Opinion ID: 1759192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the bar fail to meet its burden of proof?

Text: The burden of proof on the Bar in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is to show that the attorney violated the rules in question by clear and convincing evidence. Attorney Q. v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1991). In Bar disciplinary proceedings, where the Rules of Discipline are silent, the Rules of Civil Procedure apply. Vining. The comment to M.R.C.P. 55 Default states: [o]nce the default is established, defendant has no further standing to contest the factual allegations of [the Bar's] claim ... [the attorney's] only recourse is to show good cause for setting aside the default under Rule 55(c) and, failing that, to contest the amount of [discipline imposed]. However, when disciplinary actions are appealed to this Court, we evaluate the evidence by reviewing the entire record  de novo, on a case-by-case basis, sitting as triers of fact, and no substantial evidence or manifest error rule shields the Tribunal from scrutiny. Mississippi State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So.2d 166, 171 (Miss. 1992); citing Foote v. Mississippi Bar Ass'n, 517 So.2d 561, 564 (Miss. 1987). See also, Vining at 1048-49. While Terrell did cite a case to establish the Bar's burden of proof, she does not provide us with any authority or evidence as to why the Bar failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. Terrell merely states in conclusory fashion that the evidence was insufficient. The only way to evaluate the assertion that the Bar failed to meet its burden of proof is to look at the facts presented by the Bar, taking them as correct, to determine if it is clear and convincing that Terrell violated each rule that the Tribunal found her to have violated. It is clear and convincing that Terrell violated the rules she fails to specifically object to in her brief. She cites Rules 1.5(a) and (b), 1.6(a), 1.15(b)(c), 3.2, 3.4(c), 4.1 and 8.4(a)(c) and (d) with particularity as being unsupported by clear and convincing evidence. It will be necessary to evaluate them one at a time: Rule 1.5(a) states that a lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The facts as presented by the Bar are that Mitchell sent Terrell a $4,000 settlement check for payment in full of Johnson's injuries. Terrell and Johnson endorsed the check, after which Terrell gave Johnson a check in the amount of $1,300 representing her portion of the proceeds of the settlement. Another check for $700 was paid to the doctor who tended to Johnson's injuries. Hence, resting on the premise that paying Johnson's doctor's fee was tantamount to paying Johnson, Terrell took one-half (1/2) of the proceeds of the settlement. Furthermore, according to Johnson, she endorsed a $400.00 check payable to Stella Terrell that represented the repayment of a $400.00 loan she received from Ms. Terrell earlier in the case to help her defray some of her personal expenses. Presumably, this was a contingency fee arrangement: Terrell received her fee as a result of the settlement arranged with Mitchell; there was no written contract between Terrell and Johnson regarding Terrell's fee; and Johnson has no idea how much she paid Terrell throughout the representation. The question then becomes, was the fee reasonable under the circumstances in this case? Rule 1.5(a) sets forth the factors to be considered to determine whether or not a fee is reasonable: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Here, as with all the alleged violations, Terrell merely states that it is not clear and convincing that she violated the rule, and the Bar relies on the fact that Default Judgment was entered, making no reference to the facts in support of its argument. The fact that Terrell provided Ms. Johnson with financial assistance, and that Ms. Johnson was not apprised of the fee arrangement, are violations of Rules 1.8(e) and 1.5(b)(c) respectively. For the purposes of Rule 1.5(a), the record does not provide us with clear and convincing evidence that Terrell's fee itself was unreasonable. It is clear and convincing that the terms and conditions surrounding the fee were unreasonable; however, that is not sufficient evidence to determine that Terrell violated Rule 1.5(a). Rule 1.5(b) states that [w]hen a lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Terrell does not allege that she represented Johnson on other matters; on the other hand, the Bar does not present facts indicating that Terrell did not regularly represent Johnson. The facts state that [s]ubsequent to [Johnson's] accident, Ms. Johnson hired Ms. Terrell to represent her... . This was a personal injury case, thus not the type of matter that would lead to a career long lawyer-client relationship. The Comment to Rule 1.5 states that [w]hen the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly established. It stands to reason that whether the client is a new one or a regular, if no basis or rate of the lawyer's fee has previously been established, the lawyer is responsible for communicating the basis or rate of the fee to the client. The idea here is to protect clients from surprise when the bill comes. Terrell and Johnson had no understanding as to the fee Terrell would charge for representation. It is clear and convincing that Terrell violated this Rule of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.6(a) states: A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraphs (b) and (c). The Bar does not argue in its brief which facts point to this violation (or for that matter, which facts point specifically to any of the alleged violations); rather, the Bar trusts that this Court, taking the material allegations as true in accordance with the entry of the default judgment, will sift through and find the violations. The only facts alleged by the Bar that even arguably lend themselves to a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Terrell violated Rule 1.6(a) are these: (1) When Johnson and Terrell met at Terrell's office to negotiate the settlement checks, two unidentified gentlemen, who were strangers to Ms. Johnson, were present. (2) When Johnson received her check from Ms. Terrell, Ms. Terrell told Ms. Johnson not to cash her check until the `papers' were signed which would take approximately four to five days. Ms. Johnson said she signed some document, but did not know what the document was, and Ms. Terrell did not explain the significance of the document to her. Id. (3) Just after this, on three occasions, Ms. Terrell told Mitchell and/or his representative (Carla Strong) that Johnson had signed the full, final and absolute release. Id. These occurrences do not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence that Terrell violated her duty not to reveal information relating to the representation of Johnson. There are no facts which indicate that the two unidentified gentlemen had anything revealed to them. With regard to the release, which the Bar infers Terrell had Johnson sign unbeknownst to her, this was arguably impliedly authorized, as Johnson had consulted with Terrell prior to accepting the settlement. Terrell's representations to Strong and/or Mitchell that Johnson had signed the release is also arguably impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation ... Rule 1.6(a). Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal's finding that Terrell violated Rule 1.6(a) is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Rule 1.15(b) states: Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property. Terrell violated this Rule. After receiving the settlement checks from Mitchell, she did not, and still has not sent Mitchell the release to which he was entitled as Ruth Hester's representative. Even after negotiating the checks, which Mitchell expressly asked her not to do until he received the release, Terrell has not sent the release. Rule 1.15(c) states: When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. According to the facts presented by the Bar, Terrell received the settlement checks from Mitchell, endorsed them along with Johnson, and then gave Johnson a check for $1,300. There was never an accounting. Johnson claims she does not know how much money she paid Terrell as there was never a contract or agreement regarding fees. Terrell seemingly just gave Johnson what she felt was proper without explaining anything to Johnson. This is clear and convincing evidence that Terrell violated this Rule. Rule 3.2 states that [a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. Based on Terrell's failure to respond to Mitchell's correspondence regarding discovery requests and trial dates, her failure to follow the circuit court's order mandating compliance with discovery requests, and her delay with regard to the release she agreed to send to Mitchell to finalize the settlement agreement, she did, by clear and convincing evidence, violate this Rule of Professional Conduct. Rule 3.4(c) states: A lawyer shall not: (c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists. Again, based on Terrell's failure to abide by the court order mandating compliance with Mitchell's discovery requests so the lawyers could report back to the court, she violated this Rule. Rule 4.1: In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; ... Terrell's representations to Mitchell that Johnson had not negotiated the checks, and that she had sent the release to him, put her in violation of this rule. Rules 8.4(a)(c) and (d): It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another ...; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice ...; The facts noted supra show by clear and convincing evidence that Terrell violated these Rules of Professional Conduct. This assignment of error has merit with regard to Rules 1.5(a) and 1.6(a) as the evidence is not clear and convincing that Terrell violated these rules. Otherwise, with regard to the violations she objects to with particularity, and the violations she fails to specifically object to, this assignment of error has no merit.