Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Appellant was tried in August and September 1998 for conduct that he committed in October 1991. On July 15, 1998, new capital sentencing provisions of the 1998 General Assembly's omnibus crime legislation, HB 455, took effect, and a sentence of life without possibility of probation or parole (LWOP) became a sentencing option in capital cases. KRS 446.110 provides: If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment is mitigated by any provision of the new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. In a pretrial motion submitted by defense counsel, Appellant advised the trial court of the change in the law, stated that [t]he accused hereby consents to application of the 1998 amendments to KRS 532.030, and moved the trial court to include LWOP as a sentencing option available to the jury if the trial proceeded to a capital sentencing phase. As was the case in Furnish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 95 S.W.3d 34, 50-51 (2002), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 115, 157 L.Ed.2d 80 (2003), the trial court declined to instruct the jury regarding LWOP because it concluded that the previously available capital sentencing options were not clearly mitigated by the new penalties. A majority of this Court, however, subsequently reached the opposite conclusion when certifying the law in Commonwealth v. Phon, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 106, 108 (2000) ([U]pon the unqualified consent of the defendant, a sentence of life without parole may be lawfully imposed for capital crimes committed before July 15, 1998.). The Commonwealth now argues that although the trial court identified an erroneous basis for its ruling below, it correctly declined to instruct the jury on LWOP because the record does not contain evidence of Appellant's personal and unqualified consent to an LWOP instruction. In Furnish , this Court rejected the Commonwealth's identical argument, and we do so again today. In response to the Commonwealth's suggestion that KRS 446.110 permits trial courts to exercise discretion whether to instruct on LWOP in capital cases, we recognize that such an interpretation would permit inconsistency in capital sentencing procedures that is incompatible with due process. Accordingly, we hold that Appellant's motion satisfied the `unqualified consent' requirement we established in Phon, and he was entitled to receive an instruction on life without parole. Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 51. Compare Garland v. Commonwealth, Ky., 127 S.W.3d 529, 537-38 (2003) (where the defendant made no request for an LWOP instruction). We find no merit in the Commonwealth's contention in its brief that the instructional error in this case was harmless. Accordingly, we reverse Appellant's death sentence and remand this case to the trial court for a new capital sentencing phase. Our reversal of Appellant's death sentence and remand for a new capital sentencing phase renders moot or partially moot several of Appellant's allegations of error. Accordingly, this opinion will not address Appellant's boiler-plate objections to the death penalty, i.e., # 53 (Death Sentence Disproportionate to Co-Indictee's Sentence), # 54 (Kentucky's Disproportionality Review is Unconstitutional), # 55 (Residual Doubt Bars Death Sentence), # 56 (Constitutional Challenges to Death Penalty), and # 58 (No Access to Data), which Appellant may assert upon remand and then pursue upon appeal if he again receives a death sentence. Nor will we address other allegations of error that we would characterize as unique to the capital sentencing phase at Appellant's previous trial, i.e., # 9 (Immediate Sentencing of St. Clair), # 10 (Exclusion of Sentencing Hearing Avowals), portions of # 27 (Improper Penalty Phase Closing Argument), # 32 (Denial of Motion to Recuse), # 49 (Commonwealth Hugging Victim's Family After Guilty Verdict), and # 52 (Coerced Death Sentence). We address each of Appellant's remaining allegations of error, but address the ones that relate exclusively to capital sentencing only to the extent that they may be relevant to proceedings upon remand. Although we will identify each argument by both subject matter and number, we have reorganized Appellant's claims according to the nature of the asserted error rather than its sequential place in Appellant's brief, and we will address the allegations in our reorganized order.

Appellant was indicted in February 1992 and was extradited from Oklahoma to Kentucky to stand trial under this indictment in May 1995. Appellant's trial did not begin, however, until August 18, 1998. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth of Kentucky's delay in bringing him to trial violated both: (1) statutory provisions of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.), KRS 440.450, and (2) his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Appellant thus argues that this Court should reverse his conviction and remand this case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the indictment. KRS 440.450(Art. IV(3)) provides: In respect of any proceeding made possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one hundred twenty (120) days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. (Emphasis added). Thus, [i]f the prosecuting authority initiates proceedings, the prisoner must be tried within 120 days after his arrival in the jurisdiction seeking to try him[,] Roberson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 913 S.W.2d 310, 312 (1994), and if the time limitations are violated, the trial court is compelled to dismiss the charges with prejudice. Id. at 313; Lovitt v. Commonwealth, Ky., 592 S.W.2d 133 (1979). In this case, however, we agree with the Commonwealth that the I.A.D.'s 120-day clock provision was inapplicable to this indictment. Kentucky did not utilize the I.A.D. to obtain custody of Appellant. Instead, Kentucky obtained custody of Appellant by extraditing him pursuant to an executive agreement authorized by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (U.C.E.A.). See KRS 440.200(1). Appellant correctly observes that the I.A.D.'s 120-day clock may govern even in cases where the receiving state ultimately obtains custody of the accused through means other than the I.A.D. because the United States Supreme Court has held that the I.A.D.'s time limit applies whenever a requesting state initiates the disposition of charges underlying a detainer it has previously lodged against a state prisoner[,] United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 364, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329, 349 (1978). However, given that Appellant has not cited us to any evidence in the record to show that the Commonwealth of Kentucky ever filed a detainer [3] with Oklahoma authorities, we hold that the I.A.D.'s 120-day clock was inapplicable to this indictment. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial[.] Section Eleven of the Kentucky Constitution likewise provides that an accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage. This Court analyzes allegations of speedy trial right violations under the four-factor test outlined in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), which requires an examination of: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay. This Court has observed, however, that [n]o single one of these factors is ultimately determinative by itself, Gabow v. Commonwealth, Ky., 34 S.W.3d 63, 70 (2000), and can be determined only on an ad hoc balancing basis[.] Id. (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 514, 92 S.Ct. at 2184). We conclude that the delay in bringing Appellant to trial did not violate his rights to a speedy trial. The first factor of the inquiry requires a showing of a presumptively prejudical delay, and we conclude that the approximately six and one-half (6 1/2) years between indictment and trial in this case is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. See Barker v. Wingo (holding that a five (5) year delay in a murder prosecution was presumptively prejudicial); Gabow (thirty-four (34) month delay in murder case). And, jumping ahead slightly to the third factor, it is clear that, after he was extradited to Kentucky  but, significantly, not before  Appellant affirmatively and repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial in the trial court. Although Appellant's assertions of his rights are `entitled to strong evidentiary weight' in deciding whether the defendant's rights were violated, Dunaway v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d at 571 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117), we find no speedy trial violation under the facts presented because: (1) the majority of the delay occurred while Appellant was incarcerated in Oklahoma and prior to any assertion by Appellant of his right to a speedy trial; (2) the lion's share of the remaining delay was attributable to defense-requested continuances; and (3) Appellant's unwarranted assertions fail to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result of this additional delay. Just over seventy-eight (78) months passed between the time Appellant was indicted in February 1992 and the time his trial commenced in August 1998. Fully half of this time  thirty-nine months (39)  elapsed before Appellant was extradited from Oklahoma to Kentucky. During the remaining thirty-nine (39) months, five (5) trial dates were rescheduled  four (4) at the request of the defense and one (1) at the request of the Commonwealth: The originally scheduled trial date of August 14, 1995 was rescheduled for May 7, 1996 after Appellant's initial trial attorneys, Ray Clooney and Richard Receveur, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record less than a week prior to the scheduled trial date because of a Department of Public Advocacy Policy that prevented it from contracting with Clooney for his services because he had filed to run for public office and substitute counsel Ronald Riggs informed the trial court that he required at least six months to obtain mitigation evidence from Oklahoma. The May 7, 1996 trial date was rescheduled for January 1, 1997 after Riggs filed a motion to withdraw (citing a total, complete, and severe breakdown of communications between counsel and the Defendant) and substitute counsel, Catherine Rao-Kamenish and Mary Jo Wicker, advised the court that their schedules would not permit a death penalty trial until December or the following year. The January 14, 1997 trial date was rescheduled for August 12, 1997, without objection from the defense, on the Commonwealth's motion to continue because the lead prosecuting attorney had recently left the Office of the Attorney General to accept a position as an Assistant United States Attorney. The August 12, 1997 trial date was rescheduled for April 21, 1998 without objection from the defense after Rao-Kamenish and Wicker moved to withdraw because Appellant had begun treating the attorney-client relationship as amorous, e.g. , composing poems which professed his romantic intentions towards his counsel and sending them artwork that depicted naked women. The April 21, 1998 trial date was rescheduled to August 18, 1998 at the defense's request to allow it to investigate an incriminating statement allegedly made by Appellant to Kincaid while Appellant was incarcerated in Oklahoma. Appellant's trial ultimately began on August 18, 1998. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth bears the responsibility for the majority of the post-indictment delay, specifically: (1) the thirty-nine (39) months that Appellant remained incarcerated in Oklahoma before the Commonwealth obtained custody of him; (2) the postponement of the original trial date, which Appellant contends was unnecessary; (3) the postponement of the January 14, 1997 trial date at the request of the Commonwealth; and (4) the postponement of the April 21, 1998 trial date, which Appellant contends was made necessary by the Commonwealth's failure to provide timely discovery. When a person under indictment is incarcerated in another jurisdiction,  [u]pon ... demand [the Commonwealth has] a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to obtain custody of that person for purposes of trial. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579-80, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 614 (1969) (emphasis added). See also Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970). Appellant, however, not only failed to make such a demand upon the Kentucky authorities, but actively resisted extradition by filing a habeas corpus action. It is clear from the record in this case that Appellant raised no issue with respect to his speedy trial rights until after he was extradited to Kentucky. Additionally, the Commonwealth's capital sentencing phase evidence demonstrates that, before the extradition agreement was signed, the State of Oklahoma tried Appellant on two (2) outstanding murder charges in February 1994, which suggests that the delay in obtaining custody of Appellant may not have been solely attributable to a lack of effort on the part of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Accordingly, Appellant's speedy trial claim hinges on the thirty-nine (39) months of delay that occurred after he was returned to Kentucky. We observe that a substantial portion of those delays were at the request of or with the tacit consent of the defense. Even if we were to resolve every whose responsibility? dispute as to the post-extradition delays in Appellant's favor, however, it is clear that Appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice from this post-extradition delay. And, if not incarcerated pending trial in Kentucky, Appellant would have been incarcerated in Oklahoma under his life sentences without possibility of parole, and we find no merit in Appellant's unsupported allegations that the conditions of his imprisonment in Kentucky demonstrate prejudice associated with the delay. We find equally unpersuasive Appellant's conclusory assertion that he suffered anxiety from the delay in a resolution of his case. See Preston v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 898 S.W.2d 504, 507 (1995). Although Appellant argues that his ability to mount a defense was impaired by the delay, we have examined each of Appellant's specific complaints and have determined that they fail to demonstrate any identifiable prejudice from the additional delay that occurred after he was transported to Kentucky. Accordingly, [w]e conclude that the delay in bringing this case to trial does not justify `the unsatisfactory severe remedy of dismissal.' Gabow, 34 S.W.3d at 70 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 522, 92 S.Ct. at 2188).
