Opinion ID: 75555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mens Rea Requirement

Text: 103 Hansen argues that the instructions permitted the jury to convict him of the RCRA violations without making factual findings that he had knowledge of the RCRA elements of hazardous materials, permit regulations, and the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes. He maintains that the instruction reinforced the government's position that Hansen should be convicted because LCP was his company, and not based on the legally required relationship between Hansen and the violations. During the charge conference, Randall's attorney objected to an instruction as to Counts 22-34, arguing that it should be limited to Counts 22-33, because Count 34 had additional elements. R22-59-63, 65-66. He asked that an instruction be added limiting liability to knowledge possessed by the defendant himself, and the district judge responded [a]ll right. All right. We will add that.. Id. at 61. 104 During closing argument, the government stated: 105 Chris Hansen is a hands-on manager. You heard discussions of how he ran the plant. I would submit it was probably his way or the highway. Does anybody doubt he would have known what was going on at every place in the plant? He was there. He ordered the Bunker C tanks to be filled. 106 R22-99-100. The district judge explained that: 107 a person acts knowingly if he acts intentionally and voluntarily, realizing what he is doing, and not because of ignorance, mistake, accident, or carelessness. Whether a Defendant acted knowingly may be proven by the Defendant's conduct and by all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. 108 Id. at 188. Addressing the RCRA counts, the district judge instructed: 109 Each count charges the . . . Defendants, all of them, unlawfully treated, stored, or disposed of one or more hazardous wastes without the required permits. 110 Now in order to prove a Defendant guilty of those charges, the prosecution must establish the following essential elements: 111 First, that on or about the date charged in Counts 22 through 34, the Defendant under consideration knowingly treated, stored, or disposed of one or more of the solid wastes listed in those counts; 112 Next, that such solid wastes were listed or identified under RCRA as hazardous wastes; and 113 Third, that the wastes were treated, stored or disposed of at a location which did not have either interim status or a RCRA permit authorizing the treatment, storage or disposal of such wastes. 114 Id. at 192. The district judge also charged that the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant under consideration knew that substances involved in the alleged offenses had the potential to harm others or the environment. Id. at 193. The district judge continued: 115 Now each Defendant may be found guilty of Counts 22 through 34 of the Indictment if you find that the Government has proven the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 116 First, that the Defendant under consideration had a responsible relationship to the violation-that is, that it occurred under his area of authority and supervisory responsibility; 117 Second, that the Defendant had the power or the capacity to prevent the violation; and 118 Third, that the Defendant acted knowingly in failing to prevent, detect or correct the violation. 119 Id. at 200-01. Randall's counsel renewed the objection that the instruction as to Count 34 was erroneously included because it could not be based on constructive knowledge. Id. at 207. 120 We have held that a defendant's knowledge [as to whether a site has a permit or the disposal of hazardous waste] does not require certainty, and the jurors may draw inferences from all of the circumstances, including the existence of the regulatory scheme. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1986) (reviewing a conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d))(1)). As to Count 34, RCRA's knowing endangerment provision also requires proof that the hazardous waste violation placed persons in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and that the defendant had knowledge of that danger. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). Because the instructions clearly set forth that a finding of acted knowingly was required for a conviction, there was no error in the instruction.