Opinion ID: 303588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Participation of the Trial Court in the Questioning

Text: 6 of Defense Witnesses 7 In Washington v. United States 6 we placed a burden on trial courts where the insanity defense is raised to ensure that the jury bases its determination of blameworthiness on relevant behavioral data: 8 [T]estimony in terms of mental disease or defect seems to leave the psychiatrist too free to testify according to his judgment about the defendant's criminal responsibility. . . . This kind of testimony does not give the jury a satisfactory basis for determining criminal responsibility. A proper adjudication requires that the jury be fully informed about the defendant's mental and emotional processes and, insofar as it affects these processes, his social situation. . . . With the relevant information about defendant, and guided by the legal principles enunciated by the court, the jury must decide, in effect, whether or not the defendant is blameworthy. . . . The trial judge should limit the psychiatrists' use of medical labels- schizophrenia, neurosis, etc. It would be undesirable, as well as difficult, to eliminate completely all medical labels, since they sometimes provide a convenient and meaningful method of communication. But the trial judge should ensure that their meaning is explained to the jury and as much as possible, that they are explained in a way which relates their meaning to the defendant. 7 9 These standards which guide the trial court can and often do require the court's active participation in the examination of witnesses, a fact which we have recognized for some time. 8 10 Reviewing the record in this case, and being mindful of our recent observation that a merely quantitative approach cannot determine whether the judge's participation in questioning is improper, United States v. Wyatt, 9 we find that the defense testimony in this case was often unclear, sometimes woefully muddled, and we cannot say that the trial court in its attempts to clarify stepped out of bounds. We find that the trial court's participation was an acceptable effort to conform with the Washington standards, and obviously any such affirmative action on the trial judge's part creates some problems of its own. Of these the trial judge was keenly aware and sought to overcome them by an instruction to the jury, which admonished them that they were not to draw any inference whatsoever from any questions the Court asks, or anything the Court does or says as to how the Court feels the case should be decided. 10 We are unable to find that the trial court's participation deprived the appellant of his right to a trial by jury or prejudiced him in any manner calling for a new trial. 11