Opinion ID: 2518820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Circuit Court Erred in Denying the Appellants' Second Motion to Dismiss

Text: The Appellants contend that the circuit court erred in not dismissing the County's first amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The County, however, essentially points out that the Appellants have failed to recognize the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and other competency doctrines. The County maintains that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by the constitution and statutes and relates to the power of the court to adjudicate the issue. Subject matter jurisdiction, the County urges, does not depend on the particular parties in the case or the manner in which they have stated their claims, nor does it depend on the correctness of any decision made by the court. The County believes that there is no real dispute regarding whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction because, in its view, they all agree that the court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 603-23. The Appellants, however, do not agree. Jurisdiction is the base requirement for any court resolving a dispute because without jurisdiction, the court has no authority to consider the case. A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it is vested with the power to hear a case. State v. Kaluna, 106 Hawai`i 198, 203, 103 P.3d 358, 363 (2004). As previously stated, the County alleged in its first amended complaint that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the claims set forth in this complaint pursuant to HRS §§ 603-21.5, 603-23[,] and 632-1. In denying the Appellants' second motion to dismiss, the circuit court specifically ruled, inter alia, that [HRS] § 603-23[, entitled Injunction of violation of laws and ordinances, ] gives the [c]ourt subject matter jurisdiction in this case. HRS § 603-23 states: The circuit courts shall have power to enjoin or prohibit any violation of the laws of the State, or of the ordinances of the various counties, upon application of the attorney general, the director of commerce and consumer affairs, or the various county attorneys, corporation counsels, or prosecuting attorneys, even if a criminal penalty is provided for violation of the laws or ordinances. Nothing herein limits the powers elsewhere conferred on circuit courts. In Kaluna, this court stated: HRS § 603-23 is not a jurisdiction-conferring statute, but merely authorizes the circuit courts to act in equity, affording injunctive relief, provided there is a jurisdictional basis for equity to act. Even if the circuit court may have had the power to grant the remedy sought by the [plaintiff], it [( i.e., the court)] still needed an independent jurisdictional basis to entertain the motion. Therefore, HRS § 603-23 did not provide the court with subject matter jurisdiction. 106 Hawai`i at 204, 103 P.3d at 364 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphases added). In the instant case, we believe that, to the extent the circuit court's written order denying the Appellants' second motion to dismiss demonstrates the circuit court's belief that HRS § 603-23 alone confers jurisdiction, the circuit court erred. However, as indicated above, the County's first amended complaint asserted jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 603-21.5, quoted supra note 4, which provides the independent jurisdictional basis required by Kaluna. See State ex rel. Bronster v. Yoshina, 84 Hawai`i 179, 184, 932 P.2d 316, 321 (1997) (stating that the circuit court had jurisdiction pursuant to HRS § 603-21.5 to consider attorney general's request for declaratory relief brought pursuant to HRS § 603-23). We, therefore, hold that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case.
This court has stated: Standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issues he wants adjudicated. And the crucial inquiry in its determination is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf. Life of the Land v. Land Use Comm'n, 63 Haw. 166, 172, 623 P.2d 431, 438 (1981) (internal quotation marks, brackets, emphasis, and citation omitted). In deciding whether the plaintiff has the requisite interest in the outcome of the litigation, [this court] employ[s] a three-part test: (1) has the plaintiff suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant's wrongful conduct; (2) is the injury fairly traceable to the defendant's actions; and (3) would a favorable decision likely provide relief for plaintiff's injury. Mottl v. Miyahira, 95 Hawai`i 381, 389, 23 P.3d 716, 724 (2001) (citing Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai`i 474, 479, 918 P.2d 1130, 1135 (1996)). Our case law indicates that the requisite interest may be the result of a defendant's infringement upon a plaintiff's personal or special interest that is separate and distinct from the traditional infringements of legal rights or privileges. See, e.g., Dalton v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 400, 402-03, 462 P.2d 199, 202 (1969) (conferring standing upon neighboring landowners based on their interest in safeguarding scenic view, sense of space, and population density due to adjacent high-rise development); Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 176 n. 9, 623 P.2d at 440 n. 9 (conferring standing based upon plaintiffs' recreational use of rezoned land for diving, swimming, hiking, camping, sightseeing, horseback riding, exploring, and hunting and for aesthetic, conservational, occupational, professional and academic pursuits); and Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 589-90, 837 P.2d 1247, 1256 (1992) (standing conferred upon native Hawaiian group based on transfer of public ceded lands that would impede its customarily and traditionally exercised subsistence, cultural and religious practices on such land). Moreover, the plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying all three prongs of the injury-in-fact test. Sierra Club v. Hawai`i Tourism Auth., 100 Hawai`i 242, 250, 59 P.3d 877, 885 (2002). On appeal, the Appellants contend that the County lacked standing because it never articulated any injury in fact supposedly suffered by the County. At oral argument, Appellants' counsel vigorously argued that the County lacked standing because it failed to allege a distinct and palpable injury in its first amended complaint. When the County's attorney was specifically asked by the court whether his reference to the Charter Amendment as go[ing] to the budget was the injury, he responded that it was one of the injuries. And, when asked whether such injury was alleged in the complaint, the County's attorney indicated it was; however, he could not point to the specific allegation(s) contained therein. A closer examination of the First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, filed November 10, 2004, reveals the following relevant allegations: 13. The Council is responsible for enacting ordinances respecting real property taxes and is the entity which would adopt legislation to give effect to the Charter Amendment. 14. The Council is also responsible for enacting an annual budget ordinance. Pursuant to Article III of the Charter, the Council  shall provide sufficient revenues to assure a balanced budget. 15. Pursuant to Article 6, § 5A-6.3(b) of the Kaua`i County Code, the Council is also responsible for setting increases or decreases to the real property tax rates. . . . . 18. The Charter Amendment violates existing county ordinances relating to real property taxes and usurps the real property tax rate setting function of the Council. 19. The Hawaii State Constitution, Article VIII, section 3, reserves the taxing power to the State and delegates the real property tax function to the counties. An initiative cannot authorize, repeal, or otherwise affect the real property taxing power of the counties because this power is reserved to the County councils, and cannot be further delegated through an initiative. 20. The intent of Article VIII, section 3 of the Hawaii State Constitution is specifically to delegate the real property tax function to the county councils because the county councils are in a better position to administer local affairs. 