Opinion ID: 1460037
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Monument's Effect

Text: Governments may not mak[e] adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 594, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). And actions which have the effect of communicating governmental endorsement or disapproval, whether intentionally or unintentionally, ... make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In applying the effect prong, we evaluate whether a reasonable observer, aware of the history and context of the community in which the conduct occurs, would view the practice as communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval. Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 551-52 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, not every governmental activity that confers a remote, incidental or indirect benefit upon religion is constitutionally invalid. Id. at 555. Rather, it must be established that the governmental activity has a princip[al] or primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion. Id. In Weinbaum, we noted that application of the effect prong of the Lemon test to a particular set of facts involves an objective inquiry. See Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031; cf. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir. 2008) (viewing the endorsement analysis as constituting a distinct Establishment Clause test but noting that [t]he test does not focus on the government's subjective purpose when behaving in a particular manner, but instead focuses on the perceptions of the reasonable observer), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1524, 173 L.Ed.2d 656 (2009). We proceeded then to offer a useful summary of the nature of the inquiry: [T]he effect prong looks through the eyes of an objective observer who is aware of the purpose, context, and history of the symbol. The objective or reasonable observer is kin to the fictitious reasonably prudent person of tort law. So we presume that the court-created objective observer is aware of information not limited to the information gleaned simply from viewing the challenged display. If a government symbol has long gone unchallenged, there is a suggestion that an objective observer would not think that the symbol endorses a religious message. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir.1996); O'Connor, 416 F.3d at 1228). In this inquiry, [u]ndoubtedly, the `objective observer' is presumed to know far more than most actual members of a given community. Id. at 1031 n. 16. [R]easonable observers have reasonable memories and are aware of the context in which the policy arose. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 866, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). However, we do not treat the reasonable observer as omniscient. See, e.g., Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 560 (concluding that courts impart[] such knowledge to the reasonable observer in the broad sense of community awareness, not in the sense that a reasonable observer would have knowledge of every alleged past constitutional violation of a particular defendant). Consistent with the fact-intensive nature of this effect inquiry, the Supreme Court has advised that, in Establishment Clause cases, `the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed, per se rule can be framed.' Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1039 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678, 104 S.Ct. 1355). A challenged government action that might pass constitutional muster in some settings might be deemed constitutionally suspect in some other American communities or in other contexts. Id. ; cf. Borden, 523 F.3d at 158-59, 178 (holding that when viewing the acts [i.e., silent acts of bowing his head during his team's pre-meal grace and taking a knee with his team during a locker-room prayer] in light of [plaintiff coach's] twenty-three years of prior prayer activities with the East Brunswick High School football team during which he organized, participated in, and even led prayer activities with his team, a reasonable observer would conclude that [plaintiff] was endorsing religion when he engaged in these acts, but noting that this conclusion would not be so clear without these twenty-three years of prior prayer activities). Context carries much weight in the Establishment Clause calculus. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1033. Thus, the reasonable observer in this case would be aware of the nature and history of the Haskell County community, the circumstances surrounding the Monument's placement on the courthouse lawn, its precise location on the lawn and its spatial relationship to the other courthouse monuments, and also the Haskell County community's response to the Monument. In particular, the reasonable observer would be aware of Mr. Bush's religious motivation for seeking the erection of the Monument. After learning of these motivations, the Board swiftly approved its erection and allowed the project to go forward, despite being aware that there might be adverse legal consequences. [10] And, when those adverse legal consequences did in fact materialize in the form of Mr. Green's lawsuit, the Board seemingly did not hesitate to stay the course, electing to maintain the Monument without clarifying its purposes in doing so. Further, although the Monument ultimately also was inscribed with the Mayflower Compact, the Board approved the Monument with the understanding that it would be inscribed only with the Ten Commandments. Haskell County is a place where [e]veryone knows each other. Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1274. The Board members were identifiable as Board members. Indeed, one commissioner noted that Board members act as county officials 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. App. at 535. Mr. Bush also testified that everyone would know the commissioners and they would not have to be identified for people to know their position. The reasonable observer would know that two of the three commissioners attended the unveiling of the Monument, which had been organized by Mr. Bush and included remarks by local pastors. See Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1291 n. 30 ([E]veryone knows each other[,] and word travels in Haskell County faster than the constant airspeed of a European swallow.). Mr. Bush specifically recalled both of the commissioners speaking at the unveiling. Those commissioners posed for photographs beside the Monument, which appeared in locally distributed newspapers. After this lawsuit began, Mr. Bush organized a religiously themed rally to support the Monument, which gathered a crowd of three to four hundred people. The same two commissioners attended. One of them spoke briefly in support of the monument, and he is reported to have said, I'll stand up in front of that monument and if you bring a bulldozer up here you'll have to push me down with it. App. at 1405, 1186; see also Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1280. Numerous quotes from these commissioners appear in news reports, ranging from statements reflecting their determination to keep the Monument, see App. at 459 (I won't say that we won't take it down, but it will be after the fight.), to statements of religious belief, see, e.g., App. at 455 (That's what we're trying to live by, that right there. The good Lord died for me. I can stand for him. And I'm going to. I'm a Christian and I believe in this. I think it's a benefit to the community.); App. at 458-59 (God died for me and you, and I'm going to stand up for him.). We conclude, in the unique factual setting of a small community like Haskell County, that the reasonable observer would find that these facts tended to strongly reflect a government endorsement of religion. In particular, we find support for this conclusion in the public statements of the Haskell County commissioners. In none of their statements did the commissioners attempt to distinguish between the Board's position and their own beliefs. Several of the commissioners' statements would naturally be construed as having been made on behalf of the Board, including, I won't say that we won't take it down, but it will be after the fight, App. at 459 (emphasis added), and  We're definitely going to leave our monument there until the law tells us to take it down. App. at 1170 (emphasis added). By not distinguishing their personal opinions from their official views, the commissioners left the impression that a principal or primary reason for the erection and maintenance of the display was religious. See, e.g., App. at 458-59 (where one commissioner's statement that God died for me and you, and I'm going to stand up for him appeared in close proximity to the statement I won't say that we won't take it down, but it will be after the fight). Nor did the Board act[] affirmatively to discourage any mistaken impression that private speakers [were] speaking for the Board. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir.1998). Such action or inaction has been found significant in the Establishment Clause context. Cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (holding that government neutrality was apparent where the government ha[d] not fostered or encouraged any mistaken impression that the private speech was the university's own (internal quotation marks omitted)); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (rejecting the idea that the distinction between private and government speech disappears when the private speech is conducted too close to the symbols of government, at least where, as here, the government has not fostered or encouraged the mistake); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens ex rel. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (rejecting the fear of a mistaken inference of endorsement because the school had the capacity to make clear that its recognition of [a student religious] club is not an endorsement of the view of the club's participants and to the extent that it did so, students will reasonably understand that the school's official recognition of the club evinces neutrality toward, rather than endorsement of, religious speech). Furthermore, the photographs of commissioners standing beside the Monumentat least one depicting all three commissionersgive the impression of the Board's united endorsement of the Monument itself. Indeed, at least two of the commissioners expressly recognized that they were asked by the media to participate in the photographs because of their status as commissioners. Like the Eighth Circuit, we do not believe elected government officials are required to check at the door whatever religious background (or lack of it) they carry with them before they act on rules that are otherwise unobjectionable under the controlling Lemon standards. Clayton ex rel. Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376, 380 (8th Cir.1989) (refusing to find an action unconstitutional due only to its harmony with the religious preferences of constituents or with the personal preferences of the officials taking action); cf. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring) ([T]he Establishment Clause does not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes of the religious. Such absolutism is ... inconsistent with our national traditions .... (citations omitted)). In a small community like Haskell County, where everyone knows everyone, and the commissioners were readily identifiable as such, however, we conclude that the reasonable observer would have been left with the clear impressionnot counteracted by the individual commissioners or the Board collectivelythat the commissioners were speaking on behalf of the government and the government was endorsing the religious message of the Monument. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (The reasonable observer could only think that the [government] meant to emphasize and celebrate the Commandments' religious message.). [11] We underscore that the reasonable observer's impression of government endorsement would not be based upon the commissioners' statements alone. The statements would be just part of the history and context of which the reasonable observer would be cognizant. In particular, that observer also would know of the religious motivationseemingly endorsed by the Boardthat led to the installation of the Monument. And the observer would have little information indicating that there was more at play in the Monument's installation, and the Board members' efforts to maintain it in the face of clearly voiced Establishment Clause concerns, [12] than the Board's desire to facilitate the dissemination of a religious (i.e., in their view, Christian) message. In this light, we would be hard-pressed to conclude that a reasonable observer, reasonably informed as to the relevant circumstances, would perceive the government to be acting neutrally. [13] City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1010. We recognize that certain evidence weighs against a finding of endorsement. However, surveying the entire record, we cannot conclude that this evidence sufficiently blunts the message of endorsement that we find to be present to alter the result. Perhaps militating most significantly in favor of a conclusion of non-endorsement is the fact that a reasonable observer would have noticed that the Monument was one of numerous other monuments and displays on the courthouse lawn. This fact would typically weigh against a finding of endorsement. See O'Connor, 416 F.3d at 1228 (The reasonable observer ... would therefore be aware that the statue was one of thirty outdoor sculptures displayed on the Washburn campus, of which several were located within sight of the challenged display.); City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1011 ([W]e are persuaded that a reasonable observer would, instead, note the fact that the lawn of the municipal building contains a diverse array of monuments, some from a secular and some from a sectarian perspective.); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring) ([T]o determine the message that the text [of the Ten Commandments] here conveys, we must examine how the text is used. And that inquiry requires us to consider the context of the display.); O'Connor, 416 F.3d at 1228 ([T]he question of whether the government has endorsed a particular religious display depends in large part on the display's particular physical setting.). In this regard, in finding that the Monument was constitutional, the district court opined that the mélange on the courthouse lawn represents what Haskell County citizens consider the noteworthy events and sentiments of their county, their state and their nation. Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1295. [14] However, the Monument is not a part of a unified exhibit in a typical museum setting like the statute found in O'Connor. See O'Connor, 416 F.3d at 1228 (noting that a brochure made clear that the statue was part of an outdoor art exhibit). Nor is the courthouse lawn a setting that is typically associated with intellectual experimentation like the university setting of O'Connor. Id. at 1229-30 (noting that the statue at issue, Holier Than Thou, was displayed in the context of a university campus, a place that is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas and that especially in that context no reasonable person would associate the message of Holier Than Thou with the state (internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, we do not view the Haskell County courthouse context as bearing a close resemblance to the monument setting in Van Orden. 545 U.S. at 702, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing the monument sitting in a large park containing 17 monuments and 21 historical markers, all designed to illustrate the `ideals' of those who settled in Texas and of those who lived there since that time). [15] Although ultimately finding that the Monument had a secular effect, the district court here acknowledged that people ... might see the monument display [of Van Orden ] in Texas as more cohesive, more integrated, more, well, artistic than the Stigler mélange. [16] Green, 450 F.Supp.2d at 1288. Significantly, the sharp contrast between the timing of the legal challenges to the monument in Van Orden and the one in this case sheds significant light on whether the reasonable observer would have perceived the latter as having the effect of endorsing religion. See Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031 (If a government symbol has long gone unchallenged, there is a suggestion that an objective observer would not think that the symbol endorses a religious message.). In Van Orden, Justice Breyer observed that 40 years passed in which the presence of this monument, legally speaking, went unchallenged. 545 U.S. at 702, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring); see id. at 682, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (plurality opinion) (Forty years after the monument's erection and six years after Van Orden began to encounter the monument frequently, he sued numerous state officials in their official capacities... seeking both a declaration that the monument's placement violates the Establishment Clause and an injunction requiring its removal.). Justice Breyer reasoned that those years of tranquility suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals, whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a particular religious sect, primarily to promote religion over nonreligion. Id. at 702, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring); cf. id. at 703, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (This case also differs from McCreary County, where the short (and stormy) history of the courthouse Commandments' displays demonstrates the substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them, and the effect of this readily apparent objective upon those who view them.). Indeed, Justice Breyer found the passage of forty years without a challenge to the monument to be determinative. [17] Id. at 702, 125 S.Ct. 2854; cf. Pleasant Grove, 129 S.Ct. at 1140, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that [t]he city can safely exhale and its residents can enjoy a public park containing a Ten Commandments monument without fear that they are complicit in an establishment of religion, because, inter alia, the monument was erected in 1971 and that means it is approaching its (momentous!) 