Opinion ID: 887195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Federal Trilogy

Text: ¶ 61 In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided the first of what was to be a trilogy of cases dealing with the admissibility of expert testimony. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 requires that expert scientific evidence be subject to a reliability test, rather than the common law general acceptance test of Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013, 1014. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90, 113 S.Ct. at 2794-95. The Frye test was superseded by Rule 702. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794. Accordingly, the Court required that, when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, the trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning and methodology is scientifically valid and can be properly applied to the facts at issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. This is referred to as the courts' gatekeeping function. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. ¶ 62 The Court set forth various, flexible considerations that will bear on this inquiry, including, whether the theory or technique in question can be (and has been) tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; its known or potential error rate and the maintenance of standards controlling its operation; and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within the relevant scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. The Court observed that the inquiry is to be a flexible one, focusing solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate, and being mindful of other applicable Rules. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2797. Finally, the Court stated that cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising general acceptance standard, is the appropriate means by which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596, 113 S.Ct. at 2798. ¶ 63 The second case in the trilogy was General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997), 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508. In Joiner, the Court clarified Daubert in two respects. First the Court noted that trial courts could scrutinize the reliability of a proffered expert's reasoning process as well as his or her methodology. The Court stated that nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. at 519. Second, Joiner made clear that abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which an appellate court should review a district court's decision to admit or exclude expert scientific evidence. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. at 519. ¶ 64 The final of the three cases was Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael (1999), 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238. In this case the Court applied Daubert's gatekeeping obligation to not only expert scientific evidence, but, as well, to all expert testimony. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141, 119 S.Ct. at 1171. Furthermore, the Court emphasized the importance of the gatekeeping requirement, noting that [t]he objective of that requirement is to ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony [and] to make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176.