Opinion ID: 1160324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: construction of deprived

Text: For the guidance of the trial court in the event of retrial, we consider a final issue of statutory interpretation. Subdivision (b)(2) of section 789.3 measures the penalties to be assessed for every day in which the tenant is deprived of utility service. Numerous circumstances may attend the landlord's interruption of utility services. When may it fairly be said that the tenant is deprived of such service? (10) Because the statute is penal, we adopt the narrowest construction of its penalty clause to which it is reasonably susceptible in the light of its legislative purpose. ( Keeler v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 619, 631 [87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617, 40 A.L.R.3d 420]; Walsh v. Dept. Alcoholic Bev. Control (1963) 59 Cal.2d 757, 764 [31 Cal. Rptr. 297, 382 P.2d 337]; see Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 488 [134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081]; but see Pen. Code, § 4; People v. Van Alstyne (1975) 46 Cal. App.3d 900, 912, fn. 10 [121 Cal. Rptr. 363], cert. den. (1976) 423 U.S. 1060 [46 L.Ed.2d 652, 96 S.Ct. 798]; cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc. (1973) 411 U.S. 356, 374-375 [36 L.Ed.2d 318, 332-333, 93 S.Ct. 1652].) Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1961) defines deprive as: (2) a. to take something away from: ... (3) to keep from the possession, enjoyment or use of something. It seems clear that the landlord takes [utility services] ... away from a tenant when he interrupts those services. It is not as clear, however, under what circumstances the landlord may be deemed to be keep[ing] [the tenant] from the possession, enjoyment or use of utilities. We think the connotation of the term, in its common usage, is that one who deprives another of something must be capable of preventing the latter from having access to it. Thus, if a person is without any reasonable, practical means of obtaining the thing withheld, and therefore is insulated from its benefits, he may be considered deprived. We therefore conclude that, within the context of the issue herein presented, statutory penalties accrue so long, but only so long, as the tenant lacks practical access to any residential utility because the landlord has terminated service. If, for example, the tenant actually succeeds in restoring service, or, by reasonable effort, could have done so, he cannot thereafter be considered to have been deprived of it. Moreover, if the tenant abandons the premises permanently for other lodging, or, for reasons unrelated to the utility termination, is absent for substantial periods so as to suggest that he has established another residence during such period, the landlord's conduct can hardly be said to have deprived the tenant of service at premises which the tenant is us[ing] as his residence. (See § 789.3, subd. (a).) Finally, of course, once the tenant has been lawfully evicted or barred from possession by legal process no statutory purpose would be served by the continued accrual of the daily penalty. Here, the record demonstrates that water and electricity to plaintiff's trailer were disconnected by the landlord, and that no service was available from May 26, 1975, to November 14, 1975. Defendant testified that, in disconnecting the electricity, he removed a special adapter without which it was not possible for a trailer to plug in to the park's power supply. Defendant further declared that his own well was the source of the trailer park's water supply, and that he shut off and capped the pipe leading to plaintiff's trailer. We must therefore conclude as a matter of law, that, under these particular circumstances, plaintiff had no reasonable means of restoring service on his own initiative. The record does not disclose how many days plaintiff was actually residing in the premises during the period in question. Plaintiff testified, at one point, that from June 1975 on he resided more or less constantly with his sister because the utility termination made the trailer unlivable. At another point in his testimony he suggested that he continued living in the mobile home until August, when, after defendant had removed its tires, an earthquake knocked it over. Plaintiff's sister testified that he continued to live in the vehicle, and that she visited him there often. The trial court made no findings as to the frequency, duration and causes of plaintiff's absences from his mobile home. On any retrial, the court should, in the course of determining a proper penalty under the circumstances of this case, consider the extent to which plaintiff was deprived of utility service. We, of course, possess neither the power nor the inclination to attempt to amend a legislative enactment, our responsibility being limited to determining the statute's meaning and validity. Any appropriate changes rest exclusively in legislative hands. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for retrial on the issue of the appropriate penalty only, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.