Opinion ID: 1960763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Factual Findings

Text: The Capitals contend, in addition to their assertion of an incorrect legal ruling, that the DOES erred in its finding that the post-injury payments under the contract constituted salary, as opposed to disability compensation. We reiterate our deferential substantial evidence standard employed in reviewing findings of fact. If the record, when viewed as a whole, provides substantial evidence upon which a given decision could rationally be based, that given decision will stand. Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Comp. Bd., 377 A.2d 436, 439 (D.C.1977). `Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' Stewart v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 606 A.2d 1350, 1351 (D.C.1992) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)). The Examiner articulated, and the Director endorsed, four essential findings that served as a basis for decision: (1) the parties' ignorance of the extent of the injury until well after the expiration of the SPC; (2) the guaranteed nature of what both the SPC and the CBA characterize as salary; (3) the post-injury duties Tinordi had and continued to fulfill under the SPC; and (4) the fact that, for myriad possible reasons, a professional athlete employee may periodically fail actually to compete, yet nevertheless, he still remains `employed' by the team, in any meaningful sense of the word. These findings are uncontroverted in the record. The Examiner therefore found that the payments to [Tinordi] were regular salary payments which [the Capitals were] obligated to make irrespective of [Tinordi's] injury status, and were not `compensation,' advance [sic] or otherwise, within the meaning of the Act.