Opinion ID: 2054711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence and the Witnesses

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting eyeglasses into evidence, in admitting the hearsay telephone statements of the victim to her sister, in cutting short the testimony by appellant's aunt, and throughout its treatment of the defense psychiatrist, Dr. Schultz. The eyeglasses were identified by the victim's optician as resembling in every way those which were made for her. Her sisters said that they looked like those the victim used for driving. Police officers testified to the retrieval of the glasses from the hood of a wrecked car near where the victim's car was recovered. This was certainly enough to place their admissibility within the discretion of the trial judge. Ford v. United States, D.C.App., 396 A.2d 191, 196 (1978). Any arguments about the likelihood of someone else's glasses resembling those of the decedent could have been, and actually were, properly made to the jury. Appellant's current claim that the glasses entered into evidence were undamaged and could not be the damaged glasses originally retrieved by the police is without merit. Appellant's counsel himself noted at trial that one lens was missing from the glasses offered into evidence. The hearsay testimony about the decedent's intent to promptly visit her sister could have influenced the jury only in regard to the kidnapping charges. We hold, below, that even with the telephone call considered, there was insufficient evidence to support those convictions. Thus we need not now consider the intricacies of the future intent expression exception to the hearsay rule. The hearsay statement placing the victim at Iverson Mall, if error at all, was harmless and merely cumulative, for sales receipts independently placed her in that area and the testimony of her supervisor showed that early evening was the first time she could have been there. Thus we need not now consider the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. The trial judge cut short testimony by appellant's aunt and ordered the jury to ignore all of the comments except those based on her personal observation of appellant's nightmares. It did so after the witness had begun to blame appellant's father for his problems and at a point when several jurors were in tears. Appellant now contends that her testimony on appellant's background and upbringing was essential to an assessment of his sanity at the time of the offense and that it was improperly and prejudicially cut short. It is true that diverse aspects of defendant's life including his upbringing in slum or suburb may be relevant to an assessment of his mental health, Washington v. United States, supra, 129 U.S.App.D.C. at 38, 390 F.2d at 453, and that [l]ay witnesses may testify upon observed symptoms of mental disease. . .. Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 237, 252 F.2d 608, 618 (1957). However, [s]uch witnesses may testify only upon the basis of facts known to them. They may testify as to their own observations and may then express an opinion based upon those observations. Ibid. (Emphasis added). And the trial judge has a duty to carefully control such testimony in order to avoid mere appeals to the sympathy of the jury and the dangers of variable or sliding scales of criminal responsibility. Bethea v. United States, supra at 88. In this case the trial judge stopped the witness' testimony only when she had gone well beyond a description of the things of which she was personally aware and when it appeared that the testimony was essentially an emotional appeal. The judge properly allowed the jury to consider her testimony about the nightmares of which she knew from first-hand experience. Testimony from appellant's grandmother and his girlfriend adequately covered the other significant details of his background. No abuse of the trial judge's discretion appears here. Appellant asserts two forms of error in regard to the trial judge's handling of Dr. Schultz. The first is the claim that the giving of the Washington instruction to the sole defense expert witness and to none of the three government experts prejudiced appellant's case in the eyes of the jury. The second claim is that the trial judge unduly interrogated and denigrated Dr. Schultz because of the trial judge's own disbelief in the doctor's testimony. In Washington, supra, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dealt extensively with the appropriate procedures for expert testimony in cases where insanity was asserted as a defense to criminal liability. Since the Washington decision was rendered before the effective date of the Court Reorganization Act, it is binding on this court, absent reconsideration en banc, under the principles of M.A.P. v. Ryan, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 310 (1971). The circuit court was particularly concerned that medical testimony could either be incomprehensible to the jurors or might seem so conclusory about mental capacity as to infringe upon the jury's right and duty to assess liability. Accordingly, the court drew up a specific instruction cautioning the witness to speak in clear and non-conclusory terms, to limit opinion testimony to that based on medical expertise, and to be prepared to respond on adversarial cross-examination. A copy of this instruction was to be sent to all expert witnesses as an aid to their medical examinations of a defendant before trial. The court also ruled that To ensure that counsel and the jury are also so advised, the trial judge should give the explanatory instruction in open court to the first psychiatric witness immediately after he is qualified as an expert. It need not be repeated to later witnesses. Some of it will be repeated in the court's instruction to the jury at the end of the trial, but we think the jury should hear it in full and before the testimony. . . . [ Washington v. United States, supra, 129 U.S.App.D.C. at 42, 390 F.2d at 457 (emphasis in original).] The trial judge, acting in accordance with that holding, committed no reversible error. Nevertheless, to ensure equal treatment before the jury of psychiatric witnesses called by both the prosecution and the defense we recommend that in future cases the trial judge make clear that the Washington instruction applies equally to all such witnesses. One way to do so may be by exercising discretion to choose to repeat the instruction to later witnesses. We expect that that procedure will dispel any apparent unfairness to the party whose expert is first called. Appellant's assertion of undue judicial interference with the witness is without merit. This court will order new trials when the trial court enters into examinations in ways that substantially prejudice defendants, e. g., Petway v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 798 (1978), but this is not such a case. The trial judge's open statements to Dr. Schultz were constructive and instructive. To the extent that they were less favorable than the comments to government witnesses they were justified by the rambling nature of Dr. Schultz's testimony. The judge's more severe instructions to the doctor were properly given at the bench, out of the hearing of the jury, and Dr. Schultz's subsequent testimony indicates that he was in no way cowed, or even much impressed, by the judge's comments.