Opinion ID: 2834020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Setting and Able Supply

Text: In Able Supply , more than 3,000 plaintiffs sued nearly 300 defendants for toxic exposure. After 8 years, the plaintiffs still had not named anyone who could connect their injuries to any defendant’s product. Instead, each plaintiff responded in discovery that this basic and crucial element of their claims “has not been determined at this time, but will be supplemented at a later date.” As here, the plaintiffs asserted that the trial court had “broad discretion to manage its own docket, and . . . has acted well within that discretion in determining that no answers are required at the present time.” [10] We disagreed, holding that the trial court’s apparent indifference as to when such information might be disclosed was a clear abuse of discretion with no adequate remedy by appeal. [11] The issue in this case is the same. The defendants made the same request as in Able Supply , asking for medical experts who could connect the plaintiffs’ diseases to the defendants’ products. [12] Although five years had passed since filing, the plaintiffs all responded either “not applicable” or that “none of their treating physicians” could do so. But the interrogatory did not ask about treating physicians, but any expert; as we noted in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner , treating physicians usually cannot make this kind of connection. [13] By changing the defendants’ question, the plaintiffs were able to respond with almost nothing. The plaintiffs point out that their supplemental answers included a long list of chemicals to which they were “potentially exposed,” and medical articles and expert reports suggesting some of those chemicals were “capable of causing” or “significantly contributed” to some of their diseases. But as this Court explained in Havner , “[t]o raise a fact issue on causation . . . a claimant must do more than simply introduce into evidence epidemiological studies.” [14] Evidence that a chemical can cause a disease is no evidence that it probably caused the plaintiff’s disease. [15] And as Havner illustrated, an expert’s assurance that a study establishes causation does not make it so. Claimants must have an expert who can answer why a study is reliable, and how the plaintiff’s exposure is similar to that of the study’s subjects. [16] An expert must also exclude other causes with reasonable certainty, [17] a special problem here as the plaintiffs allege exposure to so many different chemicals. By failing to list any expert who could make this vital connection, the plaintiffs’ responses were, for all practical purposes, just like those in Able Supply : “We’ll tell you later.” We recognize this evidence is hard to obtain, but courts cannot “embrace inferences that good science would not draw.” [18] Without it, no one can prepare for trial. Accordingly, we have repeatedly granted mandamus in mass toxic tort cases when plaintiffs have refused to produce basic information like this. [19] The plaintiffs point out that this case comes to us in a different posture than Able Supply , in which the trial court had refused to compel discovery. Here, although the defendants have moved to compel discovery several times, the order they challenge merely sets the case for trial. But that does not make this case different for two reasons. First, unless we assume the interrogatory was answered in bad faith, there is nothing more to compel. The discovery rules have been amended since Able Supply , now requiring that “a party must make a complete response, based on all information reasonably available to the responding party or its attorney at the time the response is made.” [20] Parties and attorneys certify this to be true when they sign a discovery response; [21] they can no longer simply choose to delay disclosure until the last minute. [22] Taking their responses at face value, the plaintiffs here and their attorneys certified that no one could make the causal connection they needed. Given the short time remaining before trial, the defendants properly objected that this rendered the trial setting premature; they did not have to spend the few remaining weeks begging for better answers. Second, Able Supply addressed not just inadequate responses but inadequate time for discovery. There, the trial court never barred discovery completely, as the plaintiffs promised to give better answers 30 days before trial. But we held that was not enough: In a suit of this massive nature, which includes disparate exposures to a multitude of products, requiring defendants to wait until 30 days before trial to obtain crucial and probative evidence of a causal connection between their products and plaintiffs’ injuries is such a denial of their rights as to go to the heart of the case. [23] Here, the plaintiffs never promised better answers any earlier; to the contrary, they claimed to have “fully and accurately” responded already. Thus, the problem here is the same as that in Able Supply : too little time between adequate responses and trial for the defendants to have a fair chance to mount a defense. This problem can be addressed from either end: the defendants in Able Supply sought to move discovery responses up; the defendants here sought to move the trial setting back. Defendants are not required to seek both. Instead, the trial court abused its discretion by doing neither.