Opinion ID: 2639895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Anderson: arose out of and in the course of employment

Text: In denying the request for reconsideration, the Director admitted in his March 25, 2003, letter: If an award denied benefits because the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment, then the claimant would not have been entitled to workers compensation benefits received for that injury. In the present case, you and the claimant's counsel may submit to the administrative law judge a modification to the agreed award that specifies that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment. If such a modification is approved, you may renew your request for fund reimbursement based on the new findings.  (Emphasis added.) The trial court, in Finding No. 9, characterized this agreed-upon modification by the attorneys as a stipulation. The trial court further found in its Finding No. 6 that [t]he Administrative Law Judge found that Anderson had not timely filed a written claim, and that a timely application for hearing [had] not been made. The court's finding is incomplete because the determination had already been made by the ALJ that Anderson's injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. The ALJ found that [t]he parties have requested that the Court enter a final determination denying compensability based upon finding all disputed issues against claimant and in favor of respondent/insurance carrier.  (Emphasis added.) Disputed Issue No. 1 expressly stated: [w]hether claimant's accidental injury arose out of and in the course of her employment with respondent? The ALJ then granted the parties' request: This Agreed Award should be treated as any other award as if this matter was fully litigated. All other rights of the parties in this matter have been adjudicated except that the respondent/insurance carrier's right to proceed on securing the reimbursement from the Kansas Worker's Compensation Fund. (Emphasis added.) Issue No. 1 was clearly resolved against Anderson: her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. Consistent with Harness' letters to Brotherhood Mutual denying the claim for reimbursement, Director Greathouse now argues on appeal, however, that [a] finding in the form of a request does not amount to a factual determination. She also argues that the Agreed Award contains no stipulated facts on which to base a finding that the claim was not compensable. The first problem with the Director's position is that it incorrectly shifts the statutory burden of proof to the employer. Under workers compensation law, it is the claimant's burden of proof to establish his or her right to an award of compensation and to prove the various conditions on which his or her right depends. See K.S.A. 44-501(a); Titterington v. Brooke Insurance, 277 Kan. 888, 894, 89 P.3d 643 (2004). Anderson has failed to do so because there is no finding by the ALJ that she was entitled; moreover, the stipulated facts do not independently support a finding of entitlement. Until she does make such a showing, there is no entitlement. The second problem with the Director's position is that Anderson and her counsel expressly asked for an adverse determination of the issue of whether her accidental injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, which is tantamount to a stipulation that she is unable to establish this essential element of her claim. See Morrison v. Hurst Drilling Co., 212 Kan. 706, 512 P.2d 438, (1973) (Stipulation has been defined as an agreement, admission, or concession made in judicial proceedings by the parties thereto or their attorneys.). It is at least as effective as a finding of fact  based upon the evidence  that the claim was not compensable. See 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Stipulations § 17 (Stipulations render proof unnecessary and take the place of evidence.). Indeed, the Director's predecessor, Harness, acknowledged as much when he invited both sides' attorneys to stipulate that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment, to obtain ALJ approval of the stipulation, and then for the insurance carrier's counsel to resubmit the request for reimbursement based upon the new findings.  (Emphasis added.) Once this particular issue has been decided against Anderson, she cannot meet her burden of proof to establish her right to an award of compensation and to prove the various conditions on which her right depends. Failing to prove that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment is fatal to a workers compensation claimant, because the employer is liable only if personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment is caused to an employee. See K.S.A. 44-501(a); Jacobs v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 196 Kan. 613, 617, 413 P.2d 986 (1966); Gamble v. Board of Public Utilities, 137 Kan. 227, 19 P.2d 729 (1933). Accordingly, by the Director's own admission, with a showing that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of employment, the claimant has failed to meet her burden. Anderson is not entitled to the benefit.