Opinion ID: 421806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Speech or Debate Clause

Text: 36 After finding correctly that these documents were agency records, the lower court went on to hold that their release to appellant must still be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution. 45 Article I, § 6, cl. 1 of the Constitution provides that for any Speech or Debate in either House, they [senators and representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place. According to the District Court, release of these documents--intimately related to a congressional investigation--would interfere with the integrity of the Senate's ability to oversee the intelligence activities of the CIA and the FBI. Since the Speech or Debate Clause has been read generally to protect the legislative process, the District Court determined that the kind of mischief that would arise from release of these documents is precisely the kind of evil that the Speech or Debate Clause is intended to prevent. 46 We find that this application of the Speech or Debate Clause is inapposite; the Clause and its policies, as interpreted by this court and the Supreme Court, simply have no bearing on this case. 37 It is true that the fundamental purpose of the Clause is to protect the integrity of the legislative process, United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2535, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972). This is primarily accomplished by safeguarding the independence of individual legislators--by ensuring that the legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called into court to defend their actions. 47 Yet, while [229 U.S.App.D.C. 383] the policies behind the Clause are quite general, actual application of the Clause to bar judicial proceedings has been strictly limited. 48 The core protection afforded by the Clause is to preclude those civil or criminal suits that seek to hold individual legislators (or their aides) liable for their legislative activities. 49 See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). The Clause has also been interpreted to bar a second type of suit--one that would directly interfere with the legislative process by interfer[ing] with an ongoing activity by Congress. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 510 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 1824 n. 16, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975); see also Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582 (D.C.Cir.1978). 38 Neither situation exists in this case. This suit involves no individual member of Congress or legislative aide; it thus falls outside the fundamental protection of the Clause. Nor does this action threaten to interfere with ongoing legislative activity. The Paisley investigation ground to a halt years ago; the legislative process has effectively terminated. This court is not even being asked to scrutinize Congress' actions or decisions. 50 Appellant merely seeks disclosure of certain documents prepared in conjunction with a congressional investigation long since concluded. 51 As this court has recently held, FOIA's requirements and exemptions must be taken to be the definitive word on disclosure of the information in the Government's possession covered by it. Washington Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 685 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C.Cir.1982).