Opinion ID: 3134365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Object to a Statement the Prosecutor Made in

Text: Closing Argument Defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence during closing argument. At trial, Dennis Burris testified for the State that defendant had visited his house sometime in April 1982 and had seen Burris' gun collection. Burris stated that defendant commented that he had a nice collection. As earlier noted, other evidence established that, on May 22, 1982, defendant, along with Edward Stalder and another person, burglarized Burris' house and stole several firearms, one of which was later identified as the weapon used to kill Stevens and Bushman. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: Mr. Burris  told you  Perry Olinger was at his house  and saw those nice guns up in that gun case. One of the guns he saw, ladies and gentlemen, was the H&R Model 649 Magnum .22 pistol, just like this one. Perry liked it. He commented on it to Mr. Burris. (Emphasis added.) Defendant asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the emphasized portion of this comment because the prosecutor went far beyond Burris' actual testimony in an effort to tie the murder weapon more closely to defendant, to his great prejudice. This argument is waived because it was apparent from a direct examination of the record and should have been raised on direct appeal. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d at 9. Defendant maintains, however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. A defendant who contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a particular issue on appeal must show that `the failure to raise that issue was objectively unreasonable' and that, `but for this failure, his sentence or conviction would have been reversed.'  People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 283 (1992), quoting People v. Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d 248, 270 (1989). The circuit court held that defendant failed to show sufficient prejudice. We agree. Even assuming, arguendo, that the comment was improper, we are not able to say that defendant's conviction would have been reversed, but for his appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. This comment by the prosecutor was isolated and the jury was instructed that closing arguments are not evidence. In the alternative, defendant contends that the prosecutor's comment on the evidence, above, was prosecutorial misconduct so serious as to constitute a violation of his right to due process of law. We reject this assertion. The pertinent inquiry for reviewing such claims is whether the prosecutor's comment  `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'  Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 91 L. Ed. 2d 144, 157, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2471 (1986), quoting Donnelly v. De Christoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 40 L. Ed. 2d 431, 437, 94 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1974). The comment pointed to here simply does not rise to that level of unfairness. Cf. Darden, 477 U.S. at 182, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 157-58, 106 S. Ct. at 2472; Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926, 949-50 (7th Cir. 1991).