Opinion ID: 1273552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Defenses

Text: Considering Haskins' last proposition first, we are of the opinion that there is no constitutionally protected right to hold incompatible offices or employments. The antiquity of the common-law rule; the great number of cases in which it has been applied; the public policy served by a requirement of undivided loyalty; all lead us to conclude that application of the rule against holding incompatible offices, whether by the common law or as it might be declared by legislative enactment, does not result in an unconstitutional infringement of personal and political rights. The rights protected by §§ 2 and 3 of art. 1 of our constitution, as well as those protected under the first, ninth, tenth, and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, are not absolutes and do not preclude imposition, by decision or statute, of such reasonable restrictions on those rights as are in the public interest. Thus, while it has been said that a public officer or employee has the right to engage in political expression and run for political office, Sweezey v. New Hampshire (1957), 354 U.S. 234, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311; Monitor Patriot Company v. Roy (1971), 401 U.S. 265, 91 S.Ct. 621, 28 L.Ed.2d 35, it has also been held that if this personal interest comes in conflict with a compelling state policy or interest the person's right must be considered subordinated to the public interest. United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO (1973), 413 U.S. 548, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796, approves and reiterates the holding in United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell (1947), 330 U.S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754, sustaining restraints imposed by Congress upon the right of federal officers and employees to participate in political activities. These decisions sustain the right of the sovereignty to impose reasonable restrictions on personal and political rights. We believe this is also an answer to Haskins' claim under his third affirmative defense that he is entitled to hold his office under § 22.1-299, W.S. 1957, Cum. Supp. 1973, providing that a qualified elector of the school district is eligible to hold the office of school district trustee. The statute does not purport to eliminate or restrict the rule against holding incompatible offices, and we can not so construe it. We therefore hold that application of the rule against incompatibility is not an unreasonable interference with any of Haskins' political rights and that the first three affirmative defenses as alleged in the amended answer are without merit upon the issues involved. We then proceed to the question of whether the right of Haskins to hold the office of trustee while continuing as a teacher is proscribed by the common-law rule against incompatibility.