Opinion ID: 1230603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Categorical, Policy-Based Disagreement with the Guidelines

Text: First, Herrera-Zuniga claims that the district court erred in categorically rejecting the offense level prescribed under the Guidelines for illegal reentry offenses based on its policy-based disagreement with the severity of the sentencing range that the offense level yielded. [8] The sentencing transcript leaves no doubt that the district court's policy-based disagreement with the severity of the recommended sentencing range was a major factor in its decision to impose a harsher sentence. In pronouncing sentence, the district court expressed astonish[ment] that the offense level prescribed under the Sentencing Guidelines is so low. Noting the 10-year maximum penalty provided for under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), and pointing to the more severe sentencing ranges prescribed under the Guidelines for other offenses that carry a similar statutory maximum penalty, the district court rejected the 24-to-30-month advisory range as arbitrar[y] and considerably out of balance with the statute. In its recent decision in Spears v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 840, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009), the Supreme Court unequivocally recognized that district courts possess the authority to vary from the crack cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with them, and not simply based on an individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a particular case. Id. at 843 (emphasis in original). The question we confront here is whether the authority recognized in Spears to reject on policy grounds an otherwise-applicable aspect of the Sentencing Guidelines is limited to the crack cocaine context. [9] We hold that it is not. In Spears, the Supreme Court vacated an Eighth Circuit decision holding that the district court had no authority to substitute on policy grounds a different ratio for the then-applicable 100:1 crack-to-powder sentencing ratio. Id. at 842. In reaching that conclusion, the Court made clear that, at least with respect to the crack cocaine Guidelines, a categorical disagreement with and variance from the Guidelines is not suspect. Id. at 843. Clarifying its holding in Kimbrough, the Court explained that sentencing judges possess the authority to categorically reject the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines, even in a mine-run case where there are no `particular circumstances' that would otherwise justify a variance from the Guidelines' sentencing range. Id. at 844 (quoting Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 576). Although Kimbrough and Spears both addressed this issue in the context of the crack-powder cocaine disparity, the Court's decisions in those cases suggest that this authority is not limited to that context. In Kimbrough, for instance, the Court expressly noted that, because the Guidelines are advisory only, as a general matter, `courts may vary from Guidelines ranges based solely on policy considerations, including disagreements with the Guidelines.' 128 S.Ct. at 570 (internal modifications and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Kimbrough 's recognition of the broad authority of sentencing judges reaffirmed the Court's holding in Rita that district courts could depart from the Guidelines whenever the Guidelines sentence itself fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations. 551 U.S. at 351, 127 S.Ct. 2456. And in Spears, the Court justified its holding by explaining that, unless sentencing courts were given the authority to decline to follow the Guidelines on policy grounds, there were two possible outcomes: Either district courts would treat the Guidelines' policy embodied in the crack-to-powder ratio as mandatory, believing that they are not entitled to vary based on `categorical' policy disagreements with the Guidelines, or they would continue to vary, masking their categorical policy disagreements as `individualized determinations.' 129 S.Ct. at 844. Observing that the former outcome contradicted its holding in Kimbrough, and that the latter represented institutionalized subterfuge, the Court concluded that [n]either is an acceptable sentencing practice. Id. This reasoning applies equally to other aspects of the Sentencing Guidelines. In any event, even if Kimbrough and Spears could be read more narrowly, the authority of district courts to reject the Guidelines on policy grounds follows inexorably from the Court's holding in Booker that the Guidelines are advisory only. As we have recognized, Booker and its progeny emphatically empowered the district courts to reject the recommendations of the Sentencing Commission. See Vonner, 516 F.3d at 392 (observing that  Booker empowered district courts, not appellate courts and not the Sentencing Commission  (emphasis added)). To construe the district courts' authority more narrowly, as Herrera-Zuniga argues we should, thus would run counter to a fundamental principle underlying the Supreme Court's post- Booker sentencing jurisprudence. See id. (observing that the central lesson from [the Court's post- Booker] decisions [is] that district courts have considerable discretion in this area and thus deserve the benefit of the doubt when we review their sentences and the reasons given for them.); United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 172 (2d Cir.2008) (The Supreme Court has clearly signaled that district courts enjoy considerable discretion in identifying the grounds that can justify a non-Guidelines sentence.). We thus see no reason to limit the authority recognized in Kimbrough and confirmed in Spears to the crack-powder cocaine context. Nor do we stand alone in that regard. In fact, [a]mong those that have taken a definitive position, our sister circuits appear to be uniformly in accord with this view. United States v. Lente, No. 07-2035, 2009 WL 1143167, at , 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 9391, at  (10th Cir. April 29, 2009) (Holmes, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 196-97 (2d Cir.2008) (upholding district court's variance based on its finding that the Guidelines failed to take into account the greater need for deterrence in New York for firearms offenses because its strict firearms laws had produced a comparatively more profitable black market in firearms); United States v. Tankersley, 537 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Kimbrough to conclude that the district court's decision to departbased on its desire to punish terrorist activities directed at private conduct in a manner similar to how it punished terrorist activities direct [sic] at government conductdid not render [the defendant's] sentence per se unreasonable); United States v. Herrera-Garduno, 519 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir.2008) (relying on Kimbrough to hold the district court's policy disagreement with how `drug trafficking offenses' are defined under § 2L1.2 provided a sufficient reason to impose a non-Guidelines sentence)); see also United States v. Boardman, 528 F.3d 86, 87-88 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that Kimbrough granted district courts broader freedom to determine whether prior convictions qualify as predicate crimes of violence for purposes of the career offender Guideline). That district courts possess the authority to categorically reject the Guidelines, however, does not necessarily mean that it was proper to exercise that authority in this case. Although the Guidelines are advisory, they still provide important guidance for district courts. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 574 (recognizing that the Sentencing Commission plays a key role and fills an important institutional role); Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596 (As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.). Consequently, we must scrutinize closely any decision to reject categorically the Sentencing Commission's recommendations. See Spears, 129 S.Ct. at 843 (explaining that an `inside the heartland' departure (which is necessarily based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines and necessarily disagrees on a `categorical basis,') may be entitled to less respect). Our best guidance in this regard is Kimbrough, where the Court found that the district court's rejection of the crack cocaine Guidelines was reasonable because those Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role. 128 S.Ct. at 575. In other words, a categorical, policy-based rejection of the Guidelines, even though entitled to less respect, nevertheless is permissible where the guidelines in question do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role. Id.; see United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 227 (1st Cir.2008) (finding that the Guidelines' fast-track departure scheme did not exemplify the [Sentencing] Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role, and thus it deserve[d] less deference than the sentencing guidelines normally attract). Although this may not be the only circumstance in which sentencing courts are authorized to reject the Guidelines on policy grounds, it is sufficient to support the district court's decision in this case. As explained above, the district court rejected the advisory Guidelines range on the grounds that the base offense level prescribed under § 2L1.2(a) was arbitrary and out of balance with Congress' determination of the seriousness of this type of offense. In other words, before considering any individualized sentencing factors, the court was unpersuaded that the offense level chosen by the Sentencing Commission fulfilled the sentencing goals set forth by Congress in § 3553(a). Under Kimbrough and Spears, that is an adequate and appropriate basis for refusing to follow the advisory Guidelines range.