Opinion ID: 77704
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination Under the ADA

Text: 11 Albra argues that the Abbotts are personally liable under the ADA for discriminating against him on account of his HIV status. The anti-discrimination provision of Subchapter I of the ADA provides that [n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term covered entity means an employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee. Id. § 12111(2). 12 The ADA's definition of employer is similar to that under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), and this court has held that neither of those Acts countenance individual liability. Mason v. Stallings, 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996). In light of our construction of Title VII and the ADEA, we also have held that individual defendants are not amenable to private suit for violating the anti-discrimination provision of Subchapter I of the ADA. Id. 13 Here, Albra's ADA discrimination claim names the Abbotts as defendants in their individual capacities. Because individual liability is precluded for violations of the ADA's employment discrimination provision, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Albra's discrimination claim against the Abbotts.