Opinion ID: 1721671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: did the jury instructions at the penalty phase fail to guide the jury's discretion as required by article 3, section 28 of the mississippi constitution and the eighth amendment to the united states constitution?

Text: Article 3, § 28 of the Mississippi Constitution provides that cruel or unusual punishment shall not be inflicted, nor excessive fines be imposed. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII. Under this assignment of error, Shell lists seven alleged defects in the jury instructions given by the trial court at the penalty phase of the trial. The State urges that Shell is procedurally barred from making this claim due to his failure to make a contemporaneous objection at trial. Cole and Pinkney, supra .
Under the first portion of this assignment of error, Shell claims that the instructions given to the jury were defective because they stated that the jury may objectively consider the detailed circumstances of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, and the character and record of the defendant. Shell claims that this portion of the court's instruction C-1 was improperly given because the use of the word may allows the jury to permissively consider mitigating circumstances, instead of requiring them to do so. The U.S. Supreme Court cases relied on by Shell ( Hitchcock, Skipper, and Eddings ) [4] are factually distinguishable from the case at bar in that they forbid the placing of limitations on what mitigating factors the jury may consider. Such is not the case here. The decisions of this Court do not place limitations on what mitigating circumstances the jury may consider. He may prove his lack of prior criminal record and may introduce such other evidence of his character or the particular circumstances of his crime that would be relevant in deciding whether he should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242, 1254 (Miss. 1976). See also, Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365, 371 (Miss. 1987). At a later point in Instruction C-1, the jury is told that if they find aggravating circumstances to be present, they then  must consider whether mitigating circumstances are also present. There is no flaw in this portion of the jury instructions.
Secondly, Shell argues that the jury instructions shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense. The disputed language appears in Instruction C-1 and reads as follows: Next, to return the death penalty, you must find that the mitigating circumstances, those which tend to warrant the less severe penalty, life imprisonment  do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances  those which tend to warrant the death penalty. This same issue was decided by this Court in Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198 (Miss. 1978): Essentially, Jordan contends that the guidelines of Jackson appear to require the Defendant to shoulder the burden of proof on mitigating circumstances versus aggravating circumstances. Jackson simply holds, however, that one on trial for the charge involved here must be given an opportunity to present any circumstances or combination of circumstances surrounding his life and character or the commission of the offense with which he is charged that would be reasonably relevant to the question of whether he should suffer death or life imprisonment. 365 So.2d at 1206. In Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit considered Mississippi's death penalty statute, and concluded the following: Every mandatory element of proof is assigned to the prosecution. Neither the burden of production nor the burden of proof ever shifts to the defendant. Id. at 1105-06. See also, Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 944 (Miss. 1986). Shell also contends that under the instructions given, death, not life, is presumed to be the proper sentence. This issue was disposed of in Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1983), where this Court held that while one found guilty of capital murder occurring during a robbery becomes subject to the death penalty, this penalty is not automatic. The appellant's argument that he enters into the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial with one strike against him is correct in one sense  i.e., if he had not been convicted of a capital offense, there would be no need for the sentencing hearing and he would simply be sentenced to serve a life term. This does not mean though that the procedure is unfair or faulty. 435 So.2d at 650. Shell's reliance on Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1473 (11th Cir.1988), is improper. In Jackson, the jury was instructed that death was the appropriate penalty. In the case sub judice, there was no such instruction. Therefore, there was no presumption that death was the proper sentence.
Under Shell's third argument, he maintains that the jury should have been instructed that a life sentence should be assumed to be life without parole. There is no indication in the record of such an instruction ever being requested by the defense. This Court has held that such a failure serves as a bar to raising the point on appeal. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 937 (Miss. 1986); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1333 (Miss. 1987). Additionally, this Court has rejected the merits of this very argument on several occasions. Wilcher v. State, 455 So.2d 727, 737 (Miss. 1984); Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d 383, 391 (Miss. 1982); Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601, 610 (Miss. 1981). There is no merit to this claim.
Shell's fourth claim is that it was error to not instruct the jury on the consequences of a failure to agree on punishment. Once again, no such instruction was ever requested. Stringer, supra, at 937; Lockett, supra, at 1333. The same argument on the merits was used by the appellant in Stringer, with no success. The argument creates an illusion of prejudice, which has no logical basis. If the jurors were unable to unanimously find that the aggravating circumstances were sufficient to impose the death penalty and that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, then they could not return a death sentence. Further, in the event they could not unanimously agree after a reasonable period of deliberation, it would be the trial judge's duty under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-103 to dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of life imprisonment on the defendant. 500 So.2d at 945.
