Opinion ID: 1744939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in permitting irving to testify as to the credibility of the child victim.

Text: ¶ 7. This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677, 682-83 (Miss.2005). ¶ 8. Branch contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Irving to testify regarding C.V.'s credibility as to the allegations of abuse. Branch argues that Irving was never offered or qualified as an expert pursuant to Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. [2] Furthermore, Branch contends that Irving admitted he had no first-hand knowledge of the events C.V. related to him. Branch argues that such knowledge is a prerequisite for admission of evidence under Rule 701 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. [3] Branch also claims that Irving's testimony usurped the duty of the jury to evaluate C.V.'s credibility. While the trial court permitted Irving's testimony under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(4), [4] Branch contends that the primary purpose of the interview was to assess C.V.'s credibility, not to provide medical treatment or a diagnosis. ¶ 9. In the court below, Branch failed to object to Irving's testimony pursuant to Rule 701 or Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Therefore, Branch waived the right to appeal this issue. Haddox v. State, 636 So.2d 1229, 1240 (Miss.1994). ¶ 10. The record reflects that the trial court admitted Irving's testimony, which consisted of C.V. identifying her sexual assailant as her father, under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 803(4). In Jones v. State , this Court stated [t]here is a two-part test for admitting hearsay statements under 803(4). Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1056 (Miss.1992). First, the declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes of promoting treatment; and second, the content of the statement must be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment. Id. The Court further explained that statements made by a child abuse victim that the abuser is a member of the immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment, as treatment encompasses treating emotional and psychological injuries and is relevant to prevention. Id. at 1056-57 (citation omitted) (ruling that court erred in allowing doctor's testimony of the abuser's identity when the abuser was not part of the immediate household). ¶ 11. This Court finds that the trial court did not err in allowing Irving to make statements regarding Branch's identity as the abuser. The purpose of Irving's interview was to ascertain if C.V. needed further medical attention and to judge whether her claims were credible. C.V. identified Branch as her abuser during the course of the interview, an interview clearly undertaken for the purpose of promoting medical treatment. Thus, prong one of the Jones v. State test is satisfied. Id. at 1056. ¶ 12. As for prong two, the Court in Jones ruled that a child abuse victim's statement, which identifies an abuser as an immediate household member, is reasonably pertinent to treatment. Id. at 1056-57. C.V. identified her biological father, who at the time of the abuse was married to C.V.'s mother and lived in the same household. As such, C.V.'s statement to Irving is one that a physician would rely upon in providing medical care and therapy pursuant to prong two. Therefore, Irving's testimony regarding Branch's identity as the abuser was properly admitted under Rule 803(4). ¶ 13. Branch also contends that the court improperly allowed Irving to comment on C.V.'s credibility regarding the allegations of abuse. Branch relies upon Hart v. State to support his argument that it is disingenuous to suggest that testimony regarding the credibility of a witness is not a comment on veracity. Hart v. State, 637 So.2d 1329, 1338 (Miss. 1994). In Hart, this Court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of a psychologist's testimony when the psychologist stated that it was his opinion that the defendant had acted reasonably. Id. Specifically, the expert asserted that the defendant acted justifiably in self-defense. Id. This Court held that such testimony invaded the province of the jury because the testimony was an opinion on the ultimate issue and thus a legal conclusion as to the defendant's state of mind. Id. at 1338-40. ¶ 14. Hart fails to strengthen Branch's argument. Unlike the expert witness in Hart, Irving did not assert an ultimate opinion or legal conclusion. Irving testified that he assessed several variables of credibility, including consistency, details, and demeanor, all of which indicated C.V.'s report was credible. Irving never stated that C.V. was telling the truth. Irving merely testified in terms of the criteria that he evaluates in his position as a forensic interviewer with CAC. The jury was given the opportunity to independently evaluate Irving's testimony in conjunction with C.V.'s testimony in order to determine if it believed C.V.'s version of events. Therefore, Hart fails to support Branch's contention that Irving's testimony was inadmissible. ¶ 15. This Court finds Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847 (Miss.2006), controls the outcome on this issue. In Hobgood, this Court upheld the trial court's decision to allow testimony as to the credibility of a child-abuse victim. Id. at 854; see also Smith v. State, 925 So.2d 825, 834-35 (Miss.2006) (finding that expert testimony was admissible, since it pertained to the credibility of the interviews with the girls rather than the girls' veracity ). In Hobgood, a psychotherapist was asked at trial if he found the child victim credible. Hobgood, 926 So.2d at 854. The expert replied yes and explained that the victim's account of the abuse was always consistent and physical evidence supported the child's statements. Id. ¶ 16. The Court noted that the expert never stated that the victim was telling the truth. Id. The Court found that the expert explained the consistency of the accounts [the child] made to individuals, at different times, not in the presence of the others, and found them to be credible. Id. Furthermore, the Court noted that the jury had the opportunity to evaluate the expert's testimony along with five other witnesses. Id. The Court held that allowing the witness's testimony was not error when viewed in the totality of [the] testimony. Id. ¶ 17. As previously noted, Irving never stated C.V. was telling the truth. Similar to the expert witness in Hobgood, Irving testified that C.V.'s statements were credible because C.V. consistently had made the same statements with the same level of detail to various adults. Like Hobgood, the jury was given the opportunity to consider Irving's testimony in conjunction with the testimony of various witnesses. Notably, the jury was able to evaluate C.V.'s demeanor when she testified at trial. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Irving to testify as to C.V.'s credibility. Therefore, this issue is without merit.