Appellant argues that his ability to communicate confidentially with his trial counsel on a regular basis was impeded by his pretrial incarceration in facilities first in the Jefferson County Jail and then the Kentucky State Penitentiary, where he was transferred some time between October 17, 1997 and March 1998 apparently without a court order and, in fact, in contravention of the trial court's order directing that Appellant be transferred to the nearby Hardin County Detention Center as soon as space was available. Appellant's brief identifies no motion for relief with respect to this issue that was denied by the trial court. In fact, the record reflects that, three (3) weeks before trial, when Appellant's trial counsel moved the trial court to order Appellant's transfer to the Hardin County Detention Center, the trial court granted the motion with no objection from the Commonwealth, Accordingly, [t]he trial judge responded in a reasonable fashion to defense requests, Epperson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 809 S.W.2d 835, 841 (1990), and [t]here was no deficiency ... compromising the right of ... appellant to effective counsel. Id. We hold that the trial court properly addressed the concerns raised by Appellant, and we find no error.
The trial court properly denied Appellant's request for funds to retain an independent psychiatrist because Appellant failed to demonstrate that such funds were reasonably necessary to the defense. Appellant's motion for funds contained only conclusory assertions that [e]mployment of a forensic psychiatrist is an absolute necessity because this Defendant has already been convicted in the state of Oklahoma of four murders and that it would be ineffective assistance of counsel not to have this Defendant ... evaluated by a competent Forensic Psychiatrist in order to determine the mental health defenses, including mental illness and the IQ of the Defendant. When the motion came before the court for a hearing, Appellant's trial counsel stated that he had spoken with a psychologist in Oklahoma that did the work-up on Mr. St. Clair, but counsel gave no indication of the substance of that conversation  either at that time or subsequently. In denying the request for funds, the trial court observed that you're telling me that you believe you need one but don't know why you need one and indicated that if you can convince me of a need ... I'll reconsider. The trial court's ruling was correct. [O]ur review of a trial court's denial of funds pursuant to KRS 31.110 is limited to the reasons actually presented to the trial court. Dillingham v. Commonwealth, Ky., 995 S.W.2d 377, 381 (1999). Appellant had no right to a psychiatric fishing expedition at public expense, Kordenbrock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 384, 387 (1985). There is no violation of due process in the refusal to provide for expert witnesses when the defendant offers little more than an undeveloped assertion that the requested assistance would be beneficial. Simmons v. Commonwealth, Ky., 746 S.W.2d 393, 395 (1988) (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)). See also McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky., 60 S.W.3d 499, 505 (2001).
We find no merit in Appellant's unpreserved allegation that the Office of the Attorney General improperly prosecuted his indictment. Section 93 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that the duties and responsibilities of Constitutional State Officers, including the Attorney General, shall be prescribed by law. Accordingly, our statutes make the Attorney General the chief law officer of the Commonwealth[.] KRS 15.020. And, [t]o encourage cooperation among law enforcement officers [,] ... to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice [,] ... and ... to maintain uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Wilson, Ky., 622 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1981), the General Assembly has enacted KRS 15.700, which establishes a unified integrated prosecutor system in Kentucky with the Attorney General as chief prosecutor of the Commonwealth. Given that the Attorney General may act as prosecutor ... when so directed by statute, Graham v. Mills, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 698, 701 (1985), the General Assembly has enacted a number of statutory provisions that authorize the Attorney General to prosecute criminal actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g. KRS 15.190 (when requested to do so in writing by a County or Commonwealth Attorney); KRS 15.200 (when requested to do so in writing by other identified officers); KRS 15.225 (prosecution of county financial administration); KRS 15.231 (theft of identity and trafficking in stolen identity cases); KRS 15.240 (violations by abortion facilities); KRS 15.242-15.243 (enforcement of election laws); KRS 15.715 (when authorized to do so by the Prosecutors' Advisory Council). By authorizing the Attorney general to direct the investigation and prosecution of criminal actions only in given, limited situation[s], Hancock v. Schroering, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 57, 61 (1972), [t]he legislature has provided a check to prevent the Attorney General from usurping and pre-empting the office of Commonwealth's attorney[.] Id. Although Appellant is correct that the record in this case does not demonstrate the means by which the Attorney General assumed the prosecution of this indictment, the record is equally clear that neither Appellant nor any local prosecuting authority raised any objection to the Attorney General's role in this prosecution. Of course, the issue concerns the Attorney General's authority to prosecute this indictment would have been resolved conclusively in the trial court if Appellant had voiced any objection because the Attorney General's office could have identified its authority on the record (and, if prosecution was assumed pursuant to KRS 15.190 or KRS 15.200, included within the record the written request that they do so). Accordingly, while we observe that in future cases where the Attorney General assumes the role as lead prosecutor it would be a better practice for the Attorney General's office to make a record of its authority to prosecute an indictment, we hold that a presumption of regularity attaches in such cases  particularly when no objection is raised  and we are unwilling to assume wrongdoing from the silent record in this case. As such, we hold that the office of the Attorney General properly prosecuted this case against Appellant.

The trial court ruled consistently with this Court's prior precedent, Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534, 546 (1988) and was well within the scope of his discretion to control the scope of voir dire examination, Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 58 S.W.3d 435, 444 (2001), when it denied Appellant's request that all prospective jurors be required to complete a four (4) page, forty-one (41) question Juror's Personal Data Questionnaire.
