Opinion ID: 2817831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trademark Dispute

Text: Greene is a psychologist who developed an alternative approach for the treatment of behaviorally challenging children. By 1993, with his method still developing, he began a sixteen-year employment relationship with MGH. Throughout Greene's tenure at MGH, he continued to develop his method, including through studies he conducted at MGH. He also continued to disseminate his method through, among other outlets, unaffiliated workshops and his unaffiliated private practice. The development of Greene's method culminated in his 1998 book, The Explosive Child: A New Approach -3- for Understanding and Parenting Easily Frustrated, Chronically Inflexible Children (The Explosive Child). In 2001, Greene developed two service marks1 to identify his approach: Collaborative Problem Solving and Collaborative Problem Solving Approach (collectively, the CPS Marks or the Marks). Between 2002 and 2003, Greene and his business partner, Ablon, co-founded three organizations devoted to the CPS methodology, each making use of the CPS Marks. One of these organizations, the Collaborative Problem Solving Institute (the Institute), was an MGH-affiliated program within the MGH Department of Psychiatry. The Institute relied on MGH's non-profit status to solicit tax deductible donations, which were placed in a sundry fund that MGH administered. In addition, the MGH Development Office assisted with the Institute's fundraising efforts. Greene served as the Institute's Director and identified himself as such in numerous flyers, books, papers, and articles, as well as on stationery and the Institute website, which were branded with the MGH logo. The two other entities that Greene and Ablon founded, the CPS Clinic (the Clinic) and the Center for Collaborative Problem Solving, Inc. (the Center), were Massachusetts sub-chapter S 1 Service marks and trademarks function to identify the source of services and goods, respectively. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 199 n.2 (1st Cir. 1996). -4- corporations. The Clinic (which later merged with the Center, retaining the Center's name) shared space at MGH with the Institute and accepted referrals from it. However, the Clinic and the Center were private practices not formally affiliated with MGH. To wit, in an email during the planning stages of the Institute, the MGH Office of General Counsel acknowledged that Greene's private practice and the Institute would share space and interact through referrals, but expressed a need to mak[e] clear that the private practice is not associated or affiliated with MGH in any way. At all times, Greene has been the Center's President, and he and Ablon have been its sole and equal shareholders. In 2007, the Institute rebranded itself as Think:Kids and began using the service marks Think:Kids and Think:Kids Rethinking Challenging Kids to identify its programming. Although the Think:Kids marks were affiliated with MGH, it was Greene and Ablon's unaffiliated Center that registered these marks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on the principal register.2 Greene has also sought to register the CPS Marks with the USPTO. Greene registered Collaborative Problem Solving Approach 2 In its Final Judgment and Declaration on MGH's summary judgment motion, the district court ordered the amendment of these registrations so as to make MGH the registrant instead of the Center. Greene does not contest that ruling. Therefore, this dispute only concerns the CPS Marks. -5- in his own name on the supplemental register3 on July 9, 2002, noting February 15, 2001 as the date of first use. In 2008, about a year before this action began, he filed applications to register The Collaborative Problem Solving Approach and Collaborative Problem Solving on the principal register. When MGH learned that Greene was seeking to register these marks in his own name, MGH filed oppositions to his applications.4 2. Greene's Employment Contracts with MGH and the IP Policy Greene's tenure at MGH ran from July 1993 to January 2009 and was the sum of ten consecutive appointments, each of which was six months to two years in length. The process for obtaining each appointment was the same. First, Greene would sign and submit an appointment application in which he agreed to abide by MGH's bylaws and 3 The supplemental register is a separate register for marks that are not yet eligible for registration on the principal register. See 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a). Marks registered on the supplemental register receive some but not all of the protections and legal advantages marks on the principal register receive. See How to Amend from the Principal to the Supplemental Register, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/law/suppreg_ornamental.jsp (last modified Oct. 18, 2012). 4 A person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark upon the principal register may oppose another person's application to register that mark by filing an opposition stating the grounds therefor with the USPTO. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a). -6- policies.5 Greene's first three applications, covering appointments from July 1, 1993 through December 31, 1996, stated, I agree to abide by the Bylaws, rules, regulations and policies of the Professional Staff and of the Hospital. (Emphasis added.) Greene's fourth and fifth applications, covering appointments from January 1, 1997 through November 4, 1999, stated, I agree to read and abide by the Bylaws, rules, regulations and policies of the Professional Staff and of the Hospital. (Emphasis added.) Finally, Greene's next (and last) five applications, covering appointments from November 5, 1999 through November 4, 2009, stated, I have received and had an opportunity to read the Bylaws of the [Medical/]Professional Staff. I specifically agree to abide by all such bylaws and any policies and procedures that are applicable . . . . (Emphasis added.) In 2005 and 2007, as part of his final two applications, Greene also signed supplemental release forms, which stated, I understand that the ownership and disposition of inventions and other intellectual property that I create during the time when I have my Professional Staff appointment shall be determined in accordance with the Intellectual Property Policy at the Hospital, a copy of which is . . . available at [URL]. 5 Section 2.01 of the bylaws (in force at all relevant times) required Staff Members to abide by all applicable . . . policies of the Hospital. -7- After submitting his applications, Greene would receive a letter informing him that the MGH Board of Trustees had appointed him to his position for a particular term. All eleven appointment letters6 stated, Enclosed is the Professional Staff Appointment Form which reflects the terms and conditions of the appointment. All eleven Professional Staff Appointment Forms stated, In discharging the duties and exercising the privileges of your appointment, you are required to . . . [a]bide by the Bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies of the Professional Staff and the Hospital. (Emphasis added.) None of these forms state that MGH's policies might change from time to time. MGH first enacted its intellectual property (IP) policy on April 21, 1995. Consequently, MGH did not have an IP policy in place when Greene received his first three appointments in June 1993, May 1994, and January 1995. As enacted in 1995, the policy provided: Trademarks shall be owned by MGH [1] if they are created by members in the course of their employment or affiliation with an Institution or [2] if they are used to identify any product or service originating with or associated with an Institution. MGH updated its IP policy on July 19, 2002. In relevant part, the 2002 revisions added a third scenario in which MGH would 6 In February 1999, Greene was promoted from Clinical Assistant in Psychology to Assistant in Psychology. Hence, even though there were only ten applications, Greene actually received eleven appointment letters. -8- acquire ownership of a mark: Trademarks shall be owned by [MGH] if they . . . [3] pertain to significant Institutional Activities, defined as any activities that received direct or indirect financial support from an Institution, including Institutional salary support or funding from any outside source awarded to or administered by an Institution.
In June 2009, Greene filed a complaint in federal district court alleging, inter alia, trademark infringement for MGH's use of the CPS Marks (Count X) and seeking, inter alia, a declaratory judgment as to Greene's ownership of the Marks (Count XII). With its answer, MGH filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that MGH owns the CPS Marks (Count 4). MGH also sought an order that Greene's registration of Collaborative Problem Solving Approach on the USPTO supplemental register be revoked and that Greene's 2008 applications to register the CPS Marks on the principal register be denied. MGH moved for summary judgment on Counts X and XII of Greene's complaint and on Count 4 of the counterclaim.7 The district court granted MGH's motion, 7 Greene submitted an affidavit with his opposition to the motion for summary judgment that became the subject of a motion to strike and a motion for sanctions. The district court granted and allowed these motions, respectively. As a result, portions of Greene's affidavit pertaining to an alleged oral agreement between Greene and MGH were stricken and Greene was precluded from relying on that agreement in his opposition to MGH's summary judgment motion. Greene explicitly does not appeal those decisions. Therefore, we will evaluate the summary judgment motion without -9- holding that Greene was subject to the IP policy and that, on two independent grounds, MGH owned the CPS Marks. First, under the 1995 and 2002 versions of the IP policy, the Marks were used to identify services associated with MGH, namely, the CPS Institute. Second, under the 2002 version of the IP policy, the Marks pertained to significant activities that received financial support from MGH as well as outside funding that MGH administered. Greene filed a timely appeal.
