Opinion ID: 1223736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: oklahoma's statutory scheme of yore, as well as her interpretative jurisprudence, disallow pretrial disclosure of a defendant's financial records.

Text: ¶ 10 The statute that governed discovery of documents at the time of our decision in Cox was enacted in 1965 as 12 O.S. § 548. [7] That statute provided that any party in the case could request by motion the production of documents for inspection and copying (and for other purposes pertinent to that kind of evidence). [8] Good cause was required to be shown. [9] The trial judge was vested with equitable power to protect parties and witnesses from disclosures which could cause annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression. [10] ¶ 11 In Cox v. Theus this court was called upon to examine the provisions of 12 O.S. 1971 § 548 with a view to determining if good cause could be shown to support the plaintiff's questmade at the pretrial stagefor production of financial records to be used in support of the petition's plea for punitive damages. [11] Punitive (exemplary) damages were then governed by the provisions of 23 O.S. 1971 § 9, originally enacted in 1910. [12] That one-sentence section authorized damages for the sake of example when a tort defendant was found guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. [13] The 1910 antecedent of 23 O.S.1971 § 9 neither set a stage for special proceedings nor required the defendant's financial condition to play a role in the punitive award's assessment. [14] ¶ 12 Because in Cox the discovery was sought at the pretrial stage on mere allegations in plaintiff's pleading, it was declared unsupported by good cause and subject to denial as premature. [15] Only after evidence adduced at trial would provide the basis for punitive damages' submission could plaintiff compel defendant's disclosure of relevant financial documents. [16] ¶ 13 In short, Cox singled out the discovery of one's personal financial records as a protected class and pronounced it exempt from the ordinary pretrial disclosure process. There, the court concluded that no good cause was shownin the § 548 senseto compel the pretrial disclosure sought. [17] The version of 23 O.S.1971 § 9 then in force tended to accord with the Cox view. Financial worth was not yet statutorily identified as an element of proof in exemplary-damages proceedings. [18] ¶ 14 The Oklahoma Discovery Code, 12 O.S.1991 §§ 3226 et seq., was enacted in 1982. Its provisions replaced the earlier § 548. The text of § 3226(B)(1) introduced a broader discovery scope. [19] Its language did not cast the good cause requirement upon the party seeking discovery, but allowed disclosure demands to be otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with the Oklahoma Discovery Code. [20] ¶ 15 Discovery limitations are found in subsection (C) of 12 O.S.1991 § 3226. [21] That provision shifts the burden of showing good cause to the party who opposes discovery. [22] Just as it was the case under 12 O.S.1971 § 548, so under the Code the trial judge may consider whether the discovery sought would cause annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression. In order to prevent unauthorized disclosure from taking place, a protective order may be granted, which could limit or disallow the discovery, or place some documents under seal, to be opened as directed by the court. [23] ¶ 16 The 1910 version of 23 O.S.1971 § 9 (which originally governed exemplary damages) underwent yet another revision in 1986 when it was replaced by 23 O.S.Supp.1986 § 9(A). [24] The 1986 scheme required a midtrial judicial determination, to be effected at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in chief, that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider an exemplary damages award in excess of actual damages. [25] The 1986 text was repealed and replaced in 1995 by the provisions of 23 O.S.Supp.1995 § 9.1. The latter language is presently in force. [26] Under the new procedure the jury is now specifically authorized to consider in its deliberations the financial condition of the defendant. [27] The 1995 version requires a two-phase trial process (the second of which is statutorily referred to as a separate proceeding), which calls for a particularized verdict finding that the evidence meets the standards for an exemplary-damages award. [28] ¶ 17 The after-enacted provisions of the Discovery Code, coupled with the new punitive-damages submission regime, clearly call for our re-examination of Cox. The Discovery Code gives no support for setting apart the process of discovery for exemplary-damages proof as a separate disclosure rubric. All discovery must be filtered through the procedure established by 12 O.S.1991 § 3226(C), which would allow, upon good cause, a protective order if sensitive material is sought to be produced. [29] The new submission procedure for exemplary damages clearly authorizes (1) a separate trial stage for the jury consideration of that award and (2) submission of financial-worth proof for assessing the amount of that award. It neither declares nor authorizes any form of interim moratorium on compelled pretrial production of financial records. [30] ¶ 18 Neither in the Discovery Code nor in the present text of 23 O.S.Supp.1995 § 9.1 did the legislature craft a separate procedural regime for compelled disclosure of information needed in the punitive-damages stage. Pretrial discovery of a defendant's financial condition serves to protect the uninterrupted continuity of the trial process and a smooth transition into the punitive-damages stage. Objections to production of private financial documents may be made under the terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 3226(C) to protect the defendant's legitimate claims to privacy. Once an objection is interposed, equitable powers should be exercised to decide whether (a) discovery is warranted and (b) if so, whether a protective order is one's due.