Opinion ID: 1058506
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court's Limitation on the Defendant's Testimony

Text: The defendant complains he was prevented from presenting evidence of his innocence at the penalty phase by virtue of an in limine order. Specifically, the defendant refers to the trial court's ruling regarding his statement given outside the presence of the jury at the beginning of the sentencing phase. During this jury-out hearing, the defendant asserted he was wrongfully convicted. He also stated he did not receive a fair trial due to the admission of improper testimony, which the jury did not disregard. He further alluded to various instances of misconduct by a particular juror and improper removal of evidence from the courtroom by the prosecutor. In response to these statements, the trial court made the following ruling: I'm not going to allow him to testify about the entire case in front of the jury, whether he, if he wants to testify he got a fair trial, or didn't get a fair trial and on all these other statements he wants to make. That may be proper, but I'm not going to allow him to get up there to attack a particular juror, so that's the basis for my decision. The defendant subsequently testified but made no reference to the alleged unfairness of his trial. The defendant has cited no authority indicating a defendant has the right to testify that he did not receive a fair trial and verbally attack jurors. Nor do we find such attacks to be proper residual doubt testimony. Residual doubt evidence generally consists of proof at the sentencing phase indicating the defendant did not commit the offense, notwithstanding the guilty verdict. State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 321, 154 L.Ed.2d 219 (2002); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55-56 (Tenn.2001). Although the defendant had the right to proclaim his innocence, we are unable to conclude that he was prevented from doing so by virtue of the trial court's ruling.