Opinion ID: 1388423
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Heading: General Principles Underlying Employer's Vicarious Liability

Text: (1) Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment. ( Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 967 [227 Cal. Rptr. 106, 719 P.2d 676].) The origins of respondeat superior have been traced to ancient Roman law. (5 Harper et al., The Law of Torts (2d ed. 1986) ง 26.2, pp. 8-10; Holmes, Agency (1891) 4 Harv.L.Rev. 345; but see Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (1894) 7 Harv.L.Rev. 315, 383 [stating the doctrine has Germanic, not Latin, origins].) The doctrine is a departure from the general tort principle that liability is based on fault. ( Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 608, 618 [124 Cal. Rptr. 143].) It is `a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk.' ( Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 959 [88 Cal. Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988]; Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967.) Respondeat superior is based on `a deeply rooted sentiment' that it would be unjust for an enterprise to disclaim responsibility for injuries occurring in the course of its characteristic activities. ( Rodgers, supra, 50 Cal. App.3d 608 at p. 618, quoting Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States (2d Cir.1968) 398 F.2d 167, 171 [per Friendly, J.]; see also Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip (1991) 499 U.S. ___, ___ [113 L.Ed.2d 1, 17, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1041] [rejecting due process challenge to respondeat superior liability].) Recently, we articulated three reasons for applying the doctrine of respondeat superior: (1) to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) to ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury. ( Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967; 5 Harper et al., op. cit. supra, ง 26.5, at p. 21.) (2) For the doctrine of respondeat superior to apply, the plaintiff must prove that the employee's tortious conduct was committed within the scope of employment. ( Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 721 [159 Cal. Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755].) A risk arises out of the employment when `in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business. [Citations.] In other words, where the question is one of vicarious liability, the inquiry should be whether the risk was one that may fairly be regarded as typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise undertaken by the employer. [Citation.]' ( Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 968, citing Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., supra, 50 Cal. App.3d at p. 619, brackets in original.) Tortious conduct that violates an employee's official duties or disregards the employer's express orders may nonetheless be within the scope of employment. ( Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 969; Meyer v. Blackman (1963) 59 Cal.2d 668, 679 [31 Cal. Rptr. 36, 381 P.2d 916]; Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1980) ง 2.22, p. 62.) So may acts that do not benefit the employer ( Perez, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 969), or are willful or malicious in nature ( John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 447 [256 Cal. Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948]; Martinez v. Hagopian (1986) 182 Cal. App.3d 1223, 1227 [227 Cal. Rptr. 763]). (3) The doctrine of respondeat superior applies to public and private employers alike. As stated in subdivision (a) of Government Code section 815.2 (all further statutory references are to the Government Code): A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. By this language, the Legislature incorporated general standards of tort liability as the primary basis for respondeat superior liability of public entities.... (Van Alstyne, op. cit. supra, ง 2.32, at p. 77.) Courts have construed the term scope of employment in section 815.2 as broadly as in private tort litigation. (Van Alstyne, op. cit. supra, ง 2.32, at p. 79; see generally, John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 447.)