Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of unadjudicated rape of Alexandra M.

Text: Defendant urges that admission, as aggravating evidence, of the unadjudicated sexual assault against Alexandra M. violated his federal constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, a fair and impartial jury, and a reliable penalty verdict. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) [38] He asserts that jurors who had found him guilty of capital offenses could not impartially judge his guilt of the aggravating crime, and that he was denied the protection of a unanimous jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject the contention, as we have many times before. (E.g., Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 913, 962, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 420, 140 P.3d 736; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 584-585, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 863, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) Defendant also claims his federal and state due process rights were violated by virtue of the preaccusation delay in prosecuting the 1982 sexual assault on Alexandra M. But we have consistently held that the prosecution may offer in aggravation the defendant's violent criminal activity that occurred at any time. Absent demonstrable prejudice, the remote time at which that activity occurred does not violate the defendant's due process, speedy trial, or fair trial rights. (E.g., People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-138, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1088, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 585-586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 772, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Though defendant claims prejudice, he demonstrates none except the damaging nature of the evidence. The evidence was admissible. [39]