Opinion ID: 2982549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title Vu

Text: 6 “Title Vii’s antiretaliation provision forbids employer actions that ‘discriminate against’ an employee (or job applicant) because he has ‘opposed’ a practice that Title VII forbids or has ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in’ a Title VII ‘investigation, proceeding, or hearing.” Burlington N & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59 (2006) (quoting § 2000e— 3(a)). “[U]nlike the substantive provision, [the antiretaliation provision] is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 64. The “opposition” clause protects the filing of formal discrimination charges with the EEOC, as well as complaints to management, and less formal protests of discrimination. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014). Thus, we consider both Plaintiff’s filings with the EEOC and her internal complaints to Norfolk Southern management as protected activities under Title VII. Id. “The antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 67. Plaintiff offers only circumstantial evidence to support her retaliation claim. We therefore employ the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Laster, 746 F.3d at 730. If the plaintiff succeeds in making out the elements of a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants’ proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. Id. Although the burden of production shifts between the parties, the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff. Id. 6 The Ohio Supreme Court has held that federal case law interpreting Title VII generally applies to Ohio Rev. Code § 4112. Colston v. Cleveland Pub. Library, 522 F. App’x 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Burch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Ct,, 880 N.E.3d 132, ¶ 20 ((Ohio Ct. App. 2007)). 17 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the defendants knew of her protected activity; (3) thereafter, the defendants took “materially adverse” actions against the plaintiff; and (4) the protected conduct was a but-for cause of the adverse action. Id; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534-35 (2013). The third element requires a plaintiff to show that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The test is an objective one. Id. However, “[am employee’s decision to report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work.” Id. Moreover, although not dispositive, “the fact that an employee continues to be undeterred in his or her pursuit of a remedy . . . may shed light as to whether the actions are sufficiently material and adverse to be actionable.” Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir. 2008). But see Steel v. Schafer, 535 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (stating that the “materially adverse” standard does not require consideration of “the courage that particular employee demonstrated by reporting it (and hence of her asserted imperviousness to acts of retaliation)”). The fourth element requires the plaintiff to prove that “the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 731 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med Ctr. v. Nassar, --- U.S. ---, 133 5. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)). In other words, “Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533. 18 The burden of proving a prima facie case in retaliation cases is “not onerous.” Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2013).