Opinion ID: 1345760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Circumstantial evidence instructions.

Text: The trial court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.02, which advised the jury on how to evaluate circumstantial evidence introduced to prove the accused's specific intent or mental state. The court also read CALJIC Nos. 8.83 and 8.83.1, which covered circumstantial evidence both generally, and with respect to intent or state of mind, in connection with the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation. (7) However, defendant claims the court erred prejudicially by refusing also to give CALJIC No. 2.01, the basic circumstantial-evidence instruction. We find no basis for reversal. Since defendant admitted killing Savage and taking at least some of his property, circumstantial evidence was entirely unnecessary on those issues. The only disputed matter sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence was the specific intent or state of mind with which defendant committed the charged acts. Accordingly, the instructions given covered the ground adequately.
(8a) Defendant claims that the giving of a flight instruction and the wording of the instruction given were erroneous on the facts of this case. We disagree on the merits and find no prejudice in any event. The trial court gave the following modified version of CALJIC No. 2.52 (4th ed. 1979) (modification in italics): The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. If there was such flight, the weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. An instruction in substantially this form must be given whenever the prosecution relies on evidence of flight to show consciousness of guilt. (ง 1127c.) [9] (9) A flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the circumstances of defendant's departure from the crime scene or his usual environs, or of his escape from custody after arrest, logically permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty knowledge. (See, e.g., People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 391 [105 Cal. Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585]; see also Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 36-37.) [10] (8b) Defendant urges that since the evidence shows only his return to his home town after the homicide, there is no basis for an inference of guilty flight. He claims the trial court erred by failing to make a preliminary ruling on this pure question of law, and by leaving its resolution to the jury under the modified language of the instruction. (See People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597-598 [138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203].) However, the trial court did effectively rule that there was substantial evidence of flight. The court explained there was a departure from the homicide scene, the meaning of which must be left to the jury. This was an implicit conclusion that the circumstances of the departure permitted an inference of guilty motive. Moreover, in contrast with Hannon, supra, 19 Cal.3d 588, the modified instruction here did not by its terms [leave] open the possibility that no evidence of [consciousness of guilt] may have been presented. [Fn. omitted.].... (19 Cal.3d at p. 597, italics in original.) [11] As the statute requires, the instruction merely allowed the jury to determine from the relevant evidence whether flight had been proved. Finally, evidence of guilty flight was substantial, if not compelling. Mere return to familiar environs from the scene of an alleged crime does not warrant an inference of consciousness of guilt ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 37; Clem, supra, 104 Cal. App.3d at p. 344; People v. Watson (1977) 75 Cal. App.3d 384, 403 [142 Cal. Rptr. 134]), but the circumstances of departure from the crime scene may sometimes do so. (E.g., Cannady, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 391.) There were indications that defendant's departure from the Savage residence occurred with particular haste (a screen door left wide open, the victim's watch and rings left behind), and defendant himself testified he fled in panic, using the victim's car. The jury might well assume that these were normal responses to a grisly homicide, having no independent sinister significance, but that is not the only reasonable inference. In any event, we discern no prejudice. Since defendant admitted participation in a bloody slaying, the jury was most likely to infer, as the instruction permitted, that his hasty departure was to be expected regardless of his consciousness of guilt. Moreover, the independent evidence that he committed murder in the course of a robbery was extremely strong. We see no reasonable probability that the flight instruction affected the verdicts. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
(10) The trial court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.27, which advised that the credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient proof of any fact, but cautioned that before finding any fact to be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, the jury should carefully review the testimony on which the proof of such fact depends. Defendant argues the court erred by omitting a phrase which would have limited the cautionary admonition to the finding of any fact required to be established by the prosecution. [12] He urges that as given, the instruction unfairly singled out his own testimony for suspicion and wrongly implied he had the burden of proof to negate malice. We recognize that the precision of the standard single witness instruction could be marginally improved. However, we see no error or prejudice in the form of instruction given here. In the first place, we could hardly fault the trial court for instructing as it did, since it followed exactly the form we prescribed in People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864 [123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845]. There we discussed the instruction as a necessary aid to defendants implicated only by