Opinion ID: 2508761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Value of the Letter

Text: Brandt contends the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict as the State failed to present evidence that the value of the forged letter was $5,000 or more. In explaining his denial of Brandt's motion for a directed verdict, the trial judge stated, I think there is value in the case in excess of $5,000 under the testimony of Mr. Richter and Professor Freeman. We find the judge erred in considering the value of the fraudulent document in the context of a directed verdict motion. As will be discussed, the determination of the value of a forged document is not an element of the offense of forgery. Instead, it should only be a consideration for sentencing purposes after a person has been convicted of forgery. Section 16-13-10, the code section that outlines the offense of forgery, consists of two subsections. As previously discussed, subsection A outlines the elements of forgery. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-10(A)(2) (2003) (It is unlawful for a person to utter or publish as true any false, forged, or counterfeited writing or instrument of writing.). In conjunction, subsection B outlines the penalties that must be imposed on one who is convicted of forgery. Specifically, this subsection provides in relevant part: A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of a: (1) felony and, upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both, if the amount of the forgery is five thousand dollars or more. . . . If the forgery does not involve a dollar amount, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-13-10(B)(1) (2003) (emphasis added). [9] On its face, the Edisto Farm letter does not involve a dollar amount. Moreover, the evidence presented by the State regarding any amount was purely speculative as the testimony indicated the letter would have increased the value of Brandt's claim against Gooding substantially more than $5,000 and increased Brandt's probability of winning the lawsuit that would have resulted in damages in excess of $5,000. We find this evidence is insufficient to establish a dollar amount. In the absence of a dollar amount, we hold that Brandt could have been found guilty only of a misdemeanor and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of three years or less, ordered to pay a fine, or both. Based on the foregoing, we find the State presented sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's decision to submit the charge of forgery to the jury. However, because there was insufficient evidence to establish a dollar amount of the Edisto Farm letter, we reverse Brandt's felony sentence. Accordingly, we remand for the circuit court to sentence Brandt for a misdemeanor forgery conviction. See State v. Brown, 360 S.C. 581, 597-98, 602 S.E.2d 392, 401 (2004) (holding that when a conviction is reversed due to insufficient evidence, an appellate court may remand a case for sentencing on a lesser-included offense after the court considers the following six factors: (1) the evidence adduced at trial fails to support one or more elements of the crime of which appellant was convicted; (2) the jury was explicitly instructed it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense and was properly instructed on the elements of that offense; (3) the record on appeal contains sufficient evidence supporting each element of the lesser-included offense; (4) the State seeks a sentencing remand on appeal; (5) the defendant will not be unduly or unfairly prejudiced; and (6) the Court is convinced justice will be served by such a result after carefully considering the record as well as the interests and concerns of both the defendant and the victim of the crime).
Brandt claims the trial judge erred in denying the following request to charge: A document whose sole value is its potential use in a civil lawsuit does not have sufficient `legal efficacy' to support a forgery charge. In reviewing jury charges for error, we must consider the court's jury charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial. State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 318, 577 S.E.2d 460, 463 (Ct.App.2003). A jury charge is correct if, when the charge is read as a whole, it contains the correct definition and adequately covers the law. Id. at 318, 577 S.E.2d at 464. A jury charge which is substantially correct and covers the law does not require reversal. State v. Foust, 325 S.C. 12, 479 S.E.2d 50 (1996). [T]he trial court is required to charge only the current and correct law of South Carolina. Sheppard v. State, 357 S.C. 646, 665, 594 S.E.2d 462, 472 (2004). The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial. State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 302, 555 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2001). The substance of the law is what must be charged to the jury, not any particular verbiage. Adkins, 353 S.C. at 318-19, 577 S.E.2d at 464. A request to charge a correct statement of the law on an issue raised by the indictment and the evidence presented at trial should not be refused. State v. Austin, 299 S.C. 456, 458, 385 S.E.2d 830, 831 (1989). However, if the trial judge refuses to give a specific charge, there is no error if the charge actually given sufficiently covers the substance of the request. Id. `It is error for the trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction which states a sound principle of law when that principle applies to the case at hand, and the principle is not otherwise included in the charge.' State v. Williams, 367 S.C. 192, 195, 624 S.E.2d 443, 445 (Ct.App.2005) (quoting Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 390, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000)). If there is any evidence to support a charge, the trial court should grant the request. Williams, 367 S.C. at 195, 624 S.E.2d at 445. To warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010). A trial judge's failure to give requested jury instructions is not prejudicial error where the instructions given afford the proper test for determining the issues. Id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 583-84. An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 479, 697 S.E.2d at 584. Brandt's argument is merely a continuation of his argument regarding the denial of his motion for a directed verdict on the ground the letter lacked legal efficacy. As previously discussed, we disagree with Brandt's overly-narrow construction of this term. To establish the legal efficacy of a forged document, the State was only required to show that the letter had the potential to prejudice or damage the intended victim. Furthermore, our appellate courts, as previously cited, have upheld forgery convictions where the forged document was used as evidence in a civil trial. Viewing the judge's charge as a whole, we find it sufficiently covered this element. First, the judge properly instructed the jury on the elements of forgery by using the statutory language of section 16-13-10. Secondly, the judge explained each of the elements individually. Finally, the judge charged the legal efficacy element as follows: To constitute forgery, it is [essential] that a falsely made or altered instrument [possess] some apparent legal [efficacy]; otherwise, it would have no tendency to defraud. As long as a forged instrument is the apparent foundation of legal liability, the instrument need not be complete [in] all its particulars to amount to forgery, and any writing that may defraud or prejudice another, or that, if genuine, would have legal effect and operate as the foundation of another man's liability may be the subject of forgery. It is sufficient if the forged documents, believed to be genuine, might have operated to the prejudice of another. The judge's charge accurately reflects this state's current law regarding the offense of forgery. In fact, the text of the charge tracks the language in Lee-Grigg, the case primarily relied upon by Brandt. Lee-Grigg, 374 S.C. at 402, 649 S.E.2d at 48. Thus, the judge's denial of Brandt's request to charge does not warrant reversal as the charge as a whole afforded the jury the proper test for determining the issues presented at trial.
Brandt contends the trial judge erred in refusing to grant his motion for a new trial where the evidence failed to establish the Edisto Farm letter had legal efficacy and was valued at $5,000 or more. In support of this contention, Brandt reiterates his arguments regarding the trial judge's denial of his motion for a directed verdict. As previously discussed, the State presented sufficient evidence that the forged letter possessed legal efficacy as there was testimony establishing the prejudicial and damaging effect of the letter to Gooding. Furthermore, the value of the Edisto Farm letter did not affect Brandt's conviction. Thus, any lack of evidence as to its value would not have warranted the grant of a new trial to Brandt. Instead, as we previously ruled, the value of the forged document was only relevant for sentencing purposes. Accordingly, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Brandt's motion for a new trial. See State v. Johnson, 376 S.C. 8, 11, 654 S.E.2d 835, 836 (2007) (recognizing that a trial judge has the discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial, and his decision will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion).