Opinion ID: 4523206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counts Three and Ten—Possession of a Firearm in

Text: Furtherance of a Crime of Violence (18 U.S.C. § 924) Dominguez argues, in supplemental briefing, that we must reverse his convictions for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, because the Supreme Court has now held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), the socalled “residual clause,” is unconstitutionally vague, and because none of his predicate crimes qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), the so-called “elements” clause. We disagree. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) prescribes heightened criminal penalties for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to,” or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of,” any federal “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” In United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2324 (2019), the Supreme Court held that a “crime of violence” is an offense that is a felony and “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Id., quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). “Physical force” is “force capable of causing physical pain or injury,” and includes “the amount of force necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance.” Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 553−55 (2019), citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)); see also Ward v. United States, 936 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining that our prior distinction between “substantial” and “minimal” force in the ACCA robbery context is no longer viable after Stokeling). 14 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ The question then is whether an alleged predicate crime meets the Johnson standard and thus qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 2018). We use the categorical approach to make that determination. Id. Under this approach, the sole focus is on the elements of the relevant statutory offense, not on the facts underlying the convictions. Id. An offense is categorically a crime of violence only if the least violent form of the offense qualifies as a crime of violence. Id. 3 Where two counts served as predicate offenses for a § 924(c) conviction, the conviction is lawful so long as either offense qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Gobert, 943 F.3d 878, 880 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1491 (“[W]here a defendant has been convicted under a statute describing crimes of both violence and nonviolence, we need only find that the charged crime for which the defendant was convicted constitutes a ‘crime of violence.’”). 4 Dominguez’s predicate crimes were violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, which provides, in pertinent part: (a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or 3 18 U.S.C. § 1951 is a divisible statute, criminalizing both robbery and extortion, so we apply the modified categorical approach to determine which alternative formed the basis of Dominguez’s conviction. Descamps v. U.S., 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). The indictment makes clear that the predicate crimes at issue are robbery, attempted robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. 4 We reject Dominguez’s argument that we must first analyze whether conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence. UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 15 attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. (b) As used in this section— (1) The term “robbery” means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining. Dominguez’s first § 924(c) charge, Count Three of the indictment, charged him with possessing a firearm in furtherance of the 2011 Hobbs Act robbery and/or of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Dominguez’s second § 924(c) charge, Count Ten, charged him with possessing a firearm in furtherance of the 2012 attempted Hobbs Act robbery and/or of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. 16 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ
“Crime of Violence” We previously held in Mendez that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause. Mendez, 992 F.2d at 1491 (holding that robbery, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1), “indisputably qualifies as a crime of violence,” and noting that it contained an “element of ‘actual or threatened force, or violence’”); see also United States v. Howard, 650 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th Cir. June 24, 2016) (unpublished memorandum). We are in unanimous company. All of our sister circuits have considered this question too, and have held that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause. See United States v. Mathis, 932 F.3d 242, 266 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Jones, 919 F.3d 1064, 1072 (8th Cir. 2019); United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 106–09 (1st Cir. 2018); United States v. Melgar-Cabrera, 892 F.3d 1053, 1060–66 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Fox, 878 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 292 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Buck, 847 F.3d 267, 275 (5th Cir. 2017); In re St. Fleur, 824 F.3d 1337, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2016). See also, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 844 F.3d 137, 141–44 (3d Cir. 2016). 5 Dominguez nonetheless argues that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the elements clause because, he says, it may be committed “by placing a victim in fear of injury to some intangible economic interest.” Such “threats,” 5 The Third Circuit does not apply the categorical approach in this context, but it has held that specific Hobbs Act robbery convictions qualify as crimes of violence under the elements clause. UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 17 he argues, would not require any use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force. Fear of injury is the least serious way to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and therefore, the species of the crime that we should employ for our categorical analysis. But even Hobbs Act robbery committed by placing a victim in fear of bodily injury is categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause, because it “requires at least an implicit threat to use the type of violent physical force necessary to meet the Johnson standard.” United States v. Guiterrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2017) (“A defendant cannot