Opinion ID: 1148996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow appellant to amend the pleadings to conform to the proof to add the theory of commercial bribery.

Text: ¶ 17. This Court has stated that `[m]otions for leave to amend are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court reviews such determinations under an abuse of discretion standard and unless convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion, we are without authority to reverse.' Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 413 (Miss. 1997) ( quoting McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So.2d 1277(Miss. 1995)). This Court has consistently held that leave to amend is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Bourn v. Tomlinson Interest, Inc., 456 So.2d 747, 749 (Miss. 1984)(authority to reverse only where we are convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion); McDonald v. Holmes, 595 So.2d 434 (Miss. 1992); Hester v. Bandy, 627 So.2d 833 (Miss. 1993); Simmons v. Thompson Machinery of Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1994). However, the court is to be liberal in allowing a party to amend when justice so requires. Broadhead v. Terpening, 611 So.2d 949, 953 (Miss. 1992); Red Enterprises, Inc. v. Peashooter, Inc., 455 So.2d 793, 796 (Miss. 1984). The procedure for amending the pleadings to conform to the proof is governed by Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 15(b). This rule states in part: When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by expressed or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial on these issues... . The court is to be liberal in granting permission to amend when justice so requires. Miss. R.Civ. P. 15(b). ¶ 18. Flexible Flyer argues that the issue of commercial bribery had long been recognized in this suit although it had not been specifically pled, and since there was no surprise the denial of its motion to amend was an abuse of discretion. In support of this argument it cites to several cases that have allowed a pleading to be amended based on advance notice to the defendants. See Carmichael v. Agur Realty Co., Inc., 574 So.2d 603 (Miss. 1990) (allowing the enlargement of claims at trial to include claims of a partnership or joint venture when the defendants noted the new theory but did not object); Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 528 So.2d 1112, 1116-17 (Miss. 1988) (pleadings sufficiently gave notice to defendant of claims advanced at trial and [t]he court should be liberal in granting permission to amend when justice so requires); Broadhead, 611 So.2d at 953 (defendants were on notice of exact relief being sought and were on notice to defend against claim based on easement by necessity and there was no objection to plaintiff's motion to amend); Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 812 (Miss. 1986) (finding the pleadings to be adequate but nevertheless the issue of undue influence was tried by implied consent since there was no objection made by the defendants). Flexible Flyer particularly relies on Presswood v. Cook, 658 So.2d 859 (Miss. 1995) to show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying its motion to amend. In Presswood, the Court ruled that the defendant had impliedly consented to the introduction of a negligence theory by the plaintiff, when the plaintiff implicitly amended her complaint by introducing the negligence issue in her motion opposing summary judgment. Id. at 861. ¶ 19. Flexible Flyer contends that Target's motion for summary judgment specifically developed this issue just like the plaintiff in Presswood. However, when looking at the motion it states that Flex Flyer contends that Target and Kellerman, and Mr. Oswalt engaged in a kick-back scheme whereby Mr. Oswalt personally would receive payments from Mr. Kellerman, as Target's agent, in return for his purchases of corrugated supplies on behalf of Flex Flyer from Target. This language does not give any indication that Target understood that Flexible Flyer was asserting a cause of action for commercial bribery since these same alleged facts support the claim of tortious interference with contract and business relations. Likewise, Flexible Flyer's characterization of the actions of Target and Kellerman as a bastardized form of bribery in its motion for summary judgment is not sufficient to give notice that it was asserting a new cause of action for commercial bribery. This is especially true when the claim supposedly long recognized was based on a criminal statute that has never been asserted in a civil state law claim in Mississippi. ¶ 20. Flexible Flyer argues that Target never objected to any of the evidence being introduced at trial that showed each element of the crime of commercial bribery, and therefore this Court should find that the issue was tried by implied consent. In order to determine that an issue was tried by implied consent both parties must be able to detect that a new issue was being litigated. McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So.2d 1277, 1283-84 (Miss. 1995) (affirming the denial of plaintiff's motion to amend since the issue of the use of forceps where there was CPD was not tried by implied consent, despite the defense's failure to