Opinion ID: 41456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ployees under the FLSA. The regulation

Text: Plaintiffs claim that regulatory exemptions states that an employee will automatically lose from the FLSA must be “narrowly construed exempt status unless the deduction is made against the employers seeking to assert them through “inadvertence, or is made for reasons and their application limited to those [employ- other than lack of work.” Id. at § 541.118ers] plainly and unmistakably within their terms (a)(6). We reasoned that the relevant deducand spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 tions in that case, made as a disciplinary pen- U.S. 388, 392 (1960). In Arnold, however, the Court applied its canon of strict construction 14 against employers in the course of interpreting See Auer, 519 U.S. at 463 (“A rule requiring ambiguous statutory language in the former the Secretary to construe his own regulations narexemption from FLSA overtime requirements rowly would make little sense, since he is free to write the regulations as broadly as he wishes, subfor a retail establishment. See 29 U.S.C. § ject only to the limits imposed by the statute.”). 213(a)(2), (4) (1949). Because there was no regulatory interpretation of the relevant 15 See Gore, Inc. v. Espy, 87 F.3d 767, 773 (5th provisions of § 213, the Court needed to con- Cir. 1996) (holding that where the regulations do sider legislative history, past precedent, and not provide a definition, “we must first determine canons of construction to reach its result. See whether the Secretary applied the ordinary meaning of that term.”). 7 alty for cash register shortages, were “made for respect to the specific question considered.” reasons other than lack of work” and therefore Id. at 495. In contrast, § 541.3(e) contains no could be corrected by the employer. Moore, similarly forthright exclusionary language: 317 F.3d at 496-98. In the course of reaching Just because a regulation limited to persons our decision, we noted that “actually engaged in the practice” of medicine “or any of [its] branches” must exclude some- [t]he presence or lack of ambiguity in a reg- one, this fact does not make it obvious whethulation should be determined without refer- er NP’s and PA’s fall within its scope.17 ence to proposed interpretations; otherwise, a regulation will be considered ‘ambiguous’ Likewise, in Christensen the Court considmerely because its authors did not have the ered a regulation that allowed employers to forethought expressly to contradict any cre- contractually obligate employees to take manative contortion that may later be construct- datory leave to reduce accrued compensatory ed to expand or prune its scope. time.18 In that case, Harris County implemented a mandatory policy, not in the initial em- Id. at 497. EmCare cites this language to sup- ployment agreements, but only after it became port its contention that we should give no apparent that the county could not pay emweight to agency interpretations that seek to ployees for accrued time. Plaintiffs relied on a “narrow” the reach of § 541.3(e) to exclude DOL opinion letter that stated employers NP’s and PA’s merely because the regulation could institute this policy only in the text of does not explicitly mention them. the agreement itself. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581. Moore is distinguishable: We held, based on the regulation’s language, that “lack of work” The Court found that the letter was not exhausted the universe of reasons why an employer could not correct an improper de- duction. Moore, 317 F.3d at 497 (applying 16 (...continued) reasoning akin to expressio unius). Because “branches” of medicine. disciplinary deductions were not made for “lack of work,”16 there was no “ambiguity with 17 Moore would be more helpful to EmCare if, for example, § 541.3(e) stated that all employees in medicine or related fields, “other than interns and 16 The Secretary of Labor made no effort in residents,” qualify for the professional exemption. Moore to argue that the deductions in question were Because NP’s and PA’s plainly are not interns or made for “lack of work.” Instead, the Secretary residents, they likely would fall within the broad argued, despite the text of the regulation, that no scope of the regulation, even if the agency offered employer who engages in a practice of impermissi- a contrary interpretation. ble deductions can cure the problem through the 18 window of correction, except for inadvertence. See See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587-88; 29 Moore, 317 F.3d at 493-94 (quoting Klem v. C.F.R. § 553.23(a)(2) (providing that “the County of Santa Clara, 208 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th [employment] agreement or understanding may inCir. 2000)). In contrast, the instant parties present clude other provisions governing the preservation, competing positions on whether NP’s and PA’s fall use, or cashing out of compensatory time so long within the general regulatory language; i.e., the as these provisions are consistent with [the relevant (continued...) statute]”). 8 controlling because the regulation was unam- nition and the licensing requirement of biguous: It permitted employers to include a § 541.3(e), EmCare formulates its proposed compelled use clause in an agreement (“may reading of the rule, which is the analytical core include”), but by no means required them to do of its entire argument, as follows: “[A]ny perso. Id. at 588. Therefore, the Court held that son who has received formal permission from absent an express prohibition, the county could the relevant authority to practice in the art or pursue its policy of compulsory leave. Id. science of preserving health and treating disBecause the regulation in Christensen was ease is included within the Salary Basis Excepunambiguous, even though it did not discuss tion.” EmCare argues that NP’s and PA’s unevery method the county could use to imple- ambiguously fall within this definition because ment its policy, EmCare argues that § 541.3(e) they are (1) licensed and (2) act to preserve is also unambiguous, even though it fails spe- health and treat disease.19 cifically to discuss whether NP’s and PA’s fall within its scope. The decision in Clark v. United Emergency Animal Clinic, Inc., 390 F.3d 1124,1127 (9th EmCare’s reliance on Christensen is mis- Cir. 2004), lends some support to EmCare’s placed. The regulation there spoke directly to position; that court held, when considering the the binary issue posed by the case: Did the applicabilityof § 541.3(e) to veterinarians, that agency exclude non-contractual methods of en- “[l]ogically as well as linguistically, veterinary forcing a compelled leave policy? Moore posed medicine is a ‘branch’ of medicine.” The court a similar yes-or-no question: Did the rule deny used the “ordinary, dictionary meaning of the the window of correction to any employer that terms” of the regulation to reinforce its view, deducted pay for any reason besides lack of id., which is language almost identical to Emwork? Care’s proposed formulation: “[A] doctor of veterinary medicine is a practitioner licensed It is possible to pose the question in this case and practicing in the field of medical science in a similar way: Does the regulation exempt and healing on animals, a branch of medicine.” from the FLSA anyone who practices medicine Id. at 1128. or one of its branches? The problem is that one cannot answer this question without addressing Nevertheless, Clark is inapposite. First, the the key terminological dispute: whether NP’s fact that Clark also considered § 541.314, the and PA’s practice medicine or a branch of DOL interpretive regulation, suggests that that medicine. When the courts in Moore and court may have believed (or at least assumed Christensen found broad language unam- arguendo) that § 541.3(e) is ambiguous. See biguous, they were not confronted with the tax- Clark, 390 F.3d at 1127. Second, and more onomic difficulties presented here. importantly, plaintiffs argue that the “practice of . . . medicine” is a term of art that should be EmCare tries to resolve this problem with construed as a single phrase.20 dictionary definitions; most importantly, that the ordinary meaning of medicine is “the art or science of preserving health and treating dis- 19 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. ease.” RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S DICTION- ARY 447 (3d ed. 1998). Using that broad defi- 20 La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. (continued...) 9 For example, neither NP’s nor PA’s qualify may also look to other statutes dealing with to “practice medicine” under Texas law.21 the same subject that use identical, or nearly Wilson conceded that, as far as he was aware, identical, language, to resolve a difficult NP’s and PA’s are not licensed to practice interpretive problem.24 The fact that NP’s and medicine within the meaning of any state’s PA’s are not licensed to practice medicine medical practices law.22 EmCare gives no sat- under any state’s medical practices statute is isfactory answer why this evidence should not strongly persuasive evidence that these count toward finding ambiguity in the regula- professions do not view “practicing medicine” tion, other than to note that the DOL nowhere as part of their job description. It is plausible explicitly adopted any state’s definition of med- that the words “or any of [its] branches” in ical practice. § 541.3(e) are limited to traditional medical fields whose licenses are recognized by the Though we routinely consult dictionaries as states; e.g., osteopath, dentist, chiropractor, or a principal source of ordinary meaning,23 we optometrist. See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE § 104.003. 20 (...continued) Also, it is difficult to draw a limiting prin355, 372 (1986) (noting that “technical terms of art ciple from EmCare’s proposed definition: It should be interpreted by reference to the trade or would seem that registered nurses are both industry to which they apply”). (1) licensed and (2) practice the art or science of preserving health and treating disease. But, 21 See, e.g., Weyandt v. State, 35 S.W.3d 144, the courts and DOL interpretive regulations 148 (Tex. App.SSHouston [14th Dist.] 2000, no have rejected the applicability of the profespet.) (affirming jury verdict of guilty for advanced NP practicing medicine without a license); Bradford v. Alexander, 886 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex. App.SSHouston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (stating that PA does not practice medicine as contemplated 23 by the former Texas Medical Liability and (...continued) Insurance Improvement Act). (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 497 n.20 (5th Cir. 2003)). 22 For example, the Texas Occupancy Code de- 24 fines “practicing medicine” more strictly as “the See Preferred Physicians Mut. Risk diagnosis, treatment, or offer to treat a mental or Retention Group v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 913, 917-18 physical disease or disorder or a physical deformity (2d Cir. 1996) (interpreting the word or injury by any system or method, or the attempt to “discriminate” by reference to ordinary meaning effect cures of those conditions, by a person who and its use in other statutes); Liberty (A) publicly professes to be a physician or surgeon; Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 171 or (B) directly or indirectly charges money or other F.3d 818, 823 (3rd Cir. 1999) (noting the rule and compensation for those services.” TEX. OCC. CODE citing 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON § 151.002. The Code lists neither PA’s nor NP’s as STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 51.01, 51.02, licensed to practice the healing arts. See id. 51.03 (5th ed. 1992)); United States v. Gibson § 104.003. Specialty Co., 507 F.2d 446, 450 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that the word “facilitate” was held to have 23 United States v. Orellana, 405 F.3d 360, 365 its ordinary meaning in the context of the statute at (continued...) issue and other statutes). 10 sional exemption to registered nurses.25 This ropodists), dentists (doctors of dental evidence does not suggest that § 541.3(e) un- medicine), optometrists (doctors of ambiguously excludes PA’s and NP’s, but it is optometry or bachelors of science in sufficient for us to find that § 541.3(e) is am- optometry). biguous and to look to DOL’s interpretive statements for additional guidance. (2) [Section excepting interns and residents from salary-basis test omitted]