Opinion ID: 1800365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the testimony of dr. benson

Text: Dr. Christianson states that he called Dr. Benson to testify not only that Dr. Christianson was not negligent but that Dr. Ghaly was negligent, even though Dr. Ghaly had settled. Under the holding in Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979), the negligence of Dr. Ghaly was still at issue under the North Dakota comparative negligence law. Section 9-10-07, NDCC. In Olson v. A. W. Chesterton Co., 256 N.W.2d 530 (N.D.1977), we were confronted with circumstances somewhat similar to the instant case. Chesterton assigned as error the trial court's refusal to exclude the testimony of Olson's expert witness because Chesterton was not notified of the expert's existence or the substance of his testimony until the day of trial when Chesterton was served with a supplemental response to an interrogatory posed by a defendant who was later dismissed from the action. The trial court ruled that because Chesterton had not posed the interrogatory, it had no standing to object to the late notice. This court upheld the trial court, stating that the decision to allow the expert to testify would not constitute an abuse of discretion even if Chesterton did have standing. Schwartz argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Chesterton because the interrogatory not answered in Chesterton was made by a different party than the one who complained of the failure to supplement the answer. Nevertheless, we believe that the principles discussed in Chesterton are applicable to the instant case. The spirit and intent of the Rules are to eliminate surprise at trial. See Chesterton, supra, 256 N.W.2d at 539. The trial court in the instant case allowed Benson to testify because: (1) there was no violation of the Rules of Procedure; (2) the court was not satisfied that Schwartz did not know in advance of Dr. Benson and his opinion; (3) it was foreseeable, should the plaintiff settle with Ghaly, that the remaining defendants would attempt to show that Ghaly and the anesthesia team were the sole negligent parties; (4) that there was no basis for a claim of surprise or prejudice; and (5) the costs of a continuance would be high. [5] The determination to admit Dr. Benson's testimony, under the circumstances, and the refusal to postpone the trial, were within the province of the trial court and we will not reverse in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. See Chesterton, supra. When this court reviews an issue involving a discretionary decision by a trial judge, we cannot supervise so closely as to insure a perfect trial. We have often stated in the context of criminal cases that a defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not necessarily to a perfect trial. State v. Faul, 300 N.W.2d 827, 833 (N.D.1980). See also, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2364, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). The trial judge in the instant case allowed Dr. Benson to testify and refused to postpone the trial. Other judges, perhaps, might have ruled otherwise, but we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.