Opinion ID: 597855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 41 Jackson argues that the government did not produce sufficient evidence to convict him of the money laundering count or of structuring transactions to avoid the reporting requirements or conceal the nature and source of the proceeds. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determine whether substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. E.g., United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1229 (7th Cir.1990). Furthermore, we will accept circumstantial evidence as support, even sole support, for a conviction. Id. 42
43 Tracking section 1956, as set out above, the district court instructed the jury that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Jackson conducted a financial transaction involving property that represented proceeds of dealing in controlled substances; (2) Jackson knew that the property represented the proceeds of dealing in controlled substances; and (3) Jackson knew that the transaction was designed in whole or in part to conceal the nature and location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of dealing in controlled substances and to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under federal law. 4 Jackson does not challenge these instructions. Instead he argues that the government did not prove that the proceeds used to purchase the car arose from dealing in controlled substances or that Jackson knew his conduct was illegal. However, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the conviction. 44 Specifically, Jackson maintains that the government piled inference upon inference to meet its burden in this case. He relies on this court's decision in United States v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir.1990). In Sullivan the government maintained that the defendant, who had arrived in Union Station with a duffle bag full of cocaine, must have conspired with someone to distribute cocaine because of the quantity and purity of the drugs he possessed, his use of an alias, and his lack of funds and other baggage. Id. at 1099. This court acknowledged that to prove conspiracy, the government may rely on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom concerning the relationship of the parties, their overt acts and the totality of their conduct. Id. at 1098. The court concluded, however, that the defendant's conviction for conspiracy was not based on inferences from facts but on conjecture. Id. at 1099. 45 Any analogy between this case and Sullivan fails. The money laundering count involved Jackson's purchase of the Saab in October 1987. Contrary to Jackson's contentions, six witnesses indicated that Jackson was involved in selling cocaine (Cannon, Verser, Turnage, Teamer, Thurgood, and Gransberry); and four of those witnesses (Cannon, Verser, Turnage, and Donald) indicated that Jackson had provided cocaine to them or discussed providing cocaine to them at approximately the time he purchased the Saab. With this testimony, together with evidence of Jackson's unexplained, substantial wealth, the jury could reasonably conclude that Jackson was involved in drug trafficking in October 1987 without resorting to pure conjecture. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out in United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir.1990), the statute does not require that the government trace the proceeds to a particular sale. 46 The jury acquitted Jackson of conspiracy, and from that acquittal Jackson asks us to deduce that the jury disbelieved the witnesses against him. But Jackson makes too much of the acquittal. While the jury may not have believed that he was involved in the Cannon conspiracy as alleged in Count I, it could still believe that Jackson derived the proceeds used to purchase the Saab from drug transactions. 47 Finally, Jackson argues that there was no evidence that he knew his conduct was illegal. The record refutes this contention. For example, when Jackson purchased the Toyota Supra under an assumed name, he told the saleswoman that he knew about the reporting requirements: 48 Q: Did you have a discussion with Mr. Jackson on how he was going to pay for that car? 49 A: Yes. He said he was paying cash.... He did give me thousand dollars deposit when we first agreed up on a price, and he said he did not want to pay the full amount at once because whatever the problem there may be it was personal. And he also stated that somehow he knew that if anyone under thirty-five of age, if they were to bring $10,000 cash in, we would have to report that. 50 As previously stated, Jackson returned to the dealership with seven payments varying in amount from $25 to $6,772.25 in either cash or cashier's checks. In addition, when Jackson sold Cannon a Cadillac in 1987, he falsely reported the purchase price as $9,500 and told Cannon that he did so to avoid having the sale reported to the Internal Revenue Service. From this evidence, the jury could readily conclude that, when Jackson purchased the Saab by means of multiple payments in cash and cashier's checks, each for less than $10,000, he knowingly structured the transaction to avoid the reporting requirements. 51
52 The district court instructed the jury that in order to sustain the charge under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant structured a transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions as alleged in the indictment; (2) the defendant did so knowingly and willfully; and (3) the defendant did so for the purpose of evading the currency reporting requirements of the law. The court then added that [i]n order to prove that the defendant acted to avoid a transaction reporting requirement, the Government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew the actions he took in avoiding the requirement violated the law. The court also read section 5324 to the jury. 53 Although the jury found Jackson guilty, the instruction imposed a higher burden on the government than the statute requires. The instruction required the government to prove that the defendant actually knew structuring was unlawful. The circuits which have addressed this question, however, require the government to prove only that a defendant had knowledge of the reporting requirements and acted to avoid them. United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 644 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 416, 121 L.Ed.2d 339 (1992); United States v. Rogers, 962 F.2d 342, 344 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Brown, 954 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 284, 121 L.Ed.2d 210 (1992); United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 537-38 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 402, 116 L.Ed.2d 351 (1991); United States v. Wollman, 945 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Hoyland, 914 F.2d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Scanio, 900 F.2d 485, 489-90 (2d Cir.1990). We join these circuits in concluding that [b]y its plain language, § 5324(3) is violated when an individual structures a currency transaction with the intent to evade § 5313's reporting requirements, Scanio, 900 F.2d at 489, and that [a] criminal violation of § 5324(3) may be established without proof that the defendant knew that structuring was unlawful. Id. at 491. Under this test, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that Jackson structured a currency transaction with the intent to evade the reporting requirements. Under the district court's instruction, to find Jackson guilty of structuring, the jury had to conclude that Jackson knew that the actions he took in avoiding the [reporting] requirement violated the law. In order to know that he was violating the law, Jackson would first have to intend to avoid the reporting requirements. Thus to hold as it did the jury also had to conclude that Jackson acted for the purpose of evading the reporting requirement. Moreover, the testimony of several witnesses established that Jackson knew that cash transactions over $10,000 had to be reported. In buying the Toyota, Jackson paid in installments of less than $10,000 each (some in cash and some in cashier's checks). In buying the Saab, Jackson used five separate cashier's checks from five different banks purchased on the same date. By looking at Jackson's statements and his past conduct, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Jackson's decision to visit five banks on the same day and obtain five cashier's checks each for under $10,000 was not happenstance but was for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements. 54 Jackson argues further that there is no evidence that he structured anything since the name Marion Jackson appears on the cashier's checks. Jackson contends that the jury had to speculate that he (as opposed to Marion Jackson) structured the transaction. The record contains sufficient evidence, however, for the jury to infer that Errol Jackson posed as Marion Jackson and structured the transaction: he signed the purchase contract as Marion Jackson in the presence of the salesperson; he subsequently drove the Saab or directed others to do so; witnesses referred to the Saab as Errol Jackson's Saab; and as late as January 1989 the Saab was parked outside Errol Jackson's residence. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that Jackson purchased the car but used a false name--particularly in light of the absence of any evidence of a person named Marion Jackson. Because Jackson purchased the car posing as Marion Jackson, the jury could also reasonably infer that he obtained the cashier's checks as Marion Jackson.