Opinion ID: 2457177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unequal division of marital assets

Text: For her third point for reversal, Mrs. Mason argues that the chancellor erred in awarding her an unequal, and much smaller, portion of the parties' marital assets. She asserts that during the nine years that the divorce action was pending, the chancery court consistently ruled that the parties would be required to account for all income and assets acquired or spent during their separation. Yet, she maintains, while an accounting was required of her, Mr. Mason, who she alleges spent approximately $600,000 during the pendency of the action, was not compelled to account for his expenditures and was allowed to keep as his own separate property everything he purchased in that period. Mrs. Mason notes that, from the outset, Mr. Mason was permitted to live on his retirement income and his Social Security benefits as well as on one-half of the parties' joint marital rental income. She states that she, on the other hand, was obliged to live on interest income from both her Mason Realty assets and the other marital assets in her hands as well as one-half of the joint marital rental income. Arkansas family law provides that: All marital property shall be distributed one-half (½) to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable. In that event the court shall make some other division that the court deems equitable taking into consideration: (i) The length of the marriage; (ii) Age, health, and station in life of the parties; (iii) Occupation of the parties; (iv) Amount and sources of income; (v) Vocational skills; (vi) Employability; (vii) Estate, liabilities, and needs of each party and opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income; (viii) Contribution of each party in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of marital property, including services as a homemaker; and (ix) The federal income tax consequences of the court's division of property. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 1993). The chancellor outlined and addressed each of these factors in his 1993 letter opinion. Based on the entire record and with particular reference to the nine statutory considerations, the chancellor found that there should be no equalization between the parties as to expenditures. Mrs. Mason will not be required to account to Mr. Mason for her expenditures and he shall not be required to account to her for his. The chancellor weighed Mr. Mason's amounts and sources of income and his estate and liabilities against the fact that Mrs. Mason had lived on a substantial amount of marital income during the progress of the divorce action. When all things are considered, he wrote, equity should allow Mr. Mason to keep all of his non-marital property, while allowing Mrs. Mason to have the use of the marital income and her equal share of the marital property. It appears that the chancellor was endeavoring to balance the equities to the extent possible, granting the use of marital income to Mrs. Mason by way of compensation for allowing Mr. Mason to keep the disability benefits, rental income, and other non-marital property. Mrs. Mason insists, however, that despite having received the use of marital income, her income was still less than Mr. Mason's ($293,205.64 compared to $803,325.68, according to her figures). Moreover, she points out, the chancellor only took into account income from September 1984, when the parties separated, through July 1991. The chancellor is given broad powers to distribute all of the parties' property in a divorce action in order to achieve an equitable distribution. Dunn v. Dunn, supra . In the Dunn case, the court of appeals noted that, having decided to remand the case, it was unnecessary to address the argument that the court had erred in making an unequal division of the parties' joint savings account. The appellate court remanded the case to the chancellor for a full resolution of the issue of property rights. In the present case, we have determined that the matter must be reversed and remanded on the issue of the Rice land Foods disability benefits. Although, on de novo review, we have conducted our own examination of the parties' expenditures and the division of marital assets, scrutinizing the transcript of the proceedings, we have concluded that the record in this appeal does not provide sufficient evidence for us to reach a conclusion. In view of these circumstances, we are of the opinion that fairness requires our remand of this cause to permit both parties to develop their evidence regarding the equitable distribution of marital property. Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987). We therefore remand this issue to the chancery court for a complete resolution of questions pertaining to the unequal distribution of marital assets. Our decision to remand on the third point is based on other, compelling considerations. The chancellor's findings with regard to the division of marital property are couched in general terms, with few figures cited. Further, as Mrs. Mason correctly notes, the chancellor relied on calculations in the Master's report, which covered only the years 1984 to 1991. To some extent, the division of Riceland Foods disability benefits will remedy any existing inequities in the chancellor's distribution of assets. On remand, we direct the chancellor to extend the period for the income and expenditure calculation to the date of the divorce decree and to resolve all outstanding questions relating to the unequal distribution of marital property.