Opinion ID: 8414576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sexual Orientation Discrimination As Gender Stereotyping

Text: Finally, sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination “because of ... sex” because such discrimination is inherently rooted in gender stereotypes. In Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004), we considered “a crucial question: What constitutes a gender-based stereotype?” Id. at 119-20. While we did not definitively answer that question, we invoked the Seventh Circuit’s observation that whether there has been improper “reliance upon stereotypical notions about how men and women should appear and behave” can sometimes be resolved by “considering] ... whether [the plaintiffs] gender would have been questioned for [engaging in the relevant activity] if he were a woman rather than a man.” Id. at 120 n.10 (quoting Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 F.3d 563, 581-82 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated on other grounds by 523 U.S. 1001, 118 S.Ct. 1183, 140 L.Ed.2d 313 (1998) (remanding the case in light of Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998))). Relying on common sense and intuition rather than any “special training,” see Back, 365 F.3d at 120 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 256, 109 S.Ct. 1775), courts have explained that sexual orientation discrimination “is often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms. In fact, stereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes about the proper roles of men and women. ... The gender stereotype at work here is that ‘real’ men should date women, and not other men,” Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002); see also Boutillier v. Hartford Pub. Sch., No. 3:13-CV-01303-WWE, 2016 WL 6818348 (D. Conn. Nov. 17, 2016) (“[H]omosexuality is the ultimate gender non-conformity, the prototypical sex stereotyping animus.”). Indeed, we recognized as much in Dawson when we observed that “[stereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.”398 F.3d at 218 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having conceded this, it is logically untenable for us to insist that this particular gender stereotype is outside of the gender stereotype discrimination prohibition articulated in Price Waterhouse. Numerous district courts throughout the country have also found this approach to gender stereotype claims unworkable. See, e.g., Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F.Supp.3d 1151, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (collecting cases) (“Simply put, the line between sex discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination is ‘difficult to draw' because that line does not exist, save as a fingering and faulty judicial construct.”). The binary distinction that Simonton and Dawson establish between permissible gender stereotype discrimination claims and impermissible sexual orientation discrimination claims requires the factfinder, when evaluating adverse employment action taken against an effeminate gay man, to decide whether his perceived effeminacy or his sexual orientation was the true cause of his disparate treatment. See Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Connecticut, 172 F.Supp.3d 509, 524 n.8 (D. Conn. 2016). This is likely to be an exceptionally difficult task in fight of the degree to which sexual orientation is commingled in the minds of many with particular traits asso-dated with gender. More fundamentally, carving out gender stereotypes related to sexual orientation ignores the fact that negative views of sexual orientation are often, if not always, rooted in the idea that men should be exclusively attracted to women and women should be exclusively attracted to men — as clear a gender stereotype as any. Thus, in my view, if gay, lesbian, or bisexual plaintiffs can show that they were discriminated against for failing to comply with some gender stereotype, including the stereotype that men should be exclusively attracted to women and women should be exclusively attracted to men, they have made out a cognizable sex discrimination claim. In such a case, the gender stereotype theory of discrimination would encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In neither Simonton nor Dawson did we consider this articulation of the gender stereotype at play in sexual orientation discrimination.