Opinion ID: 70451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PCA’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss

Text: Saqui alleges that the district court committed clear error by reviewing its February 14, 2007 order denying PCA’s motion to dismiss on FNC grounds because there was evidence of Pereznieto’s alleged fraud available before that order was issued and PCA did not exercise due diligence in trying to get this information to the district court prior to its ruling. Saqui also argues that the district court did not engage in a de novo review of the magistrate’s R & R, because it adopted it ten days after it was issued. These arguments have no merit. As an initial matter, the district court’s February 14th order was an interlocutory order, not a final judgment. This court has explained that when a district court rules on an interlocutory order, it is “free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive law.” Lavespere v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, PCA exercised diligence in bringing the evidence of Pereznieto’s alleged fraud to the attention of the district court. The MDL court 6 Case: 08-41059 Document: 00511009113 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/21/2010 No. 08-41059 did not issue sanctions against Pereznieto until after the briefing had concluded on the issue of FNC before the district court. After the district court denied PCA’s claims, it sought to depose Dahl to determine the basis for his opinions. After PCA received the transcript of Dahl’s testimony, it filed the motion to reconsider. It was entirely reasonable for PCA to wait to file its motion to reconsider until after it received Dahl’s testimony indicating that he had misgivings regarding his previous reliance on Pereznieto’s affidavit. Lastly, Saqui argues that the district court did not engage in a de novo review of the magistrate’s R & R, because it adopted it ten days after it was issued. In Freeman v. County of Bexar, 142 F.3d 848, 852 (5th Cir. 1998), this court noted that a district court reviewing a magistrate judge’s R & R has wide discretion to consider and reconsider the magistrate judge’s recommendation. There is no record support for Saqui’s notion that the district court failed to exercise the broad discretionary review described in Freeman. Saqui only offers conjecture that the district court did not engage in a proper de novo review because it accepted the R & R ten days after it was issued. No case law or statutory law supports this meritless argument. The district court reviewed the R & R, considered Saqui’s objections to the R & R, and stated that it had given the matter de novo review. District court judges have broad discretion in managing their own dockets. Sims v. ANR Freight Sys. Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir. 1996). It is not error for the district court to resolve an issue promptly. In sum, we find that there was no error in the district court’s handling of PCA’s renewed motion to dismiss based upon FNC grounds.