Opinion ID: 222607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Next, Prince argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he contends the jury heard insufficient evidence that he knowingly gave false information to a federally licensed firearms dealer, and that the record does not reflect his personal involvement in the marijuana cultivation enterprise. After a thorough review of the record, we disagree on both points. We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1316 (10th Cir.2009). Under due process principles, evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). We will not weigh conflicting evidence or second-guess the fact-finding decisions of the jury. United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1293 (10th Cir.2005).
The facts underlying this issue are simple. Despite apparently residing at one residence in Newton at all relevant times to the crimes charged, Prince routinely purchased firearms using a different addressin another part of townthat was listed on his driver's license. This was a problem for Prince because ATF inquiries revealed he had never lived at the driver's license address. As explained above, to prove liability under § 924(a)(1)(A), the government had to establish three elements: (1) the dealers named in the indictment were federally licensed firearms dealers at the time the offenses occurred; (2) Prince made a false statement or representation in the records that the licensed firearm dealer was required by federal law to maintain; and (3) he made the false statement with knowledge of the falsity. See Jury Instruction No. 12. Prince argues the address information was immaterial, and therefore irrelevant, to the requirements of § 924(a)(1)(A), and that in any event, the government did not prove he used a false address when buying firearms. The voluminous evidence in the record belies Prince's contentions. As an initial matter, we hold that knowingly giving a false address when filling out ATF forms violates § 924(a)(1)(A). ATF Form 4473, which federally licensed firearms dealers must keep on file, requires a firearm purchaser to provide his current residence addressan out-of-date address listed on a driver's license would not sufficeand warns that the buyer's current residential address cannot be a post office box. See, e.g., Supp. R., Gov't Ex. 2F; see also United States v. Nelson, 221 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.2000) (18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(5) requires licensed firearms dealers to keep records containing information about purchasers, including name, age, and place of residence; as a result, false statements relating to this information are prohibited under § 924(a)(1)(A)). Additionally, when he signed the ATF Form, Prince certified that he underst[ood] that making any false oral or written statement, or exhibiting any false or misrepresented identification with respect to this transaction, is a crime punishable as a felony. See, e.g., Supp. R., Gov't Ex. 2F. Accordingly, Prince was well aware that submitting false address information was a criminal act. Further, the evidence presented at trial gave the jury ample reason to conclude Prince knowingly lied about his address on ATF forms. First, the government established Prince never lived at the driver's license addressthe address he repeatedly provided when purchasing firearms. Detectives showed Prince's photo to the neighbors there, all of whom reported that Prince did not live at the apartment complex. Further, the property manager for the apartment complex scoured her records and found that since at least 2004, no one named Judah Prince or Rex Lutes (Prince's former name) had lived in any of the apartments. Witness testimony supported this evidence. In contrast, the evidence showed Prince resided full-time at the other residence, where the marijuana and firearms were found. Not only did Prince tell officers that this was his home address, they also discovered the deed and title for the home were in Prince's name, records showed he took out a mortgage on the home, and an employee of the power company testified that Prince had been paying the house's electric bills since January 2006. Moreover, during a search of Prince's house, an ATF agent found a mortgage document addressed to Prince at the home's address, and another ATF agent testified that the house bore indicia of active habitation, including clothing and personal items. Prince's neighbors corroborated this evidence. For example, one neighbor testified that Prince had moved to the house approximately three years before his arrest, that she saw Prince nearly every day and had regular conversations with him, and that she observed him working in his yard. Another neighbor told the jury he regularly saw Prince mowing his lawn and clearing his driveway. And a third neighbor recounted his occasional conversations with Prince and testified that Prince moved into the house years before the search and seizure. Thus, the jury heard ample evidence that Prince did not live at the address listed on his driver's license at any relevant timeand that he nevertheless listed that address on ATF forms when purchasing guns from federally licensed firearms dealers. We have no basis on which to overturn the jury's verdict.
