Opinion ID: 4561629
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Retaliation

Text: Next, we consider the claims of alleged retaliation against Dr. Khalaf through his demotion, placement on a PEP, and alleged termination. As noted, the jury found that Dr. Khalaf had been subjected to retaliatory demotion by Ford and Fowler, retaliatory placement on a PEP by Zhou, and retaliatory termination by Ford. To demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the ELCRA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing that “(1) he . . . engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against the employee, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Beard v. AAA of Mich., 593 F. App’x 447, 451 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2001) (retaliation claims under Section 1981 governed by same standards as Title VII). “[W]hen it comes to federal antidiscrimination laws like § 1981 . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate that, but for the defendant’s unlawful conduct, [the] alleged injury would not have occurred.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020) (“This ancient and Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 24 simple ‘but for’ common law causation test, we have held, supplies the ‘default’ or ‘background’ rule against which Congress is normally presumed to have legislated when creating its own new causes of action.”). Furthermore, “the Supreme Court . . . made clear that the scope of Title VII's retaliation provision is broader than that of Title VII’s discrimination provision.” Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720 (citing Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 703(a), 704(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2(a), 2000e–3(a). “In contrast to Title VII’s discrimination provision, the ‘adverse employment action’ requirement in the retaliation context is not limited to an employer's actions that affect the terms, conditions, or status of employment, or those acts that occur in the workplace.” Id. (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 62–66). “The retaliation provision instead protects employees from conduct that would have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Niswander, 529 F.3d at 720 (quoting Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 60). 1. Alleged Retaliatory Demotion of Dr. Khalaf by Fowler We first address whether there is sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Khalaf’s encouragement of Burke to file a HR complaint against Buche in February 2013 qualified as a “protected activity” under Title VII and the ELCRA. Dr. Khalaf claims that he instructed Pauline Burke, following her phone exchange with David Buche, to file a claim with HR. R.79-8, PX16, PageID 2469 (“I have asked Pauline to file a claim with you because she made accusation over a discussion she had with David []”). Dr. Khalaf contends that Fowler “retaliated” against this “protected activity” in March 2013 by replacing him with Jay Zhou (a higher-level LL3 employee) as Lead QFL responsible for overseeing the QS&PP Department. As a result of Zhou’s appointment, Dr. Khalaf was relieved of his former responsibility of managing the Quality Analysts. R. 79-11, PX24, PageID 2480; DX70, App.1. For a plaintiff to demonstrate a qualifying “protected activity,” he must show that he took an “overt stand against suspected illegal discriminatory action.” Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 288 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “In other words, an employee ‘may not invoke the protections of the Act by making a vague charge of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 25 Fox v. Eagle Distrib. Co., 510 F.3d 587, 591 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1313 (6th Cir.1989) (holding that complaints about “ethnocism” were too vague to constitute protected activity))). With this legal standard in mind, we find that Willoughby v. Allstate Insurance Co., offers a comparable set of facts to what occurred here. In Willoughby, the plaintiff claimed he had engaged in a “protected activity” when he sent a three-page letter to his employer following his demotion, which “mention[ed] three previous sexual harassment complaints against” another employee and discussed general unhappiness amongst white employees at his company. 104 F. App’x 528, 530–31 (6th Cir. 2004). Although the plaintiff had mentioned “sexual harassment” in his letter, which could be indicative of his taking a stand against such, we dismissed his complaint because the letter was not actually “asserting discrimination,” but rather was intended primarily to “impeach the other employee’s credibility” and “contest[] the correctness of a decision made by his employer. . . .” Id. (concluding that the “vague charge of discrimination in [[the employee’s] internal letter] is insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice”) (quoting Booker, 879 F.3d at 1313). Dr. Khalaf’s report to Ford’s HR Department said even less about discrimination than did the letter in Willoughby. Dr. Khalaf’s report did not even explicitly characterize Burke as having been “sexually harassed.” Nor did Dr. Khalaf ever state that he had instructed Burke to file a sexual harassment or sexual discrimination complaint. Rather, immediately after the incident occurred, Dr. Khalaf indicated that he had “asked Pauline [Burke] to file a claim with [HR] because she made an accusation over a discussion she had with David Buche yesterday.” R.79- 7, PX15, PageID 2458; R. 79-8, PX26, PageID 2469. Dr. Khalaf’s statements were not enough for a reasonable juror to conclude that Dr. Khalaf charged “illegal discriminatory action,” as to which he was taking a direct stand. Blizzard, 698 F.3d at 288. There was insufficient evidence to show that Dr. Khalaf’s action in response to the February 2013 telephone call was “protected activity” under Title VII or the ELCRA. We therefore REVERSE the district court’s denial of JMOL on Dr. Khalaf’s retaliatory demotion claim. