Opinion ID: 763642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Role in the Relevant Conduct

Text: 24 First and foremost, the district court must measure the defendant's role against the relevant conduct for which she has been held accountable. This measurement is compelled by both the Guidelines and our case precedent. The Guidelines provide that the district court should evaluate the defendant's role in the offense on the basis of all conduct within the scope of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct), i.e., all conduct included under § 1B1.3(a)(1)-(4), and not solely on the basis of elements and acts cited in the count of conviction. 6 U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro. comment. In other words, the district court must assess whether the defendant is a minor or minimal participant in relation to the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant in calculating her base offense level. 25 We believe that this principle of symmetry of relevant conduct is analytically sound. One main purpose of the Guidelines is to punish similarly situated defendants in a like-minded way. However, given the relatively broad definition of relevant conduct under § 1B1.3, some defendants may be held accountable for conduct that is much broader than their specific acts. A conspiracy conviction is the classic example of this phenomenon. In such cases, a defendant's relevant conduct may be coextensive with the entire conspiracy even though her role in that conspiracy was relatively minor. Under these circumstances, a district court may adjust the defendant's sentence for her mitigating role in this broad criminal conspiracy. This adjustment allows a district court to impose a sentence that more closely mirrors the defendant's actual conduct, furthering the Guidelines' goal of imposing comparable sentences for similar acts. However, such an adjustment only makes sense analytically if the defendant can establish that her role was minor as compared to the relevant conduct attributed to her. Otherwise, a defendant could argue that her relevant conduct was narrow for the purpose of calculating base offense level, but was broad for determining her role in the offense. A defendant cannot have it both ways. Application note four illustrates this principle by analogy: If a defendant has received a lower offense level by virtue of being convicted of an offense significantly less serious than warranted by his actual criminal conduct, a reduction for a mitigating role under this section ordinarily is not warranted because such defendant is not substantially less culpable than a defendant whose only conduct involved the less serious offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.4). According to this example, a defendant must prove that she played a minor role in the relevant conduct attributed to her. Where her actual conduct is more serious than her base offense level suggests, a defendant will not be able to meet this burden. Similarly, where the relevant conduct attributed to a defendant is identical to her actual conduct, she cannot prove that she is entitled to a minor role adjustment simply by pointing to some broader criminal scheme in which she was a minor participant but for which she was not held accountable. 26 Recognizing this principle, we have unambiguously held that a defendant's role in the offense may not be determined on the basis of criminal conduct for which the defendant was not held accountable at sentencing. See United States v. Fernandez, 92 F.3d 1121, 1123 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam); United States v. Holley, 82 F.3d 1010, 1011-12 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam). For example, in Fernandez, we considered whether a defendant's role in a drug offense was properly determined by reference to the conduct that determined his base offense level or by reference to the greater drug conspiracy which produced that conduct. 92 F.3d at 1123. Squarely rejecting the broader inquiry, we held that the conspiracy on which a defendant's base offense level is founded is the relevant conspiracy for determining role in the offense. Id. We continue to adhere to this principle of symmetry of relevant conduct and acknowledge that several other circuits have adopted this approach. See, e.g., United States v. James, 157 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir.1998) (holding that defendant's role in the offense is determined on the basis of the relevant conduct attributed to him in calculating his base offense level); United States v. Burnett, 66 F.3d 137, 140 (7th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Atanda, 60 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 180 (7th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Gomez, 31 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1994) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 555-56 (8th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Olibrices, 979 F.2d 1557, 1560 (D.C.Cir.1992) (To take the larger conspiracy into account only for purposes of making a downward adjustment in the base level would produce the absurd result that a defendant involved both as a minor participant in a larger distribution scheme for which she was not convicted, and as a major participant in a smaller scheme for which she was convicted, would receive a shorter sentence than a defendant involved solely in the smaller scheme.). But see, e.g., United States v. Isaza-Zapata, 148 F.3d 236, 240-41 (3d Cir.1998) (relying on this Court's panel opinion in De Varon and holding that a court must examine all relevant conduct even if defendant is sentenced only for own acts); United States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir.) (recognizing that [t]he defendant's role in relevant conduct may provide a basis for an adjustment even if that conduct is not used to calculate the defendant's base offense level but holding that defendant was not entitled to a reduction in his sentence simply because he was tied to a larger drug trafficking scheme), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1282, 117 S.Ct. 2470, 138 L.Ed.2d 225 (1997); United States v. Demers, 13 F.3d 1381, 1383 (9th Cir.1994) (declining to restrict the scope of relevant conduct on which a downward adjustment may be based to the relevant conduct that is included in the defendant's base offense level.) (citing Webster, 996 F.2d at 211). 