Opinion ID: 844222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the court properly denied self-representation in this case

Text: (9) Defendant argues that the holding of Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164, may not be applied retroactively to this case. But the trial court did not apply Edwards retroactively. It revoked defendant's self-representation after Edwards was decided and in express reliance on that decision. [A] law governing the conduct of trials is being applied `prospectively' when it is applied to a trial occurring after the law's effective date, regardless of when the underlying crime was committed or the underlying cause of action arose. ( Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 289 [279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434].) Tapia involved legislation, but we see no reason to apply a different rule to a judicial decision. Edwards was applied prospectively, not retroactively. Defendant also argues the record does not support the court's ruling. As with other determinations regarding self-representation, we must defer largely to the trial court's discretion. ( People v. Lawrence (2009) 46 Cal.4th 186, 191-192 [92 Cal.Rptr.3d 613, 205 P.3d 1062]; People v. Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 702-703 [pre- Faretta holding that denial of self-representation is subject to review for abuse of discretion].) The trial court's determination regarding a defendant's competence must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461] [competence to stand trial].) Such deference is especially appropriate when, as here, the same judge has observed the defendant on numerous occasions. [T]he trial judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who presided over one of Edwards' competency hearings and his two trials, will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant. ( Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 177.) We see no abuse of discretion in this case. The trial judge, who had permitted defendant to represent himself for several months, revoked defendant's self-representation status following a very careful and thorough discussion. He cited and applied the precise standard stated in Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. 164. He had previously appointed three mental health experts to evaluate defendant's competence to stand trial and had heard their testimony at the trial competency hearing. Although he did not appoint a mental health expert specifically to evaluate defendant's competence to represent himself, we believe under the circumstances doing so was not necessary for the court to make a sufficiently informed decision. We agree with the Court of Appeal's assessment: The record here supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant, although competent to stand trial, was not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. A psychologist had testified at the trial-competency hearing that there was `a very strong possibility' that defendant had some type of delusional thought disorder coupled with conspiracy paranoia. Defendant had represented himself for almost seven months of preliminary proceedings during which he filed a number of nonsensical motions and conducted himself in a bizarre and disruptive manner. The trial judge, who had presided over all these matters, was well acquainted with defendant's limitations and reasonably concluded that defendant lacked the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel. The court found, upon substantial evidence, that defendant `has disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety and other common symptoms of severe mental illnesses which can impair his ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation, even if he can play the lesser role of a represented defendant.' The trial judge showed great patience in permitting defendant an opportunity to represent himself but chose to deny further self-representation when it became clear that defendant was accomplishing nothing and might, in the court's opinion, be deprived of a fair trial if allowed to continue his self-representation. In Edwards, the high court attached as an appendix a bizarre document the defendant had prepared as an example suggesting the common sense of the American Psychiatric Association's observations regarding how symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair a defendant's capability for self-representation. ( Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 176, 179.) Similar examples abound in the record of this case. [2] (10) Defendant notes that the jury that had found him competent to stand trial had been instructed that to be competent, he had to be able to assist in a rational manner his attorney in presenting his defense or conduct his own defense in a rational manner.  (Italics added.) He argues that this means the jury had specifically found that he could conduct his own defense in a rational manner. As the Court of Appeal found in a portion of its opinion not now under review, the trial court probably erred, although harmlessly, by including the italicized language. That language set too high a standard for competence to stand trial. But the jury's verdict and the instructions did not deprive the trial court of discretion to find defendant incompetent to represent himself under Edwards. Whether to deny self-representation due to mental incompetence is for the court, not a jury, to determine based on all of the information available to the court. (See Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 177.) (11) Defendant also notes that none of the experts appointed to evaluate him for trial competency had interviewed him personally. He is correct. The reason for this, however, is that defendant refused to meet with the experts. This refusal certainly handicapped the experts and made it more difficult for the jury to determine his competence to stand trial. But a defendant's refusal to be examined does not eliminate the court's and, ultimately, the jury's duty (see Pen. Code, §§ 1368, 1369) to determine his competence to stand trial when a doubt exists. The court and jury must do the best they can under the circumstances. Similarly, the refusal to be examined does not, and cannot, deprive the court of discretion to deny self-representation due to defendant's mental incompetence. The court had to, and did, do the best it could under the circumstances. (12) Because the record supports the trial court's findings regarding defendant's competence to represent himself, that court's ruling revoking his self-representation status was within its discretion. The Court of Appeal correctly so concluded.