Opinion ID: 1364390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: reconciling the concepts of common law governmental immunities, the public duty doctrine, and the insurance exception to constitutional immunity

Text: As noted above, appellees successfully relied below on claims of governmental immunity arising from the common law independently of the sovereign immunity of the State. Specifically, the Parole Board asserted there, and asserts here, that it was clothed with quasi-judicial immunity. Appellant argues here that any judicial or quasi-judicial immunity founded on the common law protects only against the personal liability of the public official entitled to the immunity. Appellant also argues that, in any event, such common-law immunities as may apply protect only local governments, not the State government. The essence of appellant's position, as we discern it, is that, given the direction of W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 for the State to purchase liability insurance on all state ... activities and responsibilities, any judicial or quasi-judicial immunities found in the common law do not inure to the benefit of the State (at least to the extent of its insurance coverage). We must now determine whether the State and its insurers may claim the benefit of immunities found in the common law in a W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 action where the applicable insurance contract is silent on the issue. We recognize that the task we face puts us on a slippery slope. On the one hand, the Legislature has enacted W.Va. Code § 29-12-5 to provide some level of redress in the courts to those allegedly injured by the actions of the State, limited to the insurance coverages thus made available. While the statute expressly authorizes local governments (political subdivisions) to claim the benefit of statutory immunities and expressly prohibits the assertion of constitutional immunity, it is silent on common-law immunities. Moreover, the obvious intent of the statute to provide some redress in the courts for those injured by State action could be totally or substantially defeated by an overbroad extension of common-law immunities to all State agency activities and responsibilities. Further, the State Board of Insurance (Risk and Insurance Management) is clearly clothed with the authority to tailor the coverages and exceptions to those deemed necessary to the protection of the State and those wishing to assert a claim against it. In light of those considerations, it may be argued that this Court should not reduce by judicial construction the protections it appears that the statute and the resulting insurance provide. In short, it is deceptively inviting to conclude that no common-law immunities apply which are not expressly set out in the State's insurance policies, and that a private action should therefore lie for the breach of any duty by any agency or instrumentality of the State. Under that analysis, in the absence of immunities and other defenses unique to the status of a prospective defendant as an instrument of government, a private suit might lie against the Legislatureif not legislatorsfor any number of real or imagined deficiencies in legislation, appropriations, or other actions, or against the courtsif not the judges and other quasi-judicial officersfor any negligence alleged in the judicial processes and against a variety of public offices, agencies, or instrumentalities, so long as the alleged wrong is covered by insurance and not expressly excluded by the terms of the policy or policies. Our consideration of this dilemma has prompted a review of the leading cases in this State relating to governmental immunity. We have a paucity of cases applying or considering common-law immunities of the State or its instrumentalities, as entities, because the State has long enjoyed constitutional immunity against suit. To be sure, we have some jurisprudence dealing with the personal liability of State officers for alleged negligence in the performance of official duties, but relatively little law dealing with actions against the entities and public offices comprising the State government. However, we have a considerable jurisprudence involving the common-law immunities of local governments, especially since the landmark case of Long v. The City of Weirton, 158 W.Va. 741, 214 S.E.2d 832 (1975). In an effort to perceive what common-law immunities, if any, apply to the State and its instrumentalities in actions brought under W.Va.Code § 29-12-5, it is useful to look at the highlights of the modern development of that law and recent cases relating to so-called qualified or official immunity of State officers from personal liability for alleged wrongs in the performance of or related to their duties. In 1974, in Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 157 W.Va. 724, 204 S.E.2d 1 (1974), overruled on other grounds, O'Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 160 W.Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977), this Court held that Art. VI, § 35 of the West Virginia Constitution, granting sovereign immunity to the State, does not apply to municipalities. Instead, a unanimous Court said that cities could be held liable in private actions for failing to repair and maintain its streets and sidewalks, in violation of a State statute, W.Va.Code § 17-10-17, found by the Court to impose a duty to repair and maintain. Chief Justice Caplan said in that opinion that even if cities were immune at common law, the statute imposed liability on the city for the pleaded violation of it. A short time later, in Long v. City of Weirton, 158 W.Va. 741, 214 S.E.2d 832 (1975), this Court recognized that it had long followed a general rule that the municipalities of this State enjoyed a broad immunity for governmental functions. The case then before the Court resulted from personal injuries received incident to an explosion occurring after a gas line buried in a city street was exposed by third parties doing construction work. The line was hit by a workman operating machinery, causing a gas leak that was immediately reported to the city and the gas company. Neither responded promptly, and the explosion ensued, injuring a young girl. After trial, a jury verdict was returned against the gas company, but the city was exonerated by the trial court on the basis of immunity from suit for governmental functions. The gas company appealed, seeking to impose shared liability on the city. In a scholarly unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Haden, the Court held in syllabus point 10, [t]he rule of municipal governmental immunity is now abolished in this State. In syllabus point 11, the Court also held that [a] municipal corporation shall be liable, as if a private person, for injuries inflicted upon members of the public which are proximately caused by its negligence in the performance of functions assumed by it. (Emphasis added.) The opinion traced the history of the rule of municipal governmental immunity, demonstrating that although the rule had been said to have arisen from the common law, it had not in fact been adopted by the Commonwealth of Virginia until 1867, after the creation of this State. The Court concluded that, notwithstanding some West Virginia cases that appeared to apply common-law governmental immunity to municipalities, the rule previously recognized was not a part of the common law of Virginia at the time of the creation of this State. Therefore, the Court concluded, this Court shared with the Legislature the power to modify our prior holdings on municipal governmental immunity. Commenting that Higginbotham effectively overruled prior cases treating the State's constitutional immunity as delegated to the cities, the Court strongly disapproved and abolished the prior distinction permitting actions against cities for proprietary functions but prohibiting such actions for governmental functions. Two facets of the opinion are particularly noteworthy for our current purposes: (1) The determination that municipal governmental immunity was subject either to judicial or legislative modification, and (2) the holding that cities might be subject to suit as if a private person. Long, 158 W.Va. at 784, 214 S.E.2d at 859. We discern, as noted later in this opinion, that subsequent decisions by this Court may be read as narrowing the sweep of that language by the application of the public duty doctrine. The thrust of Long was applied to suits against other organs of local government in succeeding opinions by this Court. In Ohio Valley Contractors v. The Board of Education of Wetzel County, 170 W.Va. 240, 293 S.E.2d 437 (1982), the abolition of common-law governmental immunity was extended to county boards of education. In Gooden v. County Commission of Webster County, 171 W.Va. 130, 298 S.E.2d 103 (1982), the abolition of common-law governmental immunity was extended to county commissions. In Gooden, the Court employed parallel language with that found in Long: A county commission shall be liable, just as a private citizen, to members of the general public, for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of its employees performing their duties. Syl. pt 2, in part, Id. (emphasis added). The apparent cumulative effect of these cases was to abolish governmental immunity for local governments in West Virginia. Notwithstanding the apparent total abolition of the doctrine of governmental immunity for local governmental units in West Virginia, this Court has limited the effect of that ruling by invoking the so-called public duty doctrine. Benson v. Kutsch, 181 W.Va. 1, 380 S.E.2d 36 (1989), involved the alleged negligence of the City of Wheeling in failing to inspect an apartment occupied by the plaintiffs for compliance with the city building code, particularly in failing to find and report the absence of required smoke detectors. The suit alleged that a fire resulted in damage to the plaintiffs which might have been avoided had the city conducted the inspections and enforced its building code. This Court examined the public duty doctrine for the first time, perhaps, the Court explained, because prior to Long cities enjoyed immunity for all governmental functions. Prior to Long, the Court recalled, cities could be held liable only for proprietary functions and violations of statutes which imposed a duty on the city. Therefore, the Court concluded, municipal governmental immunity foreclosed suit and there was little occasion to utilize the [public duty] doctrine before then. Noting that the Wheeling building code did not operate to impose a separate statutory duty of inspection on the City of Wheeling, the Court defined the public duty doctrine as providing that a