Opinion ID: 1928239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court's action in refusing to quash the indictment.

Text: The first assignment challenges the trial court's action in denying Harrigill's motion to quash the indictment upon the special plea of the two year statute of limitations. Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-1-5 (1972). It is argued that the indictment charges only a conspiracy, a crime not among those excepted from the operation of the two year period of limitations. There is no merit in the contention. Conspiracy is a complete offense in itself, distinct from the commission of the crime contemplated by the conspiracy and does not become merged with that crime. Martin v. State, 197 Miss. 96, 19 So.2d 488 (1944), Moore v. State, 290 So.2d 603 (Miss. 1974), U.S. v. York, 578 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1978), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1005, 99 S.Ct. 619, 58 L.Ed.2d 682 (1979), U.S. v. Cheers, 439 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.1971). In Prisock v. State, 244 Miss. 408, 141 So.2d 711 (1962), Prisock was convicted of the statutory crime of false pretenses under then Mississippi Code Annotated, section 2149 (1942). On appeal it was contended in his behalf that the indictment was duplicitous in that it charged (1) a conspiracy to commit the crime of false pretenses as well as (2) an attempt to commit that offense. In Prisock the indictment stated: [D]id willfully, unlawfully and feloniously conspire, willfully scheme and design, and willfully plan in concert with the other ... a false automobile wreck to collect money under certain insurance policies. In rejecting Prisock's argument this Court said: The word conspire, used in conjunction with scheme, design and plan, concerning all of the indictees, was used in a generic sense to show the concert of action of the parties in planning the false wreck, obtaining the insurance, causing the faked accident, and making the claims. A fair construction of the indictment shows that defendant was charged and convicted of the crime of an attempt to commit false pretenses. The indictment did not charge an offense of conspiracy only. It averred overt acts manifestly constituting an attempt to commit the offense. (244 Miss. at 416, 141 So.2d at 714). The fact that two or more persons enter into an agreement or plan to commit a felony, each playing a part, whether it be murder, false pretenses or some other felony, and carry out the plan and actually commit the crime, does not change the nature of the offense committed nor lessen the exposure of the plotters to punishment therefor. It is next argued that the offense charged in the indictment is barred by the two year statute because it charges Harrigill with having been an accessory only, and that being an accessory is a separate crime, one which is not among those excepted from the operation of the statute. This position is not well taken. Section 97-1-3 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) provides:  Every person who shall be an accessory to any felony, before the fact, shall be deemed and considered a principal, and shall be indicted and punished as such; and this whether the principal have been previously convicted or not. Prosecution of one who has been an accessory before the fact to the commission of one of the excepted felonies is not barred by the two year statute of limitations. His guilt is exactly the same as that of the principal and he suffers the same exposure to prosecution and punishment. The indictment charged Harrigill with the crime of false pretenses proscribed by Section 97-19-39, a felony, and it was of that crime that he was convicted. In express terms, false pretenses is excepted from the two year statute of limitations.