Opinion ID: 2807503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Whether an Ishikawa analysis is necessary depends on whether article I, section 10 applies to the statutory sealing of juvenile court records. Whether article I, section 10 applies depends on application of the experience and logic test. In re Det. of Morgan, 180 Wn.2d 312, 325, 330 P.3d 774 (2014). Neither experience nor logic indicates that article I, section 10 applies when sealing juvenile court records pursuant to a specific statutory provision. 3 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 A. A brief history of juvenile justice We must first take into account the history of juvenile justice. We do not presume to set forth an authoritative historical treatise, but a brief discussion is needed to provide context for our analysis of the issue presented. This discussion reveals a centuries-old effort to balance the competing concerns where a juvenile is viewed as needing reformation and rehabilitation, but is not appropriately subjected to adult criminal proceedings and punishments. To balance these unique concerns, the law has constructed a constitutional wall around juveniles, maintaining its integrity through a continuous process of refining its contours and repairing its cracks. Within the English common law tradition, juvenile law did not begin to take shape until juveniles began to be viewed as a distinct class of individuals, rather than chattels incident to adult domestic relations or as simply members of the general population. Prior to the 1600s, juveniles were not viewed as having an identity separate from their parents until they were between five and seven years old. THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 50-52 (1992). Between 1600 and 1800, the basic contours ofthe modern concept of juvenility solidifiedthe juvenile is a potential adult but not yet fully formed. Id. at 52, 54. Some early examples of juvenile-specific law may be found in the English Chancery Courts. In cases of orphaned juveniles with inherited estates, the 4 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 Chancery Court would exercise equitable authority to manage both the person and the estate of the juvenile in the name of the sovereign.Jd. at 69; Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 333, 146 P. 623 (1915). Following the Revolutionary War, sovereignty shifted from the crown to the people, but the idea that the sovereign had inherent equitable authority over the persons and estates of juveniles continued. Weber, 84 Wash. at 333. This authority was justified by the belief that 'it is indispensably necessary to protect the persons and preserve the property of those who are unable to protect and take care of themselves.' Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 105 (1909) (quoting Cowles v. Cowles, 3 Gilman 435 (1846)). While orphaned juveniles with substantial property interests were thus given special attention, juveniles charged with criminal offenses were tried in ordinary criminal courts. The age of the offender, however, was still a relevant factor in both law and fact. Under English common law, juveniles under seven years old were legally incapable of committing a crime; there was a rebuttable presumption that those between 7 and 14 years old were not criminally responsible and a rebuttable presumption that those between 14 and 21 years old were. BERNARD, supra, at 29 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ). Moreover, prosecutors, juries, and judges were sometimes reluctant to apply the letter of the law to juvenile offenders and sought to mitigate the harshness of adult criminal justice with charging, conviction, and sentencing decisions.Jd. at 35, 61; ANTHONY 5 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 186 (1969). The options were often extreme-either release the juvenile and risk the possibility that the juvenile will recidivate due to the lack of meaningful consequences, or confine the juvenile to the penitentiary with adult offenders and risk the possibility that the juvenile will be trained and encouraged to become an adult criminal due to the influence of fellow prisoners. BERNARD, supra, at 34-35, 61, 63. Beginning in the 19th century, many jurisdictions sought to create other options. In an effort to separate juvenile offenders from the corrupting influence of adult criminals, some states provided that juveniles charged with crimes could be tried on a separate docket from adult criminal cases. PLATT, supra, at 9. Some states also established separate institutions for juveniles who were found to have violated the criminal laws or were expected to do so if not institutionalized and reformed, so the juvenile might be snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity. Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9, 11 (Pa. 1839); see LAWS OF 1891, ch. 103, §§ 1-2, at 195-96; In re Habeas Corpus of Mason, 3 Wash. 609, 612-13, 28 P. 1025 (1892). Such institutionalization was sometimes held unconstitutional as depriving juveniles of their liberty without due process of law, People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 287-88 (1870), but carefully drafted legislation that consciously avoided the approach of the criminal law was held to remedy the problem, In rePetition ofFerrier, 103 Ill. 367,370-71 (1882). The intention, 6 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 though not always the actual practice, was to protect the interests of all juveniles and not merely those with large estates as the Chancery Courts did. The combination of separate trials and separate institutions led quite naturally to the formal establishment of separate court divisions devoted entirely to juvenile issues. Washington first adopted this approach in 1905. LAWS OF 1905, ch. 18. Matters on the juvenile calendar included juveniles charged with violating criminal laws and juveniles facing a range