Opinion ID: 200673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the continuing wrong doctrine

Text: 12 S-G contends that the statute of limitations was tolled from 1985 until 1998, when it cancelled the policies, by reason of New England's repeated false representations concerning the vanishing point of premiums. It argues that the 1990 notice that additional premiums would be due was itself fraudulent and that the allegations in its complaint that it was kept in the dark about New England's fraudulent scheme raise triable issues of fact. 13 We agree with the District Court that when S-G received written notice from New England in August 1990 that premiums would be due for three more years, it had information that New England had misrepresented the vanishing point and that the financial information initially provided was incorrect. At that point, under Kansas's discovery rule, it had sufficient information to know that a more thorough investigation was warranted. See Bagby, 104 F.Supp.2d at 1300. 14 Citing Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.1996), S-G would have us apply the continuing wrong doctrine to toll the statute of limitations. But S-G's reliance on Tiberi is misplaced. In Tiberi, the court acknowledged that the running of the statute of limitations in cases of fraud may be suspended by a repetition or continuation of the false representations which keeps the defrauded person in ignorance of the fraud. Id. at 1431 (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 195 (1987)). The court went on, however, to explain: Thus, Tiberi cannot be penalized for his delay if CIGNA's misrepresentations prevented him from ascertaining the cause of his injury.  Id. (emphasis added). Tiberi involved an action by an insurance agent against an insurance company, charging the latter with breach of contract and fraud arising out of an exclusive dealing arrangement between the parties. The gravamen of the action was that the insurance company had secretly withdrawn from and undermined the arrangement while continually assuring the agent that it would continue to support him. Reversing summary judgment, the court found: 15 Tiberi had no reason to believe that he was being defrauded because CIGNA had given him every assurance that it would compensate him for his losses and reward him for remaining a COMPAR agent. Tiberi's allegations that CIGNA made these assurances while planning to dismantle the program constitute a continuing tort. 16 Id. 17 The instant case bears no resemblance to Tiberi. While S-G asserts that New England made repeated false representations about vanishing points through 1998, it makes no claim that it received assurances from New England or that it was prevented from investigating the cause of its losses. To the contrary, S-G received so-called Premium Offset Statements from New England throughout the period, showing that premiums would be due for years to come. Thus, S-G was not lulled into foregoing legal action by New England's false representations that the premiums would vanish in the future. [T]he [continuing wrong] doctrine cannot be employed where the plaintiff's injury is `definite and discoverable, and nothing prevented the plaintiff from coming forward to seek redress.' Id. (quoting Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 743 (7th Cir.1992)). Because S-G's alleged injury was definite and discoverable by August 1990 the statute of limitations was not tolled by the continuing wrong doctrine.