Opinion ID: 2633536
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: intent to abandon

Text: ¶ 15 The central question in this case is whether Ms. Heg or any of her predecessors in interest ever intended to abandon the disputed easement. Concluding the trier of fact could find Ms. Heg or her predecessors intended to abandon the easement, the Court of Appeals focused on two facts: the existence of a roadway providing both Parcels A and B with alternate means of access to Smugglers Cove Road, and the existence of a road-cut put in place by Thomas, which created a four- to six-foot barrier to automobile access between Ms. Heg's parcels and the easement area. Relying on Barnhart v. Gold Run, Inc. 68 Wash.App. 417, 843 P.2d 545 (1993) for the proposition that [n]onuse of a platted but never opened easement coupled with long term use of a substitute way will also support a finding of abandonment, Heg, 124 Wash.App. at 308, 99 P.3d 914, the Court of Appeals reasoned Ms. Heg's continued use of alternative means of ingress and egress could support a finding of abandonment. ¶ 16 In Barnhart three neighboring lots shared a common platted 30-foot right of way for a private road adjacent to the northern perimeter of the tracts. In the 1940s, the three lots came into ownership of Mrs. Marie Harris, who built a jeep road north of the platted right of way, having already built a house encroaching on it. The Barnharts purchased the easternmost of the three lots, and after having it surveyed, commenced an action to determine their interest in the platted right of way. The trial court ruled the defendant had acquired title to the platted right of way through adverse possession. ¶ 17 The Barnharts appealed, and Division Three affirmed the trial court, holding that [t]he undisputed evidence supports a finding the location of the platted road right of way shifted to the existing road, due to a long period of use which predated the parties' ownership. Barnhart, 68 Wash.App. at 420-21, 843 P.2d 545 (emphasis added). In Barnhart, Division Three relied on another case involving a roadway built outside of the platted location, Curtis v. Zuck, 65 Wash. App. 377, 829 P.2d 187 (1992). ¶ 18 In Curtis, a gravel road was built north of the platted street location. Plaintiffs bought property north of the platted street, defendants bought the property to the south. Defendants built a home encroaching on the platted street, having been advised the gravel road marked the northern boundary of their land. The trial court refused to eject the defendants from the platted street or to quiet the plaintiffs' title to the portion of their land encroached upon by the gravel road. The appellate court affirmed, accepting defendants' argument that the private easement they share[d] with the [plaintiffs] ha[d] simply shifted due to a period of long use which predate[d] both parties' ownership. Curtis, 65 Wash.App. at 382, 829 P.2d 187. ¶ 19 Barnhart distinguished Burkhard v. Bowen, 32 Wash.2d 613, 203 P.2d 361 (1949) and Van Buren v. Trumbull, 92 Wash. 691, 159 P. 891 (1916) which upheld the rights of owners of unopened easements against adverse possession challenges, reasoning that whereas Burkhard and Van Buren attempted to extinguish the private easements of adjoining landowners by affirmatively excluding them from their right to use the platted alley or street, in Curtis there was no such attempt. Barnhart, 68 Wash.App. at 422, 843 P.2d 545 (emphasis added). ¶ 20 Ms. Heg asserts the Court of Appeals misapplied Barnhart because the building of both her alternate access road and the road cut predate the creation of the easement. According to Ms. Heg, she and her predecessors did not elect to ignore an existing easement when building the alternate access road because the easement did not exist until 1957. Similarly, Ms. Heg argues the existence of the road cut does not constitute evidence of intent to abandon because when it was created the easement did not exist. The Alldredges counter the instant case is similar to Barnhart because a court may find that abandonment of an easement has occurred if the original location of an easement was not used for its intended purpose, the easement area was used for other purposes, and because a substitute easement was created in a different location. [7] ¶ 21 The Alldredges' reliance on Barnhart is misplaced. Unlike the defendant in Barnhart, the Alldredges seek to exclude Ms. Heg from using her recorded easement rights, not merely alter the location where they exist. Attempted exclusion from enjoying easement rights is precisely why the Barnhart court distinguished both Burkhard and Van Buren, and why Barnhart is inapplicable in this case. Ms. Heg's driveway over Parcel A is unlike the jeep road in that case because it was not created as a result of confusion over the precise location of the easement, but rather as a separate accommodation which predates the creation of the easement. ¶ 22 The other asserted evidence of abandonment, the existence of a road cut between Parcel B and the easement, is similarly unavailing. The Court of Appeals cited Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Tacoma Junk Co., 138 Wash. 1, 244 P. 117 (1926) for the proposition the erection of a barrier rendering use of a right of way impossible or impractical will support a finding of abandonment. Heg, 124 Wash.App. at 307, 99 P.3d 914. However Northern Pacific Railway Co. is readily distinguishable from the instant case because its holding hinged on the conditions for abandonment specified in the easement, namely the cessation of use of the tract for railway purposes and the removal of the rails, and not on the common law governing abandonment of easements. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 138 Wash. at 5, 244 P. 117. The court reasoned that because [t]he easements ... contained their own terms as to when and how abandonment should be effected the authorities cited by appellants [were] not in point, for they [did] not contain the same terms as those embodied in these easements. Id. The same analysis applies here, and we decline to extend the holding of Northern Pacific Railway Co. where the easement at issue does not include corresponding provisions.