Opinion ID: 2085440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burden to Determine the Applicability of the ICWA

Text: [¶12] The father argues that once he informed the Department caseworker in 2006 of his belief that he had Indian ancestry, the Department had the duty to seek additional information about his ancestry to determine whether the ICWA applied, and that its one letter to the Bureau failed to satisfy that duty. The father further argues that the court (1) erred in conducting the termination hearing, instead of continuing the proceeding, and (2) deprived him of his fundamental liberty interest when it terminated his parental rights without first determining, based on evidence, that the ICWA did not apply. Essentially the father argues that once any parent in a child protective proceeding alleges that the parent has Indian heritage, the Department assumes the burden to seek and obtain evidence and present it to the court to disprove the allegation of Indian heritage before the case can proceed. [¶13] Generally, in a civil case, the party to a proceeding who has better access to information and is seeking the benefit of a protection or exception to a law has the burden of proof on that point. See generally Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 171 L.Ed.2d 283 (2008); United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartford RR. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n. 5, 78 S.Ct. 212, 2 L.Ed.2d 247 (1957) (The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly in the knowledge of his adversary.); Dowley v. Morency, 1999 ME 137, ¶ 11, 737 A.2d 1061, 1066. To determine which party bears the burden of investigating the Indian heritage of a child and proving or disproving the applicability of the ICWA in a termination of parental rights case, we review the ICWA, Maine's Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, 22 M.R.S. §§ 4001 to 4099-C (2008), and relevant precedent interpreting those laws. [¶14] Other than providing that a petition for child protection must include the names of relatives who are members of an Indian tribe, 22 M.R.S. § 4032(2)(K), State law does not indicate the extent of the Department's burden to investigate beyond making inquiries of the family. [2] We turn, then, to the ICWA. [¶15] The purpose of the ICWA is: [T]o protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.... 25 U.S.C.S. § 1902; see also In re Denice F., 658 A.2d 1070, 1072 (Me.1995) (citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 39, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989)). As a threshold matter, a child involved in a termination of parental rights proceeding must be an Indian child before the ICWA applies. See K.D. v. M.L., 751 N.W.2d 236, 242 (N.D. 2008) (stating that the court makes the legal determination whether the child is an Indian child under § 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), thereby triggering application of ICWA); see also In re J.L.M., 234 Neb. 381, 451 N.W.2d 377, 387 (1990). [¶16] An Indian child, for purposes of the ICWA, means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian Tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(4). An Indian tribe means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services provided to Indians by the Secretary [of the Interior] because of their status as Indians. 25 U.S.C.S. § 1903(8). Accordingly, the term Indian child as defined by the ICWA means something more specific than merely having Native American ancestors. In re Arianna R.G., 259 Wis.2d 563, 657 N.W.2d 363, 368 (2003). [¶17] In addressing the burden of proof issue, we reference a provision of the ICWA that requires that a tribe be notified when the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved. See 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(a). Section 1912(a) provides: In any involuntary proceeding in a State court, where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the ... termination of parental rights to[] an Indian child shall notify the parent ... and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention. 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(a) (emphasis added). [¶18] The ICWA does not define under what circumstances a court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved in a termination proceeding for purposes of deciding whether the ICWA applies. Courts have looked to non-binding guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines for State Courts, Indian Child Custody Proceedings (Guidelines), 44 Fed.Reg. 67584 (Nov. 26, 1979), for guidance when considering whether the ICWA is implicated in a particular case. [3] See, e.g., B.H. v. People ex rel. X.H., 138 P.3d 299, 302 n. 2 (Colo.2006); People v. Diane N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d 1030, 1043-45 (2001); In re Arianna R.G., 657 N.W.2d at 369-70. [¶19] The Guidelines state, In any involuntary child custody proceeding, the state court shall make inquiries to determine if the child involved is a member of an Indian tribe or if a parent of the child is a member of an Indian tribe and the child is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. [4] 44 Fed.Reg. at 67588; see also In re Arianna R.G., 657 N.W.2d at 369. After inquiring, when a state court has reason to believe a child involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian, the court shall seek verification of the child's status from either the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the child's tribe. 44 Fed.Reg. at 67586 (emphasis added). The Guidelines' reason to believe  standard departs inexplicably from the ICWA's reason to know  standard, 25 U.S.C.S. § 1912(a), but that distinction is not significant to this case. [¶20] The Guidelines describe circumstances under which a State court has reason to believe a child involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian child, which include when: (i) Any party to the case, Indian tribe, Indian organization or public or private agency informs the court that the child is an Indian child. (ii) Any public or state-licensed agency involved in child protection services or family support has discovered information which suggests that the child is an Indian child. .... (v) An officer of the court involved in the proceeding has knowledge that the child may be an Indian child. 