Opinion ID: 1536017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Voluntariness of Guilty Plea to Capital Murder

Text: Defendant contends that his right to due process of law was violated when the trial judge accepted his guilty plea. He claims that his guilty plea was not made voluntarily and that he was motivated by threats against his family and himself. He argues that despite his insistence that his plea was voluntary at the plea hearing, the totality of the information before the court at the time of the plea required a finding of coercion. Defendant points to the following evidence that should have persuaded the court to find that he had been coerced: 1. Simon announced his decision to plead guilty immediately after the intervention of the Warlocks' officers; 2. Simon believed he might well defeat the capital aspect of the case and could offer no good reason for purposefully risking his life by pleading to capital murder; 3. Simon received no legal benefit in exchange for the plea; and 4. Counsel believed Simon was entering the plea under duress and urged the court not to accept the plea. The importance of the constitutional rights being waived when a defendant enters a guilty plea necessitates that the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea be demonstrated in the record so that it may be reviewed on appeal. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1969). In New Jersey, it is well-settled that a plea must be entered into voluntarily and intelligently. Indeed, we have codified that requirement in Rule 3:9-2. State v. Crawley, 149 N.J. 310, 318, 693 A. 2d 859 (1997) (internal citations omitted). See also State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 421 n. 1, 558 A. 2d 1303 (1989) (stating [a] guilty plea violates due process and is, thus, constitutionally defective if it is not voluntary and knowing). Rule 3:9-2 provides, in part: The court, in its discretion, may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and shall not accept such a plea without first addressing the defendant personally and determining by inquiry of the defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that there is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is made voluntarily, not as the result of any threats or of any promises or inducements not disclosed on the record, and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. [Emphasis added.] When a guilty plea is challenged as the product of coercion, the relevant question is not whether defendant was sensitive to external consideration many defendants arebut instead whether the decision to plead was voluntary, i.e., a product of free will. United States v. Pellerito, 878 F. 2d 1535, 1541 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862, 112 S.Ct. 184, 116 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1991). The withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an absolute right; it is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court. United States v. Spencer, 836 F. 2d 236, 238 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ramos, 810 F. 2d 308, 311 (1st Cir.1987). Generally, representations made by a defendant at plea hearings concerning the voluntariness of the decision to plead, as well as any findings made by the trial court when accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier which defendant must overcome before he will be allowed to withdraw his plea. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1977). That is so because [s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity. Ibid.; State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 452, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) (DiFrisco II) , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996). When the trial court determines that a guilty plea has been voluntarily entered, the measure of what constitutes fair and just reason for withdrawal must be reposed in the sound confidence of the [trial] court. State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408, 417, 571 A. 2d 1305 (1990); see also R. 3:21-1. A guilty plea voluntarily entered should not generally be vacated in the absence of some plausible showing of a valid defense against the charges. State v. Gonzalez, 254 N.J.Super. 300, 303, 603 A. 2d 516 (App.Div.1992). Thus, the trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw his guilty plea will be reversed on appeal only if there was an abuse of discretion which renders the lower court's decision clearly erroneous. Smullen, supra, 118 N.J. at 416, 571 A. 2d 1305. We find no such abuse of discretion in this case. The trial court considered all of the evidence presented to support defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After reviewing the evidence and hearing the arguments, the court stated that the essential issue it had to decide was whether defendant lied to the court during the two-day plea process, or whether he had lied at the withdrawal hearing. The court concluded that based on observations of defendant's demeanor over many hours during the plea process, defendant's motion testimony on a vague, nonspecific asserted threat made to members of his family was totally incredible and unpersuasive. The trial court flatly rejected defendant's testimony, and concluded that he lied on the witness stand this morning. The trial court concluded that defendant's withdrawal application was nothing more than an attempted manipulation of the criminal justice system. The trial court's finding that defendant was lying on the witness stand during the hearing on his withdrawal motion was supported by the statements defendant made during his plea hearing. At that hearing, both in camera and in open court, defendant stated under oath numerous times, in numerous ways, that he had not been coerced or threatened at any time, in any manner, by anyone. Defendant told the court that he wanted to plead guilty in order to help Staples. That was a plausible explanation since there was strong evidence that defendant was the trigger person. When asked about each of the statements made by defendant, and scenarios involving defendant in which a court could find coercion, defendant effectively explained each situation to the satisfaction of the trial court. As an appellate court, we are required to give great `deference to those findings of the trial [court] [that] are substantially influenced by [its] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.' State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471, 724 A. 2d 234 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161, 199 A. 2d 809 (1964)). Indeed, one of the reasons the trial court denied defendant's motion was based on its comparative observations of defendant's demeanor during the plea hearing and the plea withdrawal hearing. The trial court gave defendant ample opportunity in camera and in open court to reveal that he was pleading guilty involuntarily. However, defendant did everything within his power to successfully convince the trial court that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. Significantly, defendant provided no convincing evidence at the plea withdrawal hearing that he or his family had in fact been threatened. Thus, we conclude that the trial judge's findings of facts were not clearly erroneous. As a result, defendant's plea was made voluntarily and the trial court properly denied the motion to vacate the plea.