Opinion ID: 4110207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Strike a Juror

Text: In Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 320 (Fla. 2007), this Court discussed, in-depth, how the Strickland standard applies to the claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to strike a juror and contrasted the standard applied during postconviction proceedings with the standard that applies to a similar claim raised on direct appeal: [T]he standard for obtaining a reversal upon the erroneous denial of a cause challenge is relatively lenient: a defendant need only show that an objectionable juror—whether or not actually biased—sat on the jury. Our consideration of postconviction claims, however, is more restrictive. As we recently reiterated: We have emphasized that “once a conviction has been affirmed on direct appeal ‘a presumption of finality and legality attaches to the conviction and sentence.’ ” . . . “[T]he test for prejudicial error in conjunction with a direct appeal is very different from the test for prejudice in conjunction with a collateral claim of ineffective assistance.” Sanders [v. State], 946 So. 2d [953, 959 (Fla. 2006)] (citations omitted) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 546 (Fla. 1999), and Sanders [v. State,] 847 So. 2d [594, 506 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)]). A defendant’s claim that his counsel offered ineffective assistance at trial, for whatever reason, must be analyzed under the standard the Supreme Court enunciated in Strickland. The purpose of the right to the effective assistance of counsel is to “ensure a fair trial,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, defined as “one in which evidence subject - 20 - to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding.” Id. at 685. .... Specifically, the Court stressed that “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Therefore, “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Witt v. State, 387 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1980) (quoting United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979)). Carratelli, 961 So. 2d at 320. In order to establish that the defendant suffered prejudice based on counsel’s failure to strike a juror during voir dire, the defendant must demonstrate that an actually biased juror served on the jury. Id. at 323. When this Court previously applied that standard to the facts in Carratelli, this Court held that the defendant failed to prove prejudice—that an actually biased juror served on the jury—even though the defendant did show that one of the jurors read a prior news article about the crime and was exposed to a prior conversation where numerous people had opined to him that the defendant was guilty. While the juror in question acknowledged that it might be more difficult for the defendant to convince the juror of his innocence based on the juror’s prior exposure, the juror still stated, “If I come in here as a juror, I will sit down with an open slate and listen to what is said and make up my mind from there.” Id. at 327. As this Court concluded, “The record plainly shows that [the juror] held no firm opinion except that he could be fair, listen to the evidence, and follow the law.” Id. - 21 - This Court has reviewed similar claims involving ineffective assistance of trial counsel pertaining to the failure to challenge a juror for cause and has generally held that in order to amount to actual bias, the juror must indicate something more than mere doubt about that juror’s impartiality. See, e.g., Guardado v. State, 176 So. 3d 886 (Fla. 2015) (holding that the record did not show a juror had actual bias even though the juror stated that he was “strongly” in favor of the death penalty, knew three of the police officers who worked on the case, and had family members who knew the victim personally); Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 745 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the record did not show a juror had actual bias when the juror stated that he had been exposed to pretrial publicity about the crime and then declined to respond to specific discussion on bias during voir dire); Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 550 (Fla. 2008) (holding that there was no evidence of actual bias in the record where a juror stated that she “[p]robably” would vote for the death penalty in the circumstance of multiple victims but ultimately stated that mitigating evidence such as testimony about the defendant’s mental health could influence her to recommend a life sentence). Applying that standard, during the voir dire in this case, when the State inquired whether any juror was concerned about whether he or she would be so bothered by photographs of the deceased victim’s burned and decomposed body that he or she could not be fair or impartial, Juror R answered that she was not sure - 22 - how she would respond and that she did not know, although she thought she would try. Specifically, in response to a compound question, asking the jurors both as to who would be bothered or disturbed by reviewing photographs of the victim’s burned, decomposed body and who would feel that such pictures would cause them to not be fair and partial, Juror R responded, stating, “I’m not sure how I would respond. I think the timing of when we see them might determine how I might feel. I just don’t know.” When the State explained that this was a part of the case and questioned whether she could be fair and impartial in the case, Juror R then replied, “I think I would try but I don’t know what I would take home with me at night and sleep with. I don’t know.” We deny this claim because Mosley has failed to show actual bias on the face of the record. As this Court explicitly held in Johnston, in order to prevail on a challenge pertaining to whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to certain jurors serving on the jury, the defendant must demonstrate actual bias, which is “more than mere doubt about the juror’s impartiality.” 