Opinion ID: 2296554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there evidence in the case legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict against the defendant?

Text: Western Maryland argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant its motions for a directed verdict at the end of the plaintiff's case, and at the end of the entire case, and its motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto, all grounded on the reasons: That there was no evidence legally sufficient to entitle Griffis to a verdict; That the evidence failed to show any duty owed Griffis or any breach of duty by Western Maryland; That the evidence failed to show that Western Maryland had any actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition; and, That the evidence failed to show any primary negligence on the part of Western Maryland. The duty owed by a landowner to business invitees, a class of which Western Maryland concedes that Griffis is a member, has been clearly defined in several recent cases. Honolulu Ltd. v. Cain, 244 Md. 590, 224 A.2d 433 (1966) involved a suit for damages for injuries sustained by a customer who slipped on ice which had formed at a shopping center parking lot. In holding that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of primary negligence, we said: The duty of an occupant of land toward his business `invitee' rested, in its inception, upon an implied representation of safety, `a holding out of the premises as suitable for the purpose for which the visitor came   ', Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, Selected Topics of the Law of Torts 243, 261 (1953). The word `invitee' itself, conveys the idea that the place is held out to the visitor as prepared for his reception. The occupant does not, of course, become an insurer of the safety of those who accept his invitation. But when the public is led to believe that premises have been offered for its entry, the law is clear that the occupant assumes a duty of reasonable care to see that the place is safe for the purpose. The duty extends to those who are injured when they enter in response to the invitation.    The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second [1965] Sec. 343, sets forth the standards governing the relationship of landowner and business invitee with respect to a hazardous condition. The landowner is subject to liability for harm caused by a natural or artificial condition on his land if (a) he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the condition, (b) he should expect that invitees will not discover the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, (c) he invites entry upon the land without (1) making the condition safe, or (2) giving a warning. These principles have been approved many times by this Court. Yaniger v. Calvert Bldg. & Const. Co., 183 Md. 285, 289, 37 A.2d 263, 265 (1944); Evans v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 223 Md. 235, 239, 164 A.2d 273, 276 (1960); Morrison v. Suburban Trust Co., 213 Md. 64, 130 A.2d 915 (1957); Glaze v. Benson, 205 Md. 26, 106 A.2d 124 (1954). 244 Md. at 595-96 Honolulu has been cited with approval or followed in a series of snow and ice cases, including Abraham v. Moler, 253 Md. 215, 252 A.2d 68 (1969); Gast, Inc. v. Kitchner, 247 Md. 677, 234 A.2d 127 (1967); Raff v. Acme Markets, Inc., 247 Md. 591, 233 A.2d 786 (1967); New Highland Recreation, Inc. v. Fries, 246 Md. 597, 229 A.2d 89 (1967); Dorsch v. S.S. Kresge Co., 245 Md. 697, 226 A.2d 899 (1967); Weisner v. Mayor & Council of Rockville, 245 Md. 225, 225 A.2d 648 (1967). It is interesting to note that Judge Harris, quite properly we think, incorporated the rule of Restatement, Torts 2d (1965), § 343 in his charge to the jury. There was evidence from which the jury could have found that Western Maryland expected pedestrians to use the road where Griffis fell, particularly since no pedestrian walkway was provided; that 21 men had spent 272 1/2 man hours cleaning snow and salting ramps, aprons, downspouts and streets on Piers 7, 8, and 9 between 7 A.M. and 10 P.M. on Thursday, 3 March; and that no cleaning or salting of streets had been done between 10 P.M. on Thursday and 8 A.M. on Saturday, when Griffis fell, although there had been high winds, freezing temperatures, and a small amount of additional snowfall. There was also testimony that the area where Griffis fell was covered with ice, although concealed by a light layer of snow, and that all of the roads in the terminal were free of ice and snow except for the particular section where Griffis fell. There was evidence to support a jury finding that Griffis saw the snow on the road, but did not see the ice which caused him to fall and had no reason to suspect that it was there. Whether Western Maryland knew or should have known of the dangerous condition was a jury question. Blanco v. J.C. Penney Co., 251 Md. 707, 714, 248 A.2d 645 (1968); Stein v. Overlook Joint Venture, 246 Md. 75, 227 A.2d 226 (1967). We conclude that there was sufficient evidence of primary negligence to take the case to the jury.