Opinion ID: 1921931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prima Facie Defense

Text: Despite his present argument to the contrary, Mr. Venison did not offer a prima facie adequate defense. His first defense is a simple assertion, completely unsupported by any evidence, that the District did not follow proper procedures when it sold his property for delinquent taxes. He cites several cases that articulate the many steps the District must take before it may make such a sale. E.g., Gore v. Newsome, 614 A.2d 40, 42 (D.C. 1992); Keatts v. Robinson, 544 A.2d 716, 718 (D.C.1988). He does not, however, establish or even allege which, if any, of those steps the District failed to take in this case. The mere fact that the process is complicated does not establish that the District failed to follow all the prescribed procedures. It is still incumbent on Mr. Venison to demonstrate, with particularity, how the District fell short of legal requirements. Because he has failed to do so, this defense fails. As his second defense, Mr. Venison claims that because he paid taxes on the property, the sale was improper. Attached to his motion to vacate the default judgment were copies of tax notices and cashier's checks indicating that he had paid taxes on the property in 1995, 1996, and 1997. All of these payments, however, were made at least five years after his redemption period had expired and do not establish that the tax sale was invalid. Rather, they show at most that Mr. Venison paid taxes which he did not owe. Moreover, Mr. Venison's bald allegation that he has paid taxes on the property since he acquired it in 1950, without some evidence to support that allegation, does not establish a prima facie defense. See Clark v. Moler, 418 A.2d at 1043.