Opinion ID: 1145144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Neglect or Refusal to Plead

Text: The purpose of the plea in criminal proceedings is to bring about the joining of the issues for trial, and there can be no trial on a charge of felony without a plea of not guilty. Fletcher v. State, 20 Wyo. 284, 123 P. 80 (1912). It follows, of course, that, without a trial, judgment cannot be passed and sentence entered against an accused who has pleaded not guilty or who stands before the bar as though he had pleaded not guilty. Concerning the necessity to enter a plea, Rule 15(a), W.R.Cr.P., provides that [i]f a defendant refuses to plead ... the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The predecessor to Rule 15(a), § 7-9-119, W.S. 1977, provides in part, if upon the arraignment the accused offer no plea in bar, he shall answer the question propounded by the court by pleading `guilty' or `not guilty,' but if he answer evasively or stand mute he shall be taken to have pleaded `not guilty.' If the accused plead not guilty a day will be designated for trial. § 7-9-121, W.S. 1977. We understand Rule 15(a) to continue to contemplate that if the accused neglects to plead  if the court neglects to take his plea  if the accused's answer is evasive or if he stands mute, his refusal or failure or the court's neglect will render the status of the plea proceedings to be as though the plea was not guilty. It is said in 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law (1965), § 462, Effect of failure or refusal to plead,: ... Generally, under modern practice, if the accused stands mute and neglects or refuses to plead, the court may enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial, for the rule is that one who stands mute on arraignment in legal effect pleads not guilty. In the instant case, the defendant stood mute, neglected to plead or was actually not called upon to do so again after his attorney's explanation of the bargain. It was, therefore, the trial court's duty to enter a plea of not guilty and supervise the setting of the case for trial, unless it can be said that, even though he did not respond directly, he did in law plead guilty through the response of his attorney to the inquiry of the court. It is argued that the attorneys' explanation of the plea-bargain arrangement, which included an agreement upon the part of the accused to plead guilty to the charge of burglary, together with the accused's admission that he understood this to be a part of the bargain, provides an adequate substitute for the change of plea of not guilty to guilty. In support of this position, the State cites Cox v. State, Wyo., 494 P.2d 541 (1972). We do not agree, in light of our holding in Cardenas, supra, because that opinion requires strict compliance with Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., in order that the accused's due-process rights be satisfied. Included in the directives of Cardenas are requirements concerning the plea bargain contained in the following language: ... In order to comply with Rule 15 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court, before the plea is entered, must determine if there has been a bargain made with respect to the plea. If there has, it must be made a part of the record. The court must then inquire of the defendant if the purported bargain is as he understood it to be when making his plea decision. The court must explain the bargain's effect with respect to maximum sentence and its effect on concurrent or consecutive sentencing, if that be a part of the bargain, and all other aspects of the agreement must be reviewed by the court with the defendant. The court must make known to the defendant whether there is anything about the bargain which is abhorrent to the court or which violates any aspect of the sentence which the court intends to impose. If the bargain purports to improperly bind the court, the defendant should know this and should be told that the court will not be bound by any such impropriety. In other words, every aspect of the bargain and the court's reaction to it should be reviewed at the Bar on the record before the plea is received so that the record will forever reflect that it was made voluntarily by the defendant and with a full understanding of its consequences. 545 P.2d at 639-640. (Emphasis supplied) In light of the above, we have no trouble reaching the following conclusion: A guilty plea was never entered because the accused himself stood mute or  for any reason  did not respond when the court asked him how he pleaded to the charge. The attorneys' explanation of the plea bargain, which included an agreement to plead guilty to burglary, together with the court's inquiry as to whether the accused understood the bargain, and the accused affirming that he did and that the attorneys had repeated it right, did not satisfy the rule of Cardenas, supra. Since the court did not explain to the accused for the record the bargain, which contemplated the change of plea from not guilty to guilty and did not inquire whether it was voluntary and whether he understood it, and since the judge did not elicit such response as would support a conclusion that the accused was making the plea voluntarily and with knowledge  it cannot be concluded by this court that the defendant changed his plea voluntarily and with full understanding of the consequences of his act. The logical conclusion is that we have a defendant who stood before the court as though he had pleaded not guilty and who was adjudged guilty and sentenced without a trial.