Opinion ID: 1205031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of the automatic application for modification of the verdict.

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in denying the automatic motion to modify the verdict pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (e). (33) Under that section, the trial judge's function is not to make an independent and de novo penalty determination, but rather to independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then to determine whether, in the judge's independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury's verdict. [Citations.] ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627], italics in original; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 846.) The trial judge must set forth his or her reasons with sufficient particularity to allow effective appellate review. (54 Cal.3d at p. 846; People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 970 [275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516].)
(34) Relying upon People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, defendant contends the trial court did not adequately specify its reasons for determining that section 190.3, factor (a) (the circumstances of the crime), amounted to an aggravating factor. In that case, we held the court's statement of reasons for denying the motion, as a whole, was insufficient to assure thoughtful and effective appellate review, where the trial court simply stated that, having considered the arguments of counsel, all the evidence, and all the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the aggravating factors outweighed those in mitigation and the weight of the evidence supported the jury's verdict of death. ( Id., at pp. 792-794.) In the present case, the trial court's comments, in considering the section 190.3 factors generally and factor (a) in particular, were far more extensive and detailed. In explaining its ruling denying the automatic motion, the court commented that it had reviewed the evidence, considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, and made a determination whether the jury's verdict (that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances) was contrary to law or to the evidence. Following defense counsel's argument that the offenses committed in the present case were not sufficiently grievous to justify the death penalty, the court stated it had examined and carefully reviewed the testimony presented and had found that the jury's verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence and that defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then considered each section 190.3 factor in turn, devoting the greatest amount of time to factor (a), the circumstances of the crime. The court summarized the evidence, emphasizing that the telephone lines in the kitchen and the den had been cut, and that the victim had been raped, beaten, stabbed, and intentionally tortured by defendant. The court described in detail the condition of the body and recounted the expert testimony concerning the nature of the victim's injuries and defendant's purpose in inflicting them. The court also noted that defendant had transported the victim's body to another location. The trial court's discourse on section 190.3, factor (a), was sufficiently detailed and thorough to justify the determination made by the court. It is readily apparent the court provided far more elaboration than did the trial court in Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, and defendant does not indicate what additional elements he believes the court should have considered in deciding whether the circumstances of the capital offense constituted a factor in aggravation. We conclude the court adequately stated its reasons for determining that the circumstances of the crime constituted an aggravating factor.
(35) Section 190.3, factor (j), specifies that among the matters to be considered by the trier of fact in determining the penalty is [w]hether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. Defendant contends that, because the evidence merely established the inapplicability of factor (j), it was improper for the trial court to consider, as a factor in aggravation, the circumstance that defendant acted alone. We have indicated or implied in numerous prior decisions that factor (j) may be considered only as a mitigating factor, and that where the defendant is not an accomplice whose participation in the offense is relatively minor, the factor is simply inapplicable and should not be considered as aggravating. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d 815, 889; People v. Gallego, supra, 52 Cal.3d 115, 200; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1233-1234; People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1184; People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 843, 865; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 643-644 [253 Cal. Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70]; People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d 315, 363-364; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d 207, 273; People v. Moore (1988) 47 Cal.3d 63, 92 & fn. 13 [252 Cal. Rptr. 494, 762 P.2d 1218]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 652 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189]; People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d 432, 455-456 & fn. 10; People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 582-583 [247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306]; see People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290.) Nonetheless, in People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1195, we approved the trial court's treatment of evidence of that defendant's sole participation as aggravating under factor (j). We need not decide the issue raised by the apparent conflict among these decisions, because any error in the present case would not have been prejudicial. The People indicate that the failing, if any, in the trial court's consideration (under section 190.3, factor (j)) of the evidence that defendant had acted alone, consists in the court's already having considered defendant's singular and active role in the offense when the court reviewed the circumstances of the offense under section 190.3, factor (a). In his reply brief, defendant contends that the trial court did, in fact, err in this regard. Our review of the record reveals, however, that at no time during the court's discourse on the circumstances of the offense did it emphasize, or even mention, that defendant had acted alone. That the court reviewed defendant's commission of the offense (and the nature of that offense) does not lead to the conclusion that the court considered defendant's exclusive participation in the acts as a circumstance in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (a). Aside from the court's consideration, under section 190.3, factor (j), of defendant's role in the offense, the only other reference by the court to the circumstance that defendant acted alone was made in the context of its review of section 190.3, factor (g), addressing whether defendant had acted under extreme duress or under the domination of another person. In the latter part of its review, the court simply noted that, because defendant had acted alone, factor (g) was inapplicable. The court did not consider twice the evidence that defendant had acted alone in conceiving and carrying out the offense, and therefore, any error in considering this circumstance under factor (j) was harmless. ( People v. Burton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 843, 865; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d 207, 273.)
(36) Defendant next asserts the trial court erred in determining that, although defendant's age (twenty years, three and one-half months at the time of the offense) could be a mitigating factor, the circumstances that defendant had been convicted of three prior felonies, had violated probation in March 1981, and was on parole at the time he committed the present offense, rendered defendant's age neither a mitigating nor an aggravating factor. Depending upon the circumstances of the crime, age properly can be considered either as a mitigating or an aggravating factor. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1076; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 844.) It functions `as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty.' ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1076.) Therefore, in the present case the trial court was not obligated to treat defendant's age as a factor in mitigation. Moreover, we believe that although the court expressed itself somewhat imprecisely, in essence it weighed the two factors of defendant's age and his prior felony convictions in concluding, in light of defendant's prior record, that the circumstance that he was between 20 and 21 years of age at the time he committed the present offense was not entitled to much weight. The court properly weighed these factors in assessing whether the penalty was appropriate. (See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1186-1187.) [13]
(37) Defendant contends that the court inadequately stated its reasons for concluding no mitigating circumstances were present under section 190.3, factor (k), [14] and that the court's statement did not indicate it had assessed the credibility of the witnesses, determined the probative force of the testimony, and weighed the evidence. As described above, the court reiterated that it had evaluated all the evidence and expressly considered the evidence or absence of evidence relating to each successive factor, examining carefully the evidence in mitigation. After expressing its views as to the applicability of section 190.3, factor (k), the court stated: As required by law, the Court has considered all the evidence adduced at the penalty phase of the trial and has been guided by the aforesaid factors, and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, the Court concludes and finds that the aggravating circumstances do in fact outweigh the mitigating circumstances and therefore the jury's finding is supported by the evidence. The court stated that, in its independent review of all the evidence, it found the jury's verdict was not contrary to the law or the evidence. The trial court's comments make clear that it fully understood its obligation to assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the probative force of the testimony, and weigh the evidence, including all information pertaining to defendant and applicable under section 190.3, factor (k). We conclude the statement of reasons given by the trial court for its determination pursuant to factor (k) was adequate. We also reject the contention, raised in defendant's reply brief, that the court, in referring to its finding that the jury's verdict was not contrary to the law or the evidence, demonstrated that it misconstrued its task in reviewing the evidence independently under section 190.4. The statements made by the court reveal that it accurately perceived its duty to reweigh independently the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then determine whether, in its independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supported the jury's verdict. (§ 190.4, subd. (e); People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d 787, 846; People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045.) In view of the numerous instances in which the trial court reiterated that it independently had reviewed the evidence, and the particularity with which the court reviewed the evidence, we conclude the court properly understood and performed the obligation imposed upon it by section 190.4, subdivision (e).