Opinion ID: 169932
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of Johnson's murder convictions

Text: In his direct appeal, Johnson asserted a two-fold attack on the propriety of his murder convictions, arguing that he was not present at the scene of the crime and thus could not be convicted as a principal, and that, even if he could be found to have aided and abetted Neill, Oklahoma's aider and abettor rule c[ould not] be aggregated with the felony-murder rule to allow a conviction for felony murder when [he] was not present during the commission of the underlying felony. OCCA Op. at 9. The OCCA rejected both of these arguments on the merits. Johnson now renews those arguments in these federal habeas proceedings. A) Sufficiency of evidenceJohnson's involvement as a principal in the felony murders Johnson first contends that the OCCA's rejection of his insufficiency of evidence argument was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The controlling standard for insufficient evidence claims asserted by state habeas petitioners was established by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Therein, the Supreme Court noted that a state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has stated a federal constitutional claim. Id. at 321, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The standard applicable to such a claim, the Court indicated, is as follows: [T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (citation omitted). Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (citation omitted). Id. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781. The OCCA, in affirming Johnson's convictions on direct appeal, did not cite to the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson. The OCCA did, however, effectively acknowledge the Jackson standard in reviewing Johnson's sufficiency of the evidence challenge, noting that the question at issue was whether, review[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, . . . a rational trier of fact could have found [Johnson] guilty of first degree felony murder. OCCA Op. at 3. In resolving that question, the OCCA began, as it indicated it would, by reviewing the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the State: The State's evidence showed that in mid-November 1984, co-defendant Neill, with [Johnson] standing next to him, told a friend they were going to rob the Bank because it did not have any security cameras or guards. Prior to December 1984, [Johnson] told several friends of the severe financial problems he and Neill were experiencing. The week before the crimes, [Johnson] appeared to his neighbors to be nervous and upset. On Sunday December 9, [Johnson] and Neill purchased over $900.00 worth of clothes and jewelry. The next night, [Johnson] and Neill went to dinner at a local restaurant. Neill again mentioned robbing the Bank as a way to solve their financial problems. On Wednesday, two days before the robbery/homicides were committed, Neill visited a local pawnshop and inquired about the purchase of a gun. He indicated to the clerk that he needed the gun for protection as he had received threatening phone calls. Different types of guns were described to him and he was told that he must have a gun permit from the police department in order to purchase a gun. However, at nineteen years old, Neill was too young to apply for the permit. The next morning, Neill talked with a travel agent at the Lawton Municipal Airport. He originally wanted a flight to Nassau leaving after 6:00 p.m. Friday, December 14th. When told there was not a flight available, he requested one to San Francisco leaving after 5:00 p.m. that Friday. Neill also inquired into hotel accommodations, specifically executive suites and limousine services. When asked for payment, Neill said he would pay cash on Friday. That same morning, the twenty-one year old [Johnson] applied for a gun permit at the Lawton Police Department. He volunteered that he lived alone and needed the gun for protection. He was told he would have to wait twenty-four hours before he could pick up the permit. At approximately 1:15 p.m. that afternoon, [Johnson] and Neill walked into the Bank. They stayed only a few minutes, talking only with each other and looking around the Bank. Approximately 45 minutes later, [Johnson] and Neill purchased two hunting knives at a local discount store. They initially looked at purchasing a gun, but when informed the guns in that store were not real, they both looked at the selection of knives. After discussion among themselves, they selected two knives, each with a six-inch blade. Neill wrote a check for the knives from the checking account he shared with [Johnson]. Both Neill and [Johnson] provided identification for the check. On the day of the robbery/homicides, Friday, December 14, 1984, at approximately 10:00 a.m., [Johnson] and Neill returned to the pawnshop and asked for a revolver seen on a previous visit. Neill asked what type of ammunition was needed for the gun, and [Johnson] asked