Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Asserted erroneous jury instructions guilt phase

Text: Defendant contends the trial court failed sua sponte to instruct, or misinstructed, on several lesser included offenses and on other relevant principles, entitling him to reversal of his convictions for the Clark and Benintende murders. As explained below, we agree that the trial court erred by giving incomplete instructions on second degree murder, giving an incorrect instruction on the principle of concurrence of act and intent, and failing to instruct on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, but conclude these errors were harmless. We find defendant's additional claims of prejudicial instructional error at the guilt phase to be without merit.
As a preliminary matter, defendant contends the trial court's failure to transcribe the in-chambers discussions of guilt phase jury instructions has deprived him of meaningful appellate review of his jury instruction claims. We disagree. It appears that all discussions of guilt phase jury instructions took place at an unreported conference on March 14, 1988. We thus have no transcript of jury instruction discussions. A summary of the conference, however, was placed on the record. As relevant here, the trial court stated: (1) defense counsel had requested CALJIC No. 8.75 (jury may return partial verdict  homicide), [15] which the trial court had refused; (2) counsel agreed instructions on involuntary manslaughter need not be given; and (3) defense counsel has no Geiger counts; that is to say, no lesser and includeds that fall within the purview of People versus Geiger at this time. When the trial court asked defense counsel whether the summary was correct, counsel stated: True and accurate, your Honor. Well stated. In addition, the clerk's transcript contains copies of all the printed instructions requested but not given. The only instruction requested in writing by defendant and not given was CALJIC No. 8.75. Defense counsel did not object to the trial court conducting discussions of proposed jury instructions off the record. When the trial court later went back on the record to summarize the proceedings that had occurred in chambers, defense counsel agreed the court's summary was true and accurate. Counsel's failure to object to the procedure forfeits any claim that the record is inadequate. ( People v. Gaston, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 485, 143 Cal.Rptr. 205, 573 P.2d 423; see also People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1333, fn. 70, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 667, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) The case of People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487, upon which defendant relies, is not controlling. There, we presumed instructional errors were preserved for review because portions of the record of jury instruction discussions were missing, with no indication that the lapse was attributable to defendant or his counsel. Here, by contrast, defendant's counsel did not object to having jury instruction discussions off the record. Moreover, as shown above, the record allows us to determine which jury instructions were requested and which objections were made. It therefore is adequate to permit meaningful review of defendant's jury instruction claims.

We agree with defendant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the definition of second degree murder committed with express malice. Regarding the Clark charge, the court gave the jury the options of convicting defendant of first degree murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter. It instructed the jury on the elements of murder and on the principle that murder may be committed with either express or implied malice. (CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.11.) It explained that first degree murder is a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) It also instructed that [m]urder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being as a direct, causal result of an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with wanton disregard for human life, or the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another, and who acts with conscious disregard for human life. (See CALJIC No. 8.31.) It did not, however, instruct the jury that second degree murder also occurs when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation. (CALJIC No. 8.30.) The prosecution initially requested this instruction, but withdrew that request. We agree the trial court erred by omitting an instruction that second degree murder includes an intentional but unpremeditated murder. The trial court is obligated to instruct the jury on all general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, whether or not the defendant makes a formal request. ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 744, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [sua sponte duty]; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 [duty upon request].) That obligation encompasses instructions on lesser included offenses if there is evidence that, if accepted by the trier of fact, would absolve the defendant of guilt of the greater offense but not of the lesser. ( People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 745, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 871, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Although defendant's jury was instructed on second degree murder with implied malice, the trial court had a duty to instruct on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [defendant was entitled to instruction on voluntary manslaughter committed as a result of heat of passion, in addition to instruction on voluntary manslaughter arising from an honest but unreasonable belief in the need for self defense].) Defendant's own testimony provided sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude the killing was not premeditated. Defendant testified that when he killed Clark, he was not making any calculated judgment or weighing considerations for and against killing her; rather he felt only fear and pulled the trigger without thinking. Defendant's experts likewise testified defendant did not premedicate or deliberate in the killing of Clark. In Dr. Glaser's opinion, at the time of the killing defendant was overwhelmed with emotion stemming from his sexual dysfunction and the volley of expletives that followed such dysfunction from Miss Clark, and the actual shooting and killing was an impulsive heat of passion event that was done without planning. Dr. Glaser believed that in this emotional state, defendant was incapable of premeditating and deliberating. Dr. Bird agreed the killing of Clark was an impulsive, emotional act of passion and fear, and opined there was no thoughtful advance planning or anticipation of doing what he did, no reasoning or thinking, and no weighing of consequences. In Dr. Franz's opinion as well, defendant killed Clark in a very emotional, anxious state in which he did not have the skills available to premeditate and deliberate. The killing was not a weighing or a balancing, but simply a defense mechanism to protect himself. The jury could have concluded the emotional, impulsive nature of the killing precluded a finding of premeditation and deliberation but that defendant nevertheless intended to kill. Based on this evidence, the trial court should have given CALJIC 8.30. Indeed, the trial court did include references to both express malice and implied malice in the definition of murder. Although it explained that murder with implied malice is also second degree murder, and that implied malice does not require an intent to kill, it failed to explain that a murder committed with express malice could constitute second degree murder. The omission of CALJIC 8.30 created an obvious gap in the instructions that was not filled by any of the other instructions given.
The erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense generally is subject to harmless error review under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, at pages 836-837, 299 P.2d 243. [16] Reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the jury would have returned a different verdict absent the error or errors complained of. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 165-179, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; see also People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 667, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175.) In the present case, it does not appear reasonably probable that the jury would have elected to convict defendant of second degree murder had it been instructed that an intentional but unpremeditated murder was a second degree murder. Defendant's jury was clearly instructed that first degree murder required not only an intentional killing, but one that is deliberate and premeditated. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) It also was told [i]f you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by the defendant, but you have a reasonable doubt whether that murder was of the first or of the second degree, then you have to give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict affixing the murder as of the second degree. (See CALJIC No. 8.71.) Defendant's claim that the error was prejudicial is premised upon the supposition that the jury may have concluded the killing was intentional but not premeditated, yet convicted defendant of first degree murder despite the clear instruction that first degree murder required premeditation, because the instructions permitted no viable option for a conviction on a lesser offense. We disagree, for two reasons. First, if the jury found that defendant shot Clark several times with the intent to kill her, we see no reasonable probability it would have believed that his conduct and state of mind did not fit the definition of second degree murder committed with implied malice, as it was explained to them. The jury was told, in the language of CALJIC No. 8.31, that second degree murder is a killing that results from an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with wanton disregard for human life, or an act the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another, and who acts with conscious disregard for human life. Defendant's act of shooting Clark certainly could be characterized as one involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death or the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. Nothing in the instructions precluded the logical conclusion that if defendant intended to kill, he acted with wanton disregard for life or knew that his conduct endangered the life of another and acted with conscious disregard for human life. Thus, the instructions, reasonably understood, did not preclude a finding of second degree murder if the jury believed the killing was intentional. (Cf. United States v. McCullah (10th Cir.1996) 76 F.3d 1087, 1111-1112 [holding two aggravating factors in the federal death penalty statute are duplicative because [a]ny intentional conduct aimed at producing death is by definition conduct done with knowledge of grave risk of death].) We have stated that implied malice and intent to kill cannot coexist. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 58, 5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 764-765, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446.) This statement was made in the context of issues raised when instructions are given on implied malice and the offense  such as attempted murder or assault with the intent to kill  requires the specific intent to kill. (See also People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 673-674, 238 Cal.Rptr. 406, 738 P.2d 752.) In the present context, however, the issue is not whether instructions on implied malice might have caused the jury to convict defendant without the required finding of intent to kill, but instead whether instructions on implied malice would have prevented the jury from convicting defendant of second degree murder if it did find intent to kill. Nothing in the instructions told the jury that an intentional killing precluded a finding of implied malice. Rather, the jury was instructed that when implied malice is established, it is not necessary to establish that a defendant intended that his act would result in a death of a human being. In other words, the jury would have understood the instruction to indicate that intent to kill was sufficient to establish implied malice, although such intent was not required. Nothing in the arguments of the parties would have created the impression that the jury could not return a verdict of second degree murder if it found the killing was intentional but not premeditated. The prosecutor argued the murder of Benintende was second degree rather than first degree murder because there's no question there was malice, that intent was there, but it was not clear whether defendant had adequate time to premeditate and deliberate. The prosecutor thus highlighted premeditation and deliberation as the critical factor distinguishing first and second degree murder, and indicated that malice without premeditation and deliberation would establish second degree murder. In addition, in discussing the second count involving Benintende, the prosecutor clearly stated second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation. She thus provided the jury with the definition of express malice second degree murder lacking in the instructions. Although the arguments of counsel cannot substitute for correct instructions from the court ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288, 304, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241), the arguments here support our conclusion that the jury was not misled (see People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111, 31 Cal. Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36). Second, even assuming the jury did not believe that an intentional killing could be a second degree murder, we find it unlikely the jury concluded the killing was intentional but not premeditated. In determining whether a failure to instruct on a lesser included offense was prejudicial, an appellate court may consider whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; see also People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 621, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152 [error harmless when evidence supporting lesser offense was weak].) Here, the evidence supporting the jury's verdict of guilt of first degree premeditated murder was relatively strong. In his confession, defendant said he killed Clark to prevent her from reporting him. Defendant said that after he shot Clark the second time, she ran up the road and I realized I was  if she turned me in I was going to be arrested and go to jail, so I shot her four more times. Later, defendant said I knew she couldn't testify against me if she was dead, and that was the bottom line. Defendant had time to contemplate his course of action; he had to pull up his pants and then get out of his truck to pursue Clark after he shot her the first time. Defendant's account of the events was strong evidence establishing that he weigh[ed] and consider[ed] the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, decided to kill Clark. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) It also was strong evidence demonstrating that the killing was not impulsive or emotional, but rather a calculated decision made only after Clark threatened to make a report and defendant had adequate time to contemplate the consequences of allowing her to live and be able to report him. Moreover, the physical evidence corroborated defendant's confession. For example, the pattern of gunshot wounds on Clark's body matched the description of the killings in defendant's confession. The pathologist testified Clark had one gunshot entry wound on the right side of the ribcage, the bullet passing through her body and lodging on the left side of her torso; one entry wound to her back; and four wounds more or less to the front of her torso, two of which had entered the body and two of which were graze wounds or abrasions. The jury could have inferred those wounds corresponded to the shots defendant confessed to having fired: one shot in the cab of the truck after Clark had been on her knees orally copulating him, one shot while Clark was running around in front of the truck's headlights (the only time she could have been shot in the back), and four shots while Clark was leaning against the embankment facing defendant. By contrast, the evidence suggesting defendant did not premeditate and deliberate came largely from defendant and his experts and was comparatively weak. The experts based their opinions in large part on the account of the Clark killing described in defendant's sodium amytal interview conducted 10 months after the crime. Thus, in order to credit defendant's expert testimony on his state of mind, the jurors would have had to conclude that the account of the murders given by defendant in his trial testimony, which was based on his sodium amytal interview, was more accurate than the confession he made a few days after the crime occurred. We do not believe it is reasonably probable the jury so concluded. At trial, defendant stated he shot Clark once as she was walking toward him, pointing her finger; there was a brief second or two when Clark backed up into a canal bank, and defendant immediately shot her five more times. Defendant's testimony did not explain why Clark had a gunshot wound going from the right side of her torso to the left, as well as an entry wound in her back. If defendant's testimony was accurate, one would expect all of the wounds to have been to the front of her torso. Moreover, the defense claimed that, until his memory was revived in the amytal interview, defendant could not remember anything that happened after he pushed Clark out of the truck. The defense further claimed defendant, in a suicidal state and mindful of the legal requirements for various offenses, concocted the confession to ensure he would be convicted of capital murder. That theory did not explain how defendant was able to confess to details  such as seeing blood on Clark's right ribcage when she was in front of the headlights  that could have been known only to a person who consciously witnessed the shooting. Further, in his confession defendant lied about how he obtained the murder weapon, denied killing Benintende, and claimed he first shot Clark accidentally. Those statements undermine the claim that his confession was an attempt at legal suicide. [17] In sum, given the relative strength of the evidence of premeditation and the relative weakness of the evidence to the contrary, we do not find it reasonably probable that had the jury been accurately instructed, it would have concluded defendant intended to kill Clark but did not premeditate or deliberate.
Defendant contends that because the instruction on the express malice form of second degree murder embodied the defense theory of the case, the trial court's instructional failure deprived him of his right to present a complete defense guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant relies on cases in which federal courts have held that a trial courts failure to give a requested instruction (whether on a lesser included offense, or on some other subject) embodying the defense theory of the case and around which the defendant had built his or her defense, violated the defendant's due process right to present a complete defense. ( Clark v. Brown (9th Cir. 2006) 442 F.3d 708, 713-718 [instruction on felony-murder special circumstance]; Conde v. Henry (9th Cir.2000) 198 F.3d 734, 739-740 [instruction on simple kidnapping as lesser included offense of kidnapping for robbery]; United States v. Monger (6th Cir.1999) 185 F.3d 574, 576-577 [instruction on lesser included offense]; see also Bradley v. Duncan (9th Cir.2002) 315 F.3d 1091, 1098-1099 [instruction on defense of entrapment].) In these cases, unlike the present one, the instruction at issue was requested by the defense. The cases do not support the proposition that a trial court's failure to instruct on a lesser included offense sua sponte denies due process. Further, nothing in the record suggests the trial court would not have given the express malice second degree murder instruction had the defense asked for it. Nor can it be said that the omitted instruction embodied the defense theory of the case. Rather, in closing argument the only lesser-included-offense verdict that defense counsel asked the jury to return was manslaughter. Although the defense presented evidence of lack of premeditation and deliberation and argued the prosecution's evidence did not support a finding of premeditation, defense counsel did not ask the jury to return a verdict of second degree murder. [18] Because defendant was allowed to present the defense he chose, followed by jury instructions he agreed to, he was not denied due process by being deprived of the opportunity to present a complete defense.
We agree with defendant that the instruction given regarding the concurrence of act and specific intent was erroneous. The trial court gave a modified concurrence instruction, CALJIC No. 3.31, stating: In each of the crimes charged in counts one and two and in the crime of voluntary manslaughter there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator, and unless such specific intent exists the crime to which it relates is not committed. [¶] The specific intent required is included in the definitions of the crimes charged. However, the crime of murder requires the specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being, and the crime of voluntary manslaughter requires the specific intent to unlawfully kill a human being. As the Attorney General concedes, the concurrence instruction was erroneous because implied malice second degree murder, a form of murder, does not require the specific intent to kill. Defendant argues that the erroneous concurrence instruction was prejudicial in several different ways. As explained below, we find the error to be harmless.
The error in the concurrence instruction did not directly affect the jury's first degree murder verdict on the Clark count. The concurrence instruction, as it related to first degree premeditated murder, was correct, for that crime does require a specific intent to kill. Moreover, the premeditated murder instruction itself informed the jury of the concurrence requirement for that offense. (CALJIC No. 8.20; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1142-1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Nevertheless, defendant argues, first, that the erroneous concurrence instruction was prejudicial in relation to the Clark count because it exacerbated the erroneous absence of an instruction on express malice second degree murder (discussed above). The concurrence instruction, which stated that all murder required an intentional killing, conflicted with the implied malice second degree murder instruction. CALJIC No. 8.31 stated: When the killing is the direct result of [an act performed with implied malice], it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being.  Defendant contends that in light of the conflict between these instructions on the mental state required for implied malice second degree murder, it is likely the jury ignored the implied malice second degree murder instructions entirely and that thus (contrary to our conclusion above) it did not view second degree implied malice murder as a viable option for an intentional, unpremeditated murder. We disagree. When reviewing ambiguous instructions, we inquire whether the jury was reasonably likely to have construed them in a manner that violates the defendant's rights. (Cf. Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385.) Applying the same standard to the conflicting instructions at issue here, we conclude it is not reasonably likely the jury determined the implied malice second degree murder instructions meant nothing at all. The jury specifically was instructed that the Benintende count could result in a conviction no greater than second degree murder, and it convicted defendant of second degree murder on that count. The jury must have applied the implied malice second degree murder instructions to reach that verdict. The jury's findings refute defendant's contention that the jury simply ignored the instructions. Rather, we believe it is reasonably likely the jury, if it confronted the conflict between the two instructions, would have concluded that one instruction prevailed over the other. If the jury concluded the specific-intent-to-kill instruction prevailed over the implied malice instruction, defendant could not have been prejudiced. Presuming, as defendant's argument does, that the jury found defendant intended to kill Clark, the instruction fit the facts as the jury found them. Likewise, if the jury concluded the language in the implied malice instruction stating that intent to kill was not necessary prevailed over the concurrence instruction, defendant still was not prejudiced. As explained above, the implied malice instruction did not preclude a second degree murder conviction based on intent to kill. [19] Second, defendant contends the conflicting instructions were prejudicial in relation to the Clark count because they could have caused the jurors to believe there was no difference between first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder, thus inviting them to impose guilt [for the Clark murder] randomly rather than on the basis of a meaningful distinction between the crimes. ( United States v. Lesina (9th Cir.1987) 833 F.2d 156, 158-159.) We disagree. Even assuming the jurors would have believed implied malice second degree murder requires the specific intent to kill, the instructions on first degree premeditated murder required more: an intent to kill formed after premeditation and deliberation and a weighing of considerations for and against killing. Nothing in the implied malice murder instructions, even with an intent-to-kill requirement superimposed upon them, required anything close to that heightened mental state. [20]
As to the Benintende count, defendant claims that because the concurrence instruction referred only to the mental state of intent to kill, the court failed to instruct the jury that the mental state required for implied malice murder  conscious disregard for life  must exist at the same time as the acts causing death. This asserted error was one of state law, subject to the Watson standard of harmless error. (See People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 219-220, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365 [applying Watson reasonable probability standard to error in failing to instruct on concurrence requirement for murder].) Any error was harmless. The instructions on implied malice and second degree murder on an implied malice theory substantially covered the concurrence of act and mental state required for implied malice murder. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 220, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) The instruction defining malice aforethought told the jury that malice is implied when the killing results from an intentional act involving a high degree of probability that it will result in death, which act is done for a base, antisocial purpose and with a wanton disregard for human life, or when the killing results from an intentional act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.  The implied malice murder instruction contained similar wording. The italicized language in these instructions adequately informed the jury of the concurrence requirement. [21] (See People v. Cleaves (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 367, 381, 280 Cal.Rptr. 146; see also People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1142-1143, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) Finally, the conflict between the implied malice instruction and the concurrence instruction was harmless as to the Benintende count. At worst, the erroneous concurrence instruction might have led the jury to believe it had to find a mental state more culpable than that required for second degree murder  that is, specific intent to kill rather than mere implied malice. Because the instruction at most could have been understood as imposing a burden on the prosecution more onerous than the law required, defendant could not have been prejudiced under any standard.
