Opinion ID: 2518547
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Avoiding inconsistent outcomes

Text: As the District of Columbia's highest court has reasoned, in considering the application of ameliorative sentencing amendments to a defendant who committed the charged offense prior to the amendment but was sentenced thereafter, [w]e cannot say that a legislature could not rationally conclude that the best approach would be a purely prospective one, so that all defendants who committed crimes before the statute became effective would be treated equally. Otherwise, sentencings could get caught up in manipulations with unfair results overall. Some convicted felons, for example, might be able to arrange sentencing delays to take advantage of the new sentencing scheme, whereas others could not achieve the same result before less sympathetic judges. But, more fundamentally, we see nothing irrational in a legislative conclusion that individuals should be punished in accordance with the sanctions in effect at the time the offense was committed, a viewpoint encompassed by the savings statutes themselves. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 72 (D.C.1996) (emphasis added). Adopting Reis's contention that proceedings is ambiguous and could be construed to include sentencing hearings as separate and distinct proceedings would invite just such an arbitrary application. The result in Tapp, discussed supra. in section III.B.2 & n. 24, illustrates the danger. In Tapp, the court reviewed precedent regarding when a penalty is incurred, citing, inter alia, State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970), and Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 479 P.2d 791 (1971). In those related cases, the defendants, Miller and Belt, were each indicted for writing fraudulent checks prior to the effective date of the same ameliorative sentencing amendment reducing the penalty, but one of them, Belt, was convicted and sentenced after the effective date while the other, Miller, was convicted and sentenced before. Miller was subject to a felony with incarceration in State Prison for upwards of 14 years, for doing the same thing, at the same time, under the same statute, with the same penalty, for the same guilt, while Belt was subject to only six months, despite the fact that it was Belt who violated parole and fled the state. Tapp, 490 P.2d at 337-38 (Henriod, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's conclusion sanctions such discrimination under the illogical, unreasonable platitude and guise that `time of sentence,'  not guilt . . .  is of the essence). Moreover, the concerns expressed in Holiday have since been borne out in Utah, where the Tapp rule has been extended to allow the application of ameliorative sentencing amendments to defendants even where the defendant's presentence misconduct resulted in the defendant's sentencing being delayed beyond the effective date of the amendments. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citing, inter alia, State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (noting that the [Utah] supreme court has determined [that the] defendant's actions that delay sentencing are irrelevant to receiving the benefits of the amended sanctions)). [26] Nevertheless, the dissent insists that, by not applying the ameliorative provisions of Act 44, section 11 to Reis's case, it is we who are being arbitrary and unjust and that our decision runs counter to the general trend in other states. Dissenting opinion at ___-___ ___, ___-___, 165 P.3d at 1021-22, 1024-25 (quoting In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (1965)) (citing Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 512; Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 472; Oliver, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d at 203; State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693, 375 A.2d 944, 947 (1977); Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66-68). Again, as discussed supra in section III.B.1.b, the cases upon which the dissent relies implicate only general savings clauses, which, as this court itself has concluded in Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 213, 638 P.2d at 322, and Koch, 107 Hawai`i at 222, 112 P.3d at 76 (quoting Von Geldern ), represent a rule of statutory construction that may yield, and often does, to more express, specific intent regarding retroactive application of ameliorative amendments. See Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 510 (concluding that the historical and philosophical underpinnings of the state's general savings clause did not support barring retroactive application of ameliorative amendments); Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 471 (concluding that the applicable general savings clause is but a canon of statutory construction to aid in interpreting statutes to ascertain legislative intent and that [i]t is not an end in itself); Oliver, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d at 201 (concluding that the general savings clause has been read by this court to provide merely a principle of construction, which governs in the absence of contrary intent) (quotation signals omitted); Estrada, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d at 952 (characterizing the general savings clause as simply embod[ying] the general rule of construction . . . that when there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not retroactively[;] . . . [a] rule of construction, however, [that] is not a straightjacket); Macarelli, 375 A.2d at 947 (relying on the unique wording of the general savings clause directing the courts to look to the record for legislative intent with regard to specific statutes to overcome the presumption against retroactive