Opinion ID: 1242865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory provisions for tollingunsound mind

Text: ¶ 40 The limitations period begins to run upon accrual. However, the Arizona Legislature has enumerated three conditions that toll the running of the statute of limitations minority, unsound mind, and imprisonment. So far as relevant, A.R.S. § 12-502 states: If a person entitled to bring an action... is at the time the cause of action accrues ... of unsound mind, the period of such disability shall not be deemed a portion of the period limited for commencement of the action. Such person shall have the same time after removal of the disability which is allowed to others. ¶ 41 The statutory provision for tolling based on unsound mind is premised on equitable principles similar to those that underlie the discovery rule: it is unfair to bar an action in which the plaintiff is mentally disabled and thus unable to appreciate or pursue his or her legal rights. See, e.g., Vega v. Morris, 184 Ariz. 461, 463-64, 910 P.2d 6, 8-9 (1996); [13] O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1991) (Tolling statutes based on mental incompetency are enacted to relieve from the strict time restrictions people `who are unable to protect their legal rights because of an overall inability to function in society.'). [14] While the purpose of the discovery rule and the tolling provisions for unsound mind are essentially similar, their applications are critically distinct. The discovery rule contains an informational component requiring that the factfinder determine when the plaintiff knew or should have known the facts that constitute a cause of action. Tolling for unsound mind, on the other hand, requires that the factfinder determine whether the plaintiff had the mental capacity to bring a claim based on those facts. Thus, taken together, the discovery rule and the tolling provision for unsound mind delay the running of the statute of limitations requiring that the plaintiff both know of the underlying facts and be mentally capable of bringing a claim. ¶ 42 In Arizona, unsound mind occurs when the person is unable to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities. Allen v. Powell's Int'l, Inc., 21 Ariz.App. 269, 270, 518 P.2d 588, 589 (1974). This standard recognizes two separate inquiries that may evince an unsound mind: (1) inability to manage daily affairs, and (2) inability to understand legal rights and liabilities. The resulting inability to bring the action is a basis for tolling the statute of limitations under unsound mind. Porter v. Charter Medical Corp., 957 F.Supp. 1427, 1437 (N.D.Tex.1997) (purpose of unsound mind tolling is to protect persons who are without access to courts and unable to participate in, control, or understand progression of suit); [15] O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1142. We recently held, however, that it is insufficient to summarily claim inability to bring the action. Florez, 185 Ariz. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. The policy of protecting defendants against stale and fraudulent claims cannot be overcome by conclusory averments such as assertions that one was unable to manage daily affairs or understand legal rights and liabilities. Id. The plaintiff instead must set forth specific factshard evidencesupporting the conclusion of unsound mind. Id. But Florez recognized that recollection of repressed memories of such awful acts may itself constitute a traumatic experience. Id. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. Thus, one who recalls such repressed memories may not be able to connect the images in a fashion sufficiently coherent to allow an understanding of the incident or the resulting injury. Such a person may not be able to articulate events so as to pursue her legal rights. These factors, standing alone, do not establish unsound mind but certainly bear upon the ultimate standard adopted in Florez whether a person is incapable of carrying on the day-to-day affairs of human existence. Id.
¶ 43 While Florez raised the argument of repressed memory, our decision did not address memory repression but only the question of tolling because of unsound mind. Id. at 528, 917 P.2d at 257. A majority of this court found that the plaintiffs failed to assert sufficient facts to withstand summary judgment and that the facts presented in the record actually supported the opposite proposition. In Florez, the plaintiffs were able to maintain employment, take care of financial affairs (Gomez), attend school part-time and work full-time (Moonshadow), manage all their daily affairs, and take care of themselves. Gomez knew what had happened, and was able to talk about it and deal with it. He had consulted a lawyer and had been investigating the statute of limitations issue. Id. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. The majority rejected as conclusory the only assertions in the affidavits that supported tollingthe experts' allegations that the plaintiffs suffered from unsound mind or post-traumatic stress disorder. The majority reasoned that simply attaching the post-traumatic stress disorder label to a person's symptoms is insufficient to satisfy the Allen definition of unsound mind. Id. at 525-26, 917 P.2d at 254-55. ¶ 44 In the present case, the court of appeals has misread Florez for the harsh proposition that as a matter of law the disabling psychological effects of child abuse do not constitute an `unsound mind' under section 12-502(A) where the victims were able to function on a day-to-day basis and manage their ordinary affairs. Doe, 187 Ariz. at 608, 931 P.2d at 1118. The court of appeals then listed evidence presented in the affidavits demonstrating Plaintiff's ability to manage her daily affairs as grounds for granting summary judgment. But Florez does not stand for the proposition that summary judgment is appropriate just because there is evidence that an alleged victim is able to manage any of her daily affairs. That reading of Florez improperly shifts the focus of inquiry from whether the plaintiff has submitted evidence of her inability to manage her affairs to whether she has disproven her ability to manage any of them. A motion for summary judgment is decided on the basis of whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. In the context of determining unsound mind as evidenced by an inability to manage daily affairs, the question is whether there is credible evidence of the plaintiff's inability to manage daily affairs. The plaintiff is not required to discredit all evidence of ability to manage her affairs such controverting evidence merely establishes that there is a jury question on an issue of material fact. ¶ 45 Thus, the court of appeals' interpretation of Florez gives the court the inappropriate role of factfinder. It is not the court's role to weigh conflicting evidence to determine whether the plaintiff was capable of functioning on a day-to-day basis. That role would encroach upon the jury's function. Florez goes no further than to require factual rather than conclusory substantiation of unsound mind. The Florez discussion of facts demonstrating the plaintiffs' ability to manage their daily affairs was illustrative, but the critical inquiry of the majority opinion focused on the absence of facts supporting the plaintiffs' claim. When the plaintiff has alleged facts indicating inability to manage daily affairs, it is the court's duty to deny summary judgment. We do not permit the court to substitute itself for the factfinder. ¶ 46 Applying this to the present case, we conclude that the trial judge erred in granting summary judgment for Defendants. The record contains evidence from which one could conclude that for a considerable period of time Plaintiff was unable to function in day-to-day affairs. She experienced suicidal ideation, was in denial of the abuse she suffered, and required psychological and psychiatric therapy and treatment as well as institutionalization for her mental condition; because she was unable to function at work, she had to quit her job and was unable to seek other employment. Because of her denial and inability to articulate or discuss the abusive acts, a jury could find that Plaintiff, unlike the Florez plaintiffs, was disabled and thus unable to seek or address the issues with legal counsel for approximately two years. Also, unlike the Florez plaintiffs, Plaintiff was not ready to talk about it; nor was she ready to deal with it. Cf. Florez, 185 Ariz. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. Unlike the affidavit in Florez, the affidavits in this case present facts, not mere conclusory opinions of post-traumatic stress disorder or unsound mind. ¶ 47 As the court of appeals correctly recognized, there are facts in the record that detract from Plaintiff's claim of inability to manage daily affairs; those findings would preclude summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff if she moved for summary judgment on the unsound mind issue. In that case, the issue would be whether there were any facts indicating Plaintiff was of sound mind, thus precluding summary judgment. However, it was Defendant who moved for summary judgment; the facts offered in opposition to that motion are more than sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether Plaintiff was unable to carry on the day-to-day affairs of life.
¶ 48 In the present case, the court of appeals limited its focus to whether Plaintiff was able to manage her daily affairs and ignored any relevance of the alternative inquiry into her ability to pursue the action the second part of the Allen test. The separate concurrence today takes a similar view. Facts permitting, however, Plaintiff is entitled to have the jury consider both alternatives. The court of appeals erred to the extent that it read Florez as prohibiting any inquiry into the question of ability to pursue a legal action. In Florez, a majority of this court wrote, [t]he focus of the unsound mind inquiry is on a plaintiff's ability to manage his or her daily affairs. It does not focus on plaintiff's ability to pursue the subject matter of the litigation at issue. 185 Ariz. at 525, 917 P.2d at 254. It appears that difficulty in interpreting this language may have given rise to a split in and between the two divisions of the court of appeals with respect to the proper scope of the Allen inquiry as applied in Florez. In Nolde v. Frankie, Division One interpreted Florez in the same manner as the Doe court. 190 Ariz. 422, 949 P.2d 511 (App.1997). The majority opinion reasoned that the touchstone of whether an unsound mind will toll the statute is whether the plaintiff is able to manage his or her daily affairs. Id. at 423, 949 P.2d at 512. However, in Logerquist v. Danforth, Division Two recognized that Florez held in favor of defendants [b]ecause the evidence, demonstrated that both plaintiffs could function on a day to day basis and understood the nature of their legal rights. 188 Ariz. 16, 19, 932 P.2d 281, 284 (App.1996) (emphasis added). ¶ 49 Florez merely reaffirmed our longstanding two-part test of unsound mind. In our discussion, we cited favorably both divisions of the court of appeals: Allen, 21 Ariz. App. 269, 518 P.2d 588; and Nelson v. Nelson, 137 Ariz. 213, 669 P.2d 990 (App.1983). In Allen, of course, unsound mind was defined as being unable to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities. 21 Ariz.App. at 270, 518 P.2d at 589. In Nelson, the court of appeals not only applied the Allen test but also provided some insight into the longevity of this standard in Arizona jurisprudence. The court cited as analogous a very early decision by this court in which incompetency, for purposes of invalidating a testamentary instrument, required that the grantor be incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree and knowing the consequences of the instrument he executes. 137 Ariz. at 216, 669 P.2d at 993 (citing Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 470, 198 P. 712, 715 (1921)). After relying on both opinions, we expressly agreed with both divisions of our court of appeals. Florez, 185 Ariz. at 525, 917 P.2d at 254. ¶ 50 Moreover, the authorities cited in Florez for the definition of unsound mind support the proposition that unsound mind is evaluated by both management of daily affairs and ability to comprehend legal rights. See id. In O'Neal, for example, the Utah Supreme Court explained that in determining what sort of lack of ability and capacity to protect one's legal rights qualifies for disability protection, courts generally hold that a person is incompetent for the purposes of a provision tolling the statute of limitations `when the disability is of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage his [or her] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or liabilities.' 821 P.2d at 1142 (quoting 51 AM.JUR.2D Limitation of Actions § 187 (1970) (emphasis added)). [16] ¶ 51 The language in Florez must be read with respect to the facts of that case. In Florez, almost all of the plaintiffs' evidence addressed only the first Allen factor of unsound mindmanagement of daily affairs. Nonetheless, the Florez majority considered the alternative Allen factor of ability to understand legal rights, noting that the only real evidence offered showed that the plaintiffs had discussed their potential causes of action with attorneys more than two years before bringing suit. 185 Ariz. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. The court emphasized that one of the therapists admitted that Moonshadow understood the nature of her legal rights. Id. Thus the only evidence considered by the majority supported the proposition that the plaintiffs were able to understand their rights. The brevity of attention paid to the second Allen factor was thus merely an incident to the factual case presentednot an abandonment of the factor. Indeed, consideration of the plaintiffs' retention of counsel was perfectly consistent with Allen, in which the only factual evidence bearing on the plaintiff's ability to understand his legal rights was the fact that he retained counsel. The Allen court concluded that the fact that [the plaintiff] hired a lawyer within four months after the accident is strong evidence that the plaintiff was aware of his legal rights. 21 Ariz.App. at 270, 518 P.2d at 589. Thus Florez did not overrule Allen and should not be read as a departure from it. ¶ 52 When the facts require the court to focus on the second part of the Allen test, inability to understand and assert legal rights may provide the basis for concluding that the plaintiff was of unsound mind. In the instant case, there is more than enough evidence to withstand summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff was able to understand her legal rights. Depending on when Plaintiff's causes of action accrued, the following evidence may establish a genuine issue of material fact as to tolling: Plaintiff repressed memories of abuse (one cannot understand legal rights with respect to a wrong of which the person was unaware); she was in denial that any abuse took place, was unable to accept that the events had occurred, and was unable to articulate them; she experienced feelings of complicity with her abuser (evidencing, perhaps, that she did not understand that a wrong had occurred); and she experienced feelings of responsibility and guilt for the abuse (same). When she was able to confront her parents about the prior abuse, she was within the two-year limitations period. Moreover, in the present case consultation with an attorney, the single factor evidencing an ability to understand legal rights in both Allen and Florez, occurred within two years of the filing date. Thus the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's award of summary judgment. The facts here create a genuine issue on the second Allen testability to understand and assert one's legal rights.
¶ 53 The statute is tolled if the plaintiff is of unsound mind at the time the cause of action accrues or thereafter. A.R.S. § 12-502. In applying the tolling statute, however, the court of appeals considered facts that chronologically preceded by years Plaintiff's first memory of abuse. Doe, 187 Ariz. at 608, 931 P.2d at 1118. The court noted that Doe was able to manage her affairs and understand her legal rights. She graduated from college, supported herself, worked as a stock trader, and was promoted to a vice president position. Id. These undisputed facts preceded any recalled events and consequent accrual of Plaintiff's cause of action under the discovery rule. They are therefore not determinative of whether the claim that came into existence after recall may be tolled due to an unsound mind. [17] The statute commands that tolling occur only if the plaintiff is of unsound mind at some time after the cause of action accrues. A.R.S. § 12-502. Plaintiff may have suffered throughout her life from denial, guilt, repression of memory, and some degree of incapacitation associated with the childhood sexual abuse, but under the discovery rule her cause of action did not accrue until some time after she had her first flashback. Thus the proper factual inquiry for whether Plaintiff was of unsound mind focuses on her mental condition at and after the time of accrual. The fact that Plaintiff demonstrated characteristics evincing a sound mind long prior to accrual does not by itself determine that Plaintiff's mind was sound upon or after accrual. Therefore, in conjunction with the discovery rule, it is for the jury to (1) discern when the cause of action accrued, and (2) determine whether at that time and thereafter Plaintiff was of unsound mind.