Opinion ID: 783682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 1976 virginia robbery conviction

Text: 17 Although the ACCA does not specifically list robbery as a violent felony, the violent felony definition includes any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The government contends that Melton's 1976 robbery conviction qualifies under this provision because the Virginia definition of robbery contains as an element the use or threatened use of force. 18 Virginia does not have a robbery statute listing the elements of the offense, relying instead on the common law definition of robbery. See George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1991) (Although the punishment for robbery is fixed by statute, Code § 18.2-58, the offense is not statutorily defined, and we must look to the common law for its definition.). Virginia courts, reiterating the common law definition, define robbery as the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation. Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 528, 138 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1964) (citing Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 105 S.E.2d 149, 150 (1958)). This definition has remained constant over the years and was well established long before Melton's conviction. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 172 Va. 615, 1 S.E.2d 300, 301 (1939) (explaining that the definition has been repeated in numerous decisions). 19 We recognize that in Taylor the Supreme Court makes specific reference to categorical analysis of a statute of conviction. Indeed, Taylor as well as the many cases applying its holding generally stem from crimes of conviction that are defined by statute. This circumstance makes our categorical analysis of Melton's Virginia robbery conviction unique, but it does not hinder our analysis. Where, as here, the state crime is defined by specific and identifiable common law elements, rather than by a specific statute, the common law definition of a crime serves as a functional equivalent of a statutory definition. This common-sense approach is consistent with Congress's emphasis on using criminal elements, as opposed to statutory labels, to trigger the ACCA's enhancement provisions. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588-90, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (explaining that Congress intended specified elements, not labels, to trigger the ACCA enhancement). It also makes sense in light of the second step of Taylor, which permits courts to look beyond the fact of conviction to determine the elements used to convict a defendant of a given offense. See id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (permitting courts to look beyond the mere fact of conviction where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary); Matthews, 278 F.3d at 884 ( Taylor requires that, when the government seeks to apply the [ACCA] enhancement, it must introduce either the statutes of conviction or some other documentary evidence that `clearly establishes' either the statutes under which the defendant was convicted or the elements of those statutes  (emphasis added).). 20 The record contains a valid judgment demonstrating that Melton was actually convicted of robbery. Looking to the common law definition of robbery as it has been articulated by the Virginia courts, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that this definition of robbery, on its face, has as an element the use or threatened use of physical force. See United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 69 (4th Cir.1995) (Violence is the use of force. Intimidation is the threat of the use of force. Thus, because robbery in Virginia has as an element the use or threatened use of force, [the defendant's] robbery convictions were properly used as predicates under [the] ACCA.). The district court properly included Melton's 1976 Virginia robbery conviction as an ACCA predicate.