Opinion ID: 2449819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: violation of discovery order

Text: In paragraph 5 of the pre-trial discovery order, the Commonwealth was ordered to provide the defendant with the names and addresses, if known, of all persons known by the Commonwealth to have been personally present at the scene during the commission of the offense charged. The Commonwealth's response was that only Appellant and Payne were present and did not identify the other three men alleged to have been in the vehicle at the time of the transaction. It appears that neither Detective Huber nor the Commonwealth's attorney was aware that any others were present until Payne so testified at trial. Payne identified one of the eye-witnesses as Paul Robey, but claimed not to know the identity of the other two. Defense counsel did not ask for a continuance in order to locate Robey and did not make any other motions at that time. However, at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence on the second day of trial, defense counsel moved for a mistrial because of the Commonwealth's violation of the discovery order. The requested relief would fall within the broad remedial powers granted by RCr 7.24(9). As a general proposition, the Commonwealth cannot be required to disclose names of persons present at the time of the acts charged in the indictment. Lowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 944 (1986). However, the Commonwealth's failure to object to the discovery order was a waiver of any error in that regard. Mounce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 795 S.W.2d 375, 378 (1990). A discovery violation justifies setting aside a conviction only where there exists a `reasonable probability' that had the evidence been disclosed the result at trial would have been different. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, ___, 116 S.Ct. 7, 10, 133 L.Ed.2d. 1 (1995); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-36, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1565-66, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383-84, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). The withholding of the identity of an alleged eye-witness to the crime ordinarily would prejudice a defendant's ability to prepare his defense. However, it developed that Robey was readily available for interview by defense counsel, who chose not to avail himself of the opportunity. The following occurred during the discussion on the motion for a mistrial: The Court: Paul Robey is no stranger to the court. . . . Have you made an effort to contact Paul Robey? Counsel: No, your honor. The Defendant: He's in the jail. The Court: Yes (unintelligible) . . . Counsel: I went to the jail last night to talk to some people, but I didn't talk to Mr. Robey. In other words, even after Robey's identity was revealed, defense counsel, who knew Robey was in jail, and who was at the jail himself for the purpose of interviewing other inmates during a trial recess, chose not to interview Robey to determine if he had any exculpatory information. Among the remedial measures available to a trial judge under RCr 7.24(9) is to grant a continuance to enable the defendant to investigate whether the belatedly provided information might be exculpatory. Here, defense counsel had an immediate opportunity prior to presenting his defense to interview Robey and determine whether he had information favorable to the defense. He cannot intentionally decline to avail himself of that opportunity and then claim on appeal that he was prejudiced. Cf. Sweatt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 550 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1977).