Opinion ID: 867372
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury sentencing renders instruction vague as applied

Text: ¶ 19 Pandeli argues that Walton does not save the (F)(6) factor from unconstitutional vagueness because juries, rather than trial judges, now find the existence of aggravating circumstances. We have rejected this argument several times. State v. Cromwell, 211 Ariz. 181, 188-89, ¶¶ 40-42, 119 P.3d 448, 455-56 (2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2291, 164 L.Ed.2d 819 (2006); State v. Anderson (Anderson II), 210 Ariz. 327, 352-53, ¶¶ 109-14, 111 P.3d 369, 394-95 (2005). Cromwell and Anderson hold that the (F)(6) aggravator may be constitutionally applied if given substance and specificity by jury instructions that follow this Court's constructions. State v. Hampton, 213 Ariz. 167, 176, ¶ 36, 140 P.3d 950, 959 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 972, 166 L.Ed.2d 738 (2007). We next address the adequacy of the instructions given in Pandeli's case.