputation of the person defamed, or, absent proof of such harm, `for the harm which normally results from such a defamation.' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 372, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3023, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 621 (1938)). At the heart of the libel-and-slander- per-se damage scheme [lies] the award of general damages for loss of reputation. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 372-73, 94 S.Ct. at 3023 (White, J., dissenting). Such damages are granted without special proof because the judgment of history [is] that the content of the publication itself [is] so likely to cause injury and because in many cases the effect of defamatory statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible directly to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person defamed. Id. at 373, 94 S.Ct. at 3023. Proof of the defamation itself establishes the fact of injury and the existence of damage to the plaintiff's reputation. Id. at 373 n. 3, 94 S.Ct. at 3023 n. 3. The jury is permitted to assess damages considered to be the natural and probable consequences of the defamatory words on proof of the defamation alone. Id. Damages are presumed because of the impossibility of affixing an exact monetary amount for present and future injury to the plaintiff's reputation, wounded feelings and humiliation, loss of business, and any consequential physical illness or pain. Id. (citations omitted). It is uncertain as to which statements or actions the jury found defamatory. Nonetheless, where there is substantial evidence to support a jury verdict under one of several theories, the judgment will not be overturned on appeal. Ramada Inns v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 826, 711 P.2d 1, 2 (1985). We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding of defamation per se by the combination of words and actions taken. Once the jury found Washington had been per se defamed by K-Mart, the jury was free to award Washington the $25,000.00 in future general damages and $20,000.00 in past general damages on proof of such defamation alone. We conclude that the award of damages for defamation was proper.