Opinion ID: 2507746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Municipality's Appeal

Text: The Municipality argues that the court erred in finding that it violated the FMLA because Gregg did not suffer from a serious health condition or undergo continuing treatment as defined in the Act; because she failed to give notice as the Act requires; and because the APD had already given her leave equivalent to the amount the Act would have granted her. The Municipality also contends that the court erred in finding that it wrongfully terminated Gregg, and in finding Gregg's testimony credible. Finally, the Municipality argues that the court erred in its calculation of damages and in its award of postjudgment interest.
To the extent that the trial court's decision relied on findings of fact, we review under the clearly erroneous standard. [1] Under this standard we reverse only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. [2] Therefore, we must `take the view of the evidence most favorable to the prevailing party below,' and give due regard to `the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses.' [3] We review questions of law de novo. [4] A claim under the FMLA involves an objective test of the plaintiff's incapacity, which, if heard by a fact-finder, presents mixed questions of law and fact. [5]
Under the FMLA, [6] an employee is entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period for childbirth or adoption; to care for a close relative with a serious health condition; or if the employee is unable to perform work-related duties due to a serious health condition. [7] The Act makes it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right the Act provides. [8] The superior court found that Gregg was entitled to FMLA leave because she suffered from a serious health condition that made her unable to perform the functions of a police officer. Regulations implementing the Act define a serious health condition as a period of incapacity of at least four consecutive days that also involves continuing treatment by a health care provider. [9] They further define incapacity as an inability to work, attend school or perform other regular daily activities. [10] A plaintiff shows that he or she underwent continuing treatment by evidence that the plaintiff sought treatment two or more times from a health care provider. [11] In short, the federal regulation allows an employee to claim protection under the Act when she is able to show that she had a period of incapacity that lasted four or more days and involved at least two treatments from a health care provider. [12]
To claim the protection of the FMLA, Gregg had first to demonstrate that she was incapacitated for four or more days and unable to perform the essential functions of her employment. [13] It is evident from its decision that the court found Gregg was incapacitated by multiple health conditions from January until April 11, 1997. The superior court found that when Gregg requested leave without pay on April 11, she was clearly suffering from the cumulative effect of several health and mental conditions that constituted a serious health condition that made her unable to perform the functions of a police officer. These included the facts that [s]he was pregnant, she was recovering from injuries sustained in an automobile accident and she was going through significant mental stress. She was a victim of domestic violence and she needed time to deal with her personal issues. The court specifically found that testimony by Gregg's expert, Dr. Cynthia Dodge, who retroactively diagnosed that Gregg had suffered from post traumatic stress disorder from January to July 1997, had the strong ring of truth. Dr. Dodge based her conclusion on the traumatic event[s] of domestic violence that Gregg suffered in January of that year. Dr. Dodge explained that the symptoms of nightmare[s] ... intrusive memories... high levels of anxiety to the point of sleeplessness ... confusion, feeling overwhelmed and distressed, and a hypervigilance that Gregg reported were all consistent with a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. The doctor further concluded that Gregg's accident injuries and pregnancy contributed to this condition. [14] Dr. Dodge's testimony is the only medical evidence that Gregg suffered from an incapacitating health condition in April 1997. The parties stipulated that Gregg did not receive treatment from a health provider in April  for either her accident injuries or emotional distress  and Gregg presented no evidence at trial to show whether or not she received care related to her pregnancy at that time. It is undisputed that the health professionals that Gregg saw in January released her back to her duties. The Municipality disputes the court's conclusion on two levels. First, it argues that, as a matter of law, Gregg cannot establish that she was incapacitated in April, when she requested further leave, because she did not obtain a contemporaneous medical provider's diagnosis that she was unable to work. Secondly, it argues that Dr. Dodge's testimony is not credible, and that therefore the trial court's finding is without basis. Based upon its reading of federal precedent, the Municipality argues that the FMLA requires a contemporaneous diagnosis of the employee's incapacity by a health care provider. It notes that Gregg was, at the time of her request