Opinion ID: 1399654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Courtroom Presence

Text: Epperson asserts that it was error to allow the son of the victims, who was also the Jackson County Circuit Clerk, to remain in the courtroom throughout the guilt phase and then become a rebuttal witness. He also challenges the right of Morris to sit at the prosecutor's table during the penalty phase. KRE 615 provides in part that [a]t the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and it may make the order on its own motion. As in Smith v. Miller, 127 S.W.3d 644 (Ky.2004), we acknowledge that the purpose of the rule is to ensure the integrity of the trial by denying the witness an opportunity to alter testimony in the light of that presented by other witnesses. Smith, supra, also recognizes that the separation of witness rule gives the trial judge broad discretion to permit or refuse a witness permission to testify when the rule is violated. The automatic exclusion of a witness from testifying who was in the courtroom during the testimony of another witness can be an abuse of discretion. Smith. The record does not reflect that the rule concerning separation of witnesses was specifically invoked. Further, the mere fact that Morris was present in the courtroom after he testified as the first witness for the prosecution, did not amount to a violation of KRE 615. There was no objection to either the initial testimony or that on recall. A review of the record indicates that no other witness who testified recounted the same facts as did Morris when he testified on recall. There was no error in allowing the witness to sit at the prosecutor's table during the penalty phase. See Brewster v. Commonwealth, 568 S.W.2d 232 (Ky.1978); KRE 615(3).