Opinion ID: 383542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Work Product Claim

Text: 19 DeCotiis' affidavits referred to in Part I established prima facie that Hughes was his agent, that Hughes had been given instructions to conduct an investigation to assist in the preparation for an anticipated criminal trial, that the instructions given to Hughes reflected DeCotiis' trial preparation efforts and strategies, and that the documents subpoenaed included the results of the agent's efforts. Thus, DeCotiis set forth a prima facie claim of protectable work product as defined in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141. That claim could be overcome only by a showing that some of the material sought was not work product, that it fell within the category of work product materials disclosure of which could nevertheless be compelled, or that there had been a waiver. 20 The disclosed affidavit, while sufficient for basic Schofield purposes, does not respond to DeCotiis' work product claim. It establishes the purpose of the grand jury investigation, and alleges that Hughes has information relevant to that investigation. Obviously, he has such information, and so does DeCotiis. But a naked allegation of relevance can not compel disclosure of work product. Here the contents of the in camera affidavit become critical, for it is only there that the Government responds in any meaningful way to the work product claim. Recognizing that it was sealed for the purpose of maintaining the secrecy of grand jury proceedings mandated by Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e), we will discuss those contents only to the extent that the same information was revealed in open court, or to the extent that they do not deal with proceedings which have taken place before the grand jury. The critical allegations are the following: 21 13. The only documentary evidence the grand jury will seek from Hughes is a list containing the names of lunch wagon operators he has interviewed in the course of his investigation. The subpoena originally was issued before the Government knew that Hughes had been hired by counsel for one of the targets. In light of Hughes' employment status, the Government presently does not intend to pursue the production of any other documentary evidence. The Government will seek Hughes' testimony before the grand jury. 22 14. The purpose of summoning Hughes as a witness before the grand jury is to determine whether he has knowledge of any other lunch wagon operators whose trucks have been burned and whose identities are presently unknown to the grand jury. 4 23 We read the second and third sentences of paragraph 13 as concessions that the subpoena as originally drawn sought production of materials which comprised protected work product. The demand was narrowed, therefore, to a list of lunch wagon operators Hughes interviewed on DeCotiis' instruction, and to testimony about other lunch wagon operators whose trucks may have been burned. To put the reference to lunch wagon operators in context, it is clear from representations made in open court that the grand jury investigation deals with alleged extortion from lunch wagon operators in the Port Newark-Port Elizabeth complex. Thus, what the government sought, after reconsideration, was: (1) a list of the persons interviewed; and (2) testimony as to whether any of those interviewed had had their lunch wagons burned. These narrower demands for information, though eliminating a large part of the work product claim, nevertheless, still presented questions about the scope of the nondisclosure privilege. Those questions are, first, whether the information sought is work product, and second, if so, should the qualified privilege yield to a higher necessity. The Government contended in the trial court, and on appeal, that the answer to the first question is negative, while the answer to the second should be affirmative. We disagree. 24 Focusing on the list of persons interviewed, we think it is plain that such a list was either obtained from DeCotiis or prepared by Hughes as agent for DeCotiis. In either event it would appear to fall within the definition of work product set forth in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141. The trial court ruled that the list of interviewees was not work product, and that if it were the nondisclosure privilege had been waived by the fact that the interviews had taken place. 25 The ruling that the list was not work product was predicated on the court's reading of our recent opinion in United States v. Amerada Hess Corporation, 619 F.2d 980 (3d Cir. 1980). In Amerada Hess we considered a claim that a list of persons interviewed in connection with an internal investigation of possible illegal overseas payments by a corporation constituted work product. We said: 26 In this case the list of interviewees is just that, a list. It does not directly or indirectly reveal the mental processes of the Milbank attorneys. It furnishes no information as to the content of any statement. There is no realistic possibility that its production will convert any member of the Milbank firm from advocate to witness. None of the policy reasons for protection of work product, other than the fact of its initial compilation by Milbank, applies. It is true, as we point out in the discussion of the attorney-client privilege, that the IRS could compile its own list by taking witness testimony. Possibly it could compile a similar list as a result of field work. Thus the need for production of the list is not as compelling as was the need in Sun Company, Inc. for the production of the statement of a deceased Sun employee. But as Chief Judge Seitz in that case makes clear, application of the qualified work product protection involves a balancing of competing considerations. Where, as here, the work product in question is of rather minimal substantive content, and presents none of the classic dangers to which the Hickman v. Taylor rule is addressed, the government's showing of need can be comparatively lower. Avoidance of the time and effort involved in compiling a similar list from other sources is, in this case, a sufficient showing of need. 27 Id. at 987-88. 