Opinion ID: 269979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exclusion of the hammer

Text: 16 Appellant's second claim is that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a hammer with an offset spur manufactured by Marlin subsequent to the marketing of its 1947 model. Appellant offered the offset spur during its redirect examination of Harry A. Teator, a Marlin employee who had testified that the spur was a new device installed on guns having a telescopic sight. Judge Timbers' ruling is preceded in the record by a lengthy colloquy that sets forth appellant's arguments for admissibility and the reasons why Judge Timbers excluded this offer. We find no error. 17 Appellant argued to Judge Timbers that the offset spur was evidence that the safety mechanism on Pavlick's rifle was defective in design. Judge Timbers reled that this subsequent technological improvement was not relevant to the question of negligent design and that, even if relevant, it was excludable because evidence of subsequent repairs is not admissible to prove negligence. 18 Under Connecticut law, evidence as to remedial measures taken after an accident is excluded on the basis of a policy to encourage repairs. See Shegda v. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 131 Conn. 186, 38 A.2d 668 (1944). The offset spur, however, represented a technological improvement not prompted by a specific prior injury; thus, the exclusionary 'repairs' doctrine did not squarely apply here. Nevertheless, we conclude that Judge Timbers' alternative ground was an appropriate exercise of his discretion, namely, that a subsequent technological improvement such as the offset spur was not relevant, according to principles of 'American ingenuity of design manufacture,' to the issue of prior negligent design. 19 Appellant also argued that the existence of the offset spur would demonstrate that Marlin had a continuing duty requiring it to install this improvement when Pavlick's gun was returned for repairs. Judge Timbers held that, unless the original design was inherently unsafe, Marlin was under no duty to install an improvement in design when the gun was submitted for specific, unrelated repairs. Finding insufficient independent evidence indicating that Marlin's 1947 design was faulty and no evidence either that the offset spur was a safety improvement or that it could be used on rifles, like Pavlick's, lacking a telescopic sight, Judge Timbers ruled that the spur was not relevant to Marlin's alleged negligence. He 'sustain(ed) the objection with leave to the plaintiff to renew the offer, if there should be appropriate occasion, based on a change in the record in its present status.' We agree with this ruling. Moreover, appellant did not attempt to offer the spur again along with additional evidence establishing its relevance; hence, she was not prejudiced by the Judge's ruling that, as to this ground, the offer was at best premature. 20 Lastly, appellant argued that the offset spur should be admitted to impeach the credibility of Teator, Marlin's employee. 2 However, it does not appear from the record that the existence of the offset spur significantly contradicted the testimony of Teator. Teator did testify that there had been no changes in the half-cock safety device after 1947. But he did not testify, as appellant here claims, that no technological changes were made in the Model 39A rifle after 1947. Instead, he admitted the development of the offset hammer spur but claimed that the spur could only be used on buns with a telescopic sight and that it had no effect on the half-cock safety device. All in all, we conclude that appellant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of this evidence.