Opinion ID: 1744914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 10. An abuse-of-discretion standard of review is applied to the trial court's admission or exclusion of evidence. See Tunica County v. Matthews, 926 So.2d 209, 212 (Miss.2006) (citation omitted).
¶ 11. On April 17, 2000, Dr. Pruett propounded an interrogatory requesting that the Hartels [i]dentify all treatises to be used in direct examination at the trial of this case. [6] The Hartels answered that they would respond and supplement in strict accordance with Rule 803(18). On June 15, 2005, six days prior to trial, counsel for the Hartels sent a fax to counsel for defendants providing the names of several medical articles which might be used during the Hartels' case-in-chief. Thereafter, Dr. Pruett and EM Care filed a joint motion in limine seeking to exclude these medical articles because they were not timely disclosed. On June 19, 2005, counsel for the Hartels faxed the medical articles to counsel for the defendants. The circuit court ruled that because the Hartels had failed to seasonably disclose their intention to use the medical articles at trial, the Hartels' expert witnesses could not rely upon or refer to them on direct examination. [7] ¶ 12. On appeal, the Hartels first contend that they were required only to disclose the medical articles prior to trial. They maintain that Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(18) merely provides that treatises, periodicals, and pamphlets must be disclosed ... pursuant to discovery. Miss. R. Evid. 803(18). Next, the Hartels argue that their disclosure was not untimely, as they did not gather the medical articles until May 2005. [8] Finally, the Hartels assert that the proximity of their disclosure to the date of trial did not prejudice the defendants because adequate time remained for their expert witnesses to review the medical articles prior to trial. ¶ 13. In response, the defendants maintain that the Hartels had a duty under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) to seasonably supplement their discovery response to the interrogatory regarding what treatises would be used at trial; that the Hartels' disclosure of the subject medical articles only six days before trial was not a seasonable supplementation; and that the Hartels' untimely disclosure unduly prejudiced the defendants, as their attorneys and expert witnesses were not provided sufficient pre-trial time in which to adequately examine these complex articles and prepare to refute them. ¶ 14. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f)(1) provides, in relevant part, that: (1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement that party's response with respect to any question directly addressed to ... (B) the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, and the substance of the testimony. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1) (emphasis added). This Court has laid down no hard and fast rule as to what amounts to seasonable supplementation.... Eastover Bank for Savs. v. Hall, 587 So.2d 266, 272 (Miss. 1991). [S]easonableness must be determined on a case by case basis looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the supplemental information the offering party seeks to admit. Blanton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 720 So.2d 190, 196 (Miss. 1998). ¶ 15. In Blanton, this Court held that the trial court's exclusion of an appraiser's supplemental report, disclosed six days before trial, was not an abuse of discretion. See Blanton, 720 So.2d at 196. This Court found that the opposing party was prejudiced because of the inherent complexity of the case, coupled with the crucial nature of the appraiser's report. Id. The opposing party simply was not afforded sufficient time prior to trial to prepare a rebuttal to the supplemental report. See id.; Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1329 (Miss.1982) ([o]ne of the principal reasons for permitting interrogatories for pretrial discovery of the opinion held by experts and the substance of their testimony is to prevent trial by ambush and surprise....). ¶ 16. If counsel for the Hartels had disclosed the medical articles to the defendants shortly after gathering them in May 2005, the supplementation may have been seasonable. However, the circuit court ruled that the disclosure only six days prior to trial provided insufficient time for defendants' counsel adequately to prepare a rebuttal in the case sub judice, i.e., to let their expert witnesses read the articles, confer thereon, and retrieve medical literature supporting their position. As in Blanton, the complexity of this case and the importance of the subject medical articles to the Hartels' case support the circuit court's finding that admission would have prejudiced the defendants. Accordingly, this Court finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in foreclosing the Hartels' expert witnesses from relying upon or referring to the subject medical articles on direct examination.
¶ 17. The Hartels contend that the circuit court abused its discretion by not allowing them to use a New England Journal of Medicine (Journal) article concerning acute diverticulitis to cross-examine Dr. Michael Stodard. Specifically, they argue that Dr. Stodard testified the [Journal] was generally reliable and well[-]respected. Therefore, they maintain that, pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(18), Dr. Stodard should have been allowed to be cross-examined. The defendants reply that Dr. Stodard admitted the [Journal] was respected in the medical community, but could not agree the Journal was generally authoritative or relied upon by the medical community. Accordingly, they assert that the circuit court correctly ruled that the test provided in the Rules of Evidence had not been met. The defendants add that because the Hartels put before the jury the statements from the [Journal] through cross-examination of Dr. [George] McGee, absolutely no prejudice to [the Hartels] resulted by not allowing Dr. Stodard to discuss this article; and no substantial right of [the Hartels] was adversely affected. ¶ 18. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(18) provides, in pertinent part, that: [t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: ... (18) To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. Miss. R. Evid. 803(18) (emphasis added). Dr. Stodard testified that the Journal was well-respected in the medical community, but he refused to concede that it was a reliable authority. [9] The following exchange took place between counsel for the Hartels and Dr. Stodard: Q: Doctor, in the medical community do you recognize generally speaking the [Journal], a peer reviewed periodical, as being a generally reliable authority? A: I would answer yes and did answer yes when you asked me if it was respected. Yes, it is respected by some. For me to know if it's reliable or not I would have to subscribe and read it on a regular basis which I never have and do not. So, no, sir, I cannot answer the question that it is reliable. I certainly would strongly disagree that it is authoritative. Q: My question to you is in the medical community is the [Journal] generally accepted as a generally reliable source of medical information, peer review[ed] medical information, used by physicians. A: Again, my answer would be only I can determine if it's reliable in my mind.... I cannot say it is reliable, no, sir. [Counsel for the Hartels]: He's missing my question, Your Honor. A: I cannot say that it is generally reliable among all physicians in the United States. Q: I didn't say among all physicians. The question is, is it generally reliable among physicians in general  A: I cannot agree with that statement, no, sir. [ [10] ] (Emphasis added). Based on this testimony, the circuit court ruled that the Journal had not been established as a reliable authority[,] under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 803(18), and refused to allow the Hartels to cross-examine Dr. Stodard using the Journal article. ¶ 19. The circuit court's evidentiary rulings are subject to an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See Matthews, 926 So.2d at 212. Neither Dr. Stodard, nor any other expert witness, testified that the Journal was a reliable authority. Miss. R. Evid. 803(18). Therefore, neither the Journal, nor the subject article contained therein, was established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. Miss. R. Evid. 803(18). Accordingly, this Court cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion in ruling that the Journal article could not be used during the cross-examination of Dr. Stodard.
