Opinion ID: 3012581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The most straightforward test of whether an action presents a federal question is to determine the law from which the cause of action arises, federal or otherwise. Justice Holmes's formulation of this test was that[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). The parties in this case both concede that it is a quiet title action. The only potential source of law for such an action is 28 V.I.C. S 372, the Virgin Islands statute _________________________________________________________________ 9. We also note that the Territorial Court has interpreted S 76(a) as rendering null and void a provision of the Virgin Islands Code that contains language similar to S 372's language that purports to vest jurisdiction in the district court. In In re Application of Moorhead, 27 V.I. 74 (Terr. Ct. 1992), the Territorial Court considered the effect of S 76(a) on 4 V.I.C. S 441. Section 441 provides that [t]he district court has jurisdiction over the admission of attorneys at law to practice in the courts of the Territory and over the discipline of persons so admitted and may make rules and regulations governing the practice of law in the Territory. S 441(a). Finding the language of S 76(a) to be clear and unequivocal in its intent to include[ ] all civil actions cognizable in local courts, the Territorial Court found that when the Virgin Islands legislature enacted S 76(a), the District Court was then divested of such jurisdiction, and the prior local law, 4 V.I.C. Sec. 441, being inconsistent with [S 76(a)], was rendered null and void. Moorhead, 27 V.I. at 82, 84. 13 titled, Action to determine boundaries. See supra at 11-12. If, as here, the cause of action is created by state or territorial law rather than federal law, the claim may still present a federal question. In these circumstances,[t]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the `well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff 's properly pleaded complaint. Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A plaintiff 's lack of reference, or erroneous reference to federal law is not controlling. See N. Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1978). Common-law pleading requirements originally provided the benchmark for determining whether a federal element must be raised to support a well-pleaded complaint. See Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure,S 3566 at 83 (1984) (noting that in early cases, the Supreme Court cit[ed] Chitty [on Pleadings] to determine what allegations are proper). Modern cases, however, look to the pleading requirements established in the statutes from which the causes of action arise, or in courts' interpretations of the pleading requirements of those statutes. See, e.g., Yokeno v. Mafnas, 973 F.2d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hodges Transp., Inc. v. Nevada, 562 F. Supp. 521, 522 (D. Nev. 1983), which in turn relied on the Nevada Supreme Court's interpretation of the pleading requirements in quiet title actions for the purpose of the well-pleaded complaint rule). The Virgin Islands legislature has helpfully specified what is necessary for a properly pleaded complaint brought under 28 V.I.C. S 372: The complaint in an action to determine boundaries shall be sufficient if it appears therefrom that the plaintiff and defendant or defendants are owners of adjacent lands and that there is a controversy or dispute between the parties concerning their boundary or dividing line or lines. It shall not be necessary to set forth the nature of such dispute or controversy further 14 than that the plaintiff shall describe the boundary or dividing line as he claims it to be. The defendant, in his answer, shall set forth the nature of his claim with reference to the location of the lines in the controversy. 28 V.I.C. S 373 (1997) (emphasis added). Club Comanche could have filed a well-pleaded S 372 complaint in this action simply by stating the boundaries of the property that it claimed. Thus, in this case, the federal issues of interpreting the Convention Between the United States and Denmark, interpreting the federal statutes that transferred submerged and public lands from the United States to the GVI, and applying the federal common law of submerged lands, did not need to be raised in Club Comanche's well-pleaded quiet title complaint. Therefore, applying the well-pleaded complaint rule, Club Comanche's quiet title action does not contain a federal question sufficient to support jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 1331 and 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a). Other federal courts that have considered the question whether quiet title actions in which the defendant's claim to the land was based on federal law have also concluded that they do not qualify for federal question jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. See American Invs-Co Countryside, Inc. v. Riverdale Bank, 596 F.2d 211, 217 n.10 (7th Cir. 1979) (If title to land is in doubt because of some matter of federal law, there is federal jurisdiction to entertain a bill to remove a cloud on title but not a suit to quiet title, since allegations as to the nature of the cloud are proper in the first kind of action but improper in the second.); see also Friend v. Kreger, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6764, at  (N.D. Cal. May 7, 1998) (finding that the state law quiet title action before the court did not present a federal question under the well-pleaded complaint rule); accord 14 ALR.2d 992, 1125 (1950) ([I]t is difficult, at least in the ordinary type of case, to plead a Federal question substantial in nature which is an essential element of plaintiff 's quiet title action . . . .). This analysis accords with common jurisprudential notions of the incidents of arising under jurisdiction. The mere fact that a source of law, such as the treaty involved here, is consulted in deciding an issue, does not create jurisdiction. 15 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Club Comanche's quiet title claim does not arise under the laws or treaties of the United States within the meaning of section 1331, and therefore that the District Court did not have jurisdiction over this dispute under 48 U.S.C. S 1612(a).10 We will therefore vacate the District Court's summary judgment order and remand the case with instructions for the District Court to dismiss it without prejudice so that it may be refiled in the Territorial Court.11 Dismissal without prejudice should not present a problem for Club Comanche because there appears to be a twenty-year statute of limitations on quiet title actions. See 5 V.I.C. S 32(b) (1997) (An action for the determination of any right or claim to or interest in real property shall be deemed within the limitations provided for actions for the recovery of the possession of real property.); S 31(1)(A) (actions for the recovery of the possession of real property are subject to a twenty-year statute of limitations). We note in this regard that the District Court does not have the authority to transfer the case to the Territorial Court. See Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. v. Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 274 (3d Cir. 1995). 10. Although Club Comanche cited in its complaint the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (which applies to the U.S. Virgin Islands pursuant to the Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. S 1561), it never requested relief in the form of just compensation, never argued the takings issue before the District Court, and has not argued before this court that the takings clause serves as the basis for federal question jurisdiction. Moreover, Club Comanche suffered neither a permanent physical occupation of its property nor a destruction of the value of its property through regulation, the actions that we generally recognize as bases of a claim for just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 11. We assume that the matter may be resolved expeditiously by the Territorial Court because the District Court has already developed a record. We trust, however, that the Territorial Court will consider the need to make findings of fact at the appropriate stage in the case. While the District Court disposed of the case on summary judgment, it appears to have made findings of fact on the issue of the proper translation of the Danish Measure Brief which, of course, is not permitted at the summary judgment stage. 16 A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 17