Opinion ID: 883367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: voluntary abandonment of the crimes charged

Text: Second, Mahoney argues that he could not be found guilty of the crimes charged because he voluntarily abandoned his criminal efforts. The Montana attempt statute in effect when Mahoney pled guilty provides that, [a] person commits the offense of attempt when, with the purpose to commit a specific offense, he does any act towards the commission of such offense. (Emphasis added.) Section 45-4-103(1), MCA (1987). State v. Ribera (1979), 183 Mont. 1, 11, 597 P.2d 1164, 1170. Further: This Court has stated that an overt act `must reach far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation.' In addition, the Court stated that `there must be at least some appreciable fragment of the crime committed, and it must be in such progress that it will be consummated unless interrupted by circumstances independent of the will of the attempter.' Ribera, 597 P.2d at 1170, citing State v. Rains (1917), 53 Mont. 424, 164 P. 540. In this case, Mahoney accosted Ms. Brandt, prevented her escape from the store and then stabbed his struggling victim twelve times, causing serious injuries, including damage to her lungs, liver and kidneys. It can hardly be argued that this is not at least some appreciable fragment of the crime [of deliberate homicide] committed [and that his actions reached] far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation. Ribera, 597 P.2d at 1170. Moreover, Mahoney forcibly pulled down Ms. Brandt's pants, lifted her shirt up, cut her bra straps and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her. Notwithstanding that she was seriously wounded from the stabbing, Ms. Brandt resisted the defendant's attack by holding her hands in front of her genitals to prevent him from having sexual intercourse. Mahoney himself stated in the proceeding to change his plea to guilty that his intent was to have sexual intercourse with the victim. These actions by Mahoney likewise unequivocally established that at least some fragment of the crime of sexual intercourse without consent was committed and that such actions reached far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation. Ribera, 597 P.2d at 1170. There is no doubt from the conduct of the defendant in this case that, with the purpose to commit the crimes of deliberate homicide and sexual intercourse without consent, he did ... act[s] toward the commission of such offense[s]. Section 45-4-103(1), MCA (1987). However, Subsection (4) of § 45-4-103, MCA (1987), provides a defense to the offense of attempt. It is on this defense which Mahoney relies for his claim that he could not be found guilty of the crimes to which he pled guilty. Section 45-4-103(4), MCA (1987), provides that: A person shall not be liable under this section if, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, he avoided the commission of the offense attempted by abandoning his criminal effort. Mahoney offers his telephone call to the police as evidence that he voluntarily and completely renounced his criminal purpose by abandoning his efforts to commit deliberate homicide and sexual intercourse without consent. The amended information discloses that after preventing her escape from the store and after stabbing the victim numerous times, Mahoney forcibly tried to disrobe the struggling Ms. Brandt, and then began to rub his penis up and down against the back of the victim's hands as she held them in front of her genitals. When he saw a large amount of blood from her wounds he stopped, went around the checkout counter and called Billings police. We are assisted in answering the question of whether Mahoney voluntarily and completely renounced his criminal purpose and abandoned his criminal effort by the decision of a sister state which has extensively explored this issue. The State of Michigan recognizes the affirmative defense of voluntary abandonment but qualifies the definition of voluntary abandonment, stating: Abandonment is not `voluntary' when the defendant fails to complete the attempted crime because of unanticipated difficulties, unexpected resistance, or circumstances which increase the probability of detention or apprehension. (Emphasis added.) People v. McNeal (1986), 152 Mich. App. 404, 393 N.W.2d 907, 912, citing People v. Kimball (1981), 109 Mich.App 273, 311 N.W.2d 343, 349. The defendant in Kimball was charged with and convicted of attempted unarmed robbery. He argued that he voluntarily abandoned his criminal enterprise before the crime was consummated; therefore, he could not be found guilty of attempt. The Kimball court concluded that voluntary abandonment was a defense to a prosecution for criminal attempt (see § 45-4-103(4), MCA.). Kimball, 311 N.W.2d at 349. However, the court stated emphatically, that abandonment was not voluntary when the criminal endeavor was not completed because of unanticipated difficulties or unexpected resistance. Kimball, 311 N.W.2d at 349. Although Michigan's attempt statute differs from ours, we agree with the approach set forth in Kimball. In arriving at its conclusion that voluntary abandonment is a defense to a criminal attempt, the Kimball court extensively reviewed authoritative commentary on criminal attempt law, citing Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), ch. 6, § 3, p. 590, among others. Perkins states that although a criminal plan has proceeded far enough to support a conviction of criminal attempt, it would be sound to recognize the possibility of a locus penitentiae so long as no substantial harm has been done and no act of actual danger committed. Kimball, 311 N.W.2d at 347. (Underlined emphasis added.) Perkins prefaces the above cited statement in his treatise on criminal law, by commenting that there are limitations to the use of abandonment as a defense to the crime of attempt. Attempted murder cannot be purged after the victim has been wounded, no matter what may cause the plan to be abandoned. Perkins at 590. We agree with Perkins' logic, particularly in this case, where the defendant prevented the victim's escape, stabbed her twelve times causing grievous injury and then tried to forcibly rape her. At this point, substantial harm had been done and acts of actual danger had, indeed, been committed. Moreover, Mahoney's actions represent at least some appreciable fragment of the crime [to be] committed. Ribera, 597 P.2d at 1170. Nor did Mahoney voluntarily and completely renounce his criminal purpose by abandoning his attempt to commit the crimes of deliberate homicide and sexual intercourse without consent, as required by § 45-4-103, MCA (1987). Even after the victim had been repeatedly stabbed, she was able to thwart the defendant's attack by holding her hands over her genitals, trying to prevent him from engaging in sexual intercourse with her. As stated in Kimball and McNeal, an abandonment is not voluntary if the defendant fails to complete the crime because of unanticipated difficulties [or] unexpected resistance. Kimball, 311 N.W.2d at 349; McNeal, 393 N.W.2d at 912. Mahoney did not abandon his criminal conduct until he met with unanticipated difficulties and unexpected resistance. He only called the police after observing that the victim was bleeding profusely from the wounds which he inflicted and because she struggled and successfully protected herself from being raped. Mahoney's conduct is not a manifestation of voluntary and complete renunciation of criminal purpose and an abandonment of criminal effort. That he did not actually consummate the crimes of sexual intercourse without consent and deliberate homicide was due not to any voluntary renunciation of criminal purpose on his part but to good fortune that the victim was not killed by the stabbing and the simple fact that circumstances occasioned by his brutal attack and the victim's continued resistance made further criminal effort impracticable. Mahoney's self-serving and conclusory arguments to the contrary exalt form over substance. Under the test enunciated above, i.e. that there is no voluntary and complete renunciation of criminal purpose and abandonment of criminal effort, where substantial harm has been done and acts of actual danger have been committed, or where the defendant fails to complete the attempted crime because of unanticipated difficulties, unexpected resistance or circumstances which increase the probability of detention or apprehension; under § 45-4-103(1) and (4), MCA (1987), and our prior case law; and under the facts of this case, we conclude that Mahoney committed the offenses of attempted deliberate homicide and attempted sexual intercourse without consent and that he has failed to establish his abandonment defense. Accordingly, Mahoney's argument that he could not have been found guilty of the crimes of attempted deliberate homicide and attempted sexual intercourse without consent to which he pled guilty is without merit.