Opinion ID: 719599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rehearing in Banc.

Text: 65 Judge Feinberg argues that rehearing in banc is inappropriate in this case because the standards of Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have not been satisfied. Rule 35(a) specifies that rehearing in banc is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. 66 As to the first category, it is clear that Baker II and Baker III may be reconciled with this court's ruling in Green, although Green calls for considerably more deference to New York's felon disenfranchisement laws than is evident in either Baker II or Baker III. In any event, the adherents of this opinion do not contend that rehearing in banc is needed to secure or maintain uniformity of [this Court's] decisions. We disagree with Judge Feinberg's claim, however, that this appeal does not present a question of exceptional importance because of the premature state of the case at which the appeal comes to us. 67 As has been made clear, the inquiry fostered by § 1973 and its legislative history is directed primarily to the electoral practices of the several states and their political subdivisions. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 44-45, 106 S.Ct. at 2762-64. The panel opinions in this case, by contrast, would authorize a highly intrusive process of pretrial discovery into the existence, vel non, of racial bias throughout the entire criminal justice system of New York State, with little or no statutory guidance to channel or provide standards for the inquest. We have no doubt that if the panel decisions had remained undisturbed, similar inquiries would soon have been underway in Connecticut, as well as in other jurisdictions throughout the nation. In our view, the distinct unlikelihood that Congress foresaw or intended to authorize anything like this process when it amended § 1973 in 1982, coupled with the severe ensuing impact upon the  ' constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, '  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. at 2401 (quoting Will 491 U.S. at 65, 109 S.Ct. at 2309 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 3147)), results in the presentation of a question of exceptional importance within the meaning of Rule 35(a), fully justifying the determination by a majority of the judges of this Court in active service to call for rehearing in banc. 68 We agree with Judge Feinberg that because of the even division on the merits, the in banc rehearing may have eventuated as an exercise in futility in clarifying the law. Obviously, however, because such outcomes cannot be predicted in advance, a preclusion of in banc rehearings because of the possibility of unclarifying results would effectively eliminate the practice. 69 FEINBERG, Circuit Judge (with whom Chief Judge NEWMAN and Judges MESKILL, KEARSE and PARKER join). 70 I respectfully disagree with Judge Mahoney's opinion in this case. I believe that the original panel opinions were correct in reversing the district court and allowing plaintiffs-appellants to proceed with their claims under the Voting Rights Act.
71 Plaintiffs-appellants are black and hispanic convicted felons incarcerated in New York State prisons. Due to their incarceration, they are denied the right to vote by New York Election Law § 5-106. That statute disenfranchises felons serving prison sentences or on parole, but does not disenfranchise felons serving suspended sentences or sentences of probation. Plaintiffs filed pro se complaints in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1 alleging pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that enforcement of § 5-106 violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and § 2 of the Voting Rights Act (sometimes called the Act hereafter), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, because, among other things, black and hispanic felons are less likely than white felons to be sentenced to probation or have their sentences suspended. Plaintiffs' amended complaints referred to a Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, which stated that there was evidence of race-based disparity in the State Courts' conviction rate and sentence type. See Amended Complaints pp 10-14, quoted in relevant part in Judge Mahoney's opinion, pp. 3-4. The Act generally prohibits voter qualifications and practices that result in a denial of the right to vote on account of race. The district court, Vincent L. Broderick, J., dismissed the amended complaints sua sponte pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F.Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (Baker I ). 72 On appeal, a unanimous panel of this court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. In that opinion, 58 F.3d 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 488, 133 L.Ed.2d 415 (1995) (Baker II ), the panel determined that dismissal of the Voting Rights Act claims was inappropriate. The panel held, among other things, that plaintiffs' allegations that § 5-106 interacted with racial discrimination in the New York State criminal justice system to result in denial of the right to vote on account of race stated a claim under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 2 The panel expressed no view on whether plaintiffs could prove their allegations. 73 Defendants-appellees (referred to hereafter as the State) then petitioned for rehearing, arguing that permitting plaintiffs to obtain relief under the Act would violate § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The panel denied rehearing, determining that although § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment does authorize States to disenfranchise all felons, it does not permit States to disenfranchise some felons because of their race. 58 F.3d at 824 (Baker III ). Familiarity with the opinions in Baker II and Baker III is assumed. 74 A majority of the active judges of this court then voted to rehear the appeal in banc. Baker v. Cuomo, 67 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir.1995). The rehearing was limited to the applicability of the Voting Rights Act. Id.
