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Text: New Mexico concedes that on the reservation the Tribe exercises exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing by members of the Tribe and may also regulate the hunting and fishing by nonmembers.[11] New Mexico contends, however, that it may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over nonmembers and that therefore its regulations governing hunting and fishing throughout the State should also apply to hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservation. Although New Mexico does not claim that it can require the Tribe to permit nonmembers to hunt and fish on the reservation, it claims that, once the Tribe chooses to permit hunting and fishing by nonmembers, such hunting and fishing is subject to any state-imposed conditions. Under this view the State would be free to impose conditions more restrictive than the Tribe's own regulations, including an outright prohibition. The question in this case is whether the State may so restrict the Tribe's exercise of its authority.

Our decision in Montana v. United States, supra, does not resolve this question. Unlike this case, Montana concerned lands located within the reservation but not owned by the Tribe or its members. We held that the Crow Tribe could not as a general matter regulate hunting and fishing on those lands. 450 U.S., at 557-567.[12] But as to "land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the Tribe," we "readily agree[d]" that a Tribe may "prohibit nonmembers from hunting or fishing . . . [or] condition their entry by charging a fee or establish bag and creel limits." Id., at 557. We had no occasion to decide whether a Tribe may only exercise this authority in a manner permitted by a State.

On numerous occasions this Court has considered the question whether a State may assert authority over a reservation. The decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 560 (1832), reflected the view that Indian tribes were wholly distinct nations within whose boundaries "the laws of [a State] can have no force." We long ago departed from the "conceptual clarity of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's view in Worcester," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973), and have acknowledged certain limitations on tribal sovereignty. For instance, we have held that Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of their sovereignty in certain respects by virtue of their dependent status,[13] that under certain circumstances a State may validly assert authority over the activities of nonmembers on a reservation,[14] and that in exceptional circumstances a State may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members.[15]

Nevertheless, in demarcating the respective spheres of state and tribal authority over Indian reservations, we have continued to stress that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing " `attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory,' " White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980), quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). Because of their sovereign status, tribes and their reservation lands are insulated in some respects by a "historic immunity from state and local control," Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, and tribes retain any aspect of their historical sovereignty not "inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National Government." Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).

The sovereignty retained by tribes includes "the power of regulating their internal and social relations," United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382 (1886), cited in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). A tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has never been doubted, and our cases establish that " `absent governing Acts of Congress,' " a State may not act in a manner that " `infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.' " McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-172 (1973), quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959). See also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 388-389 (1976) (per curiam).

A tribe's power to exclude nonmembers entirely or to condition their presence on the reservation is equally well established. See, e. g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Whether a State may also assert its authority over the on-reservation activities of nonmembers raises "[m]ore difficult questions," Bracker, supra, at 144. While under some circumstances a State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations, see, e. g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes, supra; Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), such authority may be asserted only if not pre-empted by the operation of federal law. See, e. g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982); Bracker, supra; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Williams v. Lee, supra; Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Fisher v. District Court, supra; Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).

In Bracker we reviewed our prior decisions concerning tribal and state authority over Indian reservations and extracted certain principles governing the determination whether federal law pre-empts the assertion of state authority over nonmembers on a reservation. We stated that that determination does not depend "on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but call[s] for a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake." 448 U.S., at 145.

We also emphasized the special sense in which the doctrine of pre-emption is applied in this context. See id., at 143-144; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 838. Although a State will certainly be without jurisdiction if its authority is pre-empted under familiar principles of pre-emption, we cautioned that our prior cases did not limit pre-emption of state laws affecting Indian tribes to only those circumstances. "The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty" and the federal commitment to tribal self-sufficiency and self-determination make it "treacherous to import . . . notions of pre-emption that are properly applied to . . . other [contexts]." Bracker, supra, at 143. See also Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 838. By resting pre-emption analysis principally on a consideration of the nature of the competing interests at stake, our cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional intent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. They have also rejected the proposition that pre-emption requires " `an express congressional statement to that effect.' " Bracker, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted). State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. Bracker, supra, at 145. See also Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 845, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).[16]

Certain broad considerations guide our assessment of the federal and tribal interests. The traditional notions of Indian sovereignty provide a crucial "backdrop," Bracker, supra, at 143, citing McClanahan, supra, at 172, against which any assertion of state authority must be assessed. Moreover, both the tribes and the Federal Government are firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal self-government, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes.[17] We have stressed that Congress' objective of furthering tribal self-government encompasses far more than encouraging tribal management of disputes between members, but includes Congress' overriding goal of encouraging "tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." Bracker, 448 U. S., at 143 (footnote omitted). In part as a necessary implication of this broad federal commitment, we have held that tribes have the power to manage the use of their territory and resources by both members and nonmembers,[18]Merrion, supra, at 137; Bracker, supra, at 151; Montana v. United States, supra; 18 U.S. C. § 1162(b); 25 U.S. C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b), to undertake and regulate economic activity within the reservation, Merrion, 455 U. S., at 137, and to defray the cost of governmental services by levying taxes. Ibid. Thus, when a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of state authority must be viewed against any interference with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose. See generally Bracker, supra, at 143 (footnote omitted); Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U. S., at 845, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67 (state authority precluded when it " `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress' ").

Our prior decisions also guide our assessment of the state interest asserted to justify state jurisdiction over a reservation. The exercise of state authority which imposes additional burdens on a tribal enterprise must ordinarily be justified by functions or services performed by the State in connection with the on-reservation activity. Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra, at 843, and n. 7; Bracker, supra, at 148-149; Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S., at 174 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Thus a State seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a tribe and nonmembers must point to more than its general interest in raising revenues. See, e. g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Bracker, supra; Ramah Navajo School Bd., supra. See also Confederated Tribes, 447 U. S., at 157 ("governmental interest in raising revenues is. . . strongest when the tax is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is the recipient of state services"); Moe, 425 U. S., at 481-483 (State may require tribal shops to collect state cigarette tax from nonmember purchasers). A State's regulatory interest will be particularly substantial if the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate state intervention. Cf. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165 (1977).