Opinion ID: 782410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McClain in the Second Circuit

Text: 49 The McClain defendants were convicted of conspiring to violate the NSPA by importing artifacts from Mexico that were covered by a Mexican law declaring all such artifacts to be owned by the Mexican government. See id. at 992. The defendants claimed, as Schultz does here, that the NSPA did not apply to stolen objects that were taken in violation of patrimony laws. See id. at 994. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the NSPA did apply to such objects. 4 See id. at 996-97. 50 The McClain Court cited precedent according an expansive meaning to the term stolen in the NSPA, including United States v. Handler, 142 F.2d 351, 353 (2d Cir.1944), which held that embezzled property is stolen within the meaning of the NSPA. See McClain, 545 F.2d at 995 (citing cases). The McClain Court also cited United States v. Bottone, 365 F.2d 389, 393-94 (2d Cir.1966). In Bottone, the defendants photocopied documents detailing secret manufacturing processes, and transported the photocopies across state lines. See Bottone, 365 F.2d at 391. The original documents were taken from the rightful owner only briefly for copying, and were never transported in interstate or foreign commerce. See id. at 393. The Court found that the transport of the photocopies violated the NSPA, and the fact that the photocopies were never possessed by the original owner should be deemed immaterial. Id. at 393-94. 51 The McClain Court also distinguished between mere unlawful export and actual theft, holding that a declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be considered theft, and the exported article considered `stolen,' within the meaning of the [NSPA]. McClain, 545 F.2d at 1000-01. The court engaged in a close study of the Mexican patrimony law, including its language, history and purpose, and concluded that the Mexican government had made a declaration of national ownership satisfying this standard. See id. at 997-1000. As discussed above, Egypt has made a clear declaration of national ownership through Law 117, and has enforced that law accordingly. 52 Summarizing its decision in McClain, the Fifth Circuit stated: 53 This conclusion is a result of our attempt to reconcile the doctrine of strict construction of criminal statutes with the broad significance attached to the word stolen in the NSPA. Were the word to be so narrowly construed as to exclude coverage, for example, with respect to pre-Columbian artifacts illegally exported from Mexico after the effective date of the 1972 [patrimony] law, the Mexican government would be denied protection of the [NSPA] after it had done all it reasonably could do [to vest] itself with ownership to protect its interest in the artifacts. This would violate the apparent objective of Congress: the protection of owners of stolen property. If, on the other hand, an object were considered stolen merely because it was illegally exported, the meaning of the term stolen would be stretched beyond its conventional meaning. Although stealing is not a term of art, it is also not a word bereft of meaning. It should not be expanded at the government's will beyond the connotation depriving an owner of its rights in property conventionally called to mind. 54 McClain, 545 F.2d at 1001-02 (footnotes omitted). We agree that the Fifth Circuit reached the proper balance between these competing concerns in McClain. 55
56 Although McClain is often described as the only federal appeals court case to have considered the application of the NSPA to property deemed stolen under a foreign patrimony law, the issue was actually first encountered by the Ninth Circuit three years before McClain in United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir.1974). The facts of Hollinshead are very similar to those in the case at hand. Hollinshead, a dealer in pre-Columbian artifacts, arranged with one Alamilla, a co-conspirator, to procure such artifacts in Central America, and to finance Alamilla in doing so. Id. at 1155. Once the artifacts were obtained, they were shipped to Hollinshead in the United States. See id. 57 Hollinshead was convicted of conspiracy to transport stolen property in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314. See id. The trial centered on a particular artifact that had been found in a Mayan ruin in the jungle of Guatemala and eventually shipped to Hollinshead. See id. The artifact was stolen as defined by the NSPA because under Guatemalan law all such artifacts are the property of the Republic, and may not be removed without permission of the government. Id. As occurred in this case, the district court had received testimony regarding the law of Guatemala as applied to such artifacts. See id. 58 The Ninth Circuit was not presented in Hollinshead with a direct attack on the application of the NSPA to cases involving patrimony laws; that was not the basis of the defendant's appeal. However, the Ninth Circuit's discussion indicates its acceptance of the prosecution's theory in Hollinshead: that an object is stolen within the meaning of the NSPA if it is taken in violation of a patrimony law. See id. at 1156. We are aware of no other federal appeals court that has reached this issue. 59 The Second Circuit has rarely addressed McClain, and has never decided whether the holding of McClain is the law in this Circuit. See United States v. Long Cove Seafood, 582 F.2d 159, 163, 165 (2d Cir.1978) ( Long Cove ); United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.1999) ( Steinhardt ). 5 Although Schultz asserts that these cases support his position, we disagree with his interpretation of these precedents. 60
