Opinion ID: 2584235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The March Order Violated the HPA Guidelines.

Text: Because we find that the HPA's minimum term decision was in violation of the HPA Guidelines, we do not reach the question whether the HPA violated Coulter's constitutional due process rights. The HPA adopted the HPA Guidelines for Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonment pursuant to HRS § 706-669(8), which states: The authority shall establish guidelines for the uniform determination of minimum sentences which shall take into account both the nature and degree of the offense of the prisoner and the prisoner's criminal history and character. The guidelines shall be public records and shall be made available to the prisoner and to the prosecuting attorney and other interested government agencies. HRS § 706-669(8) (1993). Section III of the Guidelines, entitled Issuance of Decision, states that [t]he Order Establishing Minimum Terms of Imprisonment [ ] will include the specific minimum terms(s) . . ., the level of punishment . . ., and the significant criteria upon which the decision was based. Coulter asserts that the HPA violated its guidelines because its March 2003 minimum term order failed to specify either the level of punishment or the significant criteria upon which the decision was based, as required by the HPA Guidelines. The failure to include this information, Coulter argues, was arbitrary and capricious. The proposition that the government must follow the rules it sets out for itself is not controversial. Here, where the legislature has delegated the creation of guidelines for the uniform determination of minimum sentences to the HPA, the HPA is not free to ignore the guidelines it has established. Cf. Peek v. Thompson, 160 Or.App. 260, 980 P.2d 178, 181 (1999) (plurality opinion) (Even if an agency is not required to adopt a rule, once it has done so it must follow what it adopted.). Even though these guidelines do not have the force of statutory law, compliance with such rules is required to serve the legislature's goal of uniform determination of minimum sentences. HRS § 706-669(8). Indeed, this court has described the availability of such guidelines as one of the procedural protections afforded to prisoners by statute. See Williamson, 97 Hawai`i at 194, 35 P.3d at 221. Deviating from such rules, without explanation, constitutes arbitrary or capricious action that violates a prisoner's right to uniform determination of his or her minimum sentence. [4] See id. at 195, 35 P.3d at 222 ([J]udicial intervention is appropriate where the HPA has . . . acted arbitrarily and capriciously so as to give rise to a due process violation. . . . ). Nor does the State contest the fact that the March Order was not in conformity with the HPA Guidelines. The only remaining question, then, is whether any other consideration renders HPA's omission harmless or otherwise deprives Coulter of a remedy. The State makes two arguments: (1) that the deficiency was cured by the December 2003 order, rendering Coulter's complaint moot; and (2) that Coulter did not suffer any actual prejudice such that he is entitled to a remedy.