Opinion ID: 895202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Illegal Immigrant Issue

Text: TXI next argues that it was error to admit evidence of Rodriguez's immigration status and his misrepresentation of that status in order to live and work in this country. TXI complains that Rodriguez's status as an illegal immigrant was irrelevant to any issue in the case. TXI asserts instead that Rodriguez's status was impermissibly used to inflame the jury and impeach Rodriguez's credibility. In sum, TXI submits that repeated questions on this subject prejudiced its defense and effectively denied it a fair trial. Hughes argues, however, that Rodriguez's misrepresentations about his qualifications and experience as a commercial truck driver were relevant to claims of negligent hiring and negligent entrustment. In particular, he relies on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulation Act (FMCSRA), which defines mandatory employment checks motor carriers must make when hiring new drivers. Under these regulations, a carrier must ensure that prospective drivers have a commercial license, have a working knowledge of English, and possess the training or experience to safely operate a commercial vehicle. 49 C.F.R. §§ 383.23, 391.11(b)(2)-(7), 391.15.
In a negligent-hiring or negligent-entrustment claim, a plaintiff must show that the risk that caused the entrustment or hiring to be negligent also proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. See Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 796 (Tex.2006) (stating [n]egligence in hiring requires that the employer's `failure to investigate, screen, or supervise its [hirees] proximately caused the injuries the plaintiffs allege' (quoting Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex.1995))); Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596-97 (Tex.1987). To sustain such a claim based on a failure to screen, a plaintiff must show that anything found in a background check would cause a reasonable employer to not hire the employee, or would be sufficient to put the employer on notice that hiring [the employee] would create a risk of harm to the public. Fifth Club, 196 S.W.3d at 796-97. The plaintiff must also prove that the risk that caused the entrustment or hiring to be negligent caused the accident at issue. Schneider, 744 S.W.2d at 597. Therefore, a plaintiff will not succeed on a negligent entrustment or hiring claim where an investigation would not have revealed the risk. See, e.g., Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 477 (finding the failure to prove negligent hiring as a matter of law because screening would not have indicated a specific risk); Fifth Club, 196 S.W.3d at 796 (noting a background check might only have shown that the employee was violating terms of employment with another employer, but not the employee's proclivity for violence). We have said a claim for negligent hiring or entrustment cannot lie if [t]he risk that caused the entrustment to be negligent did not cause the collision, Schneider, 744 S.W.2d at 597, and if a defendant's negligence did no more than furnish a condition which made the injury possible. Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 477. Here, Rodriguez's immigration status did not cause the collision, and was not relevant to the negligent entrustment or hiring claims even if TXI's failure to screen, and thus its failure to discover his inability to work in the United States, furnished [the] condition that made the accident possible. Id. We agree with the court of appeals that neither Rodriguez's status as an illegal alien or his use of a fake Social Security number to obtain a commercial driver's license created a foreseeable risk that Rodriguez would negligently drive the gravel truck. 224 S.W.3d at 914.
The court of appeals concluded, however, that the evidence of Rodriguez's immigration status was nevertheless admissible to impeach his contrary trial testimony. 224 S.W.3d at 897. This impeachment apparently related to Rodriguez's trial testimony that he never lied to get a driver's license and did not know whether he had a legal right to work in the United States. Id. at 897 n. 32. Relying on Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(A), the court concluded that Rodriguez, as a party, could be impeached with evidence of his own prior verbal statements. Id. at 897. The court further concluded that, because the statements of a party are not hearsay, see id., it was unnecessary to address complaints that Rodriguez's immigration status was not relevant and was more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 897 n. 32. We fail to see the connection. Rule 801(e)(2)(A) provides that a party admission is not hearsay. Whether impeachment evidence is hearsay, however, has nothing to do with the relevancy requirement in Rules 401 and 402, or Rule 403's requirement that evidence should be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value. See Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Tex.2007) (stating that, subject to other Rules of Evidence that may limit admissibility [citing, among other evidentiary rules, Rules 402 and 403], any statement by a party-opponent is admissible against that party); Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 846 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (noting that non-hearsay still must meet other requirements for admissibility, such as relevance). Thus, the observation that Rodriguez's statements are not hearsay neither establishes their admissibility nor explains why other witnesses were permitted to be questioned about Rodriguez's immigration status, or why extrinsic evidence was admitted on the subject.
