Opinion ID: 2159495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Martin Test and Article Eleven

Text: In determining whether the Martin test is appropriate for assessing the constitutionality of sobriety checkpoints under Article Eleven, two important questions must be answered. First, does Article Eleven permit the application of a balancing test, as opposed to the traditional requirements of a warrant and probable cause, to assess the constitutionality of this type of seizure? Second, assuming such a seizure is permissible in the absence of a warrant or probable cause, what quantum of constitutional justification is necessary to make such a seizure permissible under Article Eleven? The majority opinion fails even to address these important questions. Instead, it conveniently glosses over them by asserting, without any real analysis, that the concept of reasonableness is implicit in Article Eleven, and therefore concluding that the constitutionality of DUI roadblocks under Article Eleven is controlled by Martin. If these questions are squarely addressed, I am led to the conclusion that the Martin standard, standing alone, does not square with Article Eleven's command.
The Court recently held in State v. Jewett, 148 Vt. 324, 328, 532 A.2d 958, 960 (1986), that Article Eleven, even though it does not contain the word unreasonable, also does not contemplate an absolute prohibition on warrantless searches or seizures. Nevertheless, the Court also concluded that [t]he circumstances under which warrantless searches or seizures are permitted ... must be jealously and carefully drawn. Id. (quotations omitted). The question, then, is whether a DUI roadblock presents the sort of exceptional circumstances that, under Jewett, justify abandonment of the warrant and probable cause requirements. The majority's analysis fails to recognize that this is an important question because it assumes, without explaining why, that a balancing of competing interests is the applicable constitutional standard, rather than the warrant and probable cause requirements. By brushing aside this important analytic step, the majority tacitly approves the position that a balancing of competing interests analysis should be used to analyze the reasonableness of all searches and seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640. The danger with this position is that it transforms the balance of competing interests analysis from an exception into a rule of general applicability. See Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 257, 264 (1984). This is a result that is, in my opinion, inconsistent with our holding in Jewett, and one that should not be reached without careful consideration and some explanation of how it can be reconciled. My point is that the majority should recognize the significance of its action in applying a balancing of interests analysis in lieu of the warrant and probable cause requirements. In most cases, the warrant and probable cause requirements of Article Eleven, as well as those of the Fourth Amendment, represent the Framers' best assessment of the appropriate balance of the competing interests. As stated by Mr. Justice Blackmun: While the Fourth Amendment speaks in terms of freedom from unreasonable seizures, the Amendment does not leave the reasonableness of most seizures to the judgment of courts or government officers: The Framers of the Amendment balanced the interests involved and decided that a seizure is reasonable only if supported by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2652, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added). In cases, such as this one, where a balance of interests analysis is applied, the objective constitutional standards embodied in the warrant and probable cause requirements are replaced by a subjective judicial judgment with respect to the appropriate balance between the competing interests. Because such a standard places so much power in the hands of judges and deviates so substantially from the traditional objective constitutional standard, it should only be applied in special cases involving exceptional circumstances. Jewett, 148 Vt. at 328, 532 A.2d at 960. With this in mind, it is my judgment that, under Article Eleven, more must be shown to justify the abandonment of the warrant and probable cause requirements than a demonstration that the seizure in question is less intrusive than a traditional arrest. Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 749, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-14, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2256-57, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). In other words, the reasonableness of a seizure is to be evaluated by a balancing test only where the seizure is less intrusive than a traditional arrest and where the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search would contribute.... O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1511, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (opinion of Blackmun, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580 (balancing test applied to border search because of minimal intrusion of stop and absence of any practical alternatives for policing the border); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-24, 88 S.Ct. at 1879-81 (balancing test applied to pat-down for weapons where brief intrusion necessary to protect officer safety). If this analysis is applied to sobriety checkpoints, I agree with the conclusion of the majority that a sobriety checkpoint is in the narrow class of special cases where a balancing test is appropriate. As a general rule, brief stops at sobriety checkpoints are minimally intrusive. More importantly, the exigencies associated with the enforcement of DUI laws suggest that a balancing test is a more appropriate method of testing the constitutionality of a DUI stop than the warrant and probable cause requirement. A warrant requirement is plainly impractical due to the mobility of suspected offenders. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Moreover, a probable cause requirement would force police into the situation of monitoring drivers suspected of driving while intoxicated until they have probable cause to arrest. Without an opportunity to speak to a driver, probable cause to arrest may never arise until after an accident has occurred. Given the danger to the driving public from intoxicated drivers, a probable cause test would potentially frustrate rather than promote the goal of detecting and removing drunk drivers from the road. Under these circumstances, Article Eleven permits this class of seizures to be tested by a balancing of competing interests.
