Opinion ID: 4536574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Carter’s Appeal Waiver is Binding

Text: Carter’s plea bargain contains an acknowledgement of his “rights . . . to appeal the conviction or sentence in this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742” and states that he “expressly and voluntarily waives those rights.” (This appeal is brought under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.) The exceptions in Carter’s plea bargain are for: (a) any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum; or (b) any sentence to the extent it exceeds the maximum of the sentencing imprisonment range determined under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the sentencing stipulations and computations in this agreement, using the Criminal History Category found applicable by the Court. The plea bargain also protects his remedies for “claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.” This waiver precludes the current appeal. The statutory maximum at the time of the plea deal was life; it has since been reduced to forty years. Either way, the punishment of 151 months did not exceed it. Thus, the first waiver ground, (a), does not permit this appeal. Analyzing the second ground, (b), requires us to look to the “sentencing stipulations and computations” in the plea bargain and then ask if the sentence exceeds the maximum range under the guidelines for those figures. As we have seen, the court at sentencing did depart from the “stipulations” in the agreement in one respect, namely as to the base offense level. But an argument that this means that Carter can appeal under provision (b) is unavailing, because the PSR foresaw Carter being sentenced under up to an offense level of 37, with criminal history VI. Thus the sentence does not exceed the maximum sentence determinable under the “stipulations and computations” in his plea 8 Case No. 19-3167, United States v. Carter agreement. See United States v. Griffin, 854 F.3d 911, 914–15 (6th Cir. 2017) (appeal foreclosed by waiver, notwithstanding the court’s use of a higher offense level than stipulated, because the sentence imposed did not exceed the maximum sentencing range calculated in accord with the stipulations in the agreement). Appeal waivers are deemed to be valid and binding unless they are not knowing or not voluntary. Swanberg, 370 F.3d at 625. We look to the plea colloquy and the written agreement to determine if the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Id. at 626. Carter’s colloquy and plea bargain indicate that they were. More generally, there is no reason here to think that in our case, Carter’s waiver was not knowing or voluntary. Carter’s counsel does not argue the issue of waiver at all— not even on reply, after the government argued this point extensively in its brief. For these reasons, we find Carter’s plea waiver enforceable and applicable. However, there is another argument as to why it should not preclude this appeal.