Opinion ID: 4556845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror Misconduct During the Penalty Phase

Text: Kipp alleges that one of the jurors brought a Bible into the jury room and discussed various passages with the other jurors during the penalty phase deliberations. Kipp relies on 30 KIPP V. DAVIS the declaration 7 of juror Algertha Rivers, who stated, in relevant part: I recall that during penalty phase deliberations a female juror with dark, shoulder-length hair brought in a Bible and read it to us. She talked about several verses in the Bible, which she told us would help us in making a decision. The jurors talked about standing in judgment of another human being. There was also discussion of the verses which state, ‘an eye for an eye’ and ‘judge not lest ye be judged.’ A little over half of the jurors had a religious background and strong religious beliefs. Kipp argues that injecting Bible verses into the jury room constitutes juror misconduct because the jury improperly considered “extraneous evidence,” and that the state failed to show the misconduct was harmless. Because the state court denied this claim “on the merits for failure to state a prima facie case for relief,” AEDPA deference applies to our review of this issue. The Mattox-Remmer framework set forth by the Supreme Court governs juror misconduct claims involving consideration of extraneous evidence during deliberations: At step one, the court asks whether the contact was “possibly prejudicial,” meaning 7 We agree with Kipp that the declaration is admissible under Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits juror testimony about the consideration of extraneous evidence during deliberations but not about the effect of such evidence on the verdict. KIPP V. DAVIS 31 it had a “tendency” to be “injurious to the defendant.” If so, the contact is “deemed presumptively prejudicial” and the court proceeds to step two, where the “burden rests heavily upon the [state] to establish” the contact was, in fact, “harmless.” Godoy, 861 F.3d at 959 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)). This two-step analysis recognizes “the practical impossibility of shielding jurors from all contact with the outside world, and also that not all such contacts risk influencing the verdict.” Id. at 967. Kipp relies on cases that have applied the Mattox presumption of prejudice at the second step of the inquiry, but those cases involve extraneous influences that were wholly different in kind. For example, in Godoy, a juror had “‘kept continuous communication’ with the ‘judge friend’ ‘about the case’ and passed the judge’s responses on to the rest of the jury.” Id. at 958. The other cases he cites involve extraneous influences that are also easily distinguishable from the Bible verses here. See, e.g., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966) (per curiam) (bailiff’s statement to jurors); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 468–70 (1965) (government witnesses interacting with jurors); Remmer, 347 U.S. at 228–30 (efforts to bribe juror); Mattox, 146 U.S. at 150–53 (exposure to newspaper article). Whether the introduction of the Bible is an impermissible contact—the first step of the Mattox-Remmer framework—is still an open question, at least in our circuit. And circuits that have addressed this question are split. Compare Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F.3d 329, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing the Eleventh, First, and Sixth Circuits as 32 KIPP V. DAVIS support that “[m]ost circuits have ruled that when a Bible itself enters the jury room, the jury has been exposed to an external influence”) with Robinson v. Polk, 438 F.3d 350, 363–64 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Bible is distinguishable from other types of external influences because “reading the Bible is analogous to the situation where a juror quotes the Bible from memory, which assuredly would not be considered an improper influence”). Our circuit has previously opted to resolve juror misconduct claims involving use of the Bible on prejudice grounds. See, e.g., Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 781 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, we again find it unnecessary to decide the question of whether use of Bible verses during deliberation constitutes misconduct because the state court could have reasonably concluded that any error did not prejudice the jury’s verdict. To prevail on his claim in federal habeas review, Kipp acknowledges that any juror misconduct must have had a “substantial and injurious effect on the verdict.” See Fields, 503 F.3d at 781; Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). Applying this standard, we have previously found harmless error in other cases with even more troubling use of Bible passages. In Crittenden, the court rejected a misconduct claim based on a juror’s introduction of the passage “[w]ho so sheddeth man’s blood by man shall his blood be shed.” 624 F.3d at 973. In Fields, the juror cited the same passage, as well as “He that smiteth a man, so that he dies, shall surely be put to death.” 503 F.3d at 777, n.15. The Fields court found no prejudice, in part, because there were Biblical verses in support as well as against imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 781. Here, the same logic applies: the verses mentioned in Rivers’s declaration included both “an eye for an eye” and “judge not lest ye be judged,” verses KIPP V. DAVIS 33 tending to support opposing views. And, in Fields, “[m]ore importantly, the jury was instructed to base its decision on the facts and the law as stated by the judge, regardless of whether a juror agreed with it. We presume that jurors follow the instructions.” Fields, 503 F.3d at 781–82. The jury received similar instructions here. Moreover, the jury’s sentence of death was supported by overwhelming aggravation evidence. As discussed above, the evidence of the extent of Kipp’s violence against women was devastating, including raping and choking Martinez, violently assaulting and threatening to kill Newman, and brutally raping and killing Frizzell and Howard. Kipp twice tried to escape from jail, showed an utter lack of remorse, and threatened to commit violent atrocities again in the future. Weighing the overwhelming weight of this aggravating evidence against the purported juror misconduct, we conclude that any misconduct was harmless. AFFIRMED.