Opinion ID: 2335657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: O'Connell Is Entitled To Post-Judgment Attorney's Fees.

Text: In response to Will's motion for an order acknowledging satisfaction of the judgment, O'Connell sought $2,397.50 in attorney's fees and $45.00 in costs. O'Connell's attorney charged $2,397.50 in fees and $45.00 in costs to place liens on the Wills' assets and to serve Anthony Will's employer with a writ of garnishment. The superior court held that O'Connell was not entitled to post-judgment attorney's fees under the parties' promissory note, which it found was reasonably interpreted to permit the recovery of full attorney's fees during the course of the actionnot during collection on any judgmentparticularly where, as here, the plaintiff has already been awarded $6,492.50 of fees on a principal note due of $7,000. We disagree and hold that O'Connell can recover reasonable post-judgment attorney's fees and costs under his contract with the Wills. When interpreting contracts, our duty is to ascertain and give effect to the reasonable intentions of the contracting parties. [16] We determine the intention of contracting parties by resort[ing] to the language of the disputed provision and other provisions, relevant extrinsic evidence, and case law interpreting similar provisions. [17] We seek to interpret contractual terms harmoniously, avoiding those interpretations that cause conflicts among the provisions. [18] The plain language of the contract supports a finding that the parties intended to provide for reimbursement of all attorney's fees incurred in a suit or action to collect the note, including those incurred through post-judgment enforcement actions. The contract between O'Connell and the Wills provides that the signatories promise[], in case suit is instituted, to collect this note, or any portion thereof, in addition to the costs and disbursements of said suit, a reasonable attorney's fee in such suit or action.  (emphasis added) Black's Law Dictionary defines suit as [a]ny proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court of law, [19] action at law as [a] civil suit stating a legal cause of action and seeking only a legal remedy, [20] and action as [t]he process of doing something; conduct or behavior. [21] Black's also states that the word proceeding is used to express the business done in courts, which may include all ancillary or provisional steps, such as arrest, attachment of property, garnishment, injunction, writ of ne exeat . . . [and] the enforcement of the judgment, or a new trial, as may be directed by the court of last resort. [22] Applying these definitions, the plain language of the contract indicates that the parties intended to provide for all reasonable attorney's fees incurred by O'Connell for services performed for him by his lawyer in engaging in further proceedings to collect the note, including enforcing the judgment rendered against the Wills. This interpretation of the contract's language is also consistent with our precedent regarding contractual attorney's fees clauses. In Gamble v. Northstore Partnership, we held that where a contractual provision has the evident purpose of shifting reasonable [attorney's] fees to the winner in litigation concerning [a] contract, the contract must be construed as calling for fee shifting at all court levels. [23] We also stated that the primary concern in setting rules for attorney fee awards must be the encouragement of efficient litigation. [24] Gamble thus stands for the proposition that we construe contractual attorney's fees provisions broadly, and in a way that encourages efficient litigation. In Rockstad v. Erikson, we reiterated our holding in Gamble that, where the parties intend it, contractual attorney's fees clauses must be construed as calling for fee shifting at all levels and not just in proceedings before the trial court, [25] and concluded that an attorney's fees provision in a note and deed of trust included fees incurred in post-judgment appellate proceedings. [26] Although we were not presented with the question whether the note in Rockstad also provided for attorney's fees incurred during post-judgment enforcement actions, our holding in Rockstad supports our conclusion that the attorney's fees provision in the note between O'Connell and the Wills provided for attorney's fees incurred post-judgment to enforce the judgment. To hold otherwise would require us to artificially distinguish attorney's fees incurred for post-judgment appellate proceedings from attorney's fees incurred for post-judgment enforcement proceedings, and would in many cases eviscerate the evident purpose of contractual attorney's fees clauses like the one at issue. When a contract between two parties indicates that the parties intended to shift reasonable attorney's fees to the winner in litigation concerning the contract, interpreting that contract to require the losing party to pay all attorney's fees except for fees incurred while attempting to enforce the judgmenta cost that is only incurred when the losing party refuses to pay after a judgment has been rendered against himwould be entirely contrary to the essential purpose of such a clause. Our conclusion is also consistent with Alaska's Civil Rule 82 and our precedent regarding that rule. Alaska rejects the American rule for attorney's fees, that is, the rule that litigants pay their own fees. [27] Instead, Alaska's Civil Rule 82 provides for partial fee-shifting in most civil cases absent any agreement between contracting parties [28] for services performed up to the time of the judgment. [29] In Rockstad, however, we concluded that where a contract between the parties allows for one party to recover attorney's fees in the event of litigation, `the contract provision must prevail over any limitations otherwise imposed by Rule 82.' [30] When parties include a provision for attorney's fees in their contract, they draft that provision in the shadow of Rule 82, and it is logical to infer that the intent behind a contractual attorney's fees clause is therefore to provide for attorney's fees that are not otherwise provided by Rule 82. But Rule 82 has two limitations: it provides generally for reimbursement of only partial attorney's fees, and it provides for reimbursement of attorney's fees for actions taken only up until the time of judgment. [31] Because there appears to be no principled basis for concluding that the contracting parties in this case intended to avoid one of Rule 82's limitations but not the other, we must conclude that the attorney's fees clause at issue, which provides for recovery of all reasonable attorney's fees incurred while collecting the note, was written with the intent of providing all reasonable attorney's fees for all actions taken to enforce the note, including collections actions taken after the final judgment was entered. As discussed above, this conclusion is consistent with and supported by our attorney's fee rules and precedent. Finally, we note that construing contractual attorney's fees clauses to exclude attorney's fees incurred for post-judgment collection and enforcement proceedings would be inefficient and might stimulate further litigation. If we construed such clauses to exclude attorney's fees incurred while attempting to collect on a note through post-judgment enforcement proceedings, the prevailing party could alternatively file a separate lawsuit to enforce a judgment and then recover attorney's fees incurred for post-judgment enforcement actions in the new litigation. But filing a separate lawsuit to enforce a judgment rather than utilizing liens and other post-judgment enforcement mechanisms in an existing case results in greater economic costs to the parties and to judicial and court resources. Because the plain language of the promissory note indicates that the parties intended to provide for attorney's fees incurred in all actions taken to collect on the note, and because our precedent regarding contractual attorney's fees clauses supports the conclusion that contractual attorney's fees clauses like the one at issue provide for attorney's fees incurred during post-judgment enforcement proceedings, we reverse the superior court's order denying O'Connell's motion for post-judgment attorney's fees, and remand for further proceedings.