Opinion ID: 167590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neutrality and General Applicability

Text: 34 Chief Palmer's second argument for reversal is that the relevant regulations and actions in this case were neutral and generally applicable within the meaning of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). The transfer of an officer to the day shift, without more, is neutral on its face, and [t]he CBA [collective bargaining agreement] and its rank-takes-precedence rule for determining days off are also religion-neutral. Appellant challenges the district court's conclusion that the failure of a government employer to accommodate the religious needs of an employee, short of undue hardship, is a violation of the First Amendment. See Order, at 13. He argues that Brown v. Polk County, Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 654 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), on which the district court relied, contradicts the teaching of this Court in United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir.2002) (en banc), that  Smith creates a `safe harbor' if the law is `a valid and neutral law of general applicability.' Appellant's Br. 21. 35 We agree with Appellant Palmer that the mere failure of a government employer to accommodate the religious needs of an employee, where the need for accommodation arises from a conflict with a neutral and generally applicable employment requirement, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, as that Clause was interpreted in Smith. We thus respectfully disagree with the Eighth Circuit that the first amendment protects at least as much religious activity as Title VII does. Brown, 61 F.3d at 654. The religious accommodation requirements of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j), extend beyond the dictates of the Free Exercise Clause, as interpreted by Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Thus, the mere refusal of Chief Palmer and the Coweta police department to accommodate Officer Shrum's religious scheduling needs, without more, does not establish a constitutional violation. 36 But that is not the crux of Officer Shrum's case. Officer Shrum alleges that he was moved to the day shift precisely because of Chief Palmer's knowledge of his religious commitment. If so, the decision to transfer was not neutral, but rather motivated by Officer Shrum's religious commitments. We recognize that Chief Palmer asserts neutral reasons for his decision to require Officer Shrum to work the day shift: that he was concerned about Officer Shrum's performance level and he needed remedial training. But these asserted neutral reasons are disputed. At his deposition, Chief Palmer could not recall any specific problems with Officer Shrum's performance or the specific remedial training that was needed. R. 380-81. Officer Shrum presented evidence that another officer had been willing to trade shifts with him but that Chief Palmer would not permit it, R. 259, 381, and thus that the decision was not merely a neutral application of the rank-takes precedence rule of the CBA. 37 The district court concluded that the relevant facts are disputed, and the ultimate outcome of the case will turn on whether Officer Shrum's religious commitment was a motivating factor in the actions taken against him. Order, at 13. For purposes of interlocutory appellate review, the question before us is not whether Chief Palmer's account is worthy of belief, or even if the district court was correct that there was a disputed question of material fact on this point, but only whether, assuming the district court's evaluation of the record was correct, Officer Shrum has stated a constitutional claim strictly as a matter of law. We hold that the district court was correct that Officer Shrum's allegations establish a violation of his clearly established constitutional rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 38 To be sure, Officer Shrum does not allege that Chief Palmer held Officer Shrum's faith against him or acted from religious prejudice. Rather, the claim is that religious discrimination was the means to an entirely secular end: Chief Palmer wanted to force Officer Shrum out, and making him choose between his duties as a police officer and his duties as a minister was the method at hand. But the Free Exercise Clause is not limited to acts motivated by overt religious hostility or prejudice. As its language suggests, the animating ideal of the constitutional provision is to protect the free exercise of religion from unwarranted governmental inhibition whatever its source. The first draft, as it came from the pen of James Madison, was even more emphatic: nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed. 1 Annals of Cong. 451 (June 8, 1789) (speech by Rep. Madison) (emphasis added). Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland — not coincidentally, as a Roman Catholic, the most conspicuous example in the First Congress of a member of a religious minority — commented that the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. 1 Annals of Cong. 757 (Aug. 15, 1789). 39 True to this history, the Free Exercise Clause has been applied numerous times when government officials interfered with religious exercise not out of hostility or prejudice, but for secular reasons, such as saving money, 7 promoting education, 8 obtaining jurors, 9 facilitating traffic law enforcement, 10 maintaining morale on the police force, 11 or protecting job opportunities. 12 Proof of hostility or discriminatory motivation may be sufficient to prove that a challenged governmental action is not neutral, Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir.2004), but the Free Exercise Clause is not confined to actions based on animus. 40 This brings us to the question of whether the law on this constitutional violation was clearly established. Chief Palmer's argument for qualified immunity reiterates his legal argument that his actions were neutral and generally applicable, an argument which we have rejected as a matter of law. Chief Palmer does not dispute that it was clearly established that non-neutral state action imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion violates the First Amendment. If Officer Shrum's factual allegations are correct — that he was singled out precisely because of Chief Palmer's knowledge of his religious commitment — then Chief Palmer's claim of qualified immunity must fail. Only if the finder of fact ultimately concludes, as a matter of fact, that Chief Palmer had a neutral basis for his personnel actions, does he have a defense. This is thus a case where the claim of qualified immunity collapses into the merits. The district court was correct to hold that it should proceed to trial on the free exercise claim.