Opinion ID: 789126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Requirement of Additional Statistical Evidence

Text: 44 The panel opinion discounted the evidence Williams presented because he failed to allege certain additional details concerning the prosecutor's use of challenges and the venire composition. In doing so, the opinion strayed on two counts: 1) Williams did allege some of the facts that the panel faulted him for failing to provide; and 2) there is no case, and the opinion cited none, that supports any conclusion that such additional allegations are mandatory. Indeed, a finding that Williams failed to make a prima facie showing predicated upon his failure to allege certain details regarding the composition of the jury venire directly conflicts with both the substance and the spirit of Batson. 45 In explaining its refusal to grant a COA on the Batson claim, the panel stated: Although a pattern of strikes against African-Americans provides support for an inference of discrimination, Williams must point to more facts than the number of African-Americans struck to establish such a pattern. ... Statistical facts like a high proportion of African-Americans struck and a disproportionate rate of strikes against African-Americans can establish a pattern of exclusion on the basis of race that gives rise to a prima facie Batson violation. Williams I, 384 F.3d at 584 (internal citation omitted). The panel went on to assert, incorrectly, that Williams did not provide such statistical facts. Id. This characterization substantially misrepresents Williams' claim, for Williams has repeatedly alleged, and the record shows, that the prosecutor struck 100% (3 out of 3) of the African-Americans questioned by the parties, and exercised 3 out of 22(14%) of his peremptory challenges against African-Americans. Nevertheless, the panel faulted Williams for failing to allege additional facts, such as how many African-Americans were in the venire, and how large the venire was. Id. The panel opined that without such additional facts, it is impossible to say whether any statistical disparity existed that might support an inference of discrimination. Id. Although Williams did not provide these particular bits of information about the venire, the provision of such information is neither mandatory nor particularly informative. 5 46 While statistical analysis is a way to create the necessary inference of discrimination, it is not the only way. As noted above, we have often reiterated that [t]o establish a prima facie case, [the defendant does] not need to show that the prosecution had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory strikes against more than one prospective juror. We have held that the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that evidence of a pattern of discrimination is not necessary where other evidence reveals discriminatory motive in challenging jurors exists). If evidence of a pattern of discrimination is not a prerequisite for a prima facie Batson case, surely statistical-pattern evidence is not a prerequisite either. 47 Imposition of specific evidentiary requirements for a Batson prima facie showing directly conflicts with the Third Circuit's holding in Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707 (3d Cir.2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 410, 160 L.Ed.2d 352 (2004) (NO. 04-101). Rejecting Pennsylvania's imposition of comparable evidentiary requirements, the Third Circuit explained: 48 Notably absent from the Batson discussion of the prima facie case is any call for trial judges to seek the type of statistical accounting required by [Pennsylvania's evidentiary] rule nor do we see how such an accounting fits within Batson's first step. A trial judge undoubtedly might find in a given case that a full accounting regarding the race of the venire and the jurors struck would be helpful at the third stage of the Batson analysis, after it has heard the prosecutor's explanation for the strikes and must determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. But requiring the presentation of such a record simply to move past the first stage in the Batson analysis places an undue burden upon the defendant. 49 Holloway, 355 F.3d at 728 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hughes, 880 F.2d 101, 102 (8th Cir.1989) (we have never held that the Supreme Court contemplated the use of a purely numerical formula in determining the existence of a Batson prima facie case); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir.1987) (prima facie case established even though we are here concerned with only a single juror). 50 In sum, this case should have been reviewed as Batson and Swain require: the correct prima facie standard should have been applied; all of the relevant evidence should have been considered, including the pattern-or-practice evidence relating to this prosecutor; and Williams should not have been penalized for a lack of certain nonmandatory details in his proof, particularly since he was refused discovery.