Opinion ID: 1429633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: Was Mathenia's constitutional right to a speedy trial violated? The four-part balancing test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed.2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), (length of delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his or her right, and prejudice to the defendant) provides the standard of review. Barker involved a delay of over 5 years between Barker's indictment (along with a codefendant) and his murder trial. Although Barker was only incarcerated for 10 months and then was released on bond, his trial was postponed many times upon the State's request. The State wanted to convict Barker's codefendant before trying Barker. Barker did not object to any of those continuances. Barker's codefendant was finally convicted (after five trials). The State requested more continuances, and Barker objected. His motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his speedy trial right was denied, and he was eventually convicted. The Supreme Court affirmed Barker's conviction, devising the four-part balancing test. Barker's constitutional right to a speedy trial had not been violated. The Court concluded that Barker had gambled that his codefendant would be acquitted and had chosen not to pursue his speedy trial right. 407 U.S. at 535-36. We discussed the Barker test in Green, 260 Kan. at 473-74. Mathenia was arrested on August 30, 1993, and arraigned on November 12, 1993. His trial commenced on July 25, 1995. He claims that the almost 2-year delay between arrest and trial prejudiced his defense, because some of his witnesses became unavailable and his counsel was unable to locate them at the time of trial. Initially, we consider whether the length of delay, 23 months between arrest and trial, is presumptively prejudicial. Barker teaches that the answer to our inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. 407 U.S. at 530-31. We held in Green that a delay of 1 year and 2 days between Green's arraignment and trial was not clearly presumptively prejudicial. 260 Kan. at 474. What are the peculiar circumstances here? The crimes for which Mathenia was convicted arose from a group attack by inmates upon two correctional officers in a prison yard recreational shack crowded with other inmates on a rainy afternoon. The evidence had to come from the inmates themselves. Inmate interviews commenced on the evening of the attacks and continued as late as a week before the grand jury proceedings. Physical evidence from the scene was still being processed by the KBI at the time of the grand jury proceedings. During Mathenia's trial, KBI Agent Dennis testified that his department had taken over 600 statements concerning the investigation. At least 30 to 40 of those statements identified participants in the attack. Approximately 30 inmates were considered as viable suspects in the attacks. The investigation resulted in the indictment of 12 inmates in the district court of Leavenworth County. Seven cases went to jury trials (two acquittals and five convictions, including Mathenia's), defendants pleaded in three cases, one case was dismissed without prejudice, and the disposition of one case was not shown in this record. Mathenia's case was one of the last to be tried. To say that this case involved a complex, serious crime would be an understatement. Based on the circumstances here, we conclude that 23 months between arrest and trial is not presumptively prejudicial. However, we discuss the remaining three Barker factors below. Mathenia acknowledges responsibility for approximately 7 months of the delay due to the following: (1) He requested a continuance from November 19, 1993, to December 3, 1993; (2) he requested a continuance from December 3, 1993, to December 17, 1993; and (3) he fired his counsel on August 14, 1994, and new counsel had to be appointed (resulting in 182-day delay). The State argues that the firing of Mathenia's counsel resulted in a 217-day delay (August 12, 1994, to February 17, 1995). Also, Mathenia filed several pretrial motions, which caused delay from December 17, 1993, to March 11, 1994. The State asserts that Mathenia was responsible for a total of 310 days of the delay. Even under Mathenia's calculations, he was clearly responsible for a substantial portion of the delay. William Pray was initially appointed as Mathenia's attorney on September 15, 1993. On July 22, 1994, the State requested a continuance of the trial scheduled for July 25, 1994, in that a material witness was not available until after August 16, 1994. Mathenia objected. Mathenia requested new counsel in a letter to the district judge, received August 12, 1994. Pray filed a motion to withdraw on January 31, 1995, stating: In support of said motion [Pray] states that the defendant has requested different counsel and counsel's employment ... as Child Support Enforcement Attorney will prevent him from continuing to represent the defendant in this matter. There is no explanation in the record for the lengthy period between Mathenia's letter to the judge requesting new counsel and Pray's motion to withdraw. The district court appointed E. Roger Horsky to represent Mathenia on February 10, 1995. On April 6, 1995, Horsky filed a motion for a bill of particulars, motion to dismiss on statutory speedy trial grounds, motion suppressing photo identification, motion to dismiss the indictment (Mathenia, having been denied a preliminary hearing, argued the grand jury proceeding was improper), and a second request for a bill of particulars. These motions (except the motion to suppress) were heard and denied on April 21, 1995. The motion to suppress the photo identification was heard in part on July 7, 1995, and continued to July 14, 1995, and denied. The reason for the continuance to July 14, 1995, was that certain inmate witnesses Mathenia's counsel wanted to call had not been served with subpoenas. At the July 14, 1995, hearing, there were still problems in getting those witnesses served, but the hearing proceeded, and the district judge ruled on the motion. Changing Mathenia's counsel at his request caused a significant delay. The last of new defense counsel's several pretrial motions was decided less than 2 weeks before trial. The State's May 1995 continuance request was due to witness unavailability. Mathenia's motion to suppress still had not been heard or decided by then. The record reflects that many returns of service were filed not served on several witnesses for both parties, including some who later testified at Mathenia's trial in July 1995. Efforts to serve subpoenas on witnesses continued until the trial date. It does not appear from the record that the State's conduct caused any unusual or unnecessary delays. Mathenia first asserted his speedy trial rights on April 6, 1996, over 19 months after his arrest. A substantial portion of the delay was attributable to Mathenia, who remained passive as to his speedy trial rights throughout much of the delay. As to Mathenia's claim of prejudice because certain witnesses became unavailable at the time of trial, the district judge found that the State had rendered all the assistance requested by Mathenia's counsel in attempting to locate defense witnesses. The judge was not persuaded that the inability to obtain those witnesses was a result of the 2-year lapse in getting the case to trial and denied the motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. We agree. None of the Barker factors support a constitutional speedy trial right violation claim.