Opinion ID: 890183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mootness Jurisprudence

Text: ¶ 25 Turning now to our mootness jurisprudence, this Court's cases addressing the mootness of appeals (where the underlying judgment has been satisfied) have relied on differing, and sometimes inconsistent, rationales. Although we have overruled some of the cases in an effort to eliminate confusion, the law in this area still remains unsettled. It is helpful, therefore, to provide a comprehensive picture of where things stand, in order that we may clarify the rules to be followed.
¶ 26 The foundational precedent is State ex rel. Begeman v. Napton, 10 Mont. 369, 25 P. 1045 (1891). A juror (Begeman) applied to the district court for a writ of mandamus requiring Napton, clerk of the district court, to issue Begeman a certificate of his mileage and attendance as a trial juror in that court. The district court ordered the writ to issue, and Napton appealed to this Court. Meanwhile, Napton obeyed the writ and issued the certificate. Given these circumstances, we observed that [a] judgment of any kind from this court would present a peculiar result. An affirmance would be to direct the District Court to issue a writ, which that court has already issued, and which has been obeyed. A reversal would be to say to the lower court, you may not order the clerk to do that which he has already fully performed. It is apparent that there is no controversy before us. The case is fictitious. Begeman, 10 Mont. at 370, 25 P. at 1046. Napton acknowledged that a decision from the Court would not affect this case. He explained that he was pursuing the appeal only for the purpose of having this Court provide guidance for the future. We refused, however, to depart from the rule that courts will hear only genuine controversies, and will not tender advice upon matters not in litigation. Begeman, 10 Mont. at 370, 25 P. at 1046. We accordingly dismissed the appeal. ¶ 27 To the same effect is Snell v. Welch, 28 Mont. 482, 72 P. 988 (1903). There, the defendants (members of the textbook commission) filed an appeal from an order of the district court enjoining them from letting contracts under an act of the Legislature which provided for a uniform series of textbooks for use in public schools. The parties then settled their differences and the contracts were let. Citing Begeman, this Court dismissed the appeal, observing that [t]here is nothing in this case now for us to decide. It has been disposed of by the parties themselves pending the appeal. Snell, 28 Mont. at 483, 72 P. at 988. ¶ 28 Likewise, in State ex rel. Hauswirth v. Beadle, 90 Mont. 24, 300 P. 197 (1931), Hauswirth applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Butte mayor and city council from enacting an ordinance that would permit Montana Power Company to supply natural gas to the city's inhabitants. The district court denied the application, and Hauswirth did not request a stay. Thereafter, the city council enacted and the mayor approved the ordinance. Accordingly, this Court held that the issue had become moot, since nothing would be achieved by reversing the district court and directing it to issue the writ. Under the circumstances the writ of prohibition cannot undo that which has been done. Hauswirth, 90 Mont. at 27, 300 P. at 198. ¶ 29 In State ex rel. Brass v. Horn, 36 Mont. 418, 93 P. 351 (1908), Brass was charged in the police court of Helena with disturbing the peace. When the police judge (Horn) denied Brass' request for a transfer of the cause to the nearest justice of the peace, Brass applied to the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the transfer. The district court granted the writ, and Horn appealed. Yet, on the same day that he filed his appeal, Horn also complied with the district court's mandate. As a result, this Court dismissed the appeal as moot. The Court observed that it would serve no useful purpose to reverse the judgment appealed from, because the cause was, immediately upon the issuance of judgment and service of the writ, transferred to the justice, and has doubtless long since been disposed of. Brass, 36 Mont. at 420, 93 P. at 352. ¶ 30 A similar situation arose in Johnson v. Rosenbeck, 141 Mont. 72, 375 P.2d 221, (1962). There, the district court (in a mandamus proceeding) found that the judgments of conviction entered against Johnson in the police court of Superior were null and void. Thus, the district court ordered the police judge (Rosenbeck) to return the fines Johnson had paid. The district court also stated, however, that it was not prohibiting the Town of Superior from filing proper charges against Johnson. On the parties' appeals to this Court (Rosenbeck from the district court's order; Johnson from the denial of his request for damages and attorney's fees), we noted that sworn complaints had since