Opinion ID: 447925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rico and double jeopardy

Text: 34 The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... U.S. Const. amend. V. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects a person not only against being twice convicted of the same offense, but also against being twice put to trial for the same offense. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). Therefore, we must dismiss the Florida indictment if we find that the indictment charges the appellants with the same offenses for which they previously were prosecuted in New York. 6 35 Our task is made more difficult by the peculiar nature of the RICO statute. The subsection of RICO that the appellants are charged with violating and conspiring to violate, 7 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c), provides: 36 (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. 37 Unlike most criminal statutes, subsection 1962(c) deals not with clearly distinguishable discrete acts, but with ongoing criminal activity. At the same time, subsection 1962(c) differs from most other criminal statutes dealing with ongoing criminal activity. Such statutes generally prohibit participation in a particular kind of criminal venture. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955 (Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.); 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848 (Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which may be up to life imprisonment....). Thus, under such statutes, a potential double jeopardy problem arises whenever a defendant is charged twice with participating in the same criminal venture during the same period of time. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69-74, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2181-84, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (defendant may be prosecuted only once under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955 for participating in an illegal gambling business during given period of time, even if the illegal gambling business violated more than one criminal statute). 38 Subsection 1962(c), on the other hand, prohibits participation in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. The pattern of racketeering activity is a separate element of the RICO offense, distinct from both the existence of the enterprise and the participation of the individual in the enterprise. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982). 8 Because of this separate element, an individual may be prosecuted for more than one violation of subsection 1962(c) in connection with the same enterprise, so long as each violation involved a different pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27, 33 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1273, 79 L.Ed.2d 678 (1984); United States v. Dean, 647 F.2d 779, 787 (8th Cir.1981), modified on other grounds, 667 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.) en banc, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006, 102 S.Ct. 2296, 73 L.Ed.2d 1300 (1982). 39 The crucial inquiry in this case, therefore, is whether the activities set out in the New York and Florida indictments constitute one pattern of racketeering activity or two different pattern[s]. 9 Although we have not conducted this kind of inquiry before, we do not write on an entirely clean slate. Both the Eighth Circuit, in Dean, and the Second Circuit, in Russotti, addressed double jeopardy claims raised by defendants who had been charged with multiple RICO violations. 10 The Dean and Russotti courts considered the following five factors in determining whether the indictments charged the existence of one pattern of racketeering activity or two different pattern[s]: 40 (1) whether the activities that allegedly constituted two different RICO pattern[s] occurred during the same time periods; 41 (2) whether the activities occurred in the same places; 42 (3) whether the activities involved the same persons; 43 (4) whether the two indictments alleged violations of the same criminal statutes; and 44 (5) whether the overall nature and scope of the activities set out in the two indictments were the same. 45 See Russotti, 717 F.2d at 33; Dean, 647 F.2d at 788. These five factors are modified versions of the factors long used to determine whether multiple indictments charge the existence of one or several conspiracies. See United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir.1978); Arnold v. United States, 336 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 1348, 14 L.Ed.2d 275 (1965); Short v. United States, 91 F.2d 614, 619-20 (4th Cir.1937). 11 46 We are persuaded that these five factors constitute an appropriate method for determining whether multiple RICO indictments allege the existence of one pattern of racketeering activity or several pattern[s]. In this regard, we agree with the following observations of the Dean court: 47 A RICO charge focusses upon the pattern formed by a number of unlawful acts, while a conspiracy charge focusses upon the agreement formed by persons to do unlawful acts. Thus, a RICO charge, like a conspiracy charge, focusses upon a relation between various elements of criminal activity rather than a single criminal act. Determination in a given case of the number of patterns or agreements requires examination of the four corners of the charges. The cases have employed five factors to make this determination in conspiracy cases, and similar factors appear to us relevant in the RICO context.... 48 647 F.2d at 788; see Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Fordham L.Rev. 165, 257-259 (1980) (The practical approach to multiple conspiracy indictments should affect cases involving separate section 1962(c) indictments.). 12 We also agree with the Russotti court that the fifth factor, which involves a comparison of the overall nature and scope of the activities set out in the two indictments, is the most important factor. See Russotti, 717 F.2d at 34. We therefore proceed to apply the five factors to the indictments involved in this case. 49 Applying the first factor, we find a significant overlap in the time periods covered by the two indictments. The New York indictment included activities that occurred between 1974 and July, 1982, and the Florida indictment included activities that occurred between March, 1979, and November, 1981. Thus, the time period covered by the Florida indictment fits completely within the time period covered by the New York indictment. 