Opinion ID: 2624899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RCW 90.44.050's exemption from groundwater permit requirements

Text: Chapter 90.44 RCW, the groundwater code, is supplemental to the surface water code, chapter 90.03 RCW, and was enacted in 1945 to extend surface water statutes to the appropriation and beneficial use of groundwater. RCW 90.44.020. Both the surface water code and the ground water code are premised on the doctrine of prior appropriation, which applies when an applicant seeks to obtain a water right in this state. RCW 90.03.010; Postema v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 142 Wash.2d 68, 79, 11 P.3d 726 (2000); Neubert v. Yakima-Tieton Irrigation Dist., 117 Wash.2d 232, 240-41, 814 P.2d 199 (1991). Under the prior appropriation doctrine, a water right may be acquired where available public water is appropriated for beneficial use, subject to existing rights. RCW 90.03.010. The same is true of groundwater. Subject to existing rights, all natural ground waters of the state ... are hereby declared to be public ground waters and to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use under the terms of this chapter and not otherwise. RCW 90.44.040; see Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 383, 932 P.2d 139 (1997). RCW 90.44.060 provides that groundwater applications shall be made in the same way as provided in the surface water code in RCW 90.03.250-.340. Thus, before a groundwater permit may be issued to a private party seeking to appropriate groundwater, Ecology must investigate and affirmatively find (1) that water is available, (2) for a beneficial use, and that (3) an appropriation will not impair existing rights or (4) be detrimental to the public welfare. RCW 90.03.290. An exemption to the groundwater permitting requirement exists, however, in RCW 90.44.050. RCW 90.44.050 states: [N]o withdrawal of public ground waters of the state shall be begun, nor shall any well or other works for such withdrawal be constructed, unless an application to appropriate such waters has been made to the department and a permit has been granted by it as herein provided: EXCEPT, HOWEVER, That any withdrawal of public ground waters for stockwatering purposes, or for the watering of a lawn or of a noncommercial garden not exceeding one-half acre in area, or for single or group domestic uses in an amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day, or for an industrial purpose in an amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day, is and shall be exempt from the provisions of this section, but, to the extent that it is regularly used beneficially, shall be entitled to a right equal to that established by a permit issued under the provisions of this chapter: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That the department from time to time may require the person or agency making any such small withdrawal to furnish information as to the means for and the quantity of that withdrawal: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That at the option of the party making withdrawals of ground waters of the state not exceeding five thousand gallons per day, applications under this section or declarations under RCW 90.44.090 may be filed and permits and certificates obtained in the same manner and under the same requirements as is in this chapter provided in the case of withdrawals in excess of five thousand gallons a day. While the exemption in RCW 90.44.050 allows appropriation of groundwater and acquisition of a groundwater right without going through the permit or certification procedures of chapter 90.44 RCW, once the appropriator perfects the right by actual application of the water to beneficial use, the right is otherwise treated in the same way as other perfected water rights. RCW 90.44.050. Thus, it is subject to the basic principle of water rights acquired by prior appropriation that the first in time is the first in right. `[T]he first appropriator is entitled to the quantity of water appropriated by him, to the exclusion of subsequent claimants....' Postema, 142 Wash.2d at 79, 11 P.3d 726 (quoting Longmire v. Smith, 26 Wash. 439, 447, 67 P. 246 (1901)); see RCW 90.03.010 (codifying first in time, first in right principle). The dispute in this case involves the scope of the exemption for any withdrawal of public ground waters ... for single or group domestic uses in an amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day. RCW 90.44.050. The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. State v. Breazeale, 144 Wash.2d 829, 837, 31 P.3d 1155 (2001); State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 480, 28 P.3d 720 (2001). The court's fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature's intent, and if the statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent. J.M., 144 Wash.2d at 480, 28 P.3d 720. However, descriptions of the plain meaning rule have not been uniform in this court's cases. In some cases, the court has said that [i]n a[] unambiguous statute, a word is given its plain and obvious meaning. Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 107 Wash.2d 503, 509, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986); see Young v. Estate of Snell, 134 Wash.2d 267, 279, 948 P.2d 1291 (1997) (the meaning of a statute must be derived from the wording of the statute itself where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous); Waggoner v. Ace Hardware Corp., 134 Wash.2d 748, 752, 953 P.2d 88 (1998) (same); State ex rel. Royal v. Bd. of Yakima County Comm'rs, 123 Wash.2d 451, 458, 869 P.2d 56 (1994) (same). If the meaning of the language is ambiguous or unclear, this line of cases directs that examining the statute as a whole, or a statutory scheme as a whole, is then appropriate as part of the inquiry into what the Legislature intended. See, e.g., Addleman, 107 Wash.2d at 509, 730 P.2d 1327; Sebastian v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 280, 285, 12 P.3d 594 (2000). Thus, some of our cases indicate that consideration of a statutory scheme as a whole, or related statutes, is part of the inquiry into legislative intent only if a court determines that the plain meaning cannot be derived from the statutory provision at issue and ambiguity necessitates further inquiry. Other cases indicate, however, that under the plain meaning rule, examination of the statute in which the provision at issue is found, as well as related statutes or other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found, is appropriate as part of the determination whether a plain meaning can be ascertained. In Estate of Lyons v. Sorenson, 83 Wash.2d 105, 108, 515 P.2d 1293 (1973), for example, the court said that legislative intent is to be determined from what the Legislature said, if possible. The court then determined legislative intent from the plain and unambiguous language of a statute in the context of the entire act in which it appeared. Id.; see also C.J.C. v. Corp. of the Catholic Bishop of Yakima, 138 Wash.2d 699, 708-09, 985 P.2d 262 (1999) (where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, its meaning is derived from its language alone; court construes an act as a whole, giving effect to all the language used, with related statutory provisions interpreted in relation to one another); ITT Rayonier, Inc. v. Dalman, 122 Wash.2d 801, 807, 863 P.2d 64 (1993) (a term in a regulation should not be read in isolation but rather within the context of the regulatory and statutory scheme as a whole; statutory provisions must be read in their entirety and construed together, not by piecemeal). As has been noted: In the past, the plain meaning rule rested on theories of language and meaning, now discredited, which held that words have inherent or fixed meanings. These theories are unnecessary to the plain meaning rule, however, if the rule is interpreted to direct a court to construe and apply words according to the meaning that they are ordinarily given, taking into account the statutory context, basic rules of grammar, and any special usages stated by the legislature on the face of the statute. So defined, the plain meaning rule requires courts to consider legislative purposes or policies appearing on the face of the statute as part of the statute's context. In addition, background facts of which judicial notice can be taken are properly considered as part of the statute's context because presumably the legislature also was familiar with them when it passed the statute. Reference to a statute's context to determine its plain meaning also includes examining closely related statutes, because legislators enact legislation in light of existing statutes. 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48A:16, at 809-10 (6th ed. 2000) (extracts from R. Randall Kelso & C. Kevin Kelso, Appeals in Federal Courts by Prosecuting Entities Other than the United States: The Plain Meaning Rule Revisited, 33 Hastings L.J. 187 (1981)). Under this second approach, the plain meaning is still derived from what the Legislature has said in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute and related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision in question. Upon reflection, we conclude that this formulation of the plain meaning rule provides the better approach because it is more likely to carry out legislative intent. Of course, if, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 142 Wash.