Opinion ID: 680969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Doctrine of Absurd Results

Text: 21 The Secretary contends that enforcing the literal language of Sec. 205 would lead to absurd results, and departure from the plain meaning of Sec. 205 is therefore justified. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459, 12 S.Ct. 511, 512, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892) (declining to follow the literal language of a statute in consideration of ... the absurd results [that would] follow ...). It is not altogether clear to us what the absurd results would be in this case; the government's best approximation is its warning that as literally construed Sec. 205 would permit a career military person retiring after twenty years of service ... to challenge his or her first performance rating or first failure of selection for promotion two decades after the fact. Appellee's Brief at 20 (emphasis in original). 22 Even this extreme example, however, does not necessarily cross the line. The only courts to address the issue have held that when Sec. 205 tolls a statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches remains available to the government to protect itself from stale claims. In Deering v. United States, 620 F.2d 242, 223 Ct.Cl. 342 (1980), the Court of Claims, sitting in banc, explained: 23 The words of [Sec. 205] itself refer only to statutes of limitations. The Act is silent as to laches.... We view our statute of limitations not as an absolute entitlement to a grace period in which to sue but rather as an outside limit beyond which Congress has determined claims are simply too stale to be litigated. Implicit in the statute of limitations period is a shorter period in which laches may apply, should a particular plaintiff have unreasonably delayed and caused some prejudice to the Government.... 3 24 Id. 620 F.2d at 245. Deering is also the law of the Federal Circuit. See Foster v. United States, 733 F.2d 88, 89 (Fed.Cir.1984) (denominating Deering a precedent binding on this court, and finding challenges to pass overs for promotion that had occurred seven to nine years earlier barred by laches); accord Taylor v. North Carolina Dep't of Transp., 86 N.C.App. 299, 357 S.E.2d 439, 440-43 (1987) (holding that while Sec. 205 of the SSCRA tolled the relevant statute of limitations, plaintiff's nine-year-old claim was barred by laches). Although the issue in these cases was whether laches could be asserted before a court notwithstanding Sec. 205's tolling mandate, there is no reason why laches would not be equally available before the BCMR. See, e.g., Allen, 799 F.Supp. at 165 ([L]aches can be asserted before the BCMR.); cf. Baxter v. Claytor, 652 F.2d 181, 185-86 & n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1981) (reversing the BCMR's dismissal of Baxter's claims for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Board made no finding that review was barred by either laches or a[ ] statute of limitations). Admittedly, requiring the Secretary to prove laches imposes an extra burden not present if we accepted his construction of Sec. 205, but certainly the availability of laches dilutes the force of his argument that absurd results follow from a literal reading. 25 Even if the government's worst case scenario played out, however, the result is still not absurd. Congress may well have expected that a servicemember's self-interest would impel her to bring critical issues quickly before the Board, while quibbles would be forgotten over time. And minor injustices that did linger could be preserved until after the member left active duty, when a formal petition to the Board would be less likely to threaten unit cohesion. One might disagree with such reasoning, but it could hardly be deemed absurd. Indeed, when Congress first established BCMRs in 1946, it provided for no limitations period on any petition, whether or not brought by active servicemembers. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub.L. No. 79-601, Sec. 207, 60 Stat. 837 (current version codified at 10 U.S.C. Sec. 1552(a)).