Opinion ID: 381797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: constitutionality and justiciability of statutory

Text: SECRECY FOR CIA EXPENDITURES 45 Appellant claims that sections 403(d)(3) and 403g of Title 50 are unconstitutional insofar as they authorize the withholding of CIA expense data approved by the district court in this case. 58 The CIA replies that under the political question doctrine the Statement and Account Clause does not present a justiciable matter. 59 Finding the political question doctrine closely bound up with the merits, we investigate the history of the Statement and Account Clause for the light it sheds on both questions. Our inquiry takes notice of a broad range of evidence from our nation's early history, focusing throughout on whether the Statement and Account Clause was intended to require the public disclosure of such information as is requested here. Relevant to this inquiry are several major categories of historical evidence, including statements by the Framers of the Clause, statements reflecting a contemporaneous understanding of the Framers' intent, and governmental practices with regard to disclosure of similar information both before and after the enactment of the Constitution.
46 The Statement and Account Clause was first proposed in the final week of the Constitutional Convention, when George Mason moved on 14 September 1787 that a clause be adopted requiring that an Account of the public expenditures should be annually published. 60 In the initial debate on this proposal, Gouveneur Morris urged that such accounting would be impossible in many cases, and Rufus King remarked that it would be impracticable to account for every minute shilling. 61 James Madison then proposed an amendment to require an accounting from time to time rather than annually. The Convention adopted this amendment and enacted Clause 7 in its presently existing form. 47 The debate surrounding the adoption of Madison's amendment proves important for our inquiry. Farrand gives a brief account of the debate at the Convention, taken from Madison's notes. Madison thought that the substitution of from time to time for annually would ensure frequent publication and leave enough to the discretion of the Legislature. 62 Madison's notes from the Convention do not elaborate on the concept of legislative discretion, except to say that if too much is required, the difficulty will beget a habit of doing nothing. 63 48 The rational behind Madison's amendment came more fully to light in the debate in the Virginia ratifying convention. On 12 June 1788 Madison stated that under the Constitution as proposed, congressional proceedings were to be occasionally published, and that this requirement included all receipts and expenditures of public money. 64 He praised this as a security not enjoyed under the then existing system of government. Then, in a sentence reflecting on the degree of discretion to be allowed under Clause 7, he stated: That part which authorizes the government to withhold from the public knowledge what in their judgment may require secrecy, is imitated from the confederation that very system which the gentleman advocates. 65 Although we would hesitate to draw a firm conclusion from this passage alone, Madison's language strongly indicates that he believed that the Statement and Account Clause, following his amendment, would allow government authorities ample discretion to withhold some expenditure items which require secrecy. 49 Any ambiguity in Madison's statement is removed, moreover, by a more lengthy debate that occurred five days later on 17 June 1788 between Madison and George Mason. Arguing against Madison's from time to time provision, Mason criticized it as too loose an expression. He then summarized the arguments made by proponents of the provision: 50 The reasons urged in favor of this ambiguous expression, was (sic), that there might be some matters which might require secrecy. In matters relative to military operations, and foreign negotiations, secrecy was necessary sometimes. But he did not conceive that the receipts and expenditures of the public money ought ever to be concealed. The people, he affirmed, had a right to know the expenditures of their money. 66 51 Mason's statement clarifies several points concerning the Framers' intent. First, it appears that Madison's comment on governmental discretion to maintain the secrecy of some expenditures, far from being an isolated statement, was representative of his fellow proponents of the from time to time provision. Second, as to what items might legitimately require secrecy, the debates contain prominent mention of military operations and foreign negotiations, both areas closely related to the matters over which the CIA today exercises responsibility. Finally, we learn that opponents of the from time to time provision, exemplified by Mason, favored secrecy only for the operations and negotiations themselves, not for receipts and expenditures of public money connected with them. But the Statement and Account Clause, as adopted and ratified, incorporates the view not of Mason, but rather of his opponents, who desired discretionary secrecy for the expenditures as well as the related operations. 52 In reply to Mason's argument, Madison did not pursue the point on the need for secrecy, but argued that publication from time to time would provide more satisfactory and fuller reports to the public and would be of sufficient frequency. He added that he believed this provision went farther than the constitution of any state in the union, or perhaps in the world. 67 The remainder of the exchange between Madison and Mason was brief, and did not touch on secrecy of expenditures. 68 53 In addition to the statements of Madison and Mason, we find only one other statement from the Virginia ratifying convention expressing a view on the secret expenditure issue. This is a statement of Patrick Henry on 15 June 1788, apparently expressing a fear of the effect of the from time to time provision: By that paper the national wealth is to be disposed of under the veil of secrecy; for the publication from time to time will amount to nothing, and they may conceal what they may think requires secrecy. How different it is in your own government! 69 Though perhaps more exaggerated than Mason's language, Henry's statement further confirms our interpretation of the Madison-Mason debate. 54 Viewed as a whole, the debates in the Constitutional Convention and the Virginia ratifying convention convey a very strong impression that the Framers of the Statement and Account Clause intended it to allow discretion to Congress and the President 70 to preserve secrecy for expenditures related to military operations and foreign negotiations. Opponents of the from time to time provision, it is clear, spoke of precisely this effect from its enactment. We have no record of any statements from supporters of the Statement and Account Clause indicating an intent to require disclosure of such expenditures.
