Opinion ID: 1427701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kenneth's other assignments of error.

Text: Kenneth assigns as error three other acts or omissions by the district court. First, Kenneth urges that the district court erred by ordering Kenneth to pay the entire equity credit line debt, because the debt was community property. This contention is without merit. The district courts of this state are granted broad discretion to determine the equitable distribution of community property and debts; the court need not make an exactly equal division of the community property. Johnson v. Steel Incorporated, 94 Nev. 483, 485, 581 P.2d 860, 862 (1978). Even if the entire debt was community property, the district court's order was not manifestly inequitable, because Kenneth's overall property distribution was substantially greater than Nancy's and Kenneth enjoys a much greater future income potential. Kenneth next contends that the district court erred by ordering him to pay the statutory maximum of child support and allowing Nancy to retain possession of the residence until the youngest child reaches majority, with Kenneth to make the mortgage payments until the residence is sold. Neither the child support nor the alimony provisions of the Nevada Revised Statutes precludes the district court from making both orders. See NRS 125.150(1)(4); NRS Chapter 125B. Indeed, this court has suggested that an award both of possession of the family residence and of child support is proper. Stojanovich v. Stojanovich, 86 Nev. 789, 793, 476 P.2d 950, 952 (1970). Moreover, the orders in this case are not manifestly inequitable where: Kenneth will receive credit for his future mortgage payments under the modified Moore formulae; Kenneth has a much higher future earning capacity than Nancy; and Kenneth received substantially more community assets in the initial property division. For these reasons, the district court's orders regarding child support and possession of the house in the present case were not an abuse of discretion. Kenneth's final contention is that the district court erred by failing to apply to his medical practice the methods of apportionment of separate and community property interests in a business set forth in Pereira v. Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909) or Van Camp v. Van Camp, 53 Cal. App. 17, 199 P. 885 (1921). This court has required district courts to utilize either the Van Camp or Pereira apportionment methods in classifying separate property businesses. Wells v. Bank of Nevada, 90 Nev. 192, 194, 522 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1974). Even assuming the district court erred by failing to apply one of these two apportionment methods, however, Kenneth has failed to establish that such error was prejudicial. Kenneth has pointed to no evidence to refute the district court's determination that the business and business goodwill were entirely community property; thus, no issue of apportionment of separate and community shares in the medical practice even arises. The only question facing the district court was one of valuation of a community medical practice, including the business good will. The district court's finding that the vast bulk of value of the practice consisted of goodwill appears sound. In valuing the business good will, the district court was free to use any legitimate method of valuation which measures the present value of goodwill by taking into account past earnings. Ford v. Ford, 105 Nev. ___, ___, 782 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1989). Here, the district court's valuation of goodwill was well within the range of valuations offered at trial, and the valuations were properly reached by methods which took into account past earnings. Accordingly, the district court's valuation must stand.