Opinion ID: 3050124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Asbestos

Text: We now turn to the question of whether Congress’s use of the term “asbestos” to identify a hazardous air pollutant created ambiguity as to what substance was meant by that term. 12684 UNITED STATES v. W. R. GRACE The parties filed cross motions in limine to exclude evidence that fell outside their respective interpretations of the term. Govt. Mot. in Limine #2 Re: Definition of Asbestos (Docket # 462); Defs’ Mot. in Limine Re: Definition of Asbestos (Docket # 474). The district court held that the term “asbestos” has no inherent meaning and therefore its use in the criminal provisions of the Clean Air Act violated the rule of lenity and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It interpreted asbestos for purposes of the Clean Air Act’s knowing endangerment provision to mean the six minerals covered by EPA’s civil regulatory scheme. Order at 2 & 20, United States v. W. R. Grace, 9:05-cr-00007-DWM (“Order Defining Asbestos”) (Aug. 8, 2006) (Docket # 701). That regulation defines the civilly regulated species of asbestos as “the asbestiform varieties of serpentinite (chrysotile), riebeckite (crocidolite), cummingtonite-grunerite, anthophyllite, and actinolite-tremolite.” Definitions for National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (“NESHAPs”), 40 C.F.R. § 61.141 (2007). The district court imported the civil regulatory definition of “asbestos” into the criminal provisions of the Clean Air Act, and then ruled that evidence of asbestos releases offered at trial would be limited to those relevant to proving releases of the six minerals included in the regulatory definition; evidence of releases of other asbestiform minerals would be excluded. Order Defining Asbestos at 22. This ruling eliminated from trial evidence of releases of 95% of the contaminents in the Libby vermiculite — which are asbestiform minerals but fall outside of the six minerals in the civil regulatory definition — as well as excluding government data that did not differentiate between the six regulated minerals and unregulated asbestiform minerals. The government appeals, asserting that the definition contained in the criminal portion of the statute is the applicable definition.
We review de novo the district court’s construction of the Clean Air Act, as we do rulings on the admissibility of eviUNITED STATES v. W. R. GRACE 12685 dence in which issues of law predominate. See United States v. Mateo-Mendez, 215 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
[6] The Clean Air Act’s knowing endangerment provision prohibits the knowing and dangerous release into the ambient air of “any hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to § 7412.” 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A).2 Section 7412(b) lists “asbestos,” also identified by its Chemical Abstracts Service (“CAS”)3 Registry number 1332-21-4, as a hazardous air pollutant. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b). Thus, § 7412(b) identifies asbestos by name and defines it through reference to CAS Registry # 1332-21-
2 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(A) reads in relevant part: Any person who knowingly releases into the ambient air any hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to section 7412 of this title . . . , and who knows at the time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine under Title 18, or by imprisonment of not more than 15 years, or both. Any person committing such violation which is an organization shall, upon conviction under this paragraph, be subject to a fine of not more than $1,000,000 for each violation. If a conviction of any person under this paragraph is for a violation committed after a first conviction of such person under this paragraph, the maximum punishment shall be doubled with respect to both the fine and imprisonment. For any air pollutant for which the Administrator has set an emissions standard or for any source for which a permit has been issued under subchapter V of this chapter, a release of such pollutant in accordance with that standard or permit shall not constitute a violation of this paragraph or paragraph (4). 3 The Chemical Abstracts Service Registry, maintained by the American Chemical Society, is an authoritative database of chemical information. The Registry assigns each chemical substance a unique numeric identifier. Searches in the Registry require subscription. However, EPA maintains on its website a free “Substance Registry System” containing CAS Registry information, including the CAS definition of asbestos. http:// www.epa.gov/srs/ (search “asbestos”; follow link associated with 133221-4) (last visited Aug. 3, 2007). 12686 UNITED STATES v. W. R. GRACE The government contends that a statute may have two definitions for one term, one definition civil and one criminal. Further, it argues that the definition of asbestos applicable to the Clean Air Act’s criminal knowing endangerment provision covers the minerals involved in this case. We agree on both points. The district court found § 7412(b)’s “one-word definition”4 to be “unsatisfactory” as a matter of law. However, Congress need not define every word in a criminal statute for the statute to pass Constitutional muster. When Congress does not define a term in a statute, we construe that term “according to [its] ordinary, contemporary, common meaning[ ].” United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is well known that asbestos has a common meaning; it is a fibrous, noncombustible compound that can be composed of several substances, typically including magnesium. Or, as defined by the CAS Registry, and incorporated by reference into § 7412(b), it is a “grayish non-combustible material” that “consists primarily of impure magnesium silicates.” CAS Registry number 1332-21-4, available at http://iaspub.epa.gov/srs/srs_proc_ qry.navigate?P_SUB_ID=85282. This definition has been established for decades, as was elucidated in the motions in limine. See Defs’ Mot. in Limine Re: Definition of Asbestos n.4 (Expert Witness Disclosure of Gregory P. Meeker, Appendix A) (May 31, 2006) (noting that asbestos was first defined in 1920). [7] In addition, defendants had actual notice in this case of the risks from the fibrous content of the asbestiform minerals in their products. Defendants are an industrial chemical company and seven of its top executives. They are all familiar with asbestos. Since at least 1976, defendants have known of the health risks posed by the asbestiform minerals in their products. It is clear that defendants knew or should have 4