Opinion ID: 2056377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Allegations Of Postconviction Court Error

Text: The sources of error identified by Thompson are (1) the DNA evidence contradicted the State's theory of the case; (2) the burglary, the rape, and the murder are intertwined and equally affected by the DNA evidence; and (3) the postconviction court erred by failing to consider whether the jury would have evaluated the confession differently if presented with the DNA evidence. He asks us to reverse the postconviction court, and although he does not say explicitly, implies that he seeks a remand with instructions to consider whether there is a substantial possibility that the jury would arrive at a different verdict if it heard the DNA evidence. The State counters that (1) Thompson confessed in open court to having participated in the burglary which resulted in Williar's death; (2) the hair found on Williar's body was matched to Thompson; and (3) [w]hile it is true the State did acknowledge the possibility of one or more jurors determining that Thompson was the actual rapist, ... its theory of the case was fundamentally based upon Thompson's role as an accessory  as, indeed, Thompson admitted to being. It concludes that evidence establishing that he was not the principal rapist does not give rise to a reasonable possibility that the finder of fact would nonetheless have acquitted him. Although the State makes these arguments as if asking us to decide that, even under the correct standard, the postconviction court could not reasonably conclude that Thompson was entitled to a new trial, the State's ultimate request for relief (assuming we have jurisdiction) is a remand for further consideration under the appropriate standard. While this is the relief that we will grant, we need to address some of Thompson's arguments about how the postconviction court should have treated the DNA evidence, in order to give that court guidance on remand. See Md. Rule 8-131(a) (Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.) This is the first time this Court has reviewed the denial of a new trial based on DNA evidence pursuant to CP Section 8-201. Our CP Section 8-201 postconviction DNA cases up to this point have simply challenged a Circuit Court's refusal to order DNA testing at all. See, e.g., Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 976 A.2d 1012 (2009); Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 976 A.2d 999 (2009); Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 909 A.2d 1035 (2006); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006). Therefore we turn to decisions by our sister jurisdictions that have developed modern DNA postconviction jurisprudence.