Opinion ID: 2554480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elmer Campos-Alvarez's Claims on Appeal

Text: Campos-Alvarez's main contention on appeal is that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of his membership in Mara R and the violent rivalry between Mara R and Vatos Locos. Campos-Alvarez argues that this evidence was unnecessary to advance the government's case and served only to inflame the jury against him. According to Campos-Alvarez, guilt by association subverted his defense. We disagree. The admissibility of the evidence of gang membership and activity was raised in advance of trial. The government moved for leave to introduce the evidence, contending that it showed the context of and motivation for the shootings. Campos-Alvarez moved in limine to exclude the evidence, arguing it was unnecessary and unduly prejudicial because, under the prosecution's theory of the case, he had a motive to commit the shootings to avenge the killing of his friend Walter Villatoro regardless of his membership in Mara R. The judge rejected appellant's argument and permitted the prosecution to present the proffered gang evidence. The judge reasoned that the evidence would be helpful in making sense of the crime, [p]articularly where there [was] no evidence that the victim ... was the person that shot the friend [Walter Villatoro]. Proof that the attack took place in the context of ongoing gang rivalry showed that it was more than just revenge for the shooting of a friend. The trial judge's decision to admit the gang evidence is subject to review for abuse of discretion. [3] Evidence is relevant, if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [4] When gang evidence is relevant, the trial judge must balance the probative value of the gang references against their potential for prejudice. [5] We recognize that a defendant may be prejudiced in the eyes of the jury by evidence of his gang involvement. This court has cautioned trial judges to consider carefully before admitting evidence of gang retaliation, and then only after ensuring that the government's evidence is relevant, necessary and supported by competent evidence. [6] The trial judge has the discretion to exclude [such] evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [7] There is, however, no special admissibility rule for gang-related evidence: it is subject to the same balancing standard as applies to the admission of evidence generally. [8] Such balancing is quintessentially a discretionary function of the trial court, and we owe a great degree of deference to its decision. [9] We are satisfied that the trial judge did not exercise his discretion erroneously here. There was legitimate probative force to the evidence of Campos-Alvarez's membership in Mara R, the shooting victims' membership in Vatos Locos, and the violent rivalry between the two gangs; and the government had a substantial need for that evidence. [10] Without it, the government would have been left to argue, implausibly, that Campos-Alvarez, an apparently ordinary member of the community, embarked on a vigilante shooting spree to avenge the killing of his friend Walter Villatoroand not by targeting Villatoro's actual killer, but by indiscriminately attacking three persons who had nothing to do with the killing. Only when viewed in the context of an ongoing gang war did this picture of violent retaliation by Campos-Alvarez make sense. Because Villatoro was a friend associated with Campos-Alvarez's gang and was killed by a rival gang member at a time when the two gangs were feuding, it was understandable that Campos-Alvarez would seek revenge against any member of that rival gang. Campos-Alvarez's effort to recruit Roque Lopez, a member of Mara R, to participate in an attack on Vatos Locos members likewise made sense in light of their gang rivalry. Campos-Alvarez argues there was no evidence the leadership of Mara R directed him to carry out an attack on the enemy gang, but that is beside the point. A gang member can act on behalf of the gang, or for gang-related reasons, without following command and control protocol, and he can do so with more than a single purpose. The trial judge reasonably could find that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We perceive no significant danger that [Campos-Alvarez's] conviction rested merely on guilt by association. [11] Kenny Loza's and Javier Morales's eyewitness identifications, combined with Roque Lopez's testimony about Campos-Alvarez's incriminating statements, ensured that Campos-Alvarez's gang membership did not substitute for proof of his guilt. [12] And while [t]he admission of evidence whose sole purpose is to connect a defendant to a group of people of questionable character and [that is] not relevant to some other factual issue is improper, [13] the evidence concerning Campos-Alvarez's gang activity was limited to what was directly probative of the charges against him. There was no evidence, for example, of Campos-Alvarez's position in Mara R or his unrelated gang activities. Nor did the government possess alternative methods or evidence [to] prove the same proposition in a manner that [would have been] less unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. [14] Any risk of unfair prejudice was further mitigated by the fact that the gang evidence supported the theory of Campos-Alvarez's defense at trial. He argued to the jury that Kenny Loza, Noel Loza, and Javier Morales conspired among themselves to accuse him falsely of the shootings. That argument was made far more plausible by his membership in a rival gang. In short, the trial judge fairly found that the probative value of the evidence of Campos-Alvarez's membership in Mara R and of the violent conflict between Mara R and Vatos Locos was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting that evidence.
