Opinion ID: 2507084
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: National Church Documents

Text: Timberridge joined the PCUSA when the reunited national church was established in 1983. There is no dispute that at that time (1) the PCUSA's governing constitution plainly stated that local churches hold their property in trust for the use and benefit of the general church, see BOO § G-8.0201, and (2) the governing constitution of the general church that Timberridge had previously belonged to, the PCUS, contained an identical trust provision, see BOCO § 6.3. Moreover, when Timberridge affiliated with the PCUSA, it agreed that it was a local expression of the universal church, BOO § G-4.0102, that it would be governed by this Constitution, § G-4.0104, that its active members have voluntarily submitted to the government of this church, § G-5.0202, and that it would function under the provisions of this Constitution. § G-7.0101. Timberridge then had the right to leave the PCUSA for eight years, taking its property with it, see Article 13 of PCUSA Articles of Agreement, but instead it stayed. And while Timberridge purported to opt out of the property provisions of the Book of Order pursuant to its November 1987 letter to the Presbytery, it plainly could not opt out of the property trust provision in Section G-8-0201, which mirrored the one in Section 6.3 of the PCUS Book of Church Order. See BOO § G-8.0701 (stating that a local church could opt out of a property provision of the BOO within eight years of the formation of the PCUSA only if the local church was not subject to a similar provision of the Constitution of the church of which it was a part before the PCUSA was formed). [4] Thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals' view that the PCUSA unilateral[ly] impos[ed] the trust provision without any assent by the local church, see 307 Ga.App. at 200, 705 S.E.2d 262, Timberridge's act of affiliating with the PCUSA in 1983 with the trust provision already in its governing constitution demonstrated that Timberridge assented to that relinquishment of its property rightsrights it then chose not to reassert by leaving the new national church during the next eight years. The creation of TPC Inc. in 1984 and the transfer of Timberridge's property to that corporate entity in 1999 further demonstrated Timberridge's acceptance of the trust provision, as discussed in the last subdivision. And Timberridge's continued membership in the PCUSA, for nearly a quarter of a century in all, with the trust provision always in full effect, further bolsters this conclusion. See Barber, 274 Ga. at 359, 552 S.E.2d 90; Crumbley, 243 Ga. at 345, 254 S.E.2d 330. For these reasons, in considering the national church's constitution in this case, we need not address the more difficult question of whether a general church may amend its governing documents, pursuant to procedures agreed upon by it and its member churches, to add an explicit property trust provision and make that trust apply to the property of its existing members, particularly where the evidence does not indicate that the national church historically had authority over local church property. See Kemp, 288 Ga. at 331-332, 704 S.E.2d 175 (Carley, P.J., dissenting in part). [5] However that question is resolved, it may be incorrect to characterize such an amendment as the unilateral imposition of a trust provision, as the Court of Appeals did here, see 307 Ga.App. at 200, 705 S.E.2d 262, if the national church enacted the trust provision pursuant to rules of representative government that the local and national churches previously agreed to follow, see BOO §§ G-4.0104, G-7.0101, and in which the local church's representatives could and did participate. We also need not address TPC Inc.'s contention that the procedures used by the PCUS and the PCUSA to adopt the property trust provisions of the Book of Church Order and the Book of Order were flawed. See Rector, etc., of Christ Church, 305 Ga.App. at 97, 699 S.E.2d 45 (holding that the First Amendment precludes a court from questioning the validity of the process by which the church legislates); Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal.4th 467, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 275, 198 P.3d 66, 80 (2009) (same), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 179, 175 L.Ed.2d 41 (2009). Our conclusion regarding the effect of the local and national church documents in this case is consistent with the precedent of the United States Supreme Court, this Court, and many state courts. The decisions from other states on which Presiding Justice Carley's dissent principally relies are readily distinguishable [6] or wrongly decided, [7] and Judge Benefield's dissent cites no precedent that supports her position. [8] Finally, we reject Judge Benefield's assertion that the neutral principles doctrine, and particularly its consideration of church governing documents, creates a bias for the national church. Dis. Op. at 465. Before Jones v. Wolf , courts normally resolved property disputes in hierarchical denominations simply by deferring to the decision of the general church's ecclesiastical authorities. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726-729, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871). That approach was biased toward the national church-and it should be noted that the four Justices who dissented in Jones v. Wolf did not suggest that the neutral principles doctrine was insufficiently fair to local churches but instead wanted to continue simply to defer to the general church to avoid First Amendment concerns. See 443 U.S. at 620-621, 99 S.Ct. 3020 (Powell, J., dissenting). The neutral principles doctrine, as approved by the majority in Jones v. Wolf and as applied by this Court, allows hierarchical denominations to structure the property relationships between the general and local churches before disputes arise. The result is not pre-ordained; it depends on the deeds, statutes, and national and church governing documents. What has happened over the years since Jones v. Wolf is that many hierarchical denominations have added more explicit property provisions to their general and local church governing documents, as the Supreme Court said would be appropriate. See 443 U.S. at 606, 99 S.Ct. 3020. Thus, instead of our finding no mention of property issues in those documents, see Jones II, 244 Ga. at 389-390, 260 S.E.2d 84 (finding no trust for the general church where review of the corporate charters, relevant deeds, and the organizational constitutions of the denomination found only silence), we find provisions showing either that the general church does not control local church property, see Georgia Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, 267 Ga. at 61 & n. 2, 472 S.E.2d 66, or, as in this case and others, provisions showing that local church property is held in trust for the general church. Applying the neutral principles with an even hand, we simply enforce the intent of the parties as reflected in their own governing documents; to do anything else would raise serious First Amendment concerns.