Opinion ID: 1300562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Cause of Action pg 4

Text: Is consideration of Second Cause of Action contingent on finding in favor of Plaintiff in First Cause of Action? Can we find for the Defendant in First Cause and for the Plaintiff in Second Cause? The trial court gave the following instructions. Instruction No. 2 stated the plaintiff's allegations that the parties had entered into an oral contract in which the defendant agreed to manufacture the running gear and supply all material for 10 dune buggies for $350 per unit. It further stated that the plaintiff alleged the defendant had failed to provide required materials, forcing the plaintiff to provide them at a cost of $1,619.03. It also stated that the plaintiff alleged the defendant had failed to perform in a workmanlike manner, in that the buggies failed to operate properly for their intended purpose and required the plaintiff to purchase additional parts at a cost of $991.11. It also stated that the plaintiff alleged that proper notice of the defects had been given to the defendant, and claimed damages in the amount of $2,610.14 for the breach. Instruction No. 2 also set out the defendant's answer. This included allegations the defendant had agreed to manufacture a chassis with front hubs, steering gear, and disk brakes; the provision for specific materials, but not all materials; and that the plaintiff had made substantial changes in its requests, which the defendant agreed to supply on the basis of cost of parts plus labor. It also stated the defendant denied a failure to perform in a workmanlike manner and that the plaintiff had failed to provide reasonable notice. The instruction also contained the plaintiff's burden of proof. The jury was instructed that, on the first cause of action, the plaintiff had to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the following: 1. That the parties had entered into an oral contract in September 1978, in which the defendant had agreed to supply all material and manufacture the running gear for 10 dune buggies for $350 per unit; 2. that plaintiff had performed its duties under the contract; 3. that the defendant had failed to provide materials as agreed and failed to perform in a workmanlike manner; 4. that plaintiff gave notice to the defendant within a reasonable time after discovering the alleged breaches; and 5. that as a result of the breach the plaintiff sustained damages. The jury was instructed that if the plaintiff failed to prove any one or more of the propositions set forth above, the verdict would be for the defendant. As to the second cause of action, the jury was instructed that the plaintiff was seeking to recover overcharges in the amount of $5,169.65 and that to recover that amount the plaintiff had to prove: 1. That the defendant had received money from the plaintiff; 2. that the defendant retained possession of the money; and 3. that the defendant in justice and fairness ought to refund it. The jury was further instructed that if the plaintiff failed to establish any of those elements by a preponderance of evidence, the verdict should be for the defendant. The jury was instructed, in instruction No. 16, to award damages to the plaintiff on the second cause of action in an amount which would fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any damages in excess of the contract price. As to damages on the first cause of action, instruction No. 15 instructed the jury to consider the cost of materials provided by the plaintiff and the cost of repairs due to the defendant's failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. The jury's first question regarding the instructions was whether the jury had to find for the plaintiff on all five propositions in order to find in favor of the plaintiff on the first cause of action. This question was clearly answered by instruction No. 2, part I(C), which instructed the jury that the plaintiff had to establish all five propositions in order to prevail. The second question was whether the jury could find for the plaintiff on a portion of instruction No. 2, part I(B)1, that there was a contract, but not make a finding as to its terms. That question was also answered by the instruction, which clearly stated the jury must find in favor of the plaintiff as to both the existence of the contract and its terms. The third question was whether consideration of the second cause of action was contingent on a finding in favor of the plaintiff on the first cause of action. A fair reading of instruction No. 2 reveals the jury was instructed separately on each cause of action, and no contingency was expressed or implied. The fourth question was whether the jury could find in favor of the defendant on the first cause of action and for the plaintiff on the second cause of action. The jury was instructed separately on each cause of action, and in the effect of findings portions of the instruction the trial court clearly stated that the jury could find in favor of either party. In In re Estate of Corbett, 211 Neb. 335, 318 N.W.2d 720 (1982), we held it was error to instruct a jury, after it had retired to deliberate, out of the presence of the parties and their counsel, but if it clearly appears prejudice did not and could not flow from such error, there was no ground for reversal. In this case the trial court did not further instruct the jury but responded that the questions could be answered by rereading the instructions, and the instructions did answer the questions. The trial court's response to the jury's questions did not prejudice the plaintiff, because the jury's questions pertained to portions of the jury instructions which had not been objected to at trial, and did not relate to the calculation of damages. The assignment of error is overruled. The plaintiff's final contention is that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the second cause of action. Specifically, the plaintiff argues instruction No. 16 instructed the jury to fix an amount that would fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for any overcharge, while the language in instruction No. 2 spoke in terms of justice and fairness. The plaintiff claims this effectively changed the action from one for a sum certain to an equitable action. At the conference on jury instructions the court stated: The Court is convinced that the second cause of action is an action at law. However, my research has indicated that the proper elements of an action for money retained such as is pled in the second cause of action is as set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the burden of proof on page 5 of Instruction 2 and that even though the language justice and fairness sounds like equity, that this is still a law action and that it should be submitted to the jury on that language. The plaintiff argues that the use of such language permitted the jury to incorrectly interpose equitable considerations, and constituted an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff's representative, Harry Hartley, testified that the amount of damages sought to be recovered on the second cause of action included all costs up to receiving the cars in addition to the motion [sic] plates, gussets and bearings being installed. For the installation of the motor plates or braces and bearings the defendant required the plaintiff to pay $180 and required $32.76 for throttle cable, which was delivered after the plaintiff had taken delivery of the buggies and had made its final payment. The jury may have concluded that the defendant overcharged the plaintiff for these items, because there was evidence the defendant was informed at the time of delivery that a motor brace would be required to ensure that the buggies would perform and the throttle cable was required but it had not yet been delivered to the defendant. The jury could have found that since these parts should have been provided by the defendant for the original contract price, the defendant should refund $212.76. These were issues of fact which were within the province of the jury. Chirnside v. Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co., 224 Neb. 784, 401 N.W.2d 489 (1987). The plaintiff's argument that the language used by the trial court was improper is also unpersuasive. Whenever a person has possession of money to which in equity and good conscience another is entitled, a suit lies for money had and received. In such a case the law implies a promise by the former to pay such money to the latter. Village of Morrill v. Roosevelt P.P. Dist., 215 Neb. 41, 337 N.W.2d 125 (1983); Barker v. Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Barnabas Church, 171 Neb. 574, 106 N.W.2d 858 (1961). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.