Opinion ID: 2833985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Entergy Is a “General Contractor” Under the Act

Text: “Our primary objective” when construing statutes “is to determine the Legislature’s intent, which, when possible, we discern from the plain meaning of the words chosen.” [9] Where the statutory text is unambiguous, we adopt a construction supported by the statute’s plain language, unless that construction would lead to an absurd result. [10] We presume that every word of a statute was used for a purpose, [11] and likewise, that every word excluded was excluded for a purpose. [12] The court of appeals determined that Entergy was not a general contractor because “Entergy did not establish it had undertaken to perform work or services and then subcontracted part of that work to IMC, as a general contractor would have done.” [13] The court borrowed from the decision in Williams v. Brown & Root, Inc. , stating that “[a] general contractor is any person who contracts directly with the owner, the phrase not being limited to one undertaking to complete every part of the work.” [14] The Williams court noted that an entity that “did not contract with the owner, but instead was the owner” was arguably not protected by the exclusive-remedy provision. [15] Rather than adhering to the Labor Code’s specific definition of “general contractor,” [16] the Williams court looked to a secondary source, Corpus Juris Secundum . [17] But the Legislature has instructed that where words are statutorily defined, courts should construe the terms according to that particular meaning. [18] Contrary to the suggestion in Williams that an owner cannot be a general contractor because it cannot contract with itself, the Labor Code’s definition of “general contractor” does not prohibit a premises owner who “undertakes to procure the performance of work or a service” from also being a general contractor. [19] The Williams court and the court of appeals in this case also relied on Wilkerson v. Monsanto Co. , in which a federal district court held that a premises owner was not a statutory employer. [20] Wilkerson ’s analysis, however, turned on the statute’s then-applicable definition of a “subcontractor” as “a person who has contracted to perform all or any part of the work or services which a prime contractor has contracted with another party to perform.” [21] Wilkerson interpreted the reference to a prime contractor’s having “contracted with another party” as indicating that the prime contractor and premises owner could not be the same entity. [22] The currently applicable definition of “subcontractor,” however, reads: “a person who contracts with a general contractor to perform all or part of the work or services that the general contractor has undertaken to perform.” [23] This present-day definition does not preclude a premises owner from serving as its own general contractor and undertaking to perform work on its premises by retaining subcontractors. We therefore disagree with the court of appeals in the pending case that the current definition of subcontractor is inconsistent with a premises owner acting as general contractor. In short, the governing Labor Code definitions of general contractor and subcontractor do not forbid a premises owner from also being a general contractor.
Summers maintains that under Williams and Wilkerson the pre-1993 statute precluded this dual role. He further argues that the Labor Code’s statement that 1993 amendments were intended to revise the law “without substantive change” [24] indicates that the Legislature intended to exclude premises owners from the definition of general contractor. The general statement that a recodification is not intended to effect substantive changes does not, however, override the plain wording of the statutory provisions directly in issue in this case. “While we generally presume the Legislature accepts judicial interpretations of a statute by reenacting it without substantial change,” we recently made clear that “we do not make that presumption when there have been substantial changes, or when it would contradict the statute’s plain words.” [25] And even if the earlier statutory definition of subcontractor suggested that the prime contractor and premises owner must be separate entities, and the revised Code states that no substantive change was intended, “prior law and legislative history cannot be used to alter or disregard the express terms of a code provision when its meaning is clear from the code when considered in its entirety, unless there is an error such as a typographical one.” [26] General statements that no substantive change is intended “must be considered with the clear, specific language used” in the substantive provisions of the revised code, and “[t]o the extent that these latter sections of the [code] do change prior law, the specific import of their words as written must be given effect.” [27] In this case, the current definitions of general contractor and subcontractor contain no language mandating or implying that a premises owner cannot serve as its own general contractor. Construing the statute according to its plain and ordinary meaning, Entergy is a general contractor because it “[undertook] to procure the performance of work” from IMC. [28] That Entergy took on the task of procuring [29] the performance of work from IMC is beyond dispute: Deposition testimony established that Entergy hired IMC to supply workers to perform maintenance, including “water and turbine-related, generator-related work,” at its Sabine Plant. Thus, Entergy was a general contractor entitled to the Labor Code’s exclusive-remedy defense. The fact that Entergy also owns the premises where the accident occurred is immaterial.