Opinion ID: 848916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of masters and nabozny

Text: In the present case, it is uncontested that Robert McCarn intentionally aimed the weapon at the victim, engaged the hammer, and pulled the trigger. [10] Because he denied intending the actual injury, the event is an occurrence only if he should not have reasonably expected the consequences in light of the direct risk of harm intentionally created. The scope of the direct risk of harm created by an insured's act is necessarily dependent upon the nature of the intentional act and the facts and circumstances surrounding the event. The direct risk of harm created by intentionally throwing knives, for example, is far greater than the direct risk of harm created by intentionally throwing cotton balls. In each instance, the natural result of the voluntary act must be considered. See 9 Couch, Insurance, 3d, § 126:27, p. 126-53. What is the direct risk of harm consonant with pulling the trigger of a firearm? The obvious risk is that the weapon, if loaded, might discharge and cause an injury. In my view, the evidence adduced at the summary disposition stage warrants the conclusion that the insured should have reasonably expected the consequences of his intentional act. In his deposition testimony, McCarn testified that he consumed marijuana before taking the weapon out of storage. He also testified that he believed that the gun was unloaded and that he was just playing when he pulled the trigger of the weapon. However, he later admitted that he intended to frighten LaBelle into parting with crackers. [11] In addition, McCarn admitted that he did not check the status of the gun before pulling the trigger. He also testified that the last time he used the gun, he put it away hurriedly and could not recall whether he unloaded the weapon before putting it away. Further, the insured admitted that he deliberately aimed the weapon one foot away from the victim's face, engaged the hammer, and pulled the trigger in an effort to assault the victim. [12] As we noted in Nabozny, it can be in the interest of an insured defendant to provide testimony that will allow an injured plaintiff to recover from the insurer rather than directly from the defendant. Id., at 479, n. 10, 606 N.W.2d 639. As stated, I do not believe that reasonable jurors could conclude that Robert's stated beliefs about the harm he was creating were reasonable. Inasmuch as the reasonableness of Robert's expectations about the harm he created is the critical issue for the purpose of coverage under this policy, summary disposition in favor of plaintiff is appropriate. Therefore, I believe that the majority errs in holding that the event was an accident as a matter of law.