Opinion ID: 1059128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: E-mail Communications

Text: It is not disputed that on several occasions after July 1, 2002, more than three members of City Council corresponded with each other concerning specific items of public business by use of e-mail. It would serve no useful purpose to relate the particular subjects of the communications because the issue before us involves the method of communication. Succinctly stated, assuming all other statutory requirements are met, does the exchange of e-mails between members of a public body constitute a meeting subject to the provisions of FOIA? Beck assigns error to the trial court's holding that it does. [4] Indisputably, the use of computers for textual communication has become commonplace around the world. It can involve communication that is functionally similar to a letter sent by ordinary mail, courier, or facsimile transmission. In this respect, there may be significant delay before the communication is received and additional delay in response. However, computers can be utilized to exchange text in the nature of a discussion, potentially involving multiple participants, in what are euphemistically called chat rooms or by instant messaging. In these forms, computer generated communication is virtually simultaneous. In the case before us, the e-mail communications did not involve virtually simultaneous interaction. Rather, the e-mail communications at issue in this case were more like traditional letters sent by ordinary mail, courier, or facsimile. The record contains printed copies of the e-mails in question. The shortest interval between sending a particular e-mail and receiving a response was more than four hours. The longest interval was well over two days. The trial court held that such use of e-mail constituted a meeting pursuant to Code § 2.2-3702 and that Defendants held such meetings in private, without notice to the public and without opportunity for the public to attend in violation of the open meeting requirements of Code § 2.2-3707. The trial court held that the issue was not the electronic nature of the transmission; rather, It is how the e-mail is used. While we agree with the trial court that how the e-mail is used is the diapositive consideration, we disagree that this case presents circumstances constituting a meeting for the purposes of FOIA. FOIA deals with public access to records and meetings of public bodies. There is no question that e-mails fall within the definition of public records under Code § 2.2-3701. As previously stated, the issue in this case is whether the exchange of e-mail also constitutes a meeting under FOIA. Code § 2.2-3708 provides that [i]t shall be a violation of this chapter for any political subdivision or any governing body . . . to conduct a meeting wherein the public business is discussed or transacted through telephonic, video, electronic or other communication means where the members are not physically assembled. By definition, a violation under § 2.2-3708 presumes a meeting as defined in FOIA. Code § 2.2-3701 provides in part: Meeting or meetings means the meetings including work sessions, when sitting physically, or through telephonic or video equipment pursuant to § 2.2-3708, as a body or entity, or as an informal assemblage of (i) as many as three members or (ii) a quorum, if less than three, of the constituent membership, wherever held, with or without minutes being taken, whether or not votes are cast, of any public body. The gathering of employees of a public body shall not be deemed a meeting subject to the provisions of this chapter. Clearly, the conduct in question did not involve sitting physically in a work session. Consequently, the key to resolving the question before us is whether there was an assemblage. The term assemble means to bring together and comes from the Latin simul, meaning together, at the same time. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 131 (1993). The term inherently entails the quality of simultaneity. While such simultaneity may be present when e-mail technology is used in a chat room or as instant messaging, [5] it is not present when e-mail is used as the functional equivalent of letter communication by ordinary mail, courier, or facsimile transmission. The General Assembly anticipated this type of communication when it provided: nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit (i) separately contacting the membership, or any part thereof, of any public body for the purpose of ascertaining a member's position with respect to the transaction of public business, whether such contact is done in person, by telephone or by electronic communication, provided the contact is done on a basis that does not constitute a meeting as defined in this chapter . Code § 2.2-3710(B). Under the terms of this provision, it is anticipated that some electronic communication may constitute a meeting and some may not. As previously stated, the key difference between permitted use of electronic communication, such as email, outside the notice and open meeting requirements of FOIA, and those that constitute a meeting under FOIA, is the feature of' simultaneity inherent in the term assemblage. The Attorney General of Virginia has had occasion to render an opinion on this subject. 1999 Op. Atty. Gen. 12. The question presented to the Attorney General was whether § 2.1-343.1(A), a portion of The Virginia Freedom of Information Act, §§ 2.1-340 through 2.1-346.1 of the Code of Virginia, prohibits an elected member of a local governing body from sending electronic mail communications to three or more other members of the governing body. [6] Id. The Attorney General did not consider the dynamics presented in chat rooms or instant messaging, but did consider the precise use of email at issue in this case. For the purposes of the Opinion, the Attorney General used the following definition: Electronic mail is commonly understood to be the electronic transmission of keyboard-entered correspondence over communication networks. An electronic mail system enables the sender to compose and transmit a message to a recipient's electronic mailbox, where the message is stored until the recipient retrieves it. The message may be sent to several recipients at the same time. Id. at 13. Concluding that [t]ransmitting messages through an electronic mail system is essentially a form of written communication, the Attorney General opined that such communication does not constitute a meeting under FOIA. Id. While it is not binding on this Court, an Opinion of the Attorney General is entitled to due consideration. Twietmeyer v. City of Hampton, 255 Va. 387, 393, 497 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1998). This is particularly so when the General Assembly has known of the Attorney General's Opinion, in this case for five years, and has done nothing to change it. The legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of the Attorney General's interpretation of the statutes, and its failure to make corrective amendments evinces legislative acquiescence in the Attorney General's view. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 157, 161-62, 300 S.E.2d 603, 605-06 (1983). We hold that the trial court erred in its determination that the e-mail communications at issue in this case constituted a meeting under FOIA. Count XI of Shelton's petition must fail because it is premised upon e-mail communications constituting a meeting under FOIA.