Opinion ID: 4020402
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rates Awarded

Text: Defendants contend that the district court “awarded rates too high to too many lawyers.” Defendants’ OB at 15. The following chart displays the rate requested by each attorney and the rate awarded by the district court: Firm Attorney Rate Rate awarded ($ hr) Altshuler Berzon LLP Stephen P. Berzon 750 600 Jonathan Weissglass 615 550 Stacey M. Leyton 565 475 Danielle E. Leonard 490 450 Peder Thoreen 490 450 Barbara J. Chisholm 490 450 Caroline Cincotta 355 320 Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 36 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 Diana Reddy 340 305 Matthew Murray 320 290 Laura Trice 240 Law Clerks 215 150 Chandra Law Firm Subodh Chandra 435 425 Ashlie Case Sletvold 350 350 Sandhya Gupta 300 300 Paralegals 120 120 McTigue & McGinnis Donald McTigue 550 450 J. Corey Colombo 360 360 Mark A. McGinnis 360 360 Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur Kathleen Trafford 445 445 Caroline Gentry 350 350 L. Bradfield Hughes 335 335 Eric Gallon 335 335 Daniel Miller 275 275 Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 37 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 Jared Klaus 215 215 Law Clerks 125 125 Paralegals, support 125 125 Hunter, Carnahan, Shoub, Byard Michael J. Hunter 450 450 & Harshman Cathrine Harshman 300 300 Advancement Project Donita Judge 375 375 Defendants contend that the following rates are unreasonable—twenty-one rates of $300/hour or more, ten rates of $425/hour or more, and one $600 rate. Defendants argue that the awarded rates exceed what was necessary to attract capable counsel in Southern Ohio. In support they point to the rates awarded in other Ohio election law cases, an Ohio bar survey, and the rates of Plaintiffs’ own in-state counsel in the current award. The district court has broad discretion in determining a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney. Wayne, 36 F.3d at 533. To determine a reasonable hourly rate, courts use as a guideline the prevailing market rate, which is defined as “the rate that lawyers of comparable skill and experience can reasonably expect to command within the venue of the court of record.” Geier v. Sundquist, 372 F.3d 784, 791 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 (stating that “[t]he statute and legislative history establish that ‘reasonable fees’ under § 1988 are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community”). Thus, the appropriate rate is not necessarily the exact rate of a particular firm, but the market rate in the venue sufficient to encourage competent lawyers in the relevant community to undertake legal representation. Gonter v. Hunt Valve Co., 510 F.3d 610, 618 (6th Cir. 2007). A district court may look to “a party’s submissions, awards in analogous cases, state bar association guidelines, Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 38 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 and its own knowledge and experience in handling similar fee requests.” Van Horn v. Nationwide Pro. & Cas. Ins., 436 F. App’x 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, while the district court may take into consideration an attorney’s skill level in identifying the market rate, this Circuit holds that “reasonable” fees need not be “liberal” fees, and that “[s]uch fees are different from the prices charged to well-to-do clients by the most noted lawyers and renowned firms in a region.” Coulter, 805 F.2d at 149. Where a fee applicant seeks to recover fees for an out-of-town specialist, the district court must determine “(1) whether hiring the out-of-town specialist was reasonable in the first instance, and (2) whether the rates sought by the out-of-town specialist are reasonable for an attorney of his or her degree of skill, experience, and reputation.” Hadix v. Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1995). If competent counsel was readily available locally at a lower charge or rate, the district court may apply local market rates to the services provided by the out-of-town specialist. Id. at 535, 536. Although “special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates,” Blum, 465 U.S. at 898, “[s]ection 1988 does not guarantee civil rights plaintiffs the best counsel in the country; it guarantees them competent counsel,” Hadix, 65 F.3d at 535. Further, the mere fact that a particular attorney “has a national reputation for expertise in [the relevant] kind of litigation does not constitute proof that [the attorney’s] expertise was necessary” to the litigation. Id. Defendants point to the rates awarded in several analogous cases from Southern Ohio. See Ohio Right to Life Soc’y v. Ohio Elections Comm’n (ORTL), 590 F. App’x 597, 602 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s reduction of requested hourly rates ranging from $445 to $465/hour by lead attorney to $250/hour following a preliminary injunction and a consent judgment in a civil rights action for work performed between 2008 and 2010); Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 1:10cv820, 2013 WL 5467751, at  (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2013) (awarding McTigue $400/hour, McGinnis $250/hour, and Chandra $410/hour in 2010-12 on same law at issue in this case); Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted, No. 2:11-cv-722, 2013 WL 4833033, at -5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2013) (Marbley, J.) (awarding $300/hour from requested rate of $350/hour for work performed in 2011-12 to challenge rules governing ballot Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 39 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 access in Ohio elections because counsel ultimately obtained all of the relief sought); Harkless v. Brunner, No. 1:06 CV 2284, 2011 WL 2149138, at  (N.D. Ohio May 31, 2011) (adopting rates applied in Project Vote in a voting rights challenge); NEOCH v. Brunner, No. 2:06-cv-896, 2010 WL 4939946, at  (S.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2010) (Marbley, J.) (finding Chandra’s requested rate of $400/hour and Gentry’s requested rates of $280/hour and $290/hour reasonable for work performed preparing their first two motions for attorneys’ fees in connection with 2006 and 2007 litigation sub judice, during the appeal of those motions, and negotiating the Decree), aff’d NEOCH v. Secy of Ohio, 695 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2012); Moore v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-224, 2:08-cv-555, 2010 WL 317017, at -3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2010) (order) (rejecting requested rates of $400 and $450 as exceeding the amount necessary to encourage competent lawyers to take the case; finding $250/hour adequate but also applying a multiplier of 1.25 to reflect the exceptional results obtained in the cases); NEOCH v. Brunner, 652 F. Supp. 2d 871, 885 (S.D. Ohio 2009) (Marbley, J.) (noting that three attorneys, including Chandra, requested hourly rates above $300/hour for work performed between 2006 and 2008, stating that “[e]ach of those attorneys has substantial expertise in litigating not only civil rights cases, but more specifically election law civil rights actions” and that the requested billing rates for those attorneys (from $280 to $395 per hour) is reasonable and comparable to the rates of other attorneys of similar skill and experience in Columbus, Ohio”); Ray v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No. 2:08-CV1086, 2009 WL 1542737, at  (S.D. Ohio June 2, 2009) (approving $350/hour for lead counsel in election law case); Project Vote v. Blackwell, No. 1:06-CV-1628, 2009 WL 917737, at  & n.11 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2009) (noting that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence as to reasonable hourly rates in the Northern District of Ohio or that they required an out-of-town specialist, and relying on an Ohio State Bar publication and its own experience to grant an award of $310-$450/hour to partners in complex election law case in 2006-07, including $400/hour to McTigue and $175/hour to McGinnis). The district court relied on three of those cases. First it noted that in Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted (LPO), a voting rights case challenging an Ohio law governing ballot access, the plaintiffs achieved a preliminary injunction, which was vacated on appeal because the bill was repealed. Noting that fees in similar cases ranged from $300-$400, the district court (Judge Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 40 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 Marbley) in LPO rejected plaintiffs’ counsel’s request for $350/hour and instead awarded $300/hour as sufficient to attract competent local counsel. In Hunter, Chief Judge Dlott, after undertaking an extensive analysis of the proper attorney rates in the District, awarded a fee of $410/hour for certain experienced counsel, including Chandra. The court consulted the rates set by the 1983 Rubin Committee, with a 4% cost-of-living adjustment. 