Opinion ID: 2280027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Required for Apportionment

Text: Ordinarily, to apportion fault among multiple tortfeasors, the plaintiff must prove each tortfeasor's liability beyond the plaintiffs burden of proof (usually by a preponderance of evidence in a civil case). It would not be fair to make a tortfeasor liable with anything less. This means sufficient evidence of all the elements of the tort must be presented against every tortfeasor to which fault is assigned. If there is insufficient evidence as to a tortfeasor, the jury cannot properly apportion fault against it. But frequently, as in this case, some of the alleged tortfeasors do not participate in the trial. Numerous reasons exist for such a tortfeasor not participating in the trial, but it is usually because of a prior settlement. The question is how much proof is needed to allocate fault to such an empty-chair defendant. The burden of proof in such a case is effectively shifted, since it is the participating defendant, not the plaintiff, who seeks to show that the empty-chair defendant is responsible. Rather than trying to show the actual liability of the empty-chair defendant, as a plaintiff might do, the participating defendant is merely seeking a reduction of its liability. CertainTeed has argued that a participating defendant simply has to show that it was not the cause of at least part of the plaintiffs injury, regardless of whether the empty-chair defendant could be shown to have legal liability. Cf. 13 David J. Leibson, Comparative Fault and Apportionment Under KRS 411.182Determination of Fault, Ky. Prac. Tort Law § 10:60 (2010). ([A tortfeasor] should have to pay no more than the damage it caused, regardless of the status of other entities at fault.). But such a rule would be unworkable, since it would apply a different burden of proof to empty-chair defendants than to participating defendants, which would lead to inconsistent results. Take, for example, two cases with the same evidence, which establishes that one defendant was both negligent and a cause of the plaintiffs injury, but that the other defendant, though part of the cause of the injury, acted reasonably. In one case, the non-negligent defendant participates at trial; in the other case, the non-negligent defendant settles for a nuisance sum prior to trial. In the case where the non-negligent defendant participates in the trial, all of the fault would have to be assigned to the negligent defendant. But in the other trial, under the rule claimed by CertainTeed, the participating defendant could avoid some of the liability and obtain an apportionment against the empty-chair defendant because the non-negligent defendant was part of the cause of the plaintiffs injury. Instead, a consistent rule is needed and, indeed, is currently the law in Kentucky. Empty-chair defendants who have settled are to be treated no differently than participating defendants in regard to what must be proved to apportion fault against them. Though the empty-chair defendant will not actually be held liable in the trial, since it is literally not on trial, a participating defendant must still prove liability on the part of the tortfeasor onto whom it seeks to shift some of the blame. Such a rule has implicitly been a part of Kentucky's law of apportioning fault since the adoption of comparative fault. For example, this Court had held that [i]f there is an active assertion of a claim against joint tortfeasors, and the evidence is sufficient to submit the issue of liability to each, an apportionment instruction is required whether or not each of the tortfeasors is a party-defendant at the time of trial. Floyd v. Carlisle Const. Co., Inc., 758 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Ky.1988) (emphasis added). Or, as the Court has stated more explicitly in a case in which the instructions allowed the jury to apportion damages to parties without finding them at fault: Fault may not be properly allocated to a party, a dismissed party or settling nonparty unless the court or the jury first finds that the party was at fault; otherwise, the party has no fault to allocate. The mere fact that a party has been sued or has settled does not permit the factfinder to allocate part of the total fault to that party. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Parrish, 58 S.W.3d 467, 482 n. 5 (Ky.2001) (citation omitted); see also Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir.2000) (reading KRS 411.182(2) to require a finding of fault before apportionment is allowed).