Opinion ID: 792744
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davis' Drug Quantity Argument

Text: 37 Davis also argues that the sentencing court erred by admitting unreliable hearsay evidence when determining that he possessed with intent to distribute 50 to 150 grams of cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. However, unlike Hankton, Davis does not claim that Agent Darin's testimony was unreliable. Instead, Davis claims only that the introduction of the co-defendants' plea agreements constituted clear error due to the fact that the agreements were inadmissible hearsay. However, as noted above, the relevant inquiry is not whether the plea agreements submitted at sentencing constituted hearsay, see Smith, 3 F.3d at 1100, but whether the plea agreements included a sufficient indicia of reliability to support [their] probable accuracy, Taylor, 72 F.3d at 543, which we conclude that they did. 38 The co-defendants' plea agreements submitted at Davis' sentencing demonstrated that Davis was in the habit of distributing crack cocaine. In particular, Ngaya Brunner admits to purchasing approximately 10 and one-half grams of crack from Davis. This evidence was fully corroborated by the testimony of Agent Darin, which the sentencing judge expressly found to be credible. Specifically, Agent Darin testified as to the meaning and context of a number of intercepted phone conversations Davis had with Hankton and other individuals in which Davis discussed cooking large amounts of powder cocaine in order to produce crack cocaine. In at least one of those conversations Davis states that he purchased powder cocaine specifically for the purpose of further processing it in order to manufacture and distribute the resulting crack. See supra p. 13. Thus, because witness testimony—the testimony of a witness, Agent Darin, whom the district judge had previously determined to be credible—was introduced to corroborate information contained in the co-defendant's plea agreements and thus infused that evidence with an indicia of reliability. See United States v. Martinez, 289 F.3d at 1028-29; Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d at 980. This is not to mention the fact that Davis was provided with ample opportunity to rebut the hearsay evidence proffered against him in the form of the co-defendant plea agreements, either by calling his own exculpatory witnesses or through his cross examination of Agent Darin. See Barnes, 117 F.3d at 338. The fact that Davis called no witnesses at sentencing and failed to successfully discredit Agent Darin on cross-examination, however, evinces nothing more than a shortcoming in the presentation of his case and falls far short of establishing error on the part of the trial judge. In other words, Davis must present this court with more than conclusory allegations that a government witness is unreliable; he must present evidence which would in some way rebut that testimony or demonstrate that it is inaccurate and should not have been relied upon by the sentencing judge. See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1099. 39 Thus, because Agent Darin's credible testimony corroborated the information contained in the co-defendants' plea agreements, the sentencing court did not err in finding that evidence reliable in concluding that Davis was responsible for possessing with the intent to distribute 50 to 150 grams of crack cocaine. 27