Opinion ID: 1473632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss jurors for cause, thereby depriving defendant of his full allotment of peremptory challenges?

Text: Before us, defendant focused his appeal on two jurors, Arlene P. and Laura J. The test that we have adopted for juror disqualification in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255-56, 524 A. 2d 188, is whether the jurors' views on the death penalty would have substantially interfered with the performance of their duties in accordance with the court's instructions and the law. Defense counsel initially requested that the court remove juror Arlene P. from the panel on the ground that she was an automatic death penalty person. Counsel also sought dismissal for cause based on the juror's skepticism about psychiatric testimony. When asked if she could think of any case in which the death penalty would not be appropriate for an individual convicted of murder, she responded, I can't. No. Later, in response to rehabilitative questions posed by the prosecutor asking if she were the kind of person who would vote for the death penalty automatically, she replied, I would have to weigh and measure. Defendant argues that this kind of forced rehabilitation encouraged the juror to shield her natural views. We have reviewed the colloquy between the prosecutor and the witness and the court's questions. We are satisfied that the court correctly held that the witness' views would not have substantially interfered with her ability to decide a capital case. The court concluded that her inability to give an example of a case in which the death penalty was inappropriate occurred simply because she couldn't think of a situation at this time. The court did not rigidly force jurors' responses into a series of yes or no answers. It gave great leeway to counsel in the voir dire process. The court and counsel posed various hypotheticals to assess the jurors' attitudes. More troubling were Arlene P.'s answers to questions about psychiatric testimony. When asked her opinion of such testimony, she said: I don't think it's fair. I  , I  . She explained that she thought the use of such testimony was fair [i]f the psychiatrist was honest   . The most that she said was I guess it wouldn't be a problem. It's an  it probably wouldn't be a problem. The court asked her if she would be able to make a determination as to that particular witness's testimony automatically. Defense counsel characterizes that as asking whether you believe in apple pie, the flag, and motherhood. Even the prosecutor was concerned that the court's questions could not necessarily cure all the concerns that [defense] counsel raised, but the court refused to dismiss Arlene P. for cause because of her candor in expressing skepticism about psychiatric evidence. We have required that trial courts permit a full opportunity to ask prospective jurors about their attitudes toward insanity and mental-health defenses. State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 453-54, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991). Here, as in Moore, the concept of mental disease was critical to defendant's case. Anyone moderately familiar with criminal trials and the public's reaction where juries acquit on murder charges by reason of defendant's insanity knows the strength of these concerns and the vulnerability of the justice system to extreme erosion of confidence. Sociological studies confirm this. In re Edward S., 118 N.J. 118, 139, 570 A. 2d 917 (1990) (citing Valerie P. Hans, An Analysis of Public Attitudes Towards the Insanity Defense, 24 Crim. 393, 396, 404 (1986) (89.2% of those polled believed that insanity defense allowed guilty persons to go free)). Whether those figures are accurate is not the issue. Many people have a great deal of difficulty in accepting insanity as a meritorious defense. See State v. Jasuilewicz, 205 N.J. Super. 558, 567, 501 A. 2d 583 (App.Div. 1985) (requiring, in circumstances of case, searching judicial inquiry on juror attitudes toward insanity defense), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 467, 511 A. 2d 649 (1986). Through questionnaires, its own questions, and with the assistance of counsel, a court should decide whether a juror can evaluate the testimony of psychiatric witnesses by the same standard that he or she would apply to the testimony of any other witness. That is the approach that was followed here. The prosecutor explained to Arlene P. that we want[] to put a jury in a position of to be, more or less, a blank slate and then hear all the circumstances and evidence, and that court and counsel were concerned about her willingness to deal with psychiatric testimony. She responded: I guess I should have answered in a more direct way, which I didn't. I'm sure I don't have any  I guess I could, you know, evaluate [a case] with a psychiatric evaluation. (Emphasis added). On balance, the court did not err in assessing her ability to serve. The entire colloquy shows a frank exchange of the juror's views and a willingness to evaluate psychiatric evidence. The other challenged juror, Laura J., was asked to describe her attitude toward the death penalty, and responded: [S]ometimes it would be advisable. Rather than have somebody rot in prison if they're never going to make anything of themselves. She explained her answer by saying: What I meant by that was if there's no hope of rehabilitation or if it's just simply not going to do any good because the crime was too horrible the circumstances were too horrible, I don't know what they are but I could  I really could go either way. Defendant argues that she should have been dismissed for cause because the view that execution is preferable to rotting in prison has no place in deciding the fate of an individual who wishes to live rather than die. Defense counsel argues that Laura J.'s position, though it might be altruistic, would substantially impair her application of the death-penalty statute. However, those were isolated exchanges in the complete questioning. Immediately after volunteering her first remarks about a death-sentenced prisoner not having to rot in jail, she explained that she did not feel that in all instances a murderer should receive the death penalty. The trial court's reaction was that [S]he is very thoughtful. She's trying to consider her answers before she responds. Laura J. agreed that she would weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. These were close questions. Arlene P.'s views on psychiatric evidence were troublesome, as was Laura J.'s view regarding convicted murderers rotting in jail. Even if the trial court erred in seating those two jurors, we do not find that the loss of two peremptory challenges produced an unfair trial. In State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 154, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988), we explained that an improper denial of a for-cause challenge does not always require a new trial. Among the factors to be considered are whether the jurors were eventually removed from the jury, the stage at which they were removed, the effect on counsel's strategy, any apparent unfairness to the defendant, and whether additional peremptory challenges were required. Court and counsel were well aware of those standards. Defendant requested additional challenges. The court granted defendant an additional peremptory challenge to remove one juror as to whom a challenge for cause had been denied. The State exercised about one-half of its allotted peremptory challenges. Defendant had a fair opportunity to select jurors. Both defense counsel and the prosecutor were given great leeway in posing voir dire questions to the jurors. The court was receptive to almost all of counsels' requests in framing questions. The jury was fairly selected.