Opinion ID: 2594572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Holding Ex Parte Hearings on Reasons for Peremptory Challenges

Text: Three times, and with respect to seven prospective jurors, defendant argued that the prosecutor was exercising peremptory challenges to jury panelists on the basis of their race or ethnicity. Such an action would, of course, be improper. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.) The trial court asked the prosecution to explain its reasons for the challenges. After the prosecutor said he did not wish to reveal his strategy, the court declared that it planned to hold an ex parte hearing from which defendant and his counsel would be excluded. Defense counsel stated that he had no objection to being excluded from discussions of strategy, but that I think I am entitled to be present otherwise, in case the prosecution's statement is a misstatement of the facts and to make sure the record is clear as to what the statement of facts is. The court held three ex parte hearings, and ruled each time that the prosecutor was not challenging jury panelists because of race or ethnicity. At issue here is the propriety of the hearings at which the court reached its decisions. Under Wheeler, there is a presumption that a prosecutor uses his peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner. [Citation.] The defendant bears the burden to show, prima facie, the presence of purposeful discrimination. [Citation.] If he succeeds, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to show its absence. ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 193, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) The details of the procedure for conducting an inquiry on a claim of improper group bias against prospective jurors are well known. In the first step of the three-part Wheeler inquiry, `[i]f a party believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of group bias alone, he must raise the point in timely fashion and make a prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. First, ... he should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood [or reasonable inference] that such persons are being challenged because of their group association ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1187-1188, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) Next, the burden shifts to the challenged party to provide a race-neutral explanation for the exercise of peremptory challenges. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1284, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) At the third step of the Wheeler challenge processthe determination by the trial court whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge has proved purposeful racial discriminationthe trial court must consider at least two possibilities. If the prosecutor acknowledges that he challenged a prospective juror for an impermissible reason (see U.S. v. Thompson (9th Cir.1987) 827 F.2d 1254, 1256, fn. 1), then, of course, the Wheeler motion must be granted. If the prosecutor does not so state, but instead offers the court race-neutral reasons, it must still determine whether those stated reasons are untrue and pretextual. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Provided that the inquiry proceeds within the general framework just articulated, no particular procedures are constitutionally required. As the United States Supreme Court said of Batson hearings, It remains for the trial courts to develop rules, without unnecessary disruption of the jury selection process, to permit legitimate and well-founded objections to the use of peremptory challenges as a mask for race prejudice. ( Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411.) The response of courts across the country has created a rather wide spectrum, ranging from those that recommend an adversary proceeding of some type to those that permit the prosecutor's explanation to be received in camera and ex parte. ( Gray v. State (1989) 317 Md. 250, 257, 562 A.2d 1278, 1281.) Preliminarily, we review for an abuse of discretion the trial court's implicit rulings that the prosecution presented matters of strategy that justified ex parte hearings during challenges on Wheeler grounds. At the end of the first ex parte hearing, the trial court implied, and implicitly found, that the prosecutor had divulge[d] certainly to some extent prosecution strategy in terms of jury selection. During the second and third hearings, the court impliedly so ruled again, ordering, without prompting from the prosecutor, that the proceedings be sealed. In the first and second hearings, the prosecutor said that he was disposed to challenge prospective jurors who were unable to express themselves well, or who appeared to be nonconformist. (See People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 275, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 [peremptory challenge may be exercised against one whose clothes or hair length suggest an unconventional lifestyle].) In sum, he was simply giving the reasons for his challenges, reasons that defendant was entitled to hear and that disclosed no secrets of trial strategy. It was unreasonable to exclude defendant from those hearings. At the third hearing, the prosecution mentioned its 10-point rating system for prospective jurors, a rating given by a three-person committee including a psychologist, and the prosecutor discussed individual committee members' ratings of various prospective jurors. Even so, he was not divulging strategic information that defendant could use to his advantage at trialhe was merely describing the prosecution's system of jury selection, a process to which defendant was a passive bystander. Given that no matters of trial strategy were revealed, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in implicitly or explicitly ruling that they were. The next question is whether it was error to exclude defendant from participating in the hearings on his Wheeler motions. We conclude that, as a matter of state law, it was. As a general matter, ex parte proceedings are disfavored. (See generally NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 778, 980 P.2d 337 [excluding public from proceedings]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 402, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221 [ex parte communications with jurors]; People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 1014, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153 (cone, and dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Two basic defects are typical of ex parte proceedings. The first is a shortage of factual and legal contentions. Not only are facts and law from the defendant lacking, but the moving party's own presentation is often abbreviated because no challenge from the defendant is anticipated at this point in the proceeding. The deficiency is frequently crucial, as reasonably adequate factual and legal contentions from diverse perspectives can be essential to the court's initial decision.... ( United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Court (1975) 14 Cal.3d 902, 908, 122 Cal. Rptr. 877, 537 P.2d 1237.) Ex parte proceedings following a Wheeler motion may create similar problems and, in the main, it is error to conduct them. In the rare case in which the explanation for a challenge would entail confidential communications or reveal trial strategy, an in camera discussion can be arranged. ( Georgia v. McCollum (1992) 505 U.S. 42, 58, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33.) This, however, is not such a case. The question whether ex parte communications are proper in ruling on a Wheeler motion has not arisen in California decisional law. But the same or closely related issues have arisen in federal and other state cases discussing analogous motions brought under Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. While some decisions have tolerated an ex parte Batson hearing procedure on the ground that the United States Constitution permits it ( U.S. v. Tucker (7th Cir.1988) 836 F.2d 334, 340; U.S. v. Davis (6th Cir.1987) 809 F.2d 1194, 1202), it seems to be almost universally recognized that ex parte proceedings following a motion regarding peremptory challenges allegedly made on the basis of improper group bias are poor procedure and should not be conducted unless compelling reasons justify them. ( People v. Hameed (1996) 88 N.Y.2d 232, 237-238, 644 N.Y.S.2d 466, 469, 666 N.E.2d 1339, 1342; U.S. v. Roan Eagle (8th Cir.1989) 867 F.2d 436, 441; Gray v. State, supra, 317 Md. 250, 257-258, 562 A.2d 1278, 1282; U.S. v. Tindle (4th Cir.1988) 860 F.2d 125, 132-133 (cone. & dis. opn. of Murnaghan, J.); U.S. v. Garrison (4th Cir.1988) 849 F.2d 103, 106; U.S. v. Tucker, supra, 836 F.2d at p. 340; U.S. v. Gordon (11th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 1538; Goode v. Shoukfeh (Tex.1997) 943 S.W.2d 441, 452 [civil case].) We agree. U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, presented the issue and the countervailing values involved: The question presented to us is ... whether the district judge erred by permitting the [prosecutor] to state her reasons to him ex parte and then ruling on the objection without divulging the reasons to defense counsel. In resolving this issue we must consider and reconcile two fundamental principles of our criminal justice system. The first is that the district judge has broad discretion to fashion and guide the procedures to be followed in cases before him. [Citations.] The second principle is that adversary proceedings are the norm in our system of criminal justice, [citation], and ex parte proceedings the disfavored exception. ( Id. at p. 1257.) U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, further explained: The right of a criminal defendant to an adversary proceeding is fundamental to our system of justice. [Citations.] This includes the right to be personally present and to be represented by counsel at critical stages during the course of the prosecution. [Citation.] This is not mere idle formalism. Our system is grounded on the notion that truth will most likely be served if the decision-makerjudge or juryhas the benefit of forceful argument by both sides.... There are, to be sure, occasional departures from this norm. The district judge makes an ex parte review of the prosecution's evidence to determine whether it falls within the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). [Citations.] Also, the district judge normally considers on an ex parte basis whether to reveal to the defense the identity of a government informant. [Citation.] But, as these examples illustrate, situations where the court acts with the benefit of only one side's presentation are uneasy compromises with some overriding necessity, such as the need to act quickly or to keep sensitive information from the opposing party. Absent such compelling justification, ex parte proceedings are anathema in our system of justice and ... may amount to a denial of due process. ( U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, 1258-1259, fn. omitted.) In addition to the foregoing general considerations, it is error in particular to conduct ex parte proceedings on a Wheeler motion because of the risk that defendant's inability to rebut the prosecution's stated reasons will leave the record incomplete. We discuss this problem post, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d at page 546, 6 P.3d at page 206. We turn to the question of prejudice. We have concluded that error occurred under state law, and we have noted Thompson 's suggestion that excluding the defense from a Wheeler -type hearing may amount to a denial of due process. We nonetheless conclude that the error was harmless under state law ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243), and that, if federal error occurred, it, too, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705) as a matter of federal law. On the record before us, we are confident that the challenged jurors were excluded for proper, race-neutral reasons. As mentioned, the ex parte hearings pertained to seven prospective jurors. With respect to Olanders D., the prosecutor stated he had exercised the challenge in part because his questionnaire indicated he opposed the death penalty. The prosecutor acknowledged Olanders D.'s oral statements that his views had changed, but commented that his answers were not totally responsive to the questions of either counsel for the defense or myself. He further stated, in essence, that Olanders D.'s difficulties in communicating led him to question whether he would fit in on the jury. The court disagreed with the latter point, noting, it may well be that he would get along very well with 12 people, but added: I think the other observations of counsel are accurate and borne out by the record. In the ex parte discussion of Galileo S., the prosecutor indicated that on Hovey voir dire ( Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301) to determine his attitudes toward the death penalty, the prospective juror showed that he was a nonconformist person who has had numerous run-ins with the law. We determined through his rap sheets that he has three or four more arrests other than those that he has told us about. Moreover, the prosecutor also asserted that his attitude is such that I think it would create alienation and hostility on the part of the other jurors. The trial court agreed, commenting on Galileo S.'s paranoia ... concerning the justice system. [1] With respect to Barbara S., the prosecutor said that he had assigned her a rating of zero on the prosecution team's 10-point scale, and that the other two reviewers had given her a three and a six. During the questioning process ... I very quickly formed the opinion that there was something wrong with [Barbara S.]. Her responses were extremely slow, and I began to suspect that she was possibly under the influence of drugs. [¶] ... [S]he had ... an empty look in her eyes, ... a lack of really being totally in tune with what was going on. He noted further that her answers did not make sense, that they did not relate to the questions presented. He also commented that Barbara S. appeared somewhat angry when she initially came into court. The trial court disagreed with the last point, interpreting her demeanor as reflecting nervousness rather than hostility. But it concluded that overall it certainly [could not] quarrel with the prosecutor's impressions of Barbara S. or with the peremptory challenge based on her individual characteristics. With respect to Gerardo O., the prosecutor cited in justification of his excusal his difficulties in writing, understanding and reading English. He also mentioned his idiosyncratic dress and demeanor, his evident aloofness from other prospective jurors, and his inability to articulate any opinion about the death penalty. The trial court noted that the record supported the prosecutor's assessment of Gerardo O.'s responses. [2] The prosecutor justified his challenge of George S. on the ground he had served on a jury once before and was the holdout juror, which made the prosecutor feel extremely uneasy. On the prosecution evaluation committee's 10-point scale, the prosecutor had rated George S. about one; the other two members had rated him at one and two. The prosecutor mentioned he thought George S. was Greek (as his surname might suggest), rather than Hispanic, as the defense implied in making the Wheeler motion, but I wasn't paying attention to the racial aspect of the case. The prosecutor offered additional reasons for the challenge: George S. had once applied to be a police officer but was rejected, and the prosecutor feared it might have been for psychological reasons. Further, the prosecutor expressed unease with his Hovey voir dire responses. ( Hovey v. Superior Court, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301.) The trial court confirmed the accuracy of the prosecutor's observations. With respect to Luis M., the prosecutor explained he exercised the challenge because the prospective juror was leery of the death penalty and because he had investigated the case on his own, prior to Hovey voir dire. Luis M. had stated: In my neighborhood ... some people happen to know the accused, and I just questioned a couple of people [about] the character of the [defendant]. Luis M. had also made inquiries regarding the facts of the case. The court stated that the peremptory challenge was proper. With respect to Robert M., the prosecutor reminded the trial court that he had passed on challenges to the jury at one point, leaving Robert M. seated. He stated he had rated Robert M. between a four and a five, while the other prosecutorial reviewers had assigned him ratings of four and five, respectively. He explained that he had determined, before beginning the selection process, that he would prefer not to have jurors who scored five or less, and that he ultimately exercised the challenge because he was skeptical Robert M. could impose the death penalty. The court noted that although Robert M.'s questionnaire indicated he favored the death penalty, his voir dire answers varied to an extent that one might entertain a legitimate concern whether he could impose it, and it agreed that was an appropriate reason for a peremptory challenge. In summary, the record reveals the following facts in support of the view that the prosecutor was not engaged in racial or ethnic discrimination. The court credited the prosecutor's opinions that Olanders D. opposed the death penalty, that Barbara S. was in a dazed state, that George S. had been a holdout juror and had been rejected for a law enforcement position, and that Robert M. was less than desirable from the prosecution's point of view. Galileo S., among other deficiencies, had (unless the prosecutor was misleading the court) not been honest regarding his criminal past. Luis M. admitted that he had investigated the case. Gerardo O. struggled with English and did not understand the proceedings. A prosecution committee, including a psychologist, gave Barbara S., George S., and Robert M. poor or mediocre suitability ratings. George S.'s surname is not obviously Spanish, and the prosecutor stated that he was unaware of his Hispanic heritage. On these facts, we are confident that the prosecutor was not violating Wheeler, and that defense counsel's presence could not have affected the outcome of the Wheeler hearings. [3] Moreover, the trial court's rulings in the ex parte hearing indisputably reflect both its familiarity with the record of voir dire of the challenged prospective jurors and its critical assessment of the prosecutor's proffered justifications. To the extent the rulings expressed agreement with the prosecutor's characterizations of the prospective jurors and their responses, they also support the court's implicit conclusion that the prosecutor did not fabricate his justifications and they were grounded in fact. Defendant argues that the court's error in holding the Wheeler hearings ex parte was prejudicial because his lack of opportunity to rebut the prosecution's justifications for the challenges resulted in an incomplete record. We have agreed that such a result is theoretically possible. It is a reason for our conclusion that holding an ex parte hearing on a Wheeler motion ordinarily is state law error. In particular, defendant maintains