Opinion ID: 782263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lynch v. Donnelly

Text: 25 In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984), the Supreme Court held that the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island did not violate the Establishment Clause when it displayed a crèche as part of its annual Christmas display. In addition to the crèche, which is a representation of the Nativity scene, the display included a Santa Clause house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, hundreds of colored lights, and a large banner with the words Seasons Greetings. Id. at 671, 104 S.Ct. 1355. 26 Rejecting a strict wall-of-separation theory of the Establishment Clause, the Court cited numerous examples of the Government's acknowledgment of our religious heritage and governmental sponsorship of that heritage, id. at 677, 104 S.Ct. 1355, to demonstrate that the Constitution does not prevent government from ever using religious symbols or references to divinity. See id. at 673-78, 104 S.Ct. 1355. The Court explained, In every Establishment Clause case, we must reconcile the inescapable tension between the objective of preventing unnecessary intrusion of either the church or the state upon the other, and the reality that, as the Court has so often noted, total separation of the two is not possible. Id. at 672, 104 S.Ct. 1355. The Court continued, In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed. Id. at 678, 104 S.Ct. 1355. 27 Repeating the three useful inquiries of the Lemon test, the Court emphasized that the constitutionality of the government's use of a predominantly religious symbol depends on the context in which it appears. Id. at 679, 104 S.Ct. 1355. Hence, the Court instructed that in deciding the constitutionality of Pawtucket's display, the focus of our inquiry must be on the crèche in the context of the Christmas season. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, in reviewing precedent, the Court explained that the state practices in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam), and Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (Bible study in public schools), were impermissible because the government did not use the religious writings in a context sufficiently related to a secular purpose. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679, 104 S.Ct. 1355. 28 Applying these principles, the Court held that the district court erred when it found that the crèche display served no secular purpose. Celebrating the Christmas holiday season and depicting the origins of that holiday, the Court explained, were legitimate secular purposes. Id. at 681, 104 S.Ct. 1355. Furthermore, the Court applied Lemon 's effect test and concluded that the use of the nativity scene, at least in the context of a Christmas display that included both religious and nonreligious symbols, did not have the primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion. See id. at 683, 685-86, 104 S.Ct. 1355. 29 In a concurring opinion that has influenced subsequent religious-symbols cases, Justice O'Connor framed the central issue in the case as whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by its display of the crèche. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). To answer that question, we must examine both what Pawtucket intended to communicate in displaying the crèche and what message the City's display actually conveyed. The purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test represent these two aspects of the meaning of the City's action. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to the concurrence, [t]he meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the `objective' meaning of the statement in the community. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, the test has both a subjective and an objective component. A governmental statement or action fails Lemon 's purpose prong if, despite the existence of a stated secular purpose, the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purposes, the practice under review in fact would convey a message of endorsement or disapproval to an informed, reasonable observer. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 30 In applying the effect prong, Justice O'Connor reasoned that [a]lthough the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the crèche ... [was] not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday setting change[d] what viewers [would] fairly understand to be the purpose of the display.... Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Every government practice, she stated, must be judged in its unique circumstances and context to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Because governmental celebrations of the holiday season are so common, Justice O'Connor concluded that a reasonable person would not perceive a crèche that is accompanied by purely secular symbols of the season to be a governmental endorsement of religion. 31