Opinion ID: 766112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Error Requires Reversal

Text: 48 Habeas corpus challenges to state court convictions are among the most frequently litigated matters in the federal district courts and courts of appeals, and assessment of harmlessness is probably the single most recurring issue presented in such cases. Peck v. United States, 102 F.3d 1319, 1327 (2d Cir. 1996) (in banc) (per curiam) (Newman, J., concurring). That issue must be faced here as well. 49 In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-09 (1991), the Supreme Court articulated two categories of constitutional error, trial error and structural defects. As the Supreme Court summarized in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), trial error is one that `occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury,' and can be assessed `in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine [the effect that it had on the trial].' Id. at 629 (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08 (alteration in original)). In federal habeas proceedings, trial error is analyzed using the harmless error standard set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). That analysis seeks to determine `whether the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 4 (1996) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776)). 50 Structural defects, by contrast, encompass defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by `harmless-error' standards. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309. A common example of a structural defect is deprivation of the right to counsel. See id. (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). Harmless error inquiry cannot salvage a conviction in the presence of structural errors; automatic reversal is necessary because they infect the entire trial process. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 629-30. 51 For the purposes of harmless error analysis the Supreme Court has explained that [w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict,' that error is not harmless. And, the petitioner must win. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995). The Court explained that grave doubt means that in the mind of the judge the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error. Id. at 435. According to the Court, this grave doubt rule both protects individuals from unconstitutional convictions and helps to guarantee the integrity of the criminal process by assuring that trials are fundamentally fair. Id. at 442. 52 It is within this framework that we analyze the jury charge in this case. Smalls contends that harmless error analysis does not apply because the erroneous charge impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and, as such, is similar to such structural error violations as improper reasonable doubt instructions and deprivation of the right to counsel. Indeed, the district court stated that it would appear that a coercive Allen charge is akin to improper reasonable doubt instructions, a partial judge, or deprivation of the right to counsel, and therefore a `structural error' to which harmless error analysis is inapplicable. Smalls, 6 F.Supp.2d at 222-23. 53 Nevertheless, ruling in the alternative, the district court reasoned that even if the error was trial error, and harmless error analysis applied, the writ should issue. The court explained that because grave doubt exists concerning whether the Allen charge indeed had `substantial and injurious effect or influence' in determining the jury's verdict, the error is not harmless. Smalls, 6 F.Supp.2d at 223. 54 After viewing the charge in light of the entire record, we need not decide which category of constitutional error was committed here. Even if the supplemental jury charge constituted trial error, the writ must issue because we agree with the district court that grave doubt exists as to whether the coercive Allen charge had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence' in determining the jury's verdict. Id. 55 In particular, three times during the course of deliberations the trial judge reminded the jurors that they had a duty and responsibility to convince other jurors that their views were correct. Moreover, the trial judge failed to balance this charge with language that would remind the minority not to surrender their conscientiously held beliefs merely for the purpose of obtaining a unanimous verdict. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to say with any certainty that the erroneous charge did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. In such a situation, the petitioner must win. O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 436.