Opinion ID: 6495737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the China-Wide Rate

Text: We next turn to Commerce’s decision to apply the China-wide rate to Prime Time. We review decisions by the Trade Court de novo—the same standard under which the Trade Court reviews Commerce’s determination—although we recognize that the Trade Court has unique and specialized expertise in this field. Boomerang Tube LLC v. Case: 21-1783 Document: 57 Page: 11 Filed: 06/28/2022 PRIME TIME COMMERCE, LLC v. US 11 United States, 856 F.3d 908, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). We uphold Commerce’s calculation of an antidumping rate unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not in accordance with law. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). We determine that Commerce’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Commerce conducted a proper case-specific evaluation by applying the China-wide rate to Ningbo Homey, finding that Ningbo Homey failed to rebut the presumption of government control, and extending the China-wide rate to Prime Time as Ningbo Homey’s corresponding importer. Commerce’s failure to consider Prime Time’s efforts to cooperate as an interested party was harmless error. First, we must consider whether 19 U.S.C. § 1677e applies. Section 1677e governs when Commerce applies facts available, including AFA, in determining antidumping rates. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. The parties dispute whether the 114.90% China-wide rate is an AFA rate. Appellant’s Br. 37–38; Appellee’s Br. 31, 35–36. But regardless of whether the China-wide rate is an AFA rate or not, the statutory framework of 19 U.S.C. § 1677e can apply. “The fact that a country-wide rate may have been calculated using AFA does not change its applicability to [an] NME entity that cooperated, but ultimately failed to qualify for a separate rate.” Diamond Sawblades Mfrs.’ Coal. v. United States, 866 F.3d 1304, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Although “[t]he statutory framework, including 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d and 1677e(b) . . . explicitly applies only to market economy proceedings,” we have permitted Commerce to “adopt[] that statutory framework in NME proceedings as well.” Id. Commerce maintains “broad authority to interpret the antidumping statute and devise procedures to carry out the statutory mandate.” Id. at 1311 (citation omitted); see also Case: 21-1783 Document: 57 Page: 12 Filed: 06/28/2022 12 PRIME TIME COMMERCE, LLC v. US Albemarle Corp. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 821 F.3d 1345, 1352 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that although § 1673d “explicitly applies only to market economy proceedings . . . Commerce has adopted it in non-market economy proceedings as well”). Thus, § 1677e applies. We next consider whether Commerce met the statutory requirements of that section. Commerce conducted a proper evaluation under § 1677e(d)(2) in applying the highest available rate. We find unpersuasive Prime Time’s contention that Commerce’s application of the highest rate available to Prime Time’s entries was unsupported by substantial evidence because Commerce did not conduct the evaluation required by 19 U.S.C. § 1677e. See Appellant’s Br. 34–36. Subsection 1677e(d)(2) grants Commerce discretion to apply the highest available rate “based on the evaluation by [Commerce] of the situation that resulted in [Commerce] using an adverse inference in selecting among the facts otherwise available.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(d)(2). Commerce must provide “case-specific evaluation” for its selection of the highest calculated rate. POSCO v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1285 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018). “Evaluation of the situation” requires Commerce, “as part of its determination of applying the highest rate, to review the record to determine if there was something inappropriate or otherwise unreasonable about that rate, given the situation leading to the application of an adverse inference.” Hung Vuong Corp. v. United States, No. 19-00055, 2021 WL 4772962, at , 6 (Ct. Int’l Trade Oct. 12, 2021) (citing POSCO, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 1285–86). Here, Prime Time argues that the rate was unreasonable because Commerce did not properly consider evidence of Prime Time’s efforts to cooperate as an interested party under § 1677m(e) and § 1677e(b)(1)(A). Appellant’s Br. 23– 24, 38–39. Subsection 1677m(e), which applies to administrative review proceedings under 19 U.S.C. § 1675 like the one at issue here, states that Commerce: Case: 21-1783 Document: 57 Page: 13 Filed: 06/28/2022 PRIME TIME COMMERCE, LLC v. US 13 shall not decline to consider information that is submitted by an interested party and is necessary to the determination but does not meet all the ap- plicable requirements established by the administering authority or the Commission, if— (1) the information is submitted by the deadline established for its submission, (2) the information can be verified, (3) the information is not so incomplete that it cannot serve as a reliable basis for reaching the ap- plicable determination, (4) the interested party has demonstrated that it acted to the best of its ability in providing the information and meeting the requirements es- tablished by the administering authority or the Commission with respect to the information, and (5) the information can be used without undue dif- ficulties. 19 U.S.C. § 1677m(e) (emphases added); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b)(1) (“If [Commerce] finds that an interested party has failed to cooperate by not acting to the best of its ability to comply with a request for information from [Commerce], [Commerce], in reaching the applicable determination under this subtitle— (A) may use an inference that is adverse to the interests of that party in selecting from among the facts otherwise available . . . .”). The term “interested party” expressly includes “a foreign manufacturer, producer, or exporter, or the United States importer, of subject merchandise or a trade or business association a majority of the members of which are producers, exporters, or importers of such merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A); see also Diamond Sawblades Mfrs.’ Coal. v. United States, 986 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“Interested parties, including foreign producers or exporters of subject Case: 21-1783 Document: 57 Page: 14 Filed: 06/28/2022 14 PRIME TIME COMMERCE, LLC v. US merchandise, importers of such merchandise, and specified domestic trade associations, are allowed to participate in administrative reviews.”) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A)). United States importers, thus, are unambiguously considered to be interested parties. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (holding that effect must be given to the “unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” if “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue”). As Prime Time argues, if Commerce finds that an interested party has failed to cooperate, Commerce has the discretion to use an adverse inference. Appellant’s Br. 17. Indeed, Commerce and the Trade Court misconstrued “interested party” by failing to consider the definition of “interested party.” In its decision, the Trade Court explains: Prime Time, as the importer, is not the party whose actions are considered by Commerce when engag- ing in the adverse inferences analysis under 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b). The “interested party” the statute refers to is the party to whom Commerce di- rected its requests for information and to whom the adversely chosen rate would apply. Accordingly, Commerce’s decision not to consider Prime Time’s efforts to comply with Commerce’s requests for information is in accordance with law. Prime Time I, 396 F. Supp. 3d at 1333–34. This analysis was incorrect; Prime Time is “the United States importer, of subject merchandise.” Because the Trade Court declined to consider Prime Time’s efforts to cooperate as an importer, the Trade Court thus erred. However, the failure to consider Prime Time’s efforts to cooperate was a harmless error. Prime Time’s purported evidence of cooperation would not disturb the calculation of the 114.90% China-wide rate nor entitle it to a separate rate. Even “where a respondent in an NME country Case: 21-1783 Document: 57 Page: 15 Filed: 06/28/2022 PRIME TIME COMMERCE, LLC v. US 15 cooperates with an investigation or review but fails to rebut the presumption of government control, Commerce may permissibly apply the country-wide NME entity rate.” China Mfrs. Alliance, LLC v. United States, 1 F.4th 1028, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under the framework of the presumption and requirement to rebut government control, the China-wide rate of 114.90% would nonetheless be applied to Prime Time’s entries. We thus affirm. See Suntec Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 857 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding Commerce’s error to be harmless and affirming the Trade Court); Intercargo Ins. Co. v. United States, 83 F.3d 391, 394 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well settled that principles of harmless error apply to the review of agency proceedings.”).