Opinion ID: 1924533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before we reach the merits, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. Appellees argue that we do not because, they assert, the notice of appeal was untimely. They reason that because the injunction that appellants challenge was entered via the court's order of August 15, 2005, to be timely under D.C.App. R. 4, the notice of appeal had to be filed within 30 days of that date. [6] We should dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, appellees urge, because appellants did not file their notice of appeal until December 21, 2005, long after the 30-plus days allowed for appeal had elapsed. Appellees rely on Robinson v. Evans, 554 A.2d 332, 335 (D.C.1989) (the prescribed time limits for noting an appeal are mandatory and jurisdictional. If the notice of appeal is not timely filed, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to hear the case, and the appeal must be dismissed.). As appellees note, D.C.Code §§ 11-721(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), and (a)(2)(C) (2001) give this court jurisdiction to review not only final judgments of the Superior Court, but also injunctions and interlocutory orders changing or affecting the possession of property. Id. Thus, as appellees assert, the trial court's August 15, 2005 order rejecting appellants' adverse possession claim as to the rear 25 feet of Lot 865, and enjoining appellants from parking there, was immediately appealable to this court. See District of Columbia v. Eastern Trans-Waste of Md., Inc., 758 A.2d 1, 8 (D.C.2000) (trial court order granting partial summary judgment on one count of a multi-count complaint held appealable because it granted plaintiff's request for injunctive relief, regardless of whether all the issues in the case had been finally adjudicated). Appellees incorrectly reason, however, that because the Trustees could have appealed as of August 15, 2005, they were required to appeal within 30 days of that date or else forfeit their right to appeal as to the matters addressed in the August 15 order. This issue appears to be a question of first impression in our jurisdiction, but numerous federal courts have addressed it in applying 28 U.S.C. § 1292, which, we have recognized, is the federal counterpart to D.C.Code § 11-721. See Hagner Management Corp. v. Lawson, 534 A.2d 343, 345 (D.C.1987) (analyzing whether an order was appealable under section 11-721, and noting that this court had adopted a test established by the Supreme Court for deciding the appealability of orders under the corresponding federal statute governing interlocutory appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1292). When one of our procedural rules is nearly identical to or the functional equivalent of a federal procedural rule, we look to cases interpreting the federal rule for guidance on how to interpret our own. Id.; see also Williams v. United States, 878 A.2d 477, 480 (D.C.2005) and Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 292 n. 3 (D.C. 2000). Federal courts that have addressed the issue appear to be unanimous in holding that an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) is permissive, not mandatory, and that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order granting or denying an injunction may appeal immediately, or may wait and raise issues presented by the interlocutory order in an appeal from the final order disposing of a case. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Prudential Securities, Inc. v. Yingling, 226 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir.2000)) (Interlocutory appeal of a permanent injunction is not mandatory, as the order remains part of the case and merges with the final judgment, from which an appeal can then be taken.); In re Frontier Props., Inc., 979 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.1992) ([W]e have never held that failure to appeal an interlocutory order barred raising the decided issue after entry of a final judgment. Rather, where an issue is determined in an interlocutory order and later incorporated into a final order, the determination of the original issue is appealable upon an appeal of the final order, thereby providing the district court with an ultimate review on all the combined issues.) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Clark v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 924 F.2d 550, 553 (4th Cir.1991) (Although appeals are available under § 1292(a)(1) as a matter of right, failure to take an available appeal does not of itself waive the right to secure review, on appeal from final judgment, of matters that could have been appealed but were not.) (citation omitted); Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 756 n. 9 (5th Cir.1988) (interlocutory appeal is permissive, not mandatory, and a party does not forfeit right to appeal after judgment by failing to bring an interlocutory appeal); McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n. 7 (8th Cir.1987) (failure immediately to appeal the rejection of a qualified-immunity defense does not bar raising it on appeal after trial); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir.1978) (failure to take an authorized appeal from an interlocutory order . . . does not preclude raising the question on appeal from the final judgment); see generally 19 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 203.32[2][a], at p. 97-98 (3d ed.2006) (interlocutory appeal is permissive, not mandatory, and a party does not forfeit a right to appeal after judgment for failure to appeal interlocutorily). As these courts have reasoned, judicial economy is served by the consolidation of as many issues in a lawsuit as possible in a single appeal. That is why it is almost never mandatory to file an interlocutory appeal in order to preserve an issue for appellate review. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 626. [7] Given the apparently uniform interpretation by the federal appellate courts that an appeal of an injunction interlocutorily is permissive rather than mandatory, and in light of this court's substantial caseload of appeals, we reject the suggestion that a party must appeal an interlocutory injunction within 30 days after the injunction is entered, if at all. We hold, rather, that a party adversely affected by an interlocutory injunction may await the court's final judgment before appealingenabling the party to determine whether he is satisfied with the overall result, and possibly rendering an appeal unnecessary. The remaining issue pertinent to jurisdiction is whether the August 16, 2005 order was an interlocutory order, or instead a final order that triggered the running of the 30-day appeal period. To be final for appeal purposes under D.C.Code § 11-721(a)(1), a trial court order must dispose[] of the entire case as to all parties and all claims on the merits. McAteer v. Lauterbach, 908 A.2d 1168, 1169 n. 1 (D.C.2006). The August 16, 2005 order did not do that. Although the court ruled fully on the merits of defendants' adverse possession claims as to the 9-foot and 25-foot portions of the North 34 feet of Lot 865, there remained plaintiffs' claim that the defendants tortiously interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their easement and plaintiffs' claim against the Estate for negligent misrepresentation. Those claims were not resolved until December 1, 2005, when the parties stipulated to dismissal of all remaining claims and the court entered an order dismissing the case from its docket. Thus, even accepting appellees' argument that the court's December 16, 2005 order of dismissal was nugatory because the plaintiffs and Patterson's claims were already previously dismissed by [the December 1] Stipulation of Dismissal pursuant to [Super. Ct. Civ. R.] 41(a)(1)(ii), there was no final order before December 1, 2005. [8] Cf. United States v. Crescent City EMS, No. 91-4150, 1994 WL 518171, at , 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13504, at  (D.La. Sep. 20, 1994) (Once the . . . case is dismissed . . . upon stipulation of dismissal . . . all interlocutory orders become final and subject to review on appeal), aff'd sub nom. Fed. Recovery Servs. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447 (5th Cir.1995). Accordingly, we agree with appellants that their notice of appeal filed December 21, 2005, was timely, and that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits.