Opinion ID: 16329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicant’s Claims

Text: Barnes argues that his confession--through his third written 10 statement and fourth videotaped statement--was not voluntary and that he was coerced into waiving his constitutional rights. He argues that the trial court thus erred in admitting the third and fourth statements at his trial. He provides six specific allegations of police “physical and mental coercion, fraud and deceit” to support his argument. Barnes alleges that: (1) the police deliberately and fraudulently misled him as to the charges that they intended to press; (2) the police did not cease interrogation after Barnes invoked his right to remain silent; (3) the police coerced him by interrogating him for ten hours and holding him in custody for over nineteen hours; (4) the police left Barnes without footwear for an extended period of time, during which he was outside at points; (5) the police prevented Barnes from sleeping for more than two or three hours at a time; and (6) the police’s treatment of Barnes, when viewed in its entirety, was fundamentally unfair. We review these arguments to determine whether the trial court’s decision to admit the third and fourth statements was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . .” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).
It is undisputed that for most, if not all, of Barnes’s interrogation, he was not specifically told that he was a suspect 11 for capital murder.1 In addition, when he was brought before Judge McSpadden, Barnes was told that he was being charged with “burglary of a habitation with intent to commit murder,” a charge that apparently does not technically exist. Barnes alleges that these two aspects of his interrogation--he was not told that he was a capital murder suspect and he was brought before Judge McSpadden on a “made up” charge--render his confession involuntary. We do not agree. While Barnes was not directly informed that he was a capital murder suspect, from the beginning of his interrogation Barnes was aware that a woman had died in the house he was alleged to have burglarized. Sergeant Calhoun mentioned Ms. Greb’s murder shortly after Barnes was arrested. Moreover, Barnes himself stated that he had seen on the television news that the woman living in the house he had burglarized had been killed. In Barnes’s first statement, he mentioned the death and attempted to divert attention from himself by mentioning someone that he had seen next door, stating “I think that this man had something to do with the old womans death.” Thus, it is clear that Barnes understood from the start that the police were investigating Ms. Greb’s murder, not just theft of property. He was also well aware that he was suspected of committing the murder. A suspect’s waiver of Miranda rights is not invalid merely 1 We assume for our purposes that this was an affirmative police decision made in an attempt to get Barnes to implicate himself in the murder. 12 because police interrogators did not advise him of the subject matter of the upcoming interrogation. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574, 107 S. Ct. 851, 857, 93 L. Ed. 2d 954 (1987). Similarly, the waiver is not invalid simply because the suspect did not have “a full and complete appreciation of all the consequences flowing from the nature and quality of the evidence in the case.” Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1297, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1985). In light of Barnes’s clear understanding that the police were investigating a murder, the police’s decision not to inform Barnes specifically that he was a capital murder suspect does not render his third and fourth statements involuntary. Barnes’s further argument that he was coerced and deceived by the abnormal charge of “burglary of a habitation with the intent to commit murder” is equally without merit. Section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code defines burglary of a habitation as follows: “(A) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he: (1) enters a habitation . . . with intent to commit a felony or theft.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1997). Thus, in identifying Barnes’s charge, the police added a superfluous phrase--”with the intent to commit murder”--to the crime of burglary of a habitation. All this phrase served to do, however, was to identify the particular felony that the police intended to use for the requisite “commit a felony or theft” element. The addition of this phrase cannot be said to have worked a deception upon Barnes. Indeed, the 13 inclusion of this phrase goes directly against Barnes’s claim that he was deceived and coerced into confessing the murder because he was not informed that he was a capital murder suspect. Finally, Barnes alleges that he was deceived and coerced by not being informed that he could receive the death penalty for the Greb’s murder. There is no Supreme Court law requiring that a suspect be informed that he is suspected of an offense that could result in the death penalty. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574, 107 S. Ct. at 857, and Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S. Ct. at 1297, indicate just the opposite--a suspect need not be told that a statement or confession may expose him to the death penalty. In sum, Barnes’s claims of deceit and an “intentionally fraudulent charge” provide no support to his claim that the state court’s determination of voluntariness was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or, alternatively, an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Barnes argues that prior to the videotaping of his fourth statement, he invoked his right to remain silent. Therefore, any statements made after this point could not have been admitted at trial without violating his constitutional rights. The transcript of Sergeant Belk’s exchange with Barnes, however, makes it clear that at no point did Barnes unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent. Therefore, Belk did not violate Barnes’s Fifth Amendment rights by continuing the videotaped 14 statement and the trial court did not err in admitting it. The alleged invocation was recorded on videotape. The transcript of that incident is as follows: Q: I’m Sergeant J.W. Belk. A: I’m Willis Jay Barnes. Q: Okay, Willis. That’s B-A-R-N-E-S. A: B-A-R-N-E-S. Q: Okay. I’m going to read you your warnings, and if at any point you don’t understand, stop me and we will go through it. A: Okay. Q: You have the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that statement you make may be used against you and probably will be used against you at trial. Do you understand that right? A: I