Opinion ID: 1385188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The March 2004 Sentencing

Text: Brown made no objections to the statements or calculations in the PSR, either as originally issued or as amended, except with respect to the recommended two-step increase in offense level for possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. He did not suggest that the serial numbers were not in fact obliterated; rather, he contended that the enhancement was inappropriate because he did not know they were obliterated, and because the district court had refused to accept his plea of guilty to the § 922(k) charges that he had knowingly possessed firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Brown argued that his Guidelines imprisonment range, without that enhancement, should be 70 to 87 months. ( See, e.g., Sentencing Transcript March 26, 2004 (2004 S.Tr.), at 7.) The government responded that while 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) itself applies only if the defendant had knowledge that a firearm's serial number was removed, altered, or obliterated, the pertinent Guidelines section stated simply, [i] f any firearm . . . had an altered or obliterated serial number, increase by 2 levels, 2003 Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(4). The government pointed out that the commentary to that guideline provided that the enhancement under subsection (b)(4) for a [f]irearm with altered or obliterated serial number applies whether or not the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the firearm had an altered or obliterated serial number. (2004 S.Tr. at 6 (referring to 2003 Guidelines § 2K2.1 Application Note 19).) Thus, the guideline had no scienter requirement. Judge Johnson addressed both sides' positions, stating as follows: Problem I have with the government's position is the fact that the defendant had pled to eight counts for aggregating [sic] circumstances, the government wants to charge him basically with ten [ sic ] guns, two which he said he didn't know the guns werethe serial numbers were obliterated and while according to the law the government has the right to do that, it is not the right thing to do. The government's calculations with respect to their position is 84 to 105 months. The defendant's position is that it should be 70 to 87 months. The problem that I have with the defendant's position is that he is in a criminal category history four. It is not that this is his first contact with the criminal justice system. If he were not a criminal category history four, notwithstanding Sentencing Guidelines as related by the government, I would sentence him to 70 months. However, I'm going to sentence the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General or his duly authorized representative for a period of 84 months. (2004 S.Tr. at 20-21 (emphases added).) Judgment was entered on March 31, 2004, and Brown timely appealed. On appeal, Brown was represented by new counsel, and his new attorney filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), and moved to withdraw as counsel, stating that Brown had no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The government moved for summary affirmance. In January 2005, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), holding that the Guidelines are not mandatory but advisory. Thereafter, this Court granted Brown's new attorney's motion to withdraw; but we denied the government's motion for summary affirmance, instructed that new counsel be appointed for Brown, and, without reaching any merits questions, summarily remanded the case to the district court, in accordance with Crosby, 397 F.3d at 119, to permit the court to determine whether its original sentence would have been nontrivially different under the post- Booker advisory-Guidelines regime.