Opinion ID: 2636528
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seven months from locating Defendant to his return to New Mexico

Text: {18} To evaluate the reasons for the delay during this period, we first look to the applicability of the IAD. The IAD is a compact between forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the federal government that provides for delivery of a prisoner incarcerated in one state to another state for trial prior to the termination of the prisoner's sentence. NMSA 1978, § 31-5-12 (1971). For the purposes of this case, the IAD essentially (1) gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a[s]tate the right to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the [s]tate ... must try the prisoner within 120 days of his arrival. Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 151, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001). The IAD provides these mechanisms, but the state has no affirmative duty to seek custody of a prisoner simply because the state is aware of the prisoner's incarceration in another jurisdiction. Palmer v. Williams, 120 N.M. 63, 67, 897 P.2d 1111, 1115 (1995). Though an accused may assert the right to a speedy disposition under the IAD, the time limits do not apply if the state holding the accused discharges him prior to the running of those limits. State v. Tarango, 105 N.M. 592, 595, 734 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Ct.App.1987) (Once the prisoner is released, his rights regarding a speedy trial are the same as those of any other individual.), overruled on other grounds by Zurla, 109 N.M. 640, 789 P.2d 588 Also, the IAD does not apply to probation revocation proceedings. State v. McDonald, 113 N.M. 305, 309, 825 P.2d 238, 242 (Ct.App.1991); see Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 725, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985) (A probation-violation charge, which does not accuse an individual with having committed a criminal offense in the sense of initiating a prosecution, thus does not come within the terms of Art. III.). {19} Though the IAD time limitations may not apply, the state retains its Sixth Amendment duty to bring the defendant to trial. United States v. Dowl, 394 F.Supp. 1250, 1255 (D.Minn.1975) (While this provision places no duty upon the state, or in this case the United States, to bring the prisoner to trial absent a demand by him, ... the fact that the defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction does not relieve the government from providing a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. (citing Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (1969))); see Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37-38, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970) (Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial.). However, before the State can resolve charges against Defendant for purposes of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, the State first had to bring him to New Mexico. Therefore, the State's burden depends in part on the relationship between the IAD procedures and Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. {20} Under the IAD, when the state files a detainer, the state has 120 days from the date of the prisoner's arrival in the state to commence the trial. Section 31-5-12 art. 4(C). Conversely, when a defendant requests a speedy resolution under the IAD, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days from the date the State receives his written assertion. Id. art. 3(A). Therefore, a defendant's assertion under the IAD provides a shorter time period in which the state must try the defendant. {21} On April 24, 2003, in the email conversation with the district attorney, defense counsel informed the State that Defendant has requested a speedy disposition since a detainer was placed on him by your office on 12/13/02. [Defendant] sent it to Judge Murdoch and DDA Margot Ballon. But the State did not receive the documents from the Florida prison officials until June 16, 2003. Defendant was scheduled to finish his Florida prison sentence on July 14, 2003. The State had filed a detainer pursuant to the unrelated probation revocation proceeding, but did not have an obligation to seek Defendant's extradition under the IAD provisions. Outside of the IAD time limitations, Defendant's Sixth Amendment right gave the State some obligation to pursue his extradition. {22} However, by defense counsel's representation that Defendant had asserted his IAD rights, it was reasonable for the State to believe that any action by the State to secure Defendant's transportation would be meaningless. At the moment of Defendant's release from the Florida prison, the IAD would cease to apply, and the State would have no responsibility to seek Defendant's extradition. Thus, it was impractical to try and extradite Defendant before his Florida sentence was complete. Therefore, we do not penalize the State for the delay subsequent to this notification. Cf. United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that where the government has a good faith belief that seeking extradition from a foreign jurisdiction would be futile, due diligence does not require the government to do so); United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 778 (2d Cir.1988) (Due diligence does not require the government to pursue goals that are futile.). Under the unique circumstances of this case, Defendant's delay in filing his IAD request, therefore, weighs against his Sixth Amendment claim. {23} Consequently, this delay is attributable in part to the State, to Defendant, and to the inherent delay involved in transferring Defendant to New Mexico. Therefore, we weigh the period of Defendant's incarceration, beginning December 13, 2002, after the State located Defendant in Florida, to his return to New Mexico on July 14, 2003, neutrally.