been filed and the prosecution against Johnson instituted anew in the police court. Thus, the [district court] judgment anulling the previous proceedings in the police court was recognized and carried into effect. A reversal of the district court judgment would be futile. The ostensible effect of the reversal would be to reinstate the original judgments entered by the police judge, but that result is now impossible because the original judgments have been superseded and abrogated by new proceedings in the police court. Johnson, 141 Mont. at 74-75, 375 P.2d at 223. We accordingly dismissed Rosenbeck's appeal. Johnson, 141 Mont. at 75, 76, 375 P.2d at 223, 224. ¶ 31 The foregoing cases involved the grant or denial of injunctive-type relief where subsequent events mooted the original dispute and left this Court unable to issue anything more than an advisory opinion on the matter. A slightly different situation arose in Fox v. Hacker, 68 Mont. 413, 220 P. 749 (1923). There, Fox brought an action against Hacker to enforce a contract for the sale of land. During the pendency of the action, Hacker conveyed the land in question to Fox, and Fox paid the purchase price therefor with the exception of a portion of the price that was in dispute. The district court determined that Hacker was entitled to the disputed amount, and Fox appealed. On appeal, however, Fox argued that the district court's judgment should be reversed because the instrument in question was not a valid contract in the first place. Noting difficulty in understanding Fox's position, this Court concluded that no practical result could follow from a decision on Fox's contention. Fox, 68 Mont. at 418, 419, 220 P. at 750, 751. [W]hether the instrument referred to in the complaint was a valid contract, subject to enforcement as such in an action for its specific performance, has become a moot question, interesting perhaps from an academic point of view, but its decision could not result in any practical relief to the parties to this suit, since ... they have by stipulation consummated the deal contemplated in the instrument, irrespective of any defects which may have existed therein. Fox, 68 Mont. at 418, 220 P. at 750. We acknowledged that the parties had agreed in their stipulation that the case shall proceed as though the land had not been conveyed and no part of the purchase money paid. But we held that the parties to litigation cannot by stipulation present a moot question to this Court as the basis of a judicial decision. Fox, 68 Mont. at 419-20, 220 P. at 751.
¶ 32 The next case, In re Black's Estate, 32 Mont. 51, 79 P. 554 (1905), has been cited in subsequent cases on the question of mootness, but a careful reading reveals that the decision is grounded on principles of waivera distinction that is important to make for reasons discussed below. The deceased's son and daughter appealed from the district court's decree of distribution. Yet, prior to the appeal, the son and daughter received the shares allotted to them by the decree and gave the estate administrator receipts in full therefor. As a result, the administrator moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the son and daughter had accepted the provisions of the decree and voluntarily satisfied the same. This Court granted the motion, observing that [t]he right to accept the fruits of a judgment, and at the same time to prosecute an appeal from it, are not concurrent. On the contrary, they are wholly inconsistent rights. The election of one necessarily excludes the enjoyment of the other. Black's Estate, 32 Mont. at 53, 79 P. at 555. The Court recognized that there are exceptions to this general rule, but determined that none of them applied here. The appeal had been taken generally, and the purpose sought was a reversal of the district court's judgment as a wholesomething the son and daughter could not do, having already accepted the fruits of that judgment. Black's Estate, 32 Mont. at 54-55, 79 P. at 555-56. The Court also noted that the receipts executed by the son and daughter reflected an intention to acknowledge receipt in full of all the distributive shares to which they were entitled in the estate and to release the administrator of liability. Black's Estate, 32 Mont. at 56, 79 P. at 556. Essentially, the son and daughter had agreed that the decree was to be final. Lastly, one other facet of Black's Estate must be mentioned. In the course of its analysis, the Court posited that [w]hen a judgment has been paid, it has passed beyond review; the satisfaction of it being the end of the proceeding. Black's Estate, 32 Mont. at 53, 79 P. at 555. This categorical rule was repeated in several subsequent cases. However, as will be seen, this Court ultimately repudiated the rule as an incorrect statement of the law. ¶ 33 The next two cases are significant in that the Court