Opinion ID: 2365387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Exclusion of Civil Complaint

Text: At sentencing, defendant moved to admit a civil complaint filed by Jane Norcross against the Camden County Prosecutor, which alleged that inadequate training was a proximate cause of the death of her husband, Officer John Norcross. The sentencing court denied defendant's motion. Defendant now argues that the court erred in refusing to admit the complaint because it prohibited her from presenting the jury with evidence directly relevant to the inadequate-training mitigator, and [that] also would have recountered the State's attack on the mitigating factor. We disagree. In Nelson I, supra, we reversed defendant's death sentence due to the failure of the prosecution to disclose the civil complaint of Richard Norcross. 155 N.J. at 501, 715 A. 2d 281. There the civil complaint was relevant, admissible evidence that defendant could have used to support her case in mitigation because it lent support to her contention that the police were inadequately trained. Id. at 500, 715 A. 2d 281. In the present appeal, defendant contends that Jane Norcross' civil complaint against the prosecutor was relevant to her mitigation claim because the complaint alleged inadequate training as the proximate cause of Officer Norcross's death. However, unlike Richard Norcross, Jane Norcross was neither a key witness to the events on the day of the crime, nor was she a trained officer. When compared to the opinion of Richard Norcross, the probative value of Jane Norcross's opinion was quite low. Thus, because her opinion of what occurred that day is of little value, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the complaint. Even if the court's refusal to admit the complaint was error, that error was harmless because the evidence could not have substantially altered deliberations. The jury already had before it Richard Norcross's complaint and testimony from Gelles on the inadequate training of the police. Defendant also asserts that the civil complaint should have been admitted to counter the victim impact statement of Jane Norcross. According to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6), the State may rebut, or counter the weight of, a defendant's character or record evidence by presenting victim impact testimony. However, the State will not be permitted to elicit testimony concerning the victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 47, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996). This limitation applies not only to the State's elicitation of certain testimony, but also to victim impact testimony generally. Koskovich, supra, 168 N.J. at 502, 776 A. 2d 144 (stating that Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed. 2d 720 (1991), left undisturbed the holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed. 2d 440 (1987), that the admission of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence violated the Eighth Amendment) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Jane Norcross's victim impact statement discussed only her husband's character, interests, education, employment, and the impact of his death on her life. She did not offer an opinion about defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence. Thus, her civil complaint against the prosecutor's office would not have been the appropriate vehicle for defendant to rebut the State's presentation of the victim impact testimony. We note that defendant did not raise the issue whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury, pursuant to Koskovich, supra, not to draw any inferences from the victim impact statement in respect of the witness's preference or non preference for the death penalty. 168 N.J. at 503, 776 A. 2d 144. However, even if the jury assumed that Jane Norcross implied in her victim impact statement that she preferred the death penalty, the problem would not be the exclusion of her complaint. It still would be improper for the jury to consider the victim's opinion about the circumstances of the crime, and therefore impermissible to consider any rebuttal evidence in respect of that opinion. Further, the sentencing judge instructed the jury to consider the victim impact statement only in determining the weight of the mitigating factors regarding defendant's character or record and not the aggravating factors.