Opinion ID: 2996827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sexual Harassment in the Form of a Hostile Work

Text: Environment Claim To prevail on a claim of sexual harassment based on hostile work environment, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) she was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment; (3) the conduct was directed at her because of her sex; and (4) there is a basis for employer liability. Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2002). Proof of a hostile work environment requires evidence that the plaintiff was subjected to conduct “so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 462-63 (7th Cir. 2002). To qualify as “hostile,” the work environment must be “both objectively and subjectively offensive . . . .” Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 463. Here, IDOT concedes that Rhodes was subjected to unwelcome, sexually-related conduct severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The only question for review is whether the district court correctly 10 No. 03-1651 determined that she failed to establish a basis for employer liability. The standard for employer liability turns on whether the alleged harasser was the plaintiff’s supervisor, instead of a mere co-worker. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998); Haugerud, 259 F.3d at 69697. Harassment by a supervisor of the plaintiff triggers strict liability, subject to the possibility of an affirmative defense in the event the plaintiff suffered no tangible employment action. See Parkins v. Civil Constrs. of Ill, Inc., 163 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 1998). Conversely, an employer may be found liable for a hostile work environment created by an employee who was not the plaintiff’s supervisor only where the plaintiff proves that the employer has “been negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment.” Id. The district court determined the alleged harassers to be Mara and Poladian, and concluded that Rhodes failed to submit competent evidence that these individuals had the authority to make decisions affecting the terms and conditions of her employment. In addition, the district court determined that Rhodes could not establish that IDOT was negligent either in discovering or remedying any harassment committed by employees who were not supervisors of Rhodes, and that the pornography at the Yard was not so pervasive as to impute knowledge to IDOT. We examine each of these conclusions. We first consider the issue of supervisor harassment. For there to be an issue of material fact as to whether a supervisor harassed Rhodes, it is not enough that she point to evidence that anyone with managerial authority engaged in sexual harassment; instead Rhodes, as the victim of the harassment, must show that the harasser served specifically as her supervisor. Id at 1032-34. A supervisor is someone with the power to directly affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. Id. at 1034; Hall, 276 F.3d at 355. No. 03-1651 11 “Supervisor” is a legal term of art for Title VII purposes, and an employee merely having authority to oversee aspects of another employee’s job performance does not qualify as a supervisor in the Title VII context. See Hall, 276 F.3d at 355 (“[T]he fact that an employer authorized one employee to oversee aspects of another employee’s job performance does not establish a Title VII supervisory relationship.”). Hall held that the plaintiff’s harasser did not qualify as a supervisor despite the fact that he: (1) exercised authority to direct plaintiff’s work operations; (2) provided input into her performance evaluations; and (3) was charged with training her and other less-experienced employees. Id. Here, similar to the responsibilities of the harasser in Hall, Mara and Poladian managed Rhodes’ work assignments, investigated complaints and disputes, and made recommendations concerning sanctions for rule violations to the Department Administrative Services Manager. However, it is undisputed that neither Mara nor Poladian had authority to make any decisions affecting the terms and conditions of Rhodes’ employment, i.e., the authority to hire, fire, pro- 2 mote, demote, discipline or transfer Rhodes. Accordingly, since Rhodes cannot establish that Mara or Poladian exercised supervisory authority over her under Title VII, she is entitled to reach a jury only if she pointed to competent evidence that IDOT was negligent either in discovering or remedying the harassment directed at her. 2 The district court focused generally on whether Mara or Poladian had the authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment for any employee at the Yard. The scope is narrower than that. The proper focus should examine whether Mara or Poladian were vested with the authority to alter the terms and conditions of Rhodes’ specific employment. See Parkins, 163 F.3d at 1032. 12 No. 03-1651 Hall, 276 F.3d at 356. IDOT “will not be liable for the hostile environment absent proof that it failed to take appropriate remedial measures once apprised of the harassment.” Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 218 F.3d 798, 809 (7th Cir. 2000). Generally, we do not consider an employer to be apprised of the harassment “unless the employee makes a concerted effort to inform the employer that a problem exists.” Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 807 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). However, we could charge an employer with constructive notice where the harassment is sufficiently obvious. Mason v. Southern Ill. Univ., 233 F.3d 1036, 1046, n.8 (7th Cir. 2000); Zimmerman v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dept., 96 F.3d 1017, 1018 (7th Cir. 1996). Regardless, as emphasized by the district court, “the law against sexual harassment is not self-enforcing.” Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). Without employer knowledge of harassing conduct, the law does not require an employer to do more than promote general anti-harassment policies and training to ensure compliance with Title VII. See Cooke v. Stefani Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 250 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir. 2001). The district court determined that IDOT had an adequate anti-harassment policy in place, and that Rhodes’ sole harassment-related complaint, arising from a pornographic photo taped to her locker, was addressed appropriately. Specifically, the IDOT policy identifies designated contact persons to accept complaints of discrimination or harassment. In addition, the names and phone numbers of these contact persons, along with civil rights newsletters and posters, are displayed in the Yard. After Rhodes complained about the pornographic photo taped to her locker, Mara and Poladian immediately called a meeting where they emphasized that such material was prohibited in the Yard due to the well-publicized “zero tolerance” anti-harassment policy. No. 03-1651 13 Rhodes argues that IDOT should have been aware of the pornography in the workplace because such material was present for several years. In addition, she argues that the meetings called by Mara and Poladian to reinforce the IDOT anti-harassment policy were a sham because Poladian personally viewed the pornography. However, there is no evidence that Rhodes or anyone else complained about the pornographic magazines or movies. The record reveals that Mara, the highest-ranking IDOT employee at the Yard, discarded pornographic magazines any time he saw them. Moreover, there is no evidence that Mara watched any of the pornographic movies, or even knew that there was a TV and VCR at the Yard. Importantly, the men kept a “lookout” to alert them if a woman or outsider approached while they were viewing the movies. Accordingly, Rhodes has failed to set forth sufficient evidence that the harassment was so pervasive and obvious that IDOT must be charged with constructive knowledge as explained in Mason and Zimmerman. It is undisputed that Rhodes’ single complaint of harassment raised with management addressed only the pornographic picture taped to her locker. We agree with the district court that this complaint does not impute knowledge to IDOT of the pornographic magazines and the existence of the television. Likewise, there is no evidence that this complaint even remotely pinpointed the myriad of other allegations of discrimination alleged in this lawsuit. Cf. Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., ___ F.3d ___ (7th Cir. 2004), 2004 WL 291973, at  (7th Cir. Feb. 17, 2004). Thus Rhodes’ isolated complaint fails to establish that she made a concerted effort to inform IDOT that a problem exists as required in Silk. Rhodes failed to take advantage of the preventative or corrective opportunities provided by IDOT and thus her hostile environment claim fails without reaching a jury because she has not pointed to adequate evidence showing that IDOT was negligent in discovering or remedying the harassment. 14 No. 03-1651