Opinion ID: 1672761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Motion to Produce Documentary Evidence.

Text: Defendant was arraigned May 11, 1981. July 20, 1981, he filed a motion to require the State to produce the records and documents to be relied on by State's witnesses. The State filed a resistance, alleging the motion was untimely under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(4). The district court, Judge David R. Hansen presiding, entered an overruling order, noting that, while the State would suffer no prejudice if the motion was granted, the motion was untimely and no good cause was shown for extending the statutory forty-day period for filing such motions. Defendant argues his discovery motion should not have been overruled when no prejudice to the State was shown, and further, the pretrial denial of the documentary evidence deprived him of his constitutional right to confrontation. At all relevant times, the pertinent rule governing discovery provided: 2. Pretrial motions. Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. The following must be raised prior to trial: . . . . d. Requests for discovery. Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(2)(d). See State v. Webb, 309 N.W.2d 404, 412 (Iowa 1981). On July 20, 1981, when defendant filed this discovery motion, and on August 6, 1981, when the court denied it, Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(4) provided: [1] 4. Time of filing. Motions hereunder, except a motion for a bill of particulars, shall be filed within forty days after arraignment, unless the period for filing is extended by the court for good cause shown. The effect of failure to follow the rule 10(4) time limit is found in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(3): 3. Effect of failure to raise defenses or objections. Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial under this rule shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for good cause shown, may grant relief from such waiver. The forty-day deadline for filing this discovery motion expired June 22, 1981. We have been firm in holding unexcused late motions constitute a rule 10(3) waiver. See State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Iowa 1982); State v. McCowen, 297 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 1980); State v. Sheets, 291 N.W.2d 35, 37 (Iowa 1980). Defendant, however, focuses on district court's finding that the untimeliness of his motion did not prejudice the State. He asserts that because of this lack of prejudice, his motion should have been granted. We disagree. First, prejudice to the State is not a factor in rule 10(4). The rule permits an untimely motion to be granted only if good cause is shown. Here no attempt was made by defendant to show good cause. Cf. State v. Belieu, 288 N.W.2d 895, 899 (Iowa 1980) (defendant sought to establish good cause through affidavit that his lawyer did not learn of witness's testimony until one day before trial). Second, we have observed that discovery matters are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and are reviewable only upon an abuse of that discretion. Error in the administration of discovery rules is not reversible absent a demonstration that the substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced. Webb, 309 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting State v. Gates, 306 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 1981)). See Sullivan v. Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Co., 326 N.W.2d 320, 324 (Iowa 1982); State v. Morrison, 323 N.W.2d 254, 256 (Iowa 1982). We find no abuse of discretion here. There is an absence of any showing that defendant's substantial rights were prejudiced. In support of his argument that his motion should have been granted because district court found there would be no prejudice to the State, defendant cites State v. Miller, 311 N.W.2d 81 (Iowa 1981), and an unpublished per curiam decision of this court that is unavailable for this purpose as provided by Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 25. The published decision, Miller, involved application of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2) (speedy trial). We reversed the holdings of trial court and the court of appeals that automatic dismissal of charges was required when a defendant was not brought to trial within one year after arraignment and an extension has not been applied for and granted within that time period. We remanded to district court to determine whether good cause existed. In the case before us district court did not refuse to consider defendant's motion. The court held good cause had not been established. Defendant's reliance on Miller is misplaced. We thus turn to defendant's contention denial of his motion to produce documentary evidence deprived him of his sixth amendment right to confrontation. The primary purpose of the confrontation clause is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974); State v. Strable, 313 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Iowa 1981); State v. Anderson, 308 N.W.2d 42, 49 (Iowa 1981). Defendant in this case was accorded the full right of cross-examination of each State witness. A secondary purpose of the confrontation clause is to enable the judge and jury to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness's deportment while testifying. Strable, 313 N.W.2d at 500. Again, all the State's witnesses testified before the judge and jury. We also note the issue before us does not involve the unconstitutional suppression of exculpatory evidence prohibited by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963). See also State v. Hall, 249 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977). Defendant, however, argues district court's denial of his motion to produce deprived him of his right to effective cross-examination. See State v. Ege, 274 N.W.2d 350, 356 (Iowa 1979); accord, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 607 (1980) (confrontation clause ensur[es] the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence). These cases do not involve denial of pretrial discovery, nor does defendant cite any decision directly supporting his theory. The only decision we have found where a similar ground for reversal was urged is Martin v. Blackburn, 521 F.Supp. 685 (E.D. La.1981). There defendant claimed the state's denial of access to statements of state witnesses prior to trial denied him the right of effective cross-examination of these witnesses. In rejecting this assignment of error, the court wrote: The Confrontation Clause does not provide the defendant with any right to pretrial or in-trial discovery of the state's evidence. The purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to provide the defendant with the opportunity to challenge the testimony introduced by the state against the accused at trial by means of cross-examination of the declarant of the testimony. Where the declarant whose testimony the state wishes to introduce is present at trial, gives his sworn testimony at trial, and is subject to cross-examination by the defense as happened at the petitioner's trial, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. The petitioner has not cited, and this court has not discovered anything in the English or American history of the Confrontation Clause, or in any decision of the Supreme Court interpreting that clause, which suggests in the slightest that the Confrontation Clause is in any way concerned with discovery. Accepting the petitioner's argument would transform the Confrontation Clause from a device designed to prevent trial by affidavit into a guarantee of the right to demand trial by affidavit. Id. at 699 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Martin holding finds inferential support in United States v. Benedict, 647 F.2d 928, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1087, 102 S.Ct. 648, 70 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3018, 65 L.Ed.2d 1117 (1980); and State v. Legette, 292 N.C. 44, 53-54, 231 S.E.2d 896, 901-02 (1977). We hold denial of defendant's pretrial motion to produce documentary evidence did not deprive him of his sixth amendment right to confrontation.