Opinion ID: 779125
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent State Grounds

Text: 91 Hutchison also argues that the state postconviction court's determination that his claims were procedurally barred was intertwined with federal law, and therefore was not an independent state-law ground for denial of his petition. Hutchison bases this argument on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the defendant's constitutional due process claim on direct review from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion that the argument was waived under a state procedural rule. Id. at 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The Ake Court reasoned that because the state-law waiver rule did not apply to constitutional errors, [b]efore applying the waiver doctrine to a constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question. Id. at 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Thus, the Court could review the state supreme court's decision insofar as that decision was premised upon a determination of the merits of the defendant's federal-law claim. The Court explained that when resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. Id. 92 Hutchison argues that the Tennessee criminal appeals court's conclusion that his Brady claims were barred is similarly intertwined with federal law. In order to reach the conclusion that his claims had been waived, Hutchison argues, the court had to consider whether, under Burford, Hutchison was afforded a fair opportunity to present his claims. Hutchison argues that the exception recognized in Burford is based upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207-08 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982)); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000). Therefore, Hutchison asserts that the state court's determination of the waiver issue was necessarily based upon the application of federal constitutional law. 93 The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Coleman, 501 U.S. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. 2546. In Coleman, a habeas petitioner argued, relying on Ake, that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that his appeal was barred by the statute of limitations was not independent of federal law because state law required tolling of the limitations period if denial of an extension of time would abridge a constitutional right. Id. at 741, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Court, after expressing some doubt as to whether Ake applied in the habeas context, concluded that even if Ake applies here, it does [petitioner] no good because the Virginia Supreme Court relied on an independent state procedural rule. Id. The Court explained that the Virginia Supreme Court's tolling doctrine did not require state courts to examine the merits of the petitioner's federal constitutional claims before applying the bar. Instead, the Court concluded, [a] more natural reading is that the Virginia Supreme Court will only grant an extension of time if the denial itself would abridge a constitutional right. That is, the Virginia Supreme Court will extend its time requirement only in those cases in which the petitioner has a constitutional right to have the appeal heard. Id. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Court then explained that the tolling rule was of no help to the petitioner's jurisdictional argument, because he did not contend that the failure of the Virginia Supreme Court to hear his untimely state habeas appeal violated one of his constitutional rights. Id. 94 Coleman controls in the instant case. The Burford exception applies when the strict application of the statute of limitations would constitute a denial of federal and state due process rights by depriving the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. Thus, as with the Virginia rule, Burford provides an exception to the statute of limitations when the denial of the hearing itself would violate the petitioner's constitutional due process rights. Unlike Ake, the decision to apply the Burford exception does not depend upon the state court's determination of the merits of the petitioner's constitutional challenges to his conviction or sentence. 6 Indeed, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals expressly stated that it was not reviewing the merits of Hutchison's Brady claim. Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at  ([W]e determine[ ] that the petition was properly dismissed because it had been filed after expiration of the statute of limitations and a prior post-conviction petition had been filed and heard on the merits....). Because Hutchison, like the petitioner in Coleman, does not assert that the state's denial of a second postconviction hearing was itself a constitutional violation, the state court's decision not to apply the Burford exception is not reviewable by this Court. Accord Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 868 (6th Cir.2000) (The Supreme Court ... does not find the mere reservation of discretion to review for plain error in exceptional circumstances sufficient to constitute an application of federal law.). 95