Opinion ID: 583351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Writ of Prohibition

Text: 35 Under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988), the federal courts may issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction. The remedy has been termed a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Ca., 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir.1983) (writ of prohibition is a drastic and extraordinary remedy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819, 105 S.Ct. 90, 83 L.Ed.2d 37 (1984). Thus while a simple showing of error might suffice to obtain reversal on direct appeal, issuance of a writ of mandamus or prohibition under such circumstances would undermine the settled limitations upon the power of an appellate court to review interlocutory orders. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275 n. 6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1071 (3d Cir.1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 193 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1056, 102 S.Ct. 604, 70 L.Ed.2d 594 (1981). 36 At the outset we note that the government has styled its petition as one for a writ of mandamus rather than a writ of prohibition. The two writs are somewhat different. A writ of mandamus may seem more appropriate if the form of the order is to mandate action, and a writ of prohibition if the order is to prohibit action. In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1313 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1623, 113 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). We conclude that the writ sought in this case is properly deemed a writ of prohibition rather than a writ of mandamus because the government asks that this court prohibit the district court from enforcing the order it has entered with respect to the arrest of Boris Conde. 37 The government's erroneous terminology does not, however, affect our resolution of this case because modern courts have shown little concern for the technical and historical differences between the two writs. Id.; In re State of South Dakota, 692 F.2d 1158, 1160 n. 4 (8th Cir.1982); Rees v. United States Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Ca., 572 F.2d 700, 700 n. 1 (9th Cir.1978). A petitioner need not precisely state which writ he seeks. See In re Insurers Syndicate for Joint Underwriting, 864 F.2d 208, 209 n. 1 (1st Cir.1988); Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1059 n. 1 (7th Cir.1981); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 179 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1979). Instead, the appropriate inquiry under the All Writs Act is whether an extraordinary remedy is available, not which. In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1313; In re Jackson County, Mo., 834 F.2d 150, 151 (8th Cir.1987); Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d 915, 917 n. 1 (10th Cir.1982). The requirements for obtaining both writs are the same. In re Jackson County, 834 F.2d at 151 (whether the writ seeks to prohibit action or mandate it, the same considerations apply); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 179 n. 1 (grounds for issuing the writs are virtually identical). 38 Traditionally, federal courts have used their power to issue writs only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so. Roche, 319 U.S. at 26, 63 S.Ct. at 941. However, courts have not confined themselves to any narrow or technical definition of the term jurisdiction. Instead, if there has been a judicial usurpation of power the invocation of this extraordinary remedy will be warranted. Will, 389 U.S. at 95, 88 S.Ct. at 273. 39 To ensure that writs of mandamus or prohibition issue in only the most limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has required that a party seeking issuance have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires. Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35, 101 S.Ct. 188, 190, 66 L.Ed.2d 193 (1980). In addition, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that [the] right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable.'  Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662, 98 S.Ct. 2552, 2557, 57 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978), quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384, 74 S.Ct. 145, 148, 98 L.Ed. 106 (1953); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Phillipines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir.1991); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976, 108 S.Ct. 487, 98 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987); Matter of Bankers Trust Co., 775 F.2d 545, 547 (3d Cir.1985); Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1468. The writ should issue if, absent resort to mandamus, the court would lose its ability to review the issue and is particularly appropriate when the questions involved are unsettled and important. United States v. Christian, 660 F.2d 892, 895, 897 (3d Cir.1981). The right to a writ is clear and indisputable when the petitioner can show a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion. Vargas, 723 F.2d at 1467. See Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (petitioner entitled to writ of mandamus on showing district court exceeded authority granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) by appointing petitioner as counsel in a civil case); Christian, 660 F.2d at 895-97 (mandamus appropriate means to consider refusal of district court to convene a grand jury); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (U.S. Steel-Clairton Works); 525 F.2d 151, 155 (3d Cir.1975) (noting possibility of issuance of mandamus where district court entered order staying grand jury proceedings). 40 We believe that the requirements for the issuance of a writ of prohibition have been met in this case. Here the government has no adequate alternative means of obtaining the requested relief. If the district court's order is allowed to stand without a writ being issued, Conde will enter and leave Costa Rica, then return to Colombia, without the government being able to exercise its right to execute the arrest warrant. As will be discussed herein, we believe the government has the right to execute a valid arrest warrant, issued after a showing of probable cause. Therefore, its right to relief is clear and indisputable. The district court committed a clear error of law in issuing its order and may have usurped a power which, subject to certain constitutional limitations which have not been satisfied here, rests exclusively in the executive branch. Finally, the question involved in this case is both unsettled and important. Therefore, this court, in the exercise of its discretion, has the authority to issue a writ of prohibition on these facts. See Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403, 96 S.Ct. at 2124 (issuance of the writ is in large part a matter of discretion).III. 41 While the district court did not conclude that the warrant for the arrest of Boris Conde was in any way defective, the court nevertheless ordered the government not to arrest Conde if and when he appeared to give his deposition at the United States Embassy in Costa Rica. The court cited no statute or case law in support of its asserted authority to so order the government. Instead, the court simply determined that the defendants' interest in obtaining Conde's testimony outweighed the government's interest in effecting Conde's arrest were he to come to Costa Rica. In spite of our belief that the district court's order was the most practical solution given the peculiar circumstances of this case, we do not believe that the balancing test the court engaged in has any basis in law. Therefore, we will issue the writ of prohibition requested by the government to prevent the district court from enforcing the order it has entered. 