Opinion ID: 4512513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Navistar’s Propositions of Law

Text: {¶ 14} Navistar asserts three propositions of law. First, it argues that the commission abused its discretion by failing to address evidence of Bisdorf’s voluntary retirement. Second, it argues that the reports of Drs. Rutherford and Grunstein show that Bisdorf could have worked four hours a day and that the commission abused its discretion by failing to consider various nonmedical factors (e.g., Bisdorf’s age, education, and work record) before concluding that Bisdorf could not engage in sustained remunerative employment. And third, it argues that Dr. Rutherford’s opinion is conclusory and contradictory and that the commission abused its discretion by relying on it. We reject the first two arguments and do not reach the third.
{¶ 15} “A claimant’s eligibility for permanent-total-disability compensation may be affected if the claimant has voluntarily retired or abandoned the job market for reasons not related to the industrial injury.” State ex rel. Black 6 January Term, 2020 v. Indus. Comm., 137 Ohio St.3d 75, 2013-Ohio-4550, 997 N.E.2d 536, ¶ 14. Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D), which provides guidelines that “shall be followed” by the adjudicator of an application for PTD compensation, states: If, after hearing, the adjudicator finds that the injured worker voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force, the injured worker shall be found not to be permanently and totally disabled. If evidence of voluntary removal or retirement is brought into issue, the adjudicator shall consider evidence that is submitted of the injured worker’s medical condition at or near the time of removal/retirement. (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d). Navistar’s first proposition of law asserts that this regulation requires a hearing officer who is adjudicating a claim for PTD compensation to consider evidence of a claimant’s nondisability retirement and to address the issue of voluntary abandonment in the subsequent order. {¶ 16} However, the existence of that obligation depends on whether evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue. As we have explained, “[b]ecause voluntary abandonment of all employment is an affirmative defense and an issue critical to eligibility for compensation for permanent total disability, if evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a hearing officer’s failure to address the issue constitutes a mistake of law.” State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm., 142 Ohio St.3d 313, 2015-Ohio-1352, 29 N.E.3d 972, ¶ 17, citing Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(1)(d). Conversely, however, the Tenth District has concluded that if the defense of voluntary abandonment has not been brought into issue at the SHO hearing, then it is an abuse of the hearing officer’s discretion to address it, because the claimant has not been afforded due process, 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO i.e., sufficient notice and an opportunity to present evidence on the issue. State ex rel. Jenkins v. Indus. Comm., 2017-Ohio-7896, 98 N.E.3d 944, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.). Similarly, in State ex rel. Quarto Mining Co. v. Foreman, an employer argued that the commission had abused its discretion by failing to initiate the issue whether voluntary abandonment precluded PTD compensation. 79 Ohio St.3d 78, 81-83, 679 N.E.2d 706 (1997). This court refused to relax the rule that issues not previously raised are waived and will not be considered by a reviewing court. Id. This court went on to explain that relaxing that rule would “deny the claimant a meaningful opportunity to respond,” id. at 82, and “forc[e] an already overworked commission to comb the files of every PTD case in search of issues that could potentially be raised by both sides at the hearing table,” id. at 82-83. {¶ 17} The question is, therefore, whether Navistar brought evidence of voluntary abandonment into issue at the SHO hearing. While Navistar presented no argument regarding voluntary abandonment to the commission prior to its motion for reconsideration, Navistar asserts that it brought voluntary abandonment into issue by presenting “written evidence and testimony related to the subject” at the SHO hearing. However, this court rejected the same argument in Quarto Mining. In that case, the employer argued that the issue of voluntary abandonment “raises itself by virtue of being manifest in the record.” Id. at 81. This court disagreed, stating that the employer has the burden “to raise and produce evidence on its claim that other circumstances independent of the claimant’s allowed conditions caused him to abandon the job market.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 84. {¶ 18} Navistar attempts to distinguish Quarto Mining by pointing out that the employer in that case first raised the issue of voluntary abandonment in a petition for a writ of mandamus, while Navistar first argued the issue in its motion for reconsideration before the commission. That distinction makes no difference: either way, the claimant has been denied the opportunity to present evidence on the issue. See Jenkins at ¶ 5; see also Quarto Mining at 81-82. The purpose of 8 January Term, 2020 reconsideration of a hearing officer’s order is to address new or changed circumstances, fraud, clear mistakes of law or fact, or errors by the hearing officer—not to permit a party to present additional arguments or evidence that could have been presented at the hearing. See Industrial Commission Resolution No. R08-1-01. In its motion for reconsideration, Navistar argued that the commission had made a mistake of law by not addressing voluntary abandonment, but, as explained above, that argument contradicts Quarto Mining. {¶ 19} Navistar did no more than the employer in Quarto Mining: it merely presented evidence that could relate to voluntary abandonment and then waited for the SHO to “initiate the issue,” Quarto Mining, 79 Ohio St.3d at 83, 679 N.E.2d 706. Navistar has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that it brought Bisdorf’s alleged voluntary abandonment into issue at the SHO hearing. Accordingly, we reject Navistar’s first proposition of law.
