Opinion ID: 784988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards

Text: 20 We begin our analysis by examining the general legal principles governing federal courts' review of arbitration awards. The first step in any such review involves an examination of the sources of the arbitrator's authority. See Matteson v. Ryder System, Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 112 (3d Cir.1996) (Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court may vacate an arbitration award if, inter alia, `the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.') (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)). Simply stated, an arbitrator may not venture beyond the bounds of his or her authority, which is defined not only by the terms of the CBA, but also by the scope of the issues submitted by the parties. Id. Thus, [i]t is the responsibility of the arbitrator in the first instance to interpret the scope of the parties' submission, but it is within the courts' province to review an arbitrator's interpretation. Id. at 113. 21 In conducting this review, `the deference that is accorded to an arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement should also be accorded to an arbitrator's interpretation of the issue submitted.' Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir.1982)). This is so because (1) a more searching judicial review of submissions ... would undermine the congressional policy of promoting speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of labor grievances; (2) interpretation of a submission must often occur in the context of the collective bargaining agreement itself, thereby resulting in an inconsistency if the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA receives deference but his or her determination of the scope of the submission does not; and (3) requiring courts to engage in a close examination of the submissions to arbitrators would put a considerable strain on judicial resources. Id. (citing Mobil Oil, 679 F.2d at 302). 22 Our role in reviewing the outcome of the arbitration proceedings is not to correct factual or legal errors made by an arbitrator. 23 Courts are not authorized to review the arbitrator's decision on the merits despite allegations that the decision rests on factual errors or misinterprets the parties' agreement.... When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's `improvident, even silly, factfinding' does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award. 24 Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509, 121 S.Ct. 1724, 149 L.Ed.2d 740 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). We should uphold an arbitration award that draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement because the parties to the collective bargaining agreement `bargained for' a procedure in which an arbitrator would interpret the agreement. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO v. United States Postal Serv., 272 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir.2001) (noting that a court should uphold an arbitration award) (citing Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62, 121 S.Ct. 462, 148 L.Ed.2d 354 (2000)); United Indus. Workers v. Gov't of the V.I., 987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that a court may not overrule an arbitration decision because it finds an error of law); Tanoma Mining Co. v. Local Union No. 1269, United Mine Workers of Am., 896 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir.1990) (noting that, because the parties have bargained for the arbitrator's decision, `it is the arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept.' An award may fairly be said to `draw[] its essence from the bargaining agreement if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention.' United Transportation Union Local 1589, 51 F.3d at 379-80 (internal quotations omitted)). 25 Moreover, an award may be vacated if the arbitrator demonstrates manifest disregard for the CBA. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Newark Typographical Union Local, 797 F.2d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 1986). Manifest disregard for the CBA is established when the arbitrator's award is `totally unsupported by principles of contract construction.' Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting News Am. Publications v. Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir.1990)). 26 In reviewing an arbitration award, courts do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. Tanoma Mining Co., 896 F.2d at 747 (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 37-38, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987)); see also Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Norad Reinsurance Co., 868 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.1989) (concluding that [i]t is not this Court's role ... to sit as the [arbitration] panel did and reexamine the evidence under the guise of determining whether the arbitrators exceeded their powers.). Rather, arbitration awards enjoy a strong presumption of correctness that may be overcome only in certain limited circumstances, as described above. 27 With this standard in mind, we turn now to the specific claims at issue here.