Opinion ID: 338425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue of Defect Due to Failure to Warn

Text: 23 Greiner contends that one of her bases of liability, VW defect due to failure to warn of possible dangerous propensity, should have been submitted to the jury. She argues that the Pennsylvania courts' interpretation of section 402A of the Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d 7 compels such a charge. 24 A threshold issue is the weight to give the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's treatment of Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (Berkebile II). Berkebile II was decided on May 19, 1975. The case at bar went to the jury on April 22, 1975, and judgment was entered on April 24, 1975. The trial Judge did not have the advantage of the advices of the Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 25 The Superior Court opinion, Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa.Super, 349, 311 A.2d 140 (1973) (Berkebile I), had held that, under Pennsylvania strict liability law (i)t (was) imperative that a jury hearing a case of strict liability in tort be aware of its duty to find liability where inadequate warnings exist, even in the absence of a defect in design, manufacture, or preparation of the product. 225 Pa.Super. at 354, 311 A.2d at 143. The Superior Court went on to note language from Tomao v. A. P. DeSanno & Son, 209 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1954), to the effect that  'latent limitations'  of a perfectly made article, dangerous to the user without notice, require warning by the manufacturer. 26 In Berkebile II the Supreme Court failed to articulate a majority view on this part of the Berkebile I holding, although it did affirm the lower court's order. An opinion was written by Chief Justice Jones, concurred in by Justice Nix, which argued that a defect exists when the seller fails to warn as to the possible risks and inherent limitations of (the) product. 462 Pa. at 100, 337 A.2d at 902. Such a defect was independent of any design or manufacture defect, an independent basis of liability. Three other Justices concurred in the result, filing no opinion. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, which did not address the warning issue and was limited to approving the result on the basis of another issue. At 104, 337 A.2d at 903-04. Justice Pomeroy filed a concurring opinion, arguing (i)t is by now settled that a product which is perfectly made may nonetheless be 'unreasonably dangerous' if adequate warnings of the dangers involved in the use of the product are required and are not given by the seller. At 104, 337 A.2d at 904. Thus it can be said that three of seven Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices have argued that failure to warn is an independent basis of strict liability under Pennsylvania law. 27 Since less than a majority of the court held the Berkebile II Jones view, his opinion must be treated only as an expression of the views of a minority of the court. Bair v. American Motors Corp., 535 F.2d 249 (3d Cir., Filed May 17, 1976) (per curiam); Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F.Supp. 1268, 1276-77 (E.D.Pa.1975), appeal filed, No. 75-2407 (3d Cir., filed Nov. 25, 1975). See Sidco Paper Co. v. Aaron, 351 A.2d 250, 256 n.12 (S.Ct.1976). 28 However, Berkebile I was affirmed and is good precedent until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gives us further guidance. It, as well as prior Supreme Court precedent, compel us to find that the trial Judge erred by not submitting the failure to warn question to the jury. We do so reluctantly, for obviously the law of Pennsylvania is very far from clear. 29 Berkebile I, aside, we think the Supreme Court's holding in Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) supports our result. The full court in Incollingo adopted comments h and j to section 402A which provide that a product which requires adequate warning of danger involved in its use is defective if sold without such a warning. In Incollingo, the Supreme Court applied the warning requirement to a prescription drug. Incollingo was decided approximately four years before Berkebile and the Justices concurring and concurring-in-the-result in Berkebile II did not attempt to distinguish it or to limit the rule relating to warnings. Justice Pomeroy's concurring opinion specifically reaffirmed Incollingo, 462 Pa. at 104-105, 337 A.2d at 904. It therefore appears that the Pennsylvania law requires us to conclude that a product which contains inherent dangers, is defective when sold, if not accompanied by a sufficient warning to the consumer of possible risks and limitations of the product. 8 Indeed, in their brief and oral argument appellees do not take issue with the requirement of a warning under section 402A, but contend that Greiner did not present sufficient evidence to require jury submission of a no-warning defect charge. 