Opinion ID: 1873197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: wisconsin precedent

Text: ¶ 145 Before attempting to articulate standards for circuit courts that impose sanctions that deprive a party of trial by jury, it may be useful to examine additional Wisconsin precedent. ¶ 146 The relevant portions of Article I, Section 5 have been part of the Wisconsin Constitution since 1848. Our constitution has always provided that, The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. Wis. Const. art. I, § 5. From the beginning, judges and legislators have wrestled with the question of how to waive the right of jury trial. ¶ 147 In Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 540 (1866), this court reviewed a dispute over a conveyance of real estate. One question was whether the defendant, Mrs. Rogan, was entitled to a trial by jury. Id. at 568-71. The court stated that [i]n an action at law, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury . . . unless she has waived it. Id. at 571. The court concluded that Mrs. Rogan had waived her right of jury trial because the record revealed that the action proceeded to trial before the judge alone, without objection. Id. [I]n other words . . . the parties consented to that mode of trial. Id. (emphasis added). If the defendant had demanded a trial by jury, as she might have done, . . . the question would have been very different. Id. ¶ 148 In another case, Home Insurance Co. v. Security Insurance Co., 23 Wis. 171 (1868), the court determined that it was too late for the defendant to object to a non-jury trial when it voluntarily waived the right to trial before a court and jury by stipulating in writing to trial before a referee. Id. at 175. The court noted that while the legislature has not attempted to compel the parties to submit to a trial by referees in actions of this nature, id. at 174, the statute at issue provided that all or any of the issues in this action, whether of fact or of law, or both, may be referred, upon the written consent of the parties.  Id. at 174. The court explained that the parties may waive their right under the constitution to have the [dispute] heard and determined by the courts and juries of the country. Id. The court held that it was not incompetent for the legislature to pass such laws, because the validity of the transaction depended entirely on the will of the parties. Id. ¶ 149 In Wooster v. Weyh, 194 Wis. 85, 216 N.W. 134 (1927), the defendant claimed he was deprived of his right to trial by jury. Id. at 89, 216 N.W. 134. The court's response: The right he had to such trial by jury was one that may be waived. It was clearly waived in this case by appellant proceeding to trial without in any manner calling the matter to the attention of the court or suggesting that a trial by jury on this issue was desired or demanded. Id. at 91-92, 216 N.W. 134 (citations omitted). ¶ 150 These cases supplement Wisconsin statutes of long standing that have explained how to waive a jury trial. For instance, Section 2862 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 stated: Trial by jury may be waived by the several parties to an issue of fact in actions on contract, and with the assent of the court in other actions, in the following manner: 1. By failing to appear at the trial. 2. By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the clerk. 3. By oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. Wis. Stat. ch. 128, § 2862 (1878) (emphasis added). This text remained intact until January 1, 1936. ¶ 151 In 1935 the court revised then-existing Wis. Stat. § 270.32 (1935) to read: Jury trial, how waived. Trial by jury may be waived by the several parties to an issue of fact by failing to appear at the trial; or by written consent filed with the clerk; or by consent in open court, entered in the minutes. S.Ct. Order, 217 Wis. v, ix (eff.Jan.1, 1936). Apart from short-lived revisions in the mid-1940s, see Petition of Doar, 248 Wis. 113, 21 N.W.2d 1 (1945), this language stated the law until the court revised the rules of civil procedure in 1975, effective in 1976. ¶ 152 These statutes and cases demonstrate that waiver of the constitutional right of jury trial in civil cases has historically tracked traditional principles of waiver or forfeiture: affirmative or consensual action by one or more of the parties to surrender the right, or obvious failure by any party to assert the right. The steadfast maintenance of true waiver and forfeiture principles underlies the importance of the right being waived. ¶ 153 Wisconsin precedent honors the right of jury trial. In Schmidt v. Riess, 186 Wis. 574, 203 N.W. 362 (1925), this court observed: Jurors are obtained from the various walks of life, with various degrees of knowledge and experience and with various interests, and, it must be assumed and admitted, with certain prejudices. . . . Unconscious prejudices exist with some in favor of the plaintiff, and with others in favor of the defendant. But after conceding all of these various elements that enter into the make-up of the personnel of the jurors and of the jury, it is largely designed that the average judgment of twelve men and women chosen from the citizenship of the community in which the parties reside will meet the requirements of justice, and that a verdict of the jury will be a true and just one. Id. at 579-80, 203 N.W. 362. ¶ 154 Schmidt was a case in which the amount of damages was at issue. The court noted that [t]he assessment of damages in a personal injury case presents a matter . . . which is peculiarly within the field of a jury to determine. Id. at 579, 203 N.W. 362. In Dekeyser v. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Co., 236 Wis. 419, 431, 295 N.W. 755 (1941), this court made a stronger statement that assessment of damages is solely a jury function. Again in Schultz v. Miller, 259 Wis. 316, 327, 48 N.W.2d 477 (1951), the court said [t]he award of damages is within the province of the jury. Many additional cases could be cited. ¶ 155 In sum, [t]he parties to an action are entitled to a jury trial on all issues of fact, including that of damages. Jennings v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 13 Wis.2d 427, 431, 109 N.W.2d 90 (1961) (citing Wis. Const., art. I, § 5).