Opinion ID: 1110109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the act precludes a suit brought in state court for fraudulent misrepresentations made by cmg to the cooks after ernie's vaccination.

Text: ¶ 16. CMG's argument is quite simple: given the plain language of the Act under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A), Ernie, by and through his parents, failed to first file a petition and exhaust the federal remedial system before filing suit in state court. CMG contends that fraudulent misrepresentation falls under the purview of the Act. The disputed language states: No person may bring a civil action for damages ... against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer in a State or Federal court for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine... unless a petition has been filed in accordance with section 300aa-16 of this title, for compensation under the Program for such injury or death and (i)(I) the United States Court of Federal Claims has issued a judgment under section 300aa-12 of this title on such petition, and (II) such person elects under section 300aa-21(a) of this title to file such an action, or (ii) such person elects to withdraw such petition under section 300aa-21(b) of this title or such petition is considered withdrawn under such section. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). ¶ 17. The Cooks and Ernie equally argue that the plain language clearly does not bar a suit for fraudulent misrepresentation in this instance because the alleged illegal conduct took place after the vaccination of Ernie, for a period extending over several years, and that several doctors, beyond the one who actually inoculated Ernie (the doctor who gave Ernie the vaccine is in fact unknown at this time), were involved in the deceit. The Cooks' specifically point out that theirs is a suit for fraud, not medical malpractice. ¶ 18. The Court faces the issue whether a suit for fraudulent misrepresentation is a civil action ... against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer ... for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury... associated with the administration of a vaccine. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). This Court has a duty to give statutes a practical application consistent with their wording, unless such application is inconsistent with the obvious intent of the legislature. Marx v. Broom, 632 So.2d 1315, 1318 (Miss.1994). Consequently, if a statute is not ambiguous, the court should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning.... City of Natchez v. Sullivan, 612 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Miss.1992). ¶ 19. Under § 11(a)(2)(A) a suit is a civil action only if it is brought against a vaccine manufacturer or administrator. Federal courts have unequivocally supported this definition. See Schumacher v. Secretary of Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2 F.3d 1128, 1132-34 ( Fed.Cir. 1993); see also Klahn v. Secretary of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 31 Fed.Cl. 382, 388 (1994). The instant case clearly does not involve a vaccine manufacturer, and the administrator is unknown. For purposes of the Act, an administrator is the one who actually inoculates the individual. Klahn, 31 Fed.Cl. at 389. Because CMG is being sued for the acts of its doctors as agents, the fact that the administrator of the vaccine is unknown is irrelevant. Ernie was vaccinated by an employee of CMG. Under the plain meaning of the Act, this is a civil action against a vaccine administrator. The analysis, however, must continue. ¶ 20. Not only must the civil action be against a vaccine administrator, the suit must be for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). This stipulation is further circumscribed by the requirement that the vaccine-related injury be associated with the administration of a vaccine. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). The damages sought in the instant case are as follows: 1) the award that would have been granted under the Act had CMG's fraudulent misrepresentations not time barred Ernie from filing; 2) past and future medical expenses incurred as a result of the vaccine-related injury; 3) emotional distress and mental anguish; and 4) punitive damages. The first claim for damages are claimed by Ernie, while the last three are claimed by his parents individually. ¶ 21. Under the plain language of the Act, the Court must examine the damages sought by the Cooks and determine if they arise from a vaccine-related injury. In simple language, the question is whether the damages sought resulted from Ernie's adverse reaction to the inoculation. The answer in the instant case is no. ¶ 22. Concerning the Cooks, the damages sought resulted from CMG's alleged intentional fraudulent misrepresentations, apart from the inoculation. The Cooks seek past and future medical expenses incurred as a result of the vaccine-related injury. This language suggests that they are in fact suing on the vaccine-related injury rather than on fraudulent misrepresentation. Upon closer inspection, however, this problem vanishes. ¶ 23. While the actual language used in the Cooks' complaint reflects the language used under the Act regarding recovery for past and future medical expenses, under Mississippi law, recovery for medical expenses associated with a child's injuries are properly recoverable by the parents; thus in state court, a claim for such expenses properly belongs to the parents. Lane v. Webb, 220 So.2d 281, 286 (Miss.1969). Double recovery would not be allowed for past and future medical expenses. Either Ernie or his parents would be allowed to recover medical expenses. Id. ¶ 24. Recovery for emotional distress and mental anguish, as well as punitive damages, is allowed for fraud cases. T.G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So.2d 481, 485 (Miss.1972). Allegedly, CMG's fraudulent misrepresentations allowed the Cooks to continue to believe that their child was progressing normally, while the reality was that Ernie suffered from autism. The damages sought by the Cooks stems from the alleged intentional fraudulent misrepresentations of CMG and not from the autistic injury received by Ernie as a result of his vaccinations. ¶ 25. At its core, the basis of the suit is the breach of CMG's fiduciary duty not to deceive its patients. A fraud cause of action, and the Act do not regulate the same activity. A fraud action permits the recovery of damages attributable to reliance upon an intentional misrepresentation. The Act provides a vehicle for the recovery of damages resulting from a vaccine related-injury associated with the administration of a vaccine. Although the alleged misrepresentation may be in regard to a vaccine-related injury, the wrong endeavored to be rectified is not the subject of the misrepresentation but the act of the misrepresentation itself. ¶ 26. The suit by the Cooks is not based on Ernie's injury from the inoculation; thus, in this instance, the Cooks' intentional fraudulent misrepresentation suit is not for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury associated with the administration of a vaccine. As such, the instant case is beyond the scope of the Act and should be allowed to proceed in state court. ¶ 27. Not only is fraud beyond the scope of the Act, but the Cooks themselves would not be under the purview of the Act in this instance. The Cooks, as parents of a child who suffered a vaccine-related injury, may not individually file a petition under the Act; therefore, they may file a claim in state court. This issue has clearly been answered by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: First, one cannot easily interpret the statute as Cyanamid wishes, for the Act has no language at all that one might read as creating a bar to the type of suit before us. To the contrary, the Act subsection that creates the tort action bar says that it does not apply to this kind of lawsuit. The language that creates the bar, § 300aa-11(a), says: [n]o person may bring a civil action for damages (except in accordance with the Act's Vaccine-Court-related rules) until a Vaccine Court petition has been filed. It then states specifically that this subsection (i.e. the subsection with the tort action bar): applies only to a person who has sustained a vaccine-related injury or death and who is qualified to file a petition for compensation under the Program. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(9) (emphasis added). A person is qualified to file a petition only if that person suffered a relevant injury or death after he or she received a vaccine ... or contracted polio from another person who received an oral polio vaccine. Id. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(A). That is to say, unless a person received a vaccine or ... caught polio from someone who did (or is the legal representative of such a person), he cannot file a petition. See, e.g., Head v. Secretary of [Dept. of] Health and Human Servs., 26 Cl.Ct. 546, 547 n. 1 (1992) (parent of injured child cannot petition except in representative capacity), aff'd, 996 F.2d 318[, 1993 WL 113714] (Fed.Cir.1993). And, if he cannot file a petition with the Vaccine Court, the Act says that its tort suit ban does not apply to him. Schafer v. American Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1994). Schafer speaks clearly to the instant case. The Cooks did not receive a vaccine and therefore, are not qualified to individually file a petition under the Act. Consequently, they may bring an action in state court. ¶ 28. While CMG's motion for summary judgment was the proper motion regarding the Cooks' claims, the circuit court improperly granted the motion, whether viewed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or upon the merits. Therefore, the decision of the circuit court to grant CMG's motion for summary judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for a trial on the merits.