Opinion ID: 460381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Controlling Law Under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)

Text: 26 Under the FTCA, the district court must determine whether the United States is subject to tort liability by applying the law of the state where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b); Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir.1983). 27 In actions arising under the FTCA, the United States is liable for the negligence of its employees only in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.... 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674 (1982). To ascertain the government's liability in this case, we determine whether Washington law would impose liability on private persons or corporations under similar circumstances. Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318, 77 S.Ct. 374, 376, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957). 28 An essential element in any negligence action under Washington law is the existence of a legal duty which the defendant owes the plaintiff. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 425-26, 671 P.2d 230, 236 (1983). The common law rule that a person has no duty to prevent a third party from causing physical injury to another is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 315, which states two exceptions based on the existence of a special relation. 5 29 The parties dispute whether the law governing the liability of municipal corporations for the negligence of their law enforcement employees should apply by analogy to determine whether the United States had a duty to control Rowe's actions. 30 Appellant's position is that Rowe's military status created a special relationship with the United States that gave rise to a duty to protect such foreseeable victims as Louie under Washington law as applied in Petersen. She contends that there is no need to analogize the law of municipal corporations to reach the question of governmental liability. Finally, she contends that even if the analogy applied, civilian police in Washington could be held liable for failing to control the actions of an intoxicated person. 31 The government argues that since the sovereign immunity of the State of Washington was abrogated in 1961 6 and since the sovereign immunity of political subdivisions and municipalities was abrogated in 1967, 7 the state and its political subdivisions are treated as private persons for purposes of tort liability. The government contends that reference to Washington law, setting forth the liability of state and municipal entities to establish the government's standard of liability under the FTCA, is both necessary and proper. We agree. 32 The circumstances here involve government employees in a law enforcement function. Questions as to the power and authority to arrest, to maintain custody, and to lawfully restrict a person's liberty, are unique to the law enforcement function. Because private persons do not wield such police powers, the inquiry into the government's liability in this situation must include an examination of the liability of state and municipal entities under like circumstances. 33 We agree also with the government's contention that, under Washington law, the liability of a state or municipal governmental entity is the same as that of a private person or corporation. This equivalence is important because of this court's position in Wright v. United States, 719 F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir.1983), that a finding of immunity for state employees under state law does not determine the scope of the United States' liability under the FTCA. Although Washington recognizes a public duty doctrine 8 applicable to actions of law enforcement officers, Bailey v. Town of Forks, 38 Wash.App. 656, 659, 688 P.2d 526, 528-29 (1984), this is merely a mechanism for focusing upon whether a duty is actually owed to an individual claimant. J & B Development Co. v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 299, 304-05, 669 P.2d 468, 471-72 (1983). The Washington court has noted that the abrogation of municipal sovereign immunity by RCW 4.96.010 was not intended to create new duties where none existed before. Id., 100 Wash.2d at 305, 669 P.2d 468. Instead, the purpose of RCW 4.96.010 was to permit a cause of action in tort if a duty could be established, just the same as with a private person. Id. (emphasis in original). 34 The rule stated by the court in Wright, 719 F.2d at 1034-35, is not violated by the public duty doctrine recognized under Washington law. This doctrine applies to a preliminary determination whether a duty exists and does not alter the underlying liability imposed on political subdivisions and municipalities in RCW 4.96.010. This underlying liability is clearly equivalent to the liability of a private person or corporation. RCW 4.96.010. 35 In sum, a determination of the government's liability under Washington law in this case rests properly on an examination of the liability of the state or a municipality under like circumstances. 36 Washington courts have recognized two exceptions to the public duty doctrine. First, public officers will owe a duty to an individual if there is a clear statement of legislative intent to identify and protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons [and] a member of that class has an individual claim for violation of the ordinance or statute or creating the duty. Bailey, 38 Wash.App. at 659-60, 688 P.2d at 528-29. 