Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusions of Prospective Jurors for Cause Based on Their Questionnaires

Text: The trial court had the prospective jurors fill out a 25-page questionnaire, composed of 71 questions. On the basis of the questionnaire alone and without any oral voir dire, the trial court excused 18 potential jurors for cause. Defendant contends the substitution of written questionnaires for oral voir dire was impermissible under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [7] Alternatively, defendant contends (1) even if the exclusion of prospective jurors on the basis of written questionnaires alone was not per se unconstitutional, the questions used were confusing to the jurors or were biased, and (2) even assuming the questions were not deficient, the trial court's findings of substantial impairment for each excluded prospective juror were unreasonable and unsupported by the record. Furthermore, defendant alleges the exclusion of the identified jurors violated his rights to equal protection because the trial court's reliance on the questionnaires caused it to be more inclined to excuse life-leaning prospective jurors than those favoring the death penalty. As discussed below, we reject all of defendant's contentions of error.
The questionnaire was originally proposed by defense counsel and had primarily been shaped by the review and revision of the two previous judges assigned to the case. The judge who eventually tried the case oversaw some additional minor revisions to the questionnaire before using it in jury selection. Before the prospective jurors filled out the questionnaires, the trial court addressed the jurors with a lengthy introduction to the case and to the questionnaire, explaining the function of the guilt and penalty phases, the special circumstances, and evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The questionnaire asked detailed questions about the prospective jurors' background, prior experiences with law enforcement and the court, and ability to follow the general presumptions of the law. It also contained specific questions about Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment.

(1) Under Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], `[a] prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is . . . subject to challenge for cause . . . .' ( People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 671 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657].) Defendant contends the trial court violated Witt by excusing 18 prospective jurors for cause based solely on their written questionnaires and without any followup questioning. He argues the trial court had a constitutional duty to personally question prospective jurors. As an initial matter, respondent contends defendant has waived this claim because defendant's trial counsel himself urged the trial court to excuse jurors solely on the basis of their written questionnaires. We agree. The record indicates that trial counsel explicitly endorsed the procedure defendant now challenges on appeal. Defendant has therefore waived this claim. (Cf. People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 452 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] [claim not waived because the record disclosed no indication defendant conceded the propriety of the procedure].) (2) In the alternative, defendant contends that even if his trial counsel urged the procedure, the issue should be reviewed because counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S 668 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. Defendant contends the only reason for excusing prospective jurors solely on the basis of their questionnaires was to speed up the voir dire process (which he argues is not a valid tactical reason), and trial counsel had no other valid tactical reason for urging the procedure. We disagree. On excusing prospective jurors solely on the basis of questionnaires, we have cautioned that [t]he legitimate pursuit of laudatory efficiency should not be transformed into an arbitrary pursuit of speed for its own sake. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 530, fn. 25 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) But such was not the case here. As expressed by trial counsel and the trial court, the reason for using the questionnaires to exclude obviously Witt -impaired prospective jurors was not to gain speed for its own sake; rather, it was to spend more time with the remaining jurors at voir dire. For example, Defense Counsel Jay Grossman asserted that I think having 20 jurors on Monday morning is better than having 30 when you know there's ten or eight that you're not going to have anyway based on this questionnaire, and that my idea in suggesting that we do this, is that it gives us more time to focus on people that both sides kind of agree are a reasonable part of the pool. The record thus indicates trial counsel had a reasonable tactical strategy in urging the procedure and placing heavy initial reliance on the questionnaires. [8] Turning to the merits of the claim, we have, as defendant acknowledges, previously rejected the argument that excusing a prospective juror for cause solely on the basis of a written questionnaire is per se unconstitutional. ( People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 781-790 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 211, 187 P.3d 1041].) [R]eliance on written responses alone to excuse prospective jurors for cause is permissible if, from those responses, it is clear (and `leave[s] no doubt') that a prospective juror's views about the death penalty would satisfy the Witt standard ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412) and that the juror is not willing or able to set aside his or her personal views and follow the law. ( Id. at p. 787.) As discussed below, we conclude from our review of the individual questionnaires that the trial court did not err in discharging these prospective jurors for cause.
As a further general objection to the exclusions based on the questionnaires, defendant contends that the form of the questions was confusing or biased and thus answers to those questions could not provide an adequate basis for the trial court's rulings. Because defense counsel initially drafted the questions, agreed to the various revisions the trial court and prosecutor suggested, and accepted, without apparent objection, the final form of the questionnaire, defendant waived these claims. Were we nevertheless to address the merits, we would find the claims meritless. Defendant first asserts the questionnaire used specialized legal terms such as mitigation and aggravation, penalty phase, and special circumstances. He contends that to conclude the prospective jurors, without any guidance or explanation, would have grasped the full significance of these concepts when they wrote their responses is unreasonable. But defendant's premise is faulty because the trial court explained the terms and procedures to the prospective jurors before submitting the questionnaires to them. As noted above, the trial court presented a lengthy introduction to the case and to the questionnaire in which it explained the guilt and penalty phases, special circumstances, and evidence in aggravation and mitigation. The prospective jurors were thus given sufficient explanation of the legal terms to respond intelligently to the questions. Defendant also challenges the wording of question No. 60, which stated that no circumstance exists in which a jury must automatically return a judgment of death, and that, irrespective of what the evidence might show, the jury always retains the option in the penalty phase of choosing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Question No. 60 then went on to ask, given that two options would be available, can you see yourself (A) voting for the death penalty or (B) voting for life imprisonment. Defendant contends a prospective juror might answer no to (A) simply because he or she could not imagine the situation, rather than because he or she would be unable to consider the option of imposing the death penalty. Defendant's reading of this question is unreasonable and thus unpersuasive. Within the context of the questionnaire as a whole and the court's explanations to the prospective jurors, the jurors would reasonably have understood the question as referring to their willingness to consider the option of imposing the death penalty. (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 873 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135] [reviewing court inquires whether the jury was `reasonably likely' to have construed ambiguous jury instructions in a manner that violates the defendant's rights].) Finally, defendant contends question No. 58 was used to eliminate death penalty opponents when they answered they would never impose the death penalty, but not to eliminate death penalty proponents when they answered they would always impose it. This argument merely recasts defendant's equal protection claim, discussed below, that the trial court was more willing to dismiss life-leaning than death-leaning prospective jurors on the basis of their questionnaires alone. In sum, even assuming defendant had preserved the claim for appeal, his challenges to the questionnaire's adequacy are meritless.
Defendant contends that, even assuming it was constitutional for the trial court to excuse prospective jurors for cause based on the information in their written questionnaires alone, and even assuming the questions were not deficient in form, the trial court erred in dismissing 13 prospective jurors for cause. [9] As a threshold matter, respondent contends that defendant has waived any challenges to these exclusions because trial counsel stipulated to them. We previously have precluded challenging on appeal exclusions of prospective jurors for cause when defense counsel stipulated to the exclusion. ( People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 88 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099]; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 73 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506].) As defendant acknowledges, defense counsel stipulated or otherwise expressly agreed to the exclusion of five of the excused prospective jurors he now challenges, namely, R.H., A.A., J.J., L.K., and N.E. Defendant's claims are therefore barred as to them. [10] For the eight remaining excused prospective jurors, however, trial counsel merely stated that he submitted the exclusion to the discretion of the court, or that he would not object. Thus, while trial counsel did not stipulate to the exclusions, neither did counsel object to them. In such a circumstance, failure to object does not forfeit the right to raise the issue on appeal, although it does suggest counsel concurred in the assessment that the juror was excusable. ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734-735 [11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302].) (3) `[A]ssessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court.' ( People v. Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 668.) Generally, a trial court's rulings on motions to exclude for cause are afforded deference on appeal because, in addition to the answers given, the trial court considers the tone and demeanor of the prospective jurors. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 529.) But such deference is unwarranted when, as here, the trial court's ruling is based solely on the `cold record' of the prospective jurors' answers on a written questionnaire . . . ( ibid. ), which is available on appeal. Accordingly, we review the record de novo. ( Ibid. ) As we conclude below, the trial court did not err in excusing any of the challenged jurors.
Under California law, a juror may be challenged for cause for one of the following reasons: (A) General disqualificationโthat the juror is disqualified from serving in the action on trial. [ถ] (B) Implied biasโas, when the existence of the facts as ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror. [Or] [ถ] (C) Actual biasโthe existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 225, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(C).) Code of Civil Procedure section 228 sets forth the grounds for a challenge based on general disqualifications and includes (b) [t]he existence of any incapacity which satisfies the court that the challenged person is incapable of performing the duties of a juror in the particular action without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging party. Code of Civil Procedure section 229 sets forth the grounds for a challenge based on implied bias and includes (f) [t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party. Prospective Juror R.R. expressed a marked antipathy toward the legal system and law enforcement in his questionnaire, which the trial court cited as the basis for his exclusion. Responding to a question asking whether something might distract him during the trial, R.R. marked YES and wrote: I find judges and lawyers pompous and boring. Responding to a question whether the nature of the charges would make it difficult or impossible for you to be fair and impartial, he answered in the affirmative and wrote: Obviously (since I haven't heard of the man), the defendant is not rich or famous. Consequently his justice will be harsher than people who are privileged. R.R.'s negative feelings about the judicial system apparently stemmed from his having been charged with assaulting with a deadly weapon someone he claims was the initial aggressor. R.R. felt that law enforcement's response to that situation was completely inadequate. The trial court also noted that R.R. had indicated he would change his opinion during deliberations if it were late in the day and he was tired because I get claustrophobic, especially if I feel I couldn't get outside if I wanted to (or if I knew I had to sit still/stay in). Based on our de novo review, we conclude R.R.'s answers expressed bias against the legal system and law enforcement and indicated his inability to engage in the deliberation process. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding R.R. for cause. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 225.) Although we conclude the trial court did not err in excusing R.R., we also note defendant has cited no authority for his assumption that an error in excusing a juror for reasons unrelated to that juror's view on the imposition of the death penalty requires reversal. `[T]he general rule [is] that an erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause provides no basis for overturning a judgment.' ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].)
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excusing several prospective jurors, based solely on their questionnaire answers, as being substantially impaired to serve as capital case jurors under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. As noted above, the questionnaire had a special section on attitudes toward the death penalty. For assessing impairment under Witt for unwillingness ever to impose the death penalty, the most significant questions were Nos. 54, 56, 58, and 60. Question No. 54 asked whether the prospective juror's opposition to the death penalty was so strong that, at the guilt phase, no matter what the evidence showed, the juror would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or would refuse to find a special circumstance true, in order to keep the case from going to the penalty phase. Question No. 56 asked whether the prospective juror's opposition to the death penalty was so strong that, at the penalty phase, the juror would automatically vote against death, no matter what evidence in aggravation or mitigation was presented. Question No. 58 asked whether the prospective juror was always, never, or sometimes willing to impose the death penalty, depending on the following special circumstances: (A) murder committed for financial gain; (B) defendant previously convicted of murder; (C) defendant convicted of multiple murders; (D) murder committed upon a peace officer; or (E) murder committed during the course of a robbery. Question No. 60, the last of the section, asked about the prospective jurors' ability to impose the two options available at the penalty stage. This question first reminded the prospective jurors that under no circumstances were they required to return a penalty of death, and that they would always have the option of choosing life without the possibility of parole. Question No. 60 then presented two subparts, A and B. Part A asked whether, in the appropriate case, the prospective jurors could see themselves rejecting the death penalty and instead choosing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Part B asked whether, in the appropriate case, the prospective jurors could see themselves rejecting life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and instead choosing the death penalty. As to question No. 60, each of the excused prospective jurors marked part A in the affirmative (meaning they were willing to entertain the option of life without the possibility of parole), but marked part B in the negative (meaning they were not willing to entertain the option of imposing the death penalty). Additionally, the excused jurors gave answers to the other pertinent questions, including Nos. 54, 56, or 58, that indicated their unwillingness to apply the death penalty. Finally, as explained below, the excluded jurors further indicated their unwillingness to impose the death penalty in their written explanations to various questions. Defendant acknowledges that, taken on their own, the answers of the prospective jurors discussed below to the Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment section of the questionnaire could suggest impairment under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. But he contends the heart of the Witt inquiry actually revolves around question No. 36 in the general section of the questionnaire. Question No. 36 asked: If the Judge gives you an instruction on the law that you feel is different from a belief or opinion you have, will you be able to follow and apply that instruction? Defendant contends an affirmative response to question No. 36 should have taken priority over the answers to all of the specific death-penalty attitude questions. [11] Alternatively, defendant contends an affirmative response to question No. 36 at least made it unclear that a prospective juror was categorically unwilling to impose the death penalty, and consequently the trial court should not have excused such a juror without oral voir dire to establish whether the juror was willing to set aside his or her personal views and decide the case according to the law. (See People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 789.) We dealt with the same situation in People v. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th 758, where the excused juror marked yes to a question asking whether, `[i]f the judge gives you an instruction on the law that differs from your beliefs or opinions, will you follow the law as the judge instructs you?' ( Id. at p. 788, fn. 4.) Like the question at issue in Wilson, question No. 36 was a general inquiry about willingness to follow the law that preceded the section of the questionnaire specifically devoted to Attitudes Towards Capital Punishment. As in Wilson, question No. 36 was grouped with others in a section testing the prospective juror's ability to follow the law concerning the presumption of innocence, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, and other principles of law relating to the guilt phase of the trial. Therefore, as in Wilson, we conclude the prospective jurors' affirmative responses to question No. 36 were not necessarily inconsistent with their responses to the questions in the later section of the questionnaire dealing specifically with attitudes toward the death penalty. We turn now to the prospective jurors' responses to the questions in the death penalty section of the questionnaire. Prospective Juror P.C. When answering a question asking her to reveal her general feelings about the death penalty, P.C. wrote: I do not feel we have the right to take a life. In response to another question, she noted her philosophical position regarding the death penalty as strongly against and wrote, we don't have to kill in the name of justice. In response to other questions, she also wrote that she held the position she did on the death penalty because [t]o take a life is murder under any circumstance  (italics added) and that, I don't feel we have the right to kill. She marked question No. 56 in the affirmative, agreeing that she would automatically vote against death no matter what evidence was presented at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, she marked she would never impose the death penalty and wrote, We don't not [ sic ] have that right to kill. Answering question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror L.S. Regarding his general feelings toward the death penalty, L.S. wrote: It is barbaric! A sad reflection on our supposedly modern `civilized' society. He further noted his philosophical position as strongly against the death penalty. He also wrote: There's always a possibility a person can make a contribution to societyโif he or she is aliveโeven if it's only to warn the rest of us. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed him, he wrote: The defendant very likely needs rehabilitation, not either of the above possibilities. Answering question Nos. 54 and 56, he marked that he was so strongly against the death penalty that he would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find true a special circumstance, and he would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance he marked that he would never impose the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, he marked that he could not see himself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror D.B. D.B. responded that she generally was an opponent of the death penalty, and that, although she sometimes felt emotionally that certain murderers should die, she was rationally opposed to the death penalty. Her philosophical position was strongly against capital punishment, and she wrote that she did not want `the state' having the power to take life. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed her, she wrote: Both of them are disturbing. It assumes no possibility for a human to grow, change, amend, or repent. What a hopeless thought! Answering question No. 56, she marked that she was so strongly against the death penalty she would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. She also wrote: I would vote against death. I will not vote for the death penalty. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance she marked that she would never impose them. Then she wrote, I would never impose the death penalty, that she hoped she could be like the relatives of murder victims who had recently marched on San Quentin to oppose the death penalty, and concluded, I will never impose the death penalty. (Italics added.) Answering question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror T.T. Asked about her general feeling toward the death penalty, T.T. wrote: A life for a life is not the answer. Her philosophical position was strongly against the death penalty, and she explained that she held this position because I don't believe people should be killed although they have killed. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed her, she wrote, The death penalty should never be a factor. (Italics added.) Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, she indicated she would never impose the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror C.V. Asked about her general feelings toward the death penalty, C.V. wrote: That life and death belong to God only! She indicated she was strongly against the death penalty as a philosophical matter and because of her religious beliefs. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed her, she marked yes and wrote, I'm against the death penalty. Answering question Nos. 54 and 56, she marked that she was so strongly against the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence, she would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find a special circumstance true, and that she would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, she marked that she would never impose the death penalty. For question No. 60, she marked that she could not see herself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror T.S. Asked about his general feelings toward the death penalty, T.S. wrote: I do not believe in the death penalty. I would find it very difficult, if I had to make that decision. He indicated he was strongly against the death penalty as a philosophical matter and wrote, I don't believe anyone has the right to take a human life and It's morally wrong. Answering question No. 54, he marked that he was so strongly against the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence, he would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find a special circumstance true in order to keep the case from going to the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for the first and last special circumstance of the five listed he marked that he would never impose the death penalty, but he left the middle three blank. As an explanation to question No. 58, he wrote: I do not believe in the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, he marked that he could not see himself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Prospective Juror R.S. R.S. indicated that his general feeling was he was not in favor of the death penalty. Only God has the right to take a life. In response to another question, he reiterated the religious basis for his philosophical position of being strongly against the death penalty, further noting that I believe in God, not man. Asked whether anything about the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole disturbed him, he marked yes and wrote, I'm not in favor of the death penalty. Answering question Nos. 54 and 56, he marked that he was so strongly against the death penalty that, regardless of the evidence, he would refuse to vote for guilt as to first degree murder or refuse to find a special circumstance true, and that he would automatically vote against death at the penalty phase. Answering question No. 58, for every listed special circumstance, he marked that he would never impose the death penalty. Answering question No. 60, he marked that he could not see himself choosing the death penalty at the penalty phase. Based on our de novo review of the prospective jurors' responses to the death penalty section of the questionnaire, set out above, we conclude the excused jurors were impaired under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. Therefore, even though some of the excused jurors marked yes to question No. 36, the trial court did not err in excusing them without oral voir dire.
Defendant contends the trial court violated the equal protection clause of the federal Constitution because it applied a different standard for evaluating the questionnaires of those who strongly favored the death penalty than for those who strongly opposed it. Defendant contends that, whereas prospective jurors who expressed strong opposition to the death penalty were excused on the basis of their questionnaires alone, prospective jurors who expressed equally strong sentiments in favor of the death penalty were examined in an oral voir dire. Defendant identifies four pro-death prospective jurors, G.G., L.R., E.V., and M.P., who, he contends, should have been dismissed on the basis of their questionnaires alone had the trial court been applying the same standard to pro-death prospective jurors that it applied to those who were pro-life. Insofar as defendant's equal protection argument implies that the trial court's basic approach to substantial impairment was flawed and that all of the exclusions based on it are suspect, we reject the claim for the reasons discussed above. Insofar as defendant argues the trial court was more inclined to excuse pro-life prospective jurors on the basis of their questionnaires alone than it was pro-death prospective jurors, defendant fails to show how he was prejudiced. As defendant acknowledges, none of these four assertedly pro-death prospective jurors sat on the jury in this case: G.G. was excused for cause and defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges against the other three.