Opinion ID: 765087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Guideline and Standard of Review

Text: 10 When McKay was sentenced in August 1998, section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines stated that 11 [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 12 As an example of conduct falling within this provision, Application Note 3(h) to § 3C1.1 specifically listed providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court. Application Note 5 defined material information as information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination. On appeal, [t]he sentencing court's findings as to what acts were performed, what was said, what the speaker meant by [his] words, and how a listener would reasonably interpret those words will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Cassiliano, 137 F.3d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 506-07 (2d Cir. 1990)). A ruling that established facts constitute obstruction of justice under the Sentencing Guidelines is a matter of legal interpretation and is reviewed de novo. See Stroud, 893 F.2d at 507. 13