Opinion ID: 794190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Augustine Aviles

Text: 42 The district court attributed 400 pounds of marijuana and 2 kilograms of cocaine to Augustine. Augustine posits that he should have only been held accountable for the amount of drugs that he reasonably could have purchased with the $13,400 in cash that he brought to the warehouse. This argument represents an allegation of what has become known as sentencing entrapment. 43 Entrapment, as a defense to criminal liability, developed from concern that the government might induce an otherwise law-abiding individual to engage in criminal conduct. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a) (3d. Ed.2000). The concept of sentencing entrapment, by comparison, represents a more recent development in response to modern sentencing-guidelines systems. See United States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993) (explicitly recognizing the legal availability of sentencing entrapment as a grounds for departure under the federal Sentencing Guidelines); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n. 14. In the case of a narcotics crime, the drug quantity involved acts as a primary determinate of a defendant's sentence under the Guidelines. United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir.2000) ( Searcy I ); United States v. Stavig, 80 F.3d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir.1996); Barth, 990 F.2d at 425. Therefore, relatively small differences in the quantity or kind of drugs involved in an offense may dramatically alter a defendant's prison term. Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099. 44 Sentencing entrapment occurs when official [government] conduct leads a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs to deal in larger quantities, leading to an increased sentence. Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099 (quoting United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976, 981 (8th Cir.1999)) (brackets by Searcy I ) (internal quotations omitted). If a defendant establishes sentencing entrapment, the court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n. 12; 11 e.g., Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099. Although the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime represents the major focus of the sentencing entrapment analysis, Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099, the government's conduct acts as a triggering mechanism, i.e., the defendant must prove that the government induced the defendant to commit the crime. United States v. Searcy, 284 F.3d 938, 942 (8th Cir.2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted) ( Searcy II ). Thus, a court initially must determine whether the government induced the defendant. 45 In a reverse-sting operation, inducement occurs when the government set[s] a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance[.] U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.1, comment n. 14. 12 In addition to its literal meaning, the term price includes credit arrangements, commonly known as fronting, that are found unusually generous in light of market practices. United States v. Lora, 129 F.Supp.2d 77, 91 (D.Mass.2001); see Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1246 (This transaction fails to show that the government provided Stavig with a financial arrangement so attractive that he was able to purchase a significantly larger quantity than he would have otherwise purchased.). 46 We have not previously set forth parameters to analyze whether a credit arrangement accepted by the government constitutes an arrangement substantially below market. A generous credit arrangement becomes increasingly suspect where the government possesses limited assurances of the defendant's ability to be trusted with repayment. See Lora, 129 F.Supp.2d at 94-95; cf. Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1246 (holding that the government did not provide the defendant with an overly generous financial arrangement, reasoning that the defendant had received cocaine from the confidential informant before under similar terms). The government may obtain sufficient assurances in a variety of ways, such as when a trusted third-party trafficker vouches for the defendant, the defendant socializes with undercover agents to earn their trust, the defendant presents assets that could be used to satisfy the debt, and the defendant provides information about the extensiveness of his drug-trafficking operation in order to demonstrate his ability to distribute the relevant drug quantity and make repayment. Lora, 129 F.Supp.2d at 94-95. Other forms of assurances might also suffice, and the determination should ultimately be made in light of the totality of the circumstances. 47 As to drug quantity, the defendant must prove that he was predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs[.] Searcy I, 233 F.3d at 1099 (quoting Berg, 178 F.3d at 981) (internal quotations omitted). This requires the defendant to prove that he had neither the intent nor the resources for completing the transaction of the quantity alleged. Stavig, 80 F.3d at 1246-47 (quoting United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 (9th Cir.1995)) (internal quotations omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment n. 12. 48 When determining whether a defendant was predisposed to deal in a smaller drug quantity, a court should consider not only the defendant's cash on hand, but also other facts indicative of intent and resources. Relevant considerations include whether the government's agent pressured the defendant, whether the defendant desired the alleged quantity of drugs, whether the defendant communicated an ability to repay the debt within a reasonable time, whether the defendant has previously distributed substantial quantities, and whether the defendant expressed his intent to engage in future dealings of similar size or scale. Lora, F.Supp.2d at 93-94 (citing United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1995) and United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75-76 (1st Cir.2000)). 49 Torres testified that — based upon his experience as a former supplier of illegal narcotics to the Kansas City area — he would have been comfortable fronting $170,600 worth of narcotics to Augustine because Torres believed that Augustine would not have attempted to rip him off. This is because Torres was satisfied with Augustine's reliability based on their contacts in person and over the phone, as well as the fact that Torres knew where Augustine lived and had been to his residence. 50 Augustine attacks Torres's testimony as devoid of logic, arguing that there was insufficient trust between the two men because they had no prior business relationship and because Torres had no third-party assurances that Augustine was reliable. Indeed, Special Agent Cheatham testified that fronting was not unusual as long as there is some element of trust or someone's vouched for the person that's getting the load or if they've done business previous to that. . . . Augustine contends because there was no basis for such trust between himself and Torres, the credit arrangement offered by the government was substantially below the market under the circumstances of this case. Augustine also notes that the government used the same 400 pounds of marijuana and the same warehouse to conduct a reverse-sting operation on another, unrelated individual a short time prior to the arrest of Augustine and his co-defendants. Augustine believes that this supports his contention that the government set the drug quantity solely to enhance his sentence. 51 Here, the record indicates that the district court did not commit clear error by denying Augustine's sentencing entrapment claim. The credit arrangement presents a close question. Augustine was prepared to pay $13,400 on the night of the transaction, less than 8 percent of the total transaction price of $184,000. 13 Torres had few assurances of Augustine's reliability, but Torres's testimony provides sufficient evidence that the credit arrangement was not artificially generous. Also, the two men freely bargained about both the price and drug quantity. 14 52 Augustine also fails to prove lack of predisposition to deal in the quantity attributed to him. Minimal inducement was required, as Augustine expressed willingness to distribute narcotics in response to Torres's first remark regarding Yogi. Augustine stressed the capability of his operation to distribute and pay for the entire drug quantity. Beginning with the initial contact with Torres and continuing through to his statements while driving to the warehouse, Augustine repeatedly assured Torres that he had a network in place to quickly move a large quantity of drugs, that he already had buyers in place for the shipment, and that he could have full payment in just a few days. On the way to the warehouse, Michael also stated that the deal was going to be a success and how they would get rid of all the drugs. In addition, Augustine made numerous statements that he wanted a large shipment and that he was willing to accept an even larger quantity of drugs, including his statement that the truck might not need to go to Chicago because he could distribute the entire truckload. As mentioned above, the price and drug quantity were reached after bargaining between the two men. 53 On this record, we hold that the district court did not commit clear error by holding Augustine accountable for the entire quantity of drugs that he agreed to purchase. The record supports the finding that the government did not induce the defendant to engage in the negotiated narcotics transaction but rather that the defendant possessed the intent and the resources to complete the deal as negotiated.