Opinion ID: 1090514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: test for testimonial statements

Text: Because the majority held that Franklin's Confrontation Clause argument with regard to Lawley's statements was not preserved, its discussion of the proper test for determining whether hearsay statements are testimonial is dictum. Nevertheless, I write separately to address the test I believe we should employ in determining whether hearsay statements are testimonial. As the majority notes, in Crawford the Supreme Court mentioned (but did not adopt) a three-factor approach for determining whether hearsay statements are testimonial: [T]he Supreme Court discussed three formulations of statements that might qualify as testimonial, namely: (1) ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent  that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; (2) extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; or (3) statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Majority op. at 90 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354). In the passage the majority cites, the United States Supreme Court quoted from the petitioner's brief in Crawford and the brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae. Later in the opinion, the Court specifically declined to adopt any particular definition of testimonial, leaving that issue for another day. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Therefore, far from adopting the three-part definition, the Court expressly declined to adopt one. The United States Supreme Court came closer to defining what is testimonial in Davis v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), and its companion case Hammon v. State . In Davis and Hammon, the Court focused on the primary purpose of a declarant's statements: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id. at 2273-74 (emphasis added). Although the holding in Davis was limited to situations involving police interrogation, the Court contemplated a broader application: Our holding refers to interrogations because . . . the statements in the cases presently before us are the products of interrogations  which in some circumstances tend to generate testimonial responses. This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. . . . and of course even when interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.  Id. at 2274 n. 1 (emphasis added). The majority notes that  Davis left open the question of `whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are testimonial.' Majority op. at 91. I agree that the holding in Davis does not by its terms apply to such cases. However, I believe Davis does provide compelling guidance. I would therefore adopt a comprehensive primary purpose test similar to that the Nevada Supreme Court recently outlined in Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706 (Nev. 2006). Harkins articulated a totality of the circumstances approach for determining whether a hearsay statement is testimonial: Together, Crawford, Davis, and Hammon demonstrate that when determining whether a statement is testimonial, it is necessary to look at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. . . . . . . . . . . We now take the opportunity to further refine this rule by presenting a nonexhaustive list of factors for courts to consider in determining whether a statement is testimonial: (1) to whom the statement was made, a government agent or an acquaintance; (2) whether the statement was spontaneous, or made in response to a question ( e.g., whether the statement was the product of police interrogation); (3) whether the inquiry eliciting the statement was for the purpose of gathering evidence for possible use at a later trial, or whether it was to provide assistance in an emergency; and (4) whether the statement was made while an emergency was ongoing, or whether it was a recount of past events made in a more formal setting sometime after the exigency had ended. . . . These factors will assist courts in ascertaining the relevant facts surrounding the circumstances of a hearsay statement in order to determine its testimonial nature. Id. at 714. The Nevada Supreme Court's nonexhaustive four-factor test focuses on one pivotal issue: objectively determining the primary purpose of a hearsay statement. The fundamental question is whether the totality of the circumstances indicates that the primary purpose of the statement was to establish past events for later use in a criminal prosecution. Several state courts have discussed a similar approach. See Raile v. People, 148 P.3d 126 (Colo.2006) (To determine the nature of hearsay statements, the context and circumstances under which the statements are made are highly relevant.) (citing Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74); State v. Kirby, 280 Conn. 361, 908 A.2d 506, 522 (2006) (The Court used its `primary purpose' test to hold that these statements were testimonial. . . .); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872, 880 (Mo.2006) (holding that statements by a child molestation victim to sex abuse counselors were testimonial because the counselors, although not government employees, were government agents, and the circumstances indicate that their primary purpose was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D.2006) (Even before Davis, the cases that interpreted Crawford noted the context and circumstances in which a statement is made is important in determining whether a statement is testimonial.); State v. Mechling, 219 W.Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311, 321 (2006) (The guidelines adopted by the Court in Davis are flexible and inherently fact-based, and the existence or lack of government interrogation does not necessarily determine whether a statement is testimonial); see also United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir.2006) (holding that testimony by medical technicians, introducing medical records into evidence which proved the defendant had consumed methamphetamine, were not testimonial because the objective circumstances . . . indicate that their observations and statements . . . were made in nothing but the ordinary course of business). I would adopt the emerging primary purpose approach espoused in Davis. As to many of the statements at issue, the majority appears to use precisely such an analysis. For example, the majority applies the Davis primary purpose test to conclude that the victim's statements to the responding officer were not testimonial. Majority op. at 93. I agree with that analysis. As to the statements the victim made to Ellis just after he was shot, the majority does consider the circumstances surrounding Lawley's statements. Majority op. at 91. However, the majority does not specifically employ the primary purpose test  presumably because the statements were not made to law enforcement officers. Although Davis and Hammon involved statements to law enforcement, as I noted above, the primary purpose test the Court adopted is not necessarily limited to that context. Therefore, I would apply that test and hold that the victim's primary purpose was, as the majority itself notes, to summon assistance and to relay to his friend what had happened to him. Majority op. at 91. Because the primary purpose of the statements was not to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, Davis, 126 S.Ct. at 2274, they were not testimonial. Except for these comments, I join the majority opinion. WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur.