Opinion ID: 1917642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the circuit court committed error in finding randell's case was barred under the doctrine of res judicata.

Text: ¶ 9. The first case in this trilogy, which was filed in Pearl River County Circuit Court, was styled Steve R. Taylor, both individually and as guardian of the minor, Randell G. Taylor versus General Motors Corporation, Donald S. Taylor and Allstate Insurance Company, and was assigned cause number 96-0174 on the docket of that court. On April 7, 1997, Judge Prichard entered an Order Denying Motion for Admission to Practice Pro Hac Vice, [5] and on the same date, Judge Prichard likewise entered an Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Donald S. Taylor, because of the plaintiff's failure to obtain Rule 4 process upon Donald. [6] More specifically the circuit judge found that Steve had failed to effect proper process upon Donald within the required 120 days as set out in Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(h). While the dismissal order did not contain the language with prejudice or without prejudice, the clear language of Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(h) states that such dismissal shall be without prejudice. ¶ 10. It is clear as to what the issue was in Taylor I. We find the following language in Taylor I: Due to [the lawyer's] rejected affidavit, the trial court denied him admission to practice before the court in the instant matter and entered an order dismissing the complaint and cause of action. It is from this dismissal that Taylor appeals to this Court asserting the following issue: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF TAYLOR'S CAUSE OF ACTION, AS A PENALTY FOR HIS OUT-OF-STATE ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO SUBMIT A PROPER AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO APPEAR PRO HAC VICE, IS AN INAPPROPRIATELY EXTREME AND HARSH SANCTION WHEN TAYLOR IS REPRESENTED BY TWO DULY LICENSED MISSISSIPPI ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE PROPERLY ENTERED AN APPEARANCE IN THE CASE. 717 So.2d at 748. ¶ 11. On September 8, 1997, while Taylor I was pending on appeal before this Court, Steve and Donald filed in this Court a document entitled Stipulation of Dismissal of Appellee, Donald S. Taylor [M.R.A.P. 42(b)]. The stipulation was signed by the attorneys for Steve and Donald and stated in pertinent part: COMES NOW the Appellant, Steve R. Taylor, and Appellee, Donald S. Taylor, and under M.R.A.P. 42(b) files this Stipulation to Dismiss Appellee, Donald S. Taylor, with prejudice, and costs being assessed to the Appellant. WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant, Steve R. Taylor, and Appellee, Donald S. Taylor jointly move the Court to dismiss the Appeal, as pertains to this Appellee, and assess all costs to the Appellant. (emphasis added). M.R.A.P. 42 provides the procedure for dismissing a party from an appeal: (b) Dismissal in the Appellate Court. After the appeal has been docketed with the clerk of the Supreme Court, an appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the Supreme Court or, if the case has been assigned to the Court of Appeals, by the Court of Appeals. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding or their attorneys agree that the proceeding be dismissed, they may file a joint motion to dismiss specifying the terms as to the payment of costs and that all fees have been paid. (emphasis added). ¶ 12. Pursuant to the filing of this Stipulation, this Court entered the following Order, dated December 8, 1997, and filed on December 12, 1997: This matter came before a panel of this Court consisting of Prather, P.J., Pittman and McRae, JJ., on motion of appellee Donald Taylor to be dismissed from the appeal of this matter. Appellant has joined in the motion and the remaining appellees have filed no objection. [7] The Court finds that the motion should be granted. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss be and is granted and that appellee Donald Taylor shall be dismissed as a party to this appeal upon entry of this order. Although this Court, in its order dismissing Donald as a party to the appeal, did not indicate the dismissal was with prejudice, the stipulation clearly stated the parties agreed to dismiss Donald with prejudice. Therefore, pursuant to M.R.A.P. 42(b), the appeal was dismissed on the motion of the parties pursuant to the terms agreed upon in their stipulation. Those terms specifically included the dismissal of Donald from the appeal with prejudice. ¶ 13. With Donald no longer a party to the appeal in Taylor I, this Court, in due course, issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the circuit court, and concluded by stating: Therefore, the lower court's decision to dismiss this case is affirmed. However, the dismissal is without prejudice as to the claim of Taylor's minor son, against whom the statute of limitations, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995), does not begin to run until the son attains his twenty first birthday. The minor's claim remains viable for this time period should a determination be made to pursue the same. 717 So.2d at 750. ¶ 14. That is all well and good as to Randell's claims remaining viable under the savings clause, Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-59 (1995). But Randell's claims could only be asserted as to those parties who might have potential liability. A party, who has been dismissed, with prejudice, such as Donald, has no further liability as to Steve or Randell as a result of the cause of action which accrued on July 22, 1993. Otherwise, what does the phrase dismissal with prejudice mean? ¶ 15. Steve Taylor appeared in the first lawsuit as next friend of Randell Taylor as authorized by Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(c). Once a minor, through competent representative and legal counsel has filed suit, he is bound by the actions of his representatives. A parent appearing as next friend has authority under Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(c) to enter into a stipulation, subject to approval by the court, which approval was given. As Steve and Randell have never denied the stipulation, or attacked it for fraud, mistake, accident or misrepresentation by an adverse party (Miss. R. Civ. P. 60), then Steve and Randell are stating to the Court that the stipulation was knowingly, correctly, knowledgeably entered into by a competent Mississippi counsel for Steve and Randell. ¶ 16. The effect of a consent judgment or decree has been addressed by this Court in holding that a consent judgment acquires the incidents of and will be given the same force and effect as, judgment rendered after litigation. Guthrie v. Guthrie, 233 Miss. 550, 556-57, 102 So.2d 381, 383 (1958). In addition, consent judgments receive the same force as regular judgments, in binding parties under collateral estoppel and res judicata. Id. ¶ 17. Mississippi law on res judicata is well established. Generally, four identities are required to establish collateral estoppel, as well as res judicata: identity of the subject matter of the action, identity of the cause of action, identity of the parties to the cause of action, and identity of the equality or character of person against whom the claim is made. Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper & Assocs., Inc., 422 So.2d 749, 751 (Miss.1982). ¶ 18. This third suit is based on the same accident as the earlier suit, by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, seeking the same relief for the same injuries in the same court. The only difference is that Randell Taylor is no longer a minor and has brought this suit on his own behalf. Donald has long ago been dismissed from this cause of action with prejudice. As Donald's counsel so ably inquired in his brief, Can the Appellant be faced with his signed Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice and contend he is not bound by the strongest words in legal practice? ¶ 19. The circuit court did not err in dismissing the suit by Randell based on res judicata.