Opinion ID: 1616031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: antishuttling provisions

Text: Reed asserts in his third assignment of error that the antishuttling provisions of the Agreement were violated in this case when he was transferred from Lincoln County, Nebraska, to Adams County, Illinois. In this respect, article III(d) provides in relevant part: If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. (Emphasis supplied.) Similarly, article IV(e) provides: If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. (Emphasis supplied.) Article V(e) provides: At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. Reed argues that he was imprisoned in Illinois at the time he filed his request for speedy disposition and that he was transported back to Illinois on March 5, 2002, to attend the Illinois sentencing proceedings prior to trial on his Nebraska charges. He contends that such transport violates the antishuttling provisions of articles III and IV. The district court found that it could be argued that by its demand on the State of Illinois and Reed's subsequent waiver of extradition, the State of Nebraska took steps under article IV to have Reed returned to Nebraska. Reed contends in his brief that Nebraska took such steps and that therefore, the provisions of both articles III and IV are applicable to this proceeding. However, the record reveals that all action taken under the Agreement was initiated by Reed. If article IV were invoked, Nebraska would have presented a written request for temporary custody to the appropriate Illinois authorities. See § 29-759, art. IV(a). No such request appears in the record. The only correspondence with respect to the issue of temporary custody is Nebraska's acceptance of the Menard facility's offer of temporary custody that was made under article III. Therefore, only the antishuttling provisions of article III, and not the provisions of article IV, are applicable to our analysis of this issue. Reed relies heavily upon Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001). In that case, the defendant was serving a sentence at a federal prison in Florida when Alabama lodged a detainer against him. Alabama then invoked the provisions of article IV and sought temporary custody of the defendant. Temporary custody was granted, and the defendant was released to Alabama officials. The officials transported him approximately 80 miles to Alabama, where he spent the night in county jail, appeared in court the next morning, and was then transported back to the federal prison in Florida. Approximately 1 month later, the defendant was returned to Alabama to stand trial. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Alabama charges, arguing that the antishuttling provision of article IV had been violated by his return to the federal prison prior to trial in Alabama. Alabama did not contest that the Agreement was literally violated, but argued that the violation was de minimus because it did not prejudice the defendant or affect his rehabilitation program. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, found that the terms of article IV had been violated, and dismissed the Alabama charges. Reed contends that Bozeman stands for the proposition that the antishuttling provisions of the Agreement must be strictly construed in favor of the prisoner. Bozeman, supra, however, did not address the factual situation present in the instant case, because in that case, the prisoner was clearly returned to the original institution in which he was serving a validly imposed custodial sentence and was not returned to the sending state for the purpose of facing pending charges. Moreover, Bozeman clearly interpreted and applied the antishuttling provision in article IV of the Agreement. As noted, the State of Nebraska never invoked the provision of article IV in this case, and thus the only antishuttling provision at issue in this case is that of article III(d). Although the provisions in each article are similar, they contain one striking difference. Article III(d) provides that the prisoner may not be returned to the original place of imprisonment, while article IV(e) provides that the prisoner may not be returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof. (Emphasis supplied.) Article V(e) provides: At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. The difference in the statutory language of articles III(d) and IV(e) was addressed by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184 (Wyo.2000). In that case, a prisoner was serving a sentence in Canon City, Colorado, when he requested final disposition of outstanding Wyoming charges. He was subsequently transferred to Wyoming, based on this request. However, prior to being tried in Wyoming, the prisoner was returned to Weld County, Colorado, on two occasions to face pending charges. The prisoner was never returned to Canon City. He contended that the returns to Colorado violated the antishuttling provisions of the Agreement and required dismissal of the Wyoming charges. The Wyoming Supreme Court found that it was the prisoner who requested final disposition of the Wyoming charges and that thus, the remedy for a violation of the antishuttling provision was found only in article III(d). The court noted the distinction between the language in articles III(d) and IV(e) and concluded: Absent modifying language in Article III, similar to that in Article IV, Article III's definition of original place of imprisonment is more precise and restrictive than that of Article IV. Article III requires that the prisoner be returned to his original place of imprisonment, the Colorado Territorial Correction Facility in Canon City, Colorado, while under Article IV, it appears to suffice if the prisoner is returned to the sending state. Merchant, 4 P.3d at 189. The court concluded that because the prisoner was never returned to Canon City, even though he was returned to another location in Colorado, the antishuttling provision of article III was not violated. As Reed correctly notes, Merchant was decided prior to Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 121 S.Ct. 2079, 150 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001). Bozeman, however, while holding that the provisions of article IV must be strictly applied, did not address the statutory language of article III. Literally interpreting the statutory language of the Agreement, as we must under Bozeman, we conclude that there is a difference between the original place of imprisonment language in article III and the original place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof language in article IV. Under the article III original place of imprisonment language, it is not enough that a prisoner is returned to the sending state simply to face pending charges. In the instant case, we deem it particularly significant that Reed was never returned to any facility in Illinois in order to serve a term of imprisonment, but, rather, was returned to Illinois only to face pending charges. He was therefore never returned to his original place of imprisonment, and the district court did not err in concluding that the antishuttling provisions of the Agreement were not violated.