Opinion ID: 585701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ex Parte Communication

Text: 3 Gay and Porter argue that the district court's telephone conversation with the prosecutor discussing the scheduling of witnesses and the feasibility of supplementary opening statements constitutes reversible error. We disagree. 4 First, the district court did not err in denying Gay's and Porter's motion for a mistrial. The telephone call between the judge and prosecutor in this case was confined to procedural matters. The conversation did not touch upon legal issues pending before the court or matters to be decided by the jury. The defendants' characters and potential trial tactics were not discussed. Cf. Guenther v. Commissioner, 939 F.2d 758, 761 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). Nor did the prosecutor engage in argumentation. Cf. id. This type of ex parte communication does not amount to a constitutional violation. 5 Second, we reject Gay's and Porter's argument that, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(a), the district court should have recused itself following the ex parte contact. Arguments for recusal under sections 144 and 455(a) may not be raised for the first time on appeal, absent a demonstration of factors that excuse the failure to raise the claim in the trial court. United States v. Conforte, 624 F.2d 869, 879 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980); United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir.1980). 6 Third, we decline Gay's and Porter's invitation to reverse their convictions as an exercise of our supervisory powers. The district court's error in engaging in an ex parte communication in this case does not call for the drastic remedy of reversing Gay's and Porter's convictions. Furthermore, an exercise of supervisory powers is inappropriate when, as here, any error was harmless. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983). 2 7 Fourth, we reject Gay's and Porter's argument that their absence from the telephone call between the judge and prosecutor violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment right to be present does not extend to conferences discussing procedural and trial management issues. See, e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Easley, 505 F.2d 184, 185 (9th Cir.1974). Nor did their absence run afoul of Fed.R.Crim.P. 43. Even assuming the ex parte telephone call is a stage of the trial within the meaning of Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a), no reasonable possibility of prejudice resulted from the [defendants'] absence. United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 823 (1986); see also United States v. Wheat, 813 F.2d 1399, 1404 (9th Cir.1987) (ex parte, in-chambers conference with defense counsel does not require reversal because no reasonable possibility of prejudice shown), aff'd, 486 U.S. 153 (1988). 8