Opinion ID: 852583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Bias

Text: Stephenson challenges the post-conviction court's rejection of his claim that he was denied his right to an impartial jury because the jury was improperly exposed to a variety of extraneous, prejudicial influences. Specifically, Stephenson argues that (1) the jury foreperson's acquaintance with the victim's sister undermined the foreperson's ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror; (2) the foreperson's reading of pro-prosecution crime novels in the jury room during trial created an unacceptable influence that contaminated the verdict; and (3) some jurors' awareness of Stephenson's prior involvement in a fight was prejudicial. Stephenson argues that these singly and collectively deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury trial and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
Stephenson contends that jury foreperson Michael Fox's acquaintance with Kim Seibert, the sister of victim Kathy Tyler, undermined Fox's ability to remain fair and impartial. The right to a jury trial includes a fair trial by a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965). In certain circumstances, [t]he failure of a juror to disclose a relationship to one of the parties may entitle the prejudiced party to a new trial. Godby v. State, 736 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ind. 2000) (citing Haak v. State, 275 Ind. 415, 417, 417 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1981); Barnes v. State, 263 Ind. 320, 330 N.E.2d 743 (1975); Block v. State, 100 Ind. 357, 1885 WL 4222)). To obtain a new trial based on a claim of juror misconduct, the defendant must demonstrate that the misconduct was gross and likely harmed the defendant. Id. Furthermore, the defendant must present specific, substantial evidence establishing that a juror was possibly biased. Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (Ind.2002) (quoting Lopez v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1119, 1130 (Ind.1988)). During voir dire, all prospective jurors were asked about any possible acquaintance with the victims, the victims' families, or any other trial witnesses. Fox did not disclose any relationship with Seibert. Seibert testified in post-conviction that she had recognized Fox at Stephenson's trial but did not know whether Fox recognized her. At some point during the trial, Fox was informed by his wife that Seibert was Fox's children's Sunday school teacher, and Fox realized that he had met Seibert. He did not inform the trial court of this fact. When he was asked about his relationship to Seibert at post-conviction review, Fox stated Oh, I just knew Miss Kim. You know, I didn't know what her name was or anything else, but, you know, when she told me that that is  I put two and two together. You know, I just knew her name was Seibert or Seibert or however you pronounce it. Although Fox should have informed the court of his acquaintance with Seibert when he discovered it, Stephenson has presented no specific evidence that Fox was biased and has made no showing that Fox's nondisclosure of this casual connection to Seibert had any effect on Fox's performance as a juror. In short, the post-conviction court's conclusion that juror Fox's relationship with Seibert does not show bias or a predisposition to convict was not clearly erroneous. Indeed, it seems clearly correct.
Stephenson contends that foreperson Fox's reading of murder mysteries in the jury room during trial was exposure to extraneous information that contaminated the verdict and amounted to juror misconduct. As already noted, to warrant a new trial based on a claim of juror misconduct, the defendant must demonstrate not only that the misconduct was gross but also that it probably harmed the defendant. Carr v. State, 728 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ind.2000). Exposures to extrinsic influences during trial such as newspapers or television programs recounting facts of the trial are evaluated under this standard. See, e.g., id. Juror Fox read crime novels at breaks throughout the eight months of trial. These novels were completely unrelated to Stephenson's trial. We are given no basis to conclude that they would affect a juror's impartiality. The post-conviction court concluded that [t]he reading by juror Michael Fox of murder mystery books by author Patricia Cornwell is not juror misconduct, and does not indicate predisposition on the part of this juror to vote for conviction in this case. This finding was not clearly erroneous. Once again, it seems plainly correct.
Stephenson argues that he was denied his right to due process when one juror mentioned an unrelated altercation involving Stephenson. During post-conviction review, Stephenson submitted the affidavit of juror Merrily Reiff stating: During the many months of the trial, the jury spent many hours in the small jury room behind the courtroom. On one occasion I overheard a woman juror talking with another juror about an incident involving John Stephenson at a bar in Newburgh. The woman juror mentioned that there had been some sort of scuffle and that John had used a shovel during the altercation. As the two jurors were talking, a third juror spoke up and said they should stop talking about the incident immediately, which they did. The jurors never disclosed this information to the trial court. We have held that jurors' consideration of evidence not in the record amounts to the denial of a defendant's right to confrontation. See, e.g., Saperito v. State, 490 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ind. 1986). However, not all constitutional error requires reversal. See id.; Dyer v. State, 168 Ind.App. 278, 283, 342 N.E.2d 671, 674 (1976). If the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will stand. Dyer, 168 Ind.App. at 283, 342 N.E.2d at 674. The decision to overturn a verdict based on jury contact with outside information turns on the special facts of the case. Grigsby v. State, 267 Ind. 465, 468, 371 N.E.2d 384, 386 (1978) (citing Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959)). We look at the facts and determine whether the jury contact without outside information has so prejudiced the defendant that he was denied a fair trial. Id. at 468, 371 N.E.2d at 386. The State argues that there is no evidence to demonstrate any predisposition by any juror to convict or otherwise affect deliberations or considerations of the issues by any juror. We agree. It appears that the exchange among the jurors was short, and the juror that overheard the other two did not mention the incident to the whole jury. Although it is unfortunate that any extraneous information was injected into deliberations, this information is not sufficient to constitute a per se contamination of the jury. Id. at 468, 371 N.E.2d at 386 ([T]he Court has refused to hold that jury contact with outside information is always cause for overthrowing a verdict. . . .). The post-conviction court's conclusion that the jurors' knowledge of the prior fight does not show a predisposition on the part of any juror to convict, and has not been shown to have played any material part in deliberations, any individual juror's consideration of the case, or otherwise was not clearly erroneous.