Opinion ID: 202202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Faragher/Ellerth Jury Instruction

Text: 61 The Municipality argues that the court should have given it the benefit of a Faragher/Ellerth instruction. The Municipality has taken the position that Cruz was Valentín's supervisor. It argues that even if the record shows that there was severe and pervasive harassment, there still was no tangible employment action taken against her, and so it was entitled to assert the affirmative defense under Faragher/Ellerth. 13 62 The Municipality has not pointed to where in the record it ever requested a Faragher/Ellerth instruction. Such a request does not appear in the defendants' joint proposed jury instructions, submitted before trial. In any event, the matter arose before the court instructed the jury, when the court noted that the Municipality's anti-sexual-harassment policy itself was not in evidence. The court reasoned that this omission meant the jury had no way of knowing what opportunities, provided by the Municipality, Valentín had failed to pursue. Counsel for Cruz said [w]e have no objections [to the court's not giving a Faragher instruction]. . . . We know the manual is not in evidence. Counsel for the Municipality stood silently by, as the Municipality concedes in its reply brief. There were no objections after the jury charge was given. 63 Valentín argues that the Municipality expressly waived the Faragher/Ellerth defense. The Municipality counters that Cruz' attorney did not speak for it. Although Valentín asserts that there was a work-sharing arrangement under which Cruz' waiver was binding on the Municipality, and it appears that defense counsel did de facto divide up many tasks, she has not pointed to any record evidence of a binding arrangement. We therefore give the Municipality the benefit of the doubt and treat the issue as forfeited, not waived, and we review for plain error. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 51(d)(2). 64 This means the Municipality must show that an error was committed, that it was plain (meaning obvious), that the error was prejudicial (meaning it affected substantial rights), and that review is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice (meaning that the error seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings). Rivera Castillo v. Autokirey, Inc., 379 F.3d 4, 10 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir.1999); Muñiz v. Rovira, 373 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2004)). 65 The Municipality does not explain why the failure to give the instruction is plain error, and in any event it cannot make such a showing. Plain error review requires that there be an error. There was none. As this court recently observed, [w]here the evidence shows that the defendant cannot prove an affirmative defense under the Faragher standard, there is no reason to remand for the giving of a Faragher instruction. Arrieta-Colon, 434 F.3d at 87. Although there was testimony that the Municipality had an anti-sexual-harassment policy, there is no evidence that it was distributed or that employees of the police department knew about it until after several of the crucial events in this case. 14 There is no basis in the evidence that would permit a finding that the Municipality exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any harassing behavior. 66 Further, the Municipality has made no case that Valentín unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Assuming such opportunities were even open to Valentín, in fact and not just on paper, she pursued them. She complained — and attempted to complain — repeatedly, to several different individuals who were proper people to whom to complain. She was ignored or worse at every turn. The Municipality's point that none of her complaints were in writing is a non sequitur in light of its failure to show that complaints had to be in writing.