Opinion ID: 887107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clash of Separation and Neutrality

Text: ¶ 67 We are left with competing mandates under the Religion Clauses. On the one hand, neutrality requires that states use neutral criteria in determining eligibility for government benefits that pay no regard to the applicants' religious beliefs. On the other hand, the separation principle requires that, if the application of neutral criteria leads to a question of religious doctrine, then the state is prevented from interpreting that religious doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has stated that there is room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005), ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020, 1029 (quotation marks omitted), but it has made clear that the Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union (1989), 492 U.S. 573, 594, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472, 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in this case, if the government's examination of resources available to the Claimants requires delving into the religious beliefs of the Claimants or the tenets of their religion  thereby taking a position on questions of religious belief or making adherence to a religion relevant to the Claimants' standing in the political community  separation must take precedence over the application of neutral criteria. In short, separation trumps neutrality if neutrality leads to a governmental interpretation of religious doctrine. ¶ 68 The Court, in ¶¶ 40 and 41, disagrees with this proposition, stating that the Department's application of neutral criteria in the face of a citizen's exercise of his or her religion is as it should be. See ¶ 41. However, the law does not permit the inquiry to stop there. Neutral criteria is not the universal solution to all Religion Clause issues: Establishment Clause doctrine provides a minimum level of church-state separation against even religiously neutral government actions. In other words, not only has the separation of church and state not been eclipsed by religious neutrality, but separation is actually the more fundamental Establishment Clause value. As such, separation remains a necessary check on interactions between religion and government that pass muster under neutrality analysis. Gedicks, 43 B.C. L.Rev. at 1076 (emphasis added). Thus, the neutrality principle alone, though it may have resolved the issue before the United States Supreme Court in Zelman, as the Court notes, cannot alone resolve the very different issue here. ¶ 69 DPHHS was thus entitled to examine the Claimants' resources in the same manner as it would those of any other applicant. Because that includes looking to resources available to the applicants under a trust, DPHHS was correct to inquire whether a trust existed, whether KCR was the trustee, and what provisions governed the trust. DPHHS explains that, in doing so, it evaluated King Colony Articles of Incorporation, the King Colony By-Laws, the Constitution of the Hutterian Brethren Church and Rules as to Community of Property, statements of Hutterite leaders, and federal and state statutes. However, DPHHS also explains that it evaluated the teachings and tenets of the Hutterite Church as set forth in various religious and scholarly writings.... The Religion Clauses require that we carefully scrutinize this action.