Opinion ID: 1910213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Entry of Judgment on Liability

Text: Although the parties raise a litany of issues on appeal, treatment of DePasquale Bldg.'s contention that the trial justice erred in denying its post-verdict motion for entry of judgment on liability quickly dispenses of the need to address many of the remaining issues, which are not properly directed at the legal issue underlying this case. To support its cross-appeal, DePasquale Bldg. contends that, unless Spino Bros. could prove that DePasquale Bldg. was negligent, the plain language of the contractual agreement between the parties required Spino Bros. to fully indemnify DePasquale Bldg. Spino Bros., however, contends that the contract's indemnity clause is not all encompassing, but, rather, makes Spino Bros. liable only for its own negligent conduct, which the jury decided was none. This Court reviews questions of law, including those premised on contract interpretation, de novo. 1800 Smith Street Associates, L.P. v. Gencarelli, 888 A.2d 46, 52 (R.I.2005). When determining whether the words of a contract are unambiguous, this Court will view the agreement[] in [its] entirety and give the contractual language its `plain, ordinary and usual meaning.' Id. (quoting Lajayi v. Fafiyebi, 860 A.2d 680, 686 (R.I.2004)); Continental Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mechancial Services, Inc., 53 Cal.App.4th 500, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 668, 670 (1997) (extrapolating these contract interpretation principles to indemnity agreements). Furthermore, [u]nder established contract law principles, when there is an unambiguous contract and no proof of duress or the like, the terms of the contract are to be applied as written. Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 739 n. 11 (R.I.2005). Indeed, [i]t is a basic tenet of contract law that the contracting parties can make as `good a deal or as bad a deal' as they see fit, limited to some extent by certain rules of enforcement. Durfee v. Ocean State Steel, Inc., 636 A.2d 698, 703 (R.I.1994). In this case, Spino Bros.'s obligation to indemnify DePasquale Bldg. is derived solely from express contractual terms. See 4 Steven G.M. Stein, Construction Law § 13.17[1] at 13-120 (2006) (identifying express contractual terms as one of three sources from which an indemnity obligation can arise). The contract is abundantly clear. In two sweeping provisions, it requires Spino Bros. to hold DePasquale Bldg. free of any and all claims of any nature arising out of the performance of the work by [Spino Bros.] under this contract, and shall indemnify [it]    with respect to all such claims. Further, Spino Bros. agreed to indemnify [DePasquale Bldg.] and save [it] harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, liability, judgments, losses, costs and expenses (including, without limitations, attorney's fees and disbursements) arising out of or in connection with any such claim, action, suit or proceeding. The contract further defines such a claim as one that involves the manner or sufficiency of the performance of the work required under this Agreement. The contract's plain language is clear and unambiguous and in no way requires negligence on Spino Bros.'s part for DePasquale Bldg. to seek indemnity. Under the contract, Spino Bros. agreed to indemnify DePasquale Bldg. for  any and all claims of any nature arising out of the performance of the work by [Spino Bros.]. (Emphases added). The only limit on the full indemnification that the contract specifies, of course, is that Spino Bros. is not bound to indemnify DePasquale Bldg. for DePasquale Bldg.'s own negligence, for such a provision would violate public policy, as addressed supra. Although the contractual indemnification agreement may have been unwise, it clearly provides for wide-ranging indemnifications by Spino Bros. Indeed, there is no question that Spino Bros. agreed to such a far reaching provision. In accordance with our obligation to apply the contract terms as written, we conclude that the trial justice first erred in limiting Spino Bros.'s liability only to its negligent conduct. In light of this conclusion, the trial justice erred further by failing to enter judgment in favor of DePasquale Bldg. Despite DePasquale Bldg.'s urging, the trial justice ruled that judgment had to enter in favor of Spino Bros. because DePasquale Bldg. had not proven Spino Bros.'s negligence. Under the contract's clear terms, however, Spino Bros. agreed to indemnify DePasquale Bldg. for any and all claims of any nature, not just those claims arising out of Spino Bros.'s negligence. Therefore, when the jury returned a verdict exculpating DePasquale Bldg. of negligence, judgment should have entered in DePasquale Bldg.'s favor, requiring Spino Bros., pursuant to the agreed-upon contract terms, to fully indemnify DePasquale Bldg. Having concluded that Spino Bros.'s negligence was not in any way controlling in this matter, we may quickly dispense with the parties' remaining contentions, which all sound in negligence.