Opinion ID: 3039151
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Provisions and UPS’s Contentions

Text: Subsection (a) of § 12112 of the ADA, headed “General rule,” provides the following: “No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”13 Subsection (8) of § 12111 defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” § 12111(8). Subsection (b) of § 12112, headed “Construction,” states that “[a]s used in subsection (a) of this section, the term ‘discriminate’ includes” seven types of employer actions — as pertinent here, using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.14 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). Section 12113(a), headed “In general,” describes the defenses available to employers: 13 The parties agree that UPS is a “covered entity” within the meaning of § 12111(2), (5) and that individuals who cannot pass the DOT hearing standard are “disabled” within the meaning of § 12102(2). 14 Bates does not challenge UPS’s standard under § 12112(d), which covers in detail the propriety of medical examinations under the ADA. We therefore do not reach how § 12112(d) might apply in the present case. 17492 BATES v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter. [4] UPS’s hearing standard is clearly a “qualification standard[ ] . . . that screen[s] out . . . a class of individuals with disabilities,” § 12112(b)(6). On its face, the standard excludes individuals whom the parties agree are “disabled” from consideration for driving positions. Thus, UPS’s use of the hearing standard is “discrimination” under § 12112(b)(6), “unless the standard . . . is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity.” § 12112(b)(6). [5] The word “unless” suggests that UPS bears the burden under § 12112(b)(6) of establishing that the standard is jobrelated and consistent with business necessity. See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001) (stating the “general rule of statutory construction that the burden of proving justification or exemption under a special exception to the prohibitions of a statute generally rests on one who claims its benefits” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We have noted that “the two versions of the general business necessity defense,” in §§ 12112(b)(6) and 12113(a), are “intended to encompass the same basic requirements,” Morton, 272 F.3d at 1257 n.8, and have held that the burden of proving that a qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity under § 12113(a) falls squarely on the defendant, see id. at 1258; Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2001). It follows that the defendant has the burden of establishing that a qualification standard is jobBATES v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE 17493 related and consistent with business necessity under both §§ 12112(b)(6) and 12113(a). UPS argues, however, that even if this is so, plaintiffs must first establish that the challenged standard excludes individuals who can perform the “essential function” of driving “safely.” UPS’s argument is premised on: (1) § 12112(a)’s statement that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability”; (2) § 12111(8)’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires”; and (3) our cases holding that plaintiffs ordinarily must establish that they are “qualified individuals with disabilities.” See, e.g., Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481. If UPS were correct, then, as a practical matter, the plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that a categorical and specific safety qualification is not valid under the statute, by showing that at least some individuals who cannot meet it are capable of driving safely. That distribution of the burden of proof in a case such as this one is incompatible with the statutory scheme.