Opinion ID: 561307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Failure to Plead Assumption of Risk

Text: 13 In general, a defendant must affirmatively set forth assumption of risk, contributory negligence ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense in its response to the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c). By negative inference, a defendant's omission of an affirmative defense should therefore amount to a waiver. See, e.g., Pinto Trucking Service, Inc. v. Motor Dispatch, Inc., 649 F.2d 530, 534 (7th Cir.1981). In this case, however, Ramada's failure to specifically plead assumption of risk, although raising a substantial question, should not result in waiver because the affirmative defense of contributory negligence which Ramada did plead is broad enough to encompass assumption of risk. 14 Though distinct in principle, assumption of risk and contributory negligence are often confused and there exists substantial overlap between the two doctrines. Pure assumption of risk consists of voluntary consent to encounter a known risk while pure contributory negligence consists of failure to exercise reasonable care in self-protection. In a large number of real cases, however, the two doctrines are inextricably intertwined. In such cases, the plaintiff's conduct amounts to both assumption of risk and contributory negligence because her acceptance of a known risk is at the same time unreasonable and negligent. 2 Illinois courts are not incognizant of this doctrinal overlap. Recognizing that a plaintiff's recovery-barring conduct, while given different labels, is oft-times treated within the general concept of 'contributory negligence,'  the Illinois Supreme Court has explained that the form of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger ... commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 423-25, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308-09 (1970). 15 Coleman's conduct in voluntarily undertaking to climb a playground slide backwards appears to fit into both doctrinal pigeonholes, simultaneously constituting assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Because one act gave rise to both affirmative defenses, pleading of either defense would elicit the same discovery. Therefore, Coleman could not have suffered any prejudice from Ramada's failure to plead precisely assumption of risk. In light of the lack of prejudice to Coleman and the blurring of the doctrinal line demarcating these two theoretical categories, the district court's sua sponte consideration of assumption of risk based upon Ramada's raising of contributory negligence was not improper. See Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 417-18 (5th Cir.1986) (failure to plead affirmative defense did not result in waiver when no prejudice to plaintiff); cf. Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.1980) (district court's sua sponte dismissal of suit based upon res judicata not improper, even though defendant failed to plead this affirmative defense, in interest of judicial economy). We are reluctant to construe such a technical misstep on the part of Ramada to yield a fatal waiver.