Opinion ID: 465474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 20 Singer challenges his conviction on five grounds. He argues that the indictment against him should be dismissed because the government's procurement and review of the confidential attorney-client file resulted in a denial of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel that Judge Eisele's remedial order failed to cure. He further asserts that the government officials' statements to the press suggesting that Meshbesher had knowingly obtained perjured testimony from Gilbert Singer disrupted the attorney-client relationship and forced Meshbesher's withdrawal, thus denying Singer his sixth amendment right to effective representation by his counsel of choice. In addition, Singer argues that the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection should have barred his retrial because his first conviction was reversed as a result of judicial misconduct which, subsequent proceedings revealed, was driven by an intent to prejudice his defense. He also contends that the court violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation by refusing to strike Stoll's testimony after he invoked the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to cross-examination. Finally, Singer urges this court, because of the various demonstrated acts of repeated governmental misconduct, to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice, to dismiss the indictment.
21 Singer argues that the indictment against him should be dismissed because the government's procurement and review of the confidential attorney-client file resulted in a denial of his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel that Judge Eisele's remedial order failed to cure. 22 To establish a sixth amendment violation, a criminal defendant must show two things: first, that the government knowingly intruded into the attorney-client relationship; and second, that the intrusion demonstrably prejudiced the defendant, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1976); United States v. Davis, 646 F.2d 1298, 1303 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868, 102 S.Ct. 333, 70 L.Ed.2d 170 (1981), or created a substantial threat of prejudice. See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 366, 101 S.Ct. at 668-69. 6 Identification of a sixth amendment violation alone, however, does not require dismissal of the indictment. The interests supporting the sixth amendment right, meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal process, see, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), must be reconciled with society's competing interest in prosecuting criminal conduct. In United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court held that despite the government's deliberate violation of defendant's sixth amendment rights, by disparaging her choice of counsel and by attempting to induce her to cooperate in the absence of counsel, the district court erred in dismissing the indictment. Rather, the appropriate course when faced with a sixth amendment violation is to tailor a remedy to the injury suffered, to assure the defendant effective assistance of counsel in a subsequent proceeding. Accord United States v. Soloman, 679 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir.1982). 7 23 Judge Eisele found that a sixth amendment violation had occurred because the government's procurement and review of the attorney-client file threatened to create prejudice at retrial. The question presented, then, is whether his remedial order was effective in eliminating upon defendant's retrial any demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof. Morrison, 449 U.S. at 366, 101 S.Ct. at 668-69. 24 Singer contends that Judge Eisele's order was flawed principally by its failure to bar Johnson and Stoll from testifying at retrial after they had seen the privileged documents. He points particularly to their review of Meshbesher's witness list, a document listing 24 proposed witnesses with capsule summaries of their proposed testimonies. Appellant's Addendum at 29-30. Only three on the list had testified at the first trial, but 14 were called at retrial. Such review enabled Johnson and Stoll to anticipate defense witness testimony, he asserts. It is not possible to purge their minds. Appellant's Brief at 38. 25 Singer, however, fails to specify any testimony that reflects familiarity with the file. While full disqualification of Johnson and Stoll from any participation was an option open to the district judge, we do not believe that this extraordinary measure was necessary to remove the threat of prejudice resulting from the sixth amendment violation. Thus, we are unable to conclude that Judge Eisele's remedial order failed to satisfy the standard set out in Morrison. Nor do we believe that on retrial the taint of the earlier sixth amendment deprivation actually persisted. We have studied the record of both trials and are unable to conclude that the retrial testimony of either Johnson or Stoll was influenced by their study of the confidential file so as to result in the defendant's suffering demonstrable prejudice. 