Opinion ID: 2782311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standing for Individuals and Organizations

Text: “‘Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent[ly] of the merits of any party’s claim.’” W.H. v. D.W., 78 8 A.3d 327, 337 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 229). It is generally required that a party seeking to bring a claim must allege “. . . a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” as to “justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” W.H., 78 A.3d at 337 (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 229 n.19 (quotation marks omitted)). A party has such a “personal stake” only if: (1) he or she has suffered “injury in fact”—an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized, invasion of a legally protected interest; (2) the injury is “fairly . . . trace[able]” to defendant’s challenged actions; and (3) it is “likely . . . the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quotation marks omitted); see also Padou, 77 A.3d at 389. The redressability condition implies that plaintiff’s injuries may give it standing to seek certain types of relief but not others. For example, allegations of past injury may give a plaintiff standing to seek damages, but a plaintiff seeking forward-looking relief, such as an injunction, must allege facts showing that the injunction is necessary to prevent injury otherwise likely to happen in the future. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983); see also Fair Emp’t Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Appellant is an organization, and organizations, like individuals, have legally protected interests. An organization may file suit in its own right “so long 9 as it satisfies the constitutional requirements and prudential prerequisites of traditional standing analysis.” D.C. Appleseed Ctr. for Law & Justice v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Ins., Sec., & Banking, 54 A.3d 1188, 1205-06 (D.C. 2012) (footnote omitted). We have recognized, several times, that the DCHRA presents no additional prudential barriers.2 See Exec. Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 732-33 (D.C. 2000); see also Molovinsky v. Fair Emp’t Council, 683 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C. 1996). However, an organization’s mere interest in a problem or its opposition to an unlawful practice is not sufficient to demonstrate injury in fact, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972), nor is a simple setback to an organization’s abstract social interests. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982); see also D.C. Appleseed Ctr., 54 A.3d at 1207. “[T]he question of standing turns on whether the organization’s activities in pursuit of [its] mission have been affected in a sufficiently specific manner as to warrant judicial intervention.” D.C. Appleseed Ctr., 54 A.3d at 1206. This requires a showing that the defendant’s unlawful actions have caused a “concrete and demonstrable injury 2 We note that the Supreme Court has recently said that “prudential standing is a misnomer[,]” at least as applied to the zone-of-interest inquiry. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (2014). We need not discuss the implications of this statement, however, as the DCHRA is coextensive with standing under Article III, and we reverse on grounds other than prudential standing. 10 to the organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources.” Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379. Generally, when an organization is forced to divert resources to counteract the effects of another’s unlawful acts, it has suffered a sufficiently concrete injury to bestow standing. Id.; Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 633 F.3d at 1142. The District of Columbia Circuit has “‘applied Havens Realty to justify organizational standing in a wide range of circumstances.’” Am. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., 659 F.3d 13, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). We, too, have applied Havens Realty, holding on several occasions that organizations have standing to challenge unlawful practices they oppose, provided the practices burden them in a sufficiently specific way. See, e.g., D.C. Appleseed Ctr., 54 A.3d at 1208 (legal center had standing under DCAPA to petition for review of an agency decision that would force it to “devote significant additional resources to advocate on behalf of” low income residents facing significant unmet healthcare needs); Molovinsky, 683 A.2d at 147 (organization able to establish standing by showing defendant’s conduct required it to increase counseling of sex discrimination victims and increase educational efforts “to counteract the negative message, sent to the public 11 by” defendant’s sexual harassment); see also Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc., 749 A.2d at 733.3