Appellant argues that the trial court violated RCr 9.70 and committed reversible error at the beginning of individual voir dire when, before dividing the prospective jurors into groups scheduled to return on later days for individual voir dire, it failed to admonish them not to read about the case. According to Appellant, on the second day of individual voir dire, a local newspaper, The Pioneer News, ran an editorial regarding the trial that addressed the additional security precautions involved. The individual voir dire examination revealed that a number of the prospective jurors had either read the article or overheard others talking about it. Appellant raised no objection at the times he claims the admonition should have been given, but moved the trial court for a mistrial and asked it to strike the jury panel when prospective jurors revealed during individual voir dire that they were aware of the article. RCr 9.70 provides: The jurors, whether permitted to separate or kept in charge of officers, must be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to permit anyone to speak to, or communicate with, them on any subject connected with the trial, and that all attempts to do so should be immediately reported by them to the court, and that they should not converse among themselves on any subject connected with the trial, nor form, nor express any opinion thereon, until the cause be finally submitted to them. This admonition must be given or referred to by the court at each adjournment. Although trial courts have the discretion to admonish prospective jurors on these subjects early in the voir dire process, and we believe it would be the better practice to do so, we agree with the Commonwealth that RCr 9.70 requires this admonition only after the jury has been selected and sworn to try the case. The term jurors as utilized in RCr 9.70 refers to the members of a selected and sworn jury. Compare RCr 9.36(2) (referring to prospective jurors in context of challenges for cause); RCr 9.38 (referring to prospective jurors in context of voir dire examination). In fact, the Administrative Procedures of the Court of Justice (Ad.Proc.) Part II, § 31 require this admonition [i]f the jury is permitted to separate [.] (emphasis added). To the extent that Schweinefuss v. Commonwealth, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1965), suggests that an RCr 9.70 admonishment is required at this stage of the proceedings, it is hereby overruled. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was not required to give the RCr 9.70 admonishment to the prospective jurors at the conclusion of the first day of voir dire  or at any time before the jury was sworn  and the trial court thus properly denied Appellant's motion for a mistrial and to strike the jury panel, which were premised on the trial court's failure to give the admonishment. In any event, we agree with the Commonwealth that, under the facts of this case, Appellant has the burden to show actual jury prejudice, Byrd v. Commonwealth, Ky., 825 S.W.2d 272, 274-75 (1992), and that Appellant has failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced from either the trial court's failure to admonish the jury not to read about the case or the fact that certain jurors apparently were exposed to media coverage. The trial court, the prosecution, and defense counsel each conducted extensive individual voir dire in part to determine whether any press accounts to which prospective jurors may have been exposed might influence their decisions in the case. In Part III(C)(4), infra , we address Appellant's arguments as to the jurors and prospective jurors whom Appellant asserts the trial court should have excused because of their exposure to pretrial publicity. With regard to Appellant's speculative allegation that other prospective or actual jurors might have been exposed to the publicity but weren't discovered, we find no actual prejudice. The trial court did not err when it denied Appellant's request to question an undefined number of deputy sheriffs under oath about an incident that involved a television news reporter who was speaking with a deputy sheriff in the presence of prospective jurors, which allegedly occurred during the first afternoon of individual voir dire. Appellant was allowed to voir dire each member of the jury as to whether they had read about the case in the newspaper, seen television news coverage about it, or overheard other people discussing it. We hold that this voir dire was a more-than-sufficient mechanism to ferret out prospective jurors whose impartiality may have been compromised by the publicity they encountered.
Although Appellant raised no objection at the time of trial, he argues on appeal that the trial court violated his fundamental constitutional guarantees when it excused prospective jurors whose personal beliefs prevented them from imposing a sentence of death. This argument, which we see raised in virtually every capital case appealed to us, has been consistently rejected by the United States Supreme Court, Hodge v. Commonwealth, Ky., 17 S.W.3d 824, 838 (2000) (collecting cases), and by this Court, which has repeatedly and consistently held [it] to be without merit. McKinney, 60 S.W.3d at 512. It is a fully adequate response to Appellant's argument to state simply that: [d]eath qualification of jurors is not unconstitutional. Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 678 (2003). Appellant also argues that the trial court erroneously limited the scope of individual voir dire examination. We find the scope of voir dire in this case constitutionally adequate. The trial judge has broad discretion in the area of questioning on voir dire[,] Woodall v. Commonwealth, Ky., 63 S.W.3d 104, 116 (2001) (citing Ward v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 404 (1985)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835, 123 S.Ct. 145, 154 L.Ed.2d 54 (2002), and, in particular, [t]he extent of direct questioning by counsel during voir dire is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 44. During individual voir dire, the trial court asked the following questions, with slight variations from time to time and follow-up questions as necessary, of each prospective juror: If the Defendant is found guilty of Murder as charged and of certain aggravating circumstances the Commonwealth intends to seek the death penalty. However, there are a range of penalties the jury may consider. They include the death penalty, imprisonment for life without the benefit of parole for twenty-five years, imprisonment for life, and a term of imprisonment of not less than twenty years. Would your personal beliefs prevent you from imposing any of those four punishments, if the court instructed you to consider then and if warranted by the evidence? Would you automatically vote either for or against: Death? Life without the possibility of consideration of parole for at least 25 years? Life imprisonment? A term of not less than 20 years in prison? Mitigation is evidence about a person's character, background, or circumstances that may be considered as a reason for imposing a less severe punishment than otherwise would be imposed. A mitigating circumstance is the opposite of an aggravating circumstance, which may be a reason for imposing a more severe punishment than otherwise would be imposed. Would you consider any evidence offered to you in mitigation of punishment, if instructed to do so by the court? Would you consider any evidence offered in aggravation of punishment, if instructed to do so by the court? Have you read or heard anything about this case before today? Has anything you may have read or heard caused you to form an opinion concerning this case? Are you able and willing to disregard anything you may have read or heard, and decide this case solely on the evidence introduced during the trial? Appellant submits a list of topics upon which he attempted to question prospective jurors but was prevented from doing so when the trial court sustained objections from the Commonwealth. We find that the trial court properly curtailed questions that were not proper and only confused the panel. Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 44. The trial court was well within its discretion to prohibit Appellant from repeating questions already posed by the trial court, Woodall, 63 S.W.3d at 118, inquiring generally how prospective jurors felt about the death penalty, Id. at 117, what they considered a proper case for the death penalty, Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 839, and whether they believed fewer heinous crimes would occur if the death penalty were employed more often. Woodall, 63 S.W.3d at 117. The mere fact that more detailed questioning might have somehow helped the accused in exercising peremptory challenges does not suffice to show abuse of the discretion in conducting the examination. Id. at 116. Here, [b]oth parties were able to thoroughly voir dire the panel[,] Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 44, and we find no error in the trial court's rulings as to the scope of individual voir dire questioning.
Appellant argues that erroneous rulings on his challenges for cause denied him the full use of his peremptory challenges. Appellant identifies ten (10) prospective jurors that he argues the trial court should have excused because of their alleged exposure to pretrial publicity or their inability to consider the full range of authorized punishments, mitigation evidence, or to focus their full attentions on the case. We have examined the transcript of general and individual voir dire, and considering the voir dire as a whole, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's challenges for cause. The question of whether a juror should be excused for cause is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thompson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 862 S.W.2d 871, 874 (1993). And, because the trial court occupies a superior position to evaluate whether, in light of all of the evidence, the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict, Mabe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (1994), a trial court's rulings on challenges for cause will not be reversed on appeal unless ... clearly erroneous. Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 924, 932 (1997). See also Stopher v. Commonwealth, Ky., 57 S.W.3d 787, 797 (2001) (Giving due deference to the opportunity of the trial court to observe the demeanor of the prospective jurors and understand the substance of their answers to voir dire questions .... ), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1059, 122 S.Ct. 1921, 152 L.Ed.2d 829 (2002); Mabe, 884 S.W.2d at 671. From our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings. The record here demonstrates a thorough voir dire examination by the court and counsel and carefully considered rulings on appellant's challenges for cause.... [W]e find no error in the court's rulings. Id.
Appellant's contention that the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure entitled him to one (1) more peremptory challenge than the Commonwealth received is simply incorrect. Because Appellant was the only defendant at trial and the trial court seated alternate jurors, the trial court properly permitted Appellant and the Commonwealth to exercise nine (9) peremptory challenges each. RCr 9.40; Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 45-46; Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 798. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined Appellant's request for bonus challenges and allocated peremptory challenges in accordance with RCr 9.40. Furnish, 95 S.W.3d at 46; Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 798.

Appellant complains that much of the Commonwealth's evidence at trial was inadmissible evidence of bad character that demonstrated nothing more than Appellant's propensity towards criminal activity. Appellant primarily focuses upon the testimony as to his jail escape, burglary, and vehicle theft in Oklahoma and the ensuing manhunt, a kidnapping and vehicle theft in Colorado and a murder in New Mexico, and the shooting incident involving Trooper Bennett. We hold that no reversible error occurred from the introduction of any of the evidence identified in Appellant's brief. On appeal, the applicable standard of review is whether the trial court was clearly erroneous in its factual findings that permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the evidence. KRE 104(a). Cf. Parker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 209 (1997). Here, the trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Appellant's prior crimes and bad acts that were part of a continuous course of conduct in the form of a crime spree that began with Appellant's escape from an Oklahoma jail and ended with his flight from Trooper Bennett. KRE 404(b) provides: Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible: (1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or (2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party. The trial court correctly ruled that testimony as to Appellant's criminal conduct in Oklahoma, Colorado, and New Mexico prior to his Murder of Brady as well as his post-murder shooting at and flight from Trooper Bennett was relevant and admissible under both KRS 404(b)(1) & (2). [I]dentification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged is an essential element in any criminal prosecution. Sanders v. Commonwealth, Ky., 801 S.W.2d 665, 674 (1990). In this case, the evidence concerning Appellant's crime spree, among other things: (1) proved how Appellant came into possession of the murder weapon, see Stanford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 112, 116 (1990) (Appellant's theft of the gun used to commit the crimes charged and theft of the automobile to transport the victim to the point of the murder are so interwoven with the Commonwealth's proof as to render this evidence admissible despite the fact that it tended to prove collateral uncharged criminal conduct.); (2) demonstrated a motive for his abduction of Brady by illustrating Appellant's penchant for late-model small pickup trucks; (3) linked the items found in Brady's abandoned truck to Appellant; and (4) suggested similarities between the execution-style killings of Keeling in New Mexico and Brady in Kentucky that created a reasonable inference that Appellant had committed both murders. See Sanders, 801 S.W.2d at 674 (The record discloses a remarkable similarity between the respective crimes[.]) As such, [i]t is difficult to ignore that after his escape... appellant went on a crime spree and along the way murdered two victims. We have found no basis to disturb the trial court's rulings on the admission of the challenged evidence. Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243, 252 (1996). Nor do we agree with Appellant's contention that the Commonwealth committed overkill by presenting this other bad acts evidence in excess detail. If evidence of other crimes is admissible to show intent or identity or a common scheme or plan, the jury must weigh such evidence for what it is worth[.] Sanders, 801 S.W.2d at 675 (1990).
