Opinion ID: 716752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Surrogate Parenthood

Text: 26 Floyd first challenges his conviction for kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201. At the time of the kidnapping, section 1201 provided in relevant part: 27 (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when-- 28 (1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... 29 shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 30 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). 31 During pretrial proceedings, and at trial, Floyd argued that he was exempt from the application of section 1201 because he is Michael's parent. The district court determined that Floyd was not Michael's biological father. The court also ruled, however, that the term parent, as used in section 1201, can include a single stepparent. The district court concluded that Floyd had not demonstrated that he was performing the incidences of parenthood at the time of the kidnapping. 2 Accordingly, the district court ruled that Floyd could be convicted for kidnapping Michael. 32 Floyd does not challenge the district court's finding that he is not Michael's biological father. Instead, Floyd argues that he comes within the exemption set forth in section 1201 because he acted as Michael's male parenting figure prior to the death of the child's mother. Alternately, Floyd argues that the district court erred in finding that he was not Michael's father at the time of the kidnapping because, even after voluntarily relinquishing Michael to the State of Oklahoma, Floyd continued to exercise the [parental] rights available to him. We review de novo the district court's interpretation of section 1201. See United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir.1990) (statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 1111, 113 L.Ed.2d 220 (1991). We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1366 (10th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2564, 132 L.Ed.2d 817 (1995). 33
34 In resolving the question whether Floyd is exempt from prosecution for kidnapping, we must first determine whether the word parent, as used in section 1201, includes a person who is not a biological parent. Floyd does not argue that the record demonstrates that he is Michael's biological father. Thus, if the statutory exemption is limited to biological parents, Floyd cannot prevail on this issue. 35 Congress did not define the word parent in section 1201. In interpreting Congressional intent, a reviewing court must determine whether the language used in a statute is ambiguous, or whether it has an ordinary meaning. See Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1925, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (if statutory language has not been defined and does not have any established common-law meaning the terms of the statute must be given their ordinary meaning). If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'  United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). 36 We are persuaded, after consulting the dictionary, that the word parent is not ambiguous. The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VII at 222 (2nd ed. 1989) defines parent as both [a] person who has begotten or borne a child; a father or mother and [a] person who holds the position or exercises the functions of a parent; a protector, guardian. Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 1641 (4th ed. 1976) defines parent as one that begets or brings forth offspring and a person standing in loco parentis although not a natural parent. Accord, Black's Law Dictionary at 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (In common and ordinary usage [parent] comprehends much more than mere fact of who was responsible for child's conception and birth and is commonly understood to describe and refer to a person or persons who share mutual love and affection with a child and who supply child support and maintenance, instruction, discipline, and guidance) (citing Solberg v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 50 Wis.2d 746, 185 N.W.2d 319, 323 (1971)). 37 There is only one reported opinion that has discussed the question whether the exemption in section 1201 can apply to a person who is not a biological parent. In Miller v. United States, 123 F.2d 715 (8th Cir.1941), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 192, 63 S.Ct. 187, 87 L.Ed. 179 (1942), the appellant claimed that he was exempt from prosecution for kidnapping his married stepdaughter. Id. at 717. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that, [t]he term 'parent' primarily means one who begets a child.... However, it is also well recognized that the term 'parent' in a broad sense and under certain circumstances may include anyone who stands in a position equivalent to that of a parent. Id. at 717. The court concluded that the appellant was not exempt from prosecution because, at the time of the kidnapping, he was like an utter stranger to this minor and had never accepted any of the duties and liabilities ... of one who stood in loco parentis. Id. at 717-18. The defendant could not, therefore, satisfy even the broadest and most latitudinarian definition ... of the term 'parent'. Id. We agree with the Eighth Circuit that a person who stands in the place of a biological parent at the time of a kidnapping is exempt from prosecution pursuant to section 1201. 38 Our conclusion that a surrogate parent is exempt from prosecution under section 1201 does not contravene Congress' intent in creating the parent exception to section 1201. In deciding whether the words or otherwise that follow held for ransom and reward in section 1201 require proof of an intent to obtain money or something of value, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows in Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936): 39 [t]he words 'except, in case of a minor, by a parent thereof' emphasize the intended result of the enactment. They indicate legislative understanding that in their absence a parent, who carried his child away because of affection, might subject himself to condemnation of the statute. 40 Id. at 129, 56 S.Ct. at 397. We are persuaded that a surrogate parent, who has not voluntarily abandoned the responsibilities of a biological parent prior to the time he or she carries a child away, is not subject to prosecution under the statute. 41
