Opinion ID: 44626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Benkiser's Declaration Is Unconstitutional as Applied Under the Qualifications Clause

Text: 25 As the parties agree, the Qualifications Clause is exclusive and cannot be enlarged by the states. 9 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 131 L.Ed.2d 881 (1995) ([T]he text and structure of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and, most importantly, the `basic principles of our democratic system' all demonstrate that the Qualifications Clauses were intended to preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.). The plain language of the inhabitancy requirement of the Qualifications Clause shows that a candidate for the House of Representatives must only be an inhabitant of the state when elected. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. 26 Moreover, there is ample evidence suggesting that the Framers deliberately chose to use the when elected language. As explained by the district court, records from the constitutional convention show that the Framers debated whether to include lengthy inhabitancy requirements. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 217-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). Delegates considered seven-year, three-year, and one-year requirements and rejected all three. Id. The position is further buttressed by an 1808 case in which Congress considered the election of a Representative who moved to Maryland a mere two weeks before the election. CASES OF CONTESTED ELECTIONS IN CONGRESS 224 (M. Clarke & D. Hall eds. 1834) (discussing Sundry Electors v. Key, case XXVIII). Congress found that the Representative was qualified, given that he was an inhabitant of the state as of election day. Id. at 233. 27 When Benkiser reviewed the public records sent by DeLay and concluded that his residency in Virginia made him ineligible, she unconstitutionally created a pre-election inhabitancy requirement. The Qualifications Clause only requires inhabitancy when that candidate is elected. Given this language, Benkiser could not constitutionally find that DeLay was ineligible on June 7, the date she made her decision. 10 Therefore, her application of the ineligibility statute to DeLay was unconstitutional. 11 28 Our conclusion conforms with the Texas principle that [a]ny constitutional or statutory provision which restricts the right to hold office must be strictly construed against ineligibility. Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1992). In addition, it is supported by decisions in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits that struck down pre-election day residency requirements. Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir.2000); Campbell v. Davidson, 233 F.3d 1229, 1235 (10th Cir.2000). In Schaefer, relying on U.S. Term Limits and evidence of the Framers' intent, the Ninth Circuit held that a one-year pre-election residency requirement violates the Constitution by handicapping the class of nonresident candidates who otherwise satisfy the Qualifications Clause. 215 F.3d at 1037. The Tenth Circuit, in Campbell, struck down a Colorado law that, inter alia, required candidates to be residents of the state for at least thirty days. 233 F.3d at 1231-35. Like the Ninth Circuit, it relied on U.S. Term Limits and evidence of the Framers' intent. Id. at 1233 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)). 12 29 The RPT does not dispute that the Qualifications Clause requires inhabitancy on election day. Instead, the RPT argues that such a determination can be made prospectively in a procedural manner allowed by the Elections Clause. 30