Opinion ID: 552087
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of Batson

Text: 9 Finally, Carpenter argues that the state used peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury in violation of the Sixth Amendment. In making this argument, he relies on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which held that the Equal Protection clause forbids the state from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors solely because of their race. Batson is not applied retroactively on collateral review of convictions that became final before that decision was announced. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 257-58 (1986). By final the Court means where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed before the decision in Batson. Allen, 478 U.S. at 258 n. 1 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n. 5 (1965)). All these events took place in Carpenter's case five years before the Court's 1986 decision in Batson, thus depriving him of any benefit from the rule announced in that case. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1067 (1989) (plurality opinion).