Opinion ID: 861284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: pre-trial phase

Text: I. DID THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY REMOVE FOR CAUSE AND PREVENT DEFENSE VOIR DIRE OF SEVERAL JURORS WHO DID NOT INDICATE THAT THEIR VIEWS ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIR THEIR ABILITY TO FOLLOW THE LAW? ¶23. On appeal, Simon contends that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to permit individual sequestered voir dire of certain venire members: Ms. Williams (juror 72); Ms. Massey (juror 91); Ms. Etheridge (juror 23); and Ms. Hinson (juror 104). Simon alleges that the responses given by these venire members to certain questions pertaining to their respective ability to follow the law and impose the death penalty necessitated further inquiry. Simon argues that the trial court should have permitted the defense to question these jurors further in order to determine whether they possessed convictions about capital punishment that would substantially impair their ability to follow the court's instructions to consider a death sentence. While the record indicates Simon's objection to these jurors being excused, it does not reflect a request for individualized voir dire of these four venire members. Simon relies on Fuselier v. State, 468 So. 2d 45 (Miss. 1985), and quotes the following as controlling authority: [T]he fact that they would be hesitant to inflict the death penalty in a case based solely on circumstantial evidence does not constitute grounds to excuse them for cause. . . . Absent a clear showing that the prospective jurors would be unable to follow the court's instructions and obey the juror's oath, that juror's feelings regarding the death penalty do not constitute grounds for a challenge and the granting of such a challenge is reversible error. Id. at 54-55. ¶24. We note the opinion further states that it is completely understandable how jurors who are fully capable of following the court's instructions and juror's oath would be led to a hesitancy to state that they can impose the death penalty. Id. at 55. ¶25. Voir dire is conducted pursuant to Rule 5.02 of the Miss.Unif.Crim.R.Cir.Ct.Prac. (1992), which provides: In the voir dire examination of jurors, the attorney shall direct to the entire venire questions only on matters not inquired to by the court. Individual jurors may be examined only when proper to inquire as to answers given or for other good cause allowed by the court. No hypothetical questions requiring any juror to pledge a particular verdict will be asked. ¶26. This Court has determined that Rule 5.02 permits a circuit court, in its discretion, to utilize individualized, sequestered voir dire. Russell v. State, 607 So. 2d 1107, 1110 (Miss. 1992) (citing Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686, 692 (Miss. 1984)); Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 116 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d 590, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2882, 112 S. Ct. 1970, 60 U.S.L.W. 3781 (1992). This Court in refining the above enumerated standard has also stated that Rule 5.02 does not require more than what it states on its face. Russell, 607 So. 2d at 1110; Hansen, 592 So. 2d at 126; White v. State, 532 So. 2d 1207, 1218 (Miss. 1987); West v. State, 463 So. 2d 1048, 1054 (Miss. 1985). ¶27. Likewise, a district attorney's examination during voir dire should be abstract as opposed to what the juror might or might not do in the particular case at bar. Williams v. State, 544 So. 2d 782, 784 (Miss. 1987); Murphy v. State, 246 So. 2d 920, 921 (Miss. 1971); McCaskill v. State, 227 So. 2d 847, 852 (Miss. 1969); Phenizee v. State, 180 Miss. 746, 178 So. 579, 582 (1938). ¶28. The line between a proper and improper question is not always easily drawn; it is manifestly a process in which the trial judge must be given a considerable discretion. Harris v. State, 532 So. 2d 602, 606 (Miss. 1988); Murphy v. State, 246 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1971). ¶29. Prospective jurors in capital cases may only be excluded for cause based upon their views on capital punishment when those views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance [their] [sic] duties as juror[s] in accordance with [their] instructions and oath.' Williamson v. State, 512 So. 2d 868, 880-81 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 2051-52, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)). As a juror's bias against the death penalty does not have to be proven with unmistaken clarity, the decision of whether of not to excuse the juror is left to the trial judge's discretion. Stringer v. State, 500 So. 2d 928, 943 (Miss. 1986). The juror need not expressly state that he absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty; an equivalent response made in any reasonable manner indicating the juror's firm position will suffice. Willie, 585 So. 2d at 673; Williamson, 512 So. 2d at 881. Due to the trial judge's presence during the voir dire process, he is in a better position to evaluate the prospective juror's responses. Williamson, 512 So. 2d at 881. Finally, the determination of