61 The defendants in Long Cove were charged with violating the NSPA by taking undersized clams from Long Island Sound and selling them to area restaurants. See Long Cove, 582 F.2d at 161, 162. There was no dispute that the practice of harvesting and selling undersized clams violated various environmental laws; the question was whether the transport of these clams across state lines constituted the interstate transport of stolen goods under the NSPA. See id. at 162-63. The government argued that the clams were stolen from the State of New York because of a New York law that provides: 62 The State of New York owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the state, except those legally acquired and held in private ownership. Any person who kills, takes or possesses such fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea or protected insects thereby consents that title thereto shall remain in the state for the purpose of regulating and controlling their use and disposition. 63 Id. at 164 (quoting N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0105). 64 The Court stated that the key question was whether New York has asserted a true ownership interest in wildlife such as the Fifth Circuit, in [ McClain ], held that Mexico has done since 1972 with respect to pre-Columbian artifacts. We think not. Id. at 165. The Court emphasized that the New York statute stated that the purpose of asserting ownership was only to regulate and control the use and disposition of wildlife, not to actually take possession of it. See id. The Court further noted that while New York claimed to own the wildlife, it was not liable for an attack by any wild animal, as a private owner of such an animal would be. See id. 65 The distinctions between the facts of the Long Cove case and the facts of the case at hand are clear and require a different outcome here. First, as the testimony before the district court made clear, Egypt does assert a possessory interest in antiquities pursuant to Law 117. While the State of New York has never attempted to seize all wildlife found within its borders, Dr. Gaballa testified that the Egyptian government actively pursues any person found to have obtained an antiquity and takes immediate possession of all antiquities of which it becomes aware. 66 Second, both Dr. Gaballa and General El Sobky confirmed that the purpose of Law 117 is to bring all newly discovered antiquities within the direct possession and control of the Egyptian government in order to ensure that they are properly preserved and documented. Hundreds of antiquities police are employed by the Egyptian government solely to effectuate this purpose. To the contrary, the purpose of the New York law is simply to control the use and disposition of wildlife. See Long Cove, 582 F.2d at 164-65. 67 Third, the New York law explicitly excepts those wildlife legally acquired and held in private ownership. Id. at 164. Law 117 provides for no exceptions for private ownership of antiquities discovered after the effective date of the law. 6 It is legal under certain circumstances for a private person to obtain and dispose of wildlife in New York, for instance, by obtaining a hunting, fishing or trapping license. See, e.g., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 11-0701(4) (McKinney 2003) (A fishing license entitles the holder to take fish by angling, spearing, hooking, longbow and tipups, to take frogs by spearing, catching with the hands or by use of a club or hook, and to take bait fish for personal use.). When a licensed hunter or fisherman catches wildlife in New York, it is his to keep and dispose of as he chooses. 68 In Egypt, on the other hand, it is impossible for a private party to get a license to obtain, possess or dispose of antiquities. Law 117 does provide in Article 34 for foreign missions to receive archaeological exploration and excavation licenses. However, Article 35 states that [a]ll antiquities discovered by foreign archaeological excavation missions shall be state owned. If the Antiquities Authority determines that the foreign mission is outstanding, and has performed important excavation and restoration work, the Authority may reward the mission by donating certain antiquities which are expendable by reason of their similarity to other items excavated from the same location. Even then, the donated antiquities must be thoroughly examined and fully recorded, and may only be donated to a museum, not to the excavators themselves. 69 We also note that in Long Cove we were not called upon to rule directly on the application of the NSPA to property owned pursuant to a patrimony law, and we did not question the correctness of McClain. Long Cove cited McClain more than once, in a positive light, which is significant in light of the considerable publicity the Fifth Circuit's controversial holding in McClain had generated at the time. See Long Cove, 582 F.2d at 163, 165. These citations give no indication that the Court disapproved of the outcome or analysis of McClain. 70
71 Schultz also contends that our decision in Steinhardt indicates that we have rejected the holding of McClain. In Steinhardt, the district court had found that an Italian antiquity should be forfeited by Steinhardt, who had imported it into the United States, because (1) Steinhardt had made material misrepresentations on a customs form or, (2) in the alternative, the antiquity was properly owned by the Italian government pursuant to a patrimony law and was therefore stolen property within the meaning of the NSPA and subject to forfeiture. See Steinhardt, 184 F.3d at 134. On appeal, we concluded that Steinhardt had made a material misstatement on a customs form when he represented that the antiquity was from Switzerland, not Italy. See id. at 137. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the antiquity was subject to forfeiture. 7 See id. at 138. The Court declined to reach the alternative ground relied on below, stating: We need not ... address whether the NSPA incorporates concepts of property such as those contained in the Italian patrimony laws. Id. at 134. 72 It is irrelevant that we previously reviewed a case in which it was not necessary to reach the question now before us. It is not at all uncommon for us to decline to reach an issue when the case before us can be resolved on other grounds. See, e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 174 (2d Cir.1990) ([I]n light of our determination that the district court should be affirmed on other grounds, we find it neither necessary nor appropriate to reach this issue today.). Our failure to address a question that is not necessary to the outcome of a case is simply a wise exercise of our discretion. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 402, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part) (Deliberate dicta, I had supposed, should be deliberately avoided. Especially should we avoid passing gratuitously on an important issue of public law where due consideration of it has been crowded out by complicated and elaborate issues that have to be decided.). 8 We find Schultz's reliance on Steinhardt unpersuasive.