Opinion ID: 2375738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's Coverage

Text: The first issue presented is whether the trial court erred in ruling on the facts of this case that the restaurant operations exclusion in plaintiff's policy absolved plaintiff of all responsibility to the insureds Cowan and Deachman. A careful review of the record convinces us that the trial court did err. [1] It is well settled that the interpretation of an insurance policy is for this court and that the test in this jurisdiction is what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would understand the policy to mean. Sun Insurance Co. v. Hamanne, 113 N.H. 319, 321, 306 A.2d 786, 788 (1973); Hanover Insurance Co. v. Grondin, 119 N.H. 394, 397, 402 A.2d 174, 176 (1979). See generally R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a) (1971). In the case of an express exclusion, the question is whether the ordinary layman in the position of the insured could reasonably be expected to understand that certain exclusions qualified the policy's grants of coverage. Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Gollan, 118 N.H. 744, 745, 394 A.2d 839, 841 (1978); Brown v. City of Laconia, 118 N.H. 376, 386 A.2d 1276 (1978); see Olszak v. Peerless Insurance Co., 119 N.H. 686, 406 A.2d 711 (1979). [2] Plaintiff's policy states in typical fashion that it covers all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay damages because of bodily injury ... to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and arising out of the ownership . . . of the insured premises. (Emphasis added.) The exclusion provides only that the premises liability coverage does not apply to restaurant operations. Reading the two provisions together, we conclude that the reasonable person in the position of the insured would expect coverage for all accidents on the premises except those caused by restaurant operations. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. v. Lee Raceway, Inc., 113 N.H. 593, 596, 311 A.2d 307, 309 (1973). [3] The trial court's finding that Schofield was engaged in restaurant operations at the time of her injury is supported by the record. The question is not, however, whether Schofield was injured while engaged in a restaurant activity, but whether the restaurant activity, or some other insured-against risk, was the proximate cause of her injury. See Nassif Realty Corp. v. National Fire Insurance Co., 109 N.H. 117, 119, 244 A.2d 194, 196 (1968); Huckins v. People's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 31 N.H. 238, 247 (1855); R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 5.5(b) (1971). Schofield makes no claim that her injuries were caused by anything relating to restaurant operations. Her claim is that a defective condition in the trap door was the cause of the accident. Her suit against the owners of the house is based on their negligence as lessors in not maintaining the trap door in a safe condition, or, in the alternative, in not warning her of the danger. We therefore cannot agree with the court's finding that Schofield's injury arose out of restaurant operations. The fact that she was engaged in duties that were restaurant-related merely put her where she was at the time of the accident. It furnished the occasion for the injury, but it did not cause the injury. Cf. Terrien v. Pawtucket Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 96 N.H. 182, 185, 71 A.2d 742, 745 (1950) (upholding finding that the later and more direct of two concurring causes was the proximate cause of injury). See also Heuer v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 393, 33 N.E. 411 (1893). [4] We hold that Schofield's injuries were not proximately caused by restaurant operations, and therefore that Schofield's claims do not trigger the restaurant operations exclusion. Plaintiff's policy provides coverage for any liability arising from the underlying claims.