Opinion ID: 792809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proof of perjury

Text: 158 Bacanovic also claims that his perjury conviction under Count Six cannot stand because it rested on the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. See United States v. Weiner, 479 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir.1973). In prosecutions for perjury, ... it has long been the rule that a conviction may not be obtained solely on the uncorroborated oath of one witness. Id. This is the so-called two witness rule. Technically, the `two witness' rule is a misnomer because the rule requires either the testimony of a second witness or other evidence of independent probative value. United States v. Maultasch, 596 F.2d 19, 25 n. 9 (2d Cir.1979); see also Weiner, 479 F.2d at 926 (The rule is satisfied by the direct testimony of a second witness or by other evidence of independent probative value, circumstantial or direct, which is `of a quality to assure that a guilty verdict is solidly founded.' (quoting United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir.1959))). [T]he independent evidence must, by itself, be inconsistent with the innocence of the defendant. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). However, the corroborative evidence [need not], in itself, be sufficient, if believed, to support a conviction. Id. at 927. In other words the two-witness rule has not been construed to require the Government, in effect, to prove its case twice over. Id. Bacanovic was convicted of one count of perjury specifying that he falsely testified to the SEC that he recalled leaving a message with Stewart's assistant Ann Armstrong on the morning of December 27, 2001, in which he gave the current ImClone quote and asked that Stewart call him back, but that he did not recall telling Armstrong that ImClone was dropping. To demonstrate that Bacanovic testified falsely, the Government offered two pieces of evidence, (i) Armstrong's testimony that she recalled Bacanovic telling her that he wanted to talk to Stewart about ImClone and to tell her that he thought it would start trading downward and (ii) an entry in the computerized message log Armstrong maintained that read Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is going to start trading downward. Armstrong specifically denied that Bacanovic gave the current price at which ImClone was trading. 159 In the course of deliberations, the jurors sent a note to Judge Cedarbaum inquiring whether the testimony of one witness and the document produced in the normal course of business by that same witness at a different time and place [could] be considered as two separate pieces of evidence. The note was followed by a second one, which read, We are referring to Annie Armstrong's testimony and the phone logs she kept in the normal course of business at MSLO. Can the phone logs be used to corroborate her testimony? After hearing argument, the District Court instructed the jury that the phone logs could be used to corroborate the testimony. Reviewing the pertinent part of the record, we find that the District Court did not err by doing so. See, e.g., Carr, 424 F.3d at 218 (jury instructions reviewed de novo ). 160 Bacanovic argues that the phone log is not sufficiently independent of Armstrong's testimony to satisfy the two-witness rule because the two pieces of evidence share a common source. In that regard, the case presents a close question, and one that has not been addressed in our prior decisions: Is a document that was received in evidence as a business record under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) sufficiently independent to corroborate the testimony of the person who created the document in order to ensure that a perjury conviction does not result from the word of one person against another? See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609, 65 S.Ct. 548, 89 L.Ed. 495 (1945) (Since equally honest witnesses may well have differing recollections of the same event, we cannot reject as wholly unreasonable the notion that a conviction for perjury ought not to rest entirely upon `an oath against an oath.'). 161 The Supreme Court has explained that [t]wo elements must enter into a determination that corroborative evidence is sufficient: (1) that the evidence, if true, substantiates the testimony of a single witness who has sworn to the falsity of the alleged perjurious statement; (2) that the corroborative evidence is trustworthy. Id. at 610, 65 S.Ct. 548. We have interpreted the standard to mean that corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to substantiate that part of the testimony of the principal prosecution witness which is material in showing that the statement made by the accused under oath was false. Weiner, 479 F.2d at 927-28. 162 The phone log was introduced during Armstrong's direct testimony without objection as a business record under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). As such, its reliability and trustworthiness derive from the circumstances under which it was created, rather than the author's recollection. We have observed that 163 Business records are made reliable by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) Advisory Comm. Note. For this reason, business records may be admitted notwithstanding the unavailability of the record's author, so long as a custodian or other qualified witness testifies that the document was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and also that it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the [record]. United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 34 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir.1990)); see also Phoenix Assocs. III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir.1995) (stating that [t]he custodian need not have personal knowledge of the actual creation of the document to lay a proper foundation for the receipt). Adoption of Rule 803(6) followed reform efforts to relax[ ] the requirement of producing as witnesses, or accounting for the nonproduction of, all participants in the gathering and recording of ordinary business records. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) Advisory Comm. Note. 164 Parker v. Reda, 327 F.3d 211, 214-15 (2d Cir.2003) (alterations in original). Although the Government laid the foundation for admitting the phone log as a business record through Armstrong's testimony, its admissibility did not depend on her status as the author of the entries. See id. The same qualities that made the phone log admissible under Rule 803(6) made the document independently probative of the content of Bacanovic's message. The assurance of accuracy and contemporaneousness that characterize a business record distinguishes that category of document from personal notations, which have been found insufficient to corroborate the author's testimony for purposes of the two-witness rule. See Weiner, 479 F.2d at 929 (notation in personal diary of witness who testified that he spoke by phone with the accused insufficient to establish that the accused falsely denied the call). 165 It is clear from our prior decisions that a document used to refresh a witness's recollection will not constitute corroborating evidence to support a perjury conviction. Weiner, 479 F.2d at 929 (rule not satisfied by witness's notation of phone call used to refresh recollection); United States v. Freedman, 445 F.2d 1220, 1226 (2d Cir.1971) (rule not satisfied where document offered as corroboration merely reinforced witness's recollection). Because the message log was not used to refresh Armstrong's recollection or as a basis for her testimony, each of the two pieces of evidence retained its independent probative value. The District Court did not err in determining that the phone log entry noting the content of Bacanovic's December 27, 2001 message, which was recorded at that time in the normal course of MSLO business, was sufficiently independent of Armstrong's recollection of the message, which she recounted in testimony more than two years later, to satisfy the requirements of the two-witness rule. See Weiner, 479 F.2d at 928 ([T]he two-witness rule is satisfied by corroborative evidence of sufficient content and quality to persuade the trier that what the principal prosecution witness testified to about the falsity of the accused's statement under oath was correct.). We are assured that Bacanovic's conviction under Count Six is solidly founded and not merely the product of two differing recollections of the same event. See Weiler, 323 U.S. at 609, 65 S.Ct. 548. 14 166