Opinion ID: 4527395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removal for Conviction of an Aggravated Felony

Text: Torres-Ledesma contends he is not removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he did not plead guilty to the felony portion of the Oklahoma statute. In his appeal from the first BIA decision, this court concluded that the BIA erred in using the categorical approach to determine whether a conviction under -5- § 2-404 was an aggravated felony and instructed the BIA to reconduct its analysis using the modified categorical approach. The government had urged the theory that § 2-404(A)(6) was a categorical match to its federal counterpart, § 856(a), because both make criminal the maintenance of a dwelling where controlled substances are kept. In response to Torres-Ledesma’s argument that this was not a categorical match because the statutes contemplated different mentes reae, the government noted that the Oklahoma statute required a more intensive mens rea, necessarily fulfilling the federal requirement. In order to violate § 2-404(A)(6), a person must act with purpose, and anyone acting with purpose necessarily acts with the sort of knowledge required by § 856(a)—and the sort of knowledge or intent required for a felony conviction under § 2-404(B). While the court did not expressly address this argument, it did implicitly reject it by holding that the categorical approach was not appropriate. In so holding, the court also necessarily foreclosed, even if implicitly, the government’s argument on this appeal that there was only one crime—a felony—to which Torres-Ledesma could have pleaded guilty under § 2-404(B). See Wilmer v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that even implicitly decided matters may become law of the case). After all, a modified categorical approach is not necessary when there is only one crime to be compared to the federal statute. So this court’s decision that a modified -6- categorical approach was necessary implies a conviction under § 2-404 is divisible between two criminal provisions, and the government must show that the relevant provision matches 21 U.S.C. § 856(a). Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, we treat an earlier Tenth Circuit decision in the same action as controlling. Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 861 F.3d 1081, 1099 (10th Cir. 2017). While our law-of-the-case doctrine is discretionary, we generally only refrain from applying it: “(1) when new evidence emerges; (2) when intervening law undermines the original decision; and (3) when the prior ruling was clearly erroneous and would, if followed, create a manifest injustice.” Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070, 1086 (10th Cir. 2014). The government has not argued for any of these exceptions, and we are not inclined to find one sua sponte. The BIA reasoned that the deferred sentence of five years’ imprisonment necessarily makes the § 2-404 conviction a felony because, under its subsection B, only a felony carries jail time. The government has offered the alternative theory on appeal that only one criminal punishment is contemplated by § 2-404(B), and that punishment is one for a felony. Therefore, the argument goes, if Torres-Ledesma was convicted of a crime, he was necessarily convicted of a felony. Torres-Ledesma responded that he pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, punishable by only a civil fine. The law of the case requires us to reject the -7- government’s argument and conclude that the civil fine constitutes a non-felony criminal penalty for these intents and purposes. Because this court’s previous decision forecloses the argument that a conviction under § 2-404(A)(6) is a felony per se and the argument that the civil fine mentioned in § 2-404(B) is not a criminal penalty, we can only affirm if the record contains clear and convincing evidence that Torres-Ledesma violated § 2-404 “knowingly or intentionally.” See § 2-404(B); Bedolla-Zarate v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2018) (stating that the government has the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that an alien’s removal is warranted by his prior conviction). The record does not contain sufficient evidence to permit such a conclusion. True, some evidence supports a weak inference that Torres-Ledesma was convicted of a felony. Chief among that evidence is that the penalty for a felony conviction under § 2-404 resembles the deferred sentence Torres-Ledesma received. In its order amending the conviction nunc pro tunc, the Oklahoma court stated it dismissed the case because “the conditions of the deferred sentence ha[d] been met.” R. vol. 2, p. 498. The BIA took this to mean that the deferred sentence would have been appropriate for the new charge. Under that reading, the determination that Torres-Ledesma was convicted of a felony seems reasonable. The felony conviction under § 2-404 is, after all, punishable by up to five years in -8- prison, and Torres-Ledesma received a five-year deferred prison sentence. The felony portion also provides for a fine of up to ten thousand dollars, and he received a fine. But the BIA overreads the state court. That court never stated the original sentence would have been appropriate under the new charge. At most, the statement could mean the deferred sentence satisfied the minimum punitive requirements of § 2-404. That is, we cannot conclude the court was saying Torres-Ledesma’s sentence would have been appropriate under § 2- 404—only that such as a sentence was at least as punitive as necessary and that he deserved no further punishment. This is equally consistent with a conviction under the civil penalty portion of the statute. In sum, the government has not shown that the record clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Torres-Ledesma pleaded guilty to an aggravated felony. B. Removal for Conviction of a Controlled Substances Violation Because the BIA incorrectly concluded that Torres-Ledesma was removable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal, it may still consider whether he was removable under (a)(2)(B)(i). On remand, the agency must determine whether Torres-Ledesma’s conviction under 63 Okla. Stat. § 2-404 made him removable under § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). -9-