where they could purchase that type of ammunition. Both men were shown how to load and fire the gun, and both men held the gun. They told the clerk they were to get the gun permit by 2:30 p.m. that afternoon and would be back then to purchase the gun. At approximately 11:30 a.m., December 14, [Johnson] returned to the police department and picked up the gun permit. At approximately 12:25 p.m., both men returned to the pawnshop to purchase the gun. They hurriedly filled out the appropriate forms. Instead of listing his apartment as his address, [Johnson] wrote down a false post office box number. [Johnson] started to write the check to pay for the gun, but Neill insisted on filling out the check. The gun was handed to [Johnson] and he and Neill left the store. [Johnson] and Neill then went to a local discount store to purchase ammunition. While Neill was asking about ammunition, [Johnson] went to find masking tape to purchase. Once again, Neill was too young to purchase the ammunition, so he waited for [Johnson]'s return. Within 30 minutes of purchasing the ammunition and leaving the store, [Johnson] and Neill returned to the store to exchange the shells. The gun they had purchased had been mistakenly marked as a .38 caliber when it was actually a .32 caliber. So, the .38 caliber shells purchased had to be exchanged for .32 caliber shells. At approximately 12:45 p.m., [Johnson] went to a neighbor's apartment to use the telephone. He rescheduled the travel plans for an earlier flight, leaving at approximately 2:30 p.m. that afternoon. Shortly after 1:00 p.m., [Johnson] and Neill entered the Bank. Bank employees Kay Bruno, Jerry Bowles and Joyce Mullenix were herded to a back room, forced to lie face down on the floor and stabbed to death. At the front of the Bank, Bellen Robles had entered in order to deposit a check. Finding the teller windows empty, she looked down the hallway to the back room. There she saw the back of a man as he bent over something. She went outside to tell her waiting husband, R[uben], that she thought the Bank was being robbed. He doubted this, and went inside the Bank with his wife and their fourteen (14) month old daughter. Entering the Bank just behind them was local farmer, Ralph Zeller. Barely inside the front door, they were greeted with a gun pointed at them and told to go to the back room if they wanted to live. Once in the back room they were directed to lie down on the floor. The Robles and Mr. Zell[er] were left in the back room while Neill went up to the front of the Bank to sack up the money. While he was doing so, another customer, Marilyn Roach, entered the Bank. Neill pointed the gun at her and forced her to the back room. She was barely able to lie down inside the small, now crowded room. Moments later the gunshots rang out. Ms. Roach was shot twice in the head[, as was Mr. Zeller, who died from his injuries]. Bellen and Ruben Robles were each shot once in the head. Turning his head to keep the blood out of his eyes, Ruben Robles saw the gun pointed at his baby daughter and heard it click. But no shots were fired; the gun was empty. One of the first people in the bank after the robbery/homicides was Calvin Bowles. As Bowles checked the status of the bodies lying on the floor, R[uben] Robles rose up and said they had been shot in the head. His wife, Bellen, then rose up and said to her husband, I told you they were robbing the bank. Paul Franklin, who was also one of the first people on the scene after the shootings, testified to helping emergency medical personnel carry out Marilyn Roach. Mr. Franklin testified Ms. Roach asked, Are they gone? Marilyn Roach later told investigators that after the shooting stopped, she heard two distinct voices in the bank. One voice, which sounded, upset said, I told you not to shoot anybody. The other voice, which sounded casual, responded, well, they moved. At approximately 2:00 p.m. that day, Dara Pope arrived at her apartment across the hall from the apartment shared by [Johnson] and Neill. She knocked on [Johnson]'s door but no one responded. [Johnson] and Neill arrived at the Lawton Airport at approximately 2:30 p.m. They paid one thousand two hundred dollars ($1,200.00) in cash for their tickets and boarded the plane; carrying only a tote bag. After arriving in San Francisco, [Johnson] and Neill embarked on a spending spree, traveling by limousine to various clubs and stores. They were arrested in their San Francisco hotel, Monday, December 17, 1984. That same day, [Johnson] was interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Agent Dave Knowlton. In response to the agent's questions, [Johnson] said Neill had told him on December 13 of his plan to rob the Bank, and that Neill asked [Johnson]'s help in obtaining a gun. [Johnson] said he did help Neill acquire the gun and that after the robbery, he threw the gun in a pond. [Johnson] also told Agent Knowlton that Neill had a hunting knife with him when he left the apartment to go to the Bank. Sometime after December 14, 1984, the