Opinion ID: 1467741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The admissibility of appellees' opinion evidence on causation

Text: Appellees' theory of recovery against appellant was that appellant was strictly liable because the radial tire supplied to Nicholas's grandfather was not embossed with a warning not to mix it with non-radial tires. [3] In support of this theory, appellees introduced documentary evidence and the testimony of two witnesses that Nicholas's mixing of the tires caused the accident. Appellant in turn introduced evidence that if the mixing was dangerous, it was so only at high speeds, not at 20 to 25 miles per hour, the speed at which Nicholas was driving when the accident occurred. It is settled that in a products liability case the plaintiff must prove that a defective product was the proximate cause of his injuries. Sherk v. Daisy Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 (1982); Agostino v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co., 236 Pa.Super. 434, 345 A.2d 735 (1975). Appellant argues that [t]he only testimony that a mixed fitment could have caused the accident was given by two of plaintiffs' [appellees'] witnesses, . . . whom the court below permitted to testify as `experts.' These witnesses were not qualified to give opinions on causation in this case, and therefore the verdict cannot be upheld on the basis of their opinions. Brief for Appellant at 36. Because of the trial court's error in ruling that appellees' two witnesses were qualified to express an opinion on causation, appellant argues, it is entitled not simply to a new trial but to judgment n.o.v.