Opinion ID: 1490576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Use of Conviction as Evidence

Text: We now turn to the State's alternative argument that it should be permitted to use the defendant's aggravated burglary final conviction as evidence in the retrial for felony murder, even if the collateral estoppel doctrine is inapplicable. [4] The defendant argues that allowing evidence of the aggravated burglary conviction is improper and tantamount to invoking collateral estoppel in a different guise. In Ingenito , the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the prosecutor's claim that the defendant's prior conviction was admissible as evidence of an element of a charged offense. 432 A.2d at 920. The court reasoned that the prior conviction would not be merely evidential and that the technique would be indistinguishable from collateral estoppel. Id. The court further explained: Although the defendant may have been theoretically free to introduce evidence to the contrary, that did not overcome the preclusive and conclusive evidential effects of the prior conviction.... The effect of the prosecution's submission of the prior conviction in this case was to create a near-mandatory presumption in the minds of the jurors as to the guilt of the defendant.... The normal jury process, whereby evidence is admitted and the jury is enjoined to draw inferences as to each element of the offense, is vitiated where a prior conviction constitutes the sole evidence proffered by the prosecution. Id. (citations omitted). In Pelullo , however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that evidence of a defendant's prior conviction may be admissible as evidence of an element of the charged offense if the trial court determines that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. 14 F.3d at 888. The court explained: Admitting a judgment of conviction into evidence as one of the many pieces of evidence to prove a case is very different from according a judgment collateral estoppel effect. As an ordinary piece of evidence, a judgment is subject to evaluation by the fact finder, who can accept or reject such evidence as it deems appropriate. On the other hand, as collateral estoppel a judgment will have the effect of establishing as a matter of law facts determined in the prior proceeding.... Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court must weigh the probative value of the evidence for the prosecution, including the relatively slight burden for the government to reprove the facts upon which the judgment of conviction was based, and determine whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Id. (citing Fed.R.Evid. 403). In considering these approaches, we note that the Third Circuit's approach in Pelullo is consistent with our Tennessee Rules of Evidence. For instance, Rule 803 provides that the following evidence is not excluded by the general rule that excludes hearsay statements: Evidence of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal case for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. Tenn. R. Evid. 803(22). The Advisory Commission Comments states that Rule 803(22) adopts the federal approach admitting felony conviction records to prove underlying facts necessary to the judgment. Moreover, the Advisory Commission specifically noted that a jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a serious crime was committed should be admitted in a later civil or criminal trial to prove the underlying facts necessary to the judgment of conviction. Id. We think this approach strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of both the State and the defendant. Allowing the prosecution to use a final conviction as evidence in the trial is consistent with Rule 803(22), as well as with the reality that the conviction is final and may have probative value. Because the conviction is simply evidence, however, and is not entitled to preclusive effect under collateral estoppel, the defendant may contest the conviction by introducing contrary evidence and argument. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 888. In applying Rule 803(22), however, we emphasize that the trial court must find that the probative value of the prior conviction is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 403; see also Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 888. In this regard, a leading treatise on Tennessee evidence states: The use of a prior criminal conviction has obvious prejudicial dangers. The jury will learn of the prior offense and may give it too much attention. They may use it as proof of bad character, and then use the bad character to infer liability [or guilt] in the instant case. To avoid this possibility, the court may invoke Rule 403 to exclude the proof of conviction. Counsel may offer to stipulate the facts underlying the conviction in order to avoid having certain details of the prior conviction revealed to the jury. Neil P. Cohen, Sarah Y. Sheppeard & Donald F. Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 803(22) at 583-84 (3rd ed.1995). Accordingly, the admission of a prior conviction under Rule 803(22) protects the interests of article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution because the same jury will be permitted to consider the evidence, to make findings of fact, and to make determinations of guilt or innocence in the same proceeding. Before admitting such evidence, however, the trial court must apply the above principles and find that the probative value of the prior offense is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.