Opinion ID: 1536768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Theft Conviction

Text: We begin our analysis by addressing whether Tarray's theft conviction is sufficient to support her conviction for exploitation of a vulnerable adult. Section 8-801 provides, in part, that a person may not knowingly and willfully obtain by deception, intimidation, or undue influence the property of an individual that the person knows or reasonably should know is a vulnerable adult with intent to deprive the vulnerable adult of the vulnerable adult's property. § 8-801(b) of the Criminal Law Article. In construing language of a statute, we are guided by the principles of statutory construction. As stated recently: In statutory interpretation, our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional, or part of the Rules. We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute as a whole to ensure that `no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.' If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends. If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation ... we endeavor to resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute's legislative history, case law, statutory purpose, as well as the structure of the statute. Glascoe & Jackson v. State, 408 Md. 231, 236-37, 969 A.2d 277, 280-81 (2009) (quoting Firefighters v. Cumberland, 407 Md. 1, 8-9, 962 A.2d 374, 378-79 (2008); Doe v. Board of Elections, 406 Md. 697, 712, 962 A.2d 342, 350-51 (2008); Supervisor v. Stellar GT, 406 Md. 658, 669-70, 961 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (2008)). In the present case, the State maintains that the legislature intended to treat § 8-801 as an aggravated offense of theft by providing for the prosecution of non-fiduciaries who were able to take the property of a vulnerable adult. In other words, a person who commits a theft against a vulnerable adult, even where there is no deception, intimidation, or undue influence, is also in violation of § 8-801. In response, Tarray contends that the State's contention is without merit, because its interpretation is both unpersuasive and unreasonable. Tarray asserts that it is highly unlikely that the legislature intended to treat the phrase by deception, intimidation, and undue influence as meaningless after devoting its time and effort to illustrate what it meant by providing a statutory definition for two of the three terms. Even if the statute were susceptible to both interpretations, Tarray further contends that the legislative history underlying § 8-801 is silent on the issue of whether a theft offense against a vulnerable adult is sufficient to establish the offense of exploitation of a vulnerable adult. [13] Additionally, Tarray contends that even though there are similar at-risk adult abuse statutes in other jurisdictions, the wording of the Maryland statute at issue implicitly refutes the State's aggravated offense theory. [14] Because the State's interpretation would unreasonably constrain the plain meaning of the statute by reading out the phrase by deception, intimidation, or undue influence, we agree with Tarray's construction of the statute. See Department of Health v. Kelly, 397 Md. 399, 420, 918 A.2d 470, 482 (2007) (construing statutes so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory) (citing Oakland v. Mountain Lake, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006); Mazor v. State, Dep't of Correction, 279 Md. 355, 360-61, 369 A.2d 82, 86-87 (1977)). In rejecting the State's contention, we conclude that the General Assembly intended to treat the crimes of theft and exploitation of a vulnerable adult as separate and distinct offenses.