Opinion ID: 182125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: JMOL and New Trial for Willfulness

Text: [T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed.Cir.2007) (en banc). This is an objective inquiry. Id. In addition, a patentee must show that this risk was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer. Id. This is a subjective inquiry. The district court concluded that no reasonable jury could have found that Microsoft's conduct fell under either Seagate prong. Uniloc II, 640 F.Supp.2d at 176-77 (objective prong), 177-79 (subjective prong). If the accused infringer's position is susceptible to a reasonable conclusion of no infringement, the first prong of Seagate cannot be met. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1374 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Because `rigid' was susceptible to a reasonable construction under which Waters's products did not infringe, there was not an objectively high likelihood that Waters's actions constituted infringement.). Uniloc has failed to meet the threshold objective prong of Seagate. Uniloc has not presented any evidence at trial or on appeal showing why Microsoft, at the time it began infringement, could not have reasonably determined that MD5 and SHA1 did not meet the licensee unique ID generating means, licensee unique ID, or registration system/mode switching means limitations. Specifically, infringement of the licensee unique ID generating means limitation is a complicated issue, made more so because equivalence requires an intensely factual inquiry, DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1337 (Fed.Cir.2009). Uniloc's argument about copying is largely inapposite. See id. at 1336 ([E]vidence of copying in a case of direct infringement is relevant only to Seagate's second prong.). As the district court noted, the facts here presented are hardly the stuff of which objectively reckless unreasonable conduct is made. Uniloc II, 640 F.Supp.2d at 177. Given this court's conclusion that Uniloc failed to show that a reasonable jury could find Microsoft's conduct objectively reckless on the evidence presented, this court need not address the subjective prong of Seagate. This court thus affirms the district court's grant of JMOL of no willfulness, and need not address the district court's alternative grant of a new trial on willfulness.