Opinion ID: 418711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inability to Afford Counsel

Text: 16 Both the appointment and termination of counsel in this case were governed by the Criminal Justice Act, the relevant portions of which are reproduced in the margin. 7 Subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A provides for appointment of counsel for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation.... 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(a). This standard means something less than indigency or destitution. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 671 F.2d 139, 141 (5th Cir.1982); Criminal Justice Act of 1963: Hearings on S.63 and S.1057 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1963) (statement of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy) (S.1057 studiously avoids the term 'indigent.' Instead, it adopts the test of financial inability to secure a necessary part of adequate representation.) Though doubts as to eligibility should be resolved in a defendant's favor, see VII Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures: Appointment of Counsel in Criminal Cases p 2.04 at 2-5 (1980), subsection (c) provides that counsel may be terminated as the interests of justice may dictate if, at any time, the court determines that the defendant is financially able to obtain counsel.... See also United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Plan Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as Amended, Part IV(c) at 8 (1971). 17 A district court decision to terminate counsel under the Act will not be lightly overturned. In United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 964 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S.Ct. 139, 50 L.Ed.2d 124 (1976), we applied the test whether the district court's finding that a defendant was financially able to retain counsel was clearly erroneous. Cf. United States v. Bracewell, 569 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir.1978), in which we said in the context of a recoupment proceeding under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(f) that the district judge's decision as to availability of funds would not be disturbed [i]n the absence of a serious abuse of discretion. Also, while the Act and its legislative history are silent on the allocation of the burden of proof in proceedings to determine whether counsel should be appointed or terminated, the weight of authority is that the burden rests with the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 662 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126, 101 S.Ct. 945, 67 L.Ed.2d 113 (1981); United States v. Anderson, 567 F.2d 839, 840 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. Ellsworth, 547 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 2636, 53 L.Ed.2d 247 (1977); United States v. Kaufman, 452 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1252, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972). Applying these principles to this case, we cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous in finding that Harris failed to meet his burden of proof on the issue of his financial ability to obtain counsel. 18 When Magistrate Buchwald appointed counsel for Harris in October 1981, she had before her CJA Form 23, signed and certified by Harris as correct. This indicated that Harris had present earnings of $1,000 per month, with no other income received in the twelve months preceding October 1981. In addition, Harris disclaimed ownership of any property, including automobiles. Five months later, when the government moved to terminate the appointment of counsel, it provided Judge Leval with considerable detail, ascribing to the Harris family an income of $70,000 for 1980 and $30,000 for 1981. In response, Harris submitted an affidavit of his attorney which disclosed what the earnings of Harris and his wife had been in the preceding 12 months, but, for the most part, contended that Harris's original CJA 23 affidavit was accurate. By supplementary affidavit, the government alleged that the Harris family owned two Cadillacs (one of which was registered in Harris's name), and revised the estimate of family income to $82,000 in 1980 and over $35,000 in 1981. Together, the government affidavits raised serious questions as to whether Harris's original CJA 23 affidavit, among other things, understated his income by 50%, denied ownership of automobiles when he owned at least one, and failed to disclose other income in the 12-month period preceding submission of the affidavit. 19 At the conclusion of the subsequent hearing before Magistrate Sinclair, where both the truth of Harris's affidavit and his ability to afford counsel were explored, the magistrate stated that the government's presentation raises grave questions about the financial capacity of this defendant at the time the affidavit was executed last fall and as of today .... the burden of the defendant to convince the Court of his eligibility is in no way met on the present state of the record. When asked by Harris's attorney what in the record led the court to question Harris's inability to afford counsel, Magistrate Sinclair responded that there were a number of things in the government affidavits which give rise to an indication of a large sum of money to this defendant in recent period of time, and nothing to indicate that he plausibly lacks access to those funds today. Moreover, Harris had not directly addressed the amount of his income over the past year or explained how his living expenses had drained away his substantial prior income. While Magistrate Sinclair did not make an explicit finding that Harris presently has an X amount of money ... [which] is sufficient to meet the estimated cost ..., the magistrate concluded that [Harris] certainly has not made a showing he is incapable of meeting these costs. The magistrate gave Harris a further opportunity to submit additional information to prove inability to afford counsel. Harris declined to do so unless the proceedings were held in camera and without the government's participation. Magistrate Sinclair then recommended that the court enter an order terminating appointment of counsel at public expense. 8 This was adopted by Judge Leval. 20 Putting to one side Harris's fifth amendment claim, which we address below, a court need not take at face value an affidavit professing sudden indigency which contains material misstatements and misrepresentations. See United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 262, 266 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 933, 93 S.Ct. 2738, 37 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973). Rather, certainly where a defendant's inability to afford counsel has been put into doubt, he has the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut the government's evidence of ability to afford counsel. If a defendant fails to come forward with additional evidence instead of relying on a terse form affidavit, and fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is financially unable to afford counsel, appointed counsel may be terminated. In the case now before us, the government showed substantial income over the preceding two years, cf. United States v. Allen, 596 F.2d 227, 232 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871, 100 S.Ct. 149, 62 L.Ed.2d 97 (1979); United States v. Gipson, 517 F.Supp. 230, 231 (W.D.Mich.1981), and indicated that there might be other undisclosed sources of income. Thus, in addition to showing material misrepresentations and misstatements in Harris's CJA 23 affidavit, the government rebutted Harris's claim of inability to afford counsel by inference and circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Deutsch, supra, 599 F.2d at 48-49. 21 Harris argues that the court must explicitly consider his ability to afford counsel in light of economic realities--the cost of a criminal defense and the cost of providing for himself and dependents. See VII Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, supra, p 2.04 at 2-5. We see no indication in this record that the magistrate and the district judge did not consider these economic realities, although we would prefer more explicit findings when such questions arise again. Moreover, Harris can hardly complain here, since he declined to come forward and rebut the government's evidence of non-eligibility. Citing United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 489-90 (7th Cir.1982), Harris also argues that forcing a criminal defendant to go to trial pro se constitutes a denial of that defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. This is certainly true when a court fails to conduct an appropriate inquiry into a defendant's financial ability to afford counsel, see id. at 490; accord United States v. Moore, supra, 671 F.2d at 141; United States v. Cohen, 419 F.2d 1124, 1127 (8th Cir.1969). In the case before us, however, the court in fact attempted to conduct further inquiry into Harris's financial situation, but was unable to do so because of Harris's refusal to proceed further unless the proceeding was conducted in camera and without the government's participation. Under these circumstances, we do not believe the court was clearly erroneous in finding that Harris failed to prove financial inability to afford counsel.