Opinion ID: 1280645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pre-Death Charges

Text: The first surcharge was for pre-death charges of $4,344.33. On July 3, 1985, notice to creditors was first published, giving them until November 3, 1985, to present their claims against the estate. [4] In July and September of 1985, Gudschinsky paid herself from estate funds a total of $4,344.33 for debts allegedly owed by Bewley to Gudschinsky at the time of Bewley's death. The probate master found that: 1) it was inappropriate for Gudschinsky to reimburse herself ahead of other possible creditors, and 2) her reimbursement was supported only by scratch-pad type notes and thus was not satisfactorily documented to allow court approval several years later. The master did not make clear the legal basis for this assessment. Although she begins her discussion by citing AS 13.16.460, § 460 does not provide for liability of the personal representative. [5] Alaska Statute 13.16.480 provides for liability of a personal representative in cases of early payment. [6] But § 480 provides for such liability only in instances where another claimant has been injured by the early payment. There has been no finding, express or implied, to that effect. Without such a finding, the master could not properly surcharge Gudschinsky for the pre-death charges based on § 480. Reliance on AS 13.16.395, [7] as suggested by Hartill, suffers from the same deficiency. To impose liability based on § 395, there must be findings that (1) there was an improper exercise of power, (2) there was damage or loss to the party to whom the personal representative is liable, and (3) this damage or loss resulted from a breach of a fiduciary duty. Although the master found that it was inappropriate for Gudschinsky to reimburse herself ahead of other possible creditors, thus making the first required finding, there has been no finding of any damage or loss to any interested persons, which is the second required finding. Nor has the third required finding been made, i.e., that Gudschinsky breached her fiduciary duty by making such payments. Without these findings, it was error to surcharge Gudschinsky for the pre-death charges based on § 395. [8] We therefore reverse that part of the superior court's order affirming the master's surcharge against Gudschinsky for the pre-death charges. We remand to the superior court with directions to remand the matter to the master to make findings of fact on the issues discussed above. [9]