Opinion ID: 883138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Whether the District Court erred in denying Moore's motion to suppress a statement he made to Sgt. Burns while being transported in a patrol car?

Text: On November 23, 1990, Moore was brought into the West Yellowstone police station for an interview. Four officers were present, Sheriff C. Ron Cutting, Lt. Bill Slaughter, Lt. Bob Pearson, and Sgt. Kevin Burns. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Moore signed a waiver of the rights and agreed to answer questions without the presence of counsel. During the interview, Moore stated that he had used a .357 revolver to shoot at some rats in his camper. [1] Moore also told the officers that they were welcome to have the .357 revolver. The interview concluded after Moore invoked his right to counsel for the third time. Sgt. Burns then drove Moore home to pick up the gun. Moore could not drive himself home as the police had just seized his pickup. En route, Sgt. Burns made the following statement, [Y]ou know, make sure you don't do anything to yourself. You know, nothing is that bad. Moore responded, if I did something to myself then we'd never find Brad. Moore moved to suppress the statement he made while in the patrol car. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that Moore was not in custody and that his statement was entirely voluntary and was not made as part of a custodial interrogation. Therefore, this Court must determine if the District Court correctly concluded that: (1) Moore was not in custody at the time he made the statement to Burns; and (2) Burns had made no effort to interrogate Moore. State v. Flack (1993), 260 Mont. 181, 185, 860 P.2d 89, 92. In support of his claim of error, Moore characterizes the interrogation technique used by the officers at the police station as a suicide colloquy; i.e., the officers used Moore's confused mental state to convince him that if he did not confess, he was likely to commit suicide. According to Moore, the statement Burns made in the patrol car was simply a continuation of that technique. In determining whether a custodial interrogation has occurred, this Court examines whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. State v. Staat (1991), 251 Mont. 1, 6, 822 P.2d 643, 646. If a reasonable person does not feel free to leave, then the examination is custodial. Staat, 822 P.2d at 646. The determination of what constitutes custodial interrogation is made on a case-by-case basis. Staat, 822 P.2d at 646. In this case, the facts clearly indicate that Moore was in custody at the time he made the statement to Sgt. Burns. Moore had been taken into the police station for questioning, where he was advised of his Miranda rights. During the interview Moore offered to provide the officers with a gun he had at home. After the interview concluded, Sheriff Cutting asked Sgt. Burns to go with Moore to get the gun. Burns then told Moore, [w]e might as well get in my vehicle. Moore was not allowed to drive his vehicle home as it had just been seized. Having concluded that Moore was in custody while riding in the police car, we must next determine whether Moore was interrogated by Sgt. Burns after Moore had invoked his right to counsel. Flack, 860 P.2d at 92. In Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, the United States Supreme Court addressed the meaning of interrogation under the holding of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. The United States Supreme Court held that interrogation included express questioning and persuasion techniques while a subject was in custody. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d at 307. According to the Court, interrogation includes any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d at 307-08. The focus of the inquiry is on the perception of the suspect and not the perceptions of the police. However, the Court recognized that the police should not be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, and therefore, limited the definition of interrogation to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (Emphasis in original) Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1690, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308. Applying this test to the case before us, we conclude that Moore was not interrogated within the meaning of Miranda. First, although Sgt. Burns was present during the initial interview, he did not participate in any direct questioning of Moore. Second, we are not convinced that the officers conducted the interviews using a suicide colloquy. Sheriff Cutting testified that there was no plan or tactic used to interview Moore, other than to confront him with new evidence. Finally, Burns testified that he had known Moore for years, and had made the statement in the patrol car out of concern for Moore's well being. Burns had no reason to know that Moore would respond to the statement in the manner that he did. Given these facts, Sgt. Burns' statement cannot be characterized as reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Although the District Court was incorrect in concluding that Moore was not in custody, it was correct in determining that Sgt. Burns made no effort to interrogate Moore, and that any statements Moore made during this time were voluntary and admissible at trial. Where the result reached by the district court is correct, we will uphold it upon appeal regardless of the reasons given for the result. Kephart v. Portmann (1993), 259 Mont. 232, 236, 855 P.2d 120, 122-23. We therefore affirm the District Court's denial of Moore's motion to suppress.