Opinion ID: 686479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Younger Abstention was Proper

Text: 20 First, Kelm argues that the district court erred by dismissing his claims for injunctive relief on abstention grounds as enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Kelm argues abstention is inappropriate for his civil rights challenge to two Ohio domestic relations provisions. He alleges the district court erred by abstaining because the challenged procedures are pre-judgment and his claims do not affect the merits of the underlying divorce case. We disagree. 21 Here, the district court found that the pending divorce implicated important state issues regarding the resolution of domestic disputes. The court further found that although the Ohio courts provide an adequate opportunity for Kelm to present his constitutional challenges, he has declined to do so. We review de novo a district court's decision to abstain under Younger. See Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100 (6th Cir.1994). As discussed below, the district court correctly dismissed on the basis of the Younger doctrine. 22 In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court required that a federal court abstain from enjoining a pending state criminal proceeding. In Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, the Court applied Younger to non-criminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved. 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982) (citations omitted). Later, the Court extended the Younger principles to state civil proceedings. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1529, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). In Pennzoil, the Court held that federal courts must abstain from hearing challenges to pending state proceedings where the state's interest is so important that exercising federal jurisdiction would disrupt the comity between federal and state courts. Id. 23 Interpreting the above authorities, we have held that Younger requires federal courts to abstain where: (1) state proceedings are pending; (2) the state proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will afford the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. Nilsson v. Ruppert, Bronson & Chicarelli Co., 888 F.2d 452, 454 (6th Cir.1989). Applying these criteria to this case, Younger abstention was proper.
24 First, we have held that if a state proceeding is pending at the time the action is filed in federal court, the first criteria for Younger abstention is satisfied. Federal Express Corp. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812, 112 S.Ct. 59, 116 L.Ed.2d 35 (1991). Here it is undisputed that the underlying divorce case was pending at the time he filed his federal action. Thus, the first element of Younger is satisfied. 25
26 Next, Kelm does not specifically argue that the state proceedings do not involve important state interests. He instead argues first, that Younger does not apply to civil rights actions and second, that because the challenged pre-judgment statutes do not affect the merits of the underlying divorce case they do not per se involve important state interests. First, Younger was a civil rights action and we have consistently extended its principles to actions filed pursuant to Sec. 1983. See, e.g. Mann, at 104-05. Further, although the challenged procedures are pre-judgment, Rule 75(H) allocates property and child custody during the pendency of divorce actions, and Sec. 3113.31 offers protection from domestic violence. Ohio has great state interests in regulating domestic violence 6 and in protecting property from both parties to a pending divorce. These traditional domestic relations issues qualify as important state issues under the second element of Younger. In fact, we recently affirmed a decision to abstain where the underlying issues involved domestic relations because domestic relations proceedings involve paramount state interests. Id. 27 Further, the Supreme Court recently outlined policy considerations supporting exclusive state jurisdiction over divorce matters. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992). In Ankenbrandt, although the Court narrowed the scope of the traditional domestic relations exception, the Court did not overrule its prior decisions holding that domestic relations is a traditional area of state concern. See, e.g. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2383, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979). In fact, the Ankenbrandt Court noted the special proficiency developed by state tribunals over the past century and a half in handling the issues that arise in the granting of such decrees. --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2215 (emphasis added). Here, the challenged statutes affect the underlying divorce and involve important state interests thus satisfying the second Younger criteria. 28
Constitutional Claims 29 Finally, Kelm argues the Ohio courts cannot provide an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. Kelm alleges he can not challenge the CPO procedures because Amy Kelm withdrew her CPO. He also argues Ohio courts are inadequate because he must wait until the settlement of the divorce before challenging the validity of the Rule 75(H) restraining orders. 30 Initially, we must presume that the state courts are able to protect the interests of the federal plaintiff. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 1, 107 S.Ct. at 1521. In Pennzoil, the Court noted because all state court judges are bound by the United States Constitution, federal courts: 31 cannot assume that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state procedural law to bar presentation of federal claims.... Accordingly, when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary. 32 Id. at 15, 107 S.Ct. at 1528. Thus, the plaintiff must prove the inadequacy of the state courts. 33 The facts in Pennzoil resemble those before us. In Pennzoil, a party sought relief pursuant to Sec. 1983 alleging Texas proceedings violated the Constitution. The party did not present these claims to the state court. The district court did not abstain and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed finding Younger abstention was appropriate. In reversing, the Court noted the significance of Texas' open court provision which provides that all courts shall be open, and remedies provided, to all injured persons. Based on Texas' open courts provision and the plaintiff's failure to attempt to secure relief in the state courts, the Court found the plaintiff did not meet its burden to prove the inadequacy of the state courts. 34 Similarly, Kelm has failed to prove the inadequacy of the Ohio courts. As was the case in Pennzoil, Ohio has an open courts provision found in Article 1, Sec. 16 of the Ohio Constitution. Here, the Ohio courts have given us no reason to question their ability or willingness to address Kelm's constitutional questions. Because the Ohio courts provide an adequate forum for Kelm's constitutional claims, the third criterion of Younger is satisfied. Thus, abstention was proper in this case.