Opinion ID: 197526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Allege an Offense

Text: 16 Whiffen's first claim of error relates to his pre-trial motion, under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege an offense. Whiffen was charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) which prohibits the transmission in interstate commerce of any threat to injure the person of another. The indictment alleges that Whiffen made such a communication when he stated that [y]our building will go boom; the building will go boom; buildings go boom; and Allstate had better stop messing with me or else I'm going to blow up their building. 17 On appeal, Whiffen argues that his motion to dismiss should have been granted on the grounds that the indictment fails to allege 'unequivocal, unconditional and specific expressions of intention immediately to inflict injury' to another person. Brief of Appellant at 7 (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir.1976)). 18 Having determined that specific intent is not the standard under which Whiffen's statements should be judged, it is clear that the failure to allege specific intent is not grounds for dismissal. [A]n indictment is sufficiently particular if it elucidates the elements of a crime, enlightens a defendant as to the nature of the charges against which she must defend, and enables her to plead double jeopardy in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1192 (1st Cir.1993); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). Although the four counts contain slightly different wording, we present only Count I, which is representative of the other counts. Count I states that: 19 On or about October 17, 1995, in the District of New Hampshire, the defendant, Kevin Whiffen knowingly and willfully transmitted in interstate commerce between Farmington, New Hampshire and Tampa, Florida, a communication containing a threat to injure Kelly Terrell and other employees of Universal Fidelity Corporation, Tampa, Florida, to wit, Your building will go boom. All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(c). 20 It is our view that the indictment states the offense for which Whiffen has been convicted. The elements of the crime are elucidated and the indictment is sufficient to plead double jeopardy should future prosecutions be brought against Whiffen for the same offense. The indictment basically tracks the language of section 875(c), which states: Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing ... any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). We find the indictment to be sufficient. See Darby, 37 F.3d at 1063. 21 Appellant also argues that the indictment is inadequate because it alleges threats that a building or buildings would 'go boom.' ... It does not allege that any person would be present or hurt by any such explosion. Brief of Appellant at 6. The indictment does, however, allege that each of the threats was a threat to injure the person of another. In Count I, for example, it is stated that the communication contained a threat to injure Kelly Terrell and other employees of Universal Fidelity Corporation. Whiffen's argument appears to be that threats to blow up the building are, as a matter of law, not threats against a person. Like the district court, we are unwilling to conclude that his words did not contain a threat to injure a person. One possible interpretation of a threat to blow up a building is that the building will be blown up with people inside. Such an interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the threat was a threat against those who work in the building. Alternatively, such a threat may be interpreted as a threat to blow up the building only when it is empty. Under this interpretation, Whiffen's statement would not constitute a threat against a person. The proper interpretation of Whiffen's remarks, however, is a question of fact and, therefore, appropriately left for the jury. We cannot conclude that the interpretation preferred by Whiffen is, as a matter of law, the correct one. 22 Whiffen argues that we must interpret section 875(c) narrowly in order to avoid violation of his First Amendment rights. In support, he cites Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 89 S.Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 (1969), in which the defendant was accused of threatening the President. The primary concern of the Court in Watts was the protection of constitutionally protected political speech. See id. at 706-08, 89 S.Ct. at 1400-02. Whiffen does not claim that his statements were a form of political speech. 23 In any event, a true threat is not protected by the First Amendment. See Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1492-93; United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1990). For this reason, a conviction upon a finding that the statements were true threats would not violate Whiffen's constitutionally protected right to speech.