Opinion ID: 2143175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of Defendant White.

Text: The trial court held that White stood in loco parentis to plaintiff, and, therefore, that White could not be held liable in negligence to plaintiff, citing Wick v. Wick (1927), 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, and Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 97, 104 N. W. (2d) 154. The Wick and Schwenkhoff Cases represent the great weight of authority in this country although there is a growing tendency to depart therefrom. Anno. 19 A. L. R. (2d) 423. The rationale of Wick v. Wick, supra , that a child may not sue his parent for negligence, was that a contrary holding would introduce discord and contention into the family relationship. The court noted that the family relationship might also be disrupted by permitting a wife to sue her husband for negligence as was upheld in Wait v. Pierce (1926), 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475, 210 N. W. 822. The holding in the latter case, however, was distinguished on the ground that it rested upon statute, i.e., the Married Women's Act. Nevertheless, as Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed.), p. 677, sec. 101, points out, no shadow of a difference in principle or policy . . . exists between the two situations. We can now look back on more than thirty-five years' experience in the matter of spouses' suing each other in negligence cases. This experience causes us to doubt that the rule of Wait v. Pierce, supra , has tended to promote family discord. Because of this experience, we doubt that permitting a child to sue his parent for negligence would have any disruptive effect on family harmony. At common law, suits are maintainable between child and parent concerning property and contract rights. Preston v. Preston (1925), 102 Conn. 96, 128 Atl. 292; Lamb v. Lamb (1895), 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26; Hollingsworth v. Beaver (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900), 59 S. W. 464; King v. Sells (1938), 193 Wash. 294, 75 Pac. (2d) 130; Note, 33 St. John's Law Review (1959), 310, 312; Note, 51 Harvard Law Review (1938), 1451. In McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harvard Law Review (1930), 1030, 1075, the author points out that it is common knowledge that some of the most-acrimonious family disputes arise with respect to property. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that the law should protect the property rights of a minor more zealously than the rights of his person. Comment, 41 Marquette Law Review (1957), 188, 195. The courts' hostility to the parental-immunity rule in negligence cases is shown by the exceptions which have been carved out of it. The Missouri court recently held that the rule did not apply to a suit brought by the child against the personal representative of a deceased parent. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick (Mo. 1960), 336 S. W. (2d) 68. Other cases in accord are: Palcsey v. Tepper (1962), 71 N. J. Super. 294, 176 Atl. (2d) 818, and Davis v. Smith (D. C. Pa. 1954), 126 Fed. Supp. 497. Another exception recognized by some courts arises where the parent's tort constitutes wilful misconduct. Emery v. Emery (1955), 45 Cal. (2d) 421, 289 Pac. (2d) 218; Wright v. Wright (1952), 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S. E. (2d) 152; Mudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. (2d) 608, 131 N. E. (2d) 525; Mahnke v. Moore (1951), 197 Md. 61, 77 Atl. (2d) 923; Harbin v. Harbin (1961), 218 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 308, affirmed, 16 App. Div. (2d) 696, 227 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 1023; and Cowgill v. Boock (1950), 189 Or. 282, 218 Pac. (2d) 445, 19 A. L. R. (2d) 405. The courts of Ohio and Washington have held that the parental-immunity rule does not apply if the parent was engaged in his business or occupation at the time he committed the negligent act. Signs v. Signs (1952), 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N. E. (2d) 743, and Borst v. Borst (1952), 41 Wash. (2d) 642, 251 Pac. (2d) 149. 1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, p. 650, sec. 8.11, advocates allowing the maintenance of an action in tort against a parent or a child in every case in which it is reasonably clear that the domestic peace has already been disturbed beyond repair or where by reason of the circumstances it is not imperiled, and where the reasonableness of family discipline is not involved. The authors point out that one situation in which family harmony is not thereby disturbed arises where there is liability insurance coverage. Id., p. 649. Two courts have grounded recovery by a minor child against a parent upon the existence of insurance. Worrell v. Worrell (1939), 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. (2d) 343, and Lusk v. Lusk (1932), 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538. See also Dunlap v. Dunlap (1930), 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905. This court, however, has refused to consider the existence of liability insurance a sufficient basis for departing from the rule of Wick v. Wick, supra . Lasecki v. Kabara (1940), 235 Wis. 645, 294 N. W. 33, 130 A. L. R. 883; and see also Fidelity Savings Bank v. Aulik (1948), 252 Wis. 602, 32 N. W. (2d) 613. This accords with many decisions from other states that the mere fact that the particular defendant-parent is protected by liability insurance does not enable his minor child to maintain an action when, in the absence of such insurance, he could not otherwise maintain it. Anno. 19 A. L. R. (2d) 423, 435, 436. Nevertheless, we consider the wide prevalence of liability insurance in personal-injury actions a proper element to be considered in making the policy decision of whether to abrogate parental immunity in negligence actions. This is because in a great majority of such actions, where such immunity has been abolished, the existence of insurance tends to negate any possible disruption of family harmony and discipline. This court seriously considered the advisability of abrogating the parental-immunity rule in negligence actions when Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., supra , was before us. We then concluded that the legislature's recent action in rejecting legislation that would have abolished the immunity foreclosed this court from so doing. In so concluding we adhered to the long-established judicial policy of not overruling our past decisions where the legislature had acted in the matter. This included the situation where the legislature had defeated a bill that had proposed changes in a rule of law laid down by court decision. Subsequently, this policy was completely overturned in Holytz v. Milwaukee (1962), 17 Wis. (2d) 26, 115 N. W. (2d) 618. We there held that it was our responsibility to change a court-made rule of law when we deemed the change necessary in the interests of justice even though the legislature had refused to make the change. Thus the reason advanced in the Schwenkhoff Case for not changing the parentalimmunity rule no longer applies. After a careful review of the arguments for and against the parental-immunity rule in negligence cases, we are of the opinion that it ought to be abrogated except in these two situations: (1) Where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care. Accordingly, the rule is abolished in personal-injury actions subject to these noted exceptions. Thus as against White, plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action which was not negatived by any affidavit submitted by White in support of his motion for summary judgment. By the Court. The judgment of September 5, 1962, is affirmed; the judgment of November 14, 1962, is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. BROWN, C. J. ( concurring ). I concur in the decision that the insurance policy does not give coverage to White in this accident. I concur in the result that White is not immune from liability to the infant Goller for the results of White's negligence but that is because I do not believe that the circumstances of Goller's residence in White's household have created parental relationship. I would not extend to White the immunities possessed by a true parent. I disagree with the decision of the majority that even a parent shall no longer have the immunity recognized by law for many years. This change, resting upon the court's conception of desirable public policy is subject to very strong arguments for not changing the retention of the time-honored parental immunity. The majority of the court say that there is no difference in principle between the right of action by a wife against her husband, a right presently recognized, and a similar right of action by a child against its parent, a right which the court now says ought to be and now will be recognized. When the legislature considered that public policy made advisable rights of action by wives against their husbands the legislature stated that right by statute. Till then this court refrained from announcing a public policy in this field primarily coming within the legislative function. See Wait v. Pierce (1926), 191 Wis. 202, 209, 209 N. W. 475, 210 N. W. 822, cited by the majority. I think the court should do now as our predecessors did and leave the business of the legislature to that august body. Therefore, while affirming the result reached by the majority in this case, I believe the authority of Wick v. Wick (1927), 192 Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787, should be retained until the legislature has spoken. The following was filed July 9, 1963: