Opinion ID: 2611807
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Specific constitutional authority for powers

Text: Plaintiff relies on decisions stating that charter counties have only such authority as is expressly conferred by the Constitution or by statute. (See Younger, supra, 93 Cal. App.3d 864, 870 [counties ... have independently only such legislative authority that has been expressly conferred by the Constitution and the laws of the state]; County of Sacramento v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 222 Cal. App.3d 687, 690 [271 Cal. Rptr. 802] [quoting and relying exclusively on Younger, supra ]; Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 1212, 1221, 1222 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 179] [same].) Plaintiff observes that the challenged power to issue subpoenas is not granted (specifically or by implication) by statute. He thus concludes that defendants' charter amendment is invalid because our state Constitution nowhere specifically grants to citizens review boards the power to issue subpoenas. Plaintiff reads too much into the cited cases. They do not require that our Constitution expressly confer the specific authority under challenge. When Younger is read in context, it becomes apparent that the court did not intend the strict rule advanced by plaintiff. At issue in Younger, supra, 93 Cal. App.3d 864, was whether article XI, section 4, subdivision (b), permitted a county charter to impose term limitations on the county's elected officials. The court, in an opinion authored by Justice Wiener (also the author of the Court of Appeal decision herein), noted that the cited clause permitted a county charter to provide for the compensation, terms, and removal of elected officials, but it did not permit the charter to provide for the qualifications or tenure of those officials. At the same time, the court observed, the Constitution permitted a charter county to set the qualifications and tenure of its nonelected employees. ( Younger, supra, 93 Cal. App.3d at pp. 871-872, citing Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 1(b) & 4, subd. (f).) The court thus concluded that the state Constitution did not authorize the county, through its charter, to impose term limitations on its elected officials. (93 Cal. App.3d at p. 873.) It is apparent that the test actually applied in Younger was not whether the Constitution expressly conferred the specific challenged power; instead, the inquiry focused on whether, given the Constitution's text, the challenged power was authorized. Indeed, apart from the passage in Younger relied on by plaintiff, this latter formulation was used by that court throughout the rest of its discussion. (See, e.g., Younger, supra, 93 Cal. App.3d at pp. 869-870, quoting Whelan v. Bailey (1934) 1 Cal. App.2d 334, 335-337 [36 P.2d 709]; see also 93 Cal. App.3d at p. 870 [Therefore, a charter county has only those powers and can enact within its charter only those provisions authorized by the Constitution.].) (6) We agree that this is the appropriate inquiry, and hence reject plaintiff's claim that because the Constitution does not expressly grant to charter counties the specific authority to give its county officers power to issue subpoenas, charter counties have no authority to do so by charter amendment pursuant to the general powers and duties clause of article XI, section 4(e) of the Constitution. Instead, as the Younger court impliedly recognized, the appropriate inquiry is whether the charter amendment is authorized by the Constitution. In making this assessment, it is necessary to determine whether the power to issue subpoenas is an appropriate power under section 4(e). This brings us to plaintiff's next point.