Opinion ID: 2107600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Potential Conflict of Interest

Text: The question before us is whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Powell's request for substitute counsel after he alleged his attorney had a conflict of interest. Our analysis is squarely governed by State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 2000), our recent conflict-of-interest case. After surveying recent Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel jurisprudence, in Watson we stated: A trial court has the duty sua sponte to inquire into the propriety of defense counsel's representation when it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists. If an actual conflict existed and the trial court knew or should have known of the conflict, yet failed to make inquiry, reversal is required. If the record on appeal shows only the possibility of a conflict, then the case must be remanded for a determination as to whether an actual conflict existed and/or whether the defendant made a valid waiver of his right to independent counsel. If, on remand, an actual conflict is found, prejudice is presumed and reversal is mandated. 620 N.W.2d at 238 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166-76, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1240-46, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 300-07 (2002). What is a conflict of interest? A conflict of interest places a defense attorney in a situation inherently conducive to divided loyalties. The phrase conflict of interest denotes a situation in which regard for one duty tends to lead to disregard of another; where the lawyer's representation of one client is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of another client; or where it becomes a lawyer's duty on behalf of one client to contend for that which his duty to another client would require him to oppose. Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 549 (quoting State v. Turner, 218 Neb. 125, 354 N.W.2d 617, 622 (1984)); see id., 661 N.W.2d at 549 (conflict may involve divided loyalties or a divergence of interests); Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 239 (Basically, `a conflict exists when an attorney is placed in a situation conducive to divided loyalties.') (quoting Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir.1991)). We have thus stated that there is a possibility of a conflict when the interests of the defendants may diverge at some point so as to place the attorney under inconsistent duties. Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 548-49 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). An actual conflict, in turn, results when such interests  do diverge with respect to a material fact or legal issue or to a course of action. Id. at 549. Powell's written and oral requests for substitution of counsel put the district court on notice of the possibility of a conflict. Powell told the court there was a relationship of mistrust, attorney Flander was defense counsel in another criminal case directly related to mine, and that this person might be called as a witness. Powell further explained that the contraband he was charged with pilfering was found in this other defendant's garage during a drug raid. Because Powell's allegations raised the possibility of divided loyalties, the court had a duty to inquire into the propriety of Flander's representation of Powell. See Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 239 (noting most conflict of interest cases arise in the context of one attorney representing multiple defendants); see also Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 548 (most cases that have discussed conflicts of interest have involved an attorney who has represented a defendant or a prosecution witness in the current prosecution or simultaneous civil litigation); Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 238 (A trial court has the duty sua sponte to inquire into the propriety of defense counsel's representation when it knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists.). The record before us partially corroborates Powell's claims. In the minutes of testimony upon which Powell was convicted, a police officer testified he executed a search warrant in the garage of a man named Travis Ulrich. In Ulrich's garage, the officer found the remains of a meth lab. The officer specifically noted that only a short time before the search warrant was executed, a very large amount of pseudoephedrine had been stolen from the convenience store Powell was ultimately convicted of burglarizing. He also pointed out the pseudoephedrine packages found in Ulrich's garage were similar to those stolen in the burglary. [2] In light of these facts, the district court abused its discretion when it denied Powell's request for substitute counsel without conducting a further inquiry. Although the court framed the issue in terms of a potential conflict between Flander and a possible future witness, Powell's claims alerted the judge that Flander's representation of Powell might be hindered by then-existing divided loyalties. These divided loyalties would, it was alleged, result from her alleged representation of a man found in possession of the very contraband Powell was charged with stealing. While the precise nature of the relationship, if any, between Flander's representations of Powell and Ulrich are unclear from the record before us, in our previous discussions of the right to counsel we have long discouraged multiple representation of criminal defendants under circumstances similar to those alleged here. In the context of dual representation of codefendants, for example, we have stated that the risks involved ... ordinarily outweigh any imagined advantage in appointing the same lawyer to represent defendants jointly charged. Jackson v. Auger, 239 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1976); cf. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168, 122 S.Ct. at 1241, 152 L.Ed.2d at 302 (although not always fatal, joint representation of conflicting interests is inherently suspect). It will generally be found when two or more are accused of a serious crime, that their interests are to some extent divergent. Often the question will arise as which was the planner of the crime, which took the leading part, or in many other ways each may desire to attempt to throw the onus upon the other.... [I]t is settled that where there may be adverse interests, each defendant is entitled to separate representation. State v. Karston, 247 Iowa 32, 37, 72 N.W.2d 463, 466 (1955) (citations omitted). Although conflicts of interest are perhaps more often recognized where defendants are tried jointly, we have pointed out that the same dangers are present where their trials are separate. See State v. Gatewood, 179 N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 1970); cf. Cosgrove v. State, 304 N.W.2d 184, 187 (Iowa 1981) ([T]he potential conflict of interest inherent in the representation of both a defendant and an adverse party or witness is as substantial as in situations involving dual representation and should ordinarily militate against concurrent representation by counsel.). In both sorts of cases, [m]aintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes the acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect the lawyer's judgment on behalf of, or loyalty to, a client. This problem arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant. Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 5-14 (2002). Allegations such as Powell's raise the concern that an attorney's conflicting obligations will effectively seal [the lawyer's] lips on crucial matters and make it difficult to measure the precise harm arising from counsel's errors. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168, 122 S.Ct. at 1241, 152 L.Ed.2d at 302 (citation and internal quotation omitted). Our rules of professional responsibility thus exhort the lawyer to weigh carefully the possibility that the lawyer's judgment may be impaired or loyalty divided if the employment is accepted or continued. Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 5-15 (2002). The lawyer should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation. Id. Although the district court asked Flander if she had a conflict and received a simple negative response, the court did not ask her to elaborate or otherwise inquire into the specifics of the situation. See United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir.1986) ([W]hen a trial court becomes aware of a potential conflict of interest, it is obligated to pursue the matter even if counsel does not.). Moreover, when the court decided substitution was not warranted because the case was only two weeks old and Powell responded that two of the charges had been outstanding for several months, the court stated it didn't know anything about those [other files] and moved on. Simply put, the court did not sufficiently examine the relationship between Powell, Flander, and Ulrich. The court therefore abused its discretion when it denied Powell's request for substitution, insofar as it did so without developing the facts upon which such discretion could properly be exercised. See Pippins, 661 N.W.2d at 548 (abuse of discretion where decision rests on untenable grounds); Graber, 616 N.W.2d at 638 (untenable grounds where decision not supported by substantial evidence). We point out that this is not a case where the record clearly shows that multiple codefendants requested that the same attorney represent them, or consented to appointment of the same attorney after they were advised of a conflict. Rather, from the record before us we simply have a lone defendant inquiring about the propriety of his attorney's representation. Cf. State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Iowa 2004). Although we are cognizant of the realities of life in the district court, the right to counsel demands the court promptly deal with the issue of the conflict, and not let it simmer on the back burner. [3] Once the court is made aware of a gestating conflict it is insufficient to merely leave open the possibility of further inquiry without undertaking any follow-up measures. See Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 238 (where court knows or reasonably should know of the possibility of a conflict, a court has a sua sponte duty to inquire). As indicated, there is nothing in the record to suggest the court revisited this matter as the case inexorably progressed towards trial. There was not any other mechanism by which the issue of divided loyalties would be addressed. It is unrealistic to expect more from a defendant untrained in the law. Cf. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d at 749. Moreover, the right to counsel is not a question left solely up to the attorney  an especially tough call when that same attorney's loyalties have been questioned. These two concerns motivated the characterization of the duty to inquire in Watson as a sua sponte duty. See Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 238. The court has the heavy burden here to seek sufficient information to make an informed decision as to whether there is a conflict of interest. In sum, the court did not sufficiently inquire into Powell's allegations before it denied his request for substitute counsel. Far too many important questions  chief among them the precise nature of Flander's representations  were left unanswered even though the district court was put on notice of a potential conflict early on in the process. It therefore abused its discretion when it denied Powell's request for substitute counsel without ascertaining the facts necessary to determine whether a conflict was present, even though it knew of the possibility of a conflict.