Opinion ID: 2364354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Knight

Text: The preceding analysis applies to Detective Buie's statement to Knight that Knight's cooperation would be helpful. That statement was not an improper inducement. Detective Buie's statement to Knight, if down the line, after this case comes to an end, we'll see what the State's Attorney can do for you, with your case, with your charges, however, was clearly a promise to exercise advocacy on Knight's behalf to convince the prosecutor to exercise discretion in Knight's favor. This statement is very similar to the statements that have been held to be improper inducements. See note 14, supra. Having found that the promise to aid Knight down the line was an improper inducement, we move to step two of the Hillard test, the reliance or nexus analysis. Knight made two statements to police officers on 8 June 2000. The statement presented to the jury at trial [15] was the second of the two. That statement was recorded in the Homicide Division after the improper inducement was made. The first statement, given to Detective Sergeant Massey at the Western District Criminal Investigations Division Office prior to Detective Buie's involvement in the interrogation, preceded the improper inducement. According to Detective Sergeant Massey, the first statement contained the exact information Knight provided in his recorded statement at the Homicide Division. Knight did not attempt to impeach or contradict this assertion at either the suppression hearing or at trial. The improper inducement obviously could not have caused Knight to make the first statement. Giving due credit to Detective Sergeant Massey's testimony, [16] it follows that the improper inducement could not have caused Knight to make the second identical statement either. If Knight needed no improper inducement in order to give the first statement, then it is reasonable to conclude that there was no nexus between, or reliance on, the improper inducement in his repetition of the substantive content of the former statement. The record indicates that Knight's goal in giving both statements was to shift blame from himself. He named in both Ralph Williams as the shooter and Antonio Jones as the man who accompanied Williams from the hack to the scene of the robbery. The part of Knight's stories regarding Antonio Jones was a lie. As was subsequently discovered by the authorities, Jones was in prison at the time and could not have been involved. Knight's lie indicates a calculating, though doomed, attempt to shift the guilt to others. That, and not the hope of special treatment from the interrogating officers or prosecutor, motivated Knight when he gave his statements. It is ironic that in trying to place the blame on a man who could not have been involved in the crime, Knight gave the State its strongest evidence linking him to the conspiracy, robbery, and murder. We conclude that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence that Knight gave his first statement prior to the improper inducement and that the two statements were identical in substantive content was sufficient to support the hearing judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Knight's recorded statement was admissible, untainted by the inducement. The trial court did not err in denying the suppression motion or admitting Knight's statement as evidence at trial. JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.