Opinion ID: 184506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Conflict of Interest Challenge

Text: Gantt argues on appeal, as he did to the District Court inhis motion for a new trial, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment as aresult of Attorney X's simultaneous representation of bothDoe and appellant. Because Doe was questioned by prosecutors about the Gantt case, appellant argues that AttorneyX had a conflict of interest that caused him to be ineffectivein rendering pre-trial advice to Gantt. Appellant's counselobserves in this regard that, [d]uring this time period, [Attorney X] arranged to have Mr. Gantt waive his FifthAmendment rights, make self-incriminating statements, andattempted to convince Mr. Gantt to plead guilty. Appellant's Br. at 24. A criminal defendant succeeds on an ineffective assistanceof counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment if he shows thatan actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer'sperformance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). A defense attorney has an actual conflict when he is required to make a choice advancing [another client's] intereststo the detriment of his client's interest. United States v.Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotationomitted); see also United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 252(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 635 (1997). By making therequired showing under Cuyler, a defendant avoids the morestringent two-part test for ineffective assistance set forth inStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requiresproof (1) that counsel's performance was deficient, falling'below an objective standard of reasonableness,' and (2) thatthe deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, deprivinghim of a fair trial. Bruce, 89 F.3d at 893 (quoting Strick- land, 466 U.S. at 687, 688). Where a defendant meets theCuyler test, prejudice is presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S.at 692; Thomas, 114 F.3d at 252. Gantt cannot succeed under Cuyler for the simple reasonthat Attorney X, during his representation of appellant, didnot know that prosecutors had questioned Doe about theGantt case. In other words, no actual conflict existed. Thechronology of pre-trial proceedings provided by the Government, and relied upon by the District Court without challengefrom appellant, see Hearing Tr. (4/25/97) at 56-57, shows thatAttorney X never knowingly chose between advancing Doe'sinterests and advancing those of Gantt. It was only afterAttorney X ceased his representation of Gantt that Doeinformed Attorney X that he had been questioned aboutGantt's case. Government's counsel--most notably AUSAEdwards--failed to make the connection that Attorney Xrepresented both Doe and Gantt until Attorney X wrote tohim with that information. Thus, even if Attorney X advisedGantt to be debriefed by the Government or plead guilty, hedid so without knowing of any possible connection betweenGantt and Doe. Under these circumstances, Attorney X didnot face an actual conflict, so he did not render ineffectiveassistance on that ground. See United States v. Hopkins, 43F.3d at 1116, 1117 (6th Cir. 1995) (A conflict is hypotheticalwhere, as here, the attorney does not in fact know of theconflict from the dual representation.). Furthermore, on the record at hand, Gantt cannot showthat any alleged conflict adversely affected Attorney X'sperformance. That element of the Cuyler test requires Ganttto demonstrate that the conflict had some negative effectupon his defense (defined as 'an actual lapse in representation'). United States v. Shark, 51 F.3d 1072, 1076 (D.C. Cir.1995) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50). Here, appellantmakes no serious argument that Attorney X (or any otherattorneys in his place) would have acted differently on Gantt'sbehalf had he (or they) known about Doe's involvement at anearlier stage in the proceedings. In other words, appellantfails to articulate a strategy that would have been employed by a defense counsel upon learning of Doe's involvement thatwas not followed in this case. Gantt contends that, had Mr. [Attorney X] promptly notified the district court of his conflict, the district court wouldhave had no choice but to remove him as Mr. Gantt's counseldue to the conflict. Appellant's Br. at 29. Appellant doesnot make clear the implications of this hypothesis. Surely,the mere fact that another attorney would have taken overthe case does not demonstrate that Attorney X was deficientin representing Gantt. We might take appellant to mean thatanother attorney in place of Attorney X would have advisedGantt to forgo the debriefings with the Government. However, we are at a loss to understand why this would have beenviewed as a good strategy. Presumably, if Gantt had declined to meet with the Government in November 1996, hewould have been free to testify on his own behalf without fearof impeachment from the debriefing materials. However, itis uncontested that the Government's affirmative case againstGantt, based upon testimony of officers, fingerprint evidence,and videotapes of the store, would have remained formidable. Indeed, Gantt suggests nothing that he or other witnessesmight have said to refute or diminish the prosecution's case. Moreover, during the hearing held on April 25, 1997, ondefendant's motion for a new trial, the District Court found itvery clear from testimony provided by Attorney X that,before Gantt's debriefing, the defendant was primarily concerned with obtaining