Opinion ID: 174940
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Seizure

Text: Johnson does not contend that the police could not have patted him down after detaining him, arrested him after finding the gun, or searched his person after arresting him. Rather, he argues that the officers lacked a constitutional basis to detain him in the first place. If that is so, then the gun and drugs must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. This protection extends to all seizures, including the brief investigatory stops described by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). An officer may stop a person under Terry only if he has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Accordingly, the dispositive issue in this case is whether Sergeant Lamb and Officer Parton had reasonable suspicion that Johnson had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime when they stopped him. This issue involves two questions: First, at what point did Lamb and Parton seize Johnson, triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment? Second, did the officers have reasonable suspicion at that point?
A person is seized when an officer by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained [his] liberty, Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, such that in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave, Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, an individual must actually yield to the show of authority to be seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991). A reasonable person in Johnson's position would not have felt free to leave when the officers ordered him to stop. There were two officers, they had arrived in marked police cars, they announced themselves as police several times, and they yelled at Johnson to stop and stay right there where he was as they advanced toward him in the dead of night. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (listing the threatening presence of several officers and the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled as relevant factors); United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 539 (6th Cir.2010) (holding that [o]nce Officer Putnick asked Smith to stop, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave); United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant was seized when the officer instructed him to just hang out right here for me, okay?). At first, Johnson had his back toward the officers, but when he walked around the front of the white car and opened the passenger-side door of the vehicle, he would have been facing toward them. At the very latest, then, a reasonable person in Johnson's position would not have felt free to leave upon reaching the far side of the white car and being in a position to observe that those ordering him to stop were police officers. This is also the point at which Johnson was seized because it was then that he yield[ed] to the officers' yelled commands to stop and stay right there where he was. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547. [W]hat may amount to submission depends on what a person was doing before the show of authority.... Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 262, 127 S.Ct. 2400. Johnson was walking toward the white car before the officers yelled at him and ordered him to stop; he complied after reaching the car and putting his bag inside. Stopping after being ordered to stop triggers the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Jones, 562 F.3d 768, 775 (6th Cir.2009) (holding that defendant was seized when he complied with [the officer's] order to stop); cf. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-26, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (holding that assuming officer's chase conveyed an order to stop, defendant was not seized while he was running away); Smith, 594 F.3d at 539 (holding that defendant attempting to pass by officers in apartment entryway was not seized because he did not submit to [officers'] show of authority but, instead, tried throughout the encounter to push past the officers); United States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that defendant was not seized when he broke into a run at the moment that Agent Johnson identified himself as a DEA agent). It would be an unnatural reading of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent order to raise his hands. If a subject is seized only if (1) a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave, Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547 (internal quotation marks omitted), and (2) the subject actually yield[s] to the message that he is not free to leave, id. at 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, then for a person who is moving, to yield most sensibly means to stop. To yield cannot mean to comply with each subsequent order made by an officer after the subject's initial compliance. Indeed, if a person stopped and raised his hands at an officer's command but failed to obey a further command to spread his legs or to lie on the ground, we would not say that he had not been seized initially. It is enough to submit to an officer's initial command to stop and to remain stopped. It might be argued that Johnson had not truly yielded when he stood at the passenger-side door because he looked like he might flee. Such an argument would be unconvincing. First, Johnson had in fact stopped. There is no dispute that he stood still at the passenger door. Second, the government cites no case suggesting that a person who has actually stopped in response to officers' commands but who looks like he might run has not submitted to an order to stop. Third, even if some such case exists, Sergeant Lamb offered precious little objective basis for his belief that Johnson was either thinking I'm going to jump in the car or I'm going to run, one [or] the other. Doc. 27 at 14. The only testimony that Lamb provided in support of this belief is that Johnson was sort of bracing himself in the door frame and on the top of the door. Id. But bracing much more strongly suggests holding one's position than preparing to flee. Moreover, both of Johnson's hands were on the car, apparently within Lamb's view, and it is unclear whether the car's engine was even running. [5] Without something moreperhaps moving into the car or signaling to the driverthere are inadequate grounds to conclude that Johnson considered fleeing. For these reasons, we conclude that Johnson was seized when, after being ordered to stop by Lamb and Parton, he stopped and stood at the passenger-side door of the white car.
As noted, an officer may conduct an investigatory stop only if he has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. Place, 462 U.S. at 702, 103 S.Ct. 2637; see also Smith, 594 F.3d at 536. Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, objective facts, Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), and requires that the detaining officers have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The determination of whether reasonable suspicion existed must be based on the totality of the circumstances in place at the time of seizure. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273, 122 S.Ct. 744; United States v. McCauley, 548 F.3d 440, 443 (6th Cir.2008). That totality of the circumstances consisted of the following facts when Johnson submitted to the officers' orders to stop: (1) Johnson was in a high drug-trafficking area; (2) it was 4:00 a.m.; (3) the officers were responding to a 911 call; (4) two or three minutes after the 911 call, the officers observed Johnson twenty to thirty yards from the blue Cadillac referenced in the call and near the residence from which the call was made; (5) the officers did not notice anyone else in the area, besides the driver of the white car to which Johnson was headed; (6) Johnson did not stop when called to by the officers and instead continued walking toward the white car; and (7) he was carrying a bag, which he threw into the white car. As we explain, these circumstances were insufficient to allow an officer reasonably to suspect Johnson of criminal activity. The first two factspresence in a high-crime location and the lateness of the hourmay not, without more, give rise to reasonable suspicion, but they may be considered in the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 467 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)). Nonetheless, these are context-based factors that would have pertained to anyone in the [area] at that time and should not be given undue weight. United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 314 (6th Cir.2009); see also Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 467 (observing that labeling an area `high-crime' raises special concerns of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic profiling). This caveat is especially appropriate in this case, because while Lamb testified that the area was known for drug trafficking specifically, he observed no conduct from Johnson consistent with drug activity. Cf. United States v. Paulette, 457 F.3d 601, 602, 606 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant in high drug-crime area was engaged in criminal activity based on his hand movements, which were consistent with a hand-to-hand drug transaction). The strength of the third, fourth, and fifth facts turns on the content and reliability of the call. As the district court concluded, the 911 call was too vague and `provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility,' and it lacked even `moderate indicia of reliability.' Johnson, 2008 WL 2718882, at  (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000)). The caller did not identify the suspects beyond calling them some people, and thus the police had no descriptive information or anticipated behavior by which to identify a particular suspect on the scene. Moreover, the 911 caller provided insufficient reason to believe that Johnson, even if he was one of the people she had called about, had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. The caller stated only that some people who had been near her home earlier were back and were outside their vehicle walking around my house. App'x at 4. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375 (emphasis added). In Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.2003), we held that officers who seized an individual based on a 911 caller's report that a white male with a beard on a porch on North Howard Street had pointed something at the caller and told the caller to shut up lacked reasonable suspicion because the tipster did not even allege any criminal activity. Id. at 846, 850. In United States v. Cohen, 481 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2007), we held that a silent 911 hang-up call suggested that there might be an emergency, which might or might not include criminal activity, and that this possible suggestion of a limited assertion of illegality was unreliable absent some corroboration of criminal activity. Id. at 900. The same observations govern here: the caller stated only that people were walking around her home, not that she observed any incriminating behavior or that she suspected them of any criminal conduct in particular. [6] To the extent that the caller suggested a limited, unspecified possibility of criminal activity, her tip could not be considered reliable unless the officers' own observations raised the prospect of criminal activity. For these reasons, the fact that Johnson was near the caller's home and the blue Cadillac when the police arrived deserves little weight in the reasonable-suspicion calculus. Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 466. We come next to the facts that might cast suspicion on Johnson in particular, as opposed to anyone who happened to be in the areathe sixth and seventh facts. The district court concluded that continuing to walk to the awaiting white car after being instructed to stop and throwing his bag into the car could indicate flight and does indicate evasive behavior. Johnson, 2008 WL 2718882, at . We disagree. It is undisputed that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize Johnson when they called for him to stop and that Johnson was entitled to keep walking. Nonetheless, the government insisted at oral argument that ignoring an unconstitutional order contributes to reasonable suspicion. We seriously doubt the wisdom of labeling reasonably suspicious the proper exercise of one's constitutional rights. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673 ([W]hen an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). Moreover, there was nothing independently suspicious about Johnson's continuing to walk toward the white car when Lamb and Parton approached. The Supreme Court has held that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. 673. In Wardlow, the Court held that unprovoked, [h]eadlong flight upon noticing the police is the consummate act of evasion. Id. Following Wardlow, we held that the speed of the suspect's movements to get away may be relevant to the totality of the circumstances for reasonable suspicion, Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 466, and we have considered the abruptness and other evasive characteristics of a suspect's departure upon noticing the police to determine whether his reaction contributes to reasonable suspicion. Compare United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir.2008) (finding reasonable suspicion when, upon seeing police officer, the defendant hunch[ed] over, place[d] his right hand in the small of his back, and start[ed] backing away as though he had a weapon and was getting ready to fire (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Luqman, 522 F.3d 613, 617 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding reasonable suspicion that defendant solicited prostitution when the woman who had approached [his] truck ran back to the corner, and [his] truck moved forward, as the police vehicle approached); Caruthers, 458 F.3d at 466-67 (finding reasonable suspicion when a defendant hurried away in a semi-running manner and hunched down near a wall as if to conceal a weapon or contraband upon being approached by an officer); Paulette, 457 F.3d at 602 (finding reasonable suspicion when defendant who had just engaged in a hand-to-hand transaction in a high-crime area quickly moved his hand to his pocket and began to walk away from the officers upon noticing their approaching squad car); United States v. Davis, 331 Fed.Appx. 356, 358, 360 (6th Cir.2009) (unpublished opinion) (finding reasonable suspicion when a defendant who emerged from a known drug house had a deer-in-the-headlights kind of look and proceeded to pick up the pace to cross the street upon seeing two officers on patrol (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); United States v. Muhammad, 316 Fed.Appx. 429, 430-31 (6th Cir.2009) (unpublished opinion) (finding reasonable suspicion when defendant, in response to police officer approaching him, walked away, entered the stairwell of a nearby apartment building, and bent over as though concealing something there); United States v. Craig, 306 Fed.Appx. 256, 262 (6th Cir.2009) (unpublished opinion) (finding reasonable suspicion based on defendants' abrupt change in direction upon [the officer's] arrival and their circuitous, seemingly evasive exit route from the parking lot); and United States v. Connally, Nos. 91-6401/6440/4441, 1993 WL 8151, at -2 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (finding reasonable suspicion when, upon seeing the police, man standing at van window in location known for drug transactions threw something in the van, immediately turned, and quickly walked away while the van also quickly pulled away), with United States v. Keith, 559 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir.2009) (finding no reasonable suspicion when pedestrian and car moved from one side of liquor store to other side, out of officers' sight, after pedestrian glanced twice at officers because the suspects' conduct was more ambiguous than the examples of `evasion' that have contributed to reasonable suspicion in other cases); United States v. Patterson, 340 F.3d 368, 372 (6th Cir.2003) (stating that walking away from the police when they got out of their unmarked car constitutes a factor to be outrightly dismissed); and Patterson v. City of Cleveland, No. 97-4226, 1999 WL 68576, at  (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion) (finding no reasonable suspicion when two men who appeared to exchange something separated their hands and walked quickly up the street when a police car appeared). As the above-cited cases demonstrate, there is an ongoing debate about the circumstances under which a person responding to the arrival of police will raise suspicion of wrongdoing. This case, however, does not present even a close question. Johnson did not change course or otherwise react suspiciously to the police. He did not react at all. Instead, his trajectory remained constant: he continued walking in the manner he had been walking (according to the district court, at a normal pace, Johnson, 2008 WL 2718882, at ) and in the direction he had been walking when the officers first observed him. Upon reaching the white car, he opened the passenger-side door and put his bag inside, undoubtedly what he had intended to do even before the police arrived. Johnson's conduct was the quintessential example of going about one's business protected, unsuspicious conduct that the Supreme Court has characterized as the opposite of flight. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 676. In the rare cases in which we have found reasonable suspicion to stop a defendant who did not change course but simply continued doing what he was already doing when the police arrived, the defendant's initial conduct was itself suspicious. See, e.g., Watkins v. City of Southfield, 221 F.3d 883, 887-89 (6th Cir.2000) (defendant was driving at half the speed limit in an area victimized by several recent robberies, suggesting that he was either intoxicated or casing the neighborhood). Here, there was nothing suspicious about Johnson's walk toward the white car, least of all the fact that he carried a bag (notwithstanding Sergeant Lamb's incredible testimony to that effect, see Doc. 27 at 39). To say otherwise would be to contract dramatically the scope of the Fourth Amendment for all men and women who work an early shift or who schedule an early-morning trip to the airportor at least those unfortunate enough to live in high-crime areas. We note that the district court relied heavily on two further circumstances, which our dissenting colleague also invokes. The district court found it [m]ost important[] that Johnson did not raise his hands when ordered to do so and also very important that Johnson moved his hands toward his midsection at some point. Johnson, 2008 WL 2718882, at . Because reasonable suspicion for a stop cannot be based on events that occur after the defendant is seized, the district court erred in considering these actions. See McCauley, 548 F.3d at 443; Blair, 524 F.3d at 751. The officers did not command Johnson to raise his hands until after he complied with their demand that he stop and stood still outside the white car. Meanwhile, Lamb clearly testified that Johnson's movement toward his midsection occurred after Johnson had stopped and raised his hands at gunpoint. See Doc. 27 at 14-15 ([W]e asked him to put his hands up.... [E]ventually he did comply with us and stepped out from the side view of the, the door that was open, at which time I saw a large sag in his ... hoodie sweatshirt pocket. (emphasis added)); id. at 16-17 ([W]henever we asked him to come out from behind the car, he bent over and actually put his hands towards his middle region of his, of his body, and was sorta slumped over and bending around whenever I came up.). These facts therefore could not form any part of the reasonable suspicion needed to seize Johnson. In sum, the totality of the relevant circumstances consisted of contextual factors that would have applied to anyone in the neighborhood; a 911 call that made no specific allegation of criminal activity, provided no predictive information about the suspects, and at most suggested that someone was doing something suspicious in the area; Johnson's reasonable failure to comply with commands to stop until he had reached the white car; and the fact that Johnson did not flee or otherwise react suspiciously to the officers' presence, but rather continued along the precise trajectory he was following when the officers arrived. While facts susceptible of innocent explanation may amount to reasonable suspicion when taken together, Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277-78, 122 S.Ct. 744, that oft-cited principle is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). The facts involved here fall far short of the constitutional standard. In short, the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Johnson.