Opinion ID: 1960763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The DOES's Interpretation of Section 32-1515(j)

Text: The DOES construed the language of Section 32-1515(j) to preclude contract wages paid after an injury but before an award from advance payments of compensation, for which an employer is entitled to credit against any award. The Capitals contend that this is an incorrect construction of the plain language of Section 32-1515(j), and that it is inconsistent with that section's legislative history. As discussed below, both contentions fail.
As noted above, the Hearing Examiner weighed the parties' arguments regarding the interpretation of Section 32-1515 of the D.C.Code, entitled Payment of Compensation. As the title implies, that section prescribes the method by which compensation is to be paid by employers to employees who are eligible for benefits. See § 32-1515. The specific subsection in question, Section 32-1515(j), reads: If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due. All payments prior to an award, to an employee who is injured in the course and scope of his employment, shall be considered advance payments of compensation. D.C.Code § 32-1515(j). Specifically at issue is the import of the second sentence. The Capitals contend that [a]ll payments in the context of D.C.Code Section 32-1515(j) dealing with the advance payments of compensation, as contained in the first sentence, means all paymentsof any sort. Tinordi, on the other hand, argues that [a]ll payments means only all payments of compensation. The importance of this distinction inheres in the definition of compensation as defined under the statute. `Compensation' means the money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this chapter, and includes funeral benefits provided herein. D.C.Code § 32-1501(6) (emphasis added). The Hearing Examiner reviewed the SPC, the CBA, the parties' arguments, the testimony taken at the hearing, the statute, and the case law, and concluded that the language of the statute was vague and that it could not be construed to allow an employer credit for salary payments made under contractual obligation. (Compensation Order at 6.) He stated, It would seem reasonable to interpret the language of the statute to apply only to payments made after the date of injury which [sic] employer was not otherwise under a separate obligation to pay. Id. He reasoned that, although arguable, the Capitals' position that the absence of the word compensation modifying all payments in the second sentence of Section 32-1515(j) requires literally any post-injury payment made prior to an award to a subsequent claimant to be creditable as advance paymentscould lead to unreasonable results. Id. at 5. He concluded that the statute was not intended to confer credit for extant contractual obligations. In essence, the Hearing Examiner determined that the payments in the second sentence referred to those payments set forth in the first sentence. On review, the Director of the DOES affirmed. The Director applied the proper standard of review: [The Director] must affirm the Compensation Order under review if the findings of fact contained therein are supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole and the law has been properly applied. Id. at 3 (citing D.C.Code § 36-322 [4] and D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. § 7-230). It is that decision that we review. As a basic principle, when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Hudson Trail Outfitters v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 801 A.2d 987, 990 (D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). However, `even where the words of a statute have a superficial clarity, a review of the legislative history or an in-depth consideration of alternative constructions that could be ascribed to statutory language may reveal ambiguities that the court must resolve.' Hively v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 681 A.2d 1158, 1161 (D.C.1996) (citation omitted). In that event, this court will look to policy and the statute's `manifest purpose' in order to assist in the interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. Hively, supra, 681 A.2d at 1163. The Capitals argue that there is no such ambiguity. [5] We disagree. The Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) is a statutory regime instituted to facilitate the compensation of workers who have been injured on the job. See id. Specifically, workers' compensation statutes are to be liberally construed for the benefit of the employee. Id. (citations omitted). Looking thus to the statute in question with that principle in mind, a statute entitled Payment of Compensation whose superficially clear language confers payment credit against employee award benefits upon an employer for all payments, even salary payments that he is contractually bound to pay, a conclusion that the language is ambiguous is not only reasonable, but also arguably required. Further, the manner in which the DOES interpreted the ambiguity comports well with the purpose of the statute from which that ambiguity was reasonably gleaned. The Capitals call our attention to our decision in Gay v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 644 A.2d 1326 (D.C.1996), which they contend is inconsistent with the decision in this case. We disagree. In Gay, the DOES denied a bus driver's claim for temporary total disability benefits under the compensation statute because he had received sick leave benefits equal to his full pay from his employer. We held that the DOES had not adequately expounded its statutory analysis in light of the facts of th[e] case and the broader considerations presented by the issue. Id. at 1328 (citing Ward v. Anderson, 93 U.S.App. D.C. 156, 159, 208 F.2d 48, 50 (1953)). In doing so, we said: [I]f a certain type of payment prior to an award under the Act is determined to be an advance payment of compensation, any payment up to that amount under the Act would be immediately recoverable by the employer as reimbursement, and the employee effectively recovers nothing in the circumstances presented here. Gay, supra, 644 A.2d at 1326 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We remanded for reconsideration. If only a certain type of payment might qualify for credit, then all payments may contemplate something less than absolutely all payments. The conclusion that Section 32-1515 does not provide setoff credit for post-injury, pre-award salary payments made pursuant to contract does not appear to be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
The Capitals assert that the DOES's interpretation is counter to the statute's legislative history. We repeat, this court defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of the statute that it administers if that interpretation is a reasonable one in light of the language of the statute and its legislative history .... Mushroom II, supra, 761 A.2d at 842. The Capitals note that the current WCA replaced the Long-shore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.; Hively, 681 A.2d at 1162. As we have stated on another occasion, the D.C. Council intended with the enactment of the WCA to narrow the scope of coverage as well as the amount of compensation available to disabled employees. Hughes v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 498 A.2d 567, 570 (D.C.1985). The prior statute read: If the employer has made advance payments of compensation, he shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of any unpaid installment or installments of compensation due. 33 U.S.C. § 914. Wholly absent from the prior statute is the second sentence of the current statute, which is the sentence in contention. However, the addition of that single sentence in question in and of itself does not mean that all payments was intended to include payments of money under obligations already accrued. The context in which the need to narrow the scope of the workers' compensation regime arose is of doubtful relevance to the instant case: The prior regime extended compensation coverage to an employee of an employer carrying on any employment in the District of Columbia without regard to where the employee worked or was injured. The Supreme Court had construed this statute as giving the widest extraterritorial application coverage possible consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Hughes, supra, 498 A.2d at 569 (footnote and citations omitted). The D.C. Council was concerned about its ability to attract or to keep businesses because of its inability to compete with neighboring jurisdictions' workers' compensation costs, id. at 569-70; the primary concern was with the territoriality of the older regime. The costs were as high as they were because of the geographical scope of the prior statute. Because workers' compensation statutes are to be liberally construed for the benefit of the employee, Hively, supra, 681 A.2d at 1163, and the principally geographic concerns that prompted the Council to circumscribe the scope of employer liability, we remain unpersuaded that the DOES's construction of Section 32-1515 is inconsistent with that section's legislative history. This conclusion is consistent with Gay. As discussed above, the Gay court discussed the principle that some payments of sick pay could be found to constitute advance payments of compensation, and that others might not. Gay, supra, 644 A.2d at 1327. Note that the Gay court did not decide that that is the appropriate construction of the sentence at issue, id. Instead, the court spoke of the language of a prior case in terms of supporting the proposition that, between the positions of allowing sick pay as a credit to the employer in every situation and of never allowing a credit, a possible middle ground exists which would allow a credit in certain cases.... Gay, supra, 644 A.2d at 1327 (discussing Buckley v. Wells Fargo Guard Servs., Inc., H & AS No. 85-33, OWC No. 0055502 (Nov. 29, 1985)). In conclusion, the DOES's reasonable interpretation of the statute in question is not inconsistent with its plain meaning or its legislative history. [6]