Opinion ID: 548379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constraints of the Fifth Amendment

Text: 36 Both the First and Second Circuits also based their decisions upon what they perceive to be constraints imposed by the defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination--that requiring the defendant to accept responsibility for uncharged criminal conduct compels him to incriminate himself because acceptance could be used against him in a later prosecution. 37 In United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3172, 104 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1989), we faced a similar challenge to this guideline based upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial. We held that [e]ven assuming that the sole purpose of this guideline is to encourage guilty pleas, it is not unconstitutional for the government to bargain for a guilty plea in exchange for a reduced sentence. Id. at 826. The fact that a more lenient sentence is imposed upon a contrite defendant does not establish a corollary that those who elect to stand trial are penalized. Id. 38 Similar logic has been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit regarding this Fifth Amendment challenge. Section 3E1.1 may well affect how criminal defendants choose to exercise their constitutional rights. But 'not every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every encouragement to waive such a right is invalid.'  United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010, 1011 (11th Cir.1989) (footnote omitted) (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218, 99 S.Ct. 492, 497, 58 L.Ed.2d 466 (1978). We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that this guideline simply formalizes and clarifies a tradition of leniency toward contrite defendants. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1363, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). To hold the acceptance of responsibility provision unconstitutional would be to say that defendants who express genuine remorse for their actions can never be rewarded at sentencing. This the Constitution does not require. Id. at 1012. 39 The First and Second Circuits rely on cases demonstrating the so-called unconstitutional conditions theory. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968). We find these decisions distinguishable. They involve situations where, if a defendant took no action that would incriminate himself, the government would exact or increase punishment. Here, should the defendant choose not to accept responsibility for all of his relevant criminal conduct, nothing happens. No increase in punishment occurs. The previously calculated guideline range remains constant. The rule in White supports our reasoning that affording a possibility of a more lenient sentence does not compel self-incrimination. To the extent the defendant wishes to avail himself of this provision, any dilemma he faces in assessing his criminal conduct is one of his own making. See Henry, 883 F.2d at 1011. The government is permitted to reward contrition. This is not the same as compelling self-incrimination. 40