Opinion ID: 2317972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the jersey central-walling appeal

Text: The questions involved in the appeal of Jersey Central and Walling are whether the Superior Court, Appellate Division, erred in affirming the denial by the Superior Court, Law Division, of the Jersey Central and Walling motions (a) to dismiss Melone's action at the close of the plaintiff's case; (b) to enter judgment for Jersey Central and Walling at the close of the reception of all the evidence; and (c) for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict of the jury was against the weight of the evidence. A motion for judgment of dismissal admits the truth of the plaintiff's evidence and every inference of fact that can be legitimately drawn therefrom which is favorable to the plaintiff and denies only its sufficiency in law. And on a motion for judgment the trial court cannot weigh the evidence but must accept as true all evidence which supports the view of the party against whom the motion is made and must give him the benefit of all legitimate inferences which are to be drawn therefrom in his favor. These are settled juridical concepts. And it is equally well established that a jury verdict is not to be set aside as against the weight of the evidence unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the verdict was the result of mistake, partiality, prejudice or passion. Cf. R.R. 1:5-3( a ), as amended June 28, 1954, effective September 8, 1954. There is no dispute as to the duty of reasonable care owed by Jersey Central and Walling to Melone. The contention of defendants Jersey Central and Walling is that Melone produced no evidence of negligence on their part, nor evidence that any action or inaction of theirs proximately caused the collision with its resultant injuries to Melone. Their emphasis on this appeal is placed upon Tears' alleged negligence. If there was evidence of negligence attributable to the defendants Jersey Central and Walling which proximately caused the event, although coupled with negligence of Tears, then the defendants Jersey Central and Walling are liable to Melone. The applicable rule was quoted by Mr. Justice Wachenfeld from Matthews v. Delaware, L. & W.R. Co., 56 N.J.L. 34 ( Sup. Ct. 1893), in Ristan v. Frantzen, 14 N.J. 455, 460 (1954) as follows: `   But when each of two or more persons owes to another a separate duty, which each wrongfully neglects to perform, then, although the duties were diverse and disconnected, and the negligence of each was without concert, if such several neglects concurred and united together in causing injury, the tort is equally joint, and the tortfeasors are subject to a like liability.' As we shall demonstrate, there was evidence of negligence attributable to Tears. We find that there was also evidence from which negligence on part of the defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, could be inferred. There was evidence, although slight and disputed by the defendants, that the truck could have been removed from the traveled surface of the highway. There was evidence that this was not attempted. Negligence may consist of inaction. Bohn v. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co., 16 N.J. 180, 186 (1954). And it may be observed that negligence may result from conduct which `creates a situation which involves an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other   '. See Brody v. Albert Lifson & Sons, 17 N.J. 383, 389 (1955). There was evidence that the intersection at which the truck had stopped was illuminated by overhead arc lights, but the atmospheric conditions and time of day combined to produce a dark night, with rain; a dispute of fact as to the extent of the rain, and consequent reduction of visibility, existed. There was a dispute in the evidence as to whether the truck itself was illuminated, although the evidence demonstrates that it was carrying red reflectors and a white sign observable by persons approaching it from the rear. There was testimony that it carried one taillight located under the tailboard on the left side. There was evidence that an employee of the corporate defendant used a white spot light or flashlight to signal vehicles approaching the truck from the rear, including Tears' vehicle. There was contradictory testimony as to the scope of this effort to warn motorists, including Tears. There was also evidence that the truck was equipped with radio communication equipment and that no attempt was made to use it to obtain assistance. In addition there was evidence that the truck crew set out no flares although it had four or five minutes in which to do so. The truck crew had no flares on hand, the crew having left its three flares at a work location in Keansburg, the last point of work before it proceeded to the scene where the collision occurred. In this respect the trial court instructed the jury in the language of R.S. 39:3-64, as amended by L. 1947, c. 82, sec. 1, relative to emergency warning light equipment. R.S. 39:3-64, as amended, supra, required commercial motor vehicles weighing over 5,000 pounds (the evidence places the truck owned by the corporate defendant in this category) to carry ready for immediate use    at least three portable flares, electric lanterns, red reflector emergency warning devices, or other devices each capable of producing a warning visible from a distance of at least five hundred feet for a period of at least twelve hours    and detailed the use of the same when the vehicles were disabled and could not be removed from the highway, including the placement of one in the center of the lane of traffic occupied by the vehicle at an approximate distance of 100 feet to the rear, and one at the traffic side of the vehicle. These provisions applied on any highway, outside of a business or residence district. The defendants Jersey Central and Walling contended that the statute was not applicable because the evidence disclosed that the area in which the collision occurred was a residence district. Testimony of various witnesses was in dispute as to the conclusion whether the area was a residence district. The statutory terms, however, were subject to definition by the court under the express definition accorded them in the pertinent legislation. The collision occurred August 31, 1952. At that time the pertinent statute included the following definitions ( R.S. 39:1-1, as amended L. 1951, c. 25, sec. 1): `Business district' means that portion of a highway and the territory contiguous thereto, where within any six hundred feet along such highway there are buildings in use for business or industrial purposes, including but not limited to hotels, banks, office buildings, railroad stations, and public buildings which occupy at least three hundred feet of frontage on one side or three hundred feet collectively on both sides of the roadway. `Residence district' means that portion of a highway and the territory contiguous thereto, not comprising a business district, where within any six hundred feet along such highway there are buildings in use for business or residential purposes which occupy three hundred feet or more of frontage on at least one side of the highway. There was testimony