Opinion ID: 1187718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred by refusing to strike prejudicial and inadmissible evidence from the psychological report and by refusing to withdraw the report.

Text: Thompson moved for the admission of the psychological report which had been prepared for the purpose of determining whether he was competent to stand trial. The report was admitted by stipulation as Defendant's Exhibit A. Thereafter Thompson moved to strike a portion of the report and finally to withdraw the report altogether, when the prosecutor proposed to cross-examine defendant's ex-wife on the cause of their divorce. When Thompson objected, the prosecutor pointed out that the report contained the information that was anticipated in Thompson's ex-wife's testimony, including information about Thompson's prior sexual history and conviction. The language in the psychological report which Thompson moved to strike read: Mr. Thompson also has a history of sexual abuse. He indicated that his daughter reported that he sexually abused her. Mr. Thompson completed the Rider Program in Cottonwood, probation and treatment as a sex offender through the SANE program. According to Mr. Thompson, he did not sexually abuse his daughter. He said that she turned him in because he was pursuing a sexual interest with her friends. The trial court denied the motion to strike and the request to withdraw the report. Thompson claims the trial court erred by refusing to strike the prejudicial and inadmissible evidence from the report and by refusing to withdraw the report. A threshold question is whether this issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. The general rule in Idaho is that an appellate court will not consider an alleged error on appeal in the absence of a timely objection to that alleged error at trial. State v. Stevens, 126 Idaho 822, 824, 892 P.2d 889, 891 (1995). [O]rdinarily an objection comes too late for the purpose of review on appeal, if made for the first time after the jury has retired or the cause has been submitted to them, or after the close of the arguments, or on motion for new trial or otherwise, after the verdict has been rendered. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 424, 242 P.2d 971, 976 (1952). Thompson's objection came before the report was published to the jury, before the close of arguments, and before the case had been submitted to the jury. The objection was properly preserved for appellate review. Ordinarily, appellate courts review trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. Morris ex rel. Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 (1997). There are no Idaho cases which specifically address the standard of review with regard to a trial court's ruling on a motion to withdraw evidence. The State relies on State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 932 P.2d 907 (Ct.App.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 81, 139 L.Ed.2d 39 (1997), for the proposition that when Thompson agreed to the admission of the report, he effectively waived any objection to its admissibility. The Court of Appeals in Gray, however, held that agreeing to the admission of evidence which had previously been deemed inadmissible is a waiver of any prior objection. Id. at 794, 932 at 917. The Gray court did not address whether agreeing to the admission of evidence constituted a waiver of any subsequent objection which is the situation in the present case. Gray is not instructive. The State relies on out-of-state authority for the proposition that a motion to strike previously admitted evidence will be allowed only in cases where the ground of objection was unknown and could not have been known with ordinary diligence at the time the evidence was received. Jones v. Spidle, 446 Pa. 103, 286 A.2d 366, 368 (1971) (emphasis omitted). See also Murphy v. Waldrip, 692 S.W.2d 584, 589 (Tex.Ct.App.1985) (before motion to withdraw evidence is granted, moving party must make a showing why there was no objection made at the time the evidence was admitted). These rules, however, have not been adopted in Idaho. The general rule recognized in Idaho is that the trial court has sole discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence. This discretion, however, is not unlimited. The trial court must exercise reason in making its decision. The trial court based its denial of Thompson's motion to strike or withdraw the report on the fact that Thompson's counsel had previously stipulated to admission of the report, and the fact that Thompson had already testified that (1) he had been previously convicted, (2) he had mental problems, (3) he had been treated at the state hospital in Blackfoot, and (4) he was currently being treated at the VA Hospital. The trial court stated: [W]e got a lot of stuff that's not relevant that was introduced by the defendant and I'm not going to go back and now just cross away things that the defendant brought into the courtroom and not give the State an opportunity to clarify or explain those things. He indicated he had been convicted, he was sent to Blackfoot, he's had mental problems and the State stipulated for a psychological evaluation, so you're not going to pick and choose portions of it and not bring in other portions. We also now have Department of Health and Welfare records that were stipulated admitted and we have no proof of authenticity now. In response to Thompson's request to redact only a specific portion of the report relating to