Opinion ID: 1902143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Harmless Error Standard of Review

Text: Any harmless error analysis is a case-specific, fact-intensive exercise. This Court has previously considered the issue of harmless error in a variety of contexts, including a capital sentencing proceeding. See Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 104 (1984). This Court has consistently refused to reverse convictions for errors found to be harmless. Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 10 (1987). See also Claudio v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 1278 (1991); Hammond v. State, Del.Supr., 569 A.2d 81 (1989); Brokenbrough v. State, Del.Supr., 522 A.2d 851 (1987); Michael v. State, Del.Supr., 529 A.2d 752 (1987). The seminal case on appellate harmless error jurisprudence is Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In Chapman, the Court began its discourse by identifying the parties' respective burdens of proof. The defendant has the initial burden of demonstrating error. If the defendant is successful in discharging that obligation, the burden of proof shifts to the State. In Chapman, the Court held: Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it was harmless. It is for that reason that the original common-law harmless-error rule put the burden on the beneficiary of the error either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his erroneously obtained judgment. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. Therefore, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that any error was harmless. Id. at 26, 87 S.Ct. at 829. In Chapman, and its progeny, the United Supreme Court has also explained how appellate courts should evaluate whether the prosecution has sustained its burden of proof. The major premise of such an evaluation is that [a]n error in admitting plainly relevant evidence which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant cannot... be conceived of as harmless. Id. at 23-24, 87 S.Ct. at 827-28 (emphasis added). Consequently, the proper appellate focus in the analytical framework of the harmless error doctrine is: not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence, which we assume it was, but rather, whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258-59, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1798-99, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828). In vacating a decision in another capital sentencing proceeding earlier this month, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that the sine qua non of an appellate court's conclusion that a constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt must be a finding that it did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained. Sochor v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2114, ___, 119 L.Ed.2d 326, 60 U.S.L.W. 4486, 4489 (1992) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828).