Opinion ID: 815818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Change your e-mail address.”

Text: 21 It is undisputed that Mr. Mullineaux did not follow any of the procedures prescribed in the rules to update his contact information until finally changing his email address on November 9, 2010. Thus, CNI’s failure to receive notice was due entirely to Mr. Mullineaux’s violation of the “clear dictates of a court rule,”65 as the clerk’s office properly transmitted notice of the entry of judgment to the email address in Mr. Mullineaux’s profile, and it was plainly Mr. Mullineaux’s sole obligation to keep that profile updated. Updating his profile would have taken exceedingly minimal diligence on Mr. Mullineaux’s part, and he had every reason to be aware of any problem.66 It is remarkable that Mr. Mullineaux could fail to take these most basic steps to receive proper notifications, while at the same time relying entirely on such notifications to ensure that he filed a timely notice of appeal. In these particular circumstances, we conclude that it was not within the district court’s discretion to provide relief.67 CNI’s failure to receive Civil Rule 77(d) notice was entirely and indefensibly a problem of its counsel’s making, and Rule 4(a)(6) was not designed to reward such negligence.68 65 Silivanch, 333 F.3d at 366 (internal quotation marks omitted). 66 There were numerous filings in the case in the two years between CNI’s pro hac vice motion for Mr. Mullineaux and entry of judgment, including several filings by CNI itself. See Dist. Ct. Dkt. 1–24. All were sent only to the old email address. 67 We need not consider the extent to which a district court has discretion to grant relief when the fault is less egregious than the circumstances presented here. In particular, we need not determine whether any fault on the part of the litigant that contributes to the failure to receive notice is disqualifying of Rule 4(a)(6) relief. Nor need we consider whether such a neglectful litigant must meet the Rule 4(a)(5) standard to prevail. 68 We observe also that CNI’s actions even once it became aware of the judgment—at the latest, on November 9, 2010—do not support its claim to relief. CNI’s only action at that 22 We recognize that we appear to be the first court of appeals to identify an abuse of discretion in a district court’s grant of a Rule 4(a)(6) motion where the preconditions for relief were met. The “responsibility for determining predicate compliance with [Rule 4(a)(6)] is vested in the district court”69 and generally the district court will be best suited to weigh the competing factors relevant to a Rule 4(a)(6) motion.70 But, as we have recognized, appellate courts do have a role to play with respect to a district court’s exercise of discretion under Rule 4(a).71 The text and history of Rule 4(a)(6) provide no indication that district court discretion was meant to be unbridled. time was to file a clearly untimely notice of appeal, a “‘nullity’” of no legal effect. Silivanch, 333 F.3d at 363 (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)). CNI then could have, but did not, make a motion for an extension of time under Rule 4(a)(5). It was only well over a month later, on December 16, 2010, after MCI filed a motion to dismiss before this Court, that CNI finally sought Rule 4(a)(6) relief before the District Court. The record contains no explanation for this delay. To be sure, Rule 4(a)(6) was expressly amended in 2005 to make clear that the fourteen-day deadline to move for Rule 4(a)(6) relief is triggered only if and when the litigant receives formal notice of entry under Civil Rule 77(d), which as we have held did not occur here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to the 2005 amendments. But it is equally clear that a district court may consider a litigant’s diligence to some degree in its exercise of discretion under Rule 4(a)(6). A litigant who never receives Civil Rule 77(d) notice but becomes fully aware of the judgment a month after entry could not be entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion if without justification he fails to move for Rule 4(a)(6) relief until just before the 180-day deadline. Cf. Harper v. Ercole, 648 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights’” (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 419 (2005))). In any event, we note only that the delay does not help CNI’s position; we need not determine to what extent this factor alone would have disqualified it from relief. 69 Nguyen v. Southwest Leasing and Rental Inc., 282 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 70 Cf. Silivanch, 333 F.3d at 362 (holding that grant or denial of Rule 4(a)(5) relief “cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion that it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 71 See id. at 369–70 (holding district court’s grant of Rule 4(a)(5) relief was an abuse of discretion, and citing similar cases from other circuits). 23 Rather, appellate review is necessary in light of the systemic importance of the “sanctity of final judgments” that the limitations on Rule 4(a) relief protect.72 In sum, we reaffirm that the Civil Rule 77(d) notice is meant “merely for the convenience of litigants”73 and that litigants at all times have an “obligation to monitor the docket sheet to inform themselves of the entry of orders they wish to appeal.”74 Although Rule 4(a)(6) relief may be available to a litigant who fails to meet this obligation, such relief is discretionary and district courts should exercise their discretion mindful of the purposes and structure of Rule 4(a). Such considerations compelled the district court to deny relief here.75 72 Mendes, 215 F.3d at 314. We have recognized that where “a matter is committed to the district court’s discretion, ordinarily we might vacate the [order] and remand for reconsideration” after we identify error. CP Solutions, PTE, Ltd. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 553 F.3d 156, 161 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). As noted above, it is unclear whether the district court thought that it did not have discretion to deny relief once the preconditions were met or, rather, the court understood it had such discretion but decided to exercise it favorably for unstated reasons. Remand may permit the district court to clarify its ground for decision in such circumstances. We are persuaded, however, that on the undisputed facts of this case the grant of relief simply is not “within the permissible range of choices” and thus remand is unnecessary. Id. 73 Fed. R. Civ. P. 77 advisory committee’s note to the 1946 amendment. 74 McAllan, 248 F.3d at 53. 75 The dissent misconstrues our holding. We have not added an “unwritten requirement” barring relief to litigants at fault for their failures of receipt. Dissent Op. at 3. The dissent concedes that discretion may be abused by the grant of Rule 4(a)(6) relief—notwithstanding satisfaction of the explicit requirements—when the reasons to deny relief sufficiently outweigh the reasons to grant it. Id. at 2. We have concluded only that this is such a case. Indeed, we expressly have left open the possibility that a district court permissibly may grant relief where the fault is less egregious than the circumstances presented here. This is not a case in which the fault could have been due to a “plausible misconstruction” of the rules, Weinstock, 16 F.3d at 503, or in which the litigant argued that the error was due to unique or extraordinary circumstances. Rather, in violation of a clear court rule, Mr. 24