Opinion ID: 1890795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Directed verdict on all counts

Text: Appellant first argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on all counts because he was not criminally responsible for his actions. Thus, the issue we address is whether [i]t would not be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find against the defendant on the issue of insanity[.] Port v. Commonwealth, 906 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Ky.1995) (quoting Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984)). This, of course, is based on the evidence of record, inclusive or exclusive of expert testimony. Where one chooses to rely upon insanity as a defense, the burden rests upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that at the time the offense was committed, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Edwards v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Ky.1977) (citing KRS 504.020). After carefully reviewing the testimony presented herein, we do not believe that it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find against Appellant on the issue of insanity. Appellant admitted to shooting three peoplekilling two of them and seriously injuring the thirdunder the false impression that at least two of the victims had attempted to poison him. While there was expert testimony offered to show that Appellant could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, there was also ample testimony, some from Appellant himself, which indicated the opposite. Appellant testified that he walked away from the scene of the shooting because he was looking for an escape route. In addition, Appellant told onlookers at the scene to tell the police they could get him in the morning, because he wanted to get some rest before they arrived. Geraldine Litton also testified that, although Appellant intended to shoot her a second time, she asked him not to do so and he complied with her request. A psychiatrist who interviewed Appellant a few days after the shootings stated that Appellant knew it was wrong and illegal to kill someone. The court-appointed psychiatrist testified that Appellant showed an ability to control his actions, because he did not attempt to murder other people whom he also believed were poisoning him. We have little doubt concluding that Appellant suffers from a serious mental disease. However, [a] mental disease which does not in itself result in a lack of capacity to appreciate the criminality of one's conduct or to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law does not rise to the level of insanity, nor does it, in itself, constitute extreme emotional disturbance. McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky.1986). The burden of proof as to the question of a defendant's sanity at the time of a homicide never shifts from the defendant. Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628 (Ky.1978). See also Edwards, 554 S.W.2d at 383 ([T]he introduction of proof of insanity by a defendant does not place a burden on the Commonwealth to prove him sane; rather, it entitles the defendant to an instruction to the jury that they may find him not guilty by reason of insanity, and thus properly makes the issue of insanity a matter for the jury's determination.). This Court has long held that a motion for a directed verdict in a case involving an insanity defense would be defeated as long as there was some evidence indicating that the defendant was sane at the time of the commission of the crime; i.e., his mental problems did not preclude him from conforming his conduct to the requirements of law. Tunget v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 834, 198 S.W.2d 785 (1947). That threshold is certainly met in this case. Accordingly, we do not believe that it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find against Appellant on the issue of insanity. As such, there was no error.