Opinion ID: 653664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Preliminary Matters

Text: 4 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Russo v. Health, Welfare & Pension Fund, 984 F.2d 762, 765 (7th Cir.1993). A grant of summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. In other the words, the question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A party bearing the burden of proof on an issue may not simply rest on its pleadings, but must demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists and requires trial. Jamison-Bey v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 1046, 1047 (7th Cir.1989). 5 Before we address the merits of Stewart's claim, we must first discuss the relationship between Northern District of Illinois Local Rules 12 M and 12 N and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56. As noted, after discovery both parties filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. In accordance with Local Rule 12 M, both parties filed statements of undisputed facts with their summary judgment motions. 2 However, neither side filed the requisite Rule 12 N statements, contesting the other side's inventory of undisputed facts. 3 Given these circumstances, the district court treated as true and admitted all the plaintiff's statements of fact which were supported by the record. Stewart is disgruntled because he believes that the district court should have treated all the statements in his 12 M as true--regardless of whether the evidence in the record supported them. We disagree with Stewart's position. 6 In essence, Stewart asks us to literally construe the following portion of Rule 12 N: 7 All material facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the opposing party. 8 Under Stewart's view, the district court would have to treat as true even the most fanciful statements made in a Rule 12 M statement. We do not believe that such an interpretation is in line with our previous cases. Nor is it consistent with the language of Rule 12 M or the purpose of Rule 56. 9 We have consistently held that the district court may strictly apply Rule 12 N and consider a party who fails to submit a Rule 12 N statement as having admitted the uncontroverted facts alleged in the opposing party's Rule 12 M statement. Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d 1405, 1408 n. 8 (7th Cir.1993); Brown v. United States, 976 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir.1992); Wienco, Inc. v. Katahn Associates, Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir.1992); Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d 516, 518-19 (7th Cir.1992); Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1240 (7th Cir.1991); Appley v. West, 929 F.2d 1176, 1179 (7th Cir.1991); Skagen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 910 F.2d 1498, 1500 (7th Cir.1990); Bell, Boyd & Lloyd v. Tapy, 896 F.2d 1101, 1103 (7th Cir.1990). 10 However, we have also said that the district court should only consider facts as admitted if the allegations in the 12 M statement are properly supported by references to the record or other evidentiary material. Appley, 929 F.2d at 1179-80. We believe this approach is sound and advances the goals of the rules of procedure at issue. Rule 12 M requires the moving party to support his statements of fact with specific references to the record. We do not believe that the opposing party's failure to file a 12 N statement relieves the movant of the necessity of supporting his 12 M statement. Rules 12 M and 12 N are designed to enhance the efficiency of the court system by putting the onus on the parties to identify material issues of fact for the district court. Permitting a party to move forward on unsupported allegations simply because the opponent failed to challenge them would obstruct the goal of efficiency. 4 11 Furthermore, Stewart's position is also inconsistent with the goal of Rule 56: 12 One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 13 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Requiring the district court to take totally unsupported allegations as true would clearly impede the utility of having a summary judgment rule. 14 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 requires Local Rules to be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that Rule 83 requires us to interpret Rule 12 N to mean that facts claimed and adequately supported by the moving party may be assumed by the District Court unless controverted by the opposing party. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1135 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1985) (interpreting a virtually identical local rule). See also United States v. White, 980 F.2d 836, 844 (2d Cir.1992) (circuit courts should avoid an interpretation of a local rule which would give rise to a conflict with the Federal Rules); John v. State of Louisiana (Board of Trustees for State Colleges and Universities), 757 F.2d 698, 707 (5th Cir.1985) (rejecting construction of Local Rule which conflicted with Rule 56). 15 Based on the foregoing, we hold that the district judge properly treated as true only those facts in Stewart's 12 M statement that were properly supported by the record. We turn now to the merits of Stewart's claims. As mentioned, Stewart raised several constitutional issues in his complaint. The district court properly analyzed all of Stewart's claims and we affirm its analysis. Given the district court's thorough discussion, we feel compelled only to address Stewart's shakedown claim and the issue of attorneys fees; as for the other issues, we adopt the district court's opinion found at 800 F.Supp. 604.