Opinion ID: 3014081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dismissal will be upheld if we agree with

Text: the District Court that the Appellants can The Ap pellants cla i m ed prove no set of facts that would entitle jurisdiction for their underlying suit as a them to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. matter arising under the Constitution of the 41, 45-46 (1957). United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § The District Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear any of the 2 The Maryland case is captioned In Plaintiff’s claims based on state law, and the Matter of the Marital Trust Created considered only the challenge to the New Under the Revocable Deed of Trust Jersey adult adoption statute on Executed by Foster T. Fenton as Settlor constitutional due process grounds. and Hilary W. Gans and Mercantile-Safe Regarding the challenge to the validity of Deposit and Trust Companies as the New Jersey state court adoption Trustees, Case No. 24-T-03-000074 (Cir. decree, the District Court cited to District Ct. Baltimore Cty.). of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) for the proposition 3 The New Jersey case is captioned In that federal district courts do not have the Matter of the Estate of Maria B. jurisdiction to hear a challenge to stateFenton, deceased. The Adoptees did not court decisions, even if the challenge provide a case number citation to this raises a constitutional claim. As to the court. claim for a declaratory judgment that the Adoptees have no interest in the Trust, the 4 In addition to M aria Fenton’s District Court held that it could not assume adopted children, Mercantile-Safe jurisdiction over that issue under the Deposit & Trust Company, K. Donald Proctor, Matthew C. Fenton and Trustees were also named as nominal appellees. 4 probate exception to diversity jurisdiction.5 New Jersey, and they are not challenging Finally, although the District Court did not an adverse judgment against them. Rather, address this issue, the Adoptees argued the Appellants mount a collateral attack on before the District Court and again in their the validity of the New Jersey adoption appellate brief that this Court should decree. Therefore, we hold that the abstain from deciding the Appellants’ District Court’s finding of no jurisdiction claims. We therefore turn to each of these over a claim of a non-party to state jurisdictional issues. litigation because of Rooker-Feldman to be in error. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
does not apply to this case, and the District In dismissing for lack of Court could, in theory, assert diversity jurisdiction the challenge to the validity of jurisdiction over this collateral attack to the New Jersey adoption decree, the the New Jersey adoption decree. District Court noted the general principle
that federal district courts may not sit as appellate courts to review state court The District Court found that it did decisions. Although the District Court not have jurisdiction to declare that the cited only to District of Columbia Court of Adoptees have no right or interest in the Appeals v. Feldman, this principle is Trust due to the probate exception to commonly known as the Rooker-Feldman diversity jurisdiction. The District Court doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., did not conduct any analysis of this issue, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The District Court but simply cited to Princess Lida of Thurn correctly stated the general principle under and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 Rooker-Feldman, but failed to recognize (1939), to support its position. We an important factor in the doctrine’s conclude again that the District Court’s application. Under the Rooker-Feldman holding in this matter was incorrect. In doctrine, “a party losing in state court is Princess Lida, the Supreme Court was barred from seeking what in substance called upon to resolve a dispute between a would be appellate review of the state federal district court and the Pennsylvania judgment in a United States district court, Court of Common Pleas, where both based on the losing party's claim that the courts had claimed jurisdiction over a trust state judgment itself violates the loser's matter and had issued orders restraining federal rights.” Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 the parties from proceeding in the other U.S. 997, 1005-1006 (1994) (emphasis court. 305 U.S. at 461. The Supreme added). In this case, the Appellants were Court determined that the claims in that not a party to the adoption proceeding in case were not brought in personam to determine the rights of any person in the 5 trust. Id. at 466-467. Had the claims been See infra Part II.B for a description brought under diversity jurisdiction in of the origin and scope of the probate personam, the Court’s analysis would have exception. 5 been different. Id. Rather, the claims Generally speaking, the Judiciary were quasi in rem, as they related to the Act of 1789 conferred equity jurisdiction administration and restoration of the upon the federal courts, which did not corpus of a trust. Id. at 467. Therefore, include probate jurisdiction. Markham v. the Supreme Court held that the state court Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (noting maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the that the English Court of Chancery in 1789 corpus of the trust, and the federal district did not have jurisdiction over probate court could exercise no jurisdiction. Id. at matters). Thus, federal courts do not have 468. The differences between Princess jurisdiction to probate wills or administer Lida and the case at hand are stark. First, estates. Id. However, federal courts do there is no conflict between the federal and have jurisdiction to entertain suits raised state courts regarding jurisdiction.6 