Opinion ID: 740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IMMAct  602 and ADAA  7344(b)

Text: To repeat, ADAA  7344(b) limited aggravated felony deportations to convictions obtained on or after November 18, 1988, while IMMAct  602(c), without mentioning aggravated felonies specifically, provided generally that, with a few exceptions, grounds for deportation should apply to all aliens, regardless of the date on which the facts triggering deportability occurred. Recognizing the surface tension between ADAA  7344(b) and IMMAct  602(c), Ledezma-Galicia urges us to conclude, first, that the latter did not expressly repeal the former, and, second, that the latter provision should not be read to repeal the former by implication, because doing so would violate both the presumption against implied repeals and the presumption against retroactively applied statutes. See generally Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662-64, 127 S.Ct. 2518; Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). The Attorney General, on the other hand, contends that IMMAct  602(c) overrides the very specific directive of ADAA  7344(b), a conclusion that the BIA reached in Matter of Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. 365 (BIA 1998) (en banc). We agree with Ledezma-Galicia. To show why that is so, we explain, first, that the BIA's interpretation of IMMAct  602(c) merits no deference because, when read in light of the applicable principles of statutory interpretation, that provision is not ambiguous in the respect the BIA supposed that it was. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). We next conduct our own analysis of the IMMAct and conclude that it cannot be read to repeal ADAA  7344(b) either expressly or impliedly. Finally, we consider whether this case is controlled by United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) and United States v. Yacoubian, 24 F.3d 1 (9th Cir.1994), two cases addressing firearms convictions covered by a clause similar to ADAA  7344(b), but conclude that it is not.
The BIA in Matter of Lettman addressed the very question before usÔÇö whether the IMMAct repealed ADAA  7344(b). As will appear, the BIA in Lettman took a fundamentally wrong turn in its analysis, and so arrived at an interpretation at odds with the plain language of the two statutes. Matter of Lettman concentrated on the except clause in IMMAct  602(c): Except as otherwise specifically provided in such section and subsection (d).... The BIA determined, first, that the clause excepted from the rest of IMMAct  602(c) the portions of INA  241 that otherwise conflicted with  602(c). But  602(c) was ambiguous, the agency concluded, about which version of INA  241 the IMMAct provision referred to in the except clause. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 372-73. Lettman's position was that the except clause referred to the pre -IMMAct version of INA  241ÔÇöthat is, INA  241 as it stood after the ADAA's passage, before the IMMAct amended it. Id. at 373. The BIA rejected this reading of the statute and instead adopted the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) position that the clause referred to the post -IMMAct version of INA  241. Id. at 373-74. Having made that determination, the BIA went on to conclude that  602(c) of the IMMAct overrode  7344(b) of the ADAA, because the post -IMMAct version of INA  241 contained no temporal limitation on the application of the aggravated felony ground for deportation. As it turns out, however, it does not matter whether IMMAct  602(c) should be read to refer to the pre-IMMAct or the post-IMMAct version of  241(a). Contrary to Lettman 's supposition, the answer to that question has no bearing on whether the ADAA's temporal limitation survived the IMMAct's passage. The key to the BIA's mistake is this: ADAA  7344(b) was never part of the text of INA  241 at all. True, ADAA  7344( a ) provided: Section 241(a)(4) [of the INA] (8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)) is amended ÔÇö(2) by inserting after the semicolon [the aggravated felony ground for deportation]. But the text of ADAA  7344 ( b ), unlike subsection (a), contained no reference to INA  241, or to its codified version, 8 U.S.C.  1251. Instead,  7344(b) reads only: The amendments made by subsection (a) [of ADAA  7344] shall apply to any alien who has been convicted, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, of an aggravated felony. [9] In other words, ADAA  7344(b) was never a subsection of INA  241. Instead, it was always an entirely freestanding temporal limitation provision. As a result, neither the except clause of IMMAct  602(c) (Except as otherwise specifically provided in such section and subsection (d)....), nor the affirmative provision of  602(c)'s second sentence (... the provisions of such section, as amended by this section, shall apply to all aliens described in subsection (a) thereof), can describe the fate of ADAA  7344(b), because  7344(b) was never in such section, pre- or post-IMMAct. Thus, whichever version of INA  241 the except clause and the affirmative language of IMMAct  602(c) refer to, neither reference to such section refers to  7344(b) or tells us whether  7344(b) was alive or dead after the enactment of the IMMAct. Lettman is therefore not entitled to Chevron deference, as its reasoning cannot be squared with the actual statute. [10]
