Opinion ID: 1730571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the State Meet Its Burden of Proof?

Text: The State presented the testimony of Detective McCord during the first motion to suppress, and Detectives Catalonotto and Demma during Green's trial. All of these detectives were experienced detectives, having each spent a number of years in the Homicide Division. The detectives consistently testified that Green was Mirandized on a number of occasions and that at no time did he articulate or in any other way evidence any lack of comprehension of his rights to remain silent or to have an attorney present. Contrast State ex rel. White v. State, 606 So.2d 787 (La.1992) (inconsistent testimony of interrogating officers regarding defendant's Miranda waiver rendered their testimony incredible). Furthermore, in addition to his multiple verbal waivers of his Miranda rights, prior to making his first tape-recorded statement Green signed a rights of arrestee form which included a clause providing for a waiver of his rights. [9] In addition, there is the testimony of Melvin Green himself through the medium of the two tape-recorded statements which were played in the trial court. These recordings clearly indicate that Green was read his rights prior to each recorded statement, and that prior to the second statement Detective Demma repeated the Miranda warnings twice, pointedly inquiring whether Green understood these rights. See State v. Nicholas, 319 So.2d 365 (La.1975) (police officer's careful explanation of Miranda rights to retarded defendant factor in determining if waiver knowing and intelligent). On each occasion Green expressly waived his rights, choosing to talk to the police officers rather than to remain silent. The only evidence presented in rebuttal to the State's proof was the testimony of Dr. Zimmerman. Dr. Zimmerman, who was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology, testified that he spent approximately nine (9) hours with Green, during which time he interviewed Green and administered a battery of psychological tests. [10] Zimmerman found Green's Intelligence Quotient (Weschler) to be around 65, making him mildly retarded but educable. [11] Zimmerman placed Green's mental age at around ten (10) years old, and diagnosed Green as suffering from brain dysfunction. [12] Discussing the parameters of Green's brain dysfunction, Zimmerman stated that the regions of Green's brain most impaired were those that are most associated with academic abilities and with his ability to process information, his intellectual abilities. In particular, Zimmerman found Green's concepts and receptive speech, i.e. the ability to understand what is said to an individual, to be impaired. As part of the psychological evaluation, Zimmerman had Green read parts of the rights of arrestee form, specifically the parts addressing the rights that he was giving up. After perceiving that Green was encountering difficulties understanding the form, Zimmerman read parts of the form to Green, purportedly at the same speed as the form had been read to Green by Detective Demma. Zimmerman testified that Green was unable to comprehend the form read at that speed, and that in any case certain key words, such as privilege or waiver, were not readily understood by Green. While Zimmerman felt that Green had been unable to understand his Miranda rights as read to him by the interrogating detectives, he did believe that Green could be made to understand his rights if we changed some of the wording and brought it down to a lower level vocabulary. Zimmerman also noted that many persons with Green's mental capacity tended to avow comprehension of things which they in fact failed to understand, for fear of being regarded as different from their peers. On cross-examination, Zimmerman reiterated that Green was educable and could be made to comprehend concepts that he was not, at least initially, readily able to grasp. Zimmerman stated that he was aware that Green had been arrested, and convicted, for criminal activity before, and that he assumed that the Miranda rights were given to him before. Zimmerman was unaware that Green had been Boykinized on previous occasions. The trial court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to reopen the motion to suppress, refusing to address again the question of whether Green's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. The trial judge, specifically noting that Green had been Boykinized twice before and arrested and Mirandized on numerous other occasions, found that this defendant understood his rights. We find that the State met its burden of proof in this case. The trial judge evidently credited the testimony of the police officers, in particular their experienced opinion that Green knew what he was doing when he waived his rights and started to speak. See Withrow, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1755 (there is little reason to believe that the police today are unable, or even generally unwilling, to satisfy Miranda's requirements). Furthermore, the progress of Green's interrogation supports this view of the defendant's understanding of the interrogation process and his willingness to speak. Green's first statements to the police represented an attempt to extricate himself from culpability for the murder, and the evolution of his statements over time, in response to new facts presented Green by the detectives, reveals a mental agility and adaptability which cannot be readily associated with the diminished mental capacity found by the