Opinion ID: 1159996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did The Superior Court Properly Deny Lawrence's Motion To Modify Based Upon AS 25.24.170?

Text: AS 25.24.170 provides in part: [A]ny time after judgment the court, upon motion of either party, may set aside, alter, or modify so much of the judgment as may provide ... for the care and custody of the minor children or for their nurture and education. We interpreted this statute in Curley v. Curley, 588 P.2d 289, 291 (Alaska 1979), holding as follows: Generally, the rule is that modification of a support order may be obtained only where there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances occurring subsequent to the original order. Lawrence argues that a material and substantial change in circumstances is no longer a strict requirement for modification of a child support order, relying on Headlough v. Headlough, 639 P.2d 1010 (Alaska 1982) and Larson v. Larson, 661 P.2d 626, 628 n. 2 (Alaska 1983). In Headlough, the custodial parent testified that her expenses had not changed for the upkeep of her two minor children and that her income had not declined. Nevertheless, we held that her discovery that the sum originally awarded was inadequate to meet her children's needs constituted a change in circumstances. Noting that our primary concern was the best interests and welfare of the children of divorced parents, we reasoned as follows: In a true sense then, there was a change in circumstances. There was a change in the sense that there may have been a mistake in the assumption made when the decree was entered  that the real needs of Kathy for support of the children were something different from that which had been assumed seven months earlier. Id. at 1013. Thus, Headlough does not indicate that the change in circumstances requirement has been relaxed. Rather, as the court noted in Larson, it means only that parties need not show a change in income or in the needs of the children to meet the substantial change in circumstances requirement. Larson, 661 P.2d at 628 n. 2. Lawrence does not assert that a mistake was made when the award was entered. Neither do the considerations prevailing in Headlough apply in this case. Since Lawrence has failed to demonstrate either that his circumstances have changed or that the original award was mistaken, he has failed to meet the requirements of AS 25.24.170. Lawrence further contends, relying on Dowling, that a change in the law is sufficient to meet the substantial change in circumstances requirement. Dowling does not support this proposition. In Dowling, the child support agreement provided that payments would be made until the child turned nineteen, married, died or became otherwise emancipated. Dowling, 679 P.2d at 482. Subsequently, the statutory age of majority was reduced by the Alaska Legislature from nineteen to eighteen. AS 25.20.010. The question confronting the court in Dowling was not one of modification, but merely of interpreting the agreement, i.e., whether otherwise emancipated included emancipation by operation of law. Dowling, 679 P.2d at 482. On the basis of the foregoing we hold that Lawrence failed to show a change in circumstances which would allow the superior court to modify its divorce decree under AS 25.24.170, eliminating the portion of the decree requiring him to pay post-majority educational child support.