Opinion ID: 2572707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The PKPA and ICPC

Text: Within this web of applicable law, we must also recognize and analyze the PKPA and the ICPC. We conclude that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA or the Act), § 28 U.S.C.A. 1738A (2004), does not change the outcome of this case. That Act imposes a duty on the States to enforce a child custody determination entered by a court of a sister State if the determination is consistent with the provisions of the Act. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 175-76, 108 S.Ct. 513, 98 L.Ed.2d 512 (1988); § 28 U.S.C.A. 1738A(a). Under the PKPA, and by virtue of full faith and credit, [o]nce a State exercises jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of the Act, no other State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the custody dispute, § 1738A(g), even if it would have been empowered to take jurisdiction in the first instance. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177, 108 S.Ct. 513. When it enacted the PKPA, Congress meant to address the problem of conflicting state custody determinations resulting from the legal vacuum created by inconsistent versions of the UCCJA adopted by the various states; the Act affirmatively implemented full faith and credit requirements applicable to all custody determinations. Id. at 181, 108 S.Ct. 513. Importantly, [t]he sponsors and supporters of the Act continually indicated that the purpose of the PKPA was to provide nationwide enforcement of custody orders made in accordance with the terms of the UCCJA. Id. The PKPA does not specifically exclude adoptions. Our courts have previously construed the term custody determination under the UCCJA, K.R., 897 P.2d at 900, to include adoption proceedings, as other courts have. See, e.g., E.E.B., 446 A.2d at 876. Thus, for purposes of this opinion, we assume that the PKPA applies to this case. Accordingly, because another state has already entered a custody determination concerning this child, we inquire not whether we may exercise jurisdiction under the PKPA but whether the first-in time court's exercise of jurisdiction was in accordance with the PKPA and whether that jurisdiction continues. In re Marriage of Zierenberg, 11 Cal. App.4th 1436, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 241 (1992). The PKPA provides that every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this section, any custody determination... made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another state. § 1738A(a). The Act states that a custody determination of another state is made consistently with the PKPA as long as (1) the court of the other state has jurisdiction under the law of that state, § 1738A(c)(1), and (2) at least of one of several listed conditions is met. [18] As pertinent here, one of those conditions is whether the court in the other state has continuing jurisdiction under subsection (d) of the statute. Subsection (d) provides that continuing jurisdiction is to be found wherever the court has jurisdiction under the law of that state and either the child or any person claiming custody to the child remains in that state. § 1738A(d); § 1738A(b)(2). Under this definition, then, the Missouri court has continuing jurisdiction related to the custody order in this case. Accordingly, under the PKPA, we may not modify that order unless one of the Act's exceptions is satisfied. Subsection (f) of the Act provides that [a] court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if (1) it has jurisdiction to make such custody determination; and (2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.  (emphasis added). Because, as we noted above, Missouri has continuing jurisdiction under the Act, the exception would permit us to exercise our jurisdiction only if Missouri has declined such jurisdiction. As the U.S. Supreme Court importantly noted in Thompson, custody orders tend to be in conflict among the states because of the fact that custody orders characteristically are subject to modification as required by the best interests of the child [and a]s a consequence, some courts doubted whether custody orders were sufficiently `final' to trigger full faith and credit requirements. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 180, 108 S.Ct. 513. Thus, [b]ecause courts entering custody orders generally retain the power to modify them, courts in other States were no less entitled to change the terms of custody according to their own views of the child's best interest. Id. Because the right to modify remains with the state entering the first custody by virtue of the best interests of the child, some courts, such as the New Jersey Supreme court in E.E.B., have held that where a state court enters a custody decree without making a determination of the best interests of the child, it specifically declines its jurisdiction to modify that order. 446 A.2d at 877. Because that interpretation seems to accord with the purpose of the PKPA, as enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court, we similarly apply the analysis of E.E.B. here. Consequently, we determine that because Missouri failed to conduct a best interests analysis in issuing its custody decree, it declined jurisdiction to modify that order under section 1738A(f). Thus, we conclude that our exercise of jurisdiction in this case is consistent with the terms of the PKPA. We are left, then, with the ICPC. The ICPC is an interstate compact, which is in place in both Colorado and Missouri. §§ 24-60-18011803, 7B C.R.S. (2003); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.620 (2003). Unlike the UCCJEA, it specifically applies to adoptions. Article V of the ICPC contains the jurisdictional mandate. It states in pertinent part that: The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state, until the child is adopted.... Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant to law. § 24-60-1802, art. V(a), 7B C.R.S. (2003). Article II of the Compact defines a sending agency as a party state, officer or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, charitable agency, or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state. § 24-60-1802, art. II(b). Mother argues that because the adoption failed, Missouri, as the sending agency, retains jurisdiction over the custody of A.J.C. First, under Missouri law, the sending agency was not the state of Missouri but rather a person, Laura Sipes. See In re Baby Girl, 850 S.W.2d 64, 69 n. 6 (Mo.1993). Sipes was an intermediary who was designated to assist with the placement of A.J.C. The State Compact Administrator in Missouri identified her as the sending agency by way of a signed document entitled Interstate Compact Placement Request. As such, Ms. Sipes retained jurisdiction over the child to determine all matters until the child was adopted, became self-supporting or was discharged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such jurisdiction includes the power to effect or cause the return of the child or his transfer to another location. See § 24-60-1802, art. II(c). Accordingly, if the sending agency demands that the child be returned to the state where the proceeding began, such determination is entitled to be honored under the ICPC. Both Colorado and Missouri would support such an outcome. See Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Dist. Court, 742 P.2d at 341-42; see also Baby Girl, 850 S.W.2d at 69-70. The problem here, however, is that Sipes has sought no such outcome. Rather, in Sipes' affidavit [19] filed with this court, she specifically states that she does not request the return of A.J.C. Rather, she expresses that it is in the best interests of A.J.C. to remain in Colorado. This is more than a mere technicality. It highlights a deficiency in the Missouri proceeding which in turn amplifies the dilemma we face here. The sending agency, in the form of Ms. Sipes, was responsible for sending or causing the child to be sent to Colorado. The court order effectuated that transfer, but the court was not itself responsible for the child as was Ms. Sipes. Ms. Sipes has an ongoing responsibility, by operation of the ICPC and she is not requesting that the child be returned to Missouri. Under its own law, Missouri was initially required to appoint a guardian ad litem for A.J.C. because he was under the age of 18 at the time the adoption was filed. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 453.025 (2003). That GAL would have undertaken the responsibility of conveying to the court in Missouri what A.J.C.'s best interests might be. Based upon the record before us, we have no evidence that such message was conveyed, or inquiry undertaken. We have already noted that Missouri, like Colorado, recognizes that in certain situations, a failed adoption does not automatically result in the custody of a child being restored to the natural parent(s). See Baby Girl, 850 S.W.2d at 69-70. Accordingly, we view Missouri as a state, akin to Colorado, that authorizes, if not requires, an inquiry into the best interests of the child even following a failed adoption. Perhaps because of the absence of a GAL, or perhaps because Ms. Sipes has not requested such an inquiry, it has not occurred. No report or testimony has been offered that would result in the Missouri court making a determination about the ongoing best interests of A.J.C. in light of the failed adoption. For all of those reasons, we do not view the ICPC as commanding that Colorado decline jurisdiction over the best interests inquiry, when internal law in Colorado, internal law in Missouri, the UCCJA, and the UAA would all support if not mandate that we proceed.