Opinion ID: 2082633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: melton's standing

Text: We first review the statutory rights of appeal under RSA 98:14, :15 and RSA ch. 541. The legislature, in creating the personnel system, has provided for review of the commission's actions by permitting liberal appellate rights. RSA 98:14 (hearings) allows [a]ny employee affected by the allocation of a position in a classification to be heard by the director and, if dissatisfied, to appeal to the commission. No further statutory right of appeal is granted. However, in an attempted appeal under this section we have held that [a]lthough the plaintiffs have mistaken their remedy, our practice permits consideration of their petition as one for writ of certiorari. Winn v. Jordan, 101 N.H. 65, 67, 133 A.2d 485, 487 (1957). RSA 98:15 (appeal) permits permanent employees who are dismissed or suspended an appeal to the commission for review. [T]he appealing employee and the appointing authority ... shall have a right to be heard.... Any action or decision [of the commission] shall be subject to ... appeal as provided in RSA 541. RSA 98:15. A uniform statutory right of appeal was provided by the legislative enactment of RSA ch. 541 entitled Certain rehearings and appeals. Section 3 (motion for a rehearing) permits any party to the action or any person directly affected by an order of the commission to apply for a rehearing. Section 6 (appeal) then permits an applicant to appeal to this court after such a rehearing. Section 8 (parties) provides that [a]ny person or corporation whose rights may be directly affected... may appear and become a party, or the court may order such person and corporations to be joined as parties as justice may require. The word `person' may ... be applied to bodies corporate and politic as well as to individuals. RSA 21:9. See also City of Keene v. Zoning Board, 114 N.H. 744, 746, 329 A.2d 141, 142 (1974); BiRite, Inc. v. City of Concord, 101 N.H. 291, 140 A.2d 566 (1958). The choice of general all inclusive language in the designation of parties, coupled with the statutory scheme of appeal, shows a legislative intent to provide for judicial review of rulemaking orders and adjudicatory decisions of commissions and administrative agencies. This appellate procedure conforms to the constitutional mandate that questions of law belong to the judiciary for final determination, as a necessary deduction of the required separation of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government (Const., Part 1, Art. 37). Cloutier v. State Milk Control Board, 92 N.H. 199, 201-02, 28 A.2d 554, 556 (1942). Determining whether an administrative action is reasonable `is a question of law which the [plaintiff is] entitled to have judicially determined. Individual rights should not be overriden without judicial review.' H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Boucher, 98 N.H. 399, 402, 101 A.2d 466, 468 (1953), quoting Richardson v. Beattie, 98 N.H. 71, 75, 95 A.2d 122, 125 (1953). We hold that the legislature intended that any person, individual, or corporation (bodies corporate and politic), whose rights may be directly affected, may have recourse to the appeal provisions of RSA 541:8. [1] We next review the extent of this court's certiorari jurisdiction confirmed by RSA 490:4 (Supp. 1977). Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and is not granted as a matter of right but rather at the discretion of the court when the substantial ends of justice require such relief. State v. N.H. Retail Grocers Ass'n, Inc., 115 N.H. 623, 625, 348 A.2d 360, 362 (1975). Nevertheless, we have indicated that we are not and will not be reluctant to grant extraordinary remedy when the right to relief is clear. See generally Wilson v. Personnel Comm'n, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977); Connell's New & Used Cars, Inc. v. State, 117 N.H. 531, 375 A.2d 257 (1977); Forrest v. Personnel Comm'n, 116 N.H. 203, 358 A.2d 408 (1976); Winn v. Jordan, 101 N.H. 65, 133 A.2d 485 (1957). One object of RSA 490:4 (Supp. 1977) is to prevent and to correct errors and abuses of courts of inferior jurisdiction. `The superintending power of the court ... does not depend upon, and is not limited by, technical accuracy of designation of legal forms of action.' State v. Harkaway, 105 N.H. 42, 46, 192 A.2d 619, 622 (1963), quoting Dinsmore v. Mayor & Alderman, 76 N.H. 187, 190, 81 A. 533, 535 (1911). On a sufficient petition, the question is whether there is an error correctible by the superintending power .... Boody v. Watson, 64 N.H. 162, 173, 9 A. 794, 803 (1887). [2, 3] In order to allow challenges of decisions that would otherwise escape review, we hold that standing to petition for certiorari should be liberally granted to any party whose rights may be directly affected by the decision of a lower tribunal. See generally Wilson v. Personnel Comm'n, 117 N.H. 783, 378 A.2d 1375 (1977). Therefore, because Superintendent Melton's discretion in hiring his support staff was directly affected by the commission's decision, we hold that he has standing to bring this petition.