Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mahender Sabhnani's Jury Instruction and Sufficiency Challenges

Text: Mahender Sabhnani raises two claims of error with regard specifically to his convictions. First, he contends that the charge to the jury on aiding and abetting erroneously allowed the jury to convict him on an omissions theory of liability, rather than on any affirmative acts he might have taken to aid and abet his wife's criminal conduct. This error, he contends, infected every count on which he was convicted and requires that all of his convictions be vacated. Second, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions on any of the twelve counts on which the jury convicted him. We disagree with both claims.
The government charged both defendants under the aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2, as well as under the specific substantive statutes at issue. Mahender Sabhnani asserts error in approximately forty words in Judge Spatt's 792-word instruction on aiding and abetting. In particular, he contends that the district court's instruction on willfulness permitted the jury to convict him for failing to act. [11] Because none of the statutes pursuant to which he was charged predicates liability on a failure to act, he argues, and because no common law duty to act is at issue in this case, or was part of the jury charge, this instruction was erroneous, requiring his convictions to be vacated. For the following reasons, we disagree. A defendant challenging a jury instruction as erroneous must show both error and ensuing prejudice, United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 313-14 (2d Cir.2007), and we review the jury instructions de novo ... viewing the charge as a whole, United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 177 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Aina-Marshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2003)). De novo review leads us to [find] error if we conclude that a charge either fails to adequately inform the jury of the law, or misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard. Id. (quoting United States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 535 (2d Cir.1997)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We emphatically do not review a jury charge on the basis of excerpts taken out of context, but in its entirety, see United States v. Mitchell, 328 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v. Zvi, 168 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted), to determine whether considered as a whole, the instructions adequately communicated the essential ideas to the jury. United States v. Tran, 519 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 413-14 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) ([A] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.). At the start, we find dubious the government's claims that aiding and abetting liability may generally be predicated upon a failure to act unconnected to any legal duty to do so, that the statutes at issue created an affirmative duty to act, or that Mahender Sabhnani was properly found by the jury to have violated a common law duty that required him to act. It is a long-established principle that criminal law generally regulates action, rather than omission, and that [f]or criminal liability to be based upon a failure to act it must first be found that there is a duty to act  a legal duty and not simply a moral duty. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.2 (2d ed.2008). [12] This general principle, that omissions may serve as the basis of criminal liability only if there is an affirmative duty to act, is equally applicable when the crime charged is aiding and abetting. See United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 23 (2d Cir.1990) (To convict a defendant on a theory of aiding and abetting, the government must prove that the underlying crime was committed by a person other than the defendant and that the defendant acted, or failed to act in a way that the law required him to act, with the specific purpose of bringing about the underlying crime.). Here, none of the statutes pursuant to which Mahender was convicted expressly impose an affirmative duty to take action, lest a crime be committed. [13] And even assuming, arguendo, that Mahender Sabhnani owed a common law duty to the maids that was sufficiently well established in our legal tradition and practice that it constitutes part of the background common law against which these statutes should be interpreted, see, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 135-36 (2d Cir.2003) (en banc), the jury here was not charged on the nature of this duty nor instructed as to the factors it should consider in determining whether the duty was discharged. See Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307, 310-11 (D.C.Cir.1962) (reversing on plain error review where a jury was not instructed as to the nature of the common law duty that was the basis for omissions liability). We need not decide the question whether in the circumstances of this case Mahender Sabhnani could properly be convicted based upon an omission to act, however, because we reject his claim that the district court's instruction on willfulness, considered in the context of the aiding and abetting instruction as a whole, rendered the instructions so confusing as to permit the jury to convict him on this basis. To be clear, the jury was instructed that participation in a crime is willful if action is taken voluntarily and intentionally, or in the case of a failure to act, with specific intent to fail to do something the law requires. Drawn nearly verbatim from the model jury instruction in the leading treatise on the subject, see 1 Leonard Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions  Criminal, ¶ 11.01, at 11-4 (2008 ed.), this instruction was not inaccurate, however, but simply extraneous to this case  at least absent further instruction as to a legal theory that would support liability based on a failure to act. When a jury charge contains language that could potentially confuse the jury as to the applicable law, we look to see whether the charge as a whole adequately instructed the jury as to the applicable legal standard. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396. Here, the jury was never told that either Mahender or Varsha Sabhnani could be convicted of aiding and abetting based upon a failure to act. Indeed, immediately before the instruction on willfulness, the jury was informed that [i]n order to aid or abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associate herself in some way with the crime and that she or he willfully and knowingly seek by some act to help make the crime succeed. Tr. 5035 (emphasis added). Immediately after the challenged language, the jury was instructed that the mere presence of a defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that a crime is being committed, or the mere acquiescence by a defendant in the criminal conduct of others, even with guilty knowledge, is not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. Tr. 5036. Cf. United States v. Elfgeeh, 515 F.3d 100, 134-35 (2d Cir.2008) (finding it highly unlikely that jury relied on erroneous sentence that was immediately preceded and followed by correct statements of the charge). An aider and abettor, the district court said, must know that the crime is being committed and act in a way which is intended to bring about [its] success. (emphasis added). The repeated emphasis in the instructions on the proposition that an aider and abettor must seek by some act to make the crime succeed was further stressed in the judge's summary of the charge. The district court instructed the jury to ask itself three questions to determine whether a defendant aided or abetted the commission of a crime: Did the defendant participate in the crime charged as something she or he wished to bring about? Did the defendant associate herself or himself with the criminal venture knowingly and willfully? Did the defendant seek by her or his actions to make the criminal venture succeed? Tr. 5036 (emphasis added). If the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did these things, the district court instructed, then the defendant is an aider and abettor and therefore guilty of the offense. But if on the other hand your answers to any one of these series of questions ... is no, Judge Spatt continued, then the defendant is not an aider and abettor and you must find him or her not guilty as to aiding and abetting. Tr. 5036-37. We conclude that the charge's repeated emphasis on the necessity of acting in order to aid and abet, coupled with the crystal clear summary, was sufficient to ameliorate any possible confusion that might conceivably have arisen from the willfulness instruction. See Brown v. Greene, 577 F.3d 107, 111-12 (2d Cir.2009) (collecting cases upholding jury charges containing language that might have created some confusion about the burden of proof, because the charges as a whole made clear that the cases were governed by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 941 (2d Cir.1993) (ambiguous summary of element did not warrant reversal where earlier discussion of element was clear). This was not a case in which the jury instructions were insufficiently detailed as to an essential element of the crime and were never clarified by other language, such that the jury could have convicted based on a legally erroneous theory. See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 129-34 (2d Cir.2008) (instructions that failed to explain to jury that defendant needed to have intent to import particular controlled substance and that other substances referenced in the evidence were not controlled substances left open possibility for jury to convict on importation of other substances that were not illegal). Here, the instructions clarified what was required to convict, and the judge's three-question summary of the charge was perfectly clear, removing the possibility of any confusion on the jury's part. Cf. United States v. Moran, 493 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir.2007) (while instructions might have had minor ambiguity after a careful picking apart of their wording, clear summarizing or overview paragraph that conveys basic point to jury can cure potential error). Mahender Sabhnani makes two arguments in reply. First, he contends that Judge Spatt erroneously believed that he could be convicted for aiding and abetting based solely on his failures to act. To be sure, when counsel objected to the instruction on willfulness during the charging conference, Judge Spatt did overrule the objection, suggesting that the employer of a domestic servant does have an obligation to act when he allows for five years ... beatings, deprivation, lack of food, sleeping on the floor, wearing tattered gowns, [and] hit[s] with a stick to take place in his home. Tr. 4427. Notably, however, in denying Mahender's Rule 29 motion, the judge noted that there was sufficient evidence at the trial to prove that Mahender affirmatively acted with the specific intent to advance the crimes alleged in the indictment. Even more importantly, the jury only heard the instructions, not Judge Spatt's opinion at the charging conference, and our concern on appeal is the effect of jury instructions, not the district court's purpose in stating the jury instructions as it did. Hassan, 578 F.3d at 132. Mahender points next to the government's summation. In his sole reference to the necessary requirements for aiding and abetting, the government attorney stated without objection during the main summation that: You don't have to have actually committed the crime to be an aider and abettor. All that needs to be established is that somebody else committed the crime, and that you knowingly and willfully associated yourself with that other person in some way to help with the crime. Help with the crime. And that can be done by actions, or it can be done by a failure to act. A failure to act with specific intent, to fail to do something the law requires. Tr. 4693. Mahender contends that these words created a not insubstantial risk that the willfulness instruction led the jurors to convict him on an invalid basis. Mahender's Br. 29. Here, however, we have already determined that the jury instructions, read as a whole, clearly apprised the jury of what it was required to find in order to convict. We agree that a party's summation can heighten the already present risk that an erroneous jury instruction may mislead the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Joseph, 542 F.3d 13, 18-19 (2d Cir.2008). But that situation is not this case. The jury instructions, which we presume that jurors follow, see, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 310 (2d Cir.2006), were clear that Mahender could not be convicted solely because he knew of Varsha's crimes or acquiesced in her actions, without acting himself. And to the extent the prosecutor's summation did misstate the applicable law, Mahender raised no objection below and does not press the issue here in those terms. Given our conclusion that the instructions as a whole adequately conveyed to the jury the law it was to apply, we need not and do not address Mahender's argument that the error he alleges was sufficiently prejudicial to taint each of his convictions, including the four separate conspiracy convictions to which the challenged instructions did not apply. We conclude simply that the aiding and abetting instruction, considered as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the necessary and applicable requirements for aiding and abetting, and that Mahender's argument to the contrary is without merit.
