Opinion ID: 2192166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Application of the Limited Lockstep Doctrine

Text: Defendant argues that, notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment, this court should consider a canine sniff to be a search, within the meaning of article I, section 6. He observes, correctly, that state courts are free to independently construe their state constitutions to provide more protection than the federal constitution. He offers decisions from the courts of our sister states that have imposed a requirement of reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity before a dog sniff may be conducted. In State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 210 (Minn.2005), the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a dog sniff of a self-storage unit was a search within the meaning of the article I, section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. This provision is virtually identical to the fourth amendment (see Minn. Const., art. 1, § 10), but under Minnesota law, decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the language are merely persuasive, not authoritative. Carter, 697 N.W.2d at 210. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in Commonwealth v. Johnston, 515 Pa. 454, 466, 530 A.2d 74, 79 (1987), that although a dog sniff of the outside of a storage locker was not a search for fourth amendment purposes, it nevertheless violates state law unless the police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the place they seek to test, and the police are lawfully present in the place where the canine sniff is conducted. Under this holding, the police are not permitted to use a narcotics-detection dog or any other crime detection device, at random and without reason. Johnston, 515 Pa. at 465, 530 A.2d at 79. The wording of article I, section 8, of the Pennsylvania Constitution is also almost identical to that of the fourth amendment. See Pa. Const., art. 1, § 8. Finally, defendant cites McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska App.1991), another case in which a state court held that its state constitution requires police officers to have reasonable suspicion before conducting a warrantless canine sniff of the exterior of a warehouse. A previous appellate court decision in that state had held that a canine sniff of luggage was a search under the Alaska Constitution. McGahan, 807 P.2d at 509, citing Pooley v. State, 705 P.2d 1293, 1311 (Alaska App. 1985). Again, the language of article 1, section 14, of the Alaska Constitution tracks the language of the fourth amendment. See Alaska Const., art. 1, § 14. In each of these cases, a state court construed a state constitutional provision that does not differ in any significant respect from the fourth amendment to reach the result urged by defendant. However, in light of our continued adherence to the lockstep doctrine, albeit with some room for flexibility, these cases do not persuade us to construe the search and seizure clause of our constitution any more broadly than the search and seizure clause of the fourth amendment. We further conclude that defendant has not made a case for an exception to the lockstep doctrine. Nothing in the language of article I, section 6, or in the history of the constitutional debates suggests an intent that the use of trained dogs by the police be considered an unreasonable search or seizure. Indeed, the drafters were no doubt aware of a long history of police use of trained dogs for a variety of purposes, from search and rescue to the tracking of both lost children and fleeing felons. Despite defendant's arguments that the people of the State of Illinois will be best served by an expansive reading of the search and seizure clause of our constitution and by insulating pro-defense decisions from further review and possible reversal, we note that the people of this state have a stake in both sides of this debate. Indeed, this prosecution was brought in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, who are well served when law enforcement officers are able to detect the presence of illegal narcotics and to arrest those who violate the law. The people are also well served when law enforcement officers and other state actors are constrained from intruding upon the privacy of individuals. We conclude that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the state constitution, as construed under our limited lockstep approach, strikes the proper balance between protecting the people from unreasonable intrusion by the state and providing the people with effective law enforcement. We will not depart from the intent of the framers of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 or the understanding of voters who adopted itto the extent we are able to discern it from the language used, the committee comments, and the debateto tip the balance in favor of expanding the scope of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures that is already guaranteed by the fourth amendment. The expansion of the protections guaranteed by the state constitution can be brought about by amending the constitution or by the enactment of statutes by the General Assembly. Such expansion of rights, however, is not the function of this court. We comment, briefly, on the assertions made by defendant and his amici regarding the potential for abuse and racial profiling in the use of police dogs. These concerns, while weighty, are not at issue here. Further, such problems, where they exist, are not to be remedied by finding the reasonable use of canines for the purpose of detection of contraband unconstitutional under the search and seizure clause.