Opinion ID: 3134859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Changes to Special Remedial Statutes

Text: The appellate court in this case stated: “The general savings clause  has no application to repeals.” 324 Ill. App. 3d at 253, citing Randall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 284 Ill. App. 3d 970, 974 (1996). However, the Randall case and the cases that are cited to support this assertion address statutory changes to special remedial statutes. Randall , 284 Ill. App. 3d at 973; Shelton v. City of Chicago , 42 Ill. 2d 468, 474 (1969); People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer , 371 Ill. 367, 373-75 (1939). Special remedial statues are statutory provisions that are purely remedial or procedural in nature; they do not involve vested rights. Randall , 284 Ill. App. 3d at 973. In criminal cases in which the statutory changes affect only procedure, Illinois courts hold that the changes can be applied retroactively. See, e.g. , People v. Anderson , 53 Ill. 2d 437, 438, 440-41 (1973) (noting that lengthening the speedy-trial deadline after defendant was charged was procedural and therefore could be applied retroactively). In contrast, however, courts apply section 4 and bar retroactive application where statutory changes alter or repeal the crime itself. For example, in People v. Tanner , 27 Ill. 2d 82 (1963), this court reviewed an indictment that was quashed based on the repeal of the charging statute by the Criminal Code of 1961 (“new Code”). We held that the prosecution could continue despite the repeal. The new Code, however, also incorporated section 4 by reference explicitly, which we acknowledged in our analysis. Tanner , 27 Ill. 2d at 83-85. Soon after, the First District of the appellate court evaluated a case in which the repealing statute did not refer expressly to section 4 in People v. DeStefano , 64 Ill. App. 2d 389 (1965). In that case, the charging statute was repealed after defendant’s conduct but before his indictment. The court found that Tanner did not require that a repealing statute explicitly refer to section 4 for that provision to apply. Citing Bilderback , the court held that the prosecution could proceed. DeStefano , 64 Ill. App. 2d at 398. Therefore, the appellate court and defendant incorrectly assert that section 4 is inapplicable to all repeals. In accordance with our interpretation of section 4, courts can apply retroactively statutory changes to procedural or remedial provisions, whether they are outright repeals or amendments. Section 4 prohibits retroactive application of statutory changes that affect substantive provisions or vested rights.