Opinion ID: 2383835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Decision to Vacate Its Entry of Judgment in May 2000

Text: Appellants contend that the order of judgment entered on May 8, 2000 was correctly filed and docketed, and hence, the appellees' June 12, 2000, renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law was untimely. They assert that the trial court had no authority under Super. Ct. Civ. Rules 58 and 50(b) to vacate a properly entered order; therefore, the court erred in disturbing the May 8, 2000 judgment and should not have vacated $175,000 of the compensatory damages award to J. Tolson. Appellees contend that the May judgment contained numerous clerical errors, such as, placing the burden of paying the judgment on Officer Paul Kurgan instead of the District of Columbia, misspelling J. Tolson's name, and indicating, plaintiffs take nothing instead of the correct statement, that Alesia and Dyani Tolson take nothing. Thus, they maintain that the court was within its authority to vacate the judgment to correct clerical errors pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(a). They contend that the trial court intended to hear oral argument on outstanding motions before entering judgment. And in the alternative they maintain that their motion to vacate the May 2000 entry of judgment was properly granted under the doctrine of `unique circumstances.' D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001) specifies that [w]hen the issues of fact were tried by jury, the court shall review the case only as to matters of law. See District of Columbia v. Harris, 770 A.2d 82, 89 (D.C.2001). Legal questions are reviewed de novo. See Perkins v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 813 A.2d 206, 215 (D.C.2002). Our review of the trial court's May entry of judgment, and its subsequent decision to vacate that judgment, requires us to focus initially on Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58 and 50(b), which provide in pertinent part: Rule 58. Entry of judgment. Subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b): (1) Upon a general verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by the Court that a party shall recover only a sum certain or costs or that all relief shall be denied, the Clerk, unless the Court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction by the Court.... Rule 50 (b). Renewing motion for judgment after trial; alternative motion for new trial. If, for any reason, the Court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the Court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the Court's later deciding legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgmentand may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule 59.... Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58 specifies that the Clerk, unless the Court otherwise orders, shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment without awaiting any direction by the Court.... (Emphasis added.) The critical language applicable to this case is, unless the Court otherwise orders. During the May 26, 2000 hearing, the trial judge explained that she had deferred ruling on what was really a motion pursuant to [Super. Ct. Civ. R.] 50 [judgment as a matter of law] at the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case that was renewed at the end of the trial. She added: And following the verdict in favor of Plaintiffs Antonio and Jer[r]od Tolson, I set a hearing on that motion, and I subsequently issued an order directing the parties to submit memoranda of law on the issue of the appropriateness of sending the question of punitive damages to the jury.... By issuing that order, the trial court undoubtedly decided not to enter judgment on the jury's verdict until appellees' motion for judgment as a matter of law could be resolved. Indeed, as the trial judge stated at the May 26 hearing: Without my knowledge, and without my having made a decision to do so, a judgment had been issued earlier.... I vacated that immediately [upon receiving appellees motion to vacate the May 2000 judgment] because it was not my plan to issue a judgment at that time because I had not ruled on this motion which I had deferred ruling on. That was a matter of miscommunication between me and the clerk.... Thus, contrary to appellants' argument, the trial court did not violate Rule 58 because, as authorized by the words unless the Court otherwise orders, the trial judge in this case had ordered that the punitive damages issue, as well as the deferred motions regarding judgment as a matter of law were to be resolved prior to entry of judgment. Nor did the trial court violate Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50. The plain language in that rule contemplates the possibility that the trial court will not rule on a motion for judgment as a matter of law until after the jury verdict: If, for any reason the Court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence, the Court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the Court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(b). This interpretation is consistent with that pertaining to identical Fed.R.Civ.P. 50 which is persuasive authority in interpreting the local rule. Vale Props., Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431 A.2d 11, 14 n. 3 (D.C.1981). The Seventh Circuit has held that a court may expressly reserve decision on a motion for directed verdict. Shaw v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 249 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir.1957) (citing Karnowski v. Skelly Oil Co., 174 F.2d 770, 773 (10th Cir.1949); Western Union Tel. Co., v. Dismang, 106 F.2d 362, 364 (10th Cir.1939)). And, the Second Circuit has recommended that trial courts reserve their decisions on such motions. See Fratta v. Grace Line, Inc., 139 F.2d 743, 744 (2nd Cir.1943). This recommendation is made, not only for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary delay, but also to provide a procedure which gives the trial judge adequate opportunity to scrutinize the record and make informed rulings. See Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 658-60, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636 (1935); Shaw v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 249 F.2d 434, 437 (7th Cir.1957). Here the trial court explicitly stated each time the District moved for a directed verdict that it would consider the motions at the end of the trial, and even after the jury had returned with its verdict, the court declared that it would, rule on the motion for directed verdict at a later date and set a hearing for May 18[th], 2000, on the motion. The trial court exercised its discretion to delay ruling on the District's motions, an action consistent with Karnowski, supra . Furthermore, as appellees argue, the trial court had authority to vacate the May 8, 2000 entry of judgment under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(a) because of the clerical errors in that order. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(a) (Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative....). In sum, the trial court had the authority to vacate the May 8, 2000 order of judgment. We now address the timeliness of the appellees' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50 and 59, a motion to alter or amend judgment must be filed within 10 days of the entry of judgment, and a judge has no authority to decide untimely motions. See D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 42 (D.C.1988). Nor may the judge extend the deadline for filing a Rule 50 or 59 motion. Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 251 U.S.App. D.C. 82, 88, 781 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C.Cir.1986); Derrington-Bey v. District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, 309 U.S.App. D.C. 132, 133, 39 F.3d 1224, 1225 (D.C.Cir.1994). Here, at the end of the hearing on May 26, 2000, pertaining to the emergency motion to vacate the May 8, 2000 order of judgment, the trial court stated: We will issue a judgment now. The court clerk's memorandum log in the record before us shows an entry on June 8, 2000 which states: Judgment order filed. No corresponding written judgment appears in the record. However, the record contains an order of judgment signed on June 25, 2000 and docketed on July 3, 2000, which reflects the jury's verdict. The appellees re-filed their renewed motion on July 10, 2000. Thus, as the trial court concluded in denying plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' renewed motion, Defendant's post-trial motion filed on June 12, 2000 ... and re-filed on July 10, 2000, is ... timely, having been filed within ten days after entry of the Judgment. In light of our conclusion that the District's renewed motion was timely, we do not address the District's alternative argument based on the doctrine of `unique circumstances.'