Opinion ID: 773807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exceeding the Scope of the Warrant

Text: 25 Plaintiffs claim that defendants exceeded the scope of the warrant by seizing and reading e-mail and members' subscriber information. The warrants authorized the search and seizure of: 26 [a]ny documentation and/or notations referring to the computer, the contents of the computer, the use of the computer or any computer software and/or communications. All information within the above listed items including but not limited to machine readable data, all previously erased data, and any personal communications including but not limited to e-mail, chat capture, capture files, correspondence stored in electronic form, and/or correspondence exchange in electronic form. . . . All items to be searched and/or seized having been used in the obtaining, maintenance, and/or as evidence of said offense. 27 Guest J.A. at 69-70; O'Brien J.A. at 242-43.
28 The warrant authorized the seizure of personal communications related to the offense. Although there were presumably communications on the computers that did not relate to the offenses, [a] search does not become invalid merely because some items not covered by a warrant are seized. United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir. 1988). In Henson, a case affirming convictions involving false odometer statements, we rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the seizure of documents and computer files that were unrelated to the offenses because we concluded that it would have been unreasonable to require police to sort through extensive files in a suspect's office in order to separate out those items that were outside the warrant. Id. at 1383-84; see also Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1481 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when defendants seized a bulletin board system computer that contained personal communications unrelated to the crime under investigation); United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 637-38 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation in the search and seizure of a computer system in a child pornography investigation); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1999) (same). In the instant cases, when the seizures occurred, defendants were unable to separate relevant files from unrelated files, so they took the computers to be able to sort out the documents off-site. Because of the technical difficulties of conducting a computer search in a suspect's home, the seizure of the computers, including their content, was reasonable in these cases to allow police to locate the offending files.
29 Plaintiffs also allege that defendants read their e-mail, an allegation defendants deny. Plaintiffs rely for evidence on the following. A plaintiff testified as an expert witness that certain log records were missing from the Guest CCC BBS computers when the computers were returned; these logs normally keep a record of the use of the computer, and the expert testified that defendants must have deleted the log files or prevented them from generating. The Guest plaintiffs also refer to a paper printout of the computer directories, which showed defendants' check marks next to several directory names, including a directory labeled e-mail. 30 The printout and absence of log files are not evidence that the defendants read private communications. Plaintiffs are essentially relying on an assumption that because defendants could have read e-mail, there is evidence that they did read e-mail. Defendants may legitimately have checked to see that the contents of the directories corresponded to the labels placed on the directories. Suspects would otherwise be able to shield evidence from a search simply by misfiling it in a directory labeled e-mail. In the Guest case, defendants had a list of file names and thus could conduct their search by reviewing the file names in a directory, without actually opening the files and viewing the contents. While we construe the facts on summary judgment in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Plaintiffs' assumptions are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding an e-mail search.
31 Plaintiffs argue that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by accessing bulletin board subscriber information. These records include information such as subscribers' names, addresses, birthdates, and passwords. As we have noted above, a person must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the matter searched in order to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment. Individuals generally lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in their information once they reveal it to third parties. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), limited by statute. A bank customer, for instance, does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the information that he or she has conveyed to the bank; by placing the information under control of a third party, the customer assumes the risk that the bank will convey the information to the government. Id. Courts have applied this principle to computer searches and seizures to conclude that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person--the system operator. See Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 418; United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting a privacy interest in subscriber information communicated to an internet service provider); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039, at  (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 2000) (unpublished) (holding that defendant destroyed any privacy interest in his subscriber information when he conveyed it to an internet service provider) (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 442). We conclude that plaintiffs in these cases lack a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in their subscriber information because they communicated it to the systems operators. In addition, in the O'Brien case, subscriber information would be that of the users, who do not have Fourth Amendment standing.
32 Plaintiffs also assert that defendants exceeded the scope of the warrant when they searched for unlicenced software. The only individual with a privacy interest in the software would be the person possessing the software, i.e., the computer's owner or the system operator. In the Guest case, the owner and bulletin board operator, Robert Emerson, is not a party to the case. In the O'Brien case, although the owner and operator are parties, the warrant listed the offense of possession of unlicenced property, so the search for unlicenced software in that case was clearly authorized by the warrant.