Opinion ID: 797784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Matthews's Claim Involving Paxton

Text: 48 In general, a federal court may not consider an issue of federal law arising from a judgment of a state court if that judgment rests on a state-law ground that is both `independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an `adequate' basis for the [state] court's decision. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989). A federal court typically will not reach the merits of a claim when a state court has already rejected that claim for procedural reasons— i.e., the petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claim in state court. Id. at 261, 109 S.Ct. 1038. When a petitioner procedurally defaults a claim, the petitioner cannot receive habeas relief in federal court unless the petitioner can show either cause for the default and actual prejudice from the alleged violation of federal law, or establish that the failure to consider [federal] claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 749-50, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). 49 As Matthews readily concedes, there is no question he procedurally defaulted his claim involving Paxton. In his final motion for a new trial in state court, Matthews argued that the prosecution failed to notify him that Paxton received consideration for his testimony, as evidenced by the withdrawal of his guilty plea, the plea to reduced charges, and the re-sentencing. Although the trial court granted the motion, the Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed, holding that Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 barred his claim. Ohio v. Matthews, No. 70587, slip.op. at 9 (Ohio Ct.App. Mar. 22, 1999). Rule 33 provides, in part, a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 50 shall be filed within one hundred twenty days after the day upon which the verdict was rendered, or the decision of the court where trial by jury has been waived. If it is made to appear by clear and convincing proof that the defendant was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must rely, such motion shall be filed within seven days from an order of the court finding that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence within the one hundred twenty day period. 51 Ohio R. Crim P. 33(B). Defense counsel had discovered Roulette's plea bargain, but did not check the public records to determine whether Paxton had received a similar bargain. Matthews, No. 70587, slip op. at 8. Because of this, the state court concluded that Matthews did not exercise reasonable diligence in discovering the existence of Paxton's deal. Id. at 8-9. 52 Matthews argues, however, that he can show both cause and prejudice for his default. 1 The district court agreed, determining that the prosecutor impeded Matthews from finding out about Paxton's plea bargain by repeatedly assuring the jury that no pleas had been or would be made with either Paxton or Roulette, and then not informing Matthews of the Paxton plea bargain during his direct appeal. The district court did not fault Matthews for failing to find out about Paxton's plea bargain because, under Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 284, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), defense counsel could rely on the statements made by the assistant prosecutor. 53 The district court erred. Two important considerations distinguish this case from Strickler and some other prosecutorial-misconduct cases. First, Paxton's withdrawal of his original guilty plea, plea to reduced charges, and re-sentencing were all public information. Contrast this case with those cases when the government has sole possession of investigative notes or memoranda; in such cases, the government has a duty to provide the information to the defense. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696-97, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004) (rejecting the state's argument that the petitioner could have discovered exculpatory facts with sufficient investigation; the facts were not available in an easily accessible public forum); Strickler, 527 U.S. at 285, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (rejecting the state's argument that the petitioner should have known about the existence of investigative records and notes, even though the documents were not in the prosecutor's open file). Where, like here, the factual basis for a claim is reasonably available to the petitioner or his counsel from another source, the government is under no duty to supply that information to the defense. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 283 n. 24, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397). In other words, when the information is readily available to the defense from another source, there simply is nothing for the government to disclose. Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 344 (6th Cir.1998). 54 Second, Matthews knew that Roulette had pled to misdemeanor offenses with a suspended prison sentence, even though the assistant prosecutor had made comments during trial that Roulette did not have a deal in exchange for his testimony. Thus, Matthews's suspicion should have been piqued that Paxton may have received a new plea bargain similar to Roulette's, notwithstanding the assistant prosecutor's comments. The discovery of Roulette's plea bargain would have put a reasonable person on notice to a similar arrangement with Paxton, regardless of whether or not motions to withdraw a plea after sentencing are rarely successful in Ohio, as suggested by Matthews. Had he inquired as to Paxton like he did as to Roulette, Matthews surely would have discovered the new plea bargain, given Paxton entered his new plea and was sentenced within a day of Roulette's plea and sentencing. Matthews's failure to check the public records after being put on notice was his own failure, and not a failure caused by the assistant prosecutor or some other external factor. Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 611 (6th Cir.2004) (finding no Brady violation where defendant was on notice that evidence existed and [a] reasonable defendant would have pursued that inquiry); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 538 (6th Cir.2000) (rejecting a Brady claim where the defendant has made no showing that he would have been unable to identify, locate, and interview these individuals through reasonable efforts on his own part). Thus, Matthews has failed to establish cause for his procedural default. 55 The cause-and-prejudice analysis is a conjunctive one, requiring a petitioner to satisfy both prongs to excuse a procedural default. Because Matthews has not shown cause, we will not address whether he has satisfied the prejudice prong. Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 405 (6th Cir.2006) (As Broom has not shown the requisite cause to excuse the procedural default of this claim, we will not examine whether he has shown the requisite prejudice, nor will we proceed to the merits of Broom's Brady claim.). Accordingly, Matthews has procedurally defaulted his Brady claim involving Paxton.