Opinion ID: 1974473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entry of Final Judgment

Text: Maryland Rule 2-602 permits a trial judge, under certain circumstances, to enter as a final judgment an order or other form of decision that would not otherwise constitute a final judgment. When an action involves multiple claims, for example, an order disposing of one but not all of the claims would not be a final judgment, but a trial judge could, under appropriate circumstances, direct the entry of that order as a final judgment. Rule 2-602 does not, however, empower a trial judge to enter as a final judgment an order that disposes of less than an entire claim. [3] [T]he authorization ... for trial judges to make certain orders appealable, is limited to orders which, by their nature, have a characteristic of finality. Snowden v. Baltimore Gas & Electric, 300 Md. 555, 563, 479 A.2d 1329 (1984). See also East v. Gilchrist, 293 Md. 453, 458, 445 A.2d 343 (1982); Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 294, 402 A.2d 71 (1979); Diener Enterprises v. Miller, 266 Md. 551, 554-55, 295 A.2d 470 (1972). As we said in Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767 (1989): If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment, it must ... be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy.... Petitioners contend that the judgments entered against them following the verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs Leaf, et al. do not represent a final and unqualified disposition of the claims of those plaintiffs because the claims of the plaintiffs cannot be finally determined until the effect of releases given, before the verdict, to the other defendants is determined. The record is clear that these plaintiffs have settled with other defendants in connection with the same deaths or injuries for which they seek compensation from these petitioners, and have received money in connection with those settlements. The plaintiffs have given the settling defendants various kinds of releases, requiring either pro tanto or pro rata reduction of the plaintiffs' claims against petitioners if the settling defendants are determined to be joint tortfeasors. The relevant section of Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act provides as follows: A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid. (Emphasis added.) Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol.) Art. 50, § 19. Thus, the potential legal effect of the releases already given is to reduce the claim of these plaintiffs against petitioners. All that remains to be done to calculate the extent of that reduction is to determine whether the released defendants are in fact joint tortfeasors as to these plaintiffs, and the appropriate reduction to be made to the plaintiffs' claims according to the provisions of the releases. Until these further steps are taken, the true and final amount of the claims of the plaintiffs against these petitioners cannot be known. Under existing law, if any of the defendants to whom these plaintiffs have given releases are joint tortfeasors, the claim of the plaintiffs against petitioners must be reduced by at least the amount of money the plaintiffs have received from those joint tortfeasors, and perhaps more. Indeed, it is conceivable that the amount of money already paid to the plaintiffs by settling defendants may exceed the amount of compensatory damages awarded them in these cases, in which event the claims of the plaintiffs for compensatory damages would be wholly satisfied. [4] Martinez v. Lopez, 300 Md. 91, 96, 476 A.2d 197 (1984). Under these circumstances, final judgment should not have been entered until the net amount of the plaintiffs' claims had been finally adjudicated in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act. [5] Although we agree with petitioners that final judgment should not have been entered against them, the question remains whether utilization of the extraordinary writ of mandamus is appropriate to correct that error. We have said that this power is to be exercised with great caution. Doering v. Fader, supra, 316 Md. at 361, 558 A.2d 733; In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra, 312 Md. at 305, 539 A.2d 664. Petitioners will not be left without a remedy if this petition is denied. They may appeal from the order designated as a final judgment, [6] and the propriety of the certification of final judgment of the trial judge will be addressed on appeal. Petitioners may apply to the trial judge for a stay of enforcement of the judgment pending disposition of the post-judgment motions, Maryland Rule 2-632(c), and to the trial and appellate courts for a stay pending appeal, Maryland Rules 2-632(e) & (g) and 8-422 through 8-424. Although the normal appellate process may not produce as swift and inexpensive a result as would the issuance of a writ of mandamus, we are not persuaded that the cost and delay attendant to following normal procedures will so prejudice the litigants as to justify the issuance of an extraordinary writ. In the instant case, we anticipate that the trial judge will, upon receipt of this opinion, vacate that part of the order entering final judgment, thus rendering an appeal unnecessary. Cf. Quartertime Video v. Hanna, 321 Md. 59, 65-66, 580 A.2d 1073 (1990). PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION DENIED, WITH COSTS.