Opinion ID: 2183291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of the Juvenile Adjudication and Exclusion of Allegedly Exculpatory Testimony

Text: Corrieri argues that the court abused its discretion when it permitted the State to inquire about his juvenile adjudication. The State asserts that despite the warnings given by the court, Corrieri presented evidence of his character which would have tended to mislead the jury. We review the decision of the trial court to admit or exclude such evidence under an abuse of discretion standard because the question of admissibility frequently involves the weighing of probative value against considerations militating against its admissibility. State v. Robinson, 628 A.2d 664, 666 (Me.1993); See M.R.Evid. 403. Once a party opens the door to testimony, he may not claim error in the admission of the line of questioning he initiated. State v. Whitmore, 540 A.2d 465, 467 (Me. 1988); See also Field & Murray, Maine Evidence, § 103.8 at 1-30 (3d ed. 1993). In State v. Ruest, 506 A.2d 576, 577 (Me.1986), the court allowed the State to cross-examine a witness regarding a prior incident between the victim and the defendant. Although the determination of the relevance of evidence is reviewed for clear error, frequently the decisions of the trial court to admit or exclude such evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard because the defendant had opened the door for examination of otherwise inadmissible incidents by raising questions as to the veracity of the victim. Id. Here, the court cautioned that if Corrieri attempted to create a misleading impression of his character, he would open the door for the State to question him on the facts of his prior juvenile conviction. Corrieri testified that he was a person incapable of committing the crimes charged. [3] We find that the trial court properly acted within its discretion by allowing questioning about Corrieri's prior juvenile offense. See Ruest, 506 A.2d at 577. Corrieri incorrectly asserts that the court improperly excluded the testimony of attorney Charles Devoe during the presentation of evidence. Initially, the court ruled on Corrieri's motion in limine and excluded the hearsay testimony of Devoe. Corrieri does not now contest that ruling. Corrieri contends that circumstances changed over the course of the trial which may have provided an admissible basis for Devoe's testimony. However, Corrieri never requested that the court reconsider allowing Devoe's testimony. A matter not raised at trial and later raised for the first time on appeal is unpreserved and the court's action is reversed only for obvious error. Morris v. Resolution Trust Corp., 622 A.2d 708, 714 (Me.1993). We find no obvious error.