Opinion ID: 1404508
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the asserted constitutional right was clearly established

Text: Having concluded that the facts as asserted by Floyd constitute a constitutional violation, we now proceed to determine whether, in the specific context of this case, Floyd's constitutional right to be free from excessive force was clearly established. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151. We must consider, in other words, whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. The defendants properly concede that a suspect's right to be free from the use of excessive force is clearly established. See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 399, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (recognizing that the use of excessive force violates a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights). No further argument on this point is made by Officer Quaine. Officer Reynoso, however, asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he reasonably but mistakenly believed that Floyd had shot Officer Quaine. Reynoso contends that, because he made a purportedly honest mistake of fact, his actions were reasonable as a matter of law. This contention, however, fails to address the true issue regarding Reynoso's actions; namely, whether his mistaken perception and response were themselves reasonable. Plainly, not all mistakeseven honest onesare objectively reasonable. See Dawkins v. Graham, 50 F.3d 532, 534 (8th Cir.1995) ([T]he Fourth Amendment's allowance for officers' honest mistakes is limited to mistakes that are objectively reasonable. (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 & n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987))). The bare assertion that Reynoso allegedly formed an honest but mistaken belief thus does little to resolve the key issue of whether his belief and subsequent actions were nonetheless objectively unreasonable. Officer Reynoso claims that he followed behind Officer Quaine as the pair rounded the back corner of Floyd's house with their guns drawn. The next thing Reynoso heard was Quaine's gunshot. Reynoso testified that, as he came around behind Quaine, he saw Quaine slump down and to the side to take cover. This, Reynoso asserts, caused him to believe that Quaine had been shot by Floyd. Floyd alleges that Reynoso responded by immediately firing a shot at Floyd while looking only at [Floyd's] body and never at his hands. Under Floyd's version of the facts, moreover, he still had his hands up and was not moving toward the officers after Officer Quaine's shot missed. Officer Reynoso does not explain how any reasonable officer could have formed a belief that Floydan unarmed man with his empty hands allegedly uphad shot Quaine. As Floyd points out, Reynoso never claimed that he saw a muzzle flash or even that he saw Floyd with a gun. Furthermore, Reynoso did not allege that he saw blood on Quaine or that he heard Quaine indicate in any way that he had been shot. Reynoso's purported belief that Quaine had been shot by an unarmed suspect, therefore, rested solely on Reynoso's observation of Quaine taking cover. Officer Reynoso nevertheless attempts to demonstrate the reasonableness of his actions by relying on the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that an officer's action must be viewed in the context of split-second judgments made under circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. But the failure of both officers to properly assess the reality of the situation they created before employing deadly force without warning against an unarmed suspect cannot shield them from liability unless that failure was objectively reasonable. Indeed, even apart from Reynoso's initial belief that Quaine had been shot, Reynoso concedes that he shot at Floyd without ever seeing Floyd's hands. Had Reynoso looked at Floyd's hands even momentarily before shooting him in the chest, he would presumably have seen that Floyd was unarmed. Reynoso's argument on this score thus does little to bolster his assertion that his decision that deadly force was necessary was reasonable under the circumstances. With respect to the reasonableness of his decision, the following excerpt from Reynoso's deposition is telling: Q. Now, when you shot Mr. Floyd, I should say before you shot Mr. Floyd, at that time, likewise, you did not give him any verbal instructions? A. No. Q. In fact, you were unaware whether your partner shot at him or he shot at your partner, you didn't know either way, did you? A. No. Q. In fact, at that time, you didn't even know it was Mr. Floyd, did you? A. No. Q. It could have been anybody? A. Right. Q. And when you shot him, you never saw him being armed in any way, did you? A. I didn't have a chance to look at his hands. Q. Right. You shot before you looked at his hands, didn't you? A. Yes. Q. So at that particular time, you didn't know who this person was and whether they were armed or not, true? A. True. Q. You shot because you heard a previous shot and you were afraid that this person might be armed? A. Yes. Q. And yet you didn't see that person take any threatening action toward you or your partner, did you? A. No. Even taking into account the fact that the officers were dispatched to Floyd's home with a warning that the suspect had earlier been armed, we cannot say that Officer Reynoso's alleged actions were reasonable as a matter of law. To the contrary, we believe that his purported conduct was patently unreasonable. According to the facts that we must consider at this stage of the proceedings, the officers ran around the corner of the house with their guns drawn, spotted Floyd in the diminished light, and shot him without (1) announcing themselves as police officers, (2) ordering him to surrender, or (3) pausing to determine whether he was actually armed. Based upon the facts as construed in the light most favorable to Floyd, we conclude that his right to be free from such excessive force was clearly established on the date in question. Neither officer is therefore entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.