Opinion ID: 4689509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Events and Law Before 2015

Text: Javier Reyes worked as a loan oﬃcer at a credit union in West Chicago, Illinois. In August 2004, he was ﬁred. He soon hatched a plan to rob the credit union by relying on inside information he had gleaned as an employee. He pitched the plot to four others, who agreed to commit the robbery while Reyes was on vacation in another state, providing him with an alibi. Reyes’ co-conspirators robbed the credit union on the morning of August 23, 2004. During the robbery, one of the robbers brandished a handgun that Reyes had provided. No. 19-2463 3 After the robbery, Reyes’ co-conspirators decided to cut him out, refusing to share any proceeds with him. This proverbial falling out among thieves paled in comparison to the federal prosecution that followed. Reyes’ four co-defendants pled guilty, and three of the four testiﬁed against him at trial. Reyes was convicted of three federal crimes: conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count I); bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Count II); and brandishing a ﬁrearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, the robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count III). At sentencing, the district court applied the Sentencing Guidelines’ career oﬀender enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 (2005). This provision may apply if, among other things, the oﬀender has a history of convictions for “crimes of violence” and is convicted of a new “crime of violence.” Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2005) (deﬁning “crime of violence”). This enhancement applied to Reyes because, the sentencing court assumed, his prior convictions for burglary, voluntary manslaughter, and attempted murder under Illinois state law qualiﬁed as crimes of violence. Reyes appealed on grounds not at issue here, and we aﬃrmed his convictions. United States v. Reyes, 542 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2008). Reyes ﬁled a ﬁrst § 2255 motion in 2009 alleging ineﬀective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief, and we denied a certiﬁcate of appealability. B. Legal and Procedural Developments in 2015 and Later Reyes ﬁled this second § 2255 motion in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015). Johnson examined the deﬁnition of “violent felony” 4 No. 19-2463 in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Under this statute, a felony is “violent” if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or is one of several enumerated oﬀenses. The statutory deﬁnition also includes a so-called “residual clause,” which deﬁnes as violent any crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Johnson, 576 U.S. at 594, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court held that the residual clause is so vague that it violates defendants’ Fifth Amendment right to due process, though the other deﬁnitions of violent felonies, using elements and enumerated crimes, stood intact. Id. at 606. Reyes, represented at the time by counsel, ﬁled this second § 2255 motion arguing that Johnson should apply to the Sentencing Guidelines. The career oﬀender enhancement that was applied to Reyes at his sentencing included an identical residual clause in its deﬁnition of “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2005); see generally 83 Fed. Reg. 65400, 65407–65412 (Dec. 20, 2018) (explaining evolution of deﬁnition before and after Johnson and further proposed guideline amendments). Reyes reasoned that his prior convictions for various Illinois felonies would not qualify as crimes of violence without the vague residual clause, so that the career offender enhancement should not have applied. We found that Reyes’ proposed extension of Johnson met the minimum criteria for a second or successive collateral attack in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). We granted his application to ﬁle his successive § 2255 motion and authorized the district court to consider his claims. A month later, Reyes ﬁled a pro se “abridged motion to vacate, set aside, or correct” his original conviction pursuant No. 19-2463 5 to § 2255 with the appellate panel. This proposed amendment sought to add a new basis for relief: that Reyes’ conviction for brandishing a ﬁrearm during a crime of violence was unsound because the brandishing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), also incorporates the same residual clause in deﬁning which offenses count as predicate “crimes of violence.” § 924(c)(3)(B). Reyes argued that neither bank robbery nor conspiracy can qualify as a crime of violence if the residual clause falls, so that his conviction based on his colleague’s brandishing of a ﬁrearm during a “crime of violence” was unconstitutional. We concluded that, once we had ruled on whether to accept an application for a successive § 2255 motion, we did not have jurisdiction to reconsider amendments or supplements. We instructed Reyes to ﬁle his amendment with the district court, which he did. While Reyes’ motion was pending in the district court, we extended Johnson to the Guidelines, holding in United States v. Hurlburt, 835 F.3d 715, 725 (7th Cir. 2016) (en banc), that the residual clause in the career oﬀender guideline was unconstitutionally vague. Soon after that, however, the Supreme Court disagreed, abrogating Hurlburt and ﬁnding that the Guidelines are merely advisory and therefore cannot be unconstitutionally vague. Beckles v. United States, 580 U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 n.2 (2017). Counsel for Reyes then withdrew. Six months after Beckles was decided, Reyes, now acting pro se, moved pursuant to Rule 15 to amend his § 2255 motion to return to his claims that under Johnson and its progeny, neither bank robbery nor conspiracy counts as a crime of violence, so that his brandishing conviction was unconstitutional. The district court granted these motions to amend and ordered the government to respond to Reyes’ ﬁlings. The 6 No. 19-2463 Supreme Court then decided another “crime of violence” case, Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), which extended Johnson’s logic to another statutory use of a functionally identical residual clause in the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), referring to 18 U.S.C. § 16. On May 28, 2019, the district court denied Reyes’ § 2255 motions. The court acknowledged that Reyes had raised two distinct theories, but it squarely discussed only the sentencing issue in its opinion, holding that Reyes’ motion was foreclosed by Beckles. Less than a month later, the Supreme Court held that Johnson applied to the residual clause in the deﬁnition of “crime of violence” in § 924(c)(3) as well. United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. —, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). Before the district court closed the case, Reyes ﬁled multiple supplements regarding Davis arguing that his brandishing conviction cannot stand. The district court concluded that Davis did not apply. Reyes moved the district court to reconsider, claiming that the jury instructions given in his trial contravened Davis. The district court then issued a certiﬁcate of appealability on the Davis issue, including the allegedly erroneous jury instructions.