Opinion ID: 2588357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In re Martinez

Text: In 1970, In re Martinez found that police authorities, who did not know of a defendant's parole status, violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights by undertaking an investigative search lacking in probable cause that related to the defendant's suspected criminal activity. ( In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 646, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734.) In so concluding, In re Martinez regarded a parolee's reasonable expectation of privacy far more favorably and expansively than have later United States Supreme Court decisions. For example, In re Martinez stated: The conditional nature of a parolee's freedom may result in some diminution of his reasonable expectation of privacy and thus may render some intrusions by parole officers `reasonable' even when the information relied on by the parole officers does not reach the traditional level of 'probable cause.' ( In re Martinez, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 647, fn. 6, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734, italics added.) In observing that a diminution of Fourth Amendment protection[s] can be justified only to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process ( ibid. ), In re Martinez concluded that unless suspected parole violations are involved, a search by police officers to investigate suspected criminal activity could not be undertaken without probable cause. ( Id. at p. 646, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734.) It is worth noting at the outset that Tyrell J. addressed the analysis in In re Martinez and rejected the reasoning that Sanders adopted. ( Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) Moreover, as Samson, supra, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, illustrates, the notions upon which In re Martinez was basedi.e., regarding (1) the perception that a lawfully imposed search and seizure condition results only in some diminution of a parolee's privacy expectations and (2) the perceived invalidity of a parole system that allows suspicionless searches to investigate suspected criminal activity as well as suspected parole violationsare now obsolete. In light of Samson, we should revisit Sanders's adoption of In re Martinez's reasoning that no circumstances other than those known to the officer are relevant to determining whether a search of a parolee is reasonable. (See Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 332, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496.) First, by assessing only the reasonableness of an officer's suspicion in undertaking a particular search, and neglecting to evaluate the actual reasonableness of the search in view of both the officer's actions and the suspect's legitimate privacy expectations, the rule provides an incomplete measure of whether a search does or does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Second, the rule in In re Martinez was articulated at a very different time, when parolees were not viewed as having significantly reduced expectations of privacy. Finally, the rule is inconsistent with the high court's current emphasis on the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry and rejection of bright-line rules. ( Ohio v. Robinette (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347.)