Opinion ID: 1925267
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Churchill & Banks's application substantially complete?

Text: Section 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(A) through (J) provides SHAB with ten criteria to guide its assessment of whether comprehensive permit applications that were in process when the February 13, 2004 moratorium took effect were substantially complete at that time. [5] What it does not provide, unfortunately, is a useful definition of substantially complete. The pragmatic checklist in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(A) through (J) establishes a seemingly precise scorecard that, at first glance, would appear to reduce SHAB's evaluations to a rote exercise in inventory accounting, but the lack of a satisfactory explication of the determinative standard undermines the objectivity of the process. Under § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i), SHAB's determination of an application's substantial completeness shall be based on whether there was on or before February 13, 2004, substantial completeness of substantially all of the ten elements the statute then proceeds to list. Such circular language renders the statute susceptible to any number of potential interpretations, including those suggested by Churchill & Banks in this case. For example, one logically could argue that by substantially completing some majority of the ten requirements, but completing none of them, an applicant could attain substantial completeness under § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) as it is written. Conversely, one could argue that an application that substantially completed nine of the criteria, but totally ignored one, would not qualify as substantially complete. Of course, the resolution of such ambiguity in these instances typically is the province of the agency responsible for carrying out the statute's mandatesubject to review by the courts. See In re Lallo, 768 A.2d 921, 926 (R.I.2001). In this case, SHAB made a finding of substantial completeness based on its determination that Churchill & Banks's application was substantially complete with respect to all ten benchmarks spelled out in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(A) through (J). In its evaluation of Churchill & Banks's application, however, SHAB did not endeavor to specifically quantify what constitutes substantial completeness with regard to those benchmarks, collectively or individually. Rather, a review of the transcript of SHAB's deliberations indicates that for all practical purposes, the SHAB members' view of substantial completeness mirrored the late Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's oft-quoted take on obscenity: I know it when I see it. [6] The members appropriately drew on their professional backgrounds in re-evaluating the five criteria on which the zoning board alleged Churchill & Banks's application fell short of that mark, and their factual findings merit deference from this Court. See City of East Providence v. Public Utilities Commission, 566 A.2d 1305, 1307 (R.I. 1989). However, to the extent that SHAB's ultimate decision turned, as it clearly did, on an interpretation of § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i), that statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review before this Court. City of East Providence, 566 A.2d at 1307. Although § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) fails (or, perhaps more accurately, does not even attempt) to define substantial completeness in any meaningful way, it does succeed in unequivocally establishing that information that was not included in an application prior to February 13, 2004, is excluded from SHAB's review. Yet, in spite of this clear and unambiguous deadline, SHAB determined that it would not penalize Churchill & Banks for the omission of any information that it was ready to present to the Zoning Board before the moratorium took effect. SHAB's rationale for this decisionthat the zoning board should not be allowed to assail Churchill & Banks's application for omissions that might have been addressed but for the board's management of the February 11, 2004 meetingarose from its factual findings, to be sure. But these factual findings wandered beyond the narrow scope of review authorized by § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i), and as such they emanate from an error of law. There is no ambiguity in the controlling statutory provision here, and [i]t is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 490 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996)). SHAB's mandate was to review the application as it stood on February 13, 2004, not to speculate about what it might have been, or even should have been at that time. Churchill & Banks has pointed out that SHAB regulations permit it to consider additional evidence, but the rule to which Churchill & Banks alludes, Regulation 9.02, specifically applies to appeals from denials of comprehensive permit applications or approvals that carry conditions the appellant deems infeasible. See § 45-53-5. It is noteworthy, as well, that SHAB's ruling that Churchill & Banks should not be penalized    for the omission of any information that it was ready to present to the Zoning Board before the moratorium took effect made no mention whatsoever of Regulation 9.02. Moreover, even if SHAB's regulation did extend to substantial completeness appeals, the general provisions of a legislative rule must give way to specific statutory language, so the February 13, 2004 deadline contained in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) would trump any self-ordained right SHAB might assert to look beyond the record that was before the zoning board in this instance. See Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 121 R.I. 232, 236, 397 A.2d 884, 886 (1979). Churchill & Banks also contends that SHAB did not actually consider any information that was not part of its application as of February 13, 2004. Rather, Churchill & Banks postulates, SHAB merely considered its lost opportunity to present additional evidence. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court accepted that premise, we still would reckon it to be a distinction without a difference. During its deliberations, SHAB voted to approve a motion accepting the offer of proof submitted on behalf of Churchill & Banks to be considered as part of the record. At the February 11, 2004 zoning board hearing, Churchill & Banks had requested that the record reflect that it was prepared to present the testimony of four different professionals, each of whom would have spoken to some aspect of its application. Significantly, however, no documents were submitted or marked as exhibits. This Court need not speculate about whether the SHAB members fully (or uniformly) understood the import of an offer of proof in the context of appellate review to conclude that neither offers of proof, nor affidavits of witnesses who might have testified, nor lost opportunities can overcome the clear and unambiguous language of § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i). The zoning board decided to use its February 11, 2004 meeting to conduct an inquiry into the consequences of a moratorium that both the board and Churchill & Banks believed already was in effect at that time. Although this legitimate choice to table further consideration of Churchill & Banks's application ended up costing Churchill & Banks the opportunity to offer additional testimony before what the parties later discovered was a moratorium effective February 13, 2004, that moratorium became effective almost seven months after Churchill & Banks first submitted its application. Section 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) does not provide for the consideration of any evidence that was not part of a developer's application before the moratorium; nor does it provide an exception for any lost opportunities. Regardless of how SHAB's decision to accept Churchill & Banks's offer of proof factored into its overall analysis of Churchill & Banks's application, that decision constituted an error of law that cannot be cured retrospectively by semantic distinctions. Although Churchill & Banks disputes that SHAB considered any of the additional proffered evidence in making its decision, it is clear from the dialogue among SHAB members during their review of Churchill & Banks's application, and in some cases in the wording of the motions on which they actually voted, that at the very least SHAB's vote to accept Churchill & Banks's offer of proof colored to some extent SHAB's votes on two of the five substantial completeness criteria that were under dispute. [7] In considering whether Churchill & Banks had provided adequate site development plans as required by § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(E), SHAB members unanimously approved a motion that Churchill & Banks has supplied sufficient information and would have supplied further information given the opportunity to satisfy the requirement that there was substantial enough information that the zoning board in the Town of Smithfield would act on the petition.  