Opinion ID: 2160337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions to the Jury on Alleged Violations of the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (the Aytes Claims).

Text: In instructing the jury, the trial court gave common instructions on the McDaniel and Aytes claims based on alleged common-law negligence for failure to properly maintain the shoulder. In addition, on the claims of the Aytes plaintiffs only, the following additional instructions were given concerning their allegations that the State improperly failed to erect soft shoulder signs and edge-line striping: INSTRUCTION NO. 17 In addition [to their common-law claims], the Aytes plaintiffs assert that the State was negligent in not posting a soft shoulder sign or not installing or maintaining edgeline striping. The particulars of these grounds of negligence are explained in other instructions.... INSTRUCTION NO. 19 As to the [Aytes] plaintiffs' allegations that the State was negligent in not installing edgeline striping and in not posting a soft shoulder sign, you are instructed that these claims are to be evaluated as to whether that decision complied with generally recognized engineering or safety standards. If you find that not installing edgeline striping or not posting such signs complied with such standards, then that is evidence the State was not negligent. If, on the other hand, you find that this does not comply with such standards, then that is evidence the State was negligent. INSTRUCTION NO. 21 Evidence has been introduced concerning certain standards, policies and procedures set forth in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices. . . . If you find that the State has failed to comply with such Manual or policies, then that is evidence the State was negligent. If, on the other hand, you find that they have complied, then that is evidence the State was not negligent. The Aytes plaintiffs objected to the form of Instruction No. 21 on the ground that the jury should have been advised that a violation of the sign manual constituted negligence per se rather than merely being some evidence of negligence. On appeal, they urge that the court's failure to alter the instruction in response to that objection was error. In seeking to uphold the challenged instruction, the State urges that the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices is only a flexible guide which, by itself, does not determine the necessity of when and where to place the traffic control devices which it describes. The final determination on that issue, the State urges, is measured by the independent engineering judgment of the responsible public officials. This is the view of the uniform manual espoused in Toumberlin v. Haas, 236 Kan. 138, 144, 689 P.2d 808, 814 (1984). The role which the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices plays in determining the legal obligations of a public agency mandated by law to employ it was considered in Schmitt v. Clayton County, 284 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1979). Although that case involved the responsibility of local authorities, we believe that it also provides an accurate standard for determining the similar obligations placed on state officials. Local authorities are statutorily mandated to conform to the uniform manual by Iowa Code section 321.255 (1985). Use of the manual by state officials is mandated by section 321.252 and section 321.253. For purposes of determining the legal obligations of the respective public agencies, we find that the statutory schemes are identical. In Schmitt, we recognized that the uniform manual itself incorporates an exercise of engineering judgment. Notwithstanding that fact, we unequivocally stated: [T]he duty of the [public agency] is of a general nature, involving an exercise of due care under the circumstances to warn traffic of changing or dangerous road conditions. While engineering knowledge and skills may well be utilized by the [public agency] in fulfilling its obligation, the ... obligation is stated in broader terms. Compliance with recognized or, in the case of the manual, statutorily mandated engineering procedures would be most relevant to whether [the public agency] has properly discharged its function. [Its] duty is not necessarily coterminous with [an] engineer's professional judgment. The ultimate question is whether the public had reasonable warning of the road conditions it would face, not whether the ... engineer acted within the bounds of his professional discretion, although there would or could be much evidence common to these determinations. Id. at 189 (emphasis added). Based on what was decided in Schmitt, we conclude that the applicable statutes (§§ 321.253 and 321.255) which adopt the uniform manual also adopt by incorporation the engineering standard which the manual contains. Notwithstanding this incorporation, Schmitt indicates that the engineering determinations which are required to implement the manual are not dispositive of the legal liability of the public agency. The trial court's instruction on the legal significance of the uniform manual is therefore not subject to the objection lodged by plaintiffs. The legal obligation of the public body to install adequate warning devices continues to be a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances. Schmitt, 284 N.W.2d at 189. Other instructions, not objected to by plaintiffs, covered the State's obligation of due care in the installation of warning devices. No other standard of care was referred to in the instructions. Consequently, the marshaling instruction necessarily required application of the due care standard in determining all of the negligence claims. The requirements of the uniform manual were properly accorded evidentiary significance in making those determinations. This procedure accords with the standard approved in Schmitt. We find no basis for reversing the judgment of the district court. The judgment is affirmed. AFFIRMED.