Opinion ID: 655293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactivity of Section 511(a) of the Immigration Act of 1990

Text: 15 The Supreme Court's position on the retroactivity of civil statutes is somewhat unclear. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 971 F.2d 917, 921 (2d Cir.1992). In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary. By contrast, the Court held in Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S.Ct. 468, 471, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988), that congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language requires this result. We have previously discussed the tension between Bradley and Bowen, and will not repeat it now. See Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Housing Preservation and Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1409-11 (2d Cir.1993). Buitrago contends that there is no language in § 511 requiring that it be applied retroactively to his 1986 convictions, and further, that the statutory language and legislative history favor prospectivity from 1990, the date of the enactment of § 511, or at the very least, prospectivity from 1988, the introduction of the concept of aggravated felony. Therefore, he argues, § 511 should not apply retroactively to his 1986 convictions pursuant to either Bowen or Bradley. 16 The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for '[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.'  Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 2157, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). Buitrago submits that the plain language of § 511(b), providing that § 511(a) applies to admissions occurring after the date of the enactment of [the 1990] Act, § 511(b), 104 Stat. at 5052, does not support a retroactive application of the statute. He contends that, because § 511 does not state that it applies to admissions occurring on the date of enactment, Congress intended for it to apply prospectively only. If § 511 applied to admissions taking place on the date of enactment, Buitrago argues, it would necessarily apply retroactively, because § 511 could not apply on the date of admission absent a conviction prior to that date. Therefore, he contends, Congress's decision to provide that § 511 applies only to admissions occurring after the date of enactment indicates a choice for § 511 to affect only aliens who were convicted of aggravated felonies after the date of enactment. 17 To bolster this argument, Buitrago refers to a number of provisions in the 1988 Act applicable to any alien convicted of an aggravated felony who sought admission into the United States on or after the enactment date of the 1988 Act. See §§ 7344, 7345, 7347, 102 Stat. at 4470-72 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2)(A), 1326, 1252(a)). We agree with Buitrago that the inclusion of on indicates that Congress intended for these provisions in the 1988 Act to apply retroactively. However, we do not agree that the absence of on in § 511 indicates a congressional intent for § 511 to apply prospectively only. 18 Buitrago's argument ignores the fact that Congress limited the application of § 511 to aliens who have served at least five year terms of imprisonment. If § 511 does not apply to aliens convicted of aggravated felonies prior to 1990, its directive would not affect any action by the Attorney General until 1995, five years from the date of the 1990 Act's enactment, or, under Buitrago's alternative construction, until 1993, five years from the date of the 1988 passage of the definition of aggravated felony. However, by its terms, § 511 took effect after the date of the enactment of th[e 1990] Act. The focus of § 212(c) is action to be taken by the Attorney General, and, in the case of the § 511 amendment, there is a restriction on her discretion in the case of perpetrators of aggravated felonies. We believe that the only sensible interpretation is that Congress intended its directions to the Attorney General to go into effect promptly after the date of the enactment. As the First Circuit recently stated in holding that § 511(a) applied to a 1984 conviction for an aggravated felony, it makes small sense that so substantial a stricture should not go into effect for five years from enactment. Barreiro, 989 F.2d at 64. 19 Buitrago also argues that, because the 1991 Act did not amend § 511 to provide specifically that aggravated felons include those aliens convicted before, on, or after the date of enactment of the 1990 Act, as it amended §§ 513 and 515 of the 1990 Act, see §§ 306(11), (13), 105 Stat. at 1751, 1752, Congress intended for § 511 to apply only prospectively. We disagree. 20 To be sure, the 1991 Act modified § 513(b) by providing that § 513(a) applies to convictions entered before, on or after the enactment of the 1990 Act. § 306(a)(11), 105 Stat. at 1751. But it did so in the wake of Ayala-Chavez v. INS, 945 F.2d 288, 294 (9th Cir.1991), in which the Ninth Circuit held that § 513(a) applies only to aliens who committed aggravated felonies after the enactment of the 1988 Act, which introduced the concept of an aggravated felony. See § 7342, 102 Stat. at 4469. 21 As for the amendment of § 515, the 1991 Act similarly provided that it applied to convictions entered before, on or after the enactment of the 1990 Act. § 306(a)(13), 105 Stat. at 1752. However, this amendment was enacted because § 515(b) of the 1990 Act contained an error in cross-referencing § 515(a)(1) in both (b)(1) and (b)(2) and did not apply uniform language to proceedings for asylum and deportation. § 515(b), 104 Stat. at 5053. The 1991 Act merely corrected these problems. See H.R.Rep. No. 102-383, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1372, 1378 (noting that § 306(a)(13) of the 1991 Act corrects reference and conforms treatment of applications for asylum and withholding of deportation). 22 Buitrago argues that, because Congress did not similarly amend § 511 of the 1990 Act, we must presume that Congress acted  'intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972)). However,  '[n]ot every silence is pregnant.'  Burns v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2186, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (quoting State of Illinois Dep't of Public Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1983)). Section 511, unlike § 513, was never open to an interpretation that Congress intended it to apply prospectively only. And, in contrast to § 515, it did not contain confusion regarding its references and language. Thus, we conclude that Congress's silence signifies merely an expectation that nothing more need be said in order to effectuate the relevant legislative objective. Burns, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2186. As the Supreme Court stated in Burns, [a]n inference drawn from congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent. --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2186. 23 In Burns, the Supreme Court, in a Sentencing Guidelines case, upheld the parties' right to be notified whenever a district court is contemplating a sua sponte departure from the prescribed sentencing range notwithstanding the absence of an express provision to that effect. In light of the fact that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(A) expressly requires ten days notice to the parties of the contents of the presentence report, the Court concluded that construction of congressional 'silence' [as evidence of intent to omit notice of departure] would ... render what Congress has expressly said absurd. Burns, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2186 (emphasis in the original). The same reasoning applies in this case, where listening too closely to congressional silence would lead us to interpret § 511 as a super-prospectivity statute, and, thus, would render absurd Congress's provision that § 511 apply after the date of enactment. 24 Because we find that the plain language of the statute indicates a congressional intent that § 511 apply retroactively, we also reject Buitrago's argument that the structure of the 1988 Act compels the conclusion that § 511 of the 1990 Act applies prospectively only. See Ayala-Chavez, 945 F.2d at 291. Citing Ayala-Chavez, Buitrago contends that the 1988 Act establishes a framework of limiting the concept of aggravated felonies to post-1988 conduct in the case of deportation while imposing no such limitation in the case of reentry. Id. Given this framework, Buitrago argues that Congress intended § 511 to apply prospectively from 1990 or, at the very least, to convictions occurring after 1988. 25 However, there is no language linking § 511 of the 1990 Act with the provisions found in the 1988 Act, and, thus, no basis to infer that Congress intended § 511 to apply prospectively when the language of § 511 would require a waiting period of at least three years. Such an inference would unreasonably interpret § 511(b) to mean that § 511(a) applies to admissions after the date of enactment. Moreover, in § 515(a)(1) of the 1990 Act, which prevents aliens convicted of aggravated felonies from applying for or being granted asylum, the concept of aggravated felony expressly applies retroactively to a provision relating to deportation. § 515(b), 104 Stat. at 5053 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)). Thus, any framework that may have been established in the 1988 Act was abandoned in the 1990 Act.