Opinion ID: 865226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: (A) Procedural bar - Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-101 ¶7. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-35-101 states, “[a]ny person convicted of an offense in a circuit court may appeal to the supreme court, provided, however, an appeal from the circuit court to the supreme court shall not be allowed in any case where the defendant enters a plea of guilty.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-101 (Rev. 2007) (emphasis added). In Trotter v. State, 554 So. 2d 313 (Miss. 1989), this Court provided: [i]n Burns v. State, 344 So. 2d 1189 (Miss. 1977), this Court implied that an appeal from a sentence imposed pursuant to a guilty plea is not equivalent to an appeal from the guilty plea itself. In Burns, an appeal from denial of a habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of a sentence imposed 11 Among the conditions of Post Release Supervision, Lett was required to pay court costs, a $2,000 fine, and restitution. 6 subsequent to a guilty plea was treated by this Court as a direct appeal. While the Court acknowledged the language of § 99-35-101, the Court stated: “We do not deem the present case as an appeal from a guilty plea.” Burns, 344 So. 2d at 1190. Trotter, 554 So. 2d at 315. See also Johnson v. State, 925 So. 2d 86, 88 n. 1 (Miss. 2006) (as “Johnson seeks relief only from the length of the sentence imposed by the trial judge, and he in no way attacks the guilty plea itself[,] . . . this Court [has] jurisdiction to consider, on direct appeal, the issue of the length of Johnson’s sentence.”); Acker v. State, 797 So. 2d 966, 967 (Miss. 2001) (“[t]his Court has stated that a defendant who pleads guilty can appeal from the sentence imposed.”). As such, this Court finds that pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-35-101, Lett possesses the right to appeal, but the right extends only to alleged errors in sentencing. (B) Procedural bar - Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 ¶8. The State next contends that “the judgment appealed from was signed and filed on June 2, 2006 . . . . The notice of appeal was not filed until July 27, 2006 . . . . Accordingly, the notice of appeal was not timely filed pursuant to M.R.A.P. 4, and this putative appeal should be dismissed pursuant to M.R.A.P. 2.” ¶9. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) states, in part, that: [e]xcept as provided in Rules 4(d) and 4(e), in a civil or criminal case in which an appeal or cross-appeal is permitted by law as of right from a trial court to the Supreme Court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Miss. R. App. 4(a) (emphasis added). Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(a)(1) provides, “[a]n appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of appeal was not timely filed pursuant 7 to Rules 4 or 5.” Miss. R. App. P. 2(a)(1). In the case sub judice, the circuit court’s order was entered on June 2, 2006. We find Lett’s notice of appeal was not filed until July 27, 2006. Given that filing of Lett’s notice of appeal occurred more than “30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from[,]” Miss. R. App. P. 4(a), this Court finds that Lett’s appeal is procedurally barred. ¶10. Assuming arguendo that the procedural bar did not apply, the result is the same. “This Court has held that sentencing is within the discretion of the trial court and is not subject to appellate review if it is within the limits prescribed by statute.” Wade v. State, 802 So. 2d 1023, 1030 (Miss. 2001) (citing Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 537 (Miss. 1996)). The circuit court had the discretion to reject the State’s recommendation, see Wade, 802 So. 2d at 1028, and exercised that discretion. Any argument of detrimental reliance asserted by Lett is negated by the fact that he was repeatedly informed of the circuit court’s discretion in sentencing. Additionally, Lett was informed that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment and the actual sentence imposed was well within that prescribed limit. See id. at 1030. As such, this Court further finds that there was no abuse of discretion by the learned circuit judge in sentencing Lett.