Opinion ID: 4534282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Background: 1940 to 2016

Text: In 1940, Congress created the Board as a decision-making body for immigration disputes. See Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503 (Sept. 4, 1940). Soon after, “the Attorney General authorized [the Board] to reopen concluded immigration proceedings at its discretion. 8 C.F.R. § 90.9 (1941) (authorization to hear motions); 8 C.F.R. § 150.8 (1941) (discretion to reopen).” Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 814 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc). In 1952, Congress passed the INA, directing the Attorney General to “establish such regulations . . . [as] necessary” to administer and enforce the act. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 103(a), 66 Stat. 163, 173 (1952). Under this directive, the Attorney General updated the Board’s regulations, see 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1952) (“Reconsideration or reopening of any case in which a decision has been made by the Board, whether requested by the [government], or by the party affected by the decision, shall be only 11 upon written motion to the Board.”), and established a post-departure bar, 8 id. (“A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States.”). In 1954, the Board interpreted the post-departure bar as depriving it of jurisdiction to consider motions to reopen filed by aliens located outside the United States. See In re G–y B–, 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 160 (B.I.A. 1954). And in 1958, the Attorney General formalized the Board’s sua sponte authority: “The Board may on its own motion reopen or reconsider any case in which it has rendered a decision.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1964 Cum. Supp.) (emphasis added); Miscellaneous Amendments to Chapter, 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9118 (Nov. 26, 1958). For thirty-eight years, the statutory and regulatory regime remained largely intact. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1995) (containing the same language as the 1958 regulation). But in 1990, Congress directed that “the Attorney General . . . issue regulations with respect to . . . the period of time in which motions to reopen . . . may be offered in deportation proceedings” and ordered that the “regulations include a limitation on the number of such motions that may be filed and a maximum time period for the filing of such motions.” See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101649, § 545(d)(1), 104 Stat. 4978, 5066. “Congress issued this directive in order to ‘reduce or eliminate . . . abuses’ of regulations that, at that time, permitted aliens to 8 In 1961, Congress enacted a judicial post-departure bar, preventing courts from reviewing a deportation order “if the alien . . . has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1964); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 656 (2d Cir. 2010) (discussing the judicial post-departure bar). 12 file an unlimited number of motions to reopen without any limitations period.” Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (omission in original) (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 400 (1995)). In response, the Attorney General revised these regulations in three important ways: (1) by limiting a party to “file only one motion to reopen proceedings (whether before the Board or the [IJ]) and that motion must be filed not later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened,” 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(2) (1997) (emphasis added); (2) by expanding the Board’s sua sponte authority to “at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision,” id. § 3.2(a) (1997) (emphasis added) (adding the “at any time” language); and (3) by enabling an IJ “upon his or her own motion at any time . . . [to] reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision,” 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1) (1998) (emphasis added). 9 The regulation’s IJ provision also limited an alien to one motion to reopen and included a time bar (ninety days) and a post-departure bar. See id. Congress codified some of these regulatory changes. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 9 We cite the 1998 version because the 1997 version appears to have inadvertently omitted the “at any time” language. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(1) (1997) (“The Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion . . . reopen or reconsider any case . . . .”). 13 3009-546 (“IIRIRA” or “1996 Act”). 10 First, Congress provided aliens a right to file one motion to reopen—if done within ninety days of the final removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(A) (2000); id. § 1229a(c)(6)(C)(i); see also Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1, 14 (2008) (“[The IIRIRA] transform[ed] the motion to reopen from a regulatory procedure to a statutory form of relief available to the alien.”). Second, Congress required deportation of aliens within ninety days of final removal orders. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2000). And third, Congress repealed the statutory judicialpost-departure bar and declined to “codify the regulatory post-departure bar.” Contreras-Bocanegra, 678 F.3d at 814–15. In early 1997, responding to Congress’s direction in the 1996 Act, the Attorney General promulgated new regulations. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997). Though Congress chose not to codify either sua sponte review or a post-departure bar, the new regulations included both. See id. at 10,330–31 (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(a), (d) (1997)). These regulations remain in place. 11