Opinion ID: 77176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendants' Evidentiary Claims

Text: 19 Having set forth the relevant legal standards, we first discuss each alleged evidentiary error to determine whether the district court abused its discretion by admitting the testimony at issue. Second, in those cases where the district court did err, we consider whether the errors were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. 20 a) Gary Coley Homicide 21 At trial, Sergeant Singer of the Miami-Dade Police Department (MDPD) testified that his investigation of an October 1987 shooting that killed Gary Coley and wounded Steven Jones and Robert Fitzpatrick revealed that Williams was the gunman. Singer also testified that Steven Jones, who did not testify at trial, had identified Williams as the shooter. Singer added that Williams later pled guilty to an attempted second-degree murder charge arising from the incident. Defense counsel lodged timely hearsay and 404(b) objections. 10 22 Singer's statement about what Jones told him is unquestionably hearsay; it has no probative value other than to establish that Williams shot Coley, Jones, and Fitzpatrick. 11 Singer's statements about what his investigation revealed are similarly hearsay; even though they do not explicitly paraphrase the words of others, the only conceivable explanation for how Singer discovered this information is through listening to the statements of others. See United States v. Shiver, 414 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir.1969) (stating that a detective's testimony that his investigation revealed that a certain car was stolen was pure hearsay, since he could not have known the facts of his own knowledge.). As the statements do not fall under any of the hearsay exceptions, the district court abused its discretion in admitting them. 23 Defense counsel did not, however, lodge a timely Confrontation Clause objection, 12 and so we review this claim for plain error only. The district court erred under Crawford by admitting Singer's statements because: (1) the hearsay statements, made by accusers to a law enforcement officer in the course of a criminal investigation, were testimonial; and (2) the defendants had no opportunity to cross-examine the declarants. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n. 8, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (characterizing statement given by victim to an investigating police officer at the scene of the crime in White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992), as testimonial). 24 This error was also plain. Error is plain when, at the time of appellate review, it is obvious or clear under current law, even if the law at the time of trial was settled to the contrary. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467-68, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). Crawford 's determination that the accuser's statements to the police in White v. Illinois were testimonial makes it obvious that admitting Sergeant Singer's accounts of the accusers' statements in the Coley murder into evidence violated the Confrontation Clause. Thus, the first two elements necessary to satisfy plain error review are satisfied here. We consider the remaining two elements (i.e., whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights and whether it seriously affected the integrity of judicial proceedings) when we later discuss the prejudicial effect of the district court's errors. 25 Moreover, as the defense contended at trial, admission of this extrinsic evidence also violated Rule 404(b). Although the government argues that this evidence is relevant to establish Williams' intent, motive, knowledge, and modus operandi in the drug-related offenses, we are unpersuaded. The Coley murder is unrelated to any of the charged drug- or firearm-related crimes, 13 and predates both of the charged conspiracies and the continuing criminal enterprise. Although we have recognized a connection between narcotics trafficking and violent crime, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d 1028, 1032-33 (11th Cir.2001) (finding prior drug sales relevant to show defendant's motive in felon in possession charge), the extrinsic evidence must have at least some plausible non-character relevance to the charged conduct to be admissible under 404(b). The evidence never specified what Williams' intent, motive, or modus operandi was in carrying out the Coley shootings, and thus this incident is only relevant to show that Williams is more likely to commit crimes because he has done so in the past, which is exactly the inference that Rule 404(b) forbids. 26 Moreover, even if this evidence were relevant to show something other than action in conformity with past crimes, any such relevance is substantially outweighed by the evidence's dramatic prejudicial effect. See United States v. Sanchez, 722 F.2d 1501, 1507-08 (11th Cir.1984) (holding testimony that the defendant, who was charged with conspiracy to import, importation of, and possession of cocaine, killed two people in furtherance of the conspiracy after he received a bad cocaine shipment was inadmissible under Rule 403); see also, Church, 955 F.2d at 702. The district court thus abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. 14 27 b) Domestic Violence Complaint against Williams 28 The district court permitted Florida State Trooper Rodney Polite to testify that he received a complaint from Williams' girlfriend in 1993 that Williams had slapped her and beat her up, over the hearsay objections of the defense. The defendants also raise Confrontation Clause and Rule 404(b) 15 challenges for the first time on appeal. 29 The district court denied the hearsay objection on the basis that the statement was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. We disagree. The only conceivable probative value of Polite's testimony is to establish that Williams did beat up his girlfriend, and was thus more likely to commit the charged crimes. And because Polite's statement clearly does not fall into any hearsay exception, the district court abused its discretion under Rule 802 in admitting it. 30 c) Palmetto Expressway Triple Murder 31 The government introduced evidence, over a hearsay objection, about a triple homicide committed on March 24, 1995, that it contended was related to Williams' and Casado's drug business. MDPD Detective Juan Capote, who responded to the homicide that night, testified that four men in a red car had been shot on the Palmetto Expressway in Miami by bullets from an AK-47 assault rifle. Three men died; one survived. Capote stated that he later received information from an anonymous caller that indicated that Williams, Casado, and Marvin Rogers, an associate of Williams, were involved in the shooting, and indicated that the three victims were street level narcotics dealers who had been selling drugs on Roger's drug turf. He further testified that the survivor of the shooting told him that Williams and two other men were the gunmen. 16 32 The district court explained that it allowed this testimony because it believed that the statements were relevant not to prove their truth, but rather to explain how Capote conducted his investigation. 17 We do not understand this reasoning. Capote's investigation was not a complex endeavor; he responded to a homicide call, examined the scene of the crime, and interviewed witnesses. Nothing the witnesses said shed any additional light on why Capote conducted his investigation in the manner that he did, nor did Capote's investigation turn up any evidence other than eyewitnesses' statements accusing Williams and Casado of committing the homicides. Rather, the only relevancy of the witnesses' statements was to establish that Williams, Casado, and Rogers did in fact commit the homicides. As the statements also do not fall into any hearsay exception, the district court clearly abused its discretion in allowing their admission. 33 d) 1992 Miami Strip Club Shootout 34 MDPD Sergeant Alexander Casas testified that he had responded to a reported shooting at the Club Rolex, a Miami-area strip club. He found .40 caliber shell casings, blood, and clothing at the crime scene, but not the victim, who had already been taken to the hospital. However, he stated that he also learned upon his arrival that Williams had tried to shoot someone in the parking lot of the club when his gun jammed, and was shot by his intended victim. Finally, Casas said that he thought it strange that Williams never talked to the police about the shooting, because shooting victims are usually cooperative, and opined that the victim of a shooting would not seek out the police in cases where the victim was the aggressor. The district court overruled defendants' hearsay and Rule 701 objections to this testimony. 35 Casas' statements about what he learned are unquestionably inadmissible hearsay, as their only probative value is to establish that Williams had attempted to shoot someone, and are not covered by a hearsay exception. The district court abused its discretion under Rule 802 in admitting this evidence. 18 36 e) 1992 Murder of Ankey 37 A witness for the government testified that Williams and Richard Stit killed a member of the rival Thomas gang in Virginia, because Williams believed Thomas gang members responsible for shooting Williams' business associates. The defense made no objection to this testimony at trial, but argues on appeal that its admission violated Rule 404(b). 38 The Ankey murder was committed during the scope of and in furtherance of the Count 2 conspiracy. It is so closely related to Williams' participation in the conspiracy that it must be considered inextricably intertwined with the evidence of the conspiracy, see Veltmann, 6 F.3d at 1498, and is thus not 404(b) evidence. It also satisfies Rule 403 because it was significantly probative of Williams' modus operandi in his drug transaction — using violence to eliminate his competitors and avenge attacks on his business associates. Admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 39 f) Jetier Homicide 40 MDPD Officer David Sanchez investigated the 1991 shooting of Willie Jetier, who was hospitalized for a short while before succumbing to his wounds. Sanchez testified that he suspected that Casado and Baptiste were the shooters and, fearing that Jetier would die before having an opportunity to identify the perpetrators, he brought them to the hospital, where Jetier identified them as the men who shot him. The defendants objected on hearsay and 404(b) grounds. 41 Officer Sanchez's testimony about what Jetier told him is inadmissible hearsay. Its only probative value was to establish that Casado and Baptiste were the shooters, and did not explain any independently relevant aspect of Sanchez's investigation. Nor does it fall under a hearsay exception. 19 Its admission was thus a clear abuse of discretion. 42 Finally, Sanchez' testimony is extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b), as it is not an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offenses, necessary to complete the story of the charged crimes, nor inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offenses. Moreover, it is only relevant to prove Casado's and Baptiste's bad character and to show their action in conformity therewith, which Rule 404(b) clearly prohibits. It was thus an abuse of discretion to admit it into evidence. 