Opinion ID: 1300210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Polygraph Report.

Text: In his effort to document the sexual abuse of Sarah by her brother, Earl II sought to introduce into evidence a polygraph report of an interview of Earl III concerning Earl III's abuse of Sarah. The polygraph report was not offered for the opinion of the polygraph examiner; rather, the father merely wanted to introduce into evidence the statements made by Earl III to the examiner. The trial court held that the evidence was inadmissible because the report was the result of a polygraph examination. We have said the results of a polygraph examination are inadmissible because the reliability of such examinations has not been adequately demonstrated. See State v. Losee, 354 N.W.2d 239, 242 (Iowa 1984); In re Fairbanks, 287 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1980); State v. Freeland, 255 Iowa 1334, 1338-39, 125 N.W.2d 825, 827-28 (1964). The results to which we have referred are the opinions of the examiner as to which questions were answered truthfully. Because the scientific acceptance and evidentiary reliability of the process by which an examiner determines whether the person being tested has answered truthfully has not been established, the examiner's testimony is inadmissible opinion evidence. See State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447, 459 (Iowa 1976). Where both parties stipulate to the admission of polygraph evidence, however, it may be admitted. See State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa 19, 29, 104 N.W.2d 568, 574 (1960). Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the examiner's opinions, we have affirmed the admission of statements made by a defendant during an interview preceding the actual polygraph examination over an objection that the statements were not voluntary. See State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Iowa 1992). We have also upheld, in a civil case, the admission of statements made during the examination. See Johnson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 352 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Iowa 1984). In Johnson, a police officer challenged his termination of employment in the district court. Id. at 254. At trial, the court permitted a polygraph examiner to testify to certain statements made by the terminated employee during a polygraph examination required as a condition of continued employment. Id. at 255. On appeal to this court, the employee argued the statements should have been excluded because (1) they violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and (2) the use of his admissions was fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process. Id. at 255-56. We rejected both claims and considered the employee's statements in our de novo review. Id. at 256. As a review of these cases demonstrates, statements made during a polygraph examination, as opposed to the opinion of the polygraph examiner, have never been ruled per se inadmissible by our court. Thus, we think the juvenile court's rationale for excluding the statements made by Earl III during the polygraph examinationthat polygraph evidence in general is inadmissibleis imprecise and overly broad. The admissibility of such evidence depends on the type of polygraph evidence offered and the specific objection lodged against its admission. Notwithstanding our disapproval of the juvenile court's reason for excluding this evidence, we may affirm its ruling on any ground apparent from the record. See State v. Jones, 490 N.W.2d 787, 790-91 (Iowa 1992); Newmire v. Maxwell, 161 N.W.2d 74, 80 (Iowa 1968). Therefore, we turn now to the objections made by the State at the time Earl II sought to introduce the polygraph report. The State objected to the admission of Earl III's statements as irrelevant and cumulative. The State continues to argue on appeal that the evidence the father sought to introduce through the polygraph report was already before the court. We agree. The sexual abuse perpetrated on Sarah by her brother was fully documented in the record and the statements made by Earl III to the polygraph examiner would have been cumulative. On this basis, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court's decision to exclude the polygraph evidence. See Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 846 (Iowa 1997) (holding no abuse of discretion in trial court's exclusion of evidence where evidence was cumulative); State v. Harrington, 349 N.W.2d 758, 761-62 (Iowa 1984) (same).