Opinion ID: 200534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Defense Cost Obligation

Text: 51 The evidence at trial permitted the jury to find as it did. When a written agreement is ambiguous, the factfinder may entertain extrinsic evidence casting light upon the intention of the parties with respect to the meaning of the unclear language. Hilltop, 755 A.2d at 1063 (internal citations omitted). Crowe testified that Bolduc had promised to indemnify him against any suits. Keach and Tselikis both testified that the intent of the agreements was that Bolduc would be responsible for the costs of defending any suit brought against Crowe. A reasonable jury could have concluded that the agreement imposed an obligation on Bolduc to pay Crowe's defense costs. 52 The business logic of the arrangement also supported the jury verdict that the ambiguous language should be read in Crowe's favor. Since the deal was structured by Bolduc so that he only acquired assets and not the liabilities of Crowe Rope to trade debtors, it was likely those creditors who were owed substantial debts would sue, as did Achille Bayart. It was also likely that Crowe, not Bolduc, would be the defendant. Crowe thus had a strong interest to try to protect against both defense costs and a judgment against him. If Bolduc had intended not to provide any protection as to defense costs, there would have been no need for any of the convoluted language as to defense, nor would there have been a need for the notice provision. If doing nothing as to defense was truly an option reserved by Bolduc, he needed no language at all in an agreement. As to the indemnity of the annuity, Bolduc could simply have inserted language to the effect that: (1) Bolduc agreed to pay any judgment against Crowe (up to the amount of the annuity), but not defense costs, and would pay the indemnity if, and only if, Crowe gave Bolduc immediate notice of the claim made and provided Bolduc the opportunity to assume the defense; and (2) if Bolduc called on Crowe to cooperate with the defense assumed by Bolduc, then Bolduc would pay only Crowe's costs of cooperation (including attorneys' fees). 53 On the question of obligation to pay defense costs, the jury might have concluded in Bolduc's favor, but was not compelled to do so by the evidence. The jury's reading was permissible.