Opinion ID: 741901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Method Claim 9

Text: 26 We next address method claim 9 of the '557 patent. OI argues that the district court erred in applying section 112, p 6, to the asserted method claims. In particular, it argues that the court erred in relying upon the broad recital of a purpose in a claim preamble as a function that requires application of section 112, p 6, to a series of process steps. It asserts that section 112, p 6, only applies to steps having an individually associated function, and to steps without recited acts in support thereof. Tekmar responds that the passing clauses of claim 9 of the '557 patent are step-plus-function clauses subject to the limitations of section 112, p 6, and that, when so construed, the claims are not infringed. 27 We first address the application of section 112, p 6, generally to method claims. Appellant asserts, as have other parties, that we have not done so previously. Section 112, p 6, provides that: 28 An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 29 35 U.S.C. § 112, p 6 (1994) (emphasis added). This statutory provision clearly applies to claims for a combination. It is well-established of course that, in combinations that are apparatus claims, means for performing a specified function are subject to this paragraph when they lack recital of definite structure or material. Logically, structure and material make up the various means of apparatus. However, [t]he word 'combination' in this paragraph includes 'not only a combination of mechanical elements, but also a combination of substances in a composition claim, or steps in a process claim.'  In re Fuetterer, 50 C.C.P.A. 1453, 319 F.2d 259, 264, 138 USPQ 217, 222 (1963) (quoting P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. Vol. 1, p. 25 (1954), reprinted in, 75 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 161, 186 (Mar.1993)) (emphasis added). 30 The statute of course uses terms that might be viewed as having a similar meaning, namely, steps and acts. It refers to means and steps, which must be supported by structure, material, or acts. It does not state which goes with which. The word means clearly refers to the generic description of an apparatus element, and the implementation of such a concept is obviously by structure or material. We interpret the term steps to refer to the generic description of elements of a process, and the term acts to refer to the implementation of such steps. This interpretation is consistent with the established correlation between means and structure. In this paragraph, structure and material go with means, acts go with steps. Of course, as we have indicated, section 112, p 6, is implicated only when means plus function without definite structure are present, and that is similarly true with respect to steps, that the paragraph is implicated only when steps plus function without acts are present. The statute thus in effect provides that an element in a combination method or process claim may be recited as a step for performing a specified function without the recital of acts in support of the function. Being drafted with the permissive may, the statute does not require that steps in a method claim be drafted in step-plus-function form but rather allows for that form. 31 Here, the language in question is the step[s] of ... passing the analyte slug through a passage. The district court considered the statement which appears in the preamble, removing water vapor from an analyte slug, as a function which invokes application of section 112, p 6. We do not agree. The preamble statement of the purpose of the overall process does not constitute an associated function for the two passing steps of claim 9. Performing a series of steps inherently produces a result, in this case the removal of water vapor from the analyte slug, but a statement in a preamble of a result that necessarily follows from performing a series of steps does not convert each of those steps into step-plus-function clauses. The steps of passing are not individually associated in the claim with functions performed by the steps of passing. 32 Section 112, p 6, as is well-documented, was intended to permit use of means expressions without recitation of all the possible means that might be used in a claimed apparatus. See Federico, supra, at 25 (stating that the statute authorizes greater liberality in the use of functional expressions in combination claims than had been permitted by some court decisions such as Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 6, 91 L.Ed. 3 (1946)). The price that must be paid for use of that convenience is limitation of the claim to the means specified in the written description and equivalents thereof. Similarly, a step for accomplishing a particular function in a process claim may also be claimed without specificity subject to the same price. But claiming a step by itself, or even a series of steps, does not implicate section 112, p 6. Merely claiming a step without recital of a function is not analogous to a means plus a function. We note that the Halliburton case concerned an apparatus claim, not a process claim, and we must be careful not to extend the language of this provision to situations not contemplated by Congress. If we were to construe every process claim containing steps described by an ing verb, such as passing, heating, reacting, transferring, etc. into a step-plus-function limitation, we would be limiting process claims in a manner never intended by Congress. Accordingly, we conclude that the passing limitations of claim 9 are not step-plus-function limitations subject to the requirements of section 112, p 6. 33 Tekmar argues that, because the method claims parallel the apparatus claims, they must be construed consistently with the apparatus claims. Assuming that the limitations of the apparatus claim are subject to the limitations of section 112, p 6, Tekmar thus reasons that the steps of the method claim must likewise be subject to those limitations. Moreover, it argues that OI made no distinction between the method and apparatus claims during the prosecution of the patents and that, accordingly, they must be construed consistently with each other. We understand that the steps in the method claim are essentially in the same language as the limitations in the apparatus claim, albeit without the means for qualification. However, even if we were to hold that the word passage in the apparatus claims meets the section 112, p 6, tests, we would not agree with Tekmar that the parallelism of the claims means that the method claims should be subject to the requirements of section 112, p 6. Each claim must be independently reviewed in order to determine if it is subject to the requirements of section 112, p 6. Interpretation of claims would be confusing indeed if claims that are not means- or step-plus-function claims were to be interpreted as if they were, only because they use language similar to that used in other claims that are subject to this provision. As discussed above, the method claim is not drafted in step-plus-function form and is thus not subject to this provision. 34 We will therefore construe the meaning of the word passage in claim 9, freed from the strictures of section 112, p 6. OI argues that the word passage should be given its ordinary and accustomed meaning and that the district court erred in limiting the passage to its preferred embodiment. We do not agree. The textual language describing the passages in the '380 written description are also present in the '557 patent. Therefore, for the reasons explained above, we conclude that the word passage in claim 9 does not encompass a completely cylindrical, smooth-walled structure. There is no dispute that the accused device contains such a structure. Tekmar is therefore entitled to a judgment as a matter of law that it does not infringe claim 9. Although the district court erred in concluding that the method claims are subject to the requirements of section 112, p 6, it did not err in concluding that the accused device did not contain a passage as required by those claims. The district court's error thus was harmless. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. The assertion that infringement exists under the doctrine of equivalents is not persuasive in view of the fact that the difference between what is expressly claimed, as interpreted by this court, and what Tekmar uses, is one that OI indicated in its specification was a basis for distinguishing over the prior art, thereby estopping OI from extending the effective scope of its claims.