Opinion ID: 1147228
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutor's Comment Concerning Defendant's Statement in Allocution

Text: Over the objections of the prosecution, the trial court permitted defendant to make a statement in allocution. Later, during the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor made several references to defendant's statement and twice noted that defendant was not subject to cross-examination concerning the allocutory statement. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's remarks concerning cross-examination. The trial court, in response, explained to the jury: [T]he court has allowed, in this case, the defendant to exercise what is known as a right of allocution ... it's the matter by which a party may make a statement in these particular types of instances. The party, of course, who makes the statement is not under oath and, as a witness on the stand, of course, is not subject to direct cross-examination. (16) Defendant now contends that the prosecutor's comments concerning the lack of cross-examination constituted prejudicial error. The contention is without merit. We have held that the defendant does not have the `right to address the sentencer without being subject to cross-examination' in capital cases. ( People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 888-890 [248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355].) As we recently explained in People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 511 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]: Robbins is persuasive that the right of allocution is unavailable in California capital penalty trials. Its principal purpose in such cases would be to cloak defendant's right to testify with a unique immunity from cross-examination by the People. Recognition of a right to allocution is unnecessary to a fair trial and runs counter to the [death penalty] statute's purpose of providing the sentencer with all relevant information bearing on the appropriate penalty. In light of our holding that neither the Constitution nor the death penalty statute gives defendant the right to testify with a unique immunity from examination by the People ( People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 511), we can hardly fault the prosecutor here for simply calling attention to the fact that defendant's testimony was not subject to cross-examination. Defendant's assertions that the prosecutor's remarks impermissibly implied that he possessed unrevealed facts to impeach defendant's statement, and constituted improper comment on defendant's silence, are patently without merit. We have examined the record and find nothing in the prosecutor's remarks to support either claim.