To prove Campos-Alvarez guilty of the offenses of carrying a pistol without a license (CPWL) and possessing an unregistered firearm (UF), in violation of D.C.Code §§ 22-4504(a), 7-2502.01 (2001), respectively, the government offered in evidence two certificates signed by an employee of the Metropolitan Police Department. The certificates stated that based on the employee's diligent search of the Department's records, Campos-Alvarez had neither a license to carry a pistol in the District of Columbia on August 5, 2002, nor a firearms registration certificate on that date. Campos-Alvarez objected on Sixth Amendment grounds to the admission of the certificates without the testimony of the employee who performed the search. His objection was overruled. As Campos-Alvarez contends, and as the government concedes, it was constitutional error to admit the certificates of no record without live testimony from their preparer. In Tabaka v. District of Columbia, [15] this court held that such certificates are testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, and so are inadmissible unless the employee who performed the search and signed the certificate testifies at trial subject to cross-examination. [16] We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional admission of the certificates did not contribute to the jury's verdict of guilty on the CPWL and UF counts. We therefore must reverse Campos-Alvarez's convictions for those two offenses. [17] (This will not necessitate any alteration of his overall sentence on remand, however, because the trial judge ordered the sentences on the CPWL and UF counts to run concurrently with Campos-Alvarez's other sentences.)
Campos-Alvarez was convicted of five counts of possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV). Each PFCV count corresponds to one of the five predicate armed offenses of which he was convicted: assault with intent to kill while armed (AWIKWA), aggravated assault while armed (AAWA), and three assaults with a dangerous weapon (ADW). Campos-Alvarez and the government agree that the PFCV convictions based on AWIKWA and AAWA merge (requiring one of them to be vacated) because they derive from the same violent actthe shooting of Kenny Loza; and that the PFCV conviction based on the ADW against James Bryant merges with one of the other PFCV convictions and should be vacated for the same reason, inasmuch as Bryant was a bystander and not a separate target of the attack. Campos-Alvarez further argues that the other two PFCV counts, which correspond to the ADW's on Noel Loza and Javier Morales, also merge (with each other and with the PFCV associated with the assault on Kenny Loza), leaving him in the end with only a single PFCV conviction. The government disagrees. Our review of this merger issue is de novo. [18] Where, as here, predicate armed offenses were committed against different victims and do not merge, the corresponding PFCV convictions ordinarily do not merge either. [19] Even so, applying the rule of lenity, we have held that merger is required if the PFCV convictions arise from a single possession of a single weapon during a single violent act. [20] That holding has a constitutional underpinning: the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects defendants against `multiple punishments for the same offense.' [21] But the Fifth Amendment `does not prohibit separate and cumulative punishment for separate criminal acts.' [22] We apply a `fact-based approach' in determining whether separate criminal acts have occurred and merger therefore is inappropriate. [23] Criminal acts are considered distinct when (1) `there is an appreciable length of time between the acts,' or when (2) `a subsequent criminal act was not the result of the original impulse, but a fresh one.' [24] Acts may be separate even if the period of time between them is `quite brief,' [25] as one can experience and act upon a fresh impulse almost immediately. [26] Applying those guidelines, we agree with the parties that the PFCV convictions based on the AWIKWA and AAWA on Kenny Loza merge. [27] We likewise agree that the PFCV conviction based on the ADW on James Bryant merges. [28] We conclude, however, that the remaining two PFCV convictions do not merge. Campos-Alvarez accosted Kenny Loza outside the apartment building, drawing a weapon and firing at him first. Campos-Alvarez then turned his gun on the fleeing Noel Loza, who ran back to the building. He also fired at Javier Morales, who stood some distance away from his friends and initially took cover behind a parked car. [A]t each stage of the assaults, Campos Alvarez presumptively was able to desist from violence against another victim, but chose not to do so. [29] His `successive intentions' make `him subject to cumulative punishment.' [30] Insofar as the PFCV convictions corresponding to the assaults on Noel Loza and Javier Morales are concerned, this case thus is distinguishable from Nixon, the paradigmatic case for appropriate merger of PFCV convictions on which Campos-Alvarez relies. Unlike in Nixon, where the appellant shot at a single targetan automobile with several occupants, resulting in convictions for three different types of assault and three corresponding PFCV convictions (which merged) [31] Campos-Alvarez fired at three separate moving targets (Kenny Loza, Noel Loza, and Javier Morales), albeit rapidly and in quick succession. This case also is distinguishable from West, where the appellant had aimed at a single victim and unintentionally hit a bystander. [32] The evidence in this case shows Noel Loza and Javier Morales were not bystanders (as Bryant was); Campos-Alvarez intended to shoot at each of them separately. In short, Campos-Alvarez reached a fork in the road [33] after shooting Kenny Loza. He could have elected not to fire at Noel Loza or Javier Lopez. Instead, with a fresh impulse, he executed a new assault. [34] It follows that despite the proximity of the crimes in time and place, they constitute distinct violent crimes, and the PFCV convictions do not merge. [35] Three PFCV convictions, corresponding to the three assaults on Kenny Loza, Noel Loza, and Javier Morales, shall remain intact. [36]