Opinion ID: 1700959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sawyer and Finch

Text: Sawyer and Finch argue that they are entitled to State-agent immunity because, they say, they have met their burden of proof in establishing that entitlement. They argue: [I]n addition to establishing her entitlement to State-agent immunity, Ms. Sawyer testified that none of their actions were taken in bad faith, with malice, with willfulness, beyond their authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. . . . Likewise, other courts have found no such evidence in similar lawsuits. Nevertheless, Ms. Percer has presented absolutely no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Sawyer discharged her duties in bad faith or otherwise. Dr. Finch testified that none of his actions were taken in bad faith, with malice, with willfulness, beyond his authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law. . . . Ms. Percer also has failed to demonstrate that Dr. Finch was not exercising his judgment in the manner set forth in Ex parte Cranman [, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000)]. Dr. Finch created and implemented policies and procedures for the entire Wallace Center. . . . In short, . . . Finch has established his entitlement to State-agent immunity, [and Percer] has not and cannot present any evidence that [Finch's] actions were taken in bad faith or otherwise. The factual findings of other courts in other cases involving the same issues and the same defendants are not binding on a trial court, although Sawyer and Finch argued otherwise to the trial court. Further, as we discuss below, Percer had no opportunity to present evidence indicating that Finch or Sawyer had discharged his or her duties in bad faith, with malice, beyond the scope of authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law, because the issue of State-agent immunity was not placed before the court in a timely filed motion. Neither is the question whether Sawyer and Finch met their burden before this Court. The question Sawyer and Finch have placed before this Court is [w]hether the Petitioners' Motion for Summary Judgment based on State-agent immunity, filed after the trial court's deadline, was properly before the court for consideration, when the question of immunity is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time. We hold that because the motion for a summary judgment grounded on State-agent immunity was untimely, it was not properly before the court, notwithstanding that it raised a claim of State-agent immunity and notwithstanding the intent of the movants. Further, we reject the contention that an individual's claim of State-agent immunity raises a nonwaivable issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The long-standing legal principle of state sovereign immunity is written into Alabama's Constitution. `Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides that the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity. Under this provision, the State and its agencies have absolute immunity from suit in any court.' Neither the State nor the [State agency] has the power to waive that immunity. . . .  Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432, 434-35 (Ala.2001) (citations omitted). Actions against individuals acting as State agents implicate the protection of § 13, Ala. Const 1901. [2] See Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d at 401: In applying the doctrine of separation of powers, we must recognize § 14 as an expression of a strong public policy against the intrusion of the judiciary into the management of the State while, at the same time, acknowledging that it speaks only to a prohibition of lawsuits against the State and does not mention lawsuits against individuals. For this reason, the express provisions of § 13 establishing the right to a remedy through a lawsuit against an individual must, as to the issue before us, stand above the implications from § 14 in the hierarchy within the declaration of rights. This rationale justifies differentiating between nonwaivable immunity in an action against the State and waivable immunity in an action against a State agent sued in the agent's individual capacity. The extent to which these issues may be asserted by Sawyer and Finch at trial, however, is a question not before us. Sawyer and Finch seek an order from this Court directing the Morgan Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for them based on State-agent immunity. For the reasons presented and discussed below, such an order would be contrary to established law. This Court has stressed its willingness to protect the safeguards of State-agent immunity. We have explained that, once the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, the defendants [will] have the opportunity to seek a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to State-agent immunity, and that if such a motion was made and denied by the trial court, review of the ruling could be then sought from this Court. . . .  Ryan, 831 So.2d at 32. This opening of the Court's doors was not intended, however, to disenfranchise the trial courts. Possibly to prevent any future misinterpretation that its permissive stance in regard to State-agent immunity might allow for shortcuts, this Court continued in Ryan to reiterate its earlier statement that `it is the rare case involving the defense of [State-agent] immunity that would be properly disposed of by a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.].' Patton v. Black, 646 So.2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1994). 