Opinion ID: 774603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Review of Certified Issues

Text: 60 A COA was granted on the issue of whether Styron's conviction violated the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Arave v. Cheech, 507 U.S. 463, 470 (1993), the Supreme Court held that to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital sentencing scheme must 'suitably direc[t] and limi[t]' the sentencer's discretion 'so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' (citing Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990)). The Court has set out a two-part test to determine the constitutionality of a death penalty scheme, examining both the eligibility decision and selection decision. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994). As Styron attacks only the eligibility requirement, only that portion of the test is relevant. To render a defendant eligible for the death penalty in a homicide case, we have indicated that the trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one 'aggravating circumstance' (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972 (internal citations omitted). As we have explained, the aggravating circumstance must meet two requirements. First the circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder. Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally vague. Id. (internal citations omitted). 61 Styron argues that former Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7), now Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(8), 2 violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because the age of a victim does not establish a principled basis for distinguishing defendants under the constraints of Arave. He asserts that there is no principled basis for distinguishing between a defendant who murdered a child under the age of six from one who murdered an older child. We disagree. Under the test presented in Tuilaepa, the aggravating circumstance for capital murder of murdering a child under the age of six is constitutionally sufficient. First, it does not apply to every defendant convicted of murder; it applies only to a certain subclass of defendants. See Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972. Second, it is not unconstitutionally vague. See Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (The child-murder provision meets both tests: murderers of children under six is a subclass of murderers in general, and 'children under six' is a clear and definite category.). On the contrary, the statute is very clear unlike other statutes which the Supreme Court has found to be vague. See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (holding especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel to be vague). The vagueness review is quite deferential. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973. 62 Styron misses the mark when he argues that under the Eighth Amendment, conviction and imposition of the death penalty for the murder of a child under six years old is arbitrary. A vague propositional factor used in the sentencing decision creates an unacceptable risk of randomness, the mark of the arbitrary and capricious sentencing process prohibited by Furman v. Georgia. Id. at 974-75 (emphasis added). Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(7), now Texas Penal Code § 19.03(a)(8), has no such vague propositional factor and is not arbitrary. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (A capital sentencing scheme must, in short, provide a 'meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. This means if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty. Part of a State's responsibility in this regard is to define the crimes for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates 'standardless [sentencing] discretion.') (internal citations omitted). 63 On a more general level, the Supreme Court upheld the Texas death penalty scheme insofar as it narrowed the definition of capital murder to circumstances in which there was at least one statutory aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death sentence may even be considered. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976). Murdering a child under six is a sufficiently narrow statutory aggravating factor. Therefore, we do not find a violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
64 Styron contends that conviction for capital murder under former Texas Penal Code § 19.03 (a)(8) denied him equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment when it limited capital murder to circumstances where the victim is under six years old. First, he contends that the statute should be reviewed under strict scrutiny because it impinges on a nebulous right of freedom from the arbitrary and capricious infliction of punishment. However, besides our resolution of the arbitrary and capricious issue, the Supreme Court has never afforded this right the protection of strict scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit, led by the Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), was convinced that equal protection clauses do not require a higher level of scrutiny for legislative classifications that may result in the death penalty. Thus, [petitioner's] claims are to be assessed under a rational basis test. Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1104 (5th Cir. 1982). Despite Styron's argument that age-based capital murder statutes should be reviewed under a strict scrutiny analysis, [a]ge classifications, unlike governmental conduct based on race or gender, cannot be characterized as 'so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.' Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). [A]ge is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. (internal citations omitted). 65 Styron next contends that the Texas statute cannot withstand even rational basis scrutiny because Texas has no legitimate interest in granting greater protection to children under six than to other children and adults. Rational basis scrutiny was clearly set out in Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84. States may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate state interest . . . . [W]e will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government's] actions were irrational. Id. (internal citations omitted). 66 The Texas Penal Statute is constitutional under rational basis scrutiny. First, there is a clear governmental interest in protecting young children. As the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has eloquently stated, Children are deemed to warrant protection because of their inexperience, lack of social and intellectual development, moral innocence, and vulnerability. Henderson, 962 S.W.2d at 562. Secondly, the decision of the Texas legislature to declare the age limit of six years is rationally related to the interest of protecting children. It is inherently difficult to draw a line of demarcation, id.; however, the Texas legislature cannot be said to have acted irrationally. As was testified concerning this statute, children under six are usually still at home and are vulnerable to caregivers, as exactly was the case here. See SB 13, Public Hearing, Senate Criminal Jurisprudence Committee, March 3, 1993. Using the six-year age limit is a rationally related means to accomplish Texas's end: protecting young children. 67 Alternatively, we agree with the district court that this claim is barred by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), as it seeks application of a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure. 68
69 A COA was granted on the issues of whether an alleged misstatement by the prosecution during voir dire denied Styron a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Eight of twelve jurors were told during voir dire that the second question submitted in the punishment phase of the trial should only be answered affirmatively if the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravating evidence. Texas Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 actually instructs the court to answer the following issue: 70 Whether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficientmitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed. 71 Styron contends that a mitigating circumstance might be sufficient to warrant life imprisonment without outweighing the aggravating circumstances. 72 However, Styron, as he readily admits, failed to object to the voir dire questioning. The 'Texas contemporaneous objection rule constitutes an adequate and independent state ground that procedurally bars federal habeas review of a petitioner's claims.'Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 652 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). If Styron overcomes the procedural bar, he still must demonstrate that the prosecutors' comments 'so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction [or sentence] a denial of due process. Rogers v. Lynaugh, 848 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted). This Circuit has developed the following test of constitutional error when a generic due process violation is asserted: 'The test applied to determine whether a trial error makes a trial fundamentally unfair is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly conducted.' Id. at 609 (quotingKirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1985)). 73 Although he never clearly addresses cause or prejudice, Styron does assert that his attorney failed to object to the voir dire questioning because he misunderstood the question and thought that the state was presenting accurate law. This reason, however, is not sufficient cause. The Fifth Circuit found that if an attorney had 'no reasonable basis upon which to formulate a constitutional question,' the default is excusable. Landry v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1117, 1120 (5th Cir. 1988). An attorney's personal alleged misconceptions about the law do not rise to the level of a change in federal law. Id. Furthermore, Styron fails to demonstrate prejudice. The state never referred back to voir dire in its closing arguments, and the court submitted the special issue as dictated by Texas Criminal Procedure Article 37.071. In interpreting the mitigation issue, a Texas court has described it as the weighing of mitigating evidence[,] . . . a subjective determination undertaken by each juror. Morris v. State, 940 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 74 Styron also fails to show a risk of fundamental miscarriage of justice. Although he argues that the evidence presented during the punishment phase concerning his dysfunctional childhood and history of abuse was considerable, nevertheless the jury still received the proper instruction immediately before punishment deliberations. 3 See Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1061 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding, despite prosecutor's misstatement of the law during voir dire, there was no constitutional error because the court properly instructed the jury in accordance with law). Because Styron has failed to overcome the procedural bar, we decline to address the merits of his claim of violation of his right to a fair and impartial jury and right to due process.