Opinion ID: 3004542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The “Some Evidence” Requirement

Text: The State of Illinois has created a statutory right to goodconduct credit for the inmates in its prisons. See Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3). Illinois inmates, therefore, have a liberty interest in their good-conduct credits that entitles them “to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). A revocation of good-conduct credits complies with due process if the inmate receives: (1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by 41 (...continued) because that prisoner filed a grievance [or filed a lawsuit].”). Mr. Eichwedel raised this argument in the state court, but he no longer advances it, and it therefore is not before us. Instead of focusing on the motives of the prison officials who invoked 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d), see Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 (7th Cir. 2004), Mr. Eichwedel now focuses on the general effect of that statute. As we have explained, however, Mr. Eichwedel has not demonstrated that he is entitled to habeas relief on that theory. 32 No. 09-1031 the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Superintendent, Massachusetts Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67). Due process also requires that “the findings of the prison disciplinary board [be] supported by some evidence in the record.” Id. The “some evidence” standard of Hill is satisfied if “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56. Stated differently, “[t]his standard is met if ‘there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced.’ ” Id. at 455 (quoting United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)). “Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. “The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 457. “[O]nly evidence that was presented to the Adjustment Committee is relevant to this analysis.” Hamilton, 976 F.2d at 346. The Final Summary Reports indicate that Mr. Eichwedel was charged with “Violating State or Federal Laws” and that he was “in violation of 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d).” 4 2 That statute authorizes IDOC “to revoke up to 180 days” of a 42 R.7-10 at 1; accord R.7-9 at 1. No. 09-1031 33 prisoner’s good-conduct credit if that prisoner files a lawsuit against the State “and the court makes a specific finding that a pleading, motion, or other paper filed by the prisoner is frivolous.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). “For purposes of this subsection . . ., ‘[f]rivolous’ means that a pleading, motion, or other filing which purports to be a legal document filed by a prisoner in his or her lawsuit meets any or all of [five listed] criteria[] . . . .” Id. § 5/3-6-3(d)(1). To determine if there was “some evidence” that Mr. Eichwedel violated this statute, we must ascertain the elements of 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). See Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021, 1027 (10th Cir. 2004).4 3 The parties dispute whether 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) may be invoked properly where a court uses the term “frivolous” to describe a filing but provides no indication of what definition, if any, it is using to reach that conclusion. Mr. Eichwedel asserts that the court must indicate that it is using the term “frivolous” in the manner contemplated by the statute before a petitioner’s good-conduct credit may be revoked. See Pet’r Br. 22.4 4 The State responds 43 Superceded by state statute on other grounds as recognized in Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 2007). 44 In his state court complaint, Mr. Eichwedel argued that the State refused to follow the requirements mandated by 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) which authorizes the IDOC to bring charges against a prisoner for filing a frivolous motion (continued...) 34 No. 09-1031 that “[t]he long-standing and commonly understood meaning of a frivolous claim is one that ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,’ ” 4 5 that “[t]his well-established definition is consistent with the definition of frivolous in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)(1)(A)” 4 6 and that “[t]here can be no doubt that the district court employed precisely that definition when it found the motions frivolous.” 4 7 To resolve this dispute, we begin by looking to the opinion of the state trial court in the matter before us. See Bates v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1991). As 44 (...continued) ONLY AFTER ‘the court makes a SPECIFIC FINDING that a motion filed by the prisoner is frivolous’ . . . as that term is defined by the statute. R.7-14 at 42 (alterations omitted) (emphasis in original). He asserted that “the Adjustment Committee’s finding of guilt[] . . . was predicated solely upon ITS INTERPRETATION of Judge Baker’s October 9, 2001 and October 29, 2001 Orders.” Id. at 35 (emphasis in original). 45 Resp’t Br. 34 (quoting, e.g., Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). 46 Id. at 35. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)(1)(A) provides that a filing is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 47 Resp’t Br. 35. The State supports this last point by citing the order of November 8. As the State acknowledges, however, that order was not before the prison disciplinary board at the time it made its decision. See id. at 35; see also Hamilton v. O’Leary, 976 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[O]nly evidence that was presented to the Adjustment Committee is relevant to this analysis.”). No. 09-1031 35 relevant here, the state trial court found the following facts to be uncontroverted: that “[o]n October 9, 2001, U.S. District Judge Harold Baker denied plaintiff’s motion for sanctions as frivolous” and that “[o]n October 29, 2001, Judge Baker ruled that plaintiff’s second motion for sanctions was frivolous.” 4 8 In the course of its analysis, that court indicated that it would not allow Mr. Eichwedel “to retry issues already ruled upon by Judge Baker.” 49 Then, after stating that 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) “clearly define[s its] terms and lay[s] out the procedure and penalties which are available to the Department of Corrections,” the state court denied Mr. Eichwedel’s claim on its merits. 5 0 This passage suggests that the state trial court concluded that the district court’s use of the term “frivolous” constituted the requisite “specific finding[s]” of frivolousness within the meaning of 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d).51 To the extent that there is any doubt as to whether the state court construed the statute in this manner, we “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported[] the state court’s 48 R.7-21 at 2. 49 Id. at 3. 50 Id. 51 Indeed, in concluding that Mr. Eichwedel’s second state action was barred by res judicata, the Appellate Court of Illinois stated: “In dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, the [state trial court] found that section 3-6-3(d) of the Code was applicable because the federal court had specifically found that plaintiff’s motions for sanctions were frivolous.” R.37 at 8. 36 No. 09-1031 decision” to deny Mr. Eichwedel’s petition. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. In addressing a constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must assume that the state court “engag[ed] in a two-step process: first, it clarifie[d] the meaning of the uncertain term by deciding what historical facts suffice or are not necessary to establish the element, and second, it decide[d] that the evidence at [the hearing] support[ed] an inference that the necessary historical facts were present.” AndersonBey v. Zavaras, 641 F.3d 445, 449 (10th Cir. 2011) (discussing, e.g., Bates, 934 F.2d 99).5 2 Here, the language in the operative state trial court order, when read in light of the Richter presumption, requires us to conclude that the state trial court did not read 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) to require any specific invocation of that statute or of any of the five definitions of frivolousness contained therein before a prison disciplinary board may invoke the statute. Nevertheless, we have significant doubts about the state trial court’s apparent rendition of the elements. First, the plain lan- 52 See also Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062, 1064 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting, in the context of a “some evidence” challenge, that “[i]t may be hard in practice to separate evidentiary insufficiency from a mistaken interpretation of the [state] law’s substantive requirements”), disapproved of on other grounds by White v. Indiana Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2001); cf. Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021, 1027 (10th Cir. 2004) (determining elements of state offense to address a “some evidence” challenge to the revocation of good-conduct credits where no state court had done so in the matter before the court). No. 09-1031 37 guage of the statute requires that the court make a “specific finding that a [filing] is frivolous.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). Furthermore, the statute provides: “Frivolous” means that a pleading, motion, or other filing which purports to be a legal document filed by a prisoner in his or her lawsuit meets any or all of the following criteria: (A) it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact; (B) it is being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unneces- sary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; (C) the claims, defenses, and other legal con- tentions therein are not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; (D) the allegations and other factual conten- tions do not have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable op- portunity for further investigation or discov- ery; or (E) the denials of factual contentions are not warranted on the evidence, or if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. 38 No. 09-1031 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)(1). Therefore, the statute defines frivolous to mean five particular things and explicitly provides that a court must make a specific finding that one of those definitions has been satisfied before IDOC may seek to revoke good-conduct credit under 730 ILCS 5/3-6- 3(d). See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); People ex rel. Illinois Dep’t of Corr. v. Hawkins, 952 N.E.2d 624, 631-32 (Ill. 2011) (“The statute should be read as a whole and construed so as to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence; we must not read a statute so as to render any part superfluous or meaningless.”). Our unease about the correctness of the state trial court’s interpretation of the elements of the offense is heightened by intervening decisions of the Appellate Court of Illinois that support the alternate textual reading. For instance, in People v. Collier, 900 N.E.2d 396, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), the court found a trial court’s order revoking a prisoner’s good-conduct credits “disquieting” where its order contained “none of” the “five separate criteria” listed in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)(1) in addition to other flaws not relevant for present purposes. Collier suggests, therefore, that a court must indicate which of the five statutory definitions of frivolousness it is invoking in order for 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) to be satisfied. Other cases from that court suggest a little flexibility as long as the No. 09-1031 39 court makes clear its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d).5 3 Notably, the regulation implementing 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) 53 For instance, in People v. Shaw, 898 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), the state trial court “f[ound] that [a prisoner’s filing] was frivolous and patently without merit” within the meaning of the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act, and it “directed the circuit clerk to mail a copy of its written order to defendant’s prison warden so that a hearing could be conducted, pursuant to section 3-6-3(d) . . ., to determine whether some of defendant’s good-conduct credit should be revoked because he filed a frivolous pleading.” The appellate court noted that the plain language of section 3-6-3(d) of the Code . . . directs the procedure that must take place after a trial court finds a defendant’s postconviction petition is frivolous under the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act. Specifically, DOC is required to hold a hearing to determine if defendant violated [the regulation implementing 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)] before DOC can revoke any good-conduct credit. 898 N.E.2d at 766 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a petition is “frivolous,” as that term is used in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, “only if [it] has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (Ill. 2009). Section 3-6-3(d)(1)(A) includes within its definition of “frivolous” any filing that “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Therefore, it would seem that a finding that an item is “frivolous” within the meaning of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act would be sufficient to satisfy the plain meaning of 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d), particularly where the court then forwards its finding to IDOC so that proceedings under 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) may be held, as occurred in Shaw and in People v. Shevock, 818 N.E.2d 921, 92223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). 40 No. 09-1031 sets out the following offense: “A pleading, motion, or other paper filed by the offender for which the court, in accordance with 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3, has found to be frivolous.” Ill. Admin. Code tit. 20, § 504 app. A (emphasis added). The “in accordance with” clause comes in the middle of “the court . . . has found,” which suggests, at the very least, that the court must invoke and apply one of the definitions in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) before a prisoner may be punished for violating this disciplinary rule.5 4 However, in this case, the disciplinary board had before it only a pair of orders using the word “frivolous”—one of them in a single-sentence minute entry. The disciplinary board simply did not have before it evidence of a “specific finding” that one of the five statutory definitions of “frivolous[ness]” had been made “in accordance with 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d).” We also are concerned that the broad interpreta- tion given the statute by the state trial court in the case before us might frustrate the intended purpose of 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). The legislature crafted a detailed statute that gives very specific meaning and content to the term “frivolous.” The legislature may well have been concerned that such meticulous crafting of the statute was necessary because, in the common parlance 54 Indeed, at oral argument, Mr. Eichwedel’s counsel conceded that 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) could be invoked properly, in his view, where a court states expressly that a filing was frivolous because it lacked an arguable basis in law or fact, even if the court does not cite 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). No. 09-1031 41 of the legal profession, the term “frivolous” is often employed in a broader sense as a synonym for “meritless,” when that distinction has no immediate legal significance.5 5 The use of the general term “frivolous” does not apply expressly any precise definition of frivolousness—let alone one of the definitions in 730 ILCS 5/3-6- 3(d). Under these circumstances, it would seem inappropriate to presume that the court has considered the precise meaning given that term by the legislature. The statute requires a “specific finding” of frivolousness by the deciding judge, not a guess by an administrative body as to whether the judge made such a finding based on an interpretation of the court’s dicta. Indeed, even when courts are called on to consider expressly whether a filing is frivolous, they often struggle to draw the line between frivolous filings and meritless filings. See United States v. Eggen, 984 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1993) (“A more difficult question is whether, although Eggen’s appeal plainly lacks merit, it can be pronounced frivolous.”). Given the significant possibility that the state trial court did not take into account appropriately the legislative concerns in crafting 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d), we are reluctant to employ its interpretation of the statute in determining whether there was evidence to support a determination of a violation of the statute in the subsequent prison disciplinary proceeding. 55 For instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “frivolous” as: “Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful .” Black’s Law Dictionary 739 (9th ed. 2009). 42 No. 09-1031 We also note that the construction of 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) upon which the state trial court apparently settled attributes to the Illinois General Assembly an intention that strains significantly the usual relationship of the judiciary to administrative bodies by allowing administrative bodies to second-guess judicial judgments. When, as in this case, it is the judgment of federal courts that state administrative bodies are interpreting, the strain is especially significant, given the comity inherent in our federal system. We certainly do not mean to say that any revocation of good-conduct credits based on a finding of frivolousness made by a federal court is exempt from 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). To the contrary, federal judges in the State of Illinois—including the district judge who used the word “frivolous” in denying Mr. Eichwedel’s motions—repeatedly have invoked the statute.5 6 In doing so, however, they have made their intention clear to State authorities that the underlying litigation position of the prisoner was frivolous within the terms of the state 56 See Hibberd v. Jennings, No. 07-3131, 2011 WL 1232149, at  (C.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2011) (Baker, J.); Cook v. Standley, No. 10-3183, 2010 WL 3433060, at  (C.