Opinion ID: 2828903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Single-Subject Challenge

Text: RCW 35A.12.130 provides in relevant part that [n]o ordinance shall contain more than one subject and that must be clearly expressed in its title. While no judicial opinion has interpreted this statutory language, the parties agree that it 3 The parties dispute whether the proceeding before the superior court was a summary judgment disposition or a bench trial that ended in a declaratory judgment. We conclude that it was a summary judgment disposition. At the hearing, the trial court made clear it was relying on the declarations submitted by various parties but not resolving factual disputes as to the consequences of Proposition 1 on airport operations. 5 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 appears to be an extension of article II, section 19 of our state constitution. We therefore consider our cases interpreting that constitutional provision. In determining whether a bill, ordinance, or initiative relates to one general subject or multiple specific subjects, Washington courts look to the provision's title for guidance. When classifying an initiative to the people (as opposed to an initiative to the legislative body), the operative title is the ballot title because 'it is the ballot title with which voters are faced in the voting booth.' Wash. Citizens Action of Wash. v. State, 162 Wn.2d 142, 154, 171 P.3d 486 (2007) (quoting Wash. Fed'n of State Emps. v. State, 127 Wn.2d 544, 555, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995)). Contrary to the Committee's contention, the ballot title includes more than the first sentence of the ballot description. It consists of a statement of the subject of the measure, a concise description of the measure, and the question of whether or not the measure should be enacted into law. Wash. Ass 'nfor Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention v. State, 174 Wn.2d 642, 655, 278 P.3d 632 (2012). 4 A ballot title may be general or restrictive. When a ballot title suggests a general, overarching subject matter for the initiative, Wash. Ass 'n of Neigh. Stores v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 369, 70 P.3d 920 (2003), it is considered to be general and 'great liberality will be indulged to hold that any subject reasonably germane to such 4 To the extent our analysis in Washington Ass 'n ofNeighborhood Stores v. State, 149 Wn.2d 359, 368-69, 70 P.3d 920 (2003), suggested the operative title is limited to the first sentence of a ballot measure, this suggestion has since been foreclosed. See Wash. Ass 'nfor Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention, 174 Wn.2d at 655. 6 Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 title may be embraced,' Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wn.2d 183,207, 11 P.3d 762 (2000) (quoting DeCano v. State, 7 Wn.2d 613,627, 110 P.2d 627 (1941)). Only rational unity among the matters need exist. City ofBurien v. Kiga, 144 Wn.2d 819, 825-26,31 P.3d 659 (2001). Rational unity exists when the matters within the body of the initiative are germane to the general title and to one another. Id. at 826. In contrast, a title is considered restrictive 'where a particular part or branch of a subject is carved out and selected as the subject of the legislation.' State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 127, 942 P.2d 363 (1997) (quoting Gruen v. State Tax Comm 'n, 35 Wn.2d 1, 23, 211 P.2d 651 (1949)). In other words, a restrictive title is narrow as opposed to broad, specific rather than generic. !d. Restrictive titles are not given the same liberal construction as general titles; laws with restrictive titles fail if their substantive provisions do not fall 'fairly within' the restrictive language. Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wn.2d 622, 633, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) (quoting State ex rel. Wash. Toll Bridge Auth. v. Yelle, 32 Wn.2d 13, 26, 200 P.2d 467 (1948)). Here, the ballot title to Proposition 1 stated: Proposition No. 1 concerns labor standards for certain employers. This Ordinance requires certain hospitality and transportation employers to pay specified employees a $15.00 hourly minimum wage, adjusted annually for inflation, and pay sick and safe time of 1 hour per 40 hours worked. Tips shall be retained by workers who performed the services. Employers must offer additional hours to existing part-time employees before hiring from the outside. SeaTac must establish auditing 7 Fifo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 procedures to monitor and ensure compliance. Other labor standards are established. Should this Ordinance be enacted into law? King County Official Local Voters' Pamphlet, General and Special Election 94 (Nov. 5, 2013). Other labor standards includes a 90-day retention policy on successor employers after a business acquisition or merger. SEATAC MUNICIPAL CODE 7.45.060. The trial court upheld Proposition 1 against Fila Foods's single-subject challenge. We affirm in this respect. We agree with the trial court that the breadth of topics covered by Proposition 1 and the structure of its title are not appreciably different from the scope and structure of an initiative we recently upheld in Washington Ass 'nfor Substance Abuse & Violence Prevention. 