Opinion ID: 4563212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discovery in the District Court

Text: On the same day that Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, they also moved to stay discovery pending a decision on that motion. But the court denied that request and ordered discovery to continue in accordance with an earlier case management order. As part of that discovery, the parties filed a stipulated protective order, to which the district court agreed. A portion of that order concerned deposition testimony: Deposition testimony shall be deemed CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER only if designated as such. Such designation shall be specific as to the portions of the transcript or any exhibit to be designated as CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER. Thereafter, the deposition transcripts and any of those portions so designated shall be protected as No. 19-3914 Lipman, et al. v. Budish, et al. Page 8 CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER, pending objection, under the terms of this Order. (Stipulated Protective Order, R. 15 at PageID #167.) Another portion of the order concerned filing documents that contained information or testimony designated as confidential: Absent a statute or an order of this Court, documents may not be filed under seal. Neither this Stipulated Protective Order nor any other sealing order constitutes blanket authority to file entire documents under seal. Only confidential portions of relevant documents are subject to sealing. To the extent that a brief, memorandum or pleading references any document marked as CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER, then the brief, memorandum or pleading shall refer the Court to the particular exhibit filed under seal without disclosing the contents of any confidential information. If, however, the confidential information must be intertwined within the text of the document, a party may timely move the Court for leave to file both a redacted version for the public docket and an unredacted version for sealing. (Id. at #169–70 (citations omitted).) The order also noted that “there is a presumption in favor of open and public judicial proceedings in the federal courts, [and so] this Order shall be strictly construed in favor of public disclosure and open proceedings wherever possible.” (Id. at #165.) Finally, the order contained procedures by which a party could challenge the other side’s confidentiality designations, in which case the court would resolve the issue. Following the entry of this order, Plaintiffs took the depositions of the DCFS caseworkers who investigated Ta’Naejah’s abuse. During these depositions, Plaintiffs say that the defendantwitnesses admitted they had taken affirmative acts by conducting the interviews of Ta’Naejah, and that interviewing a child in the presence of an alleged abuser increases the likelihood that the abuser will retaliate against the child and subject her to further harm, even where the child does not admit to being abused in the interview. Defendants never submitted designations listing specific portions of these transcripts that were confidential, but instead had the court reporter type “CONFIDENTIAL PURSUANT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER” on the cover page of each. (Quint Dep. Cover Page, R. 23-1; Jackson Dep. Cover Page, R. 23-2.) No. 19-3914 Lipman, et al. v. Budish, et al. Page 9 D. The District Court’s Orders and Plaintiffs’ Proposed Amended Complaint In May 2019, while the parties were still conducting discovery, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Lipman v. Budish (Lipman I), 383 F. Supp. 3d 764 (N.D. Ohio 2019). First, the court found that DCFS was not itself a proper defendant, and that claims against it would instead have to proceed against the county. Id. at 769–70.4 Second, turning to Budish, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to state an official-capacity claim under Monell because their allegations did not establish inadequate supervision of the case workers or a custom of tolerating constitutional violations. Id. at 770–71. Third, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim failed because neither of the exceptions to DeShaney applied: Ta’Naejah was never in the county’s custody, and their decision to interview Ta’Naejah in front of Crump and Owens could not amount to a constitutional violation. Id. at 772–76. On this last point, the court reasoned as follows: To the extent plaintiffs allege that defendants violated certain policies or state laws, the Court agrees with defendants that plaintiff[s] are improperly attempting to convert alleged violations of state law into a federal due process claim. Additionally, DeShaney recognized that while the state may impose affirmative duties upon its agents, a violation of those duties does not “constitutionalize” the duties. Id. at 775. Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to state a procedural due process claim, agreeing with Defendants that because none of the state statutes they allegedly violated contain guarantees of substantive outcomes, the alleged violations of those statutes could not support a procedural due process claim. Id. at 776–78. And because all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims had been dismissed on the merits, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims, id. at 778–79, and so never addressed Defendants’ motion with respect to those issues.5 Similarly, the court never reached Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments. 