Opinion ID: 344772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Structure of the National Petroleum Council

Text: 4 In response to a request from President Truman, the Secretary of the Interior established the National Petroleum Council on 18 June 1946 as a source for advice on all matters related to oil and gas. 11 In an attempt to regulate advisory committees such as the NPC in a comprehensive and uniform fashion, Congress enacted FACA to take effect on 5 January 1973. 12 Although the NPC had operated for a considerable period of time prior to the effective date of FACA, it is clear that the Council is an advisory committee within the meaning of FACA and thus subject to the Act's provisions. 13 The key provisions of FACA for purposes of this litigation relate to the creation, membership, funding, and review of advisory committees. 5 1. The Creation of Advisory Committees. FACA deals explicitly with two types of federal advisory committees 14 those that advise the President, 15 and those that advise the executive agencies of the Federal Government. 16 The NPC belongs to the latter category in that it exists to advise the Secretary of the Interior. 17 6 FACA specifies three ways by which an advisory committee can be established: 1) an act of Congress; 18 2) a specific authorization by the President; 19 or 3) a formal determination by the head of a federal agency that the establishment of the advisory body will be in the public interest. 20 The third method was used in establishing the Council, the Secretary having made the required determination that the Council was necessary for the proper functioning of the DOI. 21 Thus, the existence of the NPC is not mandated by statute but exists because of the initiative taken by the Secretary. 7 Before an advisory committee can begin to function, it must be formally chartered in accordance with section 9(c) of FACA. 22 The charter must contain, inter alia, information concerning the committee's objectives and the scope of its operations and duties. 23 The charter for the NPC was filed with the Secretary of the Interior on 9 January 1973 and provides the following description of the Council's duties: 8 The functions of the (NPC) . . . are to advise, inform and make recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior with respect to any matter relating to petroleum or the petroleum industry submitted to it by, or approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 24 9 A most important point with respect to the chartering of advisory committees is that these committees are chartered to one federal agency. The NPC is chartered to the DOI and to no other agency; the Secretary is responsible for approving the Council's charter. 25 The Council is not chartered to the Congress or any committee thereof. Although the NPC is not chartered to the Congress, FACA does require that a copy of the charter be filed with the standing committees of the Senate and House of Representatives having legislative jurisdiction over the DOI. 26 This requirement serves to facilitate the continuing review of advisory committees which these standing committees must conduct under FACA. 27 10 Although a federal advisory committee is chartered to only one agency, such committee can serve as an advisory committee to other federal agencies. FACA provides that an advisory group will be considered as an advisory committee within the meaning of the Act if it is established or utilized 28 by an agency. The FEAA contains a similar provision with respect to the utilization of advisory bodies. 29 Appellants contend that the FEA is indeed utilizing the NPC. 30 Since the FEAA contains its own requirement of a balanced membership on advisory committees, 31 and also incorporates by reference the FACA membership requirements, 32 appellants allege that the FEAA has also been violated. 33 Thus, although the NPC is not chartered to the FEA, appellants have named this agency as a defendant because of its alleged use of advice rendered by the Council. 11 2. The Membership and Funding of Advisory Committees. There is no dispute among the parties that some 140 out of the 155 members of the NPC are affiliated with the petroleum industry or that the subgroups which handle much of the Council's research work are similarly dominated by personnel from the petroleum industry. 34 The disagreement between the parties, and the precise focus of this lawsuit, concerns the legality of this industry domination of the NPC in light of the membership provisions in FACA. FACA in pertinent part requires that 12 the membership of (an) advisory committee . . . be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee (and) that the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but will instead be the result of the advisory committee's independent judgment. 35 13 Appellees contend that the requirements of FACA have been met by the present composition of the Council because the Council is balanced in terms of . . . the functions to be performed by the advisory committee. That is, appellees interpret FACA as requiring only that the Council contain a reasonable representation of viewpoints from within the petroleum industry. 36 Appellees believe that the Council does contain such a balance since all the operational elements 37 and every function of the industry 38 are represented on the Council. 14 Appellants, on the other hand, believe that the membership requirements of FACA are violated solely by the fact that 140 members of the Council are affiliated with the petroleum industry. 39 In appellants' view, such domination in and of itself causes the Council's work to be inappropriately influenced by the petroleum industry and prevents the Council from exercising its independent judgment as required by FACA. All of the injuries which appellants assert in this lawsuit flow from this allegedly unbalanced membership of the NPC. 40 As an element of the relief requested by appellants in this case, they seek a declaratory judgment that the membership of the Council is not fairly balanced. 41 In response to interrogatories, the appellants have refused to specify the criteria which the Secretary of the Interior should use in appointing members to the Council in order to ensure the proper balance which they seek. 42 Rather, appellants leave this decision as to the proper membership balance totally to the discretion of the court. 15 In the context of this case we need not express a view as to the proper interpretation of the membership provisions of FACA. Rather, for purposes of standing we are required to accept as true all material allegations of the complaint . . . 43 Accordingly, we assume that, whether the membership of the NPC is or is not fairly balanced as required by FACA, the Council's advice is indeed inappropriately influenced by the petroleum industry. In Part III we shall examine the critical question as to whether this assumed illegality has resulted in any judicially cognizable injury to the appellants. 44 16 FACA provides very little guidance as to the manner in which advisory committees are to be funded. The Act requires each agency to keep such records as will fully disclose the disposition of any funds which may be at the disposal of its advisory committees 45 but does not specify the source from which these funds are to come. The only express requirement in the statute is that the agency shall be responsible for providing support services for each advisory committee established by or reporting to it . . . . 46 17 The NPC is, apart from the above-mentioned support services, financed entirely from funds provided by the petroleum industry. 47 Appellants claim that this funding scheme causes the advice of the NPC to be inappropriately influenced by the special interests of the petroleum industry. Thus, appellants do not challenge the NPC funding scheme as such, but contend that it, along with the membership makeup of the Council, cause the NPC to issue biased advice to the agencies which it serves. 48 As noted above, we assume for purposes of standing that the Council is inappropriately influenced in its work. Since appellants' contentions with respect to the NPC's funding merely serve to support this claim, we are not required to make a separate assumption that the funding is illegal as such. 18 3. The Review of Advisory Committees. FACA provides for three separate sources of review to ensure that the network of federal advisory committees is operating as effectively and efficiently as possible. The first source of review is the Congress itself; each standing committee of the Senate and House is required to make a continuing review of the activities of each advisory committee under its jurisdiction . . . 49 Appellant Metcalf is a member of a committee which has such oversight jurisdiction over the NPC. 50 Indeed, this appellant has introduced legislation in the Senate which would alter the membership requirements of FACA by requiring that at least one-third of the membership of advisory committees be drawn from citizens in private life who would represent the interests of the public. 51 This legislation was not enacted. Section 5(a) of FACA specifically grants these standing committees, inter alia, 52 the power to abolish advisory committees such as the NPC even though the committees may have been originally chartered by the heads of the various federal executive agencies. 53 19 The second source of advisory committee review is the Director of the OMB. 54 FACA requires the Director to conduct an annual comprehensive review of all federal advisory committees and to make recommendations concerning the continuing existence of each. 55 In addition, the Director is charged with establishing administrative guidelines and management controls applicable to all federal advisory committees. 56 One of the more significant areas in which the Director must issue such guidelines concerns the renewal of advisory committee charters. 20 FACA provides that advisory committees in existence prior to 5 January 1973 (such as the NPC) shall terminate on 5 January 1975 unless they are renewed by appropriate action. 57 The Director of OMB has prescribed the renewal procedure for advisory committees. 58 Appellants contend that the Director has violated these guidelines and they seek a declaratory judgment that all actions taken by the Council since its original charter expired on 31 December 1974 are unlawful. 59 Appellants seek this declaration apart from the alleged illegalities relating to the membership and funding of the Council. Again, for purposes of standing we assume that the Council's charter was not renewed in accordance with the proper OMB procedure; we also emphasize that this assumed illegality does not in itself confer standing on anyone to challenge it. 60 21 In addition to review by the Congress and the Director of OMB, FACA requires the head of a federal agency utilizing an advisory committee to monitor the committee's performance very closely. 61 According to information submitted to this court, the Secretary has taken particular care when discharging this responsibility in examining the membership of the NPC to determine if it is in compliance with FACA. 62 The Secretary plans an annual review of this aspect of the Council's structure. 63 As stated previously, the Secretary believes the Council to be in compliance because the NPC membership represents all viewpoints within the petroleum industry. 22 The point to be drawn from these review provisions in FACA is that federal advisory committees, and the NPC in particular, undergo close periodic examination by sources both within and without the agencies which charter or utilize the committees. In addition, the committees of Congress are given very broad power to correct what they may perceive to be any difficulty in the operation of the advisory committees and are required by the statute to exercise their review power on a continuing basis. Also, it is appropriate to observe that those who are charged with the responsibility to review advisory committee activities by FACA are more closely associated with and possess more expertise in the subject areas in which the various advisory committee operate than the federal courts. 64