Opinion ID: 2440987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resignation by Implication

Text: In his first challenge to the jury instructions, Hopper asserts that the trial court erred when it gave, over his objection, the following instruction on resignation by implication: INSTRUCTION NO. 8 It is not necessary that a resignation from a public office be couched in any particular words, it being only necessary that the person resigning evince a purpose to relinquish the office. No formal method is necessary, but the resignation may be written or oral, or it may be implied from conduct. In this regard, if you find that the plaintiff accepted an office or position which was incompatible to that of city attorney of Horseshoe Bend, Arkansas, you must find by implication that plaintiff resigned the office of city attorney of Horseshoe Bend, Arkansas. If it is your finding that plaintiff resigned the office by accepting an office or position which was incompatible with that office, you must find that plaintiff could not withdraw his resignation. On appeal, Hopper contends that there was no evidence that he accepted an office or position which was incompatible to that of city attorney, and thus the judge should not have given the instruction. We disagree with this assertion for several reasons. First, Hopper testified that a few days after he resigned as city attorney, he agreed to represent two defendants on charges pending in the City Court of Horseshoe Bend. Although he did not appear in court or accept fees for his services, Hopper did give advice, obtain documents, make inquiries, and procure continuances on behalf of these two clients. Moreover, the court clerk testified that at one time Hopper was listed on the docket sheets as the attorney for both defendants. Finally, both defendants testified on cross-examination that Hopper acted as their attorney in the city court. We also find that this representation was incompatible with being the city attorney. Hopper argues that private practice is not incompatible with being the city attorney of Horseshoe Bend because the office is only a part-time position. This argument would have merit if Hopper represented a private client in a matter outside the jurisdiction of the city court. The facts, however, suggest that Hopper represented two criminal defendants in the City Court of Horseshoe Bend. Because we find that there was evidence to support Garner's argument that Hopper accepted a position incompatible with the office of the city attorney, we affirm the trial court's decision to instruct the jury on resignation by implication.