Opinion ID: 1162628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issues Relating to Guilt Phase Instructions

Text: (18) Defendant contends in substance that the court erred by failing to advise the jurors that in fixing penalty they should not be guided by the last paragraph of CALJIC No. 1.00, which was given at the guilt phase. That portion of the instruction is as follows. You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the People and the defendant have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. At the threshold defendant claims in substance that the jurors could have carried this guilt phase instruction over to the penalty phase. For purposes of discussion we shall agree. Defendant then claims that the instruction subjected him to prejudice. Specifically, he maintains that its no-sympathy injunction interferes with the jury's exercise of its constitutional duty to consider any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether such evidence relates to the offense or to his background and character. He further maintains that the regardless-of-consequences injunction of the instruction undermines the sense of responsibility with which the Constitution requires the jury to proceed in making its determination of penalty. In California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], however, the United States Supreme Court expressly held that the no-sympathy injunction of CALJIC No. 1.00 was not erroneous in and of itself. ( Id. at pp. 542-543 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 940, 107 S.Ct. at pp. 839-840].) Similarly, in People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279], we impliedly held as much with respect to the regardless-of-consequences injunction of the same instruction. ( Id. at pp. 442-443.) Nevertheless, in People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-537, and subsequent decisions, we have recognized that in certain cases the language of the last paragraph of CALJIC No. 1.00 might indeed be understood by jurors as defendant fears and, if so understood, might fatally taint their verdict. But having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find no such taint here. First, there is no reason to believe that in this case the regardless-of-consequences injunction undermined the jurors' sense of responsibility. Indeed, in rejecting defendant's claim of Brown error we expressly concluded that the jurors were adequately informed as to what they were to do, and how they were to proceed, in the determination of penalty. (See ante, pt. IV. C.) Second, the no-sympathy injunction  even if it did in fact lead the jurors not to consider defendant's background and character evidence  could not have been prejudicial. As we concluded in resolving defendant's claim of Easley factor (k) error, the misleading of the jurors on this point must be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See ante, pt. IV. B.) Accordingly, we hold that the last paragraph of CALJIC No. 1.00 did not subject defendant to prejudice. [7]
Defendant contends in substance that the court erred by failing to instruct the jurors, sua sponte, in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.20 (Credibility of Witness), as it had instructed them at the guilt phase. Assuming for argument's sake that the court did indeed err by failing to reinstruct the jurors on this point or at least advise them that the instruction delivered at the guilt phase was applicable to their penalty phase deliberations, we believe that the court did not subject defendant to prejudice. Having reviewed the record of the penalty phase in its entirety, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the claimed error the outcome would have been the same.
Defendant contends in substance that the court erred by failing to instruct the jurors, sua sponte, in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.60 (Defendant Not Testifying  No Inference of Guilt May Be Drawn) and CALJIC No. 2.61 (Defendant May Rely on State of Evidence), as it had instructed them at the guilt phase. In People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308 [107 Cal. Rptr. 300, 508 P.2d 300], however, we clearly, albeit impliedly, rejected the point with regard to the substantially similar predecessors of these instructions. ( Id. at p. 316.) Defendant argues that we should limit the Preston holding to its factual setting, i.e., the trial of guilt or innocence. He fails, however, to provide any reason or authority that would compel us to do so either as a general matter or on the facts of this case.