Opinion ID: 1847325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: jerome smith's fundamental right to be present at all proceedings in this death penalty case was violated when the voir dire and dismissal of certain jurors, a proceeding involving the court's response to a mid-deliberations question from the jury, and a pretrial hearing at which his original attorney was removed from the case, all were conducted in his absence.

Text: ś 101. Jerome argues that the trial court committed reversible error when he was not afforded the right to be present at several allegedly critical stages of the proceedings. Jerome maintains that this violated his right to confrontation and other rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 3 of the Mississippi Constitution. ś 102. The first instance Jerome addresses is when the trial judge questioned a number of venire members outside the hearing of the defendant and his attorneys. Jerome argues that he had the right to be present at all trial proceedings, including these bench conferences during voir dire. To support his argument of reversible error, he cites to Strickland v. State, 477 So.2d 1347 (Miss. 1985), in which this Court reversed a drug conviction where the trial court interrogated potential jurors in chambers outside the presence of the defendant or defense counsel. ś 103. The State argues that these instances complained of in the present case are factually distinguishable from Strickland in that the trial judge interrogated the jurors at the bench, not in chambers, and that counsel and defendant were present in the courtroom and failed to object. Nor was any objection raised to the empaneling of the jury on these or any other grounds; and therefore, the claim is deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. ś 104. The record reveals that while qualifying the jury panel the trial judge questioned potential jurors about statutory exclusions and exemptions. He then questioned the jurors about any hardships they would face by being sequestered for approximately a week. At this point juror Allan Goetzinger raised his hand, and after questioning on the record, the trial court excused him because he had a fifteen year old daughter at home with no one to stay with her. The trial judge then made the following statement to counsel: THE COURT: Gentlemen, do you wish me to tell you the reasons for these being excused? I'll either do so now or be glad to tell you at a later time. To which counsel for both Jerome and Clyde replied: MR. JONES: Be fine, Judge. At a later time. MR. STUCKEY: A later time. ś 105. The trial court then questioned juror Malcolm Vail on the record and excused him because he was a farmer and needed to be planting beans. The trial court then proceeded to excuse juror William Charles Thomas, Jr. after a discussion off the record. The trial court then asked if there was anyone else, and jurors Hattie Jordan, Christopher Davis, and Calvin Lipsey stepped up to the bench. After excusing those three the trial judge asked if there were any more students out there who are in summer school taking final exams this week. In response, jurors William Clark, Alonzo Evans, and Amanda Montgomery approached the bench and were excused by the trial court. ś 106. At no time during these proceedings did Jerome ever object to any of these potential jurors being excused or to the manner in which they were questioned. Nor did he ever ask the judge that he be allowed to approach the bench during these conferences. ś 107. Later during the court's voir dire, the trial judge asked if the jurors could be fair. When juror Thomas H. Murphey indicated that he did not think he could be fair the following transpired: Q. Anyone else down here? How about you? A. (Mr. Thomas H. Murphey) Yes, sir. Q. You can be fair? A. I don't think so. Q. You don't think you can? A. No, sir. THE COURT: Come up let me talk to you. (BRIEF PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS.) (COUNSEL APPROACHED THE BENCH OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY) THE COURT: Postmaster at Sidon. Knows all about it. Knows the families. Says he couldn't be fair. MR. JONES: No. 89. THE COURT: Thomas Murphey. Mr. Murphey you're excused. Again there was no objection to the manner in which the trial court conducted this questioning, and there was no objection to his being excused. ś 108. After a brief recess the following transpired in regard to juror Donald Moore: THE COURT: No. 152. Step up, gentlemen, and let me give you this reason now. (JUROR DONALD L. MOORE WAS EXCUSED FROM THE COURTROOM.) (COUNSEL APPROACHED THE BENCH OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY:) THE COURT: He's the officer in charge of the maximum security unit at the Mississippi State Penitentiary. MR. MOUNGER: And is, of course, familiar with at least one of the defendants? THE COURT: Yes, sir. He has an exemptionâ legal exemption and the [sic] claimed it. MR. MOUNGER: Right. (BENCH CONFERENCE WAS CONCLUDED.) Again there was no objection by the defense. All other bench conferences during the court's voir dire were placed in the record and were conducted within the hearing of the attorneys. ś 109. This same issue was addressed in Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 845 (Miss. 1994). In that case, the trial court excused two prospective jurors after off-the-record discussions. Unlike the case at bar, the trial court apparently did not even inform the attorneys as to the reasons for their dismissals. Chase argued that this