A. Merits 75 The issue before the in banc court is simple to state: May plaintiffs, disenfranchised black and hispanic prisoners, bring a cause of action under the Voting Rights Act, claiming that their vote has been denied for reasons of race by New York Election Law § 5-106? 76 Plaintiffs' case is based on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which was contained in the original Act passed in 1965 and was amended in 1982. As amended, the section provides in relevant part as follows: 77 (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....(emphasis added). 78 (b) A violation ... is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that ... members [of protected racial minorities] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. 79 Prior to the 1982 amendment, the underlined language above read as follows: to deny or abridge. The effect of the amendment is that a plaintiff now has to prove only discriminatory result under the totality of the circumstances test set forth in § 2(b) rather than discriminatory intent. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383-84, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 2357-58, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991). 80 Plaintiffs claim that the phrase any citizen in § 2(a), quoted above, covers them and argue that their amended complaints contain sufficient allegations which, if proved, would establish their cause of action. Plaintiffs contend that § 5-106, which denies incarcerated felons the right to vote, constitutes a voting qualification within the meaning of the Act. They also allege that § 5-106 has a discriminatory result because, due to racial disparities in sentencing, a black or hispanic felon is more likely than a white felon to be incarcerated and thus disenfranchised. 81 In response to plaintiffs, the State argues in Point I of its brief to the in banc court that because [s]ection 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment ... expressly authorizes the individual States to deny the vote to convicted felons.... Congress may not override this constitutional authorization by statute. In a related but somewhat different constitutional argument, Judge Mahoney's opinion holds that the results test of the amended Act may not be applied to a felon disenfranchisement statute like § 5-106 because there is no evidence that these statutes historically were used to disenfranchise minorities. 82 The State next argues in Point II of its brief that, in any event, Congress did not intend the Voting Rights Act, either in its original form or as subsequently amended, to apply to state felon disenfranchisement statutes. The State backs up this argument by using what is, in effect, a canon of statutory construction. The State claims that a federal statute affecting the rights of disenfranchised felons to vote upsets the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers and that under controlling Supreme Court authority, that balance cannot be altered unless Congress makes its intention to do so unmistakably clear by a plain statement in the language of its statute. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 2400-01, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985)). According to the State, Congress has not done that here. Judge Mahoney's opinion also relies on this argument. I address each of these arguments in turn. 83
84 The State first contends that the Voting Rights Act may not constitutionally be applied to discrimination among felons based on race because of the insulation States enjoy in matters of felon disenfranchisement by virtue of § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That section provides: 85 Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers.... But when the right to vote ... is denied ... or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be [proportionally] reduced.... 86 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). According to the State, the Fourteenth Amendment thus expressly permits the State to disenfranchise convicted felons. Thus, the State's argument goes, since Congress may not override this constitutional authorization, the Voting Rights Act does not provide a basis for a challenge to § 5-106. This contention, however, has been substantially undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 85 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). Before Hunter, it might have been plausibly argued that § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment carves all aspects of felon disenfranchisement out of the purview of the Equal Protection Clause, which is in the very same amendment. However, the Supreme Court in Hunter easily disposed of that contention. 87 The plaintiffs in Hunter attacked a provision in the Alabama Constitution of 1901 that disenfranchised those who had committed various crimes, including any crime ... involving moral turpitude. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and claimed, among other things, that the Alabama Constitution had intentionally disenfranchised blacks. The Supreme Court unanimously accepted this proposition and held the Alabama provision unconstitutional. The Court addressed the effect of § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, so heavily relied on by the State in its argument to us. The Court stated: 88 The single remaining question is whether [the Alabama provision] is excepted from the operation of the Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by the other crime provision of § 2 of that Amendment.... [W]e are confident that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimination attending the enactment and operation of [the Alabama provision] which otherwise violates § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in our opinion in Richardson v. Ramirez, supra, suggests the contrary. 