Greene does not dispute that the IP policy was broad enough to encompass the CPS Marks. The long affiliation of the Marks with the Institute, and the Institute's financial relationship with MGH, were enough to bring the Marks within the IP policy's scope.8 Rather, Greene raises a series of contract defenses, arguing that the employment agreements binding him to the IP policy were either voidable or unenforceable because of equitable estoppel, failure to reach a meeting of the minds, or regard to the stricken passages. 8 Greene argues that MGH waived any arguments predicated on the 1995 version of the IP policy; consequently, he argues, the district court erred when it held that he was subject to the 1995 policy from, at latest, his 1997 appointment renewal. Given Greene's admission that the 2002 Policy independently encompasses the Marks, we will assume, without deciding, that only the 2002 version applies. Thus, all references to the IP policy are references to the 2002 version. That assumption makes no difference to the outcome of this appeal. -10- unilateral mistake. We address these issues in turn.9
Greene contends that MGH is equitably estopped from enforcing the IP policy. Equitable estoppel is appropriate only where failure to apply estoppel would result in injustice. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984); Sullivan v. Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgmt. of Trial Ct., 858 N.E.2d 699, 711 (Mass. 2006). Under Massachusetts law,10 an estoppel defense to a contract claim consists of: (1) a representation intended to induce reliance on the part of a person to whom the representation is made; (2) an act or omission by that person in reasonable reliance on the representation; and (3) detriment as a consequence of the act or omission. Bongaards v. Millen, 793 N.E.2d 335, 339 (Mass. 2003). [T]he party asserting the estoppel theory has a heavy burden to prove that all [three] elements are present. Sullivan, 9 We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Beacon Mut. Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Grp., 376 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2004). 10 The parties recognize, through multiple citations, that the contract claims in this case are governed by Massachusetts law. Further, as the record does not reveal a contrary choice of law provision in the bylaws, the IP policy, or Greene's employment contracts, we conclude that Massachusetts law must apply. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(3) (1971) (explaining that, in the absence of a choice of law provision, [i]f the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied). -11- 858 N.E.2d at 712 (quoting Clickner v. City of Lowell, 663 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Mass. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Greene's estoppel defense fails because he cannot establish the first element, a representation intended to induce reliance. The representation underlying an estoppel defense need not be a verbal one: conduct amounting to a representation is sufficient. Boylston Dev. Grp., Inc. v. 22 Boylston St. Corp., 591 N.E.2d 157, 163 (Mass. 1992) (quoting Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 923 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974)). Neither does the representation have to amount to deceit, bad faith or actual fraud; rather, the court looks for conduct contrary to general principles of fair dealing. Edwards v. Sullivan & Cogliano Cos., Inc., 2002 Mass. App. Div. 43, 43 (2002) (quoting MacKeen v. Kasinskas, 132 N.E.2d 732, 734 (Mass. 1956)). Greene argues that MGH represented that he owned the Marks by (1) behaving as if he owned the Marks, and (2) failing to disclose the IP policy.
