Opinion ID: 1834641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: passion, prejudice, arbitrary factors

Text: Defendant is black; his victim was white. No members of the defendant's race served on the jury; however, there was no indication that racial motivation was present in the selection of the jury. See assignment of error # 32, supra. The defendant assigned and briefed two errors which he claims contributed to the imposition of the death penalty in this case. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR # 9 In assignment of error # 9, defendant contends that he was denied his right to a reliable and responsible determination of his sentence, as guaranteed by the 8th and 14th amendments, because that determination was made by a jury which was unaware of its ultimate responsibility for imposing a sentence of death. Defendant makes three arguments to support this contention: (1) the jury was instructed that its decision to impose the death penalty was merely a recommendation, (2) the jury was misled by verdict forms which used the word recommendation, (3) the trial judge did not instruct the jury that their recommendation would be binding on the court. These arguments lack merit. A capital sentencing jury must recognize the gravity of its task and proceed with the appropriate awareness of its truly awesome responsibility. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2646, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). There is no evidence in the record in this case to support the defendant's contention that the jury was left with the mistaken impression that the ultimate responsibility for determining the death sentence did not lie with them. The trial judge told the jurors at the beginning of the penalty phase of the trial that they had the authority to make a bonding [sic] recommendation to the trial judge as to the sentence that shall be imposed upon the defendant. Later, the trial judge instructed the jury that they must now determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.... It is your responsibility in accordance with the principles of law I have instructed you to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.... Also, the use of the word recommendation on the verdict form comports with statutory provisions governing capital proceedings. See La.C. Cr.P. articles 905.6 and 905.7. [14] Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR # 10 In assignment of error # 10, defendant argues that he was denied a reliable sentencing determination because the trial judge failed to clearly and explicitly inform the jury of its option to impose a life sentence even if it found the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The trial judge made the following pertinent statements: All right ladies and gentlemen, you must now determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.... You are required to consider the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding which sentence should be imposed.... If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the aggravating circumstances existed, you may consider imposing a sentence of death.... Even if you find the existence of the aggravating circumstance, you must also consider any mitigating circumstance before you decide that a sentence of death should be imposed.... In addition to those specifically provided mitigating circumstances, you must also consider any other relevant mitigating circumstance.... You may consider any other relevant circumstances which you feel should mitigate the severity of the penalty to be imposed. In order to satisfy the requirements of the 8th and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution, a capital sentencing instruction must clearly guide a jury in its understanding of mitigating circumstances and their purpose and the option to recommend a life sentence although aggravating circumstances are found. Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794 (11th Cir.1982). In this case, when the general charge is considered in its entirety, the jury could hardly have failed to understand that there were two sentencing alternatives, one of which could only be imposed after a unanimous finding of at least one aggravating circumstance, and that the function of the mitigating circumstances was to `mitigate the severity of the penalty to be imposed.' State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919, 933 (La. 1985). Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit. Our review of the record reveals no evidence that passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors influenced the jury in its recommendation of the death sentence.