Opinion ID: 8414968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in approving the settlement agreements.

Text: Both Speedway and Alkon appeal the district court’s order approving the remaining 28 settlement agreements. And Alkon additionally appeals the district court’s order approving the Costco Agreement. But before we may consider the merits of their challenges, we must first determine whether Speedway and Alkon have standing to advance them. A. Although Speedway lacks standing to object to any of the settlement agreements, Alkon has standing to challenge 10 of them. Speedway asserts that it objected to all of the settlement agreements except the Costco agreement. But the district court concluded that Speedway failed to demonstrate it had Article III standing to challenge any of them. Speedway challenges this ruling on appeal, arguing that (1) it has standing under the plain-legal-preju-' dice doctrine; (2) it has standing under Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269 (2011); and (3) it has standing to challenge eight of the settlement agreements as a member of the underlying settlement classes. “The doctrine of standing is ‘an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 111 ....’” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). To establish standing, a party must demonstrate (among other things) an “injury in fact,” id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130)—i.e., “an invasion of a legally protected interest,” id. Non-settling defendants like Speedway “generally have no standing to complain about a settlement.” Weinman v. Fid. Capital Appreciation Fund (In re Integra Realty Res., Inc.), 262 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Transamerican Ref. Corp. v. Dravo Corp., 952 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1992)). That’s because they lack “a legally protected interest in the settlement” and therefore can’t satisfy Article Ill’s injury-in-fact requirement. Id. But as Speedway points out, “[e]ourts have recognized a limited exception to this rule where nonsettling parties can'demonstrate they are ‘prejudiced’ by a settlement.” Id. “ ‘[Prejudice’ in this context means ‘plain legal prejudice,’ as when ‘the settlement strips the party of a legal claim or cause of action.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Here, Speedway asserts it qualifies for this exception because (1) “the settlements prejudice [its] legal right to conduct business as [it has] historically done and as currently authorized by law,” Spdwy. Aplt. Br. 48; and (2) the settlements burden its speech. But as the plaintiffs suggest, these alleged injuries don’t rise to the level of plain legal prejudice as we have defined it. 4 See New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that plain legal prejudice “inelude[s] any interference with a party’s contract rights or a party’s ability to seek contribution or indemnification,” and that “[a] party also suffers plain legal prejudice if the settlement strips the party of a legal claim or cause of action, such as a cross[-]claim or the right to present relevant evidence at trial” (quoting Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1102-03)). Thus, we agree with the district court that Speedway lacks standing to object to any of the settlements on this basis. Alternatively, Speedway cites Bond, 564 U.S. 211, 131 S.Ct. 2355, 180 L.Ed.2d 269, for the proposition that “when a federal branch [of government] acts in excess of its delegated power[s],” then individuals who are “adversely affected ... have standing to object.” Spdwy. Aplt. Br. 52. Because Speedway alleges that (1) the district court acted in excess of its delegated powers by approving the settlements, and (2) the settlements adversely affect Speedway, it argues that it has standing to object to the settlements under Bond. First, we question whether Speedway adequately preserved this argument for appeal; below, Speedway confined its analysis of Bond to a one-paragraph footnote. Cf. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Arguments raised in a perfunctory manner, such as in a footnote, are waived.”). Perhaps that explains why the district court didn’t address it. And perhaps we need not address it either. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”); Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 454 F.3d 1128, 1142 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to address issue that district court didn’t rule on, even though parties fully briefed it below). In any event, even if we assume Speedway preserved this argument for appeal, it conflates Article III standing, which is at issue here, with prudential standing, which was at issue in Bond. See Sac & Fox Nation of Mo. v. Pierce, 213 F.3d 566, 573 (10th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between Article III standing and prudential standing and explaining that, under latter doctrine, “a plaintiff generally must assert its own rights, rather than those belonging to third parties”). ■ In Bond, there was no question that the defendant had Article III standing to challenge the criminal statute at issue; her conviction under that statute resulted in her incarceration, and her incarceration “constitute^] a concrete injury” that was “redressable by invalidation of the conviction.” 