Defendant points to the jurors' questions during deliberations as support for his argument that he was prejudiced by the asserted instructional errors discussed above. He also cites the court's responses to those questions as additional error requiring reversal. We reject both contentions. During deliberations, the jury sent the trial court a note seeking, in relevant part, definitions of the degrees of murder. In response, with the agreement of both defense counsel and the prosecutor, the court gave the jury written copies of all of the instructions it had given orally  those related solely to murder, as well as those related to all other guilt phase issues. Defendant contends that the jurors' question demonstrates they were confused about the meaning of the degrees of murder, supporting his argument that errors in the concurrence instruction and the second degree murder instruction were prejudicial. We disagree. That the jurors requested definitions of the degrees of murder does not demonstrate they were confused; rather, given the length and complexity of the instructions, the jurors simply may have failed to recall specifically and completely all the instructions that had been read to them. The trial court responded by giving the jurors the instructions in written form, which apparently satisfied them. [22] Defendant asserts the trial court's response to the jury's question also violated his rights under section 1138. [23] Defendant contends that, rather than merely furnishing the jury with written copies of the instructions it already had given orally, the trial court was obligated to provide the instruction on express malice second degree murder it had failed to provide originally. This argument is essentially a restatement of the argument previously discussed, that the trial court erred in omitting the instruction on the first occasion. For the same reasons we noted in finding the original instructional error to be harmless, the repetition of that error in the written instructions also was harmless. To the extent defendant contends the trial court, in response to the jury's inquiry regarding the degrees of murder, should have provided additional instructions on express malice second degree murder other than the one discussed above or should have elaborated on the standard instruction, his counsel's acquiescence in the trial court's response forfeits the claim of error on appeal. ( People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 331, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 529, 851 P.2d 811; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 902, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) In any event, defendant does not identify any respect in which the standard instruction could have been improved upon. His claim of error therefore must be rejected. [24] The clerk's transcript contains another jury note inquiring may we have the legal definitions of the crimes being charged. Defendant asserts the trial court violated section 1138 by not responding to this second note. Unlike the other jury notes in the clerk's transcript, the second note is not marked with the date and time, and there is no indication that counsel or the trial court ever saw or discussed it. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the note ever was submitted to the trial court, or if it was, when that occurred. For all we can determine, the note may have been a rejected first draft of the note considered by the court. We may not predicate error or prejudice on the bare existence of the second note. Defendant contends his trial counsel was not informed of the existence of the second note during trial, and defendant was unaware of it until late 1998 when he read the brief filed by respondent in this court. [25] He argues that the trial court's failure to inform defense counsel of the note violated section 1138 and denied him the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1136-1137, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 69, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) On this record, we are unable to verify defendant's assertion that trial counsel was not informed of the existence of the second note. Accordingly, because error has not been affirmatively shown ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, 86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193), defendant's claims under section 1138 and the Sixth Amendment must fail.
