Opinion ID: 1421686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Gross Negligence in the Instant Case

Text: It is well established that on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is required to view the evidence forecast in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Parish, 350 N.C. at 236, 513 S.E.2d at 550. Further, all inferences must be resolved against the movant. Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 318 N.C. 352, 355-56, 348 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1986); Kidd v. Early, 289 N.C. 343, 352, 222 S.E.2d 392, 399 (1976). In the instant case, defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's gross negligence claim was properly denied by the trial court after a consideration of all relevant evidence presented; however, the Court of Appeals erroneously reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. Regrettably, today's majority opinion omitted certain facts found in the record that were presented to the trial court at the time of defendants' motion for summary judgment. Therefore, in keeping with our Court's duty to consider all materials in evaluating a party's motion for summary judgment, my analysis and conclusion differ significantly from the majority's. Dendy v. Watkins, 288 N.C. 447, 452, 219 S.E.2d 214, 217 (1975) (When the motion for summary judgment comes on to be heard, the court may consider the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, oral testimony and documentary materials....). The speed with which Officer Kelly operated his vehicle during the incident in question is not an all-inclusive range of forty-five to sixty miles per hour. The record reflects the specific speed of Officer Kelly's vehicle at specific locations up until the point of impact with the pedestrian-plaintiff. This speed determination was rendered from an accident reconstruction expert's scientific calculations as to defendant's vehicular speed based upon Durham Police Department video footage reflecting the vehicle's travel over specific periods of time. For example, at the time Officer Kelly approached the railroad tracks, the record reflects he was traveling approximately seventy-three miles per hour; at the point of impact with Ms. Jones, Officer Kelly was traveling between forty-five and sixty miles per hour. Disregard of such specific and reliable scientific data and subsequent use of one general range of speed is duplicitous and misconstrues the factual circumstances surrounding Officer Kelly's actions. Therefore, our analysis of Officer Kelly's operation of the vehicle with regards to speed should not be restricted solely to the point in time at which Officer Kelly struck Ms. Jones. The majority in the instant case creates three dispositive factors for gross negligence analysis and evaluates each factor independently, rather than applying the totality of circumstances analysis which has been historically associated with negligence jurisprudence. See Charles E. Daye & Mark W. Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts, § 16.20, at 155-56 (2d ed. 1999) (Negligence is necessarily a relative term, and every case of negligence is controlled by its own set of facts.... [T]hus, all surroundings or attendant circumstances must be taken into account.). Therefore, the factors in the instant case are interrelated and dependent and cannot be evaluated in isolation to determine whether gross negligence occurred. Accordingly, I would submit the totality of Officer Kelly's actions in respondingfrom the speeding at up to seventy-four miles per hour through a densely populated area at nine o'clock in the morning, to the loss of control of his vehicle when it went airborne at the railroad tracks, to the subsequent driving on the wrong side of the road, and through the failure to brake before striking a pedestriancollectively reflects gross negligence and demonstrates a pattern of reckless disregard for the safety of all citizens. As previously set out, each time this Court has applied the gross negligence standard under N.C.G.S. § 20-145, the Court addressed law enforcement pursuit activities rather than routine response calls. Thus, the majority's direct application of this precedent to the present case is misplaced. A pursuit activity entails a greater sense of urgency on the part of law enforcement personnel because of a known danger presented to society by a fleeing suspect. A response activity, especially when the responding officer is unaware of the situation to which he or she is responding, does not present nearly the same urgency as the pursuit of a known, fleeing law violator. Thus, because of the general lack of exigent circumstances characteristic of response activities, as compared to pursuit activities, the standard of care as to the former should not be given the same deference as that applied to the latter. [11] The differentiation in analysis between pursuit and response activities is not only grounded in common sense, but also in the very law enforcement policies then governing Officer Kelly's conduct. The Durham Police Department distinguishes pursuit-related officer conduct from response-related officer conduct. The different activities have separate and dissimilar lists of factors to consider when participating in such activities. For example, police pursuits in Durham are allowed only when the police officer reasonably believes that the violator has committed a violent felony ... and the officer reasonably believes that, by the nature of the crime(s) committed, the violator poses a threat of serious injury to the public or other police officers if he/she is not apprehended immediately. Durham Police Dep't, Gen. Order 4019 R-2 at 3. Even if Officer Kelly's actions were construed as a pursuit, he was in contravention of his own department's policies that were designed to regulate his conduct. He had no knowledge a crime had been committed, much less a violent felony. Once a pursuit has begun, Durham also requires its officers to consider factors such as whether the identity of the violator is known, the likelihood of a successful stop, external