Opinion ID: 767873
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contributions Limits for Gubernatorial Candidates

Text: 64 The district court also dismissed without prejudice appellants' challenge to the limits on contributions to gubernatorial candidates on the ground that none of the parties had standing to challenge this particular limit. In order to have standing, a party must exhibit an actual or threatened injury that is traceable to the defendant's action and that will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 36 (lst Cir. 1993) (citing Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991)). None of the appellant candidates claims to be a candidate for governor in 2002, and none of the appellant donors claim that they would give more than $500 to an identifiable gubernatorial candidate but for the contribution limits. The Daggett appellants hold out Christopher Harte, a long-time donor to various campaigns, as someone with a sufficiently real or threatened injury to challenge the limits, alleging that he also has listener standing, because he is an interested individual who will hear less campaign speech under the new limits. 65 The concept of listener standing, as briefly sketched by appellants, does not find support in the jurisprudence of this court, which has emphasized the importance of a real or threatened injury. See, e.g., Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 919 (lst Cir. 1993) (The injury-in-fact inquiry 'serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation - even though small - from a person with a mere interest in the problem.' (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 690 n.14 (1973))). Even if the Supreme Court cases relied on by appellants, principally Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), stood for the proposition that a mere listener to campaign speech has standing to assert a challenge to a statute that he alleges will diminish such speech, which we doubt, in the case before us, there is no specific speech that appellants can point to that is being compromised. See id. at 756 (remarking that in that case a definite speaker existed who attested that but for the statute at issue he would advertise certain information). 66 Further, although the Stearns appellants have made gubernatorial contributions over $500 in the past, that is not sufficient. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (It must be alleged that the plaintiff 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct. (quoting Massachusetts v. Melon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). Finally, none of appellants' affidavits provide enough specificity about future plans for contributions to display a real or even a threatened injury. 23 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (injury may not be conjectural or hypothetical (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Therefore, we affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice of the challenge to the gubernatorial campaign limits. 67 The district court also indicated that the issue was not ripe because the next election for governor in Maine will not occur until 2002. 24 Ripeness is an issue that often overlaps with standing; [j]usticiability concerns not only the standing of litigants to assert particular claims, but also the appropriate timing of judicial intervention. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991); see also Rhode Island Ass'n of Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 33 (lst Cir. 1999) ([S]tanding and ripeness may substantially overlap.). Whether or not the issue is technically ripe, the clock is certainly ticking. Although apparently no one has officially declared candidacy for the governorship yet, potential candidates may very well be testing the waters and could begin seeking contributions at any time. We hope that the current situation, in which unforeseeable delay has caused both the parties and the court to face imminent statutory deadlines, will be avoided in the next phase of litigation, if there is one. 68