Opinion ID: 688525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second-Degree Burglary Conviction

Text: We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the ACCA. United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369, 1371 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the ACCA, a felon convicted of possessing a firearm who has three previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense must receive a minimum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e). Part (2)(B) of Sec. 924(e) defines violent felony as: any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that--(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another; .... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Supreme Court confronted the issue of how to define burglary under the violent felony standard of Sec. 924(e). After an extensive review of the ACCA's legislative history, the Court adopted a generic definition of burglary, stating: a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a Sec. 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. 495 U.S. at 599. Hensley argues that his conviction under Oregon's second-degree burglary statute exceeds the generic definition of second-degree burglary under Taylor, and asserts that therefore his second-degree burglary conviction thus cannot count as a predicate felony towards an armed career criminal enhancement. To adopt this argument, however, we would have to overturn our holding in United States v. Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103 (1991). In Cunningham, we examined Oregon's definition of second-degree burglary in light of the Supreme's ruling in Taylor, and found that Oregon defines second-degree burglary in a virtually identical fashion to Taylor's generic definition. 911 F.2d at 363. Under Oregon law a person commits burglary in the second degree if he or she enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein. Or. Rev. Stat. Sec. 164.215(1). Despite the clear holding of Cunningham, Hensley makes three separate arguments urging that Oregon's second-degree burglary statute does not meet the Taylor standard. First, Hensley contends that because Oregon sentencing guidelines do not classify second-degree burglary as a person felony, due process requires that the offense not be violent felony under federal law. 1 Hensley does not supply us with any case law in support of this theory, and he appears to have dropped this argument in his reply brief (although he expands greatly on the other arguments in the reply brief). We find this argument untenable in light of the Supreme Court's language in Taylor that we are to look only to the elements of the crime, regardless of the exact definition or label assigned to it by the state. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. Hensley makes two other arguments as to why the Oregon second-degree burglary statute does not meet the Taylor generic burglary definition. First, Hensley asserts that the Oregon second-degree burglary statute is overbroad under Taylor because Oregon case law has defined building under this statute more broadly than is permissible under Taylor. Second, Hensley contends that the Oregon courts' interpretation of the enter or remain unlawfully language in the statute violates Taylor. Hensley raised neither of these arguments before the district court. Therefore these arguments are waived on appeal. See Intl. Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsman v. Martin Jaska, Inc., 752 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) ([W]e will not ... review an issue not raised below unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice). In Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1136 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994), we found manifest injustice and thus heard an argument raised for the first time on appeal. In Quintero, the defendant's counsel below was allegedly paid for by the drug supplier so that the drug supplier would evade prosecution. On appeal from a denial of his motion to vacate his sentence based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Quintero argued for the first time that his counsel's urging him to reject a plea agreement was evidence of a conflict of interest. We found in Quintero that the allegations of injustice were so forceful that they overrode the fact that he had not raised the issue below. Id. 1 We do not find manifest injustice here. We have already issued an opinion that squarely contradicts the arguments newly raised by Hensley. See Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that we found the Oregon second-degree burglary statute overbroad under Taylor, it is very likely that Hensley's sentence enhancement would nevertheless stand under the alternative particularized analysis allowed under Taylor. 2 Taylor stated that even in cases where the statute is non-generic or overbroad, sentence enhancement can still be sought where the defendant was actually charged and convicted of all the necessary elements of a generic burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; see also O'Neal, 937 F.2d at 1373 (explaining that portion of the Taylor opinion). 3 In this case, the PSR alleged that the facts surrounding Hensley's second-degree burglary conviction were that he admitted breaking into a residence through a window and stealing a number of items. (PSR at 7, p 33) Based on the allegations in the PSR, Hensley's conviction for second-degree burglary meets the requirements of Taylor--because the PSR specifically alleges unlawful entry into a residence--even if the Oregon statute otherwise overbroadly defines building to include things such as booths or aircraft. See Or. Rev. Stat. 164.215(1) (defining building for the purposes of second-degree burglary); Red Br. at 7. Further, Hensley did not object to the PSR's description of the circumstances of his second-degree burglary conviction as involving a residence, nor does he presently allege that the PSR's characterization is incorrect. 4 In sum, we believe that our ruling in Cunningham, 911 F.2d 361, that Oregon's second-degree burglary statute is a violent felony under the ACCA, clearly defeats Hensley's claim. Accordingly, the district court did not err in counting his second-degree burglary conviction as a violent felony under the Act. 5