89 471 U.S. at 233. 90 In support of its argument regarding Congressional lack of power, the State also relies on Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974) and, apparently, on Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048, 88 S.Ct. 768, 19 L.Ed.2d 840 (1968). The former decision, which held that States could disenfranchise felons, was summarily brushed aside in the language from Hunter quoted immediately above. And Green did not involve either a claim of racial discrimination or the Voting Rights Act. Neither Richardson nor Green holds that felon disenfranchisement statutes that discriminate on the basis of race are beyond the reach of the Equal Protection Clause. 91 I agree that States have the right to disenfranchise felons; § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that clear. States, however, do not have the right to disenfranchise felons on the basis of race. And, to prevent such discrimination, I see no persuasive reason, in view of Hunter, why Congress may not use its enforcing power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to bar racially discriminatory results, as it did in the Voting Rights Act. 92 Plaintiffs here allege that § 5-106, which disenfranchises only some felons, discriminates among felons based on race. 3 The panel did not suggest in Baker III, 58 F.3d at 824-25, nor do I suggest here, that plaintiffs have stated a claim under the Act merely because § 5-106 disenfranchises only some felons. While a State may choose to disenfranchise some, all or none of its felons based on legitimate concerns, it may not do so based upon distinctions that have the effect, whether intentional or not, of disenfranchising felons because of their race. 93
94 Judge Mahoney's opinion apparently holds that the results test of the amended Voting Rights Act may constitutionally ban conduct which is not directly violative of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments 4 only if the ban addresse[s] historical discrimination of an unconstitutional kind. 5 According to Judge Mahoney, since felon disenfranchisement is a very widespread historical practice that has been accorded explicit constitutional recognition, 6 applying the Voting Rights Act to § 5-106 would raise serious constitutional questions. 95 Judge Mahoney's argument, taken at its fullest, would drastically limit the scope of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, prohibiting a § 2 claim by any minority citizen in the absence of an allegation that the particular discriminatory practice had been intentionally imposed in the past in the particular jurisdiction. No case so holds. Thus, in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970), the Court dealt with a 1970 amendment to the Voting Rights Act that extended to the nation as a whole the ban on the use of literacy tests that had earlier been confined to the geographical areas where they had intentionally been used to discriminatory effect. All the members of the Court upheld the nationwide ban as a legitimate exercise of Congress' power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, even though there was not proof of direct Constitutional violations in every State. Id. at 118, 91 S.Ct. at 261-62; see also id. at 284, 91 S.Ct. at 344 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Because the justification for extending the ban on literacy tests to the entire Nation need not turn on whether literacy tests unfairly discriminate against Negroes in every State in the Union, Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning either the equality of educational opportunity or actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access to the ballot box.). 96 In a subsequent decision, upholding the constitutionality of the results test contained in § 5 of the Act, the Supreme Court stated, It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are 'appropriate '.... City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1561-62, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980) (emphasis added); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1722-24, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). In light of this, Congress included past discrimination as only one of a list of factors to be considered in determining whether there has been a violation of § 2 under the totality of the circumstances test. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2758-59, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986) (citing S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206). 97 Moreover, I do not agree that there is no history of use of felon disenfranchisement statutes to impose purposeful racial discrimination. Although there has been no record developed in this case, due largely to its premature dismissal sua sponte, there is evidence to suggest that felon disenfranchisement statues often have been used to deny the right to vote on account of race. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 232, 105 S.Ct. at 1922 (disenfranchisement statute adopted at Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 selected such crimes as vagrancy, living in adultery, and wife beating that were thought to be more commonly committed by blacks in order to evade the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 Yale L.J. 537, 540-543 (1993) (identifying several states that allegedly disenfranchised criminals selectively with the intent of disqualifying a disproportionate number of blacks). While felon disenfranchisement may be a widespread historical practice, disenfranchisement based on race is a historical practice that the Voting Rights Act seeks to eradicate. 98 In sum, I believe Congress clearly has the power to apply the results test to § 5-106, New York's felon disenfranchisement statute. 99
