Opinion ID: 753713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims: Qualified Individuals under Title I

Text: 25 All appellants in these actions allege federal disability claims pursuant to Title I of the ADA and, with the exception of the Clifford appellants and Velardi, all allege claims under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 26 The district courts in the cases before us are divided over whether appellants, all of whom are former city employees and most of whom who can no longer perform the essential functions of their former employment, are qualified individual[s] with a disability within Title I of the ADA for the purpose of challenging alleged discrimination in employer-related fringe benefits. See Castellano v. City of New York, 946 F.Supp. at 252-53; Graboski, 937 F.Supp. at 266. Title I prohibits an employer or labor organization from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), including the provision of fringe benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2). Qualified individual with a disability is defined as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 27 In Castellano v. City, the district court determined that disabled retirees, who no longer hold[ ] employment position[s] and who can no longer with or without reasonable accommodation ... perform the essential functions of their former employment, do not fall within the plain language of the ADA. 946 F.Supp. at 252-53 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). Appellees urge us to endorse this approach, which has been adopted by three circuits in the context of challenges to alleged discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526-28 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1822, 137 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1997); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1042-45 (7th Cir.1996); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 185-87 (6th Cir.1996), aff'd, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 871, 139 L.Ed.2d 768 (1998). Title I of the ADA, however, expressly prohibits discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2), and certain fringe benefits such as pensions and VSF benefits are provided only post-employment and are meaningful only in that context. This led the district court in Graboski to conclude that it would be illogical for the ADA to exclude the period following employment just when the employment benefits are to be reaped. Graboski, 937 F.Supp. at 266. 28 In interpreting a statute, we first consider the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, ----, 117 S.Ct. 843, 846, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Where the language is ambiguous, we focus upon the broader context and primary purpose of the statute. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 848. Section 12111(8) defines a qualified individual with a disability as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). It fails to specify when a potential plaintiff must have been a qualified individual with a disability in the context of a claim that the provision of retirement or fringe benefits is discriminatory. The House committee report accompanying the ADA adds that a determination of whether a person is qualified should be made at the time of the [discriminatory] employment action, e.g. hiring or promotion, and should not be based on the possibility that the employee or applicant will become incapacitated and unqualified in the future, H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 456, and in doing so, focuses on the situation where the inability to perform essential functions may not have arisen at the time of the discriminatory employment action. 29 The cases sub judice, however, involve employment actions taken not only after the plaintiffs were no longer employees but after many of the plaintiffs had lost the ability to perform the essential functions of their former employment. A literal reading of the committee report suggests that at the time of the employment action refers to the actual moment when the employer performs the discriminatory act, in this case, withholds or provides unequal fringe benefits. Such a reading, however, would permit employers to discriminate freely against disabled retirees who had been qualified individuals up to the point of retirement, but who (i) no longer held employment positions, and/or (ii) were no longer able to perform the essential functions of their former employment due to infirmity. Under reading (i), for example, an employer could terminate an employee in violation of the ADA and then deny him fringe benefits, yet the employee could bring no ADA claim for the latter violation because at the time of the discriminatory denial of fringe benefits he was a former employee who did not hold an employment position. The first reading would also permit an employer to deny post-employment fringe benefits on the basis of disability to any retiree the day after (but not the day before) his retirement. Reading (ii) would permit irrational discrimination as between disabled retirees, some of whom (for whatever reason) could still perform the essential functions of their former employment and others of whom could not. This analysis only underscores the difficulty of defining any temporally discrete, discriminatory employment action in the context of the provision of fringe benefits. The fact is that many fringe benefits are earned during years of service before the employment has terminated but are provided in years after the employment relationship has ended. 30 Looking beyond this inconclusive and unsatisfactory legislative history, we turn to the purpose underlying inclusion of the essential functions requirement within the definition of qualified individual with a disability. Congress has stated its purpose to be to ensure that employers can continue to require that all applicants and employees, including those with disabilities, are able to perform the essential, i.e., the non-marginal functions of the job in question. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337; S.Rep. No. 101-116, reprinted in Arnold & Porter Legislative History P.L. 101-336, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, at 26 (1989). Congress used the phrase qualified individual with a disability to reaffirm that [the ADA] does not undermine an employer's ability to choose and maintain qualified workers, id.; H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 337, and to allow employers to select the most qualified applicant available rather than be obliged to prefer applicants with disabilities over other applicants on the basis of disability. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 56 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 338; S.Rep. No. 101-116, reprinted in Arnold & Porter Legislative History P.L. 101-336, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, at 26-27 (1989). Congress was concerned that employers not be forced to hire, promote, or retain unqualified, disabled employees. 31 Where the alleged discrimination relates to the provision of post-employment benefits, rather than to hiring, promotion, or firing, Congress's expressed concern about qualifications is no longer implicated. Because retired employees who receive fringe benefits no longer work or seek to work for their former employers, they plainly need not perform the essential functions, or indeed any functions, of their former employment. Provided that retired employees were qualified (i.e., performed the essential functions of their jobs) while employed and on that basis became entitled to post-employment benefits, the purpose of the essential functions requirement has been met. In the instant case, appellants who performed the essential functions of their former employment for a period of twenty years and who selected a for service retirement plan would be entitled under the ADA to non-discriminatory treatment in the provision of VSF benefits. Because fringe benefits are earned for actual service in employment, it is irrelevant whether former employees, otherwise eligible for fringe benefits, could also perform such essential functions at or after termination of their employment. 32 We note that the Seventh Circuit distinguished post-employment benefits claims from Title VII antiretaliation claims (where concededly former employees had standing) on the ground that the protected interest of the former employee [in not facing post-employment retaliation] arose during the period of employment only in the latter case. CNA, 96 F.3d at 1045. It is plain to us, however, that an employee's entitlement to post-employment fringe benefits arises (as much or more so than does his interest in not facing post-employment retaliation) during his period of employment. 33 An interpretation that would prevent former employees who are no longer qualified individuals from bringing claims of discrimination in the provision of post-employment fringe benefits would also undermine the plain purpose of sections 12112(a) and (b)(2): to provide comprehensive protection from discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), (b)(2). Many fringe benefits are paid out to those who no longer work and who are no longer able to work, and some fringe benefits are paid out to individuals precisely because they can no longer work. Under appellees' reading, none of these individuals would be protected by the ADA. Appellees' reading would also undermine the ADA's broad remedial purpose to prohibit disability discrimination in all aspects of the employment relationship, leaving disabled retirees unprotected from discrimination in the provision of pensions, health and life insurance, and other post-employment benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a), (b)(1) (It is the purpose of this chapter--to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.). 34 Support for our conclusion can be found in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Robinson, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 843. Robinson was handed down in 1997 after the district court decisions in Castellano and Graboski and the decisions by the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in Parker, CNA, and Gonzales. The Supreme Court held, consistent with Title VII's text and broad remedial purpose, that section 704(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)--an antiretaliation provision which prohibits an employer from discriminating against any of his employees or applicants for employment--protects former employees as well, even though former employees are nowhere mentioned in that section. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 849. Notably, with an exception not applicable here, the definition of employee under the ADA parallels that under Title VII and was intended to be given the same meaning. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. at 349 (1997) (commenting on 29 C.F.R. 1630 pt. 2(a)-(f)); see also H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 54, 76, 149, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 336, 359, 432 (Title I incorporates by reference Title VII's definition of employee); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). 35 The Court in Robinson first determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole that the language of section 704(a) of Title VII is ambiguous and then interpreted the statutory language in light of the purposes of section 704(a) and Title VII. Robinson, 519 U.S. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 846. The Court concluded that a crabbed interpretation excluding former employees from the protections of Title VII antiretaliation provisions would have undermined their primary purpose ...: [m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms. Id. at ----, 117 S.Ct. at 848. This reasoning applies with equal force to the instant case. An interpretation excluding from the ADA former employees or employees who can no longer perform the essential functions of their former employment would undermine the purpose of preventing disability discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits. See also Brown v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 834 F.2d 299, 300 (2d Cir.1987) (Title VII challenge by two retired women teachers to pension and annuity benefits determined by sex-distinct mortality tables); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., 581 F.2d 1052, 1054-55 (2d Cir.1978) (construing employee in Title VII to include former employees in light of statute's purpose to furnish a remedy against an employer's use of discrimination in connection with a prospective, present or past employment relationship to cause harm to another.); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1331 (5th Cir.1991) ( '[t]here is no ground for affording any less protection [against retaliation] to defendant's former employees than to its present employees' under Title VII.) (quoting Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir.1977)). 36 We note that the EEOC has, in the context of fringe benefits, taken the position that qualified individual[s] include former employees who can no longer perform the essential functions of their former employment. See Amicus Curiae Brief for the EEOC, Castellano v. City of New York, No. 96-7920. As evidenced by the ADA's language and legislative history, it is inconceivable to us that Congress would in the same breath expressly prohibit discrimination in fringe benefits, yet allow employers to discriminatorily deny or limit post-employment benefits to former employees who ceased to be qualified at or after their retirement, although they had earned those fringe benefits through years of service in which they performed the essential functions of their employment. 37 The narrow interpretation sought by appellees in the instant actions would permit employers to deny VSF benefits on the basis of disability to retirees with twenty years of service who elected to retire for service, either the day after their retirement or in any event as soon as they could no longer perform the essential functions of their former employment. In light of the textual ambiguity surrounding the time at which a plaintiff must have been a qualified individual, the purpose of the essential functions requirement, the illogic inherent in a statutory prohibition of discrimination in the provision of fringe benefits that would exclude a large body of retirees from coverage, and the ADA's broad remedial purpose, we hold that a former employee with a disability who with or without reasonable accommodation could perform the essential functions of the employment position for a period sufficient to establish entitlement to an employer-related fringe benefit (i.e., who is otherwise entitled to receive a fringe benefit) is a qualified individual with a disability within Title I of the ADA for the purpose of challenging alleged discrimination in the provision of that fringe benefit. 38 Because the claims of all appellants alleging violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA can easily be disposed of on the merits, we assume without deciding that these appellants are also qualified individuals within the meaning of those provisions. 39