Opinion ID: 1719788
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Heading: The Separation of Powers Argument.

Text: Article III, section 1 of the Iowa constitution provides for separation of powers of state government: The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departmentsthe Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. The plaintiffs argue that under the two decisions of the Court of Appeals which preceded the 1981 curative act, the actions of the board were held to be without jurisdiction; and to allow the legislature to retroactively change that result would obscure the lines of power, in effect allowing a legislative overruling of a court decision. They base their argument upon the general principle that jurisdiction is a matter solely within the realm of the judiciary. See McSurely v. McGrew, 140 Iowa 163, 167, 118 N.W. 415, 417-18 (1908); 2 Sutherland, supra, § 41.14 at 294. The separation-of-powers argument here boils down to this: When the legislature extended the scope of the county's easement-granting power, in 1979, and then made it retroactive in 1981, was it dealing with matters of jurisdiction or was it merely adopting a broader scope of the statute which it could have adopted in the first place? In this case jurisdiction is used quite generously. It appears to be used, simultaneously, in reference to (1) the power of the board of supervisors to grant easements to a nonmunicipal entity, (2) the powers of the legislature to enact legislation nullifying the effect of prior litigation, and (3) the court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the real key to the separation-of-powers argument. Even if we assume the defect in the board's action granting the easement was jurisdictional as it was characterized by the district court, this does not necessarily preclude legislative action. As one author points out, the term jurisdiction can mean different things in different contexts, and the power of a legislature to involve itself in the issue depends upon what type of jurisdiction is involved: It is important to distinguish between jurisdictional requirements prescribed by constitutional provisions and those established by ordinary legislation. There is a marked difference, for example, between the jurisdiction of the legislature on the one hand and the jurisdiction of courts and other public officers and agencies on the other. A legislature clearly cannot grant jurisdiction to itself where, because of constitutional or territorial restrictions it has none. Thus, the legislature may not validate its own jurisdictional defects. On the other hand, the legislature can legalize actions taken without compliance with statutory requirements by which a court or other public agency acquires jurisdiction. 2 Sutherland, supra, § 41.14, at 294-95. Therefore, the separation-of-powers principle is violated if the legislature purports to use powers not granted to it by the constitution or usurps powers granted by it to another branch, here the courts. Simply stated, the legislature cannot exercise judicial powers, and cannot reverse, vacate, or overrule the judgment or decree of a court. Wilcox v. Miner, 201 Iowa 476, 478, 205 N.W. 847, 848 (1925). See State v. Ronek, 176 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Iowa 1970) (separation of powers concept ... [prohibits] one department's exercising another's powers . . .) It is obvious from a reading of article III, section 1 of our constitution quoted above and the language of Ronek that crossing the lines of power in any direction violates the separation of power concept. We must, of course, guard against overextension of legislative powers; we must also, however, avoid our own infringement upon the constitutional powers of the legislature in our efforts to protect our own. Accordingly, our cases have established that there is no constitutional impediment to curative legislation merely because it affects pending, or even completed, litigation. The general rule as to pending cases has been stated by the court of another state: Curative acts may apply to pending proceedings, and, while the legislature cannot annul or set aside the judgment of a court, it may remove a defect on which the judgment proceeded. Independent School District v. State Board of Education, 289 P.2d 379, 381 (Okl.1955). The principle is well illustrated by our court in McSurely, 140 Iowa at 163, 118 N.W. at 415, involving a curative act which attempted to assert authority of both the legislative and judicial branches. That case contrasts the effect of the two facets of the act under the separation-of-power principle. In McSurely, the legislature had passed a statute (1) legalizing the acts of the county board of supervisors in discharging the bond of a retiring county treasurer and (2) voiding any action brought or attempted to be brought in court by any citizen upon the bond, declaring any such action to be without jurisdiction and void. The court held the first part of the statute to be properly within the legislature's power, but that the second was an unconstitutional infringement on judicial powers. It said: Remembering that this action was commenced before the curative act became effective, it is apparent ... that the second section thereof [voiding any action brought or attempted to be brought upon the bond] is unconstitutional and beyond the power of the Legislature .... Such matters are purely judicial, and not legislative, and under our three-department system of government it is inadvisable for one to assume the powers, duties, or responsibilities of the other. When action is once commenced the question of jurisdiction is purely a judicial one, and the Legislature should not attempt to usurp the functions of the judiciary by such an act as is now under consideration. Id. at 167, 118 N.W. at 417-18. Similarly, this court has held that the legislature cannot