Opinion ID: 2581989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Failure to offer any defense instructions, particularly theory of defense instructions

Text: [¶ 76] Duke scores counsel for allegedly failing to offer any defense instructions. Specifically, he faults counsel for not offering any theory of defense instructions with respect to the murder charges, including some sort of instruction on accident or some lesser included offense instructions; and not offering any instructions, beyond one dealing with renunciation, in defense of the solicitation charges. He also criticizes counsel for not having the jury instructed about the meaning of purposely and premeditated malice. His contention fails for several reasons. [¶ 77] First, the record in this case clearly belies his contention that counsel failed to ensure that the jury was instructed concerning the terms purposely and premeditated malice. Instruction No. 25 informed the jury that purposely meant intentionally. Additionally, premeditated malice was defined for the jury by Instruction No. 26: Premeditated malice means that the Defendant thought about and considered the idea of killing before the act which caused death was committed, and that the act which caused death was done with intent to kill and without legal justification or excuse. Premeditated implies an interval, however brief, between the formation of the intent or design to kill and the commission of the act which results in death. Duke has neither alleged, nor has he shown, that those instructions were an incorrect statement of existing law. Given the fact that the jury was properly instructed on the terms at issue, Duke's ineffectiveness claim in this regard is without merit. [¶ 78] Second, Duke has not identified with any specificity the theory of defense instructions that counsel was remiss in not promoting. He contends that some sort of accident instruction should have been given in defense of the murder charges but has failed to explain what such an instruction would have entailed under the facts of this case. Instead, he has simply chosen to vaguely reference a comment by this Court in Holloman v. State, 2002 WY 117, 51 P.3d 214 (Wyo.2002), to assert that counsel was derelict in his duties. In the absence of a cogent argument and citations to pertinent legal authority, his contention in this respect must be rejected. Barkell, at ¶ 32. [¶ 79] Third, Duke's contention that counsel was ineffective for not offering instructions to defend against the solicitation charges is likewise devoid of a cogent argument and citations to pertinent legal authority. He bears the burden of proving that counsel's assistance was prejudicially deficient, and his unsupported suggestionthat counsel could have offered an instruction prohibiting multiple convictions for a single solicitation with more than one victim[,] an instruction that the act of solicitation and necessary intent are not concurrent, and possibly many othersis insufficient, without more, to satisfy that burden. [¶ 80] Finally, Duke has not provided any insight regarding the lesser included offense instructions counsel should have offered relative to the murder charges considering his I didn't do anything trial defense. As shown by the record, Duke defended against those charges on the theory that his wife and child slipped and fell from a cliff while he was getting something from his vehicle. Thus, Duke denied any wrongful conduct and maintained that his wife's and child's deaths were simply the product of an unfortunate accident in which he played no part. Therefore, choosing from the facts presented at trial, the jury was left with only two alternativesfinding Duke guilty of first degree murder or not guilty. There was no evidence from which the jury rationally could have acquitted Duke on the first degree murder charges and convicted him on any lesser included offenses: for example, second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. As recently reiterated by this Court, where the facts and the defense are such that a defendant, if guilty at all, is guilty of the greater offense, a defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. Dean v. State, 2003 WY 128, ¶ 34, 77 P.3d 692, ¶ 34 (Wyo. 2003) (collecting cases). Consequently, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue lesser included offense instructions with respect to the murder chargesinstructions that Duke was not legally entitled to and which would have, most likely, been refused by the trial court based on the facts of the case. See Herdt v. State, 891 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo.1995) (ineffectiveness cannot be premised on counsel's failure to seek relief which is not available to him). [¶ 81] Duke has failed to sustain his burden of proving that he was deprived of his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Throughout his trial, defense counsel vigorously represented his client and challenged the prosecution's evidence. Duke has not demonstrated that counsel's performance was outside the range of professionally competent assistance, nor has he shown that the outcome of his trial would have been different absent attorney error. That the jury found Duke guilty does not entitle him to prevail on his ineffectiveness claim.