Opinion ID: 1969230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the statutory privileges

Text: In opposition to defendant Stanaway's discovery motion, the prosecutor asserted that the records at issue were privileged under Michigan's statutory sexual assault counselor-victim privilege, MCL 600.2157a(2); MSA 27A.2157(1)(2); [9] social worker-client privilege, MCL 339.1610; MSA 18.425(1610); [10] and the statutory provisions regarding records kept pursuant to the juvenile diversion program, MCL 722.828-722.829; MSA 25.243(58)-25.243(59). [11] The prosecutor asserted that because the juvenile diversion officer held a master's degree in social work and had provided counseling services to the complainant as part of diversion, the social worker-client privilege barred disclosure. In opposition to defendant Caruso's discovery request, the prosecutor asserted that the records requested were absolutely privileged under Michigan's statutory psychologist-patient privilege, MCL 330.1750; MSA 14.800(750). [12] Unlike other evidentiary rules that exclude evidence because it is potentially unreliable, privilege statutes shield potentially reliable evidence in an attempt to foster relationships. Westen, The compulsory process clause, 73 Mich L R 71, 160-161 (1974). While the assurance of confidentiality may encourage relationships of trust, privileges inhibit rather than facilitate the search for truth. 1 McCormick, Evidence (4th ed), § 72, pp 268-270. Privileges therefore are not easily found or endorsed by the courts. The existence and scope of a statutory privilege ultimately turns on the language and meaning of the statute itself. Howe v Detroit Free Press, 440 Mich 203, 211; 487 NW2d 374 (1992). Even so, the goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and facilitate the intent of the Legislature. People v Love, 425 Mich 691, 705; 391 NW2d 738 (1986). The Legislature expressly provided that confidential communications made to a sexual or domestic assault counselor shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim. MCL 600.2157a(2); MSA 27A.2157(1)(2). The House Legislative Analysis, HB 4609, November 16, 1983, indicates a desire to afford victims who consult with counselors at a sexual assault crisis intervention center the same assurance of confidentiality that those who consult with psychologists, psychiatrists, or social workers are afforded. The analysis discusses the role confidentiality plays in effective therapy: [Sexual assault] [c]ounselors feel obliged to warn their clients beforehand that communications between them may be used as evidence in court, and they report that this knowledge often has an important chilling effect on the client's willingness to be forthcoming. Crisis intervention centers often make it a practice to keep minimal records in order to protect privacy as much as possible, but this practice makes resumption of counseling after a lapse of time or by another counselor much more difficult. [ Id. ] The only exception recognized in MCL 600.2157a; MSA 27A.2157(1) is the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Child Protection Act, MCL 722.623(1); MSA 25.248(3)(1). [13] The statute addressing the social worker-client privilege, MCL 339.1610(1); MSA 18.425(1610)(1) provides in part one that the social worker shall not be required to disclose a communication and in part two that communications are confidential. The exceptions to the privilege are disclosures for internal supervision of the social worker, disclosures made under the duty to warn third parties, as set forth in MCL 330.1946; MSA 14.800(946), and where the client has waived the privilege. The psychologist-patient privilege, MCL 330.1750; MSA 14.800(750), establishes an evidentiary privilege in court proceedings unless the patient has waived the privilege. The few exceptions provided by the statute include when the communication is relevant to a condition the patient has introduced as an element of a claim and when a malpractice action is brought against the treating psychologist. The privilege extends not just to the communications made in the course of treatment, but to the fact of treatment as well. Defendant Stanaway included a request for the juvenile diversion records of the complainant in his discovery motion. The prosecutor asserted that those records were privileged by both the social worker-client privilege and under the Juvenile Diversion Act, MCL 722.828-722.829; MSA 25.243(58)-25.243(59). [14] The juvenile diversion officer in this case was a licensed social worker. Her contract with the juvenile division of the probate court stipulated that she would provide counseling services to juveniles in the diversion program. The Juvenile Diversion Act [15] mandates the creation of a limited record containing some specific, basic information to document the fact of diversion. [16] An examination of the House Legislative Analysis, HB 4597, December 10, 1987, reveals that the purpose of this recordkeeping requirement was to provide a trail in the event future decisions needed to be made regarding whether or not to place a juvenile in the diversion program. [17] Records created pursuant to these requirements are accessible by court order if it is determined that the person requesting them has a legitimate interest. [18] However, MCL 722.829; MSA 25.243(59) arguably defines legitimate interest in the records as being only for the purpose of considering whether to divert a minor. [19] We hold that the records required under the act are subject to the privilege established by the act. Any additional records created by the juvenile diversion officer in her capacity as a social worker are protected by the statutory social worker-client privilege. Defendants' need for the records does not fit any of the exceptions afforded under the statutes. All the privileges cited indicate a legislative intent to create an evidentiary privilege that precludes a defendant's access to confidential communications. Under the clear and unambiguous language used in the statutes, the Legislature intends to preclude defendants from having any access to communications made in these counseling settings. These communications are not intended to be available for use as evidence, either for impeachment or as exculpatory evidence, in a civil or criminal trial. We agree with the prosecutors' views that these privileges shield the counseling and juvenile diversion records of the complainants.