Opinion ID: 4787542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gibson’s Statutory Standing

Text: ¶33 Gibson, however, did appeal. Gibson agrees that he is not a political subdivision or requester under GRAMA and is therefore not “specifically enumerated as the type of appellant the statute contemplates will seek judicial review.” But he argues that GRAMA nonetheless grants him standing for the following reasons. __________________________________________________________ 9 Section 701(6) states that an appeals board “decision” may be appealed. Id. § 63G-2-701(6)(a). Unlike other sections of GRAMA, it does not specify that only denials may be appealed. See supra ¶ 24. 10 Cite as: 2021 UT 48 Opinion of the Court ¶34 First, Gibson notes GRAMA’s recognition of “the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities.” UTAH CODE § 63G-2-102(1)(b). He then argues that as the subject of the investigative records at issue, he has standing as an “interested party” under the statute because his right to privacy is at stake.10 ¶35 This is incorrect. As discussed, Gibson is not an interested party under the statute. See supra ¶ 26. And while it is true that GRAMA recognizes the importance of both “the public’s right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public’s business” and “the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities,” UTAH CODE § 63G-2-102(1), this recognition does not amount to a grant of standing. See Wash. Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ¶¶ 8–10, 82 P.3d 1125 (concluding that “broad statements of purpose” are “insufficient to establish statutory standing” and declining to infer from such statements a legislative intent to confer statutory standing).11 ¶36 Gibson next asserts that the language in subsection 701(6)(a) granting political subdivisions and requesters the right to appeal is “not exclusive.” So he argues that while the __________________________________________________________ 10Gibson has not made any claim that the relevant GRAMA provisions are unconstitutional as applied to him. The only question before us is whether Gibson has standing to pursue his GRAMA petition for judicial review. 11 We note that GRAMA protects individuals whose data appears in government records in other ways. For example, GRAMA allows any person “aggrieved by a governmental entity’s classification or designation determination” to appeal the classification or determination. UTAH CODE § 63G-2-401(8). And it directs decisionmakers at various stages of the record request and appeals processes to weigh the interests favoring disclosure against the interests favoring nondisclosure. See, e.g., id. § 63G-2- 401(6) (consideration by a chief administrative officer); id. § 63G-2- 403(11)(b) (consideration by the State Records Committee); id. § 63G-2-404(7)(a) (consideration by the district court). However, the statute stops short of granting standing to appeal an access decision on the basis of a person’s privacy interests. 11 MCKITRICK V. GIBSON Opinion of the Court subsection does not explicitly include someone in his circumstance, it does not necessarily exclude him either. ¶37 This is a misreading of the statute. Because “we presume, ‘absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each word advisedly,’” Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14 (citation omitted), we consequently anticipate “that the expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the exclusion of another.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387 P.3d 1000 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “We therefore seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.” Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 14. ¶38 The associated canon of construction—expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expressio unius)—holds that “to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Pulham v. Kirsling, 2019 UT 18, ¶ 30 n.9, 443 P.3d 1217 (citing the above definition). And while canons of construction “are not formulaic, dispositive indicators of statutory meaning,” they serve as “tools that guide our construction of statutes in accordance with common, ordinary usage and understanding of language—in this instance, the expectation that legislators typically use language advisedly and tend not to speak in superfluous terms.” Olsen, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 19. ¶39 On this basis—and absent any contrary indication in the statutory text itself—we assume that the legislature used “requester” and “political subdivision” advisedly in crafting GRAMA’s appellate review language, and to the exclusion of other persons or entities that might have an interest in appealing a local review board’s access decision. Cf. In re Gestational Agreement, 2019 UT 40, ¶ 20, 449 P.3d 69 (assuming the term “mother” in the pertinent statute was used advisedly and to the exclusion of words like “father” or “parent”). ¶40 Of course, the legislature’s inclusion of specific terms does not always exclude others. In general, [t]he inclusion of specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of something else “only where in the natural association of ideas the contrast between a specific subject matter which is expressed and one which is not mentioned leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be included within the statute.” 12 Cite as: 2021 UT 48 Opinion of the Court Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). For example, where a statute sets forth a list of considerations to be included among relevant facts a court might consider, such a list is “exemplary—an indication of some of the considerations that may be relevant,” but not all. State v. Wadsworth, 2017 UT 20, ¶ 8, 393 P.3d 338. When specific terms are not intended to be exclusive, we expect to see textual indicators such as “for example” or “including,” or for the context of the provision to otherwise suggest that it is not meant to be exhaustive. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 317 (2010) (“[U]se of the word ‘include’ can signal that the list that follows is meant to be illustrative rather than exhaustive.”); Graves v. N.E. Servs., Inc., 2015 UT 28, ¶ 53, 345 P.3d 619 (“In statutory cases far and wide, [the term ‘including’] is routinely construed as introducing a non-exclusive, exemplary list.”). ¶41 But subsection 701(6)(a) does not bear such a reading. It says simply that: “A political subdivision or requester may appeal an appeals board decision . . . by filing a petition for judicial review with the district court.” UTAH CODE § 63G-2-701(6)(a)(ii). There is no textual suggestion that the terms “political subdivision” and “requester” are meant to be merely illustrative or otherwise non-exclusive. And as our discussion of this provision and the other relevant GRAMA appeals provisions makes clear, the legislature carefully chose which access decisions were subject to appeal and which persons could pursue those appeals. Accordingly, we reject Gibson’s assertion that the legislature’s specific identification of these two terms in subsection 701(6)(a) does not limit appellate standing accordingly. ¶42 Gibson’s final argument is that the Ogden City Municipal Code grants him standing to petition for judicial review of the Review Board’s decision. However, the provision he cites does not grant broader standing than GRAMA subsection 701(6)(a). Rather, it explicitly affirms that appeal of a final decision of the Review Board “may be made to the district court, in accordance with [GRAMA] and the Utah rules of civil procedure.” OGDEN CITY, UTAH, MUN. CODE § 4-5-25(H) (2018). And as we have explained, GRAMA permits only a political subdivision or the requester to appeal a decision of the Review Board. See UTAH CODE § 63G-2- 701(6)(a). ¶43 Accordingly, we conclude that under the plain language of GRAMA, only a requester of a record—in this case, McKitrick—or a political subdivision—here, Ogden City—may 13 MCKITRICK V. GIBSON Opinion of the Court petition for judicial review of a local appeals board decision in the district court. See id. Gibson, who is neither a requester nor a political subdivision, therefore lacks statutory standing in this case.