174 Wn.2d at 665. The ballot title in that case indicated: Initiative Measure No. 1183 concerns liquor: beer, wine, and spirits (hard liquor). This measure would close state liquor stores and sell their assets; license private parties to sell and distribute spirits; set license fees based on sales; regulate licensees; and change regulation of wine distribution. Should this measure be enacted into law? Id. at 647 (quoting State ofWashington Voters' Pamphlet, General Election 19 (Nov. 8, 2011)). In addition to these specific provisions, the measure earmarked a portion of revenue raised from liquor license fees for the funding of public safety programs, including police, fire, and emergency services. !d. at 650. Like the structure of 8 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 Proposition 1, Initiative Measure No. 1183 indicated a general topic and then listed some but not all of its substantive measures. Despite these more specific details, we found the title was general, pertaining to the broad subject of liquor. !d. at 655. And, although the public safety earmark's connection with the measure's liquor privatization provisions was arguably tenuous, we found the earmark to be germane to liquor privatization given the enforcement burdens the measure places on local governments, and given the legislature's past recognition of the relationship between liquor regulation and public welfare. !d. at 657-58. We similarly find that Proposition 1 satisfies the single-subject rule. Although the title lists various provisions, it also states that Proposition 1 generally concerns labor standards for certain employers. King County Official Local Voters' Pamphlet, General and Special Election 94 (Nov. 5, 2013). This language is sufficiently broad to place voters on notice of its contents, including the 90-day worker-retention policy imposed on successor employers. The retention policy concerns labor standards and is reasonably germane to the establishment of minimum employee benefits, including job security. Proposition 1 survives the single-subject challenge. Moving to the substance of Proposition 1, we next consider whether it can be validly enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport under state law. 9 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 II. Application at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport The trial court ruled that Proposition 1 could not be applied at the SeattleTacoma International Airport because it would conflict with the Port of Seattle's jurisdiction over the airport under RCW 14.08.330. But we must try to harmonize municipal ordinances with state law when possible; we will invalidate an ordinance only if it 'directly and irreconcilably conflicts' with state law. Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 144 Wn.2d 556, 564, 29 P.3d 709 (2001) (quoting Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 561, 807 P.2d 353 (1991)). Based on our analysis ofthe statutory language, our prior case law, and the functional differences between cities and special purpose districts, we conclude that Proposition 1 can be harmonized with RCW 14.08.330 because the Port of Seattle does not show that Proposition 1 would interfere with airport operations. Therefore, we hold that Proposition 1 can be applied at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P .3d 281 (2005). When interpreting statutes, our goal is to effectuate the legislature's intent. Id. If the statute's meaning is plain, we give effect to that meaning as the expression of the legislature's intent. !d. Plain meaning is determined from the statute as a whole; we consider the ordinary meaning of the language used in the context of the entire statute, related statutory provisions, and the statutory scheme from which the language appears. Id. If the 10 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we may 'resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history,' to resolve the ambiguity. Burton v. Lehman, 153 Wn.2d 416, 423, 103 P.3d 1230 (2005) (quoting Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 134, 830 P.2d 350 (1992)). At issue in this case is whether Proposition 1 directly and irreconcilably conflicts with RCW 14.08.330, the statute that gives special purpose districts (such as the Port of Seattle) jurisdiction over airports. The statute provides: Every airport and other air navigation facility controlled and operated by any municipality, or jointly controlled and operated pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, shall, subject to federal and state laws, rules, and regulations, be under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the municipality or municipalities controlling and operating it. The municipality or municipalities shall have concurrent jurisdiction over the adjacent territory described in RCW 14.08.120(2). No other municipality in which the airport or air navigation facility is located shall have any police jurisdiction of the same or any authority to charge or exact any license fees or occupation taxes for the operations. However, by agreement with the municipality operating and controlling the