understand it. Q: Do you waive this right? A: No. Q: Okay, do you understand what “waive” means? A: It mean, uh, do I waive rights for you to do it, right? Q: Well, it’s explained . . . . you have the right to remain silent . . . . A: Right. Q: And you can remain silent and not say anything at all, or you can waive that right . . . . A: Right, that’s what I’m saying. I waive what I’m saying, it’s okay, what I’m saying is I’m giving you the right to put me that . . . to ask me these questions. All right? Q: Okay, and so you’re waiving your right to remain silent and you are talking. A: I am talking. Q: Okay, so you understand that right . . . A: I understand that right. Q: And you are waiving that right? A: Right. Q: Okay. After this exchange, Belk continued videotaping and Barnes gave his fourth statement, which was consistent with his third written statement. The question raised by this dialogue is whether Belk should have immediately ceased interrogation after Barnes replied “No.” 15 Barnes argues that by continuing beyond this apparent invocation, Belk denied Barnes his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Supreme Court has held that if a suspect “indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474-75, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). In this case, it was not clear that the suspect wished to remain silent. Indeed, considering Barnes’s previous statements and the fact that Barnes himself had initiated this particular discussion, Belk had every reason to believe that Barnes wished to talk. The Supreme Court’s most recent exposition on ambiguous invocations was in the context of whether a suspect invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the Court held that the determination of whether a suspect invoked his right to counsel is an objective one. The question is whether the suspect “articulate[d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id. Other circuits have held that this “objective inquiry” into ambiguity is applicable to invocations of the right to remain silent.2 2 See e.g. Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1100 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2505 (1996) (applying Davis’s objective inquiry to determine whether suspect’s invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous or equivocal); United States 16 This circuit has not yet determined whether the Davis analysis is applicable to invocations of the right to remain silent. However, because Section 2254 is specifically focused on federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, we need not decide that issue here. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1). We only need to decide whether the state court’s decision to admit the fourth statement was contrary to clear Supreme Court law. In light of the language and logic of the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis, we cannot say that it was. The majority opinion in Davis held that when faced with an ambiguous invocation of a right, an interrogator was not required to ask clarifying questions. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. Nevertheless, the Court noted that it will “often be good police practice for the interviewing officers” to ask clarifying questions. Id. Thus, in the present case, Belk went beyond what the Supreme Court required and followed what the Court described as “good police practice.” He was presented with an ambiguous and surprising apparent invocation. He asked a few v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1197 (7th Cir.) (same), vacated on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 478 (1996); c.f. United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 140 (1996) (assuming, arguendo, that Davis applies to invocations of the right to remain silent, but not holding that it definitely does); see also United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Davis while determining whether right to remain silent had been invoked). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has also applied the Davis analysis to invocations of the right to remain silent. Dowthitt v. Texas, 931 S.W.2d 244, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Davis and holding that statement, “I can’t say more than that. I need to rest.” was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent). 17 explanatory, noncoercive questions that revealed that Barnes did not wish to invoke his right to remain silent. In light of Davis and this clear record--in which an ambiguous statement was made and noncoercive clarifying questions revealed no intent to invoke the right to remain silent--the trial court’s admission of the fourth, videotaped statement is not contrary to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . .” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1).3
Barnes’s additional arguments are heavily factual in nature. Barnes argues that his statements were not voluntary because he was coerced by the police. He points to the length of his interrogation, his lack of footwear, and the fact that he was prevented from sleeping for more than three hours at a time. The state court made factual determinations that these police actions were not coercive and therefore did not render the statements involuntary. These state court factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C.A. § 3 Furthermore, as noted by the district court, even had there been error in admitting the fourth, videotaped statement, such error would probably have been harmless. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310-11, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265-66, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991) (holding that the admission of an involuntary confession is subject to harmless error analysis). The fourth, videotaped statement is cumulative of the third statement. Therefore, had it been error to admit the fourth statement--which it was not--such error would probably have been harmless under the particular circumstances of this case. See United States v. Ramirez, 963 F.2d 693, 698 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 388 (1992); Boles v. Foltz, 816 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 167 (1987). 18 2254(d)-(e). As the district court noted in its meticulous analysis of the state court proceedings, the state court record does not support Barnes’s claims that these police actions rendered his statements involuntary. D. Totality of the Circumstances and Fundamental Unfairness In light of our rulings on the previous issues, it is clear that under the totality of the circumstances, the admission of Barnes’s third and fourth statements was not fundamentally unfair and did not violate Barnes’s constitutional rights.