Opinion ID: 2621238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: even though an injured employee volunteers for inclusion in an employer planned reduction in force, if the employer makes the final determination to discharge the employee, workers' compensation benefits are payable.

Text: ¶ 7 Although Abbott asked to be included in the employer's reduction in force, he argues that temporary total disability is payable. He asserts that, ultimately, the employer controlled the decision to conduct a layoff and to include him in the reduction in force. The employer concedes that had it either fired or laid off the injured employee, Abbott would be entitled to temporary total disability benefits. [7] Nevertheless, it contends that the employee would not have been terminated if he had not volunteered for the program. Essentially, the employer insists that Abbott controlled his own destiny  he would not have been terminated absent his request. Therefore, volunteering for the reduction in force constituted a refusal to accept an offered light-duty assignment and was tantamount to a resignation. We disagree. ¶ 8 The employer finds support in three non-precedential opinions released for publication by the Court of Civil Appeals: [8] Tubbs v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 2001 OK CIV APP 97, 28 P.3d 624; Akers v. Seaboard Farms, 1998 OK CIV APP 169, 972 P.2d 885; and Hinton v. Labor Source, 1998 OK CIV APP 2, 953 P.2d 358. [9] All three cases are factually distinguishable. ¶ 9 Tubbs provides that an employee, released for light duty, is entitled to temporary total disability benefits if the employer offers no light-duty assignment. The precise issue presented in Tubbs is the effect that an employee's resignation will have on the right to receive benefits. The Court of Civil Appeals determined that employer's are not required to offer light-duty work to former employees not incapacitated and that the employee's resignation severed the employment relationship and the responsibility to pay benefits. Unlike the employee in Tubbs, Abbott did not resign his position nor did he refuse a light-duty assignment. ¶ 10 The employee in Akers was discharged for cause  failing a drug test. Essentially, the Court of Civil Appeals determined that the employee's own actions were an effective refusal to continue accepting the light-duty work provided by the employer. Although Abbott offered to be included in his employer's reduction in force, he did not leave his employment because of a violation of job related policies. Further, until ordered by his physician to discontinue work, he would have continued his light-duty assignments. [10] ¶ 11 Hinton involved a single issue: whether an employer must offer light-duty work to an employee to avoid the payment of temporary total disability benefits. [11] The Court of Civil Appeals held that the burden rested on the employer to show that it had offered light-duty work to defend against the payment of benefits. Under Hinton, absent an offer of light duty, the employer is responsible for paying temporary total disability. Here, there is no question that light duty was offered. Unlike Hinton, this cause turns on whether the employer may avoid payment of temporary benefits after having chosen to include Abbott in its reduction-in-force program. ¶ 12 Several views exist in extant jurisprudence on the issue of the payment of workers' compensation benefits to employees who subsequently leave their jobs. Some courts find that where an employee's separation from employment is voluntary, workers' compensation benefits are not payable. [12] Others recognize that even a voluntary separation from employment will not preclude the award of benefits. [13] Another acknowledges that employer's may not avoid their responsibilities under workers' compensation laws by allowing employees to voluntarily retire without advising them of their rights to compensation benefits. [14] Benefits have been denied where the employee resigned rather than face the possibility of disciplinary action, [15] to avoid unfriendly environmental factors, [16] or to accept a higher paying job which the employee subsequently was unable to perform. [17] ¶ 13 Authority is split over whether an employee volunteering to be included in an employer-planned reduction in force, as Abbott did here, should be considered as having effectively resigned from employment. The majority of these cases provide that although an employee may opt for inclusion in an employer-mandated layoff, the layoff itself is still instituted at the employer's prerogative. The fact that the employees may decide among themselves who will bear the burden of termination does not make the employee's departure voluntary. [18] These courts reason that when the first and last steps of the termination process are taken by the employer, i.e. planning the reduction and then selecting certain employees for inclusion, even one who has agreed to participate in the process has not voluntarily terminated employment. [19] ¶ 14 The majority recognizes that the ultimate choice and responsibility for unemployment lies only with the employer's decision to reduce available jobs. [20] It is immaterial which of several employees are terminated or that an employee may participate in the selection process [21] or whether, absent an offer of inclusion in the lay off, the employee's position would have been at risk. [22] Employers are not compelled to accept an employee's offer [23] and their benefits are the same  a reduction in the work force. [24] The employees have no voice in promulgating the lay-off policy and exercise only limited options. [25] ¶ 15 We consider the analysis proffered by the majority of jurisdictions addressing whether an employee's offer to be included in an employer-announced lay off should be considered a voluntary termination persuasive and logical. The majority's conclusions are based in the realities of the workplace  an employee electing to volunteer for an employer-planned reduction in force does not exercise the ultimate power or final decision as to which employees will be targeted for termination. It is the employer who decides to eliminate a job and to lay off a given individual, based on the employer's needs. It is irrelevant that the employee may have made the employer's determination easier by first volunteering to be laid off. ¶ 16 We hold that where, as here, an injured employee volunteers for an employer-instigated reduction in force, and the employer makes the ultimate decision to terminate, rights to workers' compensation benefits are not affected. In reaching this result, we align ourselves with the majority of jurisdictions addressing the nature of an employee's actions when deciding to volunteer for an employer-instigated reduction in force. ¶ 17 Were we not convinced by the majority position, we would still be compelled to hold in favor of the employee. Unquestionably, as the employer recognizes, [26] had the construction company fired or laid off Abbott  without his volunteering for inclusion in the reduction in force, he would be entitled to temporary total disability benefits. [27] Absent very limited circumstances, none of which apply here, the Workers' Compensation Act, 85 O.S.2001 § 11, [28] mandates that employers subject to the act shall pay [29] compensation to an employee for an accidental on-the-job injury. The statute does not provide that the requirement to disburse compensation terminates upon the employee's dismissal and we may not interpret it to do so. Otherwise, we would create an extra-statutory forfeiture of benefits in the face of the Legislature's clear prohibition in 85 O.S. 2001 § 5 [30] against an employee's discharge for filing a compensation claim. Our statutory structure mandating that employers not be allowed to avoid compensating their employees for their on-the-job injuries through termination, combined with the remedial nature of the statutes and Oklahoma's well-settled jurisprudence that the statutes should be construed in favor of the workers they are intended to benefit, [31] necessitates that we recognize Abbott's right of recovery.