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2010) (Baker, J.); Arnold v. Williams, No. 07-1178, 2010 WL 2697156, at  (C.D. Ill. July 7, 2010) (Baker, J.); Thompson v. Quinn, No. 10-1101, 2010 WL 1692690, at -2 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2010) (Baker, J.); cf. Gevas v. McLaughlin, No. 08-1379, 2011 WL 39721, at  (C.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 2011) (“advis[ing]” a prisoner that the court might later find that certain claims are frivolous if he continues pursuing them and that such a finding could result in a revocation of good-conduct credits under 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)). No. 09-1031 43 statute. 5 7 We find it difficult to attribute to the legislature an intent to permit a prison disciplinary board to give a meaning to the order of a federal or state judicial officer that was not intended. In this case, the normal course of state appellate review was truncated after the trial court—in the words of the Appellate Court of Illinois—“misle[d Mr. Eichwedel] about the jurisdictional prerequisites to an appeal.” 5 8 Therefore, neither the Appellate Court nor the Supreme Court of Illinois had the opportunity to hear Mr. Eichwedel’s appeal and correct any error in the state trial court’s opinion. Although we are required to apply state law as interpreted by the state courts, we have significant doubt as to whether 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) means what the state trial court apparently concluded that it means. Because of the odd procedural route this case has taken and the intervening case law that supports what appears to be the plain wording of the statute, we hesitate to treat the 57 See Hibberd, 2011 WL 1232149, at  (“As discussed above, the court finds Plaintiff pled frivolous claims in his complaint. See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). The clerk of the court is directed to fax a copy of this order to Assistant Illinois Attorney General Chris Higgerson.”); Cook, 2010 WL 3433060, at -4 (“find[ing]” that the suit was frivolous, invoking 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) and “direct[ing]” that a copy of the order be mailed to a representative of the State); Arnold, 2010 WL 2697156, at  (same); Thompson, 2010 WL 1692690, at -2 (same). 58 R.7-4 at 6. 44 No. 09-1031 state trial court’s opinion as a definitive statement of state law.59 When presented with similar situations, other federal courts, in the interest of comity, have elected to certify questions of law to the state court of last resort to determine what state law was on the date of the relevant state court opinion. See Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23 (1999) (certifying to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the question of what a state statute meant on the date of the petitioner’s conviction where that court denied the petitioner leave to appeal his conviction directly and where that court subsequently concluded that the statute under which the petitioner was convicted did not prohibit the conduct for which he had been convicted); Policano v. Herbert, 453 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (certifying to New York Court of Appeals the question of what a state statute meant on the date of the petitioner’s conviction where there was substantial doubt on the matter); Burleson v. Saffle, 278 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2002) (certifying to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals the question of what the statute under which the petitioner had been convicted meant on the date of the petitioner’s conviction where that court had disposed of the petitioner’s claim summarily and, shortly thereafter, announced a rule which, if applied in the petitioner’s case, would 59 See Fagan v. Washington, 942 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1991) (“When in doubt, we think it both impetuous and impolitic to impute to a state trial judge a misunderstanding of state law.”). No. 09-1031 45 implicate the petitioner’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause).60 In our view, certification presents the optimal method of assuring respect for the decision of the state courts as to the elements of the offense and of assuring that an issue which will recur frequently in both state and federal courts within Illinois, but which might not reach appellate courts with the same frequency, is decided definitively. “The goal of this certification opinion is to obtain from [Illinois]’s highest court its view of the relevant principles of [Illinois] law—not to tell that Court how, in our view, [Illinois] law ought to be interpreted.” Policano, 453 F.3d at 76. Our reading of the statute and intervening case law, as well as our consideration of the policies underlying the statute, do not empower us to construe the statute; rather, these concerns prompt us to seek a definitive interpretation of Illinois law from the state court of last resort. 60 See also Emery v. Clark, 604 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (certifying to the Supreme Court of California the question of what a state statute means where there were conflicting opinions from various courts); cf. Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 2003) (looking to the answer to a question certified to the Supreme Court of Arizona by a federal district court on elements of an Arizona crime and granting habeas on instructional error theory); Sanford v. Yukins, 288 F.3d 855, 862-63 (6th Cir. 2002) (looking to the Supreme Court of Michigan’s response to a question that the federal district court had certified regarding the meaning of the state statute under which the petitioner had been convicted). 46 No. 09-1031 If the Supreme Court of Illinois agrees with the reading of the state trial court, we would be constrained to determine that there was some evidence of a violation of the statute. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court of Illinois were to determine that the statute required the court making the finding of frivolousness to invoke one of the definitions in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or otherwise to make its intention to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known, there would be no evidence in the administrative record that Mr. Eichwedel had in fact violated the statute.