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 26 2. Zhou’s Alleged Retaliatory Placement of Dr. Khalaf on a Performance Enhancement Plan The jury determined that Zhou, but not Ford or Fowler, retaliated against Dr. Khalaf by placing him on a PEP. We conclude that this finding was not supported by the evidence based on an evaluation of the undisputed timeline related to Dr. Khalaf’s employment, which indicates no connection between Dr. Khalaf’s alleged protected activities and Zhou’s PEP decision. Dr. Khalaf encouraged Burke to report the phone incident to HR in February 2013, and he filed his harassment complaint against Fowler and Zhou on April 4, 2014. There is no evidence that either of these acts had any impact on Zhou’s decision to place Dr. Khalaf on a PEP. The latter decision was actually made in March 2014, based on documented evidence of Dr. Khalaf’s sub-par job performance. As Dr. Khalaf’s counsel conceded at trial, Zhou’s imposition of the PEP had nothing to do with the Burke complaint because Zhou was not Dr. Khalaf’s supervisor at the time of the complaint: “I’m not going to try to ask the jury to find liability against Zhou for the Pauline Burke complaint; it was before his time.” R.141, 3.26.Tr., PageID 6998. Indeed, Zhou joined the QS&PP Department in August 2013, six months after the Burke-Buche phone incident occurred. See id; DX70, App. 1. Retaliation requires proof “that the individuals charged with taking the adverse employment action knew of the [plaintiff’s] protected activity,” Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2002), and there is simply no evidence that Zhou even was aware of Burke’s complaint to HR and Dr. Khalaf’s actions related to that complaint. Dr. Khalaf contends that another relevant protected activity motivating Zhou’s decision to place him on the PEP was the email he sent to HR manager Wendy Warnick in June 2013.11 See R.37-14, PX 26 PageID 1176-1180. Attempting to support the connection between the email and his eventual placement on a PEP, Dr. Khalaf references the response made by HR supervisor Mike Lank to Dr. Khalaf’s question for why he was being placed on a PEP, where Lank stated “you had your chance when you filed your complaint.” R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5789. 11Note that Dr. Khalaf did not reference the email to Warnick in connection with his retaliatory-PEP claim in his response to defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion before the district court. See R.67, Plaintiff Rule 50(a) Opp., PageID 2361. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 27 According to Dr. Khalaf, this comment alone is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that Zhou’s imposition of the PEP represented retaliation for Dr. Khalaf’s protected activity. However, we find no merit in this argument either. The contents of Dr. Khalaf’s email to Warnick and the alleged connection Dr. Khalaf attempts to draw between its transmission and Mike Lank’s statement appear tenuous and unclear. As we noted above, in the context of protected conduct claims, employees “may not make[] vague charge[s] of discrimination.” Blizzard 698 F.3d at 275 (quoting Fox, 510 F.3d 587 (quoting Booker, 879 F.2d at 1313)). Therefore, it is questionable whether the email, in which Dr. Khalaf described what he perceived as the sub-optimal behaviors of his subordinates, constituted a protected activity in the first place, given that not once did Dr. Khalaf describe an instance of actual discrimination directed towards him based on his race or national origin. R.37-14, PX 26 PageID 1176-1180. Instead, Dr. Khalaf only described what he perceived to be instances of subordinates’ disrespect, sub-par work quality, and defensiveness, none of which he explicitly connected to being motivated by subordinates’ animus towards his race or national origin. For example, Dr. Khalaf described one subordinate, “Kim,” as “[v]ery defensive when a comment or question is raised to a person in [her] section.” R.37-14, PX 26 PageID 1179. He described the performance of another subordinate, “Shari,” as “[a]lways requr[ing] direction,” and characterized her leadership as “aggressive” and “show[ing] a lack of respect.” Id. Similarly, Dr. Khalaf explained that the leadership qualities of another subordinate, “Jim,” included his “[h]aving tendency to get unpolite, nervous, and aggressive in his lack of respect to others including his manager.” Id. However, even under the assumption that the email represented a valid protected activity, Dr. Khalaf must show proof that Zhou, the decision-maker on the PEP, “knew of the protected activity,” Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 551-512, which Dr. Khalaf fails to do. The dearth of evidence showing Zhou had of knowledge of the email is further demonstrated by the facts that (1) the email was addressed to Warnick alone; and (2) the email was delivered in June 2013, two months before Zhou joined the Department. R.37-14, PX26, PageID 1176; see also DX 70, App. 1. Finally, Dr. Khalaf fails to show the requisite causality between the June 2013 email and his April 2014 placement on a PEP—an act that occurred ten months later. Lank’s comment, Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 28 without more, is irrelevant, as Dr. Khalaf has shown no connection between the comment and the action of Zhou, the decision-maker here. Furthermore, for causation to be shown between an alleged protected activity and the retaliatory action, “the temporal proximity must be ‘very close.’” Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273. That nexus is clearly not met here, given the ten-month span separating the complaint and the PEP. For these reasons, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a connection between Dr. Khalaf’s June 2013 email to Warnick and the imposition of the PEP. Finally, there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a connection between Dr. Khalaf’s complaint against Fowler and Zhou and the imposition of the PEP. Consider the undisputed chronology of events that occurred relating to the PEP decision. Although Dr. Khalaf notes that his official placement on a PEP (on April 23, 2014) occurred after he filed the April 4, 2014 complaint with HR, there is no evidence in the record from which a reasonable juror could have found that the PEP was caused by Dr. Khalaf’s complaint. The basis for the PEP dated back to November 2013, when Zhou met with Dr. Khalaf about his performance review. Zhou indicated that Dr. Khalaf was “trending towards a lower achiever & he is expected to improve & sustain expected behaviors.” R.79-16, PX39, PageID 2506. At that time, Zhou warned Dr. Khalaf that “[i]f there [was] not sustained improvement,” Dr. Khalaf would “be placed on a PEP.” Id.; see also R.137. 3.19.Tr., PageID 6261-6262; R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5773-5775. Following this review, Zhou testified, he tried to help Dr. Khalaf improve the noted deficiencies in his job performance, particularly his leadership skills. Zhou even “went through Ford[’s] website to try to find resource[s] . . . for the leadership and development and communications skills development,” which he shared with Dr. Khalaf. R.137, 3.19.Tr., PageID 6262. However, Zhou testified that he met with Dr. Khalaf again in January 2014, and at this meeting Dr. Khalaf “didn’t own [his leadership issues]” or “take responsibility on the items highlight[ed] in the performance review.” R.137, 3.19.Tr., PageID 6265. Instead, according to Zhou, Dr. Khalaf placed blame on his subordinates. Meanwhile, despite this initial performance review and follow-up, the relationship between Dr. Khalaf and his team of department employees failed to improve. Dr. Khalaf’s management problems were the focus of a March 2014 meeting between department employees Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 29 and Zhou. It was a “very, very painful discussion,” Zhou testified, in which “everybody complained about . . . the leadership behaviors of [Dr. Khalaf] and how people are mistreated.” Based on these negative responses, Zhou concluded that the “team [had been] destroyed” by Dr. Khalaf. That same month, Zhou made the decision to institute the PEP for Dr. Khalaf. R.137, 3.19.Tr., PageID 6214. In order to officially process the decision, Zhou had to work with HR through late-March 2014, which required that he and HR representatives finalize the wording of the PEP. Id. at PageID 6213. On April 2, 2014, HR then sent an email to Zhou approving the final version of the PEP and instructing him that it was “Ok to move forward with delivery” of the PEP on Friday, April 4. R.140, 3.22.Tr. PageID 6851; R.82-5, DX132, PageID 2902. However, on the morning of April 4, 2014, Dr. Khalaf unexpectedly cancelled his scheduled meeting with Zhou, meaning Zhou was unable to deliver the PEP that day. R.82-5, DX135, PageID 2909. That afternoon Dr. Khalaf sent an email to HR complaining about the alleged harassment by Fowler and Zhou. R.79-24, PX64, PageID 2536. “To establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, a plaintiff must present evidence ‘sufficient to raise the inference that [his] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.’” In re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d 1001, 1011 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Walcott v. City of Cleveland, 123 F. App’x 171, 178 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir.1997))). There was no proof presented at trial to allow for a reasonable inference that the PEP resulted from Dr. Khalaf’s complaint about Fowler and Zhou. The district court acknowledged the specific sequence of events outlined above, even recognizing that (1) Zhou did not become Dr. Khalaf’s manager until months after Dr. Khalaf’s actions related to the Burke complaint in February 2013; and (2) that “the PEP paperwork was processed before [Dr. Khalaf] made his April 2014 harassment complaint” about Zhou and Fowler. R.115, JMOL Order, PageID 5122 (emphasis added). Nonetheless, the court denied judgment as a matter of law to Zhou, rationalizing that “the evidence at trial demonstrated a continuous course of conduct aimed at [Dr. Khalaf] following his protected activity.” Id. Respectfully, we believe the district court did not adequately account for the lack of evidence that Zhou actually knew about Dr. Khalaf’s first protected activity (encouraging Burke to report the February 2013 call sexual harassment Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 30 incident) or second protected activity (the June 2013 email) or that the PEP had anything to do with the third protected activity (reporting alleged harassment under Fowler and Zhou to HR). Ultimately then, because there was no evidence to support a continuous course of retaliatory conduct aimed at Dr. Khalaf following any protected activity, there was no basis for a reasonable jury to find the requisite causation for Dr. Khalaf’s retaliation claim. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of JMOL on Dr. Khalaf’s retaliatory PEP claim against Zhou. 3. Dr. Khalaf’s Alleged Retaliatory Termination by Ford Finally, Ford argues that it is entitled to JMOL on Dr. Khalaf’s retaliatory termination claim. Ford advances two arguments: (1) that undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Khalaf was not actually terminated; and (2) alternatively, that even if he had been terminated, Dr. Khalaf’s undisputed refusal to take the job offered to him by Ford constituted a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Dr. Khalaf’s termination. We agree with Ford’s first argument and do not address the second. Dr. Khalaf was on a medical leave of absence from June 28, 2014 through July 13, 2015. R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5824. Dr. Khalaf ended his leave of absence after his benefits under his disability plan terminated. Ford then conducted a generalized search for open positions suitable for Dr. Khalaf’s experience and skillset; however, Ford was unable to identify any available jobs at Dr. Khalaf’s old management level (LL5) and made this clear to Dr. Khalaf. Id. at 5824-5826; R.80-14, PX132, PageID 2597. Dr. Khalaf even conducted a search himself and could not identify any available managerial jobs at his former LL5 level, only finding non-management LL6 positions. R.136, 3.15.Tr., PageID 5909-5911. Ford then offered Dr. Khalaf an LL6 job, with an August 31, 2015 deadline for acceptance. Though this was a lower level position than Dr. Khalaf previously held, Ford indicated that the job would be at the same rate of pay as Dr. Khalaf’s prior LL5 job. R. 135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5806-5807, 5824-5825; R.80-12, PX122, PageID 2587; R.80-14, PX132, PageID 2597. But, on August 28, Dr. Khalaf rejected Ford’s job offer and he accepted a position with another Michigan-based corporation, BASF. The new job Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 31 gave Dr. Khalaf a higher salary, as well as a signing bonus. R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5818, R.136, 3.15.Tr., PageID 5911-5915. This evidence cited by Ford establishes that Dr. Khalaf cannot establish his retaliatorytermination claim because Ford offered him the only available and reasonable job at the time, which Dr. Khalaf refused in order to accept the BASF job offer. Therefore, Dr. Khalaf was not terminated. See, e.g., Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2016) (“An ordinary wrongful discharge claim . . . has two basic elements: discrimination and discharge.”) (emphasis added); Evans v. Davie Truckers, Inc., 769 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the “evidence clearly established that [the employee] voluntarily resigned his employment with the defendant, [he] suffered no adverse employment action at the hand of the defendant”). “The sine qua non of a discharge case is, of course, a discharge.” 1 B. Lindemann, et al., Employment Discrimination Law 21–33 (5th ed. 2012). The district court recognized this logic when it initially announced its intention to direct a verdict in favor of Ford. R.143, 3.28.Tr., Page ID 7237-7238. However, a year later, the court reversed its initial view on the question of Dr. Khalaf’s termination. R.115, JMOL Order, PageID 5117. In denying Ford’s motion for JMOL, the court cited Dr. Khalaf’s perception that the job offered by Ford (1) was not at the same grade as his pre-disability job, and therefore could potentially affect Dr. Khalaf’s future bonuses; and (2) would alter Dr. Khalaf’s seniority date, thus potentially affecting his pension benefits. Id. at PageID 5116. The court also cited Dr. Khalaf’s statements of subjective belief (1) that he would have had to “self-demote to return to work”; and (2) that, given HR Director Mike Link’s testimony “that Ford [had] offered [Dr. Khalaf] money if he separated,” this offer represented an effective termination, because in the ordinary course of business “Ford does not offer money to voluntary quits.” Id. at PageID 5116. The district court erred in its emphasis on evidence of Dr. Khalaf’s subjective belief unsupported by objective facts. Any reduction in grade or benefits, or perception of “selfdemotion” related to a job, does not indicate that Dr. Khalaf was actually terminated. Dr. Khalaf’s perceptions regarding his new role were merely assumptions based on his “review and understanding of Ford policies.” R.135, 3.14. Tr., PageID 5811-5812. In fact, these assumptions were incorrect, as established by the testimony of a Ford employee with knowledge