50 The second and third factors, however, involve only minor overlaps. The activities set out in the two indictments generally occurred in different places. The activities in the New York indictment primarily occurred in New York and New Jersey, and the activities in the Florida indictment primarily occurred in Florida. The only geographic overlap is created by the reference in both indictments to the conspiracy to rob the Landmark Union Trust Bank in St. Petersburg, Florida. The activities set out in the two indictments also generally involved different persons. In fact, the only persons named in both indictments are the appellants. 51 The fourth factor also involves only a minor overlap in the two indictments. The New York indictment involved the underlying statutory crimes of murder (New York law), theft (18 U.S.C. Secs. 2315 and 659), robbery (New York, New Jersey, and Florida law), possession and distribution of methaqualone (21 U.S.C. Secs. 812, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)), and gambling (New York law and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955). The Florida indictment involved the underlying statutory crimes of gambling (Florida law and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955), bribery (Florida law), obstruction of law enforcement (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1511), interference with commerce (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1951), interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1952), extortion (18 U.S.C. Sec. 894), obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503), robbery (Florida law), and possession and distribution of controlled substances (21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846). Thus, the two indictments overlap only in their references to the federal drug statutes, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841 and 846, the federal gambling statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955, and the Florida robbery statute. 52 Finally, we find no overlap in the fifth and most important factor. The New York indictment, viewed in its totality, involved the efforts of the Bonnano Family to establish and maintain a criminal empire in the New York/New Jersey area. The Florida indictment, on the other hand, involved a joint venture by members of several La Cosa Nostra families to conduct various criminal activities on the west coast of Florida. We find this distinction in the overall nature and scope of the activities set out in the indictments more than sufficient, in this case, to outweigh the overlaps in connection with the other factors. 53 On balance, then, we conclude that the New York and Florida indictments charged the existence of two different pattern[s] of racketeering activity. In view of this conclusion, the presence of one particular racketeering act in both indictments, namely, the conspiracy to rob the Landmark Union Trust Bank in St. Petersburg, Florida, is not significant. We see no reason why one racketeering act may not be a part of two different pattern[s] of racketeering activity. 13 The Double Jeopardy Clause protects a person against successive prosecutions for the same crime, not against successive prosecutions for two different crimes that happen to include the same underlying act. 14 54 Like the Dean and Russotti courts, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition that [t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal and spatial units. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2227, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977). We also recognize that the RICO statute is susceptible to abuse in the hands of overzealous prosecutors. See Russotti, 717 F.2d at 34 & n. 4; Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Fordham L.Rev. 165, 259 n. 505 (1980). Nevertheless, we perceive no such abuse in this case. Here, the appellants engaged in two fundamentally different pattern[s] of criminal conduct. Hence, the Florida indictment did not charge the appellants with the same offenses for which they previously were prosecuted in New York, and the appellants' motion to dismiss properly was denied. 15 III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 55 Appellant Cerasani also contends that the doctrine of collateral estoppel requires the dismissal of the charges against him in the Florida indictment. It is true that, in criminal cases, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is a corollary of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-46, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). The doctrine, however, requires the dismissal of charges against an individual only if, in order to prove those charges, the government must relitigate an issue of ultimate fact that necessarily was resolved in favor of the individual in a previous trial. See Russotti, 717 F.2d at 35. The crucial issue is whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194; see Russotti, 717 F.2d at 35. 56 The doctrine does not apply to the instant case because there is no issue of ultimate fact raised by the Florida indictment that necessarily was resolved in favor of Cerasani in the New York trial. Cerasani's previous acquittal could have been based on the jury's conclusion that, although Cerasani was an active member of the Bonnano Family, he did not participate in the particular pattern of racketeering activity set out in the New York indictment. The Florida indictment, on the other hand, charges the existence of a different pattern of racketeering activity. Thus, in the words of the Russotti court, at this stage of the proceedings, we fail to see any indication of an attempt by the government 'to persuade a second jury of the same fact already litigated' in defendants' favor. 717 F.2d at 35 (quoting United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329, 335 (2d Cir.1979)); see also United States v. Boffa, 513 F.Supp. 444, 483 (D.Del.1980) (A fortiori the jury could have reached its decision to acquit without resolving any of the present issues in favor of the defendant. Consequently, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not require dismissal of any portion of the present Indictment.). We hold that Cerasani is not entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him in the Florida indictment under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.