Opinion ID: 454946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delay Between Indictment and Trial

Text: 9 Robinson contended in his renewed motion to dismiss that the government also violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(c)(1) 4 by failing to commence the trial within seventy days of his September 3, 1982 arraignment. He argues that the district court correctly dismissed the charges against him because 109 days expired between his arraignment on September 3, 1982 and December 10, 1982, the date on which he filed his renewed motion to dismiss. 5 The government maintains, though, that only forty-nine days of includable time elapsed between Robinson's arraignment and the court's January 6, 1983 order dismissing the indictment. 10 Section 3161(c)(1) requires that a defendant be tried within seventy days of the filing date of the information or indictment, or of the date the defendant first appears before a judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever occurs later. The seventy-day period is not a consecutive calendar period, however. United States v. Severdija, 723 F.2d 791, 792 (11th Cir.1984). Rather, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h) provides that certain periods of delay, including delay resulting from the consideration of pretrial motions, are excludable in computing the time within which the trial must commence. In this case, the district court found only nineteen days of excludable time, from October 14, 1982 to November 2, 1982, and accordingly determined that the government had not complied with section 3161(c)(1). The district court, however, apparently overlooked other periods of delay that were properly excludable under section 3161(h). 6 11 Robinson was indicted on August 23, 1982 and arraigned on September 3, 1982. The Act's time limits were triggered by the arraignment and began to run on September 4, 1982, the day after the arraignment. See Severdija, 723 F.2d at 793 (date of arraignment is excludable); United States v. Stafford, 697 F.2d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir.1983) (same). Twenty-five nonexcludable days elapsed between September 4, 1982 and September 29, 1982, when Robinson filed his first motion to dismiss. Section 3161(h)(1)(F) of the Act allows for the exclusion of all time between the filing of a motion and a hearing on or other prompt disposition of the motion. Thus, the seven-day period from September 29, 1982 through October 5, 1982, when the magistrate filed her report recommending the denial of the motion, is excludable. See United States v. Martinez, 749 F.2d 623, 625 (11th Cir.1984) (when judge rules on a motion by written order, prompt disposition of motion under section 3161(h)(1)(F) occurs when order is officially filed by clerk). See also United States v. Campbell, 706 F.2d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir.1983); Stafford, 697 F.2d at 1372. Six nonexcludable days elapsed between October 6, 1982 and October 12, 1982, when Robinson filed objections to the magistrate's recommendation. The district court denied the motion in an order filed for the record on October 25, 1982, thus yielding fourteen excludable days. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(1)(F) (any pretrial motion); Martinez, 749 F.2d at 625. 12 The first disputed period of excludable time occurred between October 14, 1982, when defense counsel contested Robinson's arraignment, and November 2, 1982, when the government provided the court with evidence of the arraignment. 7 We agree with the government that this period was excludable under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(1)(J) because the matter of Robinson's arraignment was under investigation by the court during this period. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(1)(J) (excluding delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court). Given that part of this period overlaps the time excludable due to the filing of Robinson's objections to the magistrate's report, only the eight additional days from October 26, 1982 to November 2, 1982 should be excluded. Thus, twenty-two days, October 12, 1982 to November 2, 1982, are excludable in computing the seventy-day period from arraignment to trial. 13 Thirty-seven nonexcludable days elapsed between November 3, 1982 and December 10, 1982, when Robinson filed his renewed motion to dismiss. The period between December 10, 1982 and January 6, 1983, when the district court filed its order dismissing the indictment is also excludable under section 3161(h)(1)(F). See Campbell, 706 F.2d at 1143; Stafford, 697 F.2d at 1372. According to our calculations, there were fifty-eight excludable days and sixty-eight nonexcludable days between Robinson's arraignment on September 3, 1982 and the district court's grant of the motion to dismiss on January 6, 1983. The nonexcludable periods were (1) between arraignment and the original motion to dismiss (twenty-five days); (2) between the magistrate's report recommending denial of the motion and the filing of the objections to that report (six days); (3) between the time of the resolution of the dispute over the arraignment and the renewed motion to dismiss (thirty-seven days). Thus, the seventy-day period mandated by section 3161(c)(1) had not expired on January 6, 1983 when the district court granted the motion to dismiss. 8 14 Robinson's claim of constitutional infringement fares no better. 9 Fifty-eight days of delay between his arraignment and the district court's disposition of his renewed motion to dismiss are directly attributable to the court's handling of his various pretrial motions. We conclude that Robinson has not shown the prejudice necessary to establish an infringement of either his due process or speedy trial rights. See United States v. Hernandez, 724 F.2d 904, 906 (11th Cir.1984) (list of factors to be considered in assessing sixth amendment claim); United States v. Greene, 578 F.2d 648, 656 n. 8 (5th Cir.1978) 10 (defendant must show actual prejudice to establish due process violation), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133, 99 S.Ct. 1056, 59 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979). 15 The judgment of the district court granting Robinson's motion to dismiss is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for a trial on the merits.