Opinion ID: 222669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Berghuis

Text: After Plugh I was decided but before the case proceeded to trial below, the Supreme Court announced its opinion in Berghuis. There, as here, the defendant had been offered the chance to sign an advice-of-rights form but had declined to do so. [1] Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2256. There, as here, the defendant nonetheless subsequently made voluntary inculpatory statements to the police. On direct appeal, the defendant, Van Chester Thompkins, argued that his ensuing statements should have been suppressed because his conduct, namely his silence during several hours of attempted questioning, constituted an implicit invocation of those rights and thus should have cut off all further questioning. Id. at 2256-68. The state courts rejected that argument, and Thompkins filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court reiterating those claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Sixth Circuit granted the writ, reasoning that the invocation of Thompkins' rights could be inferred from his conduct on the whole. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 582 (6th Cir.2008). The Supreme Court reversed. As a preliminary matter, the Court clarified that the Davis unambigous[ ] invocation standard applies to both the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, and it applies where, as here, a court evaluates an initial rather than subsequent invocation. As the Court explained, a requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that `avoid[s] the difficulties of proof . . . and provide[s] guidance to officers' on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity. Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2260 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350) (alternations in original). Alternatively, [i]f an accused makes a statement concerning the right to counsel that is ambiguous or equivocal or makes no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify whether the accused wants to invoke his or her Miranda rights. Id. at 2259-60 (internal quotation marks, citation omitted). Applying that standard, the Court then found, on those facts, that Thompkins had not unambiguously invoked his rights, rejecting as insufficient his mere silence in the face of several hours of attempted questioning. See id. Specifically, it noted that Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning. Id. at 2260 (internal quotation mars omitted). In assessing the asserted invocation, the Court made no mention of the advice-of-rights form or of Thompkins' refusal to sign it. Having determined that Thompkins never invoked his Miranda rights, the Court proceeded to consider whether he had waived those rights and concluded that he had. Noting that the law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford, the Court found that Thompkins had engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver, including voluntarily answering questions about the crime after being fully apprised of his rights. Id. at 2262-63 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, it concluded the statements were properly admitted at trial.