Opinion ID: 540873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seventh Amendment Claim

Text: 70 We agree that additur is generally impermissible in federal actions because it violates the seventh amendment right to a jury trial. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87, 55 S.Ct. 296, 301, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935); Novak v. Gramm, 469 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir.1972). However, Brown Group misapprehends the significance of the jury's finding of a Section 1981 violation. Brown Group's seventh amendment right to a jury trial was satisfied when it received a jury trial on Hicks' Section 1981 claim. 50 Its seventh amendment rights were not further implicated by the district court's additur of $1.00 nominal damages, because Hicks' proof of a Section 1981 violation automatically entitled him to nominal damages. 71 In Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978) (Carey ), the Supreme Court held that the violation of certain absolute rights may entitle the plaintiff to an award of nominal damages even without proof of actual damages, and found that procedural due process was one such absolute right: 72 Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain absolute rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary of punitive damages, to deter or punish the malicious deprivations of rights. 73 Because the right to procedural due process is absolute in the sense that it does not depend on the merits of a claimant's substantive assertions, and because of the importance to organized society that procedural due process be observed, we believe that the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury. 74 Id. at 266, 98 S.Ct. at 1054 (citations omitted). See Hogue v. Clinton, 791 F.2d 1318, 1323 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1008, 107 S.Ct. 648, 93 L.Ed.2d 704 (1986). 75 Relying on Carey, we held in Edwards that the Section 1981 right to be free from discrimination is absolute and proof of its violation entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages. 855 F.2d at 1350. The Edwards court reasoned as follows: 76 [I]t cannot be seriously disputed that the right to be free from intentional racial employment discrimination is absolute in the same sense [as the right to procedural due process]. This much is implicit in the one hundred and twenty-two years of American social history since the decision was made to eliminate slavery and the badges and incidents thereof. 77 Id. We reiterate here that intentional racial discrimination, regardless of against whom it is directed, has no place in American society. Section 1981 thus grants an absolute right to be free of discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, the violation of which entitles the victim to nominal damages irrespective of actual injury. We hold that Hicks was entitled to at least nominal damages upon showing a violation of his Section 1981 rights. 78 Because proof of a violation of Section 1981 automatically entitled Hicks to nominal damages regardless of the district court's additur of $1.00 nominal damages, we find that the district court did not err in using additur to clarify the legal consequences (e.g., presumed nominal damages) of the jury's findings of discrimination in violation of Section 1981. 51 The nominal damages to which Hicks was entitled supported the $10,000 award in punitive damages. 52 Brown Group received the jury trial required by the seventh amendment. It cannot now be heard to complain about the legal consequences of the jury's determination that it had violated Hicks' absolute right to be free from discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. 79 Citing Mitchell v. Keith, 752 F.2d 385, 390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1028, 105 S.Ct. 3502, 87 L.Ed.2d 633 (1985) (Mitchell ), Brown Group argues that the question of whether a punitive damage award can stand absent actual or nominal damages has not been resolved by federal law, and urges us to look to Missouri law to determine whether the award can stand. According to Brown Group, Missouri law forbids the recovery of punitive damages absent a recovery of nominal damages. See Compton v. Williams Bros. Pipeline Co., 499 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Mo.1973). We disagree that Missouri law applies. 53 There is no need to resort to Missouri law because federal law has addressed and resolved the issue raised by Brown Group. See Mitchell, 752 F.2d at 390 (appropriate to look to state law when federal law is deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies). Under Carey and Edwards, Section 1981 confers an absolute right to be free of discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, and the violation of this right automatically entitles the plaintiff to an award of nominal damages which can support an award of punitive damages if the standard of proof is met. See Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir.1965) ([a]s a matter of federal common law it is not necessary to allege nominal damages and nominal damages are proved by proof of deprivation of a right to which the plaintiff is entitled). Applying federal law to determine Hicks' entitlement to the Section 1981 punitive damage award also satisfies the requirement that damages issues be determined in accordance with a federal standard which furthers the purpose of the civil rights statutes. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 238-40, 90 S.Ct. at 405-06 (1969); see Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1199 (6th Cir.1986) (court refuses to reverse punitive damages award in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action even though such damages are not recoverable under state law). For these reasons, we find that federal law applies, Hicks automatically became entitled to nominal damages upon proving a Section 1981 violation, and the district court did not violate Brown Group's seventh amendment right to a jury trial by its additur of $1.00 in nominal damages.