Opinion ID: 2096712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions, Issues and Verdicts

Text: At no time while Deshner was orchestrating the Traylors' actions and counseling their negotiations did the Graftons have any notice that the Traylors were acting in his behalf and he was thus, in accord with the definition in Restatement (Second) of Agency § 4 (3) (1958), an undisclosed principal. See Crosse v. Callis, 263 Md. 65, 72-73, 282 A.2d 86, 90 (1971). His true status as the principal became revealed only when the Traylors filed their third-party action against him under Maryland Rule 315. The Graftons then filed an amended declaration continuing their claim against the Traylors (Count I) and added counts charging a joint and several liability against both the Traylors and Deshner (Count II) and against Deshner alone, as the principal for the Traylors (Count III). In the trial court's dialogue with counsel concerning the respective motions for directed verdict made by each, Judge Proctor, after referring to Hospelhorn v. Poe, 174 Md. 242 [198 A. 582 (1938)] as authority for denying the motion on behalf of Deshner, stated: Unless Attorneys for the Plaintiffs produce a Pennsylvania case which holds that there is joint liability so far as the agent for an undisclosed principal, and his principal are concerned, the Court will direct a verdict as to the second count of the amended Declaration. In the event that Plaintiffs produce such a Pennsylvania case, then the Court will direct a verdict as to the third count of the amended Declaration. Upon a resumption of proceedings  on the following morning  at the conclusion of the trial court's discussion with counsel about instructions to be given the jury, counsel for the Graftons directed the court's attention to the holdings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Joseph Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Melnick [361 Pa. 328, 64 A.2d 773 (1949)], that Under the Pennsylvania Rule, the third person may proceed against either the agent or the undisclosed principal, or both, for the liability is joint and several. Notwithstanding this citation and quote from a Pennsylvania case, the transcript  as well as the docket entries  fails to disclose that any directed verdict was entered  either upon the second or third counts. In Hospelhorn v. Poe, supra , cited by the trial court, our predecessors held, (a) that where an agent of an undisclosed principal makes a contract in his own name, the third party, upon discovery of the principal, may enforce the contract against either the principal or the agent and may simultaneously bring an action separately against the principal and the agent, but may have only one satisfaction; (b) that after he has elected whom to sue and has sued either the agent or the principal to final judgment he cannot sue the other; (c) that he cannot recover against both, and if he elects to hold the agent, the principal is discharged, while if he elects to hold the principal the agent's liability is ended; and (d) that unless the principal and the agent are both joined in the action he may be required to make an election before it is certain that he has two alternative remedies in reference to which an election was necessary. Judge Parke, writing for the Court, stated: The liability of the agent, in those instances in which he promises in his own name, although really for an undisclosed principal, is based upon the fact that the treaty between the contracting parties is made upon the single credit and faith of the agent, because of his choosing not to reveal his principal. In such circumstances, the other contracting party has the right to hold the agent individually bound or to elect between the agent and the principal, when the latter is disclosed (b). The promisee, upon discovery of the principal, may enforce the contract against either at his election, and it is held that he may simultaneously bring an action separately against the principal and the agent, but the promisee may have but one satisfaction (c). It is urged that the contractual relation of principal and agent does not admit of a joinder of the principal and agent in an action at law, since the promise is not joint nor several, but rather alternative. The obvious reply is that the fundamental things concerned are single. There is but one contract to be performed in respect of the one subject matter involved, and the principal and agent constitute but one party of the contract. (a) Mechem on Agency (2nd Ed.) sec. 1733. See Rider v. Morrison, 54 Md. 429, 443-445; Bloede v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 139-141, 34 A. 1127; Kerr v. Urie, 86 Md. 72, 37 A. 789; (b) C.J.S., Agency, sec. 248, pp. 175, 176; (c) 3 C.J.S., Agency, sec. 248, pp. 177, 178; Estes v. Aaron, 227 Mass. 96, 116 N.E. 392; Gavin v. Durden Coleman Lumber Co., 229 Mass. 576, 118 N.E. 897. In the words of Mechem: `Whether the agent and the principal may be joined as defendants in the same action is a question involving a variety of considerations and leading to much difference of opinion.    