Opinion ID: 1980168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Court's Power to Order Disclosure of Original Records

Text: We reach a resolution of this case best by starting with plaintiff's second argument  that the balance of factors contained in § 6-112(b) to determine when court relief is appropriate supports the order plaintiff seeks. Defendant has not directly answered this argument because it has assumed that we should not reach the balancing test unless we find a clear right of access to the records in § 6-104(b), and defendant believes there is no right of access. For three reasons, we find this assumption erroneous. First, we find ambiguous the triggering language for the authorization of court action for the disclosure of information. Section 6-112(a) allows court action by a person denied disclosure of information under sections 6-104, 6-105(b)(1) or (2), or 6-107 of this title. 15A V.S.A. § 6-112(a). What the language does not explicitly answer is whether the denial must be lawful under the specified sections. Thus, it is unclear whether § 6-112(a) authorizes an enforcement action to protect rights created under the disclosure sections of the Act, or, alternatively, a method for persons properly denied access to records under the disclosure sections to obtain a court order to obtain access, nevertheless. Second, a close examination of the remainder of § 6-112 shows that the section was intended to allow a court to order access to information where no right to access is provided in the disclosure sections. In subsections (d) and (e), the section specifies how the court is to resolve two special circumstances. In each case, the subsections authorize the court to order access where a provision of a disclosure section would prohibit such access. For example, in instances where access must be based on a filed consent to such access, see id. § 6-105(b)(1) (access to identifying information of former parent with respect to adoptions finalized before July 1, 1986 allowed only if former parent has filed a consent to disclosure), disclosure can be ordered without consent if the court finds that disclosure is in the best interest of the petitioner and is unlikely to cause harm to the person whose identity is sought. See id. § 6-112(d). Since these subsections involve examples of how the overall section is to be used, it necessarily follows that § 6-112 generally authorizes the court to order access where the disclosure sections do not provide such access. Cf. In re Scheiber, ___ Vt. ___, ___, 724 A.2d 475, 476-78 (1998) (construing certain recreational activities as neither regulated nor contemplated by zoning ordinance). This view of the purpose of § 6-112 is reinforced by the balancing factors contained in § 6-112(b). Some of the balancing factors in § 6-112(b) make sense only if they relate to court discretion to order disclosure where there is no absolute right of access. For example, the court must consider as a factor whether the individual about whom information is sought has filed a request for nondisclosure under section 6-106. 15A V.S.A. § 6-112(b)(2). Section 6-106 provides, however, that by filing a request for nondisclosure, a former parent prevents disclosure of identifying information. See also id. § 6-105(b)(2) (identifying information with respect to adoptions finalized on or after July 1, 1986 may be disclosed, despite lack of a former parent's consent, but not if the former parent has filed a request for nondisclosure). If § 6-112(b) allows court enforcement of access rights only if they are granted under other sections of the Act, the court would never consider the presence of a nondisclosure request as a balancing factor because the presence of a nondisclosure request negates any access right. Finally, we note that if § 6-112 provides only for the enforcement of access rights granted in the disclosure sections, it duplicates the function of § 6-104(e), which authorizes court actions to enforce the right of access to nonidentifying information. We avoid a statutory construction that would render part of the statutory language superfluous. See Trombley v. Bellows Falls Union High School, 160 Vt. 101, 104, 624 A.2d 857, 860 (1993). The third reason is the most important. Although there are numerous amendments made by the Legislature, the template for the Vermont Adoption Act is the Uniform Adoption Act, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1994. See 9 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. Pamphlet 1998). When our statute is taken from a model or uniform act, it is often helpful to examine the intent behind the model. See State v. Papazoni, 159 Vt. 578, 581, 622 A.2d 501, 503 (1993). Here, an examination of the uniform act gives us helpful insight in construing our statute. Like the Vermont Adoption Act, the Uniform Adoption Act contains two provisions on court actions to gain disclosure of identifying or nonidentifying information. The first, contained in § 6-103(c) of the Uniform Act, is virtually identical to that in § 6-104(e) of the Vermont Adoption Act and enforces an individual's right to access to nonidentifying information. See 9 U.L.A. 83 (Supp. Pamphlet 1998). The second, contained in § 6-105 of the Uniform Act, is similar to that created in § 6-112 of the Vermont Act but explicitly applies only when the information sought is not available under the disclosure sections of the Act. See id. at 84-85 (§ 6-105(a) specifies that the section applies [t]o obtain information not otherwise available under the disclosure sections of the Uniform Act). It contains a virtually identical list of factors for the court to use in determining whether to order disclosure. See Uniform Adoption Act § 6-105(b), at 85. We have noted before that the combination of model act provisions and those locally drafted often does not produce a seamless web. See State v. Quinn, 165 Vt. 136, 139, 675 A.2d 1336, 1338 (1996); Martel v. Stafford, 157 Vt. 604, 609, 603 A.2d 345, 348 (1991). We are reluctant to conclude, however, that when the Legislature uses model language it does so for a purpose different from the purpose in the model act. See Quinn, 165 Vt. at 139, 675 A.2d at 1338; Martel, 157 Vt. at 609, 603 A.2d at 348. In the Uniform Adoption Law, the purpose of the list of factors is to inform the court's discretion where there is no clear statutory right of access. We conclude that the purpose is the same in § 6-112 of the Vermont Adoption Act. Based on our construction of § 6-112, we conclude that the superior and probate courts could have ordered the relief plaintiff sought, even if it is not authorized by § 6-104(b), if the court found that the balance of the factors contained in § 6-112(b) tips in favor of disclosure. The superior court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, without considering those factors, was error. Although we recognize that plaintiff has argued that the balance of the factors contained in § 6-112(b) tips heavily in favor of disclosure, we do not believe it is appropriate for us to determine whether to grant relief in the first instance. Section 6-112(b) requires the court to make specific findings on the statutory factors, which it can do only if it has taken evidence or the relevant facts are undisputed. In this case, the court did not take evidence or make findings because it granted the motion for summary judgment. We must remand for evidence and findings. Although we do not decide whether plaintiff should be granted the relief she requests, we make one additional comment on the statutory scheme because it may be helpful in resolving plaintiff's petition. As we indicated in the outset, this is a dispute about defendant's actions in facilitating plaintiff's adoption, and defendant is seeking to protect its own privacy interests, rather than those of birth or adoptive parents or their families. As we explain in more detail infra, we can discern no legislative intent to use the privacy protection provisions of the Act to protect the privacy interests of an adoption agency. Thus, we do not believe that references to the individual in the factors contained in § 6-112(b) include the adoption agency or its employees.