Opinion ID: 2581989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to object to the joinder of the cases for trial

Text: [¶ 37] A few days after Duke's arraignment in Docket No. CR-02-49-R, the State filed a motion to join that case with Docket No. CR-01-209-R for purposes of trial on the grounds that all counts charged in the two referenced cases include offenses of the same or similar character, and are based upon acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. That motion was addressed during a hearing on April 25, 2002. As the State was presenting argument in favor of joinder, the following transpired: [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I have a question. Is all of this necessary? Are we playing to the press to get our story out, or are we arguing a motion? [Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I believe I'm required to show that this is a common scheme or plan, and I don't want to go into a lot more detail, but I think I'm required to give you a little bit of an offer of proof so you can see whether or not it was a common scheme or plan.     [Defense Counsel]: Try your case. We know what the Judge is going to rule, we talked about it in chambers. COURT: Well [Prosecutor]: If you're going to stipulate to the ruling, I don't need to say anything else.     COURT: [Defense counsel], are you opposed to the Motion for Joinder? [Defense Counsel]: No. I have talked this over with my client, your Honor, and it's my opinion that any evidence is going to come in on either trial, especially the first degree murder charge from the felony convictions if he testifies. I don't believe I can stop that. I realize what they're trying to do is take their weakest case and put it with their strongest case, but in order for my client to testify, I have to basically agree to the joinder, so that's what I'm telling you. I'm not going to object to the joinder. [Duke] understands what I'm doing. [Prosecutor]: If there's no objection to the joinder, your Honor, I need say nothing else. COURT: All right. Itis that correct? [Defense Counsel]: That's correct, your Honor. COURT: All right. The Motion is granted. [¶ 38] Duke now scores trial counsel for not contesting the joinder of the two cases for trial. He contends that he was prejudiced by counsel's inactions because the prosecution was erroneously allowed to consolidate two sets of unrelated charges and all of its evidence, including bad character evidence, into one trial to his detriment. Duke alleges error but has failed to make the requisite showing that counsel rendered prejudicially deficient assistance. [¶ 39] The rules pertaining to the joinder of criminal cases are W.R.Cr.P. 8(a) and 13. W.R.Cr.P. 8(a) provides: (a) Joinder of offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same citation, indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. W.R.Cr.P. 13 provides in pertinent part: The court may order two or more indictments, informations, citations or a combination thereof to be tried together if the offenses ... could have been joined in a single indictment, information or citation. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment, information or citation. The rule governing the severance of criminal charges is W.R.Cr.P. 14, which provides in pertinent part: If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses... in an indictment, information or citation, or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts ... or provide whatever other relief justice requires. [¶ 40] Rule 13 conditions the joinder of offenses charged in separate informations or indictments on the same circumstances which would permit joinder of counts within a single information. That is, if the offenses charged in separate informations or indictments are of the same or similar character or constitute part of a common scheme or plan, the offenses may be tried together as if charged in a single information. The law relative to the joinder of offenses contained in the Information and Indictment against Duke is the same as that applicable to the joinder of the four offenses charged in the Indictment against him. Tabor v. State, 616 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Wyo.1980). We note that Duke has not challenged the propriety of combining the murder charges and solicitation charges regarding his wife and child in the same Indictment. [¶ 41] We believe that the two solicitation offenses charged in the Information, Docket No. CR-02-49-R, are of the same or similar character as the two solicitation offenses charged in the Indictment, Docket No. CR-01-209-R, and constituted part of a common plan or scheme. Although the criminal acts occurred at different times and against different victims, the nature of the offenses and the circumstances surrounding the commission of those offenses were identical. In each instance, Duke actively pursued and offered Roger Brauberger money to kill members of his immediate family and formulated plans by which the murders could be accomplished. [¶ 42] As a general rule, joinder of offenses is proper absent compelling reasons for severance. Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 955 (Wyo.2000) (citing Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo.1984)). Joint trials serve the public interest by expediting the administration of justice, reducing docket congestion, conserving judicial time as well as that of jurors along with avoiding the recall of witnesses to duplicate their performances. Bell, at 955 (quoting Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Wyo.1977)). Any prejudice caused by the joinder is weighed against the judicial economies created by joinder. Bell, at 955 (citing Dorador v. State, 768 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Wyo.1989); Lee v. State, 653 P.2d 1388 (Wyo.1982)). [¶ 43] In Dorador, this Court identified a two-part test for determining whether prejudice resulted from the joinder of offenses: The first is whether the evidence relating to the similar offenses charged would be admissible in a separate trial of each offense. Tabor, 616 P.2d at 1284. If the evidence would be admissible, there is no prejudice. If the evidence would not be admissible in separate trials, the trial court should then determine whether the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct. Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C.Cir.1964). Stated differently, the second consideration is whether the evidence relating to the separate offenses would be so complicated that the jury could not reasonably be expected to separate them and evaluate the evidence properly and individually on each separate charge. Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985). Dorador, 768 P.2d at 1052. [¶ 44] Duke acknowledges that the interests of judicial economy militate in favor of joinder. He also acknowledges he bears the burden of showing he would have had a better chance at acquittal had the cases not been tried together. However, in attacking counsel's assistance, he offers only an unsupported assertion that he was prejudiced by the joinder of his criminal cases. He has not provided any analysis applying the Dorador two-part test to the facts of this case and, instead, has relegated that task to this Court to undertake under the assumption that prejudice will be found. [¶ 45] An examination of the record reflects that all of the prosecution's evidence pertaining to the solicitation charges would have been admissible in separate trials under W.R.E. 404(b) to show course of conduct or to show a common plan or scheme. Bell, 994 P.2d at 956. Duke's attempted solicitation of Roger Brauberger to kill his wife and child was directly related to the murder charges. His later solicitation of Brauberger to kill his parents was relevant circumstantial evidence to prove his involvement in his wife's and child's murder and, therefore, would have been admissible in the murder case. That evidence was also relevant to explain why Brauberger contacted police and why police reopened the investigation into his wife's and child's deaths. Conversely, the evidence of Duke's solicitation of his wife's and child's murder would have been relevant to the solicitation charges concerning his parents and, therefore, would have been admissible in a separate trial on those charges. Duke clearly has made no showing to the contrary. That the evidence presented at this trial could have been separately introduced had the cases not been joined establishes the lack of prejudice to Duke in this case. [¶ 46] Furthermore, the issues and proof in each case were relatively simple and not complex. The issue before the jury was whether Duke solicited the murders of his parents, his wife and his child and whether he, in fact, killed his wife and child as alleged during the time periods in question. In Instruction No. 10, the trial court instructed the jury that it had to give separate consideration to each count and the evidence pertaining to it, and that its finding on one count was not to control its verdict as to any of the other charged crimes. Duke has provided no evidence that the jury did not follow the trial court's instruction, and he has not shown that the jury improperly cumulated the evidence in reaching its decision. [¶ 47] Duke has not established that counsel rendered prejudicially deficient assistance in not objecting to the consolidation of his criminal cases for trial.