Opinion ID: 2345595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McCraney's Collateral Attack on His Conviction

Text: In January 2004, four years after his sentencing, McCraney moved for a new trial pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 on the ground that his trial counsel, Linda Sroufe, was burdened by a conflict of interest that adversely affected her performance. The conflict arose from the fact, which had not been disclosed to the court previously, that the majority of Sroufe's legal fees were paid by McCraney's co-defendant. According to McCraney, Sroufe's conflicting loyalties to him and Stewart led her to advise him against taking the stand in his own defense at trial even though he allegedly could have exculpated himself by implicating Ricardo Mascall in Rosebure's murder. In addition to McCraney, Sroufe and Holt (Stewart's trial counsel) testified at the hearing on his motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge denied relief, finding that (1) McCraney had waived the potential conflict created by the challenged fee arrangement, and (2) in any event, the conflict of interest had not adversely affected Sroufe's performance on McCraney's behalf. On appeal, McCraney contends that both findings were erroneous and that the judge abused his discretion in denying his § 23-110 motion. The government concedes that McCraney did not validly waive his counsel's potential conflict, [53] but it defends the judge's alternative holding that the conflict had no adverse impact on counsel's representation. As the latter issue turns largely on the judge's credibility assessments and factual determinations, we begin by summarizing the testimony adduced at the § 23-110 hearing.
There was no dispute at the § 23-110 hearing that Stewart had paid the majority of McCraney's legal fees; on that point, Sroufe and Holt confirmed the essential details of McCraney's testimony. In brief, after having been represented prior to trial by four different court-appointed lawyers, McCraney met with Stewart and told him he wanted to retain counsel of his own choosing. Stewart agreed to help McCraney pay for one. A week later, Stewart's counsel Holt introduced McCraney to Sroufe, who offered to represent him for a total fee of $8,000. Holt told McCraney he would need to pay only $3,000 of that sum because Stewart would pay the balance. McCraney agreed to that arrangement and Sroufe became his counsel. Prior to trial, McCraney testified, he informed Sroufe that when the police arrived outside 1600 E Street on New Year's Eve, he and the other persons who were shooting their guns in the air went upstairs to Ricardo Mascall's apartment and left their weapons in Ricardo's keeping. Ricardo had all the weapons and he put them up somewhere in his house. To McCraney's knowledge, Ricardo Mascall thus was the last one in possession of the guns allegedly used in the shooting the next day. According to McCraney, he also told Sroufe that he had given his car to Ricardo Mascall approximately three to five weeks before the shooting. (In his testimony, McCraney did not explain the circumstances under which that alleged transfer of possession took place.) McCraney further testified that he met with Sroufe, Holt and Stewart at the D.C. Jail during trial and expressed to them his desire to testify about Ricardo's possession of the murder weapons and the car. In McCraney's words, Holt was very displeased with that prospect because his testimony would open the door to the admission of evidence that one of the weapons used to shoot Rosebure also was used in two of my co-defendant's [Stewart's] other cases in which I wasn't his co-defendant on. If McCraney insisted on testifying, Holt warned him, she would have to sever our defense and point the finger at me in order to save her client. McCraney testified that Sroufe was largely silent during this discussion, but that when he asked her for her advice, she agreed with Holt. The meeting at the Jail concluded without a decision being reached, but McCraney later decided not to take the stand. He said he was persuaded by Holt's argument that it would not be in his interest for the jury to hear the other-crimes evidence she described. In their hearing testimony, Sroufe and Holt disputed details of McCraney's account, but they agreed that Sroufe knew of Holt's opposition to McCraney's desire to testify at trial. Sroufe remembered that Holt told McCraney she would withdraw from the case if he decided to take the stand, and that Holt instructed Stewart to tell [his] co-defendant not to testify. [54] Sroufe also acknowledged that she seconded Holt's recommendation that McCraney not testify. Sroufe insisted, however, that she advised McCraney against testifying only because the substance of his testimony would have been detrimental to his case, and not in order to protect Stewart. Sroufe and Holt denied that McCraney told them Ricardo Mascall possessed the murder weapons or the car in which those weapons were found. [55] According to Sroufe, McCraney attributed Sue Ann Mascall's accusation of him to her ire at his rejection of her romantic advances, not to any desire to shield her brother. Furthermore, Sroufe testified, McCraney admitted to her that he had parked his car where the police found it, and he could not explain how the murder weapons came to be in the car's trunk. Sroufe feared that McCraney would face a hammering cross-examination on that damning fact if he testified. (I told him the government's going to ask you how those guns got in your car, what are you gonna say? And I said you're just gonna say I don't know and he agreed with that.) She thought his testimony would only subvert the efforts of the defense at trial to dissociate McCraney from the car by suggesting that the vehicle had been abandoned. Additionally, Sroufe testified, McCraney told her that Rosebure had once robbed him. If McCraney mentioned that robbery in his testimony, Sroufe believed, the jury would think it simply gave him a stronger motive to kill Rosebure. Sroufe also was concerned that McCraney would have difficulty explaining why (as his own mother testified at trial) he absented himself from the District of Columbia for a period of six months following the shootingbehavior the government would ask the jury to construe as flight manifesting consciousness of guilt. To Sroufe, the risks of putting McCraney on the stand outweighed the possible benefits. Indeed, Sroufe stated that she eventually asked him point blank if he could furnish any testimony that would not be cumulative of other defense evidence. McCraney answered that he could not and then said he did not want to testify.
The trial judge denied McCraney's § 23-110 motion because, on the central point at issue, he disbelieved McCraney and believed Sroufe and Holt. The judge agreed that it would have been a plausible strategy (notwithstanding the risks) for McCraney to have testified at trial that he and his friends left their guns with Ricardo Mascall on New Year's Eve and that Ricardo had control of the car in which the murder weapons subsequently were found. However, the judge found, McCraney never told Sroufe or Holt that Ricardo Mascall had the guns or the car, and there was no credible evidence that he would have implicated Ricardo had he testified at trial. His claim that he would have done so was a fabrication, the judge concluded, concocted out of whole cloth by Mr. McCraney in an attempt to extricate himself from his post-conviction predicament. The judge also credited Sroufe's explanation for advising McCraney against testifying, finding that Sroufe had no reason to believe [McCraney] could help himself by taking the stand and every reason to believe he would hurt himself. [56] Indeed, the judge found those reasons absolutely compelling and [could] not imagine competent, wholly unconflicted counsel giving Mr. McCraney anything other than the advice that Ms. Sroufe gave him. Under the circumstances, the judge concluded, the alternative of putting McCraney on the stand at trial was an utterly implausible strategy lacking even a remote possibility of success. In view of the soundness of Sroufe's advice, the judge ruled, McCraney had failed to show that his counsel's performance was affected adversely by her alleged conflict of interest.
In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. [57] On the record before us, given the trial judge's credibility findings, McCraney did not make that necessary showing. McCraney did establish that his lawyer had a potential conflict of interest because Stewart's payment of her fees could have given her an incentive to prefer Stewart's interests to McCraney's differing interests at trial. [58] But [a]n `actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance. [59] Otherwise put, an attorney has an actual, as opposed to a potential, conflict of interest only when the attorney's and the defendant's interests `diverge with respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of action.' [60] On that score, McCraney showed that his lawyer recommended a strategy that appeared to serve Stewart's interest despite McCraney's own contrary inclination: in line with the expressed preference of Stewart's counsel, Sroufe advised McCraney to forego his desire to testify in his own defense. To make out a Sixth Amendment violation, however, McCraney also needed to show that Sroufe's advice was against his interest, not merely his inclination. In other words, McCraney needed to show that Sroufe's advice not to testify was unsound. If an attorney renders sound advice to a client, the Sixth Amendment is not violated merely because that advice serves the attorney's other interest as well. [61] Such a situation occurs when a trial attorney [justifiably] rejects a strategy as being `specious' or because it could negatively affect `the credibility of [the defendant's] entire case.' [62] An alleged conflict of interest that obstructs the use of a particular strategy or defense is not significant unless the defense is plausible, meaning it was available and realistically might have influenced twelve reasonable jurors. [63] Thus, to show that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel was infringed, McCraney must demonstrate (1) that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not, and (2) that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests. [64] McCraney argues that but for his counsel's conflicted advice, he would have pursued the plausible defense strategy of taking the witness stand in his own defense and exculpating himself by implicating Ricardo Mascall in Rosebure's murder. As McCraney recognizes, however, this argument founders on the trial judge's finding that he never told Sroufe he could testify about Ricardo's possession of the murder weapons and the getaway car. Anchored as that finding was in the judge's firsthand assessments of the witnesses' credibilityinstead of believing McCraney, the judge believed Sroufe (and Holt, who corroborated her)it is well nigh unassailable. [65] McCraney argues that Sroufe was unworthy of belief in view of her testimony that she never asked Holt to divulge the identity of the eyewitness who allegedly said the guns were left with Ricardo on New Year's Eve, even though she and Holt were presenting a joint defense. [66] The argument is not without forceone would think Sroufe surely would have sought to know more about such a witness, unless she already knew the witness was her own clientbut it does not persuade us that Sroufe's testimony was so inherently incredible that the trier of fact had to reject it as a matter of law. [67] As we therefore must accept the trial judge's findings of fact, we cannot disturb his ultimate determination that Sroufe's advice was untainted by conflict of interest because calling McCraney as a witness at trial was not a plausible alternative to pursue. The record amply supports that determination: as the trial judge said, Sroufe articulated compelling reasons why testifying would have been contrary to McCraney's own best interests. We agree with the trial judge that McCraney's testimony would have been devastating to his defense, for had he taken the stand he would have admitted that (1) on New Year's Eve, as Sue Ann Mascall testified, he and Stewart were firing their guns outside 1600 E Street (guns linked by other evidence to Rosebure's murder the next day); (2) he had been robbed by Rosebure (and thus had an animus against him); (3) he disappeared (i.e., fled) for six months immediately after the shooting; (4) he owned and drove the car in which the murder weapons later were found; and (5) he could not explain how those weapons came to be in the trunk of his car. It appeared, moreover, that McCraney had no credible explanation why Sue Ann Mascall would have accused him falsely or in error. And while McCraney could have testified in support of his alibi (filling in the gaps when his aunt and uncle admittedly were not home), that alibi was a double-edged sword, because it tied him to Xavier Gray, who did not testify and who, according to Hart, was with McCraney and Stewart in the alley behind 1600 E Street immediately before and after the shooting. It might be argued that McCraney had nothing to lose by testifying because the government's evidence against him was overwhelming. McCraney undoubtedly had a constitutional right to testify in his own defense, and perhaps his only chance at obtaining an acquittal would have been to take the stand, stoutly deny his guilt, and hope his sincerity would shine through. That argument in favor of testifying may appear compelling now, with the benefit of hindsight, but we doubt that it would have seemed so compelling when the decision had to be made. Be that as it may, on the record before us, and given the validity of the judge's finding that McCraney would not have implicated Ricardo Mascall, the probability that McCraney would have helped himself by taking the witness stand strikes us as vanishingly smalltoo infinitesimal to establish that Sroufe's advice to McCraney was affected adversely by her potential conflict. McCraney thus has not shown that the conflict deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel's effective assistance.