Opinion ID: 1972054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: R.E. 609(a) provides:

Text: General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime involved moral turpitude. Admissibility shall depend upon a determination by the court that the probative value of this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Although this rule differs from rules of other jurisdictions in a number of important respects, the relevant inquiry is whether the conviction bears on testimonial reliabilitywhether the convicted person would regard lightly the obligation to tell the truth. V.R.E. 609, Reporter's Notes (citing State v. LaPlante, 141 Vt. 405, 408, 449 A.2d 955, 956-57 (1982)). The offense of sexual assault upon a minor involves moral turpitude because it is a socially undesirable [and] base or depraved act, State v. LaPlante, supra, 141 Vt. at 408, 449 A.2d at 956; but conviction does not per se establish the offender as a person who regards lightly the obligation to tell the truth. Cf. id. at 409, 449 A.2d at 957 (quoting Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 171, 155 A. 153, 157 (1931)). The assumption that [crimes of violence] are probative of credibility because a person convicted of assault is a bad man, and a bad man is also a liar, does not hold water.... 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 609[02], at 609-55 (1982). Under the second sentence of V.R.E. 609(a), the probative value of the evidence must be weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from its admission. Cf. V.R.E. 403. This balancing test, V.R.E. 609, Reporter's Notes; cf. State v. Gardner, 139 Vt. 456, 460, 433 A.2d 249, 251 (1981), gives the trial judge discretion to exclude evidence that is technically relevant if its probative value is outweighed by dangers of prejudice, confusion, or delay. V.R.E. 403, Reporter's Notes. In this case, evidence of the complainant's conviction was of limited probative value regarding credibility; however, its admission could have risked unfairly inflaming the jury's prejudice, and it could have confused the issues, by raising the inference that the victim's prior conviction bore some substantive relevance aside from the issue of the victim's credibility. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the witness's conviction. The conviction for simple assault is affirmed; the kidnapping conviction is reversed and remanded.