Opinion ID: 1405837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intent to kill as element of felony-murder special circumstances.

Text: The trial court failed to instruct the jury that in order to find the special circumstance allegations true, it must determine that defendant specifically intended to kill Opel. Defendant asserts this was error under Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862]. However, we have overruled Carlos's holding that the 1978 death penalty law imposes an intent-to-kill requirement on all felony-murder special circumstances. Under current law, intent to kill need be charged and proved only where the defendant was an aider and abetter, and not the actual killer. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1138-1148 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306].) Here, as noted, defense counsel conceded that defendant personally inflicted the fatal wound on Opel, and there was no substantial evidence to the contrary. Hence, there was no duty to instruct on the intent-to-kill issue. ( Id., at pp. 1147-1148, citing People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 685 [160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1]; see also People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326-327 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082] [ Anderson applies retroactively].) For similar reasons, no intent-to-kill finding was necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. (3) After proper consideration of the individual circumstances, the death penalty may constitutionally be imposed on one who  actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill.... ( Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 150 [95 L.Ed.2d 127, 139, 107 S.Ct. 1676], italics added, construing Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 102 S.Ct. 3368].) Here, the first degree murder verdict against defendant was premised solely on felony-murder instructions, and the jury made no express or implied finding that defendant personally killed Opel. However, assuming an adequate record, such a finding may be made by either a trial or appellate court at any time prior to execution. ( Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376, 383-388 [88 L.Ed.2d 704, 714-718, 106 S.Ct. 689].) Accordingly, on overwhelming evidence, we find that defendant was Opel's actual killer, thus satisfying any Eighth Amendment concern. [9]