37 Appellant relies on state statutes to provide a basis for finding that a duty would be imposed on public officers in favor of Louie. However, the Washington court recently reviewed one of the statutes relied on by the appellant (RCW 46.65.010), and found that nothing in the [statute] indicates an intent to 'protect a particular and circumscribed class of persons' such as to establish governmental liability and that the class of persons protected is the public in general. Hartley v. State, 103 Wash.2d 768, 785, 698 P.2d 77, 86-87 (1985). We find that the other statutes and policies relied on by the appellant are similarly directed at protecting the general public and are not sufficient to constitute an exception to the public duty doctrine. 38 A second exception to the public duty doctrine arises under Washington law where some contact or a special relationship can be found between the public officer defendant and the injured party plaintiff. J & B Development Co., 100 Wash.2d at 305-07, 669 P.2d at 472-73. See also Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 275, 286, 669 P.2d 451, 458 (1983) (actionable duty will arise if (1) some form of privity exists between police and victim that sets victim apart from general public and (2) explicit assurances of protection give rise to victim's reliance). In this case, there clearly was no contact or special relationship between the military authorities at Fort Lewis and Louie, the accident victim. 39 We find that neither of the recognized exceptions to the public duty doctrine is applicable here. Therefore, under Washington law, employees of political subdivisions or municipalities, if situated as were the government employees in this case, would have no duty to a given member of the public such as Louie. 40 Because the public duty doctrine has not been applied in Washington to the actions of state employees, a separate analysis is required. Appellant relies on Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983), to support her contention that the government had a duty to Louie arising out of a special relationship. 9 In Petersen, the Washington court found the state liable for the failure of a state psychiatrist to commit a patient with known dangerous propensities. 41 Petersen is distinguishable. There, the contact between the state employee and the third party arose from an involuntary commitment which extended over two weeks and which consisted of regular and continuous observations and professional treatment. In our case, government employees' contact with Rowe consisted of brief contacts in a non-custodial setting, during which time Rowe did not exhibit dangerous behavior. 42 In Bailey v. Town of Forks, 38 Wash.App. 656, 688 P.2d 526 (1984), the court found that the  'relationship' between the officer and [the intoxicated person] was too tenuous and unsubstantial to warrant application of [the special relationship] exception. Id. at 663, 688 P.2d at 531. We agree that [a] police officer's mere contact with an intoxicated person hardly creates the same type of relationship as exists between a psychiatrist and his patient, or a custodian and his inmate. Id. at 664, 688 P.2d at 531. 43 Appellant argues that, even if a municipal authority would not be liable under Washington law on the facts of this case, there exists a distinctly federal relationship undisturbed by state law. This claim of a uniquely governmental relationship is premised on the military's alleged power to exert complete authority over off-duty servicemen. Appellant claims that this relationship imposes a duty on the government to control persons in Rowe's condition for the protection of the public. 44 This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is clear that liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act is based on an application of state law. We reject appellant's attempt to create a separate cause of action based on a military relationship where liability would not lie under state law. 45 Second, we find that the Supreme Court's decisions in cases following Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), while not controlling on the facts of this case, establish clear policy guidance for courts considering an examination of military conduct. Rather than encouraging an inquiry into military procedures under the FTCA, these cases persuade us that, as a matter of public policy, federal courts should refrain from interfering in matters of military structure, supervision, and discipline. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983) (Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique structure of the Military Establishment.). 46 More recently, in United States v. Shearer, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985), the Supreme Court observed that allowing recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the negligence of military employees 47 would mean that commanding officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and how to place restraints on a soldier's off-base conduct. But, as we noted in Chappell v. Wallace, such 'complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, ... and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments.'  48 Id. 105 S.Ct. at 3044 (citations omitted). 49 We refuse to accept appellant's attempt to avoid the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and we refuse to intervene into uniquely military considerations involving internal discipline and control of soldiers on a military reservation. 50 Based on our independent review, we conclude that the government owed no duty to Louie to control the actions of an intoxicated but orderly serviceman, and that the government is, therefore, not subject to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages arising from the death of Mr. Louie. We affirm the judgment for the government. 10 51 AFFIRMED.