Opinion ID: 2584187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(4) and WAC 162-12-140(3)(n), when it inquired as to Hegwine's pregnancy status as part of its hiring process

Text: ¶ 26 Hegwine contends that Fibre also violated the WLAD when it required her to disclose her pregnancy as part of a mandatory preemployment medical exam. Fibre contends that its inquiry was permissible. The trial court did not find Fibre's action unlawful. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180, as construed by WAC 162-12-140(3)(n), when it inquired into Hegwine's pregnancy status. Hegwine, 132 Wash.App. at 563-64, 132 P.3d 789. We also affirm this holding. ¶ 27 RCW 49.60.180(4) provides, in relevant part, that [i]t is an unfair practice for any employer . . . to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to . . . sex . . . or any intent to make any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. WAC 162-12-140(3)(n) provides that [a]ll questions as to pregnancy, and medical history concerning pregnancy and related matters are prohibited as unfair preemployment inquiries. Together, these laws establish that inquiring as to a prospective employee's pregnancy status constitutes unlawful sex discrimination, unless the inquiry is based upon a valid BFOQ. ¶ 28 Hegwine's claim that Fibre violated RCW 49.60.180(4) is supported by direct, as opposed to circumstantial, evidence. Hence, her second claim is not to be analyzed under the three-step protocol from McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Instead, the applicable standard provides that Hegwine need prove only that discriminatory animus was a substantial factor in the decision at issue, after which the burden of persuasion shifts to Fibre. Griffith v. Schnitzer Steel Indus., 128 Wash.App. 438, 446 n. 4, 115 P.3d 1065 (2005), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1027, 133 P.3d 473 (2006). Fibre must then prove that it would have taken the same action regardless of discriminatory animus. Id. at n. 4. ¶ 29 Hegwine has established the following relevant facts by direct evidence: In February 2001, Fibre made a conditional offer of employment to Hegwine. The primary condition imposed on the offer was that Hegwine undergo an exam by a company physician. As part of this exam, Fibre's physician, Dr. Ostrander, required Hegwine to complete a medical history form, which included the question whether Hegwine was pregnant. At the time Hegwine was required to complete this form, Dr. Ostrander did not know what job Hegwine was applying for or what, if any, physical requirements attached to that job. 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 15, 2005) at 47, 61, 65-66. Hegwine had not expressed any health concerns or limitations associated with her pregnancy. Believing that full, truthful disclosure was necessary to ensure her employment, Hegwine revealed her pregnancy. ¶ 30 Whether the above facts establish a violation of WAC 162-12-140(3)(n) hinges on whether the medical exam was a preemployment or postemployment inquiry, as that regulation's prohibition does not apply after a person is employed. WAC 162-12-140(1). We conclude that Hegwine's exam was properly characterized as preemployment in light of the fact that Fibre itself has consistently argued, since trial, that Hegwine was never its employee. See 2 VRP (Mar. 15, 2005) at 183-85, 210; see also CP at 9 (Fibre denies that Plaintiff was employed by Fibre.). The trial court also found that Ms. Hegwine was not an employee when all this happened. 2 VRP (Mar. 15, 2005) at 291. That Ms. Hegwine's exam is properly characterized as a preemployment inquiry is also supported by case law. See, e.g., Eelbode v. Chec Med. Ctrs., Inc., 97 Wash.App. 462, 984 P.2d 436 (1999); McLean v. St. Regis Paper Co., 6 Wash.App. 727, 496 P.2d 571 (1972). ¶ 31 Because this exam was required preemployment, Fibre's inquiry as to Hegwine's pregnancy violated RCW 49.60.180(4), as construed by WAC 162-12-140(3)(n). Based on this violation, we conclude that Hegwine has established that discriminatory animus was a substantial factor motivating Fibre in its employment actions. United States Supreme Court precedent confirms that even alleged health or safety concerns of the employer, as to Hegwine or her fetus, are insufficient to rebut this proof of discriminatory animus. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 111 S.Ct. 1196. ¶ 32 To successfully defend its actions, Fibre must prove its inquiry was based upon a valid BFOQ. See WAC 162-12-140(2)(a). To succeed with a BFOQ defense here, Fibre would have to establish that inquiring as to pregnancy was essential to . . . the purposes of all of its positions, WAC 162-16-240, or that all or substantially all pregnant women are incapable of performing any job at Fibre efficiently, such that the essence of Fibre's operations would be undermined by not conducting its discriminatory inquiry. Sellers, 97 Wash.2d at 326, 646 P.2d 113. Fibre introduced no objective, medical evidence on this point. The only plausibly relevant testimony came from Dr. Ostrander, who indicated that general safety concerns motivate Fibre's medical examinations. 1 VRP (Mar. 15, 2005) at 55. This is insufficient evidence to establish a valid BFOQ. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals decision that Fibre also violated RCW 49.60.180 as construed by WAC 162-12-140.