Opinion ID: 2298341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Generation of the Instruction By the Evidence

Text: [¶ 17] Assuming for purposes of this appeal that the requested jury instruction did or would have stated the law correctly, we consider the second part of the four-part testwhether Hanaman has demonstrated that the requested instruction on adequate provocation manslaughter was generated by the evidence. See State v. Neild, 2006 ME 91, ¶ 9, 903 A.2d 339 (Whether a jury should be instructed on a particular defense in a criminal case almost always depends on whether the evidence presented at trial generates the defense.). [¶ 18] It is the court, in the first instance, that must determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to generate the adequate provocation manslaughter defense. Warmke, 2005 ME 99, ¶ 12, 879 A.2d 30. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the defendant, the court must determine as a question of law whether there is any evidence from which the jury could find provocation and other elements that would reduce the offense to manslaughter. Id.; Bridges, 2004 ME 102, ¶ 15, 854 A.2d 855. The test for measuring the sufficiency of the evidence is whether a jury could rationally have found that the defense was established by a preponderance of the evidence. Warmke, 2005 ME 99, ¶ 12, 879 A.2d 30. [¶ 19] A charge of intentional or knowing murder, 17-A M.R.S. § 201(1)(A), may be reduced to manslaughter if the defendant caused the victim's death while under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation. 17-A M.R.S. §§ 201(3), 203(1)(B); Warmke, 2005 ME 99, ¶ 11, 879 A.2d 30. Provocation is adequate only if (1) it is not induced by the defendant, and (2) it is objectively reasonable for the defendant to react to the provocation with extreme anger or extreme fear. 17-A M.R.S. § 201(4) (2011); State v. Pulsifer, 1999 ME 24, ¶ 13, 724 A.2d 1234. Adequate provocation is an affirmative defense that the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. 17-A M.R.S. §§ 101(2), 201(3) (2011). [¶ 20] We consider the elements of the adequate provocation affirmative defense in turn to determine whether evidence in the record could support findings, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) Hanaman caused the victim's death while under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear; (2) Hanaman's extreme anger or fear was brought about by provocation on the victim's part; and (3) the victim's provocation was legally adequate because (i) the provocation was of such a nature that Hanaman's reaction to it with extreme anger or extreme fear was objectively reasonable, and (ii) Hanaman did not induce the provocation. [¶ 21] It is difficult to view the record here as establishing even a prima facie case that Hanaman felt extreme anger at the time that he killed the victim. Hanaman repeatedly testified at trial that he was not angry with the victim immediately prior to killing her, and one cannot reasonably infer from the record otherwise. [¶ 22] Likewise, there is scant evidence in the record to support or even suggest a prima facie determination that Hanaman felt extreme fear at the time he killed the victim. Although Hanaman testified that he felt sudden fear, this does not support a determination that he felt extreme fear. See State v. Doody, 432 A.2d 399, 402 (Me.1981) (holding that evidence was entirely lacking even to suggest that the defendant was adequately provoked when he testified that he felt frustrated, upset, and confused). The fact that Hanaman testified that his system shut down and that he could not remember the event is not sufficient to support a determination that he caused the victim's death as a result of extreme fear. [¶ 23] There are few instances when we have recognized conduct as being sufficient to engender extreme anger or fear and mitigate the conduct of a defendant. Bridges, 2004 ME 102, ¶ 16, 854 A.2d 855; see State v. Cumming, 634 A.2d 953, 957 (Me.1993) (There are limits on the type of conduct that we will recognize as sufficient to engender extreme anger or fear and mitigate the conduct of the defendant.). [¶ 24] It would not have been objectively reasonable under the facts of this case for Hanaman to react with extreme fear to the victim's holding a shiny object in a threatening manner. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Hanaman, he saw a shiny object in the victim's hand, but he did not know what it was and did not recognize it to be a weapon, and Hanaman apparently disarmed the victim quickly and without any injury to himself at all. The record does not support a finding that it was reasonable for Hanaman to feel the extreme fear required for an adequate provocation instruction in response to the alleged provocation. [¶ 25] We also conclude that Hanaman failed to produce evidence showing that he did not induce, instigate, or create the event that allegedly provoked extreme anger or extreme fear. See Warmke, 2005 ME 99, ¶ 15, 879 A.2d 30; State v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 42, 830 A.2d 433; Pulsifer, 1999 ME 24, ¶ 15, 724 A.2d 1234. Hanaman picked the victim up, in violation of bail conditions ordering no contact, and took her back to his apartment to discuss their relationship one week after she failed to have domestic violence assault charges against him dropped. Hanaman was in the process of preparing his defense against those assault charges in which the victim would be the primary witness against him, and he was planning to raise the issue of her drug addiction in his defense. Additionally, immediately preceding the victim's raising a shiny object in her hand, Hanaman was attempting to seize from the victim the plastic bag of the victim's prescription bottlesthe victim's own propertythereby causing a struggle to occur. [¶ 26] The record actually contains substantial evidence to support a finding that Hanaman did instigate or create the situation that resulted in the alleged provocation. See, e.g., Pulsifer, 1999 ME 24, ¶ 15, 724 A.2d 1234 (holding that the provocation was not adequate when the defendant had initiated a meeting with the victim to discuss their relationship, thereby plac[ing] himself in a situation that would arouse his anger and fear); State v. Rainey, 580 A.2d 682, 685 (Me.1990) (holding that the evidence was not sufficient to generate an adequate provocation instruction as a matter of law because the provocation was induced by the defendant who had no legal right to be in the house in which the incidents occurred). [¶ 27] The court did not err in refusing to give an adequate provocation instruction in this case.