Opinion ID: 2317934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Tenth Exception.

Text: After Zahn rested and his motion for a directed verdict was denied, the respondent called Zahn as a witness in his behalf. The presiding Justice ruled correctly that Zahn was incompetent to testify. The exception must be overruled. The entire record on the point under discussion reads: Mr. Wernick: I will call Bernard Zahn. Mr. Niehoff: We object to the competency of this witness at this time, and would like to state our reasons in the absence of the jury. Mr. Wernick: May I state for the record, if the Court please, that I am calling Mr. Zahn insofar as I represent the respondent, Papalos, and I call him as a witness to testify in that regard. The Court: Do you wish to be heard further in Chambers, Brother Niehoff? Mr. Niehoff: Yes, Your Honor. (In Chambers) Mr. Niehoff: May it please the Court, the State objects to the competency of Bernard T. Zahn appearing as a witness in this case. The record discloses that the proceedings before the jury is on a joint indictment wherein Papalos and Zahn are co-defendants. The record further discloses that the Respondent Zahn rested his defense. It now appearing that his co-defendant Papalos has called the defendant Zahn as a witness in a trial of the issue in the same indictment before the same jury, the State contends that Section 22 of Chapter 135, Revised Statutes of of 1944 sets forth the only method and conditions upon which the accused may testify. The statute says that in all criminal trials the accused shall, at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness. The State further contends that the defendant Zahn had an opportunity during the trial of the cause to avail himself, at his request, to testify. He has waived that right by resting his case. He cannot now be a competent witness called by his co-defendant Papalos. The Court: Do you wish to say anything for the record, Brother Wernick? Mr Wernick: I suppose there is no need to say anything for the record except to note my exception to Your Honor's ruling, which I do. The Court: Yes. Mr. Wernick: I suppose I am premature. Your Honor has not ruled yet? The court: I have indicated what my ruling would be. Mr. Wernick: I was simply going to offer Mr. Zahn for the purpose of having him testify in regard to these matters in which he is alleged to have participated as co-conspirator with Papalos and Sahagian and we were intending to prove through him that he never had any conversation whatever with either Sahagian or Papalos about taking money or anything of value, that he never had any contact with either of them with regard to any attempts to influence him nor did he know of any such thoughts or ideas that might have been in the mind of anyone about trying to influence his judgment by offering him anything of value for that purpose. (In the Court Room) The Court: The Court is of the opinion Mr. Zahn cannot properly testify in behalf of Mr. Papalos in this case, and so the offer of Mr. Zahn as a witness must be denied. (Exception noted for Respondent Papalos) Mr. Knudsen: May it appear for the record that Mr. Zahn and counsel do not object to his appearing to testify. Mr. Wernick: On behalf of the Respondent Papalos, I rest, subject to right of sur-rebuttal. The issue lies in the competency of the witness, not in the materiality of the evidence offered. When the Court ruled, there was nothing whatever in the record to disclose that Zahn had made a request or indeed was willing to testify. Thus, the ruling was correct upon the record when it was made. Our statute reads: Sec. 22. Respondent may testify; not compelled to incriminate himself; failure to testify; husband or wife may testify.    In all criminal trials, the accused shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be a competent witness. He shall not be compelled to testify on cross-examination to facts that would convict, or furnish evidence to convict him of any other crime than that for which he is on trial; and the fact that he does not testify in his own behalf shall not be taken as evidence of his guilt. The husband or wife of the accused is a competent witness. R.S.C. 135 § 22 (1944). It is familiar law that the accused was not a competent witness at common law. Maine led the way in permitting the accused to testify in P.L. 1864, c. 280, said by Professor Thayer (Cases on Evidence, 2d Ed., p. 1117) to be `the earliest statute permitting the defendant in a criminal case to testify.' 2 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd. Sec. 579. There must be no element of compulsion to make the accused take the witness stand. He must not be forced to elect whether he will testify. Competency rests upon the statute and depends upon compliance with the words `at his own request, but not otherwise'. He is made simply `at his own request, but not otherwise,' a competent witness. Wolfson v. United States, 5 Cir., 1900, 101 F. 430, 436. The competency statute is applicable in the joint trial of co-indictees. Each may be a witness for himself, for a co-indictee, or for the State, provided his testimony is given at his own request, but not otherwise. State v. Barrows, 1884, 76 Me. 401; Wolfson v. United States, supra; 2 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed.) Sec. 580. Whether the statement by counsel for Zahn was a request within the meaning of the statute need not be decided by us. If it was not a request, then the ruling was correct for, as we have seen, Zahn in the absence of a request would not have been a competent witness. On the other hand, if we view the remarks by counsel as an expression of willingness to testify and such willingness as a request, then the respondent is faced with the fact that the ruling by the Court was made prior to any request by the witness, and further that nothing was done by either Zahn or by the respondent to call again the issue to the attention of the Court. In brief, the question of Zahn's competency insofar as the Court is concerned ended with the ruling, which as matters then stood was unexceptionable. It could not be reopened merely by a subsequent statement of counsel of a willingness to testify. Thereafter no affirmative action was taken by respondent which would require an additional ruling of the Court nor was any further exception noted.