Opinion ID: 62895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deference to the Texas Court of Appeals

Text: Richardson asks this court to defer to the Texas appellate court's finding that Judge Henry Wade, Jr. should have been recused under Texas law because the undisputed evidence showed that a reasonable member of the public, knowing all the circumstances involved, would have questions or doubts as to the impartiality of the trial judge. Richardson, 83 S.W.3d at 358-59. He argues that the district court failed to recognize that this finding by the state appellate court necessarily included a finding of a due process violation. However, the Texas Court of Appeals in Richardson based its recusal holding entirely on undisputed facts, it made no finding on any disputed historical facts, and essentially simply made a legal determination, not a fact finding, that on those undisputed facts Texas law mandated recusal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that bias may be a ground for disqualification only when it is shown to be of such nature, and to such extent, as to deny the defendant due process of law. Kemp v. State, 846 S.W.2d 289, 305 (Tex. Crim.App.1992) ( en banc ). Under Kemp, a state court deciding a recusal question based on bias must decide whether the movant has provided facts sufficient to establish that a reasonable man, knowing all the circumstances involved, would harbor doubts as to the impartiality of the trial judge. Id. However, as we expressly said in Couch, the section 455 recusal standard (similar to the Kemp standard) of where others would have reasonable cause to question the judge's impartiality is  more demanding than that imposed by the due process clause which we described, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Aetna, as being when a reasonable judge would find it necessary to do so. Couch at 82 (emphasis added). The district court correctly concluded that it need not defer to the state court's decision because the due process standard differs from the recusal standard applied by the Texas appellate court. The state appellate court made the required determination under Kemp. Richardson, 83 S.W.3d at 358-59. However, this does not indicate that the state court also necessarily made a factual finding of a federal due process violation. As noted, the court merely made a determination of the legal consequence of the undisputed facts, not a factual finding. And, it expressly stated there was no finding of actual bias, prejudice or partiality. The Texas court of appeals did not mention the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution in its opinion, and did not apply a federal constitutional standard in determining whether Judge Henry Wade, Jr. should have been recused. As the state court applied a more demanding standard in its recusal holding than this court must apply in determining whether Richardson's federal due process rights were violated by Judge Henry Wade, Jr.'s having presided at the trial, we hold that as to the second issue certified on appeal, the decision of the Texas court of appeals did not necessarily include a factual finding of a federal due process violation, and that this court owes it no deference with respect to the federal due process claim. Moreover, and in any event, our concern under section 2254(d) is with the actual facts determined by the state court and the ultimate decision of the state court, and not with every jot of [their] reasoning. Santellan, 271 F.3d at 193, 194. We accept all the facts reflected in the Texas Court of Appeals' opinion in Richardson respecting Judge Henry Wade, Jr.'s relationship to, participation in and conduct concerning the case. [8] The only question then becomes, under section 2254(d), whether on those facts the Texas appellate court's decision, that Judge Henry Wade, Jr.'s presiding at the trial (over Richardson's timely objection) did not entitle Richardson to a new trial (where, it found beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no prejudice), constitutes a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. We hold that that decision does not meet that test. The Texas appellate court's implied intermediate steps of legal reasoning are ultimately irrelevant to our said holding.