Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Massiah Error

Text: Coffman contends her statements to jailhouse informant Robin Long, including her admissions that she had gotten into the shower with Novis and Marlow, that Novis was still alive when Marlow and Coffman went to her apartment to find her PIN, and that Novis had to be killed because they could not leave any victims alive, were obtained in violation of her right to counsel and thus improperly admitted over her motion to suppress. [18] She further contends Long's testimony infected the sentencing process with unreliability, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As will appear, Coffman's contentions lack merit because she fails to demonstrate that the government did anything more than accept information that Long elicited from Coffman on her own initiative. In Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, the high court held that once a judicial proceeding has been initiated against an accused and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, any statement the government deliberately elicits from the accused in the absence of counsel is inadmissible at trial against the defendant. ( Id. at pp. 206-207, 84 S.Ct. 1199; In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 864 P.2d 474.) To prevail on a Massiah claim, a defendant must show that the police and the informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. ( Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Specifically, the evidence must establish that the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements. ( Neely, supra, at p. 915, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 203, 864 P.2d 474.) The requirement of agency is not satisfied when law enforcement officials merely accept information elicited by the informant-inmate on his or her own initiative, with no official promises, encouragement, or guidance. ( Ibid. ) A preexisting arrangement, however, need not be explicit or formal, but may be inferred from evidence of the parties' behavior indicative of such an agreement. ( Ibid. ) A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress informant testimony is essentially a factual determination, entitled to deferential review on appeal. ( People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1247-1248, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) During the hearing on Coffman's motion to suppress statements she made to Robin Long while Long was in jail on a parole violation, San Bernardino County Deputy Sheriff Bobbi New testified officials were aware of Long's practice, while in custody, of engaging in mock fortunetelling with playing cards as a means of eliciting from incarcerated suspects statements that Long would then communicate to law enforcement officials. New testified that Long was placed in protective custody, where she met and talked with Coffman, for reasons other than her alleged status as a police agent. (According to Long's later testimony, because of a prior child endangerment charge she was placed in protective custody whenever she was incarcerated.) Long's parole agent, Frank Mamone, testified at the same hearing that no official had contacted him to arrange any deal for Long's testimony or to change her parole status, and that Long had been released around February 6, 1987, as a normal procedure due to the minor nature of her parole violation (absconding and failing to report to her parole agent). Long herself testified she wanted to learn the details of Coffman's case because two of Long's friends had been murdered and she wondered if there was a connection between those killings and Coffman's case. Long also testified she did not like being incarcerated and acknowledged she had given information to authorities in an unrelated case in order to get out of jail, but insisted she had been promised nothing in connection with the present case and her testimony would have no bearing on how long she would spend in custody on her current parole violation. Coffman essentially argues that because Long was a known informant, the circumstance that she was housed near Coffman compels the inference that she was a police agent. The trial court reasonably concluded otherwise, given the testimony showing Long had acted on her own initiative and the absence of any evidence that authorities had encouraged her to supply information or insinuated that to do so would be to her benefit, or that her release from jail was other than in the normal course for a minor parole violation. Consequently, the admission of Long's testimony did not violate Coffman's Sixth or Eighth Amendment rights.