Opinion ID: 1159199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Affidavit For Search Warrant Probable Cause.

Text: A search warrant will issue only on a sworn written statement of facts showing probable cause. N.M.R.Crim.P. 17(a), N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp. 1980). Probable cause must be based on substantial evidence. N.M.R.Crim.P. 17(f). The evidence used may be hearsay, provided (1) there is a substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be credible, and (2) there is a substantial basis for believing that there is a factual basis for the information furnished. Id. This is essentially the two-prong test enunciated in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), which was designed to prevent the magistrate from becoming a rubber stamp for law enforcement officers. Where the information is based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant, the magistrate need only determine whether sufficient underlying circumstances exist to support the affiant's belief. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). This is reflected in the requirement of Rule 17 that probable cause be based upon substantial evidence. In State v. James, 91 N.M. 690, 694, 579 P.2d 1257, 1261 (N.M.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 751, 580 P.2d 972 (1978), the court said: Probable cause means a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. It exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers, based on reasonably trustworthy information, is sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. [Citations omitted.] Simply stated, the magistrate, from the verified facts presented to him, must believe that the source is credible and that a factual basis exists for the information furnished. State v. Gutierrez, 91 N.M. 542, 545, 577 P.2d 440, 443 (N.M.Ct.App. 1978). Standards for the determination of probable cause have been stated by this Court in State v. Bowers, 87 N.M. 74, 76, 529 P.2d 300, 302 (N.M.Ct.App. 1974), where it was held that (1) only a probability of criminal conduct need be shown; (2) there need be less vigorous proof than the rules of evidence require to determine guilt of an offense; (3) common sense should control; (4) great deference should be shown by courts to a magistrate's determination of probable cause. [Citations omitted.] In United States v. Ventresca, supra , the United States Supreme Court wrote: [T]he Fourth Amendment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract. If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants, such as the one involved here, must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion.    A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. Id. 380 U.S. at 108, 85 S.Ct. at 746. When reviewing affidavits in support of search warrants, a magistrate, and an appellate court, must consider the affidavit as a whole. State v. Duran, 90 N.M. 741, 568 P.2d 267 (N.M.Ct.App. 1977). All direct and circumstantial evidence alleged, as well as all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those allegations, should be considered. See State v. Luna, 92 N.M. 680, 594 P.2d 340 (N.M.Ct.App. 1979). Accord State v. Bloom, 90 N.M. 192, 561 P.2d 465 (1977); State v. Vigil, 87 N.M. 345, 533 P.2d 578 (1975). A material fact need not be proved by direct evidence. It is sufficient if there is evidence from which the fact can properly be inferred. Dull v. Tellez, 83 N.M. 126, 489 P.2d 406 (1971). As stated in Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 90 N.M. 414, 419, 564 P.2d 619, 624 (N.M.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485 (1977): A reasonable inference is a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning. This conclusion must be a rational and logical deduction from facts admitted and established by the evidence, when those facts are viewed in the light of common experience. [Citations omitted.] See also Gray v. E.J. Longyear Company, 78 N.M. 161, 429 P.2d 359 (1967). In Airco Supply Company v. Albuquerque National Bank, 68 N.M. 195, 200, 360 P.2d 386, 401 (1961), this Court said: [I]nferences may properly be drawn from circumstantial evidence, and    a well connected train of circumstances, as are present in this case, is as cogent of the existence of a fact as any array of direct evidence, and may even outweigh opposing direct testimony. [Citations omitted.] See also Ulibarri v. Village of Los Lunas, 79 N.M. 421, 444 P.2d 606 (1968). With these well-established principles of law in mind, we now inquire into the state of mind of Magistrate Scholl at the time the Affidavit For Search Warrant was presented to him by Officer Allred. Scholl, who is not a lawyer, was charged with examining the affidavit as a whole and determining if the facts and circumstances recited therein, and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, showed probable cause for him to believe that Snedeker obtained or possessed the listed property in a manner which constituted a criminal offense or that the property would be material in a criminal prosecution. The affidavit presented to Scholl by Allred showed that Allred was an agent of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the New Mexico State Police. The facts and circumstances shown in the instrument and some reasonable and obvious inferences that probably influenced Scholl are as follows: Allred was personally conducting an investigation into the purchase of weapons and ammunition by Western New Mexico University; it was a thorough, extensive inquiry; and Allred had obtained copies of University warrants and other supporting documents, including purchase orders, showing the purchase of quantities of ammunition. It may be inferred that he examined those documents and knew which department was shown as the purchaser, the name of the person who had signed the purchase orders and warrants, and the name of the person who had signed the receipts for the deliveries of the property. The records inspected showed that the President of the University had personally ordered and personally received all the listed firearm supplies which included over 12,000 rounds of ammunition for approximately sixteen guns, enough to start a small revolution. These were extraordinarily suspicious circumstances. Allred went to the Safety & Security Department of the University, presumably because it was the department shown on the warrants as the purchaser of the ammunition and other supplies. He was present when an entire inventory of all property belonging to Safety & Security was conducted. (Emphasis added.) This inventory undoubtedly would include all types of guns used by the department, as well as all types of ammunition and reloading equipment, if any. The officer found none of the listed ammunition in the department. Although there were reloading supplies listed on the documents, he found that the University did not reload ammunition. This could be easily determined if no reloading supplies or equipment were found in the inventory. Allred came to the conclusion that the ammunition ordered was far in excess of the amount needed by the department, which seems quite obvious. Knowing that the officer had seen the type of guns used by the department, Scholl could have believed the officer's statement that substantial quantities of this ammunition are for weapons which are not owned by Safety & Security. Furthermore, he was probably suspicious of the sophistication of the weaponry, the number of weapons indicated, the variation in types and sizes, and particularly the rifle slugs for two sizes of shotguns. What possible use could a small college in a small city have for shotguns shooting rifle slugs? Was Scholl to infer from these circumstances that the University was declaring war on Mexico, or that Snedeker was probably issuing false vouchers? Also, Scholl could easily infer from the circumstances of this thorough investigation that the officer had found all pertinent records and had examined them before he stated that none of the ammunition appears to be accounted for from the records of the University. The rest of the allegations in the affidavit are corroborative. The key here is whether Scholl, applying common sense and reasonable caution, had probable cause to think the massive amount of missing munitions indicated that a crime had been committed and that the man who had signed the purchase orders and University checks used to pay for the goods, and who had personally received the goods, must have possession of them. Scholl thought so. His decision is entitled to great deference. Bowers, supra . To hold that this search warrant is invalid would be to compound the toll that is being taken on society and on the integrity of the courts by an absolutist application of the exclusionary rule. Some of our judges have quite obviously been intimidated by the supposed constitutional mandates and have applied loose logic and rubber-stamp reactions when any small item appeared to be wrong. There are items in this affidavit that do not by themselves show probable cause. The warrant is not rendered invalid by the inclusion in the affidavit of some information that is not supported by probable cause. The warrant may nevertheless stand if the remaining allegations demonstrate probable cause. United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.1970). We hold that the affidavit clearly showed probable cause that Snedeker had been making false vouchers. We reverse the Court of Appeals and the trial court.