Opinion ID: 2456
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Regarding Post-Employment Services

Text: The district court also dismissed on summary judgment plaintiff's claims related to work she performed with students after she ended her employment with Cornell in December 2002. Specifically, plaintiff argued that she was entitled to compensation for her continued involvement as a Senior Honor Theses advisor to two students in the spring of 2003. As set forth below, we agree with the district court that these claims are properly subject to dismissal on summary judgment. As stated above, an implied-in-fact contract requires such elements as consideration, mutual assent, legal capacity and legal subject matter. Maas, 699 N.Y.S.2d 716, 721 N.E.2d at 970. In our prior decision, we concluded that plaintiff had failed to plead properly any mutual assent between the parties that she would be compensated for work performed after her term of employment. However, we instructed the district court to grant her leave to replead. See Leibowitz II, 445 F.3d at 593. Plaintiff amended the claim and discovery was conducted, after which the district court determined that she had failed to provide any evidence of mutual assent that Cornell agreed to pay her for her services after her retirement. Leibowitz III, 2007 WL 3019223, at  11. Specifically, the Court noted that Defendants did not consent to paying plaintiff additional compensation after she retired; plaintiff already had a pre-existing duty to perform and complete the terms of her contract. Id. (citation omitted). We agree. [8] There is no evidence that plaintiff sought permission to charge for academic advisory services performed after her employment had concluded, or that any representative of the University intended to compensate her for them. Accordingly, in the absence of any proof of mutual assent, plaintiffs implied-in-fact contractual claim for the performance of these services must fail. Plaintiff also appeals the district court's dismissal of her quasi-contractual claims, [9] based on the same nexus of facts. [10] In order to recover in quantum meruit under New York law, a claimant must establish `(1) the performance of services in good faith, (2) the acceptance of the services by the person to whom they are rendered, (3) an expectation of compensation therefor, and (4) the reasonable value of the services.' Mid-Hudson Catskill Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc., 418 F.3d at 175 (quoting Revson v. Cinque & Cinque, P.C., 221 F.3d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 448 F.3d at 586. A claimant seeking relief under a theory of unjust enrichment in New York must demonstrate (1) that the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff's expense; and (3) that equity and good conscience require restitution. In re Mid-Island Hosp., Inc., 276 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted). As with plaintiff's implied-in-fact contractual claim, we previously instructed the district court to grant her leave to replead this claim, as she had failed to allege any basis for a finding that, in the absence of contract, Cornell should be required to pay for her work as a matter of equity. Leibowitz II, 445 F.3d at 593. The district court dismissed this claim on summary judgment because plaintiff did not establish a reasonable expectation of compensation or specify the reasonable value of services provided. Leibowitz III, 2007 WL 3019223, at . Specifically, the Court noted the following: (1) plaintiff was not asked to perform the services rendered, but rather volunteered them, (2) ILR School policy was clear that teachers who were no longer employed by the University could provide advisory services on a voluntary basis only, and (3) plaintiff's $25,000 bill (which annualized to a rate of $500,000 per year) was grossly disproportionate to any actual value of the services rendered, particularly in comparison to her annual salary of $110,000, which included approximately $30,000 in gross travel expense reimbursement. Id. The Court agrees with this analysis; as stated above, plaintiff has offered no evidence that she expressed an expectation of compensation prior to the performance of the services or that anyone at the University indicated she would receive it. To that end, she has failed to establish that the rate she charged represented a reasonable value of her services, particularly when compared to the salary she received when employed by the University. Further, in the absence of any proof that plaintiff had a reasonable basis for believing she would receive compensation, and in the amount specified by the invoice submitted to Dean Lawler, it cannot be said that principles of equity require any restitution. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's quasi-contractual claims.