Opinion ID: 6499870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: This court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standard as the trial court does in considering the motion for 6 (1) Denying Bowyer declaratory relief enforcing the April 27, 2016, specific performance order entitling him to purchase the Property, as Bowyer had “acquiesced in a re-issuing of TOPA notices” after that order and thus “voluntarily caused the notices to be reissued”; and (2) refusing to stay the case pending a TOPA offer to Bowyer, as that would indicate agreement with Bowyer’s argument that the original TOPA assignments were irrevocable. 7 Ruling that the first TOPA rights expired upon issuance of the second offers, and thus that Reinhardt, as a second-round TOPA offeree and assignee of a co-tenant’s TOPA rights, was entitled to specific performance. 13 summary judgment. 8 Summary judgment is proper if, when the facts are viewed “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[,] . . . there [are] no genuine issue[s] of material fact and [ ] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 9 On appeal, this court is required to “‘conduct an independent review of the record . . . [to] determine whether any relevant factual issues exist by examining and taking into account the pleadings, depositions, and admissions along with any affidavits on file, construing such material in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.’” 10 We are confronted here with the required application of two concepts – “assignment” and “acquiescence” – either of which arguably could determine the outcome. As elaborated below, however, given the reach of Reinhardt’s assignment of his “TOPA Rights” to Bowyer during the first round of TOPA offers, our resolution of the assignment issue will be dispositive, absent sufficient 8 See District of Columbia v. District of Columbia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 963 A.2d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 2009); see also Aziken v. District of Columbia, 194 A.3d 31, 34 (D.C. 2018). 9 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c); Hosp. Temps Corp. v. District of Columbia, 926
10 District of Columbia v. District of Columbia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 963 A.2d at 1155 (quoting Graff v. Malawer, 592 A.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C. 1991)). 14 record evidence that Bowyer acquiesced in the second round of offers in a way that nullified the assignments. A. The Tenants’ Assignments to Bowyer We begin with “assignment,” governed by our standard for reviewing a contract – “a legal question, which this court reviews de novo” 11 unless “probative extrinsic evidence” is admitted to “determine what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought the disputed language meant.” 12 Neither party, however, cites extrinsic evidence of record, or suggests a remand for findings, claimed to be essential to our interpretation of “assignment” as applied here. 11 Abdelrhman v. Ackerman, 76 A.3d 883, 887 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Tillery v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Bd., 912 A.2d 1169, 1176 (D.C. 2006)). 12 Dyer v. Bilaal, 983 A.2d 349, 355 (D.C. 2009) (quoting In re Bailey, 883 A.2d 106, 118 (D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Dodek v. CF 16 Corp., 537 A.2d 1086, 1092 (D.C. 1988) (“The meaning of an integrated contract is an issue for the finder of fact only if the contractual language is ambiguous, i.e., where its interpretation depends upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence or upon a choice of reasonable inferences from such evidence.”) (internal citation omitted). 15 In granting tenants the first “opportunity to purchase [a] housing accommodation” offered for sale, 13 TOPA authorizes the tenant to “exercise rights [of purchase] . . . by assigning or selling those rights to any party, . . . structured in any way the tenant, in the tenant’s sole discretion, finds acceptable.” 14 The right of purchase, therefore, includes a right of assignment. Consistent with this authority, all assignments during the first round of TOPA offers in this case defined assignable “TOPA Rights” as “[1] the right to purchase the Property and [2] the right attached to the April 10, 2015 TOPA Notice.” 15 While the second-expressed “right” is clearly limited to a purchase or assignment authorized by the April 10, 2015, TOPA Notice, the initial, general phrase in the assignment – “the right to purchase the Property” – arguably connects with that TOPA-specific phrase and confers two distinct rights to Bowyer: (1) any future right the tenant may receive “to purchase the Property” from any lawful 13 D.C. Code § 42-3404.02(a). 14 Allman v. Snyder, 888 A.2d 1161, 1166 (D.C. 2005) (emphasis omitted). 15 After folding into “purchase” the right to “assign,” we note that the “TOPA rights” at issue would read as follows: each tenant’s “[1] right to purchase [or assign] the Property and [2] the right [of purchase or assignment] attached to the [specified] TOPA Notice.” 16 seller, and (2) the narrower, present right “attached to the [April 10, 2015] TOPA notice” to purchase the Property from Sidabras. Judge Campbell found no such distinct, future right. He observed that “the assignment contracts between [Bowyer] and each of the three original tenants [Reinhardt, Hamill, and Laye 16] . . . refer to the original offers of sale issued on April 10, 2015, thereby at least implicitly tying the assignment to that specific offer.” The “original assignment contracts,” he concluded, “applied only to the TOPA rights created by the first offers of sale.” The judge accordingly understood the 2015 TOPA Notice to confer a single right, apparently believing that the first, generic phrase (“to purchase the Property”) was mere context for the specific TOPA Notice at issue, despite language in each assignment stating that tenants Hamill, Laye, and Reinhardt “wishe[d] to assign the right to purchase the property and the right attached to the TOPA Notice” to Bowyer (emphasis added). 