Opinion ID: 2960065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Salamon’s Sibley Claim

Text: Salamon also alleges that even if she did not have an employment relationship with defendants, they interfered with her potential employment relationships by ceasing to refer 15 The question of whether the employee/independent contractor finding should ultimately be made by a jury or by the court was not briefed or argued before us, and it should be considered by the district court in the first instance. Compare Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 170-71 (2d Cir. 1998) (expressing uncertainty as to whether the matter is a question for the jury or the judge), with Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that hostile work environment claims are “‘mixed question[s] of law and fact’ that are ‘especially well-suited for jury determination’” (quoting Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir. 1999)). See also Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assoc., M.D.’s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he ultimate conclusion reached by our holding that whether or not one is an ‘employer’ is an element of a[] [discrimination] claim, is the belief that the jury, rather than the judge, should decide the disputed question.”); Herr v. Heiman, 75 F.3d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting, in ERISA context, that “[w]hether an individual is an employee or an independent contractor is generally a question of fact for the jury to decide”); Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 263-64 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding, in Title VII context, that “there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Worth was an employee”). But see Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Nebraska, 207 F.3d 480, 484-85 (8th Cir. 2000) (appearing to assume that the question is a threshold matter for the court to decide). -22- patients to her.16 She relies on Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir 1973), in which the D.C. Circuit held that, because the purpose of Title VII is to “achieve equality of employment opportunities,” a party can violate Title VII by acting so as to interfere with “access to the job market” even if that party is not an employer. Id. at 1340-41 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). In Sibley, defendant Sibley Hospital mediated between duty nurses and patients, taking patient requests and referring nurses accordingly. Plaintiff Wilson, a male nurse, was a member of Sibley’s registry. Id. at 1339. When Wilson’s name came up for a female patient, Sibley would allegedly reject him in favor of a female nurse, even though the female patients had not requested female nurses. Id. at 1340. Similarly, in this case, Salamon argues that OLV acted as an intermediary between Salamon and her potential patients. She argues that OLV violated her Title VII rights under Sibley by allegedly interfering with her access to patients after she complained of sexual harassment, as well as interfering with her employment opportunities at other hospitals.17 The district court rejected the Sibley claim because it concluded, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff’s relationship with her patients is not an employee–employer relationship. 16 This claim is distinct from her state tortious interference claim, the merits of which are not at issue on appeal. 17 Salamon also argues that the fallout from the defendants’ actions damaged her relationships with other hospitals, relationships which were potential employment opportunities. The district court held that the plaintiff did not “allege an injury-in-fact.” Order at 26. The degree to which the plaintiff contests this on appeal is unclear. See Pl. Br. at 32. Because that issue is not substantially addressed by either party, we do not reach it on this appeal. We do note, however, that the same conduct may be substantially covered by Salamon’s surviving pendent claim of tortious interference with business relationships. -23- Several months after the district court issued its opinion, this Court considered whether to recognize a Sibley interference claim under Title VII in Gulino v. New York State Education Department, 460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2006). The court disagreed with Sibley’s “expansive approach to interpreting the straightforward language of the statute,” and it held that “this Circuit has never adopted a broad reading of the Sibley interference test, and we decline to do so now.” Id. at 374. We need not decide in this case whether Gulino closed the door entirely on the Sibley theory of interference liability in this Circuit, because the district court correctly concluded that Salamon has not established that her relationship with potential patients would constitute an employee-employer relationship. See Diggs, 847 F.2d at 274 (noting that “patients d[o] not control the manner and means of [the doctor’s] professional treatment”); Alexander, 101 F.3d at 493 n.2 (observing that a physician is “not an employee of his patients, just as an insurance agent or limousine driver is not an employee of her customers”); Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 159 F.3d 186, 190 (4th Cir. 1998) (“A patient is a doctor’s customer, not his employer.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Sibley claim.