Opinion ID: 345468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Its total inapplicability under Arizona law;

Text: 5 B. The law of Arizona advocating restraint in the use of the last clear chance doctrine, (hereinafter doctrine), was not followed; 6 C. If proper to be given to the jury, the instruction, as given was materially altered, and was confusing, and not a correct statement of the law; 7 D. County personnel never had actual knowledge decedent was endangered; 8 E. By restricting the doctrine's application to the County alone, and taking the question of its applicability away from other defendants, the County was improperly made a target defendant. 9 It is hornbook law that a federal court in a diversity case must follow the substantive law of the state where the incident occurred. (Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). 10 Appellant flatly asserts that no case in the Arizona appellate courts has ever applied the last clear chance doctrine to a factual setting other than one involving mechanical instrumentalities under human control; that each of the Arizona appellate decisions relying on the doctrine involved either railroad, motor vehicle, or airplane accidents. We assume this is a correct statement and that the 25 cases cited by appellants (in Note 2 attached to their opening brief on this appeal) are all, and the only, cases involving the doctrine in Arizona law. Appellees supply none. 11 On February 8, 1974, the Arizona Supreme Court approved the use of R.A.J.I. (Recommended Arizona Jury Instructions), to be used throughout the State of Arizona, and thereafter one apparently became MAR(ICOPA) JI # 20 Instruction. MARJI Instruction # 20 applies to the last clear chance issue. The four-fact instruction relates to and is to be given if an Inattentive Plaintiff is involved. The five-fact instruction is to be given if a Helpless Plaintiff is involved. While, due to conflicting testimony, there may have been a question as to whether, and if so, when, the decedent was a helpless plaintiff, there certainly was sufficient evidence to present the issue (as to whether or not he was helpless) to the jury. Therefore, if any approved last clear chance instruction were to be given, it was required to be the five-fact Last Clear Chance Instruction (MAR(ICOPA County) J.I. Negligence 20) which reads: 12 The defense of contributory negligence does not apply if you determine that the following five facts exist: 13 (1) The plaintiff negligently placed himself in a position of danger; and 14 (2) The negligence ended or resulted in a situation of peril from which he could not escape through the exercise of reasonable care; and 15 (3) The defendant actually knew, or by exercise of reasonable care, should have known of plaintiff's situation; and 16 (4) The defendant realized, or should have realized that the plaintiff was in a helpless situation; and 17 (5) The defendant thereafter had a last clear chance to avoid the accident by exercise of reasonable care and failed to do so. 2 18 It is clear that the five facts instruction differs in several substantial respects from the four facts instruction. 3 19 So far as we can ascertain, no Arizona appellate court has ever applied the last clear chance doctrine to a situation where the alleged negligence of a defendant was in medical care. That is not surprising because normally a case such as this is filed alleging medical malpractice only, and not ordinary negligence as well. In Arizona, its State Constitution ordinarily requires that all questions of contributory negligence be left to the jury. It cannot be ruled out as a matter of law. 4 20 Thus, the trial court was required to give the jury some instruction on contributory negligence. In the Arizona instruction as approved, and in the Restatement, there is no express limitation of any kind on the doctrine, and specifically none to mechanical instrumentalities under human control. There is no question but that the doctrine became first established in law as a concomitant of the extensive use in America of railroads, streetcars, boats, automobiles, and airplanes. But this does not mean that the law in any one jurisdiction cannot extend the doctrine to factual situations not relating to mechanical instrumentalities. Appellees assert: There appears upon exhaustive research to be no case in all America that restricts the doctrine of last clear chance to mechanical instrumentalities. (Appellees' Br., p. 16). That may be true, but if there be no such restriction, it seems strange that but one case in this country has been called to this Court's attention which has extended the doctrine to factual situations where mechanical instrumentalities are not involved. 5 Appellees likewise cite Davies v. Mann, 10 M. § W. 546, 152 Eng.Rep. 588 (1842) the original Jackass case in support of their position, 6 but refuse to recognize that a horse-drawn cart necessarily includes a mechanical instrumentality. And appellant flatly urges that the only case extending the doctrine to a non-mechanical instrumentality case is one which was reversed on appeal, and is not actually a last clear chance case. 7 21 We consider that one ancient British case; a 97 year old Iowa case; and one Texas case that doesn't discuss the doctrine, to be insufficient authority to convince us what the Arizona law is ; or if it is presently undeclared, that we can postulate on such slender reeds what it should be. 22 One nationally recognized authority states the most often stated . . . explanation for the doctrine is that if the defendant has the last clear opportunity to avoid the harm, the plaintiff's negligence is not a 'proximate cause' of the result. 23 While this coincides rather well with the attempt made in the older day to fix liability upon the last human wrongdoer, it is quite out of line with modern ideas of proximate cause. In such a case the negligence of the plaintiff undoubtedly has been a cause, and a substantial and important one, of his own damage, and it cannot be said that injury through the defendant's negligence was not fully within the risk which the plaintiff has created. If the injury should be to a third person, such as a passenger in the defendant's vehicle, the plaintiff's negligence would clearly be recognized as a responsible cause, and it is an utterly artificial distinction which applies any other rule when the plaintiff himself is injured. 24 (Reference notes omitted) 25 Prosser on Torts, 4th Ed., 1971, pp. 427-428 ch. 11, § 66. 26 Appellee states that Arizona applies the doctrine as a means of determining the legal proximate cause of the injury in a negligence case (Br., p. 22), citing Odekirk v. Austin, 90 Ariz. 97, 366 P.2d 80 (1971). 27 This is a correct citation, but gives little comfort to appellees when the Arizona Court tells of the reasoning behind the application of the rule of last clear chance.The reasoning behind the doctrine is that although the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant continues up to the time of the injury, plaintiff's negligence is remote while the defendant's conduct is the proximate cause of the accident. But the biggest problem for both the trial and appellate courts necessarily arises in attempting to determine whether the negligent acts of both parties concur as proximate cause. If so, then clearly defendant cannot be guilty of having had the last clear opportunity to avoid the accident. Hirsh v. Manley, 81 Ariz. 94, 300 P.2d 588, 591 (1956). 28 The Arizona Court then suggests it will follow the American Law Institute's Restatement of the law, except in cases where different rule has been laid down by this court. Judge Beinstein of the Arizona Supreme Court then refers to two situations to which the doctrine of last clear is applicable in Arizona. This discussion appears in the margin. 8 29 Incidentally, we note that all discussions in Odekirk relate to a plaintiff injured by the operation of mechanical devices. 30 Appellant approves the cautionary language in Odekirk on the application of the last clear chance rule: There are few, if any, legal doctrines that are more difficult of logical application . . .  (90 Ariz. 97 at 99; 366 P.2d at 81); while appellee finds comfort in the end of that same paragraph, namely: (B)road statements . . . have (been) found . . . too broad . . . and must be explained and modified again. This process has not yet been completed. (366 P.2d at 81) 31 Difficult in application or not, we are not impressed with the strength of appellant's argument that because the trial court originally indicated it would not instruct on the doctrine to the jury (R.T. 390, lines 7-21), later had doubts about it (R.T. 435), but finally gave it in a modified form (R.T. D-210-211), that his final decision was necessarily erroneous. But one matter is here controlling: whether the precise instruction which finally went to the jury was correct or incorrect. Appellant urges the instruction given misstated the law. Appellee suggests it was correct. It is obvious that neither of the two previously approved state court instructions were given. 32 Without deciding (1) whether the doctrine is totally inapplicable under Arizona law where no mechanical devices are involved, or will or will not be under future Arizona law, or (2) whether the proper restraint was exercised by the trial judge in the application of the doctrine to the facts of this case, we turn to point I.C. urged by appellant: was the altered instruction on the doctrine proper, or was it a misstatement of the law? 33 We compare the last clear chance instruction given by the trial court, italicizing the departures from the approved MARJI Instruction No. 20 (five fact helpless plaintiff), as quoted above, and bracketing the omitted portions: 34 Now, the defense of contributory negligence does not apply to the County of Maricopa if you find the following facts to exist: 35
36 (2. That the negligence ended or resulted in a situation of peril from which he could not escape through the exercise of reasonable care.) 37 2. That the defendant County of Maricopa actually knew (or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have known) of plaintiff's decedent's situation. 38 3. That the defendant County of Maricopa realized, or should have realized (that the plaintiff was in a helpless situation) that the plaintiff's decedent was unable to help himself or extricate himself from the situation he was in. 39 4. That the defendant County of Maricopa thereafter (has a last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of reasonable care and failed to do so) had a last clear chance to avoid further harm to the plaintiff's decedent by the exercise of reasonable care and failed to do so. (R.T. 210-211; C.T. 448) 9 40 Thus, the instruction given:(a) Took from the jury the contributory negligence, if any, of plaintiff, insofar as one of several defendants (the County of Maricopa, alone ), was concerned. 41 (b) Excised from the instruction the required finding by the jury that the (plaintiff's) negligence ended or resulted in a situation of peril from which plaintiff could not escape, i. e., the jury might have concluded the decedent's negligence had not terminated; i. e., that the effect of the plaintiff's voluntary ingestion of drugs had not ceased. 42 (c) Excised from the instruction the County's obligation to know that plaintiff was in a helpless situation (the language chosen carefully for the approved instruction). 