Opinion ID: 620190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prohibition from Possessing Sexually Explicit Materials

Text: Anderson also contends that the district court plainly erred by prohibiting him from possessing materials depicting or describing sexually explicit conduct. Anderson argues that this condition was not based on an individualized determination but rather on his status as a sex offender. In Bender, we disapproved a special condition prohibiting the defendant convicted of a sex crime from possessing sexually stimulating materials based on the district court's abstract belief that sex offenders `need to have a very tight rein' and have `[no] business reading a Playboy magazine.' United States v. Kelly, 625 F.3d 516, 520 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting Bender, 566 F.3d at 752). Similarly, in Kelly, we vacated a special condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing pornography because the district court failed to make an individualized determination that the prohibition was warranted; instead, the district court simply `follow[ed] the special conditions of supervised release set out in the sentencing recommendation,' which also provided no justification for the condition. Id. Like the district courts in Bender and Kelly, the district court in this case failed to explain its reasoning for the special condition prohibiting Anderson from possessing sexually explicit materials. Although the sentencing recommendation sets forth the condition, it too fails to provide a justification for it. See Curry, 627 F.3d at 315 (finding the district court erred by prohibiting the defendant, who failed to register as a sex offender, from possessing pornography without explanation). Nonetheless, Anderson is not entitled to relief under plain-error review. The district court should have articulated its reasoning, but we conclude, on this record, that its oversight does not require reversal. First, Anderson fails to show how the error affected his substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (noting that the error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings). There is substantial evidence in the record from which the district court could have determined that the ban on pornography was appropriate in this case. Although this was Anderson's first offense for sexually predatory behavior, the record indicates that Anderson had been engaged in such conduct since at least 2006. During that time, Anderson routinely solicited adolescent girls as young as 13, most of whom lived locally. On a number of occasions, Anderson sent inappropriate images to the girls via text messaging or Facebook and asked for pictures of the girls in return. Given Anderson's history of predatory behavior and his need for sex offender treatment, there is little likelihood that the district court upon further consideration would remove the prohibition against possessing sexually explicit material. See United States v. Demers, 634 F.3d 982, 985 (8th Cir.2011) (finding that, even if the district court plainly erred when it imposed a condition prohibiting the defendant from possessing pornography, the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights since [the defendant's] offense and history. . . ma[d]e it unlikely that he could carry his burden of showing that the condition would not have been imposed in any event). Second, [e]ven assuming [Anderson] could show the error affected his substantial rights, we retain `the discretion to remedy the errordiscretion which ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Poitra, 648 F.3d at 889 (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009)) (quotation and citation omitted). This final prong of plain-error review is formidable and requires a showing of more than simple prejudice. Id. [W]hether an alleged error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings depends upon the nature and context of the error as well as the facts of the particular case. Id. at 890. In this case, the condition prohibiting Anderson from possessing sexually explicit material was imposed following a thorough discussion of the egregiousness of Anderson's offense. The district court explained that Anderson engaged in a pattern of grooming and soliciting others, engaged in a pattern of sending pornographic images to children, and showed no remorse until he was caught, showed no regret, showed no moral compunction at all. The district court also noted that [t]his is a picture of a man who is capable of repeating the conduct. See id. at 891-92 (finding that the defendant's risk of committing future sexual offenses supported the imposition of the special condition against possessing pornography and made the case distinguishable from prior decisions in which the district court's error affected the fairness, integrity, or reputation of the judicial proceedings). [4] Thus, prohibiting Anderson from possessing sexually explicit material is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of [Anderson's] offense and the goal of protect[ing] the public from further crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(C); see also Poitra, 648 F.3d at 891 ([P]reventing a defendantwho has a demonstrated sexual interest in childrenfrom possessing all sexually explicit material is reasonably related to preventing the defendant from committing sexual offenses in the future.). The defendant bears the burden of persuading us to exercise our discretion in this case, see Poitra, 648 F.3d at 889, and he has not done so.