Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court failed to guide the jury with adequate instructions on crucial issues.

Text: ¶ 17. On Kolberg's first appeal before us he complained that he was denied the right to present the jury with a manslaughter instruction. Kolberg I, 704 So.2d at 1315. We agreed. Kolberg was charged with capital murder during felonious child abuse. Id. We relied on one of our previous decisions where we noted ... the anomaly in our murder statutes. The elements of capital murder during the course of felonious child abuse, see Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f), are indistinguishable from the elements of felony manslaughter. See also Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2) (1972). Id. (citing Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (Miss.1992)). Thus, we held: It is not an even-handed administration of justice in turn to deny the defense a manslaughter instruction where the accused, as is the case here, could have been lawfully indicted and prosecuted for manslaughter as easily as capital murder. And especially is this true where one verdict can bring a sentence of death and the other a maximum of twenty years imprisonment. Id. at 1316 (citing Butler, 608 So.2d at 320). We concluded by holding that the trial court had erred in denying Kolberg the manslaughter instruction. Id. ¶ 18. At the second trial, both a murder and manslaughter instruction were given. However, Kolberg now complains that [t]he jury could not be told that it could convict of capital murder or manslaughter, based on precisely the same elements and facts, without being given any way to distinguish between the two. Specifically, Kolberg asserts that matters were only made worse when the State proposed, and the trial court accepted, instructions which told the jury that it must convict of capital murder, and that it must convict of manslaughter based on precisely the same elements. Kolberg seeks to have this Court hold that the State must elect between charging him with simple murder, with the lesser offense of manslaughter, or charging him only with manslaughter. ¶ 19. Kolberg now complains of two specific jury instructions. The State's capital murder instruction (S-2), which was given by the trial court, stated: If you believe from all the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that the [Appellant], on or about August 24, 1988, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with or without deliberate design, then and there, kill Madison Watson, a human being, without authority of law, when engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious child abuse and/or battery, then, if you so believe from all of the evidence, the defendant is guilty of capital murder, and it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. The State's manslaughter instruction (S-4), which was given by the trial court, stated: If you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that, [Appellant], on or about August 24, 1988, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, did kill Madison Watson, a human being, without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of [Appellant], while the said [Appellant] was engaged in the perpetration of the crime of felonious child abuse, then, if you so believe from all the evidence in this case, the defendant is guilty of manslaughter, and it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. (emphasis added). ¶ 20. Kolberg's grievance seems to emanate from the language it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. He argued before the trial judge to amend that portion of the instruction to read you may find the defendant guilty of capital murder. Kolberg also complains that the error with the mandatory language was compounded by the fact that the jury was told that they must find him guilty of capital murder if they found the same elements that would support a manslaughter instruction. The State acknowledges that our decision in Kolberg I found these two crimes indistinguishable. However, the State submits that the consequence of our holding in Kolberg I was that instructions on both crimes were to be given upon remand, and that is precisely what was done. ( Id. ) The State further submits that there was nothing in Kolberg I or in Butler which would prevent the prosecution from placing both capital murder and culpable negligence manslaughter (Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-27) before the jury. ( Id. ) Thus, the State concludes that it complied with our decision in Kolberg I by proceeding with both. The following reflects the arguments before the trial judge: MR. SMITH [for Kolberg]: Are we on six, Judge? I tell you what the difference between 6 and state's 1 isand this is fairly crucial in this case. In state's 1, they have the same elements of capital murder but in the final sentence it says, The defendant is guilty of capital murderwell, it's capital A murder, a typoand it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. The problem in this case, as the Supreme Court identified on appeal, is you've got two identical elements so you can't say you must find capital murder if you have that set of facts. You can't say you must find manslaughter either because they're both identical. So we are in an imponderable position, of course, due to the crazy state of the law, and we have noted our objection to that previously. But we certainly can't give an instruction that says, it's your sworn duty to do one thing when the instructions allow you to do either. So that's why we amended the state's version to what's marked as defense 6 to say, You may find the defendant guilty of capital murder. By doing that we are not waiving our objection to the inchoately insane and arbitrary and violative of the 6th, 8th, and 14th amendments and the state of the law. I just want to make that absolutely clear for anyone coming along later. MS. LEE [for the State]: I didn't know it was decided by the Supreme Court, though, but that waswe could go into THE COURT: I am going to adopt the state's instructions ...    