Opinion ID: 1635416
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Dismissal of the Complaint for Untimeliness Was Appropriate

Text: Section 23-4-5(a) provides that [a]ny party affected by the vacation of a street, alley, or highway pursuant to this chapter may appeal within 30 days of the decision of the governing body vacating the street to the circuit court of the county in which the lands are situated. The Trust, the Church, Rubaiyat, the City, and the City Council members rely on § 23-4-5 to argue that Barry's complaint is time-barred because Barry failed to file his complaint challenging the vacation of the alley within 30 days of the City's approval of the vacation. Barry contends that application to him of the 30-day limitation in an appeal from the decision vacating the alley is a denial of due process and that he has a right to have a declaration of the rights of the parties in and to the alley under § 23-4-20(b). [4] (Barry's brief, at 21.) Barry contends that he is an abutting landowner and, therefore, that he was entitled to notice by United States mail pursuant to § 23-4-2. Because there was a prohibition against vacation of a public road at common law, statutes authorizing such a vacation are in derogation of the common law and therefore must be strictly construed. Holland v. City of Alabaster, 624 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Ala.1993); Bownes v. Winston County, 481 So.2d 362 (Ala.1985). Applying this principle, we conclude that the 30-day appeal limitation in § 23-4-5 cannot be applied to an abutting landowner who never received the notice required by § 23-4-2 to be given to abutting landowners by United States mail. Barry alleged in his complaint that his property is adjacent to the alley. The Trust, the Church, Rubaiyat, the City, and the individual council members, however, contend that Barry is not an abutting landowner. The Trust and the Church, in their response to Barry's Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment of dismissal and in support of their motion to strike Barry's second amended complaint, attached a tax map purporting to show that Barry's property does not abut the alley. As previously noted, Barry attempted before the ruling on the motions to dismiss to obtain a continuance of the hearing on those motions on the basis that he had had inadequate time to conduct discovery. Barry also filed an affidavit attempting to establish his status as an abutting owner by adverse possession. Use of materials beyond the allegations in a complaint to support a motion to dismiss, as a general rule, converts the motion to dismiss into a motion for a summary judgment. Dobbs & Sons, Inc. v. Northcutt, 819 So.2d 607, 609 (Ala.2001) (Dobbs's attaching exhibits to its motion to dismiss effectively converted it to a summary judgment motion.); see also Donoghue v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Ala.2002) (In general, exhibits provided in support of motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are considered `matters outside the pleading' and effectively convert the motion into a motion for a summary judgment. Ala. R. Civ. P. 12(b).); Wesson v. McCleave, Roberts, Shields & Green, P.C., 810 So.2d 652, 656 (Ala.2001) (stating that conversion of a motion to dismiss to a motion for a summary judgment under Rule 12(b) occurs `regardless of what the motion has been called or how it was treated by the trial court' (quoting Hornsby v. Sessions, 703 So.2d 932, 937-38 (Ala.1997))). The Trust, the Church, and Rubaiyat rely on Newson v. Protective Industrial Insurance Co. of Alabama, 890 So.2d 81 (Ala.2003), in which this Court recognized an exception to the rule precluding reliance upon matters beyond the face of the complaint in disposing of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In Newson, we stated: The exception is that ``if a plaintiff does not incorporate by reference or attach a document to its complaint, but the document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff's claim, a defendant may submit an indisputably authentic copy to the court to be considered on a motion to dismiss.'' Donoghue v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 838 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Ala.2002) (citations omitted) (quoting Wilson v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Georgia, 716 So.2d 722, 726 (Ala.Civ.App.1998), quoting in turn GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384-85 (10th Cir.1997)). 890 So.2d at 83-84. The tax map, which purportedly defeats Barry's status as an abutting landowner, is not referred to in the complaint and is not central to the plaintiff's claim, as was a provision in the insurance policy made the basis of the action in Newson. The map does not fall within the recognized exception. As this Court stated in Patton v. Black, 646 So.2d 8, 10 (Ala.1994), in reviewing a motion to dismiss: It is not for this court to determine, based on the complaint, whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only if he may possibly prevail. After reviewing the allegations in Barry's complaint and construing them in his favor, we conclude that it is conceivable that Barry could prove that he is an abutting landowner and, therefore, that he was entitled to the statutory notice of the hearing on the proposed vacation of the alley required by § 23-4-2. The fact that two of the defendants  the Trust and the Church  deemed it necessary to resort to evidentiary materials after an order had been entered granting their motion to dismiss is sufficient indicia that the trial court erred in not granting Barry's request for a continuance and in failing to dispose of the matter under Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. Consequently, we cannot affirm the trial court's dismissal based on the failure to appeal within the time prescribed by § 23-4-5(a); the trial court improperly dismissed the action on the basis that Barry's appeal to the trial court was untimely. [5]