Opinion ID: 1111406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Getting it State v. Kam

Text: If Mueller was Yin, State v. Kam, supra, 69 Haw. 483, 748 P.2d 372 (1988)  in which this court next explored the interrelationship between the state's police power to criminalize conduct, on the one hand, and the individual's right to privacy in the personal autonomy sense, as expressly codified in article I, section 6, on the other  was Yang. In Kam, the defendants (two salesclerks employed by different adult bookstores) sold adult magazines to undercover police officers and were charged with promoting pornography in violation of HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) (1985), i.e., with having disseminated pornographic material for monetary consideration, knowing the material's content and character. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground, inter alia, that HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) violated the right to privacy guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Kam, 69 Haw. at 485, 748 P.2d at 374. The prosecution opposed the motions, inter alia, on the bases that (1) obscene items had no constitutional protection, (2) the right to privacy did not apply to the commercial sale of pornography, and (3) the statute was facially valid. Id. The district court denied the defendants' motions, and the cases were consolidated for trial. At the close of the evidence, the district court found that the magazines in question were pornographic, patently offensive, [and] violated the prevailing community standards and, accordingly, convicted the defendants as charged. Id. at 486, 748 P.2d at 374. On appeal, the defendants reasserted, inter alia, their position that the pornography statute violated article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. The unanimous Kam court agree[d] that HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) infringes on the right to privacy and therefore reverse[d] the [defendants'] convictions. Id. at 485, 748 P.2d at 374. The court's thought process, however, could hardly have been predicted from a reading of Mueller: [59] The regulatory scheme under HRS §§ 712-1210 to 712-1214 (1985) conforms to the standards set by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 26, 38 L.Ed.2d 128 (1973). Miller held that obscenity is not protected by the [f]irst [a]mendment and defined the constitutional parameters into which a state's statutory regulation must fit. 413 U.S. at 23-24, 93 S.Ct. at 2614-15. It follows that those statutes which meet the requirements of Miller will not infringe on any constitutionally protected rights under the [f]irst [a]mendment. HRS § 1210(6) recites the three-prong test established in Miller. ... State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440, 573 P.2d 945 (1977) ... adopted the reasoning of Miller: ... We interpret [a]rticle I, [s]ection [4] of the Hawaii Constitution [60] as excluding obscenity from protected speech. .... 58 Haw. at 444, 573 P.2d at 949[.] Therefore, the constitutionality of HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) has been firmly established pursuant to a free speech analysis, and hence is not [violative of] the [f]irst [a]mendment. HRS § 712-1214(1)(a), however, was not then subjected to a right of privacy scrutiny. .... In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that a distributor of contraceptives, who had been convicted of violating a state law restricting the dissemination of contraceptive products, had the standing to assert the rights of unmarried persons who had been denied access to contraceptives. The Court ruled that enforcement of the disputed statute materially impair[ed] the ability of single persons to obtain contraceptives. Id. at 446, 92 S.Ct. at 1034. By analogy, implementing HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) against the sellers of pornography severely reduces the ability of persons to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of the home. .... The materials in question[] were found to be pornographic pursuant to the Miller three-prong test. [The] State, however, would not be able to prohibit an individual from possessing and viewing such pornographic materials in the privacy of his or her own home. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). Herein lies the paradoxical conflict. Is an individual's fundamental privacy right to own and view pornographic material violated when he or she is effectively denied the right to obtain such material (since[,] generally, pornography is bought for private use at home)? This is the threshold issue of this appeal. The question is what should take precedence: [the] State's police power to regulate obscene material versus an individual's fundamental privacy right to have pornography at home? [61] The United States Supreme court has effectively ruled that the protected right to possess obscene material in the privacy of one's home does not give rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128, 93 S.Ct. 2665, 2669, 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). Furthermore, United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143-44, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 2677-78, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (1973)[,] held that (emphasis added): Congress may regulate on the basis of the natural tendency of material in the home being kept private and the contrary tendency once material leaves that area, regardless of a transporter's professed intent. Congress could reasonably determine such regulation to be necessary to effect permissible federal control of interstate commerce in obscene material, based as that regulation is on a legislatively determined risk of ultimate exposure to juveniles or to the public and the harm that exposure could cause. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 28 L.Ed.2d 813 (1971). .... The United States Supreme Court case-law [sic] is premised on the [f]irst [a]mendment. The Hawaii Constitution article I, section 6, though, affords much greater privacy rights than the federal right to privacy, so we are not bound by the United States Supreme Court precedents. [62] As the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawaii Constitution, we are free to give broader privacy protection than that given by the federal constitution. See State v. Kim, 68 Haw. 286], 711 P.2d 1291 (1985); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 687 P.2d 544 (1984); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 520 P.2d 51 (1974); see also State v. Enos, 68 Haw. 509], 720 P.2d 1012 (1986). .... The Hawaii Constitution article I, section 6 reads (emphasis added): The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to implement this right. The Hawaii Constitution must be construed with due regard to the intent of the framers and the people adopting it. The fundamental principle in interpreting a constitutional provision is to give effect to that intent. The privacy provision was drafted by the 1978 Constitutional Convention and incorporated into the Hawaii Constitution by the general election that year. The Convention's [CBRSE] recommended passage of the proposed article I, section 6 by stating that: Perhaps the most important aspect of privacy is that it confers upon people the most important right of all  the right to be left alone. As Justice Brandeis said in his now celebrated and vindicated dissent in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928): The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone  the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. It gives each and every individual the right to control certain highly personal and intimate affairs of his own life. The right to personal autonomy, to dictate his lifestyle, to be oneself are included in this concept of privacy. As Justice Abe stated in his concurring opinion in State v. Kantner, 53 Haw. 327, 493 P.2d 306 (1972): each person has the fundamental right of liberty to make a fool of himself as long as his act does not endanger others, and that the state may regulate the conduct of a person under pain of criminal punishment only when his actions affect the general welfare  that is, where others are harmed or likely to be harmed. .... It should be emphasized that this right is not an absolute one but, because similar to the right of free speech, it is so important in value to society that it can be infringed upon only by the showing of a compelling state interest. If the State is able to show a compelling state interest, the right of the group will prevail over the privacy rights or the right of the individual. However, in view of the important nature of this right, the State must use the least restrictive means should it desire to interfere with the right. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 69, [ reprinted in ] 1 Proceedings ... at 674-75 (1980) (emphasis added). After extensive debates, the Convention's Committee of the Whole adopted the proposal and concluded that: this privacy concept encompasses the notion that in certain highly personal and intimate matters, the individual should be afforded freedom of choice absent a compelling state interest. This right is similar to the privacy right discussed in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)[,] Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), etc. It is a right that, though unstated in the federal Constitution, emanates from the penumbra of several guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Because of this, there has been some confusion as to the source of the right and the importance of it. As such, it is treated as a fundamental right subject to interference only when a compelling state interest is demonstrated. By inserting clear and specific language regarding this right into the Constitution, your Committee intends to alleviate any possible confusion over the source of the right and the existence of it. Committee of the Whole Rep. No. 15, supra, at 1024 (emphasis added). Based on the clear and unambiguous reports, a compelling state interest must exist before the government may intrude into those certain highly personal and intimate affairs of [a person's] life. [63] The personal decision, therefore, to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of one's own home must be afforded the protection of the Hawaii Constitution article I, section 6 from government interference. Reading or viewing pornographic material in the privacy of one's own home in no way affects the general public's rights. [64] Anyone who is offended by pornography need not be subjected to it so long as others confine their taste for it to their homes. ... .... Because the enforcement of HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) has a ... detrimental impact on privacy rights, [the] State must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest exists to prohibit the sale of pornographic material. [The] State, however, has not met its burden. [The] State cites to Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 27, 38 L.Ed.2d 128 (1973), to support its contention that there is a legitimate state interest to regulate the commerce in obscene material. This ruling, like that of Orito [] and 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, however, was pursuant to a rational basis analysis. The Hawaii State Constitution article I, section 6, on the other hand, demands the showing of a compelling state interest. Therefore, unless the State can point to a compelling government interest, the right to privacy is infringed upon by the prohibition against the sale of sexually explicit adult material. Since a person has the right to view pornographic items at home, there necessarily follows a correlative right to purchase such materials for this personal use, or the underlying privacy right becomes meaningless. See Orito, 413 U.S. at 146, 93 S.Ct. at 2679 (Brennan, J., dissenting); [United States v.] Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. [363,] 381, 91 S.Ct. 1416, 1416, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (Black, J., dissenting)[, reh'g denied, 403 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 2221, 29 L.Ed.2d 702 (1971)]. [65] [The] State also mistakenly cites State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983), as authority for the proposition that the government may regulate obscenity despite the right to privacy provisions. Mueller, however, 1) accepted the rationale of Stanley; but 2) upheld the authority of the legislature to prohibit prostitution even in the privacy of one's own home, because prostitution was not protected by the right to privacy, and therefore the government was not required to prove a compelling state interest. 