To support his first contention, that MGH behaved as if he owned the CPS Marks, Greene points to three alleged facts: (1) MGH was aware of and endorsed his use of the Marks in unaffiliated enterprises; (2) MGH allowed the Center to share space with the Institute; and (3) MGH did not object when, in 2002, Greene registered one of the CPS Marks in his own name on the USPTO supplemental register. Drawing all reasonable inferences in -12- Greene's favor for summary judgment purposes, but mindful that Greene has the burden of proving his estoppel defense, we cannot find that any of this conduct amounted to a representation that Greene owned the CPS Marks. Greene's participation in activities that took place outside of MGH, in which he nevertheless made use of the CPS Marks, was consistent with MGH's ownership of the Marks. Greene always, to MGH's knowledge, identified himself by his MGH affiliation. By identifying himself as an MGH affiliate, Greene rendered his uses harmonious with MGH's ownership of the Marks because Greene's selfidentification with MGH served to identify the Marks with MGH as well. Also, Greene's own account of conversations he had with MGH about his external uses suggests that he sought MGH's approval to use the Marks in outside contexts.11 These interactions are entirely consistent with MGH's position as owner because, even on Greene's telling of events, he used the Marks at MGH's pleasure. Nor does MGH's acquiescence to Greene's use of the Marks in the names of his private corporations amount to a representation 11 According to Greene, he informed MGH as to how he was using the Marks to describe and brand his non-MGH activities and . . . the hospital representatives agreed to that use. Greene Br. 31 (emphasis added). Greene also writes that MGH endorsed and supported [his use of the Marks]. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). Finally, Greene stated in his affidavit that he discussed his private use of the Marks with Dr. Rosenbaum during negotiations for the creation of the Institute, and Dr. Rosenbaum did not object to Greene's continued private use of the Marks. A. 2329 ¶ 32. -13- that Greene owned the Marks.12 These private corporations, the Clinic and the Center, shared physical space with the Institute but, unlike the Institute, were not formally affiliated with MGH. Use of the Marks in the names of both Greene's private corporations and the MGH-affiliated Institute would ordinarily suggest a common source for those services. In one sense, that was entirely accurate, for Greene and Ablon were the principals in all three organizations. Furthermore, even when used in Greene's private enterprises, the Marks represented the same service, namely, the methodology Greene developed. But MGH, as owner of the Marks, would want to avoid confusion as to the source of CPS services whenever the Marks were used in a context not affiliated with MGH. See Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortg. Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1996) (The purpose of trademark laws is to prevent the use of the same or similar marks in a way that confuses the public about the actual source of the goods or service.). That is precisely what MGH did. In an email from its Office of General Counsel, MGH required Greene to make clear to the public that his private corporations were not associated or affiliated with MGH in any way. Thus, MGH both 12 For Greene's use of the Marks in his private corporations to support his argument about MGH's representations, MGH would have to know that Greene was using the Marks in this manner. The record supports the inference that MGH was, indeed, aware of this use of the Marks. See A. 1542 (identifying Greene's private practice as the CPS Clinic in an email from Greene to the MGH Office of General Counsel). -14- allowed Greene to promote the CPS Approach and behaved in a manner consistent with the notion that the trademark ordinarily -- i.e., absent a disclaimer to the contrary -- stood for services associated with MGH. Such behavior falls far short of representing that Greene owned the Marks. Greene's two remaining arguments pertaining to MGH's behavior are equally unavailing. First, while Greene points to the fact that his private corporation, the Center, shared space with the MGH-affiliated Institute, we fail to see how co-tenancy translates into a representation about ownership of the Marks. Second, although Greene argues that MGH did not object to his 2002 registration of a CPS service mark in his own name with the USPTO, Greene does not assert that MGH knew about that registration until this action began.13 In his reply brief, he tries to shift the burden to MGH and accuses MGH of failing to cite any evidence in the record to show that it did not have knowledge of Greene's registration. But the burden to produce evidence of MGH's 13 Greene also contends that the chief of the MGH Department of Psychiatry demanded that he relinquish the Marks. However, such a statement does not support Greene's estoppel defense because the alleged statement was not made until 2008, long after the Institute was founded and after Greene had signed every one of his employment agreements. By 2008, Greene had already ceded ownership of the Marks to MGH through years of affiliating the Marks with the Institute and using MGH's financial infrastructure. Consequently, even if we treated this statement as a representation about Greene's ownership, it would be impossible for Greene to show the necessary detrimental reliance. -15- knowledge, and thereby render MGH's failure to object meaningful, rests with Greene.
