Opinion ID: 197341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relative to Indian lands

Text: The final prong of the S 81 analysis, whether the Settlement Agreements were relative to [Indian] lands, presents a more difficult question. The first Settlement Agreement is not relative to Indian lands because it neither pertained nor referred to any land whatsoever. The second Settlement Agreement, however, both involved and referred to land that an Indian tribe owned. Specifically, the second Settlement Agreement provided for the disposition of the Holden Lot. At first glance, S 81 may appear to apply to the Holden Lot because PIN, an Indian tribe, owned this parcel of land. -16- 16 We believe, however, that the meaning of S 81's language, the intentions of its drafters, the Interior Secretary' of S 81, the case law from o-determinatio e statute does not apply to the Holden s interpretation n support a holding that th Lot. Although we have uncovered no precedent that explicitly considers whether or not S 81 applies to land that an Indian tribe purchased in fee simple for investment purposes, in doing so now we give voice to an assumption underlying virtually every decision addressing the applicability of S 81 to service agreements with Indian tribes relative to their lands. We base our conclusion primarily on the distinctions between Indian trust or tribal lands (hereinafter Indian trust lands)10 and lands that Indian tribes hold in fee simple (hereinafter Indian fee lands). The phrase Indian trust lands derives from the historic trust relationship existing between Indian tribes and the federal government, originally described as resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian. Worcester v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see also Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247 10. We use the terms Indian trust lands and Indian tribal lands interchangeably because we have not located any authority that draws a distinction between these terms that is material for our purposes. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 772 (1990); Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 35-36, 476 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982); Reid P. Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty:Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1061, 1061 (1974) (referring to Indian lands delineated restricted in 25 U.S.C. S 415 as Indian trust land). -17- 17 (1985); United States v. Sam Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 447 (1914); Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975). Indian trust lands constitute real property the title to which the United States holds in trust for an Indian tribe. See 25 U.S.C. S 465; Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 476 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Cohen's Handbook]. Fee simple lands, by contrast, are those lands in which the owner is entitled to the entire property, with unconditional power of disposition. Black's Law Dictionary 615 (6th ed. 1990). Federal law recognizes that Indian tribes may hold certain lands in fee simple and that these lands may not be subject to the trust relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. S 1466. Specifically, and pertinent to these appeals, the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. SS 1721-1735, indicates that the Holden Lot constitutes Indian fee land over which the federal government does not have a trust responsibility because the Lot does not lie within designated PIN Territory. In fact, Congress expressly disavowed trust responsibility for Indian real property encompassing the area in which the Holden Lot is situated. 11 Accordingly, we find that PIN held the Holden Lot 11. 25 U.S.C. S 1724(d)(3) provides: Land or natural resources acquired outside the boundaries of [Penobscot Indian Territory] . . . shall be held in fee by the respective tribe or nation, and the United States shall have no further trust responsibility with respect thereto. 25 -18- 18 in fee simple. We now consider the impact this fact has on whether S 81 applies to the second Settlement Agreement. This inquiry necessitates that we first consider the statute's text. See United States v. Gonzales, 117 S. Ct. 1032, 1034 (1997). As previously noted, S 81 states: No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians . . . for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands . . . . The statute does not distinguish between Indian trust lands and Indian fee lands; nor does it refer to all Indian lands. In fact, S 81's scope is not clearly defined. See Mark A. Jarboe, Fundamental Legal Principles Affecting Business Transactions in Indian Country, 17 Harmline L. Rev. 417, 430 (1994); see also Stowell v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 3 F.3d 539, 542 (1st Cir. 1993) (Given two plausible alternatives, and recognizing that the universe of interpretive possibilitie s may extend beyond them, we think the U.S.C. S 1722(j) defines Penobscot Indian Territory as those lands as defined in the Maine Implementing Act. The Maine Implementing Act defines Penobscot Indian Territory as the Penobscot Indian Reservation and [t]he first 150,000 acres of land acquired by the secretary for the benefit of the Penobscot Nation as further defined in this section. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30, S 6205(2)(B) (1993). The Holden Lot does not fall within either the Penobscot Indian Reservation or the remaining area that S 6205(2)(B) designed as current or potential Penobscot Indian Territory. -19- 19 statute contains an undeniable ambiguity.). Section 81's lack of clarity and its failure t Smith o define the phrase Indian lands requires us to determine the ordinary or natural meaning of these terms. See v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). When Congress has failed to define statutory language, the Supreme Court has resorted to authoritative texts to determine the ordinary meaning of statutory language. See id. at 229. According to one such text, the term Indian lands refers to [r]eal property ceded to the U.S. by Indians, commonly to be held in trust for Indians. Blac k's Law Dictionary 771 (6th ed. 1990). The definition of Indian tribal or trust land is virtually identical: real propt 772.12 In the context of S 81, the phrase relative to [Indian] lands is understood to refer to Indian trust lands. See Cohen's Handbook at 318 n.293 (explaining that 25 U.S.C. S 81[] prohibit[s] contracts with Indian tribes concerning trust property unless approved by the Commissioner of Indian affairs) (emphasis added); Patrick K. Duffy and Lois A. 12. It is noteworthy that the phrase Indian country refers to all lands set aside by whatever means for the residence of tribal Indians under federal protection, together with trust and restricted Indian allotments. Cohen's Handbook at 34; see also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-50 (1978). The phrase as Indian lands are held is read simply to state the United States will hold title in trust for the tribe. Cohen's Handbook at 476. These definitions would seem to indicate that Indian country and Indian lands encompass Indian trust lands but not Indian fee lands. -20- 20 Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the Government's Seizure of Sue, A Sixty-Five-Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurs Rex Fossil, 39 S. D. L. Rev. 478, 528 n.169 (1994) (indicating that pursuant to S 81, the Secretary has oversight responsibility for approving or vetoing the terms and conditions of all contracts involving Native American tribal or trust property) (emphasis added). No authority directly states that S 81 applies to Indian fee lands. It is understood, however, that by adopting S 81 Congress prohibited most contracts between non-Indians and tribes . . . unless approved by the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Cohen's Handbook at 143. Thus, although it appears that S 81's relative to [Indian] lands language connotes Indian trust lands rather than Indian fee lands, we acknowledge that this interpretation is not iron-clad. Recognizing that we cannot end our inquiry with the ordinary or natural meaning of the statute's terms, we consider the relevant legislative history in an effort to give effect to the intentions of the statute's drafters. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contra ctors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982); United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank, 24 F.3d 320, 327 (1st Cir. 1994); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 769 F.2d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 1985), aff'd, 479 U.S. 238 (1986). This inquiry is particularly appropriate in the context of federal Indian law. -21- 21 The Supreme Court has made it clear that Indian law[] cannot be interpreted in isolation but must be read in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted [such law]. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978); see also Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 166 (1980) (explaining that courts must interpret [certain federal statutes involving Indian tribes] . . . in light of the Congress that enacted them). Congress intended [S 81] to protect the Indians from improvident and unconscionable contracts. In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222, 227 (1893); see also Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1483, 1483 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1871) (declaring that statute was for Indians' protection and to prevent them from being plundered) (comments of Senator Davis). Specifically, Congress adopted S 81 to protect Indian tribes and individual Indians from persons, particularly attorneys and claims agents, offering dubious services, typically the assertion of the Indians' land claims against the government, in exchange for enormous fees. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. at 1483-86. One senator indicated that this section would prevent . . . contracts being made by [Indian tribes] unless approved by the Secretary of the Interior in any matter relating to the land or annuities that they hold under or derive from the United States. See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong. at 1486 (comments of -22- 22 Senator Harlan) (emphasis added). Another senator declared that S 81 is limited to such agreements or services as are made or rendered relative to the lands of the Indians or to any claim against annuities from or treaties with the United States. Id. (comments of Senator Casserly) (emphasis added). Evidence of the drafters' assumptions and intentions does little to resolve whether or not the phrase relative to [Indian] lands pertains to both Indian trust land and Indian fee lands, or solely to the former. The two statements addressing the application of S 81 may be read differently: Senator Harlan's description may indicate that the statute applies solely to lands over which the federal government exercises a trust responsibility; Senator Casserly's explanation may mean that the statute applies to Indian lands generally. To reconcile this ambiguity, and thus to parse the ordinary meaning of S 81 at the time of its ratification, we consider the understanding of the status of Indian lands that prevailed at the time Congress passed S 81.13 See Oliphant, 13. Our determination to further consider the nature of Indian land ownership during this time in order to properly interpret the phrase relative to [Indian] lands would be appropriate even if we read Senator Harlan's statement in the disjunctive, rather than in the conjunctive as the sentence was recorded. That is, if we read the phrase relating to the land or annuities that they hold under or derive from the United States so that the qualifying statement that they hold under or derive from the United States qualifies only the word annuities but not the words the land, we still would have learned little more concerning the definition of Indian lands. Such a reading, though tortured, would resolve the ambiguity between the drafters' two statements -23- 23 435 U.S. at 206. In 1872, when Congress passed S 81, federal law provided that Indian tribes enjoyed the right to possess and occupy lands but not to alienate these lands without the federal government's approval. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (indicating that United States possessed title to all Indian lands subject only to the Indian right of occupancy); Uni ted States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 592-94 (1873) (explaining that Indians enjoyed only right of occupancy in Indian lands and that the fee was in the United States); David H. Getches and Charles F. Wilkinson, Federal Indian Law 161 (1986) (The United States had the exclusive right to purchase or extinguish Indian title.) [hereinafter Federal Indian Law]. Memorializing this conception of Indian real property rights, Congress adopted general, comprehensive legislation addressing the rights of Indian tribes with respect to their lands during this era. See , e.g. , Nonintercourse Act of 1834, R.S. S 2116 (codified as 25 U.S.C. S 177) (prohibiting purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands , or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians) (emphasis added).14 and would tend to point to a broader definition of the terms Indian lands, but it would not dispose of our inquiry into the meaning of the phrase relative to [Indian] lands. 14. It was not until the legal relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government evolved dramatically in the twentieth century that legislation regulating Indian tribes' -24- 24 Congress did not distinguish between Indian trust lands and Indian fee lands at this time presumably because it did not contemplate that Indian tribes could hold land in fee simple. During this time, however, Congress did provide for individual Indians to hold land in fee simple. See 25 U.S.C. SS 348-349 (1887). The allotment process that these statutes authorized permitted the Secretary to transfer certain real property to individual Indians. Typically, the United States would hold such lands in trust for the designated individuals for a period of twenty-five years. See Sam Pelican, 232 U.S. at 447. The Secretary, at his discretion, could cause to be issued to such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land shall be removed. 25 U.S.C. S 349. Despite these statutes' provision for individual Indians' fee simple ownership of real property, we have unearthed no legislation real property routinely distinguished between restricted and unrestricted tribal lands. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1360(b) (1953) (referring specifically to the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property . . . that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States); 25 U.S.C. S 415 (1955) (referring specifically to restricted Indian lands). Modern statutes routinely distinguish between Indian trust lands and Indian fee lands.See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. S 1724(d)(3) (1980) (distinguishing between Indian trust lands and Indian fee lands, and indicating that the United States does not have trust responsibility with respect to the latter); 25 U.S.C. S 1466 (1974) (indicating that Indian tribes can purchase real property without any restriction on alienation, control, or use). -25- 25 enacted during this time that afforded similar rights to Indian tribes. See Cohen's Handbook at 36 & n.78. Interpreting S 81 and its legislative history in light of the understandings and assumptions of those who drafted it, see Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206, thus supports the conclusion that S 81 does not