Opinion ID: 2088887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Finding of Misconduct

Text: Under step one of our analysis, we find that Respondent Boles did engage in judicial misconduct. This Court is sensitive to the argument that a judge should not be subject to discipline for mere error in judgment in the context of a case. Indeed, such matters are correctable in the appellate process. In this case, however, there can be no doubt that the facts outlined above clearly demonstrate that Respondent has engaged in willful misconduct in office, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and conduct violating Canons 2, 3, and 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as charged. With regard to Count I, Respondent had no statutory right to require that a juvenile or his parents pay pauper attorney fees under the juvenile statute unless the juvenile was found to be delinquent. Woolf v. State, supra . Even if the parents could have been ordered to pay the legal fees in the juvenile case, Respondent was required, under the statute and pursuant to minimal due process standards, to afford them a hearing to fairly determine their ability to pay. Simply declaring ex parte that the parents could afford to pay the fees was improper. In addition, Respondent did not have any legal basis to order that the salaried public defender in criminal cases be allowed additional attorney fees to be paid by the juvenile. If the public defender was paid a salary by the County, then any money that might be owed after a fair hearing on a defendant's ability to pay would be owed to the County and not to the public defender. If the public defender's salary needs to be raised, that is a matter for Respondent and the County Council to resolve through normal appropriation channels. Boles violated his duty under Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to respect and follow the law. Respondent Boles clearly understood the correct interpretation of I.C. XX-X-X-XX offered by Pierce, the Prosecutor and the Indiana Judicial Center, yet he chose to ignore and defy the law. Such conduct is not appropriate because it destroys the public's confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. These actions were compounded by Respondent's clear efforts at retaliation for what he perceived as a challenge to his authority. To vacate his erroneous attorney fee order, to improperly deny Gundlach any attorney fees, and then to wrongfully accuse Gundlach of attempting to cheat the taxpayers of Hendricks County, was an abuse of judicial power. Such misconduct on the part of Respondent violates Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires, among other things, that a Judge be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism. A judge should not pander to public sentiment. In addition, a judge is required to be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, witnesses and lawyers. Moreover, Canon 7 requires that judges refrain from political activity inappropriate to the judicial office. However troublesome the conduct of Pierce and Hinkle was to Respondent, he was required to act with circumspection and not employ his judicial office as a vehicle to resolve personal disputes. Judges are held to a higher standard of conduct. In Re Terry (1975), 262 Ind. 667, 323 N.E.2d 192. It is clear that Respondent became completely embroiled in this matter and lost all semblance of impartiality, independence, dignity and distance from public clamor. Boles misused the power of his public office, displayed a lack of judicial temperament, and engaged in improper political activity in his crusade to portray himself as a taxpayers' hero. Respondent's improper order vacating all attorney fees in favor of Gundlach was a clear act of retaliation for having his erroneous pauper attorney fee awards questioned. When the juvenile's father filed an action before the Judicial Qualifications Commission, Respondent Boles again retaliated by ordering Gundlach to reject or ratify the conduct of Pierce and Hinkle, which order necessitated this Court's issuance of a Permanent Writ of Prohibition. The use of judicial power as an instrument of retaliation is a serious violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Matter of Seraphim (1980), 97 Wis.2d 485, 294 N.W.2d 485. Respondent's misconduct in this regard was compounded by the fact that his order to Gundlach directed Gundlach to ratify or reject the filing of a judicial discipline complaint by the juvenile's father. We view Respondent's order as an impermissible attempt to interdict the Commission's lawful authority. We also note that a judge must avoid the appearance that he is using the power of the office to promote his candidacy. Opinions of Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances, American Bar Association, 1957, Opinion 139, page 29. Such conduct is evident in Boles' repeated assertion in orders of the court that he was the representative of Hendricks County taxpayers against the greed of Gundlach, Pierce and Hinkle. Respondent's tactic of making personal attacks on individuals as a means of gaining favor with the electorate is highly unethical. With regard to Count II, we find that Respondent Boles' conduct in his ongoing political dispute with the County Commissioners did not avoid the appearance of impropriety as required by Canon 2. In addition, the posters, the calendar advertisement, the letters to the Commissioners and the filing of the Lis Pendens notice showed a lack of impartiality and inappropriate political activity in violation of Canons 3 and 7. Respondent's repeated assaults on the County Commissioners for violations of the Open Door Law by not having an agenda falsely stated the law and Respondent knew it. I.C. 5-14-1.5-4 (A governing body of a public agency utilizing an agenda shall post a copy of the agenda at the entrance to the location of the meeting prior to the meeting). Judges are certainly entitled to political views. However, judges must maintain an impartial stance and decide cases based on the law. To become embroiled in a political dispute and to purport to lead a campaign against other public officials as the Judge of the Hendricks Circuit Court is a breach of the duty to be impartial. If a taxpayer had brought an Open Door lawsuit before the Hendricks Circuit Court, Respondent would have had no choice but to disqualify himself due to his publicly proclaimed partiality. To reiterate, the foregoing facts demonstrate that Respondent Boles is guilty of willful misconduct in office and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute.