Opinion ID: 1819296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred in opening the property portion of the original decree of divorce.

Text: Both parties agree that Carol's motion to modify the original decree was treated as a motion pursuant to SDCL 15-6-60(b)(1), which states in part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; ... Carol relies on excusable neglect as the basis for her motion to open. The terms, `mistake,' `inadvertence,' `surprise,' and `excusable neglect' as used in SDCL 15-6-60(b)(1) have no fixed meaning; the question must be determined from the facts and circumstances presented by each case. [citation omitted] Rogers v. Rogers, 351 N.W.2d 129, 131 (S.D.1984). There seems to be no question that neglect occurred in this case. The trial court found it to be excusable. This court has said: [T]he mistake or negligence of an attorney will not be imputed to the client as a bar to relief where (1) the act or omission of the attorney is excusable or (2) the [party] [her]self is free from neglect in the matter. (citations omitted) Ackerman v. Burgard, 79 S.D. 119,124, 109 N.W.2d 10, 12 (1961). It is not clear here whether Carol herself was free from neglect. However, Ackerman indicates another requirement under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(1)  that the party show by affidavit that he has a prima facie defense. Id. See also Midcontinent Broadcasting Co. v. AVA Corp., 329 N.W.2d 378, 380 (S.D. 1983). Carol argued in her motion and affidavits that the trial court did not have a complete record before it when it entered the original decree. This is correct as to the issue of child custody. The trial court had specifically held in abeyance its decision on custody until home studies on both parties were complete. Those studies had not been submitted to the trial court when it entered its memorandum opinion. However, the custody issue is not on appeal before this court. [4] We cannot determine from the record whether the court at the trial on February 22, 1985 indicated that further evidence was necessary to decide upon a property division. [5] This is because there is no transcript of the trial in the record. Because the record is silent, we cannot presume that the trial court delayed its original decision for any reason other than the reason which does appear on the record  custody. Carol argues that she had no opportunity to dispute the property division proposed by Tom. This is true in that she was not aware of the proposed property division until after the original decree was entered. However, based on the record as it appears, the trial court had all the information necessary to make a determination as to property prior to the October decree. The principal factors to be considered by the trial court in making a property division are: the length of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; their individual ability to earn a living; the contribution of each party to the accumulation of the property; and the income producing capacity of the parties' assets. Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312 (S.D.1986). Carol had no information pertaining to any of these factors which had not been given to the court prior to her move in May 1985. The only new information before the court (as to property division) on Carol's motion to open was her change of residence and the consequent inconvenience of managing or selling the property awarded her. Had this argument been presented prior to the original decree, there would have been nothing to prevent the trial court from considering it. However, Carol's change of residence does not materially affect any of the principal factors noted above. The excusable neglect which occurred in this case did not have any substantial effect upon the decision rendered in the original decree. Unless such neglect prevented the presentation of facts which would materially affect one of the principal factors, it should not be considered as good cause for opening a final and valid property determination. These circumstances do not justify opening the final judgment under SDCL 15-6-60(b)(1). We need not address the merits of the amended property division because we reverse on the first issue. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to reinstate the property determination in the original decree. Tom has filed a separate motion for attorney fees, tax and costs. It is itemized and verified as required by Malcolm v. Malcolm, 365 N.W.2d 863 (S.D.1985). After consideration of the appropriate factors, Storm v. Storm, 400 N.W.2d 457 (S.D.1987), we award Tom $1,100 in attorney fees plus $400 tax and costs, for a total of $1,500.