Opinion ID: 1753129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Categories

Text: Yet another difficulty which arises when attempting to analyze this doctrine is that the term assumption of risk has been used to describe widely differing types of plaintiff conduct. As a result, commentators and courts have sub-divided the defense into various categories which are based upon the type of plaintiff conduct at issue. There has hardly been unanimous consent among commentators as to where the lines should be drawn in order to establish these categories. Compare 2 Harper and James, Torts 1162-68 (1956) (identifying three types of assumption of risk) with W. Prosser, Torts 303-04 (2d ed. 1955) (describing four senses of assumption of risk) and Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La.L.Rev. 122, 124-28 (1962) (identifying six categories of assumption of risk). Others doubt that such lines should be drawn at all. See Robertson, supra, 44 La.L.Rev. at 1371 (even as a matter of abstract analysis, attempts to differentiate between the various categories of assumption of risk are, for the most part, hopeless.) Even so, in answering the certified question, we must be cognizant of the fact that assumption of risk has been used to refer to different concepts in different cases. In order to provide an unambiguous answer to the certified question, we will briefly review the three most commonly utilized categories of assumption of risk, and will specify in Section III of this opinion how our answer to the certified question should affect the disposition of cases in each category. The first category has been called express assumption of risk, and it includes those cases, infrequent in occurrence, where the plaintiff expressly contracts with another not to sue for any future injuries which may be caused by that person's negligence. Anderson v. Ceccardi, 6 Ohio St.3d 110, 451 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1983). See also V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence, supra at 154; Keegan v. Anchors Inns, Inc., 606 F.2d 35, 37-38 (3rd Cir.1979). Express consent, which might also be called waiver or release, will usually bar recovery by the plaintiff unless there is a statute or established public policy against it. Wade, supra, 22 La.L. Rev. at 8. A second category of cases involves what has been called implied primary assumption of risk. In such cases, the plaintiff has made no express agreement to release the defendant from future liability, but he is presumed to have consented to such a release because he has voluntarily participated in a particular activity or situation which involves inherent and well known risks. Duffy v. Midlothian Country Club, 135 Ill.App. 429, 90 Ill.Dec. 237, 241, 481 N.E.2d 1037, 1041 (1985). Implied primary assumption of risk has been described as an alternate expression of the proposition that the defendant was not negligent, i.e., either owed no duty or did not breach the duty owed. Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attraction, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (1959). The third and largest category of assumption of risk cases are those in which the plaintiff is said to assume the risk of the defendant's negligence. Even though the defendant in such cases is found to be at fault, the plaintiff is barred from recovery on the ground that he knew of the unreasonable risk created by the defendant's conduct and voluntarily chose to encounter that risk. The plaintiff conduct at issue has been labeled implied secondary assumption of risk. However, most common law courts now agree that the plaintiff conduct involved in these cases is nothing more and nothing less than contributory negligence. See Duffy, 90 Ill.Dec. at 241-42, 481 N.E.2d at 1041-42 and authorities cited therein; Meistrich, 155 A.2d at 93-96.