Opinion ID: 2421581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equal Protection and State Racial Discrimination Claims

Text: The players argue that they have raised material facts showing that the officers' actions were impermissibly motivated by race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Rhode Island state laws. There are disputes over whether the legal contours of the rights in question would have been clear to a reasonable officer and over whether a reasonable officer would have perceived a violation of recognized rights under the factual circumstances present in this case. We begin with the rights in question and then assess the factual circumstances. Our analysis under the Equal Protection Clause looks to (1) whether the appellant was treated differently than others similarly situated, and (2) whether such difference was based on an impermissible consideration, such as race. Macone v. Town of Wakefield, 277 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2002). A plaintiff must show that the defendant selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon a protected group. In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 119 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such intent may be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts. Donahue v. City of Boston, 371 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). The players assert that this analysis forbids official actions that effectuate the known discriminatory intention of others. Citing United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir.1987), they argue that a police search that works to effectuate such discriminatory intentions voiced by a crowd violates the Equal Protection Clause. See id. at 1226. We read that decision more narrowly; in any event, it is insufficient to make plaintiffs' proposition into clearly established law. The players do not cite any cases from this court or the Supreme Court finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of purposeful discrimination on the part of the relevant officials. Accordingly, we hold that the players have not shown that it is clearly established that acts that effectuate the known discriminatory intent of others, without more, violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 241-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040; McGuire v. Reilly, 386 F.3d 45, 63 (1st Cir.2004). Under our clearly established equal protection analysis, the players have failed to demonstrate that all officers of reasonable competence would have believed that the request for a search of the players produced differential treatment. Given that the public had access to the unlocked Coventry locker room, the players argue that the officers had no more reason to search them than they had to search the crowd. Indeed, they argue that the officers had even less reason to search the players because the officers knew Coach Marchand had already searched them and a security guard had accompanied them into the locker room. These claims belie the undisputed fact that Coach Marchand identified the players as the prime suspects in his discussion with the police. Even if Coach Marchand merely intended to convey the crowd's opinion, members of the crowd had not been accused of theft. Even if we assume that the officers had no more reason to search the players than the crowd, the players fail to produce sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent to defeat qualified immunity. This court has noted that discriminatory animus seldom wears its garb openly and more often comes masked in subtle forms. Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1067 n. 12 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1082 (3d Cir.1996)). Nonetheless, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must make more than conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, or unsupported speculation. Pineda v. Toomey, 533 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.2008). A non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The players do not present such specific facts on the issue of racial animus in this case. They point to the alleged racial slurs made by the crowd and claim that the officers should have ordered the crowd to disperse or move farther away from the bus. They also claim that the officers sought to incite the crowd by displaying some of the players' iPods and cell phones. But testimony from both Coach Marchand and the players contradicts the inference that racial animus motivated the officers. No officer uttered a racial slur. It is uncontested that the officers acted courteously and told members of the crowd to stop jeering at the players. There is no evidence that all officers of reasonable competence would have believed the search was undertaken because of the national origin or race of the players. Given this conclusion, the players also cannot defeat the officers' qualified immunity defenses against their claims under Rhode Island's Racial Profiling Prevention Act and Ethnic Intimidation Statute. The Racial Profiling Prevention Act covers disparate treatment of an individual on the basis, in whole or in part, of the racial or ethnic status of such individual, with an exception not relevant here. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.2-3. The Ethnic Intimidation Statute covers behavior which would reasonably be construed as intended to harass or intimidate [a] person because of his or her race. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-35(a). For the reasons stated above, the players have not raised a genuine issue of material fact that satisfies either of these standards.