Opinion ID: 1443088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Hearsay Testimony Introduced at Trial Violated the Constitution's Confrontation Clause

Text: The irrelevance of the illegal/legal possession distinction ties directly into the next issue we consider: whether the admission of Dr. Wilkes' hearsay testimony suggesting that Goldberg's possession of the steroids was illegal violated the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution. During the course of its investigation of Equihealth, the Government reached out to Dr. Wilkes, Equihealth's then in-house veterinarian who was weakened by illness and unable to care for himself at the time that the F.B.I. spoke with him. As a result of his circumstances, we surmise that Wilkes was more than willing to cooperate with the F.B.I.'s investigation in order to avoid arrest and/or incarceration for his role in Equihealth's operations, and accordingly view his statements made under the circumstances with a degree of suspicion. During the course of his interview, Wilkes told the agent what he did for Equihealth on a day-to-day basis, and then disclosed an incident where Goldberg obtained Stanozolol for his brother to use on racehorses in his care. In order to prove that his story was true, Wilkes agreed to place a call to Goldberg that would be surreptitiously recorded. During that conversation, Goldberg freely admitted that he had obtained steroids for his brother after a three-way call involving Wilkes, Goldberg, and Goldberg's brother. In response, Wilkes told Goldberg that he did not remember that call, implying instead that Goldberg had actually obtained the prescription by forging his signature and D.E.A. number on the order form submitted to the wholesaler. Wilkes stated, I don't understand ... how you got ... my DEA number. In response, Goldberg recounted to Wilkes the following chain of events: You called Pet Health and gave it to them.... I called you and told you that I wanted to use it for, uh, my brother's horses, and you said okay[;] you called [P]et [H]ealth, and you gave them the number, you never gave the number to me. Later in the same conversation, Wilkes accused Goldberg of lying about his qualifications, saying, you told me you had a license to practice in Pennsylvania[,][t]o sell drugs in Pennsylvania. Again, Goldberg responded with his version of events: Naw, I didn't, I am not a Vet, Doc, and further explained that he had no license to dispense drugs at the behest of a veterinarian, saying, I never told you I am a pharmacist, I don't have a pharmacy. Wilkes retorted, Well that's ... what I was led to believe, that's all. Although Wilkes died before trial, the Government sought to introduce the tape (and succeeded in doing so), which it relied on during its closing argument to prove that Wilkes did not know that Marvin Goldberg had his DEA number, that he didn't know that Marvin Goldberg was repeatedly using that number in order to obtain Stanozolol from Pet Health Pharmacy, and that Goldberg had lied to Wilkes about being licensed. Put another way, the Government offered Wilkes' self-interested, out-of-court statement to prove the matters asserted. The parties (and we) agree that this amounted to a violation of Goldberg's rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause. As a result, we are only concerned with the harm visited by this event, and will reverse unless the Government proves this misstep was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., United States v. Toliver, 330 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir.2003). The steroids transaction that we are concerned with here is the same one that is discussed above, the Stanozolol transaction that led to the possession with intent to distribute charges. Relevant to our analysis, we note that the elements of the offense are: (1) knowing or intentional (2) possession (3) with intent to distribute of (4) a controlled substance. United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir.2006). For the same reasons that we disagreed with Goldberg's claim that the jury had to be told that possession really meant illegal possession, we disagree with his claim that the salient issue was whether Dr. Wilkes prescribed the Stanozolol in the amounts ordered, and whether he used his DEA number to obtain it. Goldberg Op. Br. 38. Instead, we view the key issue to be whether Goldberg possessed (legally or illegally) a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it. The conflict between Wilkes' statement and Goldberg's version of events centers solely on the legality of his possession, which, as we explained above, has no bearing since a conviction for possession with intent to distribute can stand whether it is predicated on legal or illegal possession. Because Wilkes' statements are irrelevant to whether he had committed this crime, its admission into the mix of information the jury was considering in relation to this charge was harmless. Government of Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 964 F.2d 1380, 1390 (3d Cir.1992). That said, we do consider the effect that Wilkes' statements, which undoubtedly impugned Goldberg's credibility, could have had on the trial as a whole. To that end, we note that Goldberg's credibility is simply not at issue in this case  the balance of the charges can be grouped into two categories, those based on false certifications that the drugs would not be resold and those based on dispensing prescription drugs without a veterinarian's order. At trial, the evidence supporting the jury's finding that Goldberg lied about his intention not to resell the drugs was overwhelming, so these twenty-eight convictions still stand. Further, the remaining charges stem from dispensing drugs without a prescription, which is something that Goldberg readily acknowledges that he did, meaning that there were no credibility determinations that needed to be made as to these counts. In this context, the Government's error was harmless. See Joseph, 964 F.2d at 1390.