Opinion ID: 4511274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [4-6] The purpose of a prosecutorial appeal brought under § 29-2315.01 is to provide an authoritative exposition of the law to serve as precedent in future cases.4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2316 (Reissue 2016) limits the relief we can afford, even if the exception taken by the State is sustained.5 A judgment 1 See State v. Thalken, 299 Neb. 857, 911 N.W.2d 562 (2018). 2 See id. 3 State v. Thalken, supra note 1. 4 State v. Larkins, 276 Neb. 603, 755 N.W.2d 813 (2008). 5 See State v. Thalken, supra note 1. - 684 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 of acquittal in the county court “shall not be reversed”6 by either the district court acting as an intermediate appellate court or upon further consideration in an appeal to this court or the Court of Appeals,7 since the defendant has been “placed legally in jeopardy”8 in the trial court. The relief in an appeal by the State under § 29-2316 in such circumstances is limited to determining the law to govern in any similar case that may be pending or that may thereafter arise.9 The Court of Appeals sustained the State’s application in this case as to the error alleged regarding the county court’s issuance of a directed verdict based on its interpretation of criminal trespass statutes and affirmative defenses. We agree that because these are issues of first impression concerning the meaning of §§ 28-520 and 28-522, an authoritative exposition of the law is needed. The district court erred in determining otherwise. [7,8] This exception proceeding addresses the meaning of §§ 28-520 and 28-522 within the context of whether the county court erred by granting Stanko’s motion for a directed verdict. In a criminal case, the court can direct a verdict only when (1) there is a complete failure of evidence to establish an essential element of the crime charged or (2) evidence is so doubtful in character and lacking in probative value that a finding of guilt based on such evidence cannot be sustained.10 In our consideration of a criminal defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the State is entitled to have all its relevant evidence accepted as true, every controverted fact resolved in its favor, and every beneficial inference reasonably deducible from the evidence.11 6 § 29-2316. 7 Id. See, also, State v. Thalken, supra note 1. 8 § 29-2316. 9 See id. 10 State v. Johnson, 298 Neb. 491, 904 N.W.2d 714 (2017). 11 Id. - 685 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 In light of the county court’s comments from the bench before its ruling, the court appeared to grant Stanko’s motion for a directed verdict because it believed that under the affirm­ ative defense to criminal trespass described by § 28-522(2), compliance with “all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in” the premises “at the time open to members of the public,” did not encompass compliance with a “stay away” letter directed toward the defendant. The court also appeared to consider the affirmative defense and the element of “knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged” to be interwoven. We will begin our analysis with the elements of the crime charged. [9] The burden is on the State to prove all essential elements of the crime charged.12 In the charges against Stanko under § 28-520(1)(a), it was the State’s burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stanko (1) entered or secretly remained in a building or occupied structure (2) with knowledge that he was not licensed or privileged to do so.13 The evidence demonstrated that the Subway was located in a building or occupied structure and that Stanko entered that building or occupied structure. Section 28-520 applies to “any building or occupied structure, or any separately secured or occupied portion thereof.” Section 28-520 is not specifically crafted for, but encompasses, buildings or structures hosting business operations open to the public. [10,11] As a general matter, when a business holds a portion of its property open to the public, a person who enters the open area at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner has the implied consent of the owner to enter the premises under a limited privilege.14 Nevertheless, such implied consent can be revoked.15 Business property owners have a common-law right 12 State v. Wright, 235 Neb. 564, 456 N.W.2d 288 (1990). 13 See id. 14 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 151 (2018). See 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 40 (2018). 15 See id. - 686 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 to exclude from their premises those whose actions disrupt the regular and essential operations of the premises or threaten the security of the premises and its occupants.16 Stanko has never contended that Bosselman did not properly exercise its right to exclude him; the evidence at trial was that the exclusion stemmed from an incident of disruptive and threatening behavior. Instead, Stanko asserted in his motion for a directed verdict that the State’s evidence was lacking in sufficient probative value to demonstrate that he entered the Subway “knowing” that the exclusion communicated to him by the “stay away” letter included the Subway. [12] We have never before directly addressed the knowledge element of § 28-520(1)(a). We have said that the meaning of the word “know” or the word “knowingly” in a penal statute varies in the context in which it is used.17 In other contexts, we have synonymized “knowingly” with “willfully” and distinguished it from “accidentally” or “involuntarily,” stating that to commit an act knowingly, the defendant must be aware of what he or she is doing.18 In State v. Almasaudi, we held that the phrase “receives, retains, or disposes of stolen movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen”19 imposes a subjective standard.20 We find that standard likewise applicable to § 28-520(1)(a). Section 28-520 is patterned after § 2.02 of the Model Penal Code.21 The comments to the Model Penal Code explain that the knowledge requirement excludes from criminal liability both the inadvertent trespasser and the trespasser who believes 16 See Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc., 89 N.J. 163, 445 A.2d 370 (1982). 