Opinion ID: 2831207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sneed v. City of Red Bank

Text: When a cause of action asserted against a governmental entity is based upon a statute separate from the GTLA and the GTLA neither specifically removes immunity nor specifically reaffirms immunity for the cause of action, we must determine whether the cause of action is “brought under” and governed by the GTLA. In Sneed, we identified the considerations that are relevant to making this determination. Thus, we begin our analysis with Sneed. The issues in Sneed were whether the GTLA governs Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) claims against governmental entities, and if not, whether there is an independent right to a jury trial under the THRA in chancery court. See Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 22. In determining that the GTLA does not govern THRA claims against governmental entities, we held that, while the GTLA is a comprehensive statutory scheme with respect to certain tort claims brought against governmental entities, “the GTLA does not control every single action against a governmental entity.” Id. at 25 (citing Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496; Jenkins v. Loudon Cnty., 736 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Tenn. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 81-83; J.S. Haren Co. v. City of Cleveland, No. E2002-01327-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21276662, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (holding that the remedy provided by a statute independent of the GTLA was not subject to the GTLA)). Rather, we explained that the GTLA governs “[o]nly those claims which are „brought under‟ the GTLA and for which „immunity is removed by‟ the GTLA.” Id.; see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-201(c), -307. This “„leaves significant areas of activities either protected by immunity or subject to independent bodies of law.‟” Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 25 (citing Cruse, 922 S.W.2d at 496). We went on to determine, based upon the “history and text of the GTLA itself,” that the “THRA is an independent statutory scheme that creates remedies and removes governmental -6- immunity,” and thus such claims are not subject to the GTLA. Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 27. In making this determination, we expressly overruled Young v. Davis, upon which the Court of Appeals relied in deciding both Sneed and the present appeal. See Young v. Davis, No. E2008-01974-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 3518162 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2009), overruled by Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 29. Finally, this Court in Sneed concluded that, although the THRA provides no explicit right to a jury trial, another statute provides the right to trial by jury for THRA claims brought in chancery court. Sneed, 459 S.W.3d at 30-31 & n.10 (discussing Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-1-103 (2009)).5 Using the analytical framework Sneed provided, we now turn to the first issue in this appeal: whether the GTLA applies to TPPA claims against governmental entities.