Opinion ID: 760825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effective Resignation vs. Constructive Resignation

Text: 18 When an employee voluntarily resigns, he cannot claim that he suffered an adverse employment decision under the ADA or the FMLA. 6 See, e.g., Keever v. City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir.1998) (affirming the lower court's decision that an employee who voluntarily resigned did not suffer an adverse employment decision under the ADA). Therefore, this Court must determine whether Plaintiff voluntarily resigned before we may address Plaintiff's ADA, FMLA, and ERISA claims. 7 19 The ADA, the FMLA and ERISA do not define the term resignation. This Court has held that when an employment law statute is silent as to a term's meaning, courts should identify the disputed term's meaning as it is defined under common law principles of agency and the master-servant relationship and incorporate that definition of the term into the statute. See Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 568 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Nationwide Mut. Insur. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 319, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992), wherein the term employee under ERISA was analyzed). In Ohio, definitions of employment relationships are defined using principles in contract and agency law. See generally, Henkel v. Educational Research Council, 45 Ohio St.2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (Ohio 1976) (describing state cases interpreting informal employment agreements under principles of contract law). 20 Ohio common law outlines two kinds of voluntary resignation: constructive resignation and effective resignation. See Rieke v. Hogan, 138 Ohio St. 27, 32 N.E.2d 9, 10 (Ohio 1941). An employee can constructively resign in two ways: (1) by failing to comply with his employer's written request requiring him to take a certain action, see Waldman, 88 N.E.2d at 578-79, or (2) by constructively abandoning his position, that is, by failing to report to work for a substantial period of time. See Rieke, 32 N.E.2d at 10 (noting that the state court requires cogent proof to establish [an employee's] abandonment of his position). 21 The second form of voluntary resignation is effective resignation. State ex. rel. Dwyer v. City of Middletown, 52 Ohio App.3d 87, 557 N.E.2d 788, 793 (Ohio Ct.App.1988); see also, State Employment Relations Bd. v. Ohio State Univ., 36 Ohio App.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 597, 599 (Ohio Ct.App.1987) (describing effective resignation without specific use of the term). An employee must take two steps in order to effectively resign. See State Employment Relations Bd., 520 N.E.2d at 599. First, the employee must express an intention to resign. See id. Second, the employee must take some action to demonstrate that he is relinquishing his position. See id. The employee need not take the two actions at the same time; however, he must take both actions before an effective resignation is complete. See id; see also Dwyer, 557 N.E.2d at 793 (finding an effective resignation where substantial time elapsed between the time the employee expressed an intention to resign and the time when the employee acted to relinquish his position). 22 The district court erred when it found that Plaintiff constructively resigned. DHL offered no proof to show that Plaintiff had abandoned his job, or that DHL had given him written notice that his failure to do something would be interpreted as an act of resignation. See e.g., Waldman, 88 N.E.2d at 578-79 (describing written notification); Rieke, 32 N.E.2d at 10 (describing abandonment in fact). The district court erroneously determined that Sarsfield's conversation with Plaintiff on November 22, 1993, gave Plaintiff verbal notice that his failure to call on November 23, 1993, would be interpreted as an act of resignation. Ohio courts do not use the constructive resignation doctrine to analyze resignation scenarios where an employer gives an employee verbal notice that his failure to act will signal resignation. 8 See Waldman, 88 N.E.2d at 578-79 (finding that a written letter about the employer's policy provided an employee with sufficient notice to determine that his failure to comply with the policy was an act of constructive resignation). Rather courts may only apply this doctrine to cases in which the employer has given the employee written notice that his failure to act will be construed as an act of resignation, in order to ensure that each party has a clear understanding of their obligations and the repercussions of their actions. See, e.g., id., 88 N.E.2d at 578-79. 23 Because Plaintiff here expressed an intention to resign, the district court should have analyzed the circumstances of his resignation under the line of cases describing effective resignation. See State Employment Relations Bd., 520 N.E.2d at 599. 9 To determine whether an employee effectively resigned, courts examine whether the employee expressed an intention to end his employment, and whether the employee took action to relinquish his position. See id. Facts presented at summary judgment clearly show that Plaintiff effectively resigned from his job at DHL on or about November 23, 1993. 24 The evidence presented at summary judgment showed that Plaintiff took the first step in an effective resignation when he expressed his intention to quit his job. On November 20, 1993, Plaintiff told his training instructor, Pebler, that he was going to resign. Again, on November 22, 1993, Plaintiff informed Sarsfield, a second supervisor, that he was going to go ahead and resign. Plaintiff admits that he kept repeating his intention to resign over the course of the two meetings, despite Pebler and Sarsfield's numerous entreaties that he stay on the job. 25 The evidence at summary judgment also showed that Plaintiff took the second and final step of an effective resignation by taking an action to relinquish his position. See Ohio State Univ., 520 N.E.2d at 599. During the week of November 23, 1993, Plaintiff did not resume his training for the Boeing 727 with the flight instructor class, he did not schedule his check ride, and he did not call Sarsfield to find out whether Sarsfield was assigning him a new flight instructor. See Dwyer, 557 N.E.2d at 794 (noting that an employee's failure to report to work or attempt to fulfill the obligations of her position are acts of relinquishment). Indeed, Plaintiff called a number of friends at DHL and a number of union representatives, but he never called anyone at DHL personnel until November 26, 1993. See Emanuel v. Columbus Recreation & Parks Dept., 115 Ohio App.3d 592, 685 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Ohio Ct.App.1996) (recognizing that when an employee does not respond at all to his employer during the tenure of an employment dispute this lack of response may indicate that the employee has voluntarily resigned). We need not decide which of these acts standing alone would be a sufficient act of relinquishment. Collectively, Plaintiff's actions sufficiently confirmed his intention to sever the employment relationship. 26 Notably, when Plaintiff did call Sarsfield to report his medical condition and attempt to withdraw his statement of resignation, he had already taken both of the steps necessary to complete an effective resignation. Therefore, when Plaintiff attempted to withdraw his resignation request on November 26, 1993, DHL properly informed him that his voluntary resignation had been completed and that DHL had accepted his resignation. 27 We review Plaintiff's remaining claims based on the conclusion that Plaintiff effectively resigned on or about November 23, 1993, and that therefore he voluntarily ended his employment relationship with DHL.