Opinion ID: 1156663
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive limitations on the remedial power of administrative agencies

Text: The view of the judicial powers doctrine embraced by our sister states has the advantage of avoiding meaningless, wooden distinctions (used in a number of older cases) between quasijudicial and judicial powers, [30] and at the same time remaining true to the fundamental teaching of the various constitutional judicial powers clauses. The decisions forthrightly recognize that administrative agencies do indeed exercise judicial-like powers, and accept the need for broad administrative powers in our increasingly complex government. At the same time, the view espoused by our sister states includes a crucial and workable limiting principle: The agency may exercise only those powers that are reasonably necessary to effectuate the agency's primary, legitimate regulatory purposes. Thus, contrary to plaintiff's suggestions, we perceive no danger that the view of judicial power embraced by our sister states will lead to a proliferation of agencies created to adjudicate specialized private disputes, thereby undermining the traditional role of the courts. Plaintiff's fears have not materialized in other states, and many of the decisions expressly caution against any such intrusion. [31] Practical considerations also militate against a less accommodating view of the judicial powers doctrine. If nonconstitutional administrative agencies were barred from adjudicating all money claims between private individuals who are subject to administrative regulation, such agencies would be precluded from exercising powers routinely employed, and not previously challenged. [32] For example, the authority of the FEHC to award backpay might thereby be called in doubt (see ante, fn. 8), and the authority of licensing agencies to adjudicate and conditionally order restitution ( ante, pp. 362-364) might also be questioned.