Opinion ID: 2590339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceptional Sentencing

Text: ¶ 19 Hughes next argues that under the current SRA, the trial court has no statutory authority to impose an exceptional minimum indeterminate sentence. Even if the SRA does not prohibit exceptional minimum indeterminate sentencing, Hughes argues that no statutory procedure exists for judicial fact-finding, therefore the trial court cannot impose such a sentence. His first argument fails, and the second issue he raises is not ripe for review. Further, both arguments incorrectly assume that the SRA's 2005 and 2007 amendments necessarily impact his case. ¶ 20 Hughes was sentenced under former RCW 9.94A.712 (2001), an indeterminate sentencing statute that governs sentencing for nonpersistent sex offenders. Under RCW 9.94A.712(3), the trial court must impose both a minimum and maximum sentence. The maximum sentence is the statutory maximum sentence for the offense, which in this case is life. When imposing the minimum sentence, the court may either impose a standard range or an exceptional sentence. If the court seeks to impose an exceptional minimum sentence, it must do so pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535, the general exceptional sentencing statute. When Hughes was sentenced, he was subject to the terms of former RCW 9.94A.535 (2003). Under that statute, [a] sentence outside the standard sentence range shall be a determinate sentence unless it is imposed on an offender sentenced under RCW 9.94A.712. An exceptional sentence. . . under RCW 9.94A.712 shall be to a minimum term set by the court. . . . Thus, under former RCW 9.94A.535 (2003), an exceptional sentence imposed pursuant to RCW 9.94A.712 could be indeterminate and set by the court. ¶ 21 In April 2005, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.535 to comply with Blakely and provided that most aggravating factors to support an exceptional sentence must be found by a jury through the procedures set out in former RCW 9.94A.537 (2005). In 2005, the legislature also removed the provision from RCW 9.94A.535 excepting indeterminate sentences under RCW 9.94A.712. After the 2005 amendments, RCW 9.94A.535 states in relevant part, [a] sentence outside the standard range shall be a determinate sentence. (Emphasis added.) In 2007, the legislature also added RCW 9.94A.537(2), which states that a court may empanel a jury to consider any alleged aggravating circumstances. . . at the new sentencing hearing. The legislature's 2007 statement of intent indicated that a court's authority to impanel a jury applied in all cases regardless of the date of the original trial or sentencing. Laws of 2007, ch. 205, § 1. ¶ 22 Hughes argues that since RCW 9.94A.712(3) requires an exceptional minimum sentence to be set pursuant to current RCW 9.94A.535, which permits exceptional sentencing for determinate sentences only, then the trial court has no authority to sentence him to an indeterminate exceptional minimum sentence. Despite the gap that Hughes identifies in the current statutory scheme, we conclude that he is not subject to the 2005 amendments to RCW 9.94A.535 because his convictions were entered in 2004 before those amendments became effective. See State v. Pillatos, 159 Wash.2d 459, 470, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007) (holding 2005 amendments applicable only to cases where trials have not yet begun or pleas not yet entered before amendments' effective date). We therefore hold that the trial court has the authority to consider the State's request for an exceptional minimum indeterminate sentence. [14] ¶ 23 As to Hughes' second point regarding the absence of a statutory procedure for judicial fact-finding, it is premature for us to rule on this issue. Hughes has not been resentenced, and we do not know whether the sentencing court will judicially find any aggravating circumstances to support an exceptional sentence. When the trial court exercises its authority to resentence Hughes, it should consider former RCW 9.94A.535 (2003), which governs Hughes' sentencing. Under that statute, a court imposing an exceptional sentence is required to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law and is permitted to consider a nonexhaustive list of illustrative factors in imposing an exceptional sentence. Former RCW 9.94A.535 (2003). Thus, a statutory procedure for judicial fact-finding exists. Pursuant to Clarke, such judicial fact-finding in the context of the indeterminate sentencing scheme set out in RCW 9.94A.712 is not violative of the Sixth Amendment. 156 Wash.2d at 893, 134 P.3d 188. Therefore, no Blakely issue exists.