Opinion ID: 2611931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Certiorari as Access

Text: The General Assembly created a substantive right to workers' compensation, see sections 8-40-101 through 8-47-209, 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), and Allison accrued rights pursuant to the statutes. Therefore, Allison is entitled under article II, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution to judicial review on the merits of the ICAO's decision. The questions before us are what procedures are necessary to protect Allison's right to access to the courts and to guarantee that the courts are available to effectuate Allison's statutory rights, and whether the discretionary decision to grant certiorari review by the court of appeals pursuant to section 8-43-307 satisfies the state constitutional requirement for judicial review of the ICAO's decision on the merits. Article II, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution provides that the courts of justice shall be open. The phrasing of this mandate in the terms of shall provides a mandatory constitutional right to judicial consideration of accrued rights. See Hernandez v. District Court, 814 P.2d 379, 381 (Colo.1991) ([T]he word `shall' ... involves a `mandatory connotation' and hence is the antithesis of discretion or choice.) (quoting People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987)). The discretionary nature of the decision to grant certiorari review pursuant to C.A.R. 46(a) belies the mandatory nature of article II, section 6. Review of a certiorari petition is not sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement of access to the courts which mandates review on the merits. The right of review guaranteed by the right of access to the courts, therefore, means a review on the merits. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378, 91 S.Ct. at 786 (What the Constitution does require is `an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' ... `for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.') (citations omitted). Certiorari to the court of appeals is not a review on the merits and merely determines that the case is not properly postured for review. See Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917-20, 70 S.Ct. 252, 254-56, 94 L.Ed. 562 (1950) (holding that the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari does not support the conclusion that either the majority or the dissent at the prior levels correctly applied the law). The right of access to the courts is not satisfied by discretionary review by the court of appeals of an ICAO decision on certiorari. The respondents assert that a purely discretionary decision to grant certiorari satisfies the requirements of article II, section 6 and cite Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970), to support their contention. In Bill Dreiling, we held that an appeal of right to the Colorado Supreme Court was not required to provide appellate review of a district court judgment: There is no question that certiorari is now, and always has been, a recognized form of appellate review. Indeed, under the common law, the only comparable types of review available were by writ of error, writ of false judgment, or writ of certiorari.... Certiorari is presently recognized as a form of appellate review.... Other courts have agreed with this. .... The petitioner contends that certiorari is not a writ of right. This argument begs the question of whether our procedure contravenes the constitutional provisions. The petition provided in the Colorado Appellate Rules for a writ of certiorari is an application of right. The study by this court of that petition and of the record on appeal to determine whether to grant or deny the petition constitutes a review. As to petitions for certiorari which are denied, we hold that this review is appellate review as that term is used in the Colorado constitution. Bill Dreiling, 171 Colo. at 452-53, 468 P.2d at 39-40 (citations omitted). Our holding in Bill Dreiling is not dispositive of this case. Bill Dreiling involved an issue of appellate review, not access to the courts and thus involved article VI, section 2(2), and not article II, section 6. [12] Additionally, the statutes being challenged in Bill Dreiling provided petitioner with one appeal of right to the court of appeals. Bill Dreiling initially brought an action in state district court as a matter of right and was guaranteed access to two state courtsthe court of appeals and the district court. Thus, while Bill Dreiling stated that certiorari review is appellate review, it did not hold that certiorari review constitutes judicial review on the merits. Therefore, certiorari review does not provide a litigant with access to the courts. In this case, section 8-43-307 eliminated the mandatory access to obtain a determination of the right to workers' compensation in a judicial forum. After initially adjudicating his claim before a hearing officer, Allison was only granted an appeal to the ICAO. Following the administrative hearing, Allison was not entitled to a determination from a judicial forum on the merits of his claim pursuant to section 8-43-307. Although a litigant may file a petition for certiorari review with the court of appeals, the court of appeals may reject the petition without making any ruling on the merits. The effect of section 8-43-307 and C.A.R. 46(a) is that the court of appeals need not make any ruling concerning a decision of the ICAO. Moreover, because no other court has any obligation to rule on the validity of the ICAO decisions in workers' compensation cases, such decisions can become final without a state court determination that they are valid. Certiorari does not constitute a meaningful opportunity to be heard in this case. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 377, 91 S.Ct. at 785 (stating that due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard). A denial of certiorari only means that the case is not properly postured for review and does not reflect on the merits of the petition. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 917-18, 70 S.Ct. at 254-55. Under section 8-43-307, an administrative agency is given final authority to determine a claimant's entitlement to workers' compensation. [13] Finally, the need for providing judicial review on the merits of agency decisions is clear: specialized administrative tribunals, although efficient, are not always as willing or able as state courts to protect individual rights. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1111, 1147-53 (1990) (describing shortcomings of specialized judges as instruments of control over administrative action); Richard Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S.Cal. L.Rev. 761, 777-89 (1983) (same); Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw.U.L.Rev. 745, 748 (1981) (noting that adjudication by specialized tribunals is marred by insularity and less searching scrutiny of arguments). Specialized tribunals may be affected by narrow administrative concerns, may be less independent from the political process and political pressures, and may be less aware of the general principles of law than courts of law with general jurisdiction. Posner, 56 S.Cal.L.Rev. at 777-89. Therefore, judicial review on the merits of the decisions of the ICAO is required to protect an individual's constitutional right to access to the courts embodied in article II, section 6 of the Colorado Constitution. [14]