Opinion ID: 627196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether sufficient evidence existed to support Vasquez's conviction?

Text: To establish a drug conspiracy, the government must prove: 1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to violate federal narcotics laws; 2) the defendant's knowledge of the agreement; and 3) the defendant's voluntary participation in the agreement. United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 423 (5th Cir.1996). [A] defendant may be convicted of conspiring with other unknown persons if the indictment asserts that other such persons exist and the evidence supports their existence and the existence of a conspiracy. United States v. Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (5th Cir.1988). During closing argument, the government stated that this case was primarily one of circumstantial evidence . . . The government presented evidence [2] that revealed several facts, which standing alone are insufficient, but together, support the jury's guilty verdict on the conspiracy count. In particular, the government argues persuasively that the conspiracy conviction is supported by the large and valuable quantity of cocaine, [3] the installation of the Suburban's two false car-battery casings, and Niera's testimony about the man who bought the Suburban for Vasquez. ICE Agent Grubbs and the government's expert, Dr. Liu with the DEA testified that the street value of the cocaine was $111,875, at a minimum, in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and as much as $287,000 on the upper end in Austin, Texas. Indeed, both Dr. Liu and ICE Agent Grubbs expressed opinions concerning the cocainespecifically, its weight and value, which the jury took into consideration. This court must credit all of this evidence, because the court will not substitute its own determination of credibility for that of the jury . . . United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir.1994). While [i]t takes at least two to tango for conspiracy purposes[,] United States v. Morgan, 835 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.1987), the government is not required to identify each of the co-conspirators by name. See, e.g., United States v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir.1976). Here, there is more than ample evidence. Vasquez's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the conspiracy count fails.
The offense of possession with the intent to distribute requires proof of (1) possession, (2) knowledge, and (3) intent to distribute. United States v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 731 (5th Cir.2009). Vasquez challenges only the knowledge element. The knowledge element in a possession case can be inferred from control of the vehicle in some cases; when the drugs are hidden, however, control alone is not sufficient to prove knowledge. United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir.1994). When the drugs are secreted in hidden compartments . . . this Court has normally required additional circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in nature or demonstrates guilty knowledge. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d at 544 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have previously recognized that circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge includes, inter alia, the following types of behavior: nervousness, refusal or reluctance to answer questions, inconsistent statements, and obvious or remarkable alterations to the vehicle. Id. The high value of concealed narcotics can also support knowledge. United States v. Villarreal, 324 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir.2003). Here, there was sufficient additional circumstantial evidence for a reasonable jury to infer Vasquez's knowledge of the cocaine. Officer Salazar testified that after passing inspection Vasquez drove unusually slowly and was highly alert. She testified that Vasquez was nervous when the Suburban was inspected. Officer Tims testified that Vasquez exhibited nervousness when questioned, and that he initially denied, but then admitted, owning the vehicle. ICE Special Agent Grubbs testified that the cocaine found in Vasquez's vehicle was worth approximately $125,000 in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, and $275,000 in Austin, Texas. Officer Gonzalez testified that when running on the motorcycle batteries, the Suburban could not draw enough power to run its headlights or air conditioner without burning out the batteries and alternator. A reasonable jury could have inferred from this that the reason Vasquez never used the headlights or air conditioner [4] during the twelve days he had the vehicle was because he was aware of the limitations of the Suburban's modified electrical system.
To prove the offense of importing narcotics into the United States, the government must prove the elements of the possession offense, as well as that Vasquez played a role in transporting the cocaine from Mexico into the United States. United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1158 (5th Cir.1993). Vasquez again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only with respect to the knowledge element. For the same reasons as count two, a reasonable jury could infer Vasquez's guilty knowledge from the circumstantial evidence admitted at trial.