Opinion ID: 580695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Plea Agreement.

Text: 11 Brann initially agreed to cooperate in the narcotics investigation out of self-interest: he had been caught selling cocaine while on probation. He entered into a favorable plea agreement in exchange for his cooperation, including truthful testimony. Taylor claims that the court below erred in admitting the plea agreement into evidence in the instant case, and compounded the error by allowing the prosecutor to question Brann about the agreement. In Taylor's view, the evidence should have been excluded because it carried the implication that the prosecution was vouchsafing Brann's veracity as a witness. 12 Taylor's lamentation deserves short shrift. From aught that appears, Taylor's counsel made a strategic choice to highlight the evidence of Brann's deal with the authorities. Despite numerous opportunities, he did not object either to the introduction of the plea agreement or to the questioning about it. He then vigorously cross-examined Brann in respect to the bargain, seeking, apparently, to discredit Brann. 13 That Taylor's trial strategy did not succeed is of little consequence at this stage of the proceedings. Parties cannot have their cake and eat it, too. Thus, error may not ordinarily be premised on the admission of evidence or the examination of witnesses in the absence of contemporaneous objections. See, e.g., United States v. Hunnewell, 891 F.2d 955, 956 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97, 99-100 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 844, 108 S.Ct. 137, 98 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987). 14 To be sure, even without a contemporaneous objection, the court of appeals may review for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). But, the threshold of plain error is extremely high. The doctrine encompasses only those errors so shocking that they seriously affect the fundamental fairness and basic integrity of the proceedings conducted below. Griffin, 818 F.2d at 100. In this instance, the doctrine is irrelevant. 15 We have previously ruled, and today reaffirm, that no undue prejudice results from informing the jury of the contents of a standard plea agreement, to the end that the jury may better evaluate the credibility of a witness proffered by the government. See United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 344-45 (1st Cir.1987); United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825, 108 S.Ct. 89, 98 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Here, Taylor has adduced no convincing reason to view either the plea agreement or the surrounding circumstances as anything beyond the stereotypical. The plea agreement contained only boilerplate provisions relative to disposition of the probation revocation charges pending against Brann, testimonial immunity, the need to furnish truthful testimony, and the like. The government's questioning about the agreement was restrained. The district court, solicitous of the defendants' rights, gave the jury careful instructions--to which Taylor never objected--about the purpose for admitting plea agreement evidence. 2 We discern no error, plain or otherwise. The evidence here posed less risk of vouching than did the evidence which we ruled properly admissible in Martin, 815 F.2d at 821-22. 16 Taylor's complaints about the prosecution's use of the plea agreement are meritless. 17