whether a juror is fair and impartial is a judicial question, and will not be set aside unless such determination is clearly wrong. Carr v. State, 555 So. 2d 59, 60 (Miss. 1989); King v. State, 421 So. 2d 1009, 1016 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983). ¶30. In the case sub judice, the defense raised objection to the aforementioned potential jurors (Ms. Williams, juror 72; Ms. Massey, juror 91; Ms. Etheridge, juror 23; and Ms. Hinson, juror 104) being excused for cause based on each one's opposition to the death penalty. We find nothing in the record evidencing Simon's actual request for individualized voir dire for these potential jurors. At the beginning of voir dire, the prosecution asked the entire venire whether any member was opposed to the death penalty for personal or religious reasons. Several members responded and raised their hands. Subsequently during voir dire, each of the venire members who had earlier objected to the imposition of the death penalty were individually questioned by the court, the State, and the defense, concerning their beliefs and views about the death penalty. Furthermore, the record reflects that each of the four venire members affirmatively stated that they were opposed to the death penalty, would not consider the death penalty, and would not impose it.(7) The trial court in considering the challenges for cause pertaining to these potential jurors overruled Simon's objection, relying on the fact that each of the four stated that they could not and would not consider the death penalty. ¶31. Simon relies on Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the harmless error analysis is not applicable to jurors excused for cause based on their opposition to capital punishment. Id. at 664-65. The Court determined that it was reversible error for the trial judge to excuse a potential juror for cause when the juror was initially opposed to the death penalty, but later stated she could consider it in an appropriate case. In the present case, the record reflects that the jurors excused for cause did not later state that they could or would even consider the death penalty. ¶32. The State in its argument, relies on the cases of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), as authority. The Adams-Witt standard was adopted by this Court in Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 755 (Miss. 1992), and Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 128 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d 590, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2882, 112 S. Ct. 1970, 60 U.S.L.W. 3781 (1992). In both Balfour and Hansen, this Court considered the holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Witherspoon line of cases establishes the general proposition that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (reaffirmed in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)). ¶33. Stated another way, a prospective juror merely stating general objections or expressing conscientious or religious scruples against inflicting the death penalty is not enough for that juror to be excused for cause. Willie v. State , 585 So. 2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968)). If a juror who is opposed to the death penalty indicates that, if convinced of a defendant's guilt, he could return a verdict of guilty which might result in the death penalty, then the juror cannot be struck from the jury. Willie, 585 So. 2d at 672-73. However, if a prospective juror is irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances, then the prospective juror can be struck from the jury. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n.21; Williamson v. State, 512 So. 2d 868, 881 (Miss. 1987). ¶34. This Court recognizes that it is often difficult for a juror to express in precise terms his or her feelings about, understanding of, and willingness to impose the death penalty. This difficulty of verbally expressing such views, of course, makes the interpretation of the juror's voir dire extremely difficult. We, therefore, look to not only the ruling but the setting and time devoted to the questions, and the opportunity of sequestered voir dire. Finally, we also examine and consider the overall care and concern given to developing the issues to be determined by the voir dire. The record in the present case reflects the State's concerns with these jurors serving in a capital case and fully supports the trial court's removal of these venire members. ¶35. In addition, Simon in a footnote raises as error the court's removal of Vicki Davis, over defense objection, when Davis stated that she had to leave court at 6:15 p.m. the day jury selection was taking place. Simon provides no authority for challenging this dismissal and the record clearly indicates that the trial court closely examined Davis' need to leave. It was after 6:00 p.m. when Davis requested permission to leave and the court dismissed her at 6:10 p.m. so that she would have ample time to drive home and administer a shot to her grandmother. ¶36. In reviewing each excusal for cause, it is readily apparent that the trial court was careful and cautious in exercising the