Opinion ID: 2625764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Question

Text: We begin by examining the statute in dispute. Education Code section 7054 [1] is part of the statutory scheme regulating the political activities of school districts and employees. It provides: (a) No school district or community college district funds, services, supplies, or equipment shall be used for the purpose of urging the support or defeat of any ballot measure or candidate, including, but not limited to, any candidate for election to the governing board of the district; [¶] (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit the use of any of the public resources described in subdivision (a) to provide information to the public about the possible effects of any bond issue or other ballot measure if both of the following conditions are met: [¶] (1) The informational activities are otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of this state. [¶] (2) The information provided constitutes a fair and impartial presentation of relevant facts to aid the electorate in reaching an informed judgment regarding the bond issue or ballot measure. [¶] (c) A violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor or felony punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both, or imprisonment in a state prison for 16 months, or two or three years. (1) `When construing a statute, we must ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.' [Citation.] `In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' [Citation.] At the same time, `we do not consider ... statutory language in isolation.' [Citation.] Instead, we `examine the entire substance of the statute in order to determine the scope and purpose of the provision, construing its words in context and harmonizing its various parts.' [Citation.] Moreover, we `read every statute `with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.'' ( State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1043 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 343, 88 P.3d 71].) (2) In construing the statutory language, we first note that section 7054 cannot be construed to ban the use of all public resources for political purposes. Subdivision (a) of section 7054 bans the use of funds, services, supplies, or equipment for certain political purposes, whereas subdivision (b) states that [n]othing in this section shall prohibit the use of any of the public resources described in subdivision (a) to provide information to the public about the possible effects of any bond issue or other ballot measure if both of the following conditions are met. (Italics added.) The italicized language of subdivision (b) therefore makes clear that the public resources described in subdivision (a) are a subset of all public resources. The parties argue about whether a school mailbox constitutes services within the meaning of section 7054. The District contends, and the Court of Appeal found, that mailboxes provide a service to those who use them, and that otherwise SLTA would have to use the more costly United States mail or some other means to deliver its message. SLTA argues in effect that the term services generally connotes useful activity performed by a human agency, i.e., that while distribution of mail is a service, the mailboxes themselves do not constitute a service. Thus, because the literature in question was distributed by SLTA, no public service was used. The dictionary definition of service does give some support to SLTA's position. That word has been most relevantly defined as: 1 a: the occupation or function of serving b: employment as a servant 2 a: the work performed by one that serves b: HELP, USE, BENEFIT c: contribution to the welfare of others d: disposal for use .... 4: the act of serving: as a: a helpful act b: useful labor that does not produce a tangible commodityusually used in plural s>. (Webster's 9th New Collegiate Dict. (1987) p. 1076.) Similarly, the parties disagree about whether a school mailbox constitutes equipment. The District, like the Court of Appeal, construes the word broadly, and contends in essence that such mailboxes are self-evidently equipment. As the Court of Appeal stated: We ... believe that the mailboxes themselves constitute school district `equipment' in that they are tangible, specially constructed receptacles that, while not unduly expensive, are created and maintained solely by the district. And unlike tables, which can serve many functions, mailboxes are solely dedicated to the task of distributing information to individual recipients. SLTA argues the contrary. In the words of amicus curiae California School Employees Association: `[E]quipment' connotes an object that is handled, used or operated, such as a copying machine or a printer: a mailbox does not fit within this category. Moreover, SLTA and its amici curiae argue that unlike a copying machine or printer and other common examples of equipment, which generate costs in terms of depreciation and the utilization of supplies, the use of the mailbox is virtually without cost, and therefore not within the purview of the statute primarily concerned with the expenditure of public funds for political campaigns. They further point to the District's apparent concession that a table in a faculty lounge, for example, on which the union's political literature rested, was not equipment within the meaning of section 7054. [2] (3) Because neither side makes a compelling case for its construction of section 7054 based on the language of the statute alone, we may consider various extrinsic aids, including legislative history and an examination of the objectives to be achieved, in order to discern legislative intent. ( Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 P.3d 1196].) The statute was initially enacted in 1977, and the parties agree that it was a legislative response to Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206 [130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 551 P.2d 1] ( Stanson ), which held that government agencies could not use public funds to campaign for ballot propositions or candidates, at least not without explicit legislative authorization. As we stated in Stanson, the use of the public treasury to mount an election campaign which attempts to influence the resolution of issues which our Constitution leave[s] to the `free election' of the people (see Cal. Const., art. II, § 2) ... present[s] a serious threat to the integrity of the electoral process. ( Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 218.) As we further explained in Stanson : Underlying this