of significant social, economic, and familial problems. Id. § 1. The juvenile court's broad scope was based on the belief that most juvenile offenders have more in common with a dependent or neglected child than with an adult criminal. Id. § 12; Mack, supra, at 107. Washington juvenile court legislation was revisited and modified several times over the next few years, culminating in comprehensive juvenile court legislation enacted in 1913. The 1913 laws solidified the distinction between a juvenile dependent and a juvenile delinquent. LAWS OF 1913, ch. 160, § 1. Dependent juveniles suffered from social, economic, and familial problems, while juveniles who violated state and local criminal laws were designated as delinquents. !d. The juvenile court judge had the discretion to transfer the case of a juvenile delinquent to the ordinary criminal court. Id. § 12. So long as the juvenile court retained the case, however, [a]n order of court adjudging a child dependent or delinquent under the provisions of this act shall in no case be deemed 7 State v. S..!C., No. 90355-7 a conviction of crime. !d. § 10. This court observed that the juvenile court is not intended to restrain criminals to the end that society may be protected and the criminal perchance reformed; it is to prevent the making of criminals. In re Delinquency of Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 151, 143 P. 885 (1914), disagreed with on other grounds by In re Carson, 84 Wn.2d 969, 971-72, 530 P.2d 331 (1975). After these early legislative efforts, there were few significant changes to the juvenile justice system until the mid-1970s. In 1977, the legislature undertook a major overhaul of the juvenile justice statutes, providing much more specific and delineated substantive and procedural guidelines for juvenile courts. LAws OF 1977, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 291. The law was divided into four sections, two of which are relevant here: provisions relating to juvenile courts and records generally, id. §§ 1-15, and provisions specific to juveniles who had violated criminal laws, id. §§ 5 5-81. The latter set of provisions constitutes the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 (JJA), id. § 55(1), and the juveniles adjudicated under its authority were termed juvenile offenders, id. § 56(11 ). The legislature described its intent in enacting the JJA as twofold: to establish a system capable of having primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the needs of youthful offenders while ensuring that juveniles will be held accountable for their offenses. !d. § 55(2). With the JJA, the legislature has changed the philosophy and methodology of addressing the 8 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 personal and societal problems of juvenile offenders, but it has not converted the procedure into a criminal offense atmosphere totally comparable to an adult criminal offense scenario. State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 659, 591 P.2d 772 (1979). That remains true following further legislative refinements since the JJA was first enacted. State v. Chavez, 163 Wn.2d 262, 267-68, 180 P.3d 1250 (2008). The history of juvenile justice is a history of bringing together long-standing tenets of common law with continuously evolving notions of criminology and the nature of juvenile development. While further developments will undoubtedly occur, the current contours of Washington's juvenile justice system today reflect over a century of our lawmakers' best efforts to carefully balance the interests at stake in the context of juvenile justice. These efforts have built a constitutional wall around juvenile justice; and while the dimensions of this wall have changed, its structural integrity has not. B. Juvenile court records that meet statutory sealing requirements have not historically been open to the press and the general public To determine whether experience supports the application of article I, section 10 (and thus the Ishikawa factors) to statutory motions to seal juvenile records, we must determine 'whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and general public.' Morgan, 180 Wn.2d at 325 (quoting Sublett, 176 Wn.2d at 73 (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986))). As in the case of juvenile justice 9 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 generally, the openness of juvenile court records has evolved over time, but there are certain consistent themes showing that article I, section 10 and Ishikawa do not apply. The legislature has always treated juvenile court records as distinctive and as deserving of more confidentiality than other types of records. This court has always given effect to the legislature's judgment in the unique setting of juvenile court records. Our approach has been consistent with the approaches of other states and Supreme Court jurisprudence historically, and remains so today. Washington's approach to juvenile court records is further supported by the views of professional organizations and a variety of commentators. 1. The focus of our historical analysis is on the juvenile courts A threshold question in any historical analysis is at what point in history the analysis should begin. The State urges us to begin [our] historical analysis in a time when juveniles were prosecuted in the same courts as adults. Br. of Appellant at 11. It is certainly true that there were no standards or procedures particular to juvenile courts before juvenile courts existed. From the colonial period through the 19th century, [j]uveniles are tried in adult courts as adults. There is little recordkeeping, but to the extent that court records exist, they are open to the public. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS: A MID-DECADE STATUS REPORT app. at 10 State v. S.JC., No. 90355-7 33 (1997), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/PJJR.PDF (Juvenile