Opinion ID: 69623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bad Character Evidence

Text: Gayle contends that Kevin Olson’s testimony about his purchase of the B Street property was irrelevant to the money laundering charges and served no purpose except to prove Gayle’s bad character. As such, Gayle contends Olson’s testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The government counters that Rule 404 does not apply because Olson’s testimony was not extrinsic character evidence, but rather evidence of Gayle’s conduct that was inextricably related to the charged offenses. We agree with the latter. We review a district court’s admission of other crimes or bad acts under Rule 404 for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1265 n.26 (11th Cir. 2008). Rule 404(b) excludes extrinsic evidence of uncharged 11 acts as follows: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added). However, evidence is not extrinsic to the charged offense, and thus does not fall within Rule 404(b)’s ambit, if the bad act “arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,” the evidence is “necessary to complete the story of the crime,” or the evidence is “inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Such evidence is admissible if it explains the context or set-up of the crime, and is linked in time and circumstances with the crime. See id. Regardless of whether such evidence falls inside or outside the scope of Rule 404(b), the evidence must still comport with Rule 403's requirements that its probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. See id. In this case, Olson’s testimony was relevant and integral to flushing out Gayle’s criminal acts of money laundering. According to Frank and Sam, Gayle persuaded them to invest their money in properties in order to legitimize their drug proceeds. However, at trial Gayle denied using Frank and Sam’s drug money to 12 purchase the B Street property. Gayle instead claimed that he bought the property with his parents for them to live in and to earn rental income. Olson’s testimony was necessary to show that Gayle sold the B Street property under his parents’ names to Olson, without telling Frank or Sam, and then retained the entire proceeds from the sale unbeknownst to Frank, Sam, or Olson. The fact that Gayle deceived Olson concerning the ownership of the property refuted Gayle’s defense that he and his parents had bought the property for a legitimate purpose. Olson’s testimony was thus relevant to the charges of money laundering because it reflected Gayle’s active concealment of the tainted funds used to purchase the property, and it showed the trail of the Rosarios’ drug money. Additionally, Olson’s testimony that Gayle withheld rental income due him, just as Gayle had done with the Rosario brothers, was relevant to show that Gayle was continuing to usurp any money gained from the property and that Gayle made profits using the tainted funds. Because the evidence formed “an integral and natural part of an account of the crime,” the evidence fell outside the scope of Rule 404(b) and was properly admitted by the district court. Id. at 1346 (concluding that witness’ testimony that the defendant threatened to kill her if she did not return his deposit was an integral part of how the defendant laundered those funds). Further, the probative value of Olson’s testimony was not substantially 13 outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. We have said that “Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy, which should be used only sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility.” Id. at 1344 n.8 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to its admission, and considering the overwhelming evidence of Gayle’s guilt, we find no abuse of discretion in its admission. See id. at 1346 (“[I]t is doubtful that this testimony caused any unfair prejudice considering the overwhelming evidence of Edouard’s guilt.”)