Opinion ID: 508425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circumstances Considered

Text: 39 In applying the totality of the circumstances test, those factors that a court should consider to determine whether an accused's confession is voluntary center around three sets of circumstances: (1) the characteristics of the accused, (2) the conditions of interrogation, and (3) the conduct of law enforcement officials. The relevant characteristics of the individual who confessed are the individual's experience and background, together with the suspect's youth and lack of education or intelligence. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047; Guarno, 819 F.2d at 30. The second circumstance, the conditions under which a suspect is questioned, includes the place where an interrogation is held, Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398, 98 S.Ct. at 2416 (It is hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of 'a rational intellect and a free will' than [interrogation in a hospital's intensive care unit].); see also Bram, 168 U.S. at 563, 18 S.Ct. at 194, and the length of detention, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. The presence or absence of counsel is a significant condition because counsel can assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. at 1625. 40 The final and most critical circumstance for purposes of this appeal is the law enforcement officers' conduct. Facts bearing on that conduct include the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning or the failure to inform the accused of his constitutional rights, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047; whether there was physical mistreatment such as beatings, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936); or long restraint in handcuffs, and whether other physical deprivations occurred such as depriving an accused of food, water or sleep, see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047; or even of clothing, see Bram, 168 U.S. at 561, 18 S.Ct. at 194 (suspect was taken to police detective's office and there he was stripped of his clothing) for a prolonged period. In addition--as specifically raised in the instant case--such police conduct might include psychologically coercive techniques such as brainwashing or promises of leniency or other benefits. 41 Also gleaned from the case law--as a corollary to a consideration of factors--is that these factors are not to be weighed against one another on a balance scale, with those favorable to a free and voluntary confession offsetting those tending to the contrary. Instead, the situation surrounding the giving of a confession may dissipate the import of an individual factor that might otherwise have a coercive effect. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754, 90 S.Ct. at 1472. Even after analyzing such dilution, if any, a single factor or a combination of factors considered together may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect's will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act. Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and Confessions, Chapt. I, What Is an Involuntary Confession?, 1 (1980) (discussing police interrogation techniques as they bear on voluntariness). II Application of Rule in Instant Case 42 We turn finally to analyze the recited factors in light of the evidence in the record. In so doing we have in mind the admonition that each case rests on its own state of facts and that previously decided cases provide little certainty of result because what was adequate in one case to produce an involuntary confession does not establish that the same result has been created in a different, but somewhat similar set of circumstances. See Bram, 168 U.S. at 548-49, 18 S.Ct. at 189. 43 Petitioner was 23 years old at the time he was questioned, his expert Dr. Klaf testified that he was of above average intelligence, streetwise, had a good fund of general information, and had attended school to the tenth grade. He had some familiarity with the criminal justice system by virtue of having been arrested on two previous occasions and questioned once by the police in Suffolk County, New York. The present interrogation occurred in a hearing room at the homicide office of the 68th precinct. The interview with the detectives lasted for just over two hours during the afternoon of April 17th (from 4:20 to 6:30 p.m.); the statement to A.D.A. Callan lasted from 10:30 to 11:00 p.m. that same evening. Thus, we find nothing revealed in the characteristics of the accused or the conditions of interrogation that suggests an overbearing of Green's will. 44 The third and most critical circumstance--and the focus of petitioner's challenge--is the conduct of Detectives Hazel and Byrnes. There is no suggestion of physical mistreatment by the detectives. Petitioner was not handcuffed at any time during the interrogation. Following it he was allowed to use the bathroom and was furnished with food, drink, and cigarettes. 45 Concededly, petitioner was apart from family, friends, and legal counsel throughout this time. This factor is dispelled though by the fact that Green was given his Miranda rights by Officer Zawicki at the 71st precinct and later by Detectives Byrnes and Hazel at the 68th precinct immediately preceding the questioning that led to his confession. Both times Green stated that he was willing to answer questions without the presence of an attorney. Even though the version he gave to Dr. Klaf of the events on the day of the murders differed from his recorded statement, there is no claim now that he did not understand his rights to have counsel present or that he preferred not to talk without counsel present. 46 The principal thrust of petitioner's argument is that his confession should be suppressed because it was wrongfully induced by false promises of help which held out the prospect of more lenient treatment. These promises, coupled with the detectives' misrepresentations that they already had enough evidence for his arrest and Detective Byrnes' reference to the electric chair before the questioning was recorded, petitioner continues, exacerbated the pressure on him. Petitioner asserts all of these facts considered together created coercion that was sufficient to and actually did overbear his free will. 47 We find the police conduct troubling. Because of it the issue of voluntariness is not free from doubt. We turn first to the promises of help. In Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. at 920, a female petitioner was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had turned her in. She was promised leniency and threatened that if she did not cooperate her infant children would be taken away from her. Id. Counsel for the State of Illinois conceded at oral argument in the Supreme Court that the totality of the circumstances produced a coercive effect upon petitioner; the Supreme Court held her confession not voluntary. Id. We do not think the circumstances in the case at bar require the same result. Although Detective Hazel did offer psychiatric help, nothing he said could be construed as holding out the hope of leniency in the courts or a shorter sentence. Even were this offer of help somehow to be interpreted as inducing Green to have such a hope, that belief would be dissipated by Hazel's advice that Green should not think he was going to escape responsibility for what he did and telling Green that he would have to go to jail. 48 Turning to the other arguments advanced, a careful reading of the interview demonstrates that the scare tactic improperly used by Detective Byrnes in his reference to the electric chair were not further employed by Detective Hazel to play upon Green's fears for his own life. Hazel told petitioner several times that this case was not about the chair. The chicanery--as the state trial judge termed the practice--of Detective Byrnes' asserting that he already had a strong case against petitioner and telling Green that his fingerprints matched the prints in blood in the victims' apartment is the type of police tactic that makes the issue of voluntariness in this case such a close one. But the motivation for Green's confession we are persuaded resulted not from this or any other police conduct: instead, he confessed for an entirely different reason, as revealed in a significant statement petitioner made to Detective Hazel. 49 Petitioner explained to Detective Hazel towards the end of the interrogation, after he confessed to murdering Shirley and Latisha, that to be honest with you, what made me sit down and tell you what I told you was not for you to help me. Green expressed concern that without his confession, the police might not have enough evidence (allaying to some extent the chicanery because it apparently was not the crucial motivating factor) and he would get off. Then, he added, I am going to go out there and do it to somebody else.... [I]t might be my mother. This statement convinces us that the scare tactics, false representation as to the evidence, good cop/bad cop routine, and whatever hopes were instilled from the promises or fears from the reference to the chair considered together did not overbear Green's will and bring about his confession. He confessed--as he candidly admitted--because he was afraid that what he had done to the victims in a blackout would be something he was going to do to his own family--maybe even his mother.