Opinion ID: 3015194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Richardson’s Parole History

Text: In 1984, Richardson was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County of third degree murder and was sentenced to 14-30 years imprisonment. Richardson has been denied parole each time he was considered between 1997 and 2003. Richardson was first denied parole in 1997. The 1997 parole 5 determination was made on December 12, 1996, before the effective date of the 1996 Amendments, and thus fell under the pre1996 Parole Act. The Board cited several reasons for the denial, including that the instant offense was assaultive, involved a weapon, and caused injury to the victim; Richardson’s “need for counseling and treatment”; and the unfavorable recommendation of the Department of Corrections. The Parole Board stated that it would consider in his next parole determination whether Richardson participated in the prison’s “prescriptive program plan,” maintained a good conduct record, and earned institutional recommendation for parole. The corrections staff of State Correction Institution Dallas, where Richardson was being held, first recommended Richardson for parole in 1998, and continued to recommend Richardson for parole each subsequent year. Notwithstanding these recommendations, the Parole Board continued to deny parole. The 1998 parole decision stated the same reasons as the 1997 decision, except that the 1998 decision added “habitual offender” as a new reason, and deleted “unfavorable recommendation from the Department of Corrections” as a rationale. In 1999 and 2000, the parole decision on Richardson changed format in a manner that echoed the language of the 1996 Amendments to the Parole Act. These decisions stated: The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has determined that the mandates to protect the safety of the public and to assist in the fair administration of justice cannot be achieved through your release on parole. In 2001 and 2002, the statement of reasons no longer mentioned the safety of the public and was limited to the terse conclusion: “[T]he fair administration of justice cannot be achieved through your release on parole. You are therefore refused parole . . . .” Each year the Parole Board suggested the same considerations for the next parole determination as had been given in 1998. The Parole Board issued a modification of the 2002 6 decision several months after the original decision.2 The new version of the 2002 decision stated: Following an interview with you and a review of your file, and having considered all matters required pursuant to the Parole Act of 1941, as amended, 61 P.S. § 331.1 et seq., the Board . . . . in the exercise of its discretion, has determined at this time that: your best interests do not justify or require you being paroled/reparoled; and the interests of the Commonwealth will be injured if you were paroled/reparoled. Therefore you are refused parole/reparole at this time. The reasons for the board’s decision include the following: The recommendation of the prosecuting attorney. Reports, evaluations and assessments concerning your physical, mental, and behavior condition and history. Other factors deemed pertinent in determining that you should not be paroled: your prior criminal record. The 2003 parole decision was identical to the modified 2002 decision except that two additional reasons were added: Your version of the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) committed. 2 It is not clear from the record why the Parole Board modified the decision, although the more expansive parole decision appears to be due to a system-wide change rather than anything particular to Richardson’s case. Cf. Voss v. Pennsylvania Bd. Prob. & Parole, 788 A.2d 1107 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001) (holding that the generic “fair administration of justice” language did not meet due process requirements as a matter of Pennsylvania law). 7 Your refusal to accept responsibility for the offense(s) committed. In 2003, Richardson petitioned for a writ of mandamus in the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, arguing that the parole decisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commonwealth Court denied mandamus in an unpublished order, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. Richardson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 838 A.2d 650 (2003). Richardson then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Court denied his petition. The Court held that a prisoner carries “the ultimate burden of establishing that the measure of punishment itself has changed,” Garner, 529 U.S. at 255, and “must show that as applied to his own sentence the law creates a significant risk of increasing his punishment,” Calif. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 510 n.6 (1995). The Court then found that Richardson had failed to establish that the 1996 Amendments affected the Parole Board’s decision. The Court stated that its “review of the documents in this case confirms that there is no language in the Board’s decision implicating the amendments cited in Richardson’s petition, and Richardson has not demonstrated the role which those amendments played in the Board’s decision.” Therefore, the Court denied Richardson’s petition because it concluded that “the Ex Post Facto claim in [Richardson’s habeas petition] is based on speculation and conjecture. Richardson has failed to link the one amended statute cited in connection with his first claim to the Board’s decision.”3