55 The direct evidence of the intent of the Framers, then, indicates that the Statement and Account Clause does not require disclosure of such expenditures as appellant requests in the present case. Though we would be confident in resting on this evidence alone, we find yet further confirmation in the historical evidence of government practices with regard to disclosure and secrecy both before and after the enactment of the Constitution. 56 Our nation's earliest intelligence activities were carried out by the Committee of Secret Correspondence of the Continental Congress. The Continental Congress created the Committee on 29 November 1775 to correspond with our friends in Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world, and Congress resolved to provide for expenses incurred by the Committee in sending agents for this purpose. 71 In carrying out these duties the Committee placed great importance upon secrecy. In reference to information from its agent Arthur Lee, describing French plans to send arms and ammunition to the Continental Army, the Committee stated: Considering the nature and importance of it, we agree in opinion, that it is our indispensible duty to keep it a secret, even from Congress . . . . We find by fatal experience, the Congress consists of too many members to keep secrets. 72 57 The Committee exercised broad discretionary power to conduct intelligence activities independent of the Continental Congress and to safeguard the secrecy of matters pertaining to its agents, though Congress asserted greater direct control following the Declaration of Independence. 73 It is especially remarkable that the Committee was in a position to insist upon secrecy even against Congress, which functioned both as the legislative and the executive power at this time and exercised control over foreign affairs. 58 The importance of total secrecy in intelligence matters was appreciated in this era at the highest levels. In a letter of 26 July 1777 issuing orders for an intelligence mission, General Washington wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton: The necessity of procuring good Intelligence, is apparent and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated . . . . 74 59 As commander-in-chief of the colonial armies, Washington made full provision for intelligence activities and for proper funding. The details of Washington's planning in this regard are highlighted by a letter to Washington from financier Robert Morris, member of the Committee of Secret Correspondence, dated 21 January 1783, in which Morris stated that 60 I will give directions to the Paymaster General always to keep some money in the hands of his deputy, to answer your drafts for contingencies and secret service. I have, as you will see, taken methods to put the deputy in cash, and then your excellency will be relieved from any further care than the due application. I am, however, to pray, for the sake of regularity in accounts, that your excellency, in the warrants, would be so kind as to specify the particular service when on the contingent account, and draw in favor of one of your family on account of secret services, mentioning that it is for secret service. I shall direct Mr. Swanwick to endorse the bills on you in favor of Mr. Adams to the Paymaster General, whose deputy will receive from your excellency the amount. 75 61 It is significant that this letter indicates first, the provision of a cash account before the particular necessities could be specified, and second a practice of drawing the funds in favor of Washington's family, apparently to conceal the ultimate recipient of those funds. Rather than viewing such arrangements as devious or criminal, it is clear that our highest officials in the War for Independence viewed them as entirely proper and moreover essential to the success of their enterprise. 62 When a new governmental structure came into operation in 1789 under the Constitution, secret funding for foreign intelligence activities quickly became institutionalized in the form of a contingent fund or secret service fund at the disposal of the President. The initial impetus for this fund can be found in President Washington's address to both Houses of Congress on 8 January 1790, the precursor to the State of the Union message, in which he requested a competent fund designated for defraying the expenses incident to the conduct of our foreign affairs. 76 The first step in the creation of such a fund occurred in July of that year, when Congress appropriated funds for persons to serve the United States in foreign parts. 77 In this appropriation act Congress required of the President a regular statement and account of the expenditures, but made allowance for such expenditures as he may think it advisable not to specify. 78 63 Three years later Congress re-enacted the statute, with altered language that permitted the President to make secret expenditures without specification, by making a certificate or having the Secretary of State make a certificate for the amount of the expenditure, such certificate to be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums expended. 79 This provision enabled President Washington and his successors to preserve strict secrecy for expenditures related to foreign intelligence and negotiations. Throughout subsequent years this fund continued in effect without, to our knowledge, any challenge based on the Statement and Account Clause. 64 In 1811 Madison himself made use of a special secret funding provision from Congress for contingency plans to take possession of parts of Spanish Florida. In response to a confidential message from President Madison, Congress passed a secret act appropriating $100,000 for such expenses as the President might deem necessary for obtaining possession. 80 Though approved on 15 January 1811, this act was not published until 1818. 