Opinion ID: 522855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Camping Case

Text: 18 Finally, appellant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of violating the camping regulation. That regulation, 36 C.F.R. Sec. 7.96(i)(1) (1987), defines camping as 19 the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or using any tents or shelter or other structure or vehicle for sleeping or doing any digging or earth breaking or carrying on cooking activities. The above-listed activities constitute camping when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging. Id. 5 20 Appellant points to the legislative history of the regulation as plainly revealing that [s]hort-time, casual sleeping which does not occur in the context of using the park for living accommodations will not be affected by these regulations. 47 Fed.Reg. 24,299, 24,301 (1982). Appellant contends that the government's evidence in the instant case proves at most casual sleeping. In appellant's view, all the government proved was a two-hour snooze. 21 In addressing the distinction between casual sleeping and sleeping activities sufficient to make it reasonably appear[ ], in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation, we are informed by our opinion in United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 188 (D.C.Cir.1988). In that case, we upheld a conviction for violation of this same regulation based on evidence that the defendants had lain  'on top and within bedding materials throughout the night, for a one-week period, without evidence of any other sleeping quarters,'  id. at 190-91 (quoting Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Thomas, Crim. No. 87-0231 at 17 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1988)), surrounded by minor items of property and their literature, which was covered by plastic. 864 F.2d at 191-92. 22 Certainly, a principal item of evidence of intent to use the Park for living accommodations present in Thomas is absent here. The evidence in Thomas showed that the defendants there used the Park for living accommodations for an entire week. The events in the present case all took place within a single night. But the camping regulation is not limited to long-term living accommodations. Overnight camping is as forbidden as is week-long or longer camping. Therefore, our review in the present case will be directed toward determining whether or not the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it reasonably appeared that Musser was in fact using the Park as his living accommodations for a single night. It was. 23 As we noted in Thomas, [t]he standard governing our review is well settled and understood. On appeal, a reviewing court is to accord a guilty verdict great deference; indeed, the sole evidentiary issue in such instances is whether substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. at 191. Otherwise put, [o]ur task ... is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, allowing the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, and permitting the [factfinder] to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1358 (D.C.Cir.1986). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable factfinder could certainly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a person stretched out on a wooden pallet with bedding material under him and over him, covered by plastic, a makeshift pillow under his head, and his belongings around him, asleep for at least two hours, appeared to be using the Park for at least temporary living accommodations. Though he may have broken no ground and started no fires, like an archetypical boy scout or backpacker, he appeared to be camping overnight--or at least a reasonable factfinder could so find. Unlike the law-abiding boy scout or backpacker, he was not doing his camping in an area where that activity is lawfully permitted. 24 While the District Court's finding as to sleeping was only a general one arguably as consistent with casual sleeping as with the kind of sleeping activity contemplated in the regulation, he additionally found camping as such. More importantly, since no party requested the Court to find the facts specifically as defendant could have done under Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, special findings were waived. On appeal, findings will be implied in support of the judgment if the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the government, warrants them. United States v. Ochoa, 526 F.2d 1278, 1282 n. 6 (5th Cir.1976). See also McClain v. United States, 417 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1969); 8A Moore's Federal Practice p 23.05 (2d ed. 1989). Therefore, this conviction must stand.