Opinion ID: 71911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Attorney General Guidelines

Text: 11 Ochran contends that the Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance (1991) [hereinafter Guidelines] imposed on AUSA Daltuva a mandatory course of action. The relevant provisions of the Guidelines state: 12 Consistent with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. [§§ ] 3521-3528, the responsible official shall make the necessary and appropriate arrangements to enable victims and witnesses to receive reasonable protection against threat, harm and intimidation from a suspected offender and persons acting in concert with or at the behest of a suspected offender. 13 Moreover, information on the prohibition against intimidation and harassment and the remedies therefor shall routinely be made available to victims and witnesses. The responsible official shall, if warranted, advise the component of the Justice Department having the enforcement responsibilities, (e.g. the U.S. Marshals Service), of instances involving intimidation or harassment of any victim or witness. 14 Id. art. III, § D(2) (emphasis in original). Ochran emphasizes the use of the mandatory shall in these provisions--pointing out that shall is even italicized for emphasis in one of the provisions of the published Guidelines--and argues that the provisions imposed on Daltuva three specific duties that Daltuva negligently discharged or failed to discharge. The specific duties are (1) providing Ochran with protection, (2) informing Ochran of available remedies against intimidation and harassment by Restaino, and (3) advising enforcement components of the Justice Department [hereinafter the U.S. Marshals Service] of the threat Ochran received. 1 15 The Government, on the other hand, contends that the use of the word shall is not dispositive because the Guidelines provisions at issue are laden with discretionary language. The Government emphasizes that the Guidelines require the AUSA to make the necessary and appropriate arrangements for the reasonable protection of victims and witnesses; that information on the prohibition against, and remedies for, intimidation and harassment routinely be made available; and that the U.S. Marshals Service be advised of a threat to a victim or witness, if warranted. See id. We agree with the Government that the use of the word shall in describing the responsibilities of the AUSA does not necessarily mean that the Guidelines left no room for the AUSA to exercise judgment or choice. See Powers, 996 F.2d at 1125. Even though the Guidelines require the AUSA to arrange for the reasonable protection of a victim who is threatened, they did not specify how this protection is to be provided. Clearly, the AUSA would have to exercise judgment to determine the appropriate means for providing protection. On its face, the provision dealing with advising the U.S. Marshals Service of a threat gives the AUSA the authority to decide whether such action is warranted. Finally, the Guidelines do not specify when information on the prohibition against intimidation and harassment of victims must be made available. We conclude that the provisions of the Guidelines cited by Ochran leave room for responsible officials to exercise choice or judgment in discharging their responsibilities. The question as to whether decisions pursuant to these provisions fall within the discretionary function exception turns therefore on whether the judgments involved are grounded in policy considerations. 16 Ochran argues that the judgments that the AUSA would have to make to implement the directives of the Guidelines are not grounded in considerations of public policy and that, in any case, Daltuva's deposition shows that she in fact did not consider any social, economic, or political factors in making her decisions regarding Restaino's threat. As we have already stated, however, it is not relevant whether the government employee in fact made a policy judgment in this case. See Autery, 992 F.2d at 1530-31. The inquiry is whether the nature of the conduct at issue is susceptible to policy analysis. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325, 111 S.Ct. at 1275.
17 We agree with the Government that the decision of the AUSA as to how to protect a victim that has been threatened by a suspected offender is susceptible to policy analysis. Generally, the AUSA would be expected to balance the victim's need for protection in light of the severity and credibility of the threat, the allocation of limited government resources, and the government's dealings with the suspected offender, such as a plea negotiation or cooperation of the suspected offender with law enforcement agencies. Other factors might be important, depending on the specific option for providing protection that the AUSA might consider. For example, in this case, Ochran contends that Daltuva should have considered Ochran for the Witness Security Program under the Witness Security Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3521-3528; told the arraignment judge about the threat and asked that Restaino's bond be revoked; or sought a restraining or protective order against Restaino under the provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S. §§ 1512-1515. An examination of these options, however, illustrates the policy considerations that might be considered by the AUSA in determining the appropriate means of protecting a victim. 18 As the Fourth Circuit noted in Piechowicz v. United States, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.1989), the statutory provisions and Attorney General guidance for considering a witness for the Witness Security Program afford Justice Department personnel wide discretion, id. at 1212-13, and require[ ] [such personnel] to consider, among other criteria, the witness's importance to the prosecution as an aspect of the decision, and to conclude that local authorities are unable to provide protection commensurate with the federal interest in the witness's safety, id. at 1213. These criteria, which are primarily related to the strength of the federal interest in ensuring the safety of a witness, are freighted with policy overtones. Id.; see Bergmann v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 793 (8th Cir.1982) (Determining whether protection of the witness is advantageous to the federal interest rather obviously calls for a policy decision of the discretionary nature.). 19 Daltuva's decisions not to seek revocation of Restaino's bond or a restraining order against Restaino also implicate criteria grounded in public policy. At a general level, these decisions are within Daltuva's prosecutorial discretion; this factor, standing alone, constitutes an important public policy consideration. Cf. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir.1967) (stating that prosecutorial discretion has long been recognized as sacrosanct). More specifically, in deciding whether to revoke a suspect's bond or seek certain orders against the suspect, an AUSA likely would balance the credibility of the threat to the victim against the prosecution's interest in negotiating a plea with the suspect or obtaining his cooperation. 2 20 2. The Decision Not to Inform the U.S. Marshals Service of the Threat to Ochran 21 The AUSA's decision not to notify the U.S. Marshals Service of the threat to Ochran implicates the policy considerations of allocating limited government resources for the protection of victims and witnesses. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that because budgetary constraints are almost always important to government decisions, see Autery, 992 F.2d at 1530 (citing ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir.1987)), not every choice [that implicates such constraints] is a policy judgment shielded from liability through the operation of the discretionary function exception. Phillips v. United States, 956 F.2d 1071, 1075 (11th Cir.1992). The relevant inquiry in these cases is whether the government expects the employee who is making the choice in question to consider the policy implications of that choice. See id. (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 335-36, 111 S.Ct. at 1280 (Scalia, J., concurring in part)). The fact that AUSAs are typically endowed with a high level of responsibility--and attendant discretion--in representing the Government as a prosecutor and civil litigant coupled with the absence of any specific guidance on how budgetary constraints should influence AUSAs' decision-making suggests that the Attorney General has entrusted to the U.S. Attorneys and their AUSAs the responsibility of allocating the limited resources of the Justice Department. Accordingly, we conclude that AUSA Daltuva's decisions on how best (and whether) to protect Ochran, including whether to notify the U.S. Marshals Service of the threat to Ochran, are susceptible to policy analysis and, thus, fall within the discretionary function exception. 22 3. The Decision Not to Inform Ochran of Available Remedies Against Intimidation and Harassment 23 We do not reach the same conclusion regarding Daltuva's decision not to inform Ochran of the remedies available against victim intimidation and harassment. Before we present our analysis of this issue, however, we deal with the dissent's suggestion that we should not address this issue because it was presented for the first time on appeal. We recognize that [g]enerally this court will not reach the merits of an issue not considered by the district court. Baker v. Bell, 630 F.2d 1046, 1055 (5th Cir.1980) (emphasis added). This principle is a rule of practice, however, not a jurisdictional limitation. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir.1984). The decision whether to consider an argument first made on appeal ... is 'left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.'  