Opinion ID: 150478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: June Statements

Text: Though the April statements occurred first, their relevance was tied to the June statements because the State used the April statements to cast doubt on the veracity of aspects of Simpson's June statements, in which he sought to minimize his involvement in the planning and carrying out of the arson. We therefore begin the analysis with the June statements.
Simpson's June 16th statement occurred after he had been arrested, ostensibly for violating the conditions of his judicial release. As described above, in return for his continued cooperation, Detective Kallay and Agent Ozbolt had arranged for Simpson's early judicial release from jail on an unrelated offense. When Simpson did not promptly reestablish contact upon his release, the officers caused Simpson's arrest to focus his attention back on the arson investigation, even though Simpson was technically arrested for violations of his judicial release, such as missing two drug tests. Thus, Simpson was detained on June 16th for essentially two different reasons at the same timethe release violations and the arson investigation. This presented a situation in which Kallay and Ozbolt could exert significant pressure through the potential consequences of his release violations in order to get Simpson to cooperate in the arson investigation. The June 16th interview began with both officers in an interview room with Simpson, [2] generally discussing Simpson's current arrest and his failure to contact the officers upon his release. Approximately six and one half minutes into the conversation, one of the officers left, but the other officer remained in the room. The remaining officer immediately informed Simpson that, because he was technically in custody, the officer must inform him of his Miranda rights. Simpson initially protested even being read his rights, i.e. he asked that the officer please not read him his rights. The officer persisted and eventually read Simpson his Miranda rights and gave him a copy of the rights to read. Simpson expressed that he understood his rights. The officer then asked are you willing to waive your rights, continue talking with us? Simpson responded: (1) mmm-mmmm, clearly in a negative way; (2) a sideways shake of his hand and a slight shake of his head; (3) mumbling something and then saying nah or naw; and (4) then saying I messed up last time I did that. The officer then replied, So you don't want to talk to us? You do or you don't want to talk to us? Simpson responded with more negative body language and said, I mean, it can't help. Following four to five seconds of silence, the officer said, Well that's up to you, whether you want to talk to us or not, we're not going to twist your arm or anything like that. Simpson immediately responded, what y'all wanna talk about? and the officer stated, just basically what we're talking about now. We will refer to the colloquy up to this point as the first Miranda interaction. Everything that follows will be referred to as the second Miranda interaction. Over the next one and one half minutes, Simpson questioned the officer about the details of his current situation, having been arrested and going back to jail, where he would be incarcerated, what his violations were, etc. Critically, the officer did not ask Simpson any substantive questions, [3] instead only responding to Simpson's questions and explaining that he was arrested for violating the terms of his release. The other officer then came back into the interview room. There was an eight-to-nine second period of silence, and the first officer then asked, so do you want to talk to us about any of this or not? Simpson responded by mumbling something, and even the tenor of his response is unclear. The second officer, who had not been present during the first Miranda interaction, then said, all right, since its a custodial interview, which means you're under arrest for that stuff, it's pretty customary that we advise you of your rights first. Simpson responded that the first officer had already discussed the Miranda rights. The first officer presented Simpson with a waiver of rights form and said, just go ahead and look that over, and if you're willing to talk to us, just go ahead and sign the waiver, and we can move on. Just need to make sure you understand all that. Simpson began reading the form and said, I mean, this right here, it really don't make no difference, you know what I'm saying, sign it or not. The second officer responded, that's what we're saying, but its a formality, and that's what we're required by law to do. At this point in the interview, it is apparent that Simpson was still struggling with the fact that, while he has been arrested for violations of his release conditions, the interview is more about the arson. He indicated the waiver of rights form and said, this thing right here, I mean, talking about `may be used against me.' For what? The second officer responded, Well what would happen if you came out and said that, you know, `I killed one of the people with [inaudible].' Then, you know, if you tell us that, and we didn't advise you of your right, we'd lose that statement in court. Simpson then executed the waiver of rights form.
