Opinion ID: 864487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the chancellor made findings of fact

Text: WHICH ARE NOT IN THE RECORD AND, THEREFORE, THE FINDINGS ARE IN ERROR. Exclusion of Witnesses ¶56. The Eastern Objectors aver that the court erred in failing to allow Eastern Objectors named in the pleading to be classified as parties and to be allowed to remain in the courtroom. The Eastern Objectors claim that it would have been too numerous to include 500-600 Eastern Objectors in the style, so they only listed four names and listed the other objectors in Exhibit “A” attached to the Eastern Objectors’ answer. ¶57. Petal argues that the court properly excluded witnesses that were not parties to the litigation from the courtroom. Petal also argues that it was proper to remove them from the courtroom to ensure that their testimony would not be affected by other witnesses. ¶58. M.R.C.P. 10(a) states in pertinent part that “[i]n a complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but in all other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of the other parties.”(emphasis added). Furthermore, M.R.E. 615 states: At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause. ¶59. We find that because the 500 plus names of other witnesses from the eastern annexation area were not initially listed as parties on the original complaint, they are not considered parties in this matter. We also find that when the rule of sequestration of 22 witnesses was invoked the eastern annexation witnesses were properly excluded from the courtroom. Thus, we find that the chancellor committed no error in allowing only the four named persons listed as parties to remain in the courtroom, once the rule was invoked. Exclusion of Evidence ¶60. The Eastern Objectors also assign error to the exclusion of exhibits that they claim used facts and information already in evidence. Petal contends that the trial court properly refused to admit evidence that was not previously disclosed in response to Petal’s discovery request. Additionally, Petal argues that the Eastern Objectors waived this objection by not making an offer of proof after the chancellor sustained this objection. ¶61. A chancellor’s ruling on whether evidence is excluded as a sanction for violating discovery rules rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and cannot be reversed unless an abuse of that discretion is shown. M & M Pipe & Pressure Vessel Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts, 531 So.2d 615, 620 (Miss.1988). Discovery rules are designed to prevent trial by ambush. Kinard v. Morgan, 679 So.2d 623, 626 (Miss.1996). Therefore, a court may exclude undisclosed evidence of a party who fails to comply with a discovery order. M.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(B); Ladner v. Ladner, 436 So.2d 1366, 1370 (Miss.1983). However, this Court has also held that: [e]xclusion of evidence is a last resort. Every reasonable alternative means of assuring the elimination of any prejudice to the moving party and a proper sanction against the offending party should be explored before ordering exclusion. McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 694 (Miss.1992). In the imposition of sanction [s], the trial court has considerable discretion in matters pertaining to discovery and its orders will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of discretion. Kilpatrick v. Mississippi Baptist Medical Ctr., 461 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss.1984). 23 TXG Intrastate Pipeline Co v. Grossnickle, 716 So.2d 991, 1013 (Miss. 1997). Furthermore, sanctions can be imposed even if no court order has been entered compelling discovery. Id. at 1013. ¶62. During his direct testimony, Joseph Lusteck, an urban planner, testified about census results for Petal between 1990 and 2000. He stated that he had reduced his findings to writing if it would be useful to the court. The attorney for Petal objected to the introduction of Lusteck’s report because it was not furnished during discovery. The court sustained this objection. The Eastern Objectors have failed to demonstrate how they were prejudiced by the exclusion of this evidence. We find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in excluding Lusteck’s report.