MR. SMITH: We would note our objection to that, Judge, just because it is irreconcilable. It can't be their sworn duty, and we object to the sworn duty there anyhow ... THE COURT: All right. Objection will be overruled ... ¶ 21. While the two quoted instructions above might alone be confusingly similar, the record reflects that the jury was given yet another instruction to aid them in considering the issue of culpable negligence manslaughter. It reads: The Court instructs the jury that the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without authority of law, is manslaughter, and the Court further instructs the jury that culpable negligence is defined as negligence of a degree so gross as to be tantamount to a wanton disregard of, or utter indifference to, the safety of human life. If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that the death of Madison Watson was caused by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of Bryan Kolberg, then you may find the defendant guilty of the crime of manslaughter. We are satisfied that this instruction more than adequately defines manslaughter and culpable negligence to the degree that any perceived confusion which even possibly could have been caused by the two instructions of which Kolberg now complains would be rendered virtually impossible. Jury instructions are not to be read unto themselves, but with the jury charge as a whole. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 316 (Miss.1999) (citing Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 848 (Miss.1995)). [D]efects in specific instructions do not require reversal `where all instructions taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law.' Wallace v. Thornton, 672 So.2d 724, 729 (Miss. 1996); Rawson v. Midsouth Rail Corp., 738 So.2d 280, 290 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Although Kolberg argues that the jury was given no way to distinguish between capital murder and manslaughter, it is clear from the record that the jury instructions, taken as a whole and read together, clearly distinguished between the crimes of capital murder and culpable negligence manslaughter. Consequently, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 22. There was no jury instruction given that defined child abuse, i.e., the underlying felony for Kolberg's capital murder charge. The State concedes as much in its brief when it states that there is no avoiding the fact that the jury [was] never instructed with the elements of the crime of felonious child abuse. Kolberg argues that this is reversible error, understandably asserting that this omission violates the law we espoused in Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625 (Miss.1996) and its progeny. ¶ 23. There is no doubt that the trial court is ultimately responsible for rendering proper guidance to the jury via appropriately given jury instructions, even sua sponte. See Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95, 99-100 (Miss.1995)(concerning sua sponte limiting/cautionary instruction in a case involving possession with intent to distribute drugs). See also Manuel v. State, 667 So.2d 590, 593 (Miss.1995)(citing Hester v. State, 602 So.2d 869, 873 (Miss. 1992)); Murphy v. State, 566 So.2d 1201, 1207 (Miss.1990); and, Sayles v. State, 552 So.2d 1383, 1390 (Miss.1989). On the other hand, it is interesting to note here that, while by no means dispositive of this particular issue, neither Kolberg nor the State, through counsel, brought this critical oversight to the attention of the trial court during the jury instruction conference. Additionally, when Kolberg filed his motion for a new trial (which also incorporated a request for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict), he assigned twenty-one (21) grounds for a new trial, yet did not mention this critical issue of a failure to instruct the jury in a capital murder case on the underlying felony. The only mention in the motion for a new trial concerning a complaint as to jury instructions was when Kolberg, through counsel, asserts: The instructions were incomplete and fatally misstated the law as set out in the defense objections made at the time, and the jury was permitted to make an entirely arbitrary decision between capital murder and felony manslaughter, without any rational way to distinguish between the two. Bryan Kolberg reiterates all of the objections he made during the charge conference. (emphasis added). It is obvious, for two reasons, that this assignment of error number 17 found in Kolberg's motion for a new trial pertains to the capital murder and manslaughter issue. First of all, this assignment specifically addresses the capital murder and manslaughter instructions, and, secondly, the defense objections made at the time reference certainly could not pertain to the underlying felony issue, because no objection nor inquiry was made during the jury instruction conference as to the failure to give an instruction on the underlying felony. ¶ 24. The underlying felony instruction issue came to light when the State, in its response to Kolberg's motion for a new trial, brought this issue to the trial court's attention via this language: Although not addressed by counsel during trial, or in his motion for a new trial, the jury was not instructed at the guilt phase on the underlying felony of child abuse. This is brought to the Court's attention because at least one Supreme Court opinion has suggested that failure to instruct a jury on the underlying felony of a capital murder case is fundamental error. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 636 (Miss.1996). Kolberg responds by stating that he preserved this issue for the trial court, and now for appeal, when he objected on the basis that the State's instructions were incomplete. ¶ 25. In its order denying Kolberg's motion for a new trial, the trial court, inter alia, understandably opines that Kolberg's incompleteness objection to jury instructions gave the trial court `not the foggiest' as to what error or omission the Defendant is referring and certainly not specific enough to preserve the issue. See Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246 (Miss. 1999). If the Defendant knew this was his objection then he was required to so state. Notwithstanding these statements from the trial court, it went on to rule on the merits concerning the issue of failure to instruct the jury on the underlying felony, and found that the jury was fully and properly instructed and that no error requiring the grant of a new trial was committed. ¶ 26. However, because the trial court is responsible for assuring that the jury is fully and properly instructed on all issues of law relevant to the case, because there can be no doubt that error was committed in failing to instruct the jury on the underlying felony, and because of the current status of the law in this State on this crucial issue, we address, on the merits, the issue of whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury in this capital murder case on the underlying felony of child abuse was reversible error. ¶ 27. We begin our discussion with a review of three cases critical to this issue, namely, Ballenger v. State, 761 So.2d 214 (Miss.2000); Shaffer v. State, 740 So.2d 273 (Miss.1998); and, Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625 (Miss.1996). ¶ 28. In chronological order, starting with the earliest case, we look at Hunter, which was a capital murder case. The defendant was convicted of murdering the victim during the commission of a robbery. Hunter argued before us that reversal of his conviction and death sentence was required because the jury had received no instruction for the underlying robbery. We held that the State had a duty to ensure that the jury was properly instructed on the underlying crime. Id. at 635. We stated: It is hornbook criminal law that before a conviction may stand the State must prove each element of the offense. Not only is this a requirement of the law of this State, due process requires that the State prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 (Miss.1984). A logical corollary of this principle is that, because the State has to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, then the State also has to ensure that the jury is properly instructed with regard to the elements of the crime. See also Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789, 792 (Miss.1988) quoting Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 75, 30 So.2d 593 (Miss.1947)(In conducting a criminal case, the prosecuting attorney must be fair and impartial, and see that defendant is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory right.)(emphasis in original). Hunter, 684 So.2d at 635. We went on to state: Just as the State must prove each element of the offense, the jury must be correctly and fully instructed regarding each element of the offense charged. Neal, 451 So.2d at 757 n. 9. Failure to submit to the jury the essential elements of the crime is fundamental error. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (emphasis added). In capital murder cases, the trial court is required to instruct just as fully regarding the definition of [the underlying crime] as it [is] on murder. Id. Indeed, [i]t is axiomatic that a jury's verdict may not stand upon uncontradicted fact alone. The fact must be found via jury instructions correctly identifying the elements of the offense under the proper standards. Where the jury had incorrect or incomplete instructions regarding the law, our review task is nigh unto impossible and reversal is generally required. Henderson v. State, 660 So.2d 220, 222 (Miss.1995); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 757 n. 9 (Miss.1984); see also Watson v. State, 465 So.2d 1025, 1031 (Miss. 1985). Hunter, 684 So.2d at 636. Kolberg asserts that under the rules annunciated in Hunter, harmless error analysis cannot apply. He tells us instead, that this error is fundamental and that automatic reversal is required. ¶ 29. Almost two years after Hunter, we decided Shaffer v. State, 740 So.2d 273 (Miss.1998). The defendant in Shaffer was charged with capital murdermurder in the course of sexual battery. Id. at 279. The original instructions given to the jury allowed them to find Shaffer guilty of capital murder, simple murder, manslaughter, or not guilty. Id. There was no instruction for sexual battery. Id. The jury sent a note to the trial judge inquiring about the role sexual battery would play in their verdict. Id. Subsequently, the trial judge sent the jury a new verdict form which gave the jury the original options, as well as including murder and sexual battery, and