Opinion ID: 1179653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Disqualification of the Board including the Investigatory Officer

Text: The decision as to whether the Board members and the investigatory officer should be disqualified will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Osage Implement Co. v. Bottrell, 363 P.2d 940 (Okla.1961). In this case, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. This Court has consistently held and due process requires every litigant receive a decision that is the result of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Sadberry v. Wilson, 441 P.2d 381, 382, 384 (Okla.1968); Craig v. Walker, 824 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Okla. 1992). Likewise, the Oklahoma Statutes require an agency member to withdraw from any individual proceeding in which [the member] cannot accord a fair and impartial hearing or consideration. Okla.Stat. tit. 75, § 316 (1991). When circumstances and conditions surrounding litigation are of such a nature that they might cast doubt and question as to the impartiality of any judgment the trial judge may pronounce, said judge should certify his disqualification. Sadberry, 441 P.2d at 384 (quoting Callaham v. Childers, 186 Okla. 504, 99 P.2d 126, 128 (1940)). This is an objective standard and is not dependent on the judge's belief. Merritt v. Hunter, 575 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla.1978). In Merritt, the respondent judge traveled to Kansas to testify in a hearing involving at least one of the parties who was appearing in a matter before him. In holding the judge had abused his discretion by not disqualifying himself, this Court stated: Although we do not doubt Respondent's good intentions in making such an appearance in the Kansas Court, we have consistently held that even though a judge personally believes himself to be unprejudiced, unbiased and impartial, [that judge] should [enter a disqualification] where there are circumstances of such a nature to cause doubt as to his partiality, bias or prejudice. Id. This rule applies equally to administrative boards acting in an adjudicatory capacity as it does to judges. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). The evidentiary material presented in the trial court shows the Board abdicated its decision-making responsibilities to Dr. Farley rather than examining the allegations and coming to a conclusion of its own. The Board allowed Dr. Farley to make decisions beyond his authority. Among other things the Board allowed Dr. Farley to issue the formal complaint without action by the Board and to determine the hearing dates. Later, the Board set a disciplinary hearing in violation of an injunction by the district court. These actions were in violation of the statutes, Board rules, and a court order. Dr. Johnson argues the Board should have automatically disqualified itself from hearing the case against him when it was named as a defendant in the actions he filed against it. Under this argument, any time a litigant is unhappy with a judge's decision that litigant could file an action against the judge and the judge would be disqualified. While we cannot agree such a situation results in automatic disqualification, it is a factor which might reflect on the appearance of bias by the Board. Taking into consideration all of the evidentiary material before the trial judge, we cannot say he abused his discretion in disqualifying the Board from hearing the proceedings against Dr. Johnson.
Although Dr. Farley is prohibited by the Board's own rule from sitting as an adjudicator during the hearing, Board of Governors of Registered Dentists Rule 195:3-1-2(b) (1992), he investigated the allegations, made recommendations to the Board, and in fact made decisions that were within the Board's providence, and ruled on prehearing motions. As Investigatory Officer, Dr. Farley was required to determine all issues of procedure and motions prior to the actual commencement of the hearing before the Board. . . . Id. at Rule 195:3-1-2(e). Being in the same geographical region, Dr. Farley is a competitor, albeit not a close competitor, of Dr. Johnson and thus has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings. It is presumed someone who has a financial interest in the outcome of a decision, even a pretrial decision, cannot render a decision with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held, because of a pecuniary interest in the decision, the mayor of the town, who was responsible for the town's finances which were derived in part from fines, was not an impartial judge as required by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to adjudicate matters which would result in a fine. The nexus in this case is even less attenuated than the nexus in Ward. The Board most likely recognized the conflict when it exempted the investigatory officer who was from the same district as the subject of the investigation from sitting as an adjudicator. Because of his pecuniary interest in the outcome, Dr. Farley should not act as an adjudicator even on pretrial motions. While the same strict requirements applicable to adjudicators do not apply to administrative prosecutors, serious due process implications arise when the investigator and prosecutor have a personal financial interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 250, 100 S.Ct. at 1617. As the trial judge noted, these constitutional ramifications could easily be avoided by selecting an investigatory and prosecutorial officer from a different region than the subject of the investigation. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Dr. Farley from the proceedings as an investigator, prosecutor, and hearing officer on pretrial motions.