Opinion ID: 151595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fischer’s Cross-Appeal

Text: Fischer cross-appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of UPS on his internal-complaints-based retaliation claims, as well as the district court’s decision to vacate the jury’s punitive damages award.
Fischer argues that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment in UPS’s favor on his Michigan state law claim that UPS retaliated against him for filing two internal complaints shortly before his termination. We review this claim de novo. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 584 (6th Cir. 2009). Retaliation claims under Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act differ from Title VII in that they require not just proof of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, but that the protected activity constituted a “significant factor” motivating the adverse action. See Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). - 14 - Nos. 08-1600 & 08-1601 Fischer v. UPS Other than the temporal proximity between the filing of his internal complaints and his termination, Fischer presented no evidence that his decision to engage in that protected activity prompted UPS to terminate him. Under Michigan’s heightened standard, the “[p]laintiff must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action.” West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Mich. 2003). With respect to his internal complaints claim, Fischer failed to present any evidence beyond temporal proximity. Neither Jarlett nor VanTilburg mentioned the internal complaints during the meetings leading to Fischer’s termination, and nothing in the record suggests that those complaints specifically motivated their decision. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to UPS on this claim.
The jury awarded Fischer $1.3 million in punitive damages. The district court initially reduced the award to $300,000 to bring it into compliance with Title VII’s statutory cap. Then, on UPS’s Rule 50 motion, the court vacated the entire award. Fischer appeals that determination, which we review de novo. Lowery, 586 F.3d at 432. We will uphold a grant of judgment as a matter of law “only when there is a complete absence of fact to support the verdict, so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party.” Pouillon, 206 F.3d at 719 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As when reviewing summary judgment, we may “not weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., - 15 - Nos. 08-1600 & 08-1601 Fischer v. UPS 104 F.3d 822, 825 (6th Cir. 1997), but instead must “look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and decide if it was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the jury,” EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510 (6th Cir. 2001). Title VII limits recovery of punitive damages to cases where “the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, 539 (1999), establishes a three-part inquiry governing the recovery of punitive damages against an employer. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the individuals perpetrating the discrimination acted with malice or reckless disregard toward the plaintiff’s federally protected rights. Second, the plaintiff must impute liability to the employer by establishing that the discriminatory actor worked in a managerial capacity and acted within the scope of his or her employment. Third, the defendant may nevertheless avoid punitive damage liability by showing that it engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII. See Parker v. Gen. Extrusions, Inc., 491 F.3d 596, 602–03 (6th Cir. 2007). Only the third Kolstad inquiry—the employer’s good faith compliance—remains at issue in this appeal. To determine whether an employer engaged in good faith efforts to comply with Title VII, we focus “both on whether the defendant employer had a written . . . policy and whether the employer effectively publicized and enforced its policy.” Parker, 491 F.3d at 603. We have previously suggested that “the mere existence of a written anti-discrimination policy alone does not - 16 - Nos. 08-1600 & 08-1601 Fischer v. UPS shield the company from punitive damages.” Tisdale v. Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 532 (6th Cir. 2005). “Rather, the employer must demonstrate that it engaged in good faith efforts to implement the policy.” Hall v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 337 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2003). While acknowledging that Kolstad does not spell out the type of evidence needed to establish good faith, the district court found that UPS made the requisite showing by “present[ing] ample, undisputed evidence that it formulated, disseminated, and trained employees on its antidiscrimination policies.” 