In a related contention, defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct on its own motion that provocation inadequate to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter nonetheless may suffice to negate premeditation and deliberation, thus reducing the crime to second degree murder. (See CALJIC No. 8.73; see also People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 132, 169 P.2d 1.) CALJIC No. 8.73 explains this concept. [26] The Attorney General contends that CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction relating particular evidence to an element of the offense, and therefore need not be given on the court's own motion. We agree. We have recently stated, albeit in dicta, that CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction. ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 214-215, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717 [where CALJIC No. 8.73 was requested and trial court agreed to give it but for some reason failed to do so, there was no error because no evidence supported the giving of the requested instruction]; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 778, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [on appeal, defendant could not complain that CALJIC No. 8.73, which was given, was ambiguous or otherwise inadequate when he failed to request any modifications at trial].) This conclusion is supported by People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588, a murder case in which we held the trial court was not required to instruct on its own motion that the jury should consider the defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether defendant premeditated and deliberated. ( Id. at pp. 1117-1120, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) We noted that because the defense of diminished capacity had been abolished, [i]ntoxication is now relevant only to the extent that it bears on the question of whether the defendant actually had the requisite specific mental state. Thus, it is now more like [] `pinpoint,' instructions . . . to which a defendant is entitled upon request. Such instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or `pinpoint' the crux of a defendant's case. . . . They are required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte. ( People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; see also id. at p. 1120, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588 [instruction relating evidence of intoxication to premeditation and deliberation does not involve a general principle of law as that term is used in cases imposing a sua sponte duty to instruct].) Similarly, under the principles expressed in CALJIC No. 8.73, provocation is relevant only to the extent it bears on the question whether defendant premeditated and deliberated. ( People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) Because CALJIC No. 8.73 relates the evidence of provocation to the specific legal issue of premeditation and deliberation, it is a pinpoint instruction as that term was defined in People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 1119-1120, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588, and need not be given on the court's own motion. (Accord, People v. Middleton (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 30-33, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 [CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction that need not be given on the court's own motion]; People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1732-1734, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 723 [same]; Comment to CALJIC No. 8.73 (6th ed. 1998) (July 2002 rev.) [no sua sponte duty to instruct]; Bench notes to CALCRIM No. 522 (1st ed.2005) [no sua sponte duty to instruct with CALCRIM analogue to CALJIC No. 8.73].) Defendant relies on People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673. There, we stated in dictum that a sua sponte instruction on provocation and second degree murder must be given `where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately' to carry it out. ( Id. at pp. 42-43, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673, quoting People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329, 185 Cal Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159 [no sua sponte duty to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.73 where no evidence supported the instruction]; but see People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1250, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225 [noting inconsistency between Johnson and Perez on the one hand, and Mayfield on the other].) Johnson cited People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, for the proposition that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the principles contained in CALJIC No. 8.73. Wickersham, however, held only that an instruction on second degree murder must be given when the evidence supports the theory that the defendant killed in response to provocation and thus without premeditation and deliberation. Wickersham did not state that the trial court must explain the principles spelled out in CALJIC No. 8.73. Accordingly, Johnson's reliance on Wickersham for the proposition that CALJIC No. 8.73 must be given on the court's own motion was erroneous. Indeed, in Johnson the trial court had instructed on second degree murder; thus, Wickersham was inapposite. Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with People v. Valentine, upon which CALJIC No. 8.73 is based. There, the defendant killed the victim during an argument after the victim accused the defendant of trespassing and, according to the defense, swore at defendant and shoved him. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder. We reversed based on a host of instructional errors. ( People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 137-144, 169 P.2d 1.) We also suggested the instructions on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter were misleading because the jury might have understood them as implying that provocation that was inadequate to reduce the murder to manslaughter was irrelevant to any issue. But in that case, the court also had instructed the jury erroneously that: (a) if the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill, the killing was first degree murder (thus blurring the distinction between first and second degree murder); and (b) the defendant bore the burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the murder. ( People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 130-134, 169 P.2d 1.) Valentine does not stand for the general proposition that the standard heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter instructions are always misleading in a homicide case where the jury is instructed on premeditated murder and there is evidence of provocation, or that such manslaughter instructions always must be accompanied by instructions on the principle of inadequate provocation set out in CALJIC No. 8.73. In the absence of instructional errors such as were present in Valentine, the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor distinguishing first and second degree murder. Further, the manslaughter instruction does not preclude the defense from arguing that provocation played a role in preventing the defendant from premeditating and deliberating; nor does it preclude the jury from giving weight to any evidence of provocation in determining whether premeditation existed. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction that need not be given on the court's own motion.
The jury was instructed pursuant to a modified version of former CALJIC No. 3.36 (now CALJIC No. 3.32), as follows: Evidence has been received regarding a mental disease or mental defect or mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the offenses charged in counts one and two and in the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. You may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crimes charged in the information and the crime of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to identify the specific mental state or states  namely premeditation and deliberation  to which defendant's mental health evidence was relevant. Defendant points out that the use note accompanying the standard instruction directs the trial judge to specify the mental state or intent required in each specific count. (Use Note to CALJIC No. 3.36 (1987 rev.) (4th ed.1979).) He contends the trial court exacerbated the error by failing to give CALJIC No. 3.31.5, the instruction on concurrence of act and mental state, which would have specified that the necessary mental state required for first degree murder was premeditation and deliberation. He argues the instructions as a whole would have led the jury to believe it could not consider the defense mental health evidence in determining whether the killing of Clark was premeditated and deliberate. [27] We disagree. [28] We previously have rejected claims that a trial court erroneously failed to identify premeditation and deliberation as a mental state to which evidence of mental disease or defect was relevant, in cases where the trial court either explained that premeditation and deliberation were mental states necessary for a conviction of first degree murder ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1247-1249, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1145, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757) or instructed that `the mental state required is included in the definition of the crime charged' ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 988, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171). We also have rejected a similar claim regarding the instruction relating voluntary intoxication to mental state. ( People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014, fn. 2, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197 [pinpoint instruction relating voluntary intoxication to premeditation and deliberation not required where jury was fully instructed on first degree premeditated murder and also instructed that the requisite mental states would be defined `elsewhere in these instructions']). In the foregoing cases, in light of full instructions defining first degree murder including an explanation of premeditation and deliberation, we concluded a reasonable jury would have understood that the requisite mental states (as set forth in the definitions of the crimes) were the same `mental states' that could be considered in connection with the evidence of defendant's mental disease, defect, or disorder. ( People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 989, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Although, in contrast to the cases cited above, the jury neither was informed that premeditation and deliberation were mental states, nor told that the mental state required for each crime was included in the definition of that crime, the instructions as a whole nonetheless adequately informed the jury it could consider defendant's evidence of mental disease or defect in deciding whether he premeditated and deliberated the killing of Clark. As we explained in People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at page 1017, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197: Premeditation and deliberation are clearly mental states; no reasonable juror would assume otherwise. Moreover, they refer to the quality of the intent to kill. Similarly here, the instruction on first degree murder fully explained the concepts of premeditation and deliberation. The jury would have understood that they are mental states. By relating [mental disease or defect] to mental state, the [challenged] instruction necessarily directed the jury's attention to evidence of [mental disease or defect] as it related to premeditation and deliberation. ( People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1017, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) Moreover, defense counsel's argument reinforced the notion inherent in the instructions that premeditation and deliberation are mental states. Several times in argument, defendant's counsel equated the concept of mental state with premeditation and deliberation. Counsel argued the prosecution had to prove mental state beyond a reasonable doubt, and then asked the jury to consider whether the prosecution had proven a state of premeditation and deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel also asked rhetorically whether defendant killed Clark with the high level of mental state of weighing considerations for and against? Under all the circumstances, no reasonable juror would have assumed premeditation and deliberation were not mental states as that term was used in the instruction relating defendant's evidence of mental disease or defect to the mental state necessary for the charged crimes. (Cf. People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1017, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.)
Defendant asserts the trial court erred prejudicially in failing to instruct on its own motion on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under an imperfect self defense theory. (See People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) He contends the error deprived him of rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, warranting reversal of his conviction for the Clark murder. The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.40 that voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought when there is an intent to kill, and that there is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. In the written version of CALJIC No. 8.40 given to the jury, the trial court crossed out the following language explaining imperfect self defense: there is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred ... in the honest but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury. The trial court gave a similarly modified version of CALJIC No. 8.50 distinguishing murder and manslaughter. It did not give CALJIC No. 5.17, which further explains the imperfect-self-defense theory of voluntary manslaughter. [29] In People v. Flannel we thus explained the doctrine of imperfect self-defense: [a]n honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter. ( People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 674, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, italics omitted; see also In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) We since have reaffirmed this doctrine, but have cautioned that it is narrow and will apply only when the defendant has an actual belief in the need for self-defense and only when the defendant fears immediate harm that ` must be instantly dealt with. ' ( In re Christian S., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) We have explained further that imperfect self-defense is not a true defense; it is rather a shorthand description of one form of the crime of voluntary manslaughter. ( People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Thus, a trial court's duty to instruct on this theory arises whenever the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense. ( People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Here, there was no substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded defendant killed Clark due to an honest but unreasonable belief that he needed to defend himself from an imminent threat to his life or to his bodily integrity. Neither defendant nor his experts testified defendant actually believed he had to kill Clark to defend himself from such an imminent threat. In support of the instruction, defendant points to his own testimony that when Clark was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection. He also points to his mental health experts' testimony that the killing of Clark was an act of survival. For example, Dr. Franz testified the events leading up to the shooting, including defendant's failure to perform sexually and Clark's taunts and physical threats, caused defendant to react like a frightened, abused child and to fire the gun as a defense mechanism to protect himself. Dr. Bird also explained defendant associated Clark with his abusive stepmother and shot her out of fear of not surviving himself. Contrary to defendant's contention, we do not read this testimony as supporting an inference that defendant believed he needed to defend himself from death or great bodily injury. Rather, Dr. Franz's and Dr. Bird's testimony is more susceptible of the interpretation that defendant feared for his emotional survival rather than that he feared for his physical survival. For example, Dr. Franz stated defendant lost a sense of his body and began to try to protect his essence, his soul, that last thread that was trying to be moral and solid and sane. Further, defendant himself testified only that he felt fear and a need for protection. He did not state what he feared and certainly never testified he feared his life was in danger or that he would suffer great bodily injury. The only testimony suggesting that defendant actually feared for his life came from Dr. Bird, who acknowledged it is ridiculous to fear for your own life when somebody is pointing a finger at you. That isolated comment did not constitute substantial evidence  that is, evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable persons could find ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094)  that defendant (a deputy sheriff armed with a revolver) feared great bodily injury or death from an unarmed 15-year-old girl. For these reasons, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense.
