Opinion ID: 166006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 41 We must first consider whether the OCCA adjudicated Mr. Harris's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim in its state-law evidentiary ruling. Because he filed his § 2254 habeas corpus petition after the effective date of AEDPA, its provisions apply to this appeal. See Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir.1999). If the state court did not decide Mr. Harris's federal claim on the merits, and the claim is not otherwise procedurally barred, we address the claim de novo and AEDPA deference does not apply. If the OCCA adjudicated Mr. Harris's federal claim on the merits, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief if the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Mr. Harris does not contend that the OCCA's decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). We, like the district court, therefore focus our analysis under § 2254(d)(1). 42 In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the Supreme Court set forth the proper application of the AEDPA standard: 43 Under the contrary to clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies this principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. 44 We may not grant habeas relief under the unreasonable application clause if we conclude independently that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th Cir.2003) (An unreasonable application of federal law denotes some greater degree of deviation from the proper application than a merely incorrect or erroneous application.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 45 Our case law has perhaps been less than clear about how we determine whether a state court adjudicated a federal constitutional claim on the merits. The Supreme Court's Early decision provided: 46 A state court decision is contrary to our clearly established precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent. Avoiding these pitfalls does not require citation of our cases — indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them. 47 Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 48 In Cook, we interpreted Early broadly to apply the AEDPA standard to a claim which the State court disposed of without citing controlling Supreme Court precedent. 323 F.3d at 831. Although the Kansas Supreme Court cited no federal precedent, we concluded that AEDPA deference under the unreasonable application clause of § 2254(d)(1) should apply. Id. at 830-31. Where there is no indication suggesting that the state court did not reach the merits of a claim, we have held that a state court reaches a decision `on the merits' even when it fails either to mention the federal basis for the claim or cite any state or federal law in support of its conclusion. Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir.2004) (citing Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.1999)); see also Wansing v. Hargett, 341 F.3d 1207, 1211-12 (10th Cir.2003) (concluding that we may find an implicit judgment on the federal issue in the state-court decision). But cf. Ellis v. Mullin, 326 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir.2002) (reviewing a federal due process claim de novo because the OCCA upheld the exclusion of a pre-trial report under state law without any reference to appellant's federal constitutional claim). 49 To determine the appropriate standard of review under AEDPA, we have also examined whether the state court's standard is at least as favorable to the petitioner as the federal standard. In Romano v. Gibson, this court applied AEDPA deference to a state-court decision after determining that the state-law standard for sufficiency of the evidence was more onerous than the federal standard. 239 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir.2001). [I]f the evidence was sufficient to meet [the state's] stricter test, it would certainly also meet the [federal] standard. Id.; see also Upchurch v. Bruce, 333 F.3d 1158, 1164 n. 4 (10th Cir.2003) (concluding that a state court adjudicated a federal claim on the merits because the state standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel mirrors the federal standard). Thus, if the OCCA rejected Mr. Harris's claim under a standard that is equally or more favorable to him relative to the federal standard, the state court's decision constitutes an adjudication of the federal claim despite citing no federal decisions. Obviously, in such a case, neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision would contradict federal law. Early, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S.Ct. 362. 50 Here, the OCCA undertook a detailed analysis under state law and concluded that the videos in question met the state court's newly devised, multi-factor test for trial introduction. Harris, 13 P.3d at 495. When the OCCA rejected Mr. Harris's state evidentiary claim under his first proposition, it also implicitly rejected any federal due process challenge. We agree with the district court that the OCCA's extended treatment of the videos' admission is an adjudication on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), despite no citation to Supreme Court precedent. 1 Aplt's App. at 70. We also agree with the district court that the OCCA standard for trial reenactments is at least as favorable to Mr. Harris as the federal standard for a due process violation. The district court easily concluded that the OCCA's multi-factor test and limiting instruction take[ ] into account the bedrock principles which would inform any application of the Chambers fundamental fairness standard. Id. at 74. 51 Therefore, the OCCA decision is an adjudication on the merits of Mr. Harris's federal constitutional claim, and we apply AEDPA deference.