¶ 20. The defendants designated Dr. Pruett as an expert witness, but did not provide that his expert opinions were based upon any medical literature or that any medical literature would be introduced to provide support for his opinions. At trial, counsel for the Hartels called Dr. Pruett as an adverse witness. During cross-examination, the following exchange occurred between counsel for the Hartels and Dr. Pruett: Q: I want you to cite me one article that you're relying on for that testimony which has not been provided. I want to know one article that you're citing that says Cipro alone is just as effective for diverticulitis treatment as aerobic and anaerobic coverage. You don't have one recent article that says that, do you? ... A: I do have some other articles that are guides that emergency physicians go by ... in emergency medicine. And one is an emergency medicine pediatric and adult textbook that's a reference text. Q: Is that something you're relying on? A: Well, it's something that ... a lot of the emergency room physicians rely on. It's a reference source. Q: Are you relying on that document for your opinions? A: No. ¶ 21. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for the circuit court to allow them to refer to the referenced text, Griffith's 5 Minute Clinical Consult, during their examination of Dr. Pruett. The defendants argued that, we just feel like he opened the door by asking the doctorhe put the doctor on the defensive with the question to the effect that there are no articles that would support your view. So we feel like we have a right to rebut that. Counsel for the Hartels objected to the defendants' motion on the ground that the reference text was not disclosed prior to trial. [11] The circuit court overruled the objection, concluding [i]n view of the fact it was brought out on cross-examination ..., I'm going to overrule any objection. ¶ 22. In APAC-Mississippi, Inc. v. Goodman, 803 So.2d 1177 (Miss.2002), this Court stated: [t]he Missouri Court of Appeals has ruled that, as a general rule, the issue of whether a party opens the door for an opposing party to inquire about otherwise inadmissible evidence, lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Duckett v. Troester, 996 S.W.2d 641, 649 (Mo.Ct.App.1999). We find that the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate.... Goodman, 803 So.2d at 1185. Although Dr. Pruett did not furnish Griffith's 5 Minute Clinical Consult in discovery, counsel for the Hartels opened the door by questioning Dr. Pruett with an open-ended challenge to cite me one article[,] he referenced from Griffith's 5 Minute Clinical Consult. Once the door had been opened, the defendants were entitled to present the otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut the suggestion that there were no articles to support Dr. Pruett's view. Accordingly, this Court finds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in deeming this medical text admissible.
¶ 23. Counsel for the Hartels took a videotape deposition of Dr. Pruett on December 10, 2003. On June 13, 2005, the Hartels notified the defendants of their intention to play an edited version of the videotape deposition at trial instead of calling Dr. Pruett as an adverse witness. The circuit court denied the Hartels' motion. The Hartels assert that this ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion, claiming that Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(2) permits a party to use the deposition of the opposing party as desired. ¶ 24. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a) states, in pertinent part, that: (a) At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions: (1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness, or for any other purpose permitted by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. (2) The deposition of a party ... may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.... (4) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an adverse party may require him to introduce any other part which ought in fairness to be considered with the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts. Miss. R. Civ. P. 32(a). Mississippi Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) provides, in relevant part, that (d) [a] statement is not hearsay if: ... (2)[t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity.... Miss. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). A party may enter portions of an opposing party's deposition into evidence without calling the opposing party as a witness, provided that the portions of the deposition are admissible under Rule 801. See McMillan v. King, 557 So.2d 519, 526 (Miss.1990). In McMillan, the trial court did not allow the plaintiff to enter portions of the deposition of the opposing party's employee. See id. at 525. This Court found the plaintiff should have been permitted to enter the proffered portions of [the deposition of the opposing party's employee] into evidence without calling [the opposing party's employee] as a witness. This is so even though [the opposing party's employee] was available to be called as a witness. Id. at 526. However, this Court further found that: the record discloses that [the testimony of the opposing party's employee] pertinent to McMillan's case was elicited from [the opposing party's employee] as an adverse witness. Where that testimony differed from [the deposition of the opposing party's employee], McMillan was freely allowed to impeach ... with the parts of the deposition McMillan wished [to] enter in evidence. Because McMillan got before the jury the points he had proffered via cross-examination of [the opposing party's employee], we hold the error legally harmless. Id. ¶ 25. Based upon McMillan, the circuit court erred in refusing to allow the Hartels to play the edited video deposition of Dr. Pruett. However, this error was legally harmless, id., because the Hartels were permitted to examine Dr. Pruett and then impeach him with his videotaped deposition statements on cross-examination, if inconsistent with his live testimony. Accordingly, this Court finds that this issue is without merit.