reached opposite conclusions on the question of mootness despite the similar procedural postures of the casesthe distinction being the involvement of third-party interests in the moot case. First, in State ex rel. Kurth v. Grinde, 96 Mont. 608, 32 P.2d 15 (1934), the district court issued a writ of mandate commanding that Kurth be reinstated as Great Falls water registrar. The existing water registrar (Pierse) complied with the writ, but still maintained an appeal to this Court. We allowed the appeal. We noted that, as a general rule, once a party has complied with the commands of a writ of mandate, the question whether the writ should have been granted will not be reviewed. Kurth, 96 Mont. at 611, 32 P.2d at 16. But here, we reasoned, the underlying question is who has the title to the office in question, and if that person is Pierse, then this Court may compel Kurth to surrender to Pierse all of the books, papers, and insignia belonging or appertaining to that office. Kurth, 96 Mont. at 612-13, 32 P.2d at 16. We may exercise the right of compelling restitution by our own mandate or direct the lower court to do so; hence, the fact that the order or judgment of the district court has been complied with does not warrant us in dismissing the appeal. Kurth, 96 Mont. at 613, 32 P.2d at 16. ¶ 34 In the second case, State ex rel. Hagerty v. Rafn, 130 Mont. 554, 304 P.2d 918 (1956), the district court issued a writ of mandamus compelling the Montana Liquor Control Board to issue beer and liquor licenses to parties who had tribal permits to engage in the liquor business on the Blackfeet Indian Reservation. An application was made to this Court for a stay pending the outcome of an appeal, but this Court was in summer recess at the time. The Board, therefore, issued the licenses under protest, while still maintaining an appeal to this Court. In contrast to Kurth, however, we dismissed the appeal as moot. We acknowledged that the Board's compliance with the writ had been involuntary. We also rejected the notion that when a judgment has been paid it has passed beyond review, the satisfaction of it being the end of the proceeding. Besides the fact that this statement was dictum in Black's Estate, we pointed out that the statement is not always true in every case even of a judgment for money damages when payment is voluntarily made and generally speaking is clearly an incorrect statement of the law when payment or performance otherwise is involuntary. Hagerty, 130 Mont. at 557, 304 P.2d at 919-20. Nevertheless, whether the Board obeyed the writ voluntarily or involuntarily, we concluded that our review of the issues would be to no purpose and that a reversal would be without effecti.e., the appeal was mootbecause the persons named in the issued licenses had since acted upon the permission given them thereby to dispense liquors and beer at Browning. Presumably each has a tavern, has invested capital in his respective enterprise as he was lawfully entitled to do, and has acquired patrons and customers, and has what is commonly known as an established and going business, all of which is of some value. If the appellants were to prevail in this action and upon a reversal we were to order the board and court below to cancel out the licenses now outstanding, the status quo of the parties to this litigation could not be restored as it was when the judgment of the lower court was entered. Hagerty, 130 Mont. at 557-58, 304 P.2d at 920. We distinguished Kurth on the ground that, unlike there, we could not here effect restitution upon a reversal of the district court's writ. Hagerty, 130 Mont. at 558, 304 P.2d at 920; see also Gill v. Rafn, 133 Mont. 505, 509-10, 326 P.2d 974, 976 (1958) (discussing this facet of Hagerty). ¶ 35 This brings us to the most problematic case in this line of authority: Gallatin Trust & Sav. Bank v. Henke, 154 Mont. 170, 461 P.2d 448 (1969). The case has since been overruled, but certain aspects of the decision are pertinent to the instant discussion and, thus, should be noted here. As an initial matter, the Henke Court consumed several pages addressing the merits of Henke's appeal, 154 Mont. at 172-76, 461 P.2d at 449-51, only then to observe that [w]hile we have heretofore discussed the merits of this case, we choose to discuss the motion to dismiss the appeal, 154 Mont. at 176, 461 P.2d at 451. This approach, of course, puts the proverbial cart before the horse because, as stated above, mootness is a threshold issue which must be resolved before we may address the substantive merits of a dispute. See ¶ 17, supra. The Henke Court then proceeded to dismiss the appeal as moot, 154 Mont. at 177, 461 P.2d at 452, thereby rendering the entire preceding discussion of the merits of the appeal dictum. ¶ 36 In concluding the appeal was moot, the Henke Court cited the facts that Henke had not posted a supersedeas bond, that this Court had denied her application for a stay of execution, and that the judgments against Henke had thereafter been satisfied. 