Opinion ID: 1532443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Crosby Decision

Text: In Crosby, this Court concluded that the General Assembly had made such an express statement when it enacted the Truth-in-Sentencing legislation. The General Assembly did that in cases of non-violent habitual offenders sentenced to life under section 4214(a), because any sentence imposed under section 4214(a) was made specifically subject to the provisions of section 4381 in the same Truth-in-Sentencing enactment. Thus, section 4381(a) provided that  all sentences imposed for any offense, other than a life sentence imposed for class A felonies, may be reduced by earned good time under the provisions of this section and rules and regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Corrections. Although the General Assembly created classifications for felonies when it adopted the Truth-in-Sentencing Act, it did not reclassify section 4214(a) life sentences for habitual offenders as life sentences for class A felonies, which are carved out from the earned good time provision of section 4381(a). In Crosby, we examine[d] the amendments that were made to the habitual offender statute as part of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act to ascertain the General Assembly's [then] current intent with regard to a section 4214(a) life sentence. [91] The history of Delaware's habitual offender statute reflects that the General Assembly drew a distinction between a habitual offender designation under section 4214(a) and an habitual offender status under section 4214(b). In 1970, before the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was passed, a person serving a life sentence under section 4214(a) could receive the benefit of parole, and for that purpose a life sentence would be considered a fixed term of forty-five years. A person serving a life sentence imposed under subsection 4214(b), however, was not eligible for parole. When Truth-in-Sentencing was enacted, the General Assembly retained the distinction first made in 1970 between habitual offenders who were serving life sentences under section 4214(a) and under section 4214(b), respectively. After the passage of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act, persons sentenced to life as habitual offenders under section 4214(a) were not eligible for release on parole. Such persons were still eligible for conditional release under section 4348, however, because subsection (a) specifically incorporated section 4381 by reference. The General Assembly accomplished its intention to provide for sentence reduction through the accumulation of good time credit by continuing to treat a life sentence imposed under section 4214(a) in the Truth-in-Sentencing Act as a fixed term of 45 years. [92] In Crosby, we determined that, when the Truth-in-Sentencing Act was adopted, the General Assembly intended to treat a person sentenced to life under section 4214(a) differently from persons who received other life sentences, [93] by making that person eligible for conditional release. That intent, we held, was clearly reflected in all of the General Assembly's carefully crafted statutes and amendments. The General Assembly accomplished that intent by not repealing section 4346(c) and by continuing to treat a life sentence for an habitual offender under section 4214(a) as a fixed term of forty-five years under section 4346(c). Therefore, in Crosby we held that a person sentenced to life as an habitual offender pursuant to section 4214(a) is to be considered as having been sentenced to a fixed term of 45 years, and qualifies for conditional release pursuant to section 4348, based upon good time credits earned pursuant to section 4381. [94] Following our decision in Crosby, the Attorney General's Office asked the General Assembly to change the law. [95] Even though less than 5% of criminal appeals are reversed by this Court, such requests have become a routine practice. [96] The habitual offender provisions that were originally enacted in section 4214(a) as part of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act and construed in Crosby were amended in 2004. Those 2004 amendments to section 4214(a) are not an issue in this appeal, and play no role in our resolution of the issue presented here.