43 g) Amoco Double Murder 44 MDPD Detective Jeff Lewis testified about his investigation of the murder of Roger Davis and Tyrone Tarver at an Amoco station on February 11, 1998. Although he did not witness the shootings, Lewis told the jury that eyewitnesses had told him the following during his investigation: 45 Davis and Tarver arrived at the Amoco station at about the same time, in separate cars. Shortly thereafter, a blue-green Nissan Altima drove into the station after them. Two men clothed in camouflage, ski masks, and bulletproof vests exited the car toting AK-47s and began shooting at the two men. 46 Davis and Tarver fled their assailants, but to no avail. The gunmen hunted Davis down near a fence, and shot him while he was apparently trying to surrender. After Davis collapsed, the shooter pressed the gun barrel to his head and shot him again. Tarver, on the other hand, was gunned down as he fled across the street, but did not die immediately. Instead, he lay on the road, crying out in agony that it burned. 20 At the scene of the crime, Lewis found 43 spent AK-47 shell casings on the ground, in locations indicating that the gunmen tracked their victims across the Amoco station premises as they fired. One-and-a-half blocks away, police also recovered the Nissan Altima, and found two AK-47 assault rifles, four ski masks, a skully, 21 and some tools that Lewis opined had been used to start the vehicle, which had been reported stolen. Police also discovered that the stolen car's owner had his or her cellular telephone taken along with the car. A call made from that phone after the theft had occurred was traced to the girlfriend of Corey Fish Grease Murcherson, an associate of Williams. 47 Lewis then stated that another source informed him that a rented white Toyota Camry had also been involved in the Amoco shooting. The car was traced to a Miami rental outlet. The rental paperwork listed one Richard Stit as a driver, who, Lewis told the court, the United States Attorney's Norfolk office identified as an enforcer for Williams. Police later located the Camry, which had been destroyed by fire. 48 Lewis continued, stating that unnamed witnesses identified one passenger in the Altima as a heavyset black male, over 6' tall, with long, flowing dreadlocks, and the driver as a shorter black male with a medium build. He said that another eyewitness, Mario Frazier, told him that the car's driver was Casado. 22 He also detailed the contents of a Miami Herald article, admitted into evidence, describing one gunman as a 25-30 year-old, 250-lb black male, 5' 9 to 6' tall, with a light complexion, and a long haircut — a description somewhat consistent with photos of a man Lewis identified as Hawthorne. It described the other gunman as a 20-25 year-old, 160-175 lb black male, 5' 9-6' tall, with a light complexion and Afro haircut. Hawthorne's involvement, Lewis also testified, was corroborated by an interview he had with a prisoner, Kevin Bovian. Bovian allegedly told Lewis that Hawthorne said he was the driver of the rental car, that he cut his dreadlocks after the press coverage describing the gunmen, and that the shooting was in retaliation for a shooting in which Hawthorne was wounded the month before. 49 According to Lewis, Jesus Wilson also told him that he saw Leonard and Lenard Brown inside the Altima. Wilson claimed that the Altima had been hidden at the house of a Williams' associate, earlier on the day of the shooting, along with the bulletproof vests and AK-47s Wilson said were used to kill Davis and Tarver. Lewis said that Wilson told him that the twins asked him to buy dark, full-face ski masks for them, because they did not want to draw attention to themselves by making such a purchase. However, Wilson contradicted Bovian's statement that Hawthorne was a gunman, telling Lewis instead that the twins killed Davis and Tarver. Lewis concluded by opining to the court that based on his investigation, he thought that the Amoco murders were the result of a turf war between the Boobie boys and a rival gang called Vonda's gang. 50 Finally, Lewis told the court that Williams' friend and associate Corey Murcherson, was killed shortly after the Amoco double murder in which he had allegedly participated. Lewis testified that he believed Williams and Brown thought Murcherson was a liability after the Amoco murder and sought to have him killed. Lewis' speculation about Williams' motives became more convincing after Murcherson's former lawyer, Karen Mills-Francis, testified for the defense that on November 16, 2005, Murcherson admitted to her that he was in fact a gunman in the Amoco murders. The defendants raised a hearsay objection to this evidence at trial, but also argue for the first time on appeal that its admission violated Rule 404(b). 51 Lewis' recollection of what eyewitnesses told him about the murder is inadmissible hearsay, as are his statements about what Bovian and Wilson told him. They were offered to establish their truth — who killed Davis and Tarver, and how — and do not fall into any hearsay exception. The district court thus abused its discretion in allowing this testimony. 52 The Miami Herald articles are also inadmissible hearsay, as they are relevant primarily to establish the truth of their contents — the identity of the gunmen. 23 The articles might be permissible for the non-hearsay purpose of establishing that the descriptions of the gunmen had been made public, but in the absence of any non-hearsay evidence concerning the description of the gunmen, the prejudice stemming from the hearsay use of the evidence substantially outweighs the articles' probative value to establish the murders' publicity. Thus, their admission constitutes an abuse of discretion under Rule 802. 53 Lewis' statement about the white Camry, on the other hand, was not hearsay because it was probative to establish why he procured the car's paperwork, and was properly admitted. Nonetheless, his account of what the U.S. Attorney's office told him about Richard Stit was offered to prove the truth of its contents, and is inadmissible hearsay, the allowance of which was an abuse of discretion. 54 Finally, the entire testimony concerning the Amoco murders and Murcherson's murder plainly violates Rule 404(b). 