Opinion ID: 1157295
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Holdings on Appeal

Text: 1. We agree that the plaintiff's claim for fraud in the inducement of the contract is barred by the four-year statute of limitation of OCGA § 9-3-31. Cases such as Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Green, 142 Ga. App. 770 (237 SE2d 10) (1977) and Shipman v. Horizon Corp., 245 Ga. 808 (267 SE2d 244) (1980) support this ruling. As held in Shipman, the statute of limitations as to actual fraud is tolled until the fraud is discovered or reasonable diligence should have been discovered; as to constructive fraud, mere silence does not toll the statute of limitation by debarring the plaintiff from bringing his action. Here, the plaintiff's claim is for actual fraud, and the evidence fully supports the superior court's ruling that through reasonable diligence it should have been discovered earlier than within four years of the filing of suit. 2. We disagree with the superior court's computation of the time periods during which the four-year statute of limitation of OCGA § 9-3-30 bars recovery for damages to realty. OCGA § 9-3-30 provides, All actions for trespass upon or damages to realty shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues. As held in Cox v. Cambridge Square Towne Houses, 239 Ga. 127 (236 SE2d 73) (1977), this means that, as to a continuing tort, only damages alleged to have occurred within four years of the plaintiff's bringing suit are not barred. Here, suit was brought in 1982. Therefore, only damages to the plaintiff's realty alleged to have occurred within four years of his bringing suit are not barred by the statute of limitation. Stated another way, all claims for damages to realty occurring prior to 1978 are barred. The grant in part and denial in part of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this question should be adjusted accordingly. 3. The superior court correctly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to any punitive-damage claim based on fraud in the inducement. See Div. 1, supra. Similarly, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's punitive-damage claim was also correctly granted, insofar as the plaintiff's punitive-damage claim is based on damages to realty for the years not within four years of the bringing of suit. Insofar as the punitive-damage claim is based on damages to realty occurring within four years of suit, it is not barred by the statute of limitation. Therefore, to this extent, the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment should have been denied. 4. It is also clear that the superior court, employing the criteria for determining the existence of an implied duty to mine set out in Higginbottom, supra, and the cases cited therein, correctly ruled that there is no implied duty to mine under the language of the mineral lease in this case. 5. Any remaining errors enumerated by the appellant have been reviewed and found to be without merit. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., not participating.