564 U.S. at 217, 131 S.Ct. 2355 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)). Instead, the question in Bond was whether the defendant had prudential standing to challenge the statute on certain grounds. Citing the Tenth Amendment, id. at 214, 131 S.Ct. 2355, she attempted to challenge the statute on the basis that it “interferefd] with the powers reserved to States,” id. at 216, 131 S.Ct. 2355; see id. at 217, 220, 225, 131 S.Ct. 2355. Citing “the prudential rule that a party ‘generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights' or interests of third parties,’ ” Court-appointed amicus insisted this argument was one that the “States and States alone” could make. Id. at 220, 131 S.Ct. 2355 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). The Court disagreed, reasoning that “[t]he limitations ... federalism entails are not ... a matter of rights belonging only to the States”; rather, “[flederalism also protects the liberty of all persons within a State.” Id. at 222, 131 S.Ct. 2355. Accordingly, the Court held that there was “no basis in precedent or principle to deny [the defendant’s] standing to raise her claims.” Id. at 226, 131 S.Ct. 2355. But in doing so, the Court reiterated that “[a]n individual who challenges federal action on these grounds is, of course, subject to the Article III requirements.” Id. at 225, 131 S.Ct. 2355. And it’s those very “Article III requirements” that pose a problem for Speedway here. Id. As discussed above, “[n]on-settling defendants generally have no [Article III] standing to complain about a settlement,” Weinman, 262 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Transamerican Ref. Corp., 952 F.2d at 900), because they lack “a legally protected interest in the settlement” and therefore can’t satisfy Article Ill’s injury-in-fact requirement, id. And while there exists an exception to this general rule for parties that can demonstrate plain legal prejudice, see id., Speedway fails to satisfy that exception for the reasons discussed above. Finally, even assuming it ’ lacks standing to challenge all of the settlement agreements as a non-settling defendant, Speedway asserts that it nevertheless has class-member standing to challenge eight of those settlement agreements: Valero, Chevron, CITGO, Sinclair, Shell, Conoco-Phillips, BP, and Exxon. See Tennille v. W. Union Co., 785 F.3d 422, 429 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that objectors had standing because they were class members). The district court rejected Speedway’s class-member argument below. In doing so, it pointed out that the court’s Notice to Class Members outlined the following requirements for objecting to the settlements: “To object, you must send a letter via first class mail stating which Settlements) you object to and why. Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number and signature. You must mail the objection to [the Clerk of the Court, class counsel and defense counsel] no later than March 23, 2015.” App. vol. 27, 7522 (quoting App. vol. 27, 7547). On March 23, 2015, Speedway filed its initial objection. But according to the district court’s order, that objection “did not identify which settlement agreements [Speedway] objected to based on class membership.” App. vol. 27, 7523 (emphasis added). Instead, if merely asserted that (1) “[s]ome of the Objectors are members of the settlement classes as defined in some of the ... Settlements and have standing to object to those settlements for that reason as well,” App. vol. 20, 5513 (emphases added), and (2) because “some of objectors’ employees ... bought retail fuel while on business trips for which they were reimbursed by their respective companies ..., they are members of these settlement classes,” id. at 5514 (emphases added). And while Speedway appended a declaration to its objection in which a Marathon employee attests to purchasing gas while on official business, the district court noted that the declaration doesn’t “identify from which retailers [the employee] purchased fuel.” App. vol. 27, 7523. Based on these perceived deficiencies in Speedway’s objection, the district court ruled that Speedway “did not timely identify who was objecting based on class membership and to which settlements they objected.” Id. Thus, it concluded, Speedway’s “objections based on class membership [were] untimely and not properly before the [c]ourt.” Id. at 7524. On appeal, Speedway challenges the district court’s ruling, arguing that “[e]lass membership need not be supported with evidence at the time an objection is filed.” Spdwy. Aplt. Br. 47. But Speedway’s argument misconstrues the district court’s ruling. The district court didn’t find Speedway’s objection deficient because Speedway failed to prove class membership, as Speedway alleges. Instead, the district court found Speedway’s objection deficient because Speedway failed to “timely identify who was objecting based on class membership and to which settlements they objected.” App. vol. 27, 7523. In other words, the district court didn’t require Speedway to prove membership in any particular class; it merely required Speedway to' specifically allege (1) the class or classes of which it was a member, and (2) the settlements it was objecting to on that basis. And it found that Speedway failed to timely do so. In short, the district court concluded that Speedway’s “objections based on class membership” weren’t “properly before the [c]ourt” because Speedway failed to comply with the district court’s notice requirements. Id. at 7524. And Speedway makes no attempt in its opening brief to argue that such a decision was beyond the bounds of the district court’s discretion. 5 See In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 808-09 (5th Cir. 2014) (concluding that “district court plainly acted within its discretion” in declining to consider objections where objectors failed to timely comply with requirements of court’s “Preliminary Approval Order”). Under these circumstances, we won’t disturb the district court’s ruling that Speedway’s objections weren’t properly before it. See Reedy, 660 F.3d at 1274 (declining to address propriety of district court’s ruling because appellant failed to “challenge the court’s reasoning on th[at] point” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we decline to consider Speedway’s objections to the settlement agreements. That leaves Alkon. The plaintiffs don’t dispute that Alkon is indeed a member of 10 of the settlement classes: Costco, BP; Chevron, Citgo, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMo-bil, Shell, Sinclair, Sunoco, and Valero. Accordingly, Alkon has standing to challenge those 10 settlement agreements. See Tennille, 785 F.3d at 429 (noting that objectors had standing because they were class members). But Alkon doesn’t assert it hhs standing to challenge the remaining 19 settlement agreements, and has therefore waived any argument that it does. See Colo. Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper, 823 F.3d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we confíne our remaining analysis to Al-kon’s challenges to the 10 settlement agreements listed above. 6 In doing so, we “review the [district] court’s approval of the settlement agreements] for an abuse of discretion.” Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993)). To the extent that several of Alkon’s arguments present constitutional questions, our review is de novo. See Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1199 (10th Cir. 2000). B. The district court’s approval of the fund settlements doesn’t violate the First Amendment. The fund settlements set aside money for state regulators to defray the costs associated with enacting and implementing new regulatory programs for conversion to ATC. Alkon argues this aspect of the agreements requires absent class members to subsidize the plaintiffs’ lobbying efforts aimed at obtaining regulatory approval for ATC. And according to Alkon, this amounts to the “compelled funding of speech” in violation of the First Amendment. Spdwy. Aplt. Br. 37; see Aik. Aplt. Br. 45. But as the plaintiffs point out, the First Amendment only limits state—as opposed to private—action. Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite L.L.C., 430 F.3d 1269, 1276 (10th Cir. 2005). And the plaintiffs insist that neither the district court’s approval nor its potential enforcement of these private settlement agreements constitutes state action for purposes of the First Amendment. Cf. Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he mere confirmation of a private arbitration award by a district court is insufficient state action'to trigger the application of the Due Process Clause.”). Citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), Alkon disagrees. In Shelley, the Court held that a state court’s enforcement of private covenants designed to prevent people of color from purchasing real- estate constituted state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. 334 U.S. at 18-20, 68 S.Ct. 836. Under Shelley, Alkon argues, “[t]he judicial imprimatur of the approval orders ... demonstrate^]” that the settlement agreements at issue here “are more than merely private contracts.” Alk. Aplt. Br. 38. But as the plaintiffs note, courts have uniformly declined to extend Shelley beyond cases involving discrimination. See, e.g., Everett v. Paul Davis Restoration, Inc., 771 F.3d 380, 386 n.1 (7th Cir. 2014) (“However, Shelley’s holding has never been applied outside the context of race discrimination.”); Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that “Shelley’s attribution of state action to judicial enforcement has generally been confined to the context of discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause”); Davis, 59 F.3d at 1191 (“The holding of Shelley, however, has not been extended beyond the context of race discrimination.”); United Egg Producers v. Standard Brands, Inc., 44 F.3d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he reach of Shelley remains undefined outside of the racial discrimination context.”). Alkon doesn’t suggest that the settlement agreements implicate the Equal Protection Clause. Nor does it cite any cases extending Shelley outside of that context or present a reasoned argument why we should do so here. 7 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements doesn’t constitute state action. And absent any state action, Alkon’s First Amendment argument fails. See Dominion Video Satellite, Inc., 430 F.3d at 1276. C. The district court’s approval of the settlement agreements doesn’t violate Article III. Next, Alkon asserts that the settlement agreements violate Article III and separation of power principles for various reasons. Before we address the merits of some of these arguments, we first explain why we decline to address the merits of others. First, for the reasons discussed below, we decline to address Alkon’s assertion that the district court lacked Article III authority to approve the settlement agreements because (1) those settlement agreements don’t actually redress