Opinion ID: 613803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Copyright Act and Consumer-Copier and Publisher-Copier Copyright Infringement

Text: Tenenbaum argues to us that Congress never intended for the Copyright Act to impose liability or statutory damages against what he calls consumer copiers. That argument was not presented to the district court and is waived. [9] Even were the argument not waived, it must fail. We start with the inaccuracy of the labels that Tenenbaum's argument uses. Tenenbaum is not a consumer-copier, a term he never clearly defines. He is not a consumer whose infringement was merely that he failed to pay for copies of music recordings which he downloaded for his own personal use. Rather, he widely and repeatedly copied works belonging to Sony and then illegally distributed those works to others, who also did not pay Sony. Further, he received, in turn, other copyrighted works for which he did not pay. Nor can Tenenbaum assert that his was merely a non-commercial use and distribution of copyrighted works as those terms are used elsewhere in the Act. [10] His use and distribution was for private gain and involved repeated and exploitative copying. Our analysis begins with the language of the Act, which we construe ... in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it. Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8, 23 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is well established that, when the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms. Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118, 129 S.Ct. 681, 172 L.Ed.2d 475 (2009). In addition to the factual inaccuracy of his labels, Tenenbaum's argument that the Copyright Act immunizes his conduct from liability is contradicted by the plain language of the statute. The Copyright Act does not make the distinctions he urges between consumer and non-consumer infringement of copyrighted materials by copying and distribution. Instead, the Act renders those, like Tenenbaum, who use or distribute a copyrighted work without authorization liable in copyright. Indeed, the Act does not use the term consumer at all, much less as a term excluded from the category of infringers. Rather, the statute refers to anyone as potential infringers. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). The Act explicitly grants owners of works of authorship [11] exclusive rights to, inter alia, reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords and distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. 17 U.S.C. § 106. By the plain language of § 106, copyright owners, like Sony, have the exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted works in copies or phonorecords and to distribute those copies or phonorecords. The Copyright Act contains no provision that could be interpreted as precluding a copyright owner from bringing an action against an infringer solely because the infringer was a consumer of the infringed products or acted with a so-called noncommercial purpose in his distribution of the works to others. Apart from the reality that the facts of record support neither characterization, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) provides that  anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 ... is an infringer of the copyright. (Emphasis added). Further, under 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled ... to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it. (Emphasis added). Had Congress intended to limit copyright actions against so-called consumer infringers as Tenenbaum hypothesizes, it easily could have done so. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227-28, 128 S.Ct. 831, 169 L.Ed.2d 680 (2008). Instead, subject to exceptions not relevant here, it extended liability to  anyone  who violates a copyright owner's exclusive rights and allowed those owners to pursue actions against  any infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (emphasis added). Moving from liability to damages, Tenenbaum's argument that statutory damages are not available here is also refuted by the plain statutory language. Section 504 provides that  an infringer of copyright is liable for either ... the copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer ... or statutory damages. (Emphasis added). The statute does not condition the availability of either set of damage calculations on whether the offending use was by a consumer or for commercial purposes or not. Congress drew distinctions in the Copyright Act where it meant to do so. For example, it distinguished between willful and non-willful infringements, subjecting willful infringers to a higher cap on statutory damage awards. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Where Congress wanted the Act to draw distinctions based on the nature of the use it also did so explicitly, such as with the fair use defense. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing for fair use limitation on owner's exclusive rights and identifying the purpose and character of the use including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes as a factor to consider in determining applicability of fair use limitation). [12] Further, where Congress intended to create other exceptions for solely personal or non-commercial use, it did so expressly. In two amendments which do not apply here, it drew such distinctions: (1) the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, which fully extended federal copyright protections to sound recordings but exempted certain reproductions of sound recordings made for personal use, and (2) the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., which provided some exemptions in other situations from copyright liability for infringements based on the noncommercial use by a consumer. [13] 17 U.S.C. § 1008. [14] These statutes refute Tenenbaum's argument. Because Congress has enumerated a set of express exceptions, rules of statutory interpretation instruct that Congress intended to make no other exceptions than those specified. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (finding under maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius that enumerated exceptions are the sole exceptions intended within the Endangered Species Act); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) ([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The clarity of the statutory text compels the rejection of Tenenbaum's arguments. When a statute speaks with clarity to an issue, judicial inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475, 112 S.Ct. 2589, 120 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). It is not within the province of the courts to rewrite Congressional statutes: that task is for Congress to accomplish by further legislation. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); see also Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 26-27, 128 S.Ct. 475, 169 L.Ed.2d 432 (2007) (refusing to stray from statutory text). Asking us to ignore the text and the plain meaning of the statute, Tenenbaum argues Congress was unaware that suits like this could be brought and so could not have intended the statute to apply here. The argument is wrong both on the law and on the facts. Congress did contemplate that suits like this were within the Act. Congress last amended the Copyright Act in 1999 to increase the minimum and maximum awards available under § 504(c). See Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774. At the time, Congress specifically acknowledged that consumer-based, noncommercial use of copyrighted materials constituted actionable copyright infringement. Congress found that copyright piracy of intellectual property flourishes, assisted in large part by today's world of advanced technologies, and cautioned that the potential for this problem to worsen is great. H.R.Rep. No. 106-216, at 3 (1999), 1999 WL 446444, at . Indeed, the legislative history directly addresses this concern: By the turn of the century the Internet is projected to have more than 200 million users, and the development of new technology will create additional incentive for copyright thieves to steal protected works. The advent of digital video discs, for example, will enable individuals to store far more material than on conventional discs and, at the same time, produce perfect secondhand copies.... Many computer users are either ignorant that copyright laws apply to Internet activity, or they simply believe that they will not be caught or prosecuted for their conduct. Also, many infringers do not consider the current copyright infringement penalties a real threat and continue infringing, even after a copyright owner puts them on notice that their actions constitute infringement and that they should stop the activity or face legal action. In light of this disturbing trend, it is manifest that Congress respond appropriately with updated penalties to dissuade such conduct. H.R. 1761 increases copyright penalties to have a significant deterrent effect on copyright infringement. Id. [15] Even earlier, in 1997, Congress had explicitly amended the criminal component of the Copyright Act to make clear that criminal liability for copyright infringement can be imposed even if an infringer's use of a copyrighted material is noncommercial. See No Electronic Theft Act (NET Act), Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678. The NET Act was enacted in response to United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F.Supp. 535 (D.Mass.1994), in which a court had barred prosecution of a student charged with wire fraud because even though he enabled others to download copyrighted software applications at no cost, he received no commercial gain from his activities and the criminal statute precluded prosecution where there was no commercial benefit conferred. Congress made clear that it enacted the NET Act to criminalize[] computer theft of copyrighted works, whether or not the defendant derives a direct financial benefit from the act(s) of misappropriation, thereby preventing such willful conduct from destroying businesses, especially small businesses, that depend on licensing agreements and royalties for survival. H.R. Rep. 105-339, at 5 (1997), 1997 WL 664424, at . Tenenbaum's argument that we may ignore the plain language of the statute and Congressional intent because relatively few lawsuits were brought against those in his position also goes nowhere. Again, both the factual and legal contentions are wrong. Even if we assume that copyright owners have historically chosen first to litigate against the providers of new technologies of reproduction and dissemination rather than the users of those new technologies, see Tussey, Technology Matters: The Courts, Media Neutrality, and New Technologies, 12 J. Intell. Prop. L. 427 (2005), that may best be explained by the owners using a cost-benefit analysis, and says nothing about Congressional intent. Historically, the costs of prosecuting infringement actions against individual users could be thought by owners to have exceeded the benefits. That the copyright owners have turned to litigation against individual infringers only underscores that the balance of the copyright holder's cost-benefit analysis has been altered as peer-to-peer networks and digital media become more prevalent. In any event, the argument is legally irrelevant. The Supreme Court has expressly instructed that courts apply the Copyright Act to new technologies. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984), the Court instructed that courts must [a]pply[] the copyright statute, as it now reads, to the facts as they have been developed even though Congress might ultimately take a fresh look at this new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. Id. at 456, 104 S.Ct. 774. The Supreme Court has made clear that it is particularly important for courts to take this tack when faced with novel Copyright Act issues. [F]rom its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in technology, and as new developments have occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made necessary. Id. at 430-31, 104 S.Ct. 774. We reject Tenenbaum's invitation to usurp Congress's legislative authority and to disregard binding Supreme Court precedent.