Opinion ID: 772012
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Habeas Review of Facial Overbreadth Challenge

Text: 36 The district court held that Staley's conduct was so abhorrent and harassing that it clearly falls within the zone of conduct that a stalking statute would constitutionally make criminal. Staley, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 784. The district court nonetheless granted the writ, ruling that the Michigan stalking statute was overbroad because it could hypothetically be applied in an unconstitutional manner. See id. at 788. 37 Respondent contends habeas relief should not be available to Petitioner because he did not claim that he had engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment, or that the statute was vague as applied to him. Respondent contends that First Amendment overbreadth challenges should not be allowed on habeas 7 . 38 Respondent acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has reviewed facial overbreadth challenges under §2254, see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (holding on habeas that a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor for any person without provocation, to use in another's presence, opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of the peace was on its face unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (invalidating on habeas a state law prohibiting treating a flag contemptuously; facial challenge), as has this Court. See Thompson v. Gaffney, 540 F.2d 251, 253 (6th Cir. 1976) (reviewing petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking disorderly conduct conviction on ground that city ordinance was overbroad; stating that even though the petitioner's words might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly drawn ordinance, [Petitioner] may still challenge the overbreadth of the ordinance to protect 'the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression'); see also Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975). But see Walters v. Clement, 544 F.2d 1340, 1341 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (stating that habeas corpus is a peculiarly unsatisfactory means for attacking a statute on the ground of facial unconstitutionality); Thigpen v. Smith, 603 F. Supp. 1519, 1529-31 (S.D. Ala. 1985) (holding that to permit[] facial attacks on state statutes to be heard in federal habeas proceedings would be fundamentally inconsistent with the secondary and limited role of such proceedings . . . [and] inconsistent with the adverse impact or prejudice requirement interwoven throughout habeas law), vacated on other grounds, 792 F.2d 1507 (11th Cir. 1986). Respondent nonetheless contends that merely because the Supreme Court and this Court have assumed the applicability of the facial overbreadth rule in habeas cases, this Court is not precluded from considering the issue because it is squarely raised here. We agree, and we now address the issue. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 n.4 (1989) (Supreme Court assumptions on particular legal issues, even on jurisdictional ones, are not binding on future cases that directly raise the question). 39 In urging us to hold that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioner's facial challenge, Respondent asserts that [t]he Supreme Court has not hesitated to reweigh the competing considerations peculiar to cases presented on collateral review, and to reconsider, in that context, the kind of policy considerations that led to the relaxed standing rule in First Amendment cases. In support, Respondent analogizes to Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), wherein the Supreme Court held Fourth Amendment claims that have been raised and decided in state courts cannot be heard on federal habeas court review. See id. at 494 (where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial). 40 In reaching this conclusion, the Stone Court reasoned that the judicially-created exclusionary rule is designed to deter illegal police practices and does not relate to the accuracy of the fact-finding process. See id. at 486, 490-91. Thus, theStone Court reasoned that its application was particularly inappropriate on habeas: 41 Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice. These long-recognized costs of the rule persist when a criminal conviction is sought to be overturned on collateral review on the ground that a search-and-seizure claim was erroneously rejected by two or more tiers of state courts. 42 Id. at 490-91 (footnotes omitted) 8 . The Supreme Court found that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule was not enhanced by the possibility that a conviction obtained in state court and affirmed on direct review might be overturned in collateral proceedings often occurring years after the incarceration of the defendant. Id. at 493. Nor could it agree that the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of state convictions. Id. Finally, the Court rejected the view that federal habeas corpus review was necessary to protect Fourth Amendment rights because state courts were not fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights. Id. at 493 n.35. 43 Thus, in Stone, the Supreme Court created an exception to the rule of Brown v. Allen, which itself carved out an important exception to collateral estoppel and res judicata for habeas petitions. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (opinion by Justice Frankfurter) (holding that a constitutional claim may be raised on habeas even thoughit has been raised and fully litigated in state court) 9 . See also West v. Wright, 505 U.S. 277, 288 (1992) (noting that [i]n an influential separate opinion endorsed by a majority of the Court, Justice Frankfurter also rejected the principle of absolute deference to fairly litigated state-court judgments); 10 Lundy v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 1989) (With its decision inBrown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 . . . (1953), however, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the scope of the federal inquiry on habeas into state court resolution of constitutional questions.) 11 . 44 Respondent claims that, like the exclusionary rule, the exception to the traditional standing requirement in First Amendment cases is a judicially created rule, not a personal constitutional right. Thus, Respondent argues that applying the exception on collateral review adds little to the protection of First Amendment freedoms, while exacting a significant cost on federal-state relations and the public interest in convicting stalkers such as Petitioner. 45 As Respondent suggests, the rule allowing facial challenges is a prudential doctrine, not a personal constitutional right.See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (When asserting a facial challenge, a party seeks to vindicate not only his own rights, but those of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in question. In this sense, the threshold for facial challenges is a species of third party (jus tertii) standing, which we have recognized as a prudential doctrine and not one mandated by Article III of the Constitution.). Further, the analogy to the Stone rule is inviting, because Petitioner's conduct clearly falls within the zone of conduct a stalking statute could constitutionally prohibit. Cf. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) (stating that a litigant may challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges First Amendment rights even if its application to the litigant would be constitutionally unobjectionable). 