Opinion ID: 1235169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Starr's Motion for New Trial

Text: Similar to his previous argument, Starr argues that given the weakness of the government's case, the district court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Upon the defendant's motion, the [district] court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. A district court may weigh the evidence, disbelieve witnesses, and grant a new trial even where there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict. United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir.2002). However, [u]nless the district court ultimately determines that a miscarriage of justice will occur, the jury's verdict must be allowed to stand. Id. A district court may grant a new trial under Rule 33 only if the evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Motions for new trials based on the weight of the evidence are generally disfavored. That being said, the district court has broader discretion to grant a new trial under Rule 33 than to grant a motion for acquittal under Rule 29, but it nonetheless must exercise the Rule 33 authority sparingly and with caution. Campos, 306 F.3d at 579 (citation omitted); see also 3 Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King, & Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure § 553 (3d ed.2004) (stating that granting new trial under Rule 33 is unusual remedy that is reserved for exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict). We hold that the evidence does not weigh heavily against the verdict; consequently, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Starr's new trial motion.