Opinion ID: 1966550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: In Summation

Text: In Levy v. Sherman , the Court of Appeals departed from a straight forward contract analysis of antenuptial agreements that had been utilized by the Court from the previous century. The Court chose to focus on the alleged existence of a confidential relationship, which, if one existed, would place the burden of proof on those claiming under it when the instrument is attacked to show that the contract was fair and reasonable. After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions, available secondary sources, and Maryland's 19th century cases on the matter, Levy stated that it was impossible to reconcile the diverging authorities as to how to determine whether an alleged confidential relationship existed prior to the execution of an antenuptial agreement. Instead, Levy stated that: 1) A confidential relationship existed between both parties; 2) Each party was required to make a frank, full, and truthful disclosure of their respective worth in real and personal property; 3) In those cases where the appropriate disclosure was not made and the allowance in the agreement was unfairly disproportionate to the worth, fraud was implied; and 4) The burden of proof was placed on the enforcing party to show: A) The agreement was freely, voluntarily, and knowingly entered, and B) Each party was given the opportunity to seek legal advice. In 1955 (ten years after Levy ), Ortel v. Gettig extended the breath of the confidential relationship analysis. The trustee of Mr. Gettig's estate argued that the marriage between the 62 year old husband and the 42 year old wife was one of convenience, where the parties would not be clouded by the ardor of youth. Ortel held that it was of no moment if the party seeking to enforce the agreement and his spouse were married for convenience; the confidential relationship existed nonetheless as postulated in Levy (the age gap between Levy and his spouse were roughly similar). Ortel reiterated the Levy analysis, and held the particular antenuptial agreement invalid in that case because the disclosure was not full and frank with regard to the husband's worth. Hartz, in 1967 and for the first time, analyzed an antenuptial agreement as a question of overreaching, rather than disclosure. We stated there that the real test in a determination of the validity of an antenuptial agreement is whether there was overreaching, that is, whether in the atmosphere and environment of the confidential relationship there was unfairness or inequity in the result of the agreement or in its procurement. Hartz, after reciting the language from Levy as to disclosure, added that the purpose for the frank, full, and truthful disclosure was to disclose to the attacking party the property subject to waiver so that he or she who waives can know what it is he or she is waiving. Hartz extended Levy and explained that if the attacking party had adequate knowledge of what such a disclosure would reveal, then a formal disclosure was not required. Hartz nonetheless encouraged that careful practitioners should still make the frank, full, and truthful written disclosure because such a disclosure would turn the lock of the door to impregnable validity. Hartz did not exercise this metaphor because the Court agreed with the trial court that there was neither adequate disclosure nor actual knowledge on its record. Instead, Hartz applied the overreaching analysis to allow for valid agreements even where no disclosure was made, [the] failure to disclose or lack of precise knowledge will not necessarily be fatal to the validity of the antenuptial agreement. Hartz also described alternate standards by which the validity of the agreement could be proven: 1) Is the benefit to the waiving party commensurate with what he or she relinquished such that the agreement was fair and equitable? 2) Did the party attacking the agreement enter the agreement freely and understandingly? An affirmative showing on these questions could demonstrate that the attacking party was not prejudiced by the lack of information and that the attacking party could not repudiate the agreement. Frey, in 1984, broadened the Hartz overreaching analysis further by extending it to antenuptial agreements made in anticipation of divorce. Prior to Frey, antenuptial agreements conditioned on divorce (or dealing with alimony, etc.) were void as against the public policy of Maryland to protect the institution of marriage. Frey reiterated favorably, without applying, the Hartz analysis and opined that the real test of an antenuptial agreement was one of overreaching.