Opinion ID: 518423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vessel Owner Negligence

Text: 12 The district court's finding of negligence was based on a breach of the general maritime duty of care first enunciated in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 79 S.Ct. 406, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959). At trial and in the appellate briefs, all parties conceded that the Kermarec standard governed the present dispute. Approximately two weeks before oral argument, Marlin's counsel notified the court, pursuant to Rule 28(j) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, that Sec. 5(b) of the LHWCA provided Masinter's exclusive claim and that principles of general maritime law should have no application in the present context. We agree, however, that the district court applied the wrong law is not necessarily fatal to our ability to review the judgment. As we have noted in the past, [w]hen the judgment of the district court is correct, it may be affirmed on appeal for reasons other than those asserted or relied on below. Terrell v. University of Texas System Police, 792 F.2d 1360, 1362 n. 3 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1064, 107 S.Ct. 948, 93 L.Ed.2d 997 (1987). 13 The conclusion that Sec. 5(b) of the LHCWA provides Masinter's exclusive remedy against the vessel owner emerges as follows: It is undisputed that Masinter, a non-seaman, non-longshoreman, was working aboard the Marlin IV, a vessel. Although Masinter was held not to be a longshoreman, the protections afforded longshoremen under the LHWCA are available to Masinter by operation of the OCSLA which provides in part that compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to an employee disabled as the result of operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of ... removing ... the natural resources ... of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf.... 43 U.S.C. Sec. 1333(b). Section 5(c) of the LHWCA provides in part that 14 [i]n the event that the negligence of a vessel causes injury to a person entitled to receive benefits under this chapter by virtue of section 1333 [of the OCSLA], then such person may bring an action against such vessel in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of the section. 15 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(c). Subsection 5(b) of the LHWCA in turn allows certain covered persons injured by the negligence of a vessel to bring an action for damages against the vessel. Such action shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b). Thus, Masinter's only claim against Marlin, the vessel owner, is one for negligence under Sec. 905(b). See Lormand v. Superior Oil Co., 845 F.2d 536, 541 (5th Cir.1987) (Recovery for injury to a person, other than a Jones Act seaman, working on the outer continental shelf is governed by the LHWCA....), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 739, 98 L.Ed.2d 774 (1988). The district court therefore erred in analyzing Masinter's negligence claim under principles of general maritime law. 16 In the seminal case of Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981), the Supreme Court articulated the scope of a vessel owner's duty under Sec. 905(b). Although Scindia discussed the respective duties of a vessel owner and stevedore, our subsequent jurisprudence has made it clear that the rationale of Scindia applies equally to questions of vessel owner liability for injuries to LHWCA-covered employees of an independent contractor working aboard the vessel. Lormand, 845 F.2d at 541. Thus, principles expressed in Scindia and its progeny from this court govern the duty Marlin owed to Masinter. 17 Scindia did not address every issue of vessel liability under Sec. 905(b), but the basic principle that the primary responsibility for the safety of the longshoremen rests upon the stevedore did emerge. See Helaire v. Mobil Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1031, 1036 (5th Cir.1983). Thus, once the stevedore's cargo operations have begun, absent contract provision, positive law, or custom to the contrary, the owner has no general duty by way of supervision or inspection to discover dangerous conditions that develop in the area assigned to the stevedore. Id. at 1036 (emphasis added). The vessel owner is not liable for injuries caused by defects  'about which he had no duty to inform himself,' [but rather] 'is entitled to rely on the stevedores, and owes no duty to the longshoremen to inspect or supervise the cargo operations.'  Helaire, 709 F.2d at 1036 (citing Scindia, 101 S.Ct. at 1624). 18 Scindia 's broad statements of immunity have been tempered by several exceptions. In Turner v. Costa Line Cargo Services, Inc., 744 F.2d 505 (5th Cir.1984) (Gee, J., dissenting), Judge Gee enumerated three exceptions in which a vessel owner may be found liable for injuries occurring after stevedoring operations have begun. Vessel owner liability may arise: 19 1. [if the vessel owner fails] to warn on turning over the ship of hidden defects of which he should have known, [Exception 1] 20 2. for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship, [Exception 2] 21 3. [if the vessel owner fails] to intervene in the stevedore's operations when he has actual knowledge both of the hazard and that the stevedore, in the exercise of 'obviously improvident' judgment, means to work on in the face of it and therefore cannot be relied on to remedy it. [Exception 3]. Id. at 512. 