Opinion ID: 879552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court err by infusing its own opinion of O'Neill's property value into its decision? DOR contends that the District Court, in essence, became a witness and advocate for O'Neill by permitting its personal views to become part of its decision. DOR asserts that a reviewing court should remain an impartial tribunal for all litigants. DOR argues that the court's personal observations are unilateral impressions which cannot be deemed judicially-noticed facts. Judicial notice of facts is governed by Rule 201(b) of the Montana Rules of Evidence which states: A fact to be judicially noticed must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned. We note that the District Court went far beyond the record when it observed that O'Neill's property does not generate business comparable to other motels. The District Court's observations could only be verified by the income statements of other motels on Harrison Avenue, or similar specific data. This data would not be generally known or capable of accurate and ready determination. To qualify for judicial notice, an extrinsic fact must lie within the judge's immediate knowledge and not require thorough research. In the instant case, the District Court's empirical observations pass beyond the scope of judicial notice and border on judicial impression. The observations were not supported by the record, and are not sufficiently indisputable to qualify as judicially-noticed facts. We hold that the District Court erred on this issue. Issue 5 Did the District Court err by allowing O'Neill to pay delinquent taxes without an accompanying payment of accrued penalties and interest? STAB had issued an order staying the collection of all O'Neill's taxes, penalties and interest while O'Neill's appeal was pending before STAB. O'Neill later attempted to pay his delinquent taxes to the Butte-Silver Bow Treasurer, who refused to accept payment of the taxes without an accompanying payment of the accrued penalties and interest. Upon motion by O'Neill on January 17, 1984, the District Court allowed O'Neill to pay his delinquent taxes to the Butte-Silver Bow Treasurer. However, the District Court did not require O'Neill to pay the accrued penalties and interest. DOR contends that the District Court erred, because the taxpayer is required to pay the disputed portion of the tax under protest before it becomes delinquent. DOR argues that both STAB and the District Court acted beyond the scope of their lawful powers, when they stayed payment of penalties and interest. Our analysis of this issue is governed by § 15-1-402, MCA, which allows a taxpayer to pay his taxes under protest and recover the amount protested if his challenge is successful. Section 15-1-402(1), MCA, states: The person upon whom a tax or license fee is being imposed may ... before the tax or license fee becomes delinquent, pay under written protest that portion of the tax or license fee protested. The payment must (a) be made to the officer designated and authorized to collect it; and (b) specify the grounds of protest. [Emphasis added.] A tax becomes delinquent when the taxes are due and not paid. Section 15-16-102, MCA. We held in Eagle Communications v. Treasurer of Flathead County (Mont. 1984), 685 P.2d 912, 918, 41 St.Rep. 1303, 1311, that the County Treasurer is the officer who collects tax funds under § 15-1-402, MCA. The general rule is that a taxpayer must pay his taxes when due, as a condition precedent for preserving his right to refund of property taxes under § 15-1-402, MCA. Eagle Communications, 685 P.2d at 917. In the instant case, the Butte-Silver Bow Treasurer refused to accept payment of O'Neill's delinquent taxes without an accompanying payment of penalties and interest, because O'Neill failed to comply with the requirements of § 15-1-402, MCA. We hold that the Treasurer properly exercised his authority by refusing payment. However, we cannot ignore the fact that both STAB and the District Court stayed the payment of penalties and interest by O'Neill. Therefore, we hold that O'Neill is required to pay penalties and interest on his 1982 taxes only to the date that he tendered payment of his 1982 taxes to the Butte-Silver Bow Treasurer. O'Neill's failure to heretofore pay such penalties and interest on his 1982 taxes does not affect his standing to proceed with his contested case.