Opinion ID: 840381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MCL 771.3(6)(a) Requirements

Text: The sentencing court ordered defendant to pay the cost of his court-appointed attorney as a condition of probation under MCL 771.3(2). [1] MCL 771.3(6)(a) discusses a sentencing court's obligation to consider the defendant's ability to pay these fees: If the court imposes costs under subsection (2) as part of a sentence of probation, all of the following apply: (a) The court shall not require a probationer to pay costs under subsection (2) unless the probationer is or will be able to pay them during the term of probation. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs under subsection (2), the court shall take into account the probationer's financial resources and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose, with due regard to his or her other obligations. In Music, this Court unanimously held that MCL 771.3(6)(a) [2] does not require that a sentencing judge inquire, before ordering that a defendant pay costs, as to the defendant's ability to pay the costs. Music, supra at 357, 408 N.W.2d 795. This Court agreed with the Court of Appeals holding that the statute does not require that the sentencing court hold a hearing or make findings on the record to determine whether a defendant, who has not asserted an inability to pay costs, is able to make such payment. Id. at 359, 408 N.W.2d 795. This Court also accepted the explanation by the Court of Appeals that the statute distinguishes between the imposition of costs and the sanctioning for the nonpayment of costs; a court may impose costs without considering the defendant's ability to pay, but may not enforce payment of those costs without determining whether the defendant is able to pay. Id. at 360, 408 N.W.2d 795. This Court concluded as follows: [MCL 771.3(6)(a) does not expressly state that a trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether a defendant has the ability to pay costs. In the absence of a clear statement from the Legislature, the statute is to be given a reasonable interpretation. A probationer is free to ask the sentencing judge to reduce the amount of restitution or costs, and it is clear that a probationer cannot be punished for failure to pay restitution or costs that the probationer cannot afford. Moreover, a defendant who timely asserts an inability to pay restitution or costs must be heard. In that situation, a sentencing judge shall determine whether the restitution or costs are within the defendant's meads. [ Music, supra at 361-362, 408 N.W.2d 795.] Subsequently, in People v. Hill, 430 Mich. 898, 425 N.W.2d 95 (1988), this Court, citing Music, supra, explained, Unless a defendant indicates an inability to pay, the sentencing judge need not inquire into the defendant's ability to pay prior to imposing costs and restitution as conditions of probation. Hill, supra at 899, 425 N.W.2d 95. Here, the sentencing court imposed attorney fees as a condition of defendant's probation, as permitted by MCL 771.3(2). Defendant had notice of the fees and an opportunity to object, but did not do so. The petition and order appointing counsel stated, I understand that I may be ordered to contribute and/or reimburse the court for all or part of my attorney and defense costs. [3] In Dunbar, supra at 254, 690 N.W.2d 476 the defendant's petition and order appointing counsel similarly stated that, he may be ordered to repay the court for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Dunbar panel held that this petition and order sufficiently notified the defendant of the court's decision to order the payment of attorney fees. Id. The petition and order in the instant case, which is virtually identical to the, one at issue in Dunbar, similarly, notified defendant about his responsibility to pay the attorney fees. Defendant also had an opportunity to object. The Dunbar panel held that the defendant, who was given notice of the fees by the petition and order appointing counsel, was given the opportunity to object at sentencing. Id. at 254, 690 N.W.2d 476. In regard to defendant's opportunity to be heard, defendant was not prevented from objecting at sentencing and asserting his indigency. Id. Similarly in the instant case, defendant, who had prior notice of the fees through the petition and order appointing counsel, had an opportunity to object at sentencing. Further, on the day of the sentencing hearing, defendant signed the probation order in which he agreed to pay $730 in attorney fees. He could have objected to the fees at any time on the record; he also signed the order without any protest. Thus, defendant had notice of the fees and a meaningful opportunity `to object to those fees. Under Music, the sentencing court did not violate MCL 771.3(6)(a) by imposing attorney fees without holding a hearing or stating on the 9record that it considered defendant's financial resources. The sentencing court was, required to consider defendant's financial resources only if he timely asserted an inability to pay. Because defendant had notice of the fees but did not timely object and assert an inability to pay, MCL 771.3(6)(a) did not require the sentencing court, before ordering defendant to pay the cost of his court-appointed attorney, to make a finding on the record that he was able to make such a payment. Music, supra at 357, 359-362, 408 N.W.2d 795. [4]