governmental entity is not liable because of its failure to enforce regulatory or penal statutes. Syl. pt. 1, in part, Benson v. Kutsch, Id . This doctrine, the Court said, is not a theory of governmental immunity, although in practice it achieves much the same result. Id. at 2, 380 S.E.2d at 37. We recognize that the public duty doctrine does not rest squarely on the principle of governmental immunity, but rests on the principle that recovery may be had for negligence only if a duty has been breached which was owed to the particular person seeking recovery. Nevertheless, Benson and subsequent cases applying the public duty doctrine may be fairly seen as narrowing the holdings of Long, Ohio Valley Contractors, Inc., and Gooden that local governments would be subject to suit as if a private person and just as a private citizen. The linchpin of the public duty doctrine is that some governmental acts create duties owed to the public as a whole and not to the particular private person or private citizen who may be harmed by such acts. Therefore, the nature of the defendant as a governmental entity is invoked, which operates to distinguish the defendant from a private person or a private citizen. In Benson, the Court also discussed the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine. The Court determined that no special relationship existed under the facts of the case, although it discussed, without overtly adopting, factors other courts had considered in determining whether a special relationship existed. In keeping with the position advanced by appellant in the case sub judice, the thrust of the exception as recognized in Benson is that, given certain circumstances, courts may find that such a special relationship has been created between the public body and a particular private citizen so that the public body may be said to owe a duty to that particular private person, in addition to and apart from any duty owed the public in general. In short, utilizing the principle of negligence law that one may only recover for the breach of a duty owed that person, the Court adopted a doctrine which provided the functional equivalent of governmental immunity for local governmental units, absent the circumstances necessary to create a special relationship. In place of the traditional inquiry as to whether the conduct alleged in a given law suit against a local government was governmental or proprietary, the inquiry after Benson appears to be whether the circumstances create a special relationship between the local governmental unit and the plaintiff. The public duty doctrine was developed further in Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182 W.Va. 253, 387 S.E.2d 307 (1989). In that case, the city fire department failed to respond to several calls for assistance from a home owner living outside the city limits who had, perhaps inadvertently, been billed for and had paid the city a fire fee. The home for which the fee had been paid caught fire, and the fire department would not respond under circumstances which indicated that a prompt response would have greatly reduced the damage from the fire. After a devastating fire which virtually destroyed the home, the City of Wheeling attempted to return the incorrectly assessed and collected fee. The homeowner refused to accept the return of the fee and sued the City for negligence in responding to the fire. The trial court certified questions to this Court regarding the public duty doctrine. This Court reiterated its adoption of the special relationship test, saying that the duty to fight fires and provide police protection runs to all citizens and raises no liability to a particular individual for the failure to do so, absent a special duty to do so. In Wolfe, a four-point test for the existence of a special relationship was adopted: (1) [A]n assumption by the local governmental entity, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the local governmental entity's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the local governmental entity's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the local governmental entity's affirmative undertaking. Syl. pt. 2, in part, Id. In syllabus point 3 of Wolfe, the Court held expressly that the applicability of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine would often be a question of fact. Finally, the Court recited that the doctrine and its exception applied to suits involving non-discretionary functions of city government. The Court did not discuss in detail its perceived distinction between non-discretionary and discretionary functions but did note, in keeping with the line of authority begun by Higginbotham, that the liability of city governments might also be predicated on a distinctive statutory duty, in addition to those arising from non-discretionary governmental functions. Wolfe, 182 W.Va. at 258 n. 8, 387 S.E.2d at 312 n. 8. Finally, we turn to a highly instructive opinion rendered by Justice McHugh in Randall v. Fairmont City Police Department, 186 W.Va. 336, 412 S.E.2d 737 (1991). In that case, a claim was asserted against the City of Fairmont Police Department for failing to respond to and protect a citizen who had called the police department asking for help because a person, who later killed her, had harassed and threatened her and she feared for her safety. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Local Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, W.Va.Code § 29-12A-1, et seq., against claims that it denied remedies at law guaranteed under our State Constitution and violated equal protection. It construed the immunity provided in W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5) against suits for failure to provide adequate police, law enforcement, or fire protection as stating the common-law public duty doctrine with respect to those functions and determined that, notwithstanding the immunity, the special relationship exception applied and the city was subject to suit if such a special relationship were proven. In reaching the conclusion that this particular immunity invoked the public duty doctrine and could be overcome by the showing of a special relationship, the Court relied, at least in part, on the general rule of construction in governmental tort legislation cases favoring liability, not immunity: [U]nless the legislature has clearly provided for immunity under the circumstances, the general common-law goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by negligent acts must prevail. 186 W.Va. at 347, 412 S.E.2d at 748. In Randall, the Court restricted the public duty doctrine to liability for nondiscretionary (or `ministerial' or `operational') functions and noted that at common law, a local governmental agency was immune from tort liability for acts or omissions constituting the exercise of a discretionary function. In its note, [9] the Court defined a discretionary function as the exercise of a legislative or judicial function or the exercise of an administrative function involving the determination of fundamental governmental policy, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895C(2)(a)(b) (1977). The Court's note further suggests that W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(1)-(2), (4) (1986), the Local Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act, incorporated the common-law rule granting local governments immunity with respect to [l]egislative and quasi-legislative functions, judicial, quasi-judicial and prosecutorial functions and the adoption or failure to adopt a law ... rule, regulation or written policy. [10] Finally, the Court characterized the Local Governmental Tort Claims and Insurance Reform Act as an appropriate legislative reaction to the abolition by this Court of the doctrine of municipal, county, and other political subdivision governmental immunity, as reflected by Long and its progeny. By drawing the distinction that the immunity provided by W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(1)-(2),(4), with respect to [l]egislative or quasi-legislative functions, [j]udicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutorial functions and the [a]doption or failure to adopt a law ... rule, regulation or written policy, incorporates the rule of common-law immunity while the immunities granted by W.Va.Code § 29-12A-5(a)(5), relating to fire and police protection, are subject to the public duty doctrine and its exception for a special relationship, the opinion mirrors the two legal concepts at issue in the case before us and strongly suggests that the protection afforded local governments for legislative, judicial, and administrative policy-making functions, defined by the opinion as discretionary, differs in character and scope from the protection afforded other functions of the local governments. The obvious implication is that the former protection, grounded in the law of immunities, protects the local government entity as well as its officers, while the latter ones, grounded in the public duty doctrine, achieve a like result by way of the law of negligence, with an exception for special relationships which would not be available were the protection actually an immunity. Perhaps the leading case relating to the common-law immunities available at the State level, as opposed to the local government level, is State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992). That case involved a third-party complaint against members of the State Board of Investments, in their individual capacities, for alleged negligent actions in the management of the State's investments, resulting in injury to the complainants. Complainants did not attempt to impose liability against the State Board as an entity, but attempted to impose personal liability on the members of the Board for their official actions. This Court held that: A public executive official who is acting within the scope of his authority and is not covered by the provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-1, et seq., is entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability for official acts if the involved conduct did not violate clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known. There is no immunity for an executive official whose acts are fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive. To the extent that State ex rel. Boone National Bank of Madison v. Manns, 126 W.Va. 643, 29 S.E.2d 621 (1944), is contrary, it is overruled. Id. at syl. pt. 1, 424 S.E.2d 591. Chase describes a qualified immunity for executive officials, which is to be distinguished from the absolute immunity conferred on judges and legislators and defines that immunity as an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the official. Chase, 188 W.Va. at 362, 424 S.E.2d at 597. The opinion derides the distinction between ministerial and discretionary functions as arbitrary and difficult to apply and not needed in order to apply the general qualified immunity standard adopted in the case. Chase, 188 W.Va. at 364, 424 S.E.2d at 599. That standard, drawn from federal civil rights cases, was first endorsed in this State in Bennett v. Coffman, 178 W.Va. 500, 361 S.E.2d 465 (1987). We also spoke to qualified or official immunity in Clark v. Dunn, 195 W.Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995). That opinion appeared to resurrect the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary governmental functions, although it clearly applied the Chase rule. The case applied qualified immunity to the actions of a conservation officer, acting within the scope of his employment, and allowed the doctrine to be applied for the benefit of the State agency which employed the officer unless the applicable insurance policy of the State waived the defense. The case cited and relied in part on Goines v. James, 189 W.Va. 634, 433 S.E.2d 572 (1993), which used, in a slightly altered form, the same test as Chase and applied the doctrine for the protection of a city police officer against personal liability. Finally, we note that this Court has recently discussed judicial immunity in two cases. In Carey v. Dostert, 185 W.Va. 247, 406 S.E.2d 678 (1991), we held that judges in this jurisdiction are absolutely immune from suit for the results of any judicial act performed by them while acting in their official capacity. 185 W.Va. at 253, 406 S.E.2d at 684. In that case, we said that a judge acting in his judicial capacity did not give up the protection of judicial immunity by providing the public with information contained in the public record, whether through the press or otherwise. On the other hand, in Roush v. Hey, 197 W.Va. 207, 475 S.E.2d 299 (1996), we held that the appearance by a judge on a nationally televised program, dedicated to contentious discussion of politically and socially sensitive issues, in order to vindicate a position expressed in a decision in a pending case is not a function normally performed by a judge. Finding that it was beyond reasonable dispute that the judge acted out of personal motivation and used his office as an offensive weapon to vindicate personal objectives, and finding that no one had invoked the judicial machinery for any purpose, this Court concluded that the judge's actions were non-judicial acts, not cloaked with judicial immunity. With this review of cases against the backdrop of the State's constitutional immunity from suit and the legislative prescription for liability insurance relating to the State's activities and responsibilities, we seek now to achieve a reasoned statement of the current posture of common-law immunities and the public duty doctrine as it applies to case before us. First, we reiterate that suits which seek no recovery from state funds, but rather allege that recovery is sought under and up to the limits of the State's liability insurance coverage, fall outside the traditional constitutional bar to suits against the State. Syl. pt. 2, Pittsburgh Elevator v. W.Va. Board of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (1983). We require that the record in such actions reflect both the pleading of that limitation on recovery and the scope of such insurance coverage and the contractual exceptions applicable to each such case. Second, we note that the Legislature may direct such limitation or expansion of the insurance coverages and exceptions applicable to cases brought under W.Va.Code § 29-12-5, as, in its wisdom, may be appropriate. The Legislature has also vested in the State Board of Insurance (Risk and Insurance Management) considerable latitude to fix the scope of coverage and contractual exceptions to that coverage by regulation or by negotiation of the terms of particular applicable insurance policies. In our attempt to resolve the issues presented by this case, we are sensitive to the general rule of construction favoring liability, not immunity, in governmental tort legislation cases, cited above. [11] Third, absent other legislative direction or express insurance contract provisions, we will apply to the issue of the State's liability in W.Va.Code§29-12-5 cases the immunities and defenses that have been sanctioned in analogous governmental tort cases, including cases involving the immunity of local governments not entitled to the sovereign immunity of the State, with careful sensitivity to the limitations on such cases that have been judicially developed or are reasonably implied by that development. Fourth, if the terms of the applicable insurance coverage and contractual exceptions thereto acquired under W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 expressly grant the State greater or lesser immunities or defenses than those found in the case law, the insurance contract should be applied according to its terms and the parties to any suit should have the benefit of the terms of the insurance contract. Fifth, we hold that, unless the applicable insurance policy otherwise expressly provides, a State agency or instrumentality, as an entity, is immune under common-law principles from tort liability in W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 actions for acts or omissions in the exercise of a legislative or judicial function and in the exercise of an administrative function involving the determination of fundamental governmental policy. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895C(2)(a)-(b) (1977); Randall v. Fairmont City Police Department, 186 W.Va. 336, 346 n. 13, 412 S.E.2d 737, 746 n. 13 (1991). We cannot conclude that the Legislature intended by its enactment of W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 to abolish this immunity, which has been described, at least as to judges and legislators, [12] as an absolute immunity. We are mindful of the comments in Chase that the immunity provided for executive officials is a personal, qualified one to be distinguished from the absolute immunity conferred on judges and legislators and that such immunity is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by the official. Chase, 188 W.Va. at 362, 424 S.E.2d at 597. Here, we are addressing the immunity of the State and its instrumentalities in the context of the exercise of judicial, legislative, and executive (or administrative) policy-making acts and omissions. Notwithstanding those comments in Chase, we conclude that the common-law immunity of the State in suits brought under the authority of W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 (1996) with respect to judicial, legislative, and executive (or administrative) policy-making acts and omissions is absolute and extends to the judicial, legislative, and executive (or administrative) officials when performing those functions. Sixth, we recognize that the scope of qualified immunity, as it applies to public executive officials' personal liability, or how it may extend to protect the State against suit in contexts other than legislative, judicial, or executive policy-making settings, requires more detailed analysis. In certain circumstances, the qualified immunity of public executive officials for wrongful acts or omissions within the scope of their authority should extend to protect the State governmental entity for which such officials function from liability under W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 (1996). Similarly, occasions will arise where the government should be liable when the public executive official is not, and, conversely, on occasion the State will remain free from liability under one theory or another, when the public executive official will be held liable despite qualified immunity. The comment accompanying the Restatement (Second) of Torts 2d § 895D, cmt. j, in part (1979), discusses the issue as follows: As a general rule, the immunity of a public officer is coterminous with that of his government. But this is not necessarily true. If the officer intentionally inflicts an injury or acts completely outside his authority, his government is not liable in many jurisdictions. The government is normally not liable for punitive damages, even though the officer's conduct would make him liable for them. Conversely, duties or obligations may be placed on the government that are not imposed on the officer, and statutes sometime make the government liable when its employees are immune. Beyond this, the tests for imposing liability may differ. When general tort immunity of a government has been abrogated, whether by court or legislature, this has not necessarily meant a corresponding change in the officer's liability. Even when the test is expressed in the same language, as in the availability of an immunity for the exercise of a discretionary function, its application to fact situations may prove different, depending on whether the action is brought against the government or the officer. With respect to some government functions, the threat of individual liability would have a devastating effect, while the threat of governmental liability would not significantly impair performance. An officer may have a privilege so that he is not liable if he acted reasonably. To require him to be right would seriously affect his effectiveness. But the injured party sustains a real injury when the officer acted incorrectly, even though he was reasonable. It may appear just that the government should compensate for that injury. We begin by endorsing the rule for the qualified immunity of public executive officials, drawn from Chase, from civil rights cases, and from Bennett v. Coffman : A public executive official who is acting within the scope of his authority and is not covered by the provisions of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-1, et seq., is entitled to qualified immunity from personal liability for official acts if the involved conduct did not violate clearly established laws of which a reasonable official would have known. There is no immunity for an executive official whose acts are fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive. To the extent that State ex rel. Boone National Bank of Madison v. Manns, 126 W.Va. 643, 29 S.E.2d 621 (1944), is contrary, it is overruled. Syllabus, State v. Chase Securities, Inc., 188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992). Next, we endorse the principle, expressed in the Restatement, that the immunity of the State is ordinarily coterminous with the qualified immunity of the public executive official whose acts or omissions give rise to an action under W.Va.Code § 29-12-5, unless the applicable insurance