Opinion ID: 628610
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insulin Dependent Diabetes as a Handicap

Text: 21 The City contends that Chandler is not handicapped because he failed to establish that his insulin dependent diabetes substantially limits any of his major life activities. Indeed Chandler himself testified that he did not consider his diabetes to be a substantial limitation on his major life activities. Given this testimony and the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we hold that Chandler failed to establish that he was handicapped by his insulin dependent diabetes. 22 Chandler advances an alternative argument that insulin dependent diabetes should be considered a handicap per se. Neither this nor any other circuit court has addressed whether insulin dependent diabetes constitutes a handicap per se. No explicit guidance is available from the Act itself or the DHHS regulations as neither expressly discusses diabetes. Chandler therefore bases his argument on language contained in the commentary to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations promulgated to implement the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA). 23 The ADA defines a disability in substantially the same terms as the Act defines an individual with handicaps (now an individual with a disability). 18 Stressing the similarities between the Act and the ADA, Chandler urges us to look to the ADA and the regulations promulgated under that act for additional guidance as to what constitutes a handicap under the Act. 24 The EEOC's implementing regulations for the ADA became effective on July 26, 1992. 19 In them, the EEOC uses the same definitions for key terms as does the DHHS in its regulations implementing the Act. 20 25 The EEOC also included an appendix to 29 C.F.R. part 1630 entitled Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In the Interpretive Guidance, the EEOC notes that the ADA term disabilities is substantively equivalent to the term handicaps in the Act. 21 Of particular significance to the instant case is another statement in this appendix. In its discussion of the term substantially limits, the EEOC states that a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a coma would be substantially limited because the individual cannot perform major life activities without the aid of medication. 22 26 Thus, the EEOC apparently considers that any insulin dependent diabetic has a disability per se under the ADA. The issue remains whether this statement mandates that such a person also has a handicap per se under the Act. Nonetheless, we need not decide that issue today because even if we assume arguendo that Chandler is handicapped for purposes of the Act, he has failed to establish that he was otherwise qualified for Primary Driver jobs. 23 27