Opinion ID: 792539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Buie Protective Sweeps

Text: 13 The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). That presumption is rebuttable, however, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), as [t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined `by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)). 14 In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test and permitted a limited warrantless search, or protective sweep, in a home by officers who were executing an arrest warrant inside the home and who had a reasonable suspicion that an individual posing a threat to the officers was present elsewhere on the premises. Id. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093. The Supreme Court explained that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the officers from tak[ing] reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest. Id. Accordingly, the officers could search beyond the area immediately adjoining the place of arrest if they had articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Id. The Court emphasized, however, that any such warrantless sweep may not be unnecessarily invasive and may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. Id. at 335, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Moreover, the sweep must last[ ] no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. Id. at 335-36, 110 S.Ct. 1093. 15 Buie 's protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement was constructed on the foundational reasoning of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), both of which permitted warrantless searches in specific contexts to ensure the safety of officers. In Terry, the Supreme Court sanctioned brief on-the-street frisks for weapons in circumstances when a reasonably prudent officer would be justified in believing, based on specific, articulable facts, that he was dealing with a person who might be armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 24, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Long extended Terry 's reasoning to the context of a roadside stop, allowing officers to search the passenger area of an automobile for weapons when the officers possess specific and articulable facts that warrant the reasonable belief that a suspect is dangerous and may have immediate access to weapons. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469. In Buie, the Court read Terry and Long to protect the immediate interest of [ ] police officers in taking steps to assure themselves that the persons with whom they were dealing were not armed with, or able to gain immediate control of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against them. Buie, 494 U.S. at 333, 110 S.Ct. 1093. Moreover, the Court recognized that the factors justifying warrantless searches in Terry and Long were at play, perhaps with even greater force, when officers find themselves at the disadvantage of being on [their] adversary's `turf' during the in-home execution of an arrest warrant, because [a]n ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings. Id.