Opinion ID: 1999830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Counsel's remarks to the jury.

Text: In his closing argument to the jury, counsel for the plaintiff argued as follows: And the fifth question says, if you have answered both of them are causally negligent, then you must compare the negligence. You have all been through this, maybe you haven't, I'm not sure. But you will be asked, taking one hundred percent of the negligence of both parties as a whole, then how much is attributed to the Transport Company and how much to Emily Kobelinski? And this is where, if you get to that point, this is where there is a very delicate balancing act that has to be done by you, because you are almost literally the scales of justice at that point. You have to ask yourselves how didwhat did the Transport Company do compared to what Emily Kobelinski did? Who had control of the bus? Who could decide where the bus stopped? Who could decide whether to open that door and to let passengers out? Who had the obligation to exercise the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers? Who could have stopped several feet from out into the roadway and let her get to safety that way? Who could have waited for the bus to go through the light? All those questions are answered by the Transport Company. How do you compare them to Mrs. Kobelinski's duty to exercise care for her own safety? There isn't any comparison. But if you find that they are both negligent, then I recommend that you find the Transport Company ninety percent and Mrs. Kobelinski ten percent, if you have to get to that kind of distribution. One thing I want to be very emphatic about, is that if you should even remotely consider dividing the negligence fifty-fifty, that you would be doing the gravest injustice to my client, to Emily Kobelinski. So, I ask you to reject any kind of an apportionment of negligence that even remotely resembles fifty-fifty. There was no objection by counsel for defendant to this line of argument at this point. In the course of his rebuttal argument, counsel for plaintiff further argued: So, as far as the comparison is concerned, ladies and gentlemen, I just want to urge you one more time, if you think that Mrs. Kobelinski ought to have done something when you come to that part of the question for God's sake don't consider fifty-fifty, because if you were to come back with that kind of verdict you would be doing my client the gravest kind of injustice. At this point, and for the first time, defendant's counsel objected. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the statement and that the court would instruct them with respect to that subject. Defendant argues that plaintiff's counsel's remarks were improper and prejudicial as to constitute grounds for a new trial. The trial court in its written opinion, following motions after verdict, correctly held: ... Although plaintiff's counsel's remarks were on the borderline, it cannot be said that such remark advised the jury of the result of its verdict. Counsel could just as well have said that a finding of 75 percent negligence against the defendant and 25 percent against the plaintiff would be an injustice to the plaintiff. Obviously, the jury must know that the comparative negligence question has some meaning. Plaintiff's counsel did not say that a 50-50 percentage of negligence would result in a verdict favorable to the defendant which, of course, would have been improper. Counsel was entitled to argue that the defendant was more negligent than the plaintiff. Had the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant 51 percent negligent and the plaintiff 49 percent negligent it might be said that they were influenced by the suggestion made by counsel. However, the fact that the jury found the defendant 80 percent negligent and the plaintiff only 20 percent negligent shows quite clearly that they were not influenced by any suggestions as to the effect of a 50-50 percent verdict. The fundamental rule in this state is that it is reversible error for either the court or counsel to inform the jury of the effect of their answer on the ultimate result of their verdict, especially if it appears that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to revise or set aside the judgment, or secure the new trial. Erb v. Mutual Service Casualty Co. (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 530, 123 N. W. 2d 493; Pecor v. Home Indemnity Co. (1940), 234 Wis. 407, 291 N. W. 313. This is true whether the jury is explicitly informed or informed by necessary implication. Banderob v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co. (1907), 133 Wis. 249, 287, 113 N. W. 738. However, the charge or argument is not improper merely because an intelligent juror might be able to infer therefrom the effect upon the final result of his answers to the special verdict. Banderob, supra . The rationale of these rules was stated in Anderson v. Seelow (1937), 224 Wis. 230, 234, 271 N. W. 844, as: ... The sole purpose of a special verdict is to get the jury to answer each question according to the evidence, regardless of the effect or supposed effect of the answer upon the rights of the parties as to recovery. To inform them of the effect of their answer in this respect is to frustrate this purpose.... [7] It cannot be said that plaintiff's counsel's remarks advised the jury of the result of its verdict. In addition, counsel for defendant failed to object to the statements' first introduction. If any prejudicial error existed, the defendant waived his objections thereto in not objecting to the remarks in the first instance. When no objection is made to an argument, alleged impropriety in the argument will not be considered. Rodenbeck v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 682, 190 N. W. 2d 917; Doering v. Knudsen (1952), 261 Wis. 442, 53 N. W. 2d 445. While this court disapproves of the statements made by plaintiff's counsel, in light of the verdict's apportionment of negligence, failure of defendant's counsel to object, and the trial court's proper instructions to the jury, it cannot be said that the remarks of plaintiff's counsel constitute prejudicial error, and, therefore, grounds for reversal.