Opinion ID: 2452537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc

Text: As noted, Koplin, 241 Kan. 206, 734 P.2d 1177, frames the issue of law that is presented in this appeal. In Koplin, a federal court certified facts and issues of law for this court's consideration. According to the federal court's factual statement, Koplin had suffered an on-the-job accident when a T-clamp malfunctioned. His employer, Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., destroyed the T-clamp immediately after the accident. Koplin recovered workers compensation benefits and then filed a products liability suit against several defendants. In the products liability suit, Koplin also made a claim against his employer for intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. Analyzing the question of whether Kansas would recognize the spoliation cause of action, the Koplin court noted the tort was relatively new but had been recognized by other jurisdictions. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 208, 734 P.2d 1177; see Edwards v. Louisville Ladder Co., 796 F.Supp. 966, 968 (W.D.La. 1992) (Despite the fact that the origins of a tort for spoliation of evidence trace back to at least 1973 no general consensus has developed as to the basis, essential elements, or even existence of such a tort.). In reflecting on the case law from other jurisdictions, the Koplin court discussed two distinctions that classified the cases. The first classification arose from the traditional tort distinction between negligent and intentional actions. At the time Koplin was decided, most cases addressing the spoliation tort had dealt with the negligent destruction of evidence. As in this case, the Koplin court had not been asked to recognize the tort of negligent spoliation. Consequently, the Koplin court concluded the rationale of those decisions was not persuasive because they are based upon negligence as opposed to an intentional interference with a third-party action. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 210, 734 P.2d 1177. Turning its attention to intentional spoliation, the Koplin court, 241 Kan. at 210-12, 734 P.2d 1177, noted there were only two jurisdictions recognizing the tort when the allegation was that the evidence had been intentionally destroyed: Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829 (1984), disapproved by Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511 (1998), and Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1986). Superior relies on Smith and Hazen. In the California case of Smith, 151 Cal. App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, the plaintiff was injured when the rear wheel and tire flew off a van and crashed into the plaintiff's windshield. Immediately after the accident, the van was towed to the dealer that had customized the van. A few days after the accident, the dealer agreed with Smith's counsel to preserve the physical evidence, consisting of certain automotive parts including customized wheels, for later use in a possible action against the dealer or others. The evidence was subsequently lost or destroyed, making it impossible for Smith to pursue her claim. She then sued the dealer, alleging a cause of action for `Tortious Interference with [a] Prospective Civil Action By Spoliation of Evidence.' Smith, 151 Cal.App.3d at 495, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829. The Smith court considered various arguments, pro and con, and ultimately concluded that a tort of spoliation was analogous to the tort of intentional interference with a prospective business advantage. That tort, the court stated, allows recovery for interference with a business relationship where the expectations of the parties are the subject of an unenforceable contract. To prove that claim, all a plaintiff was required to allege was a reasonable probability that a contract or profit would have resulted but for the defendant's acts. The California Court of Appeals in Smith found that a prospective civil action in a product liability case is also a probable expectancy to be protected from interference. Smith, 151 Cal.App.3d at 502, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829. (Fourteen years after the decision in Smith and 11 years after Koplin, the decision in Smith was limited to its factsnamely, where the spoliator was alleged to have agreed to preserve the evidenceand the general tort of intentional first-party spoliation was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 18 Cal.4th at 14 n. 3, 18 n. 4, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511; see also Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.4th 464, 466, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d 223 [1999] [disapproving of tort of intentional third-party spoliation].) In the Alaska case of Hazen, 718 P.2d 456, the plaintiff, Penny Hazen, brought an action for intentional spoliation of evidence that she alleged would exonerate her from criminal prostitution charges. During the criminal case, Hazen learned the prosecution was relying on a conversation between Hazen and an undercover police officer who had recorded the conversation. The recording became inaudible, however, and Hazen, who alleged the recording would have documented her telling the officer that sex was not available at her massage parlor, claimed the arresting officers, the city, and the city attorney destroyed the recording to protect themselves from false arrest and malicious prosecution claims. The Alaska Supreme Court found Smith, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, persuasive and held that Hazen had a cause of action for intentional interference with a prospective civil action by spoliation of evidence. The Hazen court stated that Hazen's false arrest and malicious prosecution actions were valuable probable expectancies that were destroyed or diminished by the destruction of the recording. Hazen, 718 P.2d at 463-64. The Koplin court distinguished Smith, 151 Cal.App.3d 491, 198 Cal.Rptr. 829, and Hazen, 718 P.2d 456, because those cases involved claims wherein the defendants or potential defendants in the underlying case destroyed the evidence to their own advantage. (Emphasis added.) Koplin, 241 Kan. at 213, 734 P.2d 1177. In doing so, the Koplin court recognized the second distinction made in the case law, which classifies spoliation committed by a party to a principal or underlying lawsuit as first-party spoliation and spoliation committed by a nonparty to the principal or underlying lawsuit as third-party spoliation. See Lips v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., 224 Ariz. 266, 267, 229 P.3d 1008 (2010); Howard Regional Health System v. Gordon, 925 N.E.2d 453, 463 n. 7 (Ind.App.), transfer granted 940 N.E.2d 823 (2010). The question of whether the court would recognize first-party spoliation i.e., spoliation by a defendant or potential defendantwas one the Koplin court concluded was not before the court because it was Koplin's employer who had destroyed the T-clamp and the employer was not a party or potential party in the products liability suit. In other words, the question the Koplin court left for another day was whether it would recognize a tort of intentional first-party spoliation. See Koplin, 241 Kan. at 213, 734 P.2d 1177. Addressing the question presented by the facts, the Koplin court noted the employer had destroyed its own property at a time when Koplin had no claims against his employer except pursuant to the workers' compensation laws. There are no special circumstances or relationships which created any duty for appellee to preserve the T-clamp. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 213, 734 P.2d 1177. This conclusion rested on a point the court emphasized throughout the opinion: It is fundamental that before there can be any recovery in tort there must be a violation of a duty owed by one party to the person seeking recovery. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 212, 734 P.2d 1177. The court noted that there was no common-law duty to preserve evidence and the employer had an absolute right to preserve or destroy its own property as it saw fit. To adopt such a tort and place a duty upon an employer to preserve all possible physical evidence that might somehow be utilized in a third-party action by an injured employee would place an intolerable burden upon every employer. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 212, 734 P.2d 1177. The court then analogized Koplin's claim to Kansas case law rejecting a civil cause of action for perjury or conspiracy to commit perjury, citing Hokanson v. Lichtor, 5 Kan. App.2d 802, 804-05, 626 P.2d 214 (1981). The Koplin court noted that the same analogy had been drawn by the dissenting judge in Bondu v. Gurvich, 473 So.2d 1307 (Fla. Dist.App.1984), disapproved by Martino v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 908 So.2d 342 (Fla. 2005), in which the Florida Court of Appeals allowed a spoliation claim. Specifically, the Koplin court quoted the dissenting judge in Bondu, Chief Judge Schwartz, who concluded that if an independent action is recognized for improper conduct by a party or witness, such as destroying evidence or committing perjury, `every case would be subject to constant retrials in the guise of independent actions.' 473 So.2d at 1313-14. Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc., 241 Kan. 206, 214, 734 P.2d 1177 (1987). Agreeing with that point, the Koplin court concluded the doctrine recognized in Hokanson [that no civil cause of action for damages should be recognized for perjury or conspiracy to commit perjury by a witness or party] is sound and applies to a destruction of evidence as well as perjured testimony. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 215, 734 P.2d 1177. (Subsequent to the Koplin decision, the Florida Supreme Court in Martino, 908 So.2d 342, disapproved the Florida Court of Appeals' decision in Bondu, 473 So.2d 1307, and this court reaffirmed the rationale of Koplin and Hokanson in OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 260 Kan. 305, 306, 315-18, 918 P.2d 1274 [1996], where we held Kansas does not recognize the independent tort of embracery, which means `to influence a jury corruptly.' [Citation omitted.]) The Koplin court then listed five reasons it was rejecting the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence, including: (1) the generation of endless litigation (as recognized by Chief Judge Schwartz in Bondu ); (2) inconsistency with the intent of the workers' compensation laws; (3) rank speculation as to whether the plaintiff could have ever recovered in the underlying action and, if so, the speculative nature of the damages; (4) the limitless scope of the new duty which would be created; and (5) the unwarranted intrusion on the property rights of a person who lawfully disposes of his own property. Koplin, 241 Kan. at 215, 734 P.2d 1177. Subsequent to the decision in Koplin, several other courts have reached the same or similar conclusions in both first-party and third-party spoliation cases. See Temple Community Hospital, 20 Cal.4th at 476, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 852, 976 P.2d 223 (reiterating its reasons for rejecting first-party spoliation and concluding no tort cause of action will lie for intentional third-party spoliation because the burdens and costs of recognizing a tort remedy for third-party spoliation are considerableperhaps even greater than in the case of first-party spoliation); Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman Adj. Co., 933 N.E.2d 7, 14 (Ind.App.2010) (stating that Indiana common law does not recognize an independent cause of action for intentional or negligent first-party spoliation of evidence); Meyn v. State, 594 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 1999) (rejecting negligent spoliation claim because it creates endless litigation, it is difficult to impose on a stranger to the litigation a duty to preserve evidence, and it is speculative in nature); Teel v. Meredith, 284 Mich.App. 660, 661, 663, 774 N.W.2d 527 (2009), rev. denied 485 Mich. 1134, 780 N.W.2d 294 (2010) (observing that Michigan does not yet recognize as a valid cause of action spoliation of evidence that interferes with a prospective civil action against a third party and declining to recognize such an action); Timber Tech v. Home Ins. Co., 118 Nev. 630, 633, 55 P.3d 952 (2002) (weighing usefulness of spoliation claims against the burdens associated with permitting them, including `the burden to litigants, witnesses, and the judicial system' imposed by potentially endless litigation over a speculative loss, and by the cost to society of promoting onerous record and evidence retention policies); Elias v. Lancaster General Hosp., 710 A.2d 65, 68 (Pa.Super.1998) (expressly refusing to recognize third-party negligent spoliation claim and stating in dicta that traditional remedies adequately protect nonspoliating party in spoliation case); Austin v. Beaufort County Sheriff's Office, 377 S.C. 31, 34-36, 659 S.E.2d 122 (2008) (under the facts, declining to adopt the tort of third-party spoliation of evidence). With this background in mind, we consider the application of these authorities to the facts of this case.