Opinion ID: 581376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Service-of-Process Issue

Text: 51 The motion that prompted the imposition of sanctions was threefold. It sought reargument of the district court's contempt order on the grounds of  '(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying claims raised by plaintiffs in this action, (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the pending appeals[,] and (3) improper service of the Order to Show Cause under Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii).'  (Majority Opinion ante at 396.) As to the third item, improper service, the fact that we have reversed the court's original decision does not mean that the sanctions award with respect to reargument must be reversed. 52 The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is to be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). In Virgin Atlantic, we held that though the court had erred on the merits of a certain question, it nonetheless had discretion to impose sanctions against a federal agency for an attempt to reargue the question on the sole basis of intervening decisions of a district court in another circuit. We recognized that the district court had imposed sanctions for the agency's attempt to reargue a decided issue on the basis of insufficient new support, not ... for the substance of its motion. Virgin Atlantic at 1255. 53 In the present case, despite the district court's repeated admonitions that Washburn's motion required the presentation of supporting affidavits and that frivolous filings could warrant sanctions, the motion to reargue lacked even the pretense of any new ammunition. (See Respondent's Memorandum Dated August 30, 1989, at 3: [n]o new facts or affidavits are submitted and no new legal arguments are advanced.) Though the majority states that the district court invited the renewed motion, plainly the court did not invite it to be made on precisely the same papers as those on which it had just been denied. The district court's sanctions opinion, New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 732 F.Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (District Court Sanctions Opinion), described the sequence. After rejecting counsel's original oral motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper service, [t]he Court advised Washburn to submit a motion in proper form, with supporting affidavits, if he wished to move to dismiss or quash service on behalf of respondents. Id. at 410. Counsel then submitted the motion in writing, but again without affidavits. In denying the written motion without prejudice, [t]he Court explained that the motion, as it was addressed to the issue of service, was inadequate in its present form, as there were no affidavits by any of respondents concerning service. Id. In connection with this explanation and again in granting an extension of time, the court cautioned that Rule 11 sanctions might be imposed if a renewed motion were frivolous. Nonetheless, in connection with Washburn's renewal of the written motion, 54 [n]o notice of motion was filed, nor were any supporting affidavits attached, despite the directive of the Court and the requirements of Civil Rule 3. No new arguments were advanced in the memorandum, with the exception of a section arguing that attorneys possess immunity from sanctions for their conduct in a judicial proceeding and, therefore, that Rule 11 sanctions cannot be imposed upon them. 55 Id. Thus the court concluded that [w]hile the Court does not impose sanctions lightly, an objective analysis of Washburn's conduct in resubmitting the motion without affidavits or additional support, and in substantially the same manner as it had been when previously denied by the Court, leads only to the conclusion that Washburn violated Rule 11. Id. at 412. On Washburn's motion to vacate the Rule 11 sanctions, the court stated that the sanctions were not imposed for the filing of the original cross-motion, but only for the resubmission of the cross-motion without additional support. New York State National Organization for Women v. Terry, 737 F.Supp. 1350, 1366 (S.D.N.Y.1990). 56 On this record, it is difficult for me to reconcile the majority's reversal of the imposition of sanctions against Washburn with either the abuse-of-discretion standard of review established by the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell or with our Court's decision in Virgin Atlantic. 57