63 So. 3d at 745. Based on the full context of Juror R’s statement, Juror R was replying to whether those types of pictures would bother her or affect her ability to sit as a juror in the case—she did not clearly indicate that she would have a bias or prejudice against a particular party or determine Mosley’s guilt or innocence based on gruesome pictures. - 23 - Even if her statements were considered to be a discussion as to whether she could be fair, Juror R’s statements merely express doubt, which this Court has held does not establish actual bias against the defendant. As this Court has acknowledged, the standard for establishing prejudice during postconviction claims must be more restrictive in order to recognize “the fundamental differences between review on appeal and review on postconviction.” Thompson v. State, 990 So. 2d 482, 489 (Fla. 2008). We stressed in Carratelli that holding otherwise would mean that “[a] defendant asserting ineffective assistance for failing to preserve a cause challenge would have no greater burden than a defendant asserting preserved error on appeal,” a result that would lead to the elimination of the contemporaneous objection requirement and permit counsel to save certain arguments for appeal. 961 So. 2d at 325. We thus deny this claim. 2. Failure to Request a Jury Instruction on the Alibi Defense In his second claim of trial counsel deficiency, Mosley alleges that trial counsel was deficient in failing to request a jury instruction pertaining to an alibi defense. Specifically, at his trial, the State presented evidence that Mosley himself admitted to meeting the victims at J.C. Penney during the time frame within which the police later determined the murders occurred. Mosley presented evidence to challenge his involvement in the murder, and his counsel’s theory of defense was that Griffin had killed the victims and blamed Mosley for the crime. Defense - 24 - counsel stressed that there was no physical evidence to show that Mosley was present at the scene of the crime and demonstrated the small window of time that Mosley was even available to be able to commit the offenses. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Mosley’s lead trial counsel testified, asserting that he researched the case thoroughly and generated a case file of fourteen boxes. Defense counsel explicitly stated that he never believed that this was an alibi case and he was concerned about his credibility with the jury if he attempted to rely on such a defense based on the available evidence. Instead, his defense strategy was to chip away at the State’s case, demonstrate its lack of direct evidence against Mosley, and stress that Griffin committed the murder. The postconviction court denied the claim as follows: Evidence from cell phone records showed the murders occurred between 12:33 p.m. and 1:21 p.m. JSO Detective Dennis Fuentes interviewed Defendant after Defendant became a suspect in the disappearance of Ms. Wilkes and Jay-Quan. At trial, Detective Fuentes testified that Defendant told the detective he saw Ms. Wilkes and Jay-Quan between 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. on the day of the murders. Defendant also told the detective that during this time Ms. Wilkes showed Defendant a house she was thinking about renting and afterwards they returned to the J.C. Penney parking lot where Ms. Wilkes performed oral sex on Defendant. JSO Sergeant Hugh Eason also interviewed Defendant during the investigation into Ms. Wilkes’s and Jay-Quan’s disappearances. According to Sergeant Eason, Defendant said he called Ms. Wilkes from Quality Tire before meeting her at “around 12:45, 1:00 . . .” and that he never said anything about going back to Quality Tire after leaving Ms. Wilkes and Jay-Quan. At trial Jimmy Holton, the manager of Quality Tire, testified that he was merely guessing that Defendant was in his shop at 1:00 p.m. on the day of the murders and - 25 - that he could not say exactly what time Defendant was there that day. Jim Jeanette, the plumber who worked on Defendant’s broken toilet, testified that he arrived at Defendant’s home at 3:00 p.m. on the day of the murders. Defendant’s daughter, Amber Mosley, testified that she saw Defendant at home “[s]ometime around 1:00” the day of the murders. Finally, Defendant’s wife, Carolyn Mosley, testified that she was uncertain where Defendant was between 12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. on the day of the murders. Mr. Kuritz testified at the evidentiary hearing that he “never thought of this as an alibi case.” According to Mr. Kuritz, he could not show Defendant was in a particular place at a specific time. Because he believed he did not have enough evidence for an alibi, counsel tried to “chip away at the state’s case and show that their [sic] story wasn’t credible.” Mr. Kuritz explained that his theory and strategy were to argue that Mr. Griffin committed the murders “either by himself or with a friend of his and that Mr. Mosley was not involved.” Mr. Kuritz believed that had he requested an alibi instruction he would have lost credibility with the jury and that “the state could have really twisted it on me . . . because as I sit here still I don’t think we had an alibi to speak.” Finally, Mr. Kuritz testified that when he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain an alibi instruction, he relied on the jury finding “plenty of reasonable doubt as to all of this.” At the evidentiary hearing, Quentin Till, co-counsel at Defendant’s trial, testified that he focused on the penalty phase. He further testified that he was unsure whether he actually sat down with Mr. Kuritz to discuss the defense’s theory for the guilt phase. Mr. Till explained he was very confident with Mr. Kuritz’s capabilities to represent somebody. According to Mr. Till, the defense could have put on an alibi defense, but he was unsure whether it would be effective. He further stated that he did not have an answer to whether there was harm in asking for an alibi instruction. Defendant argues that Mr. Kuritz’s reasons for not requesting an alibi instruction is unconvincing because counsel “used the word ‘alibi’ in describing Mosley’s defense to the jury.” In his opening statement, Mr. Kuritz made these references to an alibi: “[The plumber is] not going to say Defendant was trying to set up an alibi”; “Nobody is crunching for alibis”; “Not us making up an alibi”; and “That’s his alibi?” - 26 - Mr. Kuritz’s strategic decision not to request an alibi instruction was clearly within “the broad range of reasonably competent performance” contemplated by Strickland. Although Mr. Kuritz used the word “alibi” during his opening statement, he never directly referred to a specific alibi defense. Counsel considered whether to pursue an alibi defense and reasonably rejected doing so after reviewing the undisputed facts and concluding that Defendant did not have a sufficient alibi. We affirm the postconviction court’s determination that this was a reasonable strategic decision. As this Court has held, “[S]trategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct.” Peterson v. State, 154 So. 3d 275, 280 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Burns v. State, 944 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. 2006)). Even if “arguably trial counsel’s strategy may have ultimately been unsuccessful, [the defendant] cannot now properly challenge an informed, strategic decision of counsel in the hindsight of postconviction.” Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 62 (Fla. 2005). “The defendant bears the burden to ‘overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” McCoy v. State, 113 So. 3d 701, 707 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Mosley now asserts that counsel should have requested this jury instruction even if the evidence was weak, emphasizing that trial counsel presented witnesses who testified that Mosley could have been in a different place during the murder or when the bodies were disposed of and thus he must have been presenting an alibi - 27 - defense. As trial counsel testified during the postconviction evidentiary hearing, however, Kuritz never considered the case as one involving an alibi. His stance on this was clear to the jury from the opening argument—he repeatedly emphasized that he was “not going to say Mr. Mosley was trying to set up an alibi” and they are not “making up an alibi.” A review of the trial record very clearly demonstrates why choosing not to use an alibi defense was a reasonable strategic decision. By Mosley’s own admissions to numerous people, he could have been present at the very time that the murders occurred. Mosley initially asked the victim to meet him in the J.C. Penney parking lot so he could allegedly buy their son clothing. Wilkes notified others of her plan to meet Mosley at J.C. Penney, and her car was found abandoned in the parking lot where she met Mosley. When the police confronted Mosley about this, he acknowledged that he met Wilkes and their son there and was with her during the relevant time period. Thus, while trial counsel did call various witnesses who would have placed Mosley at home around 1 p.m., if trial counsel focused on using this as a defense, the State would have emphasized that even Mosley himself initially admitted that he was with Wilkes during the time that the police were later able to establish the murders occurred—between 12:57 and 1:21 p.m. - 28 - Further, after Mosley was arrested, he contacted numerous people in an attempt to create an alibi. He called his family from jail, explaining what statements he wanted them to provide to the police. Mosley also reached out to one of his other mistresses by letter, encouraging specific testimony that she should recall pertaining to when they saw each other on April 23—the time period when Mosley returned from disposing of the bodies. If trial counsel had attempted to pursue this case as one involving an alibi, the prosecutor had significant evidence to suggest that Mosley was attempting to fabricate an alibi. Instead, trial counsel attempted to downplay this evidence, stressing that Mosley was not trying to create an alibi and that he was just worried that his family and friends would be pressured into lying about important details. Trial counsel focused on how the only evidence that tied Mosley to the murder came from Griffin, who was also being charged with crimes concerning the murder, and that Griffin was trying to blame Mosley for murders that Griffin himself committed. We deny this claim. 3. Failure to Object to Improper Comments In his final claim, Mosley contends that trial counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to certain statements made by the prosecutor and State witnesses, focusing on four main areas: (1) trial counsel failed to object to improper bolstering of Griffin and the police; (2) the prosecutor denigrated Mosley - 29 - and his defense; (3) during the penalty phase, the prosecutor relied on prosecutorial expertise in seeking the death penalty; and (4) the prosecutor implied to the jury that a life recommendation is the “easy way out.”6 As an initial matter, during the postconviction hearing, trial counsel Richard Kuritz testified that, as a strategic choice, he was generally more conservative in how many objections he raised, objecting only where it was clear that the statement was improper and where his objection would be helpful to the defense. The postconviction court relied on this testimony, summarizing Kuritz’s testimony as follows: Mr. Kuritz testified that his use of objections is strategic. He testified that forming his strategy is a two-part process: Can I object? Should I object? Mr. Kuritz explained that if he objects too much, he might “get the ire of the court,” and he might lose credibility with the jury. He further explained that an objection may draw the jury’s attention to particular testimony that is damaging to his client and by not objecting, he does not give the jury a reason to pay attention to the damaging testimony. According to Mr. Kuritz, “the jury can’t unhear something or unring the bell.” Finally, Mr. Kuritz considers whether to use the prosecutor’s statement to his benefit: “I like it when an opposing party says something that I can use to my benefit and oftentimes it’s when they say something ludicrous, improper or pushing the envelope that I can twist on that.” 6. In light of granting Mosley relief with respect to relief on his claim under Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and remanding his case for a new penalty phase, we do not address Mosley’s claims (3) and (4), which relate to his attorney’s failure to object to statements made during the penalty phase of his trial. - 30 - Mosley first contends that his attorney was deficient in failing to object to various statements from the State that allegedly constituted improper bolstering and from State witnesses regarding Griffin’s credibility and the investigation in the case. This Court has defined improper bolstering as “when the State ‘places the prestige of the government behind the witness or indicates that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.’ ” Jackson v. State, 147 So. 3d 469, 486 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Wade v. State, 41 So. 3d 857, 869 (Fla. 2010)). After reviewing each of these arguments, we conclude that these comments, when viewed in context, are not comments placing the prestige of the government behind Griffin’s testimony or relying on anything outside of the record to support law enforcement’s testimony. Further, even if these comments could constitute improper bolstering, trial counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the comments, but in fact used some of the statements to Mosley’s advantage by suggesting that the law enforcement officers had clouded judgment pertaining to Griffin. Second, Mosley contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to numerous statements in closing arguments wherein the prosecutor argued that Mosley had lied to various people, alleging that such statements denigrated the defendant. This Court has held that while a prosecutor may “not ridicule or otherwise improperly attack the defense’s theory of the case,” the prosecutor is - 31 - permitted to suggest to the jurors that “based on the evidence of the case, they should question the plausibility of the defense’s theory.” Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1203 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Valentine v. State, 98 So. 3d 44, 55-56 (Fla. 2012)). Accordingly, this Court has previously “determined that the prosecutor’s description of the defendant’s testimony as ‘untruthful[ ]’ or of the defendant as a ‘liar’ was proper argument based on the evidence of the case.” Id. at 1204 (quoting Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857, 865 (Fla. 1987)); see also Davis v. State, 698 So. 2d 1182, 1190 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that prosecutor’s reference to defendant’s statements as “bald-faced lies” was not improper). Here, the statements at issue do not rise to the level of denigrating the defense or the defendant. For the reasons explained above, we hold that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to object to the arguments and statements made by the prosecution and its witnesses. C. Cumulative Error In his final postconviction claim, Mosley asserts that the cumulative effect of the guilt phase and penalty phase errors renders his convictions and death sentence fundamentally unfair. We reject this claim without further discussion because we have rejected all of the individual guilt phase claims of error both as to ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the claims of relief under Giglio, Brady, and newly discovered evidence, and do not consider Mosley’s penalty phase - 32 - claims in light of granting relief under Hurst v. State (Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).