Opinion ID: 2088514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of Cerene and Becker

Text: Here, the record reveals that appellants, Cerene and Becker, filed their praecipe for writ to join Laughlin as an additional defendant approximately four months after service of the complaint upon them in violation of Rule 2253. Appellants contend, however, that just cause existed for the late joinder because they believed that the filing of the preliminary objections challenging the venue of the Philadelphia court tolled the running of the sixty-day period. In support of this contention, they cite Graham v. Greater Latrobe School District, 436 Pa. 440, 260 A.2d 731 (1970), and DiCarlo v. Vincent A. Nese Construction Co., Inc., 16 D. & C.3d 573 (Allegheny Co. 1980). In Graham, our Supreme Court held that the defendant had sixty days from the date its preliminary objections were overruled to join any additional defendants. It reasoned that: Rule 2253 does not explicitly cover the situation of the joinder of additional defendants when the original defendant has filed preliminary objections to the complaint. If the objections are sustained, no problem will arise, however, for either the action will be dismissed or an amended complaint will be filed after which a sixty day period begins. When the objections are overruled, as here, reason and policy require that the defendant be given sixty days to join additional defendants. Preliminary objections attack the validity of the pleading, and until those objections are overruled, a court has not determined that the plaintiff has filed a valid complaint. Applying that reasoning to time periods (1) and (2) [within 60 days after service on the defendant of the plaintiff's complaint or of an amendment to plaintiff's complaint], the most reasonable construction of Rule 2253 would be that the defendant has sixty days from the time it is determined that plaintiff has filed a valid complaint. If no preliminary objections are filed, that will be the date of the filing of the complaint. If they are filed, that will be the date they are overruled. Also, it makes no sense to require the defendant to proceed as if the action will continue when he has before the court objections which, if successful, will terminate the litigation. No reasons of policy require that he follow these inconsistent paths at the same time. 436 Pa. 440, 444, 260 A.2d 731, 733 (1970). In DiCarlo, the Allegheny Court of Common Pleas extended the Graham ruling to cover preliminary objections which would not have terminated the litigation if sustained. We find that Graham is distinguishable from the instant case and that DiCarlo is not binding on this Court. Our position is supported by Kerry Coal Co. v. Beckwith Machinery Co., 316 Pa. Superior Ct. 195, 462 A.2d 861 (1983). In that case, this Court held that the joining defendant did not have sixty days from the date his preliminary objections (claiming lack of venue and including a motion for a more specific pleading) were overruled to join an additional defendant without leave of court, stating:  Graham is only applicable when the preliminary objections are filed by the original defendant and, if successful, would result in the filing of an amended complaint by the plaintiff or in the action being dismissed. Id., 316 Pa.Superior Ct. at 198, 462 A.2d at 863 (emphasis deleted). See also Commercial Banking Corp. v. Culp, 297 Pa. Superior Ct. 344, 348-49, 443 A.2d 1154, 1156 (1982) ([W]here defendant files preliminary objections which would terminate the litigation as to a necessary party the theory of Graham applies and the sixty day period for joinder does not begin to run until the objections are ruled upon); Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 288 Pa. Superior Ct. 267, 270, 431 A.2d 1041, 1042 (1981) ([W]here an original defendant files preliminary objections [in the nature of a demurrer] to less than all counts of a multi-count complaint, Graham does not apply and the sixty day period for joinder of additional defendants goes forward as usual; demurrer challenging only one of two counts of complaint would not have terminated the litigation even if successful, and parties sought to be joined were necessary parties to both counts of the complaint). In the instant case, the preliminary objections in question only challenged venue and, if sustained, would not have terminated the litigation. Therefore, Graham does not apply and the sixty-day period lapsed prior to appellants' filing of the praecipe for writ to join an additional defendant. Thus, we must determine whether the lower court erred in refusing to allow Cerene and Becker an extension of time within which to join Laughlin. Under Rule 2253, leave of court must be sought, upon cause shown, to secure joinder of an additional defendant after the expiration of the sixty-day period prescribed for such joinder. Zakian v. Liljestrand, 438 Pa. 249, 255, 264 A.2d 638, 641 (1970); Coppage v. Smith, 381 Pa. 400, 403-04, 113 A.2d 247, 249-50 (1955). The defendant's petition seeking an extension of time to join an additional defendant must contain: (1) some reasonable justification or excuse for the delay; (2) a statement of the facts alleged to render the proposed additional defendant alone liable, or liable with, or liable over to defendant, or liable to the defendant on a proper cross claim; and (3) allegations that the late joinder will not be prejudicial to the proposed additional defendant. It should ask for leave to file both the praecipe and the complaint called for by Rule 2252(b). Goodrich-Amram 2d § 2253:3.1 at 108 (1977) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also Farmer v. General Refractories Co., 271 Pa. Superior Ct. 349, 352, 413 A.2d 701, 702 (1979). [4] Whether there is cause shown for the allowance of an extension of time for the joinder of an additional defendant is a matter within the discretion of the lower court, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Zakian v. Liljestrand, supra 438 Pa. at 255, 264 A.2d at 641; Marnell v. Cross, 372 Pa. 82, 83-84, 92 A.2d 688, 689 (1953); Farmer v. General Refractories Co., supra 271 Pa.Super. at 352, 413 A.2d at 702; Welch Foods, Inc. v. Bishopric Products Co., 254 Pa. Superior Ct. 256, 259, 385 A.2d 1007, 1008 (1978); Desiderio v. R & R Tire Center, Inc., 242 Pa. Superior Ct. 135, 137, 363 A.2d 1197, 1198 (1976); Lamoree v. Penn Central Transportation Co., 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 380, 384, 357 A.2d 595, 597 (1976). Additionally, the burden of demonstrating sufficient cause to allow the unseasonable joinder rest[s] with defendant. Welch Foods, Inc. v. Bishopric Products Co., supra 254 Pa.Super. at 258-59, 385 A.2d at 1008; accord Coopers & Lybrand v. Penn State Mutual Insurance Co., 32 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 435, 438, 379 A.2d 901, 903 (1977). In determining what is sufficient cause for an extension of time for joinder of an additional defendant, courts should be guided by the objectives sought to be achieved by use of the additional defendant procedure in conjunction with the purpose for which a 60-day limitation was placed on its unrestricted use. In a capsule, these rules were an attempt to provide a means to simplify and expedite the disposition of matters involving numerous parties . . . without subjecting the original plaintiff to unreasonable delay in the prosecution of his portion of the litigation. Zakian v. Liljestrand, supra 438 Pa. at 256, 264 A.2d at 641 (citation omitted). See also Coppage v. Smith, supra 381 Pa. at 405, 113 A.2d at 250 (procedural rules should be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they are applicable); Ianni v. Pantalone, 238 Pa. Superior Ct. 548, 553, 361 A.2d 772, 774 (1976) (procedural rules governing third party procedure should be construed to accomplish the purpose of `[avoiding] multiplicity of suits by adjudicating in one suit the rights and liabilities of all of the parties to a single transaction which constitutes the cause of action' . . .); Martinelli v. Mulloy, 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 130, 135, 299 A.2d 19, 21 (1972) (Rule 2252(a) should be broadly interpreted not only to compel every interested person to defend the action by the plaintiff, but also to save the original defendant from possible harm resulting from loss of evidence as might result if compelled to await the end of the suit before proceeding against those from whom he seeks contribution). Moreover, the length of the delay in joining an additional defendant is not, in and of itself, determinative of whether or not joinder should be allowed; rather, [t]he length of the delay must be viewed in the context of the particular case. Zakian v. Liljestrand, supra 438 Pa. at 256, 264 A.2d at 642; Welch Foods, Inc. v. Bishopric Products Co., supra 254 Pa.Super. at 259, 385 A.2d at 1008; Lamoree v. Penn Central Transportation Co., supra 238 Pa.Super. at 384, 357 A.2d at 597. Here, Cerene and Becker contend that they did try to join Laughlin as an additional defendant within a relatively short period of time after the complaint was served, and that it was not until a significant time period later that the lower court determined that the initial filing of the praecipe was improper. They assert that the delay was due to the unexplained failure of the praecipe for writ to be served on Laughlin, and that they received notice of this failure only when Laughlin filed preliminary objections to the joinder complaint approximately four months later. They also argue that procedural defects should be disregarded when the substantial rights of the parties are not affected, and that this Court should liberally construe the procedural rules so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits. After careful scrutiny, we find that the arguments presented by Cerene and Becker to justify the late joinder constitute nothing more than a house of cards. These arguments are premised upon appellants' initial assertion that they reasonably believed that, once the preliminary objections challenging venue were filed, the sixty-day period of Rule 2253 was tolled. As we have already discussed, however, this belief was unfounded. See Kerry Coal Co. v. Beckwith Machinery Co., supra ; Pennsylvania Gas and Water Co. v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., supra . Thus, appellants had no excuse for failing to join Laughlin within the required sixty-day period. See Moore v. Howard P. Foley Co., 235 Pa. Superior Ct. 310, 318, 340 A.2d 519, 522 (1975) (inadvertence of counsel is not sufficient justification for delay in joining an additional defendant); Kearney's Account, 136 Pa. Superior Ct. 78, 82, 7 A.2d 159, 161 (1939) (ignorance of the law is no excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law). Appellants' additional reasons for the delay, namely, failure of the praecipe for writ to be served and the transfer of the case to another county, concern the period of time following the expiration of the sixty-day period and, thus, do not constitute good cause for the initial untimely joinder. Cerene and Becker were both present at the time of Kovalesky's accident and were therefore aware of Laughlin's involvement. Yet, they did not file the praecipe for writ to join Laughlin as an additional defendant until almost four months after service of the complaint upon them. Additionally, their motion for nunc pro tunc joinder was not filed until approximately five months after the filing of the praecipe for writ. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that Cerene and Becker acted expeditiously. Before the defendant can ask the Court to help him secure a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of the suit by permitting late joinder, he must have acted expeditiously himself. Zakian v. Liljestrand, supra 438 Pa. at 258, 264 A.2d at 642 (emphasis in original); Coopers & Lybrand v. Penn State Mutual Insurance Co., supra 32 Pa.Commonwealth at 439, 379 A.2d at 903 (emphasis in original). Although we bear in mind that the procedural rules should be construed so as to avoid a multiplicity of suits, the burden is upon the defendants to justify their delay in joining the proposed additional defendant. Here, we find that appellants failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating sufficient cause to allow the unseasonable joinder. Therefore, we affirm that part of the October 12, 1984 order dismissing the motion of Cerene and Becker for leave to join an additional defendant nunc pro tunc.