Opinion ID: 1862689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the appellees properly amend the restrictive covenants according to the procedures set out in the covenants?

Text: The language of the covenant for amending the restrictive provision follows: The undersigned City of Gulfport, Mississippi, does hereby agree to said protective covenants and does hereby agree that same may and does hereby attach to the title to said land and be binding on all persons claiming under said City's title until January 1st, 1975, at which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten years unless by vote of the majority of the then owners of the lots or parcels of land described herein, it be agreed to change said covenants in whole or in part, each block involved to be considered as a separate unit in voting any such change, . . Although the appellants contend that the restrictive covenant is clear and unambiguous and that an effective amendment requires the approval by the majority of the 1300 lot owners in the Bayou View subdivision, the last three lines of the provision state that to change the covenants, in whole or in part, each block involved is to be considered as a separate unit in voting any such change. Block owners, therefore, argue that the last part of the paragraph clearly states that amendment may be made by individual blocks and, in the alternative, if they are incorrect, that the covenant is ambiguous, and should not be enforced. The general rule in Mississippi concerning restrictive covenants is stated in the case of Kemp v. Lake Serene Property Owners Association, Inc., 256 So.2d 924 (Miss. 1971), which stated: Generally courts do not look with favor on restrictive covenants. Such covenants are subject more or less to a strict construction and in the case of ambiguity, construction is most strongly against the person seeking the restriction and in favor of the person being restricted. Id. at 926. See also Andrews v. Lake Serene Property Owners Association, 434 So.2d 1328, 1331 (Miss. 1983); Kinchen v. Layton, 457 So.2d 343, 345 (Miss. 1984). In Kinchen v. Layton, 457 So.2d 343 (Miss. 1984), this Court said with relation to restrictive covenants: Covenants [restrictive] of this kind should be fairly and reasonably construed and the language used will be read in the ordinary sense. [citation omitted]. The entire instrument should be considered in ascertaining its meaning, but the restrictions should not be extended by strained construction, especially when, as in this case, the restrictive covenants expressly permit the use being made of the land. Id. at 346 citing Shaeffer v. Gatling, 243 Miss. 155, 159, 137 So.2d 819, 820 (1962). Mendrop v. Harrell, 233 Miss. 679, 103 So.2d 418 (1958), the Court construed restrictive covenants and stated: The language used will be read in its ordinary sense, and the restriction and burden will be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding its formulation, with the idea of carrying out its object, purpose and intent. They are to be fairly and reasonably interpreted according to their apparent purpose. Id., 233 Miss. at 688, 103 So.2d at 422 citing Carter v. Pace, 227 Miss 488, 86 So.2d 360 (1956); 7 Thompson, Real Property § 3569 (1940). See also A.A. Home Improvement Co., v. Hide-A-Way Lake Club Inc., 393 So.2d 1333, 1336 (Miss. 1981). We again note that in 1954, the City of Gulfport amended this restrictive covenant with respect to Block 56 without presenting the issue to the entire subdivision for a vote. The City should not now be able to assert the majority vote defense when its actions in the past have shown otherwise. We are of the opinion that the covenant provides that amendments may be made by a majority of the owners of the blocks involved. However, in the event the language had been held to be ambiguous, the covenant would be construed in favor of the block owners in line with the maxim favoring free and unobstructed use of real property. See Kinchen, 457 So.2d at 345. The appellants contend next under this issue that the restrictive covenant was not amended in the appropriate manner or time, e.g., that it was never properly amended because their attorney signed the amendment that was filed in the chancery court clerk's office, and not the lot owners themselves; that no power of attorney was executed to permit Mr. Randall to bind the owners; and, that the amendment was prematurely executed before the ten (10) year period had expired. It has been held that the circulation of a petition is sufficient to comply with the requirements of majority vote. Harrison v. Air Park Estates Zoning Committee, 533 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981). In the present case, the voting at the block owners meeting, together with the signing of the affidavits clearly demonstrated the desires of the owners to effect such an amendment. The affidavits were attached to the amendment when filed at the chancery clerk's office. We are of the opinion that such procedure constituted substantial compliance with the procedure for amending the restrictive covenant. With respect to the timing of the amendment, the language of the covenant stated that said covenants ... binding on all persons ... until January 1, 1975, at which time said covenants shall be automatically extended for successive periods of ten (10) years unless by vote ... to change said covenants ... The covenant is silent as to when the vote must take place. It seems reasonable for the amendment to be voted on before the ten (10) year period to be effective for the start of the next ten year period. In this case, the block owners voted to amend the covenant in early 1984, at the block owners meeting at the elementary school, and actually filed the amendment on June 12, 1984. If the amendment was not ratified to go into effect on January 1, 1985, then the old covenant would automatically go into effect for another 10 years. See Dauphin Island Property Owners Association v. Kuppersmith, 371 So.2d 31 (Ala. 1979); White v. Lucas, 253 Ark. 476, 487 S.W.2d 615 (1972). Finally, 4 A.L.R.3d 570, § 4[b] states: Usually the right to amend, extend, or nullify the restrictions must be exercised by affirmative action on the part of a certain number or percentage of the affected owners. However, in instances where restrictions have been imposed for a definite term of years, the agreement or covenant sometimes provides that they will continue in effect for one or more additional terms unless, prior to their expiration, the property owners action affirmatively to terminate or modify them. Id. at 582. The issue is resolved against the appellants.