Opinion ID: 169434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the twist lock

Text: 37 The district court concluded the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for using the twist lock to remove Mr. Novitsky from the vehicle. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need to expeditiously resolve `immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.' Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)). 38 Given the underlying purposes of qualified immunity, we require a plaintiff to satisfy a heavy two-part burden to overcome a defendant's summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant's actions violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. Second, the plaintiff must show that the right alleged to be violated was clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue. 2 Id. 1. Prong One: Constitutional Violation 39 Mr. Novitsky alleges the officers violated the Fourth Amendment by using the twist lock to remove him from the vehicle. By its terms, the Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens the right to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures. A seizure occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The reasonableness of a particular seizure depends on the balance between the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests . . . [and] the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). 40 In balancing these interests, the Supreme Court has held that arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, are reasonable only if supported by probable cause. United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1468 (10th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Investigative detentions, on the other hand, which are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration, are reasonable if they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the detained individual is engaged in criminal activity. Id. Similarly, officers may effect a brief non-investigatory detention in the exercise of their community caretaking functions, regardless of suspected criminal activity, when articulable facts indicate the need to assure the safety of the public and/or the individual. United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1560 (10th Cir.1993). 41 The reasonableness of these latter two types of detentions — whether investigatory or non-investigatory — depends on whether the detention satisfies the two-part test set forth in Terry v. Ohio: (1) the detention must be justified at its inception, and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868; King, 990 F.2d at 1560. Because Mr. Novitsky does not argue the officers' use of the twist lock placed him under arrest, Terry supplies the analytical framework for this case. 42 There is no question Mr. Novitsky was first seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers roused him and ordered him from the vehicle. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) (holding that a police-citizen encounter constitutes a seizure if the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter). Because the officers encountered Mr. Novitsky lying in the fetal position in the back of a parked car in response to a man down call, we conclude these actions were a reasonable exercise of their community caretaking functions. United States v. Garner, 416 F.3d 1208, 1212-16 (10th Cir.2005) (holding that an officer justifiably detained an individual whom he encountered responding to a report of a man down, said to be unconscious in a half sitting, half slumped over position for several hours). Thus, Mr. Novitsky's detention by the officers was justified at its inception, and we turn to the question whether the officers' use of the twist lock was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the detention in the first place. 43 On this issue, we reach different conclusions as to each defendant officer. As to Officer Marshall, there is no evidence that he personally participated in the use of the twist lock. See Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006) (In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant's direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established.). Indeed, while he was present at the scene, the record makes clear that Officer Marshall did not assist or direct Officer Wortham in removing Mr. Novitsky from the vehicle. Thus, Mr. Novitsky has failed to allege that Officer Marshall violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Officer Marshall is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 44 On the other hand, Mr. Novitsky has sufficiently alleged that Officer Wortham had direct personal responsibility for the claimed Fourth Amendment violation because Officer Wortham personally applied the twist lock. Mr. Novitsky argues that this action was unreasonable because he did not pose a tenable threat to either officer's safety. 45 It is beyond dispute that the safety of law enforcement officers during the performance of their duties is a legitimate and weighty concern. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). Consequently, officers may use force during a Terry -type detention to the extent that such steps [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of [the] stop. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). 46 Under certain circumstances, the steps officers may permissibly take to protect their safety include drawing their weapons, placing a suspect in handcuffs, or forcing a suspect to the ground. See United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir.1993) (collecting cases). Officer safety is also the primary concern undergirding the right of an officer to perform a pat-down search. See United States v. Manjarrez, 348 F.3d 881, 886-87 (10th Cir. 2003) (The purpose of the limited pat-down search is not to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence.) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether the precautionary steps taken by an officer were reasonable, the standard is objective — would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 47 In this case, Officer Wortham was certainly justified in having some concern for his safety when he first encountered Mr. Novitsky in the backseat of the vehicle. See United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir.2001) (en banc) (The Supreme Court has found it `too plain for argument' that the government's interest in officer safety is `both legitimate and weighty,' given the `inordinate risks confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.') (quoting Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 98 S.Ct. 330). In addition, the circumstances of the encounter — in particular the facts that Mr. Novitsky's companion was intoxicated, that the vehicle smelled like alcohol, and that Mr. Novitsky was curled up in the fetal position in the vehicle's backseat at two in the afternoon — would lead a reasonable officer to believe that Mr. Novitsky might be intoxicated. Because individuals who are intoxicated are often unpredictable, Officer Wortham was confronted with an additional layer of uncertainty. See Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that reports regarding an individual who appeared intoxicated, ma[de] it reasonable [for police officers] to expect he would act unstably). 