Opinion ID: 715730
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Structure and Application of Plea Bargain

Text: 42 Appellant asserts that the package deal plea bargain offered by the government was inherently coercive. We have recognized that threats to prosecute or promises of leniency to third persons to induce guilty pleas can pose a danger of coercion and therefore require special care to insure that the plea was in fact entered voluntarily and was not the product of coercion. Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988, 107 S.Ct. 582, 93 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986). Moreover, we have noted that the inclusion of such third persons can increase the leverage possessed by prosecutors and therefore imposes upon them a high standard of good faith. Id. (citing United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir.1979)). Nevertheless, we have insisted that an accused's choice be respected, and if he  'elects to sacrifice himself for such motives, that is his choice.'  Mosier, 790 F.2d at 66 (citing Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795, 798 (1st Cir.1959)). 43 The package deal in the instant case survives this standard of special care. In contrast to the instant case, the previously cited line of cases involved third persons who had particularly close bonds to the accused: either related by marriage or affianced to the accused. 4 The record in the instant case does not indicate any comparable bonds between Appellant and the codefendants offered the package deal. Rather, it appears that Appellant's ultimate acceptance of the plea bargain was not an act of sacrifice, but rather an attempt to avoid a harsher sentence. Further, there is no claim or indication that the prosecutors in the instant case did not act in good faith in securing Appellant's plea bargain. Therefore, there is nothing to suggest that the structure or application of the package deal was improperly coercive. 44