Opinion ID: 2352986
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Heading: First Appeal Replevin Case

Text: The appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the appellee's motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the testimony in the replevin case. It is well settled that in order to maintain an action of replevin the plaintiff must prove his right to immediate possession at the time the writ issues. Koch v. Mack Motor Truck Corp., 201 Md. 562, 95 A.2d 105; Dermer v. Faunce, 187 Md. 610, 612, 51 A.2d 76; 46 Am. Jur., Replevin, § 25, 16; 77 C.J.S., Replevin, § 184, 137; 1 Poe, Pleading and Practice (Tiffany Ed.), § 251, wherein it is stated in part    for unless at the time of issuing the writ the plaintiff has the right of possession, he can not succeed, whatever may be his title in other respects. The gist of the action is the plaintiff's right to possession and he must sustain the burden of proof. 1 Poe, supra, § 253. The action does not establish absolute title to the property but only the right to possession. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not the weakness of his adversary's. The uncontradicted fact was that when on July 17, 1959, the appellant caused a writ of replevin to be issued, it possessed four notes which were sent to it by the Union Trust Company upon charging its account with the amount of said notes when the appellee was in default. However, the notes were not reassigned along with the conditional sales contract until July 27, 1959, which was ten days after the replevin action was instituted and the tractor seized. The law is clear that an absolute and unconditional assignment of a conditional sales contract by the vendor thereunder vests in the assignee of the contract such right, title and interest in the property as his assignor had. Plaza Corp. v. Alban Tractor Co., 219 Md. 570, 151 A.2d 170; Burrier v. Cunningham Piano Co., 135 Md. 135, 142, 108 Atl. 492; 6 C.J.S., Assignment, § 82, p. 1136; 47 Am. Jur., Sales, § 931, p. 140. And until the conditional sales contract is reassigned to the assignor he is not entitled to the possession of the property. 47 Am. Jur., supra, § 929, p. 138; 78 C.J.S., Sales, § 641, p. 459. It is true that the appellant had possession (physical) of the four defaulted notes which were charged to it by the Union Trust Company, but this fact did not constitute a reassignment of the legal title to the tractor, which remained in the assignee, the Union Trust Company, until ten days after this suit was filed. Even though under Code (1957), Art. 13, sec. 70, the appellant acquired title to the four notes which had been charged back to it and was entitled to have them endorsed to it, the appellant did not thereby acquire legal title to the contract of conditional sale or the right to the immediate possession of the tractor. Assuming, without deciding, that it thereby acquired some equitable interest in the contract and in the tractor, any such interest falls short of such legal title as entitled it to immediate possession. A case quite similar to this is the case of Erwin v. Potts (Miss.), 63 So.2d 50. There a replevin action was brought by the conditional seller of an automobile against the conditional buyer. The conditional sales contract had been assigned to a credit corporation by the seller at the time the writ of replevin was issued. The conditional vendee had only made two payments under the conditional sales contract and the conditional vendor had paid the balance due and owing under the contract to the credit corporation. There it was held that the legal title to the automobile and the right of action to obtain possession of it remained vested in the credit corporation, until reassigned to the conditional vendor, and that it was of no consequence that the full sum had been paid to the credit corporation. In the case of Eureka-Security Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 276 F.2d 132, 137, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals cites with approval the Erwin case, in a similar factual situation. We think the court below was correct in holding that the appellant had not established its right to immediate possession of the tractor so as to maintain its right of action in replevin and, therefore, properly granted the appellee's motion for a directed verdict.