Opinion ID: 779913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deportation as a Direct Consequence of Guilty Plea

Text: 30 Finally, Defendant argues that, because the 1990 and 1996 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act make deportation a virtually certain consequence for an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, the district court's failure, before accepting her guilty plea, to inform her of that consequence violates Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). 31 This Circuit has adopted a standard of strict adherence to Rule 11, United States v. Livorsi, 180 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Lora, 895 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir.1990), and we therefore examine critically even slight procedural deficiencies to ensure that the defendant's guilty plea was a voluntary and intelligent choice, and that none of the defendant's substantial rights ha[s] been compromised.)' Livorsi, 180 F.3d at 78 (quoting Maher, 108 F.3d at 1520) (alteration in original). 32 Rule 11(c) requires that, before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the district court address the defendant personally in open court and inform her of the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law as well as ensure that the defendant understands the applicable sentencing guidelines. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). This does not mean, however, that the district court must anticipate and warn the defendant of every conceivable collateral effect the conviction entered on the plea might have. Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir.1970). Rather, [t]he purpose of Rule 11 was to insure that an accused is apprised of the significant effects of his plea so that his decision to plead guilty and waive his right to trial is an informed one. Id. at 180 (emphasis added). 33 Years ago, we concluded that the possibility of deportation based on a conviction was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, and that the court was not required to inform the defendant of such a possible consequence. See, e.g., United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir.1954); Santelises I, 476 F.2d at 789 ([T]he mere failure of a district judge to warn a defendant of the possibility of deportation as a consequence of his plea does not, without more, amount to a violation of constitutional due process, thereby rendering the plea invalid.); Michel, 507 F.2d at 465. 34 Defendant points out, however, that at the time those cases were decided, decisions about deportation were within the broad discretion of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Parrino court, for example, noted that deportability is determined by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. 212 F.2d at 922. The court further explicitly recognized that one section of that Act provides for suspension of deportation at the discretion of the Attorney General for certain aliens. Id. at 922 n. 7. Similarly, the Santelises court, in its analysis, relied on the non-automatic nature of the deportation laws then in effect: 35 Moreover, we should emphasize that deportation... is not automatic. ... [D]eportation results ... only upon an order of the Attorney General who retains discretion whether or not to institute such proceedings. Deportation then, serious sanction though it may be, is not such an absolute consequence of conviction that we are mandated to read into traditional notions of due process a requirement that a district judge must warn each defendant of the possibility of deportation before accepting his plea. Santelises I, 476 F.2d at 790 (emphasis added). 36 Moreover, prior to 1990, a trial judge had the authority to issue a judicial recommendation against deportation (JRAD) under then 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b). Such a recommendation was binding on the Attorney General, and § 1251(b) therefore gave the judge conclusive authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a basis for deportation. Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d. Cir.1986). As part of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (1990), Congress amended former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b), to eliminate the safety valve of the JRAD. After the effective date of the 1990 Act, then, the only barrier to deportation for an alien convicted of an aggravated felony was a waiver by the United States Attorney General. But this degree of discretion, too, did not long survive. 37 Thus, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, further amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to eliminate the Attorney General's authority to grant a waiver to deportation. As a result, [n]o alien described in this section shall be eligible for any relief from removal that the Attorney General may grant in the Attorney General's discretion. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(5). 38 Given these amendments, an alien convicted of an aggravated felony is automatically subject to removal and no one — not the judge, the INS, nor even the United States Attorney General — has any discretion to stop the deportation. Therefore, Defendant argues, the rationale behind the decisions in Parrino and Santelises —that deportation is not a direct consequence because it is not automatic —no longer reflects the state of the law. Instead, deportation today is an essentially certain, automatic, and unavoidable consequence of an alien's conviction for an aggravated felony. 39 Under these circumstances, Defendant maintains, this Circuit's pronouncement that the purpose of Rule 11 is to insure that an accused is apprised of the significant effects of his plea so that his decision to plead guilty and waive his right to a trial is an informed one, Bye, 435 F.2d at 180, takes on renewed significance. Certain and automatic deportation, she argues, is, without doubt, a significant effect[ ] of which the accused should be apprised. 10 And, Defendant concludes, Rule 11 must now be read to require that the court ascertain, before accepting a plea, that the defendant is aware of this virtually certain, and unquestionably significant, consequence of a guilty plea. 40 On its face, Defendant's argument is persuasive, and we believe that it deserves careful consideration, even though three other circuits — the First, Sixth, and Ninth — have declined to reconsider their prior holdings on this point. See El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 2002 WL 31359017 (U.S. Nov.12, 2002); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 516-17 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1946, 152 L.Ed.2d 849 (2002); United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir.2000). At the least, it would seem an appropriate factor to guide the district courts' discretion in considering a defendant's attempt to withdraw a guilty plea. Nevertheless, because the circumstances of this case allow its resolution without taking up this difficult question, we need not, and hence do not, address it further.