Opinion ID: 2640085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the lipscomb order

Text: ¶42 Daines asks us to consider the trial court's denial of his motion to admit the Lipscomb order. Daines sought to admit the Lipscomb order for two purposes: (1) to impeach Vincent if he were to testify and (2) as evidence in Daines' case-in-chief. We will not consider the first argument because Vincent was not called as a witness. [8] As to the second argument, Daines concedes that the Lipscomb order constitutes character evidence; he sought its admission under the character evidence rule exception in Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). ¶43 Under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person. Utah R. Evid. 404(b). However, such evidence may be admissible for some other purpose such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. We have held that the list provided in rule 404(b) is not exhaustive and that evidence is admissible under rule 404(b) so long as the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶ 17, 108 P.3d 730. However, qualifying under rule 404(b) is not sufficient as to proffered character evidence. In Allen, we also held that meeting the rule 404(b) standard is only the first in a three-part test. Id. ¶ 16. Evidence offered under 404(b) must also meet the relevancy requirements of rule 402 and pass the prejudicial balancing test of rule 403. Id. However, we need not apply the last two steps of the Allen test because Daines' argument falters on the first step. ¶44 The Lipscomb order contains several references relevant to Vincent's character. [9] In his brief, Daines argues that the Lipscomb order should have been admitted as evidence in chief of Vincent's prior bad acts. Daines' argument manifests a fundamental misunderstanding of rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) operates to prevent evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts from coming before a jury to show conformity therewith, which appears to be the reason Daines wanted the Lipscomb order admitted. Daines' argument on this point is sufficient to affirm the trial court's denial. Further, Daines invites us to find substantive grounds for a reversal in his memorandum submitted to the trial court without further elaboration. As we have held before, an argument merely referencing submissions to the trial court is inadequate and does not provide sufficient legal reason for us to override the discretion of the trial court which had the ability to . . . review the documentation on this issue. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ¶ 134, 130 P.3d 325. Finally, we note that because the trial court assumed for purposes of its ruling that Vincent had orally agreed to the shares Daines claimed, Daines lost nothing by reason of the unavailability of the order.