Opinion ID: 4015697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Race Harassment/Hostile Work Environment

Text: Banks next argues the district court erred in concluding Banks failed to present any admissible evidence of a hostile work environment based on race. “Hostile work environment harassment occurs ‘[w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Jackman v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 728 F.3d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). To prevail on his harassment claim, Banks had to “establish that (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was subject to unwelcome race-based harassment; (3) the harassment was because of membership in the protected group; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Malone v. Ameren UE, 646 F.3d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 2011). “[I]f an employee’s hostile work environment claim is based on harassment by non-supervisory co-workers, the employee must also prove that the employer ‘knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.’” Clay v. Credit Bureau Enters., Inc., 754 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Malone, 646 F.3d at 517). In this case, the district court, quoting Clay, 754 F.3d at 540, concluded “Banks’ hostile work environment claim fail[ed] for a fundamental reason. Banks failed to present any admissible evidence that he was subjected to unwelcome race-based harassment, or that the alleged harassment was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ to -8- create an abusive working environment.” See Crews v. Monarch Fire Prot. Dist., 771 F.3d 1085, 1092 (8th Cir. 2014) (“At summary judgment, the requisite ‘genuine dispute’ must appear in admissible evidence.” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a))); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2) (allowing a party to “object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence”). More specifically, the district court determined, on Deere’s objection, (1) the three “sworn affidavits” upon which Banks relied to show racial harassment were, in fact, “unsworn statements and emails, constituting inadmissible hearsay,” and (2) Banks’s citations to such statements in his sworn interrogatories were likewise “largely inadmissible hearsay.” See Fed. R. Evid. 801-807; Cherry v. Ritenour Sch. Dist., 361 F.3d 474, 480 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining “inadmissible hearsay . . . cannot be used to avoid summary judgment”). Relying on appeal as he did in the district court on three unsworn statements from his co-workers and his related interrogatory answers, Banks argues the district court’s grant of summary judgment “was error and improper.” Banks avers he would have called three co-workers, Andrew Reagan, Mike Olson, and Randy Demro, at trial “to testify that they have all heard Sharm Loy refer to Banks as ‘that nigger’ since February 2012.” In Banks’s view, “[b]y referring to the [three] statements . . . as in admissible [sic] hearsay evidence the district court failed to view the record in the light most favorable to Banks and failed to afford it [sic] all reasonable influences [sic].” Banks’s analysis again misses the mark. Regardless of whether Banks’s assurance that his co-workers would have testified at trial mitigates the hearsay concerns with respect to the unsworn statements, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Gannon Int’l, Ltd. v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2012) (clarifying the key question is whether the evidence “could be presented at trial in an admissible form”), Banks’s proffered evidence still does not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, see Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-58 & nn.16-17 (1970) (noting an unsworn statement by an alleged witness did not meet the -9- requirements of a prior version of Rule 56(e)); Worthy v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 472 F. App’x 342, 344 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (explaining a “court may consider some forms of hearsay evidence in deciding a motion for summary judgment,” but the evidence still must comply with Rule 56). Rule 56(c)(1)(A) provides “[a] party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Rule 56(c)(4) requires “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion [to] be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Although Rule 56, as amended in 2010, no longer requires a formal affidavit, an unsworn declaration or statement substituted for a sworn affidavit must still meet important statutory requirements. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) advisory committee’s note to 2010 amendment. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1746, an unsworn declaration or statement must be written, signed, dated, and certified as true and correct “under penalty of perjury.” The unsworn and unattested statements purportedly from Banks’s co-workers and Banks’s related interrogatory answers do not meet these standards. See, e.g., Harris v. J.B. Robinson Jewelers, 627 F.3d 235, 239 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (explaining statements that are neither “sworn . . . nor . . . made under penalty of perjury . . . cannot be considered on summary judgment”); Howell v. N.M. Dep’t of Aging & Long Term Servs., 398 F. App’x 355, 359 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (concluding an “unsigned document purportedly written by” a witness was inadmissible at summary judgment to establish a hostile work environment because it was “not in the form of an affidavit or an unsworn declaration”); cf. Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 984 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding the trial court did not err in excluding sua sponte -10- two unsigned, unattested “affidavits from its consideration of . . . summary judgment”). And Banks has not explained why he could not have obtained sworn affidavits, written declarations “under penalty of perjury,” or other competent evidence from his proposed witnesses. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). In light of Banks’s reliance on incompetent and inadmissible evidence, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Deere on Banks’s harassment claim.5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(3) (permitting summary judgment, if otherwise appropriate, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact”).