Opinion ID: 1822112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Green Tree's Motion for Directed Verdict

Text: Green Tree argues that the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in its favor on all of the counts in both Standridge's complaint and Bonanza's complaint. It contends that neither Standridge nor Bonanza produced a scintilla of evidence to support its claims. [4] Under the scintilla evidence rule, a directed verdict is proper only where there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the essential elements of the plaintiff's claim, or where there is no disputed issue of fact upon which reasonable men can differ. Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 508 So.2d 247, 250 (Ala.1987). To determine the propriety of the denial of Green Tree's motion for directed verdict, each claim, with the exception of Standridge's outrage claim, will be examined. The elements of fraud are (1) a misrepresentation (2) of a material existing fact, (3) relied upon by the plaintiff, (4) who was damaged as a proximate result of the alleged misrepresentation. Earnest v. Pritchett-Moore, Inc., 401 So.2d 752, 754 (Ala.1981). Green Tree argues that Standridge failed to prove reliance on any alleged misrepresentation and failed to prove damages as a result of reliance. After reviewing the record, this Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determine that Green Tree made misrepresentations of existing fact. That evidence includes testimony by Standridge, Franklin, and employees of Standridge, that Franklin ordered Standridge to surrender possession of the mobile home immediately. That demand was inconsistent with Green Tree's usual practice of giving owners 30 days to cure defaults and was in contradiction to the thirty-day letter mailed to Standridge the following Monday. Standridge testified that he believed that Franklin possessed the authority to order him to immediately surrender the mobile home, and, therefore, that in reliance on that demand he vacated the mobile home. There was evidence that Franklin threatened to ruin his credit rating if he did not deliver the trailer. Because the contract did not specify a notice period, the contract did not contradict Standridge's belief as to Franklin's authority. In addition, there was evidence that indicated that Green Tree began taking steps to sell the mobile home to McQueen before the 30-day notice period had expired. Also, Green Tree allowed McQueen to take possession of the mobile home before January 1, 1987, despite giving Standridge notice that he had until January 8, 1987, to redeem his mobile home. Standridge was aware of McQueen's possession of the mobile home and testified that Green Tree's actions led him to believe that he would not be allowed to cure his default or redeem his mobile home. Also, there was evidence indicating that Green Tree altered the dates on McQueen's sale contract to make it appear that the sale occurred after the redemption period. Standridge also testified that he suffered damage as a result of Green Tree's misrepresentations. He testified that he had to pay storage fees for his possessions and was forced to pay increased rent and that improvements he made to the mobile home were lost or rendered valueless after the repossession. A motion for a directed verdict tests the sufficiency of the evidence presented and should be denied if there is any conflict in the evidence for the jury to decide. McLarty v. Wright, 56 Ala.App. 346, 321 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.Civ.App.1975). Green Tree's motion for a directed verdict on the fraud count was properly denied. This Court has defined conversion as [t]he wrongful exercise of dominion over property in exclusion or defiance of a plaintiff's rights, where said plaintiff has a general or special title to the property or the immediate right to possession. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Alexander, 484 So.2d 375, 377-78 (Ala.1985). In the instant case more than a scintilla of evidence was presented to show that Green Tree wrongfully deprived Standridge of possession of his mobile home and put McQueen into possession of it before Standridge's rights to cure or redeem had expired, in defiance of his immediate right to possession. Therefore, Green Tree's motion for directed verdict on the conversion claim was properly denied. Green Tree also argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict on Bonanza's fraud claim. In its complaint against Green Tree, Bonanza alleged that Green Tree fraudulently represented to Bonanza that it had the right to sell Standridge's mobile home and instructed Bonanza to have McQueen sign the sales contract prepared by Green Tree before Standridge's redemption period had expired. In its brief to this Court, Green Tree does not deny making those misrepresentations to Bonanza, but contends that Bonanza has failed to prove any damage as a result of those misrepresentations. At trial, there was evidence that indicated that Green Tree promised to pay Bonanza all the expenses it incurred in the repossession and sale of Standridge's mobile home. Bonanza apparently relied on these representations when it repossessed and sold Standridge's mobile home at Green Tree's direction. Despite Green Tree's representations, Bonanza was never reimbursed for these expenses. This Court finds sufficient evidence concerning all of the elements of Bonanza's fraud claim and concludes that that claim was properly submitted to the jury. Although the actual damages sustained by Bonanza may have been modest, even nominal damages will support an award of punitive damages under the proper circumstances. Coastal Concrete Co. v. Patterson, 503 So.2d 824, 830 (Ala.1987). In addition, it is not necessary that an award of punitive damages bear any particular mathematical relationship to actual damages. U-Haul Co. of Alabama v. Long, 382 So.2d 545, 548 (Ala. 1980). Green Tree also filed a motion for j.n.o.v. following the return of the jury's verdicts. This motion was denied. Motions for directed verdict and j.n.o.v. both test the sufficiency of the evidence and are reviewed under the same standard. Morgan v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 466 So.2d 107, 113 (Ala.1985). Granting a motion for j.n.o.v. says, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, that there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. Hanson v. Couch, 360 So.2d 942 (Ala.1978). In the instant case, the evidence concerning Standridge's fraud and conversion claims and Bonanza's fraud claim would not support such a conclusion. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Green Tree's motion for directed verdict and its decision to leave the jury's verdicts undisturbed were proper.