Opinion ID: 2631796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental State Required Under Section 18-6-803.5

Text: Under the relevant statute, a person commits the crime of violation of a restraining order if: (1) the person engages in conduct prohibited by the restraining order, and (2) the person has been personally served with a copy of the order or otherwise has acquired from the court actual knowledge of the contents of any such order. § 18-6-803.5(1). The prosecution argues that this statute was enacted as a strict liability crime because the statute sets forth no culpable mental state with respect to the portion of the statute concerning the defendant's conduct. We disagree. Under section 18-1-503(4), 6 C.R.S. (2001), [w]hen a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a culpable mental state [for one element], that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears. See also People v. Trevino, 826 P.2d 399, 402 (Colo.App.1991) (if a statute expresses or implies a mens rea for one element, that mens rea must be deemed to apply to every element of the offense); People v. Saiz, 660 P.2d 2, 6 (Colo.App.1982) (same). Applying section 18-1-503(4), we conclude that even though the first part of section 18-6-803.5(1) concerning the defendant's conduct does not contain explicit language prescribing a required mental state, the mental state of knowingly should be applied to it. The statute in effect when these events occurred, section 18-6-803.5(1), 6 C.R.S. (1997), provided: A person commits the crime of violation of a restraining order if such person contacts, harasses, injures, intimidates, molests, threatens, or touches any protected person or enters or remains on premises or comes within a specified distance of a protected person or premises, and such conduct is prohibited by a restraining order, after such person has been personally served with any such order or otherwise has acquired from the court actual knowledge of the contents of any such order. Since the second portion of the statute requires a knowing violation, which is satisfied either implicitly by personal service of the restraining order or explicitly by actual knowledge of the contents of the order, section 18-1-503(4) requires that the mental state of knowingly apply to every element of the crime, unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears. An examination of the legislative history underlying section 18-6-803.5 reveals no intent on the part of the General Assembly to limit the application of the culpable mental state of knowingly to only one element of the offense. Moreover, the words the General Assembly chose to describe the conduct portion of the offense in section 18-6-803.5 evidence no clear intent to limit the application of the knowledge requirement. Thus, the mental state of knowingly applies not only to the second prong of the statute, but also to the first, conduct, prong. This case is distinguishable from Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662 (Colo.2000) and Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283 (Colo.2000) in which we considered the applicability of section 18-1-503(4). In Gorman, we ruled that section 18-1-503(4) was inapplicable to the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute as the General Assembly did not specify a culpable mental state in the statute. 19 P.3d at 666. We concluded that the culpable mental state of knowingly applies to the act of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, but not to the statute's age element. Id. at 665-66. We noted that elements of a particular offense may have differing mens rea requirements, and that the culpable mental state of a statute may speak to conduct, circumstances, result, or any combination thereof, but not necessarily to all three. Id. at 666. In addition, in Copeland, citing section 18-1-503(4), we held that the General Assembly had evidenced its clear intent not to apply the arson statute's mens rea requirement of knowingly or recklessly to the statute's endangerment provisions. 2 P.3d at 1287. We relied on the wording of the statute and our prior decision in People v. Garcia, 189 Colo. 347, 541 P.2d 687 (1975) in concluding that the legislature intended to hold the arsonist responsible for the fire's result, whether or not he was aware of or intended the consequences. Copeland, 2 P.3d at 1287. These cases are distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the statute in Gorman, section 18-6-803.5 prescribes as an element within the statute the culpable mental state of knowingly and no intent to limit its application clearly appears. Moreover, unlike the statute in Copeland, the legislature evidenced no clear intent to limit the application of the knowledge requirement in section 18-6-803.5. We hold that the district court properly held that section 18-6-803.5 requires the culpable mental state of knowingly, and that such mental state applies to all elements of the crime. Because there is no clear intent to limit the application of the culpable mental state of knowingly to the second portion of the statute, we affirm the district court's order requiring only the mental state of knowingly.