Opinion ID: 2571564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct: Vouching for Witness Credibility

Text: During opening and closing argument at both the guilt and penalty phases, the prosecutor referred to the terms of star witness Bradley Keyes's plea agreement, an agreement that required Keyes to testify truthfully. Bonilla now argues these references constituted impermissible vouching, in violation of his rights to due process and a fair and reliable capital trial. (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, งง 7, 15, 17.) We conclude (1) Bonilla's claims are partially waived, and (2) they in any event fail on the merits because the prosecutor's arguments were no more than permissible comment about inferences the jury could draw from evidence in the record. During his guilt phase opening argument, the prosecutor read the terms of Keyes's plea agreement to the jury. The agreement repeatedly provided it was contingent on Keyes's truthfulness. [7] During guilt phase closing argument, the prosecutor returned to the subject of Keyes's plea agreement and the circumstances under which it was entered. The prosecution had a bird in the hand, Keyes; it had to choose between prosecuting Keyes and letting two birds in the bush, Nichols and Bonilla, off the hook for lack of evidence or making a deal with the devil. But at least you are attempting to bring to justice the persons that are involved in the case, all of them, [ถ] ... [ถ] He is lucky. Brad Keyes is lucky. He ought to be sitting here with these two. He ought to be facing the same charges, but he is not. But the agreement says he has got to testify truthfully, otherwise there is no deal. That is the trade-off. (Italics added.) The prosecutor later recounted Keyes's i initial shifting stories and false statements, then addressed his preliminary hearing testimony: And then when he gets to the preliminary hearing .... [h]e talks. He is consistent with regard to three trips and things that are going on, but what he does reveal now is what really was said during all of those meetings and trips. And they got to cross-examine him about that. And what it really amounted to from his [perspective] is he has got to testify under oath, otherwise his deal doesn't work. It has got to be truthful. [ถ] You know, when he testified in front of Judge Margulies and still at that point still denied, knowing about the plot, but when he gets to the preliminary hearing where now it is crunch time and he resolves in his own mind that he has got to tell the truth, the full truth, he goes that extra step and talks about things that were said. (Italics added.) And later: Once we get into the court and Brad Keyes testifies and they cross-examine the hell out of him, and his story holds up under cross-examination because he was telling the truth about what happened, then we get a shift. (Italics added.) The prosecutor closed his summation by pointing again to Keyes's testimony: There's two theories you can reach for. You can reach first degree murder under a lying in wait or premeditated theory. And they both apply because they are both there. [ถ] And it is clearly, based on what you hear in these tapes and based upon what Brad Keyes said, it is a murder for hire, murder for financial gain. During penalty phase opening argument, the prosecutor again read the terms of Keyes's agreement to the jury, including the fact the prosecutor had personally signed it. [8] Finally, during his closing argument, the prosecutor addressed Keyes's credibility: You know, Keyes lied about his intent [to others outside the courtroom]. There is no question about that, and you heard him testify about that, but [defense counsel] want you to believe ... that Brad Keyes was spoon-fed all this information so that we could elevate this case beyond what it was. [ถ] Well, that is ludicrous, because one of the things they talk about is this issue of cross-examination. You saw the stacks of transcripts from the preliminary hearing, the first trial, and an equal size stack now with respect to all the questions that were asked of Brad Keyes. And we know from everything we have heard in this case there were three trips down there, as he says. [ถ] You know [from] everything we have heard in this case that they went to various different motels, and he was able to remember which ones they went to. You know that there were motel receipts showing where they stayed. We know there were rental cars used, all the records show that. [ถ] The thing he was not filling in were some of the conversations, and he explained to you why. But you got them all on the tapes. They are all in there talking about it, alibis, plans, how we were going to take these businesses over and do all these other kind of stuff, and it is all right there.... [ถ] [Defense counsel] wanted to talk about pieces of paper with respect to Brad Keyes. [ถ] Here is a piece of paper. This is a piece of paper, his agreement. He violates it, it is void. There is no question about that. (Italics added.) To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during argument, a defendant must contemporaneously object and seek a jury admonition. ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 30-31, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 432, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1333, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Bonilla concedes he never objected to any of the instances of alleged vouching during his guilt phase trial. He nevertheless argues these omissions should be excused because (1) the trial court overruled objections two years later, when counsel finally objected during the second penalty phase trial, thereby demonstrating that any objections in the earlier guilt phase would have been futile (see Boyette, at p. 432, 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391), and (2) this case was close (see People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468). We have never expanded the futility exception to encompass a situation where, as here, the defendant made a belated objection after forgoing multiple earlier opportunities to object, and we decline to do so here. As for the close case exception, we soundly repudiated it in the very case Bonilla cites ( id. at pp. 27-34, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, overruling People v. Berryman (1936) 6 Cal.2d 331, 57 P.2d 136), and we decline to resuscitate it here. Accordingly, we hold Bonilla forfeited his guilt phase claims on appeal. We reject Bonilla's guilt and penalty phase claims on the merits as well. It is misconduct for prosecutors to bolster their case by invoking their personal prestige, reputation, or depth of experience, or the prestige or reputation of their office, in support of it. ( People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206-207, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995.) Similarly, it is misconduct to suggest that evidence available to the government, but not before the jury, corroborates the testimony of a witness. ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 593, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492.) The vice of such remarks is that they may be understood by jurors to permit them to avoid independently assessing witness credibility and to rely on the government's view of the evidence. ( Ibid. ) However, these limits do not preclude all comment regarding a witness's credibility. `[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom.' ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 215, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) [S]o long as a prosecutor's assurances regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses are based on the 'facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,' her comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 971, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; accord, Ward, at p. 215, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) The prosecutor's challenged remarks all fall within this wide latitude. The prosecutor read the contents of Keyes's plea agreement during each opening argument, but it was permissible to advise the jury of this information: `[W]hen an accomplice testifies for the prosecution, full disclosure of any agreement affecting the witness is required to ensure that the jury has a complete picture of the factors affecting the witness's credibility.' ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 821, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249, [9] quoting People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 47, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423; accord, People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 971, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) His remaining remarks about Keyes's credibility during his two closing arguments were equally permissible. They fall into three categories: arguments that Keyes should be believed because he had an incentive to tell the truth under the terms of his plea agreement; arguments he should be believed because, despite extensive cross-examination, his preliminary hearing and trial testimony were consistent; and arguments he should be believed because other evidence in the record corroborated his testimony. These were arguments from the evidence, suggesting reasonable inferences the jury could draw that might lead it to credit Keyes's testimony. They did not suggest the prosecutor had personal knowledge of facts outside the record showing Keyes was telling the truth. Nothing in the challenged remarks invited the jury to abdicate its responsibility to independently evaluate for itself whether Brad Keyes should be believed. There was no prosecutorial misconduct.