Opinion ID: 78552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enforcement Guidance.

Text: In addition to allowing inquiries directed at an applicant's ability to perform job-related functions, the ADA recognizes an exemption for drug tests. See § 12114 (For purposes of this subchapter, a test to determine the illegal use of drugs shall not be considered a medical examination.). Employers may also ask follow-up questions in response to a positive drug test, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a), as correctly noted by the district court. See Enforcement Guidance ([ I]f an applicant tests positive for illegal drug use . . . the employer may validate the test results by asking about lawful drug use or possible explanations for the positive result other than the illegal use of drugs. [For example,] the employer may lawfully ask questions such as, `What medications have you taken that might have resulted in this positive test result? Are you taking this medication under a lawful prescription?'). However, the regulations, coupled with the EEOC's guidelines, [10] make clear that disability-related questions are still prohibited. See Enforcement Guidance (Employers should know that many questions about current or prior lawful drug use are likely to elicit information about a disability, and are therefore impermissible at the pre-offer stage.) As the legislative history of § 12112(d)(2) makes clear, the drug-test exemption should not conflict with the right of individuals who take drugs under medical supervision not to disclose their medical condition before a conditional offer of employment has been given. H.R. Rep. 101-485, pt. 2, at 79. While the district court correctly concluded that employers may conduct follow-up questioning in response to a positive drug test, it failed to acknowledge any limits on this type of questioning. Since the district court did not recognize that § 12112(d)(2) prohibits disability-related inquiries, it found that the facts supported summary judgment. Harrison testified that Anthony told him his drug test was positive, that he disclosed his prescription, [11] that he was then taken to Anthony's office where he answered questions about his medication, and that Anthony remained in the room during this interview. Anthony denied ever knowing that Harrison suffered from epilepsy, and he acknowledged that it would be improper for him to be present during the MRO interview. Although BEHI was permitted to ask follow-up questions to ensure that Harrison's positive drug test was due to a lawful prescription, a jury may find that these questions exceeded the scope of the likely-to-elicit standard, and that Anthony's presence in the room violated the ADA, especially considering the conflict between Harrison's testimonythat to answer the MRO's questions he was forced to disclose the fact and extent of his epilepsyand Anthony'sthat he never knew Harrison suffered from the condition. A reasonable jury could infer that Anthony's presence in the room was an intentional attempt likely to elicit information about a disability in violation of the ADA's prohibition against pre-employment medical inquiries. On summary judgment we must give Harrison the benefit of that inference. 2. Finally, BEHI obliquely argues that even assuming an improper medical inquiry, Harrison cannot present evidence of damages sufficient to overcome summary judgment. Normally, as part of his prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he is a qualified individual with a disability. Since we have held that such a requirement is not a prerequisite to suit under § 12112(d)(2), such a showing cannot be required. However, our sister circuits require that a non-disabled plaintiff at least show some damages [12] (emotional, pecuniary, or otherwise) caused by a § 12112(d) violation. See, e.g., Tice v. Centre Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 519-20 (3d Cir.2001); Armstrong v. Turner Indus., Inc., 141 F.3d 554, 562-63 (5th Cir.1998); O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir.2002); Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 971 (8th Cir.1999); Griffin v. Steeltek, 160 F.3d 591, 595 (10th Cir.1998). We agree. In Griffin, 160 F.3d at 595, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in an improper medical inquiry case. The court concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that he suffered [damages], specifically that [his potential employer] did not hire [him] because of his responses to the impermissible questions, and . . . his suit can go forward. Id. Similarly, Harrison has presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that he suffered damagesnamely, that he was not hired as a permanent employee of BEHI because of his responses to allegedly unlawful questions. By way of example, we note Anthony's contradictory testimony: in his affidavit he claimed that he was too busy to hire Harrison due to the company-wide audit, and he maintained that his decision was not in any way based on Harrison's epilepsy; however, in his deposition, he acknowledged that the audit alone was not a reason to stop the offer letter. Coupled with the dispute over the role the corporate revocation of the requisitions played in Anthony's decision, a reasonable jury could infer that Anthony did base his decision not to hire Harrison on information gleaned from an improper medical inquiry. As our sister circuit noted in Griffin, [i]t may be that, at trial [BEHI] will be able convincingly to show that its proffered reason[s] [were] bona fide. In that case it will prevail. See Griffin, 160 F.3d at 595 n. 5. We merely hold that summary judgment cannot be supported at this time; we must, therefore, reverse and remand. REVERSED AND REMANDED.