Opinion ID: 2557538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Heron.

Text: In arriving at its determination that all of Longtin's causes of action accrued on his date of release from detention, the Majority opinion discusses and distinguishes Heron. In Heron, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with resisting arrest, obstructing the police in the performance of their duties, and disorderly conduct. Heron, 361 Md. at 261, 761 A.2d at 57. He was acquitted eventually of all charges and, subsequently, filed a civil suit for malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment. See id. We held that Heron's false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrued upon his arrest. See Heron, 361 Md. at 265, 761 A.2d at 59. The Majority opinion suggests that the conclusion reached in Heron was achieved haphazardly. In particular, the Majority claims that [t]here was no need [in Heron ] to distinguish between the date of arrest and the date of release; whichever was used, the notice was too late. Majority op. at 473, 19 A.3d at 873. In fact, it observes that, in Heron, we cited with approval multiple decisions which identified the date of release as the date a false arrest or false imprisonment claim accrues. Majority op. at 473-74, 19 A.3d at 873 (citing Collins v. County of Los Angeles, 241 Cal.App.2d 451, 50 Cal.Rptr. 586, 588 (1966); Ragland v. New York City Hous. Auth., 201 A.D.2d 7, 613 N.Y.S.2d 937, 939 (App.Div.1994); Boose v. Rochester, 71 A.D.2d 59, 421 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1979); Allee v. New York, 42 A.D.2d 899, 347 N.Y.S.2d 708 (App.Div. 1973)). In each of the foreign cases relied on by the Majority opinion, [t]here was [similarly] no need to distinguish between the date of arrest and the date of release; whichever was used, the notice was too late. Majority op. at 473, 19 A.3d at 873. Indeed, all of the cases involved plaintiffs who, like Heron, were detained for a very brief period of time, i.e., one day. Given the Majority's reason for deeming Heron unenlightening, one wonders why these foreign cases were more persuasive to the Majority than Heron seemed to be. Three of those foreign cases ( i.e., all but Collins ) appear in unanalyzed string citations in Heron. I find more relevant and persuasive the cases the Heron Court cites and fleshes out. They include Collins; Allen v. District of Columbia, 533 A.2d 1259, 1263 (D.C.App.1987); Livingston v. Consolidated City of Indianapolis, 398 N.E.2d 1302 (Ind.App.1979); Pisano v. City of Union City, 198 N.J.Super. 588, 487 A.2d 1296, 1299 (N.J.Super.Law Div.1984); Michaels v. New Jersey, 955 F.Supp. 315 (D.N.J.1996); and Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185 (3rd Cir.1984). In Collins, the California Court of Appeal held that it is only reasonable to assume that immediately upon their arrest and imprisonment [the plaintiffs] would have believed the same to be unlawful, at which time they could and should have sought legal assistance to determine the cause and the reason for their arrest. ... Collins, 50 Cal.Rptr. at 589 (emphasis added) (observing that false arrest/imprisonment and malicious prosecution do not share the same accrual date because they do not share the same elements). In Allen, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that [ a ] ccording to the facts of this case, any injury for the alleged false arrest ... would have been sustained at the time of [plaintiff's] arrest and transport to police headquarters. ... Allen, 533 A.2d at 1263 n. 9 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (interpreting statute which required notice within six months after the injury or damage was sustained). In Livingston, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that [the plaintiff's] claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery accrued on ... [a single] day  when [she] was arrested, charged, and released from custody. Livingston, 398 N.E.2d at 1303 (citation omitted). In Pisano, the Superior Court of New Jersey held that a plaintiff's cause of action for false arrest accrued as of the date of arrest. ... Pisano, 487 A.2d at 1299 (citing Collins for the proposition that [t]he interpretation of the California statute, upon which the New Jersey Tort Claims Act is modeled, provides authority for the view that a cause of action accrues at the time of the arrest); see id. (observing that false arrest and malicious prosecution do not share the same accrual date because they do not share the same elements). In Michaels, the federal District Court found that a plaintiff's causes of action accrued ... when [she] had reason to know that the elements of the claims existed, which occurred at or about the time of [her] arrest. ... Michaels, 955 F.Supp. at 326 (citations omitted). Finally, in Deary, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit  interpreting the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 33, § 3401 (2000)  provided that false arrest/imprisonment accrued when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the injury that constitutes the basis of this action, which it held was the date of arrest. Deary, 746 F.2d at 193 (stating that when the plaintiff was arrested, her cause of action accrued because nothing further had to occur; so far as she knew[,] she was arrested without probable cause). Returning to Heron, we said that to determine when ... causes of actions arise, we must examine the elements of the cause of action ... as a cause of action is said to have arisen when facts exist to support each element. Heron, 361 Md. at 264, 761 A.2d at 59 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Heron demonstrated that other jurisdictions examine also the elements of each claim to determine when it accrued  they did not opine that all tort claims in a complaint accrue on the same date, nor that false arrest and imprisonment claims always, regardless of the particular circumstances of each case, accrue on the same date. Such a one-size-fits-all, domino approach, in which one accrual date dictates the rest, is inconsistent with well-established tort law. At the very least, these cases militate against the Majority opinion's suggestion that Heron's reliance on foreign cases actually supports its position that the accrual date for all false arrest/imprisonment claims is the plaintiff's date of release. In sum, we did not in Heron select haphazardly the date of arrest as the accrual moment. Rather, the Court examined the record and held that [t]he facts alleged to support each element of his claim were in existence when he was arrested and detained by the police. Heron, 361 Md. at 265, 761 A.2d at 59. As a result, Heron's causes of action ... arose on the date of arrest. Id. Assuming the Majority opinion employs the wrong analysis in evaluating the notice question and that a proper analysis yields a conclusion that the day of Longtin's arrest was the correct accrual date of these causes of action, must Longtin's claims fail for improper notice? The answer is No.