Opinion ID: 4019035
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sams’s other claims

Text: Sams’s claims also do not rely on newly discovered evidence. Sams seems to argue that Brown and Alleyne constitute newly discovered evidence. However, these decisions do not establish Sams’s factual innocence of the offense of conviction. See In re Boshears, 110 F.3d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the applicant must show that the newly discovered evidence established that he was actually innocent of the offense). To the extent that Sams seeks to rely on the decisions in Brown and Alleyne as new rules of constitutional law, his claim fails. First, Brown is a decision from the district court, rather than a Supreme Court decision. Second, we have not yet determined, in a published opinion, whether Alleyne created a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court made retroactive to cases on collateral review for purposes of authorizing a second or successive collateral attack, or whether it is retroactive to initial collateral proceedings. See Jeanty v. Warden, FCI-Miami, 757 F.3d 1283, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding, in the context of a prisoner seeking to establish eligibility under the five-part 11 Case: 16-14515 Date Filed: 07/26/2016 Page: 12 of 13 18 U.S.C. § 2255(e) savings clause test, that Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review); United States v. Harris, 741 F.3d 1245, 1250 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2014) (applying Alleyne but noting that “doing so is not intended to suggest that Alleyne applies retroactively to cases on collateral review” because “Alleyne was decided in the context of a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court itself has not expressly declared Alleyne to be retroactive on collateral review”). Even assuming arguendo that Alleyne established a “new rule of constitutional law” within the meaning of § 2255(h)(2), it has not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. For a new rule to be retroactive to cases on collateral review for purposes of authorizing a second or successive § 2255 petition, the Supreme Court itself must make the rule retroactive. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662-63, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2482, 150 L. Ed. 2d 632 (2001). Although multiple cases can, together, make a rule retroactive, the holdings in those cases must necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule. Id. at 666, 121 S. Ct. at 2484. The Supreme Court itself has not expressly declared Alleyne to be retroactive to cases on collateral review. See generally Alleyne, 570 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2155-64. Alleyne also has not been made retroactive through any combination of cases that necessarily dictate retroactivity. Moreover, Alleyne was decided in the context of a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court has not since applied it to a case on collateral review. See id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2155-56; In re Anderson, 396 F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), was not retroactively applicable in part because it was decided in the context of a direct appeal, and the Supreme Court had not applied it to a case on collateral review). Therefore, because the Supreme Court has not held, either directly or by a series of decisions that necessarily dictate its retroactivity, that Alleyne is retroactively 12 Case: 16-14515 Date Filed: 07/26/2016 Page: 13 of 13 applicable, Sams’s reliance on it for purposes of § 2255(h)(2) is misplaced. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2); Tyler, 533 U.S. at 663, 666, 121 S. Ct. at 2482, 2484. Furthermore, to the extent Sams seeks to rely on Booker as a new rule of constitutional law, his reliance is similarly misplaced. We have concluded that Booker is not retroactively applicable because it was decided in the context of a direct appeal and the Supreme Court had not since applied it to a case on collateral review. Anderson, 396 F.3d at 1339. Finally, the remainder of Sams’s claims, including his challenges to his conviction pursuant to § 2113(a), his claims of alleged juror and prosecutorial misconduct, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, do not meet the statutory criteria because Johnson and Welch did not address these issues. Further, Sams does not allege, much less show, that these claims rely on newly discovered evidence. Accordingly, because Sams has not made a prima facie showing that his proposed claims meet the statutory criteria, his application for leave to file a second or successive motion is hereby DENIED. 13