Opinion ID: 477929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Intentional Torts Limitations Period

Text: 40 Although neither party raised the point, the concurring opinion notes that the D.C. Code contains two statutes of limitations applicable to personal injury claims. The first provides a one-year limitations period for several enumerated torts. See D.C.Code Sec. 12-301(4) (applicable to actions for libel, slander, assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment). The second, D.C.Code Sec. 12-301(8), provides a three-year limitations period for all claims not otherwise provided for. With the exception of the enumerated intentional torts, all other claims for personal injuries, intentional and nonintentional, are governed by Sec. 301(8). See Lawrence v. Acree, 665 F.2d 1319, 1323 n. 5 (D.C.Cir.1981); Habib v. Raytheon Co., 616 F.2d 1204, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1980) (dicta); Alley v. Dodge Hotel, 501 F.2d 880, 882 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1974). The parties apparently assumed that were we to conclude that the D.C. personal injury statute of limitations applies to Sec. 1981 claims, we would follow Macklin and borrow Sec. 301(8) to provide the appropriate personal injury limitation period. The concurring opinion, however, argues that Sec. 301(4) is the correct statute of limitations. 41 Unlike in the case of jurisdictional questions, the court need not raise statute of limitations issues sua sponte. Reliance on a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense and is waived if a party does not raise it in a timely fashion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c); Lopez v. Rodriguez, 668 F.2d 1376, 1378-79 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1981); Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662, 665 (8th Cir.1979). C&P has not cited Sec. 301(4) in any of its pleadings or briefs and has thereby waived this particular defense. We consider the issue in dicta only, and only in order to answer Judge Buckley's discussion of the question in his concurrence. 42 There appears to be a growing split in the circuits as to whether general tort statutes of limitations or intentional tort limitations should apply to Sec. 1983. While several courts have concluded that the specific intentional tort statute of limitations controls Sec. 1983 claims, see Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2902, 90 L.Ed.2d 988 (1986); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916, 920 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 603 (1986); Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250, 1255 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 893, 88 L.Ed.2d 926 (1986), several other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. See Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir.1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 2111, 85 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985); Hamilton v. City of Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613, 614 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2111, 85 L.Ed.2d 476 (1985); Greenfield v. District of Columbia, 623 F.Supp. 47, 48 (D.D.C.1985). Cf. Saldivar v. Cadena, 622 F.Supp. 949, 955 (W.D.Wis.1985). 20 43 The application of Garcia to a Sec. 1983 claim in a jurisdiction that has two personal injury statutes of limitations is not directly before the court. We note, however, that the Court in Garcia did not rest its conclusion that Sec. 1983 claims were best characterized as personal injury claims on the ground that the statute was intended merely to provide a remedy for physical violence. Rather, the Court also emphasized that violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's antidiscrimination command are injuries to the individual rights of the person. 471 U.S. at 277, 105 S.Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added). See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n. 10, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 1009 n. 10, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974) (suggesting that actions to redress racial discrimination should be treated as dignitary torts) (citing C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d ed. 1969) ). Thus we might well conclude, if directly confronted with the question, that Sec. 301(8) should control claims brought under Sec. 1983. 44 On this point it is instructive to compare the analysis adopted by the courts in the Second Circuit in applying New York law. Like the District of Columbia, New York has a statute of limitations governing several specific intentional torts, see N.Y.Civ.Prac.Law Sec. 215(3) (McKinney Supp.1986) (one year), and another governing all other personal injury tort actions, id. at Sec. 214(5) (three years). Nonetheless, each court in New York that has considered the issue has concluded that the general tort statute of limitations should be applied to Sec. 1983 actions. See, e.g., Villante v. Department of Corrections of City of New York, 786 F.2d at 520 n. 2 (dicta); Okure v. Owens, 625 F.Supp. 1568, 1570 (N.D.N.Y.1986); Williams v. Allen, 616 F.Supp. 653, 655 (E.D.N.Y.1985); Ladson v. New York City Police Dep't, 614 F.Supp. 878, 879 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Rodrigues v. Village of Larchmont, 608 F.Supp. 467, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y.1985). Cf. Martin v. City of New York, 627 F.Supp. 892, 900 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (applying the three-year statute to a Sec. 1985 claim). 