Opinion ID: 769749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Clearly Established Constitutional Right

Text: 40 Having identified with sufficient particularity the right claimed to be violated, we next consider whether that right was clearly established in 1996 when Coffey's alleged misconduct occurred. It is firmly established that a constitutional right exists not to be deprived of liberty on the basis of false evidence fabricated by a government officer. See Scotto v. Almenas, 143 F.3d 105, 113 (2d Cir. 1998) (parole officer); Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Authority, 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997) (police officers); White, 855 F.2d at 961 (same). As we recently stated, citing ample pre-1996 authority, When a police officer creates false information likely to influence a jury's decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial . . . . Ricciuti, 124 F.3d at 130. See also Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9 (arrest unconstitutional if police officer obtained warrant from judicial officer on the basis of evidence that no officer of reasonable competence would have considered sufficient). 41 It has also long been established that a prosecutor who knowingly uses false evidence at trial to obtain a conviction acts unconstitutionally. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). Although a prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity for his actions in presenting evidence at trial, see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984, these cases serve to inform every prosecutor that his knowing use of false evidence is unconstitutional. Any prosecutor aware of these cases would understand that fabricating evidence in his investigative role violates the standards of due process and that a resulting loss of liberty is a denial of a constitutional right. 42 Although no prior decision has found a violation by an investigating prosecutor of the right not to be deprived of liberty on the basis of fabricated evidence, the cases in which such claims have been made reveal some support for Zahrey's position. The Supreme Court in Buckley III considered a claim that a prosecutor in his investigative role fabricated evidence. A narrow 5-4 majority ruled that the alleged misconduct had occurred at the investigative stage, but the Court did not decide whether a constitutional right had been violated. Instead, the Court assumed that the complaint allege[d] constitutional violations for which § 1983 provides a remedy. Buckley III, 509 U.S. at 261. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Scalia foreshadowed Zahrey's claim when he observed: I am aware of[] no authority for the proposition that the mere preparation of false evidence, as opposed to its use in a fashion that deprives someone of a fair trial or otherwise harms him, violates the Constitution. Id. at 281 (emphasis added). Unlike a claim to be free of the mere preparation of false evidence, Zahrey's contention is that he has been otherwise harm[ed] by such misconduct. Though it may be a rare claim that the official who fabricated evidence in an investigatory role is the same person who later presented it to a grand jury in an advocacy role, the unusual facts of Zahrey's claim do not remove it from the broader category of claims that have long been recognized as alleging violations of clearly established constitutional rights. 43 The opinion of the four Justices who concurred only in part in Buckley III also lends some support to Zahrey's claim. They disagreed with the majority that the prosecutor's misconduct occurred in his investigative role, see id. at 282-91 (Kennedy, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J., White and Souter, JJ., join, concurring in part and dissenting in part), and they faulted the majority for appearing to draw the line between investigation and advocacy at the point where probable cause is established, see id. at 286-90. In expressing their disagreement on this point, however, they explicitly referred to a prosecutor who fabricates evidence that leads to an arrest, insisting that such misconduct should not be shielded by absolute immunity. See id. at 287-88 ([W]hen a civil plaintiff claims that a prosecutor falsified evidence . . . , it is difficult to fathom why securing such a fraudulent determination [of probable cause] transmogrifies unprotected conduct into protected conduct.). Whether or not the majority in Buckley III would regard this example given by the four partial concurrers as an instance of misconduct occurring at the investigating stage, Coffey concedes, for purposes of this appeal, that our case involves misconduct at that stage. The Justices who joined Justice Kennedy's opinion apparently recognize that a constitutional right is violated when a prosecutor, in an investigative role, fabricates evidence that results in a deprivation of liberty, and nothing in the majority opinion disputes that proposition. 44 Our Court has also considered a claim that a prosecutor fabricated evidence in an investigative capacity. See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662-63. Although we ruled that further exploration of the facts was required to determine whether the alleged fabrication occurred at the investigative or the advocacy stage, see id. at 663, our decision appears to be premised on the existence of a right not to be deprived of liberty resulting from a prosecutor's investigative fabrication of evidence. 45 It is true that no court decided before 1996 that a prosecutor deprived a criminal defendant of liberty without due process of law by fabricating evidence in an investigative role under circumstances where it is reasonably foreseeable that the false evidence will be used to deprive the defendant of liberty. Moreover, as the District Court in this case noted, by 1996 two courts appear to have reached a contrary conclusion. See Buckley IV, 20 F.3d at 794-95; Rhodes, 939 F. Supp. at 1270. Anderson instructs, however, that for a right to be clearly established for purposes of a qualified immunity defense, the precise conduct at issue need not previously have been ruled unlawful. See 483 U.S. at 640. We think the right at issue in this case should not be defined at such a level of particularity as to be limited to a right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of an investigating prosecutor's fabrication of evidence. The right is appropriately identified as the right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of any government officer's fabrication of evidence. That right was clearly established in 1996, when Coffey's alleged acts occurred, and it was also then well established that for purposes of actions under section 1983 and Bivens, a person is responsible for the natural consequences of his actions, Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187. Since a jury could find that Coffey would foresee that he himself would use the fabricated evidence and that a deprivation of Zahrey's liberty would result, Zahrey's claim survives Coffey's attempt to have the claim dismissed, as a matter of law, because of a qualified immunity defense.