Opinion ID: 167476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal of LOW Claim

Text: Ms. Smith also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her race-discrimination claim related to the letter of warning (LOW) issued by Ms. Alley on September 29, 2000. The district court ruled that the claim was barred because Ms. Smith did not consult an EEO counselor within 45 days of the alleged adverse employment action. Ms. Smith does not dispute that such consultation is required by 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 (relating to employees of certain federal agencies), which states:
discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or handicap must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter. -10- (1) An aggrieved person must initiate contact with a Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the action. See Davis v. U. S. Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998). Ms. Smith argues, however, that the 45-day time limit was satisfied because she initiated a union grievance within 45 days of issuance of the LOW, and thereby fulfilled the policies underlying exhaustion—“protecting administrative agency authority and promoting judicial efficiency.” Aplt. Br. at 25; see Monreal v. Potter, 367 F.3d 1224, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004). But Ms. Smith did not allege racial discrimination in her union grievance, so the agency was not alerted to her discrimination claim. The union grievance did not serve the purpose of a consultation with an EEO counselor. Cf. id. (class complaint of discrimination put agency on notice of individual claims). Ms. Smith also suggests that the time limit should be tolled because she made an EEO report regarding the LOW “as soon as it became cognizable as a ‘practice’ motivated by her race.” Aplt. Br. at 26. The district court rejected this argument, explaining that “the fact that a plaintiff may not have discovered the alleged discriminatory motive for an adverse employment action until later does not extend the 45-day period in which to contact an EEOC counselor” because the “45-day period begins to run when the plaintiff learns of the adverse employment -11- action and so is on notice to inquire whether the motive was discriminatory.” Aplt. App. at 91-92 (internal quotation marks omitted). We note that 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2) provides for tolling in certain circumstances: The agency or the Commission shall extend the 45-day time limit in paragraph (a)(1) of this section when the individual shows that he or she was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he or she did not know and reasonably should not have been known [sic] that the discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he or she was prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control from contacting the counselor within the time limits, or for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission. But the extension is to be granted by the EEOC. Ms. Smith presents no reason why she did not seek such an extension. Ms. Smith was advised by the EEO counselor’s report that she had made her initial EEO contact more than 45 days after the issuance of the LOW and that a formal complaint was therefore likely to be dismissed. Nothing in the record indicates that she offered any reason for her late contact with the EEO counselor; in fact, the line on the counseling report for “Reason for Delayed Contact Beyond 45 Days, if Applicable” is left blank, Aplt. App. at 306. Therefore, we must agree with the district court that this claim is barred.