Opinion ID: 2817285
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be

Text: granted if “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party VELAZQUEZ V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 15 on that issue,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), — that is, “if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Conversely, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, . . . a verdict should not be directed.” Id. at 250–51. When deciding whether to grant a Rule 50(a) motion, “[t]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see also Krechman, 723 F.3d at 1110. “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Dubner v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 505 (9th Cir. 2004). “[T]he determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time” of the arrest. Id. (ii) In analyzing whether a reasonable jury could have found a lack of probable cause to arrest, we look to the asserted crime for which the arrest took place. The elements of the asserted crime at issue here, a Section 148(a)(1) violation, are: “(1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance 16 VELAZQUEZ V. CITY OF LONG BEACH of his or her duties.” Garcia v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 4th 803, 818 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, “[f]or a § 148(a)(1) conviction to be valid, a criminal defendant must have ‘resist[ed], delay[ed], or obstruct[ed]’ a police officer in the lawful exercise of his duties.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (alterations in original). “The longstanding rule in California . . . is that a defendant cannot be convicted of an offense against a peace officer ‘engaged in . . . the performance of . . . [his or her] duties’ unless the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense against the officer was committed.” In re Manuel G., 16 Cal. 4th 805, 815 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217 (1990)). Consequently, “Section 148(a) does not make it a crime . . . to resist unlawful orders.” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1086 (9th Cir. 2013). And, for the purposes of Section 148(a), “an officer is not lawfully performing her duties when she detains an individual without reasonable suspicion or arrests an individual without probable cause.” Garcia, 177 Cal. App. 4th at 819 (emphasis omitted). In Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District, 724 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2013), for instance, a defendant police officer argued that the district court incorrectly denied him qualified immunity for arresting plaintiff Greer. More specifically, he “contend[ed] he had probable cause to arrest Greer for impeding him in the performance of his duties — a violation of California Penal Code § 148 — because by returning to the train, Greer evaded [the officer’s] attempt to detain and question the entire group of young men.” 724 F.3d at 1178. The district court had found that because the officer “lacked both ‘probable cause to believe that plaintiffs had committed any underlying criminal violation,’ and ‘reasonable suspicion VELAZQUEZ V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 17 to detain plaintiffs for investigatory purposes,’” the officer “also lacked probable cause to arrest Greer for violating section 148.” Id. We affirmed, observing that “[a] suspect cannot be arrested for violating section 148 because he evaded an officer’s attempt to arrest him unlawfully.” Id. Where police officers “ha[ve] no lawful basis for stopping” an individual, we held, they “ha[ve] no lawful basis to pursue and arrest [that individual] for not acceding to the investigatory stop.” Id. (iii) Additionally, “Ninth Circuit law . . . clearly establishes the right verbally to challenge the police,” and “verbal protests [cannot] support an arrest under § 148.” Mackinney v. Nielsen, 69 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Johnson, 724 F.3d at 1174; Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990). Likewise, “California law . . . gives citizens considerable latitude in confronting the police.” Mackinney, 69 F.3d at 1007 (citing People v. Wetzel, 11 Cal. 3d 104, 107–09 (1974)). Furthermore, Section 148 does not “criminalize[] a person’s failure to respond with alacrity to police orders.” People v. Quiroga, 16 Cal. App. 4th 961, 966 (1993); see also Mackinney, 69 F.3d at 1008 (holding that plaintiff’s “refus[al] to comply for a matter of seconds” with police officers’ “order[] to stop writing on the sidewalk” was not a violation of Section 148). Duran v. City of Douglas is particularly illuminating in this regard. In Duran, defendant Officer Aguilar was “dispatched to a downtown hotel in response to a bartender’s complaints about an unruly patron,” plaintiff Duran. 904 F.2d at 1374. Duran, who was intoxicated and threatening the bartender, “exchanged a few heated words” with Aguilar and then left the bar in a car driven by his wife. 18 VELAZQUEZ V. CITY OF LONG BEACH Id. “Soon thereafter, while out on patrol, Aguilar observed a car with a passenger [Duran] who was directing an obscene gesture toward him through an open window.” Id. Aguilar followed the car and initiated a traffic stop; when Aguilar then ordered Duran to step away from the car, Duran replied “I don’t have to.” Id. In response to Aguilar’s explanation that he had stopped Duran “to find out why [he] had yelled profanities and made an obscene gesture,” Duran uttered “further profanities.” Id. at 1375. Aguilar then decided to arrest Duran for disorderly conduct. Duran brought a § 1983 action for damages resulting from the alleged unlawful stop and arrest against Aguilar. The district court granted him partial summary judgment, and we affirmed. Noting that “police [may] not interfere with the freedom of private persons unless it be for specific, legitimate reasons,” Duran found any such reasons to be “[m]issing from the record.” Id. at 1376–77. That Duran “was making obscene gestures toward [Aguilar] and yelling profanities,” we explained, “was not illegal,” as “criticism of the police is not a crime.” Id. at 1377 (citing Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461–63 (1987)). Nor, we held, did Duran’s verbal conduct “constitute[] disorderly conduct or a disturbing of the peace”; Duran was traveling “late at night on a deserted road,” and there was no evidence “that he had committed or was about to commit any other illegal act.” Id. We thus held that “the stop and detention was illegal.” Id. Furthermore, we observed that the “possible motive” for Duran’s detention was “retaliation for the insult [Aguilar] received from Duran.” Id. at 1377–78. But this motive is “one upon which law enforcement officers may not legitimately rely,” as it “would constitute a serious First Amendment violation.” Id. “While police . . . may resent VELAZQUEZ V. CITY OF LONG BEACH 19 having obscene words and gestures directed at them,” we explained, “they may not exercise the awesome power at their disposal to punish individuals for conduct that is not merely lawful, but protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 1378. Indeed, an “expression of disapproval toward a police officer . . . f[alls] squarely within the protective umbrella of the First Amendment and any action to punish or deter such speech — such as stopping or hassling the speaker — is categorically prohibited by the Constitution.” Id. The district court’s Rule 50 ruling cannot be squared with these governing principles, either procedurally or substantively. 2. The District Court’s Procedurally Improper Rule 50