Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Taking Evidence in Defendant's Absence

Text: Defendant next contends his sanity and penalty phase verdicts must be reversed because he was absent from court during the sanity phase when the two videotapes of defendant answering the VESI were played for the jury. He claims his absence violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, an impartial jury, and a reliable determination of his guilt and penalty. In addition, he contends his personal waiver of his presence was invalid for a variety of reasons, discussed below. He also claims his absence violated sections 977 and 1043. Finally, he argues these errors deprived the jury of meaningful evidence that it could have considered in his favor at the penalty phase, requiring we reverse the penalty judgment as well as the sanity judgment. As we explain, we reject all of these claims.
Two videotapes showing defendant's responses to the VESI were played for the jury at the sanity phase. After the first tape was played and the jury left the courtroom for a scheduled recess, the following occurred: THE COURT: The record should note that approximately five minutes prior to the recess just taken and during the playing of a portion of the video tape the defendant requested that the guards accompany him out of the courtroom; the defendant appear[ed] to become emotionally] disturbed or distraught in someway [sic ] and soI understand at this time he wants to waive his appearance during that approximately] five minute time and also waive his presence for the balance of the playing of the tape[s]. MRS. HUFFMAN: That's correct, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. That includes this afternoon and also tomorrow morning, if necessary. MRS. HUFFMAN: Until the tapes are finished Mr. Weaver wishes to have his presencewants to waive his presence. THE COURT: Okay. MRS. HUFFMAN: He didn't want to lose control and he wants to apologize to the court for that, but he can't handle it. THE COURT: All right. First of all, do you join in that request, Mrs. Huffman? MRS. HUFFMAN: Yes, I do, your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Weaver, I discussed this with you last week when I was starting to view the films preliminarily, so I have explained to you your right to be present at all phases of the case; okay? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. You understand that by law or by Constitution you have the right to be present during all proceedings in this case. Nevertheless, you may waive that right and consent that we proceed in your absence, which is, as I understand, what you wish to do and you wish to have us complete the showing of these tapes without your presence, after which time you will be brought back in and be here for the balance of the trial. [¶] Is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. I am sorry about what happened. THE COURT: You need not apologize and I will then take that as a waiver of your personal presence for the balance of the time it takes us to play the tapes. THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.
A defendant has the right, under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution, to be present at trial during the taking of evidence. [Citations.] Nonetheless, . . . `as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law, . . . a capital defendant may validly waive presence at critical stages of the trial.' [Citation.] ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1209-1210, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Because the record demonstrates defendant waived his constitutional right to be present, we reject his claim to the contrary under both the state and federal Constitutions. Defendant contends his waiver was invalid because it was neither knowingly nor intelligently given, in that he was not advised of the importance of his personal presence before he waived it. He argues he was not admonished by the court or counsel as to the significant impact his presence and demeanor would have on the jury which was looking for signs of humanity and remorse in [defendant]. Moreover, given his history of mental problems, defendant contends the court was obligated to conduct an extensive inquiry to determine whether [defendant] actually understood the significance and consequences of his decision. Defendant cites no authority for his argument that we must apply a heightened waiver standard under the circumstances, or that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to admonish him of the importance of his decision to absent himself from the courtroom. Defendant was represented by counsel, and he himself chose, for his own reasons, to leave the courtroom. We find nothing improper about the procedure used, and we conclude defendant's waiver of his state and federal constitutional right to be present at this phase of his capital trial was both voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Defendant is on firmer ground in arguing his absence violated sections 977 and 1043. Section 977, subdivision (b)(1) states: In all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be present . . . during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his or her right to be personally present. (Italics added.) Section 1043, subdivision (b) states: The absence of the defendant in a felony case after the trial has commenced in his presence shall not prevent continuing the trial to, and including, the return of the verdict in any of the following cases: [¶] (1) Any case in which the defendant, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that the trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. [¶] (2) Any prosecution for an offense which is not punishable by death in which the defendant is voluntarily absent. (Italics added.) We have explained that when read together, sections 977 and 1043 permit a capital defendant to be absent from the courtroom only on two occasions: (1) when he has been removed by the court for disruptive behavior under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), and (2) when he voluntarily waives his rights pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b)(1). However, section 977, subdivision (b)(1), the subdivision that authorizes waiver for felony defendants, expressly provides for situations in which the defendant cannot waive his right to be present, including during the taking of evidence before the trier of fact. Section 1043, subdivision (b)(2), further makes clear that its broad `voluntary' exception to the requirement that felony defendants be present at trial does not apply to capital defendants. Thus the trial court, by permitting a nondisruptive capital defendant to be absent during the taking of evidence, committed error under sections 977 and 1043. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1210, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) The Legislature evidently intended that a capital defendant's right to voluntarily waive his right to be present be severely restricted. ( Id. at p. 1211, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) The error being merely statutory, however, we will reverse the judgment only if `it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.' ( People v. Watson [, supra, ] 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]) ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) In this case, no live witnesses testified in defendant's absence, reducing the potential value of any assistance defendant could have given to defense counsel. Although the jury was deprived of its ability to observe defendant's demeanor during the playing of the videotapes, it is unclear which way this factor cuts, as defendant apparently was afraid he would become overly emotional before the jury, harming his case. His absence, and the concomitant inability of the jury to observe him, may actually have helped him. In any event, such speculation does not support a finding that it was reasonably probable defendant would have achieved a more favorable sanity or penalty phase verdict had he been forced to appear before the jury against his will. Any state law error was thus harmless under People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 836, 299 P.2d 243. The speculative nature of any possible harm defendant suffered by his absence also precludes a finding the error affected the penalty phase verdict in any way.