Opinion ID: 1852842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Certainty and Breadth of Standards

Text: The second assignment of error declares the courts below erred in failing to declare that the various standards contained in the guardianship law are overbroad and vague and fail to incorporate the least restrictive alternative as applied to the constitutionally protected conduct of Mrs. Sim. To the extent pertinent to our inquiry, § 30-2619 provides: (a) The allegedly incapacitated person or any person interested in his or her welfare may petition for a finding of incapacity and appointment of a guardian. The petition shall be verified and shall contain allegations with regard to any of the areas as provided under section 30-2619.01 in which the petitioner claims that the allegedly incapacitated person lacks sufficient understanding to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his or her own person. The areas contained in § 30-2619.01, to which § 30-2619 refers, concern the allegedly incapacitated person's ability to make, communicate, or carry out responsible decisions concerning his or her person with regard to: (1) Selecting his or her place of abode within or without this state; (2) Arranging for his or her medical care; (3) Protecting his or her personal effects; (4) Giving necessary consents, approvals, or releases; (5) Arranging for training, education, or other habilitating services appropriate to him or her; (6) Applying for private or governmental benefits to which he or she may be entitled; (7) Instituting proceedings to compel any person liable for the support of the proposed ward to support him or her if no conservator has been appointed for the proposed ward; (8) Entering into contractual agreements if no conservator has been appointed for the proposed ward; (9) Receiving money and tangible property deliverable to him or her and applying such money and property to his or her expenses for room and board, medical care, personal effects, training, education, and habilitative services; and (10) Any other area of inquiry which the court may direct. The relevant portions of § 30-2630 provide: Upon petition and after notice and hearing in accordance with the provisions of this part, the court may appoint a conservator or make other protective order for cause as follows: . . . . (2) Appointment of a conservator or other protective order may be made in relation to the estate and property affairs of a person if the court determines that (i) the person is unable to manage his or her property and property affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, ... or disappearance; and (ii) the person has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided.... While we have held that one may not have his or her property taken away and placed in the hands of a conservator merely because potential heirs believe there will be more left for them if the owner is not free to deal with the property as he or she chooses, In re Estate of Wagner, 220 Neb. 32, 367 N.W.2d 736 (1985), it is clear that a conservator may be appointed for one who, because of advanced age, is unable to manage and will therefore waste or dissipate his or her property unless proper management is provided. In re Estate of Oltmer, 214 Neb. 830, 336 N.W.2d 560 (1983). In reliance upon O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 2494, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975), Sim's attorneys first argue that a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends. The present case does not, however, deal with the commitment with which O'Connor concerned itself and which the U.S. Supreme Court termed a massive curtailment of liberty. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972). Sim's attorneys have presented no legal authority which requires the use of a least restrictive alternative in a guardianship and conservatorship proceeding such as is at issue in the present case. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court imposed no such requirement even when dealing with the substantive rights of involuntarily committed mentally retarded individuals under the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that an involuntarily committed mentally retarded person's liberty interests required only that, in addition to food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, the state provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint, and recognized that in determining what is reasonable, the courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. Id. at 322, 102 S.Ct. at 2461. An application of the Youngberg principles is found in Mental Health Ass'n v. Deukmejian, 186 Cal.App.3d 1531, 233 Cal.Rptr. 130 (1986), modified 187 Cal. App.3d 212A, 233 Cal.Rptr. 130, review denied and ordered not to be officially published (Cal. Mar. 5, 1987). Sim's attorneys further contend that the conservatorship statute is vague and overly broad. In arguing that the necessary or desirable standard of § 30-2630(2)(ii) and the phrase the person is unable to manage his or her property and property affairs effectively in § 30-2630(2)(i) are overbroad, they rely on In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981). In doing so, they characterize Boyer as a case where the Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the constituionality [sic] of the Utah guardianship law which contains standards identical to the guardianship law in Nebraska. Brief for Appellant Sim at 31. What Sim's attorneys fail to state is that in its constitutional review, the Boyer court (1) found that while the phrase responsible decisions admitted of a broad interpretation, it was not unconstitutionally vague because it was limited to situations wherein the putative ward's decisionmaking process was so impaired that he or she would be unable to care for his or her personal safety or unable to attend to and provide for such necessities as food, shelter, clothing, and necessary medical care; (2) there was no least restrictive alternative requirement in a guardianship proceeding; (3) the guardianship statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad; (4) the flexibility available to a judge in tailoring a specific remedy to a specific individual lessens the potential for an overly broad deprivation of personal decisionmaking power; and (5) evidence of incompetency must be established by clear and convincing evidence. While it is true the Boyer court reversed the appointment of a guardian, it did so not because of a constitutional infirmity but because there was no clear and convincing evidence of incompetency. There is no merit to this assignment of error.