airport or air navigation facility, a municipality in which an airport or air navigation facility is located may be responsible for the administration and enforcement of the uniform fire code, as adopted by that municipality under RCW 19.27.040, on that portion of any airport or air navigation facility located within its jurisdictional boundaries. RCW 14.08.330. Thus, the first question is whether the meaning of this statute is plain on its face or whether it is ambiguous. The Port of Seattle contends that the statute is plain on its face. We do not agree. Reading RCW 14.08.330 as a whole, we find the statute's exclusive jurisdiction and control language ambiguous. The statute provides that 11 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 every airport controlled by a municipality shall ... be under the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the municipality ... controlling and operating it. Id. But the statute continues, No other municipality in which the airport ... is located shall have any police jurisdiction of the same or any authority to charge or exact any license fees or occupation taxes for the operations. !d. The Port of Seattle contends that the exclusive jurisdiction language means the Port of Seattle has the sole and undivided authority to regulate any matter that occurs at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. It contends, The City does not have the statutory authority to regulate any matters occurring at [the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport]. Br. of Resp't Port of Seattle at 9 (emphasis added). However, reading the statute's two sentences together, it is unclear what the legislature intended to grant the Port of Seattle exclusive jurisdiction and control over. The statute does not say any matters. See RCW 14.08.330. If the legislature meant for the Port of Seattle to have exclusive jurisdiction and control over every conceivable matter that occurred at the airport, then the statute's subsequent sentence, detailing that [n]o other municipality in which the airport ... is located shall have any police jurisdiction of the same or any authority to charge or exact any license fees or occupation taxes for the operations, would be superfluous. ' [N]o part of a statute should be deemed inoperative or superfluous unless it is the result of obvious mistake or error.' In re Det. of Strand, 167 Wn.2d 180, 189, 217 P.3d 1159 (2009) (quoting Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 12 Filo Foods, LLC v. City ofSeaTac 89723-9 Wn.2d 1, 13, 810 P.2d 917, 817 P.2d 1359 (1991)). By saying that municipalities in which airports are located may not charge license fees or occupation taxes, the legislature implied that there are matters that municipalities can regulate. Since the statute is unclear regarding what exactly the legislature intended to grant the Port of Seattle exclusive jurisdiction and control over, we find the statute ambiguous. Our task, then, is to determine the legislature's intent. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d at 600. The city of SeaTac contends that the legislature intended to give the Port of Seattle jurisdiction over only airport operations, whereas the Port of Seattle contends that the legislature intended to prohibit any city of SeaTac law or regulation from applying at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. As described below, we reject the Port of Seattle's interpretation because we find it, among other things, incompatible with a special purpose district's limited powers. Unlike cities, which are granted the broadest powers of local selfgovernment, RCW 35A.01.010, a port district is a special purpose district, which is limited in its powers to those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted, and also those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation. Port of Seattle v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm 'n, 92 Wn.2d 789, 79495,597 P.2d 383 (1979). The legislature granted powers to municipalities that establish or acquire airports in RCW 14.08.120. Among these powers is the power [t]o adopt and amend 13 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 all needed rules, regulations, and ordinances for the management, government, and use of any properties under [the municipality's] control and to fix by ordinance or resolution ... penalties for the violation of the rules, regulations, and ordinances, and enforce those penalties in the same manner in which penalties prescribed by other rules, regulations, and ordinances of the municipality are enforced. RCW 14.08.120(2). The Port of Seattle asks us to interpret this statute, in combination with RCW 14.08.330' s grant of exclusive jurisdiction, as a law that strips the city of SeaTac of all police power-that is, all of its normal authority to regulate in the interests of public health and safety-at the airport. But RCW 14.08.120(2) contemplates a municipality using its normal rule-making authority and procedures to enact and enforce airport-specific rules, and the Port of Seattle's normal authority does not include the exercise of general police powers. Outside the airport context, a port district's rule-making authority is subordinate to the authority of the municipality within which it is situated. RCW 53.08.220(1). While any port district may formulate all needful regulations for the use ... of any properties or facilities owned or operated by it, those regulations must conform to and be consistent with the ordinances of the city or town in which the district is located. !d. This statutory scheme reflects a fundamental difference between the powers of a special purpose district, like the Port of Seattle, and those of a city, town, or county. 