Opinion ID: 1650499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether public reprimand and suspension from judicial office are the appropriate sanctions for judge brown.

Text: ¶ 15. The authority of this Court to discipline judges is found in the Mississippi Constitution: On recommendation of the commission on judicial performance, the supreme court may remove from office, suspend, fine or publicly censure or reprimand any justice or judge of this state for: (a) actual conviction of a felony in a court other than a court of the State of Mississippi; (b) willful misconduct in office; (c) willful and persistent failure to perform his duties; (d) habitual intemperance in the use of alcohol or other drugs; or (e) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. Miss. Const. art. 6, § 177A. Willful misconduct has been defined by this Court as follows: Willful misconduct in office is the improper or wrongful use of power of his office by a judge acting intentionally or with gross unconcern for his conduct and generally in bad faith. It involves more than an error of judgment or a mere lack of diligence. In re Quick, 553 So.2d 522, 524 (Miss.1989) (quoting In Re Anderson, 412 So.2d 743, 745 (Miss.1982); In Re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246, 255 (1977)). As to the element of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, this Court has held: Willful misconduct in office of necessity is conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute. However, a judge may also, through negligence or ignorance not amounting to bad faith, behave in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice so as to bring the judicial office into disrepute. Id. ¶ 16. Judge Brown was found to have violated the following Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 1: An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further that objective. Canon 2A: A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 3B, in pertinent part: . . . (4) Judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom they deal in their official capacities, and shall require similar conduct of lawyers, and of their staffs, court officials, and others subject to their direction and control. (5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, gender, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's direction and control to do so. A judge shall refrain from speech, gestures or other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment and shall require the same standard of conduct of others subject to the judge's direction and control. ¶ 17. Judge Brown does not dispute that he touched S.W. in an inappropriate manner. Likewise, Judge Brown does not dispute having used racially derogatory language on prior occasions in private conversations, but he does deny having used a racial slur in reference to Mack Cox in his conversation with S.W., and in his conversation with Scipper and Earnest. Additionally, Judge Brown agrees with the Commissions findings that he exhibited willful misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute and that he violated Cannons 1, 2A, 3B(4) & (5). ¶ 18. The factors for determining the appropriateness of sanctions are as follows: (1) The length and character of the judge's public service; (2) whether there is any prior case law on point; (3) the magnitude of the offense and the harm suffered; (4) whether the misconduct is an isolated incident or evidences a pattern of conduct; (5) whether moral turpitude was involved; and (6) the presence or absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Gibson, 883 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss.2004).