Opinion ID: 2077276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Adequately Present Defendant's Motion to Suppress His Confession

Text: Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in both the Goodman and Howell cases in presenting defendant's motion to suppress his confession. We note that defendant was represented by the same two attorneys in both the Goodman and Howell cases. The facts relevant to this issue are outlined extensively in our opinions on direct appeal. See People v. Page, 156 Ill.2d 258, 284-85, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339 (1993) (Howell case); People v. Page, 155 Ill.2d 232, 246-59, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160 (1993) (Goodman case). We review those facts necessary to address defendant's argument in this appeal. Defendant was arrested around 10 p.m. on Saturday, May 16, 1987, and remained in police custody, in Cook County, until May 20, when he was taken before a judge for a bond hearing. Defendant gave law enforcement officers numerous statements with respect to the Goodman murder on May 16, 17, 18, and 19. On May 19, defendant also gave authorities formal statements regarding the murder of Andrew Devine, committed in Will County, and the murder of Charles Howell, committed in Cook County. The first case to go to trial was the Will County prosecution for Devine's murder. In that proceeding, defendant moved to suppress his statements. Defendant's motion did not specify which statements were being challenged. In his motion, defendant argued that the interrogating officers made unfulfilled promises of leniency; that defendant was led to believe that the only court proceedings in which his statements would be used would be those in which the promises of leniency would be enforced; that the officers did not honor his wishes to consult with an attorney; and that the officers threatened to charge defendant's father with the offenses in the Goodman case. The Will County trial court held a hearing at which the parties introduced testimony regarding the entire time period during which defendant was in custody. The State presented the testimony of three members of the Olympia Fields police department, the assistant State's Attorney who had questioned defendant in all three cases, and the court reporter who had transcribed defendant's formal statements to the Devine and Howell murders. These witnesses testified that defendant received Miranda warnings and waived these rights prior to each session of questioning, and that defendant was not mistreated while in custody. These witnesses further denied that any promises of leniency were made to defendant or that he or his family members were threatened in any way. Defendant testified at the suppression hearing. Defendant stated that, shortly after he was taken into custody, the police showed defendant a booking photograph of his father and told defendant that his father would be charged in the Goodman case if defendant did not confess. We note that defendant's father had been arrested when police learned that property belonging to Goodman was in defendant's father's home. Defendant's father was released soon after defendant's arrest. At the suppression hearing, defendant also testified that the police refused defendant's request to contact an attorney or a family member. Defendant further testified that, prior to making the statements regarding the Devine and Howell cases, the assistant State's Attorney promised defendant that he would receive only a 20-year sentence for those offenses if he confessed to the crimes. Defendant's mother and sister testified on behalf of defendant at the suppression hearing. They stated that during the weekend of defendant's arrest, they repeatedly called the Olympia Fields police department, and their requests to speak with defendant were denied. The defense also presented the testimony of Leila Naszkiewicz, the mother of Michael Naszkiewicz, who had also been arrested in connection with the Goodman murder. Leila Naszkiewicz testified that she too encountered difficulty in attempting to contact her son while he was in police custody. Following the suppression hearing, the Will County trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements. The trial court held that defendant had given his statements voluntarily. The trial court did not distinguish among the different statements made by defendant. Subsequently, in both the Cook County Howell and Goodman cases, defendant moved to suppress his statements. The trial court in both cases granted the State's motion to strike defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court in both cases held that the Will County trial court had already resolved the admissibility of defendant's statements, and that defendant was therefore collaterally estopped from challenging that determination. On direct appeal in the Goodman case, this court extensively reviewed this issue and concluded that the Will County trial court, in rejecting defendant's claims, necessarily determined issues pertinent to all three sets of statements made by the defendant while in police custody. Page, 155 Ill.2d at 254, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160. This court stated that we have carefully examined the evidence and arguments presented at the Will County suppression hearing. Our analysis leads us to conclude that the Will County judge's ruling on the admissibility of the Devine statements resolved as well factual issues pertinent to the Goodman and Howell statements. Page, 155 Ill.2d at 257, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160. Likewise, on direct appeal in the Howell case, this court stated that [w]e have carefully examined the record of the Will County proceedings and the record in the instant case and have found nothing to dissuade us from our earlier conclusion in the Goodman case that defendant is collaterally estopped from challenging the admissibility of his statements. Page, 156 Ill.2d at 285, 189 Ill.Dec. 371, 620 N.E.2d 339. Defendant argues in these post-conviction proceedings that trial counsel was ineffective in both the Goodman and Howell cases in presenting the motions to suppress defendant's statements. Defendant contends that he has made a substantial showing that, had trial counsel presented certain other evidence, the trial court would not have held that defendant was collaterally estopped from challenging the admissibility of his statements. Defendant