Opinion ID: 1979670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pasturage and feeding contract

Text: The trial court determined that the contract between Janz and Amsbaugh did not constitute an assignment or sublease and concluded that Janz was entitled to dismissal of Hutton's claim for eviction. The construction of a written contract to determine its legal effect presents a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Industry Financial Corp. v. Redman, 383 N.W.2d 847 (N.D.1986); Poyzer v. Amenia Seed and Grain Co., 381 N.W.2d 192 (N.D.1986); Miller v. Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685 (N.D.1984); West v. Alpar Resources, Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484 (N.D.1980). In our view, the contract between Janz and Amsbaugh constituted a sublease. Because it was entered into without Hutton's consent, it was a breach of the lease between Hutton and Janz. A subletting is a leasing by the lessee of a whole or part of the premises during a portion of the unexpired balance of his term, ... 3A, G. Thompson, Commentaries on The Modern Law of Real Property, § 1210, p. 50 (1981 Repl.). Generally, agistments [2] and temporary pasturage contracts entered into by lessees of real property and third parties are not held to be assignments or subleases. See, e.g., Harrelson v. Miller & Lux, Inc., 182 Cal. 408, 188 P. 800 (1920); Baldwin v. Jacobs, 182 Iowa 789, 166 N.W. 271 (1918); Kirkpatrick v. Fonner, 82 Neb. 32, 116 N.W. 779 (1908); Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Pulley, 95 Mont. 337, 26 P.2d 645, 89 A.L.R. 1320 (1933); Golden v. Mount, 32 Wash.2d 653, 203 P.2d 667 (1949); Vander Vate v. Watson, 19 Wash.2d 68, 140 P.2d 964 (1943); Frazier v. Kern, 18 Wash.App. 93, 566 P.2d 956 (1977). In Enders v. Wesley W. Hubbard and Sons, Inc., 95 Idaho 590, 513 P.2d 992, 71 A.L.R.3d 767 (1973), however, a pasturage contract was declared to be a sublease. The owner of a ranch leased it to Hubbard for $4,000 per year for a term of years. The Enders ranch was additional pasture for Hubbard, but not its home base. Hubbard sold its base ranch and cattle and subsequently: determined to `sell the grass' by permitting others to pasture it.... As a result, in 1969, the lessee, acting through Deon Hubbard, turned over the pasturing operation to a joint venture between a Mr. Rigby and a Mr. Cochran who after that time paid an annual rental for all of the grass on the property.... From that time on Rigby & Cochran generally controlled whose cattle, and in what numbers, would go on to the Enders ranch.... Enders, supra, 513 P.2d at 996-997. Hubbard continued to handle the irrigation, fencing, and other repairs on the premises. After discussing Golden v. Mount, supra ; Vander Vate v. Watson, supra ; Bond & Mortgage Corp. v. Pulley, supra ; Harrelson v. Miller & Lux, Inc., supra , and Baldwin v. Jacobs, supra , the court stated, 513 P.2d at 999: The foregoing cases, though not exhaustive, generally reflect that where a lessee is farming or pasturing a property, and he permits the grazing of less than all of the premises, or for a temporary period all of the premises, the courts generally construe the arrangements to be one of license rather than a sublease. However, in this case, the entire pasture on the Enders ranch, which was the only agricultural commodity produced by the ranch, was sold for several years to Rigby & Cochran for an annual gross rental figure. More importantly, Rigby & Cochran generally controlled the numbers of cattle which went on to the premises, and whose cattle could be brought on to the premises. On balance, we feel that the totality of the sale of all of the pasturage rights, together with the transfer of substantial control of those pasturage rights to Rigby & Cochran, constitutes a subletting of the premises in violation of the terms of the lease. To the extent that Janz, in contracting with Amsbaugh, transferred the right to use all of the grassland and cropland on the premises (except for a small portion known as the Poison Lake pasture), which were the source of all of the agricultural commodities produced on the Hutton ranch, that arrangement is similar in effect to that involved in Enders, supra . In one important respect, Janz's contract with Amsbaugh went beyond that involved in Enders. The subletting in Enders had no effect upon the rent or method of calculating the rent to be received by the landowner. In the instant case, however, Janz's contract with Amsbaugh has resulted in a change in the amount of rent due Hutton and the method by which it is calculated. Under the lease with Janz, Hutton was to receive 1/3 of the gross sale proceeds of livestock, farm produce and rentals. As a result of the contract between Janz and Amsbaugh, Hutton no longer receives one-third of the gross sale proceeds of livestock and farm produce but is limited to receiving one-third of the amount of cash Janz receives from Amsbaugh. Under the circumstances, we conclude that Janz's contract with Amsbaugh constituted a subletting of the Hutton ranch in violation of Janz's lease from Hutton. Hutton did not waive his right to terminate the lease. Forfeitures of estates under leases are not favored. Towne v. Sautter, 326 N.W.2d 694 (N.D.1982). Whether a contract should be canceled for breach depends upon the facts of each case. Syllabus 3, Sandberg v. Smith, 234 N.W.2d 917 (N.D.1975). We believe that Janz's subletting of the premises without Hutton's consent in a manner that changed the amount of rent to be received by Hutton and the method by which the amount is to be calculated justifies termination of the lease from Hutton. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing Hutton's claim for eviction and we reverse that part of the judgment.