Opinion ID: 2618245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 72

Heading: Alleged Robertson Error

Text: (82) Defendants first claim they are entitled to a new penalty phase hearing because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it should not consider evidence of other crimes unless it found defendants were guilty of those crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1057 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680]; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279] [plur. opn.], 60 [conc. opn. of Broussard, J.].) In particular, they point to evidence of 10 alleged other crimes that the jury could have erroneously concluded were aggravating factors. [35] Many of these alleged other crimes, however, were so trivial or irrelevant to a determination of an appropriate penalty that the jury's consideration of them was harmless even if we assume the trial court should have delivered a Robertson instruction. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 446-449.) For example, Debbie Sportsman's refusal to speak to Reilly's investigator or Cliff Morgan's attempt to bribe a witness could not have had even a marginal effect on the jury's penalty deliberation. Other evidence, such as Reilly's alleged threat to Debbie Sportsman, her parents, and others, was slightly more substantial. We nevertheless find no error because the alleged other crimes were either part of the conspiracy (such as the destruction of evidence) or inextricably intertwined with the crimes of which defendants were convicted. Significantly, the prosecutor mentioned the threats in connection with his summary of the circumstances of the present crime, i.e., under section 190.3, factor (a). [36] He did not explicitly invite the jury to consider the threats as evidence of a separate aggravating factor under factor (b). [37] To the extent a Robertson instruction was required, its omission was harmless. ( Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 446-449.)