Opinion ID: 811876
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forced Sterilization Claim

Text: Wu’s claim that he is a refugee entitled to asylum based on his forced sterilization claim is premised on the following provision: [A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. - 14 - 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (emphasis added). Importantly, as recognized by both the BIA and IJ, under In re J-S-, a spouse cannot rely upon the “sole fact of their spouse’s persecution automatically to qualify for political asylum under the statute’s coercive population control ‘resistance’ provisions.” 24 I. & N. Dec. at 534-35; see also Zhi Wei Pang v. Holder, 665 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2012). “Thus, an individual who has not physically undergone a forced abortion or sterilization procedure is not per se eligible for refugee status.” Zhi Wei Pang, 665 F.3d at 1230 (citing In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 534-35). Instead, as here, the “individual must demonstrate that (1) he resisted China’s coercive population control program, (2) he suffered or has a well-founded fear that he will suffer persecution by the Chinese Government, and (3) such persecution was inflicted . . . on account of his resistance.” Id. at 1230-31 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 542. In determining whether an individual has demonstrated “resistance” to a coercive family planning policy, the IJ or BIA may consider a “wide range of circumstances, including expressions of general opposition, attempts to interfere with enforcement of government policy in particular cases, and other overt forms of resistance to the requirements of the family planning law.” In re S-L-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (BIA 2006), overruled on other grounds by In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008).
With these principles governing our analysis, we reject Wu’s argument that the BIA erred in failing to find past persecution on account of his resistance to Chinese - 15 - family planning officials. “In this circuit, the ultimate determination whether an alien has demonstrated persecution is a question of fact, even if the underlying circumstances are not in dispute and the only issue is whether those circumstances qualify as persecution.” Zhi Wei Pang, 665 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotation marks omitted). In declining to find past persecution on account of other resistance, the BIA explained that the harm suffered by Wu did not rise to the level of persecution because he was not injured, beaten or detained for a lengthy period. We agree that Wu’s brief detention, lasting only minutes and without any resulting injuries, does not constitute persecution. See Ritonga, 633 F.3d at 976 (“lone occasion” where alien suffered “minor injuries” did not constitute persecution); Kapcia v. I.N.S., 944 F.2d 702, 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1991) (two-day detention involving interrogation and beating did not rise to the level of past persecution). We therefore conclude that the BIA’s failure to find Wu suffered past persecution on this basis is substantially supported in the record and that no reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. See Ismaiel, 516 F.3d at 1204 (noting agency’s findings of fact conclusive unless reasonable adjudicator compelled to conclude to the contrary). Nor is there any merit in Wu’s assertion that the BIA erred in determining that In re J-S- would be undermined if the BIA found Wu was persecuted because of his spouse’s sterilization. Although somewhat unclear, we construe Wu’s argument to be that the BIA erred because (1) his wife’s forced sterilization is proof of persecution and should have been considered in determining whether Wu himself suffered persecution; - 16 - (2) Wu did, in fact, demonstrate “resistance”; and (3) given his wife’s sterilization and the couple’s inability to have further children coupled with his resistance, Wu has suffered persecution entitling him to asylum relief. See Pet’r Br. at 21-23. Although Wu correctly recognizes that In re J-S- no longer permits automatic refugee status to the non-sterilized spouse but, instead, requires the applicant to show “other resistance,” Wu nonetheless misconstrues In re J-S-. Wu’s analysis is flawed in that he seemingly suggests that he must show, and did, only two, separate elements: “persecution” and “other resistance.” He fails, however, to make the requisite nexus, as required under In re J-S-, between his “other resistance” to China’s family planning policy and the persecution that he himself has suffered on account of that resistance. There is simply no nexus between the persecution that Wu’s wife suffered, i.e., the forced sterilization, or the couple’s inability to have further children, and Wu’s resistance, i.e., confronting officials when he was held against the wall. If Wu’s wife’s sterilization was in fact involuntary, this would constitute persecution as applied to her, see 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(B), but as to Wu, it would not. Instead, under In re J-S-, Wu must show that he engaged in “other resistance” and was himself persecuted on account of that resistance. Neither his wife’s sterilization nor the couple’s inability to have further children constitute persecution that Wu suffered because he resisted the family planning policy. The BIA concluded Wu did not demonstrate persecution on account of other resistance to the forced sterilization and the record substantially supports this conclusion. - 17 - Accordingly, we perceive no error in the BIA’s construction of In re J-S- and its application to the case at bar.
Wu asserts, in general, that he has a well-founded fear of persecution based upon his 2008 letter to Chinese family planning officials. His limited argument consists of reciting the fact that police appeared at his home and demanded his return to China and then stating that “[t]his shows that [Wu] does have a well-founded belief of future persecution for the letter.” Id. at 24. Wu does not expressly assign error to the BIA, cite case law, or otherwise meaningfully develop an argument concerning his fear of future persecution. Because Wu has not adequately briefed this issue on appeal, we may decline to address it. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1031 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating appellate issues advanced without reasoned argument need not be addressed); Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is insufficient merely to state in one’s brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for appeal.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that perfunctory allegations that “fail to frame and develop an issue sufficient to invoke appellant review” are waived). - 18 - But even if we did address the claim, the BIA explained Wu has not met his burden of proving a factual basis for his fear of persecution based on a letter written years after the sterilization.