Opinion ID: 1201670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: threat evidence

Text: We also address whether the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence that he threatened someone other than the victim the morning of the murder. The Appellant maintains that allowing such evidence was error, as the probative value of such evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial effect. Further, relying on our decision in State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309, 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), modified on other grounds sub nom. State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991), the Appellant argues that threats by the accused to someone other than the deceased are inadmissible. In contrast, the State contends that the testimony was properly admitted under West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b) [16] for the limited and relevant purpose of showing the Appellant's state of mind near the time of the crime and to demonstrate that he was capable of deliberation. Specifically, the Appellant objected prior to the testimony of William Tippett, the host of the party the Appellant attended just prior to the murder, that when he asked the Appellant to quiet down, the Appellant responded by saying I kill or shoot people who tell me to quiet down or shut up. At that point, Mr. Tippett stated that he escorted the Appellant out of his house, only to have him return about thirty to forty minutes later, pounding on the door to get back into the house. Mr. Tippett testified that no one answered the door and that the Appellant left about five minutes later. The Appellant's specific objection to this evidence was that it was unduly prejudicial and that the threat was not directed towards the victim. However, the record is clear that the State offered this testimony to establish the Appellant's mental state approximately two hours prior to the murder. The trial court ruled, prior to the admission of this testimony before the jury, that the evidence was relevant to the Appellant's mental state and specifically found that the evidence was not overly prejudicial. Moreover, the trial court offered a limiting instruction; but the defense indicated it preferred that such an instruction be given as a part of the jury charge. The jury subsequently was instructed with regard to the threat evidence. [17] The Appellant relies upon our decision in Young as support for his argument that threat evidence not directed at the victim is inadmissible. See 166 W.Va. 309, 273 S.E.2d 592. In syllabus point five of Young, we stated that '[a]s a general rule, an expressed intent of an accused to kill a certain person is not pertinent on his trial for killing another, but it may become pertinent and admissible under circumstances showing a connection between the threat and subsequent conduct of the accused....' Syl. Pt. 2 (in part), State v. Corey, 114 W.Va. 118, 171 S.E. 114 (1933). Id. at 310, 273 S.E.2d at 595, Syl. Pt. 5. In the present case, however, the fact that the Appellant raised his mental state at the time the crime occurred through the assertion of the diminished capacity defense constituted a circumstance which showed a connection between the threat evidence introduced and the Appellant's subsequent conduct. See id. Further, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that the evidence offered was more probative than prejudicial. As previously stated, the evidence was offered to show that just two hours prior to the murder the Appellant's mental state enabled him to verbalize his resentment at being rebuked, and therefore, indicated that he was capable of forming a malicious state of mind.