Opinion ID: 2008604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: commonwealth party status

Text: Because authority discussing nullum tempus is scarce, both the College and Dow address whether the College may assert nullum tempus by analogizing to cases that address sovereign immunity. The College emphasizes the differences between the doctrines, while Dow emphasizes the doctrines' common roots. Both are correct to suggest a functional relationship, but both fail to recognize the dispositive factor, what the doctrines have in common: the same class of parties may invoke each. The legislature has clearly set forth the entities that comprise this class. Therefore, when the question is whether an entity is a Commonwealth party, a determination should and can be made solely with reference to the legislative intent as expressed in the statutes; no judicial test is required. That the rationales supporting the two doctrines differ has no bearing on the legislature's ultimate and exclusive power to grant or to waive each privilege. We conclude that to adopt the position that one doctrine may apply to a party while the other may not contravenes the plain intent of the legislature. Generally, the issue of whether a statute of limitations will preclude a claim is properly addressed by a motion for summary judgment, and specifically, whether the doctrine of nullum tempus applies to negate a statute of limitations defense is a question of law that is properly decided on a motion for summary judgment. See General State Authority v. Lawrie and Green and John McShain, Inc., 64 Pa.Commw. 102, 439 A.2d 228 (1982). The trial court found that the College and Authority were not Commonwealth parties and thus could not invoke nullum tempus. We agree, but we reach this conclusion by a different route. The trial court applied a traditional test for whether a governmental entity can claim governmental immunity, whether the controversy arose by virtue of a governmental or by virtue of a proprietary action by the entity. The court concluded that contracting for the college building was a proprietary and not a governmental function and therefore the College was not a Commonwealth party. The trial court then reached the underlying issues, found that the applicable statutes of limitation had expired for all the claims and granted Dow's motion for summary judgment. We agree with the trial court that all the applicable statutes of limitation had run. However, we conclude that statute and caselaw in this Commonwealth have rejected a governmental vs. proprietary function test [1] and, most significantly, such tests have been rendered obsolete by the recent legislative definitions and classifications of Commonwealth parties. The legislature's classification of Commonwealth parties is unambiguous. We must construe the statute according to its plain meaning and interpret it to give effect to legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 384 Pa. Super. 454, 559 A.2d 63 (1989). Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(a), the legislature waived sovereign immunity for Commonwealth parties with respect to certain enumerated actions. The legislature defines a Commonwealth party as: [A] Commonwealth agency and any employee thereof, but only with respect to an act within the scope of his office or employment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. [2] Under 42 Pa.C.S. § 102, the definition section of the Judicial Code, a Commonwealth agency is any executive or independent agency. An executive agency is [t]he Governor and the departments, boards, commissions, authorities and other officers and agencies of the Commonwealth government. An independent agency is defined as boards, commissions, authorities and other agencies and officers of the Commonwealth government which are not subject to the policy supervision and control of the Governor . . . 42 Pa.C.S. § 102; see Hall v. Acme Markets, Inc., 110 Pa.Commw. 199, 532 A.2d 894 (1987). All authorities and agencies coming under one of these categories are now amenable to suit in a tort action enumerated in § 8522. See Gallagher v. Bureau of Correction, 118 Pa.Commw. 516, 545 A.2d 981 (1988); alloc. denied 520 Pa. 620, 554 A.2d 511. Therefore, we conclude that the Community Colleges cannot be construed as being Commonwealth parties under any of these definitions because the legislature did not create them but merely authorized their creation by means of an enabling statute, 24 P.S. §§ 19-1901 et seq. An examination of the enabling act further demonstrates the accuracy of this interpretation of legislative intent. Under the act, Community College: . . . [S]hall mean a public college or technical institute which is established and operated in accordance with the provisions of this act by a local sponsor which provides [a post-secondary program]. 24 P.S. § 19-1901-A (emphasis added). A local sponsor is a: [s]chool district or a municipality or a county board of school directors or any combination of school districts, municipalities or county boards of school directors which participate in the establishment and operation of a community college. 24 P.S. § 19-1901-A (2). The local sponsor must submit a plan to the Board of Education, which must then approve or disapprove of the plan. The plan must outline the need for the proposed college, must outline the proposed financial backing and must propose the contemplated educational programs. In addition, the sponsor must set forth a detailed financial program for the college's operation, which shall provide: [T]hat at least two-thirds of the annual operating costs and up to one-half of the annual capital expenses shall be appropriated or provided by the local sponsor . . . The plan shall indicate whether the appropriation shall come from general revenues, loan funds, special tax levies or from other sources, including student tuitions. 24 P.S. § 19-1913-A(a). The college is administered by a Board of Trustees, which may enter into contracts in the name of the college. All property purchased by the board of trustees shall be held in the name of a community college on behalf of the local sponsor of the college. 24 P.S. 19-1905-A. Thus, the Commonwealth does not control the Colleges' creation and operation. Local establishment of Community Colleges implements the legislative purpose of creating community colleges in response to local needs, providing that local financial support could be developed. In contrast, the legislature expressly created the State Colleges as part of its State System of Higher Education, a public corporation and government instrumentality . . . which shall consist of . . . [the fourteen enumerated State Colleges]. 24 P.S. § 20-2002-A. Hence, as did the Commonwealth court, we reject the College's claim to Commonwealth party status. In relying upon the above-cited statutes to ascertain the status of an entity, we adopt an approach taken by other courts of this Commonwealth. For instance, in Bradley v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 121 Pa.Commw. 51, 550 A.2d 261 (1988), the court relied on the fact that the Turnpike Commission was included in the complete list of independent agencies in 71 P.S. § 732-102 and on that basis held that the Commission was therefore a Commonwealth agency entitled to sovereign immunity. Further, we recognize that the privilege of nullum tempus does not, in the absence of express provision, usually extend to municipalities, counties, or other political subdivisions, Pocono Township v. Hall, ___ Pa.Commw. ___, 561 A.2d 53 (1989); City of Philadelphia v. Litvin, 211 Pa.Super. 204, 235 A.2d 157 (1967), unless these entities seek to enforce strictly public rights and obligations imposed by law. See Pocono Township, supra ; City of Philadelphia v. Holmes Electric Protective Co., 335 Pa. 273, 6 A.2d 884 (1939). While we agree with the College that public education is a public right, the College does not argue that it is an integral part of any political subdivision. We conclude that it is as independent of municipalities and political subdivisions as it is independent of the Commonwealth. For the same reason we reject the College's argument in the alternative that, regardless of its status as a Commonwealth party, application of the proprietary versus governmental functions test yields the result that any function having to do with education is a core governmental function. We have concluded that any functions test is obsolete when the legislature has, by defining Commonwealth parties, eliminated the need for it. Bishop, discussed supra, upon which the College heavily and erroneously relies, decided only that elimination of sovereign immunity as a general principle did not mean elimination of nullum tempus as a general principle. It did not hold that a party that may not assert one privilege may nevertheless assert the other. The college cites no authority, nor do we find any, for this proposition. In fact, in making this argument and suggesting that it may not be entitled to sovereign immunity, the College inadvertently pinpoints the critical weakness in its position. The legislature has now designated which entities are Commonwealth parties, and, as we held above, this is dispositive of whether an entity may assert any governmental privileges.