Opinion ID: 1946746
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The verdict of second degree murder was a compromise verdict unsupported by the evidence.

Text: Defendant bottoms his argument on this point upon the theory that the jury was presented with a perfect first degree murder case and that the only basis upon which the jury could rationally have come to a conclusion that defendant was guilty not of first degree murder but second degree murder would be that the jury did believe that the defendant was insane at the time of the commission of the offense in question, and therefore by compromise, reduced the first degree murder finding to a verdict of second degree murder. What defendant overlooks is that in his summation he argued that it was the jury's responsibility to decide whether or not defendant is guilty of murder in the first degree, and it will be your responsibility, your serious responsibility of deciding whether or not he is guilty of murder in the second degree and it will be equally your responsibility to decide whether he is not guilty by reason of insanity. In connection with the question of murder in the first degree, counsel argued that defendant neither premeditated nor deliberated because he lacked the mental capacity to premeditate or deliberate. Counsel therefore concluded that since two of the three essential ingredients for first degree murder were missing, defendant could not be guilty of that offense. This argument related to possible guilt of second degree murder rather than first degree, not to complete absence of guilt because of insanity. Defendant further overlooks that portion of the court's charge, in which he acquiesced, which correctly instructed the jury that in determining whether defendant did in fact premeditate and deliberate, they should consider the evidence bearing upon his mental capacity to do so, and if, because of any mental defect, mental deficiency, or mental weakness, and the proof of any trait, condition or illness or any other cause or combination of causes they concluded that he did not premeditate or deliberate, they could not find him guilty of murder in the first degree but could find him guilty of murder in the second degree. The conclusion that the verdict of murder in the second degree was a compromise verdict is unsupportable. The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The testimony of defendant's psychiatric experts was adequate to support a finding that, although defendant was not insane under M'Naghten, at the time of the commission of the homicide, he lacked the mental capacity to deliberate or premeditate and could be guilty of murder in the second degree rather than murder in the first degree. See State v. DiPaolo, 34 N.J. 279, pp. 294-297 (1961). We find no merit in this asserted ground for reversal.