Opinion ID: 1721810
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Heading: Employing the Ursery II two-step analysis: Iowa's forfeiture statute.

Text: a. Did the Iowa legislature intend proceedings under Iowa's forfeiture statute to be criminal or civil? Like the federal forfeiture statutes in Ursery II, we think the Iowa legislature intended forfeitures under Iowa's forfeiture statute to be civil proceedings. This intent is borne out by the procedural mechanisms the legislature established for enforcing forfeitures under the statute. For example, Iowa Code section 809.11(1) expressly provides that (1) forfeiture is a civil proceeding; (2) the burden of proof is on the state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is forfeitable; (3) forfeiture is not dependent upon a prosecution for, nor conviction of, a criminal offense; and (4) forfeiture proceedings are separate and distinct from any related criminal action. In addition, court appointed counsel at the state's expense is not available in forfeiture proceedings. Iowa Code § 809.11(2). Under our forfeiture statute, the defendant in forfeiture proceedings is the property sought to be forfeited, not its owner. In re Property Seized From Hickman, 533 N.W.2d 567, 568 (Iowa 1995). The proceeding is in rem and the judgment in rem operates upon the property itself. Id. So the legislature structured the forfeiture statute to be impersonal by targeting the property itself. In contrast, criminal actions are in personam. b. Is Iowa's statutory forfeiture scheme so punitive either in form or effect as to negate the legislature's intention to establish a civil remedial mechanism? For the following reasons, we think there is scant evidence that our forfeiture statute is so punitive in form and effect as to render it criminal despite the legislature's intent to the contrary. No doubt Iowa Code chapter 809 has some punitive aspects. We have recognized as much in our cases. See, e.g., In re Wagner, 482 N.W.2d 160, 162 (Iowa 1992) (Although the forfeiture statutes in chapter 809 are not criminal statutes, they are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.) (emphasis added). Nevertheless we think Iowa Code chapter 809 serves important nonpunitive goals. For example, Iowa Code section 809.1(2)(b) defines forfeitable property to include [p]roperty which has been used or is intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense or to avoid detection or apprehension of a person committing a criminal offense. Requiring forfeiture of such property encourages property owners to take care in managing their property and ensures they will not permit that property to be used for illegal purposes. In addition, Iowa Code section 809.1(2)(c) defines forfeitable property to include [p]roperty which is acquired as or from the proceeds of a criminal offense. As applied to the facts here, to the extent this definition applies to proceeds of illegal drug activity, our forfeiture statute serves the nonpunitive goal of ensuring that persons do not profit from their illegal acts. Two other factors support our conclusion that our forfeiture statute is not punishment for purposes of the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause. First, traditionally in this state, forfeiture was considered a civil proceeding to which jeopardy would not attach, rather than a criminal proceeding to which jeopardy protections would apply. State v. McFarlin, 542 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Iowa 1996). In McFarlin, we misread Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch as revok[ing] this premise and recogniz[ing] the `punishment' nature of forfeiture proceedings our earlier cases rejected, thereby introducing the jeopardy ingredients we had found lacking. Id. As it turns out, our earlier cases were right: Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch did not revoke the traditional view in this state that forfeiture was considered a civil proceeding to which jeopardy would not attach. Second, our forfeiture statute has no requirement that the state must show scienter in order to establish the property is subject to forfeiture. The court may subject the property to forfeiture even though no party files a claim to it and the state never shows any connection between the property and a particular person. See Iowa Code § 809.10(1) (If no application for the return of forfeitable property is timely made pursuant to section 809.9, upon application of the attorney for the state, the clerk shall enter an order transferring title to the state.). Like the federal statutes in Ursery II, our forfeiture statute has an innocent owner defense. See Iowa Code § 809.14(1). As the Supreme Court held in Ursery II, we do not think such a provision, without more indication of an intent to punish, is relevant to the question whether a statute is punitive under the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Our forfeiture statute, like the statutes in Ursery II, ties the forfeiture to criminal activity. See Iowa Code § 809.1. And, as the Supreme Court held in Ursery II with respect to the federal forfeiture statutes, this fact by itself is far from the proof necessary to show a proceeding is criminal in form and effect. Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude Iowa's civil in rem forfeiture statute is neither punishment nor criminal for purposes of the Federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Contrary to Predka's contention, we therefore conclude he was not subject to multiple prosecutions or multiple punishments when the State prosecuted him following the civil forfeiture action. B. The Federal Commerce Clause. Before trial, Predka moved to dismiss the charge of failure to have drug tax stamps affixed to a controlled substance. He alleged the drug tax stamp statute violates the Federal Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion and properly so. Under the Federal Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to regulate commerce... among the several states. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. As we understand Predka's argument, the tax in question could not constitutionally be imposed on property in transit. Therefore, the state could not predicate a criminal charge on a failure to comply with an unconstitutional tax law. Like the district court, we think the Commerce Clause does not protect commerce in contraband. The Supreme Court long ago held that property which is subject to seizure under the state's police power cannot be regarded as a proper article of commerce protected by the Commerce Clause. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 139, 60 S.Ct. 163, 167, 84 L.Ed. 128, 135 (1939) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to statute (1) making it unlawful to possess intoxicants except under very limited circumstances and (2) declaring intoxicants that a person unlawfully possesses contraband subject to seizure); 15A Am. Jur. 2d Commerce § 36, at 367 (1976) (Although, generally speaking, anything that can be bought and sold is a subject of commerce, things which are injurious to the public lose the benefit of protection as articles of commerce and are within the police power of the state.). Iowa Code section 124.401(1) makes it unlawful for any person to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Subsection (c)(5) of section 124.401(1) makes such possession a class C felony if the defendant possesses more than fifty kilograms but not more than one hundred kilograms of marijuana. Iowa Code section 124.506(1) subjects to forfeiture all controlled substances that a person unlawfully possesses. Iowa Code chapter 809 deals with the disposition of seizable and forfeitable property. Iowa Code section 809.1(1)(b) defines seizable property to include property defined by law to be forfeitable. Iowa Code section 809.1(2)(a) defines forfeitable property to include property that a person illegally possesses. Given the injurious nature of controlled substances, it was well within the state's police powers to enact all of these statutes. Here Predka unlawfully possessed a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to deliver. The 140 pounds of marijuana found in his possession was therefore contraband, that is, property that is unlawful to possess. The marijuana was also subject to seizure and forfeiture. As such, the marijuana was not a proper article of commerce and was therefore not protected by the Commerce Clause.