Simpson argues that the officers violated Miranda when they questioned him after he expressed his desire to remain silent. In his brief, Simpson focuses exclusively on the first Miranda interaction. Simpson argues that, at that point, he had clearly invoked his desire to remain silent, so the interview should have ceased. The warden, surprisingly, accepts the premise that this is the only relevant discussion. ( See Resp. Br. at 33 (accepting Simpson's transcription of the relevant portion of the June 16th interrogation).) The warden argues that, at the conclusion of the first Miranda interaction, Simpson's inclination remained unclear. However, at that point in time, Simpson had said mmm-mmmm, naw, and I messed up last time I did that. Tellingly, the officer responded by asking, So you don't want to talk to us? You do or you don't want to talk to us? By virtue of the first question, it is clear that the officer understood Simpson to be leaning towards saying that he did not want to talk. If that were not enough, Simpson responded with additional dismissive, negative body language and said, I mean, it can't help, and then a noticeable silence elapsed. Thus, if the analysis were to end here, the warden would likely be incorrect that Simpson's desire to remain silent was in doubt. But the analysis does not end there. Simpson focuses on too narrow of a slice of the colloquy and, instead, we must look at the entire six-minute conversation, which includes both the first Miranda interaction and the second. Viewed in its entirety, we conclude that the officer honored Simpson's initial inclination to remain silent because the officer did not ask any material questions and, instead, only responded to Simpson's inquiries. Once the other officer returned, they returned to the issue of Miranda, and Simpson executed the waiver of rights form. When viewed in this light, the officers' actions were not inappropriate. As a matter of first principles, Miranda is only directed at interrogation or its functional equivalentthe police may not continue an interrogation after the interviewee has invoked his right to remain silent. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-02, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (restricting the definition of interrogation for Miranda purposes to express questioning and words or actions by the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response). Here, the officers did not ask Simpson any material questions until they revisited the issue of whether he wished to waive his Miranda rights and discuss substantive matters, to which Simpson immediately consented. Similarly, even Simpson concedes that, when a suspect does not clearly invoke his right to remain silent or when the invocation is ambiguous, officers may follow up with clarifying questions. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-462, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2250, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 2010 WL 2160784, at  (June 1, 2010) (stating there is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis. ). Here, Simpson initially indicated a desire to remain silent. When the officer responded, Well that's up to you, whether you want to talk to us or not, we're not going to twist your arm or anything like thatwhich was, in context, a non-coercive statementSimpson immediately responded by asking the officer what he wanted to talk about. He then asked several questions of the officer until the second officer returned. Thus, the officers were faced with an individual who had indicated that he did not want to talk and yet continued to talk. Accordingly, it was not unreasonable or impermissible for the officers to have circled back to the Miranda issue to clarify whether Simpson wished to waive his rights before asking him any substantive questions. Indeed, the Supreme Court encouraged such clarifying questions in Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350, and four Justices would have required that officers seek clarification in the face of an ambiguous invocation of Miranda rights. Id. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (Souter, J., concurring). Finally, it is well-established that a suspect's voluntary, unsolicited statements after an invocation of Miranda rights are not excluded. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). This is because, in the unsolicited statement scenario, the officers have scrupulously honored the suspect's invocation and have not interrogated him. Though Simpson's is not a case of unsolicited statements, the Edwards line of cases is relevant for what it assumesthat it is permissible for the officers still to be in the same room with the interviewee for at least some period of time after he invokes his right to remain silent. The officers need not immediately leave the room; they simply may not continue questioning or badgering the suspect. But, for Simpson to prevail, his theory must be that the officers should have immediately, in a matter of seconds, left the room when he said, I mean, it can't help. This is not the law, so there was nothing wrong with the officers remaining in the room for the few seconds until Simpson asked the officers what they wanted to talk about, nor was there any prohibition on the officers answering Simpson's questions. In sum, there are at least three arguments to support the validity of Simpson's waiver of his Miranda rights. Furthermore, Simpson has not pointed to any Supreme Court case indicating that the officers' actions in these or similar circumstances were improper. Accordingly, we find that the officers validly obtained the waiver of Simpson's Miranda rights prior to the June 16th interview.
