Opinion ID: 2976805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fourth Amendment Violations under Heck

Text: By way of a now well-known footnote, the Heck Court observed that even if successful, some Fourth Amendment claims brought under § 1983 “would not necessarily imply that the plaintiff’s conviction was unlawful” due to doctrines like independent source, inevitable discovery, and harmless error. Id. at 487 n.7. Some courts read Heck to suggest that as a rule, Fourth Amendment claims may proceed because they cannot impugn the validity of a conviction. See, e.g., Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 428 (7th Cir. 2006) (concluding that “the Fourth Amendment violation affects only the evidence that might or might not be presented to the trier of fact” and not the outstanding conviction); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (same). For now, however, the Supreme Court suggests that Heck will bar at least some Fourth Amendment claims. In Wallace v. Kato, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007), Justice Scalia voiced the majority’s conclusion that “a Fourth Amendment claim can necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction, and . . . if it does it must, under Heck, be dismissed.”1 Id. at 1099 n.5. Sixth Circuit precedent comports with that position, placing the onus on the district court to assess on a case-by-case basis whether a favorable Fourth Amendment judgment would impugn the validity of an outstanding conviction. 1 Wallace also clarified that Heck does not delay the accrual of an otherwise complete and present cause of action when a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor “would impugn an anticipated future conviction.” 127 S. Ct. at 1098. Harper’s claims thus accrued on July 31, 2003, the date of the alleged illegal search and seizure. Id. Under Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations for personal injury, Harper’s claims would be untimely. The defendants forfeited this affirmative defense, however, by failing to raise it on appeal. Smith v. State of Ohio Dep’t of Rehab.& Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 429 n.2 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Titterington, 374 F.3d 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2004). -4- No. 06-5658 Harper v. Jackson E.g., Schilling v. White, 58 F.3d 1081, 1086 (6th Cir. 1995); Jackim v. City of Brooklyn, No. 1:05 cv 1678, 2007 WL 893868, at  n.11 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007) (unpublished). Although Heck bars § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims where the contested search produced the only evidence supporting the conviction and no legal doctrine could save the evidence from exclusion, see, e.g., Ballenger v. Owens, 352 F.3d 842, 847 (4th Cir. 2003); Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1999), the case before us is distinct. If Harper succeeds on his § 1983 claims, his conviction would not necessarily be impugned because both the doctrine of inevitable discovery and the Leon good faith exception apply. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (adopting a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule where police seize evidence in reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate). Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, illegally obtained evidence is not subject to the exclusionary rule “if the government can prove by preponderance that the evidence inevitably would have been acquired through lawful means.” United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 497 (6th Cir. 1995)). In asking whether the inevitable discovery doctrine applies, we examine the circumstances “as they existed at the instant before the unlawful search” and ask “what would have happened had the unlawful search never occurred.” Kimes, 246 F.3d at 804 (quoting United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992)). We apply the rule in two scenarios: (1) when an “independent, untainted investigation . . . inevitably would have uncovered the same evidence”; or (2) when “other compelling facts [exist] establishing -5- No. 06-5658 Harper v. Jackson that the disputed evidence inevitably would have been discovered.” Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 499. Here, the fact that a Wal-Mart security employee notified the police of Harper’s purchase establishes that even if we were to conclude that the officers illegally detained Harper, success on the § 1983 claim would not necessarily impugn his conviction because the resulting discovery of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia would have inevitably occurred regardless of the detention. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.7. Likewise, even were Harper to succeed on his claim that the warrant to search his home was without probable cause, that result would not necessarily impugn his conviction because even if the warrant were unlawfully obtained, the police acted in good faith reliance on the warrant as issued by a neutral magistrate, and thus the evidence could have been admitted to secure Harper’s conviction. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 913. Because we conclude that succeeding on his § 1983 claims would not necessarily imply that Harper’s conviction was unlawful due to the doctrine of inevitable discovery and the Leon good faith exception, we conclude that Heck does not bar Harper’s suit. We therefore reverse the district court’s decision to the contrary and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. -6- No. 06-5658 Harper v. Jackson