Opinion ID: 5120203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The availability of removal; and

Text: 10. Whether the federal action is vexatious or contrived. DePuy, 953 F.3d at 477. We have cautioned that this overabundant list of factors “is designed to be helpful, not a straitjacket. Different considerations may be more pertinent to some cases, and one or more of these factors will be irrelevant in other cases.” Loughran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2 F.4th 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2021). Nor does the list “preclude the district court from taking into account a special characteristic of the case before it.” DePuy, 953 F.3d at 477. More generally, the decision to abstain “does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the important factors.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). In short, abstention law doesn’t demand an exact fit with the precise parameters of a doctrinal category. J.B., 997 F.3d at 723–24. Instead, the abstention inquiry is flexible and requires a practical judgment informed by principles of comity, federalism, and sound judicial administration. 28 No. 20-3325 With these principles in mind, we find it neither necessary nor helpful to march through our 10-factor “test” and decide which factors support abstention and which do not. DePuy, 953 F.3d at 479 (explaining that the factors in a multifactor, unweighted test often point in different directions); see also United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 435 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“Multifactor tests are common in our law but they can be cryptic when unattached to a substantive legal standard, as this one is. Knowing what factors to look at is useless unless one knows what to look for.”). Several compelling considerations justify abstention in this case, and all can be loosely keyed to the factors on the list. The first is the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation over the legality of the power-line permit. Multijurisdictional legal challenges involving the same subject matter are costly, disruptive, and run the risk of a collision of conflicting rulings. A related consideration is the wholly duplicative nature of this suit. The takings claim was doomed from the start and can fairly be characterized as contrived, and there is no good reason to litigate identical due-process recusal claims in state and federal court. See Interstate Material Corp. v. City of Chicago, 847 F.2d 1285, 1289 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a federal lawsuit “could be considered” contrived when the plaintiff files parallel suits “seeking substantially the same relief from substantially the same parties”). Needless to say, the state courts routinely apply federal constitutional standards, as they must under the Supremacy Clause. More to the point here, Wisconsin courts are fully capable of applying Caperton and have begun to do so. See In re Paternity of B.J.M., 944 N.W.2d 542, 549 (Wis. 2020). And No. 20-3325 29 they have long applied federal due-process standards to recusal questions involving administrative adjudicators. See Guthrie v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm’n, 331 N.W.2d 331, 336 (Wis. 1983). So there is nothing about this particular legal context that cautions against abstention. To the contrary, it appears that Driftless simply wants two bites at the apple. And that weighs heavily in favor of abstention. What’s more, the state case has advanced toward a resolution of the due-process claim. As we’ve explained, the Dane County judge already ruled against Driftless on its allegations against Valcq. The allegations involving Huebsch remain, but the case is now before the Wisconsin Supreme Court on that issue. The petition for review raises substantive questions about the application of Caperton—both in general and in light of the specific allegations involving Huebsch. Under these circumstances, the use of federal judicial resources to decide the same questions cannot be justified. “The principal purpose of a stay under Colorado River is judicial economy … .” Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Carr, 903 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990). There is “no reason for identical suits to be proceeding in different courts.” U.S.O. Corp. v. Mizuho Holding Co., 547 F.3d 749, 750 (7th Cir. 2008). Judicial economy strongly favors abstention. That brings us to a final consideration, and it is far from the least important one. Although Colorado River abstention is primarily concerned with judicial economy, it also implements the fundamental federalism principles that animate all abstention categories. See, e.g., Adkins v. VIM Recycling, Inc., 644 F.3d 483, 486 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing Colorado River as a “federalism doctrine”); Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The Colorado River 30 No. 20-3325 abstention doctrine is based on principles of federalism, comity, and conservation of judicial resources.”). Federalism concerns loom large here. This case implicates Wisconsin’s sovereign interest in the proper functioning of its administrative law and procedure and the role of the state courts in reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies. Wisconsin has created an elaborate permitting regime for important public-utility projects like this one, and aggrieved persons are entitled to judicial review in the state courts. See generally WIS. STAT. § 227.53. Only the state courts can review the agency’s work for compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements of state law. And the state courts alone have the authority to vacate the permit and order the Commission to conduct a new hearing— whether as a remedy for a violation of state law or as a remedy for a violation of the federal constitutional guarantee of due process. Conversely, there is no significant federal interest at stake here that necessitates or even encourages federal-court review of the procedural regularity of the permit proceeding before the agency. A foundational premise of our federalism is “the assumption that state courts are co-equal to the federal courts and are fully capable of respecting and protecting” federal constitutional rights. Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1074 (7th Cir. 2018). “Principles of comity entitle the states to make their own decisions, on federal issues as well as state issues, unless there is some urgent need for federal intervention.” Nicole K. ex rel. Linda R. v. Stigdon, 990 F.3d 534, 537–38 (7th Cir. 2021). The federal courts have no institutional superiority in ruling on Caperton No. 20-3325 31 claims. 4 Accordingly, “[e]xercising federal jurisdiction over [this] claim[] would reflect a lack of respect for the state’s ability to resolve the[] issues properly before its courts.” J.B., 997 F.3d at 722 (quotation marks omitted). Finally, the recent developments before the agency are worth mentioning. As we’ve noted, the Commission recently reopened its proceedings to determine whether to rescind and reconsider the permit based on the conflict-of-interest allegations involving Huebsch. Of course, we cannot predict what it will do. But if the Wisconsin Supreme Court rules in favor of Driftless and allows the due-process claim to move forward in Dane County Circuit Court, remedial steps by the Commission would not be surprising. In short, abstention under Colorado River is amply justified. The judge was wrong to conclude otherwise.