Opinion ID: 434899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Government's Position was Substantially Justified

Text: 38 Attorney's fees will not be awarded under the EAJA if a court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). We hold that the position of the United States refers only to the government's position when it litigates over an agency action. 39 The EAJA does not itself make clear whether the position of the United States refers to the position of the government in the litigation over the agency action, or the position of the agency itself (the underlying agency action). See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 546 & nn. 27-28 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 104 S.Ct. 1908, 80 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984). The district court in the instant action adopted the view that both positions must be substantially justified, Boudin v. Thomas, 554 F.Supp. at 705 n. 7, a conclusion it based on two cases subsequently overruled by Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 104 S.Ct. 1908, 80 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984). 40 Until now this Court had not ruled on the precise question. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 1081, 1084 (2d Cir.1983). But cf. id. at 1088 (Newman, J., dissenting). See also Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F.Supp. 937, 949 & n. 15 (D.Conn.1984) (following Spencer ). Three other circuits had earlier adopted the same standard as Spencer. See United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir.1984); Tyler Business Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 75-76 (4th Cir.1982); Broad Avenue Laundry and Tailoring v. United States, 693 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed.Cir.1982). Two circuits reached the opposite conclusion; in one of these decisions, the two majority members of the panel disagreed in their reasoning and the dissenting panel member adopted the Spencer standard. See Rawlings v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1192, 1195-96 (9th Cir.1984); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 703 F.2d 700 (3d Cir.1983) (two-to-one decision). 41 We find the reasoning in Spencer persuasive, especially as applied to the present situation: 42 If, when evaluating an EAJA petition brought by a plaintiff ... who prevailed in a case [seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in an Eighth Amendment challenge to prison conditions], the judge focused on the justification for the government's underlying action, he or she would find it virtually impossible to deny the plaintiff[ ] attorneys' fees. The net result would be that the EAJA would ... become something approaching an automatic fee-shifting provision for a significant category of cases.... [T]his seems not to have been contemplated by the congressmen who enacted the statute. 43 Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d at 553 (footnote omitted). See Bennett v. Schweiker, 543 F.Supp. 897, 898-99 (D.D.C.1982) (denying attorney's fees under EAJA though government agency's original decision not supported by substantial evidence). See also Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d at 553-54 n. 52; Dubose v. Pierce, 579 F.Supp. at 949. Accordingly, we look only to the government's position in the litigation over the denial of contact visits to determine whether its actions were substantially justified. 6 The government must make a strong showing that its litigation position was substantially justified, which is essentially [a showing] of reasonableness. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Watt, 722 F.2d at 1085 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1418 at 10, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4989). 44 The denial of contact visits is troubling, but we are compelled to reach the conclusion that the government's litigating position over this issue was substantially justified. Boudin prevailed in this part of the litigation on the ground that she had a First Amendment right to contact visits which could only be curtailed if the limited restriction is a rational response by prison officials to an obvious security problem. Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F.Supp. at 793 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 550, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1880, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). 45 The government's argument that there was no First Amendment violation here, though unpersuasive, was not unreasonable. It was not clear at the time of the government's memorandum that there was a First Amendment right to contact visits. The only post-Wolfish circuit court holdings on point cited by the parties held that pretrial detainees did not have a constitutional right to contact visits. Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749, 753-54 (7th Cir.1980); Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 758-60 (3d Cir.1979); see also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 580 n. 26 (10th Cir.1980) (accord; not cited by parties), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). While the most recent pronouncement of this Court was that there was a First Amendment right to contact visits, Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 126 n. 16 (2d Cir.1978), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the change in the Supreme Court's standard of review of prison officials' actions in Bell v. Wolfish at least arguably made Wolfish v. Levi and the case on which it relied of questionable authority. 7 See Respondents' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petitioners' Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 23-24 (Memorandum in Opposition), Boudin v. Thomas, 533 F.Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y.1982). Memorandum in Opposition, at 23-24. 46 Even if there was a First Amendment right to contact visits, the government's argument that this right was not abridged was reasonable. Warden Thomas swore in his affidavit that the consent to strip searches of Boudin and her son would not be adequate to prevent escape attempts because inmates can and have defeated this procedure by secreting contraband in body cavities or by ingesting material and later, in his or her cell, regurgitating it.... [C]hildren often are exploited as vehicles for transmission of contraband, especially since they cannot be prosecuted if contraband is discovered. J.App. at 39. This affidavit was proof that might have been accepted by the district court. The government's argument that this was a legitimate alternative to the right it believed it had to cut off all social visits, see Memorandum in Opposition, at 26 n.  (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560 n. 40, 99 S.Ct. at 1885 n. 40); see also Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d at 754; Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d at 760 & n. 4, was not unreasonable. 47 Finally, we are not precluded from making a de novo determination of whether the government's litigation position was substantially justified. We have held that the government reasonably argued that Boudin had no First Amendment right to contact visits. Because we are determining the reasonableness of legal arguments, we may review the district court's finding that the government's position was not substantially justified as we would any other question of law. See Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d at 563 (whether government's interpretations of the law are plausible or colorable are findings of law). 48 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court in Docket No. 83-2170 is vacated and the cause is remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for attorney's fees. The judgment of the district court in Docket No. 83-2174 is affirmed as to the petition under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 (Supp. IV 1980). Because of the disposition of Docket No. 83-2170, the cross-appeal in Docket No. 83-2174 is dismissed in all other respects as moot.