Opinion ID: 41851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA and RA

Text: Here, Badillo sued both Thorpe and Benefiel in their official and individual capacities, for money damages and injunctive relief, under the ADA and RA. The district court dismissed the ADA and RA claims in both official and individual capacity against Thorpe based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 3 as well as absolute judicial immunity, and in individual capacity against Benefiel because there is no individual capacity liability under Title II of the ADA or RA. We now affirm, although in so holding we do not find it necessary to address the RookerFeldman doctrine. Badillo’s claim for money damages against Thorpe based upon the ADA and RA is barred by the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. See Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that state trial judge was entitled to judicial immunity against accommodation claims brought by hearing impaired litigant). However, “judicial immunity is not a bar to prospective injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in her judicial capacity.” Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1981, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984). Nevertheless, simply because injunctive relief is available does not mean it 3 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 4 is appropriate. In this case, Badillo’s request for injunctive relief is not proper as to either Thorpe or Benefiel. “Although past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury, [p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (alterations in original). Badillo does not seek to enjoin Thorpe or Benefiel from refusing to accommodate his disability in the future,4 nor does he suggest that the defendants’ alleged failure to do so is anything more than an isolated occurrence.5 Because Badillo does not allege that he faces an immediate threat that Thorpe or Benefiel will again violate his rights, we discern no error in the district court’s denial of injunctive relief under the ADA and RA. To the extent that Badillo seeks to hold Benefiel personally liable, there is 4 In his complaint, Badillo requests an order requiring the defendants to prepare and present a plan to this Court to affirmatively and publicly educate users of the Judicial System to assure that the 12% of the hard of hearing of the 42 million disabled people [sic] in our demotratic [sic] nation who work and pay taxes are participating in all legal daily activities so they may enjoy life and contribute to our prosperity and security. 5 In fact, Badillo provides a document indicating that infrared assistive listening devices are available upon request. 5 no individual capacity liability under Title II of the ADA or RA. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. Of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2nd Cir. 2001). For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Badillo’s ADA and RA claims against Thorpe in her official and individual capacities, as well as the ADA and RA claims against Benefiel in his individual capacity.