Opinion ID: 2338408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the growth of summary proceedings, especially under the disorderly persons act

Text: Broad though the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace was at common law both before and after 1776, it nevertheless was no more extensive than that of his modern successor, the municipal magistrate, embracing as it does the many violations of the motor vehicle and traffic laws, of the fish and game laws, of the ordinances of each municipality, of the disorderly persons law, of chapters 1 and 4 of the Poor Law ( R.S., Title 44), of chapters 6 and 17 of Title 9 relating to children, of article 4 of chapter 5 of Title 30 relating to institutions and agencies, and Offenses of a lesser grade or degree than a misdemeanor or as to which no indictment by a grand jury is required, N.J.S. 2 A :8-21. Each of these sources of the municipal magistrate's jurisdiction relates to offenses far too numerous to catalog. The Disorderly Persons Act alone, with which we are especially concerned, N.J.S. 2 A :170-1 et seq., consists of 96 sections, many of which deal with offenses far more serious in nature than simple assault and battery. The magnitude at the local level of the jurisdiction over disorderly persons can best be comprehended by enumerating the titles of the offenses proscribed in the successive sections of the act, but before listing them two observations spring to mind, both of which are pertinent to our present inquiry: (1) how could our courts of general criminal jurisdiction possibly function effectively in our complicated urban civilization of today if they had exclusive jurisdiction over all of these offenses either with or without a jury; (2) how many of these offenses smack of common-law crimes or involve elements of them or are specialized instances of more general crimes? The wide sweep of the act appears from its table of contents: ARTICLE I. CERTAIN DISORDERLY PERSONS ENUMERATED. Sec. 2A:170-1. Persons unable to give good account of themselves or engaged in illegal occupation, and in state for unlawful purpose; consorting with criminals. 2A:170-2. Common thieves, burglars and pickpockets. 2A:170-3. Carrying weapons or burglar tools with intent to break and enter or assault; presence in or near buildings or other places with intent to steal. 2A:170-4. Paupers, beggars and idlers. 2A:170-5. Prostitution; soliciting unlawful sexual or indecent acts. 2A:170-6. Diseased person having sexual intercourse. 2A:170-7. Fortune tellers. 2A:170-8. Use of narcotic drugs. 2A:170-9. Giving false alarm. 2A:170-10. Spitting. 2A:170-11. Air-raid shelter; refusal to admit or permit to remain. 2A:170-12. Alien not to act as detective. 2A:170-13. Driving horse while intoxicated. 2A:170-14. Abuse of animals or vehicles hired from livery stables. 2A:170-15. Marathons, etc., advertising, conducting or performing in; exceptions. 2A:170-16. Mercury; use in treating hatters' fur, etc. 2A:170-17. Persons possessing ammunition, explosive missiles, fuses, etc., to notify police; presentation for inspection. 2A:170-18. Possession of lottery or numbers slips. 2A:170-19. Persons representing themselves to be members of armed forces or auxiliaries; wearing insignia to induce belief of former membership therein. 2A:170-20. Soliciting funds for law enforcement organizations; venue of offense. 2A:170-21. Removing or injuring notices or advertisements. 2A:170-22. Deposit of refuse of chemical manufactories. 2A:170-23. Refusal or neglect to bury offensive matter. 2A:170-24. Burial of poultry or animals dying of contagious diseases. 2A:170-25. Exposure of others to infection of certain diseases; exceptions. 2A:170-25.1 Marihuana; growing or allowing to grow on one's land. ARTICLE 2. ASSAULT AND BATTERY; PUBLIC DISTURBANCES. 2A:170-26. Assault; assault and battery. 2A:170-27. Fighting. 2A:170-28. Disturbing assemblies. 2A:170-29. Offensive language; molesting or interfering with persons. 2A:170-30. Loitering or creating a disturbance while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. ARTICLE 3. TRESPASSING; INJURY TO REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY. 2A:170-31. Trespassing; penalty. 2A:170-32. Removing or defacing posted notices against trespassing. 2A:170-33. Unlawful dumping of junk on private property. 2A:170-34. Trespassing with horses and hounds. 2A:170-35. Cutting, destroying or removing trees or timber on land of another without owner's consent; exception. 2A:170-36. Malicious injury to property. 2A:170-37. Malicious mischief. 2A:170-38. Unlawful taking of motor vehicle. 2A:170-39. Poisoning domestic animals. 2A:170-40. Temporary taking of horses. 2A:170-41. Unauthorized use of plays and operas. ARTICLE 4. FRAUDS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS. 2A:170-42. Untrue and misleading advertisements. 2A:170-43. Obtaining valuable thing from state, municipality, charitable organization or association by false statement. 2A:170-44. Obtaining free hospital treatment by misrepresentation. 2A:170-45. Renting motor vehicle with intent to defraud; evidence of intent. 2A:170-46. Damaging rental motor vehicle mileage registering instrument; evidence of intent to defraud. 2A:170-47. Defrauding hotel or restaurant keeper or hospital; evidence of intent. 2A:170-48. False statements concerning hotels or lodging houses. 2A:170-49. Obtaining property or service by fraudulently operating coin receptacles. 2A:170-50. Hiring horses or wagons by deceit. ARTICLE 5. MINORS. 2A:170-51. Sale of cigarettes, cigarette papers or tobacco to minors. 2A:170-52. Permitting minors in theaters. 2A:170-53. Permitting minors in dance halls. 2A:170-54. Permitting minors in pool rooms or permitting them to gamble therein. ARTICLE 6. DISORDERLY ACTS RELATING TO PUBLIC UTILITIES, CONVEYANCES, ROADS, AND OTHER PUBLIC PROPERTY. 2A:170-55. Failure to pay fare on public conveyance. 2A:170-56. Definitions pertaining to section 2A:170-57. 2A:170-57. Sale, procurement, etc., of passage ticket, reservation or passenger accommodation above established tariff charge. 2A:170-58. Jumping on or off trains. 2A:170-59. Trespassing on railroad trains or property; penalty. 2A:170-60. Shooting or throwing objects at vehicles; placing objects on tracks; taking coal from cars or tracks. 2A:170-61. Unauthorized interference with running of trains. 2A:170-62. Displaying red light near grade crossing; exceptions. 2A:170-63. Fraudulently tapping electric wires, or gas or water meters or pipes; presumptive evidence. 2A:170-64. Tampering or connecting with electric meters; presumptive evidence. 2A:170-65. Smoking in bus or trolley car. 2A:170-66. Using closed highway or road; removal of warning signals; violating highway regulations. 2A:170-67. Erecting signs or encroachments on highways without permission. 2A:170-68. Defacing public bridges or laying wires or pipes thereon without permission. 2A:170-69. Destroying apparatus of the United States volunteer lifesaving corps; interfering with or deceiving lifesavers. ARTICLE 7. SALES, PURCHASES, DISPLAYS AND UNAUTHORIZED ADVERTISEMENTS. 2A:170-70. Selling tickets in excess of established price. 2A:170-71. Sale, etc., of containers bearing name or trade-mark of advertised or standard nationally advertised face lotion, etc. 2A:170-72. Preparation, sale, etc., of substitute face lotions, etc., under name or in containers of trade-marked, advertised or standard nationally advertised products. 2A:170-73. Purchase or sale of goods `not to be sold.' 2A:170-74. Sale or use of inflammable paper balloons. 2A:170-75. Soliciting sale of funeral wreaths, etc. 2A:170-76. Uttering or exposing to view instruments, medicines, etc., to prevent conception or procure abortion. 2A:170-77. Unauthorized placing of circulars or advertisements in newspapers or periodicals. 2A:170-77.1. Sale, offering for sale or possession of hypodermic needle for narcotic drugs. ARTICLE 8. PRACTICE OF LAW; SOLICITING ACTIONS AND CLAIMS; SIMULATING COURT PAPERS. 2A:170-78. Practice of law limited to licensed attorneys or counselors at law. 2A:170-79. Unlicensed persons not to appear as attorney or solicit law business. 2A:170-80. `Practice' includes preparation of wills and deeds. 2A:170-81. Business and practices excepted. 2A:170-82. Further exceptions. 2A:170-83. Unlicensed persons soliciting suits on contingent fee basis. 2A:170-84. Soliciting business for collection agencies upon an annual basis, or for definite time. 2A:170-85. Soliciting commencement of actions for injuries or negligence. 2A:170-86. Papers simulating summons, complaint, writ or process; printing or circulating. 2A:170-87. Imitating court process. ARTICLE 9. CORRUPTION OF EMPLOYEES. 2A:170-88. Corruption of agents, employees or servants; corporate agents punishable individually. 2A:170-89. Immunity from prosecution under section 2A:170-88. 2A:170-90. Employment by `kickback.' ARTICLE 10. RENTALS OF PROPERTY AND INJURIES THERETO. 2A:170-91. Bonus in connection with rental of property under rent control. 2A:170-92. Discrimination against children in renting houses. 2A:170-93. Injuries to or destruction of property by tenant. ARTICLE 11. IDENTIFICATION CARDS AND BADGES. 2A:170-94. Identification card or badge for employees or visitors; failure to surrender when required. 2A:170-95. Finder of identification card or badge; surrendering it to nearest police station required; failure to do so. 2A:170-96. `Identification card' and `identification badge' defined. The Disorderly Persons Act has had a long history, though its growth for 65 years was slow. It originated in L. 1799, c. 3, Paterson's Laws 410, section 1, thereof providing that: All paupers, who shall unlawfully return to the city or township, from which they were legally removed, without a certificate from the city or township, to which they belong, or who shall leave their places of legal settlement; and all persons, who shall go about from door to door, or place themselves in streets, highways or passages, to beg, crave charity, or collect alms, or who shall wander abroad and lodge in taverns, inns, beer houses, out houses, houses of entertainment, market houses, barns or other places, or in the open air, and not give a good account of themselves, or who shall wander abroad, and beg or solicit charity, under pretence of being or having been soldiers, mariners, or seafaring men, or of loss by fire, or other casualty, or of loss