Opinion ID: 539850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Reversal of Chick Kam Choo

Text: 17 In its October order, the district court also relied on the substantial change in the law brought about by the reversal of this Court's opinion in Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 817 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.1987), rev'd, 486 U.S. 140, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988). Picco argues that this alleged change justifies relief from the 1986 dismissal under Rule 60(b)(5) and Rule 60(b)(6).
18 Rule 60(b)(5) authorizes relief from a final judgment when (1) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or (2) a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or (3) it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application. Picco does not specify which of these clauses he thinks applies to his case. 19 The first clause is obviously inapplicable, because no judgment has been satisfied or discharged. Nor does the second apply. The 1986 dismissal could not have been based in any way on our decision in Chick Kam Choo, because the district court's dismissal was issued on September 4, 1986, while our decision in Chick Kam Choo was not rendered until May 21, 1987, and it was res nova when rendered. Moreover, [f]or a decision to be 'based on' a prior judgment within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5), the prior judgment must be a necessary element of the decision, giving rise, for example, to the cause of action or a successful defense. Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 157, 160 (5th Cir.1990) (quoting with approval Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir.1972)). Chick Kam Choo was irrelevant to the dismissal of Picco's claim. 20 The third clause is also inapplicable. It applies only to final judgments with prospective application. E.g., Cook v. Birmingham News, 618 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir.1980). The only arguably prospective effect of the 1986 dismissal is that it precludes relitigation of the issues decided, which clearly is not enough. See Bailey, 894 F.2d at 160; Cook, 618 F.2d at 1152. 8 It was therefore an abuse of discretion to grant Picco relief under Rule 60(b)(5).
21 Finally, Picco invokes Rule 60(b)(6), which allows relief from a final judgment for any other reason justifying relief. Relief under this section, however, should be granted only if extraordinary circumstances are present. Bailey, 894 F.2d at 160. Picco claims that the reversal of our decision in Chick Kam Choo, which assertedly removed the threat of sanctions for refiling Picco's claim in state court, created sufficiently extraordinary circumstances to warrant relief. As we have recently held, however, [a] change in decisional law after entry of judgment does not constitute exceptional circumstances and is not alone grounds for relief from a final judgment. Id. Moreover, as noted, the dismissal here was more than eight months before our res nova decision in Chick Kam Choo (which was an appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas), the Supreme Court ultimately reversed our Chick Kam Choo decision, and the bankruptcy court had lifted the stay to allow the filing of suits more than three months before we decided Chick Kam Choo. Thus, it was an abuse of discretion to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(6).