Opinion ID: 160994
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Concurrent vs. Consecutive Sentence

Text: 38 As a result of the shooting incident on July 25, 1998, Tisdale's probation was revoked in three separate state court cases. Based upon these revocations, Tisdale was sentenced to 72 months of imprisonment. Tisdale was serving this 72 month sentence at the time of his federal sentencing hearing. Based upon his conditional plea of guilty in the instant case, the district court sentenced Tisdale to 365 months of imprisonment to be served consecutive to his 72 month state court sentence. 39 Tisdale argues that the district court erred as a matter of law in failing to impose his sentence in the instant case to run concurrently with his state court sentence. Tisdale asserts that U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) applies in this case because, not only did the district court increase his criminal history score based upon the state probation revocation sentence, it also adjusted his offense level by adding two points based upon his possession of a firearm in relation to the offense conduct. U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) requires district courts to impose concurrent sentences in cases in which U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(a) does not apply, and therefore, Tisdale claims that the district court erred as a matter of law in imposing his federal sentence to run consecutive to his state sentence. 40 Alternatively, Tisdale contends that the district court abused its discretion in failing to order that his sentence in the instant case be served concurrent with his state court sentence based upon U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c). Tisdale argues that, when a defendant has had his probation, parole, or supervised release revoked (as he did) as the result of committing the offense for which he is being sentenced, application note 6 to U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 confers upon district courts the authority to order that the defendant's sentence on the offense of conviction be served concurrent with the sentence imposed for the violation of his probation, parole, or supervised release. Tisdale asserts that the district court erred in his case in believing that it lacked the discretion to impose a concurrent sentence as is evidenced by the district court's comments at his sentencing hearing. Accordingly, Tisdale asks the Court to remand this case to the district court with instructions to order that his 365 month sentence be served concurrent with his 72 month state court sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) or with instructions for the district court to exercise its discretion to impose a concurrent sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c). 41 The Government argues that U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) is inapplicable because that section requires the imposition of a concurrent sentence only if the offense level calculated in the case takes into account the offense underlying the undischarged offense. The Government asserts that Tisdale received a two point enhancement based upon his possession of a firearm in this case, not in his prior state cases. Thus, the Government claims that U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b) does not apply because Tisdale's state court offenses were not fully taken into account in the determination of his offense level for the instant federal offense. 42 Furthermore, the Government argues that, even if this Court were to follow the other circuit courts which have held that application note 6's language should be imposed is permissive rather than mandatory, the district court's statements, when viewed in context and in its entirety, establish that the district court believed that it had the discretion to order that Tisdale's federal sentence be served concurrent with his state court sentence, but it chose not to do so. In any event, the Government contends that the imposition of a consecutive sentence in this case does not constitute plain error. Accordingly, the Government asks the Court to affirm the district court's imposing Tisdale's sentence in this case to run consecutive to his state court sentence. 43 Before turning to the merits of Tisdale's argument, we must first decide the applicable standard of review. Generally, this Court reviews de novo the district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Contreras, 210 F.3d 1151, 1152 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 170 F.3d 1038, 1039 (10th Cir. 1999). However, if a party fails to lodge a specific objection with the district court to its interpretation or application of the sentencing guidelines, such a failure precludes appellate review. United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1997). 44 Nevertheless, 'we recognize a narrow exception and review a legal question involving application of the sentencing guidelines for plain error.' Id., quoting United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 1996). In order to evoke this exception, 'the error must be particularly egregious, as well as obvious and substantial,' and we will apply it 'solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.' United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1295 (10th Cir. 1996), quoting United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1511 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465-67 (1997); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). 45 Although Tisdale's objection to the district court's imposition of a sentence consecutive to that imposed by the state court is not the model of specificity, we find that his counsel sufficiently raised the issue of the imposition of a consecutive versus a concurrent sentence with the district court, and therefore, his claim is preserved for appeal. At the sentencing hearing, the district court set forth what Tisdale's sentence was going to be and then asked whether there were any objections to the proposed sentence. Tisdale's counsel responded: The only request, Your Honor, would be that the Court consider the lower end of the guidelines. And also, he is serving a State sentence, but that the Court make the sentence here concurrent with the State sentence. The district court heard brief arguments from both parties on this issue and then ordered Tisdale's sentence to be served consecutive to his state court sentence. 