Opinion ID: 2026681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: References to the Victims' Families

Text: Defendant contends that the State impermissibly elicited references to the victims' families during the trial testimony of three witnesses. The first such reference occurred during the direct examination of Helen Chisnick. At the beginning of her testimony, Helen was asked several background questions by the prosecutor, including how old she was and what she did for a living. Helen was then asked what she did on May 13, 1999, the day of the shootings. Helen replied: I took care of my mother. My mother was bedridden. She'd had a stroke. So she was paralyzed on the one side of her. So Imy routine would be I would get up in the morning. I would have to change her, feed her breakfast, test her blood sugar. The second reference that defendant contends was error took place during the testimony of Christina Chisnick. At the beginning of her direct examination, Christina was also asked several background questions, including whether she was married and whether she had any children. Helen answered that she was married and that she had a nine-year-old son. The third reference occurred during the testimony of Barul Patel, Dipak Patel's wife. Testifying primarily as a life and death witness for the State, Barul stated that she opened the Extra Value liquor store with her husband at 9 a.m., left to pick up her younger son from school in the afternoon, and returned in the evening to find that the shootings had taken place and that her husband had been taken to the hospital. Like Helen and Christina, Barul was asked several background questions at the beginning of her direct examination, including whether she was married, whether she had any children, and what the ages of the children were. Barul answered that she was married to Dipak and that she had two sons who, at the time of trial in February 2004, were 21 and 16 years old. Citing to People v. Hope, 116 Ill.2d 265, 274-79, 108 Ill.Dec. 41, 508 N.E.2d 202 (1986), and People v. Bernette, 30 Ill.2d 359, 371, 197 N.E.2d 436 (1964), defendant contends that the references to family members of the victims described above were improperly elicited by the State in an attempt to appeal to the emotions of the jurors. He maintains that he was denied a fair trial on this basis and, therefore, that his convictions should be reversed. The State correctly observes that this argument is procedurally defaulted because no objections were made to the witnesses' testimony at trial and because defendant failed to include the issue in his posttrial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Defendant, in response, contends that the admission of the complained of testimony amounts to plain error. In addressing defendant's plain error argument, we first consider whether error occurred at all. People v. Wade, 131 Ill.2d 370, 376, 137 Ill.Dec. 608, 546 N.E.2d 553 (1989). `[W]here testimony in a murder case respecting the fact the deceased has left a spouse and family is not elicited incidentally, but is presented in such a manner as to cause the jury to believe it is material, its admission is highly prejudicial and constitutes reversible error unless an objection thereto is sustained and the jury instructed to disregard such evidence. In like manner, we have held that jury argument by the prosecution which dwells upon the decedent's family or seeks to relate a defendant's punishment to the existence of family is inflammatory and improper. [Citations.]' People v. Bernette, 30 Ill.2d 359, 371, 197 N.E.2d 436 (1964).    However, `[c]ommon sense tells us that murder victims do not live in a vacuum and that, in most cases, they leave behind family members.' ( People v. Free (1983), 94 Ill.2d 378, 415 [69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218].) Thus, every mention of a deceased's family does not per se entitle the defendant to a new trial. ( People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill.2d 294, 322 [74 Ill.Dec. 557, 456 N.E.2d 59].) (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Hope, 116 Ill.2d 265, 275-76, 108 Ill.Dec. 41, 508 N.E.2d 202 (1986). In this case, several facts point to the admissibility of the three witnesses' testimony. First, unlike the testimony at issue in cases such as Hope and Bernette, Helen's and Christina's testimony did not involve the family members of a deceased victim. Rather, Helen and Christina testified as surviving victims describing their own personal backgrounds. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 32 Ill.App.3d 842, 847, 336 N.E.2d 92 (1975) (rejecting argument brought under Bernette, in part, because the complained-of testimony did not involve family members of a deceased victim). In addition, Barul's testimony that she was married to Dipak was necessary to establish her relationship to Dipak, and her testimony that she had children was necessary to explain why she left the liquor store in the afternoon. Both statements were a relevant part of her life and death testimony. See, e.g., People v. Free, 94 Ill.2d 378, 413-15, 69 Ill.Dec. 1, 447 N.E.2d 218 (1983); People v. Speck, 41 Ill.2d 177, 201-02, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 946, 91 S.Ct. 2279, 29 L.Ed.2d 855 (1971). Finally, and most important, the brief testimony elicited by the State from the three witnesses consisted solely of introductory, background questions. The State did nothing to make it appear material to establishing guilt or innocence. Thus, the testimony was properly admitted. See, e.g., People v. Pasch, 152 Ill.2d 133, 199, 178 Ill.Dec. 38, 604 N.E.2d 294 (1992) (rejecting challenge under Bernette, in part, because many of the complained-of questions consisted of merely introductory, foundational questions pertaining to the witness' background, which was proper); People v. Griffith, 158 Ill.2d 476, 484-85, 199 Ill.Dec. 715, 634 N.E.2d 1069 (1994). Consequently, there also was no plain error. In addition to challenging the testimony of Helen, Christina and Barul, defendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial because of comments the prosecutor made about the two deceased victims' families during the opening statement to the jury. While recounting the events that took place inside the liquor store during the shootings, the prosecutor stated: That bullet that struck Dipak in the back killed him. Dipak Patel was both a father and a husband. The prosecutor also stated: The defendant's bullet struck Ambalal Patel in the chest killing him. Ambalal Patel was also a husband and father. A defense objection at that point was sustained and the issue was subsequently raised in defendant's posttrial motion. We agree with defendant that the prosecutor's comments during the opening statement were error. However, we cannot say the comments were so improper as to warrant reversal of defendant's convictions. The comments were not dwelled upon by the State in any way and no attempt was made to relate defendant's punishment to the existence of the victims' family. See Bernette, 30 Ill.2d at 371, 197 N.E.2d 436. Further, defense counsel's objection to the comments was sustained and the jury was properly instructed that the arguments of counsel were not evidence that it could consider in determining guilt or innocence. Considered in the context of the entire trial, the comments did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the comments do not amount to reversible error.