Opinion ID: 1402588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requested Instruction on Self-Defense Against an Accessory

Text: {11} Coffin testified that he saw Chris Martinez, Sr. reaching for a weapon, and a knife was later found near Chris Martinez, Sr.'s body. In addition, Coffin established that Chris Martinez, Jr. was not wearing a shirt even though it was a relatively cold night, which, according to Coffin, indicated an aggressive posture. Finally, Coffin claimed that both men came at him in an aggressive manner after he brandished his gun to try to stop the fight. As a result, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the Uniform Jury Instruction on self-defense. See UJI 14-5171 NMRA 1999. Evidence has been presented that Curtis Coffin killed Chris Charles Martinez and Chris Alfred Martinez while defending himself. The killing is in self-defense if: 1. There was an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm to Curtis Coffin as a result of being approached by the two Martinezes; the father holding a knife and the son having taken his shirt off. 2. Mr. Coffin was in fact put in fear by the apparent danger of immediate death or great bodily harm and killed Chris Charles Martinez and or Chris Alfred Martinez because of that fear; and 3. A reasonable person in the same circumstances as Mr. Coffin would have acted as he did. The burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant did not act in self-defense. In considering this defense, and after considering all the evidence in the case, if you have a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Coffin's guilt, you must find him not guilty. Coffin, drawing an analogy to accomplice liability and the Uniform Jury Instruction on aiding and abetting a crime, see UJI 14-2822 NMRA 1999, also requested that the trial court give the following jury instruction: A person may defend himself against another, even though that person himself did not do the acts justifying the defense if: 1. That person intended that the attack be committed; 2. The attack was committed; 3. The person helped, encouraged, or caused the attack to be committed. Coffin argues that the trial court's refusal to give this instruction in conjunction with the instruction on self-defense constitutes reversible error. We disagree. {12} The purpose of recognizing self-defense as a complete justification to homicide is the reasonable belief in the necessity for the use of deadly force to repel an attack in order to save oneself or another from death or great bodily harm. See State v. Melendez, 97 N.M. 738, 740, 643 P.2d 607, 609 (1982) (Self-defense is a belief by a reasonable [person] in the necessity to save himself [or herself] from death or great bodily harm.); State v. Reneau, 111 N.M. 217, 219, 804 P.2d 408, 410 (Ct.App.1990) (The inquiry in a self-defense claim focuses on the reasonableness of defendant's belief as to the apparent necessity for the force used to repel an attack.). Because self-defense is defined by the objectively reasonable necessity of the action, the defense obviously does not extend to a defendant's acts of retaliation for another's involvement in a crime against him or her. See State v. Pruett, 24 N.M. 68, 73, 172 P. 1044, 1046 (1918) (affirming the trial court's use of a jury instruction containing the familiar and oft-approved statement that the law of self-defense does not imply the right to attack, nor will it permit acts done in retaliation for revenge); cf. State v. Duarte, 1996-NMCA-038, ¶ 8, 121 N.M. 553, 915 P.2d 309 (stating that under New Mexico law there must have been some evidence that an objectively reasonable person, put into Defendant's subjective situation, would have thought that [the individual whom the defendant sought to protect] was threatened with death or great bodily harm, and that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent the threatened injury  (emphasis added)). While it is true that a person may act in self-defense against multiple attackers acting in concert, this principle applies only to the extent that each accomplice poses an immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, thereby necessitating an act of self-defense. See People v. Johnson, 112 Mich.App. 483, 316 N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (1982) (This principle does not give a defendant carte blanche to kill anybody who is marginally associated with the alleged assailant.). Coffin's tendered instruction would have allowed a claim of self-defense against an accomplice to an attacker despite the fact that the accomplice posed no immediate danger of death or great bodily harm and despite a lack of necessity for the actions against the accomplice. Therefore, Coffin's instruction is contrary to the law of New Mexico regarding self-defense, and the trial court properly denied Coffin's request to so instruct the jury. {13} The instruction given by the trial court fully conveyed Coffin's defense to the jury. Coffin argued that both Martinezes posed an immediate threat of death or great bodily harm, that he feared death or great bodily harm and shot them as a result, and that he acted as a reasonable person would have acted in the same circumstances. The jury instruction on self-defense in this case included both of the Martinezes and their alleged threatening actions and, thus, accurately and adequately reflected Coffin's argument. The State introduced evidence from which the jury could infer that either one or both of the Martinezes did not pose an immediate danger of death or great bodily harm, that Coffin's shooting of Chris Martinez, Jr. was not the result of Coffin's fear of death or great bodily harm, or that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would not have acted as Coffin did. The jury verdict indicates that the jury accepted one or more of these factual interpretations and rejected Coffin's argument to the contrary. We conclude that Coffin's argument that the self-defense instruction failed to adequately account for the alleged concerted action of the Martinezes is without merit.