100 Next, the State contends that, even if Congress had the constitutional power to apply the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement, it did not intend to do so. According to the State, under Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460, 111 S.Ct. at 2400-01, a plain statement of such intent is required to upset the usual constitutional balance between the federal government and the States. Application of the Voting Rights Act to felon disenfranchisement, the argument goes, would upset that balance, and the Act contains no such plain statement. Judge Mahoney's opinion also relies on this argument. 7 101 However, the Voting Rights Act does not alter the constitutional balance between the federal government and the States that was established by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 468, 111 S.Ct. at 2405 ( '[The Civil War] Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.' ) (quoting City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179, 100 S.Ct. at 1563); see also Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (noting that, because the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power struck by the Constitution, the enforcement provision of that amendment allowed Congress to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity.) 102 Moreover, we have clear Supreme Court authority that the plain statement rule does not apply when determining coverage under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In Chisom, decided the same day as Gregory, the Court did not apply the plain statement rule in determining whether the results test of the 1982 amendment of the Voting Rights Act applied to the election of state judges. Significantly, Justice Scalia and the other three dissenters, all of whom disagreed with the Court's application of the statute to judicial elections, nevertheless agreed that the plain statement rule had no application to the statutory issue of coverage under § 2. As Justice Scalia put it, the possibility of applying that rule never crossed [the Court's] mind. 501 U.S. at 412, 111 S.Ct. at 2373. Moreover, Justice Scalia expressed the view that the plain statement rule probably does not apply to Congressional exercises of authority under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 103 Manifestly, the conduct of state judicial elections, which was at issue in Chisom, is a matter of great significance to States. Indeed, it would seem that application of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to state judges, a result that can change district boundaries, is at least as much of an intrusion of federal authority into state affairs as the effort of plaintiffs here to apply § 2 in a way that, at most, might permit some felons to vote. 104 In addition, Gregory makes clear that the plain statement rule applies only when the statute is ambiguous. 501 U.S. at 470, 111 S.Ct. at 2406. The Voting Rights Act does not seem to be ambiguous. Any citizen usually means any citizen, and I submit that it does so in the Voting Rights Act. The State appears to accept this proposition. 8 It argues, however, that the legislative history of the 1965 Act shows that felon disenfranchisement statutes were not tests or devices as defined by section 4(c) of that Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c). 9 This, according to the State, creates an ambiguity: whether the legislative history of § 4(c) of the 1965 Act creates an unwritten exception to § 2 of the Act, in both its original and amended forms. Thus, the argument continues, prohibiting a State from disenfranchising felons is barred under Gregory unless the intention to do so is clearly expressed in the Act. 105 The argument is without merit. I do not believe the 1965 legislative history of § 4(c), which makes clear that felon disenfranchisement statutes are not tests or devices, can properly be used to interpret § 2, which does not even use these terms. The Voting Rights Act operates in two different ways. The use of tests and devices (as defined in § 4(c) at the time the Act was first passed), combined with low voter registration or low voter turnout, subjects a particular jurisdiction to § 5, which prevents any future change in voting practices without first obtaining either a declaratory judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or preclearance from the Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. In contrast, § 2 applies nationwide and covers any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right ... to vote. 42 U.S.C.1973; see also Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 566-67, 89 S.Ct. 817, 832, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (by using the terms standard, practice, or procedure Congress indicated its intention to give § 2 of the Act the broadest possible scope). Because §§ 2 and 4 have different purposes, scope and language, the legislative history of § 4(c) is not necessarily applicable to interpretation of § 2, United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 2341, 68 L.Ed.2d 858 (1981), and certainly cannot create an ambiguity requiring use of the plain statement rule where the textual language of § 2 is perfectly clear. 