Opinion ID: 3066190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Manufacturer’s identity

Text: Publicly disclosing the identity of the manufacturer of the drugs to be used in Wood’s execution would not “play[] a significant positive role in the functioning” of Arizona’s execution protocol. Id. In California First Amendment Coalition, we reasoned that “[a]n informed public debate is critical in determining whether execution by lethal injection comports with ‘the evolving standards of decency which WOOD V. RYAN 43 mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 299 F.3d at 876 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Here, the State has already disclosed the type of drugs that will be used in Wood’s execution, the dosages of those drugs, their expiration dates, the fact that they are FDA approved, and the fact that they were produced domestically. The question before us is whether releasing the name of the manufacturer—or related information such as the National Drug Codes and lot numbers—would have a significant marginal benefit on the public discourse concerning Wood’s execution beyond the benefit that obtains from releasing the information already provided by the State. See Seattle Times, 845 F.2d at 1516 (“The [Supreme] Court has examined whether public access plays a particularly significant positive role in the actual functioning of the proceeding.” (emphasis added)). The information already released by the State enables informed debate about the lawfulness and propriety of Arizona’s two-drug cocktail. The public knows precisely how the State intends to end Wood’s life and can investigate whether the drugs are suited to that purpose. Wood correctly points out that it is “of particular significance to the public to know that the State that is carrying out its execution process is doing so through unlawful means.” But he does not—and cannot—explain why knowing the drugs’ manufacturer would contribute to discussing whether Arizona’s method is lawful. The identity of the chemicals and their quantities permits a full examination of the issue. Not every conceivable piece of information is equally relevant to the important, ongoing public conversation about the lawfulness of a particular lethal-injection protocol. 44 WOOD V. RYAN The only marginal benefit of disclosing the identity of the manufacturer of the drugs is that it enables the public to discuss the manufacturer’s decision to supply Arizona with the chemicals used in an execution. There is certainly value in such knowledge. For example, consumers who are opposed to capital punishment might wish to avoid doing business with the manufacturers. But the fact that there are some discursive benefits to disclosing the identities of the manufacturers is hardly dispositive. We must also consider the costs of disclosing the information. As the Supreme Court aptly put it, “[a]lthough many governmental processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of government operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly.” Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9. The disclosure of information previously kept private by the government often enhances the scope or accuracy of public discourse in some way. But the disclosure of certain kinds of information also hobbles the state’s ability to carry out its legitimate functions. When disclosure inhibits the effectiveness of the process at issue without producing substantial benefits, then public access to the information does not “play[] a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question.” Id. at 8. Several courts have observed that disclosing the manufacturer of drugs used in executions inhibits the functioning of the process in ways that harm the state, its citizens, and the inmate himself. As the Georgia Supreme Court recently explained, “without the confidentiality offered to execution participants . . . there is a significant risk that persons and entities necessary to the execution would become unwilling to participate.” Hill, 758 S.E.2d at 806. In a dissent from denial of rehearing en banc joined by seven other WOOD V. RYAN 45 members of our court, Chief Judge Kozinski observed that “Arizona has a legitimate interest in avoiding a public attack on its private drug manufacturing sources.” Landrigan v. Brewer, 625 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J,