Opinion ID: 2537905
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Exclude Identification Evidence

Text: Defendant claims that Montoya's and Padilla's pretrial and in-court identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive procedures in violation of his right to due process and a fair trial. Not so.
On June 14, 1996, Investigator Clark met separately with Padilla and Montoya. In recorded interviews, he discussed at length the events on January 12, 1991. At the end of each interview, he showed them two photographic lineups. Lineup one contained defendant's photograph in the number two position. [5] Padilla identified defendant, and Montoya selected two photographs from lineup one, one of which was defendant, and two photographs from lineup two. [6] At a hearing on defendant's motion to exclude Montoya's and Padilla's identifications of defendant at trial, Montoya, Padilla, and Investigator Clark testified. As relevant here, Padilla testified that he gave police a description of the assailant the morning after the attacks. He was not sure if he had been shown any photographs at that time, but thought maybe a series of photographs. He was not sure, but did not think he had identified possible suspects from the photographs. He did not recall to whom he spoke or whether the person was wearing a uniform, and could not describe the person, except to identify him as male. Padilla testified he was also shown photographs at his apartment by Clark about a year or two before his current testimony. Padilla was shown about 12 photographs in two groups of six. He identified one suspect, and was pretty certain of his identification. Clark testified that he had only shown photographs to Montoya and Padilla on June 14, 1996. He had never heard before today that Padilla had been shown photographs on January 13 or 14, 1991. Clark had both Montoya and Padilla read and sign the admonition form when he gave them the lineups to review. Defense counsel argued without elaboration that the lineup was unduly suggestive because defendant's photograph was distinctive as compared to and contrasted to the other individuals. As an additional basis, defense counsel asserted that Padilla was apparently shown photographs of possible suspects soon after the crimes, and these photographs were not preserved in any fashion. Counsel therefore argued that Padilla's trial identification should be excluded on due process grounds. The prosecutor said that the People were unaware of any photographs that were shown to Padilla the night of the capital crimes or on January 14, 1991. He had no reports reflecting that type of an interview, nor have I been made aware of any photo lineups that were ever shown to Mr. Padilla. The trial court found the lineups were not unduly suggestive given defendant's photograph was very, very similar to [photographs] two through six on lineup one. It observed that defense counsel had not identified as suggestive any particular characteristic of the lineup, and the court saw none. It therefore denied the motion on that ground. The court also found, based on the transcripts of the interviews and the hearing testimony, that Investigator Clark did nothing to suggest any photograph to either witness. Rather, Clark had the witnesses read the standard admonition, and merely orally confirmed their identifications once made. Finally, the court found that Padilla's identification in 1996 was not tainted because there was no evidence that Padilla was shown defendant's photograph soon after the 1991 incident and failed to make an identification. The court left open the possibility defendant could raise the issue again if evidence were found, but stated, I don't think the possibility that he was shown a series of photographs that he now can't recall, and in any event he doesn't think he made a[n] identification, is sufficient to taint the subsequent photo lineup or any in-court identification.
