Opinion ID: 6344300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ends-of-Justice Continuance

Text: The Speedy Trial Act permits a district court to pause the speedy trial clock during “[a]ny period of delay resulting from [the granting of] a continuance,” but only if the court “sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of [a] continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. 5 There is no dispute that one day elapsed on December 17, 2015, when no pretrial motions or continuances were outstanding, as did another forty-four between December 22, 2015 and February 4, 2016. In addition to the motions and continuances that we address in detail, the clock was tolled from December 18 through December 21 by Adams’s pending motion to extend time to file pretrial motions, by an open-ended continuance entered by the District Court on February 8, 2016, and by Adams’s motion to remove his defense counsel on April 4, 2016. The parties dispute when the February 8 continuance expired, but we need not resolve that question, as the number of days at issue is immaterial. They agree that the April 4 motion to remove his counsel tolled the clock until June 1, when the Court resolved the issue by appointing replacement counsel. 12 § 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added). The District Court sought to enter an open-ended continuance during a hearing on May 25, 2016, in which it considered Adams’s April 4 motion for new counsel and his April 25 discovery motion. Adams argues that the Court could not have entered a valid continuance without either citing the relevant statutory provision or invoking the words “ends of justice.” This argument fails because our precedent affords district courts significant leeway in complying with § 3161(h)(7)(A)’s procedural requirements.6 It is true that, if a District Court enters a “continuance order [that] cites the relevant provision of the [Speedy Trial] Act” or “states that it is for the ‘ends of justice,’” it streamlines our analysis: in that circumstance, the court need not provide factual justifications for the continuance at the time it is entered but can instead “supplement[] the record with further details” on why a continuance serves the “ends of justice” at a later date. Reese, 917 F.3d at 182 (citing United States v. Brooks, 697 F.2d 517, 521–22 (3d Cir. 1982)). But it is also true that a district court may enter a continuance without citing the Act or referencing the ends of justice “so long as the court explains a valid factual basis for the continuance on the record” and in a manner that shows the 6 The Supreme Court “has not elaborated on the timing, procedures, or substantive standards that must be satisfied for a district court” to enter a continuance, Reese, 917 F.3d at 182, apart from requiring factual findings to be entered “by the time [the court] rules on the defendant’s motion to dismiss,” Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 507 (2006). We have therefore found it necessary to fill in the gaps through our case law. See Reese, 917 F.3d at 182. 13 court “balanced the interests of the public and of all of the defendants.” Id. (citing and quoting United States v. Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d 293, 297 (3d. Cir. 1988)). What a district court cannot do is exclude time through a continuance “without either stating the factual basis” for doing so or “using language that invokes” the statute. Id. (citing United States v. Brenna, 878 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989)) (emphasis added). During the May 25 hearing, the District Court resolved to appoint Adams a new attorney and asked the parties to enter a stipulated protective order, outlining which discovery materials Adams was entitled to review. Having struck the outstanding trial date, the Court then explained that: I’m going to appoint counsel, and then schedule a future status hearing, so that we can all get together and [] Mr. Adams [] and his counsel can tell us what they’ve done so far, what they need to do, what they want to schedule in the future, and possibly pick a trial date at that point in time . . . . Because there still are, as I see it, some outstanding discovery issues. J.A. 146. While the District Court did not cite the statute or use the “magic words,” statements on the record make clear that it had a “valid factual basis for the continuance” and that it balanced the relevant interests.7 Reese, 917 F.3d at 182. In 7 To ensure compliance and avoid putting convictions in jeopardy, some judges in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have employed a form of order that excludes 14 considering Adams’s pro se motion for new counsel, the Court found that there had been an “attorney[-]client breakdown,” J.A. 132, and that Adams could not mount a proper defense without new representation. It recognized that new counsel would be involved in resolving outstanding discovery issues and explicitly warned Adams that, if he moved forward with his request to change attorneys, “delay[ing] [his] trial” would be unavoidable because the Court would need to find and appoint a “new attorney” and give Adams time to “meet with that [] attorney.” J.A. 133. In response, Adams repeatedly acknowledged that changing his representation would cause a delay and that he nonetheless was requesting new counsel. That colloquy reflects that the District Court delayed trial to protect Adams’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which is a time on the basis of ends-of-justice continuances. See, e.g., Order, United States v. Myers, No. 20-cr-210, ECF 85 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2022); Order, United States v. Brown, No. 20-cr013, ECF 45 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2021); Order, United States v. Salerno, No. 20-cr-320, ECF 28 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2021); Order, United States v. Woodley, No. 15-cr-340, ECF 12 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2015); Order, United States v. Vargas, No. 14-cr-652, ECF 71 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 2015); United States v. O’Brien, No. 15-cr-021, ECF 42 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 2015); United States v. Broaster, No. 12-cr-533, ECF 95 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2013); Order, United States v. Sampson, No. 09-cr250, ECF 15 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2009); see also Sample Order Granting Motion for Continuance, Federal Judicial Center (July 27, 2021), available at https://fjc.dcn/sites/default/files/session/2019/Order%20Grant ing%20Motion%20for%20Continuance_0.pdf. Doing so avoids unnecessary ambiguity and needless litigation. 15 particularly weighty justification for a continuance,8 see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (“the assistance of counsel” in criminal trials has long been recognized as “one of the safeguards . . . necessary to insure [sic] fundamental human rights of life and liberty” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938))), and that, after balancing that right against Adams’s (and the public’s) interest in a speedy trial, the Court concluded that delaying trial was warranted under those circumstances. This record is sufficient to meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and therefore to toll the speedy trial clock from May 25 to November 30, i.e., the new date that the District Court set for trial. See Reese, 917 F.3d at 182; Rivera Constr. Co., 863 F.2d at 297.9 And, with this continuance in 8 Protecting defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an especially compelling reason to delay trial, but similarly weighty interests may justify lengthy continuances in future cases. 9 Though not disputed by the parties, we note that the District Court’s decision not to specify an end date for this continuance poses no issue under our precedents. Open-ended continuances that otherwise comply with § 3161(h)(7)(A) are valid if they are not “unreasonably long” in light of the “particular circumstances of th[e] case,” including which party bears primary responsibility for delaying trial. United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 881–82 (3d Cir. 1992). Here, the continuance expired on November 30, 2016, that is, the new trial date set by the Court. This roughly six-month delay was not “unreasonably long,” given the nature of the pro se motions 16 effect, twenty-five non-excludable days could not have elapsed between February 4, 2016 and September 28, 2016. This provides one basis to deny Adams’s Speedy Trial Act claim, but there is another, equally valid ground on which to do so. We therefore turn to our alternative holding.