Opinion ID: 1999978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eleganza

Text: The trial court held that Smith v. District of Columbia, 399 A.2d 213 (D.C.1979), was dispositive of appellant's claim for false arrest against Eleganza. However, the rule of law set forth in Smith does not control the uncontested summary judgment facts of this case. We held in Smith that: To accuse someone of committing a crime, however slanderous it may be, is not enough to sustain a claim of false arrest so long as the decision whether to make the arrest remains with the police officer and is without the persuasion or influence of the accuser. Id. at 218. This rule bolsters the social policy which seeks to encourage persons to report criminal activities to the authorities without fear of civil reprisal for an honest mistake. However, Smith explicitly stated that it did not concern the issue of a malicious reporting of an alleged crime. We did not deal with the issue of whether a malicious reporting of alleged criminal activity to law enforcement authorities would, in similar circumstances, give rise to a prima facie claim of false arrest and imprisonment for there is not a scintilla of evidence to sustain the view that [the witnesses] acted maliciously in what they may have said to [the police]. Id. at 219. Here, Eleganza accepted the District's version of events for the purposes of summary judgment. [10] We think that under the principle of law correctly applicable here, a genuine issue of fact was raised as to the mental state of the employee [11] by the showing that the employee explicitly told the police that she had observed appellant commit a theft and saw him depart with the goods, and then the next day, without explanation, recanted a significant element of the story. The weight of authority holds that an informer who knowingly gives false information to a police officer necessarily interferes with the intelligent exercise of the officer's independent judgment and discretion and thereby becomes liable for a false arrest that later occurs. To consciously misstate the facts under such circumstances must be for the purpose of inducing action by the police.... HARPER AND JAMES, LAW OF TORTS, § 4.11 at 513 (1986); see, e.g., Du Lac v. Perma Trans Products, Inc., 103 Cal.App.3d 937, 163 Cal.Rptr. 335 (1980); Jensen v. Barnett, 178 Neb. 429, 134 N.W.2d 53 (1965); Newton v. Spence, 20 Md.App. 126, 316 A.2d 837 (1974). [12] We do not believe that the social policies at stake will be served by immunizing those who knowingly and maliciously make false reports to the police. [13] A plaintiff in a false arrest or false imprisonment suit cannot avoid summary judgment merely by alleging that the complaining witness acted with such a mental state. As we stated in Smith v. Tucker, 304 A.2d 303, 307 (D.C. 1973), a suit for the analogous tort of malicious prosecution, the possible lack of honest belief of the complainant only becomes a jury issue when this issue is raised out of the nature of the evidence. This is not a burden easily overcome in false arrest cases given the strong public policy in favor of reporting criminal activity. However, in the instant case, under the undisputed facts submitted for summary judgment, the recantation by the Eleganza employee after her explicit and detailed accusation against appellant raised an issue significant enough to withstand the summary judgment motion. Therefore, we reverse for a trial as to appellee Eleganza. Judgment for District of Columbia affirmed; judgment for Eleganza, Inc., reversed and remanded.