Opinion ID: 2313650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pena Analysis Applied

Text: With respect to the first Pena factor, the nature, persistency, and frequency of the outburst, there was only one isolated reference to Revel exercising his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. That occurred during the cross-examination of Detective Papili, a prosecution witness, by the defense. During the State's questioning of Detective Papili, no reference to Revel's exercise of his right to remain silent were solicited or accidentally occurred. [15] The trial judge found that Detective Papili's comment was an inadvertent and really inoffensive response to the question posed by the defense counsel regarding the absence of a writing sample. Detective Papili's response was that Revel had not been asked to provide a writing sample, because another detective had informed Detective Papili that Revel declined to make a statement and asked for an attorney, so ... we wouldn't ask him for a sample of anything or any kind like that. That statement reflected Detective Papili's (mistaken) belief that a defendant who has asserted his rights under Miranda cannot be required to provide a handwritten exemplar. [16] Thus, the only reference to Revel's exercise of his right to remain silent was marginal and was made as part of an explanation for the police's failure to ask Revel to give a writing sample. The second Pena inquiry is whether that unsolicited explanation had a prejudicial effect. The United States Constitution prohibits references to post- Miranda silence, both as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief and for purposes of impeaching a defendant's credibility. [17] Although neither circumstance is applicable here, the United States Supreme Court reasoned in United States v. Hale that a defendant's post- Miranda silence during a police interrogation at the time of the arrest has a significant potential for prejudice. [18] This Court relied upon the Hale rationale in Bowe v. State. [19] In both Hale and Bowe, the improper inquiry regarding the defendant's silence arose during the prosecution's questioning of the defendant. We recognize, however, that the same potential for prejudice can be created  even though inadvertently and in response to a question by the defense counselby a third party witness' reference to the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent. The third Pena factor is the closeness of the case. The record reflects that no eye witnesses or physical evidence linked Revel to the bank robberies. The State's case included the hat and the boots found in Revel's car. Revel argues that those items represent a generic type of clothing, as demonstrated by the fact that a previous suspect (Pruitt) also possessed a white hat with a raised white emblem and Timberland boots. The trial judge stated that absent the witness Bittenbender he would consider granting Revel's motion for a judgment of acquittal. Bittenbender, however, was not the only person who could identify Revel as being the man portrayed in the surveillance photographs. Because those photographs were introduced as evidence at trial, the jury could compare those pictures with Revel as he was sitting before them. Accordingly, the jurors could see the image of the robber and compare that image with Revel's physical appearance in the courtroom. The final Pena factor is whether the trial judge attempted to mitigate any resulting prejudice. The trial judge's curative instruction to the jury was as follows: Detective Papili ... referr[ed] to statements by Mr. Revel. As you may know, Mr. Revel, like any other accused person in the United States, has the absolute right to remain silent and to have a lawyer present. In fact, he is specifically told that by the police. So of course, absolutely no inference of any kind can be drawn by you concerning Mr. Revel's failure to make a statement at any time in this entire proceeding. We have held that an [e]rror can normally be cured by the use of a curative instruction to the jury, and [that] jurors are presumed to follow those instructions. [20] The State argues that, by promptly informing the jury that Revel had a constitutional right to remain silent of which he was made aware, and that no inference could be drawn by the jury from Revel's exercise of that right, the curative instruction efficiently and adequately addressed the concern without unduly emphasizing the subject.