Opinion ID: 1239218
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the pesticide board rely on obsolete labeling

Text: We now address Meads' contention that the Pesticide Board improperly relied upon an obsolete labeling restriction when it determined that he applied Pounce in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. Specifically, the Pesticide Board rested its decision upon a labeling restriction which states that Pounce should not be applied in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons. (Emphasis added.) The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires this warning on every pesticide label. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1992). The warning itself, however, was changed by the EPA on 20 October 1992 to read: Do not apply this product in a way that will contact workers or other persons, either directly or through drift. 40 C.F.R. § 156.206(a) (1993). Meads argues that there is a significant difference between the terms expose and contact and that the Pesticide Board erred in relying upon the old label and its use of the word expose. As stated, on 20 October 1992, the EPA changed its pesticide-labeling restriction. Under 40 C.F.R. § 156.200, which governs the scope and applicability of the amended labeling restriction, [n]o product to which this subpart applies shall be distributed or sold without amended labeling by any registrant after April 21, 1994; and [n]o product to which this subpart applies shall be distributed or sold without the amended labeling by any person after October 23, 1995. 40 C.F.R. § 156.200(c)(3), (4) (1993) (emphasis added). Therefore, 40 C.F.R. § 156.200 contained a grace period during which the affected parties could sell or distribute their products without the amended label. Further, the length of this grace period was based upon the seller or distributor's statusthat is, whether the affected party was a registrant or person. In the case sub judice, Meads was not a registrant, and therefore the labeling restriction was inapplicable until 23 October 1995. Because the alleged improper application occurred in August 1994, the amended labeling restriction did not apply. Moreover, 7 U.S.C. § 136(gg) defines the phrase to distribute or sell as to distribute, sell, offer for sale, hold for distribution, hold for sale, hold for shipment, ship, deliver for shipment, release for shipment, or receive and (having so received) deliver or offer to deliver. Under this definition, so long as a pesticide applicator does not deliver unapplied pesticide to an individual, the applicator does not distribute or sell it by simply holding or applying it as part of a pest removal service. 7 U.S.C. § 136(gg) (1992). Indeed, any applicator who holds or applies registered pesticides or who uses dilutions of registered pesticides only to provide a service of controlling pests without delivering any unapplied pesticide to any person so served is not deemed to be a seller or distributor of pesticides. 7 U.S.C. § 136(e)(1). In the case sub judice, Meads was a certified applicator of pesticides whose sole service involved the control of pests. Meads never provided any individual with unapplied pesticide. Accordingly, because Meads was not a distributor or seller of pesticides, he was not subject to the EPA's amended labeling restrictions. Although Meads was not bound by the EPA's amended labeling restrictions, the Board was nonetheless permitted to apply the Pounce label restrictions as they existed at the time of Meads application. Under N.C.G.S. §§ 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2), an applicator may not apply a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its label. The term `label' means the written, printed, or graphic matter on, or attached to, the pesticide (or device) or the immediate container thereof, and the outside container or wrapper of the retail package, if any there be, of the pesticide (or device). N.C.G.S. § 143-460(19) (1993). Further, the term labeling means all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter which, at any time, were placed upon or accompanied the pesticide, its wrappers, or containers. N.C.G.S. § 143-460(20). Accordingly, Meads was forbidden to apply the pesticide in a manner inconsistent with any written, printed, or graphic material located upon Pounce and its accompanying materials at or before the time of application. In August 1994, the time of Meads' alleged improper application, the Pounce label stated in pertinent part: Do not apply this product in such a manner as to directly or through drift expose workers or other persons. Indeed, the Pounce label, which was not required to be changed until 23 October 1995, still contained the old label at the time of Meads' application. Therefore, the Pesticide Board was correct in relying on that label. With respect to whether Meads applied the pesticide in a manner inconsistent with the label, we note that the term expose, as used in this context, is defined as subject to risk from a harmful action or condition. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 410. In the case sub judice, drift from Meads' aerial application of Pounce entered upon the Windley property. Moreover, Ms. Windley encountered the drift, as evidenced by her irritated eyes and tingling lips. This encounter subjected Ms. Windley to risk from a harmful condition and therefore exposed her to the product in violation of N.C.G.S. §§ 143-443(b)(3), 143-456(a)(2), and 143-469(b)(2). Accordingly, the Pesticide Board correctly determined that Meads applied Pounce in a manner inconsistent with its label. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals to the extent that it concluded that the Pesticide Board relied upon an obsolete labeling restriction.