26 Johnson first testified regarding his arrest of an indicted co-conspirator, who was found at a Minneapolis air freight office awaiting the arrival of a marijuana shipment that, a comparison of shipping invoices demonstrated, Singer had attempted to send from Miami. He also described the subsequent seizure of marijuana in a Minneapolis warehouse, detailing the packaging and condition of the contraband. Finally, Johnson testified to his analysis of telephone toll records, which demonstrated that numerous telephone calls had been placed from Singer's residence and Stoll's office in Miami to the residence of an admitted co-conspirator in Minneapolis. Johnson's testimony at the second trial was considerably less comprehensive than at the first trial. Nothing that hadn't previously been stated was added. We are thus unable to discern any way in which Johnson's retrial testimony may have been shaped by his review of the confidential file. 27 We similarly are unable to discern how Stoll's review of the file may have influenced his testimony. On direct examination, Stoll testified to his long-lived association with Singer and to the origins of the conspiracy to distribute marijuana. He testified that during the period from July 1977 to early 1978, marijuana regularly was shipped from Miami to Minneapolis. At first, the marijuana was shipped, accompanied by Stoll and Singer, by commercial passenger plane. As the enterprise developed, the marijuana was shipped by air freight, with Stoll and Singer travelling to Minneapolis one to three times weekly to collect and convey the proceeds, which Stoll testified ranged from $50,000 to $200,000 per trip. It is apparent that this testimony emanates not from review of the file, but from experience. 28 The government offered additional testimony and documentary evidence which substantially corroborated Singer's role in the conspiracy. Singer was arrested at a Miami air freight office in possession of several hundred pounds of marijuana. At that time he possessed numerous documents tying him to the conspiracy. In addition, other co-conspirators testified as to Singer's involvement. 29 We therefore are not convinced that Johnson and Stoll's review of the confidential attorney-client file influenced their testimony. Singer has failed to point us to any specific statement or area of testimony which reflects knowledge of the file. Our study of the record reveals none. Furthermore, it is doubtful, in light of Stoll's inculpatory admissions, that the jury placed significant weight on his testimony. 8 Finally, even if we were to completely discount the testimony of Johnson and Stoll, we believe the record makes plain that the government produced substantial additional evidence for a jury to reasonably find that Singer had indeed committed the crimes with which he was charged. 9 30 Singer alleges other ways in which he was prejudiced by the government's procurement of the confidential file. He complains that information from the documents had been communicated to numerous persons, including the United States Attorney and numerous police officials. Accepting for argument sake this assertion as true, we fail to see how such officials' knowledge resulted in prejudice to Singer. In order to comply with Judge Eisele's order, none of these officials participated in the retrial. North Dakota prosecutors previously uninvolved were assigned to the case. Johnson was replaced as case agent. There is no evidence either that Singer identifies or that we can find, that anyone, including Johnson or Stoll, ever communicated anything learned from review of the documents, let alone evidence that such communications caused prejudice. Singer's contention rests on unsupported speculation, and we therefore must reject it. We similarly dispose of Singer's complaint that Judge Murphy's review of the documents may have affected her rulings. 31 Singer finally charges that he was prejudiced because the government's examination of the documents and the subsequent suggestions of perjury and subornation of perjury prevented Gilbert Singer from testifying and resulted in Meshbesher's withdrawal as trial counsel. These assertions are without merit. As to Gilbert Singer, baseless accusations, as they are characterized by Singer, logically pose no threat to truthful testimony. As to the attorney withdrawal, Judge Eisele properly concluded that Meshbesher's continued representation of Singer was not untenable. Furthermore, even if government officials' statements to the press did create in Meshbesher a conflict of interest requiring withdrawal, there is no claim that Singer's appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 10 We thus reject these arguments. 32 We therefore conclude that Judge Eisele's remedial order was not inadequate to shield Singer from prejudice resulting from the government's intrusion into the Meshbesher file, and that Singer was not denied effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. By so concluding, we do not condone the conduct of Schermer and Johnson, who, on the basis of claims by an interested party indiscriminately sought out documents of suspect origin that they knew to be privileged. 11 We conclude only that Judge Eisele's carefully shaped remedial order was not inadequate under the standard set out by the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564, to restore Singer's sixth amendment protections.
33 Singer contends that the indictment should be dismissed because government officials' statements to the press suggesting that Gilbert Singer had committed perjury and Meshbesher had suborned perjury disrupted the attorney-client relationship and forced Meshbesher to withdraw, thus denying Singer his sixth amendment right to effective representation by his counsel of choice. 34 Judge Eisele found that law enforcement officials involved in prosecuting Singer leaked unproven assertions to the press, which potentially compromised Meshbesher's effectiveness as an advocate. He concluded that even though these statements were made without intent to interfere with the Meshbesher-Singer attorney-client relationship, they nonetheless were improper, and threatened to prejudice Singer, resulting in a sixth amendment violation. 12 We do not hesitate to add that Judge Lord's statements to the press, and his letter to Judge Murphy, also violated well-recognized ethical standards and in addition, created the potential for substantial prejudice to defendant. 