Opinion ID: 318307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: compliance with the court order-- minimization

Text: 33 As required by 18 U.S.C. 2518(5), each of the three wiretap orders contained the proviso that 34 this authorization to intercept wire communications . . . shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications that are not otherwise subject to interception . . .. 35 It is undisputed that the government recorded every conversation during the period of the wiretaps. The appellants argue that in so doing the government violated the minimization condition of the court order. In support of this contention at a suppression hearing in the District Court the appellants challenged 11 calls and in their briefs to this court they list 184 'extremely personal' calls. The government had intercepted approximately five thousand calls. 36 The congressional reports accompanying the wiretap statute and decisions interpreting 18 U.S.C. 2518(5) make it clear that the minimization standard, like the standards traditionally applied to the determination of probable cause, is one of reasonableness which must be ascertained from the facts of a given case. 'What is important is that the facts in the application on a case-by-case basis justify the period of time of the surveillance.' S.Rep.No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, p. 2190 (1968). The minimization requirement is satisfied if 'on the whole the agents have shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusion.' United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973). Therefore, interception of virtually all conversations may be found violative of the minimization requirement in a particular factual setting, see United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523 (S.D.Cal.1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3018 (Mar. 29, 1973), but be justified in other circumstances, see United States v. Bynum, 360 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973). 37 The question of reasonableness in wiretapping presents difficulties not found when the subject of a seizure is tangible property: or 'feasible' depends upon the facts or 'feasibel' depends upon the facts and circumstances in each case. It is certainly unreasonable and goes beyond the limits of practicability or feasibility in every case to give a seizing officer what the Berger (Berger v. State of New York, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040) court characterized as a 'roving commission to 'seize' any and all conversations.' 388 U.S. at 59, 87 S.Ct. at 1883. But it is not unreasonable to recognize that it is much easier to describe with particularity in a warrant the nature and contents of a physical object than a conversation which has not yet been heard. In the former case the law enforcement officer can by sight and touch generally determine before he takes the item into his custody whether it is something which he is authorized to seize by the warrant while in the latter case he can generally determine with exactness whether the conversation is authorized to be seized by the warrant only when he has already taken it into custody by having heard it in its entirety. 38 United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033, 1047 (D.Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 1530, 36 L.Ed.2d 194 (1973). With this perspective it becomes possible to identify the factors which determine the degree of minimization required in a given case. 39 1. Scope of the Criminal Enterprise Under Investigation. What the Senate noted with regard to the duration of a wiretap is pertinent to the minimization issue. 40 Where it is necessary to obtain coverage to only one meeting, the order should not authorize additional surveillance. Where a course of conduct embracing multiple parties and extending over a period of time is involved, the order may properly authorize proportionately longer surveillance . . .. 41 S.Rep.No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 101, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, p. 2190 (1968). Where the criminal enterprise under investigation is a large-scale conspiracy with many participants, it may be necessary for the government to monitor more conversations with greater intensity than when the investigation is more limited. For example, some sophisticated narcotics conspiracies closely resemble advanced commercial enterprises with production and distribution networks, collection personnel, internal security forces, and so forth. Identification of the contours of the conspiracy and the participants may be the government's principal objective. 5 Compare United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972) (continuous tap found not to violate minimization requirement where the object of the investigation was an organized criminal conspiracy of large proportions) with United States v. King, 335 F.Supp. 523 (S.D.Cal. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3018 (Mar. 29, 1973) (continuous tap found to violate the minimization requirement where the court order limited the interception to investigation of a single narcotics shipment). 42 Additional characteristics of a criminal enterprise may affect the level of minimization possible. Where the members of a conspiracy act with great circumspection, agents may be justified inmonitoring a significant part, or perhaps all, of a conversation in order to be sure that it is indeed innocent. A number of reported cases have noted the use of codes within narcotics conspiracies so that superficially innocent conversations are actually highly relevant to the investigation. See United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sisca, 361 F.Supp. 735 (S.D.N.Y.1973); United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033 (D.Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 1530, 36 L.Ed.2d 194 (1973). Another technique often found is the use of guarded language or the deliberate discussion of irrelevant matters during the early moments of a conversation so that, if the conversations are being monitored, agents, assuming the call to be innocent, will cease the interception. See United States v. Bynum, 360 F.Supp. 400, 412-413 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1973). 43 True, if this thesis is taken to the extreme, the minimization requirement could be emasculated. The answer, of course, is that it will not be taken to an extreme if the reviewing standard is one of reasonableness and the factual setting of each case is examined carefully. 44 2. Location and Operation of the Subject Telephone. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment protects a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. As Justice Harlan noted in concurrence, such an expectation must 'be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable. 