Opinion ID: 470018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Overbreadth Doctrine

Text: 19 Beigay attacks three specific statutes as being unconstitutionally overbroad. The first statute, section 16-15-260(b), defines prurient interest: 20 Prurient interest means a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion and is reflective of an arousal of lewd and lascivious desires and thoughts. 21 S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 16-15-260(b)(emphasis added). 22 Beigay argues that the emphasized language renders the statute unconstitutionally overbroad, since materials that should be protected by the Constitution will be considered obscene under this definition of prurient interest. Beigay reasons that the unemphasized language provides one definition of prurient interest, and the emphasized, another. Therefrom, Beigay concludes that, as lewd and lascivious desires are healthy, wholesome reactions protected by the first amendment, the statute prohibits constitutionally protected speech. 23 Beigay's argument is flawed in two aspects. The section defining prurient interest is a single definition, requiring both a morbid interest and reflection of arousal. 6 Thus, South Carolina's definition places a more stringent standard on the prosecution than required by the definition Beigay claims Miller mandates. 7 Accordingly, we can find no reason why the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. 24 The second flaw in Beigay's argument is that lewd and lascivious desires or thoughts have not been construed by the Supreme Court as terms depicting good old fashion healthy interest in sex. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has recognized these terms as proper definitions for prurient interest. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n. 20, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1310 n. 20, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). 8 Thus, the inclusion of lewd and lascivious in the definition of prurient interest does not make the statutes overbroad. 25 Beigay also asserts that sections 16-15-280(1) and (4) are overbroad because these sections allow the trier of fact, in deciding if material is obscene, to consider the material in the context in which it was used and the potential effects on the behavior of a group of people. 9 We agree with Beigay, that these sections exceed the Miller guidelines in distinguishing protected first amendment expression from that which is obscene, thereby potentially reaching a substantial amount of protected activity. 26 The Miller three-part test is a limitation beyond which neither legislatures nor juries may go. Cf. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), Miller, 413 U.S. at 24, 93 S.Ct. at 2615. Miller requires that the trier of fact evaluate how the average person, applying contemporary standards would find the material. Considering the character of the audience or the predominant appeal of the material to a select audience or the behavioral effect on those specific people directly encroaches upon the Miller guideline. 10 Moreover, these considerations permit the trier of fact in a South Carolina obscenity case to ignore the other two parts of the Miller test: (1) whether the work as a whole is patently offensive; 11 and (2) whether the material has some literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 12 27 The overbreadth in these two sections does not render the entire South Carolina obscenity statutes unconstitutional. It is clearly permissible to excise the specific invalid sections, leaving the remaining statutes intact. See Brockett, 105 S.Ct. at 2802. We see no reason why this course is not the proper one for the instant case. A partial invalidation does not appear to be contrary to the legislative intent behind the statutes in question. Moreover, without the two sections, the obscenity statutes pass constitutional muster, as they fully comply with the requirements of Miller.