Opinion ID: 167325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Torres’s Sentence

Text: For sentences imposed after Booker, we review a defendant’s sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2005). As we noted above, Mr. Torres’s counsel withdrew certain objections to the PSR at the sentencing hearing, and acknowledged that the defendant had, in 6 fact, been convicted of the two offenses the district court relied upon in coming to its determination that Mr. Torres was a career offender. Mr. Torres now argues that the district court erred in applying the careeroffender enhancement because he served only ninety days on one of the charges. His argument is clearly foreclosed by the Guidelines themselves: the notes to section 4.B1.2 explain that a “‘[p]rior felony conviction’ [as that term is used in the career offender enhancement guideline] means a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . regardless of the actual sentence imposed.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 n.1 (emphasis added). The two prior convictions that the district court relied upon were convictions in California for possession of cocaine for sale, which are punishable by up to five years imprisonment. C AL . H EALTH & S AFETY C ODE § 11351.5. Therefore, we hold that Mr. Torres’s argument regarding his sentence is wholly without merit and that the district court’s imposition of a 210month sentence in this case was reasonable. “[A] sentence that is properly calculated under the Guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness,” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006), and Mr. Torres has made no meritorious arguments that the sentence is unreasonable when viewed in light of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) that could overcome that presumption. 7