Opinion ID: 2046959
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Majority's Writing

Text: In addressing the majority's writing, it is useful to discuss where we agree. Astutely, the Court recognizes the need to differentiate[] between the reckless state of mind sufficient to establish the mental culpability of manslaughter and the extreme recklessness of murder under [the depraved indifference murder provision] (majority op at 380 [emphasis added]). I agree entirely. I disagree with the majority's assertion, however, that Register recognizes this difference. It is true, as the majority points out, that the Court in Register once used the phrase egregiously reckless ( Register, 60 NY2d at 279). However, no court has ever interpreted these words, as today's majority does, to require a significantly heightened recklessness for depraved indifference murder (majority op at 380). Nor, I submit, did Register itself. Indeed, the Register Court plainly stated that `recklessness' is the mens rea, and the only mens rea,  for depraved indifference murder ( Register, 60 NY2d at 278 [emphasis added]; see also id. at 277 [recklessness is the element of mental culpability required]). Recklessness, the Court explained, merely refers to defendant's conscious disregard of a substantial risk ( id. at 276). This definition, of course, is the one found in Penal Law § 15.05 (3), which defines ordinary recklessness. The Register Court repeatedly emphasized that, in its view, the only element that elevates reckless manslaughter to depraved indifference murder is the entirely objective circumstance of whether the degree of risk created by the defendant's conduct is grave as opposed to substantial ( see id. at 276-277). The majority now asserts that the degree of risk somehow elevates the defendant's culpable mental state to a heightened recklessness (majority op at 380). Register, however, did not say this. On the contrary, the Register Court expressly stated that the depraved mind murder statute requires    not only that the conduct which results in death present a grave risk of death but that it also occur `[u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life.' This additional requirement refers to neither the mens rea nor the actus reus  ( id. at 276 [emphasis added]). Plainly, the Register Court refused (improperly, I submit) to consider depraved indifference as an element, and referred only to the factual setting in which the risk creating conduct must occur[i.e., the] objective circumstances    ( id. ). Accordingly, Register cannot be read to hold that the factual setting somehow elevates the requisite mens rea to a heightened recklessness. Register has stood steadfastly for the proposition that depraved indifference murder and reckless manslaughter contain the exact same mens rea: ordinary recklessness. This Court has made that same observation time and time again, expressly confirming that Register stands for that proposition. Six years after deciding Register, this Court said unequivocally: The only culpable mental state required for murder under subdivision (2) of Penal Law § 125.25 (depraved indifference murder), we have made clear, is recklessness the same mental state required for manslaughter, second degree, under subdivision (1) of Penal Law § 125.15  ( People v Roe, 74 NY2d 20, 24 [1989] [emphasis added]; see also People v McManus, 67 NY2d 541, 548 [1986] [depraved indifference    involves the same mens rea  as reckless manslaughter]; People v Gomez, 65 NY2d 9, 11 [1985] [same]). The lower courts have similarly understood (and have uniformly applied) Register 's holding that the two crimes share precisely the same mens rea of ordinary recklessness ( see People v Shabaz, 173 AD2d 498, 499 [1991] [holding that depraved indifference murder has a mens rea of recklessness, the same mental state required for manslaughter, second degree]; People v Kalwasinski, 160 AD2d 732, 732 [1990] [holding that (t)he only culpable mental state required for depraved indifference murder,    like reckless manslaughter,    is `recklessness']; People v Zebrowski, 198 AD2d 716, 718 [1993] [holding that, like reckless manslaughter, the mental state for depraved indifference murder is recklessness]; People v Moquin, 142 AD2d 347, 353 [1988] [holding that the culpable mental state for both manslaughter in the second degree and murder in the second degree under Penal Law § 125.25 (2) is the same]). Under any analysis, objective circumstances have nothing to do with the defendant's mental culpability and, contrary to the majority's contention, those circumstances cannot possibly elevate[] and magnif[y] the degree of recklessness (majority op at 381). In my view, the majority's analysis is inapt because in defining the mens rea requirement of depraved indifference murder, it continues to focus almost entirely on the objective circumstances and improperly fails to recognize the defendant's depraved indifference to the value of human life as the central mens rea element. Nearly two centuries of decisional law and statutory enactments clearly require that to prove depraved indifference, the People must show far more than mere recklessness (i.e., mere disregard of a substantial risk). The defendant must evince a wicked and mischievous disregard (i.e., utter indifference) for the nearly certain consequences of his or her irresponsible act. It is this extreme wickednessthis abject moral deficiencythat, in the final analysis, places the defendant's culpability on an even plane with the intentional murderer. In now recognizing a heightened recklessness standard for depraved indifference murder, the Court vitiates one of Register 's principal thrusts. I applaud the majority for doing so because I think it is a step in the right direction. But it does not go far enough. The Register problem, and the unpalatable result which it has produced in this case, will never be alleviated until the logically inescapable final step is taken and depraved indifference is restored as the imperative mens rea.