court's discretion and did not abuse that discretion in removing these members from the venire. There is no merit to this issue and we therefore affirm. II. DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN TRANSFERRING VENUE TO DESOTO COUNTY? A. DID THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SIMON'S DEMAND TO BE TRIED IN QUITMAN COUNTY DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A TRIAL IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE ALLEGED OFFENSE OCCURRED? ¶37. Prior to Simon's second trial and after he was convicted and sentenced in Jones County, Simon moved for a change of venue from Jones County. The trial court granted Simon's request and ordered the change to DeSoto County. Once in DeSoto County, and one week prior to the commencement of trial, Simon moved again for a change of venue, stating that: (1) DeSoto County was not racially comparable to Quitman County -- where the crimes occurred; and (2) there was a disproportionate amount of pre-trial publicity in the area. However, Simon's motion was not heard at this time, as Simon failed to attach the requisite affidavit. During the first day of trial and immediately prior to voir dire, Simon moved again for a change of venue to Quitman County, this time including a sworn affidavit. After a lengthy discussion of this matter, the trial court gave an extensive ruling and denied Simon's second request for change of venue. In part the trial court held: [O]riginally, there was a change of venue motion from Quitman County to some other County, and when that motion was filed, the Court did grant it based on the allegations that because of the widespread publicity in Quitman County and because of the close proximity of this to all citizens of Quitman County, there was a strong likelihood that the defendant could not receive a fair and impartial jury in that County. The Court concurred with that and granted the motion. The Court still concurs with that. I think it goes without saying if it was true then, it's true now, and nothing that has transpired in the meantime has changed it. Quitman County, in the opinion of this Court, is not the appropriate place to try this case. Based on that, the Court did grant the motion and changed venue to this County, DeSoto County, Mississippi. DeSoto County has the facilities for handling cases of this sort, that's something the Court has to look for. . . . The Jackson papers were -- certainly go throughout the state, the Commercial Appeal goes throughout at least a northern portion of the state and into certain parts of the southern portion, the coastal newspapers, another local newspaper such as the Laurel Leader Call, the Hattiesburg papers and the Meridian papers and we were trying this case in Jones County, which is about half way in between the -- well, Laurel is about half way in between Hattiesburg and Meridian, certainly they're close, their radio station services the same area. Frankly, there's no area in the State of Mississippi that the Court feels would be totally without coverage by these various news media. I don't believe that, generally speaking, the people in DeSoto County have had any more coverage than the people say in Bolivar County or Hinds County or Jones County or Humphreys County or Jackson County. This has been a highly publicized case, it will continue to be. . . . The Court recognizes that it is a constitutional right to be tried in the County of your -- where the case is based and where the Defendant is a resident, but in this case, the Defendant waived that when he asked for a change of venue and the Court concurred and thought the reason was correct. . . . In this case, it's been waived and not unwaived and there was a real basis for it, faction basis that this Court acted on. . . . I do not believe there's any guarantee under the Constitution or any other law of any sort that guarantees a particular racial composition to any jury. I believe that there is such -- I do not believe that there is such. When you ask for a change, you're asking for a change to persons who are not connected, who have no reason to be prejudiced or favor one side or the other, they're not close enough to it. We don't really know what the persons in the jury, potential jury here in DeSoto County will say. We do know that we couldn't tell until we question them about their feelings about this case one way or the other. . . . As far as information is concerned that's contained in the newspapers, particularly since the Carr trial, certainly the Carr trial received publicity. The first Simon trial received extensive publicity, conceivably not as much as the Carr trial, but certainly enough to be well known throughout this state, this area, any part of the state you go to. I think it will be covered just about as well as the other. A lot of information that was released to the general public was released under the order of the Mississippi Supreme Court when they declared that all the information from the Carr trial would be released after his jury was seated, and the Court had full knowledge that these were co-defendants, that the same evidence, the same publicity, the same witness to a great