Opinion ID: 2554541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Melissa Audet's Testimony

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice erred, violating Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, by allowing Ms. Audet's testimony under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 provides that, [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Rule 403 cuts across the rules of evidence and is always a consideration in a trial justice's ruling on the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence. State v. Gaspar, 982 A.2d 140, 148 (R.I. 2009). This Court has said that a trial justice's discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be used sparingly, and [i]t is only when evidence is marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial that a trial justice must exclude it. State v. DeJesus, 947 A.2d 873, 883 (R.I.2008). It is within the sound discretion of the trial justice whether to admit or exclude evidence under Rule 403. State v. John, 881 A.2d 920, 927 (R.I.2005). Accordingly, we review the trial justice's decision for clear abuse of discretion and will not disturb such a determination on appeal absent clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 927-28. The defendant argues that the probative value of Ms. Audet's testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and that the testimony confused the jury concerning which case to decide. The trial justice found that [t]aken in totality,    the probative value of Ms. Audet's testimony is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant and that Ms. Audet's testimony is both necessary and may tend to establish intent to kill, and absence of mistake or accident. We agree. The testimony was highly probative and clearly outweighed the potential for unfair prejudice. Moreover, we observe that in an effort to ensure that the testimony was not unfairly prejudicial, the trial justice carefully excluded the testimony of another witness about an incident in 1992, noting its remoteness and its potential to be cumulative. The trial justice further prevented unfair prejudice by barring the state from addressing defendant's alcohol or drug use during Ms. Audet's testimony. Finally, to prevent the jury from being misled or confused, the trial justice issued an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury before the testimony. [22] Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the trial justice's ruling allowing Ms. Audet's testimony was not an abuse of discretion nor did it violate Rule 403. The defendant further argues, citing Gaspar, that fairness should have dictated that the prosecution withhold Ms. Audet as a rebuttal witness, rather than allowing her as a witness in the state's case-in-chief. Contrary to defendant's contention, this Court never has held, even in the broadest reading of Gaspar, that the state may not use Rule 404(b) testimony during its case-in-chief to prove its case. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 900 A.2d 1155, 1162-63 (R.I.2006). To meet its burden of proof, the state was tasked with proving the elements of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial justice allowed Ms. Audet to testify specifically because her testimony was evidence of intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, and absence of accident, reasons which defendant does not challenge on appeal. Thus, the state was entitled to use Ms. Audet's testimony, which went directly to the issue of whether Ms. Anderson's injuries were accidental. It cannot be said, therefore, that this testimony was used solely to impeach anticipated testimony. [23] Thus, we perceive no basis for concluding that the trial justice abused his discretion when he permitted the state to elicit testimony from Ms. Audet during its case-in-chief.