Opinion ID: 510631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rogove

Text: 20 On March 4, 1986, Rogove travelled with his cohort Neal from New York to Portland to meet Dworken and Agent Cunniff. Rogove admits that this meeting was for the purpose of discussing the possibility of a drug deal. Neal told Agent Cunniff that [i]t comes down to the product, and price. Rogove himself insisted on seeing the drugs, stating, You know the whole thing is that we want a thing to see, to know whether we're enthusiastic.... We want to leave enthusiastic. The group (Dworken, Rogove, Neal, Cunniff and Trooper Spaulding) went to the Maine Mall to view a sample of the marijuana. Rogove later rejected an offer of $360 per pound, but suggested a price of $320 per pound. Neal said, I'll tell you right out to your face. We want it at 320. We both can take a dime. 21 Neal and Agent Cunniff then proceeded to haggle over price and quantity. It is clear from the tapes that Neal was speaking for both himself and Rogove, together as joint venturers. Rogove bragged that we and us guys are a team and we are gonna combine forces and we're gonna turn this into green.... [Y]ou gotta negotiate a price to get this to be ... viable. They all continued to bicker over the price, Neal and Rogove refusing to budge from their $320/pound offer. Neal boasted, however, of having easy access to a quarter million dollars for payment on the first few thousand pounds. Neal and Rogove left Maine without reaching a deal with Cunniff and Dworken. But the tone of the conversations is clear: Neal and Rogove were very interested in the possible deal, but were wary about the price and quality of the drugs. 22 Cunniff testified that three nights later he was phoned by Dworken and Rogove from New York. Rogove tried to persuade Cunniff to work out an acceptable deal. He said that although earlier he was prepared to take delivery on only 10,000 pounds, he was now willing to purchase 12,500. He offered $290 per pound, but refused to come up to Maine to consummate the deal. In a conversation shortly thereafter, Rogove said that he would be able to come up with a million dollars in cash as a down-payment, and asked that the marijuana be shipped the next day. Subsequent conversations in phone calls later that night contained further negotiations between Cunniff, Dworken, Rogove and Neal. 23 Several more phone conversations followed the next day. (Cunniff was contacted by Rogove several times in the course of a 24-hour period.) Rogove boasted that he had three and one half million dollars available, but noted his suspicions of the details of the deal. He said that he wanted to make money and did not want the deal to fall apart. Later, Rogove claimed to want to dissociate himself from Dworken, and to deal independently with Cunniff. In one conversation, Rogove spoke to Cunniff's associate, Agent Festa, who was impersonating Cunniff's boss. Rogove agreed to post a $500,000 down-payment on the deal. Rogove later told Cunniff that he would show the half-million dollars at a meeting in Boston. Later that evening, Rogove assented to bringing Dworken back into the deal as broker, and suggested that Cunniff contact Dworken. Dworken later insisted that Cunniff come to New York to see the down-payment. Cunniff refused, and the negotiations were broken off. 5 24 We have no trouble concluding that this extensive behavior both evidences and strongly corroborates a design to engage in criminal activity. There is no question but that what Rogove was doing was trying to work out a narcotics transaction. This endeavor was neither frivolous nor tentative. Rogove took great pains to pursue the deal and to pressure Cunniff to accept the transaction on Rogove's terms. 25 Rogove argues, however, that this evidence fails to establish either element (intent and corroborative substantial step) of the specific crime of attempt. As to intent, Rogove's claim, in essence, is that his intent to commit the substantive offense was conditional. Rogove focuses on the fact that he and Cunniff never reached agreement on the terms of the sale; all they did was negotiate. 26 We do not accept Rogove's theory of provisional intent. In all unconsummated crimes, the intent to complete the crime is contingent on certain conditions precedent. For example, a bank robbery plan will be carried out only if there are no law enforcement officials in the area, and if the plan progresses as anticipated. The question therefore becomes which conditional intents demonstrate the requisite propensity to engage in criminal activities. Cf. United States v. Anello, 765 F.2d 253, 262-63 (1st Cir.1985) (for purposes of criminal conspiracy, virtually all agreements are, to some extent, conditional; test for conspiratorial liability should focus on likelihood that condition precedent will be fulfilled). In keeping with the principles of the Model Penal Code, we hold that liability should attach if the defendant reasonably believed that the conditions would obtain. 6 27 There is no question here but that Rogove reasonably thought that he could work out a successful transaction. He and Neal made continuous and serious offers to Cunniff regarding the price and specifications of the deal. Rogove haggled over price, quality, volume, and location. He was prepared to make the deal, as long as Cunniff agreed to his terms. The jury could reasonably have found that Rogove affirmatively desire[d] to engage in the conduct or ... cause the result that w[ould] constitute the principle offense. Model Penal Code Part 1, Sec. 5.01, comment at 301. The possession of marijuana for the purpose of selling it was the objective of Rogove's actions, and he had every reason to believe that there was a reasonable likelihood that he would realize his goal. Even if his actions did not indicate a propensity to purchase narcotics under those conditions specified by Cunniff, they left no doubt that Rogove was ready and willing to purchase on his own terms. This satisfied the government's burden of showing the requisite intent. 7 28 Rogove next insists that he did not take the substantial steps necessary to strongly corroborate the seriousness of the culpable intent. He claims that his actions did not rise beyond the level of preparation, which allegedly is insufficient for attempt liability. 29 It has long been acknowledged that it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish preparation from attempt, and that attempt in fact includes much preparatory conduct. See Hall, Criminal Attempt--A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 49 Yale L.J. 789, 821-22 (1940). See also United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir.1950) (Judge Learned Hand) (The decisions are too numerous to cite, and would not help much anyway, for there is, and obviously can be, no definite line [between preparation and attempt].) The Model Penal Code has essentially eliminated the distinction. See also Wechsler, et al., Treatment of Inchoate Crimes, 61 Colum.L.Rev. at 612 (discussing breakdown of distinction); Levenbook, Prohibiting Attempts and Preparations, 49 UMKC L.Rev. 41 (1980) (advocating elimination of legal distinction). 30 We previously have suggested that the important question is not whether something constitutes preparation or attempt, but whether the behavior does strongly corroborate clear criminal intent. We have held that in order to constitute a substantial step leading to attempt liability, an actor's behavior must be  'of such a nature that a reasonable observer, viewing it in context could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that it was undertaken in accordance with a design to violate the statute.'  Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d at 870 (quoting Manley, 632 F.2d at 988). 8 This standard was adapted almost verbatim in the court's charge to the jury in this case. We find that there was overwhelming evidence to support the jury's verdict on this question--almost all of Rogove's behavior in connection with the events described at trial could have been undertaken only in accordance with a design to violate the statute. Indeed, there is little if any identifiable non -criminal design that could have been the focus of such acts. 31 Rogove's final and most substantial argument, and one that underlies all of his contentions as to attempt, is that he should not be held liable because, even if he did attempt to possess the narcotics, he abandoned that attempt of his own accord. Abandonment is a defense that we have acknowledged but never firmly adopted or rejected as a basis for reversal. See United States v. Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 226-27 & n. 7 (1st Cir.1987). Assuming arguendo that such a defense might in some circumstances be recognized, we find that Rogove has failed to establish such a defense here. 32 The theory of abandonment is that certain behavior indicates a renunciation of criminal intent, such that the dangerousness manifested by the criminal attempt is no longer viable. The Model Penal Code provides that: 33 When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt ..., it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose. 34 Section 5.01(4). This standard provides dual criteria for the renunciation of criminal purpose: it must be both complete and voluntary. The Code explains: 35 [R]enunciation is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, that increase the probability of detection or apprehension or that make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim. 36 Id. If a defendant introduces evidence that his renunciation was complete and voluntary, the prosecution would have the burden, under the procedure recommended by the Code, to prove that the behavior was not voluntary and complete. Model Penal Code Part 1, Sec. 5.01, comment at 358-59; Wechsler, et al., Treatment of Inchoate Crimes, 61 Colum.L.Rev. at 617. 37 Rogove failed to meet his burden of production here. Even if we assumed that his renunciation was voluntary, as that term is intended in the Model Penal Code, 9 he presented no evidence even to suggest that it was complete. The abandonment cannot be temporary or contingent, Model Penal Code Part 1, Sec. 5.01, comment at 358; Wechsler, et al., Treatment of Inchoate Crimes, 61 Colum.L.Rev. at 616-17; it must instead be a change of heart. Model Penal Code Part 1, Sec. 5.01, comment at 356; Wechsler, et al., Treatment of Inchoate Crimes, 61 Colum.L.Rev. at 615. Rogove does not claim that his abandonment here was categorical or complete; he was not renouncing a life of drug dealing. He was merely unsatisfied with the terms and conditions of Cunniff's particular offer. He was thwarted not by a change of heart, but by his inability to persuade Cunniff to adopt his preferred terms. His abandonment was, therefore, particular to this transaction, and not to possession of narcotics generally. The defense of renunciation is unavailing. 