Opinion ID: 1148850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the application of the death penalty is discriminatorily applied to african-americans in violation of the due process clause and equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.

Text: ¶ 60. On April 5, 1995, Underwood filed a motion to quash his indictment based upon the discriminatory application of the death penalty in Mississippi. After hearing arguments from counsel at a May 5 hearing, Judge Toney denied his motion. In his final assignment of error, Underwood argues that the death penalty should be abolished, because it cannot be applied fairly or in compliance with equal protection. His primary argument is that the death penalty is disproportionately applied against black defendants in Mississippi. He points to statistics from the NAACP Legal Defense Fund from January 31, 1995, showing that thirty-two of Mississippi's fifty-three death row inmates at the time, 60%, were black, while only 36% of Mississippi's general population was black. At the motions hearing on May 5, Underwood submitted a list of Mississippi's death row inmates dated March 25, 1995, showing that thirty-six of the fifty-eight inmates (62%) were black. Out of these thirty-six, twenty-one (58%) had victimized whites. Forty-one of the fifty-eight death row inmates (71%) had white victims. Underwood also points to anti-death penalty studies and treatises to support his position that the application of the death penalty in Mississippi is determined by the race, sex, and economic class of the defendant and the victim, instead of by the severity of the crime. ¶ 61. Underwood cites Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), to promote his argument. Furman is a brief per curiam opinion overturning the sentence of death in three cases because the Court found that imposition of the death penalty in those cases constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40, 92 S.Ct. at 2727. The five-member majority each wrote separate concurring opinions, and none of them joined another's opinion. The principle of Furman has become that a sentencer's discretion to return a death sentence must be constrained by specific standards, so that the death penalty is not inflicted in a random and capricious fashion. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 657, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3059, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). This rationale has developed through subsequent cases following the opinions of Justices Stewart and White. See Id. at 657-60, 110 S.Ct. at 3059-60 (Scalia, J., concurring). ¶ 62. Justice Douglas based his concurring opinion in Furman upon the ground that it is `cruel and unusual' to apply the death penalty  or any other penalty  selectively to minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suffer though it would not countenance general application of the same penalty across the board. Furman, 408 U.S. at 245, 92 S.Ct. at 2729. However, Justice Douglas recognized that the source of the problem was that the uncontrolled discretion of sentencers enabled the death penalty to be applied in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 253-55, 92 S.Ct. at 2733-35. This Court has repeatedly held that Mississippi's statutory sentencing scheme in capital cases complies with the requirements of Furman and its progeny. Lester, 692 So.2d at 788; Blue, 674 So.2d at 1205-1207; Brown v. State, 682 So.2d 340, 354 (Miss. 1996); Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1139 (Miss. 1996); Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 650 (Miss. 1983). Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has approved Georgia's sentencing scheme, similar to Mississippi's, in which the use of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and a meaningful appellate review satisfy the requirements of Furman. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196-98, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2936-37, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). In Mississippi the death penalty is not applied in a discriminatory manner as a result of any arbitrary sentencing scheme. ¶ 63. The United States Supreme Court rejected this identical argument in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). McCleskey argued that Georgia's capital punishment statute violated equal protection, based upon a study showing that black defendants were more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants, and defendants murdering whites were more likely to be sentenced to death than defendants who murdered blacks. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 291-92, 107 S.Ct. at 1766-67. The Court held that in order to raise a successful claim of an equal protection violation, the criminal defendant must prove that the decision-makers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. Id. at 292, 107 S.Ct. at 1767. McCleskey's only proof supporting his claim were the results of the study. The Court determined that due to the number of variables inherent in capital sentencing and the discretion allowed trial courts in implementing criminal justice, the use of statistical evidence was insufficient to prove purposeful discrimination. Id. at 292-97, 107 S.Ct. at 1767-70. ¶ 64. Underwood has failed to offer any substantial proof that the death penalty is applied in a discriminatory manner in Mississippi today, or that he suffered discriminatory application of the law. Underwood's argument is based solely on insufficient statistical evidence and the bald assertion that had he been convicted of murdering an African-American instead of a white woman, he would have been sentenced to life imprisonment. We refuse to reverse Underwood's sentence of death based upon this assignment of error.