Opinion ID: 901506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Paid Caregivers

Text: [¶33.] The circuit court's order included an upward deviation from the basic child obligation for paid caregivers for Andrew while he is in Kimberly's home and she is at work. The circuit court found the annual cost of paid caregivers to be $2,400 and ordered Todd to pay $144 per month for the upward deviation. [¶34.] Todd argues that Kimberly would be unjustly enriched by the upward deviation ordered by the trial court for the paid caregivers. Todd contends that Kimberly testified only that she may incur such expenses, that she offered no evidence as to the cost and number of hours of care required, and that he should not be required to pay these expenses until such time that they are incurred. [¶35.] Todd again mischaracterizes the record. Kimberly testified at length as to how the age of her parents and her father's impending retirement would preclude them from caring for Andrew on a regular basis as they have for the past fifteen years. Kimberly's mother is sixty-five years old and is no longer physically able to lift Andrew by herself and transfer him to and from his wheelchair. Kimberly's father is seventy years old and semi-retired. In addition, Kimberly testified that the hourly rate she would need to pay suitable caregivers would range from eight to ten dollars per hour and that she would be seeking a nursing student with some medical training and skills due to Andrew's complicated medication regimen. She also testified the care would be required during the six-week summer break and over the Christmas and holiday breaks when Kimberly was scheduled to work. Kimberly testified the annual cost of the care provider would be $2,400 given the rate and the number of hours of care needed. [¶36.] Todd did not offer any evidence at the hearing to support his contention on appeal that Kimberly would be unjustly enriched by his payment for caregivers until such time as the expenses are actually incurred. Nor does Todd offer any authority for his proposition that he should not have to pay the expenses until they are actually incurred. Todd cites to Juttelstad, 1998 SD 121, ¶20, 587 NW2d at 451-52, for the proposition that Kimberly would be unjustly enriched as she would receive more in support payments than the expense actually incurred. However, in that case the Court's holding concerned a mother who admitted she knowingly accepted more in child care reimbursements than the actual expenses she incurred. Id. ¶21. The holding in Juttelstad does not apply to the instant case, as Kimberly has yet to receive any payments for caregivers from Todd and there are no facts to indicate she will receive more money from Todd than the expense she will incur for the services. [¶37.] The obligation to provide specialized caregivers for Andrew belongs to Kimberly and Todd, not to Kimberly's parents as suggested by Todd. See SDCL 25-7-6.18. [2] There is evidence in the record to support the need for such care and the amount of the expense that will be incurred. The trial court entered specific findings of fact as to the need for paid caregivers. The trial court then allocated seventy-two percent of the expense to Todd and twenty-nine percent of the expense to Kimberly based on their gross income figures. [¶38.] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it included an upward deviation in the child support obligation for the purchase of a van and for paid caregivers. There is ample evidence in the record to support the deviations, and deviations for both are permitted under the statutory scheme.