Opinion ID: 2587723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jury Instructions on Aiding and Abetting

Text: Engelhardt contends that jury Instructions Nos. 14 and 15 on aiding and abetting, given together, contained misstatements of law that rendered them confusing and misleading. Instruction No. 14 read: A person who, either before or during its commission, intentionally aids, abets, counsels or procures another to commit a crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission is criminally responsible for the crime committed regardless of the extent of the defendant's participation, if any, in the actual commission of the crime. Instruction No. 15 read: A person who intentionally aids or abets another to commit a crime is also responsible for any other crime committed in carrying out or attempting to carry out the intended crime, if the other crime was reasonably foreseeable. Instruction No. 14 conforms to the language of PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 (Responsibility for Crimes of Another), and Instruction No. 15 follows PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 (Responsibility for Crimes of Another  Crime Not Intended). Because defense counsel objected during the jury instructions conference, the following familiar standard of appellate review applies: `[The appellate court is] required to consider all the instructions together, read as a whole, and not to isolate any one instruction. If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts of the case, and a jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, the instructions do not constitute reversible error even if they are in some way erroneous.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Peterson, 273 Kan. 217, 221, 42 P.3d 137 (2002). This court has previously approved each of the challenged instructions individually. See State v. Manard, 267 Kan. 20, 34, 978 P.2d 253 (1999) (PIK Crim. 3d 54.05); State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 636-38, 88 P.3d 218 (2004) (PIK Crim 3d 54.06). Engelhardt argues that the district judge's error was in the decision to give the two instructions together. PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 is congruent with K.S.A. 21-3205(1), which provides that a person is criminally responsible for a crime committed by another if such person intentionally aids [and] abets . . . the other to commit the crime. The specific intent required to be proved for conviction on a premeditated first-degree murder charge is premeditation. Therefore, under K.S.A. 21-3205(1), a person guilty of aiding and abetting a premeditated first-degree murder must be found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have had the requisite premeditation to murder the victim. PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 conforms with K.S.A. 21-3205(2). Under K.S.A. 21-3205(2), a person liable under subsection (1) of the statute is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by such person as a probable consequence of committing or attempting to commit the crime intended. Engelhardt argues that the use of PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 was confusing because the instruction did not specify which crime was the allegedly intended crime, i.e., the underlying charge, and which crime was the other crime committed in pursuit of the underlying crime. According to Engelhardt, this instruction impermissibly lowered the prosecution's burden of proof for premeditated first-degree murder because the State was not required to prove the specific intent of premeditation. The district judge gave Instruction No. 15 because he believed it would be possible on the evidence for the jury to conclude Engelhardt was aiding and abetting Brian and yet question whether Brian ever intended to kill the victim during the stabbing. The court noted that, when Brian was questioned by an officer about whether his intention ever changed from merely stabbing Michael to killing him, Brian answered, No. The court reasoned that the acts committed by Engelhardt and Brian before the infliction of the death blows constituted a crime, and, in the context of aiding and abetting the crime, the murder was reasonably foreseeable. In other words, Instruction No. 15 was effectively a felony-murder instruction. The State argues that, even if Brian initially intended only to inflict serious harm on Michael, i.e., aggravated battery, Engelhardt could have been held liable for Michael's murder as an aider and abettor. The problem with this argument is that the jury was never instructed on aggravated battery. Although an accused is not required to be charged with, prosecuted for, or convicted of an underlying felony in order to be convicted of felony murder, the felony murder itself must be instructed upon. That did not occur here. See State v. Wise, 237 Kan. 117, 122-23, 697 P.2d 1295 (1985). Further, if a felony-murder theory had been advanced by the State and instructed upon, it is well established that PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 rather than PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 would have been the appropriate aiding and abetting instruction. Gleason, 277 Kan. at 637-38. We therefore hold that the district judge erred by giving Instruction No. 15. However, we again find the error was harmless. The overwhelming evidence in this case demonstrated that Engelhardt was guilty of either intentionally murdering the victim or aiding and abetting the intentional murder. The victim was stabbed approximately 55 times, and Engelhardt was clearly involved. He was not an innocent bystander. The jury instructions and the evidence, considered as a whole, did not mislead the jury, even if the instructions were in some way erroneous. See State v. Mims, 264 Kan. 506, 514, 956 P.2d 1337 (1998).