Opinion ID: 1738770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the act involve an element of choice or judgment?

Text: ¶ 14. Stewart argues that the City's abandonment an elderly and infirm patron to make her way alone from the City of Jackson's van up two (2) ramps and into the adult day care center was not discretionary conduct. In the analysis of whether an act of negligence alleged is ministerial or discretionary conduct, this Court has acknowledged that it is not always easy to determine whether a public official's conduct is ministerial or discretionary in any given case. T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1345 (Miss.1995). Since both statutory and common law immunity require a determination of discretion, prior case law can be used to define discretionary conduct. L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141. A duty is discretionary if it requires the official to use her own judgment and discretion in the performance thereof. Noblitt, 650 So.2d at 1343 (citing Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935)). ¶ 15. In contrast, an act is ministerial (if) the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or under conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion. L.W., 754 So.2d at 1141. However, even if the court deems the act to be ministerial: [The governmental entity] and its employees are protected from liability while performing or failing to perform a statutory duty so long as ordinary care is exercised. However, when ordinary care is not exercised, neither ... [the governmental entity] nor its employees will be protected from liability for performing or failing to perform a statutorily imposed duty. Lang v. Bay St. Louis/Waveland Sch. Dist., 764 So.2d 1234, 1240 (Miss.1999). ¶ 16. The duty to transport the Center's patrons, including Stewart, was a contractual obligation, not a statutorily imposed duty. Determining whether certain patrons needed assistance walking from the van to the Center clearly involved judgment and choice. As such, the decision to allow Stewart to walk unassisted was not ministerial, but instead discretionary. However, that merely satisfies the first prong of the three-prong analysis necessary to determine whether the City of Jackson and Spiller are covered by a grant of immunity.