Opinion ID: 1506760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Requirement of Pre-Deprivation Hearing.

Text: Respondents also argue that, even had they timely received notice, the Act is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to provide for a pre-deprivation hearing and fails to require sufficient information in the notice to allow the Wrens to protect their property interests. The Act's notice requirements are very limited: the director of revenue must notify the homeowner and lienholder of the manufactured home's status of abandonment, the name and business address of the landlord seeking possession of the manufactured home, and the right of the landlord to seek title to the manufactured home, sec. 700.531, unless the homeowner or lienholder [fails] to respond to the notice required by section 700.531 within thirty days of the mailing or delivery of such notice by the director of revenue. Sec. 700.535. To prevent issuance of an abandoned home title, the homeowner or lienholder must offer proof of ownership and payment of all reasonable rents due the landlord. Sec. 700.533, 700.535. But, the statutes do not require the homeowner or lienholder to be informed as to what rents are alleged to be due, much less do they provide any means for the homeowner to obtain a pre-deprivation, or indeed even a post-deprivation, hearing to contest the rents alleged to be due or even the basic allegations of abandonment. If DOR receives no response to its notice within 30 days, the home is automatically deemed abandoned, and an abandoned home title will issue to the landlord. Further, even could it do so absent a statutory requirement of notice and hearing, DOR never attempted to rectify the due process inadequacies in the statute by issuing regulations requiring adequate notice or a pre-deprivation hearing for the homeowner, although section 700.541 provides that the director of revenue may promulgate rules to effectuate the provisions of the Act. And, the letter sent to the Wrens here did not provide such notice. In relevant part, it stated only that: THE OWNER OR LIENHOLDER MUST REDEEM THE MANUFACTURED HOME WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THIS NOTICE TO PROTECT THEIR [sic] INTEREST. The owner may redeem the manufactured home by presenting proof of ownership and paying all rent owed to the landowner. The lienholder may redeem the manufactured home, if titled in Missouri, by presenting a valid security agreement to the landowner and paying all rent owed to the landowner. The owner or lienholder must notify this department within 30 days of this notice that the manufactured home was redeemed and submit a receipt issued by the landowner showing that all rent was paid. Failure to redeem the manufactured home and notify this department will cause the Director to issue title in the name of the landowner. DOR claims that, even if the Act does not expressly state that a party can seek a hearing to prevent loss of the home or to contest abandonment or rents due, those affected are presumed to know that they can seek injunctive relief under section 536.150 to prevent property loss, as occurred here once the parties finally learned the home had been deemed abandoned and an abandoned home title issued to Lakehurst. Section 536.150 is not a substitute for a pre-deprivation hearing. On its face it does not provide for a hearing prior to deprivation nor does it provide notice to homeowners of how to protect their rights. It merely provides that a party may seek review of administrative action taken without a hearing and for which no other means of review is provided if the person alleges the action was unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, stating: When any administrative officer or body. . . shall have rendered a decision which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal rights . . . of any person, . . . and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or other appropriate action . . . Sec. 536.150. In citing section 536.150, DOR in effect is arguing that because Missouri statutes provide the homeowner with a mechanism for seeking post-deprivation equitable relief, no other process is due. But, no administrative deprivation could ever violate due process if such an argument were accepted, for by definition section 536.150 always applies when no other means of review is given. In any event, it long has been recognized that the mere right to seek a post-deprivation hearing or to obtain damages after the fact for a wrongful deprivation of property does not satisfy due process: If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the deprivation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, [possessions can be returned] if they were unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded . . . for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred. This Court has not . . . embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 81-82, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (quotations omitted). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted that the type of injunctive relief suggested by DOR is improper because: Equitable remedies are particularly unsuited to the resolution of factual disputes typically involving sums of money too small to justify engaging counsel or bringing a lawsuit. An action in equity to halt [improper action], because it is less likely to be pursued and less likely to be effective, even if pursued, will not provide the same assurance of accurate decisionmaking as would an adequate administrative procedure. In these circumstances, an informal administrative remedy . . . constitutes the process that is due. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 21-22, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978). [9] For these reasons, an individual [must] be given an opportunity for a hearing before [he or she] is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (internal quotations omitted, emphasis added). [10] The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). The Wrens were entitled to a hearing before their property interests were disturbed. Without a pre-deprivation hearing, they were not given an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.