Opinion ID: 494133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Receiving Benefits to Influence the Operation of an Employee Welfare Plan

Text: 19 Robilotto contends that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1954 should be overturned because there was insufficient evidence that he exercised control over the Health and Welfare Fund, and that loans extended solely to Spagnola should not have been included in the charges against him. We disagree. 20 Section 1954 prohibits an agent or officer of an employee organization, any of whose members are covered by an employee welfare benefit plan, from receiving any ... loan, money, or thing of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to, any of [his] actions, decisions, or other duties relating to any question or matter concerning such plan. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1954. This statutory proscription extends to all persons who exercise control, direct or indirect, authorized or unauthorized[,] over the fund, United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 & 983, 101 S.Ct. 1484 & 1520, 67 L.Ed.2d 616 & 819 (1981); see United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 925 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2268, 73 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1982), including business agents of a local union who exercise influence over employee welfare benefit funds. Palmeri, 630 F.2d at 198-200. 21 Undisputed evidence demonstrated that Robilotto, as business agent for Local 294, was a union officer or agent covered by section 1954 and that the Health and Welfare Fund was an employee welfare benefit plan within the purview of the statute. Robilotto contends essentially that there was no evidence that he wielded sufficient influence to cause Health and Welfare Fund deposits to be made at the Fulton County National Bank. His argument fails for two reasons. First, section 1954, on its face, does not necessarily require proof that the malefactor actually possessed the ability to influence a welfare fund's investment decisions. The statute prohibits a union officer from accepting anything of value because of or with intent to be influenced with respect to any of his actions, decisions or duties concerning the fund. This statutory language has been interpreted to proscribe acceptance of payment with the stated purpose of exercising one's influence ..., regardless of capacity to do so. United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 90 (3d Cir.1984) (construing Friedland, 660 F.2d at 925-26), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1161, 105 S.Ct. 914, 83 L.Ed.2d 927 (1985); cf. United States v. Romano, 684 F.2d 1057, 1064 (2d Cir.) (statute prohibits receipt of things of value resulting from union pension fund investment decisions, regardless whether receipt involved corrupt transaction), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 375, 74 L.Ed.2d 509 (1982). The evidence adduced at trial amply demonstrates that Robilotto's stated intention was to influence the Health and Welfare Fund's investment decisions when he accepted the loans from Moyses. Moyses testified that Robilotto told him in a telephone conversation that Health and Welfare Fund certificates of deposit would be transferred to the bank and that Herbert Bender, a Health and Welfare Fund official, would call to arrange the transfer. This testimony amply supports the jury verdict. 22 Second, the evidence adduced at trial clearly supports a finding that Robilotto did, in fact, influence the Health and Welfare Fund's investment decisions. Moyses testified that, shortly after his telephone conversation with Robilotto, Bender left a message for Moyses stating that a deposit of $300,000 would be wired to the Fulton Bank. That deposit was made in December 1981. On two later occasions, the Health and Welfare Fund made deposits of $100,000 after Robilotto and Spagnola were advised that further deposits were necessary to obtain additional personal loans. 23 Robilotto contends that, because Moyses referred in his testimony to Robilotto's promise to supply union funds in exchange for loans, the evidence failed to show that Robilotto promised Health and Welfare Fund deposits. However, it is obvious from even the most cursory review of the testimony that Moyses used the terms union funds and Health and Welfare Funds interchangeably. Moreover, Moyses testified at one point that Robilotto claimed to have arranged for deposits to be made from the Health and Welfare Fund. See Trial Transcript at 1324. There is a clear pattern of demands for loans, followed by promises of deposits, followed closely by deposits of Health and Welfare Fund assets. 24 Robilotto's claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict under section 1954 involving the loans to Spagnola requires scant discussion. Contrary to Robilotto's contention, the evidence clearly shows that Robilotto was the central figure in the loan scheme--he initiated the entire scheme, knowingly enabled Spagnola to obtain loans contingent upon Health and Welfare Fund deposits, participated in discussions regarding the Spagnola loans, and received the proceeds from some of them. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Robilotto as a principal. In addition to Robilotto's receipt of the proceeds of some of the loans, his ability to control the disposition of loans to Spagnola can be considered a thing of value under section 1954. See United States v. Schwartz, 785 F.2d 673, 681 (9th Cir.) (Congress clearly intended the scope of thing of value to include intangibles), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed.2d 264 (1986); cf. United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir.) (phrase thing of value generally is construed to cover intangibles), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 148, 62 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979).