Opinion ID: 8704897
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional Claims Against Sergeant Jefferson

Text: In briefing the instant motion for summary judgment, both Sgt. Jefferson and Ms. Konah contest whether he violated her constitutional rights. The Third Amended Complaint does not make any such claim against Sgt. Jefferson. Compare Complaint [Dkt. 1] ¶¶ 31-33 (alleging Sgt. Jefferson acted with reckless disregard of Fourth Amendment rights), and Am. Compl. [Dkt. 8] ¶¶ 33-35 (same), and Second Am. Compl. [Dkt. 25] ¶¶ 41-M5 (same for Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights), with Third Am. Compl. [Dkt. 64] ¶¶ 54-62 (alleging only that Sgt. Jefferson and others acted under color of state law (¶ 55) and that the District violated constitutional rights). While the parties’ arguments repeat earlier briefing, the Third Amended Complaint, modified by counsel for the fourth time, has dropped them. What is now pled against Sgt. Jefferson are only the common law torts of assauli/battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62-68. The Court will address the common law claims presented in the Third Amended Complaint before it. For clarity’s sake, however, in case the issue is raised on appeal, the Court notes that if there were remaining constitutional claims against Sgt. Jefferson, it would find that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is “a defense that shields officials from suit if their conduct ‘d[id] not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Ortiz v. Jordan, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 884, 888, 178 L.Ed.2d 703 (2011) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Courts employ a two-step inquiry to determine whether qualified immunity applies, looking (1) at whether a constitutional right was violated and (2) whether that right was clearly established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Johnson v. District of Columbia, 528 F.3d 969, 973 (D.C.Cir.2008). These two steps may be analyzed in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Ms. Konah entered the sally port at 1:51:43 p.m. and left at 2:06:30 p.m. The video shows that Sgt. Jefferson opened the front gate multiple times while Ms. Konah was in the sally port. She does not challenge the video. Her constitutional claims — whether interpreted as false imprisonment, unreasonable seizure, lack of due process, or equal protection — all reduce to the argument that Sgt. Jefferson should have sounded an emergency call or “code” to bring other guards running and extricate her sooner. E.g., PI. Jefferson Opp. at 11 (“[Sgt. Jefferson] neither sounded an alarm [n]or placed a call on his radio to other officers standing outside the gate, he stood and just look at Plaintiff [sic]____”). Ms. Konah fails completely to demonstrate that a reasonable corrections officer in Sgt. Jefferson’s position would or should have known that failure to open the front gate more frequently or to sound an alarm would have violated her constitutional rights. See Ortiz, 131 S.Ct. at 888. He is entitled to qualified immunity and cannot be sued. 13