Opinion ID: 1746564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Weighing Factors and Proportionality

Text: Smith next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, and also claims that the sentence is not proportionate. We address each claim in turn. We review the weight the trial court ascribes to mitigating factors under the abuse of discretion standard. Walker v. State, 957 So.2d 560, 584 (Fla.2007). Further, competent, substantial evidence must support the trial court's final decision in weighing the aggravating circumstances and mitigation. Id. In this case, the trial court found the following mitigating factors and assigned the weight indicated: (1) Smith's background (great weight); (2) Smith's expression of remorse (little weight); and (3) mental and emotional health issues (some weight). Smith contends that the latter factor was entitled to more weight because these issues were intertwined with his background. However, with regard to the latter factor, the court found that Smith's history of depression, substance abuse, and attention deficit disorder was proven and may be related to his dysfunctional family background. The court thus considered them in context with Smith's background to which it gave great weight. Smith has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in ascribing the mental health issues some weight. Smith also contends that the court erred in its final weighing of the aggravators and mitigators. The court found the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Smith was under a sentence of imprisonment; (2) he had prior violent felony convictions, including first-degree murder, burglary, robbery, and sexual battery; (3) the murder in this case was committed for the purpose of escape from custody, and the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in official duties (merged); and (4) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP). The trial court concluded that the aggravating circumstances in this case greatly outweigh the mitigating circumstances present. We reject Smith's contention that the mitigating evidence regarding his childhood alone outweighs all the aggravating factors, two of which are among the more serious aggravating circumstances. Chamberlain v. State, 881 So.2d 1087, 1108-09 (Fla.2004) (noting that CCP and prior violent felony conviction are considered among the more serious aggravating circumstances). We also reject Smith's claim that he was merely a passive accomplice to the murder because he did not deliver the fatal blow. This minimization of Smith's role ignores the evidence that from the beginning murder was part of Smith's escape plan, and he played an active role by luring the officer to the mop closet where Eaglin waited with the sledgehammer. Therefore, we find that competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination. Smith raises three arguments regarding our proportionality review. First, he makes the conclusory claim that our review is legally insufficient and unconstitutional because it is does not include review of other factors, such as death cases from other states. We have previously rejected similar attacks on Florida's death penalty based on an American Bar Association report. See Rutherford v. State, 940 So.2d 1112, 1118 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 465, 166 L.Ed.2d 331 (2006); accord Rolling v. State, 944 So.2d 176, 181 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 466, 166 L.Ed.2d 332 (2006). Smith next claims that that his sentence is not proportionate because codefendant Jones, who Smith alleges had an equal role in the escape, received a life sentence. However, Jones pled guilty and received a life sentence. We have previously rejected claims of disparate sentencing when the codefendant's sentence resulted from his entry of a plea or prosecutorial discretion. England, 940 So.2d at 406 (citing cases). Therefore, we reject this claim as well. [12] Finally, we address Smith's contention that his death sentence is not proportionate compared to death sentences in other Florida cases. In this case, the jury voted nine to three to recommend a sentence of death. As stated above, the trial court found four weighty aggravators and concluded that they greatly outweighed the mitigation. In conducting proportionality review, we consider the totality of the circumstances of the case and compare the case with other capital cases. Simmons v. State, 934 So.2d 1100, 1122 (Fla.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1334, 167 L.Ed.2d 80 (2007). We hold that the sentence in this case is comparable to other cases in which this Court has affirmed the death penalty and is therefore proportionate. See Caballero v. State, 851 So.2d 655, 664 (Fla. 2003) (affirming the death sentence where the defendant and the codefendant bound and robbed the victim in her home, then planned to and did murder her, and where the trial court found four aggravators CCP, committed in course of robbery or kidnapping, committed to avoid arrest, and heinous, atrocious and cruel); Franqui v. State, 804 So.2d 1185, 1198 (Fla.2001) (finding a sentence proportional where a codefendant killed a police officer in the course of a bank robbery that defendant planned and during which he was armed and where the trial court found three aggravatorsprior violent felony conviction, murder committed in the course of robbery, and murder was committed to avoid arrest and victim was a law enforcement officerand minimal mitigation); see also Van Poyck v. State, 564 So.2d 1066, 1070-71 (Fla.1990) (finding the death sentence proportional even though the defendant was not the triggerman but was the instigator and the primary participant in the crime and knew that lethal force could be used).