Opinion ID: 73730
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Handwriting Analysis

Text: Paul argues that Ziegler’s testimony is not admissible under the Daubert guidelines because handwriting analysis does not qualify as reliable scientific evidence. His argument is without merit.2 In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 controls 2 Courts have long received handwriting analysis testimony as admissible evidence. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1160-61 (6th Cir. 1997) (handwriting expert’s testimony admissible to show that signatures on numerous documents were defendant’s); United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844, 848-50 (3d Cir. 1995) (handwriting expert witness admissible). 5 decisions regarding the admissibility of expert testimony.3 The Supreme Court declared that under rule 702, when “[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony . . . the trial judge must determine at the outset pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The Supreme Court stated that “[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one” and that “Rule 702 . . . assign[s] to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 597. The Court also listed several factors to assist in the determination of whether evidence is scientifically reliable.4 See Daubert, 509 U.S. 59295. Many circuits were split at the time of trial, however, on whether Daubert should apply to nonscientific expert testimony. Some held that the application of Daubert is limited to scientific testimony, while others used Daubert’s guidance to ensure the reliability of all expert testimony presented at trial. Compare McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1997) (limiting the application of Daubert to the evaluation of scientific testimony); with Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the application of Daubert is not limited to scientific knowledge). 3 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: “If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the court to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. 4 The Daubert factors include: (1) whether the theory or technique the expert employs is generally accepted in the scientific community; (2) whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; (3) whether the theory can and has been tested; and (4) whether the known or potential rate of error is acceptable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95. 6 Recently, however, in Kumho Tire Company, LTD. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court held that Daubert’s “gatekeeping” obligation, requiring the trial judge’s inquiry into both the expert’s relevance and reliability, applies not only to testimony based on “scientific” testimony, but to all expert testimony. Kumho, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1174 (1999). The Court further noted that rules 702 and 703 give all expert witnesses testimonial leeway unavailable to other witnesses on the presumption that the expert’s opinion “will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.” Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1174 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). Moreover, the Court held that a trial judge may consider one or more of the specific Daubert factors when doing so will help determine that expert’s reliability. Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1175. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is a “flexible” one, and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor solely applies to all experts or in every case. Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1175 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594). Alternatively, Kumho declares that “the law grants a district court the same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.” Kumho, 119 S. Ct. at 1171 (citing General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997) (stating that courts of appeals are to apply “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing district court’s reliability determination)).