Opinion ID: 4523191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hewey Analysis

Text: [¶26] The first step of the analysis requires the court to determine a basic term of imprisonment based on the nature and seriousness of the offense as committed by the defendant. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1). In the second step, the court must “determine the maximum period of imprisonment to be imposed by considering all other relevant sentencing factors, both aggravating and mitigating, appropriate to that case.” Id. § 1252-C(2). At the third step, the 2 Substantial portions of the Maine Criminal Code in Title 17-A, including all of its sentencing provisions, were recently repealed and replaced. P.L. 2019, ch. 113 (effective May 16, 2019). This matter was fully litigated and Hansen was sentenced prior to the effective date of the new sentencing provisions. Therefore, all citations to sentencing statutes in this opinion are to the repealed 2018 versions in effect at the relevant time. As they apply to this appeal, the relevant text is substantively unchanged in the new versions of the statutes. See P.L. 2019, ch. 113, § A-2 (to be codified at 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1501, 1602, 1604, 1608). 12 court must “determine what portion, if any, of the maximum period of imprisonment should be suspended and, if a suspension order is to be entered, determine the appropriate period of probation to accompany that suspension.” Id. § 1252-C(3). [¶27] We review de novo for misapplication of principle the basic sentence imposed at the first step of the analysis, and we review the maximum sentence and the final sentence determined at steps two and three for an abuse of discretion. Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶ 17, 65 A.3d 1242. We review the sentencing court’s analysis at each step to determine “whether [it] disregarded the relevant sentencing factors or abused its sentencing power.” Id. [¶28] At step one, the court properly assessed the nature and seriousness of each offense. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(1). The court considered the victim’s age, Hansen’s age, the specific manner in which the offenses were committed, and the fact that Hansen was a familiar and trusted person in the victim’s life. See State v. Parker, 2017 ME 28, ¶¶ 4, 8, 156 A.3d 118; Stanislaw II, 2013 ME 43, ¶¶ 10, 22, 65 A.3d 1242; State v. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶ 18, 890 A.2d 719. The court then found that Hansen’s conduct was “in the mid to high end on the continuum” of severity, and set the basic sentence at five to ten years on each count. Cf. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 7, 18, 890 A.2d 719 (finding no 13 misapplication of principle where basic sentence was set at six years on each count of Class B unlawful sexual contact). [¶29] The maximum authorized sentence for a Class B offense is ten years. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252(2)(B) (2018). Although it is rare for the basic sentence “to be appropriately set at or near the statutory maximum,” a sentencing court may properly set the basic sentence at or near the maximum if its “analysis demonstrates that the defendant’s crime was considered to be among the most serious ways in which the crime might be committed.” State v. Stanislaw, 2011 ME 67, ¶¶ 12, 13, 21 A.3d 91 (Stanislaw I) (quotation marks omitted). One factor that can support a basic sentence at or near the maximum is the selection of “extremely young children as victims.” Id. ¶ 12; see also 17-A M.R.S. § 1151(8)(A) (2018). [¶30] After considering the victim’s very young age and the manner in which the offenses were committed, the court stated that “it’s hard to imagine . . . how much more serious it could have been.” Therefore, the court did not misapply principle in setting the basic period of incarceration toward the higher end of the spectrum, near the maximum term of ten years. See Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 7, 18, 890 A.2d 719. 14 [¶31] At the second step of the analysis, the court appropriately considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including Hansen’s limited criminal history, likelihood of reoffending, motivation or reason for engaging in the criminal conduct, employment history, mental health issues, physical disabilities, and lack of compassion, remorse, or acceptance of responsibility. 17-A M.R.S. § 1252-C(2). The court also considered the effect that Hansen’s conduct had on the victim and the victim’s family. The court determined that “the aggravating factors grossly outweigh[ed] the mitigating factors,” and concluded that the maximum sentence would be in “the ten-year range.” The court did not abuse its discretion in setting the maximum period of incarceration at ten years for each count. Cf. Soucy, 2006 ME 8, ¶¶ 1, 10, 19, 890 A.2d 719 (finding no abuse of discretion where maximum sentence at step two was eight years on Class B unlawful sexual contact counts); see also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-53 (2007) (discussing the “practical considerations” underpinning use of the abuse of discretion standard for review of sentences by appellate courts). [¶32] At the third step of the analysis, after considering the purposes and goals of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S. § 1151 (2018), and observing that “[t]he age of the victim is . . . absolutely paramount in this case,” the court determined that 15 the final sentence would be ten years’ imprisonment on the first count, and a consecutive sentence of ten years, all suspended, with five years of probation on the second count. We find no abuse of discretion at the third step of the analysis.