Opinion ID: 2003960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Federal Action and CPLR 205 (a)

Text: In their federal court action, petitioners pleaded a claim under Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 207 (C) (1) to assert a violation of the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution. The relevant claim stated that [t]he Determination and Findings [of ESDC] do not conform, and result from proceedings that did not conform, with the United States Constitution (amended complaint ¶ 176, quoted in Goldstein v Pataki, 488 F Supp 2d 254, 275 n 9 [ED NY 2007]). Defendants moved to dismiss this claim on various grounds, and the District Court referred the motion to a magistrate judge for a Report and Recommendation. The matter was briefed and orally argued before the magistrate judge, who noted that, although petitioners assert a supplemental state law claim under New York Eminent Domain Procedure Law (`EDPL') § 207 ( Goldstein v Pataki, 2007 WL 1695573, , 2007 US Dist LEXIS 44491,  [ED NY, Feb. 23, 2007]), the Amended Complaint contains no claim under the state constitution ( id. n 5). Petitioners themselves emphasized this point in their objection to the Report and Recommendation, stating that [t]o be sure, Plaintiffs have pled a supplemental claim under EDPL § 207. However, this putative `state law' claim merely asserts that Defendants' use of eminent domain violates the federal Constitution because it will serve no public use. No underlying state claim is pled. The District Court accepted this argument, stating that no state constitutional issue seems to be at play in this case. Plaintiffs' Section 207 (C) (1) claim is that `[t]he Determination and Findings do not conform, and result from proceedings that did not conform, with the United States Constitution.' That claim does not refer to the New York Constitution ( Goldstein, 488 F Supp 2d at 275 n 9 [citation omitted]). On the merits, the District Court concluded that petitioners had not sufficiently alleged that the takings at issue violate[d] the public use requirement of the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution ( id. at 278), and so dismissed the case. Regarding petitioners' Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 207 claim, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because it was dismissing all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. The District Court then dismissed the section 207 claim without prejudice to its being re-filed in state court ( id. at 291). [5] The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed suit, and affirm[ed] the judgment of the district court dismissing the federal claims with prejudice and the state claim without prejudice ( Goldstein v Pataki, 516 F3d 50, 65 [2d Cir 2008]). As noted previously, petitioners filed this lawsuit exactly six months after the Second Circuit's decision. But because petitioners' section 207 (C) (1) claim, which asserted violation of the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution only, was substantively identical to their 42 USC § 1983 claim for violation of the Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution, the District Court's dismissal of petitioners' section 1983 claim on the merits effectively resolved their section 207 (C) (1) claim on the merits as well. While a dismissal with prejudice clearly constitutes an adjudication on the merits, a dismissal without prejudice only `indicates,' as a general matter, that there has been no adjudication on the merits of the claim ( ITT Corp. v Intelnet Intl., 366 F3d 205, 214 n 17 [3d Cir 2004]). And whether the federal courts' dismissal of petitioners' section 207 (C) (1) claim was upon the merits within the meaning of CPLR 205 (a) is a matter of state law for us to determine applying state precedents. We are not, as the majority suggests, somehow foreclosed from independently assessing this question by the federal courts' pro forma dismissal of petitioners' section 207 cause of action in its entirety ( see n 5, supra at 544). Further, petitioners' subsequent filing of this Eminent Domain Procedure Law § 207 (C) (1) claim does not serve[] the salutary purpose of CPLR 205 (a), which is to prevent[] a Statute of Limitations from barring recovery where the action, at first timely commenced, had been dismissed due to a technical defect which can be remedied in a new action ( United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Smith Co., 46 NY2d 498, 505 [1979]; see also Matter of Winston v Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Bd., 224 AD2d 160, 164 n 2 [2d Dept 1996] [stating that CPLR 205 (a) is designed to prevent claims from being irreversibly extinguished following technical-type dismissals]; Hakala v Deutsche Bank AG, 343 F3d 111, 115 [2d Cir 2003] [The purpose of (section) 205 (a) is to avert unintended and capricious unfairness by providing that if the first complaint was timely but was dismissed for . . . curable reasons, the suit may be reinstituted within six months of the dismissal]). Petitioners' section 207 (C) (1) claim was not dismissed by the District Court because of a technical defect or curable reason. Rather, petitioners elected to assert a section 207 (C) (1) claim in their federal court action, and further chose to confine this claim to the same federal constitutional grounds that the federal court decided on the merits.