Opinion ID: 555826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intervention as a Matter of Right

Text: 14 The district court's denial of a party's motion to intervene as a matter of right is reviewed de novo. Jansen v. City of Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336 (6th Cir.1990); Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343 (6th Cir.1989). Rule 24(a)(2) 4 has been interpreted as providing a three-pronged test for determining an individual's right to intervene: (1) does the applicant claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) is the applicant so situated that disposition of the lawsuit may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest; and (3) is the applicant's interest adequately represented by existing parties. Meyer Goldberg, Inc. of Lorain v. Goldberg, 717 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir.1983). 15 1. Whether the Campbell children claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action 16 Whether the Campbell children claim an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of this action depends in large part on the right of an illegitimate child to sue for the wrongful death of his or her biological father. If illegitimate children have no such rights, then the Campbell children would have no basis to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2). 17 In Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was a denial of equal protection to bar illegitimate children a right of recovery for the death of their mother under a state wrongful death statute. The Court found such discrimination against the illegitimate children invidious, as no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm done the mother. Id. at 72, 88 S.Ct. at 1511. Although no Supreme Court case has spoken to the question of wrongful death recovery by illegitimate children for the death of their father, the Court has recognized the right of a dependent, unacknowledged illegitimate child to recover benefits under a state's workmen's compensation act for the death of his father. See Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). In addition, the Court has held that an illegitimate child retains a judicially enforceable right under the equal protection clause to support from his father when this right is granted to legitimate children. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S.Ct. 872, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973). 18 Since Levy, Ohio courts have addressed the question, albeit sparsely, of wrongful death recovery by illegitimate children of a deceased father. See Hopping v. Erie Ins. Co., 1990 WL 31832 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 1043 (1990) (recognizing that Ohio may not deny an illegitimate child's cause of action for the wrongful death of his or her father merely because of the illegitimacy). See also Cannon v. Transamerican Freight Lines, 37 Mich.App. 313, 194 N.W.2d 736 (1971) (in applying Ohio law the Michigan court of appeals held that the denial of an illegitimate child's cause of action for the wrongful death of his or her father, merely because of the illegitimacy, violated the fourteenth amendment). In light of Levy, supra, its progeny and Ohio case law, we conclude that Ohio courts would most likely hold that the Campbell children have a cause of action for the wrongful death of Armstead Land, assuming he is their biological father. 19 Standing to assert such a right, however, may be restricted by state law to circumstances where paternity has been proved. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978) (Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute which allowed illegitimate children to inherit from their father only if a court of competent jurisdiction, during the father's lifetime, had entered an order declaring the child's paternity). As long as state law provides some means by which an illegitimate child can prove paternity and thus gain an inheritance and those means are not used as an impenetrable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimination, such a state regulation(s) would probably pass constitutional muster. See generally Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977). 20 In Ohio paternity may be established a number of different ways. The father may designate the child as his heir-at-law. O.R.C. Sec. 2105.15. He may acknowledge paternity with the probate court. O.R.C. Sec. 2105.18. He may adopt or provide for the illegitimate child in his will, Moore v. Dague, 46 Ohio App.2d 75, 345 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1975). The Campbells have not attempted to prove paternity by any of these means. However, they advance in support of their factual claim of biological paternity an affidavit allegedly executed by the decedent while living, for the purpose of proving paternity. 21 Alternatively in Ohio, parentage is presumed when the biological father and the child's mother, after the child's birth, married or attempted to marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with the law of the state in which the marriage took place, and the father has acknowledged his paternity of the child in a writing sworn to before a notary public. O.R.C. Sec. 3111.03(A)(3)(a). While Armstead Land allegedly acknowledged his paternity in an affidavit in 1977, the Campbell children do not argue, however, that Armstead Land at any time married or tried to marry Evelyn Campbell. 22 Ohio law also allows paternity to be proved by genetic tests. O.R.C. Sec. 3111.09; Hamilton County Dept. of Human Serv. v. Ball, 36 Ohio App.3d 89, 521 N.E.2d 462, 463 (1986). In Alexander v. Alexander, 42 Ohio Misc.2d 30, 537 N.E.2d 1310 (1988), the probate court held that a court order requiring disinterment to prove paternity by genetic testing could be issued when necessary. 5 Apparently the Campbell children learned that the Smith County Coroner possessed tissue or blood samples of Armstead Land sufficient for genetic testing. They therefore filed a motion in December, 1989, to inspect or test Mr. Land's tissue or blood. That motion, however, was eventually withdrawn. The Campbell children then asserted they were unable to make the additional expenditures necessary to complete the DNA testing. The Campbell children could have plead that they were indigent and, if they had so qualified, the state would have been required to prepay the cost of the genetic tests. See O.R.C. Sec. 3111.09; Edwards v. Porter, 8 Ohio App.3d 277, 456 N.E.2d 1347, 1348 (1983). Instead, they asked the probate court to set the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Witnesses testified for the Campbell children, and Mr. Land's affidavit was presented to the court. 