Opinion ID: 1952131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecution Bar.

Text: [11-13] The final issue that we address on this review is whether Petty's conviction in state court must be vacated because it violates Wis. Stat. § 161.45. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo, without deference to the lower courts. State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 669, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984). In construing a statute, this court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Benjamin Plumbing, Inc. v. Barnes, 162 Wis. 2d 837, 856, 470 N.W.2d 888 (1991). We must give words their ordinary and accepted meanings and try to give effect to every word so as to not render any part of the statute superfluous. Id. (citing State v. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 437 N.W.2d 878 (1989)). The focus of our statutory inquiry is that language found in Wis. Stat. § 161.45, which provides as follows: Bar to prosecution. If a violation of this chapter is a violation of a federal law or the law of another state, a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. The parties are in agreement that a plain reading of the statute requires that: (1) the prosecution in state court must occur after a federal conviction, [8] and (2) the federal conviction must be for the same act, in order for the statutory bar to prosecution to apply. Our analysis of this appeal must begin with a determination of the role that the term prosecution plays within the framework of Wis. Stat. § 161.45, such that it will act to bar additional criminal proceedings against a particular individual. Petty contends that his state prosecution for cocaine possession occurred after he was convicted in federal court on the conspiracy charge. The analytical basis for this conclusion relies upon the fact that Petty defines prosecution under § 161.45 as a process that is not completed until sentence has been imposed and judgment is entered. See Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928)). Therefore, Petty reasons that his state conviction is barred under the statute simply because the state prosecution was not technically completed until state sentences were imposed in November 1992, following completion of the prosecution in federal court. However, this simplified approach to interpreting Wis. Stat. § 161.45 begs the question of what aspect of prosecution it is that we are dealing with under the statute. The term `prosecution' clearly imports a beginning and an end, see Bradley, 410 U.S. at 609, and consists of a myriad of activity that generically can be classified into three categorical stages: (1) initiation, (2) conviction or acquittal, and (3) sentencing. The statute at issue does not clearly articulate the stage that a prosecution must reach in order to operate as a bar to further criminal proceedings under the laws of this state. Petty contends that the imposition of a sentence is the determinative point, while the State suggests that the conviction or acquittal stage is more appropriate. In accord with the canons of statutory construction, we are to give words their ordinary and accepted meanings so as not to render any part of the statute superfluous. Sher, 149 Wis. 2d at 9. Defining the role of the term prosecution, as utilized under Wis. Stat. § 161.45, is the focal point for our analysis of Petty's present claim. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the common usage of the term prosecution in its decision in Bradley, where it remarked that [w]hen people speak of prosecutions, they usually mean a proceeding that is under way in which guilt is to be determined. In ordinary usage, sentencing is not part of the prosecution, but occurs after the prosecution has concluded. Id. at 608. Moreover, a prosecution has been defined as a proceeding instituted and carried on by due course of law, before a competent tribunal, for the purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of a person charged with crime. Black's Law Dictionary at 1221 (6th ed. 1990). [14] We similarly employ the ordinary meaning of the term prosecution in our limited interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 161.45, and hold that a prosecution is to be equated with conviction or acquittal. The sentencing phase is therefore not the determinative point for analysis under the statute, as Petty has argued. This result is implicit from a reading of the statute, which refers to a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act [as] a bar to prosecution in this state. § 161.45 (Emphasis added.) Our interpretation of the statute is supported by the legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 161.45 as well, which, as the State notes, is undeniably sparse. [9] However, the language of the statutory bar to prosecution within the Controlled Substances Act clearly indicates the legislature's intent to abolish the dual sovereignty doctrine by statute, with regard to substantially identical drug offenses based on the same act. The United States Supreme Court and courts of numerous states have held that a state prosecution following a federal prosecution does not constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional protection against being placed in double jeopardy. In Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), the United States Supreme Court discussed the doctrine of dual sovereignty, observing: We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory.... Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each. The Fifth Amendment, like all the other guaranties in the first eight amendments, applies only to proceedings by the Federal Government, ... and the double jeopardy therein forbidden is a second prosecution under authority for the Federal Government after a first trial for the same offense under the same authority. Id. at 194 (citing United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). Despite this directive, a number of states, focusing upon the individual's interest in being free from repeated prosecutions for the same alleged acts, have enacted legislation aimed at alleviating continued prosecution, depending upon the similarity of the state and federal charges and upon whether the state and federal laws were designed to protect the same governmental interests. See generally Annotation, Conviction Or Acquittal In Federal Court As Bar To Prosecution In State Court For State Offense Based On Same FactsModern View, 6 A.L.R.4th 802, 816-24 (1981). Section 161.45 is representative of the type of legislation instituted by those jurisdictions precluding continuing prosecution, as permitted under the doctrine of dual sovereignty. We now proceed to analysis of the facts of this case, in light of the foregoing, to determine if Wis. Stat. § 161.45 will act to bar Petty's conviction in state court. Petty contends that his state prosecution for cocaine possession occurred after he was convicted in federal court on the conspiracy charge. Petty reasons that because his federal sentence was imposed in October 1992, prior to the imposition of sentence in state court in November 1992, § 161.45 should bar the state conviction, as the state prosecution came after the federal prosecution. However, this argument runs contrary to our conclusion today that prosecution is to be equated with conviction or acquittal under § 161.45. The particular date on which a sentence is imposed is not the relevant inquiry under our analysis of the statute. [15] For purposes of assessing the applicability of Wis. Stat. § 161.45, we must determine the point at which guilt was determined on the state and federal charges. In state court, the determination of guilt occurred in October 1991, when Petty entered a plea of guilty before Judge Crivello. At that time, the federal prosecution had not begun, as Petty was not even indicted on federal charges until December 1991. Therefore, we conclude that because the federal prosecution against Petty occurred after he was convicted in state court, the bar to a state prosecution contained in § 161.45, is not applicable to Petty's state drug conviction in this case. [10] The result which we have reached, based upon our interpretation of the language of the statute, is bolstered by the argument advanced by the State in both its brief and during oral argument. The State asserts that the statutory provision at issue creates a form of statutory double jeopardy, protecting individuals from multiple prosecutions by separate sovereign entities for the same act even though the constitution does not. [11] The United States and Wisconsin constitutions protect a criminal defendant from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. [12] [16-18] The proper point at which to begin this analysis is to determine the precise moment at which jeopardy attached to the state proceeding. [13] We recognized in State v. Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992), that [t]he prohibition against double jeopardy is not triggered until `jeopardy attaches' in the proceedings. Jeopardy means exposure to the risk of a determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 937 (quoting 3 W. LaFave and J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 24.1(c) at 63 (1984)). Where there is no trial, jeopardy attaches upon the court's acceptance of a guilty or no contest plea. State v. Poveda, 166 Wis. 2d 19, 25, 479 N.W.2d 175 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d at 937-38; State v. Waldman, 57 Wis. 2d 234, 237, 203 N.W.2d 691 (1973); Salters, 52 Wis. 2d at 714; Hawkins v. State, 30 Wis. 2d 264, 267, 140 N.W.2d 226 (1966); and Belter v. State, 178 Wis. 57, 62, 189 N.W. 270 (1922). [14] [19] As indicated earlier, Petty's guilty plea on the state charges was accepted by Judge Crivello in October 1991, and a judgment of conviction was entered. It was at this point that jeopardy attached to the state proceedings. Despite the significance of this juncture, Petty's argument remains consistent, asserting that the state conviction is barred by Wis. Stat. § 161.45 because the state prosecution was not technically completed until state sentences were imposed in November 1992. However, we have previously demonstrated this reasoning to be flawed in light of our reading of § 161.45. Moreover, the appellate court in Poveda clarified that the particular timing or date of completion of a prosecution is not the critical factor in the court's analysis. Rather, the determinative moment is that at which jeopardy attaches, for that is, after all, `the lynchpin for all double jeopardy jurisprudence.' Id. at 25 (quoting Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978)). The State asks this court to consider the result reached by the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 533 A.2d 116 (Pa. Super. 1987), a case factually similar to the one at hand. In Ramirez, the defendants were initially charged with possession and delivery of a controlled substance in state court. The defendants pled guilty to the state charges after being indicted in federal court on related charges. Id. at 117-18. Prior to being sentenced in state court, they pled guilty to the federal drug conspiracy charges and were sentenced. When state sentences were imposed, the defendants sought to withdraw their state pleas on grounds that the state charges were prohibited by a statutory double jeopardy bar similar to Wis. Stat. § 161.45. [15] The Pennsylvania court, consistent with the result reached in Poveda, held that application of the jeopardy bar was not dependent upon the sequence of the filing of the particular charges. Rather, the court articulated that the determinative factor triggering the application of the statutory bar was the point at which the guilty pleas were entered, stating: [a] prosecution against a defendant, consequently, is not completed, and therefore cannot be a `former prosecution,' until a defendant is acquitted or convicted. Ramirez, 533 A.2d at 119. The court therefore concluded that the statutory jeopardy bar was not applicable because the Pennsylvania prosecution had been completed first. Id. [20] In the present case, the State's prosecution of Petty was completed on October 16, 1991, when the circuit court accepted his pleas of guilty, and jeopardy attached to the proceedings. See Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d at 937-38; Poveda, 166 Wis. 2d at 25. As this date was prior to the prosecution of Petty in federal court, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 161.45 cannot serve to relieve Petty from his drug conviction in state court. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals on different grounds. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.