Opinion ID: 2131379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The judge found: [7]

Text: Garcia intended, while not so drunk as to be unable to plan ahead, to kill his wife if he found her with another man: I think he formed an intent to do away with her if he caught her with somebody else.    That the court is convinced that he was not so drunk as to be unable to plan ahead to do what he did. Pursuant to that plan he went with a pistol to kill her if the occasion arose and he thought he should: I think he went to Clinton early Monday morning with his pistol to kill her if the occasion arose and he thought he should. The occasion arose: He found her with Mr. Blevins [Rinehart]. He killed his wife and the man he found her with: He killed them both. First-degree murder is the common-law offense of murder (homicide committed with `malice aforethought') with an added element. [8] The added element here alleged is that the killing was wilful, deliberate and premeditated. [9] The judge found that when the killing occurred Garcia was not so drunk as to negative malice aforethought, intent to kill: I am convinced he was not so drunk as to have lost the ability to have malice, that malice arose in his heart and his mind. In fact, I think the drinking released the controls on the suppressed malice. These findings go only to whether the defendant intended to kill (an element of second-degree murder) and not to whether the evidence established the added elements, premeditation and deliberation, constituting the offense of first-degree murder. Malice aforethought is the intention to kill; aforethought, in the phrase malice aforethought, is meaningless surplusage and does not encompass premeditation or deliberation. [10] The judge did not find that Garcia had the ability to form a proper judgment. The judge said, I am convinced that the defendant had the ability to form a proper judgment  pardon me. I am convinced his ability to form a proper judgment was impaired by his voluntary consumption of intoxicants. A fair reading of the finding that Garcia was not so drunk as to be unable to plan ahead to do what he did is that when he conceived the plan to kill his wife if the occasion arose and he thought he should he was sober enough to so plan. The killing was in that sense premeditated. While the judge concluded, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that all the elements of first-degree murder have been proved, he made no specific finding on whether the killing was wilful or deliberate. His findings, I am convinced his ability to form a proper judgment was impaired by his voluntary consumption of intoxicants.    I am convinced he wouldn't have killed them, either one of them, if he'd been sober. I don't think there's any question about that, preclude a finding that the killing was deliberate. Deliberation contemplates that the actor may reconsider a premeditated plan to kill. A person who at the time of a killing is so intoxicated that he kills although, as the judge found, he would not kill if sober is not in a deliberative state of mind. The term wilful, deliberate and premeditated distinguishes between cool-headed and hot-headed murder. Perhaps the best that can be said of `deliberation' is that it requires a cool mind that is capable of reflection. LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 73, p 563. A person who is not in a reflective, deliberative state of mind when actually confronted with the life and death choice cannot deliberate in the sense contemplated by the statute: At the trial the vital question was the defendant's state of mind at the moment of the homicide. Did he shoot with a deliberate and premeditated design to kill? Was he so inflamed by drink or by anger or by both combined that, though he knew the nature of his act, he was the prey to sudden impulse, the fury of the fleeting moment? People v Zackowitz, 254 NY 192, 194-195; 172 NE 466 (1930). The judge found that Garcia was aware that his basic subconscious hatred, this dislike of his wife came to the forefront when he drank and that drinking released the controls on the suppressed malice. It does not follow nor did the judge find that Garcia drank to build up courage to commit the crime. [11] The most that the record and the judge's findings would support is that, having formed the intent to kill his wife if the occasion arose and he thought he should and knowing that his suppressed hatred of her was released by intoxicating liquor, Garcia was reckless in drinking. Reckless killing is common-law or second-degree murder. [12] Convicting Garcia of first-degree murder because he acted recklessly in drinking would erase the distinction between reckless (second-degree) murder and wilful, deliberate and premeditated (first-degree) murder. The judge found that Garcia was an alcoholic. I am firmly convinced that Dr. DuKay was correct in saying that the defendant is an alcoholic.    He loved, as an alcoholic, he loved his drinking   . It was not unusual for Garcia to drink too much. The record would not support a conclusion that Garcia drank before the killing as part of a plan to work up his nerve to commit the crime. The people had the burden of proof on the issue of whether the killing was deliberate and premeditated. The specific finding that Garcia would not have killed if sober precludes a conclusion that the killing was deliberate. Findings of fact control inconsistent conclusions of law. Kane v Klos, 50 Wash 2d 778, 789; 314 P2d 672, 679 (1957). [13] The judgment of conviction of first-degree murder, based on a conclusion opposed by the specific finding, is without proper foundation. A judgment cannot stand when it is based upon findings of fact of record which are antagonistic, inconsistent, or contradictory, or upon conclusions of law which are at variance with the findings of fact. Wenzel v Wenzel, 283 SW2d 882, 887 (Mo Ct App, 1955). In finding Garcia guilty of first-degree murder, the judge necessarily found him guilty of second-degree murder. [14] We would remand this cause to the trial court for entry of a judgment convicting Garcia of second-degree murder and for resentencing on that conviction.