Opinion ID: 414469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Creation of Exigent Circumstances.

Text: 28 Thompson contends that even if there were exigent circumstances in this case, those circumstances cannot justify the warrantless search of his home because they were deliberately created by the government. He maintains that if the agents had probable cause to arrest him on September 23, 1981, they also had probable cause on the evening before, and therefore they could have obtained arrest and search warrants which would have avoided the need for this entire inquiry. He maintains further that Woodfork knew in advance that there was a good possibility that Thompson would recognize him, thereby creating the precise exigent circumstances that occurred. 29 The government explained at oral argument that the agents did not obtain a warrant because they expected to gain lawful entry into the home through Woodfork's pretending to be the cocaine purchaser. The government added, in response to further questions from this court about why the agents did not obtain a warrant as a precautionary measure, that the agents had not planned to seize anything at Thompson's home, but had hoped instead to continue the investigation at another site. The government also disputed Thompson's claim that Woodfork was aware of the possibility of recognition before Thompson appeared at the front door. 30 The first question to be determined is whether the agents could have obtained a search warrant in advance of the planned drug deal. We agree with the defendant that warrants could have been obtained as of the evening of September 22. In order to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officers must inform the magistrate of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where [she] claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'  Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); see Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). In this case, the agents had information from an informant who had seen the cocaine in the defendant's home and her story was corroborated by a taped conversation in which she and the defendant planned the drug deal. 31 On September 21, 1981, Figueredo taped a conversation with Thompson in which they finalized arrangements for the deal to be made at Thompson's house. While Thompson was clever enough never to mention the word cocaine over the telephone, the references to quantity, price and sources would have corroborated Figueredo's statements concerning the real nature of the conversation. On September 22, 1981, Figueredo met Hernandez and Thompson at Thompson's residence, where Hernandez produced two ounces of cocaine to be weighed and tested. Arrangements were made to pick up and pay for the cocaine the following day. We conclude that the information available to the agents through the informant on the evening before the arrest would have provided probable cause sufficient to obtain both an arrest warrant and a warrant to search Thompson's home. 32 The agents' failure to avail themselves of the opportunity to obtain a warrant does not, however, end our inquiry, for the failure to obtain a warrant at the first opportunity is not a fatal defect. In Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974), the Supreme Court stated: The exigency [necessitating seizure of an automobile] may arise at any time, and the fact that the police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibility of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action. Id. at 596, 94 S.Ct. at 2472. Similarly, while strongly condemning the agents' failure to obtain a warrant in United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945, 97 S.Ct. 1578, 51 L.Ed.2d 792 (1977), we upheld the agents' search of an automobile when exigent circumstances did in fact arise. 538 F.2d at 1233. See also United States v. Gardner, supra, 553 F.2d at 948 (reasonableness of a search under exigent circumstances is not foreclosed by the failure to obtain a warrant at the earliest practicable moment). On the other hand, the opportunity to obtain a warrant is one of the factors to be weighed in determining reasonableness. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 40, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); see also, United States v. Chuke, supra, 554 F.2d at 263; United States v. Rubin, supra, 474 F.2d at 268. 3 33 Of perhaps more concern is the suggestion that the exigent circumstances in this case were deliberately created by the government. The agents cannot justify their search on the basis of exigent circumstances of their own making. United States v. Scheffer, 463 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 984, 93 S.Ct. 324, 34 L.Ed.2d 248 (1972); see also United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir.1979); United States v. Rosselli, 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir.1974); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir.1974); Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535, 539 (1st Cir.1968). 4 In Scheffer, we rejected the government's contention that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search of the defendant's home where there was no plausible explanation for the failure to obtain a warrant. We characterized the government's statement that the circumstances surrounding the raid on the Scheffer house were such that there was not enough time to secure a search warrant, as incredible in view of the fact that customs agents, acting through the cooperating smugglers, actually planned the cocaine transfer and could have controlled the time at which it took place. 463 F.2d at 575. We held further that [s]light delay or the inconvenience of presenting facts to a magistrate are not sufficient circumstances to by-pass the warrant requirement. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). 34 In determining whether the exigent circumstances in this case were created by the government, the district court should make a specific finding as to whether Agent Woodfork was aware of the possibility that Thompson would recognize him before Thompson appeared at the door. Woodfork testified both at the suppression hearing and at trial that he knew only that Figueredo was planning to purchase the cocaine from a man named Ronald. Woodfork maintained that he had no idea that he might know this individual until Thompson appeared. Record, Vol. II, at 7; Vol. IV, at 232-33. Figueredo testified, however, that she and Woodfork discussed the possibility that Woodfork and Thompson were acquainted on the way over to the house. Record, Vol. IV, at 181, 210-11. We note further that Woodfork corrected Figueredo's impression that she may have suggested targeting Thompson. He explained that individuals were targeted by the drug enforcement agents, not by the informants. Record, Vol. IV, at 236. If this was the case, Woodfork presumably had access to records which included Ronald's surname and which would have alerted him to the probability of recognition. In any event, we leave this assessment of credibility to the district court. 5 35 If Woodfork knew in advance that Thompson might recognize him, then the government's entire justification is called into question. The government's claim that there was no need to obtain a warrant because the agent had a means of lawful entry is undercut by the agent's knowledge of the high probability that lawful entry would be impossible. The alleged danger to the informant would have resulted from Woodfork's sending her into Thompson's home when he knew that such an action could put her in the danger from which he claims to have been protecting her. Similarly, the possible imminent destruction of the cocaine would have been created by an arrest that Woodfork should have known would be necessary. This scenario would suggest that the government created the exigent circumstances on which it now relies in attempting to justify the search. If the government in fact created the exigent circumstances, then those circumstances cannot justify the entry into Thompson's home. 36