Although we agree with Appellant's contention that the trial court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce a transcript of Stephens's testimony in a March 1992 preliminary hearing as to escape charges brought in Oklahoma against Appellant and Reese, we find the error harmless in this case because Appellant himself testified at trial to the same significant facts. At that preliminary hearing, Stephens testified that, on September 20, 1991:(1) he was laying there on the couch, watching the Michael Landon story on T.V. when he got up to turn the stove down and [Appellant] just come in right on top of me and knocked me flat in the floor; (2) Appellant then took a .357 Ruger off the end of the couch and held Stephens and his mother at gunpoint and [t]old me that if he had to he would blow my head off. That he didn't want to hurt me, but he would; (3) Appellant held the handgun pointed [r]ight square in my face and cocked the hammer on it several times; and (4) Reese and Appellant subsequently took the keys to a pickup truck from Stephens's mother and left in the pickup  with Reese driving and Appellant on the passenger side. The record reflects that Stephens died before Appellant's case came to trial, and it is thus likely that his prior sworn testimony would be admissible under the former testimony exception to the hearsay rule, KRE 804(b)(1). We need not address that question, however, because Appellant's crime was committed prior to the July 1, 1992 effective date of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence, and the transcript was thus not admissible at Appellant's trial unless it would have been admissible under evidence principles in existence prior to the adoption of [the Kentucky Rules of Evidence] KRE 107(b). See also Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 842. And, under pre-KRE law, former testimony was not admissible at a criminal trial unless the testimony was given at a previous trial of the same offense ... on the same charge[.] RCr 7.22. See also Commonwealth v. Bugg, Ky., 514 S.W.2d 119, 121 (1974); Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky.App., 665 S.W.2d 320, 323 (1984). Accordingly, the trial court erred when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce the transcript. To support his claim that he was prejudiced by the introduction of Stephens's former testimony, Appellant references the Commonwealth's trial court description of it as obviously a critical and key item of evidence in this matter. We find it clear from the context of the Commonwealth's statement that it believed the evidence to be significant because it placed the murder weapon in Appellant's hands. From our review of the record, however, we conclude that, regardless of whether the Commonwealth believed that the transcript was critical evidence at some point in the proceedings, the transcript became far less critical, if not insignificant, after Appellant himself took the stand and admitted that he had taken the handgun from Stephens's home. While Appellant described himself as somewhat of a reluctant participant in the events, he admitted that he had pushed Stephens down, grabbed the handgun, threatened Stephens with it, and left with it in his possession, and he further admitted that the testimony of Reese and Stephens to those same facts was accurate. In fact, Appellant's trial counsel had conceded as much during his opening statement in stating: There are some other facts that there is no dispute about.... They went to Texas together after stealing some items from a man named Stephens. From that point on there is going to be plenty of dispute. And the defense's culpability-phase closing argument closes the door on Appellant's suggestion that there was a substantial dispute at trial as to what had occurred at Stephens's home: We heard about the Stephens' house. No question Michael St. Clair and Dennis Reese burglarized that house. Broke in on Mr. Stephens and his mother. No question. No question Michael grabbed the gun and held Mr. Stephens at gun point. No question that they left out of there with a .357 Ruger and a green pickup truck that belonged to the Stephens[.] It is worthy of note that the only reference to Stephens's former testimony in the Commonwealth's culpability-phase summation concerned Appellant's possession of Stephens's handgun and the Commonwealth's argument further demonstrates the complete lack of factual dispute on that question: Let's look at the gun. Dennis Reese said the gun was in St. Clair's hand at the moment of the burglary; .357 Ruger Black Hawk. Vernon Stephens said that. Why Michael St. Clair even said that. Although Appellant's account of the events was not identical to Stephens's former testimony, the men agreed on the significant facts  e.g., that Appellant left in a pickup truck with Stephens's .357 Ruger Black Hawk handgun. In contrast, the differences in their accounts were minor and inconsequential. In his brief, Appellant fails to mention his own testimony regarding the crimes he committed at Stephens's home, and Appellant thus offers no indication of how he was prejudiced by the erroneous introduction of Stephens's former testimony. We discern no prejudice and find the error harmless. RCr 9.24.
The trial court ruled that the Commonwealth could introduce Exhibits 37-A and 37-B (an enlargement of Exhibit 37-A), which were computer printouts from telecommunications provider General Telephone Company (GTE) that showed eleven (11) telephone calls made from a payphone at the Glendale Truck Stop in Glendale, Kentucky to Appellant's friends and family in Oklahoma. Special Agent Robert Chatham of the Security Services Division of GTE, testified that in order to determine call volume and to track income at coin-operated telephones GTE maintains computer records on calls made from pay telephones in its regular course of business from which we can ... specify what information we want and extract it in a more timely manner. Exhibits 37-A and 37-B represented an assist run from our local switch in the Elizabethtown office denoting long distance telephone calls to Oklahoma. Special Agent Chatham testified that he was the official custodian of records for GTE and explained that although the exhibits themselves were generated in response to a subpoena from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, all of the call information on here would have been available in one report or in one form or another within GTE. KRE 803(6) provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rules, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness.... Appellant argues that the exhibits were not admissible as business records because the exhibits themselves were not prepared in the regular course of GTE's business but were instead prepared in response to a subpoena. Accordingly, Appellant maintains that the fact that the exhibits were prepared in anticipation of litigation demonstrates that the method or circumstance of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. However, [t]his argument misconstrues the essence of Rule 803(6): so long as the original computer data compilation was prepared pursuant to a business duty in accordance with regular business practice, the fact that the hard copy offered as evidence was printed for purposes of litigation does not affect its admissibility. United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1512-1513 (10th Cir.1990). See also United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir.2002) (airline check-in and reservation records compiled and presented in computer printouts prepared specifically for trial were admissible under FRE 803(6) because underlying records were compiled and maintained in ordinary course of business). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce exhibits 37-A and 37-B.
