Opinion ID: 614114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plea-Agreement Waiver of Collateral Review

Text: The district court cited another reason to reject Keller's § 2255 motion: His plea agreement contained a broad waiver of his right to collaterally attack his sentence. A defendant may validly waive both his right to a direct appeal and his right to collateral review under § 2255 as a part of his plea agreement. Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144-45 (7th Cir.1999). We have generally upheld and enforced these waivers, with limited exceptions for cases in which the plea agreement was involuntary, the district court relied on a constitutionally impermissible factor (such as race), the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, or the defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of [the plea] agreement. Id. For the waiver to apply, however, the disputed appeal or collateral attack must fall within its scope. United States v. Chapa, 602 F.3d 865, 868 (7th Cir.2010). To bar collateral review, the plea agreement must clearly state that the defendant waives his right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence in addition to waiving his right to a direct appeal. United States v. Monroe, 580 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir.2009). Keller's does. The relevant paragraph in the plea agreement broadly states that Keller knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to contest any aspect of his conviction and sentence that could be contested under Title 18 or Title 28, or under any other provision of federal law. The next paragraph confirms that this language is meant to cover direct appeal and collateral review; referring to the previous paragraph, it states that the Defendant's waiver of his right to appeal or bring collateral challenges shall not apply, then sets out two narrow exceptions not relevant here. See supra note 1. Keller contends that his § 2255 challenge nonetheless falls outside the scope of the waiver because the waiver provision explicitly preserves his right to appeal if the sentence imposed is in excess of the Sentencing Guidelines as determined by the Court or any applicable statutory minimum, whichever is greater. This language is not uncommon in plea agreements; we have not yet addressed whether a valid Johnson claim falls within this kind of exception to otherwise broad appellate and collateral-review waiver language in a plea agreement. [4] We need not decide the question here. Without his argument that the Oklahoma court vacated his prior convictions, Keller has no claim that his sentence exceeded the applicable guidelines range or the statutory minimum. The case would be somewhat more difficult if the Oklahoma court had in fact vacated Keller's prior convictions. If it had, Keller's § 2255 motion arguably might fall within the exception to his waiver of appeal and collateral review. [5] The government responds that the exception does not apply because it only preserved Keller's right to appellate review for reasonableness if his sentence exceeded either the statutory minimum or the guidelines range as determined by the Court, whichever was greater. Because Keller received a within-guidelines sentence at exactly the 180-month statutory minimum, the narrow reserved right to appeal on reasonableness grounds was not triggered; the exception covers nothing more and therefore doesn't open a window for a Johnson -type claim. The government's reading of the waiver language in the plea agreement has considerable force, but we need not resolve the matter here. Because Keller's Oklahoma convictions were not in fact vacated, the district court properly denied his § 2255 motion. The district court's order is AFFIRMED.