Opinion ID: 2971980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Circuit Appeal

Text: Venditelli submitted a competent brief to this court on direct appeal. The magistrate judge faulted the brief for not emphasizing the sentencing judge’s high estimates of the marijuana loads. Venditelli did not challenge the sentencing judge’s estimation of 500, rather than 400, pounds per load in his brief. Rather, he concentrated on the argument that the sentencing judge abused his discretion in not considering the scope of Crehore’s agreement to participate in the conspiracy when attributing the loads for sentencing purposes. He chose to emphasize government statements that arguably could have misled the judge into deciding that Crehore had a greater role in the conspiracy than the evidence supported. This was a strategic decision that we may not second-guess. Campbell, 260 F.3d at 551. Venditelli also argued that the government double-counted loads, offering an alternative route to the conclusion that Crehore was, in fact, under the 1000-kilogram threshold. Since the 400/500 pound distinction did not determine the outcome, we can find no prejudice to Crehore in its omission, even if we were to hold that not mentioning it fell below a minimum level of competence. The magistrate judge also found that Vendittelli did not “vigorously challenge” the June 1994 shipment before the Sixth Circuit; the district court disputed that conclusion, however. Crehore’s brief to this court refers to the June 1994 shipment: Obviously, Mr. Crehore takes issue with the Court’s determination that all of the loads mentioned by the Court should be attributed to him. It is interesting to note that the Court started with the load made by Mr. Crehore, which is understandable, however, ended with the load in June of 1994 for 500 pounds. We know Mr. --10- 10 - No. 03-1548 Crehore was arrested in January of 1994, yet [sic] sought to attribute 500 pounds of marjuana burned in Mexico . . . . The Court obviously erred in this regard inasmuch as Mr. Crehore should not be responsible for activity beyond his arrest. Appellant Br., No. 95-1764, at 47. Venditelli argued that the scope of Crehore’s agreement extended only to his actual activity that furthered the conspiracy: driving a 400-pound load of marijuana to Detroit in December 1993 and driving an empty motor home back from Michigan in January 1994. Id. at 50. Challenging the June 1994 load was therefore tangential to the thrust of Venditelli’s attack on Crehore’s sentence, and we may not second-guess that strategic decision. During oral argument, questions were raised about the allegation that Crehore remained in contact with his co-conspirators after his arrest, the premise for attributing the June 1994 load to him. The Assistant United States Attorney sent the court a letter on March 27, 1998 to defend the factual assertions “discussed” at oral argument. Nevertheless, we affirmed Crehore’s sentence based on allegations in the government’s brief, but not substantiated in the March 27 letter, specifically the supposed “pattern of contemporaneous calls” between Crehore and Free that made it “apparent that he continued to be involved with the conspiracy even after his arrest.” Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d at 593. Reliance on these now-discredited facts cannot be attributed to ineffective assistance of counsel. Crehore argues that Vendittelli was ineffective because he did not respond to the March 27 letter in order to underline the fact that the letter did not substantiate the allegation that Crehore was in contact with Free after his release on bond. Furthermore, Crehore argues, Vendittelli should have pointed out that James Burdick, Free’s lawyer, filed an affidavit denying that he, Burdick, had ever spoken with Crehore. In hindsight, this would have been helpful, but it is not clear that the request --11- 11 - No. 03-1548 to clarify the record was directed to Crehore, who was one of four appellants, whereas the government’s letter refers to the court’s uncertainty and “attempts to address all of the factual issues raised.” Failure to respond to the letter under the circumstances did not fall below the minimal level of professional competence that is needed to trigger a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Vendittelli unequivocally pointed out the factual discrepancy in Crehore’s petition for rehearing, which asserted: This panel’s failure to review the Lower Court record to substantiate false assertions made regarding Mr. Crehore’s participation in the conspiracy by the Government; . . . . [and the fact that] The imposition of Defendant’s sentence was based on false information provided by the Government regarding his participation in the conspiracy. He specifically argued that: The Court also falsely relied upon the assertion by the Government that Mr. Crehore had ‘extensive contact and association with co-conspirators and . . . a pattern of contemporaneous calls to Free after his release on bond,’ and therefore came to the conclusion that it was apparent that Mr. Crehore had continued to be involved in the conspiracy even after his arrest. These statements made by the Government are false. Mr. Crehore had no contemporaneous phone calls with Mr. Free after his release on bond. These allegations again are totally unsupported by the Lower Court record and a further attempt by the Government to sneak into the record false information to make Mr. Crehore look as though he played a greater role in the conspiracy. The petition for rehearing was denied, after which Venditelli properly applied to withdraw as Crehore’s counsel. A thorough review of the record of Venditelli’s performance reveals no flaws of constitutional import, and therefore the district court properly denied habeas relief on Crehore’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.4 4 We are troubled that the government’s erroneous characterization of Crehore’s postarrest contact with Free was not explained to the panel that decided his direct appeal. This panel is not at liberty to revisit that decision, but we feel compelled to point out that “every attorney --12- 12 - No. 03-1548