Opinion ID: 745856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legal Bases for Sanctions

Text: 12 Appellants claim that the district court had no legal authority for its awards of sanctions. The facts, however, suggest quite the contrary. 13 In the Bonito and Toledano action, the district court's power to sanction appellants derives from several sources. First, the district court had authority to sanction appellants under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, which allows a court to assess costs and expenses, including legal fees, upon any counsel who recklessly or in bad faith multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See also Kanarek v. Hatch, 827 F.2d 1389, 1391 (9th Cir.1987). Second, under Local Rule 7.19, appellants were subject to sanctions at the court's discretion for filing their Hearing Brief on the day of the hearing in violation of Local Rule 7.6. See C.D.Cal.Local Rule 7.19 ([T]he failure to comply fully with [Rule 7] subjects the offender at the discretion of the Court to the sanctions of Local Rule 27.). Lastly, the district court properly relied on its inherent power to sanction appellants for their abusive litigation tactics. See In re Akros Installations, Inc., 834 F.2d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir.1987). Bonito and Toledano acted in bad faith and caused unnecessary delay and expense to Guardian Life in connection with the April 26, 1993 hearing; the district court had ample legal authority to impose sanctions against them. 14 In the Bonito action, in addition to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and a court's inherent power, the district court had authority to sanction Bonito under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 for his failure to make disclosures or cooperate in discovery. Bonito's attempts to prevent meaningful discovery from his clients and his misconduct during the depositions overseen by the Special Master, among others, justifies the district court's award of sanctions. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980).