Opinion ID: 196508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process

Text: 15 This case requires us to harmonize a conflict between a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, U.S. Const. amend. VI, and the government's interest in cross-examining a defense witness who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 16 Gary contends that his right to compulsory process was denied when the trial court refused to permit Hopkins to testify and instead only permitted Hopkins' testimony from the first trial to be read to the jury. Gary argues that the trial court should have required Hopkins to invoke his right against self-incrimination during cross-examination in the jury's presence. 17 The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense.... This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). The Sixth Amendment, however, does not provide an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 653, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). As the Supreme Court noted in an opinion upholding a trial judge's decision to preclude a defense witness's testimony on evidentiary grounds, [t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversary system; one cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment as a justification for presenting what might have been a half-truth. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 2171, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). 18 While the government's interest in cross-examining defense witnesses is not rooted in the Constitution, see United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 542 n. 21 (D.C.Cir.1980) (The government of course has no Sixth Amendment or other constitutional right to cross-examine defense witnesses.), one of the legitimate demands of the adversary system is the right of cross-examination. See Fed.R.Evid. 611(b) (permitting cross-examination limited to subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of witness). Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). As Professor Wigmore stated: 19 The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. 20 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence Sec. 1395, at 150 (Chadbourne rev. 1974) (emphasis in original), quoted in Davis, 415 U.S. at 315-16, 94 S.Ct. at 1110; see also United States v. Stubbert, 655 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.1981) (quoting same). 21 Courts have not permitted defendants to call witnesses to the stand who have indicated that they will refuse to answer the government's questions on cross-examination with respect to non-collateral matters. In United States v. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d 1307 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 356, 126 L.Ed.2d 320 (1993), the defendant called his friend and former co-defendant as a witness, but in a voir dire examination, he refused to answer any questions other than his name and address on self-incrimination grounds. In response to the suggestion that the government's cross-examination should be limited so that the defense witness's privilege need not be invoked, we held that effective cross-examination would have been seriously impaired if the prosecutor were denied latitude to explore the joint criminal history and affirmed the trial judge's decision not to permit the witness to testify. Id. at 1312-14. See also United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir.1990) (It is well-accepted that a witness's direct testimony can be stricken if she invokes the fifth amendment on cross-examination to shield that testimony from scrutiny.) (citing cases); United States v. Zirpolo, 704 F.2d 23, 25-26 (1st Cir.) (when defense witness rightfully refuses to answer questions based on the privilege against self-incrimination, trial court need not limit scope of government's cross-examination on conversations relating to other contemporaneous drug offenses), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822, 104 S.Ct. 87, 78 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); accord Denham v. Deeds, 954 F.2d 1501, 1503-04 (9th Cir.1992) (We ... join with those circuits that have permitted the exclusion of a defense witness's testimony when the witness has refused on cross-examination to respond to questions on non-collateral matters.); United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1469-70 (10th Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1036, 112 S.Ct. 882, 116 L.Ed.2d 786 (1992); United States v. Doddington, 822 F.2d 818, 822 (8th Cir.1987) (trial court properly struck direct testimony of defense witness who invoked Fifth Amendment during cross-examination). 22 Attempting to combat this solid phalanx of precedent, Gary cites cases in which courts permitted government witnesses to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination during defendant's cross-examination without violating the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d 158, 160-61 (1st Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1114, 112 S.Ct. 1223, 117 L.Ed.2d 459 (1992); Stubbert, 655 F.2d at 457-58. Each of these cases rely on the Second Circuit's much-cited holding in United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822, 84 S.Ct. 60, 11 L.Ed.2d 55 (1963) that: 23 In determining whether the testimony of a witness who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination may be used against the defendant, a distinction must be drawn between cases in which the assertion of the privilege merely precludes inquiry into collateral matters which bear only on the credibility of the witness and those cases in which the assertion of the privilege prevents inquiry into matters about which the witness testified on direct examination. 24 When cross-examination is precluded only with respect to collateral issues, the Sixth Amendment does not require the court to strike the witness's testimony. See Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d at 161 (refusing to strike direct testimony when cross-examination limited to issues not relevant to Berrio- Londono's guilt or innocence); Stubbert, 655 F.2d at 457-58. 25 When cross-examination on material issues raised on direct examination is curtailed because of a witness's valid claim of privilege, however, the trial court, in its discretion, may refuse to permit that witness's testimony. See De La Cruz, 996 F.2d at 1313-14. Just as the trial court must be vigilant in ensuring that a defendant has a full and fair cross-examination, see Cardillo, 316 F.2d at 611, it must similarly safeguard the government's cross-examination to prevent coconspirators from 'whitewashing' each other through the use of testimony unchallengeable for one reason or another. Zirpolo, 704 F.2d at 26 (quoting United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 950, 962 (3d Cir.1981)). 