Opinion ID: 1177133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Drug Paraphernalia

Text: The Newmans argue that the definition of drug paraphernalia in I.C. § 37-2701(bb) allows for an individual's conviction to be based upon the transferred intent of another person. Furthermore, the Newmans argue that the Act's definitions are so unclear that they invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, as well as leave citizens unclear as to what is and what is not drug paraphernalia. In pertinent part, § 37-2701(bb) defines drug paraphernalia as any item used, intended for use, or designed for use in producing, storing, or consuming drugs.
The ordinance in Flipside defined drug paraphernalia as items designed for use or marketed for use with drugs. The Supreme Court specifically held this terminology not to be facially vague. With respect to the phrase designed for use, the Court held that this part of the definition refers to items that are principally used with illegal drugs by virtue of their objective features  features which were designed by the manufacturer. Thus, the Court held that there was no danger of a finding of guilt by transferred intent, for the definition refers to the manufacturer's design and intent and not the intent of another person in selling or using the item. Flipside, supra, 455 U.S. at 501, 102 S.Ct. at 1194. With respect to the marketed for use standard, the Court held that it refers to a retailer's intentional display and marketing of merchandise. Id. at 502, 102 S.Ct. at 1195. Thus, the ordinance, so construed by the Court, gives adequate notice of what is prohibited. We hold that the Supreme Court's interpretation of designed for use is controlling in this case. Therefore, the designed for use portion of the statute is not unconstitutionally vague for the reasons cited by that Court. The Court's interpretation of marketed for use, however, is not controlling, for Idaho's Act uses the phrase intended for use, instead of marketed for use. We hold, however, that the phrase intended for use is also not unconstitutionally vague for the following reason. While the terminology intended for use less clearly refers to the defendant-merchant than marketed for use does, we believe the following construction, which upholds this portion of the Act, [12] properly interprets this section: The term intended for use means that, in order for a prosecution to be made out, proof must be presented beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sold or marketed an item with the intent that it be used with drugs. [13] Under this interpretation of intended for use there is no problem of transferred intent, for what makes an item drug paraphernalia is the intent of the defendant and not that of another person  whether purchaser or manufacturer. This interpretation also minimizes the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement or of inadequate notice of the Act's coverage and prohibitions. To be crystal clear, then, we hold that the intent terminology in I.C. § 37-2701(bb) refers to that of the person who has control of the illegal drug paraphernalia and is being charged with a violation of the Act. See Stoianoff, supra, 695 F.2d at 1220. [14]
We are not constitutionally concerned with the fact that Idaho's Act, in further defining what constitutes drug paraphernalia, uses drug jargon in listing examples of drug paraphernalia, even though such words are probably not understood by the general populace. [15] The reason is that we view these lists, as well as the other factors included in the statute to be used in determining whether an item is drug paraphernalia, as being solely helpful guides for juries in determining whether the defendant intended that an item be used with illegal drugs, thereby making it drug paraphernalia. That is, we do not think these lists and factors should be used in determining whether an item is, in fact, drug paraphernalia without also considering the defendant's state of mind. Our view is in agreement with the New Jersey Supreme Court's view that the listed factors fit quite comfortably into a category of matters relevant to defendant's intent, assisting a jury in determining the defendant's state of mind. Town Tobacconist, supra, 462 A.2d at 583. This interpretation is most consistent with the Act's thrust and intent. Under our construction, then, a jury will never determine as a fact question whether an item is in and of itself drug paraphernalia without also considering the defendant's state of mind with respect to that item in using, marketing, or designing it. We think it clear that in nearly every case, the item in issue will be capable of being used with a controlled substance, thereby making it drug paraphernalia. The crucial decision under the Act, though, and what makes an item drug paraphernalia for purposes of the Act, is whether the defendant intended that it be used with illegal drugs. We think it rare, indeed, that a defendant will ever be able to rebut the assertion that the item in question is, in fact, capable of being used as drug paraphernalia. [16] But the defendant need not do so. Rather, with respect to I.C. § 37-2701(bb), what the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant used an item with an illegal drug (use), or, marketed an item with the intent that it be used with illegal drugs (intended for use), or, designed an item with the intent that it be used with illegal drugs (designed for use). Any other construction of the statute would unconstitutionally lead juries, parties, and judges alike into a semantical quagmire, with the potential for reliance on factors and evidence outside the defendant's awareness and control all too real. We also agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court that there is nothing in the Model Act's legislative history to suggest that a jury should first decide if an item is, in and of itself, drug paraphernalia before determining the defendant's state of mind. Town Tobacconist, supra, 462 A.2d 583-84. Rather, it is clear that the framers of the Model Act, and in turn the Idaho legislature, intended the definition of drug paraphernalia be determined by the defendant's state of mind, with evidence of the items associated with the defendant, and the lists and factors in I.C. § 37-2701(bb), going toward proving the defendant's state of mind. Under this construction of the statute, it is clear that the definition of drug paraphernalia is not invalid in all applications; therefore, it is not facially vague and unconstitutional. Furthermore, since the crux of the statute is the defendant's intent, citizens are put on adequate notice of what is prohibited conduct, thereby extinguishing any fear of a citizen being prosecuted for conduct he or she did not intend to do. Thus, in light of our construction of this section of Idaho's Act, we do not think that it is unconstitutionally vague on its face, although it is not a model of clarity. [17]