Opinion ID: 773251
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Southern Black Accent

Text: 57 Straughn testified on deposition that Giglio frequently used an offensive southern black accent at meetings attended by her and other Delta employees. Although Giglio denies the charge, it must be credited at summary judgment. See id. (citing DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 308 (1st Cir. 1997)). 58 For present purposes, we assume arguendo that there are circumstances in which use of an offensive southern black workplace accent, by a superior in a position to influence the key decision maker, would constitute probative evidence that the proffered explanation for disciplining an employee was pretextual. Cf. id. (Discriminatory comments, by key decision maker and another person in position to influence decision maker, could lead a jury to conclude that [the employer's] proffered reasons for firing [plaintiff] were actually a pretext for discrimination.). As we have acknowledged, in combination with other evidence[,] see McMillan v. Massachusetts Soc'y for Prev. of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 300 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999), so-called stray remarks may permit a jury reasonably to determine that an employer was motivated by a discriminatory intent, id. But though such stray remarks may be material to the pretext inquiry, their probativeness is circumscribed if they were made in a situation temporally remote from the date of the employment decision, or . . . were not related to the employment decision in question, or were made by nondecisionmakers. Id. at 301 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55 (remarks within two weeks of discharge probative of pretext); Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583 (remarks at time of employment action probative of pretext); cf. McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301 (remoteness heightened where at least one of three remarks occurred several years before challenged employment action). 59 Although statements directly related to the challenged employment action may be highly probative in the pretext inquiry, see Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55; Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583, mere generalized stray remarks, arguably probative of bias against a protected class, normally are not probative of pretext absent some discernible evidentiary basis for assessing their temporal and contextual relevance. Compare McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301 (workplace remarks by male department head at time remote from incident in dispute -- regarding physical traits and sexual activities of female co-workers, but bearing no direct relationship to employment -- held not probative of pretext where challenged decision involved lower salaries for female employees), with Fernandes, 199 F.3d at 583 (comments by decision maker -- including I don't need minorities; I don't need residents on this job; I don't have to hire you locals or Cape Verdean people -- were not mere stray remarks where challenged employment action concerned refusal to rehire dark-skinned residents of Cape Verdean descent). Accordingly, even if we were to assume that the assertedly offensive workplace accent is somehow suggestive of racial bias, 7 it would not be significantly probative of pretext absent some discernible indication that its communicative content, if any, materially erodes the stated rationale for the challenged employment action. 60 Straughn proffered no evidence that Giglio ever used the nondescript southern black accent either during or in relation to the challenged employment action. Nor is there competent evidence from which a rational fact finder might fairly infer that the communicative import of the nondescript accent pertained to employment matters, let alone to Straughn or her employment. Indeed, Straughn herself has never intimated either a rationale or a circumstantial predicate for reasonably inferring that the southern black accent amounted to anything other than insensitive banter. Thus, Straughn's naked ipse dixit was insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact. 61 Accordingly, we conclude that the southern black accent allegedly used on occasion by Giglio, without more, is not probative of pretext on the part of Delta, given (i) the absence of any discernible contextual or temporal relationship between the discharge decision and the workplace accent used by Giglio, (ii) the demonstrably self-sufficient basis for the management recommendation by Richard Ealey to discharge Straughn due to her persistent work-related dishonesty, and (iii) the distinctly subordinate role Giglio played in the dismissal decision. 62