154 Mont. at 177, 461 P.2d at 452. The Court purported to resurrect the rule that [w]hen the judgment is paid it passes beyond review; its satisfaction ends the proceeding. Henke, 154 Mont. at 177, 461 P.2d at 451-52 (citing Black's Estate, 32 Mont. 51, 79 P. 554). Doing so was concededly in conflict with Hagerty 's criticisms of Black's Estate, a point that ultimately had to be resolved in later cases. First, in Mont. Natl. Bank of Roundup v. Dept. of Revenue, 167 Mont. 429, 539 P.2d 722 (1975), we rejected the Department of Revenue's reliance on Henke in support of the contention that the Bank's appeal was moot. We reaffirmed the well recognized rule that payment of a money judgment by the judgment debtor does not, by itself, render the cause moot for purposes of appeal. State ex rel. Hagerty v. Rafn, 130 Mont. 554, 304 P.2d 918, and cases cited therein. A defeated party's compliance with the judgment renders his appeal moot only where the compliance makes the granting of effective relief by the appellate court impossible. State ex rel. Begeman v. Napton, 10 Mont. 369, 25 P. 1045; Anno. 39 A.L.R.2d 153, 179. Bank of Roundup, 167 Mont. at 432-33, 539 P.2d at 724. We did not expressly overrule Henke in Bank of Roundup, but later did so in an Opinion and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss in First Natl. Bank in Eureka v. Giles, No. 86-195, 1986 Mont. LEXIS 979 (July 24, 1986). There, after discussing Henke, Bank of Roundup, and Hagerty, we adopted the rule that if a judgment is satisfied by an involuntary payment or performance, the appeal from the judgment is not thereby rendered moot. [2] Bank in Eureka, 1986 Mont. LEXIS 979 at ; accord Le Clair v. Reiter, 233 Mont. 332, 335, 760 P.2d 740, 742 (1988). As will be seen, we later rejected the voluntary/involuntary distinction as an element of mootness analysis. But the critical point to be taken from these post-Henke decisions is that this Court returned to the fundamental principle that a defeated party's compliance with the judgment renders the appeal moot only where the compliance makes the granting of effective relief by the appellate court impossible. Bank of Roundup, 167 Mont. at 432-33, 539 P.2d at 724 (citing Begeman, 10 Mont. 369, 25 P. 1045). ¶ 37 Lastly, one other aspect of Henke must be noted. In its brief discussion of Black's Estate and Hagerty, the Court opined that we appeared to have set up [in Hagerty ] a new rule to the effect that where rights of third persons are involved and the parties cannot be restored to their original position the appeal becomes moot. Henke, 154 Mont. at 177, 461 P.2d at 451-52. This dictum in Henke which has worked its way into subsequent casesis not entirely accurate. First, the question is not merely whether the parties can be restored to their original positions, but whether it is possible for this Court to grant effective relief. In some situations, the only effective relief would be to restore the parties to their original positions, and if that is no longer possible, then the appeal is moot. See e.g. Hauswirth, 90 Mont. at 26-27, 300 P. at 198 (since the Butte city council and mayor had already enacted the ordinance permitting Montana Power Company to supply natural gas, the appeal was moot); Povsha v. City of Billings, 2007 MT 353, ¶¶ 22-24, 340 Mont. 346, 174 P.3d 515 (because the City had long ago granted the zoning change at issue, and Big Sky Auto Auction had already been built adjacent to Povsha's property, the appeal was moot). As explained above, however, relief may also take the form of restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichmentrather than a literal return of the parties to their starting positionsin which case it would be possible to grant effective relief. Second, as Hagerty reflects, third-party interests may bear on this issue. In Hagerty, the beer and liquor licenses had been issued to parties who then acted upon them to create going businesses, and it was not possible for this Court to effect restitution upon a reversal of the district court's writ. 130 Mont. at 557-58, 304 P.2d at 920. Yet, while third parties (as bona fide payees and purchasers) may be free from restitution claims, the appellant who obtains a reversal of the lower court's judgment may have a claim in restitution against the appellee. See ¶ 23, supra. In those situations, as noted, this Court may grant effective relief. Thus, it was wrong to suggest in Henke that the involvement of third-party interests and the inability to restore the parties to their original positions necessarily moots an appeal. Again, the question, more accurately stated, is whether it is possible to grant some form of effective relief to the appellant.
