Opinion ID: 164773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Facial Constitutionality of Former Section 3.50

Text: 53 Regulations governing the use of public property for free expression are not inconsistent with civil liberties but ... [are] one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which [civil liberties] ultimately depend. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941). Permitting schemes are necessary to ensure that scarce space is allocated among conflicting applicants, to protect public access to thoroughfares and public facilities, and to enable police, fire, and other public safety officials to function. In general, content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations governing use of public property are permissible so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). 5 54 UARC does not allege that the former Section 3.50 was content-based or that its permit application was handled differently on account of the content or viewpoint of its message. Rather, UARC's argument is based on the absence of any deadlines for grant or denial of permit applications under Section 3.50. It contends that the Ordinance is a form of prior restraint, and that the absence of written deadlines rendered the former Section 3.50 facially unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decisions in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965), and FW/PBS v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990). 55 In Freedman, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute under which a theater owner was required to submit any film it wished to exhibit to the State Board of Censors for advance approval. Among other constitutional defects in this scheme, the Supreme Court noted that the absence of any requirement that the approval process be completed promptly would enable the Board to censor films through delay. The Court thus held that any restraint of speech under such a scheme must be limited to preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial administration. 380 U.S. at 59, 85 S.Ct. 734. Similarly, in FW/PBS, the Court held that a licensing scheme for sexually oriented speech must set reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker. 493 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 596 (plurality opinion). See also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 802, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988) (a licensing scheme for solicitations requires definite time limits because delay compels the speaker's silence); Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1250 (10th Cir.2000) (because the plaintiff is barred from aiding any solicitations within the state until it complies with all the Act's requirements ... [t]he Act therefore definitionally qualifies as a prior restraint). 56 As the district court recognized, this case does not present the same problem posed by the prior restraint cases. In Freedman, FW/PBS, Riley, and American Target, each day of delay in acting on the application was a day in which the speaker was forced to be silent. As the district court put it: the government was directly preventing speech at the time the challenge was brought. Op. 6. The same is not true when the desired speech will not take place until some future date. In this case, for example, UARC's desired demonstrations would not take place for almost a year after it filed its application. Thus, the City's delay in processing UARC's application in no way prevented it from speaking. Id. at 8. Thus, while it is true that any restraint on speech pursuant to a content-based licensing or censorship scheme must be limited to the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution, Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59, 85 S.Ct. 734, that principle does not undermine Section 3.50, because under that section, speakers are not restrained from speaking at the time of the processing delay. 57 Moreover, as the district court also concluded, this case is governed not by Freedman and its progeny, which apply to content-based licensing or censorship schemes, but by Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002). In Thomas, the Court upheld a municipal park ordinance requiring groups to obtain a permit before conducting activities in the parks involving more than 50 persons. The Court clarified that the procedural requirements outlined in FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 225-27, 110 S.Ct. 596, which were spawned by the concerns of censorship present in the Freedman case, 380 U.S. at 57, 85 S.Ct. 734, were not applicable to ordinances that did not authorize a licensor to pass judgment on the content of speech. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322, 122 S.Ct. 775. The Court observed that it had never required that a content-neutral permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman. Id. 6 Those requirements were necessary only in cases where the regulators were asked to focus on, or where the regulations specifically referred to, speech of a specific content. See id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 775 (noting that Freedman was concerned with a board's authority to reject films that it found obscene); FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227, 110 S.Ct. 596 (similar concern when regulation singles out sexually oriented businesses). Among the procedural requirements the Thomas Court held inapplicable to content-neutral permit schemes is the requirement of a limit on the time during which speech can be restrained before the decisionmaker acts on the application. Instead, a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation is constitutional provided that it contains adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to judicial review. Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323, 122 S.Ct. 775. There is no requirement of a fixed statutory deadline. 58 UARC's confusion on this point of law is understandable because, prior to the Thomas decision, the scope and applicability of the doctrine of prior restraint was far from clear. As the First Circuit recently observed: 59 Until very recently, it was unclear whether the Freedman formulation applied to content-neutral permit schemes designed to ensure public safety in a traditional public forum. Compare, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975) (stating that Freedman applies in a public forum), with Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403, 73 S.Ct. 760, 97 L.Ed. 1105 (1953) (suggesting that a different standard applies if the license requirement reflects a ministerial police routine). The Supreme Court erased this uncertainty within the past few months. In Thomas, the Court clarified that Freedman 's procedural requirements do not apply to permit schemes that eschew any consideration of the content of speech.... [534 U.S. at 323, 122 S.Ct. at 775]. 60 New England Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir.2002) (case citations shortened and parallel citations omitted). 61 As discussed above, Section 3.50 is content-neutral. In Rock Against Racism, the Court stated that [t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746. Section 3.50.020G provides: 62 Free expression activity means any formation, procession, or assembly upon any public street, park or other public way or other traditional public forum in a manner which does not comply with normal or usual regulations or controls and which claims that it has the purpose of engaging in constitutionally protected speech or assembly. 63 This provision obviously makes no reference to the content or viewpoint of free expression activity. In administering the Ordinance, City officials are not required — nor are they permitted — to consider the messages applicants intend to communicate. An animal rights group receives precisely the same consideration as a pro-life demonstration, a religious vigil, or a pep rally for the local basketball team. Section 3.50 is a measure designed to preserve public safety and coordinate multiple uses of limited space, Thomas, 534 U.S. at 323, 122 S.Ct. 775, while maintaining public safety, without regard to the content of speech or the message or viewpoint of permit applicants. 64 Under the guidance of Thomas, then, our inquiry narrows to whether the regulations: 1) possess adequate standards to guide the exercise of official discretion and make possible meaningful judicial review; and 2) are narrowly tailored to a significant state interest while leaving open satisfactory alternative means of communication. See 534 U.S. at 323 & n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 775. UARC does not appear to argue that the Ordinance violates these requirements, and we therefore need not delve into them. Because there is no constitutional requirement for a fixed deadline in the context of permit applications under a content-neutral regulatory scheme, and UARC does not challenge any other aspect of the Ordinance under the Thomas criteria, we reject UARC's facial challenge to the former Section 3.50.