Opinion ID: 2293285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Nature Of Privilege

Text: Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Merzbacher v. State, 346 Md. 391, 411-12, 697 A.2d 432, 442 (1997). In some situations, the right may reasonably be limited, but it remains a valuable right essential to an effective defense. See Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 194-95, 695 A.2d 184, 188 (1997) (The trial court's discretion to limit cross-examination is not boundless. It has no discretion to limit cross-examination to such an extent as to deprive the accused of a fair trial.). As discussed below, the surveillance location privilege, like its progenitor, the informer's privilege, limits the defendant's right to cross-examination and must be analyzed in light of the requirement that the defendant receive a fair trial. The Supreme Court addressed the informer's privilege in Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), observing that [w]hat is usually referred to as the informer's privilege is in reality the Government's privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law. In Roviaro, the Supreme Court established a balancing test to determine the appropriateness of ordering disclosure of a confidential informant in which courts must weigh the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Id. at 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-29. In Maryland, [w]e have stressed that trial courts must apply the Roviaro balancing test in each case where the informant privilege is invoked. Warrick v. State, 326 Md. 696, 701, 607 A.2d 24, 26 (1992). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has had occasion to establish similar principles for the surveillance location privilege in a trio of cases, beginning with United States v. Green, 216 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 670 F.2d 1148 (D.C.Cir.1981). In Green, the court held that a qualified privilege existed for non-disclosure of covert surveillance and specifically noted that the surveillance location privilege is built upon the established informer's privilege in Roviaro. Id. at 1155, 1157 n. 14. Green left it to trial courts to create an appropriately fashioned procedure in each case. Id. at 1156. The Green court advised that [i]n exercising its discretion, a trial court should endeavor to protect the public interests that give rise to the surveillance location privilege, while also taking any steps necessary to ensure accurate fact-finding and to protect the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. It explicitly limited the privilege to suppression hearings. Id. at 1157 n. 14. In United States v. Harley, 221 U.S.App.D.C. 69, 682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C.Cir.1982) the court expanded the application of the surveillance location privilege to trial proceedings. The court determined that the privilege applied where a drug deal between an undercover officer and the defendant was observed and filmed by three officers in a covert location. The Harley court held that the surveillance location privilege, like the informer's privilege, applies at trials and that it, too, is to be applied through a balancing test controlled by `the fundamental requirements of fairness.' Id. at 1020 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60, 77 S.Ct. at 628). The court upheld application of the privilege when the surveillance location was in a privately owned apartment, other evidence regarding visibility and distance from the transaction was elicited on cross-examination, and a videotape of the transaction showed the jury the view the officers in the surveillance post had, the distance, the angle, and the existence or nonexistence of obstructions in the line of sight. Id. at 1020-21. United States v. Foster, 300 U.S.App. D.C. 78, 986 F.2d 541 (D.C.Cir.1993) illustrates how the D.C. Circuit has applied the Green and Harley factors to protect the defendant's right of cross-examination. It ruled that the covert location must be revealed when knowledge of the precise location could call into question the police officer's memory and challenge his perception. Id. at 543-44. The Foster court discussed and distinguished Harley in evaluating these factors: The Harley court discerned nothing more the defendant could have gained by learning the number of the apartment from which the police observed him. As to the government's interest in maintaining the secrecy of the observation post, the court relied on the safety of the cooperating apartment owner or tenant and the willingness of other citizens to cooperate with the police in this fashion in the future. Not one of the considerations mentioned in Harley in favor of the privilege is present in this case. Unlike Harley, the witness claiming the privilege was crucial to the prosecution. Without [the officer's] testimony, the government's case against Foster would have collapsed. The more important the witness to the government's case, the more important the defendant's right, derived from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, to cross-examine the witness. Unlike Harley, the defense challenged [the officer's] perceptions, his ability to identify Foster and the accuracy of his identification. Fifteen other people were in the vicinity at the time, some playing basketball, others moving about in the open area. One officer who arrived on the scene in response to [the officer's] call describing Foster arrested someone else (who was then released). The defense understandably wanted to cross-examine [the officer] about his estimate of the distance between him and Foster and the angle of his view and his testimony that nothing blocked his line of sight. Without knowing the location of the observation post, the defense could not effectively probe the officer's memory or veracity about these subjects. The right of the defense to engage in such lines of inquiry is at the heart of our system of criminal justice. Id. (citations omitted). Although the surveillance location privilege is a matter of first impression for this Court, the Court of Special Appeals addressed this privilege in Johnson v. State, 148 Md.App. 364, 811 A.2d 898 (2002), cert. denied, 374 Md. 83, 821 A.2d 370 (2003). The Johnson court recognized that a qualified privilege existed that allowed the withholding of a covert surveillance location where police were still using the location. Id. at 365, 366-67, 811 A.2d at 899. Johnson's associates threatened action against the location if it was found out, and the private citizen who permitted police to use the property feared reprisal if the location were revealed. Id. at 366-67, 811 A.2d at 899-900. The State filed a motion in limine to protect the location from disclosure at trial. Id. at 366, 811 A.2d at 899. The trial court ruled that the covert location should not be