Opinion ID: 3063015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lay Witness Opinion Testimony

Text: Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence lay witness opinion testimony, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 701, that identified her voice. Further, she argues that even if the testimony was admissible under Rule 701, the district court should have excluded it as unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court abuses its discretion when the “decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Id. Reversal 8 is not warranted “where an error had no substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.” United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006). A speaker’s voice may be identified by opinion testimony “based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(5). A lay witness’s opinion testimony may be admitted if it is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. Concerning the Rule 701's first prong of the test for admissibility, we have held that “the opinion of a lay witness on a matter is admissible only if it is based on first-hand knowledge or observation.” United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999). As to the Rule’s second prong, we have held that lay opinion identification testimony was “helpful. . . to the determination of a fact in issue” where there was some basis for concluding that the witness was more likely to correctly identify the defendant from a surveillance photo than the jury. United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770, 775 (11th Cir. 1998). In this regard, in Pierce, we noted that the witnesses had become familiar with the defendant’s appearance and 9 facial features over time. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that only relevant evidence is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. However, Rule 403 permits the exclusion of evidence if the probative value of that evidence “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “[B]ecause it permits a trial court to exclude concededly probative evidence, Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983). Further, in a criminal trial relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; therefore, Rule 403 only permits the exclusion of probative evidence when “unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.” Id. In Pierce, we cautioned that “[i]dentification testimony from law enforcement. . . may increase the possibility of prejudice to the defendant [] by highlighting the defendant’s prior contact with the criminal justice system, if the witness’s occupation is revealed. . .” Pierce, 136 F.3d at 776. Nonetheless, the district court does not abuse its discretion in admitting such testimony when the jury is otherwise aware of a defendant’s criminal history and the defendant does not identify any unfair prejudice stemming from the admitted testimony. See id. We find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the challenged testimony regarding voice recognition because the testimony was rationally based 10 on the perception of the witness, it was helpful to the jury, and it was not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 701. Further, the district court’s determination that the testimony’s prejudicial impact did not substantially outweigh its probative value was not clearly erroneous. Baker, 432 F.3d at 1202.