Opinion ID: 2823789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Public Trial and Andersonâs Waiver Principle

Text: Â¶7Â Â Â Â Â Â Both the United States and the Colorado Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, Â§ 16. It is well settled that a criminal defendantâs constitutional right to a public trial extends to the jury selection process. Presley, 558 U.S. at 213. Under Waller, the public trial right is violated when a defendant objects to a closure and the court does not satisfy the four factors of the Waller test. 467 U.S. at 48. Such a violation is structural error that requires automatic reversal without individualized prejudice analysis. 2 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (noting that âwe have found an error to be âstructural,â and thus subject to automatic reversal, only in a very limited class of cases,âÂ and citing Waller as including denial of public trial within the class of structural errors (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, Â¶ 10, 288 P.3d 116, 119 (â[C]ertain errors are structural errors, which require automatic reversal without individualized analysis of how the error impairs the reliability of the judgment of conviction. Examples of these errors include . . . denial of the right to a public trial.â (citations omitted)); People v. Hassen, 2015 CO 49, Â¶ 18, __ P.3d __ (stating that â[w]hen the trial court closes the courtroom over a defendantâs objection, it must satisfy the four Waller factors,â then determining that the factors were not satisfied and thus remanding for a new trial) . Nevertheless, the right to a public trial is not absolute, but rather âmay give way . . . to other rights or interestsâ even over a defendantâs objection. Waller, 467 U.S. at 45; id. at 48 (describing four factors that must be met to close the courtroom over a defendantâs objection). Â¶8Â Â Â Â Â Â Furthermore, even fundamental rights can be waived, regardless of whether the deprivation thereof would otherwise constitute structural error. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991) (âThe most basic rights of criminal defendants are . . . subject to waiver.â). âWhether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures are required for waiver; and whether the defendantâs choice must be particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.â United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). Here, we examine the particularities of the public trial right. Â¶9Â Â Â Â Â Â Under Anderson, a defendant affirmatively waives his public trial right when he does not object to a known closure. 490 P.2d at 48. In that case, we considered a factualÂ scenario almost identical to that before us nowâthe whole spectator area of the courtroom was needed to seat the jury pool, and the bailiff restricted access so as to âsegregate prospective jurors from witnesses, relatives, and other individuals whose proximity, conversation, or actions might cause the jury to be contaminated to the prejudice of the defendant or the prosecution.â Id. On these facts, we held that âany right the defendant may have had to object to the exclusion of the public from the courtroom during the selection of the jury was waivedâ when defense counsel did not object despite being aware of the closure. Id. This has been the law in Colorado since we decided Anderson in 1971. See, e.g., People v. Dunlap, 124 P.3d 780, 818â19 (Colo. App. 2004) (applying Andersonâs waiver principle). Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â Â Therefore, because Stackhouse was aware of the closure and did not object to it, Anderson would appear to resolve his appeal. 3 Stackhouse argues, however, thatÂ Anderson is no longer valid in light of more recent Supreme Court authority. We now address this contention.