Opinion ID: 204139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Government's Cross-Appeal on Grant of a New Trial

Text: Merlino also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on count three by filing a Rule 33 motion for new trial, which he filed simultaneously with his motion for acquittal. The district court issued a published opinion addressing all four defendants' various postconviction motions for a new trial and for acquittal, and it granted Merlino's motion for acquittal as to count three. However, the court stated that [t]he motions of all defendants for a new trial are DENIED. 204 F.Supp.2d at 92. The Government filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of acquittal on June 5, 2002. Several months later, on December 5, 2002, Merlino filed a Motion for Conditional Determination by the Court Whether a Motion for New Trial Should Be Granted if the Judgment of Acquittal is Reversed, relying on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(d). On February 4, 2003, the district court made a handwritten notation on the face of the motion stating The court would be inclined to grant a new trial on Count III for the reasons it stated for entering a judgment of acquittal. The Government did not file a separate notice of appeal from the district court's February 4 order. Merlino argues that we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's conditional grant of the motion for a new trial because the Government's notice of appeal, filed on June 5, 2002, designated only the judgment of acquittal and was not effective to appeal the district court's subsequent conditional grant of a new trial on count three, should its judgment of acquittal be reversed. We conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the district court's conditional grant of a new trial. The district court unequivocally denied Merlino's Rule 33 motion for a new trial as to count three, in which Merlino argued that the only evidence that he was aware of the grenade came from Romano and was insufficient to support his conviction. Merlino later filed a motion for a conditional grant of a new trial based on Rule 29(d), which provides that [i]f the court enters a judgment of acquittal after a guilty verdict, the court must also conditionally determine whether any motion for a new trial should be granted if the judgment of acquittal is later vacated or reversed. Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(d)(1). Rule 29 does not provide a separate basis for filing a motion for a new trial (we note that Merlino could not have filed his motion for a new trial at that late date under Rule 33 because it would have been untimely), and Merlino's motion only asked the court to comply with Rule 29(d)'s mandate to conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial in the event it grants a motion for acquittal. We construe notices of appeal liberally and examine them in the context of the record as a whole. United States v. Cheal, 389 F.3d 35, 53 (1st Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both parties briefed the issue of the conditional grant of a new trial, which was based on the same facts and reasoning as the motion for acquittal. Further, the court stated that it would be inclined to grant a conditional new trial for the same reasons it granted the judgment of acquittal. Thus, there is no risk of surprise or prejudice to Merlino if we allow the appeal. See Cheal, 389 F.3d at 53. In these circumstances, we construe the Government's June 5, 2002, notice of appeal of the Judgment of Acquittal effective to bring the district court's February 4, 2003, ruling conditionally granting a new trial before us for appellate review. See id. (construing notice of appeal of conviction and sentence, which included a deferred restitution order, effective to appeal the subsequent amended judgment specifying the amount of restitution); see also United States v. Oberhauser, 284 F.3d 827, 832-33 (8th Cir.) (construing notice of appeal from judgment of acquittal sufficient to encompass appeal from a Rule 29(d) conditional grant of a new trial), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1071, 123 S.Ct. 671, 154 L.Ed.2d 565 (2002). Satisfied of our jurisdiction, we turn to the merits of the Government's appeal from the conditional grant of a new trial. District courts are authorized to grant a defendant a new trial if the interests of justice so require. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. In considering a motion for a new trial, district courts may weigh the evidence and evaluate the credibility of witnesses,. . . [but] the remedy of a new trial is sparingly used, and then only where there would be a miscarriage of justice and where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Villarman-Oviedo, 325 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.2003) (district court may grant a new trial based on its own evaluation of the evidence only where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict) (internal citation omitted). Nonetheless, where the award of a new trial is predicated on the district court's evaluation of the weight of the evidence rather than its concern about the effect of prejudicial acts that may have resulted in an unfair trial, . . . it [must be] quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result. United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 486 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because the district court must generally defer to a jury's credibility assessments, see id. (A district court `judge is not a thirteenth juror who may set aside a verdict merely because he would have reached a different result.') (internal quotations marks and citations omitted), [i]t is only where exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated that the trial judge may intrude upon the jury function of credibility assessment. United States v. Cote, 544 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (applying the same standard). We review a district court's grant of a new trial for an abuse of discretion, [5] United States v. Ayala-Garcia, 574 F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir.2009), recognizing that a district court has greater latitude in considering a motion for a new trial than it does in considering a motion for acquittal, see United States v. Ruiz, 105 F.3d 1492, 1501 (1st Cir.1997). Although we do not reach our decision lightly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting Merlino's conditional motion for a new trial. [6] The district court did not elaborate when it granted the conditional motion for a new trial, stating only that it would be inclined to grant it for the same reasons it granted the judgment of acquittal. As the district court recognized in its order granting the judgment of acquittal, and as we have previously discussed in this opinion, the uncorroborated testimony of a government informant is sufficient to establish the facts underlying a defendant's conviction, as long as the testimony is not incredible or insubstantial on its face. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d at 115 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Yet, the district court did not explain why it did not credit Romano's testimony about Merlino's presence during the grenade discussion, even though it did not doubt the credibility of his testimony on other important aspects of the case. Merlino, 204 F.Supp.2d at 92. We do not suggest that the district court must always provide such an explanation. There may well be cases where it is apparent from the record why the court found the testimony of an informant facially incredible or insubstantial. Here, however, a careful review of the record points to the opposite conclusion, namely, that Romano's testimony on this point was neither incredible nor insubstantial on its face. As we have previously discussed, although Romano stated that he did not recall when different people were away from the group during the final meeting on the night prior to the planned robbery, he was unequivocal in his testimony that Merlino was present when Rossetti discussed the grenade, even in the face of vigorous challenges by Merlino's attorney on cross examination and on re-cross examination. His testimony was not internally inconsistentin fact it was quite consistent on the specific point at issueor contradicted by any other evidence in the record. Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Romano's testimony was too slender a reed to support the mandatory thirty year consecutive sentence. . . . Merlino, 204 F.Supp.2d at 92. We cannot avoid the conclusion that the district court's assessment of Romano's testimony was, to some extent, informed by its concern about the lengthy mandatory sentence. To the extent that was the case, such consideration of the penalty further undermines the district court's conclusion as to the credibility and reliability of Romano's testimony. Cf. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 2419. Because Romano's testimony regarding Merlino's presence when the grenade was discussed was ultimately consistent, uncontradicted, and unequivocal, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting the motion for a new trial. See Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d at 486 ([B]ecause it is not clear that the jury . . . reached a seriously erroneous result, we find that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in awarding [defendant] a new trial.) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).