81 65 The establishment of these secret funding practices so soon after the Constitutional Convention indicates a contemporaneous understanding that the Framers of Clause 7 did not intend it to require disclosure of expenditures for secret military and foreign diplomacy matters. It is difficult to imagine stronger contemporaneous evidence of the Framers' intent, when one considers that the contingent fund was initially requested by President Washington, who presided over the Constitutional Convention in 1787, and that a further secret funding measure was enacted under Madison, who in his earlier role as Father of the Constitution 82 had introduced the from time to time amendment. 66 The contingent fund remained in continuous use by the President throughout the nineteenth century and up to the creation of the CIA in the mid-twentieth century. Several quotations from American statesmen of the nineteenth century suffice to summarize for our purposes the nature of the contingent fund and its longstanding acceptance within our constitutional structure. During a debate on 25 February 1831 concerning a treaty between the United States and Turkey, Senator John Forsyth stated: 67 (T)he experience of the confederation having shown the necessity of secret confidential agencies in foreign countries, very early in the progress of the Federal Government, a fund was set apart, to be expended at the discretion of the President of the United States on his responsibility only, called the contingent fund of foreign intercourse. . . . But on what ground does the gentleman narrow down the use of this contingent fund? It was given for all purposes to which a secret service fund should or could be applied for the public benefit. For spies, if the gentlemen (sic) pleases; for persons sent publicly and secretly to search for important information, political or commercial; for agents to carry confidential instructions, written or verbal, to our foreign ministers, where secrecy was the element of success; for agents to feel the pulse of foreign Governments . . . . Such uses have been frequently made of this fund: indeed, the propriety of thus using it is now, for the first time, doubted. 83 68 A statement of President Tyler in 1844 further clarifies the common understanding during the first half of the nineteenth century concerning presidential use and congressional authorization of the contingent fund. Upon a Senate inquiry concerning the employment of a Mr. Duff Green to acquire information in England related to the matter of the Oregon Territory, President Tyler replied to the Senate: 69 Although the contingent fund for foreign intercourse has for all time been placed at the disposal of the President, to be expended for the purposes contemplated by the fund without any requisition upon him for a disclosure of the names of persons employed by him, the objects of their employment, or the amount paid to any particular person, and although any such disclosures might in many cases disappoint the objects contemplated by the appropriation of that fund, yet in this particular instance I feel no desire to withhold the fact that Mr. Duff Green was employed by the Executive to collect such information, from private or other sources, as was deemed important to assist the Executive in undertaking a negotiation then contemplated, but afterwards abandoned, upon an important subject, and that there was paid to him through the hands of the Secretary of State $1,000, in full for all such service. 84 70 President Polk, taking an even firmer stance based on this tradition than did Tyler, refused to accede to the request of the House of Representatives for disclosure of expenditures from the contingent fund. On 20 April 1846 he gave his reply as follows: 71 The expenditures for this confidential character, it is believed, were never before sought to be made public, and I should greatly apprehend the consequences of establishing a precedent which would render such disclosures hereafter inevitable. . . . 72 The experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary for the public safety or the public good to make expenditures the object of which would be defeated by publicity. 85 73 These statements of Presidents Polk and Tyler, far from being exceptional or abusive, appear to typify the attitude of our government toward secret expenditures for foreign intelligence operations, beginning with the Committee of Correspondence during the War for Independence, and running consistently through the Constitutional Convention and the era following it. In the debates on these issues no one expressed a belief that disclosure of intelligence-related expenditures might be constitutionally required. At most disclosure might come about if Congress decided that it should; but even when Congress demanded such information, our early Presidents were often able to raise a claim of privilege for sensitive Executive documents. 86 74 Our survey of historical evidence persuades us that secrecy of intelligence efforts, including expenditures, was a practice of General Washington during the War for Independence; that the Framers, by adopting the Statement and Account Clause in Madison's amended form, intended Congress and the President to have discretion to maintain the secrecy of intelligence expenditures; that from the time of the first Congress our government in fact provided for such secrecy pursuant to statute; and that the contingency fund for secret expenditures continued in use through the next century for purposes of foreign intelligence. Those who voiced criticism toward the practice of secret expenditures, such as Mason and Henry, prove to be a dissenting minority whose opinions contrast clearly with the prevailing view of the Framers and also with the prevailing practice of our government during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 87