pertain to the Holden Lot. When Congress passed S 81 it did not envision that Indian tribes could hold land in the manner that PIN held the Holden Lot. Cf. Cohen's Handbook at 127-43 (concluding that during this time extensive government supervisory power over the everyday life of Indians was essentially unchecked). It therefore would seem anomalous, in endeavoring to give effect to Congress' intent, to apply S 81 to lands PIN purchased in fee simple for investment purposes. Admittedly, the broad remedial purposes that S 81's drafters attributed to the statute may complicate this analysis. Congress desired to protect Indian tribes from unscrupulous business practices, see Cong. Globe 41st Cong. at 1485-86, and enjoyed the sole right to encumber all Indian lands, see Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974) (Once the United States was organized and the Constitution adopted . . . tribal rights to Indian lands became the exclusive province of the federal law. Indian title, recognized to be only a right of occupancy, was extinguishable only by the United States.). It may seem plausible, -26- 26 therefore, that S 81 should apply to agreements for services relative to all Indian lands. Congress, moreover, occasionally did authorize individual Indians to hold designated parcels of real property in fee simple, and, therefore, could have exempted these fee simple lands from S 81's purview if it did not want S 81 to apply to Indian fee lands. To our knowledge, Congress has adopted no such exemption. Our analysis thus illustrates that although S 81's legislative history, considered in light of the status of federal Indian law during the middle of the nineteenth century, points to the conclusion that S 81 does not apply to Indian fee lands, it does not provide a clear answer to the issue we face today. Having failed to arrive at a definitive answer to our inquiry through reference to S 81's plain meaning and legislative history, we turn to analyze the interpretation of the agency responsible for administering the statute. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Although we have not unearthed a general interpretation of S 81 advanced by the Secretary of the Interior, in this case the parties submitted the Partnership Agreement for the Secretary's approval. The Area -27- 27 Director of the Eastern Area Office of the Bureau of India stated: n Affairs15 The Secretary has determined that the Agreement does not encumber trust land or other trust assets, that the Agreement is not subject to the provisions of 25 U.S.C. S 81 (1982), and that, as a result, the Nation has contractual capacity to enter into this Agreement without additional Secretarial approval. Declaration of B. D. Ott, Area Director, Eastern Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs (December 31, 1986). This declaration illustrates that in determining whether or not an agreement with an Indian tribe falls within the parameters of S 81, the Secretary focuses on whether or not the agreement relates to Indian trust lands or assets. See also B arona Group of the Capitan Grande Bande of Mission Indians v. American Management & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d 1394, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Acting Superintendent for Southern California Bureau of Indian Affairs office explaining that S 81 does not apply if trust lands and funds are not involved). In this case, the second Settlement Agreement did not involve Indian trust lands or assets. Although the administrative agency's interpretation does not 15. The Secretary of the Interior's duties pursuant to the text of S 81 subsequently have been delegated to the appropriate Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1950, 5 U.S.C. S 903(a)(5) & note; Order of the Secretary of the Interior, Nos. 3150 & 3177, Amend. No. 3 (Dec. 16, 1996); 10 B.I.A.M. Bulletins 13, 9409, & 9602. -28- 28 function to conclusively resolve our evaluation of whether S 81 pertains to the second Settlement Agreement, see Stowell, 3 F.3d at 544; American Management, 840 F.2d at 1405, we must afford it considerable deference, see Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 843; Strickland v. Commissioner, Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 96 F.3d 542, 547 (1st Cir. 1996). Judicial interpretation of S 81 provides further guidance. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that in determining reasonableness of administrative agency's interpretation of statute, court should consider judicial construction) . Courts generally have focused on the existence of Indian trust land in evaluating S 81's relative to [Indian] lands component. In Koberstein, 762 F.2d at 619, the Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that S 81 applied to a bingo management agreement because S 81 applies to Indian land transactions concerning their tribal trust property. (emphasis added). See also Pueblo of Santa Ana, 663 F. Supp. at 1306 (finding S 81 applicable to agreement because it provided for construction and operation of facility on tribal trust property) (emphasis added); Enterprise Management, 734 F. Supp. at 457 (voiding bingo management agreement providing nonIndian party exclusive right to operate bingo games on Indian trust lands because this agreement was relative to Indian lands and . . . thus governed by section 81). -29- 29 The Ninth Circuit in particular has manifested the importance that the presence of Indian trust lands plays in the relative to [Indian] lands analysis. In A.K. Management Co. v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians, 789 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth Circuit considered the applicability of S 81 to a bingo management contract that the San Manuel Band of Mission Indians executed with a bingo management company. Upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment, the court held that the instant Agreement is 'relative to [Indian] lands' under 25 U.S.C. S 81. Id. at 787. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the Agreement gives the non-Indian contracting party . . . the express right to build and control the operation of the bingo facility located on tribal trust lands and prohibits the Band from encumbering the land. Id. (emphasis added). One year later, in American Management, 840 F.2d at 1404, the Ninth Circuit again determined that a contract between an Indian tribe and a non-Indian bingo management company providing for the construction and operation of a bingo facility on Indian trust lands was 'relative to [Indian] lands' under section 81. The court specifically stated that it reached this conclusion despite the fact that the agreement neither afforded the non-Indian party exclusive control over the bingo facility nor abridged the tribe's ability to encumber its trust lands. See id. The fact that the non-Indian party -30- 30 exercised some control over Indian trust lands, however minimal, proved decisive to the American Management court's analysis. See id. ; see a lso United States ex rel Yellowtail v. Little Horn State Bank, 828 F. Supp. 780, 787 (D. Mont. 1992) (The only interest the government has in overseeing certain contracts and agreements with Indians flows from its duty as trustee of tribal resources. . . . The nature of the government's interest is in the Tribe's trust resources 'relative to the land.'), aff'd, 15 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1994). The most recent circuit court decision to specifically address the relative to [Indian] lands component of S 81, Altheimer & Gray, 983 F.2d at 808-12, offers a slightly different construct that further supports the conclusion that the second Settlement Agreement in this case is not relative to [Indian] lands. The Altheimer court considered a Letter of Intent that a federally recognized Indian tribe, in the form of a wholly owned tribal corporation, executed with an Illinois corporation providing for the manufacture of latex medical products on tribal trust lands. See id . at 806-07. Although manufacture of the products actually commenced, the parties failed to execute the necessary contracts. Operations thus ceased shortly after commencement. The Illinois corporation sued the tribal corporation for breach of contract. The district court found the Letter of Intent void pursuant to S 81 and granted summary judgment to the -31- 31 tribal corporation. See id. at 806-07. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court. See id . at 815. In so doing, the court set forth four factors that it considered determinative of whether or not a management contract is relative to [Indian] lands pursuant to S 81: 1) Does the contract relate to the management of a facility to be located on Indian lands? 2) If so, does the non-Indian party have the exclusive right to operate that facility? 3) Are the Indians forbidden from encumbering the property? 4) Does the operation of the facility depend on the legal status of an Indian tribe being a separate sovereign? Id. at 811. Despite the fact that the Letter of Intent involved the operation of a facility on Indian trust lands, the Altheimer court found that it was not relative to Indian lands and thus not within the purview of S 81. The Seventh Circuit emphasized the fact that the non-Indian contracting party did not have exclusive control of the facility and that the business derived no special benefit from its location on Reservation land. Id. at 812. Considering the present case in light of Altheimer compels two initial observations. First, the second Settlement Agreement obviously did not constitute a management contract. Second, importing the precise considerations pertinent to an evaluation of a management contract to an analysis of an agreement to assist in locating a purchaser for land may present certain difficulties. See id. at 811 (indicating that -32- 32 the four factors that it set forth are not the 'sine qua non' of a contract which relates to Indian lands). Despite its distinguishing characteristics, however, Altheimer informs our analysis of PIN's appeal. Specifically, the Altheimer court refused to find the agreement relative to [Indian] lands in part because the Indian tribe in Altheimer remained involved in the business relationship. In this case, PIN participated in the Partnership, not through daily management duties, but through financing and leasing activities promoting Schiavi Homes' business activities. More importantly, Altheimer emphasized the fact that the subject matter of the contract derived no special benefit from the Indian tribe's sovereign status. See id. at 812. The Altheimer court explained: Unlike bingo, manufacturers of latex medical products need not seek refuge from state civil laws by locating on a reservation. Id. In this case, the parties to the second Settlement Agreement derived no special benefit from PIN's sovereign status.16 Notwithstanding the fact that Altheimer, like the other cases we have considered, supports the conclusion that 16. We note that when the land at issue constitutes Indian fee land it is difficult for the subject matter of the contract to derive a special benefit from the Indian tribe's sovereignty because Indian tribes do not have the same powers and privileges with respect to Indian fee lands that they do in the context of Indian trust lands. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RIBO, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48, 50 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1989); Cohen's Handbook at 232-57. -33- 33 the second Settlement Agreement does not fall within the purview of S 81, we consider one additional case in which the district court for the district of Rhode Island interpreted S 81's relative to [Indian] lands requirement. See Narragansett Indian Tribe v. RIBO, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48, 51 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 868 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1989). The N arragansett court considered S 81's applicability to two management agreements contemplating acquisition by the Tribe of property on which a high stakes bingo hall could be constructed. See id. at 49. Following execution of the agreements, the Tribe purchased a total of 28.8 acres of land adjacent to the Tribe's reservation. See id. at 50. The Tribe, however, failed to secure trust status for this land. See id. The Narragans ett defendants specifically argued that S 81 pertained only to 'tribal land' . . . [that is,] land that is part of the Tribe's reservation. Id. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning: [S]uch a construction proves to be at variance with both the plain language of the statute and with its broad remedial purpose. Thus the statute uses the term 'their [the Indians'] lands' without differentiating between original tribal lands and those subsequently acquired. Reading into those words the limitation urged by Defendants would distort their plain meaning. Moreover, it also would emasculate the statute and frustrate its purpose of providing a mechanism to regulate Indian land transactions. -34- 34 Id. Although the Narragansett court recognized that S 81 has its origin in the longstanding trust relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, id. at 50, it held that S 81 renders both the agreements and the notes and mortgages given by the Tribe in accordance with their terms null and void. Id. at 51. We find the Narragansett court's reasoning unpersuasive. The construction that the Narragansett defendants advanced, we believe, comports with the plain language of the statute. If S 81 is predicated on the trust relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes, see id.; United States ex rel. Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp. , 49 F.3d 1208, 1214 (7th Cir. 1995), then reading S 81 to apply to Indian lands purchased in fee simple for business reasons contradicts the statute's purpose and its drafters' intentions. Even those courts that have propounded a broad reading of S 81's relative to [Indian] lands component, moreover, have not found that this phrase refers to Indian fee lands. See, e.g., Koberstein, 762 F.2d at 619; United States ex rel Shakopee v. Pan American Mgmt. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1200, 1217-18 (D. Minn. 1985) (finding that the management agreements [were] . . . inextricably tied up in the property rights flowing from the establishment of the bingo operations on tribal trust lands) (emphasis added). We thus find that to the extent Narragansett can be read to hold that Indian fee -35- 35 lands purchased for investment purposes and not designated as trust lands qualify as Indian lands under S 81, that holding is not compelling. To reach a different conclusion in the context of the Holden Lot would defy common sense. See United States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 744 (1st Cir. 1997) (instructing that common sense construction that avoid[s] absurd or counterintuitive results is favored); O'Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 176 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that courts are bound to afford statutes a practical, common-sense reading). Were we to hold that the second Settlement Agreement required the pproval pursuant to S 81 despite the fact that it 17 Secretary's a relates only to Indian fee lands purchased for business reasons, we would force the Secretary to exercise a trust responsibility with respect to lands over which Congress specifically disavowed any further trust obligation.18 See 25 17. Perhaps recognizing the Narragansett decision as an anomaly, at least one circuit court has interpreted Narragansett as simply hold[ing] that bingo management agreements involve services within the meaning of [S 81].Bacon, 21 F.3d at 212. 