24 All three killings occurred outside the temporal scope of all of the charged crimes, including the Count 2 conspiracy, and there is hardly any evidence, beyond Detective Lewis' rank speculation, linking the shootings to any of the charges in the indictment. Its only real probative value is to establish the criminal propensities of those involved. And even if this evidence did have some probative worth, the details of the Amoco double homicide are so chilling that its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs any such probative value. The admission of this evidence thus constitutes error that is plain. 25 See United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003) (It is the law of this circuit that, at least where the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that error was plain when the district court's ruling was obviously contrary to the text of a federal statute). 55 In sum, admission of this evidence was an abuse of discretion under Rule 802, and represented an error that was plain under Rule 404(b). 26 56 h) Benny Brownlee Murder 57 The government's case accused Williams and other unnamed individuals of the 1994 murder of Benny Brownlee, allegedly carried out in retaliation for the murder of Williams' associate and friend Gary Dukes. Dukes was killed in a drive-by shooting while at a barbershop run by Jesus Wilson, a drug dealer and barber who bought cocaine from Williams and Harper. Johnny Hankins, a Williams associate who was also shot in the drive-by, testified that Williams told him that Williams and Marvin Rogers avenged Dukes' murder by killing a member of the Thomas gang, and that Harper had driven the car they used in committing the murder. 58 The government alleged that this member of the Thomas gang was Benny Brownlee, who was killed hours after the Dukes killing. 27 The MDPD detective who had responded to the Brownlee homicide, Gus Borges, gave a detailed account of the killing on the basis of statements he took from three eyewitnesses. He said that he learned from one eyewitness, Marlin Randal, that men in a beige Honda shot Brownlee as he fled from his attackers. Randal then reportedly said that Brownlee fell on the ground and defenseless, [and] two subjects walked up to him and continued shooting him. This commentary, Borges stated, was confirmed by two security guards present at the shooting. Moreover, he testified that the doctor who performed Brownlee's autopsy classified the death as a homicide. There was no evidence that these three eyewitnesses were unavailable to testify at trial. 59 Borges also found a beeper at the Brownlee crime scene that had telephone numbers from received calls stored in its memory. Police called the stored numbers and stated that the persons who answered the phone told him that they had paged the beeper trying to reach Marvin Rogers. Borges further testified that he learned that Marvin Rogers was part of a group operating in the Carol City area known as the primary street-level drug dealers in that area. He concluded by telling the jury that Williams, Rogers, Raye, and Bernard Shaw emerged as primary suspects in the slaying, but that there was never sufficient evidence to arrest anyone for the crime. The defense raised a hearsay objection to this evidence at trial. 60 Although Borges' testimony about the recovered beeper and the numbers it contained remain unobjectionable, Borges' testimony about what others told him or about what he had learned in the course of his investigation is only relevant to establish its truth, that Williams, Rogers, Raye, and Bernard Shaw killed Benny Brownlee. The fact that it explains what Borges did in the course of his investigation is immaterial, because Borges' investigation is only relevant to prove the very same impermissible thing — that these men in fact killed Benny Brownlee. Likewise, Borges' testimony that Williams, Rogers, Raye and Bernard Shaw emerged as the primary suspects in the shooting itself remains inadmissible hearsay, as it is founded on the hearsay statements of others. The statements are therefore hearsay, and because they do not fall into any hearsay exception, the district court abused its discretion in admitting them. 61 i) Fatso and Hollywood Murders 62 About one month after the Brownlee homicide, two more Thomas gang members were murdered: Walter Fatso Betterson and Derrick Hollywood Harris. Betterson's mother and Harris' father both testified that their children had told them shortly before they were shot that they were having problems with Williams and feared that Williams was going to kill them. 63 However, the government introduced other non-hearsay evidence at trial linking Williams and Casado with the murders. Williams' friend and associate Johnny Hankins testified that Williams told him that Betterson and Harris had killed a witness to the Dukes murder, and that Williams, Casado, and Marvin Rogers had killed them in revenge. Hankins' testimony was corroborated by Betterson's neighbor Johnny Hampton. Hampton testified that he saw a Chevrolet Impala chase Betterson's car into his neighborhood. Betterson's car crashed into a pole on the side of the road near his house, and the Impala pulled up alongside it. Someone inside Betterson's car got out and ran, pursued by an occupant of the Impala. Immediately afterwards, three men arrived in a Delta `88. Two passengers emerged, fired shots into Betterson's automobile, and then fled the scene in the Delta. Minutes later, Hampton approached Betterson's car and saw two bodies in the car, later identified as Harris and Betterson. Hampton further identified Williams and Leonard Brown as two of the shooters from the Delta `88. The defendants raised a hearsay objection at trial, and also raise a Rule 404(b) challenge for the first time on appeal. 64 The parents' statements about what their children told them are hearsay, but are excepted as present sense impressions under Rule 803(1) or as statements expressing then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition under Rule 803(3). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. 