Opinion ID: 1450682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of Weapon Testimony

Text: Appellant contends that the testimony concerning the weapons was error. In Major I, we noted that: [w]e have upheld the admission of weapons into evidence based upon testimony that the weapon was the one used in the commission of the offense, Beason v. Commonwealth, 548 S.W.2d 835 (Ky. 1977), or that it was of the same size and shape as the weapon used in the commission of the offense, Sweatt v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 520 (Ky.1977); or that it was found at the scene of the offense and was capable of inflicting the type of injury sustained by the victim, Barth v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 390 (Ky.2001). However, weapons, which have no relation to the crime, are inadmissible. Gerlaugh v. Commonwealth, 156 S.W.3d 747 (Ky.2005). 177 S.W.3d 700, 710-711 (Ky.2005). Thus, we held that it was error to introduce the weapons [into evidence] without [a] connection to the crime. 177 S.W.3d at 711. Prior to retrial, Appellant filed a motion in limine to exclude all testimony concerning the weapons Appellant possessed in 1980, i.e., the weapons that Appellant possessed and subsequently transferred following Marlene's disappearance. Appellant argued, inter alia, that this Court's ruling on weapons in Major I was to be broadly construed and should exclude all evidence of Major's weapons. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the ruling in Major I was much narrower, and covered only the introduction of the weapons themselves. After discussion of the issue, the trial court prohibited introduction of the weapons as exhibits, but allowed witness testimony concerning the weapons. The trial court's ruling was based on Appellant's previously introduced statement that he would shoot Marlene if she tried to leave him, as well as expert testimony that the bullet wounds found on the recovered skull were consistent with projectiles from Appellant's weapons. Subsequently, prosecution witness Glenn St. Hillaire testified that Appellant carried a gun. The trial court originally sustained Appellant's objection to this testimony, but later allowed it into evidence based upon the Commonwealth's assurance that later testimony would show that the gun was capable of producing the wounds present on the skull. The testimony of St. Hillaire established that there were guns at the Majors' home, which was the scene of the crime as Appellant agreed that he shot his wife outside of their home and it was also the last place Marlene was seen alive. St. Hillaire testified that Appellant had a gun at Major's home approximately one month prior to his wife's disappearance, and that, while he was handling the gun, Appellant threatened that his wife was not going anywhere. St. Hillaire also testified that once, when he and Marlene were sitting together talking by the nearby railroad tracks, they saw Major go in and out of St. Hillaire's camper with a gun in his hand. Lastly, Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial after St. Hillaire testified that he removed Appellant's .22 caliber gun from the Majors' home after Marlene's disappearance. The trial court overruled Appellant's motion for mistrial based upon the Commonwealth's assertion that appropriate foundation testimony would be presented. The trial court later clarified its ruling, explaining that the ruling meant that the Commonwealth had to present testimony that Appellant's .22 could have caused the injuries evident on Marlene's skull, or had some other connection to the crime. The court also stated that introduction of weapon testimony was not a law-of-the-case issue, but, instead, a relevancy issue, and that the guns were relevant if they were of a type that could have caused the injuries to Marlene's skull. Additionally, the trial court found that weapons evidence is admissible so long as its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice and indicated that its rulings would be made on a case-by-case basis. Shortly after the trial court's ruling on weapons, Appellant again sought to exclude weapon testimony prior to the testimony of prosecution witness Trinnie Brice. The trial court again ruled that weapon testimony was admissible if the Commonwealth established a foundation that the guns were of a type capable of inflicting the injuries to the victim. Thereafter, Brice testified that as Appellant prepared to leave town after Marlene's disappearance and after sending his children to Rhode Island, Appellant gave or sold him several items, a tractor, three guns, a CB radio, along with a box of stuff that Appellant asked Brice to store in his closet for him. Brice turned the guns over to law enforcement. David Spicer, a former acquaintance of Appellant, testified he heard Appellant say he would shoot his wife, cut her up, and that no one would ever find her. On cross-examination, Appellant asked Spicer if he thought the statement was serious. Spicer replied that he did take the matter seriously because Appellant carried a gun on his hip. Additionally, during cross-examination of the officers who transported Appellant to Kentucky from Massachusetts, it was developed that Appellant told the officers that he shot Marlene six times with a .38 caliber, and that he had been fond of telling people a false tale that he was a sniper in Vietnam, and was a prisoner of war. Leroy Williams also testified that Appellant bragged that he could perform the perfect murder. According to Williams, Appellant said he would shoot the victim, use the gun to knock out the teeth, cut off the feet, remove the lower jaw, and then scatter the pieces throughout the country so the victim could not be identified. The Commonwealth also called Dr. Emily Craig. She described, in substantial detail, how she was able to examine the recovered skull to draw conclusions about the circumstances surrounding Marlene's death. The skull revealed that someone had attempted to decapitate the body with some type of tool, such as an ax or a large knife. Further, the obvious hole in the top of the skull was an exit wound resulting from a gunshot. These wounds occurred at or near the time of death, while the bone was still alive and flexible. In all likelihood, the bullet wound suggested that more than one shot was fired into the skull. Although it was impossible to determine what caliber firearm caused the wound, Dr. Craig testified that it could have been a 9 mm handgun, a .38 caliber revolver, a 12-gauge shotgun, a .22 rifle, or some similar firearm. The wound could not have resulted from another type of weapon, such as a BB gun. Other marks on the bone indicated that someone had attempted to remove the lower jaw with a tool. In Major I, we held that the introduction of firearms owned by Appellant in 1980 was error, since the testimony did not establish that the weapons were in fact used in the murder of Marlene, were of the same size or shape as the weapon used in the commission of the offense, or were found at the scene and capable of inflicting the type of injury sustained. 177 S.W.3d at 710-711. Appellant now argues that this language serves to exclude otherwise relevant, properly admitted weapons testimony under the law-of-the-case doctrine. We disagree. Although Appellant argues that Major I broadly controls all testimony in which a firearm is mentioned, our holding in Major I was actually much narrower. Major I solely dealt with the physical introduction of weapons as items of evidence without adequate relevance to the events to which they were to be connected, not testimony about those weapons. This is clear given our citation of Beason, Sweatt, Barth, and especially Gerlaugh. Major, 177 S.W.3d at 710-711. Thus, because of the limited scope of our ruling in Major I, the trial court correctly recognized that the question concerning the testimony of weapons was one of relevancy. Given Appellant's threats, their temporal proximity to Marlene's disappearance, the availability of weapons at the crime scene, and the similarities between the threats and the actual condition of the recovered skull, the weapons testimony was clearly relevant. Thus, the trial court was correct in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the weapons in this instance because the evidence on retrial supplied a sufficient nexus, or relevancy, to the means and manner of Marlene's death. Therefore, we find no error in the introduction of weapon testimony.