Opinion ID: 1254699
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are Pesticides Unambiguously Pollutants Within the Meaning of the Act?

Text: The first question under Chevron is whether the Clean Water Act unambiguously includes pesticides within its definition of pollutant. Under this first step, this Court determines whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. This is determined by employing traditional tools of statutory construction. Id. The meaning of a statute is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997); see also Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990) (Our `starting point is the language of the statute,' ... but `in expounding a statute, we are not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.') (citations omitted). If Congress's intent is clear from the statutory language, then that intent must be given effect. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. As noted above, the Clean Water Act defines pollutant as dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). This Court has previously concluded that the broad generic terms included in the definition of pollutant demonstrate Congress's intent to capture more than just the items expressly enumerated. United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110 (6th Cir.1977) (concluding that the Clean Water Act covers, at a minimum, those pollutants covered under the Refuse Act, which applies to all foreign substances not explicitly exempted from coverage); see also, e.g., Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d at 565 ([T]he breadth of many of the items in the list of `pollutants' tends to eviscerate any restrictive effect.); No Spray Coalition, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11097, at  (citing S.Rep. No. 92-414 at 76 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3742). However, we need not consider the term's breadth today. Rather, we find the plain language of chemical waste and biological materials in § 1362(b) to be unambiguous as to pesticides. This Court must, therefore, give effect to the Congress's expressed intent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778.
Generally, a court should give a word in a statute its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended [it] to bear some different import. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Office of U.S. Attorney, 369 F.3d 960, 967 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431-32, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)). The EPA refers the Court to The New Oxford American Dictionary (Jewell & Abate eds.2001), which defines waste as eliminated or discarded as no longer useful or required after the completion of a process. Id. at 1905. Industry Petitioners point the Court to Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004), which defines waste as [r]efuse or superfluous material, esp. that after a manufacturing or chemical process. Id. at 1621. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has accepted the American Heritage Dictionary's definition of waste as any useless or worthless byproduct of a process or the like; refuse or excess material. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir.2003); Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146, 1149 (2005). Under any of these definitions of waste, chemical waste for the purposes of the Clean Water Act would include discarded chemicals, superfluous chemicals, or refuse or excess chemicals. As such, under a plain-meaning analysis of the term, we cannot conclude that all chemical pesticides require NPDES permits. Rather, like our sister circuit in Fairhurst, we conclude that: so long as the chemical pesticide is intentionally applied to the water [to perform a particular useful purpose] and leaves no excess portions after performing its intended purpose[] it is not a `chemical waste,' 422 F.3d at 1149, and does not require an NPDES permit. Id. On the other hand, as Environmental Petitioners argue and the EPA concedes, excess pesticide and pesticide residue meet the common definition of waste. To this extent, the EPA's Final Rule is in line with the expressed intent of Congress, as the Rule defines these pesticide residues as pollutants because they are wastes of the pesticide application. 71 Fed.Reg. at 68,487. The EPA aptly states: [P]esticides applied to land but later contained in a waste stream, including storm water regulated under the Clean Water Act, could trigger the requirement of obtaining an NPDES permit.... In addition, if there are residual materials resulting from pesticides that remain in the water after the application and its intended purpose has been completed, the residual materials are pollutants because they are substances that are no longer useful or required after the completion of a process. (EPA Br. 29-30.) This Court agrees. Therefore, at least two easily defined sets of circumstances arise whereby chemical pesticides qualify as pollutants under the Clean Water Act. In the first circumstance, a chemical pesticide is initially applied to land or dispersed in the airthese pesticides are sometimes referred to as either terrestrial pesticides or aerial pesticides and include applications above or near waterways. At some point following application, excess pesticide or residual pesticide finds its way into the navigable waters of the United States. Pesticides applied in this way and later affecting the water are necessarily discarded, superfluous, or excess chemical. Such chemical pesticide residuals meet the Clean Water Act's definition of chemical waste. In the second circumstance, a chemical pesticide is applied directly and purposefully to navigable waters to serve a beneficial purposesuch pesticides are often referred to as aqueous or aquatic pesticides. As contemplated by the EPA, if residual aquatic pesticide remain[s] in the water after the application and [the pesticide's] intended purpose has been completed, then the residue would likewise qualify as a chemical waste. (EPA Br. 29-30.) As such, these chemical wastes would unambiguously fall within the ambit of the Clean Water Act. This second scenario, of course, leads to the inevitable quandary that both non-waste aqueous pesticide and pesticide residual are applied to water at the same moment, which then gives rise to the question of how the EPA can regulate and permit the residual. However, this problem is more theoretical than practical. In reality, whether or not a particular chemical pesticide needs to be regulated can be easily answered by both the EPA's and industry's experience with that pesticide. If, as was the case in Fairhurst, a chemical such as antimycin leaves no excess portions after performing its intended purpose, then that chemical's use need not be regulated. See Fairhurst, 422 F.3d at 1149. If, on the other hand, a chemical pesticide is known to have lasting effects beyond the pesticide's intended object, then its use must be regulated under the Clean Water Act. See also Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 532-33 (9th Cir.2001).
