Opinion ID: 2632329
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether CT and Prentice Hall reside in Santa Fe County for purposes of venue

Text: {14} Section 38-3-1(F) provides that: suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had shall only be brought [(1)] in the county where the plaintiff, or any one of them in case there is more than one, resides or [(2)] in the county where the contract sued on was made or is to be performed or [(3)] where the cause of action originated or indebtedness sued on was incurred or [(4)] in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides. (Emphasis added.) In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the Defendants in question are foreign corporations admitted to do business in New Mexico. The issue at bar is whether Plaintiffs may place venue in Santa Fe County where the statutory agents designated by the foreign corporations reside, when the statutory agents themselves are non-residents. {15} Resolution of this issue requires us to define resides as it applies to statutory agents who are foreign corporations under Section 38-3-1(F). Using our definition of non-resident from Aetna Finance Co., Defendants claim that the statutory agents in the present case do not reside in New Mexico and that venue cannot, therefore, be placed where the statutory agent resides. Defendants argue that venue is proper only in Lea County where Plaintiffs reside and where the cause of action originated. Even though Aetna Finance Co. contains language in support of Defendants' position, it is distinguishable from the present case. In that case, the foreign corporation was suing a domestic defendant. The plaintiff corporation had offices in Albuquerque and sought venue in Bernalillo County under Section 38-3-1(A). This Court looked to subsection (F) to determine whether Aetna reside[d] in Bernalillo County for venue purposes. We ultimately held that it did not. In so holding, this Court employed broad language that we today limit. In the present dispute, the foreign corporations are defendants and we therefore look not to subsection (A), but rather to subsection (F), to determine what venue is proper. To the extent that Aetna Finance Co. can be read to hold that foreign corporations can never reside in New Mexico for venue purposes under subsection (F), it is overruled. {16} We next look to the language of Section 38-3-1(F) to determine if CT and Prentice Hall reside in Santa Fe for purposes of venue. The meaning of language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Rowell, 121 N.M. 111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995). We give such language its ordinary and plain meaning unless the legislature indicates a different interpretation is necessary. Draper v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 116 N.M. 775, 777, 867 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1994). According to Black's Law Dictionary, [r]esidence usu[ally] just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place [and a] person thus may have more than one residence at a time.... Black's Law Dictionary 1310 (7th ed.1999). Under this plain meaning of residence, CT and Prentice Hall reside in New Mexico by virtue of the offices they maintain in Santa Fe. {17} We believe that the plain meaning of the term resides best effectuates the Legislature's intent in enacting Section 38-3-1. When the Legislature determined in 1955 that suits against foreign corporations admitted to do business and which designate and maintain a statutory agent in this state upon whom service of process may be had shall only be brought ... in the county where the statutory agent designated by the foreign corporation resides, only resident New Mexicans could serve as statutory agents. Section 38-3-1(F); Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 29, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. Because all statutory agents resided in New Mexico, the term resides could have only been intended to locate the statutory agent and not to distinguish between resident statutory agents and non-resident statutory agents. {18} Our rules of venue represent the Legislature's intent to ensure that the location of a trial is convenient for both parties to a lawsuit: Venue relates to the convenience of litigants, and reflect[s] equity or expediency in resolving disparate interests of parties to a lawsuit in the place of trial[.] In transitory actions the venue rules reflect an attempt to balance the common-law right of a defendant to be sued in his [or her] most convenient forum (usually the county of his [or her] residence) with the right of the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to sue. Team Bank, 118 N.M. at 150, 879 P.2d at 782 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, when a defendant resides in New Mexico, the plaintiff's right to choose the forum in which to sue is limited by Section 38-3-1(A) to those forums that the Legislature has determined will not unduly inconvenience the defendant. When the defendant does not reside in New Mexico and does not maintain a statutory agent in the state, however, Section 38-3-1(F) allows the plaintiff to place venue in any New Mexico county, presumably because all New Mexico counties will be inconvenient to a non-resident. We believe the Legislature passed Section 38-3-1(F) in order to give foreign corporations that are admitted to do business and that have designated and maintained a statutory agent in this state the same `weight' in the venue balance as resident defendants. Team Bank, 118 N.M. at 150, 879 P.2d at 782. We believe this intent is unaffected by the residence of a statutory agent. {19} In the context of a statutory agent, we hold that the term resides has a plain meaning which we believe the Legislature intended. A statutory agent who maintains an office in New Mexico for the purpose of receiving service of process resides in New Mexico regardless of whether it is a foreign corporation or a New Mexico resident. Accordingly, in the present case, venue was proper in Santa Fe County for the Defendants who maintained CT and Prentice Hall as their statutory agents in Santa Fe County. [1] {20} Section 38-3-1(F) is silent on the issue of whether a properly joined defendant is subject to venue in the same county in which another defendant is subject to venue by virtue of the residence of a statutory agent. However, with regard to transitory actions, Section 38-3-1(A) demands that venue be brought, among other alternatives, in the county where either the plaintiff or defendant, or any one of them in case there is more than one of either, resides. See Teaver v. Miller, 53 N.M. 345, 349, 208 P.2d 156, 160 (1949) ([T]he residence of one of the defendants determines the venue of the action against all.). We can discern no basis for applying a separate rule to multiple defendants when venue is based on the residence of a statutory agent. The Court of Appeals' opinion determined that Teaver was inapplicable because under these facts no party resides in Santa Fe County. Cooper, 2000-NMCA-100, ¶ 33, 129 N.M. 710, 13 P.3d 68. Because we conclude that when a foreign corporation appoints a foreign corporation statutory agent the residency requirement in Section 38-3-1(F) is met, Teaver is applicable. We therefore hold that venue in Santa Fe County is proper with regard to all Defendants still involved in the present case. [2]