Opinion ID: 2978867
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Implied Juror Bias

Text: “The doctrine of presumed or implied, as opposed to actual, bias provides that, in certain extreme or exceptional cases, courts should employ a conclusive presumption that a juror is biased.” Johnson v. Luoma, 425 F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A finding of implied bias is appropriate only ‘where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.’” Id. at 326 (quoting Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir. 1988)). “These extreme cases occur when a juror has ‘a relationship in which the potential for substantial emotional involvement, adversely affecting impartiality, is inherent.’” United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 379 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527 (9th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the doctrine of implied bias existed prior to Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in that case describes the potential application of the doctrine by providing examples of extreme or exceptional cases: “[T]hat the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal transaction.” 455 U.S. at 222 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As this court has noted, there is a question as to the continued viability of the implied-bias doctrine after Smith. See Johnson, 425 F.3d at 326. In general, we review a district court’s decision to deny a challenge of a juror for cause for abuse of discretion. Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 239 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Marks v. Shell Oil Co., 895 F.2d 1128, 1129 (6th Cir. 1990)). However, we have neither applied an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing for implied bias nor have we explicitly stated the proper standard of review. See Frost, 125 F.3d at 380 n.15. Our sister circuits have applied different standards of review, considering it as “a question No. 07-2354 United States v. Russell Page 9 of law,” see Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316, 318–19 (7th Cir. 1992), “a mixed question of law and fact” reviewed de novo, see Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2007), or “within the discretion of the trial court . . . [and] accorded deference,” see United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 172 (2d Cir. 2002). We find it unnecessary to decide whether the implied-bias doctrine remains viable or which standard of review is appropriate in this case. Assuming the viability of the doctrine, Russell cannot demonstrate implied bias under any standard of review. The record is devoid of facts that would support such a finding. Although juror number four was a paralegal at a tribal prosecutor’s office, there is no indication that juror number four ever had contact with non-tribal federal or state prosecutors of any kind. There are no facts in the record to suggest that juror number four’s position created the sort of exceptional circumstance about which Justice O’Connor was concerned.