Opinion ID: 1405619
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appropriate constitutional analysis

Text: The first issue is whether Sonneman's challenge is more appropriately analyzed under the equal protection provisions of the United States and Alaska constitutions or under the right to vote provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution. In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the impact of candidate eligibility requirements on candidates and on voters should be analyzed directly under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution instead of engaging in a separate equal protection analysis. See also Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992) (same); Canaan v. Abdelnour, 40 Cal.3d 703, 221 Cal.Rptr. 468, 710 P.2d 268, 273-74 (Cal. 1985) (analyzing challenge to a ballot write-in prohibition under the First and Fourteenth Amendments instead of under equal protection, because statute infringed directly on fundamental voting rights and did not create a suspect classification). The Court recently stated that election code provisions governing the voting process itself,  or the mechanics of the electoral process should be analyzed to determine whether they impermissibly burden the right to vote. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 344, 345, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995) (emphasis added). Alaska Statute 15.15.030(6) allocates candidate positions on ballots. As such, it governs the mechanics of the electoral process itself and directly impacts voting rights under the federal and state constitutions. The statute does not, however, create any identifiable and fixed classes of candidates or voters; instead, it allocates any positional benefit randomly. Although several cases dealing with ballot positioning have utilized an equal protection analysis, these cases involved statutes that placed incumbents or one political party first, resulting in a fixed classification. See, e.g., Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal.3d 661, 122 Cal.Rptr. 377, 536 P.2d 1337, 1345-46 (Cal. 1975) (holding that incumbent-first and alphabetical listing violated equal protection principles); Culliton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 419 F.Supp. 126, 129 (N.D.Ill.1976) (holding that Republican-first provision violated equal protection clause), aff'd & remanded sub nom. on other grounds by, Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir.1977). Since AS 15.15.030(6) allocates positions in a random manner, allowing each candidate an equal opportunity to obtain the benefits of positional bias, equal protection concerns are not implicated. We therefore analyze this statute as a direct burden on the right to vote instead of as an equal protection violation. [6]