Opinion ID: 3180766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remand For Resentencing Is Necessary

Text: Here, remand for full resentencing is appropriate because the district court failed to orally pronounce certain conditions of supervised release. A sentencing court must orally pronounce its sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reason for its imposition of the particular sentence”); United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 2015) (“only punishments stated orally, in open court, at sentencing are valid”). Because supervised release is part of the sentence, the court must also orally pronounce both its overall imposition and its conditions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment … may include as part of the sentence that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release” (emphasis added)); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2015) (18 U.S.C. § 3583 “dispel[s] … [a]ny doubt that conditions of supervised release are a part of the sentence”). Further, where the oral pronouncement of the court conflicts with the court’s later written order, the oral proNo. 15-1252 5 nouncement controls. E.g., United States v. Garcia, 804 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The written order may clarify the oral judgment if the oral judgment is ambiguous; however, where the oral judgment is unambiguous, the conflicting written order is a “nullity.” United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Alburay, 415 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2005)). We review whether an oral judgment is inconsistent with the written judgment de novo. Id. at 710 (citation omitted). Here, the district court’s oral pronouncement was not ambiguous. The district court did not orally pronounce anything regarding the thirteen standard conditions or the condition forbidding Orozco-Sanchez from possessing a “destructive device” or “any other dangerous weapon.” These later added written conditions are therefore a nullity, and we vacate them. See id. at 711 (citing Alburay, 415 F.3d at 788) (holding that “any new conditions imposed in the later written judgment are inconsistent with the court’s oral order and must be vacated”). We do not merely delete these conditions, but instead remand the case for resentencing. The sentencing court has “wide discretion in determining the conditions of supervised release,” United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176, 193 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted), which it “retains … at any time after [the] sentencing hearing.” Johnson, 765 F.3d at 711 (citing Adkins, 743 F.3d at 196). On appellate review, we may clarify an ambiguity between the oral and written judgment without remanding the case, such as when a condition is redundant or pronouncement vague. See United 6 No. 15-1252 States v. Chatman, 805 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 2015) (removing redundant second mental evaluation and not requiring remand where district court imposed one evaluation in oral pronouncement and imposed two in written order); United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that written order clarified vague oral pronouncement and did not require remand on particular notice requirement). But where no ambiguity exists—as is the case here—we remand the case for resentencing, knowing that “[a]ny issues with the conditions [of supervised release] can … be easily corrected upon remand.” Johnson, 765 F.3d at 711.