Opinion ID: 610843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Juror Irregularities

Text: 83 Defendants' final argument on appeal is that they are entitled to a new trial because of the following juror misconduct: 1) after they were excused, some of the jurors told Los Angeles Times reporters that they had wanted to send a message to City Hall that police cannot act uncontrollably; and 2) three of the jurors revealed in interviews that the question of whether the damages should cover Morgan's attorney's fees was raised during deliberations, and one juror speculated that his attorney's fees might be around $90,000. Defendants argue that the injection of such extraneous prejudicial information, and the use of these sorts of influence, to bear upon juror deliberations is improper and arguably falls within the exception to the prohibition contained in Fed.R.Evid. Rule 606(b). 84 Without conducting an evidentiary hearing on the question, the district court refused to grant a new trial on the basis of this alleged misconduct. We review a district court's refusal to grant a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir.1985). 85 Defendants offer no legal support for their argument that the sentiments revealed by the jurors constitute a basis for reversing the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial. Nor has our research revealed any. Therefore, we affirm the district court. 86 The juror's observations about sending messages to City Hall and speculation as to the amount of Morgan's attorney's fees simply do not constitute the sort of extraneous prejudicial information that falls within the scope of Fed.R.Evid. Rule 606(b). As we have observed before, [t]he type of after-acquired information that potentially taints a jury verdict should be carefully distinguished from the general knowledge, opinions, feelings and bias that every juror carries into the jury room. Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 870 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir.1989). The jury observations complained of here are the type of subjective thoughts and beliefs which are beyond the scope of inquiry in a motion for a new trial on the grounds of juror misconduct. 87 A party has grounds to seek an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a new trial is necessary because of extrinsic prejudicial information only when these materials are sufficient on their face to require setting aside the verdict. Burlington Northern, Id. at 1461. For example, in Burlington Northern, one juror told the others that he had worked in the same place as the plaintiff, that when he injured himself on the job he'd received paid leave, speculated that defendant railroad company had probably already compensated the plaintiff for his injuries, and brought to the deliberations regarding plaintiff's injuries his independent knowledge of x-ray interpretation. Id. at 1458. Although the allegations of juror impropriety made in Burlington Northern were far more direct and damaging than those advanced here, the Burlington Northern court found no violation of Rule 606(b) or other impropriety sufficient to reverse a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial. See also Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 579-82 (5th Cir.1982) (juror's speculations as to the weakness of plaintiff's case, the relationship between plaintiff and his attorney and the amount of fees plaintiff paid considered the subjective thoughts and emotions that may have influenced a juror's deliberations and therefore not the grounds of a motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct.) In light of our past jurisprudence in this area, we have little difficulty affirming the district court's refusal to grant a new trial or hold an evidentiary hearing on the question of juror impropriety. V.