Opinion ID: 6329209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Briggs’s remaining claims

Text: Briggs’s remaining claims of false imprisonment and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrageous conduct are state-law claims that he seeks to maintain under the federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction. But “a federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims.” Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)). Because that is the case here, the district court did not err in declining to reach those claims. E. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Briggs’s motion to amend the complaint Briggs’s final argument is that he should have been permitted leave to file an amended complaint because “the District Court permitted Defendants’ dispositive motion to be filed outside of the time permitted in the court’s scheduling order without a showing of good cause,” and “what is good for the goose is good for the gander.” The defendants note, however, that they filed their motion only five days after the scheduling order’s deadline, whereas Briggs requested leave to file an amended complaint almost a year later. Briggs concedes that his request was untimely and that he did not make a claim that he had good cause for the delay. “Once the scheduling order’s deadline passes, a plaintiff first must show good cause under Rule 16(b) for failure earlier to seek leave to amend before a court will consider whether amendment is proper under Rule 15(a).” Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 909 (6th Cir. 2003). 13 No. 21-5581, Briggs v. Hogan, et al. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Briggs’s motion to amend the complaint because the court found that Briggs had failed to demonstrate good cause when he offered no explanation for his extremely late motion.