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct on its own motion on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter in relation to count one, the Clark count. Involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought and without an intent to kill. (CALJIC No. 8.45 (Jan.1987 rev.) (4th ed.1979).) A verdict of involuntary manslaughter is warranted where the defendant demonstrates that because of his mental illness ... he did not in fact form the intent unlawfully to kill (i.e., did not have malice aforethought). ( People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1117, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) An instruction on involuntary manslaughter is required whenever there is substantial evidence indicating the defendant did not actually form the intent to kill. ( People v. Webber (1991) 228 Cal. App.3d 1146, 1162, 279 Cal.Rptr. 437; see People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 28-29, 120 Cal.Rptr. 377, 533 P.2d 1017.) Assuming the trial court erred in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter, any error was harmless. In addition to being fully instructed on first degree premeditated murder, the jury also was instructed on the lesser included offenses of implied malice second degree murder and heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter, both of which require higher degrees of culpability than does the offense of involuntary manslaughter. The jury rejected the lesser options and found defendant guilty of first degree premeditated murder. Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable probability that, had the jury been instructed on involuntary manslaughter, it would have chosen that option.
Defendant contends the trial court failed to instruct on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01, an omission that prejudiced him in relation to the Benintende count. [30] The trial court did give CALJIC No. 2.02 on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence of specific intent or mental state. An instruction on the principles contained in CALJIC No. 2.01 must be given sua sponte when the prosecution substantially relies on circumstantial evidence to prove guilt. ( People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 174 [133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881]; People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46, 49 [286 P.2d 1].) ( People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 577, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418.) The instruction should not be given `when the problem of inferring guilt from a pattern of incriminating circumstances is not present.' ( People v. Wiley, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 174, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881.) Here, the prosecution's case regarding the identity of Benintende's killer rested principally on two items of circumstantial evidence  defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of Clark (like Benintende, a prostitute) a year later. There was no direct evidence linking defendant to Benintende; no witnesses saw defendant with her and defendant did not confess to killing her. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.01. The giving of CALJIC No. 2.02 did not cure the error, for that instruction by its terms applied only to circumstantial evidence of specific intent or mental state. [31] The jury first had to determine the identity of Benintende's killer, and CALJIC No. 2.02 did not speak to that issue. The error, however, was harmless. Because CALJIC No. 2.02 was given, the failure to give CALJIC No. 2.01 could have affected only the issue of identity. On that issue, the evidence supporting the jury's determination that defendant killed Benintende, while circumstantial, was strong. Both women were killed with the same gun. Defendant had obtained that weapon in 1982, and there was no evidence any other person had access to it. Further, defendant's admission to the Clark killing provided strong circumstantial evidence he also killed Benintende. Both women were prostitutes who frequented Union Avenue; defendant admitted to an affinity for prostitutes. Both women were shot multiple times, and their bodies were recovered from the same canal (although several miles apart). The similarities between the two crimes pointed strongly toward defendant as Benintende's killer. Indeed, the circumstantial evidence was not susceptible of [a] reasonable interpretation[] ... which points to the defendant's ... innocence. (CALJIC No. 2.01.) Moreover, the direct evidence pointing toward innocence was weak. Defendant presented no evidence related to the Benintende killing. The prosecution presented evidence that in his confession defendant first denied, then said he could not remember, killing Benintende. On the stand, defendant testified I have no memory of the Benintende homicide. Defendant's testimony that he could not remember was not inconsistent with the evidence of guilt. The only direct evidence that defendant did not kill Benintende was his denial in his confession. Defendant did not repeat that denial in his testimony before the jury. Under the circumstances, there is no reasonable probability ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243) that had the jury been given the circumstantial evidence instruction, it would have found defendant did not kill Benintende. Defendant contends the error violated several of his federal constitutional rights. Insofar as the federal Constitution itself does not require courts to instruct on the evaluation of circumstantial evidence where, as here, the jury properly was instructed on reasonable doubt ( Holland v. United States (1954) 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150; see also Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 7-17, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 [approving California's pattern instruction on reasonable doubt]), defendant's claim necessarily rests on the asserted arbitrary denial of a state-created liberty interest. (See Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175.) We doubt the common law right to a circumstantial evidence instruction rises to the level of a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. (Cf. People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 170-172, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094 [right under state law to lesser-included-offense instruction does not create liberty interest under Hicks ].) In any event, any federal constitutional error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for the reasons expressed above.