Opinion ID: 760396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adusumilli's Affidavit

Text: 18 As a preliminary matter, we must address Adusumilli's appeal of the lower court's order striking portions of her affidavit. We review a trial judge's decision to strike parts of an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary judgment for abuse of discretion. See Whitted v. General Motors Corp., 58 F.3d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.1995). Under this standard, [d]ecisions that are reasonable, i.e., not arbitrary, will not be questioned.... Id. 19 According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). On a motion for summary judgment, a court must not consider those parts of an affidavit that are insufficient under Rule 56(e). Friedel v. City of Madison, 832 F.2d 965, 970 (7th Cir.1987). 20 The district court held that three statements in Adusumilli's affidavit lack foundation and concern matters not within her personal knowledge, and that one statement contradicts Adusumilli's prior testimony under oath at her deposition. Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 1997 WL 769457 at  3 (N.D.Ill.1997). For these reasons, the court ordered all four statements stricken. Id. Adusumilli challenges the district judge's order with respect to three of the four stricken statements. We consider each of these in turn. 21 First, Adusumilli challenges the lower court's decision to strike the following sentence from her affidavit: However, as time passed, it became apparent to me that the harassment was based upon my gender and national origin. (Adusumilli Aff. p 2). The district court held that this statement lacks foundation and is not within Adusumilli's personal knowledge because it addresses the reasons that co-workers allegedly harassed her. This determination was eminently reasonable and safely within the district judge's discretion. 22 Next, Adusumilli argues that the lower court erred in striking the second sentence of the following paragraph: The presence of Paul Gray in my work area seriously affected my ability to carry out my job responsibilities. My superiors knew of my discomfort, but did nothing to alleviate it. (Adusumilli Aff. p 6). Concluding that this second sentence contains speculation about what Adusumilli's superiors knew, the district court held that the statement lacks foundation and is not within Adusumilli's personal knowledge. 23 Adusumilli argues that she has personal knowledge of what her superiors knew because she informed Zeliasz of her discomfort. In support of this argument, Adusumilli cites paragraphs 19 and 20 of her Local Rule 12(N) Statement of Additional Facts. Paragraph 19 is irrelevant. 3 Paragraph 20 states: Gray's presence in Plaintiff's work area interfered with Plaintiff's performance. Plaintiff complained to her supervisor, Zeliasz, but nothing was done to remedy the situation. (Adusumilli 12(N) Statement p 20 (emphasis added)). Although it is possible to interpret this paragraph to imply that Adusumilli complained that Gray's presence interfered with her performance because he made her uncomfortable, paragraph 20's cross-references to Adusumilli's deposition belie this interpretation. The cross-referenced pages show only that Adusumilli complained to Zeliasz about the fact that Gray often used the computer when she needed it, making it difficult for her to get her work done on time. (Adusumilli Dep. at 82-83). They do not show that Adusumilli told Zeliasz that Gray's presence made her uncomfortable. For this reason, the district judge did not abuse his discretion. 24 Finally, Adusumilli challenges the district judge's determination that one of the statements in her affidavit conflicts with her earlier deposition testimony. A party cannot prevail on a motion for summary judgment by submitting an affidavit containing conclusory allegations which contradict plain admissions in prior deposition or otherwise sworn testimony. Diliberti v. United States, 817 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir.1987) (collecting cases). Therefore, [w]here deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is demonstrable that the statement in the deposition was mistaken.... Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir.1995). 25 Following this well-established rule, the district judge struck the following statement from Adusumilli's affidavit: During my tenure at the 24th District, I was harassed on a near daily basis by my co-workers, Atkins, Muzupappa, and Zeliasz. (Adusumilli Aff. p 2). The judge found that this statement clearly contradicts Adusumilli's deposition testimony to the effect that her first year at the Twenty-Fourth District was uneventful. Adusumilli, 1997 WL 769457 at  3. Specifically, when Adusumilli was asked whether there [was] anything in the first year that made [her] feel that [she was] ... being discriminated against on the basis of [her] sex, she responded [n]o. (Adusumilli Dep. at 60). 4 Adusumilli asserts that her deposition testimony and affidavit do not really conflict because at her deposition she was referring to specific incidents, while in her affidavit she was referring to the general atmosphere at the Twenty-Fourth District. 26 Even under Adusumilli's interpretation, however, there is no getting around the contradiction. First she says that she cannot recall any incidents of harassment in 1992 and then she says that she was harassed on a near daily basis during her tenure at the Twenty-Fourth District. In the language of Diliberti, Adusumilli has done nothing more than submit[ ] an affidavit containing conclusory allegations which contradict plain admissions in prior deposition ... testimony. 817 F.2d at 1263. See also Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1296 (7th Cir.1993) (finding a direct contradiction between an antitrust plaintiff's deposition testimony that he could not remember any specific instance in which he wanted to charge more but didn't, and his affidavit statement that  '[i]f Schweigert had not fixed the price that I had to charge my customers, there would have been many occasions on which I would have charged more for many of the Schweigert products I sold' ). Therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.