Opinion ID: 2094512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mahan's claim as to Department of Corrections Policy IN-V-36(V)(D).

Text: Iowa DOC Policy IN-V-36(V)(D) explains the proper procedure to be followed when disciplinary charges and criminal charges are pending against a prison inmate stemming from an incident at a correctional facility .... D. When a matter has been referred to the prosecuting authority prior to the holding of a [prison] disciplinary hearing, disciplinary action shall be stayed until criminal charges are disposed of or dismissed, unless the inmate is informed that any statements made to the investigator or [prison disciplinary] committee will not be used in criminal proceedings. Written approval from the prosecutor shall be granted prior to such action. The inmate shall be advised of right to remain silent but that silence may be used in the disciplinary proceedings. (Emphasis added.) Summarized, Policy IN-V-36(V)(D) suggests that pending criminal charges against an inmate will be disposed of before any prison disciplinary action is taken against the inmate. If prison officials wish to take disciplinary action before the disposition of related criminal charges, prison officials mustbefore holding the disciplinary hearinginform the inmate that any statements made during the disciplinary hearing will not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings. The prosecutor also must agree in writing. All parties agree that prison officials did not comply with the above provision as to Mahan. Specifically, prison officials held Mahan's disciplinary hearing before the related criminal charges against him were concluded and did not inform him that any statements made by him during the disciplinary hearing would not be used in the subsequent criminal proceedings. Mahan asserts that because he was not advised of the provisions of Policy IN-V-36(V)(D), he was denied the opportunity to present a defense or mitigating factors in response to the disciplinary charges. Although the record does not show any expungement provision in the disciplinary rules governing the North Central Correctional Facility in Rockwell City, the correctional facility from which plaintiff Mahan escaped, Mahan contends that the only proper remedy for failure of prison officials to advise him of Policy IN-V-36(V)(D) is expungement of the disciplinary violations from his disciplinary record. The question we must answer then is what is the proper remedy as a result of the failure of prisons officials to comply with Policy IN-V-36(V)(D). We have said that the remedy of expungement is designed to preclude unwarranted collateral consequences from determinations arrived at with less than the requisite procedural fairness. Allen v. State, 418 N.W.2d 67, 69 (Iowa 1988) (applying expungement provisions of former Iowa State Penitentiary rule mandating expungement if an alleged prison rule violation is not adjudicated in accordance with procedures contained in penitentiary manual of disciplinary policies and procedures; inmate not entitled to expungement where one of two charges of violation of disciplinary rules was overturned because the finding of guilt rested upon an insufficient quantum of supporting proof). On this issue, one court has stated that expungement is only required when (1) the challenged disciplinary determination is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) there has been a violation of one of the inmate's fundamental [constitutional] due process rights, as enunciated in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); or (3) other equitable considerations dictate expungement of the record rather than remittal for a new hearing. Hillard v. Coughlin, 187 A.D.2d 136, 593 N.Y.S.2d 573, 576 (1993) (citations omitted) (inmate was entitled to new prison disciplinary hearing, not expungement, when prison officials failed to show him a videotape of prison uprising in which inmate was charged as a participant). Upon our review, we conclude that the failure of prison officials to advise Mahan of the provisions of Policy IN-V-36(V)(D) deprived him of a substantial right. We note, however, that Mahan conceded during oral argument that this deprivation does not amount to a violation of a constitutionally protected right. We also point out that Mahan raises no challenge concerning whether the disciplinary committee's finding that he violated certain prison rules is supported by some evidence. See Backstrom v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 508 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Iowa 1993) (adopting some evidence test as appropriate standard of proof in prison disciplinary cases). Nor do we find any equitable considerations that require expungement. We conclude that the proper remedy for noncompliance by prison officials with Policy IN-V-36(V)(D) is to sustain the writ and remand Mahan's case for a new hearing before the disciplinary committee, rather than expungement of his disciplinary record. See, e.g., Bradham v. State, 476 N.W.2d 369, 373 (Iowa App.1991) (affirming district court's ruling which granted reformatory inmate postconviction relief, vacated the disciplinary action and remanded for a new disciplinary hearing; inmate was entitled to new hearing where inmate was denied due process when warden had an ex parte communication with one of the disciplinary committee members concerning the basis for the disciplinary report); Hillard, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 576 ; Arroyo v. Coughlin, 182 A.D.2d 1130, 583 N.Y.S.2d 98, 98 (1992) (new prison disciplinary hearing, not expungement, was the proper remedy for failure of prison officers to review videotape of alleged violation of prison rules by inmate; new hearing was proper where misbehavior/disciplinary report and hearing testimony constituted substantial evidence to support the disciplinary determination, charges against inmate were serious and where inmate had served only a part of his penalty); Sabo v. Racette, 124 A.D.2d 920, 508 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (1986) ([e]xpungement is an appropriate remedy where a new hearing cannot be conducted in accordance with due process; inmate was entitled to new hearing, not expungement, where hearing officer wrongfully failed to introduce or consider certain evidence during hearing). A new hearing would enforce the DOC written policy and give Mahan the opportunity to present any defense and/or mitigating factors in response to the disciplinary charges. We point out that the warden or the DOC could have remanded Mahan's case for correction of the procedural error and new hearing pursuant to Iowa Code section 903A.3(2) (superintendent, warden, or designee may affirm, modify, remand for correction of procedural errors, or reverse an order entered in a prison disciplinary case). We conclude the district court erred in finding that Mahan's rights were not prejudiced. The writ should be sustained and Mahan's case remanded to the prison disciplinary committee for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We have all other contentions made by the parties and find them to be without merit or unnecessary to address.