Opinion ID: 2594045
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Award of Interest Was Proper.

Text: The superior court also stated that Tahni was entitled to interest at the rate of 10.5%. Douglas disputes this rate of interest, arguing that when we reversed and remanded the original 1995 award to Tahni and the superior court entered a new judgment on remand in 1999, the 1999 date became the effective date for the purposes of calculating interest. And while the statutory interest rate for money judgments before 1997 was fixed at the rate of 10.5%, after 1997, interest is to be calculated in accord with AS 09.30.070. [20] If Douglas's argument were correct, he would only owe 7.5% interest if it were calculated from 1999. [21] As an initial matter, we note that Douglas has likely waived this argument. Civil Rule 69(d)(3) states that [t]he judgment debtor waives all defenses and objections which the judgment debtor does not present by answer as herein provided. In this case, Douglas, although represented by a lawyer, did not dispute the interest amount in his response to Tahni's motion for entry of judgment. But even assuming that Douglas had not waived his objection to the award of interest, his argument has no merit. He bases his argument merely on the request that Tahni not be allowed to benefit financially from her lack of diligence and on other concerns of injustice. But Alaska has a clear rule on the effect of modification or reversal of a judgment on interest calculations. Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 509 provides: If a judgment for money in a civil case is affirmed, interest at the rate prescribed by law shall be payable from the effective date of the judgment of the trial court. If in a civil case a judgment is modified or reversed with directions that a judgment for money be issued by the trial court, interest on the new judgment at the rate prescribed by law shall be payable from the effective date of the prior judgment which was modified or reversed. Thus, if an appeal modifies or reverses a judgment and directs that a judgment for money be issued by the trial court, the interest is to be calculated from the date of the original judgment entered by the trial court. In this case, this court reversed the superior court and remanded for a clarification of the findings with regard to the Wasilla property, and any necessary adjustments to the distribution resulting from these issues and the court's treatment of the reduction of the marital debt. [22] That language amounts to a reversal with directions that a judgment for money be issued by the trial court and, following the direction of Rule 509, interest at 10.5% is thus to be calculated from the date of the original judgment of April 18, 1995.