Opinion ID: 2569087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the therapist's common-law duty as to affirmative acts

Text: ¶ 13 Although Ms. Harris was under no duty to warn or protect Officer Robinson, she answered the police dispatcher's questions about whether her patient was armed. The Robinsons assert that once Ms. Harris undertook to answer the police dispatcher's questions, she had a duty to do so nonnegligently. We agree. ¶ 14 Our common law follows the rule that, [w]ith limited exceptions, a person has no affirmative duty to control the conduct of another, to protect another from harm, or to render aid to someone already injured through no act or fault of the person. [11] The statute discussed above is entirely consistent with the common law in that it also provides that the therapist has no affirmative duty to protect or otherwise act unless the statutory exception applies. [12] ¶ 15 A duty arises, however, when a person undertakes an affirmative act for the benefit of another, whether gratuitously or for pay. In Stuckman ex rel. Nelson v. Salt Lake City , we held that a party could be held liable for negligently fencing a waterway even though that party had no general duty to fence in the waterway. [13] We explained that `[w]here one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and another reasonably relies upon that undertaking, the act must generally be performed with ordinary or reasonable care.' [14] ¶ 16 Once Ms. Harris undertook to act by answering the questions of the police dispatcher, she had an obligation to do so nonnegligently. Under both the statute and the common law, Ms. Harris was under no duty to warn Officer Robinson and would not have been liable had she failed to do so. Nevertheless, a duty arose when she replied to the police dispatcher's question, He doesn't have any weapons or anything like that? with an unequivocal No. ¶ 17 Section 78-14a-102(1) does not remove a therapist's duty in this case. While the statute excuses any obligation to warn or take precautions absent application of the exception, the language of the statute does not purport to excuse a therapist from breaching the standard of care if she does act. Therefore, we hold that the statute leaves intact the right of victims to recover if a therapist fails to exercise reasonable care as to an affirmative act. ¶ 18 Although we conclude that Ms. Harris incurred a duty to act reasonably and that such duty is not obviated by statute, we do not decide the question of whether she did or did not, in fact, act reasonably.