court of appeal. Compare State v. Penns, 407 So.2d 678, 681 (La.1981) (defendant's claimed retardation does not support a contention of low intelligence ... but rather shows the actions of an intelligent mind seeking to avoid the consequences of confessing). This view is bolstered by the extent to which extrinsic facts, i.e. the location of the gun, the details of the crime scene, etc., corroborated Green's ultimate confession. [13] Compare Brooks, supra, 648 So.2d at 375 (extrinsic corroboration is an additional factor to consider in evaluating the clarity of [a defendant's] mental processes at the time of his confession). In so stating, we emphasize that the object of our present inquiry is not the accuracy of Green's confession, but rather Green's ability to comprehend his rights to remain silent and have an attorney present during his custodial interrogation. However, when faced with a claim that the defendant's mental processes are so dysfunctional as to preclude a full understanding of those rights, any facts which shed light upon the functioning of that defendant's mental processes are relevant and pertinent evidence which the trial court is entitled to consider. See State v. David, 425 So.2d 1241 (La.1983) (circumstances surrounding confession showed defendant in control of his mental faculties despite having consumed alcohol and valium prior to confessing). In this case, Green's capacity to accurately recall specific details of the crime scene, as well as his attempt to manipulate the progress of the interrogation towards a result favorable to him, are both factors which bear upon the defendant's ability to understand his Miranda rights. See State v. Simpson, 629 So.2d 468, 473 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), discussing State v. Daniel, 378 So.2d 1361 (La.1979); State v. Taylor, 490 So.2d 459 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986), writ denied, 496 So.2d 344 (La. 1986). The trial court also relied in part upon Green's familiarity with the criminal justice process in finding that he understood exactly what he was giving up when he waived his Miranda rights. Such a reliance was proper, since it cast Green not in the light of a naive young man suddenly injected into a foreign environment, but rather showed that Green's custodial interrogation was an experience to which he was not a stranger. In addition, insofar as Green's criminal history, particularly his prior Boykinizations, indicated repeated exposure to his Miranda rights, this familiarity is relevant to the trial judge's appreciation of Green's understanding of his rights. Compare State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 616 (La.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2345, 85 L.Ed.2d 862 (1985) (fact that defendant was read his Miranda rights five times relevant to voluntariness of his confession). The defense suggested at oral argument that the trial court's strong reliance upon the prior Miranda warnings and Boykinizations is impermissible, and cited as support for this proposition State v. McGinnis, 413 So.2d 1307 (La.1981) ( on rehearing ). In McGinnis we held, in the context of a prior Boykinization, that [s]imply because the defendant was advised of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in a different court on a different charge in 1972 does not assure that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known constitutional right or privilege four years later in this case. McGinnis, supra, 413 So.2d at 1311. We went on to note that [t]o conclude otherwise would be to presume a waiver of a constitutional right by an accused from a silent record, which is clearly impermissible. Id. In this case, unlike McGinnis, there is no question as to whether the defendant waived any constitutional rights. Green expressly waived his rights, both by signing the rights of arrestee form and orally on a number of occasions, including at the beginning of both tape-recorded statements. Our inquiry involves his understanding of those rights, and consequently whether or not the defendant's express waiver was a knowing and intelligent one. While it may be true that, as defendant argues in brief, prior history with the criminal judicial system alone has never been considered a valid basis for determining the admissibility of a confession, that history is certainly a part of the totality of the circumstances which a trial judge may consider in determining a defendant's comprehension of his Miranda rights. Green's prior experiences with the criminal justice system are relevant to this inquiry because they show that Green in the past has on numerous occasions been informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to counsel, both by law enforcement and judicial officers. One of the ways that people are educated and gain an understanding of things is through repetition, through repeated exposure, and it was permissible for the trial court to read Green's Miranda waivers, in the light of this record, against Green's criminal history and to conclude that at some point Green became aware that he did not have to respond when questioned by the police and that if he desired an attorney one would be appointed for him. [14] We therefore reject the submission that the number of times that a defendant has been confronted with the exercise of his Miranda rights is irrelevant to his understanding them. Rather, Green's prior experiences are another factor the trial judge legitimately considered in determining whether Green understood his rights prior to waiving them.