Opinion ID: 2055341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Proposals for Modification

Text: There are several proposals for modification of the rule which attempt to balance the collective needs of the community and the individual rights of its citizens. One suggestion is that evidence be suppressed only where the errant law enforcement activity is intentional, reckless or grossly negligent. Geller, supra at 648. Another is that a so-called good-faith defense be adopted such that where the police have acted mistakenly, but in good-faith and on reasonable grounds, [6] the evidence should not be suppressed. Stone v. Powell, supra, 428 U.S. at 536-42, 96 S.Ct. 3037 (White, J., dissenting); Weber, supra. The American Law Institute takes the position that evidence should be excluded only where the violation committed in acquiring it was substantial. Where the violation was gross, wilful and prejudicial, it would be deemed substantial. In all other cases, various factors would be examined and weighed, and the trial court would determine whether the circumstances demonstrated a substantial violation. Circumstances to be considered in determining whether a violation is substantial are: (a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct; (b) the extent to which the violation was wilful; (c) the extent to which privacy was invaded; (d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code; (e) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered; and (f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him. [7] I favor the ALI model prohibiting introduction of evidence only when the violation by which it was obtained was substantial and would vote to adopt this modified version of the exclusionary rule as the law of this Commonwealth under Article I, Section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [8] By laying down certain reasoned parameters within which exclusion is to operate . . . the substantiality test has the potential for preserving the exclusionary sanction within a scope that is both rational and effective in carrying out the purposes for which it was originally invoked, and at the same time politically and socially acceptable. Coe, supra at 51. Applying these standards to the case at bar, I would affirm the lower court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress: (a) The extent of deviation from lawful conduct. The deviation from lawful conduct was not extreme, indeed, the conduct was sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court when that Court held, in Miller, that there is no intrusion on the bank depositor's Fourth Amendment rights. [9] On the continuum of unlawful conduct, the law enforcement practice in this case falls far short of the sort of activity condemned in Mapp v. Ohio which would be on the high end of the spectrum; [10] (b) The extent to which the violation was wilful. While there was no evidence that the investigating officers or the assistant district attorney (who advised that the subpoena procedure was proper) acted in bad faith or intended to violate appellant's right to privacy, the record is inconclusive on the wilfulness of the deviation; (c) The extent to which privacy was invaded. Again, the invasion of privacy must be seen as on the low end of the continuum. What is involved here are records at a commercial banking institution, not a private residence; (d) The extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code. To a certain extent, this factor is dependent upon the wilfulness of the violation since, as we have seen, the rationale of prevention of future violations (deterrence) is of dubious validity when applied to unintentional, reasonable enforcement procedures. In the absence of bad faith, and in light of the fact that a majority of the United States Supreme Court in Miller did not disapprove the sort of activity herein involved (and that the police and the assistant district attorney could reasonably reach the same conclusion as did the Miller court), it would appear that deterrence would not be appreciably advanced by excluding the evidence; (e) Whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered. Had the subpoenas been issued after trial had commenced, they would have been lawful, Commonwealth v. Polak, 438 Pa. 67, 263 A.2d 354 (1970), and the evidence could have been obtained at that time. Additionally, there were search warrants issued prior to the subpoenaing of the bank records which warrants authorized the search of appellant's house. These warrants were, contrary to appellant's assertion, supported by probable cause, when the affidavit accompanying the warrants is given a commonsense reading, Commonwealth v. Muscheck, 460 Pa. 590, 334 A.2d 248 (1975). [11] The information supplying probable cause to search appellant's house could also have provided probable cause for a search warrant to obtain the bank records. Thus, the evidence probably would have been discovered without the search and seizure violation; (f) The extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him. Appellant's ability to support her motion or to defend herself does not seem to be any more or less prejudiced than in any other search and seizure case. Of course, in all cases the mere fact that incriminating evidence is seized is prejudicial to a defendant's defense. This factor would be more important where the evidence seized in and of itself established guilt, i. e., in possession crimes. [12] Considering the totality of the circumstances and all the above factors, any violation of the rights guaranteed appellant by Article I, Section 8, was not substantial and, therefore, the evidence was properly admitted. [13]