uniform judicial reluctance to sanction the use of public funds for election campaigns rests an implicit recognition that such expenditures raise potentially serious constitutional questions. A fundamental precept of this nation's democratic electoral process is that the government may not `take sides' in election contests or bestow an unfair advantage on one of several competing factions. A principal danger feared by our country's founders lay in the possibility that the holders of governmental authority would use official power improperly to perpetuate themselves, or their allies, in office (see, e.g., Madison, The Federalist Papers, Nos. 52, 53; 10 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents (1899) pp. 98-99 (President Jefferson)); the selective use of public funds in election campaigns, of course, raises the specter of just such an improper distortion of the democratic electoral process. ( Stanson, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 217.) As originally enacted in 1977, section 7054 sought to limit the scope of the Stanson decision. It stated: Except as provided in Sections 7056, 35174 and 72632, no school district or community college district funds, services, supplies, or equipment shall be used for the purpose of urging the passage or defeat of any school measure of the district, including, but not limited to, the candidacy of any person for election to the governing board of the district. (Stats. 1977, ch. 36, § 396.5, p. 281.) Former section 35174, however, created a large loophole: It provided in pertinent part: The governing board of any school district or any member of the governing board of a school district may prepare or disseminate information or may make public or private appearances or statements for the purpose of urging the passage or defeat of any school measure of the district. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1010, § 2, pp. 2384, 3071.) In 1995 section 7054 was amended in conjunction with the repeal of former section 35174, and more expressly incorporated the principles set forth in Stanson. Section 1 of the new statute stated in part: (a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that, in a democratic society, the use of public funds in election campaigns is unjustified and inappropriate. No public entity should presume to use money derived from the whole of taxpayers to support or oppose ballot measures or candidates. [¶] (b) However, it is not the intent of the Legislature, in enacting this act, to restrict the political activities of officers or employees of a school district or community college district except as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 7050) of Chapter 1 of Part 5 of the Education Code or as may be necessary to meet specified requirements of federal law.... The right of speech of any member of a governing board of a school district or community college district or any employee thereof is in no manner affected by this act. (Stats. 1995, ch. 879, § 1, p. 6695.) Legislative committee analysis made clear the purpose of the amended statute: Proponents argue that in general, public funds or resources may not be used for political purposes. Members of the Legislature, for instance, are prohibited from using legislative funds, resources or personnel time for political purposes, including partisan political activity and advocacy of, or opposition to, ballot measures. Local government officials are bound by similar prohibitions. Members of school and community college district governing boards, however, have been exempted from this general rule since 1977. Education Code Section 35174, enacted in 1976, authorizes the use of public resources and employee time for the purpose of urging the support or defeat of school board candidates, school bond measures and any other school ballot measure. This constitutes an inappropriate use of public funds. Taxpayers' money should not be used for political purposes, whether in state, county, city, special district or school district elections. [¶] Proponents note that members of school and community college district governing boards have a legitimate role in addressing the public about bond measures and other related issues. This bill does not in any way abridge their constitutional right to continue to speak about these issues. Nor does it prevent them from raising money for political purposes or advocating on behalf of ballot measures or individual candidates. The bill does, however, repeal the authorization for school board members to use for political purposes district telephones, copying machines, equipment, employees, and materials produced with taxpayer monies. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 82 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 31, 1995, pp. 5-6.) (4) Two aspects of the above legislative history are noteworthy. First, it refers to materials produced with taxpayer monies, which school mailboxes clearly are. Second, and more significantly, as the legislative history of section 7054 makes clear, it was designed to avoid the use of public resources to perpetuate an incumbent candidate or his or her chosen successor, or to promote self-serving ballot initiatives, thereby compromising the integrity of the electoral process. The District contends that permitting employee organizations to use the mailboxes to endorse school board candidates will unfairly advantage those organizations and the candidates they endorse, because it allows them, but not other candidates and organizations, to use the mailboxes to communicate with teachers about these endorsements. We agree that this special access to an internal channel of communication to influence elections is a potential abuse that section 7054, and the Stanson decision, were designed to guard against. (See also Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 205 P.3d 207] [reaffirming Stanson 's basic principles].) Therefore we conclude, consistent with the purpose of section 7054, that the broad term equipment was intended to encompass mailboxes specially constructed at taxpayer expense to serve as a school's internal communication channel, which one group may not use to its exclusive political advantage. We agree with the Court of Appeal that, unlike school furniture, for example, which may be incidentally used for a host of different purposes, the term equipment is plausibly applied to fixtures dedicated to a specific use. (5) SLTA, in arguing that section 7054 is not implicated, cites an Attorney General opinion construing section 7054, found at 84 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 