Opinion ID: 1978978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speeding as Unlawful

Text: [¶ 7] Martin first contends that the court erred in instructing the jury: Maine law provides that an operator of a vehicle shall operate a vehicle within the posted speed limit and shall operate the vehicle at a careful and prudent speed having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of road and of other conditions then existing. Martin argues (1) that the instruction misstates the law of speeding pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2074 (2006); and (2) that informing the jury that operating a vehicle above the posted speed limit is unlawful constituted a direct missive to the jury to convict based on Martin's admission that he was driving eighteen miles-per-hour over the speed limit, without regard to Martin's level of intent. [¶ 8] Section 2074, entitled [r]ates of speed, requires drivers to operate a vehicle at a careful and prudent speed not greater than is reasonable and proper having due regard to the traffic, surface and width of the way and of other conditions then existing. 29-A M.R.S. § 2074. A related provision regarding the State's authority to regulate speed also states that [a] person may not operate a vehicle in excess of maximum speeds fixed pursuant to this section. 29-A M.R.S. § 2073(3) (2006). The court is not required to use the exact identical language of an applicable statute in instructing the jury, see Michaud, 611 A.2d at 64, and the court's instruction did constitute an accurate statement of the law combining sections 2073 and 2074. [¶ 9] We are also not persuaded that, as an accurate statement of the law, the court's instruction constituted any kind of missive to the jury, or that the court encouraged the jury to find Martin guilty without regard to the State's burden of proof as to Martin's intent, about which the court also instructed the jury. Thus, no prejudicial error is evident in the court's instruction.