Opinion ID: 416888
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Development of the Feres Doctrine

Text: 16 Through the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, the United States waived its sovereign immunity and agreed to be subject to suit 17 for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 18 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (1976). The FTCA provides that members of the armed forces are deemed to be employees of the federal government. Id. Sec. 2671. Of the FTCA's 12 exceptions, none bars suits by service members against the federal government. 1 19 Nonetheless, the question of the liability of the United States to members of its armed forces has vexed courts ever since the FTCA's enactment. The government initially maintained that the FTCA did not permit any suits whatsoever by service members. In Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949), however, the Supreme Court squarely rejected this argument and held that two servicemen could recover under the Act for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee of the United States when the accident did not occur incident to the plaintiffs' military service. As the Court held, 20 we are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the Brooks' army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired. Were the accident incident to the Brooks' service, a wholly different case would be presented. 21 Id. at 52, 69 S.Ct. at 920. 22 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), presented the Supreme Court with such a wholly different case. Feres involved three separate causes of action: two for medical malpractice by military doctors and one for maintenance of unsafe barracks. The Supreme Court found that none of these claims was sufficient to establish a cause of action under the FTCA. The Court held that the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Id. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. 2 23 In defense of its judicially-created incident to service exception to the FTCA, the Feres Court offered three basic rationales. As the Supreme Court summarized in its most recent discussion of Feres, the incident to service test is predicated on the distinctly federal relationship between the United States and its service personnel, on the presence of an alternative military compensation system, and on the fear of damaging the military disciplinary structure. See generally Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 2057-58, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977). See also Davis v. United States, 667 F.2d 822, 825 (9th Cir.1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir.1981); Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d 580, 597 (D.C.Cir.1980). 24 Decisions subsequent to Feres have substantially weakened the persuasive force of the first two rationales. The argument that the military relationship is distinctly federal applies with equal force to other federal agencies that are liable under the FTCA. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1233 n. 7 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc ), cert. denied 456 U.S. 972, 102 S.Ct. 2234, 72 L.Ed.2d 845 (1982). The second rationale--the existence of an alternative compensation system--has also been applied inconsistently by the Supreme Court. Although the Court mentioned this argument in Stencel and Feres, it has rejected it in other equally appropriate cases. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 113, 75 S.Ct. 141, 143, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954); Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. at 53, 69 S.Ct. at 920. In short, we agree that given the Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of this factor, it cannot be said that the presence of an alternative compensation system either explains or justifies the Feres doctrine; it only makes the effect of the doctrine more palatable. Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d at 598. See also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir.1980); Healy v. United States, 192 F.Supp. 325, 328 n. 13 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 958 (2d Cir.1961). 25 In sum, the most persuasive justification for the Feres doctrine is the potential impact of civil suits on military discipline. After reviewing the Feres doctrine, the Supreme Court concluded that the incident to service exception is best explained by the disciplinary rationale. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 159-62, 83 S.Ct. 1850, 1856-57, 10 L.Ed.2d 805 (1963). As the Court has noted, 26 the peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Torts Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the Court to read the act as excluding claims of that character. 27 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112, 75 S.Ct. at 145. See also Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d at 599 (the protection of military discipline ... serves largely if not exclusively as the predicate for the Feres doctrine ... Only this factor can truly explain the Feres doctrine and the crucial line it draws ....); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d at 1010; Veillette v. United States, 615 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir.1980). 28 Thus, the necessity of safeguarding military discipline provides the most fundamental rationale for limiting recovery under the FTCA to injuries that are not incident to military service. Unfortunately, many courts in applying Feres have clouded the incident to service distinction with a myriad of confusing interpretations. In light of such inconsistent case law, our task is to define the incident to service test in a way that both satisfies the underlying rationale of the Feres doctrine and harmonizes existing case law. 29