disclosed, indicating that the primary basis for its ruling was to protect the person or persons who consented to use of the covert location. Id. at 367, 811 A.2d at 900. The Court of Special Appeals held that the trial court correctly applied a qualified privilege by balancing the public's interest in non-disclosure against a defendant's interest in cross-examination and accurate fact finding. Id. at 368, 811 A.2d at 900. The court declared that the privilege must be based on a case-specific balancing of these interests, and utilized language from Green to articulate the balancing process that must be undertaken when considering whether the privilege applies: `the location of a police observation post may establish whether the observing officer's view was open or obstructed, whether the angle of the officer's view made the observations easy or difficult, and whether the distance from the criminal activity enhances or detracts from an officer's claimed observation of detail.' Id. at 370-71, 811 A.2d at 902 (quoting Green, 670 F.2d at 1156). The court explained that the privilege provided a protection that is essential to successful law enforcement investigations, because secret informants and secret locations are helpful only if they remain undisclosed. Revealing the hidden location (or unnamed informer) may jeopardize the safety of officers or citizens and discourage further public cooperation with the police. Id. at 370, 811 A.2d at 901 (citing Green, 670 F.2d at 1155). In applying the privilege to the case before it, the Johnson court noted that the trial court recognized a strong interest in protecting the person or persons who cooperated with police by consenting to the use of the covert location. Id. at 371, 811 A.2d at 902. The court took into account that Johnson had been able to elicit sufficient information on cross-examination from the officer to establish that his view had not been obstructed and that the distance was sufficient for him to view the alleged drug transaction. Id. at 371-72, 811 A.2d at 902-03. The court also considered that Johnson had not demonstrated what purpose would have been served had he been permitted to question the officer about his specific location: The officer testified to what he saw, his sight line, the angle of his view, lighting, timing, obstructions, his memory and potential bias. Questioning from both sides elicited answers concerning the ability of the officer to see the area, significantly diminishing any prejudice to appellant from non-disclosure of the exact surveillance location. Appellant does not proffer what else he would have been able to ask the officer had the exact location of his surveillance been disclosed. We perceive no error. Id. at 372-73, 811 A.2d at 903. So, in addition to finding that the State had a legitimate interest in protecting the people and property involved in the covert investigation, the court was persuaded that the defendant's interests were not being compromised by the restriction on cross-examination because knowledge of the exact location would not have rendered his cross-examination more effective. We agree that there is a qualified privilege for the State to refuse to disclose the location of an ongoing place of surveillance. See Green, 670 F.2d at 1155. See also, e.g., United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir.1987)(finding the policy of qualified privilege to be entirely appropriate in the context of criminal trials where a defendant seeks disclosure of confidential government surveillance information); Hicks v. United States, 431 A.2d 18, 19 (D.C.1981)(holding that the government has a qualified privilege to withhold the location of a secret surveillance post); People v. Knight, 323 Ill.App.3d 1117, 257 Ill.Dec. 213, 753 N.E.2d 408, 417 (2001)(holding that a qualified privilege exists at a trial for the disclosure of a surveillance location); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 548 N.E.2d 1263, 1265 (1990)(recognizing that [p]olicy reasons comparable to those which favor the nondisclosure of an informer support the privilege to keep a surveillance location secret); State v. Garcia, 131 N.J. 67, 618 A.2d 326, 328 (1993)(recognizing a `surveillance location privilege,' under which the State can refuse to disclose the exact location from which law-enforcement officers observe criminal activity); Hollins v. Commonwealth, 19 Va.App. 223, 450 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1994)(holding that the Commonwealth has a qualified privilege not to disclose the [observation] location). The qualified privilege arises when the State has an interest in protecting persons who have a property or possessory interest in the covert location, and such State interest(s) outweighs the defendant's need for disclosure for the purposes of cross-examination. We adopt the qualified privilege because it takes into account the privacy concerns of private citizens, the tools necessary for police officers to conduct routine surveillance, and the importance of a defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses and paint an accurate factual picture of the circumstances under which he or she was observed. These policy concerns provide the criteria for trial courts in considering whether the public interest served by non-disclosure is greater than the defendant's Sixth Amendment cross-examination rights. But, our recognition of the privilege does not resolve the dispositive issue in this case, i.e. whether this balancing test must be triggered by the State's showing that it has some legitimate interest in protecting the particular surveillance location. A number of other jurisdictions have articulated that the burden falls on the defendant to establish why the privilege should be overcome. See, e.g., People v. Montgomery, 205 Cal.App.3d 1011, 252 Cal. Rptr. 779, 785 (1988)(The correct procedure in [surveillance location] cases is for the court first to ask the defendant to make a prima facie showing for disclosure.); Bueno v. United States, 761 A.2d 856, 859 (D.C.2000), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1031, 123 S.Ct. 581, 154 L.Ed.2d 447 (2002)(A defendant who has requested the precise location of a police surveillance post must first show that he needs the information to conduct his defense before any balancing test is applied.); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 429 Pa.Super. 135, 631 A.2d 1323, 1327 (1993), cert. denied, 538 Pa. 623, 646 A.2d 1177 (1994)(It is the defendant ... who has the burden of demonstrating to the trial court that the [surveillance location] is material and that disclosure is in the interest of justice.). Nevertheless, we conclude, as explained below, that the State has a limited initial burden: its privilege does not arise just because it invokes a blanket non-disclosure policy. This issue proves to be dispositive of this appeal.