Opinion ID: 1385454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Directed Verdict in Favor of the State

Text: The standard for reviewing a motion for a directed verdict is: not to weigh conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, but is rather to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that reasonable men could not differ in their judgment. (footnote omitted). Rutherford v. State, 605 P.2d 16, 18 (Alaska 1979). See Beaumaster v. Crandall, 576 P.2d 988, 994 (Alaska 1978). If, in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Johnson, a verdict might have come back in her favor against the state, then the court erred in directing a verdict for the state. Mallonee v. Finch, 413 P.2d 159, 160 (Alaska 1966). Thus the state was entitled to a directed verdict only if it can be said that fair-minded jurors, in the exercise of reasonable judgment, could reach but one conclusion, i.e., that the state was not negligent in the design, maintenance, or signing of the roadway where the spur track crosses it. See Bachner v. Rich, 554 P.2d 430, 436 (Alaska 1976). Applying these principles and the negligence standard of due care to the facts of this case leads to the conclusion that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the state. The trial court based its decision on the fact that the state had no notice of the dangerous condition presented to bicyclists by the railway crossing. The court reasoned that the state does not have a duty to guard against all risks, and to the extent that there is a duty, it does not arise until there is notice of the defect. [4] The trial court misconstrued the role of notice in a negligence action against the state for a defective road condition. Johnson's evidence was to be measured against the substantive negligence standard of due care. The duty of care owed by the state to users of its highways is defined by ordinary negligence principles. State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 535 (Alaska 1976); State v. I'Anson, 529 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1974); State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 724-25 (Alaska 1972). That duty requires one to act with the amount of care which a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances. Leigh v. Lundquist, 540 P.2d 492, 494 (Alaska 1975). [5] Notice is relevant, and necessary, when the dangerous condition is not caused by the state. In such a case, the plaintiff must establish either actual or constructive notice. Constructive notice can result if a dangerous condition exists for such a period of time prior to the accident, and is of such an obvious nature, that the defendant public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. See Atlanta v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 353, 166 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1969); Galbreath v. Logansport, 151 Ind. App. 291, 279 N.E.2d 578, 581 (1972); Peters v. State, 400 Mich. 50, 252 N.W.2d 799, 804 (1977); James v. Nashville & Davidson County, 55 Tenn. App. 622, 404 S.W.2d 249, 252 (1966). Cf. Livings v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. App.3d 850, 326 N.E.2d 170, 174 (1975) (continued existence of a defect is sufficient to charge the government with notice); Freeport Transport v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Ky.App. 1966) (same). Notice is also a permissible inference that the jury may draw where there is evidence of prior accidents caused by the asserted dangerous condition. See Burgbacher v. Mellor, 112 Ariz. 481, 543 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1975); Atlanta v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 353, 166 S.E.2d 896, 897 (1969); City of Chicago v. Jarvis, 226 Ill. 614, 80 N.E. 1079, 1080 (1907). When the public entity itself causes the defect, however, notice is not required. Wisener v. State, 123 Ariz. 148, 598 P.2d 511, 513 (1979); Aguirre v. City of Los Angeles, 46 Cal.2d 841, 299 P.2d 862, 864 (1956); Muszynski v. City of Buffalo, 305 N.Y.S.2d 163, 33 A.D.2d 648 (App.Div. 1969), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 810, 327 N.Y.S.2d 368, 277 N.E.2d 414 (1971); Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430, 432-33 (1964). The rule has been well stated as follows in its application to municipalities. Because the standard of care required of the state in keeping its highways safe is the same as that required of a municipality, Wisener, 598 P.2d at 513, the following rule regarding notice applies equally to the state: In seeking a recovery against a city for injuries due to an allegedly defective public way, it is only where the negligence relied on is the failure of the city to remove an obstruction or to repair a defect in the street, not caused by its own act or neglect, that the question of notice of obstruction or defect is an essential element. If the defective condition is due to the act of the municipality itself, or its act or negligence in connection with the acts of others, or to the acts of others as its contractors or employees, no notice of any kind, either actual or constructive, is necessary. This rule extends to municipal negligence in the original construction of the offending public way and applies to affirmative municipal negligence in maintaining a nuisance. No notice of any kind is required in the aforementioned instances... . (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 19 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 54.104 (3d ed. 1967). Johnson claimed that the state was negligent in three ways: (a) in the design of the roadway where the spur track crosses it; (b) in the signing of the roadway; and (c) in the maintenance of the roadway. Under the rule just stated, proof of notice was not required for Johnson to prevail on her claims of unsafe design or failure to sign, because any dangerousness resulting from such acts devolves from the state's own conduct or omission. [6] Thus the court erred in directing, because of the absence of notice, a verdict against Johnson on these claims. On retrial Johnson must still convince the jury that there was in fact a dangerous condition. The court also erred in directing a verdict for the state on Johnson's claim of negligent maintenance. Taking the evidence most favorably to Johnson, as we must when reviewing a directed verdict, we conclude that a jury question was presented as to whether there was a maintenance defect and whether the state had constructive notice of that defect. Kenneth Ulz, a civil engineer, testified that the asphalt of the roadway should butt up against the outer rail or railroad crossings. Keeping the asphalt flush with the outer rail, he stated, is a maintenance function. As a former engineer for both the City of Fairbanks and the state Department of Transportation, he testified that the city maintains Phillips Field Road. In addition, however, the state admitted a duty to maintain the road. Johnson introduced several pictures to show that the asphalt at the MUS crossing failed to comply with the standards Ulz specified. Numerous accidents similar to Johnson's occurred at the spur track crossing. Eleven witnesses testified to falling sometime prior to Johnson's accident while riding a bicycle across the same spur crossing. These accidents occurred while traveling in both directions on the road, under both rainy and dry conditions, and while riding a variety of bicycle models. One accident witness was a regional geologist with the state Department of Transportation. His job duties, however, were limited to investigating the foundations of existing or proposed highway routes, rather than involving issues of surface safety, and he never reported his accident to anyone. One witness did report her accident, but not to the state. Ms. Rose Lee Bezdek testified that after her fall in 1971 at the spur crossing, she telephoned both the Railroad and the Fairbanks city manager to inform them of the hazard. Finally, a municipal worker employed at the utility plant adjacent to the spur track crossing testified that he and other utility workers were aware of bicycle accidents occurring at the crossing, but he admitted that he did not perceive bicycle accidents on the road to be within the MUS's safety program requiring that accidents be reported, and thus never did report any of the accidents. In addition to the fact of prior accidents, Johnson put on expert evidence establishing that the severely angled crossing presented a hazard to bicyclists. Gary Rice, an engineer in the Fairbanks city engineer's office from 1972 to 1977 (Johnson's accident occurred in 1974), testified that the angle at which the MUS railroad crossing intersects Phillips Field Road presents a potential hazard to bicycle traffic. He testified that bicycle tires can be deflected and caught by the flangeway of the railroad track. One way to reduce the hazard, he stated, is to post warning signs for bicyclists. A videotape prepared by Rice showed that at a similarly angled crossing in Fort Wainwright, where a bicyclists dismount warning sign is erected, the sign was effective in calling the bicyclists' attention to the potential hazard. The majority of these riders either stopped pedaling, slowed down, or attempted to cross the tracks at a more perpendicular angle. Rice further testified that an additional method of decreasing the risk of bicycle accidents at the crossing would be to allow bicyclists to cross the tracks at as close to a perpendicular angle as possible. One way to do this would be to construct a pad off to the side of the road, allowing bicyclists to angle into the crossing. He testified, however, that the lease between the Alaska Railroad and the city for the crossing's underlying land requires a seven-foot clearance, and in his view this limitation precluded installing such a pad. But other testimony established that it is possible to obtain permission from the Railroad to modify the clearance requirement. Rice also testified that at the time of Johnson's accident, no portion of Phillips Field Road was dedicated as a bikeway or bike route, although he acknowledged that bicyclists have a right to use the road. Further, he was unaware, in 1974, of any engineering criteria calling for special consideration of bicycle travel over railroad crossings. Johnson's evidence also showed that the MUS crossing was one of the three most severely angled crossings in the Fairbanks area. Ken Collette, another civil engineer, testified that of approximately sixty-one railroad crossings in the Fairbanks area, only two intersect roads at an angle as great as that of the spur track crossing on Phillips Field Road. The MUS spur track crossing intersects the road at a skew angle [7] of 76 degrees. The other two similarly-angled crossings (one 78 degrees the other 75 degrees) [8] are located on Fort Wainwright. [9] One of these crosses a gravel road and is therefore unlikely to be used by bicyclists; the other has had a bicyclists dismount warning sign for some time. No such sign was posted at the MUS spur crossing until after Johnson's accident. Finally, Ronald Tanner, the regional traffic and safety engineer for the state Department of Transportation, was called by Johnson as an adverse witness. He testified that the duty to erect adequate warning signs on Phillips Field Road is a joint obligation of the city and state. His responsibilities as regional engineer include responding to safety problems arising on the state highways within his region. These responsibilities extend to the approximately thirty-five railroad crossings maintained by the state in that region. Tanner testified that at no time prior to Johnson's accident was he aware that the MUS spur track crossing presented a potentially hazardous condition to bicyclists. He testified that he relies on a variety of information sources in identifying potential safety problems, including routine personal inspections of roads, review of police accident reports, computer printouts from his agency's headquarters in Juneau that list accidents, citizen complaints, both directly to the state and relayed by the city, newspaper articles, reports from regional maintenance personnel, and federal and state highway manuals which illustrate potentially dangerous conditions. He testified that none of these sources alerted him to the danger involved in this case. According to Tanner, at the time of Johnson's accident, a crossbuck sign and an advance railroad crossing sign were in place at the MUS spur track crossing. These signs complied with the 1974 safety manuals mentioned above, and he considered the signing adequate. Tanner admitted, however, that he was not limited to these manuals in considering possible hazards. [10] Reasonable persons could differ as to whether there was a maintenance defect and whether there was constructive notice [11] to the state of the need for repair. These were issues for the jury to resolve. Further, no proof of notice was required as to Johnson's claims of negligence which were based on the state's own act or omission, [12] i.e., negligent design or failure to sign. The trial court erred in interpreting the role of notice as to Johnson's claim and in subsequently directing a verdict for the state premised on a lack of notice. The case must be reversed and remanded for a trial against the state.