Opinion ID: 77059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the ICC Regulations

Text: 20 The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act imposes liability on common carriers for the actual loss of or damage to shipments in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Section (e) of the Carmack Amendment provides that [a] carrier may not provide by rule, contract, or otherwise, a period of less than 9 months for filing a claim against it under this section and a period of less than 2 years for bringing a civil action against it under this section. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(e). Consistent with this section, the USBL requires that the shipper must provide the carrier with a notice of claim for damages within nine months of delivery of the cargo [a]s a condition precedent to recovery. R1-37, Ex. O § 2(b). 21 The standard for evaluating claims submitted pursuant to the Carmack Amendment initially was set forth by the Supreme Court in Georgia, Florida and Alabama Railway Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948 (1916). 7 In that case, the Court stated that the purpose of a requirement in a bill of lading that claims for damages be presented in writing within a certain time after delivery was not to allow the carrier to avoid liability, but to secure reasonable notice for the carrier. Id. at 198, 36 S.Ct. at 545. Accordingly, the Court held that such requirements d[id] not require documents in a particular form, so long as their purpose was served. Id. The Court also stated that the requirements [were] addressed to a practical exigency and . . . [were] to be construed in a practical way. Id. One year later, in St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & Southern Railway Co. v. Starbird, the Court again discussed the purpose of such requirements. The Court noted that they served to put[ ] in permanent form the evidence of an intention to claim damages, . . . call the attention of the carrier to the condition of the freight, and enable it to make such investigation as the facts of the case require. 243 U.S. 592, 605, 37 S.Ct. 462, 468, 61 L.Ed. 917 (1917). Courts applying the Blish Milling standard assessed liberally written claims by shippers and generally held that the claims were sufficient so long as they gave the carrier reasonable notice of the claim. See, e.g., Wisconsin Packing Co., v. Indiana Refrigerator Lines, Inc., 618 F.2d 441, 444 (7th Cir.1980); Thompson v. James G. McCarrick Co., 205 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.1953) (There is no requirement that a written instrument be submitted in detail or that the cause and exact amount of damage be stated thereon in order to constitute a valid claim.). 22 In 1972, the ICC responded to complaints of various abuses rampant in the settlement of claims by shippers and carriers and promulgated regulations entitled PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND VOLUNTARY DISPOSITION OF LOSS AND DAMAGE CLAIMS AND PROCESSING SALVAGE. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1005.2; see Ex. Parte No. 263: Rules, Regulations, and Practices of Regulated Carriers with Respect to the Processing of Loss and Damage Claims, 340 I.C.C. 515, 547-48 (1972) [hereinafter Ex Parte No. 263]. In creating the regulations, the ICC sought to combat carriers' attempts to discriminate among shippers in their payment of claims, to encourage prompt investigation and voluntary settlement, and to facilitate more harmonious relationships between carriers and claimants. Id. at 553. 23 Among other things, the ICC regulations provide [m]inimum filing requirements for a written notice of claim. Id. § 1005.2(b). According to the regulations, a written or electronic communication complies sufficiently with the provisions for filing claims embraced in the bill of lading or other contract of carriage if it contains (1) . . . facts sufficient to identify the baggage or shipment (or shipments) of property, (2) [an assertion of] . . . liability for alleged loss, damage, injury, or delay, and (3) . . . [a] claim for the payment of a specified or determinable amount of money. Id. Additionally, the regulations dictate that when a claim is filed for an uncertain amount, such as `$100 more or less,' the carrier . . . shall determine the condition of the baggage or shipment involved at the time of delivery by it, if it was delivered, and shall ascertain as nearly as possible the extent, if any, of the loss or damage for which it may be responsible. Id. § 1005.2(d). The carrier, however, shall not . . . voluntarily pay a claim under such circumstances unless and until the shipper submits a claim containing a specified or determinable amount of money. Id. 24 We have not yet expressly held that the ICC's minimum claim requirements apply to litigated claims, as opposed to claims that are resolved voluntarily, but implicitly, we seem to have assumed as much. In Konst v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., we held that a claimant could invoke the presumption that a railroad carrier had received a properly mailed claim so that the claim could be considered filed within the meaning of 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2. 