2008 WL 880521, at . It then concluded that Fischer failed to rebut UPS’s evidence of its good faith Title VII compliance efforts, and vacated the punitive damage award. The court endorsed UPS’s argument that Fischer “[could not] rely solely upon [UPS]’s failings with regard to him to rebut cognizable evidence” of good faith. Id. Based on its reading of Sackett v. ITC Deltacom, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Tenn. 2005), it concluded that Kolstad required consideration of “the employer’s historical approach to such claims.” Id. We do not understand Sackett or Kolstad as requiring such a holding, nor do later Sixth Circuit cases. Indeed, none of this court’s cases vacate a jury award of punitive damages or specify the precise showing required to establish good faith as a matter of law. See West v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 08-6516, 2010 WL 1507629, at –14 (6th Cir. April 15, 2010) (holding that the defendant did not establish good faith as a matter of law); Parker, 491 F.3d at 604–05 (same); Tisdale, 415 F.3d at 533–34 (same); Hall, 337 F.3d at 674–76 (same). Consistent with Supreme - 17 - Nos. 08-1600 & 08-1601 Fischer v. UPS Court and Sixth Circuit precedent, we thus inquire only whether—viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fischer—a reasonable juror could find in Fischer’s favor. Relying on two cases from other circuits—Bryant v. Aiken Regional Medical Centers, Inc., 333 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2003) and Harsco Corp v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2007)—UPS nevertheless urges us to uphold the district court’s judgment because the record evidence of its overall Title VII compliance mechanisms mandates finding good faith as a matter of law. We distinguish both cases because, unlike UPS, the employers in those cases provided evidence from which a jury could conclude effective policy implementation. In Bryant, the Fourth Circuit vacated the jury’s punitive damage award where it found that the employer not only had an antidiscrimination policy, a grievance policy encouraging employees to bring forward claims of discrimination, and a diversity training program, but also ensured implementation by “voluntarily monitor[ing] departmental demographics as part of an ongoing effort to keep the employee base reflective of the pool of potential employees in the area.” 333 F.3d at 548–49. In Harsco, the defendant introduced evidence of its comprehensive policies and training procedures and demonstrated effective enforcement by offering undisputed evidence that, after the plaintiff met with the human resources director, management followed policy by launching an investigation of the plaintiff’s complaint. 475 F.3d at 1185, 1189. Here, UPS introduced evidence that it promulgated an anti-retaliation policy, trained its employees on implementing it, and established mechanisms for employees to lodge complaints. But - 18 - Nos. 08-1600 & 08-1601 Fischer v. UPS UPS presented no record evidence from which a reasonable juror would necessarily conclude that UPS effectively advanced its policies. Unlike Harsco, where the plaintiff conceded that the company launched an investigation after the plaintiff complained, a reasonable member of Fischer’s jury could find that UPS failed to investigate Fischer’s complaint. Though VanTilburg claimed that she possessed all of the information she needed to assess the complaint by virtue of her presence at the February 5 meeting, a reasonable juror could have found otherwise—VanTilburg knew nothing about Jarlett’s treatment of other employees, and reprimanding only one of the many employees with similar performance issues could support Fischer’s retaliation claim. UPS thus failed to demonstrate policy enforcement, distinguishing this case from both Bryant and Harsco. See also Green v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 654 (5th Cir. 2002) (abrogated on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)) (affirming decision not to submit punitive damages to the jury where defendant had and publicized an anti-harassment policy and made a good faith effort when it learned of the potential harassment by placing the plaintiff on paid administrative leave while investigating her case, reinstating plaintiff’s job duties, and directing the offending manager to take corrective action). On the present record, we cannot conclude that UPS presented evidence of its good faith compliance with Title VII “so overwhelming that reasonable jurors could not conclude otherwise.” See Deffenabugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999). UPS asserts that, had the district court permitted Jimmy Millard, then the Region Employee Relations Manager, to testify, he would have manifested UPS’s good faith. But through Millard, - 19 - Nos. 08-1600 & 08-1601 Fischer v. UPS UPS proposed to supplement testimony about its knowledge of anti-discrimination/retaliation laws and policies and procedures for combating discrimination, the existence of which Fischer did not dispute. We thus find that the district court correctly labeled Millard’s testimony as cumulative and, to the extent it differed from evidence already in the record, irrelevant. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Fischer, the record includes facts that support a punitive damage award. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to reinstate the jury’s award (subject to the $300,000 statutory cap).