Opinion ID: 658201
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of compensable hours

Text: 25 Ray's contention that his fee award amounts to $17.34 per hour assumes that he is entitled to compensation for all 2907 hours he claims. Ray errs in that assumption. Time expended independent of the relevant federal litigation is not compensable. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that [t]he time that is compensable under Sec. 1988 is that 'reasonably expended on the litigation.'  See Webb v. Board of Educ. of Dyer County, Tenn., 471 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 1928, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)); see also Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir.1986) (stating that Sec. 1988 does not allow fees for state court litigation based on state law). In addition, the burden rests on Ray to submit a request for fees that will enable the court to determine what time was reasonably expended on the federal litigation. See Webb, 471 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 1928. We have warned that  '[i]n a case where part of the attorney's efforts are to go uncompensated, the burden is on the attorney to provide sufficient evidence for the court to make a correct division.'  Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1139 (11th Cir.1984) (quoting King v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466, 468 (11th Cir.1983)). 26 Ray does not contend that he has submitted his fee request in a form which would enable the district court to determine how much time was spent on the federal litigation. 7 Ray simply insists that he is due to be compensated for all of this time. 27 In determining that only 800 of the 2907 hours were devoted to the federal litigation, the district court noted that Ray's timesheets, in some instances, group together his claimed legal services, thereby making it difficult to determine the exact number of hours undertaken in the present case, vis-a-vis other (non-allowable) discrete proceedings and unsuccessful claims. (Supp.R.1-400 at n. 2). The district court correctly decided that it should disallow all claims for compensation for time expended independent of the federal litigation. However, when a request for attorney's fees does not permit easy division between compensable and non-compensable hours, a district court should require the party seeking fees to refashion its request. See King v. McCord, 707 F.2d 466, 468 (11th Cir.1983). Thus, instead of undertaking the imprecise and tortuous task of determining compensable hours based on Ray's fee request, the district court should have required Ray to resubmit his request in a form that would allow the district court to clearly delineate between the federal litigation and other matters. 28