Five (5) days before trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court to allow it to take the deposition of Appellant's ex-wife, Bylynn Van Zandt, for use at trial. According to the Commonwealth, Ms. Van Zandt, a resident of Oklahoma, was unable to travel to Kentucky for the trial because of complications with her pregnancy. Over Appellant's objection, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, and counsel for both the Commonwealth and Appellant traveled to Oklahoma and took Ms. Van Zandt's deposition via video. Ms. Van Zandt testified that she had met up with Appellant and Reese in Texas shortly after their escape and had brought Appellant money and certain items  handcuffs, music tapes, and clothing. The Commonwealth used Ms. Van Zandt's testimony to link Appellant to the items found in Brady's pickup truck and thereby discredit Appellant's defense that he was not in Kentucky. At trial, the video was played twice for the jury  once during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief and again during the jury deliberations at the jury's request. Appellant raises a series of arguments with respect to Ms. Van Zandt's testimony, specifically: (a) the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce the video deposition without proving that Ms. Van Zandt was constitutionally unavailable to testify; (b) the Commonwealth's discovery violations in connection with Ms. Van Zandt's video deposition warrant a new trial; and (c) the trial court erred when it replayed Ms. Van Zandt's testimony during the jury's deliberations, but allegedly discouraged the jury from rehearing other witnesses' testimony. We find none of Appellant's arguments persuasive and we find no error in the trial court's rulings. As to Appellant's first argument, we observe that RCr 7.20(1) permits the introduction of deposition testimony at a criminal trial under certain circumstances: At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears: that the witness is dead; or that the witness is out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity, or that the party offering the deposition had been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.... While RCr 7.20(1) permits the introduction of deposition testimony if it appears ... that the witness is out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), that a witness's mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make that witness unavailable for trial. Id., 390 U.S. at 723, 88 S.Ct. at 1321, 20 L.Ed.2d at 259. Consequently, [r]eliance upon [RCr 7.20(1)] ... is not conclusive when a defendant claims a denial of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Lovett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 103 S.W.3d 72, 82 (2003). See also id. at 84. In short, a witness is not `unavailable' for purposes of ... the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-5, 88 S.Ct. at 1321-22, 20 L.Ed.2d at 260. This constitutional dimension of witness unavailability is reflected in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 8.45(IV) at 433 (3d ed. Michie 1993) (A showing that would meet the requirements of [KRE 804] would simultaneously satisfy the constitutional dictates of the Confrontation Clause.) The Commonwealth argues that Ms. Van Zandt was unavailable to testify in person at Appellant's trial because of complications associated with her pregnancy at the time. KRE 804(a)(4) provides: `Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant  (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity[.] At a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion seeking the trial court's authorization to take Ms. Van Zandt's deposition for presentation at trial, the Commonwealth explained that Ms. Van Zandt's attorney had contacted them regarding his client's medical condition and that Ms. Van Zandt's physician subsequently faxed a letter showing that she's not able  medically able to travel. The record reflects that the Commonwealth handed the physician's letter to Appellant's trial counsel. In a subsequent pleading, the Commonwealth explained that: [T]he witness is unable to travel to Kentucky for medical reasons. During the 2:30 p.m. August 13, 1998 telephone conference call, the Commonwealth stated that the information precipitating the request for a deposition had been received that same day. The Commonwealth had been informed that the witness is approximately 5½ months pregnant. She was reported to have been hospitalized that day for surgery associated with her pregnancy and, for the duration of trial, she is under a doctor's order not to travel.... The accuracy of this reported information can be explored during the deposition itself. The trial court's findings in its written order for Appellant's transport to the deposition in Oklahoma reflect that the trial court accepted the Commonwealth's proof as to Van Zandt's unavailability: it further appearing that it is necessary due to the medical condition of an essential witness to take the out of state deposition of said witness, Bylynn Van Zandt, and it further appearing that to adequately protect the defendant Michael Dale St. Clair's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation his appearance at that deposition is necessary.... Appellant argues that the failure of the Commonwealth to produce any sworn testimony as to Van Zandt's unavailability to testify at trial made the introduction of her deposition improper. It is black-letter law that [t]he ultimate question is whether the witness was unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness [and] ... the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that predicate, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74-5, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2543-44, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 613 (1980). Cf. Justice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1998) (put [ting] the onus on the party offering evidence under KRE 804(b) to show that the witness was unavailable). However, the KRE 104(a) & (b) preliminary determination of [w]hether a witness is `unavailable,' ... is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly unreasonable. Lovett, 103 S.W.3d at 83. See also Brooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 114 S.W.3d 818, 821-22 (2003). And, the trial judge has the discretion to determine the sufficiency of the showing which would justify the reading of an absent witness'[s] testimony [.] Bruce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1969). Although the Commonwealth could have made a much cleaner record in this regard by tendering the letter from Ms. Van Zandt's physician to the court, filing with the Court an affidavit from either the physician or the prosecutor himself, see Brooks, 114 S.W.3d at 821, or questioning Ms. Van Zandt as to her physician's orders during the video deposition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Van Zandt unavailable on the basis of the Commonwealth's assurances. See Ruppee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1991); Bruce, 441 S.W.2d at 437. Appellant raises three (3) allegations of error concerning alleged discovery violations in connection with Ms. Van Zandt's testimony. As to the first, we agree with Appellant that the trial court should have sustained Appellant's objection to Ms. Van Zandt's testimony that Appellant had told her about breaking into this old man's house because the Commonwealth had not complied with RCr 7.24(1) by disclosing the substance of this oral incriminating statement known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to have been made by Appellant to Ms. Van Zandt. For the reasons outlined above in Part III(D)(2), however, Appellant's own subsequent testimony as to his crimes at Stephens's home makes the error harmless. We find Appellant's other arguments, which allege that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, unpersuasive. Prior to the video deposition and outside the presence of Appellant and his counsel, the Commonwealth asked Ms. Van Zandt to identify the clothing found in Brady's vehicle, and Ms. Van Zandt told the prosecution that the blue jeans and army jacket were not the clothes she had brought to her husband when she met him in Texas. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose this allegedly exculpatory evidence to the defense in a timely fashion, i.e., prior to or during the video deposition when Appellant's trial counsel would have an opportunity to preserve testimony to that effect for presentation at trial, violated the Commonwealth's duties as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady , the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id., 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. It is fundamental, however, that the materiality of a failure to disclose favorable evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). And the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. Id., 427 U.S. at 112 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-02, 49 L.Ed.2d at 354 n. 20. Because we find no reasonable probability that Ms. Van Zandt's statement as to the clothing found in Brady's pickup would have changed the verdict in this case if disclosed to the defense and introduced at trial, we find no Brady violation in the Commonwealth's failure to disclose it. Because there is no evidence whatsoever that the Commonwealth gave or promised Ms. Van Zandt anything in exchange for her testimony, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the Commonwealth violated its Brady duties by failing to disclose an agreement, deal, or understanding that, from all indications, did not exist. Appellant's trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Ms. Van Zandt as to her motivations for testifying and her concerns that she could be charged as a co-conspirator for assisting Appellant after his escape. As to Appellant's final allegation of error concerning Ms. Van Zandt's testimony, we observe that [a]ny decision to allow the jury to have testimony replayed during its deliberations is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817, 825 (1997). The trial judge in this case did not abuse that discretion when it replayed Ms. Van Zandt's videotaped deposition over Appellant's objection that doing so would improperly highlight her testimony. Both times the videotaped deposition was played, the trial court admonished the jury to give the witness the same credence... that you would give her if she were here to testify in person. We disagree with Appellant's contention that the trial court, in its response to a juror's inquiry whether it was possible to review transcripts of the witness' [sic] testimony ... back in the jury room, limited or chilled the jurors' ability to request that additional testimony be read back to them. The trial court correctly answered [y]ou cannot review transcripts back in the jury room. see RCr 9.74, and explained [i]f you want a particular witness' [sic] testimony read back to you by the reporter the Court will consider that request. Given that the trial court had the discretion as to whether and to what extent trial testimony would be re-read at the jury's request, the court's additional commentary  [b]earing in mind that we don't want to read back the whole trial that's been going on for three weeks  did not deprive Appellant of due process.
