Opinion ID: 6107678
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Heading: brady and pitchess

Text: We begin by describing Brady and Pitchess , as an understanding of each is necessary to understanding the relationship between them. (See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 1 , 7-10, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 ( City of Los Angeles ).)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits states from denying any person due process of law. ( U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) This guarantee of due process affords criminal defendants the right to a fair trial, impos[ing] on States certain duties consistent with their sovereign obligation to ensure 'that justice shall be done. '  ( Cone v. Bell (2009) 556 U.S. 449 , 451, 129 S.Ct. 1769 , 173 L.Ed.2d 701 .)  Prosecutors, as agents of the sovereign, must honor these obligations. (See Kyles , supra , 514 U.S. at p. 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ;  Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 103 , 112-113, 55 S.Ct. 340 , 79 L.Ed. 791 ( per curiam ).) A prosecutor must refrain from using evidence that the prosecutor knows to be false. ( Mooney , at pp. 112-113, 55 S.Ct. 340 ; see also Pyle v. State of Kansas (1942) 317 U.S. 213 , 216, 63 S.Ct. 177 , 87 L.Ed. 214 .) A prosecutor must correct false evidence when it appears. ( Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264 , 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 .) And, under Brady , a prosecutor must disclose to the defense evidence that is favorable to [the] accused and material either to guilt or to punishment. ( Brady , supra , 373 U.S. at p. 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 .) For Brady purposes, evidence is favorable if it helps the defense or hurts the prosecution, as by impeaching a prosecution witness. ( People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082 , 1132, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ; see also United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667 , 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375 , 87 L.Ed.2d 481 ; Giglio , supra , 405 U.S. at pp. 154-155, 92 S.Ct. 763 .) Evidence is material  'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'  ( Kyles , supra , 514 U.S. at pp. 433-434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 .) Evaluating materiality requires consideration of the collective significance of the undisclosed evidence ( Kyles , at p. 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ), as well as the effect of the nondisclosure on defense investigations and trial strategies ( Zambrano , at p. 1132, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ). (See also Kyles , at p. 439, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ; Bagley , at p. 701, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (dis. opn. of Marshall, J.).) A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant 'would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,' only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough to 'undermine[ ] confidence in the  outcome of the trial.'  ( Smith v. Cain (2012) 565 U.S. 73 , 75, 132 S.Ct. 627 , 181 L.Ed.2d 571 .) This materiality standard applies both after judgment, when evaluating whether Brady was violated, and before judgment, when evaluating whether evidence favorable to the defense must be disclosed. (See Kyles , supra , 514 U.S. at pp. 437-438, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ; United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97 , 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 .) Because it may be difficult to know before judgment what evidence will ultimately prove material, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful [ Brady ] questions in favor of disclosure. ( Agurs , at p. 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392 ; see also Kyles , at pp. 438-439, 115 S.Ct. 1555 .) Statutory and ethical obligations may require even more. (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 1054.1, subds. (d) - (e) [statutory disclosure obligation]; Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.8(d) & com. [3] [ethical disclosure obligation].)
Without relying on Brady , our decision in Pitchess recognized that a criminal defendant may, in some circumstances, compel the discovery of evidence in the arresting law enforcement officer's personnel file that is  relevant to the defendant's ability to defend against a criminal charge. ( People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216 , 1219, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 ( Mooc ).) In 1978, the Legislature codified the right and defined which officer records are subject to Pitchess discovery. ( Galindo v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 5 .) The statutory scheme is set forth in Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1047 and Penal Code sections 832.5, 832.7, and 832.8. ( Mooc , at p. 1226, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 .) These Pitchess statutes  reflect[ ] the Legislature's attempt to balance a litigant's discovery interest with an officer's confidentiality interest. ( Riverside County Sheriff's Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624 , 639, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 339 P.3d 295 ( Stiglitz ).) The threshold question under the Pitchess statutes is whether the information requested is confidential. (See Pen. Code, § 832.7, subds. (a) - (b).) If it is, the information may generally be disclosed only by discovery pursuant to Evidence Code sections 1043, 1045, and 1046. ( § 832.7(a) ; see Johnson , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 712, fn. 2, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 .) Requests for disclosure are ordinarily made in criminal cases but may also arise in connection with civil or quasi-criminal proceedings. (See § 832.7(a) ; see also, e.g., Stiglitz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 628, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 339 P.3d 295 [appeal of employee discipline]; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47 , 53, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ( City of San Jose ) [juvenile wardship proceeding].) A party seeking disclosure under the Pitchess statutes must file a written motion and give notice to the agency with custody and control of the records. ( Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (a).) Among other things, the motion must identify the officer or officers at issue ( id. , § 1043, subd. (b)(1) ); describe the type of records or information desired ( id. , § 1043, subd. (b)(2) ); and, by affidavit, show good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought ( id. , § 1043, subd. (b)(3) ). 