Opinion ID: 2583949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants' Prima Facie Liability

Text: As we stated earlier, the parties agree that plaintiffs' malicious prosecution action arises from acts in furtherance of defendants' right of petition or free speech. Thus, the issue is whether plaintiffs presented evidence in opposition to defendants' anti-SLAPP motion that, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to support a judgment in plaintiffs' favor. Plaintiffs, we conclude, did make the required showing. As the Court of Appeal observed, Whether the facts known to Stroud constituted probable cause to prosecute the fraud lawsuit is a question of law. ( Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.) The court must `make an objective determination of the reasonableness of [Stroud's] conduct, i.e., to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to [Stroud], the institution [and prosecution] of the [fraud lawsuit] was legally tenable.' ( Sheldon Appel, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 878, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498.) The test applied to determine whether a claim is tenable is `whether any reasonable attorney would have thought the claim tenable.' ( Id. at p. 886, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498.)[¶] In the present case, . . . Stroud presented evidence in support of the anti-SLAPP motion to show that the facts available to Stroud at the time the lawsuit was filed were sufficient to support a cause of action for fraud. But in opposition to the motion, Zamos presented evidence that Stroud was given transcripts shortly after the fraud lawsuit was filed that, Zamos contends, show[s] that Stroud knew or should have known that the fraud lawsuit had no merit.
Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos told her he would continue to represent her against the nonsettling defendants in the foreclosure lawsuit. However, at the January 29, 1996 hearing, the judge advised Brookes there was a motion pending to relieve Mr. Zamos in the foreclosure matter. Is there a problem? he asked her. No, Brookes replied, other than I can't understand how Mr. Zamos can be relieved when he's never been my attorney of record to my knowledge. After listening to Brookes's rambling diatribe against Zamos, the judge asked her, What's the point? The point, Brookes replied, is I don't care if you sign him off or not. He's never been on. Brookes was apparently being sarcastic because as the judge pointed out, Mr. Zamos had tried the foreclosure matter and had persisted in obtaining a favorable settlement for her when lesser lawyers would have just bowed out. Hearing no objection whatsoever from Brookes regarding Mr. Zamos's motion to be relieved, the judge, after admonishing Brookes that she couldn't have had a better lawyer than Mr. Zamos, ordered him relieved.
Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos told her he would substitute into and represent her in a malpractice lawsuit Brookes had filed against her former attorneys. However, as the Court of Appeal stated, the transcript of [the] October 30, 1995 settlement hearing in the foreclosure lawsuit . . . shows that before Brookes agreed to the settlement, Brookes and Zamos stated on the record that Brookes had changed her mind regarding Zamos's representation in the malpractice lawsuit and that Zamos was not going to represent Brookes in that lawsuit. On Friday, October 27, 1995, in a phone call he placed to Brookes in open court, Jerome Zamos advised Brookes he would represent her in the malpractice action. However, on Monday, October 30, 1995, Mr. Zamos advised the court he would not be doing so, after all, and that Brookes had another attorney who would be representing her in that matter. Brookes, who was present in court on this occasion, acknowledged, That's correct, yes. Defendants assert there is testimony from Taylor that he was later told by Brookes that Zamos had promised to get back into the case. To the contrary, Taylor's statement was unclear in this regard. In a declaration, Taylor stated Brookes told him she had been promised that Mr. Zamos would continue with the malpractice lawsuit against [her former attorneys] and that it would be taken to a conclusion as long as the offer to settle was accepted. However, Taylor did not claim that his second conversation with Brookes occurred after Brookes acknowledged in court on Monday, October 30, that Jerome Zamos was not going to represent her in the malpractice action. Taylor merely stated he spoke to Brookes on a Friday in late October of 1995 and again on the following Monday.
Brookes alleged that Jerome Zamos promised Brookes he would secure the return of her house. As the Court of Appeal stated, The October 30, 1995 transcript shows that Brookes was told repeatedly that she would be giving up all claims to her house if she agreed to the settlement. Defendants do not dispute this characterization of the record. Instead, defendants claim that, off the record, Jerome Zamos told Brookes the settlement would be for `post eviction' damages and that the claim for [her] house could still proceed. Contrary to Brookes's claim that she agreed to the settlement in reliance on an assurance from Jerome Zamos that she would still be able to proceed with an action to have her house returned to her, Brookes initially declined the settlement, complaining that he had never discussed it with her. Then, after having been given an opportunity to consult by phone with someone other than Mr. Zamos, someone who was not an attorney, Brookes decided to accept the settlement.