Opinion ID: 354327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Escobedo Contention

Text: 20 The state trial court held that there had been no Escobedo violation. Several of the court's findings of fact underlay that conclusion. The court distinguished Escobedo in part because (t)he interrogation of the defendants was clearly of an investigatory character of an unsolved crime. Escobedo, of course, applies only when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory. 378 U.S. at 492, 84 S.Ct. at 1766. The record before us, however, establishes beyond question that the process had shifted from investigatory to accusatory four days before Schmidt confessed. He had been taken into custody on a warrant charging him with suspicion of felony murder. To the extent that the quoted finding suggests that Schmidt was not the focus of the investigation or that the interrogation was not intended to elicit a confession, it is not fairly supported by the record. 21 The court also found, however, that when Schmidt was first brought to No. 1 Police Station, he was advised that he could have counsel if he so desired, but he failed to ask for it. Justice Roberts, the only justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court who made a detailed analysis of the testimony at the suppression hearing, was justifiably skeptical about that finding. He wrote: 22 My review of the undisputed evidence in this case precludes me from giving any weight to the majority's conclusion, upon which it seems to rely heavily, that Schmidt effectively waived his right to the assistance of counsel. The only evidence that Schmidt waived his right to counsel is contained in the testimony of Detective Tercsak who stated that on the day of the defendant's arrest he warned him of his constitutional right to remain silent and of his right to be represented by counsel. Significantly, while Detective Tercsak recorded on a police action sheet that he had informed the defendant of these rights, he did not record the fact that the defendant responded by saying that he did not want counsel at that time. If Tercsak's purpose was to make a record of his action in case of a future challenge, as it evidently was, I find it inconceivable that he did not also record the denial. 6 Moreover, the interrogation took place prior to the decision in Escobedo and it was admitted by the police at the hearing that at the time of the instant interrogation they did not as a general rule inform suspects of their right to representation. In response to a question as to why he made an exception in this case, Tercsak replied because they were juveniles. I fail to see how Tercsak, or this Court, can conclude that while the defendant was so young that he needed a special warning, nonetheless, he was mature enough to make an intelligent and knowing decision to decline the assistance of counsel. 23 6. There was considerable dispute as to the accuracy of these police action sheets. On this point the testimony of Detective Tercsak and his fellow officers was in conflict. 24 423 Pa. at 448-49, 224 A.2d at 633. Justice Roberts's description of the evidence is accurate. In reviewing the trial court's factual determinations, however, he may have more latitude than does a federal judge ruling on a habeas corpus petition. The standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is limited, and the burden rests on the petitioner to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous. The trial judge in the suppression hearing found Detective Tercsak's testimony to be credible and all conflicting testimony not credible. Thus for Escobedo purposes, we must take it as established that Schmidt was told, on his arrival at No. 1 Police Station, that he had a right to counsel. We must also take it as established that he waived that right prior to interrogation. Escobedo alone would not therefore be authority for the grant of habeas corpus relief.