71 F.3d 850, 851-52, 855 (11th Cir.1996). In so holding, we did not explicitly address whether § 1005 applies to contested as well as uncontested claims, but we applied the regulation without discussion and described § 1005.2 as the federal regulations governing the minimum requirements for making a damages claim against a common carrier. Id. at 853 & n. 6. 25 Our assumption in Konst is supported by all but one circuit to have addressed the issue. The First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have held that the regulations apply to all claims, whether contested or voluntarily settled. See Nedlloyd Lines, B.V. Corp., v. Harris Transport Co., 922 F.2d 905, 908 (1st Cir.1991); Pathway Bellows, Inc. v. Blanchette, 630 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir.1980); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. G.I. Trucking Co., 1 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir.1993). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits applied the ICC regulations to litigated claims without explicitly ruling on the issue. See Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 993 F.2d 1187, 1188 (5th Cir.1993); Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 711-12 (6th Cir.1999). The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has concluded that the ICC regulations apply only to uncontested claims. Wisconsin Packing, 618 F.2d at 445. Reasoning that § 1005.2(d) prohibits carriers from voluntarily paying claims for uncertain amounts, that the legislative proposals accompanying the ICC regulations differentiate throughout between `disputed claims' and `claims determinations,' id. at 445, and that the purpose of the regulation was to make claim settlement more expeditious by providing procedures for the voluntary disposition of claims by carriers, id., the Seventh Circuit held that the sufficiency of a shipper's claim should be assessed by the old Blish Milling reasonable notice standard, id. 26 After reviewing this precedent from other circuits and the contentions of the parties, we agree with the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that at least the minimum claim requirements contained in section 1005.2(b) apply to contested as well as voluntarily resolved claims. 8 As stated by the First Circuit, the regulations' section discussing the [a]pplicability of the regulations, 49 C.F.R. § 1005.1, does not distinguish between contested and uncontested claims. See Nedlloyd Lines, 922 F.2d at 908. Instead, it states that the regulations shall govern the processing of claims for loss, damage, injury, or delay to property transported . . . in interstate or foreign commerce. 49 C.F.R. § 1005.1. Similarly, in the extensive rulemaking accompanying the regulations, the ICC clearly indicated that its regulations should be applied broadly: 27 We are persuaded by the record in this proceeding that our regulations should embrace the full range of matters relating to the filing of claims, including a prescription of minimum filing requirements and a consideration of documents that do not constitute claims, and claims for uncertain amounts. . . . 28 . . . . 29 Thus, the rules set fort in section 1005.1 and 1005.2 . . . first establish their overall applicability and then set out the manner and form in which loss and damage claims must be filed by claimants in order to accomplish the improvements shown to be required in the public interest in this area. 30 Ex Parte 263, 340 I.C.C. at 555-56. Finally, as noted in Konst, the regulations require carriers to fulfill certain obligations once a claim is received. See Konst, 71 F.3d at 853. Applying the regulations to all claims gives the carriers standards by which to recognize valid claims when they receive them. See Pathway Bellows, Inc., 630 F.2d at 904. 31 We find unpersuasive Siemens's argument that it should not be bound by the regulations' minimum claim requirements because they were not incorporated into the Carmack Amendment, the Bill of Lading, the USBL, or NSR's Conditions of Carriage. As the district court noted, [i]t is well settled that `[t]he laws in force at the time of the making of a contract enter into and form a part of the contract as if they were expressly incorporated into it.' National Distrib. Co. v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 845 F.2d 307, 309 (11th Cir.1988) (citation omitted and first alteration added). The regulations at issue here came into effect long before Siemens agreed to a Bill of Lading from NSR. Further, as we have explained, § 1005.2(b) applies to contested claims like Siemens's. For these reasons, we conclude that the question of whether Siemens's letters constituted a valid claim to NSR should be determined according to § 1005.2(b)'s minimum claim requirements. 32