Opinion ID: 764850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Claim for Attorney's Fees

Text: 26 Section 1988, Title 42, United States Code, provides: (b) In any action or proceeding to enforce ... [42 U.S.C. § 1983] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. Having prevailed on Khan's § 1983 claim, the defendants sought attorney's fees. Although the language of the statute seems not to distinguish between prevailing parties, prevailing plaintiffs receive attorney's fees as a matter of course, but prevailing defendants only receive attorney's fees if the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). The district court concluded Khan's claim was not frivolous because, although it was meritless, it was a good faith argument for an extension of existing law. 27 The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review for this issue. The statute's plain text obviously makes the awarding of attorney's fees a matter of the district court's discretion, and the courts have so interpreted it. Jaffee v. Redmond, 142 F.3d 409, 412 (7th Cir.1998) (award or denial of fees under § 1988 generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion). Here the defendants claim that the district court abused its discretion by misapprehending the law set out in our prior decisions. We review the district court's view of the law de novo. Jaffee, 142 F.3d at 412 (as with all questions of law, we review de novo the alleged legals errors made by the district court in denying fees.); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (if a court applies an erroneous view of the law, by definition it abuses its discretion). 28 As they did in the court below, the defendants focus on the supposed frivolity of Khan's substantive-due-process claim rather than her Contracts Clause claim. The defendants argue that the district court misapprehended the well established law of this circuit when it concluded that Khan had made a good faith argument for an extension of existing law. The defendants argue that our prior decisions, particularly Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452 (7th Cir.1992), are sufficiently on point that Khan's legal arguments in support of her claim are frivolous. We disagree. Wroblewski did involve somewhat analogous facts, but they were not identical. In that case, the plaintiff claimed that certain state actors prevented him from getting a job at a marina that had been owned by the municipality but was being sold to a private entity. He argued that this violated his substantive-due-process rights because the defendants had deprived him of the fundamental liberty to engage in an occupation of his choice. We rejected that argument because the plaintiff was not prevented from engaging in his chosen occupation, merely prevented from getting a particular job. The defendants argue that by analogy this reasoning should apply to this case. This is a good argument for affirming, but not a compelling one for attorney's fees. Wroblewski and the other cases the defendants rely on do not dictate the result we reach today. There is a significant difference between making a weak argument with little chance of success--what Khan did--and making a frivolous argument with no chance of success. As the courts have interpreted § 1988, it is only the latter that permits defendants to recover attorney's fees. See Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of School Directors, 969 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir.1992) (affirming award of fees to defendant where discovery produced only minimal support for plaintiff's factual allegations). The district court was therefore well within its discretion to deny fees here. 29 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.