Opinion ID: 2581763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requests for Second Counsel and Funds

Text: In April 1991, defendant filed a confidential application for appointment of second counsel. It was supported by a declaration by appointed counsel John D. Tyre, stating that there are both serious issues for the guilt and penalty phases of this trial and it is therefore necessary for the court to allot funds to cover the cost of a second attorney to handle different parts of both phases of this trial. In June 1991, defendant filed a second confidential application for appointment of second counsel, supported by an identical declaration. At the hearing on the application, counsel argued that the case involved strictly circumstantial evidence and that the burden of going through a guilt phase, the circumstantial evidence, the possible inferences, the possible investigation, the numerous people that were used at the preliminary hearing and all the investigation that would be necessary in a guilt phase supported appointment of second counsel to help him prepare in case a penalty phase is necessary. The superior court denied the application without prejudice, stating that it's not a clear-cut guilt case from the standpoint of the fact that it's a circumstantial evidence case, but it's a fairly straightforward case with not tremendous legal issues, complex issues involved. Trial counsel did not renew the motion, although at one point during the trial, he was hospitalized for illness and the trial was continued for six days. Defendant argues that the superior court erred in denying the application for second counsel. He contends that with the aid of a second attorney, he would have been able to present more effective guilt and penalty phase presentations. The claim is without merit. In Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 430, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108, we held that a trial court may appoint a second attorney in a capital case. If it appears that a second attorney may lend important assistance in preparing for trial or presenting the case, the court should rule favorably on [a] request. Indeed, in general, under a showing of genuine need ... a presumption arises that a second attorney is required. ( Id at p. 434, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108.) The initial burden, however, is on the defendant to present a specific factual showing as to why the appointment of a second attorney is necessary to his defense against the capital charges. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 279, 247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052.) An abstract assertion regarding the burden on defense counsel cannot be used as a substitute for a showing of genuine need. ( Id. at p. 280, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052; People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149 [no abuse of discretion in denying application for second counsel when counsel merely relied on the circumstances surrounding the case].) No abuse of discretion appears. Defendant's application, consisting of little more than a bare assertion that second counsel was necessary, did not give rise to a presumption that a second attorney was required; he presented no specific, compelling reasons for such appointment. Nor does the fact that counsel became ill during the guilt phase of trial demonstrate error in denying the requests months earlier; the illness was not anticipated. Indeed, counsel, whose earlier application was denied without prejudice, did not renew the request for second counsel; his illness was accommodated by a brief continuance of the trial. Defendant also submitted numerous requests for funds for investigation, forensic experts, law clerks, and travel and witness expenses pursuant to Penal Code section 987.9. He contends that if the requests had been granted, he would have been able to present a more effective case at the guilt and penalty phases. This claim, too, is without merit. The record indicates that some requests for funds for travel expenses, investigators, experts, and other assistance were denied for lack of a showing of necessity, untimeliness, or other defects; other requests, including requests for funds for travel expenses, investigators, experts, and other assistance, were granted in full or in part. Defendant fails to show that any of the denials or reductions was unreasonable under the circumstances. It is sheer speculation that greater funding would have resulted in a different outcome. [1]