35 We repeatedly have recognized that a defendant's sixth amendment right to his counsel of choice should be protected. United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834, 103 S.Ct. 77, 74 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1075, 99 S.Ct. 851, 59 L.Ed.2d 43 (1979). The question, however, is whether this independent sixth amendment violation necessitated imposition of the drastic remedy of dismissal of the indictment. Judge Eisele, again relying on United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564, found that either the passage of time or the shifting of the trial to a different locale would serve to dissipate any derogation to Meshbesher's integrity resulting from governmental impropriety. There has been no showing that this finding is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254-55 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3477, 87 L.Ed.2d 613 (1985) (district court's finding that no prejudice would flow from an alleged sixth amendment violation is reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard). Judge Eisele then permitted Singer to move for a continuance or a change of venue. In so doing, Judge Eisele tailored a remedy to avoid prejudice and to remove the taint of the violation. Thus, despite the sixth amendment violation, Meshbesher was not forced to withdraw as trial counsel. 13 III. 36 This court, after Singer's first trial, concluded that Judge Lord's misconduct had resulted in an unfair trial. United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir.1982), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 710 F.2d 431 (1983). We therefore ordered a new trial. We did observe, however, that the trial presented by no means a case of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. Id. at 432. Singer now charges that when viewed through the lens of the subsequent misconduct, it is clear that Judge Lord's improprieties at trial indeed were motivated by a desire to prejudice Singer's prospects for acquittal. Such purposeful misconduct, he argues, should have operated to bar his retrial as violative of the prohibition against double jeopardy. 37 The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment protects a criminal defendant from repeated prosecution for the same offense. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). The many purposes advanced by the double jeopardy prohibition are best expressed by Justice Harlan's conclusion in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion), that the clause promotes the criminal defendant's general interest in being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society. Thus, once a trial reaches a verdict, whether of conviction or acquittal, reprosecution is barred. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2193-94, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). Of course, if the trial ends in a verdict of guilty, but is reversed on appeal, the government may reinitiate prosecution. It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceeding leading to conviction. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465-66, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 1588-89, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). The only established exception to this rule is where reversal of the conviction is grounded on insufficiency of the evidence, United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130-31, 101 S.Ct. 426, 433-34, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), since this ruling is equivalent to a directed verdict of aquittal at trial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16-17, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2149-50, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). 38 Where no verdict is reached, but the trial ends in mistrial, the double jeopardy clause also ordinarily does not preclude retrial. See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (retrial after hung jury does not implicate double jeopardy concerns). There is a narrow exception to this rule, however, when the defendant moves for and is granted a mistrial on the basis of deliberate prosecutorial or judicial misconduct. 14 To permit retrial in such a circumstance offends the interests supporting the double jeopardy bar because the misconduct compelled the defendant to forego his right to a fair trial leading to verdict before the first tribunal. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609-10, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1080-81, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557. 39 At his first trial, Singer moved for a mistrial based on judicial misconduct. The motion was denied and a conviction followed. Subsequently, the conviction was overturned because of Judge Lord's misconduct at trial. We therefore face this question: Does the general rule advanced in DiFrancesco apply, that the double jeopardy bar does not foreclose reprosecution following appellate reversal of a conviction? Or does the narrow mistrial exception stated in Dinitz extend to a situation where the earlier prosecution proceeded over defendant's mistrial motion for judicial misconduct to a verdict of conviction, only to be reversed on those same grounds? 40 While this issue has percolated in dicta through the several circuits, 15 it has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court. 16 To this circuit it is one of first impression. 