Opinion ID: 167974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refused Proposed Jury Instruction

Text: 22 In its second issue on appeal, Fairfield claims it was prejudiced by the district court's erroneous refusal to give the jury the following tendered instruction: Fear of retaliation is not a legitimate reason for failure to use a reasonable and available procedure for reporting alleged harassment. It argues that the district court's refusal to give this instruction allowed the jury to ignore McInnis's failure to follow Fairfield's policy and likely nullified Fairfield's good-faith Kolstad defense to punitive damages. We disagree. 23 We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision not to give a tendered jury instruction. Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1062 (10th Cir.2003). In doing so, we also consider the instructions as a whole de novo to determine whether they accurately informed the jury of the governing law. Id. (quotations omitted). [F]aulty jury instruction[s] require[] reversal when (1) we have substantial doubt whether the instructions, considered as a whole, properly guided the jury in its deliberations; and (2) when a deficient jury instruction is prejudicial. Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir.2002) (quotations, citations omitted). 24 The instruction tendered by Fairfield appears to be a correct statement of federal law for purposes of applying the Faragher/Ellerth defense. See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir.2001) (recognizing a similar proposed jury instruction to be a correct statement of federal law); see also Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir.2001) (stating, in the context of the Faragher/Ellerth defense, that [a] generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment); Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir.1999) ([A]n employee's subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile environment.). But the Faragher/Ellerth defense does not apply in cases where the employer takes an adverse employment actions; here, Fairfield terminated McInnis's employment. 10 See Harrison, 248 F.3d at 1024. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to refuse to give a proper instruction on an irrelevant issue. The district court's instructions properly conveyed to the jury the issues to be decided. 11