45 The case before the court, however, involves Sec. 1981, not Sec. 1983. Even if we were to agree with those courts that have concluded that the intentional tort statute should be applied to Sec. 1983 claims, it is far from clear that the same analysis should apply in a Sec. 1981 suit. Like Sec. 1983, Sec. 1981 is best characterized as a remedy for personal injury torts, see text supra at 1421-22, but unlike Sec. 1983, it was not designed to provide a remedy for intentional torts such as assaults or batteries. Rather, Sec. 1981 primarily ensures equal rights to make and enforce contracts, equal access to judicial process, and equal rights under law. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. Even though claims for violation of these rights are personal injury claims, they cannot accurately be characterized as intentional tort claims of the sort enumerated in Sec. 301(4). Thus it would be inappropriate to apply the one-year intentional tort statute to Sec. 1981 claims. 21 46 This court has already found, in Macklin v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.1973), that the three-year limitation period set out in Sec. 301(8) is the most appropriate period for Sec. 1981 claims. Although the Supreme Court's Garcia decision does require that we re-examine the Macklin finding, we see nothing in Garcia that conflicts with Macklin. Unlike cases in other circuits whose case-by-case approach to statutes of limitations for Sec. 1983 actions has been changed in response to Garcia, see Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir.1985); Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir.1985), our Macklin decision arrived at a single statute of limitations to be applied to Sec. 1981 cases in general. 478 F.2d at 994. This is precisely the approach mandated by the Supreme Court to avoid unnecessary and costly litigation of collateral matters in civil rights cases. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 275, 105 S.Ct. at 1946-47. We see no principle enunciated in Garcia that alters our finding in Macklin or that requires or suggests adoption of the intentional tort statute of limitations set out in D.C. Code Sec. 12-301(4). 47 The Macklin opinion did not explicitly consider whether Sec. 301(4)'s one-year limitations period might apply to Sec. 1981 cases. In fact, this court has never ruled directly on the applicability of Sec. 301(4) to either Sec. 1981 or Sec. 1983. This circuit has evaluated the one-year limitations period, however, as applied to Bivens (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971)) and Sec. 1985(3) actions. In Bivens actions this court has found Sec. 301(4) to be the most appropriate limitations period for constitutional torts specifically listed in the statute. Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 (D.C. Cir.1985) (defamation action); McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366, 372-74 (D.C. Cir.1983) (false arrest). 22 The McClam opinion, however, was careful to distinguish Macklin. The Sec. 1983 claim in Macklin, wrote Judge Bork, was for racial discrimination, clearly not analogous to the torts listed in section 12-301(4), 697 F.2d at 372, unlike the false arrest claim in McClam. This language clearly implies that the three-year period would be appropriate for Sec. 1981 racial discrimination claims. 48 This court recently clarified its position on these issues by specifically holding that the three-year limitations period in Sec. 301(8) applies both to most Bivens actions and to Sec. 1985(3) actions. Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir.1984). The Hobson panel rejected an analogy between the plaintiffs' cause of action for deprivation of First Amendment free speech rights, and the torts set out in Sec. 301(4). The panel read McClam to adopt the one-year limitations period only for Bivens actions analogous to the common law actions mentioned in Sec. 301(4). 737 F.2d at 32 n. 99. On remand the defendants once again claimed that the one-year period was the applicable provision. Their argument relied on the Supreme Court's intervening Garcia opinion and cases in other circuits that subsequently adopted intentional tort limitations periods for these actions. The district court rejected this approach. Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F.Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1985). Judge Oberdorfer found that the three-year statute establishes the general personal injury statute of limitations period for the purposes of Garcia, and that the three-year provision better reflects the federal interests embodied in Bivens and Sec. 1985(3) actions. He rejected the defendants' reliance on post-Garcia cases in other circuits that adopted intentional tort limitations periods, finding that those opinions misread Garcia. 625 F.Supp. at 467-68. As Judge Oberdorfer noted, the Garcia Court easily could have specified that the 'one most appropriate statute of limitations' is that statute which is applicable to intentional torts. The Court conspicuously failed to do so. Instead it concluded that Sec. 1983 claims are best characterized as 'personal injury actions'   . Id. at 468. 49 Our decisions in Macklin, McClam, Wilson and Brennan strongly suggest that Sec. 301(8)'s three-year limitations period applies to Sec. 1981 actions in this circuit. These decisions, coupled with the language of Sec. 1981 itself, clearly foreclose application of a one-year intentional tort limitations period to this case. 50 Applying the three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries to the facts of this case quickly leads to the conclusion that the district court erred in dismissing this suit as time-barred. Appellant alleges that she was discriminatorily terminated on April 1, 1984. Her suit was filed exactly three years and one day later, on April 2, 1984. Because April 1, 1984 was a Sunday, however, the limitations period was extended an extra day. See text supra at 1418 (limitations period extended under federal and state practice when last day falls on a Sunday). Consequently, appellant's suit, insofar as it alleged a discriminatory termination, was timely filed and the district court erred in concluding otherwise.