17 16 Laye moved away from the Property after assigning his right to Bowyer, but before Bowyer obtained the April 27, 2016, order for specific performance against Sidabras. By that time, a new tenant, Reeves, had moved in. 17 Judge Campbell acknowledged that the scope of the assignments was ambiguous, but he concluded that “the original assignment contracts applied only to the TOPA rights created by the first offers of sale” because of the “specific language” of the assignment contracts when coupled with “the requirement that the Court construe any ambiguities in favor of the tenant.” To the contrary, the (continued…) 17 Although the interpretive question has no swift answer, we are persuaded, contrary to Judge Campbell, that the plain words of each assignment create two distinct, present and future, rights. Simply put, there would be no reason for the first phrase, “the right to purchase the Property” – followed by “and” coupled with a more specific addition of “the right attached to the TOPA Notice” – unless each of these ostensibly dual rights (general and specific) had a legitimate, separate purpose. And it is clear to us that each announced right satisfies that test. The legitimate, separate purpose of the second assignment category is satisfied, of course, by the “opportunity to purchase” the Property specified in the 2015 TOPA Notice. The legitimate, separate purpose of the first category would be to facilitate the purchase or assignment of the Property under any other discernible, lawful circumstance. For example, it would protect Bowyer’s right to purchase the Property ahead of Reinhardt if the contract between Bowyer and Sidabras fell through and Reinhardt either obtained a new TOPA right from a later ___________________ (…continued) provision of the TOPA statute pertaining to ambiguities does not apply in the way the judge used it. Rather, D.C. Code § 42-3405.11 (2019), titled “Statutory Construction,” instructs that ambiguities within TOPA itself – not in TOPA offers or assignments – are to be constructed in the tenants’ favor. See 1836 S St. Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Estate of Battle, 965 A.2d 832, 838 (D.C. 2009) (noting that the statutory directive pertains to “ambiguity in TOPA’s language”). 18 offer of sale, or obtained a purportedly exclusive contract to purchase the Property from Sidabras. Accordingly, where statutory interpretation, unaided by extrinsic evidence, must determine the outcome, the plainest reading of the governing language must be honored, 18 especially given the complex TOPA statutory structure where – as the record evidences here – realistic but complicated scenarios can be fashioned and numerous competing individuals can be affected. Contrary to Judge Campbell’s ruling, therefore, the first assignments to Bowyer were not obviously limited “to the TOPA rights created by the first offers of sale” on April 10, 2015; rather, they were structured to also assign a future “right to purchase the Property” ahead of any other eventual claim by Reinhardt. 18 “A court must honor the intentions of the parties as reflected in the settled usage of the terms they accepted in the contract and will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.” Fort Lincoln Civic Ass'n v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055, 1064 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted). See also N.P.P. Contrs. v. John Canning & Co., 715 A.2d 139, 142 (D.C. 1998) (determining that a clause covering “any and all claims and liabilities” in a contract “plainly reveal[ed] an intent to encompass” all claims, and noting that when terms “are so broad and comprehensive, the presumption is that if the parties had intended some limitation of the all-embracing language, they would have expressed such limitation” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 19
For sake of argument we shall assume that Bowyer, given his unqualified “right to purchase the Property,” nonetheless “acquiesced” in the second round of TOPA offers. Obviously, there is more than one possible level of acquiescence. Reinhardt, for example, argued for the most extreme level: that Bowyer – merely by failing to object – agreed that the second round of offers was legally required, thereby nullifying the first round completely and thus revoking the assignments and even the trial court’s specific performance order. If this had been the basis for defining Bowyer’s acquiescence, he would lose this appeal, as he would have no remaining contractual right to purchase the Property. Bowyer’s argument against prejudicial acquiescence is premised on a limited, lower level of agreement to the second offers: his first-round assignments were allegedly preserved by his May 13, 2016, email to the tenants 19 (confirmed by Williamowsky’s follow-up letter of July 6, 2016). 20 These communications explained that the second offers were legally required only because Bowyer had 19 See supra note 5, and accompanying text. 20 See supra text at 7. 20 “to redo the TOPA paperwork with all of [the tenants] since so much time [had] passed” (i.e., more than 180 days since the first TOPA offers), and under the statute – as Bowyer understood it – he had to “comply anew” with the TOPA requirements). 21 Put more simply, for merely technical/legal reasons, the “paperwork” had to be redone with the tenants premised on Bowyer’s assumption of the same assignments. Accordingly, in light of Reinhardt’s and Hamill’s first-round assignments to Bowyer of an unqualified “right to purchase the Property,” the question becomes whether any level of acquiescence short of renouncing the first round of TOPA offers and assignments – in particular, acquiescence attributed to a mere failure to object to the second round based on the assumption of a “redo” – would make a difference here. 21 Counsel for the title company explained that the second round was necessary because Bowyer’s contract with Sidabras to purchase the Property “was dated April 10, 2015. It has been well over 180 days since the first TOPA offer of Sale, and so you must start from scratch again.” Counsel was referring to D.C. Code § 42-3404.09(4), which directs that “the owner shall comply anew” with TOPA “[i]f 180 days elapse from the date of a valid [TOPA] offer . . . and the owner has not sold or contracted for the sale of the accommodation.” The title company was wrong; Bowyer and Sidabras had a contract, and thus the 180-day limitation did not apply. 21 We believe not. Given Bowyer’s limited reason for accepting the second round of TOPA offers – a reason Reinhardt does not challenge with any reference to or demand for extrinsic evidence 22 – we cannot perceive any sound basis for concluding that Bowyer’s acceptance of the second round reflected acquiescence tantamount to rejecting the first round completely. We therefore conclude that Bowyer’s first-round assignments from Reinhardt and Hamill conveying “the right to purchase the Property” without limitation survived, and included the later, second-round assignment from Reeves to Reinhardt. Bowyer consequently retained the right to enforce his contract with Sidabras pursuant to his first-round assignment from Reinhardt, justifying enforcement of the trial court’s specific performance order. 23 22 See supra note 12. 23 If, under the circumstances, the trial court had found that Bowyer objected to the second round TOPA offers in light of his May 13, 2016, email to the tenants and Williamowsky’s follow-up letter of July 6, 2016 – and further ruled, correctly, that the second round had not been required by TOPA – then Bowyer’s right to purchase would have been traceable directly to the trial court’s specific performance order, without further analysis of the assignments or the second round of offers. 22