75 In light of this historical evidence, we can see that when Congress enacted the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 88 creating the CIA, it merely continued a longstanding practice of secret expenditures for foreign intelligence matters. Although some particulars were changed, the structure for maintaining fiscal secrecy remained essentially the same. For example, under earlier practice the aggregate amount spent on foreign intelligence was concealed by inclusion in the overall contingent fund appropriation, which provided for considerably more activities than just foreign intelligence. Under the current practice with the CIA, subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees review CIA budget requests in executive session. That level of Agency funding approved by the subcommittees is included in the appropriations of other agencies, upon which the full House and Senate vote. Funds thus approved are then transferred from various agencies to the CIA pursuant to section 403f of Title 50. 76 Along with secrecy for the entire CIA budget, Congress has provided for secrecy of individual CIA expenditure items by means of statutes, including those at issue here, sections 403(d)(3) and 403g of Title 50. Section 8(b) of the CIA Act protects the secrecy of expenditures by means of the following provision: 77 The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified. 89 78 This provision is similar to secrecy provisions from our nation's early history, and to secrecy provisions for other agencies for which Congress has found a need for fiscal secrecy, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 90 and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 91 The similarity of the CIA Act to the early contingent fund practice is illustrated by a comparison of the above-quoted language with that of the first secret fund statutory provision, as re-enacted and revised in 1793. The 1793 statute provided that secret expenditures were to be accounted for merely by a certificate from the Secretary of State, such certificate to be deemed a sufficient voucher. 92 The CIA Act follows the same procedure, with the CIA Director performing the role formerly given the Secretary of State. 79 The same correspondence with traditional practice is seen in sections 403(d) (3) and 403g of Title 50. Both sections protect secrecy for expenditures related to foreign intelligence activities, of the sort for which Presidents Tyler and Polk demanded secrecy, and for which James Madison and a majority of the Framers provided discretionary secrecy in the from time to time amendment to the Statement and Account Clause.
80 We must conclude from the constitutional debates, from the apparent contemporaneous understanding of what the Framers of Clause 7 intended, and from the continuous practice dating from the early years of the Republic, that the Statement and Account Clause does not create a judicially enforceable standard for the required disclosure of expenditures for intelligence activities. On the contrary, it appears that the Framers of this clause intended Congress and the Executive to have discretion to decide whether, when, and in what detail intelligence expenditures should be disclosed to the public. Since the decision to disclose materials of this nature is committed to a coordinate branch of the government, it is a nonjusticiable political question. 93 Courts therefore have no jurisdiction to decide whether, when, and in what detail intelligence expenditures must be disclosed. 81 This conclusion has already been suggested by the Supreme Court in dictum to its Richardson opinion. As to the intent of the Framers, the Court observed that the genesis of Clause 7 suggests that it was intended to permit some degree of secrecy of governmental operations. 94 Touching on the justiciability question, the Court doubted whether such general directives to the Congress and Executive were intended to be enforced by suit of a citizen. 95 Although the Court did not decide what precisely was meant by a regular Statement and Account, it did say that it is clear that Congress has plenary power to exact any reporting and accounting it considers appropriate in the public interest. 96 82 In a separate case our court has similarly adopted the view that Congress has full discretion to define the appropriations process and concomitant reporting requirements. 97 Our more detailed analysis of historical evidence in the present case amply confirms that the Framers of the Clause intended it to leave discretion in Congress and the Executive to define reporting requirements for foreign intelligence operations and related expenditures.
83 That Congress has discretion to maintain secrecy for the intelligence expenditures involved in the present case is further evident from the detailed and particularized nature of these expenditure items. The earliest statements and accounts of public expenditures were not more specific than each head of appropriation, 98 and present day statements of budget and expenditure figures are similarly made according to category rather than individual detailed items. 99 We have already cited expressions of concern at the Constitutional Convention that extremely detailed accounting would be impracticable. 100 To require a public accounting of the specific fee paid to an individual attorney would invade the area of discretion that the Framers allowed to Congress on this point. 84 Moreover, in light of the CIA deposition and affidavits submitted in this case, it is clear that particular expenditure items for specific covert operations are among the most sensitive of CIA budget items; their disclosure could lead to the uncovering of covert operations themselves. The grave harm that could follow from such detailed disclosures of intelligence expenditures confirms the wisdom of the Framers of Clause 7 in endorsing the legislative discretion inherent in the from time to time language proposed by Madison. It is typical of their foresight and prudence that the Framers did not create a disclosure provision so inflexible that it might in the future eviscerate the secret military and diplomatic functions that are often essential to our nation's strength and survival. 85 In light of our analysis we must hold that Congress and the President have discretion, not reviewable by the courts, to require secrecy for expenditures of the type involved in this case. We therefore uphold the constitutional authority of Congress to protect the secrecy of the expenditures here in question by means of such statutes as sections 403(d)(3) and 403g of Title 50. We so hold as a ground additional and alternative to our holding that appellant lacks standing. The decision before is therefore 86 Affirmed.