Opinion ID: 1234716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: How the reply to the jury's request should be worded

Text: Independently of our concern regarding the decision about the tape, we also hold that the conference triggered Frantz's Faretta rights because it resolved the content of the judge's response to the jurors' request. The chance to shape the jury's interpretation of an important tactical decision is at least as important as the chance to make the decision itself. And regardless of the judge's leeway in granting the jurors' request, the substance and wording of the judge's response could have influenced the jurors' interpretation of the tape's absence. We have repeatedly recognized how seriously jurors consider judges' responses to their questions. In federal court, we allow trial judges substantial latitude in addressing jury questions. But we know that analytically correct answers to a jury may unnecessarily  and improperly  influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury's deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight. ... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (recognizing that a careful response to a jury's request for specific pieces of evidence can keep the jury from overvaluing any one piece of evidence); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that [a] defendant's participation in formulating a response to a deadlocked jury ... may be important to ensuring the fairness of the verdict, particularly because there may be hold-out jurors). Because of the delicate nature of such mid-deliberation inquiries, we have recognized that defendants or their attorneys have a due process right to be present in conferences when jurors' notes are discussed, United States v. Barragan-Devis, 133 F.3d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir.1998), or when a trial court prepares a supplemental instruction to be read to a deliberating jury, United States v. Rosales-Rodriguez, 289 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.2002). Presence is critical when a jury's questions are discussed because [c]ounsel might object to the instruction or may suggest an alternative manner of stating the message, id. at 1110  a critical opportunity given the great weight that jurors give a judge's words. The defendant's or attorney's presence may also be an important opportunity to try and persuade the judge to respond. Barragan-Devis, 133 F.3d at 1289. [19] In this case, the transcript shows that the judge chose between two instructions. He first proposed the following response: The 911 tape was not admitted into evidence and no manager's statement was ever taken. He discarded this initial proposal, however, after Lamb objected that it was not clear that no manager's statement was ever taken. Instead, the judge instructed jurors much more generally  that they must rely on [their] collective recollection of the testimony and the exhibits admitted into evidence. It is difficult to discern how the difference between the initial proposed instruction and the judge's actual instruction to jurors might have affected them differently. But the two responses were quite different, and Frantz, because he was not present, had no opportunity to make any strategic decision concerning them, or to develop on the spot an alternative proposal once the judge changed his mind about his original, proposed wording. That opportunity to strategize and to speak for himself is a Faretta right protected by McKaskle.
Respondents argue that despite the conference's importance, Frantz's exclusion was constitutional because Lamb consulted Frantz and accurately repeated Frantz's desire not to give the jury the 911 tape. But for reasons we explain below, faithfully repeating Frantz's opinion is not sufficient under McKaskle, unless Frantz consented to have Lamb speak for him at the conference. Absent consent by Frantz for Lamb to participate in his stead, whether or not Lamb accurately relayed Frantz's position on the tape is not dispositive of Frantz's claim. See generally McDermott, 64 F.3d at 1453-54 (holding that a defendant's rights were violated by his exclusion from sidebar conferences even though he did not allege that he would have conducted the conference differently than did the standby attorney who participated). Faretta grants defendants the right not only to manage, but also to conduct, their own defenses, see 422 U.S. at 816-17, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, a right that McKaskle recognized as focusing on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way. 465 U.S. at 177, 104 S.Ct. 944. Given McKaskle 's references to the defendant's right to have his voice heard, id. at 174, 104 S.Ct. 944, and to speak for himself, id. at 177, 104 S.Ct. 944, an advisory attorney's appearance is not automatically an acceptable substitute for the defendant's as to matters of importance. For similar reasons, Lamb's solo participation in the chambers conference was not constitutional simply because the record contains no objection by Frantz. The parties do not dispute that the trial court found Frantz competent to represent himself. Nor do they dispute that, despite the appointment of advisory counsel, the trial began with the understanding that Frantz alone was directing his representation at the trial. Under such circumstances, McKaskle makes clear that  absent some basis for concluding that Frantz consented to representation by Lamb as to the particular matter  Frantz's Faretta right remained intact. McKaskle does not place the burden on pro se defendants to regulate each of their standby attorneys' actions. To the contrary, McKaskle limits standby counsel's  unsolicited participation during critical proceedings. 