Opinion ID: 764670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Spencer v. Kemna

Text: 32 In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), the Court considered whether a person who is no longer in custody for purposes of the habeas corpus statute (but was in custody when the petition was filed) may maintain a habeas suit in order to fulfill the favorable termination requirement imposed by Heck to pursue a § 1983 action. Spencer had filed a habeas petition while he was still in prison, challenging the revocation of his parole by the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole. By the time his petition was heard in the district court, he had been released from prison, and the district court dismissed his petition as moot. See id. 118 S.Ct. at 982. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. See Spencer v. Kemna, 91 F.3d 1114 (8th Cir.1996). 33 The Supreme Court held that the petition was appropriately dismissed as moot because it did not present a case or controversy as required by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. See Spencer, 118 S.Ct. at 986-88. Although the Court reaffirmed its precedents holding that a prisoner's challenge to his conviction always meets Article III's case or controversy requirement, see, e.g., Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968), the Court declined to extend this presumption to Spencer's challenge to the revocation of his parole. The collateral consequences of such a revocation, the Court concluded, are too speculative and remote to justify a presumption that Article III's requirements are met. 34 The majority opinion suggested in dictum, however, that § 1983 might be available if Spencer challenged the procedures used by the Board of Parole, rather than its result, and if the alleged procedural defect did not  'necessarily imply the invalidity of' the revocation. Spencer, 118 S.Ct. at 988 (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364). The concurring opinions in Spencer also addressed the availability of § 1983. They revealed that five justices hold the view that, where federal habeas corpus is not available to address constitutional wrongs, § 1983 must be. This view had been first expressed by Justice Souter in his concurrence in Heck, which was joined by three other justices. In that concurrence, Justice Souter explained that Heck should be read as creating a favorable termination requirement only for those individuals to whom federal habeas corpus is in fact available. See id. 118 S.Ct. at 989. Reading the opinion more broadly than that, he explained, would effectively cut off all federal review for persons who do not have recourse to federal habeas corpus, and thus do not have at least one federal opportunity to satisfy the favorable termination requirement. He explained that a broad reading of Heck 35 would needlessly place at risk the rights of those outside the intersection of § 1983 and the habeas statute, individuals not in custody for habeas purposes. If these individuals (people who were merely fined, for example, or who have completed short terms of imprisonment, probation, or parole, or who discover (through no fault of their own) a constitutional violation after full expiration of their sentences), like state prisoners, were required to show the prior invalidation of their convictions or sentences in order to obtain § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, the result would be to deny any federal forum for claiming a deprivation of federal rights to those who cannot first obtain a favorable state ruling. The reason, of course, is that individuals not in custody cannot invoke federal habeas jurisdiction, the only statutory mechanism besides § 1983 by which individuals may sue state officials in federal court for violating federal rights. That would be an untoward result. 36 Heck, 512 U.S. at 500, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter's Heck concurrence was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. In her concurrence in Spencer, Justice Ginsburg indicated that she had come to agree with Justice's Souter's reasoning in Heck, bringing to five the number of justices who share that viewpoint. See Spencer, 118 S.Ct. at 990 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Breyer, who replaced Justice Blackmun on the Court, indicated his support for Justice Souter's view when he, along with Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor, joined Justice Souter's concurrence in Spencer reaffirming that view. See Spencer, 118 S.Ct. at 988 (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Stevens dissented in Spencer, but noted that [g]iven the Court's holding that [Spencer] does not have a remedy under the habeas statute, it is perfectly clear, as Justice Souter explains, that he may bring an action under § 1983. Id. 118 S.Ct. at 992 n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).