It will suffice here to say that there is a large and constantly growing number of cases in which it is held that such a joinder is proper.' The learned author cites a number of cases in support of the quoted text. 1 Mechem on Agency, sec. 1487, n. 59, pp. 1103, 1104. In the course of a subsequent discussion of what will constitute an election by the third party after discovery of the principal has been made, the author observes that `the mere commencement of an action against an agent, although this act is often regarded as an election in other fields, is not here deemed to constitute a conclusive election as a matter of law, whatever may be its force as evidence of an election as a matter of fact. There is, moreover, as has been seen, authority for saying that principal and agent may be simultaneously sued severally, and possibly even jointly.' Section 1758, pp. 1336, 1337, 1759; Curtis v. Williamson, [1874] L.R. 10 Q.B., 57; Priestly v. Firnie, 1865, 3 H. & C., 977. In Williston's Wald's Pollock on Contracts it is flatly stated: `When it is said that he (the other party) has a right of election this means that he may sue either the principal or the agent or may commence proceedings against both, but may only sue one of them to judgment; and a judgment obtained against one, though unsatisfied, is a bar to an action against the other.' p. 116. See Pollock on Contracts (7th Ed.), p. 105. The rule in Maryland is similarly stated in Codd Company v. Parker, 97 Md. 319, at page 325, 55 A. 623, 624: `And the general principle appears to be established that where an agent contracts in his own name, without disclosing his interest, though in fact for the exclusive benefit of another person, who is afterwards discovered, the creditor may sue either, but after he has elected whom to sue, and has sued either the agent or principal to final judgment, he cannot after that sue the other, whether the first suit has been successful or not.' Since the third party may simultaneously sue separately the agent and his undisclosed principal, after the latter's discovery, and is not held to have made an election to look to the one or the other, until he takes a final judgment against the one he thus elects to hold to the exclusion of the other, there is no sound reason why the agent and principal may not be sued jointly by the third party. ... The plaintiff in the joint action may therein elect, with equal, if not greater, facility, and with more certainty and singleness of procedure and record, against which of the joined defendants he would take his final judgement.  174 Md. at 257-59, 198 A. at 590. (Emphasis supplied.) He further stated in the opinion: If the third party contract with an agent for an undisclosed principal, he may hold the agent or, upon discovery, the principal, but the third party cannot recover from both. If the third party elects to hold the agent, the principal is discharged; and, conversely, if he elects to hold the principal, the liability of the agent is at an end. The existence of the relation of principal and agent is a fact, and the agency may be asserted and denied by the immediate parties. Under such circumstances, full knowledge of the facts which are material to the third party's election is difficult of ascertainment, and, unless the principal and agent are joined in the action, the third party would be required to make an election before it was certain that he had two alternative remedies in reference to which an election was necessary. 174 Md. at 261, 198 A. at 591. (Emphasis supplied.) See also Crosse v. Callis, supra ; and Garfinkel v. Schwartzman, 253 Md. 710, 727-28, 254 A.2d 667, 677 (1969). Although there is a complete compatibility between our holdings and those of the Pennsylvania courts concerning the criteria for and the enforceability of liquidated damages, there is a clear divergence of our precedents with the Pennsylvania cases concerning the liability of an agent and undisclosed principal. In Joseph Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Melnick, supra , cited to the trial court, it was held that under Pennsylvania law the liability of an agent or undisclosed principal, or both, is joint and several. In reversing the action of a trial court which had held that a release by the appellant of the later disclosed principals for whom the appellee was acting as an agent effected the release of the agent-appellee, the court stated: Many jurisdictions in the United States have adopted the view that if, after learning of the existence of an undisclosed principal, the third party obtains a judgment against the agent, there has been an election and the principal is discharged. See: Restatement, Agency, Sec. 210; Williston on Contracts, Vol. I, Revised Edition, Sec. 289. Pennsylvania, however, has not adopted this view.... This Court has decided that the third party has the option to proceed against either the agent or his principal, or both, but is entitled only to one satisfaction. This principle was established in the leading case of Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298, which has been consistently followed. See: Aber to use v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives, etc., 269 Pa. 384, 112 A. 444; Pennsylvania Company, etc., et al. v. Clark et al., 340 Pa. 433, 447, 448, 18 A.2d 807; Robinson v. Wallace, 65 Pa. Superior Ct. 54, 55; Horwath et al. v. Simon, 95 Pa. Superior Ct. 410, 413; Descalzi et al. v. North American Fruit Exchange, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 293, 296; Nusbaum v. Warwick Hotel Company, 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 277, 284, 170 A. 388; Brennan et al. v. Huber, 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 299, 304, 171 A. 122. Cf. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation v. Williams, 70 F.2d 65 (C.C.A. 3). Professor Williston says: `What has been termed the Pennsylvania view permits pursuit of both agent and principal until the claim is satisfied.' Williston on Contracts, Vol. I, Revised Edition, Sec. 289, p. 855. See also: Professor Merrill's Article, `Election Between Agent and Undisclosed Principal: Shall We Follow the Restatement?' 12 Nebraska Law Bulletin 100. If under the Pennsylvania rule, the third person may proceed against either the agent or the undisclosed principal or both, the liability is joint and several. See: Williamson v. O'Dwyer & Ahern Co., 127 Ark. 530; 192 S.W. 899, 900; Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank of Lincoln v. Bexten et al. (Neb.), 250 N.W. 84, 88; Clarry Lumber Co., Inc., v. O'Brien, 117 Misc.Rep. 319; 191 N.Y.S. 182.... 361 Pa. at 334-35, 64 A.2d at 776-77. Notwithstanding that the case was tried, and the rulings made, under the law of Pennsylvania, the trial judge instructed the jury under our holdings in Hospelhorn v. Poe, supra . Concerning the status of Deshner, the court instructed the jury: [I]f there is an agency here, the agent is liable, but also the principal is liable. Our Court of Appeals has also said in such a case the Plaintiffs may proceed against both the agent and the undisclosed principal at the same time in the same suit, in different counts in the same suit, which is what was done by the Plaintiffs. There can, however, be only one recovery on behalf of the Plaintiffs; although they have the right to sue both, the recovery is limited to one. (Emphasis supplied.) This instruction was supplemented by the jury being advised that if they found: [T]hat the contract was not voided by the parties [5] and that the Traylors were acting as agents for Deshner, then [they had] a choice; you may return a verdict for the Plaintiffs against the Traylors, in which event under count 3 you would return a verdict in favor of the Defendant. Now the verdict against the Traylors would be in the amount of $4,000  or you may return a verdict for the Defendants, in which event under count 3  the suit against Deshner  you would return a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff against the Defendant in the amount of $4,000. Although under the holdings in Joseph Melnick Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Melnick, supra , the jury would have been entitled to return a verdict under Count II  holding the Traylors and Deshner jointly and severally liable  no reference whatsoever was made in the court's instructions to Count II, or to such joint and several liability. Indeed, in its instructions the trial court advised the jury that Counts I and III were the `key' to the decision. In denying the Graftons exceptions to the court's instruction in which counsel pointed out that under Pennsylvania law both the undisclosed principal and the agent can be held liable jointly, and proffered  if permitted to do so  an election to pursue the Traylors individually  and as agents for the undisclosed principal, Judge Proctor stated: The court's answer to that is that the court followed the Maryland law.  (Emphasis supplied.) The Traylors filed no exception to the instructions in their lack of accord with Pennsylvania law, but limited their exceptions to other grounds. [6] It was only upon the conclusion of all exceptions to the instructions that counsel for the Graftons moved to amend their declaration to strike Count III against Earl Deshner  possibly a motion for voluntary dismissal or for non pros, under Maryland Rule 541, and ostensibly made as an election under Hospelhorn v. Poe . The failure to instruct the jury, under the law of Pennsylvania, that an agent and undisclosed principal could be held jointly and severally liable was emphasized when the trial court, in response to the first question submitted from the jury  and to which answer the Traylors excepted  instructed that a verdict against the Traylors (under Count I) and against Deshner (in the third-party claim) in legal theory made Deshner fully responsible and that under such a verdict the Graftons could not collect directly from Deshner. The error was compounded when, in response to the jury's second written inquiry, the trial court instructed them  to which the Traylors again seasonably excepted  that they  cannot bring in a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs against both Traylors and Deshner. That the jury was indeed confused  as the appellants here contend  is evidenced by the request of the jury foreman, when the jury undertook to announce a verdict, that the trial court mention the second count, and the court, having failed to instruct under that count, told the jury that it's [the second count] really technically the third count of the Declaration. Since the jury found, as announced by its verdicts  and by its affirmative response to Issue No. 2  that the Traylors, at the time of the execution of the contract, were acting as the agents for their undisclosed principal, Deshner, it was error to have instructed that a verdict against Deshner under the third-party claim made him fully responsible and it was error to have instructed, contrary to the law of Pennsylvania, that they could not return a verdict against both the Traylors and Deshner jointly. Indeed, Judge Proctor, upon receipt of the answers to the issues and in advising the jury that he would later enter a verdict, stated that during their deliberation counsel had been pressing upon the court its failure to permit the jury to consider the second count of the declaration, which was a count against both Traylors and Deshner, which was apparently the way you wanted to return the verdict.  (Emphasis supplied.) In challenging the propriety of submitting issues to the jury after the jury had announced a verdict and after a request for a poll had been granted, appellants assert that the court compounded its error in connection with the answer given to the first question asked by the jury, that this resulted only in further confusion and denied them procedural due process of law. A jury may correct or change its verdict at any time before the verdict is recorded. In Ager v. Balto. Transit Co., 213 Md. 414, 132 A.2d 469 (1957), the jury, after deliberating for some time informed the court that they were unable to agree upon a verdict and were thereupon discharged. Before any of the jurors had left the jury box the clerk of the court, having seen or heard some indication from the jury, stated that they have changed their minds now. The trial court directed that they return to the jury room and deliberate further, and following this they returned a verdict for the defendants. In holding this procedure proper, Judge Prescott (later Chief Judge), who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated: This Court at an early date, 1827, held that a verdict may be varied from by the jury, at any time before the verdict is recorded. Edelen v. Thompson, 2 Harris & G. 31, 34. Cf. Bronstein v. Amer. Ice Co., 119 Md. 132, 138, 86 A. 131. But, ordinarily a jury should not be permitted to amend its verdict after it has been recorded and the jury dismissed. Harris v. Hipsley, 122 Md. 418, 89 A. 852; Gaither v. Wilmer, 71 Md. 361, 18 A. 590; Williams v. New York, etc., 153 Md. 102, 107, 137 A. 506. Of course, in this case there was no verdict at the time the jury was directed to resume deliberation, and the proposed discharge of the jury was never recorded. .. . 213 Md. at 419, 132 A.2d at 471-72. Here the verdict as orally announced by the jury was incomplete in failing to announce any finding on Count III, and its recordation was interrupted by the requested poll. It was at this juncture that Judge Proctor submitted the issues. Although Maryland Rule 560 permits the court to require a jury to return a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact, and provides, upon the return of such verdict, for the entry of an appropriate judgment nisi, the Rule is silent as to whether or not such issues may be submitted to the jury, during the course of their deliberation, after they have been instructed in connection with the rendition of a general verdict, after the case has been argued on the basis of a general verdict and after the jury has attempted, although imprecisely and with some ambiguity, to announce its verdict. In Rosenberg v. Manager, U.C. & J.F. Bd., 260 Md. 164, 271 A.2d 692 (1970), this Court held that when, under Maryland Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 66 1/2, § 168, it became necessary for the trier of fact to consider whether an accident was caused by the operator of an unidentified vehicle rather than a named defendant, it was appropriate to utilize a special verdict as permitted by Maryland Rule 560, and in setting forth the procedure which might be followed Judge Digges, for the Court, stated: In either a jury or nonjury trial the court may utilize a special verdict as permitted by Maryland Rule 560. In his discretion the judge may submit special issues to the trier of fact in any of the following ways: 1) as one of several issues of fact for determination in the original case, 2) as a single issue to be specifically answered at the time the verdict in the original case is announced, or 3) as a separate issue for determination after the verdict in the original case, but before the jury is discharged  if the case is being considered by a jury.... 260 Md. at 170, 271 A.2d at 695. Judge Proctor, obviously sensing the confusion of the jury and the incompleteness of the verdict announced by the foreman, was of the opinion that the factual answers to the succinct issues he prepared would help free the jury from the morass in which it was mired and the issues can be categorized as separate issue[s] for determination