Opinion ID: 76264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McMillian and Turquitt

Text: 16 In McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 (1997), the United States Supreme Court concluded that, when acting in a law enforcement capacity, Alabama sheriffs are § 1983 policymakers for the state, and not the county. Under McMillian, the determination of the policymaker issue under § 1983, although a federal question, is guided by state law. Id. at 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734. McMillian further teaches that state law cannot answer the § 1983 policymaker question by simply labeling an official as a county or state official. Id. Instead, courts must focus on control over the official. 17 For example, although the Alabama Constitution provided that the state executive department includes a sheriff for each county and, in effect, labeled the sheriff as a state executive officer, see id. at 787, 117 S.Ct. 1734, the Supreme Court in McMillian did not end its analysis there. 7 Instead, it examined Alabama Code provisions and noted that the county had no control over the sheriff's law enforcement duties, whereas the Governor and the Attorney General had such control under an Alabama statute. Id. at 789-91, 117 S.Ct. 1734. Even though Alabama law suggested that the county had some influence over the sheriff (such as the county's payment of his salary and purchase of his equipment), and even though the sheriff was elected locally by county voters, the Supreme Court in McMillian indicated that such factors did not amount to control over the sheriff's operations. See id. at 791-92, 117 S.Ct. 1734. 18 In Turquitt v. Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.1998), this Court sitting en banc explained how to determine whether an official acts as a policymaker for a county or the state. In Turquitt, we concluded that Alabama sheriff[s] act[] exclusively for the state rather than for the county in operating a county jail. Id. at 1288. Although noting that Alabama's Constitution sends a clear message that a sheriff is a state officer, id. at 1289, we, too, focused on control in deciding the § 1983 policymaker issue. Rather than relying on the state official label, our analysis in Turquitt went beyond Alabama's Constitution and examined the sheriff's performance of his duties in operating the county jail and the lack of control that the county government had over the sheriff's performance of such duties. 19 Central to the McMillian and Turquitt decisions is the principle that  local governments [such as counties] can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of those [officials] whom the local government has no authority to control.  Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1292 (emphasis added). Indeed, in Turquitt, this Court en banc emphasized the importance of control by characterizing the inquiry in McMillian as asking which government body, under state law, had direct control over how the sheriff fulfilled [the duty at issue]. Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1292. Holding counties liable in the absence of control over sheriffs would ignore Monell 's conception of counties as corporations, would substitute a conception of counties as mere units of geography, and would impose even broader liability than the respondeat superior liability rejected in Monell. Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1291. 8 Therefore, our examination of Georgia law must center on whether counties in Georgia have control over sheriffs. A sheriff's policy or act cannot be said to speak for the county if the county has no say in what policy or action the sheriff takes. 20 Both McMillian and Turquitt further remind us that, in examining control, we must consider the particular area or function for which the government official was alleged to be the final policymaker. McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785, 117 S.Ct. 1734 (law enforcement duties); Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1287 (operation of the jail). In other words, for § 1983 liability, a determination must be made as to who the policymaker is and in which particular area that policymaker acted. Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1287-88. 9 Thus, the appropriate § 1983 inquiry under federal law is whether defendant Clayton County, under Georgia law, has control over the Sheriff in his law enforcement function, particularly for the entry and validation of warrants on the CJIS systems and the training and supervision of his employees in that regard.