Opinion ID: 2981019
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proposed Social Groups

Text: A social group is a group of persons who share a “common, immutable” and fundamental characteristic that “either cannot [be] change[d], or should not be required to be change[d] because it is fundamental to [the members’] individual identities or consciences.” Castellano–Chacon v. 6 The MDC is a political party in Zimbabwe, which opposes the ZANU-PF and the current president, Robert Mugabe, promotes democratic elections, and has a current power sharing arrangement with the ZANU-PF. (A.R. at 57, 100–101); see also Gotosa v. Mukasey, 286 F. App’x 292, 293 (6th Cir. July 11, 2008). 18 I.N.S., 341 F.3d 533, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Individuals in a proposed social group “must share a narrowing characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted.” Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2005).
Mushayahama asserts that she was persecuted in the past on account of her membership in the proposed social group of “female teachers who are not ZANU-PF supporters.” (Pet’r Br. 29). Mushayahama argues that the IJ’s finding that the group is not sufficiently visible is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Mushayahama contends that female teachers opposing the ZANU-PF are “clearly visible,” despite the finding by the IJ that her status as a teacher would not be readily recognizable outside of the classroom, because female teachers are a distinct group recognizable in Zimbabwe and because her lack of support for the ruling party is “visible by negative implication” to those who expect great support for the party. (Id. at 30). Mushayahama also disagrees with the IJ’s ruling that her profession as a teacher is not fundamental or immutable and that she should be required to change it. By discussing the importance of the profession of an educator, Mushayahama attempts to distinguish her case from the case of In re Acosta, where the BIA found that the applicant could be required to change his occupation as a taxi driver. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985), overruled on other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). Respondent asserts that the BIA was correct in finding that Mushayahama has not previously, nor will she in the future, be seen as opposing the ZANU-PF because she is a member of the party and did not assert her opposition to the party while in Zimbabwe. Respondent points out that only one of the incidents involving her position as a teacher, the family accusing her of involvement in 19 the drowning of a student, was directed at Mushayahama. Respondent discounts this event as unrelated to Mushayahama’s membership in this proposed social group because “it appears [the parents] were looking for a scape-goat for the other child’s death and likely chose her because of her role as a teacher, which necessarily includes the supervision of students.” (Resp’t Br. 41). Respondent further argues that the fact that Mushayahama was not personally harmed in the attack on the deputy headmaster of her school or during the 1998 beating of the individual who worked at her school shows that the incidents have no bearing on whether she was a member of her proposed social group or was targeted because of that membership. Respondent takes the position, and we agree, that we need not determine whether “female teachers opposed to the government or ruling party” is a cognizable social group for purposes of withholding of removal because Mushayahama has not demonstrated that she is a member of the group. (See id. at 42 n.9). Because Mushayahama has not demonstrated that she openly opposed or spoke out against the ZANU-PF in any way while in Zimbabwe, she has not established that she fits into her proposed social group of female teachers opposed to the ruling party. Mushayahama’s traits of her gender and political opinions opposing the ruling party are certainly immutable characteristics, which she either cannot or should not be required to alter. While Mushayahama testified that she would be more likely to suffer harm in Zimbabwe because of her profession as a teacher and described incidents which took place either at a school where she worked or involved individuals with whom she worked, Mushayahama provided no evidence that the events occurred because the victims were teachers, because of their genders, or because they opposed the ZANU-PF. In fact, both the school deputy who was attacked and the school clerk who was beaten were males, and Mushayahama did not describe either of them as teachers. Accordingly, the only incident Mushayahama described 20 which deals with possible persecution of a female teacher is the accusation that she was involved in the drowning of the first-grade student and, as described above, no evidence other than Mushayahama’s testimony that the accusing couple were strong ZANU-PF supporters indicates that the event was politically-motivated. Even assuming, arguendo, unlike the IJ found, that this proposed group is sufficiently socially visible as teachers and the possible group members’ profession is sufficiently immutable not to require change, like the BIA found, Mushayahama still has not established that she either was previously or would be in the future seen as a member of this group. She instead appeared to be a party supporter while in Zimbabwe and thus would not have been seen in the past or would likely be seen in the future by the ZANU-PF as a member of the proposed social group of female teachers opposed to the government. b. Citizens Returning to Zimbabwe After Long Stays Abroad Mushayahama additionally