Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Competence to Plead Guilty

Text: (32) Defendant next contends his plea to the 1975 murder must be set aside because the trial court did not order, sua sponte, a hearing to determine whether defendant was competent to plead guilty. Although he concedes a jury found him competent to stand trial after a contested hearing only two weeks before his plea, he cites federal authority holding that a higher degree of competence is required to plead guilty than merely to stand trial. (See, e.g., Sieling v. Eyman (9th Cir.1973) 478 F.2d 211; see also People v. Burnett (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 1314, 1321, fn. 3 [234 Cal. Rptr. 67] [acknowledging Sieling ].) Because the jury determined only whether defendant was able to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner (§ 1367; see generally People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531 [244 Cal. Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769]), and not whether he was able to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives presented to him and to understand the nature of the consequences of his plea ( Sieling, supra, at p. 215), defendant argues a second hearing should have been held. We reject defendant's argument and join the majority of courts that have declined to adopt the reasoning in Sieling v. Eyman, supra, 478 F.2d 211. (See White Hawk v. Solem (8th Cir.1982) 693 F.2d 825, 830, fn. 7; United States ex rel. Heral v. Franzen (7th Cir.1981) 667 F.2d 633, 637-638, and cases cited.) Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted, the Sieling court itself has limited the scope of that case. In Makal v. Arizona (9th Cir.1976) 544 F.2d 1030, certiorari denied, 430 U.S. 936 [51 L.Ed.2d 782, 97 S.Ct. 1563], the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant's guilty plea need not be invalidated even where the trial court failed to make a specific and separate finding of competency to plead, so long as the district court could properly reconstruct the competence of the defendant to plead guilty based upon evidence adduced in determining his competence to stand trial. ( Heral, supra, 667 F.2d at p. 637, fn. 4.) Even if we assume for the sake of argument that a slightly higher degree of mental competence is required to plead guilty than to stand trial, we find no error. The trial court was clearly aware of defendant's alleged mental problems; it had, after all, recently ordered a hearing to determine defendant's competence to stand trial. After that hearing produced a ruling adverse to defendant, the record shows the court was not convinced defendant was incompetent to plead guilty [14] and defendant fails to point to evidence from which we can conclude the court should have entertained a doubt regarding defendant's competence. Significantly, defendant did not request a second competency hearing before pleading guilty. Later, in a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, [15] defendant claimed he was not of sound mind when he entered his plea. Attached to the motion was a declaration by Dr. Stephens, one of the witnesses who testified at the earlier hearing to determine competence to stand trial, in which he opined that defendant was mentally incompetent and not of sound mind when he entered [his guilty plea]. The declaration, however, did not present any new evidence relevant to the issue of competence to plead guilty. The motion was denied without discussion. (Cf. People v. Kurbegovic (1982) 138 Cal. App.3d 731, 755, fn. 19 [188 Cal. Rptr. 268] [no error in refusing to reconsider competency decision absent change in circumstances or presentation of new evidence]; People v. Zatko (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 534, 548 [145 Cal. Rptr. 643] [same].) The record thus does not reveal substantial evidence that could have led the trial court to doubt defendant's competence to plead guilty. (Cf. Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 539 [substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial triggers duty to hold a hearing].) Accordingly, we find the court was under no obligation to hold a second competency hearing. (33) We likewise reject defendant's claim the court abused its discretion in failing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. Section 1018 permits a trial court to allow a criminal defendant to withdraw his guilty plea for a good cause shown. However, `the withdrawal of such a plea rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and may not be disturbed unless the trial court has abused its discretion.' [Citation.] An appellate court will not disturb the denial of a motion unless the abuse is clearly demonstrated. ( In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 685 [108 Cal. Rptr. 801, 511 P.2d 1153], quoting, in part, People v. Francis (1954) 42 Cal.2d 335, 338 [267 P.2d 8].) It is the defendant's burden to produce evidence of good cause by clear and convincing evidence. ( People v. Cruz (1974) 12 Cal.3d 562, 566-567 [116 Cal. Rptr. 242, 526 P.2d 250].) Defendant relies on the declaration of Dr. Stephens in urging us to conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion. This evidence, however, was substantially the same as that presented in defendant's competency hearing and was contradicted by other expert evidence. Because this showing does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that the court abused its discretion in denying the motion, we reject defendant's assertion that reversal is required on that ground. Inasmuch as defendant provides no elaboration or argument on the point, we also reject his claim that refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea violated his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. ( People v. Blankenship, supra, 213 Cal. App.3d 992, 995-996.)