Opinion ID: 591882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Manslaughter Instruction

Text: 4 In reviewing jury instructions, the standard applied in this circuit is whether, considering the charge as a whole, the court's instructions fairly and adequately covered the issues presented, correctly stated the law, and were not misleading. Thorsted v. Kelly, 858 F.2d 571, 573 (9th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir.1989). 5 In reviewing jury instructions, we give the trial judge substantial latitude so long as the instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented. ... Jury instructions, even if imperfect, are not a basis for overturning a conviction absent a showing they constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 6 United States v. Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519, 527 (9th Cir.1988) (citations omitted), amended, 872 F.2d 334, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989). Taken as a whole, the district court's jury instructions are not erroneous. 7 Phillips argues that the district court never once [instructed the jury] that recklessness is the required actus reus for the crimes [sic] of involuntary manslaughter. However, Phillips concedes that the jury was instructed on the required mental state or mens rea. Thus, Phillips' argument is based in part on her counsel's inability to distinguish the actus reus from the mens rea. 8 The district court properly instructed the jury that, to convict Phillips of involuntary manslaughter, the jury had to find Phillips committed a criminal act (actus reus), with a specified mental state (mens rea), which resulted in a certain result. To find a criminal act, the jury had to find that the defendant engaged in a willful act of becoming voluntarily intoxicated and driving in that condition. To find the requisite mental state, the jury had to find that, in the circumstances existing at the time, the defendant either knew that her conduct was a threat to human life or was done with reckless disregard for human life.... The jury also had to find that Rueben Ray King was killed as a result. Thus, the district court gave a proper instruction for each element. 9 Phillips' misunderstanding of the mens rea requirement for manslaughter may stem from United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462 (9th Cir.1979). In Keith, this court held that the Government must prove both gross negligence and knowledge of such gross negligence to satisfy the mens rea element for manslaughter. 10 [T]he Government must prove: (1) that the defendant acted with gross negligence, defined as wanton or reckless disregard for human life; and (2) that the defendant had actual knowledge that his conduct was a threat to the lives of others, or had knowledge that his conduct was a threat to the lives of others, or had knowledge of such circumstances as could reasonably be said to have made foreseeable to him the peril to which his acts might subject others. 11 Id. at 463 (citations omitted). The district court incorporated this mens rea requirement into jury instruction number fourteen by simply requiring knowledge that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for human life. The court instructed the jury that the government must prove that 12 in the circumstances existing at the time, the defendant either knew that her conduct was a threat to human life or was done with reckless disregard for human life or the defendant had knowledge of such circumstances as could reasonably be said to have made foreseeable to her the peril to which her acts might subject others. 13 Phillips appears to argue that the district court eliminated the requirement of gross negligence by requiring knowledge of such gross negligence. We find that the gross negligence requirement is not eliminated when it is incorporated into the knowledge requirement. It is well settled that actual knowledge is a higher level of culpability and is harder to prove than gross negligence or recklessness. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan.L.Rev. 681, 694-697 (1983). Thus, no jury could ever find that the defendant had actual knowledge of her own gross negligence unless she was indeed grossly negligent. The logic is inescapable; a defendant cannot have actual knowledge of her own gross negligence unless she was grossly negligent. Moreover, while explaining the difference between second degree murder and manslaughter in jury instruction number fifteen, the district court made it clear that [i]nvoluntary manslaughter involves reckless conduct constituting disregard for human life. 14 In short, there is nothing wrong with the district court's jury instructions. As a whole, they clearly outline the actus reus and the corresponding mens rea and result. The district court's instructions made it clear that Phillips could be convicted only if her acts were reckless, and the jury easily could have found that Phillips acted recklessly. See United States v. Loera, 923 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir.) (A rational trier of fact could have found that Loera's conduct in driving while in a state of intoxication showed a reckless disregard for the safety of others.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 164 (1991).