48 The potential risks facing Officer Wortham during his encounter with Mr. Novitsky were, however, mitigated by several facts. As our previous panel recognized during Mr. Novitsky's criminal case, Officer Wortham testified that Mr. Novitsky did not make any furtive movements in the car. Moreover, Mr. Novitsky did not resist Officer Wortham in any way; in fact, his demeanor was apparently benign, as he had begun to help himself out of the car when the twist [lock] was applied. Novitsky, 58 Fed.Appx. at 436. Furthermore, Officer Wortham testified there was no evidence that a crime had occurred or that Mr. Novitsky had engaged in criminal activity. Id. Indeed, the officers did not encounter Mr. Novitsky while investigating a crime; they arrived in the YMCA parking lot to check on the welfare of Mr. Novitsky's companion. 49 Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Novitsky, as we must, we think a reasonable jury could conclude (as a previous panel of this court did) that Officer Wortham's application of the twist lock for officer safety purposes was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Gallegos, 114 F.3d at 1031 (holding that the use of an arm bar maneuver and take-down of an individual was reasonable to protect the safety of two officers in light of the individual's strange and aggressive conduct). We therefore turn to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, asking whether Officer Wortham violated clearly established law. 2. Prong Two: Clearly Established Law 50 In determining whether a right is clearly established, the inquiry, it is vital to note, must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition . . . . Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. That is, the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 51 Moreover, [a]s the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Thus, where officers of reasonable competence could disagree regarding the lawfulness of specific conduct, qualified immunity is warranted. Id. 52 The plaintiff bears the burden of articulating clearly established law. Medina, 252 F.3d at 1128. To meet that burden, he or she may present precedent from the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, or other circuits that is on point. Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). For precedent to be on point, it need not involve the unlawfulness of the very action at issue. Rather, the unlawfulness of the action must be apparent in light of the pre-existing law such that the state of the law [at the time of the incident] gave the [defendants] fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). 53 Accordingly, the relevant question in this case is whether Officer Wortham had fair warning in June 2001 that using a twist lock to remove a potentially intoxicated individual from a vehicle for officer safety purposes was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In his attempt to convince us to answer in the affirmative, Mr. Novitsky points to our decision in United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552 (10th Cir.1993). 54 In King, an officer approached a vehicle stopped near the scene of an accident to inform the driver to stop honking at the slow-moving traffic proceeding around the accident site. When the officer reached the vehicle, she saw a firearm tucked under the driver's right thigh. The officer then ordered the driver and his passenger out of the vehicle by pointing her firearm at the driver and threatening to shoot ... if he did not comply with her order. Id. at 1562. Once the driver exited the vehicle, the officer placed him in handcuffs. Other officers subsequently recovered drugs from the passenger and a large amount of cash from the vehicle. The district court denied the driver's motion to suppress the drugs, gun, and cash as fruit of an unlawful seizure. 55 We reversed. In doing so, we first observed that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest the driver upon seeing the gun because New Mexico law allowed individuals to carry firearms in their vehicles. Id. at 1563 n. 5. We then concluded that, although the officer was entitled to separate [the driver] from the gun for her own safety, the officer's threat to shoot the defendant and use of handcuffs went far beyond what was necessary to ensure [the officer's] safety. Id. at 1563. Consequently, we held the seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and suppressed the drugs, gun, and cash. 56 We do not think King would have given a reasonable officer fair warning that using a twist lock to remove Mr. Novitsky from the vehicle was unreasonable. As an initial matter, while King applies the rule that officers may only take steps that are reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety, this is insufficient in and of itself to clearly establish the unreasonableness of Officer Wortham's conduct. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (observing that the clearly established inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition). In addition, we fail to see how the facts of King — which involved an officer removing an individual from a vehicle at gunpoint after observing a firearm — would have given Officer Wortham fair warning that the risks presented by Mr. Novitsky were insufficient to justify the application of the twist lock. 57 Moreover, Mr. Novitsky has failed to direct our attention to any other cases that would have given Officer Wortham the requisite warning. Even so, we note that some circuits have discussed at greater length the extent to which law enforcement officers may use forceful techniques to protect themselves from the risks presented by potentially intoxicated individuals. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that an officer's pat-down search of an intoxicated individual was reasonable under the circumstances of the case but stating that one should not read into the opinion any implicit approval of the frisking of drivers during routine traffic stops for drunk driving); United States v. Jaramillo, 25 F.3d 1146, 1151 (2d. Cir.1994) (stating that circumstances which justify an officer in conducting a pat-down of an individual include instances where that individual has engaged in suspicious behavior, for example, by appearing to .. . be driving while intoxicated). Nevertheless, the risks presented by potentially intoxicated individuals are inherently fact-dependent and the extent to which an officer may use force in such situations has not been definitively answered by this circuit. 58 Furthermore, while we think a reasonable jury could conclude Officer Wortham unreasonably applied the twist lock, we reached that conclusion with the luxury of both hindsight and the time to reflect upon the relevant Fourth Amendment principles, neither of which was available to Officer Wortham. Because officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), and, as discussed above, a potentially intoxicated individual inside of a vehicle presents a significant risk to officer safety, we believe officers of reasonable competence could disagree regarding the lawfulness of using the twist lock on Mr. Novitsky. Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. See Gallegos, 114 F.3d at 1030 (concluding an officer grabb[ing] [an individual's] arm three separate times during a Terry -type detention comported with the Fourth Amendment because, in part, the officer's actions consisted of a relatively minor application of force). 59 Accordingly, we conclude Mr. Novitsky has failed to establish that Officer Wortham violated clearly established law in using the twist lock to remove him from the vehicle. Officer Wortham is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.