Opinion ID: 891600
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Defendant was entitled to UJI 14-320: Battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer.

Text: {37} We next address whether Defendant was entitled to an instruction on battery, UJI 14-320, as a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer. Failure to instruct the jury on a lesser[-]included offense of a charged offense is reversible error if: (1) the lesser offense is included in the greater, charged offense; (2) there is evidence tending to establish the lesser[-]included offense and that evidence establishes that the lesser offense is the highest degree of crime committed; and (3) the defendant has tendered appropriate instructions preserving the issue. State v. Jernigan, 2006-NMSC-003, ¶ 21, 139 N.M. 1, 127 P.3d 537 (2005). {38} As a preliminary matter, Defendant claims that this issue is unreviewable because it was not raised in the State's petition for writ of certiorari. See Rule 12-502(C)(2)(b) NMRA ([T]he Court will consider only the questions set forth in the petition.). We are not persuaded. In its petition, the State presented the following question for our review: Is subjective knowledge that the victim is a peace officer an element of the offense of aggravated battery on a peace officer, as defined in [Section 30-22-25]? We conclude that this question is broad enough to encompass the issue of whether battery is a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer. Indeed, our review of the Court of Appeals' opinion reveals that the two questions, subjective intent as an essential element of aggravated battery upon a peace officer and battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer, are inextricably intertwined. See Nozie, 2007-NMCA-131, ¶ 4, 142 N.M. 626, 168 P.3d 756 (concluding that a defendant's subjective knowledge of the victim's identity as a peace officer is an element of the crime of aggravated battery upon a peace officer because a number of the various assaults or batteries defined in Article 3 of the Criminal Code are `included' offenses of parallel offenses against peace officers defined in Article 22 of the Criminal Code); id. ¶ 12 (concluding that Defendant was entitled to an instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer in relevant part because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Defendant was mistaken as to the victim's identity as a peace officer). {39} Turning to the merits of the State's claim, we first address whether battery is a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer. A lesser[-] included offense is one that includes some, but not all, of the elements of a greater offense and that does not have any element not included in the greater offense, so that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without necessarily committing the lesser offense. State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 273, 837 P.2d 862, 866 (1992). Aggravated battery upon a peace officer, contrary to Section 30-22-25(A), consists of the unlawful touching or application of force to the person of a peace officer with intent to injure that peace officer while he is in the lawful discharge of his duties. Battery, contrary to Section 30-3-4, consists of the unlawful, intentional touching or application of force to the person of another, when done in a rude, insolent or angry manner. Aggravated battery upon a peace officer therefore requires the State to prove three essential elements that battery does not: (1) that the victim was a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his duties, (2) that the defendant knew the victim was a peace officer, and (3) that the defendant intended to injure the victim. {40} We conclude that it is impossible to commit the crime of aggravated battery upon a peace officer without necessarily committing the crime of battery. First, [o]ne cannot commit battery with an intent to injure without also proceeding in a rude, insolent or angry manner. See the various definitions of rude, insolent and angry in Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966). The meaning of rude includes offensive in manner or action; the use of force. The meaning of insolent includes insult; contemptuous or brutal in behavior. The meaning of angry includes various forms of displeasure. State v. Kraul, 90 N.M. 314, 316-17, 563 P.2d 108, 110-11 (Ct.App.1977). Second, [o]ne cannot batter a peace officer while in the lawful discharge of his duties without battering the person of another. Id. at 317, 563 P.2d at 111. Accordingly, we conclude that battery is a lesser-included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer. {41} We agree with the Court of Appeals that Defendant had tendered an appropriate instruction regarding battery as a lesser included offense of aggravated battery upon a peace officer and that the facts supported the issuance of this instruction because [t]he district court instructed the jury on the question of Defendant's inability to form the specific intent to injure, UJI 14-5111 NMRA, indicating that the district court recognized that there was sufficient evidence of intoxication to support this defense. If the jury found that Defendant was unable to form the specific intent to injure, it still could have found that Defendant was able to form the general criminal intent necessary to commit battery. See State v. Crespin, 86 N.M. 689, 691, 526 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Ct.App.1974) (observing that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a nonspecific intent crime); State v. Duran, 80 N.M. 406, 407, 456 P.2d 880, 881 (Ct.App.1969) (distinguishing the intent to apply force required to commit battery from the intent to injure required to commit aggravated battery). If the jury found both that Defendant was mistaken as to the victim's status as a peace officer and that Defendant was unable to form the specific intent to injure, it could have found Defendant guilty of battery. Nozie, 2007-NMCA-131, ¶ 12, 142 N.M. 626, 168 P.3d 756. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly determined that Defendant was entitled to the requested jury instruction.