Opinion ID: 171597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stacking Policies

Text: Because we conclude the reformed policies have aggregate limits, we next determine if those limits can be stacked. As the district court noted, [s]tacking means `aggregating, combining, [or] multiplying .. . limits of separate policies....' Estate of Curry ex rel. Bowen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 101 P.3d 1133, 1135 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Colo.Rev.Stat. § 10-4-402(3.5)). Colorado allows anti-stacking provisions. Id. The district court concluded that the plain language of the PIP endorsement expressly proscribes stacked coverage. App. at 800. To support this conclusion, the district court quoted from the PIP endorsement, no eligible injured person shall recover duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under this and any similar insurance. Id. Similarly, the district court highlighted the Limits of Liability provision stating: No matter how many persons are insured, policies [ ] apply, claims are made[,] or insured motor vehicles to which this coverage applies, [American Family's] liability for [PIP] benefits for bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person in one motor vehicle accident is limited.... The total aggregate amount payable for medical expenses, rehabilitation expenses, work loss, essential expenses, and death compensation, [sic] shall not exceed the amount s[h]own in the schedule of this endorsement. Id. The district court also considered the relation of the aggregate limit to stacking and determined the overall limit to American Family's liability was $200,000. Id. Plaintiffs argue that the provisions the district court quoted do not apply to stacking. Plaintiffs contend that the block quotation from the Limits of Liability provision only addresses the per-occurrence liability on a single policy. Regarding the duplicate benefits quotation, plaintiffs contend that it only bars insureds from collecting benefits twice for the same bills, which plaintiffs assert is not at issue in this case. In contrast, plaintiffs point to another provision in the PIP endorsement that they contend supports stacking. This provision states: If an eligible injured person has other similar insurance, including self-insurance, for a loss covered by this endorsement, we will pay our share according to this endorsement's proportion of the total limits of all similar insurance. But, this does not apply to optional benefits purchased by that eligible person for additional premiums on a voluntary basis. Aplt. Br. at 43. American Family responds by highlighting portions of the endorsement that it believes prohibit stacking. This includes the Limits of Liability and duplicate benefits provisions quoted by the district court. Additionally, American Family cites the Two or More Cars Insured provision, which states, The total limit of our liability under all policies issued to you by us shall not exceed the highest limit of liability under any one policy. When this policy insures two or more cars, the coverages apply separately to each car.... Aple. Br. at 28. American Family also references cases from the Colorado Court of Appeals and Colorado Supreme Court that considered similar language to be valid anti-stacking provisions. E.g. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 852 P.2d 459, 464 (Colo.1993); Am. Standard Ins. Co. v. Ekeroth, 791 P.2d 1220 (Colo.Ct.App.1990). We agree with American Family's interpretation of the policy provisions. The other similar insurance provision contemplates insurance from a third party other than American Family. As plaintiffs concede, this provision does not apply to enhanced PIP.... Aplt. Br. at 44. The remainder of the provision is a proration clause. In Shean v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 934 P.2d 835, 838 (1996), the Colorado Court of Appeals stated: That a proration clause must be viewed as irrelevant when, as here, a policy contains a separate, intra-company anti-stacking clause and all applicable policies have been issued by one insurer is... consistent with the typical use of a proration clause. A pro rata clause is just one clause of the standard insurance industry inter-company anti-stacking provision that is intended both to limit the amount of total recovery to that available under one policy, and to distribute that liability among companies. Here, there are separate, intra-company anti-stacking clause[s]. The Colorado Supreme Court has considered language identical to the Two or More Cars Insured clause presently at issue to be anti-stacking clauses that were unambiguous according to existing precedent in this jurisdiction. Roberts v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 144 P.3d 546, 551 (Colo.2006) (discussing the clauses' conspicuousness). Thus, the policy's statement, The total limit of our liability under all policies issued to you by us shall not exceed the highest limit of liability under any one policy, serves as an enforceable anti-stacking clause. Plaintiffs contend that the concluding sentence, [W]hen this policy insures two or more cars, the coverages apply separately to each car, limits coverage on a vehicle basis. Plaintiffs argue this violates the CAARA requirement that PIP coverage is mandatory when a [person in a class that requires PIP coverage] is injured in an accident with any motor vehicle, irrespective of the insured's occupancy in a particular vehicle at the time of injury. DeHerrera v. Sentry Ins. Co., 30 P.3d 167, 173 (Colo.2001). Plaintiffs' argument misconstrues the Two or More Cars provision. First, the separate application of coverage to each car does not imply that PIP coverage will not be provided according to CAARA requirements. This provision does not state that it is limiting the coverage. Second, the separate application of coverage to each car does not modify the preceding statement. Alternatively, Mr. Reffel contends that the references to our, you, and us preclude application of the anti-stacking provisions to his policies. Mr. Reffel reads the policies to define you as the policyholder named in the declaration and spouse, if living in the same household. Aplt. Br. at 45. This definition omits resident relatives. Mr. Reffel was an eligible injured person under a policy issued to him and a resident relative under policies issued to his father. Resolving this issue is unnecessary, however, because other provisions applicable to Mr. Reffel also prohibit stacking. The Limits of Liability provisionNo matter how many persons are insured, policies or bonds apply, claims made or insured motor vehicles to which this coverage applies, our liability for [PIP] benefits for bodily injury sustained by an eligible injured person in one motor vehicle accident is limited....indicates that American Family's liability is limited to the amount in the schedule of the Endorsement. See Bush v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 101 P.3d 1145, 1147 (Colo.Ct.App. 2004) (Giving the words of this provision their plain meaning, we conclude that, regardless of the number of ... policies that apply to this accident, State Farm's maximum liability ... cannot be more than the liability of the policy with the highest liability limit.); Shean, 934 P.2d at 840 (finding that similar language contains valid anti-stacking and per occurrence limits on liability); but see Estate of Curry ex rel. Bowen v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 101 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (citing Shean for the conclusion that similar language is only a per occurrence limitation on liability and not an anti-stacking provision).