Opinion ID: 269912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct of Puffing

Text: 17 During the voir dire examination, Thaw's counsel interrogated several prospective jurors on their understanding of the distinction between fraud and mere 'puffing' in a business promotion. The District Judge terminated this line of questioning, stating out of the jury's presence that he would instruct on the distinction at the close of the evidence. Defense counsel, however, did not request such a charge either at the close of the testimony or after the court's charge when the Judge asked if either party desired additional instructions. Thaw argues that a request for such instruction was not necessary, as the court's failure to instruct on an essential element of the offense was clearly prejudicial. We have been cited to only one case as support for petitioner on this point, United States v. Levy, 153 F.2d 995 (3d Cir. 1946). There, a defendant was charged with selling whiskey at prices above those set forth in the Emergency Price Control Regulations. The trial court failed to instruct on the applicable statutes or explain the nature of the offense charged. The conviction was reversed on the ground that the jury was given no basis for imputing illegality to the conduct involved. Here, on the other hand, the illegality of the charged conduct was evident to the jury. The trial court specifically instructed on the elements of the crime, and told the jury that one essential element of the offense was an attempt to defraud. 18 Where there is substantial ground to fear that prejudice to the defendant may have resulted from failure to instruct fully, an appellate court may, in the interest of justice, consider a point not raised below. E.g., Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926); Yoffe v. United States, 153 F.2d 570, 576 (1st Cir. 1946). But there is no ground to suspect prejudice in this instance. The evidence for both the Government and the defendant was designed to characterize the activities of Thaw as either fraudulent or nonfraudulent. In his direct testimony, Thaw went to great lengths to portray his dealings as ordinary business conduct, and his counsel's closing argument attempted to characterize them in the same light. Preferably, the Judge having stated that he would charge specifically on 'puffing' should have done so. But it is plain that the court's statement was overlooked not only by the Judge, but also by counsel, because the substance of such a charge was covered in the instructions given. It does not appear that the issue the jury was called upon to decide was obscured or that any argument favorable to the defendant was cut off or weakened. 19