Opinion ID: 2655572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bankruptcy Misrepresentation Enhancement

Text: Tanke challenges the district court’s application of a 2- level sentencing enhancement for making a misrepresentation during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Swank, 676 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 2012). There is an intracircuit split as to whether the standard of review for application of the Guidelines to the facts is de novo or abuse of discretion. See id. at 921-22. There is no need to resolve this split where, as here, the choice of the standard does not affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 922. The United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) provides: “If the offense involved . . . a 22 UNITED STATES V. TANKE misrepresentation or other fraudulent action during the course of a bankruptcy proceeding . . . , increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B). Tanke argues that his offense did not “involve” a misrepresentation because his fraudulent scheme was completed in 2004, four years before he gave false testimony in a bankruptcy proceeding.4 Under § 1B1.3, however, relevant conduct for purposes § 2B1.1(b) includes all acts committed “during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (emphasis added). Tanke’s false testimony in the bankruptcy proceeding may not have occurred in preparation for or during the commission of the offense, but it plainly occurred “in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” Id.; accord United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 634 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2010) (concealing conduct that “occurred long after the” initial offense is still covered by the Sentencing Guidelines, because “nothing in the Guidelines establishes that conduct ceases to be relevant after a specified period of time”). The district court therefore did not err by applying the enhancement.