Opinion ID: 2114349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Whether the HGN Test Was Properly Administered by the Officer in This Case

Text: Defendant's final argument is that even if evidence of HGN field testing is generally admissible under Frye, the evidence should not have been admitted against her because the test was not administered by Officer Klatt in compliance with NHTSA standards. Specifically, she argues that Klatt did not testify that he checked her eyes for equal tracking before conducting the HGN test. He did not testify that he checked her eyes for equal pupil size. He did not describe the speed at which he moved the stylus or that he held the stylus at the point of maximum deviation for the requisite four seconds. He did not testify that he repeated the procedure twice, as NHTSA protocol requires. Finally, he confused two of the clues when he combined two steps in the protocol. As a result, defendant argues, Klatt's testimony regarding the HGN test should have been excluded and, further, he should not have been allowed to express an opinion that she was impaired because his opinion was necessarily based on the result of the improperly performed test. She argues further that because the trial court relied heavily on this evidence, her conviction should be reversed. Finally, she argues that a new trial is barred by double jeopardy. The State argues that defendant forfeited any argument on this issue by failing to raise it at trial and in a posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). The State notes that because the defendant failed to raise this issue at trial, it was deprived of the opportunity to cure any defect in the officer's foundation testimony at that time. People v. Bush, 214 Ill.2d 318, 333, 292 Ill.Dec. 926, 827 N.E.2d 455 (2005). In her brief to the appellate court, defendant argued that the State failed to present an adequate foundation for the results of her HGN test to be admitted. She did not argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make a timely objection and to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. She did not argue that admission of the officer's testimony regarding HGN was plain error. The State, however, failed to bring defendant's forfeiture of the issue to the attention of the appellate court. In effect, the State forfeited its ability to argue forfeiture by the defendant. People v. Williams, 193 Ill.2d 306, 347, 250 Ill. Dec. 692, 739 N.E.2d 455 (2000) (doctrine of forfeiture applies to the State as well as to the defendant and State may forfeit claim that the defendant forfeited an issue by not properly preserving it for review). The appellate court addressed the issue on the merits, finding that a sufficient foundation was presented for the admission of the test result. In her petition for leave to appeal, defendant raised only the single issue of the necessity for a Frye hearing. On this issue, she prevailed and was granted remand for a Frye hearing. At the Frye hearing, defense counsel attempted to question Dr. Citron as to whether Klatt correctly performed the HGN test according to NHTSA standards. The State objected. Counsel explained that his position was that while an HGN test performed according to these standards might meet the Frye standard for admissibility, the test as performed by the officer in this case did not meet the Frye standard. The trial court sustained the objection, reasoning that if the Frye hearing had been held at trial, the question of admissibility of HGN testing in general would have been resolved prior to the receipt of the officer's testimony. Thus, the question on remand was to be answered as a general matter. Any question regarding the admissibility of a specific test in an individual case was one to be answered at trial. Defense counsel was allowed to make an offer of proof. Citron testified that he had reviewed the transcript of Officer Klatt's testimony and that the examination as described by Klatt did not follow the NHTSA standardized protocol for HGN testing. As a result, he opined, the test was invalid. Similarly, defense counsel was allowed to make an offer of proof during cross-examination of Master Sergeant Lebron. Lebron reviewed the transcript of Officer Klatt's trial testimony and stated that Klatt performed the test while defendant was seated; while the NHTSA manual requires that the subject be standing. Further, Klatt's testimony does not indicate that he questioned defendant about any eye problems, equal tracking, equal pupil size, or resting nystagmus. Lebron stated that he would agree with the statement that Klatt did not perform the test in accordance with NHTSA standards. During its cross-examination of Dr. Citek, the defense again made an offer of proof regarding the manner in which Klatt conducted the HGN test in this case. Citek acknowledged that the officer's testimony did not state that he observed equal pupil size and equal tracking before he conducted the HGN test and that if the officer did skip these steps, the test results would not be reliable. Page acknowledged that the HGN test must be performed according to NHTSA standards to be considered reliable as a field-sobriety test and that he has seen trained police officers administer the test incorrectly. He agreed that Klatt's trial testimony did not correctly describe the clues one observes when administering the HGN test. Dr. Henson reviewed Klatt's testimony and stated based on that testimony, the test Klatt performed was not in compliance with NHTSA standards. Notwithstanding the testimony on remand in which even the State's witnesses found Klatt's testimony insufficient to lay the foundation for HGN evidence, the State argues that because defendant failed to raise the issue in her petition for leave to appeal, she again forfeited any claim that the foundation for the officer's testimony regarding her HGN test results was insufficient. People v. Carter, 208 Ill.2d 309, 318, 280 Ill.Dec. 664, 802 N.E.2d 1185 (2003) (failure to include an issue in a petition for leave to appeal results in forfeiture of that issue for review). The State is correct that an issue may be deemed forfeited if a petitioner fails to raise it in his petition for leave to appeal. However, as we explained in In re Rolandis G., 232 Ill.2d 13, 37, 327 Ill.Dec. 479, 902 N.E.2d 600 (2008), the failure to raise an issue in a petition for leave to appeal is not a jurisdictional bar to this court's ability to review a matter. Whether to review a forfeited issue under these circumstances is within this court's discretion. Rolandis G., 232 Ill.2d at 37, 327 Ill.Dec. 479, 902 N.E.2d 600. We have established a clear framework for the exercise of such discretion. When an issue is not specifically mentioned in a party's petition for leave to appeal, but it is `inextricably intertwined'  with other matters properly before the court, review