Opinion ID: 2975336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Count 5

Text: Count 2 of the original and first superseding indictments charged that Cobbs “did knowingly possess the following firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §942(c)(1)(A). In the second superseding indictment, this count was renumbered as Count 5, which alleged that “defendant herein, during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime ... did knowingly possess one or more of the following firearms in furtherance of any of the above said drug trafficking crimes[.]” Cobbs argues that Count 5 does not state an offense under §924(c), and that the district court improperly amended the indictment by instructing the jury solely on the offense of knowingly possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The sufficiency of the indictment is reviewed de novo. United States v. Lloyd, 462 F.3d 510, 513 (6th Cir. 2006). Cobbs did not object to the sufficiency of the indictment prior to this appeal. Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3), defects in an indictment, unless they pertain to jurisdiction, must be raised prior to trial. See United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 849 (6th Cir. 1997). Since Cobbs did not object to the sufficiency of the indictment below, the indictment must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency, and his conviction on Count 5 may not be reversed unless the indictment cannot be reasonably construed to charge a crime. Lloyd, 462 F.3d at 513. Cobbs also did not object 9 to the jury instructions given by the district court. Thus, the conviction on Count 5 may be overturned only if there was plain error which affected Cobbs’s substantial rights. Id. at 514. It is well established that 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A) creates two distinct criminal offenses. Id. at 513; United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2004). These offenses are: (1) using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime; and (2) possessing a firearm in furtherance of any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Lloyd, 462 F.3d at 513. In this case, Count 5 charged that Cobbs “knowingly possess[ed] one or more of the following firearms in furtherance of any of the above said drug trafficking crimes[.]” Count 5 also alleged that Cobbs acted “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime[.]” There is no allegation in that count that Cobbs used or carried a firearm. The language of Count 5 is sufficient to charge all of the necessary elements for the offense of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. However, it does not charge all of the elements necessary for the offense of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The language in Count 5 which reads “during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” is surplusage. Its presence in the indictment does not alter the fact that Count 5 contains all of the allegations necessary to charge the offense of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Combs is distinguishable. The indictment in Combs charged the defendant with “possess[ing] a firearm during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime, utilizing only one element from each of the distinct §924(c) offenses. Thus, the indictment failed to charge any offense. Combs, 369 F.3d at 934. Here, Count 5 contains all of the elements required to charge the offense of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 10 The remaining question is whether the inclusion of the surplus language in the indictment affected any of Cobbs’s substantial rights. Count 5 is not duplicitous. Unlike the indictments in Lloyd, United States v. Savoires, 430 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2002), Count 5 did not charge two offenses under §924(c) in a single count. Further, even where an indictment is duplicitous, “proper jury instructions can mitigate the risk of jury confusion[.]” Lloyd, 462 F.3d at 514. The trial court below instructed the jury only on the offense of possessing firearms in furtherance of the cocaine trafficking crimes alleged in the indictment; the “during and in relation to” language was not included in the charge. There was no risk of jury confusion or a verdict which was not unanimous. Defendant does not claim that the court’s instructions were incorrect, but argues that the instructions improperly amended Count 5. However, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument that judicial narrowing of an indictment constitutes an amendment rendering the indictment void. See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136-44, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985). “A court does not err in ignoring irrelevancies in or striking surplusage from an indictment.” United States v. Grenoble, 413 F.3d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 2005)(citing United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1206 (6th Cir. 1984)). The district court’s instructions narrowed the scope of the indictment by instructing the jury only on the possession offense under §924(c) which was adequately charged in Count 5 of the indictment. The district court did not impermissibly broaden the charge to include an offense which was not alleged in the indictment. See Grenoble, 413 F.3d at 577, n. 6. Count 5 charged a cognizable possession offense under §924(c), and this claim of error is not well taken.