Opinion ID: 181679
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remand for Consideration of New Evidence

Text: In her second claim, Ferguson contends the district court erred when it declined to remand the matter to the ALJ for consideration of new evidence that was accepted by the Appeals Council, but never considered by the ALJ. The new evidence consists of two letters from psychologist Carol A. Loeffler, Ph.D. In the first letter, addressed to Dr. Erulkar and dated July 30, 2007, Dr. Loeffler summarized the results of two tests she had administered to Ferguson, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) and the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R). A.R. 476, Letter 7/30/07. While acknowledging that the results of the MMPI-2 were technically invalid (because Ferguson was unable to complete the test in one sitting), Dr. Loeffler characterized the testing as suggesting a person who is experiencing tremendous internal and external distress, who struggles with distorted thinking with delusions, who feels hopeless, withdrawn, overwhelmed and guilt ridden, who ruminates and has rigid rituals and superstitious phobias, and who may be immobilized by multiple symptoms and complaints. Id. Dr. Loeffler characterized these impressions as consistent with the results of the SCL-90-R. She summarized her overall impressions: Overall, Ms. Ferguson struggles to maintain her hold on reality. Her level of appropriate functioning has been severely compromised. She has reached the point where she is questioning her quality of life and wishes she were dead. A.R. 477, Loeffler Letter 7/30/07. The second letter is addressed to the Social Security Administration and is dated September 28, 2007. It is directed to the question of Ferguson's ability to work. Dr. Loeffler commented on the same testing results, as well as her impressions made after eleven sessions with Ferguson over the course of six months. In addition to her diagnostic impressions that Ferguson suffers from panic disorder with agoraphobia, dysthymia, and delusional disorder, the letter includes the following observations: Ms. Ferguson's mental health issues are severe and interfere significantly with her ability to work, socialize and conduct [activities of daily living]. She has been ill for greater than 14 years with her condition getting increasingly worse each year. She has avoided recent hospitalizations only because of her family's attentiveness to her needs and tolerance of her behaviors. Ms. Ferguson's paranoia is so great she cannot develop relationships or concentrate for any period of time on a particular topic. She is easily distracted by noises, etc. as she believes people are trying to get her and/or listen to her conversation. Her delusions are well developed and well entrenched with her paranoia permeating every aspect of her life. I hope this helps you to understand Cathy Ferguson better and the extent to which her mental illness affects her functioning and precludes her from engaging in normal activities such as working and socializing. A.R. 478-79, Loeffler Letter 9/28/07. The Appeals Council considered the Dr. Loeffler letters but gave them little weight, concluding the information was cumulative and provided no basis for changing the ALJ's decision. The district court correctly recognized that a remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) sentence six for consideration of additional evidence is warranted only if the evidence is new and material and good cause is shown for the failure to present the evidence to the ALJ. Foster, 279 F.3d at 357. These requirements are defined as follows: For the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) remand, evidence is new only if it was not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding. ... Such evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the Secretary would have reached a different disposition of the disability claim if presented with the new evidence. ... A claimant shows good cause by demonstrating a reasonable justification for the failure to acquire and present the evidence for inclusion in the hearing before the ALJ.... [T]he burden of showing that a remand is appropriate is on the claimant. Foster, 279 F.3d at 357 (citations omitted); see also Hollon v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 447 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir.2006). The district court concluded that Dr. Loeffler's letters were not material because (a) the MMPI-2 results were invalid; (b) no empirical results from the SCL-90-R were provided; (c) Dr. Loeffler's impressions merely confirmed evidence that was already in the record; and (d) the evidence would not alter the ALJ's decision that Ferguson was not disabled. There is some question whether the district court's refusal to remand is reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion. See Templeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 215 Fed.Appx. 458, 464 n. 3 (6th Cir.2007) (declining to decide between the two standards). For the reasons that follow, we hold that Ferguson has failed to carry her burden of establishing entitlement to a remand under either standard of review. The letters from Dr. Loeffler meet the first of the three factors needed to warrant a § 405(g) sentence six remand. Generated in 2007, the letters detailing Dr. Loeffler's impressions based on testing and treatment provided in 2007 are new. They do not, however, satisfy the latter two factors. As justification for her failure to present the kind of evidence embodied in Dr. Loeffler's letters in 2005, when the record was open before the ALJ, Ferguson argues that she had no idea further substantiation of her mental impairments would be necessary before the ALJ rendered his second adverse decision in July 2006. We are not persuaded. When the Appeals Council granted Ferguson the second bite at the apple, she was on notice that the ALJ had already found her application deficient for lack of objective medical evidence substantiating the severity of her subjective complaints. Attentive to this deficiency, Ferguson supplemented the record with Dr. Erulkar's notes. The problem is that although Dr. Erulkar's notes reflect a diagnosis consistent with that later reached by Dr. Loeffler, they offer no objective medical substantiation and no professional explanation of the severity of the mental impairments. Dr. Erulkar's notes did not cure the deficiency and Ferguson has not shown good cause for her failure to then elicit the sort of evidentiary support she later sought from Dr. Loeffler. It is possible that Ferguson's condition had significantly worsened between 2005 and 2007. Dr. Loeffler's letters indicate a gradual worsening of Ferguson's psychosis and isolation. Yet, in general, Dr. Loeffler's observations were consistent with Dr. Erulkar's notations of Ferguson's complaints two years earlier. There is no apparent reason why the sort of additional information provided by Dr. Loeffler could not have been obtained, even from Dr. Erulkar herself, two years earlier. Ferguson has not carried her burden of showing good cause for her failure to present evidence of the type and quality provided by Dr. Loeffler two years earlier. See Hollon, 447 F.3d at 485 (claimant who fails to identify obstacles to timely submission of evidence fails to demonstrate good cause). Ferguson's showing that Dr. Loeffler's letters are material is also wanting. To the extent the letters purport to furnish the objective evidence that had been lacking, they too fail to actually deliver. As the district court observed, Dr. Loeffler herself acknowledged that the MMPI-2 results she purports to rely on were invalid. Further, the SCL-90-R results, said to be consistent with the suggestions derived from the invalid MMPI-2 results, were cited by Dr. Loeffler, but were not attached to her letter and have not been made part of the record. In the absence of the substantiating objective evidence, we are left with Dr. Loeffler's impressions. These largely unsupported impressions, being consistent with those reflected in Dr. Erulkar's notes, were reasonably deemed by the Appeals Council and the district court to be merely cumulative, confirming the pre-existing evidence that Ferguson was paranoid, withdrawn, and subject to panic attacks. Dr. Loeffler's letters purport to explain the severity of Ferguson's mental impairments, but Dr. Loeffler's impressions were derived from testing and treatment provided in 2007, almost two years after the ALJ conducted the second hearing. Among these impressions are Dr. Loeffler's observations that Ferguson is becoming increasingly more psychotic, is experiencing increased intrusive thoughts around past abuse which further exacerbates her anxiety and depression, and is getting increasingly worse each year. A.R. 477, 478. Because the information added by Dr. Loeffler's letters comes over a year after the ALJ's denial of benefits and, on its face, evidences a subsequent deterioration in condition after the second hearing, it was properly deemed immaterial because it does not necessarily speak to Ferguson's condition at the relevant time. See Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir.2003) (evidence of subsequent deterioration in condition deemed immaterial); Wyatt v. Sec. of Health and Human Services, 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir.1992) (same). Accordingly, Ferguson having failed to show that the new evidence is material and that there is good cause for not presenting it earlier, we find no error in the district court's refusal to order a § 405(g) sentence six remand.