Opinion ID: 1889347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue One Custodia Legis

Text: Relying primarily on the dissenting opinion of Judge Tamilia, Blesh argues that the Property was held in custodia legis (under the wardship of the court) pending Johnson's compliance with the Equitable Distribution Order. Blesh begins her argument by citing the general rules that, property subject to an order of court is in custodia legis, or under the wardship of the court, pending compliance with the order; and that, property so held is not subject to attachment by judicial liens. Klebach v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 388 Pa.Super. 203, 565 A.2d 448, 451-52 (1989) (citing Lappas v. Brown, 335 Pa.Super. 108, 483 A.2d 979 (1984)). From these general principles she concludes that, [s]ince the property in this action was the subject of a specific equitable distribution Order, it remained in custodia legis pending [Johnson's] compliance with the divorce court's Order. As a result, [Blesh's] claims stemming from the equitable distribution Order should take precedence in the distribution of the proceeds from the sheriff's sale. Mid-State Bank and Trust Co., 710 A.2d at 1195 (Tamilia, J., dissenting). Though seemingly logical, Pennsylvania caselaw does not support this analysis. This Court has never addressed the issue, but the Superior Court has upheld the application of the doctrine of custodia legis in several divorce cases. See Keystone Savings Association v. Kitsock, 429 Pa.Super. 561, 633 A.2d 165 (1993); Fidelity Bank v.. Carroll, 416 Pa.Super. 9, 610 A.2d 481 (1992); Klebach, supra. Each of these cases, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Klebach, Mellon Bank entered a judgment against the husband on December 14, 1982, while the couple was in the midst of a divorce proceeding. Two weeks later, the husband and wife entered into an equitable distribution agreement by which the husband agreed to convey his interest in the marital residence to the wife. On December 30, 1982, the divorce court entered a divorce decree and, pursuant to the equitable distribution agreement, ordered the husband to convey his one-half interest in the marital residence to the wife. Five days later, on January 4, 1983, the husband complied with the order and conveyed the property to the wife. The wife subsequently filed an action to quiet title to the property, arguing that Mellon Bank had no valid lien on the property. The trial court agreed and entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the wife. Mellon Bank appealed, and a majority of the Superior Court affirmed on the basis of, inter alia, the doctrine of custodia legis. The Superior Court held that: The entireties property in question was under the jurisdiction of the lower court pursuant to a divorce proceeding. This property was in fact the subject of a judicial order entered by the divorce court on December 30, 1982. As such, it was properly held in custodia legis until the parties to the action complied with the order of the lower court.... The property in question was never subject to attachment by [Mellon Bank's] lien. From December 30, 1982 until January 4, 1983, the property was in the custody of the divorce court pending execution of a deed in compliance with court order. Mellon's lien therefore never attached, and the lower court in the instant case correctly granted [the wife's] request to quiet title by striking the lien. Klebach, 565 A.2d at 451-52. Judge Johnson, however, emphatically dissent[ed] from the majority's conclusion, remarking that, I find it startling that the Majority has concluded, without citation to any authority, that the real estate here in question `was in the custody of the divorce court pending execution of a deed in compliance with court order.'Klebach, 565 A.2d at 453. (Johnson, J., dissenting). Regardless of whether the majority in Klebach was correct that the property was in custodia legis pending the husband's compliance with the divorce court's order of December 30, 1982, the holding of Klebach has no application here because the facts are plainly distinguishable. In Klebach, Mellon Bank entered its judgment and recorded its lien against the husband's property while the divorce proceeding was pending and before the marital property was equitably distributed. Cf. Fidelity Bank, 610 A.2d at 483 (Citations omitted) (When appellant initiated the divorce action, all marital property was placed under the trial court's jurisdiction. As such, the property was in custodia legis, or under wardship of the court, pending the outcome of the divorce proceeding.... When the doctrine of custodia legis is applied to the facts of the instant case, it is apparent that the liens of the Bank do not attach to the marital home. Here, appellant filed for divorce on July 17, 1987; however, the bank did not enter a judgment against Mr. Carroll until March 18, 1988. Because the marital home was then under the court's jurisdiction, the Bank's judgment did not attach.). In this case, though, Mid-State's execution of judgment took place more than eight years after the divorce was final and the marital property was distributed. This difference in timing is crucial to the application of the doctrine of custodia legis, as the concurring opinion in Keystone Savings demonstrates. In Keystone Savings, the wife commenced an action for divorce and equitable distribution on December 4, 1985. On March 14, 1988, while the divorce proceedings were pending, Keystone loaned the husband sixty thousand dollars. The husband defaulted on the loan, and Keystone commenced an action against him to recover the sixty thousand dollars plus interest. On March 12, 1990, after the divorce, court entered a decree in divorce, but before the marital property was distributed, Keystone won a default judgment against the husband. Approximately two months later, on May 24, 1990, the divorce court entered an order of equitable distribution directing the husband to convey his interest in the marital residence to the wife. On June 1, 1990, Keystone attempted to execute on its default judgment, and the wife filed a petition to stay the sheriff's sale. The trial court granted the wife's petition and entered a permanent stay of the sheriff's sale. Keystone then appealed to the Superior Court. The majority of Superior Court affirmed the order of the trial court, holding, inter alia, that: [T]he property in question was subject to equitable distribution proceedings in the lower court several years prior to Keystone's unsecured loan to [the husband]. As such, the property was in custodia legis and not subject to attachment by Keystone's judicial lien. [Citing Fidelity Bank, supra ; and Klebach, supra ].