Opinion ID: 3149553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: One‐Year Term of Supervised Release

Text: Armour argues that his term of supervised release is im‐ proper because the district court gave no justification for the length of the supervised release. This Court reviews de novo whether a judge adequately explained a chosen sentence. United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515, 522 (7th Cir. 2014). Super‐ vised release is part of the sentence imposed, so the district court’s justifications for imposing the twenty‐four months in prison also apply to the one‐year term of supervised release. See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that § 3583(c) confirms that conditions of supervised release are part of the overall sentence). The factors set out in § 3583(c), which governs supervised release, are the same § 3553(a) factors that are set out in § 3583(e), which governs No. 15‐1604 13 revocations. We have already determined that the district court properly justified Armour’s sentence after considering these factors, with particular emphasis on § 3553(a)(1)—“the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”—and § 3553(a)(2)(C)—“the need for the sentence imposed … to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” Thus, the district court provided an adequate justification for Armour’s sentence, which included his term of supervised release. 2. Prohibition on Knowingly Being Present at a Place Where Drugs are Illegally Sold Next, Armour argues that the condition that he “shall not knowingly be present at places where controlled substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered” is vague and overbroad. He contends that the word “places” is expansive and problematic because marijuana use is legal in Illinois but illegal under federal law, creating “a conun‐ drum.” We find this unpersuasive. “A condition of super‐ vised release is unconstitutionally vague if it would not af‐ ford a person of reasonable intelligence with sufficient notice as to the conduct prohibited.” United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 1999). The word “place” has a general‐ ly understood meaning—a building or area—such that a person of reasonable intelligence would understand what is prohibited by this condition. See, e.g., Merriam‐Webster (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.merriam‐webster.com/dictionary/place (providing that one definition of “place” is “a building or area that is used for a particular purpose”). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering this condition. 14 No. 15‐1604 3. Reporting to the Probation Officer as Directed During his supervised release, Armour is also required to “report to the probation officer in a manner and frequency as directed by the Court or Probation.” Armour argues that this poses a risk of inconsistent law enforcement since Ar‐ mour could be required to do as little as call the probation officer semi‐annually, or he could be subject to more rigor‐ ous requirements, such as appearing in person twice a day. We agree with the government’s argument that Armour’s speculative concern is not supported by any evidence. Addi‐ tionally, this condition is justified by 18 U.S.C. § 3603(2)’s re‐ quirement that a probation officer remain informed of the conduct and condition of a person under supervision. This reporting condition will facilitate the probation officer’s compliance with this statutory requirement. Further, the condition is consistent with the policy goal of rehabilitation, as it should allow the probation officer to help Armour “bring about improvements in his conduct and condition.” § 3603(3). Therefore, the imposition of this condition was not an abuse of discretion. 4. The “Dangerous Weapon” Prohibition The district court prohibited Armour from possessing a “firearm, ammunition, destructive device or any other dan‐ gerous weapon.” Armour challenges this ban as unconstitu‐ tionally vague and overbroad. Since a person of reasonable intelligence would have sufficient notice as to the conduct prohibited—not possessing dangerous weapons—this condi‐ tion is not unconstitutionally vague. See Schave, 186 F.3d at 843. United States v. Watts supports this conclusion. In Watts, we affirmed a conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm after the defendant No. 15‐1604 15 threw a forty‐four pound chair at a corrections officer. 798 F.3d 650, 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2015). We noted that although “[i]t would be better if the statute stated that ‘dangerous weapon’ includes objects used, though not designed to be used, as weapons … it is not a fatal infirmity.” Id. at 653. The same logic applies here. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering this condition. 