Opinion ID: 1915614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty of Inquiry and a Breakdown in Communication

Text: Tejeda argues the district court abridged his right to counsel when it failed to inquire after he alleged a breakdown in communication with his attorney and requested substitute counsel. Tejeda points to two letters, in which he (1) stated his attorney was trying to persuade him to plead guilty; (2) told the court he was withholding evidence from his attorney; and (3) requested substitute counsel. In the absence of evidence of an adequate judicial response to his letterssuch as holding a hearing in which the court would inquire into the nature of his complaintsTejeda requests we remand his case to the district court for an inquiry into whether there was an unconstitutional breakdown in communication with his attorney. If the district court determines there was such a breakdown, Tejeda asks for a new trial. The State contends Tejeda failed to preserve error, and, in the alternative, maintains a hearing was not warranted because Tejeda's letters only show his unhappiness with his attorney's recommendation that he accept a plea bargain.
The parties disagree over the applicable standard of review. The State posits we should review for an abuse of discretion, because it is the standard applied to a district court's denial of a request for substitute counsel. See State v. Martin, 608 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 2000). In this case, however, the court never ruled on Tejeda's request; Tejeda's claim thus poses a constitutional question: Does a court have a duty to inquire sua sponte once a defendant alleges a breakdown in communication? Our standard of review, therefore, is de novo. See State v. Thompson, 597 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Iowa 1999) (review of constitutional claims is de novo).
Before turning to the merits, we briefly consider and reject the State's error preservation claim. The State alleges Tejeda failed to preserve error because he never received a ruling from the court. We disagree. Tejeda wrote two letters to the court in support of his request and the question in this case is whether the court had a duty to inquire sua sponte once Tejeda complained of his attorney's actions. Although error was not preserved in the traditional sense, Tejeda's two letters sufficiently alerted the trial court of a problem for us to consider the issue. It would be unrealistic to expect much more from a defendant not trained in the law.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend. VI. This provision, incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment, is binding upon the states. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975); State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Iowa 2001). It does not, however, guarantee a `meaningful relationship between an accused and his counsel.' State v. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d 774, 778 (Iowa 2001) (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1617, 75 L.Ed.2d 610, 621 (1983)). Where a defendant represented by a court-appointed attorney requests the court appoint substitute counsel, sufficient cause must be shown to justify replacement. Id. at 778-79. Sufficient cause includes a conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant. Id. at 779 (citations and internal quotation omitted). The decision to grant a motion for substitute counsel is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Id. at 778. Last-minute requests for substitute counsel, insofar as they constitute a delay tactic, are disfavored. Id. at 779. In State v. Lopez , we discussed the adequacy of a trial judge's inquiry into a defendant's allegation of a breakdown in communication with his lawyer. Id. at 778-781. In Lopez, the State did not dispute the existence of a judicial duty to inquire, and therefore we did not explicitly recognize one. See id. Instead, we simply noted that, according to federal authority, there is a duty of inquiry once a defendant requests substitute counsel on account of an alleged breakdown in communication. Id. at 780 (citing United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d 1056, 1062 n. 2 (8th Cir.1996); Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1024-25 (9th Cir.2000); Romero v. Furlong, 215 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Davidson, 195 F.3d 402, 407-08 (8th Cir.1999)). We ultimately determined the judicial inquiry conducted in Lopez satisfied the federal standard, and held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for substitute counsel. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d at 781. Implicit in Lopez, however, was the recognition of a duty to inquire; otherwise our examination of the adequacy of the inquiry makes little sense. In light of Lopez and the federal authority cited therein, we therefore now explicitly recognize that there is a duty of inquiry once a defendant requests substitute counsel on account of an alleged breakdown in communication. See id. at 778-781 (citations omitted); State v. Irvine, 547 N.W.2d 177, 180 (S.D.1996) (When a defendant alleges the existence of a dispute leading to a destruction of communication and a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the judge is obligated to inquire whether such allegations are true. (Citations omitted.)); William W. Schwarzer, Dealing With Incompetent CounselThe Trial Judge's Role, 93 Harv. L.Rev. 633, 652 (1980) (If at any time during the proceeding the defendant makes a seemingly substantial complaint about the adequacy of counsel ... the judge should conduct an inquiry and make findings on whether bona fide grounds exist for a change of counsel.); cf. Watson, 620 N.W.2d at 238 (trial court has a duty of inquiry when it knows or reasonably should know of an actual conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently remarked, an inquiry is necessary because Even if a defendant's counsel is competent, a serious breakdown in communication can result in an inadequate defense. A defendant who cannot communicate with his attorney cannot assist his attorney with preparation of his case, including suggesting potential witnesses to call and trial strategies to pursue, discussing whether the defendant himself should testify, and helping formulate other bread-and-butter decisions that can constitute the core of a successful defense. A trial court's failure to appoint new counsel when faced with a total breakdown in communication may thus constitute a denial of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 936, 123 S.Ct. 1612, 155 L.Ed.2d 336 (2003), and cert. denied, 538 U.S. 991, 123 S.Ct. 1812, 155 L.Ed.2d 689 (2003) (quoting United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir.2000)). In Lopez, we found the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry where the presiding judge, when apprised of a potential breakdown in communication, personally asked the defendant at a hearing to explain the nature of the communication problem. 