Opinion ID: 1505912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DLII's AND DHCD's REVOCATIONS OF THE PERMIT

Text: Petitioner does not challenge the BAR's jurisdiction to resolve the question whether DLII, or only DHCD, had revocation authority, and whether the permit was validly revoked. Rather, petitioner argues that he need not have pursued his BAR remedy because, after Reorganization Plan No. 3, supra, effective July 3, 1975, DED/DLII retained no permit revocation authority and thus DLII's revocation order was patently void. It follows, he says, that this court has jurisdiction to confirm that obvious conclusion as we address the issues presented in his timely petition for review of the BAR's dismissal of his appeal of DHCD's revocation of his permit.
Although petitioner does not challenge the BAR's jurisdiction to review DLII revocations, that jurisdiction is not self-evident. We choose sua sponte to address the jurisdictional issue. See Evans v. Schlein, 51 A.2d 472, 474 (D.C.1946). Central to the analysis is the BAR's jurisdiction to review revocations under Organization Order No. 112, supra, which was last amended in 1973. Part E of that Organization Order, captioned Jurisdiction of the Board, provides in relevant part: 1. The Board [of Appeals and Review], through hearing Committees, shall consider appeals from decisions in the following types of cases in which error is alleged, and make a final administrative determination sustaining, reversing, or modifying the action from which the appeal is taken or, when appropriate, dismiss the appeal or remand the case for further consideration:       Class C cases. Appeals submitted by applicants or holders of licenses, permits and certificates, from actions taken by responsible officials of the Department of Economic Development with respect to denial, suspension or revocation of a license, permit or certificate: Provided,. . . . [Emphasis added.] [The proviso is irrelevant here.] Given the fact that the BAR's jurisdiction over permit revocations derives from actions taken by responsible officials of the Department of Economic Development, id., that jurisdiction ostensibly turns on a determination of which department  DED (now DLII) or DHCD  had permit revocation authority after Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, became effective. If petitioner is correct that DED (DLII) retained only permit issuance authority, while all revocation authority was transferred to DHCD on July 3, 1975, then there is at least a colorable argument that the BAR has jurisdiction to review permit revocations only if carried out by DHCD, as the sole inheritor of DED revocation authority. It would follow that only the Superior Court, not the BAR, has jurisdiction to declare a DLII revocation ultra vires and thus a nullity (absent a contested case requiring direct review of the DLII revocation by this court). In summary, the BAR's very jurisdiction to review DLII's revocation could turn on the answer to the merits question whether DED (DLII) retained permit revocation authority after July 3, 1975. On the other hand, given BAR jurisdiction to review permit revocations by DED before July 3, 1975, one can sensibly argue that the reallocation of DED functions was surely not intended to undermine the BAR permit revocation appeal structure. It would follow that the BAR has jurisdiction, after Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, to review appeals from permit revocations by whatever Department  DLII or DHCD  purports to exercise DED's revocation authority, without regard to whether the department in question was acting ultra vires. While either argument may be valid, the critical question is a threshold one: does the BAR, or only a court, have jurisdiction to determine whether the BAR has jurisdiction to review DLII's purported revocation? We are satisfied that Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, did not affect the BAR's jurisdiction under Organization Order No. 112, supra, to review jurisdictional facts and thus to determine (subject to court review) whether it does have jurisdiction over DLII revocations. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.07 (1958). That threshold jurisdictional power is there, without regard to how the BAR, or eventually a court, would analyze the jurisdictional problem. Thus, if petitioner is correct that DLII lacks revocation authority after July 3, 1975  a contention we do not address here  he would, in timely going to the BAR, receive a useful ruling either (1) that the BAR lacks jurisdiction because it can only review revocations by a department with revocation authority (DHCD, not DLII), or (2) that the BAR does have jurisdiction and, in reaching the merits, concludes that DLII has no revocation authority. We therefore hold that the BAR at least has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction to review appeals of DLII revocations, and thus has the power to rule accordingly.
Because petitioner did not initially invoke the BAR's appellate jurisdiction over DLII's revocation of the permit, this court must dismiss, for lack of our own jurisdiction, that part of his petition for review challenging DLII's revocation of the permit. More specifically, in declining to appeal DLII's revocation to the BAR, petitioner failed to create a contested case as to that issue, which means a proceeding before the Mayor or any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by any law (other than this subchapter), or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before the Mayor or before an agency. . . . D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (1981) (emphasis added); see id., § 1-1509. The phrase after a hearing means after a trial-type hearing where such is implicitly required by either the organic act or constitutional right. Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 314 (D.C.1974) (en banc). The DCAPA, § 1-1510 (1981), appropriately limits this court's review to cases in which there has been an evidentiary hearing, meeting the contested case requirements, or at least an effort to obtain such a hearing which the agency erroneously denied. See Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission, 287 A.2d 101, 104-06 (D.C.1972); Bay River, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Commission, 26 Or.App. 717, 721, 554 P.2d 620, 622-23 (1976). Petitioner had no contested case hearing before DLII, nor was one available. In questioning DLII's action, however, he had a right to such a hearing before the BAR. He received notice of this right. He declined to invoke it. Therefore, absent BAR review, DLII's revocation became final agency action, and this court lacks jurisdiction to review it for lack of a contested case. Id.
The next question is whether petitioner can collaterally attack the validity of DLII's permit revocation by challenging it in Superior Court (absent our contested case review). Petitioner argues that if this court lacks jurisdiction to address the DLII revocation issue (as we now have held), the Superior Court does have jurisdiction to declare both the DLII and DHCD revocations invalid; that he had no responsibility to exhaust his BAR remedy for the DLII revocation because that action was patently void; and that we accordingly should reverse the court's dismissal of the complaint and remand for further proceedings on the revocation issue. We disagree. There can be cases where an agency clearly appears, on the face of the record, to exceed its jurisdiction. Thus, [n]o court requires exhaustion when exhaustion will involve irreparable injury and when the agency is palpably without jurisdiction. 3 K. DAVIS, supra, § 20.02, at 56; accord Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Board, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 189, 466 F.2d 345, 360 (1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974) (recognizing irreparable injury standard, but finding that no such injury existed in that case). On the other hand, exhaustion may not be avoided by the mere assertion that an agency is operating ultra vires,  id., and probably every court requires exhaustion when the question presented is one within the agency's specialization and when the administrative remedy is as likely as the judicial remedy to provide the wanted relief. 3 K. DAVIS, supra, § 20.01 at 56-57. Noting that [i]n between these extremes is a vast array of problems on which judicial action is variable and difficult or impossible to predict, id. at 57, Professor Davis proposes that the courts decide whether exhaustion is required by reference to three factors: extent of injury from pursuit of administrative remedy, degree of apparent clarity or doubt about administrative jurisdiction, and involvement of specialized administrative understanding in the question of jurisdiction. Id., § 20.03, at 69. As applied to this case, each of these factors militates in favor of the District's argument that petitioner, in order to challenge DLII's revocation of his permit, was required to exhaust his BAR appeal rights  of which he had clear notice  rather than go to Superior Court. First, given the fact that petitioner himself invoked the BAR's jurisdiction to review DHCD's revocation, we perceive no possible injury if petitioner had pursued a BAR appeal of the DLII revocation. Second, there are no clear answers to the related questions whether the BAR has jurisdiction to review DLII revocations under Organization Order No. 112, and whether DLII, or only DHCD, received permit revocation authority from DLI by way of DED under Reorganization Order No. 55, supra, Commissioner's Order No. 69-96, supra, Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1975, supra, and Mayor's Order 78-42, supra  as the complexity of the parties' respective arguments shows (Part II., supra ). Finally, given the BAR's central role in permit revocation at least since Reorganization Order No. 55, supra, as well as the consistent interpretation by the various officials involved that DLI's permit revocation authority was inherent in DED's (now DLII's) permit issuance authority, it is clear that the BAR's specialized administrative understanding will be helpful to a court's ultimate resolution of the related questions whether the BAR has jurisdiction over DLII revocations and whether DLII has authority to revoke a permit. Accordingly, subject to our resolution of one remaining concern, petitioner's failure to exhaust his BAR appeal rights with respect to DLII's revocation of his sign permit is fatal to his Superior Court case insofar as he sought a declaratory judgment that DLII's revocation was invalid. Bay River, Inc., supra, 26 Or.App. at 721, 554 P.2d at 623; see Rhodes v. Quaorm, 465 A.2d 370, 372-73 (D.C.1983); Pender v. District of Columbia, 430 A.2d 513, 515 (D.C.1981); Tarpley v. District of Columbia, 342 A.2d 14, 16 (D.C.1975). The remaining concern is that petitioner no longer has a BAR remedy for the DLII revocation, the time for appeal having expired. This suggests the question whether DLII's revocation must be deemed valid, despite petitioner's Superior Court challenge to DLII's very authority  its jurisdiction  to revoke permits. The answer is yes. The BAR had jurisdiction to determine the jurisdictional facts that would be dispositive of the question whether DLII had authority to revoke permits. See 2 K. DAVIS, supra, § 18.07; Part III.A., supra. Petitioner knew he could seek an administrative remedy through the BAR. He chose to forego it. Thus, DLII's revocation, not appealed to the BAR, is a final decision which, under principles of res judicata (as an issue that might have been litigated), is not subject to collateral attack, even though the challenge is to DLII's jurisdiction, not merely to the appropriateness of the revocation by a department with unquestioned jurisdiction to revoke permits. McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 536 F.2d 910 (10th Cir.1976); see Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 15, 83 (1980) (and commentary); 2 K. DAVIS, supra, § 18.07; cf. First National Bank of Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S.Ct. 385, 68 L.Ed. 784 (1924) (waiver theory applicable when agency's jurisdiction is not contested); 3 K. DAVIS, supra, §§ 20.07, -.10 (same). It follows that DLII's revocation of petitioner's permit must be deemed valid.
The foregoing analysis establishes the validity of DLII's revocation of petitioner's permit, without considering the merits of the respective arguments for and against DLII's authority to do so. Given the validity of that revocation, however, DHCD's revocation order was redundant. Any effort to review DHCD's revocation, whether by the Superior Court or by the BAR and this court, would be superfluous. Therefore, as to DHCD's revocation, we must dismiss both the appeal and the petition for review as moot. [10]