Opinion ID: 1681659
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Meaning of the PRR Statute

Text: We first examine the PRR statute to determine whether the Legislature intended (1) to give courts discretion to impose PRR and CPC sentences consecutively to each other; [2] or as Reeves argues, (2) for a PRR sentence to serve as the statutory maximum for all offenses arising out of the same criminal episode. Questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. See Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So.2d 20, 23 (Fla.2004). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is `that a statute should be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute.' City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445 So.2d 578, 579 (Fla.1984) (quoting Deltona Corp. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 220 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1969)). It is a fundamental rule of construction that statutory language cannot be construed so as to render it potentially meaningless. Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 1001 (Fla.1993) (citing Snively Groves, Inc. v. Mayo, 135 Fla. 300, 184 So. 839 (1938)). [S]tatutory enactments are to be interpreted so as to accomplish rather than defeat their purpose. Lewis v. Mosley, 204 So.2d 197, 201 (Fla.1967) (citing 6 Fla. Jur., Constitutional Law § 14 (1956); Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13 So.2d 700 (1943)). The text of the PRR statute expresses the intent or purpose that a PRR sentence not serve as the maximum sentence for all crimes arising out of the same criminal episode. The PRR statute states in pertinent part: (9)(a)1. Prison releasee reoffender means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: . . . . o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual; . . . . within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility operated by the Department of Corrections or a private vendor. 2. If the state attorney determines that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in subparagraph 1., the state attorney may seek to have the court sentence the defendant as a prison releasee reoffender. Upon proof from the state attorney that establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is a prison releasee reoffender as defined in this section, such defendant is not eligible for sentencing under the sentencing guidelines and must be sentenced as follows: a. For a felony punishable by life, by a term of imprisonment for life; b. For a felony of the first degree, by a term of imprisonment of 30 years; c. For a felony of the second degree, by a term of imprisonment of 15 years; and d. For a felony of the third degree, by a term of imprisonment of 5 years. (b) A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release. Any person sentenced under paragraph (a) must serve 100 percent of the court-imposed sentence. (c) Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law, pursuant to s. 775.084 or any other provision of law. (d)1. It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph (a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law and as provided in this subsection, unless any of the following circumstances exist: a. The prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to prove the highest charge available; b. The testimony of a material witness cannot be obtained; c. The victim does not want the offender to receive the mandatory prison sentence and provides a written statement to that effect; or d. Other extenuating circumstances exist which preclude the just prosecution of the offender. § 775.082(9)(a)-(d)(1)., Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). [3] Paragraph (b) indicates that section 775.082(9) dictates a minimum sentence or sentencing floor, not a statutory maximum. Further, the emphasized portions of paragraphs (c) and (d)(1) indicate an intent to allow judges to impose greater punishments than those provided for in the PRR statute. Moreover, nothing in the PRR statute can be construed as restricting a trial judge's general discretion to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently. See § 775.021(4), Fla. Stat. (2006) (Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.). In light of this, the plain meaning of the PRR statute is that it provides a minimum sentence and that, given its allowance for imposition of the greatest sentence allowed by law, trial judges have the discretion to impose a CPC sentence consecutively to a PRR sentence. This Court's opinions in Grant and Nettles are consistent with this reading of the PRR statute.