Opinion ID: 2408080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The instruction question.

Text: Appellant complains of the giving of Instruction No. 6 which, after directing the jury to retire and decide upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and if found guilty to assess the punishment, further stated that if after due deliberation the jury were able to agree upon the guilt of the defendant but were unable to agree upon the punishment they might return a verdict so showing, and, in that event, the Court may assess the punishment. Appellant claims that the giving of Instruction No. 6 violated his right to a trial by an impartial jury to which he is entitled under Art. I, § 18(a), Constitution of Missouri, 1945, V.A.M.S., and the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, § 546.410, RSMo 1969, V. A.M.S., and deprives him of the equal protection of the laws provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The argument is that Instruction No. 6 encouraged the jurors to avoid the burden of deciding the question of punishment; that the jurors seized the opportunity to avoid that burden and, acceding to those more experienced in the administration of criminal justice, left the assessment of punishment to the court, to the prejudice of appellant. This argument has been made and rejected on several occasions and this instruction has been approved repeatedly, beginning with State v. Brown, Mo.Sup. en Banc, 443 S.W.2d 805. State v. Gates, Mo.Sup., 471 S.W.2d 272; State v. Mills, Mo.Sup., 465 S.W.2d 554; State v. Thompson, Mo.Sup., 465 S.W.2d 590; State v. Ransburg, Mo.Sup., 466 S. W.2d 691; State v. Lincoln, Mo.Sup., 482 S.W.2d 424 (decided July 17, 1972). There is no merit in the contention that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial of the issue of punishment. We have uniformly held that the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the constitution is the same as the right that existed at common law and that at common law the jury determined the guilt or innocence of the accused and the court fixed the punishment. State v. Hamey, 168 Mo. 167, 67 S.W. 620, 57 L.R.A. 846; State v. Perrigin, 258 Mo. 233, 167 S.W. 573; State v. Johnson, Mo.Sup., 234 S.W. 794. See also 31 Am.Jur., Jury, Section 35, p. 40. State v. Morton, Mo.Sup., 338 S.W. 2d 858, 861 [3]. In that case the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Second Offender Act, as amended, as against the contention that in permitting the trial judge (instead of the jury) to fix the punishment, upon a finding of prior conviction, the statute denied appellant due process of law and denied him the right to a trial by jury. The Court quoted with approval from State v. Hamey, supra, as follows: [T]he laws of Missouri have always recognized that it is constitutional to authorize either court or jury to assess the punishment in a felony case.    As the right and duty devolved upon the court at common law to assess the punishment, it is plain this statute does not violate the common-law jury trial, in leaving the punishment to the court. The same considerations apply to the giving of Instruction No. 6. The problem and its proper solution is well stated in Payne v. Nash, 8 Cir., 327 F.2d 197, 200 (1964): What substantial disadvantage could have inured to appellant from the procedural change of which he complains? None can be perceived. Appellant's right to trial by jury under the Missouri Constitution    is the same as the right that existed at common law. At common law the jury assessed the guilt or innocence of the accused; the court fixed the punishment.    Though it is permissible for juries to assess punishment in Missouri    such was only a conditional privilege. It has long been the law of that State that no one could gain reversal of a judgment simply because a jury did not assess the punishment.    Under the federal law the court, and not the jury fixes the punishment.    Thus, there is nothing in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, nor in the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri, which gave appellant the right to have his punishment assessed by the jury. Judgment affirmed. STOCKARD, C., concurs.