Opinion ID: 1910611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probative Value v. Prejudicial Impact

Text: Because admissibility remains an open question, we turn to the second level of inquiry: probative value versus prejudicial impact. The trial court's first and third grounds for excluding Dr. Walker's testimony related to the prejudicial character of the evidence. Specifically, the court stated that the evidence would go[] beyond those [prior violent] acts which a jury should consider [26] and that, in effect, the testimony put the decedent on trial as a batterer, [a]nd that is not being tried in this case. We have stated, apropos of this first ground, that prior acts of violence are admissible in homicide cases where the defendant raises the claim of self-defense against the decedent as the alleged first aggressor. United States v. Akers, D.C. App., 374 A.2d 874, 877 (1977) (emphasis omitted). The trial court, in fact, admitted a substantial amount of evidence relating to the decedent's earlier attacks on the appellant and other persons. See Part I.A. supra. In light of the admission of this evidence, it is apparent that the incremental, prejudicial impact of Dr. Walker's testimony on battered wives, including the labeling of Dr. Ibn-Tamas as a batterer, would have been minimal. In contrast, as we have previously observed, the testimony on battered wives was highly probative. Because Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' identity as a battered wife, if established, may have had a substantial bearing on her perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing, it was central to her claim of self-defense. We conclude, accordingly, as a matter of law, that the probative value of this expert testimony would outweigh the risk of engender[ing] vindictive passions within the jury or . . . confus[ing] the issues. Green, supra at 1268. [27]