Opinion ID: 2995472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: See Curcio v. Chinn Enters., Inc.,

Text: 887 F. Supp. 190, 193-94 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that because defendant was sole shareholder and main decisionmaker of corporation he was liable in individual capacity as alter ego of corporation). According to Worth, Tyer--as the maindecisionmaker and controlling shareholder of Grundy II and Ogle II/3- -is so intertwined with them that he is their alter ego. Because Tyer is the corporations’ alter ego, Worth contends that Tyer should be treated as her actual employer for Title VII purposes. See id. at 194. We disregard the presumption of shareholder protection from individual liability only in limited circumstances. See Van Dorn, 753 F.2d at 569-70. To overcome this presumption, a party must show, in addition to the interrelation of a corporation and its shareholders, that the protection must be disregarded in order to prevent fraud or the promotion of injustice. See id. at 570. The problem with the alter ego theory is that it seeks to impose liability upon shareholders without a showing of fraud or injustice. See AIC Sec., 55 F.3d at 1282 n.11 (suggesting that we would not adopt alter ego theory because shareholder is already potentially liable through veil piercing). Our rejection of the alter ego theory is further supported by Congress’ aversion to individual liability under Title VII. See, e.g., id. at 1279-82. In the present case, Worth presented no evidence that Tyer should be liable in his shareholder capacity. Therefore, the district court erred in denying defendants’ motion for JMOL as it relates to Tyer under Title