Opinion ID: 2642473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the district court erred in limiting the

Text: TESTIMONY OF JAMES GASKILL ¶38 Mr. Perea argues that the district court erroneously excluded the testimony of James Gaskill, the defense expert on crime scene reconstruction. Mr. Gaskill visited the scene, took measurements, and determined that there “were multiple shooters[,] . . . that the bullet casing pattern did not seem consistent with the State’s version of events, [and] that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for [Mr. Perea] to hit the[] victims according to the State’s theory.” While the district court allowed Mr. Gaskill to testify to his investigation and theory, it did not allow him to directly comment on the credibility of the State’s witnesses, or utilize photographic and animated evidence in support of his testimony. ¶39 We hold that the district court did not err when it prevented Mr. Gaskill from commenting on the veracity of other 9 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court witnesses and when it refused to admit his proffered photographs. But the district court did abuse its discretion when it refused to admit the computer animations in support of Mr. Gaskill’s testimony. A. The District Court Did Not Err when It Precluded Mr. Gaskill From Directly Commenting on the Credibility of the State’s Witnesses ¶40 “[W]e allow experts latitude to interpret the facts before them,” even when that interpretation contradicts that of another witness. Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶ 16, 242 P.3d 762. But we do not allow “an expert’s testimony as to the truthfulness of a witness on a particular occasion.” State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989) (citing rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence for the proposition that witnesses may not normally testify regarding “specific instances of [another] witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness”). Because “the resolution of credibility [is] for the factfinder [alone],” it is not a proper subject on which an expert witness may opine. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). ¶41 While our rules of evidence allow Mr. Gaskill to present theories that contradicted the testimony of other witnesses, our rules do not allow him to comment directly on the veracity of those witnesses. See Eskelson, 2010 UT 59, ¶ 17. We therefore hold that the district court did not err when it prohibited Mr. Gaskill from testifying as to the truthfulness of the State’s witnesses. B. The District Court Did Not Err When It Excluded Mr. Gaskill’s Crime Scene Photographs ¶42 Before evidence may be admitted, its proponent is required to establish a proper foundation. Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires that evidence must be relevant to be admitted. Rule 901(a) requires that an exhibit must be authenticated and that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Where an exhibit is not representative of what its proponent claims it represents, a court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses to admit the exhibit. See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). And even if an exhibit is both relevant and authenticated, rule 403 allows the district court to “exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” 10 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court ¶43 Here, the defense sought to introduce photographs taken by Mr. Gaskill that he claimed represented the crime scene. The State objected, arguing that the photographs did not accurately represent the scene on the night of the shooting. Though the photographs were based on actual crime scene photographs, Mr. Gaskill admitted that there were many differences between his photographs and the scene on the night of the shooting. He admitted that the photos purporting to show Mr. Perea’s view from the SUV could not be accurate because the appropriate make and model SUV was not used. He further admitted that a pickup truck in one of the photographs was not the same make or model as the truck parked there on the night of the shooting. Finally, Mr. Gaskill admitted that he was not certain if a car in one of the photographs was in the same location as it had been on the night of the shooting. ¶44 Mr. Gaskill’s admissions create significant doubt as to the accuracy and relevance of the photographs. Particularly where the defense’s theory was contingent on the location and size of the vehicles involved, the inaccurate use of substitute vehicles had the potential to unfairly prejudice or mislead the jury or to confuse the issues. See UTAH R. EVID. 403. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit the inaccurate and potentially misleading photographs. C. The District Court Erred When It Excluded Mr. Gaskill’s ComputerGenerated Animations ¶45 The defense attempted to introduce two computergenerated animations to visually represent Mr. Gaskill’s testimony. Mr. Gaskill testified that although he did not personally create the animations, they “g[a]ve an indication of what [he] believe[d] may have happened” and would make it easier for the jury to understand his testimony. The State objected and the district court refused to admit the animations, finding that “there [was] no foundation for the animation[s]” because Mr. Gaskill did not know “who created [them],” “the background of the people who created [them],” “how [they were] created,” or “what [the animators] relied upon in creating [them].” We hold that the district court applied an erroneous legal standard in refusing to admit the animations. ¶46 Broadly speaking, all evidence can be categorized as either substantive or demonstrative. See Steven C. Marks, The Admissibility and Use of Demonstrative Aids, 32 A.B.A. THE BRIEF 24, 25 (2003). Demonstrative evidence is evidence that is meant only to illustrate a witness’s testimony. Id. It carries no independent probative value 11 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court in and of itself, but aids a jury in understanding difficult factual issues. Id. Common examples of demonstrative evidence include models, charts, and timelines. ¶47 On the other hand, substantive evidence is “offered to help establish a fact in issue.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 640 (9th ed. 2009). In other words, relevant “[substantive] evidence directly affects the perceived likelihood that a fact of consequence has occurred” whereas the “effect of demonstrative evidence is to help clarify and make more understandable a piece of substantive proof.” Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative Evidence: Charting Its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 967 (1992). Common examples of substantive evidence include eyewitness testimony, ballistic reports, and security camera footage. ¶48 Because rule 901(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires that “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is,” the distinction between substantive and demonstrative evidence is critical to understanding the foundational burden imposed on the evidence’s proponent. If the evidence is merely demonstrative, then the proponent claims only that the proffered demonstrative evidence accurately illustrates the testimony given and rule 901 is satisfied so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the claim that it accurately depicts a witness’s testimony as well as any uncontested relevant facts.2 Alternatively, in the case of substantive evidence, there must be some showing that the evidence itself supports the proffered conclusion.3 ¶49 Computer-generated evidence is simply a subset of general evidence and the categories of computer-generated evidence correspond with the two general categories of evidence. A “com- 2 Prior cases have held that demonstrations and reenactments require substantially similar conditions. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990). This substantial similarity requirement is properly applied to the undisputed facts and proponent’s own testimony. We have never held that such evidence must be substantially similar to the opponent’s version of disputed facts. 3 The type of support required will vary depending on the nature of the substantive evidence. See R. COLLIN MANGRUM & DEE BENSON, MANGRUM & BENSON ON UTAH EVIDENCE, 802–23 (2012). 12 Cite as: 2013 UT 68 JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court puter animation” demonstrates a witness’s testimony and is therefore a subset of demonstrative evidence. See Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Admissibility of Computer-Generated Animation, 111 A.L.R. 5th 529 § 2b (2003). As such, the witness does not use the computer animation to arrive at his or her conclusions. Rather, the animation is wholly illustrative of the witness’s own conclusions drawn from the underlying substantive evidence. ¶50 In contrast, a “computer simulation” is substantive evidence used by the witness in drawing his conclusions. [C]omputer-generated simulations are typically recreations of events or experiments based on scientific principles and data; in a simulation, data is entered into a computer, which is programmed to analyze and draw conclusions from the data. Com- puter simulations are [therefore a type of] substantive evidence offered to support a fact in issue and have independent evidentiary value. Id. (footnotes omitted). Computer simulations do not just illustrate an expert’s conclusions but are submitted as substantive evidence with independent probative value. As a subset of substantive evidence, computer simulations must therefore meet a higher threshold showing than that required for demonstrative evidence. ¶51 Because computer animations are merely a subset of demonstrative evidence, it is not necessary that the testifying witness know how the animation was created in order to satisfy rule 901's authenticity requirement. Rather, it is sufficient that the animation accurately reflects the witness’s testimony. See, e.g., Gosser v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Ky. 2000) (“[B]ecause a computer-generated diagram, like any diagram, is merely illustrative of a witness’s testimony, its admission normally does not depend on testimony as to how the diagram was prepared, e.g., how the data was gathered or inputted into the computer.”), abrogated on other grounds by Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78 (Ky. 2012). For instance, an expert witness using a plastic model of a human organ is not required to know how the model was created. It is sufficient for the expert to confirm that the model accurately represents the organ about which he is testifying.4 4 We recognize, however, that because the “animation represents only a re-creation of the proponent’s version of the event,” it “should (continued...) 13 STATE v. PEREA JUSTICE PARRISH, opinion of the Court ¶52 Because the animations offered to illustrate Mr. Gaskill’s testimony were only visual representations of his opinions, the evidence was demonstrative in nature. It is uncontested that Mr. Gaskill did not know the exact computer processes through which the animations were created. But the court had already found that Mr. Gaskill’s testimony about the events depicted in the animations was relevant under rule 401 and it did not exclude the testimony or animations based on prejudice under rule 403. ¶53 The State argues that the animations do not accurately represent the facts because, under the State’s theory, there was only one shooter. But this argument misapprehends the burden for admissibility of demonstrative evidence under rule 901. Rule 901 does not require that the demonstrative evidence be uncontroversial, but only that it accurately represents what its proponent claims. Mr. Gaskill confirmed that the animations accurately represented his expert interpretation of the facts. Therefore, the district court erred when it did not admit the animations.