Opinion ID: 1227793
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination

Text: Lindsley's first argument is that because the DOT does not list a specific occupational classification called Production Inspector or Inspector, Production, there is a conflict between the DOT and VE Breslin's testimony that Lindsley could perform the job of a light, unskilled production inspector. The ALJ's purported failure to resolve this conflict, in Lindsley's view, means that the ALJ disregarded the applicable regulation by failing to obtain a reasonable explanation for ... apparent conflict[s]. See S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at . But Lindsley has not identified any apparent, let alone actual, conflict between the DOT and the testimony of VE Breslin. Instead, Lindsley repeatedly emphasizes that the occupations listed in the DOT do not include the job description of a light, unskilled production inspector. Lindsley has failed, however, to cite any authority establishing that a conflict between the DOT and a VE's testimony exists simply because an occupation described by the VE does not specifically appear in the DOT. Indeed, there is ample authority supporting the contrary conclusion. The fact that VE Breslin's description of a production-inspector job does not align perfectly with the DOT's listed occupation titles should not be surprising given that [t]he DOT contains information about most, but not all, occupations. S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at  (emphasis added). Moreover, as the magistrate judge pointed out in his Report and Recommendation, the DOT's job classifications are collective descriptions of occupations that can encompass numerous jobs. Id. (The term `occupation,' as used in the DOT, refers to the collective description of those jobs. Each occupation represents numerous jobs.); see also S.S.R. 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185, at  n. 4 (S.S.A. July 2, 1996) (An `occupation' refers to a grouping of numerous individual `jobs' with similar duties. Within occupations (e.g., `carpenter') there may be variations among jobs performed for different employers (e.g., `rough carpenter').). The fact, therefore, that a VE and the DOT might use different terminology to describe employment positions does not establish that a conflict exists between these sources of evidence. Lindsley has pointed to no legal authority or fact in the administrative record indicating otherwise. His first argument is therefore without merit.
Lindsley's second objection is that the ALJ failed to comply with S.S.R. 00-4p by, in essence, asking VE Breslin the wrong question. The ALJ asked Breslin whether there was any discrepancy between your opinions and the DOT standards. (Emphasis added.) Lindsley maintains, however, that the ALJ should have instead asked Breslin whether the evidence he ... provided conflicts with information provided in the DOT. See S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at  (emphasis added). Using S.S.R. 00-4p's precise language, according to Lindsley, would have compelled [Breslin] to reveal that the DOT does not classify jobs or occupations as `light unskilled production inspector'.... Lindsley correctly points out that the Social Security Administration imposes an affirmative duty on ALJs to ask VEs if the evidence that they have provided conflicts with the information provided in the DOT. S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at . He also properly observes that this duty was triggered in the present case because VE Breslin proffered evidence during the administrative hearing in the form of expert testimony. In particular, Breslin testified that approximately 270,000 production-inspector jobs exist in the national economy that a person with Lindsley's residual functional capacity could perform. But Lindsley has failed to show how the ALJ erred. There is little doubt that the ALJ satisfied his obligation under S.S.R. 00-4p by asking VE Breslin about any apparent discrepancies between the information provided by the DOT and that which Breslin himself presented. See S.S.R. 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at . Breslin responded that there were no such discrepancies. We do not see a material difference between asking if there are any discrepancies and asking whether there are any conflicts. Nor has Lindsley identified any authority requiring ALJs to conduct a mechanical recitation of the precise language in S.S.R. 00-4p for the purpose of determining whether there are any inconsistencies. There is yet another way to view Lindsley's second argument. Stripped of its technical veneer, Lindsley's claim amounts to the contention that the ALJ did not interrogate VE Breslin with sufficient rigor about potential conflicts between Breslin's views and the DOT. But Breslin credibly testified that there was no such conflict. And Lindsley was afforded a full opportunity to cross-examine Breslin. The ALJ had no duty under S.S.R. 00-4p to interrogate him further. See Martin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 170 Fed.Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir.2006) (Nothing in S.S.R. 00-4p places an affirmative duty on the ALJ to conduct an independent investigation into the testimony of witnesses to determine if they are correct.). Lindsley's second argument therefore lacks merit.