Opinion ID: 4541297
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did a child find violation occur?

Text: A finding of a child find violation turns on three inquiries: (1) the date the child find requirement triggered due to notice of a likely disability; (2) the date the child find duty was ultimately satisfied; and (3) the reasonableness of the delay between these two dates. See Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676. 9 See also Letter to Nathan, OSEP (available at https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/osepletter-to-nathan-01-29-2019.pdf) (“While an LEA may choose or find it necessary to expedite evaluations in these circumstances, under IDEA expedited evaluations are only required in situations where the LEA is not deemed to have knowledge that the child may have a disability . . . .”). 10 Because O.W. did not assert an independent claim arising from a failure to perform an expedited evaluation, we need not reach the School District’s alternate argument that an expedited evaluation was not required under the IDEA. 15 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 The School District does not challenge the district court’s finding that October 8, 2014, represents the appropriate notice date and we see no error in that conclusion. See Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 677 (finding sufficient notice based on “academic decline, hospitalization, and incidents of theft”). We also agree with the parties that the January 15, 2015, referral for evaluation represents the appropriate end date for the reasonableness inquiry. See Woody, 865 F.3d at 320 (considering time period between notice and referral for evaluation). The only dispute then is whether the delay between October 8, 2014, and January 15, 2015 (99 days, or three months and seven days), was reasonable. 11 This Court has twice considered the reasonableness of delay in the child find context. In Woody, this Court considered an 89-day delay between notice and referral to be reasonable where the local education agency spent the period “requesting and gathering information on [the student] in an effort to classify her and determine its obligations,” and where more than a month of the period was spent waiting for the parents of the student to provide specific information. 865 F.3d at 320. In the end, this Court concluded that the “facts suggest[ed] reasonableness, with neither the District nor the parent reacting with urgency or with unreasonable delay.” Id. In contrast, in Krawietz, this Court found a four-month delay unreasonable where the school district “failed to take any appreciable steps toward complying with its Child Find obligation” during the relevant time period. 900 F.3d at 677. In reaching this conclusion, this Court rejected the school district’s reliance on the student’s parents’ failure to act with urgency 11 Citing Texas’ one-year statute of limitations for IDEA claims, the School District urges us to look at its actions after October 28, 2014. Because “events preceding [the statute of limitations bar] may provide evidence of a child-find violation,” we decline to limit the inquiry in this way. See Mr. P. v. W. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 735, 750 (2d Cir. 2018) (considering the time frame from the relevant trigger date, even though it predated the limitations bar). 16 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 because “the IDEA imposes the Child Find obligation upon school districts, not the parents of disabled students.” Id. This Court thus distinguished the case from the facts of Woody, noting that Woody involved a delay which “was not solely attributable to the district and [a] district . . . [which] took proactive steps throughout [the] period to comply with its Child Find obligation.” Id. Taken together, Krawietz and Woody stand for the proposition that the reasonableness of a delay is not defined by its length but by the steps taken by the district during the relevant period. A delay is reasonable when, throughout the period between notice and referral, a district takes proactive steps to comply with its child find duty to identify, locate, and evaluate students with disabilities. Conversely, a time period is unreasonable when the district fails to take proactive steps throughout the period or ceases to take such steps. The School District argues this case is closer to Woody than Krawietz because it was entitled to attempt regular behavioral interventions—a process known as response to intervention (RTI)—and § 504 accommodations prior to referral, and such steps were consistent with its child find obligations. We disagree. In light of the acts and behaviors observed by the School District in this case, its failure to pursue evaluation, even while concurrently implementing intermediate accommodations, can be described as nothing less than a delay or denial. We in no way suggest that a school district necessarily commits a childfind violation if it pursues RTI or § 504 accommodations before pursuing a special education evaluation. We instead recognize that determining whether a child find violation occurred is a fact-intensive inquiry and highlight that § 504 accommodations are not a substitute for an evaluation once a school district is “on notice of acts or behavior likely to indicate a disability.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 676. The Child Find obligation is for a “child with a disability” who, by reason of that disability, “needs special education and related services.” 20 17 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). Though compliance with § 504 does not absolve a school district of its duty to comply with the IDEA, we do recognize that there may be cases where intermediate measures are reasonably implemented before resorting to evaluation. For instance, in D.K. v. Abington School District, the Third Circuit noted that “the measures the School District did take to assist D.K. in the classroom militate against finding a Child Find violation.” 696 F.3d 233, 252 (3d Cir. 2012). There, the behavior demonstrated by D.K.—hyperactivity, difficulty following instructions, and tantrums—“was typical of boys his age.” Id. at 251. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the School District to try intermediate measures before “jump[ing] to the conclusion that D.K.’s misbehavior denoted a disability or disorder.” Id. D.K. stands for the proposition that “schools need not rush to judgment or immediately evaluate every student exhibiting below-average capabilities, especially at a time when young children are developing at different speeds and acclimating to the school environment.” Id. at 252. In this case, by contrast, O.W. was not exhibiting behaviors “typical of boys his age.” And, unlike D.K., who was a “young child[]” in the early years of elementary school, O.W. was a fifth grader who had already been moved between schools in an attempt to respond to his unique educational needs. By the time the § 504 meeting occurred on October 8, 2014, O.W. had repeatedly: drawn violent pictures depicting murder, death, and anti-Semitic images; used incredibly vulgar language and made lewd gestures in the middle of the classrooms; disrupted class by yelling obscenities; hurled racial slurs and other derogatory insults at the principal, teacher, and fellow students; refused to follow directions or even remain in the classroom; thrown crayons at the teacher; and engaged in other forms of misconduct that resulted in him being removed from the classroom on a daily basis. And during this time, the School 18 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274 District had attempted to provide both positive and negative reinforcements, frequent redirections, and consequences for O.W.’s behavior. Yet they had no effect. Based on the severity of O.W.’s behavior, it was not reasonable to try intermediate measures to determine whether special education testing was appropriate for O.W., as was the case for D.K. The School District was more than reasonably “on notice of acts or behavior likely to indicate a disability” before implementing § 504 accommodations, and it was, therefore, required to evaluate O.W. 12 In sum, the record in this case reflects that as of the October 8 notice date, the School District had attempted to engage with O.W. and his parents for the purpose of offering positive incentives and that such attempts had utterly failed to improve O.W.’s behavior. This failure led the hearing officer to conclude that “[b]y the October 8, 2014 Section 504 meeting, it was apparent that general education behavioral interventions were not working . . . .” We agree with the hearing officer that by October 8, 2014, the School District should have known that general behavior interventions were not working and that relying exclusively on § 504 accommodations, in lieu of evaluation, would only delay providing O.W. the assistance he needed. Accordingly, we conclude the continued use of behavioral interventions was not a proactive step toward compliance with the School District’s child find duties and that, therefore, a child find violation occurred. 13 12 We, of course, do not suggest that the School District’s § 504 plan was unreasonable. It is only to say that, under the circumstances, it was not reasonable for the § 504 plan to be a preliminary rather than concurrent step in pursuing an evaluation. 13 The School District has suggested that some of the delay may be attributable to O.W.’s parents’ delay in providing information. While a proactive step may include waiting for a reasonable time for a parent to respond to a request for information or approval, see Woody, 465 F.3d at 320, “the IDEA imposes the Child Find obligation upon school districts, not the parents of disabled students.” Krawietz, 900 F.3d at 677. 19 Case: 18-20274 Document: 00515451413 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/12/2020 No. 18-20274