Opinion ID: 2626513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Judgment as Against Mari Must Be Affirmed Because She Failed to Raise a Genuine Issue of Material Fact.

Text: Having found sufficient basis in the record to support the judgment in favor of all Defendants against Richard and Kathleen, and the judgment in favor of Cayetano against all of the Wongs, we are left to consider whether there is a basis on which to sustain the judgment in favor of the remaining Defendants against Mari. Upon reviewing the record, we hold that the judgment against Mari must be affirmed on the basis that she failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial. We begin by restating the three elements of a malicious prosecution claim: (1) the prior proceedings must have been terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (2) the prior proceedings must have been initiated without probable cause; and (3) the prior proceedings must have been initiated with malice. Reed, 76 Hawai`i at 230, 873 P.2d at 109. We first note that: (1) there is no dispute that the proceedings in Cr. No. 99-0678 were terminated in Mari's favor, [14] and (2) neither side points to any evidence in the record as to whether the State had probable cause to charge Mari with hindering prosecution or conspiracy. See Wong, 97 Hawai`i at 526 n. 10, 40 P.3d at 928 n. 10 (withholding judgment on whether the prosecution in Cr. No. 99-0678 was initiated based on probable cause). Accordingly, the key issue is the element of malice. As the Intermediate Court of Appeals has explained at length, [t]he question of whether a summary judgment should [be] granted on the basis of a lack of malice in filing the prior lawsuit is . . . [a] difficult question. Brodie v. Hawai`i Auto. Retail Gasoline Dealers Ass'n, 2 Haw.App. 316, 319, 631 P.2d 600, 603 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 65 Haw. 598, 655 P.2d 863 (1982). We have previously stated that, at trial, a plaintiff has the burden of proving malice by clear and convincing evidence. Orso v. City & County of Honolulu, 56 Haw. 241, 247-48, 534 P.2d 489, 493 (1975), rev'd on other grounds by Kahale v. City & County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai`i 341, 90 P.3d 233 (2004). However, we have also acknowledged that it is true that malice is seldom the subject of a confession by the wrongdoer. It usually must be proved by inferences from other evidence. Myers v. Cohen, 67 Haw. 389, 397, 688 P.2d 1145, 1151 (1984). See also Brodie, 2 Haw.App. at 322, 631 P.2d at 605 (holding that an inference of malice may be supported by direct or circumstantial evidence). On summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to show the absence of any genuine issue as to all material facts. French, 105 Hawai`i at 470, 99 P.3d at 1054. To meet this burden and demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue as to whether Mari was prosecuted with malice, Defendants pointed to the files and records of related casesin particular the findings of the circuit court in Cr. No. 99-2417of which the circuit court took judicial notice. As set forth above, the circuit court in Cr. No. 99-2417 found, inter alia, that [t]here was no evidence to show that . . . the . . . indictment [in Cr. No. 99-0678] . . . was improperly motivated. Although this finding has no preclusive effect as against Mari, it is nevertheless a judicially noticed fact sufficient to meet Defendants' burden of production on a motion for summary judgment. See Application of Pioneer Mill Co., 53 Haw. 496, 497 n. 1, 497 P.2d 549, 551 n. 1 (1972) (holding that a judicially noticed fact is taken as true unless rebutted); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Ajimine, 39 Haw. 543, 551 (1952) (holding that judicially noticed facts are sufficient to meet a movant's burden of production and support a finding unless contradicted by other evidence). At this point, the burden shifted to Mari to demonstrate evidence of specific facts, as opposed to general allegations, to dispute or contradict Defendants' evidence that there was no improper motive behind the prosecution. French, 105 Hawai`i at 470, 99 P.3d at 1054. As the ICA stated in Brodie: [T]here must come a time when the plaintiff has to show facts upon which he contends that malice existed. . . . [W]e think it appropriate to give defendants the power to require plaintiffs to make such a showing pre-trial in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment. If he is unprepared to do so at the time of the filing of a motion for summary judgment, then under Rule 56(f), HRCP,[ [15] ] he can file an affidavit showing why he cannot then do so and obtain an extension for discovery or the obtaining of affidavits or such other relief as is just. Brodie, 2 Haw.App. at 323, 631 P.2d at 605. However, rather than either: (1) adducing evidence of specific facts to dispute Defendants' reliance on the judicially noticed fact that there was no improper motive behind her prosecution, or (2) filing an affidavit to show why she could not then do so and seeking an extension for discovery or the obtaining of affidavits to dispute the judicially noticed fact, Mari relied on the conclusory allegations of the complaint. She thus failed to meet her burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her prosecution was initiated with malice, which is an essential element of her malicious prosecution claim. See Reed, 76 Hawai`i at 225, 873 P.2d at 104 (Bare allegations or factually unsupported conclusions are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, and therefore, insufficient to reverse a grant of summary judgment. (Citations omitted.)). Accordingly, the judgment below as against Mari and in favor of all Defendants must be affirmed on that basis.