Opinion ID: 2795220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title IX retaliation claims

Text: The language of the anti-retaliation provision of Title IX and that of Title VII are similar and “should be accorded a similar interpretation.” Lowrey v. Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 252 n.18 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir. 2014). The district court held that Collins failed to establish causation as to his retaliation claims based on Dr. Self’s evaluation and Dorsey’s failure to 1 Collins also raises two new claims on appeal that were not raised at the district court – a “mixed motive” claim and a claim for indemnification. Claims raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Discount Ctrs., Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2000). 3 Case: 14-60768 Document: 00513011759 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/20/2015 No. 14-60768 investigate the grievance, because neither Dr. Self nor Dorsey knew of Collins’s involvement with the Title IX complaint. Unless a defendant knows that a plaintiff “engaged in any protected activity” at the time of the alleged retaliation, causation has not been shown. Watts v. Kroger Co., 170 F.3d 505, 512 (5th Cir. 1999). In his deposition, Collins stated that Dr. Self was not aware that he participated in the Title IX complaint. As to Dorsey, Collins has provided no evidence that she was aware of Collins’s involvement with the Title IX complaint. Thus, the district court’s dismissal was proper. As to Collins’s retaliation claim based on his transfer to the Alternative School, the district court held that he failed to provide evidence that the transfer constituted an adverse employment action. This court takes a “narrow view of what constitutes an adverse employment action . . . .” Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). We have held that a transfer “can be the equivalent of a demotion, and thus constitute an adverse employment action . . . if the new position proves objectively worse – such as being less prestigious or less interesting or providing less room for advancement.” Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court found that Collins had offered no evidence that the Alternative School was objectively worse than Calloway. The court in its order quoted a section in Collins’s brief where Collins had explained why he believed the Alternative School was a demotion. Though the court was “inclined to believe” the statements, it held that such statements were not evidence usable on summary judgment. Arguments in briefs, like allegations in a complaint, are assertions, not evidence. Rule 56 requires that claimed facts be supported by citations “to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 4 Case: 14-60768 Document: 00513011759 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/20/2015 No. 14-60768 materials[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A non-movant must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial . . . .” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Collins did not cite to the record for support on the question of whether the Alternative School was “objectively worse.” 2 Furthermore, we have held that to establish causation on retaliation claims, “temporal proximity must be very close.” Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Close temporal proximity is lacking here, as Collins was transferred to the Alternative School more than nine months after the District was notified of the Title IX complaint. Id. (finding a lack of causation where ten months separated the protected activity and the adverse employment action). The district court properly dismissed this claim. The district court dismissed Collins’s retaliation claim based on the nonrenewal of his contract due to a lack of argument on the issue in his response to the District’s motion for summary judgment. “Although we liberally construe the briefs of pro se appellants, we also require that arguments must be briefed to be preserved.” Price v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). On appeal, Collins refers in passing to the nonrenewal of his contract once in his initial brief and once 2 Collins argues in his reply brief that the District conceded in its Answer that the Alternative School does not offer extracurricular activities and serves as a learning alternative for students with adjustment difficulties and disciplinary problems. Regardless of whether an Answer could be relied upon by the plaintiff on summary judgment, Collins did not refer to the Answer in the district court. Rule 56(c)(1)(A) requires that parties refer the court to the relevant sections of the record. A district court is required to review on summary judgment only those portions of the record identified by the parties. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. We note that the motion may be “opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves . . . .” Id. 5 Case: 14-60768 Document: 00513011759 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/20/2015 No. 14-60768 in his reply, and provides argument in neither. Thus, he has abandoned this argument on appeal.