Opinion ID: 1404376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Navarros Are Class Members Eligible for Relief

Text: The settlement agreement defines class members eligible for relief as: individuals for whom the Immigration Judge either reserved a decision, or scheduled a merits hearing on a suspension application under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 244 (as such section existed in 1996, before amendment by IIRIRA), between February 13, 1997 and April 1, 1997, and the hearing was continued until after April 1, 1997 (other than where all three of the following are present: the continuance was at the request of the alien, the alien was represented by an attorney, and the transcript of the hearing was prepared following an appeal, and makes clear which party requested the continuance), and . . . (iv) a decision was issued denying or pretermitting suspension based on IIRIRA § 309(c)(5), the appeal was filed, and the BIA denied the appeal based on IIRIRA § 309(c)(5) (irrespective of whether further relief was pursued in federal court, or whether a motion to reopen was subsequently filed with the BIA). Barahona-Gomez II, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1031-32. This definition can be broken down into two requirements: First, the IJ must have (a) either reserved a decision or scheduled a merits hearing on a suspension application between February 13, 1997 and April 1, 1997, and (b) continued the hearing until after April 1, 1997. Second, the application for suspension must have been denied on the basis of the stop-clock rule. The parties agree that the Navarros' applications for suspension of deportation were denied on the basis of the stop-clock rule. Consequently, the Navarros satisfy the second requirement. Both parts of the first requirement, however, require further analysis.
The parties disagree about what it means to say that the IJ scheduled a merits hearing between February 13, 1997, and April 1, 1997. The Navarros argue that the clause requires that the IJ undertook the act of setting the hearing between February 13 and April 1. The Government, in contrast, argues that to meet this requirement, the IJ must have scheduled the hearing to take place between February 13 and April 1. [4] Because the interpretation of this settlement agreement is governed by California contract law, see Sotelo, 430 F.3d at 970, we first determine whether the contract language is clear or ambiguous, see Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1254, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 545, 833 P.2d 545 (1992). If the contract language is clear, we give effect to its plain meaning. See id. We believe that the settlement language is ambiguous in that it does not support unambiguously either party's interpretation. To schedule a merits hearing between x and y dates could simply require that the act of scheduling occurred between x and y dates  the interpretation advanced by the Navarros. This reading would be more obvious with the addition of a few words, e.g., stating that the IJ undertake the act of scheduling a merits hearing between x and y dates. On the other hand, the Government's interpretation, that the hearing actually take place between x and y dates, could also be inferred from the language. Like the Navarros' interpretation, the Government's reading would be more readily apparent with the addition of a few words, e.g., it would be more proper to say schedule a merits hearing for a certain period or to take place between x and y dates. The language is reasonably ambiguous and thus the plain meaning of the settlement agreement is not clear. Under California rules of contract law, where contract language is susceptible to multiple interpretations, courts attempt to discern which interpretation the parties intended. See Cal. Civil Code § 1636 (A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful.); see also id. § 1641 (The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.). For the reasons set forth below, we find that the Navarros have the better reading. First, the definition of class members includes those who have had ( or would have had ) suspension of deportation hearings conducted before April 1, 1997. . . . Barahona-Gomez II, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1030-31 (emphasis added). Thus, the definition is not limited to those whose merits hearings took place before April 1, 1997, but also includes those whose hearings were scheduled to have taken place before April 1, 1997, but did not because of a scheduling decision during the operative period by the IJ. Second, the Government's definition does not adequately cover the relevant group. The Barahona-Gomez settlement includes those individuals whose suspension of deportation hearings may have been rescheduled as a result of Chief IJ Creppy's February 11th directive. The Government's definition, in contrast, would include individuals whose hearings were not affected by the Creppy directive. For example, under the Government's definition, class membership would include a petitioner whose hearing was scheduled