Opinion ID: 1358031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Use of Emergency Procurement

Text: Sloan argues there was no sudden emergency which justified the DOT's use of a negotiated contract. We agree. Contracts for the construction, maintenance, and repair of highways and roads are specifically exempted from the South Carolina Consolidated Procurement Code (Procurement Code). See S.C.Code Ann. § 11-35-710 (Supp.2007). The procurement of construction contracts for the state highway system is governed by the following statute: Awards by the department of construction contracts for ten thousand dollars and more shall be made only after the work to be awarded has been advertised for at least two weeks in one or more daily newspapers in this State, but where circumstances warrant, the department may advertise for longer periods of time and in other publication media. Awards of contracts, if made, shall be made in each case to the lowest qualified bidder whose bid shall have been formally submitted in accordance with the requirements of the department. However, in cases of emergencies, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Department of Transportation, the department, without formalities of advertising, may employ contractors and others to perform construction or repair work or furnish materials and supplies for such construction and repair work, but all such cases of this kind shall be reported in detail and made public at the next succeeding meeting of the commission. S.C.Code Ann. § 57-5-1620 (Supp.2007) (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to section 57-5-1620, the general rule regarding contracts for $10,000 or more is that the work must be advertised for at least two weeks, and then the lowest qualified bidder must be chosen. The only exception is in cases of emergencies, as ... determined by the Secretary [8] of the Department of Transportation. The DOT contends the emergency procurement was proper because the statute requires only that the DOT Director determine that an emergency exists and the contract be made public at the next DOT Commission meeting. Because those requirements were met in this case, the DOT argues it properly complied with section 57-5-1620. Furthermore, the DOT asserts that because section 57-5-1620 does not limit what can constitute an emergency, the Director's determination is discretionary. Because the alternative to using the emergency procurement provision would have been to leave the construction project unfinishedand therefore a dangerous work zonefor four to six months, the DOT argues the facts of this case properly support its decision. Sloan, on the other hand, argues that under the plain meaning of emergency, there was no emergency in this case because the delays and safety hazards were present throughout the first four years of the project. Sloan also suggests the following definitions under the Procurement Code and its regulations are instructive, and that the instant case would not meet either definition. The Procurement Code includes the following section on emergency procurements: Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the chief procurement officer, the head of a purchasing agency, or a designee of either officer may make or authorize others to make emergency procurements only when there exists an immediate threat to public health, welfare, critical economy and efficiency, or safety under emergency conditions as defined in regulations promulgated by the board; and provided, that such emergency procurements shall be made with as much competition as is practicable under the circumstances. A written determination of the basis for the emergency and for the selection of the particular contractor shall be included in the contract file. S.C.Code Ann. § 11-35-1570 (Supp.2007) (emphasis added). In addition, the Procurement Code's regulations provide the following definition of emergency: An emergency condition is a situation which creates a threat to public health, welfare, or safety such as may arise by reason of floods, epidemics, riots, equipment failures, fire loss, or such other reason as may be proclaimed by either the Chief Procurement Officer or the head of a purchasing agency or a designee of either office. The existence of such conditions must create an immediate and serious need for supplies, services, information technology, or construction that cannot be met through normal procurement methods and the lack of which would seriously threaten: (1) the functioning of State government; (2) the preservation or protection of property; or (3) the health or safety of any person. S.C.Code Ann. Regs. § 19-445.2110 (Supp.2007). We agree that these definitions provide useful guidance, in a procurement setting, as to what constitutes an emergency. Moreover, we find that the plain meaning of emergency also provides a guideline for interpreting section 57-5-1620. See e.g., Key Corp. Capital, Inc. v. County of Beaufort, 373 S.C. 55, 59, 644 S.E.2d 675, 677 (2007) (where a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, the court has no right to impose another meaning); Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498-99, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007) (When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning.). An emergency is, by its very nature, a sudden, unexpected onset of a serious condition. See The American Heritage Dictionary 448 (2nd College ed.1982) (emergency defined as [a]n unexpected situation or sudden occurrence of a serious and urgent nature that demands immediate action); Black's Law Dictionary 361 (6th ed.1991) (defining emergency as [a] sudden unexpected happening; an unforeseen occurrence or condition; ... a sudden or unexpected occasion for action). Here, there was a five-mile construction zone which, according to the DOT, had safety concerns. These hazards, however, had existed throughout the course of the construction project and likely would have been present to some degree in any major construction project of this type. Put simply, these safety concerns did not appear unexpectedly in September 2004 thereby suddenly creating a public safety risk. Furthermore, the record reflects that any urgency felt by the DOT was, in large part, due to the delays on the project and the resultant frustration by the affected community. These factual circumstances, however, do not constitute an emergency under section 57-5-1620, as that plain and ordinary term was likely intended by the Legislature. See e.g., Key Corp. Capital, Inc., supra ; Sloan v. Hardee, supra . [9] We hold there was no emergency that existed in September 2004 to substantiate the emergency procurement authorized by the DOT. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in finding that the DOT complied with the emergency procurement provision found in section 57-5-1620.