Opinion ID: 494566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Has the Independent Counsel Properly Exercised the Authority Delegated?

Text: 27 North argues further that, [e]ven assuming that the Attorney General had the authority to delegate the powers purportedly delegated under the regulation, that authority has not been properly vested in Mr. Walsh or his associate counsel, who are therefore acting without any lawful authority whatsoever. 36 North argues that neither Walsh nor his associate counsel may act pursuant to the regulation because the associate counsel have not formally accepted appointments in the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra 37 and both they and Walsh have not been specifically directed by the Attorney General to conduct the grand jury investigation, as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 515(a). We address each argument in turn. 28 It is less than perfectly clear whether associate counsel have formally accepted appointments under the regulation. 38 The Attorney General delegated to Walsh the express authority to hire associate counsel. In a March 13, 1987, letter, Assistant Attorney General Stephen Trott wrote to Walsh that, [i]n order to effectuate the appointment of your staff, you should have each employee complete the standard 'Affidavits of Appointment' form ... and be sworn-in in the presence of a person designated in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2903. 39 The record contains no evidence that Walsh's associate counsel have taken any actions pursuant to Trott's request. North contends that the associate counsel therefore may act only in accordance with their previous appointments by the Special Division. Accordingly, North argues, any legal authority they possess proceeds from the Ethics Act, and not from the regulation. 29 Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, we find that appointment to the one office carries over to the other. The offices established under the Ethics Act and under the regulation have identical investigative and prosecutorial powers and jurisdiction. In addition, Walsh serves as Independent Counsel for each office, with the parallel authority to appoint associate counsel. Finally, the terms of the appointment and oath forms for the two offices are virtually identical. In sum, by previously submitting the appointment and oath forms to the Special Division, the associate counsel accepted appointments and took oaths identical to those that would have been required under the regulation, in order to perform the same jobs in a functionally indistinguishable office to that established by the regulation. Undoubtedly for these reasons, the Department of Justice accepts that the appointments and oaths made pursuant to the Ethics Act are sufficient as appointments and oaths of associate counsel within the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra. 40 We agree with the district court that [n]ew appointment documents, therefore, would have served no purpose, as associate counsel had already made the necessary representations and were bound to their responsibilities under the first set of forms. 41 30 North also contends that the Attorney General failed to comply with the requirement of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 515(a) that he specifically direct[ ] Walsh and his associate counsel to conduct a grand jury investigation. In so arguing, North relies upon the lack of any letter of authority from the Attorney General (or his delegate) to each attorney, which is customarily provided in order to define the scope of the grand jury investigation and identify the attorneys conducting it. Although the cases concerning compliance with section 515(a) almost uniformly involve a dispute over whether a particular letter of authority specifically authorized the investigation being conducted, 42 no court has held that section 515(a) requires that there be any letter of authority as such. In fact, as the Department of Justice emphasizes, the Seventh Circuit has recently held that an attorney was specifically directed to conduct a grand jury proceeding even though a letter of appointment had not been sent until after the indictment issued. United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1207-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed.2d 892 (1985). 31 We need not determine how we would decide Balistrieri, however, in order to resolve the case before us. In this case, no letters of authority were sent to Walsh and his associates, either before or after they began to act pursuant to the authority delegated by the Attorney General. What section 515(a) requires is a specific [] direct[ion]--not a letter of authority. Congress imposed this requirement in order to protect the government from abuse of discretion by a special attorney or unnecessary personnel expenditures by the Attorney General, not to limit the Attorney General's power to prosecute. 43 From the facts of this case, we conclude that a specific direction has been given, and that the purpose of the statute has been met. 32 It was the Attorney General, after all, who initially requested that the Special Division appoint an independent counsel. When the Special Division appointed Walsh, it delineated the jurisdiction of his investigation with considerable specificity. The President immediately responded to this appointment by pledging the complete cooperation of the executive branch. 44 Later, when North challenged the legal authority of Walsh's investigation, the Attorney General, in order to assure the courts, Congress, and the American people that [Walsh's] investigation will proceed in a clearly authorized and constitutionally valid form, 45 specially created the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra, provided it with the identical powers and jurisdiction employed by the independent counsel appointed by the court, and appointed Walsh as Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra. Accordingly, Walsh and his associate counsel have received, from the inception of their investigation, more than the usual and at least the necessary degree of specific [] direct[ion] required by statute. To find fault in the Department of Justice's failure to prepare letters of authority would be to demand the same duplicative effort as involved in requiring the associate counsel to submit appointment forms and take oaths, for a second time, in order to carry out their existing responsibilities within a functionally equivalent and in all material respects an actually identical office. We will not so exalt forms over substance. 46 33