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516. In wiretap cases decided both before and after enactment of the wiretap statute, courts have implicitly, if not explicitly, applied that standard in evaluating the propriety of government intrusion upon a citizen's privacy. Where the probability is high that persons not under investigation will be using the tapped telephone or that the content of the calls will not pertain to the subject matter of the investigation, the government must adopt procedures to limit the interception of those kinds of calls. Thus it is not surprising that statutory or constitutional violations are most often found when home or legitimate business telephones are tapped, for the citizen's expectation of privacy in such surroundings is high. See United States v. LaGorga, 336 F.Supp. 190 (W.D.Pa.1971) (minimization requirement violated by tap of home telephone when many of the intercepted calls were 'innocent'); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (constitutional violation found in continuous tap of legitimate business telephone). Where, by contrast, a telephone is used exclusively to conduct illegal business and is located in a place which serves no residential or business purpose in the sense in which those terms are ordinarily used, then the users of that telephone do not have the expectation of privacy which society accepts and less stringent minimization standards are both reasonable and permitted by Title III. See United States v. Bynum, 360 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 485 F.2d 490 (1973) (apartment at which telephone was located was used almost exclusively for criminal activity). 45 3. Government Expectation of the Content of the Calls. In order to obtain wiretap authorization, the government must show to the satisfaction of a judicial officer that there is probable cause to believe that a given telephone will be used for one of the offenses enumerated in the statute, 18 U.S.C. 2518(3)(a), (b). If at the time of the initiation of the wiretap the government knows those persons who are suspected of the criminal offense, it can tailor its minimization efforts to avoid monitoring incoming or outgoing calls involving other persons; similarly, if the government knows during what time of the day the telephone will be used for criminal activity, it can avoid intercepting calls at other times. These considerations affect the initial minimization tactics employed by the government, but agents may expand or contract their interception policy as the wiretap continues: 46 Probable cause must exist as of the time of the intrusion, and the results of the investigation-- which naturally informs the hindsight analysis of judges and lawyers-- are not to be considered. With wiretaps, however, the degree of probable cause existing during the course of an investigation may fluctuate, since the growing amalgam of information received during the tap more sharply defines the skeletal data, inferences and sophisticated suspicions with which the investigation began. 47 United States v. Bynum, 360 F.Supp. at 404. 48 Thus, judicial analysis of the minimization requirement must take note of the ever-changing character of the investigation. If the fruits of the tap in its early stages reveal a pattern of criminal conduct unknown to the government at the time of the initiation of the tap, then an expanded policy of interception (within the confines of the court order) may be justified. See United States v. Focarile, 340 F.Supp. 1033, 1047-1050 (D.Md.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. grnated, 411 U.S. 905, 93 S.Ct. 1530, 36 L.Ed.2d 194 (1973). In the Focarile case the court found that there had been no violation of the minimization requirement even though government agents had not carried out a minimization policy until the tap had existed for almost two weeks. 49 Although total interception for 12 to 13 days may well be unreasonable under ordinary circumstances to establish a pattern (of personal calls), it does not seem to the court unreasonable here where there was an alleged narcotics conspiracy involving an unknown number of persons and where it was extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine which calls were 'innocent' in advance of obtaining a reliable pattern. 50 340 F.Supp. at 1050. 51 4. Judicial Supervision by the Authorizing Judge. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Supreme Court found a violation of the fourth amendment even though the government argued that the electronic surveillance undertaken was so narrowly circumscribed that it could have been authorized in advance. The Court held that bypassing a neutral predetermination by a judicial officer would circumvent 'the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification . . ..' 389 U.S. at 358, 88 S.Ct. at 515, quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). The most striking feature of Title III is its reliance upon a judicial officer to supervise wiretap operations. 'Close scrutiny by a federal or state judge during all phases of the intercept, from the authorization through reporting and inventory, enhances the protection of individual rights . . ..' United States v. Bynum, 360 F.Supp. at 410. Once a judge has authorized a wiretap, he may continue supervising the implementation and operation of the tap by requiring reports from government agents. 18 U.S.C. 2518(6). When a judge requires such reports at regular intervals, reviews the progress as it is related to him, and closely supervises the interception, 'the rights of affected individuals are most likely to be safeguarded.' United States v. Bynum, 360 F.Supp. at 410. 52 When the circumstances of the case under review are considered in light of the above factors, it becomes clear that the authorizing judge and the government agents could not have 'formulated any detailed screening instructions which could effectively minimize licit telephone interception.' United States v. Bynum, 485 F.2d at 501. On the basis of the facts known to the government at the initiation of the tap (and contained in the Cody affidavit), it was clear that Jackson was involved in a narcotics conspiracy of great size and sophistication. The purchases of unusually pure heroin negotiated by Lewis indicated that Jackson was close to importers and high in the distribution chain. Jackson's extreme circumspection, which made it impossible for the government to penetrate his enterprise with conventional enforcement techniques, indicated that he was streetwise, and Lewis indicated that Jackson was known as one of the largest narcotics wholesalers in the city. 53 The June 19 and June 24 heroin purchases, negotiated through calls placed to 582-9265, gave the government every reason to believe that the residence and telephone therein served as an answering service. First, there had been the circumspection surrounding the disclosure of the 582 number to Lewis. Second, there had been the persons at the 582 number who had been able to get messages to Jackson. Third, although not mentioned in the affidavit, Jackson himself had told Lewis to call him at the 582 number on June 19 to arrange the drug delivery. Finally, there was the June 23 statement by a person answering the 582 telephone that Jackson was there regularly in the afternoon. These factors justified the government's belief that the telephone was used largely for illegal activities and, under the theory adopted in the Focarile case, authorized an early period of constant monitoring in order to determine the pattern of illegal usage. 54 Certainly once the tap was installed the government was justified in continuing to intercept every conversation. It became clear that the 582 number was used almost exclusively to conduct illegal business. The people taking orders frequently admonished purchasers to state their business quickly so that the telephone would not be tied up. Callers were told, 'This is a business 'phone.' (Tel. Tr. 2188). Jackson once said, 'Now lay off the 'phone, 'cause I've got some calls comin. (Tel. Tr. 5547). 'I holdin' the line up and people wants to pay money . . ..' (Tel. Tr. 5878-79). When a non-business call came in, the caller was told, 'Alrighty, well I am on somebody's 'phone, this is a business 'phone so look here, I call you when I get home.' (Tel. Tr. 12,742). Calls came in during all hours of the day and night at the rate of one every ten minutes. The telephone was manned in shifts, with 'employees' often near exhaustion. The apartment in which the telephones were located served no residential function. Although statistics prepared after the fact cannot control-- the adequacy of minimization depends upon what appeared to government agents at the time-- statistics reveal that seventy percent of the calls were related to narcotics transactions, while only twelve percent could positively be determined to involve neither narcotics nor other criminality. Because many persons involved were either friends or relatives, many conversations containing incriminating statements-- some of them in cryptic or coded terms-- also contained some personal conversations. 55 In accordance with the terms of the wiretap order, the government submitted written and oral reports to Judge Jones. Written reports, which have been examined by this court, were submitted on July 14, July 28, August 7, and August 13 with respect to the July 11-- August 19 tap on the 582 number. A number of the reports prepared by the agnet-in-charge (and submitted to the Assistant United States Attorney) were also given to Judge Jones at these times. While the reports do principally deal with aggregate statistics, they also highlight important developments in the identification of participants in the conspiracy, and a fair reading indicates that the authorizing judge was aware that the government was intercepting every telephone call. The record also cintains a memorandum from Judge Jones indicating that the Assistant United States Attorney made oral reports of the progress of the investigation on July 14, 18, 23, and 28, and August 1 and 13, 1969. Fewer oral and written reports were filed with regard to the tap on the 399 number which was in operation only between August 1 and 19; but it is clear that Judge Jones was aware of the progress of the government investigation, understood the scope of the interception, and approved the government conduct. 56 In support of their argument that the recorded interceptions were in impermissible intrusion into their privacy, the appellants refer us to a number of conversations which they characterize as 'private'. We think their illustrations contradict their argument, for although the conversations frequently contain chaff they are also laden with evidentiary wheat. For example, the appellants refer to one conversation which they summarize as follows: 'On July 16 at 5:32 a.m. a man and woman talk about personal matters for several hours.' When we examine the conversation, which was played in substantial measure by the government at trial, we find that it occurred between Jackson and his confidante and co-defendant Mary Davis. It began at 5:32 A.M. and lasted until 7:40 A.M. During the conversation reference was made to 'Carlos', later identified as the co-defendant Paladino, whom Jackson regularly met at the Davis house. Jackson discussed the efforts of the police to keep him under surveillance, the techniques the police employed, and the steps he was taking to avoid deterction. Jackson also talked at length of the economics of the drug traffic, the problems caused by people 'sniffin' nad snortin' and tastin his drugs and the problem of getting large customers to buy both heroin and cocaine. He spoke of the difficulty of obtaining good help and of keeping the good will of his suppliers. Davis accused him of paying less attention to her when he met Carlos and started making 'big money'; to which Jackson rejoined that the growing responsibility of dealing with 'bigger people' required his increased attention. 57 The appellants also point to a conversation on July 17 at 5:13 A.M., when 'a woman and her brother-in-law discuss the hardships of her life for over 10 minutes.' This was a conversation between Lester Jackson, the brother of Lawrence Jackson, and a woman. Lester told the woman that earlier in the day police had been in the neighborhood, apparently engaged in surveillance, and that Lawrence Jackson was attempting to determine whether they were still there. He said that Lawrence was often exhausted by his efforts in running a successful narcotics business because he refused to trust others and made most of the 'moves' himself; that no one in the business could keep awake longer than Lawrence who pushed himself to the limit of his endurance in pursuit of business. Lester Jackson added that he intended to leave the headquarters as soon as he finished counting the money. Five hours later he called the woman and told her he had been delayed the previous evening by 'rollers' that showed up. He said he had been receiving money 'so fast I can't get no break, every time I look around samebody else lookin' an' somebody else bring some money.' He asked whether the woman put the last batch of money in the proper spot and said he had another bag of money as 'big as that one'. Appellants characterize this conversation as one in which a 'man talked to his wife and baby daughter'. 58 The telephones in this case were used almost exclusively to conduct illegal transactions; any personal conversations were mere specks in the torrent of conspiratorial communications. The appellants were not in a position to insist that their few legitimate personal remarks must be sieved out from the great volume of their unlawful conversations.