Opinion ID: 2197239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common-Law Negligence Claims

Text: The firefighter's rule, a product of this State's long-standing common law, precludes firefighters and police officers from recovering damages for injuries caused by negligence in the very situations that create the occasion for their services ( Santangelo v State of New York , 71 N.Y.2d 393, 397). The rule is applied to bar common-law negligence claims where the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers [and firefighters] are expected to assume as part of their duties ( Cooper v City of New York , 81 N.Y.2d 584, 590, supra ). The rationale for applying the firefighter rule has evolved from the initial theory that public safety officers, as licensees entering upon the land, took the property as they found it. With that rationale undermined by Basso v Miller (40 N.Y.2d 233), subsequent cases retained the firefighter rule by reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk  i.e., that persons who accept employment as firefighters or police assume the risks of fire-related or crime-fighting-related injuries, including the risk that property owners and occupants may negligently maintain their premises ( McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co. , 26 AD2d 186, 190, affd 20 N.Y.2d 921). Continued application of the bar is presently grounded on the public policy against awarding damages to firefighters and police for hazards that create a need for their services and which they are hired, specially trained and compensated to confront ( Santangelo v State of New York , 71 NY2d, at 397, supra ). In an apparent effort to abate the harsh effects of the firefighter rule, some courts in this State created an exception to the bar of common-law negligence claims where the negligent act causing the injury was separate and apart from the act occasioning the need for the officer's services ( see, e.g. , Starkey v Trancamp Contr. Corp. , 152 AD2d 358, 361). As the Appellate Division in each of the cases before us correctly stated, however, that exception was rejected by this Court in Cooper v City of New York (81 N.Y.2d 584, 590, supra ). In Cooper , this Court explained that the determinative factor in applying the firefighter rule's bar is whether the injury sustained is related to the particular dangers which police officers [and firefighters] are expected to assume as part of their duties ( id. , at 590). In these three cases we are essentially asked to define when the requisite connection exists between the plaintiff's injury and the special hazards associated with police and fire duties ( see , id. , at 591). We hold that that necessary connection is present where the performance of the police officer's or firefighter's duties increased the risk of the injury happening, and did not merely furnish the occasion for the injury. In other words, where some act taken in furtherance of a specific police or firefighting function exposed the officer to a heightened risk of sustaining the particular injury, he or she may not recover damages for common-law negligence. By contrast, a common-law negligence claim may proceed where an officer is injured in the line of duty merely because he or she happened to be present in a given location, but was not engaged in any specific duty that increased the risk of receiving that injury. For example, if a police officer who is simply walking on foot patrol is injured by a flower pot that fortuitously falls from an apartment window, the officer can recover damages because nothing in the acts undertaken in the performance of police duties placed him or her at increased risk for that accident to happen. On the other hand, if an officer is injured by a suspect who struggles to avoid an arrest, the rule precludes recovery in tort because the officer is specially trained and compensated to confront such dangers. Applying the pertinent principles to the cases before us, we conclude that the common-law negligence claims in all three cases were properly dismissed. In Zanghi , which involved the police officer who slipped on the snow-covered metal plate, the officer's own trial testimony established that he was focused solely on quickly reaching the picketer who was packing the snowball. Thus, the emergent circumstances exposed plaintiff Zanghi to the risk of injury from slipping on the plate concealed by patches of snow  a risk similar to that faced by the police officers in Cooper , who drove in excess of the speed limit and without regard for the attendant weather and lighting conditions. Accordingly, the risk of slipping while approaching the strikers was one of the particular risks of employment that plaintiff Zanghi was compensated to confront. Likewise, injury to a firefighter due to the collapse of a burning building is one of the particular risks firefighters are asked to brave by their employment. Without doubt, the performance of the firefighting duties by plaintiffs Spoth and Raquet in Raquet v Braun increased the risk of being injured by the collapse of the roof and exterior wall. Also, police officers are commonly called to render assistance to other officers, and may respond in a variety of ways. The primary goal of the officers is to reach the fellow servant quickly and to render assistance; care and caution in the steps taken to reach that location are naturally compromised. The risk that an officer may be injured during the response, due to the loss of footing, a blow out on a tire, or a car collision at an intersection is inherent in police duties. Thus, the officers in Ruocco , who were rushing down stairs to reach a co-worker in need of assistance, were at an increased risk of injury precisely because of the nature of the duty they were performing  responding to a call for backup  and are barred from recovering damages for common-law negligence by the firefighter rule.