Opinion ID: 6498613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Evidentiary Objections Central to Dale’s appeal is his claim that the juvenile court erred in admitting hearsay and irrelevant evidence. To summarize, Dale argues that the court erred in admitting Xandria’s recorded forensic interview under rule 803(3); in allowing Gragert to testify about out-of-court statements made by Xandria, Xandria’s teacher, Dale, and Victoria; in admitting certified copies of Dale’s criminal charges; and in admitting safety and risk assessment documents concerning Xandria. [4] In regard to the forensic interview, a declarant’s out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the matter 1 See, In re Interest of Prince R., 308 Neb. 415, 954 N.W.2d 294 (2021); In re Interest of Elainna R., 298 Neb. 436, 904 N.W.2d 689 (2017). 2 See, In re Interest of D.P.Y. and J.L.Y., 239 Neb. 647, 477 N.W.2d 573 (1991); In re Interest of O.L.D. and M.D.D., 1 Neb. App. 471, 499 N.W.2d 552 (1993), citing In re Interest of L.H. et al., 241 Neb. 232, 487 N.W.2d 279 (1992). 3 See id. - 597 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF XANDRIA P. Cite as 311 Neb. 591 asserted is inadmissible unless it falls within a definitional exclusion or statutory exception. 4 Rule 803 provides: Subject to the provisions of section 27-403, the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (3) Statements made for purposes of medical diag- nosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. [5-7] Rule 803(3) is based on the notion that a person seeking medical attention will give a truthful account of the history and current status of his or her condition in order to ensure proper treatment. 5 Statements made by a child victim of sexual abuse to a forensic interviewer in the chain of medical care may be admissible under rule 803(3), even though the interview has the partial purpose of assisting law enforcement’s investigation of the crimes. 6 The fundamental inquiry to determine whether statements, made by a declarant who knew law enforcement was listening, had a medical purpose is if the challenged statement has some value in diagnosis or treatment, because the patient would still have the requisite motive for providing the type of sincere and 4 State v. Jedlicka, 297 Neb. 276, 900 N.W.2d 454 (2017). 5 Id. See, State v. Vaught, 268 Neb. 316, 682 N.W.2d 284 (2004); Vacanti v. Master Electronics Corp., 245 Neb. 586, 514 N.W.2d 319 (1994); State v. Dyer, 245 Neb. 385, 513 N.W.2d 316 (1994); State v. Red Feather, 205 Neb. 734, 289 N.W.2d 768 (1980). See, also, Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985); State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985); Gregory v. State, 56 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. App. 2001). 6 Jedlicka, supra note 4. See, Tilson v. Tilson, 307 Neb. 275, 948 N.W.2d 768 (2020); Vaught, supra note 5; State v. Roenfeldt, 241 Neb. 30, 486 N.W.2d 197 (1992). - 598 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF XANDRIA P. Cite as 311 Neb. 591 reliable information that is important to that diagnosis and treatment. 7 Whether a statement was both taken and given in contemplation of medical diagnosis or treatment is a factual finding in determining the admissibility of the evidence under rule 803(3). 8 Statements having a dual medical and investigatory purpose are admissible under rule 803(3), only if the proponent of the statements demonstrates that (1) the declarant’s purpose in making the statements was to assist in the provision of medical diagnosis or treatment and (2) the statements were of a nature reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment by a medical professional. 9 Under rule 803(3), the admissibility of a victim’s statements in a recording is not distinct from the admissibility of the statements themselves. 10 The fundamental inquiry when considering a declarant’s intent is whether the statement was made in legitimate and reasonable contemplation of medical diagnosis or treatment. 11 Under rule 803(3), the appropriate state of mind of the declarant may be reasonably inferred from the circumstances; such a determination is necessarily fact specific. 12 Dale argues there was no foundation to admit the forensic interview under rule 803(3), because the specialist who conducted the interview did not herself conduct a medical 7 See id. 8 See, State v. Herrera, 289 Neb. 575, 856 N.W.2d 310 (2014); State v. Vigil, 283 Neb. 129, 810 N.W.2d 687 (2012); Red Feather, supra note 5; Morfeld v. Weidner, 99 Neb. 49, 154 N.W. 860 (1915); State v. Cheloha, 25 Neb. App. 403, 907 N.W.2d 317 (2018); State v. Meduna, 18 Neb. App. 818, 794 N.W.2d 160 (2011). 9 Jedlicka, supra note 4. See, Tilson, supra note 6; State v. Dady, 304 Neb. 649, 936 N.W.2d 486 (2019); Vigil, supra note 8; In re Interest of B.R. et al., 270 Neb. 685, 708 N.W.2d 586 (2005); Cheloha, supra note 8. 10 Jedlicka, supra note 4. 