Opinion ID: 1214314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: remarks of prosecution

Text: The Appellant contends that she was prejudiced by certain remarks of the prosecution. A prosecutorial reference to the absence of physical symptoms to indicate that Mr. Brown had hurt the Appellant and comments regarding whether the Appellant drank beer the day of the incident were not objected to at trial. The Appellant now asserts that this Court could utilize the plain error doctrine to correct errors to which no objections were made, we do not find that the use of the plain error doctrine is justified in this case. We addressed the issue of absence of objection in State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996), and observed the following: Ordinarily, a defendant who has not proffered a particular claim or defense in the trial court may not unveil it on appeal. Indeed, if any principle is settled in this jurisdiction, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised properly in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal. We have invoked this principle with a near religious fervor. Id. at 597, 476 S.E.2d at 544. Exceptions must be few and far between and, therefore, an appellate court's discretion should not be affirmatively exercised unless the equities heavily preponderate in favor of such a step. These principles are embodied in our `plain error' rules. Id. at 598, 476 S.E.2d at 545 (Footnote omitted.) Moreover, we see nothing improper about the prosecutor's reference to evidence which had been introduced at trial regarding the absence of physical signs of abuse [7] and to the issue of whether the Appellant had been drinking on the day of the murder. Both issues had been dealt with at trial, and evidence regarding those matters had been submitted to the jury. In addition to the comments which received no objection at trial, the Appellant also alleges that she was prejudiced by the prosecutor's remark that forty days is not a punishment, referring to the possible consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. The Appellant's attorney objected, and the lower court informed the prosecutor that he was not permitted to address the length or duration of a punishment, except as contained in the court's charge on first degree murder. Appellant's counsel did not request that the jury be admonished to disregard the remark. The Appellant also alleges that she was prejudiced by prosecutorial characterization of the insanity defense as potentially a license to kill. The prosecution argues that such comment was intended only to stress the absence of any convincing evidence that the Appellant had lapsed into a psychosis prior to shooting Mr. Brown. A similar comment, if 40 million people are battered and we send out a message that this is a defense, is also raised as prejudicial. Objections to these comments were overruled. In syllabus point five of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995), we explained that [a] judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice. Syllabus point six elaborates as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters. Upon our evaluation of the allegedly improper remarks by the prosecution and the effect of those remarks upon the jury, we find that the comments do not warrant reversal. We do not believe that the remarks clearly prejudice[d] the accused or result[ed] in manifest injustice.