Opinion ID: 2468389
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: use of a special master

Text: In Nelson, supra , this court's discussion of the appointment of a special master was as follows: [T]he chancellor appointed a Special Master, and instructed him to prescribe rules for the expeditious and orderly progress of the tasks with which he was charged, and to proceed with hearing of evidence and ruling upon all matters of fact and law incident thereto. ... In this respect, the trial court was proceeding illegally.... [T]he chancellor should hear the cause upon the pleadings and such evidence as may enable him to determine the principles to be applied in adjusting the equities of the parties and then make a reference to a master for such special inquiries or statements of accounts as may aid the court in making a definite decree. ... [T]he United States Supreme Court [has] stated that the use of masters was to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties as they arise and not to displace the court. [The Court] held that the appointment of a master and a reference at the inception of the case to take evidence and to report the same to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of law was an action beyond the court's powers. [Emphasis added.] We stated in Nelson that to support the reference by reason of anticipation of a lengthy trial, complexity of the issues and congestion of the court's calendar does not constitute sufficient grounds for the virtual displacement of the court by a special master. While we can conceive of situations in which a reference of particular matters may be made to a master during the course of litigation, a reference as broad as the one involved here is clearly in excess of the court's jurisdiction and in that respect the court proceeded without authority of law. Id. at 219-220, 438 S.W.2d 33. Rule 53(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that the reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule and, except in matters of accounting and difficult computation of damages, the reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it. No such showing was made here. While we reaffirm our position in Nelson , the result reached in that casedismissal of the appeal as prematureis not appropriate here in light of our policy in favor of bringing litigated matters to an end and our ability to review matters appealed from chancery court on a de novo basis.