Opinion ID: 1341011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Supplemental Charge on Parole Eligibility

Text: During its deliberations, the jury sent the court a note inquiring: What does life in prison mean (the term specifically regarding parole). Smith's trial counsel submitted that State v. Atkins , 293 S.C. 294, 360 S.E. (2d) 302 (1987), controlled and required the court to charge that the term life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. The trial judge gave this requested jury instruction twice. State v. Norris , 285 S.C. 86, 328 S.E. (2d) 339 (1985), State v. Johnson , 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E. (2d) 317 (1987), and State v. Plemmons , 296 S.C. 76, 370 S.E. (2d) 871 (1988) hold that a trial judge should respond to a parole eligibility question by instructing the jury: (1) not to consider parole; and (2) the terms life imprisonment and death sentence are to be understood in their plain and ordinary meanings. Smith argues that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury not to consider parole here entitles him to another sentencing proceeding. We disagree. The jury's question here reflected its desire to ascertain whether Smith, if sentenced to life imprisonment, could be paroled before his life ended. The judge instructed that life imprisonment is to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. In its ordinary and plain meaning, life imprisonment can mean only what it says  in prison for life. Being imprisoned for life and being paroled are mutually exclusive propositions. Thus, the only logical conclusion available to the reasonable juror from the court's instruction was that Smith would not be parole-eligible if sentenced to life in prison. To require reversal here based on the trial judge's failure to mechanically recite the Norris charge is to ignore the fact that a life imprisonment in its ordinary and plain meaning charge necessarily precludes jury consideration of parole eligibility. Moreover, State v. Johnson and State v. Plemmons do not compel reversal. The incomplete instructions held to be reversible error in those cases are distinguishable from the instruction here. In Johnson , the trial court charged the jury that the possibility of parole is of no concern of yours; in Plemmons , the trial court instructed jurors that you are not to concern yourself with that [parole]. Neither the Johnson jury nor the Plemmons jury was instructed, as was Smith's jury, that life imprisonment was to be understood in its ordinary and plain meaning. The distinction is significant. The Johnson and Plemmons juries, instructed only that parole was not their concern, would have logically inferred that parole was someone else's concern. Simply put, those juries were practically invited to speculate about parole eligibility. Smith's jury was afforded no such opportunity for speculation. The trial judge adequately instructed that parole was not a sentencing consideration. The jury received the guidance it sought, and Smith was not prejudiced by the charge. A contrary conclusion unnecessarily places form above substance.