Opinion ID: 786370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the evidentiary holdings

Text: 32 Norfolk asserts that the district court erred in admitting three pieces of evidence: the FWHA Handbook, the PSC policy, and the deposition testimony of Norfolk's CEO. This Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence. 33 It is important to note that, under the abuse of discretion standard employed with respect to evidentiary rulings, the district court's decision regarding this evidence should remain undisturbed unless this panel is left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court clearly erred in its judgment after weighing the relevant factors, improperly applied the correct law, or inappropriately used the wrong legal standard. United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002). 5 The district court admitted all three pieces of evidence for the specific and limited purpose of showing notice or knowledge, and restricted the evidence to its proper scope.
34 Norfolk argues that the sight distance charts and graphs in the FHWA Handbook and the PSC policy that incorporated the sight distance information from the Handbook were irrelevant to Shanklin's claims and were thus erroneously admitted. 35 The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence broadly as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. Under Tennessee law, juries are required to compare the degree of fault of the parties, including the reasonableness of their conduct in light of all of the circumstances. See Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn.1994). A Tennessee jury must consider: the reasonableness of [a] party's conduct in confronting a risk, such as whether the party knew of the risk, or should have known of it. Id. at 592. Undoubtedly, whether or not Norfolk knew of the sight distance requirements recommended by the FHWA or PSC policy is a fact of consequence in relation to the issue of notice, because if Norfolk knew that a motorist needed to see a certain number of feet in order to perceive an oncoming train, it is more likely that it recognized that overgrown vegetation for which it was responsible could impede a motorist's view and cause a hazard. Indeed, it was undisputed at trial that the sight distance information from the Handbook was included in the minutes of the Norfolk Southern Tennessee Division Grade Crossing Safety Committee, and also that the sight distance information from the Handbook was incorporated into the PSC policy that was discussed with Norfolk Southern employees in Tennessee prior to the collision at issue. 6 36 Because the sight distance information in the Handbook, and as incorporated into the PSC policy, helps to illuminate the notice issue, and because the district court specifically instructed the jury that neither established a legal standard, this evidence was properly admitted. 7
37 Norfolk objects to the introduction of video deposition testimony given by David Goode, the Chief Executive Officer of Norfolk. The testimony was taken in connection with Lohman v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. on August 25, 1995, and concerned a grade crossing accident in Missouri. Norfolk argues that the portions of Goode's video deposition testimony admitted at trial were irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. Furthermore, Norfolk asserts that the testimony cannot properly be admitted as an admission of a party opponent because the case in which the deposition was taken and the current matter do not share the same identity of issues. 38 This Court must first examine whether Goode's deposition testimony, taken in connection with an earlier trial, can be entered as evidence in a subsequent trial. Federal Rule of Procedure 32(a) permits the use of any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence ... against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition. Id. The Rule further states that the deposition of a party ... who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer ... designated ... to testify on behalf of a ... private corporation ... may be used by an adverse party for any purpose,  so long as it complies with the rules of evidence. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 32(a)(2)(emphasis added). Goode's video deposition testimony does comply with the rules of evidence, either as an admission of a party-opponent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, or as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 804. 39 Under Rule 801(d)(2), a statement can be characterized as an admission of a party-opponent, and as such, non-hearsay, when: The statement is offered against a party and is ... (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment made during the existence of the relationship. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C)-(D). Norfolk does not dispute that Goode was its president and CEO at the time of his deposition, or that he was authorized to make the statements he made during that deposition. Therefore, Goode's video deposition testimony with respect to the Lohman case qualifies as a non-hearsay party-opponent admission. 40 Alternatively, Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) carves out an exception to the hearsay prohibition when a witness is unavailable for testimony; it permits the inclusion of a statement given by a witness in another proceeding so long as the party had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1). The Advisory Committee Notes remark that common law required the previous deposition to have a substantial identity of issues. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1), Advisory Committee Notes. Norfolk argues here that the Lohman case, and Goode's deposition therein, did not involve substantially the same issues as those confronted herein. While it is true that Goode's deposition covers a crossing grade accident in another state and under different conditions, it also addresses grade crossing safety issues generally. Furthermore, Shanklin sought to introduce the testimony to prove that Norfolk was aware of the danger at grade crossings, a topic which Goode did cover in the deposition. As Norfolk's general knowledge and treatment of grade crossing dangers was likewise germane in Lohman, Goode and his attorneys had an opportunity and a nearly identical motive to develop Goode's testimony in the earlier case. 41 Second, the relevance of Goode's testimony must be assessed. Similar to the Handbook and the PSC policy, Goode's deposition presents facts of consequence with regard to Norfolk's knowledge of the dangers of grade crossings. All of Goode's deposition testimony introduced during the trial of this case related to the fact that Norfolk recognized the importance of identifying and eliminating hazardous conditions at its grade crossings prior to the collision at issue in this case. Thus the district court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in admitting Goode's testimony for the limited purpose of showing knowledge. 42 Third, this Court must determine whether Goode's testimony should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as more prejudicial than probative. While there is nothing unfairly prejudicial about Goode's testimony regarding Norfolk's notice of issues attendant to grade crossing safety, the evidence that Norfolk had the highest grade crossing accident rate in the country was extremely prejudicial. 8 This testimony was erroneously shown to the jury, as the district court had already ruled it inadmissable. The district court immediately responded by striking the evidence and issuing the following curative instruction as requested by Norfolk: 43 THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen, during the recess, we spent the better part of an hour ruling on objections, taking things out of the deposition that weren't relevant or weren't admissible under the rules of procedure. Through an oversight, one small bit of information got into the deposition that should have been deleted but was not. The only way to cure it at this point is for me to tell you to disregard that last minute or so of the deposition you just saw and the memorandum that was showed to you on the screen. And any reference to it or any testimony about it, you'll disregard it. And if you don't remember what it was, that's good because you don't have to forget it then. 44 J.A. at 342-43. Even where evidence is erroneously admitted, the striking of evidence combined with instructions to the jury to disregard the evidence will usually cure the error, unless the evidence is so prejudicial that a new trial must be granted. United States v. Ursery, 109 F.3d 1129, 1133 (6th Cir.1997). Notwithstanding the undoubtedly prejudicial nature of the erroneously admitted information, this Court must assume that the jury in this case followed the instruction given it by the court. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). Therefore this Court finds the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Goode's video deposition testimony. No unfair prejudice resulted to Norfolk as a result of Goode's testimony regarding safety measures in general, and with respect to the erroneously admitted evidence, the district court properly responded to the mistake such that the prejudice to Norfolk was minimized.