Opinion ID: 1577535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dismissal of All Claims Against Jones

Text: In addition, I must dissent from the main opinion's decision to affirm the trial court's dismissal of all claims against Jones. I note first that each count of the complaint, as amendedincluding the counts alleging suppression, negligence and/or wantonness, the tort of outrage, and wrongful supervisionalleges that Jones (as well as each of the other defendants) directly committed the various wrongs alleged therein. The complaint does not allege liability on the part of Jones under such theories as respondeat superior or a piercing of the corporate veil of Crestview. [5] The defendants' joint Motion to Dismiss was filed on the day the case was set for trial, May 8, 2006. This motion was expressly filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The sole ground for dismissal presented to the trial court in this motion was that all Gilmer's claims amounted to nothing more than incognizable assertions of private causes of action arising per se from the violation of the licensing statute. It is the trial court's judgment granting this motion for dismissal that constitutes the judgment from which the appeal is taken in this case. The main opinion begins its explanation of its decision to uphold the trial court's dismissal of all claims against Jones by noting that Jones has filed a separate brief in this Court in which he argues that he cannot be held personally liable for any of the alleged torts of Crestview. 35 So.3d at 596. This is the same argument Jones made to the trial court in the failed September 2005 summary-judgment motion. See note 5, supra. (Jones even attempts to bolster this argument by reference to a statement made in Gilmer's written response to the September 2005 summary-judgment motion as a concessionan improper characterization in my viewthat Jones did not participate in the events giving rise to the tort-of-outrage claim.) As has been noted, this ground for dismissal of the claims against Jones was not presented to the trial court by the Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed by the defendants on the first day of trial, the judgment granting which is the judgment from which Gilmer appeals. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the trial court did dismiss all claims against Jones. Consequently, it is incumbent upon Gilmer, as the appellant, if she wishes to achieve a reversal of the trial court's dismissal of the claims alleged in her complaint against Jones, to argue in her brief to this Court that that dismissal was erroneous. See Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So.2d 375, 380 (Ala.2006) (noting that we will not reverse a trial court's judgment on a ground not argued on appeal); Tucker v. Nichols, 431 So.2d 1263, 1264 (Ala.1983) (explaining that the appellant has an affirmative duty of showing error upon the record). The majority is of the view that Gilmer has not made this argument, at least not as to anything other than the tort of wrongful supervision. I am of the view that she has. The main opinion reasons as follows: Gilmer mentions Jones only when discussing her negligent-supervision claim, and she presents no other argument as to why the summary judgment for Jones should be reversed regarding any other claim. 35 So.3d at 596. I believe that this mischaracterizes Gilmer's brief to this Court and that, in fact, Gilmer has presented the only argument she needs to have presented as to why the trial court's judgment should be reversed as to all claims. Gilmer begins her initial brief to this Court as follows: The issue raised in this appeal is whether the trial court erroneously granted a Rule 12(b)(6)-based dismissal of the complaint as amended and all causes of action asserted therein based on the sole ground asserted in a motion to dismiss filed on the morning that a trial on the merits was to commence. She thereafter fully addresses this singular issue. As she states, she does so as to all causes of action. The approach she takes to do so is to take up each cause of action, one at a time, not each defendant, one at a time. Specifically, Gilmer discusses why the gravamen of each cause of action is not, per se, merely the violation of the statute. In so doing, her focus is on what each legal theory entails, not against whom she plans to prove each theory. Consequently, it is true that she does not mention Jones by name in respect to most of the legal theories. By the same token, however, she generally does not argue the liability of the other defendants by name in respect to each legal theory. For example, in Gilmer's discussion of why her suppression claim was not tantamount to a per se claim based upon a violation of the licensing statute, she refers to the underlying fact that Crestview employees knew, but suppressed, certain material facts. The fact that Jones is not argued by name to have engaged in suppression is no more a ground of waiver of that tort as to him than it is to any other specific defendant. Gilmer does not take on the task of arguing that this defendant or that defendant should not have been dismissed; rather, she argues that this claim and that claim, as alleged in the complaint (i.e., as to all the defendants), should not have been dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim under Alabama law. Gilmer's brief to this Court addresses the sole issue presented to and decided by the trial court when it entered the dismissal from which Gilmer now appealswhether her complaint seeks to recover based on general common-law principles or, instead, for per se causes of action derived strictly from the violation of the licensing statute. In her brief, Gilmer defends all claims alleged in the complaint (including necessarily as they relate to Jones) against this sole ground, a ground that was not applied by the trial court to Jones in any manner or degree differently than as to all other defendants. In meeting and defeating this ground, Gilmer's brief has done all it needs to do to defeat the single basis upon which the trial court dismissed all Gilmer's claims. I do not see that Gilmer's brief is a source for any waiver of any of these claims. [6] COBB, C.J., concurs.