Opinion ID: 6111678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: January 6 Audio Evidence (Ortiz)

Text: In addition to Pena's hearsay-based sufficiency arguments, Ortiz separately contends that the district court erroneously admitted into evidence the full audio from the 15Indeed, because the jury found both Pena and Ortiz guilty, we think it is highly unlikely that the jury convicted the two of them for participating in separate conspiracies with Black, as necessarily required to support their reversible error argument, rather than a singular conspiracy that included at least Pena and Ortiz. We nevertheless address the validity of a conviction based on a conspiracy that included Black below, finding no error. See Part II.C.2, infra. - 26 - January 6 video recording, in which the defendants, R.E., and the unidentified man used racial and misogynistic epithets while discussing crimes unrelated to this case. In Ortiz's view, this bad acts audio evidence was irrelevant to any material issue at trial and was not admissible for any purpose under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Additionally, he asserts that the admission of the audio was highly prejudicial, in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, particularly given the prosecution's closing argument, in which it used the objected-to audio to attack the plausibility of Ortiz's mere-presence defense (that is, he was merely present at the drug transaction). Ortiz's arguments here implicate two separate standards of review. Because he objected to the introduction of this evidence at trial only under Rule 403, and not as other acts evidence under Rule 404(b), we review the district court's Rule 403 ruling for abuse of discretion and his newfound argument under Rule 404(b) for plain error. United States v. Pena-Santo, 809 F.3d 686, 694 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 113 (1st Cir. 2004). We fail to find such error on this issue. [W]here a defendant challenges a district court's admission of [other] bad acts evidence [under Rule 404(b)], the first question for a reviewing court is whether the objected-to evidence 'has special relevance' to the case, by which we mean - 27 - that the objected-to evidence 'is relevant for any purpose apart from showing propensity to commit a crime.' United States v. Habibi, 783 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 217, 229 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (generally prohibiting propensity evidence). In particular, the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically enumerate a number of purposes for which evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act may be used, including 'proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.' Habibi, 783 F.3d at 2 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)); see also United States v. Landry, 631 F.3d 597, 602 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining that Rule 404(b)'s list of permissible purposes is illustrative and not exhaustive). Here, we agree that the post-transaction audio had special relevance by serving at least two purposes permitted by Rule 404(b): rebutting Ortiz's mere-presence defense and demonstrating Ortiz's familiarity with drug transactions. In this objected-to audio, Ortiz admitted to drug dealing, having a runner, and renting cars under other people's names. He also revealed that the unidentified third man in the hotel room was a drug dealer, credibly explaining, in the prosecution's view, why Pena and R.E. completed the deal in the bathroom (to avoid the prying eyes and ears of a potential competitor). Because Ortiz did not personally participate in the bathroom deal, it was - 28 - arguably important that the prosecution rebut any possible inference that Ortiz was merely present or some unknowing participant in a drug deal between Pena and R.E., rather than a member of a drug selling conspiracy. Ortiz's own words, recorded in the objected-to January 6 audio, arguably did just that. Or, put in the language of Rule 404(b), Ortiz's statements, made immediately after and in the same hotel suite in which a substantial drug transaction was occurring, showed that he likely knew the subject that drew these individuals together in that room, and was not present at the drug transaction because of mere accident or mistake. Our inquiry does not stop, however, with a finding that the objected-to audio had the requisite special relevance under Rule 404(b). Habibi, 783 F.3d at 4. A reviewing court must also evaluate the evidence's admissibility under Rule 403, specifically, whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. In doing so, we are mindful that district courts are afforded 'especially wide latitude' in balancing the relative probative and prejudicial values of evidence. Habibi, 783 F.3d at 4 (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2000)). As such, [o]nly rarely -- and in extraordinarily - 29 - compelling circumstances -- will [this Court of Appeals], from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's [midtrial] judgment[s] concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Li, 206 F.3d at 84-85); see also United States v. Burdulis, 753 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that reversal under Rule 403 is appropriate only if the reviewing court is left with a 'definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear error of judgment' (quoting United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 1995))). This is not such a case. Though the objected-to audio certainly had a potential for prejudice, it was also relevant to refuting Ortiz's mere presence defense -- an issue Ortiz's closing put before the jury -- as well as any potential argument that R.E. framed, or had the opportunity to set up, Pena or Ortiz. As such, we are not convinced, on this record and under this standard of review, that the district court erred in its weighing of probative value and unfair prejudice. See United States v. Currier, 836 F.2d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 1987) (That the recording disclosed appellant using expletives and sexually explicit language does not make it unfairly prejudicial.); Li, 206 F.3d at 85 ([T]o be excluded, the evidence must [] not only be prejudicial, but unfairly prejudicial, and must not only outweigh probative value, but substantially outweigh probative value. (emphases in - 30 - original) (citing United States v. Rivera, 83 F.3d 542, 545 (1st Cir. 1996))). We accordingly find no reversible error in the admission of the January 6 video's post-transaction audio.