Opinion ID: 2272642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sudden Emergency Doctrine Defined

Text: The sudden emergency doctrine is generally defined at 57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 198 (2004): [W]hen an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation, or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor is not negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context, provided the actor has not created the emergency. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 296 (1965) describes it as follows: (1) In determining whether conduct is negligent toward another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a sudden emergency which requires rapid decision is a factor in determining the reasonable character of his choice of action. (2) The fact that the actor is not negligent after the emergency has arisen does not preclude his liability for his tortious conduct which has produced the emergency. The rationale for the rule arises from the perception of human nature that a prudent person, when brought face to face with an unexpected danger, may fail to use the best judgment, may omit some precaution that otherwise might have been taken, and may not choose the best available method of meeting the dangers of the situation. 57A Am.Jur.2d, Negligence § 200 (2004). The principle embodied in [the sudden emergency] rule enjoys almost universal acceptance in the courts of the nation, founded as it is upon common sense and a proper recognition of prudent standards in human conduct. Breaux v. Roy Young, Inc., 397 So.2d 1384, 1388 (La.App. 1981). An important aspect in understanding how to transfer the doctrine from its abstract theoretical definition to a real-world practical context is emphasized in the following articulation of the concept, from Regenstreif, 142 S.W.3d at 4, (quoting Harris v. Thompson, 497 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Ky.App.1973)): [W]hen a defendant is confronted with a condition he has had no reason to anticipate and has not brought on by his own fault, but which alters the duties he would otherwise have been bound to observe, then the effect of that circumstance upon these duties must be covered by the instructions. (emphasis added). As explained below in Section C, without the specific sudden emergency instruction, the duties set out in standard comparative negligence instructions would be immutable. They would not permit the jury to base its finding of fault on whether it believed a party's conduct was a reasonable response to an emergency situation because the jury would not know that a qualifying emergency event alters the duties required of the affected party.