Opinion ID: 1919200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Amend a Complaint

Text: We first address the issue on which conflict exists: whether a trial court has any discretion to deny a plaintiff's first amendment to the complaint before a responsive pleading is served. We hold that the plain language of the rule grants trial courts no such discretion. The Fourth District held that it is incontrovertible that plaintiff had every right under the ruleso early in the caseto amend his complaint without leave of court, and therefore the legal sufficiency of the original complaint was clearly moot. 788 So.2d at 1059. The court then discussed other cases: There were some earlier cases outside this district finding a residual discretion in the trial judge to deny leave to amend when sought by a party before the filing of a responsive pleading, but even they go on to hold that it is an abuse of discretion to deny the amendment unless as a matter of law plaintiff clearly could never state a cause of action. Id. at 1059. The court cited Volpicella, 136 So.2d at 232, as one of those cases. In Volpicella, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss without explaining the grounds for dismissal and without granting plaintiff leave to amend. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court should have granted leave to amend. The Second District reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. In doing so, the court stated: Under [rule 1.190], a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. This rule has not yet been construed as depriving a trial court of discretion to withhold leave to amend a pleading to which no response has been served. The rule does however indicate that a denial of leave to amend in such a case amounts to an abuse of discretion unless a complaint is clearly not amendable. Id. [2] In Forum, the Fourth District doubt[ed] the correctness of the second district's assertion of residual discretion. Rule 1.190(a) states a rule, not a discretion, as regards to amending before a responsive pleading is filed. 788 So.2d at 1059. Thus, the two cases conflict on whether the rule grants trial courts any discretion to deny a plaintiff's first amendment to the complaint before an answer is served. We agree with the Fourth District, as we explain below. Rule 1.190(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permits the amendment of a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). The rule reads in its entirety: A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar, may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. If a party files a motion to amend a pleading, the party shall attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 10 days after service of the amended pleading unless the court otherwise orders. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). [3] Thus, by its terms the rule provides for amendment as of right (first sentence) and amendment by agreement or leave of court (second sentence), depending on the circumstances. Several courts have recognized that the first sentence of the rule grants plaintiffs an automatic right to amend the complaint once before a responsive pleading is served. See, e.g., Vanderberg v. Rios, 798 So.2d 806, 807 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Fusilier v. Markov, 676 So.2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Posey v. Magill, 530 So.2d 985, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Abston v. Bryan, 519 So.2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Sys. Council U-4 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 307 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Bryant v. Small, 271 So.2d 808, 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Moreover, a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading because it is not a pleading under the rules. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a) (designating permissible pleadings and providing that [n]o other pleadings shall be allowed); see also Vanderberg, 798 So.2d at 807 (noting that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading) (citing Forum, 788 So.2d at 1057). Therefore, the filing of a motion to dismiss does not terminate a plaintiff's absolute right to amend the complaint once as a matter of course. Thus, the district court was correct in determining that Forum could amend his complaint without leave of court, regardless of the pending motion to dismiss, and that the trial court erred in refusing to recognize the amended complaint. Under the plain language of the first sentence of rule 1.190(a), a plaintiff has an absolute right to amend the complaint before a responsive pleading is served. Because Boca Burger had not served its answer, and had only filed a motion to dismiss, Forum had the right to file an amended complaint, even if that amendment was filed on the day ofor even just beforethe hearing on Boca Burger's motion to dismiss the original complaint. The rule clearly grants a plaintiff one free amendment to perfect the complaint before an answer is served. A judge's discretion to deny amendment of a complaint arises only after the defendant files an answer or if the plaintiff already has exercised the right to amend once. At that time, the second and fourth sentences of rule 1.190(a) apply:  Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. . . . Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires. (Emphasis added.) Although Volpicella implied that a trial court may deny leave to amend where the complaint is clearly not amendable, a court only has such discretion under the second sentence of the rule, not under the first. The cases that have recognized a court's discretion to deny amendment in those circumstances concerned either a plaintiff's second (or subsequent) amendment or an amendment requested after the answer was filed. See, e.g., Fla. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. State, 832 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that where the plaintiff had amended once before a responsive pleading had been served and once again after the defendant filed an answer, the trial court abused discretion in refusing leave to amend the second amended complaint); Kohn v. City of Miami Beach, 611 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the plaintiff failed in four attempts to cure the defects in the complaint); Bouldin v. Okaloosa County, 580 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (stating that when a party seeks to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading has been served, leave should be granted unless the court finds a clear abuse of the privilege to amend or the complaint is clearly not amendable); see also Dimick v. Ray, 774 So.2d 830, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for leave to amend plaintiff's first amended complaint); Adams v. Knabb Turpentine Co., 435 So.2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (same); Highlands County Sch. Bd. v. K.D. Hedin Constr., Inc., 382 So.2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (same). As the Fourth District held, a court has no discretion to deny an amendment under the first sentence of the rule. A defendant may contest the legal viability of a first amended complaint by moving to dismiss the amended complaint, not by contesting the plaintiff's right to amend. We disapprove Volpicella to the extent it holds that a trial court retains any discretion to deny an amendment under such circumstancesregardless of whether the plaintiff simply files an amended complaint or requests leave of court to file one.