after the verdict in the original case. The appellees respond to the Traylors' contention by arguing that no exception to the formulation of the issues or their submission was timely asserted in compliance with Rule 560 b. Although the record fails to disclose whether the appellants were actually given an opportunity to except either to issues the court proposed to submit to the jury or to their conciseness or applicability, under Kruszewski v. Holz, 265 Md. 434, 290 A.2d 534 (1972), or to offer other issues, See Continental Casualty Co. v. Pfeifer, 246 Md. 628, 639, 229 A.2d 422, 427 (1967), and although we note that the exception was filed after the jury had announced their responses, the question may be resolved on another ground. While we do not place our imprimatur upon the precedure used, we see no procedural prejudice to the Traylors inasmuch as the jury, by their affirmative answer to Issue No. 2, found  as the Traylors had contended throughout  that they were acting as the agents for Deshner. This response under Pennsylvania law effected a resultant joint liability of the Traylors and Deshner, their undisclosed principal, as we later point out. The error in failing to apply the substantive law of Pennsylvania was brought to consummation when, six days after the return of the verdicts, the trial court concluded that it had erroneously refused to permit counsel for the plaintiffs, before the charge to the jury, to dismiss Count II of the declaration (which charged both the Traylors and Deshner) and Count III of the declaration (which charged Deshner as principal) and had thus refused to permit them to make the election mandated under the holdings in Hospelhorn v. Poe . The record discloses that the election attempted by the plaintiffs during trial was to strike by amendment only Count III; it was in their post-trial memorandum that the Graftons for the first time moved to strike by amendment Count II. Judge Proctor, apparently concluding that this was in accord with the election required under Hospelhorn v. Poe , thus then permitted the dismissal of Counts II and III and entered verdicts in favor of the Graftons against the Traylors under Count I in the amount of $4,000 and in favor of the Traylors against Deshner, the third-party defendant, in the same amount. The clerk, upon those verdicts, was directed to enter the respective judgments nisi. The appellants' reliance upon Gaither v. Wilmer, 71 Md. 361 (1889), in asserting that the trial court usurped the function of the jury, when it fixed the damages, is inappropriate. In that case, in an action upon two promissory notes and accounts stated between the parties, as well as upon pleas of set-off, the jury announced a verdict for the plaintiff but failed to specify any amount. After its recordation and the separation of the jury the trial court added the words, for the sum of $5,378.72. Our predecessors there found that such a verdict was fatally defective and that in such an action upon a contract the verdict, if for the plaintiff, must be in an amount specified by the jury. Since the action here was brought for liquidated damages and the clause providing for the payment thereof was found to be enforceable, the jury was required to assess as damages the amount agreed upon and could not return a verdict for more or less. Smithson v. United States Tel. Co., 29 Md. 162 (1868). See also Cowan v. Meyer, supra . The trial court possessed the power to correct a verdict which may be defective in form but which clearly and definitely expresses the intention of the jury. Bronstein v. American Ice Co., 119 Md. 132, 86 A. 131 (1912); Gover v. Turner, 28 Md. 600 (1868); Browne v. Browne, 22 Md. 103 (1864). A verdict which is returned informally may be molded into proper shape by the trial court by referring to the pleadings and issues. Davis v. Board of Education, 168 Md. 74, 78-79, 176 A. 878, 880 (1935); Browne v. Browne, supra . See also Holloway v. Wright, 21 Md. App. 615, 620-21, 320 A.2d 572, 575 (1974). Since the only amount in controversy was $4,000, when the court inserted that amount in the verdicts it was only molding the judgment into proper form and, by reference to the pleadings and issues, supplied the only amount of damages that the jury obviously intended to award. See Diamond State Tel. Co. v. Blake, 105 Md. 570, 575, 66 A. 631, 633-34 (1907). Additionally, the jury, by answer to the issues submitted to it, in effect rendered a special verdict in that having made findings of fact, the law arising on such facts was referred for the decision of the court. See Gover v. Turner, 28 Md. at 604. See also Ebert v. Millers Fire Ins. Co., 220 Md. 602, 155 A.2d 484 (1959). Upon a finding that the contract had not been voided, it was proper for the court to apply as the amount of the verdicts the net amount due as liquidated damages. The power to permit amendment by the withdrawal of a pleading has long been recognized. See Greenbelt Homes v. Prince George's County, 248 Md. 350, 353, 237 A.2d 18, 20 (1968), citing Mitchell v. Smith, 4 Md. 403 (1853); and Somervell v. King, 1 Harr. & J. 206 (1801). When the Graftons moved to amend by striking Count III, they