for leave, technically released back to work. And it points to the fact that Gregg saw no additional doctors in April to establish that she was not entitled to the Act's protection at that time. It is true that federal courts generally require that a plaintiff base proof of an FMLA claim on a health care provider's diagnosis, at some point, that the employee cannot work (or could not have worked) because of the illness. [15] But we do not read this precedent as substituting the opinion of on-the-scene medical professionals for the ultimate judgment of the fact-finder. For one thing, an employee could, as in this case, suffer from a condition, such as post traumatic stress disorder, which is not immediately capable of diagnosis by a non-specialist. When an employee is actually incapacitated by illness, the failure to get a correct diagnosis cannot disqualify an employee from the Act's protection. To hold that a doctor must agree, contemporaneously and at all times, that the employee is unable to work, places a burden on the employee that we find nowhere in the plain text of the Act, and ignores the reality of debilitating illness. Instead, the Act allows an employer to request a contemporary diagnosis at the time it grants FMLA leave; a safeguard that balances the rights of employer and employed. [16] The Municipality did not do so. [17] While this does not obviate the requirement that Gregg show that a medical professional considered her to be incapacitated, there was substantial evidence in the record in addition to Dr. Dodge's testimony that corroborates the conclusion that Gregg was incapacitated. [18] Once the trial court accepts evidence of a medical professional, in this case Dr. Dodge, that the plaintiff was incapacitated, that finding is protected by the clearly erroneous standard. [19] The Municipality also argues that the fact that health care providers she saw in January actually released Gregg back to work should bar her claims of incapacity in April. While the health care providers that Gregg saw in January 1997 released her back to work, the court found that  possibly due to the narrow focus of their examinations  they did not fully diagnose her combination of debilitating health conditions. In fact, they were unable to determine the extent of even her knee injuries because she could not be x-rayed while she was pregnant. The court found that Gregg continued to suffer pain from her accident injuries, and neither release adequately addressed her psychological stress. We conclude from these findings that in the course of Gregg's visits to health care providers in January, the extent of her incapacity was never fully diagnosed, and, therefore, the partial releases do not bar her claim. The Municipality also disputes the factual basis of the court's decision. It asserts that Dr. Dodge's testimony was not credible because her diagnosis was retroactive; because it did not definitely establish that Gregg was incapacitated for three or more days in April; and because Dr. Dodge did not know what the functions of the job of a police officer at APD were... [she] therefore could not and did not render an opinion of whether [Gregg's] alleged post traumatic stress disorder would have prevented her from performing the functions of her police officer job. The Municipality also notes that Dr. Dodge concurred that malingering should be suspected when a litigant seeks a post traumatic stress diagnosis. We address each of these concerns with Dr. Dodge's testimony in turn. While courts have rejected retroactive diagnoses, it is generally for other evidentiary reasons, such as when the diagnosis was also speculative or given without actually examining the patient. [20] The cases cited by the Municipality do not hold that retroactive medical diagnoses may never establish an FMLA claim. Here, the superior court was in the best position to weigh Dr. Dodge's retroactive diagnosis, subject to the rules of evidence, and concluded that her opinion was credible. We will not second guess the credibility of a witness on review. The Municipality also argues that Dr. Dodge's testimony did not establish that Gregg suffered from a period of incapacity in April because Dr. Dodge did not know when the post traumatic stress disorder began nor when it ended, and so could not have testified that a definite period of incapacity existed. The Municipality is correct that Dr. Dodge could not determine the exact date when Gregg's mental and emotional stress became incapacitating. But Dr. Dodge did state that it was her opinion that Gregg suffered the symptoms of a stress disorder from January to July 1997. In this bench trial, it was the court's role to determine if this broad diagnosis, together with the other facts of the record, reasonably established that in April Gregg was incapacitated for three or more days. Finally, the Municipality asserts that Dr. Dodge was not qualified to decide if Gregg was unable to perform the duties of a police officer. Dr. Dodge admitted that she did not know the basic qualifications of a police officer, but she also testified that, in her opinion, a person suffering from post traumatic stress disorder would not be competent for police work because of the high level of symptoms. What Dr. Dodge's testimony lacked in precision on this point is supplied by other non-medical evidence in the record. Beyond Dr. Dodge's diagnosis, the facts as