Opinion ID: 2321544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Other Contentions on Appeal

Text: Appellant's final two grounds for appeal are also unpersuasive. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the written reports of Dr. King's and Dr. Christiansen's court-mandated evaluations. Appellant argues that these reports were inadmissible hearsay because they were out-of-court statements and did not fall within any recognized hearsay exception. We disagree. In admitting the reports, Magistrate Judge Nooter clearly explained his reasoning: All right, pursuant to 16-2315(e)(4) and over the father's objection, I will admit Government's Exhibit No. 2 with the clarification that information that was provided to Dr. King through what's been referred to as collateral sources or reports, are admissible not for the truth of the matters contained in those reports but solely for the basis of explaining Dr. King's opinions that he reached, although, of course, statements made by the father would be admissible for the truth of the matter because he is a party. Magistrate Judge Nooter's ruling was entirely consistent with our case law recognizing that a court may admit expert reports containing hearsay, not for the underlying truth of the matter asserted, but rather as the basis for the experts' conclusions. [21] See In re Ca. S., 828 A.2d 184, 191 (D.C.2003) (citing In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 901-02 (D.C. 1991) (en banc)). Magistrate Judge Nooter admitted the reports for precisely that purpose. On this record we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence. Lastly, appellant contends that the trial court's finding of educational neglect was not supported by sufficient evidence. On review of a neglect determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw every reasonable inference in its favor. Jam. J., supra, 825 A.2d at 910 (quoting In re E.H., 718 A.2d 162, 168-69 (D.C.1998)). Our review respects the prerogative of the trial court, as the finder of fact, to determine credibility and weigh the evidence. Jam. J, supra, 825 A.2d at 910 (quoting In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 775 (D.C.1990)). Appellant contends that he initially received permission from the District of Columbia government to home-school his daughter and, therefore, any finding that he educationally neglected M.L. is negated. This argument mischaracterizes the record. Magistrate Judge Nooter based his neglect determination upon findings that appellant: [E]ducationally neglected [M.L.] by removing her from public school and home-schooled her for a year and a half. [Appellant] admitted that [M.L.] is cognitively delayed and entitled to special education services. He also admitted that he has not been trained to teach special education students. Therefore, it is clear by a preponderance of the evidence that [appellant] was not qualified to provide home-schooling to [M.L.] and that she was deprived of education services that she needed for a year and a half. The court's finding of educational neglect was not based upon appellant merely with-drawing M.L. from schoolwhich appellant had permission from the District of Columbia government to dobut rather upon appellant's failure to provide M.L. with appropriate educational instruction. As such, the court's finding of neglect rests upon sufficient evidence. [22]