Opinion ID: 1377787
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence of Prior Convictions and Criminal Conduct

Text: (18) As his final example of errors or omissions of counsel at the guilt phase, defendant directs our attention to the failure of counsel to object to admission for the purpose of impeachment of evidence of defendant's convictions for motorcycle theft, transportation of a motor vehicle across state lines, his arrest or conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, and his escape. A settled statement was prepared and made part of the record pursuant to rule 36(b) of the California Rules of Court on motion of defendant. As executed by his trial counsel, the prosecutor and the trial judge, it recites: 7. A Beagle [ People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 (99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1)] objection was not made, nor was the motion filed because of trial strategy on the part of Defendant's counsel. This recital, to which defendant objected as being not properly included, since it reflected counsel's thought process, rather than unreported matters occurring at trial, was made in apparent response to the declaration made by counsel on appeal in his motion for a settled statement that he believed that trial counsel had made a Beagle motion, but that: If trial counsel did not make such a motion, defendant needs this information as part of his contention on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of this court directed the superior court to prepare a settled statement of any matters the court finds potentially useful on appeal. After a hearing on defendant's objections to the settled statement, the trial judge denied defendant's motion to strike that portion of the statement, reasoning that trial counsel and the prosecutor had the right to include the statement. Defendant has not sought further correction of the record by application to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 12(b).) Therefore, although the recital regarding counsel's trial strategy may not reflect an unreported oral proceeding that may be settled under rule 36(b) (see People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 584-585, fn. 2 [186 Cal. Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145]), it is now part of the record and we find no reason to ignore it. The recital both refutes the claim that the failure to object reflects incompetence and supports the conclusion reached above independent of this document, that the introduction by defendant of this evidence was not compelled by an erroneous ruling by the court that it would be admitted, but was introduced in furtherance of the defense strategy of showing that mental illness, defect, or disease, and drug intoxication reduced defendant's capacity to harbor the specific mental elements of the charged offenses. Defendant argues that the strategy elected was not one which a reasonably competent attorney would choose. However, counsel here was representing a defendant who had not only admitted the offenses, but had described them in detail to the police. In addition, his accomplice was to testify against him. Defendant suggests no other strategy that was both more likely to protect him and `reasonably foreseeable as such before trial.' ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 424.) The record on appeal does not warrant an inference, much less a conclusion, that trial counsel rendered constitutionally inadequate assistance in his representation of defendant at the guilt phase of the trial.