Opinion ID: 2793769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: {50} Defendant claims that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Baby Breandra’s injuries were intentional or recklessly inflicted, rather than accidental. Defendant argues that although the evidence presented established that Baby Breandra suffered a constellation of injuries, there was no evidence presented to show that Defendant caused those injuries, either intentionally or recklessly. Defendant cites no cases regarding sufficiency of evidence in support of this argument, and instead cites State v. Franklin, 1967-NMSC-151, 78 N.M. 127, 428 P.2d 982 and State v. Boyer, 1985NMCA-029, 103 N.M. 655, 712 P.2d 1. Beyond this, Defendant’s argument is undeveloped. {51} The State argues that the evidence presented was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. The State asserts that the evidence that Baby Breandra was uninjured before being left alone with Defendant, that the medical experts determined that the types of injuries Baby Breandra suffered could not have been accidental, and that Defendant admitted to hitting the baby, was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction.
{52} In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he reviewing court view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, indulging all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the verdict.” State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-027, ¶ 10, 284 P.3d 1076 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The test for sufficiency of the evidence is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The question before [the] reviewing [c]ourt is not whether [the court] would have had a reasonable doubt [about guilt] but whether it would have been impermissibly unreasonable for a jury to have concluded otherwise.” Id. (second and fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “In our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, we are required to ensure that a 16 rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for a conviction.” State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶ 5, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Contrary evidence supporting acquittal does not provide a basis for reversal because the jury is free to reject Defendant’s version of the facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We do “not evaluate the evidence to determine whether some hypothesis could be designed which is consistent with a finding of innocence,” and we do “not weigh the evidence [or] substitute [our] judgment for that of the fact finder so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict.” State v. Sutphin, 1988-NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314. {53} “[T]he test to determine the sufficiency of evidence in New Mexico . . . is whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction.” Id. “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” In re Gabriel M., 2002-NMCA-047, ¶ 22, 132 N.M. 124, 145 P.3d 64 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Just because the evidence supporting the conviction was circumstantial does not mean it was not substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Intent is subjective and is almost always inferred from other facts in the case, as it is rarely established by direct evidence.” State v. Sosa, 2000-NMSC-036, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 767, 14 P.3d 32 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2. The evidence presented was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction for intentional child abuse {54} In order to present sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Defendant of intentional child abuse resulting in the death of a child under twelve, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Defendant caused Baby [Breandra] to be placed in a situation which endangered her life or health, or tortured or cruelly confined or punished Baby [Breandra]; (2) Defendant acted intentionally; . . . (3) Defendant’s actions resulted in the death of or great bodily harm to Baby [Breandra]; (4) Baby Breandra was under the age of twelve; and (5) this happened in New Mexico. Walters, 2007-NMSC-050, ¶ 28; see also UJI 14-602 NMRA; § 30-6-1(H). {55} The State proved the first and second elements with Defendant’s own statement that “I slapped her. I got her by her ears and she didn’t want to keep quiet.” This statement demonstrates that Defendant endangered the baby’s health, and that he acted intentionally. Further, with the forensic pathologist’s testimony that the constellation of injuries on Baby Breandra’s body were intentional and that the manner of death was homicide, the State showed that the injuries she suffered could not have been caused by accident. Contra Consaul, 2014-NMSC-014, ¶ 56 (finding insufficient evidence of child abuse resulting in 17 great bodily harm by intentional suffocation when “expert medical testimony provided the only evidence that [the child] may have been smothered—that a crime had occurred—and that [the child] had not been injured by other, noncriminal causes.”). The State proved the third element, that Defendant’s actions resulted in the baby’s death, with testimony from Defendant’s friend Derek Vigil that he had visited Defendant at home on March 8, 2011, and when he left around 11:30 a.m. or noon, he did not see any signs that Baby Breandra was in distress. This shows that the baby was in good health before she was left alone with Defendant. In conjunction, these facts show that Defendant was the only person with the baby when she was intentionally injured, proving that Defendant’s acts caused the baby’s death. The State proved element four by showing that Baby Breandra’s birthday was September 24, 2009, and she died on March 8, 2011. Finally, the State proved the fifth element by showing that these events occurred in Española, New Mexico. {56} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence the State presented in support of Defendant’s conviction is enough that a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential facts required for conviction. We therefore hold that sufficient evidence was presented to support Defendant’s conviction.