Opinion ID: 4219733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Promega I

Text: We reversed the district court’s decisions on both motions. See Promega I, 773 F.3d at 1341. Regarding § 271(f)(1), we held that a single component supplied from the United States could qualify as a “substantial portion” of a multicomponent product, depending on the circumstances in a given case. Id. at 1356. We then held that, in this case, substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Life was liable for infringement under § 271(f)(1), because a reasonable jury could conclude that the Taq polymerase component supplied from the United States qualified as a “substantial portion” of the components of each of the accused products. Id. We also held that, based on Life’s “own admissions, which are supported by evidence in the record,” some unquantified number of Life’s kits that were “made, used, or sold in the United States” infringed the Tautz patent under § 271(a). Id. at 1357. 7 Finally, we vacated the district court’s denial of Promega’s motion for a new trial and remanded with instructions to conduct a new damages trial in light of our holding that the asserted claims of four of Promega’s patents found to have been infringed were invalid for lack of enablement. Id. at 1358. 7 It is undisputed that Life admitted to at least some infringement. See, e.g., J.A. 5127 (Life admitting at trial that there had been “an infringement” and that Promega was “entitled to be compensated for that infringement”). PROMEGA CORP. v. LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. 13