Opinion ID: 203719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope determination

Text: Arbour argues that he was not involved in a single criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Rather, he contends that he was involved in four separate clusters of criminal activity, none of which individually met § 3B1.1(a)'s numerosity or extensiveness requirement. Arbour identifies these four clusters by their direct participants: 1) Arbour, Jackson, and Landry; 2) Arbour, Giannelli and Jeremy Messer; 3) Arbour and Thompson; and 4) Arbour, Giannelli, Dubreil, and Dean James. [3] In Arbour's view, each group was associated with separate instances of criminal activitythe first three were involved in the procurement of firearms and the fourth, in drug trafficking. For § 3B1.1(a) to apply, the criminal activity that the defendant led or organized must have involved five or more participants or been extensive. § 3B1.1(a). The disjunctive language of § 3B1.1(a) is importanta criminal activity may be extensive even if does not involve five or more participants. Id. cmt. n. 3 (In assessing whether [a criminal activity] is `otherwise extensive,' all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive.); see also United States v. Laboy, 351 F.3d 578, 585 n. 10 (1st Cir.2003) (The `five or more participants' and `otherwise extensive' elements are alternative means of finding the required scope under § 3B1.1.); United States v. D'Andrea, 107 F.3d 949, 957 (1st Cir.1997) (citing Rostoff, 53 F.3d at 413). In addition, a court may look beyond the specific crimes for which the defendant was convicted when determining whether the criminal activity satisfied the numerosity or extensiveness requirement. Laboy, 351 F.3d at 585-86. The court may consider all relevant conduct surrounding the crimes of conviction. Id. at 586 (rejecting defendant's argument that the assessment was limited to the people directly involved in the three drug sales to which the defendant pled guilty when making the numerosity/extensiveness determination). Here, the district court did not commit clear error when it found that Arbour was involved in a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Although the court found that Arbour's criminal activity met both the numerosity and extensiveness requirements of § 3B1.1(a), we focus on the extensiveness component. When determining whether a criminal activity is extensive, we have noted that courts should consider the totality of the circumstances, including not only the number of participants but also the width, breadth, scope, complexity, and duration of the scheme. Pierre, 484 F.3d at 89 (quoting United States v. Dietz, 950 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir.1991)). Arbour was involved in an extensive criminal activitythe trade of drugs for firearms and vice-versathat involved a host of knowing and unknowing participants. This overarching activity encompassed all of the four clusters of criminal activity that Arbour identifies. Arbour trafficked drugs in Maine for a period of roughly eighteen months, supplying various individuals, including Dubreil, with cocaine and crack cocaine. In the course of this drug trafficking, Arbour unlawfully acquired at least six firearms. At sentencing, the government introduced evidence linking Arbour's unlawful acquisition of firearms with his drug trafficking. On at least two occasions, Arbour, a convicted felon unable to obtain firearms legally, paid othersin the form of drugs to acquire firearms for him. Jackson, who dealt drugs for Arbour on a fairly regular basis, acquired two firearms for Arbour in order to pay off a drug debt. In acquiring these firearms for Arbour, Jackson, who was too young to purchase the weapons himself, employed the services of Landry. In addition to Jackson, Arbour enlisted Giannelli to acquire firearms for him, paying Giannelli with cocaine for his service. The government also introduced evidence that, after paying others drugs to acquire firearms for him, Arbour traded these firearms for drugs. First, Giannelli testified that after he turned a firearm over to Arbour, he witnessed a number of men arrive at Dubreil's home in cars with either Massachusetts or Connecticut plates. Giannelli observed the men enter a room with Arbour and Dubreil, and explained that it was his understanding that these individuals supplied Arbour with drugs and received goods in exchange. Subsequently, when Giannelli inquired into the status of the firearm he purchased for Arbour, Dubreil told him it was already gone. Second, during a raid of a home in Massachusetts, federal agents acquired, in addition to a significant amount of cocaine, a number of firearms. Two of these firearms were traced to Thompson, who had purchased them at Arbour's direction and expense. Finally, during the district court proceedings, Arbour's counsel conceded that Arbour traded guns for cocaine on at least one occasion. In light of the significant evidence of cross-pollination between Arbour's drug and firearms dealings, both in the form of overlapping goods and criminal participants, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred in rejecting Arbour's attempt to compartmentalize his criminal activity into separate, unrelated clusters.