Although Rodriguez's statements about his immigration status may have been offered for impeachment as prior inconsistent statements, they were not admissible for at least two different reasons. First, Rodriguez's immigration status was clearly a collateral matter, that is, a matter that was not relevant to proving a material issue in the case. Poole v. State, 974 S.W.2d 892, 905 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. ref'd). Rodriguez's immigration status clearly was not a material part of the plaintiffs' case; it was not something the plaintiffs had to prove to prevail. See Bates v. State, 587 S.W.2d 121, 133 (Tex. Crim.App.1979) (stating that the test as to whether a matter is collateral is whether the cross-examining party would be entitled to prove it as a part of his case). As a collateral matternot relating to any of plaintiffs' claims on the merits, and merely serving to contradict Rodriguez on facts irrelevant to issues at trialit was inadmissible impeachment evidence. See Ramirez v. State, 802 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (stating parties may not impeach on collateral or immaterial matters); Delamora v. State, 128 S.W.3d 344, 363 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. ref'd) (noting [a]party may not cross-examine a witness on a collateral matter, then contradict the witness's answer). The immigration-related evidence was also inadmissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b). This rule provides that specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking ... the witness's credibility, ... may not be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness nor proved by extrinsic evidence. TEX.R. EVID. 608(b); see TEX.R. EVID. 404(b) (governing admissibility of prior acts). The rule reflects a general aversion in Texas to the use of specific instances of conduct for impeachment. David A. Schlueter & Robert R. Barton, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 608.02[3][b] at 537 (8th ed.2009). For over 150 years, Texas civil courts have consistently rejected evidence of specific instances of conduct for impeachment purposes, no matter how probative of truthfulness. Cathy Cochran, TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE HANDBOOK 597 (7th ed.2007-08) (citing Boon v. Weathered's Adm'r, 23 Tex. 675, 679 (1859) and other Texas cases). Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly held that a witness's immigration status is not admissible to impugn the witness's character for truthfulness. [7] The only exception to this general prohibition is for certain criminal convictions. Texas Rule of Evidence 609 permits evidence of a criminal conviction for impeachment purposes if the conviction is not more than ten years old, is a felony or involves moral turpitude, and is more probative than prejudicial. TEX.R. EVID. 609(a). As the dissenting justice in the court of appeals observed, Rodriguez's immigration conviction does not meet this criteria. 224 S.W.3d at 930 (Gardner, J. dissenting). It was therefore error to admit evidence of Rodriguez's immigration status and deportation. The court of appeals nevertheless concluded that, even if it were error to admit this evidence, it was not harmful. 224 S.W.3d at 897.
The erroneous admission of evidence is harmless unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. TEX.R.APP. P. 44.1. Probable error is not subject to precise measurement, but it is something less than certitude; it is a matter of judgment drawn from an evaluation of the whole case from voir dire to closing argument, considering the `state of the evidence, the strength and weakness of the case, and the verdict.' Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 871 (Tex.2008) (quoting Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 841 (Tex.1979)). Although the trial court initially granted a motion in limine on immigration matters, it later reversed that ruling, admitting extensive testimony and extrinsic evidence concerning Rodriguez's immigration status, including that he:  was an undocumented Mexican alien who had illegally entered the United States on multiple occasions;  invented a false Social Security number, which he used to apply for a Texas commercial driver's license;  falsely answered no in his deposition when asked if he had ever lied to obtain a Texas driver's license;  falsely answered yes on his TXI employment application when asked if he had the legal right to work in the United States;  pleaded guilty to and was convicted of a misdemeanor immigration violation, serving four months in jail; and  was previously deported and ordered not to return to the United States for ten years. Rodriguez was also Hughes's first called witness, and the first questions posed to him concerned his immigration status. There followed over forty references to Rodriguez's status, including thirty-five to his status as an illegal immigrant and seven to his prior deportation. TXI representatives were also cross-examined regarding whether they owed a duty to the public to prevent an illegal from driving a TXI truck:  Do you think he is entitled to drive here if he's illegally here?  And you don't think you owe any duty... to the public ... to the people who are driving up and down [Highway] 114... to decide whether he's illegal or not?  Mr. Rodriguez is still illegal in the United States, is he not? ... Will anybody ever turn him in, or will he just continue to drive for TXI? The investigating DPS trooper was asked whether she knew Rodriguez was in this country illegally. Additionally, there were thirty-two references to Rodriguez's misconduct in using a falsified Social Security number, sixteen references to Rodriguez's commercial driver's license being invalid or fraudulently obtained, and seven references that Rodriguez was a liar who had lied on his TXI employment application. A TXI representative was pointedly questioned about whether Rodriguez might also have lied in denying responsibility for the accident:  Do you think Mr. Rodriguez lied to ... enter the United States?  Are you telling this jury that you don't know whether he lied to get into the United States? Now do you think that Mr. Rodriguez would lie when it relates to driving a rock truck?  Did you ever consider ... and I want you to face this jury and tell this jury, did you ever consider whether Mr. Rodriguez might have lied about how this accident occurred? TXI complains that the repeated references to Rodriguez's immigration problems and alleged misrepresentations were inflammatory and deliberately calculated to cause the jury to disbelieve Rodriguez. TXI further objected to the trial court's charge, complaining that the broad-form negligence question was misleading in this particular case and that the negligence question should instead include Hughes's theory of the accident's causethat Rodriguez caused the accident by first crossing over into the opposing lane of traffic. The trial court refused TXI's requested substitutions, which TXI complains was harmful because it allowed Hughes to disguise his real claimthat Rodriguez was negligent for driving without a right to be in this country and that TXI was negligent for hiring an illegal alien. The dissenting justice in the court of appeals concluded that the Hughes's repeated injection into the case of Rodriguez's nationality, ethnicity, and illegal-immigrant status, including his conviction and deportation, was plainly calculated to inflame the jury against him. 224 S.W.3d at 931 (Gardner, J., dissenting). We agree. Even assuming the immigration evidence had some relevance, its prejudicial potential substantially outweighed any probative value. Even in instances where immigration status may have limited probative value as to credibility, courts have held that such evidence is properly excluded for undue prejudice under Rule 403. [8] The only context in which courts have widely accepted using such evidence for impeachment is in criminal trials, where a government witness's immigration status may indicate bias, particularly where the witness traded testimony for sanctuary from deportation. [9]