Opinion ID: 1895681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Constitution Issue

Text: Section 93, Alabama Constitution of 1901, as amended by Amendment No. 58, prohibits the state from being interested in any private or corporate enterprise or from lending money or its credit to any individual, association, or corporation. Edmonson v. State Indus. Dev. Auth., 279 Ala. 206, 184 So.2d 115 (1966). This section has been interpreted as banning the state or other public entities of the state from engaging in private enterprise. Edmonson. Section 94, as amended by Amendment No. 112, prohibits the legislature from authorizing any subdivision of this state to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association, or corporation whatsoever. Sections 93 and 94 have been interpreted as allowing the appropriation of public revenues in the aid of an individual, association, or corporation only when the appropriation is for a public purpose. Board of Revenue & Road Comm'rs of Mobile County v. Puckett, 227 Ala. 374, 149 So. 850 (1933); Opinion of the Justices No. 269, 384 So.2d 1051 (Ala. 1980); Opinion of the Justices No. 261, 373 So.2d 290 (Ala.1979). Thus, for instance, the state or other public entities may donate public money or other things of value to a volunteer fire department or a rescue squad because these are organizations that benefit the general public and are not engaged in private enterprise and therefore have a lawful public purpose. Opinion of the Justices No. 261, 373 So.2d at 292. In Opinion of the Justices No. 269, 384 So.2d 1051, this Court was asked whether the appropriation of state funds to nonstate agencies and organizations was for a public purpose and, thus, did not violate §§ 93 and 94 of our constitution, as interpreted by Puckett, supra. Although we were unable to give an advisory opinion because the question asked presented a mixed question of law and fact, we did provide guidelines as to what constituted a public purpose. Quoting Clifford v. City of Cheyenne, 487 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Wyo.1971), we stated that, generally speaking, a public purpose has for its objective the promotion of public health, safety, morals, security, prosperity, contentment, and the general welfare of the community. 384 So.2d at 1053 (citations omitted). The paramount test should be whether the expenditure confers a direct public benefit of a reasonably general character, that is to say, to a significant part of the public, as distinguished from a remote and theoretical benefit.... The trend among the modern courts is to give the term `public purpose' a broad expansive definition. Id. [T]he question of whether or not an appropriation was for a public purpose [is] largely within the legislative domain rather than within the domain of the courts. Id. at 1052; Opinion of the Justices No. 261, 373 So.2d 290; Puckett, supra. The Legislature has to a great extent the right to determine the question, and its determination is conclusive when it does not clearly appear to be wrong, assuming that we have a right to differ with them in their finding.... Taken on its face, it is our duty to assume that the Legislature acted within constitutional limits and did not make a donation, when such construction is not inconsistent with the recitals of the act. Puckett, supra, 227 Ala. at 377-78, 149 So. at 852. Our earlier decisions deferred to the legislature's determination that the appropriations were for a public purpose. The trial court, in its summary judgment order, relied on these decisions in giving deference to the Commission's determination, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, that its support of Stewards was for a public purpose in a broad, general sense. The trial court found that Slawson and Furman did not meet their burden of proving that the Commission's support of Stewards was clearly wrong, illegal, or unconstitutional. Slawson and Furman argue that the Commission's support of Stewards through the use of state funds, resources, and personnel does not confer a direct public benefit of a reasonably general character upon the people of Alabama. The legislature has given the Alabama Forestry Commission authority to give such advice, assistance and cooperation as may be practicable to private landowners and promote, so far as it may be able, a proper appreciation in this state among all classes of the population of the benefits to be derived from forest culture, preservation, and use. Code 1975, § 9-13-3(a). The Commission's October 7, 1992, resolution indicates that, in its opinion, Stewards' goals are compatible with the objectives of the Forestry Commission. Moody, in his affidavit in support of the defendants' summary judgment motion, states: [A]ll the actions of the Forestry Commission are designed to promote the public good by maintaining healthy forests. One way we do this is by helping private landowners to develop and maintain environmentally healthy and economically sound forests. We are convinced that activities of Stewards of Family Farms, Ranches and Forests will complement, and in no way conflict with, this mission. Applying a broad, expansive definition of public purpose, the trial court determined that Slawson and Furman had failed to clearly prove that the Commission's support for Stewards was not for a public purpose. In reviewing the judgment of a trial court, this Court will not presume error and will affirm the trial court's judgment if it is supported by any valid legal ground. Turner v. Clutts, 565 So.2d 92, 94 (Ala.1990); Odom v. Blackburn, 559 So.2d 1080 (Ala. 1990). We cannot say that the trial court erred by giving deference to the Commission's determination that its support of Stewards was for a proper public purpose. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment that the Commission's support of Stewards did not violate §§ 93 and 94 of the Alabama Constitution.