Opinion ID: 2162170
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severe and pervasive abuse

Text: There is no dispute that the conduct of Sakell and others was based on Breiner's age. Daka maintains, however, that it was not sufficiently severe to warrant damages under the DCHRA. We find this argument wanting. Although the Harris and Best standards are not mathematically precise, Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct. at 371, whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be determined by considering several factors, none of which in itself is dispositive. According to the Supreme Court, these may include: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor is required. Id. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. [21] Reduced to essentials, the test is not whether work has been impaired, but whether working conditions have been discriminatorily altered. Id. at 25, 114 S.Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring); accord, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1001, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) (citing Harris ); Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. In this case the evidence was sufficient to show that they were. Breiner described a series of events which occurred with significant frequency. The repetitive age-based slurs directed toward him were sufficiently pervasive to alter Breiner's working conditions. They were demeaning from both an objective and a subjective point of view. Concededly, some of the remarks, such as old timer or old fogey, were rather innocuous. But other comments, especially those uttered by Sakell and Reeves, could reasonably be found to have been intentionally malicious. To question Breiner's sexual prowess and his ability to perform his job in front of both customers and subordinates was intolerable. The evidence also showed that Sakell's persistent ridicule seriously undermined Breiner's ability to manage the cafeteria staff. Junior employees, such as Reeves and McKenna, began to emulate Sakell, treating Breiner in a similarly abusive fashion. The combined effect of these insults was a serious decline in Breiner's morale and job performance. He testified that he felt inadequate and incompetent, and that the insults about his age started to bother, irritate and really hurt him. It was clear from Breiner's numerous protests to Sakell and Reeves that he did not appreciate or welcome their age-based harassment. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Breiner, as we must, we hold that it was sufficient to go to the jury on the question of whether this harassment altered the conditions of Breiner's working environment. The Supreme Court held in Meritor that Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (citations omitted). We see no reason not to recognize this same right under the DCHRA. Indeed, this court has stated, in a DCHRA case, that an employee has the right to work in a decent environment and to earn a fair livelihood based on merit.... Arthur Young & Co. v. Sutherland, supra, 631 A.2d at 373. From the record before us, a jury could reasonably find that Breiner's workplace was permeated with the kind of intimidation, ridicule, and insult which Meritor forbids, and that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive `to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working environment.' Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405 (citations omitted). We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying Daka's motion for judgment n.o.v.