Opinion ID: 836303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sanction in case 96-129

Text: We begin with case 96-129, which involved the Poch matter. In determining the appropriate sanction for the accused's misconduct, we look to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards) and to this court's case law. In re Meyer (II), 328 Or. 220, 226, 970 P.2d 647 (1999). We first consider three factors: (1) the ethical duty violated by the accused's misconduct; (2) the accused's mental state at the time of the misconduct; and (3) the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct. ABA Standard 3.0; Meyer (II), 328 Or. at 226, 970 P.2d 647. We then make an initial determination of the appropriate sanction, based upon those factors. Meyer (II), 328 Or. at 226, 970 P.2d 647. Next, we consider the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors, and the extent to which the sanction should be adjusted accordingly. ABA Standard 3.0; Meyer (II), 328 Or. at 226, 970 P.2d 647. Finally, in determining the appropriate sanction, this court also considers Oregon case law. Meyer (II), 328 Or. at 226, 970 P.2d 647. The ABA Standards assume that the most important ethical duties are those that a lawyer owes to the client. ABA Standards at 5; In re Sousa, 323 Or. 137, 145, 915 P.2d 408 (1996). We find that the accused violated his duty to Poch to act with diligence and promptness in handling her case. See ABA Standard 4.4 (describing that duty). As to mental state, the ABA Standards define knowledge as the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. ABA Standards at 7. The ABA Standards define negligence as the failure of a lawyer to heed a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. Id. The Bar contends that the accused acted with knowledge when he neglected the Poch matter. The accused argues that he acted negligently. We conclude that the accused's state of mind changed during the course of handling the Poch matter. As to the neglect that occurred between May and December 1995, there is no evidence that the accused acted knowingly. However, after being reinstated in March 1996, the accused reviewed his case list, including the Poch case, with Chally on a monthly basis, which demonstrates that he continually must have been aware of the status of the case. We therefore find that, as to the neglect that occurred from March to mid-July 1996, the accused acted with conscious awareness of the    attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. ABA Standards at 7. Turning to injury, the only evidence of actual injury to Poch is that she suffered anxiety and frustration as a result of the accused's neglect of her legal matter. See In re Schaffner, 325 Or. 421, 426-27, 939 P.2d 39 (1997) (client's anxiety and frustration can constitute actual injury under ABA Standards). [3] Further, we infer from the circumstances particularly the accused's failure to take action for several months after Poch's case was dismissed and to advise Poch of that factalso caused potential injury to Poch's legal interests. See generally In re Garvey, 325 Or. 34, 43, 932 P.2d 549 (1997) (accused lawyer's neglect caused potential injury to clients' legal interests). The ABA Standards suggest that, as a preliminary matter, a public reprimand would be the appropriate sanction for the accused's misconduct in case 96-129. See ABA Standard 4.43 (reprimand generally appropriate when lawyer does not act with reasonable diligence in representing client and causes potential injury to client); ABA Standard 4.44 (admonition generally appropriate when lawyer does not act with reasonable diligence and causes little or no actual or potential injury). We now consider the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors that might affect our determination of the appropriate sanction. The first, and most significant, applicable aggravating factor is the accused's prior disciplinary record. See ABA Standard 9.22(a) (prior disciplinary offenses serve as aggravating factor). In addition to the neglect at issue in case 95-83, for which the accused stipulated that a 180-day suspension (with 120 days stayed) was an appropriate sanction, the accused also received a public reprimand in 1993 for violating DR 5-105(E), which prohibits multiple representations that would result in current client conflicts. In re Cohen, 316 Or. 657, 853 P.2d 286 (1993). The accused also has received two letters of admonition. Although this court in the past generally has considered such letters to be part of a lawyer's prior disciplinary record, see, e.g., In re Stauffer, 327 Or. 44, 68, 956 P.2d 967 (1998) (one letter of admonition constituted lawyer's only prior disciplinary offense), we now conclude, as explained below, that we shall consider a letter of admonition as an aggravating factor only in certain, limited circumstances. Letters of admonition fall within the discretion of the State Professional Responsibility Board (SPRB). The SPRB may issue such a letter to a lawyer against whom a complaint has been filed with the Bar, upon a determination that probable cause