Opinion ID: 519964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retroactive Hazardous Waste Listings

Text: 32 The impending settlement of some but not all of the issues originally scheduled for argument has introduced an anomaly into the parties' disagreement concerning the retroactivity of hazardous waste listings. The parties continue to differ as to the applicability of EPA treatment standards to leachate derived from wastes which were not deemed hazardous when they were disposed. If the settlement is finalized, however, treatment standards for multiple waste stream leachate--leachate derived from more than one hazardous waste--will not be promulgated until 1990. Much of the argument, therefore, concerns the question whether these standards, when they are eventually promulgated, can legitimately be applied to leachate derived from wastes listed as hazardous subsequent to their disposal. We must first determine whether this question is currently ripe for judicial review. 6 33 As the Supreme Court has stated, the ripeness doctrine's 34 basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 35 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). A determination of ripeness requires the court to balance its interest in deciding the issue in a more concrete setting against the hardship to the parties caused by delaying review. Webb v. Department of Health and Human Services, 696 F.2d 101, 106 (D.C.Cir.1982). Of particular relevance to the present case are decisions which address the reviewability of agency actions which threaten to cause harm at some point in the future. On the one hand, [t]he mere potential for future injury ... is insufficient to render an issue ripe for review. Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 727 F.2d 1212, 1217 (D.C.Cir.1984) (emphasis in original). On the other hand, where the likelihood of future harm is demonstrably high, it is often appropriate for courts to intervene before the feared event occurs. Friends of Keeseville, Inc. v. FERC, 859 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C.Cir.1988); see also Wilderness Society v. Griles, 824 F.2d 4, 10-12 (D.C.Cir.1987). In the present case, several factors lead us to conclude that this question is currently ripe for judicial review. 36 First, it is clear that the EPA pronouncement at issue here constitutes final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. Sec. 704. One function of the ripeness doctrine is to provide an agency full opportunity ... to correct errors or modify positions in the course of a proceeding. Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioner, Food & Drug Administration, 740 F.2d 21, 31 (D.C.Cir.1984). It seems quite clear to us, however, that the EPA has arrived at its ultimate decision on this issue. It is true that certain related questions--most notably, the specific treatment standards to be applied to hazardous waste leachate--have yet to be resolved. These questions, however, are logically distinct from the issue of retroactivity. The EPA's determination of appropriate treatment standards will not involve agency reconsideration of the retroactivity principle. Nor is there any plausible basis for believing that the specific treatment standards eventually promulgated will affect this court's judgment as to the propriety of applying those standards to leachate derived from wastes which were deemed hazardous after their disposal. 37 Second, the EPA's announcement of the retroactivity principle is not without immediate consequences for the petitioners. By the terms of the proposed settlement, the agency is free at any time to require that single-waste leachate be treated to meet the standards promulgated for the underlying waste. 7 The petitioners would thus appear to be entitled to an immediate determination as to whether these standards may be applied to single-waste leachate derived from wastes which had not been listed at the time of disposal. Moreover, the application of the retroactivity principle to multiple-waste leachate may mean that some such leachate will fall under the definition of hazardous waste when it would not otherwise be so regarded. The requirement that this leachate be treated as hazardous waste will impose significant regulatory obligations even in the absence of specific treatment standards. 8 38 Certainly the most severe consequences of the retroactivity principle will not be felt until the agency promulgates treatment standards for mixed-waste leachate. Even those consequences, however, are by no means speculative or conjectural. By rescheduling mixed-waste leachates to the third-third, the agency has postponed its obligation to set specific treatment standards. It has not, however, postponed that obligation indefinitely. The EPA is required by law to set treatment standards for third-third wastes by May 8, 1990. Even if the only consequences of the retroactivity principle would be felt in the future, we would conclude that the prospect of these consequences is sufficiently certain to warrant immediate judicial review. 39 The posture in which this issue presents itself is admittedly a somewhat peculiar one. To a large extent, this court is being asked to pass upon the validity of interpretive principles which will govern the application of standards that have yet to be promulgated. Nevertheless, we conclude that this question is ripe for our review. The agency has plainly issued its final pronouncement on the subject, and its further deliberations on related issues will not serve to inform this court's consideration of this question. The agency's decision is likely to impose some immediate consequences on the petitioners. The most significant consequences, it is true, will not be felt immediately, but even these are not speculative: they are certain to occur by a clearly determinable time in the near (if not immediate) future. Under these circumstances, no purpose would be served by delaying our decision. All parties would be inconvenienced, and judicial resources would in the long run be unnecessarily burdened, if we required that this issue be re-briefed and re-argued to a future panel. Accordingly, we proceed to consideration of petitioners' challenge.
40 In contending that the retroactivity principle was promulgated in violation of the APA's notice and comment requirements, the petitioners make two distinct arguments. First, they contend that the notice given was inadequate because it consisted only of brief references which were buried within lengthy preambles in the Notices of Proposed Rulemaking. Second, the petitioners assert that the opportunity for comment was illusory, since the rulemaking record reveals that [t]he Agency's mind obviously was made up, see Brief for Consolidated Petitioners at 48, and that the EPA was simply unready to hear new argument on these issues. See McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C.Cir.1988). We reject both challenges to the notice and comment procedures used by the agency in this case. 41 First, it is not clear to us that the agency was compelled in this case to comply with the notice and comment requirements of the APA. The APA provides that these requirements are inapplicable to interpretive rules, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553(b). The distinction between interpretive (or interpretative) and substantive (or legislative) rules is admittedly far from crystal-clear. See American Hospital Association v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1987) (the spectrum between a clearly interpretive rule and a clearly substantive one is a hazy continuum). In general, though, our cases (and those of other circuits) have emphasized the distinction between rules which create new legal obligations and those which simply restate or clarify existing statutes or regulations. See American Hospital Association, 834 F.2d at 1045-46, and cases cited therein. 42 Given that standard, it would appear to us that the retroactivity principle is an interpretive rule. The derived-from rule, on the books since 1980, provides that any solid waste generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a hazardous waste, including any ... leachate ... is a hazardous waste. 40 C.F.R. Sec. 261.3(c)(2)(i). The agency's position is that the hazardousness of a waste does not depend upon the time it was disposed, and that therefore leachate derived from any waste which is now recognized as hazardous will have been generated from the treatment, storage, or disposal of a hazardous waste. This seems to us an entirely reasonable (if not inevitable) construction of the regulation, and we therefore believe that, even had the agency failed to provide notice and an opportunity for comment, its action could be sustained. 43 We need not rest on that proposition, however, for in our view the agency did in fact provide the notice and opportunity for comment which the APA requires for the promulgation of substantive rules. The agency clearly stated the retroactivity principle in its preamble to the second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See 53 Fed.Reg. 17,586 (May 17, 1988). Admitted ly,, the language used by the EPA did not explicitly solicit comments on this question. Indeed, the Notice appeared to treat this principle as an accomplished fact. The Notice stated that the EPA confirms its long-standing interpretation that residues (leachate, for example) that derive from treatment, storage, or disposal of wastes that were disposed before the effective date of the listing are nevertheless subject to the derived-from rule. These residues therefore could become subject to the land disposal ban for the listed waste from which they derive if they are managed actively after the effective date of the land disposal prohibition for the underlying waste. 53 Fed.Reg. 17,586 (May 17, 1988). Admittedly, the agency's statement assumes rather than invites comments on this issue. Nevertheless, the public Notice did provide interested parties with a clear indication of the agency's intended course of action, and in fact the agency received numerous comments on this question. 9 Certainly the passage dealing with this issue comprised only a small percentage of a lengthy preamble to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. But whenever a rulemaking involves numerous discrete issues, it is almost inevitable that agency discussion of particular questions will be brief in comparison to the documents as a whole. This does not render public notice insufficient. 44 Of course, if the agency had ignored the comments it received--if it had simply reasserted its previous position that this principle was a long-standing interpretation--then it could not claim to have complied with the APA's notice and comment requirements. It would then be forced to rely exclusively on its contention that the regulatory principle at issue here is an interpretive rule. In announcing its final rule, however, the agency extensively discussed the objections it had received, and it cogently explained its reasons for concluding that leachate derived from wastes listed as hazardous after their disposal should be considered hazardous wastes. See 53 Fed.Reg. 31,147-31,149 (August 17, 1988). Although the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking might have suggested that the agency's mind was made up, its subsequent statements reflect a willingness to consider and respond to public comment. 45 We see no contradiction, moreover, between the agency's contention that notice and comment were not required in this instance (since an interpretive rule was involved) and its argument that the APA's notice and comment provisions were in fact satisfied. Certainly the EPA cannot be faulted for attempting to provide clarification of a pre-existing regulation. Nor do we believe that the agency, by considering and responding to comments received, has somehow waived its right to argue that the regulation in question is an interpretive rule. We therefore reject the petitioners' argument that the agency's disposition of this issue was in violation of the APA's notice and comment requirements.
