Opinion ID: 621702
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fault/Negligence under Article 1802

Text: The appellants next contend that the district court should have granted their post-trial motion for JMOL as to Serrano's Article 1802 cause of action. See Article 1802, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. Specifically, they advance the following five claims of error: that (1) the cause of action was time barred, having been filed after the expiration of Article 1802's one-year statute of limitations; (2) the application of Article 1802 -- which, according to the appellants, was merely a ruse to obtain otherwise unavailable compensatory damages -- is barred by the exclusive remedies of the ADEA and its Puerto Rico analog, Act 115, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194a; (3) the court failed to apply the heightened standard of gross negligence, required where, as here, the defendants are directors of a (Puerto Rico) corporation; (4) the evidence was generally insufficient to -14- establish a cognizable Article 1802 claim; and (5) erroneous instructions issued to the jury warrant a new trial. We address these arguments seriatim.
Whether Serrano's Article 1802 claim was time barred need not detain us. Although the appellants did raise this issue at the close of evidence, they failed to assert it in their renewed postverdict motion. Thus, the argument is unequivocally waived. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 2002) (A party who identifies an issue, and then explicitly withdraws it, has waived the issue.).
In inverse sequence, the appellants failed to raise the exclusivity argument at the close of evidence, instead reserving its initial articulation for their post-verdict motion.6 We have held in no uncertain terms that such failure to raise an issue prior to a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, without more, results in a waiver of that issue on appeal. See, e.g., Casillas-Díaz v. Palau, 463 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 2006) (adopting plaintiffs' contention that defendants ha[d] waived their [argument] by not raising it until their post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law); Larch v. Mansfield Mun. Elec. 6 The appellants raised the issue for the first time not in their actual Rule 50(b) motion, but rather in their response to the plaintiff's reply to the motion. -15- Dep't, 272 F.3d 63, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); see also James W. Moore, 5A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 50.08 (2d ed. 1994) ([A]ny argument omitted from the [Rule 50(a)] motion made at the close of evidence is waived as a ground for judgment under Rule 50(b).). Moreover, finding a waiver is particularly appropriate under the present circumstances, where the appellants not only failed to timely raise the argument, but also expressly stipulated in a joint proposed pretrial order that Article 1802 negligence was a contested issue of law to be addressed at trial, and filed proposed jury instructions on the Article 1802 claim. Even were we to deem the appellants' belated argument forfeited rather than waived, however, we would find no plain error here. See generally United States v. Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that forfeiture of an argument compels plain error review). We explain briefly. The crux of the appellants' exclusivity claim is that, pursuant to Puerto Rico case law, Article 1802 -- the Commonwealth's broad general tort statute -- may not be invoked concurrently with special labor laws, which they describe the ADEA and Act 115 as, unless the tortious or negligent conduct alleged under Article 1802 is sufficiently distinct from that covered by the paired employment statute. In support of this argument, the appellants rely principally upon a single unreported district court order, issued after the conclusion of the trial in this case and -16- mere weeks prior to the district court's denial of their Rule 50(b) motion. See Rosario v. Valdes, 2008 WL 509204 (D.P.R. Feb. 21, 2008) (unpublished order). In Rosario, the plaintiff brought an action under, inter alia, Act 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185 (wrongful dismissal act), Act 100, P.R. Laws Ann. tit 29, § 146 (employment discrimination act), and Article 1802, alleging sexual harassment by her employer. The court, itself relying on a few paragraphs from a 1994 Puerto Rico Supreme Court case, Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air., Inc., 137 D.P.R. 1 (P.R. 1994), opined that to the extent that a specific labor law covers the conduct for which a plaintiff seeks damages, he is barred from using that same conduct under Article 1802. An additional claim under Article 1802 may only be brought by the employee-plaintiff if it is based on tortious or negligent conduct distinct from that covered by the specific labor law(s) invoked. Rosario, 2008 WL 509204, at . We have held, on rare occasions, that a court's failure to recognize and apply, sua sponte, well-established case law can be so clear or obvious as to constitute plain error. See, e.g., Chestnut v. City of Lowell, 305 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that a court's failure to recognize existing Supreme Court precedent and preclude, sua sponte, the availability of punitive damages for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, was sufficiently clear and obvious to amount to plain error); see also United States -17- v. Kasenge, 660 F.3d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting that one of the elements of plain error is that the error be clear or obvious). The district court's error here -- if error at all -- was neither clear nor obvious. While the contested punitive damages issue in Chestnut was known to the court, having been affirmatively raised by the court in the parties' presence but subsequently ignored, there is no suggestion that the trial court in this case should have known about the preemption argument proposed here. Further, in Chestnut, the issue had been decisively dispatched in a decades-old Supreme Court case; by contrast, the present topic of bar by exclusive remedy had been discussed only in an unpublished district court order issued after the trial had already concluded.7 Thus, although the District of Puerto Rico has since held that a single tort claim cannot serve as the basis for simultaneous damages under Act 115 and Article 1802, see, e.g., Nieves Perez v. Doctors' Center Bayamon, No. 09-2212, 2011 WL 1843057, at  (D.P.R. May 16, 2011), that case is not an appellate decision, and the issue was far from clear at the time of Serrano's trial, see, e.g., PaganAlejandro v. PR ACDelco Serv. Ctr., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D.P.R. 2006) (considering an Article 1802 claim concurrently with 7 To the extent that the court might have considered the Rosario order in its analysis of the appellants' Rule 50(b) motion, it declined to consider the merits, correctly deeming the argument waived. See Larch, 272 F.3d at 71-72. -18- claims, based on the same conduct, under specific Puerto Rico employment statutes).8 The requirements for plain error are extremely demanding, and in this circuit, it is rare indeed . . . to find plain error in a civil [matter]. Chestnut, 305 F.3d at 20. This case is no exception. We conclude that, in light of the relative obscurity of Rosario, the paucity of jurisprudence on the issue at the time of trial, the fact that the issue was never raised by either party, and the appellants' own affirmative trial conduct acknowledging Article 1802 as a viable cause of action throughout the proceedings, the court's allowance of the Article 1802 claim did not constitute plain error. See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (declining to find plain error where the law was unsettled).
