Opinion ID: 1894515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of Price v. Sheppard

Text: The court of appeals discussed Price as the proper standard applicable before use of intrusive treatment techniques, but concluded that neuroleptics were not intrusive per se. Jarvis, 403 N.W.2d at 308. As we have already stated, we disagree with the court's conclusion regarding intrusiveness. Respondents do not directly address the issue of intrusiveness. They argue instead that Price is no longer the correct standard to be used as an analytic framework for the proper procedures required before intrusive treatment can be involuntarily used. In brief, respondents argue that Price was based solely on the right of privacy under the federal Constitution. The court balanced the patient's right to personal autonomy against the interests of the state, concluding that the state must use the least restrictive means when intrusive treatments are proposed to mitigate the impact on the patient's rights. Price, 307 Minn. at 257, 239 N.W.2d at 910. The Price opinion cited only federal privacy cases. Therefore, respondents argue, the court interpreted the federal Constitution as requiring the least intrusive means in the treatment of committed mentally ill patients. However, the United States Supreme Court has subsequently determined that, at least in some circumstances, under the federal Constitution, a patient's rights are adequately protected if professional judgment is exercised by the treating physician. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). The Court determined that professional judgments are entitled to a presumption of validity and found no reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462. Youngberg did not resolve the question before this court today. The case involved a severely retarded individual committed to a state facility who filed suit for damages and injunctive relief under the federal Constitution. The patient, having the mental capacity of an 18-month-old baby, was obviously unable to participate in any treatment decisions. Youngberg also did not raise the issue of forced drug treatment and its potentially devastating effects, but, instead, involved rights to safe physical conditions, habilitation and freedom from bodily restraint. The significant differences between the factual and legal issues addressed in Youngberg and those raised today convince us that the case furnishes little guidance. In addition, we are faced with the rights of persons committed to Minnesota institutions, pursuant to Minnesota law, by the courts of this state. Given the significant state law issues involved, we feel it is imperative to assume our obligation to be independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of [our] citizens. State v. Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn.1987) (citations omitted). We thus decide the case exclusively under Minnesota statutes and our Minnesota Constitution. The essential question in this entire case then is whether the policy and procedure outlined in this court's decision of Price v. Sheppard, supra , is still valid today and whether it should be applied to the use of neuroleptic drugs in these circumstances. We hold that the Price procedure should apply in all future cases.