Opinion ID: 1511494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forty-nine Day Period

Text: The Commonwealth listed the case for trial on January 29, 1976. Appellant did not appear for trial on that date but did, through her assigned public defender, notify a member of the district attorney's staff of her alleged unavailability due to her required appearance in federal court in Philadelphia on that date. Thereafter, by a letter dated February 6, 1976, appellant was advised by the district attorney's office that her trial was rescheduled for March 17, 1976. The Commonwealth stresses that only a few days remained between January 29th and the expiration of the period on February 2nd, and that it had no knowledge as to the length of the federal proceedings in which appellant was involved or how long her presence would be required. [W]e do not know if she was a defendant, prosecutrix or witness thereat. It is asserted that the matter could not be relisted during the January 1976 trial term as each day's list had been finalized. Based upon these considerations, the Commonwealth contends that we should conclude that appellant's unavailability on January 29th prevented the commencement of trial within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Commonwealth and that the period which elapsed between the 29th of January and the actual trial date, March 17, 1976, was excludable under section (d)(1). There are two reasons why we find this argument unpersuasive. Passing for the moment the question of the Commonwealth's due diligence in ascertaining when appellant would be available for trial, and assuming her unavailability on January 29, 1976, it is clear that the reason for not scheduling her trial in the remaining days of the period was because the court calendar would not permit. Thus, the Commonwealth's claim for excusing the commencement of trial on the days following January 29, 1976 rests upon a claim in the nature of judicial delay rather than the unavailability of the appellant. Our cases have made clear that scheduling difficulties may provide the basis for the request of an extension pursuant to section (c) [4] of the Rule rather than section (d)(1). In Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 17-18, 364 A.2d 694, 699 (1976), we noted: We must therefore consider under what circumstances judicial delay will justify an extension. While the following circumstances are not to be considered exclusive, they represent the type of circumstances wherein an extension may be justifiably granted because of a causal relationship between the judicial delay and the Commonwealth's inability to commence trial despite due diligence. (1) Situations where judicial proceedings involving prosecution of the charges are still pending or resolved so near the expiration of the mandatory period fixed by the Rule or prior order granting an extension so as to preclude commencing trial within the period despite the Commonwealth's due diligence. (2) Situations where the Commonwealth is prepared to commence trial prior to the expiration of the mandatory period but the court because of scheduling difficulties or the like is unavailable. Similarly in Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 469 Pa. 214, 222, 364 A.2d 1345, 1349 (1976), we ruled: [5] Henceforth, the trial court may grant an extension under rule 1100(c) only upon a record showing: (1) the due diligence of the prosecution, and (2) certification that trial is scheduled for the earliest date consistent with the court's business; provided that if the delay is due to the court's inability to try the defendant within the prescribed period, the record must also show the causes of the court delay and the reasons why the delay cannot be avoided. However, a request for an extension under section (c) must be made to the court prior to the expiration of the prescribed period under the Rule. Thus, even if this record might have met the requirements for the grant of such an extension, that avenue is not here available to the Commonwealth since it failed to attempt to pursue this course prior to February 2, 1976. In Shelton, supra, we made it clear that a request for an extension based upon judicial delay could not provide the basis for an exclusion under section (d). Since we have determined that judicial delay may serve as a basis for the granting of an extension pursuant to section (c), the substantial impairment allegedly created by the dicta in the Superior Court's majority opinion to the Commonwealth's right to effectuate a prosecution is not now a valid consideration in determining whether judicial delay should be impliedly excluded from the computation of the mandatory period in which to commence trial. Since the impairment has been removed, . . . our rule provides the Commonwealth with an adequate procedural method to protect its right to [effectuate a prosecution], mainly by obtaining extensions under Section (c) of the rule . . . Commonwealth v. O'Shea, supra, 465 Pa. at 491 n.7, 350 A.2d at 875 n.7. Therefore, as in O'Shea, supra, . . . we can perceive no reason to imply an additional exclusion. Id., 469 Pa. at 18, 364 A.2d 699. Secondly, a finding of unavailability causing delay requires the Commonwealth to exercise due diligence in the avoidance of that delay. Commonwealth v. Cohen, supra [5] ; Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 553, 372 A.2d 826 (1977). It can not be seriously argued in this case that the Commonwealth's willingness to arrange for the rescheduling of this matter without any further information than the fact that appellant was involved in a federal proceeding on January 29, 1976, exhibited the kind of due diligence that would warrant the exclusion of a period as extensive as the one herein involved. To conclude otherwise would effectively emasculate the due diligence requirement. We therefore conclude that the forty-nine (49) day period also could not properly be excluded under section (d). Order of the Superior Court affirming the judgment of sentence is reversed and the appellant is discharged. O'BRIEN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. EAGEN, C.J., and LARSEN, J., note their dissent.