Opinion ID: 1859815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred in granting jury instruction 9(s-1) and denying jury instruction d-12.

Text: ¶ 29. In reviewing the granting or refusal of various instructions, this Court has held that the instructions actually given must be read as a whole, and no reversible error will be found if the instructions fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice when so read. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss. 1997) (quoting Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918 (Miss.1997)). Ordinarily, failure to object to a given instruction at trial results in a procedural bar on appeal, unless its granting amounts to plain error. Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 670 (Miss.1996) (As a rule, the Supreme Court only addresses issues on plain error review when the error of the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right of the defendant); Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 606 (Miss.1995). However, an erroneously given instruction constitutes plain error where the jury is not fully instructed on the elements of the crime. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 636 (Miss.1996).
¶ 30. In the case sub judice, Jury Instruction No. 9 reads as follows: Members of the Jury, the Defendant, KWAME KENYETTA BRENGETTCY, has been charged with the crime of Murder along with JOHN BLAND, JR., A/K/A J.R., JOE ARMSTRONG A/K/A AFALFA and LARRY CARR, JR. A/K/A SPANKY. As you know, each Defendant is tried separately, and only KWAME KENYETTA BREGETTCY is on trial today for this crime. This Court instructs the Jury that Murder is the killing of a human being with malice aforethought, not in necessary self-defense, without the authority of law, by any means or by any manner, when done with the premeditated and deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed. The Court further instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that from the evidence presented during this trial that someone other than KWAME KENYETTA BRENGETTCY actually pulled the trigger and shot and killed Mark Martin, but that more than one person is responsible for the death of Mark Martin, you may still find the Defendant KWAME KENYETTA BRENGETTCY, guilty of Murder. Accordingly, the Court instructs you the Jury that each person present at the time, and consenting to and encouraging the commission of a criminal offense, including murder, and knowingly, willfully, and feloniously doing any act which is an element of the crime, or immediately connected with it, or leading to its commission, is as much a principle offender as if he had with his own hand pulled the trigger and committed the whole offense. Therefore, if you are unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that KWAME KENYETTA BRENGETTCY actually shot with a firearm and killed Mark Martin, But, you the Jury do find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) The Victim, Mark Martin, was a living person on September 1, 1997, in Coffeeville, MS and; 2) Someone other than the Defendant, KWAME KENYETTA BREGETTCY, did willfully and with malice aforethought, shoot with a firearm and kill Mark Martin, with the deliberate design to effect the death of Mark Martin, and; 3) The Defendant, KWAME KENYETA BRENGETTCY, was present at the time of the murder of Mark Martin, and consented to and encouraged the commission of the crime of the Murder of Mark Martin, and did knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously do any act which is an element of the crime of murder, or leading to its commission, such as, if you the jury so find, but not necessarily limited to, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously encouraging the actual shooter to shoot and kill Mark Martin and/or also shoot at with a firearm but not actually hit Mark Martin, then you shall find the Defendant, KWAME KENYETTA BRENGETTCY, Guilty of the Crime of Murder of Mark Martin. If the State has failed to prove any one or more of these elements, beyond a reasonable doubt, then the jury shall find KWAME KENYETTA BREGETTCY, not guilty of murder. ¶ 31. Brengettcy argues that Jury Instruction 9 is a Hornburger Instruction-an instruction which impermissibly allows a jury to convict a defendant for merely finding that he did any single act which is an element of the crime of which he is accused. In Hornburger v. State, 650 So.2d 510, 515 (Miss.1995), this Court held that such an instruction was improper, although it is harmless error where the instructions read as a whole require the State to prove every element of the offense charged. The instruction at issue in Hornburger read as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that each person present at the time, and consenting to and encouraging the commission of a crime, and knowingly, willfully and feloniously doing any act which is an element of the crime or immediately connected with it, or leading to its commission, is as much a principal as if he had with his own hand committed the whole offense; and if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Gregory Hornburger, a/k/a Greg Hornburger, did willfully, knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously do any act which is an element of the crime of burglary of a building, or leading to its commission, then and in that event, you should find the defendant guilty as charged. Id. at 513-14. ¶ 32. While this Court held the original Hornburger instruction to be harmless error, in Liggins v. State, 726 So.2d 180, 184 (Miss.1998), we reversed a conviction where a very similar jury instruction said that the jury shall find the defendant guilty rather than should find him guilty, did not make the defendant's consent an element to be proven by the State, and was not accompanied by an additional instruction laying out the correct statement of the law. The net result of the Liggins instruction was that the State's burden of proof was lessened, which compelled reversal. Id. at 184. See also Berry v. State, 728 So.2d 568 (Miss.1999)(reversing where aiding and abetting instruction could mislead jurors into thinking they had option of convicting even if State had proven only one element of crime). ¶ 33. Here, while Jury Instruction 9 was not the best possible statement of the law, the instruction did make Brengettcy's consent an element to be proven by the State, and it also said that the State was required to prove every element of the crime before the jury could convict. The error which led to reversal in Liggins is simply not present here, and this issue is without merit.
¶ 34. Brengettcy challenges the trial court's denial of his proposed Jury Instruction D-12, which is a jury nullification instruction. Jury Instruction D-12 reads as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that under the Constitution of the United States, the Jury has a paramount right to acquit an accused person for whatever reason and to find him not guilty, even though the evidence may support a conviction, and this is an important part of the jury trial system guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court further instructs the Jury that this principle of jury nullification is as much a part of and just as important to the constitutional process as any other instruction which the Court has given this Jury, and that in the final analysis, you, ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, are the sole judges of whether it is right and fair to convict the Accused or whether under the totality of the circumstances, the Accused should be found guilty. In arriving at your verdict you are not compelled to answer to anyone or to the State, nor are you required at any time by the Court or any person or party to give a reason or to be brought to accountability for your decision and vote. ¶ 35. However, Brengettcy's brief contains absolutely no arguments or case law supporting the use of this instruction. The general rule is that failure to cite to any relevant authority in support of an argument procedurally bars that argument on appeal. Edwards v. State, 737 So.2d 275, 295 (Miss.1999). In any event, this Court has clearly established that while a jury does indeed have the power to acquit for any reason whatsoever, a defendant is not entitled to an instruction that it can ignore the law to do so. Nicolaou v. State, 612 So.2d 1080, 1084 (Miss.1992). This issue is without merit.