(5) Due process requires the exclusion of identification testimony only if the identification procedures used were unnecessarily suggestive and, if so, the resulting identification was also unreliable. ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 123 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166].) The question is not whether there were differences between the lineup participants, but whether anything caused defendant to `stand out' from the others in a way that would suggest the witness should select him. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].) We independently review a trial court's ruling that a pretrial identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. ( People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 609 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 160, 115 P.3d 472].) On appeal, defendant once again points to no particular characteristic of the participants in the photo lineups that he contends made the lineups impermissibly suggestive. Nor does our independent review of the lineups reveal any suggestion of `the identity of the person suspected by the police.' ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442].) Rather, defendant contends Clark asked Montoya and Padilla leading questions. Our review of the transcripts reveals no such suggestiveness in Clark's inquiries. Both Montoya and Padilla were first admonished in writing that they were under no obligation to identify anyone from th[e] photographic lineup, and the mere fact that the Riverside County District Attorney's Office is showing these photographs in no way means that a photograph of the person(s) responsible for the crime is/are present. Clark then told each witness that the person's appearance on the night of the incident might be different from the photograph, asked Padilla if he recognized anybody, and asked Montoya if he saw the perpetrator. He then confirmed which photographs they selected. Defendant further contends the lineups were unduly suggestive because the identifications occurred more than five and one-half years after the capital crimes. While this fact goes to the reliability of the identification, it does not affect a determination whether the lineup was unduly suggestive. ( People v. Kennedy, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 608.) Because we have concluded the lineup was not unduly suggestive, we need not consider whether it was reliable under the totality of the circumstances. ( Ibid. ) Defendant also contends that the identification procedure was unduly suggestive because, while law enforcement may not have told Padilla and Montoya that they had evidence defendant committed the crimes, or that defendant was in custody, the only reasonable inference is that something about the case had changed after over five years of inaction on the part of police. Of course, [a]nyone asked to view a lineup would naturally assume the police had a suspect. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 368.) This circumstance does not render the lineup unduly suggestive. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends that Montoya's preliminary hearing testimony, which occurred several months after the photographic lineup, demonstrates the identification process was unduly suggestive. In particular, defendant claims Montoya testified he was shown photographs of defendant by the district attorney at the time the preliminary hearing was formerly scheduled to be held, and was then postponed, and that Montoya believed he identified defendant in those photographs. This assertion misstates the record. Montoya actually testified that the first time he saw defendant after the capital crimes was the first preliminary hearing that should have been in June or July. There was no testimony about viewing photographs at this earlier proceeding. Rather, Montoya testified that in June 1996, Investigator Clark showed him photographs. Montoya recalled that after viewing the photographs, he saw defendant in court. Defendant further contends the trial court improperly required the defense to prove the lineup evidence was tainted. Defendant does bear the burden of demonstrating the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1164 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476]; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 413; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210].) In addition, and also contrary to defendant's claim, Padilla did not testify that he was shown photographs on the night of the crime and could not identify defendant. Rather, Padilla said he was not certain whether he was shown photographs and, while he was unsure, did not think he had identified anyone. Investigator Clark testified he was unaware Padilla had ever been shown photographs in January 1991. Defendant further contends without elaboration that because several prospective jurors and Pauline Mesa were exposed to pretrial publicity, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to renew his motion to exclude the eye-witness identification once he was clearly aware of the pre-trial publicity without inquiring as to whether a photograph was published in any of these articles. While his claim is not entirely clear, to the extent he claims Montoya and Padilla might have seen a media photograph of defendant before the photographic lineup, he cites nothing in the record that would support this assertion, nor how this factor would affect our determination that the lineup itself was not unduly suggestive. For these same reasons, he fails to demonstrate any basis on which to conclude trial counsel was ineffective in failing to renew the motion to exclude Montoya's and Padilla's identifications of defendant following Mesa's trial testimony. Defendant contends that the trial court demonstrated judicial bias by (1) asking Clark whether he read the admonition to Montoya and Padilla or asked them to read it to themselves, but not asking questions that assisted defendant such as why the prosecution waited more than five years to conduct the lineup, why only Montoya and Padilla were asked to participate, and whether the witnesses were exposed to any pretrial publicity; and (2) trust[ing] the prosecutor's unsworn testimony over Padilla's sworn testimony that he had been previously shown photographs of a suspect and was unable to make an identification. Not so. The court acted properly in asking for clarification regarding the admonition procedure, which was ambiguous in the transcript of Clark's interview with Padilla. In addition, the questions defendant now claims the trial court should also have asked were irrelevant to a determination of whether the identification procedure was unduly suggestive. We have rejected above defendant's claim that there was any definitive testimony that Padilla was shown photographs by law enforcement in January 1991, and failed to identify a suspect. Once again, a trial court's numerous rulings against a partyโeven when erroneousโdo not establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review. ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) Defendant fails to demonstrate any judicial misconduct or bias, let alone misconduct or bias that was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant of `a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.' ( Ibid. )