Opinion ID: 1547441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Baker's Statement to Police

Text: Appellants Franklin, Sampson, and Woodland argue that admission in a joint trial of Baker's above-described statement to Detective Gonzalez about Baker's conversation with Lyles' girlfriend (see page 996 supra ) violated their Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment. The trial court denied motions for severance and permitted the detective to testify about the statement with the names of Baker's co-defendants redacted. [8] A limiting instruction, indicating that the statement could only be used against Baker, was given four times: during opening statements, immediately when the testimony was received, at the final jury instructions, and during closing arguments. The government, in opposing the appellants' motions to sever, had argued that Baker's statement was either in furtherance of the conspiracy or a statement against penal interest, and therefore admissible in a joint conspiracy trial against all the defendants. The trial court did not admit the statement on either of those grounds, but allowed a redacted statement to be admitted against Baker alone as a party admission with a limiting instruction. [9] On appeal, appellants now invoke the distinct ground that the redacted statement was inadmissible under Akins v. United States, 679 A.2d 1017 (D.C.1996). In Akins, a Pinkerton instruction on vicarious liability in a conspiracy was found to nullify a limiting instruction and the appellants were given a new trial. Id. at 1031. Statements to the police of two of five co-defendants, Akins and Taper, indicating that they had possession of the victim's wallet, were admitted as rebuttal evidence against Akins and Taper as statements of a party opponent. Id. at 1027. A limiting instruction was given that the statements could be used only against Akins, Taper, and another co-defendant named Davis, who had introduced evidence in his defense case that the government sought to rebut with admission of Akins' and Taper's statements. Id. Later, the jury was instructed on the nature of conspiracy liability, which essentially requires that proof of one defendant's guilt be counted against all members of the conspiracy. Id. The Akins court opinion stated that in a joint conspiracy trial where the government relies on a theory of vicarious liability, statements may not be introduced under the statements of party opponent exception to the rule against hearsay  or any other hearsay exception that is not reliability based  unless they are admissible as coconspirators' statements in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 1031. [10] Invoking Akins, appellants now assert that, even if the statement was admissible against Baker as a party admission, a limiting instruction (which was given multiple times here) was not enough to guard against prejudicial effect in a situation where a jury could find Baker guilty based on the statement and then find the other three appellants guilty based on vicarious liability. [11] The government argues with considerable force that we should review any error under Akins on a plain error standard. We agree. As a general proposition, `objections must be made with reasonable specificity; the [trial] judge must be fairly apprised as to the question on which he is being asked to rule.' Newby v. United States, 797 A.2d 1233, 1237 (D.C.2002) (citing Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.1992)). The purpose of requiring a specific objection is to enable the prosecution to respond to any contentions raised and to make it possible for the trial judge to correct the situation without jettisoning the trial. Hunter, 606 A.2d at 144. Appellants' objections to admission of Baker's statements and later objections to the Pinkerton instruction [12] never included the Confrontation Clause assertion now made on appeal, viz. a jury could find Baker guilty based on his statements, which were admissible only against Baker, a non-testifying co-defendant, and then convict the other appellants based on vicarious liability. While it is true, as appellants argue, that citation to a particular case is not a prerequisite to the preservation of an objection for appellate review, see Tindle v. United States, 778 A.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C.2001), the appellants' failure to either cite to Akins or object that the combination of the admission of Baker's redacted statements and the Pinkerton instruction would violate their Confrontation Clause rights meant that the trial court was not fairly apprised that appellants sought relief based on that claim. Newby, 797 A.2d at 1237. Appellants point out that Akins was cited to the trial court by the government in its Omnibus Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Sever. But the government invoked Akins to support the government's then pressed argument that Baker's statement was admissible as being in furtherance of a conspiracy. As indicated above, Baker's statement was admitted only against him, as a party admission, and the government has not renewed its argument that the statement was in furtherance of a conspiracy. At no point after the government filed its written opposition, whether during argument on the motions to sever, when Baker's statement was testified to at trial, during discussion of the Pinkerton instruction, or during the trial court's further explanation of its denial of the motions to sever at the conclusion of trial, did the appellants make any objection that invoked the Akins principle. Because the point was not preserved .... we review for plain error. Hunter, 606 A.2d at 144. [13] Plain error review permits us to grant a remedy where (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, meaning clear or obvious, and (3) the error affected substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Even where the error meets these basic requirements, discretionary relief need be granted only where the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. [14] We cannot say on this record that the error was either clear or obvious. Counsel for none of the three appellants who now assert their Confrontation Clause rights under Akins, nor the trial court, recognized the error despite the filing and review of written motions on the subject of the admissibility of Baker's statements in a joint trial and repeated arguments made orally regarding severance both pre-trial