Opinion ID: 887762
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Hearsay Statements at Issue are Testimonial

Text: ¶ 115 As explained above, a statement is testimonial when the declarant made it under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. See ¶ 89, supra; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. at 1364. In other words, what should the declarant have anticipated regarding the probable prosecutorial use of her statement given the nature of her statement, the circumstances under which it was made, and to whom it was made. (Again, she is deemed to have intended the natural consequences of her actions.) Here, Debra's statements to Grove, King, and Buennemeyer are testimonial. ¶ 116 Dawn Grove testified that she observed the Mizenkos arrive by car at their home at approximately 4:00 P.M. on October 3, 2003, and that at approximately 5:00 P.M., Debra appeared at her door, with a large dog, visibly upset and with a wound on her cheek or jaw. Grove had no recollection of Debra crying. Debra asked Grove to call 911 and another person, Carol Richard. Over objection, Grove testified that [Debra] said that her husband had been drinking and was trying to hurt her. Grove did not let Debra into her home. Rather, she placed the call to 911 on a cordless phone and handed the phone out to Debra. Grove did not hear Debra's conversation with the dispatcher. ¶ 117 Debra's statement that [my] husband [has] been drinking and [is] trying to hurt [me] (assuming Grove accurately recounted it) is undoubtedly testimonial. First, the nature of the statement was accusatorial, as Debra was claiming to be the victim of a crime, was describing the nature of that crime (domestic abuse), and was identifying the perpetrator of the crime (her husband). Granted, she did not give Grove a detailed account of what had taken place in the Mizenko home that afternoon, and her statement was not formal by any means; but it was compelling accusatorial evidence nonetheless. Indeed, the prosecutor found the statement to be extremely compelling, as he asked Grove to repeat it at Mizenko's trial, then repeated it himself while Grove was still on the stand (Q. And you stated that he had been drinking and had hurt her? A. Yes.), and then relied on it in his argument to the jury ([W]hat [Debra] told Dawn Grove, is what [Mizenko] did.). ¶ 118 Second, Grove testified at trial that I know [Mizenko] a little bit more than [Debra] but I don't know them very well. Thus, although Debra was speaking to a private party, it was someone with whom she did not have an intimate relationship or an expectation of confidentiality. Cf. Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring, at 544 (When a statement is accusatory and intended to be conveyed beyond those who would be expected to keep it confidentialto government agents, private agencies that perform government functions, and strangers at arms length from the witness it should be considered testimonial.) (emphasis added). An expectation of confidentiality would have been especially unreasonable here in light of Debra's concurrent request that Grove call 911. ¶ 119 Third, Debra herself set the prosecutorial machinery in motion by walking over to Grove's house, stating that Mizenko was trying to hurt her, asking Grove to call the authorities, and then telling King (the 911 operator) that she wanted Mizenko arrested. As the following colloquy between King and Debra establishes, Debra undoubtedly understood (and even intended) with all of the statements she made after leaving her house, as well as the evidence she left behind there, that she was creating evidence for prosecutorial use against Mizenko. King: What's going on out there? Debra: Um. He hit me, pulled my hair out, and knocked me down. I tried so hard not to call, but um, this is ridiculous. I can't do this anymore. .... King: So he has hit you and he's pulled out your hair? Debra: Yes. There's evidence of it in the house. I'm at the neighbor's. I left the hair on the floor and everything else. I want him arrested! Significantly, Mizenko had been arrested for and convicted of Partner or Family Member Assault at least twice within the preceding twelve months. [35] Thus, Debra had to have understood that there was a significant probability her statement to Grove accusing Mizenko of this same crime would be used prosecutorially. [36] Indeed, I seriously doubt that the resulting prosecution came as a surprise. ¶ 120 Accordingly, given Debra's arm's length relationship with Grove, the incriminating nature of her statement (which is undeniable, given the fact that the prosecutor elicited it from Grove and then repeated it himself at least twice during Mizenko's trial), and the fact that Debra solicited the involvement of law enforcement, she should have realized that she was creating evidence and she should have anticipatedwhether she intended it or notthat her accusatory statements made to Grove and King for the explicit purpose of having Mizenko arrested once again would be used in a later prosecution of him. ¶ 121 Nevertheless, the majority holds that Debra's statements to Grove are nontestimonial. See ¶ 27. This conclusion rests on several mischaracterizations of the nature of Debra's statements as well as a number of speculations not supported by the record. For instance, the majority, using its sixth sense, states that Debra, having fled her own home . . ., sought sanctuary from which to take her next step; that she sought the immediate solace that [Grove] could provide; and that she went to Grove's house in order to share the burden of a traumatic beating. ¶ 27. Yet, the only statements from Debra to Grove in the record before us are Call 911! and [My] husband [has] been drinking and [is] trying to hurt [me]. There is no evidence that Debra asked for sanctuary; rather, the record reflects that she only asked Grove to call 911 and Carol Richard and that, upon concluding her call to 911, Debra returned home, where Deputy Buennemeyer found her upon arriving at the scene. Moreover, the record establishes that Grove barely knew Debra; that they were not friends who shared the burdens of traumatic events with each other; that Grove did not let Debra into her home; that Grove instead handed a cordless phone out to Debra and then walked away (Grove testified that she did not hear Debra's conversation with the 911 operator); and that after the 911 call, Debra did not remain at Grove's house to plan her next step or obtain solace. Thus, Debra's statements to Grove and the circumstances in which they were made cannot fairly be characterized as a confidential conversation in the nature of sharing an emotional burden. ¶ 122 The majority also conjectures that Debra did not call 911 and Carol Richard from the Mizenkos' house because she did not feel sufficiently secure there. ¶ 27. Yet, there is nothing in the record to explain why Debra walked to Grove's house to make her call(s). (It is also unclear whether Debra ever called Carol Richard.) What the record does establish is that Debra returned home to wait for Deputy Buennemeyer, notwithstanding the very real possibility that Mizenko would return and continue the assault, ¶ 27. [37] Thus, an equally plausible theory for why Debra did not call 911 and Carol Richard from the Mizenkos' house is that she wanted a witness to her accusations and her physical condition. ¶ 123 The majority's portrayal of the circumstances in which Debra made her statements to Grove, therefore, is not supported by the record. Furthermore, while the majority reasonably infers that these statements provided context for why Debra had sudden[ly] appear[ed], with dog in tow and a freshly bruised face, on [Grove's] doorstep, ¶ 27, the fact that Debra's statements may have explained her presence at Grove's doorstep does not make them nontestimonial. Rather, the question is whether Debra should have understood there was a significant probability the statements would be used prosecutorially. For the reasons discussed above, she should have. ¶ 124 Similarly unavailing is the majority's alternative characterization of Debra's statements to Grove as primarily a cry for help. ¶ 27. It is unclear what the majority means by a cry for help, particularly in light of the facts that Debra never requested medical assistance from anyone (despite the fact that she had a visible wound on her cheek or jaw) and that Mizenko had left his and Debra's house by the time of Debra's call to 911. But even if Debra's statements were primarily a cry for help, this does not make them nontestimonial, since a cry for help may at the same time be an accusatorial statement (e.g., That man just stole my purse! or My husband just beat me! Call 911!) that the declarant anticipates or should anticipate will be used prosecutorially. Is the problem that Debra's accusation was not sufficiently explicit relative to her cry for help (yet another undefined standard)? We are left to speculate, though it is worth noting that such a premise (that the statement is testimonial only if the accusatorial aspect of the statement outweighs the aid-seeking aspect of the statement) has no support in Crawford. ¶ 125 Attributing uncommon naiveté to Debra, the majority ultimately decides that she lacked reason to believe that her statement would be used prosecutorially as substantive evidence against Mizenko. ¶ 27. This conclusion is belied by the facts that Mizenko had been arrested for and convicted of Partner or Family Member Assault at least twice within the preceding twelve months and that Debra felt she [couldn't] do this anymore, left evidence of the alleged assault in the house, and walked over to