Opinion ID: 1194597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Section 741 Apply to Reddington?

Text: The Hospital argues that even if Reddington did not waive her section 741 claim by instituting a claim under section 740, the district court correctly determined that Reddington failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim that she was an employee  a person who performs health care services for and under the control and direction of any public or private employer which provides health care services  as defined in the health care whistleblower statute. N.Y. Lab. Law § 741(1)(a). Accordingly, the Hospital urges that her section 741 claim was properly dismissed. Section 741 was enacted in 2002, and it is therefore not entirely surprising that we are unable to find any reported decisions discussing its definition of employee. We begin with the text of the statute, giving words of ordinary import in the statute their plain meaning. See N.Y. Stat. Law § 232 (Words of ordinary import used in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning. . . .); id. § 234 (Dictionary definitions may be useful as guide posts in determining the sense with which a word was used in a statute. . . .). In construing a New York law, we also look to legislative history in appropriate cases. See id. § 124 (In ascertaining the purpose and applicability of a statute, it is proper to consider the legislative history of the act. . . . ). However, these sources provide no easily discernable answer in this case. It is not plain on the face of the statute whether health care services may include services beyond the provision of medical treatment. The legislative history may suggest so. See, e.g., N.Y. Legis. Serv. Governor's Bill Jacket, 2003 A.B. 8017, ch. 505, at 3 (Like other health care workers, pharmacists often encounter situations in which a regulation is ignored because of expediency[, which] jeopardize[s] patient safety.). The term health care services might be read to encompass, for example, a hospital's pharmacist, who would likely learn if a doctor at the hospital was illegally prescribing medication, or even a hospital's insurance claims processor. But the legislative history does not clearly indicate whether the definition extends to someone like Reddington whose job description includes functions such as: (1) [c]oordinat[ing] and develop[ing] with Chief Medical Officer and appropriate medical personnel[] services to be offered to international patients; (2) [d]istribut[ing], collect[ing,] and analyz[ing] patient satisfaction questionnaires; and (3) [m]anag[ing] and train[ing] personnel providing translation services. Neither do we find controlling guidance in other New York statutes that define health care services with greater precision, see, e.g., N.Y. Ins. Law § 4900(e)(2); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 4900(5)(b); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 369-ee(1)(e), for we interpret statutory terms equivalently only when the statutes refer to the same subject matter and have the same objectives, see N.Y. Stat. Law § 221; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Hartnett, 175 A.D.2d 495, 572 N.Y.S.2d 770, 773 (App.Div.1991), which these statutes do not.