Although the BIA's premises were incorrect, we might still reach the same conclusion if the IMMAct  602(c) impliedly repealed the pertinent ADAA provision. If, as here, the presumption against implied repeal definitively resolves the critical statutory interpretation question, we do not under Chevron defer to a contrary agency interpretation, because, once the presumption is applied, the statute is not ambiguous. See generally Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 749 (9th Cir. 2000); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n. 45, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (We only defer, however, to agency interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal `tools of statutory construction,' are ambiguous. Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, there is, for Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve.) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778; other citations omitted). And here, when the canon militating against implied repeal is fully and correctly applied, it becomes clear that there is no statutory ambiguity to resolve here, and thus no reason to defer to the agency. Properly analyzed, the statute is not susceptible to multiple readings from among which the BIA could choose a reasonable one. In these circumstances, as directed by Chevron 's step one, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, we decide this case ourselves. We do not, as would the dissent, apply Chevron step two deference to a BIA interpretation of a statutory provision that, applying ordinary interpretation precepts, admits of only one apparent and unambiguous meaning. See Dissent at 5047-48. Our question thus becomes whether  7344(b) of the 1988 Act was impliedly repealed. Applying the extremely strict standards for finding an implied repeal, we conclude that it was not. As the Supreme Court has had the occasion to remind us recently, repeals by implication are not favored and will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal is clear and manifest. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662, 127 S.Ct. 2518 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). There are narrow circumstances in which implied repeals will be recognized, however. Broadly speaking, [i]t is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum, unless the later statute expressly contradicts the original act or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary in order that the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548-49, 108 S.Ct. 1372, 99 L.Ed.2d 618 (1988) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). More specifically, the Supreme Court has recognized two well-settled categories of repeals by implicationÔÇö(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict ...; and (2) [where] the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154, 96 S.Ct. 1989, 48 L.Ed.2d 540 (1976). Under either rubric, we cannot conclude that a later statute impliedly repeals an earlier one unless `the intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.'  Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662, 127 S.Ct. 2518 (alterations in original) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)). And such an intention is not clear and manifest simply because the two statutes produce differing results when applied to the same factual situation. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155, 96 S.Ct. 1989. [T]hat, the Supreme Court has pronounced, no more than states the problem. Rather, `when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts ... to regard each as effective.' Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974)) (ellipsis in original). Applying these principles, [b]oth this court and the Supreme Court have found no [implied repeal] where, by creating minor exceptions to later-enacted statutes based on earlier ones, both statutes can be preserved. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 744. In Donaldson v. United States, 653 F.2d 414 (9th Cir.1981), for example, we characterized as a small puncture in a broad shield the relationship between an earlier statute regarding resort owners' liability and a later statute that applied to all real property owners. Id. at 418. Although the two statutes conflicted on their face, we reconciled them by allowing the earlier statute to serve as a narrow exception to the later one. Similarly, Lujan-Armendariz preserved a provision in the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA) as an exception to a later law that defined the term conviction for immigration purposes. The FFOA provision allowed courts to sentence the defendant in a manner that prevents him from suffering any disability imposed by law on account of the finding of guilt. 222 F.3d at 735. The immigration law would otherwise have conflicted with the FFOA. But we held that the earlier statute was not irreconcilable with the latterÔÇöand thus not impliedly repealedÔÇöbecause to resolve the conflict between the two, [w]e need[ed] only construe the later-enacted immigration law as subject to the minor exception required by the provisions of the earlier-enacted [FFOA]. Id. at 745; see also id. at 744-45 (discussing similar analysis in Radzanower and NLRB v. Kolkka, 170 F.3d 937 (9th Cir.1999)). Applying these precepts, ADAA  7344 and IMMAct  602(c) meet neither implied repeal standard.
