Opinion ID: 1967844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of the Motion to Recuse

Text: Jones argues that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying his motion to recuse. We review the subjective aspect of this decision for abuse of discretion and the objective portion de novo. [75] Judicial impartiality is a fundamental principle of the administration of justice. [76] A party is entitled to neutrality on the part of the presiding judge but the standards governing disqualification also require the appearance of impartiality. [77] Canon 3C of the Delaware Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code) places upon the judge the direct responsibility to avoid participation in proceedings through the exercise of disqualification whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. [78] Although the Code sets forth specific instances prompting disqualification, it does not exhaust all situations in which a judge's impartiality may be questioned. [79] Thus, when confronted with a motion to recuse, the trial judge must engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether disqualification is appropriate. The first step requires the judge to be subjectively satisfied that she can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. [80] Even if the judge is satisfied that she can proceed to hear the matter free of bias or prejudice, the second step requires the judge to examine objectively whether the circumstances require recusal because `there is an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality.' [81] On appeal, we review the trial judge's analysis of the subjective test for abuse of discretion. [82] Because a claim of appearance of impropriety implicates a view of how others perceive the conduct of the trial judge, we review the merits of the objective test de novo. [83] Here, counsel for Jones filed a Motion to Recuse and a Motion for a New Trial on March 16, 2005. [84] The facts surrounding the motion to recuse and her reasons for denying it are outlined at length by the trial judge in her written order denying both motions. [85] We summarize them here. In a side-bar scheduling discussion during the penalty phase of Jones's trial on February 14, the trial judge refused to grant defense counsel's request for a full day recess. [86] In response to this denial, counsel launched into a heated tirade that accused the Court of favoring the prosecution. [87] The next day, the trial judge was overheard talking in a restaurant. A witness provided an affidavit attesting that the trial judge was angry due to something that occurred at `sidebar' with this defense attorney. [88] According to the affidavit, the trial judge used profanity when referring to counsel and said that she would get the last word and that man on trial would get the death penalty. [89] The trial judge, in her order denying Jones's motions, rejected this account. She admitted to expressing her sentiment that night about the bitter and recriminating sidebar at the restaurant. Additionally, she agreed with the affiant that she had exhibited extreme animosity toward defense counsel at sidebar and that she remained angry over defense counsel's behavior for some time after the events on February 14. However, she vehemently denied the affiant's claim that she was going to issue a death sentence. In particular, she stated the following explanation as to the, context behind the restaurant conversation: My animosity toward [defense counsel], which would be more accurately termed disappointment, is not a reasonable basis for assuming I was biased against his client. The aforementioned instances . . . provide a more than reasonable basis for the Court to have become dissatisfied with the way [defense counsel] tried this case. That feeling, however, sprang from the Court's judicial desire to ensure that Jones received a fair penalty hearing. I also had a strong personal desire to avoid a recommendation from the jury so strong that failure to issue a death sentence would appear to substitute my opinion of the juvenile death penalty for that of the law of Delaware and the conscience of the community. I did not intend to use my disappointment with [defense counsel] as an excuse to impose the death penalty regardless of Jones' mitigating evidence. Instead, I was dissatisfied with [defense counsel] because his poor performance made it practically inevitable that the jury would strongly vote death, a recommendation that I would have probably had to follow regardless of my personal convictions. [90] She further defended her conversation because it is simply too much to ask that a judge not utter a word to anyone about a case that may extend, like this one, for months, and to completely abstain from the support of family and friends when faced with difficult legal and moral decisions on matters of life and death. [91] While we do not require that a judge be silent with family about events occurring in her courtroom, it was inappropriate for the trial judge to discuss the case in a public setting where she could be overheard and misconstrued. Notwithstanding that, we accept the trial judge's representations regarding what occurred and her lack of bias. We find no abuse of discretion in her analysis of the subjective test. Addressing the objective test, we do not find an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the trial judge's impartiality. Any issue of bias in favor of the death penalty is moot because a life sentence was in fact imposed. Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of Jones's motion to recuse.