Opinion ID: 668541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Aponte-Vega's Challenges to the Government's Summation

Text: 47 Aponte-Vega contends principally that he is entitled to a new trial because he was prejudiced by parts of the government's summations that (a) repeatedly referred to his organization as the company, and (b) vouched for the credibility of Rodriguez. Neither of these contentions has merit. 48
49 A prosecutor's statements during summation, if improper, will result in a denial of due process rights only if, in the context of the entire summation, they cause the defendant substantial prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1189 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1136 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1139, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990). The determination of whether there was such prejudice depends largely on an analysis of the severity of the misconduct, the curative measures taken by the court, and the certainty of conviction absent the misconduct. See, e.g., Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 440 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 158, 116 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1136. If the defendant failed to make timely objection to a statement contained in the prosecutor's summation, the statement will not be deemed a ground for reversal unless it amounts to a flagrant abuse. United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S.Ct. 1352, 103 L.Ed.2d 820 (1989); see United States v. Perez, 702 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1336 (1983). 50 Aponte-Vega contends that since he was charged with running a continuing criminal enterprise, the repeated use by the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) of the term company when referring to the organization run by Aponte-Vega and Rivera was tantamount to unsworn testimony by the AUSA that such an organization existed. Notwithstanding Aponte-Vega's contention that the AUSA used the word company more than 75 times in her summation, Aponte-Vega made no objection at trial. 51 We cannot conclude that the AUSA's use of the term company was impermissible, much less a flagrant abuse warranting reversal in the absence of any objection at trial, for that term was used by one coconspirator witness, and the other coconspirator witness testified in analogous terms. Victor Alvarez, a bookkeeper in the organization, introduced the term, stating that [a]fter I was arrested, well, my family bailed me out and the company paid for my lawyer. (Tr. 440.) Alvarez explained that by company, he meant the suppliers of the drugs, i.e., Aponte-Vega. (Id. 451.) He thereafter repeatedly referred to the Aponte-Vega organization as the company. (E.g., id. 459, 464, 467, 468.) Further, Rodriguez, while not using the term company, described the organization's operations in a way that made it clear that it was run as a business. For example, she testified that she worked for Aponte-Vega in the heroin business (id. 748); that Aponte-Vega g[o]t a job for me (id. 765); and that at one point she had been laid off (id. 780), or fired due to [l]ack of work (id. 819). She described payroll records that were kept showing employee salaries and vacations; she testified to the organization's six-day work week, the holidays allowed, and the policy of giving employees bonuses for certain holidays; and she explained its absenteeism policy: [i]f they miss one day without notifying the day before, it's possible that they lose their position or their jobs (id. 828-29). Given the testimony of Alvarez and Rodriguez, it is plain that neither the concept nor the characterization of the organization as a company originated with the AUSA, and there was little risk that the jury would interpret the summation references to company as testimony of the AUSA. We see no error, much less plain error.
52 We have repeatedly warned prosecutors that they should avoid interjecting their personal beliefs into their summations, United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1328, or vouch[ing] for their witnesses' truthfulness, United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1179 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982). Though the occasional use of rhetorical devices may be fair argument, we have emphasized that prosecutors should avoid frequent[ ] use [of] rhetorical statements punctuated with excessive use of the personal pronoun 'I', United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d at 1328, in phrases such as  'I think it is clear,'  or  'Does it make sense--I think it does,'  id. at 1328, or  'I'm here to tell you that Mr. Amato's testimony ... is truthful,'  United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1178. Such phrasing is inappropriate because the prosecution tends to ma[ke] an issue of [its] own credibility, United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir.1973)), or to impl[y] the existence of extraneous proof, United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983). Nonetheless, we must evaluate the challenged remarks in the context of the trial as a whole, for the government is allowed to respond to argument that impugns its integrity or the integrity of its case. Id. at 60-61. Thus, when the defense has attacked the prosecutor's credibility or the credibility of the government agents, the prosecutor is entitled to reply with 'rebutting language suitable to the occasion.'  United States v. Praetorius, 622 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (2d Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. LaSorsa, 480 F.2d 522, 526 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 105 (1973)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860, 101 S.Ct. 162, 66 L.Ed.2d 76 (1980). 53 In the present case, Rivera's summation repeatedly accused the government of having fabricated Rodriguez's testimony. For example, Rivera's counsel argued that 54 [w]hen she testified she was scripted ... like in all good plays I should say there has got to be a little bit of a prompt.... 55 Why do you need and ask the prosecutor this, why do you need to see an individual a hundred to two hundred times in your office? What could you possibly say in all that time that you're not going to alter? 56 (Tr. 1410-11.) Counsel also suggested that the government had not called Rodriguez as a grand jury witness because it did not like the way her testimony would have emerged at that time and needed time to have it changed. 57 In response to these attacks, the AUSA urged the jury to believe Rodriguez, arguing, for example, that she was not playing a game up there, ladies and gentlemen.... She did whatever she could to tell the truth (id. 1439); that [s]he had the demeanor of a person who told the truth (id. 1441); and that [s]he got up there and told the truth. I submit to you that is the interpretation of what Gladys Rodriguez did, and that is the correct one (id. 1442). In light of the defense summation, the government's rebuttal was not impermissible. 58