Opinion ID: 1234215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Kidnapping as an Aggravating Circumstance.

Text: Appellants entered into plea negotiations whereby they agreed to plead guilty to first degree kidnapping in return for the District Attorney's promise that the plea would not be used as a judicial admission, but would be proven through independent evidence. Appellants claim that the stabbing immediately caused Hoff's death and that, consequently, there was insufficient evidence to establish the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping. We disagree. The standard for determining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court stated: After Winship the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citation omitted.) Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 318-319, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89 (emphasis in original). In the instant case, there was testimony by two different witnesses that appellants' co-defendants had stated that Hoff was still moaning or groaning when he was placed in the car and that he died in the car as they were being chased through town. There was also testimony from several witnesses that Hoff's body was wrapped in a sheet before being placed in the car. This sheet was still wrapped around the body when it was found buried in Verdi. The sheet contained several knife slits suggesting that Hoff had been stabbed in the car while he was still alive. Finally, the doctor who performed an autopsy on Hoff testified that Hoff did not die instantly; he stated he could have lived as long as twenty minutes. Under these circumstances, a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the movement and confinement of Hoff increased the risk of harm to Hoff. If Hoff had been left at the location where he was stabbed, the surveillance teams in the area may have been able to reach him in time to provide some form of assistance. See Langford v. State, 95 Nev. 631, 600 P.2d 231 (1979); Wright v. State, 94 Nev. 415, 581 P.2d 442 (1978). Therefore, a review of the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution indicates that a rational factfinder could have found the appellants perpetrated a kidnapping with the use of deadly weapons. Appellants also claim that the three judge panel erred by finding robbery and kidnapping as two separate aggravating factors because only one aggravating circumstance can be found for the felonies listed in NRS 200.033(4). [8] Without citing any relevant authority, appellants contend that statutory construction mandates that only one aggravating circumstance can be found under this section regardless of the number of felonies actually committed. We cannot agree. A logical reading of the statute requires that each felony be used as an aggravating circumstance. First degree murder is aggravated when it is committed during the course of one of the enumerated felonies contained in NRS 200.033(4). Therefore, when the murder is committed during the course of more than one of the felonies listed, the murder is more aggravated and heinous than it would have been if only one of the felonies were present. Moreover, other jurisdictions confronted with this issue have held that any of the enumerated felonies that have been committed during a murder can properly be used as aggravating circumstances even though they are found in the same subdivision of the statute. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 362 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 2063, 60 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979) (robbery and burglary found as separate aggravating circumstances); Legare v. State, 243 Ga. 744, 257 S.E.2d 247 (Ga. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 491, 62 L.Ed.2d 413 (1979) (armed robbery and burglary found as separate aggravating circumstances); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (S.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 957, 100 S.Ct. 437, 62 L.Ed.2d 329 (1979) (rape, kidnapping and armed robbery found as separate aggravating circumstances).