Opinion ID: 2334866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority of the Circuit Court to Grant Work Release

Text: The defendant argues that Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128 authorizes a circuit court to grant work release to a DUI second offender. [2] The State maintains that Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2-128 permits only a general sessions judge or other specified county personnel to grant work release. Section 41-2-128 of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides in pertinent part that (a) Whenever any person has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment in a county workhouse, hereafter referred to as workhouse, for the commission of a crime defined as a misdemeanor by the laws of the state of Tennessee, the county board of commissioners, if such there be, otherwise the court of general sessions, upon application made therefor by the warden, superintendent, prison keeper or other administrative head of a workhouse, may by order direct the warden, superintendent, prison keeper or other administrative head of a workhouse to permit the prisoner to leave the workhouse during necessary and reasonable hours for the purpose of working at the prisoner's employment,.... Similarly, the court of general sessions may, upon application of the sheriff, enter a like order for the same purpose for jail prisoners. .... (c)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, § 55-10-403(a)(1) [the DUI sentencing statute] ... to the contrary, the judge may sentence persons convicted of a second violation of § 55-10-401 [3] ..., to the work release program established pursuant to this section if, prior to doing so, [certain conditions are met].... Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128 (1997) (emphasis added). Issues of statutory construction are questions of law, which are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co., 27 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tenn.2000). A statute should be interpreted to preclude any part from being inoperative, superfluous, void or insignificant ... in order to carry out the legislative intent. Tidwell v. Collins, 522 S.W.2d 674, 676-77 (Tenn.1975). The legislative intent and purpose are to be ascertained primarily from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, without a forced or subtle interpretation that would limit or extend the statute's application. State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 210 (Tenn.2000) (citing State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 544 (Tenn.1999)). A court, however, must ascertain the intent without unduly restricting or expanding the statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. State v. Sliger, 846 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tenn.1993). With these principles in mind, we now examine Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128. The language of Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128(a) states that the court of general sessions may, upon application of the sheriff, grant work release to jail prisoners. The statute continues in part (c)(1) to state that [n]otwithstanding the provisions of this section, [or] § 55-10-403(a)(1) ... to the contrary, the judge may grant work release to one convicted of a second offense DUI. The defendant maintains that the phrase the judge in Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128(c)(1) encompasses circuit court judges. We must construe statutory segments together in light of the general purpose and plan ... and object to be obtained. Neff v. Cherokee Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn.1986). Construing the judge in part (c)(1) to include a circuit court judge is inconsistent with the language of the statute as a whole. Part (a) references the general sessions court specifically. Part (c)(1) contains only a general reference to the judge. Reading Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128(c)(1) in conjunction with part (a) indicates that the legislature intended the specification of a general sessions court judge in Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128(a) to apply to part (c)(1). To construe the statute otherwise would require a forced construction to expand the term the judge to encompass judges other than general sessions judges referenced in part (a). This construction of Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128 is further supported by a review of the legislative history of the work release program. The work release program was established in 1967 in Chapter 259 of the Public Acts. Section 41-1238 of the Tennessee Code Annotated authorized the County Board of Commissioners, if such there be, otherwise the County Court  to grant a prisoner work release. Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-1238 (1967) (emphasis added). Court of general sessions replaced county court in Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-1238. Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-1238 (Supp.1980). A court of general sessions is a county court. State ex rel. Winstead v. Moody, 596 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn.1980) (holding that the general sessions court is a county rather than a state office). Part (c) was added to Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-1238 in 1990. 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 1065, § 1. Part (c) uses the term the judge. Nothing, however, in part (c) evidences a legislative intent to expand from county to state courts the authority to grant work release to DUI second offenders. We hold, therefore, that Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-2-128 does not authorize a circuit court to grant work release to a DUI second offender before the completion of the mandatory minimum sentence. [4]