Opinion ID: 1422239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agent of the Court

Text: DJJ argues a juvenile probation officer acts as an agent and representative of the Family Court, and, therefore, Dorsey's placement of Fredrico was a quasi-judicial act entitling him to immunity under the Tort Claims Act, S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60(1). We disagree. DJJ cites Fleming v. Asbill, 326 S.C. 49, 483 S.E.2d 751 (1997), for the proposition that non-judicial officers are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for carrying out a function assigned by the court. In Fleming, we granted absolute judicial immunity to a court-appointed guardian ad litem based on common law theories. Id. This Court did not apply the Tort Claims Act in Fleming because we found the guardian ad litem was not an employee of the state as defined by section 15-78-30(c) of the Act. We held, however, that common law judicial immunity protected the guardian from liability in the performance of her official duties, despite a line of cases holding guardians ad litem liable for negligence. Id.; see McIver v. Thompson, 117 S.C. 175, 108 S.E. 411 (1921). We distinguished those cases based on the dramatically different role of court-appointed guardians ad litem in child custody suits today. Fleming, supra . In Fleming, this Court based the grant of immunity for court-appointed guardians on the necessity for guardians to be able to act without fear of lawsuits as well as the inequity of holding guardians liable for negligence. DJJ argues that the guardians were awarded immunity merely for being representatives of the court. Although we indicated the guardians were representatives of the court, it was not the decisive factor in our decision to grant guardians immunity. A primary role of the guardian is to be an advocate within the courtroom. However, guardians are not acting on `behalf' of the court; [they] do not affect legal relationships between the court and third parties. Fleming, 326 S.C. at 53, 483 S.E.2d 751. Their job is to represent their ward's interest before the court, unlike probation officers whose duties extend far beyond the courtroom. Additionally, the role of a court-appointed guardian is distinguishable from the role of a DJJ probation officer because the guardian's participation ends when the court renders its decision. The DJJ officer's role does not. Instead, the officer is essentially charged with executing the court's orders. While the officer may be entitled to judicial immunity when executing those orders, the present case involves an officer who, at least for summary judgment purposes, deviated from the explicit terms of the order. For these reasons, we decline to hold that DJJ is entitled to summary judgment for judicial immunity as an agent of the Family Court.