18. We recognize that the Supreme Court determined that the Nonintercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. S 177, applied to land that the Pueblo Indian tribes of New Mexico held in fee simple. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 440-44 (1926); see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-48 (1913) (finding that Congress could restrict the alienation of land that New Mexico Pueblo Indians held in fee simple). The Pueblo Indians at issue in Candelaria and Sandoval held their lands in fee simple under both Spanish and Mexican law before the United States gained control over New Mexico. See Candelaria, 271 U.S. at 442; Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 44-45. -36- 36 U.S.C. S 1724(d)(3); 25 U.S.C. 1722(j); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. lands. tit. 30, S 6205(2)(B) (1993). In the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, Congress not only disavowed further trust responsibility over the area First the Spanish and then the Mexican authorities, however, Candelaria Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 44-45. We believe that the situation in this case, in which PIN purchased land in fee simple for investment Candelaria See retained the authority to restrict the alienation of these , 271 U.S. at 442; purposes, differs substantially from that in bothand Sandoval, in which the tribes held their ancestral tribal lands in a modified version of fee simple under Spanish and Mexican rule. We note, however, that several courts, relying on Candelaria and Sandoval, have found S 177 applicable to lands that other Indian tribes have purchased in fee simple. See Alonzo v. United States, 249 F.2d 189, 196 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938). Given Alonzo's paucity of analysis and outdated paternalism (the court adopted the notion that Indians are 'a simple, uninformed people, illprepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races,' see id. (quoting Candelaria, 271 U.S. at 442)), we do not find this decision persuasive. This conclusion applies equally to 7,405.3 Acres of Land. The situation in this case, moreover, differs substantially from that in Alonzo and 7,405.3 Acres of Land.As opposed to the land in question in those cases, Congress disavowed trust responsibility over the land encompassing the Holden Lot. See 25 U.S.C. S 1724(d)(3). In Lummi Indian Tribe v. Whatcom County, 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth Circuit took issue with Alonzo and 7,405.3 Acres of Land and ruled that parcels of land approved for alienation by the federal government and then reacquired by the Tribe did not then become inalienable by operation of the Nonintercourse Act. See also Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 110-15 (1960) (determining that lands that Indian tribe purchased in fee simple were not subject to federal oversight pursuant to Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. S 797(e), because United States neither owned these lands nor owned an interest in these lands). The lands at issue in Lummi Indian Nation and Tuscarora Indian Nation were similar to the Holden Lot in that the tribes purchased these lands in fee simple. See Lummi Indian Tribe, 5 F.3d at 1357; Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. at 105-06. -37- 37 encompassing the Holden Lot, it expressly stated that the p as its source the Nonintercourse Act, meaning that th trust relationship pertains to land transactions which are or Passamaquoddy Tribe N See 25 U.S.C. S 1724(g)(1). This is significant because we reviously have indicated that the 'trust relationship' . . . has e may be covered by the Act. , 528 F.2d at 379. Because the Nonintercourse Act no longer pertains to PIN, Passamaquoddy Tribe dictates that the federal government does not have a trust obligation with respect to the Holden Lot. See Imposing such onintercours e Act, 25 U.S.C. S 177, no longer applied to PIN. also 25 U.S.C. S 1724(d)(3).19 a responsibility pursuant to S 81 would defy not only common 19. Key Bank urges us to rule that the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25 U.S.C. SS 1721-1735, implicitly repealed S 81 with respect to PIN generally. Although S 1724 provides that several statutes, including 25 U.S.C. S 177, no longer apply to PIN, it makes no mention of S 81. If Congress desired to repeal completely S 81 with respect to all PIN real property it could easily have done so, as it did with S 177. Cf. Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 507 (1995) (specifying that if Congress desired to alter a statute it specifically would have done so); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ('[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.') (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)); Hirschey v. F.E.R.C., 760 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (indicating that Congress understands how to effect such results); see also Altheimer, 983 F.2d at 805 (explaining that Congress has neither explicitly nor implicitly overruled S 81). We thus do not find that the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act implicitly repealed S 81 with respect to all PIN land. -38- 38 sense but logic as well.20 v. , See Lummi Indian Tribe Whatcom County 5 