Opinion ID: 1343313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Equal Protection Standard

Text: We find that with regard to the status offender the procedure for disposition set forth in Code, 49-5-11 [1975] can be applied in a manner repugnant to the basic principles of equal protection because it discriminates invidiously against children based upon social class, sex, and geographic location. It is obvious that a child from a family with financial resources will have an opportunity to use private institutional facilities which are far less restrictive, less dangerous, and less degrading than public correctional institutions. What would have happened to the petitioner in the case before us if he had come from an upper middle-class family in a city such as Charleston or Wheeling? He certainly would have had an opportunity to go to a private school. In the case before us we may reasonably infer that the Calhoun County Juvenile Court committed petitioner to a reform school because of the lack of a reasonable alternative which would have existed if petitioner had been from a different area or belonged to a different socio-economic class. Furthermore, the status offender is inherently in a different class from the criminal offender. The Legislature could choose to punish children guilty of criminal conduct in the same manner as it punishes adults, but as a matter of public policy the Legislature provided instead for a comprehensive system of child welfare. The aim of this system is to protect and rehabilitate children, not to punish them. See State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W.Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963); State ex rel. Browning v. Boles, 147 W.Va. 878, 132 S.E.2d 505 (1963). It has always been assumed that the Legislature can at any time withdraw some or all the benefits of this system from children guilty of criminal conduct. There is no such prospect for status offenders, however, since without the child welfare legislation they are guilty of no crimes cognizable and punishable by courts. This explains why status offenders have a special position within the current system, despite the fact that technically they are not distinguished from children guilty of actual criminal conduct. Since the class to which status offenders belong has been created under authority of the State's inherent and sovereign parens patriae power, Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57 (Cal.App. 1947); Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955), and not under the plenary powers of the State to control criminal activity and punish criminals, Barker v. People, 3 Cow. (N.Y.) 686 (1824), status offenders must be treated in a fashion consistent with the parens patriae power, namely, they must be helped and not punished, State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles, supra ; otherwise their classification becomes invidious, and accordingly, unconstitutional. Finally, it should be noted that status offender legislation discriminates invidiously against females. It is apparent that status offense petitions can easily be used to bring under control young women suspected by their parents or by other authorities of promiscuous behavior. Our society tends to condemn female promiscuity more severely than male promiscuity, and this tendency may explain why females often are unfairly classified and treated as status offenders. This Court offers no explanation for this phenomenon, nor do we make any normative judgments regarding the wisdom of such a distinction; however, we recognize its existence and its discriminatory effect on female status offenders. [6] The control of sexual behavior may be accomplished by other means.