Opinion ID: 791735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Statements Made Prior to Miranda Warning

Text: 15 Cervantes appeals the district court's refusal to suppress statements that he made before he received a Miranda warning. We review denial of a motion to suppress de novo, United States v. Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.1994), as well as whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes. United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir.2002). 16 Agent Wardlow had reasonable suspicion to stop Cervantes. While walking along a highway known to be a smuggling route approximately 40 miles north of the United States border, Cervantes saw Wardlow's marked vehicle and immediately turned and attempted to flee. Any number of factors may be taken into account in deciding whether there is reasonable suspicion to stop [someone] in the border area. . . . [B]ehavior may be relevant, as . . . obvious attempts to evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) ([I]t was not merely respondent's presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers' suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.). 17 Given that Wardlow had reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop, he could ask Cervantes questions reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An officer may question [individuals reasonably detained near the border] about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574. Wardlow asked Cervantes about his place of birth, his citizenship, whether he had permission to be in the United States and how he had crossed into the United States. These questions were reasonably limited in scope to determining whether Cervantes had crossed the border illegally. Cervantes sought to suppress only his statements made in response to Wardlow's questions, and he conceded no one asked him additional questions until after Agent Markle read him his Miranda rights. 18 By handcuffing Cervantes, Agent Wardlow did not convert the Terry stop into a custodial arrest. Handcuffing a suspect does not necessarily dictate a finding of custody. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir.1981). Where a suspect threatens physical danger or flight, officers may use handcuffs in the course of a Terry stop. See Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir.1996) ([W]e have only allowed the use of especially intrusive means of effecting a stop in special circumstances, such as. . . where the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight. . . .); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir.1982). Cervantes led Agent Wardlow on a chase away from his car into the desert. Doing so both increased the risk to Wardlow and demonstrated an intention to evade arrest. Under these circumstances, Wardlow's use of handcuffs was justified. 19 In sum, Wardlow had reasonable suspicion to make an initial Terry stop. He limited the scope of his questions to investigating that suspicion alone. His use of handcuffs was justified by Cervantes' flight and Wardlow's safety concern and thus did not convert the stop into a custodial arrest. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting the statements Cervantes made in response to Agent Wardlow's questions. 20