Opinion ID: 726058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MSG's Activities

Text: 33 MSG advances two arguments against the application of OSHA. First, it likens itself to a department of public works, and OSHA's application to it would therefore interfere with an exercise of tribal sovereignty. Second, MSG contends that OSHA's application would interfere with the Tribe's ability to self-govern by precluding the Mashantucket Pequot from adopting their own safety regulations. We reject both arguments.
34 MSG contends that OSHA's application will interfere with its governmental function in intramural matters. MSG describes its construction operation as governmental because it works on projects selected and prioritized by the Tribal Council. MSG considers its endeavors intramural because it works exclusively on its own reservation. MSG does not deny, however, that it hires non-Indians and continues to work on the construction of Foxwoods, a casino clearly operating in interstate commerce. The nature of MSG's work, the employment of non-Indians, and the continuing work at Foxwoods, taken together, doom MSG's claim that its work implicates exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters.
35 MSG takes its orders from the Tribal Council, which selects projects with the greatest benefit for the Tribe. How and from whom MSG receives its jobs, however, does not magisterially transform its operation into an exercise of sovereign power. When all is said and done, MSG is in the construction business; and its activities are of a commercial and service character, not a governmental character. See Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, 4 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir.1993). 36 In Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, the Seventh Circuit drew a similar distinction. The court was asked to consider whether wildlife officers employed by a tribe were exempt from the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The court concluded that the wildlife officers were similar to police officers, and thus were exercising governmental power. Accordingly, the court held that the application of the FLSA would interfere with tribal self-governance. In so holding, however, the court was careful to distinguish the activities of the wildlife officers from workers on a tribal farm (Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1113), lumber mill (United States Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.1991) (OSHRC )), or health care facility (Smart, 868 F.2d 929). Great Lakes, 4 F.3d at 495. 37 So too in OSHRC, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the activities of a tribal lumber mill, which took direction from a tribal council, did not touch exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters. OSHRC, 935 F.2d at 184. And in Smart, the Seventh Circuit determined that ERISA applied to a tribal health care facility despite the fact that the operation was owned and operated by the tribe. Smart, 868 F.2d at 935-36. 38 MSG excavates construction sites at the Tribe's behest for the benefit of tribal members. We think that such an operation is akin to the tribal mill in OSHRC, and has characteristics of a service-oriented endeavor like the tribal health care facility in Smart. That an entity is owned by a tribe, operates as an arm of a tribe, or takes direction from a tribal council, does not ipso facto elevate it to the status of a tribal government.
39 Unlike other sovereignties, Indian tribes have limited power over external affairs. Upon coming under the authority of the United States[,] ... certain limitations upon the external powers of tribal self-government necessarily followed. Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 231-32 (1982 ed.) (quoted in Wheeler v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 811 F.2d 549, 551 (10th Cir.1987)). Tribes were divested of their powers over external affairs because their dependent status within our territorial jurisdiction is necessarily inconsistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1088, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). 40 Limitations on tribal authority are particularly acute where non-Indians are concerned. See id. The Supreme Court has recognized that tribal inherent sovereign powers ... do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565, 101 S.Ct. at 1258; see also A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 76 F.3d 930, 939 (8th Cir.1996). This is so because the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes.... Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. at 1258. 41 MSG's employment of non-Indians weighs heavily against its claim that its activities affect rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters. In general, tribal relations with non-Indians fall outside the normal ambit of tribal self-government. Furthermore, intramural matters generally consist of conduct the immediate ramifications of which are felt primarily within the reservation by members of the tribe. Cf. Farris, 624 F.2d at 893 (intramural activities in the nature of conditions of tribal membership, domestic relations, and inheritance rules). Thus, the employment of non-Indians is another factor that tips the balance toward application of OSHA.
42 MSG continues to build expansions on the Foxwoods Hotel and Casino. MSG does not contest that the casino operates in and affects interstate commerce. Indeed, a bingo hall and casino [even one on tribal grounds] designed to attract tourists from surrounding states undeniably affects interstate commerce.... United States v. Funmaker, 10 F.3d 1327, 1331 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964)). MSG's construction efforts, even though they occur solely on the reservation, have a direct effect on interstate commerce. Cf. Donovan v. S & L Dev. Co., 647 F.2d 14, 18 (9th Cir.1981) (any construction work, regardless of the size or duration of the project, is likely to have an effect on interstate commerce). When a tribal operation affects open markets, it is unlikely that the operation is purely intramural. See Coeur d'Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (operation of a farm which employs non-Indians and sells produce in open market does not touch tribal self-governance). 43 These separate tiles--the nature of MSG's work, its employment of non-Indians, and the construction work on a hotel and casino that operates in interstate commerce--when viewed as a whole, result in a mosaic that is distinctly inconsistent with the portrait of an Indian tribe exercising exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters. See United States Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Comm'n, 935 F.2d at 184 (mill which employs non-Indians and sells wares in channels of interstate commerce not related to exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters.).
44 MSG's final argument is that OSHA will affect tribal self-governance by precluding the promulgation of its own safety regulations. We are not persuaded. 45 First, protesting the application of a federal statute because it affects the tribe's sovereign power to adopt a different regulatory scheme proves too much. Indeed, [a]ny federal statute applied to an Indian on a reservation or to a Tribe has the arguable effect of eviscerating self-governance since it amounts to a subordination of the Indian government. Smart, 868 F.2d at 935. The question is not whether the statute affects tribal self-governance in general, but rather whether it affects tribal self-governance in purely intramural matters. As already discussed in Section III. A., the nature of MSG's activities, its employment of non-Indians, and its construction at Foxwoods renders its conduct extramural. 46 Second, there is nothing to prevent the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe from adopting its own safety regulations, as long as those regulations do not conflict with the application of OSHA. The government concedes that tribes are not states under OSHA, see 29 U.S.C. § 652(7), and thus, OSHA does not preempt tribal safety regulations in the same manner in which it preempts state laws. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96-104, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2381-86, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (describing OSHA's preemption of state laws). Thus, the Tribe is free to adopt any additional regulations, consistent with OSHA, which it deems necessary. 47 We conclude, therefore, that application of OSHA will not affect exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters. MSG's activities do not fall within the Coeur d'Alene exception to the application of federal statutes.CONCLUSION 48 We adopt the Ninth Circuit's method of analysis in Coeur d'Alene as the appropriate test to determine whether a statute, silent as to Indians, applies to tribes. 49 We disagree with the OSHRC that OSHA's application will interfere with tribal self-governance over purely intramural matters. 50 Given our holding that OSHA does not fall within one of the Coeur d'Alene exceptions to the application of federal statutes, it is unnecessary to address the Secretary's additional argument that the Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq., provides clear Congressional intent of OSHA's applicability to tribes. We also reject amicus's argument that the Secretary's enforcement action is barred unless there is a clear and unequivocal waiver of tribal sovereign immunity. Tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits by the United States. See Quileute Indian Tribe v. Babbitt, 18 F.3d 1456, 1459-60 (9th Cir.1994). 51 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the OSHRC.