Opinion ID: 1189016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for a new trial

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to consider his new trial motion which was based on an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, citing State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 539 P.2d 556 (1975). The trial court noted that the ineffective assistance of counsel allegation was better addressed in a post-conviction proceeding and denied the new trial motion because, inter alia, it was not the proper vehicle for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We find no error in the trial court's actions. Idaho Code § 19-2406 sets forth the only bases for the grant of a new trial. Ineffective assistance of counsel is not included in that list. Thus, as previously noted by this Court, while a decision of whether to grant a new trial is a discretionary matter for the trial judge, I.C. § 19-2406 limits the instances in which that discretion may be exercised. State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 873, 781 P.2d 197, 210 (1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 803 (1990). Only those grounds provided statutorily can support the grant of a new trial. State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 485 P.2d 144 (1971); State v. Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 273 P.2d 97 (1954); State v. Davis, 6 Idaho 159, 53 P. 678 (1898). Further, in Lankford, we held that a trial judge does not abuse his or her discretion unless a new trial is granted for a reason that is not delineated in the code or unless the decision to grant or deny a new trial is manifestly contrary to the interests of justice. 116 Idaho at 873, 781 P.2d at 210. We recognize that Tucker could be read to support appellant's argument that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be the basis for a grant of a new trial. In Tucker, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether a new trial should be granted on the ground of inadequacy of counsel. Id. at 12 and n. 9, 539 P.2d at 547 and n. 9. However, Tucker came to this Court on appeal not only from the denial of the motion for a new trial, but also from the dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, and it is not clear from the opinion that the ineffective assistance of counsel argument was specifically raised in the new trial motion. From the Court's holding, it might appear that Tucker asserted ineffective assistance of counsel in both the motion for new trial and the post-conviction petition. However, in footnote 9 the Court noted: [T]he record before us does not indicate whether the issue of assistance of counsel was argued on the motion for a new trial. Id. at 12, 539 P.2d at 547. In any event, the Court was not directly presented in Tucker with a challenge to the use of a new trial motion to question the assistance of counsel. To the extent that Tucker may be read to permit such a challenge in a motion for new trial, it stands squarely in the face of statutory and abundant case law indicating that ineffective assistance of counsel is not grounds for a new trial. As did the trial court in this case, we consider the holding therein to be unpersuasive. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the ineffective assistance of counsel allegation as a basis for new trial and in denying the new trial motion on that basis.