Opinion ID: 2748542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Stone’s Retaliation Claim

Text: “Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees who engage in protected conduct,” such as filing a charge of harassment or discrimination. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 325 (5th Cir. 2002). To state a claim for retaliation in violation of Title VII, the plaintiff must allege that her employer took an adverse employment action against her in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct. Notably, the standard for establishing an adverse employment action in the retaliation context differs from the standard in the discrimination context. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 66–68 (2006) (noting that the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII are broader than the anti-discrimination provisions). For purposes of a retaliation claim, an adverse employment action is one that “a reasonable employee would have found . . . materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Id. at 68 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.” Id. at 69. Normally, “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence.” Id. at 68. The standard for adverse employment action is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, “not the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the Title VII complaint.” Id. The majority of Stone’s allegations supporting her claim for retaliation occurred prior to her filing an internal grievance 3 in May 2010 and the EEOC charge in August 2010. As such, any facts claimed as retaliation prior to May 2010 do not have “a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” See McCoy, 492 F.3d at 556–57. 3 The internal grievance was mitigated upon Stone’s transfer to the Houston office. 14 Case: 14-30204 Document: 00512826702 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/05/2014 No. 14-30204 As for events occurring after May 2010, Stone alleges that Lockley singled her out by not giving her credit for all of her audited cases, returned her audited cases too late to be counted toward Stone’s end-of-the-year production numbers, delayed Stone’s transfer to Houston by falsely accusing her of misplacing a form, and convinced Stone’s supervisors in Houston to limit Stone’s telecommuting privileges. We conclude that these actions “might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Taking Stone’s allegations as true, Lockley retaliated against Stone by hindering her professional development, impeding her physical transfer to a new office, and limiting her telecommuting privileges once she arrived in Houston. Especially in light of the less stringent standards applied to pro se pleadings, this is enough to state a claim for retaliation. Cf. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”); RodriguezVives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps of Puerto Rico, 743 F.3d 278, 285 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiff stated claim for retaliation where employer denied her certain assignments and “subjected her to repeated unpleasant and inequitable treatment.”); Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[Plaintiff] suffered a materially adverse action in the form of the unfavorable performance review she received (that affected her eligibility for a merit pay increase) after she complained of racial discrimination.”). Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment with regard to Stone’s retaliation claim.