465 U.S. at 177, 104 S.Ct. 944 (emphasis added). When standby counsel is appointed only to advise, the initial invocation of the right of self-representation is generally sufficient to establish that any participation by standby counsel other than for the routine matters mentioned in McKaskle is over the defendant's objection. Id. at 178, 104 S.Ct. 944; see generally United States v. Lorick, 753 F.2d 1295, 1299 (4th Cir.1985) (A defendant's assertion of the right [to self-representation] at the outset of trial proceedings constituted an express and unambiguous request that `standby counsel be silenced.' This, under McKaskle 's analysis, must be given effect as a reassertion of the general right to pro se representation as to further proceedings....). Moreover, Frantz, according to the government was in lock-up during the conference, so it is particularly unlikely that implied consent can be inferred from the failure to object. As far as appears on the current record, Frantz was never in the presence of the judge after the jury had retired, so he could not have raised an objection to him. McKaskle 's rules are not, however, without exception. Faretta established that standby attorneys can assist pro se defendants if and when their help is requested. 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525. And McKaskle further explained Faretta by cautioning that [i]n measuring standby counsel's involvement against the [ McKaskle ] standards... it is important not to lose sight of the defendant's own conduct. A defendant can waive his Faretta rights. ... A defendant ... who vehemently objects at the beginning of trial to standby counsel's very presence in the court-room, may express quite different views as the trial progresses. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182, 104 S.Ct. 944. It is this exception that we must investigate further to determine whether Frantz merits relief. Absent consent by Frantz, his exclusion from the chambers conference was unconstitutional, for all the reasons we described above. More specifically, McKaskle refers to two types of permissible consent to a standby attorney's participation. The first is express approval for a particular action. Participation by a standby attorney under such circumstances is, of course, constitutionally unobjectionable. A defendant's invitation to counsel to participate in the trial obliterates any claim that the participation in question deprived the defendant of control over his own defense. Id. The second type of consent is implied: Even when he insists that he is not waiving his Faretta rights, a pro se defendant's solicitation of[,] or acquiescence in[,] certain types of participation by counsel substantially undermines later protestations that counsel interfered unacceptably. Id. Thus, McKaskle concluded, [o]nce a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any substantial participation by counsel, subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant's acquiescence, at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews his request that standby counsel be silenced. Id. at 183, 104 S.Ct. 944 (emphasis added). Implicit consent from the overall course of the trial proceedings appears unlikely. Frantz asserted that his right to self-representation extended to all matters involving jury instructions. During trial, Frantz fully participated in the primary discussion regarding final jury instructions. Although Lamb made one request during that discussion, Frantz made an entirely separate request, arguing at length concerning why the instructions should address assault as a lesser included offense and responding to the judge's queries on his proposal. The bench conferences in which Frantz did not participate did not concern jury instructions; although they did concern some evidentiary questions, Lamb was always within consulting distance of Frantz and did sometimes consult with him during the conference. Nevertheless, our record is far from complete. We know that Frantz declared under oath that [o]n the final day of trial ... advisory counsel, Ray Lamb, did not tell [him] the jury wanted to hear [the] 911 tapes, nor to have them played to the jury. But we have no specific evidence concerning the circumstances that gave rise to Lamb's solo participation in the chambers conference concerning the jury's request. The parties did not develop the relevant factual record in state court because the state trial court decided Frantz's McKaskle claim on summary adjudication, concluding that no facts were necessary. The state court of appeals rejected that conclusion but then went on, incorrectly, to find any McKaskle error harmless. As a result, the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing in state court was not in any way the fault of the petitioner. The hearing should be held now. We thus remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing concerning the circumstances during the course of the trial and after the jury retired that gave rise to Frantz's exclusion from the chambers conference, including whether Frantz was accurately informed of the purpose of the conference and given the opportunity to appear but declined to do so, and for a determination consistent with this opinion regarding whether Frantz's Faretta/McKaskle rights to self-representation were violated by that exclusion. See § 2254(e)(2).