Opinion ID: 1291021
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michael Grube's Death

Text: Huff claims that the district court erroneously excluded evidence that, 20 months after Silva died, Wenell killed Michael Grube in a manner that resembled the way Silva was killed. In February of 1998, Grube was found dead in a Duluth motel room. Grube was the former boyfriend of Tamara Bluefog. At Huff's trial, Bluefog testified that she had been in a romantic relationship with Wenell from 1991 to 1993. According to Bluefog, when she attempted to end the relationship, Wenell stalked and threatened her, and was particularly angry that Bluefog had entered a relationship with a man. The day Grube died, he had been seen drinking with Wenell. Wenell rented the motel room in which his body was found, and Maria  the name by which Wenell referred to Silva  was written backward in soap on the motel room mirror in what appeared to be a woman's handwriting  and a heart was drawn beneath the name. DNA testing revealed that Grube's blood was on footwear Wenell was wearing the day of his death. [5] Two autopsies were performed on Grube's body, and both pathologists testified as part of Huff's offer of proof regarding similarities between Silva's and Grube's deaths. The pathologists agreed that Grube was severely intoxicated at the time he died and that he had sustained multiple soft tissue injuries about the head and face. The first pathologist to examine Grube's body, Dr. Zlonis, testified that Grube's neck showed no signs of manual strangulation and that his hyoid bone was intact when he examined Grube. Zlonis stated that he cut the hyoid bone during his examination. Zlonis concluded that, although it was possible another person had contributed to Grube's death, it was not a definite homicide. The second pathologist, Dr. McGee, agreed that there were no signs of manual strangulation on Grube's neck, but concluded that Grube's death was a homicide caused by asphyxia with multiple soft tissue injuries due to an assault, and noted acute ethanol intoxication. Huff argues that the district court's exclusion of evidence that Wenell killed Grube under circumstances sufficiently similar to the death of Silva denied him of a right to present a complete defense. According to Huff, although the deaths of Silva and Grube were not identical as to time or location, they were similar in terms of modus operandi. Huff asserts that the proffered evidence that Wenell was responsible for Grube's murder compellingly demonstrates that Wenell was an extremely jealous lover who was willing to inflict bodily harm on whomever caused her emotional pain. Huff argues that because the evidence that Wenell had killed Grube would have cast reasonable doubt on Huff's guilt, the court's failure to admit the evidence was prejudicial and entitles him to a new trial. As noted earlier, the district court concluded that Huff had laid a proper Hawkins foundation establishing that Wenell was connected to Silva's death. Having met this threshold requirement, Huff then needed to show (1) by clear and convincing evidence that Wenell killed Grube; (2) that Wenell's killing of Grube was relevant and material to Huff's case; and (3) that the probative value of evidence that Wenell killed Grube outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice. Jones, 678 N.W.2d at 16-17. In determining the admissibility of evidence that Wenell killed Grube, the district court found for purposes of the analysis that Huff had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Grube's death was a homicide, and that it resulted at least in part from asphyxia resulting from violent acts perpetrated upon him by another human being. However, the court stated that [t]here is no evidence yet proffered from which the Court can conclude it is `highly probable' or established by `clear and convincing evidence' that [Grube] died of manual strangulation. The court then stated that it presumed for purposes of the analysis that it is `highly probable' it was Faye Wennel [sic] who inflicted the trauma to Mr. Grube and that the circumstances are highly suggestive that Wennel [sic] played a part in causing his death. We infer from the court's use of the word presumed that, although the court had not found that clear and convincing evidence established that Wenell killed Grube, the court wished to make clear that the proffer did not meet the second and third reverse- Spreigl requirements. In evaluating whether evidence that Wenell may have killed Grube was relevant and material to Huff's case, the court stated that Wenell's alleged motive for killing Silva  jealous rage aimed at a former lover who had spurned her  could not be meaningfully connected to a motive for killing Grube, as Grube was not Wenell's former lover and he had not recently spurned her. Accordingly, the court concluded that Wenell's possible involvement in Grube's death was not relevant to Huff's case. The court also rejected Huff's assertion that the circumstances