Opinion ID: 165799
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the appeal waiver

Text: 28 As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to clarify Porter's argument on appeal regarding the scope of the appeal waiver. He initially argued his sentence should be reversed in light of Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), because the sentence was based on a quantity of drugs neither admitted by him nor determined by a jury. Under this theory, Porter interpreted the exception to his appellate waiver allowing him to appeal a sentence above the maximum statutory penalty provided in the statute of conviction, as referring to the maximum penalty the court could have imposed under the applicable Federal Sentencing Guideline (Guidelines) sentencing range based on facts he admitted. Porter claimed his sentence exceeded this maximum because the court determined the sentence based on facts he did not admit. In subsequent briefing, however, Porter concedes that he did in fact stipulate to the quantity of drugs for which the court sentenced him. See Aplt. Supp. Reply Br. at 3 (As the [plea agreement] reflects, Mr. Porter did in fact admit possession with intent to distribute the 30.2 grams of methamphetamine (pure).). 2 29 With these considerations in mind, we reject Porter's argument that his sentence is outside the scope of the appellate waiver for two basic reasons. First, setting aside Porter's concession regarding drug quantity, his interpretation of the waiver clause contradicts the plain language of the plea agreement. The agreement contains a waiver exception where the sentence imposed exceeds the maximum provided in the statute of conviction. Adopting Porter's approach would require us to read the term statute of conviction out of the agreement and substitute it with applicable Guideline range or some such language. 30 We decline to do so. Nothing in the record before us shows that the parties intended the exception to stand for anything other than the plain meaning of its operative language. See United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330, 1333-35 (11th Cir.2005) (holding that exception to appellate waiver for sentence exceeding the maximum permitted by statute referred to statute of conviction, not statutory maximum as defined in Blakely and Booker, where no indication parties intended otherwise); United States v. West, 392 F.3d 450, 460-61 (D.C.Cir.2004) (holding that exception to appellate waiver for sentence exceeding statutory maximum did not allow for Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) or Blakely challenge where parties did not intend the term to have such meaning). Here, the relevant statute of conviction was 21 U.S.C. § 841, which in this case carried a maximum penalty of 40 years. Porter's 110-month sentence does not exceed the maximum penalty. 31 Second, even if we were to adopt Porter's interpretation of the waiver clause, his sentence would not exceed the statutory maximum. The Sixth Amendment rule announced in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, and extended to the Guidelines in Booker is inapplicable where a sentence is determined based on admitted facts. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 756 (Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.). Again, as we have noted, Porter admitted the facts on which the district court determined his sentence. Hence, Porter's sentence is within the scope of the agreement and does not violate the 6th Amendment.