Opinion ID: 662420
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lawson's Association with Erky Berk

Text: 26 The district court's oral ruling also mentions that the officers believed Erky Berk to be a drug dealer. Perhaps because the testimony about Erky Berk's prior drug dealings was vague, the court's written memorandum conspicuously omits this fact altogether. On appeal, however, the government urges us to rely on the association between Lawson and Erky Berk as a basis for the legality of the stop. 27 While mere association with a person suspected of criminal activity is insufficient to justify a stop, cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person), we do not dispute that the addition of other circumstances including, for example, signs of common criminality among the suspect and his criminal companion, may justify a court's taking a suspect's association with the criminal into account when deciding upon whether a stop was legally justified. For example, in the cases cited by the government in which the association with a known criminal was a factor justifying the stop, the courts relied upon specific actions of the defendant or his companion indicating some joint criminal activity on the part of the observed couple. See United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 160-61 (5th Cir.) (finding reasonable suspicion to stop defendant who was in company of individual about to be arrested and fled when officers approached him), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 250 (1992); United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1200 (7th Cir.1990) (finding stop justified because defendant separated and met up with criminal who delivered package when accompanied by defendant and officers thought the two were attempting to flee), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 209 (1991); United States v. Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 643 (8th Cir.) (finding stop justified because defendant ran from front of apartment after seeing officers and after a known burglar making furtive effort to hide face exited other side of building), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 837 (1985). 28 Having one's wheelchair pushed by a reputed drug dealer, even in the high drug neighborhood together with the unspecific tip, would, however, present a close case on the existence of sufficient suspicion to stop Lawson. Compare Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312 (D.C.App.1989) (en banc) (finding no basis for stopping individual who was observed conversing in parking lot in high drug area with two persons known to have sold drugs two minutes earlier) with United States v. Reid, 997 F.2d 1576, 1579 (D.C.Cir.1993) (upholding stop and frisk of individual who had just exited an apartment which the police were approaching to execute a search warrant for narcotics and officer felt endangered by individual's potential presence behind him and his colleagues) and United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 400, 402 (D.C.Cir.1991) (tip of unchallenged reliability informed police that a described crack dealer was again working in a store parking lot selling crack and returning to identified car to place remaining drugs under floormat and then drive away only to return later; reasonable suspicion found to stop individual observed in parking lot speaking to the suspected dealer at the very time and in the very place of the suspected drug dealing and then getting into the very car in which suspected dealer stored his drug supply whereupon the two drove away) (emphasis omitted); cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (individual's conversations with over nine known narcotics addicts on the street and in a restaurant over an eight hour period did not give police officer reason to search him). 29 Since the district court's factual findings with respect to Lawson's association with Erky Berk were rather vague in the oral ruling and absent from the written memorandum order, we remand the record to the district court for a clarification of the court's finding on this factual question in the event that the trial judge decides to rely on the association as a basis justifying the stop. cf. United States v. Jordan, 951 F.2d 1278 (D.C.Cir.1991) (remanding for clarification of factual finding), appeal after remand, 958 F.2d 1085 (1992); United States v. Williams, 951 F.2d 1287 (D.C.Cir.1991) (remanding record for factual findings and conclusions of law based on those findings). In the event that he does so rely, the district court should review the suppression hearing record as it currently stands and clarify whether the officers reasonably believed Erky Berk to be a drug dealer and on what basis Lawson's association with Erky Berk would provide the necessary additional justification for a stop. We emphasize herein that if the district court does not rely on Lawson's association with Erky Berk as a factor justifying the stop he is under no obligation to make further findings on this issue.