Opinion ID: 1671742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING McFARLAND'S BATSON MOTION AND IN FAILING TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO MAKE A FULL RECORD.

Text: ¶ 18. In selecting the first twelve jurors, the State exercised peremptory strikes against six venire persons, all of whom were black. The defense raised a Batson challenge, and the trial court required the State to explain the strikes, after which the court allowed the strikes to stand. McFarland first argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow defense counsel to make a full record of the prosecution's peremptory strikes against black jurors in a previous vote fraud case. The alleged error occurred during the following exchange: MR. SWEET: Your Honor, they have not struck a black  in the last trial on voter fraud against Ms. Sandra Sewell  THE COURT: We're trying this case; now, we're trying this case and this case alone. I don't want this record confused with another lawsuit that was a mistrial; it was not reached a conclusion, and I don't want that in the record. MR. SWEET: I understand that they had a Batson violation in that case, Your Honor, where they've struck all blacks. That's the only thing I was showing; I was showing a pattern, a practice; and they've struck all blacks here. And we'd ask them to justify Carter, Your Honor, which is there S-5. THE COURT: All right, I'll ask you about Carter. ¶ 19. McFarland cannot complain here. By his own statement, defense counsel cited the earlier case in order to show a pattern of peremptory strikes by the prosecution against black jurors in vote fraud cases, which was the only thing I was showing. He pointed out that the prosecution had peremptorily struck only black jurors in the previous case as well as in the instant case, which argument the trial court accepted, as it then required the State to offer a race-neutral explanation. Apparently satisfied with the court's action, the defense made no proffer of any actual venire statistics from the earlier trial. We find that no error occurred here. ¶ 20. McFarland also argues that the trial court erred in accepting the State's race-neutral reasons and in allowing the strikes to stand. The State offered the following reasons for the challenged strikes: (1) Juror Cleveland Holmes stated that he had been a schoolmate of McFarland and that he and McFarland were longstanding friends; (2) the prosecution was informed that Juror Bessie Dennis' son was a close friend of McFarland; (3) the prosecution was informed that Juror Rosie Harris lived in the district in which McFarland had served, and that McFarland had taken a special interest in her and provided assistance to her on a number of occasions; (4) the prosecution understood that Juror Ervan Carter was a good friend of McFarland's brother; (5) Juror Donald Ray Carter's sister worked for the Wilkinson County Chancery Clerk, another vote fraud defendant who had worked closely with McFarland while McFarland was on the Board of Supervisors; and (6) the prosecution understood that Juror Joseph Edward Miles had previous problems with law enforcement, and that because he had a military background, he would be a leader on the jury capable of influencing the jury with his attitude towards law enforcement. ¶ 21. The defense made no attempt to rebut the State's race-neutral explanations, but rather pointed out that regarding some of the struck jurors, the prosecution did not question those jurors during voir dire regarding the reasons for the strikes. McFarland argues that the State's failure to question those jurors regarding the reasons for ultimately striking them reveals that the State's offered reasons were sham explanations. We rejected this very argument, however, in Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1353 (Miss. 1987), wherein we stated: We decline to set any limits on the prosecutor's use of any legitimate informational source heretofore or hereafter available as to jurors. Furthermore, the prosecutor does not have to question a juror in open court about such information before using it as a racially neutral ground to make a peremptory strike, as long as the source of the information and the practice itself are not racially discriminatory. Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1353 (emphasis added). In the case sub judice, because the defense failed even to attempt to rebut the State's race-neutral reasons, and because the defense has failed to argue, much less demonstrate, that the State's informational sources were racially discriminatory, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the strikes to stand.