Opinion ID: 694395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: LEGAL CONSTRUCTION v. FACTUAL INTERPRETATION

Text: 170 The majority's explanation for removing these factual issues from the jury is that it is construing the patent claims, and that the construction of documents is a matter of law. The legal construction of documents--patent documents and other documents--is indeed a matter of law. The legal effect of the patent claim is to establish the metes and bounds of the patent right to exclude; this is a matter of law. But this does not deprive the underlying facts of their nature as fact. These facts are found on evidence that includes the patent specification, relevant prior art, the prosecution history, the testimony of experts in the field, and other relevant evidence such as tests and demonstrations, all as I shall discuss post. These findings do not become rules of law because they relate to a document whose legal effect follows from the found facts. 171 An extensive body of law, statutory and judgemade, governs the construction and legal effect of patent claims; for example, that a claim is construed the same way in determining both patent validity and infringement; that a dependent claim includes all of the limitations of the independent claim; that the claims as filed are part of the technical disclosure; that the right to exclude is divisible into making, using, or selling the claimed subject matter; that a claim is not infringed unless every element thereof is met in the accused device, either literally or by an equivalent. These and other rules of law are applied when appropriate to the facts of the particular case: either undisputed facts, or facts that are found by the trier of fact. The procedure of applying law to facts does not convert the finding of facts into a matter of law. 172 In patent infringement litigation there is often a factual dispute as to the meaning and scope of the technical terms or words of art as they are used in the particular patented invention. When such dispute arises its resolution is not a ruling of law, but a finding of fact. Such findings of meaning, scope, and usage have been called the interpretation of disputed terms of a document, as contrasted with the construction or legal effect of a document. Professor Corbin has explained this distinction, in the context of contracts, as reflecting the difference between language and the legal operation of language: 173 It may be helpful to note that the word interpretation is commonly used with respect to language itself--to the symbols (the words and acts) of expression. In about the same degree, we speak of the construction of a contract. It is true that we also speak of construing language and of interpreting a contract; but by the latter phrase is certainly meant interpreting the words of a contract. The word contract has been variously defined; but it is seldom identified with mere symbols of expression. By interpretation of language we determine what ideas that language induces in other persons. By construction of the contract, as that term will be used here, we determine its legal operation--its effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials. 174 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Sec. 534 (1960) (footnotes omitted). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec. 200 and Comment c (1981) describes the distinction between construction and interpretation as reflecting the difference between the meaning of a term and its legal effect: 175 Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of its meaning. 176      Interpretation is not a determination of the legal effect of words or other conduct. 177 The Reporter's Note explains that the purpose is to make it clear that 'interpretation' relates to meaning and to avoid confusion with the ascertainment of legal operation or effect, sometimes called 'construction.'  (Citations omitted.) The analogy is apt, although a patent is not a contract, for this distinction has been recognized for many kinds of written instruments. See, e.g., In re XTI Xonix Technologies Inc., 156 B.R. 821, 829 n. 6 (D.Ore.1993) (proceeding in bankruptcy): 178 Interpretation and construction of written instruments are not the same. A rule of construction is one which either governs the effect of an ascertained intention, or points out what the court should do in the absence of express or implied intention, while a rule of interpretation is one which governs the ascertainment of the meaning of the maker of the instrument. 179 Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 432 F.2d 165, 179 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 934, 91 S.Ct. 1526, 28 L.Ed.2d 868 (1971) (contract): 180 In the law of contracts (conventional obligations) a proper distinction exists between the interpretation of written instruments and their construction. Interpretation refers to the process of determining the meaning of the words used; that process is traditionally thought to be a function of the jury. On the other hand, the process of determining the legal effect of the words used--once we know their meaning--is properly labelled construction; it is peculiarly a function of the court. 181 Hornick v. Owners Ins. Co., 511 N.W.2d 370 (Iowa 1993) (insurance policy): 182 Construction of an insurance policy--the process of determining its legal effect--is a question of law for the court. Interpretation--the process of determining the meaning of words used--is also a question of law for the court unless it depends on extrinsic evidence or a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn. 183 In re Union Trust Co., 89 Misc. 69, 151 N.Y.S. 246, 249-50 (Sur.Ct.1915) (will): 184 A rule of construction is one which either governs the effect of an ascertained intention or points out what a court should do in the absence of express or implied intention. A rule of interpretation is one which governs the ascertainment of the meaning of the maker of a written document. 185 Reed v. Proprietors of Locks & Canals on Merrimac River, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 274, 288-89, 12 L.Ed. 1077 (1850) (deed): 186 It is true, that it was the duty of the court to give a construction to the deed in question, so far as the intention of the parties could be elicited therefrom.... But after all this is done, it is still a question of fact to be discovered from evidence dehors the deed ... for the jury to decide, whether the land in controversy is included therein, or, in other words, was intended by the parties so to be. 187 It is indeed well understood that the legal effect or construction of the terms of a document, a matter of law, is not to be confused with resolution of disputes concerning the factual meaning of the terms. The former is for the court, the latter for the jury. That the thing whose terms require interpretation is a patent, instead of a deed or a will or a contract, does not convert the finding of disputed facts into a matter of law. Factual findings concerning a particular patented invention do not become matters of law simply because the patent document serves a legal purpose. 188 Although purity of language has occasionally slipped, for the words construction and interpretation have been loosely used, the distinction between the concepts has been recognized when it mattered. For example, Walker in his 1904 Textbook used the phrase construction of the patent, but he left no doubt as to the role of the jury as trier of fact: 189 [W]here the question of infringement depends on the construction of the patent, and that construction depends upon a doubtful question in the prior art, the latter question should be left for the jury; and the dependent question of infringement should also be left for the jury to decide. 190 A.H. Walker, Textbook on the Patent Laws of the United States of America Sec. 536 (4th ed. 1904). 191 This recognition that the factual issues that underlie the construction of the patent, and that determine patent infringement, are for the jury is manifest even in the early Supreme Court cases that are relied on by the majority, as I discuss in Part IV-C, post. The majority's authority does not show removal of factual disputes from the jury. Indeed, several of the cases that are relied upon were bills in equity, and irrelevant to jury trials. 192