the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, but we did not limit our holding to prosecution witnesses. We declared that a cautionary single-witness instruction, phrased exactly as stated in this trial, should be given in every criminal case in which no [independent] evidence [corroborating a single witness] is required.... (P. 885, italics added.) CALJIC later developed its own slightly altered form which optionally limited the instruction to any fact required to be established by the prosecution. (See CALJIC No. 2.27.) However, the Use Note for the CALJIC instruction advises that the limitation to prosecutorial evidence should be deleted as to testimony by a single witness of defenses as to which the defendant has the burden of proof. (CALJIC (5th ed. 1988) at p. 55.) Defendant argues, in essence, that the uncorroborated testimony of a defense witness should never be subject to the cautionary instruction, since the state must prove every element of a charged offense, and the defense has no burden of proof of facts to which the admonition might apply. (E.g., People v. Cornett (1948) 33 Cal.2d 33, 42-43 [198 P.2d 877]; People v. Hyde (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 463, 475 [212 Cal. Rptr. 440]; see In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375, 90 S.Ct. 1068].) [13] However, an accused is not entitled to a false and unique aura of veracity when his uncorroborated testimony is offered as evidence raising a reasonable doubt that he is guilty as charged. (See People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 879, 896, fn. 7 [258 Cal. Rptr. 208, 771 P.2d 1294] [false-in-part instruction].) When the accused offers his uncorroborated testimony for this purpose, the jury should weigh such evidence with the same caution it accords similarly uncorroborated testimony by a prosecution witness. Defendant claims the instruction is nonetheless confusing as here given, since it erroneously suggests the defense, like the prosecution, has the burden of proving facts. On reflection, we agree that the instruction's wording could be altered to have a more neutral effect as between prosecution and defense, while still satisfying the concerns we identified in Rincon-Pineda, supra, 14 Cal.3d 864. We encourage further effort toward the development of an improved instruction. [14] However, we cannot conclude that the instant jury was misled. Defendant's testimony conceded he had committed homicide and had taken property. He sought only to disclaim the independent felony (robbery) or the malice necessary for murder. On the other hand, the jury was instructed at length that the People must prove all elements of each charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including defendant's specific mental state where relevant. The jury was expressly told that it must acquit defendant of any charge, and find the special circumstance untrue, if it had a reasonable doubt that all elements of the offense or special circumstance had been established. We cannot imagine that the generalized reference to proof of facts in CALJIC No. 2.27 would be construed by a reasonable jury to undermine these much-stressed principles. Finally, defendant asserts that since his was the only uncorroborated testimony in the case, the instruction unfairly implied that his testimony alone should not be trusted. Again, however, defendant advances no reason why an accused's uncorroborated testimony is entitled to special credibility. On the contrary, the jury must understand that any uncorroborated information offered by a single witness, defense or prosecution, is to be viewed with caution. Finally, even if we were to deem the instruction erroneous or misleading under the circumstances of this case, we could find no prejudice in light of the very strong prosecution evidence and the inherent improbability of much of defendant's testimony. We therefore find no basis for reversal.
The trial court gave a slightly modified version of the standard false-in-part instruction. (CALJIC, former No. 2.21 (4th ed. 1979), see now CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1, 2.21.2 (5th ed. 1988).) The instruction warned that [a] witness willfully false in one material part of his testimony is to be distrusted in others. It authorized the jury to reject the whole testimony of such a witness unless, from all the evidence, you shall believe the probability of truth favors his testimony in other particulars. On the other hand, the instruction cautioned that discrepancies between witnesses, or within a witness's own testimony, do not necessarily indicate general untrustworthiness, since innocent forgetfulness is common, and two persons may see the same events differently. [15] (11) Defendant claims the instruction improperly singled out his testimony alone for suspicion, and thus lessened the prosecution's burden, because the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution witnesses was not disputed. The instruction was also invalid here, defendant urges, because there was no evidence that he told any material willful falsehood on the stand. We find no error or prejudice. False-in-part instructions have been criticized and disapproved elsewhere on grounds that they are superfluous and invite the jury to conclude the court believes one or more witnesses have lied. (See, e.g., Kinard v. United States (D.C.App. 1980) 416 A.2d 1232; State v. Harris (1970) 106 R.I. 643 [262 A.2d 374, 377]; Knihal v. State (1949) 150 Neb. 771 [36 N.W.2d 109, 112-114]; Rowland v. St. Mary's Bank (1944) 93 N.H. 246 [40 A.2d 741, 742].) However, we recently rejected challenges to the California instruction, noting it has been repeatedly approved [in this state] as a correct statement of the law, appropriately given where there is an evidentiary basis to support it. [Citations.] ( Allison, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 895.) Citing dictum in People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 487, 493 [176 Cal. Rptr. 687], defendant argues the instruction should not be given where it appears principally directed at