Opinion ID: 1206165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: W.Va.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) provides:

Text: A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. The identical language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4)(B) was recently interpreted in Barnes v. City of Parkersburg, 100 F.R.D. 768 (S.D.W.Va.1984). In that medical malpractice case, the defendant sought to depose an expert consulted in anticipation of litigation whom the plaintiff did not intend to call as a witness at trial. The court granted the plaintiff a protective order, stating: These experts are subject to a more restrictive discovery standard. For experts not expected to testify, the rule is that discovery can only take place upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means ... The reason for this rule is that while pretrial exchange of discovery regarding experts to be used as witnesses aids in narrowing the issues, preparation of cross examination and the elimination of surprise at the trial, there is no need for a comparable exchange of information regarding non-witness experts who act as consultants and advisors to counsel regarding the course the litigation take. Id. at 769, quoting Mantolete v. Bolger, 96 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D.Ariz.1982). The court held that the defendant had not met the heavy burden of showing exceptional circumstances incumbent upon a party seeking discovery of a non-testifying expert. Id. at 769-70. In Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D.Ill.1972), the defendants argued that exceptional circumstances existed because they were unable to obtain the opinions of the plaintiff's consulting experts by other means. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Rule clearly contemplates a showing that a party has found opinions by others on the subject to be unavailable before he may obtain discovery from his opponent's retained expert who is not expected to be called to testify on the same subject. Id. at 14 (emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, the respondents have not sustained the burden of showing exceptional circumstances justifying the discovery of relator's non-testifying experts. The respondents have available to them the decedent's medical records, and have failed to show that they are unable to retain an expert who might interpret these records and render an opinion regarding respondents' possible negligence. Because the respondents failed to meet their burden under Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the circuit court abused his discretion by requiring the relator to disclose the identities and reports of his non-testifying experts.