Opinion ID: 4584100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Zaldivar’s Controlled Substance Offenses

Text: Zaldivar asserts that, in its 2019 order, the BIA erred in rejecting his argument that his 2003 convictions cannot constitute controlled substance offenses under Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) and Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) because the Florida statutes did not require the state to prove the defendant knowingly possessed any illicit substance and presumed culpable mens rea.
The BIA must give reasoned consideration to an alien’s claims and make adequate findings to permit our review. Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019). A remand for lack of reasoned consideration is not a disagreement with the BIA’s legal conclusions or factual findings, but a determination “that, given the facts and claims in the specific case before the [agency], the agency decision is so fundamentally incomplete that a review of legal and factual determinations would be quixotic.” Id. (emphasis and quotations omitted). Reasoned consideration requires only that the BIA heard and thought about the case, rather than “merely react[ing].” Id. A failure of reasoned consideration results when the BIA decision, “read alongside the evidentiary 7 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 8 of 17 record, forces us to doubt whether we and the [BIA] are, in substance, looking at the same case.” Id. at 1334. The BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to Zaldivar’s claim. See Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 872 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating we review claims of legal error, including claims the BIA did not provide reasoned consideration in its decision, de novo). Zaldivar argued to the BIA that he was not removable for having been convicted of a controlled substance offense because his offense lacked a mens rea element as to the illicit nature of the substances he possessed. The BIA rejected this argument by stating he remained removable under Matter of Navarro Guadarrama, 27 I. & N. Dec. 560 (BIA 2019). But, although Navarro Guadarrama addressed whether a conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6) is a controlled substance offense, it rejected a completely different argument for why such a conviction did not qualify; it had nothing whatsoever to do with the lack of a mens rea element as to the illicit nature of the substance possessed, or, indeed, any lacking element. See 27 I. & N. Dec. at 560-63, 567-68 (dismissing an appeal considering whether a conviction for possession of less than 20 grams of marijuana under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(b) was a controlled substance offense, finding although the state’s definition might be more broadly written, the alien had not demonstrated there was a realistic probability the state would actually prosecute conduct involving a substance that was not federally controlled). 8 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 9 of 17 Accordingly, the BIA’s exclusive reliance on Navarro Guadarrama to reject Zaldivar’s challenge shows a lack of reasoned consideration, because the BIA’s decision is not reasonably responsive to the argument made to it, and reveals instead that the BIA “merely reacted” rather than “heard and thought.” See Ali, 931 F.3d at 1333-34. We need not remand for the BIA to consider Zaldivar’s argument anew, however, because as explained below, this issue falls within one of the “rare circumstances” where no additional explanation, investigation, or findings by the agency would be necessary or helpful. Calle v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1324, 1329-31 (11th Cir. 2007).
When the BIA has failed to address a particular issue “put before it, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’” Id. at 1329 (quoting INS v. Ventura, 527 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)). In Calle, we determined that such a rare circumstance was present, such that remand was unnecessary, because the undecided issue was a legal issue with undisputed facts, a procedural one, and not one upon which the BIA could bring its expertise to bear and make an initial determination that would aid us in our later determination of whether the BIA had exceeded its leeway under the law. Id. at 1330-31 (declining to remand for BIA to consider petitioner’s motion to reconsider, which the BIA wrongly denied as numerically barred, 9 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 10 of 17 because the motion merely reiterated prior arguments and presented irrelevant or cumulative evidence). In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), provides an alien is deportable if, any time after his admission, he “has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [21 U.S.C. § 802]).” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Marijuana, cocaine, and MDMA are all controlled substances under § 802. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(6), 812. We have held a Florida conviction for cocaine possession under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) is a conviction for a controlled substance offense under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), notwithstanding the fact Florida criminalizes possession of some substances that fall outside the federal definition of a controlled substance, because the Florida statute is divisible by the identity of the drug possessed, and cocaine is a federally controlled substance. Guillen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 910 F.3d 1174, 1176, 1179-84 (11th Cir. 2018). Florida’s statute defining a possession offense uses the general term “controlled substance.” Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a). At the time of Zaldivar’s convictions, it read: It is unlawful for any person to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance unless [authorized by medically-related exceptions or as otherwise authorized in the chapter]. 10 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 11 of 17 Id. (2003). Marijuana, cocaine, and MDMA are all defined as controlled substances. See id. § 893.03(1)(c). In 1996, the Florida Supreme Court held in Chicone v. State, that the offense of possession of a controlled substance under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) included an element of mens rea as to the illicit nature of the substance the offender possessed. 684 So. 2d 736, 743-44 (Fla. 1996). In January 2002, in Scott v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that regardless of the defense raised or the affirmative defenses asserted, a defendant in a controlled-substance possession case is entitled to an instruction on the element of guilty knowledge as to the illicit nature of the substance because it is an element of the crime, and the failure to give the instruction was not harmless error. 808 So. 2d 166, 169-71 (Fla. 2002). In response, the Florida legislature passed Fla. Stat. § 893.101, which states that Chicone and Scott’s holdings were contrary to its legislative intent, that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of an offense under the chapter, and instead the lack of such knowledge was an affirmative defense. Fla. Stat. § 893.101. The statute became effective May 13, 2002. Id. Florida appellate courts have held that Fla. Stat. § 893.101 may not be applied retroactively to an offense occurring before May 13, 2002. See Sandifer v. State, 851 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also, e.g., J.J.N. v. State, 877 So. 2d 11 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 12 of 17 806, 809 n.2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); State v. Odom, 862 So. 2d 56, 58-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Gordon v. State, 858 So. 2d 359, 359-60 & n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Remand is unnecessary because the undisputed facts show that Zaldivar’s offenses of conviction contained a mens rea element as to the illicit nature of the substances he possessed. Zaldivar committed his drug-possession offenses on November 16, 2001, before the effective date of Fla. Stat. § 893.101, which removed the illicit-nature-of-substance mens rea element, and the statute does not apply retroactively. Fla. Stat. § 893.101; Sandifer, 851 So. 2d at 790. Consequently, even if Zaldivar were correct that the lack of a mens rea element as to the illicit nature of the substance would make an offense not a controlled substance offense, his challenge would fail because his offenses had such an element. Thus, we deny Zaldivar’s petition as to this issue, notwithstanding the BIA’s failure to afford his claim reasoned consideration.