Mahender also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for forced labor, peonage, document servitude, and conspiracy to commit these crimes. We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Abdulle, 564 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir.2009). In reviewing a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a defendant's conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences in the government's favor and deferring to the jury's assessments of the witnesses' credibility. United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 225 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 391 (2d Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will sustain the jury's verdict[s] so long as any trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mahender's main contention on appeal is that the trial evidence was insufficient to show he had knowledge that Varsha was threatening or physically abusing the maidsand thus a fortiori that the evidence was inadequate to establish his intent to participate in the crimes of forced labor and peonage, whether as a principal, an aider and abettor, or a conspirator. Mahender does not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for document servitude and conspiracy to commit document servitude, but instead argues that because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his forced labor and peonage convictions, he cannot be guilty of these derivative offenses. For the following reasons, we disagree with these contentions.
With regard to the forced labor charges, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 at the time of the Sabhnanis' convictions prohibited knowingly provid[ing] or obtain[ing] the labor or services of a person by, inter alia, threats of serious harm to, or physical restraint against, that person, by means of any scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if the person did not perform such labor ... that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint, or by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a)(1)-(3) (2000). The jury convicted Mahender of obtaining the labor or services of Samirah and Enung both through threats of serious harm or physical restraint against [them] and through a scheme, plan or pattern intended to cause [them] to believe that non-performance would result in serious harm. Verdict Sheet 2-4. The peonage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a), prohibits hold[ing] or return[ing] any person to a condition of peonage.... To prove peonage, the government must show that the defendant intentionally held a person against his or her will and coerced that person to work in order to satisfy a debt by (1) physical restraint or force, (2) legal coercion, or (3) threats of legal coercion or physical force. United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364, 372 (8th Cir.2009). At the start, the jury had a more than ample basis on which to conclude that Mahender knew of both the threatened and actual maltreatment of Samirah and Enung. [J]urors are entitled, and routinely encouraged, to rely on their common sense and experience in drawing inferences of a defendant's knowledge and his criminal intent. United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir.2008). Here, Samirah and Enung lived and worked in Mahender's homea home from which he also operated his businessfor five and two-and-a-half years, respectively. The jury was entitled to credit the maids' testimony that during this time Mahender witnessed his wife humiliate themwhen, for instance, Enung was required to stand in one place until she confessed to stealing chocolate and Samirah was forced to pick up one by one the tiny pieces of paper that Varsha Sabhnani had just thrown to the ground. There was substantial evidence, moreover, that Mahender observed Samirah eat from the trash and wear rags that were inadequate even to cover her body. Indeed, Enung identified one such rag and confirmed that Mahender, along with the rest of the family, observed Samirah wear it every dayeven after it had been repeatedly cut up and resewn at Varsha's command, every time [Samirah] made [a] mistake. Tr. 3196. Samirah testified that Mahender saw her every day between 2005 and 2007, Tr. 2367a period during which Varsha repeatedly cut Samirah on the face with a knife and, indeed, on one occasion (after a report from her husband) beat Samirah about the face with an umbrella, leaving Samirah's face bleeding and swollen. Tr. 1855-57. Samirah testified that Mahender saw her wearing rags and that he [saw her] face, ... the clothings... [and] all the marks from the beating from missus. I would cry and the mister would look at me. Tr. 2368. Litras, Mahender's employee, did not live in the Sabhnani household and saw the maids only infrequently. Tellingly, however, even apart from the injuries the maids directly showed her in April 2007, she testified to noticing their very messy ... tattered and torn clothing and, on one occasion, blood dripping from Samirah's hairline. Tr. 3860. The jury clearly had more than ample evidence from which to infer Mahender's awareness of the maids' plight. There was also sufficient evidence of Mahender's intent to use Varsha's threats and maltreatment against the maids in order to obtain their labor. Samirah testified that on one occasion when she fell asleep cleaning a bathroom of one of the children, mister told missus that Sami [Samirah] was not