Opinion ID: 1179846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Proposed Instruction Defining Conscious

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction defining the word conscious. He argues that, because his defense centered on whether his conduct was due to a drug-induced psychosis and that he therefore lacked the requisite intent to commit aggravated murder, a definition of the term conscious was important. He also argues that a court-supplied definition was necessary to avoid confusion and speculation on the part of the jury. Defendant requested that the jury be instructed: `Conscious' means perceiving, apprehending, or noticing with a degree of controlled thought or observation; capable of or marked by thought, will, design, or perception; or done or acting with critical awareness. Authority: Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary. He requested that instruction as clarification of two other instructions, which the court did give to the jury, containing the word conscious. The two instructions given stated: A person acts `intentionally' or `with intent' when that person acts with a conscious objective either (1) to cause a particular result; or (2) to engage in particular conduct. (ORS 161.085(7)) (emphasis added). `Voluntary act' means a bodily movement performed consciously and includes the conscious possession or control of property. (ORS 161.085(2)) (emphasis added). Generally, words of common usage need not be defined for the jury. State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523, 539-40, 789 P.2d 1326 (1990); State v. Nichols, 236 Or. 521, 535, 388 P.2d 739 (1964). In the context of this case, we believe that the term conscious is a word of common usage and that it was understandable without elaboration. The trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction. See State v. Montez, supra, 309 Or. at 600-01, 789 P.2d 1352 (defendant's requested instruction added nothing).