Opinion ID: 198294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Prior Dispositions

Text: 61 Ortiz-Baez, Reyes-Padilla, and Moises Candelaria-Silva contend that the district court erred in prohibiting them from presenting evidence about the prior dispositions of certain local criminal charges relating to conduct involved in the charged conspiracy. Specifically, the defendants argue that the court's decision prohibited them from presenting a defense. We agree with the district court that the prior dispositions were not admissible. 62 In deciding this issue, the district court explained that the local prosecutions were not relevant to this prosecution because possible explanations for the early dismissals included lack of evidence, unavailability of witnesses, sloppy presentation by the state prosecutors, irresponsible legal determinations, and the sort. 9/14/95 Order at 3. Furthermore, the district court rejected the defendants' arguments as a disguised attempt to argue a double jeopardy defense before the jury. Id. at 4. The district court's order was proper and in accordance with this Court's recent decision in United States v. Smith, 145 F.3d 458, 461 (1st Cir.1998), holding that an acquittal instruction is not required when evidence of acquitted conduct is introduced. 63 In Smith, a defendant, indicted for a drug offense and a tax offense, was acquitted of the drug offense after a trial on that charge alone. During the subsequent trial on the tax offense, the government presented evidence of drug trafficking to demonstrate receipt of income that was not reported to the IRS. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to inform the jury of his acquittal on the drug charge and in barring his cross-examination of prosecution witnesses on their knowledge of that acquittal. The defendant in Smith, like the defendants in this case, relied on language in the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S.Ct. 668, 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), to support this position. In Dowling, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant had been acquitted of robbing a witness and the witness's testimony was admitted for a limited purpose. As we noted when rejecting the defendant's argument in Smith, however, the sentence in Dowling that begins, 'Especially in light of the limiting instructions' does not identify the language to which 'limiting instruction' refers. Smith, 145 F.3d at 461. Furthermore, since an instruction was given in Dowling, the Supreme Court did not decide the exclusion issue. See Smith 145 F.3d at 461. 64 The reasons supporting exclusion of evidence about the dismissal of a prior prosecution are even stronger than those that support exclusion with respect to a prior acquittal. As the district court noted, cases are dismissed for many reasons unrelated to the defendant's guilt. The introduction of evidence of a dismissal could well mislead the jury into thinking that a defendant was innocent of the dismissed charge when no such determination has been made.