27 Moreover, a defendant's status as a drug courier does not alter the principle that the district court must assess the defendant's role in light of the relevant conduct attributed to her. In Veloza, we recognized that courier status in and of itself is not dispositive of whether a defendant is entitled to or precluded from receiving a downward adjustment for role in the offense. 83 F.3d at 382. Simply put, the drug courier may or may not qualify for a minor role reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Cacho, 951 F.2d 308, 309-10 (11th Cir.1992) (Although [defendant] was a courier who carried the drugs into the United States, that fact alone does not establish that she was either a minimal or minor participant in the conspiracy.); Smith, 918 F.2d at 1566 ([A] drug courier is not necessarily a minor or minimal participant within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines.). Having posited this unremarkable proposition, however, it is perfectly legitimate for a district court to consider any fact related to a defendant's conduct as a courier in an importation scheme, including her status and assigned tasks in that scheme. Indeed, in many drug courier cases these are the only discernable facts. Therefore, when a drug courier's relevant conduct is limited to her own act of importation, a district court may legitimately conclude that the courier played an important or essential role in the importation of those drugs. This is permissible even though facts related to the defendant's status as a drug courier form the basis for this determination. We do not create a presumption that drug couriers are never minor or minimal participants, any more than that they are always minor or minimal. Rather, we hold only that the district court must assess all of the facts probative of the defendant's role in her relevant conduct in evaluating the defendant's role in the offense. 28 We further note, in the drug courier context, that the amount of drugs imported is a material consideration in assessing a defendant's role in her relevant conduct. See Asseff, 917 F.2d at 507 (It is evident that [the defendants'] conduct does not warrant a downward adjustment in sentencing because of their apparent knowledge of their criminal activity and the great amount of cocaine involved.); see also Webster, 996 F.2d at 212 n. 5 (recognizing that the amount of contraband may be relevant to whether a defendant is a minor participant). Indeed, because the amount of drugs in a courier's possession--whether very large or very small--may be the best indication of the magnitude of the courier's participation in the criminal enterprise, we do not foreclose the possibility that amount of drugs may be dispositive--in and of itself--in the extreme case. See, e.g., United States v. Carrazco, 91 F.3d 65, 67 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that when defendant is apprehended in possession of a very substantial amount of drugs, that is a circumstance that tends to suggest that his participation in the criminal enterprise was itself very substantial); United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir.1991) ([W]e have recognized that possession of a substantial amount of narcotics is grounds for refusing to grant a sentence reduction.); United States v. Garvey, 905 F.2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (recognizing that district court may refuse to grant a minor and/or minimal participant reduction based solely on the significant amount of drugs involved). 29 Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly recognize that amount of drugs may be determinative in the context of minimal participants. Application note two states that an adjustment for minimal participation would be appropriate, for example, for someone who played no other role in a very large drug smuggling operation than to offload part of a single marihuana shipment, or in a case where an individual was recruited as a courier for a single smuggling transaction involving a small amount of drugs. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2). We do not believe that the Guidelines intended to preclude a district court from considering the amount of drugs as a factor in the context of minor participants. Application note three states that [f]or purposes of § 3B1.2(b), a minor participant means any participant who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.2). Although this definition seems to suggest that the relevant inquiry for minor participants is solely comparative, we can discern nothing in the Guidelines to suggest that the analysis of role in the offense varies with the level of participation at issue. In fact, the Guidelines instruct just the opposite. The commentary background states that [t]his section provides a range of adjustments for a defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (backg'd.) (emphasis added). The very fact that an intermediate role exists for defendants who fall in between minimal and minor roles, moreover, suggests that the analysis used to measure role in the offense must be uniform. Therefore, we reaffirm that amount of drugs is a relevant factor and recognize that under some circumstances it may be dispositive. 30 To reiterate, in determining a defendant's role in the offense, a district court must measure the defendant's role against the relevant conduct attributed to her in calculating her base offense level. This methodology is essential to any evaluation of mitigating role. Only if the defendant can establish that she played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which she has already been held accountable--not a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy--should the district court grant a downward adjustment for minor role in the offense. 31