Opinion ID: 2981752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Cross-Reference to Relevant Conduct

Text: The sentencing guidelines applicable to defendants convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm are found in USSG § 2K2.1. Subsection (c)(1) of that guideline provides that in cases in which “the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense . . . [courts should] apply . . . § 2X1.1 in respect to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.” USSG § 2K2.1(c)(1). Section 2X1.1 in turn directs the district court to use “[t]he base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense [committed or attempted in connection to the use or possession of the firearm], plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty.” USSG § 2X1.1(a). District courts may cross-reference under § 2K2.1 only where a preponderance of the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant committed or attempted to commit the offense that provides the cross-reference. United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies postBooker). - 11 - No. 11-6461 United States v. Frost At sentencing in this case, the district court determined that a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that by shooting at his son, Frost attempted to commit first-degree murder, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Accordingly, the court set Frost’s base offense level at 33. See USSG § 2A2.1(a) (establishing a base offense level of 33, for attempted murder “if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder” and a level of 27 otherwise). Frost challenges this determination on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. He argues that the government failed to establish all of the elements necessary to prove attempted first-degree murder under federal law. Specifically, he contends that the government did not prove that he acted with premeditation and deliberate intent to kill. Both are required elements of attempted first-degree murder. United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2005) (“To convict a defendant of attempt, the government must prove (1) the defendant’s intent to commit the criminal activity; and (2) that the defendant committed an overt act that constitutes a ‘substantial step’ toward commission of the crime.”); 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (defining first degree murder as the “willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated [unlawful] killing” of a human being). Because Frost challenges the district court’s factual conclusions as to premeditation and specific intent, we review those findings for clear error. United States v. Brika, 487 F.3d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2007). To support his claim that the government failed to establish specific intent, Frost focuses on several items of evidence. First, he points to the fact that he fired only one shot - 12 - No. 11-6461 United States v. Frost at DJ and did not shoot again, even though he still had one bullet in the chamber. He also asserts that he fired the gun when DJ was a significant distance away and “running away from him at an angle.” Finally, he points to DJ’s testimony at the sentencing hearing that, shortly before the shooting, he told his father that he would come back with his brother to “get” him. Frost argues that the “near [physical] impossibility” that he could manage to hit DJ, the fact that he shot the gun only once, and DJ’s threat to do him harm all support the conclusion that he shot at his son to scare him and not because he had the specific intent to kill. To support his claim that the government failed to establish premeditation, Frost points to the fact that the shooting occurred in the midst of a heated encounter between himself and DJ. Because the evidence demonstrates that he fired the gun “in the heat of the moment,” Frost argues, it fails to establish the premeditation necessary to sustain a first-degree murder cross-reference. We conclude that neither argument has merit. With respect to the question of specific intent, the gloss that Frost puts on the evidence is marginally plausible. However, that interpretation does not make the district judge’s alternative interpretation clearly erroneous. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Here, there was nothing impermissible about the district court’s conclusion that Frost shot with the intent to kill. The circumstances of the shooting do not make it implausible to conclude that Frost fired the - 13 - No. 11-6461 United States v. Frost gun intending to hit DJ. Frost claimed that he shot at DJ from 40 feet away but, in his testimony, DJ suggested the distance was much less than that. Moreover, other courts have found specific intent in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 875 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming an attempted first-degree murder cross-reference for a defendant who pointed a gun at his wife and pulled the trigger once, but gun did not discharge). Frost’s challenge to the district court’s finding of premeditation is also not persuasive. Although the evidence does establish, as Frost asserts, that the encounter between Frost and his son was unanticipated and quite heated, it does not render the district court’s conclusion that Frost acted with premeditation clearly erroneous. An attempted murder is premeditated when it is the result of planning and deliberation. See United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2005) (approving jury instructions stating this proposition as the test for premeditation). “The amount of time needed for premeditation” varies depending on the circumstances, but it must be long enough for the defendant to have formed “the intent to kill,” and “be fully conscious of that intent.” Id. Here, after tussling with his son outside the house, Frost went into the house and returned shortly thereafter carrying a gun. It was at that point, according to DJ, that Frost pointed the gun straight at him and fired. In deciding how the gun had been aimed, i.e., either directly at DJ or in the air, the district court explicitly discredited Frost’s testimony on the issue but found DJ’s testimony fully credible – a dispositive conclusion that we cannot - 14 - No. 11-6461 United States v. Frost overturn on appeal. United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1020 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he district court's credibility findings are basically unassailable [on appeal].”). As a result, it seems apparent that in returning to the house specifically to retrieve the gun, Frost had sufficient time to form the intent to shoot DJ and to be “fully conscious of that intent.” We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in applying the cross-reference to attempted murder.