Opinion ID: 1224847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Majority Unreasonably Interfere With the Separation of Powers.

Text: Finally, the majority's determination that Chapter 433 is unconstitutional on its face unreasonably and improperly encroaches upon the prerogative of the legislative branch of government, thereby interfering with the separation of powers. [14] The doctrine of separation of powers is a precept which is central to our constitutional form of government. As this court recently explained, Although the language of California Constitution article III, section 3, may suggest a sharp demarcation between the operations of the three branches of government, California decisions long have recognized that, in reality, the separation of powers doctrine `does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent' [citation], or that the actions of one branch may not significantly affect those of another branch. Indeed, ... the substantial interrelatedness of the three branches' actions is apparent and commonplace: the judiciary passes upon the constitutional validity of legislative and executive actions, the Legislature enacts statutes that govern the procedures and evidentiary rules applicable in judicial and executive proceedings, and the Governor appoints judges and participates in the legislative process through the veto power. Such interrelationship, of course, lies at the heart of the constitutional theory of `checks and balances' that the separation of powers doctrine is intended to serve. At the same time, this doctrine unquestionably places limits upon the actions of each branch with respect to the other branches. The judiciary, in reviewing statutes enacted by the Legislature, may not undertake to evaluate the wisdom of the policies embodied in such legislation; absent a constitutional prohibition, the choice among competing policy considerations in enacting laws is a legislative function. [Citation.] The executive branch, in expending public funds, may not disregard legislatively prescribed directives and limits pertaining to the use of such funds. [Citation.] And the Legislature may not undertake to readjudicate controversies that have been litigated in the courts and resolved by final judicial judgment. [Citations.] ( Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 52-53.) Unless a statute's unconstitutionality `clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears' ( Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 814), the judiciary should not interfere. The majority in effect apply a species of independent review to the Legislature's factual findings, which would allow courts to decide for themselves whether the evidence supported the Legislature's determinations and conclusions or to make sure the Legislature โ in the reviewing court's view โ had before it sufficient evidence to warrant its enactment of the particular legislation at issue. The ramifications of such an expansive view of the court's role vis-a-vis that of a coequal branch of government, are far-reaching and pernicious. In order to enact laws that would be upheld against constitutional challenges, would the Legislature be required to hold extensive evidentiary hearings? Would it be bound by the Evidence Code as to what evidence it could consider? What standard of evidence would the reviewing court require? Would a court passing upon the constitutionality of legislation be permitted to take evidence supporting or opposing the law, as the trial court in effect did here? If so, would the constitutionality of legislation then become a question of which side hired the best attorney? The majority opinion has the strong potential to hamstring the Legislature every time its proposed legislation touches upon a constitutional mandate. The majority's view is not supported by precedent, but instead presents a sharp and unwarranted departure therefrom. As previously explained, the Legislature's factual determinations may be set aside or disregarded by the courts only if the fact of error `appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may properly take notice.' [Citations.] ( Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 33 Cal.2d at p. 461.) If the error does not so appear, `the legislative determination that the facts exist which make the law necessary' ( ibid. ) is binding on the courts in the sense that the courts cannot then go behind those findings to find factual error or lack of what might be termed evidentiary support. Thus, the requirements that courts presume legislative enactments to be constitutional and that such great weight be given to legislative findings that they will be upheld unless they are palpably erroneous, does not mean those findings are placed totally beyond the power of courts to review. Necessarily under the separation of powers doctrine, however, courts are limited in what they can review to determine the propriety of legislative findings of fact and determinations. If the Lockard requirements for disregard of the legislative findings and determinations are not met, a court must then accept the facts as found by the Legislature and determine whether, based on those facts, the legislation comports with the Constitution. (See Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1253-1255.) The majority cite Amwest as supporting greater judicial latitude regarding legislative findings, noting that even though legislative findings generally will be upheld, we also must enforce the provisions of our Constitution and `may not lightly disregard or blink at ... a clear constitutional mandate.' ( Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1252.) However, Amwest is not analogous. There, the initiative measure known as Proposition 103 provided that it could not be amended by the Legislature except to further the purposes of that act. At issue was whether a subsequently enacted statute furthered the purposes of the act. This court had to determine the standard of review applicable to that question. On the one hand, the plaintiff relied on the presumption of constitutionality to argue for a deferential standard, while its opponents argued the question was one of statutory interpretation which the court should consider de novo. ( Amwest, supra, at pp. 1247, 1251.) This court stated: In the present case, ... the construction of article II, section 10, subdivision (c) of the California Constitution is not disputed. The parties agree that the Legislature has the authority to amend Proposition 103 without voter approval, but only to further the purposes of the initiative. In enacting [the statute in question], the Legislature did not purport to interpret the Constitution, but only to amend the statutory provisions enacted by Proposition 103. The issue before us is whether the Legislature exceeded its authority. The `rule of deference to legislative interpretation' of the California Constitution, therefore, has no application in the present case. We do, however, apply the general rule that `a strong presumption of constitutionality supports the Legislature's acts. [Citations.]' ( Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1253, italics added.) This court explained that when dealing with the question of whether to uphold the Legislature's determination that an urgency measure is necessary, it applies the rule that a declaration of urgency by the Legislature will not be declared invalid `unless it appears clearly and affirmatively from the legislature's statement of facts that a public necessity does not exist. [Citations.]' `If there is any doubt as to whether the facts do or do not state a case of immediate necessity, that doubt should be resolved in favor of the legislative declaration....' [Citation.] The reason for this rule is that the question whether such necessity exists is one of fact to be determined by the Legislature.  ( Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1253-1254, italics added; accord, Stockburger v. Jordan (1938) 10 Cal.2d 636, 642 [76 P.2d 674] [determination of necessity for urgency measure is purely a legislative question; courts will not interfere with determination save in those few exceptional cases where it appears clearly and affirmatively from the legislature's statement of facts that a public necessity does not exist.].) Where, on the other hand, the question was whether the urgency legislation violated the Constitution by abolishing or changing the duties of an office, [a]lthough this court accorded great deference to the Legislature's factual determination that urgency legislation was necessary, we went on to consider, as a question of law, whether the urgency measure at issue `create[d] any office or change[d] the salary or duties of any officer, or create[d] any vested right or interest.' [Citation.] In addressing this issue, we simply examined the provisions of the statute and determined that they were not of the type forbidden in urgency legislation. [Citation.] ( Amwest, supra, 11 Cal.4th. at p. 1254, italics added.) With regard to the question before it, this court concluded: Accordingly, starting with the presumption that the Legislature acted within its authority, we shall uphold the validity of [the statute at issue] if, by any reasonable construction, it can be said that the statute furthers the purposes of Proposition 103. ( Id. at p. 1256.) Here, by contrast, Chapter 433 constitutes an interpretation of a constitutional provision, the construction and limits of which are disputed. There is one area in which it has been said that the ordinary deference a court owes to any legislative action vanishes, and that is when constitutionally protected rights are threatened. ( Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 514 [217 Cal. Rptr. 225, 703 P.2d 1119].) However, I have been unable to find any authority which applies this principle outside the area of legislation being subjected to scrutiny under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The majority cite Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994) 512 U.S. 622 [114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497] for the proposition that the deference afforded to legislative findings does not foreclose a court's independent judgment of the facts, and that the court is obligated to assure that the legislative body has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. In reality, Turner states: That Congress' predictive judgments are entitled to substantial deference does not mean, however, that they are insulated from meaningful judicial review altogether. On the contrary, we have stressed in First Amendment cases that the deference afforded to legislative findings does `not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.' [Citations.] This obligation to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights are implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own. Rather, it is to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence. [Citation.] ( Turner, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 666 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2471] (lead opn. of Kennedy, J.), italics added.) Thus, when read it context, it is clear that Turner does nothing to undermine the general rule of deference afforded to a legislative body's factual findings. Nothing in Turner or the cases on which it relies suggests that the standard enunciated in Turner applies outside the First Amendment realm. Where other areas of the law are concerned, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. [Citations.] `Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.' [Citations.] ( FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 315 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d 211], italics added.) The majority's reliance on Turner is misplaced. Moreover, even assuming that non-First Amendment areas exist in which application of a lesser standard of deference might be appropriate, this is not one of them. [15] Article VII does not involve constitutionally protected rights, nor does Chapter 433 threaten such rights. Accordingly, there is no basis for the majority's unacknowledged abandonment of the long line of authorities I have previously discussed. The judiciary's review of legislative acts must be circumspect and deferential, reflecting the constraints of the Constitution. Otherwise, the judicial branch may be perceived as assuming the role of arbiter of social and fiscal policy, a role which is properly left to the representative branch of government. It is this fundamental allocation of responsibility that undergirds our tripartite system. For the judiciary to litigate and reject the factual conclusions of the legislative branch supporting its policy determinations โ and even to come to opposite conclusions โ strikes at the heart of this delicate structure. Courts are neither policymakers nor legislative fact finders. It is for the Legislature to find the facts and it falls to us to respect those findings unless they are clearly wrong โ wrong without reasoned dispute or the influence of opposing perspectives. That is not to say we are required to acknowledge the emperor's clothing if he is naked; rather, it is to say that if we cannot by resort to what reasonable people know to be indisputably true reach a contrary finding, we must accept and respect the findings of those who have that responsibility. For these reasons, I conclude the trial court erroneously found Chapter 433 unconstitutional on its face. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeal reversing the trial court. Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied July 16, 1997. Werdegar, J., and Brown, J., did not participate therein. Baxter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.