Opinion ID: 1223281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coerced Jury Verdict

Text: Appellants collectively assert that the trial court coerced the jury to reach its verdict in a hurried manner. As we recognized in Spence, the issue of whether a trial court improperly coerced a verdict necessarily depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case and cannot be determined by any general or definite rule. 173 W.Va. at 184, 313 S.E.2d at 462, syl. pt. 2; see Jenkins v. U.S., 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) (recognizing that entire trial record in its context and under all the circumstances of th[e] case must be reviewed to determine if trial judge's statements, questions, and instructions amounted to coercion). In this case, Appellants complain not about the judge's instructions per se but about his various remarks to the jury concerning time-related issues. In Spence, this Court considered the effect of the trial judge's temporal remarks to the jury and concluded that his comments amounted to improper coercion of the jury to reach a verdict within a time limit set by the court. 173 W.Va. at 186, 313 S.E.2d at 463. The statements made by the trial judge during the trial in Spence included assertions such as we are going to take as much evidence as we can; I'll stick to my promise, you will be out of here by noon, tomorrow; and I don't want to hold you unduly but I need your help. 173 W.Va. at 186, 313 S.E.2d a 463-64. After the jury had deliberated for less than an hour in Spence, the trial court called them into the courtroom to inquire about their progress. When the trial judge learned from the foreperson that `no substantial progress' had been made, he instructed the panel: Now the Court is not ordering you, but you have to reach a verdict. I am merely telling you what is contemplated in the eyes of the law, if it is possible to do it. I am going to give you ladies and gentlemen a few more minutes to see if you can resolve your differences by discussing them and if you can arrive at a verdict. 173 W.Va. at 186, 313 S.E.2d at 464. Concluding that the trial judge's comments in Spence were designed to have the effect of expediting the trial, we reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. 173 W.Va. at 186, 313 S.E.2d at 463. Appellants contend that Judge Ferguson made improper remarks to the jury, analogous to what occurred in Spence, in an attempt to coerce the panel to reach its verdict in an accelerated fashion. Our review of the record in this case reveals that the potential duration of the trial was of some concern to the trial judge. [22] The trial court initially told the empaneled jury on Wednesday that the trial would last two days. The court inquired of the jury as to whether any of the panel had a problem with returning on Thursday for a second day of trial and no one expressed any issue with appearing for jury duty on Thursday. One of the jurors did indicate, however, that he would have a problem if the trial went longer than Friday, as he was leaving on vacation on Saturday. [23] The first time the trial judge expressed concern to the jury about the actual duration of the trial occurred, according to Appellants, as the jury was leaving for lunch on Thursday. Noting that some members had been late in returning the day before, the trial court advised the jury that they should return in a punctual fashion. Appellants contend that this directive to be timely signaled to the jurors that the trial court was anxious for the trial to reach its conclusion. The issue of time was again presented when the jury sent out a note at 4:49 on Friday afternoon indicating that they had yet to reach a verdict, asking how long they could deliberate that day, and inquiring whether they could resume their deliberations on Monday. When the jury was brought into the courtroom, the trial court addressed the question of how late they could deliberate on Friday by stating, that's up to you all. We will stay here as long as you all want to stay. Responding to the related question of whether they could come back on Monday, the trial court informed the jury that he was leaving for vacation in the morning. After commenting that he could have another judge take over for him on Monday, the trial judge noted a more troubling issuethe fact that Juror Blankenship was similarly slated to leave on his vacation the next day. Because there were no jury alternates and because defense counsel did not want to proceed with less than twelve jurors, the judge suggested that they place an order for food to be brought in, which they did, and continue to work toward reaching a unanimous verdict. After giving the jurors a ten-minute break, the trial court gave the jury what it referred to as a modified Allen charge. [24] The jury resumed its deliberations at 5:13 p.m. At 5:54 p.m., the jury sent out a note asking three evidentiary-related questions. [25] When the judge called the panel into the courtroom, he indicated that there were no written answers to what the jury had