apartment shared by [Johnson] and Neill was cleaned by the apartment complex's maintenance man. The scabbards belonging to the knives [Johnson] and Neill had purchased were found hidden behind sheetrock up close to the ceiling in the hall closet where the furnace was located. Id. at 3-8. The OCCA then concluded that [t]his evidence showed [Johnson] fully participated in the planning and execution of the robbery/homicides. Id. at 8. Although, the OCCA noted, [Johnson] was not identified by any witnesses as being inside the Bank with Neill, his conduct leading up to the robbery/homicides, and his conduct after the crimes, creates a reasonable inference that his was the other voice heard by Marilyn Roach inside the bank. Id. at 8-9. Thus, the OCCA concluded, the evidence [wa]s sufficient to find [Johnson] guilty as a principal to felony-murder. Id. at 9. Johnson contends the OCCA's conclusion represents an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard because, in his view, no rational jury could have found that he was present at the bank and actively participating in the robbery. In support of this general contention, Johnson offers four specific arguments: 1) [t]hree competent adults with a full view of the bank all saw only one robber, positively identified as [co-defendant] Jay Wesley Neill, Aplt. Supp. Br. at 19; 2) [d]espite a full forensic processing, no physical evidence even suggests that Mr. Johnson was at the crime scene, id.; 3) the alibi evidence, even [viewed] in the light most favorable to the State, left no time for Mr. Johnson to have been at the bank, unless he had access to a car that was already gone and traveled 16 miles in, at most, 17 minutes, id.; and 4) [e]ven the FBI agents investigating the case concluded that Mr. Neill committed the robbery by himself, id. at 19-20. Johnson's first two arguments are historically accurate. None of the three surviving victims of the bank robbery (Bellen Robles, Ruben Robles, and Marilyn Roach) visually observed a second robber. Further, no physical evidence, such as fingerprints, hair samples, or clothing fibers, found at the crime scene positively implicated Johnson as having been present during the robbery. That, however, is not the end of the story. Marilyn Roach, one of the surviving victims, clearly and unequivocally testified that, after she and three other bank customers (the Robles and Ralph Zeller) were shot, she heard a voice say, I thought I told you not to shoot anybody, and a second, distinct voice respond, [W]ell they moved. App. at 1834; id. at 1843 (The tone and the voices were different.). Consistent with having heard two voices, Roach asked at the time of her rescue from the bank, [A]re they gone? Id. at 1835 (emphasis added). In addition to Roach's testimony, the evidence strongly suggests, as the State argued during the first stage proceedings, that the murders of the three bank employees could not have been committed in the manner that they were unless both Neill and Johnson were present at the bank. Immediately following the crime, the three bank employees (Kay Bruno, Joyce Mullenix, and Jerri Bowles) were found dead in a back room, laying on their stomachs, touching or nearly touching each other. Id. at 1791. Richard Boatsman, the medical examiner for Comanche County, Oklahoma, who performed the autopsies on the three bank employees, testified that each victim suffered multiple stab wounds (Bruno suffered thirty-four stab wounds, Mullenix suffered twenty-seven stab wounds, and Bowles suffered fourteen stab wounds), including large, gaping, back and forth sawing type of incisional wound[s] to their necks, id. at 2214, each of which would have taken considerable work and effort, id. at 2203. Despite the quantity and severity of these wounds, Boatsman found no defensive wounds on any of the three victims, except for perhaps one defensive wound on the finger of Ms. Bowles. As the prosecutor emphasized during first-stage closing arguments, it is unlikely that one perpetrator could have physically controlled all three women in a manner that would have allowed him to carry out the relatively lengthy attacks without any of the women attempting to fight back or flee. Id. at 2954 (Can you alone keep those people there long enough for you to kill them with the knife? You cannot do it. They're not gonna hold still while you're knifing them. Somebody's gonna get up and run. Somebody's gonna fight you.). In other words, as the prosecutor argued, the more likely scenario is that both Neill and Johnson were present at the scene, and one of them performed the actual killings while the other controlled the victims by use of a gun or otherwise. Id. at 2955 (I'll tell you why nobody fought. While they was being stabbed someone else had a gun to their head. What's your choices? Either fight this knife or be shot.). Finally, the State presented evidence of a jailhouse confession that Johnson made while confined in the Comanche County Jail in August 1988. According to witness Herman Williams, Johnson told