Opinion ID: 1199801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct as to Guilt

Text: Defendant contends that on numerous occasions before the jury the prosecutor engaged in misconduct as to guilt. (4) In general, a prosecutor commits misconduct by the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) His good faith vel non  is not crucial. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 793 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].) That is because the standard in accordance with which his conduct is evaluated is objective. (5) `It is, of course, the general rule that a defendant cannot complain on appeal of misconduct by a prosecutor at trial unless in a timely fashion'  and on the same ground  `he made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.' ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 976 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214], quoting People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 794.) After review, we reject defendant's claim at the threshold. He failed to satisfy the general rule requiring assignment of misconduct and request for admonition as to any of the comments by the prosecutor of which he now complains. No exception is applicable. (6) We also reject defendant's claim on the merits. When, as here, the point focuses on comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) On this record, the answer is no. We do not overlook some apparent misstatements and other infelicities by the prosecutor. But when we consider each of the challenged comments in its context, we simply cannot conclude that the prosecutor used a method to persuade the jury that was deceptive or reprehensible. (7) Let us consider as representative examples the three complaints to which defendant devotes the greatest number of pages in his briefing. In the course of his summation, the prosecutor sought to elucidate for the jury certain aspects of the court's charge. The court had already instructed the jury that it could find defendant not guilty of murder but guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The court would soon declare that the jury could return partial verdicts, and related findings, as to homicide, including first degree murder, second degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. And the court would soon explain how the jury was to complete the forms for the possible verdicts and findings. In commenting on the foregoing, the prosecutor evidently used a demonstrative aid in the form of a chart to make sure that all of you understand ... how you would work down this ladder of lesser included offenses. Following our decision in Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 [183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809] (hereafter sometimes Stone ), we held in People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 324-325 [250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572] (hereafter sometimes Kurtzman ), that a court may restrict[] a jury from returning a verdict on a lesser included offense before acquitting on a greater offense but may not preclude [it] from considering lesser offenses during its deliberations. (Italics in original.) We thereby impliedly rejected a strict acquittal-first rule under which the jury must acquit of the greater offense before even considering lesser included offenses. ( Id. at p. 333.) Defendant claims to discern misconduct in a number of comments by the prosecutor that arguably suggested, contrary to Stone and Kurtzman, that the jury was required to deliberate on the charges and allegations in a specified order. We do not. At most, the prosecutor's remarks may have amounted to a misstatement of the law. Even if erroneous, however, they cannot be characterized as misconduct. `[A] prosecutor is not guilty of misconduct because in his argument of the law to the jury, he is wrong as to the law....' ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 702 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) [2] (8) Next, in the course of his summation, the prosecutor set out to explicate for the jury the People's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, on which the court had already given an instruction. [3] ... I'd like to discuss that a little more, what the burden of proof is, what it means, and how you're to go about proving  discharging that burden of proof. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... . . ... [T]his particular burden is substantial. There is no doubt about that, because we all take the life and liberty of our fellow citizens, our fellow occupants of this country, whether or not they're citizens, very seriously. We want to make sure that before we deprive a person of their liberty, we have thoroughly examined those issues. And whether the evidence that has been presented persuades us that a law has been broken. [4] .... .... .... .... .... .... .... . . For that reason, I have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt, and in the instruction it says not beyond a possible or imaginary doubt, because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. But it is that state of the case which after the comparison and consideration, comparison and consideration, of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. It's not absolute knowledge. We're not going to  we haven't replayed any instant replays in this particular case. However, I would suggest to you that the photographs in this case are so graphic and so convincing, that they, themselves, are sufficient for you to return a verdict of guilty. [5] You can see for yourself what occurred there. There's evidence on the ground and upon the person of Mimi Hildreth, as to what happened. So the question that's been presented to you, and if you'll recall, one of the Judge's instructions to you ..., what questions we have for the jurors to make the decision, do you feel that he raped and murdered Mimi. Will that feeling stay with you? And is that feeling based upon moral evidence produced in this courtroom? .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ... Do you feel that he did it, and is your feeling based upon evidence that's produced here in court. Now, if your feeling would be based upon well, gee, he also reminds me of the little kid that used to throw my newspapers on to the roof and gave me a smart answer when I asked him to get it on the porch, or some other ridiculous thing like that. I don't suggest that any of you would have those feelings, but if you have a feeling that he didn't do it, what is that feeling based upon? Is that feeling also based upon evidence that's produced here in court? Unless it's a reasonable interpretation of evidence that's produced here in court, it's not proper for you to take into consideration at all. And even if it was, it would only have to do with an element of the offense, because all I have to prove in this case are the elements of the offense, plus the identity. Defendant claims to discern misconduct in the comments by the prosecutor referring to feel, feeling, and feelings. We do not. Defendant argues that, by using the words quoted above, [t]he prosecutor lessened his burden of proof and appealed to the passions of the jurors.... There is simply no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. (9) Last, in the course of his summation, the prosecutor stated that [t]o return a verdict on the first degree intentional premeditated and deliberate killing, there would be [several] elements to be proved, one of which was that a human being was killed.... Well, it seems like well, that obvious. But you do have in some cases, well, it wasn't really a human being that was killed. [¶] They try to place the victim outside of the pale of humanity, as it was, that person did something wrong, it was a bad person, he or she deserved this. We didn't have that in this particular case. No one could say a bad word against Mimi. If they could have, they would have been here on the stand. [¶] That is a 17 year old girl, looking forward to her senior year, and just an absolute gem, and no one can say she deserved to die. Defendant claims to discern misconduct in the comments by the prosecutor quoted above. We do not. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's remarks to the effect that Hildreth was just an absolute gem were unsupported by the record.... That is not the case. The words in question constitute a reasonable inference from, and fair comment on, the evidence adduced at trial. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's remarks falsely attribut[ed] to the defense a claim that [Hildreth] deserved to die because she was not a human being. (Underscoring omitted.) That is also not the case. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury so construed or applied the words under review. A reasonable juror would have understood and employed the language for what it was, i.e., a reasonable inference from, and fair comment on, the evidence. [6]