the nature of his prior conviction, the following conversation took place: COURT: Well, if the defendant had not mentioned himself all of these different matters the Court might have ruled differently. I already did rule that I was not going to get into the nature of the offense. ... MR. SWAFFORD: Well, your Honor, I would suggest that Mr. Thompson never mentioned anything about SANE, Cottonwood, et cetera. COURT: Well, he did when you stipulated to admit Exhibit A. It's a psychological evaluation. MR. SWAFFORD: Yes, your Honor. However, that would be far more prejudicial than probative of anything. I mean it would prove nothing about this offense. COURT: Well, I think it has a lot to do with this offense. I think it has a lot to do with Mr. Thompson taking the stand and testifying that he was in jail, he's been in jail, taking the stand and testifying that he has been in Blackfoot, that he's been convicted of a felony and he was sent to Blackfoot for it. MR. SWAFFORD: That paragraph there contains nothing about Blackfoot or jail. .... COURT: Well, I'm not undoing what you've already done. You already admitted and stipulated to admit Exhibit A and all these matters are already in here. They were brought in by the defendant himself, not necessarily the defendant's attorney. The defendant's attorney did not ask him to inform the jury of all of these other offenses. As I recall the question was Have you been convicted of a felony and then he went on about eight or nine years ago ... and then he went to a mental hospital in Blackfoot and on and on and on, so the Court's not undoing what's already been presented to the jury. A factor to be considered when determining a request to redact information or to withdraw an exhibit is whether prejudice would result to the other party; that is, has the opposing party relied on admission of the evidence? For example, has the opposing party foregone calling a witness or failed to have available documents in reliance on the evidence being admitted? The trial court did not address this question. In fact, the State concedes that there would have been no prejudice in withdrawing the exhibit. There was no detrimental reliance on the admission of the report. The trial court's failure to consider prejudice was inconsistent with applicable legal standards. A basis for the trial court's refusal to strike portions of the report or allow its withdrawal was that Thompson had opened the door to the evidence by his own testimony. However, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, Thompson's previous testimony did not open the door for admission of this evidence. The fact that Thompson testified that he was presently in jail, that he had been previously convicted of a felony, and that he had been treated for his mental problems at Blackfoot and was now being treated at the VA Hospital for his mental problems, did not suggest that his prior conviction was for lewd and lascivious conduct with his 15-year-old daughter or that he had completed the Rider Program at Cottonwood, probation and treatment as a sex offender through the SANE program. Nothing in Thompson's testimony or the testimony received from the other witnesses suggested that Thompson had a history of sexual abuse. Finally, by acknowledging the fact of his prior conviction directly rather than wait for the prosecutor to impeach him, Thompson did not waive his objection to evidence of his prior conviction. State v. Allen, 113 Idaho 676, 677-78, 747 P.2d 85, 86-87 (Ct.App.1987). The trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard when it denied the motion to strike and the request to withdraw the report. The next question is whether the error in refusing to strike portions of the report or allow withdrawal of the report was harmless. An error may be deemed harmless if it does not affect a substantial right of the accused. I.C.R. 52. The determination of whether a substantial right has been affected hinges on whether it appears from the record that the error contributed to the verdict. An error is harmless if, and only if, the appellate court is able to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the error. State v. Brazzell, 118 Idaho 431, 435, 797 P.2d 139, 143 (Ct.App.1990) (citing State v. Boehner, 114 Idaho 311, 315, 756 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Ct.App.1988)). See also State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 120, 844 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Ct.App.1992); I.R.E. 103 (no error in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless it prejudices a substantial right of the defendant). The Court cannot conclude that the error was harmless. The error did prejudice a substantial right of the defendant. The trial court had expressly recognized that the prejudice of allowing evidence of the nature of Thompson's prior conviction outweighed any probative value considering the fact that the nature of the prior offense and the offense presently charged were very similar. The only witnesses for the State were a police officer and the victim, and the trial court determined the credibility of the alleged victim was questionable. The alleged victim had previously made false allegations of sexual abuse against other persons. Thompson testified at trial and denied the victim's allegations of sexual battery. The Court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson would have been convicted without introduction of the objectionable language in the report.