Opinion ID: 2585478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fraud and Duress

Text: As noted at the outset of this opinion, in requesting approval to withdraw her consent to the adoption, Sharon, in addition to the statutory and constitutional objections reviewed above, argued to the trial court that she had signed the adoption consent form under fraud, undue influence, and duress and that the original adoption attorney representing her and Annette had failed to obtain a signed waiver regarding conflict of interest. In her writ petition, Sharon reprised these arguments. With a few statutory exceptions not relevant here, a legal parent's valid consent is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an adoption, regardless of the child's interests. (See Matter of Cozza (1912) 163 Cal. 514, 523, 126 P. 161, disapproved on another ground in Adoption of Barnett, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 378, 6 Cal.Rptr. 562, 354 P.2d 18.) Where a parent's consent to adoption is obtained through fraud or duress, the consent is not voluntary and the jurisdictional prerequisite to a valid adoption is lacking. ( Adoption of Kay C. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 741, 751, 278 Cal. Rptr. 907; see also In re Yoder (1926) 199 Cal. 699, 701, 251 P. 205 [order of adoption may be set aside for fraud, mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect].) Since the Court of Appeal agreed with Sharon's statutory argument, it had no occasion to address the superior court's implicit rejection of her contentions respecting fraud and undue influence. We shall remand the cause to permit the Court of Appeal to address this issue in the first instance. (See Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 95, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703; Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hosp. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 306, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510, 907 P.2d 358.) Subject to the Court of Appeal's resolution of this remaining issue, the superior court on remand may validly exercise its discretion to order Annette's adoption of Joshua under the independent adoption statutes if it concludes that the administrative procedures, including a section 8617 waiver, duly established thereunder have been complied with and that all statutory prerequisites are satisfied. Sharon retains the right to oppose finalization of the adoption on the ground that new circumstances make it contrary to Joshua's interests. (See County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1059, 1065-1066, 82 Cal.Rptr. 882.) We take no position on such outstanding factual questions, and nothing in this opinion should be taken by the court below on remand to indicate a view as to whether adoption is in Joshua's interests.