23 As we had noted earlier, the probate court's decision was still pending when the Ohio Supreme Court in Martin v. Davidson required the Campbell children to refile for a paternity determination in the Summit County Juvenile Court. Thus to date, approximately two and one half years after the initial complaint was filed, no paternity determination has been made. At least on the record, there is no clear indication that the Campbells have been dilatory in pursuing a paternity determination as counsel for defendants admitted as much in his brief. Moreover, there is no question that if paternity were proved the Campbell children would have an interest related to the transaction which is the subject of this action. 24 With the foregoing material as background, we initially point out that there is no clear definition of what constitutes a litigable interest for purposes of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). Bradley v. Milliken, 828 F.2d 1186, 1192 (6th Cir.1987); C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 1908, at 263 (1986). The Supreme Court has noted that [w]hat is obviously meant [by Rule 24(a)(2) ] is a significantly protectable interest. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 532, 91 S.Ct. 534, 543, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971). Similarly, this Court has required a direct, substantial interest in the litigation which must be significantly protectable. Jansen, 904 F.2d at 341; Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 346; Meyer Goldberg, Inc., 717 F.2d at 292; Brewer v. Republic Steel Corp., 513 F.2d 1222, 1223 (6th Cir.1975). 25 However, as with the word interest, the terms direct, substantial and significantly, protectable are not well defined. Wright, Miller & Kane, Sec. 1908, at 270. Although the Campbells have a legally protectable interest related to the transaction at issue if they are in fact Mr. Land's children, that interest may be classified as indirect or contingent until paternity is proved. The same classification may be made of numerous other interests asserted in motions to intervene, the contingency of which is to be resolved by a court prior to ruling on the motion. In LoPiccolo v. Second Injury Fund, 826 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir.1987), for example, we noted that if the 1984 amendment to Michigan worker's compensation laws applied to that dispute, the Fund had an interest for purposes of Rule 24(a)(2); we then proceeded to determine the nature of the Fund's interest and found that intervention should have been allowed. Id. at 1541. Moreover, several courts have, implicitly at least, rejected the notion that Rule 24(a)(2) requires a specific legal or equitable interest. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 132-36, 87 S.Ct. 932, 935-37, 17 L.Ed.2d 814 (1967); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 352-53 (9th Cir.1974); Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Loc. U. No. 638, 520 F.2d 352, 357 (2d Cir.1975); Hatton v. County Bd. of Educ., 422 F.2d 457, 461 (6th Cir.1970) (Although the interest claimed is of a general and indefinite character, it would seem to the Court to be sufficient to permit intervention under ... Cascade which suggests that the term 'interest' in the amended Rule 24(a) should be construed liberally.). 26 Contrary to Appellee Purnell's argument, a party seeking to intervene need not possess the standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 536-39, 92 S.Ct. 630, 635-36, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972). See also United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2nd Cir.1978) (the existence of a case or controversy having been established as between plaintiff and defendant, there was no need to impose a standing requirement on the would-be intervenor). Rule 24(a)(2) uses the words may have in describing the type of interest that qualifies for intervention. The Campbells may ultimately have no standing once the paternity determination is made, but at this point that remains an open question. Cf. Dotson v. David Int'l Corp., 514 F.Supp. 109, 110 (E.D.Tenn.1981) (the district court held that resolving the paternity issue in a wrongful death action was a prerequisite to ruling on the motion to intervene). Accordingly, we conclude that the Campbell children claim a sufficient interest for intervention as a matter of right. 27 2. Extent to Which Denial of Appellant's Motion to Intervene as of Right Impairs its Ability to Protect its Interest 28 To intervene as a matter of right, the Campbells must also show that an unfavorable disposition of the action may impair their ability to protect their interest in the litigation. The applicants, however, need not show that substantial impairment of their interest will result, Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 701-02 (D.C.Cir.1967), nor, from the language of Rule 24(a), that impairment will inevitably ensue from an unfavorable disposition; the would-be intervenors need only show that the disposition may ... impair or impede [their] ability to protect [their] interest. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) (emphasis added). 29 The administrator urges that there is no impairment of interest by denying intervention because the true beneficiary of this action is the estate of Armstead Land. He is correct with regard to the survival action in count one of the complaint. We interpret count one as seeking damages only for a violation of Mr. Land's constitutional rights, specifically his first, fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. The Land and Campbell motions to intervene, the amended intervention complaint, and the briefs filed with this court do not suggest otherwise. 6 However, as far as count two is concerned, recovery under Ohio law for wrongful death depends on each beneficiary's circumstances. In Ohio, a wrongful death action is brought 30 in the name of the personal representative of the decedent, [in this case Appellee Purnell,] for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, children, and the parents of the decedent, all of whom are rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrongful death, and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the decedent. 31 O.R.C. Sec. 2125.02(A)(1). The statute further provides that compensatory damages may be awarded for the loss of support from the expected capacity of the decedent, loss of services and society of the decedent, loss of prospective inheritance, and mental anguish incurred by the surviving spouse, minor children, parents and next of kin. O.R.C. Sec. 2125.02(B)(1)-(5). As the provision dealing with the distribution of proceeds expressly demonstrates, recovery will vary according to the unique circumstances of each beneficiary. See O.R.C. Sec. 2125.03. 32 Admittedly, if we affirmed the lower court's denial of intervention, the Campbell children may not be entirely without recourse. We recognize that Ohio law normally requires the court which appointed the administrator to distribute the proceeds recovered in a wrongful death action. O.R.C. Sec. 2125.03(A). See also O.R.C. Sec. 2125.02(C) (a personal representative, with the consent of the court which appointed him, may at any time before or after trial has begun on a wrongful death claim settle with the defendant(s)). Appellee Purnell was appointed by the Ohio Summit County Probate Court. Assuming the Campbells eventually proved paternity and so notified the administrator, they may be able to intervene in the probate court's distribution of the proceeds recovered in district court. Alternatively, the Campbells could successfully sue the administrator for breach of fiduciary duty if he had already distributed the proceeds. See Rengel v. Sparks, 1990 WL 163917 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 4592. However, even assuming they are viable, such options, for obvious reasons, do not provide adequate protection. If the Campbells are not allowed to intervene in district court, the amount of proceeds will have been limited to the proof presented by the Land family; yet the proceeds would have to be shared by both the Lands and the Campbells. On the other hand, if the administrator has already distributed the proceeds he may not be worth suing. 33 Simply put, if there is a judgment for the Land family against defendants and the Campbells are successful in establishing paternity, then their joinder is necessary in the action where the beneficiaries present proof of damages so that the adjudication of the proceeds of such judgment will be just. See Dotson, 514 F.Supp. at 110 (citing to Notes of Advisory Committee on Rule 24, which states that under Rule 24 an applicant is entitled to intervene in an action when his or her interest is comparable to that of a person under Rule 19(a)(2)(i)). Accordingly, we believe that the Campbell family is so situated that disposition of its interest may as a practical matter impede its ability to protect that interest. 34 3. Adequacy of Representation by Existing Parties 35 The Campbell family's right to intervene also depends on whether its collective interest is adequately protected by the existing administrator. The proposed intervenors bear the burden of demonstrating inadequate representation. Meyer Goldberg, Inc., 717 F.2d at 293. Some of the factors to be considered in determining whether representation is adequate are stated in Triax Co. v. TRW, Inc., 724 F.2d 1224 at 1227-28 (6th Cir.1984): (1) if there is collusion between the representative and an opposing party; (2) if the representative fails in the fulfillment of his duty; and (3) if the representative has an interest adverse to the proposed intervenor. It is the last factor that must be considered in this case. The burden placed on the would-be intervenor requires overcom[ing] the presumption of adequacy of representation that arises when the proposed intervenor and a party to the suit ... have the same ultimate objective. Bradley, 828 F.2d at 1192 (citation omitted). 36 Appellee Purnell argues that the interests of the present representative and the proposed intervenor are identical as both would want to obtain a maximum recovery for the benefit of the estate. His representation, Purnell argues, is therefore adequate. See Blanchard v. Johnson, 532 F.2d 1074, 1077 (6th Cir.1976). But again, Appellee misperceives the object of the Campbells' motion. They wish to sue, through their personal representative, for personal recovery. The Campbells concede that the administrator will adequately represent their interests in the section 1983 action. As noted elsewhere, however, the interests of the Lands and the Campbells are not identical under the Ohio wrongful death statute. Although the children of both families are suing to recover the same type of damages, the amount of damages will differ for each child. Accordingly, the two sets of children are in competition in the sense that both want full recovery from what may be limited damages. 37 [I]nterests need not be wholly 'adverse' before there is a basis for concluding that existing representation of a 'different' interest may be inadequate. Jansen, 904 F.2d at 343 (citation omitted). As evidenced by his opposition to the Campbells' motion to intervene, 7 administrator Purnell has no interest in representing the would-be intervenors until paternity is proved, and though appearing neutral, he could be considered their opponent. Cf. Smith v. Clark Sherwood Oil Field Contractors, 457 F.2d 1339, 1344 (5th Cir.1972) (the court failed to see how one representative could adequately pursue and settle claims, on behalf of both legitimate and illegitimate dependents, which had the potential of becoming mutually exclusive of one another). Moreover, it is well established that [i]f the interest of the absent party is not represented at all, which will be the case here if we affirm the denial of intervention, then she or he is not adequately represented. Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 347 (citing Wright, Miller & Kane Sec. 1909, at 318). 38 We find that intervention of right is appropriate in these circumstances. Rule 24 is broadly construed in favor of potential intervenors. United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir.1986); Jansen, 904 F.2d at 340 (The need to settle claims among a disparate group of affected persons militates in favor of intervention.); Advisory Committee Note to Rule 24(a)(2) ([I]f an [applicant] would be substantially affected in a practical sense by the determination made in an action, [the applicant] should, as a general rule, be entitled to intervene....). Appellants' circumstances, in our opinion, adequately satisfy the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) and therefore justify holding in abeyance the motion to intervene until the paternity issue is resolved, one way or the other.