Opinion ID: 165930
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether there was error

Text: 65 With respect to the elements of voluntary manslaughter, the district court charged the jury: 66 If you find the defendant is not guilty of murder in the second degree, then you should proceed to determine whether the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. 67 Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice in the heat of passion. 68 In order to prove the charge against the defendant of voluntary manslaughter, the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 69 First, the defendant killed Beyonce Serawop; 70 Second, the defendant acted unlawfully; 71 Third, the defendant did so in the heat of passion; Fourth, the defendant is an Indian; and 72 Fifth, the crime alleged in the Indictment occurred within Indian Country. 73 This instruction does not accurately describe the mens rea required for voluntary manslaughter. Instead of requiring the jury to find that the defendant acted either intentionally or with depraved heart recklessness, but without malice (e.g., with mitigation) because the killing occurred in the heat of passion, the elements instruction only requires the jury to find that Defendant killed in the heat of passion. 74 It is undisputed that failure to instruct the jury on an element of the offense is error. United States v. Riggans, 254 F.3d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir.2001); see also 2A Wright, supra, § 487, at 392 (It is grave error to submit a case to a jury without accurately defining the offense charged and its elements.); id. § 497.1, at 472-73 (If intent is an element of the crime, whether or not it is stated as an element, it is plain error for the court to fail to charge on that element.). 75 Nonetheless, the Government here contends that the instructions given contain no error because: 76 general intent to kill is implicit in the statutory requirement that the defendant act in the heat of passion. A finding that the defendant killed the victim in the heat of passion necessarily includes a finding that the defendant acted intentionally, albeit with sufficient provocation. Thus, intent is not a separate element of the crime, but is subsumed in the requirement that the defendant kill in the heat of passion. 77 Thus, the crux of the Government's argument is that the requirement of an intentional or reckless mental state is implicit in this heat of passion element. 78 We are obliged to consider the instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury, taking everything together, was misled. Curtis, 344 F.3d at 1068. The district court did give a lengthy instruction on heat of passion, in which the court said in pertinent part: 79 The third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant unlawfully killed Beyonce Serawop in the heat of passion. 80 What is meant by the expression heat of passion? Heat of passion is such a passion or emotion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinary reasonable person of average disposition in the same or similar circumstances as confronted the defendant at the time the killing occurred. It is such a state of passion, or hot blood, or rage, anger, resentment, terror or fear as to indicate the absence of deliberate design to kill or as to cause one to act on impulse without reflection.... 81 The basic inquiry is whether or not at the time of the killing, the reason and judgment of the defendant was obscured or disturbed by passion—or dethroned, to use another expression—to such an extent as would cause an ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and from passion rather than judgment. 82 Before you may find that the defendant acted in the heat of passion, you must also find that there was adequate provocation. Here, too, the provocation or acts arousing such passion must be such as to create the same degree of passion in a reasonable person and cause such person to lose self-control.... 83 The Government's position is that, although this certainly does not use precise intentional or depraved heart reckless language, its emphasis on proving that Serawop was in a state of mind that would indicate the absence of deliberate design to kill or as to cause one to act on impulse without reflection or that would cause a reasonable person to act rashly and without deliberation and from passion rather than judgment suggests the same. We disagree. 84 Assuming that the instruction requires the jury to find that Serawop acted rashly and from passion, or on impulse without reflection, or without judgment, that is insufficient to differentiate voluntary manslaughter from involuntary manslaughter. Indeed, if the act was without judgment, and perhaps if it was without reflection, it might only be involuntary manslaughter, and not voluntary manslaughter at all, because voluntary manslaughter requires general intent to commit murder or at least the ability to perceive of serious risks. See Soundingsides, 820 F.2d at 1237, 1242; Hatatley, 130 F.3d at 1405. 85 Both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter could be committed in the heat of passion, on impulse, or rashly. The essential difference between these crimes is that the more serious voluntary manslaughter offense requires that the defendant had an intent to kill (or one of the surrogate core murder intents), while involuntary manslaughter may be established even though the defendant lacked such intent, and acted only negligently or even grossly negligently. Although heat of passion is the defining difference between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, it is not the defining difference between voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. Both voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter could take place in the heat of passion. 86 The defining difference between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter is whether the defendant acted with intent to kill (as defined for second degree murder) or negligently or carelessly. By refusing to instruct the jury on this mens rea component of voluntary manslaughter, the court gave an erroneous instruction that might have resulted in Serawop being convicted of voluntary manslaughter when his conduct merited an involuntary manslaughter conviction. Under the instruction as given, the jury could have convicted Serawop of voluntary manslaughter for negligent acts, albeit under heat of passion, when instead, under that version of events, he should have been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Therefore, we find there was certain error in the instructions given. See Paul, 37 F.3d at 501 (finding plain error in nearly identical instruction).