Opinion ID: 169172
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: M onetary Sanctions

Text: Defendants have filed motions for sanctions in appeal No. 05-6387 (from Springer I) and appeal No. 06-5123 (from Springer III), each of w hich requests a flat fee of $8,000 to compensate them for attorney’s fees and costs in defending what they argue are frivolous appeals. Springer thus has had notice and an opportunity to respond, as required by Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987). This court has the power to award just damages and single or double costs if the court “determine[s] that an appeal is frivolous” or brought for purposes of delay. Fed. R. App. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912. “An appeal is frivolous when the result is obvious, or the appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Braley, 832 F.2d at 1510 (quotation omitted). W e determine that appeal No. 05-6387 and appeal No. 06-5123 are frivolous and brought for purposes of delay. W hen the IRS issued its notices of deficiency in 1996, Springer had two options, to pay the tax and sue for a refund under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 or to petition the Tax Court for a redetermination under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). See Taylor v. Allan, 204 F.2d 485, 486 n.4 (10th Cir. 1953). He chose the latter option, and the Tax Court ruled against him, a judgment that is now incontestable. W hen the IRS issued its notice of intent to levy, Springer properly requested a CD P hearing, but he challenged that hearing in a jurisdictionally defective action, Springer I, then took a frivolous appeal from the -14- dismissal of that action. Springer III was dismissed as a procedurally improper means of challenging the government’s power to impose penalties arising from the failure to file federal income tax returns for 1982-2006, and his appeal from that dismissal also was frivolous. M oreover, many of his arguments take issue with the fact of his underlying liability for 1990-1995, a fact that is no longer open to challenge. Accordingly, we conclude that the results in appeal No. 05-6387 and appeal No. 06-5123 are obvious, that Springer’s arguments are wholly without merit, and that these appeals were brought to delay further the collection of his federal income tax liability for 1990-1995. Defendants’ motions, therefore, have a sound basis. 6 In support of their requests for a flat fee of $8,000 in both Springer I and Springer III, defendants state that “[a]ccording to the records of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice, the average expense in attorney salaries and other costs incurred by this office in the defense of frivolous taxpayer appeals in which sanctions were awarded during 2004 and 2005 is approximately $11,042.” No. 05-6387, Appellees’ M ot. for Sanctions at 7; see also No. 06-5123, Appellees’ M ot. for Sanctions at 5-6 (substantially the same). W e granted a similar request for $8,000 in Kyler v. Everson, 442 F.3d 1251, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 6 Like Springer I, Springer II was a jurisdictionally defective challenge to the CDP hearing, and the appeal from Springer II also is frivolous. Because the government has not asked for sanctions in that appeal, we base our award of monetary sanctions on the other two appeals. -15- 2006). But under the unique circumstances of Springer I and Springer III, we conclude that just damages are $4,000 for each of the two appeals, for a total of $8,000. 7 See Stafford v. United States, 208 F.3d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (granting request for $4,000 sanction in frivolous tax appeal). W e expressly note that this award is not meant to establish a presumptive or flat-fee sanction to be used in all frivolous tax appeals.