Opinion ID: 170621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Prior to trial, Jones sought to suppress her statements to Agent Bridge as a violation of her Miranda rights, and the subsequently discovered evidence as a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied Jones's suppression motion on both grounds. On appeal, she challenges only the Miranda issue.
In reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress, this court accepts the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the government in this case. United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir.2000). In our review, [w]e are permitted to consider evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, as well as any evidence properly presented at trial. United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir.2002). The ultimate question of whether Miranda applies, however, is reviewed de novo. Hudson, 210 F.3d at 1190. Police officers need not administer Miranda warnings to everyone they question. Id. On its own terms, Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation[s]. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Thus,  Miranda rights need only be given to a suspect at the moment that suspect is `in custody' and the questioning meets the legal definition of `interrogation.' United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1463 (10th Cir.1993)). Because the government conceded Bridge's conversation with Jones was in the form of an interrogation, in resolving Jones's appeal we need only determine whether she was in custody. Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on the type of the encounter with police. Of the three types of police-citizen encountersvoluntary cooperation, an investigatory detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and a formal arrest Miranda 's custody element is triggered only in situations associated with formal arrests. In other words, [c]ase law is well established that a defendant is not in custody under either of the first two encounters and therefore Miranda warnings need not usually be given. United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir.1993) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)). It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable [only when] a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a `degree associated with formal arrest.' Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)). Only then can we say a suspect is in custody. Whether a suspect is in custody represents an objective determination. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.6(c) (3d ed. 2007) [ Criminal Procedure ]. We therefore must determine whether `a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood the situation as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.' Chee, 514 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138) (internal brackets and ellipsis removed). A reasonable person does not have a guilty state of mind and does not have peculiar mental or emotional conditions that are not apparent to the questioning officer. Hudson, 210 F.3d at 1190 (quoting United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998)). The determination of custody, from an examination of the totality of the circumstances, is necessarily fact intensive. Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1518. We thus avoid hard line rules and instead allow several non-exhaustive factors to guide us. First, we consider the extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will. Id. Second, we look at the nature of questioning, where prolonged accusatory questioning is likely to create a coercive environment from which an individual would not feel free to leave. Id. Finally, by using the following helpful guideposts, we check whether police dominate the encounter: [S]eparation of the suspect from family or colleagues who could offer moral support; isolation in nonpublic questioning rooms; threatening presence of several officers; display of a weapon by an officer; physical contact with the subject; and an officer's use of language or tone of voice in a manner implying that compliance with the request might be compelled. Id. at 1518-19. Although these factors are useful, we emphasize that we must look to the totality of the circumstances and consider the police-citizen encounter as a whole, rather than picking some facts and ignoring others.
We agree with the district court's conclusion that Jones was not in custody when she spoke with Agent Bridge.