Opinion ID: 199027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Unlawful Action by Probation Officer

Text: 10 Appellant's second claim is that the probation officer's motion which precipitated the revocation of his supervised release was unlawfully filed. He argues that the probation officer exceeded her statutory authority, violated the separation of powers, and engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. Each of these contentions has been considered and rejected by other courts of appeals, and we largely adopt their reasoning.
11 Probation officers are authorized and required by law to,inter alia, keep informed as to the conduct and condition of a person on supervised release and to report such conduct and condition, including any violations of the conditions of release, to the sentencing court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2), (8)(B). Appellant claims that, by going one step further and recommending a course of action to the district court, the probation officer exceeded her authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3603. We disagree. 12 As the United States Courts of Appeals for both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have recognized, a motion such as that filed by the probation officer in this case is merely an exercise of the officer's statutory duty to report to the district court on the conduct and conditions of a person on supervised release. SeeUnited States v. Meja-Sanchez, 172 F.3d 1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998). When a probation officer includes in her report a recommended course of action, she is merely assisting the district court in its evaluation of the alleged violation, as is required of her as an investigatory and supervisory agent of the Judiciary. See Meja-Sanchez, 172 F.3d at 1175 (citing United States v.Burnette, 980 F. Supp. 1429, 1433 (M.D. Ala. 1997)). In light of the valuable assistance rendered by probation officers to district courts, we decline to read § 3603 so narrowly as to prohibit a probation officer from providing the court with the benefit of her professional experience, both in general and with regard to the particular individual at issue, in the form of a suggested course of action.
13 Appellant's next argument -- that the motion violated the separation of powers because only the Attorney General may initiate revocation proceedings -- also fails. As the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have noted, revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings and neither the Attorney General nor any other officer is solely responsible for their initiation. See id.; Davis, 151 F.3d at 1307. To the contrary, the sentencing court may initiate revocation proceedings sua sponte whenever it learns of a possible violation of an individual's conditions of release. See Meja-Sanchez, 172 F.3d at 1175; Davis, 151 F.3d at 1307. Moreover, it is the court and the court alone that ultimately decides whether or not revocation proceedings shall be initiated and, if initiated, what consequences will befall the individual who has violated his conditions of release. See Meja-Sanchez, 172 F.3d at 1175; Davis, 151 F.3d at 1307. In reporting suspected violations, and even in recommending a particular course of action, the probation officer is simply performing her statutory duty to assist the court in its supervision of individuals on supervised release, which supervision is an integral part of the courts' quintessentially judicial sentencing responsibility. See Meja-Sanchez, 172 F.3d at 1175 (citing Davis, 151 F.3d at 1308). 14 We hold that the motion filed in this case was fully consistent with the probation officer's statutorily mandated role as an assistant to the district court and, as such, did not offend the separation of powers.
15 Finally, we follow the Tenth Circuit in rejecting the argument that, by filing a motion recommending a course of action, the probation officer engaged in the unlicensed practice of law. See Davis, 151 F.3d at 1308. The probation officer here was engaged not in the practice of law, but rather in the performance of her statutory duty to monitor the conduct and condition of an individual on supervised release and to report such conduct and condition, including any violations of the conditions of release, to the sentencing court. See 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2), (8)(B). She was acting as an agent of the Judiciary itself, not as a practicing attorney.