17 See Hancock v. State ex. rel. Real Estate Comm., 213 Neb. 807, 331 N.W.2d 526 (1983). 18 See State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998). 19 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-517 (Reissue 2016) (emphasis supplied). 20 State v. Almasaudi, 282 Neb. 162, 802 N.W.2d 110 (2011). 21 Model Penal Code, § 2.02, 10A U.L.A. 94 (2001). - 687 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 that he has received express or implied permission to enter or remain on the premises.22 The majority of states have statutory provisions adopting the “knowing” language of the Model Penal Code or similar language, which is generally considered to impose a subjective standard.23 Most courts with similar statutes hold that “knowing that he [or she] is not licensed or privileged” establishes a subjective standard knowledge of legal authority or the consent of the person in lawful possession.24 Thus, it is not sufficient for the State to show that a defendant should have known he was not licensed or privileged to enter the dwelling;25 the fact finder must determine whether the facts and circumstances would have caused the particular defendant to “know” the requisite facts.26 [13,14] We agree with the majority of other jurisdictions and find that the plain language of “knowing” in § 28-521(1), in the context of entering any building or occupied structure “knowing that he or she is not licensed or privileged to do so,” imposes a subjective standard focused on the accused’s actual knowledge. That said, knowledge, like intent, may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act.27 In fact, it is seldom capable of direct proof.28 22 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 2.02(2)(b)(i), comment 2 (1985). 23 See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.2(c) (3d ed. 2018). 24 See State v. Dansinger, 521 A.2d 685, 689 (Me. 1987). See, also, State v. Santiago, 218 N.J. Super. 427, 527 A.2d 963 (1986); State v. Bertram, 708 N.W.2d 913 (N.D. 2006); Com. v. Namack, 444 Pa. Super. 9, 663 A.2d 191 (1995); State v. Cram, 184 Vt. 531, 955 A.2d 528 (2008). 25 See, Hancock v. State ex rel. Real Estate Comm., supra note 17; Model Penal Code, supra note 21 § 2.02(7). See, also, State v. Dansinger, supra note 24; State v. Santiago, supra note 24; State v. Bertram, supra note 24; Com. v. Namack, supra note 24; State v. Fanger, 164 Vt. 48, 665 A.2d 36 (1995). 26 See State v. Bernstein, 697 N.W.2d 371 (N.D. App. 2005). 27 State v. Almasaudi, supra note 20. 28 See Callies v. State, 157 Neb. 640, 61 N.W.2d 370 (1953). - 688 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 The “stay away” letter listed Subway on its letterhead as one of Bosselman’s businesses, and Bosselman’s attorney requested in the letter that Stanko “not come onto any of its properties.” The letter referred to the incident in which Stanko was verbally told he was “not welcome” at the Pump & Pantry, which shares the same address and is in the same building as the Subway, with open access through a hallway between the two businesses unless the Subway is closed. Stanko acknowledged to the officer of the police department that he had received the “stay away” letter. The State presented more than sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that Stanko knew he was not licensed or privileged to enter the Subway on the date in question. Thus, a directed verdict for a failure of proof on the elements of the offense charged was inappropriate. [15] Stanko’s motion for a directed verdict was also based on his contention that it was undisputed he had complied with “all lawful conditions imposed on access” and thus was entitled to a directed verdict on the affirmative defense set forth by § 28-522. An affirmative defense is established as a matter of law only if there are no factual issues remaining to be resolved by the trier of fact.29 The propriety of a directed verdict on the affirmative defense set forth by § 28-522(2) depends on statutory interpretation of “complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access.” We have never addressed the meaning of this phrase. The county court appeared to conclude that such conditions encompassed only those imposed upon the public at large to enter an open area at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, and it concluded that because the evidence was undisputed Stanko entered the Subway during normal business hours and was not acting in a disruptive manner, this affirmative defense could be decided as a matter of law. The State asserts in this exception 29 See Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007). See, also, Hill v. State, 261 Ga. 377, 405 S.E.2d 258 (1991). - 689 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 proceeding that “all lawful conditions imposed” includes the condition that a particular person for whom implied consent has been indefinitely and lawfully revoked cannot enter the premises until consent to enter is reinstated. We agree with the State. The affirmative defense found in § 28-522, like § 28-520, derives from the Model Penal Code. The comments to the Model Penal Code explain that the “primary objective of the defense is to exclude criminal prosecution for mere presence of a person in a place where the public generally