Opinion ID: 4519430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mosqueda’s Sentence

Text: Lastly, Mosqueda contends that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is out of step with that of her codefendant Galvis. According to Mosqueda, Galvis—who founded Sports Nutrition Center, designed its business model, ordered the steroids from overseas, taught Mosqueda how to mix the substances, and continued engaging in unlawful activity after police searched the Sheridan Street apartment—was “significantly more culpable” yet received the same sentence she did, 46 months. Mosqueda Appellant’s Br. at 38-39. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard, considering the totality of the circumstances and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). As relevant here, one factor the district court must consider is the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The 13 Case: 18-14175 Date Filed: 03/25/2020 Page: 14 of 16 party challenging a sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). A district court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence when it fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Although generally the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court, United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008), a district court commits a clear error of judgment when it “considers the proper factors but balances them unreasonably” and imposes a sentence that “does not achieve the purposes of sentencing as stated in § 3553(a),” Irey, 612 F.3d at 118990 (internal quotation marks omitted). We will vacate a sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190. We cannot agree with Mosqueda that the district court erred in sentencing her to 46 months’ imprisonment, the same term her codefendant Galvis received. “Disparity between the sentences imposed on codefendants is generally not an 14 Case: 18-14175 Date Filed: 03/25/2020 Page: 15 of 16 appropriate basis for relief on appeal.” United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2001). This general rule reflects Congress’s choice to enact the Sentencing Guidelines “to eliminate disparities in the sentences meted out to similarly situated defendants” rather than co-defendants in a single case. United States v. Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir. 1992). “The guidelines, structured to account for relative culpability and differences in prior records of defendants, demonstrate that the Sentencing Commission fully anticipated sentencing disparity between defendants involved in the same offense.” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (instructing sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). Here, although Mosqueda argues that Galvis was more culpable, he pled guilty rather than proceeding to trial. As a result, unlike in Mosqueda’s case, several of the charges against him were dismissed and he received a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court took into account those circumstances just as it accounted for Mosqueda’s unique circumstances. On the one hand, she went to trial and played a supervisory role in the conspiracy; on the other hand, she had no criminal history, suffered medical issues, and had a son to care for. We therefore see no occasion here to disturb our general rule that disparity between codefendants’ sentences does not provide the basis for relief. 15 Case: 18-14175 Date Filed: 03/25/2020 Page: 16 of 16 See Williams, 526 F.3d at 1322; see Regueiro, 240 F.3d at 1325-26.