Opinion ID: 787816
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cocaine Expert

Text: 17 Hicks first alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial because his counsel failed to consult with or obtain an expert on the effects of cocaine on the human body. Prior to trial, Hicks's counsel, Dominic Perrino and James Rueger, filed a notice of intent to rely on the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity. Hicks had not been evaluated prior to the filing of this notice and none of the three experts who subsequently evaluated him concluded that he was insane on the date of the murders. As Hicks's counsel realized during pretrial investigation that his cocaine ingestion could affect the guilt and penalty phases of his trial, they applied for the appointment of an expert witness pursuant to O.R.C. § 2929.024. 2 Hicks's counsel anticipated the need for an expert on the pharmacological, physiological, and psychiatric effects of cocaine, specifically as it related to his ability to form intent to commit aggravated murder and any diminished mental capacity for mitigation purposes. The trial court advised Hicks's counsel that if they came forward with such an expert witness the request would probably be granted. The trial court deferred ruling on Hicks's motion, specifically taking it under submission pending further evidence, further argument from defense counsel. Nevertheless, Hicks's counsel neither renewed the motion to appoint an expert nor obtained an expert, instead relying upon the testimony of Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling, a court-appointed psychologist. 18 Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony on Hicks's behalf was less than favorable. Although Dr. Schmidtgoessling did not hold herself out as a cocaine expert, she had been directed to evaluate Hicks regarding his competency and to determine if he was insane on the date of the crimes. While she testified that Hicks's criminal actions were consistent with cocaine intoxication and that he was probably impaired, she nonetheless opined that he acted with purpose and intent. According to Hicks, Dr. Schmidtgoessling inaccurately testified as to the following: voluntary cocaine intoxication does not meet the definition of disease or defect; Hicks understood his actions; the duration of cocaine intoxication peaks at about fifteen to twenty minutes; and injection of cocaine, rather than inhalation, leads to a quicker reaction, although the intensity or symptoms are equally the same whether injecting or inhaling it. Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony was damaging to Hicks's case because it significantly narrowed the time in which he could have been acting under the influence of cocaine. Because Hicks's counsel were surprised by Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony and as to the affect that she testified as her qualifications as to what cocaine affect has on a person, how long lasting it was, they attempted to use Dr. Ross Zumwalt, the Hamilton County Coroner, as a cocaine expert during cross-examination. Dr. Zumwalt's testimony did not benefit Hicks. The district court denied Hicks's habeas relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he feigned mental illness and refused to cooperate with his counsel, concluding that Hicks's failure to cooperate had an adverse impact on the ability of his defense counsel to conduct his defense and that the decision to use Dr. Schmidtgoessling as a defense expert was a tactical decision by counsel and appropriate under the circumstances. 19 For Hicks to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, he must satisfy two components. First, he must show that his counsel's performance was deficient, which requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed [him] by the Sixth Amendment. Wickline v. Mitchell, 319 F.3d 813, 819 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Second, he must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense[,] ... [which] requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052). To demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, [Hicks] `must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' Roberts v. Carter, 337 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). To demonstrate prejudice, he must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Wickline, 319 F.3d at 819 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Our [r]eview of counsel's performance is highly deferential and requires that [we] `indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact entitled to de novo review. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 278 (6th Cir.2000). 20 On habeas review at the evidentiary hearing before the district court, Hicks offered the testimony of Dr. Theodore Parran, an expert on the effects of cocaine use. 3 Dr. Parran observed that Hicks suffered from cocaine psychosis, which is an extreme psychotic state brought about by frequent cocaine binging, at the time of the crimes. According to Dr. Parran, Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony was erroneous and the jury was misinformed as to Hicks's condition. In fact, he viewed her testimony as the primary information which was inaccurate[.] Rueger testified at the evidentiary hearing that the defense's decision not to employ a cocaine expert was not the result of any tactical decision; rather, it was a matter of economics because he did not believe the trial court was going to appoint anybody that wasn't from around [the Cincinnati] area. In his deposition, Perrino testified that he was somewhat taken aback and surprised by Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony regarding the duration of the cocaine's influence on Hicks and that he was unaware prior to trial as to the duration[ ] because we did not have a witness to testify as to the effects of cocaine and the duration it would have upon a person. Dr. Schmidtgoessling conceded that, to the best of her recollection, she did not expect to render an opinion on anything other than Hicks's competency and insanity. 