suggests that this new evidence includes the extensive searches and cooperation with authorities in searching for the Goodman and Howell bodies; their promises relating to these searches; and the additional conversations on these outings. We review the evidence that defendant now cites in support of his argument that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting his motion to suppress his statements in Cook County. Defendant attaches his own affidavit in which he repeats allegations to which he testified at the suppression hearing. In this affidavit, defendant also states that he rehearsed his statements both before and after the court reporter arrived. Defendant states that, before the court reporter arrived, the assistant State's Attorney reminded defendant that he would help defendant get 20 [years] or less. However, the assistant State's Attorney told defendant that since he could not promise me anything, [h]e would have to ask me if there was a promise, that I would have to say no. Defendant further alleges that he found that Michael Naszkiewicz and Michelle Kury repeatedly asked for attorneys and Michael's mother tried to get an attorney, but the police would not let her. Finally, defendant states that he was told that my family and I would be killed if I did not take the rap. Defendant also references an affidavit from the investigator for the Capital Litigation Division, who interviewed Michelle Kury on June 13, 1997. During this interview, Kury stated that she was in the Village of Matteson jail for four days and could not get an attorney or talk to her family for that period of time. Defendant further cites a report from the Olympia Fields police department which discusses a May 15, 1987, meeting between a police officer and Leila Naszkiewicz, whose son Michael was in custody at the time. Naszkiewicz apparently requested that she be notified when her son had a bond hearing, and requested information regarding representation for her son by the public defender's office. Naszkiewicz was advised that her son was being held on burglary charges but that the charges could change as the investigation progressed. In this regard, defendant attaches an affidavit from his brother. His brother states that when defendant was in the Richton Park jail, my mother and I tried to see him and the police almost arrested me for sitting in the parking lot. They held Pat [defendant] for at least 72 hours, and told me that he had not been charged, he did not need a lawyer and did not need to see anyone. Defendant also attaches an affidavit from his father. His father relates that defendant told him that he confessed to the crimes because the police showed him a picture of his father in a jail cell. Finally, defendant cites two Olympia Fields police department reports which recount that defendant was transported to Wisconsin to search for Goodman's body. These reports also state that defendant voluntarily gave statements after being advised of his Miranda rights. Defendant fails to explain how any of this evidence would have resulted in a holding by the trial court that defendant was not collaterally estopped from challenging the admissibility of his statements. Most of this evidence is cumulative of the evidence that the trial court considered, and which this court reviewed, in determining that defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating his motion to suppress his statements. The other evidence, namely, the circumstances surrounding the arrests of Michelle Kury and Michael Naszkiewicz, is simply not relevant to a determination of the voluntariness of defendant's statements. We therefore hold that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that, had trial counsel presented this evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would not have held that defendant was collaterally estopped from challenging the admissibility of his statements. We note that defendant also suggests in this regard that trial counsel in the Howell and Goodman cases were ineffective for failing to ensure that appellate counsel in the Devine case challenged the admissibility of defendant's statements. In the Devine case, defendant did not receive the death penalty. Thus, defendant's appeal in that case was heard by the appellate court. See People v. Page, 196 Ill.App.3d 285, 143 Ill.Dec. 46, 553 N.E.2d 753 (1990). Appellate counsel in the Devine case did not challenge the admissibility of defendant's statements. Defendant now argues that trial counsel in the Goodman and Howell cases failed to insure that some level of appellate review was had of these statements, and that as a result of this failure, the issue of the admissibility of defendant's statements was never reviewed. This, of course, is an improper argument, as we are not reviewing the Devine case. Furthermore, defendant fails to offer any argument to support the notion that a challenge to the admissibility of his statements would have been successful. As a final matter, defendant suggests that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately present defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant attaches police reports regarding the taking of defendant into custody, and the obtainment of permission from defendant's mother to search her house. The Will County trial court denied defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. On direct appeal in the Goodman case, we noted that the trial court in the Goodman case granted the State's motion to strike defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence on the basis that defendant was collaterally estopped from challenging the Will County trial court's prior determination. See People v. Page, 155 Ill.2d 232, 248, 185 Ill.Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160 (1993) (Goodman case). We further noted that the Cook County trial court's disposition of defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence was not at issue in the appeal. Page, 155 Ill.2d at 248, 185 Ill. Dec. 475, 614 N.E.2d 1160. Defendant offers no argument to support his suggestion that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately present defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We therefore hold that defendant has waived any argument in this regard. See 177 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7) (stating that an appellant's brief must include an argument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor).