Opinion ID: 69079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Threat-of-Death Enhancement

Text: 6 Pruitt argues that the district court erred by applying a two-level threat-ofdeath enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F).2 A defendant’s base offense level is increased by two levels “if a threat of death was made.” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). The guidelines commentary explains this enhancement, as follows: “A threat of death,” as used in subsection (b)(2)(F), may be in the form of an oral or written statement, act, gesture, or combination thereof. Accordingly, the defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the victim in order for the enhancement to apply. . . . The court should consider that the intent of this provision is to provide an increased offense level for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, a fear of death. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.6. In applying U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), “[w]e do not understand the robber’s intent to be determinative. It is the impact of his message on reasonable hearers that is important.” United States v. Murphy, 306 F.3d 1087, 1089 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, we cannot say that the district court clearly erred in applying the twolevel threat-of-death enhancement in light of the demand note and Pruitt’s verbal statements to the tellers. The demand note informed the teller that: (1) “There is 2 sets of eyes on you and [Pruitt],” (2) “We are watching and listening,” and (3) 2 This Court reviews a district court’s factual findings for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v. Phillips, 413 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005). 7 “Cooperate or boom and bang!” A reasonable bank teller would have received this note and concluded: If I do not give the money requested, then there are two people watching and listening who will either detonate a bomb or shoot me and I will die. See Murphy, 306 F.3d at 1089 (concluding that a reasonable bank teller’s interpretation of a note stating that the teller had ten seconds to hand the Defendant all the money in the top drawer and that the Defendant had a gun was “If I do not give this robber money within ten seconds, I will be shot; and people who are shot often die.”). The fact that the demand note did not expressly state that Pruitt or the two observers intended to kill the bank teller does not preclude this fact finding. See U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 cmt. n.6 (“[T]he defendant does not have to state expressly his intent to kill the victim in order for the enhancement to apply.”). Nor does the fact that the note warns “Cooperate or boom and bang!” instead of stating expressly that Pruitt or the observers had a lethal weapon. See id. (providing as an example of conduct constituting a threat of death “‘Give me your money or else (where the defendant draws his hand across his throat in a slashing motion)’”). In addition, a reasonable bank teller would have interpreted the “boom or bang” threat to be directed at the teller and the bank because the note advised that there were “2 sets of eyes” watching to ensure that the teller cooperated with the 8 note’s demands. At a minimum, a reasonable interpretation of the note was that both the bank teller and Pruitt’s family were being threatened. Second, in addition to the demand note, there was evidence that Pruitt verbally threatened tellers Jimenez and Diggs. Specifically, the PSI stated that Pruitt told Diggs and Jimenez that “if they did not give him the money then ‘boom, you are dead’” and “threatened several times that if [Jimenez and Diggs] did not cooperate they would die.” According to Agent Agiz’s testimony at sentencing, Pruitt told Jimenez that “there are two black men inside this bank that are watching you and there is one outside and if you do not cooperate, boom,” and Driggs overheard Pruitt saying this to Jimenez. After hearing Agent Agiz’s testimony and Pruitt’s cross-examination, the district court found Agent Agiz’s testimony regarding the threats to be credible. It was within the province of the district court to make this credibility finding, and we will not disturb it.3 See United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating that “the appellate court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the sentencing court to judge the credibility of the witnesses” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). 3 Furthermore, it was permissible for the district court to rely on hearsay in applying the enhancement. See United States v. Zlatogur, 271 F.3d 1025, 1031 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that a district court may rely on hearsay evidence at sentencing as long as the evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability, the court makes explicit findings of fact as to credibility, and the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the evidence). 9