Opinion ID: 2379697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substantive Due Process and Taking of Property

Text: We find no merit in Good Samaritan's argument that the podiatry statute constitutes an impermissible taking of the hospital's incorporeal rights, internal management and property in violation of the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. [6] It is true, of course, that the State cannot, under the guise of exercising its police power, take private property for public use without payment of just compensation. Md.-Nat'l Cap. P. & P. Comm'n v. Chadwick, 286 Md. 1, 405 A.2d 241 (1979). For government restriction upon the use of property to constitute a taking in the constitutional sense, so that compensation must be paid, the restriction must be such that it essentially deprives the owner of all beneficial uses of the property. Governor v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 436-37, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), aff'd 437 U.S. 117, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978). In this regard, the restriction imposed must be such that the property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose, and it is not enough to show that the action results in substantial loss or hardship. Id. at 437, 370 A.2d 1102 and cases there cited. Of course, a fair exercise of the police power requires a public purpose and means which bear a real and substantial relation to public health, morals, safety and welfare of the citizens of the State. Edgewood Nursing Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 384 A.2d 748 (1978); Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975). We have consistently upheld regulatory statutes which may have, as an incidental effect, the diminution of value of property. Chadwick, 286 Md. at 9, 405 A.2d 241, and cases there cited. We noted in that case that a regulation which prohibits a beneficial use of private property constitutes a fair exercise of the police power if the public interest generally requires it and the regulation is reasonably necessary to achieve the public goal without being arbitrary, capricious or unduly oppressive. Id. at 9, 405 A.2d 241. See also PSC v. Highfield Water Co., 293 Md. 1, 441 A.2d 1031 (1982). As we stated in Governor v. Exxon Corp., supra, 279 Md. at 424, 370 A.2d 1102, the Court's function is very limited when it reviews regulatory legislation alleged to be violative of the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. We observed in that case, with abundant citation of authority, that the wisdom or expediency of a law adopted in the exercise of the police power is not subject to judicial review, and such a statute will not be held void if there are any considerations relating to the public welfare by which it can be supported. Moreover, a statute enacted by the legislature in the exercise of the police power is presumed to be valid, so that if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain the constitutionality of the statute, the existence of that state of facts as a basis for the passage of the law must be assumed. Edgewood Nursing Home, supra, 282 Md. at 427, 384 A.2d 748. Therefore, one attacking the statute's validity has the burden of affirmatively and clearly establishing its invalidity. Salisbury Beauty Schools v. St. Bd., 268 Md. 32, 300 A.2d 367 (1973). The podiatry statute's purpose, plainly evident from its provisions, is to insure that a full range of foot care services offered by qualified podiatrists will be available to the public in hospitals throughout the State. The legislature could have recognized, as the evidence tended to demonstrate in this case, that only a sterile hospital environment affords adequate health safeguards, at least in some types of podiatric cases. It could have concluded that, absent legislation, hospitals would continue to deny podiatrists access to staff privileges in contravention of the public interest. Or, the legislature could have enacted the podiatry statute to promote economic competition between podiatrists and physicians in order to reduce patient costs. Attributing any one of these reasons to the legislature is plainly sufficient to sustain the statute against the hospital's due process challenge. Notwithstanding Good Samaritan's protests that the podiatry statute has declared a forfeiture of its property and changed the very nature of the hospital, we hold that nothing in the statute even remotely resembles a taking in the constitutional sense. Quite simply, Good Samaritan has failed affirmatively to prove its substantive due process contentions in this case.