Opinion ID: 406148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: 9 Nathaniel argues that, by pleading guilty and testifying at his Rule 11 hearing, Lembric waived his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and is, therefore, subject to Nathaniel's right to secure witnesses in his defense. This argument sweeps too broadly. 10 An accused's right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of a witness does not include the right to compel the witness to waive his fifth amendment privilege. United States v. Trejo-Zambrano, 582 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1978). A voluntary guilty plea, such as Lembric's, is a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege only in regard to the crime that is admitted; the defendant retains the right against self-incrimination as to any crimes for which he may still be prosecuted. United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923, 98 S.Ct. 1486, 55 L.Ed.2d 516 (1978); United States v. Roberts, 503 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1113, 95 S.Ct. 791, 42 L.Ed.2d 811 (1975). A co-defendant who pleads guilty to one count of an indictment cannot be forced to testify by another defendant when there is still a genuine possibility that the pleading co-defendant could be prosecuted for other charges, either under the original indictment or in some later proceeding. Roberts, 503 F.2d at 600. See also United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir. 1973). Thus, Lembric's testimony at his Rule 11 hearing did not result in a waiver of his fifth amendment privilege as to other matters. 11 The fact that Lembric retains his fifth amendment privilege does not end the inquiry, however. It is also necessary to determine the proper scope of the privilege. The most precise guidance for determining the extent of a claimed privilege against self-incrimination is found in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951). Hoffman holds that in order to sustain a claim of privilege under the fifth amendment, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Id. at 486-87, 71 S.Ct. at 818. In Pierce, this court held that: 12 A proper application of (the Hoffman ) standard requires that the Fifth Amendment claim be raised in response to specific questions propounded by the investigating body. This permits the reviewing court to determine whether a responsive answer might lead to injurious disclosures. Thus a blanket refusal to answer any question is unacceptable. 13 561 F.2d at 741 (citations omitted); 1 see United States v. Sanders, 591 F.2d 1293, 1298 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ellsworth, 460 F.2d 1246, 1248 (9th Cir. 1972). 14 We have recognized only one exception to the rule announced in Pierce. In United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 367-68 (9th Cir. 1981), we found an exception to ... Pierce ... (where,) based on its knowledge of the case and of the testimony expected from the witness, (the trial court) can conclude that the witness could 'legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant questions.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980)). This exception, however, is a narrow one, only applicable where the trial judge has some special or extensive knowledge of the case that allows evaluation of the claimed fifth amendment privilege even in the absence of specific questions to the witness.