Opinion ID: 2230297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sandbulte's Liability for the Nuisance.

Text: Sandbulte contends he cannot personally be liable for nuisance because he merely leased the property to Joe's Ready Mix and had minimal personal involvement. The general rule is that a landowner is not responsible for a tenant's acts in creating or maintaining a nuisance upon the leasehold after the landlord transfers possession to the tenant. Klimkowski v. De La Torre, 175 Ariz. 340, 857 P.2d 392, 394 (Ct.App.1993); cf. Sulhoff v. Everett, 235 Iowa 396, 399, 16 N.W.2d 737, 739 (1944) (stating the landlord would be liable for injuries resulting from a defective construction at and before the tenancy began and concluding verdict for defendant-owner was rightly directed when it was the tenant who created the nuisance). This is because property law regards a lease as equivalent to a sale of the premises for the term of the lease, making the tenant both owner and occupier during the lease. Klimkowski, 857 P.2d at 394; accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 cmt. a., at 240 (1965) (When land is leased to a tenant, the law of property regards the lease as equivalent to a sale of the land for the term of the lease. The lessee acquires an estate in the land, and becomes for the time being the owner and occupier, subject to all of the liabilities of one in possession, both to those who enter the land and to those outside of it.); see also Van Essen v. McCormick Enters. Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 721 n. 5 (Iowa 1999) (quoting in part Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 cmt. a., at 240 (1965)). Under this rationale, a tenant's right to exclusive possession of the property suspends the landlord's right of entry, along with his ability to abate a nuisance on the property, during the term of the lease. Klimkowski, 857 P.2d at 394; see also Van Essen, 599 N.W.2d at 721. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 837 (1979) provides an exception to this rule. Like the court of appeals, we think this Restatement provision provides the basis for holding Sandbulte personally liable for the nuisance. Section 837 provides: (1) A lessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity carried on upon the land while the lease continues and the lessor continues as owner, if the lessor would be liable if he had carried on the activity himself, and (a) at the time of the lease the lessor consents to the activity or knows or has reason to know that it will be carried on, and (b) he then knows or should know that it will necessarily involve or is already causing the nuisance. (2) A vendor of land is not liable for a nuisance caused solely by an activity carried on upon the land after he has transferred it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 837, at 152 (1979); see also 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances § 120, at 647 (2002) (Under the Restatement Second of Torts, a lessor's liability is generally based on his or her consent to or knowledge of the nuisance.). Although this is our first occasion to adopt section 837, we have in the past applied a related Restatement provision, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 (1979), in Page County Appliance Center, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1984). Section 834 provides that [o]ne is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity, not only when he carries on the activity but also when he participates to a substantial extent in carrying it on. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 834 (1979). Several other states have adopted section 837 or have found it to represent the state's view. See, e.g., Klimkowski, 857 P.2d at 394; Stokes v. Lyddy, 75 Conn.App. 252, 815 A.2d 263, 272-73 (2003); Tex. Co. v. Sowers, 258 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Ky.Ct.App.1953) (applying Restatement of Torts § 837, at 293 (1939)); Parklawn, Inc. v. Nee, 243 Md. 249, 220 A.2d 563, 566-67 (1966); Koch v. Randall, 136 N.H. 500, 618 A.2d 283, 285 (1992); Walker v. L.G. Everist, Inc., 102 N.M. 783, 701 P.2d 382, 386-87 (Ct.App.1985); Commonwealth v. DeLoach, 714 A.2d 483, 487 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1998); Bowers v. Wurzburg, 207 W.Va. 28, 528 S.E.2d 475, 480-82 (1999). Here, as mentioned, substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the operation of the ready mix plant constituted a nuisance. The evidence establishes that Sandbulte is the owner of the property upon which the ready mix plant is located and that he personally applied for the building permits for the plant. The evidence also establishes that at the time Sandbulte leased the property to Joe's Ready Mix, he knew activities of a ready mix plant would be carried on by Joe's Ready Mix, and he consented to those activities. In fact, he purchased the property intending to build a ready mix plant on it. The Harms' protests to the conditions that would be created by the plant were made known to Sandbulte before the rezoning and the construction of the plant. Moreover, Sandbulte has been president of Joe's Ready Mix for a number of years and oversees all operations. Joe's Ready Mix operates a number of other ready mix plants, so Sandbulte is well acquainted with the activities that take place at ready mix plants. The following excerpt from the testimony of Sandbulte shows his ownership of the property upon which the plant is located, his development of and ownership in the plant itself, and his personal involvement in the property: Q. It's my understanding that you proceeded to build that plant; is that correct? A. Yes, we did. Q. And is that plant under lease? A. Yes. I leased it to Joe's Ready Mix. I own the property myself and I lease the  the ready mix plant to Joe's Ready Mix. Q. And who maintains the operation of that plant? A. Joe's Ready Mix. Q. And are you personally involved on your own behalf, not as president of Joe's, as far as that property is concerned? A. Yes. Q. You have the development in the property; is that correct? A. Yes, yes. Q. As far as the ongoing management, day-to-day operation, is that in Joe's Ready Mix? A. Yes, that's Joe's Ready Mix. Moreover, invoices in evidence show that Sandbulte purchased the silo, conveyor, and tunnel conveyor used in the operation of the plant and paid for the building permits. In sum, we think substantial evidence establishes all of the elements of section 837 of the Restatement of (Second) of Torts. For this reason, the district court as well as the court of appeals was correct in holding Sandbulte personally liable for the nuisance.