Opinion ID: 1330405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts in conjunction with statutory changes

Text: Appellee married the testator on July 24, 1981. Appellant, who is the testator's son from a previous marriage, [1] alleges that Appellee abandoned his father after approximately one and one-half years of marriage and the couple lived separate and apart for the remainder of his father's life. [2] The testator died on December 30, 1992, owning both real and personal property. [3] By will executed on November 15, 1984, the testator left his entire estate to Appellant, except for a trailer and a clock which he bequeathed to Appellee. At the time the will was executed, the dower rights of a husband or wife were barred if the husband or wife voluntarily left or abandoned his or her spouse without such cause as would entitle such husband or wife to a divorce ..., and without such cause and of his or her own free will be living separate and apart from such spouse at the time of the latter's death.... W. Va.Code § 43-1-19 (1982). [4] In addition, if the dower rights of either a husband or wife were barred under any provision of law, neither the husband nor the wife could have any part of the estate of the other, unless the same be given him or her by will and then only so much as is so given. W. Va.Code § 42-3-3 (1982). [5] In other words, if a husband or wife abandoned his or her spouse as contemplated by West Virginia Code § 43-1-19, there would be a forfeiture of rights to take any part of the estate, except what was bequeathed by the will. In an attempt to prevent Appellee from taking any part of the estate except what was provided to her by the will, Appellant sought to admit evidence pertaining to her alleged abandonment of the testator. However, approximately nine months prior to the testator's death, the legislature passed sweeping statutory revisions to the descent and distribution provisions in the code, including the repeal of the abandonment provision contained within West Virginia Code § 43-1-19. 1992 W. Va. Acts ch. 75. [6] As a result of the abandonment provision being repealed, the circuit court found the issue to be irrelevant under the statutory law in effect at the time the testator's death. Therefore, the circuit court refused to permit Appellant to introduce any testimony pertaining to it. At the same time the abandonment provision was repealed, West Virginia Code § 42-3-1 was amended. 1992 W. Va. Acts ch. 75. [7] When the testator died, West Virginia Code § 42-3-1 (Supp.1992) provided that a surviving spouse [8] could elect against a will and take an elective-share percentage of the augmented estate. W. Va.Code § 42-3-1(a). The percentage a surviving spouse was entitled to take was determined by the length of time the spouse and the decedent were married to each other.... Id. [9] Pursuant to an accrual schedule in the statute, Appellee was awarded thirty-four percent of the augmented estate. [10] Appellant claims the statutory revisions unjustly reward Appellee for her conduct and undermine his father's intent as expressed in his will. In addition, Appellant maintains his father was legally blind and in poor health at the time these statutory revisions took effect and his father died approximately six months thereafter. Consequently, Appellant asserts there was neither a reasonable opportunity nor a reasonable amount of time for his father to obtain a divorce to prevent Appellee from taking any part of the estate except what he intended to give her under the will. Therefore, Appellant argues this Court should apply the doctrine of equitable or quasi estoppel to prevent Appellee from receiving a statutory share of the augmented estate or, in the alternative, set up a constructive trust to prevent Appellee from being unjustly enriched. Upon review of the statutory provisions, we decline to apply either of these measures. As the issues raised by Appellant involve purely questions of law, our review of this case is plenary and de novo. See Gribben v. Kirk, 195 W.Va. 488, 493, 466 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1995) (stating [t]he issues presented... involve questions of law; therefore, our review is plenary and de novo ).