Opinion ID: 169649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CRLC's Cross-Appeal

Text: In its cross-appeal, CRLC challenges three sections of Article XXVIII: §§ 6(2), 2(7), and 2(12). First, it argues in the alternative, that if we reverse the district court's decision that CRLC is an MCFL entity, then we must address its facial overbreadth and vagueness challenges to §§ 6(2) and 2(7). [12] However, because we hold that CRLC meets the MCFL exemption requirements, we need not address this argument. Next, it asks us to consider whether § 2(12)'s definition of political committee, which the district court declared unconstitutional as applied to CRLC, is also facially unconstitutional. Facial challenges seek to vindicate not only individual plaintiffs' rights but also those of all others who wish to engage in the speech being prohibited. Faustin, 423 F.3d at 1196. To succeed, CRLC must establish that the law, in every application, creates an impermissible risk of suppression of ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the decisionmaker, and in cases where the ordinance sweeps too broadly, penalizing a substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally protected. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (internal citations omitted); Faustin, 423 F.3d at 1199 (The overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating from the text of the law and from actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.). This task presents a heavy burden for the plaintiff. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 207, 124 S.Ct. 619. Here, the district court determined it need not address CRLC's facial challenge to § 2(12). We agree with the general proposition that a court should never . . . formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied, and that the nature of judicial review constrains a federal court to consider only the case that is actually before it. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 192, 124 S.Ct. 619 (citing United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S.Ct. 519, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960) and James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 547, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 477-78, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995) ([A]lthough the occasional case requires us to entertain a facial challenge in order to vindicate a party's right not to be bound by an unconstitutional statute, we neither want nor need to provide relief to nonparties when a narrower remedy will fully protect the litigants.) (internal citations omitted); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (holding that a ruling of facial invalidity is, manifestly, strong medicine and noting that [i]t has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort). CRLC's facial validity argument is succinct: because the application of political committee status to groups lacking the requisite major purpose is self-evidently `substantial,' . . . the provision ought to be declared unconstitutional on its face as well. Aple's Br. at 46. We agree with CRLC that the application of § 2(12)(a) to it creates an impermissible risk of the suppression of ideas because it omits the major purpose test and encompasses groups whose incidental purpose may be to engage in express advocacy. Bartlett, 168 F.3d at 712-13. However, without more, we cannot say that in every application § 2(12) will be unconstitutional and we decline to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 192, 124 S.Ct. 619. Therefore, we decline to reach CRLC's facial invalidity challenge.