Opinion ID: 2368930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: NRS 4.010(2)(a)'s five-year admission and licensure requirement is plain and unambiguous

Text: In support of her ambiguity argument, Candelaria points to this court's decision in SNEA v. Lau, 110 Nev. 715, 877 P.2d 531 (1994). In SNEA, this court addressed a challenge to former governor Bob Miller's eligibility to run for a second full term under Article 5, Section 3 of the Nevada Constitution, which prohibits an individual acting as governor for more than two years from being elected as governor more than once. 110 Nev. at 716-17, 877 P.2d at 532-33. Miller had served one full term and a partial term after taking over for Richard Bryan, who was elected to the United States Senate during his term as governor. Id. at 717, 877 P.2d at 532-33. The determinative issue in that case was this court's interpretation of the meaning of the term years as used in the phrase more than two years in Article 5, Section 3. Id. at 716-17, 877 P.2d at 532-33. In addressing this issue, the court rejected the petitioners' argument that the term years clearly and unambiguously meant a 365-day calendar year. Id. at 717, 877 P.2d at 533. The court began its analysis by noting that many words in the English language can have two or more meanings. Id. The court then concluded that the use of the word years in Nevada's statutes and Constitution was an example of this phenomenon, and the court observed that the word may mean a calendar-based year, which is calculated from and to a set date, or an official or political year, which runs from and to a floating day within a month. [2] Id. at 718, 877 P.2d at 533. Ultimately, the court concluded that the term years, as used in Article 5, Section 3, should be interpreted as official years. Id. at 719, 877 P.2d at 534. Candelaria relies on SNEA to support her contention that there is no language in NRS 4.010(2)(a) that clearly indicates that five calendar, and typically 365-day years, must have elapsed between the date of licensure and the date of the election, or that otherwise articulates a specific period during which a candidate for justice of the peace must have been licensed and admitted to practice law to be eligible to run for that position. Candelaria asserts that NRS 4.010(2)(a) does not require her to have been licensed or admitted for a particular period of time, but merely requires that she have been licensed and admitted a certain number of calendar years. [3] Candelaria's arguments are problematic for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, the language of the statute at issue here is significantly different and far more specific than the constitutional provision at issue in SNEA. The language of Article 5, Section 3 provides no guidance on what is meant by years as used in the phrase two years of a term. In contrast, NRS 4.010(2)(a) requires a candidate for justice of the peace to have been licensed and admitted to practice law... for not less than 5 years at any time preceding his or her election or appointment. As Zadrowski points out, the not less than 5 years language anticipates that the attorney will have been licensed and admitted for an exact period of time equal to not less than five years. Moreover, he correctly notes that the statute provides a specified date by which this five-year period must have concludedbefore the attorney's election or appointment to the position. Because the statute provides a specific end date, it most logically follows that there is also a specified beginning datethe date an attorney first becomes licensed. As pointed out in SNEA, many words, viewed in isolation, can have multiple meanings. 110 Nev. at 717, 877 P.2d at 533. By focusing exclusively on the term years, Candelaria overlooks other key phrasings in NRS 4.010(2)(a). The statute modifies the term years with  for not less than 5 years at any time preceding his or her election or appointment. NRS 4.010(2)(a) (emphases added). Unlike the usage of the term years in SNEA, the usage of that term in NRS 4.010(2)(a) is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Here, the statute's language anticipates a definite period (not less than five years) and sets a definite beginning date (the date of admission and licensure) and a date by which the period must be completed (prior to the attorney's election or appointment to the position of justice of the peace). Thus, the period of not less than five years must begin and end before the attorney's election or appointment to the position, a conclusion that requires the use of a calendar-year approach. See SNEA, 110 Nev. at 718, 877 P.2d at 533 (defining a calendar-based year to mean a year calculated from and to a set date). It therefore follows that NRS 4.010(2)(a), by its plain language, requires an attorney to have been licensed for a minimum of five calendar years, which are typically 365-day years, from the date of his or her admission before being elected or appointed to the justice of the peace position. In light of NRS 4.010(2)(a)'s plain and unambiguous language, Candelaria was required to have been licensed and admitted for five calendar years by the November 2010 election. Candelaria was licensed and admitted to practice law for the first time when she was admitted to the Nevada State Bar on October 17, 2006. As a result, at most, she will have been licensed and admitted for four years by the time of the November 2010 election. Thus, she is ineligible to serve as a justice of the peace in Las Vegas Township based on her failure to meet the minimum statutory requirement. [4] Accordingly, to the extent Candelaria raises statutory construction challenges, we affirm the district court's order granting the petition to remove Candelaria from the ballot as a justice of the peace candidate. We now turn to Candelaria's constitutional arguments.