{¶ 20} “ ‘Permanent total disability’ means the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). In its second proposition of law, Navistar argues that Bisdorf could have worked four hours a day and that State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, 150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio-4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, therefore required the commission to consider various nonmedical factors before granting Bisdorf’s request for PTD compensation. See State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus. Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 173, 509 N.E.2d 946 (1987) (identifying age, education, and work record as relevant nonmedical factors). {¶ 21} However, the commission is the exclusive finder of fact in workers’ compensation matters. State ex rel. Vonderheide v. Multi-Color Corp., 156 Ohio St.3d 403, 2019-Ohio-1270, 128 N.E.3d 188, ¶ 7. And the commission did not find that Bisdorf could have worked four hours a day. On the contrary, it found that Bisdorf was incapable of performing any sustained remunerative employment 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO solely as a result of the medical impairments from his allowed physical conditions. Accepting Navistar’s argument would require us to reject that factual determination and substitute a new finding that Bisdorf was able to work four hours a day—an improper invasion of the commission’s role as the exclusive fact-finder. {¶ 22} In addition, Bonnlander is inapposite. In Bonnlander, we rejected an argument that the ability to work at least four hours a day necessarily means that the claimant can engage in sustained remunerative employment. Bonnlander at ¶ 13-14, 20. Rather, we held that “there is no hourly standard for determining one’s capability to perform sustained remunerative employment on a part-time basis. The commission decides whether a claimant is capable of sustained remunerative employment on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at ¶ 20. {¶ 23} Unlike in this case, the commission in Bonnlander found that the claimant could work up to four hours per day. 150 Ohio St.3d 567, 2017-Ohio4003, 84 N.E.3d 1004, at ¶ 5. The commission then considered the nonmedical factors listed in Stephenson, 31 Ohio St.3d at 173, 509 N.E.2d 946, and denied the claimant’s request for PTD compensation. Bonnlander at ¶ 6. While the commission may not deny PTD compensation without considering nonmedical factors, it may grant PTD compensation without considering nonmedical factors when “medical factors alone preclude sustained remunerative employment.” State ex rel. Galion Mfg. Div., Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Haygood, 60 Ohio St.3d 38, 40, 573 N.E.2d 60 (1991). That is what occurred here: the commission concluded based on medical evidence that Bisdorf could not work at all. Navistar’s argument that the commission was required to consider the Stephenson nonmedical factors is therefore not well-taken. Accordingly, we reject Navistar’s second proposition of law.
{¶ 24} “[E]quivocal medical opinions are not evidence.” State ex rel. Eberhardt v. Flxible Corp., 70 Ohio St.3d 649, 657, 640 N.E.2d 815 (1994). 10 January Term, 2020 “[E]quivocation occurs when a doctor repudiates an earlier opinion, renders contradictory or uncertain opinions, or fails to clarify an ambiguous statement.” Id. In its third proposition of law, Navistar argues that Dr. Rutherford’s opinion is equivocal on the question whether Bisdorf could have engaged in sustained remunerative employment and that the commission abused its discretion by relying on Dr. Rutherford’s opinion. However, this argument is immaterial, because the commission relied on the reports of both Dr. Rutherford and Dr. Grunstein, and even if we were to exclude Dr. Rutherford’s report as equivocal, Dr. Grunstein’s report would constitute some evidence supporting the commission’s conclusion that Bisdorf was incapable of sustained remunerative employment. See State ex rel. Ehlinger v. Indus. Comm., 76 Ohio St.3d 400, 402, 667 N.E.2d 1210 (1996). Accordingly, we do not reach Navistar’s third proposition of law.