Under Shell's fifth argument, he claims that the jury instructions failed to apprise the jury of their prerogative to exercise mercy. Again, no instruction was offered in this regard. Stringer and Lockett, supra . The merits of the issue have also been answered contra to Shell's position. This Court has held on several occasions that there is no right to a mercy instruction. Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 788 (Miss. 1987); Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078, 1100 (Miss. 1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 348 (Miss. 1985). Therefore, it would not have been error for the trial court to refuse to grant such an instruction, had one been requested.
Shell's sixth claim centers around the adequacy of the instructions given to the jury concerning mitigating circumstances. Although conceding that his argument has long been rejected by this Court, Shell nonetheless maintains that the jury was never sufficiently informed that there need not be a unanimous finding of mitigating circumstances. This claim is without merit. In Stringer v. Jackson, 862 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.1988), the Fifth Circuit examined a jury instruction that dealt with mitigating circumstances, and in which the word unanimous appeared. The Court held the following: Although the trial court undoubtedly added unanimously by oversight as the third word in the instructions quoted below, a reading of the entire charge would not have led the jurors to think they were compelled to ignore mitigating circumstances (unless found unanimously) in determining an appropriate sentence for Stringer. The instructions given did not restrict the jury's right and power to consider the appropriateness of the death penalty even after it found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. 862 F.2d at 1112. In the case at bar, the word unanimous or unanimously was not a part of the mitigating circumstances portion of the jury instructions. Instruction C-1 refers to a unanimous jury finding for aggravating circumstances, but there is no corresponding requirement for mitigating circumstances. In addition to the language found in the jury instructions, defense counsel made the following statement during closing arguments: And if one of you feel like this man's entitled to mercy, when you get back into that room there and deliberate, you can hold out and say, No, I want him to have some mercy. It takes only one of you to hold out for that mercy if that's what you choose to do. And regardless of who tries to persuade you or dissuade you, if you give up in yourself that he's entitled to mercy, then you hold out, because if you bolt at that point in time and end up convicting him, then you're going to be punished for the rest of your life. Did I do right? If I get that chance would I do that again?
Shell's final contention is that the instruction concerning the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor failed to meet constitutional standards and that the limiting instruction given by the trial court was also vague. The limiting instruction, S-3, reads as follows: The court instructs the jury that in considering whether the capital murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, the word heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment of the suffering of others. Shell relies on Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) to support his assertion that the aggravating factor instruction was defective. Maynard is distinguishable from this case for several reasons. The U.S. Supreme Court in Maynard struck down a heinous, atrocious, or cruel instruction because there was no accompanying instruction defining those terms. This Court pointed out in Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354, 1363-64 (Miss. 1988) that [t]his Court has placed a limiting construction on `especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.' This fact was also mentioned in Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 434 (Miss. 1988). Although Maynard stated the need for a limiting instruction, no mention was made of the specific language needed to satisfy this requirement. 486 U.S. at 365, 108 S.Ct. at 1859-60, 100 L.Ed.2d at 382. This Court held in Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329 (Miss. 1988), that: [I]t is sufficient for us to hold that hereafter, capital sentencing juries of this State should and must be specifically instructed about the elements which may satisfy the aggravating circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 538 So.2d at 357. No mention is made in Pinkney of the specific language requirements for the limiting instruction. The instructions at issue in this case appear to adequately define each of the three potential aggravating factors in terms the average layman (juror) could understand. The language used is neither vague nor unclear. Shell also questions the disjunctive language of the aggravating factor instruction, claiming that it is impossible to know whether some of the jury found the murder heinous, some atrocious, and some cruel. The cases relied on by Shell address criminal statutes which prohibit a series of distinct acts. In one of those cases, United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.1985), the Court stated: If the jury is told only to determine if the defendant violated the statute, some jurors could find him guilty because he performed one of the prohibited acts, while others might find him guilty because he performed another. The appearance of unanimity would be misleading, because the jury may have reached no agreement as to what the defendant actually did. 779 F.2d at 1224. The problem being addressed in Balistrieri is not present here. Only one crime  the murder of Mrs. Johnson while in the commission of a robbery  was considered by the jury. The list of aggravating circumstances applies only to this one crime. The issue for the jury to determine was whether the aggravating circumstances as a whole applied to the murder of Mrs. Johnson, a question they answered in the affirmative. Furthermore, the jury found two aggravating circumstances overall, that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery, and that the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Even should this Court find that the aggravating circumstance challenged here is invalid, the remaining circumstance is sufficient to uphold the death sentence. Clemons, supra, at 1362. This Court holds that there is no merit to any of the seven portions of this assignment of error, and, as a consequence, to the assignment of error as a whole.