Opinion ID: 178211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weighing All the Factors

Text: Tenneco’s only direct consumer evidence is the aforementioned declarations of three of its distributors, each declaring that from their experience in the field they personally associate the 171 3 Because there is no evidence supporting the intentional copying of the product numbers themselves, we do not address Tenneco’s assertion of a presumption in its favor. 16 Nos. 08-2276/09-1920, Tenneco v. Kingdom Auto Parts product number with the Monroe brand.4 Taking all available inferences in Tenneco’s favor, this factor weighs very slightly in Tenneco’s favor.
There are no consumer surveys in this case. In cases where no survey evidence was filed this Court has treated the factor as favoring neither party, although it’s absence certainly does not help the mark holder’s effort to meet its burden to prove secondary meaning. See Herman Miller, 270 F.3d at 313 (“While consumer surveys certainly would have been helpful to Herman Miller’s claim, their absence is not fatal, at least on summary judgment.”).
The district court noted that Tenneco claimed that it continuously used its “71” product numbers since 1983 and its “171” numbers since 2003. These numbers appear on the struts, packaging, sales catalogs, sell sheets, price lists, and promotional rebates. However, the district court noted that on the packaging the number is always prominently accompanied by the Monroe trademark. For the purpose of the end consumer, the district court found that the “use of multiple marks appearing together suggests that the product number has a different purpose than identifying the product as belonging to Tenneco. The Monroe mark identifies the source of the product, and the number identifies the type of product contained inside the package.” Tenneco does not seriously dispute this finding, arguing only that there is “no requirement . . . that a mark be used or advertised 4 The only other evidence Tenneco submitted to the district court on this factor was Richard Alameddine’s declaration, which the district court refused to consider following Defendants’ objection. Tenneco has not appealed that decision, so we do not consider it either. 17 Nos. 08-2276/09-1920, Tenneco v. Kingdom Auto Parts alone in order to be entitled to protection.” The district court’s finding, however, is not a strictly legal one, but rather one of common sense, and is not incorrect. Although neither of the parties nor the district court mentions it in this context, we also find it significant that the product numbers are used to specifically describe the strut and identify the vehicle to which the strut is designated. This use strongly favors Defendants’ claim that these product numbers primarily describe the product, not the source. This factor strongly favors Defendants.
The district court noted that Tenneco spent over $1.1 million in advertising that included the “171” product numbers, and that advertising reached around 75,000 potential and existing customers. The district court disregarded this assertion, however, because Tenneco offered “no evidence that Tenneco’s advertising is directed to connecting its product numbers with its identification as the source of the products.” Tenneco does not dispute this finding on appeal. Again, the lack of evidence does not weigh in favor of Defendants so much as it does not help Tenneco to satisfy its substantial burden.
The district court did not note any evidence on this factor. The parties quibble over it, but Tenneco does not claim that this factor raises a genuine issue of material fact. Tenneco asserts it has about 80% of the struts market with about 1,500 customers and $26.6 million in revenue in 2007. Defendants argue this is irrelevant because Tenneco’s customers are all distributors, and therefore Tenneco cannot connect these sales to any individual retail consumer. Tenneco responds that relying 18 Nos. 08-2276/09-1920, Tenneco v. Kingdom Auto Parts solely on individual consumers to the exclusion of distributors is erroneous. For the same reasons we found the three distributor declarations relevant, we also find that sales volume is relevant. However, it does little if anything here to demonstrate that the product numbers have acquired secondary meaning. See Burke-Parsons-Bowlby Corp. v. Appalachian Log Homes, Inc., 871 F.2d 590, 596 (6th Cir. 1989).
The district court did not note any evidence for this factor. The parties considered it together with the fifth factor—the amount of sales and number of customers. Therefore, for the reasons in subpart e., supra, this factor weighs very slightly in Tenneco’s favor.
As explained above, Tenneco has not produced any proof of intentional copying.
The district court also considered two pieces of other evidence. The district court found persuasive Mr. Enborg’s declaration, in which he gave his opinion as a trademark expert that the Tenneco product numbers did not qualify as protectable marks because they are “descriptors that use a numeric code separately assigned to each strut assembly to describe its (i) product type and (ii) application to a particular vehicle chassis.” The district court also gave substantial weight to the USPTO’s decisions to deny Tenneco’s patent applications because Tenneco’s product numbers did not “distinguish Tenneco’s goods from those of others.” Tenneco objects to the Enborg declaration, claiming that it is based on an erroneous view of the law and the facts. Defendants argue that Tenneco waived any objection to this evidence by not 19 Nos. 08-2276/09-1920, Tenneco v. Kingdom Auto Parts objecting to it below, and further argue that the declaration is opinion from his experience, not a statement of law in all cases. Tenneco does not argue with Defendants’ assertion that it did not raise the issue below, and it has therefore waived the objection. “If a party fails to object before the district court to the affidavits or evidentiary materials submitted by the other party in support of its position on summary judgment, any objections to the district court's consideration of such materials are deemed to have been waived, and [this Court] will review such objections only to avoid a gross miscarriage of justice.” Johnson v. U.S. Postal Serv., 64 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original). There is no gross miscarriage of justice here, or any other error, because the Enborg declaration is merely one trademark lawyer’s opinion from years of experience in trademark practice. The district court was free to take it or leave it, and Tenneco was free to refute Enborg’s opinion with its own evidence. The Enborg declaration will be considered with the other evidence. The same goes for the USPTO decisions, which Tenneco strives mightily to distinguish or explain away or even demonstrate that they somehow cut in its favor. The mere fact of a USPTO decision reversing itself, and reversing itself again soon thereafter, does not create a genuine issue of fact for Tenneco. The USPTO denied Tenneco’s nine applications because, in its judgment, Tenneco failed to establish secondary meaning with “ordinary retail customers,” and because the product number “merely identifies a model number; it does not function as a trademark to identify and distinguish applicant’s goods from those of others and to indicate the source of appellant’s goods.” The district court found these decisions to be persuasive, and Tenneco offers no plausible 20 Nos. 08-2276/09-1920, Tenneco v. Kingdom Auto Parts reason why this Court should not do so as well. Both these sources of evidence weigh heavily in Defendants’ favor.
As stated above, “[a] descriptive mark achieves secondary meaning when ‘in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product.’” Leelanau, 502 F.3d at 513 (quoting Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (emphasis added)). Compiling the evidence above yields the following: 1. Direct consumer testimony Very slightly favors Tenneco 2. Consumer surveys No evidence 3. Exclusivity, length, and manner of use Strongly favors Defendants 4. Amount and manner of advertising No evidence 5. Amount of sales and number of customers Very slightly favors Tenneco 6. Established place in the market Very slightly favors Tenneco 7. Proof of intentional copying No evidence Enborg Declaration Strongly favors Defendants USPTO decisions Strongly favors Defendants Considering these factors, particularly how weakly Tenneco’s evidence supports its claim, we hold that Tenneco has not carried its substantial burden to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the primary significance of the product numbers in the minds of the consuming public is to identify Monroe rather than the type of strut and what car it fits into. Accordingly, the district did not err in granting summary judgment on the product number claims. 21 Nos. 08-2276/09-1920, Tenneco v. Kingdom Auto Parts