Opinion ID: 2599716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court Authority to Limit the Scope of Closing Argument

Text: ¶ 10 At trial, Frost's counsel sought to argue both that the State failed to prove accomplice liability as to Frost's robbery offenses and that Frost acted under duress in committing these offenses. The trial court ruled, relying on language in this court's decision in Riker, 123 Wash.2d 351, 869 P.2d 43, that defense counsel could not argue these inconsistent theories in closing. Frost now argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by limiting the scope of his counsel's closing argument. The State counters that the trial court acted within its discretion. ¶ 11 We hold that the trial court erroneously interpreted our decision in Riker and, based on that erroneous interpretation, unduly limited the scope of Frost's counsel's closing argument, thus abusing its discretion. However, we ultimately conclude that the trial court's error was harmless.
¶ 12 It is well established that trial courts possess broad discretionary powers over the scope of counsel's closing arguments. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474-75, 6 P.3d 1160; City of Seattle v. Erickson, 55 Wash. 675, 677, 104 P. 1128 (1909). As explained by this court: The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. . . . He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he must have broad discretion. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474-75, 6 P.3d 1160 (quoting Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550). This court has emphasized that the trial court should `in all cases . . . restrict the argument of counsel to the facts in evidence.' Id. at 475, 6 P.3d 1160 (alteration in original) (quoting Sears v. Seattle C.S.R. Co., 6 Wash. 227, 233, 33 P. 389, 33 P. 1081 (1893)). Counsel's statements also must be confined to the law as set forth in the instructions to the jury. Id. ¶ 13 However, despite their broad discretion, trial courts cannot compel counsel to reason logically or draw only those inferences from the given facts which the court believes to be logical. City of Seattle v. Arensmeyer, 6 Wash.App. 116, 121, 491 P.2d 1305 (1971). Moreover, it is generally permissible for defendants to argue inconsistent defenses so long as they are supported by the evidence. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wash.2d 448, 458-60, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000); State v. Conklin, 79 Wash.2d 805, 807, 489 P.2d 1130 (1971). Where a trial court goes too far in limiting the scope of closing argument, a defendant's constitutional rights may be implicated. ¶ 14 For instance, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses the delivery of a closing argument. Herring, 422 U.S. at 858, 95 S.Ct. 2550. The Court explained: There can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is the basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial. Accordingly, it has universally been held that counsel for the defense has a right to make a closing summation to the jury, no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the presiding judge. Id. This court has also held that the constitutional right to be represented by counsel includes the right of counsel to argue the case to the jury. See Erickson, 55 Wash. at 677, 104 P. 1128; State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 548-49, 85 P. 251 (1906). Likewise, this court has recognized the particular importance of closing argument to the effective exercise of this right. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474, 6 P.3d 1160. Thus, where a trial court unduly limits the scope of defense counsel's closing argument, it may infringe upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ¶ 15 Improper limitation of closing argument may also infringe upon a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as set forth in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Due process requires that the State prove every fact necessary to constitute a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. McHenry, 88 Wash.2d 211, 214, 558 P.2d 188 (1977). Where a trial court limits argument as to any fact necessary to constitute a charged offense, the trial court may lessen the State's constitutionally required burden, thus, implicating a defendant's due process rights. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that trial court's action in limiting scope of argument as to element of crime relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt).
¶ 16 Duress is an affirmative defense, which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Riker, 123 Wash.2d at 368-69, 869 P.2d 43. As an affirmative defense, duress does not function to negate an element of the charged offense. Id. at 367-68, 869 P.2d 43. Rather, a finding of duress excuses the defendant's otherwise unlawful conduct. Id. Washington law specifically provides for the defense of duress at RCW 9A.16.060. [3] ¶ 17 In the present case, the trial court ruled as follows regarding the interplay between the defense of duress and the State's burden of proof: THE COURT: You cannot argue to the jury that the state hasn't proved accomplice liability and claim a duress defense. You must opt for one or the other. Riker is very clear on this. You must admit the elements of the offense have been proved before you can use the duress offense. [DEFENSE]: But am I not permitted to argue in the alternative, using duress and failure to prove in the alternative? THE COURT: No. Duress is an affirmative defense. To quote Riker, a defense of duress admits that the defendant committed the unlawful act but pleas an excuse for doing so. You may not argue both. Riker wouldn't stand up if that was the ability the defense has. Once the state proves its charges the defense says it is proved and that is when you get an opportunity to raise this affirmative defense and prove it by a preponderance. I don't see any other way to write it. There are pages and pages about this. VRP (Dec. 11, 2003) at 126-27. We reject the trial court's overbroad interpretation of our decision in Riker. In Riker, this court held that duress is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 123 Wash.2d at 368-69, 869 P.2d 43. In reaching this decision, this court stated, a defense of duress admits that the defendant committed the unlawful act, but pleads an excuse for doing so. Id. at 367-68, 869 P.2d 43. This court also stated, a duress defense necessarily allows for no doubt that the defendant did the acts charged. Id. at 368, 869 P.2d 43. These statements were made in the course of rejecting the defendant's claim that she need only prove duress `to the extent of creating a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the [defendant's] guilt. . . .' Id. at 367, 869 P.2d 43 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bromley, 72 Wash.2d 150, 155, 432 P.2d 568 (1967)). Specifically, these statements were made in support of this court's conclusion that because [a] successful duress defense does not create a reasonable doubt that the defendant did the crime charged, but rather condones the defendant's admittedly unlawful conduct. Any burden of proof for duress which literally relies on the ability of the defendant to create a reasonable doubt would . . . be impossible to meet. Id. at 