Opinion ID: 2358793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exemption under RCW 42.56.540 for Fair Trial Rights

Text: ¶ 25 Judge Serko found that because of the extraordinary level of local, state and national attention the story of the Lakewood murders and subsequent events received, further release of investigative materials and details may jeopardize the respondents' ability to seat a fair and impartial jury. CP at 268. A defendant has a right to fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, and under article I, section 22 of our state constitution. There is no specific exemption under the PRA that mentions the protection of an individual's constitutional fair trial rights, but courts have an independent obligation to secure such rights. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 378, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (stating that [t]o safeguard the due process rights of the accused, a trial judge has an affirmative constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial pretrial publicity). Judge Serko viewed RCW 42.56.540 as a basis under the PRA for withholding records alleged to violate the respondents' fair trial rights. ¶ 26 RCW 42.56.540 reads in relevant part: The examination of any specific public record may be enjoined if, upon motion and affidavit by an agency or its representative or a person who is named in the record or to whom the record specifically pertains, the superior court for the county in which the movant resides or in which the record is maintained, finds that such examination would clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions. ¶ 27 The respondents claim that the disclosure of the requested records will result in media coverage that may taint a future jury pool. See Br. of Resp't at 9. Their claim is therefore analogous to a motion for a change of venue due to pretrial publicity. In that context, we have recognized that the `defendant must show a probability of unfairness or prejudice from pretrial publicity.' State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 269, 76 P.3d 217 (2003) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 116 Wash.2d 51, 71, 804 P.2d 577 (1991)). Moreover, as this court observed in a case involving a challenge to a trial court's gag order on publicity, trial courts considering suppression of publicity should also inquire as to the availability of alternatives to the suppression of publicity, including more searching voir dire, clear and emphatic cautionary instructions, a change of venue, continuance of the trial date, and sequestration of the jury. State v. Bassett, 128 Wash.2d 612, 616-17, 911 P.2d 385 (1996). Thus, a trial court that orders the withholding of public records based on protecting a fair trial right must find with particularity that it is more probable than not that unfairness or prejudice will result from the pretrial disclosure, and must consider alternatives to withholding the records. [4] In applying this standard, a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial [does not] compel categorical nondisclosure of police investigative records. Cowles, 139 Wash.2d at 479, 987 P.2d 620. Application of the standard should be done as to each record requested, with the trial court conducting an in camera review. ¶ 28 In light of the foregoing discussion, we must conclude that Judge Serko's May 20 order cannot stand. First, the order does not identify with particularity the unfairness or prejudice that would result from release of the records at issue, nor does the order consider alternatives to the suppression of public records. Second, the order relies on RCW 42.56.540, but this statute does not provide a stand-alone exemption to production under the PRA. It is simply an injunction statute. It is a procedural provision which allows a superior court to enjoin the release of specific public records if they fall within specific exemptions found elsewhere in the Act. PAWS II, 125 Wash.2d at 257, 884 P.2d 592 (discussing predecessor statute codified as RCW 42.17.330). ¶ 29 The respondents attempt to recast the significance of RCW 42.56.540 by arguing that the May 20 order properly relied on the provision in barring production of the documents because the prosecutor failed to assert available exemptions despite his constitutional and ethical obligations to do so. Br. of Resp't at 24. We disagree. The petitioners did not request any documents from the prosecutor, only from the Sheriff. [5] Even if the prosecutor's office was the agency to which this request for records had been made, there is no support for the argument that it has an obligation under the PRA to claim exemptions to production. Indeed, such a requirement would run counter to the PRA's policy of openness, as evinced by its mandate that exemptions be narrowly construed. See RCW 42.56.030. ¶ 30 In sum, Judge Serko's May 20 order is not supportable under the appropriate standard relating to any of the claimed exemptions or based on a violation of the respondents' fair trial rights. Moreover, the stated basis for the order, RCW 42.56.540, is not a substantive provision of the PRA, but a procedural one that cannot stand alone. Accordingly, we must vacate the May 20 order.