It is quite evident that IMMAct  602(c) is a more general statutory provision than ADAA  7344(b). IMMAct  602(c) directs generally that revised INA  241 applies without regard to whether the facts, by reason of which an alien is described as removable in [INA  241], occurred prior to IMMAct's enactment. But it does not specifically cover the impact of convictions for crimes generally, or the impact of pre-1988 convictions in particular. ADAA  7344(b), in contrast, narrowly and expressly covered both of these considerations, and, even more narrowly, did so with regard to the aggravated felony ground of deportation only. True, when applied after 1990 to pre-ADAA aggravated felony convictions, the affirmative provision of IMMAct  602(c), which covers all of INA  241, could, read literally, produce [a] differing result when applied to the same factual situation as ADAA  7344(b). Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155, 96 S.Ct. 1989. That is, with the except clause out of the picture, IMMAct  602(c), on its face, could be read to allow deportation for such convictions, while ADAA  7344(b) would not. But, as Radzanower teaches, that ... states the [implied repeal] problem but does not resolve it. Id. at 155, 96 S.Ct. 1989. To resolve the problem, Radzanower and its progeny inform us, we must consider whether, like the preexisting narrow statutes at issue in Lujan-Armendariz and other cases, the earlier and narrower statutory provision hereÔÇöADAA  7344(b)ÔÇömust be construed as a minor exception to the very general language of the later statutory provisionÔÇöIMMAct  602(c). We determine that it must, for several reasons. First, construing ADAA  7344(b) as an exception to the broad reach of IMMAct  602(c) would certainly be a small puncture in a broad shield. Donaldson, 653 F.2d at 418. ADAA  7344(b) addresses only one of many categories of deportable offenses. Aggravated felony convictions constitute one of the approximately thirty grounds for deportation and fourteen categories of deportable criminal offenses that IMMAct  602(a) listed. Further, with the passage of time, the pool of otherwise deportable aliens who committed pre-ADAA aggravated feloniesÔÇöalready a small percentage of all deportable aggravated felonsÔÇöwill continue to shrink. Second, nothing in the text of the IMMAct indicates a clear intention, Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 153, 96 S.Ct. 1989, to apply the broad language of IMMAct  602(c) so as to repeal the very precise, narrow directive of ADAA  7344(b). Nor does anything in the text preclude interpreting ADAA  7344(b) as a narrow exception to IMMAct  602. The except clause of  602(c) shows that Congress anticipated some tension between IMMAct  602(c) and INA  241, but, without more, we cannot conclude that this clause shows the requisite congressional intent to repeal a separate provision specifically addressing retroactivity of a small subset of deportation grounds, ADAA  7344(b). [11] Third, when ADAA  7344(b) was enacted, INA  241 already contained a provision nearly identical to the second sentence of IMMAct  602(c). INA  241(d), 8 U.S.C.  1251(d) (1982), provided: Except as otherwise specifically provided in this section, the provisions of this section shall be applicable to all aliens belonging to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, notwithstanding (1) that any such alien entered the United States prior to June 27, 1952, or (2) that the facts, by reason of which any such alien belongs to any of the classes enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, occurred prior to June 27, 1952. At the time of its enactment, ADAA  7344(b) unarguably presented an exception to former INA  241(d), even though it was not an exception specifically provided in this section because ADAA  7344(b) was a freestanding provision never incorporated in INA  241. IMMAct  602(c) performs essentially the same function as former INA  241(d). [12] As ADAA  7344(b) was a freestanding exception to former INA  241(d), then the similar language of IMMAct  602(c), making no mention whatever of ADAA  7344(b), should also be read as compatible with ADA  7344(b), rather than as doing away with that section sub silentio. Fourth, the legislative history of IMMAct  602 is of no additional assistance in demonstrating a clear and manifest intention to repeal ADAA  7344(b). The conference report on the IMMAct makes clear that IMMAct  602(a) was to replace the former INA  241(a) by updating the grounds for deportation and `consolidat[ing]... related grounds in order to make the law more rational and easy to understand.' Matter of Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 371 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-955, at 119, 128 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6793). But neither that conference report nor any other legislative history document we have found discusses IMMAct  602(c) in any regard, or reports the intended effect of the IMMAct on ADAA  7344(b) or similar provisions. Compare Novak, 476 F.3d at 1051-52 (concluding that a statute impliedly repealed another in part because the legislative history showed Congress was aware of the potential conflict between the two