40th anniversary without an Establishment Clause challenge). Here, the difference is striking. In less than one year after the Monument was unveiled, Mr. Green challenged the erection of the Monument as an Establishment Clause violation, filing the federal lawsuit underlying this appeal. Accordingly, despite its presence on the courthouse lawn with other displays and monuments, this rather prompt litigation response to the Monument makes it difficult for us to glean a suggestion that an objective observer would not think that the symbol endorses a religious message. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1031. Accordingly, viewing the record as a whole, we do not believe that the Monument's setting here should lead us to a different conclusion on the endorsement question. Likewise, we cannot conclude that the Monument's text that is unrelated to the Ten Commandments would persuade a reasonable observer that the principal or primary effect was not to endorse religion. The reasonable observer would have been aware that the Monument not only contained the Ten Commandments, but also the Mayflower Compact. The fact that the Ten Commandments are not displayed in isolation is not without significance. See, e.g., McCreary, 545 U.S. at 869, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (The point is simply that the original text [of the Ten Commandments] viewed in its entirety is an unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious obligations and with morality subject to religious sanction. When the government initiates an effort to place this statement alone in public view, a religious object is unmistakable. (emphasis added)). But, at least on these facts, the import of its pairing with the Mayflower Compact is equivocal at best. The Mayflower Compact has an independent historical significance and also demonstrates the relevance of religion to that history. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (The fact that the Founding Fathers believed devotedly that there was a God and that the unalienable rights of man were rooted in Him is clearly evidenced in their writings, from the Mayflower Compact to the Constitution itself.); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (quoting same); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting same). However, we cannot construe a display of the Ten Commandments not to be an endorsement of religion merely because it is accompanied by the Mayflower Compact or other secular documents. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 854, 856, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (noting that the Mayflower Compact was included in the second and third versions of the display containing the Ten Commandments that was ultimately struck down). Its inclusion arguably could be viewed as merely part of an unstinting focus ... on religious passages that merely furthers the endorsement. Id. at 870, 125 S.Ct. 2722. The evidence thus cuts in both directions, and because no effort was made by the Board to help the reader interpret the intended relationship between the two documents, the reasonable observer would not find the Mayflower Compact helpful in determining whether the Monument endorses religion. [18] Similarly, we do not believe that the reasonable observer would be less inclined to find an impermissible endorsement of religion because of the Monument's notation Erected by Citizens of Haskell County. We recently suggested in other cases that a city could post a disclaimer explaining clearly that private entities are responsible for at least some of the [monuments on municipal grounds], including the Ten Commandments Monument and the Seven Principles Monument. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d at 1011; see Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701-02, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring) (The tablets, as displayed on the monument [bearing the Ten Commandments], prominently acknowledge that the Eagles [a private civic, and primarily secular, group] donated the display, a factor which, though not sufficient, thereby further distances the State itself from the religious aspect of the Commandments' message.). However, the addition of such a disclaimer would not be sufficient, alone, Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 701, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (Breyer, J., concurring), and could not tip the balance on these facts, given the very significant magnitude of the evidence indicating an impermissible endorsement. [19] Furthermore, any incremental movement toward the side of non-endorsement resulting from the addition of the notation would be hobbled by the reasonable observer's awareness that the addition took place after litigation had begun and on the eve of trial. Litigation positions do not alter reasonable memories. Cf. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 871-72, 125 S.Ct. 2722 (noting that the counties' new statements of purpose were presented only as a litigating position and that [n]o reasonable observer could swallow the claim that the Counties had cast off the [religious] objective so unmistakable in earlier displays). We conclude by underscoring the proposition that [c]ontext carries much weight in the Establishment Clause calculus. Weinbaum, 541 F.3d at 1033. In the context of the small community of Haskell County, we hold that the Board's actions in authorizing and maintaining the Monumentinscribed with the Ten Commandmentson the courthouse lawn had the impermissible principal or primary effect of endorsing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.