Opinion ID: 3189192
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Challenges to the capital sentencing scheme

Text: Defendant contends that California‟s death penalty statute is constitutionally invalid in numerous respects. We have repeatedly rejected similar claims and do so again here as follows: “[T]he California death penalty statute is not impermissibly broad, whether considered on its face or as interpreted by this court.” (People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 813.) The death penalty statute does not lack safeguards to avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing, deprive defendant of the right to a jury trial, or constitute cruel and unusual punishment on the ground that it does not require either unanimity as to the truth of aggravating circumstances or findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance (other than Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) has been proved, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate sentence. (People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 90; Dykes, at p. 814; Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 724.) Nothing in Hurst v. Florida (2016) ___ U.S. ___ [136 S.Ct. 616],16 Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, Blakely v. Washington 16 In Hurst v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court recently held that Florida‟s sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584. (Hurst v. Florida, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [136 S.Ct. 616, 621].) The California sentencing scheme is materially different from that in Florida. Here, a jury weighs the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and reaches a unanimous penalty verdict that “impose[s] a sentence of death” or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Pen. Code, §§ 190.3, 190.4.) Unlike Florida, this verdict is not merely “advisory.” (Hurst, at p. 622.) If the jury reaches a verdict of death, our system provides for an automatic motion to modify or reduce this verdict to that of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. (Pen. Code, § 190.4.) At the point the court rules on this motion, the jury “has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty.” (Pen. Code, § 190.4, italics added.) The trial court simply determines “whether the jury‟s findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances (footnote continued on next page) 52 (2004) 542 U.S. 296, Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, or Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, affects our conclusions in this regard. (Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 55.) “Written findings by the jury during the penalty phase are not constitutionally required, and their absence does not deprive defendant of meaningful appellate review.” (People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1097.) “Use of the adjectives „extreme‟ and „substantial‟ in [Penal Code] section 190.3, factors (d) and (g) is constitutional.” (Dement, at p. 57.) A “prosecutor‟s discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty is sought does not offend the federal or state Constitution.” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1098.) “The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment [citations], do not require intercase proportionality review on appeal.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1057.) Defendant contends that his death sentence violates international law. He points to no authority that “prohibit[s] a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.” (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511.) (footnote continued from previous page) outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented.” (Pen. Code, § 190.4.) 53