action violated his right to be present during the impaneling of the jury. Id. at 845. The Chase Court rejected the argument, stating: As has been the case in other assignments of error, there was no objection raised at the time of the alleged error. Chase also failed to object to the jurors prior to the jury being impaneled and indicated to the court that he had no objection to the selection of the jury. Since no objection was made, the issue is not properly preserved for review by this Court. As noted by the State, another independent basis for rejecting Chase's argument is the failure to preserve an adequate record. In Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 127 (Miss.1991), this Court stated: It is elementary that a party seeking reversal of the judgment of a trial court must present this court with a record adequate to show that an error of reversible proportions has been committed and that the point has been procedurally preserved. Id. at 845. ś 110. As was the situation in Chase, Jerome offered no objection to the actions of the trial judge that he now asserts to be reversible error. In fact, defense counsel stated on-the-record that it was alright for the trial court to give the reasons for excusing the prospective jurors at a later time. Furthermore, Jerome made no objection to the final jury panel, nor did he raise this issue in his motion for a new trial. For these reasons, this issue has not been properly preserved for review by this Court. ś 111. Next, according to Jerome he was improperly excluded from a conference during the penalty phase deliberation in which the jury sent a written question to the trial judge asking whether Jerome would be eligible for parole if given a life sentence. The attorneys for both Jerome and the State were present, and Jerome's attorneys voiced their objection to the trial court answering the jury's inquiry. The trial judge then proceeded to submit a handwritten answer to the jury informing them that Jerome would be eligible to be considered for parole. ś 112. The only case Jerome cites in support of his argument that it was error for the trial court to give an additional jury instruction in the defendant's absence and without the defendant's voluntary waiver of his right to continuous presence because it violates his right to due process, is Speer v. State, 570 So.2d 1271 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). In that case, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals relies entirely on Alabama law. A number of other jurisdictions have held that a defendant does not have the right to be present during a discussion on jury instructions. ś 113. In Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289 (Miss.1994), the Court, discussing whether Mack had a right be present during a pretrial motion hearing stated: [D]iscussions on purely legal matters are not critical stages of the proceedings. United States v. Sherman, 821 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964 (5th Cir.1982). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceedings that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). This Court has not addressed the question of whether the conference on jury instructions is such a critical stage of the proceedings.... .... Although this Court has not addressed this issue, the jurisdictions which have addressed it, have held that a defendant has no constitutional right to be present at a conference which deals with legal issues, such as a conference on jury instructions. Mack's presence was not necessary to contribute to the fairness of the procedure, therefore, his absence did not violate due process. There is no merit to this contention. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1307. ś 114. The record shows that Jerome had earlier voluntarily absented himself from the discussion on the guilt phase instructions: MR. MOUNGER: Could I just make a brief statement on the record, Your Honor, that before we broke for lunch and to go over the jury instructions, we advised Clyde and Pete [Jerome] Smith both that if they wished they could be present during the instructions, and they wanted to go theirselves [sic] and have lunch. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Jerome was present during the discussion of the sentencing instructions. Whether or not the trial judge should answer the jury's inquiry was purely a legal question, and so, Jerome had no constitutional right to be present. ś 115. Lastly, in this issue Jerome complains that he was not afforded the right to be present at the pre-trial hearing in which his retained attorney was allowed to withdraw, and Mr. Jones and Mr. Gandy were re-appointed as his counsel. Jerome cites Myers v. State, 254 So.2d 891, 893 (Miss.1971), as his sole authority that he had a right to be present at such a hearing. ś 116. Upon Jerome's indictment for capital murder on November 12, 1992, the lower court appointed Leland Jones and Leman Gandy to represent him in the case. Subsequently, Jerome's mother and sister retained attorney Solomon Osborne to represent Jerome. On January 13, 1993, Jerome informed Jones and Gandy that an attorney had been retained for him, and on January 19, 1993, the two filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. January 20, 1993, Osborne entered an appearance, and Jones and Gandy were allowed to withdraw with Osborne substituted as counsel. On May 24, 1993, a hearing was scheduled by the defendant for a motion for continuance. At the commencement of that hearing