Opinion ID: 1894142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confessions and admissions to law enforcement officials.

Text: Albright claims that the trial court should have suppressed (1) the statements he made to law enforcement officials during the execution of the search warrant on February 20, which statements revealed the stolen nature of the items seized, and (2) the confession he gave to Charles on February 21, 1986. At the time the search warrant was executed, Albright was informed of his rights under Miranda. State v. Adkins, 88 S.D. 571, 225 N.W.2d 598 (S.D.1975). Albright testified at the motion hearing that he understood the search warrant and the Miranda rights that were read to him. At trial, however, Albright changed his testimony and stated that he did not fully understand the warrant. It was factually disputed whether Albright originally requested an attorney. Judge Moses concluded (1) that any statement made by the defendant at the time (of the search) was a result of his free and voluntary choice to do so, (2) that there was no interrogation or functional equivalent of interrogation at that time, and (3) that the February 21 confession was not tainted by the events which took place on February 20. We find Albright's functional equivalent to interrogation argument to be meritless as the trial judge obviously resolved the disputed fact of whether Albright had requested an attorney against the defendant. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); State v. Janis, 356 N.W.2d 916 (S.D.1984); State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440 (S.D.1980). Additionally, Albright himself admits that he had been informed of the Miranda rights and understood them, thus indicative that the statements were voluntarily made. As there was no interrogation on February 20, none of the constitutional self-incrimination provisions are implicated. Cody, supra . As the February 20 statements were not improperly obtained, they obviously do not taint the February 21 confession. Additionally, regarding the February 21 confession, Albright claims that the confession was induced by promises of leniency by Charles. Charles denies that promises of help were given in exchange for the confession. The trial court resolved the conflict in the testimony against Albright. In making a determination on waiver of an accused's rights against self-incrimination, we must review the totality of the circumstances. Janis, supra. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Albright had voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right against self-incrimination. Janis, supra. However, if the trial court finds the confession or incriminating statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, such a finding is binding upon (the Supreme Court) unless we conclude from our review of the record that the finding is clearly erroneous. Janis, supra at 919. Here, Albright has had prior experience in the legal system. His own testimony revealed that he understood his rights and his answers appeared to be appropriate to the questions. Unlike almost all cases involving improper inducements, there is no indication that there was any promise of leniency in terms of the charges or punishment. See State v. Hodges, 326 N.W.2d 345 (Iowa 1982). Under all the circumstances, we do not find that the trial court's decision to deny Albright's request for suppression of his confession was clearly erroneous.