by creditors, heirs and other claimants Second, the case at bar deals primarily against an estate as long as the federal with a determination of rights in the Trust court “does not interfere with the probate among the parties; there is no claim in rem proceedings or assume general jurisdiction requiring the federal court to maintain of the probate or control of the property in jurisdiction over the corpus of the trust. the custody of the state court.” Id. See also Moore v. Graybeal, 843 F.2d 706, 709 A determination of whether the (3d Cir. 1988). In Markham, the Supreme probate exception to diversity jurisdiction Court upheld a district court judgment a p p l i es r e q u i re s a m u c h m o re declaring that a petitioner was “entitled to comprehensive analysis than that offered receive the net estate of [the decedent] in by the District Court. Several of our sister distribution” because the judgment did not circuit courts have discussed the limits of disturb the administration of the t h e p r o b a t e ex c eption, o fte n decedent’s estate, but rather “decree[d] acknowledging its difficult contours. See, petitioner’s right in the property to be e.g., Mangieri v. Mangieri, 226 F.3d 1, 2 distributed after its administration.” 326 (1 st Cir. 2000) (noting that “the precise U.S. at 495. scope of the probate exception has not been clearly established”). However, the In the cases following Markham, Supreme Court and the several circuit the circuit courts have further refined the courts have sufficiently clarified the probate exception to diversity jurisdictions doctrine’s guiding principles to resolve the explaining generally that the jurisdictional issue presented in this case. question can be decided by determining whether the action could be brought in a state court of general jurisdiction where 6 The Appellees stipulated at oral the federal court sits. Foster v. Carlin, 200 argument that the Maryland state court F.2d 943, 947 (4th Cir. 1952). However, has stayed the proceedings in the case where a matter does not ordinarily fall brought by the Adoptees pending within the probate exception to diversity resolution of this appeal. jurisdiction, the exception may not be 6 expanded or federal jurisdiction denied court would presumptively consider the because state law would allow the matter same issues presently before this court, to be assigned to a probate court. See, including whether Maryland law requires e.g., Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank recognition of the New Jersey adoption & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43-44 (1909). decree and a grant of full faith and credit for all purposes. Because these issues are Turning to the case at hand, we appropriate for the Maryland state court of conclude that the District Court erred in general jurisdiction, and not the Maryland determining that the probate exception to probate court, the federal court’s diversity diversity jurisdiction applies to this case. jurisdiction, consequently, is not disturbed Fenton established the Trust at issue in this by the probate exception.8 case prior to his death, and there is no current or pending matter regarding the C. Trust to be administered in the state The Adoptees argue that this Court probate court. To this Court’s knowledge, should abstain from deciding this case, no state pro bate court exercised based on several recognized abstention jurisdiction over the Trust prior to the doctrines. In order to weigh the appellants filing the present suit. appropriateness of abstention, it is helpful Therefore, the federal court is not asked to to summarize the parties’ positions interfere with any probate proceeding or regarding the state law issues before us. assume control over property in probate. Appellants concede that the Trust is Thus, the District Court possesses diversity governed by Maryland law, but argue that jurisdiction over this claim in personam to the New Jersey adoption decree is not determine the rights of the parties in the entitled to full faith and credit in Maryland Trust. because it is the result of an invalid To further reinforce the point, we judicial ruling. Appellants cite to a series note that the claim brought by the of New Jersey cases for the proposition Adoptees to establish their rights in the Trust was appropriately raised in Maryland Circuit Court, the state court of general brought by the Adoptees in New Jersey jurisdiction.7 In that action, the Maryland does not affect the probate exception to diversity jurisdiction analysis. 7 8 Under the Maryland constitution, the It is worth noting that even if the courts and legislature have vested Maryland case is postured in rem, the probate jurisdiction in the orphan’s court. federal court will not be stripped of See Radcliff v. Vance, 757 A.2d 812, jurisdiction because the state court claim 816 (Md. 2000). Because the Trust is was filed after the federal in personam governed by Maryland law, and only the claim. See Reichman v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Maryland courts could assert any Bank, 465 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1972). potential probate jurisdiction, the case 7 that in New Jersey, adult adoptions entered McCoy, 436 A.2d 436 (M d. 1981). for the purpose of inheriting from a third As noted above, once the District party or “stranger to the adoption” are not Court resolved its temporary restraining valid.9 Had the Appellants been provided order, the Adoptees filed the Maryland notice of the adoption proceeding, they case seeking distribution of their interest in suggest that they would have informed the the Trust funds, and the New Jersey case New Jersey court of Maria’s “invalid” seeking declaratory relief to establish the purpose in the adoption (i.e. arranging for validity of the adoption. These pending her cousins to inherit from the third party state court claims form the basis for the Trust) and prevented the court from Adoptees’ request for abstention. approving the adoption. The Adoptees rely on two different The Adoptees argue that New lines of cases to support their request for Jersey law does not prohibit adult abstention. First, under Railroad Comm’n adoptions simply because they involve, of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 among other things, inheritance from a (1941) and its progeny, the Supreme Court third party passing through the adoptive acknowledged that the federal courts may parent. Adoptees assert that the adoption exercise their “wise discretion” to abstain is valid because they complied with every from a case if a parallel state suit may requirement of the New Jersey adult resolve the federal question. 