Opinion ID: 854545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basis for Denial of the Petition

Text: The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably found that, based on the record before it, which was devoid of any evidence pertaining to trial counsel’s pretrial conduct, there was insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s jury-trial-waiver claim.4 Petitioner failed to develop the claim in the state court and, in the absence of an evidentiary hearing, there is nothing in the state court record to support his assertion that, before the bench trial commenced, Petitioner’s trial counsel disregarded his instruction to withdraw his jury trial waiver. Consequently, the state court record fails to indicate 3 The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s determination that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011), compelled a departure from the strong dicta in Johnson v. Sherry, 586 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir. 2009), which suggested that prejudice is presumed when the deficient performance results in a structural error. Because this case can be resolved under the deficient-performance prong, we do not reach the issue of whether Premo bars a presumption of prejudice for Strickland claims. 4 Petitioner argues for the first time in his reply brief that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not adjudicate the jury-trial-waiver claim on the merits. Not only is this argument waived, see Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010), but it is also unconvincing under Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), which compels a strong presumption that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of a procedural bar. 9 No. 11-1584 that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner argues that there was sufficient evidence adduced from the evidentiary hearing held in federal court to support his jury-trial-waiver claim for habeas relief. However, if Petitioner is to “overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1),” he must do so “on the record that was before the state court.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (emphasis added). Though Pinholster was decided after the evidentiary hearing in this case was held and after the district court’s order was filed, we are nonetheless bound by its ruling. Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 451 (6th Cir. 2012). Federal courts sitting in habeas review cannot act as “alternative forum[s] for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 437). Notably, in recommending an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge acknowledged that this claim standing alone (without the appellate counsel claim) would not have merited an evidentiary hearing because Petitioner failed to diligently pursue the claim in state court. Under the circumstances of this case, any evidence derived from an evidentiary hearing in federal court would not have been relevant to our analysis under the AEDPA standard of review. See id. at 1400; Frankin, 695 F.3d at 451. Accordingly, because the state court record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding that trial counsel disregarded his client’s instruction to withdraw a jury trial waiver, the Michigan courts’ disposition of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims cannot be held to be unreasonable. 10 No. 11-1584