Opinion ID: 2612557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: conveyance of fee simple or easement

Text: Appellant's claims for return of the $3,675 purchase price and a restraining order are based on the contention that in 1951 the State acquired only a right-of-way, not a fee simple interest, in the disputed strip. This contention relies on two statutes in effect in 1951. The first, U.C.A., 1943, § 104-61-2, is part of the chapter on eminent domain. It states in pertinent part: The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use: (1) A fee simple, when taken for [purposes unrelated to the instant case]. (2) An easement, when taken for any other use. [Emphasis added.] Since the disputed strip was conveyed to the State by warranty deed, it was not taken for public use within the meaning of this statute having to do with condemnation proceedings and eminent domain. Consequently, this statute does not direct the outcome of this case. Appellant also relies on a statutory provision in the chapter on Highways, U.C.A., 1943, § 36-1-7. This section, which was repealed in 1963 but which was in effect at the time the disputed land was acquired, states: By taking or accepting land for a highway the public acquires only the right of way and incidents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. [1] [Emphasis added.] Appellant argues that under this section the State was statutorily incapable of acquiring a fee simple interest in land for a highway and therefore only acquired an easement under appellant's 1951 warranty deed. The key issue on the applicability of § 36-1-7 is the meaning of accepting. Appellant argues that accepting should be read broadly to embrace the receipt of a deed in a negotiated purchase. The State contends that in this context the word accepting should be construed to refer solely to accepting land dedicated by usage as a highway. Neither party cites any Utah precedents conclusively construing this statute on the issue before us. [2] Considering this statute in light of its apparent purpose and the desirability of harmonizing its meaning with that of other statutes, we conclude that the construction advocated by the State and adopted by the district court is the correct one. The history recited in Justice Howe's concurring opinion is persuasive evidence that the word accepting in the quoted sentence of U.C.A., 1943, § 36-1-7, was intended to refer only to highway lands received by dedication. As to highway lands received in that manner, the statute was therefore declaratory of the common law: the original owner retained the fee, and the public acquired only an easement. Barclay v. Howell's Lessee, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 498, 512, 8 L.Ed. 477 (1832). But there is nothing in the history or interpretive decisions to suggest that this statute was meant to apply to lands the State acquired by warranty deed. In fact, such an interpretation would conflict with another early statute prescribing the effect of warranty deeds as passing a fee simple title, U.C.A., 1953, § 57-1-12, and it would also deny the State a power (to acquire fee simple title) routinely exercised by individuals and corporate bodies. Being unwilling to accept either of those results without statutory language more compelling than we have in this case, we conclude that § 36-1-7 did not prevent the State from acquiring a fee simple title under appellant's warranty deed to this strip of land in 1951. For the reasons stated here and in Justice Howe's concurring opinion, the district court's order dismissing appellant's action for the return of his $3,675 and for other relief related to his claimed ownership of the land will therefore be affirmed.