Opinion ID: 1832587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unconstitutional Delegation/Exercise of Legislative Power

Text: The primary issue in this case is whether La. Adm.Code tit. 76, Part VII, § 343(E)(5) (1995) is unconstitutional because the Legislature either could not or did not validly delegate to the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, which under La. Const. art. IX, § 7 and La.Rev.Stat. 56:1 is in the executive branch of state government, the authority to adopt the rule. [6] Legislative power rests exclusively in the Legislature. [7] This legislative power includes the power to create and define criminal offenses and their penalties. [8] Primary legislative power, strictly speaking, may not be delegated, but administrative and ministerial functions may, by statute, be delegated to an agency in the executive branch. Delegation of certain administrative functions is necessary because of the vast amount of governmental functions that are vested in the legislative branch, which cannot possibly enact and re-enact detailed laws to cover every situation during rapidly changing times. By establishing primary standards and then delegating to an agency the task of adjusting these standards to current conditions, the legislative body has necessary flexibility in the face of changing circumstances, particularly in an era of rapidly developing technology. Alfred C. Aman, Jr. and William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 10-11 (1993). Moreover, the legislative body may wish to utilize the particular skills and experience of various administrative agencies. Id. When the legislative body, in delegating powers, clearly expresses its policy and provides sufficient standards, judicial review of the exercise of the means chosen by the agency in exercising its delegated power provides a safeguard against abuse by the agency. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-17 (2d ed.1988). This court, while recognizing that the Louisiana Constitution unequivocally mandates the separation of powers among the three branches of state government, has traditionally distinguished in delegation cases between delegation of legislative authority, which necessarily violates the separation of powers, and delegation of ministerial or administrative authority, which does not. State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, Inc., 93-1316, pp. 6-7 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 707, 711. Accordingly, although the Legislature may not delegate primary legislative power, it may declare its will and, after fixing a primary standard, may confer upon administrative officers in the executive branch the power to fill up the details by prescribing administrative rules and regulations. Adams v. State Dep't of Health, 458 So.2d 1295, 1298 (La.1984). Thus the Legislature may delegate to administrative boards and agencies of the state the power to ascertain and determine the facts upon which the laws are to be applied and enforced. State v. Taylor, 479 So.2d 339, 341 (La. 1985). This court, in determining whether a particular delegation of power is constitutional, has applied the following approach enunciated in Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 237 La. 768, 788, 112 So.2d 606, 613, appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 114, 80 S.Ct. 207, 4 L.Ed.2d 154 (1959): It is now well settled that the Legislature may make the operation or application of a statute contingent upon the existence of certain conditions, and may delegate to some executive or administrative board the power to determine the existence of such facts and to carry out the terms of the statute. So long as the regulation or action of the official or board authorized by statute does not in effect determine what the law shall be, or involve the exercise of primary and independent discretion, but only determines within prescribed limits some fact upon which the law by its own terms operates, such regulation is administrative and not legislative in nature. (footnotes omitted). Guided by the principles set forth in Schwegmann and inherent in the constitutional separation of powers, this court has fashioned a three-prong test for determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority, as opposed to administrative or ministerial authority, to an administrative agency. Under this test, a delegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally valid if the enabling statute ( l ) contains a clear expression of legislative policy; (2) prescribes sufficient standards to guide the agency in the execution of that policy; and (3) is accompanied by adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of discretion by the agency. State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, Inc., 93-1316, p. 7 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 707, 712. Application of the Schwegmann three-prong test ensures the elected members of the Legislature retain all legislative power by insisting that they, and not their delegates in the executive branch, make the difficult policy choices for which they are accountable to the public through the democratic process. State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, Inc ., at p. 8, 639 So.2d at 712. Significantly in this case, even when the Legislature has properly delegated to an agency certain administrative or ministerial authority, the regulations promulgated by the agency may not exceed the authorization delegated by the Legislature. State v. Domangue, 93-1953, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/22/94), 649 So.2d 1034, 1038. An agency exercising delegated authority is not free to pursue any and all ends, but can assert authority only over those ends which are connected with the task delegated by the legislative body. Tribe, supra. The open-ended discretion to choose ends is the essence of legislative power; it is this power that the legislative body possesses, but its agents lack. Id. In the present case, the Legislature in La.Rev.Stat. 56:333 A delegated to the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission the power to adopt rules to regulate the taking of mullet, expressly stating that such regulations shall provide for zones, permits, fees, and other provisions necessary to implement this Section. This power clearly does not involve the delegation of primary legislative power, but rather involves the delegation of administrative authority to adopt certain provisions relating to the taking of mullet. The indictments charge these defendants with failing to report their monthly catch of mullet. Clearly, the Legislature could have delegated to the Commission the authority to adopt rules regulating the reporting of mullet catches. The critical issue is whether the Commission exceeded its delegated authority under Section 333 A by adopting reporting requirements, especially when the requirements are punishable in a criminal proceeding by a life-time prohibition against earning a living by fishing mullet. The State argues that the reporting regulation was promulgated pursuant to the other provisions phrase of La.Rev.Stat. 56:333 A. According to the State, Section 333 G requires the Commission to report information on mullet annually to the Legislature and the information required by the Commission's administrative rule is necessary for the Commission's annual report. The general words following the specific powers enumerated in Section 333 A must be construed to apply to powers of the same nature as those enumerated. In our view, the Legislature in Section 333 A intended for the Commission only to adopt rules (the violation of which is punishable by permanent loss of a mullet permit) which involved the taking of mullet. The statutory definition of taking does not relate in any manner to the reporting of catches, but refers to the manner in which mullet are harvested. [9] The legislative authorization enabling the Commission to promulgate rules was limited to conduct which constitutes a taking of mullet, i.e., the methods employed by fishermen to capture the fish. The trial court presumably found that there was no connection between the taking of mullet and the regulation enacted by the Commission, which requires commercial mullet fishermen, under a criminal penalty, to file monthly reports pertaining to their harvest. [10] We conclude that the Commission exceeded its authority by adopting La. Adm. Code tit. 76, Part VII, § 343, which criminalizes the commercial mullet fishermen's failure to report their catch. The conduct criminalized by the administrative rule does not fall within the statutory definition of taking. Moreover, the legislative silence in La. Rev.Stat. 56:333 A regarding delegation of authority to adopt regulations on reporting of catches of mullet, when considered with La.Rev.Stat. 56:345's requirement for fishermen (under a much less harsh criminal penalty) to report all sales of fish to resident wholesale or retailers, supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to authorize the Commission to adopt reporting requirements with drastic criminal penalties. We further conclude that the challenged administrative rule fails the third prong of the Schwegmann test. The delegation in La.Rev.Stat. 56:333 A lacks adequate procedural safeguards to protect against an abuse of discretion by the Commission. In fact, the statute makes no mention of any guidelines for the Commission to follow when promulgating regulations. Although the State contends that the Commission enacted the instant regulation after a public hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), La.Rev.Stat. 49:950-971, this hearing was not mandated by Section 333 A. Unlike the enabling provision upheld in State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, Inc., supra at pp. 19-20, 639 So.2d at 720, Section 333 A neither refers to the APA nor prescribes any procedures to allow for legislative review. The trial court correctly held that the Commission, in adopting the reporting requirement in La. Adm.Code tit. 76, Part VII, § 343(E)(5), improperly exceeded its statutory authority. The administrative regulation is therefore unconstitutional and cannot be used as a basis for the offenses charged in these proceedings. Because this court holds that the administrative regulation is unconstitutional, it is unnecessary to address the other bases under which the trial court quashed the criminal charges against these defendants.