Opinion ID: 895408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Respondent's Policy Arguments

Text: The Comptroller argues that, as a matter of policy, the state should only compensate persons who were wrongfully imprisoned and subsequently found not guilty of the crime for which they served time. In other words, she contends the state should only compensate applicants who establish Herrera -type actual innocence claims. That is a plausible policy. However, the Legislature has drawn no distinctions between the two types of actual innocence claims. The actual innocence language of the TCA includes both types of claims and provides no indication that Schlup -type claims are precluded. We acknowledge that there are potential problems in the TCA  such as compensating someone now who later could be retried and found guilty, that may result in compensating someone temporarily who is actually guilty of the crime. The TCA addresses this concern to a degree by terminating compensation payments if the person is convicted of a crime punishable as a felony. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 103.154(a) (providing that payments terminate on the date of the subsequent conviction). Still, while unlikely, it is conceivable that the state could compensate someone who is later found guilty of the crime. Just as someone could be imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, the state could erroneously compensate someone who committed the crime for which he was incarcerated. The imperfection of humanity means that the state may make mistakes, but that possibility does not vitiate the government's interest in avoiding injustice. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324-25, 115 S.Ct. 851. Here, it appears unlikely that Allen will be retried or found guilty. In granting habeas relief to Allen, the Court of Criminal Appeals also remand[ed] him to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas County. [6] 2009 WL 282739, at . Since the Court of Criminal Appeals granted habeas relief and Allen filed his application with the Comptroller, the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, in which his case had been tried, dismissed all pending criminal charges against Allen. The District Attorney of Dallas filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges based on the destruction in 2007 of all physical evidence, the death of one fact witness, the failing memory of another fact witness, and the effect of the passage of time from the trial on the memory of other fact witnesses and the health of yet other surviving witnesses. The District Attorney concluded that these circumstances render the State unable to prosecute the Defendant for the offense at this time. The Comptroller correctly points out that these are important policy issues, and they may be addressed with the Legislature because her policy arguments cannot prevail over the words of the statute. [7] The role of the judicial branch in our government is important but that role is not to second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results; rather, our task is to interpret those statutes in a manner that effectuates the Legislature's intent. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 748 (Tex.2003). [T]he Court must adopt the interpretation of the statute that is most faithful to its text.... `If Congress enacted into law something different from what it intended, then it should amend the statute to conform to its intent.' Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 199, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 173 L.Ed.2d 347 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 542, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004)). The Legislature changed the key statutory language from not guilty to actual innocence following the Court of Criminal Appeals' recognition of both Herrera and Schlup as actual innocence claims in Texas. Since then, the Legislature has amended the Act three times, in 2007, 2009, and 2011, giving itself ample opportunities to distinguish between Herrera and Schlup if so desired, but it did not. [8] Where legislative enactments unambiguously direct our path, we must follow. Therefore, we conclude that habeas relief from a Schlup -type claim merits compensation under the Act as a writ based on a court finding of actual innocence. The Legislature has provided for compensation to individuals who have been granted habeas relief based on actual innocence. This is a narrow class of claimants within a larger class of individuals who obtain habeas relief. [9] The Court of Criminal Appeals has emphasized that Texas recognizes only two types of innocence claims  Herrera and Schlup claims. Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544. Recognizing only two types of innocence claims is consistent with the legislatively-identified narrow class of claimants who are entitled to compensation. Indeed, a number of other types of habeas claims fall outside compensable actual innocence claims. See e.g., Ex parte Vaughn, 2003 WL 21467074 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (not designated for publication) (granting habeas relief to file petition for discretionary review); Puckett v. State, 801 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (challenging the penal statute); Ex parte Wagner, 905 S.W.2d 799 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (challenging a void judgment); TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07.