368, 869 P.2d 43. Nothing in the Riker opinion was directed toward answering the question presented in the case at bar. Yet, the trial court and the Court of Appeals treated this case as though it were dispositive. See VRP (Dec. 11, 2003) at 126-27; Frost, 2005 WL 1579705,  7, 2005 Wash.App. LEXIS 1570, at . ¶ 18 Besides Riker, the Court of Appeals relied on this court's decision in State v. Mannering, 150 Wash.2d 277, 75 P.3d 961 (2003), to affirm the trial court. Frost, 2005 WL 1579705, , 2005 Wash.App. LEXIS 1570, at -24. In Mannering, this court addressed the defense of duress in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 150 Wash.2d at 286-87, 75 P.3d 961. As part of our rationale for denying defendant's claim, this court concluded that the failure to pursue the defense of duress was strategic. Id. Specifically, this court reasoned that defendant's counsel could reasonably have decided not to raise duress because doing so would have required the defendant to admit all of the elements of the underlying crimes, an admission that would have been inconsistent with the defendant's theory that she lacked the intent to commit the attempted murder. Id. at 287, 75 P.3d 961. However, this court did not hold that such inconsistent defenses would have been impermissible had defense counsel sought to raise them. ¶ 19 In sum, neither Riker nor Mannering is dispositive as to the question presented in this case. While there is language in both opinions suggesting that a successful duress defense requires admitting the commission of acts constituting a crime, these cases do not necessarily stand for the proposition that a defendant must concede criminal liability to claim duress. To require such a concession would arguably run afoul of the due process requirement that the State prove each element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068; Conde, 198 F.3d 734. Likewise, it would infringe upon a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have counsel make argument to the jury, at least where duress is only one of the viable defense theories. See Herring, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550. ¶ 20 In light of the above constitutional concerns, we reject the reading of Riker and Mannering adopted below and narrowly interpret this precedent as applied to the present case. Instead, we conclude that Riker stands for the proposition that a duress defense admits the unlawful act or conduct, not the crime itself. [4] ¶ 21 In sum, we hold that while a defendant may be required to admit that he committed acts constituting a crime in order to claim duress, he or she is not required to concede criminal liability. The trial court erred in ruling to the contrary.
¶ 22 Based on its erroneous interpretation of Riker, 123 Wash.2d 351, 869 P.2d 43, the trial court precluded Frost's counsel from arguing both that the State failed to meet its burden as to accomplice liability and that Frost acted under duress. Determining whether this limitation on the scope of counsel's argument constituted an abuse of discretion requires further inquiry into the evidence before the court, as well as the constitutional ramifications of the court's ruling. ¶ 23 Frost entered a plea of not guilty to all of his offenses. As explained by this court in Conklin, [a] plea of not guilty permits all defenses, excepting insanity and prior conviction or acquittal. 79 Wash.2d at 807, 489 P.2d 1130. In light of such a plea, [t]he state must prove each necessary element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant may challenge the state's proof at every turn. Id. Imposing a limitation on closing argument that prevents a defendant from challenging the State's burden may implicate due process. See Conde, 198 F.3d at 739, 741. ¶ 24 A trial court has the discretion, indeed the duty, `to restrict the argument of counsel to the facts in evidence.' State v. Woolfolk, 95 Wash.App. 541, 548, 977 P.2d 1 (1999) (quoting Sears, 6 Wash. at 233, 33 P. 389). However, the court cannot compel counsel to reason logically or draw only those inferences from the given facts which the court believes to be logical. Arensmeyer, 6 Wash.App. at 121, 491 P.2d 1305. To attempt to compel such logic in closing argument may implicate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The trial court's ruling in the present case constituted an abuse of discretion in that it infringed upon both Frost's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. ¶ 25 Given the State's theory of this case, whether Frost was an accomplice to the charged robbery offenses was a necessary finding to support his convictions. See State v. Carter, 154 Wash.2d 71, 81, 109 P.3d 823 (2005). Hence, in accordance with due process, the State was required to prove the elements of accomplice liability, beyond a reasonable doubt, as to each offense. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. By preventing counsel from arguing this point in closing, the trial court lessened the State's burden to some degree; thus, the court infringed upon Frost's due process rights. See Conde, 198 F.3d at 739, 741. ¶ 26 Moreover, while the argument that the State failed to meet its burden as to accomplice liability may have appeared illogical in light of Frost's trial testimony, the trial court did not have authority to compel counsel to argue logically. See Arensmeyer, 6 Wash.App. at 121, 491 P.2d 1305. As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Herring: The Constitutional right of a defendant to be heard through counsel necessarily includes his right to have his counsel make a proper argument on the evidence and the applicable law in his favor, however simple, clear, unimpeached, and conclusive the evidence may seem, unless he has waived his right to such argument, or unless the argument is not within the issues in the case, and the trial court has no discretion to deny the accused such right. 422 U.S. at 860, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (quoting Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 207, 178 A.2d 879 (1962)). Admittedly, the State's evidence of accomplice liability in this case was particularly strong. Yet there remained an evidentiary basis, however slim, for counsel to argue that the State failed to prove Frost participated in each of his accomplices' criminal acts with adequate knowledge of promotion or facilitation. See RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a) (requirements for accomplice liability). This argument is best illustrated by the robberies in which Frost was only a driver and remained in the car. As this court and the Supreme Court have recognized, closing argument is the defendant's `last clear chance to persuade the trier of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.' Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474, 6 P.3d 1160 (quoting Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550). Because the trial court unduly limited this aspect of Frost's defense, it infringed upon his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ¶ 27 In sum, the trial court's misinterpretation of our decision in Riker resulted in the imposition of an undue limitation on the scope of defense counsel's closing argument. This limitation infringed upon Frost's due process and Sixth Amendment rights. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion.