Opinion ID: 546191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FTCA Claim of John Hiatt

Text: 9 At the beginning of trial, Hiatt stipulated that her son, John, suffered no loss of support as a result of his father's death. However, she did present evidence of noneconomic damages sustained by him. See Record, Vol. 17 at 14-27; Vol. 19 at 425-26. The court ruled that it could not award damages for John's loss because he failed to file an administrative claim with the FAA as required by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) 4 . 10 Hiatt argues that the district court erred in refusing to award damages for John's noneconomic loss, claiming that because John was the decedent's minor son and therefore a beneficiary of the decedent's estate, his claim was encompassed in the administrative claim submitted by her. Hiatt also emphasizes that under the Florida Wrongful Death Act a wrongful death action can be brought only by the decedent's personal representative, who in this case was herself. On the other hand, the government argues that the FTCA's exhaustion requirement is a jurisdictional rule, and, accordingly, because John failed to file an administrative claim the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his claim. 11 We encountered a similar situation in Davis v. Marsh, 807 F.2d 908 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam). There, the decedent's sister filed an administrative claim on behalf of two of the decedent's five children, seeking $100,000 for wrongful death. After that claim was denied, the decedent's sister and husband instituted an FTCA suit on behalf of the husband and all five children seeking in excess of $1,000,000 for the decedent's wrongful death. Following trial, the district court awarded $50,000 to each of the five children. On appeal, this court held that the district court properly considered the claims of all five children even though only two were named in the administrative claim, noting that the claims of the other two had been inadvertently omitted. Id. at 912. However, the court ruled that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award damages of more than $100,000 because that was the amount sought in the administrative claim. Id. 5 12 In this case, we do not face the problem of a plaintiff seeking more money in the FTCA suit than she had sought in the administrative claim. Shirley Hiatt sought $10,000,000 in her claim with the FAA and she has requested that amount in the instant suit. However, here, as in Davis, we are confronted with the situation where damages are sought on behalf of one of the decedent's children whose name was omitted from the administrative claim. As Mrs. Hiatt argues, Davis clearly is authority for allowing the district court to entertain the omitted child's claim, and thus we hold that John Hiatt's claim should have been considered in this case. 13 The government argues that the exception recognized in Davis applies only to the omitted claims of minor children and that John Hiatt does not qualify because he was nineteen at the time of his father's death. The government claims that under Florida law the age of majority is eighteen. We recognize that under Fla.Stat. Sec. 743.07(1), eighteen is recognized as the age of majority. However, under the Florida Wrongful Death Act minor children are defined as children under 25 years of age, notwithstanding the age of majority. Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.18(2) (1986). We consider this more specific statute to be applicable in this case. Thus, for purposes of this wrongful death suit John Hiatt is considered to be a minor. 14 We do not believe that allowing recovery for John's damages is unfair to the government. In Shirley Hiatt's administrative claim it was clear that Shirley was acting as the personal representative of Dale Hiatt's estate, and thus the government had notice that damages would be sought for all beneficiaries of the estate. Indeed, the government has not argued that it was surprised by Hiatt's pursuit at trial of damages on John's behalf. See Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 1435, 1441-44 (5th Cir.1990) (estate executor's failure to name decedent's spouse and daughter in administrative claim did not defeat their claims in FTCA suit), amended on reh'g on other grounds, 905 F.2d 61 (5th Cir.1990); Schuler v. United States, 675 F.Supp. 1088, 1093-94 (W.D.Mich.1987) (allowing recovery in FTCA suit for decedents' children even though children were not named in administrative claims, noting that the government had sufficient notice that the claims sought damages for all beneficiaries of the estates), rev'd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 195 (6th Cir.1989). 15 The government argues that allowing damages for the minor son is contrary to Jackson v. United States, 730 F.2d 808 (D.C.Cir.1984). Its reliance on that case, however, is misplaced. In Jackson, the decedent's parents filed an administrative claim alleging wrongful death and seeking $100,000 in damages. After that claim was denied, the decedent's widow filed a wrongful death and survival claim. The district court dismissed the widow's suit, reasoning that the parents' administrative claim for wrongful death could not be used by the widow to satisfy the requirement that she file an administrative claim. Id. at 809. The D.C. Circuit affirmed that ruling, noting, among other things, that the widow's survivorship claims raised in the FTCA suit were different in nature from the wrongful death claim asserted administratively. Id. at 810 (citation omitted). That is not the case here. The administrative claim and the FTCA suit involved here assert virtually the same claim; both sought damages for Hiatt's wrongful death. The result we reach here is not contrary to the D.C. Circuit's holding in Jackson. 16 Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in refusing to award damages for the noneconomic loss sustained by John Hiatt as a result of his father's wrongful death. We therefore remand this case to the district court and direct that court to consider the evidence presented at trial with respect to the damage sustained by John and to enter judgment accordingly. 17 In its opinion the district court stated in dictum that even if it were to entertain John Hiatt's claim the damages awarded would be negligible because the evidence indicated that John was not close to his father. Hiatt v. United States, No. 82-6446, slip op. at 16-17 (S.D.Fla. July 28, 1988). The parties have briefed this issue; the government, of course, argues that any damages awarded to John should be negligible, and Hiatt argues that the district court's finding that John's damages were negligible was clearly erroneous. Because the district court's comment in this regard was dictum and did not constitute a clear holding, we refrain from ruling on it or commenting upon it in this appeal. We make no finding on the amount of damages that should be awarded for John's noneconomic loss. On remand, the district court should carefully consider the evidence of John's noneconomic damages and enter a fair and reasonable award.