Opinion ID: 559995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Policies/Practicalities of Litigation

Text: 14 The second part of our analysis requires that we determine whether the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make the federal statute of limitations a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking. Reed, 488 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. at 625. 15 First, there are no practicalities of litigation present here that make the federal rule more appropriate. In DelCostello, the Court cited as one reason for choosing the federal rule the fact that the state statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards was just 90 days. The Court concluded that the state rule fail[ed] to provide an aggrieved employee with a satisfactory opportunity to vindicate his rights.... DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 166, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. No such practical problem is present here. 16 Further, because the Union asserts a straightforward section 301 claim, and not a hybrid claim, another practical concern present in DelCostello is absent here. [A] hybrid Sec. 301/fair representation action yokes together interdependent claims that could only very impractically be treated as governed by different statutes of limitations. Departure from the normal practice of borrowing state statutes of limitation is more likely to be necessary where distinct actions are combined, making the possibility of finding a single analogous state statute more remote. Reed, 488 U.S. at 328 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. at 628 n. 4 (citations omitted). Therefore, no practical considerations make the federal rule more appropriate and we now turn to policy considerations. 17 ITT argues that choosing the federal rule would protect two important federal interests, the need for uniformity in federal labor law and the policy of rapidly resolving labor disputes. We agree, of course, that these are important federal interests. It is clear, however, that the need for uniformity is not of itself enough to override the general rule that we should borrow state statutes of limitations. If it were enough, the Reed Court would have been compelled to choose the federal over the state rule. 18 ITT contends that applying the six-month limitation period of section 10(b) promotes the rapid settlement of industrial disputes. ITT fails to explain why applying a one-year limitation period disserves this interest other than to assert that one year is twice as long as six months. Our task is to decide whether a one-year period, although twice as long as the federal period, frustrate[s] or significantly interfere[s] with federal policies. Reed, 488 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 627. 19 Although one-year is admittedly twice as long as six-months, it is difficult to see how a statute of limitations that is only six months longer could frustrate or significantly interfere with the federal interest in resolving labor disputes quickly. ITT's contention that the section 10(b) period is more appropriate here because the state statute of limitations is twice as long fails to take seriously [the Supreme Court's] ... admonition that state statutes of limitation are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly interfere with federal policies. Reed, 488 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 627. 20 We also note that a suit to compel arbitration  'does not affect any interpretation or effect any reinterpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.... There is no erosion of the finality of private settlements.'  Reed, 488 U.S. at 330, 109 S.Ct. at 629 (quoting Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1986)). The Union is not seeking to overturn a settled agreement, it is seeking to enforce one. Although federal interests in the relationship between labor and employers are tangentially implicated, those interests are not directly affected as they are in hybrid suits. Hybrid suits, unlike suits to compel arbitration, constitute a direct challenge to private-dispute settlement under a collective bargaining agreement. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 165, 103 S.Ct. at 2291. We hold that the one-year state statute of limitations, although it interferes to some small degree with the federal policy of resolving labor disputes rapidly, does not frustrate or significantly interfere with that or any other federal policy. Therefore, ITT has failed to satisfy the second prong of the test. 21 ITT further contends that our circuit has already decided the question presented here and has determined that the federal statute of limitations should be applied in cases such as this. We disagree. All four cases ITT cites to support this proposition are distinguishable. 22 Three of the cases cited by ITT are easily dismissed because they involved hybrid suits, just as DelCostello did. These cases are therefore not on point. See Hill v. Georgia Power Co., 786 F.2d 1071 (11th Cir.1986); Simon v. Kroger Co., 743 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1075, 105 S.Ct. 2155, 85 L.Ed.2d 511 (1985); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 742 F.2d 612 (11th Cir.1984). The other case cited by ITT, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 1688 v. Allied Products Corp., 786 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir.1986), along with another case ITT might have cited for the same proposition, Samples v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 755 F.2d 881 (11th Cir.1985), do involve straightforward section 301 claims. In both cases, this court rejected state limitation periods and adopted the federal six-month statute of limitations. 23 Samples arose from Georgia and predates the Supreme Court's decision in Reed. The Samples court adopted the section 10(b) limitation period for a straightforward section 301 action brought by a union against an employee for enforcement of an arbitration award. The court noted that Georgia has no specific statute of limitations for actions to enforce arbitration awards; such actions are treated like judicial determinations 11 and are enforceable subject to a seven-year dormancy provision. 12 The court next looked to Georgia's statute of limitations for actions to enforce contracts, which is six years. 13 Both options were rejected principally because they were too lengthy, and the court adopted the section 10(b) limitation period. 24 Allied Products arose in Alabama and also predates Reed. There, as here, a union sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. The court noted that Alabama law provides no statute of limitations for actions to compel arbitration and a six-year statute of limitations for contract actions generally. 14 This lengthy limitation period, the court said, contravenes the federal policy of the prompt resolution of labor disputes. Allied Prods., 786 F.2d at 1564. 25 Consequently, both Samples and Allied Products are distinguishable. Both courts had to choose between six months and six years. Given the federal interest in the speedy resolution of labor disputes, it is not surprising that each court chose the six-month period. We do not believe that the choices made in those cases mean that we must always choose the shorter limitation period. Indeed, the result in DelCostello (where a lengthier limitation period was chosen) counsels just the opposite. We further note that what we have said about Samples and Allied Products may be said of the cases from other circuits cited by ITT. Those cases presented similar choices: the alternatives to the section 10(b) period were either much lengthier periods or much shorter periods; none of the cases presented a one-year period as an alternative to the section 10(b) period. In addition, many of those cases concerned state causes of action (such as breach of contract or an action to vacate an arbitration award) which are not as analogous to the federal cause of action as the analogy present in this case. 15