found by the trial court support its conclusion that Gregg was incapacitated. Significantly, Woodward, Gregg's immediate supervisor and the only department officer reviewing her case, admitted in testimony that Gregg might have required a psych evaluation before she could return to work to see if her emotional stress was affecting her judgment. The Municipality as much as admits this in its brief when it states, Based on what he had seen of [Gregg's] behavior, Woodward believed that she should have been assessed for judgment issues. Judgment is a key concern for police officers. Gregg did testify that she continued to suffer from pain from her accident injuries and saw a specialist in October 1997, when she could be x-rayed after the birth of her child. And the fact that Gregg was in an abusive domestic relationship is relevant. A reasonable person could conclude that Gregg was effectively unable to work because she fled the state to leave an abusive husband who followed her, and that she was unable to perform daily activities because she was held in a hostage situation, where her behavior was dictated by the combination of fear for her children, a high level of emotional stress, her accident injuries, and her pregnancy. [21]
To earn the protection of the FMLA for a serious health condition, a plaintiff must also establish that her period of incapacity involved treatment two or more times by a health care provider. [22] The Eighth Circuit has observed that this reflects the [Department of Labor's] decision that `serious health condition' should be defined by an objective test that could be applied consistently based on the facts of each case. [23] The superior court found that Gregg had satisfied this requirement because she visited three medical providers for treatment of her accident injuries and pregnancy in January 1997. The Municipality maintains that the superior court erred in relying on this period of treatment because these providers released Gregg back to light duty at the end of January. It contends that Gregg would have to show that she received treatment in April when her request for further leave was denied, to qualify for further FMLA leave. The Municipality's first argument would read into the regulations a requirement that the length of an employee's leave should be determined by a medical professional, rather than decided as an accommodation between employer and employee. The purpose of the second regulatory factor is verification. It simply requires that the employee's serious health condition be serious enough to require two or more visits to a health care provider. [24] Such is the objective test. [25] The Act then entitles the employee to leave for any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to the same condition. [26] The plain text of the regulation proves that it was unnecessary for Gregg to seek further treatment in April and yet still claim the Act's protection. Gregg saw three health providers in January. The court found that she was still suffering pain from the car accident after her visits, and that these trips to the doctors did not address the complete extent of her psychological stress. Gregg testified that she discussed the stress of her marriage with at least one of them, who prescribed Valium to Gregg according to his medical records. Thus, we may reasonably conclude that Gregg first qualified for FMLA leave in January, and since the trial court found that the same health conditions that caused her to seek treatment in January persisted through April, Gregg suffered through April a period of incapacity relating to the same conditions sufficient to satisfy the plain text of the regulation. [27]
To invoke the protection of the FMLA, an employee must notify his or her employer of her intention to take leave. [28] The requirements of this rule are flexible. If the employee's need for FMLA leave is based on foreseeable events or treatment, thirty days notice must be given to the employer. [29] Otherwise, the employee should give notice as soon as is practicable. [30] When the need for leave is unforeseeable, the employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed. [31] Under this standard, whether an employee has given adequate notice will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. [32] The critical question is whether the information imparted to the employer is sufficient to reasonably apprise it of the employee's request to take time off for a serious health condition. [33] Accordingly, the test of whether or not an employee has given adequate notice is a factual one that we review for clear error. [34] The Municipality argues that Gregg failed to give sufficient notice because she stated only that she needed time to get her life back together on April 11 when she requested leave without pay. It asserts that Gregg, at a minimum, needed to alert Woodward of her need for medical treatment or another qualifying reason under the FMLA. The trial court found that Gregg gave proper notice, although she did not expressly invoke the FMLA. The record supports this conclusion. The Municipality placed Gregg on sick leave initially and, although her status changed to annual leave in March, the department never alerted her to her rights under the FMLA. Woodward was in weekly contact with Gregg and was aware of her injuries and domestic situation. The court found Gregg's testimony was