Opinion ID: 1383957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA and the Nevada Supreme Court

Text: AEDPA directs us to determine whether the state decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). So far this analysis has proceeded as though the highest state court to rule on the case had the power to determine the facts. But this is not so. The constitution of the State of Nevada prohibits the Nevada Supreme Court from finding facts in the course of a criminal appeal. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 4; Lane v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 104 Nev. 427, 760 P.2d 1245, 1261 (1988) (Steffen, J., concurring). It must be assumed the Nevada Supreme Court obeyed or, that if it did not, its findings were unlawful and may be disregarded. In terms of the analogy with baseball, this split between the ability to determine the facts and the ability to state the law constitute a distinct problem. It is as though the home plate umpire could only find the facts  the catcher touched the runner; the runner had not crossed home plate; while a super-umpire would have the power to review the application of the rules and pronounce the runner to be out. Certainly, the super-umpire could not invent facts and say, The runner crossed the plate. He's not out. Out of an abundance of caution, it has been assumed that some facts could be determined by the Nevada Supreme Court. Now, however, as an alternative approach, the analysis is founded on what was found by the only Nevada court that had power to find facts, the trial court. As to A's unavailability as a witness, as already noted, the trial court made no finding of fact. Consequently, there is nothing for us to review or to treat with deference, and no guarantee of the statement's trustworthiness shown. Nor is anything shown by the statement's plausibility. The prosecutor wouldn't be trying to introduce it if it were implausible. Chronological order seems to be characteristic of any narrative. The judge found that A had no motive to fabricate. This negative conclusion was scarcely a guarantee of trustworthiness. That the trial judge thought the statements reflected A's perception and that he found the account credible merely presents the trial judge's view of the evidence. At the end of his brief analysis, he acknowledges that A spoke differently at the preliminary hearing. Plausibility, rationality, chronological order, absence of motive to lie, and credibility create no exception to the constitutional requirement set by the Sixth Amendment. The writ of habeas corpus must be issued. As to the other requirements of Wright, the trial court found the hearsay statements not irrational or not plausible. They follow chronologically the events. They tell what the little girl's perception of it was and it seems to be credible, although I grant that at the preliminary hearing there is a different version. That a statement does not appear irrational and that it appears plausible and credible to the judge  none of these are particularized guarantees. And when the judge concedes that A's testimony is not consistent, how could anyone conclude that cross-examination of her would be of little utility? No findings as to the necessary guarantees have been made. For this reason, too, the writ should issue.