Opinion ID: 1734311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in refusing to grant a continuance.

Text: ¶ 10. Peden filed his Motion for Continuance on the morning of the hearing, citing that he was in poor health and that he was no longer represented by counsel. We review the chancellor's decision under an abuse of discretion standard: The granting of a continuance is largely a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and unless manifest injustice appears to have resulted from a denial, this Court should not reverse. Thomas v. Hilburn, 654 So.2d 898, 904 (Miss.1995) (quoting Hatcher v. Fleeman, 617 So.2d 634, 639 (Miss.1993)). This Court has further held that the trial court may exercise reasonable latitude in the setting and continuance of cases. Thomas, 654 So.2d at 904 (citing Watts v. Pennington, 598 So.2d 1308, 1312 (Miss.1992)). Morgan v. Greenwaldt, 786 So.2d 1037, 1045 (¶ 26) (Miss.2001). ¶ 11. Peden argues that the matter should have been continued because he was in poor health and taking medication. The record reflects that Peden left the courtroom at one point to go and make a phone call to [his] cardiologist. However, the record does not reflect how long he was gone, but does reflect that after the court called a recess, Peden was in the courtroom and actively participated in the hearing before the trial court, including questioning his own witness. ¶ 12. In furtherance of his argument, Peden asserts that he was forced to go forward unrepresented by counsel due to a sudden change of events that had occurred only 12 hours earlier and, consequently, caused Peden's attorney to now become his adversary and oppose Peden at the hearing and act against Peden's interest to the extent that his attorney actually crossexamined the sole witness called by Peden. The chancellor stated that Peden had been acting pro se since his motion was filed June 29, 2000, through the hearing of March 19, 2002, with the exception of a brief appearance by Kihyet. Additionally, Kihyet represented the Board, of which Peden was a member, and on behalf of the Board entered into the Agreed Order, which would resolve this matter on its behalf. ¶ 13. Based upon the foregoing, we cannot say that the chancellor abused her discretion in denying the motion for continuance. Therefore, this issue is without merit.