Williams that he (Johnson) and Neill planned it [the bank robbery] together and that they planned it in a way in which there would be no survivors. Id. at 2134. Williams further testified that Johnson told him that the situation inside the bank got so gross until he [Johnson] had to leave the bank and go sit in their automobile that was parked near the bank. Id. In light of all this evidence, we conclude that a jury could reasonably have found that Johnson was present at the bank during the robbery and murders. Turning to Johnson's third argument, he suggests that his alibi evidence would have prevented a jury from reasonably finding that he was present at the bank during the robbery and murders. The alibi evidence that Johnson refers to is primarily his own testimony that on the day of the robbery and murders, he remained at his own apartment while Neill, allegedly unbeknownst to Johnson, carried out the crimes. In particular, Johnson testified that he visited a neighbor's (Debbie Ward's) apartment to use her telephone shortly before 1:00 p.m. that day, did not leave Ward's apartment until 2 or 3 minutes after 1:00 p.m., and did not see Neill until shortly before 2 p.m. when he (Neill) returned to the apartment. In an attempt to bolster his testimony, Johnson elicited testimony from Debbie Ward that when she left her apartment that day to return to work, she did not observe Neill's car (the only vehicle owned by Neill and Johnson) in the apartment complex parking lot. Johnson also presented evidence suggesting that it would have taken a person, at an absolute minimum, more than seventeen minutes to drive from his apartment complex to the bank. In light of this evidence, Johnson asserted, it would have been impossible for him to have been at the bank at the time the crimes were committed. What Johnson fails to note, however, is that his alibi evidence was far from uncontroverted. To begin with, the evidence overwhelmingly established that Johnson and Neill were together in the hours prior to the robbery, first picking up a gun permit from the Lawton Police Department (which Johnson had applied for the day before), then visiting a pawn shop at approximately 12:20 p.m. to purchase a handgun, and finally making back-to-back visits to a local department store to purchase ammunition for the handgun (during their first visit to the store, Neill and Johnson purchased the wrong ammunition and thus had to return shortly thereafter to exchange it). Testimony from Johnson's neighbor, Debbie Ward, suggests that Johnson and Neill returned to their apartment following their purchase of the gun and ammunition (presumably, the jury could reasonably infer, to prepare themselves for the robbery and finalize preparations for their post-robbery trip). Specifically, Ward testified that she came home for lunch on the day of the robbery, and that at approximately 12:45 p.m., Johnson came to her door and asked to use her telephone. According to Ward, she overheard Johnson on the telephone saying he needed to change his flight schedule. Ward further testified that Johnson completed his telephone call and the two left her apartment shortly before 1 p.m., she to return to work and Johnson presumably to return to his own apartment. Although Ward testified under cross-examination by defense counsel that she did not observe Neill's car in the apartment parking lot when she left that afternoon, she acknowledged on redirect that during the preliminary hearing in 1985, she testified that she did not particularly notice if Neill's car was there or not. Id. at 1921. Brent Howard, Ward's boyfriend at the time of the crime, testified that he was also at Ward's apartment during the noon hour on the day of the robbery. Similar to Ward, Howard testified that Johnson came to Ward's apartment and proceeded to make a telephone call in which he asked to move his reservations up to as close to 2:30 p.m. as he could get them. Howard also testified that he and Ward left her apartment at approximately 12:50 p.m., and that he proceeded to drive her back to work for a 1:00 p.m. appointment. In addition to the testimony of Ward and Howard, the State presented evidence indicating that it took approximately twenty minutes to drive at the established speed limits from Johnson's apartment complex to the bank, but that it was possible, if exceeding the speed limits, to complete the trip in as little as ten to twelve minutes. The State also presented evidence indicating that a telephone call occurred between Kay Bruno, the branch manager, and the Glendale Savings & Loan Association in Tampa, Florida, and that the call ended at approximately 1:16 p.m. on the day of the robbery. Finally, the State presented evidence that Dara Pope, who shared an apartment with Debbie Ward, knocked on the door of Johnson's apartment at 2 p.m., and again at 2:30 p.m., and that on neither occasion did anyone answer. Considering all of this evidence together, we conclude a rational jury could reasonably have found that, notwithstanding Johnson's alibi