Opinion ID: 1901509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Issue 6 Constitutionality of (d)(9) Aggravating Circumstance

Text: May next claims that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9) [17] is unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied, because the term significant history, as used in this aggravating circumstance, is not defined under Pennsylvania law. Because counsel for his trial, sentencing hearings, and direct appeals never raised the claim, May alleges ineffective assistance. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have addressed the substance of the claim, finding it meritless. The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed a vagueness claim against a portion of the death penalty statute of the State of California, which states, in determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into consideration . . . the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involves the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 969, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994); Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 190.3(b). In upholding the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: [This aggravating circumstance] is phrased in conventional and understandable terms and rests in large part on a determination whether certain events occurred, thus asking the jury to consider matters of historical fact. . . . Both a backward-looking and forward-looking inquiry are a permissible part of the sentencing process ... and the States have considerable latitude in determining how to guide the sentencer's decision in this respect. Here, [the challenged aggravator] is not vague. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 976-77, 114 S.Ct. 2630. [18] It is noteworthy that the statutory language upheld in Tuilaepa is less restrictive than the language in the Pennsylvania statute. Specifically, the California statute stated that the presence of criminal activity could constitute an aggravating circumstance. The Pennsylvania statute requires more than a mere presence of such activity; rather, it requires a significant history. Similarly, the California statute allows any criminal activity to trigger the aggravating factor; the Pennsylvania law demands felony convictions. It is clear to this Court that where the less demanding standard of the California statute is constitutional, the same must be true of the statute in the case sub judice. Because May has failed to demonstrate how the Pennsylvania statute is unconstitutionally vague, we find his contention wholly without merit. In asserting that the (d)(9) aggravator is unconstitutionally vague as applied, May does nothing more than present that bald statement. His argument only attacks the statute as a whole, without indicating how it might be unconstitutionally applied to him while constitutionally applied to others. Because May's argument that this portion of the sentencing statute is unconstitutional is wholly unsupported, he fails to demonstrate arguable merit, and, therefore, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. Commonwealth v. Tilley, 566 Pa. 312, 780 A.2d 649 (2001).