Opinion ID: 1941980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: abrogation of the doctrine

Text: It is well settled that the judiciary has the power to overturn judicially-created doctrine, so long as that doctrine has not been codified in a statute. Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing, Del.Supr., 564 A.2d 1132 (1989); Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Lake, Del.Supr., 594 A.2d 38 (1991). Furthermore, it is the duty of this Court to review common law rules to ensure that the conditions and policy objectives that justify the rules remain relevant and valid. [3] Relying on the case of Saunders v. Hill , Husband argues, conversely, that changes in well-settled public policy must be effected by the General Assembly. 202 A.2d at 810. This reliance is misplaced, however, because the case is factually distinguishable. In Saunders the General Assembly had enacted controlling legislation. [4] In the present case, there is no statute that directly applies to the Doctrine. Therefore, it is within the authority of this Court to abrogate the common law doctrine if it no longer merits recognition. This Court refused to abrogate the Doctrine in Alfree, 410 A.2d at 162, despite the renunciation of the parental immunity doctrine in Williams v. Williams, Del.Supr., 369 A.2d 669 (1976). Williams held that the promotion of family harmony and the discouragement of collusive and fraudulent claims were unacceptable justifications for the parental immunity doctrine in light of contemporary conditions and modern concepts of fairness. Id. at 671. The Alfree Court declined to abrogate the Doctrine because it was then perceived that the effects would be far-reaching and the problem was more appropriate for legislative solution than for judicial determination. Alfree, 410 A.2d at 163 (citation omitted). The Alfree Court's rationale for retaining the Doctrine included: 1) the preservation of family harmony and 2) the prevention of fraud and collusion. Id. at 162. These were the same rationales that were rejected with regard to parental immunity in Williams. It is inconceivable that suits between children and parents are less likely to disrupt family harmony than interspousal suits. This is also true with respect to property claims and actions for breach of contract, which are actionable in the family context. In our view, the Doctrine is more likely to have the effect of disrupting family harmony rather than preserving it. Denying a person compensation for injuries arising from the negligence of his or her spouse can be very disruptive ( e.g., large medical bills and loss of wages often result from serious accidents). Under the Doctrine, the married couple will have to pay these huge expenses, instead of relying on insurance proceeds. This added financial burden could well promote marital discord. Hack v. Hack, Pa.Supr., 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859, 866 (1981). Any destruction of family harmony that is prevented by the Doctrine is likely to be minimal due to the prevalence of liability insurance. In addition, the Doctrine may actually promote divorces because a person who suffers an injury at the hands of his or her spouse, but who has since divorced the spouse, may maintain a tort action against the former spouse. Hudson v. Hudson, Del.Super., 532 A.2d 620, 624, appeal refused, Del. Supr., 527 A.2d 281 (1987). Accordingly, it is conceivable that spouses may decide to divorce solely to bypass the restrictions of a Doctrine which putatively is designed to preserve marital harmony. Such a result is repugnant to public policy. Because of the prevalence of liability insurance, Husband argues that collusion and fraud will increase if spouses are able to sue each other. It is true that the adversarial system may be subject to tension because it is in the defendant spouse's interest for his or her injured spouse to receive some compensation, especially when the insurance company is the real party being sued. Such tension could potentially lead to a threat of corruption. Although the possibility of collusion exists in various situations such as intrafamily cases and suits between friends, the judicial system is adept at ferreting out frivolous and unfounded cases. [5] It is unnecessary and unwise to deny legitimate claims in order to prevent fraudulent and collusive suits because the judicial system contains numerous safeguards and deterrents against fraudulent claims such as perjury charges and modern discovery procedures. [6] Luna v. Clayton, Tenn.Supr., 655 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (1983). Cf., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 supersedes the general acceptance rule regarding scientific evidence, and that the adversarial process, including vigorous cross-examination, provides safeguards against admission of junk science evidence). The conclusion that the abrogation of the Doctrine will not lead to the destruction of family harmony or the proliferation of fraudulent suits is amply supported by empirical evidence. [7] Delaware is the only state in the nation which recognizes the doctrine solely on common law grounds. [8] Four other states also recognize the Doctrine, [9] but do so pursuant to a statute or a perceived statutory prohibition of judicial abrogation of the Doctrine. In addition to arguing that the Doctrine should be abrogated because it is no longer a viable concept, Wife also argues that the Doctrine violates the Delaware Financial Responsibility Laws, 21 Del.C. Ch. 29 and 21 Del.C. § 2118 (hereinafter § 2118). Section 2118, Delaware's no-fault statute, states that coverage on automobiles must be provided against all liability and injuries. Section 2118(f) further states that once a plaintiff recovers from the insurer, the insurer is subrogated to the plaintiff's right to sue the insured. Thus, recovery of insurance proceeds by the plaintiff is based on the plaintiff's right of action against the insured. Application of the Doctrine renders § 2118 unenforceable in full. Construing the coverage provisions of the Delaware Financial Responsibility Laws, specifically 21 Del.C. § 2118 and 21 Del.C. § 2902, this Court has held that neither statute restricts liability coverage to certain claims based upon the relationship of the plaintiff to the defendant. Rather, both provisions are drafted in broad language which provides for liability coverage for all claims up to the stated limits, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wagamon, Del.Supr., 541 A.2d 557, 560 (1988) (emphasis supplied). This holding strongly supports a finding that the General Assembly intended to extend coverage to an injured spouse. [10] We agree with the Supreme Court of Kansas and the vast majority of other jurisdictions which have found the Doctrine to be a judicial anachronism that no longer merits recognition. Flagg v. Loy, Kan. Supr., 241 Kan. 216, 734 P.2d 1183, 1190 (1987). Accordingly, we hold that the Doctrine no longer meets the needs of society and must be abrogated.