Opinion ID: 2193164
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Heading: Wrongful death of a fetus.

Text: The other important question we consider on this appeal is whether this court's decision in McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971), should be overruled. McKillip held that no wrongful death action may be maintained on behalf of a fetus which is not born alive, because a fetus is not a person within the meaning of our survival statute, section 611.20, The Code. We are satisfied that McKillip was correctly decided. In Iowa, the right to maintain a suit for wrongful death is purely statutory, there being no such action at common law. Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1973); Major v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Northern Railway, 115 Iowa 309, 88 N.W. 815 (1902). See generally Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal.3d 564, 572-75, 139 Cal.Rptr. 97, 102-04, 565 P.2d 122, 127-29 (1977). The statute which affords this cause of action, section 611.20, provides: All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same. Unlike the wrongful death statutes in many states, Iowa's death statutes have always been of the survival type. Fitzgerald v. Hale, 247 Iowa 1194, 1196, 78 N.W.2d 509, 510 (1956). Such a statute does not create a new cause of action in a decedent's survivors; rather, it preserves whatever rights and liabilities a decedent had with respect to a cause of action at the time of his death. Wright v. Daniels, 164 N.W.2d 180, 181 (Iowa 1969), overruled on other grounds, Shook v. Crabb, 281 N.W.2d 616, 618, 620 (Iowa 1979); Cardamon v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, 256 Iowa 506, 520, 128 N.W.2d 226, 235 (1964). The cause of action thus preserved is deemed to accrue to the decedent's estate representative at the time it would have accrued to the deceased if he had survived. § 611.22, The Code. Because a wrongful death action in Iowa is purely statutory, our sole task is to construe the survival statute to determine if the plaintiff comes within its terms. McKillip, 191 N.W.2d at 708. We recognize that a majority of courts, in construing their state wrongful death or survival statutes, have reached a result contrary to that in McKillip; however, a significant number of states adhere to the minority view. [5] See generally Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp.1981). Wrongful death statutes vary in wording from state to state and are likely to vary in intended meaning as well. [6] Therefore, what other courts have said about their state code provisions cannot be conclusive as to ours. We must make an independent determination of the intended meaning of our own statute. When construing a statute, this court has a limited role. We must [search] for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(13). The judiciary should not rewrite a statute under the guise of construing it. If changes in a law are desirable from a standpoint of policy or mere practicality, it is for the legislature to enact them, not for the court to incorporate them by interpretation. State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24, 36 (Iowa 1975). Bearing these principles in mind, we turn to the task of reexamining our construction of the term person in section 611.20. The ordinary meaning of the word person is a human being who has attained a recognized individual identity by being born alive. Cardwell v. Welch, 25 N.C.App. 390, 392, 213 S.E.2d 382, 383 (1975), cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623. For reasons we will explain, we believe this was the meaning the legislature had in mind when it enacted our survival statute. Initially, we note that an unborn fetus was not generally considered a person at common law. [7] Kilmer v. Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 553, 529 P.2d 706, 707 (1974); State ex rel. Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Mo.1976). If the legislature intended to abrogate that rule for the purpose of wrongful death actions under the survival statute, it presumably would have made that intention clear by a specific reference to the unborn in the statute. In the criminal area, our legislature has not hesitated to be specific when it intended a statute to apply to fetuses. Murder is defined as the killing of another person with malice aforethought, § 707.1, The Code, but feticide and related crimes are treated separately in statutes that specifically refer to fetuses. See §§ 707.7-.10, The Code. From this we conclude, as did the California court in Justus, that when the legislature intends to confer legal personality on unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses that intent in specific and appropriate terms; the corollary, of course, is that when the [l]egislature speaks generally of a `person,' ... it impliedly but plainly excludes such fetuses. Justus, 19 Cal.3d at 579, 139 Cal.Rptr. at 107, 565 P.2d at 132. McKillip's holding that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of section 611.20 is reinforced by the fact that, in the ten years since that case was decided, the legislature has not responded by changing the statute. While such legislative silence is not conclusive, we may consider it as some evidence that the legislature is satisfied with the McKillip construction of the statute. See General Mortgage Corp. of Iowa v. Campbell, 258 Iowa 143, 152, 138 N.W.2d 416, 421 (1965). The fact that in the intervening period the legislature has considered and passed other legislation relating to the death of fetuses, as noted above, lends additional significance to its failure to