Opinion ID: 202283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: García's Affidavit

Text: 11 Roberto García's Alien Registration File included an affidavit, dated October 27, 1999, containing the following statement, handwritten in English: 12 My true [and] complete name is Roberto García. I was born on May 10, 1969 in Colombia and I am a citizen of Colombia. I entered the U.S. from Mexico in 1989 illegally. I did not present myself for inspection because I did not have a Visa. 13 The handwritten statement was signed: Roberto G. The affidavit indicated that, while an interpreter was not used, the affiant appeared before a Spanish-speaking officer of what was then the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 1 (INS), that the affiant was advised of his Miranda rights in Spanish, and that the affiant willingly made the above sworn statement. Following the signed handwritten statement was a typewritten statement indicating that the foregoing statement had been read to the affiant, that the answers made therein were true and correct, and that the affidavit was a full, true, and correct record of the affiant's interrogation by the INS officer. The typewritten statement was signed: Robert G. 14 Before trial began, García moved in limine to exclude the affidavit, arguing that the affidavit was untrustworthy because it was prepared in English and allegedly signed by García, who speaks only Spanish. The district court rejected García's argument, explaining that (1) while the affidavit was written in English, it was interpreted into Spanish by the INS officer; (2) the affidavit indicated that García was advised of his rights; and (3) García's signature appeared on the affidavit. The district court noted not only that the signature on the affidavit appeared to be the same as the signature on a waiver-of-presence form 2 signed by García in open court that very day, but also that García did not challenge the signature and did not proffer that the affidavit had not been interpreted for him in Spanish. 15 At trial, the affidavit was introduced through Sassone, who testified that Roberto García's Alien Registration File was maintained in the regular course of business. Sassone identified the various documents contained in the Alien Registration File, including the 1999 affidavit, but she admitted that she had no personal knowledge about the events that triggered the preparation of those documents. García objected to admission of the affidavit on hearsay and lack-of-authentication grounds. 16 The district court overruled García's hearsay objection, finding that the affidavit was an admission of a party opponent. The district court again noted that García had adopted the statements contained in the affidavit as his own and had offered nothing to challenge the representation that the affidavit was explained in Spanish. 17 The district court also overruled García's objection to admission of the affidavit on authentication grounds. According to García, because Sassone had no personal knowledge about García's 1999 deportation and was not present when the affidavit was created, she could not establish that the document was, in fact, signed by García. The district court was unpersuaded, having itself seen the obvious similarities in the signature placed on the waiver-of-presence form signed by García in open court and the multiple signatures found on various documents in Roberto García's Alien Registration File. 18 García now contends that the district court committed reversible error by admitting the affidavit signed by Roberto G. We find no merit to such contention. Indeed, García has pointed to nothing in the record that casts doubt upon the district court's findings that (1) the statements contained within the affidavit were translated into Spanish for García's benefit, (2) García heard, understood, and acquiesced in those statements, and (3) García twice signed the affidavit, thereby signaling his adoption of the affidavit as his own. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 930 (3d Cir.1985) (holding that a seaman's signature on Sea Service records prepared by others was an unequivocal adoption of the contents therein). Given these findings, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the affidavit as a non-hearsay admission of alienage by a party opponent. 19 García's authentication argument is equally unavailing. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a), [t]he requirement of authentication ... as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. If the trial court determines that there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person to believe the evidence is what it purports to be, the evidence may be admitted subject to the factfinder's assessing what weight will be given to the evidence. United States v. Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1997). There is no single way, moreover, to authenticate evidence. As this court has recognized on more than one occasion: 20 [T]he direct testimony of a custodian or a percipient witness is not a sine qua non to the authentication of a writing. Thus, a document's appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances, can, in cumulation, even without direct testimony, provide sufficient indicia of reliability to permit a finding that it is authentic. 21 E.g., United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 167 (1st Cir.1994) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1084, 115 S.Ct. 1797, 131 L.Ed.2d 724 (1995); United States v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1994). 22 Here, given the absence of any evidence to refute what the affidavit, on its face, revealed, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in admitting the affidavit. The content of the affidavit, the circumstances surrounding its creation, and its location in an Alien Registration File containing not only García's photograph but also several examples of his signature (a signature that appeared to be the same as the signature placed on the waiver-of-presence form signed by García in the presence of the district court) all support the district court's decision to admit the affidavit as an authentic document.