Opinion ID: 2277887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Regular or Frequent Employment by a Court of Law

Text: The Board concluded that a violation of Section 17 B of Rule and Regulation 1 occurred based on its finding that [Mr. Oudin] is the owner of a bail bond company and a company [Court Services] which is regularly or frequently employed by a court of law. Though the introductory paragraph of Court Services' contract for services states that the agreement is between Court Services and the City of Pine Bluff, the Board points to substantial evidence that the contract is between Court Services and the Pine Bluff Municipal Court. The evidence in favor of the Board's decision consists of the following: (1) the third recital of the contract states,  [w]hereas, A.C.A. section 16-17-217(a) (Repl.1994) authorizes the Municipal Court, upon approval of the governing body of a municipality, to execute a contract with a person for the collection and enforcement of fines and costs; (2) Paragraph No. 1 of the contract states, Court Services is hereby retained by the Municipal Court to monitor and collect installment payments of fines and court costs; (3) Paragraph No. 2 of the contract lists certain services that Court Services will provide in cooperation with the Municipal Court; and (4) the contract is signed by Mr. Oudin and both the Mayor of Pine Bluff and the Pine Bluff Municipal Judge. In spite of the above-referenced language in the contract, Appellees maintain that the contract at issue was solely between Court Services and the City of Pine Bluff and that Court Services performs a service for the municipal court that is not prohibited by applicable statutes, rules, or regulations. In support of this argument, Appellees point out that the Pine Bluff City Council passed an ordinance on December 21, 1998, waiving competitive bidding and authorizing the mayor, municipal judge, and city clerk to execute the contract with Court Services for the collection of outstanding fines. They also emphasize Mr. Oudin's testimony that Court Services provides a service for the court but actually contracts with the city and county governments and his testimony that employees of Court Services have no contact with the municipal judge. Once again, our standard of review requires us to review the agency's decision, giving the evidence its strongest probative force in favor of the agency's decision, and to determine whether the Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Pursuant to this standard of review, viewing the evidence in the Board's favor, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision that the contract is between Court Services and the Pine Bluff Municipal Court.
We turn next to the Board's argument that the status of Court Services as an independent contractor is irrelevant to the Board's interpretation of Rule and Regulation 1, Section 17 B. There is no dispute that, according to the contract at issue, Court Services acts as an independent contractor and is not an agent, employee or servant of the City. The Pulaski County Circuit Court, in its order entered on March 26, 2001, reversed the Board and concluded that Rule and Regulation 1, Section 17 B, does not apply to independent contractors. We disagree and hold that the Board's interpretation of the regulation is not clearly wrong. The Board admittedly relied upon Attorney General's Opinion No. 98-194 as to the relevance of Court Services' status as an independent contractor. We need not address the effect of that opinion, however, other than to note that Attorney General's opinions are not binding precedent. See, e.g., City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990); Klinger v. City of Fayetteville, 293 Ark. 128, 732 S.W.2d 859 (1987). [3] The first rule in considering statutory meaning is to construe the statute exactly as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. See, e.g., Bob Cole Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Howard, 307 Ark. 242, 819 S.W.2d 274 (1991). An administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation will not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hillsboro Manor Nursing Home, Inc., 304 Ark. 476, 803 S.W.2d 891 (1991). It is also important to note that, in considering the administrative intent behind a regulation, this court should not engage in interpretations that defy common sense and produce absurd results. See, e.g., Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 4 S.W.3d 493 (1999). Appellees assert that the phrase regularly or frequently employed does not ordinarily refer to independent contractors because the term frequently employed could apply to temporary workers and does not necessarily apply to independent contractors. They further claim, without citation to authority, that because independent contractors are not specifically mentioned within the regulation's prohibition they are necessarily excluded. These arguments assume that independent contractors are not employed by those for whom they work. Though Appellees are correct in asserting that there is a clear distinction between employees and independent contractors, it does not follow that independent contractors are not employed. The specific arguments made by Appellees elucidate the flaw in their logic. Appellees point out several indicia of an independent-contractor relationship. For example, they assert that [c]haracteristic of an independent contractor relationship is that the employer does not possess the power of controlling the person as to the details of the stipulated work. (Emphasis added). See Jackson v. Petit Jean Elec. Co-op, 268 Ark. 1076, 599 S.W.2d 402 (1980). Appellees also point out that circumstances to consider in determining whether a workman is an independent contractor include the time for which a workman is employed and the right to terminate employment without liability. See Arkansas Transit Homes v. Aetna Life & Cas., 341 Ark. 317, 16 S.W.3d 545 (2000); Parker Stave Co. v. Hines, 209 Ark. 438, 190 S.W.2d 620 (1945). These specific arguments indicate that independent contractors, though clearly not employees within the legal definition, are still considered to be employed by those for whom they work. A holding by this court that the regulations preventing bail bondsmen and bail bond companies from engaging in employment with courts of law do not apply where the bondsmen or bond companies are independent contractors, rather than employees, of such courts would produce absurd results. Likewise, exempting independent contractors would defeat the purpose of the regulation, which is to prevent objectionable conflicts of interest. See Ark. Code Ann. § 17-19-105 (Repl.2001) (prohibiting bondsmen or bond companies from giving or promising anything of value to a person who has power to hold in custody). Appellees further their argument that Section 17 B of Rule and Regulation 1 does not apply to them by underscoring the fact that, in addition to being an independent contractor, Court Services, Inc., is a corporation. They maintain that Court Services and the bail bond company are separate corporate entities and the Board improperly pierced the corporate veil in order to find liability. This argument is without merit. The Board's order simply states:

.... Respondent, Marc Oudin violated Section 17 of Rule and Regulation 1 in that he is the owner of a bail bond company and a company which is regularly or frequently employed by a court of law. As demonstrated by its order, the inquiry before the Board under Section 17 B of Rule and Regulation 1 was whether any owner, partner, stockholder, or officer of a bail bond company was regularly or frequently employed by a court of law. Clearly, Marc Oudin, Jr., is the owner, sole shareholder, and contact person for a bail bond company, Bail Bond Financing, Inc. Marc Oudin, Jr., is also the owner, sole shareholder, and contact person for Court Services, which is regularly employed by the Pine Bluff Municipal Court. Pursuant to our standard of review, we cannot say that the Board's interpretation of Rule and Regulation 1, Section 17 B, is clearly wrong. Reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the Board's decision. CORBIN, J., not participating.