To support the notion that MGH's failure to disclose the IP policy amounted to a representation that Greene owned the Marks, Greene points to (1) MGH's exclusive knowledge of the IP policy; (2) the unfairness of enacting a policy mid-appointment that could result in an employee's unknowing loss of IP rights; and (3) the lack of a warning in his employment contracts that policies could change or may have changed since the last appointment, coupled with the similarity of language across his employment contracts. All of these arguments are grounded in Greene's assertion that he did not have actual knowledge of the IP policy until after he had unwittingly ceded his intellectual property rights to MGH by allowing the Marks to become affiliated with the Institute. Extrinsic materials may be incorporated into a contract by reference as long as the language used in the contract . . . clearly communicate[s] that the purpose of the reference is to incorporate the referenced material into the contract (rather than merely to acknowledge that the referenced material is relevant to the contract, e.g., as background law or negotiating history). NSTAR Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 968 N.E.2d 895, 905 (Mass. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless incorporation by general reference is explicitly rejected by some statute or -16- regulation, incorporation by a clearly stated general reference will suffice. Chicopee Concrete Serv., Inc. v. Hart Eng'g Co., 498 N.E.2d 121, 122 (Mass. 1986). Accordingly, a Massachusetts employer's policies may be incorporated by reference into its employment contracts. See Madonna v. Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 593 N.E.2d 1321, 1322 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that an employer bound an employee to its personnel policy with the following language on the reverse side of an employment contract: All employees of the University are employed pursuant to and subject to the polices and procedures of the Medical Center and the policies, rules and regulations adopted by the Board . . . as amended, revised, or repealed from time to time). Here, the language in Greene's applications and appointment forms was sufficiently clear to incorporate the IP policy by reference. Greene signed and submitted three applications while the 2002 version of the IP policy was in effect: in October 2003, August 2005, and October 2007. Each application stated, I have received and had an opportunity to read the Bylaws of the Medical/Professional Staff. I specifically agree to abide by all such bylaws and any policies and procedures that are applicable to appointees to the Medical/Professional Staff. Each application was accepted and Greene received, on each occasion, a Professional Staff Appointment Form stating, In discharging the -17- duties and exercising the privileges of your appointment, you are required to . . . [a]bide by the Bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies of the Professional Staff and the Hospital. Once it is acknowledged that at least three of Greene's employment contracts incorporated the IP policy as enacted in 2002, his arguments quickly fall away because of [t]he general rule . . . that, in the absence of fraud, one who signs a written agreement is bound by its terms whether he reads and understands it or not. Spritz v. Lishner, 243 N.E.2d 163, 164 (Mass. 1969) (quoting Cohen v. Santoianni, 112 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Mass. 1953)); see St. Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 35 (Mass. 2008) (distinguishing Cohen because the plaintiff alleged fraud in the inducement); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 18, 21 n.17 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in a case in which the plaintiff signed a form incorporating rules, constitutions, or by-laws, that [i]f [the defendant] had provided the rules to [the plaintiff] but she did not read them, that would not save her [from having to abide by those rules]). Greene argues that it is unfair to hold him to a policy enacted in the middle of one of his appointments. When the 2002 version of the IP policy was enacted, Greene was in the middle of an appointment that began in November 2001 and ended in November 2003. However, considering Greene's subsequent applications in October 2003 and August 2005 (the latter of which included explicit -18- reference to the IP policy), the fact that the IP policy was enacted mid-appointment is inconsequential. As the district court reasoned, MGH's claim to the CPS Marks arose, inter alia, from the association of the Marks with MGH services, namely, the Institute. Greene allowed that association to continue even after he signed subsequent applications agreeing to abide by the IP policy.14 Finally, Greene complains that his employment contracts did not explicitly warn him that MGH might adopt new policies or modify existing policies. The argument fails to appreciate that Greene's tenure at MGH was not one continuous period of employment. Rather, Greene enjoyed ten separate appointments, each governed by a separate agreement to be bound by the policies then in effect. Regardless of the facial similarity between contracts, Greene was required to read or assume the risk of not reading the policies incorporated afresh into each agreement. In sum, since MGH's conduct did not amount to a representation that Greene owned the Marks, Greene's estoppel defense fails. 14 This reasoning also applies to Greene's argument that the policy could not be applied retroactively to IP created before 2005. Even if the policy did not apply until 2005, Greene nevertheless permitted the ongoing association of the Marks with the Institute. -19-
