Opinion ID: 3149414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Batson Step One—Crediting the Trial Court’s

Text: Factual Finding Under Batson step one, Crittenden must “show[] that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94. The state trial court found that Crittenden did not meet this standard. Under both the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and Batson principles, overturning such a finding requires “exceptional circumstances.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2201 (2015) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)). Because there is nothing amiss about the trial court’s finding—much less exceptionally wrong—that conclusion should have ended the matter. Instead, the majority secondguesses the fact-bound decision of the state trial judge with a I”). The prosecutor’s earlier for-cause challenge of Casey is similarly unpersuasive and wasn’t even mentioned by Crittenden’s counsel in making his Wheeler motion. The prosecutor also unsuccessfully challenged a white juror for cause based on similar anti-death penalty statements. 44 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL raft of new evidence introduced in federal habeas proceedings. I dissent from this upside-down approach to deference. The starting point is AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), under which the trial court’s factual finding is “presumed correct” and Crittenden “has the burden of rebutting that presumption by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2199–2200 (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338–39 (2006)). In light of AEDPA’s mandate, “we normally review the state trial court’s fact-specific determination of whether a defendant has made a prima facie case of a Batson violation deferentially, applying AEDPA’s ‘statutory presumption of correctness.’” Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Wade v. Terhune, 202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000)). In contrast, “where the trial court has applied the wrong legal standard, AEDPA’s rule of deference does not apply.” Id.; see also Cooperwood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2001). Nothing reflects that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard or otherwise erred in its application of Batson step one. Importantly, neither the majority nor Crittenden suggests otherwise. Although, in 1994, the California Supreme Court conflated Batson’s “reasonable inference” test with Wheeler’s more stringent “strong likelihood” test, see Majority Part II.A, there is no reason to think that the trial judge committed that same mistake five years earlier.2Nor can 2 In denying Crittenden’s prima facie case, in February 1989, the trial judge did not detail the standard he was applying. Before 1994, we presume that California state courts applied the correct Batson standard. Terhune, 202 F.3d at 1196–97. Even absent the Batson-specific presumption, the Supreme Court repeatedly has “instruct[ed] us to give CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 45 Crittenden summon clear and convincing evidence that the trial court erred in assessing whether there was a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based on the evidence before the state court. The prima facie determination is a factual inquiry that is “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province,” Ayala, 135 S. Ct. at 2201 (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477), because the trial judge plays a pivotal role supervising voir dire and is “best situated to evaluate both the words and the demeanor of jurors who are peremptorily challenged, as well as the credibility of the prosecutor who exercised those strikes,” id. See also Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 683 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that, at Batson step one, “the trial judge’s unique perspective of voir dire enables the judge to have first-hand knowledge and observation of critical events” and to “personally witness[] the totality of circumstances that comprises the ‘factual inquiry’” at issue, making heavy deference appropriate). In his Wheeler motion, Crittenden’s counsel made two primary points. He noted that the same prosecutor faced an unsuccessful Wheeler challenge in a previous case. Additionally, Casey, as an African-American, was “a member of a cognizable racial group” and was in fact the “only member of the identifiable group” among the voir dire panelists. Neither contention satisfied the requirements for a prima facie showing. state courts the benefit of the doubt when the basis for their holdings is unclear.” James v. Ryan, 733 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2013). Significantly, we owe deference to the state trial court notwithstanding the California Supreme Court’s subsequent legal error. See Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 2010). 46 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL The prosecutor’s earlier Wheeler challenge was “weak” evidence because, as we explained in Crittenden’s first appeal, it was “one isolated incident in which the trial court denied the Batson objection,” and “it did not add significantly to his prima facie case,” Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 957 n. 4. Nor does “the fact that the juror was the one Black member of the venire,” in and of itself, “raise an inference of discrimination.” Terhune, 202 F.3d at 1198 (quoting United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994)). “More is required.” Id. Benchmarked against the defense counsel’s proffer at the prima facie stage, the trial judge gave specific reasons, based on his firsthand observations, for finding no inference of discrimination. Even before the prosecutor and defense counsel began jury selection, Crittenden’s counsel alerted the trial judge that he planned to make a Wheeler motion—and already had prepared a written motion to that effect—if the prosecutor struck Casey, the sole black member of the venire. The judge therefore was acutely attuned to the issue of discrimination and took notes on Casey’s demeanor and voir dire answers. The judge’s notes and impressions “revealed that at the very time that we questioned Ms. Casey, my exact quotation is: ‘This is a case where a Wheeler motion would be inappropriate, because of the fact that she is indecisive and cannot guarantee that she would vote in a certain way.’ . . . She couldn’t decide whether or not she would be able to follow the law.” Context is key. Before striking Casey, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes against 14 white jurors—consistently targeting those who expressed doubt about the death penalty. To cite a few examples, the prosecutor used his first peremptory against juror Smith, who stated, “I do not believe CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 47 in [the death penalty] as a general rule—there are exceptions.” The prosecutor used his fourth peremptory against juror Gilbert, who described himself as an “extremely liberal person” and said he “would have a difficult time voting for the death penalty.” The sixth strike removed juror Pisarek, who generally opposed the death penalty but recognized it was the law and, unlike Casey, was unequivocal that she could vote for it. The prosecutor’s tenth strike went against juror Works, who believed that “all life is precious” but added that she wouldn’t conscientiously object to voting for the death penalty. The prosecutor struck juror Henley, whom he labeled as “Borderline DP weak” despite Henley’s bland statement on his juror questionnaire that “[t]here are times and circumstances when I have considered [the death penalty] appropriate.” The strike of Casey hardly stands out. Casey opposed the death penalty, and the death penalty was the overriding focus of Crittenden’s capital trial. On her juror questionnaire, Casey wrote: “I don’t like to see anyone put to death.” During her voir dire question-and-answer session, Casey continued to express hesitancy about capital punishment. “I am against death—being put to death,” she said at one point. “And I am against people killing people.” Given the prosecutor’s pattern of peremptory strikes and Casey’s death penalty views, the trial judge understandably cited “abundant [] reasons” why he expected and accepted a peremptory challenge against her. The prior panel compared Casey to two white jurors—Clark and Krueger—who ultimately served on Crittenden’s jury. Crittenden I, 624 F.3d at 957. However, that prior decision was issued before Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). Now, “[w]hen examining a 48 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL petitioner’s habeas claim through the AEDPA lens, we ‘focus[] on what a state court knew and did,’” and “thus consider ‘how the [state court] decision confronts [the] set of facts that were before [it],’ rather than how it should have confronted a new set of facts presented for the first time in federal court.” Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 2013) (last four alternations in original) (quoting Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1399)). The two white jurors entered the jury box after the prosecutor struck Casey and the trial judge denied Crittenden’s Wheeler motion. Hence, when the trial judge denied the prima facie case, he could not have divined that Clark and Krueger later would be permitted to serve on the jury. Nor did Crittenden’s counsel renew his Wheeler motion at any subsequent point. A post-hoc, comparative analysis in these circumstances has no place in evaluating the trial court’s finding of fact at the prima facie stage. Even if the juror analysis is appropriate, the comparison hardly provides clear and convincing evidence that the trial judge got it wrong, because both subsequently seated white jurors are readily distinguishable from Casey. See Section II.B. In repudiating the trial court’s prima facie finding, the majority mistakenly relies on evidence produced at the 2002 federal evidentiary hearing—namely, the prosecutor’s notations rating jurors in the margins of their questionnaire sheets. No state court was ever privy to this evidence. As we recently explained, “after Pinholster, a federal habeas court may consider new evidence only on de novo review, subject to the limitations of § 2254(e)(2).” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1000 (9th Cir. 2014). As we explained in Murray, Pinholster cabins our review under § 2254(e)(1), because it “eliminated the relevance of ‘extrinsic’ challenges CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL 49 when we are reviewing state-court decisions under AEDPA.” Id. at 999. Of course, where the conditions for de novo review are satisfied—i.e., when the factual finding is rebutted under § 2254(e)(1)—Pinholster may allow for new evidence adduced during federal habeas proceedings. But first things first: Because our review under step one is constrained by AEDPA deference and Crittenden has not effectively rebutted the trial court’s initial factual finding, we are not in de novo review mode at this stage. This conclusion follows from a faithful reading of Murray. I acknowledge that the postMurray cases cited by the majority may be in tension with Murray, given that they appear to support new fact-finding simply on the basis that the California Supreme Court alone rendered a decision contrary to clearly established law under § 2254(d)(1). See Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1069 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011). That error cannot be imputed to the state trial court, however. Under Murray, the situation here is clear: the state trial court did not err in its factual finding that Crittenden failed to carry his burden, and therefore our review is cabined by the evidence before the trial court. In any event, the majority lacks authority to overrule Murray and cannot escape its holding simply by dismissing it as an earlier case–indeed, it was decided in 2014, the same year as Hurles. See Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013). Crediting the state trial court’s factual finding, I would deny Crittenden’s habeas petition at step one of the Batson analysis. 50 CRITTENDEN V. CHAPPELL