Opinion ID: 1857696
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim Against Schminkey.

Text: Hollingsworth alleged that Schminkey was negligent in: (1) failing to keep and maintain his vehicle in a proper operating condition, (2) operating the vehicle without taking proper precautions to ensure all exhaust fumes were properly discharged, (3) operating a vehicle not in proper working condition, (4) operating the vehicle in a careless manner without regard to safety of other persons, and (5) failing to keep the surfaces of his driveway in good and safe condition. He alleges that Schminkey's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and the resulting injury and damage to him. Schminkey denied the allegations. In his motion for summary judgment, Schminkey stated that the injuries and damages were caused by Hollingsworth's act of lifting Schminkey, not the manner in which he operated, maintained, or used his vehicle. In his supporting statement, Schminkey cited the district court's ruling on the State Farm claim. The district court considered the concepts of foreseeability and proximate cause. It recognized: When conduct or forces occur after an actor's conduct, the actor may be relieved of liability, even when his conduct is a cause-in-fact of the injury, if a court finds the later occurring conduct is such as to break the chain of causal events between the actor's conduct and the injury. The court stated the key question in regard to Schminkey's motion is whether or not the fire constituted a force which occurred after Schminkey's conduct which relieved Schminkey of liability for his decision to drive an unsafe car. Concluding the fire was not a foreseeable consequence of the operation of the vehicle, the court held the fire was a force which relieved Schminkey of liability of his conduct. We do not agree the fire was a superseding event that relieves Schminkey of liability for his conduct. Generally, questions of negligence and proximate cause are for the jury; however, in exceptional cases they may be decided as matters of law. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(10); see Ruden, 543 N.W.2d at 607; Burton v. Des Moines Metro. Transit Auth., 530 N.W.2d 696, 703 (Iowa 1995). We have discussed the question of proximate cause in many cases. We have stated: It is a rule too well established to require the citation of authority, that the question of proximate cause is generally for the jury to determine, although the line of demarcation between what is sufficiently proximate and what is too remote is often a thin one. If upon looking back from the injury, the connection between the negligence and the injury appears unnatural, unreasonable, and improbable in the light of common experience, such negligence would be a remote rather than a proximate cause. If, however, by a fair consideration of the facts based upon common human experience and logic, there is nothing particularly unnatural or unreasonable in connecting the injury with the negligence, a jury question would be created. Henneman v. McCalla, 260 Iowa 60, 66-67, 148 N.W.2d 447, 451 (1967) (quoting Chenoweth v. Flynn, 251 Iowa 11, 17-18, 99 N.W.2d 310, 314 (1959)). In Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 349 (Iowa 1991), we stated: Factors to consider in determining whether an actor's conduct is a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injury include the proximity and foreseeability of the harm flowing from the actor's conduct, although it is not necessary that the actual consequences of a defendant's negligence should have been foreseen. When conduct or forces occur after an actor's conduct, however, the actor may be relieved of liability if a court finds that the later-occurring event is such as to break the chain of causal events between the actor's negligence and the plaintiff's injury. This is so even when the actor's conduct is a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's harm. (Citations omitted.) We have recently reviewed the requirement of causation in tort actions. See Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810, 813-18 (Iowa 1996). In Gerst, we found the majority of our decisions require a plaintiff to meet both the but-for test of causation (with the concurrent cause exception) and the Restatement substantial factor test. Id. at 817. A superseding cause is a third party's act or other force that intervenes to prevent the defendant from being liable for harm to the plaintiff that the defendant's antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440 (1965); Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co., 257 N.W.2d 7, 15 (Iowa 1977). An intervening force is one which actively operates to produce harm to another after the actor's negligent act or admission has been committed. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 441(1). We have approved the considerations in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding cause, as identified in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 442. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. General Elec. Co., 352 N.W.2d 231, 235-36 (Iowa 1984). It is clear that not all intervening forces become superseding causes: The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443. To relieve an individual from liability, the intervening act or force must not have been a normal consequence of his or her acts or have been reasonably foreseeable. Haumersen, 257 N.W.2d at 15. In other words, an intervening force which falls squarely within the scope of the original risk will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Stevens v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 528 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Iowa 1995). In Stevens, plaintiff was attending middle school when he was physically assaulted by another student. He sued the school district, alleging it failed to: warn its students of danger, control its students, and properly supervise the premises. The jury was instructed that if the plaintiff's injuries resulted from unforeseen and sudden acts of another pupil, these acts would be a superseding cause of the injury, and the negligence of the school district could not be the proximate cause. The jury found that the school was negligent, but that its negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. We held the superseding cause instruction should not have been given. Id. A defendant is not relieved from liability by the fact that the risk to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Id. To summarize, in order for an act or force to be a superseding cause, thereby relieving a negligent defendant from liability, the intervening force must not have been reasonably foreseeable. Generally, where the defendant's negligence has created a stimulus for the plaintiff's act there is no break in the chain of events which would prevent the negligent defendant's liability. 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 650, at 607 (1989). The principles of intervening forces and superseding causes must be carefully applied when a rescue is involved. In most cases, the person being rescued is not relieved of liability. Under the rescue doctrine efforts to protect the personal safety of another have been held not to supersede the liability for the original negligence which has endangered it.... There is ... an independent duty of care owed to the rescuer, which arises even when the defendant endangers no one's safety but the defendant's own. The rule is not limited to spontaneous or instinctive action, but applies even when there is time for thought. And whether the person injured in the attempt at rescue is the rescuer, or the person rescued, or a stranger, the original wrongdoer is still liable. W. Page Keeton et. al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 44, at 307-08 (5th ed. 1984). Restatement (Second) of Torts section 445, in a special application of the rule stated in section 443, addresses these situations in which the conduct of a person has created a danger only to himself or herself, but where it is reasonable to anticipate that others might attempt to rescue him or her from the self-created peril, and sustain harm in doing so. Section 445 provides: If the actor's negligent conduct threatens harm to another's person, land, or chattels, the normal efforts of the other or a third person to avert the threatened harm are not a superseding cause of harm resulting from such efforts. An illustration of section 445 states: A negligently drives a tank truck full of gasoline so that it goes off of the highway and is wrecked. A is knocked unconscious, and the truck catches fire. B, a bystander, attempts to rescue A from the burning truck, and while he is doing so the gasoline explodes, injuring B. A is subject to liability to B. Under the record, a court or jury could infer from the undisputed facts that Schminkey drove his station wagon with knowledge that the exhaust system was defective, causing carbon monoxide to be emitted into the passenger area. It was reasonably foreseeable that he or others could be harmed by his action. The fire that alerted Hollingsworth was a foreseeable risk of Schminkey's operation of the defective vehicle, not a superseding act or event. A reasonable jury could find that Hollingsworth's rescue of Schminkey was an act done in normal response to the fear or emotional disturbance caused by Schminkey's negligence. Summary judgment should not have been granted to Schminkey.