65 Moreover, the parents' testimony is not 404(b) evidence because it is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. See Veltmann, 6 F.3d at 1498. Evidence at trial tied these murders to Williams' feud with the rival Thomas gang and the Thomas gang's murder of Gary Dukes, which in turn was part of the prosecution's case against the defendants in the Count 2 conspiracy. Moreover, it satisfies Rule 403 because it is significantly probative of the defendants' modus operandi in their drug business. The admission of this testimony was thus not error under Rule 404(b), much less plain error. 66 j) Colors Apartment Triple Murders 67 Detective Simmons' testimony also linked Pless to the 1995 triple murder of Otis Green, Green's girlfriend Alicia, and Alicia's five-year-old son Mikie, at the Colors Apartment complex in Miami. Green was a small-time drug dealer who sold at the Colors complex, which was considered his spot. However, Pless also sold drugs there, as did David Pagan, Pless's supplier and an associate of Casado. Witnesses testified that a dispute had arisen between Pagan and Green, and that Pagan had put a hit out on him. Pagan himself testified that Pless had engaged in a shootout with Green's workers at the Colors complex a few months before the murders. 68 Brian Gibson, a Colors resident who was with Green, Alicia, and Mikie at the time of the shooting, testified that they were parked near the Colors complex when men in ski masks approached the car with large guns and opened fire, killing everyone but him. He also stated that earlier that night he had seen Casado and Baptiste around the Colors complex, and had seen Pless's truck nearby. 69 Detective Simmons testified that he learned from Anthony Brantley that Pless, Casado, and Johnson had planned and carried out the murders. Brantley ostensibly told Simmons that Pless solicited him to drive the getaway car. Simmons stated that Brantley said he met Pless and Johnson at Casado's warehouse, where they retrieved a stolen car and equipped themselves with assault weapons, dark clothes, and bulletproof vests, and then carried out the killings while Casado watched from a distance. 70 The government also introduced into evidence a photo of a tattoo Pless had depicting a young boy praying over a crucifix-shaped tombstone engraved with the letters RIP that read, Dear God Can You Save Me. Simmons said that Pless had told him he got this tattoo after the Colors murders to deflect suspicion that he had been involved. 71 The defendants did not raise an objection to this testimony at trial, but now argue that admission of Anthony Brantley's statements violated Rule 802 and the Confrontation Clause. Admission of the statements did plainly violate the hearsay rule. 28 Simmons' testimony was clearly admitted for its truth, and concerns statements Brantley made in the course of a police interrogation — in this case, an interview with Detective Simmons as part of a criminal investigation. 29 72 However, it is apparent from the record that counsel for Arthur Pless invited this error while attempting to undermine the credibility of Simmons' investigation. During cross-examination, Pless's attorney asked Simmons whether Brantley was among the quality people that Simmons had relied on in his investigation of the murders and subsequent questioning of Pless: 73 Q: And Anthony Brantley, Cedrick's brother, that's the word of another person upon whom you were getting ready to interrogate my client to determine if he was going to incriminate himself in the triple homicide over there in the Colors apartments of Otis Green, his girlfriend, and Michael Frazier, correct? 74 A: What was the first part of your question? 75 Q: Anthony Brantley is the person upon whom you are relying for your information that you got before my client surrendered and you started talking to him about that homicide? 76 A: In part. Anthony Brantley was a young man recruited by Efrain Casado, Arthur Pless and Benjamin Johnson to drive a vehicle. He was the getaway driver in the Colors apartments complex in which the little boy was killed along with his mother. He drove the vehicle and provided sworn testimony before the grand jury which was corroborated in every respect through our investigation, and others. It was not totally based on one person's testimony, sir. 77 Q: And Anthony Brantley didn't get arrested or charged with it even though he claimed to you under sworn testimony that he was the driver, that he was taking him to and from a hit where these people were killed. He wasn't arrested and charged or indicted downtown to stand trial for first degree murder and look at death in the electric chair or a lethal injection now, was he? 78 A: No, sir. 79 Counsel also noted that Anthony Brantley had recently been released from jail. 80 On re-direct examination, Detective Simmons related that Anthony Brantley had spoken to him in the course of the investigation, and had testified before a grand jury, both times describing his involvement in the Colors murders. According to Simmons, Anthony Brantley had confessed that he was recruited by Casado to assist in the murder of Otis Green, and had driven the car from which Johnson and Pless emerged before committing the murders, and in which Casado, Baptiste, Johnson and Pless apparently escaped after the murders. 81 [I]t is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party. The doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party induces or invites the district court into making an error. Where invited error exists, it precludes a court from invoking the plain error rule and reversing. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327 (11th Cir.2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Martinez, 604 F.2d 361, 366 (5th Cir.1979) (The accepted rule is that where injection of allegedly inadmissible evidence is attributable to the action of the defense, its introduction does not constitute reversible error.) (quoting United States v. Doran, 564 F.2d 1176, 1177 (5th Cir.1977)). Moreover, a defendant can invite non-responsive testimony when he insists on pursuing a line of questioning after it becomes apparent that further cross-examination will elicit potentially damaging testimony, and fails to object to the non-responsive answer when it is given. See id. (finding non-responsive testimony invited when counsel pursued his questioning until he dragged the prejudicial statements out of the witness). 82 It can be fairly said that Pless's counsel elicited the Anthony Brantley testimony from Simmons on cross. Pless's counsel specifically referred to sworn testimony in which Brantley supposedly stated that he was the driver, that he was taking him [Pless] to and from a hit where these people were killed. He also did not object when Simmons gave his non-responsive answer. The re-direct testimony merely elaborated on Simmons' response to this question, which presented the basic outline of the Brantley statement. Thus, Pless cannot now complain about the district court's error. 83 However, the other defendants may still fairly object to the introduction of this testimony on appeal, as the errors of Pless's counsel are not their own, and they in no way were responsible for Simmons' testimony on cross. Moreover, any objection that they could have made on redirect was foreclosed, as the prosecutor was entitled to elaborate on the information yielded in cross. However, because they raised no objection at the trial court, their claims are subject only to review for plain error. Simmons' testimony that Brantley told him that Casado and Johnson carried out the murders was inadmissible hearsay. That error satisfies the first two prongs of the plain error test. We reserve our discussion of the remaining two prongs for our discussion of prejudice. 84 k) Johnny Belliard Murder 85 The government's case also connected Pless to the murder of Johnny Belliard, a drug dealer who had been threatening to steal money and drugs from Pless. MDPD Detective David Simmons told the jury that he worked on a task force investigating homicides that was [sic] committed by members of the Boobie boys. He testified that Cedric Brantley, an associate of Pless's who sold drugs for him in Pensacola, told him in a prison interview that Pless and Casado hired Brantley's brother Anthony to kill Belliard. 30 86 The defense did not object to this testimony at trial but now argues that admission of the statements violated Rule 802 and the Confrontation Clause. We therefore review the district court's decision for plain error only. 31 The statements are plainly hearsay; they were made by an out-of-court declarant and their only probative value is for their truth. In sum, admission of this evidence violated Rule 802; that error is now plain. 32 87 l) 1997 Car Chase and Robert Sawyer Shooting 88 Robert Sawyer was a drug dealer whose business interests sometimes conflicted with Williams' and Casado's. At trial, Jesus Wilson testified that Sawyer had threatened to kill both Williams and Casado over a drug dispute, and that Casado had returned the threat. Later, Sawyer shot, but did not kill, Casado outside Casado's house. Wilson also testified that he, Williams, and others had learned that Sawyer had killed Marvin Rogers, Williams' associate who had participated in the clashes with the Thomas gang. In response, Williams placed a price on Sawyer's life. 89 Officer Ariel Saud testified that on March 23, 1997, he had attempted to stop a black Honda in the Overtown section of Miami. The car fled, prompting a car chase. Saud testified that he saw weapons being tossed from the car, and that eventually the occupants of the car fled on foot. Saud and fellow Officers Miguel Rodriguez, Steven Walthen, and David Sanchez testified that they pursued the fleeing suspects and eventually captured Williams, Casado, and James Deleveaux, a Williams associate. 33 The police found Williams behind a woodpile, and Casado and Deleveaux in the shower of a nearby residence. 34 The officers testified that the owners of the properties where the three men were found said that they did not have permission to be there. Various weapons, including assault rifles, as well as camouflage clothing and armored vests were recovered from the scene. Rene Texidor, Casado's friend, testified that Williams, Casado, and Deleveaux had been on their way to kill Sawyer when they were captured. 90 Jesus Wilson also testified that in February 1998, he had been in an apartment with Williams, Casado, Lenard Brown, Roshawn Davis, and others, who had assembled weapons and were planning to kill Sawyer. Later, Wilson said, Lenard Brown and Roshawn Davis told him that Lenard, Williams, and Casado had shot Sawyer from their car while traveling next to him on the highway, but that Sawyer survived. The defense raised hearsay and 404(b) objections to this evidence at trial. 91 Wilson's statements relating what Lenard Brown and Roshawn Davis told him are not hearsay because under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) they are co-conspirator statements made during the course and in furtherance of the Count 2 drug conspiracy. However, the officers' testimony about statements made by the owners of the properties where Williams, Casado, and Delevaux were found are hearsay, and do not fall into a hearsay exception. Their admission therefore was an abuse of discretion. However, their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The statements were not testimonial under Crawford because there is insufficient evidence to say that they were accusatory in nature. There is no indication as to whether the declarants knew that their statements would be used at trial later. Roberts therefore governs their admission. Because the details of the surrounding testimony make it almost impossible for the owners' statements to have been false, the statements carry a particularized guarantee of trustworthiness, and their admission does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 92 Finally, we need not analyze whether admission of this evidence violated 404(b) because none of it is extrinsic. It clearly concerns an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense. See Veltmann, 6 F.3d at 1498. The dispute with Sawyer arose out of the defendants' involvement in the Count 2 drug conspiracy. Moreover, the testimony does not pose a significant enough risk of unfair prejudice to substantially outweigh its probative value in demonstrating the modus operandi of the defendants' drug business. Its admission was thus not an abuse of discretion. 