requested. At 5:58 p.m., the jury retired to the jury room to continue their deliberations and at 7:15 they indicated that they had reached a verdict. Appellants seek to convince us that the trial judge improperly rushed the jury to reach its verdict. Our review of the record indicates that over a five-hour period (from 2 p.m. til 7:15 p.m.), the jury was engaged in the type of deliberative process contemplated by our system of jurisprudence. See State v. Hobbs, 168 W.Va. 13, 37, 282 S.E.2d 258, 272 (1981) (deciding that trial court's instructions constituted a fair and reasonable effort to stimulate continued deliberation). The record reveals that the jury carefully considered the evidence adduced at trial, as reflected by the jury's notes, first at 3:23 p.m. and then at 5:54 p.m., through which they asked for specific items of evidence. While the jury was clearly impelled to keep trying to reach a unanimous verdict late on a Friday afternoon, there was no indication that the trial court was going to refuse to let the panel leave the courthouse if they reached the point of being hopelessly deadlocked. All the trial court did was to ask the jurors, after approximately two and a half hours of deliberations, to see if they could make any further progress on reaching a verdict. As we recognized in Hobbs, [i]t is generally held that when a jury is unable to agree on a verdict, it is within the trial court's discretion to urge an earnest effort to agree, so long as the jurors are free to act without any form of coercion by the trial court. Id. at 37, 282 S.E.2d at 272. In State v. Blessing, 175 W.Va. 132, 331 S.E.2d 863 (1985), we considered whether the trial court's giving of an instruction, similar to what Judge Ferguson gave in this case, after only one hour and forty-five minutes of deliberations on a Friday afternoon had a coercive effect on the jury. At the end of the instruction, the trial court remarked further: What I'm asking you at this time is to go back in and decide what you want to do as far as deliberating. I want you to deliberate for some other period of time. If you want to go to dinner or if you want to stay or if you want to come back Monday, I will go along with whatever you want to do. I don't feel at this time you have had sufficient time. I don't want to attempt to coerce you in any way, but I don't feel you have had sufficient time to reach a verdict.... 175 W.Va. at 134, 331 S.E.2d at 865. Under the circumstances presented in Blessing a jury reporting impasse after less than two hours of deliberating on a first degree murder charge tried over the course of two dayswe determined that the giving of the instruction on the desirability of reaching a verdict was properly geared toward the goal of `stimulat[ing] continued deliberation.' Id. at 135, 331 S.E.2d at 866 (quoting Hobbs, 168 W.Va. at 37, 282 S.E.2d at 272). In finding that the trial judge's remarks and the supplemental instruction were not coercive, we noted that the trial court did not address his comments solely to the minority members of the jury and he never urged the minority to reconsider its position. 175 W.Va. at 135, 331 S.E.2d at 866. In the instant case, the fact that both the trial judge and one of the jurors was scheduled for vacation the next day undeniably presented a unique situation. [26] As we recognized in State v. Waldron, 218 W.Va. 450, 624 S.E.2d 887 (2005), a trial judge has an inherent need to address both time constraints and the potential for scheduling issues. Id. at 459, 624 S.E.2d at 896. The defendant in Waldron cited the fact that the trial court gave the jury a date by which he expected the trial to end and inquired of the jurors whether they could stay past 5 p.m. on certain dates as evidence of a coercively-reached verdict. The mere discussion of scheduling issues, as we made clear in Waldron, does not give rise to a presumption that the verdict was improperly coerced. Our review of the record in this case convinces us that the jury approached its decision-making process in a careful and considered fashion. Illustrative of the panel's serious consideration of its task is the fact that the jury sent out notes at both 3:23 p.m. and 5:54 p.m. through which they sought technical assistance, [27] clarification, or additional items of evidence. [28] The fact that the jury sent out its third note at 5:54 p.m., after the modified Allen instruction, indicates that the jury continued to approach its charge of weighing the evidence in a careful manner. That the jury did not simply rush to reach a verdict is further gleaned from the fact that the verdict was returned over two hours after the trial court gave its modified Allen charge. [29] When the deliberative process that occurred in this case is viewed in its entirety, we are simply not left with the impression that the trial judge forced a quick verdict on the jury. State v. Waldron, 218 W.Va. at 459, 624 S.E.2d at 896. Accordingly, we do not find that the verdict reached in this case resulted through the trial court's improper coercion of the jury. [30]