object, because the evidence was also supportive of the pleadings asserted in the original complaint); See also Shipley v. Ferguson, 638 So.2d 1295 (Miss. 1994) (reversing award of a tax exemption to the father when the mother was not alerted that this issue not raised in the pleadings was being litigated). In Setser v. Piazza , the action was an effort to reduce child support payments and the issue of the child's emancipation was not raised in the pleadings. Setser v. Piazza, 644 So.2d 1211 (Miss. 1994). This Court held the issue of emancipation was not tried by implied consent. By way of explanation this Court stated, [w]here the questions asked or the evidence presented at trial are relevant to the issues actually raised in the pleadings, trial by implied consent will not be found. Id. at 1217. Just as McCarty, Setser, and Shipley, all of the evidence Flexible Flyer presented at trial was relevant to the claims actually raised in the pleadings (tortious interference with contract and with business relations). Consequently, there was no reason for Target and Kellerman to be alerted that a new, unpled theory of commercial bribery was being litigated at trial. In addition there is ample reason for the judge to deny the motion based on a lack of due diligence on the part of Flexible Flyer and prejudice to Target if the motion had been granted. ¶ 21. Although leave to amend should be freely granted when justice requires, there are limits. If there is no prejudice to the defendant then it may be reversible error to deny a motion to amend. Red Enterprises, Inc., 455 So.2d at 795-96. But the comment to Rule 15(b) states, [i]n practice, an amendment should be denied only if the amendment would cause actual prejudice to the opposite party. 6 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 1484 (1971). Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(b) cmt. This Court also explained: Freedom to grant leave to amend when justice so requires, as provided by the [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure], diminishes as the litigation progresses. Since prejudice to the opposing party is the key factor governing the court's discretion in granting leave to amend a pleading, the court will ordinarily refuse to grant such permission where the motion comes so late and in such circumstances that the right of the adverse party will necessarily be prejudicially affected. 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleadings § 315 (1981) (emphasis added). It appears to this Court that the timing of the motion to amend the pleadings [offered at the conclusion of trial] was desperately late and potentially prejudicial to the Defendant. McCarty, 667 So.2d at 1284-85 (emphasis original). Likewise, in Hester v. Bandy , this Court reversed the grant of plaintiff's motion to amend by explaining, ... amendment should not occur when to do so would prejudice the defendant. Allowing the entire theory of liability to change at the conclusion of a three-day trial seriously prejudiced [the defendant]... . Clairvoyance by the defense would have been required to anticipate any contention beyond [what was pled]. Hester, 627 So.2d at 839. ¶ 22. Target argues they would have been prejudiced if the trial court had allowed the motion to amend at the end of Flexible Flyer's presentation of its case and on the last day of a four-day trial. It asserts that because some of the key witnesses were outside the scope of the circuit court's subpoena power and therefore unavailable for trial, Target and Kellerman did not have the opportunity to examine these witnesses on issues pertinent to a claim of commercial bribery at their depositions. Target argues that Flexible Flyer had full knowledge of all the facts necessary to plead a cause of action for commercial bribery well in advance of trial. This Court has addressed the lack of diligence when it stated: An application to amend should be prompt and not the result of an inexcusable want of diligence. Osborne v. Vince, 240 Miss. 807, 129 So.2d 345 (1961). Moreover, amendments which are permitted in the latter stages of litigation may deny the important policy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation. Thus, liberality in permitting amendments is not allowed to encourage delay, laches and negligence. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 392 (2d ed. 1950). William Iselin & Co., Inc. v. Delta Auction & Real Estate Co., 433 So.2d 911, 913 (Miss. 1983). ¶ 23. In denying the motion to amend the complaint to conform the pleadings to the proof, the trial court stated, [t]hat would substantially change the allegations contained in this lawsuit at a time when discovery has been already completed and over  and the trial has proceeded. That motion is overruled. I don't care to hear argument on that one. From this statement one can deduce that the judge believed that Flexible Flyer lacked due diligence in amending the complaint and Target and Kellerman would be adversely prejudiced if the motion to amend was granted at such a late date. Good faith and reasonable diligence is expected by all parties. This Court finds the trial court's denial was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this Court affirms the trial court as to this assignment of error.