Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Charge on Withdrawal Sua Sponte

Text: 299 Ajaj argues that his arrest and incarceration on passport fraud charges approximately six months prior to the World Trade Center bombing entitled him to a jury instruction on withdrawal from the bombing conspiracy. Ajaj argues that the district court's failure to provide this instruction constituted plain error. We disagree. 300 A criminal defendant is entitled to have instructions presented relating to any theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, no matter how weak or incredible that evidence may be. United States v. LaMorte, 950 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir.1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Nava-Salazar, 30 F.3d 788, 799 (7th Cir.1994) (A defendant is entitled to a withdrawal instruction only if the evidence could sustain that claim.). Typically, to sustain a withdrawal defense, a defendant is required to present evidence of some affirmative action [taken] ... to disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369, 32 S.Ct. 793, 56 L.Ed. 1114 (1912). Mere cessation of activity is not enough ...; there must also be affirmative action, either the making of a clean breast to the authorities ... or communication of the abandonment in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators. United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (1964). 301 A conspirator who presents evidence of his imprisonment during the course of the conspiracy is entitled to a jury instruction on withdrawal. See United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir.1976) ([E]vidence that [defendant] had been incarcerated ... would have been enough to make his withdrawal a jury issue.); Borelli, 336 F.2d at 390 (concluding that although incarceration for a crime unrelated to the charged conspiracy does not entitle defendant to a directed verdict on withdrawal, the fact [of incarceration] ... raise[s] a question for the jury on the issue of ... withdrawal); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 839 (2d Cir.1962) (The law is clear ... that while arrest or incarceration may constitute a withdrawal from a conspiracy, it does not follow that in every instance it must.); see also United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir.1961). Whether a conspirator's imprisonment constitutes a withdrawal must be decided by the jury in light of the length and location of the internment, the nature of the conspiracy, and any other available evidence. Panebianco, 543 F.2d at 454 n. 5. 302 Ajaj, who was incarcerated during the course of the conspiracy, therefore was entitled to a jury instruction on withdrawal. Ajaj, however, did not raise this contention at trial and we therefore assess the court's instructions for plain error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We conclude that Ajaj has not met his burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the jury, properly instructed, would have found that Ajaj withdrew from the conspiracy. 303 Other than the fact of his incarceration, Ajaj presented no other evidence at trial to demonstrate that he withdrew from the conspiracy. The government, however, presented compelling evidence that Ajaj, through conversations with Abukhdeir and Yousef, retained a stake in the conspiracy during his six-month imprisonment. Ajaj discussed the bombing conspiracy in coded language and never affirmatively sought to distance himself from his coconspirators. In fact, during one such conversation, Ajaj agreed to convey the terrorist materials to Yousef. Therefore, in light of Ajaj's relatively short prison sentence on his passport fraud conviction, his internment in New York and the government's evidence demonstrating Ajaj's frequent contact with Yousef during the term of his incarceration, we conclude that the district court's failure to instruct the jury on withdrawal was not plain error.