the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries; (2) whether the settlement agreements will actually provide any redress for the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries is contingent upon the actions of third-party actors, e.g., state legislatures; and (3) the settlement agreements aim to change the law, rather than to redress an injury caused by a violation of existing law. We agree with Alkon that, to establish Article III standing, “a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70, 104 S.Ct. 373, 78 L.Ed.2d 58 (1983). The problem is that Alkon makes no effort to explain how Article Ill’s redressability requirement operates in the context of a settlement agreement. Alkon appears to be suggesting that when the parties to a settlement agreement ultimately agree to a remedy that doesn’t actually and fully redress a plaintiffs alleged injury, that factor somehow operates to retroactively dissolve the plaintiffs Article III standing to bring-—and thus a federal court’s jurisdiction to hear— that plaintiffs claims in the first place. But we know of no authority that would support this argument. And Alkon cites none. Accordingly, we find this argument inadequately briefed and decline to consider it. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (requiring argument section of appellant’s brief to contain “contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities ... on which the appellant relies”); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are ... inadequately presented[ ] in an appellant’s opening brief.”). Likewise, we decline to consider Alkon’s assertion that the conversion settlement agreements constitute advisory opinions and therefore run afoul of Article III. See Fialka-Feldman v. Oakland Univ. Bd. of Trs., 639 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2011) (“The ‘case or controversy’ requirement prohibits all advisory opinions .... ”). Here, the Valero and Costco settlement agreements contain releases enjoining class members from suing based on “actions taken by [Valero and Costco] that are authorized or required by” the agreements. Aik. Aplt. Br. 31. Alkon alleges that if the “plaintiffs tried to bring a lawsuit against Costco today contending that its gasoline sales practices in 2017 will violate consumer law, the complaint would be dismissed as unripe.” Id. at 35. Yet “just because [the plaintiffs] changed the cover sheet to say ‘Proposed Settlement’ rather than ‘Complaint,’ ” Alkon laments, the parties were able to “induce[] the district court to issue an advisory opinion that no class member may proceed against Costco’s and Valero’s future practices.” Id. But again, Alkon doesn’t cite any authority suggesting that a district court’s approval of a private settlement agreement containing a future-conduct release constitutes an advisory opinion. And again, its failure to do so waives this argument. Finally, we decline to consider Al-kon’s related argument that the future-conduct releases in the conversion-settlement agreements purport to release claims that aren’t “based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action.” TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982). Here, the underlying claims against Costco and Valero are based on Costco and Valero’s failure to use ATC. Yet the settlement agreements purport to release future claims against Costco and Valero for using ATC, as the settlements require them to do. And Alkon makes a convincing argument that using ATC and not using ATC aren’t identical factual predicates; rather, they’re opposite ones. But despite its obligation to do so, Alkon doesn’t provide a record citation establishing that it raised this identical-factual-predicate argument below. See 10th Cir. R. 28.2(C)(2); Harolds Stores, Inc, 82 F.3d at 1541 n.3. And our independent review of the record suggests it didn’t. Moreover, Alkon fails to argue for plain error on appeal. And that “surely marks the end of the road for” this argument on appeal. Richison, 634 F.3d at 1131. Turning next to the arguments that Alkon has adequately preserved and briefed, it first argues that the district court abused its discretion in approving both the fund and conversion settlement agreements because (1) regulators and policymakers have long debated requiring or authorizing ATC at retail but have ultimately “chosen not to,” Spdwy. Aplt. Br. 28; (2) selling gas by the gallon is lawful; (3) deciding whether to use ATC is a policy decision best left to the legislature; (4) the district court made an impermissible policy judgment about ATC when it found that class members would derive some benefit from the settlements to the extent that the settlements will increase the odds of conversion to ATC; (5) what the plaintiffs actually seek here is a change in the existing law, which is a political remedy, not a judicial one; and (6) the district court lacked authority to provide that political remedy under Article III. But as the district court reasoned, the settlements don’t actually change the law. True, the fund settlement agreements remove one disincentive to implementing ATC by offering funds to reimburse state regulators for costs incurred as a result of conversion. But the district court didn’t order states to require, or even allow, conversion to ATC; that decision remains in the hands of state lawmakers—a fact that Alkon concedes (and in fact relies on) in arguing that the plaintiffs can’t satisfy Article Ill’s redressability requirement. Thus, contrary