The jury also heard voluminous evidence that Prince was personally involved in growing the more than 200 marijuana plants found at his house in Newton, Kansas. To convict Prince for manufacturing at least 100 plants of marijuana, the jury had to find Prince (1) knowingly or intentionally manufactured marijuana plants, and (2) he knew the amount of the controlled substance he manufactured was at least 100 plants. Jury Instruction No. 20; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prince advances several arguments that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of this charge. First, Prince argues it would have been illogical for him to store his valuable gun collection in the same place as a large marijuana growing operation, given that he knew ahead of time about the ATF investigation. Next, Prince contends it was his sonsnot himwho lived in the house and grew the marijuana. [8] Prince denies living in the house at the time of the search, and he says that a latched and locked door, combined with a sophisticated ventilation system, prevented him from detecting the illicit activities in the basement. In short, Prince asserts that his adult children were solely responsible for the marijuana cultivation, and that even if he suspected illegal activity in the basement, his mere suspicion does not amount to aiding and abetting under § 841(a)(1). Whether it was logical for Prince to cultivate cannabis where he stored his guns is fundamentally a question of credibilityand therefore a question for the jury. At trial, Prince's attorney repeatedly argued that it made no sense for Prince, who knew he was under investigation, to store his firearms in a house with more than 200 marijuana plants. This was an appeal to logic unsupported by evidence. The jury apparently did not accept Prince's story, and we cannot question the jury's credibility determination unless it exceeds the bounds of rationality. It does not: none of the evidence supports Prince's contention that he sought to store his firearms in a neutral location devoid of criminal activity. Rather, he asks us to reevaluate the jury's inferences and concoct a different narrative furthering his theory of the case. This we cannot do. Similarly, Prince's argument that he was either unaware of the marijuana grow operation, or perhaps merely suspicious of criminal activity, does not withstand scrutiny. The record shows that the marijuana plants in the Newton house basement generated a pungent stench of marijuana that wafted throughout the house. In addition to rebutting Prince's contention that the house's ventilation system masked the marijuana odor, this evidence shows that it would simply have been impossible for Prince to live at the homewhich the evidence shows he didwithout being aware of the illicit enterprise in his basement. Moreover, in contrast to Prince's gloss on the evidence, the record shows that access to the basement was barely restricted at all. In fact, the basement door was not even locked, but was rather closed with a child-safety mechanism that was easily disabled. This is only the beginning of what the jury heard. In addition, evidence of the marijuana enterprise was strewn throughout the house. In the basement, law enforcement officers found a sophisticated marijuana cultivation operation, which included a planting bed, grow lights, fertilizers, chemicals, gardening tools, drug paraphernalia, and 204 marijuana plants. Authorities also seized literature with instructions for maintaining a marijuana grow operation, composition books chronicling the progress of the plants, and writings suggesting multiple people were involved in the grow operation. Indicia of the marijuana operation were found upstairs as well, in Prince's living quarters. For example, one composition book, which contained notes about the marijuana operation, was found upstairs alongside copies of Prince's passport and driver's licenseand containers of marijuana were found in an upstairs freezer. Finally, the jury had the opportunity to match Prince's handwriting with notes in composition books found in the house. The government, without the aid of a handwriting expert, invited the jury to compare the way that the number four was written on Prince's ATF forms with the way it was sometimes written in the composition books found around the house. The government argued that Prince wrote the number with a distinct pennant shape (e.g., as it appears in Times New Roman font4), while his sons did not, and that this distinction should lead the jury to infer that Prince's handwriting appears inside the composition books. Such an inference would not have been improper. Ultimately, there is no doubt that a reasonable jury could have found Prince guilty of manufacturing marijuana plants. Prince owned the Newton house, he lived there, and he kept personal items there. Although the marijuana grow operation was in the basement, its odor permeated the house, and it was easily accessible by anyone who could open a simple child lock. Indicators of the grow operation abounded in the house. In sum, sufficient evidence supports the drug count.