Opinion ID: 1838417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentence under repeater statute.

Text: Defendant contends that the three-year indeterminate sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment of the Constitution of the United States and of art. I, sec. 6 of the Wisconsin Constitution. Punishment imposed under statutes providing for increased penalties for habitual criminals or subsequent offenders does not in itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Graham v. West Virginia (1912), 224 U. S. 616, 32 Sup. Ct. 583, 56 L. Ed. 917; State v. Sullivan (1942), 241 Wis. 276, 5 N. W. 2d 798. Defendant argues that the sentence in this case is unconstitutional in that it is disproportionate to the offense committed because of its excessive length. Although constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is primarily aimed at the kind of punishment imposed rather than the length, when the duration of a sentence is greatly disproportionate to the offense committed it may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The standard for determining whether a particular prison sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because of its length is whether it is `so excessive and unusual, and so disproportionate to the offense committed, as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.' State v. Pratt (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 312, 322, 153 N. W. 2d 18. The theft offense of which defendant was convicted carries a six-month maximum sentence. However, because the defendant was convicted of four counts of forgery in October, 1965, he was a repeater as defined by sec. 939.62 (2), Stats. Sec. 939.62 (1) (a) provides that where the present conviction is one for which the maximum sentence is one year or less, the sentence may be increased to three years where the defendant is a repeater. Thus the sentence imposed on defendant was the statutory maximum. A trial judge clearly has discretion in determining the length of a sentence within the permissible range set by statute. The standard by which cruel and unusual punishment is determined does not preclude a sentence within the permissible statutory range from constituting cruel and unusual punishment and thus a reversible abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. However, this court has stated many times that review of a sentence of a lower court is guided by a strong policy against interference with the lower court's discretion. Cheney v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 454, 468, 171 N. W. 2d 339, 174 N. W. 2d 1; Finger v. State (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 103, 111, 161 N. W. 2d 272. Defendant argues that imposition of the maximum three-year sentence under sec. 939.62 (1) (a), Stats., because the present offense only involves theft of two boxes of candy, is cruel and unusual. We do not agree. Defendant's sentence was not imposed solely because of the instant theft, but also because of the defendant's prior felonious criminal conduct. In Block v. State (1968), 41 Wis. 2d 205, 212, 213, 163 N. W. 2d 196, this court reviewed a sentence imposed under sec. 939.62 (1) (a), Stats., on a defendant convicted of disorderly conduct and stated: We consider there is no merit in the argument that the sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion.... [I]t must be remembered the repeater statute was passed for the very purpose of increasing the punishment of those persons who do not learn their lesson or profit by the lesser punishment given for their prior violations of the criminal laws. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence under the repeater statute. The defendant also alleges sec. 939.62 (1), Stats., is unconstitutional as arbitrary and unreasonable on its face. This assertion must be based upon possible sentences that could be imposed under subsections (a), (b) and (c). It is argued that if the present crime provides for a maximum term of one year, the offender could be sentenced to a longer term than if the present offense were a felony. This argument speaks in terms of various possible sentences that could be imposed under the repeater statutes and not in terms of maximum additional increments of sentence. The fact that such a possibility exists does not make the statute arbitrary and unreasonable. The maximum sentences established by the statute are not unreasonable and arbitrary, and all increases in sentences imposed under the repeater statute are discretionary with the trial judge within the maximum limits. It does not follow that the statute is unreasonable and arbitrary on its face simply because different results may be reached in its application.