Opinion ID: 3008595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Raised Solely by Derek Edmonds

Text: 1. Comparison to Jesus in Guilt Phase Closing Argument and Examples of Worse Cases in Penalty Phase Closing Argument Edmonds claims it was error for the trial court to sustain objections to his attempts to compare himself to Jesus being put to deatti on the cross and to worse cases like Jack the Ripper, Jeffrey Dahmer, and John Wayne Gacy . As to the comparison to Jesus, Edmonds claims his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion was violated . Yet, given the direction his attorney was headed, and the fact that this was a closing arguriicnt rather than a church service, it is clear that he did not wish to engage in any sort of religious worship or ceremony, and thus this was clearly not an issue of the free exercise of religion . Generally, (iit is unquestionably the rule in Kentucky that counsel has wide latitude in making opening or closing statements . Brewer v. Commonwealth , 206 S.W.3d 343, 350 (Ky. 2006) . However, trial courts retain the sound discretion to limit closing arguments when necessary. While it may not have been necessary to restrict Edmonds' counsel as to these topics, there is also little conceivable benefit to Edmonds from such comparisons. Certainly, it is not likely that their omissions had a substantial effect on the verdict. If error, it was harmless. 2. Full Access to Hall's Psychiatric Condition Edmonds claims that he was improperly denied full access to Hall's psychiatric records and an independent psychiatric examination, and that he therefore could not adequately impeach Hall with his own psychiatric history. Even though many of Hall's psychiatric records were contained in juvenile records that the trial court ruled were discoverable by the co-defendants, Edmonds objects that lie was not permitted to delve even further into Hall's psychiatric history. However, after a review of Hall's records that Edmonds did have, this Court finds it would have been unnecessary to compel the disclosure of additional records. Kentucky follows the majority rule that a criminal defendant, upon a preliminary showing that the records likely contain exculpatory evidence, is entitled to some form of pretrial discovery of a prosecution witness's mental health treatment records that would otherwise be subject to an `absolute' privilege . Co mmonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 561 (Ky. 2003) . If the psychotherapy records of a crucial prosecution witness contain evidence probative of the witness's ability to recall, comprehend, and accurately relate the subject matter of the testimony, the defendant's right to compulsory process must prevail over the witness's psychotherapist-patient privilege . Upon a preliminary showing . . . the witness's psychotherapy records are subject to production for an in camera inspection to determine whether the records contain exculpatory evidence, including evidence relevant to the witness's credibility. Id. at 563 . In Barroso , however, this Court was cognizant. that a more restrictive test is required to preclude `fishing expedition[s] to see what may turn up.' (quoting Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States , 341 U .S . 214, 221 (1951)) . Therefore, an  in camera review of a witness's psychotherapy records is authorized only upon receipt of evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records contain exculpatory evidence . Id . at 564. After examining Hall's juvenile records in camera-which contained some of his psychiatric records that were five to ten years old-the trial judge found that. an in camera review of the rest of his records was not warranted. The judge specifically found that the information in Hall's juvenile file from years before the current case was not sufficient evidence under Barroso to establish the required reasonable belief that the records contain exculpatory evidence . A person's credibility is not in question merely because he or she is receiving treatment for a mental health problem. To subject every witness in a criminal prosecution to an in camera review of their psyciiotii%rapis is records vvould be the invasion of privacy which the psychotherapist-privilege is intended to prevent. Id. at 563 (quotation marks and citations omitted) . Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion . As to Edmonds' request for an independent psychiatric examination of Hall pursuant to CR 35.01-made applicable to criminal proceedings by RCr 13 .04, St. Clair, 140 S.W.3d at 542-good cause must be shown to warrant such an examination. For the same reasons that the trial judge did not find the required reasonable belief that Hall's psychiatric records contained exculpatory evidence, the trial judge did not . abuse her discretion by declining to order an independent. psychiatric examination . 3. Competency to Stand Trial and Serious Mental Retardation Edmonds also claims that he should have been found incompetent to stand trial and found to be mentally retarded so as to exclude the possibility of the death penalty. Before the trial in this case, the trial court conducted a competency hearing. Dr. Peter Schilling testified for the defense and Dr. Steven Simon testified after conducting a competency evaluation at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC) at the court's request. Dr. Schilling conceded that Edmonds recorded a full-scale I .Q. score of 71 on the test he administered, and that he had previously scored 71 and 73. He also conceded that Edmonds achieved scores indicative of malingering. Dr. Simon testified that Edmonds scored 66 on the test administered at KCPC but that he once again achieved scores indicative of malingering. RCr 8 .06 and KRS 504.100 set out the legal duty to order a competency hearing once reasonable grounds are presented which call competency into question. Alley v. Commonwealth , 160 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Ky. 2005) . The trial judge did this. At this hearing, however, [t]he burden is on the defense to prove a defendant incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence . Id. In Kentucky, the standard of competency is whether the defendant has a substantial capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to participate rationally in his defense. Id. ; see also KRS 504 .060. The trial judge noted this standard in reaching her decision. The mere fact that the trial judge accepted the testimony of one of the doctors as more credible than-the other, has been found to be permissible and allows the judge to make a finding regarding competency . Alley, 160 S .W.3d at 739 . The situation here is on point with Alley, where the trial judge had the authority to accept the medical evidence that he believed was most credible and convincing . He made extensive findings of fact with regard to the evidence and determined that. Alley had failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he was incompetent: to stand trial in light of the evidence to the contrary. Our review of the record indicates that the decision of the trial judge was supported by substantial evidence and was not clearly erroneous. Id . Here, the trial judge weighed the two evaluations acid found that Edmonds had been malingering . She did not abuse her discretion by finding him competent to stand trial at that time . Additivliaiiy, EdliVlld~ argues he should hwr- been found mentally retarded and thus been exempt from the death penalty under Atkins v. Vir mia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and KRS 532 .140. Because Edmonds did not receive the death penalty, this issue is moot. 4. Improper Sentence for First-Degree Sodomy The trial court's Judgment of Conviction and Sentence lists Edmonds' sentence for first-degree sodomy as life without benefit of parole. The jury, however, recommended a sentence of life, which is also reflected in the Judgment on Jury Trial entered just after the trial but before final sentencing . The Judgment of Conviction and Sentence gives Edmonds an impermissible sentence for first-degree sodomy . In this case, the sodomy was a Class A --felony, KRS 510 .070, the penalty range for which is 20 to 50 years' or life imprisonment, KRS 532 .060(2) . This issue was not, raised by Appellant, but has been revealed in review of the record . To the extent that the final Judgment reflects an impermissible sentence, it must be reversed and remanded to the trial court, for entry of an amended judgment reflecting the life sentence fixed by the jury and contained in the trial judgment .