Opinion ID: 451968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Question Concerning Gibson's Past Conviction

Text: 31 Appellant Gibson argues that the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the government, on cross-examination, asked him if he had been convicted of an offense involving methaqualone (quaaludes). Gibson argues that this question, which was never answered, was irreparably prejudicial. Gibson states that under Rule 609(a), Fed.R.Evid., and cases such as United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2162, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980), evidence of a prior conviction may be admitted only after an on-the-record determination by the trial court that the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial value. Gibson correctly notes that no such determination was made in this case. 32 Evidence of past convictions need not be subjected to these restrictions, however, if it is offered for purposes other than impeaching a witness. See United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1979) (evidence offered to contradict direct testimony not subject to restrictions of Rule 608(a)). The government argues that on direct examination Keating had equivocated in a self-serving manner concerning his involvement with the sale of drugs and the drug-trafficking schemes of the Outlaws. It claims that evidence of an earlier conviction was intended to counter the implication of Keating's testimony that he was unfamiliar with the world of large-scale drug traffic. Not only would the evidence of a conviction have been useful in dispelling this illusion, but since objection was immediately made and the question was never answered, any error in permitting the question seems likely to have been harmless. 11