633 N.W.2d at 781. The defendant, however, failed to give the judge any reason why he believed communication between his lawyer and him had broken down. Id. We determined [t]he basis of Lopez's complaints had nothing to do with defense counsel's representation. Id. As a result, we held the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for substitute counsel. Id. In this case, the court did not inquire into this problem. Unlike Lopez, there is nothing suggesting the court determined the nature of the alleged breakdown in communication. The court merely invited counsel to respond to Tejeda's request for substitute counsel. Because the court did not address Tejeda personally, counsel did not respond, and no other measure was undertaken, the nature of Tejeda's allegations was left undisclosed. We simply have no way to determine whether a complete breakdown in communication occurred, in violation of Tejeda's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 779 (sufficient cause for substitution of counsel includes a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant). Although there may be some evidence in the record which may indicate the court determined there was not a complete breakdown in communication in violation of Tejeda's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it would be misplaced for us to engage in such speculation. The record itself is completely silent on whether there was a complete breakdown in communication, and if so, its causes or duration. State ex rel. C.C., 48 P.3d 244, 249 (Utah Ct.App.2002) ([T]he court's failure to sufficiently explore Appellant's complaints in this case leaves us without the information needed to evaluate whether she was entitled to substitute counsel either as a matter of sound discretion or as a matter of law.); Schell, 218 F.3d at 1027 (noting, in habeas context, that because the state trial court failed to make an appropriate inquiry, the record does not reflect how far the [attorney-client] relationship ... had deteriorated, or whether [the defendant] himself had sabotaged the relationship or failed to make reasonable efforts on his end to develop the relationship ... [because no court has examined his claims] we must take his allegations at face value). In a case such as this, an evidentiary or in camera hearingalthough not required in every case every time a defendant alleges a breakdown in communicationwould have been appropriate. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1027 (Evidentiary hearings are particularly appropriate when claims raise facts that occurred out of the courtroom and off the record.); see, e.g., Lott, 310 F.3d at 1249 (remanding for a hearing). This is not to say courts must conduct a hearing every time a dissatisfied defendant lodges a complaint about his attorney. In this case the defendant did more than simply ask for counsel of his choice; Tejeda indicated the relationship with his attorney had deteriorated so far that he was withholding evidence from his attorney. Cf. State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Iowa 1979) (defendant does not have an absolute right to lawyer of own choosing). Having received a colorable complaint, the district court should have inquired into whether there was a complete breakdown in communication between the attorney and the defendant to the extent Tejeda's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Lopez, 633 N.W.2d at 779. The types of communication breakdowns that constitute total breakdowns defy easy definition.... As a general matter... to prove a total breakdown in communication, a defendant must put forth evidence of a severe and pervasive conflict with his attorney or evidence that he had such minimal contact with the attorney that meaningful communication was not possible. Lott, 310 F.3d at 1249.
Tejeda requests we remand his case for a hearing to determine whether there was a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., Lott, 310 F.3d at 1250 (remanding for a hearing); C.C., 48 P.3d at 249 (same); cf. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 170-75, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 1242-46, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, 303-07 (2002) (remand proper remedy for trial court's failure to inquire after defendant's counsel did not object to conflict of interest). But see State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 964 n. 4 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (courts are divided on appropriate remedy); 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.4(b) n. 22, at 554-55 (2d ed.1999). In support of this argument, Tejeda cites Watson, our recent Sixth Amendment conflict-of-interest case. In Watson, we stated [i]f the record on appeal shows only the possibility of a conflict [of interest], then the case must be remanded for a determination as to whether an actual conflict existed.... 620 N.W.2d at 238 (but reversing and remanding for new trial because trial court had a duty to inquire into conflict of which it knew or should have known). The case at bar, however, involves a pre-trial breakdown in communication, not a conflict of interest. Unlike a conflict of interest, a pre-trial breakdown in communication may resolve itself before trial. To simply remand for a hearing to determine whether there was a complete breakdown in communication before trial, then, would accomplish very little; any pre-trial violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel may not have had any adverse effect on his trial defense, if timely ameliorative measures were taken. By contrast, the actual conflict of interest in Watson was permanent, and, once identified, constituted a denial of the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. See id. at 240-41. In this case, a more expansive hearing, which takes into account the health of the attorney-client relationship at trial, is appropriate. The record is inadequate for us to resolve this issue on direct appeal. In his letters to the trial court, Tejeda never alleged a complete breakdown in communication. Nor is there any other evidence in the record to support such a finding. Instead, we only have Tejeda's bare allegation that he had some communication problems with his attorney. As previously indicated, this allegation triggered a duty to inquire on the part of the trial court, because it might indicate a greater problem was afoot. Because the record is inadequate for us to rule on direct appeal, we preserve Tejeda's claim for postconviction relief. Cf. State v. Bass, 385 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1986) (where no record made in the district court, we pass the issue in this direct appeal and reserve it for post-conviction proceedings.) Postconviction relief is particularly appropriate here, because the defendant claims (1) his conviction ... was in violation of the Constitution of the United States and (2) [t]here exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that required vacation of the conviction ... in the interest of justice. Iowa Code § 822.2(1), (4). Although decided in the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context, our discussion in State v. Coil is particularly instructive with respect to Tejeda's Sixth Amendment claim: We have said we should not decide a claim such as is made here without an adequate factual basis to support it. There are cases when incompetency is so glaring that we are justified in saying so upon an examination of the record. Ordinarily, we should be slow to do so on what amounts to an ex parte hearing... This holding is without prejudice to [the defendant's] right to raise this issue by application for postconviction relief, where a full evidentiary hearing may be had and where counsel will have an opportunity to respond to defendant's charges. 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978) (citations omitted). Given the scant record before us and the availability of an adequate remedy in postconviction, we affirm the judgment of conviction without adjudicating whether Tejeda was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Instead, we preserve this issue for postconviction proceedings, in which an adequate hearing may be held and a record developed. Cf. State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 206 (Iowa 1979) (We find no basis on the record before us to hold defendant's trial counsel did not perform within the range of normal competence. We determine we should affirm the judgment but without adjudicating the issue.... Defendant's right to raise that issue by postconviction proceedings ... is reserved.) (citations omitted).