Opinion ID: 2995535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Severance Prior to Trial

Text: Rouster contends that his conviction should be overturned because his trial counsel failed to move to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants. Indiana law allows for severance when the parties’ defenses are mutually antagonistic and acceptance of one party’s defense precludes the acquittal of the other./12 Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1272 (Ind. 1997). Rouster relies on events that occurred during closing arguments to illustrate the alleged irreconcilable defenses between his case and Williams’./13 For example, Williams’ counsel depicted Rouster as an individual who wanted to settle the score and who went berserk. In response, Rouster’s counsel argued that Williams was the real maniac and that blood stains on Rouster’s vest and shirt indicated that Rouster could not have fired the shots at the Reases. Rouster argues that this sort of finger- pointing establishes mutually antagonistic defenses. Therefore, Rouster asserts he was prejudiced by being jointly tried with Williams. In order to show that he was prejudiced by his joint trial with Williams, Rouster must show that had his counsel moved for severance and had the motion been granted so that he was tried separately, there was a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Even if Indiana law mandated severance in this case,/14 Rouster would not be able to establish prejudice because there was not a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted if tried separately. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In applying Strickland to Rouster’s claim, the Indiana Supreme Court stated: Moreover, there is no reasonable probability that the results of the guilt phase of trial would have been different if a separation had occurred. First, each co-defendant’s arguments regarding who pulled the trigger were actually of little relevance since both were convicted of felony murder under Ind. Code sec. 35-42-1-1. All participants in a robbery or attempted robbery that results in killing by one robber are deemed equally guilty of murder, regardless of which participant actually killed the victim. Additionally, the same evidence would have been admitted against Rouster even if he had been granted a separate trial. Such evidence includes testimony that Rouster said, I killed the motherfuckers to his co-defendant Teresa Newsome shortly after shots were heard inside the Rease home; Derrick Bryant’s testimony that he heard Rouster tell Williams, Bring them both back here before he heard Henrietta Rease say, Greg, why are you doing this? followed by two shots; plus the physical evidence of the blood consistent with that of John Rease found on Rouster’s shoes, socks, and vest. Considering the amount of corroborating evidence indicating Rouster’s role in the crime, Rouster was not prejudiced by his counsel’s failure to move for separate trials. Id. at 1005 (citations omitted) (emphases added). We have no problem holding that the Indiana Supreme Court’s application of Strickland was reasonable. In Hernandez, 200 F.3d at 999, we held that Strickland prejudice exists with respect to trial counsel’s failure to move for severance only when there [is] a reasonable probability that the severance would have made a difference to the outcome of the trial. In that case, Hernandez was convicted for murder based on evidence that was adduced almost entirely from his co-defendant’s testimony at trial, which contradicted Hernandez’s own testimony at trial. See id. We held that Hernandez was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to move for severance because there was a reasonable probability that had Hernandez been tried separately, his co-defendant would not have testified at Hernandez’s trial. See id. at 999-1000. In contrast to Hernandez, in the present case, the only contradictory positions proffered by the co-defendants occurred during closing arguments. As Rouster’s counsel argued to the jury, however, closing arguments are not evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 2 F.3d 792, 795 (7th Cir. 1993). Therefore, had severance been granted, the evidence that would have been presented at Rouster’s trial would have been the same as the evidence that was, in fact, presented at his joint trial. Cf. Hernandez, 200 F.3d at 999. This evidence would include the testimony of several witnesses who heard Rouster admit that he killed the motherfuckers, the testimony of several witnesses that saw Rouster in or around the Rease house on the night of August 12, 1986 and then heard gunshots coming from the house, and the physical evidence indicating that Rouster had blood consistent with John Rease’s blood on his clothing. Further, we agree with the Indiana Supreme Court that the contradictory defenses concerning who was the triggerman were irrelevant, as both Rouster and Williams could have been convicted of felony murder even if the other had fired all of the gunshots. See Rogers, 315 N.E.2d at 709-10. Therefore, because we do not believe that there would have been a reasonable probability of a different outcome had Rouster been tried separately, we find that no prejudice resulted from Rouster’s counsel’s failure to file a motion for severance prior to trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.