Opinion ID: 2535305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Statutory and Administrative Framework for Determination of PPRD and its Role in a Final Parole Decision

Text: The Commission contends that PPRD decisions are so different from gain time challenges that they cannot fall within the exemption set forth in section 57.085(10), and that the rationale of Cox is not applicable to the determination of an inmate's PPRD because that calculation does not alter the stated term of the inmate's original sentence. The Commission further contends that although gain time directly affects the length of an inmate's sentence and is essentially a sentence-related matter, parole decisions are discretionary determinations that are separate and apart from the sentence and from calculation of the length of the sentence. We have considered each of these contentions and find that none of them supports the Commission's contention that section 57.085(10) is inapplicable to actions challenging an inmate's PPRD calculation. Chapter 947 sets forth the legislative scheme governing parole in this state. We recognize that section 947.002, Florida Statutes (2009), titled Intent, confirms that parole is not a matter of right, but is one of legislative grace. § 947.002(5), Fla. Stat. (2009). Even so, an inmate who is entitled to consideration for parole is entitled under chapter 947 to an initial determination by the Commission of a PPRD based on objective guidelines and relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Section 947.172, Florida Statutes (2009), Establishment of presumptive parole release date, provides that a hearing examiner shall conduct an initial interview with the inmate in preparation for recommending a PPRD to a panel of no fewer than two parole commissioners appointed by the Commission chair. § 947.172(2), Fla. Stat. (2009). Under section 947.172(2), Florida Statutes, the hearing examiner's recommendation of a PPRD is to be based on objective parole guidelines and any other competent evidence relevant to aggravating and mitigating circumstances. § 947.172(2), Fla. Stat.; see also § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (2009) (defining Presumptive Parole Release Date as the tentative parole release date as determined by objective parole guidelines). [7] Section 947.165, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the Commission to develop and implement the objective parole guidelines, which shall be the criteria upon which parole decisions are made. § 947.165(10), Fla. Stat. (2009). Under this statutory scheme, where aggravating circumstances are found to exist, additional months are added to the PPRD calculation. We also recognized in Florida Parole & Probation Commission v. Paige, 462 So.2d 817 (Fla.1985), that although [p]lacement of the inmate on parole on the date of his presumptive parole release date ... is not automatic, the PPRD becomes binding on the Commission in the sense that, once established, it is not to be changed except for reasons of institutional conduct, acquisition of new information ... or for good cause in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 819. This is also reflected in section 947.172(3), which provides in pertinent part: (3) A presumptive parole release date shall become binding on the commission when agreement [by the commissioners] on the presumptive parole release date is reached. Should the presumptive parole release date fall outside the matrix time ranges as determined by the objective parole guidelines, the reasons for this decision shall be stated in writing with individual particularities. § 947.172(3), Fla. Stat. (2009) (emphasis added). The significance of a properly calculated PPRD is apparent when it is viewed within the statutory scheme for progressing to the next critical step in the parole process, determination of the inmate's effective parole release date. Section 947.005(5), Florida Statutes (2009), defines [e]ffective parole release date as  the actual parole release date as determined by the presumptive parole release date, satisfactory institutional conduct, and an acceptable parole plan. § 947.005(5), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Section 947.1745, Florida Statutes (2009), directs the Commission to establish the inmate's effective parole release date and provides in pertinent part that [i]f the inmate's institutional conduct has been satisfactory, the presumptive parole release date shall become the effective parole release date. [8] Thus, only after the Commission determines the PPRD can the Commission progress to the point of setting the inmate's effective parole release date (EPRD). While it can be seen that the PPRD is not the final determination of the inmate's parole release date, we cannot ignore the fact that without this first critical step, none of the other statutory steps may be taken on the path to reaching an effective parole release date for the inmate. Unless corrected, errors in determination of the PPRD, such as consideration of improper aggravating circumstances, will necessarily cause the effective parole release date and, if parole is ultimately granted, the actual release date to be delayed. As we noted in Schmidt, gain time credits are `one determinant of a petitioner's prison term ... and [his] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.' Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367 (quoting Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 445, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997)). Similarly, alterations to the calculation of an inmate's PPRD based upon elimination of an erroneous aggravating circumstance in turn alters a prisoner's presumptive parole release date and, thus, alters the effective parole release date, once that determinant is changed. We therefore conclude that although the PPRD does not determine an inmate's actual parole release date, and while we recognize that parole is not a matter of right, an action challenging the correctness of the PPRD determination can directly affect the length of time that an inmate will spend in prison. Accordingly, challenges to the PPRD do not fall into the category of frivolous or malicious civil actions which the Legislature sought to discourage by the enactment of section 57.085, but are instead analogous to collateral criminal proceedings intended by the Legislature to be exempt from the fee and lien provisions of the act. Such actions fall within the exception expressly set forth by the Legislature in section 57.085(10) for collateral criminal proceedings. Further, similar to the concern we voiced in Schmidt, to hold otherwise would effectively result in an unlawful chilling of a prisoner's right to seek review of the Commission's determination of his presumptive parole release date. See Schmidt, 878 So.2d at 367 (citing Geffken, 778 So.2d at 977 n. 5). For these reasons, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative.