Opinion ID: 891702
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common-Law Principles of Agency Apply Unless Explicitly Abrogated.

Text: {17} When a statute's plain language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation. Quynh Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This case illustrates how a statute, apparently clear and unambiguous on its face may for one reason or another give rise to legitimate . . . differences of opinion concerning the statute's meaning. Key, 121 N.M. at 769, 918 P.2d at 355 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {18} Defendants argue that only a person identified by name, address, and telephone number in a written records request can enforce the act because IPRA (1) states that a written records request must include the name, address and telephone number of the person seeking access to the records, Section 14-2-8(C), and (2) provides that a person whose written request has been denied can enforce the act, Section 14-2-12(A)(2). The statutory language does not explicitly address the issue before us, whether a person can request records or enforce the request through an agent. {19} Plaintiffs, joined by amicus curiae New Mexico Foundation for Open Government (NMFOG), argue that the common law of agency applies and that a request made by an attorney on behalf of a client is the legal equivalent of a request made by the client personally. If a request made by an attorney on behalf of a client is denied, the client would be a person whose written request has been denied within the meaning of Section 14-2-12(A)(2) and would therefore have standing to bring an enforcement suit. {20} When this Court interprets statutes, we do so against a background of common-law principles. In 1876, New Mexico's territorial Legislature determined that the common law as recognized in the United States of America shall be the rule of practice and decision. 1875-1876 N.M. Laws, ch. 2, § 2; see NMSA 1978, § 38-1-3 (1876) (current version of the statute). [T]he common law, upon its adoption, came in and filled every crevice, nook and corner in our jurisprudence where it had not been stayed or supplanted by statutory enactment. . . . Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We presume that the Legislature enacts statutes that are consistent with the common law and that the common law applies unless it is clearly abrogated. Id. ¶ 24. A statute will be interpreted as supplanting the common law only if there is an explicit indication that the legislature so intended. Id. ¶ 22. {21} The legal principles governing the relationship between an agent and a principal are part of the common-law perspective from which IPRA must be viewed. An agent is a person who, by agreement with another called the principal, represents the principal in dealings with third persons or transacts some other business, manages some affair or does some service for the principal, with or without compensation. UJI 13-401 NMRA. Generally, a person may appoint an agent to do the same acts and to achieve the same legal consequences by the performance of an act as if he or she had acted personally, unless public policy or the agreement with the principal requires personal performance. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 18, at 442 (2002). Unquestionably, insofar as an agent's acts are within [the agent's] authority they are in legal contemplation the acts of the principal. Ronald A. Coco, Inc. v. St. Paul's Methodist Church of Las Cruces, N.M., Inc., 78 N.M. 97, 99, 428 P.2d 636, 638 (1967). {22} The common law of agency does not require an agent to disclose that he or she is acting on behalf of someone else. See 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 305, at 674; see, e.g., Latch v. Gratty, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex.2003) (An agent need not disclose his or her principal's identity in order to act on behalf of that principal.). {23} Where an agent makes a contract on behalf of an undisclosed principal, the third party's liability to the principal is generally the same as the third party's liability to the agent. See William A. Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership § 105, at 192 (3d ed. 2001). An undisclosed principal can sue and be sued on a contract made in the agent's name because the common law of agency regards the agent's actions as the principal's own. See id. The undisclosed principal may at any time appear as such and claim all the benefits of the contract from the other contracting party, so far as the principal can do so without injury to the other party by the substitution of himself or herself for the agent. 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 316, at 684. Apart from some limited exceptions not relevant here, courts have unanimously held that an undisclosed principal becomes a party to transactions entered into by the principal's agent. See Dana v. Boren, 133 Wash.App. 307, 135 P.3d 963, 965 (2006) (listing exceptions); 2 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.03 cmt. d, at 43-45 (2006) (discussing exceptions); Gregory, supra, § 95, at 180 (noting that this rule is universal). {24} The application of agency law is not limited to contracts but instead encompasses a wide and diverse range of relationships and circumstances. 1 Restatement (Third) Agency § 1.01 cmt. c, at 19. In New Mexico as elsewhere, the common law of agency allows an agent to do on behalf of the principal whatever the principal would be able to do. See Turley v. State, 96 N.M. 579, 581, 633 P.2d 687, 689 (1981) (It is an elementary principle of law that a person may do anything through an agent that he may lawfully do personally, unless public policy or some agreement requires personal performance.), overruled on other grounds by U.S. Brewers Ass'n, Inc. v. Dir. of the N.M. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, 219, 668 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983). {25} A person may use an agent to take action under the authority of a statute, even when the agent is not the person specifically identified in the statute. Coldwater Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc., 78 N.M. 41, 45, 428 P.2d 15, 19 (1967). In order to determine that a right conferred by statute shall only be exercised personally and cannot be delegated to an agent something must be found in the Act by express enactment or necessary implication which prevents an agent from acting. Id. {26} In Coldwater Cattle, the nonprofit corporation Portales Valley Project filed 197 applications with the state engineer on behalf of multiple water rights owners seeking to drill supplemental wells and change the points of diversion for the water rights. Id. at 43, 428 P.2d at 17. New Mexico's water code provided that [t]he owner of a water right may drill and use a supplemental well and may change the location of [a] well, but these acts could be done only upon application to the state engineer. Id. at 44-45, 428 P.2d at 18-19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Coldwater Cattle Company challenged the applications, arguing that under the plain language of the water code the only person who could file an application with the state engineer was the owner of a water right and that an agent is excluded from performing any of the required acts under the statute. Id. at 45, 428 P.2d at 19. {27} This Court looked to legislative intent to determine whether a water rights owner could file an application through an agent. Id. The water code provisions at issue were intended to provide a procedure for determining whether proposed changes [to a water right] injuriously affect the rights of others, not to limit the right of water right owners . . . to act only in person and not through a designated agency. Id. (internal citation omitted). Because the water code did not expressly or impliedly prevent an agent of the owners of water rights from filing and prosecuting applications . . . [o]n behalf of the owners, this Court held that the water rights owners could delegate the function of filing and prosecuting such applications. Id.; see also Turley, 96 N.M. at 581, 633 P.2d at 689 (holding that the use of an agent was permissible under a statute because the statute did not state or imply that the use of an agent was prohibited). {28} We therefore must consider whether there is anything in IPRA that reflects a legislative intent to abrogate common law agency principles.