Opinion ID: 1224644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuances of the Disposition Hearing by Court Order or Waiver

Text: While the language of RCW 13.40.150(3)(f) regarding the setting of restitution at the disposition hearing is mandatory, we believe the Juvenile Justice Act and our case law permit exceptions to that general rule.
Both RCW 13.40.130(8) and JuCR 7.12(a) establish the time frame in which the juvenile's disposition hearing must be held. RCW 13.40.130(8) states: The disposition hearing shall be held within fourteen days after the adjudicatory hearing or plea of guilty unless good cause is shown for further delay, or within twenty-one days if the juvenile is not held in a detention facility, unless good cause is shown for further delay. Similarly, JuCR 7.12(a) provides: A disposition hearing shall be held if the juvenile has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty by the court. The hearing may be held immediately following the juvenile's plea of guilty or immediately following the adjudicatory hearing if found guilty by the court. By their terms, RCW 13.40.130(8) and JuCR 7.12(a) authorize the juvenile court to continue a disposition hearing. Thus, the juvenile court could initially determine a disposition for a juvenile and continue the hearing, upon a showing of good cause, for entry of a final disposition which might include restitution. In the present case, the State did not file a formal motion to continue the disposition hearing pursuant to RCW 13.40.130(8)/JuCR 7.12(a). We have no basis upon which to conclude the trial court properly set the November 22, 1993 restitution hearing, in effect, as a continuation of the statutory disposition hearing.
Mollichi contends that the trial court here lacked jurisdiction to hold a separate restitution hearing... Pet. for Review at 3. Moreover, Mollichi argues no party can confer jurisdiction which exceeds that statutorily granted to the trial court. Pet. for Review at 6 n. 4. We disposed of this jurisdictional argument in Moen in the context of the SRA: [U]ntimely imposition of restitution as a condition of a sentence is not a jurisdictional defect. Moen, 129 Wash.2d at 545, 919 P.2d 69. Similarly, the requirement that restitution be set in a disposition hearing is not jurisdictional and may be waived by the juvenile. [4] We must now turn to the circumstances which evidence a waiver. Looking by analogy to the cases involving waiver of the time frame for setting restitution in the adult system, we note that an adult offender may agree to have restitution set in a hearing outside the mandatory time frame for setting restitution in the SRA. In In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of Fleming, 129 Wash.2d 529, 919 P.2d 66 (1996), two prisoners filed personal restraint petitions complaining the court entered their restitution orders beyond the 60-day statutory time limit. We dismissed both petitions because the petitioners had not demonstrated a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice requiring dismissal of the restitution orders. Id. at 533, 919 P.2d 66. Additionally, we indicated a defendant may not collaterally attack a restitution order entered by agreement where the defendant waived the 60-day limit for restitution hearings: While a defendant cannot agree to have the court act outside its authority or jurisdiction, the Petitioners in this case can hardly argue they have been subject to a complete miscarriage of justice when the sentencing court had the authority to order restitution at the time of sentencing but did not on the basis of the Petitioners' request to defer the restitution hearings. Id. at 534, 919 P.2d 66. Petitioner Smith's restitution hearing was continued beyond the 60-day limit at his own request because he wanted to obtain additional evidence to contest the State's assertion of the restitution amount. Fleming was sentenced and ordered to pay an amount of restitution to be determined at a later time. He then disputed the amount requested so that a hearing was necessary to set the amount of restitution. The restitution hearing was not scheduled until more than a year after sentencing. Although we said: we note that Fleming and Smith both agreed to the continuation of their restitution hearings, Fleming, 129 Wash.2d at 534, 919 P.2d 66, there is no indication in the record that Fleming himself requested the 60-day limit be enlarged. Fleming did request a continuance of the restitution hearing, but not until one year after the statutory limit had been exceeded. Fleming appears to apply only to PRP cases, where the standard of reviewfundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justiceis probably exacting enough to overcome most challenges to lateness in determining the restitution amount. Thus, Fleming left open the more general question of whether a court has authority to enter a restitution order beyond the statutory limit even if the defendant agrees to a waiver. In State v. Hunsicker, 129 Washed 554, 919 P.2d 79 (1996), Hunsicker entered into a plea agreement in which he agreed to pay restitution of $1,800 for eight forged checks. Id. at 555, 919 P.2d 79. The restitution hearing occurred well beyond the 60-day limit. Hunsicker challenged the restitution order. We affirmed the restitution order on the ground Hunsicker had entered into an agreement to pay a specific amount of restitution as part of his plea agreement. Plea agreements are contracts. Id. at 559, 919 P.2d 79. Because Hunsicker had agreed to pay a specified amount at the time of his sentencing, we held that Hunsicker's restitution was determined within the statutory time requirement. Id. at 560, 919 P.2d 79. Thus, the statutory imperative to determine the amount of restitution within 60 days was honored. Entry of the order of restitution was a ministerial formality under such circumstances. Finally, in State v. Moen, 129 Wash.2d 535, 919 P.2d 69 (1996), Moen expressed his desire in open court to pay restitution to his victim. An order of restitution was entered at the time of his sentencing, but the order required the amount to be set at a later date. A restitution order was subsequently entered three weeks beyond the 60-day limit. Moen objected to the entry of that order on timeliness grounds. We agreed with Moen, and reversed the restitution order in a 5-4 decision distinguishing Moen from Hunsicker by noting, While the defendant expressed a desire to pay restitution, it was not part of any plea agreement. Id. at 540, 919 P.2d 69. In fact, there had been no quid pro quo because Moen had been convicted of an offense resulting in injury to another, and under RCW 9.94A.142(2), the court was required to enter a restitution order with or without Moen's agreement. Id. at 540, 919 P.2d 69. However, we indicated a waiver by the defendant of the statutory time limit might be effective: We will not construe an uncontested order entered after the mandatory 60-day period of former RCW 9.94A.142(1) had passed as a waiver of that timeliness requirement Id. at 542, 919 P.2d 69. Notwithstanding the mandatory language of RCW 13.40.150(3)(f), we believe there are circumstances where a juvenile may waive the statutory requirement of setting restitution at the disposition hearing in accordance with the time frames established by RCW 13.40.130(8)/JuCR 7.12(a). Our case law on restitution hearings under the SRA affords some guidance with regard to these circumstances. A juvenile may agree to continue the disposition hearing [5] or may even agree to set restitution at a different time. Moreover, as we said in Hunsicker, where the offender has contractually undertaken to pay restitution pursuant to a plea agreement, the offender is bound by the terms of the agreement. We now turn to the question of whether Mollichi's actions in this case constituted a waiver of RCW 13.40.150(3)(f) and RCW 13.40.130(8)/JuCR 7.12(a).