Opinion ID: 2294072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Substantive Due Process As Applied

Text: Mr. Germane's substantive due process claim is two-pronged. He first asserts that the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act burdens certain fundamental rights (namely, the liberty interest discussed in the preceding procedural due process section of this opinion). Moreover, he contends that the act is wholly irrational as applied to the facts of his case due to the nature of the prima facie case to be established by the state before the Superior Court for purposes of judicial review by that court. [36] This Court has clearly articulated the analytical approach that we employ in dealing with substantive due process claims. That approach was recently summarized in the case of Riley v. Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management 941 A.2d 198 (R.I.2008), as follows: The threshold question that must be addressed before we can determine the constitutionality of the statute is whether a fundamental right is in play. If so, in that case the statute will be subject to strict scrutiny; however, where neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is implicated, then the legislation properly is analyzed under a minimal-scrutiny test. Under those circumstances, this Court will review the statute to insure that a rational relationship exists between the provisions of [the statute] and a legitimate state interest. Under this analysis, if we can conceive of any reasonable basis to justify the classification, we will uphold the statute as constitutional. Id. at 205-06 (internal quotation marks omitted). 1. Does the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act Impermissibly Burden a Fundamental Right as Applied to Appellant? Mr. Germane first argues that, as applied in his case, chapter 37.1 of title 11 impermissibly burdens certain of his fundamental rights that are protected by the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. We consider this contention to be without merit. The due process clause of the federal constitution [37] (and the parallel provision of our state constitution [38] ) provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997). The jurisprudence of substantive due process recognizes that there are certain rights so implicit in the concept of ordered liberty that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937). Such rights are more fundamental and profound than the several liberty interests that have been deemed sufficient to trigger the requirements of procedural due process. Consequently, the fundamental rights protected by substantive due process are substantially shielded from adverse state actions regardless of the procedures used by the state. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2302. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the above-referenced fundamental rights include those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights as well as certain liberty and privacy interests implicit in the due process clause and in the penumbra of constitutional rights. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2302. These special liberty interests have been held to include the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to abortion. Id. (citations omitted). At the same time, it should be borne in mind that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that it is reluctant to expand the doctrine of substantive due process by recognizing new fundamental rights. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ([T]he Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended). This Court is similarly reluctant to recognize heretofore unarticulated fundamental rights. In order to prevail on the substantive due process prong of his constitutional argument, appellant was required to identify a fundamental right which is objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21, 117 S.Ct. 2302 (internal quotation marks omitted). [39] The record in this case is significantly devoid of a careful description by appellant of any fundamental liberty interest of his that was allegedly violated. See id. at 721, 117 S.Ct. 2302 (holding that individuals asserting a substantive due process claim must set forth a careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we are not convinced that persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses have a fundamental right to be free from the registration and notification requirements set forth in the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act, even if those requirements are intrusive and remain in place indefinitely. [40] Because the act does not constrain appellant's liberty in a manner that implicates a fundamental right, this Court's role at this juncture is simply to determine whether a rational relationship exists between the provisions of [the statute] and a legitimate state interest. State v. Garvin, 945 A.2d 821, 824 (R.I.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard sets a rather low bar for constitutionality, and appellant bears the substantial burden of demonstrating that no rational relationship exists between [the statute] and some legitimate state interest. Id. Mr. Germane has not carried this burden. 2. Are the Challenged Provisions of the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act Arbitrary or Capricious? In addition to protecting certain fundamental rights, the substantive due process doctrine also guards against arbitrary and capricious government action. Brunelle v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075, 1084 (R.I.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have previously stated, [t]o make out a violation of substantive due process, [challengers] must establish that the challenged provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Kaveny v. Town of Cumberland Zoning Board of Review, 875 A.2d 1, 10 (R.I.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1991) ([S]ubstantive due process prevents governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, or abuse of government power that shocks the conscience, or action that is legally irrational in that it is not sufficiently keyed to any legitimate state interests) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the burden is on the challenging party to establish that a given statute or adverse state action violates the party's right to substantive due process. Section 1137.1-16(b) provides that the state may make out a prima facie case with respect to the reasonableness of the board of review's risk assessment by demonstrating (1) that the board of review used a validated risk assessment tool to determine an individual offender's risk of re-offense and (2) that it used reasonable means to collect the information assessed by that tool. The appellant challenges the board of review's use of the STATIC-99, (as opposed to another risk assessment tool) and the magistrate's taking of judicial notice that the STATIC-99 as a validated instrument. He argues in his brief that the STATIC-99 measures only a portion of the spectrum of characteristics relevant to a determination of offender dangerousness. On the basis of that observation, he contends that, by giving substantial weight to the use of such a risk assessment instrument, the General Assembly statutorily created an irrational form of mandatory presumption. Additionally, appellant contends that allowing the state to rely on the STATIC-99 in making out a prima facie case is wholly irrational as applied in his case because his risk level as measured using the STATIC-99 did not conform to the board of review's determination of his risk level for purposes of community notification. [41] As discussed at greater length in the next section of this opinion, the board of review is required, pursuant to its own guidelines, to review a number of case-specific facts in addition to an individual offender's score on the STATIC-99. While it may be used as a predictive tool in individual cases, the STATIC-99 was not designed to encompass every factor pertinent to a determination of future dangerousness. In fact, in the introduction to the STATIC-99 Coding Rules, the creators of the instrument note as follows: The STATIC-99 utilizes only static (unchangeable) factors that have been seen in the literature to correlate with sexual reconviction in adult males. The estimates of sexual and violent recidivism produced by the STATIC-99 can be thought of as a baseline of risk for violent and sexual reconviction.    The strengths of the STATIC-99 are that it uses risk factors that have been empirically shown to be associated with sexual recidivism and the STATIC-99 gives explicit rules for combining these factors into a total risk score.    The weaknesses of the STATIC-99 are that it demonstrates only moderate predictive accuracy    and that it does not include all the factors that might be included in a wide-ranging risk assessment.     [A] prudent evaluator will always consider other external factors that may influence risk in either direction. (Emphasis added.) In Mr. Germane's case, the board of review considered both the static factors measured by the instrument and also a variety of additional dynamic factors set forth in the Parole Board Guidelines. This approach was not only reasonable, but it was also in accordance with the express recommendation of the STATIC-99's creators, who stated that a prudent evaluator will always consider other external factors that may influence risk in either direction. According to the board of review's report and supplemental report, the additional dynamic factors which the board considered were the predicate for the conclusion that appellant posed a greater risk than indicated by his STATIC-99 score alone. We can find nothing clearly arbitrary or capricious in such reasoning; furthermore, the board of review's ability to consider dynamic factors beyond the static factors analyzed by the STATIC-99 and to adjust its conclusion as to an individual's future dangerousness on account of those dynamic factors, has a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Kaveny, 875 A.2d at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to appellant's suggestion that the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act creates an impermissible form of mandatory presumption, we also find this argument unpersuasive. [42] (For a more extensive discussion of the constitutionality of the burden shifting scheme set forth in § 11-37.1-6, see Section III, infra, discussing separation of powers).