Opinion ID: 2176551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Read the Record and Transcripts

Text: Defendant first argues that his resentencing counsel was per se ineffective because the record establishes that counsel, who did not represent defendant at the original trial and sentencing hearing, never read the original trial and sentencing transcripts. In support of this argument, defendant points to the following statement, which appeared in the motion to reconsider sentence that counsel filed on defendant's behalf: Counsel for defendant maintains, that the Court did not, at the time of trial, specifically find that the age of the victim was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, while acknowledging that counsel is working without the benefit of a transcript of the Court's original finding.  (Emphasis added.) According to defendant, this statement makes it apparent that [counsel] never read Deleon's trial transcripts in preparation for the [resentencing] hearing. Moreover, given the gravity of such an omission, defendant insists that he should not be required to prove the prejudicial effect of this error. The State responds that defendant's argument rests on a faulty factual premise. According to the State, the above statement in no way proves that counsel never read Deleon's trial transcripts in preparation for the [resentencing] hearing. On the contrary, the above statement appeared in counsel's motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was filed three weeks after both the resentencing hearing and the imposition of sentence. Thus, the State maintains, the most it proves is that counsel prepared that motion without the benefit of a trial transcript. The State also notes that the original trial and sentencing transcripts were available to counsel prior to the resentencing hearing, and there are other comments from counsel that suggest a working familiarity with the trial record. We agree with the State. The record simply does not support defendant's claim. In relation to one of the factual assertions contained in the motion to reconsider sentence, counsel conceded that he was working without the benefit of a transcript. From this concession, defendant asks this court to infer that counsel had been working without the benefit of a transcript all along, even prior to the resentencing hearing itself. Like the appellate court, we are unwilling to draw such an inference, as it dramatically exceeds the scope of counsel's concession. All that reasonably can be inferred from counsel's concession is that he was working without the benefit of a transcript at the time he prepared the motion to reconsider sentence. The concession appears exclusively in that motion, and nothing about it implicates counsel's performance at or before the resentencing hearing itself. Of course, this in no way proves that counsel actually read the original trial and sentencing transcripts prior to the resentencing hearing. On the record before us, as with most appellate records, we have no way of knowing one way or the other. But that is sufficient to defeat defendant's claim, as [a] defendant cannot rely on speculation or conjecture to justify his claim of incompetent representation. People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill.2d 294, 324, 222 Ill.Dec. 341, 677 N.E.2d 875 (1997).