manslaughter and sexual battery. Id. The jury returned a guilty verdict of murder and sexual battery. Id. ¶ 30. The jury instruction on murder omitted the element of evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, which is an element of murder pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b). Although Shaffer objected to the instruction on a different ground at trial, we held that he was not precluded from raising a new objection to the instruction before us. Id. at 282. We said that [i]nstructing the jury on every element of the charged crime is so basic to our system of justice that it should be enforced by reversal in every case where inadequate instructions are given, regardless of a failure to object or making a different objection at trial. Id. We then relied heavily on our decision in Hunter, labeling the omission fundamental. Id. ¶ 31. We also reiterated the rule from Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 817, 819 (Miss. 1991) that [a] conviction is not valid where the prosecution does not prove each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The logical corollary of this, we said, was that if the jury does not find the defendant guilty of each element of the offense, a conviction may not stand. Id. We concluded by saying [w]here the jury is not even instructed on one of the vital elements of the offense, the conviction must not survive the scrutiny of this Court. Id. ¶ 32. Only two years after Shaffer, we handed down Ballenger v. State, 761 So.2d 214 (Miss.2000). Ballenger came before this Court as a motion for post-conviction relief. Ballenger's direct appeal was before us prior to our decisions in Hunter and Shaffer. See Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1252 (Miss.1995). On direct appeal, we rejected Ballenger's argument that the failure to include an instruction on the underlying felony of robbery was fundamental. Ballenger II, 761 So.2d at 216. Ballenger's assertion in her motion for post-conviction relief alleged this omission was a violation of both state and federal constitutional law. Id. We examined her claim in light of the intervening decisions in Hunter and Shaffer. This time, we agreed with Ballenger. In a 5-4 decision, we held that those two decisions required an automatic reversal, and granted her motion. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added). ¶ 33. We deem it appropriate to now at least revisit our decisions in Hunter, Shaffer, and Ballenger as they relate to automatic reversal for failure to give a jury instruction on the underlying felony in a capital murder prosecution under the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e)(f). ¶ 34. In Carleton v. State, 425 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Miss.1983) this Court held that each case must stand on its own facts in determining whether a particular error constitutes reversible error. In Forrest v. State, 335 So.2d 900, 903 (Miss.1976), this Court held that an error is harmless only when it is apparent on the face of the record that a fair minded jury could have arrived at no verdict other than that of guilty. (citing Rule 11, Miss. Sup.Ct. Rules (1976), Kuhn v. State, 324 So.2d 744 (Miss.1976), Dixon v. State, 306 So.2d 302 (Miss.1975)). ¶ 35. Conley v. State, 790 So.2d 773, 793 (Miss.2001) is similar to this case. Conley was a capital murder case in which the trial court refused a manslaughter instruction which correctly defined culpable negligence. Instead, it allowed an instruction which did not fully define culpable negligence. Justice Mills, writing for this Court, held that the error was harmless: The error did not contribute to the verdict as the jury unanimously agreed that (appellant) murdered (victim) while engaged in the crime of kidnapping. Error is harmless if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967.) Therefore, although the trial court may have erred in refusing to grant (Appellant's) manslaughter instruction containing an adequate definition of culpable negligence, it was harmless error. ¶ 36. Even back in 1941, this Court was recognizing the principle discussed by the Conley court. In Lancaster v. State, 200 So. 721, 722 (Miss.1941), this Court stated that errors were harmless where the same result would have been reached had they not existed. ¶ 37. We opined in Lentz v. State, 604 So.2d 243, 249 (Miss.1992), that [e]ven where error has occurred, we will not reverse a conviction when the overwhelming weight of the evidence supports the guilty verdict. (citing Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 865 (Miss.1991); Whitley v. State, 511 So.2d 929, 931 (Miss.1987); Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186, 190 (Miss.1987); Giles v. State, 501 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1987)). ¶ 38. Even in Hunter, we stated that [i]ndeed, an instructional error will not warrant reversal if the jury was fully and fairly instructed by other instructions. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d at 635, citing Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 35 (Miss. 1992); Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss.1991), Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp.1990). ¶ 39. The language of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945), is instructive as to this particular issue, despite Hunter' s negative citation of it. The Screws Court stated that ... where the error is so fundamental as not to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the only offense on which the conviction could rest, we think it is necessary to take note of it on our own motion. Here in Kolberg's case, the essential ingredients have been submitted and conviction has been obtained on the charge of capital murder. Instruction No. S-2, which was given by the trial court, stated: If you believe from all the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, that the defendant, Brian Joseph Kolberg, on or about August 24, 1988, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with or without deliberate design, then and there, kill Madison Watson, a human being, without authority of law, when engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious child abuse and/or battery, then, if you so believe from all the evidence, the defendant is guilty of capital murder, and it is your sworn duty to say so by your verdict. (emphasis added). Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f) provides: (2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases:    (f) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, or in any attempt to commit such felony; Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2) states: Any person who shall intentionally (a) burn any child, (b) torture any child, or, (c) except in self-defense or in order to prevent bodily harm to a third party, whip, strike or otherwise abuse or mutilate any child in such a manner as to cause serious bodily harm, shall be guilty of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child.... In comparing Instruction No. S-2, with Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(f) and Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(c), there is no doubt that the jury was fully and fairly instructed as to all the elements of capital murder with the underlying felony of child abuse. Instruction No. S-2 informed the jury that in order to find Kolberg guilty of capital murder, the jury had to find, inter alia, that the killing of Madison Watson was committed by Kolberg while he was engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious child abuse and/or battery. The jury was informed in other instructions that before it could find Kolberg guilty, the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. We must consider a United States Supreme Court case which was handed down after our decisions in Hunter and Shaffer, but admittedly prior to our decision in Ballenger II, namely, Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). However, Kolberg argues that we handed down Ballenger one year after the United States Supreme Court handed down Neder. Therefore, he says that we were well aware of this holding. However, there is no mention of Neder either in the majority or the dissent. Yet, in Ballenger, we did cite to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1038, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) for the proposition that the [f]ailure to submit to the jury the essential elements of the crime is `fundamental' error. Ballenger, 761 So.2d at 217. Thus, our decision was grounded, at least in part, on federal interpretation; therefore, we now consider the high court's decision in Neder. In Neder, the defendant was found guilty by the jury despite a jury instruction which left out one element of the charged offense. The Neder Court ruled that omission of the element did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, and did not warrant reversal of the conviction: We have often applied harmless-error analysis to cases involving improper instructions on a single element of the offense. 527 U.S. at 9-10, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987)). The Court in Neder continued by stating: Having concluded that the omission of an element is an error that is subject to harmless-error analysis, the question remains whether Neder's conviction can stand because the error was harmless. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), we set forth the test for determining whether a constitutional error is harmless. That test, we said, is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id., at 24, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705; see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ([A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 527 U.S. at 15-16, 119 S.Ct. 1827. ¶ 40. After mature consideration and consistent with the foregoing authority, both from this Court and the United States Supreme Court, including Conley, we apply a harmless error analysis in this case where the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the underlying felony in this capital murder prosecution. However, we implore the trial courts to be alert to the need to assure that the jury is adequately instructed on the underlying felony in a capital murder trial. We also acknowledge that our decisions in many cases are fact-driven thereby meaning that, even in applying a harmless error analysis, had the facts in this case been different, the result here certainly could have been different. We make this statement as a caveat in future capital murder prosecutions under the provisions of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e)-(f), that should the trial court fail to instruct the jury on the underlying felony, even in applying a harmless error analysis, this Court may still be compelled, based on the facts and/or the particular underlying felony, to find such failure to be reversible error. ¶ 41. In applying harmless error analysis here, the Court notes that there is overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing to Kolberg's guilt. Doctors have testified that the type wounds young Madison received are consistent with those received in an automobile accident or falling from the second or third story of a building. Kolberg took Madison to see her mother at work around 1:00 p.m. on the day she ended up in the emergency room around 4:00 p.m. Experts have testified that Madison could not have been alert at 1:00 p.m. when she saw her mother if the head trauma had already been inflicted, meaning that the head trauma had to have occurred after that. Moreover, Kolberg was the only person with Madison in between the visit with her mother and the trip to the emergency room. Kolberg, however, maintains that he has no idea what happened to Madison to cause her massive head trauma. Madison had no medical conditions or preexisting injuries. ¶ 42. The only law that the jury did not receive via jury instructions was the language found in Miss.Code Ann. § 97-5-39(2)(c), which would have informed the jury that felonious child abuse meant an intentional whipping, striking or otherwise abusing or mutilating of any child in such a manner as to cause serious bodily harm. There is absolutely no way that this lack of information on the part of the jury affected the outcome of this case. Kolberg claims that while Madison had serious injuries, he was not the one who inflicted the injuries. By their verdict of guilty, the jury was satisfied that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that Kolberg did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with or without deliberate design, then and there kill Madison Watson, a human being, without authority of law, which necessarily meant that based on the evidence before the jury, Kolberg was the one who inflicted these massive head injuries upon Madison. The evidence revealed that the head trauma which caused young Madison's death was so severe that no reasonable juror, upon finding that Kolberg killed Madison within a three-hour period, could have made any finding other than that the injuries were intentionally inflicted upon Madison in such a manner as to cause serious bodily harm. ¶ 43. As previously stated, a trial court's instructions to the jury are not to be read unto themselves, but with the jury charge as a whole. Edwards, 737 So.2d at 316. Without doubt, when the jury considered the overwhelming evidence of Kolberg's guilt, and applied that evidence to the law pronounced in the jury instructions given by the trial court, including, but not limited to, Instruction S-2 on the elements of the crime of capital murder, which, inter alia, informed the jury that the killing had to occur while Kolberg was engaged in the commission of the crime of felonious child abuse and/or battery, the error in failing to instruct the jury on the underlying felony of child abuse was harmless error because it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict. Conley, 790 So.2d at 793. Accordingly, applying harmless error analysis to the facts of this case, Kolberg's assignment of error concerning the trial court's failure to instruct the jury by way of defining the underlying felony of child abuse in this capital murder prosecution is without merit.
¶ 44. Kolberg next tells us that he requested an instruction which would have stated his theory of the case, but that the instruction was improperly denied. Jury Instruction No. 11 which Kolberg requested reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that it is the defense theory of the case that Madison Watson suffered a brain injury on August 12, 1988, while in the care and custody of her aunt Lisa Watson. That Madison sustained a second brain injury in a fall from the bed on August 19, 1988. This fall, in part because of the established brain injury, resulted in the catastrophic brain injury that led to her death. The defense is not required to prove this theory but rather the State of Mississippi is required to disprove this theory and prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and to exclusion [sic] of every other reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. ¶ 45. The State responds that: [i]n a homicide case, as in other criminal cases, the court should instruct the jury as to theories and grounds of defense, justification, or excuse supported by the evidence, and a failure to do so is error requiring reversal of a judgment of conviction. Even though based on meager evidence and highly unlikely, a defendant is entitled to have every legal defense he asserts to be submitted as a factual issue for determination by the jury under proper instruction of the court. Where a defendant's proffered instruction has an evidentiary basis, properly states the law, and is the only instruction presenting his theory of the case, refusal to grant it constitutes reversible error. (quoting Giles v. State, 650 So.2d 846, 849 (Miss.1995)). We agree with the State's assertion that this instruction contained no instruction of law except identifying the State's burden of proof. The State's burden of proof was contained within other jury instructions. Since this proffered jury instruction did not instruct upon the principles of a defense beyond a general denial of the allegations in the indictment, the given Jury Instruction No. 14 was sufficient. Jury Instruction No. 14 stated: If there is a reasonable hypothesis under which the death was due to causes which were either accidental or due to actions not caused directly by the defendant, the occurrence is one for which the defendant is not liable. This instruction sufficiently comported with Kolberg's entire theory of the case and evidence he presented at trial. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.