Opinion ID: 1732923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: tolling of the statute

Text: ¶ 11. While the Court is not at liberty to extend or modify statutory limitations, when a party is prohibited from exercising his right to proceed by circumstances which are clearly beyond his control and rise to such a dimension as to implicate due process and fundamental fairness, the Court may and should toll the limitations for the period of the impairment. Application of this limited equitable rule requires recognition that state post-conviction efforts, though collateral, have become part of the death penalty appeal process at the state level. Jackson, 732 So.2d at 191. An indigent inmate under a sentence of death is entirely dependent upon state-appointed counsel to pursue his post-conviction efforts. ¶ 12. Our sister state of Tennessee has recently addressed the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464 (Tenn.2001), under similar circumstances. There, Williams urged that the limitations for his post-conviction filing should be tolled due to his attorney's abandonment of his case without informing Williams. Distinguishing a judicial extension or alteration of the legislative act from equitable tolling for due process purposes, the Court remanded for a factual determination in the trial court, saying: We emphasize that under no circumstances are we allowing a petitioner to file an untimely application for permission to appeal with the belief that the one-year statute conviction would commence upon this Court's dismissal of that untimely application. As the dissent aptly states, filing an untimely application for permission to appeal to this Court does not constitute `an appeal' as that term is used in Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-202(a) and therefore does not delay commencement of the one-year post-conviction statute of limitations. Indeed, in this case, the statute of limitations began to run ... when the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Williams's conviction. The sole inquiry here, however, is whether this limitation period is tolled because of due process concerns surrounding possible attorney misrepresentation.... [The statute of limitations] gives defendants one year to file their petitions, and we are simply remanding the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine (1) whether due process tolled the statute of limitations so as to give the appellee a reasonable opportunity after the expiration of the limitations period to present his claim in a meaningful time and manner; and (2) if so, whether the appellee's filing of the post-conviction petition [after the statutory period had run] was within the reasonable opportunity afforded by the due process tolling. To summarily terminate his claim without further inquiry would be an abridgement of both direct and post-conviction avenues of appeal-without ever reaching the merits of the appell[ee's] case-[and] would be patently unfair. Crittenden v. State 978 S.W.2d 929 (Tenn.1998). .... In conclusion, the 1995 Post-Conviction Procedure Act clearly requires that post-conviction claims be filed in a timely manner. Although we agree that Williams filed his petition beyond the statutory deadline, due process considerations may have tolled the limitations period. Hence, the statute cannot be strictly applied without further inquiry, to deny him a reasonable opportunity to seek post-conviction relief. Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 471. See also Steele v. Kehoe, 747 So.2d 931 (Fla.1999) (affirming the district court of appeals and saying that due process entitles a defendant to belatedly file a post-conviction claim if his efforts were frustrated by his counsel's misleading conduct). ¶ 13. Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in post-conviction proceedings is likewise recognized in the federal system. Dunlap v. United States, 250 F.3d 1001, 1006 (6th Cir.2001). The doctrine should only be applied in rare and exceptional circumstances. Turner v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir.1999). The doctrine may be applied when a movant files in untimely fashion due to extraordinary circumstances which are both beyond his control and unavoidable even in the exercise of due diligence. Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir.1999). A showing of excusable neglect is insufficient, and a petitioner must show that he was prevented from asserting his right to relief. Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.1999). ¶ 14. Puckett brings to this Court's attention the facts that indicate without doubt that he has been prevented from filing his application through no fault or neglect on his part. On February 9, 2001, the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel contracted with Steve Presson of Norman, Oklahoma, to represent Puckett. Then, by order dated October 31, 2001, the Circuit Court of Forrest County declared Puckett to be indigent and further found that Steve Presson of Oklahoma should be appointed as Puckett's post-conviction counsel, if funds were available to pay him, and that in the event that such funds do not become available, then an attorney from the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel should be appointed as post-conviction counsel for Mr. Puckett effective December 4, 2001. Funds were determined to be unavailable, and C. Jackson Williams, then director of the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel, was substituted as counsel for Puckett on December 7, 2001. Williams thereafter resigned as director of the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel on January 2, 2002. The new director, Robert Ryan, and Terri L. Marroquin filed appearance forms with the Clerk of this Court on February 22, 2002. ¶ 15. It appears that in the interim, Presson had obtained important files and documents including trial counsel's files, police reports and discovery materials and removed them to his offices in Oklahoma. The Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel began to attempt to recover these materials in order to proceed on Puckett's behalf. Presson however ignored requests to turn over the files, and Ryan was ultimately forced to file a complaint with the Oklahoma Bar Association seeking their return. On June 13, 2002, this Court entered an order directing Presson to return all of Puckett's files. Presson eventually delivered three boxes of material to the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel on July 8, 2002. The record before us demonstrates that during the period from late December 2001 the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel conscientiously tried to retrieve those documents and to obtain duplicates from other sources. Counsel for Puckett now seeks relief from this Court requesting an extension of time in which to file the application for leave to seek post-conviction relief. ¶ 16. In the present case, it cannot be said that Puckett has slept on his rights or that he seeks relief because of mere excusable neglect. Due to circumstances completely beyond his control, Puckett has been unable to timely file an application for leave to seek post-conviction relief within the one-year time frame. His former attorney's actions have affirmatively frustrated his efforts through new counsel to pursue the post-conviction process. Pursuant to this Court's decision in Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187 (Miss.1999), Puckett was clearly entitled to appointed competent and conscientious counsel to assist him with his pursuit of post-conviction relief. Although his direct appeal was affirmed on June 28, 2001, with the mandate issuing on July 19, 2001, the trial court did not hold a hearing until October 23 of that year, to determine Puckett's indigence and desire to have counsel. The trial court's order reflects that the Office of Capital Post Conviction Counsel lacked the funding to pay Presson to represent Puckett. Attachments to Puckett's motions for time include copies of e-mail communication between that Office and Presson which indicate that Presson had ceased to work on the matter, failed to return vital documents, and abandoned communication with the Office. While Presson could not be expected to represent Puckett without compensation, once he entered on the task he was bound by professional obligation to do no harm. His failure to return the documents, for whatever reason, fell below professional standards and frustrated Puckett's efforts to seek relief. To punish Puckett for these circumstances would deprive him of minimal due process and a fair opportunity to be heard. The statute was tolled by these events, and the Court is bound to grant Puckett relief.