46 Despite its superficial appeal, this argument must be rejected. Other than the fact that in both situations an admittedly guilty person would escape punishment, cf. Withrow, 507 U.S. at 704 (O'Connor, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (Whether the Court admits it or not, the grim result of applying Miranda on habeas will be, time and time again, the release of an admittedly guilty individual who may pose a continuing threat to society. (internal quotation omitted)), the two doctrines serve different purposes. Admittedly, both rules are prophylactic -- one attempts to deter police misconduct, and the other seeks to prevent the chilling of protected expression. Yet, the exclusionary rule seeks to remedy a discrete, past violation, and to send a message to police officers in the process. 47 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, is prospective. Its purpose is to prevent the chilling of future protected expression. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 768 (1982) (persons whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression (internal quotation omitted)). Its value would therefore not be diminished on habeas. Further, it is intentionally broad in scope. Facial challenges to overly broad statutes are allowed not primarily for the benefit of the litigant, but for the benefit of society - to prevent the statute from chilling the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court. Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 958 (1984). For this reason, any sense of injustice created by the windfall to a guilty defendant is vastly outweighed by the benefit to society in protecting the right to free expression. Thus, the balance struck in the First Amendment overbreadth context is vastly different than that struck in Stone, and not inconsistent with the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Stone, 428 U.S. at 490. 48 The First Amendment occupies hallowed ground in our constitutional jurisprudence. As the Supreme Court has observed, freedom of speech is delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).Given the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression, see Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) (citation omitted), it is not improvident to at least entertain such claims on habeas. 49 Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to extend Stone. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (expressly refusing to extend Stone to due-process challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-66 (1979) (refusing to extend Stone to equal protection claim in selection of a grand jury); Kimmelman v. Morris, 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986) (holding that a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could be relitigated on habeas corpus, even though the attorney's error was failure to raise Fourth Amendment objections in the state courts); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (refusing to extend Stone to Miranda claims raised on habeas; stating that '[p]rophylactic' though it may be, in protecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Miranda safeguards a fundamental trial right). Cf. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994) (noting that the Court has repeatedly declined to extend the rule in Stone beyond its original bounds; deciding Interstate Agreement on Detainer Act speedy trial claim on state grounds); Withrow, 507 U.S. at 700 (O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (only once has this Court found that the concerns of finality, federalism, and fairness supported excluding certain types of claims from habeas review). This Court has also been reluctant to extend Stone. See DeLisle v. Rivers, 161 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075 (1999) (summarily rejecting the argument that the sufficiency of the evidence and impartiality of the jury claims are not reviewable on habeas, stating that: The United States Supreme Court has explained that Stone was a prudential decision, based in large part on the fact that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, and it has repeatedly declined to extend the rule in Stone beyond its original bounds (internal quotation marks omitted)). 50 Finally, in Stone itself, the Court stressed that its decision restricted the exclusionary rule, not the scope of § 2254 in general. 51 Our decision today is not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally. We do reaffirm that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right, . . . and we emphasize the minimal utility of the rule when sought to be applied to Fourth Amendment claims in a habeas corpus proceeding. 52 Stone, 428 U.S. at 494, n. 37 (citation omitted) 12 . 53 For all these reasons, we decline to hold that First Amendment overbreadth challenges are not reviewable on habeas. 54 The State also argues that the language of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, refutes the notion that a habeas corpus action may be advanced on the basis of hypothetical situations. Specifically, § 2254(e)(2) includes the phrase the factual basis of a claim and § 2254(e)(2)(B) includes the phrase the facts underlying the claim. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i) (the factual predicate for the claim); § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (the facts underlying the claim). Finally, Respondent notes that in Williams, the Supreme Court concluded: For now it is sufficient to hold that when a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case, a federal court applying § 2254(d)(1) may conclude that the state-court decision falls within the provision's 'unreasonable application' clause. Williams, 120 S.Ct. at 1521 (emphasis added). 55 As Petitioner points out, Williams did not involve a facial challenge to a state statute. At issue was whether the defendant's attorney had provided ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of a capital case, which is necessarily a fact intensive issue. Nothing in the opinion suggests that the single sentence extracted by Respondent was intended to have the broad meaning the State has ascribed to it. 56 Furthermore, the language of the governing statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as enacted in the AEDPA, does not speak in terms of application of law to facts; it speaks in terms of the unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law 13 . More importantly, as the Supreme Court observed in Williams, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, namely that the state-court adjudication must be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1523. Significantly, the AEDPA, which substantially changed many aspects of federal habeas jurisprudence, narrowed the scope of federal court review, 14 but did not ban outright any type of constitutional claim. Had Congress wanted to limit certain species of federal constitutional challenges on habeas, it could easily have done so in the AEDPA. See generally Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185 (1988) (Congress is presumed to know about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts). That Congress did not is telling. 57 Respondent's stringing together of references to the facts from various sources is unpersuasive. Although the AEDPA has imposed new restrictions on federal habeas, we can find no authority in the legislative history or the case law for the proposition that the AEDPA intended to prohibit facial challenges on habeas. We therefore reject Respondent's invitation to prohibit facial challenges on habeas. 58