Opinion ID: 61659
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Textual commitment

Text: The district court first found that the issues raised by the Plaintiffs' claims implicated a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to the Executive Branch, namely, that war and foreign policy decisions are for the Executive. Fisher, 454 F.Supp.2d at 640-41. Of course, the Constitution commits to Congress the power to raise and support an army and navy, and to the Executive the responsibilities of commanding those armed forces. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cls. 12-14; art. II, § 2. The decisions whether and under what circumstances to employ military force are constitutionally reserved for [these two] branches. Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th Cir.1991). The strategy and tactics employed on the battlefield are clearly not subject to judicial review. Id. We disagree with the district court's textual commitment analysis because at this stage we cannot find that all plausible sets of facts that could be proven would implicate particular authority committed by the Constitution to Congress or the Executive. Examples of cases that implicate a textual commitment of constitutional authority to the Executive Branch include a challenge to the President's decision to deploy troops in a foreign land, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789, 70 S.Ct. 936, or mine the harbors of another country in the course of a war against that country, DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1153-57 (2d Cir.1973); so too has such a textual commitment been involved when a suit seeks judicial oversight of training procedures employed by the National Guard, Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5-10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, requests an injunction of all nuclear testing, Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 (D.C.Cir. 1963), or requires the resolution of a territorial dispute between foreign sovereigns, Occidental, 577 F.2d at 1202-03. These are matters that the President is constitutionally privileged to address. In addition, as these cases suggest, the first Baker formulation is primarily concerned with direct challenges to actions taken by a coordinate branch of the federal government. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1359 (11th Cir.2007). KBR is not part of a coordinate branch of the federal government. Therefore, to invoke the textual commitment factor, KBR faces a double burden. Id. First, [KBR] must demonstrate that the claims against it will require reexamination of a decision by the military. Then, it must demonstrate that the military decision at issue is ... insulated from judicial review. Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). Contrary to the situations regarding matters of war, there is no textual commitment to the coordinate branches of the authority to adjudicate the merits of the Plaintiffs' claims against KBR for breach of its duties. In fact, when faced with an ordinary tort suit, the textual commitment factor actually weighs in favor of resolution by the judiciary. See Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49-50 (2d Cir.1991). It is an extraordinary occasion, indeed, when the political branches delve into matters of tort-based compensation. See, e.g., September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001). Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, their claims challenge actions taken and omissions made only by KBR. That company's conduct can be examined by a federal court without violating the Constitution's separation of powers.