Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Faretta Claim (Oliver)

Text: Oliver claims that two withdrawals from his constitutional right to represent himself ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 ( Faretta )) before trial began in January 1993 were ineffective, because they were the product of the trial court's improper attempt to discourage self-representation. Oliver complains that the court's actions generally violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and under parallel provisions of the state Constitution. He claims as an additional legal consequence that a related hearing held on September 9, 1991, violated due process under the Fifth Amendment, because he did not receive an adequate opportunity to be heard. The record does not support the claims. Criminal defendants have the right both to be represented by counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution and the right, based on the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, to represent themselves. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) However, this right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom or disrupt the proceedings. ( Ibid. ) Faretta motions must be both timely and unequivocal. Otherwise, defendants could plant reversible error in the record. ( Marshall, at pp. 21, 22, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262; accord, People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 98-99, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) Equivocation of the right of self-representation may occur where the defendant tries to manipulate the proceedings by switching between requests for counsel and for self-representation, or where such actions are the product of whim or frustration. ( Marshall, supra, at pp. 21, 22, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Of course, a defendant may withdraw his Faretta motion before a ruling is made. (See, e.g., People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 68-70, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Oliver made unsuccessful motions to act as cocounsel and for library privileges on March 1 and 19, 1990, and on June 21, 1990. He also made an initial Faretta motion on June 29, 1990, which he withdrew on July 11, 1990, and a second Faretta motion on October 12, 1990, accompanied by a refusal to accept appointed counsel as advisory counsel. He reaffirmed his desire to represent himself, coupled with the appointment of new advisory counsel, on October 24 and 30, 1990, and the court allowed him to do so. He relinquished his self-representation for the second time on March 8, 1991. Oliver made and withdrew two more Faretta motions. They form the basis of his claims on appeal. One of these motions was litigated during hearings held on August 23, 1991, and September 9, 1991, and withdrawn on the latter date. The second motion arose much closer to trial, and was addressed on November 18 and 19, 1992. The trial court cautioned that it viewed the latter motion as untimely, but was willing to continue it to the next day and entertain it further. On that next day, Oliver equivocated, refusing to give the court a clear answer on whether he still wished to proceed in propria persona. The court ruled that he had withdrawn his motion. Oliver maintains that his actual or constructive withdrawals of the two Faretta motions at issue were ineffective because they were the product of the trial court's improper attempt to discourage him from representing himself. Specifically, Oliver complains that the court improperly delayed acting on the August 23, 1991 motion, inducing him to withdraw it on September 9, 1991, and that it erroneously denied his November 18, 1992 request as untimely. The trial court did not improperly delay acting on Oliver's August 23, 1991 motion, or induce him to withdraw it on September 9, 1991. During these two hearings, the court had a serious discussion with Oliver and his counsel, Charles E. Lloyd, who stepped forward to represent him, about the security risks that self-representation would present. Oliver admitted that he had abused the pro. per. perks before. He became frustrated, however, over the tenor of the discussion, and over the possibility that valid security concerns might interfere with his unfettered right of self-representation. The court made no ruling on August 23, 1991, and continued the matter until September 9, 1991, so that it could review Oliver's jail records and consider additional evidence related to security. When Oliver withdrew his Faretta motion at the latter hearing, and accepted representation by Lloyd and his associate, William E. Turner, Oliver's actions were not the result of any error by the court, but of his own frustration over legitimate security concerns. A similar conclusion applies to Oliver's claim regarding the Faretta proceedings held in November 1992. The only reference to the timeliness of this motion occurred when the trial court asked on November 18 that Oliver join Lewis in waiving time to start the trial, which was imminent. Oliver refused and asked to appear in propria persona. As noted, the court said the motion was untimely, but postponed its ruling until the next day. Oliver became hostile and said he would refuse to return to court the next day. On November 19, when Oliver nonetheless appeared, he and the court debated whether he wanted to pursue or withdraw his request for self-representation. The court found a withdrawal. In the process, Oliver agreed with Lewis to delay the start of the trial until January 1993. Nothing more was said about whether Oliver's request for self-representation was timely. Oliver's acceptance of the court's conclusion that the Faretta motion was withdrawn was not the product of any ruling  erroneous or otherwise  on the timeliness of the motion.