conditions (such as population density, road conditions, and weather), and officer-specific factors (such as an officer's driving skills, his or her familiarity with the roads, and the condition of the officer's vehicle)all of which weigh against the actions taken by Officer Kelly. Id. at 4-5. Contrary to pursuit requirements, Durham lists more general considerations for officers when engaging in routine response situations, such as the unpredictable reaction of civilian drivers, the officer's view of all lanes of traffic at intersections, road conditions, and the increased hazard of driving left of the center line. Durham Police Dep't, Gen. Order 4051, at 2-3. Most telling, the Durham Police Department has recently amended General Order 4051 governing emergency vehicle operation to include a provision directly applicable to the present case: All officers responding to calls shall limit the speed of their vehicle to a maximum of 15 miles per hour above the posted speed. Id. 4051 R-1, at 3 (Jan. 10, 2005). Though this subsequent remedial measure could not be considered as evidence of negligence by the City of Durham or Officer Kelly under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, see N.C. R. Evid. 407; Lowe v. Elliott, 109 N.C. 581, 584, 14 S.E. 51, 51-52 (1891), I commend the Durham Police Department for its recognition of the need for such an amendment mandating that their officers' routine response calls be executed consistent with their responsibility to act with due regard for the safety of others. Further, the majority relies upon the North Carolina Justice Academy's Basic Law Enforcement Training Manual to justify Officer Kelly's evasive maneuver taken to avoid hitting the plaintiff. However, while [e]vasive steering or sudden lane change is one accepted method of collision avoidance for law enforcement vehicular operations, the acceptable method of collision avoidance listed first in the manual is [q]uick, sudden braking. N.C. Justice Acad., Basic Law Enforcement Training: Student § 18F, at 48. The BLET Manual, required by the North Carolina Administrative Code, 12 NCAC 9B .0205(c) (June 2004), to be used in all North Carolina law enforcement training courses, also specifically states: In those instances where an emergency driving response is justified, the officer should remember that excessive speeds are seldom, if ever, warranted during the response. N.C. Justice Acad., Basic Law Enforcement Training: Student § 18F, at 52. In the instant case, Officer Kelly's actions were not only contrary to his own department's mandate, but also statewide BLET policies. Additionally, Officer Kelly was engaged in a response activity at approximately 9:00 in the morning. This difference in time between the instant case and the majority's cited precedent, all of which concern nighttime incidents, is crucial to the analysis of this case because of the difference in pedestrian and vehicular traffic density on public roads at the different times. I cannot agree with the majority's assertion that high speed vehicular activity is more dangerous at the quiet, desolate hour of 4:00 a.m. than it is at 9:00 a.m., during the beginning of the work day. Evaluating the different actions or circumstances leading up to the traffic accident in the present case, and applying the facts to our jurisprudence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it is clear to me defendant's actions rise to the level of gross negligence, if not pure recklessness. Specifically, the record reflects that: 1. When Officer Kelly responded to Officer Fox's call for backup at about 9:00 a.m. on 15 September 2000, Officer Kelly was approximately two and one half miles away from Officer Fox's location, and he knew or should have known of the eight additional officers who were also responding to the call; 2. Officer Fox was not alone at the scene of the domestic disturbance complaint, but was accompanied by Officer McDonough at the time she requested backup; 3. Officer Kelly knew or should have known the posted speed limit on the street where the traffic accident occurred was in fact thirty-five miles per hour. Further, he admitted during deposition any speed over forty-five miles per hour on this particular stretch of street would constitute disregard for the safety of others; 4. An accident reconstruction expert estimated Officer Kelly's speed over the course of his travel to be anywhere from forty-five miles per hour to seventy-four miles per hour; 5. Officer Kelly, based upon his familiarity with the area, knew or should have known the section of the road on which he was speeding was a densely populated urban area, especially near the railroad tracks where a tree was located and people frequently were hanging out; 6. Officer Kelly knew or should have known there was an incline at the railroad tracks followed by a serious dip which he was about to cross, he could not see any pedestrians until he came over the hill, and the intersection after the railroad tracks was complex in design; 7. Due to the manner of operation and excessive speed, Officer Kelly lost control of his vehicle, causing his vehicle to go airborne after proceeding over the railroad tracks; 8. At the point of impact with the pedestrian, Officer Kelly was operating his vehicle on the wrong side of the road, had not applied his brakes, and was traveling at a speed of forty-five to sixty miles per hour; and 9. As a direct consequence of Officer Kelly's actions, the pedestrian was hit by Officer Kelly's vehicle and was thrown six feet into the air, after which she landed on the pavement and came to rest seventy-six feet away from the location where she was struck. The impact of Officer Kelly's vehicle with the pedestrian severely broke the pedestrian's shoulder and both of her legs. As stated above, when determining whether a law enforcement officer acted willfully, the Court must consider whether the totality of the officer's actions was done purposely, knowingly, or without yielding to reason[,] and not consider if he intended the ensuing result. Yancey, 354 N.C. at 52, 550 S.E.2d at 157; Foster, 197 N.C. at 191, 148 