Opinion ID: 901878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the information from the tipster alone provided reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop in this situation.

Text: [¶ 6.] Satter argues that the unidentified citizen's statements did not have sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the stop because the police officer did not corroborate any of the tipster's information and conducted the traffic stop based solely on the informant's tip. Further, because no identifying information was collected from the citizen, Satter contends that there is no way to assess the reputation of the tipster or hold this person accountable should the allegations turn out to be untrue, and thus, the tip should be considered unreliable. Finally, Satter argues that the tip regarded an open container violation, not that the driver of the vehicle was impaired; therefore, public policy concerns about the dangers of drivers under the influence are not applicable when the police officer, in following up on the tip, did not observe impaired driving. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. Although this protection generally requires probable cause to search, the requisite level of suspicion necessary to effectuate the stop of a vehicle is not equivalent to probable cause necessary for an arrest or a search warrant. All that is required is that the police officer has a reasonable suspicion to stop an automobile. Therefore, the factual basis needed to support a traffic stop is minimal. While the stop may not be the product of mere whim, caprice or idol [sic] curiosity, it is enough that the stop is based upon specific and articulable facts which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion. State v. Scholl, 2004 SD 85, ¶6, 684 NW2d 83, 85 (quoting State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, ¶¶15-16, 668 NW2d 89, 95) (emphasis added). An informant's tip may carry sufficient `indicia of reliability' to justify a [vehicle] stop even though it fails to rise to the level of the probable cause needed for an arrest or search warrant. All that is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. Id. (quoting State v. Olhausen, 1998 SD 120, ¶7, 587 NW2d 715, 717-718). The ultimate determination of the existence of a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id. (citing State v. Faulks, 2001 SD 115, ¶8, 633 NW2d 613, 617).