Opinion ID: 1439460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reputation and Other Bad Acts Evidence

Text: For his fourth argument on appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by allowing the State to present reputation and other bad acts evidence. Specifically, Appellant argues that the testimony of six witnesses, who were allowed to testify over his objections, was highly prejudicial, thus mandating a new trial. The State contends that Appellant failed to preserve these specific arguments on appeal. We disagree as the record reveals that Appellant did object to the introduction of some of this testimony throughout the trial. Nevertheless, the issue of whether these arguments were preserved has no bearing on this case. At the outset, we note that, as this is a death-penalty case, we are bound by Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 10. As we explained in Newman v. State, 353 Ark. 258, 276, 106 S.W.3d 438, 450 (2003), Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure  Criminal 10 provides, in pertinent part, that the Arkansas Supreme Court shall consider the following issues in conducting its mandatory review of death sentences imposed on or after August 1, 2001: (b) Mandatory review. Whenever a sentence of death is imposed, the Supreme Court shall review the following issues in addition to other issues, if any, that a defendant may enumerate on appeal. . . . The Court shall consider and determine: . . . . (iv) whether the trial court failed in its obligation to intervene without objection to correct a serious error by admonition or declaring a mistrial; (v) whether the trial court erred in failing to take notice of an evidentiary error that affected a substantial right of the defendant; . . . . Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 10(b) (2002). As required by Ark. R.App. P-Crim. 10(b), we have reviewed all of the testimony, including those statements not objected to at trial. Our review reveals that the trial court committed serious error when it permitted the State to introduce the following testimony, pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404 provides, in part: (a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by prosecution to rebut the same; . . . . (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Rule 404(b) permits introduction of testimony of other criminal activity if it is independently relevant to the main issue, that is, relevant in the sense of tending to prove some material point rather than merely to prove that the defendant is a criminal. Spencer v. State, 348 Ark. 230, 236, 72 S.W.3d 461, 464 (2002). The State is entitled to produce evidence showing circumstances which explain the act, show a motive for the killing, or illustrate the accused's state of mind. Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003). Consequently, if the evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is relevant to show that the offense of which the appellant is accused actually occurred and is not introduced merely to prove bad character, it will not be excluded. Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 198, 163 S.W.3d 333, 342 (2004) (quoting Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 473, 95 S.W.3d 801, 804 (2003)). However, even if evidence is relevant pursuant to Rule 404(b), Ark. R. Evid. 403 provides that evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The State is not entitled to introduce evidence of other offenses to persuade the jury that the accused is a criminal and likely to commit the crimes he has been charged with. Hickey v. State, 263 Ark. 809, 569 S.W.2d 64 (1978). Specifically, proof of other crimes is never admitted when its only relevancy is to show that the prisoner is a man of bad character, addicted to crime. Id. at 810-811, 569 S.W.2d at 65 (quoting Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 333, 266 S.W.2d 804, 806 (1954)). In dealing with issues relating to the admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b), a trial court's ruling is entitled to great weight and this court will not reverse absent an abuse of discretion. Anderson, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333; Barnes v. State, 346 Ark. 91, 55 S.W.3d 271 (2001). With this standard in mind, we now look at the following testimony.
