Opinion ID: 3010362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d at 1115 (Zappala, J., dissenting).

Text: 7 expressly, or in strict liability cases. Id. at 1113 n.10. The Howell plurality decided, however, that because it is desirable to preserve the public policy behind assumption of risk . . . but to the extent possible, remove the difficulties of application of the doctrine and the conflicts which exist with our comparative negligence statute, to the extent that an assumption of risk analysis is appropriate in any given case, it shall be applied by the court as part of the duty analysis, and not as part of the case to be determined by the jury. Id. at 1112-13. The court went on to hold that a court may determine that no duty exists only if reasonable minds could not disagree that the plaintiff deliberately and with the awareness of specific risks inherent in the activity nonetheless engaged in the activity that produced his injury. Id. at 1113. Under both Carrender and Howell, the assumption of risk analysis is incorporated into the duty analysis. Even though the Howell court was unable to get majority support for this principle, this approach found in Carrender and Howell is our best prediction of how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would analyze this case. Carrender is the most recent Supreme Court decision commanding a majority of justices. Therefore, it is Kaplan's burden to establish that Exxon had a duty here, and not Exxon's burden to prove Kaplan assumed the risk of her injury. Under Carrender, this issue goes to the jury unless reasonable minds could not disagree. Carrender, 469 A.2d at 124.4 _________________________________________________________________ 4. The approaches in Howell and Carrender are similar, except that Howell held the duty/assumption of risk issue is a question of law for the court: [Our] approach preserves the public policy behind the [assumption of risk] doctrine while at the same time alleviating the difficulty of instructing a jury on voluntariness, knowledge, and scope of the risk. Under this approach the court may determine that no duty exists only if reasonable minds could not disagree that the plaintiff deliberately and with the awareness of specific risks inherent in the activity nonetheless engaged in the activity that produced his injury. Under those facts, the court would determine that the defendant, as a matter of law, owed plaintiff no duty of care. 8 Exxon had no duty to Kaplan if she discover[ed] dangerous conditions which [were] both obvious and _________________________________________________________________ If, on the other hand, the court is not able to make this determination and a nonsuit is denied, then the case would proceed and would be submitted to the jury on a comparative negligence theory. Under this approach, . . . assumption of the risk would no longer be part of the jury's deliberations or instructions. Howell, 620 A.2d at 1113. This approach has much to commend it. But Howell was only a plurality ruling and therefore does not displace the prior majority ruling in Carrender that the duty/assumption of risk issue goes to the jury. Williams v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 687 A.2d 428, 483 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (plurality opinion of state supreme court not binding precedent). Nonetheless, when a jury applies the law as stated in Carrender and decides defendant owed a duty to plaintiff, we assume it must thereafter (as explained in Howell) apply the comparative negligence statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 7102(a). See Carrender, 469 A.2d at 125 (recognizing the overlap between the doctrines of assumption of risk and comparative negligence, and stating, For fault to be apportioned under the comparative negligence statute, there must be . . . a breach of duty by the defendant to the plaintiff . . . . Whatever the effect of the adoption of a system of comparative fault on the defense of assumption of risk where that defense overlaps and coincides with contributory negligence, the adoption of such a system has no effect where, as here, the legal consequence of the invitee's assumption of a known and avoidable risk is that the possessor of land is relieved of a duty of care to the invitee.). As the Civil Instructions Subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Committee for Proposed Standard Jury Instructions noted, Pennsylvania courts have held the Comparative Negligence Act would still apply where the underlying conduct of a plaintiff amounted to negligence, even though it may not have amounted to the more culpable conduct of actual assumption of risk. Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions S 3.03A (Subcommittee Note on Assumption of Risk) (1991) (citing Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 542 A.2d 525 (1988)). See also Victor E. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence S9-4(b), at n.100 (3d ed. Supp. 1996). We note this case would appear to be a good example of the type of assumption of risk which is better viewed as contributory negligence. The plaintiff has exposed herself to risk of future harm but has not consented to relieve the defendant of a future duty to act with reasonable care. Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 485 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). In cases like this one, it would appear that the comparative negligence approach is the better one. 9 avoidable, and nevertheless proceed[ed] voluntarily to encounter them. Carrender, 469 A.2d at 125. We agree with the district court that the snow mound was a known and obvious risk. But we do not agree that Kaplan acted voluntarily as a matter of law when she crossed over the snow mound. A plaintiff voluntarily confronts a danger only where there is a real choice involved, Howell, 620 A.2d at 1112, i.e. a safe alternative to encountering the risk. Prosser and Keeton on Torts S 68, at 490-91 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (no assumption of risk where plaintiff has no reasonable alternative.). The district court held there was such a safe alternative here, relying on its view that [i]t was [Kaplan's] own idea to cross there as opposed to at a nearby, safe location. Kaplan, 926 F. Supp. at 62. But a jury could find there was no safe alternative route to the bus, because entering the street by the fire hydrant would have required Kaplan to walk a distance back towards the bus stop in an icy street with traffic. Moreover, to avoid having to stand in the street (its roadway narrowed by ice and snow), she would have had to visualize the arriving bus and time her round-about traverse to the bus stop with some precision. Indeed, Kaplan testified at her deposition that she thought the bus would leave without her if she walked away from the bus stop towards the hydrant. If Kaplan had no reasonable alternative to climbing the snow mound, then a jury could find she did not act voluntarily and therefore did not assume the risk of injury. Because reasonable minds could disagree whether Kaplan's actions were truly voluntary, we will vacate the grant of summary judgment on this ground.