Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Riley's Waiver of the Right to Remain Silent

Text: There is no doubt that Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. on September 9. The issue before us here, however, is whether he waived that right a few hours later, at 1:43 p.m. on September 9. The admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857 (D.C. 1995), this court listed four factors, originally set forth in Mosley, that must be considered in determining whether a suspect's rights have been scrupulously honored: (1) was the suspect orally advised of his rights and did he orally acknowledge them; (2) did the police immediately cease questioning and make no attempts to resume or ask him to reconsider; (3) was there a sufficient break (in Mosley, two hours) between the first and second interrogations and was the second performed at a different location by a different officer about a different crime and (4) were Miranda warnings given before the second questioning session. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. 321; see Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863. The Mosley Court envisioned a case-by-case approach involving an inquiry into all of the relevant facts to determine whether the suspect's rights have been respected. United States v. Dell'Aria, 811 F.Supp. 837, 842 (E.D.N.Y.1993) (cited in Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863). In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this court may not disturb the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. E.g., Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863; see D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001). However, we review de novo whether the defendant's rights were scrupulously honored and whether the police conduct constituted interrogation because these are questions of law. Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 281 (D.C. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 906, 122 S.Ct. 1207, 152 L.Ed.2d 145 (2002); Stewart, 668 A.2d at 863. The trial court ruled that with one failing, which I find to be inadvertent, the police did scrupulously honor [Riley's] right to remain silent . . . having invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. that morning and having decided to waive his rights at 1:30 or 1:43 that same afternoon. In coming to this decision, the court reviewed the events of September 9 following Riley's arrest. The court first noted that the police properly terminated their questioning when Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m. However, Detective DeLoatch then improperly entered Riley's interview room at 10:45 a.m. with the express purpose of eliciting a statement from Riley and interrogating him. Though this was not a proper reinitiation of questioning under Michigan v. Mosley , the trial court concluded, and we agree, that under the totality of the circumstances this isolated act did not invalidate Riley's subsequent waiver of rights or make his confession inadmissible. In Peoples v. United States, 395 A.2d 41 (D.C.1978), the defendant was arrested in Maryland at 9:00 a.m. and thereafter invoked his rights. Despite this invocation, improper questioning ensued, and the defendant admitted to past criminal involvement in the District of Columbia and gave a written confession. Six hours after making this confession, the defendant was again informed of his rights by a magistrate, and he indicated that he understood them. He was then taken back to the police station, where he asked to speak to a District of Columbia police officer. This officer again read the defendant his rights, and the defendant waived them, giving a four-page written statement on the crimes he had committed, signing each page, and initialing a further waiver of his Miranda rights. Though the defendant's initial confessions early in the day were inadmissible, this court held that the trial court did not err in finding appellant's subsequent confession to be voluntary and untainted. 395 A.2d at 44. Although the defendant in Peoples was interviewed about the same crime after invoking his right to remain silent, we held that under the totality of the circumstances the Mosley requirements were satisfied, and thus the statements were admissible. In the case at bar, we are satisfied that, under the totality of the circumstances, the Mosley requirements, as applied in Peoples, were met. [16] Riley invoked his right to remain silent at 9:00 a.m., and the questioning was immediately terminated. Riley was then left alone for a substantial period of time, more than four hours, except for the brief improper remarks that Detective DeLoatch directed at Riley at 10:45 a.m. Later, while Riley was being escorted to the bathroom at around 1:30 p.m., he initiated a conversation on the subject of the murders by making statements to Detective DeLoatch about his innocence which the detective described as unsolicited outbursts. [17] After returning from the bathroom with Riley and hearing his outbursts continue, DeLoatch correctly understood that Riley wished to speak further on the subject. Detective DeLoatch then read Riley his Miranda rights and gave him a waiver form listing these rights, asking if he waived them. After checking the no box next to the question, Are you willing to make a statement at this time without a lawyer?, Riley, without prompting, orally clarified that he was willing to talk but did not want to make a written statement. [18] After Detective DeLoatch explained to Riley that answering yes would not result in a written statement but would simply allow him to talk about the murders, Riley changed his answer from no to yes and waived his rights. [19] During the ensuing conversation Riley told Detective DeLoatch that he had nothing to do with the murders for which he had been arrested. After leaving Riley alone for another long stretch, Detective DeLoatch returned to complete the processing of Riley's arrest. While this was going on, Riley initiated a conversation with Detective DeLoatch by asking if he could speak with Muhammad. Detective DeLoatch arranged a meeting between the two of them at about 7:30 p.m., and during that meeting Riley learned from Muhammad that he had confessed. Riley then decided that he too wanted to confess, and told Detective DeLoatch that he wanted to tell his side of the story. Riley then gave a written statement, in the course of which he admitted his involvement in the murders. Although he was not read his Miranda rights again before writing that statement, which was completed at around 9:40 p.m., the evidence established that he had already heard his rights read several times that day. In addition, he testified at the suppression hearing that he understood his rights because of his prior arrest on August 22, only two and a half weeks earlier. Finally, Riley signed an addendum at the end of his written statement, indicating that he waived his rights and that at no time that day had he requested the aid of counsel. The timing of Riley's confession persuades us that the key factor in prompting him to confess was his 7:30 p.m. meeting with Muhammad, which was arranged at Riley's behest. We hold that Riley's waiver of his Miranda rights shortly after 1:30 p.m. was not tainted by Detective DeLoatch's serious, but ultimately inconsequential, misstep at 10:45 a.m., and that his written confession several hours later  which he gave after his meeting with Muhammad  was not subject to exclusion under Mosley and its progeny.