Opinion ID: 1381445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: It is apparent that the Court of Appeals remanded the case because of its conclusion that the trial court decree would result in taxable gain to the husband. Because of the later legislation and the decision of this court that the corporate stock is a marital asset, that reason for remand no longer exists. The property division of the trial court, in light of the 1981 amendments to ORS 107.105(1)(e) and the holding of this court, impresses us as being fair. In a long term marriage in which the parties' properties were acquired during the marriage, the parties should separate on as equal a basis as possible. See Grove and Grove, 280 Or. 341, 349, 571 P.2d 477 (1977). Here, the marriage was long term, and although the husband received the long half of the parties' assets, much of the property had been the husband's prior to the marriage, and therefore the division is not unfair. The trial judge recognized the difficulty of obtaining a complete separation of assets. Although a property division achieving a complete disentanglement of the parties' affairs is preferred, Haguewood and Haguewood, 292 Or. 197, 207, 638 P.2d 1135 (1981), see also Slauson and Slauson, 29 Or. App. 177, 183-184, 562 P.2d 604 (1977), because of the unique facts of this case, we believe that the trial court did about as well as can be done to divide the parties' assets. Unfortunately, complete disentanglement was not readily possible. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the decree of the trial court. TANZER, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which CAMPBELL, J., joins.