Opinion ID: 1464874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Execution of the Search Warrant

Text: Appellant's first claim concerns the manner in which law enforcement officials executed the search warrant. He argues that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress because the executing officers failed to properly follow the knock and announce procedure mandated by article I, section 15, of the Missouri Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which affords the same guarantees against unreasonable search and seizures as article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution, State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. banc 1996), protects [t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures... U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has held that this right includes the right to be notified by law enforcement officials of their purpose and authority prior to entering a dwelling. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). This right, however, is far from absolute. Although the Supreme Court has incorporated the common law knock and announce principle into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and acknowledged that the failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement may render an otherwise valid search and seizure invalid, the Court also has recognized that non-compliance will not inevitably offend the Constitution. Id. Where exigent circumstances exist, legitimate law enforcement interests may outweigh an individual's right to be notified prior to police entry. Id. at 936, 115 S.Ct. 1914. Given the myriad of possible factual scenarios faced by police when executing search warrants, the Supreme Court has been unable to define with precision the exact exigencies that will overcome the Fourth Amendment knock and announcement guarantee. The Court has made it clear, however, that in the face of a threat of violence or a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed, law enforcement officials are justified in dispensing with the knock and announce requirement. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). With this guidance in mind, it must be determined whether the facts and circumstances surrounding this particular entry warranted the caution exhibited by the police. If it is determined that the officers in this case had a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence, the Court is obliged to uphold the constitutionality of the officers' actions. Id. Although not a high standard of proof, this reasonable suspicion standard strikes the appropriate balance between the individual privacy interests affected by a no-knock entry and countervailing law enforcement concerns. Id. Several aspects of the search, as well as testimony of law enforcement officials, support the trial court's finding that the SER team's failure to knock and announce prior to entry was a justifiable reaction to exigent circumstances. As noted, during the suppression hearing, Sergeant Wingo testified that the SER team had been called in to execute the warrant because officers believed the entry would involve a serious risk of danger. Wingo stated that, based on prior experiences with appellant, he believed appellant had violent propensities, describing him as violent, erratic, [and] paranoid. He further testified that he had reason to believe appellant owned weapons, and that at the time police executed the warrant, appellant was present in the residence. Officer Houston, captain of the SER team, concurred with Wingo's assessment, testifying at trial that team members were worried about possible gunfire coming from the residence. The warrant was served at night, in a building that had many doors and could have easily facilitated an attempted escape if appellant had been notified prior to entry. Furthermore, methamphetamine, as well as many other substances for which the search warrant was issued, could have been readily discarded in a brief amount of time. In view of this evidence this Court concludes that the officers had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous or futile, or that it would lead to the destruction of evidence and, therefore, they were justified in failing to knock and announce their presence before entering appellant's residence. See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71, 118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191 (1998) (finding that where defendant, who police suspected was inside the residence at the time the warrant was executed, had a violent past, reportedly had access to weapons, and had vowed not to do federal time, police failure to knock and announce prior to entry was justified by exigent circumstances). See also State v. Hamilton, 8 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Mo.App.1999) (information that defendant owned a handgun, and had an extensive criminal history deemed sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that the execution of the search warrant might involve a risk of physical danger); State v. Ricketts, 981 S.W.2d 657, 662 (Mo.App.1998) (noting that a defendant's presence in the building at the time the search warrant is executed might be a reasonable justification for forced entry if the police had a specific reason to believe that [defendant] was violent or had firearms on the premises ...). This point is denied.