Opinion ID: 2605208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: improper use of discovery deposition.

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing appellee to put into evidence the discovery deposition taken by appellant in lieu of appellee presenting his expert as a witness at the trial. Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in receiving in evidence the deposition of appellee's expert witness because: (a) the deposition was for the purpose of discovery rather than preserving testimony; and (b) the party in control of selecting the witness should insure the presence of that witness at trial or be considered to have procured the absence of the witness in the event the witness does not appear for trial. Appellant contends that because the deposition was identified as being taken for discovery purposes, it could not be used at trial to supply evidence on valuation. We must agree with Savoie v. LaFourche Boat Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.1980), which states that appellant cites no authority, and we know of none, in support of the proposition that discovery depositions may not be used at trial against the party who conducted them. There is not a distinction as to the admissibility at trial between a deposition taken solely for purposes of discovery and one which is taken for use at trial. 23 Am.Jur.2d Depositions and Discovery § 174. The decision to avail oneself of depositions of witnesses involves the risk that these depositions will have an evidentiary value and may be used at trial. One should prepare accordingly. Rule 32(a)(3), W.R.C.P., provides: (a) Use of depositions.  At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:       (3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is absent from the county where the trial or hearing is held, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. The trial court received in evidence the deposition of the expert witness because the witness was a non-resident and, therefore, absent from the county where the trial was being held. Appellant would have us find that the absence of the witness was procured by appellee. He argues that a party in control of selecting a non-resident expert witness should insure his presence at trial. If the witness is unavailable for trial,the deposition should not be allowed. Appellee did not procure the absence of the witness. The witness was never within the jurisdiction of the court. Appellant should have known from the beginning that there was a risk that appellee's expert would not be at trial. We do not see how appellant can complain. He had his own expert witness present and testifying at the trial to the evaluation of the corporation; by knowing in advance the evidence of appellee's expert witness, offered by deposition, he was in a position to refute that testimony. We fail to see how this advantage was prejudicial. Affirmed.