Opinion ID: 1977253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of the county court.

Text: Petitioner argues that the county court had no jurisdiction to proceed in her case because the action was improperly commenced when a Milwaukee police officer, rather than a Milwaukee city attorney, filed with the court the uniform traffic citation for speeding. In support of this argument she cites sec. 299.06 (2) (a), Stats., which states: An individual may commence an action either in his own proper person and in his own behalf, or by an attorney regularly authorized to practice in the circuit courts of this state, but not otherwise. Actions on behalf of any other party shall be commenced only by attorneys regularly authorized to practice in the circuit courts of this state. Since the city of Milwaukee is not an individual, petitioner concludes that the action against her had to be commenced by an attorney. She also argues that this requirement is sound as a matter of policy because a police officer is merely a witness to a traffic violation, and a prosecuting attorney should in all cases exercise independent discretion in regard to whether an action should be commenced. However, sec. 299.01 (2), Stats., provides that ch. 299 applies to civil forfeiture actions except as a different procedure is prescribed in chs. 66, 288 and 345. The alleged violation in this case occurred on August 11, 1971, and thus the references of the attorney general to sections of the uniform traffic procedure [6] are not relevant to this case, since this procedure was not effective until October 1, 1972. Nevertheless, certain statutes were in effect in 1971 which overrode the provisions of ch. 299. Sec. 345.11 (5), effective in 1971, provided as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes, the use of the uniform traffic citation and complaint promulgated under sub. (4) by any peace officer in connection with the enforcement of any state traffic laws or any local traffic ordinances in strict conformity with the state traffic laws, shall be deemed adequate process to give the appropriate court jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense upon the filing with such court of the uniform traffic complaint. But the phrase adequate process to give the appropriate court jurisdiction over the subject matter of the offense was erroneous, since subject matter jurisdiction is not conferred by service and filing of process, but by constitution and statute, which grant power to various courts to hear various kinds of actions. The apparent aim of sec. 345.11 (5) was to provide that issuance of a uniform traffic citation to an individual, and filing of that citation with the appropriate court, was sufficient process to invoke the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant, as is done in the case of service and filing of a summons. This discrepancy was rectified by Laws of 1973, ch. 218, sec. 18, which amends sec. 345.11 (5) as follows: Notwithstanding any other provision of the statutes, the use of the uniform traffic citation and complaint promulgated under sub. (4) by any peace officer in connection with the enforcement of any state traffic laws or any local traffic ordinances in strict conformity with the state traffic laws, shall be deemed adequate process to give the appropriate court jurisdiction over the person upon the filing with such court of the uniform traffic complaint. We construe the provisions of sec. 345.11 (5), Stats., to mean that a police officer may file a uniform traffic citation and complaint with the appropriate court, and that such filing, after issuance of the citation to the motorist, is sufficient process to confer upon the court personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Even if sec. 345.11 (5) were construed to mean that a prosecuting attorney, and not a police officer, is the proper party to file the citation and complaint, petitioner would still not prevail. In Drugsvold v. Small Claims Court , [7] this court held that a small claims suit improperly commenced by a nonattorney was not void, as long as the necessary acts were accomplished in fact. At most the role of the nonattorney constituted unauthorized practice of law. It did not, however, deprive the court of jurisdiction, as long as the complaint was properly made and the summons properly issued. In this case it is undisputed that a uniform traffic citation and complaint were issued and thereafter filed with the appropriate court. These are the steps which the statute requires in order to commence such an action. Thus, even if one assumes arguendo that a nonattorney was not the appropriate initiating party, this did not have the effect of depriving the county court of jurisdiction. There is another reason why petitioner cannot claim a lack of personal jurisdiction in this case. Petitioner was arrested for a traffic violation, and shortly thereafter brought before the county court. While the more usual practice is to release a motorist after a citation for a traffic violation, arrest without a warrant and immediate arraignment were not prohibited under the former statutes. [8] Petitioner apparently concedes that she entered a plea of not guilty during this appearance, although the record on appeal does not indicate anything in this regard. Appearance before a court and entry of a plea are acts by virtue of which that court acquires personal jurisdiction over the defendant. [9]