Continuing our review under Chevron, we must examine the ordinary, contemporary, [and] common meaning of biological materials. Grand Traverse Band, 369 F.3d at 967. Environmental Petitioners point out that Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Gove ed.1993) defines material as of, relating to, or consisting of matter and the basic matter from which the whole or the great part of something is made. Id. at 1392. The Oxford English Dictionary provides that material is that which constitutes the substance of a thing (physical or non-physical); a physical substance; a material thing. OED Online, available at http:// dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00303279?que ry_type=word&queryword=material&firs t=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type= alpha&result_place=1&search_id=VoPl-c VwRjA-12823&hilite=00303279. The plain, unambiguous nature of this language compels this Court to find that matter of a biological nature, such as biological pesticides, qualifies as a biological material and falls under the Clean Water Act if it is discharged into water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). The EPA points to Ninth Circuit case law that holds that mussel shells and mussel byproduct are not pollutants under the Clean Water Act. Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld & Totten Inlets v. Taylor, 299 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir.2002). The Hammersley court found the Clean Water Act to be ambiguous on whether `biological materials' means all biological matter regardless of quantum and nature. Id. While that case is distinguishable, we choose a more limited analysis. [6] We see our obligation not as defining the outermost bounds of biological materials, but rather simply as deciding whether biological pesticides fit into the ordinary meaning of biological materials. The term biological materials cannot be read to exclude biological pesticides or their residuals. The EPA's Final Rule treats biological pesticides no differently from chemical pesticides, exempting both from NPDES permitting requirements in certain circumstances. See 71 Fed.Reg. at 68,492. We find this interpretation to be contrary to the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act. In 33 U.S.C. § 1362, Congress purposefully included the term biological materials, rather than a more limited term such as biological wastes. Congress could easily have drafted the list of pollutants in the Clean Water Act to include chemical wastes and biological wastes. But, here, the word waste does not accompany biological materials. Thus, if we are to give meaning to the word waste in chemical waste, we must recognize Congress's intent to treat biological and chemical pesticides differently. This interpretation is consistent with the precedent of this Court and others. In National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir.1988), we determined that [m]illions of pounds of live fish, dead fish and fish remains annually discharged in Lake Michigan by [a] facility are pollutants within the meaning of the [Clean Water Act], since they are `biological materials.' Likewise, the District Court of Maine determined that salmon feces and urine that exit the net pens and enter the waters are pollutants as they constitute `biological materials' or `agricultural wastes.' United States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Atl. Salmon of Maine, 215 F.Supp.2d 239, 247 (D.Me. 2002) (citing Higbee v. Starr, 598 F.Supp. 323, 330-31 (D.Ark.1984) aff'd, 782 F.2d 1048 (8th Cir.1985)). Biological pesticides similarly must be considered biological materials. Biological pesticides consist of artificial concentrations of viruses, bacteria, fungi, plant materials, and/or other biological materials. See Pesticides: Glossary, U.S. EPA, available at http://www. epa.gov/pesticides/glossary. Congress defined pollution as the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19). Adding biological pesticides to water undeniably alters its biological integrity. Therefore, we find biological pesticides to be biological materials under the Clean Water Act.