F.3d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling that Nonintercourse Act did not apply to land Indian tribe purchased in fee simple over which Congress previously terminated its trust obligation); cf. Fe deral Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 110-15 (1960) (finding that federal government did not own an interest in lands Indian tribe purchased in fee simple). Applying S 81 to the Holden Lot also would necessitate that almost every agreement for services executed with an Indian tribe, no matter how minute, would require Secretarial approval. See In re United States ex rel. Hall, 825 F. Supp. 1422, 1434 (D. Minn. 1993) (discussing undesirable implications of such an interpretation), aff'd, 27 F.3d 572 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. de nied, 115 S. Ct. 1112 (1995); see also Raymond Cross, De-Federalizing American Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political Economy for Indian Country, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 445, 489 (1993) (indicating that even as presently interpreted, [e]xperience has shown . . . that in many cases . . . [S 81] harms, rather than helps, Indian 20. The fact that Congress explicitly determined that the Nonintercourse Act does not apply to PIN further distinguishes this case from the cases in which courts have interposed a trust obligation in regard to real property that Indian tribes have purchased in fee simple. See Alonzo, 249 F.2d at 196; 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d at 422-23.Congress never stated that the Nonintercourse Act did not apply to the real property at issue in Alonzo or 7,404.3 Acres of Land. -39- 39 tribes. Its rigid formalism and over-inclusiveness chill business dealings between tribes and third parties without providing substantial offsetting benefits.). We believe that further extending administrative authority over the Holden Lot would neither favor, see Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985), nor protect, see In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. at 227, Indian tribes. In fact, adopting PIN's interpretation would frustrate Indian tribes' efforts to promote economic development and fiscal autonomy. This analysis reflects the modern trend in federal Indian policy away from outmoded paternalistic21 practices and policies. Se e Cohen's Handbook at 180-206; Federal Indian Law at 151-59. Particularly during the last forty years, Congress has endeavored to afford Indian tribes the latitude to pursue their social, political, and economic goals as they determine appropriate. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. S 450 (proclaiming that prolonged Federal domination . . . has served to retard rather than enhance the progress of Indian people and their communities by depriving Indians of the full opportunity to develop leadership skills crucial to the realization of self government); 25 U.S.C. S 450a (declaring Congress' commitment 21. One proponent of S 81 described the statute as follows:If it is enacted and becomes part of the law it will be the best shield, the best protection, and the best security for the rights and the helplessness of these sons of the forest that has ever been devised by American legislation or American humanity. Cong. Globe 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1483, 1484 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1871) (comments of Senator Davis). -40- 40 to the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy); Blatchford v. N ative Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 793 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress has passed legislation in recent decades as part of a larger national policy of 'self-determination' for the Native American peoples). To find S 81 applicable to a tract of real property that PIN purchased in fee simple to promote its business interests would contravene modern efforts to secure tribal self-determination. In light of these policy considerations, the dictates of common sense, the vast majority of S 81 jurisprudence, and the Secretary's interpretation, we conclude that the second Settlement Agreement does not qualify as relative to [Indian] lands. This Agreement did not pertain to Indian trust lands. In fact, the second Settlement Agreement involved lands PIN purchased in fee simple to promote its investment objectives over which Congress expressly disavowed trust responsibility. To rule that this Agreement necessitated the Secretary's approval pursuant to S 81, we conclude, would strain the statute's ordinary meaning and exceed its drafters' intentions. We recognize that statutes affecting Indian tribes must be construed liberally in favor of the tribes. See Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766. The rule recited in Blackfeet Tribe, however, does not require a court to ignore compelling authority supporting a conclusion contrary to the -41- 41 position that a particular Indian tribe advances. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 456 (1988). We therefore hold that the Settlement Agreements did not fall within the parameters of S 81, and thus that the two Settlement Agreements constituted valid, binding releases that preclude PIN from further pursuing its remaining claims.