Opinion ID: 45358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hartzog’s Brady Claim

Text: Hartzog also claims that the district court’s failure to disclose the unredacted DEA-6 reports violated his due process rights established by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The Brady rule, which requires the government to disclose evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or to punishment, also “encompasses evidence concerning the reliability of a witness that may be determinative of guilt or innocence.” United States v. Garcia, 917 F.2d 1370, 1375 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154). Hartzog now claims that the government’s failure to disclose the unredacted DEA-6 reports deprived him of potentially exculpatory impeachment evidence. In response, the government argues that Hartzog failed to establish a sufficient record for our review of this Brady claim because he did not ask the district court to include the unredacted DEA-6 reports in the record. In addition, the 10 government argues that Hartzog has failed to demonstrate that any of the withheld information would have made a material difference to his defense. See, e.g., United States v. Lowder, 148 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting Brady claims because, even assuming that the government withheld potential impeachment evidence, the evidence was immaterial as the government’s case “consisted of testimony from numerous witnesses”). We review “allegations of Brady violations de novo.” United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 386 (5th Cir. 2005). To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant such as Hartzog must satisfy a three-part test: “(1) the prosecution did not disclose evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence was material--i.e., there is a reasonable probability that if the government had disclosed the evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Infante, 404 F.3d at 386. This reasonable probability has been defined as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Holley, 23 F.3d 902, 914 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). We have reviewed the redacted reports, and we conclude that the withheld information is non-material. Virtually all of the redacted information relates to witness identity: for the most part, only the names of certain informants have been redacted; in a few instances, additional identifying information such as 11 addresses or phone numbers have also been redacted. “We fail to see how access” to these minor omissions “could have been of any real value” to Hartzog’s defense, “even for impeachment purposes.” United States v. Sink, 586 F.2d 1041, 1051 (5th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we hold that Hartzog’s Brady claim is without merit.