Opinion ID: 3051063
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to investigate and to call witnesses

Text: Gonzalez argues that his private defender was ineffective at re-sentencing for failing to investigate potentially mitigating evidence of mental illness, and for not calling family members to testify on his behalf. [7] Appellant’s instant claims fail on both Strickland prongs. First, Garcia’s alleged failures to investigate and to call witnesses were not objectively unreasonable. Absent any objective indication that Gonzalez suffered from any mental illness, Garcia cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue this avenue of mitigation where Gonzalez’s mental illness seemed unlikely. See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (that counsel knew defendant had been beaten, without more, did not render decision not to investigate possibility of psychiatric defense unreasonable). Furthermore, Garcia was aware, as a result of Such’s letter, of the substance of the family members’ testimony, but simply opted not to call them. This “reasoned tactical choice” did not constitute defi1740 GONZALEZ v. KNOWLES cient performance. See Gerlaugh v. Stewart, 129 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1997) (attorney not ineffective for failing to call character witnesses where testimony had limited value in establishing mitigation); but cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (prejudicial wholesale failure to investigate may violate Sixth Amendment). That Such would have called the witnesses does not render Garcia’s failure to do so objectively unreasonable under Strickland. Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1984) (counsel’s informed decisions do not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment even if in hindsight a better strategy was available). [8] Second, even if Garcia’s performance was constitutionally deficient, Gonzalez cannot demonstrate prejudice. Here, Garcia presented a number of mitigating factors to the judge at re-sentencing — alcohol abuse, no prior “strikes”, de minimis nature of the charged conduct, but the court nevertheless imposed an upper-term sentence of 16 years. In doing so, the judge cited Gonzalez’s “prior convictions, his poor perfor- mance on probation in the past, and the evidence of planning in the current case.” ER at 143. The testimony of sympathetic family members would not have impacted any of these objectively verifiable factors enumerated by the trial court. Based on this record, we cannot say that the omission of generally sympathetic testimony by some6 family members sufficiently “undermine[s] confidence in the [sentencing] outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. As to the failure to investigate 6 We find it significant to note here that Gonzalez’s suggestion that his family members were all on his side, see Appellant’s Brief, at 41 (family could have testified “they did not fear for their children, and that they would welcome him back in the family group”), is belied by other information found in his own submissions. In particular, Such stated in a declaration to the court that Gonzalez’s sister-in-law, Zulema’s mother, apparently did not intend to fully welcome Gonzalez back into her family’s life. ER at 116 (“I also spoke to Mariana Gamino, the mother of the three alleged victims in the case . . . [h]er main concern seemed to be that, if [Gonzalez] were released, he not be allowed to move back into her house”) (emphasis added). GONZALEZ v. KNOWLES 1741 mental health mitigation, Gonzalez does not contend that he actually suffered from a mental illness; he merely argues that if tests had been done, and if they had shown evidence of some brain damage or trauma, it might have resulted in a lower sentence. Such speculation is plainly insufficient to establish prejudice. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997).