Opinion ID: 562320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Departure for Underrepresented Criminal History, Sec. 4A1.3

Text: 11 Our framework for reviewing upward departures under the sentencing guidelines is well settled. First, we undertake de novo review of the correctness of the district court's determination that the relevant circumstances were sufficiently 'unusual' to warrant departure. Second, all findings of fact material to the challenged departure are reviewed for clear error. Third, we accord considerable deference to the decision of the district court in our review of the reasonableness of the degree of departure, which is 'quintessentially a judgment call' for the district court. 12 United States v. Figaro, 935 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1991) (citations omitted). 13 Appellant concedes that the commission of an offense while awaiting disposition of another charge may warrant an increase in the defendant's otherwise-underrepresented criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3. See also United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 642, 645 (1st Cir.1990) (offense committed while awaiting trial on state drug and firearm charges); United States v. Polanco-Reynoso, 924 F.2d 23, 24-25 (1st Cir.1991) (offense committed while on conditional release on state drug charge). 1 14 Appellant contends, however, that a condition precedent to any increase under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3 was never met: namely, the determination that the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history.... (emphasis added). As support for the contention that the district court determined upon a one-level increase without regard to the representativeness of the prescribed criminal history category, appellant invites particular attention to the district court's statement that this court has consistently taken the position as [it] will in this case that when an individual commits an offense while on bail or pending trial on another offense that that warrants an increase, a departure for purposes of determining the criminal history. 15 We admit concern that this statement may imply a misconception that an increase was appropriate under section 4A1.3 merely by virtue of the fact that the offense of conviction was committed while the defendant was awaiting disposition of another charge, without regard to the representativeness of the defendant's criminal history category or to the constraints of individualized sentencing. The purpose of the sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of individualized sentences. S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3235, cited in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 52 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 177, 107 L.Ed.2d 133 (1989); see also Ocasio, 914 F.2d at 336 (sentencing guidelines do not abandon individualized sentencing). Therefore, we reiterate that [d]eparture is permitted [only] in those cases where idiosyncratic circumstances warrant individualization of sentence beyond that which is possible within the comparatively close-hewn parameters constructed by the guidelines. United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir.1989) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 964 (1st Cir.1989) (same). 16 Nevertheless, the district court's apparent misstatement may not be interpreted out of context as appellant would have it. The court specifically determined that the appropriate criminal history category here is not category three but rather category four.... We cannot fault its judgment call, see Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 49-50, that a one-level increase was warranted where the defendant committed serious cocaine offenses involving almost two kilograms of cocaine while awaiting disposition of a state charge involving almost four kilograms of cocaine. As the district court stated, when one is released pending trial one commits to keeping the peace and being of good behavior. And if one commits an offense of this sort while on release, that person has breached that commitment. (emphasis added). See Hernandez, 896 F.2d at 645 (defendant who commits a crime while under court supervision undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system); Polanco-Reynoso, 924 F.2d at 24-25 (same). The implicit determination that appellant's criminal history would be significantly underrepresented absent a one-level increase in the criminal history category was not erroneous. 17 Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the degree of departure. The sentencing court correctly referred in the first instance to the sentencing range for a defendant with the next higher criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3; see also Polanco-Reynoso, 924 F.2d at 25; United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 70 (1st Cir.1991). 2 The prescribed sentencing range for criminal history IV and offense level twenty-six is 92 to 115 months. 3 The district court determined upon a sentence at the lower end of the indicated guideline range, 95 months, which was well within its considerable discretion in departure decisions. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d at 52; Polanco-Reynoso, 924 F.2d at 25. 18 Affirmed.