46 While it would have been preferable for Tisdale to have referenced U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 in making his request to the district court that it order his sentence to be served concurrent with his state court sentence, he did alert the district court to the issue at hand. See United States v. Reyes-Lugo, 238 F.3d 305, 307-08 (5th Cir. 2001)(reviewing the defendant's claim de novo where, although he did not object to the imposition of a consecutive sentence, he did ask the district court to impose a concurrent sentence); see also United States v. Hernandez, 64 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1995)(opining that, although the defendant failed to cite U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c), his request for a concurrent sentence alerted the district court to the issue before it). Accordingly, we will review the district court's imposition of a consecutive sentence de novo. As we have recently explained: 47 In general, a district court has broad discretion to sentence a defendant to a consecutive or concurrent sentence. This discretion is limited, however, by U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 when the district court seeks to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence upon a defendant subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment. Section 5G1.3(a) requires a consecutive sentence when the defendant committed the instant offense while serving a term of imprisonment, or before the defendant began serving a term. Section 5G1.3(b) applies when subsection (a) does not, and requires a concurrent sentence if the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the instant offense level. Section 5G1.3(c) applies in any other case and authorizes the district court to impose a sentence to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the undischarged sentence to achieve a reasonable punishment. 48 Contreras, 210 F.3d at 1152 (internal citations and footnote omitted). Subsection (a) does not apply in this case because an undischarged term of probation is not an undischarged term of imprisonment as that phrase is used in U.S.S.G. 5G1.3. United States v. Cofske, 157 F.3d 1, 1-2 (1998); Prewitt v. United States,83 F.3d 812, 817-18 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, subsection (b) does not apply because the district court did not fully take into account Tisdale's prior state court offenses. Contreras, 210 F.3d at 1153; United States v. McCarty, 82 F.3d 943, 951 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir. 1994). As the Government notes, the district court increased Tisdale's base offense level by two levels because he possessed a firearm in the instant offense (i.e., his federal drug conviction), not because he possessed a gun in any of his prior state court cases. Therefore, U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c), which grants the district court the discretion to impose a concurrent sentence, a consecutive sentence, or a combination thereof, applies. 49 Application note 6 to U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 provides in relevant part: 50 If the defendant was on federal or state probation, parole, or supervised release at the time of the instant offense, and has had such probation, parole, or supervised release revoked, the sentence for the instant offense should be imposed to run consecutively to the term imposed for the violation of probation, parole, or supervised release in order to provide an incremental penalty for the violation of probation, parole, or supervised release. 51 Id. Although we have previously noted the current split among the circuit courts regarding whether note 6's language is mandatory or permissive, e.g., United States v. Carver, 160 F.3d 1266, 1268 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1998), we have not yet weighed in on the issue. Compare United States v. Alexander, 100 F.3d 24, 26-27 (5th Cir. 1996)(holding that note 6's language is mandatory), and United States v. McCarthy, 77 F.3d 522, 539- 40 (1st Cir. 1996)(same), and United States v. Bernard, 48 F.3d 427, 430-32 (9th Cir. 1995)(same), and United States v. Goldman, 228 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir. 2000)(same), with United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 70-73 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding that note 6 is not mandatory based upon use of the word should rather than the word shall), and United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944, 945 (7th Cir. 1996)(indicating, in dicta, that note 6 creates a strong presumption in favor of consecutive sentencing.). The issue is now squarely before us because the state court revoked Tisdale's sentences of probation and sentenced him on those revocations prior to the district court sentencing him. 52 We side with the minority of the circuit courts which have held that note 6's language is permissive. Paramount to this conclusion is the Supreme Court's directive that courts are to give words their ordinary meaning when they do not have a specific definition or an established common-law meaning. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991); United States v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1996). Should is used in auxiliary function to express duty, obligation, necessity, propriety, or expediency. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2104 (1st ed. 1993); see Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed. 1990)(defining should as ordinarily implying duty or obligation; although usually no more than an obligation of propriety or expediency . . . .). The phrase should be is defined as something that ought to be. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2104 (1st ed. 1993). Conversely, shall is used to express a command or exhortation, and is used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 2085 (1st ed. 1993); see Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (7th ed. 1999)(defining shall as [h]as a duty to ; more broadly is required to.). Thus, when used within the context of a Sentencing Guideline provision, should does not mean shall. Maria, 186 F.3d at 70; see United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1999)(noting that [i]f a word in the Sentencing Guidelines is not specifically defined and does not have an established common-law meaning, the word must be given its ordinary meaning.). 53 Furthermore, as the background commentary to U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 points out, when a defendant is subject to an undischarged sentence of imprisonment, the sentencing court generally has the authority under 18 U.S.C. 3584(a) to impose a sentence to run either concurrently with or consecutive to the prior undischarged term, predicated on the sentencing court's consideration of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). U.S.S.G. 5G1.3, comment. (backg'd). The governing statutes thus vest discretion in the sentencing court and provide criteria for the exercise of that discretion. 