Opinion ID: 2779924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence and Delay

Text: The MSPB asserts the well-settled rule that “a petitioner is responsible for the errors of her chosen representative.” Resp’t’s Br. 19; see also Green v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 232 F.3d 912, 2000 WL 369683, at  (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (“Citing precedent, the Board noted that . . . the errors and omissions of one’s attorney do not prove good cause for delay unless the attorney has thwarted a petitioner’s diligent efforts to pursue an appeal.”). However, the cases cited by the MSPB in support of this proposition involve either greater negligence or delay (or both) than the case at bar. Green, for example, involved a delay of more than two-and-a-half years between the filing deadline and the time at which the application was filed, due in part to the disbarment of counsel. Green, 232 F.3d. at . The MSPB specifically noted the petitioner “waited from June of 1996 until January of 1997 before asking his attorney whether she had filed his petition for review,” far longer than the six calendar days during which it is suggested Ms. Herring 8 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD could have acted. Green v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 83 M.S.P.R. 333, 334 (1999), aff’d, 232 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 2000). More significantly, the MSPB in Green also found that the petitioner, contrary to his assertion, had met with counsel two years before the petition was ultimately filed and was informed at that time of her disbarment. Id. In the present matter, Ms. Herring asserts she followed up by telephone with counsel six days before the filing was due, at which time it appeared matters were proceeding without issue. Other cases cited by the MSPB are similarly distinguishable in that they involve much longer delays or greater fault on the part of the petitioner. For example, Moore v. Department of Veterans Affairs involved a delay of more than four years, during which period Moore consulted with counsel but nevertheless failed to file an appeal. 80 M.S.P.R. 268, 270 (1998). In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., the Supreme Court noted it “could reasonably be inferred from [the facts of the case] . . . that petitioner had been deliberately proceeding in dilatory fashion.” 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962) (emphasis added). In Johnson v. Department of the Treasury, the MSPB presiding official had made “repeated requests” for information that were not satisfactorily answered and “[t]wo prior continuances had been granted despite delayed or insufficient support.” 721 F.2d 361, 364 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In Sofio v. Internal Revenue Service, both the appellant and her representative failed to appear at a scheduled hearing because the representative was ill, but the Regional Office was not notified in advance of the illness and no explanation was ever given for this failure. 7 M.S.P.R. 667, 668 (1981). Even then, the presiding official found good cause present, and only after a third postponement request did the presiding official decide to adjudicate the matter on the record without a hearing. Id. at 669. This case contains no evidence of lengthy delay, dilatory conduct, repeated neglect, or unexplained nonHERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 9 responsiveness. To the contrary, the record shows that immediately upon learning of the error, the consulting attorney filed Petitioner’s appeal with the Board via facsimile the same day at 5:56 P.M. Pet’r’s App. 36; see also Pet’r’s Br. 8–9. While previous cases have declined to find good cause even where the delay was short, these cases each contained some additional factor weighing against a finding of good cause. For example, only a four-day delay was at issue in Rowe v. Merit Systems Protection Board, where this court found good cause lacking. 802 F.2d 434 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Unlike the present case, however, where petitioner diligently communicated with her attorney and reasonably believed the appeal would be timely filed, in Rowe the petitioner made no efforts to ensure that his attorney would file within this period. Id. at 435 (noting the petitioner continued to insist the appeal “was not untimely” even though the deadline “had been specifically mentioned in his removal notice”). In Phillips v. United States Postal Service, the MSPB upheld a finding that the appellant had not shown good cause despite only a six-day delay, but the delay was due to the appellant’s failure to correctly address materials to his attorney. 5 M.S.P.R. 339, 340 (1981). In Lands v. Department of the Air Force, the MSPB upheld a finding of no good cause despite only a single day of delay. 95 M.S.P.R. 593, 596 (2004). The sparse explanation for the lateness, however, was “oversight” on the part of the attorney. Moreover, the explanation was provided in an unsworn response even though “any explanation for the untimeliness of a petition for review that is not submitted in the form of an affidavit or a statement signed under penalty of perjury is insufficient to establish the assertions it contains.” Id. at 595; see also McAdory v. Dep’t of Justice, 6 M.S.P.R. 112 (1981) (upholding a finding of no good cause despite only a single day of delay due to attorney negligence, but noting that in addition to the late filing, no response was received to the 10 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD show cause letter). Goldberg v. Department of Defense involved similar circumstances to the present matter in that only a seven-day delay was at issue and the cause for the delay, in part, was that the attorney’s office had misplaced the Board’s order denying a ninety-day extension of the time to file. 39 M.S.P.R. 515, 517 (1989). In upholding a finding of no good cause, however, the Board noted that a copy of the order had also been mailed to the appellant. Id. at 518. Unlike the present case, there was no indication that the appellant had attempted to contact counsel following receipt of the order. “To establish good cause for a filing delay, an appellant must show that the delay was excusable under the circumstances and that the appellant exercised due diligence in attempting to meet the filing deadline.” Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Dunbar v. Dep’t of the Navy, 43 M.S.P.R. 640, 643 (1990) (“To establish good cause, a party must show that due diligence or ordinary prudence was exercised under the particular circumstances of the case.”). It is unclear from the record what a reasonable person in Ms. Herring’s circumstances would have done that she did not do. This is not a case where the petitioner deliberately ignored a deadline due to the erroneous advice of counsel. See Massingale v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 736 F.2d 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding a finding of no good cause where petitioner, on the advice of counsel, initiated an arbitration proceeding rather than submitting an appeal to the agency, as the agency had indicated he must do). Nor is it a case where the petitioner repeatedly failed to communicate with the agency. See Barnes v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 566 F. App’x 909, 910 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In hindsight, it may be easy to construct a sequence of events that would have led to timely filing. Ms. Herring, however, had no reason to know that any additional steps were necessary. HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 11 To the extent any MSPB decision suggests attorney negligence can never constitute good cause, 2 even where the petitioner has exercised ordinary prudence under the circumstances and other mitigating factors are present, it is erroneous. A recent MSPB order finding good cause despite attorney negligence illustrates this point and provides a useful comparison to the present matter. In Brink-Meissner v. Office of Personnel Management, the petitioner missed a filing deadline by six days because the OPM’s decision “was erroneously date stamped” by the attorney’s support staff as being received in the attorney’s office on September 4, 2013, when in fact it had been received on August 26, 2013. No. PH-844E-14-0077-I-1, 2014 WL 5361501, at  (M.S.P.B. Aug. 5, 2014). As in the present case, see Pet’r’s Br. 6, 7, 13 and Pet’r’s App. 37–38, Brink-Meissner communicated with her attorney several times in order to ensure the appeal would be timely filed, was assured by a staff member at the attorney’s office the attorney would handle the matter, and had no reason to believe otherwise, Brink-Meissner, 2014 WL 5361501, at . The Board found under these circumstances, Brink-Meissner “[had] made the requisite showing under Dunbar,” i.e., that “her diligent efforts to prosecute her appeal were thwarted, without her knowledge, by her attorney’s deceptions and negligence.” Id. at ; see also Crawford, 60 M.S.P.R. at 446 (finding the attorney’s negligence to have “misled and lulled” the appellant into believing the case was proceeding smoothly) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 See, e.g., Goldberg, 39 M.S.P.R. at 518 (“Negli- gence on the part of an appellant or his attorney does not constitute good cause for a late filing, even though the filing may be late by only [one] day.”); Stromfeld v. Dep’t of Justice, 25 M.S.P.R. 240, 241 (1984) (same). 12 HERRING V. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD