Opinion ID: 2183480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Accomplice Credibility

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the following instruction: You are instructed that an individual has the right against self-incrimination and that Chris Day and Ronald Wingett could not be compelled to testify in this trial if they would incriminate themselves unless they were granted immunity or entered into a negotiated plea agreement. Appellant claims that the instruction was irrelevant to the issues before the jury. A trial court's instructions must be relevant to the issues which the jury must decide in reaching a verdict. Orr v. State (1984), Ind. App., 472 N.E.2d 627. Relevancy in this context requires that jurors be instructed on matters of law which are necessary for their information in giving their verdict. Ind. Code § 35-1-35-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), recodified as Ind. Code § 35-37-2-2 (Burns 1984 Supp.). Debose v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 675, 389 N.E.2d 272. The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Foster v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 567, 320 N.E.2d 745. We have previously held that this statute requires jury instructions on the law applicable to the case, rather than instructions which encompass all laws touching upon or related to the subject in controversy. Malo v. State (1977), 266 Ind. 157, 361 N.E.2d 1201. Failure to disclose to the jury an agreement of leniency between an accomplice and the State constitutes reversible error. However, a cautionary instruction on this subject is not required and has the tendency to unduly disparage the testimony of the accomplice. Morgan v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 666, 419 N.E.2d 964. Moreover, an instruction directed to the testimony of one witness erroneously invades the province of the jury when the instruction intimates an opinion on the credibility of a witness or the weight to be given to his testimony. Murphy v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 184, 369 N.E.2d 411; Taylor v. State (1972), 257 Ind. 664, 278 N.E.2d 273. In the case at bar, Wingett and Day testified on behalf of the State pursuant to a grant of immunity and plea bargain agreement, respectively. The terms of the immunity granted Wingett and the plea bargain negotiated with Day were divulged to the jury during trial. The jury was thus presented with information to assess the credibility of these witnesses. The right against self-incrimination, the compulsion to testify when granted immunity, and testimony given under the terms of a plea bargain are all matters relevant to a jury's deliberative process, but this jury already possessed knowledge of the conditions under which Wingett and Day were testifying. This instruction served no purpose other than to suggest to the jury that the accomplices' testimony might be discredited because they would not have testified unless they benefitted by the State's agreements. The substance of the instruction unduly disparaged the testimony of the accomplices and the presentation of the instruction itself served to emphasize to the jury the credibility and weight to accord their testimony. However, the testimony of the accomplices was inculpatory to Fox. Therefore, the instruction disparaging their testimony was actually to his benefit. The error attributed to this instruction is harmless because the negative effect would be beneficial, not detrimental, to appellant's case.