Simpson next argues that, even if the officers did not violate Miranda, his June 16th statement was coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled confessions. He does not claim that the officers utilized improper physical tactics. Instead, he claims that they used a combination of threats and promises, which had the cumulative effect of overbearing his will. Whether a confession was voluntary depends upon the totality of all the surrounding circumstancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The Supreme Court has held that the combination of threats and promises may rise to the level sufficient to overbear an interviewee's will, rendering any confession the product of impermissible coercion. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); see also Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1070 (6th Cir.1994) (recognizing that, in the face of a powerful combination of threats and promises, even [a] defendant who is completely innocent might well confess). However, as a plurality of the Supreme Court noted in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after [ Miranda ] warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver. Id. at 609, 124 S.Ct. 2601; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) ([C]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was `compelled' despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare.). Accordingly, it is clear that a defendant faces an uphill climb when, as here, he argues that a confession was involuntary even though he properly received and waived his Miranda rights. And as an implicit derivative principle, in light of these candid statements from the Supreme Court, the facts of a given interview must be especially egregious to lead to the conclusion that a state court's application of Supreme Court involuntariness case law was unreasonable for purposes of habeas relief under AEDPA. Although the June 16th interview came about as the result of Simpson's arrest for violation of his release conditions, it must be remembered that Simpson previously had agreed to cooperate with the officers in return for his early release. Thus, Simpson was familiar with the officers, and that he would interact with them after his release should have come as no surprise to Simpson. Simpson points to two threats made by the officers during the interview. First, the officers warned Simpson that he faced a new felony charge for failure to comply with his release provisions and guaranteed that the felony charge would be filed unless he provided information about the arson. (A396-97.) Second, they stated, This is your opportunity. `Cause if not, you're going down with [Kelly], and guess what? Being an accomplice carries the same penalty as the person that threw the bottle.... We've proven to you that we don't play games. We don't bluff. (A402.) The officers also stated, You are not the focus of our investigation. But if we leave this room tonight with no answers, you will be.... You are looking at the rest of your life, possibly the death death row. If that's the game you want to play, Peanut, we'll take you there. (A404.) In addition to these threats, Simpson also points to promises of leniency that he claims contributed to the overbearing of his will. With regard to the charge for violating his release conditions, one of the officers stated, You want to help yourself, now's the time to help yourself. `Cause that charge ain't been filed yet. (A397.) With regard to the arson, the officers stated that they ultimately wanted to get Pumpkin [Kelly] and Leah and that, if he confessed to his involvement, the officers would work with him and talk to whomever. (A402-03.) Simpson also points to the following colloquy: Kallay: We did not accuse you of anything. We're not gonna accuse you of anything except being there. Simpson: See, that's, that's a crime man. Kallay: It, it could be a crime if you continue doing what you're doing. (A409-10.) Simpson contends that this statement implied that he would not be charged if he admitted to being there and implicated Kelly and Leah. In addition to those highlighted by Simpson, another aspect of the interview bears upon Simpson's decision to implicate himself. Simpson has several children. It seems that, upon his release from jail, he had been living with his youngest son, and he was with this son when he was re-arrested. He was clearly concerned about being away from his son, and the officers played upon this. Several times, they suggested that Simpson tell the truth so that he could get back to his son. And, more effectively, the officers played on Simpson's conscience, making repeated comparison between Simpson's children and the child killed in the fire. The video shows that this tactic was extremely effectiveone can almost see the emotional struggle going on in Simpson's mind. Simpson primarily relies upon Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963), as clearly established Supreme Court law holding that threats and promises may combine to render a confession involuntary. There, the Court held that a defendant's confession to selling marijuana was involuntary. Id. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917. The defendant testified that, immediately upon entering her apartment, the officers threatened that she would never see her children again if she did not confess but assured her that they would recommend that the prosecutor not charge her if she cooperated. Id. at 531-32, 83 S.Ct. 917. The Court held that, under these circumstances, it was clear that the confession could not be deemed voluntary; in fact, the state conceded that the confession was coerced but argued that the error was harmless. Id. at 534-35, 83 S.Ct. 917. The major flaw in Simpson's reliance upon Lynumn is that the Lynumn defendant had not received Miranda warnings before the confession; indeed, Lynumn predates Miranda by three years. As the more recent cases, like Berkemer and Seibert, teach, it has become much more difficult to argue the involuntariness of a confession if Miranda warnings have been given and the rights have been waived. Thus, we must analyze Simpson's case under the more general involuntariness doctrine. As we stated in Ledbetter: In determining whether a confession has been elicited by [psychological] means that are unconstitutional, this court looks at the totality of the circumstances concerning whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case. Factors to consider in assessing the totality of the circumstances include the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; whether the accused has been informed of his constitutional rights; the length of the questioning; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 35 F.3d at 1067. Applying these factors to the June 16th interrogation, none cuts strongly in Simpson's favor, and certainly not so strongly that a state court's conclusion to the contrary could be deemed objectively unreasonable. Though it is not clear from the record what level of education Simpson has achieved, it is clear that he had extensive experience with the criminal justice system. Thus, on June 16th, the experience of being questioned by the police was not new or novel to him. Furthermore, Simpson had a prior, consensual relationship with the officers. He had agreed to continue speaking with them even before this specific interrogation. And though the officers did employ threats and promises in their effort to obtain Simpson's full disclosure, the video reveals that the most effective tactic was the play on his conscience. Simply stated, under the totality of the circumstances, Simpson has not met his burden of showing circumstances so severe that there is a substantial risk that his will was overborne. We therefore deny Simpson habeas relief as to the June 16th statement.
Though Simpson admits that he technically waived his Miranda rights during the June 20th interrogation, he contends that the waiver was not voluntary and, thus, ineffective. His argument is more appropriately framed as two distinct attacks on the validity of his Miranda waiver. First, Simpson advances a pure involuntariness argument, arguing that the officers obtained the waiver by using false promises, threats, and misleading statements that he had no choice except to talk with them. We find this argument unpersuasive. Second, Simpson argues that the officers violated Miranda by discouraging him from consulting with an attorney. This argument is significantly more persuasive, as the facts are not materially distinguishable from the facts in Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374 (6th Cir.1998), in which we found a clear violation of Miranda. Coming into the June 20th interview, Simpson had already given incriminating statements on June 16th. He had confessed to being with Kelly immediately prior to the arson while Kelly prepared the Molotov cocktail and to driving the car before and after Kelly threw the Molotov cocktail at the house, though he disclaimed having been involved in the planning of the attack or having any intent to kill or harm anyone. Detective Kallay and Agent Ozbolt seem to have suspected that Simpson was more involved than he claimed. They therefore proposed, at the end of the June 16th interview, that Simpson take a polygraph test. They essentially told him that, if he had been completely truthful on the 16th, he would pass the test and they would continue to work with him and seek favorable treatment from the prosecutor. If he failed the lie detector, they would know that he was more involved than he had admitted, and the officers would recommend that the prosecutor bring the most serious possible charges against Simpson. Thus, the officers proposed the lie detector for two purposes. The first purpose was to test the truth of Simpson's June 16th statement. The second purpose was to get Simpson to confess to his true role in the arson by telling him that, if he lied, the test would pick it up, so he should come clean before the test. On June 16th, Simpson initially agreed to take the test. However, he was less than cooperative when the time actually arrived on June 20th. At the end of the June 16th interview, the officers were very blunt with Simpson about how his case would proceed. The relevant dialogue was as follows: Kallay: Tuesday morning we pick you up and bring you in for a polygraph. You pass the polygraph then we'll reinstate your bond. Under the stipulation that you do what you're told with us. You don't do that, we'll charge you with complicity to commit agg murder, right away. Ozbolt: And that ain't no bullshit. Kallay: That is no bullshit. You don't have a choice at this time. Ozbolt: Let me ask you this. Is that agreeable to you? You gonna pass the polygraph? `Cause if there's something else you need to tell us, tell us now. Simpson: No, that's it. Ozbolt: Hmmm. Simpson: What'd you say I charged with? Kallay: Complicity to agg murder. If you fail to do any of that, that's exactly what you'll get charged with. If you want to run, you can run, but we will find you. .... Simpson: But agg murder, but