Opinion ID: 710874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The NRC Subpoena

Text: 22 Respondents deny that the NRC acted within its statutory authority when it inquired into Holub's termination and its possible nuclear safety implications; and even if it did, Respondents challenge whether that authority may be exercised against mere suppliers. 23 The AEA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 et seq., as amended by the ERA, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5801 et seq., establishes a comprehensive regulatory framework for the ongoing review of nuclear power plants in the United States. See County of Rockland, 709 F.2d at 768-69. Under the AEA and the ERA, the NRC is charged with primary responsibility to ensure that the generation and transmission of nuclear power do not unreasonably threaten public safety and welfare. Id.; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2012. Consistent with its administrative mandate, the NRC is authorized to: 24 make such studies and investigations, obtain such information, and hold such meetings or hearings as the [NRC] may deem necessary or proper to assist it in exercising any authority provided in this chapter, ... or any regulations or orders issued thereunder. For such purposes the [NRC] is authorized ... by subpena to require any person to ... appear and produce documents.... 25 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(c) (emphasis added); see also Oncology Servs., 60 F.3d at 1019. 26 Although an agency investigation must be conducted for a legitimate purpose, see Brigadoon, 480 F.2d at 1054; In re Sealed Case, 42 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C.Cir.1994), Sec. 2201(c) does not require that the precise nature and extent of an NRC investigation be articulated in a specific provision of the AEA or the ERA. Rather, Sec. 2201(c) makes clear that an NRC investigation is proper if it assist[s] [the NRC] in exercising any authority provided in this chapter, ... or any regulations or orders issued thereunder. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(c) (emphasis added); see also FTC v. Rockefeller, 441 F.Supp. 234, 240 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff'd, 591 F.2d 182 (2d Cir.1979). And, pursuant to NRC regulations, the NRC may exercise its authority through standards-setting and rulemaking; technical reviews and studies; public hearings; issuance of authorizations, permits, and licenses; inspection, investigation, and enforcement; evaluation of operating experience; and confirmatory research. 10 C.F.R. Sec. 1.11(b). 27 The NRC asserts that the purpose of its subpoena is to determine whether Respondents' treatment of whistleblowers poses a threat to public health and safety by discouraging would-be whistleblowers from coming forward, thereby increasing the likelihood that safety defects will escape detection. That a widespread employment practice of squelching employee disclosure of nuclear risks might have serious safety implications takes no stretch of the imagination: 28 Common sense tells us that a retaliatory discharge of an employee for 'whistleblowing' is likely to discourage others from coming forward with information about apparent safety discrepancies. Yet, [the NRC's] safety inspectors cannot be everywhere; to an extent they must depend on help of this kind to do their jobs. Incidents that deter such aid are inherently suspect. They obviously merit full exploration in the interests of safety and certainly are prima facie within [the NRC's] legislative charter. 29 Union Elec. Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), 9 N.R.C. 126, 134 (1979). Unless the NRC is permitted to investigate whether an employer regularly stifles disclosure of possible nuclear hazards, this practice could go unchecked--a situation rife with safety ramifications. 30 Here the information sought by the subpoena could reveal an employment practice of discouraging whistleblowing. On the other hand, it might merely assure the NRC that such practices are not taking place. See Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 642-43, 70 S.Ct. at 363-64. Under its mandate to ensure safety from nuclear risks, the NRC might ultimately use the information to exercise its rule-making authority, to issue notices of non-conformance, or to provide reports to Congress. See 10 C.F.R. Secs. 1.11(b), 2.201; 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2210(p). In any event, the information sought by the subpoena is not plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the NRC in the discharge of [its] duties. Endicott Johnson, 317 U.S. at 509, 63 S.Ct. at 343. We therefore find that the issuance of the subpoena was within the NRC's statutory authority. 31 Respondents argue, however, that pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Provision of the ERA, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851, Congress delegated to the DOL--not the NRC--the task of investigating all potential nuclear safety risks resulting from adverse employment practices. We disagree. The Whistleblower Protection Provision provides, in relevant part: 32 No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee ... caused to be commenced ... a proceeding under ... the [ERA] or the [AEA]. 33 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851(a)(1)(D). An employee who claims retaliation under this section must file a complaint with the DOL, which may then investigate the allegations and make a determination. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851(b). Congress logically gave the power to resolve Sec. 5851 retaliation claims to the DOL, as those claims are within the DOL's particular area of expertise. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 83 n. 6, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2277 n. 6, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) ([T]he enforcement and implementation of [Sec. 5851] was entrusted by Congress not to the NRC--the body primarily responsible for nuclear safety regulation--but to the Department of Labor.) (emphasis added); Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 637 (2d Cir.1989). 34 It bears emphasis, however, that the NRC is not trying to adjudicate Holub's individual retaliation claim; Holub himself has already filed a claim with the DOL and has received a favorable decision. Instead, the NRC is attempting to investigate Respondents' general employment practices to determine whether those practices are having a chilling effect on would-be whistleblowers. That aim is quite distinct from the aim of the DOL investigation: 35 [T]he [NRC's] investigatory powers and those of the [DOL] under [Sec. 5851] neither serve the same purpose nor are invoked in the same manner. They are, rather, complementary, not duplicative.... Under [Sec. 5851] the [DOL] apparently lacks two remedial powers--which the [NRC] possesses-- ... the right to take important action against the employer, and the ... authority to do so immediately.... [T]he [DOL] may order only reinstatement and back pay--not correction of the dangerous practices themselves. 36 Union Electric, 9 N.R.C. at 138; cf. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5851(j)(2) (a DOL finding that a retaliation claim has no merit shall not be considered by the [NRC] in its determination of whether a substantial safety hazard exists). 37 We further reject Respondents' argument that they are not subject to the NRC's investigatory power. Section 2201(c) authorizes the NRC to subpoena any person. The term person encompasses any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or private institution, group, Government agency other than the [NRC].... 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2014(s). Respondents clearly fall within this broad definition. If and when the NRC decides to use the information obtained by the subpoena, Respondents may then challenge whether they fall within the NRC's enforcement jurisdiction. See Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 201, 66 S.Ct. at 501-02 (holding that although agency must defend purpose behind investigation, it is not required to prove cause of action at subpoena enforcement stage); Endicott Johnson, 317 U.S. at 509, 63 S.Ct. at 343; Brigadoon, 480 F.2d at 1053; Newmark & Co. v. Wirtz, 330 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir.1964). We conclude, therefore, that the NRC has the authority to conduct this particular investigation and to obtain the information sought by the subpoena.