42 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 43 If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, a warrant for the arrest of the defendant shall issue to any officer authorized by law to execute it.... 44 (emphasis added). Rule 9 similarly provides that [u]pon request of the attorney for the government the court shall issue a warrant for each defendant named in an information supported by a showing of probable cause under oath as is required by Rule 4(a), or in an indictment. Fed.R.Crim.P. 9(a) (emphasis added). The language of these rules is mandatory, leaving the court with no discretion to refuse to issue an arrest warrant once probable cause for its issuance has been shown. See In re Sturman, 604 F.Supp. 278, 279 (N.D.Ohio 1984) (once government attorney requests arrest warrant for defendants named in a valid indictment, court must issue warrant); 8 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, p 4.02 (1989) (Rule 4 provides that if there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed a crime, magistrate must issue warrant); Id. at p 9.03 (when government attorney requests arrest warrant for individuals named in an indictment, court must issue arrest warrant). 3 45 As a general proposition, matters of law enforcement are within the power of the executive branch. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1644, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973) (execution of the federal laws under our Constitution is confided primarily to the Executive Branch of the Government). However, the power of the executive branch is not completely unfettered. Fed.R.Crim.P. 4, which requires that the executive branch make a showing of probable cause to the judicial branch in order to obtain a warrant, reflects, in some sense, the different functions served by the judicial and executive branches. 46 Courts have long held that the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify issuance of a warrant must be determined by a neutral and detached judicial officer. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 1647, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 2324, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979). The purpose of this requirement, which is embodied in Rule 4, is to place a checkpoint between the Government and the citizen who is the subject of suspicion. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212, 101 S.Ct. at 1648. This checkpoint is an acknowledgement that  'an officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime' may lack sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the individual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the privacy of his home. Id. (citation omitted). The warrant requirement serves to subject the probable-cause determination of the police to judicial review. Id. at 212-213, 101 S.Ct. at 1648. Thus the process of obtaining a warrant involves the very principles of checks and balances on which our system of government, with its three coequal branches, is based. Once this judicial check on law enforcement has taken place, however, the judicial branch seemingly has no further authority to affect the powers of law enforcement officials who are members of the executive branch. 47 In Ex Parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 53 S.Ct. 129, 77 L.Ed. 283 (1932), the Supreme Court addressed an issue similar to the issue presented on the facts before us. There the issue was whether a district court could exercise its discretion and decide not to issue an arrest warrant once probable cause had been shown. In that case, a federal grand jury had indicted the defendant and on the basis of that indictment, the United States attorney asked the court to issue a bench warrant. Id. at 245, 53 S.Ct. at 129. The district court refused to issue the warrant, relying on its belief that issuing the warrant was a matter within its discretion. The Supreme Court held that a federal district court cannot refuse to issue an arrest warrant once probable cause for its issuance has been shown. Id. at 250, 53 S.Ct. at 131. The Court then granted the government's request for a writ of mandamus, ordering the district court to issue the warrant. The Court noted that once the grand jury had found probable cause to indict, the court should have issued the warrant as a matter of course. Id. at 249, 53 S.Ct. at 131. The Court cautioned that refusal to issue the warrant falls little short of a refusal to permit enforcement of the law and interfered with the absolute right of the United States to prosecute. Id. at 250-51, 53 S.Ct. at 132. 48 Given Ex Parte United States, it is clear that a federal district court is required by Rule 4--and by the limitations on its own authority--to issue a warrant once probable cause is found. 4 See also n. 3 supra (specifying the limited circumstances in which the court may void an unexecuted warrant). The refusal to issue a warrant is thus beyond the power of a federal district court. In essence, then, we read Rule 4 against the background of the principle of separation of powers. 49 While the power of the executive branch to fulfill its law enforcement duties is broad, it is, consistent with the foregoing reading of Rule 4, subject to certain constitutional and statutory limitations as well as judicial rules fashioned to enforce those limitations. Russell, 411 U.S. at 435, 93 S.Ct. at 1644. The judiciary may not impose its personal and private notions of fairness on law enforcement officials, but does have a limited authority to affect prosecutorial actions when those actions are taken in violation of the Constitution. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Russell, 411 U.S. at 435, 93 S.Ct. at 1644; United States v. Carrasco, 786 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir.1986) (court may not interfere with decisions properly within the prosecutorial domain unless such decisions constitute constitutional violation or prosecutorial misconduct). 50 As a general matter, even when actions by the prosecution appear to deprive a criminal defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense, no remedy will lie for such infringement absent a showing that the government has caused the unavailability of material evidence and has done so in bad faith. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988) (no denial of due process where criminal defendant fails to show bad faith on part of police in destruction of evidence); Buie v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.1990) (arrest of eyewitness who had indicated he would exculpate defendant at trial did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because defendant was able to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means and no showing arrest was motivated by bad faith); United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C.Cir.1982) (court's warning that witness could be prosecuted for perjury, which caused witness not to testify for defense, did not violate constitution absent showing witness was threatened); United States v. Fricke, 684 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir.1982) (prosecutor's advice that witnesses were targets of grand jury investigations, causing them to invoke Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify for the defense, did not violate due process because witnesses were already targets and investigation was not result of their plans to testify for the defense), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011, 103 S.Ct. 1250, 75 L.Ed.2d 480 (1983); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d Cir.1978) (court may order prosecutor to grant immunity if prosecutor's refusal to immunize exculpatory witness is part of intentional attempt to distort judicial fact finding process), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 229 (3d Cir.1976) (where prosecutorial misconduct caused witness not to testify on defendant's behalf, defendant's right to present a defense violated). In keeping with this general rule the Supreme Court has stressed the importance for constitutional purposes of good or bad faith on the part of the Government. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57, 109 S.Ct. at 337. 51 The foregoing principles are not diluted by this court's decision in Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.1980). We conclude that Smith does not mandate upholding the district court's order in this case. 52 In Smith, a witness whose testimony might have exculpated the defendants refused to testify pursuant to his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The defense requested that the witness be granted use immunity but the United States Attorney refused to give consent. Accordingly, the exculpatory evidence was never presented to the jury. Id. at 967. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the refusal of the government to grant immunity violated their due process rights. This court recognized that under certain circumstances due process may require that the government afford use immunity for a defense witness. Id. at 968. 53 In explaining our decision we delineated two situations in which a district court could take a role in the determination of when immunity should be granted to a defense witness whose testimony might exculpate the defendant. First, in cases where the prosecution's decision to refuse to grant immunity is made with the deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process, the court could order the government to provide statutory immunity to the witness. 5 Id. We stressed that this avenue of relief would be foreclosed absent some showing of distortion or prosecutorial misconduct. In addition, we held that even in cases where no prosecutorial misconduct was shown, courts possess the inherent power to immunize the testimony of defense witnesses if all of the following conditions are met: immunity must be properly sought in the district court; the defense witness must be available to testify; the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity. Id. at 972. 54 If Smith has any application in this case, clearly only its discussion concerning judicially fashioned immunity concerns us because there has been no showing that the government's interest in arresting Boris Conde is the result of a deliberate intention [to] distort[ ] the judicial fact finding process. Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204. Therefore, there would be no justification under Smith for the district court in this case to order the government to take action or not take action in order to ensure that a particular witness testifies for the defense. 55 The Smith court's discussion of judicially fashioned immunity presents a somewhat different situation in that the defendant may be able to avail himself of that remedy even in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. 6 We conclude that the facts of Smith differ significantly from those of the case presently before us and that even if the discussion concerning judicial immunity were applicable to these facts, the requirements set forth by the court in Smith have not been satisfied here. 56 First, the court in Smith was cognizant of the separation of powers problems that might be perceived to result from its decision, stressing that its judicial immunity remedy would not infringe on the power of the executive because the court would be relying on its own authority to ensure the testimony of a defense witness rather than ordering the executive branch to take action. 615 F.2d at 969-70. Even if we agreed that this distinction adequately addressed separation of powers concerns, that same distinction cannot be made on these facts because here the district court specifically ordered the government to refrain from taking action which the government clearly possessed the power to take. Therefore, we do not think the concept of a court's inherent authority, as set forth in Smith, can be applied in this case without offending the very separation of powers principles which the Smith court sought to avoid offending. 57 Moreover, we conclude that even if Smith could be applied on these facts, its final requirement, that there be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity, has not been satisfied here. Id. at 972. 7 The government argues, and we agree, that it has a compelling interest in arresting Conde and prosecuting him for his crimes as well as an institutional interest in maintaining its power to arrest fugitives. Gov't Reply Brief at 15 n. 6. Although the defendants would have us hold that the interest of the government in arresting Conde and the interest of the defendants in presenting their defense must be in some way balanced, we do not read Smith as requiring us to engage in a balancing test. See United States v. Sampson, 661 F.Supp. 514, 520 (W.D.Pa.1987) (Smith does not require a court, which has identified a strong governmental interest, to weigh that interest against the defendant's need for testimony; instead, the existence of a strong opposing governmental interest that cannot be accommodated forbids any weighing and any judicial immunity (citation omitted)). We conclude that where a compelling government interest exists, a court simply may not invoke its inherent authority to ensure that all witnesses whose testimony might exculpate the defendants testify at trial. In short, Smith is clearly distinguishable from this case both doctrinally and because there has been no showing of misconduct or bad faith on the part of the prosecution.