¶ 38 We now come to Martin Dev. Co. v. Keeney Constr. Co., 216 Mont. 212, 703 P.2d 143 (1985), which presents the most analogous circumstances to the present case. There, the district court entered judgment in favor of Martin for $72,000: $40,000 in lost profits, $20,000 in attorney's fees, and $12,000 in interest. Peschel, the appellant, did not take any action to stay execution of the judgment, and the judgment was thereafter satisfied. For this reason, Martin argued (like Stuivenga does here) that the appeal was moot. This Court disagreed. While acknowledging some apparent confusion in our caselaw, we concluded that the basic rule on mootness was stated best in Bank of Roundup: payment of a money judgment by the judgment debtor does not, by itself, render the cause moot for purposes of appeal; a defeated party's compliance with the judgment renders his appeal moot only where the compliance makes the granting of effective relief by the appellate court impossible. Martin, 216 Mont. at 218-19, 703 P.2d at 147 (citing Bank of Roundup, 167 Mont. at 432, 539 P.2d at 724). Martin had relied on Henke and First Sec. Bank of Kalispell v. Income Props., Inc., 208 Mont. 121, 675 P.2d 982 (1984), but we found these cases distinguishable. In Bank of Kalispell, the defendants had surrendered real property pursuant to the lower court's order, and this Court accordingly dismissed their appeal as moot because we were not able to render the relief the defendants sought. In Henke, various changes of position had occurred in the course of satisfying the judgment which would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for this Court to reverse. In contrast, [n]o property changed hands pursuant to the judgment in Martin and there were no third party interests involved; rather, a simple money judgment was satisfied. 216 Mont. at 220, 703 P.2d at 148. Thus, we held that there was no reason why this Court could not grant effective relief. Martin, 216 Mont. at 220, 703 P.2d at 148. Though not citing the Restatement, we implicitly recognized Peschel's entitlement to restitution of the amounts that had been improperly paid to Martin in satisfaction of the judgment (the $20,000 in attorney's fees and the $12,000 in interest). ¶ 39 The last significant clarification in this line of cases occurred in Turner v. Mt. Engg. & Constr., 276 Mont. 55, 915 P.2d 799 (1996). There, we noted that confusion had arisen from this Court's attempt to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary compliance with a judgment within the context of analyzing mootness. See Turner, 276 Mont. at 59, 915 P.2d at 802 (citing cases). We explained that voluntariness bears on the question whether the appellant has waived his or her right of appeal, but has no bearing on the question of mootness. Turner, 276 Mont. at 59-60, 915 P.2d at 802. The fact that the appellant has voluntarily complied with the judgment does not necessarily mean the appeal is moot. Likewise, the fact that the appellant has involuntarily complied with the judgment does not necessarily mean the appeal is still live. Rather, in deciding whether the appeal is moot, the issue is whether this Court can fashion effective relief. Turner, 276 Mont. at 61, 915 P.2d at 803. Separate and distinct from this issue is the question of waiver. Voluntary compliance with the judgment may result in a waiver of the right to appealin which case it would be unnecessary to address the question of mootness. Turner, 276 Mont. at 61, 64, 915 P.2d at 803, 805; see also H-D Irrigating, Inc. v. Kimble Props., Inc., 2000 MT 212, ¶ 19, 301 Mont. 34, 8 P.3d 95 (The general rule is that a litigant who voluntarily and with knowledge of all the material facts accepts the benefits of an order, decree, or judgment of court, cannot afterward take or prosecute an appeal to reverse it.). This is what occurred in Black's Estate. Conversely, where compliance is involuntary, the party cannot be deemed to have waived or acquiesced in the judgment such that an appeal would be precluded. Turner, 276 Mont. at 61, 64, 915 P.2d at 803, 805; see also e.g. Kennedy v. Dawson, 1999 MT 265, ¶¶ 30-33, 296 Mont. 430, 989 P.2d 390. The appeal may, however, be moot to the extent that this Court cannot grant any effective relief, as occurred in Hagerty. ¶ 40 The Turner Court criticized some of our prior decisions for fail[ing] to analyze the question of what, if any, relief could be fashioned in the event of a reversal. 