Opinion ID: 2607349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the law and its application

Text: A challenge to a Will as the will of the testator can be based on separate and independent grounds. Lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, lack of knowledge, and fraud are among them. Each one of these can independently and sufficiently support a finding of invalidity. Thus, although a testator may well have testamentary capacity, that same person may not have knowledge of the contents of a Will. Testamentary incapacity can be a sufficient condition to invalidate a Will, but it is not a necessary one. See, e.g., Newhall's Estate, 190 Cal. 709, 214 P. 231, 235 (1923). We believe the evidence in this case of lack of knowledge is so overwhelming that it is unnecessary to base our decision on any other ground. [2] Where the testator lacks knowledge as to the entire contents of the will or is misled as to the nature of the instrument as a whole, then it is undoubtedly correct that the instrument is inoperative. 1 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 5.8, at 176-77 (1960). For example, in Duchesneau v. Jaskoviak, 360 Mass. 730, 277 N.E.2d 507 (1972), the court noted that in addition to testamentary capacity, it must also be shown that the testator knew the contents of the instrument which he signed. Id., 277 N.E.2d at 510. The evidence supported a finding in that case that a hospital patient did not know the contents of an instrument he was asked to sign. He had no part in drafting the instrument, and no one did any talking at the hospital before the testator signed the instrument. Id. The cases uniformly support the proposition that unless the document that purports to be a Will is in fact the will of the testator, it is invalid. Pepe v. Caputo, 408 Ill. 321, 97 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1951) (Where a will is prepared for a testator, and he is not given an opportunity to read it, or if he is unable to read and its contents have not been explained to him, such an instrument cannot be said to be his will, and will not, on contest, be sustained as a will.); Estate of Smelser, 16 Kan. App.2d 112, 818 P.2d 822, 826 (1991) (It is required that the testator have knowledge of the will's contents at the time of its execution for the will to be valid); Estate of Mendoza, 76 Nev. 396, 356 P.2d 13, 16 (1960) (It needs no citation of authority to support the universally recognized rule that it is essential to the validity of a will that the testator know and understand the contents thereof.); Estate of Cohen, 445 Pa. 549, 284 A.2d 754, 756 (1971) ([I]f a decedent had no knowledge of the contents of a document purporting to be his will, it cannot be said that such a document is a declaration of that decedent's intentions.). The 1992 Will was the will of James, not Grace. Grace did not ask anyone to draw up a new Will for her. She already had a Will and a lawyer. James took it upon himself to substitute his judgment for hers. He asked his lawyer to draft a Will and a trust agreement that expressed his will. He then presented one of them to his mother on her deathbed and failed to disclose its contents to her. She was intubated and could not speak. She was in no position to read the Will. Neither he nor Bernadette told their mother that the document they presented her varied in material respects from her Will. It changed the personal representative, the distribution, and made specific bequests. It subjected Bernadette's and Sidney's shares to the discretion, power, and control of James through a trust arrangement. James did not tell her that he had changed her lottery beneficiary designation so that instead of passing outright to her children it would be subject to his control under a trust. Without full disclosure, the representation that each of her children would take equally was misleading. When James asked his mother to ratify his acts as attorney-in-fact, he did so under the representation that it would allow him to continue to pay her bills and feed her bird. He did not tell her that the document purported to ratify the substitution of his estate plan for hers. On these undisputed facts we conclude as a matter of law that the 1992 Will is invalid because Grace lacked any understanding of its contents and indeed was misled as to its true nature. The trial court thus erred in granting James's motion for summary judgment and should have granted Sidney's. We reverse the judgment in favor of James, vacate the memorandum decision of the court of appeals, and remand this case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Sidney on his motion for summary judgment, denial of probate of the 1992 Will, and for further proceedings on the admission of the 1979 Will to probate. FELDMAN, C.J., MOELLER, V.C.J., and CORCORAN and ZLAKET, JJ., concur.