Opinion ID: 4722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Procedural Advantages in FIRREA.

Text: We recently reco gnized an important way FIRREA increases the FDIC's post-judgment powers in RTC v. McCrory, 951 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir.1992). In that case, we held that FIRREA permitted federal regulators to assert their special defenses for the first time on appeal. See also Union Federal Bank v. Minyard, 919 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir.1990) (FDIC allowed to raise special defense for first time on appeal because, as the Corporation was not a party in the trial court, it had neither the occasion nor opportunity to raise it below); FDIC v. Castle, 781 F.2d 1101, 1106 (5th Cir.1986) (FDIC allowed to first raise defenses on appeal because applicability of defenses clear under relevant statute). Generally, arguments not asserted until an action reaches an appellate level are lost. See, e.g., Hulsey v. State of Texas, 929 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir.1991), and cases cited therein. FIRREA confers a powerful litigation weapon by making such usually untimely arguments available to the FDIC. But see Baumann v. Savers Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 934 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.1991), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. January 6, 1992) (holding that FIRREA does not allow Resolution Trust Corporation to raise issues on appeal which were not raised below). Furthermore, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(C) allows the FDIC to appeal orders remanding removed actions to state courts. Under the general removal statutes, such orders are not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In addition, the FDIC can remove in any case to which it is a party, even though generally only defendants can remove. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In Lazuka v. FDIC, 931 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit held that § 1819 allows the FDIC to overcome the well-pleaded complaint rule. Under this rule, the basis for federal jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Section 1819 allows the FDIC to invoke federal jurisdiction regardless of what appears in the complaint. The Lazuka court found that, in enacting FIRREA, Congress used very strong language to afford the FDIC every possibility of having a federal forum within the limits of Article III. Id. 11 Although this is not a post-judgment advantage, it is another indication of the importance Congress placed on getting cases falling under the scope of FIRREA into federal courts. Cumulatively, these procedural advantages bestowed by Congress tremendously increase the FDIC's ability to carry out its regulatory and enforcement responsibilities under FIRREA. These advantages allow the FDIC to step into the shoes of a troubled financial institution at any stage of proceedings without being penalized for the timing of that substitution and to effectively and aggressively protect the institution's interests and assets. Our finding that § 1819 allows removal in 11 Additionally, it is even possible for parties other than the FDIC to remove an action once the FDIC becomes a party. FDIC v. Otero, 598 F.2d 627 (1st Cir.1979). this case is completely consistent with the other procedural advantages FIRREA gives the FDIC and with the underlying goal of promoting uniform federal, as opposed to state, regulation and supervision of thrift institutions. D. Procedural Results of Allowing Appellate Removal. Appellees argue against finding jurisdiction under FIRREA because of the procedural consequences. Their argument goes like this: If we allow removal after a final state court judgment has been entered and where Rule 60 relief is not available, the federal district court would have no original jurisdiction to exercise. Basically, it would face two choices. First, it could review the state court judgment in an appellate posture. We make no indication of the propriety of such action because it is not necessary to force district courts into this role when the other role available to them does not present such complex constitutional and jurisdictional issues. This second option is for the district court to take the state judgment as it finds it, prepare the record as required for appeal, and forward the case to a federal appellate court for review. We are not persuaded that this so-called rubber-stamping by district courts is so at odds with Article Three jurisprudence that it precludes following the plain language of the statute or that Congress could not have intended this result. It is argued that district courts, in order to exercise original jurisdiction, must judge something in order for there to be a case or controversy before them under Article Three. The case or controversy requirement does not, however, preclude federal appellate courts from remanding cases to district courts on a regular basis with instructions to take a prescribed action, such as enter judgment for a specified party. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Schultz, 848 F.2d 655, 658 (5th Cir.1988) (dist rict court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction vacated and case remanded with instructions to enter judgment for appellees); Ferguson v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir.1985) (district court's upholding of an ALJ's determination under Social Security Act reversed and case remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the claimant); and Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270, 1278 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1199, 89 L.Ed.2d 313 (1986) (district court's judgment against defendants for violating plaintiffs' constitutional rights reversed and case remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants). The district court's role in these remand situations in no less mechanical and involves no more active a judicial role than does adopting a state court judgment and sending the proceeding to an appellate court.12 We have been presented with a parade of horribles which it is argued will follow from our holding. These premonitions unnecessarily complicate the matter. A case removed from state court simply comes into the federal system in the same condition in which it left the state system. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Etc., 415 U.S. 423, 435–36, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1122–23, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). For instance, if the notice of appeal was adequate in the state court system, it should be deemed adequate when it enters the federal courts, regardless of whether the state technical requirements for notice of appeal differ from the federal. Granny Goose, 415 U.S. at 435–36, 94 S.Ct. at 1122–23 (Judicial economy is promoted by providing that proceedings had in state court shall have force and effect in federal court, so t hat pleadings filed in state court, for example, need not be duplicated in federal court.). Finally, we do not intend by the holding in this case to suggest that the FDIC removal statutes effect a wholesale replacement of the general removal statutes found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–51. We agree that § 1819(b)(2)(B) invokes Section 1441 by referring to the appropriate United States District Court and t hat FIRREA's lack of provisions for the mechanics of removal necessitates reliance on the general schema. Indeed, we recently held that the FDIC must adhere to the timely filing requirements of the general removal statutes. FDIC v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316 (5th Cir.1992) (28 12 A compromise to the case or controversy issue would be to allow removal only when Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 relief is available. We are certain, however, that Congress did not intend to deprive the parties to this dispute of their right to appeal and to relegate them to relief under Rule 60 when it expanded the FDIC's removal power by enacting the FDIC removal statute. U.S.C. § 1446(b) timely filing requirement applies to the FDIC under FIRREA). FIRREA, however, confers a specific removal power to a federal corporation. To the extent that the specific powers or mechanisms in the statute are inconsistent with the general removal statutes, FIRREA supersedes the general statutes. This holding is consistent with the Eleventh Circuit's in Lazuka v. FDIC, which, like our decision in Loyd, held that removal under FIRREA does fit into the general removal scheme. 931 F.2d at 1536 (concluding that the FIRREA removal provisions located at 12 U.S.C. § 1819 should be viewed as specific exceptions from the relevant provisions of general removal procedure, located at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, 1447 but reaching a different conclusion than Loyd concerning when the 30–day filing period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 begins to run). Because the statutes and the law that has evolved from them conflict on the issue before us, FIRREA controls.