Reese testified for the better part of two (2) days during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief as to the events beginning with his escape with Appellant from jail in Durant, Oklahoma and continuing through Brady's kidnapping and murder. The Commonwealth's theory of the case was premised largely upon Reese's testimony, which fingered Appellant as the person who killed Brady. As a result, Appellant raises several allegations of error that address the trial court's rulings on matters relevant to Reese's testimony and Appellant's ability to impeach and otherwise discredit that testimony. We find no grounds for reversal in any of Appellant's allegations. Appellant sought to attack Reese's credibility with evidence that he suffered from Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID)  a condition that the defense argued prevented Reese from having the ability to accurately recall and relate events and would lead him to confabulate events. After he learned that Reese had been previously diagnosed with DID by a Dr. Joann Ondrovik, who examined Reese in 1993 in connection with a criminal prosecution for murder in Oklahoma, Appellant sought an order directing that [Reese] be subjected to a comprehensive forensic mental health evaluation, with particular focus on the diagnosis of Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), by a professional who is specially qualified in the field, prior to testifying against the accused herein[.] The trial court denied Appellant's motion, but stated that it would reconsider its ruling [i]f information is obtained that the defendant feels would be appropriate to bring this motion in the future. Appellant subsequently unsuccessfully moved the trial court to reconsider the prior ruling, but Appellant submitted no additional relevant information at that time for the court's consideration. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court should have ordered the examination he sought pursuant to CR 35.01 as well as principles of due process and fundamental fairness. We find no error. CR 35.01, which is applicable to criminal proceedings by virtue of RCr 13.04, provides: When the mental ... condition of a party, or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party, is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a ... mental examination by a physician ... or appropriate health care expert, or to produce for examination the person in his custody or legal control. (Emphasis added) Although Reese was Appellant's co-indictee, he plead guilty three (3) years before Appellant's case came to trial and thus was not a party to the action at the time of Appellant's motion. Appellant provides no warrant for his assertion that Reese was in the custody or under the legal control of a party, namely the Commonwealth. To the contrary, Reese's trial testimony demonstrated that his permanent home was the Oklahoma State Prison. It thus appears that Reese was on loan from Oklahoma in order to testify at Appellant's trial, but was not in the custody or under the legal control of a party within the contemplation of CR 35.01. Accordingly, CR 35.01 provides no basis for ... an independent examination. Bart v. Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 576, 578 (1997). While we recognize that this Court has held that due process and fundamental fairness may, depending on the circumstances, entitle the defendant to have the alleged victim examined by an independent expert, Mack v. Commonwealth, Ky., 860 S.W.2d 275, 277 (1993) (emphasis added), the critical question is whether the evidence sought by the appellant is of such importance to his defense that it outweighs the potential for harm. Turner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 767 S.W.2d 557, 559 (1988). And, [w]e must be vigilant not to open the door to the opportunity for a defendant in a criminal case to invade the privacy ... or to harass the witness. Id. at 559. In this case, Dr. Ondrovik testified for the defense at trial regarding her diagnosis of Reese, and Appellant was able to present this evidence to the jury notwithstanding the trial court's denial of his motion for an evaluation, which effectively denied Appellant only a more recent diagnosis to present to the jury. The trial court appropriately denied Appellant's request for additional psychological testing because Appellant failed to demonstrate that the evidence sought was sufficiently important to outweigh the potential for harm. In a related allegation of error, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for an order that would have required the Commonwealth to provide Appellant with copies of any and all mental health records concerning... Reese, in the custody and control of any agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or of the State of Oklahoma, or known by either such agency to exist, or in the custody and control of any current or former agent of, or attorney or mental health professional employed by or on behalf of, Dennis Reese[.] We observe that Eldred v. Commonwealth, Ky., 906 S.W.2d 694 (1994), defined the Commonwealth's obligations with respect to mental health records much more narrowly: [t]he Commonwealth's obligation includes records actually in the hands of the prosecutor, its investigator, and other agencies of the state. Id. at 702 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58-59, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001-02, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 58 (1987)). Significantly, when his motion was heard by the trial court, Appellant's trial counsel conceded that the Commonwealth was not required to serve as Appellant's investigator: The Commonwealth's position appears to be that they don't have any obligation to obtain this stuff that is not in their possession, we can obtain it by subpoena. And that's okay. We will proceed to get subpoenas and obtain those records as best we can so long as the Commonwealth asserts that it has complied or turned over to us every record which is in its control, which is within the control of its agents, or which it has knowledge of and the ability to obtain control over. And so long as the Commonwealth is aware of its obligation... and asserts that it is complying with that, that's okay. As far as the remainder of the record, we will obtain them by subpoena with the Court's cooperation. After the Commonwealth explained that it had turned over the one and only report that had come into our possession, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to require the Commonwealth to accumulate Reese's mental health records, but expressly permitted Appellant to subpoena the records himself. And it is clear from the record in this case that the trial court subsequently issued a subpoena duces tecum for Dr. Ondrovik to provide records upon which she based her diagnosis and that Appellant received additional psychological records as a result. Appellant's brief identifies no coherent claim of error. Shortly before Dr. Ondrovik testified at trial, she learned that her mother had just suffered a stroke. During Appellant's direct examination of her, he first solicited testimony concerning her name, address, occupation, and employment. Then Appellant's trial counsel asked: Doctor, before we go any further, I just want to let the jury know if you appear nervous or upset, it is not about testifying here, is it? Simultaneously, Dr. Ondrovik replied no, my, and the Commonwealth objected. The trial court sustained the objection. Appellant argues that the trial court's ruling prevented him from communicating to the jury that the trial proceedings were running later than usual that day because Dr. Ondrovik needed to get on her way because of a family emergency and thereby abridged his right to present a defense, denied him due process of law, a fair trial, and reliable capital sentencing. We find no merit to this assertion. The trial court correctly sniffed this out as an attempt to introduce evidence that, while clearly irrelevant, could engender sympathy for the witness. The trial court thus properly sustained the Commonwealth's objection. Even if the trial court had the discretion to prohibit attorneys from communicating with their witnesses during mid-testimony recesses, compare Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283-4, 109 S.Ct. 594, 601-2, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, 635 (1989) ([T]he judge must also have the power to maintain the status quo during a brief recess in which there is a virtual certainty that any conversation between the witness and the lawyer would relate to the ongoing testimony) with Reams v. Stutler, Ky., 642 S.W.2d 586, 589 (1982) (characterizing a trial court's admonition that prohibited counsel from conferring with his own witness ... when a recess was called as an abuse of discretion), it did not abuse that discretion when it denied Appellant's motion for an order prohibiting the Commonwealth from communicating with Reese during any trial recesses that occurred in the course of his testimony. Although it is ordinarily improper for the Commonwealth to show during its case-in-chief that a co-indictee has already been convicted under the indictment, see Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 640 S.W.2d 818, 820 (1982); Parido v. Commonwealth, Ky., 547 S.W.2d 125, 127 (1977), we find no reversible error in Appellant's unpreserved and improperly-preserved claims regarding the Commonwealth's introduction of such evidence in this case. Appellant's trial counsel's opening statement included the following: Another fact: Dennis Reese was present and played a role in Frank Brady's murder. You'll hear a lot of different versions most of them coming from Dennis Reese as to what role he played. But the fact is he was there. He played a role in it. And he has confessed before this Court to the murder of Frank Brady. ... Dennis Reese, I will remind you again, the man who stood in this very courtroom in front of this very judge and confessed and pleaded guilty to the murder of Frank Brady. The very first question asked during the defense's cross-examination of Reese zeroed-in on the fact that Reese had entered a negotiated plea of guilty, and subsequent cross-examination demonstrated to the jury that, by pleading guilty to the Kentucky charges, Reese had avoided the death penalty without really losing anything, because he was already facing consecutive sentences in Oklahoma of life without possibility of parole and one-hundred sixty (160) years. Appellant, of course, raised no objection to the Commonwealth's similar questioning during its direct examination of Reese, and it is apparent that the holdings of Tipton and Parido are inapplicable here because this case illustrates the exception to the rule... when the defendant permits the introduction of such evidence without objection for the purpose of trial strategy. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 13, 33 (1998). Having employed that strategy, Appellant cannot be heard to complain after the strategy failed. Id. We additionally hold that the Commonwealth's introduction, through the Bullitt Circuit Court Clerk, of portions of Reese's plea colloquy was permissible in this case to rebut the defense's opening statement characterization of that plea as a confession to the murder of Frank Brady, which created an inference that Reese had stated during his plea that he had personally shot and killed Brady. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gaines, Ky., 13 S.W.3d 923, 924 (2000) (defense opened door to testimony about co-defendant's plea during its cross-examination of co-defendant). In its opening statement, the Commonwealth informed the jury that it would hear what Michael St. Clair said to Dennis Reese about murdering Keeling, the man who Appellant killed in New Mexico after abducting him and stealing his pickup truck in Colorado. Reese testified that he remembered that the murder took place in New Mexico approximately seven (7) miles before they reached the Texas border because Appellant made a statement to the effect that they enforce the death penalty in Texas. According to Reese, after Appellant killed Keeling, he then went through [Keeling's] wallet and tore the picture up of his little girl and thr[ew] it out the window. Appellant objected to these portions of Reese's testimony on the grounds that the Commonwealth had failed to comply with its RCr 7.24(1) discovery obligation by failing to disclose the substance of this testimony, which he alleges involved Appellant's oral incriminating statements. The trial court sustained Appellant objection to his they enforce the death penalty in Texas statement and ordered it stricken from the record. Although Appellant alleges that the introduction of this evidence necessitated a mistrial, the record does not demonstrate a manifest necessity ... or an urgent or real necessity, Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 678 (1985), for a mistrial, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant's motion. Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 662 S.W.2d 483, 484 (1983) ([W]e must rely on the good sense of the trial court in not declaring a mistrial[.]). Because Reese's testimony concerning Appellant's destruction of Keeling's child's picture did not involve any statement by Appellant, the Commonwealth had no obligation under RCr 7.24(1) to inform Appellant of it, and the trial court correctly overruled Appellant's objection, which was premised exclusively on an alleged breach of RCr 7.24(1). Appellant is correct that the trial court erroneously overruled his hearsay objection to Reese's testimony that he had spoken with Kincaid, see infra Part III(D)(6), regarding Kincaid's testimony and that [h]e [Kincaid] told me [Reese] what Michael had told him at one point andI  asked me if it was true and I told him yes and I told him he should write . Given that Kincaid subsequently testified to what Michael had told him, and Reese's testimony made it abundantly clear that, from his perspective, Kincaid's account, which identified Appellant as Brady's murderer, was true, the error was harmless in this case. See Garland, 127 S.W.3d at 540. Appellant's final allegation of error in connection with Reese's testimony involves issues of privilege and waiver, and this allegation requires a more extensive factual explanation than some of the prior allegations. In its attempts to impeach Reese's credibility as a witness, the defense: (1) argued that Reese had utilized discovery materials that were provided to him to fill in the gaps and to supply details in his testimony that were consistent with the Commonwealth's other evidence; and (2) suggested that Reese had a motive to lie because he had agreed to testify against Appellant in exchange for the plea agreement that spared his life. During its direct examination of Reese, the Commonwealth sought to rebut these claims: Comm.: I want to make this clear. At any time when I have spoken to you  when any representative of the Commonwealth has spoken to you, have they ever handed you your statements and told you to keep them? Reese: No, sir. Comm.: Have they ever let you read your statements? Reese: No, sir. Comm.: Have they ever let you listen to tape recordings that you may have made? Reese: No, sir. ... Comm.: Are you expecting any benefit or has it been suggested to you from anybody that you would receive a benefit for testifying here today? Reese: No, sir. Comm.: Did you ever sign an agreement that you would testify? Reese: No, sir. During its cross-examination of Reese, Appellant's trial counsel explored Reese's expectations at the time of his plea as to whether he would be asked to testify against Appellant: Defense: Now, when you were back here and entered your guilty plea you sort of expected this day would come, didn't you? Reese: Yes, sir. Defense: All right. You knew when you entered that plea that if Michael St. Clair ever went to trial here you would be called to testify against him. Reese: I suspected that. Defense: You talked about it? Reese: I don't remember talking about it. Defense: You don't remember talking to your attorneys about it? Reese: We may have. Defense: Did it seem important? Reese: I was concerned about the plea bargain that I was signing. Defense: My question is: Do you remember any discussion about whether or not you're going to have to testify against Michael St. Clair if he went to trial as he is now? Reese: Yes, sir. Defense: You do remember that? Reese: Yes, sir. Defense: And the answer was if they called you, you would have to come testify. Right? Reese: If I didn't have no appeal pending. To provide further evidence relevant to these topics of impeachment, Appellant informed the trial court of its intention to call Rebecca Murrell, an attorney who represented Reese on his Kentucky charges, to testify as to whether she recalls providing him with copies of his discovery and whether the likelihood of his being required to testify against St. Clair if he entered that plea was in fact something that was discussed between them. At a bench conference, Murrell explained that Appellant's trial counsel had informed her of the questions he intended to ask her, that she had discussed this with Reese, and that Reese had told her he does not wish to waive the attorney[-]client privilege and does not wish either myself or [co-counsel] Ms. Schmidt as his counsel in connection with this case, to testify concerning any matters pursuant to client communication. Appellant argued that: (1) the attorney-client privilege was not relevant to Appellant's proposed question as to whether Reese's attorney had provided him with discovery materials; and (2) by testifying himself about discussions concerning whether his plea agreement would require him to testify, Reese had waived his attorney-client privilege with respect to any confidential communications concerning that topic. The trial court ruled that it would not require Murrell to answer the questions that Appellant's trial counsel had identified, but would permit Appellant to ask whether or not it was [Murrell's] usual and customary practice to furnish items of discovery furnished to her by the Commonwealth to her clients. Appellant called Murrell as a witness and, after establishing that she had represented Reese in her capacity as public defender, asked: Defense: Ms. Murrell, tell the jury what is meant by discovery in a criminal law context? Murrell: In laymen's terms discovery would be that process by which a defendant, through counsel, is furnished with information relating to the case, it is a process that is governed by applicable rules and statutory provisions. Defense: Do those rules provide that if the prosecution is in possession of a statement, whether written or taped, that they must provide it to you in discovery? Murrell: Yes, sir. Defense: Do those rules provide that other items of evidence, reports, photographs, so on, are provided to you in discovery? Murrell: Yes, sir. Defense: And once they are provided to you, is it your professional practice to copy those materials and provide them to your client? Murrell: Yes, sir. Defense: Is that something you make a point to do? Murrell: It is my professional practice to do that. Yes, sir. Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it would not allow him to ask the questions that he proposed to ask of Murrell, i.e. , whether she and Reese discussed the possibility that he would have to testify against Appellant and whether she had provided him with discovery materials. We agree with Appellant's contention that the trial court's rulings were erroneous, but find the errors harmless in this case. KRE 503(b) provides that: A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client (i) between the client or a representative of the client and the client's lawyer or a representative of the lawyer.... KRE 503(a)(5) states that [a] communication is `confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. Appellant's proposed question as to whether Murrell had furnished Reese with the discovery materials turned over to her by the Commonwealth did not implicate the KRE 503 privilege. Attorneys may testify as to matters affecting a client so long as such matters do not relate to confidential communications. Futrell v. Shadoan, Ky., 828 S.W.2d 649, 651 (1992) (citing Hyden v. Grissom, 306 Ky. 261, 206 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1947) (An attorney may testify as to matters affecting the client, except as to confidential communications.)). If Murrell had testified that she had furnished discovery materials to Appellant, her testimony would have been a revelation of an act in which [s]he participated, not of a confidential disclosure, United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1119-1120 (5th Cir.1980), and the Kentucky Evidence Rules Study Commission's commentary to KRE 503 states that [t]he privilege does not extend to ... non-communicative acts. (emphasis in original). Because [c]ommunications from attorney to client are privileged only if they constitute legal advice, or tend directly or indirectly to reveal the substance of a client confidence, Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 5.10 at 233 (3d Ed.1993) (quoting United States v. Defazio, 899 F.2d 626, 635 (7th Cir.1990)), any vestige of communicative intent represented by a bundle of the opposing party's discovery materials that have been duplicated by an attorney for his or her client falls outside the scope of KRE 503. The trial court's erroneous ruling on this proposed question was harmless error in this case, however, because the record from the bench conference makes it clear that Murrell had no specific knowledge of whether she had furnished Reese with discovery materials and that her case file, which presumably might have refreshed her memory, had been destroyed in a flood. In fact, Appellant's trial counsel stated to Murrell during this bench conference that I know from our discussions, that even if you were to answer that question, your answer would have to be you don't know because the file was destroyed in the flood. Thus, even if the trial court had permitted Appellant to ask the question, Murrell's answer would not have been probative. And, by permitting Appellant to introduce evidence of Murrell's professional practice (a.k.a. her habit) of providing discovery to her clients, the trial court more than accommodated the defense by allowing it to introduce evidence that is inadmissible in Kentucky. See Burchett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 98 S.W.3d 492 (2003). We agree with Appellant's argument that Reese's testimony concerning discussions with his attorneys as to whether he would be required to testify against Appellant waived any privilege as to those communications under KRE 503. In response to questions posed to him on cross-examination, Reese testified at trial that he recalled discussions with his attorneys about whether he would have to testify and that the answer was that he would have to come testify unless he had an appeal pending. KRE 509 provides that [a] person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he ... voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. Having disclosed the substance of his communications with his attorneys, Reese could not assert the KRE 503 privilege as a bar to testimony from his attorney as to those same communications. Given that Reese testified that it was his understanding that he would be required to testify, however, the trial court's erroneous ruling was harmless because, in the best case scenario for Appellant, Murrell's testimony would have been merely cumulative.
The trial court found that the Commonwealth had inadvertently breached its discovery obligations under RCr 7.24(1) and 7.26(1) by failing to produce for the defense  until the day that Scott Kincaid, an inmate at the Oklahoma State Prison testified  a letter that Kincaid had written to the Commonwealth in February 1996  approximately two and a half (2 1/2) years prior to trial. Although the Commonwealth had previously disclosed to the defense that the substance of Kincaid's testimony was that Appellant had confessed to murdering Brady, the letter contained substantial detail regarding Appellant's incriminating statement to Kincaid that had not been previously disclosed to the defense, i.e. , he admitted to me that he himself killed Frank Brady their [sic] in Kentucky by shooting him twice with a .357 while he was handcuffed. (In front) and also admitted he shot at a K.S. trooper trying to kill him. St. Clair also told me the [sic] he was going to denie [sic] being in Kentucky and that he was going to blame it on Reese. Accordingly, pursuant to the discretion that the Rules of Criminal Procedure grant Kentucky trial courts to remedy discovery violations, see RCr 7.24(9), the trial court ruled that Kincaid could relate the fact that Mr. St. Clair informed him that he murdered Mr. Brady, but that it would not `allow this witness to relate the other information contained in this letter' because the Commonwealth had not timely provided it to the defense. Kincaid testified that Michael admitted to me to killing Mr. Frank Brady and that, in the course of that conversation, Appellant had admitted to personally shooting Brady. Appellant argues that the trial court should have prevented the Commonwealth from soliciting any testimony from Kincaid about Appellant's confession to him. RCr 7.24(9) states that: If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may direct such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as may be just under the circumstances. Here, the trial court prohibited the Commonwealth from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's choice of remedy for the Commonwealth's discovery violation. See Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 849-50.
