Opinion ID: 795247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application to Drake's Claims

Text: 54 We think that the preemption analysis described above can only be conducted by examining the contours of the state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard in question and its relationship to the FAA's drug-testing program. 14 C.F.R. Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). Because all of Drake's state-law claims are based on New York common law, we must consider his specific theories of recovery and determine whether the common-law rules and standards on which they rely are compatible with the federal regulatory scheme. 55
56 In each of his state-law counts, Drake claims that he is entitled to relief under state law for the defendants-appellants' alleged violations of federal regulations. We have already concluded that the remedial provisions of the FAAct, the regulations' enabling statute, do not preempt such claims. See supra, Part III.B. But federal regulations may have preemptive effects that are broader than those of their enabling statutes so long as the preemption does not exceed the agency's delegated authority. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 154, 102 S.Ct. 3014. The defendants-appellants contend that Drake's claims for state-law remedies are preempted by the FAA drug-testing regulations because they cover[] the subject matter of those regulations. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). 57 To be sure, any claim that the FAA regulations have been violated necessarily relates to the subject matter of the FAA regulations. But, as we understand Drake's claims, state common law plays no role in determining whether the defendants-appellants have breached the duties established by the federal regulations. The claim, instead, is that if such federal duties have been breached, there are state law causes of action for relief. If that is indeed Drake's claim, the subject matter covered, it seems to us, is not the substantive standards of the federal regulations, but the relief that is available for violations of those standards. But, as noted, the FAA drug-testing regulations are silent about remedies for their violation. Because remedies are not addressed by the FAA regulations, the state law under Drake seeks remedies for violations of the regulations does not cover the subject matter of the regulations of any specific provision of the regulations. 58 This conclusion is consistent with past interpretations of the FAAct and accompanying regulations. Other courts have recognized that, under the FAAct and other federal laws, the federal government's intent to preempt substantive state-law standards does not necessarily imply an intent to preempt state-law remedies for violations of federal standards. See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 375 (Even though we have found federal preemption of the standards of aviation safety, we still conclude that the traditional state and territorial law remedies continue to exist for violation of those standards.); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232-33, 115 S.Ct. 817, 130 L.Ed.2d 715 (1995) (The [Airline Deregulation Act's] preemption clause, read together with the FAA[ct]'s savings clause, stops States from imposing their own substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but not from affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated.); cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (concluding that state-law remedies for violations of Food & Drug Administration regulations regarding medical devices were not preempted because they merely provide[d] another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing requirements under federal law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Riegel v. Medtronic, 451 F.3d 104, 124 (2d Cir.2006) ([T]ort claims that are premised on a manufacturer's deviation from the standards set forth in the device's [federally] approved [premarket approval] application ... are in no way preempted.). 59 State-law remedies do not in our view, moreover, cover the subject matter of drug testing in a way that would interfere with the operation of the federal regulatory system. The administrative remedies of the FAAct provide only for the FAA to issue an order of compliance, and bring suit to enforce it. They do not provide injured parties with any further redress, such as compensation for attendant harm to a individual who has been wronged by the failure to comply. See 49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(4); cf. Frank, 314 F.3d at 201 n. 9. And the FAAct does not provide a private right of action for violations of FAA drug-testing regulations. See Drake v. Delta Air Lines, 147 F.3d at 170-71. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); see also Lohr, 518 U.S. at 487, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (plurality opinion) (same). And here, Congress has indeed commented on the matter, stating in the FAAct's saving clause that it does not intend for the Act to leave injured parties without remedy. 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c); 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 1506 (1993). When states provide remedies for violations of FAA regulations, they are in effect responding to the FAAct's express invitation to fill the gaps in its deliberately incomplete remedial scheme. 60 As for the FAA, its purpose in preempting state law covering the subject matter of its drug-testing regulations was to ensure that its drug-testing program could be administered in a consistent and uniform manner. 53 Fed.Reg. at 47048. It is difficult to see how state-law remedies for violation of the FAA regulations would detract from the uniformity of the program or interfere with its effective administration. Cf. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (state-law remedies merely provide[d] another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing requirements under federal law (internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum, we have been given no persuasive reason to conclude that federal law should be interpreted so as to deprive aggrieved employees of legal recourse against persons involved in the commercial enterprise of testing for drugs who would otherwise apparently enjoy immunity from liability despite their alleged failure to comply with federal law. 61
