Opinion ID: 1931339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of a Strict Liability Felony

Text: McNeely asserts that, separate and apart from vagueness, the Pit Bull Act violates the Due Process Clause because it is a strict liability felony. [18] A great weight of case law rejects the notion that there is a constitutional bar to strict liability crimes or a prohibition against imprisonment for conviction on a strict liability basis. [19] Strict liability criminal offenses  including felonies  are not unprecedented in the District of Columbia; the Council has enacted several such statutes in the past. [20] Moreover, this court has upheld the Council's constitutional authority to do so. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 162 A.2d 503, 505 (D.C.1960) (stating that it is now too settled to doubt that the legislature may dispense with intent as an element of criminal liability when the regulation is in the exercise of the police power for the benefit of the people); accord Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 188 Pa.Super. 153, 146 A.2d 306, 308 (1958); Kirkham v. City of North Little Rock, 227 Ark. 789, 301 S.W.2d 559, 563-64 (1957); People v. Darby, 114 Cal.App.2d 412, 250 P.2d 743, 754 (1952); People v. Cramer, 247 Mich. 127, 225 N.W. 595, 598 (1929); State v. Striggles, 202 Iowa 1318, 210 N.W. 137, 138 (Iowa 1926). These precedents, moreover, are consistent with the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that conduct alone without regard to the intent of the doer is often sufficient to constitute a crime because lawmakers have wide latitude ... to declare an offense and to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. 240. This latitude is justified in the interest of the larger good ... [which] puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952) (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281, 64 S.Ct. 134); see also United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). Thus, a statute defining an offense malum prohibitum may impose a fine and/or imprisonment on a strict liability basis without offending due process of law. Our conclusion is supported by the accepted proposition that [t]he accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. [21] Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256, 72 S.Ct. 240.