Opinion ID: 2632884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Error in Excusing Prospective Juror Maria R.

Text: Defendant first argues the court erred in excusing for cause Prospective Juror Maria R. because of her stated aversion to the death penalty. (See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) He claims excluding Maria R. as a potential juror deprived him of his right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) Defendant also claims the exclusion violated his rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination. (U.S. Const., 5th, 8th & 14th Amends.) The record shows that, to evaluate prospective jurors' ability to serve in the case, the court required them to complete a questionnaire that asked their views regarding the death penalty. Maria R. answered that she did not believe in the death penalty and could never vote for the death penalty even if someone were convicted of murder with special circumstances. She also answered yes, however, to a question asking whether she could set aside her feelings against the death penalty when the court instructed her to do so. Both the prosecution and defense moved to exclude for cause various prospective jurors solely on the basis of their questionnaire responses. Maria R. was among those whom the prosecutor challenged for cause. The defense observed that Maria R. indicated she could set aside her feelings about the death penalty. The court, without conducting voir dire of Maria R., nonetheless excused her, observing that, not only did she express strong views against the death penalty, but she also admitted that victim photographs would strongly affect and anger her, and that she would automatically accept the opinions of various professional medical experts. Defendant now argues that the court erred in failing to conduct voir dire to clarify Maria R.'s views. The Attorney General responds that defendant waived the point by agreeing with the prosecutor that the court could resolve challenges for cause on the basis of the questionnaire responses alone. We first address the claim of waiver or forfeiture. The record shows that the court asked whether, in addition to prospective jurors both parties agreed should be excused, are there others that there's going to be a challenge for cause that you're willing to submit on the questionnaires? Defense Counsel Goldstein acknowledged that he had agreed with the prosecutor to submit on the questionnaire challenges for cause to certain prospective jurors, and the court clarified that, although the parties could discuss these challenges with the court in chambers, they would be thereby waiving your right to any further questioning.... The court also noted that if it denied any such challenges, counsel could later question the prospective jurors in voir dire if their names were called. Both defense counsel and prosecutor expressly agreed to this procedure. After the defense's challenges were discussed in chambers and were either granted, denied, withdrawn, or submitted on the questionnaires, the prosecutor's challenges were similarly discussed, including the challenge to Maria R. (also referred to as Juror No. 116). Defense counsel, after simply noting that Maria R. had indicated in her questionnaire that she could set aside her beliefs against the death penalty, agreed to submit it without requesting further voir dire. The court then asked defense counsel, [o]n this one specifically, you're agreeing to submit it at this point on the questionnaire without any additional clarifying questions? Defense counsel replied, yes. The court then discussed Maria R.'s questionnaire responses and indicated that it would grant the challenge for cause for the reasons started above. Defense counsel made no comment. Therefore, we agree with the Attorney General that defendant has forfeited his right to complain of the court's failure to interrogate Maria R. further on voir dire. Defense counsel repeatedly agreed to let the court decide the challenge solely on the basis of the questionnaire responses. In that regard, the present case is distinguishable from People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271, on which defendant relies. There, we reversed a penalty judgment because the trial court, acting without the parties' prior agreement, granted several prosecution challenges for cause solely on the basis of the questionnaire responses, despite the court's earlier assurances that it would conduct further oral voir dire to address any ambiguous responses, and despite the defendant's repeated objections to the procedure the court used. ( Id. at p. 452, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Here, perhaps in the interest of accelerating the normally slow jury selection process, both parties, through their counsel, agreed to submit challenges for cause on the basis of the questionnaire responses, following argument in chambers. Although this procedure may sometimes result in the exclusion of prospective jurors whose ambiguous responses might be clarified on voir dire, we see no legal impediment to such procedure. Capital defendants are permitted to waive the most crucial of rights, including the rights to counsel, to a jury trial, to offer a guilt phase defense, and to be present at various stages of trial. (E.g., People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 61, 255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109, and cases cited.) And counsel, as captain of the ship, maintains complete control of defense tactics and strategies, except that the defendant retains a few fundamental personal rights. (E.g., In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95, 284 Cal.Rptr. 305, 813 P.2d 1335.) In order to address the merits of defendant's contention, we have reviewed the record de novo to determine whether the trial court had sufficient information regarding Maria R.'s state of mind to permit it to reliably determine whether her views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties in this case. ( People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) In People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 532, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076, we upheld a trial court order excusing Prospective Juror O.D., whose questionnaire answers showed he could never impose the death penalty even though he also responded that he could set aside his personal feelings and follow the law. The questionnaire before us presents a similar dichotomy. In her questionnaire, Maria R. answered that she did not believe in the death penalty, that she felt the death penalty was imposed randomly, that she generally would strongly recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, and that she could never vote for the death penalty even if someone were convicted of murder with special circumstances. Significantly, with regard to question No. 48 of the jury questionnaire, Maria R. unequivocally answered no to the following question: It is alleged that two deaths occurred in a single incident. Depending upon all of the circumstances of this case and the evidence to be presented in the penalty phase, if any, could you consider as a realistic and practical possibility ... [i]imposing the death penalty in such a case. (Capitalization and emphasis omitted.) Maria R. answered yes, however, to a question asking whether she could set aside her feelings against the death penalty when the court instructed her to do so and follow the court's instructions. Although Maria R. stated that, in the abstract, she could put her feelings about the death penalty aside and follow the court's instructions, she repeatedly expressed her unequivocal opposition to the death penalty and specifically stated her unequivocal refusal to consider the possibility of imposing the death penalty in a case in which two deaths occurred in a single incident. Her answer to question No. 48 revealed that, regardless what the evidence would show at trial or at the penalty phase and regardless what instructions she would receive, Maria R. could not consider the possibility of imposing the death penalty in the instant case. Having reviewed all relevant responses in Maria R.'s questionnaire, we find that, when taken together, her views, as expressed in her answers to the jury questionnaire, would have prevented or substantially impaired her from performing her duties in this particular case. ( People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 445, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err by excusing Maria R. for cause based on her responses to the jury questionnaire.