Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: interference with jury selection.

Text: Defendant also argues that he is entitled to either a new penalty phase trial or, at the least, a remand for a taint hearing because of a claimed interference with defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury[.] At its core, defendant argues that there was an informal, social contact between a secretary in the Prosecutor's Office and a member of the jury panel that resulted in that potential juror being excused, and that due process and fundamental fairness were violated by such blatant and unethical conduct[.] In response, the State notes that the potential juror was excused by consent after he explained that his judgment might be [a] little steered differently because the social interaction he had could impact his ability to judge the testimony of one of the prosecution witnesses. The State also notes that, once that potential juror was excused, there simply was no basis on which to strike the entire jury panel. During jury selection, one of the prosecution witnesses, Det. Joseph McFadden, was shot in the face during an unrelated homicide investigation and was hospitalized in critical condition. Due to McFadden's unavailability as a witness, the State sought an adjournment. Although the trial court initially denied the State's application, it later granted an adjournment of three months. During that hiatus, one of the potential jurors continued to coach youth sports; among his charges was the son of a secretary employed by the Prosecutor's Office. The child missed a game the day McFadden was shot. Speaking to the mother on a later date, she explained to the potential juror that her son's absence was due to the fact that one of her friends  McFadden  had been shot and she was quite upset as a result. According to the potential juror, he did not relate the shooting to defendant's case because he did not realize that McFadden was a witness in defendant's case. During a later conversation with the mother, the potential juror told her that he was among the jury pool in defendant's case and she told the juror that she had worked on defendant's case in the Prosecutor's Office. When jury selection recommenced, all prospective jurors were asked to complete a supplemental questionnaire. In response to that questionnaire, this potential juror indicated that someone had spoken with [him] about the case since the date of [his] jury interview; that he had heard [someone] discuss or [he had] discussed the case or the people involved in it . . . since the date of [his] jury interview; and that he knew or had heard something about this case or any of the people involved in it, since the date of [his] jury interview[.] The trial court then examined this potential juror and ascertained the contacts described above. The trial court also invited both counsel to examine the potential juror; only defense counsel elected to examine the potential juror. Once the examination of the potential juror was completed, all parties agreed that he should be excused. Defendant then complained about the actions of the secretary, alleging that, after she was aware of the potential juror's status in respect of this case, she should not have told the potential juror that she had worked on this case. Claiming that this potential juror was one defendant specifically wished to retain on the jury, defendant sought to examine the secretary under oath, a request the trial court granted. Both the trial court and defense counsel questioned her. There were some differences between her recollection of the events and the potential juror's testimony; however, the trial court credited her recall. Conceding that no juror tampering had occurred, defendant nonetheless moved to dismiss the entire jury panel. Defendant's focus was on the loss of that potential juror, a juror defendant insisted he wished to retain. The State resisted that application, arguing that defendant was entitled to fair, impartial and death-qualified jurors, precisely what had been empanelled. The State noted that defendant could have, but did not, request that the jury venire be expanded and that defendant's complaints about the composition of the jury as empanelled were belied by the fact that defendant exercised only fifteen of his allotted twenty peremptory challenges. The trial court denied defendant's motion. Its complete reasoning is informative and, for that reason, is set forth in full: Before the Court is a motion to strike the panel and implicit[ ] in that application [is] to commence selection of the panel anew. For [the] reasons which follow, I deny the application. My reasons are these: While clearly the defense does not consent and had to deal with the situation as it unfolded, the Court did adjourn this case for an initial period and a short subsequent period and that arose out of the absence of Detective McFadden. McFadden was shot in the face while involved in another matter at times material to this case. Needless to say, that was not a plan or strategy of anyone involved. The defense isn't arguing it, but I merely note [that] what we have is an unforeseen set of circumstances. The unforeseen set of circumstances is superimposed on another unforeseen set of circumstances which was the death by heart attack of Sergeant Henry Carr, one of the other participants in the initial two statements of the defendant. A trial, all things being equal, is a search for [the] truth. And subject [to] counter-veiling considerations which may affect that, the Court[ ]  should be . . . permitted to structure a matter so that the fact-finder can have the best available information from the respective sides as to what occurred[,] and that is the dynamic of the adjournment. While things happen in the passage of time, and I'll get to the [potential juror] matter in a moment, but the mere inadvertent dynamics of the passage of time are not such as to require this Court to start anew with another panel. Now, with respect to the [potential juror] issue. There are some differences between the testimony of what [the potential juror] said and what we just heard from [the Prosecutor's Office secretary]. Having said that, I am satisfied to find for the purpose of this hearing that the contact was inadvertent. It was not designed but rather, arose out of community activity, sports related with respect to their children involving both [the secretary] and [the potential juror]. It was not where someone set out to contact or set out to do something. Now, with respect to the first aspect of the distinctions between [the potential juror] and [the secretary], there may or may not be a distinction in their testimony. I say that because it is clear and I accept the witness today was quite upset when she learned of what transpired with respect to McFadden and was talking about it to those who were at the sporting event which she described. Apparently [the potential juror] was one of those present there at the sporting event. From her perspective it was not directed specifically at [the potential juror] or even at [the potential juror], although he was probably there to either hear or learn of it secondhand. Somewhat more problematic is the issue with respect to what occurred thereafter. It's his testimony that she was aware that he was a member of the panel. She said she didn't know that. What one remembers and another may or may not [may be] material distinctions, but what occurred here again is through inadvertence as opposed to any type of effort to in any way influence the jury. Her testimony is necessarily totally contradictory to [the potential juror]. In any event, it is clear that when he became aware of her friendship, this was one with McFadden, this was one of the things that . . . caused him to reflect on his ability to be fair and impartial. What we have I think is an inadvertent series of contacts and by reason of his excusal I think for the purposes of this it ends the issue, so I do deny the motion with respect to the panel.
Because the trial court examined both the potential juror and the secretary, and thereafter made factual findings based on that testimony, our review of the trial court's findings is guided by [c]ertain broad principles [that] are paramount and helpful in an appellate court's approach to this aspect of the decision-making process. . . . It must review the record in the light of the contention, but not initially from the point of view of how it would decide the matter if it were the court of first instance. It should give deference to those findings of the trial judge which are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy. The aim . . . is rather to determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record. This involves consideration of the proofs as a whole. . . . When the reviewing court is satisfied that the findings and result meet this criterion, its task is complete and it should not disturb the result, even though it has the feeling it might have reached a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal. . . . . But if the appellate tribunal is thoroughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction, then, and only then, it should appraise the record as if it were deciding the matter at inception and make its own findings and conclusions. While this feeling of wrongness is difficult to define, . . . it can well be said that that which must exist in the reviewing mind is a definite conviction that the judge went so wide of the mark, a mistake must have been made. This sense of wrongness can arise in numerous ways  from manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to support the finding, obvious overlooking or under-evaluation of crucial evidence, a clearly unjust result, and many others. This, then, is when and how the permissive power of [ R. 2:10-5] should be utilized by the first appellate tribunal and is what our prior cases mean no matter how they have expressed it. [ State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62, 199 A. 2d 809 (1964) (citations omitted).] Accord State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470-71, 724 A. 2d 234 (1999); Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496, 432 A. 2d 63 (1981). Because this issue arises in the context of the jury selection process, the principles that govern the voir dire of the jury in a capital case further inform our analysis: It is axiomatic that an impartial jury is a necessary condition to a fair trial. This requirement of fairness  and particularly jury impartiality  is heightened in cases in which the defendant faces death. In order to insure the impartiality of the jury, we have emphasized the critical importance of the voir dire in exposing potential and latent bias. Under our single jury capital trial system, jury selection must serve double duty as a time to death qualify jurors and to enable counsel to exercise the valuable constitutional prerogative of selecting a fair and impartial jury. In that dual setting, voir dire acts as a discovery tool. It should be like a conversation in which, without manipulation or delay of trial, the parties are able to discern the source of attitudes that would substantially interfere with the jurors' ability to follow the law. In order for this discovery procedure to be effective, potential jurors must have a full comprehension of their legal duties. [ State v. Papasavvas (I), 163 N.J. 565, 584, 751 A. 2d 40 (2000) (citations omitted).] Ultimately, we observe that  [v]oir dire procedures and standards are traditionally within the broad discretionary powers vested in the trial court [and] its exercise of discretion will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal. Id. at 595, 751 A. 2d 40 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 410, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988) (same); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 62, 402 A. 2d 203 (1979) (same). Gauged against these standards, there was no error in respect of either the procedure utilized by the trial court in dealing with what the trial court aptly termed an inadvertent series of contacts or the findings it reached. On the contrary, by immediately questioning the potential juror and determining whether there was a taint and, if so, whether it extended beyond that single potential juror, the trial court hewed to the procedure we explicitly endorsed in respect of mid-trial juror taint, State v. R.D., 169 N.J. 551, 557-61, 781 A. 2d 37 (2001), one we now extend to allegations of taint in the pre-trial jury selection process. Under R.D., the overarching relevant inquiry is not whether the trial court committed error, but whether it abused its discretion. Id. at 559, 781 A. 2d 37 (The abuse of discretion standard of review should pertain when reviewing such determinations of a trial court.). That is so because [a]pplication of that standard respects the trial court's unique perspective [and w]e traditionally have accorded trial courts deference in exercising control over matters pertaining to the jury. Id. at 559-60, 781 A. 2d 37. When we apply the abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's actions, we are well satisfied that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant's motion to strike the jury panel. For that reason, we reject defendant's challenge to the trial court's refusal to strike the jury panel.