Opinion ID: 1388423
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Invited Error Doctrine

Text: In this case, the trial court instructed the jury, based on White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 566, that when a police officer who, as a result of the exercise of his authority, legally causes injury, the employer may be held liable regardless of the employer's rules or knowledge of the wrongful conduct, and regardless of whether the employer or the employee benefited from the act itself. [3] Because the record indicated that the City had requested the instruction, we solicited briefing from the parties to determine whether the doctrine of invited error should bar the City from contending that, as a matter of law, Sergeant Schroyer was acting outside the scope of his employment when he raped plaintiff. The record shows that the instruction was proposed under the following circumstances. Throughout the proceedings in this matter, the City challenged the decision in White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 566. The trial court correctly considered itself to be bound by the appellate court's decision in White. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) At the instruction conference, the court told the parties that notwithstanding the City's objections, it would instruct the jury in accordance with White, and that unless the City proffered an alternative instruction it would give plaintiff's proposed instruction, which was based on White. The City then submitted, and the court gave, the instruction quoted above. Immediately after the case was submitted to the jury, the trial court gave the parties an opportunity to tie up any loose ends relating to any matter that had not yet been put on the record. Counsel for the City then explained the circumstances which led it to submit the instruction at issue: [D]uring our many, many hours of discussions concerning jury instructions, I did indicate to the court that we did not believe that White was an appropriate case with which the jury should be instructed as it was ... not an appropriate statement of the law. [ถ] The court indicated that it would follow White and unless I wanted Plaintiff's instructions to be the ones to go to the jury, I would be requested to draft an instruction based upon the language in White. [ถ] In response to that, the defense submitted an instruction based upon White which the court ... read to the jury. [ถ] For the record, I would like it to be clear that we do not believe that White is the authority that should be followed and that we objected to giving any instructions in accordance with the White case, albeit, we did submit an instruction based upon the court's request. The trial court agreed with counsel's account, but pointed out that the precise wording of the instruction was the City's. (4) Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error. ( People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 549-550, fn. 3 [153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 591 P.2d 63]; Jentick v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 117 [114 P.2d 343]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, ง 301, p. 313.) But the doctrine does not apply when a party, while making the appropriate objections, acquiesces in a judicial determination. ( People v. Perez, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 550, fn. 3.) As this court has explained: `An attorney who submits to the authority of an erroneous, adverse ruling after making appropriate objections or motions, does not waive the error in the ruling by proceeding in accordance therewith and endeavoring to make the best of a bad situation for which he was not responsible.' ( People v. Calio (1986) 42 Cal.3d 639, 643 [230 Cal. Rptr. 137, 724 P.2d 1162], quoting Leibman v. Curtis (1955) 138 Cal. App.2d 222, 225 [291 P.2d 542].) Here, the City did not invite the trial court to instruct the jury that liability for a sexual assault can arise from a police officer's exercise of official authority. To the contrary, it took the opposite position throughout the case, including the instruction conference. The City never induced the trial court to follow White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 566; it merely acquiesced โ after objecting โ to the court's decision to instruct in accordance with White, and submitted an instruction in accordance with that decision. [4] Although the City would be barred from attacking the specific language of the jury instruction it submitted, it is, under the circumstances of this case, not precluded from asserting that White v. County of Orange, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 566, was erroneously decided and that, as a matter of law, the evidence presented here established that Sergeant Schroyer acted outside the scope of his employment when he raped plaintiff. [5]