Opinion ID: 1723928
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Heading: THE THOMPSON v. OKLAHOMA ISSUE

Text: In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), in a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court determined that the imposition of the death penalty against a defendant who was under the age of 16 at the time of the offense violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Stevens, author of the plurality opinion, grounded this holding on the current evolving standards of decency. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823, 108 S.Ct. at 2691, 101 L.Ed.2d at 710. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor joined the result, but on the narrower ground that defendants below the age of 16 when the offense was committed may not be executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857, 108 S.Ct. at 2711, 101 L.Ed.2d at 734. The United States Supreme Court remanded Jones' case to this Court for consideration in light of Thompson presumably for the purpose of applying these principles to a person whose mental age, not biological age, has been demonstrated to be below age 16. Jones was found by two court-appointed experts to be mentally retarded with an I.Q. between 61 and 66, placing him in the lowest 1% of society in terms of intelligence, with the functional equivalent of a 7 year old. Jones v. State, 517 So.2d 1295, 1301 (Miss. 1987). However, since the decision in Thompson, the United States Supreme Court has decided the case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), which deals specifically with the issue of the applicability of the death penalty to mentally retarded persons under the Eighth Amendment. This decision is more to the point in deciding Jones than is Thompson. Penry, mentally handicapped and functioning at the age of a 6 1/2 year old, was convicted of capital murder under the Texas statute and sentenced to death. After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on direct review, the federal district court and court of appeals upheld the death sentence in habeas corpus proceedings. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on two issues: (1) whether Penry was sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the jury was not instructed that it could consider and give effect to his mitigating evidence in imposing its sentence; (2) whether the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits Penry's execution because he is mentally retarded. As to the first issue, the Court decided that, under the Texas sentencing scheme in death penalty cases, the absence of instructions informing the jury that it could consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and abused background by declining to impose the death penalty deprived the jury of a vehicle for expressing its response to that evidence in rendering its sentencing decision. 492 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 2952, 106 L.Ed.2d at 284. By contrast, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6) (Supp. 1991) sets forth statutory mitigating circumstances which the sentencing jury in death penalty cases must consider. Included are § 99-19-101(6)(b), the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and § 99-19-101(6)(f), the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. Also pertinent is § 99-19-101(6)(g), the age of the defendant at the time of the crime. Significantly, age is not defined as biological age specifically, leaving it open for a jury to be informed as to the mental age of a particular defendant if relevant, as well as biological age. Not only was the jury in Jones' case instructed as to these three mitigating factors, but also these three mitigating factors were argued to the jury, the point being specifically made that Jones' mental age at the time of the offense was 7 or 8. Jones, 517 So.2d at 1301. Therefore, unlike Penry, Jones' jury was provided a vehicle, through this State's sentencing scheme in death penalty cases, appropriate jury instructions, and through appropriate argument, to consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation in rendering its sentencing decision. As to this issue, the concerns of the Penry decision have been met. As to whether or not the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons, the United States Supreme Court held that there is no such prohibition as a matter of federal constitutional law so long as the jury has a vehicle for considering a defendant's mental retardation in its sentencing deliberations: In sum, mental retardation is a factor that may well lessen a defendant's culpability for a capital offense. But we cannot conclude today that the Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of any mentally retarded person of Penry's ability convicted of a capital offense simply by virtue of their mental retardation alone. So long as sentencers can consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation in imposing sentence, an individualized determination of whether `death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case. 492 U.S. at 340, 109 S.Ct. at 2958, 106 L.Ed.2d at 292. As a matter of state law, this Court has previously addressed whether or not a mentally retarded person is subject to the death penalty under Mississippi law. In Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1984), this Court stated: Neal in effect argues that the State of Mississippi is constitutionally proscribed from imposition of the sentence of death upon one suffering from mental disabilities and impairment. That is simply not the law. The legislature of this State has within its lawful powers declared that mental or emotional disturbance or cognitive or volitional deficiencies may be mitigating circumstances. Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-19-101(2), (6). But in doing this, our legislature has provided that mental disability is only one mitigating circumstance, to be considered together with other mitigating circumstances and to be balanced and weighed against the aggravating circumstances, according to the procedure elaborated in Sections 99-19-101 et seq., generally. If its discretion is guided by otherwise proper instructions, the jury has been empowered by law to find that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances proved outweigh this (and other) mitigating circumstances and that the defendant should suffer the penalty of death. Id. at 762. Thus, statutory provisions now in place in this state's death penalty sentencing scheme provide an adequate vehicle for a jury to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental retardation in imposing sentence such that an individualized determination of whether `death is the appropriate punishment' can be made in each particular case. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340, 109 S.Ct. at 2958, 106 L.Ed.2d at 292. Jones' jury was so instructed and so informed. This Court need not impose a life sentence on Jones simply on the basis of his mental retardation under either federal constitutional or state law considerations. Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court discussed the argument that mental age ought be equated with biological age such that execution of juveniles and those of a mental age equivalent to a juvenile should be prohibited. The Court rejected this mental age argument saying, Such a rule should not be adopted today. 492 U.S. at 339, 109 S.Ct. at 2957, 106 L.Ed.2d at 291. The decision in Penry answers, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the Supreme Court's apparent concerns in Jones in light of Thompson.