Opinion ID: 687918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: arrest and prosecution for possession of marijuana.

Text: 19 Hampton claimed that Officer White could not have reasonably believed he had probable cause to arrest her on the charge of possession of marijuana based upon the fact he planted the evidence when he performed the inventory search of her truck. A claim that officers fabricated evidence in support of a criminal prosecution states a constitutional claim. Cf. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 61 U.S.L.W. 4713 (U.S.1993) (prosecutor does not have absolute immunity against claim that he fabricated evidence but may have qualified immunity); Warlick v. Cross, 969 F.2d 303 (7th Cir.1992) (officer entitled to qualified immunity where jury answered special interrogatory by finding that officer did not plant evidence). And, because no reasonable officer could believe that they had probable cause to arrest if the only evidence against the accused was fabricated, an officer is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity only if there is no factual dispute regarding whether he planted the evidence. 20 In response to Hampton's claim, White avers that he did not place the marijuana or the container in which the marijuana was found in the car and the he merely discovered the marijuana during the course of an inventory search after Hampton's arrest. Normally, a police officer's statement would be sufficient to dispel a speculative claim that he planted the marijuana. That is, because the search takes place outside of the accused's presence and because the evidence is typically not visible, the accused can usually offer nothing more than mere speculation to refute the officer's disavowal. However, Hampton has produced substantial, specific evidence which, at the least, creates a factual dispute whether White planted the marijuana in Hampton's truck. Cf. Coates v. Daugherty, 973 F.2d 290 (4th Cir.1992). 21 Hampton attested that she did not know that the marijuana was there and that the evidence was planted. Hampton's companion at the time of the stop corroborated these facts. A man who had repaired Hampton's truck radio, approximately an hour before Hampton was stopped, attested that he had removed the radio, that the marijuana was not there when he examined the radio, that someone would have to know how to remove the radio before she would be able to store the marijuana there, and that it was not easy to remove the radio. Hampton attested that she did not know how to remove the radio. In addition, the owner of the towing company which impounded Hampton's truck attested that he found no marijuana during his eye search of the truck. 22 If the facts are as Hampton alleges them to be, no reasonable officer could have believed Officer White's conduct was lawful. This question cannot be resolved on summary judgment. We affirm the district court's order on this claim. III 23 White also alleged that he was not involved in Hampton's arrest or prosecution for unlawful use of a telephone. The district court did not specifically address this issue; rather, the court denied the motion on the general ground that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Because White appeals the denial of qualified immunity, this Court has the jurisdiction to reach the merits of the unlawful use of a telephone claim. Wagner, 13 F.3d at 90-91 n. 2. 24 It is uncontroverted that Officer White was not involved in Hampton's arrest or prosecution for unlawful use of a telephone. Officer DuBose attested that he received a complaint from Lee Huffstickler alleging that Hampton had been calling him, harassing him, and threatening him. Based on Huffstickler's affidavit relating these facts, the municipal judge issued a warrant for Hampton's arrest, charging her with unlawful use of a telephone in violation of S.C.Code Ann. Sec. 16-17-430 (Law. Co-op. Cum.Supp.1993). Officer DuBose also attested that he arrested Hampton and that Officer White had nothing to do with Hampton's arrest and prosecution. Hampton never refuted White's affidavit in this respect. 25 The unrefuted facts demonstrate that White was not involved with Hampton's arrest for unlawful use of a telephone. Because a rational trier of fact could not find for Hampton under these facts, we find that White was entitled to summary judgment. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wagner, 13 F.3d at 90. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of White on this claim. 26 In conclusion, White was entitled to qualified immunity on the claims of unlawful use of a license and operating an uninsured vehicle. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment on these claims. However, with regard to the claim of possession of marijuana, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether White planted the marijuana in Hampton's truck. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order on that claim. Finally, because a rational trier of fact could not find that Officer White maliciously prosecuted Hampton for illegally using a telephone, we reverse the district court's order and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment on this claim. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented and argument would not aid the decisional process. 27 REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.