about the Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 32 seniority date that would have been assigned to Dr. Khalaf. R.140, 3.22.Tr., PageID 6849-6850, 6873-6875. Therefore, there is no evidence to show that Dr. Khalaf would have lost his seniority or would have lost his ability to participate in Ford’s defined-benefit plan. R.135, 3.14.Tr., PageID 5811-5812. If anything, the factors Dr. Khalaf references as demonstrating actual discharge under Ford would be more appropriate for a “constructive discharge” claim, Logan v. Denny’s Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2001).12 However, constructive discharge was never presented by Dr. Khalaf as a theory for the jury to consider. The only question that the jury was asked to decide relative to Dr. Khalaf’s alleged termination was whether he was actually terminated. “An actual discharge . . . occurs when the employer uses language or engages in conduct that would logically lead a prudent person to believe his tenure has been terminated.” Fischer v. Forestwood Co., Inc., 525 F.3d 972, 979 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 88 (2nd Cir. 1996)); see also Pennypower Shopping News, Inc. v. NLRB, 726 F.2d 626, 629 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The test of whether an employee has been discharged depends on the reasonable inferences that the employee could draw from the statements or conduct of the employer.”). “An actual discharge does not occur, however, when the employee chooses to resign rather than work under undesirable conditions.” Id. It is undisputed that, after engaging in a search of available positions, Ford offered Dr. Khalaf a job that he refused. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that Ford used any “language” or “conduct” that “would logically lead [Dr. Khalaf] to believe his tenure [had] been terminated.” Forestwood, 525 F.3d at 979. While Dr. Khalaf may have assumed the new job offered to him by Ford represented a termination based on his personal “review and understanding of Ford policies,” R.135, 3.14. Tr., PageID 5811-5812, as we noted above, these 12“To determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer’s intent and the employee’s objective feelings must be examined.” Id. Our analysis of the first prong “depends on the facts of each case.” Id. “[W]e consider the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee's former status.” Id. Based on the evidence presented by Dr. Khalaf, it may be questioned whether he would have been even able to demonstrate evidence of a constructive discharge, but we do not address that issue because Dr. Khalaf did not raise it. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 33 assumptions were incorrect, as established by the testimony of a Ford employee who possessed knowledge of the new seniority date assigned to Dr. Khalaf. Based on these facts, we hold that no reasonable juror could have concluded that Dr. Khalaf was actually discharged based on Ford’s actions. See Pennypower Shopping News 726 F.2d at 629. Dr. Khalaf’s reference to Lank’s testimony (where he stated that Ford does not generally offer severance pay to employees who voluntarily quit, yet offered severance to Dr. Khalaf) does not change our conclusion. R.140, 3.22.Tr., PageID 6869. This is because Lank qualified his statement, explaining how the circumstances were different in Dr. Khalaf’s unique situation. Namely, as was the case with Dr. Khalaf upon his return from disability leave, when a Ford employee’s position “goes away” or is no longer available, and the only replacement position “available” to that employee requires a reduction in level, then Ford’s personnel system classifies the situation “as an involuntary separation,” which thereby qualifies that employee for severance benefits. Id. at 6871. This was the case with Dr. Khalaf because, after conducting its search, Ford did not locate a position available at Dr. Khalaf’s prior LL5 management level—meaning Dr. Khalaf would have necessarily been reduced to an LL6 position (though that position offered the same salary and benefits). Therefore, under Ford’s internal classification nomenclature, Dr. Khalaf’s rejection of the offer and departure represented “an involuntary separation,” id. at PageID 6871-6872, meaning Dr. Khalaf would be eligible for “some [severance] pay.” Id. Regardless of Ford’s internal classification, however, it is clear that Dr. Khalaf “was given a choice to take the [Ford] position and he chose not to,” id. at PageID 6870; instead, he chose to separate from Ford in order to take a higher paying job at BASF.13 For these reasons, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Dr. Khalaf was not actually terminated by Ford. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of JMOL on Dr. Khalaf’s retaliatory termination claim. 13Additional support for Lank’s description of Ford’s internal personnel classifications comes from the “Salaried Involuntary Reduction Process Approval Form” signed by Fowler, Zhou, and other Ford representatives on September 1, 2015 to document Dr. Khalaf’s departure. That form explains that Dr. Khalaf was offered an LL6 position, but “failed to accept the position by the specified deadline of 12:00 p m. on August 31, 2015,” and therefore, Dr. Khalaf was “involuntarily separated from Ford Motor Company.” R.80-14, PX132, PageID 2597. Nos. 19-1435/1468 Khalaf v. Ford Motor Co. Page 34