extent, everything was the same in these two cases. I would assume the Mississippi Supreme Court knew what would happen when that information was released, I would hope so. This Court made every effort to see that these files were closed and kept closed, and it was at the motion of the Defense, and the Court preferred to go with the newspapers. . . . . . . At any rate the Court does not feel that changing venue back to Quitman County would be appropriate. The Court does feel until shown otherwise that DeSoto County will be as good a place to try this case as any other place, frankly better as far as the Court can see or it wouldn't have brought it here to begin with, certainly because of the availability of facilities, personnel, the willingness of them to try it, the availability of the courthouse and the convenience of all persons concerned. As I stated, I do not feel that there's any reason to think that we have to guarantee any particular makeup of any particular jury. The same argument was made in Jones County. I think Jones County was approximately the same -- maybe the same makeup as DeSoto County. I believe the claim has been made that DeSoto was somewhere between 20 and 25 percent; Jones County was something about that. We did have two black jurors and the defendant did not received the death penalty as everyone knows. I do not know what will happen in DeSoto County. it always depends on how the jury falls and who's drawn and that's by -- under the laws of the State of Mississippi and the United States government, they require that they be done at random. We have no control over that and don't want to have any control. The Court's rule, as far as the change of venue is concerned, feels like it's been made, it's appropriate that it stay here, should not be moved back to Quitman County, and the Court's rule of that portion of the motion is denied. And with regard to a continuance, the Court feels there has certainly been publicity about this case, there was publicity about this case when we transferred the first of the trials in this case for the four charges against Mr. Simon to Jones County, a claim was made that immediately that would bring on publicity in Jones County and it did, and the same thing has happened wherever it's been, and it's been the same rehash of what has taken place every time. The press has seen fit to quote everything about this case that they could remember from the beginning to the end. As stated, this Court has made every effort to have as little publicity about this case and as little prejudicial publicity about it as it possibly could, and it was not through the efforts of the Defense of the Court or the State that this was not always carried out. I don't think that anything would be availed by postponing the case. As soon as it was announced it was going to be tried next December or whenever we might set it, the same publicity would be extant again or continue to be extant. It's a prominent case, it has always been and will continue to be as long as it's around to be tried, and the only thing this Court knows is to go ahead with the case and complete it, . . . ¶38. On appeal to this Court, Simon characterizes his second motion for change of venue as a conditional motion to change venue, conditioned on the right to be tried in the county where the offense occurred in the event the trial court moved the cause to a county less favorable than Quitman County. Simon argues that because the racial composition of DeSoto County was 83.2% white and 15.2% black, it was improper and reversible error for the court to move the cause to that county. Simon argues that because DeSoto County was only 40 miles from where the crimes occurred and that DeSoto County was saturated with pre-trial publicity that he should have been tried in Quitman County, the county where the offenses occurred even though it, too, had been saturated with the same publicity, because Quitman County's racial composition was more closely aligned. (Quitman County's population was 53.6% black and 45.1% white). ¶39. Simon, as part of his appeal in Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407 (Miss. 1993), vacated on other grounds, Simon v. Mississippi, 115 S.Ct. 413, 130 L.Ed.2d 329, 63 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S.Miss. Oct. 31, 1994) (hereinafter referred to as Simon I), argued that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a second change of venue. Prior to Simon's trial in Simon I, on the indictment for the capital murder (committed in the course of arson, sexual battery and kidnaping) of Charlotte Parker, he moved for and was granted a change of venue from Quitman County to Jones County. During the course of trial, Simon objected to the specific venue of Jones County. Simon contended that Jones County with 21% of the registered voters being black was not racially comparable to Quitman County with 54% of the registered voters being black. On this basis, Simon requested a second change of venue, which the trial court denied. Simon was tried, convicted and received sentences of 30 years for sexual battery, 30 years for kidnaping and a life sentence for murder in Jones County. On appeal, this Court addressed Simon's second motion for change of venue, stating that: The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides for a trial by an impartial jury. However, as we noted in Britt v. State, Although the defendant does have a right to be tried by a jury whose members were selected pursuant to a nondiscriminatory criteria, the Batson court noted that the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has never been held to require that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the populations. Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d at 412. ¶40. The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is fundamental and essential to our form of government. It is a right guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Johnson v. State, 476 So. 2d 1195, 1209 (Miss. 1985) (citing Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 72 So. 2d 211 (1954)). The accused has a right to a change of venue when it is doubtful that an impartial jury can be obtained; such doubt is implicit when there is strong public sentiment against the defendant. . . . Johnson, 476 So. 2d at 1210-11. ¶41. At first glance, it appears that Simon was forum-shopping. The question on appeal is not whether the trial court erred in granting the change of venue motion, but rather whether the trial court erred in granting the motion and moving the case to DeSoto County, a county where the racial composition was disproportionate to that of Quitman County. In other words, should the trial court have moved the trial (a second time) to a county with a similar racial composition to that of Quitman county. We look again to this Court's decision in Simon I, wherein Chief Justice Hawkins wrote: Simon cites no cases to support his contention he was entitled to a second change of venue to a county with a population similar to Quitman County. Indeed the United States Supreme Court declined to make such a requirement incumbent on the states in the case of Mallett v. Missouri, 769 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. 1989), cert. denied 494 U.S. 1009, 110 S. Ct. 1308, 108 L.Ed.2d 484 (1990). Simon I, 633 So. 2d at 412. ¶42. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the granting of a change of venue is a matter so largely in discretion [sic] of the trial court that a judgment of conviction will not be reversed on appeal on the ground that a change of venue was refused, unless it clearly appears that trial [sic] court abused its discretion. Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 454 (Miss. 1984) (quoting Parks v. State, 267 So. 2d 302, 304 (Miss. 1972)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985). This Court later refined this discretionary standard in Fisher v. State: We have repeatedly held that the matter of whether venue should be changed in a criminal proceeding is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., Winters v. State, 473 So. 2d 452, 457 (Miss. 1985); Cabello v. State, 471 So. 2d 332, 339 (Miss. 1985); West v. State, 463 So. 2d 1048, 1053-54 (Miss. 1985); Billiot v. State, 454 So. 2d 445, 454 (Miss. 1984). A corollary premise is that we will not reverse for failure to grant a change of venue unless the trial judge has abused his discretion. We have repeated these notions so often in recent years that we have tended to overlook that the venue decision is committed to the trial court's sound discretion, not his unfettered discretion. . .. The sound exercise of the discretion vested in the trial judge when faced with a motion for change of venue must be informed by the evidence presented at the venue hearing coupled with the trial judge's reasoned application of his sense of the community and, particularly in a case such as this, an awareness of the uncontrovertible impact of saturation media publicity upon the attitudes of the community. . . . A venire drawn from a fair-cross section of the community in theory and in fact is supposed to, and generally will, represent that community and reflect the biases and prejudices of that community-as every judge and lawyer who has ever picked a jury well knows. Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 215 (Miss. 1985). ¶43. The Simon cases generated an enormous amount of publicity throughout the State of Mississippi. It is unlikely that a change of venue to other areas in this State would have resulted in a venire comprised of members who had not heard about the case in some form or fashion. The venire chosen in DeSoto County was thoroughly examined and questioned about whether they had been exposed to any form of publicity. The venire was questioned about their amount of exposure to any of the various forms of publicity. In addition, if any member was exposed, they were also questioned about whether such publicity would influence or affect their impartiality. The linchpin is whether the venire members stated that they could be fair and impartial jurors if chosen. See King v. State, 421 So. 2d 1009, 1016 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919 (1983); Armstrong v. State, 214 So. 2d 589, 593 (Miss. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965 (1969). The record reflects that each of the impaneled jury members affirmatively stated that they could serve as fair and impartial jurors. ¶44. As the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Simon's second motion for a change of venue and moving the cause to DeSoto County, we affirm. B. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERR IN REFUSING SIMON'S REQUEST FOR INDIVIDUAL VOIR DIRE? ¶45. There was no occasion where Simon requested individual voir dire and was denied. The trial judge conducted a general voir dire of jurors. ¶46. The trial court asked the entire venire several questions surrounding the extent of pre-trial publicity and specifically asked the prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial jurors. There was an announcement by the court and seemingly an understanding by all parties that individual and sequestered voir dire would be held in chambers for those venire members answering affirmatively to questions concerning exposure to the various forms of publicity. Indeed, the record reflects that certain veniremen were called into chambers for individualized questioning. Mr. Dennis and Mr. Wilkes were both brought into chambers for further examination of their views and about their respective ability to serve as fair and impartial jurors. ¶47. This Court, in Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 126 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 118 L. Ed. 2d 590, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2882, 112 S. Ct. 1970, 60 U.S.L.W. 3781 (1992), held that a circuit court may in its discretion allow individualized and sequestered voir dire. ¶48. Simon, as he did in Simon I, his prior appeal, argues that because of the vast amount of pre-trial publicity, there was a need for individualized and sequestered voir dire. Simon contends that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to conduct individualized and sequestered voir dire pursuant to Rule 5.02 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Simon further contends that because of the publicity, the court erred in accepting at face value the answers and assurances of the venire. In support Simon relies on Fisher v. State, 481 So. 2d 203, 222 (Miss. 1985), wherein this Court held that the trial judge further erred in accepting at face value the assurances of then jurors impaneled that they could ignore what they heard . . . Id. at 222. (emphasis added) Therefore, this Court determined that Fisher was unable to receive a fair trial because of the publicity and venue of this case should have been transferred to a county substantially outside the coverage area. Id. at 223. The record in the present case reflects that the venire was thoroughly questioned by both a pre-trial questionnaire and examination once in the courtroom. The record further supports the fact that none of the jurors impaneled, when asked during voir dire, stated that the media coverage would impair their ability to be fair and remain objective. Further, the record reflects that only four of the jurors for this case responded affirmatively that they had heard, read or seen this case discussed in the papers and on television. ¶49. The State submits that the issue of whether a juror can be fair and impartial is the primary focus and can be determined without sequestration. The State cites Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991), wherein the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. In Mu'Min, there was an extensive amount of publicity surrounding the trial. While eight of the twelve jury members who served, affirmatively answered that they had either read or heard something about the case, all of the jury members said that they had not formed an opinion about the case. Further, they stated that what they had read or heard would not affect their ability to perform their duties as jurors in the case. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 419-20. ¶50. The petitioner Mu'Min alleged that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court refused to further question certain jurors about the specific contents of what they read or heard. The United States Supreme Court held that questions pertaining to the content of pretrial publicity to which a juror had been exposed is not constitutionally required. Id. at 425. The Court stated that such questions are constitutionally required only if the trial court's failure to ask such questions renders the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. Mu'Min, 500 U.S. at 426 (citation omitted). The Court also noted that trial courts are given a wide range of discretion in conducting voir dire in the area of pre-trial publicity. Id. at 427. ¶51. After considering all the evidence, we find that the trial court did not commit reversible error, as certain venire members were subject to individualized and sequestered voir dire. This issue is without merit, and we therefore affirm. C. DID THE TRIAL JUDGE'S TRANSFER OF SIMON'S TRIAL FROM PREDOMINANTLY BLACK QUITMAN COUNTY TO VIRTUALLY ALL-WHITE DESOTO COUNTY RAISE AN INFERENCE OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WHICH THE STATE FAILED TO REBUT? ¶52. Simon