14 Fila Foods, LLC v. City ofSeaTac 89723-9 To interpret RCW 14.08.120 and .330 in the manner the Port of Seattle suggests, we would have to conclude that the legislature intended the Revised Airports Act, chapter 14.08 RCW, to deprive the city of SeaTac of all its police powers at the airport, even though the Port of Seattle lacks the authority to fill this regulatory gap through its normal rule-making authority. We decline to interpret the Revised Airports Act so broadly. Although the language ofRCW 14.08.330 plainly denies the city of SeaTac some authority, the overall statutory scheme and the purposes underlying the Revised Airports Act suggest that RCW 14.08.330 denies the city of SeaTac authority over airport operations and the subject of aeronautics, as opposed to any matters occurring at [the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport]. Br. of Resp 't Port of Seattle at 9 (emphasis added). The legislature expressly instructed that the purpose of the statutory scheme is to ensure uniformity in the laws regarding aeronautics. RCW 14.08.340. Additionally, the law detailing the specific powers of municipalities operating airports, RCW 14.08.120(1), provides that a municipality may establish a board responsible for the construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, and regulation [of the airport or other air navigation facility]. These aspects of the statutory scheme lead us to conclude that the legislature intended to vest authority for the operation of the airport exclusively with the Port of Seattle, 15 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 but not to prohibit a local municipality like the city of SeaTac from regulating for the general welfare in a manner unrelated to airport operations. Our interpretation is supported by our case law indicating that the purpose of the statutory scheme is to preclude local municipalities from interfering with respect to the operation of the Seattle-Tacoma airport. King County v. Port of Seattle, 37 Wn.2d 338, 348,223 P.2d 834 (1950) (addressing whether local municipalities can impose license fees). In that case, we considered a separate-but related-issue: whether King County could impose a licensing fee on taxicabs operating at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. We looked to the statute's specific limitation regarding the ability of local municipalities to impose license fees and held that King County could not impose a fee because the statute provides that 'no other municipality in which such airport or air navigation facility [is located] shall have any police jurisdiction of the same or any authority to charge or exact any license fees.' Id. at 346-47 (alteration in original) (quoting REM. REV. STAT. § 2722-44 (Supp. 1945) (codified as amended at RCW 14.08.330)). We explained that [t]he effect of this section, when read in the light of the entire revised airports act, is merely to preclude [King County]from interfering with respect to the operation of the SeattleTacoma airport and forbids [King County from] exacting any license fees. Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 16 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 While that case was focused on the more specific limitation on license fees, this language represents a commonsense interpretation of the legislature's intent, particularly its grant of jurisdiction. Looking at the statutory scheme overall, we conclude that the legislature intended to give the Port of Seattle exclusive jurisdiction over the operation of the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport: specifically the construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, operation, and regulation of the airport. RCW 14.08.120(1). Here, Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport operations or the subject of aeronautics. In addition, the Port of Seattle does not show that Proposition 1 would interfere with airport operations. As a result, we conclude that Proposition 1 can be enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport without violating RCW 14.08.330. The dissent asserts that the provision ofRCW 14.08.330 related to the administration and enforcement of local fire codes disproves our interpretation of the statute. Dissent at 6. It asserts that [i]fthe legislature intended the operating municipality's exclusive jurisdiction to be over only [airport operations], why would the legislature specify an exception from the operating municipality's exclusive jurisdiction to allow the municipality in which the airport sits to enforce afire code at the airport? !d. at 6-7. The legislative history of the fire code amendment answers the dissent's question. The house committee in support of the bill testified, Seattle has