Opinion ID: 6341873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proper Standard of Review

Text: As explained above, the standard of review a district court must apply to the denial of a § 1782 application turns on whether the magistrate judge’s decision was dispositive within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 636. The parties have not directed us to any published decision by a federal court of appeals directly addressing this question. 6 CPC’s opening 466 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Whether the magistrate judge’s order to compel discovery was dispositive or non-dispositive in this unusual proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, it was not a final appealable order until the district court acted on it.”). 6 CPC’s opening brief claimed that the Second Circuit has “recognized that an order on a § 1782 petition is a dispositive ruling,” 10 CPC PATENT TECH. V. APPLE brief relied heavily on a separate opinion by a member of our court, Judge Callahan, concluding that a motion to quash a § 1782 subpoena is a case-dispositive matter. See Khrapunov v. Prosyankin, 931 F.3d 922, 931 & n.3 (9th Cir. 2019) (Callahan, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting). Having considered the issue independently, we agree with the relevant portions of Judge Callahan’s analysis, 7 and conclude that the district court should have treated the magistrate judge’s order as a non-binding recommendation and applied the de novo standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). citing Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2011). However, Berlinger held only that “an order granting or denying discovery” under § 1782 is an appealable final decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 629 F.3d at 306. It did not address whether such an order is dispositive, or even involve a magistrate judge at all. As for Apple, its answering brief claimed that our court has already spoken to the proper standard of review in § 1782 cases. That is incorrect for the reasons given in Part II.c of this opinion, and Apple admitted at oral argument that we are faced with “a case of first impression.” 7 CPC and Apple disagree as to what label (and, by implication, authoritative weight) we should apply to Judge Callahan’s separate opinion. What matters for our purposes is that the relevant portions of Judge Callahan’s opinion did not conflict with the majority opinion, which did not address the issue we resolve today. See Khaprunov, 931 F.3d at 923, 925–26 (vacating and remanding for further fact-finding without discussing standard of review); see also id. at 926 (N.R. Smith,