the exculpatory testimony of the accused. Such a danger exists here, he asserts, because the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution witnesses was largely uncontroverted. We disposed of an identical argument in Allison, supra . We noted that the instruction is neutrally phrased and does not focus attention on a particular witness. (48 Cal.3d at p. 895.) Moreover, we emphasized, in this context as in others, `a defendant who elects to testify is not entitled to a false aura of veracity. [Citations.]' ( Id., at p. 896, fn. 7, quoting People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 [99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1].) Applying neutral standards of credibility to defense witnesses does not improperly lessen the prosecution's burden. Defendant suggests the false-in-part instruction is proper, if ever, only when there are discrepancies between opposing witnesses whose credibility is equally subject to attack. But an inference of willful falsehood can also arise from inconsistencies within the testimony of a single witness (as the instruction itself explains), or when his efforts to explain away undisputed circumstances are inherently implausible. There were many such instances of implausibility in defendant's testimony. Among other things, he denied cutting telephone cords which were found severed; he denied taking property which was found missing; he was arrested in possession of a television he insisted he picked up only for self-defense; and his claims of defensive poking with his knife were inconsistent with the number, depths, and locations of the victim's wounds. Thus, there was ample evidence upon which to base the false-in-part instruction. In any event, we conclude defendant suffered no prejudice by any applicable standard. Given the strong circumstantial evidence of robbery-murder, and the inherent implausibility of much of defendant's version of events, we cannot conclude the instruction caused any increased distrust of his testimony. There is no substantial chance the outcome was affected. No basis for reversal appears.
On the morning of Wednesday, November 21, 1984, the jury returned verdicts on the guilt and special circumstance issues. The forms signed by the foreman indicated a verdict of guilty of first degree murder (count I) and a true finding on the robbery-murder special circumstance. After the verdicts were announced and the jury was polled, the jurors were admonished, told to return for commencement of the penalty trial the following Tuesday, and released. Neither counsel objected to the form or regularity of the verdicts while the jurors remained present. On the afternoon of November 21, the jurors having departed, court and counsel realized that the jury had signed and returned no verdict, one way or the other, on count II, the robbery charge. Over defense counsel's objection, the court took the position that it had not discharged the jurors, and thus still had jurisdiction to recall them to correct the verdict. In the court's view, it could direct the jurors either to record any decision they had already reached on the robbery count, or to resume deliberations on that issue. The nine available jurors and the two alternates were recalled to the courtroom the same afternoon; the remaining three jurors could not be found. Juror Obara, the foreman, insisted in open court that the jury had indeed reached a decision on the robbery count. However, Obara recounted, no verdict form had been signed because the jurors had misinterpreted the court's response to an earlier question as meaning that if they found the murder and special circumstance charges true, they did not have to return a verdict form on the robbery charge. Juror Patten agreed with Obara's account, and no juror present demurred. Nonetheless, the court decided it was not possible to proceed further without all jurors present. The court indicated the jury would therefore be asked to return next Tuesday morning on that matter [i.e., the robbery count] as well as the others [i.e., the penalty phase]. Those present were again admonished not to discuss the case further or to form any opinion or conclusion that hasn't already been reached by you, in your deliberations. [ถ] In other words, please go no further than your state of mind as of this moment. Whatever that is.... The full jury returned as ordered on Tuesday, November 27. The court directed the jury to resume its deliberations on the robbery count, and the jury retired at 10:12 a.m. Eleven minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on count II. (12) Defendant urges that this procedure was erroneous and void because the jurors, once discharged from their guilt phase responsibilities and released from the court's custody and control, could not be recalled to clarify or complete their verdict. However, we recently held the contrary under substantially similar circumstances. In People v. Bonillas (1989) 48 Cal.3d 757 [257 Cal. Rptr. 895, 771 P.2d 844], the jury in a capital case returned guilty verdicts on charges of murder and burglary, and also found true a burglary-murder special circumstance. However, because a necessary verdict form was mistakenly not furnished, the jury failed to specify the degree of the murder as the law requires. (See ง 1157.) The defect was not immediately noticed; the jury was admonished, told to return for the penalty trial, and released. The next day, a Friday, defense counsel brought the problem to the court's attention. Over counsel's objection, the court ordered the jury to reassemble the following Monday, in advance of the penalty trial, to determine the degree of the murder. Within minutes, the jury returned a finding that the murder was in the first degree. In an extended discussion, we upheld this procedure. We explained that jurors in a capital case are neither discharged, nor beyond the court's control, once they have completed guilt phase deliberations. Where, as here, further proceedings are to take place, the jury has not been discharged, the jurors have been specifically instructed that they are