312 U.S. at adoption statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1 et seq., 501. Subsequent cases refined the and that Maryland law explicitly states that Pullman abstention doctrine, warning that adult adoptees will be considered “issue” abstention is only appropriate in entitled to the same rights as natural “exceptional circumstances.” Moses H. children in matters governing the Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., disposition of a trust. See Evans v. 460 U.S. 1, 14 (1983) (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 9 States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)). The See Matter of Duke, 305 N.J. Super. appropriateness of abstention should be 408, 702 A.2d 1008 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. reached by balancing factors such as Div. 1995); Matter of the Action of M “inconvenience of the federal forum; the for the Adoption of P, an Adult, 193 N.J. desirability of avoiding piecemeal Super. 33, 471 A.2d 1220 (N.J. Super. litigation; and the order in which Ct. Law Div. 1983); Matter of Nicol’s jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent Estate, 152 N.J. Super. 303, 377 A.2d forums.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 15 1201 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); (citation omitted). Yet, none of these Matter of Griswold’s Estate , 140 N.J. factors will be determinative, and the Super. 35, 354 A.2d 717 (Morris County balance is “heavily weighted in favor of Ct. 1976); In re Comly’s Estate, 90 N.J. the exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. at 16 Super. 498, 218 A.2d 175 (Gloucester (citation omitted). County Ct. 1966). 8 The S upreme Co urt als o Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. acknowledged that “[g]enerally, as § 400, presenting only questions of local between state and federal courts, the rule is laws, the court is under “no compulsion to that ‘the pendency of an action in the state exercise [] jurisdiction” if a parallel state court is no bar to proceedings concerning court proceeding would address the the same matter in the Federal court matters in controversy between the parties. having jurisdiction . . . .’” Colorado River, In Wilton v. Seven Falls, 515 U.S. 277 424 U.S. at 817 (citing McClellan v. (1995), the Court reaffirmed the district Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). In courts’ broad discretion for abstention fact, when a judgment sought is strictly in when entertaining claims for declaratory personam, both state and federal courts judgment. “Since its inception, the with concurrent jurisdiction may proceed Declaratory Judgment Act has been until judgment is obtained in one of them. understood to confer on federal courts Princess Lida, 305 U.S. at 465-466. unique and substantial discretion in See also In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, deciding whether to declare the rights of 234 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that parallel litigants.” Id. at 286. Thus, courts are in personam actions may proceed in permitted to avoid gratuitous interference federal and state courts, with principles of with state court matters by abstaining from res judicata resolving the effect of a claim s for declaratory judgment, judgment in one court upon the other). specifically if the state court proceedings would address “the same issues, not Under these circumstances, we do governed by federal law, between the same not believe that this case requires parties.” Wilton, 515 U.S. at 282 (citing application of Pullman abstention. First, Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495). deferring the state law issues to the state courts would not likely resolve the federal Therefore, if the federal court constitutional question presented. Second, believes that the state law questions in we see no issues in these state law claims controversy between the parties are better that create the “exceptional circumstances” suited for resolution in state court, then the required for Pullman abstention. federal court may properly abstain from deciding a declaratory judgment claim. Id. However, Adoptees also argue for Although the Adoptees informed this abstention under an alternate theory. Court of their pending claims in Maryland Despite the strong antipathy to abstention, and New Jersey, those complaints are not the Supreme Court acknowledged a in the record before us. Without reviewing specific situation that allows federal courts the complaints, we cannot verify whether greater deference in deciding whether those state claims will adequately address abstention is appropriate. In Brillhart v. all of the issues presented in this case. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, Thus, we will remand this issue for further 494-95 (1942), the Court held that when a consideration by the District Court and federal suit is brought under the Federal application of the Brillhart abstention 9 doctrine should the District Court then failure to follow Rule 24(c), we will treat deem such action appropriate. the claim as a challenge to the statute as applied, and turn to the merits of the