is appropriate. Rolandis G., 232 Ill.2d at 37, 327 Ill.Dec. 479, 902 N.E.2d 600, quoting Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 198 Ill.2d 420, 430, 261 Ill.Dec. 744, 764 N.E.2d 35 (2002). If, however, the forfeited issue is not inextricably intertwined with the issues properly before the court, the forfeiture rule should be given effect. The issues properly before this court in the present appeal are whether, in general, evidence regarding HGN testing of a defendant in a DUI prosecution is admissible under the Frye test and, if so, what circumstances must be present before such evidence may be admitted in a specific case. We conclude that the forfeited question is inextricably intertwined with the issues that we have addressed herein, particularly given the clear record Klatt's testimony did not meet the standards we have now adopted. Admission of Klatt's testimony regarding the HGN test he performed in the absence of a proper foundation was error. Error will be deemed harmless and a new trial unnecessary when the competent evidence in the record establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the erroneous admission of the challenged evidence would produce no different result. People v. Arman, 131 Ill.2d 115, 124, 137 Ill.Dec. 5, 545 N.E.2d 658 (1989). In McKown I, we rejected the State's argument that if denial of a Frye hearing was error, it was harmless error. Given the fact[s] that defendant's blood-alcohol content was not verified by any chemical test, and no other field-sobriety tests were given, we found it reasonable to conclude that the trial court relied heavily on the improperly admitted HGN test results. McKown I, 226 Ill.2d at 276, 314 Ill.Dec. 742, 875 N.E.2d 1029. In light of our earlier decision, defendant's conviction must be reversed. We must now consider whether a new trial would subject defendant to double jeopardy. See People v. Jones, 175 Ill.2d 126, 134, 221 Ill.Dec. 843, 676 N.E.2d 646 (1997); People v. McDonald, 125 Ill.2d 182, 201, 125 Ill.Dec. 781, 530 N.E.2d 1351 (1988). If the evidence presented at the first trial, including the improperly admitted evidence, would have been sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, retrial is the proper remedy. People v. Lopez, 229 Ill.2d 322, 367, 323 Ill.Dec. 55, 892 N.E.2d 1047 (2008). If no rational trier of fact could so find, defendant may not be subjected to a second trial. In her brief, defendant argues that because the results of her HGN test should not have been admitted into evidence, Klatt's opinion, which was based in part on the test results, should also be excluded and that remand for a new trial would, therefore, violate double jeopardy. She offers no authority for the proposition that an opinion witness who is barred from testifying regarding one fact that entered into the formation of his opinion is barred from giving an opinion altogether. Further, she offers no authority for the proposition that a police officer cannot testify to the facts and circumstances he observed while investigating an accident. We agree with the State that a new trial is proper. There is no bar to the officer's testifying regarding the facts and circumstances he observed while investigating the accident. In addition, the officer's opinion regarding defendant's state of intoxication was supported by other facts in the record, aside from her performance on the HGN test. Klatt testified that defendant had already been transported from the scene when he arrived. He found a partially full can of beer in her car. He spoke to defendant later at the hospital and observed that her speech was slurred, her eyes were bloodshot, and she had a strong odor of beer on her breath. Although she initially denied drinking that day, she later admitted to him that she had consumed two cans of beer before leaving her house, another can while driving, and had opened a fourth can just prior to the accident. She also stated that she had slept only four hours the previous night. At that point, Klatt performed the HGN test. Because defendant was seated in a hospital bed, he was unable to perform other field-sobriety tests. There was sufficient information in Klatt's possession prior to his conducting the HGN test to allow him to form an opinion regarding defendant's impairment due to alcohol. At the time he interviewed defendant, he already suspected her of driving under the influence based on the statements of the other witnesses and the open can of beer he found in her car. Her speech, eyes, and breath confirmed his suspicion. Her admission that she had consumed three cans of beer and was in the process of consuming a fourth can, after having only four hours of sleep, provided further confirmation. The result of the HGN test he performed may have merely provided additional support for his opinion. We conclude that Klatt may testify regarding these other facts and to the opinion he formed based on these facts. [4] In addition, three witnesses other than the officer testified regarding the accident. Randall Retherford, another motorist, testified that he drove his truck onto the shoulder of the road to avoid the defendant's car, which was approaching him at high speed. He saw the defendant's vehicle lock up its wheels, veer to the left, and hit three on-coming motorcycles. His testimony was corroborated by one of the injured riders, Robert Stanley, who testified that as he lay on the ground after being thrown from his motorcycle, defendant approached him and offered to help him remove his helmet. He testified that he smelled the odor of beer on her breath. Another cyclist who was not involved in the accident, Chad Morris, testified that he heard squealing tires and saw defendant's car veering into his lane, sliding sideways into the oncoming motorcycles. He was able to stop in time to avoid being hit. Viewing the testimony of these witnesses, in combination with the admissible portion of Officer Klatt's testimony, in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Diggins, 235 Ill.2d 48, 58, 335 Ill.Dec. 608, 919 N.E.2d 327 (2009)), there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have found defendant guilty of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol beyond a reasonable doubt and, thus, double jeopardy does not preclude a new trial. See People v. Hope, 116 Ill.2d 265, 279, 108 Ill.Dec. 41, 508 N.E.2d 202 (1986). However, we note that nothing in this opinion should be construed as a finding regarding defendant's guilt that would be binding upon remand. Defendant argued in McKown I that the odor of alcohol on her breath merely indicated that she had consumed alcohol, not that she was impaired. She also argued that her bloodshot eyes could be explained by her recent overnight shift working in a chemical plant. These are arguments better addressed to the trier of fact. She is free to make these arguments at her new trial.