Opinion ID: 1411039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interplay Between Collective Bargaining Agreements and State Discrimination Law

Text: As a preliminary and fundamental matter, this Court acknowledges that resolution of this case does not depend upon any assessment of the appropriateness of collective bargaining agreements between the Plaintiffs' union and the Railroad. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), the United States Supreme Court explained: [W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim [9] ... or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law. 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court also noted, however, that not all labor disputes are pre-empted by Section 301: Clearly § 301 does not grant the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for what is illegal under state law. In extending the pre-emptive effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section to pre-empt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract. 471 U.S. at 212, 105 S.Ct. 1904. The Supreme Court specified that it expressly did not hold that every state-law suit asserting a right that relates in some way to a provision in a collective-bargaining agreement, or more generally to the parties to such an agreement, necessarily is pre-empted by § 301. The full scope of the pre-emptive effect of federal labor-contract law remains to be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904. With specific reference to the Railway Labor Act, the United States Supreme Court has expressed the identical sentiment: substantive protections provided by state law, independent of whatever labor agreements might govern, are not preempted under the [Railway Labor Act.] Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 257, 114 S.Ct. 2239, 129 L.Ed.2d 203 (1994). The Court reasoned that no proposed interpretation demonstrates a clear and manifest congressional purpose to create a regime that broadly pre-empts substantive protections extended by the States, independent of any negotiated labor agreement. Id. at 255-56, 114 S.Ct. 2239. Where an employer raised a defense which allegedly required some interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987), explained that § 301 did not preempt state consideration of the claim. [T]he presence of a federal question, even a § 301 question, in a defensive argument does not overcome the paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint rulethat the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.... [A] defendant cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated. 482 U.S. at 398-99, 107 S.Ct. 2425. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), the United States Supreme Court encountered a plaintiff who had submitted his discrimination claim to arbitration through a collective bargaining agreement. The Court determined that the plaintiff had not foreclosed his rights to pursue his discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and reasoned as follows: Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver. 415 U.S. at 51-52, 94 S.Ct. 1011 (citations omitted). In this Court's recent examination of these issues in Greenfield v. Schmidt Baking Co., 199 W.Va. 447, 485 S.E.2d 391 (1997), we stated as follows at syllabus point four: An application of state law is pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement. Based upon extensive evaluation of federal preemption law, we also explained at syllabus point five of Greenfield: A determination of pre-emption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947) (1994 ed.), requires a fact specific analysis. [10] With reference to the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, we concluded in syllabus point four of Ash v. Ravens Metal Products, Inc., 190 W.Va. 90, 437 S.E.2d 254 (1993), that `[t]he mere fact that W.Va.Code, 21-5-4, relates to matters which may be the subject of collective bargaining does not mean that the terms of this statute are preempted by virtue of Section 301 of the [Labor Management Relations Act], 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).' Syllabus Point 5, Lowe v. Imperial Colliery Co., 180 W.Va. 518, 377 S.E.2d 652 (1988). In syllabus point five of Ash, we continued in that vein: An arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement cannot nullify the statutory rights given to employees under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W.Va.Code, 21-5-1, et seq.  In Yoho v. Triangle PWC, Inc., 175 W.Va. 556, 336 S.E.2d 204 (1985), an employee instituted an action under West Virginia law against her employer and union for retaliatory discharge allegedly based upon her receipt of workers' compensation benefits. Her discharge after a one-year absence from work was consistent with the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; thus, her challenge was determined to have its foundations in state law rather then any violation of collective bargaining agreements. We therefore found that her action was not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185, governing suits by and against labor organizations for contract violations. Id. at 560, 336 S.E.2d at 208. In the present case, we conclude that our review of this state law discrimination claim is not exclusively dependent upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreements. [11] The Plaintiffs do not directly attack the agreements or allege a violation thereof, but instead allege that the Railroad discriminated against them in a more general effort to remove them from its workforce through any means available to it, including discriminatory application of the collective bargaining agreements, intimidation, and hostile comments directed toward the older workers and based upon the age of those workers. Thus, this Court's perception of the adequacy of the resolutions made through the existing labor agreements is irrelevant. [12] We concentrate only upon the allegations of discrimination and refrain, as the Railroad cautions, from permitting the Plaintiffs to utilize the West Virginia Human Rights Act to reverse modifications in the Railroad industry developed by collective bargaining agreements or PEB 219. B.