Opinion ID: 2995409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay testimony by co-

Text: conspirators. Hunt argues that the district court erred by concluding that the testimony of Birge, Jr., Bernard, and Rockett that recounted statements made by Birge was admissible hearsay under the co- conspirator exception--Rule 801(d)(2)(E). To fulfill the requirements of the exception, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a con spiracy existed between the declarant and the defendant, and that the statement was made in furtherance of that conspiracy. Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175. Hunt asserts that the government did not prove that he was a member of the conspiracy or that Birge’s statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. To establish a conspiracy, the government must show the existence of an agreement between two or more persons for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act. United States v. Hunte, 196 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 1999). There must be a participatory link between the conspiracy and the defendant, which requires the government to show that the defendant knew of the conspiracy and intended to join its criminal purpose. United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Navarez, 954 F.2d 1375, 1380-81 (7th Cir. 1992). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and findings of law de novo. We do not believe that the district court clearly erred in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Hunt knew of the conspiracy, based on his participation with Birge in money laundering and counting, and his close friendship with Birge. Nor do we believe that the district court erred as a matter of law by finding Hunt intended to join the conspiracy on the basis of that same evidence. Hunt argues that because he was not involved in the actual sale of drugs, he was not part of the conspiracy. But the conspiracy’s objectives were two- fold--to sell drugs and launder profits. Therefore, Hunt was part of the conspiracy; he participated in and helped to protect the proceeds of the conspiracy when he laundered and counted its money. For statements to be in furtherance of the conspiracy, they must be part of the information flow between conspirators intended to help each perform a role, which, for example, may be a statement to control damage to an ongoing conspiracy or keep conspirators advised about the progress of the conspiracy. United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1991). All the statements of which Hunt complains satisfy that standard. Birge, Jr., Bernard, and Rockett were each co-conspirators who testified concerning their conversations with Birge about Hunt’s involvement in the conspiracy, helping to launder money. The conversations involved Birge informing co-conspirators of the existence and progress of the laundering end of the conspiracy or attempting to control damage to the conspiracy. For instance, Rockett testified that he and Birge discussed how Birge concealed drug trafficking money. Rockett stated, as an example, Mr. Hunt, he had gotten a ’90 something Accura [sic] Legend . . . . [Birge] said it was his, but he couldn’t put it in his name because it was such an expensive car, and Birge said this was done [s]o it wouldn’t be traced back to him. Rockett testified that although he could not state absolutely that drug proceeds were used in the purchase, this is mainly what happened and Birge had no other source of income, he didn’t have a job. The district court properly found that these and the other statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.