Grove's house with an intent she later stated explicitly to King to have Mizenko arrested. The majority argues that [i]f she had anticipated such use, in all likelihood, she would have divulged greater detail, as she later did when speaking with 911 operator King. ¶ 27. This reasoning presumes, however, that Debra expected Grove not to remain nearby (or at least within earshot) while Debra divulged greater detail of the alleged assault to King, which seems unlikely if, as the majority claims, Debra went to Grove's house expecting to obtain immediate solace and share the burden of a traumatic beating, ¶ 27. More importantly, the majority has stated the inquiry backwards: it is not whether Debra's anticipation (i.e., her intention, as anticipation is used by the majority here) should have led her to make a sufficiently detailed statement, but rather whether her statement (and the circumstances in which it was made) should have led her to anticipate prosecutorial use thereof. As explained above, irrespective of Debra's reasons for not providing Grove with a more extensive description of what had happened at the Mizenko home that afternoon, the degree of detail in Debra's statements was sufficiently accusatorial and compelling under the circumstances (as confirmed by the prosecutor's subsequent reliance on those statements at trial) to make the statements testimonial. ¶ 126 In addition, the assertion that Debra had no objective reason to believe or anticipate that her statement would be used in court since she was in distress and addressing a non-governmental agent, her neighbor, ¶ 27, is pure folly. A woman who appears on a neighbor's doorstep visibly upset with a fresh wound on her cheek or jaw and who asks the neighbor to call 911, explaining that my husband has been drinking and is trying to hurt me, has every reason to anticipate that her statements will be used in court against her husband, particularly when she is clearly contemplative, as was Debra: I can't do this anymore.... I want him arrested! To suggest, as does the majority, that a person such as Grove would be unaffected by the sight of a battered neighbor standing on her doorstep and take no action (such as alerting law enforcement) in the face of domestic abuse occurring just next door reflects a dimand unjustifiedview of the citizenry of this State. ¶ 127 The majority cites Compan v. People (Colo.2005), 121 P.3d 876, as support for its position. See ¶ 28. In Compan, however, the statements of the victim/declarant (Martinez) inter alia, that her husband had hit her and that she was frightenedwere made to a friend (Vargas) in a context that suggests Martinez reasonably expected Vargas not to repeat them; rather, the statements were made for the purpose of getting to safety and shar[ing] the burden of an emotional event. Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring, at 573. As for getting to safety, Martinez stated to Vargas over the telephone that Compan was angry and yelling at her, that she feared Compan would hit her, and that she wanted to be picked up. Martinez also asked to stay at Vargas's home. See Compan, 121 P.3d at 877. As for sharing the burden, when Vargas picked Martinez up, Martinez prefaced her explanation of what Compan had done with `Gloria, I just have to tell you what's been happening to me. I can't believe it.' Compan, 121 P.3d at 877. By then, Compan had hit Martinez, see Compan, 121 P.3d at 877, and she was clearly terrified of him. She asked Vargas to `hurry, hurry. Get out of here. He's standing right there, and he might come after me.' Compan, 121 P.3d at 878. Yet, although she was hurt, Martinez did not ask Vargas to call the police and take her to the hospital until after Martinez had calmed down, about twenty or thirty minutes after they had arrived at Vargas' home. See Compan, 121 P.3d at 878. ¶ 128 By contrast, the record in the case at hand, as discussed above, establishes that Grove and Debra were not friends. Thus, this is not a case in which the declarant made statements for the purpose of sharing the burden of an emotional event with someone she could reasonably expect would keep her statements in confidence. To the contrary, Debra left evidence of the alleged assault in the house and walked over to Grove's a short time after the assault, according to the majority, see ¶ 34, implying that her decision to have Mizenko arrested (because this is ridiculous. I can't do this anymore.) was made contemporaneously with the assault and before she made her statements. Her intent, she later stated explicitly to King, was to have Mizenko arrested. Getting to safety and/or obtaining medical assistance were never mentioned. Consequently, Compan does not support the majority's conclusion that Debra's statements are nontestimonial. ¶ 129 Finally, relying on generalities the majority