Opinion ID: 1697830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equitable Fatherhood Doctrine.

Text: ¶ 14. Jane argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the doctrine of equitable fatherhood, previously unknown in this state, is applicable to the present case and in using this doctrine as his basis for awarding physical custody of Catherine to Tom. Tom notes that his paternity of Catherine was not called into question until Catherine was six-years old and the parties were almost a year into the divorce proceedings and argues that the chancellor's adjudication that he is Catherine's equitable father should remain undisturbed. ¶ 15. Jane initially apprised the chancellor that Tom may not be Catherine's natural father on October 28, 2002, the morning their divorce trial was to begin. Tom and Jane subsequently agreed to have a paternity test conducted, the results of which showed that Tom was not Catherine's biological father. The chancellor later held a hearing on Jane's petition to terminate Tom's parental rights. At the end of the hearing, the chancellor ruled it was in Catherine's best interests to remain the child of these two parents forever and ever and declared Tom to be Catherine's father despite the fact that he is not her biological father, stating my ruling is going to be that Mr. [Morgan] is the father in fact  either equitably through judicial adoption of some sort, or through judicial estoppel on the part of anyone complaining about it. The chancellor more fully articulated this finding in the Revised Decree for Divorce. ¶ 16. In the revised decree, the chancellor noted that Catherine was born on June 21, 1996, while Tom and Jane were legally married, Tom was listed as Catherine's father on her birth certificate, Tom's paternity was never called into question until October 28, 2002, and Catherine has been in Tom's custody by court order since July of 2002. The chancellor also noted that the man whom Jane has alleged to be Catherine's natural father, Nick Harrison, testified before the court that he was unaware if he were Catherine's father but that even if he were adjudicated to be her father, he was not interested in custody, visitation or any relationship with her. Additionally, the chancellor found that Tom was the only father Catherine had ever known, Jane had encouraged the relationship between Tom and Catherine, and Jane had failed to raise the issue of Catherine's paternity in earlier court hearings on temporary custody. ¶ 17. The Chancellor used these factual findings as the predicate for his determination that Mississippi should now adopt the equitable fatherhood doctrine. Though he cited cases from several jurisdictions, the chancellor relied most heavily on an Iowa case, Gallagher v. Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1995), as the basis for his ruling. [4] In Gallagher, the husband filed for divorce, and the wife sought an adjudication that the husband was not the father of a child conceived and born during the marriage and to have the husband's parental rights terminated. Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d at 480. The trial court ruled that because the husband was neither the biological nor adoptive father of the child at issue, he had no parental rights. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted the husband's interlocutory appeal and ruled that Iowa would now recognize equitable fatherhood, finding: we believe equitable parenthood may be established in a proper case by a father who establishes all the following: (1) he was married to the mother when the child is conceived and born; (2) he reasonably believes he is the child's father; (3) he establishes a parental relationship with the child; and (4) shows that judicial recognition of the relationship is in the child's best interest. Id. at 481. The Gallagher Court noted that its adoption of equitable parenthood was consistent with principles of equitable estoppel and that all four elements of equitable estoppel were apparent in that particular case. [5] Id. at 481-82. ¶ 18. The chancellor specifically adopted the reasoning in Gallagher as the basis for his decision to establish Tom as the equitable father of Catherine, stating: This Court adopts the view of the Gallagher Court that, if a Husband were married to the wife when the child was conceived and born; Husband believes that he is Child's father; a parent/child relationship is fostered; and shows that it is in the child's best interest for a judicial determination of the relationship, then the courts should recognize an equitable parenthood. The chancellor conceded that, unlike the child in Gallagher, Catherine was not conceived during her parents' marriage but held this factual difference to be of no consequence since Catherine was born after her parents were married. ¶ 19. In finding that the law of Gallagher should be extended to Mississippi to establish equitable fatherhood, the chancellor distinguished the instant factual situation from the scenarios in two prior Mississippi cases which he found were not controlling here. The chancellor invoked the cases of W.H.W., Jr. v. J.J., 735 So.2d 990 (Miss.1999) and Rafferty v. Perkins, 757 So.2d 992 (Miss.2000). In each of those cases, this Court ruled that a putative father `has the legal right to attempt to overcome the rebuttable presumption' that the [presumed father] is the father of the child in question. Rafferty, 757 So.2d at 995 (quoting W.H.W., 735 So.2d at 992). The chancellor reasoned that because there is no putative father seeking to have his paternity established in the instant case, as there was in W.H.W. and Rafferty, and because Tom has maintained a parent-child relationship with Catherine for her entire life, and wishes to continue that relationship, Jane should not be allowed to pursue a course of action that would disestablish Tom's paternity and essentially bastardize Catherine. ¶ 20. Jane argues that the chancellor's decision completely ignores Mississippi law, as this Court has established that the doctrine of in loco parentis controls in child custody actions where a third party seeks to gain custody over a natural parent. As support for her argument, Jane cites to Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So.2d 481, 484 (Miss.1994), where this Court articulated the standard for making a custody determination in situations involving a natural parent and a third party. In Sellers, this Court stated as follows: In custody battles involving a natural parent and a third party, it is presumed that a child's best interest will be served by placement in the custody of his or her natural parent, as against any third party. In order to overcome this presumption there must be a clear showing that the natural parent has 1) abandoned the child; 2) the conduct of the parent is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child; or 3) that the parent is unfit mentally or otherwise to have custody. Sellers, 638 So.2d at 484 (citing Keely v. Keely, 495 So.2d 452, 453 (Miss.1986)). See also In re V.R., 725 So.2d 241, 246-47 (Miss.1998) (finding that in custody dispute between natural parent and third party, natural