Opinion ID: 2062958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: errors

Text: Over defense objections, during presentation of the State's evidence in chief, the State was permitted to introduce Exhibit No. 13, a photograph of the defendant. As contended by the State, it was not a typical mug shot, but it had been obtained from the Fulton County Sheriff's Department, had not been taken in conjunction with his arrest for the crime for which he was on trial, was readily identifiable as a police record and was placed in evidence without any attempt to obscure the objectionable identifiable data. It was a plain, black and white, full face view photograph with no numerals exhibited on the face. On the reverse side, however, which was in no way obscured, the following appeared: Property FCSD Taken 9-12-76 Rickey A. Miller 4-26-52 DOB XXX-XX-XXXX SS Identified in picture line up by /S/ ______ ________ (prosecutrix) The exhibit was identified by Jeannette as a photograph of the defendant which she had selected from a photographic array at the Bourbon Police Department a few days after the incident. She had previously identified him at the trial, and it had been admitted in defense counsel's opening statement that he admitted the act of intercourse and that his defense was consent. Following identification of the exhibit, but before its introduction into evidence, counsel asked her if it reflected the appearance of the defendant as he appeared at the time of the alleged rape, and she replied, Similar. Q. All Right. In what way is it similar? A. I just know that that's his face. In response to a defense objection that the exhibit was a mug shot and therefore prejudicial and further of no evidential value since identification was not in issue, the prosecutor stated that its purpose was to reflect that the exhibit more closely resembled his appearance on the night of the incident than did his current appearance. The Exhibit was admitted and passed among the jurors. It was clearly identifiable as a photograph taken from police files and evidenced that the defendant had had involvement with the police prior to the incident for which he stood charged. Our standard of review for police file photographs admitted at trial, which had been taken in connection with a different charge, requires the State to prove that the photograph in question is not unduly prejudicial and that it has substantial evidential value independent of other evidence, Lawrence v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 236, 238. The State's contention that the exhibit was offered to evidence Defendant's changed appearance is simply not borne out by the witness' testimony. Further, we are at a loss to see how a change in appearance, if it did in fact exist, was relevant, inasmuch as there was simply no issue of identification. The evidence was clearly irrelevant and had a substantial potential for prejudice, under the circumstances of this case. Its admission was error. Over a proper objection that such testimony was irrelevant and would reveal other criminal activity that would prejudice him, Jeannette was permitted to relate that during the afternoon visit preceding the incident, the defendant had told her of having gone to California to avoid prosecution on two charges of assault and battery, one of which involved his wife. We agree that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Generally, evidence of criminal activity, other than that charged, is inadmissible on the question of guilt. However, such evidence may be admitted to show intent, motive, purpose, identification, or common scheme or plan. Cobbs v. State, (1975) 264 Ind. 60, 62, 338 N.E.2d 632, 633. Even if the evidence is relevant to one of these issues, it may be excluded if it misleads the jury or serves no other purpose than to prejudice the defendant in the mind of the jury. Id. at 62 n. 1, 338 N.E.2d at 633 n. 1 (cases cited therein); Lawrence v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 306, 310, 286 N.E.2d 830, 832. The State contends that the evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and asserts that knowledge that the defendant assaulted his wife would naturally have placed Jeannette in fear and that the reference to the assault was    only an incidental burden which was minimized by the prosecutor's severely limiting his inquiry into this area. Despite the limited inquiry, the effect of that inquiry most certainly was not overlooked by the State in its closing argument: Does that ring a bell with you? That trip to California. You remember any conversation that Jeanette related about the things that Ricky had told her that afternoon about why he had gone to California? What it was that had prompted that trip. In Meeks v. State, (1968) 249 Ind. 659, 234 N.E.2d 629, we reversed a conviction for rape where a witness testified over objection that the defendant had had carnal knowledge of her by force approximately thirty-five (35) days prior to the offense charged. We quoted approvingly from Lovely v. United States, (4th Cir.1948) 169 F.2d 386, 390 as follows: Until the accused admitted the intercourse with the prosecutrix, the issue in the case was two fold, whether he had had carnal knowledge of her, and if so, whether it was forcibly and against her will. After he admitted the intercourse, there was only the issue of consent. At no time was there any question of assault with intent. The accused was either guilty of rape or not guilty; and his case should not have been prejudiced by evidence of a crime committed against another woman, on the theory that it might show the intent of an assault not accompanied by rape, when no one contended that any such assault had occurred. We stated further that: An individual on trial for a sexual offense should be afforded the same evidentiary safeguards against irrelevant prejudicial testimony as an individual on trial for another felony. 249 Ind. at 664, 234 N.E.2d at 632. We have stated that Meeks stands for the proposition    that evidence of prior crimes is inadmissible in rape cases where the act charged has been proved or admitted and the only issue concerns the consent of the prosecutrix. Woods v. State, (1968) 250 Ind. 132, 143, 235 N.E.2d 479, 486. In subsequent cases we limited the holding in Meeks to rape prosecutions in which the defendant interposed a defense of consent. Austin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 529, 531, 319 N.E.2d 130, 132, cert. denied, (1975) 421 U.S. 1012, 95 S.Ct. 2417, 44 L.Ed.2d 680; Miller v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 296, 299, 268 N.E.2d 299, 301; Kerlin v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 420, 424-25, 265 N.E.2d 22, 25. See Merry v. State, (1975) 166 Ind. App. 199, 219-20, 335 N.E.2d 249, 261-62. Even if we were to relax the rule of Meeks, the State has not convinced us that the defendant's prior activity was relevant to the issue of consent. See Montgomery v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 793, 795-96 (rape and kidnapping convictions reversed where fourteen year old witness related instance of consensual sexual intercourse between herself and Defendant that occurred six weeks prior to the offense charged); Duvose v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 450, 275 N.E.2d 536 (rape and kidnapping convictions reversed where no showing of relevance of police officer's statement that the defendant raped two other women in Pennsylvania); Burns v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 1, 7-8, 260 N.E.2d 559, 562-63 (involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide convictions reversed where no showing of relevance of record containing defendant's prior instances of drunk driving and reckless driving). In the case before us, the only issue that the jury was to determine was whether or not the defendant used force or the threat of force to induce the prosecutrix to have sexual intercourse with him. In view of her testimony that he placed a knife forcefully against her throat, twisted her arm behind her back and threw her to the kitchen floor, we do not believe, as the State would have us to do, that the jury could have believed that her fear was induced by the story that he had casually related to her some six hours earlier. It is clear to us that the police file photograph and the evidence of Defendant's prior brush with the law was offered for the purpose of tarnishing his image in a case that hinged entirely upon his credibility. It also appears likely that such improper evidence had its desired effect. We cannot permit such a conviction to stand. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial. GIVAN, C.J., and HUNTER, J., concur. DeBRULER, J., dissents with opinion in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs.