Opinion ID: 3154983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Shimshoni’s Two-Year Probationary Sentence

Text: With this background, our task is to determine the statutory maximum penalty applicable to defendant Shimshoni’s criminal offense. As recounted earlier, defendant Shimshoni was charged with, and pled guilty to, knowingly and willfully failing to provide a federally approved lead-paint-hazard brochure, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 2615(b) and 2689 of the Toxic Substances Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(5) of the Lead Hazard Act, and the Disclosure Rule, 40 C.F.R. § 745.107(a)(1). As outlined above, the Lead Hazard Act, § 4852d(b)(5), makes a violation of a rule issued under the Lead Hazard Act also a “prohibited act” under § 2689 of the Toxic Substances Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(5). In turn, the Toxic Substances Act has its own set of civil and criminal penalties for a “prohibited act” depending on 14 Case: 14-15295 Date Filed: 11/16/2015 Page: 15 of 18 whether or not the violation is knowing and willful. Moreover, the probation term comes from § 3651, for criminal offenses. Accordingly, the statutory question is whether the Lead Hazard Act and its limitation of “the penalty” to a $10,000 fine cabins not just the “civil penalty” in the Toxic Substances Act but also extinguishes (1) the separate criminal sanctions in § 2615(b) of the Toxic Substances Act which say that “in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty” a violator may be subject to imprisonment for not more than one year, and (2) the authorized probation term in § 3561 for criminal offenses. In such matters of statutory interpretation, we start with “the language of the statute itself.” See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 656, 106 S. Ct. 3143, 3149 (1986). The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined not only by the language itself, but also by the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Yates v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82 (2015) (plurality opinion). The statutory language in § 4852d setting a maximum “penalty” of $10,000 for purposes of enforcing § 4852d under the Toxic Substances Act is most reasonably read to cap any civil penalty imposed pursuant to § 2615(a)—not as a prohibition on the separate criminal penalties under § 2615(b) or the probation term in § 3561. See 15 U.S.C. § 2615; 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(b)(5). Cf. Vidiksis, 612 F.3d at 1153 & n.2 (explaining that, “[u]nder [the Toxic Substances Act], the EPA 15 Case: 14-15295 Date Filed: 11/16/2015 Page: 16 of 18 has the authority to seek civil penalties for failure to comply with the Disclosure Rule” and that “§ 4852d(b)(5) limits the penalty for each violation to $10,000” (emphasis added)). Notably, § 4852d refers to a “penalty” and § 2615(a) refers to a “civil penalty,” while § 2615(b) refers to a “fine” and “imprisonment” following conviction. Indeed, Shimshoni’s argument would render the criminal provisions of § 2615(b) superfluous and nullified if the $10,000 penalty in § 4852d(b)(5) were the sole punishment. See United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that statutes should be construed so that “no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant” (quotations omitted)); see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267, 101 S. Ct. 1673, 1678 (holding that “repeals by implication are not favored”) (quotations omitted). Nothing in the statutory language of § 4852d refers to criminal penalties or probation, and thus it cannot, and does not, displace § 2615(b) or § 3561. Shimshoni’s argument that this Court in Vidiksis interpreted § 4852d(b)(5) in a manner that did “not contemplate or allow for a criminal penalty” is meritless. In Vidiksis, this Court was expressly discussing the “civil penalties” that may be imposed for a violation of the Disclosure Rule. See Vidiksis, 612 F.3d at 1153 & n.2. And the Vidiksis Court limited its discussion to civil penalties because it was reviewing an administrative ruling by the Environmental Appeals Board, rather than a criminal case, and at no point did the Vidiksis Court address whether 16 Case: 14-15295 Date Filed: 11/16/2015 Page: 17 of 18 § 4852d(b)(5) eliminates imprisonment as a penalty for a criminal violation of the Disclosure Rule. See id. at 1152, 1158-60. Shimshoni also contends that, because there is “substantial ambiguity” as to whether he was subject to the statutory maximum in § 2615(b), we should apply the rule of lenity in this case and construe § 4852d as he urges. We disagree. We conclude that this issue is resolved by the plain language of the applicable statutory scheme, and we certainly find no “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” that would justify application of the rule of lenity. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138-39, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998) (explaining that there must be a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute” to apply the rule of lenity because “most statutes are ambiguous to some degree” (quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Sloan, 97 F.3d 1378, 1382 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that the rule of lenity applies only after the language and scheme of the penalty statute are considered). In any event, it is § 3561, not the Toxic Substances Act, that authorizes a probation term. At best, Shimshoni’s argument is necessarily that the penalty cap of the Toxic Substances Act should be somehow read to implicitly exclude the possibility of a probation term. However, even so, the plain language of Toxic Substances Act still does not “expressly preclude” a probation term, and, therefore, Shimshoni’s sentence was authorized by § 3561. See 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(2). 17 Case: 14-15295 Date Filed: 11/16/2015 Page: 18 of 18