Opinion ID: 211469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of an Interference-in-Fact

Text: 14 For the reasons explained below, we agree that under the second prong of the two-way test for obviousness, Rolabo's genus claim renders obvious the Medichem species claim. We therefore affirm the lower court's finding of an interference-in-fact without needing to review the district court's unsupported factual finding that the second prong of the two-way test was independently satisfied on anticipation grounds.
15 In reviewing a district court's finding of an interference-in-fact pursuant to the two-way test, this court reviews, where necessary, both the subsidiary findings of anticipation and/or obviousness as they relate to the application of the test. See Medichem II, 353 F.3d at 932 (articulating the standard of review for findings of an interference-in-fact under 35 U.S.C. § 291). Here, because we agree with the district court's subsidiary finding of obviousness, which is sufficient to support its finding of an interference-in-fact, it is not necessary for us to review the court's finding of anticipation. 16 Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a legal conclusion that is reviewed de novo; however, it is based in turn on underlying factual determinations which are reviewed for clear error. Id. Under the clear error standard, a reversal is permitted only when this court is left with a `definite and firm conviction' that the district court was in error. Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed.Cir. 2004) (quoting Amhil Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d 1554, 1562 (Fed.Cir. 1996)).
17 The ultimate determination of whether an invention would have been obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is a legal conclusion based on the factual Graham findings, e.g., (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary skill in the prior art; and (3) the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art. Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S.Ct. 684, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966)). 18 This court has held that if all the elements of an invention are found in a combination of prior art references: 19 a proper analysis under § 103 requires, inter alia, consideration of two factors: (1) whether the prior art would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art that they should make the claimed composition or device, or carry out the claimed process; and (2) whether the prior art would also have revealed that in so making or carrying out, those of ordinary skill would have a reasonable expectation of success. 20 Id. 21 The first requirement, the motivation to combine references, serves to prevent hindsight bias. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed.Cir.2001) (To prevent hindsight invalidation of patent claims, the law requires some `teaching, suggestion or reason' to combine cited references.) (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573 (Fed.Cir. 1997)). In making obviousness determinations, the test is whether the subject matter of the claimed inventions would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the inventions were made, not what would be obvious to a judge after reading the patents in suit and hearing the testimony. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1092 (Fed.Cir.1985). Whether such a motivation has been demonstrated is a question of fact. See Winner Int'l Royalty Corp. v. Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed.Cir. 2000). Evidence of a motivation to combine prior art references may flow from the prior art references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, or, in some cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1125 (Fed.Cir.2000). 22 When a piece of prior art suggests that the line of development flowing from the reference's disclosure is unlikely to be productive of the result sought by the applicant the piece of prior art is said to teach away from the claimed invention. In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir.1994). As with other subsidiary obviousness inquiries, [w]hat a reference teaches and whether it teaches toward or away from the claimed invention are questions of fact. Winner, 202 F.3d at 1349 (internal quotations omitted). However, obviousness must be determined in light of all the facts, and there is no rule that a single reference that teaches away will mandate a finding of nonobviousness. Likewise, a given course of action often has simultaneous advantages and disadvantages, and this does not necessarily obviate motivation to combine. See id. at 1349 n. 8 (The fact that the motivating benefit comes at the expense of another benefit, however, should not nullify its use as a basis to modify the disclosure of one reference with the teachings of another. Instead, the benefits, both lost and gained, should be weighed against one another.). Where the prior art contains apparently conflicting teachings (i.e., where some references teach the combination and others teach away from it) each reference must be considered for its power to suggest solutions to an artisan of ordinary skill. . . . consider[ing] the degree to which one reference might accurately discredit another. In re Young, 927 F.2d 588, 591 (Fed. Cir.1991). 23 As stated above, an obviousness determination requires not only the existence of a motivation to combine elements from different prior art references, but also that a skilled artisan would have perceived a reasonable expectation of success in making the invention via that combination. While the definition of reasonable expectation is somewhat vague, our case law makes clear that it does not require a certainty of success. See In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903-04 (Fed.Cir.1988) (Obviousness does not require absolute predictability of success.... [A]ll that is required is a reasonable expectation of success.). 24 However, to have a reasonable expectation of success, one must be motivated to do more than merely to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. Id. at 903. Similarly, prior art fails to provide the requisite reasonable expectation of success where it teaches merely to pursue a general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it. Id. 25 The district court's finding of a reasonable expectation of success is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. See Ruiz, 357 F.3d at 1275 (explaining that the obviousness determination rests on various factual findings that this court reviews for clear error following a bench trial); Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1129 (reviewing the district court's finding of reasonable expectation of success under the clear error standard); see also Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1376 (Fed. Cir.2003) (reviewing the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences' finding of a reasonable expectation of success under a substantial evidence standard).
26 Rolabo argues that the district court erred in finding that the Medichem invention (which uses a tertiary amine) would have been obvious over the broader Rolabo invention (which does not require it). Specifically, it appears to argue both that the prior art contained no motivation to combine references so as to have encouraged one reasonably skilled in the art to have added a tertiary amine to a McMurry reaction and that an artisan, even if motivated to add a tertiary amine to Rolabo's process, would have had no reasonable expectation of succeeding in making loratadine via a McMurry reaction in the presence of a tertiary amine. 27 In support of its arguments, Rolabo cites the trial testimony of an expert witness who explained that a seminal review article in the field showed that a tertiary amine could have a positive effect, a negative effect, and in some cases, both a positive and negative effect on the McMurry reaction. Rolabo goes on to cite prior art references that disclose negative effects and essentially argues that the existence of prior art references that teach away from the invention clearly negates the motivation to combine and that the district court's finding of motivation was clearly erroneous. We disagree. 28 Granted, it is clear that the prior art disclosed not only potential advantages of using a tertiary amine in a McMurry reaction but also potential disadvantages. On the one hand, some pieces of prior art taught that low concentrations of a tertiary amine could sometimes be used to improve the yield of reactions or to avoid the formation of undesirable rearranged products. On the other hand, other references reported that tertiary amines could sometimes promote the formation of undesirable diol side-products and that when they were used as the reaction solvent (i.e., when tertiary amines are present at their highest possible concentrations), they could stop the reaction completely. 29 We also note the ambivalence of Medichem co-inventor Dr. Onrubia toward the introduction of a tertiary amine to the reaction mixture. On the one hand, she testified that she had added a tertiary amine [b]ecause the literature said that it might be possible to use tertiary amines in the reaction, that it wouldn't interfere, that it wasn't incompatible, and it's habitual in these circumstances to try various options until you get the reaction to work. On the other hand, when asked, Is this purely hit or miss or is there some logical cause. . . for believing that tertiary amine would add something? she responded: Frankly, as an organic chemist I have no reason to say that there were grounds for expecting anything from the addition of tertiary amine. 30 As we have explained above, the fact that some teachings in the prior art conflict with others does not render the findings of the district court clearly erroneous per se. Rather, the prior art must be considered as a whole for what it teaches. We understand the prior art, viewed as a whole, to teach that the addition of a tertiary amine sometimes works to improve the yield of McMurry reactions, especially when a tertiary amine is used in relatively low concentrations. In light of this, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in finding that the prior art would have provided the skilled artisan with a motivation to combine references so as to use pyridine in the McMurry reaction. We wish to emphasize that this is not a case where the prior art's lack of definiteness or certainty about the result of using a tertiary amine in a specific reaction system renders the inventive subject matter obvious to try but not obvious. While we have made clear that `obvious to try' is not the standard under § 103[,] . . . the meaning of this maxim is sometimes lost. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir.1988). In O'Farrell, we opined that: 31 [This] admonition . . . has been directed mainly at two kinds of error[, namely where] . . . what would have been obvious to try would have been . . . to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices . . . where the prior art gave . . . no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful[ or] . . . to explore . . . a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance. . . . 32 Id. (citations omitted). In the instant case there are not numerous parameters to vary. Rather, the principal parameter is the concentration of tertiary amine that should be used, and the prior art teaches that if the tertiary amine were to have any positive effect at all, it would be when it was present at low concentrations. Likewise, this is not a case where the prior art gives merely general guidance. In contrast, the guidance is quite clear—namely, that McMurry reactions of this kind can sometimes be optimized by adding low levels of a tertiary amine. 33 For the aforementioned reasons, we find no clear error in the district court's determination that skilled artisans in possession of the Rolabo patent and the prior art would have not only been motivated to add a tertiary amine but that they would have possessed a reasonable expectation that they would succeed in optimizing the reaction. Reviewing de novo the trial court's application of these factual findings to reach the legal conclusion of obviousness, we likewise find no error. Accordingly, we agree with the district court's determination that the addition of a tertiary amine to a McMurry reaction would have been obvious in view of the Rolabo patent and the prior art. Because this obviousness finding satisfies the second prong of the two-way test for an interference-in-fact, we affirm the district court's determination that an interference-in-fact existed. 34 As a final matter, we note that we find no merit in Rolabo's contention that we should exclude from the subject matter of the interference that portion of its invention that is directed to running reactions where titanium is present in specific concentration ranges (claims 10 and 11 of the '827 patent). Claim 10 requires a relative titanium concentration of 1.5:1 to 4:1, and claim 11 requires a ratio of 2:1 to 3:1. The district court relied on the testimony of Medichem's expert witness, Dr. Finney, in holding that all of the various claims of the '827 patent were essentially identical to one another and substantially the same as claim 2 of Medichem's patent. See Medichem III, 2004 WL 2674632 at . Rolabo argues that Finney's expert testimony was conclusory and therefore insufficient to establish an interference. However, it is clear from the record that Finney's testimony was far from conclusory. In fact, Finney provided a solid factual basis for his opinion, stating that 35 [c]laim 10 says that you should have between, a ratio of one and a half to 4 to 1 titanium to dibenzosuberone. Claim 11 states the range should be 2 to 1 to 3 to 1. These are both perfectly normal ranges. And in fact, the patent examples in the '827 [Rolabo's] patent specify I think about a 2.2 to 1 ratio. . . . Indeed, other evidence of record also supports the conclusion that these are normal ranges. The Banerji reference discloses ratios of 2:1 and 1:1, Ishida discloses ratios of 1.5:1, 2.5:1 and 5:1, and Lenoir discloses a ratio of about 1:1. 36 In short, it is clear that Rolabo's claims 10 and 11 are directed to titanium ratios that are entirely within the range of the prior art, and this fact is dispositive. This court has held that [s]electing a narrow range from within a somewhat broader range disclosed in a prior art reference is no less obvious than identifying a range that simply overlaps a disclosed range. In re Peterson, 315 F.3d 1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir.2003). Moreover, when the claimed ranges are completely encompassed by the prior art, the conclusion is even more compelling than in cases of mere overlap. Id. We have explained that the normal desire of scientists or artisans to improve upon what is already generally known provides the motivation to determine where in a disclosed set of percentage ranges is the optimum combination of percentages. Id. Therefore, because Rolabo's claims 10 and 11 are directed to ratios that are entirely within the prior art, the district court properly held those claims to be part of the interfering subject matter pursuant to the two-way test. 37