Opinion ID: 1275734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Preemption or conflict with state law

Text: Article XI, section 11 of the state constitution provides that [a]ny ... city ... may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. Within this authority, a municipality may enact an ordinance touching on the same matter as a state law, provided that state law is not intended to be exclusive and the ordinance does not conflict with the general law of the state. King County v. Taxpayers of King County, 133 Wash.2d 584, 611, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997); Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wash.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991). Thus, an ordinance is unconstitutional if a state enactment preempts the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or if a conflict exists between the ordinance and a statute which cannot be harmonized. King County, 133 Wash.2d at 612, 949 P.2d 1260; Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 559, 807 P.2d 353. An ordinance is presumed constitutional and a heavy burden rests upon the challenger to establish unconstitutionality. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 559, 807 P.2d 353. Petitioner contends that the city ordinances providing authority for destruction of the dogs violates Const. art. XI, § 11 both on the ground that state law preempts the field and that the local ordinance conflicts with state law. Under SMC 9.25.083, it is unlawful to own a vicious animal (other than a licensed guard or attack dog) with knowledge that the animal is vicious or with reckless disregard of the viciousness of the animal. SMC 9.25.024 defines a vicious animal as an animal which bites, claws or otherwise harms a human being or another animal, or which demonstrates menacing behavior toward human beings or domestic animals except where a person or other animal has provoked it. Under SMC 9.25.030(A)(4) the City's finance director is authorized to ... [d]irect immediate humane disposal of any animal ... (c) involved in a court proceeding in which the owner pled guilty or was found to be guilty of owning a ... vicious ... animal. State law enacted in 1987, Laws of 1987, ch. 94, pertains to potentially dangerous and dangerous dogs. A potentially dangerous dog means any dog that when unprovoked: (a) Inflicts bites on a human or a domestic animal either on public or private property, or (b) chases or approaches a person upon the streets, sidewalks, or any public grounds in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack, or any dog with a known propensity, tendency, or disposition to attack unprovoked, to cause injury, or to cause injury or otherwise to threaten the safety of humans or domestic animals. RCW 16.08.070(1). State law provides that potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated only by local, municipal, and county ordinances. Nothing in this section limits restrictions local jurisdictions may place on owners of potentially dangerous dogs. RCW 16.08.090(2). A dangerous dog is defined as any dog that according to the records of the appropriate authority, (a) has inflicted severe injury on a human being without provocation on public or private property, (b) has killed a domestic animal without provocation while off the owner's property, or (c) has been previously found to be potentially dangerous, the owner having received notice of such and the dog again aggressively bites, attacks, or endangers the safety of humans or domestic animals. RCW 16.08.070(2). `Severe injury' means any physical injury that results in broken bones or disfiguring lacerations requiring multiple sutures or cosmetic surgery. RCW 16.08.070(3). It is unlawful to own a dangerous dog unless it is registered with local animal control authorities. RCW 16.08.080(1). A certificate of registration is to issue only if the owner has a proper enclosure to confine the animal, conspicuously posts signs warning of the dangerous animal, and obtains a surety bond or liability insurance of at least $50,000 payable to any person injured by the dog. RCW 16.08.080(2)(a)-(c). It is also unlawful for the owner to permit the dog to be outside the enclosure unless properly muzzled and restrained by a leash. RCW 16.08.090(1). The state statutes provide for criminal penalties in connection with ownership of dangerous dogs. If a dangerous dog is not properly registered, if the owner fails to obtain a surety bond or insurance, if the dog is not kept in the proper enclosure, or if the dog is outside the enclosure and outside the owner's residence without proper physical restraint the owner is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. RCW 16.08.100(1). In addition, under any of these circumstances the dog shall be immediately confiscated by an animal control authority. Id. If the owner has a previous conviction under the statute and the dog attacks or bites a person or domestic animal the owner is guilty of a class C felony. RCW 16.08.100(2). The owner is also guilty of a class C felony if the dog aggressively attacks and causes severe injury or death of any human.... RCW 16.08.100(2),(3). [3] In the latter two circumstances, the dog is to be immediately confiscated by the animal control authority, placed in quarantine for the proper length of time, and then destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner. RCW 16.08.100(3). Preemption may be found where there is express legislative intent to preempt the field or such intent appears by necessary implication. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 560, 807 P.2d 353. Petitioner concedes there is no express statement of legislative intent to preempt the field. He also recognizes that state law is clearly not intended to regulate potentially dangerous dogs. He contends, however, that state law preempts regulation of dangerous dogs by necessary implication. He reasons that the statutes contain single uniform standards for statewide application and constitutes such a comprehensive scheme that there is no room left for concurrent jurisdiction. See City of Spokane v. Portch, 92 Wash.2d 342, 346, 596 P.2d 1044 (1979). He then reasons that because the Seattle ordinances do not distinguish between potentially dangerous and dangerous dogs, but instead the definition of vicious animal includes what are defined as dangerous dogs under state law, the local ordinances relating to destruction of his dogs are preempted. Petitioner places considerable emphasis on RCW 16.08.080(2) which states that the animal control authority ... shall issue a certificate of registration provided the statutory requirements of keeping dangerous dogs are met. (Emphasis added.) He contends that by this language the Legislature indicated its intent that local authorities must follow state law with regard to dangerous dogs. As the Court of Appeals observed, however, RCW 16.08.090(2) specifically provides that potentially dangerous dogs are to be regulated locally, and RCW 16.08.080(4) provides that cities and counties may charge an annual fee for registering dogs in addition to a regular license fee. Rabon, 84 Wash.App. at 302, 932 P.2d 646. In contrast, the court noted the absence of any expression of intent to preempt local regulation. The court held there was no implied intent to preempt. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals. In Brown, we held that where state fireworks law expressly provided some measure of concurrent jurisdiction to municipalities, the Legislature did not intend to preempt the field. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 560, 807 P.2d 353. Here, the statutes do not merely provide for concurrent jurisdiction, but rather expressly provide that sole jurisdiction over potentially dangerous dogs lies with local government. In addition, the language of RCW 16.08.090(2) that potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated  only  by local law indicates that both local and state law may govern dangerous dogs, particularly where there is no comparable provision directing that the state has sole jurisdiction over dangerous dogs. Nothing in the statutes clearly indicates legislative intent that state law preempts. Absent any such clear indication, the presumption that an ordinance is constitutional, along with the rule that courts will not interpret a statute to deprive a municipality of the power to legislate on subjects within Const. art. XI, § 11, see State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett Dist. Justice Court, 92 Wash.2d 106, 108, 594 P.2d 448 (1979), compels our holding that state law does not preempt local law. As to petitioner's reliance on Portch, the court held there that state obscenity laws preempted local law because uniform laws were necessary to avoid infringement of First Amendment rights. Portch, 92 Wash.2d 342, 596 P.2d 1044. Portch does not stand for the proposition that uniformity is always required. Amicus Korolak claims that City of Seattle v. Williams, 128 Wash.2d 341, 908 P.2d 359 (1995) requires uniformity. There, the court invalidated a local ordinance defining driving under the influence of alcohol by a different level of alcohol concentration than state law does. However, the court's decision was due to state statutes specifically requiring uniformity. Williams, 128 Wash.2d at 347-48, 908 P.2d 359. Korolak points to no comparable statute in this case. The argument that the Legislature intended uniformity is also undercut by the fact that local jurisdictions are solely responsible in the area of potentially dangerous dogs, and clearly may enact nonuniform laws on the subject. [4] Finally, petitioner says that legislative history shows intent to preempt. The court in Brown held, however, that legislative history is not relevant when concurrent jurisdiction is expressly provided for. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 560, 807 P.2d 353. Because the state law expressly recognizes local jurisdiction as to potentially dangerous dogs, the legislative history is irrelevant on the preemption issue here as well. In any case, the final bill reports relied upon indicate that the dog control statutes passed in 1987 were intended in large part to require insurance to pay for injuries caused by dogs. That purpose does not clearly indicate legislative intent to preempt. An ordinance also violates Const. art. XI, § 11 if it directly and irreconcilably conflicts with a state statute. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 561, 807 P.2d 353. If the two enactments can be harmonized, however, no conflict will be found. Id. Unconstitutional conflict is found where an ordinance permits that which is forbidden by state law, or prohibits that which state law permits. Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash.2d 261, 269, 877 P.2d 187 (1994); City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash.2d 106, 110-11, 356 P.2d 292, 92 A.L.R.2d 192 (1960). Petitioner argues that the ordinance forbids possession of dangerous dogs while the state statute expressly allows such possession under RCW 16.08.080, and thus the ordinance prohibits what RCW 16.08 permits. He reasons that the definition of vicious animal under the ordinance necessarily includes dangerous dogs, and state law allows registration while the ordinances require destruction of the animal in circumstances not requiring destruction under state law. The fact that an activity may be licensed under state law does not lead to the conclusion that it must be permitted under local law. A local ordinance may require more than state law requires where the laws are prohibitive. Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash.2d 664, 671, 388 P.2d 926 (1964). For example, in Brown, the local ordinance was held not to conflict with state fireworks law where the local ordinance went further in its prohibition of possession of fireworks than state law by providing for a shorter time period for lawful possession of fireworks. Similarly, in Schillberg the court reasoned that state law concerning safe operation of motor boats did not conflict with a local ordinance banning the operation of motor boats on a specific lake. The court said the state provisions did not in any way grant permission to operate boats in any place. Schillberg, 92 Wash.2d at 108, 594 P.2d 448. Here, state law provides that [i]t is unlawful for an owner to have a dangerous dog in the state without a certificate of registration issued under this section. RCW 16.08.080(1). Rather than a permit to own a dangerous dog, this provision requires that at a minimum if one owns a dangerous dog the registration requirements must be followed, and thus it is prohibitory in nature. As noted, a local ordinance may go further in its prohibition than state law. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 562-63, 807 P.2d 353. Petitioner contends, however, that because RCW 16.08.080(2) states that the animal control authority  shall  issue a certificate of registration when state requirements are satisfied, the statute imposes a mandatory duty on localities to register and license dangerous dogs. The Court of Appeals reasoned, however, that the word shall creates mandatory licensing of dogs as a minimum safeguard to protect the public from dangerous dogs, and, thus, this language is also prohibitory in nature. Rabon, 84 Wash.App. at 304, 932 P.2d 646. Protection of the public from dangerous dogs is a clear purpose of the state statutes. In exercise of its police power a municipality may wish to provide further protection from dangerous or vicious animals. Petitioner also argues that the local ordinance is less restrictive than state law and thus is invalid under Const. art. XI, § 11. He contends that under the city ordinances all dog bites are treated alike regardless of their severity and a dog's first offense simply puts the dog's owner on notice that the dog has vicious propensities. He says that, in contrast, under state law the dog is required to be labeled dangerous after a first severe bite and to be insured and registered. This argument lacks merit, however, since the ordinance nowhere states or implies that a dangerous dog may be kept without complying with state law. We hold that state law neither preempts nor conflicts with the city ordinances at issue and therefore the ordinances do not violate Const. art. XI, § 11.