Opinion ID: 2038712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Greve's and the State's Positions

Text: ¶ 13. Greve contends that the contents of his sentencing memorandum cannot be used in a subsequent trial. In order to prevail, he must establish either a statutory or a constitutional right that precludes the use of his statements. Greve raises both theories. He contends that Wis. Stat. § 972.15 is the statutory basis because in Crowell we concluded that a PSI prepared under § 972.15 could not be used in a trial subsequent to Crowell's plea withdrawal. Greve argues that because we concluded in Crowell that § 972.15 prevents the subsequent use of a court-ordered PSI, and a defendant's sentencing memorandum serves the same purpose as a court-ordered PSI, § 972.15 protects his sentencing memorandum too. The State argues that both the statute and Crowell apply only to court-ordered PSIs. ¶ 14. To support his constitutional argument, Greve contends that at sentencing, a defendant has a due process right: (1) to be sentenced on the basis of true and correct information; and (2) to allocution. He cites State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 772, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992); Bruneau, 77 Wis. 2d at 174-75; and Perez, 170 Wis. 2d at 138. He contends that neither constitutional right can be fully exercised by a defendant if the statements that are made to whomever prepares his sentencing memorandum are not suppressed. The State does not parse whether Greve has a due process right to allocution, but it agrees that Greve does have a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. However, it contends that any constitutional right Greve has is not affected by subsequent use of his sentencing memorandum, which the State characterizes as an advocacy document.