Opinion ID: 1591852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in dismissing donald's motion for visitation?

Text: A court may, on its own initiative, dismiss a complaint under SDCL 15-6-12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See, K/O Ranch, Inc. v. Norwest Bank of Black Hills, 748 F.2d 1246 (8th Cir.1984); Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.1982). If, on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, matters outside the pleadings are presented to, and not excluded by, the trial court, the motion should be treated as one for summary judgment. Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian School, 438 N.W.2d 204 (S.D.1989) ( citing SDCL 15-6-12(b)). Thus, in Glanzer, supra, where the record indicated that matters outside the pleadings were presented to, and considered by the trial court in dismissing the case, this court reviewed the dismissal under the rules applicable to summary judgment. Donald contends that factual matters outside the pleadings were submitted to the trial court in Tamera's brief. As a consequence, Donald argues that the trial court erred in not converting the dismissal proceeding to a summary judgment proceeding. He argues this denied him an opportunity to present the trial court with additional matters pertinent to his claim. We disagree. While extraneous matters were submitted to the trial court in Tamera's brief, the only matters pertinent to the ultimate decision were contained in the pleadings, i.e., that Donald is a nonparent seeking visitation rights with a minor child. This fact is clear from Tamera's original petition for a protection order and is not disputed on appeal. Thus, although extraneous matters may have been submitted, the record is clear that, in contrast with Glanzer, the extraneous matters were not relevant to the trial court's ultimate legal determination that nonparents have no visitation rights with minor children. Thus, the trial court did not err in failing to convert the dismissal proceeding to one for summary judgment. Such a conversion would have served no useful purpose as the key facts relevant to the trial court's decision were contained in the pleadings and were not disputed. Donald contends that he should have been afforded the opportunity to present facts establishing that he was a de facto parent to Tamera's son or that he stood in loco parentis [1] to the boy. He argues that proof of these facts would have established his claim for visitation rights with the child. [2] This court has not spoken directly to the issue of the visitation rights of a nonparent. However, [t]he right of visitation derives from the right of custody and is controlled by the same legal principles. 59 Am.Jur.2d Parent and Child § 36 (1987). This court has spoken to the custodial rights of nonparents. Before a parent's right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed in favor of a nonparent a clear showing against the parent of gross misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child is required, and an award cannot be made to [nonparents] simply because they may be better custodians. Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669, 670 (S.D.1983). Accord, Langerman v. Langerman, 321 N.W.2d 532 (S.D.1982). It follows that in order to grant a nonparent visitation rights with a minor child over the wishes of a parent, a clear showing against the parent of gross misconduct, unfitness or other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child is required. [3] A similar test was employed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724 (D.C.1962). In Jackson, a grandparent sought custody or visitation rights with a four-year-old grandchild against the wishes of the child's father. As in this case, the lower court dismissed the grandparent's complaint for failure to state a claim. The substance of the complaint was that the child and its mother had lived with the grandparent for a period of time, that during that time the grandparent expended considerable money for the support of the child and devoted much care and attention to it and that the child would benefit by the grandparent's companionship. There was, however, no charge in the complaint of parental unfitness or misconduct. In upholding the dismissal, the D.C. Court stated: In the absence of any charge of unfitness or misconduct, there was plainly no basis for disturbing the father's right to custody. And, logically, the same must be said as to the claim for visitation rights. The right of visitation derives from the right to custody. The court could not award the plaintiff visitation rights without impinging on the father's vested right of custody. And that could not be done on the basis of the barren complaint we have described. Jackson, 185 A.2d at 725-26. See also, Chodzko v. Chodzko, 66 Ill.2d 28, 4 Ill.Dec. 313, 360 N.E.2d 60 (1976) (right to determine third parties who have visitation privileges with children should vest with parent who has responsibility of rearing children and normally should not be a judicial concern). Like the complaint in Jackson, Donald's motion for visitation contained no charge that Tamera was unfit or guilty of misconduct nor was there any allegation of unusual circumstances. The motion merely alleged that Donald helped raise Tamera's son and that having assumed part of that responsibility he should be granted the opportunity to visit the boy. Thus, as in Jackson and under the settled law of Langerman, the trial court appropriately dismissed Donald's motion for failure to state a claim. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, HENDERSON and SABERS, JJ., and HERTZ, Circuit Judge, acting as a Supreme Court Justice, participating. AMUNDSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this action was submitted did not participate.