Opinion ID: 884504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying Werner/Freeman's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial?

Text: ¶ 40 The decision to grant or deny a new trial is in the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. Baxter v. Archie Cochrane Motors, Inc. (1995), 271 Mont. 286, 287-88, 895 P.2d 631, 632. Generally, a jury award of damages will not be overturned unless it shocks the conscience of the Court. Gibson v. Western Fire Ins. Co. (1984), 210 Mont. 267, 290, 682 P.2d 725, 738. Where the evidence is substantial, though conflicting, the order [granting a new trial] will be sustained in the absence of ... abuse of discretion. Gibson, 210 Mont. at 290, 682 P.2d at 738. ¶ 41 After the conclusion of the trial, Werner/Freeman renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50(b), M.R.Civ.P., and moved for a new trial, pursuant to § 25-11-102(5) and (6), MCA. Werner/Freeman based its motions on the grounds that Anderson's damage award was excessive because it was awarded under the influence of passion or prejudice, and was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court denied the motions. ¶ 42 On appeal, Werner/Freeman advances the same arguments it advanced in the District Court. With respect to excessiveness, Werner/Freeman likens the instant case to Maurer v. Clausen Distributing Co. (1996), 275 Mont. 229, 237, 912 P.2d 195, 199, wherein the plaintiff requested $90,000 but was awarded $500,000, an amount more than five times that requested. The Court held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial because the plaintiff's award of $500,000 for loss of established course of life was excessive. Maurer, 275 Mont. at 237, 912 P.2d at 199. Werner/Freeman analogizes Maurer to the instant case, noting that Anderson requested $100,000 for loss of established course of life but was awarded $225,000, more than twice the amount requested. On the basis of Maurer, Werner/Freeman argues that Anderson's damage award was excessive and that the District Court erred in denying its motion for a new trial. ¶ 43 Werner/Freeman also cites a compilation from a publication entitled Jury Verdict Research wherein $88,000 is the reported statistical median average of total damage awards for hip fracture cases in which the medical expenses incurred are $25,800, the amount incurred by Anderson in this case. Werner/Freeman argues that because $690,800 is more than eight times the statistical average for similar cases, Anderson's total damage award was excessive. Additionally, Werner/Freeman cites a 1973 Montana case where the plaintiff suffered a fractured pelvis and dislocated hip and received a total damage award of $45,000, an amount fifteen times less than the amount received by Anderson. See McGuire v. Nelson (1973), 162 Mont. 37, 508 P.2d 558. ¶ 44 We reject Werner/Freeman's arguments concerning excessive damages. The mere fact that a damage award exceeds that requested by a plaintiff is not in itself a ground for the grant of a new trial. Gibson, 210 Mont. at 290, 682 P.2d at 738. It is only when the excessive damages appear to have been given by the jury under the influence of passion or prejudice that a new trial may be granted. Gibson, 210 Mont. at 290, 682 P.2d at 738. Werner/Freeman has failed to present any evidence that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice. ¶ 45 Moreover, the authorities on which Werner/Freeman relies are not persuasive. The jury verdict research publication is not legal authority and most certainly would be excluded from a trial as inadmissible hearsay. See Rule 408, M.R.Evid. The verdict in McGuire was rendered twenty-five years ago at a time when the dollar went further than it does today. Moreover, McGuire is distinguishable from the instant case. The verdict in McGuire was based on medical expenses alone; there is no mention of the plaintiff seeking damages for pain and suffering, loss of earnings, or loss of established course of life. McGuire, 162 Mont. at 40, 508 P.2d at 559-60. Lastly, Werner/Freeman's reliance on Maurer is misplaced. In Maurer, we held that the defendant was entitled to a new trial not because the damage award exceeded that requested by the plaintiff, but because the evidence did not support the jury's damage award. Maurer, 275 Mont. at 237, 912 P.2d at 199. ¶ 46 Werner/Freeman next argues that Anderson's damage award was not supported by sufficient evidence. Werner/Freeman points to the following facts as evidence that Anderson's damage award was not supported by the evidence: (1) a statement made by Anderson's surgeon, Dr. Matthews, indicating that he thought Anderson could return to truck driving; (2)statements by Anderson and Dr. Matthews indicating Anderson had ceased using pain medication since April 1993; (3) Anderson's admission that within a year of his surgery he was able to walk without a limp, and that since 1993, he required no further physical therapy; (4) the fact that Anderson was employed as a truck driver from November 1994 to April 1996; (5) a statement made by Dr. Robinson, Anderson's treating physician, confirming that Anderson's work as a logging truck driver appeared to be an appropriate work environment for Anderson; and (6) Anderson's statement that, since his termination from employment, he had been spending time riding his motorcycle. ¶ 47 We reject Werner/Freeman's claim of insufficient evidence. We have held: It is not a question of the amount this Court would have awarded under the circumstances. It is not the amount which in our opinion would compensate the injured party; rather, it is a question of what amount of damages will the record in the case support when viewed ... in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Barrett v. Larsen (1993), 256 Mont. 330, 339, 846 P.2d 1012, 1018 (citations omitted). This same rule was established in Maurer. In Maurer, we held that the district court did not err in granting a new trial because an award must be reduced when it substantially exceeds that which the evidence can sustain. Maurer, 275 Mont. at 237, 912 P.2d at 199. ¶ 48 A review of the record in the instant case reveals that Anderson produced substantial evidence to support the jury's damage award. Anderson testified that at the time of the accident, he was within one and one half years of completing the payments on his $75,000 semi-truck. Anderson's wife testified that it was a dream of Ray's since he was a child, to buy his own truck and drive long haul. Anderson started his own trucking business in 1984 with a used truck, then sold it to buy the plush $75,000 truck. Anderson testified that he enjoyed the independence and freedom of being self-employed. With respect to owning and operating his own truck, Anderson stated, you can go where you want to go. I like traveling. And I make good money. ¶ 49 Both Dr. Matthews and Dr. Robinson described Anderson's hip injury as Pipken 4 meaning the most severe. Dr. Robinson stated, you don't have a grade 4 injury and get a good result .... that's why it's the worst grade for this kind of injury. Dr. Robinson opined that the degenerative process in Anderson's hip would continue and that Anderson may need a second hip replacement. Anderson testified that, despite Dr. Robinson's recommendation that Anderson seek sedentary work, he went back to truck driving after surgery out of financial necessity. Although in one note Dr. Robinson's patient record indicated that Anderson's work environment with Mike Bartholomew was appropriate, the same note stated: He [Anderson] may continue with activities as comfort permits, but I still recommend avoiding activities of high impact and avoiding situations where he has to be up on his feet for long periods of time.... Only time will tell how long his left hip will perform well over the years. Anderson stated he no longer took pain medication because over the years it isn't good for you. It bothers other parts of your body, digestive system, and so on. Anderson testified that he continues to feel a great deal of pain with any kind of minor lifting, pushing, walking too much, or even sitting too much. Anderson testified that his sexual relationship with his wife is difficult. He testified that he enjoyed riding his motorcycle on occasion, but that it was painful to get on the motorcycle. ¶ 50 The vocational rehabilitation expert, Kent Shafer, testified that Anderson's employment prospects were quite limited and his best option was employment as a trucking dispatcher. Mr. Shafer concluded that if Anderson could not find sedentary work in the trucking industry, his employment would be limited to entry-level, unskilled jobs. The economic expert, Mr. Kasperick, testified that had Anderson not been injured, he would have earned $40,000 in 1993, and his earnings would have increased each year thereafter. ¶ 51 We conclude that the evidence supporting Anderson's damage claims was substantial and straight forward. The record is void of any attempt by Anderson to expand the record for purposes of creating passion or prejudice against Werner/Freeman. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Werner/Freeman's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial. ¶ 52 Affirmed. NELSON, REGNIER, TRIEWEILER, and GRAY, JJ., concur.