Rehearsing similar arguments under a different heading, Greene argues that a valid contract was not formed at all because there was no meeting of the minds. Since he did not know the IP policy existed, the argument goes, Greene simply did not agree to be bound. Although mutual assent is often misleadingly referred to as a meeting of the minds, the formation of a valid contract under Massachusetts law requires objective, not subjective, intent. Nortek, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 843 N.E.2d 706, 713-14 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). A party's intent is deemed to be what a reasonable man in the position of the other party would conclude his objective manifestations to mean. CSX Transp. Inc. v. ABC & D Recycling, Inc., No. 11-30268-FDS, 2013 WL 3070770, at  (D. Mass. June 14, 2013). Assent may be inferred from conduct. Okerman v. VA Software Corp., 871 N.E.2d 1117, 1125 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). Here, notwithstanding Greene's assertions that he was unaware of the IP policy, he objectively manifested the intent to be bound by that policy when, without reservation, he signed the employment agreements that incorporated it by reference. See I & R Mech., Inc. v. Hazelton Mfg. Co., 817 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (The manifestation of mutual assent between contracting parties generally consists of an offer by one and the acceptance of -20- it by the other.). Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that Greene intended to be bound by his employment agreements in their totality. Separate evidence of Greene's assent to a particular provision (the incorporated IP policy) would be superfluous. Nevertheless, Greene provided precisely that additional evidence by signing the supplemental forms in 2005 and 2007. These forms, which Greene submitted with his final two employment applications, gave explicit notice of the IP policy and provided a URL address where the policy text could be accessed. Against the weight of such clear manifestations of objective intent, Greene's meeting of the minds defense cannot succeed.
Finally, Greene argues that, for the same reasons asserted above, his employment agreements are voidable under the doctrine of unilateral mistake. The district court held that Greene waived the unilateral mistake affirmative defense by failing to plead it in his answer to MGH's counterclaim. We find that the defense could not succeed even if it were not waived. Unilateral mistake is a disfavored defense. See, e.g., Eck v. Godbout, 831 N.E.2d 296, 303 (Mass. 2005) (A release may be rescinded or modified based on a mutual mistake of the parties, but not on one party's unilateral 'mistake' about how future contingencies might make the release inadvisable.); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 cmt. a (1981) (Courts have -21- traditionally been reluctant to allow a party to avoid a contract on the ground of mistake, even as to a basic assumption, if the mistake was not shared by the other party.). Nevertheless, a contract may be avoided under Massachusetts law if the party asserting unilateral mistake does not bear the risk of the mistake and either (1) enforcing the agreement would be unconscionable or (2) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the mistake. Nissan Autos. of Marlborough, Inc. v. Glick, 816 N.E.2d 161, 166 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153). A party bears the risk of a mistake when . . . he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient . . . . Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 154; accord Horney v. Westfield Gage Co., Inc., 77 Fed. App'x 24, 34 (1st Cir. 2003); Covich v. Chambers, 397 N.E.2d 1115, 1121 n.13 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). In part due to the doctrine's origins in equity, courts have considerable discretion in matters of contractual mistake. O'Rourke v. Jason Inc., 978 F. Supp. 41, 47 (D. Mass. 1997). Here, the mistake to which Greene refers is his misunderstanding about whether an IP policy existed and applied to the Marks. Greene's argument fails because he bore the risk of that mistake when he signed his employment contracts knowing that he had incomplete knowledge about the terms of those contracts. -22- All of his employment contracts clearly stated that he would be bound to MGH's policies, yet he did not seek out or read those policies. Greene therefore treat[ed] his limited knowledge as sufficient and assumed the risk of mistake. Even if Greene did not bear the risk, we could not find it unconscionable to enforce the agreements under the circumstances. Nor could we find that MGH had reason to know Greene was unfamiliar with the IP policy, particularly considering that Greene explicitly acknowledged that policy in the 2005 and 2007 supplemental forms. The unilateral mistake defense, like Greene's other defenses, must fail. Since all of Greene's contract-based defenses fail, the judgment for MGH is affirmed.