Opinion ID: 1886457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Void-For-Vagueness Analysis

Text: As an initial matter, we note our agreement with the State's contention that even if there was a violation of COMAR 12.02.20.04, a violation of a State regulation does not trigger the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule generally applies only to violations of the Fourth Amendment. MVA v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 368, 739 A.2d 58, 65 (1999) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is ... a judicially created means of deterring illegal searches and seizures.); cf. Parker v. State, 402 Md. 372, 406, 936 A.2d 862, 882 (2007) (noting that under some circumstances evidence is inadmissible if it is obtained in violation of Maryland's common law knock and announce principle). Because we have held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated in this case, McFarlin's argument in relation to COMAR 12.02.20.04E is not relevant. Despite the above determination, we also note that we agree with the Court of Special Appeals' conclusion that COMAR 12.02.20.04E is not unconstitutionally vague. In Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 781 A.2d 851 (2001), this Court provided an extensive examination of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. There, we explained that a statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, otherwise, the enactment is void-for-vagueness. Galloway, 365 Md. at 614, 781 A.2d at 860 (quoting Williams v. State, 329 Md. 1, 8, 616 A.2d 1275, 1278 (1992)). We then summarized the requisite void-for-vagueness analysis as follows: A well grounded principle in federal constitutional law is that, when considering the void-for-vagueness doctrine, courts consistently consider two criteria or rationales. The first rationale is the fair notice principle that persons of ordinary intelligence and experience be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that they may govern their behavior accordingly. The standard for determining whether a statute provides fair notice is whether persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the statute's meaning. A statute is not vague under the fair notice principle if the meaning of the words in controversy can be fairly ascertained by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words themselves if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning. The second criterion of the vagueness doctrine regards enforcement of the statute. This rationale exists to ensure that criminal statutes provide legally fixed standards and adequate guidelines for police, judicial officers, triers of fact and others whose obligation it is to enforce, apply and administer the penal laws. To survive analysis, a statute must eschew arbitrary enforcement in addition to being intelligible to the reasonable person. Galloway, 365 Md. at 615-16, 781 A.2d at 860-61 (citations omitted). McFarlin argues that COMAR 12.02.20.04 is unconstitutionally vague because subsection E of the regulation provides that [o]utgoing mail may not be opened unless clear evidence exists to warrant inspection, yet, does not inform what constitutes clear evidence. In other words, McFarlin asserts that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because it begs the question, clear evidence of what? We do not find COMAR 12.02.20.04 void-for-vagueness. As the Court of Special Appeals noted in its opinion in this case, McFarlin had fair notice that clear evidence under COMAR 12.02.20.04E relates to security and safety matters, as McFarlin is incarcerated in a high security penal institution. We also agree with the Court of Special Appeals's conclusion that because COMAR 12.02.20.04 specifically applies only to inmates' outgoing mail, it is not so broad that it would likely be interpreted irrationally. See Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 122, 389 A.2d 341, 346 (1978) (A criminal statute is not void merely because it allows for the exercise of some discretion on the part of law enforcement and judicial officials. It is only where a statute is so broad as to be susceptible to irrational and selective patterns of enforcement that it will be held unconstitutional....). JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS.