Opinion ID: 2525464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Failing to challenge prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument in the guilt phase

Text: Evans alleges that four instances of prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing argument in the guilt phase and that his counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge them. First, in responding to defense counsel's argument that Anthony Collins or other persons might have committed the murders, the prosecutor asked, where's the evidence? Evans claims this improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. Generally, prosecutorial comment on the failure of the defense to present witnesses or evidence impermissibly shifts the burden of proof. [39] However, this court held that a prosecutor was justified in commenting on a defendant's failure to call a person to testify where the defendant had injected [the person] into the testimony as an alibi witness. [40] The Ninth Circuit has held that as long as a prosecutor's remarks do not call attention to a defendant's failure to testify, it is permissible to comment on the failure of the defense to counter or explain evidence presented. [41] Here, Evans injected the theory that someone else had committed the murders, and the prosecutor's remarks did not call attention to Evans's failure to testify. Therefore, the prosecutor could properly argue that the defense failed to substantiate its theory with supporting evidence. Second, in discussing the definition of reasonable doubt as a doubt which would govern a person in the more weighty affairs of life, [42] the prosecutor said such affairs included choosing a spouse, a college, or an occupation. Defense counsel had argued that weighty affairs of life could include deciding whether to end life support for a badly injured child or parent, and the district court concluded that the prosecutor's assertion was a permissible response. Defense counsel's remarks were improper, but did not justify the prosecutor's mischaracterization of reasonable doubt. This court has repeatedly cautioned the district courts and attorneys not to attempt to quantify, supplement, or clarify the statutorily prescribed standard for reasonable doubt. [43] In Holmes v. State [44] and Quillen v. State, [45] this court specifically held that it is improper to compare reasonable doubt to decisions such as choosing a spouse, buying a house, or changing jobs. The prosecutor's remedy was to object to defense counsel's remarks as impermissible elaboration on the definition of reasonable doubt, not to commit the same error in response. The error was harmless, however, because the jury received the proper written instruction on reasonable doubt. [46] We again caution the defense bar and prosecutors alike not to explain, elaborate on, or offer analogies or examples based on the statutory definition of reasonable doubt. Counsel may argue that evidence and theories in the case before the jury either amount to or fall short of that definition nothing more. Third, in responding to defense counsel's argument that police failed to properly investigate the role of Everett Flowers in the crimes, the prosecutor conceded Flowers's possible involvement, referred to the large homicide file, and stated that the investigation was ongoing. Evans now complains that these remarks argued facts not in evidence. This complaint is frivolous: the facts supported Evans's own strategy of accusing Flowers of the murder and certainly did not prejudice Evans. Fourth, Evans complains that the prosecution made improper remarks, including that he was an evil magnet. We conclude that the remarks were not improperly inflammatory and did not disparage legitimate defense tactics. [47]