Opinion ID: 2332091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of Sua Sponte Instruction After Impeachment

Text: Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to give sua sponte a cautionary instruction with respect to the limited admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement used to impeach a defense witness. As counsel did not request such an instruction either at the time of the testimony or when the court instructed the jury, as required by Super.Ct.Cr.R. 30, [6] we are precluded from reversing unless such failure amounts to plain error within the meaning of Super.Ct.Cr.R. 52(b). This court recently held in Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 387 A.2d 1084 (en banc) (1978), that it was not plain error under the circumstances of that case for a trial judge to fail to give sua sponte an immediate cautionary instruction when a witness has been impeached by a prior inconsistent statement. Appellant argues, however, that prior statement in this case was subject to misuse by the jury and the trial court's failure to act sua sponte to insure that the jury understood the limited purpose for the admission of the statement constitutes plain error. Here there was little problem of jury confusion. The prosecutor made it quite clear at the time of cross-examination that he was using the statement for impeachment purposes. [7] The trial court would have been better advised to give an immediate instruction informing the jury of the limited purpose for which the evidence was admissible. It is an elementary procedure with some trial judges. But we do not find the failure to do so here prejudicial to the defendant's case so as to compel the conclusion there was plain error. Since the witness' prior statement was given under oath before the grand jury, we find appellant's argument less convincing than the argument advanced in Johnson v. United States, supra . The recently-enacted Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at trial, hearing, or other proceeding . . . [Rule 801(d)(1); emphasis added]. While not binding here, in federal court the failure to give a cautionary instruction as to the limited relevance of the prior statement would not have been error at all, let alone plain error. One would have to consider the federal judiciary has gone far afield in the reasoning underlying its rule in order to conclude, as the dissenting opinion does, that there was plain error here. We might say in passing that, as exemplified by enactment of the federal rule, the traditional view that prior inconsistent statements are hearsay and inadmissible as substantive evidence has come under attack in recent years. One leading commentator has stated: It is hard to escape the view that evidence of a previous inconsistent statement, when declarant is on the stand to explain it if he can, has in high degree the safeguards of examined testimony. Allowing it as substantive evidence pays an added dividend in avoiding the ritual of a limiting instruction unlikely to be heeded by a jury. McCormick, Evidence § 251 at 603-04 (2d ed. 1972). We find no grounds for reversal on the failure of the trial court to give the instruction where none was requested. Johnson v. United States, supra .