Opinion ID: 504859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 8 Under the Disputes clause, which essentially incorporates the standard of review set forth in the Wunderlich Act, [t]he decision of [WMATA's] Board of Directors or its duly authorized representative ... shall be final and conclusive unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have been fraudulent, or capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. J.A. at 39; see also 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1987). The Disputes clause, in accordance with the Act, goes on to state that Nothing in this contract ... shall be construed as making final the decisions of the Board of Directors or its representatives on a question of law. J.A. at 39 (emphasis added); see also 41 U.S.C. § 322. 9 Success on a changed conditions claim turns on the contractor's ability to demonstrate that the conditions it encountered during performance differed materially from those indicated in the contract documents. See P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed.Cir.1984). The Board's determination as to the conditions that were actually encountered during the performance of the contract is purely factual in nature and therefore is entitled to finality where supported by substantial evidence and not otherwise arbitrary. Arundel Corp. v. United States, 515 F.2d 1116, 1123, 207 Ct.Cl. 84 (1975); Dale Ingram, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1177, 1184, 201 Ct.Cl. 56 (1973); Foster Constr. C.A. & William Bros. Co. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 878, 193 Ct.Cl. 587 (1970). In this case, there is no dispute over the actual conditions encountered; the parties agree that Granite-Groves experienced sand and water intrusion problems during tunneling. See J.A. at 19, 25. The only question here is whether materially different subsurface conditions were indicated in the contract between Granite-Groves and the WMATA. Determination of the claimed contract indications is a matter involving analysis and interpretation of the contract documents, and thus presents a question of law for the court to decide independently of the decision [269 U.S.App.D.C. 277] of the Board. See, e.g., P.J. Maffei, 732 F.2d at 916-17; George Hyman Constr. Co. v. United States, 564 F.2d 939, 944, 215 Ct.Cl. 70 (1977); Foster, 435 F.2d at 880; Arundel, 515 F.2d at 1123. In interpreting a contract, it is proper for the court to place itself into the shoes of a 'reasonable and prudent' contractor and decide how such a contractor would act in the situation at hand. H.N. Bailey & Associates v. United States, 449 F.2d 387, 390, 196 Ct.Cl. 156 (1971), quoted in P.J. Maffei, 732 F.2d at 917). However, where the Board's interpretation of a contract is reasonable and based on the Board's expertise, its determination, while not binding, will be given careful consideration and accorded great respect. McCollum v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 373, 375 (1984); Raytheon Co. v. United States, 2 Cl.Ct. 763, 767 (1983); George Hyman, 564 F.2d at 944; Dale Ingram, 475 F.2d at 1177; Winston Bros. Co. v. United States, 458 F.2d 49, 54, 198 Ct.Cl. 37 (Ct.Cl.1972) (stating that while court is not bound by Board's contract interpretations, we accord them great respect, as emanating from a source having expertise).