Opinion ID: 1235015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Deference under Skidmore

Text: Applying the factors articulated in Skidmore, we find that the methodology utilized in Program Statement 5880.28 is both persuasive and reasonable. Under Skidmore, one of the factors we consider is the rational validity of the agency decision. See The Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1068. In Pacheco-Camacho and Mujahid, we already determined that the BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b) via its regulation, § 523.20, is reasonable. See Mujahid, 413 F.3d at 998; Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270-1271. Because Program Statement 5880.28 provides an interpretation of the federal statute identical to that in § 523.20, our conclusion in Pacheco-Camacho regarding the reasonableness of § 523.20 applies to it with equal force. In Pacheco-Camacho, we found that the BOP's methodology for calculating good time conduct credits was reasonable because it comports with the statutory language of section 3624(b).... Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270. In particular, we examined the statutory language of § 3624(b) and focused on its final sentence, which reads, credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence. Id. at 1268-69 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1)). Under the BOP's reading of the statute, the model prisoner will ordinarily receive his fifty-four-day credit after complying with prison disciplinary rules for 365 days.... Id. (emphasis in original). During the last year or portion of a year of the prisoner's sentence, the BOP would prorate the 54 days of credit a year to 0.148 day of credit for every actual day served during good behavior (54/365 = 0.148). Id. at 1267-68. Like Tablada, the plaintiff in Pacheco-Camacho read the statute as awarding good time credit based on the sentence imposed, so a prisoner with a ten-year sentence would receive 54-days per year multiplied by ten years, or 540 days. We found the plaintiff's reading inconsistent with a statute that contemplates prorating credit for the last year of imprisonment. See id. at 1269. We pointed out that under the plaintiff's interpretation (or in this case Tablada's), the model prisoner would receive a 54-day credit after serving only 311 days (365 days-54 days), thus conferring a windfall on prisoners. Id. We noted that [n]othing in the statute clearly suggests that Congress intended to give the prisoner such a windfall in his last year. Id. Likewise in Mujahid, we reaffirmed the BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b) as reasonable and subject to deference. See Mujahid, 413 F.3d at 997. In addition to the statutory language, we also discussed in Pacheco-Camacho the legislative history of § 3624, and determined that the BOP's methodology for calculating good time conduct credits does not subvert the statutory design. Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270. By enacting § 3624, Congress sought to simplify the computation of good time credits which, under its predecessor statute, computed good time credits after every month served. Id. at 1269. Thus, unlike the earlier scheme which called for calculating good time credits at different monthly rates depending on the length of the prison term and which allowed prison officials discretion to withhold and restore credits depending on the inmate's subsequent behavior, the new system embodied in § 3624 envisioned that a prisoner could calculate with certainty the time of his release. Id. Acknowledging the complexity of the BOP's computation method, we explained that Congress chose to tolerate the additional complexity in order to arrive at a more equitable result, namely an effective and fair prorating scheme, enabling inmates to calculate with reasonable certainty the end of their imprisonment.... Id. at 1270. In sum, based on our reasoning in Pacheco-Camacho and Mujahid, we find that the methodology utilized in Program Statement 5880.28 has rational validity. Another factor we consider under Skidmore is whether the agency has applied its position consistently. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228, 121 S.Ct. 2164; Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417, 113 S.Ct. 2151, 124 L.Ed.2d 368 (1993). Here, BOP Program Statement 5880.28 has been in effect for at least sixteen years, since its implementation in 1992. See Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211, 1221-1222 (9th Cir. 2000) (treating unambiguous language in a program statement as binding upon the BOP). Moreover, Program Statement 5880.28 incorporated the same sentencing credit methodology the BOP had been practicing since 1987. Tablada has not identified any instances where the BOP used any other methodology for calculating good time credits, including the methodology he proposes. We may thus assume that for more than twenty years, the BOP has consistently implemented its policy of calculating good time credits based on time served rather than sentence imposed. While Tablada and others may have asserted a reasonable alternative interpretation, i.e., calculating good time credits based on sentence imposed rather than time served, the consistent and even application of the BOP's methodology promulgated in Program Statement 5880.28 since 1992 convinces us that we must accord deference to the BOP's interpretation. To change course now would have an extremely disruptive effect on the BOP's administration of the release of federal prisoners. Given this consideration, as well as the reasonableness of the BOP's interpretation of § 3624(b)(1) discussed in Pacheco-Camacho, we conclude that the BOP's methodology for calculating good time credits in Program Statement 5880.28 is reasonable and persuasive. Finally, we address Tablada's argument that the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) has provided the appropriate standard by which to interpret § 3624. Tablada insists that the Commission has interpreted the good time credit statute to mean a prisoner earns credit on each year of the sentence imposed. He contends that the fact that the Commission interprets § 3624 in this manner means that the proper remedy for the BOP's APA violation is to implement Tablada's interpretation, rather than the time served rule unless and until the BOP adopts a regulation complying with the APA that passes judicial muster. Congress charged the Commission with establishing sentencing ranges for offenses, 28 U.S.C. § 994(b), and instructed it, as a starting point in its development of the initial sets of guidelines, to ascertain the average sentences imposed and length of terms served prior to creation of the Commission. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). [5] The Commission then engaged in a statistical analysis of data from thousands of sentences, and presented the results in the Levels Table in June 1987. See United States Sentencing Commission, Supplementary Report on the Initial Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements, at 27-39. Table 1(a), Estimated Time Served for Baseline Offenses: 1st Time Offenders, Convicted at Trial, Sentenced to Prison, Adjusted for Good Time presents a statistical analysis of average sentences. See id. In the Supplementary Report, the Commission provided a definition of the term adjusted for good time: Adjusted for good time.  Prison time was increased by dividing by 0.85 good time when the term exceeded 12 months. This adjustment corrected for the good time (resulting in early release) that would be earned under the guidelines. This adjustment made sentences in the Levels Table comparable with those in the guidelines (which refer to sentences prior to the awarding of good time). Id. at 23. Tablada asserts that every federal prisoner has a term of imprisonment imposed based on a Sentencing Table that assumes good time credit based on 15% of the sentence imposed. [6] He claims that because the Commission was acting in its authority to interpret the Sentencing Reform Act  including § 3624(b) covering good time credit  the Commission's (and Tablada's interpretation) should prevail. We are not persuaded by Tablada's argument. First, if the Commission felt the BOP was erroneously interpreting § 3624(b), it had ample opportunity to make its objections known during the notice and comment periods for 28 C.F.R. § 523.20, in September 1997 and June 2003. The Commission, however, remained silent. Second and more importantly, we have already found that the BOP is the agency charged with interpreting the good time credit statute. See Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1270 (While the statute does not explicitly vest the BOP with the authority to determine the basis for the proration of good time credits, this power is implied by the BOP's statutory authority [under 18 U.S.C. § 3624] to award good time credits to inmates serving federal sentences). For these reasons, Tablada's argument cannot stand.