Opinion ID: 1867686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Mississippi law recognizes a claim for negligent entrustment in the context of a sales transaction.

Text: ¶ 18. The Freemans argue that Laurel Yamaha should be liable for negligent entrustment of the motorcycle to Brandon. In furtherance of this proposition, the Freemans assert Laurel Yamaha, in selling the motorcycle to Brandon, violated the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390 provides: One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them. ¶ 19. The Freemans argue that Laurel Yamaha bears responsibility based on the Restatement, as it sold the motorcycle to Brandon, when it knew or had reason to know, that Brandon, because of his youth and inexperience, or otherwise, would use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 390. Laurel Yamaha argues that there is no evidence in the record to show, that at the time of sale, Pitts or Creel knew or had any reason to know that Brandon, a college student, would operate the motorcycle in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of physical harm, and that no evidence of same existed at the time ownership and control passed to Brandon. ¶ 20. Laurel Yamaha asserts that Mississippi law does not establish a claim of negligent entrustment in the context of a sales transaction. In support of this assertion, Laurel Yamaha directs this Court to Sligh v. First National Bank of Holmes County, 735 So.2d 963 (Miss.1999). The Freemans seek to distinguish Sligh by asserting that Brandon, unlike the purchaser of the vehicle in Sligh, was not duly licensed to operate a motorcycle. However, as will be discussed infra, Brandon was not required to produce a license which showed the E endorsement. Further, it is uncontroverted that Brandon demonstrated he was familiar with the operation and features of the motorcycle he purchased. ¶ 21. Sligh was a case of first impression for this Court. The Court held Harreld Chevrolet was not liable for negligent entrustment as [a]fter the sale of the vehicle, Harreld Chevrolet had no control over it. Id. at 969. In finding no claim based on a negligent entrustment theory, Sligh held, There is no evidence in the record which would indicate that Harreld had knowledge of [Plaintiff's] drinking habits. Harreld Chevrolet sold a truck to [Plaintiff] and no further relationship existed between the two. Sligh, 735 So.2d at 970. ¶ 22. Sligh, in reviewing the decisions of other states, held, The paramount requirement for liability under the theory of negligent entrustment is whether or not defendant had a right to control the vehicle. Id. (citations omitted). Once the purchase was completed, ownership and control of the motorcycle passed to Brandon on April 10, 2004. The accident occurred on April 13, 2004. At the time of the accident, Brandon clearly owned, controlled and was in possession of the motorcycle, with no right to control enjoyed by Laurel Yamaha. Suppliers in terms of the Restatement must have the right to control the chattel. Id. (quoting Broadwater v. Dorsey, 344 Md. 548, 555, 688 A.2d 436 (1997)). Absent the right to control, no action lies for negligent entrustment. ¶ 23. Further, this Court has held, The three primary indicia of ownership [are]: title, possession, and control. . . . Hobbs Automotive, Inc., d/b/a Kim's Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, Toyota v. Dorsey, 914 So.2d 148, 167 (Miss.2005). Brandon met all three and Laurel Yamaha meets none. Title passed to Brandon, and he was in control and possession of the motorcycle, just prior to and up to the time of the accident. In Sligh, we quoted the Supreme Court of Florida, holding, It is clear under existing law there is no liability on the part of the seller of a motor vehicle where beneficial ownership or legal title, together with possession, have been transferred to a purchaser and injuries occur because of the negligence of the purchaser operating the vehicle. In short, transfer of ownership cuts off liability on the part of the former owner. Sligh, 735 So.2d at 969 (quoting Horne v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., 533 So.2d 261, 262 (Fla.1988)). See also Savage v. LaGrange, 815 So.2d 485 (Miss.App.2002). ¶ 24. The Freemans' desire to distinguish Sligh must fail. In Sligh, this Court clearly addressed negligent entrustment in the context of a completed sales transaction. The doctrine of negligent entrustment `ought not to be extended where the party sought to be charged had no control over the machine and the other party actually committing the injurious wrong was the owner, sui juris. ' Sligh, 735 So.2d at 969 (quoting Estes v. Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604, 607-08 (Ky.Ct.App.1953)). The facts herein, as well as applicable law, require the same result. The claim of negligent entrustment is without merit. II. Whether Mississippi law imposes any duty on a seller, sufficient to support a negligence claim, to restrict motor vehicle sales to licensed drivers or to determine the competence of drivers as part of the sale. To succeed on a claim for negligence, the plaintiff must prove duty, breach, causation and injury. Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866, 869 (Miss.1992). The plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a duty `to conform to a specific standard for the protection of others against the unreasonable risk of injury,' (2) a breach of that duty, (3) causal relationship between the breach and alleged injury, and (4) injury or damages. Id. at 870 n. 5 (citing and quoting Burnham v. Tabb, 508 So.2d 1072, 1074 (Miss. 1987)). Rein v. Benchmark Construction Co., 865 So.2d 1134, 1143 (Miss.2004) (citing Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 174 (Miss.1999)). ¶ 25. The Freemans assert Laurel Yamaha's sale to Brandon constituted a knowing sale and relinquishment of a dangerous instrumentality and was violative of Miss.Code Ann. Sects. 63-1-6 and 63-1-63. ¶ 26. It is uncontested that Brandon produced his driver's license to Pitts and Pitts was aware Brandon's license did not bear an E endorsement. However, an E endorsement is not a prerequisite for purchasing a motorcycle in the state of Mississippi. See Miss.Code Ann. § 63-1-6 (Rev.2004). An E endorsement is required for operating a motorcycle on the highways in Mississippi. ¶ 27. The Freemans contend that allowing Brandon to purchase a motorcycle without an E endorsement is a violation of public policy. The Freemans offer no authority in support of their contention, nor does their contention comport with the mandates of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 63-1-6. [W]here the statute is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction. See Gannett River Publ. Co. v. Entergy, 940 So.2d 221, 224 (Miss.2006); Bailey v. Al-Mefty, 807 So.2d 1203, 1206 (Miss. 2001). ¶ 28. Laurel Yamaha argues Mississippi law does not impose any duty on a seller to determine whether a driver is licensed and/or competent. Laurel Yamaha's counter-public policy argument is that if a motor vehicle seller is required to vouch for the competency of every person to whom he sells a motor vehicle, then sellers would be required to monitor each and every customer throughout the entire period of ownership. . . . [sellers] could be held liable for any injuries caused by a driver after the purchase of a vehicle and could be named as defendants to every motor vehicle accident case filed in this state where allegations of driver negligence or incompetence were raised. ¶ 29. The Freemans also assert that Laurel Yamaha violated Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 63-1-63 and that this constituted negligence per se. To prevail in an action for negligence per se, a party must prove that he was a member of the class sought to be protected under the statute, that his injuries were of a type sought to be avoided, and that violation of the statute proximately caused his injuries. Gallagher Bassett Servs. v. Jeffcoat, 887 So.2d 777, 787 (Miss.2004) (citation omitted). Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 63-1-63 provides: No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to be driven upon any highway by any person who is not authorized under the provisions of this article or in violation of any of the provisions of this article. ¶ 30. The Freemans again offer a public-policy argument akin to negligent entrustment, without citing persuasive authority. They assert that a prudent retailer would have inquired as to why Brandon was not licensed and would not have let him drive away from the dealership. In support of this argument, the Freemans cite case law regarding negligence in the operation of motor vehicles. However, each case cited by the Freemans involves drivers under eighteen, in vehicles owned by another. Brandon was age eighteen when he purchased this motorcycle. Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 93-19-13 allows, All persons eighteen years of age or older, if not otherwise disqualified, or prohibited by law, shall have the capacity to enter into binding contractual relationships affecting personal property. . . . ¶ 31. Brandon legitimately entered into the contract to purchase the motorcycle, and legal title and control passed to Brandon. As discussed supra, once Brandon gained legal title to the motorcycle and it was in his possession, Brandon controlled its use. Accordingly, the statute does not impose a duty on Laurel Yamaha, because when this accident occurred, the motorcycle was not owned by [Laurel Yamaha] or under [its] control. See Miss.Code Ann. § 63-1-63 (Rev.2004). ¶ 32. Whatever the Legislature says in the text of the statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent. Miss. Dep't of Transp. v. Allred, 928 So.2d 152, 155 (Miss.2006). There is no language in either Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 63-1-6 or Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 63-1-63 which imposes a legal duty upon Laurel Yamaha. This Court is bound by the plain meaning of these statutes, and [i]t is the task of the Legislature and not this Court to make the laws of this state. Id. at 156. Upon the facts of this case, this Court is unwilling to impose duties which were not expressly created by statute.