still jurors in the case, they have been admonished not to discuss the case with anyone nor to permit anyone to discuss the case with them, and they have been directed not to read anything about the case, the jurors have not thrown off their character as jurors nor entered the outside world freed of the admonitions and obligations shielding their thought processes from outside influences. Clearly, the jury here remained within the court's control [citations], their verdict was incomplete, and the court was authorized to reconvene the jury to complete its verdict. (48 Cal.3d at p. 773.) Similarly, the jury in this case rendered an incomplete guilt verdict, since it failed to find on all charged offenses. Nonetheless, before they were released pending the penalty trial, all the jurors were admonished to avoid exposure to all publicity about the case; to refrain from reading or listening to anything about the case; not to discuss this matter with anyone or allow anyone to discuss it with them; and not to discuss the matter among yourselves or with anyone else. Under these circumstances, as in Bonillas, supra, the panelists had not lost their status as jurors nor entered the world free of court-imposed restrictions on outside influences. The court was therefore authorized to recall them to complete their verdict. [16] Defendant urges that if the jurors could be reconvened for this purpose, at least they should have been instructed clearly to begin their robbery deliberations anew. He asserts that the nine jurors who heard the ambiguous colloquy between the court and Juror Obara on the afternoon of November 21 could reasonably have inferred the court's tacit acceptance of Obara's claim that a robbery verdict had already been reached, and that no further deliberations were necessary. Hence, he implies, the subsequent jury proceedings were fatally infected with improper judicial coercion, as evidenced by the speed of the final robbery verdict. We see no impropriety. In the first place, when all the jurors returned on November 27, they were clearly told to resume deliberations. (Italics added.) Second, the colloquy of November 21 had no coercive import. Indeed, though Juror Obara argued that the jury had merely failed to sign the verdict form, he acknowledged in open court he was sure that won't be accepted.... The court promptly responded, That's right. After hearing further from Obara, the court again stated, Well, sir, I'm sorry. Without the presence of all of the members of the jury, it's just not possible for us to proceed. Nothing in this exchange could reasonably be construed as the court's agreement that no further deliberations were necessary. Nor was it error for the court to suggest, as it did on both November 21 and 27, that the jury should take up robbery deliberations wherever they had left off. The 12 jurors who reconvened on November 27 were the same panelists who had deliberated on November 20 and 21. Thus, it was not necessary that deliberations begin anew in order to afford defendant his right to deliberations which are the common experience of each of the jurors. (Compare People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 692-693 [131 Cal. Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 742].) Finally, defendant argues that if the robbery conviction is invalid on the grounds asserted, the robbery-murder special circumstance must also fall because the former is a necessary condition of the latter. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 59.) Our finding that the robbery conviction was proper makes it unnecessary to address the special circumstance issue.
Defendant urges that his prior convictions should not have been admitted for purposes of impeachment, since the trial court failed to exercise discretion to admit or exclude them after weighing their probative value against their potential for unfair prejudice. (See People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111].) Defendant acknowledges that his trial counsel raised no objection to admission of the prior convictions and did not request that the court exercise its exclusionary discretion. Indeed, defense counsel himself elicited the existence and nature of the prior convictions during his direct examination of defendant. Defendant argues that his counsel thereby rendered ineffective assistance. (13) Under the particular circumstances, however, we need not brand counsel incompetent in order to address the merits of defendant's claim on direct appeal. Though evidentiary challenges are usually waived unless timely raised in the trial court, this is not so when the pertinent law later changed so unforeseeably that it is unreasonable to expect trial counsel to have anticipated the change. (E.g., People v. Ogunmola (1985) 39 Cal.3d 120, 123, fn. 4 [215 Cal. Rptr. 855, 701 P.2d 1173]; In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 861 [83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127]; People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 22-23 [76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353]; People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 [294 P.2d 17].) Such is the case here. In 1982, Proposition 8 added article I, section 28, subdivision (f) (section 28(f)), to the California Constitution, providing that [a]ny prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, ... shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment.... (Italics added.) Section 28(f) governed defendant's trial, since the charged crimes occurred after June 9, 1982, the effective date of Proposition 8. ( People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 257-263 [193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149].) It was widely assumed that the without limitation language of section 28(f) eliminated all restrictions on the admissibility of prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment. We so paraphrased section 28(f) in our decision upholding the validity of Proposition 8. ( Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 243 [186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274] [ง 