93 In sum, only admission of the statements by the property owners that Williams and Casado lacked permission to be on their land was an abuse of discretion under Rule 802. 94 m) 1997 Armed Robbery 95 MDPD Officer Steven Waltham and Detective David Richards testified that a stolen ATM card and checkbook were found in the black Honda used by Williams, Casado, and Delevaux in the March 23, 1997 car chase. Detective Richards stated that several months earlier, the owner of the ATM card and checkbook had reported that she had those items stolen from her at gunpoint, by someone she later identified in a photographic lineup as Williams. 96 The district court allowed this testimony over a hearsay objection, believing that it was not hearsay because it was a statement of identification. Rule 801(d)(1)(C) does state that statements of identification of a person made after perceiving the person are not hearsay, but only if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross examination concerning the statement. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 36 F.3d 266, 271 (2d. Cir.1994) (Under Rule 801(d)(1)(C), a statement of prior identification may be received in evidence only if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the prior identification.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The victim of the theft never testified at trial, so the testimony is hearsay. Since no hearsay exception applies, its admission was an abuse of discretion. 97 n) Everett Cooper Murder 98 The government's case accused Pless and Casado of killing small-time drug dealer Everett Cooper (a.k.a. Charlie Paul) in September 1994. Cooper dealt drugs at the Silver Blue Lakes apartment complex in Miami, where Pless also sold cocaine. Detective Michael Malott, who investigated the murder, stated that eyewitnesses told him that a man got out of a Lincoln Town Car and shot Cooper with a chrome revolver. Malott further stated that Casado had been known to drive a blue Town Car, and that shell casings found at the scene matched those found at the scene of the Colors triple murder. 35 The defense lodged a hearsay objection at trial, and also raises a 404(b) challenge for the first time on appeal. 99 Malott's testimony about what eyewitnesses told him and about what Casado had been known to do is inadmissible hearsay because it is only relevant for its truth — to establish that Casado and Pless were responsible for Cooper's death. As no hearsay exceptions apply, admission of this testimony was an abuse of discretion. 100 However, admission of Malott's testimony did not violate Rule 404(b), much less constitute plain error, because like the government's evidence concerning the Ankey murder, evidence that Pless and Casado killed a rival drug dealer during the scope of the Count 2 conspiracy is inextricably intertwined with the evidence of their involvement in that conspiracy. See Veltmann, 6 F.3d at 1498. And although the evidence is certainly prejudicial, it still satisfies Rule 403 because the danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh its significant probative value in establishing Pless's involvement in the Count 2 drug conspiracy. 101 o) America's Most Wanted/Crimestoppers 102 Deputy U.S. Marshal Michael Moran testified that Williams had appeared on the television programs Crimestoppers and America's Most Wanted around 1998. The defense made an objection at trial based on hearsay, and Rules 403 and 404(b). 103 Although the government offered this testimony to provide background on Williams' status as a fugitive, it is nonetheless inadmissible hearsay. The only relevance of the testimony is to show that Williams was, in fact, wanted by law enforcement. As it falls under none of the hearsay exceptions, it was an abuse of discretion to admit it into evidence. 104 Finally, although this evidence may be inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense since it demonstrates that Williams was trying to elude capture for the charged offenses and thus tends to show his cognizance of his own guilt, see People v. Slater, 268 A.D.2d 260, 260, 701 N.Y.S.2d 371 (N.Y.App.Div.2000), it does not satisfy Rule 403 in this case. 36 While this evidence has virtually no probative value, it is incredibly and unfairly prejudicial — essentially telling the jurors to believe that Williams is guilty of the charged offenses because he appeared on two well-known television programs featuring individuals that police consider responsible for committing crimes. 37 See Ford v. Curtis, 277 F.3d 806, 811 (6th Cir.2002) (finding references to the F.B.I's Ten Most Wanted List and to America's Most Wanted  in the government's case constituted 404(b) evidence that was of nominal relevance and prejudicial); Wilding v. State, 674 So.2d 114, 119 (Fla.1996), overruled on other grounds by Devoney v. State, 717 So.2d 501 (Fla.1998) (The fact that [the defendant] was the subject of [the] widely viewed television program [ America's Most Wanted ] clearly was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.). Permitting the admission of this evidence was thus an abuse of discretion. 105 p) 1997 Staged Drug Rip-Off 106 Government witnesses testified that defendant Baker, an MDPD officer, had been hired by Williams, Shaw, and Harper to steal drugs and money from their customers. MDPD officers also testified that Baker participated in an unrelated drug rip-off for a different drug dealer in 1997 that had been staged by the MDPD's Internal Affairs Department. In particular, Detective Joe Gross, who supervised a surveillance operation against Baker, testified as to what other officers who were watching Baker told him over police radio about Baker's actions. The defense made a hearsay objection to Gross' testimony at trial, and raises a 404(b) challenge to its admission for the first time on appeal. 107 We need not reach the defendants' 404(b) contentions, as Gross' statements were inadmissible hearsay. Although they were relevant to explain how Gross conducted his sting operation, their primary probative value was to prove that Baker was accepting money in return for helping drug dealers rip off their customers. The testimony does not fall into any hearsay exception, and thus its admission was an abuse of discretion. 108 q) Threats Made By Williams, Baptiste, and Brown to Witnesses in Holding Cells 109 Errol Sawyer, an acquaintance of many of the defendants, testified for the government that Leonard Brown, Baptiste, Shaw, and Williams threatened him while he was in a holding cell waiting to testify. Sawyer said that Brown told him that black grease-ass kid's mother is sitting over there [in the courtroom] with his kid and to be careful about your son `cause we're going to get him on the streets and [fuck] him. He said that Shaw asked him why he let the white people make him start talking, that Williams made sly remarks, and that both said, You ain't going to get forty years off of me. Witness Reggie White testified that he also overheard Williams and Brown make threatening remarks to Sawyer. The defense objected to this testimony on Rule 404(b) grounds. 38 110 Although prejudicial, [c]ourts may consider evidence of threats to witnesses as relevant in showing consciousness of guilt under Rule 404(b). United States v. Gonzalez, 703 F.2d 1222, 1223 (11th Cir.1983). However, [b]ecause the potential prejudice from death threats may be great, the government must have an important purpose for introducing the evidence in order to satisfy the balancing test of Rule 403. Id. (internal citation omitted). We have held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed a government informant to testify in a multi-defendant trial that one defendant threatened his life two weeks before trial, when the court had given a limiting instruction to the jury to consider the testimony only with respect to the defendant who had made the threat. Id. Although we realize that the district court has wide discretion in admitting evidence, id. at 1224, it is clear to us that the district court abused that discretion in allowing the evidence of the threats in this case, to the extent that it refused to give such a limiting instruction to the jury commanding them to only consider the evidence against Shaw, Williams, Leonard Brown, and Baptiste, in light of the extreme prejudice that such evidence can create with respect to other co-defendants. See id. at 1223-24 (presence of limiting instruction important in determination that district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence with respect to the defendants that did not make threats). 111 The district court therefore abused its discretion in admitting this evidence as to Casado, Harper, Pless, Johnson, Hawthorne, Gibson, and Baker. As to the four defendants that actually made the threats, whether admission of this testimony was proper remains a close call, but we ultimately conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it as to Williams, Shaw, Baptiste, and Leonard Brown. 112 r) Gibson's 1980s Drug Sales 113 Several government witnesses testified that Gibson, with the help of her twin sons, engaged in many drug transactions in Overtown in the 1980s, before the time period covered by the Count 2 conspiracy. These witnesses said that Gibson had a spot in Overtown near her house where she would give small quantities of cocaine and heroin to small children, to sell on the street for her. Leonard and Lenard Brown, who at that time were still in their early teens, allegedly helped Gibson pack cocaine, cook it into crack, and sell cocaine and heroin on the street along with other children. The defense raised a 404(b) objection at trial. 114 This evidence of Gibson's drug sales before any of the charged conduct in the indictment is extrinsic evidence whose admission is regulated by Rule 404(b). Under that Rule, this evidence was probative of Gibson's intent on the Count 17 charge of knowingly maintaining a place for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, and using drugs. United States v. Cardenas, 895 F.2d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir.1990) (holding that when a defendant charged with conspiracy enters a not guilty plea, he makes intent a material issue in the case and imposes a substantial burden on the government. Thus, the government may introduce extrinsic offenses which qualify under 404(b) to prove defendant's state of mind, unless defendant takes affirmative steps to remove the issue of intent from the case.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony concerning Gibson's extrinsic drug sales. 115 s) Reference to Pless's Post-Miranda Silence 116 Pless raises a Fifth Amendment due process challenge to Detective Simmons' testimony regarding Simmons' post-arrest questioning of Pless regarding the Everett Cooper murder and Pless's refusal to answer certain questions. The following exchange ensued: 117 Q [AUSA]: Did there come a time that your interview of Mr. Pless terminated, told you he didn't want to talk to you any further? 118 A [SIMMONS]: Yes. But prior to doing so, he mentioned — 119 MR. MATTERS: 39 Objection. I would like to preserve that for a sidebar. 120 THE COURT: Sustained. 121 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 122 Q: What subject matter were you relating to him when the interview ended? 123