Opinion ID: 2636560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the prosecutorial misconduct at warren's second trial

Text: ¶ 31 Normally, prosecutorial misconduct is grounds for reversal where there is a substantial likelihood the misconduct affected the verdict. State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 672, 904 P.2d 245 (1995). However, when the prosecutor's misconduct affects a constitutional right, such as the right against self-incrimination, the court undertakes a separate analysis: the constitutional harmless error analysis. See State v. Easter, 130 Wash.2d 228, 242-43, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996); State v. Davenport, 100 Wash.2d 757, 761-62, 675 P.2d 1213 (1984). Under this review the error is harmless if the court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result. Easter, 130 Wash.2d at 242, 922 P.2d 1285. ¶ 32 According to Davenport, 100 Wash.2d at 761, 675 P.2d 1213, constitutional harmless error analysis is inappropriate for cases involving mere trial irregularities. Such irregularities neither independently violate a defendant's constitutional rights . . . nor violate a statute or Rule of Evidence. . . . Id. at 761 n. 1, 675 P.2d 1213 (citations omitted). But here, the prosecutorial misconduct directly and independently infringed on the bedrock of our criminal justice system: the presumption of innocence. State v. Bennett, 161 Wash.2d 303, 315, 165 P.3d 1241 (2007). Moreover, the prosecutorial misconduct violated RCW 10.58.020, providing, [e]very person charged with the commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . As such, the constitutional harmless error analysis applies, and the court must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result. Easter, 130 Wash.2d at 242, 922 P.2d 1285; see also State v. Fleming, 83 Wash.App. 209, 216, 921 P.2d 1076 (1996) (utilizing constitutional harmless error analysis where prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof, misstated the nature of reasonable doubt and the role of the jury, and infringed on the defendant's right to remain silent). ¶ 33 In Warren's second trial the prosecutor argued in closing it was not reasonable for the jury to infer everything for the benefit of the defendant. . . . Report of Proceedings (RP) (Feb. 20, 2003) at 98. Warren objected, but the trial court overruled his objection. Afterward the prosecutor reprised her erroneous interpretation of the burden of proof: [r]easonable doubt does not mean give the defendant the benefit of the doubt. . . . RP at 99. Later the prosecutor repeated her argument that reasonable doubt does not mean beyond all doubt. It doesn't mean, as the defense wants you to believe, that you give the defendant the benefit of the doubt. RP at 104. Warren again objected and without ruling on the objection, the court instructed the jury in relevant part: [A]fter you have reviewed all of the evidence or lack of evidence, and you continue to have a reasonable doubt then you must find the defendant not guilty. And if in still having a reasonable doubt that is a benefit to the defendant, then in a sense you are giving the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. So I don't want you to misconstrue the language that somehow there is no benefit here. Indeed there is, because the benefit of the doubt is if you still have a doubt after having heard all of the evidence or lack of evidence, if you still have a doubt, then the benefit of that doubt goes to the defendant, and the defendant is not guilty. So we are playing with words here in a sense. RP at 104-05. [2] ¶ 34 The State concedes the prosecutor mischaracterized the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The State argues, however, the jury was not misled by the prosecutor's repeated mischaracterization because of the court's curative instruction. I cannot agree. ¶ 35 The trial court overruled Warren's first objection to the prosecutor's clear mischaracterization, implicitly bolstering the mischaracterization. The trial court passed on Warren's second objection, giving a curative instruction instead. Yet, the trial court's instruction undermined its curative effect by implying the issue was merely a semantic quibble as opposed to the foundation of our criminal justice system. Moreover, given the repeated and flagrant misconduct involved here, such a tepid instruction was unlikely to cure the obvious prejudice involved in mischaracterizing the presumption of innocence. See State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 284, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted) (`If misconduct is so flagrant that no instruction can cure it, there is, in effect, a mistrial and a new trial is the only and the mandatory remedy.') (quoting State v. Belgarde, 110 Wash.2d 504, 508, 755 P.2d 174 (1988)). ¶ 36 In the final analysis a jury is made up of human beings, whose condition of mind cannot be ascertained by other human beings. Therefore, it is impossible for courts to contemplate the probabilities any evidence may have upon the minds of the jurors. State v. Robinson, 24 Wash.2d 909, 917, 167 P.2d 986 (1946). I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have reached the same result had the prosecutor not mischaracterized the presumption of innocence and its high burden of persuasion.