put a reasonable person in fear of bodily harm without threatening to use ‘force capable of causing physical pain or injury.’” (citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Selfa, 918 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that analogous federal bank robbery statute, which may be violated by “intimidation,” qualifies as crime of violence under sentencing guidelines). We need not analyze whether the same would be true if the target were “intangible economic interests,” because Dominguez fails to point to any realistic scenario in which a robber could commit Hobbs Act robbery by placing his victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic interest. Cf. Gonzales v. Duenas- Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007) (explaining that, under the categorical approach, there must be a “realistic possibility” that a state would apply a state statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a federal crime); Garcia-Ortiz, 904 F.3d at 107−08. Dominguez’s reliance on cases analyzing Hobbs Act extortion, or jury instructions generally describing how the statute may be violated, do not “point to . . . cases in which . . . . courts in fact did apply the statute in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. 18 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ In Mathis, the Fourth Circuit rejected this precise argument: We also observe that both Section 924(c) and Hobbs Act robbery reference the use of force or threatened use of force against “property” generally, without further defining the term “property.” . . . . And neither provision draws any distinction between tangible and intangible property. Thus, we do not discern any basis in the text of either statutory provision for creating a distinction between threats of injury to tangible and intangible property for the purposes of defining a crime of violence. Mathis, 932 F.3d at 266. We agree with and adopt this reasoning. Dominguez further argues that Hobbs Act robbery can somehow be “predicated on gross negligence or reckless conduct,” and so lacks the necessary mens rea to qualify as a crime of violence. Dominguez is wrong. We have previously held that “criminal intent—acting ‘knowingly or willingly’—is an implied and necessary element that the government must prove for a Hobbs Act conviction.” United States v. Du Bo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). We reaffirm that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), and we affirm Dominguez’s conviction on Count Three. UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 19
Violence” Because completed Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924, attempted Hobbs Act robbery is also a crime of violence. In so holding, we agree with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits that, when a substantive offense would be a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), an attempt to commit that offense is also a crime of violence. There is no circuit court decision to the contrary. United States v. Ingram, 947 F.3d 1021, 1025–26 (7th Cir. 2020) (attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335, 351–53 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 18, 2019) (No. 19-5267) (analyzing attempted Hobbs Act robbery); Hill v. United States, 877 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 352 (2018) (analyzing Illinois attempted murder; holding that “[w]hen a substantive offense would be a violent felony under § 924(e) and similar statutes, an attempt to commit that offense is also a violent felony.”) 6; cf. United States v. D.D.B., 903 F.3d 684, 689–93 (7th Cir. 2018) (declining to apply Hill rule where state law did not require proof of intent for attempt conviction). The reasons for this are straightforward. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) explicitly includes as crimes of violence offenses that have as an element the “attempted use” or “threatened use” of force. In order to be guilty of attempt, a 6 The Seventh Circuit analyzed whether attempted murder, in violation of Illinois law, was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act. We have held that the operative language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is identical to the portion of the elements clause at issue in this case. See United States v. Fultz, 923 F.3d 1192, 1194 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2019). 20 UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ defendant must intend to commit every element of the completed crime. See, e.g., Nelson, 66 F.3d at 1042 (attempt conviction requires evidence that defendant intended to violate the statute). An attempt to commit a crime should therefore be treated as an attempt to commit every element of that crime. Hill, 877 F.3d at 719. “When the intent element of the attempt offense includes intent to commit violence against the person of another, . . . . it makes sense to say that the attempt crime itself includes violence as an element.” Hill, 877 F.3d at 719. Not so, argues Dominguez, because the “substantial step” required for an attempt conviction need not be itself violent. Since the elements of attempt are only an intent to commit the crime, along with a substantial step, Dominguez argues that attempt crimes contain no “element” of force. This argument would have us ignore his specific intention to commit a violent crime, as well as common sense. A criminal who specifically intends to use violence, and then takes a substantial step toward that use, has, by definition, attempted a violent crime, albeit an uncompleted one. Moreover, adopting Dominguez’s approach in this case would be plainly inconsistent with our prior determination that “[t]he ‘attempt’ portion of [a] conviction does not alter our determination that the conviction is a crime of violence. We have ‘generally found attempts to commit crimes of violence, enumerated or not, to be themselves crimes of violence.’” Arellano Hernandez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Riley, 183 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (providing that an aggravated felony includes the attempt to commit the offense)). UNITED STATES V. DOMINGUEZ 21 We hold that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). We affirm Dominguez’s conviction on Count Ten.
We do not reach whether Conspiracy to Commit Hobbs Act robbery is also a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) because we have determined that each of Dominguez’s § 924(c) convictions is supported by a predicate crime of violence—completed and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, respectively. 7