that a prosecutor might offer a reason unanticipated by the defense that sounds neutral, but in fact is untrue. His point is this: he is required, in making his prima facie case, to try to anticipate all the justifications the prosecutor may have for peremptorily challenging the prospective juror. But there are some he simply may not be able to anticipate. For example, the prosecutor might declare that he challenged a prospective juror because he silently mouthed an obscenity toward the prosecution table during voir dire. Defense counsel might not have noticed that act. But having been apprised of it, they could point out that other unchallenged prospective jurors did the same thing, that the prosecutor saw them do it, that those prospective jurors were not in a protected group, and that he did not peremptorily challenge them. (Accord, U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260.) Although such a possibility exists in the abstract, nothing suggests that something similar occurred here. Rather, the trial court heard the criteria the prosecutor articulatedcriteria furnishing reasons for the challenges that were, at a minimum, plausible, and that the record often supportsand expressly agreed that each of the excusals was proper. It impliedly found the prosecutor's stated justifications to be honest. We will not reverse the judgment on the basis of speculation regarding theoretical possibilities of the type discussed above. A second concern, voiced by the Thompson majority, was that a prosecutor might offer a reason that is legally improper i.e., the product of impermissible group biasbut that the trial court overlooks. ( U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, 1260.) That was the case in People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216, 242 Cal. Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452, in which the trial court admitted that it was unfamiliar with Wheeler ( Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 224, 226, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452) even though [v]oir dire occurred ... several years after Wheeler was filed. ( Id. at p. 224, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452.) In this case, however, the court was thoroughly familiar with Wheeler and the requirements that case imposed. We have now reviewed the records of two cases tried by this superior court judge in respect of the same crimes: defendant's and Ronaldo Ayala's ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682). In both, the trial judge showed himself to be in command of the law and the facts. He was diligent, prepared, knowledgeable, and engaged in the proceedings, including those relating to defendant's Wheeler motion. The concern voiced in Thompson, though real in the abstract and bearing fruit in People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d 216, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452, is of no moment in this case. Thompson, supra, 827 F.2d 1254, is distinguishable in additional respects from this case. First, the Thompson majority, observing that all it had before it concerning the propriety of the challenges was the prosecutor's explanation of her reasons and the district judge's ruling, professed itself unable to place confidence in the latter in the face of the record's [un]reassuring silence. ( Id. at p. 1261.) Here, by contrast, the record, even if not as complete as it might have been had defendant participated in the ex parte hearings, is well developed. In particular, the trial court's remarks constitute a valuable assessment of the prosecutor's justifications. Second, the Thompson majority noted that in attempting to justify one of her challenges, the prosecutor cited the fact that the prospective juror and defendant were both Black. ( Id. at p. 1260; see id. at p. 1256, fn. 1.) As the Thompson majority correctly observed, the fact that the potential juror might identify too much with the defendant because they are of the same race is precisely what Batson said [is] not legitimate. ( Id. at p. 1260.) A reviewing court might well entertain a reasonable doubt regarding the propriety of the challenge on such a record. But nothing comparable appears in the record before us. In sum, when a trial court decides to hold a Wheeler hearing, it is possible, in the abstract, that the defense's contribution might make a difference in the ultimate ruling, which is why Wheeler hearings generally should be adversarial. On this well-developed record, however, we are confident that defense counsel could not have argued anything substantial that would have changed the court's rulings. Accordingly, the error was harmless. Defendant also contends that the error violated his rights to be present and to be represented by counsel as guaranteed by the state and federal Constitutions and by California statutory law. (See U.S. Const, 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const, art. I, § 15; Pen.Code, §§ 977, subd. (b), 1043, subd. (a); People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741-742, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) And he claims violations of rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We need not address these contentions in detail, for our analysis shows that the erroneous exclusion of the defense from the Wheeler hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the federal constitutional standard of Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, and also harmless under the state law standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243. (Cf. Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 U.S. 114, 118-119, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 ( per curiam ) [assuming the trial court's erroneous ex parte communications with juror implicated the defendant's federal constitutional rights to presence and to counsel, the error was harmless]; People v. Wright, supra, 52 Cal.3d 367, 402-403, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221 [same]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 849-850, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 (lead opn.), disapproved on another ground in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 836, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865 [temporary absence of counsel during jury deliberations assessed under harmless error standard]; People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 128, 132-133,164 Cal.Rptr. 96 [same].)