Opinion ID: 721413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Farmer Exception.

Text: 24 The plaintiffs contend that, even if their claims would normally be subject to RLA preemption, their tort claims fall within the exception to the preemption doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977) (holding that an otherwise preempted claim could be prosecuted in state or federal court if the conduct alleged was sufficiently outrageous). Farmer was decided under a separate federal statute and the circuits have split over whether the Farmer exception applies to claims of preemption under § 301 or the RLA. 25 In Johnson, we expressly held that Allis-Chalmers and Lingle, not Farmer, control § 301 pre-emption and we decline to hold otherwise. Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1021. The district court, characterizing the instant case as one of first impression, properly employed the principles enunciated in Johnson and determined that the Farmer exception was inapplicable. The plaintiffs refer us to dicta in Albertson's, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 1482-83 (10th Cir.1993), implying that Johnson should be limited to its facts, and argue that the Farmer exception is applicable in the RLA preemption context. However, the holding in Albertson's, that the plaintiff's claims were not preempted by the RLA, was based on the fact that there was no need to interpret the CBA. Id. at 1482. Also, as we noted in Albertson's, we have consistently held that a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrageous conduct is preempted by § 301 and the same logic prevails under the RLA. Id. (citing Mock, 971 F.2d at 529; Johnson, 921 F.2d at 1020); Viestenz v. Fleming Cos., 681 F.2d 699, 702-04 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 972, 103 S.Ct. 303, 74 L.Ed.2d 284 (1982). 26