Opinion ID: 175612
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Heroin Conspiracy

Text: Ferguson and Matthews argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions for participation in the heroin conspiracy.3 Ferguson argues that the evidence presented at trial failed to demonstrate that he shared with his alleged co-conspirators the intent to distribute heroin, but merely demonstrated that he occasionally purchased heroin for personal use. Matthews similarly argues that the evidence demonstrated nothing more than that he was a heroin customer of Good’s. The elements of conspiracy are “an agreement, either explicit or implicit, to commit an unlawful act, combined with intent to commit an unlawful act, combined with intent to commit the underlying offense.” United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 134 (3d Matthews did not properly move under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, their sufficiency-of-theevidence claims are not preserved, and we thus review them for plain error. See United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1997) (where the defendant does not preserve insufficiency issue by filing a timely motion for a judgment of acquittal, sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed under a plain error standard). 3 Thompson also argues in passing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his participation in the heroin conspiracy. We reject out of hand his sufficiency-of-theevidence challenge with respect to the heroin conspiracy. Aside from a threadbare statement that the “evidence in this case was [in]sufficient to convict him of either of the two conspiracies charged,” and a one-sentence footnote complaining about the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, Ferguson Br. at 35, 40 n.5, Thompson provides no specific argument as to why the evidence actually admitted at trial was insufficient to allow a jury to conclude that he was a member of the heroin conspiracy. He has thus waived the issue. See United States v. Demichael, 461 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”)). Having reviewed the evidence in any event, we find Thompson’s sufficiency challenge baseless. 5 Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986)). Thus, “[o]ne of the requisite elements the government must show in a conspiracy case is that the alleged conspirators share a ‘unity of purpose,’ the intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward that goal.” United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Wexler, 838 F.3d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir. 1988)). In addition, even in situations where the defendant knew he was engaged in illicit activity, and knew that “some form of contraband” was involved in the scheme in which he was participating, the government is obliged to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the particular illegal objective contemplated by the conspiracy. United States v. Idowu, 157 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 1998). Factors bearing on whether a conspiracy has been shown are “the length of affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy; whether there is an established method of payment; the extent to which transactions are standardized; and whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust.” United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). The evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the Government, allowed a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ferguson shared the same goal (i.e., distributing heroin) as the other conspirators. For example, the jury heard testimony that Ferguson told Good that the heroin Good had sold to him had thereafter been sold to a third party, and that he intended to buy more heroin from Good in the future to furnish to that same buyer. Appendix (“App.”) 1126-27. The jury also 6 heard testimony concerning Ferguson’s heroin sales techniques. App. 2409-10. And the jury heard testimony that Ferguson purchased heroin from Good in quantities greater than “personal use amounts.” App. 1843. This evidence easily passes muster. Matthews’s argument – that the evidence supported only a conclusion that he was merely a heroin customer – likewise fails. Good testified that on at least two occasions, he left heroin with Thompson for him to sell to Gary Sloan. After the jury listened to a January 11, 2003 telephone call between Good and Sloan, Good testified as follows: Q. Mr. Good, . . . [w]ho are you talking with during that call? A. Gary Sloan. Q. What were you talking about? A. I told him that – because he was calling me to get some more heroin, I told him to go see Pumpkin because I already gave it to Pumpkin to – for Gary and his brother to come get because I wasn’t going to be around. Q. What had you given to Pumpkin? A. I gave him some heroin. Q. Do you recall how much? A. If that was the first time, it was 20 bricks. If that was the second time, it was 40 bricks. Q. You’re talking about two different times. What are you referring to? A. Heroin. Q. But in terms of first time or second time, what do you mean by that? 7 A. Because the first time I gave [Matthews] some, I only gave him 20 bricks to see can he handle that and do the right thing with it. And he did. Second time, I gave him 40 bricks of heroin. Q. When you said, can he handle that, do the right thing, what are you talking about? A. Sell it to Gary and then pay me my money. App. 1374-75. This testimony, viewed in a light most favorable to the Government, easily undermines Matthews’s argument that he was a mere purchaser of personalconsumption heroin. Good’s testimony demonstrates that Matthews played a pivotal role in distributing heroin within the organization. Moreover, the record is replete with testimony and other evidence that many of the drug deals within the Good conspiracy took place at Matthews’s mother’s residence, that Matthews registered one of Good’s cellular phones in his own name, and that Good and Matthews shared a close personal friendship. The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude that Matthews shared a unity of purpose with the other conspirators to distribute heroin and entered into an agreement to further that objective. The evidence was sufficient, we conclude, to support the appellants’ convictions on the heroin conspiracy charges.