Opinion ID: 70350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Group or Class Termination Information Requirement

Text: 9 Section 201 of the OWBPA prohibits waiver of ADEA rights if the waiver is not knowing and voluntary. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(f)(1). The statute provides that an ADEA waiver is not knowing and voluntary unless the party that requested the waiver has met several requirements. Id. Sec. 626(f)(1)(A)-(H). Pursuant to one requirement, waivers requested in connection with an exit incentive or other employment termination program offered to a group or class of employees are not knowing and voluntary unless 10 (H) ... the employer (at the commencement of the period specified in subparagraph (F)) informs the individual in writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average individual eligible to participate, as to- 11 .... 12 (ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program. 13 Id. Sec. 626(f)(1)(H)(ii). The party asserting the validity of the waiver (in this case, KGF) has the burden of showing that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Id. Sec. 626(f)(3). 14 The parties agree that the closure of the Decatur plant entailed the termination of a group or class of employees, and that KGF provided the employees with the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible for the Plan. Thus, the central substantive issue is whether KGF satisfied the second half of Sec. 626(f)(1)(H)(ii)'s informational requirement in requesting the waivers. In the context of KGF's motion for summary judgment, to prevail KGF must show that no issue of material fact remains as to whether KGF provided the Decatur workers the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who were not eligible for the Plan's severance benefits. 15 The employees and amicus curiae American Association of Retired Persons contend that Sec. 626(f)(1)(H)(ii)'s language imposes a requirement to provide comparative information to the employees so that they may assess the possibility of age discrimination. This comparative information must, they assert, include the ages of employees at other plants that are not closed when, as here, the company may have considered for closure several plants producing similar products, and employees at other plants may assume the functions of the Decatur employees in making these food products. Thus, they conclude, KGF is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 16 KGF and amicus curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council (EEAC) counter, and the district court held, that as a matter of law there are no individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected for the program whose ages KGF can provide when the group or class termination arises from the closing of an entire plant. Thus, they conclude, KGF merits summary judgment even though it offered no evidence as to the job classifications or organizational units that employed the plaintiffs. 5 17 We agree with the plaintiffs. To our knowledge, it is an issue of first impression whether individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit can include employees outside a single facility. Statutory construction begins with the words of the statute itself, Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 127-29, 111 S.Ct. 1156, 1163, 113 L.Ed.2d 95 (1991), and the statutory language supports the plaintiffs' argument. Neither job classification nor organizational unit is defined, but neither phrase naturally includes only the employees at a single plant. Given the myriad organizational structures of the business world, it is easy to conceive of a unit that would span more than one plant. Likewise, employees at the company's other plants may perform the same jobs, at identical levels in the hierarchy, making the same products, for pay similar to the Decatur employees'. Furthermore, the statute does not in any other way limit the informational requirement to the ages of a single plant's noneligible employees. Plant closures are not excluded from group or class terminations, and the statute does not except plant closings from its conditions for knowing and voluntary waiver. Thus, to limit individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit to a single plant would be to read the statute's words contrary to their naturally broad meaning and to insert an exception where none is written. 6 18 This interpretation comports with the provision's purpose as expressed in the legislative history. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, which approved the ultimate version of the OWBPA, stated that the purpose of Sec. 626(f)(1)(H)(ii) was to permit older workers to make more informed decisions in group termination and exit incentive programs. S.Rep. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1539. Without legislation, the Committee found, older workers in group or class terminations are generally unable to determine whether the [termination] program gives rise to a valid claim under the ADEA. Id. This inability arises because 19 employees affected by [group or class termination] programs have little or no basis to suspect that action is being taken based on their individual characteristics. Indeed, the employer generally advises them that the termination is not a function of their individual status. Under these circumstances, the need for adequate information and access to advice before waivers are signed is especially acute. 20 Id. at 1538 (emphasis in original). These concerns are no less valid in the plant closing context than in other group or class terminations. Thus, we conclude that individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit may include employees at other plants in the same company. 21 Therefore, whether there are in fact other individuals in the plaintiffs' job classification or organizational unit who were not eligible for Plan benefits is, in this case, not an issue of law but one of fact to be determined in light of Sec. 626(f)(1)(H)(ii)'s purpose. In moving for summary judgment, KGF presented no evidence to show that this issue of fact is not in dispute. Indeed, we cannot ascertain from the record what the plaintiffs' job titles or responsibilities were, let alone what KGF job classifications or organizational units are relevant in light of the provision's purpose of providing older employees with information that permits them better to evaluate any ADEA claims. Not having carried its burden, KGF is not entitled to summary judgment as to this issue. 22