Opinion ID: 200396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reworking the Algorithm.

Text: 59 From this analysis, it is evident that the district court erred in constructing the first Beecher variable. In order to determine whether that error affected the Candidates' substantial rights, see Fed. R.Civ.P. 61, we rework the algorithm using the proper variables. If that algorithm does not yield ratios that show parity (or, at least, rough parity) between the percentage of minorities in the entry-level rank of the BFD and the percentage of minorities in the City of Boston as a whole, then the entry of summary judgment in the City's favor must stand. See Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that a grant of summary judgment may be affirmed on any independent ground revealed by the record). 60 On this issue, the parties urging that parity has been achieved (here, the Candidates) bear the burden of proof. See C.K. Smith & Co., Inc. v. Motiva Enter. LLC, 269 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir.2001). That is of purely academic interest in this case for the pertinent facts are uncontradicted. The court below developed the factual record sufficiently to demonstrate that, when the City recruited the 2000 hiring class, blacks and Hispanics comprised approximately 40% of the firefighters within the BFD. At the same time, blacks and Hispanics constituted slightly over 38% of Boston's overall population. Quinn, 204 F.Supp.2d at 162. Hence, parity had been achieved, and the City had become eligible for release from the strictures of the Beecher decree. See Beecher II, 504 F.2d at 1026-27. 61 Given these facts, the district court's error was not harmless. After all, a public employer who consents to the use of race as a factor in order to palliate the lingering effects of past discrimination must maintain continuous oversight in order to ensure that the decree works the least possible harm to other innocent persons competing for employment. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Once parity has been achieved, the decree has served its legitimate purpose, and the justification for it has abated. See id. at 309, 98 S.Ct. 2733. From that point forward, the employer has no basis to continue preferring minorities. See id.; see also Mackin, 969 F.2d at 1276 (An intrusion by a federal court into the affairs of local government should be kept to a bare minimum and not be allowed to continue after the violation has abated and its pernicious effects have been cured.). 62 We conclude, therefore, that the City's continued resort to race-based preferences from and after the time when parity was achieved fails the second prong of the strict scrutiny analysis. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309, 98 S.Ct. 2733. Thus, the City's adherence to the Beecher decree during the 2000 hiring cycle was unconstitutional. Consistent with the foregoing, we reverse the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the City and direct the court to enter judgment in the Candidates' favor.