Opinion ID: 776953
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bray

Text: 53 Before August 15, 1995, 10 the Louisiana habitual offender statute required that both the third or fourth strike triggering life imprisonment and two of the prior felonies be a crime of violence ..., a sex offense, or ... a violation of the Uniformed Controlled Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more or any other crime[] punishable by imprisonment for twelve years or more. See 1995 La. Sess. Law. Serv. 1245 § 1 (West) (amending La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (c)(ii)). Because his current offense, albeit treatable as a felony if two prior thefts were considered, see La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:67(B)(3), is not within any of these special categories of felonies, Bray could not have received such a sentence had he committed his offense in Louisiana at the time he committed his petty theft in California. 54 Rather, the applicable Louisiana law when Bray committed his offense and received his sentence would have allowed him to be sentenced to a maximum of four years for his current offense: That offense could only have been charged as a third felony in Louisiana, because Louisiana considers only offenses tried separately. Bray was convicted of three of his four robberies in one trial, so he had — and has — at most three strikes under Louisiana law. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764 n. 22, 765 (citing State v. Butler, 601 So.2d 649, 650 (La.1992); State v. Corry, 610 So.2d 142, 147 (La.Ct.App.1992)). The petty theft offense, with two prior theft offenses, could be treated as a second or third subsequent felony, in which case the maximum sentence for Bray would have been twice the two-year maximum for a first-time offender. La.Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 14:67(B)(3), 15:529(A)(1)(b)(i); see also Andrade, 270 F.3d at 764 n. 22. 55 Louisiana has recently amended its habitual offender law so that it currently reads as it did before August of 1995. 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. 403 (West). For a period of about six years, however, including the time at which his court of appeal decision was issued, Louisiana could have imposed a sentence of life without possibility of parole on Bray. See La. Rev.Stat. Ann. §§ 14:67(B)(3), 15:529.1(A)(1)(b)(ii) & (c)(i)-(ii) (West 2000), amended by 2001 La. Sess. Law Serv. 403 (West); see also Andrade, 270 F.3d at 765 & n. 22. 11 As the statute so providing was not in effect when Bray committed his last offense and is not in effect now, however, it is of no relevance to the interjurisdictional comparison.