Opinion ID: 1809082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Order to Register as a Sex Offender.

Text: In its judgment entry, the district court ordered the defendant to register as a sex offender for the remainder of his life. In his cross-appeal, the defendant contends that this order is erroneous, as he is only required to register for ten years. Compare Iowa Code § 692A.2 (1999) (requiring lifetime registration only upon a second or subsequent offense; otherwise, imposing a ten-year registration requirement), with id. § 692A.2 (Supp. 1999) (broadening lifetime registration to include persons convicted of an aggravated offense, and defining such an offense to include burglary in the first degree in violation of section 713.3(1)( d ), see id. § 692A.1(1)( f ) (Supp.1999)). The State argues that the issue is not ripe for review because sex offender registration is an administrative process that does not commence for an incarcerated individual until he is released from prison. We agree that the issue is not ripe, and, therefore, we do not determine for what length of time the defendant must register. A case is ripe for adjudication when it presents an actual, present controversy, as opposed to one that is merely hypothetical or speculative. State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000). The basic rationale for the ripeness doctrine is particularly apropos here. That rationale is to protect [administrative] agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties. Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681, 691 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 984, 51 L.Ed.2d 192, 199 (1977). An incarcerated defendant's duty to register commences upon his release from prison. See Iowa Code § 692A.3(1) (requiring registration within ten days of a release from custody, or placement on probation, parole, or work release). A person required to register does so with the county sheriff, not the court. See id. Maintenance of registry records is the responsibility of the Department of Public Safety, not the court. See id. § 692A.10(2). Of even greater relevance here is the statutory provision that allows a person who has registered to apply to the Department of Public Safety for a determination whether the period of time during which the person is obligated to register under this chapter has expired. Id. § 692A.8. The court's involvement in the registration process is restricted (1) to informing convicted defendants who are not sentenced to confinement of their duty to register and (2) to the collection of specified information from such defendants. See id. § 692A.5(1). Of course, these limited duties are not applicable here, where the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Based on the statutory scheme we have just reviewed, it is at once apparent that the determination of the length of any required registration is an administrative decision initially committed to the Department of Public Safety. We conclude, therefore, that the sentencing court was without authority to determine the length of any future registration by the defendant. See Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1995) (holding that district court had no authority to determine whether criminal defendant was subject to law requiring revocation of driver's license where matter had been entrusted to administrative agency and no petition for judicial review of agency action had been filed). Until the Department has made a decision on the defendant's term of registration, there is no concrete controversy. Any adjudication by the district court prior to an administrative decision and a request for judicial review of that decision is premature. Therefore, the nature and extent of the defendant's registration obligation are issues that are not ripe for our review.