41 There is good reason to argue that a criminal defendant whose conviction over a timely motion for mistrial is reversed because of any sort of governmental misconduct should be placed on equal footing with a defendant whose motion properly is granted. The defendant obtains mistrial only if the trial judge apprehends the sufficiently prejudicial misconduct. In reversing, the appellate court simply corrects the trial court's error. The right of a criminal defendant not to be twice placed in jeopardy should not hang on which court correctly determines that misconduct infected the trial. See Robinson v. Wade, 686 F.2d at 307-08; United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d at 774. As the Supreme Court stated in United States v. Burks, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, when explaining why double jeopardy concerns preclude retrial upon reversal for insufficient evidence, [T]o hold otherwise would create a purely arbitrary distinction between those in petitioner's position and others who would enjoy the benefit of a correct decision by the District Court. Id. at 11, 98 S.Ct. at 2147. 42 But there is danger in drawing too much from Burks' grudging exception. Indeed, in Burks itself, the Court stated that governmental misconduct was not among the grounds for reversal that implicated the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 15, 98 S.Ct. at 2149. And as the Court added in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416: This Court has consistently held that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no limitation upon the power of the government to retry a defendant who has succeeded in persuading a court to set his conviction aside, unless the conviction has been reversed because of insufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 677 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. at 2090 n. 6 (citation omitted). 17 If the bedrock interest supporting the double jeopardy prohibition is protection of the defendant's valued right to have a verdict rendered by the first jury, Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 674, 102 S.Ct. at 2088; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. at 689, 69 S.Ct. at 837, then the dangers which the prohibition seeks to avoid are more attenuated when the first trial goes to verdict, since the defendant has not lost his chance for acquittal by the first jury. United States v. Singleterry, 683 F.2d at 124. Thus it can persuasively be argued that the double jeopardy clause should not be read to impose the drastic remedy of dismissal of the indictment following reversal of a conviction on the basis of misconduct. 43 Like other courts, we recognize that this is a complicated and close question. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 683 F.2d at 772. Its resolution, however, is not necessary to this appeal. Although we do not condone Judge Lord's behavior, we do not believe it manifests the intent required to implicate double jeopardy concerns. 44 In United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976), the Supreme Court considered when the double jeopardy clause would bar reprosecution after dismissal due to judicial misconduct and the double jeopardy clause. In Dinitz, the defendant made an unopposed motion for a mistrial after the trial judge expelled his attorney from the courtroom for impropriety in his opening statement. The defendant was retried and convicted. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause. The Court admitted that the judge's action was improper, but reasoned that it did not reflect the intent level necessary to bar retrial. [It] was not done in bad faith in order to goad the respondent into requesting a mistrial or to prejudice his prospects for an acquittal. Id. at 612, 96 S.Ct. at 1082. In so holding the Court echoed the standard established in United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1970) (plurality opinion), which also involved judicial misconduct. 45 The Court has since refined this standard. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), involving prosecutorial misconduct, the Court held that double jeopardy interests attach only when the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Id. at 680, 102 S.Ct. at 2091. In announcing this narrower standard, the Court explicitly rejected the bad faith and prejudice language it earlier had offered. Id. The Court, however, did not make clear whether the new standard applies to judicial as well as prosecutorial misconduct. Kennedy involved only prosecutorial misconduct. Moreover, the rationale the Court employed, that Every act on the part of a rational prosecutor during a trial is designed to 'prejudice' the defendant by placing before the judge or jury evidence leading to a finding of his guilt, Id. at 675, 102 S.Ct. at 2089, would seem anomalous in the context of judicial misconduct. Every act on the part of the trial judge, obviously, is designed not to prejudice the defendant, but to ensure fairness. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171-72, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). On the other hand, the Court's frequent reference to Dinitz and Jorn, and its repeated mention, as if in one breath, to prosecutorial and judicial misconduct--both appear in the paragraph immediately preceding the Court's statement of its holding--leave a question as to the intended scope of Kennedy. 46 Regardless of which standard should apply, we do not believe this is a case that implicates double jeopardy concerns. Judge Lord's misconduct at the first trial was sufficiently objectionable to require reversal of the conviction. But even when colored by his post-trial misconduct, it does not evince the bad faith or design to prejudice the defendant's prospects for acquittal that the Court asserted even in Dinitz and Jorn are prerequisite to invocation of the double jeopardy bar. As we stated in our decision after en banc review, 47 On the whole, it seems clear to us that the court believed the evidence of the defendants' guilt was strong, but that the case was a complicated one, and that justice might not be done if government counsel were left to his own devices. 48 United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d at 436. We are not persuaded to move from our en banc conclusion that Judge Lord's conduct at trial, while improper, did not demonstrate actual bias. Id. at 432. 