Opinion ID: 1479202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Responsibility to Ensure Competency

Text: Competency, as defined by the forensic statute, requires something more than just a momentary condition. Section 40.1-5.3-3(a)(2) explains that a person is competent to stand trial if he or she is able to understand the character and consequences of the proceedings against him or her and is able properly to assist in his or her defense[.] This definition is consistent with the jurisprudence of both this Court and United States Supreme Court. See State v. Martinez, 651 A.2d 1189, 1193 (R.I.1994) (applying competency standard as defined by forensic statute); State v. Cook, 104 R.I. 442, 447, 244 A.2d 833, 835-36 (1968) (competency requires ability to understand charges, an understanding of the purpose and object of the proceedings, and a mental capacity to assist counsel in preparing and putting forth defense); see also Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam) (test of competency is whether [defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him). The requirement that a person be able to assist in his or her defense means that a defendant cannot simply be competent when the trial commences. Rather, the ability to assist in one's defense requires a mental condition that continues through all stages of a trial. Judicial responsibility to ensure that a defendant is competent throughout the entire trial is not a novel idea. As the Supreme Court stated in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial. This well-established principle of law is reflected throughout the competency statute. Section 40.1-5.3-3(c) vests the court with authority to raise the issue of competency on its own motion at any time during a criminal proceeding. Moreover, whenever the issue of competency arises, it is the judge who makes a final determination about the defendant's condition. We recognize that in certain situations, the requirement that a person remain competent during all stages of his or her trial may seem at odds with the mandatory discharge provision in § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(3)(i). To harmonize these potentially conflicting requirements in a manner that is consistent with the statute's objectives, it is necessary for judges to be vested with discretion to consider whether a defendant's commitment should continue despite a judge's finding of competency. See Billington v. Fairmount Foundry, 724 A.2d 1012, 1013-14 (R.I.1999) (Court must harmonize conflicting provisions of statute in a manner consistent with legislative intent). To construe § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(3)(i) as foreclosing judicial discretion would thwart the Legislature's dual intent of ensuring that defendants are competent and that the state is given the opportunity to prosecute them for their alleged crimes. MHRH argues that restoration of competency never comes with a guarantee, and that judges who are concerned about a defendant's future competency may be tempted to order commitment beyond a finding of competency based on amateur clinical assessment and unfounded speculation. We agree that competency does not come with any guarantees, but we disagree that such judicial assessments are amateur. On the contrary, competency is a legal condition, not a medical condition, and therefore it is well within the province of the court. See § 40.1-5.3-3(g) (court shall decide whether defendant is competent); § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(3)(i) (termination of commitment requires finding of competency by the court); § 40.1-5.3-3(m) (court shall make a finding as to the defendant's competency). While judges may rely heavily upon the advice of mental health professionals in assessing a defendant's competency, it is the judge, not the mental health professionals, who must make the final call and who bears the weight of the final decision on his or her shoulders. It is therefore reasonable for judges, charged with the responsibility of ensuring a defendant's competency, to make legal assessments about whether a defendant's competency is likely to continue during his or her trial. Under MHRH's extremely literal reading of § 40.1-5.3-3(i)(3)(i), however, a judge would be precluded from considering whether a currently competent defendant is likely to decompensate during trial. In petitioner's view, the hearing justice is prohibited from proactively taking necessary steps to prevent a mentally fragile defendant from decompensating. Instead, he must ignore his legitimate concerns regarding the defendant's competency until a defendant no longer is competent. This formalistic approach not only would frustrate legislative intent, it also would lead to an absurd result. See Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996) (stating that [t]his [C]ourt will not construe a statute to reach an absurd result). Assuming competency could be restored, judges would be left with the daunting, if not impossible, task of trying to determine at what point during the criminal proceeding the defendant's competency had faded. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966) (noting difficulty presented by post hoc determinations of competency) (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788). Judges (and likely this Court) would be faced with the complicated question of whether to start the trial anew or simply resume where it left off. Either scenario inevitably would threaten the economy of justice and waste resources of the parties, the courts, and ESH alike. [12] Given § 40.1-5.3-3's remedial goal of obtaining and retaining competency, we cannot agree with MHRH's strict interpretation of the forensic commitment statute because, in some cases, such as the matter before us, prohibiting judicial discretion would lead to absurd results and be contrary to legislative intent. Everyone with an interest in this case  the state, Tavares, and the family of Glen Hayes  had an interest in seeing Tavares tried for his crimes. We are loath to tie hearing justices' hands by precluding them, in proper cases, from taking steps to ensure a defendant's competency; indeed, to do so would frustrate the purposes of a comprehensive legislative scheme. In light of the severity of Tavares' condition and the legislative intent of § 40.1-5.3-3, we believe it was consistent with Tavares' rights, the interests of the state and the interests of the victim's family, as well as the overall interests of justice, for the trial justice to order Tavares' forensic commitment. The trial justice's decision was based on a finding that Tavares' competency was fragile and conditioned upon his continued care at ESH. The record satisfies us that the hearing justice was correct in his finding and exercised his discretion properly.