21 In Ohio, evidence of voluntary intoxication `may be considered in determining whether an act was done intentionally or with deliberation and premeditation.' Combs, 205 F.3d at 288 (quoting Ohio v. Fox, 68 Ohio St.2d 53, 428 N.E.2d 410, 412 (1981)); see also State v. Wolons, 44 Ohio St.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 443, 446 (1989). 4 In Combs, this Court was presented with a similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Combs's counsel employed one expert witness, Dr. Roger Fisher, a clinical psychologist, to testify as to Combs's drug and alcohol abuse and his intoxication on the day he committed two aggravated murders. Although Combs's counsel intended to elicit testimony that Combs was incapable of acting with purpose or intent due to his diminished capacity, Dr. Fisher opined during cross-examination that Combs acted purposefully and intentionally even though he was intoxicated. Identically, Hicks claims that his counsel's failure to anticipate, avoid, or prepare for Dr. Schmidtgoessling's damaging testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, as in Combs, the prosecution highlighted the inconsistencies between the defense's theory of voluntary cocaine intoxication and Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony during its closing argument. The district court, however, differentiated Combs from Hicks's claim because Dr. Parran could not have testified that [ ] Hicks's use of cocaine negated his ability to act purposely, his input would not have altered the results of the trial and defense counsel would have been subjected to the same criticism which carried the day in Combs .... 22 Despite any similarity to Combs, Hicks was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. First, there was overwhelming evidence of Hicks's guilt; therefore, he cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt about his guilt. Id. at 290 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Accordingly, Hicks failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. 23 Second, the record indicates that Hicks was a malingerer who refused to assist his counsel in the preparation of his defense. For example, prior to trial Perrino informed the trial court that defense counsel needed a cocaine expert because they did not have assistance from our client except that we know from certain things that he indicated in statements that were given to us to the ingestion of cocaine and what its effect may have on him. Furthermore, although Rueger observed that Hicks was fully communicative during their first meeting, Hicks later went into a shell, ... wouldn't talk, wouldn't look at you, just stared off in the distance and kind of rocked back and forth. Rueger also insisted that Hicks's lack of cooperation and participation in his own defense adversely affected his counsel's preparation of the case. Rueger cited a specific instance in which he and Perrino couldn't even communicate or ask [Hicks] whether or not the notes that the Police Officers in Cincinnati had taken ... were consistent with what he remembered talking to them about. Dr. James Reardon, a counseling psychologist who testified during the evidentiary hearing on behalf of Warden Collins, insisted that Dr. Schmidtgoessling was prevented from administering and interpreting any psychological tests upon Hicks due to his feigning mental illness; Dr. Schmidtgoessling could not obtain any kind of coherent history or representation of the circumstances and facts of the case based on [ ] Hicks's behavior; and by reason of Hicks's behavior and lack of cooperation, his counsel were unable to have any psychological tests performed upon him, which may have contributed to their ability to assess him in a more complete way. 24 Third, and most importantly, even if the jury had been informed of cocaine psychosis and its effects, the result of the proceeding would not have been different. Like Dr. Schmidtgoessling, Dr. Parran testified that Hicks's actions were purposeful and that certainly people can do purposeful actions when they're involved in cocaine psychosis. Additionally, Dr. Parran could not testify that Hicks was insane at the time he committed the offenses. The decision to employ Dr. Schmidtgoessling was a direct result of Hicks's refusal to cooperate with his counsel. See Coleman, 244 at 545 (death penalty petitioner was not subjected to ineffective assistance of counsel where he did not cooperate with his counsel concerning the investigation and identification of mitigating evidence, imposed restrictions upon his counsel, and refused to submit to further psychological or psychiatric testing). A fair assessment of counsel's performance requires that we evaluate [their] conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Combs, 205 F.3d at 278 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052).