1 22 In applying both Scindia 's general rule and its exceptions we are persuaded that it is beyond peradventure that Marlin owed to Masinter a duty of care to take precautions necessary to avoid exposing Masinter to the hazardous conditions created by the placement of the stairway. We reach this conclusion by noting that the present case does not involve a vessel owner turning over the control of the vessel to a stevedore or independent contractor. Rather, Marlin was contractually bound to conduct the drilling operations and remained in control of the vessel to effectuate this obligation. In these circumstances, Scindia 's general rule absolving a vessel owner of its duty to warn absent contract provisions provides Marlin with an illusory safe harbor. 23 Furthermore, Scindia 's second exception broadly states that a vessel owner remains responsible for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship. Marlin's answers to interrogatories and admissions clearly indicate that its crew was solely responsible for placing the stairway in the position it was in when Masinter twisted his ankle. Thus, by remaining in control of the vessel, Marlin had a continuing duty of care to those aboard the vessel. 24 We are unpersuaded by Marlin's argument that it had no duty to protect Masinter from a condition which was open and obvious. 2 We adhere to the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a vessel owner remaining in control of the vessel must exercise due care to avoid exposing longshoremen to harm from hazards they may encounter in areas ... under the active control of the vessel.... Scindia, 101 S.Ct. at 1622 (emphasis added); See also Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp., 783 F.2d 527, 535 (5th Cir.1986) (vessel owner not relieved of duty of care where he remained in control of work area). This position comports with the second Scindia exception which, as referred to on several occasions by this court, see Helaire, 709 F.2d at 1036; Turner, 744 F.2d at 512, broadly states that a vessel owner shall be liable for injury caused by hazards under the control of the ship. Thus, neither the Supreme Court nor this court has intimated that a vessel will be relieved of its duty of care under Sec. 905(b) simply because the hazard is open and obvious. 25 This court encountered a similar situation in Turner a case in which the vessel owner relinquished control of part of the vessel to a stevedore and its crew of longshoremen. One longshoreman was required to traverse a portion of the deck which had not been assigned to the stevedore and hence remained under the control of the vessel owner. A pile of debris leaking oil across that part of the deck under the owner's control created a hazard which, as the plaintiff testified, was apparent at a glance. While crossing the deck, the plaintiff slipped and injured himself. 26 Relying on Scindia and Helaire, the majority held that the vessel owner remained liable for injuries occurring in areas under its control. The majority did not address the implications of the fact that the hazard was open and obvious. However, Judge Gee, dissenting on other grounds, noted that the Scindia 's first exception, i.e., liability for failure to warn on turning over the ship of hidden defects of which the shipowner should have known, was inapplicable because the hazard was obvious. Nevertheless, Judge Gee would have remanded for a determination of whether the area in which the injury occurred was an area over which the shipowner had relinquished control. That is, Judge Gee would have remanded for a determination of the applicability of Scindia 's second exception. The important point to be gleaned from Turner is that obviousness, though relevant to the first exception, bears no significance to a vessel owner's duty under the second exception. 27 Of course, Sec. 905(b) does not impose strict liability on vessel owners for injuries resulting from such hazards. Rather, liability only arises if the vessel owner breached its duty of care. As mentioned previously, the district court found both Marlin and Masinter partially negligent for the accident. The question of negligence in maritime cases is factual, and, unless the district court's finding was clearly erroneous, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Lormand, 845 F.2d at 543 n. 9. 28 The record reveals ample evidence to support the district court's finding that Marlin was negligent. Masinter's expert testified that the inordinate distance between the deck and last tread attributable to Marlin's placement of the stairway on the I beam presented a hazard. Compounding this danger was the beveled seam extending out from the steps. Marlin does not dispute that the stairway was placed on the I beam or that the seam ran perpendicular to the stair. A finding of negligence on this evidence alone is sufficient to withstand the clearly erroneous standard. In addition, testimony was elicited from both sides as to the adequacy of the lighting. That the district court found Masinter's witness more credible than Marlin's is not clearly erroneous. Finally, the court found that the presence of drilling fluid contributed heavily to the accident. Based on Masinter's testimony at trial that he did not slip, emphasis on the slippery condition of the deck surface appears clearly erroneous. Nevertheless, a finding of negligence based on the remaining three conditions--the position of the stairway, the inadequacy of lighting, and the location of the beveled seam--cannot be said to be erroneous and thus will not be disturbed. 29 The record also contains evidence substantiating the finding that Masinter's own negligence contributed to his injuries. Masinter testified that he had been up and down the stairs at least a dozen times during the shift and that, if he had looked directly at the area of the deck where the seam was located, he would have seen the hazard. Others testified that they had negotiated the stairs with no problem. Lastly, there is some evidence to suggest that Masinter should have used the I beam as an intermediary step between the last stairway tread and the deck. This evidence militates against disturbing the district court's finding of contributory negligence.