argues that she is more likely than not to suffer future persecution because her actions in fleeing the country without the knowledge or permission of the government in Zimbabwe and applying for political asylum in the United States will show the ZANU-PF that she is ideologically opposed to it if she returns. The IJ found that this proposed social group has the immutable characteristic that the individuals are returning from long stays abroad, but determined that the group is not sufficiently delimited or socially visible for purposes of withholding of removal. Mushayahama contends that the group is delimited in terms of time to include only Zimbabweans who remain outside of Zimbabwe for five years or longer. Mushayahama uses this time restriction based on “the length of time after which the Zimbabwean government revokes the citizenships of persons who have left the country.” (Pet’r Br. 34 (citing A.R. at 207)). 21 Mushayahama also argues that the group is sufficiently visible because those who return to Zimbabwe after five years no longer retain citizenship, and those lacking citizenship are visible as a distinct element of society. As stated above, a “social group,” as defined by the BIA, must be a group of people sharing a common, immutable characteristic, and the common defining characteristic must be one that the individual members either cannot change or that is so fundamental to their identities that they should not be required to change. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233; see also Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 546 (adopting the BIA’s definition of a “social group”). Sweeping and general classifications will not usually constitute a social group for purposes of asylum or withholding of removal. See Rreshpja, 420 F.3d at 555. In this case, the BIA’s decision also discusses the importance of the element of “visibility” and of being recognizable to others in the country at issue. (A.R. at 4). The BIA found that Mushayahama did not adequately show that “she and other citizens returning to Zimbabwe after long absences abroad would be ‘highly visible and recognizable’ by others in Zimbabwean society.” (Id.). The BIA went on to find that even if she had proved that the group was sufficiently visible, Mushayahama did not show that “it is more likely than not that she would be persecuted on such ground, whether through the nation’s citizenship revocation law or through other means.” (Id.). As the IJ found, this proposed social group has the immutable characteristic of having spent time periods abroad. Even assuming, arguendo, that the group is sufficiently delimited to include only individuals having been abroad for more than five years, as suggested by Mushayahama, the group still lacks the requisite visibility to the Zimbabwean society at-large to constitute a social group for the purposes of withholding of removal. Mushayahama seeks to rely on the Citizenship 22 Act as proof of her claims related to the adequacy of this proposed social group and her inclusion in it; however, she did not provide the contents of the Act for inclusion in the record. As the IJ and the BIA found, the Country Report’s brief mention of the contents of the Citizenship Act suggests that only those with claims to dual citizenship who have failed to return to the country within a five year period shall lose their Zimbabwean citizenship under the law. Mushayahama provided no evidence, such as the Citizenship Act itself or its legislative history, to rebut this finding, and she has not demonstrated that she has a claim to dual citizenship. See Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 106 (BIA 1989) (placing the burden of proving the relevant application of foreign law on the party asserting it). In her petition for review, Mushayahama now claims that her due process rights were violated by the BIA’s discussion of the Citizenship Act and its citation to the contents of the Citizenship Act on an internet website without affording her the opportunity to respond. Mushayahama thus argues that the BIA improperly took administrative notice of a contested fact and requests that the case be remanded to allow her to submit rebuttal evidence on this issue. Respondent cites several BIA decisions standing for the proposition that a party who wishes to rely on a foreign law bears the burden of proof as to the content of the law. (Id. at 36); see Soleimani, 20 I. & N. at 106; Matter of Ho, 18 I. & N. Dec. 152, 155 (BIA 1981); Matter of Annang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 502, 502 (1973). Mushayahama did not submit the text of the Citizenship Act and instead, relies on a passage from the Country Report, which briefly references the law. The petitioner must have exhausted all of her administrative remedies for a federal court to have jurisdiction over an appeal from an order of removal. 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1). This Circuit has interpreted the exhaustion requirement to mean that the petitioner must “first argue the claim before 23 the IJ or the BIA before an appeal may be taken.” Csekinek v. I.N.S., 391 F.3d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 2004); Coulibaly v. Gonzales, 220 F. App’x 400, 401 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining jurisdiction where there was “no evidence in the record that petitioner ever presented these claims to either the Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals”). The purposes of the exhaustion requirement of § 1252(d)(1) are: “(1) to ensure that the INS, as the agency responsible for construing and applying the immigration laws and implementing regulations, has had a full opportunity to consider a petitioner’s claims; (2) to avoid premature interference with the agency’s processes; and (3) to allow the BIA to compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.” Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mushayahama did not file a motion to reopen the BIA’s proceedings, as is required before obtaining judicial review of the decision. See Dokic v. I.N.S., 899 F.2d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 1990). Moreover, Mushayahama has not shown that the BIA would have found her proposed social group cognizable or that its decision would have been at all affected had the BIA not looked to the contents of the Citizenship Act. See Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir. 2005) (requiring an applicant claiming a due process violation in removal proceedings to show “error and substantial prejudice” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, no error that may have been committed by the BIA7 affected the outcome of the proceedings, and a remand on such grounds is not appropriate. Regardless of whether the Citizenship Act would apply to Mushayahama upon her return to Zimbabwe, she has not sufficiently demonstrated that she would be persecuted on account of her having been absent from the country for the past decade. As Mushayahama has not proven that she 7 This is not to say that the BIA did err in discussing the contents of the Citizenship Act, as it is permitted to take “administrative notice of commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of official documents[.]” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv). 24 suffered past persecution because of her membership in this proposed group in the past, Mushayahama does not enjoy the presumption that she would suffer persecution on account of her membership in the group in the future. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). Mushayahama provided no evidence of other similarly situated returnees suffering persecution when returning to Zimbabwe. The evidence in the Country Report, when taken with her testimony and the other documents in the record, does not show that it is more likely than not that Mushayahama will be persecuted on account of her membership in the proposed social group of citizens returning after long stays abroad. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(ii); (b)(2). In sum, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Mushayahama has not established that she suffered past, or is more likely than not to suffer future, persecution on account of her political opinion, real or imputed, or on account of her membership in either of the proposed social groups. Accordingly, we deny Mushayahama’s petition for review as to her claim for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3). D. Withholding of Removal under the Convention Against Torture Mushayahama contends that the BIA and IJ erred in determining that she is not entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture.8 The applicant’s burden of proof to obtain relief under the CAT is to show “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed” to the country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture” is defined as: any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 8 See Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2001), for a full description of the ratification and implementation of the Convention Against Torture in the United States. 25 coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). As set out by this court in Mostafa v. Ashcroft, [i]n determining whether an alien is entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture, all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture in the proposed country of removal shall be considered, including, but not limited to: past torture inflicted upon the applicant; evidence that the applicant could relocate to another part of the country of removal where he or she is not likely to be tortured; gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights; and other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of deportation. 395 F.3d 622, 625 (6th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Matter of G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 366, 367 (BIA 2002) (en banc)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3). If an IJ determines that the applicant is more likely than not to be tortured upon return to the country of removal, protection under the CAT should be granted. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(4). Unlike withholding of removal under the INA, no protected-ground nexus is required for relief under the CAT. Almuhtaseb, 453 F.3d at 751. An application for relief under the CAT “focuses on the particularized threat of torture,” rather than a link to race, nationality, religion, political opinion, or membership in a social group, making it possible for a petitioner to succeed on her CAT claim despite the denial of her INA-based claim for withholding of removal. Castellano-Chacon, 341 F.3d at 551–52. Mushayahama claims the IJ erred in denying her relief under the CAT because he misstated her burden of proof under the CAT to say that she had to show that it was “more likely than not that she will be detained” when she arrives in Zimbabwe, rather than that she must show that it is “more likely than not” that she will be tortured in any way upon her return. (Pet’r Br. 38–39). 26 Mushayahama claims that the past persecution she was found to have suffered is equivalent to past torture and that the past incidents are “great evidence of the likelihood of similar torture in the future.” (Id. at 39 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3)). Mushayahama also points to her credible testimony that she fears future torture in the form of beatings, rape, electrocution, or being killed if she returns, as evidence that she will likely suffer torture. Mushayahama argues that her past persecution, when taken together with the Country Report’s statements “that the government engaged in serious and systematic violations of human rights,” that there were “politically-motivated killings and disappearances,” and that “security forces regularly tortured detainees,” shows that it is more likely than not that she will suffer torture if removed to Zimbabwe. (Id. at 39–40 (quoting A.R. at 62)). The panel in Mostafa found that the BIA failing to mention or discuss the relevant country conditions outlined in the Country Reports in the record and discussed in an earlier BIA opinion, led to the conclusion that the BIA “failed to analyze [the petitioner’s] Convention Against Torture claim in light of relevant country conditions and applicable legal precedent.” 395 F.3d at 626. That panel found that had the BIA considered “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” in the country, as the regulations require, the BIA may have decided the case differently. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The panel thus determined that it was appropriate to remand the case to the BIA for proper consideration of the CAT claim. Id.(citing Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 477–78 (3d Cir. 2003); Kamalthas v. I.N.S., 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001); Mansour v. I.N.S., 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000) (all opinions where the BIA’s failure to consider the country conditions in its review of a torture claim required remand)); see also N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]here is no indication in the record before us that 27 the Immigration Judge or the Board took cognizance of the dire human rights situation in Mauritania” and commenting that the BIA should explain its reasoning if it finds the “country reports that explain torture, slavery, and other human rights violations” to be “unimportant or irrelevant to the case”). Additionally, in Mapouya v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 396, 414–15 (6th Cir. 2007), after finding that the IJ erroneously made an adverse credibility determination, the panel addressed that the IJ only briefly mentioned the petitioner’s CAT claim, stating that the evidence fell short of relief under the CAT. In addition to the other errors in the IJ’s analysis related to the adverse credibility finding, the Mapouya court found fault in the IJ’s failure to analyze the CAT claim “through the lens of the four factors,” and determined that the claim needed to be remanded for proper analysis. Id. at 415. Here, the IJ found that Mushayahama suffered past persecution when he found her testimony regarding her rape and other instances through which she was victimized to have been credible. The widespread violations of human rights in the country of removal is a proper consideration when determining whether relief under the CAT is appropriate, and the Country Report and other documents in the record describe killings committed by the government or its agents, politicallymotivated abductions, excessive force by police in apprehending of detaining suspects, security forces torturing citizens, arrests and beatings of civil protesters, reports of rapes by ZANU-PF members, police, and military, abuse of prisoners, arbitrary arrests and detention by police, failure by police to respond to vigilante violence, home searches and evictions by government security forces without warrants or notice, and government restrictions on academic freedom. Nothing in the record indicates that the conditions have improved since Mushayahama left Zimbabwe or since the 28 publication of the Country Report in the record, and respondent does not argue that the country conditions have changed. Despite the mass violations of human rights and other relevant evidence related to the conditions in Zimbabwe contained in the record, neither the IJ nor the BIA discussed these conditions in their analysis related to Mushayahama’s CAT claim. The BIA’s only mention of the Country Report was in reference to Mushayahama’s attempted reliance on the Citizenship Act for one of her proposed social groups for purposes of withholding of removal under the INA. While the BIA’s brief dismissal of Mushayahama’s CAT claim suggests that it found the past persecution she suffered insufficient to indicate that she is more likely than not to suffer torture in the future, this determination did not take into account the conditions in the country of return which were in the record for the BIA’s review. Moreover, not only did the IJ fail to discuss the relevant country conditions, he also improperly misstated the appropriate CAT standard to imply that Mushayahama must show that it is more likely than not that she will be detained upon arrival at the airport in Zimbabwe. We find that the BIA failed to consider “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture” in Zimbabwe and that the BIA “might have adjudicated [Mushayahama’s] claim differently” if it had. See Mostafa, 395 F.3d at 626 (quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, it is appropriate to remand Mushayahama’s claim to the BIA for proper consideration of all relevant evidence related to future torture in the country of return. We vacate the BIA’s denial of withholding of removal under the CAT and grant Mushayahama’s petition for review as to this claim. 29