surrounding Grube's death were sufficiently similar to Silva's death to establish a signature crime, noting that, despite certain similarities, circumstances of each death were dissimilar in several ways: As to similarities, both occurred in a room with a bed, involved use of force applied manually, resulted at least in part from asphyxia, occurred in a setting where feces were left nearby, involved decedents whose remains were left on their backs covered by cloth items, involved trauma to body regions at and above neck level, involved persons known to Wenel [sic], occurred in locations somewhat near one another geographically, and had as victims persons of brown skinned origin   . [However,] [o]ne was in the victim's home while one was not. One involved a female, the other a male. One was found on the floor, one on a bed. One was clothed; one was not. One was strangled; one was not. One had been drinking; one had not. One had been severely beaten about the face, and as far as can be told, one had not. One had rib fractures; the other did not. One was smeared with feces; one was not. One was covered with bed coverings, the other with a clothing item though bed covering items were close at hand. The door to the room where one was found was locked, the door to the room where the other was found was not. The scene where one was found showed signs of a struggle while the other scene did not. While writing was found on a mirror at one scene, none was present at the other. While one scene was abandoned in a somewhat methodical fashion    the scene [where Grube was left] seems to have been more carelessly abandoned   . Given the differences between the deaths, the court concluded that evidence that Wenell killed Grube simply falls outside the penumbra of circumstances sufficiently similar to those of the death of Silva to be relevant, material and useful to the jury. Further, the court stated that it could not conclude the prejudice to a fair and evenhanded presentation of the facts for determination by the trier of fact will be balanced, let alone outweighed, by the benefit to be derived by defendant. We must determine whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that evidence that Wenell killed Grube was not relevant and material to Huff's case and that the evidence's probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Amos, 658 N.W.2d at 203; Minn. R. Evid. 403. First, we note that the record establishes that the district court approached Huff's proffer regarding the Grube murder with careful deliberation. The court withheld judgment on the issue until the state had rested its case, then heard testimony from two pathologists who examined Grube's body and issued a thorough, detailed memorandum explaining the reasons for excluding the evidence. Having reviewed the record, Huff's offer of proof, and the court's memorandum, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Huff's proffer that Wenell killed Grube under circumstances similar to Silva's death. The following dissimilarities between the deaths of Grube and Silva strike us as particularly significant. First, it does not appear that Huff sought to offer any evidence that Wenell was upset about Bluefog's relationship with Grube in 1998, 5 years after Wenell and Bluefog parted ways. Thus, although the record indicates that Wenell was angry about Silva's relationship with Huff near the time that Silva died, there is no indication that Wenell carried lingering resentment regarding her breakup with Bluefog 5 years earlier. To the contrary, the evidence that Wenell and Grube spent a large part of the day drinking together suggests that Wenell had no general animosity toward Grube. Next, although there was no question that Silva was manually strangled, Grube's hyoid bone was intact during the first autopsy and his neck showed no signs of manual strangulation. Huff argues that the two deaths were strikingly similar because feces were found in the room adjacent to Silva's body and feces were smeared on Grube's clothing. Huff suggests that the feces in Silva's apartment could have been left as a signature by Wenell. It is true that the police search of Silva's apartment showed the carpet in the bedroom next to where Silva's body was discovered had been stained by feces. But police did not test for DNA the feces either in Silva's apartment or on Grube's clothing, so neither could be identified as Wenell's. More importantly, Huff confirmed in his own testimony that the fecal staining of the carpet in Silva's apartment had been caused by Silva when she had a seizure in May, and that neither he nor Silva had cleaned the carpet. Accordingly, Huff's argument that the feces were a signature attributable to Wenell cannot be reconciled with Huff's familiarity with the precise location of the feces in the apartment and his explanation of their origin. Given the dissimilarities between Grube's death and Silva's death, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Wenell's involvement in Grube's death.