Opinion ID: 1629913
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Designation of planning jurisdiction

Text: We will first address the Potters' assertion that Tontitown did not properly designate its planning jurisdiction because only a legal description was filed with the Washington County Clerk in violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-413 (Repl.1998). In response, Tontitown argues that the statute only requires that a description of the boundaries, rather than a planning area map must be filed. Tontitown further asserts that while Arkansas law requires a city's planning commission to prepare and maintain a planning area map, no statute requires that the map be filed. Tontitown therefore contends that it complied with the statute by filing a metes and bounds legal description of the planning area in the office of the Washington County Circuit Clerk on June 15, 2005. We review issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 995 S.W.2d 341 (1999). In this respect, we are not bound by the decision of the trial court; however, in the absence of a showing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the law, that interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Ghegan & Ghegan, Inc. v. Barclay, 345 Ark. 514, 49 S.W.3d 652 (2001). The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary meaning and usually accepted meaning in common language. Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003). We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Ozark Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 342 Ark. 591, 29 S.W.3d 730 (2000). When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Weiss v. McFadden, supra . When the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Id. Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-413(b)(1) states that [t]he planning commission shall designate the area within the territorial jurisdiction for which it will prepare plans, ordinances, and regulations. Subsection 14-56-413(b)(2) states that [a] description of the boundaries of the area shall be filed with the city clerk and with the county recorder. In addition to these requirements, Ark.Code Ann. § 14-56-412 (Repl. 1998) provides: The commission shall prepare and maintain a map showing the general location of streets, public ways, and public property and the boundaries of the area within the territorial jurisdiction for which it will prepare plans, ordinances, and regulations. The map shall be known as the planning area map. Id. The Potters assert that the word description in subsection (b)(2) is ambiguous, and therefore, the trial court should have looked at the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, and the purpose served. They contend that the object of filing the planning area boundary map at the county clerk's office is to allow the clerk to determine whether or not the applicant for a building permit should apply with the county's planning commission or the city's planning commission, and it would be impractical to require the county recorder to call or visit the Tontitown City Hall every time he or she needed to determine whether plat approval should be obtained from Tontitown. Here, we agree with Tontitown's contention that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation that the filing of a legal description was sufficient to meet the statutory requirement that Tontitown file a description of the boundaries. Construing § 14-56-413(b)(2) just as it reads and giving the word description its ordinary meaning, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute. See Weiss, supra . We do not read into a statute a provision that was not included by the General Assembly. See Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, 365 Ark. 133, 226 S.W.3d 753 (2006). Here, there is simply no requirement in the statute that the planning area map be filed. We conclude that Tontitown met the requirement of filing a description of the boundaries by filing a legal description with the county clerk. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not err in its interpretation of § 14-56-413.