Opinion ID: 63262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Dismissing McIntosh's Defamation Claim?

Text: McIntosh next argues that the district court erred by dismissing his state law defamation claim because Partridge failed to prove absence of malice and to plead the affirmative defense of qualified privilege in his first responsive pleading. To the extent that McIntosh's defamation claim was brought against Partridge in his individual capacity, Partridge asserted official immunity. [13] The record is unclear as to how McIntosh's defamation claim was dismissed below. The docket sheet and a Conference Memorandum dated August 4, 2006, both state that the district court dismissed McIntosh's defamation claim on McIntosh's own oral motion. McIntosh did not challenge this characterization of the disposition of his claim at any point below and only disputed this issue on appeal once it was brought to his counsel's attention at oral argument. McIntosh's failure to raise this issue below waives the issue on appeal, so it might ordinarily be a sufficient basis for affirming the district court's dismissal of his defamation claim. Kinash v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 739 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The district court's April 30, 2007 Opinion on Summary Judgment, however, casts doubt upon that disposition of the claim by stating that [t]he defamation claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim because Partridge had a qualified privilege to make the statements. [14] Given this discrepancy, we will also consider whether the district court's decision can be affirmed on a basis other than the August 4, 2006 order. McIntosh correctly objects that Partridge failed to raise a qualified privilege defense in his first responsive pleading. [15] In Texas, qualified privilege is an affirmative defense, Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd, 460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970), and Partridge failed to raise it in his answer as required by Rule 8(c). Moreover, McIntosh's complaint alleged that Partridge made the statements with malice, and if the plaintiff establishes malice the privilege is defeated. [16] Therefore, the district court erred by dismissing McIntosh's defamation claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) based on qualified privilege. Nevertheless, this court may affirm a district court's granting of a motion to dismiss on a basis not relied upon by the district court, and Partridge properly raised the defense of official immunity in his answer. Gulf Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 476, 486 (5th Cir.2002). In Texas, [a] governmental employee is entitled to official immunity: (1) for the performance of discretionary duties; (2) within the scope of the employee's authority; (3) provided the employee acts in good faith. Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000). McIntosh does not dispute that Partridge was performing discretionary duties within the scope of his employment when he allegedly defamed McIntosh by reporting him to the state dental board, but he claims that these statements were false and that Partridge made them intentionally, willfully, and maliciously. Although the district court stated that it dismissed for failure to state a claim, it appears that it considered evidence outside the pleading because it concluded that Partridge acted without malice, contrary to McIntosh's allegations. Since the district court went beyond the scope of the pleadings, we will review its dismissal as a grant of summary judgment. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 500 (5th Cir.1982); Bossard v. Exxon Corp., 559 F.2d 1040, 1041 (5th Cir.1977). While [w]e may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir.2001), this principle does not of itself generally justify affirmance on a ground not raised below. F.D.I.C. v. Laguarta, 939 F.2d 1231, 1240 (5th Cir.1991). Nevertheless, affirmance on such a ground is proper where the lack of notice to the nonmovant is harmless, such as where `the [unraised] issues were implicit or included in those raised below or the evidence in support thereof, or . . . the record appears to be adequately developed in respect thereto.' F.D.I.C. v. Lee, 130 F.3d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting Laguarta at 1240 & n. 20). See also, e.g., Love v. National Medical Enterprises, 230 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir.2000); Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 504 (5th Cir.1994); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 28 F.3d 1388, 1397-98 (5th Cir.1994). Under Texas law, [a] plaintiff attempting to controvert the employee's summary-judgment evidence on good faith must show that no reasonable person in the employee's position could have thought that the facts justified the employee's actions. Cloud v. McKinney, 228 S.W.3d 326, 336 (Tex.App.Austin 2007, no pet.). McIntosh has presented no evidence that shows that a reasonable employee in Partridge's position would not have reported to the state dental board Dr. Sadowski's and Dr. Scalzitti's allegations that McIntosh committed professional misconduct. Furthermore, while the district court did not specifically address the defense of official immunity, such defense was properly pled, the court properly held that Partridge was entitled to qualified immunity as to McIntosh's federal claims, and Texas law of official immunity is substantially the same as federal qualified immunity law. Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1160 (5th Cir.1997) (per curiam); see also City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.1994). The evidence on official immunity, as well as that on qualified immunity (and on qualified privilege) appears to be fully developed. McIntosh has at no time suggested other evidence that he had and would have tendered below (or sought discovery respecting) had official immunity, and not simply qualified immunity, been raised as a ground for summary judgment (or had qualified privilege been properly raised). The record evidence shows as a matter of law that Partridge was entitled to official immunity with respect to his statements to the state dental board (and that those statements were made without malice) and there is no evidence to support a contrary finding. We affirm the dismissal of McIntosh's defamation claim.