Opinion ID: 159787
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the speech in question involves a matter of public concern.

Text: 15 2. If so, we must weigh the employee's interest in the expression against the government employer's interest in regulating the speech of its employees so that it can carry on an efficient and effective workplace. 16 3. Employee must show the speech was a substantial factor driving the challenged governmental action. 17 4. If so, can the employer show that it would have taken the same employment action against the employee even in the absence of the protected speech. 18 Id. at 1257. The first two questions are ones of law for the court, while the latter two questions are ones of fact for the jury. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1257; Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1271. 19 An initial question presented by this case is whether, and/or how, a Pickering/Connick analysis applies to an employee like Ms. Barker who is also a policymaker or political affiliation employee to whom the Elrod/Branti line of cases applies. The City appears to argue that a political affiliation employee can always be terminated, regardless of whether she would otherwise be entitled to the protections of the Pickering/Connick balancing test for any particular exercise of free speech. The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected the City's position. See O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719 (1996) (noting that there will be cases where specific instances of the employee's speech or expression, which require balancing in the Pickering context, are intermixed with a political affiliation requirement. In those cases, the balancing Pickering mandates will be inevitable.). Our circuit has similarly implicitly endorsed the idea that the two different analyses remain distinct and separate. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1251 (noting that we address separately a political association claim and a free speech claim raised by the same employee). 20 We agree with the Seventh Circuit that, [a]lthough an employee's status as a policymaker bears considerable attention when weighing the interests of the government, the policymaking employee exception does not apply and courts must apply Pickering balancing when the speech at issue does not implicate the employee's politics or substantive policy viewpoints. Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969, 979 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Cohen, 165 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir.) (Although it is true that, consistent with the First Amendment, a policymaking employee may be discharged on the basis of political affiliation such as membership (or lack of membership) in a particular political party, that same employee may not be discharged on the basis of specific speech on matters of public concern unless the Pickering balancing test favors the government employer.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 70 (1999); but see, Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1997) (Because we hold that [plaintiff's] position . . . was a policymaking one, we do not address [plaintiff's] claim that under the Pickering balancing test his interest in free speech outweighs the [employer's] interest in running an efficient office.). 21 Accordingly, in this case, a Pickering/Connick analysis could appropriately be applied to Ms. Barker's speech on a matter of public concern unrelated to her politics or substantive policy positions, even though she is also a policymaking employee to whom the Elrod/Branti line of cases applies. We turn, therefore, to whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City on Ms. Barker's free speech claim. 22 The City concedes that Ms. Barker's speech about claimed violations of the Open Meeting Act by members of the City Council is a matter of public concern. The next step of the Pickering/Connick test requires Ms. Barker to show that [her] 'interest in the expression outweighs the government employer's interest in regulating it.' Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1272-73). However, the employer must also articulate its proffered interest in regulating the speech in question. We will defer to a public employer's reasonable predictions of disruption, but those predictions must be supported by the presentation of specific evidence. The [employer] cannot satisfy its burden by making purely speculative allegations. Cragg v. City of Osawatomie, 143 F.3d 1343, 1347 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). 23 Here, the City has never articulated any particular interests it had in limiting or punishing Ms. Barker's speech, nor has it articulated how that speech actually, or even potentially, disrupted its governmental functions. 2 The Pickering balancing test requires a 'fact-sensitive' weighing of the government's interests. Anderson v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723, 729 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677 (1996)). While the district court concluded that the efficient operation of city business undoubtedly suffered while [the mayor and City Council members] were distracted with such matters as suits against the city clerk and a second election campaign to retain their seats, Order at 10, Appellant's App. Vol. II at 781, no actual evidence indicates that the City experienced any disruption, that any such disruption was reasonably predicted, or that the City itself had any particular interest in limiting Ms. Barker's speech. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City. See Andersen, 100 F.3d at 729. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to the City on Ms. Barker's free speech claim.