Having determined that a balancing test is appropriate, the remaining question is the quantum of constitutional justification necessary to support a sobriety checkpoint seizure. The majority answers this question with the conclusory assertion that satisfaction of the Martin criteria also satisfies Article Eleven's demands, but the opinion fails to explain why. This flaw in the majority's analysis flows from its failure to recognize the significance of the fact that the seizure involved in this case, as with most seizures at DUI roadblocks, was undertaken without an iota of individualized suspicion that defendant had committed a crime. This Court has recognized that, in cases involving warrantless seizures, the balance between an individual's Article Eleven rights and the public interest is struck by requiring that an officer have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. See State v. Aldrich, 122 Vt. 416, 423, 175 A.2d 803, 808 (1961) (under Article Eleven, the [s]eizure of a motor vehicle on the public highway may be accomplished without a warrant only where the seizing officer has reasonable cause for believing that the automobile which he halts is illegally transporting contraband.) (emphasis added). Under Martin, however, a sobriety checkpoint is generally reasonable if conducted according to the criteria listed in the opinion; no degree of individualized suspicion is necessary to justify any particular stop. Under this analysis, the traditional justification for the infringement on personal libertyindividualized suspicion is dispensed with in those cases where a seizure is minimally intrusive and neutral and where objective limitations are placed on officer discretion in the field. In my view, the clear and absolute language of Article Eleven is a clear statement of the policy against unjustified searches and seizures as well as arbitrary ones. As Professor Amsterdam has noted: Indiscriminate searches or seizures might be thought to be bad for either or both of two reasons. The first is that they expose people and their possessions to interferences by government when there is no good reason to do so. The concern here is against unjustified searches and seizures: it rests upon the principle that every citizen is entitled to security of his person and property unless and until an adequate justification for disturbing that security is shown. The second is that indiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion of executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seize. This latter concern runs against arbitrary searches and seizures: it condemns the petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 411 (1974). Written police guidelines aimed at curbing officer discretion, as mandated by Martin, may alleviate the problem of arbitrary police conduct, but sobriety checkpoints implicate Article Eleven's concern regarding justification as well. The majority offers no theory justifying such widespread suspicionless seizures other than the public interest in combating the problem of DUI. But, as well be demonstrated, such an interest, in and of itself, has never justified abandonment of the fundamental requirement of individualized suspicion. While I would not disagree with the statement in Martin that drunk driving is a serious threat to public safety giving rise to a strong state interest in curbing the practice, I cannot agree that the existence of this strong state interest, ipso facto, justifies abandonment of the requirement of individualized suspicion. As stated by Mr. Justice Stewart, in response to the argument that the problem of illegal immigration justified limited automobile stops some twenty-five miles from the United States' border in the absence of any individualized suspicion: It is not enough to argue, as does the Government, that the problem of detering unlawful entry by aliens across long expanses of national boundaries is a serious one. The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution's protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2540, 37 L.Ed. 2d 596 (1973). The tension involved in this case is little different from that described by Justice Stewart in Almeida-Sanchez. If all that is required to trigger the suspension of the individualized suspicion requirement is the existence of a serious law enforcement problem, then I fear that a police state is not far around the next corner. See State v. Smith, 674 P.2d at 564. As stated by one court: If roadblocks can be maintained to stop all persons, regardless of how innocent their conduct for the purpose of investigating or arresting drunk drivers, then presumably similar stops of all citizens could be undertaken for questioning and surveillance with regard to other crimes, such as possession of narcotics, possession of stolen property, or burglary.... Taking [such] an end justifies the means approach, would lose sight of a basic tenet of American jurisprudence that the government cannot assume criminal conduct in effectuating a stop such as the one in the instant case. Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d 676, 683 (Tex.Ct. App.1985). I would not go so far as to conclude that all searches or seizures not based on individualized suspicion are per se violative of Article Eleven. [9] Article Eleven, like the Fourth Amendment, must be flexible enough to accommodate very limited exceptions to rules of general applicability in particular cases where extraordinary private or public interests are involved, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878-79, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-79 (need to police United States' borders against illegal alien influx), or where the practical realities of a situation make more flexibility essential. See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881 (need of police officers to protect themselves in performance of their duties). Nevertheless, such exceptions must be carefully circumscribed to those situations where there is a demonstrable need for a particular type of suspicionless search, or seizure, as well as neutral and objective limitations, enforceable by the courts, on the exercise of the officer's discretion in the conduct of the search or seizure. In the context of a sobriety checkpoint, I would require the State to show that a properly conducted roadblock (according to the criteria outlined in Martin ) would increase the effectiveness of DUI law enforcement to a significant degree. Other state courts have applied precisely this sort of analysis to sobriety checkpoints. See State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E. 2d 1125, 1141 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) (holding DUI roadblock unconstitutional, on Fourth Amendment grounds, because state failed to demonstrate that such seizures are necessary, or at least more effective than available methods of drunk driving law enforcement, which are based on individualized suspicion aroused by observed conduct); State v. Koppel, 127 N.H. 286, 291-92, 499 A.2d 977, 981 (1985) (To justify the search or seizure of a motor vehicle, absent probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion that a criminal offense is being committed, the State must prove that its conduct significantly advances the public interest ... [and that] no less intrusive means are available to accomplish the State's goal.); Webb v. State, 695 S.W.2d at 681-82 (holding DUI roadblock unconstitutional on ground that State failed in its burden of establishing the superiority of the ... roadblock in light of available less intrusive alternative means of deterrence.); see also Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 98, 483 N.E.2d 1102, 1112 (1985) (Lynch, J., dissenting) (If such an intrusion [caused by a roadblock] can ever be said to be reasonable in a constitutional sense, it can only be after the Commonwealth has met its burden of showing that `[s]uch a procedure [achieves] a degree of law enforcement and highway safety that is not reasonably attainable by less intrusive means.') (citation omitted). Moreover, this approach is implicit in the better-reasoned Supreme Court decisions in this area. In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the Court struck down random drivers license checks by reasoning that [g]iven the alternative mechanisms available, both those in use and those that might be adopted, we are unconvinced that the incremental contribution to highway safety of the random spot check justifies the practice under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), the decision to uphold suspicionless border stops at fixed checkpoints was based in large part on the rationale that illegal alien traffic could not be controlled in a less intrusive yet equally effective manner. Id. at 556-57, 96 S.Ct. at 3082. Similarly, the decision in Brignoni-Ponce to uphold random border stops on the basis of reasonable suspicion expressly relied on the absence of practical alternatives for policing the border. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881, 95 S.Ct. at 2580. The majority glosses over the fact that the seizure involved in this case was conducted without a warrant, probable cause, or any suspicion whatsoever that the defendant had violated the law. While I might accept the proposition that such seizures are permissible in extraordinary cases where they are justified, e.g., State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash.App. 185, 188, 605 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1980) (roadblock and search for suspects departing ferry without individualized suspicion reasonable where serious felony had been committed), [10] I cannot conclude that DUI roadblocks in general are justified unless the State can show that they are substantially more effective than available methods of enforcing the DUI laws.