Opinion ID: 1613051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Ursula Sweitzer a Party?

Text: Appellants urge that summary judgment should have been granted as to Ursula Sweitzer because she was not a party to the lease. Although Mrs. Sweitzer was not named as lessee in the body of the lease, she signed the lease directly under her husband's name in a space designated lessee. The general rule ... is that when the body of the contract purports to set out the names of the parties thereto and a person not named in the body of the contract signs the contract, and there is nothing in the contract to indicate that such person signed as a party, such person is not bound by the contract and hence not liable thereunder. [6] A. L. R. cites Nutrena Mills v. Earle [7] to support this proposition and appellants urge that this authority controls the question of whether Ursula Sweitzer was a party. We think not. Nutrena Mills holds: . . . when the body of a contract purports to set out the names of the parties to the contract, and a person not named therein signs the contract, and there is nothing to indicate that such person signed as a party, such person is not bound. [8] Thus Nutrena Mills does not hold that, under all circumstances, a person who signs a contract although not named in the body of the contract, is not a party to the contract. Nutrena Mills involved a financing agreement between a turkey-farm grower and Nutrena. The grower's mother signed the contract beneath the grower's name so that the signatures looked like this: Witnesses /s/ Dean S. Knight Grower: /s/ Roger C. Earle (mother) /s/ Althea Taylor Earle /s/ Helen Haas Nutrena Mills, Inc. By /s/ Ed. L. Kienholz The grower (Earle) defaulted and Nutrena brought suit against the mother as a party to the contract. The trial judge sustained a demurrer by the mother, holding she mistakenly placed her name beneath that of the grower's and was not a party to the contract. The supreme court affirmed, stating that the trial court's construction was the only one which would give effect to all parts of the contract without reaching an inconsistency. Pointing out that there was nothing in the contract to indicate that the mother intended to sign as a grower, the court refused to permit such an inference from the position of her signature alone. The trial court correctly determined that Nutrena Mills was not applicable to the case at bar. In Nutrena the signer preceded her name by the word mother rather than the word grower, which would have indicated she was a party to the contract. In the instant case, Mrs. Sweitzer signed the contract directly under her husband's name in a space designated lessee. This at least creates an ambiguity about whether she or the lessor felt she was a party to the contract. Moreover, Mrs. Sweitzer benefited under the contract and occupied a relationship to the other signer which would indicate she was a party. These factors tend to establish, under a reasonable construction of the contract, that the contract itself indicated that Mrs. Sweitzer intended to be a party. The trial court was correct in overruling defendants' demurrer and in denying summary judgment to Ursula Sweitzer on this ground. In Nutrena the court also refused to permit parol evidence to resolve the controversy. Justice CURRIE, in a well-reasoned dissent, argued that the signature of the mother created a patent ambiguity in the contract so that parol evidence should be admissible to resolve this ambiguity. We believe this to be a better statement of the law and overrule Nutrena to this extent. This is additional reason for supporting the trial court's denial of summary judgment sought by the defendants.