Opinion ID: 2831824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Imprisonment Portion of Sentence

Text: Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014). We first look to whether the district court committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory guideline range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, 1 selecting a sentence based on clearly 1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for 2 Case: 14-12900 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 3 of 17 erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Id. The duty to adequately explain the sentence imposed is satisfied when the appellate court can conclude that the sentencing court considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal decisionmaking authority. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Then, we examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Cubero, 754 F.3d at 892. The party challenging a sentence has the burden to show that the sentence is unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). We will reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1191 (quotation marks omitted).
Before the district court, Defendant requested a downward variance based on the Sentencing Commission’s 2013 Report to Congress (“the 2013 Report”), which recommended revisions to the Guideline’s provisions for non-production child deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 3 Case: 14-12900 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 4 of 17 pornography offenses (U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2) to reflect technological changes in the way typical offenders receive and distribute child pornography. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offenses (December 2012). Relying on the concerns raised in the 2013 Report about the § 2G2.2 enhancements, Defendant argued that a within-Guideline sentence would overstate his level of culpability and potential for dangerousness. The district court denied Defendant’s request for a variance. On appeal, Defendant contends that the district court procedurally erred by not giving sufficient reasons to justify its refusal to downwardly vary. He argues that the 2013 Report provides a nonfrivolous reason for a downward variance, and thus the district court should have more extensively articulated its reasons for declining to vary from the calculated range. We disagree. We have previously rejected an identical argument that the 2013 Report requires the district court to give more extensive reasons for the chosen sentence. See Cubero, 754 F.3d at 901 (holding that “the 2013 [R]eport does not heighten the district court’s statutory duty to state the reasons for imposing a particular sentence”). Moreover, in this case, the district court did give a detailed explanation of its sentencing decision. In imposing sentence, the district court specifically acknowledged Defendant’s arguments regarding the 2013 Report and noted that, in the report, the Sentencing Commission indicated that the following 4 Case: 14-12900 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 5 of 17 factors should be the primary considerations: (1) the contents of an offender’s child pornography collection and the nature of his collection behavior; (2) the offender’s degree of involvement with other offenders; and (3) the offender’s history of engaging in sexual abuse or exploitative or predatory conduct. The court then went on to explain its consideration of these factors as they applied to Defendant. First, the court acknowledged that Defendant had no history of engaging in other sexually abusive or predatory conduct. But the court also expressed its concern with (1) Defendant’s involvement with other offenders in the internet community through his participation in a peer-to-peer file-sharing network; (2) the presence of a shared folder on Defendant’s computer that advertised and made available more than 650 files with hashtags and names consistent with child pornography; and (3) the contents of Defendant’s pornography collection which included 58 videos (the equivalent of over 4,000 images) of minors engaging in sexually explicitly conduct. With regard to these videos, the district court noted that the vast majority of the videos were longer than five minutes, at least six of the videos involved very young children, and some of the videos involved sadistic and masochistic images, including one that showed the bondage of a nine-year old girl. The district court also weighed and discussed the § 3553(a) factors as applied to Defendant’s case, including the nature and circumstances of the offense, 5 Case: 14-12900 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 6 of 17 Defendant’s history and characteristics, and the need to promote respect for the law, provide adequate deterrence and just punishment, and protect the public. In light of this detailed explanation, we conclude that the district court adequately explained its chosen sentence, and thus Defendant’s sentence is procedurally reasonable.
Defendant has also not shown that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Defendant’s 97-month sentence is at the low end of the advisory Guideline range of 97 to 121 months’ imprisonment, and well below the 20-year statutory maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). See United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, while we do not apply a presumption, we ordinary expect a sentence inside the advisory guidelines range to be reasonable); United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing the fact that the sentence imposed was well below the statutory maximum as an indication of reasonableness). The record does not support Defendant’s arguments on appeal that the district court “gave no weight” to either the 2013 Report or the mitigating facts he presented at sentencing.2 In imposing sentence, the district court acknowledged it 2 Defendant argued that: (1) his offense involved no physical abuse of, or any contact with, any minor; (2) his offense did not involve any actual distribution or intent to distribute the images downloaded using the peer-to-peer software, but rather the images he downloaded and 6 Case: 14-12900 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 7 of 17 had considered Defendant’s arguments, but ultimately concluded that Defendant’s arguments were insufficient to warrant a downward variance. A district court is not required to expressly address each mitigation argument advanced by a defendant. United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Even so, the district court here addressed the concerns raised by the 2013 Report and acknowledged the existence of a psychosexual evaluation report, which opined that Defendant was not likely to reoffend. See part I.B, supra. Additionally, the district court specifically noted Defendant’s argument that his history of mental illness justified a sentence at the low end of the Guideline range. 3 We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court when it denied Defendant’s request for a downward variance after concluding that his alleged mitigating factors were outweighed by (1) the nature of certain videos that Defendant had downloaded; (2) the number and length of the videos he downloaded; (3) the fact that he had been downloading child pornography since 2005 and that he could easily do so through the internet; (4) the fact that Defendant’s shared folder advertised more than 650 files of child pornography; and (5) the seriousness of child pornography offenses, given the continuing harm saved were for his own personal use; and (3) a psychosexual evaluator found that Defendant posed little risk of recidivism. 3 Defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2006, but during the course of his criminal proceedings he refused to take medication necessary to control the mental instability that this condition can cause. 7 Case: 14-12900 Date Filed: 08/28/2015 Page: 8 of 17 suffered by the victims. See United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (stating that “[t]he weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” (quotation marks omitted)). Further, the court’s refusal to vary downward based on the 2013 Report does not render Defendant’s sentence substantively unreasonable. We have previously held that “[w]hile a district court may certainly consider the 2013 [R]eport in choosing the ultimate sentence, the report does not invalidate § 2G2.2,” and “use of § 2G2.2 as an advisory guideline” does not make the resulting sentence substantively unreasonable, “limit the district court’s discretion to determine what weight to give each § 3553(a) factor,” or “require the district court to vary from the § 2G2.2-based guidelines range.” See Cubero, 754 F.3d at 900. For all these reasons, Defendant has failed to show that his 97-month sentence is substantively unreasonable.