Opinion ID: 4514513
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA Title II Claims

Text: Under the Eleventh Amendment, federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting states. Congress can abrogate this immunity if it (1) “makes its intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the statute” and (2) “acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 4 Here, the first prong is easy: Congress expressly declared that states “shall not be immune” from suit for a violation of the ADA. 5 The second—whether Congress’s purported abrogation was a valid exercise of its § 5 power—is more complicated. Section 5 legislation that targets facially constitutional conduct is valid only if it demonstrates “a congruence and proportionality between the injury 2 Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410 F.3d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 2005). 3 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). 4 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003). 5 42 U.S.C. § 12202. 3 Case: 19-50286 Document: 00515339200 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/10/2020 No. 19-50286 to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” 6 In Reickenbacker v. Foster, we held that Title II of the ADA, as a whole, fails that test. 7 But three years later, the Supreme Court held that Title II is congruent and proportional—and does validly abrogate states’ sovereign immunity—in “cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts.” 8 We did not decide whether Reickenbacker’s holding remains valid in cases beyond that specific purview. 9 The Supreme Court changed the Title II abrogation landscape a second time with United States v. Georgia. 10 Importantly, the Court established a three-part test for determining whether Title II validly abrogates states’ sovereign immunity. A court must determine, on a “claim-by-claim basis”: (1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid. 11 Here, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (adopted by the district court) skipped to Step 3, and held that “the accommodation obligation imposed by Title II, as it relates to non-fundamental rights” like the right to practice law involved here, “exceeds that imposed by the Constitution and is not a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity.” But under Georgia, we do 6 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 7 274 F.3d 974, 983 (5th Cir. 2001). 8 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004). 9 See Pace v. Bogalusa City School Board, 403 F.3d 272, 277 n.14 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“The continuing validity of Reickenbacker [after Lane] is uncertain.”) (cleaned up). 10 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). 11 Id. Under Georgia, only if a plaintiff has alleged conduct that violates Title II and does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment should a court determine whether Title II is valid § 5 legislation as to that class of conduct. If a plaintiff alleges no conduct that violates Title II, the inquiry ends. 4 Case: 19-50286 Document: 00515339200 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/10/2020 No. 19-50286 not reach that question unless and until it is decided that Block has stated a claim under Title II. 12
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, Block must show (1) he is a “qualified individual” under the ADA; (2) he was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which TBLE is responsible; and (3) the exclusion was by reason of disability. 13 Title II requires public entities to make “reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures” for disabled individuals, unless the entity can show that a modification would “fundamentally alter the nature” of the service or program it offers. 14 A public entity’s failure to make a reasonable modification may satisfy the second and third prongs of the prima facie case. 15 Block bears the burden of showing that he requested a modification and that it was reasonable. 16 Block alleges that TBLE violated Title II by refusing to waive the active practice requirement for admission without examination to the State Bar of 12 Our court has stated it was “unclear” whether Georgia’s first step requires a court to determine whether the plaintiff has actually stated a claim under Title II, or merely to identify the conduct she alleges in support of her Title II claim. Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). In practice, though, we have consistently determined whether the plaintiff stated a claim at this stage—see id. at 503 (declining to reach Georgia’s second and third steps where plaintiff failed to state a claim)—and so have most other circuits. See, e.g., Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (under Georgia, “we must first ascertain whether any of the University’s alleged conduct states a claim for a violation of Title II”); Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2013) (same); Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); Babcock v. Michigan, 812 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 2016) (same); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1036 (10th Cir. 2006) (same). 13 Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004). 14 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(7)(i); Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454–55 & nn. 11–12 (5th Cir. 2005). 15 See Windham v. Harris Cty., Texas, 875 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017). 16Reil v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Reasonable accommodation is an element of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, and [the plaintiff] bears the burden of proof of reasonableness.”) (citation omitted). 5 Case: 19-50286 Document: 00515339200 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/10/2020 No. 19-50286 Texas. But Title II “does not require States to compromise their essential eligibility criteria for public programs”—“[i]t requires only reasonable modifications,” and “only when the individual seeking modification is otherwise eligible for the service.” 17 TBLE protects the integrity of its bar by requiring applicants to either pass the Texas bar exam or meet the three requirements for admission without examination. 18 The active practice requirement ensures that applicants have both achieved and maintained the skill and knowledge required to practice law in Texas. Waiving it to admit a lawyer who has neither passed the Texas bar exam nor practiced law for thirteen years would not inform TBLE of a vital fact: does Block currently have the necessary knowledge and skill to practice law? The modification Block seeks is not a reasonable one. 19 Because Block has alleged no conduct that violates Title II, TBLE is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.