application). However, a default presumption against retroactive application remains alive and well both in our jurisprudence and in the foreign jurisdictions that the dissent cites. See e.g., Taniguchi v. Assoc. of Apt. Owners of King Manor, 114 Hawai`i 37, 48, 155 P.3d 1138, 1149 (2007) ([I]t is well settled that `all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.') (quoting Robinson v. Bailey, 28 Haw. 462, 464 (1925)); Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai`i 426, 432, 121 P.3d 406, 412 (2005) (quoting Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai`i 325, 333, 104 P.3d 912, 920 (2004) (`Hawai`i statutory and case law discourage retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing that such operation was intended.')); Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215-16, 638 P.2d at 323 (clarifying that we are not suggesting, as other courts have, see, e.g., . . . Estrada ; . . . Oliver, that whenever an amendatory statute is enacted . . ., it must be presumed that the legislature intended for it to apply in every case where it could constitutionally apply and reemphasizing that [w]here the intention of the legislature with respect to retroactivity is incapable of ascertainment, the provisions of HRS § 1-3 will determine the statute's interpretation); Evangelatos v. Super. Court, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 642, 753 P.2d 585 (1988) (rejecting the characterization that Estrada eroded the strong presumption against retroactivity and asserting that absen[t] . . . an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application.). Therefore, insofar as the presumption remains against retroactive application, the inclusion of a specific savings clause within an amendment  the polar opposite of an express retroactivity provision  must operate as clear evidence of the legislature's intention that the act in question should apply prospectively only. Indeed, where a specific savings clause has been included in amendatory legislation, the general trend among the states nationally is, in fact, not to apply the amendments retroactively, even when they are ameliorative. In People v. Floyd, 31 Cal.4th 179, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885, 72 P.3d 820 (2003), the California Supreme Court refused to apply ameliorative amendments requiring probation and treatment for certain drug offenders where the amendments took effect before the defendant's conviction was final, relying on the language of a savings clause included as part of the amending statute. [27] 1 Cal.Rptr.3d at 886-87, 72 P.3d 820. It concluded that the rule of Estrada allowing retroactive application for ameliorative amendments did not apply when the amendments in question contained a specific savings clause, adding that [w]e cannot embrace an interpretation that makes [the specific savings clause] mere surplusage. Id. at 887, 889, 72 P.3d 820. [28] Similarly, in State v. Parker, 871 So.2d 317 (La.2004), the lower appellate court attempted to apply to the defendant's case ameliorative amendments to the state's habitual offender statute  despite a specific savings clause that provided that the provisions of this Act shall only have prospective effect  by relying on the fact that the hearing in which the lower court found that the defendant was an habitual offender occurred after the amendment's effective date. 871 So.2d at 324. The Louisiana Supreme Court (1) refused to apply the ameliorative sentencing amendments (a) in light of the existence of a specific savings clause and (b) because it sought to prevent manipulation of the court schedule for the benefit of individual defendants and (2) noted that, had the legislature intended the more lenient sentencing provisions to be immediately effective, it could have signified that intent in the Act. Id. at 322-23 (citing State v. Sugasti, 820 So.2d 518, 520-21 (La.2002); State v. Dreaux, 205 La. 387, 17 So.2d 559, 560 (1944)). The Washington Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Ross, 152 Wash.2d 220, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004), wherein it rejected the defendant's argument that state precedent required that ameliorative amendments apply retroactively. Id. at 1232, 1234. The court instead concluded that, by including a specific savings clause that provided that the amendments in question apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2002, the state legislature had expressed the opposite intent, i.e., that the ameliorative amendments applied only prospectively. Id. at 1234. Indeed, a number of other jurisdictions have refused to apply ameliorative amendments retroactively, even when only general savings clauses were implicated. See, e.g., State v. Vineyard, 96 Ariz. 76, 392 P.2d 30 (1964); State v. Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d 644, 655 (Del.Super.Ct.2004) (citing Holiday, 683 A.2d at 78-79, for its concern that to conclude otherwise would bestow a windfall on defendants whose sentencing proceedings had been delayed and concluding that [j]ust as the State will not surprise a defendant with greater punishment in an ex post facto fashion, neither should a defendant feign surprise about the penalties that accompanied his [or her] conduct at the time); Castle v. State, 330 So.2d 10 (Fla.1976); Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938 (1968); Pollard v. State, 521 P.2d 400 (Okla.Crim.App.1974); State v. Kane, 101 Wash.App. 607, 5 P.3d 741 (2000). Our decision today is not, therefore, out of step with the jurisprudence of other states, nor is our analysis of specific versus general savings clauses, despite the dissent's disparagement of the distinction, dissenting opinion at ___ n. 51, 165 P.3d at 1021 n. 51 (discussing the so-called specific savings clause in Section 29).