policy otherwise provides. We have applied that principle, albeit with mention of the discretionary nature of the officer's conduct, in Clark v. Dunn, 195 W.Va. 272, 465 S.E.2d 374 (1995). Conversely, we recognize that while no qualified immunity would protect a public executive official acting beyond the scope of his authority or by fraudulent, malicious, or otherwise oppressive conduct, the vicarious liability of the State for its officer's conduct is not to be presumed merely from the absence of qualified immunity to protect the public executive official from personal liability for that conduct. [13] We suggest that the principle underlying qualified immunity provides the guideline that must be applied on a case-by-case method to determine if qualified immunity which is applicable to a public officer's actions should result in the application of that immunity to the government as well. Qualified immunity is said most often to be available to protect the public executive officer because, as suggested in Bennett v. Coffman , Goines v. James and Clark v. Dunn , an officer should not be faced with the choice of doing his duty and being constantly faced with litigation for doing so. The public interest is that the official conduct of the officer not be impaired by constant concern about personal liability. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts comment quoted suggests, this concern need not always prevent the attachment of liability to the State: With respect to some government functions, the threat of individual liability would have a devastating effect, while the threat of governmental liability would not significantly impair performance. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, cmt. j, in part (1979). In summary, we conclude that, in cases arising under W.Va.Code § 29-12-5, and in the absence of express provisions of the insurance contract to the contrary, the immunity of the State is coterminous with the qualified immunity of a public executive official whose acts or omissions give rise to the case. However, on occasion, the State will be entitled to immunity when the official is not entitled to the same immunity; in others the official will be entitled to immunity when the State is not. The existence of the State's immunity of the State must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Because we do not have before us a factual situation requiring further development of this approach to the scope of qualified immunity for the governmental entities represented by public officials entitled to its benefit, we leave the full development of that approach to another day. [14] Seventh, we do not disturb our ruling in Roush v. Hey, 197 W.Va. 207, 475 S.E.2d 299 (1996), allowing an action to be brought where a judge's alleged actions were determined to be non-judicial acts and, therefore, were not cloaked with judicial immunity. Eighth, we do not disturb the holding in Higginbotham, commented upon in Benson, that an action against a governmental body otherwise entitled to immunity, be it absolute or qualified, may be predicated on the violation of a distinctive statute which imposes a duty on the government which is owed to the claimant. As noted in the Restatement comment: [D]uties or obligations may be placed on the government that are not imposed on the officer, and statutes sometime make the government liable when its employees are immune. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895D, cmt. j (1979). Finally, we turn to the public duty doctrine and its exception for a special relationship. Just as it was found applicable to cases against local governments in Randall, we hold that, the public duty doctrine and its special relationship exception apply to W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 actions against the State and its instrumentalities, unless the doctrine is expressly waived or altered by the terms of the applicable insurance contract. The doctrine and its exceptions are a recognized part of our law on the liability of governmental bodies, providing a means of determining the duties for whose breach such an action may be brought against such governmental bodies. [A] governmental entity is not liable because of its failure to enforce regulatory or penal statutes. Syl. pt. 1, Benson v. Kutsch, supra . Likewise, we adopt the factors to be considered to determine the applicability of the special relationship exception, found in syllabus point 2 of Wolfe v. City of Wheeling, 182 W.Va. 253, 387 S.E.2d 307 (1989), and reiterate its holding in syllabus point 3: In cases arising under W.Va.Code§29-12-5 the question of whether a special duty arises to protect an individual from a state governmental entity's negligence is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of the facts. Restated for their application to State agencies, the four requirements for the application of the special relationship exception to W.Va.Code § 29-12-5 cases are as follows: (1) An assumption by the state governmental entity, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured; (2) knowledge on the part of the state governmental entity's agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the state governmental entity's agents and the injured party; and (4) that party's justifiable reliance on the state governmental entity's affirmative undertaking. See syl. pt. 2, Wolfe, Id.