Opinion ID: 1354990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: First Amendment right to petition government

Text: As their final federal claim, Plaintiffs alleged in their second amended complaint that Defendants, in enacting Act 44 in the manner they did, deprived Plaintiffs of their First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of speech to lobby their elected state representatives concerning passage of House Bill 1521 before it was enacted into law as Act 44. App. at 70. Specifically Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants, acting at all times under color of state law, implemented the legislative process used to enact Act 44, as part of a continuing pattern of illegal statutory enactment, thereby depriving Plaintiffs [of] their right to freedom of speech to lobby their elected state representatives concerning passage of House Bill 1521 before it was enacted into law as Act 44, as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as more fully described in the preceding paragraphs, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for which the individual Defendants are individually liable. Id. In the preceding paragraphs of the complaint, Plaintiffs further asserted that [t]he truncated legislative process used by the Leaders [of the General Assembly] to enact Act 44, and the early morning hour at which it was triggered, intentionally inhibited Plaintiffs['] ability to receive timely information regarding proposed government actions necessary to exercise their First Amendment right of free speech to support or oppose the Senate-House conference committee's new version of House Bill 1521 before it was enacted by the General Assembly into law. Id. at 56. [8] The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert this claim because they alleged only a generalized, abstract grievance shared by all Pennsylvanians. See Common Cause, 447 F.Supp.2d at 426-30. Plaintiffs reiterate these same arguments on appeal. [9] On appeal, Plaintiffs expand their First Amendment claim to encompass the alleged secret discussion of Act 44 that occurred between officials of the three branches of Pennsylvania's government, prior to the enactment of that legislation. Again, Plaintiffs generally cannot create standing through new allegations asserted for the first time on appeal. [10] See Storino, 322 F.3d at 297; see also In re Mystic Tank Lines Corp., 544 F.3d at 528. Even considering all of these allegations, however, Plaintiffs have failed to allege that they in particular were actually and concretely injured by Defendants' challenged conduct. Instead, Plaintiffs continue to allege only a general, abstract grievance shared by all Pennsylvanians. To illustrate this point, Plaintiffs specifically alleged in their complaint that [t]he Leaders [of the General Assembly] intentionally deprived Plaintiffs, and the entire Pennsylvania electorate, of any notice of the text of House Bill 1521 ... before it was enacted into law by a legislative process lasting a few hours in the very early morning. App. at 56 (emphasis added). And on appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the Petition Clause ... must forbid individual state actors from intentionally and affirmatively orchestrating sophisticated modes of total interference with Appellants' right to informally petition and communicate with their elected state representatives on any issue of concern, including the Act in this case. The Petition Clause must preserve some small quantum of effective communication between the electorate and the elected from intentional interference by other state actors. To hold otherwise is to condemn a First Amendment right to a mere privilege subject to the whims of political elites; elites who far too often are beyond the electoral reach of those whose rights they have intentionally invaded. Aplt. Br. at 61-62. Because these allegations and arguments are only generalized, abstract grievances held by all Pennsylvanians, the district court did not err in concluding Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge their First Amendment claim. Cf. Goode, 539 F.3d at 315, 320-22 (dismissing taxpayers' right-to-petition claim because their alleged injuries are no different in nature from the general interest in enforcing compliance with the law which the public shares). [11]