Opinion ID: 182528
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Passport Application Provision 5(b)

Text: Chattler argues that provision 5(b) in the passport application and a statement on the Department of State website formed the basis of an express contract to process the application within three days and return it to Chattler within about two weeks. Provision 5(b) in the passport application reads: For faster processing, you may request expedited service. Expedited requests will be processed in three workdays from receipt at a passport agency. The additional fee for expedited service is $60. Barrett Decl. 16. Passport application provision 5(b) was not an offer. An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 788, 441 F.2d 1179, 1183 (1971) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (Tentative Draft No. 1) (1964)). Provision 5(b) was not a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain for at least four reasons. First, provision 5(b) categorizes the applicant's initiation of the expedite procedure as a request, Barrett Decl. 16 (For faster processing, you may request expedited service.), which belies any obligatory intent, see Cutler-Hammer, 441 F.2d at 1179 ([N]owhere is there a promise on the part of the Government to sell even one ounce of silver at the price mentioned. Purchasers are simply invited to make `application' to buy certain quantities of silver at a price which will be not less than $1.29 +.). Second, [t]he obligation of the government, if it is to be held liable, must be stated in the form of an undertaking, not as a mere prediction or statement of opinion or intention. Id. at 1182. Likewise statements of information or definition are not statements of obligation. The expedite provision in the passport application was included in furtherance of a regulatory scheme that (1) allowed applicants to request expedited processing by a Passport Agency, 22 C.F.R. § 51.66(a); (2) defined expedited processing, [e]xpedited passport processing shall mean completing processing within 3-business days. . ., 22 C.F.R. § 51.66(b); and (3) called for a fee to be collected in the amount prescribed in the Schedule of Fees for Consular Services, 22 C.F.R. § 51.66(c). Provision 5(b) substantially mirrors the informational content of the regulation: (1) it authorizes expedited processing (For faster processing, you may request expedited service); (2) defines expedited processing ( Expedited requests will be processed in three workdays from receipt at a passport agency ); and (3) notes the fee from the Schedule of Fees for Consular Services (The additional fee for expedited service is $60). Barrett Decl. 16. The use of language that simply restates obligations created by a regulation evinces that the government never intended the language [ ] to be more than a mere expression of intention, as opposed to words of commitment. Floyd v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 889, 891 (1992), aff'd on other grounds 996 F.2d 1237 (Fed.Cir.1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 925, 114 S.Ct. 328, 126 L.Ed.2d 274 (1993). See also Clawson v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1991) (Where rights and obligations are prescribed by statute and regulations rather than determined through the mechanics of a bilateral exchange, there is no contract in the usual sense of that word.). The word will is often used in this definitional way, without creating an underlying obligation. See Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/will (last visited July 20, 2010) (defining will as 3used to express futurity will wake up in this first-class hotel suite Tennessee Williams>). We also note the use of the passive voice, i.e. will be processed, makes it less likely that the government intended to be bound. Cf. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 258, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (In addition, there is some significance in the use of the active voice in the main paragraph and the passive voice in clauses (2) and (3) of § 2119.). Compare Airborne Data, Inc. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1350 (Fed.Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (Contracting officers and other Governmental personnel shall comply with the terms of the legend.). Third, as the relevant regulations confirm, an applicant's assent to the offer would not necessarily conclude the bargain because the Department may decline to accept the expedite request under certain conditions. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.66(d) (A request for expedited processing normally will be accepted only if the applicant can document urgent departure with airline tickets showing confirmed reservation or similar evidence. The Passport Agency may decline to accept the request if it is apparent at the time it is made that the request cannot be granted.). Fourth, the form of provision 5(b) informs the substance; the single sentence of the provision is a far cry from the comprehensive instruments that typify government contracts under the Federal Acquisition Regulations and in the express contract cases relied on by Chattler. The Claims Court confronted a similar assertion of a contract arising out of a statement in an agency publication in Girling Health Systems, Inc. v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 66 (1990). There, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) publication included a single sentence that was alleged to constitute an offer to contract: You should generally receive determination on your election within 60 days after you have filed form 2553. Id. at 68. The court found that no contract was formed, in part because the basis for the contract was a simple statement in an IRS publication, and there has been no negotiation between IRS personnel and the plaintiff and no one from the IRS has assented to anything. Id. at 70. This court affirmed because there, like here, the language manifest[ed] no intent to be bound. Girling Health Sys., Inc. v. United States, 949 F.2d 1145, 1147 (Fed.Cir.1991). Chattler relies on two sets of cases to support her contention that provision 5(b) was an offer. First, she relies on a group of express contract cases in which the sufficiency of the offer was not in dispute. See Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336, 1337-38 (Fed.Cir. 2000) (resolving whether an administrative exhaustion provision of a contract covered particular types of inaction by the government); N. States Power Co. v. United States, 224 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed.Cir.2000) (same); Hughes Commc'ns Galaxy v. United States, 998 F.2d 953, 954 (Fed.Cir. 1993) (noting that the government was bound by a contract to provide its best efforts to launch commercial payloads through the space shuttle program, in part because the government did not challenge the validity of the contract before the Claims Court and does not do so here). Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1012 (Fed.Cir.1996) is closer, in that it addressed whether a contract was formed. However, the issues in that case were whether any government official had the authority to contract and whether certain conditions precedent precluded contract formation, not whether certain governments statements constituted offers. No similar issues are presented here. Because none of these cases addressed whether certain statements of the government constituted offers, they are inapposite. Chattler also relies on a second set of cases, which found that the government entered into implied-in-fact contracts to keep proprietary information confidential. See Airborne Data, 702 F.2d 1350; Research, Analysis, & Dev., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl.Ct. 54 (1985). We do not believe these cases are dispositive. Moreover, Chattler has failed to cite, and this court has been unable to find, a single case where the government was held to have contracted to perform a service in furtherance of a regulatory scheme by virtue of a statement in a form application. In the closest case, Girling, the Claims Court determined that no contract was formed, 22 Cl. Ct. at 73, and this court affirmed, 949 F.2d at 1147. The only cases where the government was bound in contract to perform a service are those in which the contract was manifested by an express obligation observing the formalities of typical government contracts, including a signature by an authorized agent. See Me. Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1337-38; N. States Power, 224 F.3d at 1364; Wells Fargo, 88 F.3d at 1019; Hughes Commc'ns, 998 F.2d at 954. For these reasons, this court holds that the government did not manifest an intent to be bound in contract by provision 5(b) of the passport application.