Opinion ID: 2227102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Postpetition Removal

Text: If parental consent cannot be obtained, section 1027, at issue here, provides for preliminary orders after the filing of a neglect (or abuse) petition. Thus, according to the statutory continuum, where the circumstances are not so exigent, the agency should bring a petition and seek a hearing prior to removal of the child. In any case involving abuse  or in any case where the child has already been removed without a court order  the Family Court must hold a hearing as soon as practicable after the filing of a petition, to determine whether the child's interests require protection pending a final order of disposition (Family Ct Act § 1027 [a]). As is relevant here, the section further provides that in any other circumstance (such as a neglect case), after the petition is filed any person originating the proceeding (or the Law Guardian) may apply for  or the court on its own may order  a hearing to determine whether the child's interests require protection, pending a final order of disposition ( id. ). [8] For example, in Matter of Adam DD. (112 AD2d 493 [3d Dept 1985]), after filing a child neglect petition, petitioner Washington County Department of Social Services sought an order under section 1027. At a hearing, evidence demonstrated that respondent-mother had told her son on several occasions that she intended to kill herself, and Family Court directed that custody be placed with petitioner on a temporary basis for two months. At the subsequent dispositional hearing, a psychiatrist testified that respondent was suffering from a type of paranoid schizophrenia that endangered the well-being of the child, and recommended the continued placement with petitioner. A second psychiatrist concurred. The Appellate Division concluded that the record afforded a basis for Family Court to find neglect because of possible impairment of the child's emotional health, and continued placement of the child with petitioner. While not a domestic violence case, Matter of Adam DD. is instructive because it concerns steps taken in the circumstance where a child is emotionally harmed by parental behavior. The parent's repeated threats of suicide caused emotional harm that could be akin to the experience of a child who witnesses repeated episodes of domestic violence perpetrated against a parent. In this circumstance, the agency did not immediately remove the child, but proceeded with the filing of a petition and a hearing. Upon such a hearing, if the court finds that removal is necessary to avoid imminent risk to the child's life or health, it is required to remove or continue the removal and remand the child to a place approved by the agency (Family Ct Act § 1027 [b] [i]). In undertaking this inquiry, the statute also requires the court to consider and determine whether continuation in the child's home would be contrary to the best interests of the child ( id. ) [9] . The Circuit Court has asked us to harmonize the best interests test with the calculus concerning imminent risk and imminent danger to life or health  (344 F3d at 169). In order to justify a finding of imminent risk to life or health, the agency need not prove that the child has suffered actual injury ( see Matter of Kimberly H. , 242 AD2d 35, 38 [1st Dept 1998]). Rather, the court engages in a fact-intensive inquiry to determine whether the child's emotional health is at risk. Section 1012 (h), moreover, sets forth specific factors, evidence of which may demonstrate substantially diminished psychological or intellectual functioning ( see also Matter of Sayeh R., 91 NY2d 306, 314-316 [1997]; Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. on behalf of Dante M. v Denise J. , 87 NY2d 73, 78-79 [1995]). As noted in our discussion of Certified Question No. 1, section 1012 (h) contains the caveat that impairment of emotional health must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child ( see Matter of Theresa CC. , 178 AD2d 687 [3d Dept 1991]). Importantly, in 1988, the Legislature added the best interests requirement to the statute, as well as the requirement that reasonable efforts be made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from the home (L 1988, ch 478, § 5) [10] . These changes were apparently necessary to comport with federal requirements under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act (42 USC §§ 670-679a), which mandated that federal foster care maintenance payments may be made on behalf of otherwise eligible children who were removed from the home of a specified relative pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement, or as the result of a `judicial determination to the effect that continuation therein would be contrary to the welfare of the child and . . . that reasonable efforts [to prevent the need for removal] have been made' (Policy Interpretation Question of the United States Department of Health and Human Services, May 3, 1985, Bill Jacket, L 1988, ch 478, at 32-33). The measures  ensure[d] that children involved in the early stages of child protective proceedings and their families receive appropriate services to prevent the children's removal from their homes whenever possible (Mem from Cesar A. Perales to Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor, July 27, 1988, Bill Jacket, L 1988, ch 478, at 14). By contrast, the City at the time took the position that the mixing of the standards `best interest of the child' and `imminent risk' is confusing. It makes no sense for a court to determine as part of an `imminent risk' decision, what is in the `best interest of the child.' If the child is in `imminent risk', his/her `best interest' is removal from the home. A `best interest' determination is more appropriately made after an investigation and a report have been completed and all the facts are available  (Letter from Legislative Representative James Brennan, The City of New York Office of the Mayor to Governor Mario M. Cuomo, July 27, 1988, Bill Jacket, L 1988, ch 478, at 23). In this litigation, the City posits that the best interests determination is part of the Family Court's conclusion that there is imminent risk warranting removal, and concedes that whether a child will be harmed by the removal is a relevant consideration. The City thus recognizes that the questions facing a Family Court judge in the removal context are extraordinarily complex. As the Circuit Court observed, it could be argued that the exigencies of the moment that threaten the welfare of a child justify removal. On the other hand, a blanket presumption in favor of removal may not fairly capture the nuances of each family situation (344 F3d at 174). The plain language of the section and the legislative history supporting it establish that a blanket presumption favoring removal was never intended. The court must do more than identify the existence of a risk of serious harm. Rather, a court must weigh, in the factual setting before it, whether the imminent risk to the child can be mitigated by reasonable efforts to avoid removal. It must balance that risk against the harm removal might bring, and it must determine factually which course is in the child's best interests. Additionally, the court must specifically consider whether imminent risk to the child might be eliminated by other means, such as issuing a temporary order of protection or providing services to the victim (Family Ct Act § 1027 [b] [iv]). The Committee Bill Memorandum supporting this legislation explains the intent to address the situation [w]here one parent is abusive but the child may safely reside at home with the other parent, the abuser should be removed. This will spare children the trauma of removal and placement in foster care  (Mem of Children and Families Standing Comm, Bill Jacket, L 1989, ch 727, at 7). These legislative concerns were met, for example, in Matter of Naomi R. (296 AD2d 503 [2d Dept 2002]), where, following a hearing pursuant to section 1027, Family Court issued a temporary order of protection against a father, excluding him from the home, on the ground that he allegedly sexually abused one of his four children. Evidence established that the father's return to the home, even under the mother's supervision, would present an imminent risk to the health and safety of all of the children. Thus, pending a full fact-finding hearing, Family Court took the step of maintaining the integrity of the family unit and instead removed the abuser.