Opinion ID: 2542376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Failure of the Written Judgment to Reflect the Sentence the Judge Imposed at the Sentencing Hearing Is a Clerical Error and Subject to Appropriate Correction.

Text: The rule that written judgments prevail is not, however, without exception. See, e.g., Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672 (Ky.2000); Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.01 and CR 60.02; Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.10. Among these exceptions is RCr 10.10, which allows a trial court the latitude to correct clerical errors. The rule provides, in pertinent part: Clerical mistakes in judgments ... may be corrected by the court at any time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is perfected in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. RCr 10.10. Clerical mistakes or errors, as opposed to judicial errors, are all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function. Buchanan v. West Ky. Coal Co., 218 Ky. 259, 291 S.W. 32, 35 (1927). The distinction between judicial and clerical errors does not depend so much upon the person making the error as upon whether it was the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination, regardless of whether it was made by the clerk, by counsel, or by the judge. Id. (citation omitted). Some inaccuracies are clearly clerical errors, such as an incorrect or missing date on a document in the record, Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. McEuen, 281 Ky. 113, 134 S.W.2d 1012 (1939); Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v. Daly, 374 S.W.2d 497 (Ky.1964); a mistake made when transcribing numbers, Weil v. B.E. Buff aloe & Co., 251 Ky. 673, 65 S.W.2d 704 (1933); or a mathematical error when calculating a judgment, Bratcher v. Ohio Co. Bank's Assignee, 152 Ky. 458, 153 S.W. 950 (1913). The nature of other seeming inaccuracies in a trial court's order or judgment, as either clerical or judicial errors, however, is not always so readily apparent. In Wides v. Wides, 300 Ky. 344, 188 S.W.2d 471 (1945), the Court held that a discrepancy between the terms in the parties' separation agreement and the terms in the final judgment, meant to formalize the separation agreement, was not a clerical error. The Wides's separation agreement, which referred to Mr. Wides as the party of the first part and Mrs. Wides as the party of the second part, provided, The party of the first part agrees to pay to the party of the second part, during the lifetime of the party of the first part or as long as the party of the second part remains unmarried, the sum of Forty ($40.00) Dollars per month. 188 S.W.2d at 473. However, the judgment, which purported to be in accord with the parties' separation agreement, provided, Morris Wides, shall pay to the defendant, Leah O. Wides, during the lifetime of the said Leah O. Wides, or as long as she remains unmarried, the sum of Forty ($40.00) Dollars per month. Id. After Morris died, Leah claimed she was entitled to continue receiving payments until her death, per the terms of the judgment, whereas Morris's heirs claimed the contrary terms in the judgment were due to a clerical error and the agreement should prevail, preventing Leah from receiving payments after Morris's death. Id. Lacking a clear indication from the record as to whether the discrepancy between the separation agreement and the judgment was intended by the judge for some undisclosed reason or the product of an unexplained mistake, the Court never definitively found the discrepancy to be an error. Id. It noted that, rather than error, the differing language in the judgment could, for example, be due to a later verbal modification of the separation agreement that was not apparent from the record, but which the court considered before entering judgment accordingly. Id. The Court did definitively find, however, that the error, if any, was a judicial and not a clerical error: Had the same terms of `party of the first part' and `party of the second part' been used in the judgment as in the contract but transposed, or `first' used instead of `second', it might be regarded as a clerical misprision, that is, an error in recording the judgment. But the judgment specifically says the money shall be paid `during the lifetime of Leah O. Wides or until she remarries.' Id. at 474. As either a judicial error, which thus could not be corrected, or a deliberate judicial decision, the outcome was the same: the judgment controlled. Id. In Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672 (Ky.2000), this Court, in a 4-3 Opinion with a vigorous dissent, encountered another problematic determination regarding the nature of an error, this one related to sentencing. In Cardwell, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Id. at 673. At sentencing, in open court with Cardwell present, the trial court stated Cardwell was to serve the ten-year sentence consecutively to a five-year sentence Cardwell had previously received. Id. However, the written judgment failed to include this consecutive provision and it was not until eight months later that the trial court entered an amended judgment correcting the mistake. Id. at 674. While acknowledging the amended judgment was entered well after the judgment became final, a bare majority of the Court held the error was clerical and, consequently, correctable under RCr 10.10. Id. The omission in the original judgment of a provision that Cardwell's sentence was to run consecutive with his previous sentence was a mistake made in reducing the oral judgment to writing. The omission was not the product of judicial reasoning and determination. It was a clerical error. Id. at 674-75. The Court noted the amended judgment did effectively increase Cardwell's sentence by five years, but explained the distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error is not whether the correction of the error results in a substantive change in the judgment. Rather, the distinction turns on whether the error `was the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination.' Id. (quoting Buchanan, 291 S.W. 32). The failure to accurately reduce to writing the trial court's intended sentence, a sentence which was evident from a review of the videotaped record and made known to both parties at the sentencing hearing, was a clerical error the judge could correct pursuant to RCr 10.10. As the Cardwell majority noted: The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner. Id. at 675 (citing Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 67 S.Ct. 645, 91 L.Ed. 818 (1947)). The case at hand bears distinct similarities to Cardwell and, as in that case, we hold the discrepancy between the trial court's intended sentence as stated at the formal sentencing hearingthat Machniak's class D felony sentences run consecutively should Machniak violate probationand the written Judgment, which lacks this provision, was a clerical error. We declare more formally that which the Court in Cardwell implied, i.e., a discrepancy between a trial court's intended sentence and the final judgment is a clerical error where the intended sentence was explicitly expressed by the trial court and fully made known to the parties, and such is readily apparent from the record of the sentencing hearing, with no credible evidence to the contrary. Sentencing is a significant occurrence, as it is when the defendant learns the extent to which he has lost his liberty and the Commonwealth learns what punishment will be imposed. [2] In an ideal world, the written judgment would accurately reflect the appropriate punishment determined by the judge for the crime committed, but unfortunately reality does not always conform to the ideal. Judges have a solemn duty to dispense justice fairly, in accordance with the law, and to maintain the integrity of the justice system so as to merit and hold fast the public's faith in that system. Binding parties to an unintended and mistaken judgment that either delivers an undeserved windfall or imposes an inequitable punishment serves neither party and undermines our system of justice. Unlike Wides, 188 S.W.2d 471, in this case there is a clear record regarding the trial court's intent, namely that Machniak's sentences would run consecutively if Machniak violated probation, a term that was known and agreed to by Machniak. The provision was part of the written plea agreement that Machniak signed and, further, when the trial court took Machniak's guilty plea, and again at sentencing, the judge specifically explained the provision to Machniak, who indicated he understood and voiced no objection. Although Machniak is not entitled to reap the benefit of a clerical error made in reducing his sentence to writing, correction of that error required appropriate action by the trial court under RCr 10.10, action that was never timely taken. [3]