Opinion ID: 3135059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We begin our analysis with an examination of the attempt statute, which is at issue in this appeal. Since the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961, Illinois law has provided that the offense of attempt is committed when a person, “with intent to commit a specific offense,  does any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.” 720 ILCS 5/8–4(a) (West 2000). This general attempt provision presumptively applies to all offenses ( People v. Wallace , 57 Ill. 2d 285, 290-91 (1974); People v. Taylor , 314 Ill. App. 3d 943, 945-46 (2000); 720 ILCS Ann. 5/8–4, Committee Comments–1961, at 438 (Smith-Hurd 1993)) and it is no defense to a charge of attempt that, due to a misapprehension of the circumstances, it would have been legally or factually impossible to commit the principal offense. 720 ILCS Ann. 5/8–4, Committee Comments–1961, at 437-38 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The attempt statute provides that, as a general matter, the penalty for committing an attempt may not exceed the maximum penalty for the offense attempted. 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c) (2000). The statute further specifies that, when the offense attempted is designated a Class X felony, the attempt will be sentenced as a Class 1 felony; when the offense attempted is designated a Class 1 felony, the attempt will be sentenced as a Class 2 felony; when the offense attempted is designated a Class 2 felony, the attempt will be sentenced as a Class 3 felony; and when the offense attempted does not fall within one of the specified categories, the attempt will be sentenced as a Class A misdemeanor. 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(2), (c)(3), (c)(4), (c)(5) (West 2000). Special sentencing rules apply, however, when the offense attempted is first degree murder. Under ordinary circumstances, the offense of attempted first degree murder is to be sentenced as a Class X felony, which carries a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years. 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2000). If certain aggravating factors are present, however, the sentencing range is increased to a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of 80 years. 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1)(A) (West 2000). Effective January 1, 2000, the attempt statute was amended by Public Act 91–404, which added the following provisions: “(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder while armed with a firearm is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court; (C) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the person personally discharged a firearm is a Class X felony for which 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court; (D) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D) (West 2000). Accordingly, the attempt statute, as amended, requires the offense of attempted first degree murder to be sentenced as a Class X felony with the mandatory addition of 15 years, 20 years or 25 years to life, based on the extent to which a handgun was involved in the commission of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), (c)(1)(D) (West 2000). As noted above, the general attempt provision is ordinarily applicable to all offenses. However, there are exceptions. Where application of the attempt provision to a principal offense creates an inherent impossibility, the offense cannot exist. See People v. Viser , 62 Ill. 2d 568, 581 (1975) (attempt statute not applicable to felony-murder statute). Applying this principle, it was determined in People v. Reagan , 99 Ill. 2d 238 (1983), that the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter was inherently impossible. In Reagan , the defendant was charged with three counts of attempted murder and three counts of armed violence. Defendant raised the affirmative defense of self-defense and was acquitted of attempted murder. Instead, defendant was found guilty of three counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. Defendant appealed his convictions, arguing that the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter did not exist. The appellate court agreed and reversed defendant’s convictions, holding that it was inherently impossible to commit the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter. On review, this court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment. Viewing the attempt statute in conjunction with the voluntary manslaughter statute, this court reasoned that, because the offense of attempt requires the intent to commit a “specific offense,” an attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter necessarily would require a person “to specifically intend to kill with an unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force in self-defense.” Reagan , 99 Ill. 2d at 240. Finding it inherently impossible to intend an unreasonable belief, this court concluded that the offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter did not exist. Reagan , 99 Ill. 2d at 240. See also Viser , 62 Ill. 2d at 581 (“[t]here is no such criminal offense as an attempt to achieve an unintended result”). After Reagan was decided, the legislature enacted Public Act 84–1450 (Pub. Act 84–1450, eff. July 1, 1987), amending the laws of this state with regard to murder. As noted in People v. Jeffries , 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1995), the legislature, intending to remedy “the confusion and inconsistency that had developed in regard to the murder and voluntary manslaughter statutes,” renamed the offense of murder to first degree murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9–1, now codified at 720 ILCS 5/9–1 (West 2000)), abolished the offense of voluntary manslaughter and created the offense of second degree murder to take its place (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 9–2, now 720 ILCS 5/9–2 (West 2000)). Second degree murder was defined by statute as first degree murder plus the existence of one of two possible statutory mitigating circumstances. 720 ILCS 5/9–2 (West 2000). (footnote: 1) This meant that a defendant charged with first degree murder could raise, as an affirmative defense, the existence of a statutory mitigating circumstance and bear the burden of proving its existence. If successful, the defendant would be found guilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder. People v. Lopez , 166 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1995). With the creation of this new second degree murder statute, a conflict arose over the application of the attempt statute. Some courts held that it was not inherently impossible to apply the attempt statute to second degree murder, while other courts disagreed. In Lopez , this court resolved the conflict, holding that it was inherently impossible to commit attempted second degree murder and, for that reason, the offense of attempted second degree murder, like attempted voluntary manslaughter, did not exist under the laws of this state. In Lopez , this court reviewed the consolidated appeals of two defendants who had been convicted of attempted first degree murder. Both defendants had introduced evidence of mitigating circumstances at their trials and, in both cases, the trial courts refused to instruct the juries on attempted second degree murder, ruling that no such offense existed. The appellate court panels affirmed. On review, a majority of this court affirmed the convictions, agreeing with the lower courts that the offense of attempted second degree murder did not exist under Illinois law. This court explained that it was the wording of the attempt statute, not the wording of the second degree murder statute, which led to the conclusion that attempted second degree murder is an offense that is inherently impossible to commit. Looking to the language in subsection (a) of the attempt statute, we noted in Lopez that the offense of attempted second degree murder, if it existed, would require a showing that the defendant intended to commit the “specific offense” of second degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/8–4(a) (West 2000); Lopez , 166 Ill. 2d at 449. Second degree murder, like first degree murder, requires the intent to kill, but also requires the presence of a mitigating circumstance which reduces the defendant’s culpability and, accordingly, the applicable sentencing range. 720 ILCS 5/9–2 (West 2000). This court then reasoned that, “for an attempted second degree murder, the defendant must intend the presence of a mitigating factor, which is an impossibility.” Lopez , 166 Ill. 2d at 449. It was argued in Lopez that the failure to recognize attempted second degree murder as an offense rendered the attempt statute unconstitutional under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. In support of this argument, defendants pointed out that, if attempted second degree murder was not a recognized offense, a person who acted with the intent to kill, but failed to cause the death of the victim, would necessarily be convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class X felony, punishable by a term of imprisonment between 6 and 30 years (720 ILCS 5/8–4(c)(1) (West 2000); 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(a)(3) (West 2000)), whether or not mitigating circumstances existed. At the same time, however, if a person acted with the intent to kill and succeeded in killing the victim, the person, having been charged with first degree murder, would have the opportunity to reduce his culpability, as well as the applicable sentencing range, by introducing evidence that mitigating circumstances existed. If successful in proving the mitigating circumstances, the person would be convicted of the lesser offense of second degree murder, a Class 1 felony, punishable at that time by a term of imprisonment between 4 and 15 years (720 ILCS 5/9–2(d) (West 1992)) or, perhaps, a term of probation (730 ILCS 5/5–6–1 (West 1992)). Thus, defendants argued, the failure to recognize attempted second degree murder as an offense resulted in the possibility that a defendant would be sentenced to a greater term of imprisonment if the victim lived than if the victim died. Lopez , 166 Ill. 2d at 450. On this basis, defendants argued that the penalty for attempted first degree murder was disproportionate to the severity of the offense. This court acknowledged in Lopez that, where mitigating circumstances are present, a defendant who intends to kill is subject to a greater sentencing range when the victim lives than when the victim dies. Nonetheless, this court held that the attempt statute was not rendered unconstitutional. Although the sentencing range for attempted first degree murder was broader than the sentencing range for second degree murder, the sentencing range for attempted first degree murder encompassed the sentencing range for second degree murder. Thus, we concluded, “the disparity in sentencing range here is [not] cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.” Lopez , 166 Ill. 2d at 450-51. Moreover, we held that, in the absence of a proportionate penalties violation, the wording of the attempt statute, which required us to hold that attempted second degree murder could not exist as an offense in this state, was a matter better addressed to the legislature. Lopez , 166 Ill. 2d at 449-50. Against this backdrop, we are now asked to consider the validity of the attempt statute as amended by Public Act 91–404. The Act creates a mandatory sentencing scheme which increases the penalty for the offense of attempted first degree murder based on the extent to which a firearm is involved in the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the amended statute, a defendant whose actions demonstrate an intent to kill, but do not result in death, is subject to sentencing ranges of 21 to 45 years, 26 to 50 years, or 31 years to natural life, depending on whether a firearm was in the defendant’s possession, discharged, or the cause of bodily harm. At the same time, however, no provision has been made for one charged with attempted first degree murder to introduce mitigation evidence. Accordingly, the mandatory enhanced sentencing ranges created by the Act are applicable without regard to whether defendant acted under extreme provocation or while possessing an unreasonable belief that his actions were necessary for his defense. Defendant argues here, as he did before the circuit court, that the attempt statute has been rendered unconstitutional by the addition of this mandatory enhanced sentencing scheme. The circuit court ruled that, because the mandatory enhanced sentencing ranges are applicable whether or not defendant acted under extreme provocation or while possessing an unreasonable belief that his actions were necessary for his defense, the sentencing scheme, as set forth in subsections (c)(1)(B), (c)(1)(C), and (c)(1)(D) of the attempt statute, violates the proportionate penalties clause of our state constitution, which requires the legislature to proportion penalties “according to the seriousness of the offense.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11; People v. Lombardi , 184 Ill. 2d 462, 474 (1998). We agree.