Opinion ID: 1360483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: recent changes

Text: Williams also points to a 1993 change in the MQT statute in arguing for a strict interpretation of the word individual as it is used in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(2). In 1993, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA-93) repealed 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k). The MQT statute now appears at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (1993), which states in pertinent part as follows: (2)(A) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall be considered to have established a trust if assets of the individual were used to form all or part of the corpus of the trust and if any of the following individuals established such trust other than by will: (i) The individual. (ii) The individual's spouse. (iii) A person, including a court or administrative body, with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or the individual's spouse. (iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or the individual's spouse. .... (C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard to  (i) the purposes for which a trust is established, (ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion under the trust, (iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions may be made from the trust, or (iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the trust. (3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust  (i) the corpus of the trust shall be considered resources available to the individual, (ii) payments from the trust to or for the benefit of the individual shall be considered income of the individual, and (iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered assets disposed of by the individual for purposes of subsection (c) of this section. (B) In the case of an irrevocable trust  (i) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust could be made to or for the benefit of the individual, the portion of the corpus from which, or the income on the corpus from which, payment to the individual could be made shall be considered resources available to the individual, and payments from that portion of the corpus or income  (I) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be considered income of the individual, and (II) for any other purpose, shall be considered a transfer of assets by the individual subject to subsection (c) of this section; and (ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income on the corpus from which, no payment could under any circumstances be made to the individual shall be considered, as of the date of the establishment of the trust (or, if later, the date on which payment to the individual was foreclosed) to be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of subsection (c) of this section, and the value of the trust shall be determined for purposes of such subsection by including the amount of any payments made from such portion of the trust after such date. Williams argues that the Congressional changes alter the former MQT law by closing loopholes in the former statute. The trial court agreed, relying on the general presumption that the legislature, in amending a statute, intends to change the law as it existed prior to the amendment. SRS argues that the changes were only to clarify, not alter, the MQT statute. We agree. In this case, any presumption that Congress intended to change MQT law is inapplicable. Although the former statute used only the term individual and did not specify that the term individual includes persons acting on behalf of the individual, the amendment including that definition of individual does not constitute a change in the law. In summary, we hold that the Williams trust is an MQT and therefore an available resource in evaluating Squier's Medicaid eligibility. SRS did not erroneously interpret the law. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k)(1), the maximum amount of payments permitted under the terms of the trust, assuming the full exercise of discretion by the trustee, are deemed to be available. The Williams trust authorizes the trustee in its discretion to make payments from both the income and the principal of the trust. Therefore, the entire corpus of the Williams trust is considered available to Squier. Reversed.