Opinion ID: 2205488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Commonality Requirement Has Been Met

Text: ¶ 27 Commonality requires only that a single issue of fact or law be common to each class member. J.B., 186 F.3d at 1288; Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639, 642 (D.Utah 1998). To have a common issue, there must be a discrete legal question of some kind. J.B., 186 F.3d at 1289. Simply asserting systematic violations of the law is not sufficient to meet the requirement of commonality, because it does not present a common question. Id. The district court is given wide discretion in determining commonality, because it is `in the best position to determine the facts of the case' and the `consequences of alternative methods of resolving the issues.' Id. (quoting Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 826 (10th Cir. 1995)). ¶ 28 The district court found that commonality exists in each of the classes proposed by the Purchasers. First, for the classes arising from the Purchasers' VTP claims, the district court certified three classes defined as (1) all those who had purchased VTP products from Midway Auto Plaza, (2) all those who had purchased Edge Guard products from Midway Auto Plaza, and (3) all those who had purchased Edge Guard products from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi. The district court determined that a common question among these classes was, whether the defendants' vehicle theft policies violate the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are available? Second, for the classes arising from the Purchasers' GAP claims, the district court certified two classes defined as (1) all those who had purchased GAP insurance from Midway Auto Plaza and (2) all those who had purchased GAP insurance from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi. The district court determined that a common question among these classes was, whether the defendants' GAP policies violate the Utah Insurance Code, and if so, which legal remedies are available? Third, for the classes arising from the Purchasers' doc fee claims, the district court certified two classes defined as (1) all those who had purchased a vehicle from Midway Auto Plaza and (2) all those who had purchased a vehicle from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi. The district court determined that a common question among these classes was whether the defendant's actions violated the law and thus render the documentary fee provisions of the sales contract invalid? [5] Each of these questions is discrete and common among the respective class members. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's finding on commonality. ¶ 29 Because the district court certified the VTP and GAP class actions based only on a violation of section 31A-15-105(2) of the Utah Code, and not based on any other claim made by the Purchasers, this is the only question concerning the VTP and GAP class actions that we address on appeal. Similarly, the district court certified the doc fee claims based only on the question of whether the Car Dealers' actions violated the law, and not based on the individual claims made by the Purchasers. Therefore, this is the only question concerning the certification of the doc fee class actions that we address. ¶ 30 The Car Dealers make two arguments against the district court's findings. First, they argue that there was no common plan or scheme perpetuated by the Car Dealers against the members of the class. Second, they argue that resolution of the common questions in each action would require individual inquiry into each purchaser's claim. ¶ 31 The Car Dealers' first argument misconstrues the requirements of commonality. The district court was required to find only a common question of law or fact among each member of the class that would have to be resolved in order for any class member to recover in a claim. Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2); J.B., 186 F.3d at 1288. It was not required to find a common plan or scheme by the defendants. Commonality is principally concerned with the characteristics of the class, not of the defendant in a class action. 1 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:13 (4th ed. 2002). As noted above, the district court found a common question for each class. ¶ 32 The second argument by the Car Dealers is that each proposed class lacks commonality because resolving the questions in each class would require inquiries into the factual circumstances of each individual purchase. The Car Dealers list possible factual differences for each claim. For instance, they point to the doc fees claims and argue that some class members may not have been overcharged, some class members may have seen an explanation of the fees prior to signing the contract, and some class members may have understood and accepted the doc fees. Likewise, they argue the claims for VTP products and GAP insurance also contain factual variances. Class members purchased different types of VTP products. Both the VTP products and GAP insurance may have had different administrators and underwriters for each purchaser. The Car Dealers argue that maintaining these classes would cause this case to devolve into a series of individual trials on issues peculiar to each plaintiff. Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 166 (D.Kan.1996). We disagree. ¶ 33 Although there may be varying factual differences between each purchaser within each class, there still remains a common question that must be answered for any class member to recover. Concerning VTP products and GAP insurance, the district court stated the primary consideration is whether the defendants sold the plaintiffs an insurance product at a time when the defendants did not have a license to sell insurance products. It is irrelevant whether these products had different administrators and/or different underwriters. Likewise, concerning doc fees, the district court found the common question to be, whether the appellants' actions violate the law and thus render the documentary fee provisions of the sales contract invalid? ¶ 34 There will often be individual factual issues in a class action. The presence of these issues, however, does not necessarily prevent a district court from finding commonality. Payne v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 216 F.R.D. 21, 25 (D.Mass.2003); Scholes v. Stone, McGuire & Benjamin, 143 F.R.D. 181, 185 (N.D.Ill.1992); 4 Conte & Newberg, supra § 13:16. [T]he commonality requirement has been characterized as a low hurdle easily surmounted. Scholes, 143 F.R.D. at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not find that the potential individual issues argued by the Car Dealers justify preventing the trial court from exercising its discretion in favor of certification at this point. ¶ 35 One reason that district courts are allowed such broad discretion is that rule 23(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure grants the district court the ability to alter or amend the order of class certification before the decision on the merits. Thus, if it becomes necessary, the class action may be amended to contain subclasses to meet the factual pattern of the case. Furthermore, if it is found by the district court that the individual transactions of the class members are too varied to be categorized into subclasses, it is within the discretion of the court to decertify the class. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding commonality in these classes.