Opinion ID: 4540104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury instruction on ambiguity

Text: Dow argues the “district court committed legal error by instructing the jury that Section 3.1(a) was ambiguous.” The relevant language is in Jury Instruction 13: “This Court has determined, as a matter of law, that the 90day termination clause in the Agreement between Gulf Engineering Company, LLC, and The Dow Chemical Company is ambiguous.” We have already held that the relevant contract provisions are not ambiguous. Thus, the language of the instruction compounded the error. Nonetheless, the district court also instructed the jury that under the terms of 7 Case: 19-30395 Document: 00515445934 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/09/2020 No. 19-30395 the Agreement, “Dow was not required to utilize Gulf’s services in the 90-day notice period unless Gulf was engaged in authorized work that had to be completed.” Whether such an obligation existed is the question that makes ambiguity in Section 3.1(a) relevant. Both parties agree that Gulf was entitled to complete any work that Dow assigned during the 90-day termination period. That means the district court’s error in denying Dow’s motion for partial summary judgment and the district court’s jury instruction on ambiguity was harmless. See Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 240 (5th Cir. 2014).