Opinion ID: 1384933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did certain communications between the court and jury prevent zinn from receiving a fair trial?

Text: While the jury was deliberating, the jurors sent several written questions to the court. During the time that five of these questions were presented to and answered by the court, Zinn was not present because his attorney had waived his presence. On appeal, Zinn does not challenge the propriety of the court's answers. Instead, he challenges the State's attempted rebuttal of the prejudice presumed by his absence. On the day after the jury was excused (October 1, 1986), we issued our decision in Hovey v. State, 104 N.M. 667, 726 P.2d 344 (1986), in which we held that there is a presumption of prejudice in the precise situation which arose here, and that the State bears the burden of rebutting the prejudice by showing on the record that the communication did not affect the jury's verdict. The State attempted to do just that, first by presenting testimony from the foreperson, and then by introducing two affidavits signed by all the jurors. In the first affidavit each juror swore as follows: 1. None of the answers to any of the questions effected (sic) the deliberations concerning the murder counts or resulted in a conviction on those counts. 2. No answers received on our questions resulted in the change of our vote on any count. 3. None of the answers, except the definition of a credit card, contributed to or resulted in a conviction on any count and that definition effected (sic) only the Fraudulent (sic) use of a credit card count and not other counts. In the second affidavit each juror swore as follows: 1. None of the answers received resulted in any new discussion or any new areas of discussion. 2. None of the answers received by us resulted in a revote on any of the counts. 3. None of the answers to any questions were discussed during the deliberations on the murder counts. For clarification, we note that the third statement in the first affidavit resulted from a required response to the jury's question concerning the definition of a credit card as provided in SCRA 1986, 14-1689. Zinn does not challenge the trial court's response as given. We conclude that the court correctly ruled that Zinn did not effectively waive his right to be present during the various communications between the court and jury. This was in keeping with Hovey. The next question is whether the State effectively rebutted the prejudice which arose. Zinn contends the State did not, on the strength of State v. McClure, 94 N.M. 440, 612 P.2d 232 (Ct.App. 1980), arguing that because the State did not show that the improper communication occurred after the jury was `ready to return a verdict,' (citations omitted), id. at 442, 612 P.2d at 234, the State's affidavits avail nothing. We disagree. One method by which the State could have rebutted the prejudice would have been by doing as Zinn argues, but that was not the only method by which the State could have rebutted the prejudice. The underlying purpose of the court's ruling in McClure was to establish a situation in which the jury's verdict was not affected by the communication: [T]o overcome the presumption the State must show that the comunication did not affect the verdict. Id. at 442, 612 P.2d 234. Here, while the State did not show that the communication between court and jury occurred after the jury was ready to return a verdict, it nonetheless showed that the communication, except in the understandable instance of the credit card definition, did not affect the verdict. Zinn argues further, however, that the testimony elicited from the foreperson, and the affidavits signed by all the jurors, were received into evidence contrary to the provisions of SCRA 1986, 11-606(B). That section reads as follows: Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about what he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes. Zinn would put the State in a double bind. He argues that the State must rebut the prejudice which arose as a result of the communications in question. Yet, if the State attempts to rebut that prejudice, even, let us assume, by showing that the jury had already agreed on its verdict, how is the State to meet its burden except by making an inquiry into the effect which the court's answers had on the jury? The purpose of SCRA 1986, 11-606(B) is to prevent tampering and harrassment of the jury and inquiry into its deliberations to the end of casting doubt on the jury's competence. State v. Barela, 91 N.M. 634, 578 P.2d 335 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 610, 577 P.2d 1256 (1978). The State did not contravene that purpose here. Further, it should be kept in mind that SCRA 1986, 11-606(B) is a rule of evidence and not a rule of procedure taking on constitutional dimensions, as Zinn apparently would have it. Like any rule of evidence, this one too may be waived. Zinn raised no objection at trial either to the State's introduction of the foreperson's testimony or of the affidavits, and thus he may not be heard now to object to the introduction of that evidence.