Opinion ID: 3170319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discriminatory Action

Text: The district court properly dismissed Johnson’s complaint on the ground that she failed to plead a plausible discrimination claim. Discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 42 2 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 2015) (Title VII, § 1981, and NYSHRL); Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2012) (ADEA). “The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, however, is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). “[A]t the initial stage of the litigation” in a Title VII case, “the plaintiff does not need substantial evidence of discriminatory intent.” Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015). Rather, “what must be plausibly supported by facts alleged in the complaint is that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id.; see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 87 (2d Cir. 2015). A similar “minimal” pleading standard applies to ADEA claims. See Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001). In addition, “a plaintiff alleging age discrimination under the [ADEA] must allege ‘that age was the but-for cause of the employer’s adverse action.’” Vega, 801 F.3d at 86 (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2000)). Johnson attempted to raise an inference of discrimination based upon disparate treatment: she was fired and a co-worker outside of her protected class was not. “An inference of discrimination can arise from circumstances including . . . more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, “[a] plaintiff relying on disparate treatment evidence must show she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare herself.” 3 Mandell v. Cty. of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 379 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Johnson’s third amended complaint did not allege that she and her co-worker had similar job descriptions or responsibilities. We will not consider Johnson’s allegations on this score, as they are advanced for the first time on appeal. See Kraebel v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1992). Johnson’s complaint otherwise failed plausibly to allege that she suffered an adverse employment action on the basis of her race, sex, national origin, or age. Although Johnson alleged that she was harassed and fired, and that she was “discriminated against” based on her race, sex, national origin, and age, she never alleged that she was fired or harassed “because of” of those protected characteristics. Vega, 801 F.3d at 88. Even if liberally construed as alleging that she was fired “because of” those characteristics, Johnson’s complaint alleged no facts that would create a plausible inference of such discrimination. Likewise, Johnson alleged no facts to suggest that her age was a “but-for” cause of the harassment or her discharge. Id. at 86.