Opinion ID: 777484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: 20 We review a district court's legal conclusions in a habeas proceeding de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir.1999). Because Calvert's habeas petition was filed after April 24, 1996, our review is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDP1A), 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). As amended, AEDPA provides, in relevant part, that a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 21 In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court explained that a state court acts contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if it decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Justice O'Connor's Part II majority opinion). The Court also explained that a state court's decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions but then unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case, or (2) unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new context. Notably, an unreasonable application is an objectively unreasonable application. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495.