contends that because the trial was moved to a predominantly white county, he was denied a trial by a fair and impartial jury. ¶53. The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States mandates that all defendants receive a trial by an impartial jury. In Britt v. State, 520 So. 2d 1377 (Miss. 1988), Appellant claimed that he was denied a fair trial as there was not a cross-section of his community present in the seated jury. Appellant also alleged that the State systematically excluded men as jurors. This Court held that [a]lthough the defendant does have a right to be tried by a jury whose members were selected pursuant to a non-discriminatory criteria, . . . the Sixth Amendment . . . has never been held to require that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. Britt, 520 So. 2d at 1379 (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)). ¶54. Furthermore, in Lanier v. State, 533 So. 2d 473 (Miss. 1988), this Court outlined the elements necessary to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement for an impartial jury: 1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; 2) the representation of this group in vineries from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and 3) this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Lanier, 533 So. 2d at 477 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)). ¶55. Case law supports the State's argument that Simon was not entitled to a racially comparable jury and that there was no showing of systematic exclusion. The impaneled jury was comprised of 12 females, 1 black and 11 white. The three alternates were also females and were all white. ¶56. Furthermore, the facts demonstrate that: (1) the clerk of the court drew the venire in random fashion; (2) the black voter registration for DeSoto County was in the area of 15% and therefore 9 of the 105 members being black is considered a fair representation; and (3) Simon failed to show or offer any evidence that the State engaged in systematic exclusion of a particular race. ¶57. Our case law is clear in that there is no constitutional right to be tried by a jury that absolutely mirrors any particular community. Simon alleges that the trial, if not moved to a racially comparable county, should have been moved back to Quitman County. However, the fact that he now complains of prejudice because of the proximity of DeSoto County to the crime scene is without merit. A defendant's motion for a change of venue effectively waives his right to be tried in the county where the crimes occurred. See Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 26 (1890). ¶58. Upon closer examination of Simon's argument, it appears Simon wanted the both of best worlds: if he could not move the case from Jones County to a county that he approved of, he wanted the case heard in the county where the offense occurred, and Simon did not attempt to withdraw the motion until the court had acted on this motion by granting the change of venue. The Court notes that the same strategy was attempted in Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407 (Miss. 1993), vacated on other grounds, Simon v. Mississippi, 115 S.Ct. 413, 130 L.Ed.2d 329, 63 U.S.L.W. 3346 (U.S.Miss. Oct. 31, 1994), (Simon I). However, we hold that Simon waived his right to be tried in Quitman County when he first moved for the change of venue. In addition, Simon wanted the case moved to a court where there had been little to no pre-trial publicity. The trial court commented on the vast publicity generated by both the Simon and Carr trials and that such publicity saturated the majority of, if not the entire State. It would have been a difficult task for the trial court to move the case to a county in this State that had not been exposed to a fair amount of media coverage. ¶59. The record discloses that the trial court sufficiently guarded against empaneling a biased jury. Therefore, this issue is affirmed. D. DID THE PRETRIAL PUBLICITY, TOGETHER WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO APPROVE INDIVIDUAL SEQUESTERED VOIR DIRE, DEPRIVE SIMON OF HIS RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL ON GUILT AND PUNISHMENT? ¶60. Simon was never denied any sequestered voir dire that he requested. Simon's argument pertaining to the trial court's refusal to allow individual sequestered voir dire has been previously addressed within assignment I and assignment II, part B. Therefore, this discussion is limited to Simon's argument surrounding the change of venue based solely on the pre-trial publicity. ¶61. In each of Simon's trials, there was a change of venue granted due to the publicity generated from the case. In Simon I from Quitman County to Jones County and in the present case from Jones County to DeSoto County. This Court held in Simon I, Simon's motion for a change in venue because of wide-spread publicity generated by this case was granted. Nothing in our constitutions, statutes, or case law gives a criminal defendant the right to obtain a venue of his choosing by making repeated motions for a change of venue. Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d at 412. As the same reasoning is applicable to Simon's present appeal, this issue is without merit and is therefore affirmed. V. DID THE PROSECUTOR OFFER A PATENTLY PRETEXTUAL EXPLANATION FOR HIS PEREMPTORY REMOVAL OF ONE OF THE TWO PROSPECTIVE BLACK JURORS FROM THE QUALIFIED VENIRE? ¶62. Simon, a black male, was convicted by a jury comprised entirely of women, both black and white. Of the twelve members, one was a black citizen. The three alternates, all white, were also women. Simon challenges the trial court's findings pertaining to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to remove venire member, Ms. Annie Jamison (number 19). ¶63. During the course of juror selection, Simon objected to the State's peremptory challenge of Jamison and alleged that the prosecution violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by improperly striking Jamison, one of the only two black venire members.(8) The State in response to the defense's Batson assertion, offered the following reasons for removing Jamison: (1) the State earlier accepted number 26, a black; (2) Jamison looked intimidated when the State discussed the black-on-white nature of the crime and also stated that she looked intimidated when Walls asked whether the race situation would affect the jury; and (3) Jamison had two young children and a blind grandmother to care for while her husband worked the midnight shift. ¶64. The trial court was satisfied that the State provided a racially neutral reason to justify its challenge, and as such overruled the Batson objection, stating systematic exclusion had not been demonstrated by the exercise of a peremptory against Jamison. Simon challenges this determination, stating that the State offered a patently pretextual reason for the strike. The State counters this assertion stating that: (1) Simon failed to make out a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination; (2) the prosecutor was nonetheless required to offer a race neutral reason for the challenge; and (3) even if a prima facie showing had been made, the State's proffered reasons for the strike were sufficient, race-neutral reasons under the law. ¶65. The United State Supreme Court, in considering Batson v. Kentucky, set forth a three-prong test to be used in establishing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection: To establish such a case, the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire, members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.' Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude that veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury, as in the selection of the venire, raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. Batson, 176 U.S. at 35 (citations omitted). ¶66. Mississippi in adopting the test set forth in Batson, recognized the importance of credibility issues raised by a Batson challenge and has elaborated further stating: We today follow the lead of other courts who have considered this issue and hold that a trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be given great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Lockett v. State, 517 So. 2d 1346, 1340 (Miss. 1987) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988). ¶67. In addition to this Court's holding concerning the Batson test, the Lockett opinion included an appendix containing numerous examples of acceptable race-neutral reasons which the prosecution could assert in justifying the use of its peremptory challenges. Id. at 1356. ¶68. As Simon is black and the State challenged a prospective black juror, the first two prongs of the Batson test are satisfied. The remaining hurdle required by the test is a showing of intent on the part of the State to use its peremptory challenges for the purpose of excluding minorities. As long as the trial court was within its authority when it determined that the State articulated a 'neutral non-race based explanation', we will not reverse. Willie v. State , 585 So. 2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991) (quoting Chisolm v. State, 529 So. 2d 635, 639 (Miss. 1988)). The trial courts of this State are afforded a great deal of deference by this Court in their findings of fact surrounding a Batson challenge. Willie, 585 So. 2d at 1283. ¶69. The trial court was satisfied that the State offered a racially neutral reason for its challenge against Jamison; she had numerous other responsibilities in caring for family members. The trial court's ruling that the defense failed to show systematic exclusion on the part of the State comports with the holdings set forth in Willie and Lockett. This decision on the part of the trial court should not be viewed as clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Lockett, 517 So. 2d at 1349-50. Furthermore, great deference should be given to the trial court's findings as these findings turn largely on credibility. Lockett, 517 So. 2d at 1350; Willie, 585 So. 2d at 672. ¶70. The reasons offered by the prosecutor, together with the trial court's ruling, does not rise to the level of being clearly erroneous. Therefore, we hold that no reversible error resulted in the State's exercising a peremptory challenge against Annie Jamison.