43 (d) Changed the words: has a last clear chance to avoid the accident, etc. to had a last clear chance to avoid further harm to plaintiff's decedent. While we concede accident might not be the best word to use under the peculiar facts of this case, we cannot approve the instruction's inference that this one defendant, the County of Maricopa alone, had harmed plaintiffs' decedent, nor the inference that the jury was being instructed, as a matter of law, that plaintiff suffered at least two time periods of harm. These issues were for jury determination. This language is particularly susceptible to misinterpretation when we consider the excision of the termination of plaintiff's decedent's negligence language in (b) supra. 10 44 As we understand the Arizona law, we cannot say, nor could the trial judge instruct, that the jury could not have found that the plaintiff's decedent was or was not himself negligent in his voluntary ingestion of a large quantity of drugs, constituting a continuing negligence which was a contributing factor to decedent's own demise. Again, such a decision is peculiarly a question of fact for the jury's determination. 45 Finally, we do not completely understand why or how Dr. Espinoza's actions and conduct, could, as a matter of law, not be subject to the last clear chance doctrine, when the jury was instructed that his employer, the County, was so subject. It may be because there were jailers and other County employees, unnamed as defendants, who might have had a last clear chance. The record does not disclose why this distinction was made in the instructions. 46 Appellant asserts that ordinarily the last clear chance doctrine is not applied to but one of several alleged joint tort feasors accused of negligence. 11 It enabled all defendants other than the County of Maricopa to rely on plaintiff's contributory negligence, which may or may not have been why all other defendants were exonerated. 47 Appellees assert that the Arizona Supreme Court has said: The Constitution of Arizona, Article 18, § 5 . . . takes from the court all control of the defense of contributory negligence. (It is) a question of fact, and shall at all times be left to the jury. Heinke v. Munoz, 106 Ariz. 26, 470 P.2d 107 (1920). This includes . . . the right . . . to apply or not, as the jury sees fit, the law of contributory negligence as a defense. (Id. at 28, and 470 P.2d at 109, respectively). If this be true, most assuredly the jury must be properly, adequately and fully instructed on the subject. 48 Appellees' counsel argued to the jury the instruction on the last clear chance doctrine would take care of any contributory negligence of decedent. 12 49 That doctrine apparently had never been applied by Arizona courts to any negligence cases which did not involve mechanical instrumentalities controlled by humans, nor to malpractice actions. Nor is there any convincing citation of cases from any other jurisdiction that has so extended the original doctrine. We need not here determine whether Arizona courts would or would not, or should or should not, so extend the doctrine, particularly in view of the caution warnings contained in cases and textbooks with respect to the application of Erie v. Tompkins, supra. 13 50 We are not required, however (under Erie ) to speculate as to how the State Court might decide the question before us if it has not already decided it. 1A Moore, Federal Practice, 3327. 51 But if we grant that a federal trial court may extend the last clear chance doctrine to cases where there is no mechanical instrumentality involved, it does not follow that it may instruct the jury contrary to what Arizona courts have approved as requisite in such an application, if it be made. And here appellees' counsel first : admittedly excised one material portion of the five-part instruction approved by Arizona for helpless plaintiffs in a situation claimed to require a last clear chance instruction, and second : modified the language in another paragraph of the approved instruction; and third : where the court, by its own excisions, made the County of Maricopa, defendant alone, an easy target, while eliminating the doctor (the County employee), who allegedly gave the wrong drug to the decedent; and the City of Phoenix, which had the first nineteen hours control over the arrested decedent. 52 Due objection was timely interposed to the instruction given. (R.T. Vol. IV, pp. 12-14). The court overruled the objection. 53 In so doing, the trial court interfered with the jury's sole right to adequately consider and pass upon the existence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, if any there might be, and in essence, directed a verdict for the two defendants (other than the County of Maricopa), to whom the last clear chance doctrine was said, as a matter of law, to be not applicable. Counsel for appellees so interpreted the court's action (Cf. note 12, supra ). 54 The Arizona law of whether an instruction contains reversible error is stated as follows: 55 If any instruction directly contradicts the true rule of law so that the jury would be misled thereby on a material point, it is, of course, fatal; if, however, it is merely incomplete in itself, but when taken together with proper qualifications made in some other portion of the instructions it correctly states the law, it is not reversible error, unless it is so ambiguously worded that a reasonable man, taking the instruction as a whole, would be misled thereby. Humphrey v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 50 Ariz. 167, 70 P.2d 319, 323 (1937). 56 There was but the one instruction given on last clear chance. Under that test quoted, we conclude the instruction given on the doctrine of last clear chance would have misled the jury, was improper, and requires reversal.