Opinion ID: 2328502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the Trial Court's Interpretation Of The Exclusion Language Render The Term Practicing Nugatory?

Text: Twin City's third, and final claim of error is that even if the exclusion is construed against the drafter, the interpretation adopted by the trial court was incorrect because it effectively reads the term practicing out of the contract. The trial court held that the term practicing referred to practice activities that were directly related to a scheduled race. That construction, Twin City argues, conflates the terms participating in and practicing, and makes them redundant, in violation of the principle that where possible, a court should give effect to all contract terms. We disagree. The trial court's interpretation of the term practicing [for] horseracing was a reasonable construction of the policy language, which included in the definition of Athletic Activity a sports or athletic contest or exhibition that you [the insured] sponsor. That definition envisions a horserace officially scheduled by Delaware Park, consistent with the definition of racing in the Rules of Racing. It therefore was reasonable for the trial court (1) to interpret the exclusion term participating in horseracing as covering cases where the rider is injured while actually participating (as a rider) in a race officially scheduled and sponsored by Delaware Park, and (2) to interpret the term practicing to encompass situations where a rider is injured while practicing to participate in an officially sponsored, scheduled horse race  in advance of that race. Twin City has not attempted to explain in any reasoned way how or why that interpretation collapses the distinction between participating and practicing, or otherwise renders those two terms redundant. We find Twin City's challenge on this ground lacking in merit.