Opinion ID: 2995535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expert Testimony on Self-Defense

Text: Finally, Rouster argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony on self-defense at trial. Rouster asserts that expert testimony would have established that the shots Rouster fired at John Rease were fired in self-defense, based on the trajectory of the bullet path. In response to this argument, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: Rouster argues that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to present expert evidence to show the killings were committed in an act of self-defense. Self-defense is not available, however, as an affirmative defense when one is engaged in the commission of a robbery. Ind. Code Ann. sec. 35-41-3-2(d)(1). Rouster’s proposed evidence (expert testimony meant to indicate the Reases’ wounds were consistent with shots fired in self-defense) does not affect the evidence necessarily believed by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Rouster and Williams were both engaged in robbery at the time the killings occurred. Thus, even if we assume Rouster was indeed acting to protect himself (an assumption that is belied by virtually all of the evidence), he is barred from asserting self-defense since the jury found he was engaged in robbery at the time of the killings. Trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to offer self- defense evidence. Rouster, 705 N.E.2d at 1006. Even assuming that the expert testimony would have conclusively shown that Rouster was acting in self-defense, under Indiana law, a person is not justified in using force if he is committing . . . a crime. Ind. Code sec. 35-41-3-2(d)(1). The Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to mean that self-defense could not be applied as a defense to the crime of robbery. Debose v. State, 450 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ind. 1983). In the present case, the State charged Rouster with two counts of felony murder under Ind. Code Section 35-42-1-1(2), which states that a person who . . . kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . robbery . . . commits murder, a felony. The jury instructions stated that in order for the jury to convict Rouster of felony murder, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rouster killed the Reases while committing or attempting to commit a robbery./15 The jury returned a verdict on those two counts that stated, [w]e, the jury, find the defendant, Gregory Anthony Rouster, guilty of Murder, a felony. Therefore, the jury necessarily found that Rouster had committed or attempted to commit robbery. The only expert testimony that Rouster alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to present was testimony from a reconstruction expert [that] could have shown the .32 caliber shots fired by the Petitioner . . . were evidence of self- defense. This evidence does not affect the overwhelming evidence believed by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that Rouster was committing or attempting to commit a robbery when the Reases were killed. This evidence includes uncontradicted testimony that Bryant heard Taylor say that Rouster had a gun, that he heard Rouster ask Taylor where the Reases kept their money, that he heard Rouster say let’s go rob them, that he heard Rouster enter the Rease house and threaten Henrietta Rease with a gun, and that he then heard several gunshots being fired. Further, Newsome testified that Rouster had given her money that he had taken from the Reases. Therefore, because the jury believed the overwhelming evidence that Rouster committed a robbery, because the expert testimony only concerned self-defense and did not affect the evidence concerning the robbery, and because self-defense is not an affirmative defense to robbery, Rouster was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to present the expert testimony. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. As Rouster was not prejudiced by this failure, the Indiana Supreme Court’s application of Strickland was reasonable. See United States ex rel. Bell v. Pierson, 267 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding state court’s application of Strickland reasonable where evidence that counsel failed to present would not have overcome overwhelming evidence of guilt). Finally, Rouster argues that the Indiana Supreme Court’s reliance on Indiana law stating that self-defense is not an affirmative defense to felony murder is contrary to and an unreasonable application of Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1019 (1967) and its progeny./16 See Williams, 529 U.S at 405-06. However, Rouster cannot succeed on this claim. In that case, the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants had the fundamental right to present [their] own witness[es] to establish a defense. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19. That case dealt with a defendant’s generalized right to present a defense--a right to his day in court. Id. at 18. Rouster confuses this right with the purported right to have a state recognize any particular affirmative defense that a defendant wishes to raise. No such right exists and we reject Rouster’s final claim.