Opinion ID: 2585419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: failing to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses of reckless second-degree murder and reckless manslaughter

Text: The jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of first-degree murder, including intentional second-degree murder (the crime of conviction) and involuntary manslaughter done in the commission of a lawful act of self-defense in an unlawful manner by the use of excessive force. The defense counsel requested an instruction on reckless second-degree murder, reasoning that Calderon's testimony was that his intent was to cut Munoz' arm and that the stab wound to the abdomen was an accidental result. Defense counsel did not request an instruction on reckless involuntary manslaughter. The trial judge refused to give instructions based on reckless behavior. The trial court has a statutory duty to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses.... The duty arises whether or not the defendant requests the instruction at trial. State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 413, 904 P.2d 951 (1995); State v. Bowman, 252 Kan. 883, 892, 850 P.2d 236 (1993). Recently, this court restated the standard of review in State v. Harris, 259 Kan. 689, 702, 915 P.2d 758 (1996): We have held that a criminal defendant has a right to an instruction on all lesser included offenses supported by the evidence at trial so long as (1) the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant's theory, would justify a jury verdict in accord with the defendant's theory and (2) the evidence at trial does not exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense.' State v. Moncla, 262 Kan. 58, 73-74, 936 P.2d 727 (1997). Calderon contends that his testimony regarding his intention merely to wound Munoz in the arm is sufficient to establish the duty of the trial court to instruct on reckless behavior. We have reviewed the record. Based on the evidence admitted at this trial, the trial judge was correct in refusing to instruct on recklessness. There was overwhelming evidence of intent and no evidence of recklessness. Under the circumstances, Calderon's self-serving statement regarding his lack of intent did not in itself invoke a duty on the trial judge to instruct on recklessness. See State v. Clark, 261 Kan. 460, 466, 931 P.2d 664 (1997). Reversed and remanded for a new trial. DAVIS, J., concurs in the result. ABBOTT, J., dissenting: I would affirm the conviction under the harmless error rule. Here, the defendant has the burden of showing reversible error. He does not suggest that he was prejudiced. He does not point to any part of the closing argument and contend that he might have given his lawyer information that would have been helpful in his defense. He squarely stands on his constitutional right to be present at all crucial stages of his trial. I have no quarrel with that black letter law. However, an error of constitutional magnitude may be held to be harmless error if we declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. To so hold, we must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. State v. Coyote, 268 Kan. 726, 732, 1 P.3d 836 (2000). I am not persuaded that, under the facts of the case, the presence of a translator for the defendant would have been of any benefit. It is hard to imagine what benefit a jury would have watching a defendant hearing a translation in a language the jury does not understand with some delay between what the jury hears in English and what the defendant later hears in a foreign language. I would follow the reasoning in Luu v. Colorado, 841 P.2d 271, 275 (Colo. 1992), where the Colorado Supreme Court said: There is no evidence that the absence of an interpreter interfered with Luu's ability to cross-examine witnesses. Nor is there any indication in the record that the absence of an interpreter during closing arguments and the giving of jury instructions compromised the basic fairness of the trial.... In light of the entire record, we conclude under these facts that any error suffered by Luu was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It went on to hold: In [ Arizona v.]Fulminante [499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed.2d 302, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991)], the Supreme Court segregated those cases in which harmless error analysis does not apply from the cases in which harmless error analysis is appropriate. [Citation omitted.] Harmless error analysis does not apply when there is a `structural defect in the constitution of the trial mechanism.' [Citation omitted.] The Fulminante Court cited examples of structural defects as total deprivations of the right to counsel and partial or biased trial judges. [Citation omitted.] Conversely, the Fulminante Court emphasized that harmless error analysis applies where a trial errorsuch as deprivation of the right to be presentoccurs. [Citation omitted.] Under Fulminante, federal law is clear: harmless error analysis applies to allegations of error regarding denial of the federal constitutional right to be present at trial. Accordingly, the court of appeals did not err in determining that the harmless error doctrine should govern Luu's allegations of constitutional error. 841 P.2d at 274-75. The majority, in essence, determines that the harmless error doctrine cannot apply in this case. In the absence of the defendant making some effort to explain how he was prejudiced, I would hold the error was harmless and affirm the conviction. McFARLAND, C.J., joins in the foregoing dissent.