Opinion ID: 1472665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continuance for Substitution of Counsel

Text: Sampson maintains that the hearing justice improperly denied his request for a continuance to obtain new counsel. At his hearing, Sampson told the hearing justice that he had a conflict with Lovoy because [w]hat I'm asking him to do, he doesn't want to do. Specifically, Lovoy refused to raise an issue concerning the propriety of Sampson's arraignment because he believed the argument was without merit. Sampson also expressed dissatisfaction with Lovoy's previous representation of Sampson's brother on a felony charge. The hearing justice disagreed with Sampson's assessment of his court-appointed attorney, noting that [Lovoy] does an outstanding job for his clients and that he recently gave the best final argument I have ever heard a defense counsel give. It is well settled that a decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for a continuance to secure new counsel is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Greene, 726 A.2d 471, 472 (R.I.1999) (mem.) (citing State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 645 (R.I.1995)). This is especially true in a probation revocation hearing where a defendant enjoys the right to counsel, but where due process rights are limited by virtue of the fact that the defendant has already been convicted of a crime. Id. (citing State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 643 (R.I.1989)). In State v. Moran, 699 A.2d 20 (R.I.1997), this Court outlined some of the factors that a trial justice should consider when a defendant requests a continuance: the promptness of the continuance motion and the length of time requested; the age and intricacy of the case; the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, jurors, counsel, and the court; whether the request appears to be legitimate or merely contrived foot dragging; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request; whether the defendant in fact has other competent and prepared trial counsel ready to pinch-hit; whether there are multiple codefendants, making calendar control more difficult than usual; and any other relevant factor made manifest by the record. Id. at 26. Sampson has not presented this Court with evidence that the hearing justice abused his discretion or failed to consider these factors. [4] Sampson's request was made after the hearing had begun, and a last-minute continuance would have been inconvenient for both the witnesses and the court. Officers Houghton and Costantino were both present to testify, as was Ms. Catley, a mother of five children with a two-week old infant. The legitimacy of Sampson's request is also questionable because he did not object to Lovoy's representation until Lovoy refused to assert an argument that he believed to be without merit. Bustamante v. Wall, 866 A.2d 516, 524 (R.I.2005) (A defendant is entitled to appointment of an attorney with whom he can communicate reasonably, but has no right to an attorney who will docilely do as he is told.) (quoting United States v. Moore, 706 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir.1983)). Prior to his attorney's reluctance to placidly bow to his dubious instructions, Lovoy's competence was otherwise unquestioned by Sampson. The public defender appointed to represent defendant in this case was experienced and highly competent. He and the other attorneys in the Public Defender's office are state employees who dedicate themselves to indigent defense. We are of the opinion that it is both unreasonable and unfair to the taxpayers to be expected to underwrite the fees of private counsel based upon a defendant's unsupported conjecture about the competence or dedication of the public defender. [5] Based on the foregoing, we are satisfied that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Sampson's requested continuance.