Opinion ID: 2519712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: plaintiffs' inadequate warning device theory of liability is preempted by federal law [7]

Text: ¶ 10 Congress in 1970 enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act (the FRSA). [8] Its stated purpose is to promote safety in every area of railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents. [9] It authorizes the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) to prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety. [10] Until the Secretary adopts a rule, regulation, order or standard covering the subject matter of a particular state safety requirement, the FRSA permits states to adopt or continue in force their own laws regulating that safety issue. [11] Once the Secretary promulgates regulations or issues an order covering the subject matter of a particular safety requirement, the provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 20106 preempt most state laws purporting to regulate the same safety concern. [12] ¶ 11 The Secretary issued federal regulations in 1973 covering the adequacy of warning devices at grade crossings. [13] The United States Supreme Court held in CSX Transportation., Inc. v. Easterwood [14] that where these regulations are applicable and federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, state tort law imposing different requirements is preempted. [15] The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the scope of this federal preemption in Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Shanklin, [16] holding that the federal protective device regulations do not depend for their applicability on an individualized determination of adequacy by a diagnostic team or by federal officials, [17] but rather `are applicable' to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds. [18] ¶ 12 Plaintiffs alleged that defendants were negligent for having provided inadequate warning devices at the Highway 19 crossing. Defendants moved for summary adjudication of that theory on the grounds that it was preempted by the federal warning device regulations. In support of their motion, defendants tendered a copy of a contract between the railroad's predecessor and the State of Oklahoma dated 30 January 1962, which provides for the installation of an Automatic Grade Crossing Protective Device at the Highway 19 crossing. The contract states that the project was to be financed with federal funds provided through the Federal Aid Program. Defendants also tendered an affidavit from the railroad's Director of Public Projects, Cliff Shoemaker, confirming that federal money was in fact expended and comprised 90% (ninety percent) of the funds for the project. ¶ 13 Plaintiffs did not dispute the 1962 participation of federal money in installing the existing warning devices, but argued that the use of federal money in 1962 could not give rise to federal preemption under the FRSA because that legislation was not enacted until eight years after the expenditure of federal funds at the Highway 19 crossing. The trial court disagreed and ruled that plaintiffs' inadequate warning device theory was preempted. ¶ 14 On the morning the trial of this cause was set to begin, defendants presented to the court a number of newly discovered documents showing that the Highway 19 crossing's protective devices had again been upgraded using federal funds in 1987. Defendants did not ask leave of court to supplement the summary adjudication record with these documents, but simply announced their existence and provided copies of them to the court and opposing counsel. Defendants did not request a revised preemption ruling to take into account the additional evidentiary material. ¶ 15 Plaintiffs reacted to defendants' eleventh-hour production of the documents by asking the trial court to sanction defendants, but did not specifically object to the trial judge taking them into consideration nor make a motion to strike or for a continuance. [19] In fact, plaintiffs' counsel stated on the record more than once that the documents provided proof of post-FRSA funding. Plaintiffs nevertheless argued (two years before the Supreme Court in Shanklin held to the contrary) that the 1987 documents actually proved that preemption was inapplicable because they lacked a specific, written determination by a diagnostic team that gates were not necessary at the Highway 19 crossing. Plaintiffs then moved the trial court to reverse its earlier preemption ruling. The trial judge refused. Plaintiffs subsequently re-pressed this argument in writing and tendered the 1987 documents to the trial court in support of their offers of proof. The documents were later made part of the appellate record by plaintiffs' designation. ¶ 16 Plaintiffs urge this court to reverse the nisi prius preemption ruling on the grounds that the only evidentiary material properly before the trial court in making its summary ruling was that pertaining to the 1962 upgrade of the Highway 19 crossing. Pre-FRSA federal funding, plaintiffs argue, does not support preemption. Plaintiffs contend that even if the 1987 documents do in fact show post-FRSA federal funding, a matter plaintiffs now deny, they are beyond this court's reviewing cognizance because they were never properly made part of the summary process record. While we agree with plaintiffs that the 1962 federal funding would not support preemption, we disagree that the 1987 documents are beyond our power to consider on review. ¶ 17 A summary disposition of fewer than all issues in a cause is simply a judicial pretrial designation of those issues which are to be treated as resolved. [20] It is neither a final judgment nor a final order, but a provisional remedy whose interlocutory character makes it subject to alteration or modification by the trial court at any time prior to entry of judgment in the case. [21] Re-examination of a summary disposition is always within the trial court's discretion and may be effected at any stage of the proceeding when it appears that the earlier disposition was in error. ¶ 18 Ordinarily, an appellate court will not take notice on review of any material that was not properly before the trial court in the decisional process that led to summary judgment. [22] We must hence consider whether the 1987 documents were properly before the trial judge in this case. The provisions of District Court Rule 13, the rule governing summary judgments, provide in part: A party may move for judgment in his favor on the ground that the depositions, admissions in the pleadings, stipulations, answers to interrogatories and to requests for admissions, affidavits, and exhibits on file, filed with his motion or subsequently filed with leave of court show that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact.... [23] (emphasis added) The 1987 documents were not presented to the trial court in conformity with the procedure set forth in Rule 13. Nevertheless, they were placed before the trial court in the decisional process leading to summary judgment. The filing requirement contained in Rule 13 is for the benefit of nonmovants so that they may have an opportunity to respond. It may be waived. [24] In this case plaintiffs not only did not explicitly object to the consideration of the 1987 documents, but they themselves used the documents in arguing for a reversal of the court's earlier ruling. Moreover, having themselves placed the documents in the record on appeal, plaintiffs cannot now be heard to complain because we treat them as part of that record. Summary relief issues stand before us for de novo review in which this court's scrutiny of the entire record is pursued independently and without deference to the trial court's resolution. [25] That record includes the 1987 documents. Preemption was clearly the defendants' due.