11 Id. 12 Id. - 599 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF XANDRIA P. Cite as 311 Neb. 591 examination or render a medical diagnosis, nor did any other health care professional. Dale argues the sole purpose of the interview was criminal investigation. However, Dale’s argument is contrary to Nebraska law and this court’s precedents. Here, Scheinost testified that the NNCAC is located on the campus of a medical facility. Scheinost testified that the recorded forensic interview was conducted for a medical purpose and could be used for purposes of diagnosis and treatment. During the forensic interview, Scheinost told Xandria that the interview room is a safe room, where she could say what she wanted to say and use the words she wanted to use without getting into trouble. Scheinost told Xandria that NNCAC is part of a hospital, that doctors and nurses work there, and that after the interview, Xandria could speak with a doctor or nurse if she had any concerns about her body or health. Upon our de no review, we conclude that the testimony of Scheinost and the recorded interview itself provide adequate foundation for admitting Xandria’s recorded testimony under rule 803(3). Given our conclusion that the juvenile court properly admitted Xandria’s recorded interview, Dale’s remaining evidentiary arguments as to the admission of the out-of-court statements of Xandria’s teacher, Dale, and Victoria; the admission of certified copies of Dale’s criminal charges; and the admission of the safety and risk assessments are irrelevant because Dale has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result of the court’s evidentiary rulings. [8] This court has recently observed that in a juvenile case, just as in a civil case, the admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party. 13 Moreover, when evaluating Dale’s evidentiary objections, it is important to note that an appellate court does not consider inadmissible evidence 13 In re Interest of Vladimir G., 306 Neb. 127, 944 N.W.2d 309 (2020). - 600 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF XANDRIA P. Cite as 311 Neb. 591 in its de novo review of a juvenile proceeding. 14 Given the lack of demonstrated prejudice and the applicable standard of review which requires the exclusion of inadmissible evidence, Dale failed to show how the juvenile court’s other evidentiary rulings had any independent legal significance in the resolution of this matter. As such, Dale’s assignments of error concerning the improper admission of evidence are without merit. Sufficiency of Evidence [9,10] The purpose of the adjudication phase is to protect the interests of the child. 15 The parents’ rights are determined at the dispositional phase, not at the adjudication phase. 16 At the adjudication stage, in order for a juvenile court to assume jurisdiction of minor children under § 43-247(3)(a), the State must prove the allegations of the petition by a preponderance of the evidence. 17 Dale postulates that the forensic interview was insufficient evidence because Xandria referred to “dad” and not “Dale.” Dale thus argues the interview failed to establish a positive identification. However, Dale’s assertion is refuted by the record, because Xandria consistently referred to “dad” as the man living in her home who is married to her mother. As such, we conclude that the State sustained the adjudication petition by a preponderance of the evidence. This assignment of error is without merit. 14 In re Interest of D.P.Y. and J.L.Y., supra note 2. 15 In re Interest of Brian B. et al., 268 Neb. 870, 689 N.W.2d 184 (2004). 16 Id. See, also, In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., 304 Neb. 734, 936 N.W.2d 733 (2020); In re Interest of Justine J. et al., 286 Neb. 250, 835 N.W.2d 674 (2013); In re Interest of Karlie D., 283 Neb. 581, 811 N.W.2d 214 (2012); In re Interest of Sabrina K., 262 Neb. 871, 635 N.W.2d 727 (2001); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450, 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999). 17 In re Interest of Brian B. et al., supra note 15. - 601 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF XANDRIA P. Cite as 311 Neb. 591 Motion to Dismiss As a final matter, Dale argues the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over the petition, based on his allegation that the court did not enter a temporary custody order within 48 hours from the time Xandria was taken into custody, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-250(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020). Section 43-250(2) states in relevant part: When a juvenile is taken into temporary custody pursuant to subdivision (2), (7), or (8) of section 43-248, and not released under subdivision (1)(a) of this section, the peace officer shall deliver the custody of such juvenile to [DHHS] which shall make a temporary placement of the juvenile in the least restrictive environment consistent with the best interests of the juvenile as determined by [DHHS]. . . . If a court order of temporary custody is not issued within forty-eight hours of taking the juvenile into custody, the temporary custody by [DHHS] shall terminate and the juvenile shall be returned to the custody of his or her parent, guardian, custodian, or relative. Here, the record refutes Dale’s argument, because a temporary custody was issued within 48 hours. On January 8, 2021, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Gragert placed Xandria into protective custody and delivered her to the custody of DHHS. On January 9, at approximately noon, a Platte County judge signed a temporary ex parte placement order and emailed it to Gragert, DHHS personnel, and a deputy Platte County attorney. Moreover, Dale’s argument is inapposite to our jurisprudence. In In re Interest of R.G., 18 we held the State’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements relating to the entry of an ex parte temporary detention order does not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction. Additionally, in In re 18 See In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991), disapproved on other grounds, O’Connor v. Kaufman, 255 Neb. 120, 582 N.W.2d 350 (1998). - 602 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports IN RE INTEREST OF XANDRIA P. Cite as 311 Neb. 591 Interest of S.S.L., 19 we held that in the absence of direct statutory language to the contrary, failure to comply with the time limits imposed by § 43-250 did not mean that the juvenile court failed to acquire, or somehow lost, jurisdiction of the matter. As such, this assignment of error is without merit.