106 When the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965, § 2 apparently protected a potentially large group of people (any citizen) against racially-motivated, intentional discrimination with respect to voting rights. That large group could challenge a felon disenfranchisement statute, regardless of the legislative history behind § 4(c). This proposition is, as already indicated, directly supported by Hunter in which disenfranchised felons successfully sued under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to set aside Alabama's intentional denial of their right to vote because of their race. Admittedly, the plaintiffs in Hunter did not raise a claim under the Voting Rights Act. But it seems clear that they could have because it is undisputed that, prior to the 1982 amendment of the Voting Rights Act, § 2 of that Act was coextensive with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1495-96, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (Stewart, J.); see also H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437. There is apparent agreement that the only effect of the 1982 amendment is to allow a plaintiff to show racial discrimination by proving discriminatory result rather than discriminatory intent. Therefore, because disenfranchised felons like the plaintiffs here could have brought an action under the 1965 Act, they continue to have the right to protection under the amended Act. 107 In sum, I reject the argument that there is ambiguity in the Voting Rights Act that requires it to contain a plain statement of congressional intent to affect felon disenfranchisement. 108 Finally, I have considered all of the State's other arguments for affirming the district court and find them to be without merit. 10 B. Rehearing In Banc 109 Before closing this opinion, something should be said about the propriety and usefulness of an in banc rehearing of this appeal. Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) allows a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service to rehear an appeal in banc. However, [s]uch a ... rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance. (emphasis added). Id. This case raises neither concern. There is no issue as to uniformity of circuit law. As already indicated, the original panel opinion in Baker II does not conflict with this court's prior opinion in Green v. Board of Elections; indeed, the panel opinion quoted extensively from it. Green upheld the constitutionality of New York Election Law § 152, which deprived all convicted felons of the right to vote. 380 F.2d at 452. Green did not involve discrimination among felons on the basis of race, nor did it involve the Voting Rights Act, as the present case does. 110 Furthermore, this appeal is too premature to present an issue of exceptional importance. The pro se complaints were dismissed by the district court sua sponte before an answer was received. Therefore, the appeal arises at an extremely early stage in the proceedings, with virtually no record developed in the district court. Moreover, the original panel did not determine that § 5-106 violates the Voting Rights Act or even intimate, on this phase of the case, that plaintiffs were likely to be able to prove their allegations. The panel merely held that plaintiffs were entitled to try to do so. Nor did the panel say that, in the event that plaintiffs could establish a violation, prisoner enfranchisement would be the appropriate remedy. Thus, it would have been wiser to wait until a later stage in these proceedings before embarking on the rare (in this circuit) and timeconsuming procedure of an in banc rehearing. 111 Our annual filings have in recent years soared to approximately 4,000. Mere substantive disagreement with a panel decision is not, under FRAP 35, sufficient reason for an in banc rehearing. If we do not follow the clear spirit of the Rule, we will become mired in endless internal review. This creates much additional work and slows down the pace of other cases. See Jon O. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55 Brook. L.Rev. 355, 369 (1989); Jon O. Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 Brook. L.Rev. 365, 382 (1984). The lack of benefit is compounded in this case, where the court is evenly divided. The opinions issued today will have no precedential effect. Thus, § 5-106 can be challenged on the same grounds by different minority plaintiffs. Since some or all of the four judges who are recused from this case may not have a conflict in a subsequent case, future plaintiffs might receive a different result than the present plaintiffs do today. 112 In sum, the in banc proceeding here was not required either to maintain uniformity or to decide an issue of exceptional importance. Moreover, this in banc proceeding has turned out, as so many do, to be an exercise in futility in clarifying the law. 113