S.E. at 37. Officer Kelly operated his police vehicle in the present case knowingly or without yielding to reason. His unwarranted decision to travel at such a high speed and to take evasive action instead of applying the brakes upon seeing the pedestrian in the street evidences his failure to act without reason and is contrary to recognized law enforcement policy and procedures. Additionally, the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's order denying summary judgment was incorrect because a reasonable jury could find Officer Kelly acted wantonly or  needlessly, manifesting a reckless indifference to the rights of others. Foster, 197 N.C. at 191, 148 S.E. at 38 (emphasis added). Surely, Officer Kelly's actions, considering he was engaged in response and not pursuit activities, were needless and manifested a reckless indifference for the public. Officer Kelly's knowledge of the area's dense population, the characteristics of the road, his disregard for a safe speed (as high as seventy-four miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone), and subsequent airborne travel are all factors sufficient to lead a jury to find Officer Kelly acted with a reckless disregard of the safety of others and contrary to local and national law enforcement doctrine, [12] the intent of the General Assembly, and our established jurisprudence. Further, in both the record and at oral argument, it was acknowledged that Officer Kelly's response to Officer Fox's call contradicted the Durham Police Department's Policy on Response Priorities. Durham Police Dep't, Gen. Order 4001. At the time Officer Kelly began his response to Officer Fox, who was accompanied by another officer at the scene, he was aware at least three, and perhaps as many as eight, other officers were independently responding to the initial call for backup. The maximum authorized number of officers permitted by Durham Police Department Policy to respond to an initial request for backup that does not specify the number of units needed is threetwo officers and one supervisor. Id. Accordingly, Officer Kelly's response to Officer Fox's request for assistance, even if it had been executed with due regard for the safety of others, was not in accordance with Durham Police Department Policy to which he was mandated to adhere. By ignoring established policy, Officer Kelly knowingly engaged in an unnecessary response to a call for backup. In the simplest of terms, when a call for backup is made, every officer cannot respond. If they did, the citizens of Durham would find themselves unprotected; this is why Durham limits the number of officers allowed to respond to calls for assistance, an order specifically ignored by Officer Kelly. Thus, Officer Kelly, or any other reasonably prudent police officer in this response situation, should have realized the high rate of speed he elected to operate his vehicle was not only more dangerous than beneficial to public safety, but also completely unnecessary considering the number of officers present at the scene and responding to the call for backup. I surely do not intend to convey a lack of appreciation for the dangerous and admirable work our responsible law enforcement officers perform on a daily basis. They are truly the thin blue line that protects society from the criminal element, and they should be afforded every reasonable deference. This having been said, when an officer acts with such blatant disregard for public safety, as witnessed in the instant case, I simply cannot turn a blind eye to the resulting harm. As the Supreme Court of Tennessee recognized: [P]olice officers have a duty to apprehend law violators and ... the decision to commence or continue pursuit of a fleeing suspect is, by necessity, made rapidly. In the final analysis, however, a police officer's paramount duty is to protect the public. Unusual circumstances may make it reasonable to adopt a course of conduct which causes a high risk of harm to the public. However, such conduct is not justified unless the end itself is of sufficient social value. The general public has a significant interest in not being subjected to unreasonable risks of injury as the police carry out their duties. We agree with the Texas Supreme Court's observation, that [p]ublic safety should not be thrown to the winds in the heat of the chase. Haynes v. Hamilton Cty., 883 S.W.2d at 611 (footnote and citation omitted). A reasonable juror could find Officer Kelly's actions, from the beginning of his response to Officer Fox's call for backup until his collision with Ms. Jones, were grossly negligent. Officer Kelly acted without yielding to reason, needlessly, and with a strong degree of certainty that the risk his actions posed to the public outweighed his unwarranted response. Officer Kelly's actions were arguably reckless misconduct according to our precedent, and thus his actions easily satisfy our gross negligence standard. Regrettably, if the truth be known, Officer Kelly's behavior in total disregard for the rights and safety of others is, in reality, more than gross negligenceit is simply reprehensible conduct. On that day, Officer Kelly was the law, and he acted as he did because he could. The ultimate tragedy is the pedestrian-plaintiff, an innocent bystander, will not have her day in court. I would submit if the shoe were on the other foot, and Officer Kelly was performing his police functions and observed a citizen operating his vehicle in this manner, Officer Kelly would have not only issued a citation for the citizen's reckless behavior, but would have likely placed the citizen in handcuffs and taken him before a magistrate. Therefore, I believe whether Officer Kelly's actions were in fact grossly negligent is a question that should have been submitted to the jury for their determination. Unfortunately, the majority today unnecessarily contorts the facts of the instant case and erroneously applies an ambiguous standard. As a result, the majority's decision leaves our citizens and our courts with one question: If this case is not gross negligence, then what is gross negligence? I respectfully dissent.