Opinion ID: 2812632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Apple III

Text: On October 19, 2012, the present Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action against Apple in Ward v. Apple Inc., 4:12-cv-05404-YGR (N.D. Cal.) (Apple III), asserting a single claim that Apple conspired to monopolize the aftermarket for iPhone voice and data services. ATTM was not named as a defendant. The case was consolidated with Apple II. The parties in Apple III stipulated to submit the Apple II briefs on the Rule 19 issue, and agreed that the district court should grant Apple’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(7) if the court decided to follow Judge Ware’s decision in Apple II. The district court granted the motion “for the reasons set forth in Judge Ware’s July 11, 2012 Order,” and entered judgment in favor of Apple. The Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because this is an appeal from a final decision of the district court. We respectfully disagree with the dissent’s conclusion that the judgment below was not “adverse” to the Plaintiffs, as our case law has defined that term. The dissent contends that we “only” have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district court that are “involuntary and adverse to the appellant.” This statement of our law is too broad. We have repeatedly recognized that voluntary dismissals with prejudice that produce an adverse final judgment may be appealed. See Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014); Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1506–09 (9th Cir. 1995); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir. 1986); 10 WARD V. APPLE, INC. Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1342, corrected, 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1985). It is true that our decision in Seidman v. City of Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447, 1448 (9th Cir. 1986), contained broad language stating that “[a] plaintiff may not appeal a voluntary dismissal because it is not an involuntary adverse judgment against him.” However, our decision in Concha v. London clarified that a plaintiff “may appeal from a voluntary dismissal with prejudice, at least where the plaintiff is not acting pursuant to a settlement agreement intended to terminate the litigation.” 62 F.3d at 1057 (emphasis omitted). In doing so, Concha specifically interpreted Seidman to stand for the narrower principle that a plaintiff may not “appeal from a joint stipulation to voluntary dismissal, entered unconditionally by the court pursuant to a settlement agreement.” Id. (emphasis added). And, as the dissent acknowledges, we held in Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc. that “absent a settlement, a stipulation alone does not destroy [the] adversity” required for appellate jurisdiction. 741 F.3d at 1065. The dissent’s conclusion that this judgment was not adverse to the Plaintiffs appears to be based, in part, on a definition of “adverse” that is without basis in our case law concerning statutory appellate jurisdiction. The dissent contends that a judgment is not adverse if “no adverse positions were taken by the parties” or if the issue was not “actually litigated.” The dissent appears to understand “adverse” to refer to whether the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial. Of course, parties must be sufficiently adverse to one another for a justiciable controversy to exist, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304–05 (1943), but we do not understand the dissent to argue that this appeal is non-justiciable because it lacks sufficient adversity for Article III purposes, but rather WARD V. APPLE, INC. 11 only that we lack statutory appellate jurisdiction. In construing our statutory jurisdiction, we have consistently used the term “adverse” to refer to whether a judgment was prejudicial to a party, not whether the parties took sufficiently adverse positions. For example, in Concha v. London we explained that [u]nder Coursen and Unioil, the appealability of a voluntary dismissal ordinarily depends on whether the action was dismissed with or without prejudice. The basic principle we follow is that the plaintiff may appeal a voluntary dismissal only when it is with prejudice to his right to commence another action for the same cause or otherwise subjects him to prejudicial terms or conditions. 62 F.3d at 1507. We went on to explain that “[a] voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not adverse to the plaintiff’s interests . . . [because] [t]he plaintiff is free to seek an adjudication of the same issue at another time in the same or another forum.” Id. By contrast, a voluntary dismissal with prejudice is adverse to the plaintiff’s interests because “the plaintiff submits to a judgment that serves to bar his claims forever.” Id. The judgment in this case is adverse to the Plaintiffs because it bars their claims in future proceedings. The requirement of an adverse judgment is therefore not a barrier to appellate jurisdiction in this case. Reading between the lines, the dissent appears to be concerned that the parties effectively agreed with Judge Rogers to manufacture appellate jurisdiction without presenting the Rule 19 issue to her for an independent 12 WARD V. APPLE, INC. decision. But the record simply does not compel the conclusion that Judge Rogers did not make an independent