Opinion ID: 2120964
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Substitution Motion

Text: Defendant contends that, at the 1987 Batson hearing, the trial judge openly held a strong and fixed predisposition, manifested at the 1982 proceedings, that legitimate reasons underlay the disputed challenges of black venire members. Accordingly, defendant contends that his 1987 motion for substitution of judge was erroneously denied and that the ensuing hearing did not comport with due process of law. ( People ex rel. Przyblinski v. Scott (1959), 23 Ill.App.2d 167, 170, 161 N.E.2d 705 aff'd (1960), 19 Ill.2d 500, 167 N.E.2d 194; United States v. Sciuto (7th Cir.1976), 531 F.2d 842, 845.) As examples of cases in which judicial predisposition was held to have warranted substitution of judges, defendant cites People v. Chatman (1967), 36 Ill.2d 305, 223 N.E.2d 110, and People v. Robinson (1974), 18 Ill.App.3d 804, 310 N.E.2d 652. As evidence of the trial judge's alleged predisposition, defendant also points to the judge's inquiry of defense counsel at the Batson hearing as to whether a challenge could be based on the differing races of defendant and victim and to the judge's response that he was not too sure that counsel's negative reply was correct. However, when defendant made his motion for substitution of judge, he failed to adduce any of the reasons he now sets forth. (Granted, when defendant made his motion, he could not yet have referred to the trial judge's later comments regarding differing races of defendants and victims, but neither did defendant make any attempt to renew the motion thereafter.) The entire exchange between counsel and judge pertaining to the motion was as follows: MR. [ISAACSON, assistant public defender]: We're going to file this motion with the clerk. It's an SOJ. I'll tender a copy to the State. MR. ARTHUR [assistant State's Attorney]: Acknowledge receipt, Judge. THE COURT: I don't know under what section you are filing this. MR. [ISAACSON]: The reason we don't say the section is that there is no law on it. As Your Honor knows what this really is is an SOJ for cause. Obviously it's a matter of right because it's not here for trial. THE COURT: It's going to be denied. What else? Section 114-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 114-5) requires that a motion for substitution of judge be in writing ( People v. Agnew (1983), 97 Ill.2d 354, 358, 73 Ill.Dec. 544, 454 N.E.2d 641) and that, if more than a statutorily limited time has elapsed after a cause has been placed on a judge's trial call, the motion be supported by affidavit showing cause for the substitution (see People v. Marshall (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 968, 974-75, 118 Ill.Dec. 256, 521 N.E.2d 538). Defendant has not pointed out where, if at all, his motion is to be found in the record on appeal, and we have not discovered it. Assuming that the written motion was supported by any requisite affidavit and that the trial judge's statement that the motion was going to be denied amounted to denial, it is true, as defendant contends, that the trial judge summarily denied the motion: Defense counsel was not invited to proceed except for answering the judge's query regarding the statutory section under which the motion was brought. In turn, this at least calls into question whether the statutory mandate to conduct a hearing and determine the merits of the motion was complied with. (See Ill.Rev. Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c); cf. People v. Myles (1980), 83 Ill.App.3d 843, 852-53, 39 Ill.Dec. 1, 404 N.E.2d 385, rev'd on other grounds (1981), 86 Ill.2d 260, 55 Ill. Dec. 939, 427 N.E.2d 59 (oral argument was sufficient without evidentiary hearing when judge knew defendant's reasons for motion and had conducted proceeding that prompted it); People v. Spurlark (1978), 67 Ill.App.3d 186, 201, 23 Ill.Dec. 860, 384 N.E.2d 767 (explicitly extending opportunity for oral argument constituted sufficient hearing); People v. Pinchott (1977), 55 Ill. App.3d 601, 602-03, 13 Ill.Dec. 267, 370 N.E.2d 1294 (oral argument opportunity constituted hearing).) We note parenthetically that, at the time of the Batson hearing, the hearing on a motion for substitution of judge did not have to be before a different judge if the motion was made under section 114-5(c) after more than a limited time had elapsed since a cause was placed on a judge's trial call. Since the time of the Batson hearing, an amendment to the section has become effective, requiring that a judge not named in the motion conduct the hearing. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c). Nevertheless, precisely because the written motion is absent from the record, and because the report of proceedings fails to show that defendant made any attempt to present to the trial judge the grounds on which defendant now relies in support of his motion, defendant through procedural default has waived such grounds for appeal purposes. (See People v. Curtiss (1984), 126 Ill.App.3d 568, 572-73, 81 Ill.Dec. 753, 467 N.E.2d 624; People v. Bach (1979), 74 Ill.App.3d 893, 896, 30 Ill.Dec. 527, 393 N.E.2d 563.) Moreover, lack of specificity in a motion for substitution of judge has been held to be a valid reason for denying it even when no hearing is held on the motion. People v. Marshall (1988), 165 Ill.App.3d 968, 975, 118 Ill.Dec. 256, 521 N.E.2d 538. Nor would our plain error doctrine (see 107 Ill.2d R. 615(a)) apply even if defendant sought to invoke it (which he has not done). That doctrine permits us to take notice of plain errors and defects affecting substantial rights in instances where the evidence is closely balanced or where the error affected the fundamental fairness of the proceeding. ( People v. Fields (1990), 135 Ill.2d 18, 56, 142 Ill.Dec. 200, 552 N.E.2d 791.) Here, the evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming. If it is evidence pertinent to the substitution motion itself on which we are to focus, such evidence would have concerned whether cause existed for allowing the motion. We have already observed that defendant has failed to show that any such evidence at all was presented by affidavit or, even informally, in open court when his motion was made. Thus, there is no question of a close balance, regardless of which body of evidence is to be considered. Neither can we say that the fundamental fairness of the proceedings was impaired by denying the substitution motion. Finally, we note the strong presumption that judges rely only on proper evidence in reaching determinations on the merits. The fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a defendant on a previous occasion does not necessarily disqualify the judge from later sitting in judgment of the same defendant's claims. See People v. Vance (1979), 76 Ill.2d 171, 178, 28 Ill.Dec. 508, 390 N.E.2d 867; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill.2d 286, 310, 24 Ill.Dec. 508, 385 N.E.2d 649; People v. Beasley (1982), 108 Ill.App.3d 301, 309, 63 Ill.Dec. 942, 438 N.E.2d 1305; People v. Massarella (1979), 80 Ill.App.3d 552, 565, 36 Ill.Dec. 16, 400 N.E.2d 436. Thus, the fact that the trial judge had rejected defendant's claim of discrimination in jury selection on the basis of 1982 law does not by itself imply that the judge would hold a strong predisposition and would not fairly decide defendant's renewed claim on the basis of 1987 law. The trial judge did consider defendant's claims and rejected them, stating that he had heard nothing in 1987 that would alter the conclusion he had enunciated in 1982. This had the same effect as setting forth in full again his 1982 conclusions. However, the State does stray when it argues that we did not direct the trial judge to make his reasoning of record. As we have already observed, our remand order did specifically direct the circuit court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and to file them with our court's clerk. The fact that the circuit court failed to comply diligently with this order, though regrettable, does not undermine our conclusion that the trial judge's 1987 reaffirmance of his 1982 findings represented substantial compliance with his Batson obligations.