Opinion ID: 3037195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Failure-to-Accommodate Claims

Text: [9] Title VII claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Bodett v. Coxcom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2004); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, for his failure-toaccommodate claims, Mr. Berry must first set forth a prima facie case that: “(1) he had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) he informed his employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged, threatened, or otherwise subjected him to an adverse employment action because of his inability to fulfill the job requirement.” Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606. We agree with the district court that Berry has established a prima facie case by showing that: “(1) he is an evangelical Christian who believes in sharing his faith with others and he was reprimanded for this practice insofar as he communicated with clients about religion; (2) he informed his employer of his beliefs and the conflict; and (3) the employer, at least implicitly, threatened some adverse action by formally instructing him not to pray with or proselytize to clients.” [10] Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the Department to show that “it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee’s religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Id. at 606 (citing Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998)). As undue hardship is not defined within the language of Title VII, courts have had to determine it on a caseby-case basis. See, e.g., Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 29 F.3d 589, 592 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that “undue hardship” is not defined by statute and that the precise BERRY v. DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVICES 4899 reach of the employer’s obligation to its employee must be determined on a case-by-case basis). [11] The outer limits of “undue hardship” need not detain us as the Department has clearly demonstrated that it cannot accommodate either Mr. Berry’s desire to discuss religion with the Department’s clients or his preference for displaying religious items in his cubicle. As we have noted, allowing Mr. Berry to discuss religion with the Department’s clients would create a danger of violations of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This constitutes an undue hardship. See Knight, 275 F.3d at 168 (“Permitting appellants to evangelize while providing services to clients would jeopardize the state’s ability to provide services in a religion-neutral matter.”). Similarly, it would be an undue hardship to require the Department to accept, or have to rebut, the inherent suggestion of Department sponsorship that would arise from allowing the display of religious items in a cubicle in which Mr. Berry interviews clients who are seeking assistance. We conclude that Mr. Berry has not shown that the Department’s restrictions on his religious speech to clients and on displaying religious items constitute a failure to accommodate his religious beliefs.14