Opinion ID: 1958575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: assignment of error number twenty-one

Text: Defendants contend that the trial court erred in not calling Barbara Jean Allen to the witness stand in the presence of the jury. Barbara Jean Allen had been examined twice outside the presence of the jury and answered some questions but invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to most inquiries. Her attorney stated that any testimony about the events of August 23 or 24 would be incriminating to the witness and that she invoked the Fifth Amendment in relation to such questions. The questions the witness answered outside the presence of the jury were irrelevant to any issues in the trial. It is contended that failure to force the witness to invoke her privilege before the jury restricted the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. It is reversible error to allow a witness to claim a blanket privilege. State v. Wilson, 394 So.2d 254 (La.,1981). However, when it is clear to the trial court that the silence of a witness is justified as to a particular evening because any testimony could be injurious, a question by question asserted of the privilege is unnecessary. State v. Darby, 403 So.2d 44 (La.,1981). It is improper to call a witness to the stand solely to impress upon the jury the fact that the witness will claim the privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Berry, 324 So.2d 822 (La.,1975); State v. Day, 400 So.2d 622 (La.,1981). Once it was determined that witness Allen would invoke the Fifth Amendment as to all questions relative to August 23 or 24, the trial court did not err in refusing to have her testify before the jury, State v. Darby, supra. The rights of confrontation and cross-examination are guaranteed. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). However, none of the statements by this witness bore on a fundamental part of the State's case and they would not have bolstered the defense. Douglas, supra. Defendants were not denied testimony which which would have been relevant and material to their defense. Compare Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). It may be trial error, but not necessarily reversible error to require a witness to answer questions in front of the jury which the witness will refuse to answer on the ground of self-incrimination. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 83 S.Ct. 1151, 10 L.Ed.2d 278 (1963). The better policy is an examination outside the presence of the jury such as that conducted by the trial court here. See United States v. Lacouture, 495 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206 (1st Cir. 1973); and, United States v. Bowman, 636 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1981). The trial court did not err in not requiring the witness to invoke the privilege in front of the jury. This assignment lacks merit.