5. Reporting Changes in Residence or Employment The district court required Armour to “notify Probation at least ten days prior to or as soon as you know about any changes in residence and any time you leave a job or accept a job.” Armour argues that the reporting requirement for any change in residence is vague and unnecessary, citing Kappes. However, Armour takes the Kappes holding out of context. In Kappes, this Court found that the condition that defendant notify his probation officer of any “change in … employ‐ ment” was overly vague because it failed to indicate “whether change in employment just means changing em‐ ployers or also includes changing from one position to an‐ other for the same employer at the same workplace.” 782 F.3d at 849. This can be distinguished from the reporting condition here, which makes clear that it applies when Ar‐ mour relocates to a new residence or leaves or accepts a job. Armour also argues that given that he is unemployed, there should be no condition pertaining to his employment, relying on our decision in United States v. Thompson. In Thompson, we held that it was inappropriate to impose a condition that the childless, single “defendant shall support his or her dependents” because the condition “assumes arbi‐ trarily and maybe inaccurately that should [defendant] ever acquire dependents he will have … the resources necessary 16 No. 15‐1604 to support [them].” 777 F.3d at 376. However, Armour’s case is distinguishable. While it is unwarranted to assume that a defendant will have the resources to support hypothetical future dependents, it is reasonable to think that if Armour accepts a job, he will be able to comply with this simple re‐ porting requirement. Unlike the defendant in Thompson, Armour is not required to take on responsibilities that he may not be able to fulfill; rather, he need only notify his pro‐ bation officer if he accepts a job. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing this condition. 6. Prohibition Against Knowingly Interacting with Felons The district court prohibited Armour from “meet[ing], communicat[ing], or otherwise interact[ing] with any person whom [he] know[s] to be a convicted felon … or to be en‐ gaged in or planning to engage in criminal activity unless [he is] granted permission to do so by the probation officer.” Armour argues that banning interactions with a convicted felon serves no valid purpose, but we disagree. The district court stated that the purpose of this condition is to limit Ar‐ mour’s exposure to triggers of negative behavior. Further, this condition includes a knowledge requirement, which dis‐ tinguishes it from the conditions found to be fatally vague in Kappes, 782 F.3d at 848–49 (defendant forbidden from “asso‐ ciat[ing] with any person convicted of a felony, unless grant‐ ed permission to do so by the probation officer”), and Thompson, 777 F.3d at 377 (same). Thus, this was not an abuse of discretion, especially given the district court’s dis‐ cussion of Armour’s “long history of abusing drugs and No. 15‐1604 17 breaking the law, and despite numerous incarcerations, con‐ tinued negative behavior.”3 7. Home Visits Between 6:00 AM and 11:00 PM Next, we turn to the condition that Armour “permit a probation officer to visit [him] at home or any other reason‐ able location between the hours of 6:00 AM and 11:00 PM, un‐ less investigating a violation or in case of emergency.” Ar‐ mour argues that unlike probationers and parolees, his Fourth Amendment rights are fully in place during super‐ vised release. He claims that allowing a probation officer to search his property without a valid warrant is an infringe‐ 3 Armour also argues that giving the probation officer the power to determine whether Armour has permission to associate with convicted felons violates the non‐delegation principle, citing United States v. Voelker, 489 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2007). Armour takes issue with the probation of‐ ficer’s authority to decide whether Armour can “work at a job where an‐ other felon is employed, attend a church where another felon worships, or shop at a store where a felon shops.” However, Voelker is distinguisha‐ ble from this case. In Voelker, the district court prohibited the defendant, who pled guilty to possessing child pornography, from associating with minors without the prior approval of the probation officer. Id. at 153. The Third Circuit found improper the “unbridled delegation of authority” that made the probation officer “the sole authority for deciding if [de‐ fendant] will ever have unsupervised contact with any minor, including his own children, for the rest of his life,” with “no guidance whatsoever for the exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 154. Delegating to a probation officer the authority to decide whether an offender will ever have unsu‐ pervised contact with his children again is more serious than delegating to a probation officer the authority to decide if Armour can interact with a convicted felon during his term of supervised release. Therefore, Ar‐ mour has not shown that the district court’s decision to impose this con‐ dition was an abuse of discretion. 