credible that she informed Woodward on April 11 that she needed more time to deal with her injuries. It concluded that any reasonable person would have seen ... the significant mental stress [Gregg] was suffering from during the relevant times in this case. But neither Woodward nor the responsible department officer, Kinard, alerted Gregg to her rights under the FMLA or considered how the Act might grant her protected leave for her incapacity. The court reasonably determined that Gregg could not foresee her need for further leave on April 11. Gregg was in a stressful domestic situation, she had left Alaska, and Woodward presented her with an ultimatum on April 11 to either return to Alaska within three days or risk termination for abandoning her position. Therefore the Municipality cites incorrectly to the stricter standards of notice for foreseeable leave, 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c), rather than § 825.303, which governs unforeseeable leave. The Municipality's reliance on case law is similarly misplaced. [35] Instead, federal precedent supports a finding of proper notice where, as here, the plaintiff was initially placed on sick leave and mentioned an illness during her request for leave. [36]
Finally, the Municipality claims that even if Gregg established the elements of her FMLA claim, she did not qualify for further FMLA protection because by April 11, 1997, the Municipality had already given her the full extent of leave permitted under the Act. According to the Municipality's argument, Gregg took thirteen weeks of leave before she resigned, which is actually more than the Act guarantees, thus she suffered no prejudice from its refusal to grant her further leave. [37] The Municipality failed to raise this factual argument in the trial court, and it misstates the trial court's conclusion on appeal. The Municipality could be correct only if the court had found that it violated 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a), the failure to properly designate Gregg's leave. Section 825.700(a) provides in pertinent part that [i]f an employee takes paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA entitlement. For § 825.700(a) to be relevant, the Municipality would have had to establish that it had granted Gregg twelve weeks of FMLA leave concurrent with her regular department leave, and had simply failed to designate it as such. Instead the court found that Gregg was entitled to further FMLA leave in April, when she was forced to resign. [38] How much additional leave is a question of fact, which cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [39]
The trial court held that Gregg had proved her claim of wrongful termination by a preponderance of the evidence because she was constructively discharged [40]  forced to either resign or risk being fired and losing her certification on April 11  in the course of seeking leave that she was entitled to under federal, state, and local laws. The Municipality claims that Gregg had a choice other than resignation, because she could have returned to a light duty position at APD, and because she was not receiving any medical treatment which would have prevented her from returning. However, the court held explicitly that it was reasonable for [Gregg] to resign based upon the facts of the case. This finding may only be reversed if clearly erroneous, and there is sufficient evidence in the record for the court to reach this conclusion. [41] The Municipality's argument that no reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign in Gregg's situation is similarly defeated by the findings of the trial court that Gregg was between a rock and a hard place where she had to choose resignation to protect her certification.
The Municipality debates the trial court's findings in favor of Gregg on several disputed facts. It argues that the court's belief in Gregg's testimony was clearly erroneous because other facts in the record contradict her version of events. The Municipality outlines four points of error: (1) that Gregg's testimony regarding her actions at her husband's bail hearing was inaccurate; (2) that Gregg's testimony about her purpose for leaving Alaska contradicts her earlier admissions; (3) that Gregg resigned for reasons other than the trial court's conclusions; and (4) that other evidence contradicts Gregg's claim that she attempted to rescind her resignation. Because they required an assessment of Gregg's credibility, we shall affirm the trial court's conclusions on these points unless clearly erroneous. [42] To reverse, we must have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. [43] Gregg reminds us that a trial court does not err simply by choosing between conflicting evidence. [44] Insofar as the Municipality relies upon Woodward's testimony to contradict Gregg's version of events, Gregg points to the trial court's finding that Woodward was less credible than other witnesses who confirm her recollections. The Municipality's first contention is that Gregg's deposition testimony that she waited outside her husband's February arraignment is irreconcilable with her appearance in the actual record of that proceeding. At trial, Gregg admitted that she had made a mistake during the deposition: that she had simply forgotten that she did, in fact, enter the courtroom for Wimer's arraignment. The court was aware of her inconsistency. It was