Opinion ID: 4121052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Enumerated Offense of Robbery

Text: The parties primarily argue about whether the Nevada robbery statute proscribes conduct that falls within the generic, contemporary meaning of robbery. Under the categorical framework, we compare the elements of the Nevada statute with the generic definition to determine whether conduct proscribed by the statute is broader than the generic definition. 9 Here, MontielCortes argues that the Nevada statute is broader than the generic, contemporary meaning of robbery. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the generic, contemporary definition of robbery encompassed by the guidelines corresponds to the definition found in a majority of states’ criminal codes and draws on the Model Penal Code, treatises, and other trusted authorities. 10 We have held that “rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts” criminalized, and then determine whether even those acts are encompassed by the generic federal offense. Id. (citations omitted, alteration in original). 8 U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii) (2015). 9 See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 10 United States v. Tellez-Martinez, 517 F.3d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541, 547-63 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc)). 6 Case: 16-50074 Document: 00513855038 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 No. 16-50074 “robbery may be thought of as aggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of misappropriation of property under circumstances involving [immediate] danger to the person.” 11 The immediate danger element “makes robbery deserving of greater punishment than that provided for larceny and extortion.” 12 Montiel-Cortes was convicted under Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.380, which provided in full: 1. Robbery is the unlawful taking of personal property from the person of another, or in the person’s presence, against his or her will, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his or her person or property, or the person or property of a member of his or her family, or of anyone in his or her company at the time of the robbery. A taking is by means of force or fear if force or fear is used to:
(b) Prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; or (c) Facilitate escape. The degree of force used is immaterial if it is used to compel acquiescence to the taking of or escaping with the property. A taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear. 2. A person who commits robbery is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 2 years and a maximum term of not more than 15 years. 13 Montiel-Cortes argues that the Nevada statute described the offense more broadly than the generic definition. Under the Nevada statute, he argues, 11 Id. (quoting Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 380). 12 Id. (quoting Santiesteban-Hernandez, 469 F.3d at 380). 13 Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.380 (2013). 7 Case: 16-50074 Document: 00513855038 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 No. 16-50074 the phrase “force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future” does not necessarily require immediate danger because a threat involving the future by definition cannot be “immediate.” The government argues that the immediacy element is inherently satisfied because the force or putting in fear must occur contemporaneously with the taking. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has considered whether, under the categorical approach, Nevada robbery constitutes the enumerated offense of robbery for purposes of the 16-level enhancement. Nevertheless, our decisions addressing other state robbery statutes shows that this court has rejected arguments similar to the Government’s and generally requires that danger to the victim be “immediate” to constitute a generic robbery. For example, in United States v. Alvarado-Rodriguez, 269 F. App’x 427 (5th Cir. 2008), this court held that a California robbery statute, Cal. Penal Code § 211, fell within the generic definition of robbery where it defined robbery as “the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” 14 The “fear” mentioned in the statute was defined as either (1) “fear of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the person robbed, or of any relative of his or member of his family” or (2) “fear of an immediate and unlawful injury to the person or property of anyone in the company of the person robbed at the time of the robbery.” 15 The defendant argued that Cal. Penal Code § 211 was broader than the generic definition of robbery because the California statute criminalized threats to property in addition to threats to persons. 16 We rejected that argument, finding that it misconstrued the essential language of Cal. Penal 14 Cal. Penal Code § 211. 15 Cal. Penal Code § 212. 16 Alvarado-Rodriguez, 269 F. App’x at 429. 8 Case: 16-50074 Document: 00513855038 Page: 9 Date Filed: 01/30/2017 No. 16-50074 Code § 211 “defining robbery as a crime committed: (1) directly against the victim or in his presence; and (2) against his will.” 17 The Court also noted that “the California robbery statute involves the misappropriation of property under circumstances involving danger to the person” and that the danger to the person “is inherent in the criminal act.” 18 Therefore, “even when the statute is violated by placing the victim in fear of injury to property, the property has been misappropriated in circumstances “involving [immediate] danger to the person.” 19 Thus, we held that Cal. Penal Code § 211 falls within the generic definition of robbery. 20 In sum, although generic robbery may be broad enough to encompass a fear concerning injury to property in addition to personal injury, the danger must still be “immediate.” Because the Nevada statute covered not just immediate danger but also future danger, we conclude that it was broader than the generic, contemporary definition of robbery. In fact, as Montiel-Cortes points out, California courts distinguish Nevada robbery because it permits fear of a future injury. 21