Opinion ID: 496991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Language and History of the Eleventh Amendment

Text: 54 In addressing the scope of congressional power to abrogate, an understanding of the purpose and scope of the amendment is required. Therefore, a brief review of the history of the eleventh amendment is essential. 55 The eleventh amendment was a reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. [2 Dall.] 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), in which the Court construed Article III's extension of the judicial power over controversies between a State and Citizens of another State to make states amenable to suit in federal court by citizens of another state. 8 See Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 91-98, 104 S.Ct. at 903-06; Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Commission, 359 U.S. 275, 276, 79 S.Ct. 785, 787, 3 L.Ed.2d 804 (1959); McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 317. In swift response to this construction of Article III, Congress and the States passed the eleventh amendment to provide: 56 The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend. XI. 57 In light of the circumstances surrounding the passage of the eleventh amendment, this language has been construed to mean that courts cannot, pursuant to their Article III powers, subject states to suit. Thus, the language of the amendment does not, nor was it ever intended to, limit Congress' Article I powers; rather, it limits the courts' power to construe the grant of judicial power in Article III to abrogate the state's presumptive immunity from diversity suits. See Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 682, 693-99 (1976). 58 Courts have broadly extended the principles of state sovereign immunity that underlie the eleventh amendment and have applied them to cases outside the technical language of the amendment. For example, the eleventh amendment does not, by its terms, limit all Article III jurisdiction. The words of the amendment seem to limit only the diversity jurisdiction over disputes between a State and Citizens of another State. See McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 317-19; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan.L.Rev. 1033 (1983). However, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), the Court held that the eleventh amendment barred suits based on federal question jurisdiction. That case provides an example of the breadth of application. Although the eleventh amendment does not on its face address federal question jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has instructed that we cannot rest with a mere literal application ... or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322, 54 S.Ct. 745, 748, 78 L.Ed. 1282 (1934). 59 The theory of sovereign immunity, which undergirds the eleventh amendment, has thus led the Supreme Court to fashion a presumption that a congressional enactment conferring general federal question jurisdiction does not operate to subject states to suit. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13, 10 S.Ct. at 506; McVey Trucking, 812 F.2d at 318 (as a sovereign, a state is presumptively immune from suit in a federal court even if the cause of action arises under federal law). As we have discussed at length in Part II, only Congress' clearly articulated decision to subject the states to suits by private individuals in federal court operates to rebut this presumption. The presumption of immunity and the high threshold for its rebuttal animate the notion of sovereignty that underlies the eleventh amendment. Given this strong presumption, where Congress has clearly articulated its desire to abrogate the eleventh amendment, any further expansion of the eleventh amendment is unwarranted. 60 In sum, the language and history of the eleventh amendment provide substantial checks on the ability of the federal government to subject states to suit in federal court. First, the Supreme Court has extended the reach of the amendment, granting state immunity from suits by citizens of the same state, and from suits involving many federal questions. Second, Congress may only override the eleventh amendment when acting under a grant of plenary authority; the presumption of immunity is high, however, and the congressional exercise of a grant of plenary authority alone is not enough. Thus, where the Court has recognized congressional power to override the amendment, as in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, the Court has required that Congress speak with unmistakable clarity. 61 Such limitations on abrogation of the eleventh amendment protect state sovereignty consistent with the amendment's purposes, and limit the reach of congressional authority to override under Article I. Moreover, as we discuss in the following section, implicit in the constitutional plan are limitations on Congress' power and incentive to abrogate state sovereign immunity under Article I. As the final phase of our analysis of the question of congressional power to abrogate eleventh amendment protection under the aegis of Article I, we now consider these limitations within the framework of the constitutional design.