Opinion ID: 4567680
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State-Created Danger Theory Today

Text: Several other Circuit Courts have also recognized the state-created danger theory of liability.6 But the Supreme Court 5 Courts often treat the “state-created danger” doctrine “as if it were a rule of common law.” Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2019). But it is not, and we must guard against reasoning that, especially with the best intentions, deviates from the Constitution’s careful balance of authority recognized in DeShaney. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (“We have previously rejected reasoning that would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States.” (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6 See, e.g., Doe v. Jackson Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 954 F.3d 925, 932 (6th Cir. 2020); Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019); Estate of Her v. Hoeppner, 939 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019); Anderson ex rel. Anderson v. City of Minneapolis, 934 F.3d 876, 881 (8th Cir. 2019); Matthews v. Bergdorf, 889 F.3d 1136, 1150 (10th Cir. 2018); Okin v. Village of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t., 577 F.3d 415, 428 (2d Cir. 2009). But see Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he Fifth Circuit has 9 has not.7 And the doctrine has not escaped criticism, since it does not stem from the text of the Constitution or any other positive law, 8 and consequently vests open-ended lawmaking power in the judiciary. 9 Moreover, the “state-created danger” never recognized th[e] ‘state-created-danger’ exception.”); Turner v. Thomas, 930 F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e have never issued a published opinion recognizing a successful state-created danger claim.”); Irish v. Maine, 849 F.3d 521, 526 (1st Cir. 2017) (“While this circuit has discussed the possible existence of the state-created danger theory, we have never found it applicable to any specific set of facts.”). One oddity of this reasoning is that it seems to create liability for the kind of action DeShaney did not. 7 Nor is it certain to. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“As a general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process[.]”). 8 See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 188 (4th Cir. 2010) (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“Neither the majority nor the parties point to any instance where Congress has laid down a rule to govern the conduct in this case, and it is wrong for a federal court to rush in where Congress has feared to tread.”) 9 See Johnson, 597 F.3d at 184 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“Law exists in part to guard against the overreaching of public authority, and from that general purpose the life-tenured federal courts are not exempt. When the many cautionary maxims of restraint are toppled like dominos, the chances of judicial miscalculation exponentially increase. . . . Federal courts simply do not have a roving warrant to adopt whatever policies they believe to be beneficial, all in the name 10 doctrine offers little help to public employees seeking to better discharge their duties, and does not tell them “what to do, or avoid, in any situation.” Weiland v. Loomis, 938 F.3d 917, 919 (7th Cir. 2019). But we remain bound to faithfully apply our precedent explaining the scope of the doctrine. As currently formulated, that requires a plaintiff to plead four elements: first, foreseeable and fairly direct harm; second, action marked by “a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience”; third, a relationship with the state making the plaintiff a foreseeable victim, rather than a member of the public in general; and fourth, an affirmative use of state authority in a way that created a danger, or made others more vulnerable than had the state not acted at all. See Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, of substantive due process.”); Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 874 (5th Cir. 2012) (Higginson, J., concurring) (noting the “loose articulation” of the state-created danger doctrine); cf. Collins, 503 U.S. at 125 (“[G]uideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area [of substantive due process] are scarce and open-ended. The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”) (citation omitted); see also Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 462 (3d Cir. 2017) (Fisher, J., concurring) (“[I]t is troubling how far we have expanded substantive due process . . . .”); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 186 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Ambro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Federal courts cannot be the forum for every complaint that a government actor could have taken an alternate course that would have avoided harm to one of our citizens.”). 11 905 F.3d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 2018). We apply that precedent to the facts Appellant pleads here.