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001); Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 125 Wash.2d 305, 312, 884 P.2d 920 (1994). Here, the plain meaning of the domestic uses exemption is apparent from the language in RCW 90.44.050 and related statutes. RCW 90.44.050 plainly says that the exemption applies provided 5,000 gpd or less is used for domestic purposes. This is true, the statute provides, whether the use is to be a single use or group uses. That is, whether or not the use is a single use, by a single home, or a group use, by several homes or a multiunit residence, the exemption remains at one 5,000 gpd limit, according to the plain language of the statute. The developer of a subdivision is, necessarily, planning for adequate water for group uses, rather than a single use, and accordingly is entitled to only one 5,000 gpd exemption for the project. Secondly, where a permit is required, it is required before any wells are dug. Under the groundwater code, each applicant to withdraw groundwater must provide specified information, including the location of the proposed well or wells or other works for withdrawal of water, the amount of water proposed to be withdrawn, and the depth and type of construction proposed for the well or wells or other works. RCW 90.44.060. RCW 90.03.250 provides for the application procedure for surface water and, by virtue of RCW 90.44.060, for groundwater as well. RCW 90.03.250 states that any person may make application for a permit to make an appropriation of water for beneficial use, and shall not use or divert such waters until he has received a permit from the department as in this chapter provided. The construction of any ditch, canal or works, or performing any work in connection with said construction or appropriation, or the use of any waters, shall not be an appropriation of such water nor an act for the purpose of appropriating water unless a permit to make said appropriation has first been granted by the department. RCW 90.44.050 itself begins with the language no withdrawal of public ground waters of the state shall be begun, nor shall any well or other works for such withdrawal be constructed, unless a permit is issued, except as provided in the exemption. (Emphasis added.) Thus, RCW 90.44.050 plainly contemplates, as do related statutes, that a permit is required before any construction occurs and before any withdrawal of water is made. Withdrawal of water, alone, is not the activity that necessitates a permit. A permit is required earlier in the process, before any well is dug or other works constructed for withdrawal of groundwater. Thus, two concepts, construction of works, or digging of wells in order to withdraw water, and the withdrawal of water and putting it to beneficial use are linked in the permitting process. Neither can occur absent a permit. The same two concepts must be linked for purposes of the exemption from the permitting process because that is precisely what the exemption isan exemption excusing the applicant from permit requirements. The one seeking an exemption from permit requirements is necessarily the one planning the construction of wells or other works necessary for withdrawal of water and is the one who would otherwise have to have a permit before any construction commences or wells are dug. Thus, under RCW 90.44.050, and related statutes, qualification for the exemption does not depend, as respondents claim, solely on who ultimately withdraws the water and puts it to beneficial use. [2] It also concerns the person planning the wells or other works, before any water is ever withdrawn. Moreover, we note that if the developer in this case dug one well to provide water for the domestic uses for the entire development, there is no question that more than 5,000 gpd would be withdrawn and a permit would be required. Insofar as beneficial use is concerned, however, the water would be put to the same purpose and actually beneficially used by the same homeowners who would withdraw from individual wells. Because (1) the proposed use is group domestic uses, and (2) the exemption to the permit must be determined with regard to the same conditions necessitating compliance with permitting requirements if the exemption does not apply, the exemption does not apply here to allow a withdrawal for each lot in the residential subdivision under separate, individual 5,000 gpd exemptions. [3] In this case it is the developer, not the homeowner, who is seeking the exemption in order to drill wells on the subdivision's lots and provide for group domestic uses in excess of 5,000 gpd. The developer may not claim multiple exemptions for the homeowners. [4] C & G contends, though, that the plain meaning of RCW 90.44.050 flows from the words any withdrawal in the statute. C & G argues that the court should determine the meaning of the words any withdrawal from standard dictionary definitions, and that any means every and all. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1986); see State v. Smith, 117 Wash.2d 263, 271, 814 P.2d 652 (1991); State ex rel. Evans v. Bhd. of Friends, 41 Wash.2d 133, 145, 247 P.2d 787 (1952). Withdrawal, C & G urges, means to remove or draw out from a place or position. Webster's at 2626 (defining withdraw). Thus, C & G reasons, the statute plainly provides that every or all removals of groundwater for domestic uses of less than 5,000 gpd [5] is exempt from permitting requirements. However, as Ecology urges, C & G's reading of any withdrawal in the exemption would necessarily mean that each well is a separate withdrawal because every and all removals of groundwater would fall within any withdrawal. But, as Ecology points out, the groundwater code clearly contemplates that one withdrawal may be made from more than one well. RCW 90.44.060 refers to each application to withdraw public ground water by means of a well or wells  shall set forth certain information. (Emphasis added.) RCW 90.44.100(1), allowing for amendment of groundwater permits or certificates, states that the holder of a valid right to withdraw public ground waters may ... construct wells or other means of withdrawal at a new location if the change is approved. (Emphasis added.) The same statute says that a permit or certificate may be amended to allow construction of replacement or a new additional well or wells.  RCW 90.44.100(2) (emphasis added). RCW 90.44.080(1), concerning the showing required to obtain a certificated water right, requires the permittee to show the location of each well or other means of withdrawal constructed under the permit. (Emphasis added.) Thus, under a permit or water right certificate, one can, under appropriate circumstances, remove water using two or more wells. The term withdrawal is, as Ecology urges, a term of art in water law, although Ecology does not go so far as to define it. In general, when one appropriates water one does so by means of diversion of surface water or by withdrawal of groundwater. The words diversion and withdrawal both relate to the actual physical acquisition of water to put to beneficial use, and both also relate to the type of right a water right holder has, i.e., diversionary and withdrawal rights. Neither term, in and of itself, defines the scope of the right, and the word withdrawal and the words any withdrawal do not establish the plain meaning of the exemption in RCW 90.44.050. Other statutes in the surface and groundwater codes support our understanding of the plain meaning of RCW 90.44.050. As Ecology points out, the surface and groundwater codes generally require protection of existing rights and water resources. See RCW 90.03.290; RCW 90.44.030, .070; RCW 90.54.020. Of course, where the exemption in RCW 90.44.050 applies, Ecology does not engage in the usual review of a permit application under RCW 90.03.290, including review addressing impairment of existing rights and public interest review. Nevertheless, the Legislature's limits on the exemption, particularly the 5,000 gpd limit on the group uses exemption, establishes that the Legislature did not intend unlimited use of the exemption for domestic uses, and did not intend that water appropriation for such uses be wholly unregulated. The balance which the Legislature struck in RCW 90.44.050 allows small exempt withdrawals for domestic uses, but does not contemplate use of the exemption as a device to circumvent statutory review of permit applications generally. The parties here dispute the potential impacts if RCW 90.44.050 is read to allow the exemption to apply to each individual well in a development such as Rambling Brooks Estates. [6] The question is more basic, i.e., whether the Legislature even contemplated the possibility that developments of the size in this case, or even larger, would be entitled to exempt withdrawals of 5,000 gpd for each of their lots. Given the limitation on single and group uses, and the overall goal of regulation to assure protection of existing rights and the public interest, it is clear that the Legislature did not intend that possibility when this statute was enacted. [7] Respondents urge, however, that there are enforcement mechanisms in place to assure that existing rights and the public interest can be protected even if the exemption is applied as they request. [8] Initially, the existence of enforcement statutes does not alter the plain meaning of RCW 90.44.050. Moreover, after-the-fact remedies will not serve legislative purposes as effectively as review before appropriation occurs. By the time they are invoked, particularly given that Ecology's resources are already spread too thin, see Hillis v. Dep't of Ecology, 131 Wash.2d 373, 932 P.2d 139 (1997), damage will already have been done. While the Legislature has obviously discerned that this is an acceptable risk for small exempt uses, the Legislature's limit on single and group domestic uses tells us that it is an impermissible result beyond the plain terms of the statute. [9] Finally, on this issue, it seems apparent that developers seek to use the exemption in an attempt to bypass the permit system because obtaining new permits to appropriate water within a reasonable time has become virtually impossible. The backlog of unprocessed permits is due in part, it appears, to inadequate funding for Ecology to carry out its statutory duties. The problems faced by developers and others seeking to appropriate water could be ameliorated to a degree if the Legislature would provide adequate funding for studies, resources, and personnel necessary to carry out the water resource laws and regulations.