Opinion ID: 558074
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of the Traffic Stop

Text: 8 Defendants' first argument is that the troopers' traffic stop of the Ford was a mere pretext to facilitate the search for narcotics. 1 See, e.g., United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed. 877 (1932) (An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.); United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 979 (7th Cir.1988) (an arrest may not be used as a mere pretext to avoid the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment). They contend that the troopers' motivation in stopping the Ford was not the minor traffic infraction committed by Fiala (weaving over the fog line for 5-10 seconds), but rather an inarticulable--and constitutionally insufficient--hunch that the occupants of the car were engaged in illegal activity. 9 In United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.1989), we explained that our fourth amendment inquiry in cases involving allegedly pretextual stops is a narrow one: so long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, an arrest [or stop] is constitutional. 878 F.2d at 1041. We eschewed in Trigg the subjective motive examination in which the defendants ask us to engage, because of the obvious and very significant difficulties that inhere in such attempts to peer into the minds of law enforcement officers. Id. at 1040; see also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 2782-83, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). Instead, we articulated a two-pronged objective inquiry into the lawfulness of an allegedly pretextual stop or arrest: we ask first, whether law enforcement authorities had reasonable suspicion to make the stop or probable cause to make the arrest, and second, whether the officers involved were authorized under state or municipal law to effect the stop or arrest in question. 878 F.2d at 1041. 2 10 Applying the Trigg test in this case, we find that the troopers' stop of Fiala's car did not violate the fourth amendment. Under Sec. 11-709 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the troopers did indeed have cause to stop the Ford for partially swerving off the roadway. The district court found the troopers' testimony regarding Fiala's erratic driving credible, and we defer to that finding. The second prong of the pretext inquiry is easily met as well: under Sec. 16-102 of the Vehicle Code, state troopers are authorized to enforce the Illinois traffic laws as they did in this case. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 95 1/2, Sec. 16-102. We conclude that the stop of Fiala's car was not pretextual and did not violate the fourth amendment.