Opinion ID: 1709406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of motion to contact jurors regarding alleged juror misconduct

Text: ¶ 12. On December 27, 2002, after the jury rendered a verdict for Edwards's estate, Mariner was contacted by one of the jurors, Juror B, who alleged that another juror, Juror W, had made prejudicial statements during the trial and in jury deliberations. Juror B alleged in an affidavit that Juror W, on the first day of trial, said that she had made up her mind in favor of the plaintiff; that she could not wait to give money to the plaintiff; and that there was nothing anyone could say that could change her mind. The affidavit alleged several other statements, including: (1) that Juror W knew a resident at Greenwood Health, who to the affiant's best recollection was Juror W's relative; (2) that she had personally witnessed this resident lying in her own waste and receiving poor care, and that because that resident had received poor care, Edwards must also have received poor care; and (3) that Juror W saw other residents unknown to her receive poor care when she visited the nursing home. Furthermore, the affiant referred to general comments by jury members that white people have been taking black people's money and black people have figured out that lawsuits are the way to get the money back, and that jurors needed to stick together to get the money back to black people and that money should be given in this case because the plaintiff was black. [2] The affidavit did not precisely clarify which jurors made these statements. Such remarks are attributed to juror comments and were apparently made by multiple jurors. The affidavit implicitly included Juror W among those who made such statements. Nevertheless, even if Juror W never made these comments, the other statements that were directly attributed to Juror W are material to the issue at hand. ¶ 13. Relying on this affidavit, Mariner moved to contact additional jurors and to stay the judgment until an inquiry had been conducted. The trial court ruled that the juror's affidavit was not competent evidence because it failed to allege impermissible external influences and that, even if the statements had in fact been made, they represented the juror's knowledge of the witnesses and the case and, as such, did not constitute the sort of outside influence contemplated by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 606(b). The trial court therefore denied Mariner's motions and entered its final judgment. On appeal, Mariner contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion to contact additional jurors. ¶ 14. Rule 606(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence prohibits jurors from testifying to statements made during jury deliberations, subject to an exception for extraneous prejudicial information, not brought out at trial, that was improperly put before the jury. M.R.E. 606(b). This prohibition on the impeachment of juries is crucial to the viability of our legal system, since it protects the jury's ability to candidly discuss issues free from the fear that they will be called to justify their decision. Salter v. Watkins, 513 So.2d 569, 571 (Miss.1987). The rule is designed both to prevent the harassment of jurors and to prevent a juror from remaining silent during deliberations and later asserting improper influence. Id. Consequently, while a juror may testify whether outside influence or information was improperly presented before the jury, Rule 606(b) categorically prohibits testimony regarding specific statements made during jury deliberations or any influence such information had on his or her mental processes. Id. ¶ 15. A trial court is obligated to investigate an allegation of misconduct when the party alleging misconduct makes a showing of extrinsic evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of jury impartiality. United States v. Infelise, 813 F.Supp. 599, 605 (N.D.Ill.1993). Where a party fails to make this threshold showing, no inquiry into the jury's verdict is required. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117-27, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 2745-51, 97 L.Ed.2d 90, 103-11 (1987). A new trial is appropriate only when the jury received facts that concern a material issue in dispute and they are qualitatively different from the evidence admitted at trial. Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So.2d 407, 412 (Miss.1993). In determining whether outside information is prejudicial, reversal is warranted where there is overwhelming evidence that a juror withheld information for which he or she would have been challenged by one of the parties and subsequently relayed that exact disqualifying information to the jury during deliberations. T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 950 (Miss.1992). ¶ 16. In the present case, the trial court found that the juror's affidavit was not competent because it concerned the mental impressions of a juror during deliberations. In the alternative, the trial court held that a new trial was not warranted because information about the alleged mistreatment of other residents of the nursing home was not qualitatively different from the evidence put on by Edwards's estate. While the affidavit did contain information regarding the mental impressions of both the speaker and the allegedly offending juror, it also specifically alleged that the juror failed to truthfully answer questions during voir dire. ¶ 17. The standard for the review for juror misconduct arising from a failure to respond to questions during voir dire is as follows: Where a prospective juror in a criminal case fails to respond to a question by defense counsel on voir dire, the Court should determine whether the question was (1) relevant to the voir dire examination, (2) whether it was unambiguous, and (3) whether the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. If all answers to the above questions are affirmative, then the court determines if prejudice to the defendant in selecting the jury could be inferred from juror's failure to respond. Barker v. State, 463 So.2d 1080, 1083 (Miss.1985) (citing Odom v. State, 355 So.2d 1381 (Miss.1978)). Though this test has been applied almost exclusively in criminal trials, it is equally applicable to allegations of juror misconduct in civil suits. See Stanley, 614 So.2d at 948; Salter v. Watkins, 513 So.2d 569, 573 (Miss.1987). In Stanley, the defendant corporation moved for a new trial after submitting an affidavit that alleged one of the jurors had said during recesses that she knew the plaintiff, that the plaintiff should get the money, and that the vice president of the defendant company could not be trusted. Id. The defendant's motion also alleged that the juror had failed to disclose that her brother had been killed while working for the defendant. Id. The trial court allowed the parties to question the juror. The juror admitted that she knew the plaintiff, but denied speaking about the parties to any other jurors before deliberation. Id. The trial court ruled that the defendant's voir dire questions were not specific enough to make the juror's failure to disclose her knowledge reversible error, and declined to address allegations of misconduct during jury deliberations. Id. at 949. We reversed, finding that [t]he evidence is overwhelming that [the juror] withheld material information during voir dire which would have resulted in her being challenged by [the defendant], then relayed that exact disqualifying information to the other members of the jury during deliberations. Id. at 950. In doing so, we emphasized that where, as a matter of common experience, a full and correct response would have provided the basis for a peremptory challenge, not rising to the dignity of a challenge for cause, our courts have greater discretion, although a discretion that should always be exercised against the backdrop of our duty to secure to each party trial before a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 949 (citing Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554, 558 (Miss. 1990)). ¶18. The alleged misconduct in the present case is similar to that found to be reversible error in Stanley. During voir dire there were at least two instances in which the juror withheld material disqualifying information. First, in the context of assuring that venire members could reach a verdict based solely on the law and evidence presented at trial, plaintiff's counsel asked, [I]s there anybody who has any reason to feel that there is any reason that we haven't touched on, that you feel that we ought to know that would adversely impact your ability to serve as a juror in this case, that we haven't discussed thus far? Second, plaintiff's counsel later asked, Is there anyone here who just the mention of a nursing home invoke [sic] negative feelings, negative experiences? The juror in question did not raise her hand or otherwise indicate that she had any experience with nursing homes. The question by defense counsel was relevant, unambiguous, and the juror had substantial knowledge of the information requested. If accurate, her statement on the first day of trial that she had already decided for Edwards's estate clearly belied her implied impartiality. ¶ 19. There is no unbending rule for every situation that might arise on the voir dire of prospective jurors. Odom, 355 So.2d at 1383. Rather, each case must be decided based on the facts presented. Id. Additionally, we must consider the relationship between the question posed and the juror's knowledge. See Buckley v. State, 772 So.2d 1059, 1064 (Miss.2000) (question during voir dire was ambiguous as it related to a particular juror); T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 949 (Miss.1992) (question on voir dire should have elicited a response in light of juror's knowledge). ¶ 20. The allegations listed in the affidavit therefore met the threshold for a judicial inquiry, and the trial court erred in refusing to conduct one. We find that, in this case, the failure to investigate juror misconduct jeopardized the parties' right to a fair and impartial trial, and that consequently the judgment must be reversed.