Opinion ID: 785549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counting Past Convictions

Text: 16 Cline also argues that the district court erred in computing Cline's criminal history score, by counting past convictions which may have been uncounseled. Cline appears to contend that, in order to legitimately rely on the convictions listed in paragraphs 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, and 113 of the presentence investigation report, the district court was required to find that Cline was represented by counsel, or explicitly waived his right to counsel, in each case. Cline cites Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967) for the principle that [p]resuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible. Id. at 114-15. 17 The United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), remarking that [a]t the time the prior conviction at issue in Burgett was entered, state criminal defendants' federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet been recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the defendant had not waived a right he did not possess. Parke reaffirmed the application of a presumption of regularity to state court proceedings, even as to the waiver of counsel, and Cline cites no precedent to support his contention that said presumption does not apply in this matter. 18 In relying on this presumption to compute Cline's criminal history score, the district court did not err.