Opinion ID: 64501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Objections to Special Agent Sepeda's Testimony

Text: Admission of evidence, including summaries and summary testimony, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir.2006). Even if the district court errs in its evidentiary ruling, the error can be excused if it was harmless. United States v. Hart, 295 F.3d 451, 454 (5th Cir.2002). A nonconstitutional trial error is harmless unless it had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to proffer demonstrative exhibits 65, 67, and 69. [A]llowing the use of charts as `pedagogical' devices intended to present the government's version of the case is within the bounds of the trial court's discretion to control the presentation of evidence under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 611(a). Harms, 442 F.3d at 375 (quotation omitted and emphasis added). [S]uch charts are not admitted into evidence and should not go to the jury room absent consent of the parties. Id. (quotation omitted). If a summary or chart is introduced solely as a pedagogical device, the court should instruct the jury that the chart or summary is not to be considered as evidence, but only as an aid in evaluating evidence. Id. (citation omitted). Demonstrative exhibits 65, 67, and 69 accurately reflected Sepeda's opinion testimony regarding those purchases that he regarded as personal. Summary charts premised on the Government's assumptions are permissible as long as supporting evidence has been presented to the jury, and the jury is instructed that it must determine what weight the evidence should be given. United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 442 (5th Cir.1984). In this case, demonstrative exhibits 65, 67, and 69 did not allow the Government to assume that which it was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt as operative facts of the alleged offense. Cf. United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 316 (5th Cir.2000). Rather, Sepeda's conclusions regarding whether a given purchase was personal was based on his multi-factor test, Ollison's admissions, his search of Ollison's residence, and his review of the receipts. Cf. Hart, 295 F.3d at 456 (holding that there was a total absence of any independent testimony to support [the witness's] assumptions in preparing [the demonstrative exhibits]). Furthermore, the district court instructed the jury that [e]xhibits 65, 67, and 69 were demonstrative aids only and that [t]he evidence relevant to expenditures regarding the P-Card are Exhibits 8, 9, 10, and 11, which have previously been admitted into evidence. [7]
Sepeda testified as a summary witness and referred to several demonstrative exhibits during his testimony. For complex cases, we have allowed summary witnesses in a limited capacity. United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 413 (5th Cir.2003). After reviewing Sepeda's testimony, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Sepeda's summary testimony. The evidence presented was voluminous and presented an appreciable degree of complexity. See Harms, 442 F.3d at 376. Sepeda's summary testimony was supported by the evidence, and we are not persuaded that it implicates the concerns that we have previously expressed about the improper use of summary testimony. See Fullwood, 342 F.3d at 413-14.
Sepeda gave opinion testimony as a lay witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, not as an expert witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 701 states: If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. [T]he distinction between lay and expert witness testimony is that lay testimony results from a process of reasoning familiar in everyday life, while expert testimony results from a process of reasoning which can be mastered only by specialists in the field. United States v. Yanez Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotations omitted). The Government argues that Sepeda's testimony regarding Ollison's admissions and his search of her residence was merely descriptive, and his opinion testimony regarding whether the purchases were personal was based on his common-sense application of various factors that any lay person would consider relevant. We need not decide whether Sepeda's testimony exceeded the bounds of permissible lay opinion testimony because the error, if any, was harmless. Id. at 200-01. Sepeda was qualified to testify as an expert, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that his opinion testimony, whether lay or expert, would assist the jury in evaluating the evidence.