Opinion ID: 2452189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the contempt of court conviction. At the bench trial, the appellant did not question the sufficiency of the evidence. Consequently, the state asserts appellant has not preserved this issue for appeal. However, it is not necessary for a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial in order to raise the issue on appeal. See Strickland v. State, 322 Ark. 312, 909 S.W.2d 318 (1995). In finding the appellant to be in contempt of court, the trial court concluded that Ms. Witherspoon has defrauded this court. A criminal contempt citation must be based on evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jolly v. Jolly, 290 Ark. 352, 719 S.W.2d 430 (1986). In an appeal of a case of criminal contempt, we view the record in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial judge and sustain that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Carle v. Burnett, 311 Ark. 477, 845 S.W.2d 7 (1993). Substantial evidence is evidence of a sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or another, forcing the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture. Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark. 120, 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995). Finally, decisions as to the credibility of the witnesses are to be made by the trier of fact. Silvey Cos. v. Riley, 318 Ark. 788, 888 S.W.2d 636 (1994). At trial, the juror information sheet which appellant signed prior to her selection as a juror was admitted. It provided: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that the statements contained herein are true and that I have given true and perfect answers to the above questions asked touching my qualifications to serve as a grand or petit juror, so help me God. The oath for new jurors to which appellant was sworn was also introduced and provided: Do you, and each of you, solemnly swear or affirm, that you will well and truly try each and all of the issues submitted to you as a juror, and a true verdict render, according to the law and the evidence, so help you God? In addition, a partial transcript of the Ledell Lee trial was admitted. At the Ledell Lee trial, the prospective jurors were asked if anyone knew a Hubert Anderson from Little Rock. Appellant did not respond. The jurors were also asked: (1) if they had read anything, seen anything or heard anything on the radio? (2) Is there any reason that you couldn't give both parties to this case a fair trial? and (3) Anybody else know anybody? Anything that would keep you from being here? Again, appellant did not respond. In addition, the jurors were asked during the trial whether anybody had been compromised by anything you may have read or heard about this case? ... [H]ave any of you been talked to by a witness or something that would compromise you in any way? Appellant never responded. At appellant's trial, Mr. Hubert Anderson, a private investigator, testified that he had been employed by attorneys representing Ledell Lee. Mr. Anderson stated that he knew appellant because he had dated her sister for about six years. Mr. Anderson testified he saw appellant once every three or four months, and talked with her on the morning of the jury selection for the Ledell Lee trial. Mr. Anderson also stated that he usually goes by the name Andy, and appellant refers to him as Andy. He further stated that he did not give appellant any information regarding the Ledell Lee case. Although Anderson was listed as a witness, he did not testify at the Ledell Lee trial. Mr. Jerry Sallings, one of Ledell Lee's attorneys, testified that while he was with the public defender's office he represented appellant on a theft by receiving charge in 1991. He stated that he represented her at a plea and arraignment, September 16, 1991, and at trial, September 23, 1991. Sallings testified he did not recognize appellant when she was called as a juror in the Ledell Lee case. An alternate juror for the Ledell Lee case testified she saw appellant in the hall talking with an individual who had been on the witness stand and with Ledell Lee's sister. She testified that she did not hear what was said, and did not report the conversation to court personnel. One of the jurors from the Ledell Lee trial testified that appellant said her brother-in-law was a private investigator and had worked on the Ledell Lee case; the juror further stated: It seems like she said her brother-in-law told her something about it. Another juror testified he saw appellant talking to someone in an office, while Ledell Lee's sister was in the office. This juror was not sure appellant was talking to Ledell Lee's sister, because there was a third person in the room. He also stated that after the jury retired to deliberate, appellant indicated she knew somebody that had investigated the case the first time it was tried. He stated I think she said that it was her brother-in-law. He further testified that on the second day of deliberations, the appellant read a lengthy statement to the other jurors in which she asserted that the justice system was biased and racist, and she wasn't going to have a part in that, and that officers who participated in the Lee investigation had all been promoted. Finally, he testified that after reading her statement, appellant turned her chair away from the rest of the jurors and began to read a book out loud, which was disruptive to the deliberations. Another juror testified that after appellant was elected jury foremen she stated that she had worked with one of the prosecutor's witnesses, a man named McCullough, and questioned why he was at home the day of the murder, and not at work. One juror also testified that appellant stated she had a brother-in-law who worked for one of the defense attorneys, and testified that appellant said she knew the private investigator. Finally, a juror testified she saw appellant talking to a prosecution witness during the trial, and she heard appellant say Hi. How are you doing? to Ledell Lee's brother. An act is contemptuous if it interferes with the order of the court's business or proceedings, or reflects upon the court's integrity. Hodges v. Gray, 321 Ark. 7, 901 S.W.2d 1 (1995). The inherent power to punish for contempt should never be exercised except where the necessity is plain and unavoidable if the authority of the court is to continue. Id. The court's contempt proceedings are to preserve the power and dignity of the court, to punish for disobedience of orders, and to preserve and enforce the rights of the parties. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision of the trial judge, we hold the contempt finding is supported by substantial evidence that Ms. Witherspoon had prior knowledge of the case which prevented a fair trial.