Opinion ID: 474490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Judgment Interest Before the 1982 Act

Text: 8 To properly evaluate appellants' argument, it is necessary to set forth at length the state of the law before the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. Prior to its amendment by the Federal Courts Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 provided that: 9 Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court. Execution therefore may be levied by the marshal, in any case where, by the law of the State in which such court is held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by State law. 10 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 (emphasis supplied). Although this section, literally read, appears to have mandated the award of interest on any money judgment in a civil case in district court, we nonetheless held that the language of section 1961 was insufficient by itself to permit an award of post-judgment interest against the United States. See Holly v. Chasen, 639 F.2d 795, 796-97 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822, 102 S.Ct. 107, 70 L.Ed.2d 94 (1981). Our holding relied on the legislative history of the predecessor to section 1961, which demonstrated that Congress did not intend its general authorization of post-judgment interest to require the payment of such interest by the United States. See 639 F.2d at 797. 11 This court found further support for its anti-waiver interpretation in three specific statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2516, and 31 U.S.C. Sec. 724a. These provisions designated certain judgments against the United States on which interest would be allowed and established both the rate of interest and the time period during which such interest would be payable. As we explained in Holly, If 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 is read to confer an automatic entitlement to interest at the rate provided by state law on all civil judgments against the United States, these very detailed statutory provisions will all become superfluous. 639 F.2d at 797-98. 12 Before turning to appellants' argument it is also necessary to lay out the fairly complicated statutory scheme governing awards of interest against the federal government incorporated in the three statutory provisions cited in Holly v. Chasen. These statutes permitted the award of interest against the federal government in four classes of cases: (1) Internal Revenue cases; (2) Federal Tort Claims Act cases; (3) Tucker Act cases seeking damages of less than $10,000; and (4) Court of Claims cases. The interest rate paid by the federal government and the time period during which it was liable for interest varied dramatically depending on which of these four types of cases was involved. 13 The potential liability of the United States for interest was greatest in judgments rendered against it for overpayment of taxes. In such cases the United States was liable for both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. Subsection (a) of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411 provided that such interest was payable from the date of the payment or collection of the tax to a date preceding by not more than thirty days the date of the refund check. The interest rate in tax overpayment cases was the adjusted prime rate established by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 6621 of the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6621. 14 An entirely different interest rate and time period governed post-judgment interest awards on judgments against the United States under the Little Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2674. Subsection (b) of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411 fixed the interest rate on such judgments at 4% per annum and provided that interest would run from the date of the judgment up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation Act providing for payment of the judgment. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411(b). The time period set forth in subsection (b) of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411 was further limited by 31 U.S.C. Sec. 724a. Section 724a created a permanent appropriation for satisfaction of certain judgments against the United States, including Little Tucker Act and FTCA claims. It provided in pertinent part that: 15 whenever a judgment of a district court to which the provisions of section 2411(b) of Title 28 apply, is payable from this appropriation, interest shall be paid thereon only when such judgment becomes final after review on appeal or petition by the United States, and then only from the date of the filing of the transcript thereof in the General Accounting Office to the date of the mandate of affirmance.... 16 31 U.S.C. Sec. 724a (emphasis supplied). Courts resolved the apparent conflict between 31 U.S.C. Sec. 724a and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411(b) by holding that the time period set forth in 31 U.S.C. Sec. 724a overrode the period contained in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2411(b) and thus limited the period during which the federal government would be liable for post-judgment interest. See United States v. Maryland, 349 F.2d 693, 694 (D.C.Cir.1965); see also Reminga v. United States, 695 F.2d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086, 103 S.Ct. 1778, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); Rooney v. United States, 694 F.2d 582, 583 (9th Cir.1982). 17 Prior to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, judgments against the United States in the Court of Claims were subject to yet other terms concerning post-judgment interest. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(b) provided that interest on such judgments affirmed by the Supreme Court shall be paid at the rate of four percent per annum from the date of the filing of the transcript of the judgment in the Treasury Department to the date of the mandate of affirmance. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(b). The United States was thus liable for post-judgment interest only during the period that it appealed its adverse judgment to the Supreme Court. 18 In sum, prior to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, section 1961 authorized awards of post-judgment interest only against private parties. The United States was liable for interest on judgments against it only in specific instances and pursuant to different statutory provisions. Furthermore, the rate of interest and the time period during which the federal government might be obligated to pay such interest varied widely depending on the nature of the judgment against it.