Opinion ID: 186119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The ‘‘But For’’ Test.

Text: As stated, we can award only ‘‘those reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by [a subject of the investigation] during that investigation which would not have been incurred but for the 9 requirements of’’ the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 593(f)(1). Lewinsky argues that in cases such as In re Donovan, 877 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (per curiam), and Dutton, supra, we have awarded fees where we have found that a professional or politically appointed prosecutor would not have pursued allegations similar to those investigated by an IC, and that her case falls within that category. She asserts that perjury allegations such as those against her would not have been pursued by the Department of Justice had they not been ‘‘part of a broader inquiry of the President of the United States’’ and at best ‘‘would have generated a cursory or summary nonpublic investigation by the Department of Justice.’’ In other words, she asserts that her claim for fees meets the ‘‘but for’’ test because there would have been no investigation of her conduct had it not involved the President. The IC in her evaluation of Lewinsky’s fee petition first takes issue with Lewinsky’s claim that the DOJ does not investigate perjury and obstruction of justice, stating that in fact ‘‘the Department routinely prosecutes perjury and obstruction cases and is willing to do so for perjury in civil cases and even when those cases settle.’’ But the IC argues that in any event it is of no consequence in the ‘‘but for’’ discourse how rare a certain type of prosecution is ‘‘if it is shown, as it has been here, that that type of offense would be and has been prosecuted by the Department of Justice if and when it occurred.’’ The IC further argues that Lewinsky’s claim that the investigation of her was overly thorough and intrusive does not satisfy her burden of showing that the requirements of the Act caused her to incur attorneys’ fees. Lewinsky’s reliance on In re Nofziger is misplaced, according to the IC, because the court in that case concluded that the fee reimbursement provision of the Act was intended for instances in which covered officials were investigated ‘‘for criminal offenses for which ordinary citizens would not have been investigated or prosecuted,’’ 925 F.2d at 444, whereas here the criminal offense investigated was perjury for which ordinary citizens are routinely investigated and prosecuted. 10 Additionally, the IC argues that Lewinsky’s comparison of her situation to that of an ‘‘ordinary citizen’’ is not appropriate. The IC cites In re Babbitt (Babbitt Fee Application), 290 F.3d 386, 391 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2002) (per curiam), in which the court stated that Babbitt, the Secretary of the Interior, could not compare the investigation of himself to an investigation of an ordinary citizen; rather, the comparison would have to be to an investigation of a cabinet officer. The IC notes that the allegations here concerned plans by the President of the United States to commit perjury as well as his involvement in a scheme to provide Lewinsky with a job in exchange for false testimony, and that ‘‘[i]t is in the context of the broader allegations of obstruction at the highest levels of government that Lewinsky’s situation must be analyzed.’’ Finally, the IC notes that at the very beginning of the investigation of her the IC offered Lewinsky transactional immunity in exchange for her cooperation. She refused and in the next six months accumulated more than $800,000 in attorneys’ fees, after which she successfully negotiated an immunity agreement with the IC. The IC argues that in this regard Lewinsky ‘‘cannot show that any requirement of the Act forced these choices upon her.’’ The DOJ in its evaluation also contradicts Lewinsky’s argument here by citing numerous cases that it asserts demonstrate that the DOJ frequently investigates and prosecutes the crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice in civil cases. And the DOJ points out the seriousness of the perjury allegations involving both President Clinton and Lewinsky. Relying on In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 443–44, the DOJ states that Lewinsky invokes the wrong legal standard for the ‘‘but for’’ test: it is not, as she claims, whether there would have been no investigation of her if her misconduct did not involve the President, but rather whether there would have been a similar investigation ‘‘if there had been no Independent Counsel statute but all other circumstances were the same.’’ (Emphasis by the DOJ.) After reiterating the allegations of perjury and subornation of perjury that were leveled against Lewinsky and President Clinton, the DOJ asserts that in the absence of the Act it would have conducted a similar investi11 gation and therefore Lewinsky has not satisfied the ‘‘but for’’ requirement because she ‘‘has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that there would have been no investigation of this matter in the absence of the Independent Counsel Act.’’ We agree with the OIC and the DOJ. Lewinsky asserts that her claim for fees meets the ‘‘but for’’ test because there would have been no investigation of her allegedly criminal conduct had it not involved the President. In making that argument, she applies the wrong legal standard. The language she draws from our prior decisions concerning the possibility of investigation of ‘‘private citizens’’ describe specific applications of the statutory requirement. That statutory requirement is that the legal fees ‘‘would not have been incurred by a similarly-situated subject investigated in the absence of the Act.’’ In re Pierce (Kisner Fee Application), 178 F.3d at 1359. In other words, her burden is to prove that she would not have incurred these fees if there had been no IC statute but all other circumstances were the same. See In re Nofziger, 925 F.2d at 443–44. Here, the underlying allegations were that Lewinsky lied under oath in a pending lawsuit against the President of the United States; that she was planning to lie again and had encouraged others to lie; that she had spoken to the President and an associate of the President about the matter; and, at least implicitly, that the President and his associate may themselves have been involved in the wrongdoing. See, e.g., Final Report at 14–15; Referral Order of January 16, 1998; Application to Expand the Jurisdiction of the IC 1–2 (January 16, 1998). As noted, the Independent Counsel ultimately concluded that the basic allegations were substantiated and that sufficient evidence existed to prosecute the President. Final Report at 19–20, 23, 28–29, 32–34, 41–43. Lewinsky has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that there would have been no comparable investigation of this matter in the absence of the Act. At most, Lewinsky has established that the investigation would not have occurred had her fellow subject been someone other than the President of the United States, not that the 12 investigation would have never begun or been aborted early in the absence of the Act. We doubt whether she has established even that; but even if she had, it would not be sufficient. As we stated in Kisner, ‘‘[her] difficulties were occasioned by [her] being suspected of having done mischief in high company, not by the identity of the authority investigating the allegation of mischief.’’ 178 F.3d at 1361. We have considered and rejected this same claim not only on parallel facts, as in Kisner, and numerous other cases, but on the very investigation before us in this petition. In Jordan Fee Application, Vernon Jordan, an associate of former President Clinton, made the same argument that Lewinsky now presents. As we stated in Jordan, when the Attorney General made the referral, and when the OIC conducted the investigation generating the fees, each ‘‘had credible, indeed compelling, evidence that Monica Lewinsky had committed perjury and was attempting to suborn perjury of others. This was accompanied by other evidence that the President of the United States had committed perjury and had suborned or attempted to suborn others.’’ 344 F.3d at 1255. Like the petitioner in Jordan, Lewinsky ‘‘offers no reason why any prosecutor in the absence of the Act would not have investigated these serious allegations of criminal wrongdoing as thoroughly as did the Independent Counsel.’’ Id. As in Jordan and cases cited therein, we cannot hold that the Attorney General and other investigative authorities would not have pursued allegations of corruption as deep and widespread as those revealed by the Independent Counsel’s investigation had there been no such Act. Id. (quoting In re Pierce (Olivas Fee Application), 178 F.3d 1350, 1355 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 1999) (per curiam)). In short, the question is: would evidence of criminal wrongdoing by an incumbent President and accomplices of that President have escaped an investigation of similar scope in the absence of the Ethics in Government Act? History 13 teaches us that the answer is no. The most recent parallel investigation of an incumbent sitting president before the enactment of the Ethics in Government Act arose from the Watergate scandal during the administration of President Richard Nixon. The thoroughness of that investigation is legend. We have no reason to believe that the Department of Justice, the Congress, and other civil authorities would have been any less diligent in the Clinton administration of the 1990’s than in the Nixon administration of the 1970’s. As in Jordan, Lewinsky’s petition flounders on the ‘‘but for’’ requirement and we can award no counsel fees. We note in passing that in Jordan, Clinton, and other fee application decisions, we have awarded fees for time spent by counsel reviewing the Independent Counsel’s Final Report. See Jordan at 1255; In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan (Clinton Fee Application), 334 F.3d 1119, 1128 (D.C. Cir., Spec. Div., 2003) (per curiam). Lewinsky has made no claim for any such fees and we therefore make no similar award.