Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purported Coercion of the Jury by the

Text: District Court70 The Defendants question the validity of the verdict in light of supposed coercion of the jury. In particular, the Defendants claim that the jury believed it was under time constraints to reach a verdict after deliberations started, largely brought on by the forthcoming departure of certain jurors for their prepaid vacations. According to the Defendants, the jury believed it would have to start deliberations anew each time a juror was excused, so the jurors felt rushed to reach a verdict before more jurors could be excused. Combining that prospect with the fact that the trial had already lasted months longer than originally promised, the Defendants say the jury was coerced by the District Court into reaching its verdict quickly. It is true that “a trial judge may not coerce a jury to the extent of demanding that they return a verdict.” United States v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “We will find a supplemental charge to be unduly coercive, however, only where the charge caused the jury to be influenced by concerns irrelevant to their task and where the jury reached its 70 “In reviewing jury instructions, we consider the legal standard stated in the instructions de novo, but apply an abuse of discretion standard as to the specific wording of the instructions.” United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006). 113 subsequent verdict for reasons other than the evidence presented to it.” United States v. Boone, 458 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Thus, undue coercion from a trial court “generally involve[s] substantial and explicit pressure from the court for a verdict or for a particular result.” Id. at 327. That is why instructions are permissible when they, for example, merely remind jurors of their oaths or simply explain that disagreement would result in retrial. Id. at 326-27; cf. Jackson, 443 F.3d at 298 (coercive charge when the court “goes further and unduly emphasizes the consequences, i.e., time, toil, or expense, that will accompany a failure to arrive at a[] unanimous verdict”). Similarly, when it comes to jurors’ understanding of the length of deliberations, we have drawn a distinction between impermissible “affirmative coercive conduct” by the court – such as reminding the jury of the approaching weekend – and a permissible failure to address a question about an approaching holiday. United States v. Graham, 758 F.2d 879, 883-85 (3d Cir. 1985) (“The impending holiday of and by itself is an insufficient additional factor to render the district court’s order for further deliberations coercive.”). With respect to the original jury – before Juror #12 was excused – the Defendants cannot complain of any coerced verdict. For one, the record does not clearly support the Defendants’ claim that the jury knew it would have to start deliberations anew after Juror #12 was replaced. The Defendants latch onto the District Court’s concession that it told alternates that the deliberations would start anew if they replaced a juror, speculating that the alternates relayed that message to the jurors, in direct contravention of the Court’s 114 order not to discuss the case outside deliberations.71 But we assume that jurors follow instructions. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985). More clear – though still not entirely so – is the District Court’s statement to the parties that the jurors “all understand that if they don’t have a verdict when [Juror #]12 leaves, they’re going to get an alternate in there, have to start again next week.” (JAC at 14002.) But regardless of the jury’s understanding of the consequences of Juror #12’s excusal, the fact remains that it did not return a verdict before Juror #12 was replaced by an alternate and the jury was instructed to start over. The Defendants cannot complain about a coerced verdict when there was no verdict at all at that point. See Jackson, 443 F.3d at 297 (supplemental charges were coercive when they “caused” the jury to be influenced by irrelevant concerns and reach a verdict for reasons other than the evidence presented (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). After Juror #12 was replaced, the jury may well have believed that deliberations would have to start anew again if 71 And because the Defendants simply speculate that alternates told jurors about starting deliberations anew upon a substitution, we disagree with the Defendants that the Court had an obligation to conduct a hearing to determine the existence of improper contact between jurors and alternates. See United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that “[t]here is no obligation for the judge to conduct an investigation” if there is no “reason to believe that jurors have been exposed to prejudicial information” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 115 another juror was replaced. Even though other options were available and considered here,72 the jurors saw what happened after Juror #12 was replaced – the Court instructed them, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c)(3),73 to start over – and they could have “assum[ed] that substitution was the only option[.]” (NS Opening Br. at 123.) But that assumption, without more, does not amount to coercion. Other than complying with Rule 24(c)(3), the District Court undertook no “affirmative coercive conduct” that would put pressure on the jury to reach a verdict by a certain deadline. Graham, 758 F.2d at 885. The Defendants point to no instance in which the Court imposed any “pressure … for a verdict or for a particular result.” Boone, 458 F.3d at 327. Without any other indicia of coercion, the Defendants effectively invite us to deem a use of Rule 24(c)(3) to be coercive per se, for the message it sends to a newly constituted jury.74 We decline that invitation. 72 “The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently provide courts three options after excusing a juror for good cause during deliberations: (1) declare a mistrial; (2) proceed with eleven jurors; or (3) seat an alternate.” United States v. James, 955 F.3d 336, 346 (3d Cir.) (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 329 (2020). 73 See supra note 64. 74 The Defendants emphasize the lack of evidence that the jury was not coerced by an understanding that deliberations would start anew with another replacement. But the burden of showing error remains with them. See United States v. 116