Opinion ID: 221275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kinsel's Claim Is Barred by the AEDPA's Bar on Successive Petitions

Text: The AEDPA bars state prisoners from filing second or successive federal habeas applications with one relevant exception: A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed unless... the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and [] the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. [14] This actual innocence exception thus allows a petitioner to overcome the AEDPA's bar on successive applications and pass through the gateway to argue the merits of his habeas claims if he establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for constitutional error. In the instant case, we granted Kinsel leave to file this successive federal application, noting that the district court may dismiss the motion if it determines that this claim does not satisfy the successive standard. The district court, however, failed to analyze whether Kinsel's claims satisfy the successive standard and instead dismissed the claims on the merits. This was an error, [15] and we must first determine on appeal whether Kinsel has satisfied the AEDPA standard. Kinsel asserts in his application that (1) he is actually innocent of the crime, i.e., he did not sexually abuse A.M., as supported by her newly discovered recantation, and (2) his rights to a fair trial, due process of law, and his right to confront his accusers, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated. Although the newly discovered evidence of A.M.'s recantation does call her trial testimony into question, the Louisiana trial judge concluded, not that Kinsel was actually innocent and should therefore be exonerated because no reasonable juror could convict him in light of the recantation, but rather that Kinsel was entitled to a new trial because, if reasonable jurors should believe the recantation, none could convict absent her testimony. In the end, the trial judge stated that he did not know when to believe A.M.at trial or at the postconviction evidentiary hearing and therefore determined that Kinsel should have a new trial. On appeal, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit likewise found A.M.'s recantation to be unreliable and inconsistent. Under the AEDPA, we must presume the correctness of the state court's factual finding that A.M.'s recantation lacked credibility, [16] recognizing that credibility determinations in particular are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. [17] Although Kinsel could have rebutted this presumption, [18] he has not succeeded in doing so. [19] We conclude, therefore, that Kinsel's reliance on A.M.'s recantation alone does not satisfy his burden under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). [20] In addition, we agree with the district court that the Louisiana Fifth Circuit reasonably determined that Kinsel has not established that errors at trial violated his rights under the Due Process Clause, the Confrontation Clause, or the Sixth Amendment. Initially, Kinsel asserted that the state prosecutor knew that A.M. was going to perjure her testimony before she testified at trial. If this allegation had proved to be true, the State would have violated Kinsel's due process rights, as articulated by clearly established federal law. [21] But, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit here determined that the record as a whole does not show the prosecutors either coerced or knowingly used false testimony from the victim. [22] The court based this finding on the prosecutors' testimony that A.M. never informed them that she was lying, and on A.M.'s own testimony that she did not tell the prosecutors that she was lying, only that she did not want to testify on the morning of trial: Q. You never told [the district attorney] that you were lying about this defendant Mr. Kinsel representing (sic) you. What you told him was, I don't want to do anyI don't want to do anymore. I'm tired, I'm scared, I want to go home? Is that right? A. Yesyes. The Louisiana Fifth Circuit's factual finding that the prosecutors did not know that A.M. was lying, [23] therefore, is reasonable if for no reason other than by A.M.'s own testimony. The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause is violated when the government knowingly uses perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. [24] Although some circuits recognize a due process violation when perjured testimony is provided by a government witness even without the government's knowledge, [25] we are limited by the AEDPA to applying only established Supreme Court precedent in our review of a state court's reasonableness. [26] Consequently, given the Louisiana Fifth Circuit's reasonable factual finding that the prosecutors did not know that A.M. was lying at trial, we cannot say that the state court unreasonably applied established federal law in determining that Kinsel's due process rights were thus not violated. Kinsel never explains how his Confrontation Clause rights were violated at trial, as his attorney did have an opportunity to cross-examine A.M. Neither does Kinsel provide any analysis of how his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was violated by A.M.'s perjured testimony. Although the perjury may have made the trial unfair, the Supreme Court has never held that perjured testimony alone violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. In sum, Kinsel has not established by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the underlying offense. In fact, Kinsel ultimately does not allege a constitutional error at all given that the prosecutors did not knowingly present false testimony at his trial. His successive federal application is therefore barred by the AEDPA (and would fail on the merits even if it were not barred).