831 So.2d at 32. Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., is closely related to Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., Summary Judgment. Rule 12(b) states, in part: If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. . . .  Thus, it is a rare case where a claim of State-agent immunity could be disposed of without resort to matters outside the pleadings, i.e., based on a bare assertion of immunity. After a hearing with the parties, the trial court scheduled the filing of summary-judgment motions no later than February 7, 2006. Sawyer and Finch filed their motion for a summary judgment on May 3, 2006, nearly three months after the filing deadline set by the trial court; the judge denied it two days later. The motion does not assert a claim of State-agent immunity in its 2 pages and 15 exhibits. The first assertion of a claim of State-agent immunity appears at page 8 in Sawyer and Finch's brief in support of their motion for summary judgment, where the argument is presented. The trial judge, in his answer filed in response to this Court's order of answer and briefs for this petition, stated: On May 3, 2006, the petitioners filed their Motion for Summary Judgment which serves as the subject matter of this Petition. (Pet. Exhibit 17.) Finding that they had not requested an extension of the February 7 deadline and were about three months overdue, the undersigned on May 5, 2006, denied the Motion for Summary Judgment as being untimely filed (Pet. Exhibit 19.) On May 19, 2006, the Court denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and for Modification of Scheduling Order (Pet. Exhibits 21 and 22). `A writ of mandamus is . . . available only when there is . . . an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so. . . .' Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d at 452 (quoting Ex parte Nall, 879 So.2d at 543) (emphasis added). Here, the trial judge had no imperative duty to respond to an untimely motion. The court's denial of the motion for a summary judgment was not based on State-agent immunity, it was based on the untimeliness of the motion. Furthermore, [i]n order to claim State-agent immunity, a State agent bears the burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would entitle the State agent to immunity. Giambrone [v. Douglas], 874 So.2d [1046,] 1052 [(Ala.2003)]; [ Ex parte] Wood, 852 So.2d [705,] 709 [(Ala.2002)]. Estate of Reynolds, 946 So.2d at 452. The trial judge argues in his answer: Whether subject matter jurisdiction is involved or not, the burden remains on the petitioners to properly and timely raise the immunity issue and prove that they are entitled to it. This is true in any case where subject matter jurisdiction is implicated. . . . In this case the petitioners did not timely request an extension of the summary judgment deadline imposed in the Court's January 17, 2006 Scheduling Order. Nor did they offer a showing of good cause for their delay of nearly three months beyond the deadline in filing their Motion for Summary Judgment. In their reply to the trial judge's answer, Sawyer and Finch concede that their Motion for Summary Judgment based on State-agent immunity was filed after the trial court's February 7, 2006 deadline. . . . However, . . . Kathy Sawyer has been granted State-agent immunity, as affirmed by this Court, on at least two separate occasions. Likewise, not only has the Morgan County Circuit Court previously granted Dr. Finch State-agent immunity, but this Court has affirmed the grant of State-agent immunity in similar suits. For these reasons and under well-settled law, the trial court was obligated to consider and grant their claims to State-agent immunity. Sawyer and Finch suggest in their reply to the trial judge's answer that they never had scheduling meetings with the trial judge and that they would not have agreed, and certainly would have objected, to a February 7, 2006, deadline for filing summary judgment motions. Sawyer and Finch then assert that they did not receive the scheduling order until January 26, 2006, thereby giving them twelve days to file motions for summary judgment or seek relief from the Scheduling Order.4 4 With the benefit of hindsight seeking relief at that time from the January 17, 2006, Scheduling Order may have been the better course of action. However, seeking such relief was certainly not a guaranteed remedy. We agree with Sawyer and Finch that addressing the issue at the time would have been more prudent than filing their summary-judgment motion three months after the filing deadline set by the trial court. Filing the summary-judgment motion on time would have been even more prudent because it would have placed the issue of State-agent immunity before the trial court. While 12 days is not an overly long period in which to file the required motion, Sawyer and Finch seem to be very practiced at such filings, based on their claimed successes in the recent past, and this argument provides no support for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. The trial court here did not consider whether State-agent immunity applied; it denied Sawyer and Finch's motion for a summary judgment as untimely filed outside the deadline set by the Court. Sawyer and Finch have not demonstrated a clear legal right to the remedy they are now requesting from this Court, and their petition is accordingly denied.