Roofing & Sheet Metal Serv. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 989 (11th Cir.1982) [hereinafter Roofing ] (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)). The question in this case, therefore, is whether it is proper for us to exercise our discretion to consider Ochran's failure to inform claim, 3 even though the district court did not address it. We believe that this case presents compelling circumstances for exercising our discretion. 24 At the outset, we note that the government did not argue on appeal that we should not address Ochran's argument. Rather, the government met Ochran's contentions head-on in its brief as well as oral argument. We do not believe it is incumbent upon us to make a waiver argument which the government was willing to forego. In other words, it may be that the government waived the waiver argument. To be sure, the doctrine that the dissent invokes is prudential in nature and can be raised by the court of appeals sua sponte. We are mindful, however, that one of the underpinnings of the rule is a concern for avoiding prejudice to the parties. Roofing, 689 F.2d at 990; see Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941) (The rule is essential in order that litigants may not be surprised on appeal by final decision there of issues upon which they have had no opportunity to introduce evidence.). There is no prejudice to the government in this case since it fully briefed all the issues that we address. 25 The second purpose of the rule is a concern for judicial economy. Roofing, 689 F.2d at 990. We have noted, however, that no great gains in judicial economy are achieved by refusing to consider purely legal arguments raised for the first time on appeal from a motion for summary judgment. Id.; cf. Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir.1994) (opinion of Carnes, J., joined by Cox and Woods, JJ.) ([W]ith issues subject to de novo review on appeal, our scope of review is at its broadest and our willingness to decide without the benefit of a district court ruling should increase commensurately.). Indeed, we submit that remanding the case to the district court after full briefing and oral argument in which the parties heavily and primarily litigated section D(2) of article III of the Guidelines, and after we have expended a considerable amount of time--both before and after oral argument--parsing through that section of the Guidelines, would itself work a significant loss of judicial resources. 26 Moreover, we have previously recognized that there are exceptions to the general rule that we do not consider arguments first raised on appeal. See generally Dean Witter, 741 F.2d at 360-61 (listing exceptions). Among them,  'a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below ... where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt.'  Id. at 361 (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. at 2877). We believe that the issue that we address falls within this exception. 27 In short, although the general rule is that we do not address arguments that were not addressed by the district court, we unquestionably have the discretion to do so. Considering the particularly compelling circumstances of this case--involving, lest we forget, the near murder of a citizen, who voluntarily cooperated with the government to apprehend a drug trafficker, due to the negligence of an AUSA--and the failure of the government to argue that we should not address Ochran's claim of failure to inform, we choose to exercise that discretion. We are justified in doing so where, as here, the interest of substantial justice is at stake. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 28 We turn therefore to the government's claim that Daltuva's decision not to inform Ochran of the remedies available against victim intimidation and harassment, including the availability of protective orders, falls within the discretionary function exception. According to the Government, such a decision involves a judgment as to when to inform the victim of these remedies. As we have already stated, we agree with that assessment. The Government has not advanced, however, any policy considerations that might influence the judgment of when to give the victim or witness the relevant information. Nor can we discern any such policy considerations. 4 We find unconvincing the Government's general assertion that the decision to inform a victim of available remedies against intimidation and harassment is inextricably linked to the decision of how to protect the victim. The Guidelines list the duty to inform in addition to, not merely as a part of, the general duty to provide reasonable protection to the victim. That the latter duty involves the consideration of public policy matters has no bearing on whether the former also involves the same considerations. 5 Cf. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 542-45, 108 S.Ct. at 1962-63 (analyzing each provision of the relevant regulations as the source of a separate government duty). Because we conclude that the duty to inform does not involve considerations of public policy, we hold that the discretionary function exception does not bar a cause of action based on Ochran's allegation that Daltuva negligently failed to discharge her duty to inform Ochran of available remedies against intimidation and harassment. 6 C. Special Relationship 29 Ochran argues further that the discretionary function exception does not bar a cause of action alleging negligent failure to protect because AUSA Daltuva voluntarily assumed the duty to protect Ochran, thereby inducing Ochran's reliance. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 530 F.Supp. 611, 615 (E.D.Pa.1982) ([C]ourts have ... recognized that, where the government enters into a special relationship with an individual, the government may not have any discretion as to whether to protect that individual.... [T]he negligent performance of that duty [to protect] is not shielded by the discretionary function exception.) (footnote omitted); Merced v. City of New York, 856 F.Supp. 826, 831 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (The Government admits that it 'may have a legal duty to protect' if it 'voluntarily assumed or incurred that duty to a specific individual ....' ) (quoting Piechowicz v. United States, 685 F.Supp. 486, 498 (D.Md.1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.1989)). According to Ochran, once Daltuva undertook to protect Ochran, she entered into a special relationship with Ochran and bound herself to discharge the duty with due care. See, e.g., Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla.1985); State, Office of State Attorney v. Powell, 586 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991). 30 The Government counters that two requirements must be satisfied for the district court to have jurisdiction in an FTCA claim: (1) there must be a state-law duty and (2) the discretionary function exception must not apply. According to the Government, the special relationship theory of liability only serves to create a state-law duty to the plaintiff, thus satisfying one of the two FTCA requirements; if the discharge of this state-law duty involves judgments grounded in considerations of public policy, the discretionary function exception bars suit against the United States. We agree. 31 Perhaps the strongest support for Ochran's position comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955). The plaintiff in Indian Towing sued the United States for the alleged negligence of the Coast Guard in maintaining a lighthouse. The government argued that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (imposing liability in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances), in conjunction with § 2680 (the discretionary function exception), meant that the government cannot be held liable for uniquely governmental functions. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64, 76 S.Ct. at 124. In rejecting this argument, the Court held that the FTCA allowed liability because the government affirmatively undertook to warn the public and it is hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good Samaritan' task in a careful manner. Id. at 64-65, 76 S.Ct. at 124. Justice Frankfurter went on to explain: 32 The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate a light on Chandeleur Island and engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obligated to use due care to make certain the light was kept in good working order.... If the Coast Guard failed in its duty and damage was thereby caused to petitioners, the United States is liable under the Tort Claims Act. 33 Id. at 69, 76 S.Ct. at 126-27. Ochran's contention is based on similar reasoning: AUSA Daltuva exercised her discretion whether to protect Ochran when she promised and undertook to protect Ochran, thereby engendering reliance; the Government is therefore liable for Daltuva's negligent discharge of this undertaking. This interpretation of Indian Towing, however, has been severely undercut, if not altogether disavowed, by the Supreme Court in Gaubert. 34 Before Gaubert, federal courts had generally interpreted Indian Towing and other Supreme Court precedent as drawing a distinction between governmental decisions at the planning or policy making level and those at the operational or policy application level. See, e.g., Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 321, 111 S.Ct. at 1272-73 (explaining that the court of appeals in Gaubert adopted the planning/operational distinction on the basis of Indian Towing, Varig Airlines, and Berkovitz ); Alabama Elec. Coop. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir.1985) (arguing that Varig Airlines supports the planning/operational distinction developed by the lower courts). The discretionary function exception was said to cover decisions at the planning level, but not at the operational level. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 321, 111 S.Ct. at 1272-73 (explaining the rationale of the court of appeals). The Supreme Court unequivocally rejected this distinction in Gaubert, explaining that [t]he United States was held liable [in Indian Towing ], not because the negligence occurred at the operational level but because making sure the light was operational 'did not involve any permissible exercise of policy judgment.'  Id. at 326, 111 S.Ct. at 1275 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 538 n. 3, 108 S.Ct. at 1959 n. 3). 35 Therefore, Indian Towing, as interpreted by the Gaubert Court, involved discretion grounded in public policy considerations only at one level: whether the Coast Guard would undertake to operate the lighthouse. Significantly, the judgments involved in deciding how to operate the lighthouse were not grounded in public policy consideration. By contrast, as we have explained in part II.B of this opinion, the nature of the conduct at issue here is such that it involves discretion grounded in public policy considerations in deciding both whether and how to protect a victim. Thus, under Gaubert, even though AUSA Daltuva may have voluntarily assumed the duty of protecting Ochran, her alleged negligence in discharging that duty is not actionable under the FTCA because deciding how to protect Ochran involves the exercise of policy judgment. 7 Id.