Opinion ID: 2331534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Co-Conspirator Statements

Text: The third issue raised by Reyes on appeal is that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting into evidence two statements attributed to Luis Cabrera by Ms. Skjefte. [13] The trial judge ruled that Reyes and Cabrera were co-conspirators. The statements attributed to Cabrera by Ms. Skjefte were admitted into evidence against Reyes as statements by a co-conspirator. There are two statements that were introduced into evidence by the State that are in dispute. Cabrera made the first statement in response to an inquiry from Ms. Skjefte when she heard a commotion in the basement of her living complex. According to Skjefte, Cabrera said, nothing [is going on]. We're taking care of some business; I'll explain later. A few days later, after the completion of the murders, Ms. Skjefte asked Cabrera what had taken place in the basement. Cabrera responded, well you know, that boy was messing with  messing around with my boy's girl. So we had to teach him a lesson. Delaware Rule of Evidence 802 provides that hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless permitted by law or the Rules. [14] Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d), however, states, A statement is not hearsay if: ... (2) ... The statement is offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy; provided that the conspiracy has first been established by the preponderance of the evidence .... [15] A statement qualifies as an exception under 801(d)(2)(E) if the offering party can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, [16] that: first, a conspiracy existed; second, the co-conspirator and the defendant against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; and third, the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. [17] Reyes does not contend the State did not prove the first two qualifications but rather argues there was no proof the statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. Generally, a conspiracy terminates upon accomplishment of the principal objective unless evidence is introduced indicating that the scope of the original agreement included acts taken to conceal the criminal activity. [18] Reyes' contends that the statements attributed to Cabrera did not further either the completion of the conspiracy or the concealment of criminal activity. Therefore, Reyes argues the admission of Ms. Skjefte's testimony constituted reversible error. The State asserts that the duration of a conspiracy depends on the fact-specific scope of the original agreement and, in this case, included the assault that preceded the actual murders and acts to conceal the murders. The State's position is supported by the record. Cabrera made the first statement to Skjefte in furtherance of concealing the crimes in progress so that the objective of the conspiracy could be completed without detection. Cabrera's second statement to Skjefte was intended to conceal the involvement of Cabrera and Reyes in the completed murders. The record supports the trial judge's factual determinations and rulings that both of Cabrera's remarks were admissible against Reyes as the statements of a co-conspirator. [19]