Opinion ID: 340661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Possession Counts

Text: 6 Robinson claims that the government's proof was insufficient to establish that the Treasury checks he possessed were stolen from the mails. We agree. 7 In a prosecution for theft from the mails where eyewitness testimony is lacking, the government usually produces evidence that the sender placed in the mails the item alleged to have been stolen, along with evidence from the addressee that the item was never received. From this evidence the jury can infer that an item which is found in improper hands was stolen from the mails. 8 In United States v. Hines, 256 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1958), Chief Judge Clark explained that, 9 To procure a conviction (under 18 U.S.C. § 1708) the prosecution had to show that the check actually had been stolen from the mails and that the defendant unlawfully possessed it, knowing that it was stolen. . . . the evidence adequately supports the conclusion that the check was actually stolen from the mails, for a letter properly mailed and never received by the addressee, but found in quite improper and misusing hands, can be found to have been stolen from the mails in the absence of any other explanation being proffered. Id. at 563-64. (Emphasis added) 10 In the instant case the government produced no evidence from the sender but limited its proof to evidence that the checks were always received by the addressees by mail, 2 they were issued by three disbursement offices outside New York, 3 they did not arrive, they were endorsed by someone other than the payee and they were deposited in accounts of a New York business in New York banks at which the payees had no accounts. Based upon this evidence, the government argues in this Court that 11 the only way the seven checks could have been stolen, but not from the mail, and still have arrived in the Eastern District would have been for them to have been taken from the separate disbursing offices and then transported individually to the (grocery store). This is a most unlikely possibility. 12 The government's proof regarding the disbursement offices is based upon information printed on the checks that was never explained to the jury. The origins of the checks were never mentioned at any time during the trial. Moreover, the inference suggested by the government is impermissible. It violates the principle that the jury must consider the defendant's guilt or innocence as to each count of the indictment separately. See 1 E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice And Instructions § 17.02 (2d Ed. 1970). Thus, although it may be most unlikely that the seven checks would all be stolen from three different disbursement offices and then transported individually to the grocery store, it is not so unlikely that an individual check would be so stolen and so transported. The individual checks, which were the subject of separate counts of the indictment, cannot be lumped together to support the inference urged by the government. With respect to Robinson's guilt or innocence as to any particular check, evidence concerning other checks, whether or not included in the indictment, was merely similar act evidence. Such evidence, although relevant and admissible to prove Robinson's knowledge of theft, was not relevant to prove that any particular check covered by the indictment was stolen from the mails. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Judge Bartels correctly instructed the jury that evidence concerning checks not involved in the indictment, of which there were many, was admitted for the limited purpose of proving knowledge. Consequently, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the charge that the checks possessed were stolen from the mails, we cannot draw any inference from the fact that some checks originated from different out-of-state disbursement offices. 13 Ignoring, as we must, the impermissible inference urged by the government, we find that the government's proof on the issue of theft from the mails amounts to nothing more than proof of non-receipt. 14 In its casual presentation of this case, the government overlooked an obvious issue, and one easily proved. All that was required was evidence demonstrating that the checks were duly placed in the mails. Cf. United States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 966 (2d Cir. 1976). We hold that proof of non-receipt, without more, is insufficient even circumstantially to sustain an inference that the checks were stolen from the mails. 4 Accordingly, we reverse Robinson's conviction on the possession counts and direct that the indictment on those counts be dismissed. 5 II. The Uttering Counts 15 The uttering counts charge Robinson with negotiating forged Treasury checks, knowing them to be forged, and with intent to defraud the United States. Under 18 U.S.C. § 495, the government must prove intent to defraud. Thus, specific intent is an essential element of the crime of uttering. United States v. Ellison, 494 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sullivan, 406 F.2d 180, 186 (2d Cir. 1969); Ross v. United States, 374 F.2d 97, 101 (8th Cir.) (Blackmun, J.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882, 88 S.Ct. 130, 19 L.Ed.2d 177 (1967). Judge Bartels so charged the jury, but he also charged that, 16 In determining the issue of intent in this case a jury may reasonably infer, as I said before, that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly omitted. 17 So, unless the contrary appears from the evidence, the jury may draw the inference that the defendant intended all the consequences which one in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from any act knowingly done or knowingly omitted by the defendant. 18 In United States v. Bertolotti, 529 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1975), this Court explained that, 19 We have for many years warned against the use of this type of charge, United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1966), and are somewhat surprised at its continued appearance. Given our disposition of this case, there is no need to determine whether the (district court's) erroneous charge constitutes reversible error. We wish, however, to take this opportunity to again stress our disapproval of the natural and probable consequences charge and to remind trial judges that its continued use may jeopardize otherwise sound convictions. Id. at 159. 20 We cannot agree with the government that the charge was entirely correct. 6 However, since defense counsel failed to object to the charge at the time it was given, we must determine the effect of the error. In order to make that determination, an analysis of the nature of the error inherent in the natural and probable consequences charge is necessary. 21 The objectionable nature of the charge was ably summarized in Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897, 88 S.Ct. 217, 19 L.Ed.2d 215 (1967): 22 The jury may mistakenly believe that it is permissible to infer specific knowledge or intent solely from the doing of a particular act, without regard to the totality of circumstances; or that the occurrence of the particular act shifts the burden of proof of knowledge or intent from the prosecution to the defense; or that the question is whether a reasonable man in similar circumstances would have had the requisite knowledge or intent, rather than whether the accused actually had it. 23 Thus, the natural and probable consequences charge, particularly when, as here, it contains the phrase unless the contrary appears from the evidence, is a burden-shifting charge which has the potential for misleading the jury with respect to the requirement that the government must prove every element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.); see United States v. Erb, 543 F.2d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 1976). 24 In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the due process clause requires the prosecution to bear the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on every element that constitutes the crime charged against the defendant. Under Mullaney, therefore, the error inherent in the natural and probable consequences charge takes on a constitutional dimension, and must be judged accordingly. 7 While it is true that there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), we need not decide whether the right here involved falls within that category, for the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. See also United States v. Toliver,supra, 541 F.2d at 964-966 (2d Cir. 1976). Although defense counsel failed to object to the natural and probable consequences charge, we cannot presume a waiver of Robinson's rights under Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, from the silent record. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). We note that no objection was made to the charge involved in the Mullaney case. Indeed, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which upheld Wilbur's conviction, found the issue cognizable because of its constitutional implications. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. at 688 n.7, 95 S.Ct. 1881. 25 Judge Bartels instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that intent was an essential element of the uttering charge. Only one instruction, however, focused on the manner in which intent may be proven, and that instruction consisted solely of the  natural and probable consequences charge quoted above. Viewing the instructions as a whole, we find little that might have served to cure the error or to insure that the jury was not misled. The instructions on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt were general in nature, while the instruction on intent was specific. We cannot conclude that the jury ignored the specific, erroneous instruction. On the contrary, the jury probably applied the erroneous instruction and believed the government had satisfied its burden by proving mere negotiation of the checks. Even though the government presented a relatively strong case on the uttering counts, we are unable to conclude that the erroneous charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Robinson's conviction on the uttering counts must be reversed.