to take place February 13th. Given that there are generally several weeks between the date that an IJ undertakes the act of scheduling a hearing and the date that the hearing occurs, it is highly unlikely that there was adequate time for an IJ to read the February 11th directive and schedule a hearing to take place only two days later. Rather, the February 13th hearing would likely have been scheduled sometime in December or January, long before Chief IJ Creppy issued his directive. As a practical matter, it is therefore impossible to assume that all of the hearings scheduled to take place between February 13th and April 1st were scheduled as a result of the Creppy directive. Consequently, the Government's definition is inadequate. It is far more reasonable that the February 13th-April 1st period refers to the time period that the IJs undertook the act of rescheduling the suspension of deportation hearings  something that they could do  for purposes of the Barahona-Gomez settlement  only after they had read Chief IJ Creppy's directive. This definition better adheres to the settlement's intention that the class include all those whose hearings were rescheduled as a direct result of Creppy's February 11th directive. [5] Two interpretative canons support our holding that the Navarros' definition is more appropriate. First, we have consistently held that ameliorative immigration laws enacted by the legislature to forestall harsh consequences should be interpreted in an ameliorative fashion. See Akhtar v. Burzynski, 384 F.3d 1193, 1200 (9th Cir.2004). This case involves a settlement reached between immigrants and the government agency charged with interpreting immigration law  an agreement intended to prevent the harsh consequences of a government agency's actions relating to suspension of deportation. Accordingly, that agreement should be interpreted in an ameliorative fashion. Second, because of the harsh consequences that attach to removal of an alien from the United States, we have held that doubts in interpretation should be resolved in favor of the alien. See id. Thus, where the language of the settlement is ambiguous, we resolve doubts in favor of coverage under the settlement. [6] In short, if some IJs read Chief IJ Creppy's directive to encourage delaying suspension of deportation hearings until IIRIRA applied  and it is now impossible to tell why a particular alien's hearing was delayed and whether that hearing could have been completed before April 1, 1997  then a reasonable person would think that the parties attempting to remedy the harm caused by Chief IJ Creppy's memorandum would have provided a remedy to all such aliens. For this reason, we adopt the Navarros' interpretation of the scheduling language. Because, on March 3  a date that falls between February 13 and April 1  the IJ scheduled a merits hearing to be continued to April 1, 1997, we hold that the Navarros meet this part of the definition.
The Government also argues that the Navarros do not qualify as Barahona-Gomez members because their hearing was not continued until after April 1, 1997, but was held on April 1, 1997. This argument is unavailing. The meaning of this phrase is unambiguous, but the language, as memorialized in the written agreement, contradicts the intentions of the parties. IIRIRA's effective date was April 1, 1997  not April 2, 1997. The definition of the class refers to those who had (or would have had ) suspension of deportation hearings conducted before April 1, 1997, Barahona-Gomez II, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1030-31 (emphasis added)  the clear implication being that class members include those who had their hearings April 1, 1997, or later. There is no reason to believe that the parties to the Barahona-Gomez settlement agreement meant to help all aliens whose hearings were continued until after IIRIRA went into effect, except the unfortunate few whose hearings were scheduled to occur on the very first day that IIRIRA became effective. Under contract law, we have the power to reform a contract where, due to mistake, the clear intention of the parties is not reflected in the final agreement. See Hess v. Ford Motor Co., 27 Cal.4th 516, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 41 P.3d 46, 52 (2002); 1 Witkins' Summary of California Law, Contracts § 276 (10th ed. 2005) (Where the parties come to an agreement, but by mistake (or fraud) the written instrument does not express their agreement correctly, it may be reformed or revised on the application of the party aggrieved. . . .). Here, it appears that there was a mistake in reducing the agreement to written form. Consequently, we read the settlement language as continued until April 1, 1997, or after. This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the Barahona-Gomez settlement. See Sotelo, 430 F.3d at 972. The settlement remedy is simply the opportunity for eligible class members to have their applications for suspension of deportation heard under the law which would, but for the improper delay, have governed their cases. See Barahona-Gomez II, 243 F.Supp.2d at 1033.