Opinion ID: 2551874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instructions on Rothlisberger's Damages

Text: Rothlisberger argues the jury instructions on damages were deficient in two ways. First, the district court erred in supplying an instruction on nonpecuniary loss, when Rothlisberger waived recovery for nonpecuniary loss and in defining pecuniary loss. Second, the district court erred by refusing to allow her to present evidence on a lost investment theory of damages. The district court has a duty to properly instruct the jury on a party's theory of the case. If the instructions are substantially correct, and the jury could not reasonably be misled by them, the instructions will be approved on appeal. Hawkinson v. Bennett, 265 Kan. 564, 577-78, 962 P.2d 445 (1998) (quoting Noel v. Pizza Management, Inc., 258 Kan. 3, 12, 899 P.2d 1013 [1995]). Rothlisberger complains that the district court erred in rejecting her proposed damage instruction on pecuniary loss. Her proposed instruction included eight types of losses (such as care and nurturing, aid and assistance, counsel and advice). Rothlisberger argues that these items of damage are pecuniary (economic) in nature, and the district court's chosen instruction was both erroneous and misleading. Initially, Newman argues that plaintiff has waived this issue by failing to object to the damage instruction given by the district court. The district court's instruction follows PIK Civ.3d 171.32. Reviewing the record, it is difficult to discern whether a proper objection was lodged, and, if so, the grounds for that objection. What is clear is that Rothlisberger did not object at trial to the inclusion of the first paragraph on nonpecuniary damages. This first paragraph, following PIK Civ.3d 171.32, defined nonpecuniary loss. It then stated that Rothlisberger was not claiming nonpecuniary loss in this case. Rothlisberger argues it was error to include this paragraph because she was not seeking nonpecuniary damages and its inclusion probably confused the jury. Rothlisberger did not raise the issue of jury confusion over the nonpecuniary damage paragraph in her motion for new trial. Rothlisberger simply argued that her proposed instruction correctly defined pecuniary loss and should have been given to the jury. Rothlisberger's argument concerns the definition of pecuniary damages in Kansas. Considering the ambiguities in the transcript and that Rothlisberger raised the issue of defining pecuniary damages in her motion for a new trial, we address her pecuniary damages contention. PIK Civ.3d 171.32 Notes on Use state that there is no distinguishable difference between the terms pecuniary and economic. The district court chose to use the word pecuniary. PIK Civ.3d 171.32 categorizes and defines economic and noneconomic losses. Pecuniary loss includes: loss of services, attention, filial care, and protection. Nonpecuniary loss includes: (a) mental anguish, suffering, or bereavement, and (b) loss of society, comfort, or companionship. Rothlisberger sought an instruction on pecuniary loss that included damages for: (a) Loss of care and nurturing. (b) Loss of aid and assistance. (c) Loss of counsel and advice. (d) Loss of the value of a continued family relationship through the existence of a living child. (e) Loss of enjoyment and entertainment. (f) Loss of protection. (g) Loss of services. (h) Loss of attention. Without explicitly saying so, Rothlisberger advocates a change in the law. Continued family relationship and loss of enjoyment and entertainment are strikingly similar to loss of society, comfort, or companionshipnonpecuniary damages. By requesting that the pecuniary damage instruction include those items, Rothlisberger requested instruction goes beyond the traditional definition of pecuniary loss. The jury instruction given by the district court for Rothlisberger's damages follows PIK Civ.3d 171.32 Wrongful Death of A Child. The instruction included a claim for Loss of services, attention, care, protection, and advice and counsel. This instruction is consistent with PIK Civ.3d 171.32 and our case law. See Wentling v. Medical Anesthesia Services, 237 Kan. 503, 513, 701 P.2d 939 (1985); Cerretti v. Flint Hills Rural Electric Co-op Ass'n, 251 Kan. 347, 365, 837 P.2d 330 (1992). The district court did not err in rejecting Rothlisberger's instruction. With respect to the lost investment theory of damages, Rothlisberger argues that the district court improperly excluded it as a basis for recovery. Under the lost investment theory, Rothlisberger sought to recover the time and money invested in the rearing of her deceased daughter. Rothlisberger cites no authority for her position that such damages are allowed in Kansas. Damages in a wrongful death action are defined by K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 60-1903. Under 60-1903, there are three categories of damages: (1) nonpecuniary; (2) expenses for care of the deceased caused by the injury; and (3) pecuniary. Pecuniary or economic loss is loss of: (a) services, attention, care, and protection; (b) loss of earnings; and (c) funeral expenses. PIK Civ.3d 171.32. The lost investment of infant care, clothing, support, and education of the deceased child do not fit into any of the 60-1903 categories. Rothlisberger's argument is inconsistent with 60-1903 and against the clear weight of authority. See the following cases rejecting the lost investment theory: Wallace v. Woods, 271 N.E.2d 487, 490-93 (Ind. App. 1971); Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 280, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 196 (Wyo. 1979); see also Gravley v. Sea Gull Marine, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 896, 901 (Minn. 1978) (A child ... is not a monetary investment.) The district court did not err in refusing to instruct on the lost investment theory.