Opinion ID: 2675558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Young's Second Account to Sheriff Clark

Text: Mock sought to elicit testimony from Sheriff Clark that would inform the jury of Young's second, conflicting account of the events that occurred on the night of Griesbauer's death. Mock hoped that presentation of Young's conflicting accounts to Sheriff Clark would provide evidence of Young's guilty conscience as well as corroborate Mock's theory that Young set Mock up to be the fall guy for Griesbauer's murder. The district court forbade the questions to Sheriff Clark at that time, stating, -19- [T]he most salient part of the discussion I think is the last thing that [the Assistant United States Attorney] alluded to, which is that the statement is in large part self-serving at this point in time. Now looking down the road though, it's clear to me that more likely than not at some point in time, we will be revisiting this statement, and more likely than not if circumstances are right, it's probably going to come in. There is also an incidental problem to the use of the statement now. That is a timing issue. There are some things that most likely need to be brought out or established before the statement can come in because it's just kind of there and hanging there now. So having said that, I guess I'm sustaining the Government's objection at this point in time. Mock never again sought to introduce this testimony at trial; however, Mock now challenges on appeal the district court's decision to exclude this testimony. We hold that Mock failed to preserve this issue for appellate review. Mock avers that the district court's ruling as to her objection was definitive because the district court stated that it was sustaining the government's objection. Federal Rule of Evidence 103(b) was amended in 2000 to provide, Once the court rules definitively on the record—either before or at trial—a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. (emphasis added.) The rule focuses on the definitiveness of the district court's ruling because renewed objections to a district court's definitive decisions are an unnecessary formalism. Fed. R. Evid. 103 advisory committee's note to 2000 Amendment. However, when the district court reserves its ruling or otherwise indicates that the ruling is provisional, then the proponent should reintroduce the court to the issue at the appropriate time. Id. The amendment imposes the obligation on counsel to clarify whether an in limine or other evidentiary ruling is definitive when there is doubt on that point. Id. This court has never defined precisely the bounds of a definitive ruling. We have determined that a party failed to preserve an issue for appeal when the district court made a tentative pretrial ruling and expressly invited the party to raise the issue -20- during trial where it could better assess the issue's relevance in the case. United States v. Echols, 346 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2003). The district court in Echols refused to rule as to the relevance of the defendant's illegal-immigrant status, requiring instead that the government approach the bench before eliciting this testimony. Id. The district court never stated that it was overruling or sustaining any objection; however, by reserving its ruling, the district court effectively excluded the evidence until the parties presented additional facts that would make immigration status relevant. We have reiterated the Echols holding where the district court expressly postpones ruling on an evidentiary matter until the parties develop the factual context at trial. See United States v. Morales, 684 F.3d 749, 755 (8th Cir. 2012). We have also indicated that definitive rulings do not invite reconsideration. In Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., we stated, In the instant case the district court made a definitive pre-trial ruling that affected the entire course of the trial. The district court's denial of the motion was not made conditionally or with the suggestion that the matter would be reconsidered. 771 F.2d 1112, 1118 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). Therefore, a district court's invitation to re-raise evidentiary challenges renders its ruling non-definitive. The inquiry does not focus on magic words like sustained or overruled but on the overall context of the ruling. When that context includes a district court's invitation to re-raise the issue later at trial, then the ruling is not definitive. As the advisory committee note to the 2000 amendment suggests, counsel bears the burden of obtaining clarification as to whether a district court's ruling is definitive. Here, the district court's invitation to re-raise the issue of whether it should allow introduction of Young's conflicting account prevented its ruling from being definitive. As a result, Mock failed to preserve this issue for normal appellate review. -21- Assuming, without deciding, that plain-error review is appropriate, Mock fails to satisfy that standard.5 To prevail under plain-error review, the appellant must show (1) there was an error that was not affirmatively waived, (2) the error was . . . clear and obvious, (3) the error affects . . . substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Lindsey, 702 F.3d at 1100 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 494, 504 (8th Cir. 2012)). Assuming, without deciding, that plain error occurred in this case, the error did not affect Mock's substantial rights because the evidence supporting her conviction was overwhelming. See Lindsey, 702 F.3d at 1100–01 (noting that a party's substantial rights are not violated where overwhelming evidence of guilt supports verdict). This evidence includes Mock's presence at the crime scene, her purchase of the ski mask, the presence of her DNA on the ski mask and latex gloves, the gunpowder and gunshot residue on the gloves, her solicitations of Keri and Thomas to kill Griesbauer, her financial struggles, and her statements to Ballard the day after Griesbauer's death. Furthermore, introduction of Sheriff Clark's testimony would be of little probative value considering that one of the primary purposes for its introduction was to demonstrate Young's guilty conscience. The jury apparently did not need additional evidence of Young's guilty conscience because the admitted evidence was sufficient to convince the jury of Young's guilt. As a result, the district 5 Our cases are unclear as to the next step in the analysis following a determination that the appellant failed to preserve an issue under Rule 103(b). We have taken at least three positions. First, we have determined that a party's failure to seek a final ruling waives the issue such that the appellate court undertakes no review. Morales, 684 F.3d at 755; Echols, 346 F.3d at 821. Second, we have determined that a party's failure to seek a final, definitive ruling allows us to review for plain error. United States v. Lindsey, 702 F.3d 1092, 1100 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 2842 (2013). Finally, we have determined that we will conduct plain-error review when the appellant fails to obtain a definitive ruling as a matter of oversight rather than from a tactical decision not to object. United States v. Frokjer, 415 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2005). This court will not review a district court's non-definitive ruling where the appellant makes the tactical decision to refrain from further objections. Id. -22- court did not adversely affect Mock's substantial rights by excluding testimony relating to Young's second account to Sheriff Clark.