the transcript reveals the following occurrence: BY THE COURT: 22, 161, Clyde Wendell Smith. Mr. Osborne, I expect we can take up your motion a lot quicker than we can these others. Let's take your's up. What are the grounds for your continuance? BY MR. OSBORNE: Your Honor, this is a case in which I was retained afterâ well I have another motion that I want you to consider first before we get to the continuance. If you grant it there will be no need for a continuance. This is a case in which two attorneys were appointed to represent Jerome Smith and after that his mother and sisters came to me and retained me to represent him. They ... they paid me a portion of the fee in March of this year and sub ... and in April, about April the 26th, they came to my office and told me that they didn't long... they didn't want me to represent Mr. Smith any longer and that they were not going to pay the balance of the fee, and based on that I filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. BY THE COURT: Have you ... have you done enough work on it to earn the fee they've paid you? BY MR. OSBORNE: Yes, sir, I have, but I advised them that I just couldn't withdraw unless I got permission from the Court. BY THE COURT: Well, Mr. Osborne, I'm notâ I hadn'tâ it has not been my practice, and I'm not going to start now, to require attorneys to work for nothing where people haven't paid them, and obviously he's indigent; is that correct? BY MR. OSBORNE: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: This was his family paying this? BY MR. OSBORNE: This was his mother and sisters. BY THE COURT: I will release you. BY MR. OSBORNE: All right. .... BY MR. CROOK: Excuse me, Your Honor. In his motion he has asked to be allowed to withdraw as retained counsel, as I understand it, and his motion has listed in the alternative to appoint him. BY THE COURT: Well I'm not going to appoint him, no, sir. I will appoint someone else. BY MR. OSBORNE: All right, well thank you. BY DEPUTY SHERIFF TINDALL: They had two appointed attorneys before they hired Mr. Osborne. They just told them they didn't want them. BY THE COURT: They didn't want them? Well it'll be the same two. BY MR. CROOK: That was Mr. Jones... They didn't want Leman. BY MR. STUCKEY: Yeah, I'll call them and tell them they got thirty days to get ready. BY THE COURT: Yes, sir, thatâ it'll be his original appointed attorneys, we're not going to have attorney shopping between indigents. ś 117. This case is distinguishable from the Myers case cited by Jerome. In that case, midway through trial, Myers' court-appointed attorneys, out of the presence of the defendant, made a motion to withdraw as counsel, making serious accusations against the defendant. This Court, reversing, stated that, [t]his was a very important and crucial stage of the case to the appellant and involved serious charges against him by his own counsel, and that under the circumstances Myers was entitled to be present while the motion was heard. Id. at 892. ś 118. This Court has refused to hold that a defendant always has the right to be present during a hearing on a motion for his attorney to withdraw, but instead has to look at the facts on a case-by-case basis. The Court made such a factual distinction in Lampkin v. State, 389 So.2d 113 (Miss.1980). In Lampkin, the defendant was represented by the law firm of Turner and Walker. Prior to trial, Bennie Turner was appointed County Prosecuting Attorney of a county in the same circuit court district as Lampkin's trial. On the morning of trial, the district attorney informed Turner that he intended to seek Turner's removal from the case for that reason. This motion was denied by the trial court. Subsequently, Turner asked to withdraw because he was uncertain of the law concerning his defense of a person in the same district covering the county attorney's residence. The trial judge allowed Turner to withdraw. Turner's co-counsel also asked to withdraw because Turner had been lead counsel. This motion was overruled. All of these proceedings were done outside the presence of the defendant. ś 119. This Court refused to reverse, stating: We are of the opinion that appellant had no constitutional right to be present on Turner's request to withdraw as counsel, under the facts of this case, and that no error was committed by the lower court. See Boyington v. State, 389 So.2d 485 (Miss.1980). Likewise, the record indicates that appellant's present counsel was familiar with all the facts of the case, that he adequately represented the appellant in the trial below, and that no prejudice resulted to appellant from Attorney Turner's withdrawal from the case. Therefore, the first assignment lacks merit. Lampkin, 389 So.2d at 114-15. ś 120. The case at bar is even more easily distinguishable from Myers than is Lampkin. Osborne did not ask to withdraw as Jerome's counsel mid-trial, or even on the morning of trial, as was the case in Lampkin, but rather, the motion came more than a month prior to trial. Furthermore, the trial court reappointed attorneys Gandy and Jones, who were already familiar with the case, having served as Jerome's attorneys for two months before Osborne was retained when they were allowed to withdraw. One final distinction is that Osborne made no allegations against Jerome which he was entitled to defend. Under the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that Jerome had no constitutional right to be present during Osborne's motion to withdraw as counsel. Therefore, this issue is without merit.