Opinion ID: 1135834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick

Text: Myrick modifies our reading of Cipollone. After Myrick, Cipollone appears to stand for the proposition that the limited reach of an express preemption provision does not preclude a finding of implied preemption, although it does raise a rebuttable presumption that a claim is not preempted. See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Gaus, 61 F.3d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 910, 133 L.Ed.2d 841 (1996) (inference discussed in Cipollone is rebuttable) (citing Myrick ). As Myrick explains, the presence of an explicit statement limiting Congress' preemptive intent does not obviate the need for courts to examine the [implied] preemptive effects of a statute. Myrick, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1341 n. 5 (11th Cir.1995), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 806, 133 L.Ed.2d 752 (1996) (the Supreme Court recently explained that implied preemption is sometimes appropriate despite the existence of [a limited] preemption provision) (citing Myrick ). Nonetheless, the text of a preemptive clause is still of great importance. Thus, before we can determine whether a particular state common-law claim is preempted by federal law, we must first look to the language of the statute to ascertain its explicit preemptive intent; under Cipollone, the explicit pre-emptive scope of the [statute is] governed by [its] language. Myrick, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1487.