Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judicial Response to Citizen Letters

Text: In response to media requests and prior to sentencing, the District Court disclosed that it had received nearly 200 letters from the public regarding the case and authored seven letters in response to some of those letters. In disclosing the public‟s letters, the District Court stated that it had “not read or considered, nor will it read or consider, the bulk of such materials in determining the sentence to be imposed [on Ciavarella].” App. 42. The Court then publicly released all of the letters, with the exception of those requesting confidentiality. The seven responses that Judge Kosik sent contained the following statements: February 20, 2009 . . . Thank you for your letter and expressed concerns over the corruption which has come to light in Luzerne County, and most seriously with the courts. My personal opinions are in complete sympathy with those you express. The only difference is 20 that my personal beliefs cannot guide my responsibility and judgments. As you know, the government has entered into an agreement with the defense with regard to the sentence which is binding if neither side rejects it. According to the government, this resulted because of the legally questionable Count I of the indictment. To proceed, it would result in litigation and appeals which could extend any finality in the case for at least one year. I need to determine if the government‟s reasoning is correct, and I must do so as detached as possible. I am not sure we have seen the end of many transgressions in your county. App. 1507 (hereinafter “Wojack response”). March 2, 2009 . . . Thank you for your letter and frank expressions. If personal opinions were our only guide, we are on the same page. . . . The prosecution stated the plea bargain was reached because of some legal uncertainties in a law which prohibits corrupting public service. To litigate the uncertainties before finality would result in extending the presumption of innocence for a least a year. Accordingly, they 21 claim to have been guided by the need of closure. App. 1510. July 16, 2009 . . . Thank you for your note concerning the pending case before me. I appreciate your views and hope that ultimately you can respect the final consideration in the case before me. App. 1518. July 23, 2009 . . . Thank you for your letter of July 21 concerning the case of two judges out of Luzerne County. Your sentiments are noted. However, I have yet to receive a pre-sentence report which will aid in making a decision. App. 1516. Feb. 24, 2010 . . . Thank you for your letter . . . voicing your concerns regarding Judge Michael Conahan. This is just another example of why Judge Conahan and his cohort have been indicted and expect to go to trial in the federal criminal case. 22 App. 1512. May 6, 2010 . . . I thank you for the letter expressing interest in and opinions concerning the judicial process as it may play out in the case of former Judge Conahan. I appreciate your views and hope that ultimately you can respect the final consideration in the case before me. App. 1520. June 15, 2010 . . . Thank you for your letter dated April 30, 2010, and received by me on June 14, 2010. I am sorry justice is so slow, but ultimately I hope you find it to be true. App. 1514. Ciavarella renewed his prior recusal motion based on these letters. When a sitting judge comments on a pending case, he or she should heed the clear tenets expressed in our Code of Conduct for United States Judges. Judges should adhere to the following standards: [3A(1)] A judge should be faithful to, and maintain professional competence in, the law 23 and should not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism. . . . [3A(6)] A judge should not make public comment on the merits of a matter pending or impending in any court. A judge should require similar restraint by court personnel subject to the judge‟s direction and control. The prohibition on public comment on the merits does not extend to public statements made in the course of the judge‟s official duties, to explanations of court procedures, or to scholarly presentations made for purposes of legal education. . . . [3C(1)(a)] A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge‟s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which: [] the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding . . . . Code of Conduct Canon 3. Given the Canon‟s clarity, we emphasize that writing letters to non-parties about a case during its pendency is highly discouraged.7 7 Nonetheless, we recognize that the “Code is designed to provide guidance to judges,” and adherence is not mandatory. Code of Conduct Canon 1 cmt. (emphasis added). Furthermore, “it is possible to violate the Code without creating an appearance of partiality; likewise, it is possible for 24 The inquiry here, however, is whether Judge Kosik‟s conduct violates 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and triggers a duty to recuse. We have carefully analyzed the contents of each letter and are troubled by the correspondence and the expressions of Judge Kosik‟s thoughts on Ciavarella and his conduct. Nevertheless, though Judge Kosik‟s personalized responses to any letters from the public was ill-advised, their contents do not mandate his recusal because no reasonable person would question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality under these unique circumstances. Nor does our review of the record show anything other than proceedings conducted by a fair and impartial jurist. We find that the letters fall into three categories: (1) those in which Judge Kosik expressed his personal opinion about the case but clearly stated that those opinions could not affect his judgments; (2) those in which Judge Kosik never expressed an opinion but stated that he “appreciated” the recipient‟s viewpoint; and (3) those where Judge Kosik neither expressed an opinion nor took note of the recipient‟s comments but responded with the status of the case. The second and third groups of letters abide by the Code of Conduct‟s standards because they merely provided “explanations of court procedures,” Code of Conduct 3A(6), and took “particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary‟s integrity and impartiality.” Commentary to Code of Conduct Canon 3A(6). No reasonable person could question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality based on these letters. a judge to comply with the Code yet still be required to recuse herself.” Boston’s Children First, 244 F.3d at 168. 25 The first category of letters, however, causes us greater concern because the letters in that category contain Judge Kosik‟s personal opinions about Ciavarella and the case before him. Because Ciavarella must only demonstrate that Judge Kosik appears to be biased, see Liteky, 510 U.S. at 553 n.2, we must consider whether a reasonable person might question Judge Kosik‟s impartiality based on the opinions expressed in this correspondence. As the Supreme Court has stated, when a judge‟s opinion is formed by the proceedings before him, his opinions do not constitute bias “unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Id. at 555. Because, as noted, Judge Kosik‟s opinions did not result from any extrajudicial source, but from events occurring in the course of proceedings, for recusal to be warranted, Ciavarella must meet Liteky‟s high bar of deep-seated antagonism. We conclude that Ciavarella has failed to do so given that in each letter in which Judge Kosik expressed his opinion, he also expressly stated that his personal opinion would not guide his rulings. This stands in stark contrast to United States v. Antar, where we required recusal of a district judge who commented at the sentencing hearing that his “object in this case from day one ha[d] always been to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others.” 53 F.3d 568, 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Berg, 247 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2001). Judge Kosik‟s comments do not “display [the] high degree of antagonism” we found in Antar. Id. at 576. At oral argument, defense counsel cited the response to Wojack as most exemplary of Judge Kosik‟s perceived bias and apparent partiality. Wojack had written to Judge Kosik to 26 “search the deepest veins of [his] soul and find reason not to let these two judges off lightly,” pleading that “[s]even and a third years and some forfeiture of wealth is not severe enough punishment to begin the healing of the public trust.” App. 1506. Wojack said that Ciavarella and Conahan had “committed the most serious crime against the people” by using their courtrooms as “a business for profit at the expense of children.” App. 1506. The defense contends that Judge Kosik‟s response evidenced his partiality. This view, however, requires consideration of only certain sentiments expressed—“My personal opinions are in complete sympathy with those you express” and “I am not sure we have seen the end of many transgressions in your county”—while disregarding others—“The only difference is that my personal beliefs cannot guide my responsibility and judgments” and “I need to determine if the government‟s reasoning is correct, and I must do so as detached as possible.” Wojack response. As the Supreme Court noted in Liteky, “[i]mpartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Viewing Judge Kosik‟s statements in the Wojack correspondence as a whole, no reasonable observer who is informed of all of the surrounding facts and circumstances would believe that Judge Kosik could not, and did not, act impartially. Recusal was not required.