been enforcing its uniform fire code on the portion of the King County airport 17 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 located within its boundaries, but their attorney feels they may not have this authority . . . . This bill clarifies an ambiguity in current law. H.B. REPORT ON H.B. 139, 49th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1985). That language shows that the legislature added the fire code language because it recognized that the statute's ambiguous language called into question Seattle's ability to enforce the uniform fire code. By adding in the language, it clarifie[d] an ambiguity.5 Id. Rather than disproving our interpretation, the house bill reinforces our conclusion that the statute's language is ambiguous. Our interpretation is further supported by the portion ofRCW 14.08.330 that incorporates other state laws, including the Washington Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW. To the extent the Port of Seattle's jurisdiction over the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport is exclusive, its jurisdiction is still subject to ... state laws, rules, and regulations. RCW 14.08.330. As we have said before, that clause subordinates the Port of Seattle's authority over the airport to applicable state law. Port of Seattle, 92 Wn.2d at 804. One applicable state law that we must consider is RCW 49.46.120, part of the Washington Minimum Wage Act. That statute provides: Any standards relating to wages, hours, or other working conditions established by any applicable federal, state, or local law or ordinance ... which are more favorable to employees than the minimum standards applicable under this chapter ... shall be in full force and effect. 5 Unfortunately, while the legislature recognized that the existing statute was ambiguous, it chose to clarify only the provision related to the fire code. The ambiguity with regard to other municipal laws remains. 18 Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 RCW 49.46.120 (emphasis added). Thus, state law sets the minimum wage in any given location at the most favorable level to the employee whether by federal, state, or local law. No party argues that the Port of Seattle is exempt from our state minimum wage law. The Port of Seattle's regulatory authority over the airport is subordinate to all state laws, including the state minimum wage law, that require it to comply with local minimum wage laws. This argument regarding the Washington Minimum Wage Act was first advanced by the Washington State attorney general as amicus to this court, and Filo Foods argues that we may not consider new arguments raised only by an amicus. This misunderstands this court's authority; while we generally decline to reach issues not properly presented by the parties, this court has inherent authority to consider issues not raised by the parties if necessary to reach a proper decision. Alverado v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., Ill Wn.2d 424,429, 759 P.2d 427 (1988) (citing Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wn.2d 448, 502 P .2d 1181 (1972)). This is especially true in a case such as this where we are tasked with interpreting a statute. We read statutes together to achieve a 'harmonious total statutory scheme ... which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes.' Am. Legion Post No. 149 v. Dep 't ofHealth, 164 Wn.2d 570, 588, 192 P.3d 306 (2008) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Peninsula Neigh. Ass 'n v. Dep 't ofTransp., 142 Wn.2d 19 Fila Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac 89723-9 328, 342, 12 P.3d 134 (2000)). That is because [t]his court assumes the legislature does not intend to create inconsistent statutes. Id. Under Filo Foods's reading, the two statutes would be inconsistent with one another. RCW 49.46.120 mandates that the laws in any given location most favorable to the employee shall be in full force and effect. That provision would be meaningless if the Port of Seattle could trump such laws in airports it controls. RCW 49.46.120 does not carve out an exception for airports, and RCW 14.08.330 does not contain any language indicating that the Port of Seattle's jurisdiction and control over the airport includes the power to trump local minimum wage laws. As stated above, that provision precludes the city of SeaTac only from interfering with the operations of an airport. The ordinance does not do so. Municipal ordinances are presumed to be valid. Heinsma, 144 Wn.2d at 561. We must try to harmonize municipal ordinances with state law when possible; we will invalidate an ordinance only if it 'directly and irreconcilably conflicts' with state law. Id. at 564 (quoting Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 561). In this case, we hold that Proposition 1 can be harmonized with RCW 14.08.330 as a matter of law. Absent a factual showing that Proposition 1 would interfere with airport operations, the proposition does not conflict with the Port of Seattle's jurisdiction or ability to operate the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. Therefore, Proposition 1 can be validly enforced at the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. 20 Fila Foods, LLC v. City ofSeaTac 89723-9