Opinion ID: 1694698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Specific Intent in Information and in Elements Instruction.

Text: Davlin next asserts that the district court erred in failing to quash the amended information because it failed to allege that Davlin had the specific intent to kill Ligenza and that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that in order to find Davlin guilty of second degree murder, the jury needed to find that Davlin had the specific intent to kill Ligenza. Because both the information and the elements instruction used statutory language, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying the motion to quash or in giving its elements instruction. [10] In the operative information, the State charged Davlin with second degree murder pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-304 (Reissue 1995) and alleged that Davlin did cause the death of [Ligenza] intentionally, but without premeditation. Davlin moved to quash the information on the basis that, inter alia, the information failed to allege that Davlin had the specific intent to kill. The district court rejected the motion. We have stated that where an information alleges the commission of a crime using language of the statute defining that crime or terms equivalent to such statutory definition, the charge is sufficient. State v. Smith, 269 Neb. 773, 696 N.W.2d 871 (2005). The information in this case used the language of § 28-304(1) which provides, A person commits murder in the second degree if he causes the death of a person intentionally, but without premeditation. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in rejecting Davlin's motion to quash the information. With respect to the elements instruction, we note that Davlin concedes that trial counsel failed to object to the instruction and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. However, we consider the instruction issue because Davlin also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel when counsel failed to object to the instruction. We conclude that the instruction was not erroneous and that therefore, Davlin was not prejudiced when counsel did not object to the instruction. Davlin argues that the elements instruction, which stated that the jury must find Davlin caused the death of Ligenza intentionally, but without premeditation, defined second degree murder as a general intent crime and that therefore, the jury could find him guilty if it found that he intentionally set in motion events that caused Ligenza's death even though he did not specifically intend to kill her. Davlin argues that this court has recognized second degree murder as a specific intent crime because we have said that second degree murder require[s] the intentional killing of another human being, State v. McCracken, 260 Neb. 234, 251, 615 N.W.2d 902, 917-18 (2000), abrogated on other grounds, State v. Thomas, 262 Neb. 985, 637 N.W.2d 632 (2002), and that [t]he distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter is the presence or absence of intent to kill, State v. Jackson, 258 Neb. 24, 38, 601 N.W.2d 741, 752 (1999). [11] We have stated that in giving instructions to the jury, it is proper for the court to describe the offense in the language of the statute. State v. Sanders, 269 Neb. 895, 913, 697 N.W.2d 657, 672 (2005). The elements instruction in this case used the language of the statute and stated that in order to find Davlin guilty, the jury was required to find Davlin caused the death of Ligenza intentionally, but without premeditation. Furthermore, the instruction as stated requires a finding of specific rather than general intent. The instruction requires that the jury find Davlin intentionally caused the death of Ligenza; therefore, contrary to Davlin's assertion, the instruction would not permit the jury to find Davlin guilty of second degree murder if the jury found that, without an intent to cause Ligenza's death, Davlin simply set in motion events that happened to cause her death. We conclude that the elements instruction was not erroneous in the respect challenged, and we further conclude that the fact counsel did not object to the instruction did not prejudice Davlin's defense.