Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substitution of judge; jury's malice question.

Text: Judge Cianchetti, who had presided throughout the trial, apparently became ill on Thursday, August 28, 1980, the day jury deliberations were to begin. Judge Miller was selected as a temporary replacement and presided during that day. Judge Miller read the concluding instructions prepared by Judge Cianchetti and submitted the case to the jury. He also dealt with a subsequent jury request to elaborate upon the malice instructions that previously had been read and provided. Neither defendant nor his counsel objected on the record to the temporary substitution. Judge Cianchetti returned on the next court day, Tuesday, September 2, before deliberations were completed. (7) Defendant first asserts that it was improper to substitute another trial judge without first obtaining defendant's affirmative consent. However, section 1053 provides that another judge of the court where the trial is proceeding may proceed with and finish the trial in the event of the original trial judge's death, illness, or inability to proceed. The section does not require the consent of the defendant or his counsel. The cases cited by defendant (e.g., People v. Henderson (1865) 28 Cal. 465, 473; People v. Stuller (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 582, 590-591 [89 Cal. Rptr. 158, 41 A.L.R.3d 712]) hold only that consent waives any objection; they do not purport to require consent. Defendant claims the substitution violated his due-process right (U.S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 15) to a judge who was expressly familiar with the proceedings. Absent his consent, he urges, he was also denied his jury-trial right (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 3, & Amends. VI, XIV; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16) to the same judge and jury throughout the trial. Some authorities provide abstract support for these assertions. (See, e.g., Randel v. Beto (5th Cir.1965) 354 F.2d 496, 500, & fn. 5; Freeman v. United States (2d Cir.1915) 227 Fed. 732, 759; State v. Davis (Mo. 1978) 564 S.W.2d 876, 878; 2 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Crim.2d (1982) § 392, pp. 402-403; cf. Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 25(a), 18 U.S.C.) However, when the original judge becomes unavailable during trial, prudent substitution may have no actual effect on fairness and is often manifestly preferable to a mistrial. For this reason, both California and federal courts have long possessed express substitution authority. (§ 1053; Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 25, 18 U.S.C., both supra. ) As might be expected under the circumstances, many modern decisions reject the notion that reversal is always required when a midtrial substitution occurs without the defendant's affirmative consent. These cases confirm that a well-justified change of judges, even if technically erroneous, is no basis for reversal if the accused failed to object and no substantial prejudice resulted. (E.g., United States v. LaSorsa (2d Cir.1973) 480 F.2d 522, 530-531; State v. Amarillas (1984) 141 Ariz. 620 [688 P.2d 628, 630]; State v. McKinley (1982) 7 Ohio App.3d 255 [455 N.E.2d 503, 507]; Peterson v. State (1969) 203 Kan. 959 [457 P.2d 6, 11]; see United States v. Lane (9th Cir.1983) 708 F.2d 1394, 1396-1398 [Fed. Rules Crim.Proc.]; United States v. Santos (9th Cir.1979) 588 F.2d 1300, 1303-1304 [same].) Here we see no unfairness and no substantial infringement on the right to jury trial. [7] Judge Cianchetti's absence was for good cause, and Judge Miller presided only for one court day. Judge Miller's tenure comprised a period of jury deliberations and, with one exception, his judicial acts were essentially ministerial. Judge Cianchetti resumed his duties before deliberations were completed. (8) Defendant claims the substitution caused substantial prejudice because Judge Miller mishandled the jury's request to clarify the malice instructions. We disagree. Judge Cianchetti had given the standard malice, murder, and manslaughter instructions. (See CALJIC Nos. 8.11, 8.20, 8.30, 8.37, 8.40, 8.50.) The jury was provided a written copy of the instructions. During the first day's deliberations, the jury asked Judge Miller to clarify the legal definition of malice. Judge Miller explained that he doubted he could improve on the standard definition contained in the instructions previously read and furnished. He urged the jurors to reread the instructional definition (CALJIC No. 8.11) in the context of the preceding and subsequent instructions regarding the definitions and degrees of murder. The jury foreman replied, Thank you, your Honor. I think that clarifies it. Neither Judge Miller, nor Judge Cianchetti upon his return, received any further inquiry on the malice issue, though Judge Miller had asked the foreman if he had any specific questions on the matter. Defense counsel neither objected to Judge Miller's actions nor offered his own clarifying instructions. Defendant urges that Judge Miller's refusal to give additional malice instructions violated section 1138, which requires the court to provide the jury any desired information on any point of law arising in the case. As defendant observes, the statute imposes a mandatory duty to clear up any instructional confusion expressed by the jury. (See People v. Gavin (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 408, 418 [98 Cal. Rptr. 518]; People v. Malone (1959) 173 Cal. App.2d 234, 244 [343 P.2d 333].) However, Judge Miller obviously did resolve the jury's questions by advising them to reread the malice and homicide instructions in context. Where, as here, the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information. (See People v. Rigney (1961) 55 Cal.2d 236, 246 [10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23, 98 A.L.R.2d 186].) Judge Miller fulfilled that duty, and no error or prejudice appears.