Opinion ID: 353818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Law: Wheels and Chains

Text: 80 1. Kotteakos and the Wheel Conspiracy Rationale : The Court in Kotteakos held that proof of multiple conspiracies under an indictment alleging a single conspiracy constituted a material variance requiring reversal where a defendant's substantial rights had been affected. At issue was the right not to be tried en masse for the conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed by others. 328 U.S. at 775, 66 S.Ct. at 1253. Kotteakos thus protects against the spill-over effect, the transference of guilt from members of one conspiracy to members of another. United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 1975). 81 The facts of Kotteakos have been summarized by this court as follows: 82 In that case, one where the indictment charged but one overall conspiracy, the government's proof at trial, by its own admission, showed that there were eight separate conspiracies involving some thirty-two persons. The key figure in the scheme, which involved the obtaining of government loans by making fraudulent representations, was a man named Brown, who was a part of, and directed each of the eight conspiracies. Brown was the only element common to the eight otherwise completely separate undertakings, no other person taking part in, nor having knowledge of the other conspiracies. Though each of the conspiracies had similar illegal objects, none depended upon, was aided by, or had any interest in the success of the others. 83 United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 60 (5th Cir. 1973). These facts led the Court to speak in terms of a wheel conspiracy, in which one person, the hub of the wheel, was accused of conspiring with several others, the spokes of the wheel. As we explained in United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1977): 84 For a (single) wheel conspiracy to exist those people who form the wheel's spokes must have been aware of each other and must do something in furtherance of some single, illegal enterprise. Otherwise the conspiracy lacks the rim of the wheel to enclose the spokes. If there is not some interaction between those conspirators who form the spokes of the wheel as to at least one common illegal object, the wheel is incomplete, and two conspiracies rather than one are charged. (Citations omitted). 85 2. Blumenthal and the Chain Conspiracy Rationale : The impact of Kotteakos was soon limited by the Court in Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947), where the indictment charged a single conspiracy to sell whiskey at prices above the ceiling set by the Office of Price Administration. The owner of the whiskey, through a series of middlemen, had devised an intricate scheme to conceal the true amount he was charging for the whiskey. Although some of the middlemen had no contact with each other and did not know the identity of the owner, they had to have realized that they were indispensible cogs in the machinery through which this illegal scheme was effectuated. The Court concluded that in every practical sense the unique facts of this case reveal a single conspiracy of which the several agreements were essential and integral steps. Id. at 559, 68 S.Ct. at 257. Thus the chain conspiracy rationale evolved. 86 The essential element of a chain conspiracy allowing persons unknown to each other and never before in contact to be jointly prosecuted as co-conspirators is interdependence. The scheme which is the object of the conspiracy must depend on the successful operation of each link in the chain.  An individual associating himself with a 'chain' conspiracy knows that it has a 'scope' and that for its success it requires an organization wider than may be disclosed by his personal participation. United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 827 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959, 83 S.Ct. 1013, 10 L.Ed.2d 11 (1963). Thus, in a 'chain' conspiracy prosecution, the requisite element knowledge of the existence of remote links may be inferred solely from the nature of the enterprise. United States v. Perez, supra, 489 F.2d at 59 n. 10. 24 87 3. Limits of the Chain Conspiracy Rationale : The rationale of Blumenthal applies only insofar as the alleged agreement has a common end or single unified purpose. United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167, 170-71 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lloyd, 425 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1970). Generally, where the government has shown that a number of otherwise diverse activities were performed to achieve a single goal, courts have been willing to find a single conspiracy. 25 This common objective test has most often been used to connect the many facets of drug importation and distribution schemes. 26 The rationale falls apart, however, where the remote members of the alleged conspiracy are not truly interdependent or where the various activities sought to be tied together cannot reasonably be said to constitute a unified scheme. In United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191, 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), for example, the Second Circuit held that the value and quantity of drugs sold by the defendant-suppliers was insufficient to justify the inference that each knew his supplies were only a small part of the drugs handled by a larger operation. Similarly, in United States v. Bertolotti, supra, 529 F.2d at 155, the same Court focused on an alleged narcotics conspiracy that bore little resemblance to the orthodox business operation found to exist in other drug cases; many of the narcotics transactions involved amounted to little more than simple cash thefts in which no drugs changed hands. The only factor that tied several isolated transactions together, the Court noted, was the presence of two of the defendants, Rossi and Coralluzzo, in each. In effect, (t)he scope of the operation was defined only by Rossi's resourcefulness in devising new methods to make money. Under these circumstances, the Court held that the government had failed to prove the existence of a single conspiracy. 88 Applying pre-RICO conspiracy concepts to the facts of this case, we doubt that a single conspiracy could be demonstrated. Foster had no contact with Delph and Taylor during the life of the alleged conspiracy. Delph and Taylor, so far as the evidence revealed, had no contact with Recea Hawkins. The activities allegedly embraced by the illegal agreement in this case are simply too diverse to be tied together on the theory that participation in one activity necessarily implied awareness of others. Even viewing the common objective of the conspiracy as the raising of revenue through criminal activity, we could not say, for example, that Foster, when he helped to conceal stolen meat, had to know that J. C. was selling drugs to persons unknown to Foster, or that Delph and Taylor, when they furnished counterfeit titles to a car theft ring, had to know that the man supplying the titles was also stealing goods out of interstate commerce. The enterprise involved in this case probably could not have been successfully prosecuted as a single conspiracy under the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371. 27 89