Opinion ID: 2003427
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Heading: The CSET and Double Jeopardy

Text: Bryant claims that because the State assessed the CSET and its 100 percent penalty for nonpayment against him and later convicted him of a felony for nonpayment, it violated his double jeopardy rights under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. [11] U.S. CONST. AMEND. V; IND. CONST. art. I, § 14. [12] The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. This clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). It protects a person from suffering (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Jeopardy is, in its constitutional sense, a technical term which has traditionally applied only to criminal prosecutions. Evans v. Brown, 109 U.S. 180, 3 S.Ct. 83, 27 L.Ed. 898 (1883). Departing from this historical rule, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has held in recent years that particular forfeitures, civil fines and financial exactions can be jeopardies. Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Cf. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993). In determining whether a jeopardy has occurred, the Court has said that the sanction's label of criminal or civil is not controlling. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901; see also United States v. Haywood, 864 F.Supp. 502, 506 (W.D.N.C.1994) (description of sanction as civil does not foreclose possibility it is a jeopardy). Rather, the test is whether the civil sanction constitutes a punishment. Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. at___, 114 S.Ct. at 1946. When the sanction serves the goals of punishment rather than the remedial purposes of compensating the government for its loss, it is a punishment and thus a jeopardy within the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. The sanction's essence as a punishment can be identified only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901.
The Supreme Court recently delineated the analysis for determining whether a tax is a punishment in Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S.___, 114 S.Ct. 1937, a case bearing strong resemblance to the one before us. In Kurth, the Montana Department of Revenue sought to impose both criminal and tax penalties for the same possession of marijuana. In determining whether the tax was a punishment and thus a jeopardy under double jeopardy analysis, the Court examined four factors: the tax's deterrent purpose (as opposed to revenue purpose), its high rate, its prerequisite of the commission of a crime before assessment, and the nature of the tax. Ultimately, the Court found that when considered in tandem these factors revealed that the Montana tax was a punishment and thus a second jeopardy imposed on the taxpayer in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. To apply the Kurth analysis, we examine first the purpose and rate of the CSET. [13] It is apparent that the CSET is aimed at least partly towards deterrence. One who pays the CSET receives a receipt that admonishes him that delivery, sale, possession or manufacture of a controlled substance is a crime. Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-3-10(a) (West Supp. 1994). The taxpayer is required to show this receipt to officials to prove he has paid the tax, but the receipt is valid for only forty-eight hours. Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-3-10(b) (West Supp.1994). A taxpayer who possesses the same drug for over forty-eight hours must therefore repay the tax every forty-eight hours to continue to possess a valid receipt and thereby avoid the CSET's additional sanctions. Both the receipt's admonition and the limited period for which it is valid suggest a deterrent purpose. Second, just as the Kurth Court found the high rate of the Montana tax demonstrated its punitive character, we find the CSET's rate similarly revealing. The Montana tax was imposed at the rate of $100 per ounce, roughly eight times the market value of the marijuana taxed. Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. at ___, n. 12, 114 S.Ct. at 1943, n. 12. Indiana's CSET imposes a tax of $40.00 per gram, or $1,133.96 per ounce. This is a rate of over ninety times the market value and more than eleven times the rate imposed in Kurth. [14] It indicates a punitive character. The third factor the Kurth Court found suggestive of the tax's punitive nature was the fact that it was conditioned on the commission of a crime and was exacted only after the possessor was arrested. The Court found these conditions  `significant of [the tax's] penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue.'  Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. at___, 114 S.Ct. at 1947 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295, 56 S.Ct. 223, 227, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1935)). The CSET is similarly conditioned on the commission of a crime. It is imposed only on individuals who deliver, possess or manufacture controlled substances in violation of IC 35-48-4 or 21 U.S.C. 841 through 21 U.S.C. 852. Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-3-5 (West Supp.1994). Moreover, while the plain language of the statute does not limit the imposition of the CSET to a time after arrest, this is its effect. The law does say that a taxpayer owes the tax regardless of whether she is arrested. The Department assesses the tax, however, only when police contact it to report an individual who is in custody for the delivery, possession or manufacture of a controlled substance. The resemblance between the two schemes seems more compelling than the difference. Finally, the Kurth Court found that because the Montana tax was characterized as a property tax but was assessed only after the controlled substance was confiscated, the tax possessed none of the indicia of a species of a property tax. Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. at___, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. Likewise, the CSET is so far removed from a normal excise tax that it must be classified as a punishment. An excise tax is one which is imposed upon the performance of an act or the enjoyment of a privilege. Black's Law Dictionary 506 (5th ed. 1979). As in Kurth, however, the Department routinely imposes the CSET only after a taxpayer's drugs have been confiscated. The taxpayer neither enjoys a privilege nor performs an act at the time of taxation. The CSET cannot therefore be classified as a normal excise tax. [15] The CSET differs from a traditional excise tax in another respect. The rate of the tax so significantly outreaches that of other excise taxes in this state that its classification as a normal excise tax is impossible. No other Indiana excise tax imposes such a severe civil penalty for nonpayment. See, e.g., Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-1-24(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (failure to pay cigarette tax can result in fifty percent penalty). The CSET is not identical to the Kurth tax in every respect, but the factors outlined in Kurth do not create a bright line. After evaluating the CSET as a whole, like the Court in Kurth, we conclude that this drug tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis. Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. Accordingly, the assessment of the CSET and its 100 percent penalty against Bryant was a punishment and thus a jeopardy.
Having concluded the CSET's civil sanction was a jeopardy, we must now determine whether the imposition of the CSET's civil and criminal penalties constituted multiple punishments for the same offense. Because the CSET imposes its civil and criminal penalties in two separate proceedings, we are not required to address the permissibility of multiple punishments imposed in the same proceeding. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, ___ U.S. at___, n. 21, 114 S.Ct. at 1947, n. 21; cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Rather, we must address whether the CSET's criminal and civil punishments violate the double jeopardy prohibition against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction or acquittal because it imposes separate sanctions in successive proceedings. [16] In determining whether the two offenses are the same, we apply the test first announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and recently revived in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). [17] Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. If each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, the offenses are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. For example, a state violates double jeopardy protection when it punishes a defendant for a greater offense and a lesser included offense. That is, if the lesser included offense requires no proof beyond that required for the greater offense, the two are the same offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. [18] There are, however, similar offenses which do not violate the same elements test. Crimes which possess overlapping proof are not conclusively double jeopardies. The conduct proved may be  `one and the same'  so long as each offense possesses  `an element not embraced in the other.'  Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704, 113 S.Ct. at 2860 (quoting Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 345, 31 S.Ct. 421, 423, 55 L.Ed. 489 (1911)). Employing the same elements analysis, we find that the CSET's civil and criminal sanctions are punishments for the same offense. Both punishments require that a person deliver, possess or manufacture a controlled substance without having paid the CSET to be subject to prosecution. The only distinction between the punishments is found in the criminal sanction imposed for nonpayment in subsection (b) of § 6-7-3-11. This provision requires a mens rea of knowingly or intentionally for criminal conviction. The CSET's civil sanction requires no mens rea. However, its elements are identical to the criminal sanction's elements in all other respects. Because the civil penalty invoked by subsection (a) of the statute requires no elements other than those included in the criminal penalty found in subsection (b), these subsections are two punishments for the same offense.
The determination of when jeopardy attaches is the lynchpin for concluding which jeopardy is barred as a second jeopardy. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2162, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Consequently, we turn to the question of which CSET sanction was Bryant's first jeopardy and which was the second jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. To resolve this question we must settle when jeopardy attaches in a civil proceeding. Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered this question since its decision just last year in Kurth. Thus, we write on largely a clean slate. [19] The Court has, however, enumerated factors and policies underlying attachment which will help identify the point when jeopardy attached in this action. Although the Fifth Amendment declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, this constitutional prohibition is not against being twice punished, but is against twice being put in jeopardy. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). The Double Jeopardy Clause thus refers to the risk that a person will, for a second time, be convicted of the same offense. Id. The notion that jeopardy is risk is the very core of double jeopardy jurisprudence. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Where a risk of a determination of guilt exists, for example, jeopardy attaches. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); see also Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970) (jeopardy is the risk of trial and conviction, not punishment). These cases are consonant with the well-known rule that jeopardy attaches when a jury has been impaneled and sworn. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977). Using the point at which there is a risk of conviction as the moment when jeopardy attaches for Fifth Amendment purposes assures that a person is not forced to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a trial more than once for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause achieves this result by effectively dictating that the government cannot make multiple attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); see also Breed, 421 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 1786. Accordingly, it is essential to determine the time of attachment to protect promptly the accused's rights to finality of judgment, to minimization of exposure to the ordeals of trial and to continue with a chosen jury. Crist, 437 U.S. at 38, 98 S.Ct. at 2162; see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (constitutional policy of finality inherent in Fifth Amendment). A court's conclusion that jeopardy attached at a specific point reflects its judgment that the constitutional policies underpinning the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated at that stage of the proceeding. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480, 91 S.Ct. at 554-55. We conclude that jeopardy first attached when the Department served Bryant with its Record of Jeopardy Findings and Jeopardy Assessment Notice and Demand. At that moment, Bryant faced more than a risk of being found guilty; he had actually been found guilty. The assessment itself was a judgment against Bryant for the CSET and its 100 percent nonpayment penalty. This judgment enabled the Department to levy on Bryant's property immediately, and the Department exercised that authority the day after it issued Bryant's jeopardy assessment. To hold jeopardy attached at any point later than assessment would give the Department latitude to subject the taxpayer to the ordeal of assessment and levy multiple times for the same offense. [20] That would be contrary to the constitutional policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. The dissent suggests that finding jeopardy attached at assessment forecloses prosecution. This is correct so long as the State prosecutes the defendant after the Department assesses the CSET. We know from oral argument on this cause, however, that the Department does not conduct independent investigations, searching for drug offenders. Rather, it learns of an offense only when contacted by the police or prosecutor. This situation creates the opportunity for discussion between the Department and law enforcement authorities as to who will proceed first. Moreover, it seems plain enough for Fifth Amendment purposes that, from the citizen's point of view, it is irrelevant whether penalties imposed by one branch of the government foreclose penalties by another branch. In any event, if there is any problem of coordination between the Department and law enforcement authorities (and what we were told at oral argument suggests there is none), the General Assembly may simply amend the statute to require the Department and prosecutor to consult with one another about who should go first. The CSET assessment was Bryant's first jeopardy. The moment the jury was sworn in his criminal trial for nonpayment of the CSET a second jeopardy attached. Crist, 437 U.S. at 38, 98 S.Ct. at 2162. Accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Bryant's criminal prosecution for nonpayment. We vacate the conviction for failure to pay the CSET. Moreover, having concluded the CSET is a jeopardy, Bryant's convictions for growing more than 30 grams of marijuana and possessing less than 30 grams of marijuana were also subsequent jeopardies barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. As we explain today in Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1995) Ind., 660 N.E.2d 310, subsequent prosecutions under the criminal law for the same drug offenses twice places a defendant in jeopardy. We therefore vacate Bryant's criminal convictions.