66 Haw. at 630, 671 P.2d at 1360. The Hawaii Constitution article I, section 6, by contrast, encompasses the privacy right to read or view pornographic material in one's own home. .... Because of our invalidation of HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) ..., ... [the defendants'] convictions are reversed. Kam, 69 Haw. at 487-96, 748 P.2d at 375-80 (footnote and some citations omitted) (some emphases, ellipsis points, and brackets added and some in original). It is no coincidence that the penultimate paragraph quoted above contains the Kam opinion's only reference to Mueller, in which Mueller is distinguished as being inapposite. The paragraph is cursory, dismissive, and framed almost as an afterthought. In substance, the Kam court says of Mueller, Mueller is different from this case because (1) the Mueller court held that consensual sex in the home for a fee did not fall within the ambit of personal conduct protected by article I, section 6 and therefore was within the sovereign police power of the state to criminalize, whereas (2) we, in Kam, are holding that possession of constitutionally unprotected pornographic contraband in the home, purchased for the purpose of engaging in autoeroticism, does fall within the ambit of personal conduct protected by article I, section 6 and therefore is not within the sovereign police power of the state to criminalize, the state having failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest in doing so. That sounds to me like Mueller is different from Kam because we say so, and, therefore, Mueller is different from Kam because it is. That's pretty circular. The fact is that there was not much the Kam court could have done with Mueller other than what it did, except to overrule the decision, which it seemingly was unwilling to do. Nevertheless, it is apparent to me that the Kam court abandoned  indeed, renounced  the Mueller analysis for purposes of resolving the issue before it. Had the Kam court tracked the reasoning of Mueller, its decision would have read something like this: The sole question presented on appeal is whether the proscriptions of HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) may be applied to the sale of constitutionally unprotected pornographic contraband that is foreseeably destined to be used for autoerotic purposes in the home. In order to answer the question, we must determine whether such use of that otherwise constitutionally unprotected pornographic contraband is protected by article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Article I, section 6 was proposed by the 1978 Constitutional Convention and ratified by the electorate in the same year. The framers of article I, section 6 intended that the parameters of the new section of the Bill of Rights be coextensive in all respects with the United States Supreme Court's view of the nature of the derivative and penumbral federal right to privacy, as reflected in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe. Roe teaches, with regard to the federal right to privacy, that only personal rights that can be deemed `fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. Accordingly, only personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty are included within article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. We note that pornographic material is expression unprotected either by the first amendment to the United States Constitution or by article I, section 4 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Therefore, only a deranged idiot would regard the right to sell constitutionally unprotected pornographic contraband for autoerotic use in the home as fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. That being the case, there is no fundamental constitutional right, protected by article I, section 6, to engage in such sales. All legislative enactments are presumptively constitutional, and the appellants have the burden of proving unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. There being no fundamental right to sell constitutionally unprotected pornographic contraband for autoerotic use in the home, the legislature need only have had a rational basis for proscribing it. The legislature, in fact, had a rational basis for doing so because, without the power to proscribe its sale, nothing would prevent the interstate trafficking and widespread dissemination (to juveniles and others) of this unprotected, destructive, debilitating, degrading, and immoral smut. Therefore, the appellants have failed to rebut the statute's presumptive constitutionality, and their convictions are affirmed. Of course, that is not the opinion that this court wrote in Kam. As actually written, I suggest that the Kam decision can be paraphrased as follows: The core issue presented on appeal is whether the proscriptions of HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) infringe the right to privacy, as guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution (1978). In order to resolve the issue, we must answer the threshold question, When in conflict, does the individual's fundamental privacy right to possess pornography at home, as guaranteed by article I, section 6, take precedence over the sovereign police power of the state to regulate obscene material? Because we answer the threshold question in the affirmative, we hold that HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) is, indeed, violative of article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. We note at the outset that the district court found that the magazines that the defendants were convicted of selling were pornographic, patently offensive, and contrary to prevailing contemporary community standards. Accordingly, we assume that the magazines were, in fact, obscene for purposes of our analysis. We further note that obscenity (and, thus, pornographic material) is protected neither by the first amendment to the United