Opinion ID: 488849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gray's Testimony

Text: 21 The government contends that the district court properly admitted Gray's testimony under the inevitable discovery rule. The government argues that because the officers were conducting surveillance of Drosten's apartment at the time Gray was present, they would have waited until Gray departed, detained and questioned him, and thereby would have received the substance of his testimony. 22 Drosten's counter argument notes that the officers were unaware of Gray's presence in Drosten's apartment prior to the unlawful entry. Moreover, the officers had no information relating to Gray's identity, residence, or relationship with Drosten or any other person involved in this investigation prior to the unlawful entry. Drosten argues that the government has failed to satisfy the active pursuit element under the inevitable discovery rule. We agree. 23 Prior to the unlawful entry, the law enforcement officers had no knowledge of Gray's existence and were not pursuing any leads that would have revealed Gray's identity and testimony. The mere surveillance of Drosten's apartment is insufficient to support the government's position relating to the admissibility of Gray's testimony. Thus, we find that the district court erred in failing to grant Drosten's motion to suppress Gray's testimony. 24 Alternatively, the government contends that because Gray's testimony was purely corroborative and cumulative, the admission of the testimony did not constitute prejudicial error. At trial, Gray testified on direct examination as follows: 25 Q. Approximately when did you arrive at Drosten's apartment on March 13, 1986? 26 A. Oh, right in the 7 o'clock, 7, right around 7, something like that. 27 Q. And you brought Mr. Drosten with you; is that right? 28 A. Yes, sir. 29 Q. And what did you do when you arrived? 30 A. Went upstairs and sat on the couch and was watching the basketball game that was on television. 31 Q. Who else was present? 32 A. That gentleman Dunn. 33 Q. The gentleman that just left the courtroom? 34 A. Yes, sir. 35 Q. Was anyone else there? 36 A. No, sir. 37 .... 38 Q. After you arrived at the residence of Mr. Drosten that evening, did someone come to see him? 39 A. Yes, sir.Q. Could you tell me about that, please? 40 A. I didn't know the gentleman that came in, and didn't know who he was, and he came in the house, and they walked into the back bedroom, and then that's all, you know. 41 Q. By they, who walked in the back bedroom? 42 A. Mr. Drosten and this gentleman that came in who I didn't know. 43 Q. And you and Mr. Barrett stayed out in the living room? 44 A. Yes, sir, watching the basketball game. 45 .... 46 Q. Did you bring any drugs to that apartment that night? 47 A. No, sir. 48 Q. Did you see any drugs in the apartment that night? 49 A. No, sir. 50 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Drosten and this other individual were involved in a drug transaction? 51 A. I had no idea that was happening. 52 The district court erred in admitting Gray's testimony, but we must determine whether such error was harmful and warrants reversal of Drosten's conviction. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The purpose of the harmless error rule is to avoid 'setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result.'  Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 847 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22, 87 S.Ct. at 827). 53 A defendant suffers no prejudice where the court erroneously fails to suppress evidence obtained from an unlawful search which merely corroborates other overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Holton v. Newsome, 750 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.1985). To determine harmfulness in this case, we must decide whether Gray's testimony corroborated the testimony of Barrett and McMahon. At trial, Barrett testified as follows: 54 Q. So Mr. Gray and Mr. Drosten came together about 7 o'clock? 55 A. Yes, sir. 56 Q. Did you see Mr. McMahon again that evening? 57 A. Hum, yes, sir. 58 Q. Tell me about that period. 59 A. He just came in later, we were--Mr. Gray and I were watching the basketball game, so he came in right after them. 60 Q. Came what? 61 A. He came into the house right after John and Mr. Gray came in. 62 Q. What happened then? 63 A. I don't know. I was watching the basketball game and he just came in. 64 Q. What did he do? 65 A. There was some kind of discussion and then-- 66 Q. Between whom? 67 A. Mr. Drosten and Mr. McMahon or Teaf. 68 Q. Where did they go? 69 A. Into a room off the living room there. 70 Q. Did they close the door back there? 71 A. Yes, sir. 72 .... 73 Q. Did you give Mr. McMahon any drugs that night? 74 A. No, I didn't. 75 Q. Did Mr. Gray give Mr. McMahon any drugs that night? 76 A. I didn't see any drugs anywhere. 77 Q. Was Mr. Gray with you during the whole time that Mr. McMahon was up on the apartment back in there with Mr. Drosten? 78 A. Yes. 79 Barrett's testimony is consistent with and corroborates McMahon's testimony. Thus, Drosten has failed to establish any prejudice resulting from the improper admission of Gray's testimony. Gray's testimony is cumulative. Consequently, we hold that the district court's error in admitting Gray's testimony constituted harmless error. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824.