Opinion ID: 1188723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the jury instruction on forcible sodomy

Text: The trial judge's initial instruction to the jury accurately stated the law as found in § 76-5-403, which provides: (1) A person commits sodomy when the actor engages in any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant. (2) A person commits forcible sodomy when the actor commits sodomy upon another without the other's consent. After the jurors had retired for deliberation, they informed the judge through the bailiff that they desired to be further instructed on a point of law. Specifically, they asked the judge to define the term genitals as used in the statute. The judge refused to give the requested instruction. [5] A conflict in the testimony suggests the reason for the jury's concern with the meaning of the word genitals. One or more jurors might have believed defendant's denial that he put his mouth on prosecutrix's vagina, but nevertheless believed the prosecutrix's testimony that he put his mouth on her breast. Without a clarifying instruction, such a juror might have voted for conviction on the forcible sodomy charge in the mistaken belief that the term genitals includes the female breast. A proper definition should have prevented this mistake. Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing the juror's request for a definition of the statutory term genitals? It is normally unnecessary and undesirable for a trial judge to volunteer definitions of terms of common usage for the jury. In State v. Day, Utah, 572 P.2d 703, 705 (1977), this Court stated: Ordinarily, non-technical words of ordinary meaning should not be elaborated upon in the instructions given by the court. It is presumed that jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand the meaning of ordinary words like depraved and indifference. Thus, it has been held that there was no need to define intercourse in a rape case, since that word has a common meaning. [6] On the other hand, in a case in which the defendant was accused of having administered poison, it was held that failure to instruct the jury on the meaning of administer was reversible error. [7] And in reversing for failure to define concealed, another court held that where the word is susceptible of differing interpretations, only one of which is a proper statement of the law, an instruction must be given. [8] Where the jury requests the instruction, however, it is generally held error to refuse to provide a definition, even where the word is a term of common meaning. People v. Ochs, 9 A.D.2d 792, 194 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1959); State v. McClure, W. Va., 253 S.E.2d 555 (1979). The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Felix Frank-furter, expressed the basic principle as follows: Discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing appropriate conclusions from the testimony depended on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria. When a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy. [Emphasis added.] Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946). The same principle undergirds the Utah statutes in force at the time of this trial, the former § 77-32-3, which states in pertinent part: After the jury shall have retired for deliberation, .. . if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause ... the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or his counsel. [Emphasis added.] [9] This principle applies to the instant case. Where the jury requests it, the definition of a term critical to the meaning of a criminal statute is a point of law. Jurors cannot be considered properly instructed on a criminal statute if they are demonstrably confused about the meaning of the words used in it. Despite the risk that supplying a definition will obfuscate the normal interpretation of familiar words, [10] where a jury at its own instance requests the definition of a term whose understanding is essential to a proper application of the law, the trial judge must provide the requested definition. In the application of this rule, we see no reason to distinguish between terms of art and non-technical words of common usage. The critical fact is that the jury has signified its lack of understanding of the meaning of a word it must apply in performing its function. The word genitals was a key word the jury had to understand as it sought to apply the relevant statute to the testimony in this case. When the jury requested a definition of that word, the trial court should have provided it. The failure to do so was reversible error. Defendant's conviction for forcible sodomy is therefore reversed, and that cause is remanded for a new trial.