parent presumption can only be overcome by clear showing of a statutorily defined reason why parent should not retain custody). In Sellers, this Court reversed a chancellor who had awarded custody of a child to a maternal aunt over the natural father without making a finding that the father was clearly unfit to assume custody of the child. Sellers, 638 So.2d at 487. We noted in Sellers that while the chancellor correctly considered several issues in reaching his custody decision, a consideration such as separating siblings may not be used as a basis to deprive a parent of his child in favor of a third party unless the parent has been found unfit. Id. at 485. ¶ 21. Because the chancellor found that Tom is not Catherine's natural father based on genetic testing, Jane would have us declare Tom to be a third party to the custody dispute under Sellers and find that Tom can only obtain custody of Catherine upon a specific finding that Jane has either abandoned Catherine, her conduct is so immoral as to be detrimental to Catherine, or she is mentally or otherwise unfit for custody. We find the instant situation distinguishable from the cases on which Jane relies and note that the third parties seeking custody in Sellers and Keely were an aunt and a grandfather, respectively, whereas Tom has been Catherine's legal father since her birth. Thus, he has existing legal rights and obligations that the third parties in Sellers and Keely did not. Based on this fact (and others articulated below), we find our recent decision in Griffith v. Pell, 881 So.2d 184 (Miss.2004), which was handed down after the chancellor's revised decree was entered, to be controlling in the instant case, rather than the cases relied on by the chancellor or either party. ¶ 22. In Pell, a husband brought a divorce action against his wife. When she became pregnant about a year after the divorce proceedings began, the husband suspected he was not the father of the couple's first child, born prior to their marriage, and he sought a paternity test. Pell, 881 So.2d at 185. Genetic testing proved that the husband was not the biological father of the subject child, and the chancellor later granted the wife's motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the husband had no legal standing to pursue custody. Id. The wife then filed a motion to terminate the husband's visitation rights with the child, and the final divorce decree did not grant the father any visitation. Id. The wife then filed a separate paternity action against Griffith, and she and Griffith entered an agreed order declaring Griffith to be the child's biological father and ordering child support. Id. Griffith and the husband filed a motion seeking to declare the husband to be the child's legal father, with Griffith agreeing to relinquish his parental rights and allow the husband to adopt the child. Id. The chancellor, however, denied the motion, set child support payments and awarded Griffith visitation rights. Id. Both actions were appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed both decisions; and this Court consolidated the appeals on writs of certiorari. Id. ¶ 23. This Court disagreed with the chancellor's holding that the adjudication of Griffith as the child's biological father in the paternity proceedings foreclosed the husband from having any rights of custody or visitation regarding the child. Id. at 186. We stated that [m]erely because another man was determined to be the minor child's biological father does not automatically negate the father-daughter relationship held by [the husband] and the minor child, and pointed out that in Logan v. Logan, 730 So.2d 1124 (Miss.1998), this Court held that, under the facts of that particular case, the stepfather should be awarded custody of the child in a divorce action between the stepfather and the child's biological mother. Id. In Pell, we reaffirmed the in loco parentis doctrine [6] and found a portion of Logan's holding to be controlling in the instant case, specifically finding: [w]here a stepfather, as an incident to a new marriage, has agreed to support the children of a previous marriage, or where he does so over a period of time and the mother and the children in good faith rely to their detriment on that support, the best interests of the children require entry of a child support decree against the stepfather. Thus, it follows that if a stepparent can be required to pay child support for a stepchild based on his support of the stepchild over a period of time, where it is in the best interests of the child, he should be allowed to have custody of the stepchild based on the affection for and support of that child over a period of time. With the burden should go the benefit. Id. at 186 (emphasis in original). We reasoned in Pell that because the husband may be required to pay child support under Logan, because of his continued support and care for the child and the wife and child's previous reliance on that support, [i]t therefore follows that he may be awarded custody and/or visitation rights with the minor child. Id. Based on this reasoning, we reversed the chancellor's termination of the husband's parental rights in Pell and remanded the case for a determination of custody, support and visitation issues in light of the best interests of the child. Id. at 187. ¶ 24. In the instant case, Tom was established as Catherine Morgan's legal father at the time of her birth (as his name appears on her birth certificate) and has supported her under that assumption without challenge for several years. Because Tom is Catherine's legal father, he has legal rights and obligations which cannot be compromised without sufficient cause. Also, Catherine and Jane have continually relied on the support that Tom has provided for Catherine, and the record reflects that Tom and Catherine have established a strong father-daughter relationship. ¶ 25. These facts bring this case squarely within our holding in Pell; we, therefore find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding custody to Tom, despite his reliance on an equitable fatherhood doctrine. Furthermore, we note that there is no putative father in this case seeking to be recognized as Catherine's father, as there was in Rafferty. Because Catherine's biological father has not been conclusively established and no man is seeking to fill Tom's role as Catherine's father, disestablishing Tom as Catherine's father would require Jane, DHS, and the court system to expend additional time and resources in an effort to establish another man as Catherine's father, without any guarantee that such an individual would pay child support or attempt to establish a father-daughter relationship with Catherine. Such a result is not likely to be in Catherine's best interests. ¶ 26. We decline to adopt the equitable fatherhood doctrine upon which the chancellor based his custody ruling in favor of Tom. We do, however, uphold the chancellor's finding that Tom is Catherine's father in fact and is thus entitled to rights of custody, visitation, and the like, as this finding comports with our decision in Pell. Therefore, we affirm the chancellor as to this issue.