his release from detention prior to theChristmas holiday and with avoiding incarceration for thecharged offenses. Hearing Tr. (4/25/97) at 53-54. Thus, it isunsurprising that Gantt, even in hindsight, fails to articulate areason why Attorney X's advice that he cooperate with theGovernment would have been unsound, even if the fact ofDoe's conversations with the Government had been known toAttorney X or another attorney in his stead. Assuming,arguendo, that another attorney might have advised Ganttdifferently, the mere possibility that appellant would haverefused a debriefing in these hypothetical circumstances doesnot, by itself, demonstrate that there was a lapse of representation in the instant case. To further support his contention that Gantt suffered adverse effects from Attorney X's conflict, Gantt argues thatAttorney X's actions in Gantt's case were strongly, if notsolely, motivated by his ability to collect a fee.... [A]s faras his ability to earn a fee, the most expedient course ofaction for [Attorney X] was exactly what took place in theinstant case--allow the conflict to remain undisclosed andadvise Mr. Gantt to enter into a plea agreement so that therewill be no trial. Appellant's Br. at 29. This allegation iseither (1) an implicit assertion that Attorney X actually knewof the conflict, which he failed to disclose so that he couldincrease his fee, or (2) an alternative theory of an actualconflict--i.e., that Attorney X was forced to choose betweenadvancing his own pecuniary interests and mounting an effective defense on behalf of Gantt. Neither claim demonstratesan actual lapse in representation, because neither explainswhy Gantt should not have agreed to the debriefing. Furthermore, Gantt did not argue to the District Court,nor does he make a serious argument in his briefs on appeal,that Attorney X actually knew at some earlier stage aboutDoe's involvement. Gantt presents no evidence that AttorneyX failed to disclose any knowledge of the conflict in order tomaximize his fee. Thus, we reject as unsupported the suggestion that Attorney X knew of Doe's activities at the sametime that he represented Gantt, and that Attorney X intentionally delayed informing the other parties of this information until after his representation of Gantt had ended. We also reject the suggestion that Attorney X's desire tomaximize his fees itself constituted an actual conflict. As atheoretical matter, it is possible for a conflict to arise when acriminal defendant's interests are adverse to his or herlawyer's pecuniary interests. See Daniels v. United States,54 F.3d 290, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1995) (remanding for evidentiaryhearing on defendant's claim that lawyer pressured defendantinto accepting plea); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307-08(2d Cir. 1993) (concluding that contingency fee created anactual conflict of interest for trial counsel). But the claimthat Attorney X attempted to maximize his fee by encouraging Gantt to plead guilty makes no sense, because Attorney X presumably would have earned a larger fee if, rather thanentering a guilty plea, Gantt had decided to proceed with atrial with Attorney X as his counsel. Gantt offers nothing tocontradict the obvious. In sum, Gantt's claim of ineffective assistance fails underthe Cuyler test, because there is no showing of an actualconflict, nor is there any showing that any alleged conflictadversely affected Attorney X's performance. B.The Challenge to the Denial of 30-Day Continuance Gantt also argues that the District Court committed reversible error in granting him only a two-day continuance for thestart of his trial, from February 3, 1997, to February 5,rather than the requested 30-day continuance. AttorneyJones filed the motion for the continuance on January 31,1997--three days before the scheduled start of appellant'strial--claiming that he needed the extra time to obtain anexpert witness and prepare an adequate defense. Motionfor Continuance, Crim. No. 96317-02(JRR) (filed Jan. 31,1997) (Continuance Motion). Jones noted in the motionthat he had not received Gantt's files from Attorney X untilJanuary 27, 1997, at which time Jones was engaged in a trialin an unrelated case. See id. Jones further noted that onJanuary 29, 1997, he was advised by Government counsel ofcrucial information that would have a major impact ondefendant's trial strategy, id.--that is, that Gantt had madeincriminating statements in the debriefing. In granting onlya two-day continuance, the District Court explained that itsimply did not have another opening on its calendar withinthe next 90 days. The Supreme Court has made clear that [n]ot everyrestriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate orto consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trialviolates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel[,]as judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude inscheduling trials. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). In short, [a] trial judge enjoys great discretion in ruling on amotion for a continuance, and such rulings are reviewed onlyto determine whether the judge clearly abused his discre- tion. United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir.1990). Among the factors to be weighed by a court inconsidering a motion for a continuance are: the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether the other counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; [and] whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir.1978) (footnotes omitted); see also Poston, 902 F.2d at 97. Indeciding whether the District Court abused its discretion indenying a request for a continuance, the appellate court mustassess the reasons presented to the trial judge at the timethe request is denied, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589(1964), and remain mindful that trial judges necessarily re- quire great latitude in scheduling trials. On the record before us, we conclude that the DistrictCourt acted within its discretion in denying the request for a30-day continuance. Gantt's second defense counsel told theCourt when he took over the case on January 22, 1997, thathe was ready to go to trial. Thus, it was not unreasonable forthe trial judge to view with skepticism the reasons profferedby defense counsel for the 30-day continuance. Moreover,the District Court indicated it would have been greatly incon- venienced by the long continuance, in part because the Courthad relied upon defense counsel's statement of readinesswhen the Court approved Jones' replacement of Attorney Xin the case. See Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 2, 13. Furthermore,the trial court knew that Attorney X had complete discov- ery when he moved to withdraw as counsel; that Attorney Xindicated that, if necessary, he would be prepared to go totrial on the original date; and that all of Attorney X's filesand discovery were available to Jones. Motion to Withdraw,at 2. Although the Court's concern about its docket is notdispositive of the question of whether to grant a continuance,see Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589, the trial judge couldlegitimately question the reasons for delay proffered by de- fense counsel in light of counsel's earlier attestations ofreadiness. It is also noteworthy that Gantt's defense counsel made nospecific proffer justifying a need for more time. Counselsuggested that his primary motivation for seeking the continuance was his finding out about the incriminating statementsmade by Gantt during the November 27, 1997, debriefing,which he claimed totally destroy[ed] the trial strategy [he]had prepared. Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 5. However, counseldid not articulate to the District Court, nor does he demonstrate on appeal, any identifiable prejudice that is materialor substantial [in] nature, Burton, 584 F.2d at 491, resultingfrom the denial of the continuance. Defense counsel effectively conceded to the District Court that the problemposed by the debriefing would not get any better with thepassage of a month. Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 5. Defensecounsel filed a motion in limine just before trial, seeking toprevent the use of the debriefing statements for purposes ofimpeachment during the trial, but Gantt does not now arguethat the District Court erred in denying the motion andallowing the Government to use the debriefing material, nordoes Gantt explain how the motion in limine could haveimproved with time. Moreover, as discussed above, Ganttmakes no serious argument that he would have declined toengage in the debriefing session had it been known at thetime that Doe had been questioned by prosecutors. Other arguments by Gantt similarly fail to show prejudiceresulting from the District Court's denial of the 30-daycontinuance. In claiming in his motion for a continuance thathe wanted time to obtain the needed expert, ContinuanceMotion, defense counsel presumably was referring to his desire to obtain a witness in order to challenge the Government's fingerprint evidence. Gantt has renewed this argument on appeal, asserting that the Government's fingerprintexpert found only 13 points of comparison between defendant's prints and prints recovered by the Government inconnection with the February 1995 incident, where the average fingerprint has between 75 and 150 comparable characteristics. See Appellant's Br. at 10-11; Reply Br. at 5. However, at no point in the proceedings has appellant expressly claimed that an expert witness, in light of these facts,would testify that the Government's fingerprint evidence wasunreliable. Thus, Gantt's claim that the Government's fingerprint evidence could have been rebutted remains entirelyspeculative. See Poston, 902 F.2d at 98 (Mere assertionsregarding the utility of prospective testimony do not providea sufficient basis to compel a continuance where there is noindication that the testimony would have been material andfavorable.). In any event, Gantt's attack on such evidencedoes not account for other evidence--such as videotape evidence--demonstrating his involvement in a conspiracy, andthe fact that the drugs were tossed from Minnick's car duringthe chase. Gantt also makes passing reference on appeal, as he didbefore the District Court, to the trial counsel's need for timeto interview a government witness prior to trial. Appellant's Br. at 21; see also Hearing Tr. (1/31/97) at 13. Thisargument is unconvincing, given that Jones did not articulateat the pretrial hearing what witness he sought to interviewand what his line of inquiry would be. See Poston, 902 F.2dat 98. Gantt's complaint that Jones was unable to review allof the Government's exhibits before trial, see Appellant's Br.at 22-23; Reply Br. at 6, is likewise vague and conclusory. Although the Government does not dispute that it waiteduntil January 30, 1997, to disclose certain evidence obtainedfrom electronic surveillance, and to request further fingerprinting of Gantt, see Continuance Motion, Gantt provides nopersuasive argument that this burden was significant in thecontext of the trial.