Opinion ID: 194677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Title IX.

Text: At its inception, the broad proscriptive language of Title IX caused considerable consternation in the academic world. The academy's anxiety chiefly centered around identifying which individual programs, particularly in terms of athletics, might come within the scope of the discrimination provision, and, relatedly, how the government would determine compliance. The gridiron fueled these concerns: for many schools, the men's football budget far exceeded that of any other sport, and men's athletics as a whole received the lion's share of dedicated resources a share that, typically, was vastly disproportionate to the percentage of men in the student body. Part of the confusion about the scope of Title IX's coverage and the acceptable avenues of compliance arose from the absence of secondary legislative materials. Congress included no committee report with the final bill and there were apparently only two mentions of intercollegiate athletics during the congressional debate. See 118 Cong. Rec. 5,807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh on privacy in athletic facilities); 117 Cong. Rec. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh noting that proposed Title first of these to reach the courts of appeals, others are pending. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., No. 93-1052 (10th Cir. 1993) (not yet argued); Cook v. Colgate Univ., No. 929175 (2d Cir. 1993) (argued Feb. 26, 1993). 7 IX will not require gender-blended football teams). Nevertheless, under congressional direction to implement Title IX, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) promulgated regulations in 1975 which included specific provisions for college athletics. Four years later, HEW's Office of Civil Rights (OCR) added another layer of regulatory exegesis when, after notice and comment, it published a Policy Interpretation that offered a more detailed measure of equal athletic opportunity. In 1984, the Supreme Court radically altered the contemporary reading of Title IX. The Court held that Title IX was program-specific, so that its tenets applied only to the program(s) which actually received federal funds and not to the rest of the university. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 574 (1984). Because few athletic departments are direct recipients of federal funds most federal money for universities is channelled through financial aid offices or invested directly in research grants Grove City cabined Title IX and placed virtually all collegiate athletic programs beyond its reach.5 In response to Grove City, Congress scrapped the program-specific approach and reinstated an institution-wide application of Title IX by passing the Civil Rights Restoration 5Following the Court's decision in Grove City, the United States Department of Education (which by then had been spun off from HEW, see infra Part III(C)) dropped or curtailed seventy- nine ongoing Title IX cases. See Statements on Civil Rights Restoration Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 53, at D1 (Mar. 20, 1981). 8 Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. 1687 (1988). The Restoration Act required that if any arm of an educational institution received federal funds, the institution as a whole must comply with Title IX's provisions. See id.; see also S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6 (explaining that Congress wanted to prohibit discrimination throughout an institution if the institution received any federal funds). Although the Restoration Act does not specifically mention sports, the record of the floor debate leaves little doubt that the enactment was aimed, in part, at creating a more level playing field for female athletes. See, e.g., 130 Cong. Rec. S12,642 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1984) (statement of Sen. Byrd decrying past discrimination against female athletes); 130 Cong. Rec. S11,253 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch regarding importance of Title IX to ensuring development of women athletes); 130 Cong. Rec. S2,267 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1984) (statement of Sen. Riegle noting extensive evidence of sex discrimination in education and athletics). The appellants do not challenge the district court's finding that, under existing law, Brown's athletic department is subject to Title IX. Accordingly, we devote the remainder of Part III to deterrating the meaning of Title IX, looking first at the statute and then at the regulations.