Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Bivens Doctrine and Implied Causes of Action

Text: In the review of the Bandonis' claim for relief under the Rhode Island Constitution, it is useful to look to the federal courts, which have repeatedly addressed the question of whether the Federal Constitution is judicially enforceable without any express prior legislative or constitutional authorization. Central to their discussion has been the development and refinement of the doctrine arising from the landmark federal decision of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), and its progeny. I acknowledge at the outset that we are not bound by the Bivens rationale because the Rhode Island Constitution is an independent source of rights. Nevertheless I deem its rationale to be directly relevant to the question of our judicial power to implement a cause of action vindicating the victims' rights provision in our State Constitution. In addition I observe that Bivens and its progeny confirm the unquestionable power of the Judiciary to entertain causes of action for monetary damages for alleged constitutional violations (hereinafter Bivens actions). But for the same reasons discussed previously, I note again that in the case at bar this Court is not so limited to recognizing a cause of action just for monetary damages. In Bivens the United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff alleging violations of his Fourth Amendment rights was entitled to sue federal officials in federal court and to obtain monetary damages if he were to pre-vail. 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005, 29 L.Ed.2d at 627. In so holding, the Court observed that the Judiciary had both the authority and the responsibility to be alert to adjust [its] remedies so as to grant the necessary relief' when constitutionally protected rights have been trammeled. Id. at 392, 91 S.Ct. at 2002, 29 L.Ed.2d at 624 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684, 66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939, 944 (1946)). A damages remedy was held to be appropriate because it was the only possible remedy for the plaintiff. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 2011-12, 29 L.Ed.2d at 634-35 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that [for people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing). Injunctive relief would not have obviated the invasion of Bivens' Fourth Amendment rights, and application of the exclusionary rule (itself a judicially created remedy for constitutional violations) was inappropriate since they were not raising the alleged constitutional violations as a defense to a criminal prosecution. Id. In his concurrence Justice Harlan addressed the power of the Judiciary to remedy the violation of federal constitutional rights. First, he rejected the notion that the Judiciary was powerless to permit damages remedies to vindicate social policies which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the popular will. Id. at 403-04, 91 S.Ct. at 2008, 29 L.Ed.2d at 631. Justice Harlan also deemed it the Judiciary's role to safeguard and enforce the Bill of Rights. He dismissed the notion that the Judiciary must first wait for legislative action, positing that constitutional rights are to be protected absolutely from the will of legislative majorities. [T]he judiciary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests such as those embraced by the Fourth Amendment. To be sure, `it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.'    But it must also be recognized that the Bill of Rights is particularly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular will as expressed in legislative majorities; at the very least, it strikes me as no more appropriate to await express congressional authorization of traditional judicial relief with regard to these legal interests than with respect to interests protected by federal statutes. Id. at 407, 91 S.Ct. at 2010, 29 L.Ed.2d at 633. (Emphasis added.) Finally, Justice Harlan rejected the suggestion that administrative or budgetary considerations could potentially override the judicial power to protect constitutional rightsโ that is, that the Court should disallow a private damages action because increased expenditure of judicial resources would be necessitated by a new class of constitutional litigation. Id. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 2012, 29 L.Ed.2d at 635. He cautioned that limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound constitutional principles. Id. at 411, 91 S.Ct. at 2012, 29 L.Ed.2d at 635. After Bivens the United State Supreme Court twice recognized a cause of action for monetary redress directly under the United States Constitution. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980) (violation of Eighth Amendment's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979) (violation of Fifth Amendment's DueโProcess Clause). In particular, I find Davis illuminating for its discussion of the Judiciary's role in the enforcement of constitutional, as opposed to merely statutory, rights. In Davis the United State Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's use of a multifactor test previously laid out by the Court for determining whether a private cause of action can be implied from a federal statute. 442 U.S. at 232-33, 99 S.Ct. at 2270, 60 L.Ed.2d at 854. The Court found that the question of who may enforce a statutory right is fundamentally different from the question of who may enforce a right that is protected by the Constitution. Id. at 241, 99 S.Ct. at 2275, 60 L.Ed.2d at 860. Statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, thus making it entirely appropriate for Congress to determine additionally the appropriate means of enforcement. Id. In statutory-right cases the correct approach is thus whether the legislative intent informing the particular statute would permit a cause of action. However, the Davis Court emphasized that the analysis differs when constitutional rights are involved because the Judiciary is presumed to be the primary means by which constitutional rights are to be enforced. Id. The bedrock role of the Judiciary in enforcing constitutional rights also finds firm support in the origins of the Federal Constitution. When James Madison presented the Bill of Rights before Congress, he observed: [If the Bill of Rights is] incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be led naturally to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights. 1 Annals of Congress 439 (1789); see also Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 335 (1996) (quoting Madison's speech in the House of Representatives, June 8, 1789). In his examination of the proposed federal government's judicial department, Alexander Hamilton declared the Judiciary to be the faithful guardians of the Constitution, protecting it against legislative invasions    instigated by the major voice of the community. The Federalist No. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed.1961). Hamilton wrote that, as bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments, the Judiciary is to protect against those situations wherein the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing constitution, [act] in violation of those provisions. Id. at 527. As did Madison and Hamilton, I believe that the power of the Judiciary to enforce constitutional rights is part of its checking function against unconstitutional encroachment by other political branches. See also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178, 179 (finding that courts must declare as void acts repugnant to the Constitution and must neither close their eyes on the constitution nor allow constitutional principle to yield to the legislative act). Moreover, it is unquestionably the province of the Judiciary to fashion an adequate remedy when, as here, there is a legal right and that right has been violated. The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. Id. at 163; see also R.I. Const. art. 1, ง 5 ([e]very person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may be received in one's person, property, or character). Thus the recognition of a damages remedy in the case at bar is not only consistent with traditional notions of what it means to exercise the judicial power, but it would also be an abdication of our constitutional duty not to recognize such a legal claim because otherwise the Bandonis would be left remediless. The majority concludes its Bivens analysis by referring to several opinions of the United States Supreme Court decided subsequent to Davis and Carlson, all of which further explored the Court's pronouncement in Bivens that a plaintiffs right to sue for monetary damages directly under the Constitution could be defeated when there are alternative remedies or special factors counseling hesitation. Remarkably though, the majority neglects to indicate that none of these decisions has any applicability to the facts of this case. Recognizing a constitutional right of action in the case at bar is fully consonant with the reasoning proffered by the Supreme Court in those cases for refusing to allow Bivens suits. Indeed those cases are easily distinguishable from the case at bar because of the presence there of special factors counseling hesitation. In sum those cases involved situations in which (1) complex and well-considered administrative remedial schemes already existed to provide meaningful remedies to injured parties such as the plaintiffs, [51] (2) Congress's plenary authority over the military, including its constitutional authorization to make rules governing the military establishment, and the military's unique disciplinary structure weighed in favor of judicial deference to the Legislature, [52] or (3) an attempt to expand the category of defendants against whom Bivens actions may be brought (to include federal agencies as well as federal agents ) would have undermined Congress's prerogative to make decisions involving federal fiscal policy. [53] I discern no special factors counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages remedy here. The Victim's Bill of Rights Act creates no remedial mechanism for victims injured by the government's failure to give them their mandated notice. Although the victim does possess certain other remedies for injuries directly resulting from the acts constituting the criminal offense, [54] these potential alternative remedies address injuries different from the ones about which the Bandonis complain. Compensation or other relief for injuries the Bandonis may have sustained as a result of defendants' failure to provide them with notice and the opportunity to address the court before sentencing are distinct and separate from any remedies that they may possess for the original criminal harm they suffered. Thus, unless this Court allows the Bandonis to maintain a lawsuit for the violation of their constitutional rights as crime victims, they are remediless and their rights to address the court before sentencing are not only unenforceable but meaningless.