Opinion ID: 2975823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Sign Regulations

Text: Turning now to the question of which level of scrutiny to apply to the Township’s sign regulations, it is apparent that at least some of the restrictions are content-based, and thus must survive strict scrutiny.5 Section 314.14, for example, states that “[n]o off-premise advertising sign carrying a commercial message shall be permitted.” Section 314.30 bans “banner signs,” including most flags, but creates an exception for “federal, state and local flags.” Much of § 316 creates special rules which signs containing certain content, such as “political signs” or “domestic advertising,” must follow. Section 321.1-2 permits signs that identify the name of a shopping center, but allows signs with no other content. What all of these provisions have in common is content discrimination. Each of them identifies particular types of signs on the basis of their content, and then creates rules specific only to those signs so identified. These provisions are content-based, and thus are subject to strict scrutiny. When applying strict scrutiny, the defendant bears the burden to justify its speech regulations. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005). Defendant, in the instant case, asserts that the sign regulations are necessary because of aesthetic interests and public safety concerns, but these concerns are insufficient to survive strict scrutiny. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565 (1993) is helpful in explaining why Defendant’s aesthetic and safety concerns are insufficient to sustain the sign regulations. Dimmitt struck down a local ordinance limiting the kind and number of flags which the plaintiff car dealership could display. Id. at 1568. The Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance must withstand strict scrutiny, and the city responded by asserting its interests in “promoting aesthetics and in minimizing visual distractions to motorists.” Id. at 1569. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, “only the most extraordinary circumstances will justify regulation of protected expression based upon its content.” Id. The court added that neither the need to preserve international relations nor the threat of criminal violence are sufficient grounds to allow content-based government censorship. Id.; see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-29 (1988) (prohibition on display of signs critical of a foreign government within 500 feet of foreign embassy is unconstitutional); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446-48 (1969) (government may only forbid incitement of violence “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”). 5 Alternatively, even assuming arguendo that the sign regulations are not content-based, the sign regulations would not be able to withstand the intermediate standard of review afforded to commercial speech. “Under intermediate scrutiny, the Government may employ the means of its choosing so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation, and does not burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further that interest.” Turner, 520 U.S. at 213-14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the course of applying intermediate scrutiny, the district court must review evidence adduced by the parties. See id. at 214. Even applying intermediate scrutiny, the sign regulations are invalid because they deter significantly more speech than necessary to protect the Township’s asserted interests. No. 06-3828 Midwest Media Property, et al. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio Page 20 The Township’s asserted interests in this case are hardly more compelling justifications for allowing such censorship than the government’s interest in preserving international relations or preventing criminal violence. Accordingly, the content-based provisions of the sign regulations should be struck down as inconsistent with the First Amendment.