Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony about gun use during 1980 robbery

Text: The prosecution presented testimony about a 1980 robbery of the proprietor of a small Los Angeles liquor store. One witness, Officer Lee Smith, described defendant's arrest for that crime and Smith's postarrest interview with defendant. According to Smith, although he could not recall having mentioned to defendant anything about a weapon before or during the interview, defendant stated at one point, I didn't have a knife and I didn't have a gun ... I'll be out of here in seventy-two hours. The prosecutor had intended to also call as a witness the victim of the robbery, Kiro Horiuchi, but Horiuchi died before the penalty phase began. The prosecutor therefore sought to admit Horiuchi's 1980 preliminary hearing testimony under Evidence Code section 1291. After finding the witness unavailable, the trial court considered defense hearsay and relevancy objections to the evidence. With respect to relevancy, defense counsel pointed out that the transcript makes repeated references to defendant's use of a gun, contrary to a specific not true finding by the trial court on a firearm use allegation charged. Referring to the docket sheet in the prior matter, counsel observed that the case apparently involved a court trial at which the prosecution presented no evidence of gun use, and counsel noted that the trial court made an express not true finding on the sentencing allegation. He argued that because there was a not true finding on the gun use, the issue was not relevant and the prosecutor should not be permitted to relitigate it. The prosecutor challenged defense counsel's characterization of the prior proceeding. Quoting from the minute order that reflected the trial court's not true finding, the prosecutor pointed out that defendant's 1980 robbery conviction, including the absence of evidence in support of the gun use allegation, was the result of a plea bargain. As he noted, the minute order included the notation DA will not offer proof on [section] 12022.5, settlement is mid-term three years or less with probation open up to five years. He argued further that the jury was entitled to know the facts surrounding the prior violent incident, whether or not a conviction was obtained. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor and found that the 1980 robbery conviction was the result of a plea bargain that included dropping the firearm-use allegation. It further agreed that the details of an alleged crime of violence, whether or not a conviction occurred, could be considered by the jury and that robbery, by definition, is such a crime. The trial court then considered defense counsel's objections to specific portions of the offered transcript and ordered one of the witness's statements redacted to omit reference to a hearsay statement by the witness's wife. Later, the prosecutor read the prior testimony to the jury. In that testimony, the witness indicated that defendant had held a straw hat over some object in his hand and had said, I don't want to shoot you, leading the witness to believe that defendant was holding a gun. [12] Defendant acknowledges that under existing law evidence and testimony on the facts underlying prior felony convictions and criminal activity is admissible at the penalty phase of a capital trial. He points out, however, that principles of double jeopardy and due process require exclusion of evidence of prior conduct if the defendant was acquitted of charges based on that conduct. Because the trial court's not true finding on the gun-use enhancement allegation was tantamount to an acquittal, defendant argues, the references to gun use in the preliminary hearing testimony were admitted in violation of state and federal double jeopardy protections. Section 190.3 permits the prosecution to present evidence of the facts surrounding a capital defendant's prior felony convictions and violent criminal activity as part of its case-in-aggravation at the penalty phase. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 818-820, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 788, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 754, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) The statute also expressly provides, however, that evidence of prior criminal activity for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted is not admissible. (ง 190.3.) A defendant has been prosecuted and acquitted for such purposes where the falsity of the charge had been judicially established. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 132, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559, judg. vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Bacigalupo v. California (1992) 506 U.S. 802, 113 S.Ct. 32, 121 L.Ed.2d 5.) At the same time, however, an acquittal within the meaning of section 190.3 does not include a bargained-for dismissal, and admission of the facts underlying such a disposition, when it is presented in a later proceeding to determine the appropriate penalty for a different offense, does not violate a capital defendant's right to due process or the prohibition against double jeopardy. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1157, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 755, 756, fn. 17, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) As we have explained, there is nothing improper or unfair in permitting the jury at the penalty phase of a capital trial to consider, in deciding whether death is the appropriate penalty for a later offense, all relevant circumstances surrounding prior criminal activity that was the subject of a plea bargain. ( People v. Melton, supra, at p. 755, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Here, we will assume, without deciding, that the trial court's not true finding on the gun use was a `judicial determination with respect to the truth or falsity of the charge' ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 131, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559), barring its use at the penalty phase. Nonetheless, there was no error in admitting the prior preliminary hearing testimony to show the details and circumstances underlying the offense of which defendant was convicted, namely, the robbery itself. Significantly, the victim did not testify that he ever saw defendant holding a gun. Rather, the victim said defendant told him he had a gun and did not want to shoot. Defendant's threat to use a possibly nonexistent gun was thus a relevant circumstance underlying the robbery, which involves the felonious taking of the victim's personal property from his person and against his will by force or fear. (ง 211; see People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224 [no error in admitting evidence of acts constituting circumstances of simple battery where defendant had been previously convicted of that offense as a lesser included offense of charged offense of battery causing serious injury].) Because the preliminary hearing testimony, including its references to defendant's claimed possession of a gun, was admitted to show the circumstances relating to the bargained-for robbery conviction, a proper consideration for the penalty jury under section 190.3, factor (c), its admission did not violate the proscription against double jeopardy. ( People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 134-135, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Nor did its admission result in any unfairness. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 788-789, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) As noted, the evidence was limited to the facts supporting the prior conviction and did not indicate that defendant had in fact used a gun in the commission of that offense. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 71, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Moreover, the jury was informed of the not true finding on the gun-use enhancement and heard testimony by the investigating officer in the 1980 robbery case about his notation in the police report that defendant's modus operandi appeared to be a simulated gun. Defendant urges this court to reconsider the holdings of our decisions permitting introduction of evidence relating to the facts and circumstances underlying prior felony convictions generally. In arguing that the admission of such evidence constitutes a deprivation of the rights to due process, impartial jury, and reliable capital penalty determination, he points to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. United States (1990) 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607. There, the high court adopted a formal categorical approach to determining whether a prior state court conviction qualified for purposes of sentence enhancement under the federal Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1968 that prohibited the federal district courts from looking beyond the record of the prior conviction to determine the underlying facts and circumstances. ( Taylor v. United States, supra, at p. 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143.) We have in previous decisions repeatedly rejected the identical argument that defendant raises here. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1178, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 819-820, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 190, fn. 7, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 656, fn. 8, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1243, fn. 14, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) As we have explained, Taylor is distinguishable. The statutory scheme established by section 190.3 `involves wholly different considerations than ordinary criminal sentencing' schemes and `properly allows the jury to focus on the defendant's prior criminal conduct and propensity for violence, factors deemed relevant as possible aggravating circumstances.' ( People v. Mayfield, supra, at p. 190, fn. 7, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331.) Defendant further contends he was placed twice in jeopardy within the meaning of the federal Constitution's double jeopardy clause by the presentation of evidence relating to the facts underlying a prior felony conviction, characterizing such evidence as a retrial of the prior offense. We have previously considered and rejected this contention, finding no double jeopardy bar to the presentation of the details underlying a prior conviction at a later proceeding on the separate issue of penalty for a subsequent offense. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 711, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 543, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 199-200, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664; People v. Bacigalupo, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 134-135, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559.) So too have we previously considered and rejected the more specific argument defendant presents, that Bullington v. Missouri (1981) 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 compels the conclusion he was again placed in jeopardy when the jury was permitted to consider evidence of the 1980 robbery. ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 601-602, fn. 24, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741; People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 568, 250 Cal.Rptr. 530, 763 P.2d 1269.) In Bullington, the United States Supreme Court held that double jeopardy protections prohibit the state from seeking the death penalty on retrial after a trial court's granting of a new trial motion where the jury had set the penalty at life imprisonment rather than death. ( Bullington v. Missouri, supra, at pp. 444-446, 101 S.Ct. 1852.) Here, by contrast, no attempt has been made to prosecute or punish defendant anew for the crime he committed in 1980. Bullington is not controlling. ( People v. Wharton, supra, at p. 602, fn. 24, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) Because defendant advances no compelling reasons to reconsider our existing precedents, we decline to do so. In a different claim related to the evidence of the 1980 robbery, defendant asserts he received constitutionally inadequate representation because defense counsel failed to object to, or to seek a cautionary instruction on, a portion of Officer Smith's testimony about defendant's postarrest statements. He contends more specifically that the remark attributed to him, I'll be out of here in seventy-two hours, was not relevant to any statutory factor in aggravation and should have been excluded. We have long recognized that counsel's decision whether or not to object to inadmissible evidence is a matter of trial tactics. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 621, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) Because we accord great deference to trial counsel's tactical decisions, counsel's failure to object rarely provides a basis for finding incompetence of counsel. ( People v. Kiel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1185, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) Here, nothing in the record suggests defense counsel lacked a rational tactical reason for not objecting to Officer Smith's testimony. (See People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, fn. 16, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) For example, counsel could reasonably have viewed the officer's testimony as further support for the defense position that defendant did not actually use a weapon during the robbery. We find no incompetence on this record.