to Alkon’s argument, the district court didn’t usurp the legislature’s role by “altering the method of sale cooperatively established by Congress and the States,” Spdwy. Aplt. Br. at 30; instead, policy decisions about whether to allow or require ATC remain with state policy makers. Second, Alkon says a court can’t “approve a class settlement based on an unan-chored belief that the settlement would further the public interest.” Id. at 31. In support, it cites Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). But even assuming that Amehem supports this general assertion, the district court in this case didn’t approve the settlements based on “an un-anchored belief that the settlement would further the public interest,” Spdwy. Aplt. Br. 31; it made a finding that the settlements would benefit the class members. Third, Alkon argues that in approving the settlements, the district court violated the Rules Enabling Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (explaining that Federal Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”). In support, Alkon cites Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F.Supp.2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). There, the district court ruled that a settlement agreement ran afoul of the Rules Enabling Act because it “attempt[ed] to use the class action mechanism to implement forward-looking business arrangements that [went] far beyond the dispute before the [c]ourt in th[at particular] litigation.” Id. at 677. But as the plaintiffs point out, at least two of our sister circuits have' since concluded that the Rules Enabling Act has no application in this context. See Marshall v. Nat’l Football League, 787 F.3d 502, 511 n.4 (8th Cir. 2015) (concluding that district court’s approval of settlement agreement “is not a ‘substantive adjudication of the underlying causes of action,’ and therefore ... does not implicate the Rules Enabling Act”) (quoting In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 173 n.8 (3d Cir. 2013)), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 1166, 194 L.Ed.2d 177 (2016); Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 313 (3d Cir. 2011) (“In the absence of a'finding that plaintiffs are actually entitled to relief under substantive state law, we reiterate that a court does not ‘abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right’ by approving a voluntarily-entered class settlement agreement.” (quoting § 2072(b))); cf. Whitlock v. FSL Mgmt., LLC, 843 F.3d 1084, 1092-93 (6th Cir. 2016). We find these authorities persuasive. Accordingly, we reject this argument. D. Attorney’s fees don’t render the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements an abuse of discretion. A district court may approve a settlement agreement “after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). We review a district court’s approval of a settlement agreement under Rule 23(e)(2) for an abuse of discretion. But we review any factual findings for clear error. Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180, 1186-87 (10th Cir. 2002). This court has “noted four factors to be considered in assessing whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate,” id. at 1188: (1) whether the proposed settlement was fairly and honestly negotiated; (2) whether serious questions of law and fact exist, placing the ultimate outcome of the litigation in doubt; (3) whether the value of an immediate recovery outweighs the mere possibility of future relief after protracted and expensive litigation; and (4) the judgment of the parties that the settlement is fair and reasonable. Id. (quoting Gottlieb v. Wiles, 11 F.3d 1004, 1014 (10th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002)). Here, Alkon argues that an additional factor rendered the district court’s approval of the settlement agreements an abuse of discretion. Alkon points out that the settlement agreements contemplate awarding millions of dollars in attorney’s fees and argues that this aspect of the settlement agreements makes class counsel— rather than class members—the primary beneficiaries of those agreements. 8 According to Alkon, Rule 23(e) simply doesn’t permit such a result. 9 We agree with Alkon that class action settlements pose obvious conflict-of-interest problems. “The defendant cares only about the size of the settlement, not how it is divided between attorneys’ fees and compensation for the class. From the selfish standpoint of class counsel and the defendant, therefore, the optimal settlement is one modest in overall amount but heavily tilted toward attorneys’ fees.” Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2014). Thus, class counsel may be tempted “to sell out the class by agreeing with the defendant to recommend that the judge approve a settlement involving a meager recovery for the class but generous compensation for the lawyers.” Id. Alkon suggests that’s what happened here. In support, it advances three general arguments: (1) the agreements don’t benefit the class; (2) even assuming the agreements benefit the class, they provide the same benefit to the general public; and (3) even assuming the agreements provide unique benefits to the class, the primary beneficiaries of the agreements are class counsel, who stand to receive millions of dollars in attorney’s fees. In challenging the district court’s conclusion that the settlement agreements benefit the class, Alkon first argues that the district court’s conclusion