Opinion ID: 755605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 31 Before addressing the merits, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, courts of appeals are empowered to hear appeals from final decisions of a district court. The question before us then is whether the district court's involuntary dismissal of LeBlang II was a final decision. If the dismissal was without prejudice, then it was not a final decision unless LeBlang could not file another complaint. See Ordower v. Feldman, 826 F.2d 1569, 1572 (7th Cir.1987). On the other hand, if the dismissal acts as an adjudication on the merits, then the dismissal is a final decision, and we have jurisdiction. 32 In dismissing LeBlang II, the district court did not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice. It stated only that Defendant's motion for 'involuntary dismissal of plaintiffs' claims' is granted and that this action is dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Order, LeBlang Motors, Ltd., No. 96 C 7681 (N.D.Ill. March 25, 1997). For reasons we do not understand, Subaru moved for involuntary dismissal of LeBlang II without prejudice. Because the court granted Subaru's motion, one could argue that the resulting dismissal was without prejudice. However, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), the Rule pursuant to which the court dismissed LeBlang II, states in pertinent part: Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision ... operates as an adjudication upon the merits. Because the district court did not otherwise specify in its order, we treat the dismissal as an adjudication upon the merits. The dismissal thus acts as a final decision, and we have jurisdiction under § 1291 to hear this appeal.