Opinion ID: 437132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CHARLES McGILL

Text: 11 In support of his argument that his motion to suppress was improperly denied, McGill contends that the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and that the district judge should not have relied on evidence introduced at trial to support the court's pretrial denial of the motion to suppress. The court's findings are not clearly erroneous and evidence adduced at the suppression hearing supports the court's determination that McGill's arrest was legal. 12 At the time McGill was stopped on Interstate 10, the officers had knowledge of enough facts to establish probable cause for arrest. Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). When McGill was stopped the officers knew: (1) the customs tip, (2) McGill was associating with Merrill, a suspected narcotics smuggler, (3) McGill had taken a circuitous route from the Ramada Inn to Fort Pike, (4) the Robalo had been on Lake Ponchartrain at night without lights in close proximity to the FORTY, (5) the remarks of Merrill or McGill at the Fort Pike landing indicated a rendezvous with another vessel had occurred, (6) marijuana gleanings had been discovered aboard the M/V FORTY. In light of these facts, the district court was not clearly erroneous in denying McGill's motion to suppress. 13 Even if the arrest was illegal, McGill voluntarily signed a form consenting to the search. Evidence obtained from an informed and voluntary consent to search is admissible despite an illegal arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Troutman, 590 F.2d 604, 606-07 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Fike, 449 F.2d 191, 192-93 (5th Cir.1971); Bretti v. Wainwright, 439 F.2d 1042, 1045-46 (5th Cir.1971). 14 McGill also contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case is whether a 'reasonable trier of fact could [have found] that the evidence establishe[d] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d 738, 742 (5th Cir.1983) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1605, 80 L.Ed.2d 135 (1983). In addition to the facts outlined above, additional evidence adduced at trial tended to show that: (1) Holt paid for McGill's motel room; (2) a call was made from Holt's room to the 129 Roan Lane residence; (3) the M/V FORTY docked at 129 Roan Lane where her cargo of marijuana was unloaded. 15 McGill argues that Sgt. Stanley Hughes should not have been allowed to testify to the possible meaning of three words found on a sheet of paper in Merrill's possession. McGill maintains that the testimony was unreliable, did not assist the jury, and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value. Hughes had over seven years of experience with the Louisiana State Police performing investigative and undercover work in numerous smuggling conspiracies. Sgt. Hughes was qualified to render an opinion as to the meaning of the words Phoenix, Dragon, and Home Place. The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the expert testimony. See United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 369 (2nd Cir.1983); United States v. Alfonso, 552 F.2d 605, 618 (5th Cir.1977). 16 When McGill was arrested, a bearcat scanner radio was seized. Officer Segur testified that when other officers pressed the buttons on the scanner the frequencies that appeared were used by local police, DEA, and U.S. Customs. 17 McGill argues that the prosecution violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(D) 1 by failing to produce the examination or test results showing that the radio was set on these frequencies. The government argues that this evidence does not fall within the scope of Rule 16(a)(1)(D). 18 Even if the government should have produced this evidence, the failure to do so does not merit a reversal unless the defendant can demonstrate prejudice. See United States v. DeWeese, 632 F.2d 1267, 1272 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Arcentales, 532 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir.1976). Segur's testimony was subsequently struck from the record and the jury instructed to disregard it because he had no personal knowledge of the frequencies used by law enforcement agencies. Assuming there was a Rule 16 violation, we find no prejudice to McGill. 19