Opinion ID: 2635680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Two-prong test for pre-indictment delay challenges

Text: A challenge by which a defendant seeks to have the complaint dismissed due to pre-indictment delay is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Article 1, Section 8(5) of the Nevada Constitution. This constitutional guarantee protects a defendant from lengthy delay[s] between the commission of an offense and the initiation of prosecution. [3] United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). To succeed on a due process challenge to pre-indictment delay, the accused must make two requisite showings: (1) that he or she suffered actual, nonspeculative prejudice from the delay; and (2) that the prosecution intentionally delayed bringing the charges in order to gain a tactical advantage over the accused, or that the prosecution delayed in bad faith. Id.; U.S. v. DeGeorge, 380 F.3d 1203, 1210-11 (9th Cir.2004). With respect to the first required showing, Wyman argues that she suffered prejudice because some witnesses are difficult to locate, and important neighbors, family members, and the coroner in 1974 are now deceased. Wyman argues that these potential witnesses may have been able to testify as to whether they saw or heard any indicia of abuse that occurred at the Wyman home. Wyman does not specifically allege what any of the potential witnesses would have testified. Because Wyman fails to make a particularized showing of actual, nonspeculative prejudice resulting from the delay, we reject Wyman's claim of prejudice. As the Ninth Circuit has succinctly stated, [W]hen a defendant fails to make a specific showing as to what a [lost or] deceased witness would have said, any argument of prejudice is pure conjecture. U.S. v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.2007). [A]llegations of prejudice `must be supported by non-speculative proof.' Id. (quoting U.S. v. Doe, 149 F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir.1998)). Because Wyman failed to specifically demonstrate how the unavailability of the lost or deceased witnesses prejudiced her defense, or how testimony from such witnesses would have benefited her defense, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wyman's motion to dismiss the complaint. See id.; see also State v. Delisle, 162 Vt. 293, 648 A.2d 632, 644 (1994) (where that court rejected the defendant's claim of prejudice as a result of the nearly 14-year pre-indictment delay because, while one witness had died, the defendant failed to demonstrate what the deceased witness would have testified had he been alive). Although our conclusion that Wyman failed to demonstrate actual prejudice makes it unnecessary for us to evaluate the second prong of the test, we further conclude that Wyman failed to meet the second prong of the test  that the State used the delay to gain a tactical advantage or delay the indictment in bad faith. In particular, we conclude that Wyman failed to demonstrate that the delay `offend[ed] ... fundamental conceptions of justice.' Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d at 1112 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting U.S. v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir.1989)). The record is devoid of any indication that the State's delay was an intentional device that the State utilized `to gain tactical advantage' over Wyman. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 795, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)); see also Jones v. State, 96 Nev. 240, 242, 607 P.2d 116, 117 (1980). As the district court noted, it is likely that the State suffered from the delay as well. For these reasons, we conclude that Wyman's pre-indictment delay challenge lacks merit.