276 Mont. at 62, 915 P.2d at 803. The Turner Court itself, however, failed to provide a complete analysis of this question. The underlying dispute in the case was between a mortgagee (Turner) and construction lien creditors who had performed work on the subject property. The district court determined that Turner's mortgages were valid and superior to the construction liens and entered a decree of foreclosure and order of sale. The lien creditors filed a notice of appeal but did not stay the foreclosure sale or post a supersedeas bond. A sheriff's sale was held to satisfy the outstanding mortgages, and Turner purchased the property. Turner, 276 Mont. at 58, 915 P.2d at 801. On appeal, this Court identified two factors as dispositive of the mootness issue: whether property has changed hands, and whether third party interests are involved. Turner, 276 Mont. at 63, 915 P.2d at 804 (citing Martin, 216 Mont. at 219-20, 703 P.2d at 147-48). Here, the Court observed, the subject property has been sold at a sheriff's sale and third party interests, albeit Turner's, are involved. Turner, 276 Mont. at 63, 915 P.2d at 804. The Court posited that because the lien creditors had not posted a supersedeas bond or stayed the foreclosure sale pending appeal, and because no surplus had been recovered at the sale, it was impossible for this Court to grant effective relief. [3] Turner, 276 Mont. at 63, 915 P.2d at 804. ¶ 41 Stuivenga engages in the same sort of analysis in the present case. He reasons that because Evans did not post a supersedeas bond or stay disbursement of the interpleaded funds, and because Stuivenga has since paid those funds to third parties, it is impossible for this Court to grant effective relief. The flaw in this analysis is that it fails to account for the possibility of a restitution claim. This Court in Hagerty to which the third party interests factor may be tracedmade a specific point of noting that it could not effect restitution upon a reversal of the district court's writ in that case. 130 Mont. at 558, 304 P.2d at 920. The Hagerty Court distinguished Kurth, where we held that if [the appellant] is entitled to a reversal of the judgment, then [w]e may exercise the right of compelling restitution by our own mandate or direct the lower court to do so. Kurth, 96 Mont. at 612-13, 32 P.2d at 16; see also Hagerty, 130 Mont. at 558, 304 P.2d at 920. The Turner Court, in contrast, did not analyze whether, upon a reversal of the judgment, the lien creditors would have a claim in restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 18; see also Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 18 cmt. f (discussing the rights of purchasers at execution sales); cf. Marriage of Gorton, ¶ 18 (reasoning that although the real estate had already been sold to a third party, the basic question in analyzing mootness is whether effective relief could be granted, and [i]f we were to conclude the [parties'] agreement is unconscionable or invalid, we would remand to the District Court to fashion a remedy which could involve payment from the sale proceeds or other adjustments). [4] Stuivenga, likewise, overlooks the fact that Evans may be entitled to restitution upon a reversal of the judgment in this case.
¶ 42 We have considered the property changed hands and third party interests factors in a handful of cases subsequent to Turner. See e.g. Graveyard Creek, ¶¶ 13-15; Mills v. Alta Vista Ranch, LLC, 2008 MT 214, ¶ 22, 344 Mont. 212, 187 P.3d 627; In re Marriage of Dahm, 2006 MT 230, ¶¶ 36-37, 333 Mont. 453, 143 P.3d 432; In re Marriage of Caras, 2012 MT 25, ¶ 10 n. 1, 364 Mont. 32, 270 P.3d 48. Without calling into question the validity of these decisions, which were decided on their particular facts, it is necessary nonetheless, in light of the above discussion, to clarify this jurisprudence. ¶ 43 First, to dispel any further confusion on the point, we reject the categorical rule recited in Black's Estate, Henke, and the cases listed at ¶ 36 n. 2, supra, that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, the satisfaction of it being the end of the proceeding. A party might waive the right to appeal by voluntarily complying with the judgment or by accepting benefits under it. But compliance with the judgment, whether voluntary or involuntary, does not necessarily, in and of itself, render an appeal moot (or not moot). The question of mootness is whether this Court can grant effective relief, which will depend on the specific factual and procedural circumstances of the particular case and the relief sought by the appellant. ¶ 44 Second, the fact that property has changed hands and third-party interests are involved does not necessarily, in and of itself, render an appeal moot. If the appellant is requesting that the parties be restored to their original pre-judgment positions, the fact that property has already changed hands and third-party interests are now involved may make this impossible, in which case the appeal will be deemed moot. But if the appellant, upon reversal, will have a claim in restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment, see ¶ 21, supra, then effective relief can be granted and the appeal is not moot.