Opinion ID: 6778
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Case's Allegations

Text: 21 Of course, the eight corners rule and the Work You Performed exclusion operate in conjunction, as there is no duty to defend if the petition only alleges facts that exclude the insured from coverage, such as facts that invoke the Work You Performed exclusion. Thus, an examination of the allegations in Case's complaint is necessary for a proper resolution of this appeal. The following allegations are relevant to our determination: 22 9. In April of 1989, ... Case entered into a contract with Taylor to remove the ferrous oxide deposited on the automobile body surfaces by a chemical process involving friction, which would not require repainting the vehicles. Taylor guaranteed that the process would remove the ferrous oxide from the vehicles and, at a minimum, not harm the car finish, including the chrome on the vehicle. 23 11. All of the work on the four hundred and forty (440) damaged vehicles was performed by Taylor/Houston, by the employees/owners, in Racine, Wisconsin ... As a result of faulty workmanship by the employees/owners of Taylor/Houston, Taylor/Houston employees/owners returned in July and August of 1989 for remedial work on damaged vehicles. 24 12. Not only did the Taylor process not remove the ferrous oxide deposited as represented by Mr. Brad Taylor but ... a chemical reaction occurred with the materials used, under Wisconsin atmospheric conditions prevailing at the time the work was performed, and, based on information and belief, the skill of the applicators of the chemical substances, [sic] serious damage was caused to vehicle finishes, including the chrome of vehicles ... 25 14. In addition, Case has paid for the refinishing of damaged surfaces of many of the vehicles or the replacement of damaged parts incapable of being repaired, such damage caused by Taylor's/Houston's breach of contract and its technical, professional negligence or malpractice. 26 Because of Taylor's alleged breach of contract and negligent performance, Case requested the following: 1) a declaratory judgment that Case does not owe Taylor on the contract; 2) the repayment of funds already advanced to Taylor; and 3) the reimbursement of funds expended by Case to refinish or replace the damaged surfaces. 27 The determinative inquiry in a Work You Performed exclusion analysis involves a definition of Taylor's work product. See, e.g., Cruse, 938 F.2d at 603 (5th Cir.1991) (The decisive issue here is definition of [the] work product.); Volentine, 578 S.W.2d at 504 (The decisive question then becomes: What was [the] work product?). In other words, the operative question is what was Taylor hired to do? 28 Simply put, Taylor was hired to repair the exterior finishes of the vehicles; hence, Taylor's work product was intended to be restored exterior finishes. As mentioned, the petition alleges that Case entered into a contract with Taylor to remove the ferrous oxide deposited on the automobile body surfaces by a chemical process involving friction. Despite Taylor's contentions and creative semantic arguments, the chemical process is not the crucial element here; rather, the essence of Taylor's work was the removal of the ferrous oxide deposits, or, stated differently, the restoration of the finishes. 29 Moreover, the petition seeks only monetary damages related to the repair or replacement of Taylor's defective work on the vehicle finishes. As mentioned, the petition requests reimbursement for the expenses of refinishing the surfaces damaged by Taylor, and for the costs of replacing the damaged parts that could not be repaired. Such requests for monetary relief all stem from Taylor's defective work product--the vehicle finishes. In short, Taylor was hired to work on vehicle finishes, and damages were requested only for the repair or replacement of the vehicle finishes. As such, these claims fall directly into the Work You Performed exclusion. See, e.g., Bateson, 784 S.W.2d at 694-95; Volentine, 578 S.W.2d at 503-04. Similarly, the petition also requests repayment of the funds previously advanced to Case under the contract. This relief also falls directly into the Work You Performed exclusion from coverage, as an insured cannot recover from the insurer for his own failure to perform his contract. Cruse, 938 F.2d at 603. Thus, analyzing the eight corners rule and the Work You Performed exclusion in conjunction, we conclude that the allegations in Case's petition are directly within the scope of the coverage exclusion. As such, Travelers had no duty to defend. 4 30 Taylor also asserts that he should be given the benefit of the doubt in this case because insurance policies are to be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured. While Taylor correctly states the general rule, this benefit of the doubt is only invoked when the policy provisions are ambiguous. See, e.g., Gulf Chemical & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir.1993) ([W]hen the language of a policy is susceptible to more than one construction, the 'polic[y] should be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.' ) (quoting Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex.1987)). In this case, however, the policy provisions, including the exclusions, are not ambiguous. More importantly, the policy provisions themselves are not challenged by Taylor; rather, Taylor seems to assert that the allegations in Case's petition are ambiguous. Aside from the fact that we find no ambiguity in the pleadings, some courts have not afforded a benefit of the doubt in construing pleadings. As the Feed Store court explained: 31 [A]ppellant seeks to transform the rule of contra proferentum out of the realm of contract interpretation and into the area of construing pleadings.... Yet the law is, and always has been, otherwise. There is good reason to construe a printed form against its author, and the law encourages an insurance company to think carefully about its draftsmanship. But it takes a great leap to transform this rule into one which construes a third party's pleadings strictly against the insurance company, a leap we simply cannot make. 32 774 S.W.2d at 75.