Opinion ID: 494478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Convictions and Guilty Pleas

Text: 15 Defendants argue that the district court erred by permitting the prosecution to elicit testimony from seven of its witnesses concerning their prior convictions and guilty pleas for the purpose of exposing defendants to the impermissible inference of guilt by association. Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires that all objections to the admission of evidence must be stated specifically. '[A] specific objection made on the wrong grounds and overruled precludes a party from raising a specific objection on other, tenable grounds on appeal.' J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 1 Weinstein's Evidence p103, at 103-25-103-26 (1986); see also United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 78 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1384 (1987). Because defendants did not assert in the district court the specific ground for objection they now urge on appeal, we must consider defendants' argument under the plain error standard of review. See Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d at 78; Helminski v. Ayerst Laboratories, 766 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 386 (1985). '[T]he plain error doctrine is to be used sparingly. . . . only in exceptional circumstances, . . . and solely to avoid a miscarriage of justice. . . . Recourse may be had to the doctrine 'only on appeal from a trial infected with error so 'plain' the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it. United States v. Hook, 781 F.2d 1166, 1172 (6th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 269 (1986); see also Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d at 78. 16 The prosecutor impeached the credibility of Lykins, Isaac, Pickett, Oney, and Porter by eliciting testimony that they had previously been convicted of felonies. Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that '[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.' The prosecution's 'questioning of its own witnesses concerning prior felony convictions is admissible to enable the jury to weigh the credibility of the witnesses.' United States v. Bileck, 776 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1985). The prosecution does not hold out [its] witness[es] as worthy of belief, and its 'candor . . . in eliciting the fact that a witness has a felony conviction is to let the jury know precisely the kind of witness [it] is relying on.' Belick, 776 F.2d at 197-98 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 607). 17 'Rule 607 may not, however, be used 'for the purpose of introducing irrelevant evidence or of establishing the defendant's guilt by association with the witness. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Gorny, 732 F.2d 597, 604 (7th Cir. 1984)). The prosecution's conduct must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that a witness is not called merely for the purpose of introducing this sort of improper evidence. Gorny, 732 F.2d at 604. Our review of the record in the present case shows that the testimony of these five witnesses was extremely important and that the prosecution impeached their credibility because of their hostility and failure to be forthcoming. Thus, the district court's failure to exclude the testimony does not rise to the level of plain error. 18 The prosecution also elicited the testimony of Taylor and Labanz that they had previously pleaded guilty to felony charges for the purpose of informing the jury of the circumstances under which they appeared as witnesses. While the guilty plea of a compatriot may not be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, the guilty plea 'may properly be considered as evidence of a witness' credibility. . . . '[U]nder proper instruction, evidence of a guilty plea may be elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination so that the jury may assess the credibility of the witnesses the government asks them to believe. United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 214 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981)) (citation omitted); see also Townsend, 796 F.2d at 162. The district court in the present case instructed the jury that 'the fact that an accomplice has entered a guilty plea to the offense charged is not evidence, in and of itself, of guilt or innocence-of the guilt of any other person.' Thus, the district court's failure to exclude the testimony does not rise to the level of plain error. 19 Defendants further argue that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that the testimony of the witnesses concerning their prior convictions should not be considered in assessing the guilt or innocence of defendants. While defendants twice asked the district court to instruct the jury that a prior conviction is a factor to be considered in assessing witness credibility and that a witness' prior conviction should not be considered in assessing the guilt or innocence of defendants, defendants made no objection when the district court twice gave only the initial portion of the requested instruction. Defendants' requests alone were not sufficient to preserve their objection to the limiting instruction. 'If counsel requests a limiting instruction, but is dissatisfied with the one given, he must then make an objection to the instruction that is timely and specific.' 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 5065, at 325 (1977); see also United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 543 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). Defendants made no timely and specific objections, and we do not consider the district court's failure to give the requested instruction in its entirety plain error. The evidence of defendants' guilt was overwhelming, and the instruction given by the district court was sufficient to minimize any possible unfair prejudice to defendants.