Opinion ID: 169653
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The government's arguments

Text: Here, the government advances three challenges to the district court's ruling that Ms. Ricker lacked actual authority to consent to the search of his apartment. First, invoking a phrase from Matlock, it contends that, by allowing Ms. Ricker to use his apartment, Mr. Cos assumed the risk that she would consent to the search. Second, invoking another phrase from Matlock, the government maintains that Ms. Ricker had a sufficient relationship to the apartment to give consent. Finally, under the alternative standards set forth in Rith, the government contends that Ms. Ricker had both (a) mutual use of the apartment by virtue of joint access; and (b) control over the apartment for most purposes. The government's first two arguments are not supported by the law of this circuit. As Mr. Cos correctly notes, when determining whether a third party has actual authority to consent to the search of a residence, we do not apply an independent assumption of the risk or sufficient relationship to the premises test. Although those phrases do appear in Matlock and other courts have occasionally applied those concepts to find actual authority, Rith controls our reading of Matlock, Under Rith, neither the defendant's assumption of the risk nor the existence of a sufficient relationship between the third party and the premises frames the inquiry. We acknowledge that our recent decision in United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694 (10th Cir.2007) does employ one of the concepts invoked by the governmenta sufficient relationship to the premisesin concluding that a third party had actual authority to consent to a search. In Trotter, the defendants conspired with a third party, Mr. King, to possess and distribute illegal drugs. As part of the conspiracy, Mr. King, acting under the direction of one of the defendants and using that defendant's funds, rented a storage unit in his own name. The defendants kept the keys to the storage unit, but on numerous occasions they gave Mr. King a key so that he could retrieve drugs and drug paraphernalia from the unit. Citing a Ninth Circuit decision involving similar facts, United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d 1579 (9th Cir. 1997), we held that Mr. King had actual authority to consent to a search of the storage unit by the police. In reaching this conclusion, we reasoned that because Mr. King had leased the storage unit in his own name, he could at any time have exercised his rights as lessee to have the storage company open the unit, without [the defendant's] knowledge or permission. Trotter, 483 F.3d at 699. Moreover, the defendants had allowed Mr. King access to the storage unit when they sent Mr. King to the unit to retrieve and drop off items. Id. Accordingly, Mr King's position as a lessee of the unit and his active participating in renting and using the facility gave him a ` sufficient relationship to the premises ' to justify the searches based upon his consent. Id. (emphasis added). Despite its application of the sufficient relationship to the premises language from Matlock, our opinion in Trotter does not support a departure from the standard we announced in Rith for determining actual authority in this case. Most importantly, this case, like Rith and unlike Trotter, involves the search of a home. Given the heightened protection afforded to the home under the Fourth Amendment, see e.g., Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610, 119 S.Ct. 1692, we are convinced that Rith 's more precise formulation of the standard applies here. Applying the Rith standard for actual authority, we are not convinced by the government's arguments. The government maintains that Ms. Ricker had joint access to the apartment because she had used it in the past and because, on the day of the search, Mr. Cos had left her alone there. According to the government, the record also establishes the alternative standard for actual authoritycontrol for most purposes. As to that standard, the government asserts, Ms. Ricker had an established personal relationship with Mr. Cos and thus Mr. Cos had no expectation of exclusive access to the apartment. Aplt's Br. at 16-17. For support, the government observes that Ms. Ricker had slept in Mr. Cos's bedroom on previous occasions and, on the day of the search, had gone through the bedroom where the gun was found in order to use the bathroom. The government's argument regarding the first alternative Rith inquirymutual use of the property by virtue of joint accesscompletely ignores our statement that the government must show that the third party entered the premises or room [that was subjected to the search] at will, without the consent of the subject of the search. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1330 (emphasis added). Here, Ms. Ricker testified at the evidentiary hearing that she did not have a key to the apartment, and the district court expressly found that the United States has not established that [Ms.] Ricker had, in fact, a key to the apartment. Aplt's App. vol. I, at 62. Moreover, Ms. Ricker also testified that she could not enter the apartment without Mr. Cos's consent and that she had to ask for his consent to invite other people over, like the children who came to the apartment to swim on the day of the search. Thus, like the district court, we conclude that Ms. Ricker could not enter the apartment without Mr. Cos's consent. Moreover, as the district court also observed, there are additional facts indicating that Ms. Ricker was more like an occasional visitor whom [Mr.] Cos allowed to visit, rather than one who asserted a right to access the property jointly with [Mr.] Cos. Id. Ms. Ricker did not leave her personal belongings in the apartment, but instead took them with her when she left, indicating that she could not come and go as she pleased. Further, she had only been alone in the apartment on two occasions before the day of the search, and each occasion was only for a brief period. Ms. Ricker's limited access to the apartment is therefore insufficient to demonstrate actual authority under the first Rith inquiry. See United States v. Warner, 843 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir.1988) (affirming the district court's finding that a landlord lacked actual authority to consent to a search of a tenant's property because at best, the landlord had permission to enter the property for the limited purpose of making specified repairs and occasionally mowing the lawn); United States v. Corral, 339 F.Supp.2d 781, 791-92 (W.D.Tex. 2004) (holding that a part-time housekeeper lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the defendant's residence because she enjoyed only limited access to the residence, was present for specific and limited purposes only, did not have a key, and never let others into the house nor had permission to do so); see also United States v. Salimonu, 182 F.3d 63, 76 (1st Cir.1999) (Lipez, J., dissenting) (concluding, on an issue not reached by the majority, that a third party who had permission to enter the defendant's apartment solely for the purpose of facilitating the move of his possessions into storage lacked actual authority to consent to search of the apartment because [a]ccess to the apartment for that limited purpose cannot be reconciled with the joint access or control for most purposes which is required for valid consent). As to the second Rith inquirycontrol over the apartment for most purposesthe government's argument is similarly unconvincing. The relationship between Ms. Ricker and Mr. Cos, who had dated for a short time and were friends (having an established personal relationship, in the government's words), is not the equivalent of the relationships we recognized in Rith as establishing a presumption of control: those between parent and child and husband and wife. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1330. If, as we stated in Rith, co-tenant relationships do not establish a presumption that each party has control over the property for most purposes, we fail to see how this particular personal relationship should create such a presumption. See id. Finally, the government's argument in support of Ms. Ricker's alleged control over the apartment is untethered to any persuasive account of widely shared social expectations or reasonable expectations of privacy that would support the view that, in the absence of a valid warrant or exigent circumstances, Mr. Cos somehow forfeited his right to exclude the government's entry into his home by leaving Ms. Ricker alone there for forty minutes before the officers arrived. Randolph, 126 S.Ct. at 1521; McAlpine, 919 F.2d at 1463.