Opinion ID: 3056780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Reasonability

Text: After an appellate court has determined that a sentence is procedurally sound, it reviews the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). “The review for substantive unreasonableness involves examining the totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” Id. at 1324. Once again, we will only reverse the sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of 3 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 4 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 6 Case: 12-11881 Date Filed: 12/10/2012 Page: 7 of 9 reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Early, 686 F.3d at 1221 (internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson argues that his sentence is greater than needed, particularly in light of his family situation and the amount of time he has spent in a pretrial detention facility. For several reasons, we are convinced that the district court imposed a substantively reasonable sentence under § 3553(a). First, Johnson’s 48-month sentence for mail fraud, despite being 24 months over the Guidelines range, is still far below the 240-month statutory maximum for wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341. This fact indicates that Johnson’s sentence is a reasonable one. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324 (holding that when a sentence below the statutory maximum, there is an indication of reasonableness); United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding a sentence reasonable, in part because “the 42-month sentence the district court reached after considering the § 3553(a) factors and the ultimate sentence were appreciably below the length of the statutory maximum”). Further, § 3553(a)’s factors militate in favor of an upward variance in this case, especially Johnson’s criminal history and the probability of recidivism. See Early, 686 F. 3d at 1223. The sentencing judge exhaustively recounted Johnson’s criminal history, which began in 1968 and included eight federal-fraud convictions, along with ten Georgia state convictions. Even while in state custody, 7 Case: 12-11881 Date Filed: 12/10/2012 Page: 8 of 9 Johnson forged several court orders in an attempt to modify his sentence and be released from custody. Moreover, the PSR indicated that Johnson’s criminal history might be understated because he had been either in custody or under supervision for the last 35 to 40 years. The sentencing judge remarked that Johnson’s criminal history was “one of the longest I’ve seen.” (D.E. 89: 11). Similarly, in Early we affirmed an upward variance in part because the defendant’s “criminal history [was] so extensive that he [had] been incarcerated virtually all of his adult life.” Early, 686 F.3d at 1222. Johnson’s criminal history indicates a strong disrespect for the law and a high probability of recidivism. We are certainly not convinced that the sentencing judge committed a “clear error of judgment” by imposing a 24-month upward variance to Johnson’s sentence, especially when the judge’s concerns about criminal history and deterrence are both required by § 3553(a) and readily apparent from the record.