Opinion ID: 2324802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent Judgments

Text: There are two rules of court which are determinative as to whether the trial court rendered a judgment in this particular case. Maryland Rule 1-202(n) defines judgment as any order of court final in its nature entered pursuant to these rules. Accordingly, a judgment is an order of court. Additionally, at the time this judgment was rendered, Maryland Rule 2-601 (1997) [2] prescribed the manner in which a judgment must be entered as follows: (a) When Entered.Upon a general verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court allowing recovery only of costs or a specified amount of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherwise. Upon a special verdict of a jury or upon a decision by the court granting other relief, the clerk shall enter the judgment as directed by the court. Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending a determination of the amount of costs. (b) Method of EntryDate of Judgment.The clerk shall enter a judgment by making a record of it in writing on the file jacket, or on a docket within the file, or in a docket book, according to the practice of each court, and shall record the actual date of the entry. That date shall be the date of the judgment. (c) Recording and Indexing. Promptly after entry, the clerk shall record and index the judgment, except a judgment denying all relief without costs, in the judgment records of the court. This Court has previously interpreted the interplay between these two rules as follows: Read in conjunction, Rule 1-202(m) [3] and Rule 2-601 [4] make clear that two acts must occur for an action by a court to be deemed the granting of a judgment: the court must render a final order and the order must be entered on the docket by the clerk. These two required acts rendition of a judgment by the court and entry of the judgment by the clerkare discrete occurrences. Rendition of judgment is the judicial act by which the court settles and declares the decision of the law on the matters at issue. In other words, rendition is the court's pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication. The second act required under Maryland lawthe clerk's entry of the judgment on the docketis the purely ministerial act by means of which permanent evidence of the judicial act of rendering the judgment is made a record of the court. See Doehring v. Wagner, 311 Md. 272, 533 A.2d 1300 (1987); Corey v. Carback, 201 Md. 389, 94 A.2d 629 (1953). A judgment is therefore not granted until it is both properly rendered and properly entered. Davis v. Davis, 335 Md. 699, 710, 646 A.2d 365, 370 (1994); see also Claibourne v. Willis, 347 Md. 684, 690, 702 A.2d 293, 296 (1997); Board of Liquor License Comm'rs v. Fells Point Cafe, Inc., 344 Md. 120, 127-28, 685 A.2d 772, 775 (1996). In the case sub judice, both of these requirements were met when the court rendered a consent judgment in favor of respondent and the clerk recorded the judgment on the docket and indexed it. ` Rendition of judgment is ... the court's pronouncement, by spoken word in open court or by written order filed with the clerk, of its decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication.' Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 128, 685 A.2d at 775 (quoting Davis, 335 Md. at 710, 646 A.2d at 370). In Parkington Apartments, Inc. v. Cordish, 296 Md. 143, 149, 460 A.2d 52, 55 (1983), this Court said: Black's Law Dictionary 1165 (5th ed.1979) [5] is instructive as to what the General Assembly may have contemplated when it used the term rendition of judgment: Rendition of a judgment is effected when trial court in open court declares the decision of the law upon the matters at issue, and it is distinguishable from `entry of judgment,' which is a purely ministerial act by which the judgment is made of record and preserved. Ex parte Gnesoulis, Tex. Civ. App., 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 [(1975)]. A judgment is rendered as of date on which trial judge declares in open court his decision on matters submitted to him for adjudication, and oral pronouncement by the court of its decision is sufficient for `rendition of judgment'. Farr v. McKinzie, Tex. Civ.App., 477 S.W.2d 672, 676 [(1972)]. The rendition of judgment is the pronouncement of the court of its conclusions and decision upon the matter submitted to it for adjudication; a judgment may be rendered either orally in open court or by memorandum filed with the clerk. Travelers Express Co., Inc. v. Winters, Tex.Civ. App. 488 S.W.2d 890, 892 [(1972), overturned on other grounds by Reese v. Piperi, 534 S.W.2d 329 (Tex.1976)]. `Rendition' of judgment is distinguishable from its `entry' in the records. Rehm v. Fishman, Mo.App., 395 S.W.2d 251, 255 [ (1965) ]. See Entering judgment. Several courts in other jurisdictions define rendition of judgment consistent with this interpretation. Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 909 F.Supp. 1224, 1238 (N.D.Iowa 1991) ([A] judgment is rendered `when it is announced, or when the judge signs an enrolled judgment order ....') (quoting World Teacher Seminar v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 406 N.W.2d 173, 177 (Iowa 1987)); Gorum v. Samuel, 274 Ala. 690, 151 So.2d 393, 396 (1963) (`When a judgment is pronounced in open court, it is rendered and the clerk could ... enter it on the minutes at any time during that term ....') (quoting DuPree v. Hart, 242 Ala. 690, 693, 8 So.2d 183, 186 (1942)); Willmon v. Arizona, 16 Ariz.App. 323, 324, 493 P.2d 125, 126 (1972) (Judgment is complete and valid when orally pronounced in open court and entered in the minutes without anything further or any written judgment.); Second Injury Fund v. Lupachino, 45 Conn.App. 324, 337, 695 A.2d 1072, 1080 (1997) (`A judgment is in fact rendered in a cause tried to the court when the trial judge officially announces his decision orally in open court, or, out of court, signifies orally or in a writing filed with the clerk in his official capacity the decision pronounced by him ....') (quoting Zoning Comm'n v. Fairfield Resources Management, Inc., 41 Conn.App. 89, 102, 674 A.2d 1335, 1342 (1996)); Gorzik Corp. v. Mosman, 315 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Mo.1958) (`Rendition' is a judicial act; entering is a ministerial act. The judgment is rendered when it is ordered by the court; it is entered when it is spread on the docket.); Stimpson Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Pam Trading Corp., 98 N.C.App. 543, 553, 392 S.E.2d 128, 134 (1990) (A judgment is `rendered' when it is announced or declared in open court.); Phillips v. Phillips, 556 P.2d 607, 609-10 (Okla.1976) (A judgment is `rendered' when pronounced by the court.); McCown v. Quillin, 48 Tenn.App. 162, 169-70, 344 S.W.2d 576, 580 (1960) (`Rendered' means expressed or announced in a conclusive manner and with decisive effect, certainly so when at the same time notation of it is made on a judgment docket, or other more or less permanent memorandum record....); Knox v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 295, 257 S.W.2d 289, 291 (1953) (`The judgment of a court is what the court pronounces. Its rendition is [a] judicial act.... Its entry is a ministerial act....' (quoting Coleman v. Zapp, 105 Tex. 491, 494, 151 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1912))), overruled on other grounds by Jackson v. Hernandez, 155 Tex. 249, 285 S.W.2d 184 (1956); Keim v. Anderson, 943 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tex.App.1997) (Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. [It] is distinguishable from the entry of judgment, which is a purely ministerial act by which judgment is made of record and preserved.). A final order was rendered by the trial judge when he decisively announced in open court: Judgement in favor of the Plaintiff Selbe Hubbard, against Defendant Oliver Jones and Mattie B. Jones, in the amount of $5,000.00. And then the docket should reflect that judgment m[a]y be satisfied by payment of $2,550.00 within 30 days. The value of a simple docket entry which ... make[s] clear to everyone the disposition of each and every claim in a case cannot be overemphasized. Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 133, 685 A.2d at 778 (1996) (quoting Estep v. Georgetown Leather Design, 320 Md. 277, 287, 577 A.2d 78, 82 (1990)). Black's Law Dictionary 554 (7th ed.1999) currently defines entry of judgment as [t]he ministerial recording of a court's final decision, usu. by noting it in a judgment book or civil docket. Entry of the judgment on the docket serves to make a permanent record in the court. See Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 128, 685 A.2d at 775; Davis, 335 Md. at 710, 646 A.2d at 370. A permanent record of the judgment was created when the clerk placed it on the docket as entry number 13: Matter passed for settlement. Court directed judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Selbe Hubbard and against Oliver Jones and Mattie B. Jones in the amount of $5,000.00. Judgment can be settled upon payment of $2,5[5]0.00 within 30 days. Both required acts described in Davis have been satisfied. A judgment, however, will only be considered rendered by a court if it has clearly indicated that the issue submitted has been adjudicated completely and it has reached a final decision on the matter. As this Court previously stated: If a ruling of the court is to constitute a final judgment, it must have at least three attributes: (1) it must be intended by the court as an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy, (2) unless the court properly acts pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), it must adjudicate or complete the adjudication of all claims against all parties, and (3) the clerk must make a proper record of it in accordance with Md. Rule 2-601. Fells Point Cafe, 344 Md. at 129, 685 A.2d at 776 (1996) (quoting Rohrbeck v. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. 