Opinion ID: 1282491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary factors as a result of an overly broad and vague construction of the capital murder statute and was excessive and disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.

Text: Under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4C [2] a jury may impose the death sentence upon either of the alternative findings therein specified. In the present case, the jury based its verdict upon both alternatives, finding that there is a probability that Clanton would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society, and that his conduct in committing the capital murder of Smith was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in the manner delineated in the statute. Upon our review of the case, it is our responsibility under Code § 17-110.1 [3] not only to consider any errors in the conduct of the trial, but also to consider and determine whether the sentence of death was improperly imposed. Heretofore, we have considered the errors assigned by Clanton to the denial by the trial court of his motion for a change of venue or venire, and to the conduct of his trial, and have determined that no error was committed. Finding nothing in the record to support Clanton's allegation, we hold that the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. There was ample evidence to support the jury verdict based upon findings that Clanton had a propensity for violence and that the capital murder of Smith was an offense of exceptional ferocity. Clanton had served eight years in prison in New Jersey for murder; the jury did not have to believe his testimony, offered in mitigation, that he merely acted as a lookout for other more active participants in what was planned as a robbery but ended in murder. Clanton subsequently had been convicted of felonious assault in Petersburg, but had avoided serving the sentence imposed for that crime by fleeing before he could be incarcerated. While a fugitive, he strangled Smith with a belt, stabbed and cut her with a knife, and bruised her about the head in robbing her of $8 in currency. Clanton's violent, aggressive, and antisocial temperament was clearly demonstrated, and the jury could reasonably find, as it did, that he would be a continuing serious threat to society. The jury could also reasonably find, as it did, that Clanton's killing of Smith was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery to the victim. The evidence showed that Smith's blood was found throughout her apartment, on the floor, on a bed, on the walls, and on a television set. It is a reasonable inference that Clanton confronted Smith when she returned to her apartment, that he subdued her by forcibly placing and tightening the belt around her neck, and that he stabbed her repeatedly to compel her to surrender her money. The evidence also supports the reasonable inference that the struggle continued from room to room until Smith expired and that Clanton then ransacked her apartment before the unexpected arrival of the police prompted him to hide. To determine whether Clanton's sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases, we have examined the records in all the capital murder cases reviewed by this Court. [4] We have upheld the imposition of death sentences in Coppola, Stamper, Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S.E.2d 36 (1980), Linwood Earl Briley, Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va.___, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981), and Whitley v. Commonwealth , where the capital murders were perpetrated in the commission of armed robbery. The evidence of extraordinary brutality in Clanton's killing of Smith is comparable to that adduced in those six cases; indeed, it bears some striking similarities to the evidence in Coppola and Stamper. In Coppola, the defendant bound his victim, repeatedly beat her head upon the floor, and strangled her with a sock to force her to reveal where money was hidden. In Stamper, the defendant murdered three employees in the restaurant where they worked. In fixing the penalty for capital murder of the employee in charge of the business, the jury based its verdict upon the defendant's proclivity for violence and also upon his conduct in committing the offense. Only this employee had the combination to the safe, which was found open, with money missing. A trail of blood led from the safe to the body of the employee, found dead with multiple lacerations, a skull fracture, a cut on his neck, and a gunshot wound in his chest. Upholding the death sentence, we noted that there was a reasonable inference that the employee had been tortured before he was shot to death. Likewise, in the present case, the jury could reasonably infer that Smith was tortured before she was killed by strangulation. We conclude that Clanton's sentence is not excessive or disproportionate. Finally, Clanton challenges the constitutionality of §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4C as overly broad and impermissibly vague, but he acknowledges that his argument on this question is identical with that presented to us in Linwood Earl Briley. We rejected the argument in that case, we reaffirm the views therein expressed, and we again reject the argument. Finding no error in the judgment of the trial court, and no other reason to disturb or commute the death sentence imposed in this case, we will affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence. Affirmed.