Opinion ID: 3066522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Basis of the Enforcement Proceeding

Text: As a threshold matter, the parties disagree as to the statutory basis of the enforcement proceeding before the Commission. This is an issue we must decide before we can determine if the Commission erred in not providing VastFame an opportunity to present its invalidity defense. VastFame argues that the enforcement proceeding, which was expressly conducted under 19 C.F.R. § 210.75(b), constituted an investigation under § 1337(b) because that is the only provision that authorizes the type of inquiry engaged in by the Commission in this case. The Commission argues that § 1337 provides the Commission with general authority to enforce its own exclusion orders. It argues that multiple provisions in § 1337 indicate that Congress intended for the Commission to have a role in enforcing its own orders. Neither party cites express statutory authority for enforcement proceedings, and we have found none. Because the statute is silent with respect to the Commission’s authority specifically to conduct enforcement proceedings, the Commission’s interpretation of § 1337 may be entitled to deference “if it is reasonable in light of the language, policies and legislative history of the statute.” Enercon, 151 F.3d at 1381. The Commission is a creature of statute. Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 987 (CCPA 1981). Thus, it must find authority for its actions in its enabling statute. See Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305, 1311-12 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“5 C.F.R. § 211.57 cannot, and does not, provide greater authority than the statute.”). The Commission cites 19 U.S.C. § 1335, which gives the Commission authority to “adopt such reasonable procedures and rules and regulations as it deems necessary to carry out its functions and duties.” However, this provision does nothing more than provide the Commission with authority to promulgate rules. It does not give the Commission the substantive right to go beyond the express powers provided in § 1337. Similarly, the Commission cites Rule 210.75(b), under which the enforcement proceeding was conducted. However, the Rule itself cannot provide the needed statutory authority. See Young Eng’rs, 721 F.2d at 1312. The Commission also cites § 1337(f); however, that section concerns only cease and desist orders and cannot provide the authority for Rule 210.75(b), at least to the extent that the rule relates to the enforcement of a general exclusion order. As VastFame points out, a cease and desist order was not issued against it in this case. The Commission also cites § 1337(k)(1), which provides that exclusion orders shall remain in effect until the Commission determines otherwise; and § 1337(k)(2), which provides that a party previously found in violation of § 1337 may petition for a change of an exclusion order. Section 1337(k)(1) says nothing about the Commission’s authority to conduct enforcement proceedings. Moreover, it was Fuji, not the Commission, that initiated the present proceedings when it filed its complaint. Section 1337(k)(2) is inapplicable because VastFame had not “previously been found by the Commission to be in violation of” § 1337. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(k)(2) (2000). And that would be true even if VastFame had requested the proceedings. Finally, the Commission cites § 1337(i), which provides that the Commission may order the seizure of goods previously adjudged to be in violation of § 1337 and previously denied entry. But the Commission does not argue that any of these statutory provisions, including § 1337(i), expressly authorizes the enforcement proceeding conducted in this case. The Commission uses § 1337(i) to buttress its argument made with respect to each of these statutory provisions that the authority to promulgate Rule 210.75(b) emanates from the penumbra of § 1337. We cannot agree with the Commission that, if no specific statutory authority exists, the Commission has the inherent authority to conduct enforcement proceedings. Such a view is not reasonable in light of the express powers provided in § 1337 and the fact that the Commission is a creature of statute. Sealed Air Corp., 645 F.2d at 987. Because the Commission’s proffered interpretation of the statute is unreasonable, we reject it. While no statutory provision of § 1337 expressly refers to enforcement proceedings, § 1337(b) gives the Commission general authority to investigate violations of the statute. Section 1337(b)(1) provides, “The Commission shall investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon its initiative.” Section 1337(b), by its language, is not limited to initial complaints and authorizes the Commission to conduct proceedings, including proceedings for the enforcement of general exclusion orders, to “investigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath.” In this case, the Commission began its investigation as a result of Fuji’s complaint. Initial Determination, slip op. at 1. The statute further provides that “the Commission shall publish notice thereof in the Federal Register.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (2000). Consistent with this requirement, the Commission, in this case, published notice of its investigation in the Federal Register. In re Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, 66 Fed. Reg. 40,721 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 3, 2001) (notice of investigation). Although the Commission seeks to avoid basing its enforcement proceeding on § 1337(b), we hold that the Commission has authority to conduct proceedings to enforce general exclusion orders, and that its authority to conduct such proceedings arises under and is subject to the provisions of § 1337(b).