Opinion ID: 655324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumptive Vindictiveness

Text: 21 In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the Supreme Court examined the due process requirements applicable when a convicted criminal defendant is successful in having that conviction set aside on appeal, but is then given a more severe sentence after retrial. The Court held that [a] trial judge is not constitutionally precluded ... from imposing a [greater] sentence ... in light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's 'life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.'  Id. at 723, 89 S.Ct. at 2079. But, while the constitutional requirements of due process do not prevent a judge from imposing a greater sentence, vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. Id. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080. 22 The Court therefore cautioned that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Id. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081. This prophylactic rule creates, in effect, a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 2489, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982). 23 Some circuit courts have applied the Pearce presumption in the parole context, e.g., Weinstein v. United States Parole Comm'n, 902 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir.1990); Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933, 947-48 (3d Cir.1988), and Kimberlin asks this court to do so here. However, we need not reach the general question of whether Pearce applies to Commission redeterminations, since the record unquestionably establishes that Kimberlin did not receive a more severe sentence after remand. 24 Kimberlin argues to the contrary by focusing on the fact that the Commission set his parole date after the district court's remand at 116 months above the Offense Category 7 minimum (for a total of 180 months in prison), whereas the original parole date had been set at only 108 months above the Offense Category 8 minimum (a total of 228 months in prison). Despite the overall reduction in his sentence, Kimberlin argues that the Commission thereby increased its upward departure from the parole guidelines minimums by eight months, and that these eight months were presumptively vindictive under Pearce. 25 This argument fails because it depends upon a classic comparison of apples and oranges. Kimberlin attempts to show an increase in upward departure by comparing the first calculation of his parole date, which was made from Offense Category 8, with the post-remand calculation, which was made from Offense Category 7. In so doing, he fails to recognize that Category 8 is uniquely different from the lower categories. Offense Category 8 is reserved for only the most serious crimes, and therefore no upper limits are specified due to the extreme variability of the cases within this category. Guidelines for Decisionmaking, n. 1, 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1992). Because there are no upper limits for Category 8, there is no such thing as an upward departure from Category 8. Id.; Madonna v. United States Parole Comm'n, 900 F.2d 24, 25-26 (3d Cir.1990); see Hackett v. United States Parole Comm'n, 851 F.2d 127, 129, 131 (6th Cir.1987). Therefore, Kimberlin cannot characterize the determination of his parole date after remand as increasing any upward departure, since the Commission's first determination did not amount to an upward departure. This leaves Kimberlin no basis to contend that any element of his sentence was increased after remand. 6 This in turn defeats his assertion of presumptive vindictiveness, since, as noted earlier, the presumption only applies when a more severe sentence is imposed after remand. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 565, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3221, 82 L.Ed.2d 424; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081. The district court emphasized that [t]he undisputed fact is that the Commission on remand reduced [Kimberlin's] presumptive parole release date by 4 years. Earlier the Commission had decided that [Kimberlin] must serve 228 months before parole; now it finds that he must serve only 180 months. It is difficult to overcome the conclusions that this simple arithmetic demands. Finding no error in the court's arithmetic, we affirm its conclusion that the Commission's determination after remand should not be viewed as presumptively vindictive. See United States v. Schoenhoff, 919 F.2d 936, 939 (5th Cir.1990) (the first inquiry must be whether the new sentence is actually harsher than that imposed prior to successful appeal). 26