21. The Charter Amendment violates Article VIII, section 3 of the Hawai`i State Constitution. (Bold emphases added.) (Italicized emphasis in original.) At the hearing before the circuit court, the County argued that the setting of taxes is related to the overall budget process. It's a very complex process. It isn't a matter of balancing the budget. It's a matter of the balancing of interest[s] and various factors that go into balancing the budget, [and] the various needs of the community that need to be taken into account. (Emphasis added.) In other words, if implemented, the Charter Amendment would result in the reduction in real property tax revenues that, in turn, would likely necessitate county budget adjustments that would affect services provided to the citizens of Kaua`i county. We believe that the first amended complaint alleges a sufficient injury under our case law to confer standing  BUT, upon the County Council. [10] In fact, the Appellants essentially recognize on appeal that the harm[] alleged in the first amended complaint impact[s] the County Council. Clearly, as the entity responsible for setting increases or decreases to the real property tax rates, see article 6, § 5A-6.3(b) of the Kaua`i County Code, the County Council has a personal stake in the outcome of this case. However, the instant declaratory action was not brought in the name of the County Council. The Kaua`i County Council is the primary governing body of the County of Kaua`i, cf. Bremner v. City & County of Honolulu, 96 Hawai`i 134, 137, 28 P.3d 350, 353 (App.2001) (stating that the Honolulu City Council is the primary governing body for the City and County of Honolulu) and, pursuant to RCCK § 3.01, is the legislative branch of county government. [11] Pursuant to RCCK § 6.01, [t]he executive power of the county shall be vested in and exercised by the executive branch, which shall be headed by the mayor[,] who, pursuant to RCCK § 7.05, serves as the chief executive officer of the county. [12] The director of finance is a mayoral appointee, pursuant to RCCK § 10.02 and serves within the executive branch as the chief accounting, fiscal and budget officer of the county[.] RCCK § 10.04. [13] As previously stated, the instant case was brought by the County. [14] The County, as an artificial entity, acts through the officers of its executive and legislative branches. See City of Sequim v. Malkasian, 157 Wash.2d 251, 138 P.3d 943, 951 (2006) (stating that the grant of power to a city governing body means exclusively the mayor and the city council and not the electorate (citations omitted)); Ward v. Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, 70 Cal.App.3d 23, 138 Cal.Rptr. 532, 537 (1977) (stating county acts through its board of supervisors, its officers, and its employees, much as does a private corporation); cf. Oahu Plumbing & Sheet Metal, Ltd. v. Kona Constr., Inc., 60 Haw. 372, 376, 590 P.2d 570, 573 (1979) (stating corporation, as artificial entity, can act only through its agents). Thus, inasmuch as the County must act through either the executive branch, i.e., the mayor, or the legislative branch, i.e., the County Council, or both, it is clear from a plain reading of the allegations in the first amended complaint that the plaintiff-County has brought the instant case on behalf of the County Council. See Bronster, 84 Hawai`i at 185, 932 P.2d at 322 (stating that, for purposes of this appeal, the fact that the attorney general brought this action in the name of the state rather than in the name of the governor represents a distinction without a difference). Here, the specified injury, i.e., the usurpation of taxing authority, is clearly to the County Council; and, as such, the County Council is the entity with the personal stake in the outcome of this case. Akau v. Olohana Corp., 65 Haw. 383, 388, 652 P.2d 1130, 1134 (1982) (stating the crucial inquiry in its determination [of standing] is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his[, her, or its] invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his[, her, or its] behalf (quoting Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 172, 623 P.2d at 438) (internal quotation marks and brackets and emphasis in original omitted)). Problematic, however, is the fact that the County Council is specifically named as a defendant in this case; consequently, the above construction leads to the conclusion that the County is, in essence, suing itself. [15] Accordingly, because a plaintiff must be adversarial to a defendant to create an actual case or controversy sufficient for a court to invoke jurisdiction, State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 274, 686 P.2d 1379, 1385 (1984), an actual controversy does not exist between the plaintiff-County (acting on behalf of the County Council) and the defendant-County Council. See also HRS § 632-1. [16] Consequently, it appears that the absence of a controversy would compel dismissal of the first amended complaint. The inquiry, however, does not end here in light of the County's assertions that (1) Appellant's intervention cured any defect and (2) that a sufficient controversy exists based upon the antagonistic legal duties of the parties. We address each assertion in turn.