evidence, it was not only possible for him to have been at the Bank at the time of the robbery and murders, but that he was present and actively participating. More specifically, the jury could reasonably have found that Johnson left Ward's apartment shortly before 1 p.m., and that he and Neill proceeded soon thereafter to the Bank, arriving at some point between approximately 1:10 and 1:15 p.m. In his final argument in support of his insufficiency claim, Johnson asserts that [e]ven the FBI agents investigating the case concluded that Mr. Neill committed the robbery by himself. Aplt. Supp. Br. at 19-20. Presumably, Johnson is referring to two reports from Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Granville Long, one dated April 15, 1985, and the other one undated. App. at 3279-81. In the April 15th report, Long gives a narrative of the offense, stating, in pertinent part: At approximately 1:15 p.m. on Friday, December 14, 1984, an individual, subsequently identified as JAY WESLEY NEILL, entered the FIRST BANK OF CHATTANOOGA, Geronimo Branch, Geronimo, Oklahoma, apparently alone, to commit a robbery. Id. at 3279 (emphasis added). In the undated report, Long states that, [o]n the basis of [his] investigation, it seems apparent . . . that JAY WESLEY NEILL entered the bank and perpetrated the murders and robbery by himself although he was assisted in the planning, preparation, and purchase of the instruments utilized in the crime by JOHNSON. Id. at 3281. The problem for Johnson is three-fold. First, there is no indication in the record on appeal that these reports were admitted into evidence at trial. Second, even assuming they were admitted, they amount to nothing more than one person's opinion as to the probable chain of events. Lastly, at the time Long prepared these two reports, he did not have access to all of the evidence that was ultimately presented by the State at trial (for example, Long clearly would not have had access to the testimony of Herman Williams, who described the jailhouse confession of Johnson in August 1988). Thus, the conclusions tentatively reached by Long in his two reports do nothing to undercut the conclusion, outlined above, that the evidence presented by the State was sufficient for a rational jury to reasonably find that Johnson was present at the Bank during, and actively participating in, the robbery and murders. In summary, we conclude that the OCCA reasonably applied the Jackson standard in rejecting Johnson's argument that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to allow the jury to find him guilty as a principal in the felony murders. Thus, Johnson is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. B) OCCA's application of felony murder doctrine In affirming Johnson's murder convictions on direct appeal, the OCCA also concluded that, [a]ssuming arguendo, the evidence showed [Johnson] was not in the Bank with Neill at the time of the robbery/homicides, evidence of [his] participation in the planning and his active involvement in the steps necessary to ensure completion of the plan [wa]s sufficient to find him guilty as a principal to felony-murder. OCCA Op. at 12. In particular, the OCCA noted that it ha[d] specifically applied the aider and abettor rule to felony-murder cases, id. at 10, and that doing so [wa]s consistent with the [Oklahoma] Legislature's definition of felony-murder because it `[wa]s a reflection of the policy that one who, by his willful criminal conduct, sets in motion a chain of events so perilous to the sanctity of human life that death results therefrom must bear the ultimate responsibility for his actions.' Id. at 11 (quoting Hatch v. State, 662 P.2d 1377, 1384 (Okla.Crim.App.1983)). In turn, the OCCA noted that Johnson's participation in acquiring the gun permit and the weapons, `casing' the Bank the day before the crimes, rescheduling travel arrangements to leave town immediately after the crimes, and taking the stolen money to and spending it in San Francisco [wa]s clear evidence that [Johnson] aided and abetted Neill in the commission of the robbery/homicides. . . . Id. at 13. Because, the OCCA concluded, [Johnson] and Neill together created a situation inherently dangerous to human life, Johnson [could not] disclaim responsibility for his acts, and was thus liable as a principal for felony-murder. Id. In these federal habeas proceedings, Johnson attempts to challenge the OCCA's conclusion that, even assuming he only aided and abetted Neill, he was still subject to conviction for felony-murder. Johnson offers six arguments in support of this challenge. First, he contends that the jury expressly rejected the theory that [he] aided [and] abetted the murders. [1] Aplt. Supp. Br. at 23. Second, he argues that Oklahoma's aider/abettor statute cannot be aggregated with [Oklahoma's] felony murder statute to broaden the scope of the felony murder statute. Id. Third, he argues that the Oklahoma legislature itself recognized that the felony murder statute was not broadened by the aiders/abettors