Opinion ID: 3051818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Private School Reimbursement Under 20 U.S.C.

Text: § 1412(a)(10)(C) [1] Before 1997, the IDEA was silent on the subject of private school reimbursement, but courts had granted such reimbursement as “appropriate” relief under principles of equity pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C). See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (“[W]e are confident that by empowering the court to grant ‘appropriate’ relief Congress meant to include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case.”); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) (“In any action brought under this paragraph, the court . . . shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”). Congress amended the IDEA in 1997 to include a new section entitled “Payment for education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C). Clause (ii) of the new statutory section states: If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without the consent of or referral by the pub4550 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. lic agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). Clause (iii) further states that “[t]he cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii) may be reduced or denied” if certain requirements, such as notice, are not met. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii); see also id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) (stating exceptions to the requirements in clause (iii)). In this case, the Hearing Officer and district court found, and neither party challenges, that T.A. never received special education and related services from a public agency. Accordingly, we must decide whether the reference in § 1412(a) (10)(C) to students “who previously received special education and related services” bars private school reimbursement for students who have not “previously received special education and related services,” or whether those students remain eligible for private school reimbursement, as they were before 1997, under principles of equity pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C). In other words, did Congress revoke, categorically, private school reimbursement for students who have never received special education and related services from a public agency, or did Congress simply legislate concerning students who had previously received special education and related services, leaving discretion in cases such as T.A.’s in the hands of courts applying principles of equity? [2] We are not the first circuit court to have addressed this question. In Frank G., 459 F.3d at 367-76, the Second Circuit thoroughly analyzed the question and concluded that the reference in 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to students “who previously received special education and related services” does not create a categorical bar to recovery of private school reimFOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. 4551 bursement for all other students. We agree with and adopt the analysis and conclusion of the Second Circuit. [3] The Second Circuit first examined the text of the statute. The court concluded that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is ambiguous because its text does not clearly create a categorical bar and because such an interpretation is in tension with the broader context of the statute. Id. at 368-70. The Second Circuit then applied “traditional canons of statutory construction” to the ambiguous text and reasoned that reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to create a categorical bar “would defeat both purposes of the IDEA,” which are to give children with disabilities an appropriate and free education; would not “produce[ ] a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law”; and would lead to “absurd results.” Id. at 370-72 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the Second Circuit noted that its interpretation was “consistent with that of the [U.S.] Department of Education’s Office of Special Education & Rehabilitative Services,” id. at 372-73,9 and held 9 The Second Circuit quotes a letter by the U.S. Department of Education establishing its position that § 1412(a)(10)(C) does not “foreclos[e] categorically an award of reimbursement in a case in which a child has not yet been enrolled in special education and related services.” Frank G., 459 F.3d at 373 (quoting Letter to Susan Luger, listed in 65 Fed. Reg. 9178 (Feb. 23, 2000), and reprinted in 33 I.D.E.L.R. 126 (Mar. 19, 1999)). We note that the Department of Education’s position was also set forth in the Federal Register in response to comments concerning its regulations governing the IDEA: [H]earing officers and courts retain their authority, recognized in Burlington and Florence . . . to award “appropriate” relief if a public agency has failed to provide FAPE [free appropriate public education], including reimbursement and compensatory services, under section [1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)] in instances in which the child has not yet received special education and related services. This authority is independent of their authority under section [1412](a)(10)(C)(ii) to award reimbursement for private placements of children who previously were receiving special education and related services from a public agency. 64 Fed. Reg. 12,406-01, 12,602 (Mar. 12, 1999). 4552 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. that neither the ambiguous legislative history of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) nor the First Circuit’s decision in Greenland School District v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004), altered its conclusion. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 373-76. [4] We see no reason to disagree with the Second Circuit’s well-reasoned analysis of this issue. We emphasize in particular that the express purpose of the IDEA is “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added); see also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369-70 (emphasizing this purpose).10 Interpreting the 1997 amendments to prohibit categorically reimbursement to students who have not yet received special education and related services runs contrary to this express purpose. Additionally, it would lead to the absurd result that the parents of a child with a disability must wait (an indefinite, perhaps lengthy period) until the child has received special education in public school before sending the child to an appropriate private school, no matter how uncooperative the school district and no matter how inappropriate the special education. Further, if the school district declined to recognize a student as disabled—as occurred in this case—the student would never receive special education in public school and therefore would never be eligible for reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). “The Act was intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education and a free one; it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of those objectives.” Burlington, 471 U.S. at 372. 10 The dissent asserts that a “FAPE was not at issue” when T.A.’s parents removed him from public school. Dissent at 4558. But the Hearing Officer found that T.A. was disabled and that the School District failed to provide a FAPE. The district court adopted all of the Hearing Officer’s factual findings, and the School District has not appealed any of those findings. T.A.’s parents also provided notice to the School District before T.A.’s final year of school. On this record, therefore, we must take as a given that T.A. was disabled and that the School District failed to provide a FAPE. FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. 