Opinion ID: 1681700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: officer veski's testimony

Text: Riechmann's first claim is that the lower court erred in refusing to allow Officer Hilliard Veski's proffered testimony at the evidentiary hearing below. This testimony concerns his inventory notes reflecting his recovery of a flashlight and a blanket from Riechmann's car and his recollection of the State's pressuring him to testify at trial in a certain fashion. At the evidentiary hearing, the State objected to Veski testifying for the defense, asserting his testimony was irrelevant to the two claims on which an evidentiary hearing had been granted. Riechmann's counsel responded that the court must consider Veski's testimony cumulatively with the claim involving Smykowski. The court sustained the State's objection and did not permit Veski to testify. [9] We find no error in the trial court's ruling refusing to allow Veski's proffered testimony. Riechmann now argues that Veski's testimony should be considered as part of his argument that the State's outrageous conduct in this case violated both Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and that furthermore, the trial court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on this claim. He asserts alternatively that Veski's testimony could have served as an impeachment of the prosecutor who testified on the Smykowski claim at the evidentiary hearing. As noted, the lower court did not grant an evidentiary hearing on Riechmann's claim of outrageous law enforcement conduct, and Riechmann did not advance the impeachment argument at the hearing. We find no error in the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on the outrageous conduct claim and possible Brady and Giglio violations, and we agree with the State's assertion that the claim was procedurally barred for not having been properly asserted earlier in the case. The movant in a rule 3.850 motion filed in a capital case is entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that the [movant] is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. Freeman v. State, 761 So.2d 1055, 1061 (Fla.2000); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(d). However, when a claim is raised in a successive motion, the movant has the additional burden of demonstrating why the claim was not raised before. See Owen v. Crosby, 854 So.2d 182, 187 (Fla.2003) (A second or successive motion for postconviction relief can be denied on the ground that it is an abuse of process if there is no reason for failing to raise the issues in the previous motion.). Because a court's decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a rule 3.850 motion filed in a capital case is ultimately based on written materials before the court, its ruling is tantamount to a pure question of law, subject to de novo review. See State v. Coney, 845 So.2d 120, 137 (Fla.2003). The State asserts that Riechmann failed to demonstrate why this outrageous conduct claim in relation to Veski's testimony had not been asserted in the prior 3.850 motion, citing transcripts from the trial and the first postconviction proceedings demonstrating that Riechmann's trial counsel knew early on, even before trial, about Veski's role in securing the blanket and flashlight from Riechmann's car as well as Veski's claim of being pressured by the State. The State is correct that this current claim is procedurally barred and was properly summarily denied by the trial court. The record reflects that Veski performed an inventory of the car in which the murder occurred. Veski initially stated at a pretrial deposition that he found a flashlight with bloodstains on it in the trunk of the car during his inventory search. After this deposition, but before trial, Veski informed Riechmann's trial counsel that he had testified falsely about the flashlight during the deposition and that he had refused to testify for the State at trial because of alleged improper pressures the State placed upon him to accommodate the State's case. Despite these revelations, Riechmann's counsel did not call Veski as a defense witness at trial, and Veski never testified at the trial in any capacity. In addition, during the trial, the State placed a folded blanket recovered from the front seat of the car into evidence. [10] Riechmann's trial counsel conducted a voir dire of Detective Robert Hanlon when the State attempted to introduce the blanket. During the voir dire, Detective Hanlon stated that he saw the blanket on the driver's seat of the car when he secured the car the night of the murder and did not see it again until he submitted the blanket to William Rhodes, the State's serology expert, for serology testing eight or nine months later. Detective Hanlon stated that Veski inventoried the car two days after the murder and took the blanket out of the car and delivered it to the Miami Beach Police Property Room. Riechmann's counsel further inquired: Q. And do you know why the records show that it was recovered from the right front seat of the car? . . . . A. I don't believe it is in my records, sir, I don't know. Q. How about the records of the Miami Beach Police Department? A. I'm not privy to that, sir, I don't know. Q. You did not take the blanket out of the car, correct? A. No, sir. Q. So you don't know what happened or what was done or what was laid on that blanket from the time you saw it on the night of October 25th until you got it from the property room and gave it to Mr. Rhodes on June what? A. June 29th, sir. Q. Do you? A. No, sir. Q. All right. There were other blood stained articles in that car, weren't there? A. Yes, sir, there was. Q. Towels, shawls, robes, correct? A. That's correct. Q. Do you know whether theywell, first, do you know if this is the original container that Veski put this blanket in? A. I don't know sir. You've got to ask Veski. Q. Okay. So you don't know whether this has been rebagged since the time he collected it from the car and put it into the property room, is that correct? A. No, sir. Q. Do you know whether or not this blanket was placed in a bag, a large bag with a number of other blood stained articles? A. No, sir, I don't. . . . . Q. So how can you tell us under oath then, Mr. Hanlon, that this blanket is in the same condition that you saw it on the night of October 25th? A. It looks like the same blanket that was on the seat of the car. Q. Oh, it looks like the same blanket? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. How can you tell us that it hasit is in the same condition as when you collected it or when you saw it rather? A. I can't tell you that, sir. In short, the record is clear that the defense had long been aware of Veski's role in the case, including his claims of pressure from the prosecution. However, no legal justification for failing to assert this claim at an earlier time was offered to the trial court below to overcome the procedural bar for claims raised in successive postconviction motions. Accordingly, relief on this claim of outrageous conduct was properly summarily denied by the trial court. Regardless of this procedural bar, we also agree with the State's assertion that Riechmann could not have established a Brady or Giglio claim even if Veski's proffered testimony is considered.