Opinion ID: 1536017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: Excusing Prospective Juror James Clevenger

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously excluded prospective juror James Clevenger. He contends that unlike the failure to dismiss a biased juror for cause, the erroneous exclusion of a prospective juror because of his or her opposition to the death penalty can never be harmless error. Thus, he seeks a reversal of his death sentence and a new penalty-phase trial. In Adams v. Texas, supra , the United States Supreme Court held that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581; see Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 123, 97 S.Ct. 399, 400, 50 L.Ed. 2d 339 (1976); see also Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 352, 700 A. 2d 306 (stating that a potential juror can be removed for cause based on that belief if such views would substantially impair his or her ability to follow the law during the trial); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, 524 A. 2d 188 (recognizing the Adams test in death-qualifying a jury). If a prospective juror is excluded on any broader grounds than his ability to follow the law or abide by his oath, the death penalty cannot be imposed. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, 524 A. 2d 188. [A] juror's bias for or against capital punishment need not be shown with `unmistakable clarity.' State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 588, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188). In fact, trial courts possess broad discretion in determining whether a potential juror should be removed, and their determination will be disturbed only if that discretion is abused. DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 460, 645 A. 2d 734. This is because evaluating whether a potential juror is biased is a subjective decision based upon an observation of the juror's demeanor during the course of voir dire  observations which an appellate court is precluded from making. State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 63, 402 A. 2d 203 (1979). During his voir dire, James Clevenger, a Quaker, stated that he did not believe in the death penalty. When asked whether matters of personal conscience and beliefs would prevent him from imposing a death sentence, Clevenger stated that he thought he could vote for the death penalty. However, when questioned further by the prosecution, Clevenger explained that he had religious qualms about imposing the death penalty since the age of sixteen or seventeen, and only in rare cases where the defendant had committed an execution style murder would he have felt comfortable imposing the death penalty. He further stated that since imposing the death penalty is a subjective determination, he believed he would have a hard time reconciling his religious beliefs with his civic duties. In fact, he repeatedly told the court he would have a tough time in this respect. Based on his voir dire, the trial court decided to excuse Clevenger for cause. The court told Clevenger that since imposing the death penalty would have forced him to decide between his personal conscience and his civic duty, he would be excused. The court stated, I'm not going to ask you to do that, so you're excused. We reject defendant's contention that Clevenger was removed for cause because he did not believe in the death penalty. From the explanation the trial court gave Clevenger, it is clear that he was not removed because he believed in the death penalty. Instead, he was removed because it was obvious that Clevenger's views about capital punishment would have substantially impaired his ability to follow the law, despite his pronouncement that he thought he could impose the death penalty if he was forced to make that decision. See Singletary, supra, 80 N.J. at 64, 402 A. 2d 203 (stating a potential juror's professions of impartiality will not always insulate him from excusal for cause). Thus, the trial court was correct in not forcing Clevenger to decide between his personal conscience and his civic duty because it was not clear which one would have prevailed. Furthermore, since the trial court was in a position to accurately assess the sincerity and credibility of Clevenger's statements, we pay due deference to its evaluation. Therefore, we conclude that defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his death sentence or a new penalty-phase trial based on the excusal of Clevenger for cause.