Opinion ID: 842413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: in re forfeiture of united states currency

Text: The Court of Appeals affirmed the forfeiture of the $180,975 in currency on the basis of In re Forfeiture of United States Currency. Like claimant Smith herein, the petitioner there, Kenneth Williams, moved to suppress evidence of controlled substances and $30,632.41 in cash illegally seized from his home by the police. The trial court granted Williams's motion to suppress and all criminal charges were dismissed. Thereafter, the city of Lansing brought a forfeiture proceeding against the seized items and the trial court ruled in the city's favor. Williams appealed, arguing that the trial court erred because illegally seized evidence could not be the subject of a subsequent forfeiture action. The Court of Appeals, when faced with the issue now before us, observed: Michigan courts have not decided the specific question whether property seized pursuant to a search warrant which is subsequently held invalid may still be subject to forfeiture under the Michigan forfeiture statute. However, this Court has stated that property and monies described in the analogous federal statute are subject to forfeiture even where the seizure of the property subject to the forfeiture is subsequently found to be unlawful. Michigan State Police v. 33rd District Court, 138 Mich. App. 390, 395, 360 N.W.2d 196 (1984). [ In re Forfeiture of United States Currency, 166 Mich.App. at 87-88, 420 N.W.2d 131.] Williams contended, as does claimant Smith here, that One 1958 Plymouth Sedan bars a forfeiture proceeding when the subject of the forfeiture is illegally seized property. The Court of Appeals in In re Forfeiture of United States Currency, 166 Mich.App. at 88-89, 420 N.W.2d 131, disagreed: One 1958 Plymouth Sedan holds that evidence and property illegally seized cannot be used in a forfeiture proceeding, and not that the illegally seized property cannot be forfeited. The decision in United States v. Monkey a Fishing Vessel, 725 F.2d 1007, 1012 (C.A.5, 1984), addressing forfeiture of illegally seized property under federal law, is instructive: This court recently decided that `even if the seizure were illegal, it would not bar the government's right to claim the vehicle through forfeiture proceedings. Improper seizure does not jeopardize the government's right to secure forfeiture if the probable cause to seize the vehicle can be supported with untainted evidence. United States v. Eighty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars, 671 F.2d 293, 297-298 (C.A.8, 1982); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac Lemans, 621 F.2d 444, 450-451 (C.A.1, 1980); United States v. One Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351, 351-352 (C.A.9, 1974). This position is not contrary to One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). That case holds that an object illegally seized cannot in any way be used either as evidence or as the basis for jurisdiction. Therefore, evidence derived from a search in violation of the fourth amendment must be excluded at a forfeiture proceeding. In the case at bar, all evidence of probable cause was developed independent of the seizure of the vehicle. Thus, even if a warrant were required, the failure to secure it would not bar the forfeiture of the vehicle.' [ United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 4-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297 (C.A.5, 1983).] We hold that illegally seized property is forfeitable under MCL 333.7521; MSA 14.15(7521), so long as the probable cause for its seizure can be supported with untainted evidence and any illegally seized property is excluded from the forfeiture proceeding. In this case, the illegally seized articles were never introduced into evidence. Thus, the circuit court complied with an interpretation of Michigan's forfeiture statute which parallels the federal statute and is consistent with this opinion, despite its erroneous assertion as to the holding of One 1958 Plymouth Sedan. We first note that the Court of Appeals panel in the instant case erred in relying on the erroneous standard of proof cited in In re Forfeiture of United States Currency when the panel held that probable cause supported by untainted evidence existed for the seizure. In re Forfeiture of $180,975, 475 Mich. 909, 717 N.W.2d 336, slip op at 2 (2006). The correct burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, not probable cause. [19] We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that while One 1958 Plymouth Sedan holds that illegally seized evidence and property cannot be used in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding, One 1958 Plymouth Sedan does not state that illegally seized property cannot be forfeited. We disagree, however, with the Court of Appeals inclusion in its analysis of the questionable conclusion made by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that One 1958 Plymouth Sedan holds that `an object illegally seized cannot in any way be used either as evidence or as the basis for jurisdiction.' [20] Although One 1958 Plymouth Sedan characterized the forfeiture proceeding in that case as being quasi-criminal and requires application of the exclusionary rule to forfeiture proceedings, neither One 1958 Plymouth Sedan nor the exclusionary rule prevents the mention of the illegally seized property that is the subject of the forfeiture proceeding. In fact, in Lopez-Mendoza, supra at 1039-1040, 104 S.Ct. 3479 the United States Supreme Court stated that [t]he `body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. A similar rule applies in forfeiture proceedings. . . . The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit properly interpreted One 1958 Plymouth Sedan and Lopez Mendoza in United States v. $639,558: [21] When illegally seized property is itself the defendant in the forfeiture proceeding, it may not be relied upon to sustain a forfeiture, Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 698, 85 S.Ct. 1246 but it is not excluded from the proceeding entirely. Such property may be offered into evidence for the limited purpose of establishing its existence, and the court's in rem jurisdiction over it. This, we think, is the import of the Second Circuit's recent statement that with respect to unlawfully obtained property that is the subject of the forfeiture suit, the property itself cannot be excluded from the forfeiture action, United States v. $37,780 in U.S. Currency, 920 F.2d 159 at 163 (2d Cir.1990). In other words, as the Supreme Court suggested in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 at 1041, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), the fact that the defendant property had been seized after an illegal search does not immunize it from forfeiture, any more than a defendant illegally arrested is immunized from prosecution. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 at 474, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). See, e.g., United States v. One (1) 1987 Mercury Marquis, 909 F.2d 167 at 169 (6th Cir.1990); United States v. U.S. Currency $31,828, 760 F.2d 228 at 230-31 (8th Cir.1985). Thus, other evidence, legally obtained, may be introduced to establish that the property should be forfeited to the government. United States v. One (1) 1971 Harley-Davidson Motorcycle, 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.1974). In this case the government apparently had no such other evidence and, for that reason, the district court dismissed the action after ordering the cash (and the keys and ledgers) suppressed. We agree with the conclusions in United States v. $639,558 that (1) the illegal seizure of property does not immunize it from forfeiture, and (2) illegally seized property that is the subject, or res, of the forfeiture proceeding may be offered into evidence for the limited purpose of establishing its existence and the court's in rem jurisdiction over it. We therefore find that the Court of Appeals in In re Forfeiture of United States Currency reached the correct result. We further hold that illegally seized property is forfeitable under MCL 333.7521 as long as the forfeiture can be supported by a preponderance of untainted evidence. While illegally seized evidence itself is physically excluded, it is not entirely excluded from the forfeiture proceeding However, questions concerning this excluded evidence should be limited to the circumstances surrounding its existence. For example, in the case of illegally seized cash, the state should not be permitted to exploit the search by asking how the money was packaged, or whether evidence of drugs was detected on the money. In addition, any other legally obtained evidence may be introduced to support the forfeiture. [22] Justice Markman, in dissent, questions the propriety of permitting the consideration of the surrounding circumstances of illegally seized property during a forfeiture proceeding. [23] Further, the dissent apparently would immunize the illegally seized property such that a court could not consider anything regarding that property, even the presence of a large sum of money, post at 511-512. Yet this reasoning has been rejected. In United States v. $493,850 in United States Currency, [24] the government sought to forfeit illegally seized cash, but the claimant asserted that the cash could not even be mentioned during the forfeiture proceeding and that the illegally seized cash should be treated as if it were a widget. The United States District Court for Arizona disagreed, holding: However, the Court does not believe that exclusion of the cash means the Court must consider the defendant cash as a widget. The Court believes it can still take notice of the fact that the defendant is cash. This is obviously stated in the caption of the case. Perhaps the denominations making up the amount and the actual money itself cannot be put into evidence. However, there is no way for the Government to show that a widget is the product of a drug transaction and, therefore, the Court does not believe it has to disregard the fact that one of the defendants is cash.[ [25] ] Because a basic purpose of a drug forfeiture proceeding is to establish that the item subject to forfeiture (here the $180,975 in cash) is connected to drug activity, a court cannot be forced to pretend that the cash does not exist. Nor must the court turn a blind eye to the conclusions one reaches when considering all of the circumstances surrounding its existence and its implications. Rather, we apply a commonsense approach to drug forfeiture hearings in which the item subject to forfeiture has been excluded from evidence: [26] while the court may not consider the specific physical characteristics of the item itself, the court can consider evidence presented in relation to the fact of the item's existence, such as the fact that claimant's testimony about the money itself is questionable. This approach in no way redefines the judicially created exclusionary rule. Here, the court can consider the reliability of the claimant's testimony concerning the money's origin, its existence in her rental car, its intended purpose, the amount of the money in relation to her reported income, the fact that she was traveling along a known drug corridor in a rental car, and that she had rented several cars in the preceding weeks, and any other circumstantial factors not specifically related to the physical characteristics of the money. Our conclusion is supported by United States v. $22,287 in United States Currency, 520 F.Supp. 675 (E.D.Mich., 1981) [27] in which the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that the circumstances surrounding illegally seized cash may be considered. The court held that although all the evidence seized during an illegal drug raid ($22,287 in currency, a bag of heroin, two scales and some firearms) was excluded, the forfeiture was still supported on the basis of a conversation between a police officer and a purported drug seller, as well as certain circumstances concerning the money. Specifically, the court noted that $22,287 was an unusually large amount of cash for any individual to have on hand and, further, that the amount of cash was very close to the price of `nineteen five' ($19,500.00) noted by Johnny [purported drug seller] as the cost of an `lb' (pound of heroin). [28] These are precisely the type of factors regarding the existence of the cash that the dissent would preclude from consideration. [29]