Opinion ID: 3135348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ill Const.1970, art. IV, '13.

Text: The special legislation clause prohibits the General Assembly from conferring a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluding others that are similarly situated. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 235; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122. While the legislature has broad discretion to make statutory classifications, the special legislation clause prevents it from making classifications that arbitrarily discriminate in favor of a select group without a sound and reasonable basis. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 235; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122. Our inquiry into special legislation issues is twofold. We must determine whether the statutory classification at issue discriminates in favor of a select group and, if so, whether the classification is arbitrary. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 235. Plaintiffs argue here that section 7B2c(3) cannot pass special legislation scrutiny because the narrow window created by the effective date makes Ohlhausen the only beneficiary of the provision. Ohlhausen responds that the clear flaw in plaintiffs= case and the circuit court=s judgment is that there was no Asimilarly situated group@ who sought detachment or annexation of some other piece of property but was prevented from doing so by the language of section 7B2c. We first determine if section 7B2c conferred a special benefit or privilege upon one person or group and excluded others that are similarly situated. We agree with the circuit court that there is significant evidence in the record that this -16- piece of legislation was solely intended to benefit Ohlhausen. Especially with regard to the portion requiring a petition to annex to be filed on the effective date of the Act, it is reasonable to assume that Ohlhausen is the only one who has benefitted from this provision. However, legislation is not constitutionally infirm under the special legislation clause merely because of its unique application to the property at issue. The mere fact that a law may affect only a single entity does not render the law invalid under the special legislation clause. See, e.g., Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d 221 (statute affecting only Illinois Bell upheld against special legislation challenge); Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d 315 (statute affecting single river boat gambling licensee upheld against special legislation challenge); Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357 (1985) (rejecting constitutional challenge to validity of laws that affected only Wrigley Field). For instance, in Crusius v. Illinois Gaming Board, 216 Ill. 2d 315 (2005), the plaintiff sued the State of Illinois and the Illinois Gaming Board challenging as unconstitutional section 11.2(a) of the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West 2000)). That provision provided that a gambling licensee not conducting riverboat gambling on January 1, 1998, could apply to the Board for a license renewal and could secure approval to relocate the business upon receiving approval from the new municipality in which the licensee sought to relocate. Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 320. We found it Aclear@ not only that the challenged provision discriminated in favor of a select group, but that the statute was intended to benefit one specific gambling licensee, Emerald Casino, Inc. Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 326. Nevertheless, we rejected the special legislation challenge because the classification was rationally related to a legitimate state interest. To contravene article IV, section 13, of our constitution, the statute must confer on a person, entity, or class of persons or entities a special benefit or exclusive privilege that is denied to others who are similarly situated. Thus, under the first part of the inquiry, we determine if another entity similarly situated to Ohlhausen was denied a privilege. This burden has been met in previous cases through evidence of other entities that would -17- have been able to benefit from the legislative privilege, but for some limiting exclusionary provision. For instance, in In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117 (1995), the legislature created a mechanism whereby a non-home-rule municipality with more than one fire protection district may transfer territory served by one district into another district. The Village of Vernon Hills petitioned to transfer territory to the Countryside Fire Protection District. The Vernon Fire Protection District filed an objection to the petition stating that the law was special legislation in that it was restricted to non-home-rule municipalities in a county with a population between 500,000 and 750,000. Lake County was the only Illinois county at the time with this population. We noted, A[t]hrough all the exhibits, Vernon Fire showed that municipalities located in Du Page County are similarly situated to the Village, but cannot utilize [the mechanism] because Du Page County has a population of over 750,000 persons.@ Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 121, 129-30. This court struck down the legislation as there was no rational basis to distinguish between the different districts based on the population requirement. Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 130. Conversely, in Big Sky Excavating, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 217 Ill. 2d 221 (2005), the legislative section at issue (220 ILCS 5/13B502.5 (West 2002)) terminated administrative proceedings against Illinois Bell and declared that certain of its services would be classified as Acompetitive,@ enabling Illinois Bell to increase rates for its services. The section also required Illinois Bell to expend $120 million in refunds and other payments. This court found, A[T]he advantages received by Illinois Bell were not denied to others who were similarly situated. They could not have been, for there were no other telecommunications carriers whose situation was similar to Illinois Bell=s.  If any telecommunications carrier believed that section 13B502.5 afforded Illinois Bell an advantage it was denied, there is no evidence of it in the record before us.@ Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 236-37. -18- We stated that because no other carrier was shown to be similarly situated to Illinois Bell, section 13B502.5 cannot be said to have discriminated in favor of a select group. After finding that the legislature had a rational basis for the classification, we found that plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of clearly establishing that the statute violated the prohibition against special legislation. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 240. Like the plaintiffs in Big Sky, plaintiffs here have failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality of section 7B2c with evidence that Ohlhausen=s privilege was denied to any other similarly situated entity. Notably, plaintiffs do not claim that they are similarly situated to Ohlhausen. Instead, plaintiffs provide a conclusory argument that this statute prevented Aany other property owner who meets all of the other conditions from effectuating a school boundary change, merely because he or she did not have a petition on file on the effective date of section 7B2c.