28 There are significant differences between an Internal Revenue Service summons enforcement proceeding under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b), 7602(a) (1976) and a proceeding for the enforcement of a grand jury subpoena. But while the Internal Revenue Service summons in Amerada Hess had a civil purpose, the possibility of criminal sanctions was quite real. The two situations are practically indistinguishable. We agree with the trial court that Amerada Hess controls on the question of production of the list, not because it is not work product, but because for the production of a mere list of persons interviewed the government's showing of need to overcome the nondisclosure privilege is comparatively low. In so holding we have no occasion to endorse the trial court's alternative ruling that conducting the interviews constituted a waiver. 29 The oral testimony sought by the government respecting the results of the interviews in particular the information about whose lunch wagons were burned presents a different problem. 5 Here the trial court was faced with the core of the work product of an agent of the attorney, the very substance of the interviewee's statements. Though Hughes would presumably have been speaking from memory, examination into his recollection of the interview might have indirectly revealed his, and DeCotiis', mental processes. Moreover, use of such material could have created not merely the danger, but also the actuality of converting an agent for the attorney into a witness. The agent as witness problem would not have ended with his grand jury testimony, for Hughes could have been called as a witness at trial had some of the interviewees testified for the Government and had Hughes' trial recollection of their statements contrasted with his recollection at the time of his grand jury appearance. Finally, if the government possessed the list of interviewees the actual witnesses were readily available to the grand jury by compulsory process. 30 The only justification advanced by the government before the district court for probing into the content of the interviews was that Hughes had information about destruction of lunch wagons which the grand jury lacked. It made no showing that the same information could not be obtained easily by resort to alternative sources. 31 Except for the list of interviewees, on the record made in the trial court the government made no showing, even in the in camera affidavit to the extent we have discussed it, of the inapplicability of the work product protection, of its waiver, or of any countervailing necessity which would overcome it. When the government chooses to subpoena an agent of an attorney to inquire into his investigative activities, and a valid work product claim is interposed, a motion to quash should be granted unless the government can show that its proposed line of inquiry falls within the good cause exception which our cases have recognized. United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d at 987-88; Sun Company, Inc., 599 F.2d at 1233. A general unsubstantiated allegation is (in)sufficient to overcome the protection afforded by the work-product doctrine. Id. at 1232. 32 One showing that the government could have made, obviously, is that the agent was engaged in criminal activity. In its brief the government does not explicitly charge that there was such activity, but at oral argument in the district court and on appeal it has suggested that the grand jury was considering possible obstruction of justice. Some of the questions which the court directed that Hughes answer seem to point obliquely toward an inquiry into possible misconduct. 6 It would be intolerable to permit investigators hired by defense counsel to attempt to obstruct justice by influencing or threatening witnesses. It would be equally intolerable to permit such investigators to violate the law by posing as officers or employees of the Government. But we may not presume that attorneys or their agents routinely engage in such activities. The speculative possibility that they might can not justify endangering protected work product by bringing them before a grand jury. Moreover, when the examination of an attorney's agent with respect to the inquiries he has carried out in that capacity is sought on the ground that the agent, or the attorney, may have engaged in misconduct, something more is required to substantiate the reasonableness of the government's assertions than an ex parte affidavit. Potential witnesses are not Government property. Resentment of energetic trial preparation by defense counsel may lead to unfounded suspicion and baseless charges. Before the Government can justify interrogation of attorneys, or their agents, with respect to matters which are prima facie work product, on the ground that the work product involved misconduct, it must demonstrate a reasonable basis for such a belief and the opposing attorney must be afforded an opportunity to respond to the government's allegations. Otherwise, the court may be acting, in directing testimony, on no more than groundless suspicion or prosecutorial resentment. Bringing the agent of an attorney before a grand jury to testify concerning his activities is, after all, a rather serious matter. 33 The Government's justification for insisting that in this case its affidavit be kept secret is the provision in Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2) that a United States Attorney shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury. There are several obvious responses, which we make with full knowledge of the contents of the in camera affidavit. The first is that it is not at all necessary to disclose matters occurring before the grand jury in order to disclose alleged misconduct elsewhere. The second is that disclosure, otherwise prohibited by Rule 6(e)(2), may be made when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i). If the only source of the information about alleged misconduct is grand jury testimony, the court may well conclude that its disclosure, in justification of a possible invasion of protected work product, is warranted. It may also conclude that some form of notice of the nature and source of the charge of misconduct short of disclosure of proceedings before the grand jury can be devised which will be adequate to give the attorney making the work product claim an opportunity to respond before his agent is ordered to testify. No such opportunity was afforded here, and in its absence there was no justification for a blanket denial of the motions to quash the subpoena served on Hughes. 34 We note, however, that the practical thrust of the trial court's decision lies less in the denial of the motion to quash, than in the direction to Hughes that he furnish the list of interviewees, and that he answer seventeen specific questions. We have already indicated that the list should have been furnished. The seventeen questions are considered below.