Opinion ID: 175689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prejudgment Interest and Award of Attorneys' Fees Was Reasonable

Text: Dr. See's final two arguments challenge the district court's decision to award prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees to RK, both of which we review for an abuse of discretion. Serafinn v. Local 722, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 597 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir.2010) (attorneys' fees); Shott v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Med. Ctr., 338 F.3d 736, 746 (7th Cir.2003) (prejudgment interest). As to prejudgment interest, it is well-established in this circuit that prejudgment interest is presumptively available to victims of federal law violations. Gorenstein Enters. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 (7th Cir.1989). Prejudgment interest ensures that victims of federal law violations are fully compensated for their loss, as a dollar received in 1992 is worth considerably more than a dollar in 2009. S.E.C. v. Koenig, 557 F.3d 736, 745 (7th Cir.2009). Dr. See argues that RK's failure to request prejudgment interest in the final pretrial order waived RK's entitlement to such an award. See, e.g., Lindy Investments, LP v. Shakertown Corp., 209 F.3d 802, 804 (5th Cir.2000). But, in this circuit, a failure to request prejudgment interest in the final pretrial order does not result in a waiver. Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1298 (7th Cir.1987). Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a prevailing party will be granted all the relief to which it is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings, and we cannot see what prejudice Dr. See has suffered by RK's failure to include its request in the pretrial order. Prejudgment interest is presumptively available in this circuit, and Dr. See cannot argue that he would have acted any differently had the request been spelled out in the pretrial order. The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest to RK. We similarly find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding RK attorneys' fees. An award of attorneys' fees will only be reversed if it cannot be rationally supported by the record. Cintas Corp. v. Perry, 517 F.3d 459, 469 (7th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). In the district court, and again here, Dr. See neglects to specify his objections to RK's fee petition. He tells us that there is no evidence that RK actually paid or incurred any fees, that Dr. See had virtually no time to prepare objections to the fee petition, and that merely a cursory review of RK's bills would establish the duplicity of the work. Then, Dr. See tells us that a court can disallow hours that were not reasonably expended. This is true, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), but to do so, Dr. See must detail his objections to the fee petition such that the court can determine what portion of the fees, if any, were not reasonably expended. To facilitate the district court's ability to determine reasonable fee amounts, Local Rule 54.3 of the Northern District of Illinois requires parties who cannot agree on the amount of fees to file a motion documenting fees, hours, rates, and any objection to the fees, hours and rates of the opposing party. Though Dr. See asserts he had virtually no time to do this, RK sent invoices to him on April 9, 2007. In far excess of the 21 days granted by the local rule, Dr. See received extensions and did not file his general five-page response until August 2, 2007. The court did its best to respond to Dr. See's objections, and concisely supported its grant of attorneys' fees by observing that the litigation had lasted over seven years, involved complex securities fraud issues, and involved thousands of documents and filings. Furthermore, our cursory review of the fees reflect that the invoices were being paid by an RK employee, and we have previously stated that the best evidence of whether attorney's fees are reasonable is whether a party has paid them. Cintas Corp., 517 F.3d at 469. Given Dr. See's failure to raise specific objections to RK's attorneys' fees and mindful of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding RK the full amount of fees requested.