that's how much time, doesn't that carry life in jail? Kallay: Mmmm-hmmm. Life with no parole. You've got a lot of incentive. And we're not playing with you, that is the straight, honest to God truth. We could do that to you right now, if we wanted to. Simpson: What? Charge me? Kallay: Mmm-hmmm. But what did we tell you from the beginning? Simpson: Alright. Kallay: I want Leah. So does Dan [Ozbolt]. She's the one who caused this whole thing to happen. She's the one who caused this whole thing to happen. She's the one who needs to pay. Simpson: Right. Kallay: Pumpkin threw the fire ... Simpson: Yes. .... Kallay: You don't have alternatives. Simspon: I know. I was just thinkin', there's nothing, it's just straight forward... Ozbolt: Mmm-mmm. It's straight up. Simpson: Straight up, its just ... Ozbolt: Complicity to commit aggravated murder. There's no nice way to say it. That's the way it is. (A492-94.) [4] At the beginning of the June 20th interview, in preparation for the polygraph exam, Kallay had more strong words for Simpson. He stated at various times, You don't cooperate on this case, you eat the whole thing. It's called agg murder conspiracy to commit.... If you don't cooperate then ... there are no holds barred, and you're gonna lose. You're gonna spend the rest of your life in jail.... If you don't take the test today... we're gonna file the paper on you today for complicity to commit agg murder. It's that simple. (A514-15, 518.)
Simpson claims that (1) the promise that if he took and passed the polygraph, he would be released (which Kallay admitted was a false promise) and (2) the strong language indicating that Simpson had to take the polygraph or else be charged with aggravated murder, had the combined effect of overbearing his will, rendering his waiver of rights involuntary. The government bears the heavy burden of proving the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. Miranda, 384 U.S at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The voluntariness question requires an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine if the interviewee in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forego his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979). And, as Miranda itself stated, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Beginning with the argument regarding Kallay's false promise of release, Simpson points to our decision in Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284 (6th Cir.1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 507 U.S. 680, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). In Williams, we addressed a situation in which a police officer stated, I'll make you a deal. You tell us everything that happened and you tell us the truth and I confirm it on a polygraph that you're telling us the truth. Yeah, you walk. 944 F.2d at 286. The officer subsequently formalized this into a promise of immunity if the suspect took and passed the polygraph. Id. at 287. We held that the prisoner was entitled to habeas relief because an evaluation of `the entire course of police conduct' in this case establishes that Williams' statements were not voluntary. His statements were conditioned on his belief that he would be released if he talked. The officers' promises of leniency were intended to induce Williams' admissions. Id. at 289. However, Williams is distinguishable because, in that case, the officer explicitly promised immunity in return for taking and passing the polygraph. By contrast, here, the officers never told Simpson that he would not be charged in the arson if he passed the polygraph. They simply said that they would re-instate his bond on the previous, unrelated crime. Thus, Simpson was not like the suspect in Williams who confessed because he believed that doing so could get him out of any charges. As to Simpson's claim that the officers' threatening aggravated murder charges if he did not participate in the polygraph rendered his waiver voluntary, the state court and the district court held that these were all essentially true statements. To be sure, they had a very strong influence on Simpson's decision to waive his rights on June 20thhe repeatedly indicated that he felt as if he did not have a choice (A521, 526) and even said that he felt that he was being railroaded (A527). But the state court and district court were correct that the officers were telling Simpson the truth about his predicament. In light of his June 16th statement, the officers already had enough evidence to charge him in the arson. In essence, the officers were merely informing Simpson of the options before him. So Simpson was correct that he did not have much of a choice, but this was simply an acknowledgment of reality. Simpson cites no authority, much less clearly established Supreme Court authority, indicating that a waiver is involuntary if made after hearing the truth, or that officers may inform an interviewee of reality only when that reality is bright and cheery. E.g. McCalvin v. Yukins, 444 F.3d 713, 721 (6th Cir.2006) (We are not prepared to forbid police from conveying to suspects the seriousness of the crime for which they are being investigated.). Though the case may exist in which the ugly truth could be presented in such an overwhelming and combative way that a suspect would lose his free will, the circumstances of the June 20th interrogation do not strike us as that case. Accordingly, neither the false promise regarding the polygraph nor the blunt statements regarding Simpson's options are sufficient to warrant habeas relief.
