Opinion ID: 1364239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Diaries

Text: Barhoumi contends that in admitting the diaries, the district court adjudicating his habeas petition failed to comply with the CMO, which set forth the following procedures regarding the admission of hearsay evidence: On motion of either the petitioner or the government, the Merits Judge may admit and consider hearsay evidence that is material and relevant to the legality of the petitioner's detention if the movant establishes that the hearsay evidence is reliable and that the provision of nonhearsay evidence would unduly burden the movant or interfere with the government's efforts to protect national security. The proponent of hearsay evidence shall move for admission of the evidence no later than 7 days prior to the date on which the initial briefs for judgment on the record are due. CMO, 2008 WL 4858241 at  (internal citation omitted). Barhoumi points out that the government never timely filed a motion specifically requesting admission of the diaries, as required by the CMO. Rather, the government submitted a memorandum in which it made general assertions regarding the admission and reliability of hearsay evidence in all the Guantanamo detainee cases, but made no mention of the diaries or any other evidence in specific connection to Barhoumi's factual return. Later, after the deadline established in the CMO had passed, the government filed a motion in Barhoumi's case to supplement the record with the diaries. The district court admitted all the hearsay evidence, including the two diaries, explaining: Because these Guantanamo proceedings are unique and difficult, I have decided to receive and consider all of the evidence offered by both sides, but have assessed it item by item for consistency[,] the conditions in which the statements were made and the documents found. The personal knowledge of the declarant and the levels of hearsay. I have given the evidence the weight I think it deserves. Hr'g Tr. at 4. Barhoumi argues that the district court's decision violated the CMO not only because the government failed to timely move to admit the diary evidence (according to Barhoumi, the generic hearsay memorandum, though timely, failed to qualify as a motion to admit the diaries), but also because the government never demonstrated that the provision of nonhearsay evidence would unduly burden the movant or interfere with the government's efforts to protect national security, as the CMO required. CMO, 2008 WL 4858241 at . Quoting the Federal Circuit, Barhoumi states that parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders, and that failure to do so may properly support severe sanctions and exclusions of evidence. Appellant's Br. 20 (quoting 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir.2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rosario-Diaz v. Gonzalez, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir.1998) ([L]itigants have an unflagging duty to comply with clearly communicated case-management orders.). Given this, Barhoumi argues, the district court's alleged failure to comply with the CMO in and of itself constitutes grounds for reversal. We disagree. Although the cases Barhoumi cites hold that parties have a duty to comply with case management orders, he cites no authority for the proposition that judges are required to follow their ownmuch less another judge'scase management order. In any event, the CMO governing the Guantanamo habeas cases expressly authorizes judges assigned to adjudicate habeas petitions to alter the framework [set out in the CMO] based on the particular facts and circumstances of their individual cases. CMO, 2008 WL 4858241 at  n. 1. That is precisely what the district court did here. Citing the unique and difficult circumstances inherent in the Guantanamo proceedings, the district court decided after giving Barhoumi an opportunity to respond to the government's motion to supplement the recordthat the circumstances of Barhoumi's case justified admitting all hearsay evidence. Hr'g Tr. at 4. Other district judges have made the same determination in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 646 F.Supp.2d 20, 23 (D.D.C.2009) (receiving all evidence offered by either side but assessing it item-by-item for consistency, the conditions in which statements were made and documents found, the personal knowledge of a declarant, and the levels of hearsay). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing from the CMO's procedural framework regarding the admissibility of hearsay. See Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 546 (D.C.Cir.2009) (case management decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion). Barhoumi next contends that irrespective of the district court's fidelity to the CMO, the court erred in admitting the diaries absent a demonstration by the government that they fall within an established hearsay exception in the Federal Rules of Evidence. This argument, however, runs counter to this court's decision in Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C.Cir.2010), another Guantanamo habeas case in which the detainee also challenged the district court's admission of hearsay evidence. Relying in part on the Supreme Court's suggestion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004), that hearsay may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence in enemy combatant proceedings, the court stated that the question a habeas court must ask when presented with hearsay is not whether it is admissible it is always admissiblebut what probative weight to ascribe to whatever indicia of reliability it exhibits, Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 879 (emphasis added). Barhoumi seeks to sidestep this language by characterizing it as mere dicta that is neither binding nor persuasive. Appellant's Br. 20. Since oral argument in this case, however, another panel of this court has squarely foreclosed his theory. In Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir. 2010), the panel explained that Al-Bihani stands for the proposition that hearsay evidence is admissible in this type of habeas proceeding if the hearsay is reliable. Id., at 7. We, of course, are without authority to overturn a decision by a prior panel of this Court. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 390 (D.C.Cir.2008). Thus, to show that the district court erred in considering the diary evidence, Barhoumi must establish not that it is hearsay, but that it is unreliable hearsaya question that we address in Part III, below. Awad, at 7.