Opinion ID: 2117993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invalidity of the Search Warrant

Text: In Callender v. State (1922), 193 Ind. 91, 138 N.E. 817, this Court held that evidence gained as a result of a constitutionally invalid search and seizure of property would not be admissible in a subsequent prosecution. This decision predated by approximately 40 years the United States Supreme Court opinion of Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, which required the states to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. These two cases have been consistently followed by this Court to suppress evidence gained as a result of an unconstitutional search and seizure. We most recently recognized this principle in Benefiel v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 338, cert. den. (1992), ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2971, 119 L.Ed.2d 591, and Everroad v. State (1992), Ind., 590 N.E.2d 567. In Benefiel v. State , we recognized the above-cited principle as well as an exception to that principle in a situation where the search is conducted under emergency circumstances involving injury or imminent danger to a person's life. However, in Benefiel we reiterated the general rule of law that if the affidavits presented to the trial judge requesting a search warrant contained second-hand hearsay information, it would be insufficient as far as search for property was concerned. 578 N.E.2d at 344. Most recently, in Everroad v. State , we discussed the effect of an affidavit for probable cause based on hearsay and held that a search warrant could be based on hearsay only if the affidavit contained either reliable information establishing the credibility of the source and of each of the declarants of the hearsay and establishing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished or information that establishes that the totality of the circumstances corroborates the hearsay. 590 N.E.2d at 570, quoting Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2(a-b). In Everroad, we held that neither of the above requirements was met and concluded that the hearsay mountain is insurmountable, and does not constitute probable cause. 590 N.E.2d at 571. We must reach the same conclusion here. A comparison of the recorded anonymous telephone call with the affidavit prepared by Houck reveals extreme discrepancies. In the search warrant affidavit, after describing the location to be searched, Houck swears there is probable cause to believe that certain property is concealed in [such location] which constitutes unlawfully obtained property, contraband, evidence of a crime or other illegal property. We hold that the information received by Houck from the anonymous call, combined with the information gathered by Houck as a result of his investigation, could not amount to probable cause to believe the above statement. The caller did not identify himself and did not establish his personal knowledge of any of the claims that he made concerning Dolliver's possession of narcotics. Based on the information available to Houck, it was equally conceivable that Dolliver was a drug dealer or that the caller was angry at Dolliver for the perceived effect that Dolliver may have had on the caller's sister and ex-girl friend. The fact that Dolliver lived in a trailer, drove a Cadillac and a four-wheel drive vehicle, and had been previously convicted of a crime clearly did not constitute probable cause to believe that the anonymous caller was telling the truth. Perhaps more investigation by the state police officer, such as placing Dolliver's residence under surveillance, may have eventually resulted in probable cause to believe that narcotics were contained in the trailer; but, simply stated, the evidence that Trooper Houck had available to him at the time he prepared the affidavit did not constitute probable cause. There are other discrepancies between the recorded telephone call and the search warrant affidavit. The affidavit states that the affiant had received information from a reliable and confidential informant which facts the informant stated were within his personal knowledge. The recorded anonymous call simply does not comport with this allegation. The anonymous phone caller was by no stretch of the imagination a reliable informant. The transcript reveals that, contrary to the affidavit, the caller did not state that he was at Dolliver's residence and did not state that he personally observed 40 pounds of marijuana and a kilo of cocaine as alleged in the affidavit. Clearly, when the facts in an affidavit requesting a search warrant are at such variance with the truth as revealed by the transcribed anonymous telephone call, a warrant issued pursuant to such affidavit is invalid. Equally obvious is that a search and seizure conducted pursuant to such invalid warrant violates the citizen's rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Here the affidavit stated that the confidential informant was reliable when, in fact, there was no basis to conclude that the anonymous caller was reliable. Also, the affidavit swears that this reliable, confidential informant made personal observations of large amounts of drugs when, in fact, the anonymous caller made no such representation. Dolliver's constitutional rights were violated when the search warrant was issued pursuant to this misleading and unsubstantiated affidavit.