Opinion ID: 708054
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Application to Appellants' Claims

Text: The Alien Tort Act provides: 13 The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. 14 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350 (1988). Our decision in Filartiga established that this statute confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction when the following three conditions are satisfied: (1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of the law of nations (i.e., international law). 1 630 F.2d at 887; see also Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir.1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989). The first two requirements are plainly satisfied here, and the only disputed issue is whether plaintiffs have pleaded violations of international law. 15 Because the Alien Tort Act requires that plaintiffs plead a violation of the law of nations at the jurisdictional threshold, this statute requires a more searching review of the merits to establish jurisdiction than is required under the more flexible arising under formula of section 1331. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88. Thus, it is not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to plead merely a colorable violation of the law of nations. There is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act unless the complaint adequately pleads a violation of the law of nations (or treaty of the United States). 16 Filartiga established that courts ascertaining the content of the law of nations must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today. Id. at 881; see also Amerada Hess, 830 F.2d at 425. We find the norms of contemporary international law by  'consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law.'  Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820)). If this inquiry discloses that the defendant's alleged conduct violates well-established, universally recognized norms of international law, id. at 888, as opposed to idiosyncratic legal rules, id. at 881, then federal jurisdiction exists under the Alien Tort Act. 17 Karadzic contends that appellants have not alleged violations of the norms of international law because such norms bind only states and persons acting under color of a state's law, not private individuals. In making this contention, Karadzic advances the contradictory positions that he is not a state actor, see Brief for Appellee at 19, even as he asserts that he is the President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Srpska, see statement of Radovan Karadzic, May 3, 1993, submitted with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For their part, the Kadic appellants also take somewhat inconsistent positions in pleading defendant's role as President of Srpska, Kadic Complaint p 13, and also contending that Karadzic is not an official of any government, Kadic Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 21 n. 25. 18 Judge Leisure accepted Karadzic's contention that acts committed by non-state actors do not violate the law of nations, Doe, 866 F.Supp. at 739, and considered him to be a non-state actor. 2 The Judge appears to have deemed state action required primarily on the basis of cases determining the need for state action as to claims of official torture, see, e.g., Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109 (5th Cir.1988), without consideration of the substantial body of law, discussed below, that renders private individuals liable for some international law violations. 19 We do not agree that the law of nations, as understood in the modern era, confines its reach to state action. Instead, we hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals. An early example of the application of the law of nations to the acts of private individuals is the prohibition against piracy. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 196-97, 5 L.Ed. 64 (1820). In The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232, 11 L.Ed. 239 (1844), the Supreme Court observed that pirates were hostis humani generis (an enemy of all mankind) in part because they acted without ... any pretense of public authority. See generally 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 68 (facsimile of 1st ed. 1765-1769, Univ. of Chi. ed., 1979). Later examples are prohibitions against the slave trade and certain war crimes. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 193 (1992); Jordan Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties Under Human Rights Law, 5 Harv.Hum.Rts.J. 51 (1992). 20 The liability of private persons for certain violations of customary international law and the availability of the Alien Tort Act to remedy such violations was early recognized by the Executive Branch in an opinion of Attorney General Bradford in reference to acts of American citizens aiding the French fleet to plunder British property off the coast of Sierra Leone in 1795. See Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795). The Executive Branch has emphatically restated in this litigation its position that private persons may be found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 5-13. 21 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1986) (Restatement (Third) ) proclaims: Individuals may be held liable for offenses against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide. Restatement (Third) pt. II, introductory note. The Restatement is careful to identify those violations that are actionable when committed by a state, Restatement (Third) Sec. 702, 3 and a more limited category of violations of universal concern, id. Sec. 404, 4 partially overlapping with those listed in section 702. Though the immediate focus of section 404 is to identify those offenses for which a state has jurisdiction to punish without regard to territoriality or the nationality of the offenders, cf. id. Sec. 402(1)(a), (2), the inclusion of piracy and slave trade from an earlier era and aircraft hijacking from the modern era demonstrates that the offenses of universal concern include those capable of being committed by non-state actors. Although the jurisdiction authorized by section 404 is usually exercised by application of criminal law, international law also permits states to establish appropriate civil remedies, id. Sec. 404 cmt. b, such as the tort actions authorized by the Alien Tort Act. Indeed, the two cases invoking the Alien Tort Act prior to Filartiga both applied the civil remedy to private action. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F.Supp. 857 (D.Md.1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.Cas. 810 (D.S.C.1795) (No. 1,607). 22 Karadzic disputes the application of the law of nations to any violations committed by private individuals, relying on Filartiga and the concurring opinion of Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985). 5 Filartiga involved an allegation of torture committed by a state official. Relying on the United Nations' Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A.Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975) (hereinafter Declaration on Torture), as a definitive statement of norms of customary international law prohibiting states from permitting torture, we ruled that official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (emphasis added). We had no occasion to consider whether international law violations other than torture are actionable against private individuals, and nothing in Filartiga purports to preclude such a result. 23 Nor did Judge Edwards in his scholarly opinion in Tel-Oren reject the application of international law to any private action. On the contrary, citing piracy and slave-trading as early examples, he observed that there exists a handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility, 726 F.2d at 795. Reviewing authorities similar to those consulted in Filartiga, he merely concluded that torture--the specific violation alleged in Tel-Oren--was not within the limited category of violations that do not require state action. 24 Karadzic also contends that Congress intended the state-action requirement of the Torture Victim Act to apply to actions under the Alien Tort Act. We disagree. Congress enacted the Torture Victim Act to codify the cause of action recognized by this Circuit in Filartiga, and to further extend that cause of action to plaintiffs who are U.S. citizens. See H.R.Rep. No. 367, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 (explaining that codification of Filartiga was necessary in light of skepticism expressed by Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren ). At the same time, Congress indicated that the Alien Tort Act has other important uses and should not be replaced, because 25 Claims based on torture and summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered [by the Alien Tort Act]. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international law. 26 Id. The scope of the Alien Tort Act remains undiminished by enactment of the Torture Victim Act. 27