Opinion ID: 1760644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror Hobbs' Conduct.

Text: Juror William Hobbs, during the course of trial, called the Veterans Administration and obtained information that contradicted Cindia Dutton's testimony relating to the availability of veteran's benefits for Jude's military schooling. He communicated this during jury deliberations. Defense counsel obtained affidavits from several jurors implying Hobbs' information partially influenced their belief that Cindia Dutton lied during her testimony. These affidavits were countered by affidavits obtained by the State from two other jurors. We note preliminarily that occurrences such as this would be rarer if trial courts would give a simple oral instruction or admonition [2] along with the other oral directions given pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 199(a). See Wiedenfeld v. Chicago and N.W. Transp., 252 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Iowa 1977). The State concedes in its brief that Hobbs' actions constituted misconduct. We thus turn to the critical question whether Hobbs' action was calculated to, and it is reasonably probable that it did, influence the verdict. Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d at 535. Our analysis is aided by reference to several of our decisions. In State v. Little, 164 N.W.2d 81, 82 (Iowa 1969), defendant asserted it was jury misconduct when several members of the jury made unauthorized trips to the scene of defendant's arrest for the express purpose of a view of the scene and were influenced by their observations and in turn influenced others of the jury. Although we held this misconduct, we reasoned that [t]he supporting affidavits fall far short of showing any reasonable probability, as our decisions require, that the unauthorized view of the premises influenced the verdict. Id. at 83. In an effort to determine nighttime visibility, the jury in State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42 (Iowa 1973), experimented by turning off the jury room lights and looking through the window. We held trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's new trial motion, observing: Historically, we have considered ... situations [of alleged jury misconduct] with a bemused but limited tolerance for the ingenuity of jurors and the realization a rigid approach would result in interminable litigation. Id. at 45. A California decision, People v. Bullwinkle, 105 Cal.App.3d 82, 164 Cal.Rptr. 163, app. dismissed, 449 U.S. 988, 101 S.Ct. 522, 66 L.Ed.2d 285 (1980), is more factually on point. In this stolen property case, defendant's friend, called by the prosecution, testified he recalled seeing no expensive equipment in defendant's apartment. When asked if defendant had a car, the friend responded he did not know, but that he and defendant would drive in the friend's car when visiting a casino where defendant was a member. Affidavits of four jurors disclosed that one juror, on her own accord, visited the casino and learned defendant was not a member. The appellate court agreed this was misconduct on the juror's part. Nonetheless, the court reasoned trial court properly overruled the new trial motion because the friend's testimony contributed nothing to [defendant's] convictions. [The friend's] testimony as to the... casino was irrelevant to any issue in the case. The result of the juror's independent investigation was not such as to adversely affect the jurors' impartiality, lighten the prosecution's burden of proof, or contradict any asserted defense. Id. at 92, 164 Cal.Rptr. at 169. The same language could be applied to the rather innocuous information obtained by juror Hobbs in the case before us. In examining this asserted error, we have ignored the conflicting statements in the jurors' affidavits that Hobbs' communication did or did not affect the jury's verdict. We apply an objective rather than a subjective test in evaluating the asserted misconduct, Rouse, 290 N.W.2d at 916; Harris, 263 N.W.2d at 730-31; State v. Hahn, 259 N.W.2d 753, 757 (Iowa 1977), determining whether a reasonable probability exists that it influenced the verdict, Cuevas, 288 N.W.2d at 535; Harris, 263 N.W.2d at 730-31. Further, we think trial court in the exercise of its broad discretion properly could examine the claimed influence critically in light of all the trial evidence, the demeanor of witnesses and the issues presented before making a commonsense evaluation of the alleged impact of the jury misconduct. That trial court did so in this instance is disclosed by its ruling on the new trial motion, which included the following finding: [T]he telephone call made by juror Hobbs... related to a collateral matterthe credibility of the witness Cindia Duttonand the Court cannot refrain from observing that her testimony would tax the credulity of all but the most naive and gullible to the utmost and her testimony did not relate to any facts concerning the commission of the offense but went to the lack of credibility of her son as opposed to the credibility of her lover, the Defendant. Although the question is a close one, we cannot say under all the circumstances that trial court abused its broad discretion in overruling defendant's motion for new trial. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the trial court. DECISIONS OF COURT OF APPEALS AND DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.