Opinion ID: 888660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The 1972 Montana Constitution

Text: ¶ 111 Montana's longstanding public policy against the assistance of suicide was continued by adoption of the 1972 Constitution. It supports neither the Court's public policy determination, nor the District Court's constitutionally based decision. ¶ 112 No statement concerning a right to die is included within the Constitution's Declaration of Rights. This absence is neither accidental nor the product of ignorance. In this regard, it is important to note that [n]o proposal was adopted or rejected without considered deliberation. Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, p. 618. ¶ 113 One of the proposals receiving such careful deliberation was Proposal No. 103. Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, February 9, 1972, p. 2. Submitted to the Bill of Rights Committee by Delegate Robert L. Kelleher, Proposal No. 103 would have included a right to die within the Constitution's Declaration of Rights. Montana Constitutional Convention, Delegate Proposals, February 2, 1972, p. 223. ¶ 114 Delegate Kelleher's proposal provided, in pertinent part, The incurably ill have the right not to be kept alive by extraordinary means. Montana Constitutional Convention, Delegate Proposals, February 2, 1972, p. 223. Delegate Kelleher testified before the Bill of Rights Committee, that the person with an incurable disease should have the right to choose his own death. Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, February 12, 1972, p. 5. Alternatives offered to Kelleher's proposal covered the broad spectrum of right to die scenarios. Joe Roberts testified on the same day as Delegate Kelleher, advocating for broader language: There shall be a right to die. The legislature shall make appropriate provisions therefore. Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, February 12, 1972, p. 6; Montana Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joe Roberts Before the Bill of Rights Committee Concerning the Right to Die, February 12, 1972, p. 4. Mr. Roberts referenced the very poignant testimony of witness Joyce Franks and her personal encounter with the agonizing death of her father. Montana Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joe Roberts Before the Bill of Rights Committee Concerning the Right to Die, February 12, 1972, p. 1. Ms. Franks' testimony had described the death of her 86-year-old father and his wish that a doctor give him something to put him to sleep right then. Montana Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joyce M. Franks Before the Bill of Rights Committee, February 3, 1972, p. 5A. Ms. Franks stated to the Bill of Rights Committee, What I am working for is that every person shall have the right to determine, barring accident, the manner of his dying. And then, I am advocating the twin right to make it legal, if he desires this type of death, for a person to receive a quick and easy medicated death somehow. Montana Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joyce M. Franks Before the Bill of Rights Committee, February 3, 1972, p. 1. Ms. Franks therefore urged adoption of an amendment stating: Every citizen shall be allowed to choose the manner in which he dies. Montana Constitutional Convention, Testimony of Joyce M. Franks Before the Bill of Rights Committee, February 3, 1972, p. 2; see also Charles S. Johnson, Right to Die Resurfaces in Montana, Independent Record F1 (Aug. 23, 2009) (describing Constitutional Convention's consideration and rejection of a right to die). ¶ 115 However, the Bill of Rights Committee rejected Kelleher's proposal in its entirety and also rejected all of the alternatives which had been offered in conjunction with Kelleher's proposal to incorporate a right to die of any kind within the new Constitution. See Montana Constitutional Convention, Minutes of the Bill of Rights Committee, February 9, 1972, p. 2. ¶ 116 Nor were other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Individual Dignity and the Right of Privacy provisions, drafted to include a right to die. The Constitutional Convention adopted the Individual Dignity Section for the express purpose of providing equal protection and prohibiting discrimination. The Bill of Rights Committee proposed the Individual Dignity Section with the intent of providing a Constitutional impetus for the eradication of public and private discriminations based on race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas. Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, p. 628 (emphasis added). During the floor debate on the provision, Delegate Otto Habedank expressed concern that he would be required to associate with people that I choose not to associate with. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1643. Delegate Wade J. Dahood, Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee, responded to Delegate Habedank's concern by stating, There is no intent within this particular section to do anything other than to remove the apparent type of discrimination that all of us object to with respect to employment, to rental practices, to actual association in matters that are public or matters that tend to be somewhat quasi-public. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1643. Delegate Dahood's statement was consistent with the expressed intent of the Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, which was, in consideration of the entirety of Article II, Section 4, to provide a Constitutional impetus for the eradication of public and private discriminations.... See Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, p. 628; Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, p. 1643. Nothing within these discussions or explanations suggests even a thought that the dignity clause contained vague, lurking rights that might someday manifest themselves beyond what the delegates or the citizens of Montana who approved the Constitution believed, and overturn long-established law, here, the policy against assisted suicide. The reference to dignity therefore provides an aspirational introduction to the already well-established substantive legal principles providing the operative vehicles to achieve dignity: equal protection and the prohibition upon discrimination. [4] Likewise, the right to privacy did not alter the State's policy against assisted suicide. There is nothing within either the language of the provision or the convention proceedings which would reflect any such intention. See e.g. Montana Constitutional Convention, Verbatim Transcript, March 7, 1972, pp. 1680-82; Montana Constitutional Convention, Bill of Rights Committee Proposal, February 22, 1972, pp. 632-33. For such reasons, not one court of last resort has interpreted a constitutional right of privacy to include physician-assisted suicide. Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 100, 104 (Fla.1997); Sampson v. Alaska, 31 P.3d 88, 98 (Alaska 2001); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-06, 117 S.Ct. at 2261. No evidence exists that the delegates intended the right of privacy to change the state's longstanding public policy. Since adoption of the 1972 Constitution, the Legislature has continued to enact legislation prohibiting assisted suicide. Indeed, the Legislature directed the Department of Public Health and Human Services to implement a suicide prevention program by January 1, 2008, including a plan that must delineate specific activities to reduce suicide. Sections 53-21-1101(1), -1102(2)(b), MCA. This is further indication of a state public policy against assisted suicide. ¶ 117 Because we live in a democracy, this policy may someday change. Controlling their own destiny, Montanans may decide to change the State's public policy after what would be, no doubt, a spirited public debate. In fact, efforts in that regard have already started. See e.g. Bill Draft LC1818, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 9, 2008) (The proposed Montana Death with Dignity Act had the stated purpose of allowing a terminally ill patient to request medication to end the patient's life.). This Court should allow the public debate to continue, and allow the citizens of this State to control their own destiny on the issue. ¶ 118 Until the public policy is changed by the democratic process, it should be recognized and enforced by the courts. It is a public policy which regards the aiding of suicide as typifying a very low regard for human life, Commission Comments, § 45-5-105, MCA, and which expressly prohibits it. Instead, the Court rejects the State's longstanding policy. It ignores expressed intent, parses statutes, and churns reasons to avoid the clear policy of the State and reach an untenable conclusion: that it is against public policy for a physician to assist in a suicide if the patient happens to live after taking the medication; but that the very same act, with the very same intent, is not against public policy if the patient dies. In my view, the Court's conclusion is without support, without clear reason, and without moral force. ¶ 119 I would reverse.