Opinion ID: 1673978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: GMAC's Issue # 3: Whether Ivy's References to a Writ of Replevin Were Prejudicial and Reversible?

Text: Through this issue, GMAC complains that Ivy violated its right to a fair trial by repeatedly referring to the fact that GMAC did not acquire a writ of replevin prior to repossessing the van. GMAC explains that the Retail Installment Sales Contract included a so-called insecurity clause. This clause, as well as Mississippi law, empowered GMAC to immediately repossess the van upon default by Ivy. This clause also empowered GMAC to repossess the van without first acquiring a writ of replevin. Thus, GMAC made a motion in limine prior to trial and requested that Ivy be precluded from referring to the fact that no writ was sought or obtained. The trial court denied the request. GMAC contends that the judge's denial constituted a reversible error because it allowed the plaintiff to interrogate almost every witness about this unnecessary and irrelevant writ of replevin and thus prejudiced the jury. Ivy counters that the error, if any, should be deemed harmless since: (1) the judge instructed the jury that a writ was not required in order to repossess the van; thus the trial judge took the curative action to eliminate any prejudicial effect; and (2) jurors are presumed to follow the law as instructed.
The trial judge is in the most advantageous position to correctly rule whether prejudice, or the lack of it, has emanated from [an allegedly improper] comment. Palumbo, 371 So.2d at 876. This Court holds that GMAC has failed to prove that the judge in this case abused his discretion by denying the motion.