Opinion ID: 198473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Closing Argument of Plaintiffs' Counsel

Text: 19 Kmart first argues that plaintiffs' counsel's closing argument interjected purely emotional, inflammatory, and prejudicial elements into the jury deliberations. Kmart argues that this closing argument constituted plain error, warranting a new trial despite its failure to object to the arguments at trial and its failure to request a new trial on this basis. 20 Kmart argues that plaintiffs' counsel made three types of purely emotional, inflammatory, and prejudicial statements during his closing argument. First, Kmart objects to counsel's repeated arguments that Kmart did not care about Smith, her alleged condition, or the safety conditions in Kmart stores. Second, Kmart complains that counsel improperly asked the jury to punish Kmart for the failure to produce Guffy for deposition. Third, Kmart argues that plaintiffs' counsel encouraged the jury to award punitive damages against defendants by requesting that the jury consider the damages associated with other potential customers.
21 Kmart admits that it failed to object to any of these allegedly improper arguments and concludes from this that the standard of review is plain error. See Fernandez v. Corporacion Insular De Seguros, 79 F.3d 207, 210 (1st Cir.1996); Johnson v. National Sea Products, Ltd., 35 F.3d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1994). Appellees counter that Kmart's failure to raise the improper argument issue at any point prior to its brief on appeal results in a total waiver of the issue, rather than plain error review. Appellees cite two cases for the general proposition that [i]f any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that, absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal. Teamsters, Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.1992): see also Noonan v. Winston Co., 135 F.3d 85, 89-90 (1st Cir.1998). Appellees also cite cases in which this court has stated that [w]e will not consider arguments which could have been, but were not, advanced below, Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1097 n. 1 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190, 115 S.Ct. 1252, 131 L.Ed.2d 133 (1995), and that it is a bedrock rule that when a party has not presented an argument to the district court, she may not unveil it in the court of appeals, United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir.1992). 22 The appellees' citations overlook the basic difference between waiver and forfeiture. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-33, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 807-08 (1st Cir.1996). The overwhelming weight of the authority supports the rule that, when no timely objection is made, claims of improper closing argument are forfeited, not waived, and thus amenable to review for plain error. See Fernandez, 79 F.3d at 210; Johnson, 35 F.3d at 631; Anthony v. G.M.D. Airline Services, Inc., 17 F.3d 490, 496 n. 7 (1st Cir.1994); DeVasto v. Faherty, 658 F.2d 859, 864 (1st Cir.1981). Even courts which purport to foreclose review of such claims due to the absence of an objection make exceptions tantamount to plain error review. See, e.g., Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1056 (1st Cir.1990) (stating that issues regarding twelve items of impermissible argument or evidence were not properly preserved for appeal due to the failure to object, but still allowing review upon a showing of substantial injustice); Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605, 609 (1st Cir.1985) (stating that review of a claim of improper closing argument was foreclosed due to the failure to object, but still determining whether review was required to prevent a miscarriage of justice despite the lack of an objection). 1 Thus, we review Kmart's claims for plain error. 23 Under plain error review, we will consider a forfeited objection only if: (1) an error was committed; (2) the error was plain (i.e. obvious and clear under current law); (3) the error was prejudicial (i.e. affected substantial rights); and (4) review is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. See Chute v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 143 F.3d 629, 631 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Bartelho, 129 F.3d 663, 673 (1st Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 241, 142 L.Ed.2d 198 (1998). To merit reversal, the error must have resulted in a miscarriage of justice or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 189 (1st Cir.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927, 117 S.Ct. 294, 136 L.Ed.2d 214 (1996). Plain error is a rare species in civil litigation, encompassing only those errors that reach the pinnacle of fault envisioned by the standard set forth above. See Cambridge Plating Co., Inc. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 767 (1st Cir.1996) (citations omitted). 24
25 Kmart's first claim of improper argument centers on plaintiffs' counsel's nine references that Kmart did not care about Smith or safety conditions at its stores. As noted by appellant, [i]ntroduction of purely emotional elements into the jury's deliberations is clearly prohibited conduct. Doty, 908 F.2d at 1059 (citing Polansky v. CNA Ins. Co., 852 F.2d 626, 630 (1st Cir.1988)). Appellees argue that counsel's references were not such emotional appeals, but rather were proper arguments addressed to the negligence issues of whether Kmart knew or could foresee that injuries would occur, but still failed to prevent them. 26 Viewed in context, some of plaintiffs' counsel's references do appear to have been properly directed towards the knowledge, foreseeability, and breach of duty questions. Others, however, do not. For example, counsel argued at one point that Kmart and its doctors don't care at all about Smith personally, which is quite different than arguing that Kmart did not care about or take steps to prevent the possibility of injury. There were other instances in which plaintiffs' counsel argued that Kmart does not care, in the present tense, which has little bearing on the question of Kmart's negligence at the time of the accident. Counsel also argued that Kmart did not even care enough to make Guffy available to give a deposition in the case. Finally, counsel argued that Kmart did not care because it was not paying the true amount of damages that it caused. The import of these remarks was to stain the corporate character of Kmart in front of the jury. This is improper argument. 