Opinion ID: 1434401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fatally defective information

Text: Defendant next alleges that count one of the information charging him with rape and count two charging him with sodomy were fatally defective in that they failed to state with specificity the date or time on which the alleged offenses occurred. Failure to charge him with specific acts, he argues, violated his right to be informed of the charges against him, denied him due process of law as contemplated by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and denied him the opportunity to consider the very critical defense of alibi. Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-12, provides in pertinent part as follows: (b) Any defense, objection or request, including requests for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: (1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding. The failure to timely raise defenses or objections constitutes waiver under Utah R.Crim.P. 12(d). An offense may be charged by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. The time of the commission of the offense need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Utah R.Crim.P. 4(b). The defendant must disclose to the prosecutor before trial information relating to alibi. Utah R.Crim.P. 16(c). No motion was made before or at trial objecting to the charging language. No disclosure was made to the prosecution that the defendant intended to assert the defense of alibi. No contention is made that the statute of limitations may have run. The information contained the common law terms rape and forcible sodomy, referred to the statutes governing those charges, and mentioned the degree of felony and the age of the victim as under 14. It gave the general time frame within which the offenses occurred. In the probable cause statement there were cited 25-30 incidents of sexual intercourse over a period of six months and one incident of forcible sodomy in the summer of 1981. There was thus nothing constitutionally infirm in apprising the defendant of the offenses charged, and absent a defense of alibi, time was not necessary to charge the offense. Defendant relies on State v. Foster, 87 N.M. 155, 530 P.2d 949 (1974); State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 P.2d 764 (1949); State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937); State v. Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860 (1918); and State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085 (1908) to support his contentions. In State v. Foster, supra, the defendant was charged with one act of sodomy happening on or about August, 1973. The victim testified to three acts: one in late August, another a week later and the last act about a month later. At the trial it was uncertain for which act the defendant was being tried. The last act was witnessed by the victim's guardian and he testified concerning it. The court on appeal observed that evidence of the two earlier acts would have been inadmissible if he were being tried for the third. The court found the information void for failure to give the defendant notice of the charges against him. By comparison, in the instant case, the defendant was not charged with an act of rape occurring on a specific date which could have been confused with an act on another date. To the contrary, count one charges the defendant with an act of sexual intercourse during the period from June, 1981 to January, 1982. The victim testified to many acts during that period. In order to convict the defendant of rape, the jury had only to find one act committed during that period. Count two, the sodomy count, referred to only one act and the victim testified to only one act, the exact date of which she could not pinpoint. The information complied with Utah R.Crim.P. 4(b). See State v. Wilson, Utah, 642 P.2d 394 (1982). The other cases cited by defendant do not deal with the precise problem here. State v. Jensen, supra, dealt with a conviction on a second information for which the defendant had never been committed and held to answer by a committing magistrate. State v. Nelson, supra, dealt with the conviction for an offense for which no preliminary examination was had or waived and no information was filed. The defendant there was given a preliminary exam for one offense and then subjected to trial for another. No such error was claimed or committed here. In State v. Waid, supra, where the defense was alibi, we remanded the case for a new trial in spite of defendant's failure to object to erroneous instructions requiring the wrong standard of proof, as the error was palpable and prevented a fair trial. We see no such constitutional infirmities in the case under review. In State v. Cooper, supra, this Court in dictum recognized that the issue of time might be important where alibi is a defense or where there is a danger of exposing the defendant to double jeopardy. The instructions to the jury in the instant case clearly referred to an act of sexual intercourse during a stated period of time and to one act of sodomy within a shorter period. The jury convicted the defendant for those acts so that he cannot be placed twice in jeopardy for any such acts occurring during those time periods.