by the Indians, or by war, or other pretence or thing; and all persons, who shall leave, or threaten to leave their families to be maintained by the city, township or county, or to become chargeable thereto, or who, not having sufficient property or means for their subsistence or support, shall live idle, or not engage in some honest employment, or not provide for themselves or families; and all persons, who shall use, or pretend to use, or have any skill in physiognomy, palmistry, or like crafty science, or who shall pretend to tell destinies or fortunes; and all runaway servants or slaves, and all vagrants or vagabonds, common drunkards, common night walkers, and common prostitutes, shall be deemed and adjudged to be disorderly persons. Section 2 dealt with a related group of problems: And Whereas divers ill disposed persons are frequently apprehended, having upon them implements for house breaking, or offensive weapons, or are found in or upon houses, ware houses, stables, barns or out houses, areas of houses, coach houses, smoke houses, inclosed yards, or gardens belonging to houses, with intent to commit theft, misdemeanors or other offences; and although their evil purposes are thereby manifested, the power of the justices of the peace to demand of them sureties for their good behavior hath not been of sufficient effect to prevent them from carrying their evil purposes into execution; Be it further enacted, That if any person shall be apprehended, having upon him or her any picklock key, crow, jack, bit, or other implement, with an intent to break and enter into any dwelling house, ware house, stable, barn, coach house, smoke house or out house; or shall have upon him or her any pistol, hanger, cutlass, bludgeon, or other offensive weapon, with intent to assault any person; or shall be found in or upon any dwelling house, ware house, stable, barn, coach house, smoke house or out house, or in any inclosed yard or garden, or area belonging to any house, with an intent to steal any goods or chattels, then he or she shall be deemed and adjudged to be a disorderly person. Section 3 provided that disorderly persons might be apprehended without a warrant and on conviction before a justice of the peace might be committed to the work house of the city, town or county, there to be kept at hard labor for any time not exceeding three calendar months. Section 4 made it the duty of every justice of the peace on information, or his own view to issue his warrant to apprehend any disorderly person. Section 5 empowered any two justices of the peace to bind out the child of any beggar, vagrant, vagabond, common drunkard, or common prostitute, or of any other person, who shall not provide for such child, as a servant or apprentice to any person, who may be willing to take such child, till the age of twenty one years, if a male, or eighteen years, if a female, or for a less time. This short act stood unchanged and unsupplemented until 1864 through the last 45 years of the Constitution of 1776 and the first 20 years of the Constitution of 1844. It is important to note that, notwithstanding the provision of Article XXII of the Constitution of 1776 declaring that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed, as a part of the law of this colony, without repeal, forever, the act makes no provision at all for trial by jury, but it was never successfully challenged therefor. The 1776 Constitution had no provisions relating to presentment or indictment, so that phase of our problem was not present until 1844. Without anticipating at this point the constitutional problems under the Constitution of 1844, we must also note that the act of 1799 and the numerous acts which amended, supplemented and revised it after 1864 all also were never successfully challenged in spite of Article I, paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the Constitution of 1844, the pertinent parts of which read as follows: 7. The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate   . 8. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury   . 9. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except    in cases cognizable by justices of the peace   . In passing it is to be observed that these three provisions of the 1844 Constitution are carried forward in the 1947 Constitution, quoted supra, the first two in identical words and the third in substance and meaning. In the third provision, for the words cases cognizable by justices of the peace there is substituted in the new Constitution in cases now prosecuted without indictment, the change in language being necessitated by the deletion from the earlier Constitution of any references to justices of the peace; see Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 1, and Art. VII, Sec. 2, par. 7, of the Constitution of 1844. The first change in L. 1799, c. 3, was effected by a supplement, L. 1864, c. 132, directed at runaway husbands or fathers who neglected to provide for their families. From that date follows a long succession of acts relating to disorderly conduct, covering the 103-year period of the Constitution of 1844 and the first five years under the Constitution of 1947, most of which are still reflected in