Opinion ID: 1996009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alleged Refusal to Allow Applicant to Testify

Text: The applicant argues that his counsel also was constitutionally remiss because applicant's will and desire to testify was overborne by his counsel. He argues that the hearing justice's findings of fact regarding Washington's attorney's advice to him that he not testify in his defense could reasonably be used to meet the first part of the Strickland test, and, therefore, he claims that the hearing justice's conclusion that he received effective assistance of counsel when he waived his right to testify at trial was error or an abuse of discretion. With respect to the second prong of the Strickland test, applicant contends that his testimony was essential to the [j]ury's understanding of his state of mind and his remorse,    which only he could present. The hearing justice rejected applicant's argument that his waiver of his right to testify was the product of his attorney's ineffectiveness. In dispatching his argument, she found the applicant's attorney vigorously and zealously represented applicant when he counseled him against taking the stand, advice which the hearing justice found that applicant accepted voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. After reviewing of the record and hearing testimony, the hearing justice found no credible evidence to support the argument that applicant's will to testify was overborne by counsel. She also concluded that applicant had fail[ed] to present evidence that the absence of his testimony prejudiced him at trial. She found that if applicant had testified, he would not have offered beneficial testimony for his defense and his testimony would not have produced a different outcome of the proceeding. Therefore, the hearing justice concluded that Washington had failed to establish that he could overcome either prong of the Strickland test. We agree with the hearing justice and are of the opinion that Washington has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he took his attorney's advice and waived his right to testify at trial. Washington argues that the facts here are similar to those in United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir.1992), which held that, under the first prong of the Strickland standard, the essence of such a claim is that the action or inaction of the attorney deprived the defendant of the ability to choose whether or not to testify in his own behalf. After careful review of the record, we disagree with applicant and, like the hearing justice, hold that, as in Teague, 953 F.2d at 1535, the record here reflects a voluntary waiver by the defendant of his right to testify. In Teague, 953 F.2d at 1527, the defendant informed his attorney before trial that he wished to testify. His attorney determined that the defendant might encounter difficulty on the witness stand, but decided to wait and see whether it would be beneficial for the defendant to testify. Id. at 1528. After a witness gave conflicting testimony, the defendant pulled on his lawyer's sleeve and inquired about when he could testify himself. Id. However, his attorney told him not to be concerned about the testimony, and the defense rested without the defendant's testimony. Id. Prior to closing arguments, the defendant asked again when he would have the opportunity to testify. Id. His attorney told him that his testimony was not necessary. Id. Even after receiving a verdict, the defendant called his attorney at home and asked her when he could give his version of the events. Id. The Teague court analyzed the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland's two-part test. Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534. It held that counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient and thus the defendant had not satisfied the first prong of the test. Id. at 1535. The court reasoned that an attorney's performance is not objectively reasonable if the attorney either refuses to accept the defendant's decision to testify or if the attorney does not inform the defendant of the right to testify. Id. at 1534. Viewing the argument from the perspective of defense counsel, the court concluded that the defendant's attorney believed that Teague had assented or acceded to her recommendation that he refrain from taking the witness stand. Id. at 1535. Therefore, counsel had neither refused to accept her client's decision to testify nor failed to inform him of his right to do so. Id. In the case before us, the record reveals that applicant's attorney, like the attorney in Teague, did not refuse to accept his client's desire to testify, nor did he fail to inform applicant of his right to testify. Indeed, as the hearing justice acknowledged, applicant's attorney addressed applicant's desire to testify in his opening statement to the jury. Accordingly, the hearing justice discredited applicant's testimony that his attorney always told him that he would not be allowed to take the stand, no matter what. She noted that his attorney had requested a recess and conferred with Washington for thirty minutes before resting his case. Further, when applicant's attorney informed the trial court of the defense's decision to rest without presenting applicant as a witness, the attorney asked him on the record, Is that correct, Jeffrey? to which Washington replied, Yes. She concluded that [i]t reasonably can be inferred    that defense counsel advised Mr. Washington during the conversation against testifying in response to the State's case at trial and that Mr. Washington assented voluntarily during the thirty-minute recess. Based on this evidence, and aware that applicant did not accuse his attorney of violating his right to testify until a year after his attorney's death, the hearing justice found that applicant's waiver of his right to testify was knowing and intelligent. Therefore, she ruled that applicant had not shown that his counsel's actions in vigorously advising applicant to not testify were objectively unreasonable. After a review of the record, we cannot say that the hearing justice neglected or misconceived the evidence when she made findings on the performance of applicant's attorney. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the hearing justice did not err when she concluded that applicant voluntarily waived his right to testify, and that he received effective assistance of counsel. Because we are satisfied that applicant did not establish the first prong of the Strickland test on this issue, we need not discuss whether his defense was prejudiced by the absence of his live testimony before the jury, such that the outcome of the trial would have differed.