Opinion ID: 1299978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Abduction for Pecuniary Benefit?

Text: Cortner was convicted of abduction for pecuniary benefit under Code § 18.2-48, which states in pertinent part: Abduction with the intent to extort money, or pecuniary benefit ... shall be a Class 2 felony. A Class 2 felony carries a penalty of imprisonment for life or for any term not less than twenty years. Code § 18.2-10. Cortner tendered to the jury, and the court refused, his instruction pertaining to abduction and kidnapping derived from Code § 18.2-47. [1] Code § 18.2-47 is a less severe charge of abduction and kidnapping, calling for Class 5 felony punishment of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years or confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $1,000, either or both. Code § 18.2-10. Cortner argues on appeal that there was absolutely no evidence presented at trial to show that there was any intention or plan to take a hostage for the purpose of gaining any kind of benefit, but only as a means of escape, and that there was no pecuniary benefit as contemplated in Code § 18.2-48. We disagree. The statutory language with the intent to extort money, or pecuniary benefit has been with us for many years. [2] We first construed the language in Kent v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 840, 183 S.E. 177 (1936). In that case the defendant contended he could not be convicted because the evidence failed to show any intent on his part to extort money or pecuniary benefit. There we said: The evidence shows that Mrs. Hastings was pressing the accused for the payment of money he owed her, and she was induced to accompany him to Washington on the occasion referred to upon the assurance that if she would do so he would obtain the money from a relative living there and pay her. The evidence also plainly shows that accused expected to obtain the possession of Blue Ridge Springs and otherwise benefit financially, if he could get Mrs. Hastings out of the way. That she was murdered soon after leaving Blue Ridge Springs in company with accused is beyond question. After careful consideration of the record, we think the evidence shows that the accused took Mrs. Hastings with him under such circumstances as amount to fraud and coercion on his part, and for the purpose of pecuniary benefit, and the same is, therefore, sufficient to sustain a conviction under the statute. 165 Va. at 841-42, 183 S.E. at 177-78. Some years later, this holding was reaffirmed in Krummert v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 581, 584, 43 S.E.2d 831, 832-33 (1947), where we said: Intent to extort some pecuniary benefit is also enough. The appellant makes but one claim, and that is that he received no pecuniary benefit; in short, that no money passed or was demanded. By `pecuniary benefits' is meant not only money, but everything that can be valued in money, ... [Citations omitted.] .... In this case this defendant sought free transportation to Washington. It costs money to ride from Richmond to Washington by public conveyance. Moreover, he took over Abernathy's automobile. We agree with the trial court's decision refusing Cortner's motion to strike the evidence on the abduction charge for pecuniary benefit. By using Mitchell as a shield and by threatening to blow him away, Cortner and Chears safely left the scene of the robbery with the stolen money and drugs. Thus, they acted with intent to extort or acquire pecuniary benefit for themselves. Tangentially, the defendant contends that the jury should have considered the lesser charge implied in Code § 18.2-47, and to that end he tendered Instruction No. D-1. [3] The trial court correctly refused that instruction because there was no evidence to support the lesser charge. See Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 811, 814, 214 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1978), and Wooden v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 629, 159 S.E.2d 623 (1968). Further, the tendered instruction was not properly framed because it totally ignored the possible finding of guilt under Code § 18.2-48. We therefore hold that the kidnapping of the hostage, Scott Mitchell, under the circumstances of this case was for pecuniary benefit within the meaning of Code § 18.2-48.