Opinion ID: 67089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to sever trial

Text: Martinez argues that the district court should have severed the trial to allow him to call Valadez as a witness on his behalf. According to Martinez, Valadez would have testified, inter alia, that he never told Martinez about the drugs and that Martinez thought the purpose of the trip was to move cars from Florida to Mexico. “It is well settled that defendants who are indicted together are usually tried together,” which is “particularly true in conspiracy cases.” United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1268 (11th Cir. 2007). We review the denial of a Rule 14 motion for severance under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. This standard requires an appellant to meet the “heavy burden of demonstrating compelling prejudice from the joinder.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted). To show that he is entitled to a new trial, an appellant first must “demonstrate that the joint trial resulted in prejudice to him; and second, must show that severance is the proper remedy for that prejudice.” Id. 6 Where, as here, the motion for severance is based on the defendant’s desire for a codefendant’s testimony, the “defendant must demonstrate [to the district court]: (1) a bona fide need for the codefendant’s testimony; (2) the substance of the testimony; (3) the exculpatory nature and effect of the testimony; and (4) that the codefendant will actually testify.” United States v. Leavitt, 878 F.2d 1329, 1340 (11th Cir. 1989). “If a showing is made, the district court must then consider the significance of the testimony, the prejudice caused by the absence of the testimony, the timeliness of the motion and the effect on judicial administration and economy of resources.” Id. In Browne, the defendants were charged with embezzlement and fraud by abusing their positions in a labor union. Browne, 505 F.3d at 1241. Browne moved to sever the trial so that his codefendant could testify that she: “never discussed the submission of false expense vouchers” with Browne; “told Browne that her New York trips were related to union business”; “did not conspire in any manner with Browne”; and “ha[d] no evidence or reason to believe that Browne knew she was victimizing the union.” Id. at 1269. The district court found “that the proffered testimony contain[ed] few specific exonerative facts and consist[ed] of undocumented conclusory allegations[,] which mitigate[d] against Browne’s severance motion.” Id. We affirmed, noting that the codefendant’s “proffered 7 testimony was in no way contrary to her own interests.” Id. at 1270. Here, Valadez’s proposed testimony appears analogous to, and no less selfserving than, the testimony offered in Browne. By testifying that Martinez had no knowledge of the drug transaction and that he told Martinez that they were merely buying cars for resale in Mexico, Valadez would have served his own interest by disapproving the conspiracy charge. See United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 651 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming denial of motion to sever where the proffered testimony “was of dubious credibility because it was in no way contrary to [testifying codefendants’] own interests”). Valadez’s affidavit (providing a glimpse into his anticipated testimony), moreover, contained conclusory statements claiming innocence and lacked any specific and exonerative facts as to Martinez. See Browne, 505 F.3d at 1269. Given the usual practice of trying indicted defendants together, especially in conspiracy cases, and a district court’s discretion to decide if severance is appropriate, we find no error.