Opinion ID: 1166598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Warning

Text: Appellant first claims that the trial court's failure to give him a warning before finding him in contempt was violative of his right to due process. The trial court concedes that no specific warning was issued but argues that such a warning is not necessary. In Continental Insurance Cos. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., supra , we stated that in most cases the court may be required to at least provide a warning before it can properly hold a person in contempt. (citations omitted). 548 P.2d at 402 n. 6. We cited in support of this proposition People v. Ellis, 540 P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1974), in which the court partially based its reversal of a contempt on the trial court's failure to give any warning. The Ellis court looked to the language of Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 94 S.Ct. 1228, 39 L.Ed.2d 693 (1974), in which he stated: I place a high premium on the importance of maintaining civility and good order in the courtroom. But before there is resort to the summary remedy of criminal contempt, the court at least owes the party concerned some sort of notice or warning. 415 U.S. at 700, 94 S.Ct. at 1231. Appellee argues that the Ellis and Eaton cases are distinguishable from the case before us now, since they both condemn the trial court's failure to issue warnings to non-attorneys, who might not otherwise know that their conduct could constitute a contempt. The ABA Standards Relating to the Function of the Trial Judge, § 7.2, lend support to the trial court's position that a warning may not be necessary if the contemnor knew or should have known that his conduct was contemptuous. § 7.2 Admonition and Warning No sanction other than censure should be imposed by the trial judge unless: (i) it is clear from the identity of the offender and the character of his acts that disruptive conduct was willfully contemptuous, or (ii) the conduct warranting the sanction was preceded by a clear warning that the conduct is impermissible and that specified sanctions may be imposed for its repetition. However, the commentary to this standard does not suggest that warnings need be issued only to laymen; it reasons that a warning is desirable before punishing all but flagrant contempts, since (1) it may prevent further disorder; (2) it assures the court that the subsequent conduct will be willfully contemptuous and deserving of punishment; and (3) it reduces the risk that attorneys will be deterred by fear of punishment from exercising zealous advocacy. In this case the conduct of appellant was certainly not flagrantly contemptuous, and thus he was entitled to a warning that his behavior could constitute the basis for imposition of contempt sanctions. Such a procedural safeguard is particularly necessary in a case such as this one, in which an attorney's conduct may tread the borderline between zealous advocacy and contempt.