Opinion ID: 1738072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Elvie Robinson

Text: Elvie Robinson, who was homebound, requested a ballot to vote by mail in the primary election only; although the Code permits a voter to request a mail-in ballot for the general election at the same time that the voter requests a primary election ballot, Robinson did not do so. Nevertheless, the registrar also mailed her a ballot on November 9 for the November 20 general election, but the ballot contained the wrong police jury district, and Robinson's son returned the incorrect ballot. Because there was insufficient time to mail Robinson a correct ballot, the registrar hand-delivered the correct ballot to Robinson on November 18. After the registrar left, Robinson voted the ballot and had her relative return the ballot to the registrar's office. The court of appeal reasoned that Robinson's vote was valid because Robinson likely would have requested a general election ballot if the registrar had not already sent her one by mistake. The court of appeal bolstered that conclusion by noting that Ms. Robinson's return of the improper ballots may be viewed a request for an absentee ballot for the general election, and any untimeliness of that request is minimized by the fact that the whole situation was the fault of the registrar and not of Ms. Robinson. 33,593 at p. 13 (La. App.2d Cir.12/23/99), 749 So.2d 900. I would agree with the court of appeal that Robinson's return of the improper ballot might be viewed under appropriate circumstances as a request for a general election ballot. However, there were several deficiencies. First, the Code requires a written request, and an unwritten, implied request is not sufficient. This record contains no evidence of a writing over Robinson's signature, as required by La.Rev.Stat. 18:1307 A, that can be construed as an application to vote by mail. Moreover, the implied application, based on the return of the improper ballot, does not contain any of the other information required by Section 1307 A, and Section 1307 E prohibits the registrar from send[ing] an absentee ballot to an applicant whose application for an absentee ballot does not meet the requirements of Subsection A of this Section. Finally, it does not appear that the implied application was received by the registrar before 8:00 p.m. on November 16, the deadline for making a request to vote by mail. In addition to these deficiencies, I distinguish Pate's and Robinson's votes from those of Jocille Kellogg [5] and Marvin Green. [6] Kellogg and Green did everything necessary to validly vote by mail, and the mistake of the registrar or the mailman or someone else caused the last minute situation that the registrar attempted to rectify. However, it was Pate, and not the registrar, who caused her last minute situation by not taking the proper steps to request a mail-in ballot for the general election. As to Robinson, the dissenters and I disagree because, as I understand their position, the registrar's gratuitously sending her a general election ballot misled her into not making a timely written application. I disagree because Robinson had every opportunity under the Code to request a general election ballot along with her request for a special election ballot. She did not request a general election ballot then and still had not done so when she received the improper ballot sometime (not shown in the record) after it was mailed on November 9. Because November 16 was the deadline for the registrar's receipt of a proper written request, I cannot conclude that the registrar's mailing of an unrequested ballot misled Robinson into not making a proper written request that she otherwise would have validly made. In summary, Robinson's absentee ballot did not substantially comply with the Code and was properly disqualified because of her own inaction, which was not substantially affected by any action or inaction on the part of the registrar. When the votes of Fowler, Pate and Robinson are disqualified, one cannot determine the result of the general election, and a new election must be held. JOHNSON, J., Concurring. I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that it is impossible to determine the results of this runoff election, and because of this impossibility a new general election should be held between the candidates. I write separately to express my views on the application of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18:1432(A). Since the adoption of our current Election Code, this Court has addressed the application of La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18:1432(A) on two occasions. First, in Kelly v. Village of Greenwood, 363 So.2d 887 (La.1978), and most recently in, Savage v. Edwards, 98-2929 (La.12/18/98), 722 So.2d 1004. In Kelly, we determined that the statutory scheme in La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18:1432 was in accord with the pre-election code jurisprudence which provided an alternative for candidates who could not prove that but for the irregularity he would have been elected. Under the pre-election code jurisprudence, it was recognized that if the Court finds the proven frauds and irregularities are of such a serious nature as to deprive the voters of the free expression of their will, it will decree the nullity of the entire electioneven though the contestant might not be able to prove that he would have been nominated but for such fraud and irregularities. Garrison v. Connick, 291 So.2d 778, 781 (La.1974), quoting, Dowling v. Orleans Parish Democratic Comm., 235 La. 62, 102 So.2d 755 (1958). Savage presented an opportunity for this Court to provide clear guidance to the lower courts on when an election may be declared void under La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18:1432(A). Instead of seizing this opportunity to give direction to trial courts faced with fraud or irregularities, the Court relied on numerical calculations and concluded that the number of votes proven to have been cast illegally or fraudulently was not sufficient to change the result of the election. Savage, 722 So.2d at 1004. While the case at hand presents the situation where the number of proven irregularities exceeds the margin of victory, I am still of the opinion that a trial judge is not limited to strictly numerical considerations in declaring an election void. See id. at 1007 (Johnson, J., dissenting). In determining whether to declare an election void under La.Rev.Stat. Ann. 18:1432(A), a judge can and should consider whether the proven frauds or irregularities are of such a serious nature so as to deprive the voters of the free expression of their will. While the Louisiana Election Code provides no procedure for the disqualification of local election supervisors (Registrars of Voters, Clerks of Court, etc.), prudence would dictate that the State Commissioner of Elections, the State Board of Election Supervisors, or the Secretary of State provide some monitoring of the new general election ordered by this Court. A system of monitoring would ensure that the irregularities found in the prior election and the potential ethical conflicts created by the relationship between the Clerk of Court and one of the candidates (husband and wife) do not impact the new election.