is invited,” but the affirmative defense would not foreclose prosecution of persons “who become undesirable due to disorderly conduct or other misbehavior [which] itself amounts to another criminal offense.”30 Only a few states have adopted this part of the Model Penal Code.31 One case from one of those states appears at first glance to support the county court’s reading of the statute. In State v. Morse,32 the court held as a matter of law that the defendant should be acquitted of criminal trespass under the “open to the public” affirmative defense, despite the fact that the defendant had been indefinitely evicted from the casino in question for allegedly cheating at blackjack. The defendant had not exhibited cheating or disorderly conduct on the date he was alleged to have trespassed. The court reasoned that, as a place of public business, the casino could lawfully exclude patrons for cause only, and it stated that “fairness mandates that when the patron attempts to return to the casino and acts in accord­ance with all lawful conditions imposed, the patron 30 A.L.I., Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 221.2, comment 2 at 90 (1980). 31 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-110 (West 2012); § 28-522; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-3 (West 2015); 18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3503 (West 2015); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-35-7 (2017); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.52.090 (West 2015). 32 State v. Morse, 276 N.J. Super. 129, 647 A.2d 495 (1994). - 690 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 cannot be excluded, as he is not interfering with any legitimate business interests.”33 But, in State v. Slobin,34 a case from the same jurisdiction also involving blackjack at a casino, the court rejected as dicta any contention that an exclusion by a business open to the public can last for no more than 24 hours. The court then affirmed criminal trespass convictions of patrons who were indefinitely barred from the blackjack table for repeated disorderly conduct, despite the fact that they were not disorderly on the date they were alleged to have trespassed.35 Other courts in jurisdictions with statutes adopting the language of the Model Penal Code have similarly affirmed convictions of criminal trespass when the defendants were lawfully barred from the business premises, despite otherwise behaving reasonably at the time for which they were charged for trespassing.36 [16] We hold that a person entering premises open to the public has not “complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises” pursuant to § 28-522(2) if he or she has been lawfully barred from the premises and the business has not reinstated its implied consent to entry. While a penal statute is to be construed strictly, it is to be given a sensible construction in the context of the object sought to be accomplished, the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied, and the purpose sought to be served.37 And in the absence of anything indicating otherwise, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.38 33 Id. at 134, 647 A.2d at 497. 34 State v. Slobin, 294 N.J. Super. 154, 682 A.2d 1205 (1996). 35 Id. 36 See, Com. v. White, 342 Pa. Super. 1, 492 A.2d 32 (1985); State v. Finley, 97 Wash. App. 129, 982 P.2d 681 (1999). See, also, Alexis v. McDonald’s Restaurants of Massachusetts, 67 F.3d 341 (1st Cir. 1995). 37 In re Interest of W.D., 232 Neb. 581, 441 N.W.2d 608 (1989). 38 Id. - 691 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 Unlike that portion of § 28-522(2) describing the element that “[t]he premises were at the time open to members of the public,” § 28-522(2) does not limit “all lawful conditions imposed” to those imposed on “members of the public.” Rather, § 28-522(2) designates that “the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the plain language of § 28-522(2) encompasses conditions specific to a specific patron, and we will not read into the statute “all lawful conditions imposed [on the general public].” It is not sensible to conclude that the Legislature wished to shield lawfully barred former business patrons from criminal trespass liability so long as they comply with the conditions of the limited privilege granted by the business to the public at large. The county court was correct that “one of the elements is knowing that one is not licensed or privileged to do so presupposes the defense,” inasmuch as the “open to the public” affirmative defense is one of privilege and negates the unlawful entry element of criminal trespass.39 The county court was incorrect, however, in its understanding of what “all lawful conditions” under the “open to the public” affirmative defense entails. Under the facts presented, there was no legal basis for granting a directed verdict in Stanko’s favor. The State presented evidence from which the trier of fact could have determined that Stanko was lawfully barred from the Subway, knew he was barred from the Subway, and did not comply with the condition that he not enter the Subway until his privilege was reinstated. Stanko’s acquittal stands, pursuant to the limits of relief we can afford under a prosecutorial appeal brought under § 29-2315.01, but the State’s exception is sustained. When the business revokes and has not reinstated its limited implied privilege to enter at a reasonable time and in a reasonable 39 See State v. R.H., 86 Wash. App. 807, 939 P.2d 217 (1997). - 692 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. STANKO Cite as 304 Neb. 675 manner, the defendant has not complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or remaining in the premises, for purposes of the “open to the public” affirmative defense set forth in § 28-522.