Opinion ID: 1429477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent as an Exception

Text: While consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for searches, Hinsch argues that consent to seizure is not. He argues that the agents' seizure of the drug proceeds violated his constitutional rights inasmuch as it was done without a warrant and that none of the exceptions set forth in the statute under which the property was seized applied. The statute establishes certain exceptions when property may be seized without a warrant, but consent is not one of them. [2] However, the State argues that consent is a common law exception and need not rely on statutory authority. The State argues that we should recognize consent as an exception to warrantless seizures as we do with respect to warrantless searches. It also points out that consent is a recognized exception to warrantless seizures in both federal search and seizure law. It further argues that because consent is explicitly made an exception in a related statute that addresses administrative searches and seizures, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-10, it should also be recognized as an exception here. In support thereof, the State cites Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991), a case that involved the forfeiture of a van that was used for personal possession and consumption of a controlled substance. In a footnote to that case, this court compared this statute with a statute addressing administrative search and seizure, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-10, which explicitly included exigent circumstances as an exception to the warrant requirement and held that the exception should also apply to forfeitures sought pursuant to this forfeiture statute although this statute does not explicitly include such an exception. 813 P.2d at 1182 n. 2. The State urges the same construction here, explaining that the policy and protections surrounding an administrative seizure made pursuant to section 58-37-10 should apply equally to those made pursuant to a forfeiture proceeding. Our state constitutional guarantee against unreasonable seizures originates from the same clause as does the guarantee against unreasonable searches. Article I, section 14 reads as follows: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. Because the language giving rise to these rights is one and the same, it logically follows that the protection offered thereby would also be similar. Searches and seizures were addressed in the same clause because they are closely related. In practical terms, the protections should be similar because the general right to the private enjoyment of property is at stake in both searches and seizures. Because seizures are usually precipitated by searches, uniformity between searches and seizures with respect to a warrant requirement and its exceptions is logical. In regard to searches under Utah constitutional law, consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980); see also State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1108 (Utah 1977); State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah 1975). However, whether consent is also an exception to seizure of property without a warrant has never been addressed by this court. Federal law recognizes a consent exception in both search and seizure analysis. Interpreting a similar federal forfeiture statute, [3] the Second Circuit held that a warrantless seizure is valid if it meets one of the recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031-32, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971)); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 49 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir.1993). Consent is a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement for searches in federal law. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514-15, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628, 66 S.Ct. 1277, 1279, 90 L.Ed. 1477 (1946). The State argues that this court should interpret Utah's forfeiture statute similarly. Inasmuch as the right against unlawful searches and the right against unlawful seizures are coupled within the same constitutional provision, it is only logical that if a person could expressly consent to one, he or she should be able to consent to the other. Whereas we have previously held that consent is an exception to the warrant requirement in the case of searches, Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 106, we now hold that consent is likewise an exception in the case of seizures. In other words, a warrantless seizure of property is valid if done pursuant to and within the scope of voluntary consent. Hinsch argues, however, that even if consent to seizure of property is recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement, his consent was involuntary and therefore invalid. He contends that the existence of an understanding that he could prevent his wife and friends from being arrested through his cooperation coerced him into consenting. However, the trial court concluded that Hinsch's consent was voluntary. The trial court found that Hinsch, himself, initiated and pursued this understanding. He said he would be willing to cooperate if it would help his friends avoid criminal charges. Although the agent informed Hinsch that he would discuss his cooperation with the county attorney, no explicit promises or threats were made. It can hardly be said that the understanding was coercively employed when it was reached, in fact, at Hinsch's suggestion. He offered his consent to the seizure of the money. The trial court also found that he wanted to get drug dealing behind him. He not only voluntarily led officers to where the money was stashed but later, outside of custody, volunteered information about forthcoming drug payments. In short, the trial court did not err in determining that Hinsch's consent was voluntarily given.