Opinion ID: 2225661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutional Right to Proceed Pro Se

Text: Toward the conclusion of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, Castor asserted a request that he be permitted to do a portion of the summation pro se. The trial court, after properly questioning Castor, denied the request. At the beginning of the penalty phase of the trial, Castor again moved for pro se representation and again the trial court denied the request. At the beginning of the sentencing phase, however, the court granted Castor's third request to proceed pro se. We hold that the trial court acted correctly on each request. Castor, according to the record, finally acquiesed in his counsel's doing the summation. Secondly, Castor concedes on appeal that his request to proceed pro se during final argument of the guilt-innocence phase and during the penalty phase may not have been timely. However, argues Castor, under the peculiar circumstances of his case, it was within the trial court's discretion to grant said requests. We agree, but hold that the trial court correctly denied such requests. Broadus v. State (1986), Ind., 487 N.E.2d 1298, 1304; Koehler v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 196, 198. Castor contends that he should have been allowed to proceed pro se on appeal. There is no citation of authority in support of this argument and, thus, such argument is waived. Goliday, 526 N.E.2d at 1175. Additionally, however, the record reveals that the trial court explicitly referred to defendant's right to file his own pro se motion to correct errors and, in granting counsel's motion for leave to file a belated motion to correct errors, specifically stated that defendant could file his own motion pro se. Finally, the court granted both counsel and Castor 90 days from that date to file a motion to correct errors. Castor did not avail himself of the opportunity to file a pro se motion nor did he file a brief or attempt to file one. The record does not support Castor's conclusion that the trial court denied him his right to proceed pro se. As the State correctly points out, Castor's own inactivity denied him this opportunity. Having previously argued that the court improperly denied him the right to proceed pro se during summation and the penalty phase of the trial, Castor urges us to hold that the court further erred in permitting him to proceed pro se at the sentencing hearing. Because we are reversing the sentence and remanding for a new sentencing procedure, we need not decide whether the trial erred in permitting him to proceed pro se.