Opinion ID: 889300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arrest (May 17, 2004) to First Trial Setting (Jan. 9, 2006): 602 Days

Text: ¶ 80 Due to the unique procedural history of this casein particular, the lack of a firm trial setting for more than half the pretrial periodit is necessary for purposes of this section to determine what actions and events delayed the setting of the first trial date. Initially, there is no question that the 10 days between Couture's May 17 arrest and the first scheduled arraignment (May 27) is institutional delay attributable to the State. ¶ 81 Couture continued his arraignment six times from May 27 to September 9, a total of 105 days, in order to obtain a mental health evaluation through the State Hospital. We agree with the District Court that this delay was attributable to Couture. Couture argues, however, that the 105 days were attributable to the State as built-in delays inherent in [the] criminal justice system. He points out that a defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to enter his plea (§ 46-12-203, MCA), and he maintains that he required additional time before entering his plea to obtain the mental health evaluation, since a person who is not competent to proceed may not be tried (§ 46-14-103, MCA). Yet, the fact that the defendant must be competent to proceed does not make the delay for obtaining a mental health evaluation institutional delay. A defendant must also be given reasonable time to prepare a defense to the charges, which could be considered a built-in delay inherent in the criminal justice system, but this does not mean that delay for defense investigations is institutional delay. Institutional delays are caused by crowded court dockets and other systemic circumstances beyond the control of the prosecutor and the accused, such as a backlog at the State Crime Lab. See Ariegwe, ¶¶ 68, 130. Of course, had the State Hospital not been diligent in conducting Couture's evaluation, then such delay would have been attributable to the State. But there is no showing of a lack of diligence here. ¶ 82 Couture also argues that the postponements of his arraignment should not have been counted against him since they did not cause any corresponding postponements of a trial date. However, setting aside the Twentieth Judicial District Court's particular trial setting procedures, we do not expect district courts in general to set a firm trial date prior to the defendant's entry of a not guilty plea. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that when a defendant postpones the entry of his plea, as he is statutorily authorized to do, he concomitantly delays the first trial date. We therefore are not persuaded that Couture's continuances of his arraignment did not result in a delay of his trial. [6] ¶ 83 Next, the District Court correctly attributed the 28 days from the September 9 arraignment to the first scheduled omnibus hearing (October 7) to the State as institutional delay. Nobody disputes this attribution. ¶ 84 The next logical period is from October 7, 2004, to January 27, 2005, the date on which Nistler announced that the plea proposal process had been exhausted and the defense embarked on a new defense theory (a mental state or mitigation defense). During this period of 112 days, Couture repeatedly continued the omnibus hearing in order to conduct investigations and explore the possibility of a plea agreement. The District Court attributed this delay to Couture, but we agree with Couture that the delay is attributable to the court's plea agreement policy. In fact, Nistler specifically cited that policy and the need to exhaust the plea proposal process before proceeding to omnibus as the reason for seeking the continuances. As explained above, the court's plea agreement policy results in seriatim requests for continuances of the omnibus hearing, which the court routinely grants and which, in turn, result in de facto continuances of the trial date. See ¶¶ 6-8, supra. In this case, the omnibus hearing was held 413 days after Couture entered his not guilty pleas. This approach conflicts with statutory procedures, which state that the court shall hold an omnibus hearing  [w]ithin a reasonable time following the entry of a not guilty plea but not less than 30 days before trial. Section 46-13-110(1), MCA (emphasis added). It is also inconsistent with the court's affirmative constitutional obligation to move the case along toward trial in an expeditious manner. The State points out that Couture filed a speedy trial waiver (at the court's insistence) on January 3. But this does not alter the fact that the court's plea agreement policy, together with its policy of not setting a firm trial date until the omnibus hearing, is what caused this built-in, systemic delay in the first place. We therefore attribute the 112 days to the State, though we will weigh that delay the same as we do institutional delay. ¶ 85 The next segment of delay occurred between January 27 and May 19, 2005, a total of 112 days. During this period, Couture arranged for a second mental health evaluation in order to determine whether a mental state or mitigation defense was plausible, and he acknowledged on the record at the January 27 hearing that this delay could not be held against the State for speedy trial purposes. We agree with the District Court that the delay is attributable to Couture. Couture argues, however, that the court's plea agreement policy dictated Nistler's actions in seeking continuances of the omnibus hearing during this period, but the record establishes otherwise. On January 27, Nistler reported that [w]e have exhausted the plea proposal process at this point. On March 17, Nistler stated that Couture has rejected any plea proposals, and it appears that the probability is great that it's headed to trial. And on April 14, Nistler noted that Couture did not wish to accept the plea proposals from the State and wanted this matter to proceed to trial, where the primary defense would be a mental defense. Hence, there is no merit to the contention that the omnibus hearing needed to be continued in order to exhaust the possibility of a plea agreement. We also are not persuaded by Nistler's insistence at the April 14 hearing that Couture could not go through