@ At best, plaintiffs point to the property owners to the north and south of Ohlhausen who had similarly vacant farmland with an area of under 160 acres. However, the mere fact that this property exists is not enough to satisfy plaintiffs= burden without any additional evidence that those unnamed property owners could have benefitted from section 7B2c but for the effective-date limitation. No evidence is in the record that these owners sought to convert their farmland into residential areas, desired the Village of Frankfort to annex their property, or additionally sought a school district boundary change. There is no evidence in the record of anyone similarly situated to Ohlhausen, i.e., any other property owner who sought a boundary change under similar circumstances. Thus, plaintiffs have not met their burden under the first part of the twofold inquiry. The holding that plaintiffs failed in their burden is borne out by each case cited by plaintiffs. In each of those cases, the similarly situated entities or class of persons which was denied a benefit was clearly identified. See Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357 (1985) (plaintiff Chicago Cubs challenged the validity of laws preventing them from staging nighttime baseball games); In re Belmont Fire -19- Protection District, 111 Ill. 2d 373 (1986) (evidence demonstrated that certain municipalities that could have benefitted from the transfer of fire districts were denied benefit of law by population classification); County of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d 323 (1990) (law imposed upon plaintiffs, certain local governmental entities, the obligation of maintaining some 50 bridges that pass over the Illinois and Mississippi Canal); Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997) (severely injured plaintiffs were deprived of right to collect their full compensatory damages from the tortfeasor); In re Estate of Jolliff, 199 Ill. 2d 510 (2002) (only immediate family members who were caregivers of disabled persons were entitled to make statutory custodial estate claims, while all other classes of caregivers were excluded). Here, neither plaintiffs themselves nor any other entities have been excluded from a benefit received by Ohlhausen. Article IV, section 13, of our constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. IV, '13) only prohibits passage of a special or local law when Aa general law is or can be made applicable.@ Nothing in that provision bars the legislature from enacting a law specifically addressing the conditions of an entity that is uniquely situated. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 237; County of Bureau v. Thompson, 139 Ill. 2d at 345-46. Because no other landowner was shown to be similarly situated to Ohlhausen, section 7B2c cannot be said to have discriminated in favor of a select group. This stands as a sufficient basis to uphold the constitutionality of the Act. We therefore find that plaintiffs have not met their burden in demonstrating a violation of the special legislation clause. We do add, however, that even if section 7B2c discriminated in favor of Ohlhausen, to the demonstrated exclusion of another property owner, plaintiffs= claim would still fail. The second part of the twofold inquiry examines whether the legislative classification is arbitrary. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 237; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122. In determining whether a statute violates this standard, courts generally apply the same standards applicable to challenges brought under the equal protection clause of our constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, '2). Where the statute under consideration does not affect a -20- fundamental right or involve a suspect classification, we review it under the deferential rational basis test. Under this test, the statute is constitutional if the classification it establishes is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 237-38; Crusius, 216 Ill. 2d at 325. If any set of facts can be reasonably conceived that justify distinguishing the class to which the statute applies from the class to which the statute is inapplicable, then the General Assembly may constitutionally classify persons and objects for the purpose of legislative regulation or control, and may enact laws applicable only to those persons or objects. Big Sky, 217 Ill. 2d at 238; Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d at 122. We first note that the legislature retains the power to abolish, dissolve, and change boundaries of school districts. 32A Ill. L. & Prac. Schools '39 (2004), citing People ex rel. Dixon v. Community Unit School District No. 3, 2 Ill. 2d 454, 465-66 (1954). We have previously stated that school districts established under enabling legislation are: Aentirely subject to the will of the legislature thereafter. With or without the consent of the inhabitants of a school district, over their protests, even without notice or hearing, the State may take the school facilities in the district, without giving compensation therefor, and vest them in other districts or agencies.  The area of the district may be contracted or expanded, it may be divided, united in whole or in part with another district, and the district may be abolished. All this at the will of the legislature.@ People ex rel. Dixon, 2 Ill. 2d at 465-66. Here, the Act is far more modest than one creating, abolishing, or even contracting a school district. It merely authorizes the detachment and annexation of a small, vacant parcel of land representing a tiny fraction of a district=s taxing revenues under certain closely defined circumstances. Moreover, the Superintendent adopted the findings of the hearing officer, who applied the Acommunity of interest standard@ for annexation and detachment cases (Board of Education of Golf School District No. 67 v. Regional Board of School Trustees, 89 Ill. 2d 392 (1982)), and found that the property=s Afuture is tied@ to Frankfort. The hearing officer observed that the subject -21- property is Aphysically isolated from any developed section of the Village of Richton Park. The only developed land near the Subject Property is the Prestwick and Southwick subdivisions in the Village of Frankfort.@ He observed that Aall municipal services for the site will be provided by the Village of Frankfort,@ and also library service was already provided by Frankfort prior to the annexation. He found that the Village of Frankfort, District 157-C and District 210 are the Anatural community for any possible future inhabitants of the Subject Property.@ It seems apparent, based on the hearing officer=s finding regarding the Anatural community@ of the property alone, that the legislature could have determined that the future schoolchildren of this area would best be served by participation in the Frankfort school districts. Therefore, there is an adequate rational basis for the legislation. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of overcoming the statute=s constitutionality; therefore, we reverse the circuit court and affirm the judgment of the Superintendent of Education.