Simpson next contends that the police violated Miranda by suggesting that he needed an attorney only if he was lying. When the polygraph examiner, Officer Walker, began discussing Simpson's Miranda rights and indicated that Simpson had the right to have counsel present, Simpson replied, Oh, I can have an attorney present? (A528.) Walker responded, You c-can any-anytime, you can always have an attorney present. It is my understanding that you wanted to take the test. ( Id. ) Simpson understandably seems to have taken this to mean that, if he wanted an attorney present, he would not be able to take the test that day. Furthermore, he had already been told that if he did not take the polygraph that day, he would be charged with aggravated murder immediately. But, for the reasons stated above, this is not problematic under Miranda because it was essentially the truth. The problem arises in what happened next: Walker: Do you follow what I'm sayin'? That's ... if you're telling me the truth, then you won't have a problem with the test. If you're lying, then, uh, yeah, if I was lying, I probably would, I'd probably get an attorney, I probably wouldn't take the test. Simpson: Oh. Walker: Yea, well, that's me. But that's a decision that, yeah, you know, you have to make. This part of the form is wordy and is-is lengthy. What this says is, that you are giving me permission to give you the exam. (A531-32.) Simpson claims that we have held a materially identical exchange to violate Miranda. In Kyger, we addressed a situation in which the following transpired: Officer: Steve, do you understand them rights? Kyger: Yes, sir. Officer: Alright, having them rights in mind, would you answer some of our questions, without an attorney present? Kyger: I'd just as soon have an attorney [']cause, you know ya'll say there's been a shooting involved and that's a serious charge. Officer: Yes it is but we're investigating. We're not saying you shot anybody. We're just investigating. Now, if you've got something to hide, I can understand you not wanting to sign that. If you ain't got nothing to hide, you know, you can answer our questions. Kyger: I ain't got nothing to hide. Officer: Okay. But you don't want to answer our questions without an attorney present now? Kyger: You know, I'll answer a certain amount, you know. Officer: Okay, you know well you know you have the right to stop at any time. That's (inaudible) ... Kyger: Where do I sign at? Officer: Just where it says sign. Kyger: Okay [Kyger then signs]. 146 F.3d at 376-77 (emphasis added). In light of this colloquy, we found that Kyger's statement was a request for counsel, such that the interrogation should have stopped immediately. Id. at 379. Importantly, however, we went on to state that: [Even] if Kyger's request was equivocal, the subsequent statement by the police (Now, if you've got something to hide, I can understand you not wanting to sign that. If you ain't got nothing to hide, you know, you can answer our questions.) was an inappropriate effort at pressuring Kyger to answer, rather than an appropriate attempt to get Kyger to clarify his response. This would also render this questioning constitutionally infirm. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 454, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (disapproving of just such a tactic); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (approving the use of clarifying questions). Id. (citation omitted). As the Kyger Court noted, Miranda itself spoke ill of an interrogation technique in which the interrogator tries to dissuade a suspect from speaking with an attorney by saying Joe, I'm only looking for the truth, and if you're telling the truth, that's it. You can handle this by yourself. 384 U.S. at 454-55, 86 S.Ct. 1602. [5] The warden concedes that the statement in Kyger is similar to the statement by Officer Walker in this case. However, the warden seeks to distinguish the cases on the temporal basis that Kyger involved a suspect who had stated that he wanted to speak to an attorney whereas Simpson had not yet requested counsel. We find two faults with the warden's attempt at distinction. First, Kyger expressly stated that the officer's statement was inappropriate even if Kyger had only made an equivocal request for counsel, as opposed to a clear request for counsel. 