Opinion ID: 4376974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agency and Section 6111

Text: [¶14] Title 14 M.R.S. § 6111(1) prohibits enforcement of a residential mortgage until thirty-five days after written notice of the right to cure “is given by the mortgagee to the mortgagor.” The court determined that because other subsections of the statute, see id. § 6111(1-A)(D)-(E), differentiate between mortgagees and loan servicers, the Legislature did not intend to designate servicers as entities that can send notice to mortgagors. [¶15] “We interpret the meaning of a statute de novo by analyzing its plain language . . . .” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Cloutier, 2013 ME 17, ¶ 12, 61 A.3d 1242. “A plain language interpretation should not be confused with a literal interpretation . . . . Rather, courts are guided by a host of principles intended to assist in determining the meaning and intent of a provision even within the confines of a plain language analysis.” Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 ME 158, ¶ 20, 107 A.3d 621. [¶16] When analyzing the interplay between section 6111(1) and the common law of agency we look to “the well-established rule of statutory construction that the common law is not to be changed by doubtful implication [or] be overturned except by clear and unambiguous language, and that a statute in derogation of it will not effect a change thereof beyond that clearly 8 indicated either by express terms or by necessary implication.” Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hosp., LLC, 2007 ME 17, ¶ 23, 914 A.2d 1116; see also Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 2004 ME 53, ¶ 10, 847 A.2d 1169 (“Generally, Legislatures are deemed to draft legislation against the backdrop of the common law, and do not displace it without directly addressing the issue.”). Also informing our interpretation of section 6111(1) is the directive from the Legislature that, “unless such construction is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the enactment . . . . [w]hen an act that may be lawfully done by an agent is done by one authorized to do it, his principal may be regarded as having done it.” 1 M.R.S. § 71(1) (2018). [¶17] Although section 6111 distinguishes between mortgagees, mortgage servicers, and agents of mortgagees in its various subsections, there is no clear statement or necessary implication that the Legislature intended to abrogate the long-established principles of agency by simply stating that notice “is given by the mortgagee.” Accord U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Jones, 330 F. Supp. 3d 530, 536 (D. Me. 2018), appeal filed No. 18-1719 (1st Cir. Aug. 1, 2018) (“[S]uch a narrow interpretation [of section 6111(1)] ignores well established agency principles without any indication that the Maine Legislature intended this result.”). Nor does the plain meaning of the statute suggest that the 9 Legislature intended to depart from its general rule of statutory construction that a principal is legally regarded as having done an act that was done on its behalf by its agent acting within the scope of its authority. [¶18] This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to prevent the unnecessary loss of a mortgagor’s home, and does not alter our mandate that lenders must strictly comply with its requirements. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶ 31, 96 A.3d 700; Sinclair v. Sinclair, 654 A.2d 438, 440 (Me. 1995). Moreover, Needham does not—and seemingly cannot—suggest any legal or practical difference between an agent loan servicer giving the notice on behalf of the mortgagee and the mortgagee itself giving the notice. On the other hand, his suggested interpretation—which the trial court adopted—is so narrow that it would prohibit even an attorney from giving a notice of the right to cure on behalf of a mortgagee client. We cannot say that the Legislature intended such a constricted reading. Accordingly, we conclude that a mortgagee may delegate to an agent—such as a loan servicer— its duty to provide a notice of the right to cure pursuant to section 6111(1).