Opinion ID: 1176143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Change of Counsel Issue

Text: ¶ 29 In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant's request to remove trial counsel and to substitute himself as counsel pro se. He asserts that the trial judge erred by failing to inquire into the reasons defendant wanted his own substitution as counsel and alleges that the court's actions fail the test of United States v. Gonzalez, 113 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1997) (when deciding motion for change of counsel, reviewing court looks at adequacy of trial court's inquiry, extent of conflict between defendant and counsel, and timeliness of motion). See also United States v. D'Amore, 56 F.3d 1202, 1204-05 (9th Cir.1995). In support, defendant refers to a letter he wrote to the judge dated February 14, 1995, describing dissatisfaction with what he perceived as a lack of communication between himself and trial counsel. Because the letter preceded his February 15 motion to substitute himself as counsel, defendant argues, the trial judge should have known that defendant was really seeking the representation of counsel who would communicate with him. ¶ 30 Although not expressly stated in his supplemental brief, defendant apparently wishes now to treat the motion at issue as one to change counsel, rather than to waive counsel and substitute self. The impetus for his characterization seems to be (1) the aforementioned letter and (2) the title of the form upon which he asked to represent himself. The motion was titled CHANGE OF COUNSEL and stated: I, RICHARD K. DJERF, hereby request that MICHEAL [sic] VAUGHN/ALAN SIMPSON be withdrawn as my counsel of record, and that RICHARD K. DJERF be substituted as my attorney in all future proceedings in the trial court. ¶ 31 Defendant's later characterization of the motion as one to obtain new counsel is contradicted by the record. In his letter of February 14, defendant enumerated his complaints about counsel, but never once suggested that he wanted new counsel appointed. At a hearing on February 17, the trial judge (who had not yet received the letter but did have the motion) stated that what he had before him was basically a motion for self-representation by defendant and asked defendant if he still desired to represent himself. Defendant replied in the affirmative, and the trial judge scheduled the February 23 hearing. (The trial court did not receive defendant's letter until February 21.) At the February 23 hearing, the court treated the motion as stated on its face, to proceed pro se, and neither defendant nor his attorneys objected to this or gave any sign that this was not consistent with defendant's intent. Defendant never characterized his request as one for new counsel, not in his letter nor at the hearing nor at any time prior to his supplemental brief in this court. He requested only that he be allowed to represent himself. Further, in a later motion, defendant himself characterized his February 15 motion as a request to proceed pro se. [4] ¶ 32 Because defendant had an absolute constitutional right to act pro se, the trial court correctly determined that defendant was competent and that the waiver of counsel was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Defendant's argument is meritless, and Gonzalez, which describes the test for whether a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a motion to change counsel, is inapplicable. ¶ 33 Finally, the September 1995 motion which the trial judge denied was mentioned in defendant's brief only to bolster the argument that his February 15 motion was intended to request different counsel, not to challenge the denial. [5]