2013 WL 5467751, at . The Hunter court remarked that the requested rates were below the rates awarded to other plaintiff’s attorneys in Ohio with similar years of experience. For example, in 2010, this Court awarded fees to the following attorneys at the following rates: Jim Helmer (admitted 1975)—$498 per hour; Frederick Morgan, Jr. (admitted 1983)—$500 per hour; Julie Popham (admitted 1992)—$425 per hour; and Jennifer Verkamp (admitted 1996)—$450 per hour. U.S. ex rel. Ellison v. Visiting Physicians Ass’n, P.C., No. 1:04–cv–220, 2010 WL 2854137 (S.D.Ohio July 19, 2010). The prior year, the District Court approved experienced counsel rates ranging from $351 to $497 per hour in an ERISA matter. West, 657 F.Supp.2d at 934. And in 2009, the District Court awarded fees to Mr. McTigue at $400 per hour and Mr. McGinnis at $250 per hour. Project Vote v. Blackwell, No. 1:06cv1682, 2009 WL 917737 (N.D.Ohio March 31, 2009). And the Sixth Circuit recently affirmed a decision from the Northern District of Ohio in which the court approved rates ranging from $250 to $450 per hour, depending on each attorney’s experience. Van Horn v. Nationwide Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 436 F. App’x 496, 499 (6th Cir.2011). Id. In a prior ruling in the case sub judice, the same district court (Judge Marbley) awarded rates ranging from $325/hour to $400/hour for fees related to work performed from January 2009 to April 2010 for briefing and arguing the plaintiffs’ prior motions for fees and costs; opposing and settling the State of Ohio’s appeal of this court’s award of fees; and negotiating the Decree. NEOCH, 2010 WL 4939946, at . Chandra was awarded fees at a rate of $400/hour and Gentry at a rate of $290/hour. Id. at . (Altshuler Berzon had not yet been hired to represent the NEOCH Plaintiffs.) Defendants direct our attention to ORTL, where the district court rejected $450/hour rates during the relevant time frame for “experienced attorneys litigating election-law actions.” Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 41 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 ORTL, No. 2:08-cv-492, 2013 WL 5728255, at  (S.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2013) (magistrate judge’s ruling) (adopted with modification by 2014 WL 234677). The magistrate judge in that case relied on Moore v. Brunner, an election law action litigated in a similar time frame in the Southern District of Ohio, which held that “‘an hourly rate of $250 is adequate to attract competent counsel’” within the venue and would not produce a windfall for attorneys. Id. (quoting Moore v. Brunner, No. 2:08-cv-224, 2010 WL 317017, at  (S.D. Jan. 25, 2010)). This applied to counsel who “‘enjoy[ed] high levels of experience and expertise.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 2010 WL 317017, at ). The Moore court relied on a survey of the 250 largest law firms in the country, including three Ohio firms. The partner fee rates for the Ohio firms were $220 to $495, $225 to $490, and $200 to $475. Moore, 2010 WL 317017, at . This court affirmed those rates, crediting the district court’s reliance on “the thorough analysis set forth in Moore”: While courts have approved higher hourly rates, it was within the district court’s “broad discretion” to rely on the thorough analysis set forth in Moore to determine an appropriate hourly rate for calculating the lodestar. Wayne, 36 F.3d at 533. The underlying actions in Moore involved election law disputes during the same time frame as the instant action, and the Moore court based its $250 hourly rate on the hourly rates billed by law firms in the relevant geographic region. Furthermore, while the district court may take into consideration an attorney’s skill level in identifying the market rate, this Circuit has consistently held that “reasonable” fees need not be “liberal” fees, and that “[s]uch fees are different from the prices charged to well-to-do clients by the most noted lawyers and renowned firms in a region.” Coulter v. State of Tenn., 805 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir.1986). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in basing its lodestar calculations on an hourly market rate of $250. ORTL, 590 F. App’x at 602. Defendants also point out that the same district court (Judge Marbley) reduced the rate of an attorney with over twenty years of experience from $350 to $300/hour for 2011 work in LPO. See LPO, 2013 WL 4833033, at -5. Nonetheless, as we observed in ORTL, “courts have approved higher hourly rates.” ORTL, 590 F. App’x at 602. Given the district court’s broad discretion we cannot say that the district court abused it in awarding the Ohio attorneys, who have substantial experience and expertise in election law cases, their prevailing market rates other than McTigue ($450/hour Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 42 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 instead of $550/hour) and Chandra ($425/hour instead of $435/hour), since those amounts are not out-of-line with other cases in the venue of record). See Hadix, 65 F.3d at 536 (observing that “normal billing rates usually provide an efficient and fair short cut for determining the market rate” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 822 (6th Cir. 2013) (district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding hourly rate of $400/hour, although “on the high end,” where the court found that lead counsel was a “highly respected, experienced and accomplished practitioner in civil rights and employment litigation” and the rate was not outside the range of reported rates for highly experienced attorneys in the area). Furthermore, the district court distinguished LPO, noting the complexity of the NEOCH/SEIU Local 1 cases and the greater amount of labor required. Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 26. But the rates for the Altshuler Berzon attorneys are a different story. They clearly are out of step with the local market, and the district court did not explain why the rates for these attorneys are higher than the comparable Ohio attorneys in the case or even how it calculated the reductions for the Altshuler Berzon attorneys. For example, Gentry from Porter Wright in Columbus, Ohio charged $350/hour, her actual rate in 2012. Gentry graduated from Yale Law School in 1995, was a federal clerk, and is a partner at a prominent Columbus firm. Yet seven attorneys from Altshuler Berzon with less experience billed a higher rate than Gentry. Four such attorneys (Leyton, Leonard, Chisholm, and Thoreen) received $100/hour more than Gentry. Weissglass, an attorney with one more year of experience, received $200/hour more. Plaintiffs offered the declaration of Daniel R. Mordarski, who attested that Altshuler Berzon attorneys “have a long history of successfully engaging in sophisticated and complex litigation at all level[s] of federal and state court, including in a number of significant elections cases” and that their hourly rates were comparable to the typical rates for top lawyers in Ohio firms like Jones Day, Squire Sanders (now Squire Patton Boggs), and Baker & Hostetler. NEOCH, No. 2:06-cv-896, ID# 14072-73. Plaintiffs, however, have not claimed that the Altshuler Berzon attorneys were out-of-town specialists whose expertise was necessary in this Ohio case. The mere fact that Altshuler Berzon attorneys may have a national reputation for Nos. 14-4083/ 4084/ Northeast Ohio Coalition, et al. v. Husted, et al. Page 43 4132/ 4133/ 15-3295/ 3296/ 3380/ 3381 expertise in election law litigation is not proof that their expertise was necessary in this litigation. See Hadix, 65 F.3d at 535. Absent any explanation for the differential rates between Altshuler Berzon attorneys and local counsel, we are required to hold that the district court abused its discretion and remand for recalculation of the rates of the Altshuler Berzon attorneys in accordance with the legal principles outlined above, along with a suitable explanation as to how it reached its conclusions. The district court’s rejection of a report by the Ohio State Bar Association, “The Economics of Law Practice in Ohio in 2013” (OSBA Report), as a comparison point was not an abuse of discretion. The survey set forth billing rates of 1000 Ohio private practitioners, only about half of the active attorneys in Ohio, and it does not provide information regarding the skill, experience, and reputation of those who responded. The report, “by its own terms,” states that it was “‘not intended for use in setting minimum, average, or maximum attorney fees or salaries.’” Sept. 29, 2014 Op., at 25 (quoting OSBA Report at 4). The author of the report explained that it “significantly understates” rates because many attorneys failed to respond. Id. at 26 (quoting OSBA Report at 5). Finally, the data available for civil rights attorneys (twenty-six in all) was similar to the rates sought by Plaintiffs--$400-500/hour for primary civil rights lawyers, and $300-$550 /hour for partial civil rights practitioners. Id.