Opinion ID: 457553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cross-Examination of Bryant

Text: 30 During the course of Bryant's direct examination his testimony squarely contradicted that of several other witnesses. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked him if the other witnesses had testified inaccurately. 11 Defense counsel objected, stating: 31 Your Honor, I'd like to interpose an objection at this point to Counsel repeatedly asking Sergeant Bryant to assess the credibility of the witnesses. That's a question for the jury to determine and not for Mister--not for Sergeant Bryant to determine. 32 The court overruled the objection. On appeal, Bryant presses much the same argument. He contends that questions of this type are prejudicial because he, not the jury, was required to assess the credibility of the other witnesses. We disagree. 33 While it is indisputable that the jury is the exclusive arbiter of the credibility of witnesses, see United States v. Caballero, 712 F.2d 126 (5th Cir.1983), it is also clear, as we have stated, that 34 [w]hen the credibility of a witness is placed in issue the district court has broad discretion concerning the extent to which cross-examination may exceed the scope of direct examination. United States v. Contreras, 602 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 971, 100 S.Ct. 466, 62 L.Ed.2d 387 (1979). When a defendant chooses to testify, he makes an issue of his credibility and the Government is allowed to cross-examine the defendant with respect to matters about which he has testified. United States v. Dooley, 587 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 949, 99 S.Ct. 1430, 59 L.Ed.2d 639 (1979); United States v. Caron, 474 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1973). 35 United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 183 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1148, 103 S.Ct. 790, 74 L.Ed.2d 996 (1983). 36 In light of Bryant's evasiveness in responding to the various questions from the prosecutor and in light of the fact that Bryant's direct testimony squarely contradicted that of several government witnesses, 12 we believe the district court acted well within its broad discretion in allowing the prosecutor to ask Bryant whether his testimony necessarily meant the testimony of other witnesses was untrue. Thetford, 676 F.2d at 183. Moreover, even if the prosecutor's questions invaded the province of the jury, Bryant suffered no prejudice from such questioning. In each instance, Bryant unequivocably stated that the testimony of the government witness was indeed untrue. We cannot say that Bryant is prejudiced when he is given an opportunity to affirm that contradictory testimony is fallacious. The error, if any, is harmless.