Opinion ID: 2419331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Correctness of the Decision of the Administrative Hearing Commission

Text: We agree with the circuit court that AHC fell into error in holding that MHFRC's purported decision was so lacking in compliance with statutory requirements as to amount to no decision at all. Charter's argument is as ingenious as it is unprecedented. The committee issued a purported decision in writing. Charter was advised in writing that its application had been denied. Yet it seeks to convert the alleged deficiencies into an absence of notice, sufficient to convert the ostensible denial into an automatic approval for failure to act within the time delimited by § 197.330.1(5). The facts stipulated before AHC show that Charter's application was expressly denied, by majority vote, on December 16, 1982. It may be fairly inferred that the committee members had the SHPDA staff report before them, that MHFRC approved the substance of that report, and that it implicitly authorized the transmittal of the conclusions in the report to the applicant along with its decision. This procedure well might constitute substantial compliance with the statutory requirements. Charter makes much of the rubber stamp signature of the chairman and of his statement that he did not expressly authorize the use of this stamp, but the written communication accurately reflected the decision of the committee and a signature is not expressly required by the statute. It cannot be successfully argued that MHFRC did not reach and communicate a decision within the time allowed. Charter goes on to argue however, that the communications are totally inadequate to constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by § 197.330.1(5), and that the decision is therefore a nullity. It rejects the normal procedure of remand to the agency for further findings, and takes a quantum leap by observing that the time for action by MHFRC is past, and asserting that the remedy for the perceived inadequacy is a decree of automatic approval pursuant to § 197.330.2. [4] We reject the suggestion. The policy of the law would not be well served by a holding that an applicant could acquire the right to build a possibly unneeded facility, simply because MHFRC issued a decision but blundered in the formalities. [5] Charter has an adequate remedy by appealing the denial of its application to AHC for full evidentiary hearing pursuant to § 197.335 and the procedural provisions there incorporated. This appeal is the sole recourse available to an applicant whose application is timely denied by MHFRC. Inasmuch as Charter had taken proper steps to perfect an appeal, the circuit court acted properly in remanding the case to AHC for a full hearing as provided by statute. Because the briefs of the parties and amici indicate some uncertainty about further proceedings we deem instructions appropriate, while resisting the temptation to comment on hypothetical problems raised by the parties and amici which need not be resolved in the context of this case. The respondent MHFRC argues that AHC acted beyond its constitutional and statutory authority in finding the committee's decision so defective under the statutory standards as to constitute a nullity. It places reliance on State Tax Commission v. Administrative Hearing Commission, 641 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. banc 1982), which holds that AHC cannot exercise powers within the exclusive province of the judiciary. We need not answer the question as put, or comment on the authority of AHC to decide legal questions necessary to the resolution of cases before it. AHC's holding was manifestly erroneous, for the reasons just discussed, and this conclusion of error is fully adequate to support the judgment of the circuit court. It is appropriate to observe, nevertheless, that AHC has no authority to superintend the operation of MHFRC, or to determine what procedures it should follow. It is limited to reviewing its decisions in accordance with the governing statutes. A reviewing tribunal, if of the opinion the findings and conclusions of a subordinate tribunal are inadequate, might appropriately remand the case for further findings. Such a remand to MHFRC would be inappropriate in this case. It is the sense of the statute that MHFRC is to do its work on an accelerated schedule. A hearing before the committee is required only if requested. The hearing at that level, furthermore, is an abbreviated procedure with no provision for summoning witnesses or for cross-examination, and severe time constraints. Only committee members are permitted to ask questions. No formal transcript is available. This hearing is of a kind often afforded by legislative bodies, but it is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. AHC, by contrast, affords a full and complete evidentiary hearing, which should now proceed. There is no support, statutory or otherwise, for the proposition that AHC functions in this instance solely as an appellate tribunal having the duty of reviewing the record before MHFRC to determine whether its decision is supportable. Any such use of AHC has no precedent elsewhere in the statutes and would raise serious problems under State Tax Commission v. Administrative Hearing Commission, supra . AHC is obliged to proceed in accordance with its governing statutes, which provide only for a full evidentiary hearing. [6] The burden of persuasion, as always, is on the party who asserts error in the decision appealed from. We need not determine, in the context of this record, who, if anyone, might appeal from the approval of and final administrative action on an application by reason of failure by the committee to issue a written decision ... within the time required by this section, ... or speculate as to the tribunal to which such an appeal might be taken under the provisions of § 197.330.2. We find no failure of decision within the time delimited. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed and the case is remanded to the Administrative Hearing Commission for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. HIGGINS, C.J., BILLINGS, WELLIVER and RENDLEN, JJ., and SNYDER and FINCH, Special Judges, concur. DONNELLY and ROBERTSON, JJ., not sitting.