Opinion ID: 205765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: License Requirement for Firms

Text: Appellants next argue that Florida's license requirement is unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause because it has a discriminatory effect on out-of-state interior design firms. Florida's statute requires that, for firms practicing interior design in commercial settings in Florida, [o]ne or more of the principal officers of the corporation or one or more partners of the partnership, and all personnel of [the entity] who act in its behalf in [Florida] as interior designers are registered under the Florida licensing regime. Fla. Stat. § 481.219(7)(b). Registered interior designers are those who are licensed. See Fla. Stat. § 481.203(9). The factors we apply to determine whether a neutrally-worded state statute has a discriminatory impact on out-of-state residents lead us to conclude that the license requirement, as applied to design firms, is constitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause. Our analysis of the license requirement for firms parallels our analysis of the requirement for individual designers but differs in one respect. We acknowledge that requiring firms to appoint principal officers who are licensed in Florida may impose a greater burden on interstate commerce than merely requiring individuals practicing in Florida to obtain a license. We conclude, however, that because this burden is one shared by Florida and out-of-state firms alike, the burden is not clearly excessive in relation to the requirement's local benefit. The license requirement for firms does not exclude a class of predominately out-of-state firms from practicing interior design in Florida. Any cost imposed on out-of-state firms as a result of the license requirement is also imposed on in-state firms doing business in Florida's commercial design market. Moreover, the license requirement does not apply to out-of-state firms doing business in Florida's residential settings. See Fla. Stat. § 481.229(6)(a). Thus, similar to the license requirement for individuals, the requirement merely restricts but does not bar entry into Florida's commercial interior design market. We also do not agree with Appellants' argument that the legislature was motivated by protectionist purposes in passing the license requirement for firms, because the safety justification underlying the requirement is no less compelling when applied to firms. We therefore conclude that the license requirement for firms is also constitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Appellants next argue that Florida's license requirement violates their substantive due process right to earn a living in the profession of their choice. They also argue that the license requirement violates their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it discriminates against out-of-state interior designers. Rational basis review applies to Due Process and Equal Protection Clause challenges to state professional regulations, because the right to practice a particular profession is not a fundamental one. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); see also Kirkpatrick, 70 F.3d at 103. On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute . . . bear[s] a strong presumption of validity. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314-15, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-02, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). A statute is constitutional if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for [it]. Id. at 313, 113 S.Ct. at 2101. The party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving that the statute lacks a rational basis. See Bah v. City of Atlanta, 103 F.3d 964, 967 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 314-15, 113 S.Ct. at 2101-02). Appellees have failed to prove that Florida's license requirement lacks a rational basis. States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and . . . they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2016, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). The Florida legislature enacted the license requirement to protect public safety by ensuring that interior designers are trained to comply with fire and building codes. See Fla. Stat. § 481.201 (describing purpose of interior design license requirement as promoting the interest of the public); see also Senate Report, at 1-2. We reject Appellants' argument that the legislature's safety concern does not provide a rational basis for the license requirement because it was unfounded. A law may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. at 315, 113 S.Ct. at 2102. A statute survives rational basis review even if it seems unwise . . . or if the rationale for it seems tenuous. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). Thus, the fact that, after Florida passed its license requirement, other states have considered and rejected the notion that the unlicensed practice of interior design poses safety concerns, is of no consequence. Further, this Court has recognized that: under rational basis review, a state has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification. Rather, a statute is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the one attacking the law to negate every conceivable basis that might support it, even if that basis has no foundation in the record. Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d 1223, 1230 (11th Cir.2010) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, contrary to Appellants' argument, Florida and Appellees had no burden to produce evidence of the safety benefits that follow from allowing only licensed interior designers to design in commercial settings. Moreover, Appellants did not negate every conceivable basis that might support Florida's license requirement. They have failed to carry their burden and prove that the license requirement does not lead to any improvement in the safety of interior design or compliance with building and fire codes. Nor do the exceptions to Florida's license requirement pose constitutional problems under rational basis review. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 489, 75 S.Ct. at 465. Thus, the fact that Florida's legislature exempts, under certain circumstances, retail establishments and manufacturers of commercial food service equipment from the licensing requirement does not invalidate the statute, even if it seems unwise or illogical in light of the safety concerns behind the statute. Under rational basis review, a court must accept a legislature's generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends. Deen, 597 F.3d at 1230-31 (quotation marks omitted).