Further, SHAB's written decision notes that it has given due consideration to the fact that Churchill & Banks was declined the opportunity to present additional evidence on February 11, 2004. Although the decision does express the view that the zoning board had more than ample information to proceed with a meaningful review of the application, it follows that pronouncement with a curious caveat that would seem to undercut a finding of substantial completeness: To the extent that the Zoning Board believes that a particular detail may need clarification or supplementation, it may request that Churchill & Banks provide such information during the course of the evidentiary hearings on remand. The question before SHAB was whether the Churchill & Banks application had been substantially complete as of February 13, 2004, so reassurances that the zoning board would be allowed to ask for additional information on remand were beside the point. Just as it is clear from the plain language of § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) that applications had to be substantially complete by February 13, 2004 to proceed under the pre-moratorium approval process, it is clear from the plain language of SHAB's decision that SHAB's acceptance of Churchill & Banks's offer of proof impermissibly influenced SHAB's analysis of Churchill & Banks's site development plans. SHAB's review of Churchill & Banks's report on existing site conditions, required under § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(F), recycles the same perplexing proclamations on meaningful review and supplementation that diluted the persuasive force of its endorsement of Churchill & Banks's site development plans. And, after observing that Churchill & Banks had indicated that it intended to provide additional information regarding existing site conditions during the February 11, 2004 hearing, the SHAB decision again acknowledges that it has given due consideration to that lost opportunity. SHAB also admits that the panel actually neglected to vote on the sufficiency of Churchill & Banks's report on existing site conditions, a procedural misstep that certainly raises questions about the findings of fact on this particular point. But we need not question SHAB's findings of fact because again in this instance it is clear that SHAB's review of the site conditions report incorporated to some extent a consideration of extraneous factors beyond the black-and-white application that was frozen in time on February 13, 2004, by operation of the moratorium. Although we conclude that SHAB's consideration of information that might have been submitted before February 13, 2004 ( i.e., Churchill & Banks's lost opportunity), was erroneous, it was at least understandable. We are hard-pressed, however, to fathom the complete disregard of the plain language of a statutory provision. Section 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(H) requires [a] master plan, if the development proposal is for a major or minor land development plan or a major or minor subdivision[.] Both parties acknowledge that § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(H) applies to Churchill & Banks's application, and both parties agree that as of February 13, 2004, Churchill & Banks's application contained no discrete document either labeled as a master plan or that could reasonably be said to fit that description. In spite of this glaring omission, SHAB found that Churchill & Banks had submitted a substantially complete master plan. The transcript of SHAB's October 17, 2005 meeting sheds some light on exactly how that happened: CHAIRWOMAN SHEKARCHI: Moving to the fourth issue in dispute, the master plan submission, whether or not that was substantially complete. MR. GOODRICH: I take the position, I don't think they need it. I certainly think based upon all our other findings that there was adequate information, whether it be a planning board or zoning board, could understand what was being attempted by this applicant. I think there was enough specificity of detail that would enable the master plan submission. I make that in the form of a motion. (Emphasis added.) Section 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(H) unequivocally requires a master plan, and SHAB's own regulations echo that mandate. [8] For its part, the town points to Section IV, Article B of the Smithfield Land Development and Subdivision Review Regulations, which sets forth very specific requirements as to what constitutes a valid master plan. SHAB seemingly chose to search the entire application to amalgamate some reasonable facsimile of a master plan, and even at that its ultimate finding of substantial completeness stands in stark contrast to the list of notable omissions cited in its own December 2004 staff report. [9] The SHAB decision refers to the town's regulations, as well as the statutory definition of master plan provided in G.L.1956 § 45-23-32(23), [10] but it is entirely bereft of any factual findings. In lieu of factual findings, SHAB offers the conclusory observation that the administrative record, when reviewed in its entirety, contains more than ample information to qualify as a substantially complete master plan level submission   . Ironically, SHAB's decision chides the zoning board for failing to identify a single omission from its local filing requirements. This reproach strikes us as gratuitous in light of two facts: (1) SHAB's own staff report identified several omissions; and (2) the zoning board argued that Churchill & Banks had completely failed to submit a master planto this Court, that contention seems to sufficiently identify a rather gaping omission. Ignoring the plain language of a statute is perhaps the ultimate error of law, and SHAB's ruling that Churchill & Banks's application included a substantially complete master plan arose from a disregard for the plain language of § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(H). And although SHAB's consideration of information beyond the application documents that were on file with the zoning board as of February 13, 2004 was perhaps an understandable misinterpretation of § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i), that, too, was an error of law. In imposing the moratorium, the General Assembly expressly declared that towns throughout Rhode Island were confronted by an unprecedented volume and complexity of development applications by private for-profit developers, and that in order to protect the public health and welfare in communities a temporary respite was necessary to provide sufficient time to establish a reasonable and orderly process for the consideration of applications. Section 45-53-4(b)(1). This clear statement of statutory purpose underscores the significance of the February 13, 2004 dead line. As we conclude that SHAB's findings were infected by error of law, we reverse its ruling that Churchill and Banks's application was substantially complete under § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i).