Opinion ID: 204733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to appeal the trial court's weighing of mitigating evidence

Text: In this third claim, Tibbetts argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective because he did not challenge the state trial judge's failure to adequately consider all mitigation evidence. According to Tibbetts, the trial court clearly erred in failing to consider all the mitigating factors, and it was unreasonable for appellate counsel to fail to raise on direct appeal the trial court's error. Applying the heavy measure of deference to counsel's decisions required by AEDPA, we conclude that this claim fails because it is unclear that the trial court did not consider the mitigating factors. Moreover, even if the trial court erred and counsel was unreasonable in failing to raise the claim, there was no prejudice because the Ohio Supreme Court cured any defect by conducting an independent re-weighing of the mitigating and aggravating factors, and affirmed the sentence of death. Tibbetts argues that the trial court violated clearly established federal law by failing to comply with the requirement that all mitigation evidence be considered at sentencing. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761 (6th Cir.2007). Tibbetts relies, however, on a slight misstatement of the rule established in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and applied by the Eddings Court. The rule is that the sentencer must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating factor, Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, not that the sentencer must expressly list all relevant mitigating factors. [3] In Davis, we applied the rule and remanded because the trial court had excluded mitigating evidence. Davis, 475 F.3d at 774. But the record here is devoid of any indication that the trial court excluded any evidence. In fact, the trial court expressly weighed a number of mitigating factors and stated clearly that it had considered all mitigating evidence. Plaintiff argues that the trial judge was insufficiently clear in describing all of the mitigation evidence which was considered. In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to Ohio sentencing law, Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.03(F), which requires that a trial judge state, in a separate opinion its specific findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors set forth in [Ohio statute], the existence of any other mitigating factors, . . . and the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. However, even Tibbetts acknowledges that the trial court stated that there were two statutorily required mitigation factors present: (1) lack of capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct; and (2) any other factors that call for a penalty of less than death or to lessen the appropriateness of the death penalty. Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.03(B)(3) & (7). Tibbetts points to the fact that the trial court did not find any other factors in mitigation, and argues that this is evidence that the trial court failed to truly consider any other factors. This is pure speculation, which fails to meet the clear and convincing standard required to overcome the presumption of correctness afforded state trial courts' findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Even assuming, arguendo, that the state trial judge's sentencing opinion failed to meet the requirements of § 2929.03(F), the Ohio Supreme Court's independent consideration of the mitigating evidence allegedly ignored by the trial judge cured any error. State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304 (1990). Tibbetts argues that the Ohio Supreme Court effectively found error in the trial court's weighing of mitigating factors when it afforded some weight to Tibbetts' troubled childhood and family background, his drug use, his expressed remorse, and his ability to maintain gainful employment prior to the work-related accident that reintroduced drugs into his life. Tibbetts, 749 N.E.2d at 259. However, even if the Ohio Supreme Court intended to make an implied finding of error, its express reconsideration of those very mitigating factors, and its subsequent decision to affirm the trial court's imposition of the death sentence cured any error. Because the Ohio Supreme Court raised, sua sponte, and rejected the very claim that Tibbetts argues appellate counsel should have raised on direct appeal, he cannot show prejudice from his appellate counsel's actions. We affirm the district court's denial of relief on this claim.