Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Vicki Lane

Text: 122 Hall claims that Vicki Lane should have been struck for cause because (1) she demonstrated general hostility to the prospect of life imprisonment for convicted murderers when she stated on a jury questionnaire, I believe life without parole is a waste and a burden, financially and morally, to our state; and (2) she indicated that she did not consider the existence of equally culpable defendants who did not receive the death penalty to be a mitigating factor. We reject these arguments. 123 During voir dire, Lane made abundantly clear that she considered herself fully capable of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors in determining an appropriate sentence and that the fact that a defendant had committed premeditated murder would not close her mind to the possibility of a life sentence. She also stated that she understood that financial considerations regarding keeping a defendant in prison for the rest of his life could not enter her consideration of the appropriate sentence and that she would follow the court's instructions fully in serving as a juror. Moreover, she stated that, upon reaching a verdict of guilty, she would remain equally open to all sentencing options. Additionally, the court engaged in an extensive discussion with Lane regarding whether she could consider the existence of equally culpable defendants who did not receive the death penalty as a mitigating factor, and she ultimately stated that she could consider such evidence. In this regard, the district court concluded as follows: 124 It doesn't seem unreasonable, looking at this totally in the abstract, that equally culpable defendants would strike some people as not a very strong mitigating factor. I think she ended up saying she would consider it. 125 Given that the district court had the opportunity to observe Lane's demeanor face-to-face, we decline to second-guess its determination that she was willing to give consideration to the existence of equally culpable defendants who would not receive the death penalty as a mitigating factor and that she simply did not consider this to be an especially weighty consideration. The Eleventh Circuit addressed a similar circumstance in United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073 (11th Cir.1993). In that case, the government sought the death penalty pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848, which is substantially similar to the FDPA in terms of the procedure utilized in obtaining a sentencing recommendation from the jury. See Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1079. During voir dire of the jury venire, a venireperson stated that she did not believe that the defendant's age and past criminal history would affect her recommendation for or against a death sentence. Id. at 1103. In holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in nonetheless choosing not to strike the venireperson for cause, the court observed, 126 [The venireperson's] answers do not raise the primary concern of Morgan; that is, a juror who would automatically recommend a penalty of death regardless of any mitigating evidence. The statement that she would not consider two of the statutory mitigating factors was made in response to defense counsel's questions and in ignorance of the mandates of § 848. Jurors are not expected to know the law prior to being properly instructed. More important, [the venireperson] stated that she would follow the district court's instructions in arriving at her decision. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in finding that [the venireperson] would be able to follow the court's instructions. 127 Id. We likewise conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to strike Lane for cause in spite of her initial statement that she could not consider the existence of equally culpable defendants who did not receive the death penalty as a mitigating factor. 128