Opinion ID: 887695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Objection

Text: ¶ 20 With respect to the court's sua sponte objection, Price points out that [a] trial judge must take care to insure that he does not abandon his role as impartial judge in favor of that of an advocate (citing State v. Stafford (1984), 208 Mont. 324, 331, 678 P.2d 644, 648). However, he has not persuaded us that by raising the objection at issue here, the District Judge crossed the line between arbiter and advocate. [4] ¶ 21 To be sure, in our adversarial system, the development of the facts is a task primarily assigned to counsel, and the role of the trial judge is to regulate the proceedings and ensure that the trial is fair. See State v. McConville (1922), 64 Mont. 302, 308, 209 P. 987, 989. `The purposes and modes of thought of the advocate and the judge are different and no person can successfully enact the dual role of prosecutor and judge. They are inconsistent.' State v. Richardson (1924), 69 Mont. 400, 404, 222 P. 418, 419 (quoting People v. Judycki (1922), 302 Ill. 143, 134 N.E. 134, 137). For this reason, the judge should avoid officious interference in the proceedings, Richardson, 69 Mont. at 403-04, 222 P. at 419, and must at all times maintain impartiality in demeanor as well as in actions, United States v. Hickman (6th Cir.1979), 592 F.2d 931, 933 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also People v. De Jesus (1977), 42 N.Y.2d 519, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752, 755-56; People v. Martinez (1974), 185 Colo. 187, 523 P.2d 120, 121; Greenhow v. United States (D.C.App.1985), 490 A.2d 1130, 1136; State v. Thornburgh (Iowa 1974), 220 N.W.2d 579, 585; Canons 5 and 15, Montana Canons of Judicial Ethics (1963). ¶ 22 At the same time, however, [t]he presiding judge is not a mere figurehead or umpire at the trial. It is his province to see that justice is done. McConville, 64 Mont. at 308, 209 P. at 989. Thus, he is not required to remain silent and passive throughout a jury trial, speaking only to rule on motions or objections. See McCormick on Evidence (5th ed.1999) (hereinafter, McCormick), § 55, at 247 (A party's failure to object . . . does not preclude the trial judge from excluding [inadmissible] evidence on his own motion if . . . the judge believes the interests of justice require the exclusion.). To the contrary, it is his duty to conduct the trial in a manner calculated to ensure fairness, avoid needless consumption of time, keep from the jury extraneous matters likely to mislead them, and facilitate the ascertainment of truth. See State v. Dickens (1982), 198 Mont. 482, 486, 647 P.2d 338, 341; State v. LaMere (1980), 190 Mont. 332, 339-40, 621 P.2d 462, 466; State v. Cassill (1924), 70 Mont. 433, 453, 227 P. 49, 57; Richardson, 69 Mont. at 403, 222 P. at 419; Rule 611(a), M.R.Evid. ¶ 23 In the case at hand, it is evident that the District Judge raised the challenged objection not to influence the minds of the jurors concerning Price's guilt, but rather to address the real possibility that they could be misled by extraneous matters or base their verdict on incompetent evidence. He explained to counsel that I sometimes don't like to submit my own [objection], but I don't think [evidence of Fouse's propensity for violence] was proper testimony because [t]he rules of evidence limit attack of a witness to character for truthfulness, or untruthfulness. What we're doing here is bringing up evidence thatviolent, nonviolent, he's not the victim in this case. . . . I don't think any of this testimony about Frank Fouse is admissible. It appears from this explanation that the judge's purpose was to regulate the proceedings so as to ensure a fair trial, not to advocate on behalf of the State. Significantly, unlike a judge with an agenda, the judge here did not immediately rule on his objection. Rather, he solicited and heard arguments from both parties concerning the merits of the objection before issuing a ruling. Moreover, the objection related to testimony elicited by both the State and Price the previous day; thus, it had the capacity to adversely affect both parties. [5] And finally, the judge raised the objection outside the jury's presence, thereby avoiding the risk of appearing in the eyes of the jurors to be on the side of the prosecution. For these reasons, we conclude that the District Judge did not abuse his discretion in volunteering the objection to testimony concerning Fouse's propensity for violence.