Opinion ID: 757280
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cause Versus Condition

Text: 46 Defendants also requested a cause versus condition instruction, which the district court denied. I Aplt.App. at 126; II Tr. at 250-52. Defendants essentially argue that the actual cause of the collision was not Alexander's backing of the rig across the highway at night, but rather that the collision was proximately caused by Annette's vision problems and her driving at night in violation of the daytime restriction on her driver's license. 13 Defendants say that Annette was temporarily blinded by the headlights of a passing vehicle immediately before she struck defendants' rig. Therefore defendants contend that a jury question existed on the issue whether the presence of the rig in Annette's lane of traffic was a cause of the collision or a mere condition which allowed the collision to occur, requiring their proposed cause versus condition charge. Defendants argue that the district court erroneously concluded that the cause versus condition principle is limited to the facts set out in Thur v. Dunkley, 474 P.2d 403 (Okla.1970), which involved a collision between a motorist and parked cars on a public roadway. 47 We note that in a post-trial order, the trial judge held that he did not err in refusing to submit defendants' proposed cause versus condition instruction since it gave the Direct Cause--Defined instruction found in the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions--Civil (Second Edition). II Aplt.App. at 390-91. The judge instructed the jury that: 48 Direct cause, as used in these instructions, means a cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces injury and without which the injury would not have happened. For negligence to be a direct cause it is necessary that some injury to persons in the plaintiffs' situation must have been a reasonably foreseeable result of negligence. 49 I Aplt.App. at 220. 50 The district judge's order denying a new trial and remittitur stated that: 51 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that the distinction between a cause and a condition is the element of foreseeability. Long v. Ponca City Hospital, Inc., 593 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Okla.1979). Foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause ... and it is the standard by which the proximate cause, as distinguished from the existence of a mere condition, is to be tested. Atherton v. Devine, 602 P.2d 634, 636 (Okla.1979);.... 52 II Aplt.App. at 391. The judge held that the jury's verdicts for the plaintiffs, in light of the direct cause instruction, shows that the jury had to conclude that the injuries of plaintiffs were a reasonably foreseeable result of defendant Alexander's negligence. They accordingly found that his negligence was the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries and not a mere condition. Id. Since the court had given its Direct Cause--Defined instruction, the judge said that a new trial was not warranted because of failure to give the defendants' condition versus cause instruction. 53 We agree with the trial judge's conclusions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores, Inc., 854 P.2d 910, 915-16 (Okla.1993), stated: 54 Proximate cause must be the efficient cause that sets in motion the chain of circumstances leading to an injury; if the negligence complained of merely furnishes a condition by which the injury was made possible and a subsequent independent act caused the injury, the existence of such condition is not the proximate cause of the injury. Foreseeability is an essential element of proximate cause ..., and it is the standard by which proximate cause, as distinguished from the existence of a mere condition, is to be tested. Atherton v. Devine, 602 P.2d 634, 636 (Okla.1979). The distinction between a cause and a condition is the element of foreseeability.... A condition also begins with the breach of a duty of care. With a condition, however, the subsequent injury was neither foreseeable nor reasonably anticipated as the probable result of the breach. 55 Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Thur held that if the negligence complained of merely furnishes a condition by which the injury was made possible and a subsequent independent act caused the injury, the existence of such condition is not the proximate cause of the injury. Thur, 474 P.2d at 405. 56 Defendants argue that Annette had serious vision problems and that she was driving at night in violation of her daytime driving restriction. They say that her negligence in operating her vehicle at night thus superseded any negligence on the part of Alexander in backing the rig across the highway, and that Annette's vision problems constitute the proximate cause of the collision. 57 To agree with the defendants, we would have to hold that Annette's negligence as a matter of law was the proximate cause of the collision. This we decline to do, feeling that the evidence made a factual issue on proximate cause and comparative negligence for the jury. While an extreme case may permit a conclusion on proximate cause as a matter of law, this is not such a case. We agree with the trial judge's assessment in submitting the factual dispute to the jury in these circumstances. As we held in Kinnison v. Houghton, 432 F.2d 1274, 1277 (10th Cir.1970), the proximate cause issue was within the questions of fact for the jury to decide, and its verdict against appellants is not without support. The jury found that Annette was ten percent negligent and the appropriate reduction in the damage award has accordingly been made. 58 We are satisfied that the judge did not err in his instructions, which, as a whole, adequately submitted the causation and proximate cause questions to the jury in accord with Oklahoma law. There was no error in not giving the particular Cause Versus Condition instruction of the defendants in light of the adequate instruction given in accord with the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions and cases noted.