Opinion ID: 196651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the possession charge and the firearm charge

Text: On the possession charge under count 1, the panel concluded that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendants knowingly possessed the drugs or aided and abetted their possession. Among other evidence, the testimony permitted the jury to conclude that the drugs were stored in a bag with a broken zipper and that the drugs were plainly visible from -6- outside the bag, easily seen by anyone on the 20-foot boat. The en banc court did not request further argument on this issue. On the firearm charge, the story is more complicated. Section 924(c)(1) is directed against anyone who uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and the district court charged the jury with the language of the statute, defining use in accordance with circuit precedent.2 Assuming that each appellant was aware of the revolver, its presence on the vessel made it available for use to protect the drugs. The panel ruled that, assuming knowledge of the firearm, its proximity and potential for use permitted the jury to convict under the so-called fortress theory previously adopted by this court and others. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. at 2813 (1991). The panel had more difficulty with the question of whether a reasonable jury could find that each of the defendants knew that the gun was present; unlike the drugs, the gun was not in plain view. The panel upheld the conviction of Ram rezFerrer, since the revolver was located behind a compartment adjacent to his seat and served an obvious purpose to protect the cocaine. The panel also upheld the conviction of Su rez-Maya, who was the central figure in the drug venture and the captain of 2 The indictment mistakenly charged the defendants with having possess[ed] and carr[ied] the firearm. There is no claim that the variance was prejudicial error. -7- the boat. As to Troche-Matos, the court ruled that a reasonable jury could not infer that he knew of the weapon. In their petitions for rehearing on this issue, Su rezMaya and Ram rez-Ferrer drew our attention to United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 1994), arguing that on somewhat similar facts a panel of this court had found the evidence insufficient to support convictions under section 924(c)(1). In that case, the weapon was found in a zippered opaque tote bag on a sofa in a room in which drugs and money were also found, and the court concluded the evidence was not adequate to establish that two of the individuals in the room actually or constructively possessed the weapon. Id. at 102. Despite its differing outcome, Torres-Maldonado does not conflict with the original Ram rez-Ferrer panel on the proper legal standards to be applied. Although the en banc court agreed to rehear the case as a whole, sufficiency of the evidence is not normally a question for en banc consideration unless a mistaken legal standard has been used. Any possible tension between the panel opinion and the decision in Torres-Maldonado stems from their appraisals of their own respective facts. But given the kaleidoscope of different facts presented in drug and gun cases and the varying compositions of panels in the court, the en banc court was, and remains, of the view that differences in weighing evidence are inevitable in cases of this kind even within a single circuit. Nothing will produce perfect harmony among outcomes unless the -8- court chooses to hear every drug and gun case en banc, a course that is neither practical nor useful. Therefore, we conclude that the full court should not seek to decide en banc whether the evidence against each appellant in this case was or was not sufficient on the gun charge. As a result, the en banc court declines to review the adequacy of the evidence on either count 1 or count 3. This does not end the matter. While the en banc opinion was being prepared, the Supreme Court decided Bailey. There, the Supreme Court determined that a conviction for firearm use under section 924(c)(1) required evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. Bailey, U.S. at , 116 S. Ct. at 505. As far as use is concerned, the Supreme Court rejected the fortress theory, disagreeing with the suggestion that a gun placed in the closet is 'used' because its mere presence emboldens or protects its owner. Id., U.S. at , 116 S. Ct. at 508. Although the Supreme Court has rejected the fortress theory of use under which defendants were convicted, the issue of their firearm convictions remains unresolved. Section 924(c)(1) imposes a prison term upon a person who during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm. 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). Defendants were convicted on a gun count that went to the jury -9- with instructions that permitted the jury to convict if it found that defendants either used or carried the weapon found under the T-shirt behind Ram rez-Ferrer. The interpretive problems posed by the term carry are apparent, given the shadow that Bailey casts over previous circuit precedent. Moreover, Bailey contains little comment on the proper scope of carry in section 924(c)(1). By contrast, the Supreme Court went on to state that use cannot extend to hypothetical situations where the offender has hid[den the firearm] where he can grab it and use it if necessary, id., U.S. at , 116 S. Ct. at 508, a description that, in the best light for the government, includes the set of facts before this en banc panel. However, the Court went on to state that the carry prong could cover situations that the use prong could not, noting that a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug transaction. Id., U.S. at , 116 S. Ct. at 507. As a result, defendants' conviction for use should be vacated, and they should face only reconsideration of their convictions under the carry prong, since Bailey has both limited the word use to the extent that it cannot apply in the instant case and emphasized that carry has meanings not covered by use. Id., U.S. at , 116 S. Ct. at 508-09 (cautioning against readings of the word use that render the term carry superfluous, and remanding two unrelated defendants' convictions for consideration under the carry prong). -10- In light of Bailey, then, we decline to decide en banc defendants' firearm convictions, and instead require further consideration of count 3 under section 924(c)(1). We think that these problems should be addressed in proceedings before the panel rather than the en banc court. -11-