Opinion ID: 3171608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Johnson Briefing

Text: After the parties' briefs came in, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Johnson involved a void-for-vagueness challenge to the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which, like the Guidelines, provides for lengthier sentences for certain defendants based on their criminal histories. In this regard, the ACCA contains a residual clause that is almost identical to the one found in the Guidelines. See id. at 2555-56 (recognizing the ACCA's residual clause includes any felony that 'involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another' (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B))). The Johnson Court ultimately held that the ACCA's residual clause is void for vagueness and that [i]ncreasing a defendant's sentence under the clause denies due process of law. Id. at 2557.6 We afforded the parties an opportunity to submit supplemental briefs addressing Johnson's effect, if any, on this appeal. Soto-Rivera argued that Johnson's reasoning applies equally to the Guidelines, rendering the Guidelines's residual 6 As will be made clear, the reasoning leading to the Supreme Court's holding is of no particular import in this appeal. The only thing that matters for today's analysis is that the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA's residual clause. - 12 - clause unconstitutionally vague and invalid as well. And since he was found to be a Career Offender by virtue of that residual clause, Soto-Rivera tells us his sentence cannot stand. In its supplemental brief, the government said it acknowledge[d] that the Guidelines's residual clause is unconstitutionally vague based on Johnson, and so it no longer holds the position that [Soto-Rivera's sentence] should be affirmed based on the residual clause. Thus, for purposes of this appeal, the government concedes that it violates due process to utilize the Guidelines's residual clause to classify a defendant as a Career Offender and thereby impose a longer sentence. Nevertheless, the government says we may affirm SotoRivera's sentence even without the residual clause. We can do this, it says, because the residual clause is not the only route leading to sentencing Soto-Rivera as a Career Offender. According to the government, we may rely on commentary explaining and further expanding upon U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2's definition of crime of violence.7 7 Guidelines commentary, the Supreme Court has explained, may serve these functions: commentary may 'interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be applied,' 'suggest circumstances which . . . may warrant departure from the guidelines,' or 'provide background information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline.' Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41 (1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7). - 13 - Specifically, Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 states that '[c]rime of violence' does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, unless the possession was of a firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, Application Note 1. The referenced statute, § 5845(a), provides various definitions of the term firearm, and it explicitly includes machinegun[s] within the word's meaning. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(6). Because Soto-Rivera admits that he possessed a machinegun, and because § 5845(a)(6) clearly refers to machineguns, Application Note 1, therefore, provides a basis completely independent of the residual clause for applying the Career Offender enhancement. Or so the government's argument goes.