The County asserts that any defects in controversy were cured by the Appellants' intervention which, thereafter, provided a genuine controversy. The County cites City of Springfield v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 752 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir.1985), in support of its assertion of cure. However, neither that case, nor the United States Supreme Court case that it relied upon for vitality, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983), strictly stand for the proposition that the lack of an actual controversy can be cured by intervention. In Chadha, an alien challenged the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) action to deport him. During the pendency of the matter, the House of Representatives, pursuant to statute, formally intervened by resolution. The Supreme Court stated that,  prior to Congress' intervention, there was adequate Art. III adverseness even though the only parties were the INS and Chadha.  Chadha, 462 U.S. at 939, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (emphasis added). Similarly, in City of Springfield, the city sought a declaration that it had the authority to enter into a billing arrangement with the Bonneville Power Administration. During the pendency of the matter, citizen consumers intervened. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, [w]hile it appears to us that there was a case or controversy at the outset, the alternate position of the intervenor . . . resolves any doubt on that point. City of Springfield, 752 F.2d at 1427 (emphasis added). Thus, the holding in Chadha, like that in City of Springfield, was that there was a controversy from the beginning of the proceedings, which intervention only strengthened. It is well settled that[,] since intervention contemplates an existing suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and because intervention is ancillary to the main cause of action, intervention will not be permitted to breathe life into a `nonexistent' law suit. Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323, 328 (3d Cir.1965) (citations omitted); see also Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 205 S.W.3d 690, 705 (Tex.App.2006) (stating that intervention by one with standing does not retroactively cure a jurisdictional standing defect); Goto v. Dist. of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 423 A.2d 917, 922 (D.C.1980) (stating [a]s a rule, an intervenor joins a preexisting dispute and cannot cure a jurisdictional defect in the original case. . . . In other words, an intervenor cannot come into a case that is not really there. (Citations omitted.)). Thus, based on the foregoing, the County's argument is without merit.
On appeal, the Appellants contend that there is no actual controversy[,] and the County Attorney, the Mayor, the Finance Director, and the County Council are not adversaries or contending parties with antagonistic claims. (Some initial capitalization and internal quotation marks omitted.) As such, the Appellants characterize the County's first amended complaint as collusive in nature. In response, the County essentially maintains that a sufficient controversy existed based upon the antagonistic legal duties of the parties. As previously stated, a plaintiff must be adversarial to a defendant to create an actual case or controversy sufficient for a court to invoke jurisdiction. See Fields, 67 Haw. at 274, 686 P.2d at 1385. As to the controversy, this court has observed that[, alt]hough the courts of Hawai`i are not subject to a cases or controversies limitation like that imposed upon the federal judiciary by Article III, [section] 2 of the United States Constitution, [this court] nevertheless believe[s] judicial power to resolve public disputes in a system of government where there is a separation of powers should be limited to those questions capable of judicial resolution and presented in an adversary context. . . . In short, judicial intervention in a dispute is normally contingent upon the presence of a justiciable controversy. Life of the Land, 63 Haw. at 171-72, 623 P.2d at 438 (citations omitted). Furthermore, an action not founded upon an actual controversy between the parties to it, and brought for the purpose of securing a determination of a point of law, is collusive and will not be entertained[.] State v. Hoang, 93 Hawai`i 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (2000) (citing Reynolds v. Van Culin, 36 Haw. 556 (1943)). In Reynolds, two business associates, among others, were involved in an automobile accident. 36 Haw. at 556. One sent a letter to the other, stating: I want to remind you again that we do not propose to look to you for the satisfaction of any judgment. The only way that we can proceed against the insurance company under the . . . policy is to sue you, obtain judgment and then sue the insurance company under the policy, alleging and proving that you were driving the car for the [policy holders] at the time [of the accident]. Id. at 559. The defendant who received the letter offered it as evidence of collusion, urging that an action brought on pretense of a controversy which does not exist is not justiciable. Id. at 560. This court held that, despite the subjective desires of the parties, their legal interests and duties created an actual controversy. Id. The Reynolds court relied on Golden Gate Bridge & Highway District v. Felt, 214 Cal. 308, 5 P.2d 585 (1931), involving real property taxpayers in California who were opposed to the establishment of county districts and the resulting taxation. Id. at 588. One district adopted plans to build a bridge across the Golden Gate between San Francisco and Marin County and attempted to issue bonds to raise money for construction. Id. at 589. When the district secretary refused to sign the bonds, asserting they were invalid under state law, the district brought a suit to compel issuance of the bonds. Id. The issue at trial