Opinion ID: 1195107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: On June 13, 1992, Drysdale was driving his 1980 Ford Pinto south on Interstate 15 near Beaver, Utah, when one of his tires blew out. His car slid into the median and rolled several times. Drysdale was severely injured as a result. Following the accident, Drysdale's family removed the blown tire and accompanying rim from the car and then had the car towed to a service station near Beaver. Sometime during Drysdale's hospital stay, and apparently without his knowledge or consent, the proprietors of the service station destroyed the car. It was not until approximately five months after the accident that Drysdale discovered that the car no longer existed. Drysdale filed suit against several parties to recover damages relating to the accident. Against Ford, Drysdale made claims of strict products liability, breach of implied warranty, and negligence based on allegations that the car was defective, unreasonably dangerous, and unfit for the purpose for which it was sold. Ford moved for summary judgment, arguing that the car was the most relevant and crucial piece of evidence in this case and that without it Drysdale could not possibly prove, and Ford could not adequately defend, the case. The trial court granted the motion, and Drysdale appeals. On appeal, Drysdale claims that the trial court incorrectly granted Ford's motion for summary judgment. He argues first that the trial court's dismissal of his case was more properly characterized as a discovery sanction for failure to preserve evidence under rule 37(b)(2)(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Drysdale argues that since the destruction of the car was not willful on his part, the trial court's sanction was an abuse of discretion. Drysdale further argues that if the dismissal was in fact a summary judgment, it was still improperly granted, reasoning that the destruction of the car does not preclude him from making out a prima facie case of design defect, since the alleged defect would be evident in any 1980 Ford Pinto. Drysdale also asserts that the trial court's findings of fact stating that Ford was unfairly and severely prejudiced by the destruction of the car were disputed, precluding summary judgment. In response, Ford emphasizes that in Utah proximate cause is a required element in a products liability cause of action. Ford argues, however, that without the car, Drysdale cannot prove that the alleged design defect was the proximate cause of the particular injuries he sustained in the accident. Ford further claims that it cannot properly defend Drysdale's action without the car.