Opinion ID: 187240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Distinction of claims

Text: Section 113 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), states: In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs. . . . There is no dispute that the Trout class was the prevailing party on the primary issue of sex discrimination and that it is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees from the Navy for litigating that issue. The Trout class contends, however, that even if it is determined that it is not eligible for pre-November 21, 1991, interest on backpay and attorneys' fees, the district court nevertheless erred when it ruled that the class was not entitled to recovery of the attorneys' fees incurred for litigating that issue. In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a plaintiff who has succeeded on a significant claim, and therefore is entitled to attorneys' fees for work done on that claim, is also entitled to attorneys' fees for work performed on an unsuccessful claim. The Court, recogniz[ing] that there is no certain method of determining when claims are `related' or `unrelated,' 461 U.S. at 436 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 1933, held that attorneys' fees should not be awarded for an unsuccessful claim when that claim is distinct in all respects from [the plaintiff's] successful claims. Id. at 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (emphasis added). The Navy argues that the interest issue is distinct from the sex discrimination issue and therefore no attorneys' fees should be awarded for litigating that issue. The Trout class asserts that the issues are in fact not distinct, claiming that, for purposes of collecting attorneys' fees, it remains the prevailing party in the sex discrimination litigation, and that its request for pre-November 21, 1991, interest was part of that litigation because such interest was intended to compensate the class for damages due to the Navy's bad faith delays. For authority the Trout class relies on Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir.2002), in which the Eighth Circuit, in determining whether to award attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs for civil rights litigation, considered, inter alia, the plaintiffs' considerable success in the litigation as a whole, and whether issues litigated later were inextricably intertwined with the issues upon which the plaintiffs prevailed. Id. at 773-74. Here, argues the Trout class, the 1993 Consent Decree gave them maximum success, and furthermore the interest issue is `inextricably intertwined' with the awards of backpay and attorneys' fees because the class would have no claim for interest if it were not the prevailing party in the underlying sex discrimination litigation. Under this approach, a claim for prejudgment interest would always be deemed related to the merits claim. The Trout class further argues that the Consent Decree contains express language reserving the pre-November 21, 1991, interest issue, and that under a fair reading of the Consent Decree it was required to litigate that interest issue. Quoting from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Johnson v. City of Tulsa, 489 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir.2007), that attorneys' fees were to be awarded for compensation for reasonable efforts to preserve the fruits of the decree, id. at 1111, the Trout class argues that the Consent Decree expressly contemplated that a post-judgment determination would be made as to whether the class would receive pre-November 21,1991, interest, and that in seeking that interest the class was trying to preserve the fruits of the Consent Decree. Therefore the Trout class claims that the interest issue was part and parcel of the central issue in the case, i.e., the sex discrimination allegations. The Navy contends that the Trout class's argument that it should be awarded attorneys' fees for litigating a post-decree issue even though it lost that issue on appeal has no merit. According to the Navy, fees for litigating post-decree issues have only been awarded in two situations. The first situation is when the consent decree expressly authorizes the court to award such fees. Here, the Navy argues, the Consent Decree did not obligate it to pay such fees regardless of the final outcome of the issue, but merely reserved the Trout class's right to seek such fees. And the Navy further argues that any such fees already paid were subject to explicit reservations of the right of the Navy to seek recovery of those fees if it prevailed on the interest issue. The second situation in which fees have been awarded for litigating post-decree issues, according to the Navy, is when that litigation was necessary to protect the relief granted for the primary claims. But the litigation issue here, argues the Navy, was not necessary to secure any particular relief granted by the Consent Decree. Instead, the Navy contends, the litigation on the interest issue was undertaken in an attempt to gain an additional remedy for the Trout class. Consequently, contends the Navy, the district court acted well within its discretion when it determined that the interest issue was distinct from the sex discrimination issue. Relying on the factors set forth in Hensley, the district court determined that the Trout class's unsuccessful interest claim was distinct from its successful sex discrimination claim, Trout, 464 F.Supp.2d at 32, and we agree. The Trout class and the Navy disagree as to our standard of review on the issue of the distinctness of the sex discrimination claim and the interest claim. The Trout class contends that this is a purely legal question which we should review de novo, while the Navy believes that we should review the district judge's decision for abuse of discretion, giving great deference to the district judge's superior knowledge of the case as a whole. On the present record we need not establish a precedent on that subject as the same result prevails in any event. Even applying the de novo standard, we agree with the Navy that the claims are distinct. Litigation of the interest issue was not inextricably intertwined with the sex discrimination litigation  it was not necessary to obtain or protect any relief awarded, nor was it necessary to preserve the integrity of the Consent Decree as a whole. The district court therefore correctly determined that the issues were distinct and denied an award of attorneys' fees for litigation of the interest issue.