laws when the later statute was passed). Fifth and finally, when other provisions of the IMMAct are taken into account, it becomes apparent that Congress did not intend to repeal ADAA  7344(b), because doing so would have produced exceedingly odd results. See generally Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 402 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 2449, 101 L.Ed.2d 352 (1988) (courts should strive to avoid attributing absurd designs to Congress). The peculiar outcome we must strive to avoid would result from the interaction of IMMAct  602(c) and IMMAct  501, which amended the definition of the term aggravated felony. [13] Section 501 broadened the definition of the term aggravated felony by, inter alia, adding certain controlled substance trafficking crimes and crimes of violence to the list of qualifying crimes in INA  101(a)(43). IMMAct  501(a), 104 Stat. at 5048. So, like the ADAA, the IMMAct treated the definition of aggravated felony as distinct from the aggravated felony ground for deportation. The IMMAct also separately specified the temporal reach of the new definition: IMMAct  501(b) provided that four of the six amendments added by  501, including the addition of crimes of violence, would apply only to offenses committed on or after the date of the enactment of [the IMMAct]. 104 Stat. at 5048. Two other amendments, including addition of certain controlled substance trafficking offenses, applied as if they had been included in the ADAA's 1988 definition of aggravated felony. Id. Section 501(b)'s reference to the ADAA indicates that Congress considered  7344(b) of that Act as continuing in force. Were  7344(b) impliedly repealed by IMMAct, the provision in IMMAct itself specifying that certain of the amendments contained in  501(a) would be effective as if included in the enactment of section 7342 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 would be pointless. For, if IMMAct  602(c) in fact eliminated ADAA  7344(b), the pivotal provision in the 1988 Act concerning the temporal impact of the aggravated felony definition would no longer exist, and there would be no reason to refer in IMMAct to the ADAA, rather than to  602(c) of IMMAct itself, as the source of effective date provisions concerning amendments to the aggravated felony definition. [14] Moreover, if  501(b) is read as having incorporated the temporal limitations of the ADAA with regard only to some of the IMMAct's definitional amendments, that reading would produce exceedingly peculiar results: For aliens who committed money laundering and crimes of violenceÔÇö first defined as aggravated felonies in IMMAct  501(a)ÔÇöthe new aggravated felony definition would apply prospectively, so that only aliens who committed such crimes after IMMAct's passage in 1990 could be deported as aggravated felons. But aliens who committed the controlled substance or state law offenses referenced in IMMAct  501(b) before 1988, like aliens who committed aggravated felonies included in the ADAA but were convicted prior to the ADAA's passage, would suddenly become deportable with the enactment of the IMMAct. Such a reading would mean that the IMMAct, for no apparent reason, protected from deportation some, but not all, aggravated felons who committed crimes before the aggravated felony ground of deportation was created. This division would make no sense. Instead, in light of IMMAct  501(b)'s reference to the ADAA, and  501(b)'s apparent purpose to limit the instances in which criminal aliens were retroactively categorized as deportable, it becomes evident that the 1990 Congress intended generally to preserve the ADAA's determination that an aggravated felon would be deportable as such only if convicted of the crime in question, at the earliest, after November 18, 1988ÔÇöthat is, after conviction of an aggravated felony became a deportable offense. The dissent argues that the BIA read IMMAct  602(c) as part of a `wholesale revision of 8 U.S.C.  1251 [INA  241], a new statutory scheme, embracing `comprehensive changes,' Dissent at 1082 (quoting Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 374)ÔÇöand thus, as a repeal by way of complete substitution, which is not the sort of implied repeal that is discouraged by our presumption. Id. at 1083 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 663, 127 S.Ct. 2518). The dissent's view of the BIA opinion as properly resting on a complete substitution implied repeal theory and as therefore entitled to deference cannot be right, for three reasons. First, the BIA stated in Lettman that its reading of  602(c)  comports with our understanding that the purpose of  602 of the 1990 Act was to completely revise the deportation grounds. Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 372 (emphasis added). That is, it came to its reading of  602(c) quite apart from the complete revision rationale, namely because it considered  602(c)'s reference to INA  241(a) to encompass ADAA  7344(b) expressly. The BIA never directly addressed the presumption against implied repeals before settling upon its interpretation of  602(c). As we have already shown, ADAA  7344(b) was never a part of INA  241, so whatever the BIA believed about  602(a) being intended to replace former section 241(a) (1998) in its entirety, Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 371, such a complete replacement would not directly have affected the meaning of  602(c). Second, even taking the BIA's decision on its own terms as the dissent suggests we should and presuming that the BIA regarded IMMAct  602(c) as a complete revision of the deportation provisions of the INA, the BIA's statutory construction in Matter of Lettman was not well within the general principles applicable to implied repeals. See Dissent at 5045. Matter of Lettman stated that there would be no point in enacting a new statutory scheme if the intent was to keep the former version of the law in control whenever there was a difference between the old and the new. We cannot conclude that this was the intention of Congress. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 374. The BIA's reasoning, and the dissent's attempt to portray Lettman as properly applying the demanding requirements for an implied repeal, do not work. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 56 S.Ct. 349, 80 L.Ed. 351 (1936) explains: The cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored. Where there are two acts upon the same subject, effect should be given to both if possible. There are two well-settled categories of repeals by implicationÔÇö(1) where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act[.] Id. at 503, 56 S.Ct. 349 (emphasis added). As we have shown extensively, IMMAct was by no means clearly intended to repeal the ADAA generally, and the dissent fails to identify any clear and manifest congressional intent to do so. Instead, the dissent is forced to infer[ ] a repeal, see Dissent, 1083, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive not to infer a statutory repeal unless the later statute expressly contradicts the original act or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary ... in order that the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 662, 127 S.Ct. 2518 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Boardmember Rosenberg, dissenting from the majority decision in Matter of Lettman, showed at length why the IMMAct did not replace the aggravated felony provisions of the ADAA, but only redesignated them. 22 I. & N. Dec. at 389-93, 396-97 (Rosenberg, dissenting). [15] Moreover, Matter of Lettman does not discuss IMMAct  501(b) and so does not recognize the inconsistency between that section and a wholesale revision implied repeal theory. Third, Chevron does not apply here in the first place. As explained above, if reading the statutory language in light of the presumption against implied repeals resolves any potential ambiguity, Chevron deference has no role to play. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749; St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 320 n. 45, 121 S.Ct. 2271. For all these reasons, we conclude that IMMAct  602(c) did not repeal ADAA  7344(b).
The effective date provision in the following subsection, IMMAct  602(d), does not serve to overcome the presumption against implied repeal either. That section is fully consistent with interpreting ADAA  7344(b)'s specific mandate that the aggravated felony ground of deportation is not retroactive as a minor exception to IMMAct  602(c)'s general retroactivity provision. IMMAct  602(d) states that  602's amendments to INA  241 shall not apply to deportation proceedings for which notice has been provided to the alien before March 1, 1991. The Second Circuit in Bell held that  602(d) directs that the grounds for deportation in  602(a) apply to all aliens who received notice on or after March 1, 1991. See Bell, 218 F.3d at 94. [16] But this mode of interpreting an effective date provision has been definitively rejected. As the Supreme Court held in St. Cyr, a `statement that a statute will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.' St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 317, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 257, 114 S.Ct. 1483). Thus, a simple effective date provision cannot impliedly repeal all previous temporal limitations on the application of grounds of deportability.
In sum, application of the implied repeal doctrine demands that we interpret  602 as leaving the temporal limitation on the aggravated felony ground of deportation intact. We therefore need not consider Ledezma-Galicia's argument that the BIA's interpretation also violates our presumption against retroactively applied statutes. See generally Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (describing the presumption against retroactivity); Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1156 (concluding, in a related context, that the Landgraf presumption did not apply to IMMAct  602, because  602(c) represented an express statement that IMMAct  602(a) should be applied retroactively); see also Bell, 218 F.3d at 93-94 (concluding that Matter of Lettman was unreasonable because it failed to take into account the Landgraf presumption against retroactively applied statutes). We do, however, address the government's concern that our analysis today is foreclosed by our previous applications of IMMAct  602(c).
We previously considered IMMAct  602(c) in Hovsepian and Yacoubian. These cases concerned two aliens who were convicted at trial of destructive device offenses in 1984, prior to enactment of the ADAA. At that time, the convictions would not have rendered the aliens deportable under the firearms category of offenses. In 1988, however, the ADAA, in addition to defining the term aggravated felony and designating aggravated felonies as a category of deportable offense, amended INA  241(a) to expand the list of firearms and destructive device convictions that could serve as a basis for deportation. See ADAA  7348(a). [17] At the same time, in language identical to that of ADAA  7344(b), ADAA  7348(b) limited the amendment to the firearms ground to convictions on or after the ADAA's enactment. Despite that temporal limitation, we have twice held that IMMAct  602(c) rendered aliens deportable based on their pre-ADAA convictions. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d at 1156-57; Yacoubian, 24 F.3d at 6-7. Because of the similarity between the ADAA temporal limitation at issue in Hovsepian and Yacoubian and ADAA  7344(b), at issue here, those cases inform our analysis today. But they do not control our resolution of Ledezma-Galicia's petition, because the ADAA and the IMMAct treated the offenses at issue in Hovsepian and Yacoubian differently from aggravated felonies in a critical respect. In INA  241(a), which lists the grounds for deportation, the ADAA inserted only a reference to aggravated felony convictions generally; it did not further define the term aggravated felony. [18] Then, the ADAA inserted into the INA's definitional section, see INA  101(a) (8 U.S.C.  1101(a)), a definition of the term aggravated felony. For firearms offenses, in contrast, the ADAA made no such structural division, but instead inserted into INA  241(a)(14) directly an expanded list of firearms the illegal possession of which would render an alien deportable. The IMMAct continued the ADAA's distinct structural treatment of the aggravated felony and firearm categories of deportable offenses. Like the ADAA, the IMMAct amended the aggravated felony definition in INA  101, while continuing to reference only the term aggravated felony in INA  241(a), the statutory list of grounds for deportation. By contrast, the IMMAct once again broadened the category of deportable firearms offenses by amending INA  241(a) directly. As a result of this distinction, there was no need for a provision of the IMMAct pertinent to firearms offenses that is parallel to  501 of that statute, [19] and there is none. These two related structural distinctions between the aggravated felony and firearms categories of offenses are critical here. Combined, they explain why the implied repeal question in Hovsepian and Yacoubian was fundamentally different from the one we decide today: First, because there is no IMMAct provision applicable to firearms offenses that is parallel to IMMAct  501(b), no peculiar result has ensued from our holding that the IMMAct repealed ADAA  7348(b), regarding firearms deportations. As we have seen, because of IMMAct  501(b), an implied repeal of ADAA  7344(b), with respect to pre-ADAA aggravated felony convictions covered by the ADAA but not by the IMMAct, would mean that some aggravated felons could be deported for convictions that occurred before aggravated felony convictions were made a ground for deportation, while others could not, for no discernible reason. But the implied repeal of ADAA  7348(b), regarding firearms deportations, creates no comparably odd outcome. The IMMAct did not include a separate temporal reach provision governing firearms convictions that is in tension with IMMAct  602(c). Second, IMMAct  602(a) substantiallyÔÇöand substantivelyÔÇöchanged the firearms ground for deportability from the version contained in the ADAA. [20] In doing so, the BIA concluded, IMMAct  602(a) enact[ed] ... a new statutory provision that completely supersedes all former versions of that [firearms] deportation ground. Matter of Chow, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 650 (emphasis added). In other words, IMMAct  602(a) made ADAA  7348(b), regarding the deportation consequences of certain pre-ADAA firearms convictions, no longer applicable at all, working a complete revision of the firearms ground for deportation. [21] In contrast, IMMAct  602(a) changed only the statutory placement of the aggravated felony ground within INA  241(a), but made no change to the substance of the aggravated felony ground for deportation. Compare 8 U.S.C.  1251(a)(4)(B) (1988) (Any alien in the United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be deported whoÔÇö... (4) ... (B) is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after entry) with 8 U.S.C.  1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1988 Supp. II) (Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after entry is deportable). So the complete revision implied repeal theory was applicable in Hovsepian and Yacoubian, but is not applicable here. See also Matter of Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 389-90 (Rosenberg, dissenting) (explaining that with section 602(a) of the 1990 Act Congress only changed the numerical designation of some deportation grounds, while with others, such as that governing firearms violations, it completely substituted the text of the new section for that of the former section (internal citations omitted)). To summarize: For pre-ADAA aggravated felonies, our implied repeal analysis is informed by considerations quite different from those relevant to pre-ADAA firearms offenses. We hold that unlike ADAA  7348(b), regarding pre-ADAA firearms offenses, ADAA  7344(b), regarding pre-ADAA aggravated felonies, survived the IMMAct.