Opinion ID: 352530
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal of instruction on misconduct of a fiduciary.

Text: 103 Summa next argues that the court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that proof of serious misconduct by a fiduciary, whether or not it was strictly criminal, would justify the slanderous utterance. The argument is that the court turned a defamation case, in which the defense of truth requires merely that the gist of the statement be proved, into a criminal proceeding by defining all the elements of the crime of theft and failing to define dishonesty in terms of what would amount to fiduciary misconduct. We do not think that this is what happened. 104 The instructions of which Summa complains cover three pages of the Reporter's transcript, and they were accurately summarized by the judge on the last of those pages as follows: 105 Just briefly, and I will repeat it, Summa is contending that the words uttered by Mr. Hughes mean that Mr. Maheu acted dishonestly. Maheu agrees that at the very least the words charge him with dishonest conduct. But, it is Maheu's contention that the words charge him with more than dishonesty, they charge him with criminal misconduct, theft. So Maheu has the burden of persuading the jury or convincing the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the words mean theft. 106 Now, if you are satisfied that the words mean theft, then Summa to prove truth has to prove theft. It is that simple. 107 But, on the other hand, if Maheu does not sustain the burden of proving that the words mean theft, then you are left with the charge of dishonesty, and Summa, to sustain its burden, then would have to show that Maheu acted dishonestly. 108 And all those burdens, of course, have to be satisfied by what we call a preponderance of the evidence, which I will define in a few moments for you. Is this clear to you, ladies and gentlemen? (R.T. pp. 12,592-93) 109 The jury was also instructed on principal-agent and on non-agency contractual relationships and duties for their consideration in determining whether Maheu acted dishonestly, if they had decided that that was the gist of the statement. The final choice as to the meaning of the words was left to the jury; and the instructions on the law applicable to each of the two possible interpretations were correct. 110