Opinion ID: 2592928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 10 Officer Cobb testified he knew there was no weapon in Garvin's coin pocket but continued squeezing in one slow motion because he felt something and suspected it might be a baggy with narcotics. In doing so, he exceeded the permissible scope of a limited Terry stop-and-frisk. Without probable cause and a warrant, an officer is limited in what he can do. He cannot arrest a suspect; he cannot conduct a broad search. State v. Setterstrom, 163 Wash.2d 621, 626, 183 P.3d 1075 (2008) (citing Hudson, 124 Wash.2d at 112, 874 P.2d 160). ¶ 11 As a general rule, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d at 171, 43 P.3d 513 (citing State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 736, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984)). There are a few `jealously and carefully drawn exceptions' to the warrant requirement, which include exigent circumstances, searches incident to a valid arrest, inventory searches, plain view searches, and Terry investigative stops. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d at 171-72, 43 P.3d 513 (quoting Williams, 102 Wash.2d at 736, 689 P.2d 1065, and citing State v. Rife, 133 Wash.2d 140, 150-51, 943 P.2d 266 (1997)). The State bears a heavy burden to show the search falls within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions. State v. Jones, 146 Wash.2d 328, 335, 45 P.3d 1062 (2002). The State must establish the exception to the warrant requirement by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Smith, 115 Wash.2d 775, 789, 801 P.2d 975 (1990). ¶ 12 In what is commonly known as a Terry stop, a police officer may briefly stop and detain an individual for investigation without a warrant if the officer reasonably suspects the person is engaged or about to be engaged in criminal conduct. State v. Day, 161 Wash.2d 889, 895, 168 P.3d 1265 (2007). The officer may briefly frisk the individual for weapons if she reasonably believes her safety or that of others is endangered. Id.; see Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. For a permissible Terry stop, the State must show (1) the initial stop is legitimate, (2) a reasonable safety concern exists to justify the protective frisk for weapons, and (3) the scope of the frisk is limited to the protective purposes. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d at 172, 43 P.3d 513; see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). ¶ 13 Here, Garvin does not contest Officer Cobb was justified in stopping him and frisking him for weapons. Rather, he argues Cobb exceeded the permissible scope of the frisk by squeezing his pocket rather than patting him down. Garvin contends the Court of Appeals extended one of this Court's carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement in treating an officer's squeeze search as synonymous with a lawful pat down. Supplemental Br. of Pet'r. at 7. According to Garvin, Division Three held police officers can lawfully manipulate objects from the outset of a Terry frisk so long as the manipulation is intrusive enough to allow for the immediate recognition of contraband. Id. at 6. ¶ 14 The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the search was lawful under the plain touch doctrine discussed in Hudson, 124 Wash.2d at 113-20, 874 P.2d 160. But Division Three acknowledged that under Hudson, [a]t the point the officer ascertains a weapon is not involved, any continuing search becomes unreasonable. Garvin, 141 Wash.App. 1015, 2007 WL 3112416, at  (citing Hudson, 124 Wash.2d at 113, 874 P.2d 160). According to the court, The officer may not slide, squeeze or in any other manner manipulate the object to ascertain its incriminating nature. Such manipulation of the object will exceed the scope of a Terry frisk. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 15 The Court of Appeals was correct to cite Hudson but misapplied it to the facts of this case, which come down to the officer's report and his testimony at the suppression hearing. First, it is important to understand the facts of Hudson. In Hudson, 124 Wash.2d at 110, 874 P.2d 160, police detectives conducted a pat-down search of a suspect wearing a jacket. While patting down the outside of the man's jacket, one of the detectives `felt a quite substantial bulge, hard something' in the right jacket pocket, which the officer thought might be a weapon. Id. (quoting videotape recorded proceedings at 50-51). The detective reached into the pocket, felt the item, and instantly recognized it as a pager. The officer also felt paperwork and a baggie containing a `ragged edge chunk' of substance that he suspected was a large rock of cocaine. Id. (quoting videotape recorded proceedings at 54). The officer took out the baggie and pager, confirming his suspicions, and he and his partner arrested the man, searching the rest of his pockets, which yielded more cocaine and a large stash of cash. Id. ¶ 16 In Hudson, the trial court had suppressed the evidence, reasoning that `[a]s soon as the detective realized he was not feeling a weapon, any further search of the baggie was unjustified.' Id. at 111, 874 P.2d 160 (quoting Clerk's Papers at 48). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, reasoning Washington had not recognized a plain touch exception to the warrant requirement because the tactile sense does not usually result in the immediate knowledge of the nature of an item. Id. ¶ 17 This court reversed the Court of Appeals in Hudson, holding that prior decisions did not preclude the application of the plain touch doctrine but instead merely acknowledged that touch alone cannot `usually' result in immediate recognition of contraband. Id. at 115, 874 P.2d 160 (quoting State v. Broadnax, 98 Wash.2d 289, 298, 654 P.2d 96 (1982), abrogated on other grounds by Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993)). This court reiterated that the application of the plain touch doctrine depends on whether an officer's recognition of the contraband is as immediate and as accurate as recognition of a weapon, thereby meeting a key requirement of the plain view doctrine. Id. at 115, 874 P.2d 160. [8] Significantly, in Hudson, we remanded for further fact finding to determine whether the detective immediately recognized he was touching cocaine or whether he improperly continued his search after realizing there was no weapon. Id. at 119-20, 874 P.2d 160. ¶ 18 Here, the trial court did not enter a specific finding on whether Officer Cobb determined Garvin's coin pocket contained the baggy with suspected contraband before or after he discovered there was no weapon there. The trial court merely found that, [u]pon squeezing the pocket the officer immediately recognized the incriminating character of a baggy and its contents as possible narcotics. This was based on the location, size and feel of the baggy. CP at 33 (Finding of Fact IV). To be sure, this finding in itself is confusing: can the officer recognize it's a baggy full of narcotics because of its telltale location in the coin pocket, or must he continue squeezing until he doesn't just feel the outside of the bag but its granular contents? Under either interpretation, the court's finding does not fully track the officer's report and testimony. ¶ 19 In his report, Cobb indicates he first felt something in the coin pocket, which he recognized ... as a plastic baggie. Id. at 14. He continued squeezing and noticed [t]here was something inside the plastic baggie that moved around inside when I squeezed it. Id.; see also RP at 9. He similarly testified, It was obvious when I squeezed it gave way.... As I continued to squeeze, the granules separated. It's like the area I pinched granules separated and down from there. RP at 9 (emphasis added). ¶ 20 The officer admitted he did not feel any weapons or hard objects in the pocket but continued to squeeze in one motion anyway. Id. at 12. This indicates Cobb immediately ascertained there were no weapons (whether razor blades or needles small enough to fit in a tiny coin pocket), and then as he continued to manipulate, he discovered the baggy and its substance with a granular texture. Id. at 9-10, 12. Indeed, to feel 0.5 grams of methamphetamine through a plastic bag and a jeans coin pocket, Cobb needed to manipulate the contents thoroughly. His testimony about how coin pockets are common places to stash dime baggies further indicates that at that point, the squeezing was not about finding weapons but about discovering drugs. Thus, Cobb's actions run afoul of both Hudson's requirement of immediate recognition of contraband, 124 Wash.2d at 115, 874 P.2d 160, and Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334, which we cited with approval in Hudson. ¶ 21 In Dickerson, id. at 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130 the United States Supreme Court held police may seize contraband detected through the sense of touch only as long as the protective pat-down stays within the bounds marked by Terry. That's because touch alone can result in an officer's immediate knowledge of suspected contraband if the contour or mass of the object makes its identity immediately apparent. Id. at 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130. However, the Court said that since the officer in Dickerson determined the lump was contraband only after squeezing and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket, which the officer already knew contained no weapon, the search exceeded the lawful bounds of Terry. Id. at 368-78, 113 S.Ct. 2130. ¶ 22 Like the United States Supreme Court, this court has recognized a Terry frisk for weapons must be brief and nonintrusive. Day, 161 Wash.2d at 895, 168 P.3d 1265. In State v. Hobart, 94 Wash.2d 437, 446, 617 P.2d 429 (1980) for example, an officer felt spongy objects in the defendant's pocket during a weapons pat-down. Although the officer did not fear the objects were weapons, he squeezed them anyway and determined they contained narcotics. Id. This court held that once the officer ascertained the objects were not weapons, the permissible scope of the search ended and he needed probable cause to search further. Id. To approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated to weapons would be to invite the use of weapons[] searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches, and thus to severely erode the protection of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 447, 617 P.2d 429; see also State v. Loewen, 97 Wash.2d 562, 567, 647 P.2d 489 (1982) (noting officer's search exceeded scope when he removed a small tube used for sniffing cocaine after determining the pocket contained no weapons). ¶ 23 Since the methamphetamine Cobb discovered in Garvin's coin pocket was the product of an unlawful search, the evidence must be suppressed. The exclusionary rule mandates the suppression of evidence gathered through unconstitutional means. Duncan, 146 Wash.2d at 176, 43 P.3d 513. The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).