62 We think, though, that some of Drake's allegations that the defendants violated substantive common-law standards of may be incompatible with federal law. 63 1. Enlargements of Federal Requirements. Although we have concluded that Drake may seek state-law remedies for violations of the federal regulations, we think that state law cannot enlarg[e] or enhanc[e] the regulations to impose burdens more onerous than those of the federal requirements on matters addressed by the federal regulations. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233, 115 S.Ct. 817. Throughout his complaint, for example, Drake claims that the defendants' actions, in addition to violating applicable federal regulations, were improper[] and wrongful[]. E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 102, 113. If Drake is asserting that conduct addressed by the federal regulations is wrongful under state law although it does not violate the federal regulations, such claims are preempted. Consistency and uniformity require that drug-testing laboratories be able to follow the requirements of the federal regulations exactly as they are written. A state-law enlargement or variation of any specific requirement of the regulations would interfere with the laboratories' ability to do so. It would be a state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject matter of the FAA regulations and therefore be preempted. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A). 64 2. Industry Standards and Protocols. Drake's claim that the defendants-appellants acted negligently by ignor[ing] industry standards and protocols for random drug testing also appears to be preempted to the extent that it refers to standards and protocols other than those in the federal regulations. Compl. at ¶ 89. The FAA and DOT regulations prescribe a comprehensive set of standards and components to be included in a federally regulated drug testing program. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I. State laws mandating additional or other standards and components for drug-testing programs— whether or not inconsistent with the federal requirements—would require aviation-industry employers and drug-testing laboratories to comply with two separate sets of procedures when carrying out FAA-regulated drug testing. This appears to be precisely the sort of burden that the FAA was seeking to avoid when it stated that state laws covering the subject matter of the drug testing of aviation personnel are preempted. Id. § XI(A). 65 3. Misrepresentation. Drake's claim for misrepresentation, however, does not appear from the pleadings to be preempted, notwithstanding the fact that it is based on state-law standards of behavior rather than the standards set forth in the federal regulations. At the time of Drake's termination, there was nothing in the FAA regulations concerning false statements made by drug-testing laboratories during the course of federally mandated testing. 16 Thus, the tort of misrepresentation regulates an issue on which the regulations are silent. It does not cover the subject matter of any specific federal requirement. And complying with common-law restrictions on misrepresentation would not seem to us to impose any special burdens on drug-testing laboratories that would interfere with the consistency and uniformity of the federal drug-testing program. We therefore do not think that Drake's misrepresentation claim covers the subject matter of drug testing of aviation personnel under the meaning of the FAA regulations. 14 C.F.R Pt. 121, App. I § XI(A).
66 A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 197-98 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because we are confined to the allegations contained in Drake's complaint, the precise contours of [his] theory of recovery have not yet been defined. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495, 116 S.Ct. 2240. For those claims for which preemption cannot be easily determined from the pleadings, Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 128 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 1997), our standard of review requires us to affirm the district court's decision to deny the defendants-appellants' motion to dismiss, with the understanding that the claims may ultimately prove to be preempted at a later stage of the litigation. 67 At present, none of Drake's five surviving state-law causes of action—negligence, tortious interference with economic relations, misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and conspiracy—appears to be foreclosed in its entirety. Each claim is based at least in part on the defendants-appellants' alleged violation of federal drug-testing regulations. As we have explained, state law may provide remedies for violations of federal standards so long as it does not impose substantive standards of its own in areas addressed by the federal regulations. On the other hand, certain subsidiary claims in Drake's complaint are incompatible with federal law to the extent that they seek to supplement the federal requirements with substantive state-law standards applicable to the same issue. And they are preempted insofar as they rely on state common-law procedures and protocols for drug testing. 68 Because, construing Drake's complaint liberally, none of his asserted state-law causes of action are based solely on preempted state law, the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss them at this time. On remand, however, and as the litigation proceeds, Drake will continue to be precluded from developing theories of recovery that are incompatible with the FAA's drug-testing program.