Opinion ID: 1385188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Enhancement for Obliterated Serial Numbers

Text: Brown's contention that the obliterated-serial-numbers enhancement should not have been applied to him because he did not know the numbers were obliterated does not warrant extended discussion. The Guidelines provided for a two-level enhancement [i]f any firearm . . . had an altered or obliterated serial number. 2003 Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4). The commentary to § 2K2.1 provided that the enhancement applied whether or not the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm . . . had an altered or obliterated serial number. 2003 Guidelines § 2K2.1 Application Note 19. Thus, in United States v. Williams, 49 F.3d 92 (2d Cir.1995), we upheld the strict liability nature of this provision, stating that while 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number, contains a scienter requirement, . . . Congress has not required . . . that the § 2K2.1(b)(4) sentencing enhancement contain a scienter requirement. Id. at 93. We noted that the strict-liability nature of the enhancement reasonably imposes the burden upon a felon who illegally possesses a firearm to ensure that the serial number is not obliterated, and such an obligation does not violate due process. Id. To the extent that Brown may also be arguing that the § 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement could not be applied to him because the fact that serial numbers were obliterated was not proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury (see Brown brief on appeal at 17-18), his argument fares no better. Judicial authority to find facts relevant to sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence survives Booker. United States v, Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 220 n. 15 (2d Cir.2005). Here, the PSR stated unequivocally that on at least two of the guns sold by Brown, the serial numbers were obliterated; and Brown made no objection to that statement. His argument to the district court was that he under oath stated he was not aware of the defaced weapon. (2004 S.Tr. at 3 (emphasis added).) Finally, Brown points out that at his original sentencing hearing, the district court stated that while the government has the right to seek the Guidelines obliterated-serial-numbers enhancement despite not pursuing the criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), it is not the right thing to do (2004 S.Tr. at 20). Brown argues that the application of that enhancement to him on remand, after the Guidelines were declared advisory, was thus unreasonable. We reject this argument, given that the purpose of a Crosby remand is to permit the district court to determine whether to impose a different sentence knowing that the Guidelines which had given the government the right to seek that enhancementare not mandatory. On the remand in this case, the court acknowledged the advisory nature of the Guidelines, and it obviously concluded that the enhancement was appropriate even under the advisory Guidelines. We see no error or abuse of discretion in that conclusion.