The first testimony Appellant claims was improperly allowed is Kathy Elliott Hart's. Kathy testified that her brother, Carl, and her nephew, Shane Martin, stole Appellant's marijuana plants. Kathy also testified that she was afraid for her brother to be around the Greens because her nephew had died mysteriously after the theft. Appellant immediately objected to this statement and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the mistrial motion, but offered a limiting instruction. Appellant accepted the offer, but a limiting instruction was not given at that time. Kathy further testified that she did not want her brother around the Greens because she knew Carl was involved with stealing Appellant's marijuana plants. After further testimony and an objection on a hearsay issue, Appellant renewed his objection to the testimony about Martin's death and also renewed his motion for mistrial. The trial court again asked if Appellant wanted a limiting instruction, but this time he responded, I don't know yet. The court again revisited this issue after the testimony of John Hart. At that time, the trial court offered a limiting instruction that there's been absolutely nothing to prove a link between Appellant and Martin's disappearance, and that it was only elicited for the fact to show fear on behalf of Mrs. Hart. Appellant declined the offer on the basis that he feared it would be more prejudicial. Upon reviewing this testimony, it is clear that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Mrs. Hart's testimony. First, Mrs. Hart's statement was clearly prejudicial and alluded to her belief that Appellant played a role in Martin's murder and disappearance. Second, no admonition could have cured this statement, even if the trial court had intervened and attempted to curb the statement's effect on the jury. This statement was not only prejudicial but also irrelevant to the issue of whether Appellant committed the Elliott murders. In fact, it was nothing more than an attempt to prove that Appellant was a bad person. A mistrial is a drastic remedy to be used only when an error is so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial and when the prejudicial statement cannot be cured by an instruction. Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000). The trial court has the sound discretion to decide whether to grant a mistrial, and this decision will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse or upon manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Id. Additionally, even if a remark is improper, the trial court may deny the mistrial motion and cure any prejudice by issuing a jury admonishment to disregard the remark. Smith, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801; Dandridge v. State, 292 Ark. 40, 727 S.W.2d 851 (1987). Moreover, where the possible prejudice could have been cured by admonition by the trial court, this court has found no abuse of discretion when defense counsel has refused the trial court's offer of such a curative instruction. Ferguson v. State, 343 Ark. 159, 177, 33 S.W.3d 115, 126 (2000). Nevertheless, there are instances where a statement is so prejudicial that an admonishment could never cure. See Moore v. State, 323 Ark. 529, 537, 915 S.W.2d 284, 289 (1996) (holding that the unresponsive testimony that appellant had admitted he killed another woman was so prejudicial that it could not be cured by an admonition to the jury and the trial court abused its discretion in its denial of a motion for mistrial in the face of such a patently inflammatory and prejudicial statement.) Because of the nature and prejudice attached to Mrs. Hart's statement, we find that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant the motion for mistrial. Having determined that a mistrial was warranted, we now turn to the admissibility of other statements that are likely to be an issue during Appellant's retrial.
Second, Appellant argues that Joshua Green's testimony was improperly allowed. Specifically, Appellant claims that Joshua's testimony that his dad had always been on the outside of the law and had physically abused him from the time he was a child was improper character evidence. During Joshua's testimony, Appellant made a Rule 403 objection on the basis that the prejudice resulting from the testimony was going to substantially outweigh any probative value it might have. The trial court overruled the objection as to specific prior bad acts in that it is coming in under 40[4](b) with the concept of control which is the major part of their case. . . . [t]he probative value will far outweigh any prejudicial effect. [6] In introducing this testimony, the State sought to demonstrate that Appellant's abusive and controlling behavior played a part in the commission of the murders. Specifically, the State argued that the control that [Appellant] had over his family explains why none of them ever came to the police until he got arrested. It explains why Chad did what he did. The trial court took this into consideration and overruled Appellant's objections to the testimony. Upon review, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Joshua's control testimony because it is not relevant evidence. The State's claim that the evidence was admissible because it was not offered to prove Appellant abused his family, but rather to show the control he had over the family, has no merit. First, control is not an issue in this case. Appellant was charged with four counts of capital murder and kidnapping. Therefore, the control he may or may not have had over his family is not independently relevant to whether he committed the crimes. Second, the State's control argument deals more with Joshua's credibility as related to his delay in coming forward rather than Appellant's guilt. The credibility of a witness is not the subject of Rule 404(b) and, as such, cannot be the basis for allowing testimony of other bad acts. Finally, Joshua's statements that his father was outside the law and that Appellant physically abused him were more prejudicial than probative. We must again note that Appellant was charged with the murder of the Elliott family and the kidnapping of Felicia, not with ordering a member of his family to commit these crimes; therefore, control was not a main issue at trial. Joshua's statements painted a picture to the jury that Appellant was a controlling, abusive father. Whether or not this was true, it was not independently relevant to the present case. Consequently, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony under Rule 404(b).
The third testimony Appellant claims was improperly allowed is that of Amber Green. Appellant objected to Amber's testimony that her dad was abusive to her brother and her mother, and that he had once held a gun to her mother's head and told her to say her prayers. During trial, Appellant objected to the State's questions regarding her father's abuse, claiming that it constituted improper testimony of prior bad acts. The trial court overruled the objection under Rule 404(b). Just as with Joshua's testimony, the trial court allowed Amber's testimony as being relevant to Appellant's control over his family. As noted above, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing control testimony. Amber's statements are just as prejudicial as those made by Joshua, and were improperly allowed. There was no relevance or basis for allowing continual testimony that Appellant was abusive and controlling.
Fourth, Appellant claims that Chad Green's statements, that it was a common thing for him to smoke methamphetamine with Appellant and that Appellant made him do other things he did not want to do, such as steal, were improperly allowed. Although a review of the record reflects that Appellant did not make a contemporaneous objection to Chad's statement that he commonly smoked methamphetamine with Appellant, we will examine the statement for prejudice and error as required by Rule 10(b). The trial court allowed Chad's testimony about Appellant forcing him to steal under Rule 404(b), just as the court had allowed prior Green family testimony on Appellant's control of the family. Upon review, the trial court erred in allowing both statements. First, Chad's testimony about smoking methamphetamine had no independent relevance to the State's case that Appellant committed the murders and kidnapping. Rather, it demonstrated that Appellant was a drug user  a subject that was not an issue in this case. Second, Chad's specific statement about his father making him do things he did not want to do, such as steal, was not relevant. Specifically, the issue of Chad's stealing under Appellant's direction is not relevant. These two statements merely demonstrated that Appellant had control over Chad and that he was a bad father. We note that Chad was not on trial, Appellant was. As such, there was no valid reason to allow the statements. They were prejudicial and not probative. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the statements.
Fifth, Appellant maintains that Mary Green's testimony was also improperly admitted over his objections. Appellant points to a series of Mary's statements that he deemed to be prejudicial in nature, such as (1) her testimony about Appellant being an abusive husband and father; (2) that she did not pay much attention to Appellant's business because it would just get her in trouble; (3) that she figured Appellant was involved with the Elliott murders; (4) that she had been going to the police for thirty years to get protection from Appellant; (5) that she knew more things about him but could not tell the jury; and (6) that since Appellant's arrest she had been safer than she had ever been since meeting him but she still felt that he would get to her like he always said he would. A review of the record reflects that Appellant did not make a contemporaneous objection to statements two, four, and five, and that the trial court ruled in favor of Appellant's speculation objection to statement three. Nevertheless, we will still examine all statements for prejudice and error as required by Rule 10(b). Statements one, two, and four involve Mary's testimony as to Appellant's physical and mental abuse. The trial court allowed the testimony, over Appellant's objections that it was character evidence outside the scope of Rule 404(b), because the statement went to the control factor that was a major issue in the trial. As with other Green family testimony, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the testimony was admissible. Additionally, statement three reflected Mary's belief that Appellant was involved with the murders. While this statement may be relevant as to whether Appellant committed the crimes, the court properly granted Appellant's speculation objection. Furthermore, statement five was so prejudicial that the court should have stepped in and either issued an admonishment or granted a mistrial. Mary's reference to her further knowledge of Appellant was clearly prejudicial because it amounted to nothing more than speculation on her part as to Appellant's guilt. There was no basis for allowing this testimony and it should not have been allowed. Lastly, the trial court erred in allowing Mary's last statement, that she feels safer since Appellant was arrested. After this statement, Appellant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the statement was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as it was too prejudicial to Appellant. The trial court ruled that what basically happened is that you impeached her and he rehabilitated her and she went on and on and on. The court overruled the objection, and offered a limiting instruction to advise the jury to disregard her redirect testimony. The jury was never instructed, however, as Appellant chose not to have the limiting instruction given. The lack of a limiting instruction is irrelevant, however, because an admonishment or curative instruction could not have cured the prejudicial effect of this statement. Mary's statement was improper and unrelated to any portion of the State's case against Appellant. Rather than being relevant to the case, Mary's final statement was highly prejudicial to Appellant because he was again labeled as the abusive and violent husband. In sum, the statement, that he would get to her like he always said he would, was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b), and the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this statement.
