Opinion ID: 1190159
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The merits of Lockett's First Amendment claims

Text: A prisoner alleging retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right must show that (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and twothat is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc). Lockett admits that he called Hearing Officer Maki a foul and corrupted bitch. The threshold question is therefore whether that comment was protected conduct under the first prong of the Thaddeus-X test. MDOC contends that Lockett's comment was not protected because it constituted insolent behavior in violation of MDOC's disciplinary regulations. Lockett did not respond to this argument, asserting instead that his speech was protected under the public-concern test. MDOC correctly notes that whether the public-concern test determines the protection to be afforded a prisoner's speech is an open question in the Sixth Circuit. In Thaddeus-X, this court sitting en banc specifically refused to make a determination about the appropriateness of explicitly applying the public-concern limitation to speech by prisoners. Id. at 392. Nor do we need to decide that issue here, because the court held in Thaddeus-X that if a prisoner violates a legitimate prison regulation, he is not engaged in `protected conduct,' and cannot proceed beyond step one of the three-step retaliation analysis. Id. at 394; see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (holding that a prison regulation that impinges on inmates' constitutional rights is nevertheless valid if that regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests). MDOC Policy Directive No. 03.03.105 provides that insolent behavior is a major misconduct violation. Mich. Dep't of Corr. Pol'y Directive No. 03.03.105B, Attachment B: Major Misconducts, at 3, http://www.michigan.gov/corrections (follow the Publications and Information link, then follow the Policy Directives link) (Jan. 1, 2007); see also Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2004) (analyzing the § 1983 claim of a Michigan state prisoner against whom a prison officer filed an allegedly false major misconduct charge for insolent behavior); Denham v. Shroad, 56 Fed.Appx. 692, 693 (6th Cir.2003) (addressing the § 1983 claim of a Michigan state prisoner who was convicted of major misconduct for, among other things, insolent behavior). Such behavior is defined as [w]ords, actions, or other behavior which is intended to harass, degrade, or cause alarm in an employee. Mich. Dep't of Corr. Pol'y Directive No. 03.03.105B, Attachment B: Major Misconducts, at 3. Lockett's comment that the hearing officer was a foul and corrupted bitch was insulting, derogatory, and questioned her authority as well as the integrity of the proceeding. It thus falls well within the definition of insolence under the MDOC Policy Directive. Accordingly, Lockett's First Amendment claim fails as a matter of law because his comment to the hearing officer was not protected conduct under Thaddeus-X.