Opinion ID: 2318646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: anderson's appeal

Text: A. Anderson's claims Anderson challenges his conviction of recklessly fleeing a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle on two grounds. First, he claims, relying on the words of § 50-2201.05b, [5] that [b]y the terms of that statute, only an operator of a motor vehicle can commit that offense. Anderson asserts in his brief that no reported case in the District of Columbia has been found applying aiding and abetting to this statute or otherwise holding a passenger in a car liable for violating it. Second, Anderson asserts in the alternative that even if someone other than the driver may be held criminally liable under the statute pursuant to an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecutor did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson aided and abetted English in carrying out the flight. We are unpersuaded by Anderson's first contention, but we agree with the second. B. Anderson's claim that only a driver can violate the fleeing statute Although the fleeing statute, by its terms, applies to the operator of a motor vehicle, Anderson has cited no authority or persuasive argument, and we know of none, for the proposition that conventional principles of aiding and abetting should not apply to the offense here under consideration. In particular, we are aware of no logical reason why a passenger cannot be an aider and abettor of flight. Under District of Columbia law, [i]n prosecutions for any criminal offense all persons advising, inciting or conniving at an offense, or aiding the principal offender, shall be charged as principals and not as accessories, the intent of this section being that as to all accessories before the fact the law heretofore applicable in cases of misdemeanor only shall apply to all crimes, whatever the punishment may be. D.C.Code § 22-1805 (2001). Thus, if a passenger advis[es], incit[es], or conniv[es] at flight in an automobile from a law enforcement officer, or if he aid[s] the principal offender in fleeing, then, under the literal terms of the statute, he or she is subject to prosecution just as the driver is. We know of no District of Columbia case law directly in point with respect to the particular scenario presented here. In Fox v. United States, 11 A.3d 1282 (D.C. 2011), the driver of a vehicle and his two passengers were convicted of armed robbery and related offenses, as well as of fleeing from a police officer. This court affirmed the convictions of all three defendants of the latter offense. The issue presented to us by Anderson in this case, however, was not raised by any of the defendants in Fox, and we did not address it. As this court recently had occasion to reiterate in Richman Towers Tenants' Ass'n, Inc. v. Richman Towers LLC, 17 A.3d 590, 610 (D.C.2011): Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents. Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925); Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C.1994) (quoting Webster ). [T]he rule of stare decisis is never properly invoked unless in the decision put forward as precedent the judicial mind has been applied to and passed upon the precise question. District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 360 (D.C.1996) (quoting Murphy, 650 A.2d at 205). Case law from other jurisdictions suggests that conventional aiding and abetting principles should apply here. In State v. Patch, 594 N.W.2d 537 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999), the police were seeking to serve a woman with outstanding arrest warrants. The defendant alerted the woman that the cops are coming to get you. The defendant was convicted of obstructing legal process. The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction of that offense, but observed that the state could . . . have charged [the defendant] with aiding and abetting [the other woman] to flee a police officer in a motor vehicle. Id. at 540. In State v. Hines, 465 So.2d 958 (La. App.2nd Cir.1985), a passenger in a motor boat was convicted, inter alia, of reckless operation of watercraft and of obstructing an officer by aiding and abetting flight. The evidence showed that the driver of the boat was attempting to escape from pursuing game wardens, and that during the chase, the passenger threw bags of fish overboard. While reversing the passenger's conviction of careless operation of the boat, because the passenger did not aid or abet that offense, id. at 963, the court upheld his conviction of obstructing the officers: Although the defendant was not the driver of the boat, his actions in attempting to dispose of evidence by throwing the bags of fish overboard tend to show that the defendant was an active participant in the flight from the officers. Thus, his actions aided and abetted the driver in fleeing from the officers, making him a principal under the terms of the [Louisiana statute]. [6] Id. at 962-63. In People v. Branch, 202 Mich.App. 550, 509 N.W.2d 525 (1993), the defendant, a passenger in a vehicle which was involved in a twenty-two mile high speed chase, was convicted of fleeing and eluding a police officer. He appealed, claiming that Michigan's fleeing and eluding statute applied only to drivers. The court rejected his contention, holding that a passenger may be charged with aiding and abetting a driving offense and that the defendant intentionally assisted the driver by giving him directions and by throwing beer cans out of the car, thus slowing the police pursuit. Id. at 526. In light of the authorities cited above, [7] as well as the lack of any reasoned justification for declining to apply recognized aiding and abetting principles to the offense of reckless fleeing a law enforcement officer in a motor vehicle, we cannot agree with Anderson's broad claim that the fleeing statute applies only to the operator of the vehicle and cannot be violated by a passenger. C. Sufficiency of the evidence of aiding and abetting by Anderson We now turn to the dispositive question, namely, whether Anderson has demonstrated that, viewing the record, as we must, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, see pages 5-6, supra, we must deem the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We begin by noting that, although the fleeing statute technically falls under Chapter 22 of Title 50 of the District of Columbia Code, entitled Regulation of Traffic, it is an offense that may often have grave consequences. In its recent opinion in Sykes v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2267, 180 L.Ed.2d 60 (2011), the Supreme Court described flight such as that which occurred here as a provocative and dangerous act that dares, and in a typical case requires, the officers to give chase. Id. at 2273. Accordingly, officers pursuing fleeing drivers may deem themselves duty bound to escalate their response to ensure that the felon is apprehended. Id. Confrontation with police is the expected result of vehicle flight[,] and risk of violence is inherent to [it]. Id. at 2273-74. Indeed, as the Court went on to explain: A 2008 International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) study examined 7,737 police pursuits reported by 56 agencies in 30 states during 2001-2007. C. Lum & G. Fachner, Police Pursuits in an Age of Innovation and Reform 54. Those pursuits, the study found, resulted in 313 injuries to police and bystanders, a rate of slightly over 4 injuries to these nonsuspects per 100 pursuits. Id. at 57. Given that police may be least likely to pursue suspects where the dangers to bystanders are greatest i.e., when flights occur at extraordinarily high speedsit is possible that risks associated with vehicle flight are even higher. Id. at 2274. In other words, the offense which English committed and Anderson allegedly aided and abetted is not a minor traffic violation which can be resolved by a ticket and a small fine. Rather, it is a serious crime, which in this case was made even more dangerous by the speed at which English traveled. [8] The trial judge instructed the jury as follows with respect to the elements of the fleeing statute: One, that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle. Two, that a law enforcement officer signaled the defendant to bring the motor vehicle to a stop. Three, that following the signal from a law enforcement officer the defendant failed or refused to bring the motor vehicle to an immediate stop or attempted to allude the law enforcement officer. Four, that he did so knowingly and intentionally, this means consciously, voluntarily, and on purpose, not mistakenly, accidentally or inadvertently. And five, that while failing or refusing to bring the motor vehicle to an immediate stop, fleeing or attempting to allude the law enforcement officer the defendant drove recklessly. No party objected to the instruction, and we agree that it represents a correct statement of the law. In general, to prove aiding and abetting the government must show that (1) a crime was committed by someone; (2) the accused assisted or participated in its commission, and (3) the accused participated with guilty knowledge. Lancaster v. United States, 975 A.2d 168, 174 (D.C. 2009) (citing Tyree v. United States, 942 A.2d 629, 636 (D.C.2008)); accord, Carter v. United States, 957 A.2d 9, 16 (D.C.2008); Fox, 11 A.3d at 1287; Dang v. United States, 741 A.2d 1039, 1043 (D.C.1999). To be guilty as an aider and abettor of a charged offense, however, the defendant must be shown to have assisted or participated in that crime with guilty knowledge. Lewis v. United States, 996 A.2d 824, 831 (D.C.2010) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In the words of Judge Learned Hand, written three quarters of a century ago but still recognized as authoritative on the point, see Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949); Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 831 (D.C.2006) (en banc), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933, 127 S.Ct. 2248, 167 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2007), an aider and abettor is guilty as a principal if he in some sort associate[s] himself with the venture, participate[s] in it as something he wishes to bring about, and . . . seek[s] by his action to make it succeed. United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938) (emphasis added). The key question is whether, drawing all reasonable inferences in the prosecution's favor, an impartial jury could fairly find beyond a reasonable doubt that Anderson intentionally participated in English's reckless flight from the pursuing officer, and that he not only wanted English (and his passengers) to succeed in eluding the police (which Anderson undoubtedly did), but that he also took concrete action to make his hope a reality. The government has cited no evidence that would support an affirmative answer to this question, and we are aware of none. In Hines, 465 So.2d at 962-63, relied on by the government, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the defendant, a passenger in a motor boat, actively participated in the flight from the pursuing game wardens by throwing bags of fish overboard. There was no such conduct shown in this case. The Branch decision, 509 N.W.2d at 526, is distinguishable on essentially the same ground. The government argues as follows: Although Anderson was not driving the Grand Marquis, the jury could reasonably conclude that he aided and abetted English's flight from the police by supporting, assisting, encouraging, or cooperating with the chase. [9] Indeed, he was an active participant in the flight from the police; he continued his effort to flee the law enforcement officers after the car was brought to a halt. Anderson's presence in the car while English was driving like a bat out of hell, and Anderson's subsequent flight on foot, undoubtedly show that he did not want to be apprehended, and the jury could fairly so find. Missing, however, is any evidence that Anderson took any concrete action to assist English in escaping from the police. [10] This is not a case, for example, in which there appears to be some indication in the record before us that [Anderson] may have urged or directed the driver to take evasive action. United States v. Cook, 181 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir.1999) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In Dennis v. State, 342 Md. 196, 674 A.2d 928 (1996), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 802, 117 S.Ct. 40, 136 L.Ed.2d 4 (1996), reaffirmed, 345 Md. 649, 693 A.2d 1150 (1997), the court stated: There ordinarily is no reason to believe that a passenger in a vehicle is guilty, as an accessory or aider and abettor, of the traffic offense with which the driver may be charged. This is true even when the offense is fleeing and eluding. Id. at 932 (emphasis added); accord, DeRosa v. Rambosk, 732 F.Supp.2d 1285, 1298-99 (M.D.Fla.2010) (no probable cause to arrest passenger for aiding and abetting fleeing driver where passenger did not aid in the driving of the vehicle and had no control over it or capacity to stop it). The court in Dennis did indicate that if, as in the present case, the passenger in an automobile in which the driver is charged with fleeing from the police, flees after the automobile is stopped, it is possible for there to arise at least a reasonable suspicion that the passenger was the driver's accessory or aider and abettor. 674 A.2d at 933 (footnote omitted). We agree with the court's analysis in Dennis. [11] Although Anderson's flight on foot after the car came to a stop might well give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion that he was an aider and abettor to English's flight in the car, the standard for articulable suspicion is not a demanding one, see, e.g., Gomez v. United States, 597 A.2d 884, 888-89 (D.C.1991), and the evidence warranting such a suspicion is not sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires near certitude of the defendant's guilt. Rivas, 783 A.2d at 133 (citation omitted). [12]