demonstrating that the area of Route 36 in question was neither a residence district nor a business district within the statutory definitions above quoted. The evidence relating to the status of the location justified a charge to the effect that it was obligatory for Jersey Central and Walling to comply with the provisions of R.S. 39:3-64, as amended, supra. Of this more will be said in connection with Tears' appeal. It suffices that the statute was applicable and therefore the manner of its presentation to the jury was not prejudicial to substantial rights of the defendants Jersey Central and Walling. The defendants Jersey Central and Walling argued on this appeal that Melone did not plead their alleged violation of the statute relating to warning devices, as an element of negligence on the part of these defendants. The complaint alleged there were no warning signals of any kind, manual or mechanical, to advise of the presence of said truck, parked in the nigh(t) time on said highway. The pretrial order reiterated these allegations in substance. R.R. 4:8-1 in this respect requires only the pleading of the facts on which a claim is based showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. A pleading is required to be such as fairly to apprise the adverse party of the state of facts which it is intended to prove. R.R. 4:9-3. The objective of the present practice is to reach an issue through the media of simplified pleadings, but not at the sacrifice of stating the elements of a claim. Anderson v. Modica, 4 N.J. 383, 393, 394 (1950). Civil Procedure Form 9, a model form of a complaint in a negligence action, suggests brevity is desirable. It has been inferred that this form requires nothing more than the date, name of the street, city and state where the accident occurred, plaintiff's mission at the moment of impact and the charge that the impact was caused negligently, although allegations of particulars continue to be common practice. Schnitzer & Wildstein, N.J. Rules Serv. AIV -143, 144. We do not decide the various circumstances which would call for more detailed pleadings, but observe in passing that where a statute creates a cause of action there may be a necessity for the pleading of it. Ibid., AIV -145. It must not be forgotten that the aim of the rules is substantial justice, and that All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. R.R. 4:8-6. Cf. C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. National Newark, etc., Banking Co., 14 N.J. 146, 155-156 (1953). There is authority to the effect that: It is usually sufficient in automobile cases to allege the particular conduct relied on as constituting a ground for recovery, without reference to statutory provisions claimed to have been violated by such conduct. 9B Blashfield's Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (1954, Bandy ), sec. 5952, pp. 101 et seq. In this respect no objection was asserted by defendants Jersey Central and Walling during the reception of evidence nor after the trial court instructed the jury in reference to the statute, R.S. 39:3-64, as amended, supra. The trial court, before the retirement of the jury, asked counsel whether they had omitted anything else you gentlemen feel I should include. These defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, during the subsequent colloquy, referred only to the definition of residence district as charged. And after the jury retired the trial court received further objections from these defendants, not one of which found fault with the application of the statute to them, but only with the part of the charge wherein the trial court left the determination of the character of the area to the jury. In this respect, as hereinbefore stated, we find no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendants Jersey Central and Walling. In summary, we find that there was evidence from which reasonable men could infer that the defendants Jersey Central and Walling were negligent and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence within the purview of R.R. 1:5-3( a ), as amended, supra. The further contention was made that the evidence conclusively shows that the negligence of Tears was the sole proximate cause of the collision. Tears, the operator of the automobile in which Melone was riding, as a witness for Melone testified the overhead (street) light showed him the truck when he (Tears) was 200 feet away. Tears further testified: that he saw this truck soon after he rounded the bend in the highway; a second or two afterwards he saw the red reflectors on the rear of the truck; he was moving at 30 to 35 miles per hour and applied his brakes, slowing the car; he saw a man in the highway waving a flashlight; when he was approximately 100 feet from the truck; he didn't reduce speed perceptibly but prepared to pass; when he was approximately one or two car lengths from the truck, two men appeared in the other lane ( i.e., the one he was moving into to pass). He testified there was no reason to stop before that. Ordinarily, the comparison and determination of alleged plural or concurrent causes falls within the province of the jury. Green, Proximate Cause, (1927), pp. 143-144. Where there is a factual dispute as to the events and circumstances which caused the injuries, proximate cause is a jury question. Vadurro v. Yellow Cab Co. of Camden, 6 N.J. 102, 108 (1951). Cf. Battaglia v. Norton, 16 N.J. 171, 179 (1954). We are of the opinion that proximate cause, of concurrent nature, was properly submitted to the jury under the circumstances of this case. The defendants Jersey Central and Walling also asserted that Melone was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Melone's own testimony was: that Tears was driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour; Tears was driving in a very normal fashion considering the hard rain and nothing in the driving caused Melone to protest; Melone wasn't paying much attention and noticed the truck only when Tears yelled; Melone had been just sitting there nonchalantly. Melone's testimony as to absence of lights on the truck was equivocal. The general rule as to a passenger is that he is bound to exercise such care for his own safety as the exigencies of the situation require. Kaufman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 2 N.J. 318, 323 (1949). In the Kaufman case, supra, the court held (2 N.J., at page 323): The duty of an invitee to warn the driver is only of a known and appreciated peril if a reasonably prudent person would have given such warning under the same or similar circumstances, and the risk could thereby have been averted. We are not convinced that Melone's conduct under the circumstances of this case was such that no reasonably debatable issue existed as to his alleged contributory negligence. It was properly left to the jury for determination and we do not find that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence within the review procedure prescribed by R.R. 1:5-3( a ), as amended, supra. See for example Gudnestad v. Seaboard Coal Dock Co., 15 N.J. 210, 222-223 (1954). Cf. Battaglia v. Norton, supra (16 N.J., at page 179); Shappell v. Apex Express, Inc., 131 N.J.L. 583, 587 ( E. & A. 1944).