Opinion ID: 2743726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: delivering cells

Text: The “delivering cells” element appears in each of the asserted ’159 patent claims, as “delivering, to an animal, cells containing a nucleic acid encoding a fluorophore operatively linked to the promoter.” See ’159 patent col. 24 l. 44 - col. 26 l. 12. AntiCancer’s claim charts refer to the Pfizer publication and the publication’s statement that “we generated transgenic mice expressing EGLN1 shRNA.” EGLN1 shRNA denotes the mouse expression of a known genetic trait. The district court observed AntiCancer’s argument to be that it is a basic scientific concept that in order to have a transgenic mouse, cells must have been deliv- ered. In other words, inherent within the state- ment ‘we generated transgenic mice expressing EGLN1 shRNA’ is the concept that cells contain- ing a nucleic acid encoding a fluorophore were de- livered to an animal. Dist. Ct. Op. at 11 n.8. The defendants argued that the Pfizer publication did not show the “delivering cells” element, but merely described the fluorescent mice used by Pfizer. AntiCancer ANTICANCER, INC. v. PFIZER, INC. 23 responded that “[a]lthough the Pfizer Article does not explicitly state that GFP [green fluorescent protein]- labeled cells were delivered, such delivery is so implicit that it needs no statement . . . [because] it could not be done any other way than by ‘delivering cells,’ a basic scientific concept that should be well understood by a company with Pfizer’s expertise.” AntiCancer Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. at 5, AntiCancer (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2012), ECF No. 41. AntiCancer argued that identification of the information in the Pfizer publication by the AntiCancer Preliminary Infringement Contentions and claim charts satisfied the requirements of the Patent Local Rules, for the step of “delivering cells” would be “apparent to a competent scientist, or even a layman.” Id. The district court compared the claim language “delivering, to an animal, cells containing a nucleic acid encoding a fluorophore,” with the language of the Pfizer publication “we generated transgenic mice expressing EGLN1 shRNA,” and stated: As Pfizer correctly notes, the cited sentence does not mention cells. It does not mention delivering cells, fluorophores, or nucleic acids encoding fluorophores to animals. The quoted sentence only re- fers to animals (i.e., ‘transgenic mice’) with a particular genetic trait (i.e., ‘expressing’ a particular gene—‘EGLN1 shRNA’). Dist. Ct. Op. at 10 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The district court concluded that “AntiCancer in no way attempts to make a connection between the sentence provided and the claim language, and the PICs additionally draw no connection between Figure 2 and the relevant claim language.” Id. However, the district court observed that AntiCancer had elaborated on this element in its opposition brief, the court stating: “Essentially, Anticancer argues that because its [sic] common knowledge that GFP comes from jellyfish—not mice—‘the 24 ANTICANCER, INC. v. PFIZER, INC. GFP gene had to have been delivered.’” Dist. Ct. Op. at 11 (quoting AntiCancer Opp’n Mot. Summ. J. at 5). The district court ruled that the Contentions for the “delivering cells” element did not “suppl[y] sufficient information for how Pfizer allegedly practiced this element. . . . cit[ing] to a single sentence from the Pfizer paper as evidence that Pfizer infringed this element.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 10. The court stated that “the connections between the claim language and the ‘evidence of the accused instrumentality’ that AntiCancer makes in its opposition brief need to be set forth in the PICs, even if they are ‘basic scientific concepts’ that are generally known or publicly available.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 11 (citing Linex Techs., Inc. v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 703, 709 (E.D. Tex. 2008)). The district court faulted the Preliminary Infringement Contentions for failing to provide sufficient “evidence” of the accused instrumentalities and “information” about how Pfizer practiced the “delivering cells” element. Dist. Ct. Op. at 10-11. AntiCancer argues that, as precedent has established, the purpose of the Contentions is to outline the theories of infringement and streamline discovery, not to provide proof of infringement. See O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1364 (the Contentions are intended to “crystallize [the infringement] theories . . . so as to prevent the shifting sands approach to claim construction” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We conclude that, in view of AntiCancer’s presentation of the “delivering cells” element at this stage, and applying the law of the Ninth Circuit concerning the standards for fee-shifting, the district court exceeded its discretionary authority in imposing a fee-shifting sanction as a condition of proceeding with the litigation. ANTICANCER, INC. v. PFIZER, INC. 25