Opinion ID: 1996184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Appellant's Motion to Suppress

Text: In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and uphold the trial court's findings of fact and all inferences derived therefrom unless they are clearly erroneous. Robinson v. United States, 928 A.2d 717, 725 (D.C.2007). We review the trial court's legal conclusions, however, de novo. Id. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. His first argument is that the trial court erroneously concluded that appellant never invoked his Miranda rights. Instead of forcefully defending the trial court's finding that appellant's request for a lawyer was sarcastic and thus not a valid invocation, however, the government's response on this point is conspicuously relegated to a footnote. Instead, the government argues that appellant invoked his Miranda rights, if at all, with regard to Detective Norris only. Alternatively, the government argues that even if appellant invoked his Miranda rights as to both detectives, he waived his right to counsel by immediately reinitiating the conversation (when he asked Detective Corbett Can I talk to you, please?). In response, appellant notes that the trial court never reached the government's Edwards [3] theory because it found that appellant never invoked his Miranda rights. Appellant insists that if we reach an Edwards analysis, he prevails nonetheless because he did not reinitiate the conversation after invoking his Miranda rights. In sum, for the reasons explained more fully below, we agree with appellant that the trial court erred in concluding that he never invoked his Miranda rights because his statements were sarcastic. Although the trial court is normally afforded great deference to make credibility determinations and factual findings, we conclude that the trial judge erred as a matter of law when he held that appellant failed to invoke his Miranda rights in this case. Ultimately, however, we affirm the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress because we find that appellant immediately reinitiated the discussion with the detectives and thereby waived his right to counsel. We begin our analysis by noting that the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule in Miranda [4] that if an accused who is subject to custodial interrogation invokes his or her right to counsel, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Court elaborated in Edwards that an accused, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.  Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (emphasis added); see In re G.E., 879 A.2d 672, 678 (D.C.2005). The first question, then, is whether appellant in fact invoked his right to counsel, and the Supreme Court has counseled that the test is an objective one: Although a suspect need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,' he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (citation omitted). In this case, appellant said I'm done talking to you. Go get my lawyer. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress, however, reasoning that appellant was being sarcastic. Having reviewed the videotape, which was part of the record, we can see why the trial judge may have thought appellant's statement was sarcastic. Cf. Smith v. United States, 529 A.2d 312, 317 (1987) (acknowledging that it is conceivable that an individual might say the word `no' with a look or a tone of voice communicating some ambiguity or confusion). Nevertheless, when we apply the objective test enunciated in Davis, we conclude that appellant was sufficiently clear[] that a reasonable police officer would have understood his statement as a request for an attorney. 512 U.S. at 460, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Having found that appellant invoked his right to counsel, we must next consider whether Edwards requires the suppression of his subsequent confession. As noted above, when an individual who is subject to custodial interrogation requests an attorney, the interrogation must cease unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. In this case, we have no doubt that appellant reinitiated the conversation. Indeed, without pausing so much as to even take a breath in between, appellant turned to face Detective Corbett and asked Can I talk to you, please? immediately after he told Detective Norris to Go get my lawyer. In this regard, appellant's reliance on In re G.E. is misplaced. In In re G.E., we affirmed the trial court's determination that it was the police, and not the defendant, who initiated the conversation where the detective asked Are you sure? after G.E. invoked his right to counsel. In re G.E., supra, 879 A.2d at 678. Appellant asks us to focus on Detective Norris' statement (Okay. Oh, you the one charged with murder one, not me.) and claims that it  like the Are you sure? in In re G.E.  was an effort to persuade [appellant] to rethink his initial disinclination to speak with [police] without counsel present. Id. at 680. But appellant ignores the fact that he had already turned to Detective Corbett and asked Can I talk to you, please? even before Detective Norris made the statement at issue. Thus, however inadvisable it may have been, we cannot say that Detective Norris' comment was an effort to persuade [appellant] to rethink his initial disinclination to speak with [police] without counsel present, id., because appellant had already evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation [5] when he turned toward Detective Corbett and asked Can I talk to you, please? [6] As we reiterated in Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1217 (1999), however, Edwards requires more than just a simple inquiry into who reinitiated the conversation. [I]f an accused does initiate communication with the authorities after he has refused to answer questions without counsel, the police nevertheless may not interrogate him without an attorney being present unless he has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Id. As we have held, the determination whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend upon the particular facts and circumstances in each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Morris, 728 A.2d at 1219. In this case, appellant has not challenged the trial court's finding that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when he initially agreed to speak with the police. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that appellant did not still understand those rights when he later reinitiated contact with Detective Norris. See Morris, 728 A.2d at 1219-20 (trial court's conclusion that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary supported by evidence that defendant invoked his right to counsel just before reinitiating the discussion). Furthermore, as the trial court noted, appellant had previous experience with the criminal justice system. In fact, this case reminds us of the circumstances we faced in McIntyre v. United States, 634 A.2d 940 (D.C.1993). In that case, we affirmed the trial court's finding that Mr. McIntyre had reinitiated the conversation with police. Id. at 944. Like appellant in this case, McIntyre was no stranger to the criminal justice system, and in that case we found that he had knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel because he negotiated with the police and ultimately agreed to continue speaking with them on the condition that he have an opportunity to visit with his girlfriend. Id. at 945 (appellant's shrewd conduct in negotiating with [the police] showed his knowledge of his rights and his clear concise understanding of them . . . they were bargaining as equals). In this case, we find that appellant demonstrated a similar shrewdness when he told Detective Norris to Go get my lawyer before immediately turning to Detective Corbett and asking Can I talk to you, please? [7] Indeed, after having invoked his rights in a strategic manner to manipulate the situation and exclude Detective Norris from the interview room, appellant cannot argue that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive those rights when he reinitiated the discussion with Detective Corbett immediately thereafter.