exists to believe that misconduct has occurred. The letter is issued in lieu of referring the complaint either to a Local Professional Responsibility Committee (LPRC) for investigation or to the Bar for filing a formal complaint. BR 2.5(d)(1). [4] Under the Bar Rules of Procedure, a letter of admonition neither is a sanction, nor is it part of a disciplinary proceeding or an accused lawyer's prior record. See BR 1.1(m) ([d]isciplinary [p]roceeding defined as proceeding in which Bar charges lawyer with misconduct in a formal complaint); BR 6.1 (listing sanctions available in disciplinary proceedings as public reprimand, suspension, disbarment, restitution, and reimbursement to Client Security Fund); BR 5.5(a) (defining [p]rior record, for purpose of prohibiting admission of same to prove character or to impeach, as any contested    disciplinary    decision of the Disciplinary Board or the Supreme Court which has become final). See also BR 3.6(c)(iv) (requiring stipulation for discipline to recite accused lawyer's prior record of reprimand, suspension or disbarment). Under the Bar Rules of Procedure, then, it is inaccurate to characterize an earlier letter of admonition as a sanction or as part of a prior record of discipline previously imposed upon an accused lawyer. [5] Notwithstanding the particular wording of those various rules, this court's case law demonstrates that a letter of admonition can be relevant to the determination of the appropriate sanction in a subsequent proceeding involving other misconduct. Indeed, this court has discussed the existence of earlier letters of admonition as part of an accused lawyer's prior disciplinary record in 15 cases; the court discounted the letters in only two of those cases. [6] The case law further demonstrates that a letter of admonition particularly can be significant if it involved misconduct that was similar to the misconduct at issue in the case at bar and if the accused lawyer received the letter close in time to the misconduct at issue. See In re Porter, 320 Or. 692, 708, 708 n. 9, 890 P.2d 1377 (1995) (court considered letter of admonition arising from misrepresentation and issued three months before lawyer engaged in misconduct involving dishonesty to be particularly significant in determining appropriate sanction for dishonesty). It also bears noting that, in In re Jones, 326 Or. 195, 200, 951 P.2d 149 (1997), this court considered the accused lawyer's two letters of admonition to be part of his disciplinary record when it set out the following construct for analyzing such a record: We take this opportunity to discuss our application of the `prior offenses' aggravating factor. First, that factor refers to offenses that have been adjudicated [7] prior to imposition of the sanction in the current case. Second, the following considerations also are an important part of our analysis: (1) the relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offense to the offense in the case at bar; (3) the number of prior offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction, specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the offense in the case at bar. Those considerations are important, because they can serve to heighten or diminish the significance of earlier misconduct. As this court has noted before, the ABA Standards, which represent a comprehensive authority concerning sanctions in lawyer discipline cases, serve as a helpful guide to this courtalthough not as binding authorityin determining issues surrounding the determination of the appropriate sanction in a given circumstance. See In re Morrow, 303 Or. 102, 107, 734 P.2d 867 (1987) (so stating). As to the issue before us here, the ABA Standards generally confirm the approach taken in this court's case law, as discussed above. See ABA Standard 2.6 (admonition available sanction for ethical misconduct); ABA Standard 8.3(b) (reprimand generally appropriate when lawyer has received admonition for same or similar misconduct, and causes injury or potential injury to client, public, legal system, or profession). Indeed, the prior disciplinary offenses aggravating factor, ABA Standard 9.22(a), incorporates any admonition previously imposed upon an accused lawyer as a sanction for earlier misconduct. See Commentary to ABA Standard 9.2, citing People v. Vernon, 660 P.2d 879, 881 (Colo.1982) (when considering appropriate sanction for conversion of client funds, Supreme Court of Colorado noted that accused lawyer had received three letters of admonition for misconduct occurring after misconduct at issue; lawyer had no other disciplinary record). See also generally American Bar Association's Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement (1996), Rule 10(A)(5) (admonition may serve as evidence of prior misconduct bearing upon sanction in subsequent proceeding). We draw the following principles from the foregoing sources of law and related materials. First, as noted, it is inaccurate under the Bar Rules of Procedure to characterize a letter of admonition as a form of sanction or as part of a prior record of discipline imposed