that the settlements benefit the class members is based on clearly erroneous factual findings. Specifically, Alkon asserts the district court clearly erred in finding that “retailers [who convert to ATC] would not raise prices to reflect increases in marginal costs because of competition.” Aik. Aplt. Br. 24. We’re not convinced that the district court ever made such an unequivocal finding. To the contrary, the court explicitly recognized the possibility that retailers might pass the additional expenses associated with conversion along to their customers, and concluded not that competition would necessarily prevent retailers from raising prices altogether, but simply that competition would impact whether retailers raised their prices “and if so by how much.” App. vol. 27, 7513. Moreover, in approving the plaintiffs’ settlement agreements with BP, Chevron, Citgo, ConocoPhillips, ExxonMobil, Shell, Sinclair, Sunoco, and Valero, the district court incorporated by reference its earlier analysis in approving the Costco Agreement. And there, the district court again (1) explicitly acknowledged the possibility that retailers might raise prices in response to conversion; (2) concluded it was impossible to determine with any certainty the prices that retailers might charge for gas in the future; and (8) reasoned that, even assuming the price of fuel might rise slightly as a result of conversion, class members would still benefit simply from “knowing that they can get accuracy and consistency of fuel measurement for their fuel dollar, regardless of fuel temperature at the time of pumping.” R. vol. 11, 3146. In other words, the district court didn’t necessarily find that retailers wouldn’t raise fuel prices; it concluded that even assuming fuel prices might rise slightly, conversion to ATC would still benefit class members. Thus, we conclude that the district court didn’t make a clearly erroneous fact finding, let alone rely on that finding to the objectors’ detriment. Next, in a related argument, Alkon asserts the district court “independently erred in refusing to consider” (1) the report of its expert witness, David Henderson; and (2) evidence supporting Alkon’s cross-subsidization theory. Aik. Aplt. Br. 25. That theory posits that “any temperature differentials in volumetric gasoline sales simply meant ] that customers purchasing at above-average temperatures [are] cross-subsidizing customers purchasing at below-average temperatures without any additional profit to the retailers,” and that while converting ATC will “end the cross-subsidization,” doing so will only benefit the former at the expense of the latter, “without any net benefit to the class as a whole.” Id. at 10-11. But Alkon fails to provide a citation to the record demonstrating that the district court “refus[ed] to consider” either the Henderson report or Alkon’s cross-subsidization theory. Id. at 25. To the contrary, the district court explicitly acknowledged the Henderson report in approving the Costco settlement and then explained why it found it unnecessary to resolve whether, as the Henderson report suggests, ATC conversion will increase consumer fuel costs. And in approving the remaining settlement agreements, the district court incorporated this analysis by reference. The fact that the district court ultimately found the Henderson report irrelevant doesn’t establish that the district court “refus[ed] to consider” that report, as Alkon alleges. Id. Similarly, while the district court didn’t explicitly address Alkon’s cross-subsidization theory, Alkon doesn’t provide a record citation that suggests the district court “refus[ed] to consider” it. Id. And in any event, Costco’s cross-subsidization theory simply posits that the class as a whole won’t reap any economic benefit from ATC conversion. Because the district court took that possibility into account and explained why it declined to find the potential lack of any economic benefit dispositive in determining whether the settlement agreements benefited the class, any error in the district court’s failure to consider Alkon’s cross-subsidization theory was harmless. Next, even assuming the settlement agreements benefit the class, Alkon argues those benefits aren’t unique to the class members. After all, it points out, nonmembers will receive the same supposed benefits from ATC conversion. And unlike class members, non-members won’t have to release their claims in order to obtain those benefits. Thus, Alkon asserts, the agreements actually leave class members worse off than non-members. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the district court found that the plaintiffs’ “overall prospects of ultimately prevailing in litigation” were slim. App. vol. 27, 7502. In other words, class members didn’t give up much by releasing their claims. So even assuming that class members are now worse off than non-class members, any difference is marginal. Second, and more importantly, Alkon cites no authority for the proposition that a district court abuses its discretion in approving a settlement agreement unless the agreement benefits class members more than it benefits non-members. Here, the class members gave up their claims—claims the district court said were unlikely to succeed—in exchange for an informational benefit. While non-class members might receive the same benefit, this isn’t a zero-sum game where that fact somehow detracts from the informational benefit that class members might receive. Likewise, the fact that class members may be marginally worse off than non-class members doesn’t change the fact that class members will still be better off than they were before the settlement. Under these circumstances, the district court didn’t abuse its discretion. Finally, even assuming that class members will receive some marginal informational benefit from the settlement agreement, Alkon argues that class counsel remain the primary beneficiaries of the settlement agreements. And according to Alkon, that makes the settlement agreements unreasonable. Under the Costco Agreement, Costco agreed to pay attorney’s fees in whatever amount the court awarded. Under the Va-lero Agreement, Valero agreed to pay $4,000,000 in attorney’s fees. Finally, under the remaining eight settlement agreements that Alkon has standing to challenge, the defendants agreed not to oppose attorney’s fees and litigation costs of up to 30% of the settlement amounts. The following list illustrates that percentage for each of the remaining relevant settlement agreements: BP: $ 1,500,000 CITGO: $ 270,000 ConocoPhillips: $ 1,500,000 ExxonMobil: $ 1,500,000 Shell: $ 1,500,000 Sinclair: $ 240,000 Chevron: $ 637,500 Sunoco: $ 18,300 In total, that means the defendants agreed not to object to attorney’s fees up to $11,165,800, plus any amount the court awarded for the Costco Agreement. Alkon argues that this amount is “grossly disproportionate” to any benefit the class members might receive from the settlement agreements. Aik. Aplt. Br. 27. But in making this argument, Alkon puts the attorney’s fees on one side of the ledger and the potential economic benefits to the class on the other—benefits that Alkon says will amount to, at most, one cent per consumer per year. While this comparison makes for compelling imagery, it also mischaracterizes the district court’s decision. The district court didn’t base its approval of the settlement agreements on a finding that they might provide class members with an economic benefit. In fact, it readily acknowledged that (1) it’s impossible to accurately predict ATC’s potential impact on future fuel prices and (2) there exists a possibility that consumers will actually pay slightly more for gas under ATC. Instead, the district court found that the settlement agreements provide class members with an informational benefit: “accuracy and consistency of fuel measurement for their fuel dollar.” R. vol. 27, 7500; see also id. at 7502. To the extent that Alkon attempts to reduce the question before us to one of simple arithmetic, its arguments are unpersuasive. So too is its citation to In re Dry Max Pampers Litigation, 724 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2013). There, a divided panel of the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in approving a settlement agreement under which the class members received meaningless injunctive relief, while class counsel raked in $2.73 million—much less than defendants agreed to pay in attorney’s fees here. Id. at 721. But class counsel in In re Dry Max Pampers Litigation apparently also did much less work: counsel didn’t “take a single deposition, servé a single request for written discovery, or even file a response to [defendant’s] motion to dismiss.” Id. at 718. Alkon doesn’t suggest that’s the case here, and a mere glance at the district court’s docket—which contains almost 5,000 entries spanning more than nine years—confirms otherwise. More importantly, the district court’s order approving the settlement agreement in In re Dry Max Pampers Litigation failed to address any of the objector’s objections. Id. at 717. When a district court “is required to make a discretionary ruling that is subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy ourselves, before we can conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, that he exercised his discretion, that is, that he considered the factors relevant to that exercise.” New England Health Care Emps. Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005)). While that was impossible to do in In re Dry Max Pampers Litigation, it’s not impossible to do here; the district court provided thorough, well-reasoned responses to each objection—including, critically, Alkon’s arguments that the settlement agreements (1) don’t benefit class members; and (2) allow excessive attorney’s fees. Because we are therefore confident that the district court in this case “considered the factors relevant” to its exercise of discretion, Woodruff, 512 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679), we owe its exercise of that discretion great deference, see Jones v. Nuclear Pharmacy, Inc., 741 F.2d 322, 324 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The authority to approve a settlement of a class or derivative action is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”). We therefore decline to rely on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in In re Dry Max Pampers Litigation. We likewise decline to rely on Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014), which Alkon also cites. There, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in approving a settlement agreement that set aside approximately $2 million for class counsel fees and attorney expenses and only $865,284 for the 30,245 class members, concluding that the settlement amounted to “a selfish deal between class counsel and the defendant” that “disserve[d] the class.” 