Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: contractual nature of compacts

Text: Third, the majority concludes that the tribal-state compacts are not legislation because they merely constitute contracts between two sovereign entities that the Governor, pursuant to IGRA, may enter into on behalf of the state and that the Legislature may approve of by resolution vote. [53] Opinion of Corrigan, C.J., ante at 226; opinion of Kelly, J., ante at 239-240. I do not dispute that the compacts are akin to contracts of a unique nature. However, as explained above, these contracts create new law and constitute legislation and they purport to bind the state of Michigan to that legislation. That is the pivotal consideration in this case. A contract may, in effect, create new law and such a legislative contract should not be exempt from the constitutional provisions otherwise applicable to legislation. [54] Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of our state government may circumvent the constitutionally mandated processes for enacting legislation by entering into a contractual relationship. However, I will consider whether there is some source of law that does allow the Governor to enter into a compact without legislative approval consistently with the enactment requirement of Michigan's Constitution. First, it should be considered whether IGRA itself, regardless of state constitutional procedures, provides that a Governor may enter into a tribal-state compact with only a resolution vote of the Legislature. It is clear that IGRA does not so provide. The court in Saratoga Co, supra at 822, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654, 798 N.E.2d 1047, stated: IGRA imposes on the State an obligation to negotiate in good faith (25 USC 2710[d][3][a]), but identifies no particular state actor who shall negotiate the compacts; that question is left up to state law .... As the Supreme Court noted, the duty to negotiate imposed by IGRA is not of the sort likely to be performed by an individual state executive officer or even a group of officers. [Quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 n. 17, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), citing State ex rel Stephan v. Finney, supra . ] Likewise, in Clark, supra at 577, 904 P.2d 11, the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated: We entertain no doubts that Congress could, if it so desired, enact legislation legalizing all forms of gambling on all Indian lands in whatever state they may occur.... That is, however, not the course that Congress chose. Rather, Congress sought to give the states a role in the process.... It did so by permitting Class III gaming only on those Indian lands where a negotiated compact is in effect between the state and the tribe. [ 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C).] To this end, the language of the IGRA provides that Any State ... may enter into a Tribal-State compact governing gaming activities on the Indian lands of the Indian Tribe. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B). The only reasonable interpretation of this language is that it authorizes state officials, acting pursuant to their authority held under state law, to enter into gaming compacts on behalf of the state. [Emphasis added.] Accordingly, IGRA does not provide or require that the Governor shall have the power to bind the state to tribal-state compacts with only a resolution vote of the Legislature. The pertinent consideration is which state actor has the power to bind the state to a legislative compact and according to which procedures under state law. [55] Second, it is therefore necessary to consider whether state law grants the Governor the authority to bind the state to a tribal-state compact with only a resolution vote of the Legislature regardless whether that compact constitutes legislation. The Michigan Constitution provides that  [t]he executive power is vested in the governor. Const 1963, art 5, § 1. The majority essentially argues that the executive power includes the power to bind the states to contractual agreements with sovereign entities and, therefore, whether those agreements otherwise constitute legislation is irrelevant. The executive power is, first and foremost, the power to enforce. This observation was concisely summed up by this Court in People ex rel Attorney General v. Holschuh, 235 Mich. 272, 274-275, 209 N.W. 158 (1926), in which we stated, Consideration of some fundamental principles relative to the powers of government will aid greatly in determining the issues before us.... The law ... must observe constitutional limitations; but within such limitations the legislative power may command, the executive power must enforce, and the judicial power respond. (Emphasis added.) [56] While our state Constitution grants specific additional powers to our executive branch of government beyond the enforcement of legislative enactments, I find no provision in our Constitution that supports a finding that the Governor possesses broad powers to bind the state to legislative compacts with foreign sovereignties absent legislative action consistent with the enactment requirement. Nor have my colleagues pointed to any language of that sort. In addressing this issue, it is also necessary to consider what our Constitution does say regarding the Governor's right to bind the state to an intergovernmental agreement. Const 1963, art 3, § 5 provides: Subject to provisions of general law, this state or any political subdivision thereof, any governmental authority or any combination thereof may enter into agreements for the performance, financing or execution of their respective functions, with any one or more of the other states, the United States, the Dominion of Canada, or any political subdivision thereof unless otherwise provided in this constitution.... Thus, pursuant to this constitutional provision, the Governor of this state may enter into intergovernmental agreements without the advice or consent of the Legislature  whether by resolution vote or consistently with the enactment requirements of our Constitution. However, this power is not unlimited. First, it is specifically limited to agreements with the other states, the United States, the Dominion of Canada, or any political subdivision thereof. The power to enter into an intergovernmental agreement with an Indian tribe is conspicuously absent. Second, the power is specifically limited to those agreements necessary for the performance, financing or execution of [its] functions. Neither IGRA nor any other law places the duty or the power to determine the scope and parameters of gambling within Michigan's borders, on or off Indian lands, within the functions of the executive branch. Accordingly, unless the Legislature properly delegates to the executive branch a rulemaking power to set the parameters for gambling on Indian lands within Michigan's borders, that power is not, in my judgment, reasonably within the scope of the executive branch's functions. It may be said that because the intergovernmental agreement provision of the Michigan Constitution does not refer to agreements with Indian tribes that provision is inapplicable to this case. However, in light of the fact that the powers of the executive branch are constitutionally defined, I read additionally a negative implication in Const 1963, art 3, § 5. Because our Constitution contains an express provision regarding intergovernmental agreements that may validly be entered into by governmental authorities, I conclude that, subject to provisions of general law, intergovernmental agreements beyond the scope of Const 1963, art 3, § 5 are invalid. [57] Moreover, even were I to decline to read a negative implication into Const 1963, art 3, § 5, this provision is, nonetheless, significant insofar as it expressly provides that, in the realm of applicable intergovernmental agreements, no branch of the government may contract in such a way that is inconsistent with its own powers or that usurps the powers of another branch. That rule, which is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine of Const 1963, art 3, § 2, should apply equally to intergovernmental agreements that are expressly subject to Const 1963, art 3, § 5, as well as those that are not. Thus, in any case, a governmental authority may only bind the state to an intergovernmental agreement that is for the performance, financing or execution of their respective functions....  Id. As already noted, absent a proper legislative delegation of power to the executive branch, the duty and power to set the parameters for casino gambling on land within Michigan's borders is not in any comprehensible sense a function of the executive branch. The United States Constitution expressly provides that the President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.... U.S. Const, art II, §2, cl 2. [58] The Michigan Constitution notably contains no explicit authorization for the Governor to enter into treaties with sovereign nations without the majority approval of the entire Legislature. I have found no case law, nor have my colleagues identified such a law, that would support a determination that, despite our Constitution's silence on the issue, such a right exists. [59] I believe that no source of law, federal or state, exists that would permit the Governor to bind the state to these legislative compacts without the approval of the Legislature consistent with the enactment requirements of Michigan's Constitution. Because the compacts constitute legislation, they were subject to Const 1963, art 4, §§22 and 26. Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue and hold that the approval of HCR 115 by resolution, rather than by bill, did not comport with the enactment requirement of our Constitution. [60]