Opinion ID: 754172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Property Cause of Action

Text: 15 Strasburger bases his second cause of action on a substantive due process property interest. He asserts that the School Board's conspiracy to take away his tenured employment deprived him of a constitutionally protected property interest. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants because, under the doctrine of Parratt v. Taylor, Strasburger had adequate state remedies available to him and thus had not suffered a loss of due process. 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). We do not even reach the Parratt question because Strasburger has not properly raised a substantive due process property interest claim. 16 To make out a violation of § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535, 101 S.Ct. at 1913. In the absence of elucidation from the Supreme Court, it has long been our precedent that a plaintiff who challenges the substance of a government decision on substantive due process grounds (as opposed to challenging the process the decision-makers used on procedural due process grounds) must show (1) that the decision was arbitrary and irrational, and (2) that the decision-makers either committed another substantive constitutional violation or that state remedies are inadequate. See Kauth v. Hartford Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 951, 958 (7th Cir.1988); see also Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 325 (7th Cir.1996); Polenz v. Parrott, 883 F.2d 551, 558-59 (7th Cir.1989). We have recently applied this very standard in an employment property case. See Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir.1997). 17 The parties do not dispute that Strasburger had a protected property interest in his tenured teaching position. A generous reading of the record might also reveal a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the School Board acted arbitrarily and irrationally. However, Strasburger has not made out the second element by coming forward with an additional constitutional violation or by showing that state remedies are inadequate. Thus, he has not made out a genuine issue of material fact as to all the elements of his claim, and the district court properly granted summary judgment on the property interest count. 18 Strasburger styles his property interest claim as a violation of substantive due process. However, under that heading he also makes arguments that are more properly categorized as violations of procedural due process. For example, he complains that he was given no notice and no hearing at any time before any part of his termination and he has been harmed by the absence of such notice and a hearing, and [h]e has not been afforded 'due process' by the board officials before they took his protected property interest in his tenured employment. Br. for Appellant at 7. We will read his brief as making a procedural due process argument in addition to his substantive ones. 2 19 Procedural due process claims require a two-step analysis. The first step requires us to determine whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest; the second requires a determination of what process is due. Doherty, 75 F.3d at 322 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1153-54, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 315 (7th Cir.1992)). We skip to the second part of the analysis, which is dispositive here. To show a failure of due process, a plaintiff might show that state procedures as written do not supply basic due process or that state officials acted in an random and unauthorized fashion in depriving the plaintiff of his protected interest, Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540, 101 S.Ct. at 1915-16. 20 Strasburger is not challenging the constitutionality of Illinois' reduction-in-force procedure; that is, he is not arguing that the Illinois procedures do not supply basic due process. He vaguely argues that the School Board's actions were random and unauthorized, id. at 541, 101 S.Ct. at 1916. While the contours of the Parratt jurisprudence are ill-defined, the center of the doctrine is fixed-one who challenges state action as random and unauthorized must also demonstrate that state post-deprivation remedies do not satisfy due process. Id. For the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations; [t]he Fourteenth Amendment protects only against deprivations 'without due process of law.'  Id. at 537, 101 S.Ct. at 1914 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694-95, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). State law remedies in theory can satisfy due process as well as federal ones, so we require plaintiffs seeking federal remedies to show the state's remedies lacking. 21 Strasburger has not alleged or shown that Illinois post-deprivation remedies are lacking. Therefore, Strasburger has not made out a procedural due process violation that necessitates a federal remedy. After all, what he complains of is a conspiracy by state officials to deprive him of a state-created property interest. The State of Illinois should have the first chance to assess the alleged violations of its own laws. The district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on the second count. 22