Opinion ID: 4533587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Liability of the CDOC and CDCJ for

Text: Discrimination The district court also concluded that the CDOC and CDCJ could not incur liability under either the Rehabilitation Act or Americans with Disabilities Act because Intervention had unilaterally decided to regress Ms. Marks and the CDOC and CDCJ could not unravel that decision. We disagree. Under the statutes, the CDOC and CDCJ could incur liability for disability discrimination in their own programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination against the disabled by a public entity); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012) (same for discrimination by entities receiving federal funding). The issue here is whether the community corrections program could be considered not only a program of Intervention but also a program of the CDOC and CDCJ. We answer “yes.” 14 Ms. Marks was a state prisoner, and the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act “unambiguously extend[] to state prison inmates.” Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also Wright v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corrs., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Both the [Americans with Disabilities Act] and the [Rehabilitation Act] undoubtedly apply to state prisons and their prisoners.”). The CDOC and CDCJ thus could not discriminate against disabled prisoners participating in the state’s community corrections program. See Castle v. Eurofresh, 731 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that state agencies could incur liability under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act when a subcontractor had committed discrimination against disabled prisoners in a program for paid labor and vocational training); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 286 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that states incurred liability under the Rehabilitation Act for localities’ violations because the states’ acceptance of federal funds had reflected a promise to ensure statutory compliance). As long as the CDOC and CDCJ complied with the prohibition against discrimination, they could choose how to operate the community corrections program. For example, the CDOC and CDCJ could operate the program themselves or farm out operations to a local or private entity. But 15 either way, the CDOC and CDCJ would remain subject to the statutory prohibition against discrimination. See Castle, 731 F.3d at 910 (stating that the obligations under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act “apply to public entities regardless of how those entities chose to provide or operate their programs and benefits”). Because this prohibition applies, the statutes and related regulations do not allow public or federally-funded entities to contract away their liability for discrimination. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act provides that discrimination is prohibited when it is either direct or committed “through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A) (2012). And the accompanying regulations prohibit public entities from committing disability discrimination either “directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (2013). 5 Similarly, the regulations accompanying the Rehabilitation Act prohibit recipients of federal funding from discriminating against the handicapped “through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements.” 28 C.F.R. 42.503(b) (2013). 5 These regulations carry the force of law. See Marcus v. Kan. Dep’t of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1306 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that regulations implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act have the force of law). 16 Under these statutes and related regulations, a state entity’s services include programs “undertake[n] through third parties by means of contracts and other arrangements.” Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2010). The CDOC and CDCJ thus cannot avoid statutory liability solely because they were not directly involved in Intervention’s decision to regress Ms. Marks. See Phillips v. Tiona, 508 F. App’x 737, 753 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished); 6 see also Armstrong, 622 F.3d at 1068 (holding that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act required state defendants to ensure compliance by private operators). 7 The CDOC and CDCJ consider the community corrections program the exclusive province of the county and Intervention. But a factfinder could reasonably regard the program as the state’s. Indeed, a state regulation assigns administration of residential community corrections 6 In Phillips, we discussed a potential claim against the state for a private prison operator’s discrimination against an inmate. 508 F. App’x 737, 739 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). We noted that the private nature of the operator should not materially affect liability because the Americans with Disabilities Act’s regulations suggest that states can’t use contracts to sidestep obligations to disabled inmates. 508 F. App’x at 753. 7 The CDOC and CDCJ argue that Armstrong is distinguishable because in that case “[t]here was no dispute that the state had the obligation to house the prisoners in the first instance, so it was contracting out its actual authority over those prisoners to third parties.” Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 23. But the same is true here. Even when Ms. Marks participated in community corrections, the CDOC retained the obligation to house her. 17 programs to the CDOC. CDOC Admin. Reg. 250-15(I) (2011). 8 And the CDOC and CDCJ collectively provided funding for community corrections, made referrals to community corrections, 9 created standards for community corrections, maintained custody over all inmates in community corrections, continued to monitor the status of these inmates while in community corrections, and audited community corrections programs. Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 17-27-103(4), 17-27-108(1)–(2) (2013); see also Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2, at 305–06, 448, 475. 10 8 Ms. Marks relied on the 2011 version of the regulation. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2, at 475–80. 9 Though the CDOC made the referrals, Intervention could decide whether to accept the inmate into community corrections or regress the inmate to prison. 10 The defendants also argue that the claims for damages would fail based on the absence of intentional conduct even if the evidence of state oversight had otherwise sufficed. We need not address this argument because it does not appear in the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Green v. United States, 880 F.3d 519, 532–33 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding that a party waived an issue by omitting it from a party’s motion for summary judgment and asserting it for the first time on appeal). 18