Opinion ID: 774059
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: would likely produce an acquittal if the case were retried.

Text: 29 Barlow, 693 F.2d at 966. 30 Although the district court in its opinion recognized that the Barlow test is used to evaluate new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence, it held that a different standard is used when a new trial motion is based on a material government witness's recantation of his trial testimony. The district court then cited to the test first stated in this circuit's published opinion in Gordon as the appropriate standard in such cases. In Gordon, the defendant, following his conviction, filed a motion for a new trial based on the principal government witness's recantation of his trial testimony. In addressing the new trial motion, this court followed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), stating that a motion for a new trial based on the recantation of a material government witness should be granted only if: 31 (1)the court is reasonably well satisfied that the trial testimony given by the material witness is false; (2)without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion; and 32 (3)the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given, and was unable to meet it or did not know of its falsity until after the trial. 33 Gordon, 178 F.2d at 900. 34 In applying the test, the Gordon court first stated that, in cases such as these where all of the testimony given by a witness against the defendant is recanted, the requirement that the defendant be surprised when the false testimony is given and be unable to meet it or know of its falsity until after the trial is not pertinent. Id. The district court in Gordon had denied the defendant's new trial motion based on the first factor of the Larrison test: that the court be reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the witness at trial was false. This circuit, noting the witness's history of crime and perjury, held that the district court's decision was not unreasonable[,] and affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's new trial motion. Id. at 899-900. 35 After examining the history of this circuit's use of both the Barlow and Gordon tests, we agree with the district court in this case that the Gordon test, and not the Barlow standard, is the appropriate test to apply in these unique circumstances where a material witness testifying on behalf of the government later recants his trial testimony. No published opinion in this circuit has explicitly called the use of the Gordon test into question. Nor have any of our published opinions applied the Barlow test to facts like those at issue in Gordon and the current case. As the rules of this circuit require, a panel of this court is bound by the prior published opinions of this circuit unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision. Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985); 6th Cir. R. 206(c). 36 On several occasions, this circuit has acknowledged that the Gordon test applies to these unique situations in which a material witness for the government recants his testimony after the trial. For example, in United States v. Lewis, 338 F.2d 137, 138-40 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978 (1965), we applied the Gordon test to a new trial motion based on the recantation of a prosecution witness. Furthermore, in more recent cases, we have recognized the Gordon test's continuing applicability in criminal cases, and we have applied the test to new trial motions in the civil context. See, e.g., Davis v. Jellico Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 134 (6th Cir. 1990); Abrahamsen v. Trans-State Express, Inc., 92 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Davis and Gordon). 37 The only published opinion in this circuit that has not explicitly recognized the distinction between the Barlow andGordon tests is United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1263-64 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1112 (1992), another case involving a new trial motion based on a recanting government witness. In Chambers, this court cited both to the Barlow test for new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence and to the Gordon test for new trial motions based on the recantation of a material government witness. Although the Chambers court cited to both Barlow and Gordon, the decision to deny the defendant's new trial motion was based on an application of the Gordon test. 38 The district court in Chambers, after examining the recanting witness's demeanor both during trial and at the evidentiary hearing, as well as the witness's motivation to lie after trial, found the witness's trial testimony to be credible and his subsequent recantation to be 'wholly unbelievable.' Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1264. Based on these findings, the district court denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. This circuit, in affirming the district court's decision, recognized as the primary ground for granting the new trial motion the requirement emanating from Gordon that the trial judge be reasonably well satisfied that the recanting witness's trial testimony was false. Id. (quoting United States v. Kearney, 682 F.2d 214, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The Chambers court then held that, because the district court had observed the witness both at trial and at the evidentiary hearing, the district court was uniquely qualified to pass on [the recanting witness's] credibility. Id. This court could find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. 39 Although the Chambers court cited to both the Barlow and Gordon tests in addressing the defendant's motion for a new trial, we applied only the Gordon test, and our decision was dictated by the defendant's failure to satisfy the Gordon test's first element. We do not believe that Chambers provides any basis for questioning Gordon's continuing applicability in this circuit. 5 Even if it did, however, to the extent that Chambers calls into question a prior published opinion of this circuit, we remain bound by the holding of the earlier case. Sowards v. Loudon County, Tenn., 203 F.3d 426, 431 n.1 (6th Cir.),cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 179 (2000); Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180 F.3d 758, 765 (6th Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 40 Although we do not believe the Barlow test to be applicable to this case, it has been used by this circuit in cases similar to, though certainly not the same as, the current case. For example, in United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 823-35 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1136 (1996), we applied Barlow to a new trial motion in which a character witness for the defendant came forward after the trial and confessed to committing the crime for which the defendant was convicted. In Turns, a similar case to Pierce, this court applied Barlow to a new trial motion in which the defendant's sister, who refused to testify at trial, later brought forth evidence that tended to exonerate the defendant. Turns, 198 F.3d at 586-87. 41 While this circuit has applied the Barlow test in cases similar to this one, it is clear that different concerns are at issue in cases like Pierce and Turns. In both Pierce and Turns, the defendants attempted to come forward after the trial with entirely new evidence never before heard by the jury in an attempt to exonerate themselves. In these cases, arguably the stricterBarlow standard should be applied in light of concerns that defendants might sandbag the prosecution, waiting to see if they are convicted before bringing forth new evidence in an attempt to get a second chance at acquittal. As this court stated in Turns:If the district court's decision [granting a new trial] was allowed to stand, then other defendants would be encouraged to file motions for new trials based solely upon the existence of previously uncalled witnesses who, after learning of the defendant's conviction, state for the first time that they are willing to testify truthfully on the defendant's behalf. Such a precedent would also encourage defendants to hold a witness or two in reserve, knowing that if they lost at trial, they might get another chance by producing sworn affidavits from their reserve witnesses. 42 Turns, 198 F.3d at 588. 43 In cases like Gordon and the current case, these sandbagging concerns are not at issue. Instead, the fear in a case like this one is that the defendant, his friends, or his family have reached the witness after trial and convinced him to recant his damaging testimony. While this surely is a legitimate concern, there are two checks on witness tampering in these cases that do not factor into the Barlow scenario. 44 The first check is the 'primary' element of the Gordon test: that the district court be reasonably well satisfied that the original trial testimony given by the now-recanting government witness was false. Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1264 (quotingKearney, 682 F.2d at 220). Because the district court must be satisfied that this original trial testimony was false, this substantially allays concerns that posttrial witness tampering will serve as the basis for a successful new trial motion. Indeed, in Gordon, Lewis, and Chambers, the defendants' new trial motions were all denied because the primary element of the Gordon test had not been satisfied. Gordon, 178 F.2d at 900; Lewis, 338 F.2d at 139-40; Chambers, 944 F.2d at 1263-64. 45 The second check on coerced recantations is the threat of perjury charges being brought against the recanting witness. Whereas in Barlow cases a previously uncalled defense witness will not incur a substantial risk of perjury charges by coming forward with new testimonial evidence, in cases like Gordon and the one at bar, the recanting witness, by admitting under oath that the testimony he gave at trial was not true, clearly opens himself up to perjury charges being brought by the government. 46 With these two checks in place, arguably, new trial motions based on the recantation of a material government witness, unlike new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence, do not need the further check of a probability standard. Regardless of the policy justifications for having two separate tests, it is clear that Gordon is still good law in this circuit, and that we remain bound by it. The district court did not err in applying the Gordon test to Willis's motion for a new trial.