Opinion ID: 2074721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tort claim: nature and function

Text: A Condition Precedent to Filing Action. In Chicago Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No. 71, 227 Neb. 355, 366, 417 N.W.2d 757, 764 (1988), we stated: The Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act reflects a limited waiver of governmental immunity and prescribes the procedure for maintenance of a suit against a political subdivision.... As a condition precedent to commencement of a suit brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, one must timely file a proper claim with the appropriate political subdivision. Recognition and acknowledgment that filing or presentment of a claim pursuant to Nebraska's Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a condition precedent to commencement of a tort action against a political subdivision has also been expressed in West Omaha Inv. v. S.I.D. No. 48, 227 Neb. 785, 788, 420 N.W.2d 291, 294 (1988) ([T]he filing of a notice of claim under the Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a condition precedent to the institution of suit against a political subdivision); in Utsumi v. City of Grand Island, 221 Neb. 783, 785-86, 381 N.W.2d 102, 104 (1986) (`The notice of claim requirements of the Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a condition precedent to the institution of suit against a political subdivision ...'); and in Campbell v. City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703, 712-13, 240 N.W.2d 339, 344 (1976) (The notice of claim requirements of the Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a condition precedent to the institution of suit against a political subdivision). See, also, Employers Reins. Corp. v. Santee Pub. Sch. Dist. No. C-5, 231 Neb. 744, 748, 438 N.W.2d 124, 127 (1989) (the filing of a notice of claim under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit). More recently, referring to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, we stated in Schmid v. Malcolm Sch. Dist., 233 Neb. 580, 582, 447 N.W.2d 20, 21 (1989): [T]he Tort Claims Act ... is procedural in nature. The Tort Claims Act is not part of Schmid's cause of action in negligence, but sets out the procedural means through which the district waives its sovereign immunity. Without compliance with the procedural requirements of the Tort Claims Act, the political subdivision's sovereign immunity applies, and not the Tort Claims Act. A plaintiff who sues a political subdivision for negligence and has not complied with the procedures in the Tort Claims Act could not be said to have properly brought an action pursuant to the Act, because it would not apply. Function of a Filed Tort Claim. The purpose or function of a written tort claim against a political subdivision was explained in Chicago Lumber, supra 227 Neb. at 368-69, 417 N.W.2d at 766: [T]he written claim required by [the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act] notifies a political subdivision concerning possible liability for its relatively recent act or omission, provides an opportunity for the political subdivision to investigate and obtain information about its allegedly tortious conduct, and enables the political subdivision to decide whether to pay the claimant's demand or defend the litigation predicated on the claim made. See, also, West Omaha Inv. v. S.I.D. No. 48, supra ; Campbell v. City of Lincoln, supra . Thus, the Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act affords a governmental subdivision a pre-action opportunity, or a period before commencement of a lawsuit, to examine the merits of a tort claim and possibly avoid the expense, time, and varied but frequent rigors of litigation to dispose of a claim. See Chicago Lumber, supra . Cf. Hill v. Middletown Bd. of Ed., 183 N.J.Super. 36, 443 A.2d 225 (1982) (the purpose of notice under the New Jersey governmental tort claims act is to expedite investigation with the hope of reaching a nonjudicial settlement and to protect accessibility to information about the incident on which the claim is based). Notice Requirement and a Cause of Action. There exists, however, a problem on account of Utsumi v. City of Grand Island, supra , wherein Utsumi's petition failed to allege compliance with the notice requirement of the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. The city filed a demurrer to Utsumi's petition, claiming that the petition did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action against the city. When the demurrer was sustained and Utsumi failed to plead further, the trial court dismissed Utsumi's negligence action against the city. In affirming the dismissal, this court relied on a statement in Sole v. City of Geneva, 106 Neb. 879, 881, 184 N.W. 900 (1921): When a privilege or right is conferred by statute on certain prescribed conditions, and a party desires to avail himself of such privilege or right by bringing action for the enforcement thereof, he must allege and prove all the facts essential to a strict compliance with the prescribed conditions. The foregoing excerpt from Sole is found in Utsumi, supra . The predicament engendered by Utsumi is twofold. First, Sole did not involve a tort claim against a city, but did involve a statutory cause of action for detachment of land from a city pursuant to a special cause of action created by Rev.Stat. § 5090 (1913). Delozier v. Village of Magnet, 104 Neb. 765, 178 N.W. 619 (1920), cited in Utsumi as support for the excerpt from Sole set forth above, also involved the special detachment statute, § 5090, mentioned in Sole. The Sole court quite correctly concluded that since the cause of action existed by statute, one seeking detachment of land by virtue of the statute must fulfill the statutory prescription for detachment. This leads to the second troublesome aspect of Utsumi and its reliance on Sole. As noted, Sole involved a statutorily created cause of action, whereas Utsumi involved a cause of action based on common-law negligence and, therefore, a cause of action which exists independent of any statute. A cause of action is judicial protection of one's recognized right or interest, when another, owing a corresponding duty not to invade or violate such right or interest, has caused a breach of that duty. Sorenson v. Lower Niobrara Nat. Resources Dist., 221 Neb. 180, 193, 376 N.W.2d 