Opinion ID: 2077593
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Theresa's Section 3507 Statement Voluntary

Text: At trial, Theresa Anderson was called as a State's witness. Her testimony at trial did not conform to the tape-recorded statement she made to Detective Fiscella in Massachusetts on the day of her husband's arrest. The State then sought to introduce her tape-recorded statement into evidence. [5] Roth, Jr.'s defense counsel objected to any use of the statement at trial on the basis that it had not been given voluntarily. The trial judge then permitted voir dire examination of Theresa Anderson and Detective Fiscella on the issue of voluntariness. Theresa Anderson was questioned first about her statement to Detective Fiscella. When asked why she made the statement, she gave three reasons: her husband wanted her to make the statement, she wanted to cooperate so the police would let her see her husband and Detective Fiscella threatened to take her daughter away from her if she refused to make a statement. Although Theresa Anderson stated that Detective Fiscella threatened to take her child from her if she refused to make a statement, she did not elaborate on this threat and was unable to remember the words Detective Fiscella used. She did testify, however, that she would not have made the statement had that threat not been made. On cross-examination, the State demonstrated that although Theresa Anderson expressed concern for the welfare of her daughter, who she had left in Delaware, she could not remember with whom her daughter was staying. During his voir dire examination, Detective Fiscella denied making any threat. He testified that he was unaware that Theresa Anderson had a daughter until she mentioned a concern about her daughter's welfare during the interview. On cross-examination, Roth, Jr.'s defense counsel pointed out that James Anderson had previously told Detective Fiscella he had a daughter. The trial judge resolved the credibility conflict by accepting the testimony of Detective Fiscella. The trial judge noted that Theresa Anderson's testimony contained certain inconsistencies. First, she testified she gave the statement so she would be allowed to see her husband, but also testified that her husband wanted her to make the statement, indicating she had been in contact with him. Second, she expressed concern for her daughter's welfare but was unable to recall with whom she had entrusted her care when fleeing to Massachusetts with her husband. Although Detective Fiscella's testimony was not without its own inconsistencies, the trial judge concluded that Detective Fiscella's only concern with interviewing the Andersons was about investigating the crimes and not the Andersons' family relationships. Section 3507 provides, in pertinent part, that [i]n a criminal prosecution, the voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value. The trial judge concluded that Theresa Anderson's testimony regarding Detective Fiscella's threat was not credible. Therefore, the trial judge found her tape-recorded statement to Detective Fiscella to be voluntary and admissible into evidence. Roth, Jr.'s first argument on appeal is that this ruling was not supported by competent evidence because James Anderson had told Detective Fiscella that he had a daughter before Detective Fiscella interviewed Theresa Anderson. Thus, according to Roth, Jr., Detective Fiscella lied when he testified that he did not know that Theresa Anderson had a daughter until she told him so during the interview. Consequently, Roth, Jr. contends that the trial judge erred by accepting the truth of Detective Fiscella's testimony that he never threatened to take Theresa Anderson's daughter away from her if she did not make a statement. The State bears the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. In Martin v. State , this Court stated the following: The State's burden is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that under the totality of circumstances the witness' statements were the product of a rational mind and free will. The trial judge must focus his [or her] attention on ... the behavior of the interrogators, as well as the mental/physical makeup of the individual being interrogated, to determine whether the individual's will was so overborne that the statements produced were not the product of a rational intellect and free will. [6] The record reflects the trial judge acknowledged that arguably Detective Fiscella should have inferred from James Anderson's statement that his daughter was also Theresa Anderson's daughter. The trial judge concluded, however, that Detective Fiscella's attention during the interview with James Anderson was focused on investigating the crimes and not on his family relationships. Accordingly, when Detective Fiscella testified that he did not realize Theresa Anderson had a daughter until she told him this during the interview, the trial judge was not required to conclude that Detective Fiscella was lying. Rather, the trial judge could properly determine, as he did, since that information was not significant to Detective Fiscella, it had not registered with Detective Fiscella when it was related to him by James Anderson. The issue presented to the trial judge was not whether Detective Fiscella knew or should have known about Theresa Anderson's daughter before he interviewed her but whether he threatened to take her daughter away from her should she refuse to make a statement and, thereby, caused her statement to be involuntary. The trial judge was the sole judge of the credibility of both witnesses' testimony during voir dire and was responsible for resolving conflicts in their testimony. [7] The record reflects that the trial judge performed this function in a careful and principled manner. In addition to hearing the live testimony of Theresa Anderson and Detective Fiscella, the trial judge listened to Theresa Anderson's tape-recorded statement. The trial judge concluded that Detective Fiscella's testimony was more credible than the testimony of Theresa Anderson. This Court will not disturb findings of fact made by a trial judge when those factual determinations are supported by competent evidence. [8] In this case, the record reflects that the trial judge's credibility determinations are supported by competent evidence. Consequently, the trial judge's ruling that Theresa Anderson's Section 3507 statement was voluntary is affirmed. Nevertheless, Roth, Jr. argues that, even if Theresa Anderson's statement was voluntary, the admission of her Section 3507 statement into evidence violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment because that statement did not bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and did not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. This claim is without merit because the declarant, Theresa Anderson, was a witness at trial and available for cross-examination. Out-of-court statements are required to be inherently trustworthy only when the declarant is not available to testify and are admitted solely pursuant to a hearsay exception. [9] The decision of the trial judge to admit Theresa Anderson's Section 3507 statement into evidence is affirmed. [10]