amend the survival statute to include fetuses. See 1976 Sess., 66th G.A., ch. 1245(1), §§ 707-10; 1977 Sess., 67th G.A., ch. 148, §§ 2-4. We recognize that McKillip is factually distinguishable from the case at bar because the fetus in McKillip was not viable at the time of injury, 191 N.W.2d at 707, while the Weitl fetus was alleged to be viable and nearly full term. However, we do not believe the legislature intended to include even a viable fetus within the class of person[s] under section 611.20. Had the legislature intended to include one class of fetuses and not another, there would have been even greater reason to specifically refer to such fetuses in the statute. The history of section 611.20 also supports our conclusion that a fetus is not a person within the meaning of the statute. Except for a few minor changes in punctuation and grammar, the present section 611.20 is identical to the version of the statute which first appeared in the Iowa Code of 1873. Compare § 611.20, The Code 1981 with § 2525, The Code 1873. An earlier version of the statute did not contain the word person, but said that no cause of action ex delicto dies with either or both [of] the parties, but the prosecution thereof may be commenced or continued by or against their respective representatives. § 2502, The Code 1851. See also §§ 2501, 1698-99, The Code 1851; § 3467, The Code, Revision of 1860. By its terms, this statute applied only to those who were or could have been parties to a tort cause of action at the time of death, and therefore would not apply to a fetus. There is no reason to believe that the legislature, in enacting the 1873 version, intended any substantive change when it used the phrase person entitled or liable instead of parties. Plaintiffs contend that adhering to McKillip will preclude our recognizing a live-born infant's cause of action for prenatal injuries, if and when such a question comes before us. [8] Although we do not intimate what our decision would be in such a case, we do not believe our construction of the statute would mandate such a result. Plaintiffs' argument is based on the fact that recovery for wrongful death under section 611.20 is generally allowed when the decedent would have been able to recover for the alleged wrongful act had he survived the injury. Egan, 208 N.W.2d at 917. Plaintiffs contend that a cause of action for prenatal injuries, if recognized in Iowa, would be one that a stillborn fetus could have brought had it survived those injuries. Therefore, they argue, the statute must either preserve this cause of action for the fetus's estate, or we must be prepared to say that the cause of action does not exist in Iowa. We do not agree that our construction of the statute presents such a dichotomy. Plaintiffs' argument begs the question. See Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 305-06, 204 A.2d 140, 142 (1964). The language in Egan construes section 611.20 and therefore applies only to a decedent who is a person within the meaning of the statute. Plaintiffs' argument erroneously assumes that a fetus is a person to whom the had he survived language of Egan applies. Without that assumption, the argument fails. Furthermore, we note that courts in at least four states have had no difficulty in denying recovery for wrongful death of a fetus, even though those states had already recognized a live-born infant's cause of action for prenatal injuries. See Graf, 43 N.J. at 305, 311, 204 A.2d at 142, 145; Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 486, 301 N.Y. S.2d 65, 68, 71, 248 N.E.2d 901, 903, 905 (1969); Cardwell, 25 N.C.App. at 391-93, 213 S.E.2d at 383-84; Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 48-50, 202 A.2d 9, 10-11 (1964). [9] Plaintiffs also argue that it would be incongruous to immunize a tortfeasor from liability when he injures an unborn fetus badly enough to cause stillbirth, but to impose liability when the fetus is injured less severely and thus born alive. First, we note that this argument is premature because this court has yet to decide whether liability should be imposed in the latter case. Second, even assuming we would decide to impose liability in such a case, plaintiffs' argument would more properly be addressed to the legislature, because it attacks section 611.20 on policy grounds. [10] As we have noted, our role is to construe the statute as we believe the legislature intended it, not to debate its wisdom. Accordingly, we hold that a fetus, whether viable or not, is not a person within the meaning of section 611.20. In so doing, we repeat the admonition in McKillip that we express no opinion regarding the existence of a fetus as a person in a biological, religious or philosophical sense. 191 N.W.2d at 709. The matter before us has been solely one of statutory construction. Trial court's dismissal of Count III of plaintiffs' petition is reversed, its dismissal of Count IV is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed one-half to appellants and one-half to appellees. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. UHLENHOPP, J., concurs. REYNOLDSON, C. J. and HARRIS, J., concur in divisions I and II. McCORMICK, J., concurs in division I and concurs in the result in divisions II and III. McGIVERIN, J., with whom SCHULTZ, J., joins, concurs in divisions I and III, but dissents from division II. LARSON, J., concurs in division I and the result of division II, but dissents from division III. REYNOLDSON, C. J., and HARRIS, J., join in the dissent to division III. LeGRAND, J., concurs in division I, joins in McGIVERIN's, J., dissent as to division II and LARSON's, J., dissent as to division III.