Opinion ID: 1616861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Jury Determination of Aggravating FactorsPlain Error

Text: We now turn to Mata's claim that there was plain error in the imposition of the death sentence under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). We first addressed the effect of Ring on Nebraska's capital sentencing scheme in State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003), a direct appeal in a capital case, in which the defendant assigned as error the trial court's denial of his motion challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska's capital sentencing statutes and requesting a jury determination of sentencing issues. After the defendant's appeal was perfected, but before it was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ring that its prior decisions in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled, Ring, supra, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), were irreconcilable and that Walton should therefore be overruled to the extent that it allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. The Court concluded that because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that the factors be found by a jury. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. In Gales, supra, we held that under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), the new constitutional rule announced in Ring was applicable because, due to the pending direct appeal, the defendant's conviction and sentence were not final when Ring was decided. We held that Ring required, in order to fulfill the guarantee of rights conferred by the Sixth Amendment, that the existence of any aggravating circumstance utilized in the imposition of a sentence of death, other than a prior criminal conviction, must be determined by a jury. Gales, supra . We further concluded that in that case, as in the instant case, the jury made no explicit determination that any of the statutory aggravating circumstances existed. See id. Consequently, the procedure violated the constitutional principle articulated in Ring, and the defendant's death sentences were vacated. Gales, supra . We again addressed the effect of Ring in State v. Lotter, ante 266 Neb. p. 245, 664 N.W.2d 892 (2003). In Lotter, however, the defendant's death sentences had become final, and the defendant sought to challenge those sentences in postconviction proceedings. We denied the defendant's motions to vacate his death sentences, based upon our determination that Ring did not apply to collateral challenges to sentences which were final when Ring was decided. We held that Ring announced a new rule of constitutional procedure which did not fall within either of the exceptions set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), to the principle that such changes in the law do not apply retroactively to final judgments. Lotter, supra. Accordingly, we declined to apply Ring to the final judgments collaterally attacked in Lotter. The present case comes before us in yet another procedural posture. Unlike Lotter, the judgment in the instant case was not yet final at the time that Ring was decided, and pursuant to Griffith, the constitutional rule announced in Ring and applied to Nebraska law in Gales is also applicable to this case. As in Gales, the sentencing procedure in the instant case did not comport with the rule announced in Ring. However, unlike the defendant in Gales, Mata did not argue to the trial court that he was entitled to a jury determination of aggravating circumstances. In the absence of plain error, when an issue is raised for the first time in an appellate court, the issue will be disregarded inasmuch as the trial court cannot commit error regarding an issue never presented and submitted for disposition in the trial court. State v. Keup, 265 Neb. 96, 655 N.W.2d 25 (2003). Consequently, the issue before us in the instant case is whether the violation of the constitutional principle articulated in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), constitutes plain error. An appellate court always reserves the right to note plain error which was not complained of at trial. State v. Davlin, 263 Neb. 283, 639 N.W.2d 631 (2002). Plain error exists where there is error, plainly evident from the record but not complained of at trial, which prejudicially affects a substantial right of a litigant and is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. Id. The error in the instant case is plainly evident from the record under the current state of the law, if not at the time of trial. In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that in a case such as thiswhere the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appealit is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration. The Court observed that to hold otherwise would result in counsel's inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing precedent. 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544. In this case, the settled law at the time of trial was that a jury was not required to find the aggravating circumstances underlying a capital sentence. See, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), overruled, Ring, supra ; State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000). In fact, Mata was sentenced even prior to the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the jurisprudential source of the Sixth Amendment principle established by Ring. Lotter, ante 266 Neb. pp. 245, 260, 664 N.W.2d 892, 907 (2003). Nonetheless, pursuant to Ring and Johnson, the error committed was plain for purposes of this appeal. We also have little difficulty in concluding that a substantial right of Mata's has been prejudicially affected, given the prevailing view that an Apprendi violation, for purposes of plain error review, affects a substantial right of the defendant when the outcome of the trial court proceedings has been prejudicially influenced, i.e., the sentence imposed has been increased beyond that authorized by the jury's verdict. See, e.g., U.S. v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1078, 123 S.Ct. 680, 154 L.Ed.2d 578; U.S. v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Robinson, 250 F.3d 527 (7th Cir.2001); U.S. v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434 (5th Cir.2001); U.S. v. Butler, 238 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir.2001). Nor can it be said that the evidence of aggravating circumstances presented in this case is overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted, such that the trier of fact would surely have made the same finding as the sentencing panel. Compare United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (finding Apprendi violation was not plain error because evidence of fact increasing penalty was overwhelming and uncontroverted). We have recently applied the plain error doctrine to correct errors that are, viewed objectively, less threatening to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process than the error presented in the instant case. For example, we have held that the use of a defendant's prior convictions to enhance the defendant's sentence absent proof in the record that the prior convictions were obtained at a time when the defendant was represented by counsel or had knowingly waived such right is plain error. State v. Thomas, 262 Neb. 985, 637 N.W.2d 632 (2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 918, 123 S.Ct. 303, 154 L.Ed.2d 203; State v. Nelson, 262 Neb. 896, 636 N.W.2d 620 (2001). In State v. Ildefonso, 262 Neb. 672, 634 N.W.2d 252 (2001), we found plain error where a defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for first degree murder and a consecutive term of years for a weapons charge, but his time served was erroneously credited to the life sentence rather than to the consecutive sentence. We also found plain error where a defendant convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol was erroneously ordered to participate in alcohol assessment as part of the sentencing order, instead of during the presentencing proceedings. State v. Hansen, 259 Neb. 764, 612 N.W.2d 477 (2000). We found plain error where a defendant was erroneously sentenced to a term of 2 to 4 years in prison, where the statutory minimum sentence could not exceed 20 months' imprisonment. State v. Bartholomew, 258 Neb. 174, 602 N.W.2d 510 (1999). When compared with the foregoing instances of plain error, it is evident that to ignore the error evident from the record in the instant case would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. See State v. Davlin, 263 Neb. 283, 639 N.W.2d 631 (2002). We are not at liberty to ignore the clear instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court. In State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 193, 583 N.W.2d 31, 34 (1998), we stated that `[t]o use a ... waiver as a means of ignoring a plain error that results in an unconstitutional incarceration would place form over substance; would damage the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process; and would render the plain error doctrine ... meaningless.' Here, where the unconstitutionally imposed sentence is execution instead of incarceration, this principle is even more compelling. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the violation of the constitutional principle articulated in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and applied to Nebraska law in State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003), was plain error that we cannot leave uncorrected. Consequently, we must vacate Mata's death sentence due to reversible error in the sentencing proceedings, and remand the cause to the district court for resentencing. See Gales, supra, citing State v. Reeves, 258 Neb. 511, 604 N.W.2d 151 (2000).