upon an accused lawyer. Nonetheless, this court's case law demonstrates that such a letter can be relevant to the determination of the appropriate sanction in a subsequent proceeding for other misconduct, because it demonstrates that the accused lawyer has engaged in misconduct in the past. Finally, this court has taken particular note when an earlier letter of admonition involved the same or similar type of misconduct as that at issue in the case at bar, and when the earlier letter was issued shortly before the accused lawyer engaged in the misconduct at issue. We conclude that a letter of admonition should be considered under ABA Standard 9.22(a), as evidence of past misconduct, if the misconduct that gave rise to that letter was of the same or similar type as the misconduct at issue in the case at bar. If that circumstance is present, then it is appropriate to consider a letter of admonitiontogether with an accused lawyer's formal disciplinary record, if anyunder the construct set out in Jones, 326 Or. at 200, 951 P.2d 149. Stated differently, if the letter of admonition involved the same or similar type of misconduct as that presently at issue, then the remaining factors set out under Jones including the relative recency of the misconduct giving rise to the letter of admonition and whether the accused lawyer had received that letter before engaging in the misconduct at issueserve to heighten or diminish the significance of the misconduct that gave rise to the letter of admonition. However, if a letter of admonition involved misconduct wholly different in nature from the misconduct at issue in the case at bar, then we ordinarily shall not consider that letter under ABA Standard 9.22(a). In this case, the accused was admonished in May 1989, and again in December 1990, for violating DR 6-101(B). Because those two earlier letters of admonition concerned precisely the same type of misconduct at issue in the Poch matter, we shall apply the considerations set out in Jones to both those letters of admonition, as well as to the accused's formal disciplinary record, which included his stipulation for discipline in case 95-83 and his 1993 public reprimand for violating DR 5-105(E). We first note that, although the accused's earlier offenses were not relatively serious in isolation, it is significant that he has been disciplined once and admonished twice for neglect of a client matter. It also bears consideration that the accused has engaged in four earlier instances of misconduct; however, the significance of the first three instances is diminished somewhat, as they were removed in time from his misconduct in the Poch matter. Finally, we find it significant that the accused neglected the Poch matter while negotiating his stipulation for discipline in case 95-83 and, for a short period of time, after being reinstated following his suspension in that case. Turning to other aggravating factors, we note that the accused engaged in a pattern of misconduct when he neglected the Poch matter in part on the heels of being disciplined for the same type of misconduct in case 95-83. ABA Standard 9.22(c); see also In re Bourcier, 325 Or. 429, 436, 939 P.2d 604 (1997) (finding pattern of misconduct to exist when accused lawyer failed to cooperate after recently having been disciplined for similar misconduct, among other misconduct); Schaffner, 325 Or. at 427, 939 P.2d 39 (finding pattern in light of accused's recent discipline for similar misconduct). We further note, however, that we already have considered the weight of the accused's earlier neglectful conduct in aggravation under ABA Standard 9.22(a). The final applicable aggravating factor is substantial experience in the practice of law, ABA Standard 9.22(i), the accused having been admitted to practice in 1979. We find a significant number of mitigating factors to exist, including absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct, full disclosure and cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, favorable character and reputation, and remorse. ABA Standards 9.32(b), (d), (e), (g), and l. We discuss additional mitigating factors below. The trial panel found that the accused suffered from personal and emotional problems, as well as a mental disability, when he neglected the Poch matter. ABA Standards 9.32(c) and (i) (amended 1992). Under the ABA Standards, mental disability may be considered a mitigating factor only when: (1) there is medical evidence that the [accused lawyer] is affected by a    mental disability; (2) the    mental disability caused the misconduct; (3) the [accused lawyer's] recovery from the    mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely. ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992); see also In re Murdock, 328 Or. 18, 29-30, 968 P.2d 1270 (1998) (applying 1992 version of ABA Standard 9.32(i) in context of chemical dependency). We turn to a review of the facts that are relevant to determining whether ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992), as well as ABA Standard 9.32(c), are applicable here. In early 1994, while the accused was representing Richardson in case 95-83, his children's long-time nanny and his ex-wife, a quadriplegic for whom the accused had acted as a primary caretaker and with whom he had maintained a close relationship, both died suddenly. Their deaths occurred within a month of each other, leaving the accused to care for his two daughters, of whom he already had primary custody, without his long-standing family support system. As a result of those events, coupled with a 1992 courtroom suicide of a client in the accused's presence, the accused suffered from dysthemic disorder, a form of depression, [8] as well as post-traumatic stress syndrome. According to Jones, the accused's depression diminished his ability to function throughout most of 1994 and 1995, and had its greatest detrimental impact upon his office administrative tasks (as opposed to his high-pressure trial practice). Although it is clear from the record that the accused's depression greatly contributed to his misconduct in case 96-129, the accused also acknowledged that, had more efficient office practices been in place, he might have weathered his depression without violating DR 6-101(B). [9] The accused began taking medication for his condition in late 1995 and continued to do so through mid-1996. Jones testified that the medication made a remarkable difference in the accused's mental function. A number of witnesses also testified that, in the year before the trial panel hearing in July 1997, the accused had made great strides in improving his mental health and overall outlook, his energy level, and his office practices. The same witnesses further testified that they thought that the accused would continue to improve and would not engage in future misconduct. The foregoing facts support application of ABA Standards 9.32(c) (personal and emotional problems) and 9.32(i) (amended 1992) (mental disability). Compare Murdock, 328 Or. at 29-30, 968 P.2d 1270 (declining to find chemical dependency as mitigating factor under ABA Standard 9.32(i) (amended 1992) when accused lawyer failed to demonstrate causation, recovery, or unlikeliness of recurrence); In re Butler, 324 Or. 69, 74, 921 P.2d 401 (1996) (declining to apply ABA Standard 9.32(c) when accused lawyer did not demonstrate that his personal problems contributed to his misconduct); In re Morin, 319 Or. 547, 565, 878 P.2d 393 (1994) (declining to apply ABA Standard 9.32(c) when accused lawyer acted with pattern of intentional deception and misconduct). We give very great weight to the mental-disability factor in the context of this case. See Commentary, ABA Standard 9.32 (amended 1992) (mental disability should be given very great weight as mitigating factor when it was principally responsible for misconduct in question). A final mitigating factor is delay in the disciplinary process. ABA Standard 9.32(j) (amended 1992). The misconduct at issue in case 96-129 occurred between May 1995 and mid-July 1996. The trial panel hearing was held a year later, in July 1997, and the trial panel did not release its decision until November 1998. This court heard oral argument a year later, in November 1999. [10] In short, it has been four years since the accused neglected the Poch matter, and, according to the parties at oral argument, no complaints have been filed against the accused since that time. See In re Unrein, 323 Or. 285, 288, 917 P.2d 1022 (1996) (citing delay as particularly significant mitigating factor when four years elapsed between misconduct and court's decision, and no additional complaints had been filed); Morrow, 303 Or. at 106 n. 1, 106-07, 109, 734 P.2d 867 (court stayed suspension and imposed probation in light of improvements in accused lawyer's practice in nine years since misconduct in question occurred and at least three years since other misconduct occurred). We now consider the applicable case law. At the outset, we observe that a public reprimand can be an appropriate sanction for a single instance of neglect, particularly the type of neglect at issue in this case. See In re Rudie, 290 Or. 471, 622 P.2d 1098 (1981) (public reprimand for neglect of client's dissolution action, resulting in opposing party taking a default decree; accused lawyer found not to have committed other multiple violations). Cases involving isolated instances of neglect coupled with related misconduct have resulted in short suspensions. See In re Hedges, 313 Or. 618, 836 P.2d 119 (1992) (63-day suspension for neglect, misrepresentation, failure to maintain complete client-funds records and to pay funds to client, and failure to cooperate); In re Kissling, 303 Or. 638, 740 P.2d 179 (1987) (63-day suspension for neglect, misrepresentation, false statements, and failure to carry out contract of employment). We have found only one case from this court in which an accused lawyer was charged with a single violation of DR 6-101(B). In Meyer (II), 328 Or. 220, 970 P.2d 647, this court imposed a one-year suspension upon an accused lawyer who knowingly neglected a client matter, causing actual injury to the client's case. The accused lawyer in that