Opinion ID: 1132505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: giving unsolicited advice on case from which petitioner had been disqualified

Text: (15a) The commission found: In De Carolis, on August 27, 1980, and while the defendant was incarcerated, the public defender filed a declaration of prejudice against petitioner under section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereafter section 170.6). On August 29, the superior court granted a writ of habeas corpus that effectively terminated criminal proceedings, leaving for determination only the amount of attorney fees, if any, to be awarded the county under section 987.8 for the public defender's services. Knowing those facts, petitioner on September 2 wrote the following note addressed to Commissioner Murphy, an employee of petitioner's court: 987.8 hearing should be held. Suggested order $500.00 for all PD's work including Petition and Order re Habeas Corpus payable thru Co. Bureau of Collections. PD to have no part in such hearings. MEG. The fee matter was heard not by Commissioner Murphy but by Judge Kaufman, of the same court, on September 5. The docket sheet indicates that he ordered fees of $400. The masters, who made the same findings as the commission in the matter, found that Judge Kaufman was not influenced by petitioner's note. The court file in evidence includes the order remanding the defendant to custody, dated August 26, and signed by petitioner. Petitioner testified he did not remember having been disqualified before writing the note (which he acknowledged was his handwriting). But the note was on the case file, and the clerk who accepted the section 170.6 declaration for filing said it was his practice to put the original declaration with the case file and to inform the affected judge as soon as possible. The facts found are otherwise undisputed. The commission and masters concluded that petitioner's writing the note was wrongful in three respects: (1) It created an impression that petitioner was trying to influence the decision of a commissioner who serves at the pleasure of the court. (2) The section 170.6 declaration should have deterred petitioner from advising other judicial officers on how to decide the matter. (3) Apart from the section 170.6 disqualification, a judge should not give unsolicited advice to another judicial officer on how to decide a matter within the latter's discretion; such advice is to be distinguished from communicating factual matters. We do not agree that petitioner's writing of the note would have been so clearly wrongful as to warrant judicial discipline if there had been no section 170.6 disqualification and the addressee had been a fellow judge rather than a subordinate judicial officer. Canon 3(A)(4) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should ..., except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding. The commentary to the canon states: The proscription against communications concerning a proceeding ... does not preclude a judge from consulting with other judges, or with court personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out his adjudicative responsibilities. Though the word consulting was probably intended to refer only to discussion initiated by a judge in connection with his or her own adjudicative responsibilities, we are not aware of any limitation on communication among judges of the same court that is sufficiently clear to warrant labeling unsolicited advice to one judge from another judge who is not disqualified as misconduct. The disqualification of petitioner under section 170.6, however, rendered the writing of the note an act that he knew or should have known was beyond his authority. (16) Preliminarily, it is clear that the disqualification barred petitioner from himself ordering attorney fees in the matter under section 987.8. In argument to this court, petitioner disputes that premise, citing Wenger v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 29 Cal.3d 615, 646. There, the petitioner had asserted in the trial court that despite a section 170.6 disqualification, an arraignment hearing remained within his power because section 170.6 disqualifies a judge only from trying a case or hearing `any matter therein which involves a contested issue of law or fact.' That view had at least enough merit to prevent the holding of it from constituting misconduct. (See Mezzetti v. Superior Court (1979) 94 Cal. App.3d 987 [156 Cal. Rptr. 802] (disqualified judge held authorized to hold settlement conference); Fraijo v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal. App.3d 222 [109 Cal. Rptr. 909] (plea bargain). But see In re Byron B. (1979) 98 Cal. App.3d 300 [330] [159 Cal. Rptr. 430] (acceptance of juvenile's admission of guilt); Lyons v. Superior Court (1977) 73 Cal. App.3d 625, 627 [140 Cal. Rptr. 826] (plea bargain).) ( Id., at p. 647, fn. 13.) Here, however, it is irrefutable that the setting of an attorney fee under section 987.8 involves a contested issue of law or fact within the meaning of section 170.6. Petitioner argues that the section 987.8 hearing was not the same action or proceeding from which he was disqualified because it was a separate civil matter that could be heard only upon conclusion of the criminal proceedings in the trial court (§ 987.8, subd. (a)). The contention is meritless: section 987.8 clearly calls for the holding of the fee-setting hearing at the end of, but as part of, the criminal action in which the legal services were rendered, and that was the procedure followed in petitioner's court. (15b) Since petitioner was disqualified under section 170.6 from hearing the fee-setting issue, it was highly improper for him to give unsolicited advice to another judicial officer on how to decide it. The right to disqualify a judge, guaranteed by section 170.6 ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 12 Cal.3d 512, 531; see Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 193 [137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148]), would be undermined and perhaps vitiated if the disqualified judge were permitted to circumvent the disqualification by initiating advice to another judicial officer on how to decide the matter. There was additional impropriety, apart from petitioner's disqualification under section 170.6, arising from the fact that Commissioner Murphy was not a full-fledged judge but an officer appointed by petitioner's court to perform subordinate judicial duties (Const., art. VI, § 22) under the direction of the judges (Gov. Code, § 72190). As the judge senior in service of the court's two judges, petitioner alone had the ultimate say on whether to hire or fire the commissioner. (Gov. Code, § 72192.) On the other hand, the commissioner had all the judicial obligations imposed by the California Code of Judicial Conduct and thus was required to discharge his duties impartially and independently. (Cal. Code of Jud. Conduct, canons 1, 2(A), 3(A), Compliance with the Code of Judicial Conduct foll. canon 7.) For petitioner, as the judge to whom the commissioner owed his continued tenure in office, to thrust upon the latter unsolicited advice concerning a matter entrusted to the commissioner's impartial judicial determination was bound to create seemingly, if not actually, intolerable interference with the commissioner's impartiality. The commission concluded that petitioner's writing of the note was wilful misconduct. We agree. The superior court's habeas corpus order, obtained by the deputy public defender who had filed the section 170.6 declaration of prejudice against petitioner, resulted in final termination of the criminal proceeding only three days after petitioner had ordered the defendant incarcerated. Petitioner's pattern of retaliatory conduct in other matters ( Anderson, Rueda), plus the facts that the note (1) dealt with the merits of a matter in which petitioner was barred from acting in deference to a litigant's right to impartiality and (2) was addressed specifically to a subordinate judicial officer who held his office at petitioner's pleasure, leads us to conclude that petitioner's act of writing the note was for a corrupt purpose, i.e., for [a] purpose other than the faithful discharge of judicial duties and thus constituted wilful misconduct. ( Spruance v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, supra, 13 Cal.3d 778, 796.)