invoked Maryland Rule 320 b, ostensibly on the ground that there was then a misjoinder in pursuing Deshner alone under that count. See Thompson v. Sun Cab Co., 170 Md. 299, 303, 184 A. 576, 577 (1936); Pendergast v. Reed, 29 Md. 398, 402-03 (1868). That motion, made before the jury retire[d] to make up its verdict, was timely filed in accord with Maryland Rule 320 c 2. When the trial court, holding the verdict sub curia, then permitted the Graftons by amendment to strike both Counts II and III, the motion to abandon Count II patently came too late. [7] Assuming the trial court then properly granted the motion  to strike Count III (as to Deshner alone)  which it concluded that it had earlier erroneously denied, and even though the abandonment of those two counts was then manifestly undertaken to permit, before final judgment, the election mandated under Hospelhorn v. Poe, supra , Count II, subjecting the Traylors and Deshner to both a joint and several liability, under the substantive law of Pennsylvania, was still viable. The abandonment by the plaintiffs of their claim against Deshner under Count III did not operate as an abandonment of his potential liability jointly or severally under Count II and it was error for the trial court to dismiss that count. When two or more promisors agree to pay a sum of money under a contract the amount promised is the promise of all and the promisee is entitled to a joint judgment against them, or judgments against them severally. In satisfying such judgments execution may be levied upon the goods of any one of them. See 4 A. Corbin, Contracts, §§ 924, 925, 928, 929 (1951). Even though the judgment may be joint, the payment of the entire judgment might be satisfied from any one of them. See In re Hoge's Estate, 188 Pa. 527, 41 A. 621 (1898). Our holdings are in accord. See Shriver v. Carlin & Fulton Co., 155 Md. 51, 65, 141 A. 434, 440 (1928). See also 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 903 (1969); 30 Am.Jur.2d Executions § 101 (1967); and 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 353 (1963). Although both the Traylors and Deshner were, under the substantive law of Pennsylvania, subject to a joint or several liability, the elective procedure for fixing such liability is set forth in Wilson v. Kelso, 115 Md. 162, 169, 80 A. 895, 898 (1911), quoted with approval in Sharp v. State ex rel. Brown, 135 Md. 551, 558, 109 A. 454, 457 (1920), as: Where the obligation is joint and several, an ancient and familiar rule of law forbids it to be treated as several as to some of the obligors, and joint as to the rest. The obligee has the right of choice between the two methods of proceeding; but must resort to one or the other exclusively, and can not combine both. He must proceed either severally against each, or jointly against all. When the contract is several as well as joint, the plaintiffs [are] at liberty to proceed against the parties jointly, or each separately though their interest be joint. 1 Chitty Pl. 143; Merrick v. Bank of Metropolis, 8 Gill, 74; Poe Pleading, 2 Ed. section 382. Although a plaintiff may dismiss as to all but one defendant in an action under a contract brought against two or more defendants whose obligation is joint and several, such abandonment must be timely made. See Sharp v. State ex rel. Brown, supra (where a judgment of non pros was entered during the progress of the trial as to all defendants save one who were jointly and severally liable under a bond). Where, as here, the Graftons, by amendment, abandoned their claim against Deshner severally (in Count III), their failure then to seasonably abandon their right against Deshner under Count II resulted in only a joint liability of both Mr. and Mrs. Traylor and Deshner under that count. In the view we take of the case, it was error for the court, upon the responses by the jury, to direct the entry of a judgment against both of the Traylors severally (under Count I), rather than have directed the entry of a judgment in favor of the appellees, under Count II, against both of the Traylors and Deshner jointly. Although at first blush it may seem that the Traylors' right to exoneration by their undisclosed principal ( Hospelhorn v. Poe, supra ) and their rights to future subrogation from Deshner as a joint obligor ( Shriver v. Carlin & Fulton Co., supra ; In re Hoge's Estate, supra ) is protected by the third-party judgment entered in their favor against Deshner, and the judgment entered against them alone is nonprejudicial, this may not necessarily be so. The Traylors, as joint obligors with Deshner, might be able to avail themselves  although we do not here so decide  of the provisions of Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 808 (1953), which entitles a joint obligor who may be entitled to subrogation or contribution to require the Graftons to levy upon or make sale of the real property of Deshner, in proportion to or in the succession in which, the properties of the several joint obligors might be liable to contribute toward the discharge of the common encumbrance. See Roddy's Appeal, 72 Pa. 98 (1872); Wilner v. Croyle, 214 Pa. Super. 91, 252 A.2d 387 (1969).