Opinion ID: 770662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Connick Analysis

Text: 12 Belk's comments are not entitled to First Amendment protection unless they addressed matters of public concern. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146. Matters of public concern include matters of political, social, and other concern to the community. See id. at 147-48. In evaluating speech under the Connick framework, we examine the content, form, and context of the speech as revealed by the entire record. See id.; Shands, 993 F.2d at 1343. The defendants argue that Belk's statements to Dolby did not address matters of public concern because (1) Belk's statements were not made in a public setting, (2) Belk herself was motivated by a desire to spread gossip and animosity toward Link, and (3) her statements were purely job-related.
13 We generally have held that speech about the use of public funds touches upon a matter of public concern. Kincade v. City of Blue Springs, 64 F.3d 389, 396 (8th Cir. 1995). Allegations of the misuse of public funds relate directly to citizens' interests as taxpayers, and are generally considered to address matters of public concern despite their personal pecuniary ramifications. See Kincade, 64 F.3d at 396; Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993). 14 Speech that criticizes a public employer in his capacity as a public official also addresses matters of public concern. Criticism, no matter how obnoxious or offensive, of government officials and their policies clearly addresses matters of public concern. Casey, 12 F.3d at 802.; see Barnard v. Jackson County, 43 F.3d 1218, 1225 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding allegations of wrongdoing by public officials are on the highest order of First Amendment concern). Heightened public interest in a particular issue, while not dispositive, may also indicate that the issue is one of public concern. See Bowman v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 723 F.2d 640, 644 (8th Cir.1983) (holding that media coverage and citizen activism  . . . are a good indication of the public's interest). 15 Not every statement made by a public employee about her job addresses a matter of public concern, however. When a public employee's speech is purely job-related, that speech will not be deemed a matter of public concern . . . . Unless the employee is speaking as a concerned citizen, and not just as an employee, the speech does not fall under the protection of the First Amendment. Buazard v. Meredith, 172 F.3d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1999). In Tuttle v. Missouri Department of Agriculture, for instance, we held that a grain inspector's conversation with his supervisor touching on recent worker cutbacks, employment policies, possible increases in salaries, promotions, and safety issues did not address matters of public concern because the employee was speaking solely as an employee. 172 F.3d 1025, 1034 (8th Cir. 1999). Statements that deal with personnel matters are not generally protected by the First Amendment, and statements of purely academic interest to the speaker will be given broader protection than those in which she has a personal interest. See Shands, 993 F.3d at 1343. The question before us, then, is whether Belk's statements, which were unquestionably related to her employment, addressed solely personnel matters or matters of public concern. 16 First, Belk's statements implicated her interests as a citizen-taxpayer by alleging the misuse of public funds. The jury specifically found that Belk told Dolby that she believed a city employee was receiving benefits to which she was not entitled. The clear implication of such a statement is that public funds were being misused. Unlike the plaintiff in Tuttle, Belk had no employment-based personal pecuniary interest in the subject matter of her comments; her interest was academic. Belk and Carpenter did not have the same employment status, nor do Carpenter's benefits appear to have had any link to Belk's. Thus, Belk had no interest in Carpenter's benefits beyond those of a citizen. 17 Second, Belk's conversation with Dolby addressed a matter of public concern because, at its base, it was a criticism of the city administrator's conduct as a public official, not as her supervisor. Belk found fault not with Link's office policies as they affected her and her fellow employees, but with what she perceived as his misuse of his public position. Moreover, the fact that the issue was taken up by a concerned citizen's group indicates that there was public interest in the matter. 18 The defendants repeatedly point out that Belk's statements to Dolby included reports that rumors were circulating about Link's relationship with Carpenter. Although such statements may have been in poor taste, they were nonetheless part of Belk's protected speech, because they provided a potential explanation for Link's alleged misuse of public funds.
19 Even when the content of a public employee's speech addresses matters of public concern, the form and context of the speech are also relevant to our analysis. See Shands, 993 F.2d at 1343. The defendants charge that Belk's statements, taken in context, could not have addressed matters of public concern because they were made in the course of a private conversation with Dolby and because she had improper motives for making them. 20 Although the context of the speech must be considered, the fact that a plaintiff made statements in a private conversation about a public official toward whom she may have harbored personal animosity does not vitiate the status of statement as addressing a matter of public concern. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 n.11 (1987). Private statements are particularly amenable to First Amendment protection when they are made to a public official in his official capacity. See id. at 387. The inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to the question of whether it deals with a matter of public concern. Id.. Nor does the presence of unsavory personal motives eviscerate the protection, so long as the speech itself addresses matters of public concern. See id. 21 If it raises any inference, the private nature of Belk's conversation with Dolby suggests that her statements addressed matters of public concern. After coming across information that she believed revealed inappropriate compensation of a city employee, she approached an elected city official in private and passed on the information, identifying the portion that she knew to be a rumor. Although her conduct may not be so obvious an exercise of political speech as pamphleteering or soap-box speeches, it is considerably more so than, for instance, the offhand comment of the plaintiff in Rankin who, in the course of a private conversation with a co-worker, stated that she hoped that the next attempt on the President's life would be successful. 22 The defendants also point to Belk's admitted difficulties with Link as evidence that her motivations were those of a town gossip rather than a concerned citizen. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Belk, as we must, we see no basis for the defendants' contention that Belk was motivated by a desire to spread gossip and rumors about Link. She told Dolby that reports of the affair were only rumors. She spoke to him in private, and asked him not to share her comments with others. Later, when she was presented with the more public forum at the meeting of the concerned citizen's group, she chose not to comment on Link's affair. Any prurient appeal that Belk's statements may have contained did not affect their underlying content, nor did it give Belk a personal interest in passing on the information that would diminish its First Amendment protection. Accordingly, we reject the defendants' contextual argument. In light of the jury's findings that Belk told Dolby of her concerns about Carpenter's benefits and that this conversation was a motivating factor in Belk's discharge, we proceed to the second portion of the Connick framework. See Shands, 993 F.2d at 1343.