Opinion ID: 1311169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex parte reception of evidence.

Text: After the hearing examiner recommended continuation of probation, Lloyd Lind, a field supervisor with the bureau of probation and parole, met with agent Gagnon. On October 15, 1974, they sent a memo to R. J. Capener, a regional bureau chief, voicing their objections to the hearing examiner's recommendation. On October 16 this memo was forwarded to the hearing examiner's office by Delmar Huebner, the director of the bureau. It was thereafter brought to the attention of the secretary of the department. Neither Mr. Ramaker nor his counsel were informed of the existence of this memo. The state attempts to characterize the memo as a permissible objection to the proposed findings and recommendations. But it clearly goes beyond appropriate commentary on the evidence received and the findings made. In regard to the contents of Mr. Ramaker's metal box, the memo presents in lurid detail adjudicative facts which were not introduced into evidence at the hearing. None of these facts were testified to by Mr. Gagnon at the hearing. In addition, the memo states as follows: . . . We now feel that the secretary of the Department should have some of this material available to him at this time should he decide to review it. Some of the pictures referred to above are in the attached envelope. None of these pictures which apparently reached the secretary were ever admitted as evidence at the hearing. Reception of these facts and exhibits, with no notice to or opportunity to respond by Mr. Ramaker, was clear constitutional error. Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U. S. 471, 489, 92 Sup. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, made applicable to probation revocation proceedings by Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U. S. 778, 93 Sup. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656, requires disclosure to the [probationer] of evidence against him, opportunity to be heard, and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. All of these minimum requirements of due process were violated by the confidential reception of these facts and photos adverse to Mr. Ramaker. However, Mr. Ramaker cannot raise this error as a matter of right here, because he failed to raise it below, even though the departmental memo was part of the record before the lower court. Nevertheless, this court may consider this constitutional issue for the first time on appeal, because it is in the interest of justice to do so and because there are no unresolved factual issues. State v. Clarke (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 161, 174, 181 N. W. 2d 355; Bradley v. State (1967), 36 Wis. 2d 345, 359, 153 N. W. 2d 38, 155 N. W. 2d 564. [3] In considering this issue on the merits, we conclude that this constitutional error was harmless. The facts and exhibits which were unconstitutionally received related solely to the contents of the box found in Mr. Ramaker's room. But both the hearing examiner and the secretary based their decisions upon the July 27 incident of following and photographing a young girl, and not upon the contents of the box. The departmental revocation order, which is the subject of judicial review, refers only to the July 27 incident as the basis for revocation, and does not mention the contents of the box. In short, the error is harmless because this court can independently conclude that there is sufficient evidence, other than and uninfluenced by the unconstitutionally received evidence, which would warrant the revocation of Mr. Ramaker's probation. Wold v. State (1973), 57 Wis. 2d 344, 356, 204 N. W. 2d 482.