Opinion ID: 2618078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Statements of Deceased.

Text: In her capacity as creditor of Hewett, and not as executrix of the estate, Grace Daly filed a claim against the estate in the amount of $11,175 for board and room furnished Hewett at various times between 1949 and 1955. This claim was allowed and approved by the probate court in the order settling the final account of the executrix. At the hearing conducted by the probate court on the executrix' final report and account, Grace Daly testified in support of her claim as follows: Mr. Hartlieb: Mrs. Daly tell the Judge in your own words what if any financial arrangements or understanding existed between you and Mr. Hewett as to his living quarters.       Mrs. Daly: He asked when he came up here that he was broke and that I help him until he could get to work and when he worked he got drunk and couldn't pay me anything and I had to kick him out and then he got sick and had to have a doctor for quite a while and then worked for a little while and drank again and finally they sent him out. The Court: Limit your answer. Mrs. Daly: He said he would pay when he got to work. Mr. Hartlieb: Did he ever pay you anything? Mrs. Daly: No. Nellie Hewett contends that this testimony was inadmissible on the ground that the decedent's statements do not fall within the exception to the common-law rule provided by the Alaska deadman's statute. That statute (Section 58-6-1, ACLA 1949) reads as follows: Matters affecting credibility: Statements of deceased person. Neither parties nor other persons who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding are excluded as witnesses; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor persons on account of their opinions on matters of religious belief; although in every case, except the latter, the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question, according to the rules of the common law. When a party to a civil action or suit by or against an executor or administrator appears as a witness in his own behalf, statements of the deceased whether oral or in writing concerning the same subject may also be shown. The statute as originally enacted in 1913 [18] was comprised of only the first sentence of what now appears as Section 58-6-1. This had the effect of removing the common-law disqualification of interest, and brought two important witnesses, the plaintiff and the defendant, into the trial of almost every suit. However, when the accident of death had withdrawn one of these witnesses, the testimony of the other gave him, as a party, an undue advantage. [19] An example of this would be where the defendant had died and the plaintiff testified as to declarations made by the defendant during his lifetime. If these statements were against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the decedent, they would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. But the personal representative of the deceased could not rebut such evidence with statements that the latter had made in his favor, because those statements would be barred by the rule against hearsay testimony. Probably for this reason the Alaska Legislature in 1931 [20] added the last sentence to the existing statute. As Professor Wigmore has pointed out, the avowed purpose of such a statute was merely to place the deceased party's case on an equal footing, in respect to sources of proof, with that of the surviving opponent. [21] This act was construed by the late Judge Folta in the case of Murkowski v. Lien, D.C.D.Alaska 1953, 115 F. Supp. 889, 14 Alaska 450. He held that declarations of a decedent are not admissible on behalf of his personal representative in an action brought by him except in rebuttal. Thus, declarations of a decedent in his favor, not admissible under the hearsay rule, become admissible only after the one asserting the claim against the estate or defending a claim interposed against him on behalf of the estate has first testified. In this case, however, there was no attempt to introduce statements of the decedent which would tend to defeat a claim against his estate. Grace Daly was testifying, not as executrix in favor of decedent, but as one asserting a claim against the estate. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider the exception to the common-law rule found in the last sentence of the statute. This testimony was admissible. Grace Daly was not disqualified as a witness on account of interest. [22] The statements which she reported Hewett as having made constituted an acknowledgment of a debt which he owed to her and thus would be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule because they were statements against Hewett's pecuniary interests. As Professor McCormick has pointed out in his work on evidence: In respect to declarations against pecuniary interests, the clearest example is the acknowledgement that the declarant is indebted. [23] Therefore, there was no error in permitting Grace Daly to testify as she did. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.