Opinion ID: 77514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Use of Expert Mental Health Testimony

Text: 9 Lynd argues that he was deprived of his right to the assistance of necessary and competent mental health experts, and that the trial court's exclusion of available mental health testimony from his competency trial and from both phases of his capital trial violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The district court treated this claim as asserting two separate grounds for relief. We address each ground in turn. 10 First, Lynd argues that he was deprived of his right to the assistance of necessary and competent experts in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court held that when a defendant demonstrates ... that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Id. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087; see also Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1206 (11th Cir.2004) (setting forth elements of an Ake claim). 11 Lynd's counsel requested and received the appointment of an expert witness. Ultimately, for reasons discussed below, the trial court excluded the expert's testimony. Lynd argues that this exclusion constituted a de facto denial of his request for expert assistance, and that such denial rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 12 We may not consider the merits of this argument here because Lynd failed to raise it on direct appeal in the state courts. The first time Lynd raised his Ake claim was in his state habeas petition. Under Georgia law, a petitioner's failure to ... pursue [an issue] on appeal ordinarily will preclude review by writ of habeas corpus, unless the petitioner can show either adequate cause for his failure to pursue the issue and actual prejudice, or that a miscarriage of justice, caused by a substantial denial of constitutional rights, will occur. Black v. Hardin, 255 Ga. 239, 336 S.E.2d 754, 755 (1985). Because Lynd failed to raise his Ake claim on direct appeal, the state habeas court found that Black precluded review. The state habeas court also found that Lynd failed to establish that he qualified for an exception to the procedural bar. 3 Accordingly, the state habeas court dismissed the claim as procedurally barred by a rule of state law. See Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (11th Cir.1999) (Procedural default arises when the state court correctly applies a procedural default principle of state law to arrive at the conclusion that the petitioner's federal claims are barred.). 13 A procedural bar precludes federal review when it provides an adequate and independent state ground for denial of a claim. 4 See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989); Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir.1995). Because the state habeas court found that these claims are procedurally barred, this Court cannot review the merits of Lynd's Ake claim unless he qualifies for at least one exception to the procedural bar. 14 A federal habeas petitioner may still obtain federal review of a claim that has been procedurally barred if he can demonstrate either (1) cause for the [procedural] default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or (2) that the court's failure to consider the [federal] claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Lynd fails to address either of these possibilities. He has not shown cause for his failure to raise the Ake claim on direct appeal; nor has he shown any actual prejudice. Further, he has not established that this Court's failure to consider the Ake claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Therefore, this Court is precluded from reviewing Lynd's Ake claim on the merits. 15 Lynd's second ground for relief within Claim One is that the state trial court violated his constitutional right to present witnesses in his own defense when, due to Lynd's refusal to submit to a state mental health evaluation, the court excluded his mental health expert testimony from his competency trial and both phases of his capital trial. Lynd argues that this exclusion was improper because it could have provided mitigating information relevant to both his state of mind at the time of the crime and his ultimate sentence. 16 When a state trial court's evidentiary rulings violate a habeas petitioner's fundamental constitutional right to present witnesses in his own defense, a federal court must grant the petition. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (identifying the calling and interrogation of favorable witnesses as a constitutional right basic to our adversary system of justice); United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359, 1363-66 (11th Cir.2004); Boykins v. Wainwright, 737 F.2d 1539, 1544 (11th Cir.1984). However, a defendant's right to present witnesses is not unlimited. A state trial court has wide discretion in determining whether to admit evidence at trial, and may exclude material evidence when there is a compelling reason to do so. Boykins, 737 F.2d at 1543-44. A defendant's refusal to submit to an evaluation by a state expert, based on his own choice and not on the advice of ineffective counsel, may provide a compelling reason to exclude the defendant's expert testimony, even when the testimony is material. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (stating in dicta that [w]hen a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case.). 5 17 In denying this claim on direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err by excluding testimony of the defendant's mental health experts where the defendant refused to submit to an examination by mental health experts chosen by the state. Lynd, 414 S.E.2d at 11. The state trial record indicates that Lynd refused to be interviewed by the state's expert on four separate occasions. Lynd testified in a pretrial hearing on October 5, 1989 that he would not speak with the state expert because he believed the expert had lied to him. On May 5, 1997, the state habeas court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which Lynd's trial counsel testified, and found that it was the Petitioner's refusal to be examined by the State's mental health professionals [and not his counsel's advice] that led to the exclusion of any mental health evidence regarding Petitioner's mental state and culpability. 18 Because the Georgia Supreme Court denied this claim on the merits, and the state habeas court made factual findings concerning this claim, we must evaluate whether those rulings were either contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). An independent review of the record indicates that there were sufficient facts to support the state habeas court's findings that Lynd refused a state evaluation for reasons unrelated to his counsel's advice. We cannot say that those findings were unreasonable. Nor can we say that the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling was contrary to federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, we deny this claim.