Opinion ID: 2225661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Validity of the Charged Aggravating Circumstance Upon Which the Request for Death Sentence Was Premised

Text: Castor argues that, in order to impose the sentence of death for the murder of Malcolm Grass, the State must have proven that Castor, in fact, knew that the victim was a law enforcement officer. Castor argues further that the sentence of death could not be imposed on him if he held the good faith belief that Malcolm Grass was not a law enforcement official. The State, on the other hand, cites Moore v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 1264, 1275, cert. den. (1985) 474 U.S. 1026, 106 S.Ct. 583, 88 L.Ed.2d 565, for the proposition that the death penalty can be imposed where the defendant either knew or should have known that his victim was a law enforcement official. Here the jury was instructed that it should determine whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the aggravating circumstances alleged by the State, including whether at the time the defendant killed Malcolm Grass the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that Malcolm Grass was a law enforcement officer. It is true that Moore stands for the proposition espoused by the State. However, the facts in this case are markedly different from the facts in Moore. In Moore, the law enforcement officer was wearing his official, distinctively-marked uniform with a badge and radio clipped to the front of his shirt when he knocked on the door and was shot by the defendant. This Court held that the evidence in that case clearly established that appellant had the ability and a timely opportunity to ascertain that his victim was a law enforcement officer acting in the course of his duty and that Moore forfeited his standing to complain that he did not know that his potential victim was a police officer when [he] did not take advantage of the opportunity he had to become so informed. 479 N.E.2d at 1276. Justice DeBruler, in his dissent to Moore, set forth the rationale for requiring that the ultimate sentence of death be imposed only where there is a determination that the defendant knew that his victim was a law enforcement official. Justice DeBruler said: The policy at the base of the exercise of the police power here is to create a special deterrence to the direction of physical force against police officers and others upon whom the security of the community depends. There are at least two essential states of mind referred to in the provision, the one required for murder plus an awareness of the official status of the target. The first is within the meaning of the term murder and the second is within the special official status terms. The purpose of the statute restricts it to instances in which the attacker knows he is dealing with one of the enumerated officials. Such knowledge of official status must be actual. Actual knowledge is, I am convinced, intended by the legislature... . I consider the reasonable discernment test applied by the majority to be contrary to legislative intent and basic precepts of criminal law governing standards to select those who deserve death as a penalty for crime. Id. at 1283. Further, in Moore, Justice Pivarnik, writing for the majority, held that the majority was deciding that case based upon the facts of that case and stated that we will not decide this case merely on the basis of his abstract arguments. Id. at 1276. This case does not present a set of hypothetical facts or abstract arguments, but presents this Court with the question of whether to affirm the imposition of the sentence of death in the case of the murder of an unmarked, plainclothes law enforcement official without a finding from either the jury or the sentencing judge that Castor, in fact, knew that his victim was a law enforcement official. We believe that the societal rationale for imposing death for one who kills a law enforcement official is promoted only if the defendant knew that the victim was a law enforcement official at the time of the killing. Because the jury was instructed that it could recommend the death penalty if it found that Castor should have known that Grass was a law enforcement official, its recommendation to the trial court that death be imposed was premised on an incorrect instruction of law. Additionally, the sentencing court, in its well-reasoned sentencing order did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Castor, at the time he shot and killed Malcolm Grass, knew that he was shooting at a law enforcement official. The case must be resubmitted for jury recommendation and trial court sentencing utilizing the principle of law that a defendant can only be sentenced to death for murdering a law enforcement officer if the trier of fact is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time of the shooting, the defendant knew that he was shooting at a law enforcement officer.