Opinion ID: 199901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title II coverage

Text: 12 The question of whether challenges to employment practices are cognizable under Title II has been considered by two of our sister circuits, and by several trial courts within this circuit, with divergent results. See Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir.1999) (not cognizable), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1189 (2001); Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 820-22 (11th Cir.1998) (cognizable); Downs v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 13 F. Supp.2d 130, 134-36 (D.Mass. 1998) (cognizable); Motzkin v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 938 F. Supp. 983, 996 (D.Mass. 1996) (not cognizable); see also McKibben v. Hamilton County, 215 F.3d 1327 (6th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (noting split, but proceeding on merits where coverage not challenged by defendant). Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12112-12117 (1994), expressly covers the employment practices of both private and public entities. 3 Id. § 12112. 13 The district court believed that the clear language of Title I indicated that Title I was the sole avenue for bringing employment claims, and that the clear language of Title II indicated that Title II was limited to so-called outputs of a public agency. Currie, 147 F. Supp.2d at 34-35. Specifically, the court found that the second clause of Title II, which mandates that qualified individuals not be subjected to discrimination by any [public] entity was not intended to expand the scope of coverage beyond services, programs, or activities (articulated in the previous clause), but simply to clarify that Title II prohibits both intentional discrimination (through the subjected to discrimination clause) and disparate treatment (through the excluded from participation in or ... denied the benefits of clause). Id. at 34-36 (analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). The court supported its clear language analysis by finding that the overall structure of the ADA, which provides a remedy for employment discrimination under Title I, supported its conclusion. Id. at 36. 14 The answer is not so plain. While Title I's language clearly covers employment discrimination, and public employers are not exempted from the definition of a covered entity, Title I says nothing about it being an exclusive remedy or avenue for suit. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. It is not unheard of for individuals to have overlapping rights, even within one Act. 4 Here, the two Titles grant substantively different rights — for instance, while Title I gives successful plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain compensatory and punitive damages, there is no such right under Title II. Id. § 12133 (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 794a). Nor is the language of Title II clear on this question. The words public services, programs, or activities do not necessarily exclude employment, 5 and the subjected to discrimination clause may broaden the scope of coverage further. Moreover, the Department of Justice has promulgated a regulation stating that Title II does cover employment practices. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2001); see also 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, App. A (2001) (elaborating on § 35.140). This regulation is entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine if the statutory language is unclear. Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). In addition, Currie cites to legislative history which she says demonstrates that Congress intended Title II to cover employment and to function in the same manner as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.