Opinion ID: 6346965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Private Cause of Action for Damages

Text: Plaintiffs first argue that “suits attacking compulsory labor, i.e., indentured servitude, arise directly under prohibition of § 1 [of the Thirteenth Amendment], which is ‘undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation . . . .’” (Appellants’ Br. 28 (emphasis added) (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 28 (1883)).) Accordingly, they contend that the Thirteenth Amendment “must provide a direct private right of action,” and they “ask this Court to interpret § 1 of U.S. Const. amend. XIII . . . to adopt a construction which supports the intent of an implied private right of action against a State for said State’s violation . . . .” (Id. at 28, 31.) But “[t]he Supreme Court has never recognized a cause of action arising directly under the Constitution in a case where § 1983 was available as a remedy,” and “it is unnecessary and needlessly redundant to imply a cause of action arising directly under the Constitution where Congress has already provided a statutory remedy of equal effectiveness through which the plaintiff could have vindicated her constitutional rights.” Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 500 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Graves v. Wayne Cnty., 577 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1984) No. 21-6183 Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky. Page 5 (quoting Small v. Inhabitants of the City of Belfast, 574 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Me. 1982))), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Azul-Pacifico Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a plaintiff “complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983” where § 1983 “was available . . . but plaintiff failed to file its complaint within the applicable limitations period”)); see also Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 742 (2020) (noting that the finding that “a damages remedy is implied by a provision that makes no reference to that remedy may upset the careful balance of interests struck by the lawmakers,” particularly where there is no clear manifestation of congressional intent to do so); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856 (2017). Unlike cases where federal courts have recognized implied rights to sue for damages, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (recognizing an implicit right to sue federal officials for violation of the Fourth Amendment), Plaintiffs here had, and simply missed, the opportunity to avail themselves of a statute through which to properly bring their lawsuit, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389, 396. This conclusion bears the weight of binding authority. Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment is distinct from other amendments from which courts have recognized an implied cause of action for damages. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIII with U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VIII; Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979) (recognizing the plaintiff’s implicit right to sue a federal official for alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980) (recognizing the plaintiff’s implicit right to sue federal officials for alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment). Unlike the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment explicitly gives Congress the “power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. Const. amend. XIII § 2. And Congress has done so. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, 1584; see also United States v. Roof, 10 F.4th 314, 394–95 (4th Cir. 2021) (concluding that “the HCPA [18 U.S.C. § 249] is appropriate legislation under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the district court more specifically pointed out, “Congress has used its authority under § 2 to create private remedies for harms similar to those alleged in this case: imposing badges of slavery and holding someone in involuntary servitude.” (Op. & Order, R. 13, Page ID # 176 No. 21-6183 Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky. Page 6 (emphasis added)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–91. In this sense, the Thirteenth Amendment is more like the Fourteenth Amendment than the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. See U.S. Const. amends. XIV § 5, XIII; see also Const. amends. IV, V, VIII. And “we have long held that § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for constitutional violations” for rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment where Congress has not otherwise provided a cause of action. Foster v. Michigan, 573 F. App’x 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Shipka, 818 F.3d at 503). In the present case, Plaintiffs initially asserted their alleged Thirteenth Amendment violations against Kentucky state actors through the mechanism available to them in federal court: 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But they did so after the relevant statute of limitations expired. See Collard v. Kentucky Bd. Of Nursing, 896 F.2d 179, 180 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Since Congress has never legislated a statute of limitations period for section 1983 actions, the courts, pursuant to the mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, have had to look to analogous state statutes.”); Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989) (“[W]here state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions”); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a) (establishing a limitations period of one year for personal injury actions). Plaintiffs then attempted to circumvent the applicable limitations period by asking the district court “to imply a cause of action arising directly under the Constitution where Congress has already provided a statutory remedy of equal effectiveness through which [they] could have vindicated [their] constitutional rights.” Shipka, 818 F.3d at 500; see also Azul-Pacifico Inc., 973 F.2d at 705. Because this approach is foreclosed by binding precedent, the district court did not err when it granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Shipka, 818 F.3d at 500; see also Martin A. Schwartz & Kris Markarian, Section 1983 Litigation § 2 (3rd ed. 2014) (“In addition, § 1983 provides the exclusive available federal remedy for violations of federal constitutional rights under color of state law. Thus, plaintiffs may not avoid the limitations of a § 1983 claim for relief by asserting a claim directly under the Constitution.”) (citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989)). No. 21-6183 Smith v. Commonwealth of Ky. Page 7