Appellant maintains that a suggestive photographic show up procedure employed in this case rendered Trooper Bennett's identification of Appellant unreliable. Consequently, Appellant contends that the trial court should have: (1) suppressed all testimony concerning Trooper Bennett's out-of-court identification; and (2) prohibited Trooper Bennett from identifying Appellant at trial as the man who stepped out of the passenger side of Brady's pickup truck on October 7, 1991 and fired shots in his direction. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's motion at which Trooper Bennett and FBI Special Agent Phillip Lewzader testified. Following the hearing, the trial court entered a written order denying Appellant's motion to suppress in which it accurately outlined the facts as demonstrated at the hearing: On October 7, 1991, Bennett was dispatched to investigate a report of a truck on fire on Flint Hill Road. He arrived around midnight, or shortly thereafter, and observed a burned pick-up truck still smoldering. The fire department had preceded him and apparently extinguished the fire. A witness informed Bennett that a maroon or dark brown Ranger was seen in the area. Bennett left after approximately 45 minutes and returned to normal patrol. During the course of the evening, in Sonora, Kentucky at the Union 76 Truck Stop, he observed a Ranger pick-up truck in the parking lot matching the description given to him by the witness. He passed the parking lot, turned around, and observed that the Ranger was now in another location in the parking lot. As the Ranger left the parking lot Bennett observed two white males in the vehicle. He ran a check on the license plate and then proceeded to follow the Ranger onto Interstate 65 headed north for a distance of approximately two miles. When he activated his blue lights the Ranger abruptly pulled to the right and stopped in the emergency lane. Bennett pulled his cruiser into the emergency lane and while his cruiser was still rolling he observed someone exiting from the passenger's side. Bennett stopped his cruiser about two car lengths behind the rear of the Ranger. At that time the passenger was standing behind the truck behind the right rear wheel. The weather was clear and cold and Bennett related that he does not wear glasses. Bennett trained his spot light directly on the passenger. The passenger raised a handgun and fired two shots directed toward Bennett. Bennett ducked behind the dash board of his cruiser and when he raised up the Ranger was exiting the emergency lane and proceeding north on Interstate 65. Bennett related that he made a positive identification of the person who fired the handgun and that he was a white male, 5' 10, 180 pounds, brown or black hair (Bennett says this was a typo  it should have been brown or blond hair) and a scruffy bead. Later in the evening on October 8, 1991, Bennett, while at home, was informed by dispatch that an FBI agent wanted to talk to him. He went to the State Police Post in Elizabethtown and met with Phillip Lewzader, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Lewzader exhibited to Bennett two photographs (mug shots). Bennett made a positive identification of the photo depicting the Defendant, Michael Dale St. Clair, as having been the person who fired two shots at him with a handgun; however, could not identify the second photograph. Agent Lewzader did not identify the name of either individual portrayed in the photographs. Trooper Bennett initially testified that he had received training in identifying suspects at the Kentucky State Police Academy and an additional 40 hours of training per year and had made thousands of vehicle stops in the 23 years that he had been with the Kentucky State Police. The trial court's order then identified the controlling precedent, applied that precedent to the facts of the case, and concluded that Trooper Bennett's identification was reliable: Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case, when reviewed in light of the criteria set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-7, [93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)] the Court finds the photos were not misleading as to require suppression of Bennett's pretrial identification of the Defendant.... Applying [the Neil v. Biggers ] factors to the facts of this case, the Court concludes that the identification made by Bennett of the Defendant's photograph was reliable. The Court finds that the procedure utilized by Special Agent Lewzader did not create a situation in which there was a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of Trooper Bennett's October 8, 1991, identification of Appellant from the photograph presented to him by Special Agent Lewzader. In addition, Trooper Bennett identified Appellant in court. We agree with the trial court's ruling on Appellant's motion to suppress this testimony. The relevant United States Supreme Court precedent, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), establishes a two-prong due process test, Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 854, 857 (1985), under which the court must first determine whether the confrontation procedures employed by the police were `suggestive' [and then] [i]f [it] conclude[s] that they were suggestive, [it] then must assess the probability that the witness would make an irreparable misidentification, based on the totality of the circumstances[.] Id. Although Appellant correctly observes that this Court has held that the display ... of a single mug shot ... unaccompanied by any other pictures, was unnecessarily suggestive, Moore v. Commonwealth, Ky., 569 S.W.2d 150, 153 (1978) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)), we held in the same case that, despite the suggestive procedure, [t]he crucial question ... is whether [the] in-court identification of appellants was reliable despite this suggestiveness, i.e., whether [the witness] likely would have been able to identify [the suspects] even if a proper photographic identification procedure had been utilized. Moore, 569 S.W.2d at 153. Because the photographic show-up procedure employed in the case at bar was sufficiently suggestive to satisfy the first prong of the Neil v. Biggers analysis, the relevant inquiry is thus whether, under the `totality of the circumstances,' the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. The United States Supreme Court has identified five (5) factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness's degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the time of identification; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id., 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. at 382. In addition to these five (5) factors, this Court has also considered whether other evidence tends to corroborate the witness's identification. See Merriweather v. Commonwealth, Ky., 99 S.W.3d 448, 452 (2003); Roark v. Commonwealth, Ky. 90 S.W.3d 24, 29 (2002). In applying these factors to Trooper Bennett's identification, we find it to be reliable despite the suggestive photographic lineup procedure. Because of the position of his cruiser and the fact that his spotlight illuminated Appellant, Trooper Bennett had ample opportunity to view him. Trooper Bennett's attention was sufficiently attuned to Appellant, who was, after all, firing a handgun in his direction at the time. While not perfect, Trooper Bennett's prior description was a fair representation of Appellant. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Bennett testified that, when he identified Appellant from the photograph presented to him I was sure. I mean, sure is sure and Special Agent Lewzader testified that Trooper Bennett was absolutely certain of his identification, which came less than twenty-four (24) hours after the shooting incident. In addition, Trooper Bennett's identification of Appellant is corroborated by Reese's testimony and significant circumstantial and forensic evidence. [T]he totality of the circumstances indicate that Appellant's due process rights were not violated, Merriweather, 99 S.W.3d at 451.
At trial, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to introduce fourteen (14) pictures of the victim's body  four (4) of which depicted the body at the crime scene and ten (10) of which were taken at an autopsy. The trial court specifically found that the photographs in question ... will assist the jury in making a determination as to the cause of death in this case and thus concluded that the probative value of this evidence outweighs any possible prejudice to the defendant. Appellant argues that the photographs, which he describes as gruesome and repetitive should have been excluded from evidence as substantially more prejudicial than probative. KRE 403. [R]elevant pictures are not rendered inadmissible because they are gruesome and the crime heinous. Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793, 794 (1991). See also Epperson, 809 S.W.2d at 843 ([E]ven gruesome photographs are admissible if they have probative value.). The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce these photographs. See Woodall, Ky., 63 S.W.3d at 130.
Appellant argues that the trial court should have excluded the Commonwealth's fingerprint evidence at trial because he was denied an opportunity to conduct independent testing when the Commonwealth released Brady's and Keeling's trucks after it processed the vehicles for latent fingerprints. However, [t]o warrant any relief, Appellant was required to demonstrate bad faith on the part of the police. Crowe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 38 S.W.3d 379, 385 (2001) (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289 (1988)). See also Kirk v. Commonwealth, Ky., 6 S.W.3d 823, 826 (1999) (Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of the due process of law.); Allen v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 817 S.W.2d 458, 462 (1991). Cf. Estep v. Commonwealth, Ky., 64 S.W.3d 805, 811 (2002) ([T]he Due Process Clause is implicated only when the failure to preserve ... evidence was intentional and the potential exculpatory nature of the evidence was apparent at the time it was lost or destroyed.) In the case at bar, the Commonwealth explained in its response to Appellant's motion that it is normal police procedure to release motor vehicles to their lawful owners after the vehicles have been processed for latent fingerprints. To retain custody is of little utility, since the latent fingerprints on the vehicle are often completely removed by the lifting process, and continued retention may be very burdensome to the lawful owners of vehicles seized. Appellant points us to nothing in the record to support a different conclusion. Kirk, 6 S.W.3d at 826. We further observe that the Commonwealth provided Appellant with the information and notes incident to the lifting of the latent fingerprints, including the investigative reports from the officers who lifted the prints, photographs of the vehicle in question, and examination of the latent impressions, which distinguishes this case from Green v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 684 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1984), the authority upon which Appellant relies. In past cases where evidence of bad faith is lacking and the notes and other information incident to the Commonwealth's testing is provided to the defense, we have found no merit in challenges to the admissibility of evidence collected from automobiles premised upon the Commonwealth's release of automobiles before the defense could pursue independent testing. Perdue v. Commonwealth, Ky., 916 S.W.2d 148, 159 (1995); Johnson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 892 S.W.2d 558, 560-561 (1994). Appellant has failed to demonstrate ... bad faith under the standard recognized in this Commonwealth, [and][t]hus we cannot conclude that Appellant was denied due process of law. Collins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 951 S.W.2d 569, 573 (1997).