54 Section 5G1.3 itself is divided into three sections, one of which establishes circumstances in which a court shall impose a consecutive sentence (U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(a)), and one of which sets out circumstances in which a court shall impose a concurrent sentence. U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b). Section 5G1.3(c), the section with which we are concerned, differs from the first two sections in two significant respects. First, it is a policy statement and not a guideline provision. Moreover, it is not even a policy statement which interprets a guideline provision, and therefore, it is advisory rather than mandatory in nature. United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1996). Second, 5G1.3(c) imposes no duty on the sentencing court but merely provides that, in any case not covered by the other two sections, the sentence may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant offense. Id. The use of the permissive word may and the reference to the need to achieve a reasonable punishment clearly contemplate an individualized examination of particular factors and an exercise of sentencing discretion by the sentencing court in assessing those factors. 55 In addition, application note 6 provides that, under the circumstances present here, the sentences should be imposed to run consecutively . . . in order to provide an incremental penalty for the violation of probation, parole, or supervised release. U.S.S.G. 5G1.3, comment. (n. 6)(emphasis added). The note then refers to U.S.S.G. 7B1.3 and describes that section as setting forth a policy that any imprisonment penalty imposed for violating probation or supervised release should be consecutive to any sentence of imprisonment being served or subsequently imposed. Id. (emphasis added). Section 7B1.3 is also a policy statement and not a guideline provision and is, therefore, only advisory. In apparent recognition of that fact, note 4 to 7B1.3 provides that it is the Commission's recommendation that any sentence of imprisonment for a criminal offense that is imposed after revocation of probation or supervised release be run consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. U.S.S.G. 7B1.3, comment. (n.4)(emphasis added). 56 We are particularly persuaded by the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999). In our opinion, the Second Circuit in Maria persuasively refuted the majority of the circuit courts' position that 5G1.3 and application note 6 mandate the imposition of consecutive sentences. 57 In concluding that application note 6's language is mandatory, the majority of the circuit courts have based their holding upon the fact that neither U.S.S.G. 5G1.3 nor application note 6 provide any qualifications or reservations. However, as Maria notes, the Sentencing Commission's use of 'should' instead of 'shall' strongly suggests the existence of the very qualification that the First and Fifth Circuits found not to exist. The Commission knows how to draft a mandatory provision when it intends to. Maria, 186 F.3d at 73. Moreover the majority of the circuit courts find significant the fact that the situations covered by note 6 are analytically similar to those governed by 5G1.3(a) which mandates consecutive sentences. The Commission, nonetheless, did not include the note 6 situations in the ambit of 5G1.3(a), and the factual distinctions between that section and note 6 indicate that the Commission did not include them for a reason. Id. No court which has adopted the majority position has explained why, if the Sentencing Commission had indeed intended to require a consecutive sentence in situations envisioned by Note 6, it did not either amend subsection (a) to include federal offenses in violation of parole, probation or work release, or reword Note 6 to require unambiguously a consecutive sentence. Id. Finally, as for the other circuit courts' reliance upon U.S.S.G. 7B1.3(f), as discussed supra, note 4 to that section states only that the Commission recommends running the sentence consecutively in apparent recognition that the Commission has chosen to couch that entire section as an advisory policy statement rather than as a mandatory guideline. 58 Thus, based upon the plain language of U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c) and application note 6 and because nothing in the language of the applicable statutes, the guideline provisions, the application notes, or the provisions to which the notes refer indicate that the sentencing court is without discretion to determine whether a sentence under the circumstances before us in this case should run concurrently or partially concurrently with a prior undischarged term of imprisonment, we conclude that sentencing courts possess the discretion to determine, under U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(c) and application note 6, whether to impose a sentence concurrent with, partially concurrent with, or consecutive to a prior undischarged term of imprisonment. 59 Based upon this conclusion, we must remand for re-sentencing in this case. Contrary to the Government's argument, we do not believe that the district court believed that it could impose Tisdale's federal sentence to run concurrent with or partially concurrent with his state sentence but that the district court simply exercised its discretion not to do so. The district court's comments during Tisdale's sentencing hearing leaves little doubt that the district court believed that it was required to impose Tisdale's federal sentence to run consecutive to his state sentence: 60 Mr. Tousley: The only request, Your Honor, would be that the Court consider the lower end of the guidelines. And also, he is serving a State sentence, but that the Court make the sentence here concurrent with the State sentence. 61 The Court: What does the Government have to say about it? 62 Ms. Furst: And Judge Bribiesca in State Court imposed, I think, consecutive State sentences if they hadn't already been, but the total was 72 months, if I recall correctly. I oppose this one running concurrent. I think they need to be consecutive to his State Court convictions. 63 Mr. Tousley: Just for the Court's information, the probation in the other cases was revoked as a result of this same indictment. 64 The Court: He's known that under the plea agreement, he's known that the Government was going to oppose anything but the maximum. I don't know how to do it, we'll let the State take care of it. We'll this this sentence cannot be served with the State sentence. We'll let the State decide what they want to do about that. This sentence will be consecutive to the State sentence, whatever that is. 65 Although it is true that during Tisdale's change of plea hearing, the district court advised Tisdale that his sentence could be imposed consecutive to his state sentence, we do not believe that this comment by the district court reveals an understanding on its part that it could impose a sentence concurrent with Tisdale's state sentenceespecially given the district court's unequivocal comment during Tisdale's sentencing hearing that this sentence cannot be served with the State sentence. Accordingly, we must vacate this portion of Tisdale's sentence and remand this matter to the district court for re-sentencing. On remand, the district court must decide whether Tisdale's sentence in this case should run consecutive to, concurrent with, or partially concurrent with his State sentence.