Opinion ID: 1543416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: introduction

Text: The Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963), that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Court subsequently has refined and elaborated on this holding, extending the categories of evidence that must be disclosed, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972) (impeachment evidence), and, when evidence is highly probative of innocence, relieving the accused of the burden of making a request. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 353 (1976); Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 346, 768 A.2d 675, 682 (2001); see also Diallo v. State, 413 Md. 678, 706-08, 994 A.2d 820, 837-38 (2010) (discussing a prosecutor's duty to discover and disclose exculpatory evidence known to other state actors). There are, however, limits to the prosecutor's automatic duty of disclosure. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n. 7, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380 n. 7, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 489 n. 7 (1985) (An interpretation of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of discovery `would entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal justice.') (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 117, 87 S.Ct. 793, 819, 17 L.Ed.2d 737, 769 (1967)) (Harlan, J., dissenting). As the Supreme Court has explained, a rule that the prosecutor commits error by any failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, no matter how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden on the prosecutor and would undermine the interest in the finality of judgments. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n. 7, 105 S.Ct. at 3380 n. 7, 87 L.Ed.2d at 489 n. 7. The results of these refinements can be distilled into the following formulation: There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286, 302 (1999); see also Harris v. State, 407 Md. 503, 521, 966 A.2d 925, 935 (2009) (noting that, in the context of a Brady claim, evidence favorable to the defense includes mitigation evidence); accord State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194, 199, 896 A.2d 973, 975-76 (2006); Ware v. State, 348 Md. 19, 38, 702 A.2d 699, 708 (1997). The prejudice prong is closely related to the question of materiality. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698-99, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 1276, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166, 1194-95 (2004). The standard is whether there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have led to a different result. [5] Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, 506 (1995) (emphasis added). A `reasonable probability' of a different result is ... shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Id., quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381, 87 L.Ed.2d at 491. Accord Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. at 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d at 302 ([S]trictly speaking, there is never a real ` Brady violation' unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.). The Supreme Court has further explicated the materiality standard, explaining that it is essentially the same test as set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), in determining whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a constitutional violation affecting his right to a fair trial. [6] Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 (Blackmun, J., plurality). See also 6 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b), at 350-53 (3d ed. 2007). Our own cases have said that evidence is material if there is a  substantial possibility that, had the [evidence] been revealed to [defense] counsel, the result of his trial would have been any different. [7] State v. Thomas, 325 Md. 160, 190, 599 A.2d 1171, 1185 (1992) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 426-27, 578 A.2d 734, 738-39 (1990). Accord Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 432 n. 4, 889 A.2d 366, 377 n. 4 (2005). An alleged Brady violation is a constitutional claim, based on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d at 352 (We are not considering the scope of discovery authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or the wisdom of amending those Rules.... We are dealing with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth [and Fourteenth] Amendment[s] to the Constitution.); id. at 110, 96 S.Ct. at 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d at 353 (discussing the determination of `materiality' in the constitutional sense and delineating the constitutional obligation of the prosecutor); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218 (the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process ) (emphasis added); Harris, 407 Md. at 521, 966 A.2d at 935; 6 LaFave, § 24.3(a), at 339-43 (explaining that Brady claims have been analyzed under due process rather than as violations of the Confrontation Clause). Brady disclosure thus is fundamentally distinct from discovery rules, which further spell out the State's (and to a lesser extent, the defendant's) obligations to disclose information prior to trial, but are not grounded in either the Federal or State Constitution. [8] It bears repeating that the burdens of production and persuasion regarding a Brady violation fall on the defendant. Diallo, 413 Md. at 704, 994 A.2d at 835 (To establish a Brady violation, Petitioner must establish ...) (emphasis added); accord Harris, 407 Md. at 521, 966 A.2d at 935; Grandison, 390 Md. at 431, 889 A.2d at 377; Ware, 348 Md. at 38, 702 A.2d at 708.