Opinion ID: 628599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Uncounseled Interviews with Federal Agents

Text: 30 It is undisputed that, while in federal custody in Otisville, Brown initiated a series of ten interviews with the FBI and that he did so against the advice of counsel. Each time Brown met with FBI agents, he signed a waiver of counsel form and stated that he did not want his attorney present. The FBI agents did not inform Brown's attorney that they were conducting the interviews; nor did the agents discuss the content of the interviews with New York law enforcement authorities, in light of New York State's constitutional prohibition against interviewing anyone under State indictment without the presence of counsel. The state court suppressed Brown's statements to the FBI and, at a post-trial hearing, found that none of the evidence offered to convict Brown arose from the FBI interviews. See People v. Brown, 136 A.D.2d 1, 9 n. 5, 525 N.Y.S.2d 618, 622 n. 5 (2d Dep't), review denied, 72 N.Y.2d 857, 532 N.Y.S.2d 507, 528 N.E.2d 897, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 897, 109 S.Ct. 240, 102 L.Ed.2d 229 (1988). Brown testified at the post-trial hearing that federal authorities offered no bargain and made no promises to gain his cooperation. 31 Brown does not contend that the state court improperly admitted evidence of his statements to the FBI, or that anyone reneged on a plea bargain. Brown claims prejudice on the theory that the FBI interviews interfered with his right to counsel at the plea bargaining stage because, without counsel, he did not know to withhold valuable information about his comrades until some offer of a plea was made to him. Brown thus asks us to adopt the rule that uncounseled post-indictment interrogation violates the Sixth Amendment, regardless of waiver, since uncounseled defendants may lose their best opportunity to barter their criminal intelligence for an advantage in plea or sentencing. Brown also claims that his injuries rendered him vulnerable at the time of the FBI interviews, and that the FBI tried to drive a wedge between him and his revolutionary counsel by branding him an informant. Because Brown cannot be restored to the position he occupied prior to his disclosures to federal authorities--as a holder of information in exchange for which the State might plea bargain--Brown claims that the only remedy for the alleged constitutional violations is dismissal of the indictment. 32 The State's response is threefold: that there was no violation of Brown's federal constitutional rights; that the remedy of dismissal is inappropriate; and that in any event, the state cannot be held to account for the initiatives of the federal agents. We do not reach the third issue because we find that Brown's constitutional rights were not violated and that dismissal is not warranted. 33 Brown offers no basis to upset state court findings that he initiated the discussions with the FBI and expressly and competently waived his right to counsel each time he was interviewed. See People v. Brown, 136 A.D.2d at 11, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 623. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant may be questioned without his attorney present. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2394, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988); Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-93, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). In view of this authority, we decline to adopt a per se rule, implicitly urged by Brown, that bars interviewing a defendant in the absence of counsel if there is a possibility of a plea bargain. Cf. United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 678 (2d Cir.1983) (rejecting the New York rule which prohibits an uncounseled waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege once formal adversary proceedings have begun). 34 We similarly reject the suggestion that Brown's conscious decision to disregard legal advice impaired the adequacy of legal representation. The Sixth Amendment protection requires that counsel be effective, not that counsel be heeded. A competent defendant who disregards counsel may confess or otherwise undermine his own defense without creating by that deliberate conduct a basis under the federal constitution for later reversal of his conviction. 35 As to Brown's claim that the FBI exploited his injuries and subverted his relationship with his attorney, the issue is whether he knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel. Since the state court expressly found a valid waiver, this claim is unavailing. The record does not evidence government misconduct intended to interfere with the attorney-client relationship or otherwise dilute Brown's Sixth Amendment rights. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171, 106 S.Ct. 477, 484-85, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 833 (2d Cir.1985). 36 In any event, Brown can hardly contend that the presence of any of his revolutionary lawyers would have facilitated a plea bargain. Brown concedes that, had a revolutionary lawyer been present at or aware of the FBI interviews, counsel's advice would have been not to cooperate or plea bargain. Under the circumstances, the input of Brown's chosen counsel might have precluded the FBI interviews, but would not have advanced a plea agreement. 37 Assuming arguendo that Brown's Sixth Amendment rights were violated, dismissal of the charges against him is not an appropriate remedy. In United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), the Supreme Court held that [c]ases involving Sixth Amendment deprivations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests. Id. at 364, 101 S.Ct. at 668. In Morrison, federal agents met with a criminal defendant without her attorney's knowledge or permission, even though they were aware that she was under indictment and had counsel. Although the agents disparaged her defense counsel and urged her to cooperate, she declined and immediately notified her attorney. The Supreme Court condemned the agents' behavior as egregious, but found that it had no adverse impact upon the criminal proceeding: counsel's effectiveness was not undermined and the prosecution did not gain use of any tainted evidence. The Court held: 38 Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, ... there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant's right to counsel and to a fair trial. 39 More particularly, absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.... The remedy in the criminal proceeding is limited to denying the prosecution the fruits of its transgression. 40 Id. at 365-66, 101 S.Ct. at 668-69 (footnote omitted). Here, Brown has not demonstrated any impairment of representation or any unfairness at trial. The state court neutralized Brown's allegedly tainted statements to the FBI by suppressing them entirely. To the extent his cooperation with the FBI alienated his counsel, that effect resulted from a disagreement as to how to handle his case, not from any constitutional violation. There is no other effect of a constitutional dimension which needs to be purged. Id. at 366, 101 S.Ct. at 669. 41