Opinion ID: 2779092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Washington Water Law and Lummi Indian Nation

Text: Washington, like other western territories in the late 1800s, followed a water law system called prior appropriation. Ellis v. Pomeroy Improvement Co., 1 Wash. 572, 578, 21 P. 27 (1889). Prior appropriation is a system offirst in time ... first in right, and our legislature formally recognized that system in 1917. LAws OF 1917, ch. 117, § 1 (currently codified as RCW 90.03.010). Prior appropriation focuses on the beneficial use of water and generally provides that a person's right to the 6 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 beneficial use of water is superior to others if he or she first appropriated the water for beneficial use. Id. Washington still follows the general prior appropriation system but has a regulatory permit scheme to balance and prioritize competing beneficial uses of the state's waters. Put simply and very generally, would-be users submit applications to Ecology and Ecology detennines what water is available and to what beneficial use it can be applied before issuing permits. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 252-53; RCW 90.03.290(1). Permits represent inchoate water rights, which are not choate (i.e., vested) until perfected. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 253; RCW 90.03.330. Before the right is perfected, the applicant still has an incomplete appropriative right in good standing, but he or she must act with reasonable diligence to perfect the right by developing the water system. RCW 90.03.320; Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 253. Ecology can cancel the permit if the permit's terms are violated. RCW 90.03.320. Once the water right is perfected, Ecology issues a certificate. RCW 90.03.330. Importantly, the perfected right evidenced by the certificate relates back to the date the applicant filed the original application with Ecology. RCW 90.03.340. Thus, the date a water right vests is often determined by the date the application was filed. Ecology and its predecessor have applied the perfection doctrine inconsistently over the years. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 254-55. Initially, water users 7 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 needed to both appropriate water and put it to beneficial use before they could perfect their right. See, e.g., OrteZ v. Stone, 119 Wash. 500, 503, 205 P. 1055 (1922). However, in the 1950s, Ecology and its predecessor issued both permits and certificates based on a user's need and capacity rather than on its actual beneficial use; this different approach was aptly named 'pumps and pipes.' Dep 't ofEcology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wn.2d 582, 587,957 P.2d 1241 (1998). Tension arose because of this inconsistency, and it led to our decision in Theodoratus. George Theodoratus had a water right application approved by Ecology for a development he planned to build. !d. Ecology's Report of Examination approving his application had language purporting to create a vested water right based on his development's capacity for water so long as it was built by a particular date. !d. Under the original report, Theodoratus would have been entitled to a certificate and his rights would have thus vested once he completed his water supply system and it was capable of delivering water-regardless of actual beneficial use. !d. Theodoratus was delayed in completing the development, and Ecology granted him several permit extensions, the last of which placed conditions on his water rights vesting. !d. at 58788. The conditions provided, among other things, that his vested water right would be determined based on actual application of water to beneficial use, not on system capacity. !d. at 588. Theodoratus appealed Ecology's condition, and we eventually held that the relevant statutes and our common law left no doubt that Theodoratus' s 8 Cornelius v. Dep 't of Ecology No. 88317-3 vested water rights must be based on beneficial use-not system capacity. Id. at 590. We noted, however, that our decision did not involve municipal water suppliers, which are treated differently under our statutory scheme. Id. at 594. Specifically, since 1967, our statutory scheme has treated water rights claimed for municipal water supply purposes as immune from statutory relinquishment, while nonmunicipal water rights may be relinquished through nonuse. LAws OF 1967, ch. 233, § 18 (codified as RCW 90.14.180); cf LAWS OF 1967, ch. 233, § 14 (codified as RCW 90.14.140(2)(d)). Generally, a nonmunicipal water right holder relinquishes all or part of its right if it fails to beneficially use the water right for five successive years without sufficient cause. RCW 90.14.180; see RCW 90.14.140(2)(d). However, despite this favorable treatment, until recently, our laws did not define municipal water supplier or municipal water supply purposes. This ambiguity in the water code, combined with our Theodoratus decision, caused water users concern about the validity of their water rights based on system capacity and whether their water rights were subject to relinquishment. In response, our legislature amended the water law act. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 256; LAWS OF 2003, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 5; SECOND ENGROSSED SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1338, 58th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (2E2SHB 1338). In addition to defining municipal water supplier and municipal water supply purposes for the first time, the law declared that water right certificates issued prior to September 9, 9 Cornelius v. Dep 't ofEcology No. 88317-3 2003, for municipal water supply purposes based on system capacity were in good standing. Lummi Indian Nation, 170 Wn.2d at 256-57 (citing LAWS OF 2003, 1st Spec.Sess., ch. 5; 2E2SHB 1338; H.B. REP. ON2E2SHB 1338, at 1-2). It further provided that after September 9, 2003, Ecology must issue certificates based on the actual beneficial use ofwater. Id. at 257 (quoting RCW 90.03.330(4)). As we stated in Lummi Indian Nation, The legislation essentially put the legislature's imprimatur on our holding in Theodoratus prospectively while confirming the good standing of water certificates issued under the former system. I d. The amendments garnered opposition from various groups and ultimately led to our Lummi Indian Nation decision. In that case, two groups of challengers (including Cornelius) brought facial constitutional challenges, arguing that the amendments, specifically RCW 90.03.015(3) and (4) and RCW 90.03.330(3), violated separation of powers and due process. Id. at 259, 265. The challengers argued the amendments violated separation of powers by changing the requirements we noted in Theodoratus for private water rights to vest and thereby unsettling our decision. Id. at 259-60. As discussed further below, we found no separation of powers violation because the legislature did not apply the law to an existing set of facts, affect the rights of parties to the court's judgment, ... interfere with any judicial function, or adjudicate facts. Id. at 263. The challengers argued that the amendments violated due process by potentially depriving junior water users of vested rights by 'resurrecting' the 10 Cornelius v. Dep 't ofEcology No. 88317-3 relinquished water rights of potentially senior rights holders. I d. at 268-69. Again, as discussed further below, we found that the amendments by themselves did not resurrect any relinquished rights and did not deprive junior water rights holders of vested property rights. I d. We left for another day consideration of any as-applied challenges. Id. at 263. Today is that day.