Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Must the Jury Hear Evidence of Mitigating Factor

Text: The penalty phase opened with defense counsel attempting to waive the jury during the penalty phase. The prosecutor would not consent, so the trial court, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(1), denied the application. Defense counsel then presented to the trial court the following statement, which the defendant wished to sign before the court: My attorney has explained to me my rights for a motion to a new trial to present evidence of mitigating factors at the death penalty phase in my case concerning the death of Amie Hoffman and also my right to appeal my conviction and the guilty verdict. I have told my attorney that I do not want anything done on my behalf and that I want to be executed within 60 days of my being sentenced to death. Defendant signed the statement in the trial court's presence. Defense counsel then informed the court that the defendant had instructed him to do absolutely nothing concerning the mitigating or sentencing phase of this case, including making no opening statement, not presenting evidence concerning mitigating factors, and making no summation. Pursuant to defendant's instructions, defense counsel presented no evidence during the penalty phase proceeding. He made no opening statement to the jury, nor did he offer any summation to the jury. Indeed, defendant even sought to stipulate to the aggravating factors. However, the trial court refused to accept that stipulation and decided that no stipulations would be accepted other than defendant's previous conviction of murder, and the State would have to prove the existence of the alleged aggravating factors. Defendant maintained his position throughout the sentencing phase and presented no mitigating evidence. Indeed, even after he was sentenced, defendant continued to resist further trial proceedings. He urged this Court to vacate the stay of execution that the court issued after the Office of the Public Defender filed a Notice of Appeal on defendant's behalf. We denied his motion. State v. Koedatich, supra, 98 N.J. 553. Defendant now alleges that his death sentence must be vacated because the jury heard no evidence of mitigating factors during the penalty phase. [13] Defendant makes two claims with respect to this issue. First, he argues that his waiver of his right to present mitigating evidence was invalid because it did not comply with Rule 3:9-2, which governs the acceptance of guilty pleas. Secondly, he argues that defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence, notwithstanding his own express instructions in that regard, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We are unpersuaded by defendant's first contention that the waiver was invalid. Specifically, we disagree with defendant's contention that the procedures employed in the instant case were insufficient to assure voluntariness. Defendant concedes that one may make a voluntary waiver of a constitutional right. However, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary, and whether such a waiver is made depends upon whether the totality of the circumstances supports that conclusion. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466-67 (1938); Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800 F. 2d 1057, 1065 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Ellison, 798 F. 2d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir.1986), cert. den., 479 U.S. 1038, 107 S.Ct. 893, 93 L.Ed. 2d 845 (1987); State v. McCombs, 81 N.J. 373, 378 (1979); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54 (1975). As the United States Supreme Court has recently stated in the context of a waiver of the right against self-incrimination: First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. [ Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 107 S.Ct. 851, 93 L.Ed. 2d 954, 965 (1987) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed. 2d 410, 421 (1986)).] Defendant claims that the waiver was not knowingly or voluntarily made. He analogizes this situation to the entering of a guilty plea, and argues that the court, at a minimum, should establish standards as stringent as those set forth in Rule 3:9-2, which requires completion of a detailed Administrative Office of the Courts form explaining the nature of the offense, the possible penalties and the rights he or she is waiving when entering a guilty plea. We find defendant's analogy to the guilty-plea context to be imperfect at best, since the trial court rejected the idea of a stipulation and required the State to prove its case during the penalty phase. In any event, our review of the record satisfies us that defendant's decision to forgo the presentation of mitigating evidence during the penalty phase was not the result of coercion. Rather, the record indicates that his waiver of that right was knowing and voluntary. The fact that defendant unequivocally expressed his wishes to the trial court, combined with his later attempt to waive his appeal rights, convinces us that he was aware of the consequences of his actions. Although we are unpersuaded by defendant's legal reasoning, we find persuasive policy reasons exist for not allowing a defendant in a capital case to execute even a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. These policy reasons are based substantially on the State's interest in a reliable penalty determination. People v. Deere, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P. 2d 925, 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1985); State v. Koedatich, supra, 98 N.J. at 554 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); State v. Hightower, 214 N.J. Super. 43, 44 (App.Div. 1986). In State v. Hightower , the Appellate Division held that a defendant may not prevent his attorneys from presenting mitigating evidence. The Appellate Division stated its reasons for allowing a defense attorney to present mitigating evidence even over his client's express order not to contest the imposition of the death sentence: Certainly tension exists between the desires of the client as expressed to his lawyer and the constitutional necessity to insure that the ultimate penalty is not extracted in a wanton and freakish manner. In normal circumstances, the lawyer is required by the Rules of Professional Conduct to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.         Under our statutory scheme, a jury may impose the death penalty only if the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury did not hear the evidence allegedly in mitigation, it could have difficulty discharging its statutory, and indeed moral, duty. Our conclusion is reinforced by a recent amendment to the death penalty statute which requires that an appeal must be taken even if defendant does not want to appeal and that our State Supreme Court must review the issue of proportionality of the sentence on defendant's request.         