Opinion ID: 200332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing: Constitutional and Prudential

Text: 8 Federal courts are confined by Article III of the Constitution to deciding only actual cases or controversies. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). Federal courts can only decide a live grievance. Am. Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1374 (1st Cir.1992) (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969)). Standing is thus a threshold question in every case, requiring the court to determine whether the plaintiff has `alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant [ ] invocation of federal-court jurisdiction. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). The constitutional standing inquiry has three elements. A litigant bears the burden of showing that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). As this court has noted, Article III standing is largely — albeit not entirely — a practical jurisprudence. N.H. Hemp Council, Inc. v. Marshall, 203 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000) (citing 13 C.A. Wright, A.R. Miller & E.H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3531.1, at 352, 355-56, 362-63 (2d ed. 1984)). 9 The plaintiffs' claim here involves a threat of future injury. 2 The parties dispute the degree of threat presented by these facts to the plaintiffs' legal interests. Plaintiffs must show that the threatened injury is impending and concrete, see Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, sufficient to constitute injury in fact. There must be some immediacy or imminence to the threatened injury. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02, 103 S.Ct. 1660). 10 The standing inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise. Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197; see also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-56, 73 S.Ct. 1031, 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953) (describing Court's complementary rule of self-restraint for its own governance that exists alongside constitutional restriction on jurisdiction). Federal courts have identified a number of prudential concerns regarding the proper exercise of federal jurisdiction. Three of these areas are well-established: (1) the complaint must fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked; (2) the plaintiff must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties; and (3) the suit must present more than abstract questions of wide public significance which amount to generalized grievances, pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches. N.H. Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315; Warth, 422 U.S. at 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475, 102 S.Ct. 752); see also Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 918 n. 7 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir.1992). 11 Prudential standing concerns, unlike constitutional ones, can be abrogated by an act of Congress. Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197. We start with the language of the ADA. The enforcement provisions of Title III of the ADA are set forth in § 308, which provides: 12 The remedies and procedures set forth in section 204(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.2000a-3(a)) are the remedies and procedures this title provides to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this title or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation of section 303. Nothing in this section shall require a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization covered by this title does not intend to comply with its provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). McInnis-Misenor is not being subjected to discrimination, so her claim must rest on whether she has reasonable grounds for believing [she] is about to be subjected to discrimination. The statutory language about to be subjected to discrimination dovetails with the usual prudential analysis as to whether McInnis-Misenor's claims are too contingent and premature. 13 McInnis-Misenor cites some ADA cases to us, all factually distinguishable. This is not, for example, a case in which the existence of architectural barriers is the only reason the ADA plaintiff has not returned for services. E.g., Parr v. L&L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1079-80 (D.Hawai`i 2000) (finding standing for a plaintiff prevented from using fast food chain restaurant due to various architectural barriers because of his sincere intent to return as evidenced by his past patronage and taste for the chain's food). The ADA does not permit private plaintiffs to bring claims as private attorneys general to vindicate other people's injuries. 14 The statutory requirement that plaintiff must have reasonable grounds to believe she is about to be subjected to discrimination does not, in our view, displace the normal background prudential standing limitations. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163, 117 S.Ct. 1154 (Congress legislates against the background of our prudential standing doctrine, which applies unless it is expressly negated.); cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973) (noting that while Congress may not confer jurisdiction to render advisory opinions, Congress does have the power to enact statutes expanding standing through the creation of new legal rights).