mandate to the judiciary how it should interpret a particular statute. Interpretation is a judicial, not a legislative function, Sioux City v. Young, 250 Iowa 1005, 1007-08, 97 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1959); and it cannot abrogate by retroactive legislation a purely court-based rule of immunity for witnesses entering the state to testify in another matter. Frink v. Clark, 226 Iowa 1012, 285 N.W. 681 (1939): The decision, as to the validity of service of process, properly challenged because of immunity extended to a non-resident litigant while in attendance at the trial of a case in which he was a defendant, is a judicial function. The legislature is without power to control the exercise of such function by the courts. When it undertook to dictate to the courts what the decision should be in cases pending before the statute was enacted, it assumed to exercise power that it does not possess. Id. at 1020, 285 N.W. at 685. The legislature cannot arbitrarily decree that courts are without subject matter jurisdiction in a certain class of cases then pending in the courts. See McSurely, 140 Iowa at 167, 118 N.W. at 417-18. On the other hand, if the curative legislation is not a direct legislative assertion of judicial power but merely a belated assertion of a power inherently possessed by the legislature, the curative act does not violate the separation principle. This is so even though it might have the ultimate effect of nullifying a judicial ruling. [1] Richman v. Supervisors of Muscatine County, 77 Iowa 513, 42 N.W. 422 (1889), is a case close in point. There, the action of the board of supervisors in approving a levy project was initially held by the supreme court to be void for lack of jurisdiction because the applicants had failed to file a petition for the establishment of the levy as required by statute. See Richman v. Board of Supervisors, 70 Iowa 627, 630, 26 N.W. 24 (1885). A curative statute, enacted after the decision by the supreme court and attempting to legalize the proceedings, was challenged on the ground that the legislature undertook to make valid such acts of the board [of supervisors] as [the supreme] court had adjudged to be void and that where there is a want of such jurisdiction, and their acts are for that reason void, no curative act can ever reach them. Id. 77 Iowa at 518, 519, 42 N.W. at 424. This court concluded, however, that because the legislature could have dispensed with the filing of the petition in the first instance, [2] it could retroactively legalize establishment of a levy without it. This was so, even though it had the effect of nullifying the decisions of both the district court and this court. The jurisdiction found to be lacking under the prior decision was not a matter of the court's power to deal with the case but rather with the lack of statutory authority of the board of supervisors, a matter which the legislature was empowered to modify. Id. Other Iowa cases supporting this principle include Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Town of Grand Junction, 221 Iowa 441, 454, 264 N.W. 84, 90 (1935) (contract proceedings by town held by court to be void; later curative act held not to be unconstitutional interference with judiciary); Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Rosenbaum, 212 Iowa 227, 231 N.W. 646 (1930) (curative act legalizing statute previously held by court to be void not infringement on judiciary); Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. v. Streepy, 211 Iowa 1334, 1338, 236 N.W. 24, 26 (1931) (act previously held unconstitutional because of inadequate title amended by legislature; held not infringement); Gill v. Patton, 118 Iowa 88, 91 N.W. 904 (1902) (original assessment held void by district court; legalizing act held valid); Windsor v. City of Des Moines, 110 Iowa 175, 179-80, 81 N.W. 476, 477 (1909) (curative act binding, even though passed after district court decree); Iowa Savings and Loan Association v. Heidt, 107 Iowa 297, at 303, 77 N.W. 1050, 1052 (curative act, passed after decree); City of Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655, 660, 68 N.W. 431, 432 (1890) (curative act legalizing street assessment after court action commenced, held valid); Tuttle v. Polk & Hubbell, 84 Iowa 12, 15-16, 50 N.W. 38, 39 (1891) (curative act legalizing paving contract, previously held by supreme court to be void, valid exercise of power); Huff v. Cook, 44 Iowa 639, 641 (1876) (curative act binding, even though passed after decree). See also Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill.2d 196, 49 Ill.Dec. 322, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (Ill.1981) (statute retroactively validating untimely assessment publications; held not violative of separation-of-powers although previously held void by supreme court). See generally. Anno. Validity of curative statute impairing judgment or rendering it ineffective, 17 A.L.R. 1352 (1947). The curative act in question does not offend the constitutional separation of powers. While the effect of the court of appeals decisions was nullified by the curative act, the legislature merely furnished authority for the board of supervisors which the court of appeals had found lacking in the prior statute; it did not challenge the power of the court to make that decision. In summary, we find the curative act did not constitute legislative construction of the same statutory language construed by the court of appeals. Instead the act purported merely to authorize the easements of a new statutory ground. Moreover, no constitutional barrier prevented the association from resisting issuance of the injunction on the new statutory ground. The separation of powers doctrine does not dictate that the propriety of the injunction could be attacked only after it was issued. The substance of the doctrine was not implicated by the procedure employed here.