Opinion ID: 2508633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII claims

Text: {13} Ocana argues that there are two reasons why the 90-day period for filing her Title VII claim should be tolled. First, she argues that the 90-day period does not begin to run until the complainant actually receives notice of the right to sue from the EEOC. Second, she argues that the Division's mistake equitably tolled the 90-day period. She contends that had the Division placed her attorney on its mail distribution list, the EEOC would have known to send him her right-to-sue letter. She further contends that had the Division mailed its no-probable-cause letter to her attorney, he would have been able to check on the status of the right-to-sue letter because he would have known that it would be forthcoming as a matter of course. We discuss each of her tolling arguments in turn. {14} The 90-day period for filing suit under Title VII normally begins to run on the date the complainant receives actual notice of the right to sue. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Williams v. S. Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 487 (10th Cir. 1976). Known as the actual notice rule, this rule is meant to protect a Title VII complainant from losing the right to sue because of fortuitous circumstances or events beyond his or her control which delay receipt of the EEOC's notice. St. Louis v. Alverno Coll., 744 F.2d 1314, 1316 (7th Cir.1984). Thus, a complainant who is at fault for not receiving notice of the right to sue may not rely on the actual notice rule. See Wagher v. Guy's Foods, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 667, 669 (D.Kan.1991). The actual notice rule does not apply where the complainant fails to report a change of address to the EEOC. St. Louis, 744 F.2d at 1316-17; accord 29 C.F.R. § 1601.7(b) (1991) (The person claiming to be aggrieved has the responsibility to provide the Commission with notice of any change in address....). Therefore, since neither Ocana nor her attorney notified the EEOC of her change in address, the actual notice rule does not apply to the facts of her case. {15} We now turn to Ocana's equitable tolling argument. Since Ocana's Title VII claim involves a federal statute, federal law governs the resolution of this issue. See Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 926 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir.1991) (When Congress has provided a federal statute of limitation for a federal claim, however, state tolling and saving provisions are not applicable.); Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1998) (Given that the relevant limitation period originates in a federal statute, the issue of equitable tolling is governed by federal law.). The 90-day period for filing a Title VII lawsuit is subject to equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Equitable tolling is a nonstatutory tolling theory which suspends a limitations period. See Gathman-Matotan Architects and Planners, Inc. v. State Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 109 N.M. 492, 494, 787 P.2d 411, 413 (1990). Equitable tolling typically applies in cases where a litigant was prevented from filing suit because of an extraordinary event beyond his or her control. Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir.1984). However, where a plaintiff fails to receive notice of the right to sue through his or her own fault, equitable tolling does not apply. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.). In Hunter v. Stephenson Roofing Inc., 790 F.2d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1986), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that equitable tolling is not available to a Title VII plaintiff who fails to notify the EEOC of a change in address, and does not receive notice of the right to sue as a result. Relying on precedent and federal law, the court said that a plaintiff's burden of notifying the EEOC of a change in address is both minimal and reasonable. {16} Ocana argues that Hunter does not apply because it does not address the failure of an administrative agency to send notice of decision to an attorney of record. Ocana's argument is similar to the argument that was advanced in Banks v. Rockwell Int'l N. Am. Aircraft Operations, 855 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1988). In Banks, the EEOC mailed notice of the right to sue to Banks, but did not mail notice of the right to sue to his attorney of record. Id. at 325-26. Banks moved while his complaint was being investigated. Id. at 325. He did not leave a forwarding address and he did not notify the EEOC of his change in address. Id. Consequently, his right-to-sue notice was returned to the EEOC unclaimed. Id. Banks argued on appeal that the 90-day period should be tolled because, even if he had failed to give his new address to the EEOC, the EEOC's failure to send notice of the right to sue to his attorney contributed to the expiration of the ninety-day period. Id. at 326. The court rejected this argument and said that Title VII complainants have an affirmative duty to notify the EEOC of a change in address. Id. at 326-27. The court also said that since equitable tolling is based in equity, the individual claiming equitable tolling must have clean hands. Id. at 327. The court said that since Banks had failed to comply with the change of address requirement, he was not entitled to have the 90-day period equitably tolled. Id. {17} Similarly, in Hill v. John Chezik Imps., 869 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir.1989), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply equitable tolling where Hill, a represented complainant, failed to receive notice of the right to sue due in part to her failure to notify the EEOC of her change in address. The EEOC told Hill during its investigation that it would send its correspondence to her and her attorney. Id. at 1123. Hill moved during the investigation, but she did not notify the EEOC of her new address. Id. The EEOC subsequently mailed a right-to-sue letter to Hill's old address. Id. However, the EEOC did not notify her attorney of Hill's right to sue. Id. As a result, Hill did not receive the letter. Id. In its decision, the court noted that equitable tolling has generally been reserved for circumstances which were truly beyond the control of the plaintiff. Id. at 1124. The court held that Hill's Title VII claims were not subject to equitable tolling because Hill could easily have informed the EEOC of her new address. Id. Furthermore, the court also noted that [t]he fact that Hill relied on the EEOC to send copies of correspondence to her attorney [did] not distinguish her case. Id. {18} We find Banks and Hill persuasive. As Banks and Hill demonstrate, Ocana has an affirmative duty to notify the EEOC of her change in address even if she has counsel. See Wagher, 765 F.Supp. at 670 (noting that the fact that the complainant has taken the steps necessary to insure the right-to-sue letter is sent to [his or] her legal counsel, [whom he or] she has charged with the responsibility of acting upon this letter... does not take away from the complainant's duty to report a change in address but only provides an alternative way for the complainant to protect [his or] her interest in the potential lawsuit). Even if the Division contributed to Ocana's non-receipt of the right-to-sue notice, she was also at fault for not giving the EEOC her new address. Thus, the doctrine of equitable tolling does not apply to her Title VII claim. See id. Therefore, since Ocana did not establish the existence of a genuine factual issue on the tolling of her Title VII claim, the district court's granting of summary judgment on this claim was proper.