Opinion ID: 6330744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statement by McKinley Daniels

Text: The second error Jenkins alleges on appeal is the trial court's refusal to admit into evidence, during the sentencing phase, a statement made by Jenkins' co-defendant McKinley to Jenkins' expert witness Dr. Maddox. Dr. Maddox interviewed McKinley several days before Jenkins' trial. During the interview, McKinley told her that, during the course of the second Sunhouse robbery and murder, he told Jenkins to kill the store clerk—Trisha Stull. Jenkins called Dr. Maddox to testify during the sentencing phase and asked, Do you have an opinion as to whether or not J.J. was under the influence of James or McKinley Daniels?10 Dr. Maddox answered, Yes. It is my opinion he was, absolutely. In a hearing outside the jury's presence moments earlier, Jenkins told the trial court he intended to elicit from Dr. Maddox the statement by McKinley to her that McKinley told J.J.[11] to kill Trisha Stull. The trial court refused to admit the statement, ruling it is hearsay. The State argues the trial court was correct to find the statement is hearsay because Jenkins offered the statement in evidence to prove the truth of what McKinley asserted in his statement to Dr. Maddox—that McKinley did in fact tell Jenkins to kill Stull. See Rule 801(c), SCRE ('Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.). Jenkins argues, however, he did not offer the statement for that purpose, but for the purpose of explaining the basis of Dr. Maddox's opinion that Jenkins was under the influence of . . . McKinley. 12 To 10 This particular testimony was addressed to the mitigating circumstance found in subsection 16-3-20(C)(b)(5), which provides the jury must consider whether The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person. 11 Jenkins is also known by the nickname J.J. 12 Jenkins argues on appeal the statement was admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence as a statement against interest. Jenkins did not argue admissibility under Rule 804(b)(3) to the trial court. Nevertheless, Rule 804(b)(3) applies only if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. McKinley was present by subpoena at Jenkins' trial, had already pled guilty to murder and armed robbery, and had been sentenced to forty-five years in prison at the time of Jenkins' trial. Thus, McKinley was not unavailable. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 support this argument, Jenkins relies on Rule 703 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Rule 703, SCRE, provides, If [the facts or data . . . upon which an expert bases an opinion] [are] of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Rule 703, SCRE, clearly provides facts or data need not be admissible for an expert to rely on the facts or data in reaching an opinion. In this respect, Rule 703 reflects a change to the common-law rule to the contrary. 13 See State v. King, 158 S.C. 251, 286-87, 155 S.E. 409, 422 (1930) (applying the common-law rule that an expert must base an opinion on his [or her] own [personal] knowledge [of] the facts or a hypothetical state of facts recited in a hypothetical question), overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 352, 520 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1999); see also Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee's note to 1972 proposed rules (In this respect the rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.). It has been less clear how Rule 703, SCRE, affects admissibility of those otherwise inadmissible facts or data when an expert has relied on the evidence in forming an opinion. As the Federal Rules Advisory Committee stated when Federal Rule 703 was amended in 2000, Courts have reached different results on how to treat inadmissible information when it is reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion or drawing an inference. Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee's note U.S. 314, 326, 119 S. Ct. 1307, 1314, 143 L. Ed. 2d 424, 436 (1999) (It is true . . . that where there can be no further incrimination, there is no basis for the assertion of the privilege. . . . If no adverse consequences can be visited upon the convicted person by reason of further testimony, then there is no further incrimination to be feared.). 13 The common-law rule was actually changed in South Carolina in 1990 with the addition of new Rule 24(b) to the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rule 43(m)(2) to the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rule 24(b), SCRCrimP (1991) (repealed 1995); Rule 43(m)(2), SCRCP (1991) (repealed 1995). See Rule 703, SCRE, note (The rule is identical to the . . . former Rule 43(m)(2), SCRCP, and former Rule 24(b), SCRCrimP.); Rule 1103, SCRE (These rules shall become effective September 3, 1995.). to 2000 amendment. The Advisory Committee noted some federal courts and states provide unlimited admissibility of facts or data relied on by experts, while other courts allow admissibility only in limited circumstances. Id. This Court and our court of appeals have made it clear that—in South Carolina— Rule 703 allows admissibility of otherwise inadmissible evidence only in limited circumstances. In other words, the mere fact an expert relies on inadmissible evidence does not make the evidence admissible. As this Court stated in State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 737 S.E.2d 490 (2013), Rule 703, SCRE, does not . . . make hearsay automatically admissible simply because it was relied upon by the expert. 