Opinion ID: 2363417
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Recordation on Life of Judgment

Text: The life of recorded and unrecorded judgments is equal: twelve years from when execution might first have issued. See D.C.Code 1973, § 15-101. The appellee contends that § 15-101 does not govern the appellant's judgment, which, on the record before us, is unrecorded. Instead, the appellee urges, the life of an unrecorded judgment is prescribed by § 15-302: three years. Section 15-302 has been quoted infra at p. 945. Section 15-101 reads as follows: Enforceable period of judgments; expiration (a) . . . [E]very final judgment or final decree for the payment of money rendered in the: (1) United States District Court for the District of Columbia; or (2) Superior Court of the District of Columbia, when filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia, is enforceable, by execution issued thereon, for the period of twelve years only from the date when an execution might first be issued thereon, or from the date of the last order of revival thereof. The time during which the judgment creditor is stayed from enforcing the judgment, by written agreement filed in the case, or other order, or by the operation of an appeal, may not be computed as a part of the period within which the judgment is enforceable by execution. An examination of § 15-302 in juxtaposition with a repealed section of the code leads to the conclusion that § 15-302 does not govern the life of unrecorded judgments. Furthermore, while by its terms § 15-101 appears to apply only to judgments of the two specified courts which are filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds, when viewed in the context of the evolution of § 15-101 and certain related sections of the code and their legislative history, § 15-101 is a firm indicator that the life of an unrecorded judgment is also twelve years.
The earliest statutory forerunner of § 15-101 provided for judgments of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court and other trial courts, which later became the District of Columbia Superior Court, to be docketed in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which later became the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Under § 1212 of the 1901 District Code, these judgments, when docketed, were enforceable for twelve years. [26] The same section provided that a judgment of a justice of the peace was on equal footing with a Supreme Court judgment when certified to and docketed in the clerk's office of said Supreme Court. D.C. Code 1901, § 1212. Thus, the Supreme Court judgments were not required to be recorded, and the justice court judgments were recorded or docketed in the Supreme Court. The Juvenile Court of the District, which rendered the 1965 judgment ordering the support payments, was established by Congress in 1906. [27] As of the time the support payments were ordered, it stood in somewhat the same position vis-a-vis the United States District Court for the District of Columbia as had the justices of the peace vis-a-vis the Supreme Court. D.C.Code 1961, § 11-959 provided: The Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia is hereby empowered after such notice and hearing to reduce to judgment the arrears under any order hereafter entered for the support and maintenance of a child born out of wedlock, or any amounts ordered to be paid by the defendant under this subchapter; and when docketed in the clerk's office of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia such judgment shall have the same force and effect as judgments of the United States Court for the District of Columbia and execution thereon may be affected in the same manner as upon judgments of the said district court. So far as the record reveals, however, no judgment for arrearages was ever entered and therefore none was available for docketing in the District Court. Although one may query concerning the effect of docketing the support order in the District Court and the result of not having done so, the issue need not be decided here. [28] The point to be noted is that a Juvenile Court judgment was not on equal footing with a District Court judgment until it had been docketed in the District Court. Congress' enactment of a six-year life for unrecorded judgments of the predecessors of the Superior Court indicates that the three-year period of § 15-302 does not govern the life of unrecorded judgments. The Municipal Court succeeded the justices of the peace, [29] and was in turn succeeded by the Court of General Sessions. [30] At the time the support order was rendered, the Court of General Sessions occupied a position analogous to the Juvenile Court insofar as the docketing of judgments was concerned. In 1965, when the support judgment was entered, the following code provision was in effect: A judgment entered by the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions shall remain in force for only six years, unless it is docketed in the office of the clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Upon being so docketed, the judgment has the same force and effect for all purposes as if it were a judgment of the District Court, and, until it is so docketed, it does not become a lien upon any real property in the District. [31] Docketing a judgment of the Court of General Sessions was designed to extend the life of the judgment and to create a lien. [32] Docketing judgments of the Juvenile Court in the District Court appears to have been designed for the same purpose. Section 15-132 also established a time period different for unrecorded judgments than for recorded judgments, when read in conjunction with D.C.Code 1966 Supp., § 15-101 (twelve-year life for recorded judgments). Both periods were different than the three-year period governing the issuance of a writ of execution, [33] and were identical to the period during which a writ of attachment would issue in aid of execution. [34] Thus, as of the time the support order was entered, the life of an unrecorded judgment of the Juvenile Court was governed by a six-year period rather than, as the appellee now claims, by the three-year period governing the issuance of writs of execution. There is no indication that Congress, subsequent to the time the support order was entered, intended the § 15-302 three-year period to govern the life of unrecorded judgments. Indeed, a reading of the legislative history concerning the 1971 repeal of the six-year provision would indicate the contrary.
The evolution of § 15-101, in conjunction with the statute repealing the six-year period, indicates that the life of an unrecorded judgment is twelve years. Accordingly, we hold that the repealing act extended, from six years to twelve years, the life of any recorded judgment which, at the effective date of the act, had not expired under the six-year rule. The legislative history of the bill repealing the six-year period governing the life of unrecorded judgments indicates that Congress intended the life of all judgments of the Superior Court and the District Court, whether recorded or unrecorded, to be twelve years in length. [35] Congress repealed the provision relating to the life of an unrecorded judgment by the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970. [36] The House Report [37] states that the relevant section of the 1970 Act applies the same provisions for enforcement of judgments to both Federal and local courts in the District and repeals the separate provisions relating to the local courts. [38] As shown in the following paragraphs, the life of a judgment of the District Court and its predecessor has always been twelve years, regardless of whether the judgment was or was not recorded. Through 1967, life of a judgment of the United States District Court and its predecessor clearly was twelve years from when execution might first be issued thereon, regardless of recordation. At the formation of the District of Columbia, the life of all judgments was twelve years, as provided for by chapter 23 of the 1715 Maryland Act. [39] The Maryland Act provided, [That] no bill, bond, [or] judgment . . . shall be good and pleadable, or admitted in evidence. . . after . . . the . . thing in action [has been] above twelve years' standing. [40] As mentioned above, the 1901 District code applied the twelve-year rule particularly to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, which preceded the United States District Court: Sec. 1212. Limitations.  Every final judgment at common law and every final decree in equity for the payment of money rendered in the supreme court of the District, and every judgment of a justice of the peace certified to and docketed in the clerk's office of the said supreme court, as herein elsewhere directed, shall be good and enforceable, by an execution issued thereon, for the period of twelve years only from the date when an execution might first be issued thereon, or from the date of the last revival thereof under fieri facias, except as provided in the next section; but the time during which the judgment creditor is stayed by agreement in writing filed in the cause, or injunction, or other order, or by the operation of an appeal from enforcing the judgment is not to be computed as part of said period of twelve years. By 1967, the statute had been amended to reflect the evolution of the justice courts into the Court of General Sessions, and the Supreme Court into the United States District Court. The place for docketing the local court judgments had changed from the United States District Court to the office of the Recorder of Deeds. The section had been renumbered and read as follows: § 15-101. Enforceable period of judgments; expiration (a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, every final judgment or final decree for the payment of money rendered in this: (1) United States District Court for the District of Columbia; or (2) civil division of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, when filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia  is enforceable, by an execution issued thereon, for the period of twelve years only from the date when an execution might first be issued thereon, or from the date of the last order of revival thereof. The time during which the judgment creditor is stayed from enforcing the judgment, by written agreement filed in the case, or other order, or by the operation of an appeal, may not be computed as a part of the period within which the judgment is enforceable by execution. The clause referring to recordation applied only to the local court, as had been the case since the 1901 code. Only the life of a judgment of a local court was affected by recordation; the life of the District Court judgment was always twelve years. In 1968, Congress amended the District code [t]o provide that a judgment or decree at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall not constitute a lien until filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia. [41] Theretofore, judgments of the local courts became liens only when docketed in the District Court (or its predecessor) or after 1966, recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds. [42] As of 1967, one searching for a lien was obliged to search in the Recorder's office and the District Court Clerk's office. By the 1968 act, Congress specified a single office for all recordings: the office of the Recorder of Deeds. [43] Congress thereby placed the judgments of federal and local courts on equal footing, so far as their effect as liens on land were concerned. [44] Recordation or docketing has not been required, prior to execution on personal property. [45] As to executing on real property, recordation was made a prerequisite to execution on realty for the District Court as well as the Court of General Sessions. [46] Section 15-101 was amended to read thus: (a) Except as provided by subsection (b) of this section, every final judgment or final decree for the payment of money rendered in the  (1) United States District Court for the District of Columbia; or (2) District of Columbia Court of General Sessions  when filed and recorded in the office of the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia, is enforceable, by execution issued thereon, for the period of twelve years only from the date when an execution might first be issued thereon, or from the date of the last order of revival thereof. [Remainder of text unchanged by 1968 amendment.][ [47] ] The clause of § 15-101 referring to recordation was made applicable to the federal court, whereas before it had been applicable only to the District of Columbia court, as was intended. Inadvertently, however, the amendment reworded the code to imply that unless a District Court judgment was recorded with the office of the Recorder of Deeds it was not valid for the twelve-year period. This implication was not intended by Congress and we hold that no such limitation was placed on the life of a District Court judgment by the 1968 act. That the Act of March 11, 1968, did not limit the life of unrecorded District Court judgments is demonstrated by viewing the legislative history of the act. It is devoid of reference to altering the life of an unrecorded District Court judgment. [48] By contrast, the history is replete with references inferring that the sole purpose of the statute was to make the recording requirements for the local and federal court uniform for lien purposes. [49] Thus, the 1968 act, which seemingly altered specified differing periods of life for recorded and unrecorded judgments of the District Court, did not effect the life of judgments. Therefore, the twelve-year life prescription regarding a federal court judgment, which clearly existed from the formation of the District through 1967, continues in force today. It follows that when Congress repealed the six-year life of unrecorded local court judgments by the 1970 Court Reform Act, intending to confer upon the local court judgments the same longevity as the judgments of the federal courts had theretofore enjoyed, Congress prescribed a twelve-year period for the life of all judgments rendered by trial courts sitting within the District of Columbia. Accordingly, the recordation of the original support payment order, or the judgments which came into existence as unpaid amounts fell due, has no effect upon their lives so far as we are here concerned. [50]