772 F.3d at 780-81, 787. In reaching that conclusion, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the “presumption should ... be that attorneys’ fees awarded to class counsel should not exceed a third or at most a half of the total amount of money going to class members and their counsel.” Id. at 782. We disagree. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “[cjonsumer class actions ... have value to society more broadly, both as deterrents to unlawful behavior—particularly when the individual injuries are too small to justify the time and expense of litigation—and as private law enforcement regimes that free public sector resources.” Gascho v. Glob. Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d 269, 287 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Blackman v. Gascho, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1065, 197 L.Ed.2d 176 (2017), and sub nom. Zik v. Gascho, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1065, 197 L.Ed.2d 176 (2017). “If we are to encourage these positive societal effects, class counsel must-be adequately compensated—even when significant compensation to class members is out of reach (such as when contact information is unavailable, or when individual claims are very small).” Id. And “[a]n inflexible, categorical rule,” such as the one the Seventh Circuit espoused in Pearson, “neglects these additional considerations.” Id. In short, Alkon doesn’t cite a single case in which this court has disturbed a district court’s order approving a settlement agreement. And our research yields only one: Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283. But in Woodruff, as in Pearson, the district court failed to provide “any independent reasoning or analysis” to support its decision to approve the settlement agreement. Id. at 1290. That’s not the case here. And while we may not agree with the decision the district court ultimately reached, we cannot say that decision is an abuse of discretion. E. The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in certifying the class. Finally, Alkon asserts that because the district court found it “infeasible to distribute damages to class members if the litigation were successful,” the district court erred in finding certification appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Aik. Aplt. Br. 43; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring, in relevant part, finding that class action is “superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”). The district court rejected this argument, concluding that (1) the settlements “provide value and benefit to class members”; and (2) Alkon failed to establish that class members could feasibly pursue- individual claims given the cost of maintaining separate actions. App. vol. 27, 7508. “The decision to grant or deny certification of a class belongs within the discretion of the trial court. We will not interfere with that discretion unless it is abused.” J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1309 (10th Cir. 1988)). Here, Alkon appears to suggest that a district court necessarily abuses its discretion by certifying a class when a class action “can provide no compensatory value to class members.” Alk. Aplt. Br. 43-44. But none of the cases that Alkon cites-establish such a bright line rule. At best, one of them establishes that a district court may deny certification on similar grounds—not that a district court must to do. See Quinn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 281 Fed.Appx. 771, 778 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (concluding that district court didn’t abuse its discretion in refusing to certify class under Rule 23(b)(3) where “class action proposed by plaintiffs would be difficult to manage and would not be more efficient than having the claims of individual class members resolved independently”). The other cases Alkon cites are distinguishable on factual and legal grounds. See In re Aqua Dots Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that district court erred in “departing from the text of Rule 23(b)(3)” in refusing to certify class, but nevertheless affirming district court’s ultimate decision not to certify class under Rule 23(a)(4)); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1974) (concluding that class action wasn’t superior method of adjudication under Rule 23(b)(3) where any monetary benefit to class members would have been “entirely consumed by the costs of notice alone,” but never addressing whether non-monetary benefits to class members might satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)). Here, the district court found that “in light of the limited size of any potential financial recovery for any particular class member and the possibility of inconsistent results, a class action [was] a far superior method of resolving the claims compared to individual suits.” App. vol. 27, 7498-99. And again, even assuming we might disagree with the district court on this point, Alkon fails to • establish that the district court’s decision is so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion. See Queen v. TA Operating, LLC, 734 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that district court abuses its discretion only if “it makes a clear error of judgment, exceeds the bounds of permissible choice, or when its decision is arbitrary, capricious or whimsical, or results in a manifestly unreasonable judgment” (quoting Eastman v. Union Pac. R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007))).