Opinion ID: 852041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: iii-c

Text: Lastly, Ward claims that trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to testimony regarding the existence of a putt-putt golf course at the Indiana State Prison (ISP). The thrust of the claim here is that counsel allowed the prosecutor to suggest that Ward was enjoying life in prison playing putt-putt when in fact there was no putt-putt course at the prison at all. The PC court rejected this claim, and it made certain findings to support this rejection. It recounted the challenged testimony that the ISP has a putt-putt golf area and the prosecutor's arguments in closing that emphasized this point. The PC court recognized that by September, 2006, the putt-putt course was no longer operational and that Ward's second trial was held in May, 2007. PCR App. 335. The PC court found, however, that [t]o the extent that there was not a working miniature golf course on the grounds of the [ISP] at the time of Ward's trial, Ward was not prejudiced by the State's suggestion that [inmates] could participate in activities such as miniature golf. Petitioner's own evidence at post-conviction establishes that ISP had at least fairly recently had [sic] such a facility available for use by inmates. The evidence also established that life without parole inmates had access to a number of social, educational, and recreational activities. Regardless, the Court finds that had Ward's counsel made an effort to disabuse the jury regarding the availability of miniature golf to inmates, such would not have created any probability, let alone a reasonable one, of a different outcome. Id. at 335-36 (internal citation omitted). We agree.
Third, Ward claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Specifically, he argues that appellate counsel failed to argue that presentation of criminal-deviate-conduct argument and evidence was fundamental error; failed to argue that presentation of victim-impact argument and evidence was fundamental error; failed to argue that Ward's guilty plea was a mitigating circumstance; and failed to challenge adequately Ward's sentence of death. [23] The standard for gauging appellate counsel's performance is the same as that for trial counsel. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 927-28. [24] Therefore, `[t]o prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, [the petitioner] must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.' Id. at 928 (alterations in original) (quoting Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1166); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (two-part test for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims). As for the first prong  counsel's performance  we presume that counsel provided adequate representation. Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 928. Accordingly, `[c]ounsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and we will accord that decision deference.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Allen, 749 N.E.2d at 1166). The second prong  the prejudicial effect of counsel's conduct-requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). Applying these legal standards, the PC court concluded that appellate counsel rendered competent, constitutionally adequate representation. PCR App. 345. Specifically, it rejected the first three of Ward's claims regarding criminal deviate conduct, victim-impact evidence, and his guilty plea as mitigating evidence by referencing its discussion of these claims as they applied to the effectiveness of trial counsel and concluding that these claims of appellate ineffectiveness of counsel failed for the same reasons. Id. at 346-47. As discussed earlier in this opinion, we affirmed the PC court's finding of no ineffective assistance of trial counsel on Ward's claims regarding criminal deviate conduct, victim-impact evidence, and the guilty plea as mitigating evidence, and for essentially the same reasons, we affirm its finding of no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in these regards. See Pruitt, 903 N.E.2d at 930 (rejecting appellate counsel ineffectiveness claim based on prior finding of no trial counsel ineffectiveness on same issue). With regard to Ward's fourth claim in this section  that his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge adequately his death sentence  the PC court found that this was a `catchall' that offers no meaningful allegation of deficient performance or prejudice with respect to appellate counsel's representation. PCR App. 347. We agree. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In this claim, Ward alleges that his appellate counsel were ineffective, in general, by inadequately challenging his death sentence, but he identifies no specific act or omission. The PC court properly rejected this claim.
Fourth, Ward raises a claim under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), that the trial court's rulings on certain matters prevented trial counsel from rendering effective assistance. Specifically, Ward argues that the set of facts surrounding the trial court's (a) denial of a continuance; (b) denial of funds for essential experts; and (c) decision to alter the method of jury selection justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. In Cronic, the Supreme Court recognized that in certain limited circumstances of extreme magnitude, prejudice to a criminal defendant is so likely that an inquiry into counsel's actual performance is not required. Id. at 658-62, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Stated differently, a presumption of ineffectiveness arises in certain extreme circumstances without resort to the traditional two-prong Strickland analysis. Id.; see also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) (explaining that Cronic is a narrow exception to Strickland ). The Court in Cronic identified three circumstances justifying such a presumption: (1) the complete denial of counsel; (2) situations where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) situations where surrounding circumstances are such that, although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. 466 U.S. at 659-60, 104 S.Ct. 2039. In Cronic, the district court had appointed a young lawyer with a real estate practice who had never conducted a jury trial to represent a defendant who had been indicted for mail fraud. Although it had taken the government four-and-one-half years to investigate the case and review thousands of documents, this young lawyer had only 25 days for pretrial preparation. Id. at 649, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Tenth Circuit had held that these circumstances, among others, justified a presumption of ineffectiveness without inquiry into performance or prejudice. Id. at 652-53, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Supreme Court disagreed. While recognizing that certain extreme circumstances justify such a presumption, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances at issue in that case did not make it unlikely that the defendant could have received effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 666, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Thus, Ward faces an extremely heavy burden in making his Cronic claims. Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 481, modified on reh'g on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211 (Ind.1997). In examining these claims, we look for circumstances that justif[y] a presumption that no lawyer could provide [Ward] with the effective assistance of counsel required by the Constitution. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (footnote omitted). In other words, for us to presume prejudice under Cronic, it must be shown that the circumstances completely deprived [Ward] of any meaningful opportunity to subject the State's evidence to adversarial testing. Games, 684 N.E.2d at 479.