Opinion ID: 1655519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of State's Witness.

Text: James Simeon, taking the stand for the State, testified the defendant was one of those involved in the beating of Felton prior to his death, and that he thought he remembered someone mentioning getting a gun while Felton was still in the house. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to establish that Simeon had an interest in furnishing evidence favorable to the State in order to avoid criminal charges. The following colloquy transpired: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Q. Are you scared of Mr. Hisey? A. I guess so. Q. You know that if he doesn't think your telling the truth, he can file charges against you? MR. HISEY: Object. There's no evidence in the record whatsoever that anything is contingent on whether or not I think he's telling the truth. THE COURT: Sustained. MR. McCOY: If someone thinks you're not telling the truth, you know charges can be filed against you, don't you? MR. HISEY: Objection for the same reason, your honor. He's just broadening the scope of question. THE COURT: Sustained. Defendant now claims that the trial court's exclusion of the interest evidence violated his right to a fair trial. Generally, the scope and extent of cross-examination rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Menke, 227 N.W.2d 184, 191 (Iowa 1975). The court, however, especially in a case where defendant is charged with a grave offense, should permit the defendant wide latitude in seeking to show the bias or interest of all alleged accomplices or other witnesses, who testify for the prosecution. See State v. Armento, 256 N.W.2d 228, 229 (Iowa 1977). It is said that [t]he rule allowing great or liberal latitude in the cross-examination by defendant of a witness for the prosecution, with respect to his motive for testifying, is especially applicable where such witness is a codefendant or accomplice of the accused ... and whose testimony against defendant may be influenced by a promise of, or hope or expectation of, immunity or leniency with respect to this case as a consideration for testifying against defendant. Id. at 229, quoting Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 610, 624 (1958). See also State v. Carney, 236 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1975). We believe the court should have allowed the witness to answer the question relating to his credibility; we do not, however, believe it was reversible error in this case to sustain the objection. During defense counsel's previous cross-examination of Simeon, he was allowed to testify in regard to the same issue. Defense counsel covered the subject of Simeon's plea agreement and the potential for criminal charges in the event he did not testify truthfully. The record reflects the following exchange: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Q. And at that time were you aware then, or did you know that, or did they tellsomeone tell you that if you talked to the police, you would have this plea bargain? A. Yea. Q. And what was this plea bargain?
Q. And if you would do that, then no charges would be brought against you; right? A. Correct. This testimony came in, on cross-examination, without objection. We have held that prejudicial error does not occur when a particular line of cross-examination objected to and excluded by the trial court was merely repetitious of testimony previously received. See State v. O'Callaghan, 157 Iowa 545, 551-52, 138 N.W. 402, 405 (1912) (no prejudice to defendant from sustaining an objection to question about whether witness had a charge filed against him when from other testimony it was clear that the witness had been promised immunity in return for his testimony.) We conclude under the circumstances of this case it was not reversible error to sustain the objection to Simeon's cross-examination. We find no basis for reversal. AFFIRMED.