Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Comments on Defendant's Past Sexual Activity

Text: At the penalty phase, defendant called as his last witness Richard Michael Yarvis, M.D., a psychiatrist, to give expert opinion testimony regarding his background and character. In forming his views, Dr. Yarvis relied on face-to-face meetings with defendant and/or counsel and on the review of documents of various sorts and the live testimony of other witnesses. On direct examination, Dr. Yarvis purported to provide a kind of overview or synthesis or explanatory vehicle, if you will, a chronology of the symptoms and impairments on the one hand, and the list of what ... can be reasonably construed to be relevant factors, ... on the other hand, nothing more, nothing less. On cross-examination, Dr. Yarvis declined an invitation by the prosecutor to diagnose defendant as a sadist or sado-masochist. During the questioning, he was probed as to his knowledge of various alleged instances of sexual activity on defendant's part  of which there was no evidence in the record  including the following: defendant handcuffed and spanked a girl named Wendy B. against her will when she was about 15 years old; he whipped another girl named Kim S., who bore him a child, and asked her to whip him in return; he requested Kim S. to insert a table leg into his rectum; and he manipulated the anus of an 18-month-old child. In the course of his summation, the prosecutor made the following comments. When the defendant testified he noted that Marcie had tears in her eyes while he was assaulting her, ... and that raises a question in my mind and I hope in yours. As the defendant was assaulting Marcie, as he was sexually raping her and sodomizing her, was he watching and enjoying what he was doing? Was he getting sadistic satisfaction in what he was doing? What was his motivation in doing those horrible and cruel things to her? I asked Dr. Yarvis about that. I asked him what he thought of it in light of the past history which he acknowledged in cross-examination consists of molestation of an eighteen month-old [ sic ] and spanking the other[,] Wendy [B.], ... the whipping he asked of and did to Kim [S.], the mother of his child. I think there is considerable evidence in this case, evidence that Dr. Yarvis was happy to gloss over but evidence, nevertheless, that the defendant does and did take sadistic satisfaction in what he did to Marcie [D.]. I found it very interesting that there was so many semen over Marcie's abdomen. There was semen in her vagina as well and in her rectum, but it is apparent that the defendant did not ejaculate fully inside Marcie. He ejaculated at least one time over her; how else can we explain the semen on her abdomen? What was the defendant looking at and thinking about as he ejaculated over Marcie [D.] onto her abdomen? I don't believe it is an unfair inference or a stretching of the evidence to suggest to you that the defendant was using Marcie in a perverse way. He didn't think that Marcie was a girlfriend. He was not making love to her as though he would make love to a girlfriend. (35a) Defendant now contends that through the comments about his past history, the prosecutor committed misconduct. He argues that the remarks went beyond the evidence in the record in contravention of California law; they thereby offended the Sixth Amendment, with its right of confrontation; and as a result, they violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. We reject the claim at the threshold. The rule of timely and specific assignment of misconduct and request for admonition was not satisfied. To be sure, after the prosecutor's summation defense counsel did in fact make an unsuccessful assignment and request on the ground that the complained-of comments incorrectly stated or implied that crimes other than burglary and assault with intent to commit rape could be considered in aggravation. But he did not make the assignment and request on the ground that underlies his point here. [17] Moreover, the exception to the rule is inapplicable. Any harm threatened by the remarks  which were relatively isolated and unemphatic  was certainly curable. We shall also address the merits. The question does not appear to be difficult so far as the United States Constitution is concerned. The complained-of comments seem not to have offended defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation right. Apparently, the prosecutor here ... introduced no statements made by persons unavailable for questioning at trial. ( Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643, fn. 15 [40 L.Ed.2d 431, 437, 94 S.Ct. 1868]; accord, People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 534 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129].) Neither do the remarks seem to have violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. As noted, they were relatively isolated and unemphatic. By contrast, the question is somewhat closer so far as California law is concerned. (36) It is settled that a prosecutor may not go beyond the evidence in his argument to the jury. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 794.) (35b) The prosecutor here seems to have done so. It is certainly conceivable that a reasonable juror could have understood the comments as stating or implying  incorrectly  that there was evidence in the record supporting the mentioned instances of sexual activity on defendant's part. But even if we were to find misconduct, we would not reverse. Certainly, any failing here is not prejudicial per se, but rather is subject to harmless-error analysis. Whether it violates state law only or implicates the United States Constitution as well is immaterial. It is harmless under both Brown 's reasonable possibility standard and Chapman's reasonable doubt test  which, as noted, are the same in substance and effect. The gist of the prosecutor's argument was that defendant does and did take sadistic satisfaction in what he did to Marcie [D.]. Comment of that sort was permissible: it was reasonably fair in light of the evidence. Considered in their context, the remarks here challenged were brief and essentially inconsequential. Defendant argues that some standard stricter still than Chapman 's applies to Eighth Amendment violations. (37)(See fn. 18.) That is not the case. (See People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1031-1032 [245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342].) [18]