539, 548 (1985); First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. State, 230 Neb. 259, 430 N.W.2d 893 (1988); Ravenna Bank v. Custom Unlimited, 223 Neb. 540, 391 N.W.2d 557 (1986); Suhr v. City of Scribner, 207 Neb. 24, 295 N.W.2d 302 (1980). In reference to a petition, a cause of action means a statement of the subject matter on which a plaintiff claims a right to a remedy. Muenchau v. Swarts, 170 Neb. 209, 102 N.W.2d 129 (1960); Schwank v. County of Platte, 152 Neb. 273, 40 N.W.2d 863 (1950); Lincoln Joint Stock Land Bank v. Barnes, 143 Neb. 58, 8 N.W.2d 545 (1943); Zelen v. Domestic Industries, 131 Neb. 123, 267 N.W. 352 (1936); Myers v. Moore, 78 Neb. 448, 110 N.W. 989 (1907). In Chicago Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No. 71, 227 Neb. 355, 370, 417 N.W.2d 757, 767 (1988), we acknowledged that to recover under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act a claimant must prove the four basic elements of negligence, namely, the substantive elements of negligence, which are duty, breach of duty, proximate causation, and damages. See, Rahmig v. Mosley Machinery Co., 226 Neb. 423, 412 N.W.2d 56 (1987) (elements of actionable negligence); Maple v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 384 N.W.2d 254 (1986) (negligence action under Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act; contributory negligence). Courts in several other jurisdictions have recognized that filing or presentment of a claim under a governmental tort claims act is a procedural precedent for commencement of a negligence action against a governmental subdivision and that filing or presentment of a claim is not an element in a negligence cause of action against a governmental entity or body. For example, in Aaron v. City of Tipton, 218 Ind. 227, 32 N.E.2d 88 (1941), the Supreme Court of Indiana explained the purpose of the written notice provision in Indiana's governmental tort claims act. The court's explanation in Aaron coincides with our explanation for the purpose of the notice provision as set forth in Chicago Lumber, supra . The Aaron court concluded that the notice provision did not constitute a condition precedent to the liability of the city or to the accrual of the claimant's right against the city, 218 Ind. at 232, 32 N.E.2d at 90, and then more fully explained the rationale underlying the procedural aspect of a notice provision as a condition precedent to commencement of an action: Our notice statutes do not purport to set up a condition precedent to the liability of the city, but merely establish a procedural step which was necessary to the remedy of bringing an action to enforce the liability. The city may pay such liability without any notice having been given. If two persons were injured in the same accident caused by the same negligence on the part of the city, one claim might be settled by the city and the other contested. The liability of the city might be identical on the two claims. The only necessity of notice on the contested claim is to enable that claimant to institute and maintain his action. The notice does not affect the legal or moral obligation of the city to pay for the damages caused by its negligence. Its only purpose is to enable the city to make a prompt investigation as to its liability. The notice does not affect the right, it affects only a remedy of the injuredthe remedy of instituting and maintaining an action for the collection of the damages. ... Even more clearly is the serving of the notice merely a procedural step in the remedy where the liability is a common-law liability for negligence rather than a statutory liability. 218 Ind. at 235-37, 32 N.E.2d at 91-92. The procedural principle expressed in Aaron, supra, was reexamined and affirmed some 34 years later in Thompson v. City of Aurora, 263 Ind. 187, 325 N.E.2d 839 (1975), when the Indiana Supreme Court considered, and reversed, a directed verdict against Thompsons because they alleged, but failed to prove, that written notice of their claim was given to the city, as required by the Indiana governmental tort claims act. The Thompson court expressed the following: As stated in Aaron, the notice requirement is not an element of a plaintiff's claim of negligence, but rather a procedural precedent which must be performed prior to commencement of the suit. 263 Ind. at 193-94, 325 N.E.2d at 843. The Kansas Supreme Court, in Fuller v. State Highway Comm., 140 Kan. 558, 559, 561, 38 P.2d 99, 99-100 (1934), held that the provision for written notice pursuant to the Kansas governmental tort claims act did not have any relationship to the liability. It is simply something that must be done preliminary to filing suit.... The giving of the notice in our statute is not the establishment of particular conditions. It is merely a preliminary step in the bringing of the action. From the foregoing, it is clear that a negligence action brought under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act has the same elements as a negligence action against a private individual and to recover under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act a claimant must prove the four basic elements of negligence. Chicago Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No. 71, 227 Neb. 355, 370, 417 N.W.2d 757, 767 (1988). See, also, §§ 13-904 and 13-908. See, further, Maple v. City of Omaha, 222 Neb. 293, 384 N.W.2d 254 (1986). For that reason, filing or presentment of a claim under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is neither a condition precedent to a political subdivision's tort liability nor a substantive element for a claimant's recovery in a negligence action against a political subdivision, but, as has been frequently stated by this court, is a condition precedent to commencement of a negligence action against a political subdivision. In retrospect, through Utsumi v. City of Grand Island, 221 Neb. 783, 381 N.W.2d 102 (1986), we elevated the procedural requirement of notice under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act to the level of a substantive element in a negligence action against a political subdivision. Hence, any language in Utsumi which indicates, explicitly or implicitly, that compliance with the Nebraska Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act is a substantive element in a negligence cause of action against a political subdivision is expressly disapproved.