Opinion ID: 1161511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Class Action ( S.F. 21806 )

Text: The Weber plaintiffs in S.F. 21806 contend that the trial court erred in dismissing a class action brought by them. In their first cause of action, as amended, plaintiffs alleged ownership of certain undivided fractional interests in mineral rights underlying section 31 (see fn. 2, supra. ) In their second cause of action, as amended, plaintiffs claimed to bring this action on its own behalf, and for and on behalf of the owners of the remaining undivided fractional interest in the aforesaid real properties. Plaintiff and said other remaining owners constitute a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them before this court. There are common questions of law and fact affecting the several rights of the members of said class and a common relief is sought. Plaintiff fairly insures the adequate representation of all the members of said class. The trial court found that [e]ach claim of each purported class member presents individual and important problems. Each claimant must trace his title from a date on or before 1912 in the case of COP and 1915 in the case of Ashurst until 1957, a period of 42-45 years. Problems incident to abandonment, divorce, bankruptcy, succession, laches, estoppel, and the effect of several intermediate quiet title suits and foreclosures would affect each claimant's title individually and with divers results. The members of the purported class interested in prosecuting their claims are not so numerous as to require a class action as opposed to intervention. A large number of said persons had actual knowledge of the pendency of this litigation prior to the trial but none took any steps to intervene individually or as members of the class until the first day of trial.... [30a] We uphold the trial court's ruling that the questions raised in these cases were not appropriate for a class action. [51] [31] We have recently pointed out that two requirements must be met in order to sustain any class action: (1) there must be an ascertainable class [citations]; and (2) there must be a well defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting the parties to be represented [citations]. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 704 [63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d 732].) Applicable precedents indicate that in observing the ascertainable class requirement they are at the same time giving recognition to the principle that a group of individuals' rights to recover, each of which is based on a separate set of facts, cannot be determined by a judgment in a class action. ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, 704.) [W]hether there is an ascertainable class depends in turn upon the community of interest among the class members in the questions of law and fact involved. (P. 706.) [30b] Although as to all the shareholders of the corporations and their successors, many common questions of law and fact must be resolved before a court can determine definitively the ownership of the mineral rights underlying section 31, [52] we point out that in the instant case every member of the alleged class would have to litigate numerous and substantial questions determining his individual right to recover against the named ... defendants following the rendering of a `class judgment' which determined in plaintiffs' favor whatever questions were common among the plaintiffs sought to be represented as a class. ( Chance v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 275, 285 [23 Cal. Rptr. 761, 373 P.2d 849]; see Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Assn. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 833, 838-840, 842-843 [198 P.2d 514].) As noted by the trial court, each alleged member of the class would be required to establish his individual deraignment of title from the shareholders, a difficult task in view of the failure to use the recording system. Moreover, the defendants would undoubtedly raise the defense of abandonment of the mineral interests as to each alleged member of the class, which, as pointed out supra, creates a factual issue as to the individual owner's intent. Finally, we find no substantial benefits resulting from class litigation.... ( Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) The plaintiff in Daar sought to bring a class action to recover overcharges by defendant's taxicabs; we noted that the unavailability of a class action would in effect preclude recovery by the individual members of the class, because the amount each member could recover was minute. Furthermore, if a large number of the class chose to litigate, a multiplicity of legal actions dealing with identical basic issues will be required in order to permit recovery by each of several thousand taxicab users. The result would be multiple burdens upon the plaintiffs, the defendant and the court. (Pp. 714-715.) In Chance v. Superior Court, supra, 58 Cal.2d 275, plaintiffs, who owned a note in default secured by a trust deed, sought judicial foreclosure on their behalf and on behalf of other note owners who held trust deeds on parcels of property in the same tract. In upholding the propriety of the class action we noted that the land subject to the deeds of trust was probably more valuable as a unit and that [t]he instant class foreclosure action is the only procedure presently suggested to be readily available by which all of the parcels of land securing the present 2,139 trust deed notes may be sold as a unit. (P. 291.) In the instant case, however, the class action would provide no benefits similar to those discussed in Daar and Chance; plaintiffs have not alluded to any substantial advantage which would result from the class action. Since plaintiffs testified that in spite of diligent effort they have been unable to locate most of the remaining shareholders or their heirs, a class action could not substantially clarify the state of the title to the oil and gas rights. We conclude that the trial court could properly dismiss the class action.