Opinion ID: 484262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reinstatement in the halfway house as a habeas corpus action

Text: 21 Appellant raises the threshold issue of the appropriateness of maintaining this action under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1982). He argues that the claim for reinstatement challenges the conditions of confinement and not the fact or length of confinement. Citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), appellant contends that the proper vehicle for such a challenge is the civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982). 22 We reject this contention. We do not agree that Preiser would mandate that the reinstatement claim be brought as a Sec. 1983 action even if we were to accept appellant's characterization of the claim as a challenge to the conditions of confinement. In Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499-500, 93 S.Ct. at 1841, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that a challenge to prison conditions, cognizable under Sec. 1983, might also be brought as a habeas corpus claim. 3 See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526-27 n. 6, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1867-68 n. 6, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 153-54 (1st Cir.1984). 23 We find, moreover, that this case may be properly viewed as similar to cases involving challenges to the fact or length of confinement. The work release program in New Hampshire is closely connected to a prisoner's impending release. The program considers for admission only those inmates who are within eight months of parole. The program's Mission Statement, printed in the Community Centers--Handbook of Rules and Regulations (Handbook), states that the Centers function as testing situations to enable inmates to demonstrate they are capable of leading responsible law-abiding lifestyles. See Handbook, Rule C. Moreover, the Handbook states that admission into this testing situation for release is granted only after a lengthy application process involving consideration by a classification board, and approval by the warden and the sentencing judge. See id. at Rule D, Application and Screening Process. Presumably, this evaluation process is undertaken in light of the mission of the program. 24 Finally, the actual operation of the work release program shows that it indeed warrants our viewing it as a halfway house between incarceration and release. The Handbook states that [t]he program allows for the resident to progress through four phases of increasing freedom and responsibility. See Handbook at 13. The four phases culminate in such freedoms as UNSUPERVISED OUTINGS OF UP TO 12 HOUrs. id. at 14. 25 The present case provides a telling example of the intimate connection between the halfway house program and ultimate parole. Brennan's admission to the program was the culmination of a long-range pre-parole plan lasting several years. See Brennan v. Cunningham, 493 A.2d at 1214. This plan included a year of intensive therapy at the New Hampshire Hospital for sexual abnormality, as well as participation in socializing programs in the prison's minimum security unit. Id. Finally, Brennan was admitted to the halfway house only after the assurances from the Parole Board were obtained by Warden Perrin that the board would look favorably on Brennan's parole application in April, 1984. Thus, the nature of the program, as exemplified by Brennan's case, shows that it is more closely related to the length, rather than simply the conditions, of confinement. 26 We hold, therefore, that, under Preiser v. Rodriguez, a challenge to the revocation of participation in such a program may be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding. 4