Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grant of Prosecution Challenge to Prospective Alternate Juror Janice S.

Text: In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror Janice S. wrote that she really [didn't] believe in the death penalty, but she thought she could set her beliefs aside and impose it if she thought it was appropriate. During voir dire, however, Janice S. said that she did not believe she had the right to say ... somebody else should die. I can't make that decision. The court asked if Janice S. could think of a set of circumstances in which she could impose the death penalty for a person convicted of first degree murder committed in the course of a robbery. Janice S. said she could not, although she had written on her questionnaire that she could do so. Janice S. explained: [N]ow I'm thinking. I had time to think. And no, I couldn't say  even if they did all that  that I still couldn't say that I could sentence this person to death. When the court asked again, are you telling us ... you can't see a set of circumstances where you could find yourself personally voting to put someone to death, Janice S. answered, Right. I couldn't. No, I could not. Later, the prosecutor challenged Janice S. for cause. Defense counsel asked for an opportunity to attempt to rehabilitate her. In the alternative, he opposed the challenge based on Janice S.'s questionnaire responses expressing a willingness to set aside her beliefs and impose the death penalty if appropriate. The court sustained the challenge without allowing further inquiry. (11) A prospective juror may be excluded for cause without compromising a defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury if the juror's views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424; see also People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1146 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate. [Citations.] ( People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1246 [131 Cal.Rptr.2d 468, 64 P.3d 762].) Generally, the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause are matters within the wide discretion of the trial court, seldom disturbed on appeal. [Citations.] There is no requirement that a prospective juror's bias against the death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror. [Citations.] `On review, if the juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's determination of the juror's state of mind is binding. If there is no inconsistency, we will uphold the court's ruling if it is supported by substantial evidence. [Citations.]' ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 357 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]. ...) ( Jones, at pp. 1246-1247.) The record amply supports the trial court's dismissal of Janice S. for cause. Although her questionnaire responses were somewhat ambiguous, Janice S. unequivocally stated at voir dire that she had considered the matter further and concluded she could not vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances. This clear admission established that Janice S. could never impose the penalty sought by the prosecution in this capital case. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Janice S. because her views would have substantially impaired her ability to perform her duties as a juror. (12) Defendant also claims the court violated his constitutional rights by refusing to allow defense counsel to question Janice S. further on her views about the death penalty. Defendant speculates that further questioning might have shown that Janice S. could have set aside her strong views and fulfilled her duties as a capital juror. However, as we have repeatedly stated, [t]he court has discretion to refuse to allow defense counsel to question jurors for the purpose of rehabilitation if their `answers made their disqualification unmistakably clear ....' ( People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1085, citing People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 364 [78 Cal.Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395].) ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 355; see also People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 823 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2].) We find no abuse of discretion. After reflection, Janice S. candidly admitted that she could not vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances. Her clearly stated views disqualified her from jury service. (13) Defendant nevertheless insists the questioning of Janice S. was constitutionally inadequate under Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 112 S.Ct. 2222]. Not so. Morgan simply held that general questions about a juror's ability to be fair and follow the law are not sufficient to detect those in the venire who would automatically vote for or against death. ( Id. at pp. 734-735.) Questions about death penalty biases must be specific enough that they require potential jurors to consider whether they have such strong views about capital punishment that they could not follow the law. ( Id. at pp. 735-736.) The trial court's questions directly involving the death penalty were sufficiently specific. As the Supreme Court observed in Morgan, such jurors  whether they be unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the death penalty in every case  by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with law .... ( Id. at p. 735.)