Opinion ID: 2286059
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appeal of the Drive Entrance Permit

Text: [¶ 28] Webster and Platz contend that, because the court dismissed their claim for lack of standing, the court never reached the merits of their appeal of the City of Auburn's decision to grant a drive entrance permit to Tim Morse. They contend that, if the court had determined that they had standing, it would have found merit in the question raised by their appeal: whether the permit required further review because the project is really a solid waste plant, not a truck terminal. Webster and Platz also contend that, because neither Morse Brothers nor MB Bagging was the applicant for the permit, neither may raise this appeal in their wrongful use of civil process complaint. [¶ 29] The tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings lies where: (1) one initiates, continues, or procures civil proceedings without probable cause, (2) with a primary purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based, and (3) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought. Palmer Dev. Corp. v. Gordon, 1999 ME 22, ¶ 4, 723 A.2d 881, 883 (quoting Pepperell Trust Co. v. Mountain Heir Fin. Corp., 1998 ME 46, ¶ 15, 708 A.2d 651, 656). Although we have not had the occasion to decide whether a dismissal for lack of standing constitutes a judgment in favor of the defendant, see Pepperell, ¶ 16, 708 A.2d at 656, we have held that [a] successful statute of limitations defense does not reflect on the merits of an action. Palmer, ¶ 11, 723 A.2d at 884. Other state courts have determined that a dismissal granted on procedural grounds does not constitute a judgment terminating proceedings in favor of the successful defendant. See, e.g., Rowen v. Holiday Pines Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 759 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2000) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a favorable termination because a court must first have jurisdiction over the action that it terminates); Sierra Club Found. v. Graham, 72 Cal.App.4th 1135, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 726, 734 (1999) (a favorable termination reflect[s] on the merits of the action and the plaintiff's innocence of the misconduct alleged.... If resolution of the underlying action leaves a residue of doubt about the plaintiff's innocence or liability, it is not a favorable termination sufficient to support a cause of action for malicious prosecution). [¶ 30] The court never addressed the merits of the appeal, and could not, therefore, determine whether the exercise of the right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law.... 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. The dismissal of Webster and Platz's appeal of the decision to grant a drive entrance permit does not constitute a termination in favor of Tim Morse for which the Morse group may allege the wrongful use of civil proceedings. Even if the decision did constitute a termination in favor of Tim Morse, however, the court's seven page decision and order on the motion to dismiss establishes that there was a bona fide issue regarding whether Webster and Platz had standing to appeal the decision based on their claim that the drive would, de facto, be an impermissible accessory use like the one prohibited by the court's decision in the Auburn site plan appeal. Because the pleadings and evidence presented by the Morse group are, as a matter of law, inadequate to establish that the drive entrance appeal terminated in its favor, the same pleadings and evidence are also insufficient to meet the burden imposed by 14 M.R.S.A. § 556. [¶ 31] The court committed legal error by concluding: (1) that the Poland site plan appeal lacked factual or legal support, (2) that the BEP appeal, which the court earlier found not to be frivolous, lacked any basis in fact or law, and (3) that the Morse group met its burden in the drive entrance appeal when the allegations and evidence do not even support a prima facia case for wrongful use of civil proceedings because the Morse group failed to establish that the proceeding terminated in its favor. [¶ 32] Because we have concluded that the Morse group's complaint should be dismissed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, we need not address Webster and Platz's additional arguments that MB Bagging lacked standing to raise the three appeals to which it was not a party, that Morse Brothers lacked standing to raise Tim Morse's drive entrance appeal, and that the Morse group suffered no actual injury. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to dismiss.