Opinion ID: 351963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: George Victor Albert

Text: 11 Appellant Albert first contends that the district court erred in failing to dismiss one count of the indictment because both counts arose from a single transaction. Albert argues that one of the two counts is superfluous since the indictment charges him with possession with intent to distribute heroin, distribution, and aiding and abetting the offenses. Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) 2 makes it unlawful to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance. In United States v. Stevens, 521 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1975), and United States v. King, 521 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1975), this court found that when a single sale of a controlled substance gives rise to separate counts charging possession and sale under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), there is a merger of the two offenses permitting only one sentence upon conviction of both counts. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the decisions in Stevens and King do not preclude the multiple count indictment at issue in the instant case. Rather, those decisions held that separate convictions on the two counts were permissible, but that multiple sentences could not be imposed. 12 Accordingly, because Albert received identical concurrent sentences on each count of the indictment, his case must be remanded for the purpose of vacating one of the two concurrent sentences. 13 Albert next contends that the district court erred in permitting the Government to ask a witness for the purpose of identification whether he had ever seen appellant prior to the date of the criminal offense. The testimony was as follows: BY MR. MILLIKEN: 14 Q Agent Linoski, have you ever seen George Victor Albert on occasion other than the one you earlier testified to? 15 A Yes, sir. 16 Q Was that prior to or subsequent to the date of April 29, 1975? 17 A It was November of 1974. 18 MR. MILLIKEN: Thank you very much. No further questions, your Honor. 19 Albert contends that this testimony was intended to prejudice him by innuendo rather than to establish that the Government agent positively could identify him. Albert asserts that the testimony of the narcotics agent implied that he previously had been involved in narcotics. We find this contention to be without merit. 20 Albert finally contends that the district court erred in failing to permit him to raise the defense of entrapment in spite of his refusal to admit that he was guilty of the crime charged. On the other hand, the Government contends that one may not plead entrapment and nonparticipation in the alternative because the defense of entrapment admits all elements of the offense. See, e. g., United States v. Mitchell, 514 F.2d 758, 761 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847, 96 S.Ct. 86, 46 L.Ed.2d 68 (1975); United States v. Posey, 501 F.2d 998, 1002 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Lamonge, 458 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863, 93 S.Ct. 153, 34 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). Albert relies upon United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933, 91 S.Ct. 2263, 29 L.Ed.2d 713 (1971), in which the Fifth Circuit stated that although the defense of entrapment is not available when the defendant denies the acts upon which the prosecution is based, the defense is available when the defendant chooses not to testify so that no evidence inconsistent with the defense is introduced. 440 F.2d at 605. Appellant therefore argues that since he did not take the stand, he is entitled to the defense of entrapment. We find Groessel to be factually distinguishable from the instant case, in that there was no evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Albert was entrapped. 21 The judgments of conviction of both appellants are affirmed except as to the sentencing of Albert. His case is remanded to the district court for the purpose of vacating one of the two concurrent sentences imposed upon him, in accordance with Stevens, supra, 521 F.2d 334.