Opinion ID: 1994454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Successive Conflicts of Interest

Text: The PCC alleges the respondent violated Conduct Rule 1.9. Conduct Rule 1.9 protects former clients by recognizing the twin duties an attorney owes to a former client: The duty to preserve confidences and the duty of loyalty. Sullivan Cnty. Reg. Refuse Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 141 N.H. 479, 483, 686 A.2d 755 (1996) (quotation and brackets omitted). At all relevant times, Conduct Rule 1.9 provided, in part: (a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation and with knowledge of the consequences. N.H.R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a). The PCC argues that the respondent breached Conduct Rule 1.9 after he concluded representing David by continuing to represent Brault in the Texas and New Hampshire guardianship matters and in connection with the disputed management of the conservatorship. We agree. A violation of Conduct Rule 1.9 consists of four elements: a valid attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the former client; materially adverse interests between the former client and a present client; representation of the present client in the same or a substantially related matter; and a lack of consent on the part of the former client. See Sullivan Cnty. Reg. Refuse Dist., 141 N.H. at 481-82, 686 A.2d 755.
We will assume that the respondent ceased representing David on April 24, 2002. The respondent thereafter continued representing Brault with respect to the Texas and New Hampshire guardianship proceedings. The May 2002 effort to extend the temporary guardianship order was the same matter as the temporary guardianship ordered by the Carroll County Probate Court. The simultaneous effort to establish a permanent guardianship over David's person in New Hampshire was substantially related given the factual overlap between the two actions. Similarly, the guardianship proceedings in Texas were substantially related to the New Hampshire guardianship matters and the conservatorship itself because each concerned David's capacity and autonomy to make decisions. Representing Brault in each of these proceedings was materially adverse to David's interests because David opposed a guardianship over his person. See N.H.R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a). Because there is no evidence that David consented to the conflict after consultation and with knowledge of the consequences, the respondent violated Conduct Rule 1.9(a) by representing Brault in the New Hampshire and Texas guardianship proceedings after April 24, 2002.
The respondent further violated Conduct Rule 1.9(a) by representing Brault against David's challenges to the management of the conservatorship and payment of certain expenses. This matter was the same and/or substantially related to the earlier conservatorship matters. David's interests were materially adverse to Brault's because he was alleging misconduct on the conservator's part. While the respondent argues that there was no true adversity until March 18, 2003 (the date Brault resigned as conservator), he should have detected the adversity as early as August 2002, when Attorney McCandless detailed concerns about payment of certain legal and medical expenses by the conservatorship and the respondent's conflict of interest. Because there is no evidence that David consented to the conflict, see id., the respondent violated Conduct Rule 1.9(a).