Opinion ID: 1154942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: exclusion of evidence of witness bias

Text: Valdobinos argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence suggesting Vilchez was biased in favor of the State because he had not been prosecuted on a Douglas County assault charge. The evidence the trial court excluded was Valdobinos's request to call to the stand witnesses to Vilchez's alleged assault. Valdobinos maintains the Douglas County prosecutor had falsely claimed the witnesses were unavailable to testify against Vilchez. At trial, Valdobinos hoped to have these witnesses testify that they had in fact been available. He thus hoped to show that Vilchez owed the police a debt for failing to prosecute him on a serious charge. [6] The court gave two reasons for its denial: the matter was collateral to the principal issues before the jury, and there was insufficient evidence to warrant this line of inquiry. We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling. Both Vilchez and United States border patrol agent Bauman stated in an in limine hearing that Vilchez's status as an informant was unconnected to charges not being filed against him in the previous assault. The court was also presented an affidavit of Frank Jenny, the prosecutor on the alleged assault charge. The affidavit stated that the investigating officer told Mr. Jenny none of the witnesses to the assault would cooperate with him and that the officer could not get statements from them. We reject the argument that Valdobinos was denied the opportunity to show witness bias. First, it is simply not true that Valdobinos was denied the opportunity to suggest Vilchez's bias. Valdobinos's counsel repeatedly inquired into his possible bias at trial and during closing argument. See Report of Proceedings (Valdobinos) vol. II, at 2-25, 74-78, 86-89; Report of Proceedings (Valdobinos) vol. III, at 139-42. Second, the reasons supplied by the trial court for refusing to permit collateral inquiry into the matter of bias are not reversible under the applicable abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., State v. Demos, 94 Wn.2d 733, 736-37, 619 P.2d 968 (1980) (applying an abuse of discretion standard to the trial court's refusal to admit evidence). See also State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971) (a trial court abuses its discretion when its exercise is manifestly unreasonable, or based on untenable grounds or reasons). There was no abuse of discretion.