Opinion ID: 570364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Admission of Prior Bad Acts Testimony

Text: 18 The District Court permitted the Government to introduce rebuttal testimony from a neighbor of Wiggins who testified that he had seen Wiggins engage in PCP transactions on occasions other than those forming the basis for his indictment. The court allowed this evidence for purposes of impeaching Wiggins' testimony on direct examination that he had never previously sold drugs. Wiggins argues that the trial court erred in permitting the Government to put on this rebuttal testimony, claiming that he in fact never denied prior drug sales on direct examination. Wiggins' relevant testimony is as follows: 19 [Wiggins' Attorney]: Have you ever dealt in drugs? 20 A: I've used drugs, yes. 21 Q: Do you use them at this time? 22 A: Not now I don't, uh-uh. 23 Tr. at 236. 24 Admittedly, Wiggins' response to the question about his past drug sales is ambiguous. However, those in the courtroom, including Wiggins' own attorney, apparently understood it to be a denial of past drug sales. On this point, Wiggins' counsel recalled that his client had testified that he used drugs but had never sold them. 1 In fact, in closing argument, Wiggins' counsel depicted Wiggins as someone who had never been involved in PCP distribution. See id. at 438 ([H]e is not involved in drugs. The only way he's involved in drugs, according to his own testimony that he volunteered, was that he does or he did take PCP himself.). 25 Although Wiggins' counsel objected to the admission of the prior bad acts testimony at trial, he did so on other grounds, never suggesting that the testimony was inappropriate for impeachment because Wiggins had not in fact denied prior drug sales. Having treated Wiggins' testimony as a denial of such sales at trial, Wiggins cannot now be permitted to argue a contrary interpretation. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 31 (1988) (refusing to overturn trial court's interpretation of ambiguous language where counsel stood silently by when the trial court made clear its contrary interpretation). In short, the District Court's ruling simply does not rise to the level of plain error. See United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589, 591 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam) (legal objections not articulated at trial are waived, absent plain error). The District Court's understanding of Wiggins' trial testimony as denying any prior involvement in drug sales was not an unreasonable one, especially given the fact that defense counsel recalled his client's testimony in the same way that the trial judge had construed it.