Opinion ID: 2633521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Jury Instructions at Trial

Text: {31} While we do not agree with Plaintiff's argument that proximate cause of the original injury should have been determined as a matter of law, we must still ascertain if the jury understood, based on the instructions it was given, how to decide the essential issues of a case involving successive tortfeasor liability and its consequences. Plaintiff argues the jury did not understand, but was hopelessly confused by the instructions. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the instructions on negligence and causation were misleading in suggesting that the Clinic and the Hospital's causation for the injuries could be compared, and thus that there could be only one proximate cause for all of Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff argues that this forced the jury to choose between, or compare, the Clinic and the Hospital, which of course is directly contrary to successive tortfeasor theory and joint and several liability. {32} The jury was instructed on successive tortfeasor liability. Instruction 14, using the language of this Court in Lujan, stated, When a person causes an injury to another which requires medical treatment, it is foreseeable that the treatment, whether provided properly or negligently, will cause additional harm. Therefore, the person causing the original injury is also liable for the additional injury caused by the subsequent medical treatment, if any. This instruction properly set forth successive tortfeasor liability. However, it was coupled with other instructions that appeared to contradict the basic tenets of this form of liability. Cf. Vigil v. Miners Colfax Med. Ctr., 117 N.M. 665, 670, 875 P.2d 1096, 1101 (Ct.App.1994) (citing Kirk Co. v. Ashcraft, 101 N.M. 462, 466, 684 P.2d 1127, 1131 (1984)) (jury instructions are not sufficient if, when read in their entirety, they do not fairly present the issues and the applicable law). {33} As we will explain, the jury was asked about the causation of injuries considered as a whole, but was never asked the critical question about causation of a separate, original injury at the Clinic. Instruction 4, based on the Clinic's theory of the case, advised the jury that, Dr. Hall also contends that [Plaintiff's] injuries were caused by the acts or omissions of employees or agents of the University of New Mexico Hospital, and/or the negligence of [Plaintiff]. (Emphasis added.) [4] Instruction 4 also included language that placed the burden on Plaintiff to show that the Clinic's negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries and damages.  (Emphasis added.) Then Instruction 13 defined proximate cause without differentiating between the original injury and the successive injury. UJI 13-305 NMRA 2004; see supra note 3. {34} As emphasized throughout this opinion, the critical question for the jury to decide was whether the Clinic's negligence caused a discrete injury, separate from injuries inflicted at the Hospital. The jury was never asked that question. Instead, based on generic negligence jury instructions, it was asked about causation of Plaintiff's injuries, possibly all of them considered together, without differentiating between what the Clinic's negligence caused and what the Hospital's negligence caused. See Const. Contracting & Mgmt., Inc. v. McConnell, 112 N.M. 371, 374-79, 815 P.2d 1161, 1165-69 (1991) (granting a new trial because the instructions confused the jury on what question it was being asked to determine and what damages it could award). {35} As in McConnell, the jury was given instructions that were particularly likely to confuse the jury. See also State v. Benally, 2001-NMSC-033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 (in a criminal case [a] juror may suffer from confusion ... despite the fact that the juror considers the instruction straightforward... [if the] instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law). Based on the given instructions, the jury could well have concluded that it had to determine whether the Clinic's negligence caused all the injuries, both those occurring at the Clinic and those occurring at the Hospital. The jury was never asked the critical question: whether the Clinic's negligence caused a separate injury, causally-distinct from those occurring at the hands of the Hospital. {36} In sum, the jury was asked the wrong question, causation for injuries as a whole, and never asked the right question, causation for an original injury. For that reason, we lack confidence in the jury's verdict, especially when it found negligence but no causation for any of Plaintiff's injuries. While we acknowledge there was sufficient evidence for the jury's outcome, we cannot be sure that the jury was addressing the pivotal and determinative issue of the case. {37} We are also aware that some of the confusing instructions were offered by Plaintiff, and it is not our practice to grant a new trial if the original error was the fault of the complaining party. See McConnell, 112 N.M. at 375 n. 3, 815 P.2d at 1166 n. 3. However, the circumstances of this case present us with a unique challenge. At the time of trial, there were no Uniform Jury Instructions on successive tortfeasor theory, and in fact there was very little caselaw on the subject. Lujan, 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025; Lewis I, 1999-NMCA-145, 128 N.M. 269, 992 P.2d 282. Importantly, none of that caselaw dealt with claims against the original tortfeasor, but rather dealt only with claims against the successive tortfeasor. Also, the law at the time was in flux because Lewis II had not yet been decided, leaving Lewis I as the applicable law. {38} These circumstances, along with complicated facts and application of a complex area of law, make this case something of an aberration. We should not penalize any party for not anticipating future developments in the law, including law set forth years later in this opinion. For these reasons we are compelled to remand for a new trial on the merits.