Opinion ID: 2995676
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Country Mutual apply its

Text: legitimate employment expectations against Peele in a discriminatory manner? Peele argues, however, that even if she was not meeting Country Mutual’s legitimate employment expectations at the time of her termination, she can still establish prima facie cases of sex and age discrimination because the company applied its expectations against her in a discriminatory manner. When a plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to raise an inference that an employer applied its legitimate employment expectations in a disparate manner (i.e., applied expectations to similarly situated male and younger employees in a more favorable manner), the second and fourth prongs of McDonnell Douglas merge--allowing the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, stave off summary judgment for the time being, and proceed to the pretext inquiry. See, e.g., Curry v. Menard, 270 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 2001); Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 886- 87 (7th Cir. 2001); Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 612 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001); Flores v. Preferred Tech. Group, 182 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999); Coco, 128 F.3d at 1180. Peele claims that while the company strictly enforced the Best Practices standards against her, it did not do so with respect to similarly situated male and younger employees. A plaintiff may demonstrate that another employee issimilarly situated to her by show[ing] that there is someone who is directly comparable to her in all material respects. Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676, 680 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Greer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, Illinois, 267 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 617- 18 (7th Cir. 2000). In determining whether employees are similarly situated, a court must look at all relevant factors, the number of which depends on the context of the case. Radue, 219 F.3d at 617. Furthermore, in disciplinary cases--in which a plaintiff claims that [she] was disciplined by [her] employer more harshly than a similarly situated employee based on some prohibited reason- -a plaintiff must show that [she] is similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct. Id. (emphasis added). This normally entails a showing that the two employees dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and had engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of them. Id. at 617-18 (emphasis added). Specifically, Peele contends that Hanenberger was far more critical in his evaluations of female and older employees than in those he conducted for similarly situated male and younger employees. In support of her argument, Peele identifies four employees--Christopher Mason, Thomas Kyle, Matthew Smith, and Laura Dempski, who she claims are similarly situated and were treated more favorably by the company in the application of its legitimate employment expectations./9 Peele begins by comparing her situation to that of Christopher Mason, the individual Country Mutual hired to replace her. She contends that while the company criticized Mason’s job performance, it never disciplined him. The criticisms Peele references, however, are minor and quoted entirely out of context./10 The record contains four written evaluations of Mason’s job performance, and each of them is positive. Additionally, one of the evaluations, a 1998 supervisor’s audit, was conducted by Donald Weber, not Hanenberger. This demonstrates that at least one other employee at Country Mutual was of the opinion that Mason was meeting the company’s performance expectations. For virtually identical reasons, Laura Dempski is also not similarly situated to Peele./11 In any event, Country Mutual’s criticisms of Mason and Dempski pale in comparison to those lodged by the company against Peele (i.e., nine critical written evaluations in 18 months as a CR2), and therefore neither is similarly situated to her for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination./12 As for Thomas Kyle and Matthew Smith, even were we to assume that they were similarly situated to Peele,/13 the record clearly demonstrates that neither of these gentlemen was treated in a more favorable manner by Country Mutual. As the district court noted, the undisputed evidence shows that Thomas Kyle was on his way out for reasons akin to Peele, and [that] Matthew Smith was also terminated for similar reasons . . . . If a district court determines that a plaintiff has failed to identify a similarly situated co-worker outside of her protected class, or that the co- worker identified by the plaintiff, while similarly situated, was not treated in a more favorable manner, it need not address any of the underlying allegations of disparate treatment. See Patterson, 281 F.3d at 680 (holding that we cannot compare [an employer’s] treatment of [a plaintiff with that co-worker] . . . [if the plaintiff] fail[s] to meet her burden of establishing that [the co-worker] is a similarly situated employee.). See also Radue, 219 F.3d at 618; Plair, 105 F.3d at 350. Peele’s failure to offer such comparables dooms her Title VII and ADEA claims, see, e.g., Radue, 219 F.3d at 619-20, and obviates the need to address her particularized allegations of disparate treatment by Country Mutual. In this case, the record clearly demonstrates that Peele’s job performance was unsatisfactory. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Country Mutual enforced its legitimate employment expectations in a disparate manner. As such, we are unable to infer discriminatory intent under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See, e.g., Biolchini, 167 F.3d at 1154./14 Because Peele has failed to establish prima facie cases of sex and age discrimination, we need not address her pretext argument. See, e.g., Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1036 (7th Cir. 1999); Coco, 128 F.3d at 1178-79. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to grant Country Mutual’s motion for summary judgment, but do so on the alternative ground that Peele failed to make out a prima facie case of sex or age discrimination. See, e.g., Slaney v. The Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 224 F.3d 580, 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding [a]n appellate court may affirm the district court’s [decision] on any ground supported by the Record, even if different from the grounds relied upon by the district court.).