28(f) permits unlimited use of prior felonies for impeachment].) Moreover, at the time of defendant's November 1984 trial, all but one originally published Court of Appeal decision addressing the issue had so concluded. [17] Under these circumstances, a reasonable and competent criminal trial attorney could well have surmised that any effort to limit or exclude impeachment priors in a case governed by Proposition 8 would be futile. However, in March 1985, after defendant's trial, a majority of this court held in Castro that Proposition 8 did not eliminate the trial court's power and duty under Evidence Code section 352 to weigh the probative value of prior convictions offered for impeachment against their potential for unfair prejudice. Castro further held that only crimes involving moral turpitude are admissible for purposes of impeachment. (38 Cal.3d at pp. 306-316 [plur. opn. of Kaus, J.], 322 [conc. & dis. opn. of Grodin, J.], 323-332 [conc. & dis. opn. of Bird, C.J.].) Our Castro decision thus rejected the overwhelming weight of appellate authority and consciously declined to accept the apparent plain meaning of the constitutional language. (See plur. opn. of Kaus, J., 38 Cal.3d at p. 310 [subdivision (f) seems clear and absolute ... โ `any' means `any' and `without limitation' means `without limitation,' ...]; conc. & dis. opn. of Grodin, J., 38 Cal.3d at p. 319 [subdivision (f) on its face does not suffer from any lack of clarity or directness]; conc. & dis. opn. of Lucas, J., 38 Cal.3d at pp. 322-323 [concurring in Grodin, J.'s analysis of ง 28(f)].) Defendant's counsel cannot be saddled with the burden of anticipating such an abrupt change in the law. [18] We therefore address defendant's Castro claim. (14) We note at the outset that the two prior convictions were neither admissible nor inadmissible as a matter of law. (See People v. Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d 378, 389, 390, fn. 11.) Both robbery and receiving stolen property necessarily involve moral turpitude. ( Id., at p. 395; People v. Waldecker (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 1152, 1156 [241 Cal. Rptr. 650]; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 177 Cal. App.3d 174, 178-179 [222 Cal. Rptr. 809].) Moreover, under the facts of this case, the broad authority afforded by Castro would have permitted the trial court either to admit or to exclude both prior convictions. (15) Nonetheless, we find no need for a  Collins remand to enable the trial court to exercise its Castro discretion nunc pro tunc. On the facts of this case, we do not consider it reasonably probable that admission of the prior convictions altered the outcome. Hence, the absence of a trial court ruling on the matter must be deemed harmless. ( Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 390-391.) We recognize some potential for prejudice in both prior convictions. Both were relatively recent and, like the robbery charge at issue here, both involved crimes of dishonesty against property. The prior robbery was an identical charge and implied that defendant was predisposed to steal by force or fear. Revelation of this prior conviction could detract from defendant's efforts to raise a reasonable doubt whether the killing of Savage was related to a robbery. However, the valid evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that defendant was guilty of robbery and murder, was compelling. Defendant was unable to conform crucial portions of his exculpatory testimony to the undisputed physical facts. His claims about his motives for the homicide were undermined by his admissions that he was familiar with homosexuality and did not object. (See ante, at pp. 688-689.) Under these circumstances, we think it highly unlikely that the prior convictions tipped the balance. Hence, there is no basis for reversal, or for further proceedings on the Castro issue.
Defendant contends he was prejudiced on both guilt and penalty by improper admission at the guilt trial of a videotape depicting the crime scene and the victim's body as initially encountered by the police. He also objects to guilt phase testimony by the autopsy physician, Dr. Murdoch, and related autopsy photos, indicating the number, location, and severity of wounds on the victim's body. Defendant claims these materials were gruesome, inflammatory, irrelevant, and cumulative. Several responses are appropriate. First, defendant waived these issues on direct appeal by failing to object at trial to introduction of the challenged evidence. Second, defendant may not claim on appeal that counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance. The appellate record does not affirmatively disclose that counsel acted from ignorance or mistake, and there are plausible reasons why competent counsel would not oppose admission of the tape, testimony, and photos. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581-582 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) [19] In any event, the challenged evidence was highly pertinent, since the two divergent theories of how the homicide occurred depended for support on details of physical and circumstantial evidence, including a clear understanding of the clues provided by the condition of the victim's body and the crime scene itself. The prosecution was not obliged to prove these details solely from the testimony of live witnesses, and the jury was entitled to see how the physical details of the scene and body supported the prosecution theory of murder for robbery. Hence, the tape, testimony, and photos were neither irrelevant nor cumulative. (See, e.g., Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 740-742; compare, e.g., People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1137 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].) Even if the evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant or cumulative, no reversible prejudice ensued. Our independent review of the tape, photos, and autopsy testimony persuades us that they were not unduly gruesome or inflammatory. ( Anderson, supra . )