28, 41, 566 A.2d 767, 773 (1989)). In the case sub judice, all three of these attributes have been satisfied. First, the trial court's ruling was an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy. Second, it adjudicated all claims against all parties. Third, the clerk made a proper record of it in accordance with Maryland Rule 2-601. This Court concluded in Davis, 335 Md. at 711, 646 A.2d at 370: [T]he trial court's ruling must be an unqualified, final disposition of the matter in controversy. Rohrbeck, 318 Md. at 41, 566 A.2d at 773; see also Anthony v. Clark, 335 Md. 579, 644 A.2d 1070 [(1994)]. There are, however, no formal requirements regarding the rendition of a judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534, 64 S.Ct. 359, 361, 88 L.Ed. 290, 292 (1944). As one court has observed, [t]here are no hard and fast rules for determining what is a judgment. Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 323 F.2d 114, 115 (6th Cir.1963). Rather, whether a judgment has been rendered in a particular case is an inquiry that must be made on a case-by-case basis and which focuses upon the actions and statements of the court. [Second alteration in original.] As illustrated, supra, the requirements for the rendering of a judgment were satisfied by the trial court. If the court had not properly rendered a final judgment, this agreement would have been a settlement agreement. A settlement agreement is not a final judgment. Clark v. Elza, 286 Md. 208, 213-15, 406 A.2d 922, 925-26 (1979); see also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Equitable Bank, 77 Md.App. 320, 328, 550 A.2d 407, 411 (1988); Ramsey, Inc. v. Davis, 66 Md.App. 717, 725, 505 A.2d 899, 903, cert. denied, 306 Md. 514, 510 A.2d 260 (1986). The Court of Special Appeals has distinguished between these two related entities: Although a settlement order resembles a final judgment, it is not the same. A settlement agreement is a contract which the parties enter into for the settlement of a previously existing claim by a substituted performance. When this agreement is entered with the court, it is termed a settlement order; however, it is not a court order. Rather, it is a compromise between the parties, which they submit to the court to stay the proceedings in the case. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 77 Md.App. at 328, 550 A.2d at 411 (quoting Mitchell Properties, Inc. v. Real Estate Title Co., 62 Md.App. 473, 482, 490 A.2d 271 (1985)). When parties agree to settlement terms in the presence of the court and ask the court to render a judgment based on that settlement agreement and the court renders a judgment on the settlement, the agreement becomes a final judgment. Montgomery County v. Revere Nat'l Corp., 341 Md. 366, 378, 671 A.2d 1, 7 (1996) (Thus, an order entered on a docket pursuant to Rule 2-601, and having the effect of terminating the case ... is a final judgment.). Chertkof v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 251 Md. 544, 549, 248 A.2d 373, 376 (1968); see also Mitchell Properties, 62 Md.App. at 483, 490 A.2d at 276 (If the court reduces the settlement order to a money judgment, it becomes a final judgment to the extent the underlying agreement address[es] the respective claims of the parties.). A court judgment makes the settlement agreement a judicial act. When parties endorse a judicial decree entered pursuant to a settlement agreement, a critical element [is added] to [the] contractual act: judicial conclusiveness. Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 170, 274 A.2d 339, 343 (1971); see also Dorsey v. Wroten, 35 Md.App. 359, 361, 370 A.2d 577, 579 (1977) ([A] consent decree adds a critical element to the contractual actjudicial conclusiveness.). Looking at the actions and statements of the trial court, we conclude that there was a judgment rendered in this case. When the trial court reduced the proposed agreement to a consent judgment, it became a final judgment and an order of the court. We now turn our analysis on whether a consent judgment is to be treated any differently than any other form of judgment. We start with an interpretation of Rule 2-612. [6] As we said in State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998): We begin our analysis with the canons of statutory construction that are also generally applicable in respect to rule construction. See State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79, 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997) . . .; In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994).... We have said that [t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriot[Marriott] Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater [Tidewater/Havre de Grace Inc.] v. Mayor of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1, 2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent. Marriot[Marriott] Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). .... This Court recently stated that statutory language is not read in isolation, but `in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.' Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, [w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other external manifestations or persuasive evidence, including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. ... [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51 (1987),... [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as the legislative scheme. [ Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59. We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill. See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted). Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (alterations in original). Looking at the unambiguous wording of Maryland Rules 1-202(n), 2-601 and 2-612, as well as the minutes from the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Rules Committee) meetings, it is evident that a consent judgment is a judgment and an order of court. Its only distinction is that it is a judgment that a court enters at the request of the parties. Minutes from the Rules Committee meetings give insight to the intent behind the rules governing consent judgments: [A] consent judgment... must dispose of all claims in the action.... [A]n order adjudicating less than all of the claims is not a judgment.... Minutes of the Rules Committee, at 31 (Oct. 17, 1981). The proposed amendment[][is] designed to establish a bright line test for entry of judgment.... Minutes of the Rules Committee (Sept. 13-14, 1985). Both statements permit the implication that a consent judgment is a judgment. There is no indication that the Rules Committee, or this Court, intended a consent judgment to be anything other than a final judgment. Generally, we hold that consent judgments should be treated in the same fashion as any other form of judgment. The rationale is simple: A judgment is a judgment, regardless of whether it was rendered after a lengthy trial or an agreement by consent. The primary purpose in having a settlement agreement become a court order is to get the imprimatur of the court, i.e., to turn the agreement into a court order so that it will be controlled by the rules applicable to judgments and court orders. Consent judgments are a hybrid of two competing aspects of the law. Consent judgments or decrees are essentially agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court. They have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees. Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. 470, 478, 610 A.2d 770, 774 (1992). This dual character ... has resulted in different treatment for different purposes. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S.Ct. 3063, 3073, 92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986). Whether the law of contracts or judgments governs the interpretation of an aspect of a consent judgment is determined by the character of the specific aspect. In the case sub judice, [o]nce the court adopt[ed] the agreement of the parties and set[ ] it forth as a judgment of the court . . . the contractual character of the agreement [was] subsumed into the court-ordered judgment. Henderson v. Henderson, 307 N.C. 401, 407, 298 S.E.2d 345, 350 (1983). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted consent decrees as follows: A consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378, 112 S.Ct. 748, 757, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992). Our cases are in accord. [O]rdinarily a judgment by consent, having been enrolled `under the eye and with the sanction of the court . . . should be considered as a judicial act....' Kirsner, 261 Md. at 171, 274 A.2d at 343 (quoting Cox v. Maryland Elec. Rys., 126 Md. 300, 304, 95 A. 43, 45 (1915)); see also A.H. Smith Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Maryland Dept. of the Env't, 116 Md.App. 233, 243, 695 A.2d 1252, 1257 (1997). Other federal courts and a number of our brother state courts support this rationale. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Scherer, 7 F.3d 191, 193 (10th Cir.1993) (A consent decree is a negotiated agreement that is entered as a judgment of the court.); United States v. Homestake Mining Co., 595 F.2d 421, 425 (8th Cir.1979) (A consent decree is a judicial act and `possesses the same force and character as a judgment rendered following a contested trial.' (quoting Siebring v. Hansen, 346 F.2d 474, 477 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943, 86 S.Ct. 400, 15 L.Ed.2d 352 (1965))); Mastercraft Fabrics Corp. v. Dickson Elberton Mills, Inc., 821 F.Supp. 1503, 1510 (M.D.Ga.1993) (`[A] consent judgment is a conclusive adjudication and has the same force and effect as a judgment after trial.'  (quoting Prudential Lines, Inc. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 91 A.D.2d 1, 3, 457 N.Y.S.2d 272, 274 (1982))); Interstate Power Co., 909 F.Supp. at 1238 (same as Homestake Mining Co., supra ); Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Clyce, 512 F.Supp. 430, 433 (N.D.Tex.1980) (A consent judgment has substantially the same effect as any other judgment rendered in ordinary course.); Frasemer v. Frasemer, 578 So.2d 1346, 1348 (Ala.Civ.App.1991) (A consent judgment is in the nature of a contract which, with the approval of the court, binds the parties as fully as any other judgment.); California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Ct., 50 Cal.3d 658, 663, 268 Cal.Rptr. 284, 788 P.2d 1156, 1158 (1990) (In a ... consent decree, litigants voluntarily terminate a lawsuit by assenting to specified terms, which the court agrees to enforce as a judgment.); McCarthy v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 386 N.W.2d 122, 126 (Iowa Ct.App.1986) (`Judgments by consent ... are entered by sanction and order of the court, exercising a judicial function and power ....' (quoting Iowa Water Pollution Control Comm'n v. Town of Paton, 207 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Iowa 1973))); Madison v. City of Detroit, 182 Mich.App. 696, 701, 452 N.W.2d 883, 885 (1990) ([O]nce a consent judgment is entered by the sanction and order of the court, it possesses the same force and character as other judgments.); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 233 Miss. 550, 556-57, 102 So.2d 381, 383 (1958) (A consent judgment acquires the incidents of, and will be given the same force and effect as, judgments rendered after litigation.); Gunning v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Mo.Ct.App.1980) (The judgment entered by consent of the parties was within the court's jurisdiction and should be given the same force as any other judgment.); First Bank (N.A.) W. Mont. v. District Ct., 226 Mont. 515, 520, 737 P.2d 1132, 1135 (1987) (The effect of a stipulation is the same as a judgment on the merits.); Schillinger v. Brewer, 215 Mont. 333, 338, 697 P.2d 919, 922 (1985) (A judgment by stipulation is as binding as any judgment or verdict, no more or less.); Chamberlin v. Chamberlin, 206 Neb. 808, 817, 295 N.W.2d 391, 397 (1980) ([A] consent judgment is treated as an agreement of the parties and is given greater force than an ordinary judgment....); Macfadden v. Macfadden, 49 N.J.Super. 356, 362, 139 A.2d 774, 778 (App.Div.) (A consent judgment `is regarded as an adverse judgment and is conclusive and effective ... to the same extent as though entered after a full trial.'  (quoting Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Union Cemetery Ass'n, 136 N.J.Eq. 15, 40 A.2d 205 (Ch.1944))), cert. denied, 27 N.J. 155, 141 A.2d 828 (1958)); Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Waldroup, 38 N.J.Super. 419, 426, 119 A.2d 172, 175 (App.Div. 1955) (same); Henderson, 307 N.C. at 408, 298 S.E.2d at 350 (The power of the court to enforce its judgment is no less and no greater for a court-adopted consent judgment than for a judgment resulting from a jury verdict in a hotly contested adversary proceeding.); Third Nat'l Bank v. Scribner, 212 Tenn. 400, 409, 370 S.W.2d 482, 486 (1963) (A `consent judgment acquires the incidents of, and will be given the same force and effect as, judgments rendered after litigation.' (quoting 30A Am.Jur. Judgments 148)); Birdwell v. Birdwell, 819 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.App.1991) (A judgment rendered by consent has the same force as a judgment entered after protracted litigation....). The general trend of these courts can be appropriately summarized as follows: Despite the fact that a judgment has its genesis in an agreement between the parties, the judgment itself has an independent status. Once the agreement of the parties has been approved by the court and made a part of its judgment, the agreement is no longer merely a contract between private individuals but is the judgment of the court. ... The fact that a judgment is rendered by consent gives it neither less nor greater force or effect than it would have had it been rendered after protracted litigation, except to the extent that the consent excuses error and operates to end all controversy between the parties. Spradley v. Hutchison, 787 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Tex.App.1990) (citations omitted) (quoting Peddicord v. Peddicord, 522 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.App.1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). To interpret a consent judgment as anything other than a judgment would contradict common sense and undermine the efficiency that this legal tool brings to the judicial system. As one court stated: Consent judgments are entered daily in our courts, and if they do not have a binding effect as to all of the issues raised, it would not be long before resort to this expeditious way of terminating litigation would cease. Certainly, under our present practice, which allows parties to protect themselves by providing for partial judgments and special findings to be made on issues of fact, a general judgment entered by consent should have as great if not greater adjudicative efficacy as to all of the questions in issue as one entered after a trial. Waldroup, 38 N.J.Super. at 426-27, 119 A.2d at 176. We hold that, generally, for purposes of the issue before us in the case sub judice, consent judgments should normally be given the same force and effect as any other judgment, including judgments rendered after litigation. In the case sub judice, the trial court met the requirements necessary to render a final consent judgment. Revere, supra .