Opinion ID: 1880543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Denying Certain Defendants' Motion to Sever?

Text: ¶ 6. Certain Defendants argue that the plaintiffs are improperly joined because the health and work histories are so varied that they do not meet the standards required for joinder. More specifically, they argue that the same transaction and occurrence requirement of Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 is not met by the plaintiffs' claims. Defendants also argue that they will be denied due process and joinder would result in an unfair trial. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs argue that they have met the requirements of Miss. R. Civ. P 20. The plaintiffs state that it was the defendants' placement of asbestos-containing products into the stream of commerce, as well as defendants' engagement in a conspiracy that constitutes the transaction or series of transactions from which plaintiffs derive a commonality. The trial court, in denying defendants' motion to sever, relied on American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 818 So.2d 1073 (Miss.2001), overruled by Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. Boots Smith Corp., 889 So.2d 505, 2004 WL 2403939 (Miss.2004), and stated that the transaction or occurrence test of Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 was satisfied because the plaintiffs allege a common pattern of behavior among various defendants in allowing or contributing to the exposure. ¶ 8. The case at bar is controlled by Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Armond, 866 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Miss.2004), wherein this Court drew the line with respect to what is considered the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. ¶ 9. As Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 states both requirements must be satisfied in order to sustain party joinder under Rule 20(a). M.R.C.P. 20 cmt. (emphasis added). Pursuant to the February 20, 2004, amendment made to Rule 20, the comment now states that [t]he phrase `transaction and occurrence' requires that there be a distinct litigable event linking the parties. (emphasis added). In the case sub judice the plaintiffs do not have a distinct litigable event that links them together. The controversy identical to all plaintiffs is the exposure of asbestos at Ingalls Shipyard. However, the events giving rise to the litigation were quite different for each plaintiff. Although each plaintiff worked at a common workplace, Ingalls Shipyard, their employment was at different dates and times. Each plaintiff worked at Ingalls Shipyard for varying lengths of time. The most one plaintiff worked at Ingalls Shipyard was around seventeen years and the least amount of time was about a year. Each plaintiff was exposed to asbestos for varying lengths of times, depending on how long they worked at Ingalls Shipyard. Each plaintiff had a different job description and a different work site. Of the nine plaintiffs, four could remember working on the same ship. However, they worked on this ship at different times and for varying lengths of time. Some plaintiffs even stated that they could have been exposed to asbestos at other places of employment other than Ingalls Shipyard. Each plaintiff also has a different medical history which could make it harder for some of the plaintiffs to prove causation. There are too many differences between the plaintiffs, and there is not a distinct litigable event linking the parties together, except that they all at one time in their life worked at Ingalls Shipyard.