Opinion ID: 1349774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Lasswell decision

Text: did not involve a contemporary `balance' between competing constitutional rights, and was not based on a determination that the restriction imposed a `minimal' burden on the district attorney's right to speak. Instead, it involved a historically based exception for restrictions on expression by public employees to the extent the expression is incompatible with their public function.      Under [ State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 649 P.2d 569 (1982) ], the validity of these restrictions does not turn on whether the right of the employees to free expression is outweighed by the public interest served by the restrictions. That is, it does not turn on whether an appropriate balance has been struck between these `competing' interests. It turns, instead, on whether the restrictions are based on a historically recognized exception for public employees that it is incompatible with their public function, and on whether the restrictions are wholly confined within this exception. Armstrong, supra, 70 Or.L.Rev. at 890-91 (footnotes omitted). As I explained in In re Fadeley, supra, 310 Or. at 582, 802 P.2d 31 (Unis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part): The incompatibility between the particular privileged speech and the performance of one's special role or function need not be spelled out in the text of the enactment, but it must be shown by the government to be a `highly likely' effect. Incompatibility, which is always related to state action, is assessed at the time the individual chooses what to speak or write. It is not simply assumed at the time of the enactment of the governmental provision. Incompatibility cannot, in other words, be legislated in the abstract or by a generalized finding; it must be shown to be a `highly likely' effect in a concrete case. `Our cases under Article I, section 8, preclude using apprehension of unproven effects as a cover for suppression of undesired expression   .' City of Portland v. Tidyman, [306 Or. 174, 188, 759 P.2d 242 (1988) ]. A mere likelihood of incompatibility will not, therefore, suffice. (Emphasis in original; some citations omitted.) In In re Lasswell, supra , this court articulated the incompatibility exception under Article I, section 8. In Lasswell, this court recognized that speech that could not constitutionally be prohibited outright may nevertheless, under narrowly-defined circumstances, be found incompatible with the performance of one's special role or function. In Lasswell, this court held that a lawyer disciplinary rule could constitutionally restrict prosecutors from commenting publicly on pending cases with which they are associated if the rule was narrowly limited to actual incompatibility between the speech and the prosecutor's official function, including his responsibility to preserve the person's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution would preclude the enactment of an outright prohibition against public comment by persons generally or against publication by those to whom such comment is made. See In re Lasswell, supra, 296 Or. at 124, 673 P.2d 855 (citing cases). Canon 3 A(6) is, however, directed at judges, not at persons generally. The point of Canon 3 A(6) is not restraint of free expression by judges because they are judges. In my view, a canon that requires a person who becomes a judge to surrender all speech rights guaranteed by Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution could not survive a challenge under that constitutional provision. In re Fadeley, supra, 310 Or. at 590, 802 P.2d 31 (Unis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See In re Richmond, 285 Or. 469, 474-75, 591 P.2d 728 (1979) (same principle stated for lawyers). Rather, Canon 3 A(6) addresses the incompatibility between a judge's official function, including his or her responsibility to promote public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary, and speech that, though privileged against other professional sanctions, vitiates the proper performance of that function under the circumstances of the specific case. In short, a judge is not denied freedom of expression or freedom to speak, write, or publish; but when a judge exercises official responsibility in the performance of the judicial office, he or she also undertakes the professional responsibility to act in a manner compatible with the judicial office in what he or she says or writes. Canon 3 A(6) survives the Judge's constitutional challenge if it is narrowly construed so as to limit its coverage, in the words of Article I, section 8, to a judge's abuse of the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever. In re Lasswell, supra . Thus, the Judge may be disciplined under Canon 3 A(6) only if a highly likely effect of the Judge's public statements was actual harm to public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. I am satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that some of the Judge's statements that were published in the Chieftain, viewed in context, were statements about pending or impending cases and that actual harm to public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judiciary was a highly likely effect of those statements. I agree with the court's holding regarding the Judge's arguments under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, although my analysis of those issues would be somewhat different. See Shockey v. City of Portland, 313 Or. 414, 435-441, 837 P.2d 505 (1992) (Unis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (setting forth analytical framework for determining whether public employee speech is constitutionally protected under the First Amendment).