Opinion ID: 167148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standing to claim injunctive relief

Text: 37 Finally, B-S Steel argues that the district court erroneously determined that B-S Steel had no standing to seek injunctive relief against the appellees under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, in order to prevent them from  continuing and maintaining illegal WFB pricing conduct. Appellant's Br. at 34. The district court held that B-S Steel lacked standing to pursue injunctive relief because the arbitrators had already determined that it could not show antitrust injury for purposes of its pre-April 3, 2001, damages claim. B-S Steel II, 327 F.Supp.2d at 1264. B-S Steel argues that this holding is in error because the standards for obtaining treble damages under § 4 and for obtaining injunctive relief under § 16 are different. As discussed below, we agree that the district court's reliance on the arbitration award to resolve whether B-S Steel has antitrust standing for purposes of its request for injunctive relief was in error. However, because B-S Steel no longer purchases steel from the appellees, it has no claim for injunctive relief. We therefore affirm the district court's ruling on this alternative ground. 15 38 Designed to determine whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action, the standing inquiry in antitrust law requires a court to evaluate the plaintiff's harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 & n. 31, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983) (observing that the focus of the doctrine of `antitrust standing' is somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional doctrine). The inquiry applies to actions arising under both section 4 and section 16 of the Clayton Act. Cent. Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720 F.2d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir.1983); see Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 111, 107 S.Ct. 484, 93 L.Ed.2d 427 (1986) ([U]nder both § 16 and § 4 the plaintiff must . . . allege an injury of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.). However, [s]tanding analysis under section 16 is not identical to that for section 4. McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 856 (3d Cir.1996). Rather, [s]ection 16 has been applied more expansively, both because its language is less restrictive than that of § 4 . . . and because the injunctive remedy is a more flexible and adaptable tool for enforcing the antitrust laws than the damage remedy. Id. (internal quotation omitted); see also Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1172 (8th Cir.1998) (rejecting the notion of an inflexible rule that no antitrust plaintiff may seek injunctive relief unless he may also seek damages). 39 The Supreme Court has expressly stated that injunctive relief under § 16 is available even though the plaintiff has not yet suffered actual injury. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969); see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 152 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.1998). Rather, a plaintiff need only demonstrate a significant threat of injury from an impending violation of the antitrust laws or from a contemporary violation likely to continue or recur. Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 130, 89 S.Ct. 1562. Moreover, the Court has directed that [§] 16 should be construed and applied, keeping in mind that its intent is not merely to provide private relief, but . . . to serve as well the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws. Id. at 130-31, 89 S.Ct. 1562. 40 In order to make the necessary threshold showing of entitlement to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show a threat of `antitrust injury,' which is described as injury `of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.' Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 257 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Cargill, 479 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 484) (further quotation omitted); see also Glen Holly Entm't Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 343 F.3d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003). [T]he antitrust injury requirement. . . . ensures that the harm claimed by the plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of the antitrust laws in the first place, and it prevents losses that stem from competition from supporting suits by private plaintiffs for . . . equitable relief. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990). 41 The showing of threatened antitrust injury is not always sufficient to establish antitrust standing. Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d Cir.1987). Once [the threat of] antitrust injury has been demonstrated by a causal relationship between the [threatened] harm and the challenged aspect of the alleged violation, standing analysis is employed to search for the most effective plaintiff from among those who [may] suffer[] loss. Id. ; see also Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 437 (2d Cir. 2005). However, because standing under § 16 raises no threat of multiple lawsuits or duplicative recoveries, a court need not consider those dangers when making the determination. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 111 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 484. Accordingly, as recognized by the district court, this circuit has specified a number of factors relevant to the inquiry, which, as concerns injunctive relief, include 42 (1) the causal connection between the antitrust violation and the plaintiff's [potential] injury; (2) the defendant's intent or motivation; (3) the nature of the plaintiff's [potential] injury—i.e., whether it is one intended to be redressed by the antitrust laws; (4) the directness or the indirectness of the connection between the plaintiff's [potential] injury and the market restraint resulting from the alleged antitrust violation. 43 Roman v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 542, 543 (10th Cir.1995) (citing Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 406-07 (10th Cir.1992)). 44 In a summary judgment determination, the initial question is therefore whether plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to show a threat of antitrust injury if defendants engage in future violations of the type alleged. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 107 (2d Cir.1989). The district court answered this question in the negative because the arbitrators had already determined that B-S Steel could not show actual injury based on pre-April 3, 2001, violations. B-S Steel II, 327 F.Supp.2d at 1264. The court reasoned that because no injury resulted from the pre-April 3, 2001, violations, the price discrimination for which B-S Steel sought an injunction was not the type of injury that would entitle a plaintiff to compensation if the injury actually occurred. Id. at 1270. This conclusion is in error, however, because it ignores the distinction outlined above between showing that antitrust injury actually occurred in the past and showing that it might occur in the future. Indeed, as recognized above, B-S Steel offered different evidence regarding injury for the period after December 2001. Thus, simply because the arbitrators concluded that B-S Steel failed to meet its evidentiary burden in regard to past violations does not mean, as a matter of law, that it would be impossible for B-S Steel to show a threat of future injury. See H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1022 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that the court's determination that the plaintiff failed to make a showing of antitrust injury adequate to allow treble damages does not provide a basis to dismiss plaintiffs' Robinson-Patman Act claim insofar as it seeks [injunctive] relief). The arbitrators' Reasoned Award therefore cannot provide a basis for denying B-S Steel injunctive relief. 45 Nevertheless, we are precluded from reversing the district court's summary judgment on this ground because B-S Steel is no longer a purchaser of WFB from the appellees and has failed to show any possibility that it might resume such purchases in the future. As indicated above, a plaintiff must have made reasonably contemporaneous purchases in order to show a violation of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Without such purchases, there can be no causal connection between the threatened injury that B-S Steel alleges and a violation of § 2(a). Nor would any such injury be one that this provision could remedy in practice. A consideration of the factors listed above thus militates against recognizing standing here. See H.L. Hayden Co., 879 F.2d at 1022 (holding that [s]ince [the defendant] is no longer selling to [plaintiffs], as is its right, there is no danger that it will sell to them on discriminatory terms in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982), and accordingly no basis for a Robinson-Patman injunction). 46 B-S Steel points to an Eighth Circuit case as recognizing that a plaintiff can seek damages or injunctive relief after it ceases purchasing the defendant's product as long as the plaintiff has purchaser status at some time while price discrimination is ongoing. Appellant's Reply Br. at 8. That case, Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc. v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., 374 F.3d 701 (8th Cir.2004), has subsequently been reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds. Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 860, 163 L.Ed.2d 663 (2006). Moreover, to the extent that the Eighth Circuit's opinion remains good law, we do not believe it supports B-S Steel's contention. In Reeder-Simco, the plaintiff submitted a damages calculation that spanned the entire four-year period during which price discrimination was alleged to have occurred, even though it had made only one three-item purchase from the defendant in the first year of that period. 374 F.3d at 710-11, 715. The court rejected the defendant's challenge to the jury's damages award on that basis, citing the Supreme Court for the proposition that a damages determination is not calculated merely in relation to the excess a plaintiff paid for its purchase, over the amount paid by a favored buyer. Id. at 714 (citing J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 565, 101 S.Ct. 1923, 68 L.Ed.2d 442 (1981)). In our view, the Eighth Circuit's holding on that issue merely approves the use of a lost sales damages model in order to calculate damages. It has no evident implication for a plaintiff's standing to seek injunctive relief where there is no indication the plaintiff will continue purchasing from the defendant. 47 B-S Steel also points to a 1951 Fifth Circuit case, which held that the plaintiff was not required to make purchases upon such [discriminatory] terms in order to attain the status of a competing purchaser under the [Robinson-Patman] Act, as its failure to do so was directly attributable to defendant's own discriminatory practice. Am. Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, 187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir.1951). We need not consider whether to adopt such a rule here, however, because B-S Steel has not alleged that it stopped purchasing WFB from the appellees due to their discriminatory pricing. Rather, the pretrial order indicates B-S Steel's contention that the appellees refused to sell to B-S Steel in retaliation for B-S Steel's initiation of this lawsuit. 16 48 B-S Steel finally argues that, if we fail to recognize that it has antitrust standing in these circumstances, once a customer complains about price discrimination, Defendants can simply cease selling to that customer and effectively cut off its ability to seek injunctive relief. Appellant's Reply Br. at 6. However, we understand this to be the nature of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. That provision states that nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). It is well established that a refusal to deal simply does not fall within the proscription of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 682 (10th Cir.1984). B-S Steel has not alleged a violation of any other antitrust provision that might provide relief for a refusal to deal in certain circumstances. See id. (indicating that a refusal to deal may be actionable under other antitrust provisions). 49 We therefore conclude that B-S Steel lacks antitrust standing to pursue injunctive relief in this case and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this issue.