52 (2001). There, the Attorney General addressed the question of whether section 7054 prohibited a school district from making employee payroll deductions for a political action committee established by a representative employee organization. The Attorney General's opinion interpreted section 7054 not to apply when a school district merely transfers nonpublic money from employees to a nongovernmental organization like a political action committee. (84 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 53-54.) As the District points out, the Attorney General's opinion has been critiqued by PERB for neglecting the fact that section 7054 is not only concerned with public funds but also with services, and for failing to come to terms with the fact that payroll deductions are a service. ( American Federation of Teachers Guild v. San Diego Community College Dist. (2001) PERB Dec. No. 1467 [26 PERC P33014].) [3] In any case, there is no basis in the language of section 7054 for concluding it applies to school districts but not employee organizations. Indeed, SLTA appears to concede in its briefing that, had it used school copying machines or printers to produce its political literature, or used on-duty school personnel to distribute that literature, it would have run afoul of that statute. Nor is a construction of section 7054 to ban placing candidate endorsements in school mailboxes inconsistent with Government Code section 3543.1, subdivision (b). That statute states: Employee organizations shall have the right of access at reasonable times to areas in which employees work, the right to use institutional bulletin boards, mailboxes, and other means of communication, subject to reasonable regulation, and the right to use institutional facilities at reasonable times for the purpose of meetings concerned with the exercise of the rights guaranteed by this chapter. (Italics added.) (6) The term reasonable regulation is not defined. In reference to an almost identically worded provision of the Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act (Gov. Code, §§ 3560-3599)Government Code section 3568one court has stated: To assess the reasonableness of a particular regulation, the Board must balance, in light of applicable public policies, the benefits conferred by the regulation and the burdens it imposes. ( Regents of University of California v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 346, 361 [269 Cal.Rptr. 563].) Thus, the inquiry into reasonableness is necessarily contextual. On the one hand, a school district is given the discretion to regulate mailbox access so that it does not interfere with the district's legitimate interests. On the other hand, since the statute speaks of a  right of access by employee organizations to mailboxes, the regulations in question should not unreasonably interfere with such access. (7) When two statutes touch upon a common subject, they are to be construed in reference to each other, so as to `harmonize the two in such a way that no part of either becomes surplusage.' [Citations.] Two codes `must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof.' ( DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 778-779 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 889 P.2d 1019].) In the present case, there seems little question that a regulation that bans candidate endorsements pursuant to section 7054 to preserve the integrity of the electoral process is a reasonable regulation pursuing a legitimate statutory objective. Moreover, such a regulation would not unduly limit a union's statutory right of access. Government Code section 3543.2 defines the scope of union representation as limited to matters relating to wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. As we have recognized, school districts are not compelled to bargain about, nor are school employees compelled to contribute to, matters or activities outside the scope of union representation. (See Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 575, 593-594 [262 Cal.Rptr. 46, 778 P.2d 174].) That is not to say that public employee unions do not have an important political dimension, given that they are governed by and negotiate with government entities. (See Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977) 431 U.S. 209, 228 [52 L.Ed.2d 261, 97 S.Ct. 1782].) Here, however, the SLTA still has numerous alternative channels with which to communicate its views to its members. The regulation of school mailboxes to disallow candidate endorsements and to counter the advantage that those with special access to those mailboxes may possess would not interfere with a teachers' union's core mission of advocating for its members. (8) We therefore hold that the District's regulation in the present case is lawful. We emphasize the narrowness of the holding. We do not hold that school districts are compelled to exclude candidate endorsements from school mailboxes. Indeed, section 7058, part of the same article as section 7054, states: Nothing in this article shall prohibit the use of a forum under the control of the governing board of a school district or community college district if the forum is made available to all sides on an equitable basis.  (Italics added.) A school mailbox is a forum of communication, albeit, as discussed in the next part of this opinion, a nonpublic one, that is within the control of the school district. Section 7058 makes clear that section 7054 does not prohibit a school board from opening up mailboxes to political endorsement literature, as long as this is done on an equitable basis. (9) Furthermore, our holding does not extend to union literature in school mailboxes that does not urg[e] the support or defeat of any ... candidate within the meaning of section 7054, but merely urges members to become involved in upcoming elections and informs them how to do so, or engages in public policy discussion in more general terms. [4] We note that a school district's ability to control the political communication of its employees is limited by section 7052, part of the same article as section 7054, which states: Except as otherwise provided in this article, or as necessary to meet requirements of federal law as it pertains to a particular employee or employees, no restriction shall be placed on the political activities of any officer or employee of a local agency. [5] We hold only that a rule prohibiting candidate endorsement literature in school mailboxes is a reasonable regulation within the meaning of Government Code section 3543.1, subdivision (b) because it enforces the directive of section 7054.