the 96 sections of our present Disorderly Persons Act, N.J.S. 2 A :170-1 et seq. None of the provisions of the present Disorderly Persons Act provides for indictment or for trial by jury, though a few of the earlier acts, commencing with L. 1864, c. 132, did provide for a trial by jury. Yet we know of no instance in which it has been successfully contended that a provision of any of the Disorderly Persons Act was unconstitutional for failure to accord the defendant the right to an indictment or trial by jury. On the contrary, in Griffin v. Mills, 39 N.J.L. 587, 590 ( Sup. Ct. 1877), Mr. Justice Van Syckel speaking for the court stated: That the justice may try cases under the act concerning disorderly persons, without a jury, where no right of jury trial is expressly given by the act, is too well settled in the practice of this state to be disturbed, and no reason appears why the defendant may not waive the right to a jury trial where the act confers it. Moreover, many of the offenses which have long been considered disorderly conduct and which have been continued in the present act involve more serious conduct than does simple assault or simple assault and battery. In the field of trespass we find such offenses as malicious injury to property, malicious mischief, and the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. In the category of frauds and misrepresentations are many reprehensible acts of fraud and deceit. Certainly it cannot be seriously contended that such offenses or the use of narcotic drugs are as petty as simple assault and simple assault and battery. Yet it has never been successfully argued that the defendant accused of a violation of any one of these sections of the Disorderly Persons Act was entitled to indictment or trial by jury. And this is true regardless of the fact that many of the offenses contained in the Disorderly Persons Act were either indictable crimes at common law or at least are akin to such indictable crimes. Thus we find trespass with horses and hounds, cutting, destroying or removing trees or timber on the lands of another, malicious injury to property, and malicious mischief listed as disorderly conduct, N.J.S. 2 A :170-34 to 37. All of these were indictable crimes at common law, 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 243-247. Article 4 of the Disorderly Persons Act, N.J.S. 2 A :170-42 to 50, sets forth various kinds of fraud, which were indictable crimes at common law although at times they could also be prosecuted summarily, 4 Blackstone's Commentaries 158. Then there are such offenses as carrying weapons or burglar tools with an intent to break and enter, as well as being present in or near buildings or other places with an intent to steal, N.J.S. 2 A :170-3. These are offenses arising out of the common-law indictable crimes of burglary and larceny. Then there is the offense of being a common thief or burglar, N.J.S. 2 A :170-2, as in the case of Griffin v. Mills, 39 N.J.L. 587, supra, involving three common thieves. Clearly, theft and burglary were indictable crimes at common law. These are mere illustrations of the close relationship between disorderly conduct and crimes. This relationship has existed throughout the life of the Disorderly Persons Act, yet our courts have never held that the defendant charged with such disorderly conduct was entitled to indictment or trial by jury. As we review the growth of the Disorderly Persons Act under our three successive Constitutions, it is manifest beyond a shadow of a doubt that the three clauses of the Constitution of 1844 and the corresponding three clauses of the Constitution of 1947 heretofore quoted exclude from their operation not merely the limited subject matter of L. 1799, c. 3, Paterson's Laws 410, supra, but all of the related petty offenses that are now incorporated in the Disorderly Persons Act of today, N.J.S. 2 A :170-1 et seq., supra, and which in one form or another have stood on the statute books without challenge a hundred years. It is unthinkable that if there were anything unconstitutional with respect to any phase of the growing jurisdiction over disorderly persons or the method of trial or the mode of punishment, that it would not have been subjected to judicial test in some one of the hundreds of thousands of cases that have been tried under one section or another of the act. The plain truth is that the bench and the bar and the public alike have recognized from the very beginning of this State, as the common law did before New Jersey became a state, the necessity not only for a summary jurisdiction over petty offenses, but also that the list of offenses must inevitably expand in response to the changing needs of the time and that some of these offenses of disorderly conduct, as we have seen, are even more related to common-law crimes than simple assault and battery. Nor are the advantages all with society; the defendant is spared the brand of being adjudged a criminal with all of its political, business and social implications, the punishment meted out to him is less severe than that imposed on corresponding crimes, and he is given the right to a speedy trial de novo in the County Court, N.J.S. 2 A :3-6, Rule 2:11.