Opinion ID: 1407226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Admissibility of Victim's Recitation to Father of Defendant's Threat

Text: Under our Rule 805 analysis, we must now examine whether the recitation of the defendant's threat by the victim to her father was admissible. The State finds justification in the repetition of the threat from the victim to her father under the excited utterance exception within W.Va.R.Evid. 803(2), which provides: The following [is] not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Mr. Lusk testified that he went to his mother's house to pick up his daughter, and while leaving, they were confronted by the defendant approximately one block from the house. Mr. Lusk stated that his daughter and the defendant went into the defendant's automobile where they engaged in a conversation lasting approximately thirty minutes. Mr. Lusk testified that while he could not hear the contents of the conversation, he observed the defendant leaning toward his daughter, when she started to cry. After the conversation ended, Mr. Lusk escorted his daughter to his mother's house so that she could collect her belongings. After walking about one-half block from the defendant's automobile, and while still scared, nervous, and shaking, the victim told her father that the defendant had threatened to kill her if she left him. We find the justification for the reliability of an excited utterance in State v. Jones, 178 W.Va. 519, 362 S.E.2d 330 (1987), where we stated that [t]he excited utterance exception is predicated on the theory that a person stimulated by the excitement of an event and acting under the influence of that event will lack the reflective capacity essential for fabrication. Id. at 522, 362 S.E.2d at 333. The rationale upon which this theory rests is that a guarantee of reliability surrounds statements made by one who participates in or observes a startling event, provided they are made while under the stress of excitement. State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. 104, 109, 358 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1987). In Smith, we noted the evolution in West Virginia of the excited utterance from its common law ancestor, the spontaneous declaration: Rule 803(2) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence correctly contains the heart of the hearsay exception that was formerly called a spontaneous declaration and which is now termed the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Syllabus Point 1, in part, State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. 104, 358 S.E.2d 188 (1987). In determining the admissibility of a statement under the common law spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule, we provided a comprehensive list of factors: An alleged spontaneous declaration must be evaluated in light of the following factors: (1) The statement or declaration made must relate to the main event and must explain, elucidate, or in some way characterize that event; (2) it must be a natural declaration or statement growing out of the event, and not a mere narrative of a past, completed affair; (3) it must be a statement of fact and not the mere expression of an opinion; (4) it must be a spontaneous or instinctive utterance of thought, dominated or evoked by the transaction or occurrence itself, and not the product of premeditation, reflection, or design; (5) while the declaration or statement need not be coincident or contemporaneous with the occurrence of the event, it must be made at such time and under such circumstances as will exclude the presumption that it is the result of deliberation; and (6) it must appear that the declaration or statement was made by one who either participated in the transaction or witnessed the act or fact concerning which the declaration or statement was made. Syllabus Point 2, State v. Young, 166 W.Va. 309, 273 S.E.2d 592 (1980), modified on other grounds by State v. Julius, 185 W.Va. 422, 408 S.E.2d 1 (1991). These factors have survived the codification of the Rules of Evidence as reflected in Syllabus Point 2, State v. Murray, 180 W.Va. 41, 375 S.E.2d 405 (1988). While we still find the six-factor test recited in Young to be instructive, we also find ourselves looking for more efficient protocols in performing the necessary analysis of Rule 803(2). The West Virginia Rules of Evidence are patterned upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, State v. Smith, 178 W.Va. at 109, 358 S.E.2d at 193, and we have repeatedly recognized that when codified procedural rules or rules of evidence of West Virginia are patterned after the corresponding federal rules, federal decisions interpreting those rules are persuasive guides in the interpretation of our rules. See, e.g., Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 192, 451 S.E.2d 755, 758 n. 6 (1994) (Because the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure are practically identical to the Federal Rules, we give substantial weight to federal cases ... in determining the meaning and scope of our rules.); State v. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. 147, 158, 455 S.E.2d 516, 527 n. 14 (1994) (applying Painter v. Peavy in the context of the West Virginia and Federal Rules of Evidence). The federal cases, while not departing from the theme expressed in the six-factor test of Young, have distilled those factors into a three-part analysis where, in order to qualify as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2): (1) the declarant must have experienced a startling event or condition; (2) the declarant must have reacted while under the stress or excitement of that event and not from reflection and fabrication; and (3) the statement must relate to the startling event or condition. See Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.1986); David v. Pueblo Supermarket, 740 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir.1984). We are not rejecting the six-factor test recited in Young; however, we believe that the three-part analysis synthesizes these six factors and provides for a more efficient analysis of Rule 803(2). [9] 1.