Opinion ID: 2463945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Closing Argument (Clayton's points 3 and 10)

Text: Clayton contends that the trial court plainly erred in allowing certain statements by the prosecutor during his guilt and penalty phase closing arguments. Rule 30.20. `Relief should be rarely granted on assertion of plain error to matters contained in closing argument, for trial strategy looms as an important consideration and such assertions are generally denied without explication. State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 134 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 834, 142 L.Ed.2d 690 (1999) ( citing State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Mo. banc 1986)) (emphasis in original); State v. Cobb, 875 S.W.2d 533, 537 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 896, 115 S.Ct. 250, 130 L.Ed.2d 172 (1994) ( citing State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Mo. banc 1986)). Furthermore, the instructions given to the jury safeguard against harm that might otherwise result from exaggerated closing argument by either prosecutor or defendant. State v. Owsley, 959 S.W.2d 789, 797 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 191, 142 L.Ed.2d 156 (1998). Under plain error review, a conviction will be reversed for improper arguments only when it is established that the argument had a decisive effect on the outcome of trial and amounts to manifest injustice. State v. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d 584, 596 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1082, 140 L.Ed.2d 140 (1998).
As his third point, Clayton complains about two statements made in the state's rebuttal at penalty phase. It is important to note that during its penalty phase closing argument defense counsel stated and we live in a civilization where we should try to make the punishment fit the criminal. In its rebuttal the state responded by stating: I think counsel said one thing here that is interesting, in that I think it shows the fallacy of what he has suggested to you. And that is he said the punishment should fit the criminal. You will find that nowhere in our law, nowhere in our tradition. Punishment should fit the crime. That's what you'll find in our law and in our tradition. The focus should not be on the criminal, but should be on the crime, and I think that is instructive.    Punishment here must fit the crime, and if it doesn't, then it diminishes us all. We are not here to judge Cecil Clayton as a person, we are here to punish him for the crime he's committed. There is a difference. The crime calls for the ultimate penalty, and that's what I ask you for. A prosecutor has considerable leeway to make retaliatory arguments at closing. Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 922. A prosecutor may retaliate to an issue raised by the defense even if the prosecutor's comment would be improper. State v. Walls, 744 S.W.2d 791, 798 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 181, 102 L.Ed.2d 150 (1988). The prosecutor's argument that the punishment should fit the crime was retaliation to defense counsel's statement that the punishment should fit the criminal since consideration of both the crime and the criminal is required to determine the appropriate sentence. See Storey, 901 S.W.2d at 902.
As his tenth point, Clayton contends that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the prosecutor to make a number of arguments during his guilt and penalty phase closing arguments.
During the state's closing argument at the guilt phase the prosecutor made reference to the testimony of defense expert Dr. Betty Back. Specifically, Clayton complains about the following statements: Well, he didn't plan in a socially acceptable manner. Well, I've never met a criminal who did. That is not only unlikely, it's preposterous. It's absolutely preposterous. Well, they don't have very good judgment. Well, as far as I'm concerned somebody who buys a Toyota doesn't have very good judgment because I don't like Toyotas. That doesn't mean there's anything wrong with their ability to reason. Folks, it's voodoo, that's all it is. It's an excuse.     Folks, not only could he discriminate, he did. And right now, at this moment, he continues and hopes that he can fool you. Don't be fooled. Prosecutors may also comment on the evidence and the credibility of witnesses, even to the point of belittling and/or discussing the improbability of specific testimony. State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 229 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 416, 139 L.Ed.2d 318 (1997); see also State v. Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 513 (Mo. banc 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 856, 117 S.Ct. 153, 136 L.Ed.2d 98 (1996).
Clayton complains about statements made by the prosecutor during its penalty phase closing argument. Clayton contends that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument went outside the evidence by suggesting that Clayton went to Dixie Seal's home to commit other crimes, by referring to his own experience as a soldier, and by stating that death was the appropriate penalty. And certainly if he intended some ill toward anyone else, which well may have been his intent at Dixie Seal's drive after the argument he had with Martha Ball, that would have broken the law as well. During closing argument, a prosecutor is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the evidence. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 229. While the prosecutor's statements may have suggested that Clayton went to Dixie Seal's home to commit other crimes, the statement can reasonably be inferred from the evidence presented in the case. Clayton also contends that the prosecutor went outside the evidence by referring to his own experience of being a soldier. Me, having been a soldier, I guess I can imagine reasons why a person would kill. I don't understand killing a police officer. If you'll kill a police officer, you would kill anyone. That is a figure of authority. Taken in context, this statement was made by the prosecutor while encouraging the jury to assess the most severe penalty, the death penalty. Urging a jury to impose the most severe penalty is proper argument. Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 596; Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919. Clayton further contends that the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument improperly personalized and denigrated the defense. In its penalty phase closing argument defense counsel stated, I ask you to impose a sentence of life, and not to impose a sentence of death simply because he's different or because he's defective. The prosecutor responded to this statement: Folks, what we're dealing with here is, yes, there is value in human life, and Christopher Castetter's life had value too, a great deal of value. And he did nothing wrong. A suggestion to you that there is something wrong with you issuing a death sentence where it is called for is preposterous. Again, it is proper for a prosecutor to seek and request the most severe penalty. See Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 596; Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919. It is also proper for a prosecutor to retaliate to statements made by defense counsel, even to the point of characterizing a defense theory as preposterous. See Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 229; Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 922.
Lastly, Clayton contends that the prosecutor improperly criticized him for exercising his constitutional rights. You cannot be compared to Cecil Clayton. You have done nothing wrong. Look at all the legal niceties we have danced through to get to the point where you can make this decision. Those legal niceties were not available to Christopher Castetter because one man chose to play God. Again, the prosecutor's argument seeks to obtain the most severe punishment. See Lyons, 951 S.W.2d at 596; Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919. The prosecutor's statement does not seek to punish movant for exercising his right to a trial by jury. Instead, the prosecutor's statement, read in context, highlights the nature and seriousness of the crime and movant's disregard for the law. State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 209 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1375, 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998) ( citing Antwine v. State, 791 S.W.2d 403, 410 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055, 111 S.Ct. 769, 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991)); see also Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 875. Clayton has not established that any manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice resulted from the prosecutor's closing arguments as asserted in his points 3 and 10. Those points are denied.