The defendant now says he only wants to appeal the guilt phase and not challenge the penalty phase, and inferentially also not challenge the proportionality of the death penalty as applied to him. But this is no guarantee that he will still think this way if the death penalty is imposed. Defendant's present desire thus may eventually thwart effective proportionality review or require a new trial on the penalty phase. We conclude that the jury should hear all relevant testimony. [ Id. at 44-46 (citations omitted).] See also State v. Koedatich, supra, 98 N.J. at 554 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (What is required at the capital sentencing stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. The record before us does not disclose how or whether the jury was informed of the essential information concerning the character of the defendant that should precede the jury's judgment.) We find the reasoning in State v. Hightower, supra, 214 N.J. Super. 43, and in Justice O'Hern's concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Koedatich to be persuasive. Essential to our statute is that its application cannot result in death sentences that are wantonly and ... freakishly imposed. Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. at 310, 92 S.Ct. at 2762-2763, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 390 (Stewart, J., concurring). In Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 188-95, 96 S.Ct. at 2934, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 883-87, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing jury procedure that gave the jury individualized information about the defendant and consistent guidelines for applying that information avoided the random and disproportionate imposition of the death penalty and thus was constitutional. Thus, [w]hat is required at the capital sentencing stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and circumstances of the crime. State v. Koedatich, supra, 98 N.J. at 554 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874-75, 71 L.Ed. 2d 1, 8-9 (1982)). These procedures are established not only to protect the interests of the accused, but also to enable a state to enact a constitutional death penalty statute. Under our death penalty statute, before a defendant may be sentenced to death, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the proffered aggravating factors exist. The jury then must weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating before it imposes the death penalty; the death sentence is imposed only if the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. A defendant who prevents the presentation of mitigating evidence withholds from the trier of fact potentially crucial information bearing on the penalty decision no less than if the defendant was himself prevented from introducing such evidence by statute or judicial ruling. People v. Deere, supra, 710 P. 2d at 931. Courts have recognized that the qualitative difference between death and any other penalty gives rise to a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961; accord State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 326. It is self-evident that the state and its citizens have an overwhelming interest in insuring that there is no mistake in the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, we have the constitutional and statutory duty to review every judgment of death. Without any evidence in the record of mitigating factors we are missing a significant portion of the evidence that enables us to determine if the imposition of the death penalty was appropriate. Hence, we would be unable to discharge our constitutional and statutory requirement to review a judgment, and, therefore, we would fail to safeguard the state's interest in insuring the reliability of death-penalty decisions. On this ground alone, there must be a new penalty trial. We turn nevertheless to the issue of whether defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence, despite his or her client's instructions, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. The problem arises from defense counsel's untenable position. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide that under normal circumstances an attorney is to abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. MRPC 1.2(a). In this context, however, following the client's instructions may result in the client's execution. The defendant argues that such representation can only be characterized as ineffective assistance of counsel. We think not. The standards for ineffective assistance of counsel were set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under the Strickland two-part test, the court must consider first whether the challenged conduct (in this case, the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty trial) was deficient, and, if so, whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. In State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), we adopted for state constitutional purposes the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. Courts have reached varying conclusions when faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from counsel's accession to a defendant's wish not to present mitigating evidence. In People v. Deere, supra, 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P. 2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13, the California Supreme Court held that counsel's failure to introduce mitigating evidence  and his endorsement of his client's decision to seek death  constituted ineffective assistance. The court held that the defense attorney's honest but mistaken belief that he had `no right whatsoever to infringe upon his [client's] decisions about his own life' operated to deny defendant his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 41 Cal. 3d at 364, 710 P. 2d at 931-32, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20. The court endorsed the view, consistent with the Appellate Division's view in State v. Hightower, supra, 214 N.J. Super. at 46, that the lawyer's duty to the client is altered in a capital setting: [A]t the penalty phase defense counsel has a critical obligation to present a case in mitigation, first, `to assure reliability in capital sentencing,' and second, `to attempt to convince the sentencer that, notwithstanding the defendant's guilt, he or she is a person who should not die.' [ Id. at 364, 710 P. 2d at 931, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 20.] See also People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333, 