Opinion ID: 768356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michas's Prima Facie Case

Text: 19 The ADEA makes it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's age. 29 U.S.C. sec. 623(a)(1). We will find an ADEA violation when a plaintiff presents evidence that demonstrates that age was a determining factor in a discharge decision. See Smith v. Great Am. Restaurants, Inc., 969 F.2d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). A plaintiff pursuing an ADEA claim has two ways to make such a prima facie case. Either he can present direct evidence that age was a determining factor in his discharge, see Cowan v. Glenbrook Sec. Servs., Inc., 123 F.3d 438, 443 (7th Cir. 1997), or he can present indirect evidence to demonstrate that the employment decision was motivated by the employer's discriminatory animus. Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 492. 20 Michas presents no direct evidence that his age was a determining factor in his discharge and attempts to make a prima facie case by circumstantial evidence. Because he presents no direct evidence of discriminatory animus, Michas must rely on the inferences that we may draw from indirect evidence. The traditional test for determining workplace discrimination by indirect evidence requires the plaintiff to make a prima facie case of discrimination, then shifts the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate non- discriminatory motive to the defendant. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 338 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to ADEA claims). If the defendant provides a legitimate motive for termination, the burden shifts again to the plaintiff to provide evidence that this motive was pretextual. See id. 21 Under the traditional McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff is required to present evidence on four prongs to make a prima facie case. He must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he reasonably performed to his employer's expectations, (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action and (4) the position remained open. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. However, recognizing the variety of adverse employment actions covered within the broad reach of the discrimination statutes, we have adapted the requirements for making a prima facie case in special cases to reflect the reality of the workplace. See Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 494. Here, the parties agree that Michas's termination constitutes a special case, but they differ in their description of the type of case presented and in the requirements that must be met to make a prima facie case. 22 HCC argues that Michas's termination was a part of a reduction in force (RIF). A RIF occurs when an employer permanently eliminates certain positions from its workforce. See id. Because the employer has removed a position entirely, the position will never be refilled. In such a case, it makes little sense to require a plaintiff to meet the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, in which the plaintiff must demonstrate that the position remained open or was filled by someone who is not a member of the protected class. Instead, we require a plaintiff to demonstrate that other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more favorably. See id. 23 To prove discrimination in a RIF, Michas must prove that there were similarly situated younger employees who were treated more favorably than he was. To make this proof, Michas first must have shown that his position was similarly situated with younger employees who were not terminated. The district court found that Michas presented no evidence that his job was fungible with the younger team leaders who were not terminated. For this reason, the court found no genuine issue of material fact about whether similarly situated individuals were treated better than Michas. 24 Michas seeks to recharacterize his termination not as a true RIF, but as a case of what this circuit has dubbed a mini-RIF. See Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 495. In a mini-RIF, a single employee is discharged and his position is not filled. However, the employee's responsibilities are assumed by other members of the corporate workforce. See Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995). Because of the fear that employers might misuse the RIF description to recharacterize ordinary terminations as reductions in force when they terminate an individual with a unique job, we have dispensed with the requirement that the plaintiff show similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably. Instead, because the fired employee's duties are absorbed by other workers and the employee was 'replaced,' not eliminated, we only require that a plaintiff demonstrate that his duties were absorbed by employees who were not members of the protected class. See Bellaver, 200 F.3d at 495. 25 Ultimately, calling an adverse employment action a mini-RIF merely emphasizes that McDonnell Douglas, rather than the RIF test, should apply. In both the traditional McDonnell Douglas analysis and the mini-RIF analysis, the discharged employee's duties are assumed by other employees (or in the mini-RIF scenario, the position is absorbed by other employees); in the RIF context, the employer no longer needs the discharged employee's duties performed. Thus, our decision whether an action is a RIF depends on whether HCC still needed Michas's job responsibilities to be performed. Even though HCC discharged multiple employees at the time it discharged Michas, HCC's own evidence demonstrates that HCC still needed someone to perform Michas's responsibilities and that Demaret intended, at the time of Michas's discharge, to perform them. Because Michas's responsibilities were absorbed and not eliminated, we will apply the McDonnell Douglas/mini-RIF standard. 26 Under McDonnell Douglas, Michas needed to present evidence that his position was absorbed, not eliminated to meet this aspect of his prima facie case. In its findings of fact, the district court accepted HCC's statement that Michas's responsibilities were assumed by Demaret. This evidence is sufficient to create a genuine question of fact as to whether Michas met the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. Therefore, had the district court granted summary judgment on this basis alone, we would find that the court erred in its grant of summary judgment. 27 The district court also found that Michas failed to make a prima facie case because he failed to present sufficient evidence that he was performing to HCC's expectations. HCC blames Michas's discharge, in part, on Michas's subpar performance. Because of the overlap between this element of Michas's prima facie case and his claim of pretext, we will analyze the dispute over Michas's performance within the context of HCC's grounds for discharge. However, we will discuss the district court's analysis of this only if we determine that HCC's other claim, that it discharged its legal department in an effort to reduce costs, was pretextual. The district court found that Michas presented no evidence to refute HCC's claimed legitimate non- discriminatory motive. Michas contends that he produced evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact that these claims were pretextual.