4553 In amending the IDEA in 1997, Congress chose to specify in § 1412(a)(10)(C) the requirements and factors to be considered by district courts and hearing officers when deciding whether to award reimbursement to students who previously received special education and related services. For students who never received special education and related services, however, the new provisions of § 1412(a)(10)(C) simply do not apply. For those students, reimbursement may be sought only under principles of equity pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C). Because T.A. never received special education and related services, § 1412(a)(10)(C) does not apply in this case.11 He may recover reimbursement, if at all, only under principles of equity pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C). [5] In conclusion, we hold that students who have not “previously received special education and related services” are eligible for reimbursement, to the same extent as before the 1997 amendments, as “appropriate” relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).12 The statutory requirements of § 1412(a) (10)(C) do not apply. We therefore reverse the district court’s holding that T.A.’s failure to meet the requirements of § 1412(a)(10)(C) prevents private school reimbursement as a matter of law, and turn to the district court’s alternative holding that T.A. was not entitled to reimbursement under general principles of equity. B. Private School Reimbursement Under Principles of Equity Pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C) [6] “Parents have an equitable right to reimbursement for 11 Therefore, we express no opinion on the requirements for reimbursement under § 1412(a)(10)(C) for students who have received special education and related services. 12 Given our clear statement that such students are eligible “to the same extent as before the 1997 amendments,” we are puzzled by the dissent’s unsupported assertion that our opinion “expand[s] the principle” of equitable reimbursement. Dissent at 4557. 4554 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. the cost of providing an appropriate education when a school district has failed to offer a child a [free appropriate public education]. The conduct of both parties must be reviewed to determine whether relief is appropriate.” W.G., 960 F.2d at 1485-86 (citation omitted). The district court exercises its discretion in granting or denying appropriate equitable relief under § 1415(i)(2)(C), and we may reverse only if the district court has abused that discretion. We hold that the district court in this case abused its discretion in denying private school reimbursement to T.A., because the district court made two distinct legal errors in its discussion of the relevant equitable considerations. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of private school reimbursement and remand for consideration of T.A.’s claim under the proper legal framework. [7] First, the district court erred by considering the § 1412(a)(10)(C) statutory requirements in its analysis under principles of equity. In particular, the district court found that the equitable considerations in favor of granting reimbursement did not “override the statutory requirements for tuition reimbursement.” As discussed above, there are no statutory requirements for tuition reimbursement for students, like T.A., who never received special education and related services in public school. Congress’ choice to legislate concerning students who previously received special education and related services did not alter the proper analysis for students who have not received special education and related services in public school, under general principles of equity pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C). [8] Second, the district court applied the wrong legal standard by asserting that “tuition reimbursement may be ordered in an extreme case for a student not receiving special education services.” (Emphasis added.) The court cited Greenland, 358 F.3d at 160 n.8, for that proposition, not having the benefit of our opinion today, which rejects Greenland in favor of the Second Circuit’s approach. Nothing in § 1415(i)(2)(C), Supreme Court precedent, or our own precedent suggests that FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. 4555 tuition reimbursement is available only in extreme cases for parents who place their child in private school before receiving special education and related services in public school. [9] In summary, the district court erroneously considered the inapplicable statutory requirements of § 1412(a)(10)(C) and applied an incorrect legal standard. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of reimbursement and remand for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court should consider all relevant factors in determining whether to grant reimbursement and the amount of the reimbursement, including those factors that we have identified in the past. For example, we have previously recognized that notice to the school district is a relevant equitable consideration. In Ash, the disabled student attended private school beginning in 1983, but his parents did not provide meaningful notice to the school district until 1989. Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7J, 766 F. Supp. 852, 853-55, 864 (D. Or. 1991); see also Ash, 980 F.2d at 586 (incorporating the district court’s account of the facts). In response to the parents’ 1989 request, the school district offered to provide certain special education services, Ash, 766 F. Supp. at 855, but the district court found that the offered services were inadequate to meet the student’s educational needs, id. at 863. The district court awarded reimbursement beginning in 1989, but rejected the parents’ claim that private school reimbursement should be given for the whole period beginning in 1983. Id. at 864. We affirmed the district court’s conclusion that reimbursement was warranted only beginning in 1989, after “ ‘[the school district] had been asked to provide services to [the student] and had been given a reasonable opportunity to complete the process of evaluating [the student] and making a placement recommendation.’ ” Ash, 980 F.2d at 589 (quoting Ash, 766 F. Supp. at 864). In this case, T.A.’s parents did not notify the School District before removing T.A. from public school. Instead, 4556 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. shortly after enrolling T.A. in private school, T.A.’s parents notified the School District, attended several meetings with school officials, and made T.A. available for evaluation. At the conclusion of its evaluation in July 2003, the School District nevertheless concluded that T.A. was not disabled and therefore declined to offer him special education services under the IDEA. In other words, after “[the School District] had been asked to provide services to [T.A.] and had been given a reasonable opportunity to complete the process of evaluating [T.A.] and making a placement recommendation,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), the School District still failed to recognize T.A. as disabled or to offer him a free appropriate education. Thus, the district court would be within its discretion to consider notice as a relevant factor in its reimbursement determination. Additionally, as we have noted in other cases, “[f]actors to be considered [by the district court] include[ ] the existence of other, more suitable placements, the effort expended by the parent[s] in securing alternative placements[,] and the general cooperative or uncooperative position of the school district.” W.G., 960 F.2d at 1487 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Adams v. Oregon, 195 F.3d 1141, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999); Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1161 (5th Cir. 1986). We are mindful that the Hearing Officer found that T.A.’s parents sent him to Mount Bachelor Academy not only because of his disabilities, but also for reasons unrelated to his disabilities (i.e., substance abuse and behavioral problems), and the district court would be acting within its discretion to consider that factor as well. REVERSED and REMANDED. FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T.A. 4557