Opinion ID: 2632907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Trial Court's Midtrial Dismissal of Juror

Text: On the morning of Monday, October 23, 1995, after the guilt phase of trial had been underway for a month, the trial court told the parties that the previous evening a juror had left a recorded telephone message at the court saying that the juror's father-in-law had died over the weekend. After receiving the message, the court explained, the court clerk telephoned the juror's home; unable to reach the juror, the clerk talked to the juror's wife. She said her father had been killed in an automobile accident, that she and her husband would be attending the out-of-town funeral, and that her husband would be unavailable as a juror for the rest of the week. The court announced its tentative intention to discharge the juror and to replace him with an alternate. The prosecutor and defense counsel both objected, each stating a preference to keep the juror. The trial court overruled their objections and replaced the juror. Defendant argues the court violated section 1089 and his rights to a chosen impartial tribunal, due process, and a reliable judgment under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as analogous provisions of the state Constitution. We disagree. Section 1089 provides: If at any time ... a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, or if a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefor, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall ... be subject to the same rules and regulations as though the alternate juror had been selected as one of the original jurors. Once a trial court is put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, it is the court's duty `to make whatever inquiry is reasonably necessary to determine whether the juror should be discharged. ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 821, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) On appeal, the trial court's determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1029, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 987, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) Defendant claims the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether discharge of the juror was necessary, because neither the court nor the court clerk spoke to the juror himself. We disagree. Although it would have been preferable for the clerk to have spoken to the juror himself, we conclude the juror's absence from court, combined with his recorded telephone message to the court explaining his absence and the information provided to the clerk by the juror's wife, was adequate to inform the court why the juror was not present, the reason for his absence, and the length of time he would be unavailable for jury service. No further inquiry was required. We also reject defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it found good cause to discharge the juror. We have in the past rejected similar claims in similar circumstances. (See People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 1028-1030, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519 [juror's father near death after suffering stroke]; People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 986-87, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214 [death of juror's mother]; In re Mendes (1979) 23 Cal.3d 847, 852, 153 Cal.Rptr. 831, 592 P.2d 318 [death of juror's brother].) Although defendant tries to distinguish these cases on the ground that in each matter the juror expressly asked to be discharged, no such request is required. (See Cunningham, supra, at pp. 1029-1030, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Defendant's contention that the discharge violated the state and federal Constitutions is based on the argument that the discharge violated section 1089, a premise we just rejected. Defendant acknowledges that we have held that section 1089 does not offend constitutional proscriptions ( People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 691, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742) and he does not argue to the contrary. Thus, our conclusion that the trial court did not violate that statute necessarily disposes of his constitutional claims.