Opinion ID: 6984727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Title III applicable to UNUM?

Text: Title III of the Act says that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 50 UNUM makes three arguments as to why Weyer cannot bring suit against it under Title III. First, UNUM says that it is not a place of public accommodation. Second, UNUM says that Title III relates only to the availability of goods and services and not the content of the goods. Third, UNUM says its activities fall within the Act’s safe harbor for insurance underwriting. 51 We agree with UNUM and believe that each reason is independently sufficient to prevent Weyer’s suit against UNUM under Title III. We note at the outset that neither Fox nor UNUM question Weyer’s ability to bring a suit regarding her employment relationship under Title III. Our recent decision in Zimmerman v. State Department of Justice, 52 however, calls into doubt whether Weyer can sue under Title III about matters relating to her employment. In Zimmerman, we held that a plaintiff could not sue for discriminatory employment practices under Title II of the Act because “employment by a public entity” is not a “service, program, or activity” of a public entity within the meaning of Title II. We explained in Zimmerman that “the structure of the ADA as a whole unambiguously demonstrates that Congress did not intend for Title II to apply to employment.” 53 This was so because “Congress ... crafted extensive employment-specific provisions in Title I” and “omitted any mention of employment in Title II.” 54 We see no reason why the rationale of Zimmerman on Title II would not apply equally to Title III. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has so held. 55 Because neither Fox nor UNUM challenge whether Title III permits a suit relating to an employment relationship, however, we assume for purposes of this case only, that Weyer states a valid cause of action under Title III. Title III provides an extensive list of “public accommodations” in § 12181(7), including such a wide variety of things as an inn, a restaurant, a theater, an auditorium, a bakery, a laundromat, a depot, a museum, a zoo, a nursery, a day care center, and a gymnasium. All the items on this list, however, have something in common. They are actual, physical places where goods or services are open to the public, and places where the public gets those goods or services. The principle of noscitur a sociis requires that the term, “place of public accommodation,” be interpreted within the context of the accompanying words, and this context suggests that some connection between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place is required. 56 The question then is whether an insurance company, like UNUM, that administers an employer-provided disability plan is a “place of public accommodation.” Certainly, an insurance office is a place where the public generally has access. But this case is not about such matters as ramps and elevators so that disabled people can get to the office. The dispute in this case, over terms of a contract that the insurer markets through an employer, is not what Congress addressed in the public accommodations provisions. The Sixth Circuit addressed precisely this issue in Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 57 In Parker, the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff could not sue an insurance company that issued a long-term disability policy for an employer under Title III of the Act because it was not a “place of public accommodation” within the meaning of the Title III. The Sixth Circuit explained that [w]hile we agree that an insurance office is a public accommodation as expressly set forth in § 12181(7), plaintiff did not seek the goods and services of an insurance office. Rather, Parker accessed a benefit plan provided by her private employer and issued by MetLife. A benefit plan offered by an employer is not a good offered by a place of public accommodation. As is evident by § 12187(7)[sic], a public accommodation is a physical place.... 58 The Sixth Circuit found dispositive the fact that there was “no nexus between the disparity in benefits and the services which MetLife offers to the public from its insurance office.” 59 The Third Circuit took the same position in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp. 60 In Ford, the Third Circuit reasoned that [t]he plain meaning of Title III is that a public accommodation is a place.... Since Ford received her disability benefits via her employment at Schering, she had no nexus to MetLife’s “insurance office” and thus was not discriminated against in connection with a public accommodation ... Ford cannot point to these terms [“goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodation”] as providing protection from discrimination unrelated to places. 61 We agree with the Third and Sixth Circuits and hold that an insurance company administering an employer-provided disability policy is not a “place of public accommodation” under Title III. The Third and Sixth Circuits have also both held that “Title III does not govern the content of a long-term disability policy offered by an employer.” 62 Title Ill prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of “the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” The ordinary meaning of this language is that whatever goods or services the place provides, it cannot discriminate on the basis of disability in providing enjoyment of those goods and services. This language does not require provision of different goods or services, just nondiscriminatory enjoyment of those that are provided. Thus, a bookstore cannot ■ discriminate against disabled people in granting access, but need not assure that the books are available in Braille as well as print. 63 “[Likewise, an insurance office must be physically accessible to the disabled but need not provide insurance that treats the disabled equally with the non-disabled.” 64 We find the Third Circuit’s analogy persuasive and hold that Title III does not address the terms of the policies that UNUM sells. Even if UNUM were a “place of public accommodation” and even if the content of the policy were actionable under Title III, UNUM’s decision to classify the risks of mental illness, alcoholism, and drug abuse differently from physical disabilities falls within the safe harbor provision of § 12201(c). Section 12201(c) says that Subchapters I and III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict— (1) an insurer ... or any agent, or entity that administers benefit plans ... from underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State law. Paragraph! ](1) ... shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of subchapter I and III of this chapter. 65 “The coverage of mental disability and physical disability involves different risks with different hazards (or exposure).” 66 By putting an insurance company “safe harbor” in the Act, Congress gained such freedom of choice for policy purchasers and efficiencies for insurers as might accrue if insurance companies were free to decide whether to cover and to what extent to cover various disabilities. Amici advise us that research shows that policies that do not place a limit on the duration of benefits receive nearly double the percentage of mental disorder claims as policies with such limits. 67