washing, but ... was sleeping in the bathroom and Varsha Sabhnani came with something to hit. Tr. 1869. Samirah, afraid, ran away and urinated by the stairs, soiling Mahender's shoes as two of the children cried. Samirah further testified as follows: Q. Did you sometimes get punished for things that you did that the Missus didn't see you do? A. Yes. Yes. The Mister would report to the Missus that I slept in the bathroom upstairs and the Missus would immediately hit me. And another time ... it was during the fasting months for the Muslims. I couldn't fast because I didn't eat inI ate [food] from the garbage, and the Mister saw it, and told the Missus about it, and immediately the Missus got very angry. You again stole the food? And I said I found it in the garbage, and I was hit. Tr. 1848-49. It is of no importance that, as Mahender points out, Samirah testified that he was not present when Varsha hit Samirah for eating the food, nor does it matter whether he was present on the other occasions when she was punished after he reported her misdeeds. The jury was not required, as Mahender contends, to infer that he was acting charitably by reporting the maids' conduct to his wife. On the contrary, the jury was entitled to infer from these incidents and from the other evidence of Mahender's knowledge of abuse that when Mahender reported Samirah's conduct to Varsha, he knew how she would react. Mahender contends that even if there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction for forced labor, his peonage conviction is infirm because there was no direct evidence that he held Samirah and Enung in involuntary servitude in satisfaction of a real or alleged debt. Samirah, Enung, and Samirah's daughter, Lita, testified that Varsha told them repeatedly that if the maids wanted to be returned to Indonesia they would have to reimburse the costs of bringing them to the United States. Enung specifically testified that she did not run away from the Sabhnanis' residence in part because she still owe[d] months of work to Mahender and Varsha. I was very frightened. I didn't dare to go out of the house prior to the debt being paid off. Tr. 3188. Mahender concedes that this testimony, if credited, might be adequate to support his wife's conviction. He contends, however, that it is insufficient to establish his intent to hold the maids in satisfaction of a debt because he was not present during any conversation about repaying money. Mahender's Br. at 58. We disagree that this is the relevant question, and that the evidence was insufficient in any respect. 18 U.S.C. § 1581(a) prohibits the holding of a person in a condition of peonage. Peonage is compulsory service in payment of a debt that can be real or artificially created. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242, 31 S.Ct. 145, 55 L.Ed. 191 (1911); Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86 (5th Cir.1944). Here, the jury was entitled to infer first that Mahender knowingly participated in the creation of an obligation on the maids' part to work. The jury was entitled to infer that the appellants paid for the maids' travel to the United States based not only on the involvement of Varsha Sabhnani's family, but also upon Varsha's statements that this money had to be repaid if the maids were to leave. Samirah testified, for instance, that when she begged to be given away she was told by Varsha that she was brought to the United States in an airplane and that if she was to be given to someone else, that cost would have to be paid back: [T]he missus answered, you think I have money tree? You came here with money. If you had 100 million [rupiahs], I'll give you to someone else. Tr. 1881. Enung also testified that her salary was paid up-front in its entirety, and that Varsha was supposed to be the one paying it. The jury was permitted reasonably to infer that Mahender knew of these payments, and that they evinced an intent to create a debt-like obligation on the maids to work. Cf. Pierce, 146 F.2d at 85-86 (evidence sufficient to support peonage conviction when defendant, among other acts, paid the full fine owed by incarcerated women in exchange for them agreeing to work for him); Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341 (5th Cir.1917) (defendant convicted of peonage paid for victims' transportation to come to work for her). Second, the evidence also sufficiently demonstrated that Mahender, who benefitted from the maids' labor, knew that the maids were being forced to work and that the maids were completely dependent on the Sabhnanis for food, clothing, and shelter, the family's provision of which contributed to the maids' obligated status. Cf. Pierce, 146 F.2d at 85-86 (defendant contributed to victims' indebtedness by buying them clothes and other gifts). Indeed, the record shows that during the summer months when the Sabhnanis departed, neglecting to leave adequate provisions for the maids, it was Mahender who called Litras to put her in touch with his wife, who instructed Litras to obtain foodusually many loaves of breadfor the maids, and to pay for it with petty cash from Mahender's office. [14] From the evidence that Mahender reported on Samirah when she foraged in the garbage for something to eat, the jury was entitled to infer both that Mahender knew the maids were in a condition of abject dependence, and that he both intended and acted to keep them in that state. Under these circumstances, the evidence supported the conclusion that Mahender, having knowingly contributed to the creation of the maids' indebted situation and knowing of their dependence on the family, forced the maids to work through the threat of violence from his wife. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Mahender acted to aid and abet the holding of the maids in satisfaction of their obligations to the Sabhnanis. For substantially the same reasons, we also reject Mahender's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for conspiracy to commit forced labor and peonage. The existence of a criminal agreement between two persons can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180; see also United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir.1964) (Friendly, J. ) (Although it is usual and often necessary in conspiracy cases for the agreement to be proved by inference from acts, the gist of the offense remains the agreement, and it is therefore essential to determine what kind of agreement or understanding existed as to each defendant.); United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir.1996) (A tacit understanding will suffice to show agreement for purposes of a conspiracy conviction. There need not be any written statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates agreement.). As to a defendant's participation, even a single act may be sufficient for an inference of involvement ... if the act is of a nature justifying an inference of knowledge of the broader conspiracy. Huezo, 546 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1112 (2d Cir.1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the evidence is ample that Mahender assisted his wife in bringing the maids to his home, that he did so to benefit from their labor, which he helped to direct, and that, knowing of his wife's threats and punishments, he aided her in meting them out. This evidence provides more than a sufficient basis on which to conclude that there was a tacit understanding between Mahender and Varsha that the maids would be held in involuntary servitude and peonage in the Sabhnanis' home.
As already noted, Mahender does not directly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for document servitude and conspiracy to commit document servitude. Instead, he argues that, because the evidence was insufficient to support his forced labor and peonage convictions, he necessarily cannot be guilty of the derivative offense of document servitude. Mahender's Br. 64. Mahender's argument is based on a fundamental misreading of the document servitude statute. Section 1592 of Title 18 provides that [w]hoever knowingly destroys, conceals, removes, confiscates, or possesses any actual or purported passport or other immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person either in the course of a violation of one of a number of statutes, including the forced labor and peonage statutes, or with the intent to violate the same statutes, is guilty of a crime. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1592(a)(1)-(2). Mahender continually refers to this crime as an offense that is merely derivative of the forced labor and peonage crimes. This is incorrect: a defendant may be convicted under § 1592 for knowingly concealing immigration documents merely with intent to violate the forced labor or peonage statutes. 18 U.S.C. § 1592(a)(2). In any event, we have already determined that Mahender's convictions for forced labor and peonage were supported by sufficient evidence. Here, the evidence that Samirah's and Enung's passports and other immigration documents were kept in a locked cupboard in the closet adjacent to the Sabhnanis' master bedroom was ample. The jury could infer Mahender's knowing possession of Samirah's and Enung's passports and other immigration documents from the fact that his own passport was kept in the same cupboard, and from the closet's position in the house. Therefore, Mahender's convictions for document servitude and conspiracy to commit document servitude are supported by sufficient evidence. Finally, without challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, Mahender suggests that his conviction for harboring illegal aliens should be vacated because the harboring statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A), was not designed to cover a situation in which a defendant forces an alien who wishes to leave the country to remain here. Such conduct is outside the scope of the statute, which was only intended to criminalize conduct facilitating an alien's illegal presence in the United States. Mahender's Br. 64-65. Suffice it to say that the text of the statute cannot support such limitations. The statute renders guilty of a crime any person who, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, conceals, harbors, or shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection, such alien in any place, including any building or any means of transportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). The statute does not attempt to distinguish among various reasons why an alien has come to, entered, or remains in the country illegally, nor does it distinguish among various motives a defendant might have for concealing, harboring, or shielding the alien. [Section] 1324, on its face, does not restrict the persons within its reach. United States v. Kim, 193 F.3d 567, 573 (2d Cir.1999). We decline Mahender's invitation to read words into the statute that are not there.