Opinion ID: 171733
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Properly Preserved Claims

Text: After the foregoing analysis, we are left with claim Two, portions of claim Three, and claim Four, all of which the district court denied on the merits. As with a procedural claim, Mr. Dungen must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a district court denies a habeas claim on the merits, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner is not granted a writ of habeas corpus unless: adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Mr. Dungen does not have to meet that high standard to be entitled to a COA, but the standard is relevant to our inquiry. The AEDPA provides the standard under which the district court evaluates habeas claims. Thus, in evaluating the 3 Mr. Dungen argues that Silva v. People, 156 P.3d 1164 (Colo. 2007), has created a right to post-conviction counsel. His argument fails, however, because the right to postconviction counsel recognized in Silva was based entirely on a Colorado statute. Id. at 1168. Before announcing that right, the court reiterated that “there is no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel under . . . the United States Constitution.” Id. at 1167. -7- application for a COA, we ask whether reasonable jurists could debate whether the district court erred when applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring); Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004) (“AEDPA’s deferential treatment of state court decisions must be incorporated into our consideration of a habeas petitioner’s request for COA.”).
Mr. Dungen asserts that the jury selection process was racially biased. The record reflects that there were seven Hispanic persons and one black person in the jury pool. During peremptory challenges, the prosecution struck the only black juror and five of the seven Hispanic jurors. The defense struck one Hispanic juror, and one Hispanic juror was empaneled. The trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Mr. Dungen had made a prima facie case for discrimination regarding the black juror, but that the prosecution had fulfilled its burden to provide a race-neutral explanation. The prosecution stated that it struck the black juror because he had lied about a prior felony conviction. The trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals held that Mr. Dungen had not made a prima facie case for discrimination with regard to the striking of the five Hispanic jurors. Once a defendant has made a prima facie case for discrimination, the prosecution must provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenge. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986). The explanation must do more than simply deny a discriminatory motive, id. at 98, but the explanation need not be persuasive, or even plausible. Purkett v. Elem, -8- 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.” Id. Here, there is no inherent discriminatory intent in the prosecution’s explanation. That the potential juror lied about a previous felony conviction is clearly a race-neutral explanation, and the explanation is sufficient to defeat Mr. Dungen’s claim of discrimination in striking the black juror. Thus, reasonable jurors could not debate whether the district court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law. Regarding the Hispanic jurors, the Colorado courts found that Mr. Dungen had not made a prima facie case for discrimination. The issue, then, is whether reasonable jurors could debate whether the district court’s finding—that Mr. Dungen had not made a prima facie case of discrimination related to the Hispanic jurors—was contrary to clearly established federal law. See id. The Supreme Court’s decision in Miller-El offers some guidance. In Miller-El, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s denial of a COA to a prisoner. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 348. The prisoner claimed discrimination based on the prosecution’s striking ten of eleven available black jurors. Id. at 331. The court found that the numbers themselves were some evidence of discrimination. Id. at 342. The Court did not, however, state that numbers alone could establish discrimination. Importantly, the Court detailed several other reasons for determining that Mr. Miller-El should be granted a COA to pursue his discrimination claim: the state’s reasons for challenging black jurors applied to some white jurors; the prosecutors asked different -9- questions to white and black jurors; the prosecutors twice “shuffled” the jury panel when several black jurors were in the front row; and the petitioner provided historical evidence of discrimination by the local district attorney’s office. Id. at 343–46. In our case, the only evidence of discrimination regarding the Hispanic jurors is the raw numbers. Mr. Dungen has pointed to no other evidence suggesting discrimination by the prosecutors. In addition, one Hispanic juror was empaneled, and the defense struck one Hispanic juror. Our case, therefore, is far different from Miller-El, where several signs of discrimination were present. Without more evidence of discrimination, reasonable jurors could not debate whether the district court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law.
On appeal, Mr. Dungen alleges eight instances of prosecutorial misconduct. He does not detail those instances, however. He originally asserted ten instances of prosecutorial misconduct, but the magistrate judge determined that two of those claims were procedurally barred. See Dungen, 2008 WL 4000864 at , . The district court noted Mr. Dungen’s failure to object to the magistrate judge’s findings regarding several other claims, leaving only three claims preserved.4 Id. at . Those claims were 1) that 4 Both the magistrate judge and the district court also stated that all ten claims were arguably unexhausted. However, both judges determined that the claims failed on the merits. Dungen, 2008 WL 4000864 at , –. Because we agree that the claims clearly fail on that basis, we need not address the exhaustion issue. See Moore v. Schoeman, 288 F.3d 1231, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002) (stating that a district court may deny a habeas claim on the merits, even if it is unexhausted). -10- during closing arguments the prosecutor referred to photographs that were not admitted into evidence; 2) that the prosecutor impermissibly vouched for the testimony of a government witness; and 3) that the prosecutor generally made derogatory remarks about Mr. Dungen. Id. On appeal, Mr. Dungen offers no facts to support his claim and states only that “as a whole the cumulative acts denied the Petitioner the right to due process.” We have reviewed the magistrate judge’s lengthy investigation into the matter and see no basis for determining that Mr. Dungen has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
Mr. Dungen’s final preserved claim alleges judicial misconduct, arguing that “the judges [sic] communication during jury deliberation outside the presence of the court has denied the Petitioner his due process.” Mr. Dungen appears to be reasserting his argument that he was denied due process because he was not present when the trial judge responded to a request submitted by the jury. Dungen, 2008 WL 4000864 at . Mr. Dungen’s counsel was present, however. A defendant “has a due process right to be present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (quotations omitted). Here, during the jury’s deliberations, the jury sent a note requesting to see pictures of Mr. Dungen displaying the murder weapon. Dungen, 2008 WL 4000864 at . The court’s response was simply that the pictures were not in evidence. Id. -11- Mr. Dungen has offered no argument—nor can we imagine one—detailing how his presence would have made any difference. The court gave a proper answer, in the presence of Mr. Dungen’s counsel. Mr. Dungen’s presence would have had no relation, much less a substantial one, to his ability to defend himself. Therefore, he has failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).