Opinion ID: 3170660
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: who is in an independently established trade,

Text: occupation, profession or business. 820 ILCS 115/2. Because the test is conjunctive, if BeavEx cannot satisfy just one prong of the test, its couriers must be treated as employees. Novakovic, 820 N.E.2d at 973–74; cf. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 776 N.E.2d 166, 169–70 (Ill. 2002) (noting the conjunctive nature of the same independent-contractor exemption contained in the Unemployment Insurance Act, 820 ILCS 405/212). There is no doubt that common evidence will satisfy the second prong of the test—whether the individuals “perform[ed] work which is … outside the usual course of business … of the employer.” 820 ILCS 115/2. Prong two only requires common evidence about BeavEx’s business model, which is applicable to all class members. BeavEx argues, and the district court found, however, that because individualized inquiries would be necessary to resolve prongs one and three of the IWPCA’s test for employment, common issues cannot predominate. The district court committed a legal error when it concluded that “[f]ailure to acknowledge the individualized inquiry required by the first prong because the second prong Nos. 15-1109 & 15-1110 27 can be decided through common facts would be the same as a ruling on the merits.” Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 303 F.R.D. 295, 308 (N.D. Ill. 2014). The district court thought that it could not find that common questions predominate because the first prong contemplates individualized factfinding. That is incorrect. There is no requirement that the district court blind itself to the conjunctive structure of the IWPCA’s test for employment. Rather, “[i]n conducting this preliminary [predominance] inquiry … the court must look only so far as to determine whether, given the factual setting of the case, if the [plaintiff’s] general allegations are true, common evidence could suffice to make out a prima facie case for the class.” Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005). Under the IWPCA, if the employer cannot satisfy just one prong of the test, the inquiry into employment status ends. Because Plaintiffs have shown that common evidence will resolve prong two, they have made a prima facie showing that they can win their case based on evidence common to the class. That conclusion is not the same as saying, as the district court thought, that Plaintiffs do win their case, which is the merits determination. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that common questions predominate by making out a prima facie claim under the IWPCA based on evidence common to the class. Because the district court based its certification ruling on the erroneous assumption that the hypothetical individualized inquiry of prong one precluded a finding of predominance, it abused its discretion in denying class certification. Moreover, certifying the class for purposes of prong two would substantially advance the litigation, regardless of whether the common evidence on prong two turns out in 28 Nos. 15-1109 & 15-1110 Plaintiffs’ or BeavEx’s favor. If answered in Plaintiffs’ favor, all of BeavEx’s couriers would have to be classified as employees under the IWPCA, eliminating the need for any individualized factfinding. If answered in BeavEx’s favor, BeavEx would not have to litigate its satisfaction of prong two against every individual plaintiff, promoting efficiency. We have looked favorably upon the use of such a hybrid procedure. See, e.g., In Re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 2005) (approving a procedure where the district court would decide whether a company-wide policy exists and then conduct individual hearings to determine whether an employee was affected by that policy as a “more efficient procedure than litigating the class-wide issue of [the defendant’s] policy anew in more than a thousand separate lawsuits”). Regardless of which party wins, the common answer on prong two “represent[s] a significant aspect of [a] case and … can be resolved for all members of [a] class in a single adjudication.” Messner, 669 F.3d at 815 (quotation marks omitted and alterations in original). The district court also mistakenly found that prong one could not be decided by common evidence. The district court thought that the first prong “so clearly requires a factual inquiry into the circumstances of each driver. That is not true. The independent-contractor exemption requires that the individual be free from control “in fact,” which is evaluated by looking at twenty-five factors. See Carpetland, 776 N.E.2d at 374–83 (evaluating the same employment test under the Unemployment Insurance Act). The existence of factors to evaluate, however, does not defeat the ability of Plaintiffs to satisfy those factors by offering common eviNos. 15-1109 & 15-1110 29 dence.4 In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court in Carpetland evaluated the twenty-five factors as they applied to “measurers” and “installers” based on common evidence, not to each individual measurer or installer. Id.; see also Cohen Furniture Co. v. Ill. Dep’t Emp’t Sec., 718 N.E.2d 1058, 1062–63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (evaluating control under same employment test of “carpet installers,” not each individual carpet installer). Finally, we find it telling that there is an inherent tension in BeavEx’s position on class certification and its position on the merits of preemption. On one hand, BeavEx argues that class treatment is not warranted for its couriers because it must individually evaluate and classify each courier as an independent contractor “in fact.” On the other hand, for purposes of preemption, BeavEx takes the position that every single courier would have to be reclassified from independent contractor to employee, revealing the more likely proposition that BeavEx thinks that uniform treatment of its couriers is appropriate. See Norris-Wilson v. Delta-T Grp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 596, 602 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“[I]t may be that [the defendant] believes its workers are in fact independent contractors for reasons unique to each individual, but it’s more likely the case [the defendant] believes the independent contractor 4 Plaintiffs attempt to “concede that control ‘in fact’ may require individualized assessments, and therefore waive any argument for class certification as to BeavEx’s control ‘in fact.’” (Appellee’s Br. at 52.) “[A] court is not bound to accept a concession when the point at issue is a question of law.” Deen v. Darosa, 414 F.3d 731, 734 (7th Cir. 2005). Because the question of whether common evidence could ever satisfy an inquiry “in fact” is a question of law, we reject Plaintiffs’ concession. An inquiry as to control in fact could still be satisfied by the presentation of common evidence. 30 Nos. 15-1109 & 15-1110 classification is universally appropriate. That runs at crosspurposes with the reason for objecting to class certification, which is that it’s impossible to reach general conclusions about the putative class as a whole.”). Because the district court committed legal error when it thought that finding that prong two could be decided by common evidence was an improper decision on the merits, it abused its discretion in denying class certification on those grounds. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s denial of class certification and remand for further consideration.