Opinion ID: 2971805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legg’s Motion to Suppress

Text: Legg moved to suppress evidence seized during execution of a search warrant issued by a Tennessee state court magistrate judge. The items seized were narcotics, guns and money. The motion was denied, but the suppression hearing was reopened during the trial after it was determined that the officer who swore out the affidavit supporting the search warrant had lied about certain facts in the affidavit. Applying Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),2 the district court struck the false parts of the affidavit, but found that the remaining portions provided probable cause to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be found on Legg’s property. The court also found that the “open fields” doctrine applied to the search, denying Legg any reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence hidden in the wooded area around his home. 2 In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Supreme Court held that where defendant demonstrates perjury by a preponderance of the evidence, the false information must be set aside and if the remaining information is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded. -17- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton The warrant had been obtained the day before the search was executed based on an affidavit sworn to by Officer Cherilyn Bryant, an undercover officer with the Chattanooga Police Department. In her sworn affidavit, Bryant stated that she had purchased cocaine from Legg and a man named William Burnette, also known as “Computer,” on numerous occasions and had observed others purchasing cocaine from Burnette. The property to be searched had several cabins and was identified as belonging to Legg. The evidence seized included narcotics, guns and money from various locations around Legg’s property. At issue in the suppression hearing was $4100 in cash and a coffee creamer jar wrapped in black electrical tape containing 6 ounces of cocaine found hidden in two separate places in a wooded area behind Legg’s residence. A federal magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in March 2000 recommending that the motion to suppress be denied. No objections were filed by either side at that time to the report and recommendation. During the trial in November 2000, Officer Bryant admitted that she had fabricated part of her affidavit and that she had never purchased cocaine from Legg, and she had only witnessed one occasion of someone purchasing cocaine from Burnette. Based on this admission by Officer Bryant, Legg renewed his motion to suppress. The court found that Officer Bryant did fabricate parts of her affidavit and struck those parts of her affidavit. After striking those parts, the court found that sufficient probable cause remained to support issuance of the warrant in and around Legg’s property. The court relied on those portions of the affidavit that stated that Officer Bryant had witnessed Legg preparing and consuming crack cocaine at his residence, directing an unknown person to purchase cocaine from Burnette and observing Burnette retrieving cocaine hidden in or -18- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton near the garage on the property. Legg has not disputed the veracity of these statements in the affidavit. At the suppression hearing during the trial in November 2000, Officer Narramore, a member of the surveillance team, testified that he positioned himself on a ridge about 80-100 feet above the cabins. He saw Legg walk by him about 20 feet away on a logging road carrying a container wrapped in black tape, which he hid under a rock. He walked 20 more feet and placed another container under another rock. The officers investigated after Legg left and found the 6 ounces of cocaine in one container and the $4100 in the other. The search warrant, even with the discredited portions removed in accordance with Franks, gave the officers ample probable cause to be on or near the property preparing to execute the search warrant. The officer then witnessed the suspicious behavior by Legg when he was hiding the two containers, giving him probable cause to investigate what Legg had hidden. The “plain view” doctrine authorizes the seizure of the items found. It is well settled that observations of “objects falling into the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view . . . may be introduced in evidence. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (per curiam). B. Ex Parte Communication between Judge and Juror Sexton contends that a brief ex parte communication concerning personal matters between the court and three jurors was error. When it became evident that the trial was going to take longer than anticipated, the court entertained requests by the jurors to be excused for personal reasons. Ultimately one juror was excused. “There is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors do -19- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial.” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983). The court told the parties he planned to hear from the jurors about personal hardships relating to the lengthy trial. No party objected, so we review for plain error and find none. C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Defendant Sexton argues that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of conspiracy. We have held that: In determining whether the evidence supporting [the defendant's] conviction is sufficient, we must ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In order for a criminal defendant to be found guilty of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) an agreement by two or more persons to violate the drug laws, and (2) knowledge of, intention to join, and participation in the conspiracy on the part of each conspirator. United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1006 (6th Cir.1998). Evidence from coconspirators, law enforcement, informants and the recorded controlled purchases demonstrate Sexton’s role as the main supplier for the conspiracy. The evidence demonstrates that Sexton was the main supplier for Moss, Legg and Romans; other witnesses also stated that Sexton was their main supplier. At least five witnesses (Estill, Jones, Elizabeth Sexton, Thompson and Phillips) identified Sexton as their drug supplier. Robert Thompson testified that he -20- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton purchased cocaine directly from Sexton, but Sexton told him to purchase from someone else in the future. In tape recordings made between Sarah Moss and Eddie Goins during controlled buys Goins made from Moss, Moss identifies Sexton as her supplier. Law enforcement officials who monitored the controlled buys between Goins and Romans observed Romans meeting with Sexton immediately following drug sales by Romans. Drugs were frequently sold from Sexton’s Rhode House bar, including the controlled buys. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, there is no question that the government offered sufficient evidence during trial from which a reasonable jury could find Sexton to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. D. Jury Instructions Defendant Romans claims that the court failed to instruct the jury on his defense theory – a theory based solely on the fact that because Goins lied on two fabricated tapes, any evidence connected to him should be disregarded. No specific instruction was submitted on Romans’ defense theory, but Romans did request a specific instruction that Goins had fabricated evidence and therefore all the tapes between Goins and Romans should be disregarded. The district court decision not to give this specific instruction was not error. The jury had been told about the fabricated tapes, and the defense had told them repeatedly that Goins was untrustworthy. A separate jury instruction about this untrustworthiness was not required. E. Remaining Issues Concerning Sexton The remaining issues deal with Sexton’s complaint that there was prosecutorial misconduct in connection with the cross-examination of his witnesses, both fact witnesses and character -21- Nos. 02-5781/6292/6322 United States v. Sexton witnesses, and that the judge was biased against his counsel and therefore “chilled” his defense, resulting in ineffective assistance of counsel. He also claims the court erred in limiting his character witnesses to three. As to the prosecutorial misconduct in connection with the cross-examination of his witnesses, Sexton charges that the government made impermissible inquiries to these witnesses to establish “guilt by association.” As discussed supra, the cross-examination was generally proper and any evidentiary error was harmless. To rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct, Sexton must demonstrate intentional misconduct or reckless disregard for the truth by the prosecution in its cross-examination. Sexton presents no evidence that any errors during cross-examination rise to that level. The “judicial bias” claim is meritless. This was a 23-day trial and the district court was called upon to make difficult rulings. A review of the testimony and rulings provide no evidence of bias against defendant Sexton or any other defendant.