was the validity of the bonds. Amicus curiae briefs on behalf of taxpayers were filed as reflecting the public's interest. Id. at 589. It was conceded that the district secretary-defendant personally desired the bonds to be found valid and was thus subjectively on the side of the petitioner. Id. Moreover, the court observed that the petitioner and bridge contractors had agreed to reimburse the district secretary-defendant for his litigation expenses. Id. Thus, the amicus taxpayers argued that there was no actual controversy and that the suit was a collusive, friendly suit. Id. at 589. The California Supreme Court, however, apparently found the argument unavailing and held that [a] genuine controversy existed . . . between petitioner and [defendant] as to matters vitally affecting [their] duties. . . . The personal desires of the parties as to the result of the litigation are of no moment[.] Id. at 590. Consequently, the court in Golden Gate Bridge  as did this court in Reynolds  held that, despite the subjective desires of the parties involved, it is their legal interests and duties that are to be considered when determining whether a suit is adversarial and, thus, not collusive for purposes of justiciability. Golden Gate Bridge 5 P.2d at 590; Reynolds, 36 Haw. at 566. Here, the Appellants argue that the Defendants were not actually adversarial to the lawsuit, but in fact supported it wholeheartedly. In support of their position that no actual controversy existed, the Appellants point to the facts that (1) the County Attorney and the Defendants jointly issued a press release, expressing their serious doubts as to the Charter Amendment's validity and also placed a newspaper advertisement urging a no vote on the Charter Amendment, (2) the Defendants were themselves represented by a Deputy County Attorney, and (3) the County Attorney's duties reflected that she also represented the Defendants in their official capacities. [17] The County, on the other hand, argues that: The uncertainty [over the validity of the Charter Amendment] had the consequence to the Kaua`i County Officials in that they are legally charged with implementation of the Charter Amendment. The Kaua`i County Officials therefore had concrete interests in the validity or invalidity of the Charter Amendment. The Mayor heads the executive branch of Kaua`i County. RCCK § 6.01. He is its chief executive officer, exercises direct supervision over all departments and submits operating and capital budgets to the Council. RCCK § 7.05. The Director is the chief accounting, fiscal and budget officer of Kaua`i County; he prepares the annual budget under the direction of the Mayor, and operates and manages the real property tax functions as established by ordinance. RCCK § 10.04. The Council exercises the legislative power of Kaua`i County. RCCK § 3.01. The Council also enacts the annual budget ordinance and must finance and balance the same by ensuring sufficient revenues. RCCK § 3.10. The Kaua`i County Officials have no discretion as to their duties to implement valid laws of the jurisdiction, regardless of their personal views. Their legal interests and responsibilities were irreconcilable with the apparent invalidity of the Charter Amendment, and thus an actual controversy existed. . . . The County clearly had an interest in determining the validity of amendments to its Charter. On the other hand, the legal duties of the Kaua`i County Officials to implement the Charter Amendment, regardless of its validity, were at odds with the legal interests of the County. Given the uncertainty and controversy, it was wholly appropriate for the validity of the Charter Amendment to be judicially resolved. In United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO v. Yogi, 101 Hawai`i 46, 62 P.3d 189 (2002), this court, in deciding that the plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants' claim for declaratory relief was not moot because a substantial controversy remained in the case, stated: In the words of HRS § 632-1, the dispositive question is whether the court is satisfied also that a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. This is a question of law. In determining whether parties still retain sufficient interests and injury as to justify the award of declaratory relief, the question is whether the facts alleged, under all circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant a declaratory judgment. Id. at 57, 62 P.3d at 198 (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citations omitted) (emphasis added). [18] Yogi is consistent with the principles in Reynolds and Golden Gate Bridge, discussed supra. In other words, despite the subjective desires of the original parties to this action, it is their legal interests and duties that are to be considered when determining whether a suit is adversarial and, thus, not collusive for purposes of justiciability, i.e., standing. However, as previously discussed in section III.A.2., the presence of the County Council as a defendant in this case destroys the existence of an actual controversy because, at least as between the plaintiff-County, acting on behalf of the County Council, and the defendant-County Council itself, their legal interests and duties are identical. Had the County Council not been named as a defendant, then the legal interests and duties between the County, acting on behalf of the County Council, as plaintiff, and the Mayor and Finance Director as defendants would be adversarial. In other words, the legal duty of the plaintiff-County, acting on behalf of the County Council, to protect against the Charter Amendment's usurpation of the Council's taxing authority would be adverse to the executive branch officers' legal duties to enforce the Charter Amendment. Thus, the question arises whether it is appropriate, at this stage of the proceeding, for this court to drop, i.e., dismiss, the County Council to cure the spoiler problem, which we next examine.
Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 21 (2004) provides: Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately by order of the court. (Emphases added.) In Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawai`i 214, 948 P.2d 1055 (1997), this court stated that [a] circuit court has the discretion to realign the parties at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Id. at 244, 948 P.2d at 1085 (citation omitted). However, Kawamata Farms' reference to the circuit court's discretion was in the context of the appropriate number of peremptory challenges to be allocated to the parties at trial and, thus, provides little guidance with respect to the circumstances we have here. Nevertheless, inasmuch as HRCP Rule 21 is identical to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 21, we look to federal cases for guidance. See Pulawa v. GTE Hawaiian Tel, 112 Hawai`i 3, 20 n. 15, 143 P.3d 1205, 1222 n. 15 (2006) (noting that, [w]here a Hawai`i rule of civil procedure is identical to the federal rule, the interpretation of [that] rule by [the] federal courts is highly persuasive (citation omitted)). The historical purpose of FRCP Rule 21 was to provide[] the courts with a valuable procedural device that can be used to avoid multiple litigation and to promote liberal joinder of parties. 7 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1681 at 473 (3d ed.2001). As explained by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in Stark v. Independent School District # 640, 163 F.R.D. 557 (D.Minn.1995), wherein it examined the interplay between FRCP Rules 19 (relating to joinders), 20 (allowing separate trials on separate claims), and 21 (misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties): [T]he underlying purpose of Rules 19, 20 and 21 is to allow the district court itself to exercise its power to align the parties and the issues presented in a single lawsuit in a way that will foster judicial efficiency, while protecting against prejudice. The [r]ules seek to preserve the autonomy of the parties, but that goal is not without limits. Rule 19 serves to insure the presence of an essential core of parties and issues, to avoid multiplicity of suits. Rule 20 permits the Court to add parties but to avoid unduly complicating the proceeding. Rule 21 serves both functions. The duty of the Court in considering a motion to add or drop a party is to strike a balance among these competing considerations, while following the initial mandate to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.  Id. at 564 (emphases added) (citations and footnote omitted). In Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 109 S.Ct. 2218, 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989), superseded by statute on other grounds in Singh v. Daimler-Benz AG, 9 F.3d 303, 311 (3d Cir.1993), the United States Supreme Court observed that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment has been rendered. Id. at 832, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (footnote omitted); see also Safeco Ins. Co. v. City of White House, Tennessee, 36 F.3d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1994) (same). Based on such observation, the Court examined whether a court of appeals may do what a district court can do and dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party itself, or whether a court of appeal must remand the case to the district court, leaving it to the district court's discretion to dismiss the party[.] [19] Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 832-33, 109 S.Ct. 2218. In answering the inquiry, the Court stated that [a]lmost every modern [c]ourt of appeals faced with this issue has concluded that it has the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party by virtue of Rule 21, id. at 833, 109 S.Ct. 2218, noting that [t]he cases holding that appellate courts are powerless to remedy such jurisdictional defects are few and far between. Id. at 833 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (citations omitted). The Court, pointing to its decision in Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 72 S.Ct. 428, 96 L.Ed. 458 (1952), further stated that, [a]lthough we did not discuss extensively Rule 21's applicability in the appellate setting, we did note that the change in the parties would not have affected the course of the litigation if it had occurred at some earlier point, and would not embarrass the defendant[] [and that] dismissing the petition and thereby requiring the plaintiffs to start over in the District Court would entail needless waste and runs counter to effective judicial administration.  