Opinion ID: 517603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of Access to Religious Services

Text: 9 In his complaint, Young stated that he is a Muslim and he was denied to attend and participate [sic] in the Muslim Ramadan Fast in the general population, etc. In his motion for summary judgment, he also stated that he was unable to attend religious services or classes during the period when he was confined to either the limited privilege program or punitive keeplock. Young later amplified this allegation in an affidavit stating as follows: 10 The plaintiff is a Muslim and his religion is Islam and I am a believer of the Holy Qur'an (the Holy Book) for all Muslims. The plaintiff argues that the month of Ramadan is a religious observance month for Muslims all over the world. The plaintiff argues that during the month of Ramadan, it is mandatory that all Muslims should (1) attend Juma services (Friday Religious Services) (2) attend Muslim study call classes daily (3) attend Idul-Fitr (end of Ramadan Festival) (4) Idul-Ad'ha (heart of Sacrifice), etc. 11 In a Memorandum of Law in support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees responded to these allegations by contending that appellant had failed to state how his placement in the limited privilege program [had] affected his observance of Ramadan, and that appellant's conclusory allegations fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief [might] be granted. At no point, however, did appellees set forth any specific reasons in an affidavit or otherwise for their decision to restrict appellant's exercise of his first amendment rights. 12 In the report and recommendation which was adopted by the district court, the magistrate accepted appellees' characterization of appellant's complaint as conclusory, and observed that appellees' decision not to allow Young to attend ... religious services with the general population ... was completely reasonable given plaintiff's disciplinary confinement. Judge Foley also rejected appellant's first amendment claim, stating: 13 As the Magistrate further notes, a prisoner's right to practice his religion is not absolute, and prison officials may impose reasonable restrictions when necessary. Dreibelbis v. Marks, 675 F.2d 579, 580 (3d Cir.1982) (citations omitted). Plaintiff, at the time was subject to disciplinary sanction as well as being on limited privilege status; clearly the restrictions placed upon him were reasonable in light of the circumstances. 14 In our view, it was error to grant appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment and to dismiss appellant's complaint at this stage of the proceedings. 15 As a threshold matter, we believe that Young's pleadings were sufficiently clear and specific to state a claim for which relief might be granted. The district court's ruling that appellant's allegations were conclusory simply is not supported by a review of Young's complaint and moving papers. Appellant clearly states that beginning on July 17, 1984, he was precluded from attending religious services, classes, and any of the activities associated with the celebration of Ramadan, because of his placement in the limited privilege program, and his subsequent placement in punitive keeplock. We do not believe that these allegations can be characterized as ambiguous or conclusory. 16 Next, the court's finding that the restrictions on appellant's first amendment rights were reasonable is not supported by the record. Although we recognize that great deference should be accorded to prison officials as they undertake the difficult responsibility of maintaining order in prisons, we have long held that prisoners should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to attend religious services, whenever possible. See Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.1976); see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). A prisoner's first amendment right to the free exercise of his religious beliefs may only be infringed to the extent that such infringement is  'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.'  O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (citation omitted). At no time during the pendency of this action did the defendants proffer an explanation as to why Young was denied access to religious services, or articulate a particular penological interest that was served by denying appellant such access. In Mawhinney, which involved an alleged deprivation of first amendment rights, we held that it was incumbent upon prison officials to make such a showing in order to prevail on a motion to dismiss. Mawhinney, 542 F.2d at 3 ([A]n evidentiary hearing will establish what policies concerning religious practices exist at [the prison] and whether officials had a reasonable basis for limiting appellant's participation at group services.). Since appellees made no effort to justify their restriction of appellant's free exercise rights while he was in either the limited privilege program or disciplinary keeplock, they were not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, at least at this juncture. See Leon v. Harris, 489 F.Supp. 221, 224-25 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on grounds that prison officials had failed to establish that this particular prisoner needed to be excluded from church services). 17 While it very well may be true that, on remand, appellees will be able to show that the restrictions at issue here are reasonably adapted to achieving a legitimate penological objective, the district court should not have dismissed appellant's first amendment claim without requiring prison officials to establish the basis for the first amendment restrictions imposed. It also was error to assume that prison officials were justified in limiting appellant's free exercise rights simply because Young was in disciplinary confinement. See LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 979 n. 9 (2d Cir.1972) ([N]ot every prisoner in segregation lawfully can be prevented from attending church services in the chapel ... [because] [n]ot all segregated prisoners are potential troublemakers....), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 49, 38 L.Ed.2d 123 (1973); see also Harris, 489 F.Supp. at 225 (prison officials must make individual determinations on a case-by-case basis as to the need for exclusion).