27 Kmart's second claim is that plaintiffs' counsel improperly asked the jury to punish Kmart for failing to produce Guffy for deposition by awarding a greater amount of damages. Appellees argue that their counsel made no such argument. During rebuttal, plaintiffs' counsel argued: 28 Now, what we do want here is that this same thing not continue to happen. And I am not asking for punishment, I'm asking to send a message to this guy, [Ben Guffy], who even committed an act of defiance to this Court. That's why an order is here. And you send a message to this guy, that in Puerto Rico we won't take this. And if they allow it, they were to pay the full price. 29 Appellees claim that when counsel argued we don't take this, he meant that the public would not tolerate the unsafe conditions in the Humacao Kmart store. We agree with appellees that it is reasonable to interpret this passage as asking the jury to send a message about the unsafe conditions that caused the accident, while simultaneously reminding the jury that Guffy failed to appear for deposition and that an instruction existed to punish Kmart for that failure. 30 Still, counsel's reminder was improper to the extent that it was a request for a punitive form of damages, and it was also improper because it attempted to sanction Kmart a second time for its failure to produce Guffy for deposition. Because the district court had already determined that it would punish Kmart for that failure in the form of an instruction to accept certain facts as true, this solicitation of a second sanction was improper. Cf. Werbungs Und Commerz Union Austalt v. Collectors' Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1027 (2d Cir.1991) (finding error when a district court first sanctioned a party for late production of documents by precluding the introduction of evidence and then effectively allowed the jury to sanction the party a second time by instructing the jury that it could consider the late production). 31 Kmart's final claim of improper argument asserts that plaintiffs' counsel encouraged the jury to award punitive damages against Kmart in excess of any compensable damages for injuries actually suffered by appellees. Kmart claims that counsel asked the jury to consider the injuries allegedly suffered by other individuals. We cannot agree with this contention. Even the excerpt cited by Kmart specifically states that plaintiffs' counsel was asking for the full price, not more than that. Counsel did attempt to portray the magnitude of the alleged safety problem by estimating the number of accidents in Kmart stores nationally. Counsel also spoke in general terms in stating that every customer is entitled to be safe and that if you have an injury, you have a right to be treated fairly. However, Kmart points to no instance--and we can find none--in which counsel argued that the jury should award appellees additional damages for this general problem or for any injuries allegedly suffered by others. 32 In sum, while some of the arguments complained of by Kmart were proper, others were clearly not.
33 Kmart faces an uphill battle in attempting to show prejudice because, on this record, we are confident in stating that a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was inevitable. Whether the improper arguments identified above were responsible for elevating the award to an excessive one is highly debatable. Kmart now argues that the excessive award was caused by the improper argument of plaintiffs' counsel, but it made no such claim in its post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur. Nor did Kmart raise the improper argument issue in its statement of issues filed under former Fed. R.App. P. Rule 30(b). These omissions cast doubt on whether Kmart itself believed that the alleged excessiveness of the award was caused by plaintiffs' counsel's closing argument. 34 Several other factors could have caused or contributed to the substantiality of the award. We have already found many of appellees' counsel's arguments to be proper, and the jury may well have been influenced to grant such a substantial award by those proper arguments. The jury may have been swayed by the extensive expert medical testimony in this case or by the emotional testimony of Smith or Orth. Or the jury may have been inflamed by Kmart's trial tactics (including the choice to dangle the offending cooler over Smith's head) or by Kmart's own improper argument. Additionally, the district court took precautions in its instructions to minimize the chance of a verdict based on passion or prejudice. The jury was instructed that: (1) its duty was to follow the law; (2) the attorneys' statements were not evidence; (3) it should apply the law without being governed by sympathy or prejudice; and (4) plaintiffs were only entitled to receive compensatory damages for injuries they had suffered and proven. As a result, we are not persuaded that plaintiffs' counsel's improper argument caused whatever excessiveness may exist in the award.
35 Even if Kmart could demonstrate some degree of prejudice resulting from plaintiffs' counsel's argument, we still would not count this case among the rare species of civil cases that must be reversed due to plain error. Kmart must demonstrate that the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice or seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Coastal Fuels, 79 F.3d at 189. We do not find such a miscarriage in this case, where Kmart's own closing argument was nearly as improper as that of which it complains. Kmart repeatedly introduced emotional elements of its own into the jury's deliberations in response to plaintiffs' counsel's attempts to paint Kmart as an uncaring villain. Kmart sought to demonize the plaintiffs when, under the guise of credibility arguments, defense counsel argued: (1) that Smith forgot she was supposed to be in pain until her lawyer reminded her; (2) that Orth was planning litigation rather than attending to his supposedly injured wife; and (3) that Orth claimed to have seen another person express shock at what [they]'ve done to hide the fact that he caused the accident himself. Both sides made emotional arguments in this case, sometimes proper, sometimes not. But it is hardly a miscarriage of justice when a party fails to object to improper argument by its opponent and chooses to retaliate with improper argument of its own, only to have this strategic decision backfire when the jury returns a substantial award against it. 36 For all of these reasons, we find no reversible error either in plaintiffs' counsel's summation or in the district court's failure sua sponte to grant a new trial due to that summation.