Id. at 833, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (quoting Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 417, 72 S.Ct. 428) (emphases added). In holding that appellate courts have the authority to dismiss a dispensable nondiverse party, the Court emphasized that the appellate court should carefully consider whether the dismissal . . . will prejudice any of the parties in the litigation. Id. at 838, 109 S.Ct. 2218. Acknowledging that the dismissal of the nondiverse dispensable party in Mullaney represented the exercise of an appellate power that long predates the enactment of the [FRCP], id. at 834, 109 S.Ct. 2218, the Court in Newman-Green discussed several 19th-century cases generally dealing with the amendment power of the appellate courts. In so doing, the Court observed: Although these 19th-century cases were decided in a procedural era different from our own, it is apparent that the weight of authority favored the view that appellate courts possessed the authority to grant motions to dismiss dispensable nondiverse parties. Courts relied then on § 32 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 or on the inherent power of appellate courts. Today courts rely on Mullaney or Federal Rule 21. We decline to disturb that deeply rooted understanding of appellate power, particularly when requiring dismissal after years of litigation would impose unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the parties, judges, and other litigants waiting for judicial attention. Appellate-level amendments to correct jurisdictional defects may not be the most intellectually satisfying approach to the spoiler problem, but . . ., because law is an instrument of governance rather than a hymn to intellectual beauty, some consideration must be given to practicalities.  Id. at 836-37, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (emphases added) (footnotes and citations omitted). Concluding that the practicalities of the case before it weighed heavily in favor of dismissing the nondiverse dispensable party, the Court stated that parties should not be compelled to jump through . . . judicial hoops merely for the sake of hypertechnical jurisdictional purity. Id. at 837, 109 S.Ct. 2218. The Supreme Court's holding that appellate courts have the same authority as the district courts to dismiss a party from the suit under FRCP Rule 21 is consistent with Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 2.1. HRAP Rule 2.1(a), entitled Applicability of other court rules, provides that the Hawai`i Rules of Civil Procedure [(and other court rules)] that may be adopted by the supreme court from time to time are hereby adopted as part of these rules whenever applicable. In other words, HRCP Rule 21's authority that [p]arties may be dropped . . . by order of the court . . . of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just is granted to the supreme court via HRAP Rule 2.1 whenever applicable. See also HRCP Rule 81(i) (providing that the HRCP shall apply . . . to all appeals to the appellate courts in all actions and proceedings of a civil nature). In the case at bar and as previously discussed in section III.A.2., plaintiff-County, by asserting that the Charter Amendment usurps the taxing authority of the County Council, has asserted an injury on behalf of the Council. A review of the first amended complaint clearly demonstrates that the entity identified as having been injured throughout the complaint is the County Council. Thus, by dropping the County Council as a defendant an actual controversy exists. The first amended complaint clearly put the parties, including the Appellants, on notice with respect to the alleged injury, i.e., usurpation of the County Council's taxing authority, and called into question the validity of the Charter Amendment. See In re Genesys Data Technologies, Incorporated v. Meindl, 95 Hawai`i 33, 41, 18 P.3d 895, 903 (2001) (stating that Hawaii's rules of notice pleading require that a complaint set forth a short and plain statement of the claim that provides defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which the claim rests (citations omitted)). Moreover, all of the parties' legal arguments have been properly focused on the validity of the Charter Amendment. Thus, neither the remaining defendants (the Mayor and Finance Director) nor the intervenor-appellants would be prejudiced by dropping the County Council as a defendant. The County's position that the Charter Amendment is invalid because it usurps the County Council's taxing authority remains the position of the plaintiff-County as it alleged in the first amended complaint. In other words, the change in the parties would not have affected the course of the litigation if [dropping of the dispensable party, i.e., realignment] had occurred at some earlier point[.] Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 833, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mullaney, 342 U.S. at 417, 72 S.Ct. 428). Finally, dismissing the first amended complaint at this stage of the litigation, thereby requiring the County to start over in the circuit court would entail needless waste and runs counter to effective judicial administration. Newman-Green, 490 U.S. at 833, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (citation omitted). If this court were to remand this case with instructions that the first amended complaint be dismissed, it is highly likely that the County will simply re-file its case with the proper alignment of parties and minimal revisions to its complaint. The focus will remain the validity of the Charter Amendment, which has already been extensively briefed; nothing will have changed, except for the absence of the County Council as a defendant. Indeed, the Newman-Green Court instructs that, because law is an instrument of governance . . ., some consideration must be given to practicalities, 490 U.S. at 837, 109 S.Ct. 2218 (citation omitted), and that we should not compel litigants to jump through judicial hoops merely for the sake of hypertechnical jurisdictional purity. Id. In our view, given the recent public interest in real property taxation and the likelihood of increased litigation regarding real property taxes, the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this case outweighs the hypertechnical pleading defect, see Stark, 163 F.R.D. at 564 (acknowledging district court's power to align parties and issues presented in a single lawsuit that will foster judicial efficiency, while protecting against prejudice),  especially in light of the fact that the first amended complaint properly asserts the requisite injury to the proper party with the personal stake in the outcome of the litigation, i.e., the County Council. We, therefore, dismiss the County Council as a dispensable defendant in this case. [20] In so doing, we hold that the plaintiff-County, acting on behalf of the County Council, has sufficiently alleged a threatened injury, i.e., the usurpation of the Council's taxing authority. With respect to the second and third prongs of the injury-in-fact test, see Akau, 65 Haw. at 389, 652 P.2d at 1134-35, we hold that the County/Council's threatened injury is fairly traceable, id., to the Defendants' duty to enforce the Charter Amendment and that a favorable decision, id., i.e., invalidating the Charter Amendment, would likely provide relief, id., for the threatened injury. Based on the foregoing, we hold that the plaintiff-County, acting on behalf of the County Council, has standing to maintain this action. [21]
The Appellants also assert that this case is not ripe for review . . . because the [D]efendants did nothing after the enactment of [the Charter Amendment] to implement it, and its mere enactment was not a `violation of the law' contemplated by [HRS §]603-23[.] (Citing City of Santa Monica v. Stewart, 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 72, 90 (2005), for the proposition that a claim is not ripe when judicial guidance was sought on the constitutionality of a law that was not implemented.) The County, however, maintains that: In this case, the Charter Amendment was already enacted. There existed no method by which the Charter Amendment could be revised or its legal defects cured. If the Charter Amendment was invalid, it was so on its face. The question of the Charter Amendment's validity therefore ripened upon certification of the results of the election, if not sooner. This court has stated that ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing, and a ruling that an issue is not ripe ordinarily indicates the court has concluded a later decision may be more apt or that the matter is not yet appropriate for adjudication. Convention Ctr. Auth. v. Anzai, 78 Hawai`i 157, 162, 890 P.2d 1197, 1202 (1995) (internal quotation marks, elipses, brackets, and citations omitted). Here, as the County points out, [o]nce the election was certified, there remained no further action to be taken to enact the Charter Amendment or to implement its directives. Consequently, we believe that a later decision will not be more apt. Anzai, 78 Hawai`i at 162, 890 P.2d at 1202. Based upon the state of the record, we believe the validity of the Charter Amendment is appropriate for adjudication. Id. Moreoever, we decline to address the applicability of Stewart to this case in light of the fact that the Appellants do not provide any argument as to why this court should follow California's two-part test to determine the ripeness of a case. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying the Appellants' second motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. We now turn to the Appellants' challenge to the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.