Opinion ID: 1427816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absolute Immunity for White

Text: The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim against White under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) after ruling that White's status as a prosecuting attorney made him absolutely immune from suit, regardless of whether his actions actually deprived Mr. Cooney of a constitutional right, privilege, or immunity. The district court relied on Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) and this court's application of Imbler in Blake v. Rupe, 651 P.2d 1096 (Wyo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S.Ct. 1199, 75 L.Ed.2d 442 (1983). It interpreted both of those cases as granting prosecutor White absolute immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for public policy reasons. [3] The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is deceptively simple because it makes no mention of immunity from liability. [4] The appellate history of the provision, however, reveals that its application necessarily invokes traditional common-law defenses of official immunity which extend absolute immunity to prosecutors in certain situations. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418, 96 S.Ct. at 989, 47 L.Ed.2d at 136 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951)). See also Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503, 48 S.Ct. 155, 72 L.Ed. 395 (1927). Imbler involved a § 1983 action in which Imbler, an exonerated criminal defendant, sought damages against a prosecuting attorney for the prosecutor's alleged knowing use of false testimony and suppression of material evidence to obtain an illegal conviction. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 415-16, 96 S.Ct. at 987-88, 47 L.Ed.2d at 134-35. The prosecutor successfully moved for dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that he was absolutely immune from civil liability and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id., 424 U.S. at 416, 96 S.Ct. at 988, 47 L.Ed.2d at 135. On certiorari review of that dismissal, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a prosecutor is absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983 by focusing on the various functions that a prosecutor serves in society and the balance which must exist between protecting the integrity of those functions and protecting private citizens from prosecutorial abuse. Id., 424 U.S. at 421-24, 96 S.Ct. at 990-92, 47 L.Ed.2d at 138-40. After completing this review, the Court held: It remains to delineate the boundaries of our holding. As noted, the Court of Appeals emphasized that each of respondent's challenged activities was an integral part of the judicial process. The purpose of the Court of Appeals' focus upon the functional nature of the activities rather than respondent's status was to distinguish and leave standing those cases, in its Circuit and in some others, which hold that a prosecutor engaged in certain investigative activities enjoys, not the absolute immunity associated with the judicial process, but only good-faith defense comparable to the policeman's. We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent's activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate. We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983. Id., 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 994-95, 47 L.Ed.2d at 143-44 (citations and footnotes omitted). Courts and commentators generally agree that this holding structured a functional analysis. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201, 106 S.Ct. 496, 501, 88 L.Ed.2d 507, 514 (1985). This court adopted the functional analysis in Blake. In Blake this court extended absolute immunity to a county and prosecuting attorney who employed and supervised an investigator to check both court and penitentiary records, investigated matters preliminary to initiating the prosecution, and presented the prosecution of the state's case of perjury charges against a juror. Blake, 651 P.2d at 1104. Relying on Imbler and decisions following that case, this court determined that the prosecutor's challenged activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. In that regard, this court found it significant that the ill-fated prosecution concerned possible perjury by a prospective juror, arising in a judicial proceeding by failure to disclose [on voir dire examination] a conviction of felony. Id. at 1106. In this court's view, the integrity of the judicial process was at stake in the prosecutor's performing the investigative function. Therefore, not only do we have an investigation involving the initiation of a criminal prosecution, but a prosecution resulting from alleged in-court perjury. We therefore find a greater involvement of the judicial function than the usual investigation by a prosecutor in preparation for initiation of the criminal process by filing of a complaint and trial. Id. at 1106. The functional analysis requires a cautious judicial application because [a]bsolute immunity flows not from rank or title or `location within the Government,' but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official.  Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 201, 106 S.Ct. at 501, 88 L.Ed.2d at 514 (emphasis added; citation omitted). It probes the character of the ultimate decisions required by any prosecutor who would make decisions in the situation in question; allegations of malice, self-interest, vindictiveness and the like will not defeat absolute immunity for protected prosecutorial functions. Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 828, 108 S.Ct. 97, 98 L.Ed.2d 58 (1987); Ybarra v. Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.1984), and numerous cases cited therein. Therefore, the reviewing court must not allow its focus on the functional character of the prosecutorial conduct at issue to be skewed by an emotional response to a particularly abusive fact situation. There is no bad faith exception to absolute prosecutorial immunity for prosecutorial conduct that meets the Imbler requirements. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427, 96 S.Ct. at 993, 47 L.Ed.2d at 141. See also Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom. Barbera v. Schlessinger, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1338, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989) (soliciting and suborning perjured testimony does not create liability in damages for prosecutorial conduct functionally qualifying for absolute immunity under Imbler ); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861, 101 S.Ct. 165, 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980) (falsifying evidence and coercing perjured testimony); Campbell v. State of Maine, 787 F.2d 776, 778 (1st Cir.1986). The functional approach has proven to be a somewhat difficult standard to apply because of the limited scope of the Imbler holding. In Imbler, the Court recognized there would be administrative and investigative prosecutorial conduct not done in furtherance of a prosecutorial function that demands the protection of absolute immunity. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995, 47 L.Ed.2d at 143-44. See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-16, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2914-16, 57 L.Ed.2d 895, 920-22 (1978) (certain federal administrative officers are entitled to absolute immunity when they function analogous to prosecutorial functions protected under Imbler ). However, the Court expressly reserved an explanation of the difference between the two classes of conduct noting only that: Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them. Id., 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995, 47 L.Ed.2d at 144 n. 33. [5] As the following discussion will illustrate, federal and state courts have been wrestling with those difficult questions ever since. The Eleventh Circuit recently remarked [t]he dividing line is amorphous, and the process of determining on which side of the line particular kinds of conduct fall has proceeded on a case-by-case basis. Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 789 (11th Cir.1988). The Cooneys' § 1983 action against prosecutor White requires that we venture into this difficult legal terrain. In their appeal the Cooneys contend that the deputy county attorney's wrongful conduct was his decision to have Mr. Cooney arrested and detained in jail for thirty-eight days. They argue that the deputy county attorney's activities of assisting the Department, of using the perjured probation revocation petition to obtain a bench warrant for Mr. Cooney's arrest, and of causing Mr. Cooney to be arrested and detained were administrative in nature and not the functional equivalent of the prosecutor's role as an advocate in a criminal proceeding. If they are correct, the deputy county attorney enjoys qualified, not absolute, immunity in their civil rights action.
Against the backdrop of Imbler and Blake, we must determine whether the deputy county attorney's challenged activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and, therefore, were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995, 47 L.Ed.2d at 143.