We turn next to the appellants' contention that the jury, pursuant to the court's purportedly erroneous instructions, applied a standard of general negligence, rather than the required gross 8 Indeed, at the time of Serrano's trial, there was also language in some cases suggesting that such a bar might exist only where the text of the employment statute being invoked provides explicitly that its remedies are exclusive -- language that is not evident in Act 115. See, e.g., Melendez v. KMart Corp., No. Civ. 04-1067, 2006 WL 696082, at  (D.P.R. Mar. 17, 2006) (unreported opinion and order) (ordering plaintiff to show cause why the causes of action under Article[] 1802 . . . should not be dismissed considering settled case law indicating . . . Act 80's nature as the provider of exclusive remedies, thus, preempting causes of action under Article[] 1802) (emphasis added). -19- negligence standard, in imposing liability on HEAM's board members in their individual capacity. Our cases hold that because this claim was not raised in either of the appellants' motions for JMOL, it has been effectively waived. See Rodríguez-García v. MirandaMarín, 610 F.3d 756, 766 n.10 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1016 (2011); Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008). Even assuming, arguendo, that this claim was merely forfeited, it is still subject to the plain error test, which in this case is but an alternative path to the same result. To meet the requirements of plain error, the appellants must show (1) an error that was (2) clear or obvious and not only (3) affected the appellants' substantial rights but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings -- something akin to a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 116 (1st Cir. 2011). Given the facts underpinning this argument, the appellants cannot hope to meet this stringent standard. At the close of trial, the appellants requested, in pertinent part, the following jury instructions to be issued on the applicable negligence standard: Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 36 Civil Code of Puerto Rico, Article 1802 The standard of liability for this cause of action is a negligence standard. [. . .] Negligence under the law of Puerto Rico means failure to use reasonable care which essentially translated into not anticipating -20- and not foreseeing the rational consequences of an act or of a failure to act which a prudent and reasonable person could have foreseen under the same circumstances. Defendants' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 37 Fault for Negligence - Defined Another cause of action filed against the individual defendants . . . is a negligence claim . . . . The standard of liability for this cause of action is a negligence standard. [. . .] Negligence under the law of Puerto Rico means failure to use reasonable care which essentially translates into not anticipating and not foreseeing the rational consequences of an act or of a failure to act which a prudent and reasonable person could have foreseen under the same circumstances. Thus, refined to its essence, the appellants invite us to find that the court's substantial incorporation of their own proposed instructions, rather than issuing, sua sponte, completely divergent gross negligence instructions, constituted at the very least a miscarriage of justice. We decline the invitation. Where a defendant does not offer a particular instruction, and does not rely on the theory of defense embodied in that instruction at trial, the district court's failure to offer an instruction on that theory sua sponte is not plain error. United States v. Alberico, 559 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 2009). It necessarily follows that where, as here, a defendant not only fails to offer a particular instruction, but proposes an alternative instruction which the court substantially adopts -- and the embodiment of which the -21- defendant espoused throughout the trial proceedings -- no plain error has occurred.
Article 1802 provides that [a] person who by act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. In order to prevail on this theory, the plaintiff must show (1) evidence of physical or emotional injury, (2) a negligent or intentional act or omission (the breach of duty element), and (3) a sufficient causal nexus between the injury and defendant's act or omission (in other words, proximate cause). VázquezFilippetti v. Banco Popular de P.R., 504 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (construing Puerto Rico law). As with Serrano's retaliation claim, a reasonable jury could have found fault or negligence on the part of the board. The board based its decision to terminate Serrano in part on his testimony in a deposition concerning an unrelated property dispute with the hospital; but none of the board members bothered to read the deposition transcript, instead relying on characterizations of Serrano's testimony from the hospital's lawyer who was present at the deposition (and adverse to Serrano). Moreover, the board never gave Serrano an opportunity to defend himself, despite his twentyplus years of service and impeccable reputation. Instead, the board had its fiat delivered in a terse and impersonal letter more -22- than three weeks after the fact. Finally, Serrano testified that, as a result of his termination, he experienced anxiety, bouts of depression, and trouble sleeping, all of which was corroborated at trial by Serrano's wife. This comprised a sufficient basis for the jury's Article 1802 finding.
The appellants' request for a new trial fares no better. The first proposed ground for a new trial is that all instructions concerning Article 1802 were wrong. That ground, however, is premised entirely on their waived argument that Article 1802 has no place in this case, and in any event it lacks adequate independent development. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.). The second ground, somewhat more specific than the first, is that the court improperly instructed the jury on the proximate cause element of Article 1802. We see no material difference, however, between the proximate-cause instruction proposed by the defendants and the one that the court ultimately delivered, and we are satisfied that the court's choice of language adequately explained the concept. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion. See McDonough v. City of Quincy, 452 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2006). -23-