Opinion ID: 2350798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Was the petitioner denied effective assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's questions relating to irrelevant evidence?

Text: [¶ 22] In this final issue, the petitioner claims that he was materially prejudiced by his attorney's failure to object to the prosecutor's questions about irrelevant facts. The petitioner points to two specific instances in which he argues irrelevant testimony was elicited. The first involved questions by the prosecutor about the condition of other horses and the land where all the horses were kept. Q. All right. And the condition of the one horse you've described that you took the halter off, the condition of the other horses? A. Good to fair maybe. Thetheir hooves were extremely long. Q. What do you mean by that? A. Well, they'rethe ground they were on is fairly soft, so the hooves naturally chip away, and there was no way that these hooves were getting chipped away. The ground was too soft where they were at. Q. Does that require A. Trimming. Q. Okay. Trimming. A. Yes, a horse farrier. Q. All right. Other than that, though, pretty good? A. They could've used some worming because they were ribby. Q. They were ribby? A. Their ribs were showing. Q. Okay. And anything else? Is that about it? A. Some doctoring, but like I said, the stud had some pretty bad cuts on his right rear leg. Q. Uh-huh. A. And it looked like from some wire orI don't know what, but it was cut up pretty bad. The other colt filly had a really bad hernia. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to object that this is irrelevant to the case, what the condition of the other horses was. THE COURT: Mr. [Prosecutor]. [PROSECUTOR]: II don't have to explore any further, Your Honor. I will leave it at that. THE COURT: Sustain the objection. Additionally, the prosecutor asked the petitioner's girlfriend, Isn't it true that citizens complained because the manure was about a foot deep in the 30-by-40 area that there were no windbreaks or any kind of shelters for the horse, that they were asked to be removed? To which the girlfriend responded, No, that has nothing to do with it. The petitioner argues that because his cruelty to animals charge related only to the horse with the halter growing into her face, any testimony about the condition of other horses and land where the horses were located was irrelevant. [¶ 23] The other testimony to which the petitioner points as irrelevant and prejudicial came from the petitioner's brother. The prosecutor was questioning the brother about the extent of the petitioner's communication to the brother about the horses. A. I stopped at my mom's, and my brother showed up there, and then it all come [sic] out in the open that he was staying out there at that ranch and had put five horses out there. Q. All right. Now, you say he was staying out there. Was he staying out there during some of the time when you were here? A. No. He left as soon as I showed up. Q. And that would've been around the 1st of July? A. Or wheneveryeah, somewhere around there. Q. Do you know why he left? A. No, not really. All I know is that hewhen me and my girlfriend showed up here, hewe gotmy mom got a phone call to say come out here and pick him up because he had been stopped by a highway patrolman and got a ticket, and then so my girlfriend and my mom went out there and drove him back into town, and that was the first and last time I seen him. Q. All right. Now, did you have any conversation with your brother during the short time that you saw him? A. Just briefly. Q. What kind of conversation? A. It had to do with something about that I don't have a driver's license and stuff, that, you know, he said, It's a shame that I lost my license for a long time and just mediocre stuff, you know. Q. Anything at all about the horses, []? A. No. No. Q. Did you talk at all about the five horses that were out there that he had just brought in? A. No. Q. Did he ever ask you to take care of those horses? A. No. The petitioner asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the reference to his speeding ticket and loss of license asserting that such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible prior misconduct under W.R.E. 404(b). [¶ 24] We will again focus our analysis of the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim on the question of whether material prejudice arose from the alleged errors. We need not address the propriety of the admitted testimony because we find that the petitioner has not met his burden of proving he was prejudiced thereby. His prejudice argument consists solely of a single sentence, concluding that [h]ad defense counsel assertively advocated for [the petitioner], there is more than a `reasonable possibility' that the outcome of the trial may have been different. He does not discuss any specific prejudice arising from the admission of the above-quoted testimony and makes no attempt to explain, in light of the facts of the case, how the challenged statements adversely impacted his trial and, ultimately, the jury's verdict. The petitioner's assertion is utterly inadequate to satisfy his burden of showing material prejudice arising from the alleged ineffective assistance. See Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 38, 197 P.3d 722, 734-35 (Wyo. 2008); Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 22, 192 P.3d 137, 145 (Wyo.2008); Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d 963, 971 (Wyo.2006); Bhutto v. State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 44, 114 P.3d 1252, 1268 (Wyo.2005).