Opinion ID: 3014381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Greystone and requested the appointment

Text: of counsel to help advance his case. Challenging his transfer to Greystone, Alston filed two pro se The District Court referred the complaints under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on matter to a Magistrate Judge, who granted December 4, 1995. In those complaints, Alston’s application for counsel on March which were later consolidated, Alston 19, 1996. The threshold requirement for sought over $63 million in damages from the appointment of counsel to indigent four Greystone employees, who he plaintiffs is the arguable legal and factual contended had violated his rights. The merit of a complaint. See Tabron v. employees included William Parker, Jack Grace, 6 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1993). The Singer, and Lynda Navratil (collectively, Magistrate Judge recognized two claims in “Defendants”). 1 The complaints, the Alston’s complaint: 1) a claim that his 17pertinent text of which we set forth in the year term in prison caused him such harm margin, are not models of clarity. 2 Yet, that his sentence constituted cruel and their thrust is clear enough: Alston unusual punishment; and 2) that his questioned the basis of his transfer to involuntary commitment, as Alston put it “without victim without evidence,” violated due process. With respect to the 1 Although Alston also named “Carroll latter claim, the Magistrate Judge cited Simmon” as a defendant, the parties have Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), in been unable to identify such an individual. which the Supreme Court articulated the minimum procedural protections that must 2 With the exception of misspellings, we be afforded to a prisoner who is set out Alston’s allegations verbatim. In transferred to a psychiatric institution. o n e com plaint, A lst o n s ta t e d: Such procedures include fair notice and a “Defendant(s) slanderous allege that I was hearing at which evidence may be a threat(s) that got me six (6) month(s) presented. This Vitek claim is at the heart more in jail without victim without of Alston’s complaint. The Magistrate evidence when than know I have no other Judge recognized the legal sufficiency of right to petitioner the covered which I am these claims, but noted at the same time exercising.” In the other complaint, the paucity of factual development. Alston stated: “Plaintiff did seventeen (17) Nevertheless, after considering other years in hard labor and maximum security factors, including his doubt that Alston jail after serving this cruel and unusual could adequately present his case without punishment(s) I am denied release as the assistance, he ordered counsel to be judiciary promised at the completion of my appointed. jail term I was transfer to another jail for Four years later, in August of 2000, an year now for allege medical reason(s) the District Court finally appointed that never had existed until I got in this jail.” 2 counsel for Alston.3 By that time, Alston that it was “well settled” that civil rights had been released from Greystone and his complaints must be pled with factual whereabouts were unknown. Eventually, specificity. Concluding that Alston’s his counsel successfully located him and complaint was unsubstantiated and did not entered into a representation agreement on specifically set forth how each defendant November 7, 2000. One month later, on infringed Alston’s rights, the District December 6, 2000, Alston’s counsel filed Court found that Alston had not met the a status update with the District Court. pleading requirements necessary to pursue Counsel informed the District Court that it a § 1983 action. The District Court further was attempting to locate, and serve held that Alston had sufficient notice of Alston’s pro se complaint on, the this pleading defect, referring to the Defendants. A similar status update was Magistrate Judge’s admonition in 1996 filed on February 21, 2001. that the allegations lacked factual support. 4 Notwithstanding these updates, on March Accordingly, the District Court entered an 20, 2001, the District Court dismissed the order granting the Defendants’ 12(b)(6) case for lack of prosecution. motion and dismissing the complaint. The order did not specify whether the dismissal Subsequently, Alston’s counsel was with or without prejudice, but successfully served the complaint on three pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), we treat out of the four named defendants and the dismissal as an “adjudication upon the petitioned the District Court to reconsider merits.” Subsequently, the District Court its dismissal. On January 29, 2002, the rejected Alston’s motion for reargument District Court reinstated the case upon and reconsideration. Alston appeals both Alston’s motion and vacated its earlier the orders dismissing his complaint and dismissal order. The Defendants denying reconsideration. responded by filing a 12(b)(6) motion, invoking various defenses, such as defects in the pleading, witness immunity, qualified immunity, and sovereign immunity. The District Court determined that 4 The District Court initially misspoke Alston’s complaint was fatally defective, when it stated that counsel had seven years and on that basis, granted the motion to after its appointment to rectify the dismiss. Citing Darr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d pleadings, since counsel had only been 79, 80 (3d Cir. 1985), the Court observed appointed in 2000. The Court corrected this error in its response to Alston’s motion for reconsideration, noting that 3 There is nothing in the record before us Alston’s counsel nevertheless had more that explains this unfortunate delay in the than enough notice and time to amend the appointment of counsel. defective complaint. 3