146 F.3d at 379. Here, though Simpson's statement was certainly not an unequivocal request for counsel, it was at least an equivocal expression that he was considering speaking to counsel. Indeed, that Officer Walker responded with a clarifying statement (You c-can any-anytime, you can always have an attorney present. It is my understanding that you wanted to take the test.)which was appropriate under Davis, 512 U.S. at 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350 shows that Officer Walker thought that Simpson might have been requesting counsel. Thus, because Simpson's statement was an equivocal statement about his desire for counsel, Kyger is on all fours. Second, and more troubling, to accept the warden's distinction would be to accept a rule that police may not discourage interviewees from persisting with their request for counsel after they have already requested counsel, but may preemptively discourage them from seeking the advice of counsel after informing them of the right to counsel but before they actually request counsel. The warden offers no authority, and we are aware of none, endorsing such a strange proposition. In essence, to accept the warden's distinction would be to approve the following alteration of the Miranda warnings: You have the right to an attorney, but you only need to exercise that right if you are guilty or are lying. This would be an unreasonable rule and an unreasonable reading of Miranda, which expressly disapproved of such a tactic. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 454-55, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Here, Officer Walker indicated to Simpson that he only needed a lawyer if he had lied or intended to lie, and such a tactic is highly likely to taint an interviewee's decision-making calculus. The obvious takeaway from the perspective of someone in Simpson's position is that, if he requested an attorney, he would be admitting to lying, which would result in his immediately being charged with aggravated murder. Thus, his only other option, as stated by Officer Walker, was to take the polygraph that day without the assistance of counsel. Framing the issue in this way is inherently coercive and violative of Miranda. Furthermore, in so doing, Officer Walker crossed the line from stating the truth to distorting the truth and, arguably, to giving legal advice. Officers run a high risk when they move into the realm of offering advice. It is quite possible that, had Simpson spoken with an attorney, the attorney could have arranged for a polygraph at a later date. Officer Walker essentially advised Simpson to the contrary. As the Fifth Circuitin a case in which officers responded to an equivocal request for counsel by stating that an attorney could not relate [the suspect's] story to the police, and [the officer] explained that an attorney would probably advise him to say nothingexplained: [T]he limited inquiry permissible after an equivocal request for legal counsel may not take the form of an argument between interrogators and suspect about whether having counsel would be in the suspect's best interests or not. Nor may it incorporate a presumption by the interrogator to tell the suspect what counsel's advice to him would be if he were present. Such measures are foreign to the purpose of clarification, which is not to persuade but to discern. .... Officer Cunningham's explanation of the consequences of the suspect's talking to counsel might have been innocuous, even proper, had it been correct.... But even such explanations are perilous and, if given, must not be materially incorrect. Here they were incorrect: it was simply not true, as Thompson was told, that if he told his attorney he could not tell his side of the story..... The point is that counsel's advice about what is best for the suspect to do is for counsel, not the interrogator, to give. And it is for him to give after consultation with his client and after weighing where the suspect's best interests lie from the point of view of the suspect, not from that of a policeman be he ever so well intentioned. Until this occurs, it is simply impossible to predict what counsel's advice would be; and even if it were, the right to advice of counsel surely is the right to advice from counsel, not from the interrogator. Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 769, 772 (5th Cir.1979). Thompson 's reasoning applies with equal force here. Simpson correctly viewed Officer Walker as having superior knowledge about his circumstances and options. Officer Walker crossed the line separating adversary from advisor when he said that Simpson only needed an attorney if he was lying. Not only was this not true as a matter of legal strategy, as lawyers routinely instruct even innocent clients not to speak with the police, but, even if it were true, it was not Officer Walker's place to give the advice. Thus, because Miranda itself expressly disapproved of the tactics used here, as confirmed by Kyger, [6] and because the warden's attempt to distinguish Kyger is unpersuasive, we find that the state court's admission of the June 20th statement was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.