omnibus until they received Dr. Stratford's report. In fact, the parties could have proceeded with the omnibus hearing on January 27, at which time Couture could have given notice that he was investigating his fitness to proceed and a mental state defense, and that he would file proper notice upon receiving the report from Dr. Stratford. See §§ 46-13-110(3)(f), 46-15-323(3), MCA. Simply waiting to receive that report was not good cause for delaying the omnibus hearing, particularly since delaying the omnibus hearing meant delaying the setting of the first trial date. We therefore weigh the 112 days heavily against Couture. [7] ¶ 86 The next delay of 84 days from May 19, 2005, to August 11, 2005, was caused by Couture's request for different counsel and the appointment of Dupuis to replace Nistler. The District Court correctly attributed this delay to Couture. ¶ 87 Beginning on August 11, 2005, and running through October 16, 2006, there were numerous continuances of the omnibus hearing and, later, the trial date as a result of the discovery/suppression issue. Recall that the State failed to file the return on the May 17, 2004 search warrant (§ 46-5-301(1), MCA), failed to produce the search warrant and application in response to Nistler's May 20, 2004 discovery request (§ 46-15-322, MCA), and thereafter lost both documents. While it appears from the record that these omissions were not due to bad faith, but rather were the inadvertent result of the lead detective's illness, the fault still lies with the State. Act I of the ensuing discovery/suppression saga began August 11 and ended October 26, when the District Court issued its first order suppressing all evidence obtained from the May 17 search warrant. Act II ran from October 26 to July 17, when the court issued its second order clarifying that any evidence which was discovered from an independent source or which would have been inevitably discovered would not be suppressed. Finally, Act III ran from July 17 to October 16, when the court issued its third order clarifying that all evidence seized under the May 18 search warrants would not be suppressed. Having created this situation in the first place, the State bears a measure of responsibility for the resulting delays. However, as detailed below, the defense is also responsible for a substantial portion of them. ¶ 88 Turning to the 77 days from August 11, 2005, when the omnibus hearing was first continued because of the discovery/suppression issue, to October 27, 2005, when the omnibus hearing was finally held, the District Court assigned 27 days to the State for lack of diligence and 50 days to Couture based on his September 8 speedy trial waiver. Couture argues, and we agree, that all 77 days are attributable to the State. First, as just noted, the delay associated with the discovery/suppression litigationespecially the initial period leading up to the court's first suppression ruling on October 26was created by the State's failure to comply promptly and fully with its obligations under the search-and-seizure and discovery statutes. Second, we disagree with the District Court's premise that we can't get to omnibus until we can get a resolution of the motion to suppress on this matter. Suppression issues do not have to be resolved before omnibus, see § 46-13-110(3)(i), MCA, and they certainly do not have to be resolved before a trial date can be set. Thus, there was no basis for requiring a waiver from Couture in this instance. For that matter, Couture could not be required to waive his right to a speedy trial in order to exercise his rights to discovery and against unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Bailey, 201 Mont. 473, 480, 655 P.2d 494, 498 (1982). Lastly, the continuance of the September 8 hearing to September 22 was sought by Couture and the prosecution to submit briefs and prepare for the hearing. The prosecutor then filed his initial brief on September 21 at 4:07 p.m., which left Couture without adequate time to file his response; and as a result, the hearing had to be continued to October 27. Clearly, Couture did not intend to waive delay caused by the prosecution. As we have previously held, delay requested by a particular party may be attributable to the other party. Ariegwe, ¶ 66; see also e.g. State v. Hardaway, 2009 MT 249, ¶ 20, 351 Mont. 488, 213 P.3d 776 (although Hardaway moved for a continuance, the delay was attributable to the State due to its failure to provide the CI's identity); State v. Keyes, 2000 MT 337, ¶¶ 13-14, 303 Mont. 147, 15 P.3d 443 (the time associated with Keyes' application for a writ of supervisory control was attributable to the State, given that the necessity of the application and the resulting delay were due to the confusing nature of the charges under which the State sought to prosecute Keyes). Here, the 77-day delay was directly the result of the State's lack of diligence regarding the May 17, 2004 search warrant. ¶ 89 Next, the period of 74 days from the October 27, 2005 omnibus hearing to the first trial setting (January 9, 2006) began with the prosecutor's motion for clarification of the suppression ruling. The District Court assigned the first 7 days of this delay to the State as institutional delay. Then, in early November, the court had to replace Dupuis and give Anciaux and Putikka some time to get up to speed, which was delayed when Dupuis did not promptly turn over her file on Couture. Since Couture neither caused the delay of 67 days nor had control over the situation, the District Court attributed it to the State as institutional delay. We conclude, however, that the particular circumstances surrounding Dupuis' removal as Couture's counsel require a different approach for purposes of this case only. Dupuis was removed after the District Court learned that she had engaged in unlawful conduct in an unrelated matter, which in turn led to the filing of criminal charges against her as well as her suspension and, ultimately, disbarment from the practice of law in Montana. The court then promptly took steps to minimize the impact of Dupuis' removal by appointing two attorneys to take over Couture's defense. Under these unique, fact-specific circumstances, we conclude that the delay of 67 days should not weigh against the State or Couture.