Opinion ID: 788794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BIA Order of Removal

Text: 12 Noriega-Lopez's holding rests upon at least three grounds that apply here: (1) the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47); (2) the structure of the current immigration department and process of judicial review, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3)(A); and (3) the consistency of this interpretation with the appellate authority of the BIA, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). The same statutory language and structure applicable in Noriega-Lopez apply with equal force to cases like Molina's, in which an IJ finds an applicant removable, but grants discretionary relief from removal which is then appealed by the INS and reversed by the BIA. 13 The Government concedes that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A), which defines order of deportation, now applies to orders of removal as well. This definition contains plain language that deportation orders can be entered only by special inquiry officers — not the BIA, which is specifically charged by the statute with affirming such orders on appeal in order to make them effective. 2 See Noriega-Lopez, 335 F.3d at 883 (The BIA (in its sole appearance in the statute) is restricted to affirming such orders, not issuing them in the first instance.). As we pointed out in Noriega-Lopez, regulations in effect at the time Congress passed 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47) defined immigration judge to mean a special inquiry officer and may be used interchangeably with the term special inquiry officer wherever it appears in this chapter. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1( l ) (1996). 14 Moreover, nothing in the regulations enumerating the powers of the BIA indicates that the scope of those powers goes beyond appellate review of immigration judges' decisions and other administrative adjudications. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (The Board shall function as an appellate body charged with the review of those administrative adjudications under the Act that the Attorney General may by regulation assign to it.); see also § 1003.1(b)(2) (appellate jurisdiction over decisions of immigration judges in deportation cases). 15 This is in contrast to the regulations enumerating the powers and authority of immigration judges. See id. § 1240.1(a)(1)(i) (authority to issue order of removal pursuant to INA § 240(c)(1)(A)); id. § 1240.12(c) (The order of the immigration judge shall direct the respondent's removal, or the termination of the proceedings, or such other disposition of the case as may be appropriate.); id. § 1240.13(d) (If the immigration judge decides that the respondent is removable and orders the respondent to be removed, the immigration judge shall advise the respondent of such decision....); see also id. § 1241.1 (An order of removal made by the immigration judge ... shall become final [inter alia] [u]pon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals;[or][u]pon expiration of the time allotted for an appeal if the respondent does not file an appeal within that time. (emphasis added)). 16 The Government argues that the present case is distinguishable from Noriega-Lopez because, in that case, the IJ determined that petitioner was not removable. In contrast, the Government argues, a finding that an applicant is removable, such as the IJ's finding in this case, is essentially equivalent to an order of removability: 17 Here the special inquiry officer (immigration judge) determined that Petitioner was removable, and the Board concurred in that uncontested finding on appeal. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (such order shall become final upon... a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or ... expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals). 18 Accepting the Government's interpretation of the interplay between a finding of removability and an actual order of removal would render the IJ's discretionary ability to literally cancel removal meaningless, because a finding of removability in the first instance is a prerequisite to such discretionary relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (providing circumstances under which the Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable from the United States). 19 The Government's reasoning is also flawed because it conflates the BIA's uncontested substantive power to reverse a finding of removability or eligibility for cancellation of removal on appeal with the procedural power to issue the order of removal that results from such a reversal. (Resp't's Opp'n to Pet'r's Mot. for Remand, at 7) ([O]nce the Board reversed the immigration judge's order granting cancellation of removal, there was nothing left to do, but affirm the immigration judge's finding that Petitioner is removable, and enter an appropriate order disposing of the matter on appeal.). There is no statutory authority or case law that supports the assertion that a finding that a petitioner is removable is the same thing as an order of removal and, indeed, the Government points to none on appeal. 20 The Government correctly points out that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1, which delimits the powers vested in the BIA, gives Board members the power to take any action consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case. 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(1)(ii). But the key language in that provision is  consistent with their authorities under the Act and regulations.  Id. (emphasis added). There is simply no authority under the INA or any regulation for the BIA to issue an order of removal. Instead, [t]he current INA ... spells out the manner in which the Attorney General is to exercise his authority to order aliens removed, namely, through proceedings instigated by the INS before immigration judges, resulting in removal orders issued, after a full hearing, by one of those judges. Noriega-Lopez, 335 F.3d at 884. 21 In light of the absence of any principled distinction between the statutes and procedures governing this case from those at issue in Noriega-Lopez, we apply that case and hold that the BIA acted ultra vires in issuing a deportation order instead of remanding to the IJ.