Opinion ID: 2995638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: See also United States v. Soskin, 100

Text: F.3d 1377, 1380 (7th Cir. 1996). An indictment that is constructively amended at trial violates the Constitution because the Fifth Amendment requires an indictment of a grand jury to guarantee that the allegations in the indictment and the proof at trial match in order ’to insure that the defendant is not subject to a second prosecution, and to give the defendant reasonable notice so that he may prepare a defense.’ United States v. Folks, 236 F.3d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 74 (2001) (quoting United States v. McKinney, 954 F.2d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 1992)). A constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government . . . the court . . . or both, broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury. United States v. Cusimano, 148 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 710 (4th Cir. 1994)). In order to demonstrate constructive amendment, the crime charged in the indictment must be materially different or substantially altered at trial, [so that] it is not impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved. United States v. Muelbl, 739 F.2d 1175, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted) (finding no constructive amendment when jury instructions separated charged drug offenses while indictment only referred to drug offenses collectively). However, it is not a material amendment when the court’s description of the indictment alters the terms of the indictment in an insignificant manner. United States v. Franco, 874 F.2d 1136, 1144 (7th Cir. 1989) (no amendment in supplemental instructions); United States v. Williams, 798 F.2d at 1024, 1033 (7th Cir. 1986) (no amendment in instructions). The court instructed the jury that it could find Trennell responsible for specific quantities of cocaine and cocaine base./4 The jury was also given a special verdict form that listed several specific amounts involved in the drugconspiracy ranging from less than 500 grams of cocaine to more than five kilograms of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base./5 While these quantities were not specifically mentioned in the indictment, not every variation from the terms of the indictment materially changes the indictment. United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2000). In order to rise to the level of constructive amendment, the change must establish offenses different from or in addition to those charged by the grand jury. See Pigee, 197 F.3d at 886. Trennell argues that by allowing the jury to find the amounts of drugs involved, his charge was increased from a crime that carried a maximum sentence of 20 years to one that carried a maximum sentence of life. But Trennell was indicted for conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute quantities of mixtures containing cocaine and cocaine base . . . . Also, the indictment charged that part of the conspiracy was the resale of wholesale quantities of cocaine and cocaine base by the members of the conspiracy. This language was broad enough to include the quantity of drugs for which Trennell was convicted, namely 5 kilograms of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base. A variance between the broad allegations of an indictment and the narrower proof at trial is acceptable so long as the offense proved was fully contained within the indictment. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 137 (1985). Because the proof at trial was fully contained in the indictment, and the jury instructions were narrower than the indictment, Trennell’s claim that the indictment was constructively amended fails. The indictment put Trennell on notice that evidence of quantities, and specifically, wholesale quantities of cocaine and cocaine base, would be introduced in the government’s case. Thus, he was able to prepare a defense. Therefore the court did not commit plain error by including specific quantities of drugs in the jury instructions and verdict form. B. Apprendi Issue Trennell argues next that his conviction must be reversed under Apprendi because the indictment did not charge a specific quantity of drugs, even though the drug quantity was submitted to the jury. The applicability of Apprendi is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Chemetco, Inc., 274 F.3d 1154, 1158 (7th Cir. 2001). Under Apprendi, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury . . . . Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. Trennell argues that decisions from this circuit applying Apprendi require that facts which increase a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum must both be charged in the indictment and submitted to the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 632 (7th Cir. 2001) (Thus, when drug quantity is not charged in the indictment or submitted to the jury, the statutory maximum under sec. 841(b) must be determined without reference to drug quantity.). Trennell argues that because the indictment failed to specifically address drug quantity, the maximum sentence he could have been exposed to was 20 years. Because he received a 30- year sentence under sec. 841(b), he argues that his sentence was illegally increased above the statutory maximum in violation of Apprendi. In the wake of Apprendi, we have held that sections 841(b)(1)(A) and 841(b)(1)(B), the enhanced statutory maximum penalty provisions of sec. 841, ’may not be utilized for sentencing without a finding of drug quantity by the jury.’ Westmoreland, 240 F.3d at 632 (citations omitted). Here the alleged Apprendi error occurred not at sentencing, as the jury found drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, but only at the indictment stage. Therefore, in order for us to find an Apprendi violation, we would have to find that the failure alone of the indictment to state drug quantities that the prosecutor seeks to prove under sec. 841(b) would be a constitutional violation, even if the trier of fact finds those quantities beyond a reasonable doubt. We held in Bjorkman that Apprendi does not rewrite or change the elements of any federal offense; it does, however, determine who must make particular decisions, and what the burden of persuasion must be. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d at 491. Because Apprendi arose as a state prosecution, it did not address federal offenses and did not address the contents of a federal indictment. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 n.3 (disclaiming any reliance on, or interpretation of, the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment Clause). Other circuits have held, contrary to this position, that the failure to charge drug quantity in the indictment deprives the district court of jurisdiction and requires automatic reversal. See Cotton, 261 F.3d at 407; Gonzalez, 259 F.3d at 361. We need not, however, resolve the issue in this scenario, because even if an Apprendi error occurred by failing to allege drug quantity in the indictment, it was harmless because the trier of fact did in fact determine drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1986) (holding that petit jury’s guilty verdict in prosecution for drug-related offenses and conspiracy established probable cause to charge defendants and thus rendered harmless any error in grand jury’s charging decision). It is now well established in this circuit that Apprendi errors in both the indictment and the charge to the jury are subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Atkins, 274 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Bjorkman, 270 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Martinez, 258 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 2000)). Under that standard of review, if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found Trennell guilty of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute over 5 kilograms of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base, then the Apprendi error was not so serious that we would set aside the judgment. See Atkins, 274 F.3d at 450; Bjorkman, 270 F.3d at 492; Nance, 236 F.3d at 826. In this case we need not engage in any hypothetical analysis as to whether the jury’s verdict would have differed because the jury was properly instructed to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to drug quantity and specifically found that Trennell was accountable for more than 5 kilograms of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base on the special verdict form. Therefore any error in the indictment under Apprendi is harmless. C. Sufficiency of Evidence Trennell’s final argument is that the district court erred at sentencing by finding that Trennell was accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. The jury found Trennell’s conspiracy involved at least 5 kilograms of cocaine and 50 grams of cocaine base. This finding subjected him to a statutory maximum sentence of up to life imprisonment under either 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), for cocaine, or (iii), for cocaine base. The district court calculated his base offense level at 42, based on the determination that Trennell was accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, which set his sentencing guideline range at 360 months to life imprisonment. Trennell argues that while the trial testimony is replete with testimony about transactions involving cocaine powder, he maintains that the record does not support the district court’s finding that he conspired to distribute 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base./6 On this appeal, Trennell does not challenge the district court’s factual finding that over 15 kilograms of cocaine may be attributed to him, and the record amply supports this finding. According to U.S.S.G. sec. 2D1.1(c), a person convicted of a crime involving between 15 and 50 kilograms of cocaine has a base offense level of 34. However, the district court also found that Trennell’s crimes involved 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base, which mandates a base offense level of 38. At the sentencing hearing the judge noted that I think the evidence amply establishes that the amount, whatever it was, was in excess of 1.5 [kilograms of cocaine base]. We review a district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear error. United States v. Roe, 210 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2000). Under this standard a district court’s findings will only be reversed if the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Huerta, 239 F.3d 865, 875 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). The testimony at trial does indicate that a significant amount of cocaine base exchanged hands between the conspirators. Specifically, his co-conspirators testified that in total, 3 to 5 kilograms of cocaine powder were cooked into cocaine base for Trennell during 1997. In the cooking process, baking soda is added to the cocaine base so that more drugs are produced in the process than the starting amount of cocaine./7 Also, one of the conspirators testified that he was involved in a drug transaction involving five kilograms of cocaine base. This testimony is sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Trennell was responsible for more than 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base. Trennell also argues that the district court erred by not establishing a cocaine to cocaine base conversion ratio as required by United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 911 (7th Cir. 2001). Under Stott, when sentencing is determinative on quantities of cocaine that have been converted into cocaine base, it is incumbent upon the Government to establish a conversion ratio. Id. (citing United States v. Hunter, 145 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir. 1998) ([C]onversion ratios are a finding of fact that must be determined in each individual case . . . .)). A conversion ratio includes two components: the percentage of the powder cocaine that a defendant could reasonably foresee would be converted into base, and evidence of the percentage of weight lost during theprocess of converting cocaine into base. Id. See also Hunter, 145 F.3d at 952. However, the district court did not need to convert the amounts of cocaine to cocaine base because the evidence indicated that when Trennell provided 3 to 5 kilograms of cocaine to co-conspirators, he received this amount of cocaine base in return. And, finally, evidence was presented at trial that he was involved in actual transactions of cocaine base that amounted to more than 5 kilograms. Due to this fact, any reliance placed by the defendant on Stott is misplaced. In this case, based on the wealth of evidence presented to the court, the district court did not commit clear error in sentencing Trennell based on an excess of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.