Opinion ID: 173037
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Costs Associated with the NPL

Text: Next, Raytheon argues even if it is solely responsible for the contamination, the district court erred in requiring it to pay $1,454,827.13 in costs associated with the EPA's attempt to list Herington Field on the NPL. These costs stem primarily from the decision to conduct an ESI. According to Raytheon, these costs are not recoverable because the government abandoned its efforts to list the site on the NPL. [3] The district court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. Tosco Corp. v. Koch Indus., 216 F.3d 886, 892 (10th Cir.2000). CERCLA § 107(a)'s subparagraph (A) makes a responsible party liable for all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government. . . not inconsistent with the national contingency plan. [4] 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Removal includes such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release . . . of hazardous substances as well as action taken under section 9604(b). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). Permissible response actions under § 9604(b)(1) include such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering as [the President] may deem necessary or appropriate to identify the existence and extent of the release or threat thereof, the source and nature of the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and the extent of danger to the public health or welfare or to the environment. In addition, the President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the costs thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter. Raytheon does not object to the district court's conclusion that conducting an ESI is a removal or remedial action under CERCLA. Rather, Raytheon claims the ESI was inconsistent with the national contingency plan because the EPA ultimately ceased its efforts to have Herington Field listed on the NPL. The district court did not directly address this argument, determining only that the costs of an ESI, regardless of whether that investigation was conducted to determine eligibility for listing on the NPL, are recoverable costs under § 107's subparagraph (A). The question remains, then, whether an ESI is necessarily inconsistent with the national contingency plan if the government subsequently abandons its attempt to list a site on the NPL. When the government seeks recovery of its costs, the burden of proof on the question of inconsistency lies with the defendant. United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir.1992). Furthermore, [w]hen the government is seeking response costs . . . consistency with the [national contingency plan] is presumed unless the defendant can overcome this presumption by presenting evidence of inconsistency. Id. To demonstrate inconsistency with the national contingency plan, a defendant must show that the government acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to consider cost, or in selecting a remedial alternative that is not cost-effective. Id. at 1443. Raytheon rests its argument on an unpublished district court decision from the Western District of Washington. United States v. Rayonier, Inc., No. C01-5743-RBL (W.D.Wash. Feb. 25, 2004). [5] In Rayonier, the court determined the EPA's decision to conduct the ESI in the manner, and for the purpose, it did [was] arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 11, ¶ 13. This conclusion was based on a number of factual findings, however, including that the decision to conduct the ESI was driven almost totally by a desire to list the site on the NPL, even though such an attempt was a useless endeavor. Id. at 5, ¶ 24. Specifically, the success of an attempt to list the site was highly unlikely because the fund used by the government to clean up NPL sites was empty, the State of Washington had made clear that it opposed the listing, sufficient data already existed without the ESI to permit a high enough score for listing on the NPL, and Rayonier had already expressed a willingness to voluntarily clean up the site. Id. The district court also found the EPA had collected samples at locations with discharges unrelated to the site and used inappropriate sampling methods, such that many of the samples obtained in connection with the ESI were not useful. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 20-21. In light of these facts, the district court determined that conducting the ESI to obtain placement on the NPL made no sense and was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 5, ¶ 24. Raytheon's reliance on Rayonier is curious because Rayonier says nothing about the effect of the government's abandonment of an attempt to list a contaminated site on the NPL. In fact, the mere abandonment says nothing about whether the government acted arbitrarily or capriciously in selecting the remedial action of conducting an ESI. Raytheon presents no case law to suggest otherwise. Rather, this court concludes that a party who simply points to the government's decision to discontinue its pursuit of a listing has failed to overcome the presumption of an ESI's consistency with the national contingency plan. Were this court to adopt Raytheon's view that the decision to abandon a good faith attempt to list a site on the NPL makes that attempt arbitrary and capricious as a matter of law, the EPA would be forced to continue expending efforts and funds in support of a listing in order to recover its costs, even where the results of the ESI itself ultimately reveal the contamination is not serious enough to warrant the listing. Such a result is untenable. Moreover, to whatever extent Raytheon attempts to compare Rayonier 's factual basis to this case, the court sees no similarity. The district court in Rayonier was faced with numerous facts indicating the government's primary goal, placement of the site on the NPL, was unattainable from its inception. Here, Raytheon presents no evidence the ESI was initiated for the sole purpose of listing the site on the NPL. In fact, the district court indicated the ESI served other purposes, including establishing the nature and extent of contamination and determining potential source areas for the contamination to assist with clean-up. Likewise, there is no evidence the EPA should have known it could not obtain an NPL listing when it first initiated the ESI. Though it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears the EPA only ceased efforts to list the site, if at all, after it became clear those efforts would be fruitless in light of the State of Kansas's opposition. Thus, this court concludes Raytheon has failed to rebut the presumption that the EPA's efforts to list the site on the NPL were consistent with the national contingency plan. Because Raytheon has presented no evidence to support a determination that the EPA's actions were arbitrary and capricious, the district court's judgment must be affirmed.