Opinion ID: 755762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New York Law as to Interference with Parental Custody

Text: 55 Notwithstanding the trial court's unobjected-to instruction that if Erna Pittman was the defendant on trial here she would be liable to both Mr. Pittman and Elizabeth for the damages they suffered as a result of Elizabeth being taken to Iceland (Tr. 349), the existence and contours of a tort cause of action for interference with parental custody under New York law are far from clear. As we recently noted, New York has very few cases dealing with this tort or related torts in this context. Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 594 (2d Cir.1994). The question raised here by Icelandair is whether New York law recognizes, on behalf of either parent or child, a claim for damages for interference with parental custody on account of the removal of the child from the jurisdiction in violation of a court order where the removing parent, at the time of the removal, had joint custody. New York law has not provided a definitive answer. 56 New York cases, including one decided since Minot, have indicated that in some circumstances there is recognized a tort of intentional interference with parental custody. See, e.g., Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital, 62 N.Y.2d 523, 531, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838, 842, 467 N.E.2d 502 (1984) (ruling that parents had no cause of action against a hospital for negligence in permitting child's abduction from its nursery, but distinguishing, obiter, cases involving intentional torts such as ... willful disobedience of a court custody order  (emphasis added)); Casivant v. Greene County Community Action Agency, Inc., 234 A.D.2d 818, 819, 652 N.Y.S.2d 115, 117 (3d Dep't 1996) (mem.), aff'd, 90 N.Y.2d 969, 665 N.Y.S.2d 952, 688 N.E.2d 1034 (1997); Harley v. Harley, 170 A.D.2d 779, 781, 565 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (3d Dep't 1991) (mem.) (The tort of interference with custody is not unheard of ....) (citing, e.g., Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F.Supp. 15, 19 (E.D.N.Y.1978)), appeal dismissed, 79 N.Y.2d 1035, 584 N.Y.S.2d 441, 594 N.E.2d 935 (1992). Further, some courts have indicated that a noncustodial parent who has visitation rights has a cognizable claim against the custodial parent for removal of a child from the jurisdiction in violation of the court order permitting visitation, see, e.g., McGrady v. Rosenbaum, 62 Misc.2d 182, 188, 308 N.Y.S.2d 181, 188 (1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 917, 324 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1st Dep't 1971), although they have stated that the remedies for such a violation do not include money damages, see id. (remedy against a spouse who violates a court order respecting custody or visitation by removing the child from the state is by way of contempt or by precluding her standing to challenge the order or to enforce its support provisions, not by an action for damages); Friedman v. Friedman, 79 Misc.2d 646, 647, 361 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109-10, (1974). On the other hand, New York courts have indicated that damages may be a proper remedy for a custodial parent who has a valid claim for intentional interference with her custodial rights in knowing violation of the custody order. See, e.g., Lisker v. City of New York, 72 Misc.2d 85, 89, 338 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1972) (refusing to dismiss complaint seeking damages against municipal Home for the keeping [of] plaintiff's child without lawful justification and the delivery of the child to foster parents after the Home had been notified by the mother of her right to custody of the child). That case, however, did not deal with a defendant parent who had joint custody. 57 In Casivant v. Greene County Community Action Agency, Inc., 234 A.D.2d 818, 652 N.Y.S.2d 115 (Casivant ), the most recent pertinent state-court opinion of which we are aware, the Appellate Division stated that 58 [t]he tort of intentional interference with a parent's custodial rights is rather narrow. As the Court of Appeals noted in Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp. (62 N.Y.2d 523, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838, 467 N.E.2d 502), cases upholding the existence of this tort have involved violent abduction, willful disobedience of a court custody order, and wrongful detention (supra, at 531, 478 N.Y.S.2d 838, 467 N.E.2d 502). 59 234 A.D.2d at 819, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 117. The Casivant court dealt with a plaintiff father who alleged that a court order had given him sole custody of three children and that the defendants (who included the children's mother and an employee of a domestic-violence shelter) had knowingly violated that order. The court held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint where (a) the father failed to produce, in response to the summary judgment motion, the court order that he claimed had given him sole custody, and (b) the defendants stated under oath that they did not know of an order awarding the father sole custody and believed instead that the mother and father had joint custody. The Casivant court's emphasis that defendants' assumption that the parents shared custody of the children was certainly not unreasonable, id. at 820, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 117, may well indicate that custodial interference by or at the behest of a parent who had joint custody would not have been viewed as tortious. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 comment c (1976) (When the parents are by law jointly entitled to the custody ... of the child, no action can be brought against one of the parents who abducts or induces the child to leave the other.). Even so, however, Casivant would not necessarily resolve the actionability of Erna's conduct here, for Casivant did not involve a court order expressly prohibiting one parent from removing the children from the court's jurisdiction. Nor did it purport to address the rights of the children themselves. 60 There is little authority as to the standing of a child, such as Elizabeth, to assert a claim of interference with custodial rights, but what little state authority we have found suggests that a child cannot maintain such an action. See, e.g., Offenhartz v. Cohen, 168 A.D.2d 268, 268, 562 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1st Dep't 1990) (mem.) (indicating that child could not hold her custodial parent liable for abduction, and remarking that cause of action for abduction belongs solely to a parent); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 (one who interferes with a parent's right to custody is subject to liability to the parent  (emphasis added)); cf. Harley v. Druzba, 148 Misc.2d 564, 566-67, 560 N.Y.S.2d 959, 961 (1990) (dismissing sibling's claim for custodial interference where sibling had not been awarded custody, though refusing to dismiss her statute-based claim to visitation); Whalen v. County of Fulton, 941 F.Supp. 290, 299 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (brother could not maintain an action for custodial interference) aff'd, 126 F.3d 400 (1997); but cf. Bennett v. Town of Riverhead, 940 F.Supp. 481, 488-89 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest against governmental interference with the custody of their children, and [t]his interest is reciprocal in that it belongs to the children as much as it does to parents). 61 In sum, the validity of Icelandair's contention that the New York courts would not recognize a cause of action in favor of either Frederick or Elizabeth for money damages against Erna, Elizabeth's joint custodian, for traveling with Elizabeth in violation of a court order, is unclear. We conclude, however, that we need not decide that question in this case, for Icelandair is sued as an aider and abetter or coconspirator; and while it cannot be held liable on such a concerted-action theory if Erna herself has not committed a cognizable tort, see, e.g., Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, 295, 582 N.Y.S.2d 373, 375, 591 N.E.2d 222 (1992) (It is essential that [inter alia ] ... one of the defendants committed an act in pursuance of the agreement which constitutes a tort ....), it also cannot be held liable if any of the other elements of a concerted-action claim have not been established. Since, for the reasons discussed in the following section, we conclude that the notice element of concerted action was not established, we leave it to the state ... [to] lead the way in developing its law in this area, balancing the delicate issues involved. Minot v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d at 594.