brought out by the Municipality during cross-examination, and it was within the court's discretion to accept Gregg's excuse. Second, the Municipality protests that Gregg told the judge at that arraignment that she expected her husband to follow her out of state, which is inconsistent with Gregg's testimony in this case that she fled the state to escape the domestic violence of her marriage. Again this inconsistency was explored by the Municipality during cross-examination, and the court found that Gregg left Alaska to be where she had family support. Third, the Municipality argues that the trial court's conclusion that Gregg had to resign to protect her certification conflicts with the fact that her then husband, Michael Wimer, who knew nothing of her conversations with Woodward, faxed in her resignation. The Municipality maintains that this establishes a fundamental inconsistency and proves that Gregg was in fact reconciling with Wimer in April when she resigned and did not intend to return to the department. But the fact that Wimer faxed in Gregg's resignation is equally consistent with the premise that Gregg knew she had to quit to preserve her certification, knew Wimer wanted her to quit, and allowed him to fax in the resignation without explaining the circumstances of her conversations with Woodward. Finally, the Municipality contends that no evidence corroborates Gregg's testimony that she called Woodward to rescind her resignation. The Municipality notes that Gregg did not mention the fact that she had attempted to rescind her resignation either in the course of background interviews during her attempt to get rehired, or in a subsequent taped conversation with Woodward. Indeed, at trial the court allowed the Municipality to fully impeach Gregg with this evidence. Our review of the record convinces us that, on this point as well as those above, the court reasonably decided between conflicting accounts and evidence.
The Municipality asserts that the trial court incorrectly calculated the interest on Gregg's damages. The FMLA specifically allows for an award of interest on lost wages. [45] Under Alaska law, prejudgment interest is a substantive right of an injured party. [46] The ordinary rule is that when suit is brought in state court under a federal statute, the substantive provisions of federal law govern the action. [47] For this reason, prejudgment and postjudgment interest calculations on FMLA claims should be decided under federal law. [48] Precedent interpreting the interest award provision of the FMLA is sparse. [49] Generally, the rate of federal prejudgment interest is at the discretion of the trial court, with the goal of fairly compensating the plaintiff. [50] The date when prejudgment interest accrues, unlike under our own statute, is also at the discretion of the court with the same aim in mind. [51] Postjudgment interest is specifically provided for by statute. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, postjudgment interest shall begin at the date of entry of judgment and be set at a floating market rate. [52] After considering the memoranda of the parties, the court found that federal law should determine the interest on Gregg's judgment, rather than Alaska statute. The court concluded that it should calculate prejudgment interest at a variable yearly rate from the date of Gregg's termination until the beginning of trial, and that postjudgment interest should commence at the date of trial. In setting the rate of postjudgment interest, however, the court found that the rate set by AS 09.30.070 should govern. The Municipality argues that the court incorrectly calculated prejudgment interest because under Alaska law prejudgment interest accrues from the day the defendant receives notice of the complaint. [53] But here federal law applies and the timing of prejudgment interest is at the court's discretion. Even under our own statute, we have held that when the plaintiff claims economic damages, prejudgment interest should commence upon the date of injury. [54] It was within the court's discretion to decide that Gregg's award of back pay and prejudgment interest should begin on April 11, 1997, the date she was constructively discharged. Next, the Municipality argues that postjudgment interest should have begun upon final judgment, rather than at the commencement of trial as the superior court decided. It suggests that a final, appealable judgment is a clear demarcation line, rather than the arbitrary date chosen by the trial judge. The court decided that because of the facts of the case and nature of the damages expert's testimony, that the date of final judgment was an arbitrary date, and chose the approximate date the trial began instead. Since federal law governs Gregg's award of damages, postjudgment interest should have been calculated from the date specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1961: [postjudgment] interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment. Under the plain terms of the federal statute the Municipality is correct: the obligation to pay postjudgment interest only arises after the court renders final judgment. Similarly the rate of postjudgment interest should be the floating market rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961. We therefore remand for the trial court to recalculate Gregg's postjudgment interest from the date of final judgment. [55]