Opinion ID: 2379651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: continued polling of the jury and resumption of deliberations

Text: After the foreman announced that the jury had recorded a unanimous guilty verdict as to all seven counts charged against Irving and all six counts charged against Perkins, the court polled the jury. Each of the first nine jurors indicated agreement with each count individually, responding first to inquiries regarding Perkins' charges and then to inquiries regarding Irving's charges. When juror number ten responded, she announced guilty as to the first four counts against Perkins but indicated that she did not agree with the verdict on the fifth count charging appellants with the felony murder of Gaddy Little. The trial judge immediately stopped the jury poll and convened a bench conference. The judge indicated that he would stop the poll of juror number ten as to Perkins and move on to poll her about Irving. Although counsel for Perkins requested a mistrial on the fifth count at this time, both of appellants' counsel agreed to the judge's proposal to continue with the poll. When questioned as to Irving, juror number ten responded guilty as to the first four counts but again stated that she did not agree with the guilty verdict announced on count five. After a brief recess, the judge suggested that the polling be continued with jurors number eleven and twelve, limited to the first four counts. Both defense counsel again indicated that they had no objection to this procedure. Jurors eleven and twelve were polled and each responded guilty as to the first four counts for each appellant. These two jurors were not polled with respect to counts five, six, and seven. The following day, the trial judge entertained mistrial motions from defense counsel for both appellants and then reconvened the jury. The judge read to the jury Criminal Jury Instruction 2.93 (3d ed. 1978), and the supplemental jury instruction recommended by this court in Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336, 342 n. 11 (1978). [4] He then asked the jury to resume its deliberations. After several hours, the foreman informed the judge that the jury remained unable to reach a unanimous verdict on counts five and six dealing with the felony murder and the attempted robbery of Gaddy Little. There was, however, unanimity as to count seven, charging appellant Irving with unlawful possession of a pistol. The judge accepted the jury's verdicts on counts one through four, and seven, and discharged the jury. Appellants both argue that the trial judge erred in permitting the continued polling of the jury, even as to counts one through four, after a dissent was registered on count five. Appellant Irving further asserts that the court erred in allowing resumption of deliberations under the particular facts of this case. We address these arguments in turn. Appellants maintain that Super.Ct. Crim.R. 31(d) [5] provides the court with only two alternatives when disagreement is expressed during a jury poll: to send the jury back for further deliberations or to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury. Any additional polling of the jury, it is argued, is error. To support their position, appellants rely heavily on In Re Pearson, 262 A.2d 337 (D.C.1970). In that case, this court held that, because the potential prejudice in continuing the poll was not outweighed by a `useful purpose,' it was error for the trial court to continue polling after one of the jurors voiced dissent. Id. at 339. We find In Re Pearson distinguishable on both factual and policy grounds. The defendant in In Re Pearson was tried on a one count indictment, and, after deliberation, the jury informed the judge that it was prepared to return a guilty verdict. During the jury poll, juror number one expressed reservations about the defendant's guilt. The trial judge went on to poll the remaining eleven members of the jury, ascertaining that each concurred in the verdict of guilty as originally announced. The judge instructed the jury to resume deliberations but recalled the jury after a short period of time without any indication that a unanimous verdict had been reached. At this point, the judge inquired whether the split was still eleven to one and asked juror number one if her reservations about the defendant's guilt persisted. Juror number one acquiesced: I'll change it to guilty. On these facts, this court reversed the conviction. The potential harm that concerned the court in In Re Pearson was that continued polling would exert a coercive effect on the dissenting juror by isolating that juror in open court and making clear that he or she was the lone person holding to a decidedly minority position. This coercion would taint further deliberations. This reasoning is powerful in the context of a single count indictment or when the poll is continued on the same count as to which disagreement has been expressed. In the present case, however, the continuation of the poll did nothing to increase the isolation of juror number ten. Juror number ten's indication of dissent immediately made clear her disagreement with jurors one through nine and left uncertain her position vis-a-vis jurors eleven and twelve, who were not polled on count five. The limited polling of jurors eleven and twelve on counts one through four did nothing to alter this situation before the resumption of deliberations. Moreover, in contrast to the situation in In Re Pearson, a useful purpose was served by continuing the polling in the present case. The court in In Re Pearson correctly pointed out that continued polling on a count which is already the subject of a dissent serves no purpose other than to reveal the precise numerical division of the jury. In the present case, however, continued polling provided the court with valuable information regarding the advisability of asking the jury to resume deliberations. If jurors eleven or twelve had expressed disagreement with the verdicts on counts one through four, the judge might well have decided that the jury was sufficiently discordant to warrant a mistrial on all counts. [6] In short, we read the prohibition on continued polling set forth in In Re Pearson to preclude continued polling only on those counts as to which disagreement has been registered. In cases such as the present one, where useful purposes outweigh potential for coercion, continued polling is not error. [7] We next consider whether, irrespective of the decision to continue the jury poll, the trial judge abused his discretion by permitting the jury to resume deliberations. In Crowder, supra, this court held that the trial judge erred when he permitted further deliberations, rather than granting a mistrial, after the jury poll revealed disagreement on the part of the twelfth and final juror polled. The Crowder opinion is expressly limited to the facts of this case. 383 A.2d at 342 (emphasis in original). The present case is distinguishable from Crowder in several crucial respects. Juror number ten was never isolated as the sole dissenter on any count, and the precise numerical division of the jury was not disclosed by the poll. Neither appellant was ultimately convicted on any count as to which dissent was expressed. And the judge here gave the jurors the supplementary instruction recommended by the court in Crowder, see note 6 supra, before sending them back to the jury room. In light of these facts, we are convinced that the jury freely and fairly arrived at a unanimous verdict.