Opinion ID: 1465675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testing of DNA Evidence

Text: Mr. Johnson requested DNA testing of some evidence and retesting of other evidence both under Act 1780 of 2001, which is codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-201-207 (Supp.2003), and under Rule 37, asserting trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request testing. The evidence at issue consists of the following: (1) a cigarette butt that was located in a green shirt that was bloodstained with the victim's blood and was found in the woods in close proximity to the victim's purse and a white t-shirt that also had the victim's blood on it; (2) negroid hairs found on the white t-shirt and in the victim's apartment on and around the victim's body; and (3) caucasian hairs that were found in the victim's apartment and on the green shirt in the woods. DNA test evidence was presented at both trials on the cigarette butt and negroid hairs, and Johnson was not able to be excluded as the donor of the DNA. According to Kermit Channell of the Arkansas Crime Laboratory, the chances the DNA belonged to another African American was 1 in 250. Sometime after the first trial, further testing was performed on the saliva on the cigarette butt and it was shown that Johnson still was not excluded as the donor and the probability that another African American was the donor of the DNA was decreased from 1 in 250 to 1 in 28 million. In other words, retesting actually made it more likely that it was Johnson's DNA on the cigarette butt. The negroid hairs were not retested. The caucasian hairs have never been tested, and the prosecution stipulated that they did not belong to Johnson. Along with his Rule 37 request for retesting, Mr. Johnson requests retesting of the above items under Act 1780 of 2001, which provides for retesting of evidence when there is new scientific technology available that was not available at trial. Act 1780 of 2001 is codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16-112-201 through 207, and reads as follows: (a)(1) Except when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime may make a motion for the performance of fingerprinting, forensic deoxyribonucleic acid [DNA] testing, or other tests which may become available through advances in technology to demonstrate the person's actual innocence if: (A) The testing is to be performed on evidence secured in relation to the trial which resulted in the conviction; and (B) The evidence was not subject to the testing because either the technology for the testing was not available at the time of the trial or the testing was not available as evidence at the time of the trial. (2) The motion shall be filed before the court in which the conviction was entered. (3) Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served on the prosecuting attorney who represented the state at trial. (b) A person who makes a motion for the performance of fingerprinting, forensic deoxyribonucleic acid testing, or other tests which may become available through advances in technology to demonstrate the person's actual innocence must present a prima facie case that: (1) Identity was an issue at trial; and (2) The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material aspect. (c)(1) The court shall order that testing be performed if: (A) A prima facie case has been established under subsection (b) of this section; (B) The testing has the scientific potential to produce new noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence; and (C) The testing requested employs a scientific method generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. (2) The court shall impose reasonable conditions on the testing designed to protect the state's interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing process. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-202 (Supp.2003). Illinois was the first state to pass postconviction DNA testing laws, and Arkansas's Act 1780 was largely modeled after the Illinois laws. The Illinois model was used by at least three other states, Delaware, Idaho, and Missouri, but most states follow a New York model which differs greatly in standards of review and is more akin to an ineffective assistance standard. Like Act 1780, Illinois's law requires: (1) identity must have been an issue at trial; (2) scientific evidence must not have been available at trial; (3) testing must have potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the assertion of actual innocence; and (4) almost identical provisions for the preservation of evidence. See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3 (West 1998) ( cited in People v. Savory, 197 Ill.2d 203, 258 Ill.Dec. 530, 756 N.E.2d 804 (2001)). In People v. Savory, supra , the Illinois Supreme Court considered a request for testing of evidence in a twenty-year-old conviction. At issue were bloodstains found on the defendant's trousers on the night of the murder. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the issue of whether or not evidence is materially relevant cannot be determined in the abstract, but must be considered along with other evidence introduced at trial. Id. In the Savory case, the trial court had found that Savory was not entitled to retesting unless he could show that results favorable to him would completely exonerate him. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected this, and held that material relevance is not limited to those cases in which a favorable result would completely exonerate the defendant. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of the retesting request, holding that the bloodstains on the trousers were not materially relevant because the prosecution's case rested primarily on other evidence and the bloodstains were essentially collateral. Id. In making this determination, the court went through the litany of other evidence and stated, ... [T]he bloodstain evidence was essentially a collateral issue at trial and was not central to the State's evidence of guilt. Under these circumstances, a test result favorable to the defendant would not significantly advance his claim of actual innocence, but would only exclude one relatively minor item from the evidence of guilt marshaled against him by the State. Id. at 811-12 (emphasis added). Like Arkansas, Delaware modeled its legislation on the Illinois Act. The Delaware Supreme Court, in a similar case, adopted the standards announced in Savory, supra , as follows: Because the Delaware statute was modeled after the Illinois statute, that state's case law is highly persuasive in determining the meaning of [the Delaware statute]. In People v. Savory , the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a lower court's determination that post-conviction DNA testing is available only in cases where the proposed scientific testing will, by itself, completely vindicate a defendant. [FN 22] The Savory court decided the meaning of materially relevant by reference to dictionary definitions and held that, evidence which is `materially relevant' to a defendant's claim of actual innocence is simply evidence which tends to significantly advance that claim. [FN 23] We adopt that definition in construing the identical language in Delaware's statute. When deciding whether evidence is materially relevant, the trial court must consider not only the exculpatory potential of a favorable DNA test result, but also the other evidence presented at trial. [FN 24] Thus, if the State presented a strong case, and a favorable DNA test would discredit only an ancillary fact, the testing should be refused. At the opposite end of the spectrum, where the DNA test could exonerate the defendant, it does not matter how strong the other evidence might have been, [the Delaware statute] is satisfied. Anderson v. State, 831 A.2d 858, 867 (Del.2003). The Delaware court went on to hold that it is irrelevant whether the DNA test is likely to produce favorable or unfavorable results. If testing is warranted under this material relevance standard, the Delaware court held that testing would be authorized regardless of the slight chance it will yield a favorable result. We do not believe, as the Delaware court does, that testing should be authorized regardless of the slight chance it may yield a favorable result. Nonetheless, we do find these cases to be persuasive, particularly with respect to their definition of the term material relevance. Therefore, we hold that DNA testing of evidence is authorized if testing or retesting can provide materially relevant evidence that will significantly advance the defendant's claim of innocence, in light of all the evidence presented to the jury and the evidence presented to the trial court at the Act 1780 hearing. Thus, in the instant case, we must look at the three pieces of evidence at issue in the petition for retesting, (1) the caucasian hairs, (2) the cigarette butt, and (3) the negroid hairs, in light of the other evidence introduced at trial, in order to determine whether the evidence is materially relevant and would require retesting. The other evidence included the following: (1) a bloody green shirt, identified as belonging to Mr. Johnson, [2] was found in a wooded area in close proximity to the victim's purse, a bloody white t-shirt, and a bloody towel. (2) DNA tests showed the victim could not be excluded as the source of the blood on the green shirt, the white t-shirt, and the towel. (3) Officer Hayes McWhirter testified that the victim's young daughter, Ashley Heath, was present in the apartment the night of the murder and gave statements that (A) a black male with a girl sounding name had come into the apartment; (B) the black male had on a green shirt and sweater; (C) the black male fought with her mother because her mother was dating someone else; (D) she saw her mother and the black male fighting, then her mother was laying on the floor and was bloody. (4) Ashley Heath had picked Mr. Johnson out of a photo lineup twice. (5) At the time of his arrest, Mr. Johnson confessed to an Albuquerque police officer that he had killed someone in Arkansas; (6) Testimony read into the record from Mr. Johnson's stepmother, Sharon Johnston, was that Mr. Johnson had been released from jail on another matter the day of the murder, and he had told her he was going to spend the night with a white female who worked at a bank and had two children (this description matched the victim). (7) Testimony was heard from Steven Hill, an inmate who had been jailed with Stacey Johnson on the day of the murder, who stated that Johnson told him he was going to have sex with the first woman he met after being released from jail that day. The Caucasian hairs. In regard to the caucasian hairs that have never been tested, Johnson's request fails under Act 1780 for two reasons. First, subsection (a)(1)(B) requires that the evidence was not subject to testing before trial because the technology for the testing was not available at the time of trial or the testing was not available as evidence at the time of trial. [3] However, DNA testing of some sort was available at trial, and yet the caucasian hairs were not tested. The second reason the request fails as to the caucasian hairs is that this sort of DNA testing is used for the purpose of excluding a defendant as a possible donor. In this case, the prosecution stipulated that Johnson, an African-American, was not the donor of the caucasian hairs. Therefore, not only were the hairs available for at least some DNA testing, the jury knew there were hairs that belonged to someone other than Johnson and it still convicted him. On these facts, we do not believe that the caucasian hairs are evidence that is materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual innocence as required by § 16-112-202(c)(1)(B). With regard to Mr. Johnson's Rule 37 claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request testing of the caucasian hairs, we find that claim is unfounded. Once the prosecution stipulated that these hairs belonged to someone other than Johnson, there was no need for the defense to request retesting. Mr. Johnson contends that the caucasian hairs should have been compared to the DNA database to determine if they matched the DNA of a known serial killer. However beneficial Mr. Johnson thinks such information might be, the fact is that this theory is so speculative that we cannot say a defense attorney was deficient for not having pursued it. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny testing of the caucasian hairs on both the Act 1780 and Rule 37 petitions. The cigarette butt. As to the saliva on the cigarette butt that was found on the green shirt, it was already retested once, pursuant to a request from Mr. Johnson. Far from excluding Mr. Johnson, the probability of the saliva being a donor other than Mr. Johnson went from 1 in 250 to 1 in 28 million, thereby decreasing the probability that the saliva belonged to anyone other than Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson argues that DNA testing has advanced now and there are new genetic markers that can now be tested. In support of his request, Mr. Johnson points to a statement by Kermit Channell of the Arkansas Crime Lab that it is theoretically possible that someone could be excluded based upon a retesting for those additional markers. However, Mr. Channell also testified that the only way a retesting of the cigarette butt could exclude Mr. Johnson would be if he and someone else had the exact same DNA genetic profile  to a certainty of 1 in 28 million  and yet differed in other genetic markers. Mr. Channell testified that it was his opinion that it was extremely unlikely that retesting would rule out Mr. Johnson as the donor of the saliva on the cigarette butt. The trial court denied Mr. Johnson's request to retest the cigarette butt, finding that the defense was seeking an endless succession of retesting of old evidence. We believe the trial court was correct. Act 1780 was not meant to do away with finality in judgments. It was meant to be used to test evidence that will prove actual innocence of a wrongly-convicted person. It is conceivable that one could test and retest evidence repeatedly, each time obtaining a more narrow result, while there still is a theoretical possibility that at some point a retest would exclude a defendant. Where would it end? Act 1780 hearings are governed by Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-205, which states in pertinent part: (d) The court may summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner and may summarily deny a petition if the issues raised in it have previously been decided by the Arkansas Court of Appeals or the Arkansas Supreme Court in the same case. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-112-205(d) (Supp.2003). Mr. Johnson's request has the potential to open a case for retesting of evidence every time science advances to include testing for yet another genetic marker. However, this is simply not the purpose behind § 16-112-201 et seq. Mr. Johnson obtained retesting once on the cigarette butt saliva, and it did not exclude him. In fact, it made it extremely likely that the saliva was his. Such a high probability that the saliva on the cigarette butt was Mr. Johnson's, coupled with Kermit Channell's testimony and all the additional evidence presented to the jury at trial, makes retesting results unlikely to significantly advance Mr. Johnson's claim of innocence. On the Rule 37 claim of ineffectiveness, the defense attorneys were certainly not deficient for deciding to avoid retesting of the cigarette butt, in light of the results of their first retesting request. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of retesting on the cigarette butt on both the Act 1780 and Rule 37 petitions. The negroid hairs. The test results on the negroid hairs presented at trial are much more troubling. At trial, DNA results on these hairs could not exclude Mr. Johnson, but the probability that they belonged to another African-American were only 1 in 250. Considering the population of African-Americans in Arkansas alone, these results could conceivably include hundreds or thousands of people besides Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson acknowledges that retesting could result in the same narrowing of probability that happened when the cigarette butt was retested, but that the 1 in 250 ratio is so broad and includes so many persons other than Mr. Johnson, that he is entitled to retesting of the negroid hairs under Act 1780. We agree that retesting of the negroid hairs could be materially relevant to Mr. Johnson's claim of innocence. Certainly, the other evidence in this trial shows that a favorable result would not per se exonerate Mr. Johnson. Nonetheless, our interpretation of § 16-112-202 does not require such a showing of complete exoneration in order to request retesting alone. The fact that some of the negroid hairs were found on the victim's body made them particularly relevant to the prosecution's case, and test results that would exclude Mr. Johnson could significantly advance his claim of innocence. For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's denial of Mr. Johnson's Act 1780 petition for retesting of the negroid hairs and remand for the trial court to have such tests conducted. [4] While our holding effectively moots Mr. Johnson's Rule 37 request regarding the negroid hairs, we do wish to note that trial counsel testified that when the retest of the cigarette butt came back so unfavorably, it was a strategy decision to not retest the negroid hairs. That seems to have been a prudent decision, and strategic decisions are not within the ambit of a Rule 37.