Opinion ID: 2333047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unbridled Administrative Discretion

Text: The power of eminent domain belongs exclusively to the legislative branch of the government. [7] The General Assembly may delegate the right of eminent domain to an administrative agency for a public purpose. The General Assembly's ability to delegate an exclusively legislative function, however, is carefully circumscribed by the parameters of the non-delegation doctrine. This Court has recognized that the non-delegation doctrine is based upon a fundamental principle of constitutional democracy: [a]dministrators should not have unguided and uncontrolled discretionary power to govern as they see fit. [8] Accordingly, reviewing Courts must focus on the totality of protections against [administrative] arbitrariness, including both substantive standards and procedural safeguards, i.e., due process or the law of the land, as the latter term appears in the Delaware Constitution. [9] Where it is not feasible for the General Assembly to set precise guidelines, the presence of administrative procedural safeguards may compensate for the lack of precise statutory standards. [10] In most situations involving action delegated to an administrative agency, an aggrieved party has a right of administrative review that is subject to the right of judicial review. [11] That two-tiered system of review is designed to protect adversely affected parties from arbitrary administrative decisions. [12] In this case, the General Assembly did not provide any statutory standards for DelDOT to use in making its administrative determination of necessity. DelDOT did not apparently adopt any substantive or procedural safeguards for either making a determination of necessity or for providing administrative review of that decision. Accordingly, judicial review is the only protection the Cannons have against an exercise of unbridled administrative discretion by DelDOT. The applicable statute provides for DelDOT to exercise its judgment in making the determination of necessity for condemning private property. There is no precedent, however, for judicial deference to an administrative agency's determination that it is necessary to condemn private property for a public purpose when that determination is made without any substantive or procedural safeguards. Statutes that vest the power of eminent domain in an administrative agency must be strictly construed because by their operative nature they subrogate rights of private property owners to the greater public need. [13] The record reflects that the Cannons have demonstrated conclusively that, although DelDOT was required to provide property for wetlands mitigation, it was not necessary to take the Cannons' additional private property to accomplish that purpose. The Cannons' constitutionally protected private property rights cannot be subordinated to an administrative agency's decision to repudiate the pursuit of a myriad of acceptable alternatives for wetlands mitigation, simply as a matter of its own convenience.