Opinion ID: 2494456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The right against self-incrimination in the Federal and Florida Constitutions

Text: The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that [n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Under this clause, an individual has a due process right to not be compelled to make a statement that would incriminate him in a criminal proceeding. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897)). This right extends to custodial interrogations, and it establishes a due process right to have counsel present during such an interrogation. See id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The presence of counsel during a custodial interrogation is needed because it is the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege [against self-incrimination]. Id. By having counsel present, a suspect is guarded against the inherently coercive nature of an interrogation and assured that his or her statements obtained during an interrogation are freely and voluntarily given. See id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ([W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.). More precisely, the presence of counsel insure[s] that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion. Id. at 466, 86 S.Ct. 1602; see also Sapp v. State, 690 So.2d 581, 584 (Fla. 1997) (These rights, commonly known as Miranda rights, are designed to protect an individual's Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by offsetting the `inherently compelling pressures' of custodial interrogation. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602)). However, state courts are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (emphasis added) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038-40, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). Nothing in the United States Supreme Court's decisional law trenches on the Florida Supreme Court's authority to impose, based on the State's Constitution, any additional protections against coerced confessions it deems appropriate. Powell II, 130 S.Ct. at 1203 (emphasis added). In fact, in accordance with our federalist system of governance, article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution may place more rigorous restraints on government intrusion than the federal charter imposes; [it] may not, however, place more restrictions on the fundamental rights of [Florida] citizens than the federal Constitution permits. Traylor, 596 So.2d at 961. And, [w]hen called upon to decide matters of fundamental rights, Florida's state courts are bound under federalist principles to give primacy to our State Constitution. Id. at 962. Therefore, for a Florida court to admit a confession, the confession[] must pass muster under both the state and federal constitutions. . . . [A court must] examine the confessions initially under our state Constitution; only if they pass muster here need we re-examine them under federal law. Id. at 961. That is because [i]n any given state, the federal Constitution thus represents the floor for basic freedoms; the state constitution, the ceiling. Id. at 962. The common law principles governing confessions and other self-incriminating statements have long been matters of constitutional import in Florida, with the Florida Supreme Court having long ago defined the basic contours of Florida confession law. Id. at 964. This Court defined the tenets of Florida confession law [a]s early as 1896, when it emphasized the importance `of the advice and aid of counsel' in helping prevent `torture [of suspects] for the purpose of extorting from them confessions of guilt, or statements which could be used in securing their conviction.' Id. at 964-65 (quoting Ex parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652, 654 (1896)). To determine whether a confession was not coerced and is admissible, [t]he test [in Florida] is one of voluntariness, or free will, which is to be determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. Id. at 964. Found within Florida confession law is a right against self-incrimination, which arises from article I, section 9, of the Florida Constitution. See id. That section, as with its federal counterpart in the Fifth Amendment, protects an individual's right not to make incriminating statements. See art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. It provides that [n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself. Id. To meet the intended purpose of the protection against self-incrimination found in Florida confession law, this Court has broadly and independently construed the protections against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 965 (citing Senior, 19 So. at 654) ([W]e conclude[] that in order for this constitutional privilege to accomplish its intended purpose it must be broadly construed.). This broad and independent construction is embodied and explained in this Court's decision in Traylor. In Traylor, this Court construed article I, section 9, and the safeguards allocated to an individual's right against self-incrimination under the Florida Constitution by that section. See id. at 964-66. It interpreted article I, section 9, to require that prior to a custodial interrogation, police must inform a suspect that he has a right to a lawyer's help, id. at 966, which includes the presence of the lawyer both before and during questioning, see id. at 966 n. 13. The decision of the Court provided: Based on the foregoing analysis of our Florida law and the experience under Miranda and its progeny, we hold that to ensure the voluntariness of confessions, the Self-Incrimination Clause of Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution, requires that prior to custodial interrogation in Florida suspects must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say will be used against them in court, that they have a right to a lawyer's help, and that if they cannot pay for a lawyer one will be appointed to help them. Id. at 965-66 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). In footnote thirteen of that decision, this Court stated that the right to the help of a lawyer means that the suspect has the right to consult with a lawyer before being interrogated and to have the lawyer present during interrogation. Id. n. 13 (emphasis added). This Court noted that the prime purpose of this rule is to maintain a bright-line standard for police interrogation, with any statement obtained in contravention of th[is] guideline[] violat[ing] the Florida Constitution. Id. at 966. Thus, as interpreted in Traylor, under the protection against self-incrimination provided by article I, section 9, a suspect has the right to counsel's assistance during a custodial interrogation, which encompasses having counsel present both before and during the interrogation. However, this Court in Traylor defined how police should articulate those rights to a suspect conterminously with Miranda and its progeny as it existed at that time. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 965-66 (basing the way in which Florida courts are to convey the right to counsel on Florida law and the experience under Miranda and its progeny). This Court has continued to follow that interpretation set forth in Traylor. See, e.g., Miller, 42 So.3d at 220-22 (stating that this Court derived how police are to administer the rights in article I, section 9, in its Traylor decision). In fact, in interpreting the parameters of the manner in which Miranda warnings are administered, this Court has explicitly held that [t]hough our analysis in Traylor was grounded in the Florida Constitution, our conclusions were no different than those set forth in prior holdings of the United States Supreme Court. State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715, 719 (Fla.1997). Accordingly, although article I, section 9, delineates a right against self-incrimination that provides Florida citizens with an independent right to counsel before and during a custodial interrogation, the parameters of the manner in which police are required to advise a suspect of that right in Florida follows the dictates of Miranda and its progeny as they existed at the time of this Court's decision in Traylor.