Opinion ID: 1166825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The imposition of post-judgment interest on punitive damages is proper.

Text: NRS 17.130 outlines computation of a judgment and imposition of any interest thereon. [6] The statute provides for interest to accrue on a judgment as of the date the complaint was served, although interest on certain parts of a judgment, such as damages not incurred until after the complaint was served, accrues as of the date those damages were actually sustained, see, e.g., Gibellini v. Klindt, 110 Nev. 1201, 1209, 885 P.2d 540, 545 (1994) (holding pre-judgment interest accrues on costs from time incurred after complaint served); LTR Stage Lines v. Gray Line Tours, 106 Nev. 283, 289, 792 P.2d 386, 389 (1990) (holding pre-judgment interest accrues on damages from time actually incurred after complaint served). Powers argues that the plain language of the statute does not preclude post-judgment interest on punitive damages; rather, it provides for interest on a judgment. In the present case, the jury award included compensatory and punitive damages, cumulatively comprising the judgment in the case. Powers argues that every aspect of a judgment entered by the court should be treated the same, and that interest should accrue on punitive damages as of the date the judgment is awarded. We have held that pre-judgment interest does not accrue on punitive damages because a plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right. Ramada Inns v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 711 P.2d 1 (1985). We later expanded this rule to apply to post-judgment interest on punitive damages. Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958, 110 S.Ct. 376, 107 L.Ed.2d 361 (1989) (hereinafter  Ainsworth II ). Powers asks this court to revisit the issue and consider the policies in favor of imposing post-judgment interest on punitive damages awards. The purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the plaintiff for loss of the use of the money awarded in the judgment `without regard to the elements of which that judgment is composed.' Air Separation v. Lloyd's of London, 45 F.3d 288, 290 (9th Cir.1995)(quoting Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir.1973)). In Air Separation, the Ninth Circuit also noted that failing to award post-judgment interest creates an incentive for the defendant to exploit the time value of money by frivolously appealing or otherwise delaying timely payment. Id. Moreover, awarding post-judgment interest on exemplary damages is consistent with the purpose of post-judgment interestcompensation to a successful plaintiff for the intervening time between entitlement to and actual payment of an award of damages. Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 51 (5th Cir.1992). In response to USAA's contention that allowing interest to accrue on punitive damages would deter meritorious appeals, we note that the courts require defendants who appeal from a judgment for compensatory damages to pay interest, and that imposition is not considered to deter meritorious appeals. Moreover, a defendant whose conduct was egregious enough to warrant the imposition of punitive damages should not be given preferential treatment and be allowed to make money during the appellate process on what has been ordered to be paid to the plaintiff. Based upon our review of the policies mentioned above, we believe that Ainsworth II should be modified to the extent that it denies successful litigants post-judgment interest on punitive damages. Accordingly, we conclude that Powers' punitive damage award should have accrued post-judgment interest as of the date the judgment was entered.