18 No. 15‐1604 ment on his Fourth Amendment rights. Armour is incorrect. This Court has stated: Although it is true that persons on supervised release, like prisoners, do not relinquish all constitutional rights, those rights are not unfet‐ tered. A court may impose conditions of su‐ pervised release which implicate fundamental rights so long as those conditions are reasona‐ bly related to the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public from recidivism. United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2002) (cita‐ tions omitted). This condition is reasonably related to reha‐ bilitation and protecting the public from recidivism since it should allow probation officers to help Armour reintegrate into society after his time in prison and to ensure that he is abiding by the conditions of his supervised release. See John‐ son v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 709 (describing supervised release as “the decompression stage” between prison and full release and noting that defendants may need help achieving “successful reintegration”). Armour further argues that that the term “other reasona‐ ble location” is vague and may subject Armour to searches at a church, hospital, or funeral home. However, under most circumstances, those visits would be unreasonable and thus barred by the condition itself. Therefore, imposing this con‐ dition was not an abuse of discretion. 8. Notifications of Arrests or Law Enforcement Question‐ ing The district court also required Armour to “notify Proba‐ tion within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by law No. 15‐1604 19 enforcement.” Armour argues that this condition violates his Fifth Amendment rights. We disagree. In Kappes, the defend‐ ant made this same argument in contesting an identical con‐ dition of supervised release. 782 F.3d at 850. This Court said it did not see “how the mere fact of an arrest or law en‐ forcement contact is itself incriminating” and that “this con‐ dition assists the probation officer in monitoring the defend‐ ant’s conduct and compliance with the other conditions of release, most notably, the mandatory condition that the de‐ fendant commit no other criminal offenses.” Id. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition. 9. Prohibition on Controlled or Psychoactive Substances Finally, Armour’s supervised release includes the condi‐ tion that he “shall not purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or psychoactive sub‐ stance.” Armour is also required to, “at the direction of Pro‐ bation, participate in a program for substance abuse treat‐ ment [and] abide by the rules of the treatment provider.” Armour points out that the district court gave a lengthy oral explanation of the term “psychoactive” at the revocation hearing but that the explanation was not included in the written judgment. According to Armour, this is problematic because if a dispute were to arise about the condition, the parties are more likely to have access to the judgment than the sentencing transcript. However, sentencing judges are simply required to “orally pronounce all conditions, with the written judgment only clarifying the oral pronouncement in a manner that is not inconsistent with an unambiguous oral provision.” Kappes, 782 F.3d at 839; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) (“As used in this rule, ‘sentencing’ means the oral an‐ 20 No. 15‐1604 nouncement of the sentence.”); United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen the written sentence differs from the oral, the oral [sentence] takes precedence.”). Thus, if a dispute were to arise, there is no question that the oral explanation would control, and the district court did not abuse its discretion. Armour also argues that he should have been given a copy of the treatment provider’s rules prior to his resentenc‐ ing so that he would have had adequate notice and an op‐ portunity to object to them. We disagree. It would be more problematic to require a judge to provide these rules prior to sentencing, as it would be impractical to attempt to antici‐ pate developments in how substance abuse is treated and to predict the type and success of the treatment the defendant receives while in prison. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 374 (not‐ ing that “because conditions of supervised release, though imposed at sentencing, do not become operational until the defendant is released, the judge has to guess at the time of sentencing what conditions are likely to make sense in what may be the distant future”). Armour also finds it problematic that the probation office can determine how long he will be subject to drug treatment and testing, arguing that this violates the non‐delegation principle. Armour cites United States v. Voelker, which is dis‐ tinguishable. In Voelker, the court provided “no guidance whatsoever” for the probation office’s exercise of discretion. 489 F.3d 139, 154 (3d Cir. 2007). By contrast, the district court in this case noted at the revocation hearing that Armour would only be subject to drug treatment and testing until it would “no longer assist [him] to avoid committing further No. 15‐1604 21 crimes.” Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its dis‐ cretion in ordering this condition.