Opinion ID: 780097
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Guilt-Assuming Hypotheticals to Cross-Examine Character Witnesses

Text: 53 Although he did not raise the point in the district court, Shwayder now argues that the prosecution's use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals during cross-examination of Shwayder's character witnesses constitutes reversible error. We review for plain error. United States v. Antonakeas, 255 F.3d 714, 727 (9th Cir.2001). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been (1) error, (2) that was clear or obvious, (3) that affected substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir.1999) (citation omitted).
54 Federal Rule of Evidence 405(a) allows the government to cross-examine character witnesses regarding their knowledge of specific instances of the defendant's misconduct. Fed.R.Evid. 405(a) (In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.) Such cross-examination helps the jury evaluate the quality of the character testimony. 55 We have not yet addressed whether it is error for the prosecution to ask questions on cross-examination that assume the defendant's guilt of the precise acts for which he is on trial. 6 The reasons for why it is error were cogently stated by the Fourth Circuit: 56 Character testimony in a criminal trial is admitted pursuant to Rule 405(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence only as it may bear on the issue of guilt. Although an argument can be made that guilt-assuming hypothetical questions may be probative of the credibility of a non-expert witness, an opinion elicited by a question that assumes that the defendant is guilty can have only negligible probative value as it bears on the central issue of guilt. 57 ... 58 And, in addition to a proper application of the rules of evidence, adherence to a basic concept of our justice system, the presumption of innocence, is not served by this line of questioning. United States v. Mason, 993 F.2d 406, 408-09 (4th Cir.1993) (footnote omitted). Following almost every other circuit that has addressed the question, 7 we now hold that the use of guilt assuming hypotheticals undermines the presumption of innocence and thus violates a defendant's right to due process. The prosecution's use of guilt-assuming hypothetical questions on cross-examination of Shwayder's character witnesses therefore constituted error. 59 To be plain, however, an error must have been clear or obvious. United States v. Turman, 122 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir.1997). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has previously addressed the guilt-assuming hypothetical question. The government contends that the error therefore was not plain. 60 It is, indeed, not clear that an error can be deemed plain in such circumstances. See United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir.1996) ([W]e do not see how an error can be plain error when the Supreme Court and this court have not spoken on the subject, and the authority in other circuits is split. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We need not decide, however, whether the near-unanimity among the other circuits distinguishes this case from Thompson. There are other reasons that there was no plain error — the error did not affect Shwayder's substantial rights or seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Vences, 169 F.3d at 613.
61 The prosecution's improper use of guilt-assuming hypothetical questions did not affect Shwayder's substantial rights. Both Shwayder's character witnesses declined to answer many of the hypothetical questions. Also, each of the character witnesses, when he did answer guilt-assuming questions, did so with statements expressing his disbelief that Shwayder would ever be capable of knowingly committing such acts, thereby bolstering rather than detracting from his positive opinion of the defendant's honesty. 62 In a case where similar answers were provided by character witnesses, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 63 The harm in allowing the use of this type of improper hypothetical lies in the effect of having the defendant's own character witness assume that the defendant is guilty. Here, the witness essentially refused to accept that assumption. The government's improper question backfired and, arguably, Guzman's case was strengthened by [the] response. It strains credulity to maintain that, in such context, the question attenuated the presumption of innocence to which Guzman was entitled. 64 Guzman, 167 F.3d at 1353-54. The Guzman court went on to find it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned the same verdict if the question had not been asked. Id. at 1354. Similarly, here — and even more clearly, as we are applying the plain error standard — the prosecution's use of guilt-assuming hypotheticals did not affect Shwayder's substantial rights. The witnesses' answers negated any harm that may have been caused by the government's use of these questions. As a result, Shwayder has not established that the jury's verdict would have been different if the questions had not been asked. 65 Although Shwayder has not met the third prong of the plain error standard, we note that the error in this case also did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Shwayder's attorney, having presumably prepared the character witnesses, may well have anticipated that they would answer the guilt-assuming hypotheticals in a manner favorable to the defense. His failure to object to the government's repeated questions may therefore have been a deliberate, tactical decision. Where such tactical behavior is likely, we should take great care before exercising our discretion to reverse for plain error. 66 We therefore hold that asking character witnesses hypothetical questions that assume the defendant's guilt during cross-examination is error. Nevertheless, the error did not affect Shwayder's substantial rights and thus does not warrant reversal under the plain error standard.