statute. Id. at 24. Fourth, he contends that the aider/abettor statute only means that a defendant who aids and abets in a crime is guilty as a principal of that crime, not of felony murder. Id. at 25. Fifth, he argues that even if the aider and abettor statute could be combined with the felony murder statute, a person is not guilty as an aider and abettor simply because they helped someone acquire a gun before a robbery. Id. at 25-26. Sixth, and finally, he argues that the OCCA's decision to retroactively define the scope of the felony murder statute implicates not only state-law questions, but also violates [his due process] rights under the constitution. Id. at 27. The problem with Johnson's first five arguments is that they all focus exclusively on the proper interpretation of Oklahoma state law. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state-law questions. Id. at 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475. Rather, the Court stated, [i]n conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id. at 68, 112 S.Ct. 475. Thus, that leaves only Johnson's sixth and final argument, i.e., that the OCCA's application of both the aider and abettor and the felony-murder doctrines to his case violated his federal due process rights. The initial problem with this argument is that there is no indication in the record on appeal that Johnson ever presented this argument to the OCCA. [2] As a result, it appears the claim is unexhausted and, ultimately, procedurally barred, since it is too late for Johnson to file an application for state post-conviction relief raising the claim. See Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1139 n. 7 (10th Cir.2007) (Anticipatory procedural bar occurs when the federal courts apply procedural bar to an unexhausted claim that would be procedurally barred under state law if the petitioner returned to state court to exhaust it.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Johnson properly exhausted his due process claim, we conclude there is no merit to it. Although Johnson argues that the OCCA's decision in his case represents the first time in Oklahoma history that the OCCA held that a defendant can be convicted of felony murder without proof that he was actively engaged in the commission of the underlying felony, Aplt. Supp. Br. at 27, he is mistaken. As the OCCA noted in affirming Johnson's murder convictions on direct appeal, it previously applied the aider and abettor rule in the felony-murder context in the case of Lewis v. State, 451 P.2d 399 (Okla.Crim. App.1967). In Lewis, the defendant and two co-defendants planned the robbery of a gas station, but in carrying out that plan the defendant merely drove the get-away car and did not enter the premises nor participate in the assault made upon [the gas station operator] who was robbed, shot and beaten by the two co-defendants. Id. at 400. The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In disposing of the defendant's direct appeal, the OCCA concluded that the evidence amply support[ed] the defendant's conviction for the crime of Murder as a principal under the felony murder rule. . . . [3] Id. Thus, the Lewis case clearly placed Johnson on notice that he could be held liable as a principal for felony-murder, even if he merely aided and abetted Neill in the commission of the bank robbery. Even ignoring the Lewis decision, we note, as the State has pointed out in response to Johnson's habeas petition and appeal, that in 1984 this court, in the context of a federal habeas proceeding initiated by an Oklahoma state prisoner, held that a first degree murder conviction under Oklahoma law could be upheld by application of the aider and abettor statute, together with the Oklahoma felony murder statute. . . . Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1350 (10th Cir.1984). In reaching this holding, this court effectively rejected the construction of Oklahoma's then-existing felony-murder statute that is now urged by Johnson in these proceedings. Finally, it is important to emphasize that Johnson's attack on the OCCA's dual application of the aider and abettor and felony-murder rules hinges, in substantial part, on his assertion that all he did in assisting Neill was to acquire [the] gun before [the] robbery. Aplt. Supp. Br. at 26. A review of the state trial transcript, however, overwhelmingly establishes that Johnson played a far greater role in the planning and execution of the robbery. Even assuming, for purposes of argument, that Johnson was not present at the bank during the actual robbery, it is clear that he helped Neill purchase the gun and knives used during the crime, helped Neill scout out the bank on the day prior to the robbery, actively participated in making and executing the getaway plans, and assisted Neill in spending the robbery proceeds. In sum, we conclude that Johnson is not entitled to federal habeas relief arising out of the OCCA's dual application of the aider and abettor and felony-murder rules under Oklahoma state law.