Opinion ID: 1209978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the law firm is entitled to summary judgment on the intentional interference with contract claim based on runft's representation of nijc.

Text: The law firm asserts that it cannot be liable for intentional interference with contract, because Runft was representing NIJC when he took the actions of which Jones complains. We agree. The trial court focused on two contracts it concluded were alleged by Jones: (1) a contract between Jones and NIJC, in which NIJC promised Jones it would secure the Pinecrest assignment from Sigismonti and Kundrat, and (2) a contract between Jones and the escrow company, in which the escrow company promised to hold the loan money until the collateral NIJC had agreed to furnish Jones, including the Pinecrest assignment, was provided. The trial court concluded that the law firm's summary judgment motion based on Runft being NIJC's attorney could apply only to the first of these two contracts, because NIJC was not a party to the second contract. Concerning the second contract to which the trial court referred, our reading of the record reveals no evidence of an agreement between Jones and the escrow company. Although Jones may be a third-party beneficiary of the escrow instructions, this would not preclude summary judgment in NIJC's favor. The escrow instructions were directions from NIJC to the escrow company. Anything Runft did to provoke the escrow company to disburse the loan money without the Pinecrest assignment, he did as attorney for NIJC, a party to the escrow instructions. Therefore, we focus only on the potential liability of the law firm based on Runft's representation of NIJC in provoking the escrow company to disburse the loan money. Concerning the applicability of Runft's representation of NIJC to interference with the contract between Jones and NIJC, the trial court concluded that there is an issue of fact whether Runft was acting within the scope of his authority from NIJC when he modified the escrow instructions to allow disbursement of the loan money without the Pinecrest assignment. The trial court stated that the law firm contended NIJC and Jones's agents agreed to the modification, while Jones denied there had been an agreement to modify this requirement. The trial court's theory was that if there had been no agreement between Jones and NIJC to modify the escrow instructions to allow disbursement of the loan money without the Pinecrest assignment, Runft's representation to Rogers that the real estate transaction could close without requiring the Pinecrest assignment would not have been a truthful representation, because Jones and NIJC had not agreed to the modification. Therefore, the trial court reasoned, the dispute between the law firm and Jones whether Jones and NIJC had agreed to the modification created an issue of fact that precluded summary judgment. We are unable to accept this logic. If Jones and NIJC had agreed to a modification of the requirement that the loan money not be disbursed until the Pinecrest assignment was executed and/or recorded, the claim for intentional interference would fail because there would have been no breach of a contract between Jones and NIJC. On the other hand, if Jones and NIJC had not agreed to a modification, there is no evidence that Runft was not representing NIJC when he provoked the escrow company to disburse the loan money. It is undisputed that the escrow company only disbursed the loan money after receiving a letter from the secretary of NIJC stating: You are authorized and directed to accept this letter as fulfilling the provision to close escrow and use those funds being loaned by Aaron U. Jones to the North Idaho Jockey Club, Inc. Although Runft drafted this letter for the secretary's signature, it was NIJC through its secretary that authorized the disbursement. This may have been a breach of contract by NIJC, but it does not provide a basis for a claim against the law firm for intentional interference with contract.