Opinion ID: 1166842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of judge's sentence

Text: ¶ 13 The remaining question is whether the trial judge abused or failed to exercise discretion by not decreasing a sentence he felt was extremely harsh and clearly excessive. The judge had mixed motivations for imposing the sentence he did. He gave three reasons: 1) the increased sentences required for repetitive offenders by § 13-702.02, which he found excessive, 2) his interest in not demeaning the victims, and 3) his belief that § 13-708 carried a presumption of consecutive sentences. R.T., at 10. ¶ 14 We agree with the court of appeals that the judge was bound to sentence Garza under § 13-702.02 for Counts III and IV. See mem. dec. at 3-4. We further agree that it was well within the judge's discretion to consider the impact of the crimes on the victims when imposing consecutive sentences. See id. at 5. However, because § 13-708 creates no presumption of consecutive sentences, the judge wrongly felt himself confined by a non-existent presumption. ¶ 15 The court of appeals notes that had the court, as defendant suggests, been unaware of its power to deviate from the presumptive consecutive sentence, it would have ordered consecutive sentences for [both] Counts III and IV. Mem. dec at 5. Because the judge imposed both consecutive and concurrent sentences, the court determined that the judge was aware of his discretion to choose and thus must not have felt bound by § 13-708. Id. at 6. Instead we can only conclude that [the trial judge] was referring to the mandatory provisions of A.R.S. section 13-702.02. Id. at 6. We do not agree that this is the only conclusion that can be reached. Had the judge been dissatisfied only by the restrictions of § 13-702.02, he had alternate discretionary measures to lessen the total result. It is important to note that application of the increased sentences for repetitive offenders required by § 13-702.02 added only 5.5 years to one of Garza's sentences. In light of the 26.25-year total sentence imposed, we are not persuaded that the additional five-plus years required by § 13-702.02 was the only reason the judge thought the sentence excessively harsh and clearly excessive. Although parts of the record may be open to a variety of interpretations, one point is clear: the judge felt bound to impose a sentence he did not wish to impose. The judge's final comment is most illustrative:  all of [these] factors together indicate to me that this sentence is excessive. But I am bound by the law to do it in the fashion that I am doing it. Thus, we disagree with the court of appeals that the judge only felt himself bound by the mandatory provisions of § 13-702.02. ¶ 16 A court's refusal or failure to exercise its discretion may be treated as an abuse of discretion. Fillmore, 187 Ariz. at 184, 927 P.2d at 1313 (citing United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932, 938 (1st Cir.1978); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144 (8th Cir.1973)); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 296-97, 660 P.2d 1208, 1223-24 (1983). [7] Examining the sentencing proceeding, we conclude that one of two things occurred: Either the judge knew he had discretion and failed to exercise it, thus imposing a sentence he thought harsh and excessive and referring the case to the board of executive clemency for review, or he did not realize the extent of the discretion available to him. Ultimately, it does not matter which actually occurred because in either instance the judge failed to properly exercise his discretion. ¶ 17 Even when the sentence imposed is within the trial judge's authority, if the record is unclear whether the judge knew he had discretion to act otherwise, the case should be remanded for resentencing. See State v. Thurlow, 148 Ariz. 16, 20, 712 P.2d 929, 933 (1986). Contrary to the judge's statement when sentencing Garza, the statute in question does not diminish a judge's discretion to choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. While the judge in this case did not exceed his authority when he imposed concurrent and consecutive sentences, he evidently believed § 13-708 created a presumption constricting his discretion. He listed this incorrect conclusion as a reason he felt bound to impose consecutive sentences. R.T., at 10. But the correct rule is: The legislature by statute, the prosecutor by charge, and the jury by conviction set the sentencing boundaries for the judge. But within those boundaries, the ultimate responsibility for fitting the punishment to the circumstances of the particular crime and individual defendant still rests with the judiciary. Fillmore, 187 Ariz. at 185, 927 P.2d at 1313 (quoting Thurlow, 148 Ariz. at 19, 712 P.2d at 932). In the sentencing context, if the judge relies on inappropriate factors and it is unclear whether the judge would have imposed the same sentence absent the inappropriate factors, the case must be remanded for resentencing. State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 561, 769 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1989) (quoting Thurlow, 148 Ariz. at 20, 712 P.2d at 933).