Opinion ID: 1057381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The photographic lineup and subsequent in-court identification

Text: ¶ 11. Defendant next raises three contentions regarding the admission of the photographic lineup and the victim's in-court identification of him at trial: (1) the trial court erroneously found that the victim could not have identified defendant at the time of the photographic lineup; (2) based on these findings, the trial court improperly found that the lineup was not unnecessarily suggestive; and (3) the trial court improperly admitted the in-court identification as evidence at trial. We review these three claims in turn. ¶ 12. Upon appeal of a motion to suppress, this Court applies a deferential standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact. . . . Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. State v. Williams, 2007 VT 85, ¶ 2, ___ Vt. ___, 933 A.2d 239 (mem.) (citations omitted). We will overturn the factual findings of the trial court only if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, and excluding the effect of modifying evidence, there is no reasonable or credible evidence to support them. State v. Nault, 2006 VT 42, ¶ 7, 180 Vt. 567, 908 A.2d 408 (mem.) (quotations omitted). ¶ 13. Here, the trial court found that the victim had not met defendant in twenty years, and would not have been able to identify him by name, had he seen him. The court further found that the victim did not know that one of the photos he had chosen in the lineup from December 17, 2004 depicted defendant. When making these findings, the court acknowledged that, while the victim's testimony had been confusing and contradictory at times, he indeed was able to see his assailant during the attack, and offer a description of him. ¶ 14. We see no error in these findings. Although we acknowledge the murky nature of the victim's testimony regarding his past interactions with defendant, [t]he credibility of witnesses, weight of the evidence and its persuasive effect are matters for the exclusive determination of the trier of fact. The ruling of the court must stand if supported by credible evidence, even though there may be inconsistencies or substantial evidence to the contrary. State v. Tribble, 2005 VT 132, ¶ 12, 179 Vt. 235, 892 A.2d 232 (quotations omitted). Under this deferential standard, sufficient evidence was presented to support the trial court's ultimate finding that the victim could not have identified the defendant by name at the time of the lineup on December 17, 2004. ¶ 15. At the hearing on February 15, 2005, the victim testified that he had never put defendant's name to the face until this incident took place. He stated that, although he knew of defendant's group of friends and had seen them around town during the summer of 2004, he could not have identified defendant among them. Although the victim initially presented differing and somewhat sparse details regarding the physical description of his assailants prior to being shown the lineup, there was testimony that he had trouble recalling the incident due to his injuries and had misunderstood the inquiries of the police at the time. At the hearing on February 15, the victim stated that he had seen defendant clearly during the attack. He further testified that he picked defendant out of the lineup because he recognized him as one of the men who assaulted him  not because he was aiming to pick out Stanley Mayo after being told by eyewitness that defendant had been involved in the attack. His inquiry to Officer Fish after the lineup  Did I pick out Stanley Mayo?  further supports the trial court's finding that the victim was not able to identify defendant by name at the time of the lineup. Based on this testimony, the trial court was within its discretion to find that the victim could not have identified the photo of defendant as Stanley Mayo at the time of the lineup. ¶ 16. Defendant next argues that the trial court improperly failed to suppress the introduction of the lineup in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We apply a two-part inquiry to determine the admissibility of pretrial identifications, first asking if the identification was unnecessarily suggestive, and, if so, then assessing its reliability. Even if the lineup is found to be unnecessarily suggestive, it may still be admissible if it bears sufficient indicia of reliability. State v. Emerson, 149 Vt. 171, 174, 541 A.2d 466, 468 (1987) (Before defendant's conviction can be reversed on grounds of an invalid pretrial identification procedure, the procedure must be shown to have been so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.) (quotations omitted); State v. Kasper, 137 Vt. 184, 192-193, 404 A.2d 85, 90 (1979). We review the trial court's legal conclusions on a motion to suppress de novo. State v. Chapman, 173 Vt. 400, 402, 800 A.2d 446, 448 (2002). ¶ 17. To determine whether a pretrial identification involved unnecessary suggestivity, we look to the totality of the circumstances. State v. Bissonette, 145 Vt. 381, 385, 488 A.2d 1231, 1233 (1985). First, we must determine if the lineup was suggestive, concentrating on form, such as how the lineup was set up, how many photos were arrayed, whether the photos were similar in size, color, or description, and the officer's administration of the lineup. We have flagged several practices as suggestive, including the display of multiple photos of a defendant within one photo array, Kasper, 137 Vt. at 192, 404 A.2d at 90, and a presentation consisting solely of one photo of the defendant, State v. Findlay, 171 Vt. 594, 597, 765 A.2d 483, 487 (2000) (mem.). ¶ 18. Applying the initial analytical framework here, we do not find this pretrial identification to be suggestive. The lineup at issue consisted of eight photographs, all of men with round faces, stocky builds, fair complexions, light hair, and in their late twenties to early forties. Officer Fish, who administered the lineup, handed each of the eight photos to the victim sequentially, telling him that he should examine them and choose his assailant. The victim was told that the officer could not answer any questions during the process. The victim examined the photos and selected two who resembled the person who had assaulted him. The officer's procedure was no more leading than lineup practices we have previously approved of as non-suggestive, including a lineup displaying twenty-seven photos sequentially, rather than in an array, Bissonette, 145 Vt. at 386, 488 A.2d at 1234; an array of black-and-white photos, Emerson, 149 Vt. at 174, 541 A.2d at 468; and a lineup displaying five photos with only the defendant smiling and displaying his teeth, when a description of the defendant's teeth was one of the identifying factors provided by the witness, State v. Leavitt, 133 Vt. 35, 38-39, 329 A.2d 627, 628-29 (1974). Because we find that the officer's photo-array procedure was not suggestive, we need not reach the questions of necessity or irreparable misidentification. ¶ 19. Defendant argues that the victim's testimony demonstrated that he did, in fact, know who defendant was before the lineup, and that the victim had not given a sufficient description of his attacker before he was shown the photo lineup. While such facts, if believed, might go to the weight the jury would accord the lineup, they have no bearing on our inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is to ascertain if the lineup was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Emerson, 149 Vt. at 174, 541 A.2d at 468 (citation and quotation omitted). As stated by the United States Supreme Court, evidence with some element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has some questionable feature. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977). ¶ 20. We also reject defendant's claim that the victim's in-court identification was erroneously allowed at trial. We have held that reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony, Kasper, 137 Vt. at 192, 404 A.2d at 90 (quotations omitted), weighing numerous factors to assess reliability, including the opportunity of the witness to observe the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the description he is able to give police, the level of certainty accompanying the description, and the time lapse between the crime and when the description is first given. State v. Savo, 141 Vt. 203, 212, 446 A.2d 786, 791 (1982). Again, such testimony is excluded only if there is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Kasper, 137 Vt. at 192, 404 A.2d at 90 (quotations omitted). We will overturn the trial court's ruling only if it is an abuse of discretion. Savo, 141 Vt. at 208, 446 A.2d at 789. ¶ 21. Here the court was within its discretion in admitting the victim's in-court identification of defendant. Although the assault lasted but minutes, Mr. Gonyo testified that he observed defendant with perfect vision as he was bent over on top of Mr. Gonyo, punching [him] smack da[b] in the face. Mr. Gonyo gave descriptions of his attackers to the police a month after the attack, when interviewed at the station, and also at a hearing on February 15, 2005, less than three months after the incident occurred. While not 100% sure, he was able to narrow the eight-man photo array presented to him down to two photographs, one of which depicted defendant. Given these factors, we cannot say that admitting his in-court testimony created a substantial risk of irreparable misidentification, and thus decline to find that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the in-court identification.