Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Evidence Supportive of Defendant's PTSD Defense.

Text: (7a) Defendant's brother, William Babbitt, testified at length concerning changes he observed in defendant since his return from Vietnam. He and Theresa Babbitt, defendant's former common law wife, both testified to a number of incidents that indicated that defendant was mentally ill. When, however, defense counsel proposed to have Theresa testify to remarks made by defendant demonstrating his adverse reaction to symbols of Vietnam, e.g., green trash bags, Vietnamese people, and certain songs played on the radio, the court sustained the prosecutor's objection that the evidence was self-serving hearsay. Defense counsel then formulated the question so as to call for Theresa's personal observations, whereupon the trial court sustained the prosecutor's Evidence Code section 352 objection that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its undue consumption of time and prejudicial effect. Defendant maintains that evidence of his remarks was admissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, ง 1250, subd. (a)). This exception was not advanced below and therefore need not be considered on review. (See Evid. Code, ง 354.) Moreover, defendant cites nothing in the record to support the argument that his state of mind at the time he made the asserted remarks to Theresa Babbitt had any bearing on his state of mind at the time he attacked the two victims in this case. Defendant also contends that exclusion of the evidence under Evidence Code section 352 was an abuse of discretion. However, in the absence of any evidence supportive of a connection between defendant's reaction to symbols of Vietnam and his attacks on Leah Schendel and Mavis W., the trial court's ruling was not error. As the court observed, I really don't see the relevance of that [defendant's reaction to Vietnamese people who had settled near him] in view of the fact that neither of the victims were Vietnamese. Nor was there evidence that defendant encountered any Vietnamese or any other symbol of Vietnam before the attacks. (8) As we reiterated in People v. Wright, supra , Section 352 directs `the trial judge to strike a careful balance between the probative value of the evidence and the danger of prejudice, confusion and undue time consumption. That section requires that the danger of these evils substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. This balance is particularly delicate and critical where what is at stake is a criminal defendant's liberty. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that the trial judge's ruling on this evidence, of which the probative value was slight and the chance of prejudice and confusion substantial, struck an improper balance and thereby constituted an abuse of discretion.' [Citation.] (39 Cal.3d at p. 588.) (7b) Here the probative value of the proffered evidence was de minimis and the chance of confusion substantial. Exclusion of the evidence was not an abuse of discretion. Furthermore, except for defendant's reaction to Vietnamese people, the other items of evidence excluded from Theresa Babbitt's testimony, and more, were elicited from other witnesses. The jury heard evidence that defendant turned off music that reminded him of Vietnam; that he had difficulty sleeping; that he heard voices; he giggled; he had headaches and pain; he was upset by green garbage bags; he practiced yoga and took long walks; and he changed for the worse, becoming more violent, after being in Vietnam. Thus, any error in precluding Theresa Babbitt from answering certain questions about defendant was nonprejudicial. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)