729 P. 2d 802, 821-22, 233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 386 (1987) (following Deere; failure of defense counsel to offer mitigating evidence, because defendant expressly informed me that he didn't want this kind of evidence to be presented, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Burgener, 41 Cal. 3d 505, 714 P. 2d 1251, 1274-76, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 137 (1986) (following Deere; defendant instructed counsel not to call psychiatrist, parents, former cellmate, and to stipulate to aggravating factors: The fact that defense counsel deliberately refrained from introducing any evidence in support of a lesser penalty than death, though such evidence was available, in itself required reversal). There is, however, authority for the contrary proposition. In Autry v. McKaskle, 727 F. 2d 358, 361-62 (5th Cir.), cert. den., 465 U.S. 1085, 104 S.Ct. 1458, 79 L.Ed. 2d 906 (1984), the Fifth Circuit held that [b]y no measure [including Strickland ] can Autry block his lawyer's effort and later claim the resulting performance was constitutionally deficient.... If Autry knowingly made the choices, Carver was ethically bound to allow Autry's wishes.... See also Felde v. Blackburn, 795 F. 2d 400, 401 (5th Cir.1986) (following Autry; attorney followed instructions in requesting that the jury return a sentence of death; case remanded for competency hearing). We do not believe that the doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel is applicable in this case. In Trimble v. State, 693 S.W. 2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985), the Missouri Court of Appeals pointed out the dilemma: The difficulty in the case arises from the manner in which the issue is posed. Here, we have no inadvertence or neglect of counsel. Trial counsel was prepared to offer the evidence and argument, and urged his client, movant, to permit that effort. Movant was obdurate. He did not want that course pursued. Even the trial court's warning that movant's chosen course of action would, in all probability, result in the death penalty, failed to persuade him. The issue is thus to determine trial counsel's duty in this unusual situation. The state urges that counsel had no duty to act, as the client has essential control of the case.... [T]he decision was for the client, and the lawyer must accept the client's determination, even though contrary to the lawyer's advice. [ Id. at 278-79.] See also Larette v. State, 703 S.W. 2d 37, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (where counsel had prepared evidence regarding mitigation, so that failure to introduce it was a consequence of movant's recalcitrance, counsel's conduct was reasonable under Strickland, and no prejudice was proven since the evidence of guilt was overwhelming). Applying Strickland-Fritz to this case, we do not find that defense counsel's conduct was anything but reasonable; he was, after all, adhering to ethical canons by following his client's instructions. Application of the Strickland standard to this situation, in short, results in an anomaly: defense counsel's conduct was reasonable, but the result of that conduct was prejudicial. In our view, it is simply the wrong standard to apply. As Justice Broussard of the California Supreme Court so aptly stated in his concurring opinion in People v. Deere : I hesitate ... to describe this case as one involving the ineffective assistance of counsel. The constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel belongs to defendant personally. A man facing the awful alternatives of execution or life imprisonment without possibility of parole could rationally prefer execution, or at least feel that the comparative advantage of life imprisonment was not worth the humiliation and loss of dignity he believes entailed in the presentation of mitigating evidence. Here counsel satisfied himself that his client was making a rational, knowing, and intelligent decision, and then acted in accord with his client's wishes. I do not believe his conduct violated any constitutional right of defendant. Although counsel in this case fulfilled his obligations to his client, he failed to perform a role assigned to him by the state, that of presenting the mitigating evidence necessary to assure the reliability of the penalty determination. But the fact that the state assigns defense counsel a role which may require him to act contrary to his client's wishes on a matter of such vital importance to the client presents a troubling picture. The defense of a capital case often requires a close and trusting relationship between counsel and client; yet our decision requires counsel to violate that trust, to take a position against his client, and perhaps to present evidence revealed to him in confidence by his client. Trial courts should explore methods of alleviating this conflict. [14] In some cases it might be desirable for counsel, in addition to presenting mitigating evidence, to inform the jury of defendant's personal position. In other cases, the court might permit the defendant himself to address the jury. Alternatively, the court could call persons with mitigating evidence as its own witnesses, or appoint new counsel to call them, and thereby place on the record the mitigating evidence essential to a careful, balanced penalty determination. In sum, both the state's need to assure the fairness and reliability of the penalty determination, and defendant's rights to personal choice and dignity, command respect. It is essential that the penalty trial constitute a balanced presentation of aggravating and mitigating evidence, but this goal should be achieved, as far as possible, with respect and accommodation for defendant's personal values and for his relationship with counsel. [41 Cal. 3d at 369, 710 P. 2d at 934-35, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24 (Broussard, J., concurring).] Justice Broussard thus concurred not on the ground of incompetency of counsel, but because no steps were taken to assure a fair and balanced penalty trial. Id. 41 Cal. 3d at 369-70, 710 P. 2d at 935, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 24. In sum, it follows that the mitigating factors must be introduced, regardless of the defendant's position. As Justice Broussard stated, trial courts should explore methods of handling this situation that are sensitive to the need to preserve the close and trusting attorney-client relationship. Justice Broussard's proposed solutions merit serious consideration, although we do not adopt or reject any of them. Nor do we foreclose the possibility that cases may arise in which the trial court may have to compel defense counsel to present the mitigating evidence despite a client's instructions to the contrary.