Opinion ID: 901553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Zandstra-Tveidt Contract

Text: [¶12.] The Zandstra-Tveidt Contract consisted of a one page form and in its entirety read as follows: The agreement made this 22nd day of May, 2000, between Zandstra Construction, Inc. . . . and Ester [sic] A. and Lewis Tveidt, . . . . Zandstra Construction, Inc. hereby agrees to: Pay Tveidt's $30,000.00 for return haul road 35' wide. Pay Tveidt's $2.50 per ton for riprap produced on their property. Additional Conditions: Return haul road will need to be 35' wide. We will reseed & reclaim when hauling is complete. All stumps from project will be buried in Tveidt's waste area. Use an area on Tveidt's property to screen and store riprap, we will reseed this area when completed. Not all riprap for this project will be produced in Tvedt'd [sic] property. We will grade a trail south of Highway on Tveidt's property. We will also dig a trench from the spring at STA 514+00 to the sleeve. Tveidt will install a pipe from the spring to the sleeve. We will then backfill pipe. [¶13.] The Zandstra-Tveidt Contract provided that Tveidt would receive $2.50 per ton for riprap produced on their property. By using the word produced, Tveidt argues that, by definition, Zandstra had an obligation to pay for any riprap brought into existence or created on Tveidt's property. See Black's Law Dictionary 1245 (8th ed 2004). Even if we were to accept this definition of the term produced, Tveidt's argument fails. The riprap obtained from the excess embankment material was not created on Tveidt's property. In other words, it did not have its origin from Tveidt's property. Rather, the DOT moved it from the Boulder Canyon Project and placed it on Tveidt's property for storage purposes. In contrast, the 9,948.34 tons of riprap that Zandstra tendered payment for had its origin in Tveidt's property. Furthermore, Black's Law Dictionary also defines produced as to bring (oil, etc.) to the surface of the earth. Black's Law Dictionary 1245 (8th ed 2004). The riprap produced from the excess material had already been brought to the surface of the earth when it was placed on Tveidt's property. Therefore, under both of these definitions, the term produced does not apply to the riprap obtained from the excess embankment material. [¶14.] Tveidt further argues the excess embankment material became the property of the Tveidts once placed on their property. Tveidt cites Hayes v. Alaska Juneau Forest Industries, Inc., a case dealing with the deposit of mine tailings, as support for this position. 748 P2d 332, 336 (Alaska 1988). In Hayes, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that [a]ll authorities to which we have been referred hold that when tailings or other mine wastes are deposited in such a manner or with such an intention that they become real estate, they become the property of the owner of the underlying land. Id . at 337. However, in Hayes the minerals were deposited for the purpose of disposal, as distinct from being stockpiled for future use. Id. at 334-35. Zandstra, as an agent of DOT, did not dispose of excess embankment material; it screened and stored the riprap for future use. This is not indicative of an intent to abandon the riprap, as required in Hayes. Id. at 335. The Hayes Court recognized that the minerals did not change ownership until they were abandoned; stating: [t]he concept of abandonment plays an important role . . . . If the tailings are `abandoned' they become real estate, if they are not abandoned they remain the personal property of the mine or mill which created them. Id. at 335. Neither Zandstra nor the DOT abandoned any of the excess embankment until after the completion of the Boulder Canyon Project. The Zandstra-Tveidt Contract and the DOT-Tveidt Contract further emphasize this fact. [¶15.] The DOT-Tveidt Contract stated the quantity of excess embankment would be determined by measuring cross sections taken before and after the roadway project. (Emphasis added). This measurement clause clearly states that DOT would only pay Tveidt for the excess embankment remaining on the property at the conclusion of the roadway project. It further implies that excess embankment material may be removed from Tveidt's land prior to the roadway project's completion. Hence, the property was not abandoned until the conclusion of the Boulder Canyon Project. The Zandstra-Tveidt Contract also contradicts the Hayes analogy. [¶16.] The Zandstra-Tveidt Contract referred to both stored riprap and produced riprap. It provided that Tveidt's land would be used to screen and store riprap. (Emphasis added). It further provided, [n]ot all riprap for this project will be produced in Tvedt'd [sic] property, a reasonable interpretation of the two provisions is that the parties agreed that not all of the stored riprap would be produced in Tveidt's property. In other words, some of the stored riprap would come from another source. Rationally, another source of riprap was the excess embankment material Zandstra stripped from the Boulder Canyon Project area and transported to Tveidt's land. Moreover, there would be no reason to store riprap which was already part of Tveidt's land. When interpreting a contract we prefer to give effect to all its terms, rather than an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable or of no effect. In re Dissolution of Midnight Star Enterprises, L.P. ex rel. Midnight, 2006 SD 98, ¶12, 724 NW2d at 337 (quoting Nelson v. Schellpfeffer, 2003 SD 7, ¶14, 656 NW2d 740, 744 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1981))). [¶17.] Neither the DOT-Tveidt Contract nor the Zandstra-Tveidt Contract obligated Zandstra to compensate Tveidt for riprap screened from the excess embankment material; therefore, we find no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment. [¶18.] Affirmed. [¶19.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, and ZINTER, Justices, concur.