Opinion ID: 1309631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dorothy Reniewich Matter

Text: The record supports the Review Department's findings that Garlow (1) wilfully failed to communicate with his client, (2) wilfully failed to refund any portion of his $400 fee, and (3) committed perjury and subornation of perjury. Dorothy Reniewich retained Garlow on December 8, 1982, to represent her in a dissolution of marriage action. Reniewich intended to substitute Garlow for another attorney who had worked on her dissolution. She paid him a total of $400 with the understanding that any court appearances would be in addition to the $400. Garlow informed Reniewich that he would obtain a court date to secure a bifurcation of certain portions of her dissolution proceeding within six weeks. Throughout 1983, Reniewich made numerous telephone calls to Garlow's office to determine the status of her case. Garlow purposefully avoided her calls and refused to return her calls. He testified that he avoided communication with her because she always asked the same questions and was bugging the hell out of him. On May 27, 1983, Garlow sent Reniewich a letter stating that the motion for bifurcation was set for court hearing on June 16, 1983. Reniewich testified that she called Garlow's office twice on June 2, 1983, and once on June 13, 1983. She did not speak to Garlow, but one of his secretaries told her that they did not have her June 16th court appearance on their calendar. Reniewich told the secretary to have Garlow call her. He never did. On June 13, 14 and 15, Reniewich called the court for information on her court appearance. The court informed her that it did not have any such appearance scheduled for her case. Garlow called Reniewich on the morning of June 16. Reniewich's boyfriend, Jerry McMillian, answered the phone. Garlow asked if they were ready to go to court; McMillian responded that there was no court appearance scheduled. Garlow expressed surprise and indicated that he would meet them in court. Reniewich and McMillian got ready for court and drove to the courthouse. Upon their arrival they discovered that there was no court appearance set for her case. Moreover, Garlow never showed up at the courthouse. Adding insult to injury, Reniewich was informed by the county clerk that Garlow was not even listed as her attorney of record. After speaking with McMillian on the morning of the 16th, Garlow called the court and discovered the problem. He had sent the substitution-of-attorney form and the motion for bifurcation without enclosing the proper fee. The court had previously called Garlow's office in May to notify him of the problem and one of his secretaries indicated that the fee would be sent. However, the court never received the fee and thus the papers were never filed. Garlow never attempted to meet Reniewich at the court or to communicate with her again. Nor did he attempt to resubmit the documents with the proper filing fee or return Reniewich's $400. Reniewich made written demand on Garlow for return of her $400. Garlow did not respond. She also made two phone calls demanding her $400 and her file, without response. She then brought suit against Garlow in small claims court. Garlow did not appear and the court rendered judgment against him for $400 plus court costs. Garlow testified that when he received the notice of judgment, he instructed Maria Gonzalez, one of his secretaries, to send Reniewich the money. However, the Review Department determined that Garlow's testimony that he told his secretary to send a check was knowingly false. Moreover, the Review Department further found that Garlow induced his secretary, Alma Cuevas, to testify falsely to corroborate his story. There are numerous inconsistencies in the testimony which support the Review Department's findings of false testimony, and we adopt those findings of fact. [5]
The Review Department concluded that Garlow's misconduct violated rules 2-111(A)(3), [6] 6-101(A)(2) [7] and 6-101(B)(2) [8] of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Business and Professions Code section 6103. Moreover, the Review Department determined that Garlow's conduct involved moral turpitude and dishonesty within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 6106. The Review Department found as a mitigating circumstance that the $400 amount was not substantial. However, the Review Department also found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) that Garlow's four prior disciplinary actions were for wilful failure to communicate with clients, showing a continuing pattern of misconduct, (2) that Garlow never refunded the $400 despite the small claims judgment against him, and (3) that Garlow testified falsely and induced his secretary to testify falsely. The Review Department concluded that disbarment was warranted.
Garlow again attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Review Department's findings of fact and conclusions of law. (9) He first argues that he performed all of the services for which he was retained until he was discharged and that he communicated with his client and kept her fully informed. We disagree. The overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that Garlow did not perform any of the services for which he was retained. He never became attorney of record, he never actually filed a motion for bifurcation, and he intentionally avoided communication with his client. Moreover, Garlow never tried to resubmit the motion for bifurcation with the proper filing fee. (10) Garlow next contends that he earned the $400 fee. He argues that he spent two or three hours on the case and that he rightfully could bill Reniewich close to $400 for that time. However, the oral retainer agreement between Reniewich and Garlow did not specify an hourly fee. It specified a result. Even if we accept Garlow's position that he was only retained to secure the bifurcation, it is clear that he did not achieve the result for which he was retained, nor did he make much of an effort to do so. (11) Garlow also argues that even though he earned the fee, he nevertheless attempted to pay the small claims judgment against him by directing his secretary to send a check to Reniewich. However, as we have already indicated, there is substantial evidence to support the Review Department's findings that Garlow and Alma Cuevas testified falsely about whether Garlow ever directed any of his employees to mail a check. (12) Garlow's next contention is that the Review Department's finding that he committed perjury and subornation of perjury should be stricken as a matter of law because the Hearing Panel made no such finding and was in a better position to determine such facts. Garlow bases his contention on the premise that because the Hearing Panel did not expressly find that Cuevas testified falsely, it must have believed that she was telling the truth. We decline to adopt such reasoning. Moreover, rule 452 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar provides that the findings of the Hearing Panel shall only serve as a recommendation to the Review Department and that the Review Department has the authority to independently review the record and render findings of fact at variance with the Hearing Panel's findings. More importantly, we independently review the record and make our own determinations of fact. ( Galardi v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 683, 689 [238 Cal. Rptr. 774, 739 P.2d 134]; Alberton v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 1, 11 [206 Cal. Rptr. 373, 686 P.2d 1177].) Although we give great weight to the findings of the Hearing Panel, we conclude that the Panel was silent on this subject and that the record supports the added finding of the Review Department that Garlow testified falsely and that he induced Cuevas to testify falsely. (See fn. 5, ante. ) (13)-(15) Garlow finally contends that his conduct did not violate Business and Professions Code sections 6103 or 6106, or rules 2-111(A)(3), 6-101(A)(2) and 6-101(B)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Garlow's primary argument is that rule 2-111(A)(3) requires that an attorney return unearned monies given to him by a client upon his withdrawal from service. Garlow argues that he did not withdraw, he was fired, and therefore rule 2-111(A)(3) is inapplicable to him. Although it is true that Garlow was fired, he fails to recognize that he was fired because he effectively withdrew from representing Reniewich by failing to perform as agreed. His conscious decision to avoid her telephone calls and his failure to communicate the status of her court appearance or to resubmit the documents for filing evidence his withdrawal as diligent counsel. Thus, rule 2-111(A)(3) is definitely applicable to his misconduct in this case, as are rules 6-101(A)(2) because of his repeated failure to perform competently and 6-101(B)(2) because of his willingness to accept employment when he should have known he was not in a position to competently represent his client. Finally, Business and Professions Code section 6103 states that conduct in violation of an attorney's oath is cause for suspension or disbarment. Garlow took an oath that he would abide by the rules of professional conduct promulgated by the State Bar of California. His violation of that oath subjects him to discipline under section 6103. Moreover, we agree with the conclusion of the Review Department that his intentional disregard of the small claims judgment and his perjury and subornation of perjury constitute moral turpitude and dishonesty within the meaning of Business and Professions Code section 6106.