2 This good cause requirement has two components. First, the movant must set forth the materiality of the information sought to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation. ( Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) The function of this requirement is to exclude[ ] requests for officer information that are irrelevant to the pending charges. ( Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011 , 1021, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 2 , 112 P.3d 2 .) If the movant shows that the request is relevant to the pending charges, and explains how, the materiality requirement will be met. (  Johnson , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 721, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 ; see also Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040 , 1048-1049, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 226 , 183 P.3d 1199  [The materiality standard is met if evidence of prior complaints is admissible or may lead to admissible evidence].) If information is material within the meaning of Brady , it is necessarily material to the subject matter involved in a criminal prosecution. ( Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3) ; see City of Los Angeles , supra , 29 Cal.4th at p. 10, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 202 , 52 P.3d 129 .) Second, the good cause requirement obliges the movant to articulate a 'reasonable belief' that the agency has the type of information sought. ( City of Santa Cruz , supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 ; see also Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This belief may be based on a rational inference ( Johnson , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 721, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 ); for example, that because officers allegedly used excessive force in a pending case, other complaints of excessive force 'may have been filed'  ( City of Santa Cruz , at p. 90, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 ; see also id. , at p. 93, fn. 9, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 ). Certainly, a movant is not required   'to allege with particularity the very information'  sought. ( Johnson , at p. 721, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 , quoting Memro , supra , 38 Cal.3d at p. 684, 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 .) At the least, the requisite reasonable belief exists when a movant declares that the agency from which the movant seeks records has placed the officer at issue on a Brady list. (See ibid . ) The function of the good cause requirement at this stage of the Pitchess process is not to determine whether documents will be disclosed to the movant; it is to determine whether information will be reviewed in camera. Accordingly, the burden imposed by the requirement is not high. ( Johnson , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 720, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 ; see City of Santa Cruz , supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 84, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 [requirement is designed to ensure the production for inspection of all potentially relevant documents].) When a court determines that a movant has made a showing sufficient to justify in camera inspection, the custodian of records should bring to court all documents 'potentially relevant' to the ... motion. ( Mooc , supra , 26 Cal.4th at p. 1226, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 .) [I]f the custodian has any doubt whether a particular document is relevant, [the custodian] should present it to the trial court. ( Id. , at p. 1229, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 .) The court must examine those documents in conformity with [Evidence Code] section 915 (i.e., out of the presence of all persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other[s as that person] is willing to have present). ( City of Santa Cruz , supra , 49 Cal.3d at p. 83, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520 , 776 P.2d 222 ; see Evid. Code, §§ 915, 1045, subd. (b).) To facilitate appellate review, the court should make a record of what it has examined. (See People v. Townsel (2016) 63 Cal.4th 25 , 69, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 19 , 368 P.3d 569 ; see also Mooc , at p. 1229-1230, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 ; see generally People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172 , 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 627 , 205 P.3d 1074 .) Questioning the custodian of records under oath regarding which documents were produced helps both to facilitate  appellate review and to ensure that information is not withheld from the movant improperly. (See Mooc , at p. 1229 & fn. 4, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 482 , 36 P.3d 21 .) After conducting in camera review, a court has discretion regarding which documents, if any, it will disclose to a movant. (See, e.g., People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181 , 1209, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 .) Evidence Code section 1045 guides the exercise of that discretion, requiring the court to exclude from disclosure certain information ( id. , § 1045, subd. (b)(1)-(3) ) and to consider whether the movant could obtain certain other information without disclosure of individual personnel records ( id. , § 1045, subd. (c) ). (See also Evid. Code, § 1047 ; Stiglitz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at pp. 641-642, 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 339 P.3d 295 .) Notwithstanding these provisions, however, the court must disclose information that is favorable to the defense and material within the meaning of Brady . ( Johnson , supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 720, 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 606 , 377 P.3d 847 .) Finally, the Pitchess statutes protect information that is disclosed to a movant from  further dissemination. The court shall, in any case or proceeding permitting the disclosure or discovery of any peace or custodial officer records requested pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 1043, order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law. ( Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e) ; see generally  Chambers v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 673 , 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 43 , 170 P.3d 617 ; Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033 , 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 63 P.3d 228 .) Upon a proper motion by the custodian or the officer at issue, the court may also make any order which justice requires to protect the officer or agency from unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment or oppression. ( Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (d).)