Opinion ID: 803895
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Benjamin Purdue, Jr., was sentenced to two life

Text: terms plus twenty-one years for the malicious wounding of his former wife, the murder of her parents, and related firearms offenses. He com- mitted these offenses in 1983. At the time of conviction, he had no prior criminal history, and he has incurred no infractions while imprisoned. On ten occasions, the Board has declined to release Purdue on parole. Each time, it has pro- BURNETTE v. FAHEY 11 vided the same reason, the seriousness of the crimes. 10. After pleading guilty to the 1980 murder of a bootlegger, Henry Stump was sentenced to a term of ninety-three years’ imprisonment. His prior criminal record consisted of a conviction for auto theft as a juvenile and public intoxica- tion charges. While serving his sentence, Stump has committed two disciplinary infrac- tions, for possessing dice in 1991 and an extra pair of reading glasses in 2008. He also pled guilty to possession of controlled substances for two incidents occurring during his incarcer- ation. The Board has declined to parole Stump on eighteen occasions. In doing so, it has always cited the seriousness of the crime and, several times, it has also referenced Stump’s commission of crimes while incarcerated. 11. In 1981, Barbara Tabor was convicted of fel- ony murder, for which she received a sentence of life plus twenty-one years. Her criminal his- tory at the time included only one prior convic- tion, for transporting stolen property. She has been charged with three minor disciplinary infractions while in prison. The Board has denied parole to Tabor eleven times. The sole reason given for each denial is the seriousness of the crime. In sum, the Inmates claim that, in evaluating a prisoner for parole, the Board has replaced fair and meaningful review of the fourteen Policy Manual factors with consideration of only one factor, the offense for which the prisoner is incarcerated. Thus, they assert that their limited prior criminal histories and generally outstanding institutional records cannot alter the outcome of the Board’s determination because, for certain 12 BURNETTE v. FAHEY violent crimes, the Board has replaced the exercise of discretion with the automatic denial of parole. According to the Inmates, the Board fails to consider violent offenders as individuals; instead, it effectively applies the 1994 legislative changes retroactively to eliminate discretionary parole for parole-eligible violent offenders.