38 In sum, the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find that Rogove had attempted to possess narcotics for the purpose of delivering them, and Rogove failed to offer evidence of the sort of renunciation that would negate the presumption of dangerousness evidenced by his attempt. 39 Though no decision in this muddled area could possibly be consistent with all prior cases, we are supported in our holding by numerous decisions from other circuits finding attempt in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978 (2d Cir.1980) (defendant brought considerable amount of cash to home of prospective seller and was found running from a room in which cocaine was being weighed); United States v. Rivero, 532 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.1976) (defendant gave sample of cocaine to prospective buyer, offered jewelry for collateral on a downpayment, and agreed on a price); United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir.1974) (defendant requested and received $650 for ostensible purchase of heroin); United States v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315 (6th Cir.1983) (defendant inquired into possibility of purchasing cocaine, and arrived at putative seller's house with $3400); United States v. Mazzella, 768 F.2d 235 (8th Cir.1985) (defendant ordered and received precursor chemicals for manufacture of amphetamines, but had not started to manufacture); United States v. Scott, 767 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir.1985) (defendant called putative seller expressing interest in purchasing cocaine, and brought $4500 to agreed upon place of sale); United States v. DeRosa, 670 F.2d 889 (9th Cir.1982) (defendants arranged and coordinated sale of cocaine, but backed out when they became suspicious of police presence); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.1985) (defendant sent $15,000 for purchase of phenylacetone); United States v. McDowell, 705 F.2d 426 (11th Cir.1983) (defendant negotiated sale for kilogram of cocaine, but backed out of deal, before paying, after DEA agent refused to let him sample narcotics). 10 40 The most significant support, however, comes from United States v. Rivera-Sola, in which we upheld an attempt conviction in circumstances analogous to those we find here. The defendant in Rivera-Sola asserted to DEA agents that he was trying to raise money to purchase quaaludes, explained an elaborate distribution scheme, had numerous meetings and conversations with DEA agents and informants, and tested a sample of drugs. The defendant then became suspicious of the agents and cut off negotiations. In this case, Rogove asserted that he had the money to purchase the narcotics, negotiated at length for acceptable terms, came to Maine to deal with Cunniff, viewed the marijuana, and continued to dicker with Cunniff over price, quantity and location in numerous phone calls over a two-day period. He made several substantial, though conditional, offers to purchase. We cannot say that there is any material difference between this case and Rivera-Sola. The indicia of intent and the substantial corroborative steps were just as, if not more, substantial in the instant case. There was no ambiguity about what Rogove was trying to accomplish. 41 Rogove cites United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir.1982), and United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859 (2d Cir.1987), as authority for reversal here. In Joyce, the defendant flew from Oklahoma City to Saint Louis to meet with DEA agents posing as drug dealers. He was carrying $22,000 in cash. Joyce asked to see the cocaine, and said he could handle a pound for $20,000. He desisted in his effort to buy when the agent refused to open for inspection the package allegedly containing the cocaine. The appeals court held that Joyce had aborted his attempted possession when he abandoned his intention prior to the commission of a necessary step in the transaction, namely, handing over the money. 693 F.2d at 841. The court concluded that no attempt had been made. 42 In Delvecchio, the defendant had agreed, at a meeting with undercover DEA agents, to purchase five kilograms of heroin from the agents for nearly one million dollars. He never showed up for the agreed upon follow-up meeting, and later claimed to be not comfortable with the deal. The court held that verbal agreement alone, without more, is insufficient as a matter of law to support an attempt conviction. 816 F.2d at 862. 43 We think that both of these cases are distinguishable from the instant case, for the simple reason that Rogove did far more than either Joyce or (especially) Delvecchio to corroborate his criminal designs. But insofar as these two cases purport to establish a different standard from that we have adopted here, we must respectfully disagree with their analyses. In both cases, we think, the defendants' attempt was established by their very clear efforts to purchase narcotics. Each then abandoned this attempt. In each case, however, the abandonment seemed to be triggered by fear of apprehension rather than by any change of heart. There was no complete and voluntary renunciation of the general criminal intent to possess narcotics, merely a desisting in the attempts to purchase the narcotics in question, for fear of government involvement. 11