Opinion ID: 2549935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Child Abuse Allegations and Divorce Decree

Text: Adams proffered notes from a family clinic containing allegations that Lori had physically, emotionally, and sexually abused one of her daughters from her previous marriage, and a divorce decree granting Lori only supervised visits with the children of that marriage. According to Adams, this evidencealong with admitted evidence that Hailey was fussy and lethargic on the day she died and evidence that Lori had been seen acting aggressively toward Hailey weeks beforewas integral to his theory that Lori, rather than he, abused Hailey and caused her death. Although the State recognizes the right of a criminal defendant to offer evidence in support of his or her theory of the case, it argues that the right to present evidence of a third party's guilt is not absolute. In the State's view, the direct evidence against Adams, including his confession and demonstration, meant the proffered evidence merely suggesting Lori could have had a role in Hailey's death was inadmissible. The State also argues that the medical testimony about when Hailey's fatal injuries occurred warranted the exclusion of the evidence proffered by the defense. Our first consideration when examining appellate challenges to a district court's admission of or refusal to admit evidence is relevance. See State v. Carter, 278 Kan. 74, 77, 91 P.3d 1162 (2004) (citing State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609, 618, 88 P.3d 789 [2004]). Once relevance is established, evidentiary rules governing admission and exclusion may be applied either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the district judge's discretion, depending on the contours of the rule in question. Carter, 278 Kan. at 77. It is also true that an evidentiary decision based on an erroneous interpretation of the law can be equivalent to an abuse of discretion. See Koon v. United States, 515 U.S. 81, 100, 135 L. Ed. 2d 392, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996) (abuse of discretion standard includes consideration of whether exercise of discretion rested on error of law). A district judge's decision under the third-party evidence rule at the heart of the evidentiary question before us here is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review on appeal. See State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 531, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), cert. granted ___ U.S. ___, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1109 (sound exercise of judicial discretion dependent on the totality of facts and circumstances in a given case). Discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. State v. Shelby, 277 Kan. 668, 677, 89 P.3d 558 (2004). If a reasonable person could have taken the view adopted by the district judge, then no abuse of discretion has occurred. This standard of review places the burden of proof on appeal on the party alleging that such an abuse of discretion occurred. Meeks, 277 Kan. at 618. This court's most recent discussion of the third-party evidence rule appears in State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. at 531-34. Although as of this writing, Marsh 's holding striking down the state's death penalty statute will soon be argued before the United States Supreme Court, and thus our mandate has not yet issued, we discuss our clarification of Kansas' third-party evidence rule in Marsh because that portion of the opinion will not be subject to further review. In Marsh, defense counsel attempted to introduce evidence concerning the culpability of Eric Pusch, the husband and father of the two victims. Specifically the defense wanted to put on evidence of Pusch's motive and opportunity to commit the crimes, as well as his potential connection to a murder weapon. The district court refused to admit the evidence, interpreting the Kansas third-party evidence rule to forbid introduction of circumstantial evidence of a third party's guilt when the State had presented direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Marsh, 278 Kan. at 526-27. We made clear that admission of third-party evidence did not turn on the sometimes hazy distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Rather, we said, a district judge must evaluate the totality of facts and circumstances in a given case to determine whether the defense's proffered evidence effectively connects the third party to the crime charged. Marsh, 278 Kan. at 531. In addition, we said, [W]hile evidence of the motive of a third party to commit the crime, standing alone, is not relevant, such evidence may be relevant if there is other evidence connecting the third party to the crime. Marsh, 278 Kan. at 531. With the rule thus enunciated, we held that the exclusion of the defendant's proffered evidence was reversible error. Marsh had proffered more than mere evidence Pusch had a motive. For example, there was direct evidence that Pusch's blood as well as the blood of a victim appeared on Marsh's shoes. Marsh, 278 Kan. at 527. Adams directs our attention to State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 105, 62 P.3d 220 (2003), in which we wrote: Circumstantial evidence that would be admissible and support a conviction if introduced by the State cannot be excluded by a court when offered by the defendant to prove his or her defense that another killed the victim. We also noted in Evans that, although this court recognizes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value, the exclusion of evidence establishing nothing more than mere speculation and conjecture to connect the third party to the crime is not error. Evans, 275 Kan. at 104-05. In Evans, the defendant attempted to admit circumstantial evidence that another individual was seen holding the murder weapon immediately after the fatal shot was fired. There also was evidence that the other individual subsequently admitted to shooting the victim and dumping his body. Evans, 275 Kan. at 97, 101. We held that this evidence should have been admitted; it directly linked the other person to commission of the crime. Evans, 275 Kan. at 106. As such, its exclusion was inconsistent with substantial justice. Evans, 275 Kan. at 106. We reached a different result in State v. Hooker, 271 Kan. 52, 21 P.3d 964 (2001). In that case, the State presented evidence that the defendant broke into the residence of the victim and his girlfriend, asked about money, struggled with the victim, and shot him in the back. A burgundy Cadillac had been seen in the parking lot at the time of the shooting; three days later, the girlfriend of the victim saw a burgundy Cadillac at a gas station and recognized the defendant as the man who had broken in and shot her boyfriend. She wrote down the license plate number and called the police, who picked up the defendant later that day. 271 Kan. at 54-57. In response, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that two other persons had threatened the victim. He conceded that the proffered evidence was hearsay based on rumors. We held the evidence was irrelevant in the absence of other evidence to connect either of the two persons to the victim's death. Hooker, 271 Kan. at 65-66. The situation here is closer to that in Hooker than to that in Marsh or Evans. The State had a wealth of evidence against Adams, both direct and circumstantial. He confessed to the crime, demonstrating for law enforcement how he threw Hailey down and shook her. Expert medical testimony established that Hailey's injuries occurred approximately 10 to 14 hours before she was declared dead and that the injuries would have made her unconscious immediately. Adams was with her in the relevant time period, while Lori was not. When Hailey arrived at daycare, and for several hours thereafter, she was not gravely injured or unconscious. Neither of the pieces of evidence Adams proffered could place Lori at the crime scene at the pertinent time and thus link her to Hailey's fatal injuries. The same was true of the other pieces of evidence that were admittedHailey's fussiness and lethargy on the day of the crime and Lori's aggressive behavior from weeks earlier. Defendant's theory of the case lacked a critical element medical evidence that injuries inflicted at a time when Lori was with Hailey could have caused Hailey's death. Without competing evidence on the mechanism and timing of the fatal injuries, Adams' effort to pin blame on Lori amounted to baseless innuendo. In such a situation, the district judge's decision to exclude the family clinic record and the divorce decree did not qualify as an abuse of discretion.