401 S.C. at 358, 737 S.E.2d at 499 (citing Allegro, Inc. v. Scully, 400 S.C. 33, 4647, 733 S.E.2d 114, 122 (Ct. App. 2012), remanded on other grounds, 408 S.C. 200, 758 S.E.2d 716 (2014); see also Jones v. Doe, 372 S.C. 53, 62-63, 640 S.E.2d 514, 519 (Ct. App. 2006) (stating Rule 703 does not allow for the unqualified admission of hearsay evidence merely because an expert has used it in forming an opinion). We have yet to be so clear, however, as to how a trial court should determine whether to admit evidence reasonably relied on by an expert when the evidence is otherwise inadmissible. We begin our analysis of whether the trial court properly excluded the evidence in this case by observing the obvious fact that evidence often serves dual purposes. Here, McKinley's statement to Dr. Maddox would be useful to the jury for the improper hearsay purpose of determining whether McKinley did in fact tell Jenkins to kill Stull during the second Sunhouse robbery and murder. McKinley's statement would also be useful for the legitimate purpose of explaining the basis for Dr. Maddox's opinion that Jenkins was under the influence of . . . McKinley. In State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 842 S.E.2d 654 (2020), we addressed how a trial court should analyze this situation. We stated, To the extent a trial court finds evidence . . . does serve these dual purposes, the court must determine whether the evidence has sufficient probative force for serving the legitimate purpose that the evidence should be admitted, despite its inherent tendency to serve the improper purpose. 430 S.C. at 31, 842 S.E.2d at 657-58. We hold the same analysis must be conducted under Rule 703, SCRE. This application of Rule 703 is consistent with the Federal Rules Advisory Committee’s interpretation of the original version of Federal Rule 703, which is identical to South Carolina's existing Rule 703. 14 Explaining that the 2000 amendment to the Federal Rule was intended to better reflect the original meaning, the Advisory Committee stated, Rule 703 has been amended to emphasize that when an expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information to form an opinion or inference, the underlying information is not admissible simply because the opinion or inference is admitted. Fed. R. Evid. 703 advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment. The Advisory Committee then explained, When information is reasonably relied upon by an expert and yet is admissible only for the purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating an expert's opinion, a trial court applying this Rule must consider the information's probative value in assisting the jury to weigh the expert's opinion on the one hand, and the risk of prejudice resulting from the jury's potential misuse of the information for substantive purposes on the other. The information may be disclosed to the jury, upon objection, only if the trial court finds that the probative value of the information in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. In a lengthy hearing outside the jury's presence, the trial court conducted this very analysis on the admissibility of McKinley's statement to Dr. Maddox. After hearing from both parties, the trial court ruled the statement is inadmissible hearsay. We begin our review of the trial court's analysis by pointing out that Dr. Maddox's opinion did not specifically address the subsection 16-3-20(C)(b)(5) mitigating circumstance, The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person. Rather, responding to defense counsel's question whether J.J. was under the influence of . . . McKinley, Dr. Maddox answered, Yes. In addition, the statement McKinley told J.J. to kill Trisha Stull relates directly to the second Sunhouse robbery and murder on January 25 and, thus, only indirectly to Dr. 14 When South Carolina adopted the Rules of Evidence in 1995, Rule 901(a) was identical to the federal rule. Rule 703, SCRE, note. Rule 703, SCRE, has not been amended. Maddox's opinion McKinley influenced Jenkins during the first Sunhouse robbery and murder on January 2. These facts lessen the probative value of the statement for the purpose of explaining Dr. Maddox's opinion. Jenkins makes an effective argument, however, that McKinley's statement would have served as a factual anchor to solidify and give credence to Dr. Maddox's opinion Jenkins was under the influence of McKinley. Without the statement, Jenkins argues, the jury was likely to view Dr. Maddox as a hired gun. Turning to the prejudicial effect on the State from the jury's consideration of McKinley's statement for its truth, the fact the statement relates only indirectly to the first Sunhouse robbery and murder diminishes the prejudice. In addition, the admission of the statement would have significantly helped the State in another respect because the statement directly contradicts what Jenkins told investigators in interviews admitted into evidence in the sentencing phase, that he denied participation in the second Sunhouse robbery and murder. The State placed particular emphasis on Jenkins' guilt in the Scotchman robbery and the second Sunhouse robbery and murder as justification for its seeking, and the jury's imposing, the death penalty. 15 The statement would thus have supported the State's sentencing phase argument that the death penalty is warranted against Jenkins because he committed the second Sunhouse robbery and murder. Therefore, we find the jury's use of McKinley's statement for its truth would have been only minimally prejudicial to the State. Whether the trial court erred in excluding the statement McKinley made to Dr. Maddox is a close question. Some members of this Court would have admitted the statement, while others agree with the trial court and would have excluded it. The standard is whether the probative value of the statement for explaining Dr. Maddox's opinion substantially outweighs the probative value for its truth. Ultimately, we cannot say the trial court's decision to exclude the statement was an abuse of its discretion. See State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) (stating, as to the sentencing phase of a capital trial, The admission or exclusion of evidence 15 In the Deputy Solicitor's opening statement to the jury in the sentencing phase, he emphasized the importance of Jenkins' guilt in the second Sunhouse robbery and murder to the question of whether Jenkins deserved the death penalty, stating, The reason we are here isn't January 2, 2015. We are here for January 25, 2015; that is why we are here. is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice).16