Opinion ID: 47769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court’s Instructions on Texas Law

Text: Lee alleges that he was denied due process and a fair trial when the district judge impermissibly testified as a witness in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 605 and “impeached” a “pivotal” defense witness. Alicia Carlos, the filing room supervisor in the El Paso County District Clerk’s Office, testified, in order to rebut the Government’s position, that since Lee had waived service of his divorce decree, there was no possibility that her office could have sent him a copy of it. In response to Carlos’s testimony, the district judge instructed on and read to the jury TEXAS RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 119a, which requires the County Clerk to mail a certified copy of a divorce decree to any party who waived service of process. Lee characterizes the instruction as judicial testimony in violation of FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 605 because it allegedly created the impression that the judge was directing the jury to assume that Lee had received a copy of the divorce decree. The jury instruction at issue is, however, not akin to the improper fact-based testimonial statements that Rule 605 prohibits. The instant situation is more appropriately analyzed within the scope of caselaw defining the district court’s “power of comment and the inherent limitations on this power.” United States 3 v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 159 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus, it is well established that a trial judge may facilitate a jury’s understanding of the evidence by questioning witnesses, by eliciting facts not yet adduced by the parties, or through explanation and commentary. United States v. Reyes, 227 F.3d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 2000); FED. R. EVID. 614. On appeal, the issue is whether the disputed judicial behavior “was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.” United States v. Saenz, 134 F.3d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court’s action must be “qualitatively and quantitatively substantial” to merit a finding of reversible error. United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 414 (5th Cir. 1998). Because Lee did not object to the court’s instruction at trial, we review only for plain error. United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 875 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court’s Rule 119a instruction was not plainly erroneous and did not deprive Lee of a fair trial. It did not impermissibly insinuate that the jury should disbelieve Carlos’s testimony, nor did it provide any guidance as to how the jury should interpret Carlos’s testimony. Cf. United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 2005); Paiva, 892 F.2d at 158. The judge intervened only to disabuse the jury of the witness’s incorrect assertion that there was no possibility that the El Paso District Clerk mailed divorce decrees to individuals who have waived service of process. This single instruction, made 4 in the course of a nine-day trial featuring twenty-five witnesses, does not constitute error, much less prejudicial or plain error. See United States v. Hefferon, 314 F.3d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 2002).