4Plaintiffs have not challenged this ruling on appeal. 5On appeal, the parties also have not addressed these claims. Because we reverse the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, we additionally vacate the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims and No. 19-3914 Lipman, et al. v. Budish, et al. Page 10 After the motion to dismiss was decided, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file under seal. In that document, Plaintiffs said that they intended to file a motion to reconsider that cites deposition testimony and transcripts. Because, Plaintiffs said, the stipulated protective order “require[d] deposition testimony pertaining to this matter [to] be filed under seal,” they asked for leave to file the motion to reconsider until seal as well. (Mot. for Leave, R. 21 at PageID #241.) In a text-only docket entry two days later, the court said: “Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal is DENIED. Deposition testimony may not be considered on a Motion to Dismiss.” (Docket Order, June 12, 2019.) A few days later, Plaintiffs filed a motion both to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and to file a first amended complaint under Rule 15(a). In that motion, Plaintiffs discussed the caseworkers’ deposition testimony and asked to file an amended complaint including additional allegations on state-created danger that were uncovered through those depositions.6 Specifically, Plaintiffs said they took “the exact testimony from these Defendants and placed it into their amended complaint to meet the pleading standard for state created danger.” (Rule 59 Mot., R. 22 at PageID #246; see also id. at #247 (“The above allegations are supported by the admissions contained in depositions. Witnesses have testified that caseworkers affirmatively acted to interview the child in front of her abusers at least four times; that it was foreseeable that an abuser would retaliate against the victim; and further admitted that interviewing a child in front of her abusers increased the danger to the child.”).) In a footnote, Plaintiffs mentioned the sealing issue and why they did not attach the transcript pages themselves: Plaintiffs requested leave to file the deposition transcripts under seal pursuant to the protective order for the Court to consider new evidence; however the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion. Plaintiffs are well aware that deposition testimony cannot be used under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Deposition testimony was proposed to be used purely for the limited purpose of showing the Court [that] remand for the district court to assess their merits in the first instance. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 493–94 (6th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 6Plaintiffs also say they tried to address other potential defects highlighted in the court’s earlier dismissal order. No. 19-3914 Lipman, et al. v. Budish, et al. Page 11 Plaintiffs have new evidence for the Rule 59(e) Motion to Reconsider and ha[ve] made the amended allegations in good faith. (Id. at #247 n.3 (citations omitted).) In response, Defendants moved to strike Plaintiffs’ motion and their proposed amended complaint. In that motion, Defendants argued that the cover sheets to the deposition transcripts designated them as confidential in their entirety, and so any information derived from those transcripts could not be disclosed. Defendants also pointed to Plaintiffs’ earlier motion to seal as evidence that they agreed these transcripts had to be protected. Thus, Defendants say that Plaintiffs should have asked for leave to file both redacted and unredacted versions of their motion but failed to do so. “Instead, despite the Stipulated Protective Order and despite this Court’s prior ruling denying Plaintiff’s [sic] leave to file under seal, Plaintiffs simply filed their Motion that liberally uses information taken from the confidential transcripts.” (Mot. to Strike, R. 23 at PageID #308.) And so, because “Plaintiffs willfully and intentionally violated the Stipulated Protective Order,” Defendants asked the court to strike their filings from the docket. (Id. at #309–10.) The court agreed with Defendants and struck Plaintiffs’ filings, specifically noting that the cover pages to the transcripts designated them as confidential and that Plaintiffs had conceded as much by filing their original motion to seal. Lipman v. Budish (Lipman II), No. 1:18-CV-2985, 2019 WL 4194176, at –3 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2019). It also noted that Plaintiffs never followed the protective order’s procedures for challenging a designation, and so could not later complain that those designations were invalid. Id. at . The court went on to say that even if it had not decided to strike the motion, it would still have denied it in any event. Id. While Plaintiffs argued that they asked for leave to amend at the close of their opposition to the motion to dismiss, the court held that it was not required to grant leave to amend based merely on a superficial request for amendment at the end of an opposition brief. Id. The court also found that Plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Rule 59: Plaintiffs argue that they have “new evidence” in the form of the deposition testimony which now demonstrates a viable substantive due process claim based on both the state created danger and custody exceptions to the established rule as No. 19-3914 Lipman, et al. v. Budish, et al. Page 12 well as a Monell claim. But, plaintiffs acknowledge in their motion that they “received deposition transcripts days before this Court entered its ruling” on the Motion to Dismiss. The Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed as of April 22, 2019, and plaintiffs do not dispute defendants’ statement that the depositions were completed by May 1. Although plaintiffs assert that the depositions were not transcribed until May 15 and, as a result, they did not have an opportunity to amend the Complaint prior to this Court’s ruling on May 23, this Court held a status conference on May 16. On that date, the Court let the parties know that the ruling on the Motion to Dismiss was forthcoming, and plaintiffs did not mention an intention to amend their Complaint. Accordingly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have new evidence. Id. at  (citation omitted). The district court also said it had not erred by dismissing Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim in its original order: Here, plaintiffs are essentially alleging that the state actors’ action of interviewing the child in front of her abusers created or increased their intent to abuse her which led to her death. The Court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs are trying to do “an end-run” around the law which does not hold the government liable on a substantive due process claim when it fails to protect and investigate; returns a child to an abusive situation; or violates duties, policies, or state laws. Id. at . Plaintiffs then appealed. E. Proceedings on Appeal On appeal, Plaintiffs outlined the facts alleged in their original and proposed amended complaint, and went on to argue that the district court erred by dismissing their original complaint and by striking or alternatively denying their Rule 59 motion. Specifically, Plaintiffs said that their substantive due process claim was supported by both the custody and state-created danger exceptions to DeShaney, that the state had violated Ta’Naejah’s rights by discharging her from the hospital and into Crump’s and Owens’s custody without procedural due process, and that Plaintiffs had successfully stated a Monell claim against Budish based on a custom of tolerating constitutional violations. With respect to their Rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs say the district court erred in striking it because Defendants’ confidentiality designations for the depositions were themselves improper, as they merely labeled the transcripts “confidential” on the cover pages and did not designate the specific portions of the transcript that should be No. 19-3914 Lipman, et al. v. Budish, et al. Page 13 protected. Further, the allegations in the complaint were simply facts about Defendants’ knowledge, and should not have been sealed regardless of where Plaintiffs learned of them. Finally, Plaintiffs say that because district courts should not dismiss civil rights complaints without first granting leave to amend, the district court erred in denying their Rule 59 motion on the merits. While Defendants opposed each of these points in their brief, they also raised two additional issues of their own. First, they argued that the bulk of Plaintiffs’ appeal should be dismissed as untimely. While normally a Rule 59 motion extends the time to file a notice of appeal, Defendants say that the district court’s decision to strike that motion rendered it a nullity, and so it no longer could extend that deadline. So, if this Court upholds the district court’s decision to strike, Defendants say the rest of Plaintiffs’ appeal—namely their challenge to the dismissal of the complaint—must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Second, Defendants reiterated their argument that, even if this Court reaches the merits of Plaintiffs’ appeal and even if it finds there was a constitutional violation, the caseworkers are entitled to qualified immunity. But again, Defendants exclusively framed this argument in terms of returning Ta’Naejah to Crump and Owens, and did not address Plaintiffs’ state-created danger arguments based on the interviews. Defendants also filed a motion to seal Plaintiffs’ brief on appeal. In this motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ brief contains information taken from the stricken proposed amended complaint, which in turn was taken from the deposition transcripts. Thus, the brief also violated the district court’s protective order, and so Defendants say it should be filed under seal. That said, Defendants identify only four pages of Plaintiffs’ brief that contain allegedly confidential information, and Defendants cite no case law and provide no reason why the brief should be sealed other than the district court’s protective order.