30 It remains to examine the record to determine whether the 1966 VW colorably could be characterized as having inherent dangers, so as to justify submitting the question of no-warning to the jury. 31 Greiner presented two expert witnesses who described the VW's design and handling characteristics. Each expressed the opinion that it was designed in a defective manner and was an unstable vehicle with a tendency to overturn. Both witnesses testified that the design defect was the cause of the overturn. The expert witnesses presented by the appellees testified to the contrary that it was a safe vehicle. The appellees contended that the overturn was due solely and completely to Mrs. Nickel's manner of operation and that it was in no way attributable to any characteristic of the car. Some of the appellant's experts' testimony should be presented here. O'Shea testified in part as follows on direct examination: 32 Q. Now, Mr. O'Shea, as a result of your investigation in this case, your study, your analysis, your background in the study of the 1966 Volkswagen Type 1 sedan, do you or do you not have an opinion as to whether that vehicle as designed and sold was or was not stable insofar as its propensity to upset or overturn was concerned? 33 A. Yes, I have an opinion. 34 Q. What is your opinion? 35 A. It was not stable in that connotation. 36 Q. As a result of your investigation, study, analysis and operation of the 1966 VW Type 1 sedan, do you have an opinion as to whether the vehicle as designed and sold was or was not defective and dangerous from the standpoint of ability to upset or overturn? 37 A. Yes, I have an opinion. 38 MR. MADEIRA (counsel for VW): I object to the form of the question. 39 THE COURT: Overruled. 40 By MR. BERNSTEIN (counsel for Greiner): 41 Q. What is your opinion, sir? 42 A. My opinion is that it is defective and dangerous because it will allow this rollover to take place and it will get you into the situation . . . (where) the rollover tak(es) place. 43 Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether such vehicle did or did not have a propensity to overturn? 44 MR. MADEIRA: I object to the form of the question. 45 THE COURT: Overruled. 46 A. Yes, I have an opinion. 47 Q. What is your opinion? 48 A. It has a propensity to overturn. 9 49 The testimony of the other expert offered by the appellant, Batterman, was to similar effect. The appellees offered countervailing testimony, including expert opinion, accident reconstruction, and film displaying the handling characteristics of the VW at speeds comparable to those at which it was estimated to have been driven on the night of the accident. Although the jury rejected the opinions of the Greiner experts on the issue of design defect, we find they were sufficient to form a basis for jury deliberation on whether there was liability for failure to adequately warn of inherent or latent limitations in a product, which do not necessarily amount to a design defect. Under Pennsylvania law we find this an independent basis of liability, not requiring the jury to find a design defect. 10 50 However, the failure to charge on no-warning defect would require a new trial only if, as a matter of law, there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the two other elements necessary for strict liability on this issue. Assuming arguendo there was defect, it must appear there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that the defect was unreasonably dangerous and the proximate cause of the accident. Since these questions of evidentiary sufficiency have not been adequately briefed here, we remand for determinations by the District Court. 11 51 Both of these issues should be submitted to a jury  'where facts are disputed, or where from the undisputed facts there is room for reasonable differences of opinion . . .'  Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182, 1185 (3d Cir. 1970), quoting, Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, Inc., 407 Pa. 339, 346-49, 180 A.2d 414, 417-19 (1962) (negligence action) 12 ; United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle, 506 F.2d 331, 338 (3d Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2416, 44 L.Ed.2d 679 (1975). There have been tort cases decided under Pennsylvania law where it has been found proper to remove proximate cause issues from the jury. Schreffler v. Birdsboro Corp., 490 F.2d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir. 1974) (rule applicable both in strict liability and in negligence). Liney v. Chestnut Motors, Inc., 421 Pa. 26, 218 A.2d 336 (1966) (negligence action). But see Capasso v. Minster Machine Co., 532 F.2d 952 (3d Cir., filed April 5, 1976); Hanlon v. Cyril Bath Co., No. 75-1334 (3d Cir., filed Dec. 9, 1975). 52 On remand the District Court should consider, inter alia, what weight to attach to the jury's finding that Nickel's driving was negligent and a substantial factor causing the accident. Interrogatories to the Jury, Nos. 5, 6, supra; Appendix, infra, at 24-25, see Schreffler, supra, 490 F.2d at 1154. Generally the record should be surveyed to ascertain whether the jury would have been invited to indulge in pure conjecture or guess, Kridler, supra, 422 F.2d at 1186, if charged on the unreasonably dangerous and proximate cause issues.