44 Fed.Reg. at 67586. [¶21] The Guidelines indicate that the court is obligated to inquire if the child involved in a termination of parental rights proceeding is a member of an Indian tribe, or if a parent of the child is a member of an Indian tribe and the child is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe. Pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4032(2)(K), the Department shares this obligation. See also Commentary to 44 Fed.Reg. at 67586 (The guidelines also list several circumstances which shall trigger an inquiry by the court and petitioners to determine whether a child is an Indian for purposes of [the ICWA] (emphasis added)). However, the party asserting the applicability of the ICWA has the burden to provide sufficient information to at least put the court or Department on notice that the child may be an Indian child, within the meaning of the ICWA, and that further inquiry is necessary. See generally In re Arianna R.G., 657 N.W.2d at 370-72; see also In re J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d at 387 ([A] party to a proceeding who seeks to invoke a provision of the [ICWA] has the burden to show that the act applies in the proceedings.). The Bureau's response to the Department's request for information recognized a similar burden upon one claiming Indian heritage, stating, If families declare Indian blood they need to give appropriate information regarding family or relatives who may be Indian, with names, birth dates, place of birth and Tribal affiliation for proper searches to be completed. [¶22] If, as a result of information it receives, the Department or court has reason to believe that the child may be an Indian child, the Guidelines provide that the Department or court is obligated to verify the child's status either through the Bureau or, if possible, through the tribe at issue. See 44 Fed.Reg. at 67586. Here the Department and the court complied with their obligations to determine whether Trever is an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA. The court affirmatively inquired at the jeopardy hearing whether the father is a member of a federally-recognized Indian tribe, and, based on the father's response, determined that the ICWA did not apply. The father agreed with that conclusion in the only significant court hearing at which he appeared. Subsequently, the father alleged to a Department caseworker that he had some Indian heritage, but failed to provide any information to support his allegation. Even if we were to assume that the father's bare allegation of Indian heritage was sufficient to trigger action on the part of the Department, the Department took the proper action. Despite the father's failure to identify the tribe, provide other necessary information, or to even remain in regular contact with the Department, the Department attempted to investigate the father's vague claim of Indian heritage by sending a letter, including what information it had to support the father's claim, to the Bureau. [5] The Department's action in contacting the Bureau is precisely what is recommended in the Bureau's guidelines. [¶23] On the morning of the termination hearing, more than three years after denying Indian heritage at the jeopardy hearing and two years after alleging that he had some Indian ancestry, the father alleged for the first time, through his attorney, that he thought he had Cherokee background. This vague and questionable eleventh-hour suggestion of Cherokee background did not cause the Department or the court to know or have reason to know that Trever is or might be an Indian child. See, e.g., In re Arianna R.G., 657 N.W.2d at 370-71 (party's vague assertion of having Chippewa ancestry, but failing to give information accurate or complete enough to allow a determination to be made, did not put the court on notice that the children involved in the proceeding were Indian children); see also Diane N., 256 Ill.Dec. 788, 752 N.E.2d at 1044 (father had the burden of producing evidence sufficient to allow the court to determine whether the child was an Indian child, and two vague references in the record to his claim of Indian heritage and his being the son of a full-blooded Blackfoot Indian did not meet this burden); In re A.L. and J.L., 623 N.W.2d 418, 420, 422 (N.D.2001) (holding that a party asserting the applicability of the ICWA must produce evidence for the court to decide whether a child is an Indian child, and that the ICWA was not invoked based on unsupported and vague statements when nothing in evidence suggested that the children were members of, or eligible for membership in, the Turtle Mountain Indian Tribe or other tribe). [¶24] As one court stated, although the purpose of the ICWA is to permit tribal involvement when tribal members are engaged in child custody matters, reasonable grounds to believe [that a child is an `Indian child'] must depend upon the totality of the circumstances and include consideration of not only the nature and specificity of available information but also the credibility of the source of that information and the basis of the source's knowledge. B.H., 138 P.3d at 300, 303-05 (holding, under the facts of that case, that the court could have had reason to believe that the child could have been an Indian child and remanding for further proceedings). [¶25] In the case before us, based on the totality of the circumstances and the father's failure to provide more specific information in the three years preceding the termination hearing, it was not clear error for the court to determine that the father's last-minute assertion of Indian heritage was not credible. Even if the court had halted the proceedings to allow the Department to again contact the Bureau for information, as provided in the Bureau's guidelines, it would have been a futile exercise. The father's asserted potential affiliation with the Cherokee Tribe did not provide the information that the Bureau would have needed, as described in its letter, to determine the father's, or the child's, ancestry. [¶26] While we take very seriously parental rights matters that implicate children of Indian ancestry, here the father did not meet his burden of producing sufficient information to obligate the Department or the court to make further inquiry into his ancestry beyond the steps taken. The court was not required to continue the termination proceeding based on the father's vague, last minute, allegation of Cherokee background.