Opinion ID: 2374230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of motion to dismiss without prejudice

Text: [¶ 8] The first issue raised in this case arose because the investigating police officers called Graham on October 1, 2009, and asked her to come to their offices at the Evanston Police Department to talk about the events of June 29, 2009. One purpose of that interview was to ask her to become a confidential informant for the Evanston Police Department. She declined to do that. She spoke with the officers at length and incriminated herself, to a limited extent, with respect to the incident on June 29, 2009. Those discussions were also recorded. [¶ 9] At a pretrial conference held on March 24, 2010, the prosecutor broached the subject of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence which could potentially have an impact on Graham's defense. That evidence was on the tape recorded interview that took place on October 1, 2009. The district court was very concerned about the content of the tape recorded discussions Graham had with the police and decided that the prosecution could not use the tape. Instead, if the prosecution wanted to make use of the general tenor of the discussions had on October 1, 2009, then that would have to be done with questions posed to the police officers, and answered by them, but carefully avoiding placing any Rule 404(b) evidence, or other objectionable evidence, before the jury. In response, the prosecutor made a motion to dismiss the charges against Graham without prejudice. The district court refused to grant the motion. The prosecutor did not argue to the district court that it was usurping the prosecutor's prerogatives and violating the principles of separation of powers. Defense counsel did not object to the motion to dismiss made by the prosecutor. [¶ 10] Graham contends that the district court's refusal to grant that motion to dismiss without prejudice was an abuse of discretion that violated the separation of powers doctrine. We are not persuaded that Graham can use the district court's refusal to grant the prosecution's motion to dismiss as a sword in these circumstances. Graham did not object to the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss. That is, Graham cannot construct an injury to her defense strategy based upon the district court's insistence that the case proceed to trial in accordance with the planned schedule for that trial and in a manner that protected her rights vis-a-vis W.R.E. 404(b) evidence. In 3B Charles Alan Wright, Nancy J. King, and Susan R. Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 3d § 812, at 323-32 (2004 and Supp.2010), we found this very instructive authority: At common law the prosecutor could enter a nolle prosequi without approval of the court. This was the rule recommended to the Supreme Court by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, but the Court itself, on promulgating the rules, added the requirement in Rule 48(a) that only by leave of court could the prosecution file a dismissal. The reason for this action by the Court is unclear. It has been read as an expression by the Court of a belief that entry of a nolle prosequi should be a permissive right only, and as intended to prevent harassment of a defendant by charging, and then dismissing without placing a defendant in jeopardy. It is difficult indeed to see any real or substantial change or benefit achieved by Rule 48(a). The court is powerless to compel a prosecutor to proceed in a case that he believes does not warrant prosecution. If the court refuses consent to dismiss, the prosecutor in his opening statement to the jury and in his presentation of evidence can indicate to the jury the considerations that should work an acquittal. Nevertheless the requirement of leave is in the rule, and each judge is left to struggle with its uncertainties as best he can. Since the court must exercise a sound judicial discretion in considering a request for dismissal, it must have factual information supporting the recommendation. Leave will be granted if the government is without sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction or if dismissal is sought for some other bona fide reason that does not involve harassment of the defendant. Courts have expressed willingness to deny a prosecutor's motion if it was clearly contrary to manifest public interest, although some courts would require, in addition, a showing of bad faith. [¶ 11] Given the circumstances that exist here, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss without prejudice, that Graham was not injured in any way by the district court's ruling and, further, that the district court's action did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.