Opinion ID: 259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs' Legal Theory of Relief

Text: To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must show that the defendant, under the color of state law, deprived them of a federal constitutional or statutory right. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir.2000). Plaintiffs base their claims on retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights, which is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under section 1983. White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir.1990). To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation. Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 282 (3d Cir.2004). At the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs need only show a reasonable probability that their retaliation claims will succeed on the merits. McTernan, 577 F.3d at 526. The initial plaintiffs brought three causes of action in their complaint: (1) retaliation in violation of the minors' First Amendment right to free expression, the expression being their appearing in two photographs; (2) retaliation in violation of the minors' First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech, the speech being the education program's required essay explaining how their actions were wrong; and (3) retaliation in violation of the parents' Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to direct their children's upbringing, the interference being certain items in the education program that fall within the domain of the parents, not the District Attorney. The District Court granted injunctive relief based only on the second and third claims, and the parties did not brief the first claim before us. While we requested supplemental briefing on plaintiffs' first cause of action, we decline to consider it in the first instance. (Of course, plaintiffs may advance that cause of action on remand as the case proceeds on the merits.) Accordingly, we will consider only those causes of action addressed by the District Court and raised by the partiesthe second and third claims. Before going further, we focus on the act of retaliation urged by plaintiffs. We discern two possibilities based on plaintiffs' complaint and argument: (1) the District Attorney retaliated against plaintiffs when he threatened prosecution; and (2) any future prosecution would be an unconstitutional act of retaliation. As discussed below, only the second theory is viable. The first theorythe theory accepted by the District Courtis that the District Attorney's threatened prosecution is retaliation for the exercise of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights for refusing to participate in the education program at issue here. Miller, 605 F.Supp.2d at 643. In other words, plaintiffs asserted a constitutionally protected right to refuse to participate in the education program, and the District Attorney responded to that assertion with threats to prosecute the minors for the sole purpose of coercing them to attend the program. This claim presents a timing problem, as the District Attorney threatened to prosecute Doe before she refused to attend the program. Such a threat of prosecution was not retaliation in response to and because of the exercise of a right not to attend the program, as Doe had not yet asserted that right when the District Attorney made the threat to prosecute. Because this theory has a sequence flaw, we cannot affirm the District Court's grant of injunctive relief on this basis. [9] Cf. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 558 n. 10, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007) (In the standard retaliation case recognized in our precedent, the plaintiff has performed some discrete act in the past, typically saying something that irritates the defendant official; the question is whether the official's later action against the plaintiff was taken for a legitimate purpose (firing to rid the work force of a substandard performer, for example) or for the purpose of punishing for the exercise of a constitutional right (that is, retaliation, probably motivated by spite). The plaintiff's action is over and done with, and the only question is the defendant's purpose, which may be maliciously motivated.) (emphases added); Moron-Barradas v. Dep't of Educ., 488 F.3d 472, 481 (1st Cir.2007) (It is impossible for the DOE to have retaliated against Morón before she engaged in protected activity.); Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614-15 (7th Cir.2003) (It is axiomatic that a plaintiff engage in statutorily protected activity before an employer can retaliate against her for engaging in statutorily protected activity. ... [W]e have never held that an employer can retaliate when there has been no protected expression. An employer cannot retaliate if there is nothing for it to retaliate against.). Plaintiffs' second theorythat a future prosecution would be the retaliatory actdoes not suffer the same timing defect, as any prosecution will necessarily come after Doe's refusal to attend the program. [10] We discern this theory from plaintiffs' TRO motion before the District Court, which stated,  Although the retaliation has not yet occurred, it is `of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance' of an order enjoining the threatened prosecution. (Emphasis added.) Other statements in the same motion espouse this second theory: plaintiffs asserted they sought relief to bar Skumanick from bringing the retaliatory criminal charges for their refusal to attend the program, that Skumanick has assured [them] that he will retaliate by filing criminal charges, and that plaintiff minors would be subject to an adverse action if they are prosecuted for child pornography. (Emphases added.) The District Court also recognized plaintiffs' second variation on their retaliation claim, stating: Plaintiffs insist that retaliation exists here because (1) minor plaintiffs have a constitutional right to avoid the courses and their parents have a constitutional right to direct their education; (2) prosecution of the girls would be retaliation (an adverse action); and (3) because the girls' pictures were not illegal, the only reason to prosecute them would be in retaliation for exercising their constitutional right not to participate in the program. Miller, 605 F.Supp.2d at 643 (emphases added). In other words, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prevent a future retaliatory act an actual prosecution that has not yet been broughtfrom occurring. As discussed below, we affirm the District Court on this alternative ground. [11] See Ayers v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1196 (3d Cir.1990) (affirming on a different ground the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction motion).