46 We observe at the outset that the agency has to a certain extent brought its troubles on itself. Both in its second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and in its explanation of the final rule, the EPA asserted that hazardous waste listings are retroactive. See 53 Fed.Reg. 17,586 (May 17, 1988); id. at 31,147 (August 17, 1988). Petitioners argue that the EPA lacks the authority to promulgate retroactive regulations, and they correctly observe that such regulations are disfavored. See Ralis v. RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121 (D.C.Cir.1985). In our view, however, the crucial question is not whether the EPA is authorized to promulgate a retroactive rule. Rather, the crucial question is whether the challenged regulation in fact operates retroactively. We conclude that it does not. 47 In discussing the presumption against retroactive lawmaking, this court has noted that the Supreme Court's teaching in this area is, upon analysis, decidedly unfriendly to statutory interpretations that would effect a latter-day burdening of a completed act--lawful at the time it was done--with retroactive liability. Ralis, 770 F.2d at 1127. It is plain, however, that the regulation with which we are confronted here is not retroactive as that term was used in Ralis. The agency has made no effort to impose a legal penalty on the disposal of waste which was not deemed hazardous at the time it was disposed. Nor, in fact, does this regulation require the cleanup of any newly listed hazardous wastes. The preamble to the final rule expressly provides that these residues could become subject to the land disposal restrictions for the listed waste from which they derive if they are managed actively after the effective date of the land disposal prohibition for the underlying waste. 53 Fed.Reg. 31,148 (August 17, 1988) (emphasis supplied). The rule has prospective effect only: treatment or disposal of leachate will be subject to the regulation only if that treatment or disposal occurs after the promulgation of applicable treatment standards. 48 As a practical matter, of course, a landfill operator has little choice but to collect and manage its leachate. Active management of leachate is sound environmental practice, and a panoply of regulations require it. 10 A landfill operator therefore finds its present range of options constrained by its own past actions (the decision to accept certain wastes) even though it could not have foreseen those consequences when the actions occurred. This does not, however, make the rule a retroactive regulation. It is often the case that a business will undertake a certain course of conduct based on the current law, and will then find its expectations frustrated when the law changes. This has never been thought to constitute retroactive lawmaking, and indeed most economic regulation would be unworkable if all laws disrupting prior expectations were deemed suspect. 11 49 Moreover, we find this aspect of the agency's interpretation of the derived-from rule to be eminently reasonable. The derived-from rule establishes a presumption: leachate generated from hazardous waste will be presumed hazardous unless it is proved nonhazardous or treated to applicable standards. The reasonableness of that presumption does not vary depending upon the time when the underlying waste was disposed. In fact, the view of the rule urged by the petitioners would seem to create serious enforcement problems. No doubt there are many landfills which have accepted certain listed hazardous wastes both before and after the wastes were listed. Under petitioners' approach, leachate generated from the wastes disposed after listing would be deemed hazardous and would be subject to the treatment standards; leachate derived from previous shipments of the same waste would not. There is, however, no possible way of determining which portions of the collected leachate were generated from particular shipments of the underlying waste. 50 In upholding the EPA rule as a nonretroactive regulation, we do not believe that we have impermissibly sustained the agency's decision on a basis other than that relied upon by the agency itself. 12 The EPA did, it is true, state repeatedly that hazardous waste listings are retroactive. Read in context, however, these statements mean only that the hazardousness of leachate will depend on the composition of the underlying wastes, not on the time at which those wastes were disposed. The agency emphasized that its action would apply only to the future active management of leachate. The preamble to the final rule stated: What EPA's reading does is to ensure that once hazardous derived-from residues are collected, their subsequent management will be controlled under the statute designed to control management of hazardous waste. EPA has no other statutory tool for assuring prospectively that proper management will occur. 53 Fed.Reg. 31,149 (August 17, 1988) (emphasis supplied). Although the EPA did use the word retroactive in a way that careful lawyers would not, we believe that the basis on which the agency acted was congruent in substance (if not in phrasing) with the rationale which we uphold today.