Opinion ID: 774021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Tapes Are Judicial Records Subject to the Common Law Right

Text: 23 On appeal, the defendants contend that, because the tapes 3 played at the pretrial detention hearing were not entered into evidence, they are not judicial records. 4 We disagree. 24 First, we note that while the transcript of the detention hearing indicates that the tapes were merely marked for identification, and not formally admitted into evidence, it is clear from the district court's order that the court relied substantially on the tapes in making its bail determinations. Moreover, it is clear that, had any of the defendants appealed the district court's decision to hold them in custody pending trial, both the parties and this Court would have considered the tapes played at the hearing a part of the record on appeal. 5 Thus, while the defendants are correct that the words admitted into evidence were not used at the hearing, the distinction appears to us to be at most a semantic one, given the presentation of the tapes at the hearing and the district court's reliance on them in making its decision. 25 Even assuming that the tapes were not for all practical purposes admitted into evidence, we do not agree with the defendants that they are beyond the reach of the common law right to inspect and copy judicial records. In United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) (Amodeo I), we considered whether the common law right applied to reports filed by a court officer pursuant to a consent decree in a RICO case. Rejecting the view that this Court could answer this question simply by determining whether the document was physically on file with the court, we defined the term judicial document as follows: [T]he item filed must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process in order for it to be designated a judicial document. See id. at 145. Having determined that the officer's reports did serve a judicial function - that of informing the court of the officer's actions and providing a basis for possible rulings with respect to the consent decree - we found that the reports were judicial documents. See id.; see also United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 631 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that forms submitted by appointed counsel requesting payment were judicial documents). Nowhere did we imply that the term judicial document applied only to evidence admitted at trial. 26 The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have all similarly held that the common law right applies not only to items in evidence, but rather more generally to materials on which a court relied in determining the litigants' substantive rights, which may include transcripts of proceedings [and] everything in the record, including items not admitted into evidence. Smith v. United States Dist. Ct., 956 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1992); see FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (distinguishing materials on which a court relied in determining the litigants' substantive rights from [t]hose documents which play no role in the adjudication process... such as those used only in discovery); United States v. Martin, 746 F.2d 964, 968 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that [t]he common law right of access is not limited to evidence, but rather encompasses all 'judicial records and documents'). 27 Moreover, in discussing the scope of the common law right, the Supreme Court in Warner Communications, 435 U.S. at 598-99, referred to judicial records and documents and to the courts' supervisory power over their own records and files. This would be an odd way to say evidence at trial, as the defendants would have us read the Court's language, and we have no reason to assign such an unnatural meaning to those words. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the policy behind the common law presumption of access is that what transpires in the courtroom is public property. Smith, 956 F.2d at 650; see Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). In effect, the common law right functions to extend the right of the public to attend court proceedings to include the inspection of evidence presented at those proceedings. Thus, just as a member of the public sitting in the courtroom might observe the presentation of evidence as to which an objection is made and sustained as well as evidence which is admitted, it makes sense that the definition of a judicial document would extend to any material presented in a public session of court relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process whether or not it was formally admitted. Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 146. 28 Our view is in no way undermined, as the defendants suggest, by our statement in Myers that we had no occasion to consider the different issues that would arise if evidence of questionable admissibility were marked only for identification. Myers, 635 F.2d at 952. Read in the context of the preceding sentence, which focused on the fact that the tapes' sights and sounds had been seen and heard by those in the courtroom, and the common law privilege of public inspection and copying had fully attached to them, it is clear that our mention of evidence... marked only for identification refers to evidence which is never presented in open court. See id. 29 Because we find that the question whether the tapes at issue are judicial documents within the meaning of the common law privilege identified in Warner Communications does not turn on whether they were formally admitted as evidence, we must return to the more general question whether they are relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process. Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at146. We find that they are. As mentioned above, although there is some confusion regarding whether the district court considered the tapes to be formally entered into evidence, there can be no doubt that the tapes were instrumental in its decision to detain the defendants. Indeed, the discussion of the tapes is the focal point of the court's decision. Moreover, the decision whether to detain the defendants obviously constituted a determination of the defendant's substantive rights. We therefore conclude that the tapes are judicial documents for the purposes of the common law right.