Opinion ID: 784664
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Removal of Jurors Spence and Williams

Text: 59 Dennis contends that the trial court improperly removed two jurors, Kathleen Spence and Ruby Williams, for cause based on their views of the death penalty. The Ohio Supreme Court held as follows: 60 In State v. Frazier (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 323, 327, 652 N.E.2d 1000, 1006, we reaffirmed the standard in Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 61 `The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause based on his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.' 62 Prospective juror Spencer stated unequivocally during voir dire that she did not feel she could recommend the death sentence. She further stated that she would have a lot of trouble imposing death, even if the court instructed the jury that it was worthy of consideration. Spencer also indicated that she did not feel she could put her beliefs aside and follow the law. When asked if she could recommend the death penalty, Spencer replied, I don't feel I could really do that. 63 Prospective juror Williams also indicated that based on religious and moral grounds, she could not follow the law and recommend the death penalty. After further questioning, Williams insisted that [i]t will be a big problem for me to sign and say that, yes, I believe in the death penalty or I believe this person should be given the death penalty. 64 We have previously stated that where the trial court is left with a definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law, deference must be given to the trial judge who sees and hears the prospective juror. State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 38, 526 N.E.2d 274, 284-85. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the two prospective jurors for cause. Both expressed views that would prevent or substantially impair them from fulfilling their duties as jurors. State v. Tyler, (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 30, 553 N.E.2d 576, 586. Accordingly, we overrule Proposition of Law No.8. 65 State v. Dennis, 683 N.E.2d at 1103. 66 The district court held that the Ohio Supreme Court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. Dennis v. Mitchell, 68 F.Supp.2d at 889. The district court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court followed the correct controlling United States Supreme Court precedent of Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, which sets the standard for excusing jurors for cause. Witt held that the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. 844. 67 Based on this standard, the district court concluded that: 68 Here, both Spencer and Williams stated that they could not follow the law and recommend the death penalty. Before trial, the prosecutor, using the Wainwright language, asked juror Spencer if her moral belief against the death penalty would substantially impair your ability to do that, to follow the law. Spencer then replied Yes, indicating that her beliefs prohibited her from following the law. (Trial Tr. at 351.) 69 Similarly, the trial judge asked juror Williams if she could follow the law: 70 Our question to you is simply do you feel that you can go through that analysis, follow the law and make that recommendation if the circumstances of this case warrant it? Williams simply replied No. ( Id. at 368, 652 N.E.2d 1000.) 71 Dennis v. Mitchell, 68 F.Supp.2d at 889. The district court concluded that, based on these two exchanges, the trial court acted properly in excluding these jurors. 72 The Ohio Supreme Court's decision is not an unreasonable application of Witt. In Witt, the Supreme Court upheld that trial court's excusal for cause of a juror after she stated that her personal beliefs against the death penalty would interfere with judging the defendant's guilt or innocence. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 416, 105 S.Ct. 844. Similarly, in this case, the record reflects that both witnesses stated that they would be unable to sign a death verdict, regardless of the verdict. The district court's independent review of the state court record confirms the state courts' assessment that the jurors' views on the death penalty would substantially impair their performance. For these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling is not contrary to Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) (holding that certain veniremen had been improperly excluded because they acknowledged that their views of the death penalty might affect their deliberations, but only to the extent that they would view their task with greater gravity), and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (finding it improper to exclude veniremen simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious objections to its imposition), because the record reflects that the jurors had more than mere qualms or moral objection to the death penalty, but an inability or unwillingness to follow the law or obey their oaths. The district court properly rejected this claim. 73