case previously had been reprimanded for neglect and improper withdrawal. He also contemporaneously had been suspended for other, unrelated misconduct of the same gravity as the neglect at issue in Meyer (II). Additional aggravating factors were the accused lawyer's substantial experience in the practice of law and his refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. No mitigating factors applied. Id. at 227-29, 970 P.2d 647. A lengthy suspension like that imposed in Meyer (II) is not warranted here, in light of the less grievous nature of the neglect at issue, the lack of harm to the client's case, and the significant number of applicable mitigating factors. In addition to Meyer (II), the Bar cites cases in which the accused lawyers repeatedly had engaged in neglect, among other misconduct, warranting lengthy suspensions. See In re Bourcier, 325 Or. 429, 939 P.2d 604 (disbarment for neglect and failure to respond to Bar's inquiries, when accused lawyer acted knowingly and had record of neglecting client matters and failing to respond); Schaffner, 325 Or. 421, 939 P.2d 39 (two-year suspension for neglect, failure to deliver client property, and failure to respond, when accused lawyer acted knowingly and had been disciplined within prior year for similar misconduct). Those cases do not suggest the appropriate sanction here, because they both involved much more egregious incidents of neglect, coupled with complete, knowing failures to cooperate with Bar investigations, and no mitigating factors existed in either case. However, Bourcier, Schaffner, and Meyer (II) all demonstrate that this court generally imposes a sanction of greater magnitude than ordinarily would be warranted when an accused lawyer has a prior disciplinary record, particularly when that record includes misconduct similar to the misconduct at issue in the case at bar. See also Jones, 326 Or. at 202, 951 P.2d 149 (in light of prior disciplinary record that included similar misconduct, single act of misrepresentation warranted 45-day suspension, instead of 30-day suspension); In re Hereford, 306 Or. 69, 76, 756 P.2d 30 (1988) (imposing 126-day suspension instead of public reprimand for failure to cooperate, when accused lawyer had record of neglect and related misconduct). The Bar relies upon that unspoken principle in this case, asserting that, in light of the accused's prior disciplinary record, a suspension, rather than a public reprimand, is warranted here. See also generally ABA Standard 8.2 and accompanying commentary (suspension generally appropriate when lawyer previously reprimanded for same or similar misconduct, and causes injury or potential injury to client, among others); Porter, 320 Or. at 708, 890 P.2d 1377 (citing and applying ABA Standard 8.2). Although that approach may be a sound one in most cases, we conclude that this case is exceptional. As noted, the only evidence of any actual injury to Poch is that of anxiety and frustration. Other than the accused's disciplinary record and earlier letters of admonition, the only aggravating factor of note is his substantial experience in the practice of law. Multiple mitigating factors exist, including full and free disclosure, and complete candor and cooperation with the Bar's investigation. We further note that the accused's depression contributed to his misconduct in case 95-83, which is the most significant instance of earlier misconduct. Indeed, we view that instance of misconduct on a continuum together with case 96-129, rather than in isolation, because both occurred when the accused was in the depths of depression caused by personal crises and while he was in the beginning stages of recovering from that depression. Finally, the record is replete with testimony concerning the accused's concentrated efforts, beginning in mid-1996, to improve his mental health and his office practices, and his success in doing both. In short, the circumstances of this case justify imposition of a less severe sanction than ordinarily would be warranted in light of the accused's earlier instances of misconduct. See generally In re Allen, 326 Or. 107, 127-30, 949 P.2d 710 (1997) (existence of nine mitigating factors balanced against only two aggravating factors warranted shorter suspension than earlier case involving comparable misconduct). As this court has stated before, [t]he purpose of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely to discharge properly their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. Bourcier, 325 Or. at 437, 939 P.2d 604; see also ABA Standards at 7 (so stating). After reviewing the entire record in this case, we cannot say that the accused is unlikely to discharge those professional duties. Indeed, in the four years that have elapsed since his misconduct in the Poch matter, the accused by all accounts has acted aggressively and effectively to remedy the deficiencies that led to his misconduct, and has made remarkable and consistent improvement in all the areas that required attention. On de novo review, we conclude that the appropriate sanction in case 96-129 is a public reprimand.