26 We have recognized that it may sometimes be feasible for a district court to reconcile the defendant's right to present witnesses with a witness's privilege against self-incrimination by limiting the scope of the latter's testimony. Id. at 26. In striking the appropriate balance between a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the government's interest in cross-examination, a trial judge may or even must limit the government's cross-examination on collateral matters if this can be done without unduly limiting the government and if doing so will preserve the defendant's ability to call a material witness who would otherwise claim the privilege. De La Cruz, 996 F.2d at 1313; see also Pardo, 636 F.2d at 544 ([W]here the rights of the defendant and the government can be reconciled, the defendant's constitutional right to procure testimony in his favor must prevail.). 27 Where, as here, a defense witness's claim of privilege shields material testimony from cross-examination, however, this balance weighs against the defendant. The trial court held a voir dire hearing to determine whether the subject matter concerning which the witness intended to assert the Fifth Amendment was collateral. She fairly concluded that it was not. See Fed.R.Evid. 611(b) (giving court authority to exercise reasonable control over examination of witnesses to make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth). 28 In considering similar types of challenges brought under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we have applied an abuse of discretion standard. See Berrio-Londono, 946 F.2d at 160 (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike witness's testimony on direct examination when witness asserted Fifth Amendment on collateral matters on cross-examination, particularly when witness was required to invoke privilege in presence of jury). We apply the same abuse of discretion standard in determining kindred challenges under the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir.1995) (applying abuse of discretion standard to review evidentiary decision challenged on Compulsory Process Clause ground). We find no abuse of discretion here. 29 According to Gary's proffer, Hopkins would have testified that during the course of the evening, he was able to observe [Gary] and never visually saw a firearm on his person, nor was one detected by the metal detectors, or doorman at the nightclubs. Hopkins' testimony certainly was material to the defense as it showed that, after a significant period of observation, he did not see Gary possess a firearm. However, at the first trial, Hopkins testified that the pair had been involved in two instances of breaking and entering after leaving the clubs and that he did not know whether Gary had hidden a gun in his car before going to the clubs. Had Hopkins been permitted to testify and to refuse to answer questions regarding the breaking and entering, as he told the court he would, the government's cross-examination of Hopkins would have been rendered ineffective. 30 Thus the trial court found, [t]he matters that Mr. Hopkins would have testified to and, in fact, did testify to at the previous trial were closely related in time and space to the matter that is before the Court in which the jury must consider. And therefore, all of the information that would have been elicited or attempted to have been elicited by the Government would have been germane and would have been permissible. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the subject matter of the cross-examination as to which Hopkins would have asserted his privilege was material and relevant. Any limitation on cross-examination would have been unduly prejudicial to the government. 31 Furthermore, in striking the appropriate balance, the trial court took into consideration that Gary was not deprived of an opportunity to present Hopkins' testimony. Although Hopkins did not appear personally in the second trial, his testimony from the first trial was read in full to the jury. It was read with counsel for the government and for Gary each reading their respective parts and a third person reading Hopkins' responses. Indeed, at oral argument Gary's counsel engaged in a brief thespian demonstration intended to convey the desiccated manner in which Hopkins' testimony was read at Gary's second trial. We noted then, and reiterate today, that whenever transcript testimony is admitted in a trial, the fact-finder is deprived of a full-fledged opportunity to assess directly the credibility and demeanor of the declarant. The rules of evidence, however, permit such evidence to be admitted at trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) (former testimony exception to hearsay rule). 32 Gary suggests that, rather than prohibit Hopkins' live testimony altogether, the trial court should have permitted Hopkins to testify on direct examination and forced him to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege on cross-examination in the presence of the jury. That solution, Gary argues, strikes a more appropriate balance between the government's and the defendant's interests because the government could have used the transcript to impeach this testimony or could have relied upon the adverse inference of the witness's invocation of the Fifth. This approach finds some support in United States v. Kaplan, 832 F.2d 676 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 907, 108 S.Ct. 1080, 99 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988), where we held that when a non-party government witness invokes the Fifth Amendment on cross-examination at trial, the court should permit the assertion of the privilege in the presence of the jury. The invocation of the privilege acts as a form of impeachment. Id. at 684. 33 In Kaplan, we distinguished United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir.1973), in which we held that a court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a defense witness to take the stand when, after direct examination was completed, that witness would assert the Fifth Amendment as to essentially all questions on cross-examination. Id. at 1211. The basis for the distinction follows: 34 A different case is presented where, as here, the defense seeks to cross-examine a government witness within the scope of his direct and then the witness asserts the privilege. We note, first, that the impact on the jury's deliberations from asserting the privilege has to be less here than in Johnson from the fact that Brown did not claim the privilege comprehensively. Instead, Brown answered most questions put to him by the defense and could have refused to answer at trial only those bearing on the alleged cocaine abuse. And whatever danger exists that the jury may give too much weight to this line of questioning is small in comparison to its impeachment value. 35 Kaplan, 832 F.2d at 684. 36 Unlike Kaplan, where the invocation of the Fifth Amendment pertained to a collateral matter--the effect of alleged cocaine abuse on the witness's power of memory or observation--here the assertion of the privilege would have shielded the witness from testifying on a core issue addressed on direct examination. Hopkins' claim of privilege would have precluded government inquiry into the intervening events between the time Hopkins observed the defendant to have no firearm and the time the police officer testified he saw a gun in defendant's possession. Such testimony would have been directly relevant to Gary's guilt or innocence. Accordingly, while the trial judge may have had the discretion to strike a balance along the lines proposed by the defendant, 4 there was no abuse of discretion in striking the balance a different way. 5 37