49 Singer points to three acts which he argues illuminate Judge Lord's motives at trial: first, his ex parte meeting with Assistant United States Attorney Schermer in April, 1981, between the time of Singer's conviction and his filing of post-trial motions, where he expressed his concern over the adequacy of the trial record; second, his statements to the press on July 23, 1983, after this court's en banc reversal of defendant's conviction and on September 16, 1983, after it was revealed that the United States Attorney possessed the confidential attorney-client documents; and third, his letter to Judge Murphy on September 20, 1983, criticizing Meshbesher and offering to testify. These acts have been roundly condemned by Judge Eisele and we join in his condemnation. However, we do not believe that they speak with any certainty to Judge Lord's motives during trial. 50 First, all of the demonstrated improprieties were committed after the jury returned its conviction. The episodes involving the press statements and the letter to Judge Murphy occurred several years after the trial. We do not think it possible to divine by acts so distant in time any motive for the relevant trial misconduct. Second, even if we could, we believe these acts demonstrate nothing more than Judge Lord's concern that the conviction, which he clearly believed served the ends of justice, not be reversed. While we have no doubt that Judge Lord overstepped the ethical bounds in pursuit of this end, we do not believe it evinces a bad faith motive. 51 We therefore conclude that Judge Lord's misconduct at trial was not driven by the kind of motive that would allow invocation of the double jeopardy prohibition. Under the circumstances of this case, retrial was the proper course.
52 Singer contends that on retrial the court violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation by permitting government witness Stoll to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and by refusing to strike his entire testimony once the privilege had been invoked. Stoll claimed the privilege during cross-examination regarding his acquisition of the confidential attorney-client file. 53 At the outset, we observe that Stoll repeatedly, explicitly, and successfully asserted his fifth amendment right during his testimony at the Eisele hearings and at retrial before Judge Murphy. The question then arises whether Stoll, by his testimony at the hearings, implicitly waived the privilege. In Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274 (2d Cir.1981), the Second Circuit articulated a useful test to determine whether a witness has waived the fifth amendment privilege. Under this analysis, a trial or reviewing court must infer waiver from a witness' prior statements if: 54 (1) the witness' prior statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and (2) the witness had reason to know that his prior statements would be interpreted as a waiver of the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. 55 Id. at 287. We believe that neither part of this test is satisfied. 56 Stoll's statements on retrial created no significant likelihood that the jury would be left with a distorted view of the truth. On the contrary, his testimony was fairly corroborated by the testimony of the unindicted co-conspirators and the police officers, and by the substantial documentary and physical evidence. Stoll also could not reasonably have believed that his prior testimony would be viewed as a waiver. While Stoll did testify at in camera hearings before Judge Eisele regarding his acquisition of the confidential file, he successfully asserted the privilege when questioned about how the documents actually had been removed from Meshbesher's office. The possibility of prosecution for burglary or theft, of course, still existed. To withdraw the grant of privilege upon similar inquiries at trial would do violence to Stoll's reasonable expectation that it would be respected. Judge Murphy determined that the privilege had not been waived. She did not err in this conclusion. 57 Although Stoll's invocation of the fifth amendment privilege prevented Singer from cross-examining him regarding his knowledge of how the file was taken from Meshbesher's office, Singer's sixth amendment right to confrontation was not abrogated when the court refused to strike Stoll's entire testimony. 58 The right to confrontation includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). When a conflict of rights arises between a witness' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation, a balance must be struck. Ellis v. Black, 732 F.2d 650, 656 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 222 (8th Cir.1976). If the subject upon which the witness refuses to testify relates to matters elicited by the government on direct examination and the defendant's counsel is prejudicially impaired in his ability to assail the truthfulness of the direct testimony, the court should strike at least the relevant portion of the testimony. United States v. Humphrey, 696 F.2d 72, 75 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1222, 103 S.Ct. 1230, 75 L.Ed.2d 463 (1983). On the other hand, if the witness' invocation of the privilege prevents the defendant's inquiry into merely collateral matters, such as credibility, the defendant has suffered no prejudice and the witness' other testimony need not be stricken. Ellis v. Black, 732 F.2d at 656; United States v. Brierly, 501 F.2d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1052, 95 S.Ct. 631, 42 L.Ed.2d 648 (1974). This balancing includes the effectiveness of the cross-examination as a whole. Thus, if the defendant has available effective alternative means of exploring relevant matters on cross-examination, sixth amendment rights remain intact. Ellis v. Black, 732 F.2d at 650. 59 Singer asserts here, as he did at retrial, that his attempt to cross-examine Stoll regarding his acquisition of the file was driven by two purposes. First, Singer sought to establish that the witness had stolen the file so that he could negotiate a favorable plea bargain with the government. Judge Eisele, however, found specifically after an evidentiary hearing that the file was removed from Meshbesher's office by someone other than Stoll. In addition, inquiry into the circumstances and terms of Stoll's plea agreement goes to Stoll's credibility, and therefore is a collateral issue. Singer had adequate opportunity to attack Stoll's credibility, and indeed, as amply demonstrated by the record, elicited substantial impeachment evidence. Second, Singer sought to show that Stoll's direct testimony was influenced by his review of the documents. While this purpose does go to the reliability of Stoll's direct testimony, Singer's counsel was permitted to ask Stoll whether he had read the documents before testifying. Such permissible inquiry effectively provided Singer the means to pursue his purpose without endangering Stoll's fifth amendment protection. 60 The sixth amendment confrontation rights of a defendant are met when defense counsel is permitted to effectively challenge the truthfulness of the direct testimony and pursue impeachment of the witness so as to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliabilitiy of the witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Judge Murphy properly reconciled the conflict of rights by permitting such inquiry while protecting the witness' fifth amendment privilege. Thus, there was no basis to strike Stoll's direct testimony. 61 Finally, Stoll's credibility was thoroughly impeached upon cross-examination. Moreover, the testimony of the remaining government witnesses and additional documentary and physical evidence introduced provided an overwhelming basis for the jury to return a conviction. Violations of the confrontation clause may, in the appropriate case, be declared harmless. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1059, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). If any error had been committed by Judge Murphy to prevent Singer from fully cross-examining Stoll and by refusing to strike Stoll's remaining testimony, it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). See United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1982).
62 Finally, Singer urges this court, because of the various demonstrated acts of governmental misconduct, to exercise its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice, to dismiss this indictment. 63 These proceedings have exposed acts of police, prosecutorial, and judicial misconduct and impropriety. Police and prosecutors have engaged in ex parte meetings with Judge Lord. The Minneapolis Chief of Police offered unproven accusations to the press. The office of the United States Attorney sought, obtained, and reviewed privileged documents unrelated to the discovery of evidence of other crimes. We condemn these actions. The Supreme Court warned in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): 64 The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law,   . It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 65 Id. at 88, 55 S.Ct. at 633. These principles apply with equal force to the police. 66 Even more deeply distressing is Judge Lord's misconduct. He assume[d] the mantle of an advocate at trial, United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d at 438 (Lay, C.J., concurring), and initiated at least one ex parte meeting with the prosecutor to advise on how to avoid reversal of the conviction. These acts of misconduct already have been criticized. We reemphasize, such misconduct cannot be tolerated. Judge Lord also made unproven and damaging statements to the press. We acknowledge that these comments may have been driven by an understandable concern that perjury had been committed in his courtroom. But Judge Lord had at his disposal acceptable procedures to address the perceived violation. Trial by press undermines the delicate processes carefully crafted to do justice. Judge Lord also wrote to a fellow judge on a pending action. A letter to a fellow judge creates at minimum substantial appearance of impropriety. 67 Judge Lord's misconduct at trial and afterward caused one reversal in this case and created a serious possibility of reversal in this second appeal. The public should not be made to suffer these assaults. The weight of the criminal justice system rests on our respect for process and disregard of outcome. The trial judge is the cornerstone of this system; he must double-shoulder the weight, not with action but with sound restraint. He must strain to preside with self-disciplined impartiality to achieve a just verdict. To this cause Judge Lord shrugged, and let the weight fall. 68 But we cannot say that the weight fell on Mark Singer. He has had two trials, three appeals, and numerous ancillary hearings. He has been twice convicted, and twice sentenced to 10-year terms. And yet, although it has been nearly eight years since his arrest, our system, despite its failings in this case, or perhaps because of them, has not required him to spend one night in prison. The evidence of Singer's guilt, however, is overwhelming. And while these proceedings have suffered much error, the error, as it pertains to Singer's conviction of guilt, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has admonished the courts of appeals to refrain from exercise of our supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice when the error is harmless. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1982). We therefore follow that directive, and reject Singer's request to dismiss the indictment. 69 We affirm the judgment of conviction. 70