Opinion ID: 2360649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Insufficient Evidence of Aggravator

Text: The sole aggravating circumstance submitted to the jury in the 1999 resentencing was that the murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(8)(A) (Repl.1997). To establish this aggravator, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following: (B)(i) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially cruel manner when, as part of a course of conduct intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture is inflicted. (a) Mental anguish is defined as the victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate. (b) Serious physical abuse is defined as physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. (c) Torture is defined as the infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's death. (C) For purposes of this subdivision (8), a capital murder is committed in an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder[.] Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(8)(B)(i) and (C) (Repl.1997). Greene contends that the record is devoid of any evidence that Burnett actually endured mental anguish, abuse or torture. He claims that the only evidence of such factors is the deposition testimony of Dr. Malak that appellant argues should not have been admitted. But even considering Dr. Malak's testimony, he urges that it is equally plausible that Burnett was immediately rendered unconscious by a blow to the back of the head and was never subject to mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture. Furthermore, Greene argues that there was no evidence of Greene's state of mind to prove that the murder was committed in an especially depraved manner. The State's first rebuttal to this point is that this issue was decided in Greene I and that law of the case applies. See Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d 680 (1999). However, the issue in Greene I was whether the especially cruel or depraved instruction was properly presented to the jury. If there is evidence of the aggravator, however slight, the matter should be submitted to the jury. Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3, cert. denied 459 U.S. 1022, 103 S.Ct. 389, 74 L.Ed.2d 519 (1982). In this appeal, the issue raised by Greene is whether there is substantial evidence that the State proved the aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. See Willett v. State, 335 Ark. 427, 983 S.W.2d 409 (1998); see also Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-603 (Repl.1997). The burden of proof required for an instruction and for sufficient proof of the aggravator is altogether different. We will not apply the doctrine of law of the case for a determination of this issue. Nevertheless, we agree with the State that Dr. Malak's testimony substantially proves a depraved intent on the part of Greene. We further agree that intent must usually be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the killing. See Willett v. State, supra ; Russey v. State, 322 Ark. 786, 912 S.W.2d 420 (1995). Dr. Malak testified that Burnett was alive when his hands and feet were tied, when he was kicked and stabbed, when he was shot in the chest, and when his face was cut from mouth to ear. This easily qualifies as substantial evidence of the aggravating circumstance. See Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000); see also McGehee v. State, 338 Ark. 152, 992 S.W.2d 110 (1999). We affirm the trial court on this point.