Opinion ID: 1462522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DOJ Regulations Implementing Title VI

Text: The district court correctly rejected the first theory, citing Johnson v. City of Detroit, 446 F.3d 614, 629 (6th Cir.2006). In Johnson, the court held that a federal regulation alone cannot create a right enforceable through § 1983. Wilson acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action to enforce § 602 of Title VI (forbidding disparate impact practices). Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 289-90, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). He argues, however, that the Court left open the possibility that disparate impact claims enforcing § 602 could be brought through § 1983, citing the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens. Id, at 299-301, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Yet, while the dissenting opinion appears to have left open the possibility, the Court's majority opinion did not: [W]e have found no evidence anywhere in the text to suggest that Congress intended to create a private right to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. Id. at 291, 121 S.Ct. 1511. Subsequently, two circuits have interpreted Sandoval as meaning that regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI cannot be enforced through a private cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939-40 (9th Cir.2003); South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Dep't of Env. Protection, 274 F.3d 771, 789 (3d Cir.2001). The reasoning employed in Johnson is consistent with these decisions. Wilson has not identified any case specifically holding that § 602 regulations are enforceable through a § 1983 action. We therefore reject his contention that Johnson is not controlling and that he can maintain a § 1983 action to enforce regulations promulgated pursuant to § 602 of Title VI. 2. Equal Protection Wilson correctly argues that the district court's ruling neglected to address his equal protection theory. This may be because Count V of his complaint does not expressly allege a violation of his equal protection rights; it relies exclusively on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Yet, even if we assumed Wilson properly stated a claim for denial of equal protection, it is apparent that the state defendants would have been entitled to summary judgment. Wilson acknowledges that the Ohio DNA Act is facially neutral. He also acknowledges that to prevail on his claim that the Act nonetheless violates equal protection, he must prove the existence of a racially discriminatory purpose behind the statute. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). He admits that he lacks any direct evidence that the Ohio legislature enacted the statute with racially discriminatory intent, but asks the court to draw an inference of invidious racially discriminatory purpose based on the totality of the relevant facts. Yet, he has failed to identify any relevant facts supporting the urged inference other than disparate impact. Washington recognizes that evidence of disparate impact alone, though not irrelevant, is insufficient to justify an inference of invidious discriminatory purpose. Id. at 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040. `Discriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected . . . a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects on an identifiable group. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (quoting Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). The record is devoid of evidence of such a discriminatory purpose. Accordingly, Wilson having presented no evidence other than disparate impact to support his equal protection claim, summary judgment was properly awarded to the state defendants on this claim as well.