Lastly, Appellant claims that statements made by Scott Moffitt during his testimony were highly prejudicial and improperly allowed. Appellant argues that although the trial court sustained most of his objections regarding insinuating questions, Moffitt blurted out answers during his testimony. Consequently, the jury was left with the impression that Appellant was an extremely violent drug dealer, who had threatened to kill Moffitt and had beat up Moffitt on two occasions. Appellant also points out that Moffitt went so far as to state that if he was on the jury he would convict Appellant. With regard to the question about methamphetamine that Appellant claims left the jury with the impression that he was a drug dealer, Appellant objected at trial and the State moved on to another question. Additionally, the objections to Moffitt's other statements about threats and violence were sustained. Moreover, Moffitt's statement that Appellant beat me down twice was elicited on cross-examination. Thus, these statements do not constitute reversible error. As required by Rule 10(b), we have reviewed all of Moffitt's statements. Only one statement warrants further discussion  [i]f I was on the jury, I'd convict him. This statement was made during Appellant's cross-examination, and Appellant immediately motioned for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the motion on the ground that Appellant's counsel had halfway invited this. Appellant asked for an admonition and the trial court granted one as it acknowledged that the comment showed bias. The trial judge informed the jury that they should disregard and take no thought about what Mr. Moffitt thinks should or should not happen, and specifically pointed out that the statement was not evidence to be considered. Appellant claims that the admonition to the jury was not sufficient and that a new trial must be granted. Appellant primarily relies upon Shroeder v. Johnson, 234 Ark. 443, 352 S.W.2d 570 (1962), as his basis for maintaining that the only way to remove the prejudice that resulted from this statement is to grant a new trial. However, this reliance is unmerited. In Shroeder , this court reiterated that there are: a class of cases which present argument and remarks so flagrantly prejudicial . . . that the commendable efforts of the trial judge to eradicate the evil effects of them will be unavailing. In such event, then, a new trial is the only way to remove the prejudice, notwithstanding the judge may have . . . emphatically instructed the jury to disregard the prejudicial statements. Id. at 449, 352 S.W.2d at 573 (quoting Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 259-60, 85 S.W. 428, 429 (1905)). There, the court went on to explain that it could not say with certainty that the jurors were prejudiced . . . but we are less sure that they were not. Shroeder, 234 Ark. at 450, 352 S.W.2d at 573. Moreover, the court explained that the reference was improper and the court's admonition did not tell the jury what and to whom the `rap sheet' referred, and if it had done so the prejudice probably would have been even greater. Id. There, this court concluded that the trial court erred in not granting the mistrial. In the present case, we are faced with a different situation and a different kind of remark than in Shroeder . Here, Moffitt stated that he would convict Appellant if he was on the jury. The trial court made a specific admonition to the jury that instructed them to disregard and ignore what Moffitt thinks should or should not happen. The court specifically instructed the jury to disregard that last statement about guilt or innocence of the defendant, that is not evidence to be considered by you. This admonishment was sufficient to overcome any prejudice that may have resulted from the statement, especially in light of the other evidence presented to the jury. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the admonishment and denying the motion for mistrial.