Opinion ID: 627223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: .Precedent Prohibits The Trial Court's Holding

Text: This court has previously found that the bad men provisions were not confined to wrongs committed by government employees. See Tsosie, 825 F.2d 393. [16] In Tsosie, the court stated: We hold . . . that the treaty provision in question [the bad men provision of Art. 1], even if infrequently invoked, has not become obsolete or been abandoned or preempted in any sense that affects its enforceability by suit in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Tsosie, 825 F.2d at 394. In rejecting the notion that the provision at issue had been preempted by changes in the law since the treaty's negotiation, notably since the advent of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, we stated: [T]he bad men provision is not confined to wrongs by government employees. The literal text of article I and the legislative history of the treaty show that any white can be a bad man plus any nonwhite subject to the authority of the United States, whatever that means, but most likely Indian nonmembers of the Navajo tribe but subject to United States law. Id. at 400. [17] The court's finding in Tsosie is controlling here. [18] After rejecting Tsosie as guiding precedent, the trial court then examined two types of cases: (1) where courts have reached the merits of claims alleging that wrongs were committed by bad men who were acting for or on behalf of the government, and (2) cases where courts have dismissed claims failing to allege that `wrongs' were committed by individual `bad men' who were subject to the authority of the United States. Richard, 98 Fed.Cl. at 286-89. The trial court concluded that, among these cases, [a] common thread is discernible . . . the court possesses jurisdiction over Article I `bad men' clause claims where there exists a nexus between the individual committing the alleged `wrong' and the United States. Id. at 289. The trial court relied on the absence of bad men cases brought against defendants who were not officers, agents, or employees of the federal government as evidence that such cases cannot be brought. [19] However, as pointed out in Tsosie, [p]rolonged nonenforcement, without preemption, does not extinguish Indian rights. 825 F.2d at 399. [20] In addition, there are other cases that provide guidance for our interpretation, indicating that the bad men provisions should not be limited as defined by the trial court. For example, as articulated in Janis v. United States : In a somewhat remarkable case, United States v. Perryman (100 U.S. 235, 25 L.Ed. 645) [(1879)], the Supreme Court has held that the term a white person in section 16 of the act of 1834 (section 2154 of the Revised Statutes) does not include a black man. That is to say, the Supreme Court has held of a crime perpetrated by a black man in the Indian country in stealing the property of a friendly Indian, amid circumstances which would have rendered the Government liable if the perpetrator had been a white man, that the Government is not liable; and that for such a depredation a friendly Indian can not recover, though the black man was a citizen of the United States. The [Laramie] treaty is more comprehensive than the act of 1834. It provides against depredations both by whites and by other persons subject to the authority of the United States; and conversely it holds the Indians liable for a depredation upon the person or property of anyone subject to the authority of the United States, be he white, black, or Indian. Janis v. United States, 32 Ct.Cl. 407, 410-411 (1897) (emphasis added). [21] Also, in Ex parte Crow Dog, the Supreme Court articulated the following with regards to the bad men provisions of the Laramie Treaty: But it is quite clear from the context that this does not cover the present case of an alleged wrong committed by one Indian upon the person of another of the same tribe. The provision must be construed with its counterpart, just preceding it, which provides for the punishment by the United States of any bad men among the whites, or among other people subject to their authority, who shall commit any wrong upon the person or property of the Indians. Here are two parties, among whom, respectively, there may be individuals guilty of a wrong against one of the other one is the party of whites and their allies, the other is the tribe of Indians with whom the treaty is made.  Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 557-558, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883) (emphasis added). Clearly, any white can be a bad man within the terms of the Laramie Treaty. [22]