Opinion ID: 19557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: challenges related to the jury verdict

Text: 35 Lankford raises several points of error related to the jury's verdict. First, he argues that the court did not explain the meaning of willfully when it instructed the jury as to the elements of interstate domestic violence and of kidnapping. Second, he insists that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction of interstate domestic violence (Count 1), kidnapping (Count 2), and of use, or carrying of afirearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 3).
36 Because Lankford did not challenge his jury instructions at trial, we review for plain error. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Davis, 19 F.3d 166, 169 (5th Cir. 1994). Plain error occurs only when the instruction, considered as a whole, was so clearly erroneous as to result in the likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice. Id. We find no such error here. 37 The judge instructed the jury as to the definitions of knowingly and intentionally. The latter was stated to mean that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely. Intentionally, not willfully, is included in the interstate domestic violence statute. See 2261(a)(1). Willfully is included in the kidnapping statute. See 1201(a)(1) (providing that the person be willfully transported). The court instructed the jury that in order to find Lankford guilty of kidnapping, it had to find that the government proved that the defendant intentionally transported Joanie Lankford in interstate commerce while so kidnaped or confined. Considering the jury instruction, as a whole, we do not find that a grave miscarriage of justice is likely to have occurred because of the absence of the proffered definition of willfully. Thus, we find no plain error.
38 Lankford challenges his conviction of interstate domestic violence principally because there was insufficient evidence to show that (1) he crossed a state line with intent to injure, harass, or intimidate his spouse, and (2) his wife's protestation was sufficient to dispel his mistaken belief that she was consenting to sexual acts. His challenge to his kidnapping conviction rests on arguments regarding his wife's consent to go to Lawton with him and on an absence of evidence that his intent in going to Lawton was for his sexual gratification. Finally, he challenges his conviction of using or carrying a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 924(c), with arguments that evidence did not support a finding that a real gun was used, and that it did not support a finding of a nexus between use or carriage of a firearm and the underlying crimes of violence. As to the latter contention, Lankford points to the absence of evidence that showed he used or carried a gun after stopping at a rest stop in Texas. 39 Lankford raised sufficiency of evidence arguments in his Rule 29 motion, and thus preserved these issues for appeal. In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and will affirm if a rational trier of fact could have found that the government proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Castro, 15 F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1994). The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1189 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Salazar, 66 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir. 1995)). 40 As the lower court noted when considering Lankford's sufficiency of evidence arguments, the jury in this case was confronted with two diametrically opposed versions of what happened on August 8 and 9. In light of the verdict, it is clear that the jury chose to give more credibility to Joanie Lankford's testimony than to her husband's. This is exactly the type of decision juries are called upon to make, see United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 182 (5th Cir. 1993) (The jury is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence, and of the credibility of witnesses.), and, unless testimony is incredible as a matter of law, we will not disturb the jury's findings.See United States v. Freeman, 77 F.3d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 1996). 41 Joanie Lankford's testimony neither asserts facts that [she] physically could not have observed, nor asserts events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature. Id. As a result, we must accept that the jury found that Joanie Lankford consented to neither being taken to Lawton, nor to sexual activity while there. We also find that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that the government met its burden in proving that Lankford crossed state lines with the intent to harass, injury or intimidate his wife, that during the course of, or as a result of, such travel, he intentionally committed a crime of violence and thereby caused Joanie Lankford bodily injury. There was also sufficient evidence to support a conviction of kidnapping. Because the Government did not have to show that Lankford's intent in crossing state lines was to obtain sexual gratification in order to prove kidnapping under 1201, an absence of evidence to that effect is irrelevant. See United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 100 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing elements of 1201(a)(1)). 42 With regard to his conviction under 924(c), Lankford asserts that there is insufficient evidence because the Government did not admit an actual gun into evidence and because his wife testified that she did not know (versus did not believe) that what he was carrying was in fact a real gun. Although to date we have not detailed the nature of the evidence the government is entitled to rely on in attempting to prove a firearm was used or carried for purposes of 924(c), a number of our sister circuits have considered the issues Lankford raises. See United States v. Hunt, 187 F.3d 1269, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Taylor, 54 F.3d 967, 975 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Moore, 25 F.3d 563, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Jones, 16 F.3d 487, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir. 1990); Parker v. United States, 801 F.2d 1382, 1384-85 (D.C. Cir. 1986). We agree with the principle emerging from these opinions: The Government is not required to produce the actual weapon allegedly used, possessed, or carried and may rely on testimony, including the testimony of lay witnesses, in its attempt to prove that a defendant used, possessed or carried a firearm as that term is defined for purposes of 924(c). See 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3). A review of the record with this principle in mind leads to the conclusion that a sufficient basis for a jury finding that Lankford used or carried a firearm exists. 43 Lankford's argument regarding the use or carriage of a gun at the time state lines were crossed has been previously rejected by this court, see United States v. Ivy, 929 F.2d 147, 151-52 (5th Cir. 1991), and the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), and Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), do not provide us with reasons to consider that argument meritorious at this juncture. There is sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that Lankford used a gun during the kidnapping and in relation to that kidnapping. A showing that Lankford also used a gun during and in relation to his sexually abusing his wife is not required to sustain his conviction.