Opinion ID: 175508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Property Clause

Text: Congress authorized the NPS to regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks, . . . to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. 16 U.S.C. § 1. The Secretary of the Interior has the authority to issue such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary or proper for the use and management of the parks. Id. § 3. Pursuant to that congressional grant of rule-making authority, the NPS issued 36 C.F.R. § 4.2, which provides: (a) Unless specifically addressed by regulations in this chapter, traffic and the use of vehicles within a park area are governed by State law. State law that is now or may later be in effect is adopted and made a part of the regulations in this part. (b) Violating a provision of State law is prohibited. The regulation applies to all persons entering, using, visiting, or otherwise within.. . the boundaries of federally owned lands and waters administered by the National Park Service. 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(1); see also id. § 4.1 (The applicability of the regulations in this part is described in § 1.2 of this chapter.). Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, Washington law prohibits driving a motorcycle without wearing a helmet on a state highway, county road, or city street. [2] Wash. Rev.Code § 46.37.530(1)(c). Defendant contends that, because the federal government does not have exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over the Stehekin Valley Road, requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets on the road exceeds congressional authority. We review de novo the constitutionality of a statute or regulation challenged as exceeding congressional authority. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 435 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir.2006). The federal government has at least proprietary jurisdiction over land that it owns. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976). Here, Defendant concedes that the federal government has proprietary jurisdiction over the Stehekin Valley Road. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the federal government lacks exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over the road. [3] The Property Clause grants Congress plenary power to determine what are needful rules respecting the public lands. Id. at 539, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (internal quotation marks omitted). That power does not depend on the existence of concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 542-43, 96 S.Ct. 2285. In Kleppe, the Supreme Court explained: [W]hile Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over lands within a State by the State's consent or cession, the presence or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress' powers under the Property Clause. Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. Id. Thus, Congress has power over the Stehekin Valley Road under the Property Clause, even if the federal government lacks concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction over it. In Kleppe, which involved a challenge to the federal government's authority over wild horses and burros, the Court held that the Property Clause grants Congress the power to regulate and protect the wildlife living [on public lands]. Id. at 541, 96 S.Ct. 2285. Wildlife regulations are not at issue in the present case. But the Supreme Court also noted in Kleppe that the Property Clause allows Congress to control the[ ] occupancy and use of public lands and to enact legislation respecting the public lands if it be found to be necessary for the protection of the public, or of intending settlers. Id. at 540, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Here, Congress authorized regulations to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired. 16 U.S.C. § 1. Regulating the use of federal parks to protect the land and the wildlife living there and to promote non-destructive use of the parks easily falls within the permissible category of needful rules that control the[ ] . . . use of federal land, and protect[ ] . . . the public. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539-40, 96 S.Ct. 2285. We hold that the grant of rule-making authority to the NPS did not exceed congressional power under the Property Clause. Nor does 36 C.F.R. § 4.2, a regulation that controls traffic and motor vehicle use, exceed Congress' Property Clause power. That regulation clearly qualifies as a needful rule for the use of federal land and the protection of the public. Defendant asserts that, under the Property Clause, regulations must relate to the designated purpose of the federal land. But, even assuming for the sake of argument that the traffic regulation here does not relate to provid[ing] for the enjoyment of the [national parks] in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations, 16 U.S.C. § 1, the authority that Defendant cites for his proposition is not on point. Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass'n of Missouri v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir.1983), and the case on which it relies, Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1249 (8th Cir.1981), hold that Property Clause power extends to conduct threatening the designated purpose of federal lands whether that conduct occurs on or off federal land. Neither case holds that Property Clause power over conduct occurring on federal land is limited by the designated purpose of the federal land. Defendant's citations are therefore unpersuasive. Defendant also argues that 36 C.F.R. § 4.2 is not needful for the protection of the public because there is no federal policy on motorcycle helmets and because the state laws incorporated by reference into 36 C.F.R. § 4.2 either do not require motorcycle helmets under all circumstances or do not require them at all. Therefore, Defendant reasons, 36 C.F.R. § 4.2 does not serve a federal interest in safety. His logic is flawed. The fact that the federal government does not generally mandate helmet use does not mean that the federal government has concluded that helmet use never serves the interest of safety. Similarly, that state governments sometimes do not require motorcyclists to wear helmets does not mean that requiring their use does not protect the public. Our conclusion here as to the extent of the federal government's Property Clause power agrees with the conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit in a similar case. United States v. Gliatta, 580 F.2d 156, 160 (5th Cir.1978), held that the Property Clause authorized the government to enact and enforce regulations designed to maintain safety and order on government property. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the defendant's conviction for violating several provisions of 39 C.F.R. § 232.6 by driving in an unsafe manner in a post office parking lot and by driving his car into a parking space after being ordered to stop. Id. Finally, we reject Defendant's contention that the NPS is enforcing state law in violation of a memorandum of understanding between the NPS and the Chelan County Sheriff's Office. The federal government is enforcing a federal regulation here, albeit one that incorporates state law by reference. We acknowledge Defendant's warning that if the federal government adopts and enforces the substance of state law pursuant to the Property Clause, there could effectively be dual (or conflicting) enforcement of the same substantive provisions by state and federal officials. However, the fact that it might be a poor use of federal resources to duplicate state effort, or that it might be politically unwise to crack down on conduct that state law enforcement chooses to ignore, does not mean that the Property Clause withholds from the federal government the power to act. Moreover, although state priorities in prosecuting violations do not bind the federal government, if a state wishes to shield certain conduct from federal penalties, it can do so by rewriting its own law.