Opinion ID: 3014453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Proceedings in the

Text: We have recently described the Territorial Court and Before structure of the court system in the Virgin the Appellate Division Islands in some detail, see Gov’t of V.I. v. Rivera, 333 F.3d 143, 145-46 (3d Cir. In November 1999, Duvalier 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3373 Basquin was lured to a lonely road in the (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004) (No. 03-736), and Bolongo Bay area of St. Thomas. There, need not recount it here, though some he was robbed and murdered. Following details bear repeating. There are two trial courts: The Territorial Court is comparable 1 to a state court of general jurisdiction, see The three-judge panel is composed of 4 V.I. Code § 76, while the District Court the two Judges of the District Court of of the Virgin Islands has “the jurisdiction the Virgin Islands, and a judge of the of a District Court of the United States,” Territorial Court designated by the Chief 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a). Appeals from the Judge of the District Court. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(b). 3 an investigation by the Virgin Islands the Territorial Court, the Government Police, the Government of the Virgin offered proposed redactions of the Islands (the “Government”) charged statements, but after lengthy argument, Selvin Hodge, Ottice Bryan, Kirsten the Territorial Court concluded that the Greenaway, and Eladio Camacho Government’s proposal did not satisfy (collectively, the “defendants”) with Bruton and its progeny. Ruling from the robbery, felony murder, and conspiracy bench, the Territorial Court described the to commit murder. During the further redactions that would be required investigation, Hodge and Camacho gave to admit the confessions.3 statements inculpating themselves and Title 4, section 39(a)(1) of the the other defendants in Basquin’s Virgin Islands Code provides: murder. Greenaway gave a statement exculpating herself, but potentially The United States or the inculpating the other defendants. Bryan Government of the Virgin gave no statement. Islands may appeal an order, entered before the The Government sought to use trial of a person charged these statements at trial. However, since with a criminal offense the Government proposed to try the under the laws of the defendants jointly, and none of the Virgin Islands, which defendants who offered statements would directs the return of seized testify, the statements would have to be property, suppresses redacted—or even rewritten—to preserve evidence, or otherwise the defendants’ Sixth Amendment denies the prosecutor the Confrontation Clause rights. See Bruton use of evidence at trial, if v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the United States Attorney Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 or the Attorney General (1987), and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. conducting the prosecution 185 (1998). 2 At a pretrial hearing before for such violation certifies to the Judge who granted 2 The issue in cases raising a Bruton issue is that the prosecution would like to them—in this situation, the nontestifying introduce confessions by nontestifying defendant who made the confession. defendants in joint trials. While such 3 statements may of course be admitted In its opinion, the Appellate Division against the defendants who made them, summarized the Territorial Court’s order admitting such statements in a joint trial from the bench as requiring “that any would deprive any codefendants sentences [in the confessions] containing implicated in those statements of their direct references to the defendants, right under the Confrontation Clause to nicknames, physical descriptions, and . . . cross-examine witnesses against substituted pronouns be omitted.” 4 such motion that the appeal Court, arguing that either the Appellate is not taken for purpose of Division did not have jurisdiction under delay and the evidence is a 4 V.I. Code § 39(a)(1) to review the substantial proof of the Territorial Court’s order, or else that the charge pending against the Appellate Division erred on the merits in defendant. holding that the Territorial Court went further than required by Bruton and its The Government, relying on 4 progeny. Under the former disposition, V.I. Code § 39(a)(1), noticed its appeal we would simply reinstate the Territorial to the Appellate Division and on the Court’s order. Under the latter same day provided the certification that disposition, we would confront the merits the statute requires. On appeal, the of the defendants’ Bruton argument. Appellate Division opined that the Government’s proposed redaction was insufficient to protect the defendants’ II. This Court’s Appellate Jurisdiction Confrontation Clause rights, but concluded that the Territorial Court had At the threshold, we must directed more redaction than necessary. examine whether we have appellate It offered some illustrations of how, on jurisdiction over one, both, or neither of remand, the Territorial Court could solve the questions that the defendants present. the “Goldilocks problem” of crafting See Gov’t of V.I. v. Marsham, 293 F.3d altered confessions that were not too 114, 116 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting lightly redacted, not too heavily redacted, Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 but just right. F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 1998) (“we have an independent obligation to examine our The defendants were disappointed jurisdiction to hear this appeal.”)). Three in the outcome before the Appellate of the four defendants invoke this Division; they would have much Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § preferred the redactions ordered by the 1291. Although some of our cases are Territorial Court. 4 They appealed to this imprecise about the statutory source of our jurisdiction over the Appellate 4 It appears that the Territorial Court’s Division, we take this opportunity to order would have eviscerated the clarify that, as a technical matter, it is 48 confessions to the point that they might U.S.C. § 1613a(c), and not 28 U.S.C. § have lost all value to the prosecution. 1291, that confers jurisdiction on this We observe this only to emphasize the Court over appeals from the Appellate high stakes of this litigation; because of Division. However, the distinction is our holding regarding our own appellate only technical—our cases have jurisdiction, we of course express no uniformly held that 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) view as to the correctness of the has the same requirements for Territorial Court’s or Appellate appealability as 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See, Division’s Bruton rulings. e.g., Rivera, 333 F.3d at 147; Ortiz v. 5 Dodge, 126 F.3d 545, 547 (3d Cir. 1997). 1613a(c). In re Alison, 837 F.2d 619 (3d Cir. 1988), considered our appellate Turning to the substance of our jurisdiction over an order of the appellate jurisdiction, we consider Appellate Division reversing the whether we have jurisdiction over some Territorial Court’s grant of a Fed. R. Civ. or all of this case as a “final decision” of P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Since the the Appellate Division within the Appellate Division had reversed, it meaning of 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). W e remanded the case to the Territorial conclude that we do not in the usual Court for further proceedings. W e sense. We then consider whether we concluded that such a remand was not a have appellate jurisdiction over some or final decision under § 1613a(c). Remand all of this case under the collateral order orders are not generally appealable doctrine. We conclude that we do have because they are not final decisions jurisdiction under the collateral order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 doctrine to review the Appellate and 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). W e recently Division’s determination of its own reiterated that “[a] final decision ‘ends jurisdiction. the litigation on the merits and leaves A. Not a Final Decision nothing . . . to do but execute the judgment.’” Rivera, 333 F.3d at 150 We are the second appellate court (alteration in original) (quoting Catlin v. to address this case. Nonetheless— to United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). reiterate the point made above about the The remand in Alison left more to do parallel construction of 48 U.S.C. § than mere execution of the judgment, and 1613a(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291—“with thus the remand order was not regard to the question of finality, we appealable. have treated appeals from the Appellate Division . . . no differently than appeals A second, independent reason taken from any other federal district leads us to conclude that the Appellate court.” Ortiz, 126 F.3d at 548 (citing as Division’s order was not a final decision: examples Gov’t of V.I. v. Blake, 118 F.3d The first appeal (i.e., the appeal to the 972 (3d Cir. 1997); In re A.M., 34 F.3d Appellate Division) was interlocutory, 153 (3d Cir. 1994)). but, as we explain in Part III below, was nonetheless proper. The subsequent The key question is whether the appeal to this Court asks us, in effect, to vacate-and-remand order of the (re)consider an interlocutory order of a Appellate Division was a final decision trial court. But, in view of the finality under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c). It was not a policy of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 48 U.S.C. “final decision” in the most common § 1613a(c), this is something which we sense of the term—for two reasons. do not generally engage in (absent First, it was a remand order, and we have explained in a similar context that remand orders are not final under § 6 specific statutory authorization).5 Such decision” in the most common sense statutory authorization comes from under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c), and Congress. See U.S. Const. Art III. § 1 therefore this Court does not have (“The judicial Power of the United appellate jurisdiction in the normal sense. States, shall be vested in . . . such inferior We next consider whether this Court has Courts as the Congress may from time to jurisdiction under the collateral order time ordain and establish.”). If we were doctrine. to blithely take jurisdiction over appeals B. Collateral Order Doctrine of decisions that the Appellate Division rendered on interlocutory appeal, we This Court’s recent definitive would in practice be allowing our treatment of the collateral order doctrine jurisdiction to expand based on the is In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954 Virgin Islands Legislature’s exercise of (3d Cir. 1997). There we explained: its authority, under 48 U.S.C. §1613a(a), [T]he collateral order to determine the appellate jurisdiction of doctrine, first enunciated the Appellate Division. Of course, the by the Supreme Court in scheme in § 1613a means that, for a Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Territorial Court case to appear on our Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 docket on appeal, it is necessary that the (1949), provides a narrow Virgin Islands Legislature confer exception to the general intermediate appellate jurisdiction on the rule permitting appellate Appellate Division; but it does not follow review only of final orders. that such a jurisdictional statute is An appeal of a nonfinal sufficient to confer jurisdiction, in turn, order will lie if (1) the on this Court. Hence we decline to order from which the conclude that in enacting § 1613a appellant appeals Congress intended to cede to the Virgin conclusively determines Islands Legislature such control over this the disputed question; (2) Court’s jurisdiction. the order resolves an Thus we hold that the Appellate important issue that is Division’s decision is not a “final completely separate from the merits of the dispute; and (3) the order is 5 effectively unreviewable One such statute allowing for interlocutory appeal to this court is 18 on appeal from a final U.S.C. § 3731, which is comparable to judgment. See the interlocutory appeal statute at issue in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. this case, 4 V.I. Code § 39(a)(1). Both v. Home Indem. Co., 32 allow, in a proper case, the prosecution F.3d 851, 860 (3d Cir. to immediately appeal a pretrial order 1994). suppressing evidence. 7 Id. at 958. As the Cohen Court resolve much of anything. To be sure, it explained, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 has been established some guideposts for “too given a “practical rather than a technical much” and “too little” redaction, but at construction.” 337 U.S. at 546. To this bottom, it remanded the issue to the end, as a doctrinal matter, orders that Territorial Court to settle on the exact meet the three prongs described above redaction to use. are deemed to be “final decisions” within On the second prong, the the meaning of the statute. redaction question is clearly separable Ford Motor Co. paid special from the merits, and this favors attention to the question of what makes appealability. The question about the an issue “important” under the second redactions goes to how much identifying prong. We described the task as one of information can be contained in a “compar[ing] the apple of the desire to nontestifying codefendant’s statement avoid piecemeal litigation to the orange and still preserve the other defendants’ of, for example, federalism.” Ford Confrontation Clause rights. This is an Motor Co., 110 F.3d at 960. In cases exercise in applied constitutional law, as where the Supreme Court has blessed it were, and it does not implicate the interlocutory appeals, we observed, it merits of whether some or all of the was because “the imperative of defendants did or did not participate in preventing impairment of some the robbery-murder of the victim. As for institutionally significant status or the importance of the question, there are relationship” made “the danger of mixed signals. On the one hand, the denying justice by reason of delay in Confrontation Clause articulates a appellate adjudication outweigh[] the fundamental constitutional right, and one inefficiencies flowing from interlocutory might assume that such rights cry out appeal.” Id. most strongly for vindication on interlocutory appeal. Cf., e.g., P.R. We will apply the doctrine Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & separately to both of the questions that Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) the defendants urge us to consider: (1) (holding that determination of sovereign the merits of the Appellate Division’s immunity was a proper subject for decision, and (2) the Appellate interlocutory appeal because it “involves Division’s determination of its own a claim to a fundamental constitutional jurisdiction. protection”). On the other hand, 1. Appellate Jurisdiction to Confrontation Clause rights are Review The Merits of the Appellate vindicated through evidentiary rulings, Division’s Decision and a prime target of the policy against interlocutory appeals is the avoidance of As to the first prong of the piecemeal review of the many collateral order doctrine, the Appellate evidentiary rulings in a typical case. Division’s order did not conclusively Thus we find this factor inconclusive. 8 The third prong strongly disfavors this Court does not have appellate appealability. Practice alone—in Bruton jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the and Gray themselves—suggests that merits of the Appellate Division’s order. interlocutory appeal is unwarranted 2. Appellate Jurisdiction to because the constitutional defect in Review the Appellate Division’s Bruton’s and Gray’s trials were, in fact, Determination of Its Own Jurisdiction remedied by vacating their convictions and remanding for a new trial.6 Turning to the question of the reviewability of the Appellate Division’s In sum, the prongs range from determination of its own jurisdiction, it is inconclusive to strongly disfavoring clear that we may at least review this appealability. As the collateral order limited question. This Court’s doctrine is a “narrow” exception and the indistinguishable precedent in Supreme Court has “described the Government of the Virgin Islands v. conditions for collateral order appeal as Blake, 118 F.3d 972 (3d Cir. 1997), stringent,” Digital Equip. Corp. v. compels this conclusion. In that case, the Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 Government had taken an interlocutory (1994), failure to meet one prong makes appeal from the Territorial Court to the the doctrine inapplicable no matter how Appellate Division under 4 V.I. Code § compelling the other prongs may be (and 39(d), a provision which allows an here, not even one prong is in favor of interlocutory appeal during trial under appealability). Thus we conclude that some circumstances. (In Blake, the Territorial Court had suppressed—during 6 motions decided after the jury had been Bruton and his codefendant were tried selected and sworn—a variety of and convicted in federal court, apparently testimony and other evidence the with no interlocutory appeals. Bruton’s Government sought to present.) The conviction was reversed and remanded Appellate Division in Blake decided that for retrial (where he was again it did not have jurisdiction to hear the convicted). United States v. Bruton, 416 Government’s appeal. On appeal we F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1969). Though Gray’s held that although we had no jurisdiction case was in state court in Maryland (and to reach the merits, we did have thus presented no opportunity for jurisdiction under the collateral order interlocutory appeal in the federal doctrine to review the Appellate system), the same remedy was of course Division’s jurisdiction over the appeal. available: The Supreme Court vacated Blake, 118 F.3d at 975-76. We of course his conviction and remanded. In adhere to Blake in this case, see Third Richardson, the Supreme Court did not Circuit IOP 9.1, but we do add a few find in Richardson’s favor, but there was words of analysis since the discussion in no doubt that even in the habeas corpus Blake was quite summary. posture of that case it would have been possible to afford him relief. The first prong of the collateral 9 order doctrine is clearly satisfied here want of subject matter jurisdiction are because the Appellate Division did not ordinarily entitled to interlocutory finally determine its own jurisdiction review.” Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 187 over this sort of interlocutory appeal. F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing The third prong is also clearly satisfied Catlin, 324 U.S. at 236). because such a determination cannot be The dispositive differences in this effectively reviewed on appeal from a case are twofold. First, we are final judgment because, by hypothesis, considering the ability to appeal an the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction to interlocutory determination of appellate hear interlocutory (i.e., not final) appeals jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction, would not be implicated in that posture. making cases like Merritt The second prong is more distinguishable. Second, the order at complex, but it too favors our issue here is not so much effectively jurisdiction. Part of it is clear: The issue unreviewable as it is procedurally of the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction is unreviewable if we do not take separate from the merits. Whether the jurisdiction now. “Effective” question is important enough requires unreviewability arises because a party’s some discussion. On the one hand, putative rights will be irreparably issues involving the scope of federal harmed. For example, a party may have jurisdiction are good candidates for the to forego an injunction guarding against collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., irreparable harm because the security Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 bond that is the price of the injunction U.S. 706 (1996) (holding that an may have been made too costly by the abstention-based remand to state court lower court; or a party wrongly was immediately appealable under determined to lack qualified immunity collateral order doctrine). On the other may be subjected to a trial. In such hand, a vague reference to the “scope of situations, although the aggrieved party federal jurisdiction” may denominate the cannot be made whole after the fact, the category too broadly, for the cases legal question will, as a matter of involving the collateral order doctrine procedure, still be preserved for the and the scope of federal jurisdiction are appellate court’s review at a later time. by and large abstention cases, see id. at In contrast, only in the most convoluted 712-15 (canvassing cases), which “put and improbable of hypotheticals will the the litigants ‘effectively out of court,’” jurisdictional issue presented here ever id. at 713 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l make its way to this Court on appeal Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. from a final decision.7 As 1, 11 n.11 (1983) (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 7 U.S. 713, 715 n.2 (1962))), and some The dissent “see[s] no reason why we courts have explicitly held that “non- could not [after trial] consider whether immunity based motions to dismiss for the Appellate Division had jurisdiction to 10 a procedural matter, now is this Court’s only opportunity to pass on the issue. render its decision.” Dissenting Op. post at —. In one sense, this is a truism, but This reasoning also explains why in practical terms it is a half-truth. The our holding here would not apply to the whole tenor and dynamic of a issue in Merritt, i.e., why a district trial—here, for murder no less—can be court’s determination of its subject radically altered by a decision like that of matter jurisdiction is not generally the Appellate Division here. We think it reviewable under the collateral order imprudent to let pass a ruling of such doctrine.8 Questions of original moment without examining, if we can, jurisdiction are always automatically whether the court making the ruling even before this Court on appellate review. had jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wujick v. Dale & Dale, Inc., 43 Second, the dissent’s offhand F.3d 790, 792 (3d Cir. 1994) (“‘[E]very statement about easy reviewability after federal appellate court has a special trial is also unsupported by an analysis of obligation to satisfy itself not only of its the posture in which the question might own jurisdiction, but also that of lower actually arise. On appeal from a courts in a cause under review.’” conviction (the dissent is quite right that (alteration in original) (quoting Spring the point is moot if there is a plea or Garden Assoc., L.P. v. Resolution Trust acquittal), the question will be whether Corp., 26 F.3d 412, 415 (3d Cir. 1994) the redaction actually used was (quoting Employers Ins. of Wausau v. constitutionally sound. If it was, we Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42 (3d would have no occasion to consider the Cir. 1990)))). In other words, there is no Appellate Division’s jurisdiction, for it procedural posture where a question of will have made the right decision original jurisdiction will escape this (whether it was empowered to or not). If Court’s review in an appeal from a (nonthe redaction used was unsound (and not interlocutory) final decision. In harmless), the Appellate Division’s jurisdiction is beside the point—the case must go back for a new trial. review after trial. This analysis also explains why 8 the dissent’s efforts to distinguish Blake The dissent criticizes the distinction are unconvincing. While there may have here as inconsistent with our earlier been factors present in Blake that are pronouncement that we must “treat[] absent here, the core concern remains: appeals from the Appellate Division no How are we to review the Appellate differently from appeals from any other Division’s jurisdiction if not through the district court.” Dissenting Op. post at —. collateral order doctrine? Both in Blake But of course, that greatly overstates our (as the dissent explains) and in this case earlier point, which was confined to the (as the preceding paragraph illustrates), issue of how we treat questions of the question cannot be addressed on finality. 11 contrast—as this case itself is the very sort of inefficiency that the illustrates—there are procedural postures collateral order doctrine should not which render permanently unreviewable countenance. We are underwhelmed by the judgment of a hierarchically inferior the dissent’s in terrorem argument. First, appellate court,9 and thereby prevent the it is a dubious empirical proposition that automatic review of jurisdiction the holding here will increase the described in Wujick. Because review of quantity of this sort of appeal. As the a question of appellate jurisdiction is a citations in the opinion in this case now-or-never proposition, interlocutory suggest, this Court has seen but a handful review of a jurisdictional question is of cases like this in the past decade. warranted here where it is not warranted Second, the fact that we here take the in the case of a district court’s opportunity to give some guidance (both determination of its own original to litigants and to the Appellate Division) jurisdiction. should decrease, not increase, the number of appeals taken in good faith. In brief, coupled with the institutional importance of the question, Third, the dissent claims that the absolute unreviewability of the “[t]he majority’s decision effectively Appellate Division’s jurisdiction in this grants an appeal as of right.” But it is the case makes the question an important Congress, not this Court, that has granted one. Thus this prong too favors litigants an appeal as of right from the appealability. Because all three prongs Appellate Division. Even if we did are satisfied, the collateral order doctrine dismiss this appeal in its entirety for lack affords us a basis for reviewing the of jurisdiction, as the dissent would, little Appellate Division’s determination efficiency would be gained as a practical regarding its jurisdiction under 4 V.I. matter: In a subsequent case, a litigant Code § 39(a)(1). could still file a notice of appeal (as a matter of statutory right), and he could In reaching this conclusion, we still advance a good faith argument in have considered the dissent’s contention favor of review under the collateral order that our “decision effectively grants an doctrine. A motions panel would likely appeal as of right to question an appellate refer the jurisdictional question to the court’s jurisdiction whenever it makes an merits panel, and the merits panel would interlocutory ruling,” and that this result address the question (hopefully in less extended fashion than we have had to 9 The judgment of the Appellate here). In other words, the decision here Division is permanently unreviewable makes it neither easier nor harder for a only in the sense that it will never be party who is dissatisfied with the ruling specifically reviewed by this Court; the of the Appellate Division to drag out the Bruton question in general is preserved for this Court’s review. See supra note 4. 12 process by appealing to this Court. 10 The United States or the Government of the Virgin At bottom, it seems to us that the Islands may appeal an dissent’s problem is the presence of a order, entered before the system of two-tier appellate review as of trial of a person charged right. In fact, the dissent states explicitly with a criminal offense that “[t]his type of review is wisely not under the laws of the found elsewhere in the federal system, Virgin Islands, which and should not exist here.” Dissenting directs the return of seized Op. post at —. While we might agree property, suppresses with the dissent if we were drafting 48 evidence, or otherwise U.S.C. § 1613a, that simply is not our denies the prosecutor the task. Congress has provided that we use of evidence at trial, if have appellate jurisdiction (until such the United States Attorney time as the conditions for certiorari or the Attorney General jurisdiction are met, see 48 U.S.C. § conducting the prosecution 1613), and accordingly, we will turn our for such violation certifies attention to the substance of the appeal. to the Judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of III. The Appellate Division’s delay and the evidence is a