Opinion ID: 848833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the operation of the doors of the bus in this case was inherent in and necessary to driving the bus

Text: Although it is true that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity must be narrowly construed, [9] the majority's reading of the term operation is unnecessarily and inappropriately narrow. The statute in question makes a governmental agency, such as defendant, liable for its negligent operation of a motor vehicle it owns. [10] In writing it, the Legislature did not define the term operation. Confronted with providing a definition, our Court of Appeals in Orlowski v. Jackson State Prison [11] adopted the interpretation of negligent operation accepted by most other jurisdictions. As a consequence, for over thirty years Michigan courts have followed the rule that `negligent operation' may occur even though the vehicle is standing still as long as it is being used or employed in some specific function or to produce some desired work or effect. [12] This Court did not grant leave to appeal in Orlowski or its progeny to overturn that precedent. However, today, without the benefit of full briefing or oral argument, the majority announced a new rule redefining negligent operation to mean negligent driving. It does this despite the fact that the long line of Court of Appeals cases discussed in the thorough Court of Appeals opinion militates against peremptory action by this Court. Today's redefinition of negligent operation is particularly inappropriate as applied to this case. Here, plaintiff alleged that he was injured as a consequence of the negligent operation of the hydraulic doors on defendant's bus. His injury occurred after the driver had parked the bus and shut off the engine. In order to get out of the bus, the driver had to open the doors. Without contest, the doors were an integral part of the bus. Their operation was inherent in and necessary to the operation of the bus. Consider the majority's definition of operation in a hypothetical case involving the same bus. Assume that a passenger was injured because of negligent operation of the hydraulic doors while the bus was stopped. The bus was not being operated as the majority defines the term, because it was not being driven. Would the injury be barred by governmental immunity? If so, what wording in the statute evidences a legislative intent to define the term so narrowly? If not, why should the fact that in this case the plaintiff was not a passenger affect the definition of operation? Recall that the statute does not require that the motor vehicle be involved in any particular activity. Recall also that the statute does not include words such as upon a highway. Assume a second hypothetical case involving the same bus, in which the bus was stopped on a hill, its engine off. Through the driver's negligent setting of the brakes, it began to roll, injuring a pedestrian. Would governmental immunity apply? Could the Legislature have intended that someone thus injured by the bus would not be entitled to bring suit against defendant merely because the bus was not being driven?