Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Testimony of Arvie Carroll

Text: Defendant contends Arvie Carroll's testimony recounting defendant's jailhouse admission that he murdered Detective Williams was admitted in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (See Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246.) In addition, defendant contends the testimony was too unreliable to satisfy minimum demands of due process of law, that it was more prejudicial than probative and thereby properly subject to exclusion under Evidence Code section 352, and that it was the product of a state-orchestrated informant scheme which, prosecutors knew, was likely to generate perjury and violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to exclude the testimony of this witness. Contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court did not deny defendant an evidentiary hearing on his motion to exclude the testimony of Arvie Carroll. The record establishes that defendant filed a motion to exclude the testimony of all jailhouse informants and for an evidentiary hearing, but that when the court called the motion for hearing, counsel submitted the matter on the pleadings. There is no suggestion that counsel still desired an evidentiary hearing or that the court rejected a demand for such a hearing. In addition, the motion did not contend primarily that the testimony of the informants should be excluded because of any violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Indeed, the motion referred to such a claim only in a footnote that states: There is some indication that certain informers may have acted as an agent of the police at the time of the defendant's alleged statements. If at the evidentiary hearing it is determined that this is the case, defendant will move to dismiss for violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Rather, the motion contended that testimony of jailhouse informants should be excluded on the ground that such informant testimony is so inherently unreliable that it cannot constitutionally support a capital murder verdict or death sentence; and that such informer testimony is so prejudicial that under Evidence Code [section] 352 any probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. In addition to referring to the asserted inherent unreliability of informant testimony, the motion stated, without reference to testimonial or documentary evidence, that the facts contained in the informants' statements were public knowledge, and these informers have a history of selling testimony to the police in order to evade prosecution on their own criminal charges or to obtain a better deal. Some of the informers have a reputation for untruthfulness. Some of the informers' information has been refuted by other jailhouse inmates. In conclusion, the motion stated that at the evidentiary hearing, particular circumstances showing the unreliability of the informers in the present case would be shown. At the hearing, however, defendant presented no evidence and did not contend that any Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. Assuming, without deciding, that this Sixth Amendment issue may nonetheless be raised on appeal, we find it obvious that defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating such a violation at the hearing on the motion. In order to make out the Sixth Amendment claim, defendant had the burden of demonstrat[ing] that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. ( Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364.) Defendant made no attempt to meet this burden in the trial court. Defendant's references on appeal to the transcript of the grand jury report regarding the use of inmates to secure incriminating statements from persons represented by counsel are unavailing. This record was not before the trial court, and we have declined defendant's request that we take judicial notice of it. The record before the trial court did not support defendant's contention that his statement to Arvie Carroll was taken in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and we reject his contention that the trial court erred in denying the motion on that ground. [23] Defendant's contention that Arvie Carroll's testimony was so unreliable that the trial court should have determined that its admission would constitute a violation of due process of law also is rejected. Defendant's contention that Carroll's testimony was unreliable and subject to exclusion on due process grounds for the same reason that courts exclude evidence produced by tainted identification procedures (see, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 113-114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140) is unpersuasive, because it depends upon an unsubstantiated factual assertion that Carroll's testimony was tainted by improper procedures for securing jailhouse informant testimony. Claims that the testimony must have been unreliable or perjurious because of the informant system in the Los Angeles County jail are speculative on this record. The record before the trial court did not demonstrate that Carroll's testimony was, in fact, unreliable. In addition, we consistently have rejected the contention, made in connection with capital appeals, that informant testimony is inherently unreliable. (See People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 201-202, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Defendant had ample opportunity to cross-examine Carroll to expose to the jury any unreliability in his testimony, an opportunity he exploited fully. Finally, with respect to the contention that the evidence should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, [w]hen an objection to evidence is raised under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court is required to weigh the evidence's probative value against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time consumption. Unless these dangers `substantially outweigh' probative value, the objection must be overruled. [Citation.] On appeal, the ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) The probative force of the evidence relating defendant's admission that he killed Detective Williams is obvious. There was no danger of undue consumption of time or of confusion of the issues. The evidence was not of a sort likely to provoke emotional bias against a party or to cause the jury to prejudge the issues upon the basis of extraneous factors. (See People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070-1071, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337 [in the context of Evidence Code section 352, unduly prejudicial evidence is evidence that would evoke an emotional bias against one party]; People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 958, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704 [prejudice as used in Evidence Code section 352 refers to the harm of prejudging on the basis of extraneous factors].) Defendant's claim that the evidence was unduly prejudicial or lacking in probative value was based upon his assumption that it was unreliable; that assumption was speculative, and the trial court was entitled to reject it. (See People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 610, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 [doubts regarding the credibility of a witness do not amount to prejudice under Evidence Code section 352; credibility of witnesses is the province of the jury]; see also People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1165, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950 [informant testimony is not inherently unreliable].) The court was well within its discretion in-denying the motion to exclude this evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, considering the facts before it at the time of the motion.