informs us that a statement made by the victim of a crime to a friend, a family member, an acquaintance, or a loose acquaintance and describing the crime, identifying the perpetrator or both is nontestimonial unless the declarant had clear reason to believe that [the statement] will be used prosecutorially. ¶ 30. As support for this proposition, the majority provides a multi-page string citation. See ¶ 30. Notably, none of these courts applied a clear reason to believe standard or referred to the respective declarants as loose acquaintance[s], an amorphous term which the majority leaves undefined. Moreover, these cases do not stand for the majority's broad generalization that statements made to loose acquaintance[s] are nontestimonial. As explained above, the reasonable anticipation or expectation of the declarant as to whether her statement to a private party will be used for evidentiary purposes depends on the nature of the statement and the circumstances or formalities under which it was made. This conclusion flows in part from Professor Mosteller's discussion of statements made to private parties ( see ¶ 93, supra, quoting Mosteller, Encouraging and Ensuring, at 573), which the majority itself favorably cites ( see ¶¶ 21, 27). As such, the majority's string citation only proves that under the particular circumstances in which the particular statements were made, the courts concluded that the declarants should not have anticipated prosecutorial use thereof. But even if these cases supported the majority's loose acquaintance standard, its string citation is still of minimal persuasive value. Although extant authority, ¶ 30, in medieval Europe supported the view that the world was flat, Europeans' persistent determination in this regard did not make their belief true. ¶ 130 Accordingly, the majority's characterizations of Debra's statements and the circumstances under which they were made are nothing but an unrealistic assessment of what Debra should have reasonably expected (if the majority is applying an objective standard), and an inaccurate assessment of what Debra actually intended and believed (if the majority is applying a subjective standard), given the nature of her statements to Grove and the circumstances under which she made them. [38] ¶ 131 As to dispatcher King's testimony, she testified to receiving a 911 call from the Grove residence at about 5:30 P.M. and to speaking with a person at that residence. [39] She stated that she could not tell who was actually on the phone. Over objection, King testified that the person with whom she spoke was [w]inded and upset and that this person said that [Mizenko] hit her, pushed her down and she had hair he had pullen [sic] out her hair, and that [s]he wanted him arrested. These hearsay statements were testimonial for the same reasons discussed above. ¶ 132 Lastly, Deputy Buennemeyer testified, over objection, and recounted Debra's statements which were made while taking the deputy around the home and pointing out evidence of the alleged assault. He testified that she told him the tufts of hair found in the house were her hair, pulled from her head, during an altercation at her residence, at that time and date. As noted above ( see note 14), these statements fit within the category of interrogations by law enforcement officers, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 124 S.Ct. at 1365. While we can equivocate, as did the Supreme Court, over what constitutes an interrogation, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n. 4, 124 S.Ct. at 1365 n. 4, it is clear that Buennemeyer asked Debra questions during his investigation, that she answered those questions, and that he gathered inculpatory evidence on the basis of those questions, all in support of the State's case, not unlike the officer who took statements from Sylvia Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 39-40, 52-53 & n. 4, 124 S.Ct. at 1357, 1364-65 & n. 4. Thus, the statements to Buennemeyer are testimonial as well. ¶ 133 Because all of the statements at issue in the case at hand were testimonial, Crawford's categorical bar applies. The statements were inadmissible at Mizenko's trial unless (1) Debra was unavailable and (2) Mizenko had a prior opportunity to cross-examine her. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 55-56, 59, 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1365, 1366-67, 1369, 1374. There is no dispute that Mizenko did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine Debra. Accordingly, I could conclude my analysis under the testimonial perspective of Crawford at this point by simply observing that the hearsay statements should not have been admitted. However, I am compelled by the manner in which the question of unavailability was handled by the District Court to comment on this issue.