42 Floyd contends that the district court erred in concluding that his status as a stepparent terminated when he voluntarily relinquished custody of Michael to the state shortly after Sharon's death. Floyd asserts that he exercised all the care and the custodial indicia of parenthood identified by the district court until the death of Michael's mother. 43 A person acting in loco parentis is one who acts in the place of a parent. Webster's Third New International Dictionary on the English Language at 1165 (4th ed. 1976). A person who acts in loco parentis voluntarily performs all of the duties a parent normally provides to his or her child. See Leyerly v. United States, 162 F.2d 79, 85 (10th Cir.1947) (a person acting in loco parentis is charged fictitiously with a parent's rights, duties and responsibilities); Griego v. Hogan, 71 N.M. 280, 377 P.2d 953, 955-56 (1963) (a person acting in loco parentis undertakes the care and control of another in the absence of such supervision by the latter's natural parents and in the absence of formal legal approval); Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa.Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879, 881-82 (1977) (a person acting in loco parentis put[s] himself in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship without going through the formalities of adoption). Parental status based on in loco parentis status is thus, by its very nature, a temporary status. Black's Law Dictionary at 787 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Griego, 377 P.2d at 955). It is created when a person undertakes the care of a child. It ends when a person voluntarily ceases to fulfill this responsibility. Because in loco parentis status is temporary and voluntary, to apply the parent exception to a person who kidnapped a child, we must consider whether such a person continued to fulfill the responsibilities of a parent at the time of the kidnapping. Accord Miller, 123 F.2d at 717 (determining parental status at the time of the kidnapping). These duties include bestowing upon the child love, affection, support, maintenance, instruction, discipline, and guidance. 44 Floyd appears to argue that, because he acted as Michael's male parent in the place of his biological father from the date of the child's birth until his custody was voluntarily relinquished to the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, he is exempt from prosecution under section 1201. This argument confuses the distinction between a biological parent and a surrogate parent. 45 A man or woman who begets a child remains his or her biological parent forever. A surrogate parent who has not adopted the child may terminate his or her parental relationship to the child by freely relinquishing custody to the state or to another person. Once the responsibilities of surrogate parenthood are abandoned, the interim status of parenthood ends. 3 46 Here, Floyd voluntarily relinquished custody of Michael to the Oklahoma Department of Human Services. After that, he ceased to act in place of Michael's biological parents. That responsibility was assumed by the state and Michael's foster parents. The district court did not err in determining that Floyd was not exempt from prosecution for kidnapping Michael because he was not his surrogate parent on the date of the kidnapping. 47 Floyd also contends that because he paid child support as ordered by the state trial court, and because he exercised his right to have Michael brought to the prison to visit him, he thus continued to serve as Michael's parent after he relinquished custody of Michael to the state. This argument is unpersuasive. The record shows that at the time Floyd paid the court-ordered child support, and insisted that Michael be brought to the prison, he had falsely represented to the state trial court that he was Michael's biological father. Floyd apparently perpetrated this fraud in order to regain custody of Michael upon Floyd's release from prison. This fraudulent conduct does not demonstrate that Floyd continued to perform the duties of a surrogate parent after he relinquished custody of the child to the state. It shows, instead, that he was attempting to deceive the court into awarding him custody of Michael solely because he falsely claimed to be the child's biological father. 48 By surrendering the child to the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, Floyd demonstrated his recognition that as a fugitive from justice, he was not in a position to fulfill all the responsibilities owed to a child by someone acting in the place of a biological parent. Floyd's refusal to return Michael to Oklahoma unless state and federal authorities agreed not to file any criminal charges against him, eloquently confirms the fact that he has treated Michael as a helpless pawn, instead of as a child in need of the protection and love of responsible surrogate parents. The district court did not err in holding that Floyd was not exempt from prosecution for kidnapping Michael.