Opinion ID: 1913768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in prohibiting the grand jury of the first judicial district of jones county from considering any claim of criminal conduct by the jones county district attorney?

Text: ¶ 27. The only issue of merit in this case is whether the trial judge had the authority to enjoin the Ellisville Grand Jury from considering any claim that District Attorney Pacific had committed criminal acts. This is a case of first impression, in which a District Attorney successfully sought to enjoin the Grand Jury from what are supposed to be secret deliberations, based upon the District Attorney's belief that the Grand Jury did not like her and might indict her. [10] ¶ 28. Despite the District Attorney's beliefs to the contrary, this Court must indulge the presumption that the Grand Jury is composed of men [and/or women] who have a reasonable degree of intelligence and would perform their duties in accordance with the law and the evidence before them. Mosley v. State, 396 So.2d 1015, 1019 (Miss. 1981). ¶ 29. Furthermore, as stated earlier, § 175 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 provides that [a]ll public officers, for wilful neglect of duty or misdemeanor in office, shall be liable to presentment or indictment by a grand jury. Moreover, Grand Juries are statutorily charged to investigate possible violations of statutes related to the expenditure of county funds. See Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-47(3). That the District Attorney would seek to enjoin the Grand Jury from performing its constitutional and statutory duty is quite unprecedented. ¶ 30. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Grand Jury actually was investigating Pacific, and there likely never would be such evidence, since Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-61 (Supp. 1996) provides that such information is secret (at least until six months after final adjournment of the Grand Jury). See also Mississippi Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 7.04 (Grand Jury secrecy). ¶ 31. In addition, a long line of Mississippi caselaw prohibits a trial judge from singling out a particular defendant in the Grand Jury charge. See Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 524-25 (Miss. 1996); Necaise v. Logan, 341 So.2d 91, 93 (Miss. 1976); Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 So. 749, 750 (1905); and Blau v. State, 82 Miss. 514, 34 So. 153, 156 (1903). Common sense dictates that, if a judge cannot charge the Grand Jury to investigate and/or indict a particular individual, then a judge cannot charge the Grand Jury not to investigate and/or indict a particular individual  in this case, the District Attorney. ¶ 32. Finally, although there is no case on point, some general statements of law are particularly pertinent: A grand jury has broad investigative power and wide latitude in conducting an investigation, and is the decision maker in exercising its powers.... A grand jury has a responsibility to thoroughly investigate the matters before it. The grand jury need not specify the particular crime or person to be investigated.... A grand jury need not demonstrate any reason for investigating anyone.... The law presumes, absent a strong showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority. It has been held that a mere witness does not have standing to contend that a grand jury is exceeding its jurisdiction.       The court generally will not interfere with the grand jury in the absence of a strong reason for doing so. The grand jury must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does not trench on the legitimate rights of any witness called before it. The court generally cannot limit the grand jury, its legitimate investigation, interfere with its investigatory function, control the nature of its investigation, prohibit consideration of offenses within any particular class of crimes, stay its proceedings, dismiss a matter, or do various other things.       It has been said that a grand jury witness is not entitled to challenge the authority of the court or of the grand jury ... to object to the jurisdiction of the grand jury, to take exception to the jurisdiction of the grand jury over the particular subject matter that is under investigation, or to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct. 38A C.J.S. §§ 76, 78, 131 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) ¶ 33. For all these reasons, the injunction imposed on the Ellisville Grand Jury was improper. Although that Grand Jury has already been discharged, this opinion is written in order to provide guidance, should a similar situation arise in the future.