Opinion ID: 1160538
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Typical Child Abuse

Text: In large part, the majority bases its conclusion that DePiano's sentence is excessive on the notion that this case is not a typical case of child abuse because it did not involve the evil, wicked, depraved or otherwise bad state of mind one associates with child predators. See maj. op. at 31-32, 926 P.2d at 498-499. The majority's error begins with its characterization of the nature of the crime. The majority opinion states: Although her children were with her, the crime here is essentially a botched suicide. Maj. op. at 31, 926 P.2d at 498. While it is clear that DePiano intended suicide, it is equally clear that she intended a double murder of her own children. She is not being sentenced for a botched suicide. She is being sentenced for her botched acts of child abuse by which she intended to kill her children, a result averted only through a neighbor's watchfulness and prompt police intervention. The majority also finds a legislative intent that we fail to discern in the statutory language or otherwise. A.R.S. § 13-3623(B) imposes substantial penalties on those who having the care or custody of a child, intentionally or knowingly place the child in a situation where its person or health is endangered. The majority acknowledges that DePiano violated the statute but asserts that the statute was intended to apply to cases involving child predators, which, we can only infer from the majority opinion, would involve the beating, torture, or molestation of children. See maj. op. at 31, 926 P.2d at 498. A predator limitation, which appears nowhere in the statutory language, should not be grafted onto the statute by this court. The statute punishes caretakers who intentionally or knowingly place children in danger, and that is exactly what DePiano did. The majority seems to suggest that sentencing under § 13-3623(B) should be based on some sliding scale of violence; if a person places a child in mortal danger without violence, she should receive a lesser punishment than one who otherwise places the child in the same mortal danger. We believe this conclusion, unsupported in the majority opinion by logic or precedent, is incorrect. A mother who cold-heartedly and with premeditation attempts to kill her children by asphyxiation, whether by suffocating them with a pillow, by poisoning them with car exhaust, or by putting them in a bag and dumping them in a public receptacle, is not, under the statute, less culpable than a mother who flies into a rage and beats her children. If there is a public policy favoring one or the other for sentencing purposes, it should be expressed by the legislature.