Opinion ID: 622676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Our Jurisdiction to Review the District Court's Initial Dismissal Order

Text: We therefore begin our analysis by evaluating whether we have jurisdiction to review the District Court's order dismissing Long's complaint. That inquiry leads us to examine two distinct questions. First, we address whether allegations of prison delay can excuse the untimeliness of a motion to reconsider under Rule 59(e) so as to permit us to exercise jurisdiction under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to review the underlying dismissal. If an untimely Rule 59(e) motion can be considered timely as a result of prison delay, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) permits the time to file an appeal [to] run[] ... from the entry of the order disposing of ... [that] motion. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Second, assuming Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) does provide an avenue for us to reach the underlying dismissal order, we consider whether there is a temporal limitation on the operation of that rule that would prevent its application in circumstances where a Rule 59(e) motion is filed after the otherwise applicable time period for filing a notice of appeal, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), has lapsed. We address those questions in turn.
The idea that prison delay may serve to toll the time to appeal stems from our holding in United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds by Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321 (3d Cir.2010). There, we held that delay by prison authorities in delivering mail to a prisoner should be excluded in calculating the time for filing a notice of appeal in a criminal case. See id. at 313. Although the prisoner in Grana filed a pro se appeal fifteen days out of time under Appellate Rule 4(b), Grana alleged that the prison had negligently handled his incoming mail, and as a result he did not receive the district court's final order until May 5, 1988, after the expiration of the appeal period. Id. at 314. He consequently argued that, for purposes of jurisdiction, his appeal should be treated as having been filed on time. We agreed. Pointing to the Supreme Court's adoption of the prison mailbox rule, [11] we observed that prison delay beyond the litigant's control cannot fairly be used in computing time for appeal and we perceive[d] no difference between delay in transmitting the prisoner's papers to the court and transmitting the court's final judgment to him so that he may prepare his appeal. Id. at 316. We therefore held that, in computing the timeliness of pro se prisoners' appeals, any prison delay in transmitting to the prisoner notice of the district court's final order or judgment shall be excluded from the computation of an appellant's time for taking an appeal. Id. We remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the appeal was timely under that standard because the record d[id] not show the date the prison received notice of the district court's final order or conclusively establish the date the prison transmitted the notice to [the] appellant. Id. We instructed that, on remand, the prison would have the burden... of establishing the relevant dates because the prison was best equipped to provide that information. Id. In United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282 (3d Cir.2003), we extended the Grana rule to permit an untimely motion for reconsideration to be made timely so that it would, in turn, toll the time to appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). Fiorelli filed a civil case under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, [12] mounting a collateral attack on his criminal conviction. Id. at 284. His claim for relief was denied by the district court on April 9, 2001. Id. at 285. On April 30, 2001, outside of the then-applicable 10-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration but within the 60-day period for filing a notice of appeal, see Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing that a notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from in a case in which the United States or its agent is a party), he filed what the Fiorelli court ultimately construed as a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration, Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 285, 288. The district court denied that motion on May 18, 2001, and Fiorelli filed a notice of appeal on July 17, 2001. Id. Thus, as in this case, Fiorelli's notice of appeal was timely as measured from the denial of the untimely motion for reconsideration, but was otherwise untimely. Fiorelli alleged, however, that he received the district court's original order during the normal mail distribution at the federal prison where he [was] confined, 13 days after the district court issued the order denying his § 2255 claim. Id. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted). The question, therefore, was whether Fiorelli's delayed receipt of the original order, which delay was allegedly caused by prison officials, should result in his untimely motion for reconsideration being viewed as timely, thereby rendering his appeal of the original order denying his § 2255 claim timely under the provisions of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). See id. (Fiorelli's appeal may be properly filed if his motion for reconsideration is deemed timely, thus invoking the tolling provision of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).). We answered that there was no reason why Grana 's exclusion of prison delays from the time limits of jurisdictionally sensitive filings should not apply to motions for reconsideration, inasmuch as such deadlines are critical to appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 289. It followed that a prison's actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final order of the district court is excluded from the calculation of the timeliness of motions for reconsideration... filed by pro se inmates. Id. at 289-90. While we emphasized that the tolling rule requires a prisoner to allege that actual delay or interference in mail delivery was caused by the prison, we were satisfied that Fiorelli's statement that he received the District Court's order during the normal mail distribution could refer to such interference and remanded for the district court to determine whether the tolling rule could be properly invoked. Id. at 290 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we did in Grana, we instructed the district court to undertake factual findings as to the relevant dates of the prison's receipt and delivery of the District Court's order so that, on review, we could make a determination of our jurisdiction. Id. Notwithstanding Fiorelli 's extension of the Grana tolling principle to a case governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Appellate Rule 4(a), we seemed to reject that approach in Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 368 F.3d 263 (3d Cir.2004). In Poole, a pro se prisoner filed an untimely notice of appeal, apparently because of delay in receiving notice of the entry of the order dismissing his claims. Id. at 264. Citing Grana, Poole argued that his [otherwise untimely] notice of appeal should be regarded as having been filed on time because there was a delay in his receipt of notice from the district court clerk's office regarding the entry of the order of dismissal. Id. That delay was allegedly the result of Poole's transfer from one correctional institution to another shortly before the order of dismissal was entered. [13] Id. at 264-65. Without mentioning Fiorelli, we concluded that the Grana tolling rule did not apply, distinguishing Poole's appeal because it unlike the appeal in Grana occurred in a civil case, id. at 265-66, and because the delay was not primarily due to Poole's status as an inmate but to the simple fact that he was moved, id. at 266 n. 4. Poole's proper remedy, we explained, would have been to file a motion to reopen in accordance with Appellate Rule 4(a)(6). See id. at 266-67. While Poole is plainly in tension with Fiorelli, we view the holding in Poole as turning not on its distinction between criminal and civil cases but rather on the nature of the alleged delay. In Fiorelli, the delay in the prisoner's receipt of the order was allegedly the result of the prison's handling of the mail. It was, in other words a classic prison delay case, after the manner of Grana. In Poole, by contrast, the delay allegedly was caused by the clerk's office and did not stem from actions or omissions by prison officials. Cf. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 289 ( Grana makes clear that only delays caused by the prison warrant tolling of the filing deadlines, and `[t]o the extent that the delay represents slow mail, there is nothing that this Court can do to preserve an appellant's right to appellate review.' (emphasis added) (quoting Grana, 864 F.2d at 316)). We therefore read Fiorelli to articulate a still-controlling rule that applies when delay is allegedly caused by actions or omissions of prison officials in the delivery of mail to a prisoner litigating pro se. [14] We reaffirm that we can view a Rule 59(e) motion as timely in such situations, allowing us to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) over an appeal of the underlying case-dispositive order, if the delay in filing the Rule 59(e) motion is caused by a prison's actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final order of the district court. [15] Id. at 289. Thus, when a pro se prisoner makes allegations in connection with a motion for reconsideration that could reasonably be construed as a non-frivolous assertion that the prison delayed delivering the court order that he is asking be reconsidered, the district court should engage in the fact-finding necessary to a jurisdictional analysis under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). See id. (The timeliness of a motion under ... Civil Rule 59 ... is critical to appellate jurisdiction.). In some instances, such as when the prisoner's allegations are uncontested, the district court may of course choose to credit what the prisoner says. There ought, however, also be some effort to confirm that the order was sent to the prisoner's correct prison address and an explicit determination that the prisoner's allegations as to the date of receipt are accepted as being true. [16] We then, in turn, would accept any such fact-finding as long as it was not clearly erroneous. Even when the district court determines it needs further information to decide whether the prison actually delayed or interfered with a prisoner's receipt of an order, we are not suggesting that a hearing will be necessary; we are instead directing only that, in such a case, the prison has the burden of providing evidence of the date it received the district court's final order and the date on which it was transmitted to the appellant. See Grana, 864 F.2d at 316. As a practical matter, this should add no burden to prison record-keeping because prison officials have, at least since Grana, been on notice that they should maintain clear and accurate mail logs. Id. In the present case, Long certified [17] that his delayed receipt of the District Court's memorandum and order was a result of two things: first, that those documents were incorrectly mailed to his old prison, and second, that his new prison opened legal mail before delivering it to prisoners. Thus, although some portion of the delay was allegedly caused by the District Court's clerk's office and any such time lost would not count towards making Long's untimely motion for reconsideration timely, some of the delay was also allegedly a consequence of prison delay, as Long complains of his new prison's practice of opening legal mail before sending it to inmates. We cannot sort out these alleged sources of delay, however, because the District Court made no express finding as to whether the prison actually delayed or interfered with Long's receipt of its order, and the record before us does not indicate when the prison where Long currently resides received the District Court's memorandum and order or when it transmitted those documents to Long. We would therefore ordinarily remand to the District Court to find those facts.
Our Amicus, however, indicates that remand would be fruitless here since there is a 30-day outer time limit (or 60-day, when the United States or its agent is a party) on Fiorelli's tolling rule because Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) imposes that jurisdictional time limit on the filing of a notice of appeal. Amicus's argument is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). In that case, the Supreme Court held that timing requirements for filing notices of appeal, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and from which Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) is derived, are mandatory and jurisdictional, and, as such, a court has no power to create equitable exceptions to them. 551 U.S. at 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360. As we discuss more fully in the companion case filed today, Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448 (3d Cir.2012), there is no doubt after Bowles that the rules listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, one of which is restated in Appellate Rule 4(a)(1), are jurisdictional. [18] Because of that, and because Fiorelli tolling can permit a litigant entitled to its application to file a notice of appeal from the original order after Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)'s jurisdictional deadline has lapsed, our Amicus has taken the position that Fiorelli cannot allow an untimely motion for reconsideration to be deemed timely for purposes of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) if that motion is filed after the expiration of the 30- or 60-day jurisdictional period for filing a notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(1). Were we to hold otherwise, Amicus warns, we would be allowing, and perhaps encouraging, an end-run around Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)'s jurisdictional deadline. But Amicus's argument is misplaced. Properly viewed, the Fiorelli tolling rule does not extend any of the deadlines set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and Appellate Rule 4(a)(1). Rather, it concerns the timeliness of a motion for reconsideration, which then determines, under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A), the orders over which we can exercise jurisdiction. When facts are found that demonstrate prison delay, all that Fiorelli does is allow us to, by excluding the time lost due to prison delay, deem as timely what would otherwise be an untimely motion for reconsideration. After subtracting such time, the prisoner must still file his appeal within 30 (or 60) days of the district court's disposition of his motion. If he does so, he will be considered to have properly filed his appeal in accordance with Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). Fiorelli's tolling rule is nothing more than an application of the principle from Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) that time lost due to prison delay cannot fairly be used in computing time for appeal. Grana, 864 F.2d at 316. It is quite possible, then, that, after factfinding by the District Court, we could conclude that we do have jurisdiction to consider the District Court's underlying order that dismissed Long's complaint. Our usual practice would therefore be to remand for the District Court to find the facts that are essential for a determination of our jurisdiction over that order. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 290. That step is unnecessary in this case, however, since we agree with the parties that we have jurisdiction to consider Long's appeal to the extent he challenges the District Court's denial of his motion for reconsideration, [19] which proves sufficient in this case.