Opinion ID: 1977492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue of admission of evidence of other sales.

Text: The city asserts trial court allowed testimony regarding comparable sales which were not comparable, the critical difference being, according to the city's brief, in zoning of the alleged comparables. The owner's experts referred to sales of property zoned commercial or multi-family. See Frederickson v. Hjelle, supra at 743. The city's witnesses testified for the most part concerning sales of property zoned R1A (single family dwellings). Of course, since Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 413 (1959) evidence of comparable sales has been admissible as substantive evidence of value. Like other evidence, it is for the jury to determine its weight and credit. Belle v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 256 Iowa 43, 47, 126 N.W.2d 311, 313 (1964). Other salesnot comparable in the Redfield sensemay also furnish a foundation for an expert's opinion testimony. See Bellew v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 284, 290-291 (Iowa 1969); Thornberry v. State Board of Regents, 186 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Iowa 1971) and citations. Much must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court as to whether or not the conditions are met which make the admissibility rule applicable. Perry v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 180 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 1970). While the properties must be similar enough that the sales assist the jury, we have noted, Jurors are men and women of the world, and when the differences between the properties are brought out in evidence.    the jurors can make comparisons in value. Id. But in the case sub judice our holding in divisions I and II carries the resolution of this issue: as the jury could permissibly disregard zoning in these circumstances, it was entitled to hear evidence from which it could determine the before-condemnation valuation of the Englert tract, without the R1A restriction. In addition, we note the city by cross-examination solicited and received evidence of several of the comparables of the owner's first valuation expert. The court's jury instruction 12 would permit the jury, upon finding either party's evidence disclosed a sale of a similar tract, to consider the sale price as independent evidence of the value of the Englert tract. If there was no competent evidence the owner's comparable sales were similar, the instruction was of course erroneous. Martinson v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 257 Iowa 687, 696, 134 N.W.2d 340, 345 (1965); Wicks v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 254 Iowa 998, 1006, 119 N.W.2d 781, 786 (1963). But the city made no objection, nor did it request an instruction which would limit the purpose for which the testimony could be considered. Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 251 Iowa 77, 86, 99 N.W.2d 404, 409 (1959). In fact, jury instruction 12 in all material respects was identical to a requested instruction submitted by the city. Under the record made here we believe this instruction became the law of the case, Hamdorf v. Corrie, 251 Iowa 896, 902, 101 N.W.2d 836, 840 (1960), and the city thereby waived the objections made to this evidence as it was introduced. We are persuaded trial court did not err in any of the aspects urged by the city, and therefore affirm. Affirmed.