Opinion ID: 756460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eyewitness Instruction

Text: 40 Patterson's third assignment of error is that the district court erred in failing to instruct jurors on identification testimony in the manner set forth in United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Cir.1974). The standard of review for a trial court's refusal to give a specific eyewitness identification jury instruction is abuse of discretion. United States v. Brooks, 928 F.2d 1403, 1408 (4th Cir.1991). A refusal to grant a requested instruction is only reversible error if the instruction (1) was correct; (2) was not substantially covered by the court's charge to the jury; and (3) dealt with some point in the trial so important, that failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant's ability to conduct his defense. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir.1995). 41 In Holley, the Fourth Circuit adopted a detailed model jury instruction on eyewitness identification testimony. It did so in the context of a case that contains no evidence of identification except eyewitness testimony. 502 F.2d at 275. In Brooks, this Court further outlined when a Holley instruction should be given: 42 [U]nder the rule in this Circuit, the [Holley ] instruction, in the opinion of the trial judge, is compelled only where the evidence in the case strongly suggests the 'likelihood of irreparable misidentification.'  43 928 F.2d at 1407. 44 The circumstances present in Holley are not present in this case. This was not a case wholly dependent on eyewitness identification. In case at bar, two witnesses who knew the defendant testified that he had participated in the robbery in addition to the eyewitnesses who testified to seeing him at the school. Greene's and Hooks's testimony take this case out of Holley's realm. 45 In addition, the evidence in this case does not strongly suggest the likelihood of irreparable misidentification. In this case, the eyewitnesses were not eyewitnesses to the crime itself. Even if they misidentified Patterson and had actually seen another individual at the school, Patterson could have been convicted based on Greene's and Hooks's testimonies. 46 Patterson's theory of the case seems to be that it was his roommate Hooks who committed the robbery with Greene. Hooks is approximately the same size as Patterson and admitted to committing other robberies with Greene in which he used the same type of gun as used by Greene's co-defendant in the bank robbery and in which he used Patterson's car. According to Patterson, therefore, the witness identifications bolstered the shaky testimony of Hooks and Greene. 47 The witness identifications were, in fact, conducted in a questionable fashion although hindsight is 20/20. One witness picked Patterson out of a photo lineup after having seen the same picture of him in the newspaper. The other witness picked Patterson out of two photo lineups one in which he wore glasses and one in which he did not. Patterson's photo, however, was the only one that appeared in both photo lineups. 48 The instruction given by the district court in this case was as follows: 49 Eye witness testimony is an expression of belief on the part of a witness, and its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the person initially and later to make a reliable identification. A reliable identification would be one based upon the initial observation at the time and place which the witnesses testified about. A reliable identification would not be one unfairly suggested by events that have occurred since the time of the initial observation. 50 Joint Appendix at 421. Although brief, the judge's instruction did cover the important issue of unfair suggestion and that identification should be based on the initial observation, not later events. The instruction also covers the importance of the opportunity the witness initially had to observe the person. Thus, the instruction meets the requirement of Holley that there be sufficient application of the law to the facts of the case in the instruction. 502 F.2d at 275-76. In addition, any concerns regarding poor identification procedures and misidentification could be and were raised on cross-examination and during closing argument. Accordingly, although a more specific instruction might have been desirable to Patterson, it cannot be said that the district judge abused his discretion in this instance.