Opinion ID: 2451581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bristol Police Officers and CNHSOU Commander Robert Cormier

Text: All three plaintiffs bring claims of unreasonable seizure against the Bristol officers and Commander Cormier on the theory that there was no justification for keeping them in handcuffs in the living room for forty-five minutes to an hour while the police searched the apartment. The qualified immunity question before us is whether a reasonably competent officer could have thought, even mistakenly, that in light of the clearly established law at the time, it was reasonable to keep plaintiffs in handcuffs for this duration while the search was executed. Whether a seizure is reasonable depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. Defendants argue that given the injuries inflicted by Rothman during the beating that precipitated the execution of the warrants and the report to Sergeant Lewis that Rothman was known to carry a firearm, a reasonable officer could have believed that plaintiffs' continued detention would not outweigh the officers' safety interests. Cf. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (stating that minimizing the risk of harm to officers is a substantial justification for detaining an occupant during a search). But this argument glosses over the fact that Rothman had been removed from the scene before his family was taken to the living room. Once he was removed, any threat from him or that the three plaintiffs would try to assist him in avoiding arrest was eliminated. The question then is whether there were other valid reasons to keep plaintiffs in handcuffs after Rothman's arrest and removal. After Rothman was removed and most of the CNHSOU officers left, it appears that six officers remained in the house. These officers had the combined task of searching a three bedroom apartment, including adjoining areas and a basement, and ensuring that the occupants did not interfere with that search. This itself was a good reason to keep the occupants together in one room. The reasonableness of keeping them in handcuffs, however, is a different matter. Defendants rely heavily on Mena, which at the time was the most recently established Supreme Court case on detention in handcuffs during execution of a search warrant. In Mena, a qualified immunity case, the Supreme Court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation when Iris Mena was detained in handcuffs for the two- to three-hour duration of a warrant-authorized search of her building for deadly weapons and evidence of gang membership following a drive-by shooting. Mena, 544 U.S. at 95-96, 125 S.Ct. 1465. It was known that the suspect in the shooting, and possibly other gang members, rented rooms in the building. Id. The warrant in that case was executed by a SWAT team at 7 a.m. Id. at 96, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Mena was found asleep in bed, and placed, at gunpoint, in handcuffs. Id. Three other individuals living on the premises were also put in handcuffs, and all four were moved to a garage. Id. Although they were allowed to move about in the garage, the four detainees remained cuffed. Id. They were guarded by one or two officers, while the other officers performed the search. Id. The Court concluded that the use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate Mena's detention in the garage ... was reasonable because the governmental interests outweigh the marginal intrusion. Id. at 99, 125 S.Ct. 1465. [15] The Court reasoned that it was no ordinary search because it involved a search for weapons and because a wanted gang member reside[d] on the premises, making it an inherently dangerous situation. Id. at 100, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Under the circumstances, it held, the governmental interests in detaining and using handcuffs were at their maximum. Id. The Court recognized that handcuffing was a more intrusive form of detention than that which it had previously upheld and that Mena's claim was not about mere detention and handcuffing, but rather about the two- to three-hour duration. But it rejected her argument that this violated the Fourth Amendment. Emphasizing that the case involved the detention of four detainees by two officers during a search of a gang house for dangerous weapons, it held that the duration of the detention in handcuffs in this case does not outweigh the government's continuing safety interests. Id. [16] Appropriately, defendants here do not contend that Mena 's approval of the use of handcuffs for the two- to three-hour period of the search sets a per se rule that this is a permissible duration. Rather, they argue that Mena was sufficiently like this situation so that a reasonable officer could have thought his actions constitutional under Mena, or at least debatably so. Several features of the case support the objective reasonableness of that conclusion. Defendants could have reasonably thought that officer safety concerns justified the use of the handcuffs to avoid any danger, however small, that the detained occupants would use the hidden nightstick or possibly a gun to harm them. See id. ([T]his safety risk inherent in executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of handcuffs....); see also Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.). Defendants also had a valid interest in conducting an unimpeded search thoroughly and efficiently, and the use of handcuffs assisted in this. The handcuffs prevented the occupants of the house from interfering with the search, and from attempting to dispose of the nightstick. See Mena, 544 U.S. at 98, 125 S.Ct. 1465; see also Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (recognizing that the government's interest in the orderly completion of the search and preventing frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence may justify detention). There is no allegation that plaintiffs were handcuffed longer than it took to search the house. A reasonable officer could have also taken into account the fact that the plaintiffs did noton this recordcomplain that the handcuffs were painful. As Justice Kennedy explained in his Mena concurrence, which he wrote to provide more guidance to police and help ensure that police handcuffing during searches becomes neither routine nor unduly prolonged, Mena, 544 U.S. at 102, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (Kennedy, J., concurring), there are special concerns raised when handcuffs hurt the person cuffed: If the search extends to the point when the handcuffs can cause real pain or serious discomfort, provision must be made to alter the conditions of detention at least long enough to attend to the needs of the detainee.... The restraint should also be removed if, at any point during the search, it would be readily apparent to any objectively reasonable officer that removing the handcuffs would not compromise the officers' safety or risk interference or substantial delay in the execution of the search. Id. at 103, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Here, there is no evidence that any of the plaintiffs made any complaints about the handcuffs. Indeed, the cuffs on Tina apparently loosened so much that when the police said they would cut them off, she said they did not need to. She apparently slipped them off. The absence of complaints was a factor a reasonable officer could have taken into consideration. In light of Mena, we conclude that the question of qualified immunity must be decided in favor of these officers. They are entitled to immunity because it would have been fairly debatable among reasonable officers whether detaining plaintiffs in handcuffs for forty-five minutes to an hour during the search was reasonable under the facts. We say the question was fairly debatable because, as the district court carefully noted, there are some obvious differences from Mena which we believe reasonable officers should have considered. First, the number of detainees did not, as in Mena, outnumber the number of officers throughout the period of their detention. Cf. id. (noting that the detainees outnumbered those supervising them, and this situation could not be remedied without diverting officers from the search). Second, plaintiffs' home was not a gang house known to have firearms in it, but rather an apartment known to house a family that included a fifteen-year-old girl; other than Rothman, the remaining members of the family were not known or even suspected to be violent. Cf. id. at 100, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (majority opinion). Third, the object of the search was a nightstick used when two teenagers attacked another one over a girl, rather than a gun possessed by a gang member who had recently been involved in a drive-by shooting; although the officers had a fear that there was a firearm on the premises that could be used against them, that fear did not have the same foundation as in Mena. Cf. id. at 95-96, 125 S.Ct. 1465. Based on these differences, a reasonable officer might well have reached a different conclusion than defendants did here. However, these factors are not so substantial that no competent officer could have thought that the use of handcuffs during the search was permissible. Even if this reasoning were mistaken, it would not have been egregiously so and, accordingly, qualified immunity is available. Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 404 F.3d 504, 509 (1st Cir.2005); see also Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (stating that qualified immunity is available when officers of reasonable competence could disagree). We reverse the denial of immunity on all claims arising out of this handcuffing and order entry of judgment granting qualified immunity. To be clear, we are not holding that on plaintiffs' version of the facts there was no constitutional violation, but rather that if there was a violation, it was not so clear as to give the officers fair warning.