States Constitution nor by article I, section 4 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Obviously, then, there can be no fundamental right, in and of itself, to sell, purchase, possess, or use the magazines in question for autoerotic purposes. Correlatively, there can be no doubt that the state may, in some fashion, regulate the mode of access to, and the manner of use or display of, pornographic material. Thus, as noted, the question before us is whether the police power of the state encompasses the criminalization of the magazines' sale, on the one hand, or whether the statute contravenes the right to privacy contained in article I, section 6, on the other. The framers of article I, section 6 intended to confer on the people the most important right of all  the right to be let alone. This right gives to each and every individual the right to control certain highly personal and intimate affairs of his own life. The right to personal autonomy, to dictate his lifestyle, and to be himself are included in this concept of privacy. In this respect, article I, section 6 codified the position of Justice Abe, as stated in State v. Kantner , that each person has the fundamental right of liberty to make a fool of himself as long as his act does not endanger others, and that the state may regulate the conduct of a person under pain of criminal punishment only when his actions affect the general welfare  that is, where others are harmed or likely to be harmed. (Emphasis added.) We should emphasize that the right to be let alone/personal autonomy/privacy is not absolute. But because it is a fundamental right, on a par with the right of free speech, it may be infringed through the state's police power only if the state is able to demonstrate both that there is a compelling state interest in doing so and that the interference caused thereby employs the least restrictive means available. Based on the clear and unambiguous history underlying the promulgation of article I, section 6, we hold that the personal decision to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of one's own home is protected by article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. We further hold that such activity does not affect the general welfare  i.e., the general public's rights  inasmuch as it does not harm others or create a likelihood of harm. In other words, we hold that such activity does not implicate a state interest, much less a compelling one, and that the state may not criminalize it. Our preliminary holding, however, is not dispositive of the ultimate issue presented in this appeal because it is the sale of pornographic material, rather than its mere private possession, that HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) criminalizes. In this connection, the United States Supreme Court has ruled, under the federal constitution, that the right to possess obscene material in private does not give rise to a correlative right to have someone sell or give it to others. Specifically, the high court has held that Congress may regulate the sale of pornography on the basis of the natural tendency of such material to exceed the bounds of privacy and the concomitant risk of ultimate harmful exposure to juveniles or the public at large. Article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution, however, affords much greater privacy rights than the federal right to privacy, which merely emanates from the penumbra of other expressly enumerated fundamental rights set forth in the federal bill of rights. Under the Hawai`i Constitution, a rational basis for a statute infringing the protections of article I, section 6 is insufficient; rather, it must be supported by a compelling state interest and employ the least restrictive means available. We are therefore not bound by the precedents of the United States Supreme Court. It is self-evident that enforcing HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) against the sellers of pornography severely reduces the ability of persons to read or view pornographic material in private and, thus, has a chilling effect upon activity expressly protected by article I, section 6. In this way, HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) infringes upon the individual's personal autonomy to engage in activity protected by an expressly enumerated, fundamental constitutional right. We therefore hold that, notwithstanding the otherwise unprotected status of pornographic material, the privacy interest of the individual in the mere personal possession and use of such material outweighs the state's interest in criminalizing its sale through the exercise of the sovereign police power. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that HRS § 712-1214(1)(a) violates article I, section 6 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Accordingly, the appellants' convictions thereunder are reversed. I do not believe that stasis can be achieved as between the Mueller and Kam analyses. As I have demonstrated, Mueller is pure Baker/Renfro/Bachman, see supra section I.C.2, which were implicitly repudiated by the framers of article I, section 6. See supra section II.A.2. Kam, on the other hand, remains faithful to the intent of the framers, insofar as it balances rights protected by article I, section 6, into which the Abe thesis was directly imported, see supra section II.A, against the circumscribed prerogative of the state to exercise the sovereign police power. In this respect, Kam is pure Kraft /Lee/Cotton/Kantner trio. See supra sections I.A, I.B, and I.C.1. I am aware that there has been a scholarly attempt to reconcile the two decisions; in particular, it has been suggested that, [r]eading Mueller and Kam together, one could predict that in the future the Hawaii Supreme Court will use federal case law in determining what is a fundamental right but may go beyond federal case law in extending the right of privacy to protect non-fundamental activities which are necessary to the exercise of fundamental rights. Nancy Neuffer and Gaye Y. Tatsuno, Note, State v. Kam : The Constitutional Status of Obscenity in Hawaii, 11 U. Haw. L.Rev. 253, 271 (1989). The same could be said, however, by reading Kam alone, without reference to Mueller.