Opinion ID: 1797629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the qualified reporter's privilege branzburg

Text: The qualified reporter's privilege in Florida finds its origins in the United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in Branzburg. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether requiring a reporter to testify before a grand jury regarding information about criminal activity obtained from a confidential source violated the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The criminal activity for which the reporters in Branzburg were to be questioned involved their personal observation of the making of hashish, conversations and observations concerning the use and sale of drugs, and interviews and observations concerning subversive activities of the Black Panther Party. In claiming protection under the First Amendment, the reporters argued that, if they were forced to reveal the identity of their sources of information and to disclose other confidences to a grand jury, informants would refuse or be reluctant to furnish newsworthy information in the future, which, in turn, would cause their sources of information to evaporate and would chill the dissemination of information to the public. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion authored by Justice White, refused to find that the reporters' information was privileged where news sources themselves are implicated in crime or possess information relevant to the grand jury's task. 408 U.S. at 691, 92 S.Ct. 2646. In doing so, however, the Court acknowledged that the First Amendment did extend to news gathering activities, noting: [W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. 408 U.S. at 681, 92 S.Ct. 2646. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, who provided the fifth and deciding vote in Branzburg, noted the limited holding of the majority's opinion and emphasized the need for a qualified reporter's privilege in some circumstances, stating: [N]o harassment of newsmen will be tolerated. If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered. The asserted claim of privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions. Id. at 709-10, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In essence, Justice Powell recommended balancing, on a case-by-case basis, a reporter's First Amendment rights against society's interests in obtaining the information. Three of the dissenting justices in Branzburg argued that a three-prong test should be applied to determine whether a reporter would be required to reveal confidences. Under the test, which is similar to that set forth in Green, the dissenting justices would have required the government to: (1) establish that the information sought was relevant to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information could not be obtained by an alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information. This test was designed to prevent the government from using reporters as an investigatory arm of the government.