Opinion ID: 1649522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the circuit court erred and abused its discretion in allowing expert testimony regarding loss of enjoyment of life.

Text: ¶ 27. At trial, KCS filed a motion in limine in an effort to exclude the testimony of Dr. Stan Smith. The claim was that an expert must have acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs, and, moreover, that the method by which his opinion was reached was not generally accepted in his field of expertise as required by M.R.E. 702. On appeal, KCS argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion in limine. ¶ 28. The admission of testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Roberts v. Grafe Auto Co., 701 So.2d 1093, 1098 (Miss.1997). Unless we conclude that the discretion was arbitrary and clearly erroneous, the decision will stand. Id. (citing Seal v. Miller, 605 So.2d 240, 243 (Miss.1992); Hooten v. State, 492 So.2d 948, 950-51 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 29. Under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony should be admitted only when the trial court can affirmatively answer a two-fold inquiry. First, the witness must be qualified as an expert because of the knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education he or she possesses. M.R.E. 702. See also Watkins v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 770 So.2d 970, 973 (Miss.Ct.App.2000). Second, the witness's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge must assist the trier of fact to understand or decide a fact in issue. Id. Rule 702 does not relax the standard that the expert must indeed be qualified to speak an opinion on a matter within his alleged field of knowledge, nor does it relax the requirement that the scientific principle from which the expert's opinion is derived `must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs' M.R.E. 702 cmt. (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923)). ¶ 30. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that Federal Rules of Evidence 702 supersedes the former general acceptance test set forth in Frye. Mississippi, however, has not adopted the Daubert test, and continues to utilize the general acceptance test enumerated in Frye even after the adoption of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Miss.1998) (citing Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028, 1046 (Miss.1998); Polk v. State, 612 So.2d 381, 390 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 31. In Hooten v. State, 492 So.2d 948 (Miss.1986), we reiterated the rule for expert witnesses stating, it is not necessary that one offering to testify as an expert be infallible or possess the highest degree of skill; it is sufficient if that person possesses peculiar knowledge or information regarding the relevant subject matter which is not likely to be possessed by a layman. Id. at 948 (citing Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012, 1015 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 32. Johnson contends that Smith's testimony assisted the trier of fact in determining the amount of loss suffered as a result of KCS's negligent conduct and thus meets the standards set forth in MRE 702 and Frye. We agree. Although there is some honest dispute as to whether Dr. Smith's testimony was generally accepted in his field, the question of whether the proffered witness had obtained the required degree of specialized knowledge within a particular field is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless there is abuse of that discretion, his determination will not be disturbed on appeal. Pharr v. Anderson, 436 So.2d 1357, 1359 (Miss.1983)(collecting authorities). ¶ 33. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Smith to testify as he had qualified as an expert in over 100 cases. Three affidavits of noted economists were tendered opining that, [c]alculations of loss of enjoyment of life damages are now widely accepted in the field of forensic economics. The railroad produced its own expert who testified that Dr. Smith's conclusions were unreliable, invalid, and speculative. It is the jury's duty to determine which expert's testimony is to be given the greater weight. We do not find today that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing this testimony.