Opinion ID: 2626474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumptive Sanction of Suspension

Text: ¶ 40 Standard 4.32 of ABA Standards provides: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a client the possible effect of that conflict, and causes injury or potential injury to the client. Knowledge is `the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.' Longacre, 155 Wash.2d at 743, 122 P.3d 710 (quoting ABA Standards at 17). Conscious knowledge that particular conduct violates the RPC is not a prerequisite to showing a respondent's conduct is knowing. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Egger, 152 Wash.2d 393, 416, 98 P.3d 477 (2004) (noting knowledge can be established in conflict of interest cases where attorney consciously enters into the conflicted transaction). State of mind is a factual determination, and the hearing officer's firsthand determination is respected. See Longacre, 155 Wash.2d at 744, 122 P.3d 710. ¶ 41 Here, Greenlee did not challenge the hearing officer's factual finding that Greenlee's sole motivation in making Sanchez-Suwaneh sign the release was to exculpate himself on the chance [Sanchez-Suwaneh's] unhappiness with him led her to take further action. CP at 42. The hearing officer also found Greenlee not credible on the issue of his supposed negligence in not reading the release prior to his giving it to Sanchez-Suwaneh. CP at 32. This, despite a finding that Greenlee believed in good faith that his work on the personal injury case was not negligent, and that he was not trying to cover up negligence he knew existed. CP at 39 n. 16. This court respects credibility determinations of the hearing officer who has direct contact with the witnesses. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kagele, 149 Wash.2d 793, 814, 72 P.3d 1067 (2003). ¶ 42 Under ABA Standards, [i]njury is defined as harm to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession. ABA Standards Definitions at 17. Potential injury is defined as harm to a client, the public, the legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer's misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have resulted from the lawyer's misconduct. Id. We give `particularly great weight' to the question of the extent of injury involved due to the attorney's misconduct. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dann, 136 Wash.2d 67, 79, 960 P.2d 416 (1998) (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, 115 Wash.2d 747, 772, 801 P.2d 962 (1990)). But as this court has also held, in disciplinary proceedings, no actual harm need be shown. Halverson, 140 Wash.2d at 486, 998 P.2d 833. ¶ 43 Here, the hearing officer appropriately found Sanchez-Suwaneh suffered potential injury by being made to sign a release of her rights by a lawyer who had superior knowledge, without obtaining the required written advice to consult independent counsel. CP at 35, 40-41. Had Sanchez-Suwaneh subsequently decided to sue Greenlee for malpractice, she could have reasonably been discouraged from doing so after viewing the release she had signed. She was not sophisticated, partially disabled, and understood matters better when in writing. CP at 23, 33. Additionally, the hearing officer appropriately found Greenlee's actions harmed the legal profession because he exploited his client's vulnerability to obtain a release from her. CP at 35, 40-41.