Opinion ID: 788362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation

Text: 61 In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that in the trial of a criminal case, an out-of-court testimonial statement is prohibited by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has, or previously had, an opportunity to cross-examine him. See 541 U.S. at ___ n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1365-66, 1369 n. 9. That Clause, however, gives an accused the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him [i]n ... criminal prosecutions,  U.S. Const. amend. VI (emphasis added), and it has long been established that [p]robation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) (revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution). Thus, in Morrissey, the Supreme Court noted that although a parolee is entitled not to have his parole revoked without due process, id. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593, the full panoply of rights due a defendant in [a criminal prosecution] does not apply to parole revocations, id. at 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593; and in Scarpelli, the Court held that the same principles apply to proceedings for the revocation of probation, see 411 U.S. at 782 & nn. 3, 4, 93 S.Ct. 1756. Nothing in Crawford, which reviewed a criminal trial, purported to alter the standards set by Morrissey/Scarpelli or otherwise suggested that the Confrontation Clause principle enunciated in Crawford is applicable to probation revocation proceedings. 62