Opinion ID: 859237
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statements to bartender

Text: ¶43 The State called a former bartender who testified that two days before the murders Hardy came to her bar in tears and told her, “My baby is gone . . . . [S]he’s really gone this time,” and he “could kill them both.” It is not clear that such 19 testimony constitutes “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” nor was the evidence offered to prove Hardy’s character “in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b); compare State v. Huerstel, 206 Ariz. 93, 106 ¶ 69, 75 P.3d 698, 713 (2003) (testimony about defendant’s stated plans to rob store on weekend of murders was not evidence of his conduct, and therefore not subject to Rule 404(b)), with State v. Nordstrom, 200 Ariz. 229, 247-48 ¶¶ 52-57, 25 P.3d 717, 73536 (2001) (applying Rule 404(b) to admission of defendant’s statements soliciting another person to commit a crime two years before the offense at issue). But if Rule 404(b) applies to the bartender’s testimony, that evidence clearly was relevant and admissible to prove Hardy’s intent, plan, or knowledge. See Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 402, 404(b); see also State v. Dickey, 125 Ariz. 163, 167, 608 P.2d 302, 306 (1980) (ruling that defendant’s statement weeks before shooting, “If anybody ever messes with me, I’ll blow them away,” was relevant to prove premeditation). And the evidence was not barred by the hearsay rule, see Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), 803(3), nor was its probative value substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Ariz. R. Evid. 403. ¶44 Hardy argues that his statements to the bartender are not reliable because they were made while he was drinking, were incomprehensible to her, and were remote in time. To the extent 20 any evidence supports this argument, it goes to the weight rather than admissibility of the testimony. And even though the bartender might not have known to whom Hardy was referring when he made the statement that he could kill them both, there is nothing inherently ambiguous or incomprehensible about the statement. ¶45 Hardy also asserts that the bartender heard of the statements from a third party rather than from Hardy himself. But each of the statements introduced into evidence was made by Hardy directly to the bartender. Although the bartender allegedly heard from a co-worker other statements Hardy made that night, evidence of those statements was not presented at trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the bartender’s testimony about Hardy’s statements to her.