Opinion ID: 168138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of W essel I.

Text: -7- The union defendants’ first argument is that Wessel I did not foreclose the possibility that the entire fair share fee was chargeable to the non-member employees. W e disagree. Our previous decision considered “w hether the fees collected in this case violated the . . . constitutional standard on extra-unit expenses” as articulated in Lehnert v. Ferril Faculty Assoc., 500 U.S. 507 (1991). Wessel I, 299 F.3d at 1196. In Lehnert, the Supreme Court notes “[t]here must be some indication that the payment is for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.” 500 U.S. at 524. Applying and quoting Lehnert, we held “extraunit expenses [are] not chargeable if they [are] ‘unrelated to an objecting employee’s unit.’” Wessel I, 299 F.3d at 1196. After reviewing the record, we found “some evidence in the record that a portion of the fees collected went to the national Union to ‘[serve] as exclusive representative in other bargaining units.’” Id. Rejecting the union defendants’ argument that the entire fee was constitutional, we held: Such fees would not inure to the benefit of the mem bers of the local organization and their collection violates the principles expressed in Lehnert. W e disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the U nion did not exceed the constitutional limitations on the types of expenses properly included in a fair share fee. Id. Consequently, we remanded the case to the district court “to hold a hearing to determine which fees are attributable to bargaining-related expenses in [Local -8- 624] as distinguished from those which do not inure to the benefit of the local bargaining unit.” Id. W e agree with the district court that Wessel I explicitly resolved the question of the chargeability of the entire fair share fee for sums collected for use by AFSC M E as exclusive bargaining representative for other local unions. The panel’s opinion in Wessel I was unambiguous. W e stated that collection of fees for this purpose “violates the principles expressed in Lehnert,” 299 F.3d at 1196, and remanded for necessary fact-finding on the amount of the overcharge. Accordingly, the district court did not err in its understanding of the scope of Wessel I.