Opinion ID: 1758374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Preserve the Errors in this Case

Text: The State argues that the issues in this case have not been properly preserved for appellate review. Specifically, the State contends that the incompetency issue was not raised at trial or on appeal before the district court and, consequently, that the district court had no jurisdiction to reverse on this basis. As to the other issues, the State asserts that Townsend failed to properly preserve those issues through appropriate objections and that those issues are procedurally barred. First, we note that the issue raised in the certified question was properly raised by Townsend in a pre-trial motion and was the same issue before the district court in Townsend I. Under these circumstances, we find that the district court could properly consider this issue in the second appeal and that the question at bar was properly certified to this Court for review. Second, we find that Townsend did, in fact, sufficiently preserve objections as to certain portions of the psychologist's testimony. For instance, Townsend did properly object to the psychologist's testimony indicating that Townsend was the individual who committed the alleged abuse. It is questionable, however, whether Townsend properly preserved other issues, such as the failure of the trial judge to make specific factual findings regarding the reliability of the child's statements. Moreover, we recognize that some of the errors in this case, when considered alone, might not constitute error that was so fundamental that no objection was necessary to preserve the error for review. For example, the failure of a trial judge to make sufficient findings under the statute, in and of itself, does not constitute fundamental error. Hopkins; Seifert v. State, 616 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA) (a trial court's insufficient findings under 90.803(23) do not equate with fundamental error), review granted, 626 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1993); Jones v. State, 610 So.2d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (issue of whether findings were sufficient under section 90.803(23) not preserved for review because no contemporaneous objection made to the findings), review denied, 620 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1993). Consequently, were we not reviewing these errors as a whole, we might find that some of the errors to which no objection was made were procedurally barred. When, however, we consider the errors in this case as a whole, we must conclude that Townsend was denied the fundamental right to due process and the right to a fair trial. State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1993) (error so basic to the judicial decision under review that an accused is denied the right to due process is fundamental); Fuller v. State, 540 So.2d 182 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989) (cumulative effect of the errors in child sexual abuse case was so fundamental as to require reversal); Nazareth v. Sapp, 459 So.2d 1088 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Dukes v. State, 356 So.2d 873 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). This is especially true in light of the erroneously admitted testimony of the psychologist, which, under the circumstances, cannot be considered harmless. Other than the hearsay statements of the child, the only evidence presented by the State was the testimony of the medical doctor and the treating psychologist. The medical doctor's testimony was not conclusive with respect to sexual abuse, and, as indicated previously, much of the treating psychologist's testimony was never subjected to a proper reliability determination under section 90.803(23). Given the errors in this case and the limited amount of non-hearsay evidence introduced at trial, we find that Townsend did not receive a fair trial. Consequently, we agree with the district court's finding that Townsend is entitled to a new trial.