Opinion ID: 1318063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Introduction of Evidence of Cigarette Sales

Text: Wantuch argues that the court erred in admitting (1) the evidence of the contraband cigarette sales between Wantuch and Sienkiewicz, and (2) the related conversations about other stolen merchandise. In Wantuch's view, the evidence does not prove an element of any of the charged offenses, and thus is not inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes. Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine to introduce (1) evidence of Wantuch's sale of contraband cigarettes to Sienkiewicz, and (2) conversations between Sienkiewicz and Wantuch in May of 1999, in which Wantuch offered to sell Sienkiewicz other stolen merchandise. Wantuch filed a written objection to the introduction of the evidence of the cigarette sales. During a pretrial hearing, the district court held that evidence of the cigarette sales was admissible because it was intrinsically connected with the case (or intricately related), and therefore the court did not have to deal with [the admissibility of the evidence] under Rule 404(b). The government then asked the court for a ruling on the admissibility of the other conversations between Wantuch and Sienkiewicz about the stolen liquor and cars. The court gave Wantuch a few days to raise any objections, but Wantuch raised none. On the first day of trial, the government requested a ruling on the admissibility of the conversations related to the stolen merchandise. The court stated to Wantuch, It doesn't sound like there's an issue, to which Wantuch responded, No. Wantuch subsequently failed to raise any objections during trial. First, we address Wantuch's argument regarding the admission of the evidence of other stolen merchandise. The district court gave Wantuch a number of days to file any objections, which Wantuch failed to do. The court also directed a question to Wantuch, giving him another chance to object to the evidence, but Wantuch affirmatively stated on the record that he had no objection to the admission of this evidence of other stolen merchandise. Therefore we find that Wantuch waived his objections to this evidence, and we decline to review the district court's decision. United States v. Murry, 395 F.3d 712, 718-19 (7th Cir.2005). Next, we turn to the admission of the evidence of the contraband cigarette sales. The district court admitted this evidence solely under the theory that it was intricately related to the conspiracy. This court has a well-established line of precedent that allows evidence of uncharged acts to be introduced at trial if the evidence is intricately related to the acts charged in the indictment. Bogan, 267 F.3d at 621. We review the district court's decision to admit the evidence of the contraband cigarette sales under the intricately related doctrine for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Strong, 485 F.3d 985, 989 (7th Cir.2007). Under this doctrine, whether instances of uncharged conduct are intricately-related (or inextricably intertwined) to the case at hand depends on whether they complete the story of the crime on trial; their absence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the story of the crime; or they are so blended or connected that they incidentally involve, explain the circumstances surrounding, or tend to prove any element of, the charged crime. United States v. Gougis, 432 F.3d 735, 742 (7th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). The admissibility of such evidence is limited only by the balancing test set forth in Rule 403 and does not implicate the character/propensity prohibition of Rule 404(b). United States v. Griffin, 493 F.3d 856, 867 (7th Cir.2007); McLee, 436 F.3d at 760; United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (7th Cir. 1995). Wantuch contends that the discussion of illegal sales of cigarettes has nothing to do with immigration documents or elements of the charged offenses; however, uncharged criminal activity need not be identical to the charged crime in order to be admitted under the intricately related doctrine. Gougis, 432 F.3d at 743. Here, the evidence of the sale of contraband cigarettes showed how Wantuch's relationship with Sienkiewicz began, its basis and structure, and how the relationship blossomed into the charged conspiracy. United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1469 (7th Cir.1994). It outlined how the relationship of trust and cooperation between Sienkiewicz and Wantuch was born, developed and eventually led to their respective roles in the conspiracy. See United States v. Spaeni, 60 F.3d 313, 316 (7th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Richmond, 222 F.3d 414, 417 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that evidence was intricately related because it explained the circumstances surrounding the relationships of the people involved in the conspiracy). Further, the evidence showed that Wantuch was a willing participant in the sale of illegal goods (and eventually the green card scheme), demonstrating that he was ready to pursue any avenue in order to make money by offering to provide Sienkiewicz with any merchandise that he required. Wantuch argues that any probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Fed.R.Evid. 403. The district court's admission of evidence under Rule 403 is entitled to special deference. Only in an extreme case are appellate judges competent to second-guess the judgment of the person on the spot, the trial judge. Strong, 485 F.3d at 991 (citation omitted). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial only if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, rather than on the evidence presented. Id. The evidence was probative to counter Wantuch's defense that he was simply hired by Sienkiewicz to work in the office at GSGT and help the INS by new computers for the Y2K, and that he did not commit a crime when he sold the contraband to Sienkiewicz. Additionally, to minimize the risk of unfair prejudice, the court ensured that the jury used the evidence only for a legitimate purposeWantuch's intentwhen it gave a limiting instruction in the final jury instructions. See United States v. Whitlow, 381 F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir.2004). The evidence was properly admitted.