and at the conclusion of trial. As we said in Akins itself, the Confrontation Clause issue as it relates to statements of co-defendants is one of some complexity, 679 A.2d at 1032 n. 13, and indeed the precise breadth of the Akins holding is not entirely clear. [15] Even if we were to conclude that the error was plain, we do not think the error can be said to have affected the outcome of the [trial] court proceedings, Olano, 507 U.S. at 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, [16] much less seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Baker's statement that we knew what to do was both vague and cumulative of much weightier evidence that Baker, along with his co-conspirators, planned and carried out a raid on the 1303 T Street house in the early morning hours of August 5. The statement itself offers only an imprecise notion that Baker, along with unnamed and unenumerated others, was going to do something with the information provided by Lyles' girlfriend. The statement makes reference to no specific plans. There was significant other evidence of an intent on the part of the four appellants to enter the 1303 T Street house for the purpose of seizing drugs and money, which was the only piece of information that Baker's statement could arguably have offered. Gaither testified to a discussion with appellants during which they talked about breaking into 1303 T Street and robbing Lyles and Baker asked Gaither if he wanted to participate. Dockery testified to a discussion in which appellants set out their plans for breaking into the house. Dockery further testified that the appellants were heavily armed at this point, demonstrating that they did indeed have a plan to carry out that would require the use of firearms for force and protection. A further indication of the lack of import of Baker's statement is its omission from the government's initial closing argument. See Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 602 (D.C.2004) (A prosecutor's `stress[ ] upon the centrality' of particular evidence in closing argument tells a good deal about whether the admission of the evidence was meant to be, and was, prejudicial.) (citing Allen v. United States, 837 A.2d 917, 923 (D.C.2003)). If, as appellants contend, the statement served the function of curing the shortcomings of the government's other evidence, rendering insignificant various peculiarities in witnesses' testimony and making the dubious seem plausible, surely the government would have seen fit to remind the jury of this statement during closing argument seven days after it was testified to by Detective Gonzalez. As it happened, the government only mentioned Baker's statements in its rebuttal closing argument. [17] Finally, the credibility of Baker's final statement to police was highly questionable after the jury heard that he had given Detective Gonzalez three very different false accounts as to how he had come to be shot that night. Furthermore, the limiting instruction made it clear that the evidence was relevant only to Baker's guilt, as to which the Pinkerton liability was only derivative. The evidence of Baker's guilt, apart from the statement, was very strong, including that Baker ran with the other appellants towards the house, while armed, immediately after discussing their plans, Lyles shot at Baker inside the house, Dockery transported Baker to the hospital with a gunshot wound that night, the testimony of Dockery and Gaither describing Baker's involvement in the planning of the burglary, and the .45-caliber cartridge casings found alongside Pinkney's dead body, consistent with the .45- caliber handgun that Dockery saw Baker carrying before and after the break-in. Based on the weight of the evidence demonstrating Baker's guilt and the evidence implicating all four appellants in a conspiracy to enter the house for unlawful purposes, we are quite unable to say that the admission of Baker's statement combined with a Pinkerton instruction on vicarious liability was plain error in that it affected the outcome of the court proceedings. Even if appellants had preserved the argument under Akins, we would conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), for substantially the same reasons that the introduction of Baker's statement did not affect the other appellants' substantial rights. Under the test in Chapman, we must reverse appellants' convictions unless the government has demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. Thus, unless there is a reasonable possibility that the improperly admitted evidence contributed to the conviction, reversal is not required. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (stating that erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence in violation of Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights is subject to a harmless error inquiry that asks Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?); Morten, supra . In Morten, supra, erroneous admission of the statements of co-conspirators who had pled guilty, against appellants in a trial on murder and conspiracy charges, was not harmless. This case is different from Morten. The prosecutor in Morten repeatedly referred to the co-conspirators' statements in closing arguments, including inviting the jury to review one of the co-conspirator's videotaped statements during deliberations. Further, the primary witness, Barnes, relied on by the government in Morten to prove the existence of a conspiracy, was testifying as part of a plea agreement and was vigorously challenged as someone with weighty reasons to fabricate or embellish, which led the prosecutor to encourage[ ] the jury to rely more heavily on [a co-conspirator's] statement. Here, neither Dockery nor Gaither were charged with any crime [18] relating to the incidents at 1303 T Street and the government repeatedly cited as the cornerstone of its case the fact that Baker got shot at 1303 T Street. In contrast to the marginal relevance of Baker's statement, the co-conspirator's statement in Morten went to the very heart of the government's case. Furthermore, in Morten, there was a specific conspiracy count in the indictment and the evidence was admitted against all defendants. For these reasons, we would conclude that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found [the appellants] guilty absent the error of introducing Baker's statement. [19] Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at 18, 119 S.Ct. 1827.