Opinion ID: 2570635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: attorney fee allocation

Text: ¶ 40 The only issue before us regarding the attorney fee agreement is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the value of Barrett's contribution to the legal work in Campbell amounted to $25,000. In cases of equity, we defer to a trial court's conclusion that it had a sufficient factual basis for reaching an equitable distribution. Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, 39, 112 P.3d 495. ¶ 41 Barrett, the only appellant on this issue, does not appeal the jury's special verdict; rather, he appeals the trial court's equitable distribution of the attorney fees. On appeal, Barrett argues that the trial court erred by failing to show that its judgment flowed logically from the evidence as prescribed in Parduhn and by employing an incorrect measure in fashioning a remedy. He also argues that the trial court should have relied on the 1990 Agreement in reaching an equitable distribution of the attorney fees. ¶ 42 Barrett's first argument is premised upon our language in Parduhn, which reads as follows: [F]indings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree flows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached. Id. ¶ 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 43 In reaching its decision, the trial court found that: (1) while Appellees attended and actively participated in all of the nearly 100 depositions taken in the Campbell case, Barrett attended only two of these depositions, and even then, did not participate; (2) Barrett prepared one pleading, consisting of five pages, out of the hundreds of pages of pleadings filed in the Campbell case; (3) Barrett did not appear nor did he participate as counsel in any of the hearings or at either of the bifurcated trials which lasted ten weeks, and his appearance as a spectator did not advance the Campbell case in any material way; (4) Barrett never advanced any funds to cover the litigation expenses which the Campbells were unable to pay and refused to do so despite Appellees' requests that he share equitably in the costs; (5) Appellees advanced all of the costs totaling more than $500,000 and bore the risk of losing these advances if the plaintiffs lost; (6) Appellees spent a large amount of time doing the work Barrett failed to do; (7) Barrett's testimony and other evidence at trial showed that Barrett did not have an understanding of the fundamental issues involved in Campbell, such as the distinction between first and third-party bad faith claims, the names of key trial witnesses or the content of important exhibits and pleadings; (8)Barrett played no role in the four appeals that occurred after the successful litigation of Campbell; (9) Barrett's client, and the Ospitals were dismissed as plaintiffs from the Campbell case in 1987 due to lack of standing to assert bad faith claims against State Farm, and this ruling was never challenged by any of the parties; (10) Barrett's client ultimately recovered almost $3,000,000 in addition to his initial judgment, plus interest, against Campbell in the 1984 litigation; (11) Barrett's client had no rights in Campbell except his contractual rights to share in the proceeds from the Campbells' claims against State Farm; (12) As a party to the agreements and a recipient of a third of the Campbell recovery, Barrett's client was already obligated to cooperate with the Campbells and to pay Appellees their share of the contingency fee, regardless of whether Barrett encouraged him to or not; (13) Barrett was not entitled to a finder's fee or any other type of fee for encouraging Slusher's cooperation within the group, but was merely entitled to an equitable fee for the time he spent working on Campbell. ¶ 44 Contrary to Barrett's assertion, we conclude that the trial court's findings were sufficiently detailed to support its holding. Because the trial court's decision was an equitable one, it was not mandated to show that it adhered to specific factors or that it used a formulaic test in reaching its decision. Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ¶ 24, 89 P.3d 148. The court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties. Id. ¶ 26 (quoting 1 Spencer W. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 109 (5th ed.1941)). In this case, the trial court devised a remedy based on its determination that because Barrett was not entitled to any fees under the agreement, he was only entitled to an equitable fee for the amount of work he actually performed in the case. In its findings, the trial court gave a detailed description of Barrett's involvement in the Campbell case, and utilizing those findings, it determined that Barrett's contribution amounted to $25,000. ¶ 45 Barrett challenges only one finding of fact. He points out that the trial court inaccurately stated that Appellees alone bore the risk of losing advanced costs if the plaintiffs lost the case. Nevertheless, even if this isolated finding of fact is inaccurate, we have long held that a reversal of a trial court's findings will occur only where the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings of the trial court. Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150, 152 (Utah 1981); Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah 1981); Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 64 (Utah 1981); Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329, 330 (Utah 1978); Pagano v. Walker, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1975); Mollerup v. Daynes-Beebe Music Co., 82 Utah 299, 24 P.2d 306, 309 (1933). Because this finding relates to only one, relatively minor, factor in the court's assessment process, we conclude it does not change the balance in the preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 46 Barrett further contends that the trial court should have relied on the 1990 Agreement in reaching its conclusion because that agreement showed the parties' intended method of equitable distribution. Barrett argues that the trial court should have focused on that agreement because under Parduhn, a court may consider a contract, whether valid or invalid, as evidence of the intent behind the agreement. 2005 UT 22, ¶ 34, 112 P.3d 495; see also Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, 247-48 (1963). The trial court's decision not to rely on the 1990 Agreement in fashioning an equitable remedy in this case was a valid exercise of its broad discretion. Hughes, 2004 UT 22, ¶ 24, 89 P.3d 148. Prior to submitting the special verdict to the jury, the parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine the amount of fees Barrett was entitled to if the jury found that the contract was unenforceable. The trial court was not obligated to look to that agreement because pursuant to the jury verdict, Barrett was not entitled to anything under it; and there was ample evidence of changed circumstances affecting the intent of the parties. Our language in Parduhn and in Bennett Leasing Co. merely clarified that a court in determining equitable remedies may, as one of its many choices, look to such agreements or contracts to discern intent. Parduhn, 2005 UT 22, ¶ 34, 112 P.3d 495; Bennett Leasing Co., 387 P.2d at 247-48. It is not obligated to do so. ¶ 47 Furthermore, Utah's Rules of Professional Conduct specify that division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if, the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation. Utah Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.5(e)(1) (emphasis added). Therefore, in the absence of a joint representation agreement, a court may generally infer that the attorneys intended, pursuant to rule 1.5(e)(1), to divide the fees in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer. Id. Although Barrett may have intended to be paid for merely introducing Slusher to the group and signing his name on the attorney agreements, Appellees must have intended, as required by rule 1.5(d)(1), that he actually perform services in proportion to his share of fees. ¶ 48 Therefore, we affirm the trial court's equitable distribution of attorney fees. It did not abuse its discretion and reached a result that serves equity given the overall facts and circumstances of the individual case. Hughes, 2004 UT 22, ¶ 24, 89 P.3d 148.