Opinion ID: 1826951
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Mental Health Defenses

Text: Evans claims that trial counsel was ineffective in investigating the mental state defenses of insanity and voluntary intoxication and for failing to give vital information to the mental health experts. The mental health information that Evans claims was withheld includes the pretrial depositions of Quinn and Francis, in which they describe Evans' behavior and consumption of alcohol and drugs on the night of the crime, and some letters and correspondence from Evans, in which he exhibits strange communication. In denying relief on this claim, the trial court noted that numerous mental health evaluations had been conducted in this case. The court also outlined defense counsel's investigation of the mental health issues and the presentation of this evidence at the penalty phase. The court concluded that Evans waived his right to proceed with a guilt-phase mental status defense when he instructed counsel not to prepare one, and it is not reasonable for him to . . . complain now that counsel's performance was deficient for complying with his instruction. We agree. Evans' competency to stand trial was litigated extensively prior to trial. On two occasions, the trial court concluded that Evans was not competent to proceed with trial and had him hospitalized. Evans, 800 So.2d at 188. During the final competency determination, three experts offered conflicting evaluations, with two opining that Evans was competent to stand trial and one concluding that he was not competent. Id. On appeal, this Court found no error in the trial court's conclusion that Evans was competent to stand trial. Id. at 187-88. While counsel did not present either an insanity or voluntary intoxication defense during the guilt phase of trial, there is record evidence that counsel investigated and pursued these defenses. This investigation is memorialized in counsel's correspondence with Evans, in which counsel explained that both insanity and voluntary intoxication were viable defenses. However, Evans refused to pursue these defenses, maintained that he was not present at the crime, and instructed counsel to pursue an alibi defense. In fact, despite counsel's advice that Evans not testify at trial and the fact that numerous witnesses testified about Evans' participation in the crime, Evans testified at trial that he was not present at the crime scene, had never been in Wright's apartment, was only an acquaintance of Wright and Francis, and did not know Ward at all. At the penalty phase, the three mental health experts who had evaluated Evans testified about his mental state. Two of the experts opined that Evans suffers from bipolar disorder. Both of these experts examined Evans on numerous occasions and reviewed a number of documents, including the depositions of the codefendants and the witnesses who described strange behavior by Evans and his use of alcohol and drugs on the night of the crime. The third expert concluded that Evans suffers from a rare form of paranoid schizophrenia. He classified Evans as a dissembler, a person who is psychotic and insane, yet tries hard to appear sane and has delusions about being sane. This third expert had also opined that Evans was not competent to stand trial. At the Spencer hearing, Evans waived the presentation of any additional mitigating evidence and asked the court to follow the jury's recommendation and impose a death sentence. In accordance with the procedures in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.2d 246, 250 (Fla.1993), defense counsel profferred additional mental health evidence, including the mental health reports from the appointed experts, depositions from codefendants, and letters to the court from family and friends. Based on the evidence presented at trial and proffered at the Spencer hearing, the trial court found the statutory mental mitigators of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, which was given substantial weight, and substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law, which was given some weight. On appeal, this Court found that the trial court gave proper weight to the impaired capacity mitigating factor based on the extensive record evidence that Evans' mental impairment did not impede his ability to appreciate the criminality of his actions. Evans, 800 So.2d at 196. At the postconviction evidentiary hearing, the third mental health expert testified that trial counsel only provided him with the depositions of codefendants Quinn and Francis one week before trial and never gave him copies of the strange correspondence from Evans. The expert admitted, however, that this information did not change his pretrial diagnosis that Evans was not competent to stand trial. Francis offered essentially the same testimony at the evidentiary hearing as he did at trial, i.e., Evans was drinking, smoking pot, and acting weird on the night of the murder. Quinn's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was similar and was cumulative to that presented through the testimony of Francis and Ward at trial. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that Evans was adamant that she not pursue an insanity or mental state defense. Counsel nonetheless consulted with the appointed mental health experts and other mental experts to investigate possible defenses and mitigating circumstances. We agree with the trial court that counsel's performance was not deficient on this issue. With respect to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, the Supreme Court observed in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), that  Strickland does not require counsel to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing. Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case. Rather, in deciding whether trial counsel exercised reasonable professional judgment with regard to the investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence, a reviewing court must focus on whether the investigation resulting in counsel's decision not to introduce certain mitigation evidence was itself reasonable. Id. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This is not a case where counsel conducted no investigation or presented no mitigating evidence. See Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 572 (Fla.1996) (concluding that defendant was entitled to relief in case where trial court found no mitigating circumstances and counsel made practically no investigation of mitigation and presented little mitigation evidence in the sentencing proceedings despite the existence of substantial evidence that would have been revealed by reasonable investigation); Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So.2d 1321, 1326 (Fla.1994) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel during penalty phase where counsel made no attempt to investigate family history and background and admitted that he had no strategic reason for failing to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase). In fact, the record in this case shows extensive investigation and evaluation of Evans' mental health status. The record also shows a very uncooperative client who absolutely refused to let counsel present a mental status defense. The mental health experts opined that Evans was competent to proceed to trial; the judge made a finding of competency to stand trial; and this Court affirmed that ruling on appeal. Thus, Evans had the right to control his defense after being informed by counsel about his options and the risks. Evans chose not to pursue a mental status defense. He is not entitled to postconviction relief because his choice was not an effective one.