Opinion ID: 3011368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shoats' Due Process Claim

Text: Although we hold that Shoats has a protected liberty interest that has been adversely affected by his indefinite segregation in administrative custody, we reject Shoats' argument that he has been deprived of the process he is due under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), the Supreme Court considered whether prison inmates were entitled to due process before being placed in solitary confinement for administrative -- rather than disciplinary -- reasons. The Court expressly rejected the idea that due process required a detailed adversary proceeding, on the ground that it would not materially assist the decision to be made. Id. at 473-74. The Court further held that in these situations, an informal, nonadversary review at which the prisoner has the opportunity to state his views, satisfies the requirements of due process: An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding 8 whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where they believe a written statement would be ineffective. So long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and thenavailable evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied. Id. at 476. The inmate in Hewitt received notice of the charges against him the day after his misconduct took place. Id. at 477. Only five days after his transfer to administrative segregation, a Hearing Committee reviewed the existing evidence against him. Id. Moreover, the inmate acknowledged on his misconduct form that he had the opportunity to have [his] version reported as part of the record, and thus had an opportunity to present a statement to the Committee. Id. The Supreme Court held that this proceeding plainly satisfied the Due Process requirements for confinement of the inmate in administrative custody. Id. Here, Shoats has been given exactly the same opportunities as those given to the inmate in Hewitt; there is therefore no question that, on its face, the procedure provided to Shoats is constitutionally adequate. The process provided by the Pennsylvania DOC to an inmate confined in administrative custody is as follows. A hearing is conducted by the PRC, in which the rationale for the administrative custody placement is read and explained to the inmate. See A84. The inmate is permitted to respond to the rationale for administrative custody placement either orally or in writing. Id. A Committee member then drafts a summary of the inmate's statements. Id. A written summary of the entire hearing is then prepared, which includes the reasons relied upon by the PRC to reach its decision, and a copy of this summary is given to the inmate. Id. An inmate may appeal the PRC's decision to the Superintendent in writing within two days of the completion 9 of the hearing, and the decision of the Superintendent must be forwarded to the inmate within ten days of the receipt of the appeal. See A85. The inmate's right to appeal terminates when he or she is released from administrative custody. Id. At least once every thirty days, those inmates assigned to administrative custody have the right to be personally interviewed by the PRC. Id. For those inmates not released from administrative custody following the thirty-day review, the reasons for the PRC's decision are forwarded to the Superintendent for his or her review. Id. If the Superintendent agrees that the rationale for holding an inmate in administrative custody is reasonable, he or she notifies the inmate accordingly. Id. If, however, the Superintendent believes the inmate should be released to the general population, he or she will so order it. Id. After an inmate is confined for ninety days in administrative custody, the Superintendent must complete a formal report to the Regional Deputy Commissioner, who then reviews the recommendation of the institution to determine if any further action is necessary. Id. Further action may include release to the general population, transfer to another facility or program, or continuation in administrative custody. Id. In light of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Hewitt, we conclude that the Pennsylvania procedures clearly comply with due process requirements. The record reflects that the procedures called for did in fact occur. Specific program review committee progress reports are included in the record, which reflect Shoats' choice to appear at some, but not all, of his PRC reviews. The reports reflect that Shoats raised and discussed various issues at these committee sessions, including his desire for library time, complaints about the commissary and medical treatment, visitation rights, and other general matters. In many instances, Shoats complained about the denial of his release into the general population, and he was advised of the prison's reasons for denying his release. There is no indication that Shoats presented any countervailing arguments or considerations to the review committee. 10 Shoats does not argue that he was denied the opportunity to respond or be heard, nor does he argue that the prison authorities failed to consider favorable information or that they otherwise dealt with his case in a perfunctory fashion. Cf. Sourbeer v. Robinson , 791 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1986). In fact, Shoats does not contend that he made any arguments, or offered any favorable factual data to counter the prison's rationale for holding him. Rather, Shoats argues that his continued confinement in administrative custody is based solely on his past crimes of murder, escape, kidnaping and assault, and therefore has no contemporaneous justification. (Appellant's Br. at 42-48). We disagree. Shoats is not confined to administrative custody simply because he committed crimes in the past, but because he is, in the considered judgment of all the prison professionals who have evaluated him, a current threat to the security and good order of the institution, and to the safety of other people. See A238-44 (Mistrick Dep.). This assessment is based partly on Shoats' conduct, but also on the prison professionals' current impressions of him based on their day-to-day dealings with Shoats over time. See, e.g., A243 (Mistrick Dep.)([H]e represents a danger to the secure running of the institution and the safety of others); A115 (Varner Dep.)([I]n my opinion, this man was still a danger); A169 (White Dep.)(I felt he was still dangerous). Even were we to conclude that Shoats' continued confinement in administrative custody is based solely on his past crimes, the process he received would nonetheless pass constitutional muster, because predictions of likely future behavior based on a generally volatile criminal character have been upheld by the Supreme Court: In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other 11 prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 474 (internal citations omitted). Thus, Shoats could conceivably be held in administrative custody merely because his prior crimes reasonably foreshadow future misconduct. Shoats also claims that his confinement is the result of the bias of Superintendent Varner, who reviewed his confinement at SCI-Greene, first as a member of the PRC and later as Superintendent. (Appellant's Br. at 38-39). However, Shoats' administrative custody dates back to 1991, long before Shoats came to SCI-Greene, and it has continued to the present, long after Varner left SCI-Greene in April 1998. No member of the PRC, and no Superintendent, at SCI-Greene or elsewhere, has ever recommended that Shoats be released to the general prison population. Thus, we hold that Shoats' bias argument is without foundation. Shoats' confinement in administrative custody has been, in accordance with the DOC regulations, reviewed every month by the PRC and the Superintendent. Furthermore, Shoats has been given the opportunity to present his views personally at each review. See A85-86. In effect, the record demonstrates that Shoats' continued placement in administrative custody is supported by evidence sufficient to pass constitutional muster. Because Shoats has failed to provide any support for his assertions that his PRC reviews were constitutionally inadequate, we hold that the periodic reviews conducted by the PRC here comport with the minimum constitutional standards for due process.