Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Response to Jury Question About Unanimity

Text: On the second day of penalty phase deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking, in relevant part: What happens if the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision? The jury also asked whether the court would decide on a sentence and whether a sentence of life imprisonment without parole would be given automatically. Defense counsel requested that the jury be given a verbatim reading of section 190.4, subdivision (b), which would instruct them that in the event they could not reach a unanimous verdict, the court would dismiss the jury and impanel a new jury to try the issue of penalty. In the alternative, he requested an instruction telling the jury it had received all the law and the evidence and was not to speculate as to the consequences of their failure to agree. As a third alternative, defense counsel asked the court to give CALJIC No. 17.40. [18] The prosecutor objected that defendant's proposed instructions were inappropriate because the jury had not indicated it was deadlocked. It had merely asked what would happen if it did deadlock. The trial court observed that almost exactly the same question was presented in People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 539 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101], in which the jury asked, `What would be the action taken by the court in the event that the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision?' We approved of the court's response, which advised the jury not to consider or concern itself with this matter and told jurors to `make every effort to reach a unanimous decision if at all possible.' ( Ibid. ) We further held that the Thomas court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury that their inability to reach a verdict would result in a retrial of the penalty phase and could not lead to a sentence of less than life without possibility of parole. ( Ibid. ) Expressly relying on our decision in Thomas, the trial court here responded to the question from defendant's jury about the consequences of an inability to reach a unanimous verdict by instructing them: [T]hat subject is not for the jury to consider or to concern itself with. You must make every effort to reach [a] unanimous decision if at all possible. Defendant now claims the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the consequences of a deadlock. He also contends the instruction that the jury must reach a unanimous decision if possible was coercive under the circumstances. These claims have no merit. (44) We have repeatedly held, in cases presenting the same circumstances, that `[t]he trial court is not required to `educate the jury on the legal consequences of a possible deadlock.'' [Citations.] ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 402 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]; see People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1193.) Informing the jury about the possibility of retrial in the event of a deadlock is risky, because it has the potential for unduly confusing and misguiding the jury in their proper role and function in the penalty determination process. Penalty phase juries are presently instructed that their proper task is to decide between a sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole. Any further instruction along the lines suggested herein could well serve to lessen or diminish that obligation in the jurors' eyes. [Citations.] ( People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 814 [248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22.) As we have emphasized, at the penalty stage, [t]he proper focus of the jury's deliberations is which penalty to choose, and not whether to make the choice in the first place. ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 746.) The potential for mischief is especially acute when, as here, the jury's question comes early in their deliberations and there is no indication of an actual, as opposed to hypothetical, failure to agree. Especially in a case like thisin which it was not clear that there actually was any deadlockan instruction informing the jury of the consequence of a deadlock `would have diminished the jurors' sense of duty to deliberate, and to be open to the ideas of fellow jurors. The effect of a hung jury is irrelevant to the jury's deliberation of any issue before it. ' ( People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1115 [248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960], italics added.) ( Hughes, at p. 402.) For a contrary result, defendant relies on a statement taken out of context from our opinion in People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80]. In Wader, absent any note from the jury inquiring about the consequences of a failure to achieve unanimity, the defendant requested that the court give an instruction stating that the jury was not required to reach a verdict and that `[t]he possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable by-product of the requirement that a verdict must be unanimous.' ( Id. at p. 664.) We found the trial court properly denied this request. In reaching this conclusion, we said, there is no duty to instruct a jury regarding its possible failure to reach a verdict in the absence of a request by the jury for an explanation. ( Ibid. ) Defendant seizes on this statement as support for his argument that when there is a request by the jury for an explanation about the consequences of a failure to reach a unanimous verdict, the court has a duty to instruct on the point. However, when viewed in context, the statement in Wader refutes, rather than supports, defendant's interpretation. Referring to our established case law criticizing instructions that explain the possibility of retrial, we stated: We have previously rejected the proposition that when a jury asks the trial court what will happen if it fails to reach a penalty verdict, the court must explain to the jury the consequences of its failure to agree. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 227 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) It follows that there is no duty to instruct a jury regarding its possible failure to reach a verdict in the absence of a request by the jury for an explanation. ( Wader, at p. 664.) In other words, there is no duty to instruct when the jury does not ask for an explanation because there is no duty to instruct even when the jury does ask. (See also People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 746-747 [although a trial court may instruct a deliberating jury on the consequences of its inability to reach a unanimous verdict, nothing in the federal Constitution requires it to do so].) Finally, it was not coercive to instruct the jury, in response to the note, You must make every effort to reach [a] unanimous decision if at all possible. Defendant likens this statement to various dynamite instructions we have disapproved in the past. (See, e.g., People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 852 [139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997].) The comparison is inapt. The trial court here simply reminded the jury of its duty to deliberate and try to reach a unanimous verdict if possible. The instruction did not introduce extraneous factors into deliberations by admonishing minority jurors to reconsider their positions, or by pressuring jurors into reaching a decision quickly. (See Gainer, at pp. 847-852.) [19]