Opinion ID: 1388553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Steele's Testimony

Text: Defendant challenges certain rulings limiting impeachment of informant Steele. We find no prejudicial error. Shortly before Steele took the stand, defendant moved outside of the jury's presence to introduce letters Steele had written to judges in three separate criminal cases pending against him several months before defendant's trial. In the letters, Steele vigorously offered to inform on various people in exchange for leniency, and explained that he feared injury and death in prison and had been threatened with sexual assault in jail. In addition, defendant offered to prove that Steele had threatened witnesses, apparently in the same cases. Defendant argued that the proffered evidence showed Steele was desperate to avoid imprisonment and would do or say anything to promote his own aims. The trial court refused to admit the evidence on relevance grounds. As noted, Steele stated on direct examination that he shared a jail cell with defendant while awaiting sentencing for burglary, and that defendant admitted killing Lashan to prevent her from disclosing that he had raped her. Steele also testified as follows: he offered this information to the district attorney on condition he be allowed to serve his sentence in county jail. The offer was rejected and he received a three-year prison term. Steele repeated the offer from prison, conditioning it upon an early parole date. The offer was rejected again. Steele nonetheless met with the district attorney in prison, and relayed everything he purportedly knew about the crimes. Steele further testified that he had been paroled shortly before the instant trial and had received no benefit for his testimony. He simply wanted to help society and become a better person. On cross-examination, Steele admitted repeating his request for an early parole date while meeting with the district attorney in prison. Steele also said he knew he could be returned to prison if he got in trouble on parole. In a bench conference held towards the end of Steele's cross-examination, defendant again asked to examine Steele and introduce evidence about the alleged threats. Later, after the People rested, defendant moved outside of the jury's presence to introduce the letters. Each time, the court invoked its prior ruling and denied the motion. (1) Defendant correctly observes that the court erred in denying his midtrial motion to admit the letters on relevance grounds. Evidence tending to show a witness has some motive, bias, or interest that might induce false testimony has long been a permissible form of impeachment. (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 780, subd. (f); 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (Cont.Ed.Bar 1982) § 28.6, pp. 900-913.) Here, Steele insisted that he expected no benefit and was testifying for purely unselfish reasons. The proffered letters implicitly contradicted this claim, and suggested that he had a heightened interest in currying favor with the prosecution on parole and avoiding the risk of harm he associated with imprisonment. (See People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 49-50 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1] [witness's status as probationer/parolee bears on bias].) (2) Defendant also correctly claims the court erred insofar as it excluded, as irrelevant, evidence that Steele had threatened witnesses to prevent them from testifying against him in a legal proceeding. The charged crimes occurred after Proposition 8 added article I, section 28, subdivision (d) to the California Constitution. [12] Hence, statutory rules against impeachment with acts not culminating in a felony conviction and with character traits not bearing directly upon honesty or veracity do not apply. ( People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081-1082 [255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619]; see Evid. Code, §§ 786-788.) Evidence that Steele threatened witnesses suggests he is the type of person who would harm others and subvert the court's truth-finding process for selfish reasons. Both traits are indicative of a morally lax character from which the jury could reasonably infer a readiness to lie. (See People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 314-315 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111].) (3) Nevertheless, we reject a related suggestion that by barring cross-examination of Steele about the letters and the alleged threats, the court violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Defendant emphasizes Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683, 106 S.Ct. 1431], which found such error where the defendant had been prohibited from asking a prosecution witness about a key fact suggesting bias  dismissal of a criminal charge in exchange for testimony. The high court made clear that no constitutional violation occurs where the excluded testimony could not reasonably have produced a significantly different impression of [the witness's] credibility.... ( Id. at p. 680 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 684]; see People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 750-751, fn. 2 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Inquiry into Steele's letters and his alleged threats against witnesses would not have painted a materially different picture of his credibility. Defense counsel implied on vigorous cross-examination that Steele was a manipulative and untrustworthy person, e.g., he had fired several competent attorneys in the burglary case because they advised him to plead guilty, and he had faked being defendant's friend in jail in order to obtain information that could later be used against him. In addition, a motive to fabricate could be inferred from Steele's testimony. Jurors knew he had repeatedly attempted, without official encouragement, to strike a deal with information allegedly obtained from defendant. Jurors also knew Steele was a convicted felon who was testifying under pressure to perform well on parole. No federal constitutional error occurred. Moreover, even under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065], exclusion of the impeachment evidence was not prejudicial. For the reasons stated above, Steele's testimony was susceptible of the same basic inferences as the proffered evidence, namely, that he was an untrustworthy person with reason to fabricate. He also played a relatively minor role in the prosecution's otherwise strong circumstantial guilt case. Under the circumstances, reversal of the guilt judgment is not warranted.