Opinion ID: 2350302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The District Court's Exclusion of Certain Evidence of the Victim's Prior Conduct

Text: [¶ 15] Appellant insists that the district court should have allowed him to present certain evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct at times that she was intoxicated to fully explain to the jury his motivation and specific intent at the time of the events giving rise to the charges. He believes that, armed with evidence of the victim's past alcohol-fueled risky sexual behaviors, the jury could have understood and agreed that his true intent was to protect hernot to harm her. Appellant maintains that conveying his actual intent to the jury was vital to his defense to the specific intent crimes charged, and that the district court committed error by refusing such testimony. [¶ 16] In pretrial hearings regarding the State's motion in limine, the district judge spontaneously expressed his views upon the various arguments being advanced by the opposing attorneys. Comments interspersed in the record during these hearings relate to the court's reaction to: the State's counsel's analogy to Wyoming's rape shield statute, preventing introduction of the victim's sexual history in a sexual assault case; Appellant's trial counsel's arguments relying upon W.R.E. 404(a) as supporting introduction of the victim's sexual past events; the claims that W.R.E. 405 addresses character evidence based upon past instances of conduct in very specific circumstances; the State's assertions that W.R.E. 608 prohibits use of evidence of the victim's character, except as to her reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness; and, arguments whether W.R.E. 609 would permit introduction of the victim's misdemeanor convictions for alcohol-related offenses. Appellant contends that these remarks made during arguments were the trial judge's stated grounds for the evidentiary rulings for which he assigns error. The record belies Appellant's contention. [¶ 17] Throughout the pretrial proceedings, the trial judge patiently reiterated that evidence of the victim's sexual conduct while intoxicated or evidence that she was sexually assaulted while passed-out was simply not relevant to the issues in the case. [1] W.R.E. 401 (`Relevant evidence' means evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.). Inasmuch as this victim's sexual history was held to be not relevant, it was, therefore, not admissible. W.R.E. 401 and 402 (Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.). After declaring evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct to be inadmissible, there was no need for the district court to conduct any further analysis under any of the other evidentiary rules. W.R.E. 104(a), 401, 402. The trial judge then informed Appellant's trial counsel that the court would revisit the issue during trial if it were raised as an offer of proof outside the hearing of the jury. [2] See W.R.E. 104(b). Since Appellant has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in making this preliminary evidentiary ruling, we uphold that determination. Edwards, ¶ 7, 167 P.3d at 637. [¶ 18] Appellant's objective of placing the victim's self-endangering proclivities before the jury to vitiate any proof of his specific intent to harm her went almost unimpeded by the district court's exclusion of certain irrelevant evidence. The victim admitted that she had hurt herself when intoxicated; she had experienced acute and chronic health problems while under the influence of alcohol; she had been arrested for driving under the influence; and, she was an habitual drinker. She acknowledged that she had informed Appellant of these facts, or knew that he was in a position to have personally observed them. The victim's mother outlined the victim's addiction to drinking, that the victim had been arrested for driving while intoxicated, and that the victim had once been left stranded in the desert after a bout of drinking. The victim's former roommate testified that the victim's incessant drinking precipitated the termination of their living arrangement. A former neighbor described how he had observed the victim being taken away by ambulance after she consumed straight vodka from the bottle. The victim's prior boyfriend testified that he decided to end their relationship due to her habitual drinking. Appellant testified at trial. He explained that the victim had crashed his car when she was intoxicated; the victim had to be removed from bars due to her drinking to the point of unconsciousness; the victim is often inebriated to the point that she has no orientation of time or place; the victim suffers health problems stemming from her use of alcohol; and, once, while passed-out, a stranger photographed her nude body. Appellant concluded that he was aware of the victim's past risky behaviors inevitably attributed to her alcohol consumption, and that his intent at the time of the events giving rise to his criminal charges was merely to protect the victim. [¶ 19] Throughout the entire trial, there was only one occasion where Appellant's trial counsel crossed into forbidden areas of evidence production, yet no offer of proof was made. [3] While cross-examining the victim, Appellant's trial attorney inquired about a prior marriage and whether she had been sexually assaulted. This drew an objection from the attorney for the State. At a bench conference on the objection, the district court sustained the objection since the inquiry fell into previously disallowed subjects. Instead of making an offer of proof, Appellant's counsel sought permission to query the victim regarding photographs taken of the victim while nude after she passed-out from alcohol consumption. The court permitted this line of questioning. [¶ 20] In order to protect the record and to satisfy the requirements of W.R.E. 103, Appellant needed to make a timely showing that a substantial right [of Appellant was] affected and the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. W.R.E. 103(a)(2). Quite simply, Appellant should have made an offer of proof if he intended to attack the district court's evidentiary rulings: [T]here is only one prudent way for an offer of proof to be made at trial. The attorney who seeks to offer evidence, which has been refused or to which an objection has been upheld, should take the initiative. The offer of proof should then take the form of counsel's eliciting the proposed testimony directly from the witness, or entering the tangible evidence in the record, all outside of the hearing of the jury. Bloomfield, ¶ 23, 234 P.3d at 375 (quoting Rudolph v. State, 829 P.2d 269, 275 (Wyo. 1992)). Further, It is settled law that a proponent of evidence has the burden to apprise the trial court that a rule of evidence permits the admission of that evidence. Moe v. State, 2005 WY 149, ¶ 9, 123 P.3d 148, 151 (Wyo. 2005). [T]he offer of proof must specifically indicate the purpose of the testimony. Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241, 245 (Wyo.1977). Bloomfield, ¶ 20, 234 P.3d at 374. [¶ 21] Appellant's decision not to give an offer of proof stripped the district court's ability to reconsider its exclusion of evidence at an appropriate time during trial, and it now inhibits meaningful appellate review of the district court's action. Id., ¶ 23, 234 P.3d at 375-76 (quoting Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 338 (Wyo.1998)) (The lack of an offer of proof impacts the district court's ruling and severely impedes appellate review.). Indeed, Appellant's omission to make an offer of proof must result in a waiver of his ability to attribute error to the district court. Padilla v. State, 601 P.2d 189, 194 (Wyo.1979) (citing Meredith v. Hardy, 554 F.2d 764 (5th Cir.1977) and Yost v. A.O. Smith Corp., 562 F.2d 592 (8th Cir.1977)). [¶ 22] Appellant has not satisfied his burden of showing that the district court abused its discretion in making evidentiary rulings excluding irrelevant evidence of the victim's past conduct. Edwards, ¶ 7, 167 P.3d at 637. It was reasonable for the district court to conclude as it did, and we, therefore, find no error.