Opinion ID: 171233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequacy of the Court's Explanation

Text: Insofar as Appellant claims that the district court's explanation for his above-Guidelines sentence was generally insufficient under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), we cannot agree. The district court thoroughly explained that the upward variance was needed to protect the public from Mr. Pinson, and it more than adequately articulated the factors that drove it to this conclusion: at the age of 13 ... you chased your mother in her bathroom and struck the door with an axe; at age 13, you sent your mother a threatening letter; at age 13, you sent a letter to the President threatening the President at that time; at age 13, you were convicted of assault and battery against an employee of a juvenile facility; at age 16, you were convicted of break [sic] and entering. This involved breaking into a congressional candidate's office and writing such words as whore, slut and nigger lover on the walls and stole [sic] equipment. You have attempted suicide on at least four occasions. In 1996, you were hospitalized for psychiatric care and you had to be secluded from making threats to the staff. While currently incarcerated, you have had at least 22 misconduct write-ups, including grabbing feces out of a toilet and smearing it and blood on yourself and on the walls. We know about the letters that were testified to by the witness. From the psychiatric report, the following information: Mr. Pinson reported that his mother was afraid of him because he tried to stab her and put ipecac  whatever that is  in her food. In an e-mail of August 30, 2005, Mr. Pinson's mother wrote, I would not be surprised if someday he either kills me or does significant harm to me. You've reported having significant problems in the sixth grade when you attempted to  or threatened to blow up the school. You were suspended from school for being disruptive at the age of 10. At age 13, you stabbed a schoolmate 15 times with a pen. Mr. Pinson reported he always liked to play with fire and began making bombs around age 15. He stated he enjoyed killing and torturing animals, like dogs, cats, birds and insects, because he thought it was funny. And he also added, I always felt I would upgrade to people one of these days. In an e-mail, Debra Pinson wrote, Mr. Pinson has a history of doing things to people and animals. He beat one of my dogs to death once because he got mad at me. He kicked another in the head and killed it. Mental health records from 1996 indicate that Mr. Pinson has hurt others with objects, such as knives, and also has hurt the family dog. I think with this kind of a background, I'm afraid for other people, and I think it's my duty to protect the public against further crimes of this defendant and potential crimes in the future. R. Vol. V at 88-90. There is no ambiguity in the district court's reasoning for varying upward. The plethora of bizarre events dating back to Mr. Pinson's early youth convinced the court that Mr. Pinson presented a risk to the public. A more thorough explanation than this one is not required. Appellant's more specific complaints about the court's statement of reasons carry more weight, but ultimately do not require reversal of the sentence. First, he argues that the district court's conclusion that he poses a danger to the public was based on impermissible considerations and was inadequately explained. It should be noted that the crimes for which Mr. Pinson was convicted were based on making threats and false statements, not on acts of violence. The district court explained the need for incarceration far beyond the Guidelines recommendation on the ground that while some of those letters [Mr. Pinson] sent could be merely hyperbole, I would think that, but for your history of violence. I think the public needs to be protected from you, unfortunately. R. Vol. V at 88. As Appellant points out, however, no evidence was presented in court of any acts of violence against people after the age of 13. (Mr. Pinson is now 21 years old.) We regard the district court's conclusion that Mr. Pinson's threats were more than hyperbole and actually present a danger to the public as factual in nature, and entitled to deference on appellate review unless clearly erroneous. And while it may be true that the documented cases of violence in Mr. Pinson's past date to his early teen years, there is evidence in the record that he continues to present an actual danger. Mr. Pinson's own expert, Dr. Preisz, testified that Mr. Pinson had a moderately high ... potential to be dangerous, R. Vol. V at 73, though he believed Mr. Pinson had a chance to overcome his personality disorders given appropriate treatment and therapy, id. at 57. Indeed, Dr. Preisz commented that he was surprise[d] ... [Mr. Pinson had not] done so much harm to himself that either it's resulted in his death or in harming others. Id. at 62. Even Mr. Pinson's mother, who testified in his favor at the sentencing hearing, acknowledged in an e-mail that she would not be surprised if someday he either kills me or does significant harm to me. Id. at 89. Moreover, the evidence in the record seems to show that Mr. Pinson brutally killed a family dog, and told his aunt that he would upgrade to people. Id. In light of this evidence, we cannot agree that the district court's explanation for the sentence was without evidentiary support. To the extent that Mr. Pinson complains that the district court improperly relied on his juvenile conduct, the argument has no merit. Mr. Pinson does not object to the district court's sentencing guidelines calculation, which took into account his juvenile conviction for breaking and entering. His objection, therefore, must be to the district court's use of his juvenile activities to justify the upward variance. While the weight the district court places on certain factors is reviewed for substantive unreasonableness, use of an improper factor is reviewed for procedural unreasonableness. See, e.g., Smart, 518 F.3d at 803-04 (it is procedural sentencing error to give significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor). There are likely some boundaries on what factors sentencing courts can permissibly consider at sentencing  for example, it would surely be impermissible for a court to consider the defendant's race in support of an upward variance  but aside from these few exceptions, we have repeatedly stated that [n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence. United States v. Magallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684 (10th Cir.2005) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3661); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949). Under the circumstances of this case, Mr. Pinson's behavior as a juvenile is not irrelevant to evaluating his threat to the public under § 3553(a)(2)(C). Because Mr. Pinson was only 21 at the time of sentencing, to disregard his behavior as a teenager could lead to an inaccurate assessment of his dangerousness, as there would be insufficient out-of-custody behavior for the court to evaluate. See United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir.1995) (These pubescent transgressions, when considered along with adult offenses, help the sentencing judge to determine whether the defendant has simply taken one wrong turn from the straight and narrow or is a criminal recidivist.). The district court committed no procedural unreasonableness in examining Mr. Pinson's juvenile conduct. Appellant also complains that the district court did not provide a specific reason for its decision not to adopt Dr. Preisz's recommendation that he be given four to eight years of extended therapy. The record reveals, however, that the district court considered Dr. Preisz's testimony and took it into account. The district judge stated that he considered Dr. Preisz's excellent statement, R. Vol. V at 87, and that the court was very sympathetic to [Mr. Pinson] for [his] unfortunate background. Id. The judge explained why he believed that protection of the public required a far more extended sentence of incarceration. This was sufficient explanation.