Opinion ID: 194534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Adequacy of the Searches

Text: Plaintiff next contends that the defendant agencies did not conduct adequate searches for responsive documents. Plaintiff directs most of her brief to this argument. However, as with plaintiff's arguments regarding the defendant agencies' Vaughn indices, plaintiff's contentions with respect to the adequacy of the agencies' searches lack merit and, in some instances, ignore agency affidavits that cure deficiencies noted by the district court in earlier affidavits. The adequacy of an agency's search for documents under the FOIA is judged by a standard of reasonableness and depends upon the facts of each case. E.g., Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. 1984). The crucial issue is not whether relevant documents might exist, but whether the agency's search was reasonably -24- calculated to discover the requested documents. Safecard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C., 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In order to establish the adequacy of its search, the agency may rely upon affidavits provided they are relatively detailed and nonconclusory, and are submitted by responsible agency officials in good faith. E.g., Miller v. United States Dept. of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1985); Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1485. A satisfactory agency affidavit should, at a minimum, describe in reasonable detail the scope and method by which the search was conducted. See, e.g., Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68; Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The affidavit should additionally describe at least generally the structure of the agency's file system which makes further search difficult. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. I.R.S., 792 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.). If an agency fails to establish through reasonably detailed affidavits that its search was reasonable, the FOIA requester may avert summary judgment merely by showing that the agency might have discovered a responsive document had the agency conducted a reasonable search. E.g., Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983). However, if an agency demonstrates that it has conducted a reasonably thorough search, the FOIA requester -25- can rebut the agency's affidavit only by showing that the agency's search was not made in good faith. Miller, 779 F.2d at 1383. An agency's affidavit is accorded a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by 'purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.' Safecard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1200 (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Plaintiff complains, first, that the FBI, the Customs Service, and the State Department failed to search alternate spellings and files containing the information of cohorts. Plaintiff also charges that unspecified clues contained in the four documents released to her by the State Department might have indicated other potential repositories of information that the State Department should have searched. Plaintiff's FOIA request, however, was limited to information pertaining to Robert Thompson.14 Because the scope of a search is limited by a plaintiff's FOIA request, there is no general requirement that an agency search secondary references or variant spellings. See Gillin v. IRS, No. 92-1803, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. December 7, 1992) (quoting Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 955 (D.C. 14. Plaintiff sent identical FOIA requests to each defendant agency stating the following: I am requesting, through the FOIA, any information you may have concerning my former husband, Robert Thompson. He disappeared along with Robert Swanner on a flight over Cuba in December of 1961. -26- Cir. 1986)) (The adequacy of an agency's search 'is measured by the reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific request.'). Nor is there any requirement that an agency conduct further searches on the basis of unspecified clues in released documents. Second, plaintiff complains that the declarations submitted by the FBI and the CIA were not based on personal knowledge. However, an agency need not submit an affidavit from the employee who actually conducted the search. Instead, an agency may rely on an affidavit of an agency employee responsible for supervising the search. E.g., Safecard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1201; cf. Weisberg v. United States Dept. of Justice, 627 F.2d 365, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (court holds that affidavit was inadequate because it was not based upon personal knowledge of affiant or anyone else), appeal on remand, 705 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Here, the FBI submitted several declarations of David Lieberman, a supervisor in the FOIA section of the FBI's records division, who reviewed the information in his official capacity. Similarly, the CIA submitted the declarations of John Wright and Katherine Stricker, the persons responsible for directing FOIA searches at the CIA and determining the applicability of FOIA exemptions. These affidavits, although partly secondhand, are sufficient to satisfy the government's burden of submitting affidavits of responsible agency officials. -27- Plaintiff also makes numerous arguments directed at just one of the defendant agencies. With respect to the FBI, plaintiff contends that the FBI improperly limited its search to 105, 106 references, rather than to all references. This argument was first raised in an untimely motion for reconsideration and was denied because it should have been raised earlier. This court, therefore, reviews the denial only for an abuse of discretion. E.g., National Metal Finishing Co. v. Barclays American/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 125 (1st Cir. 1990). In any case, plaintiff's argument is contrary to the facts. The FBI submitted a declaration explaining that the 105, 106 reference was contained on a 1969 FOIA search slip, not plaintiff's 1987 search slip. Consequently, the agency did not limit its search for documents responsive to plaintiff's FOIA request to the 105, 106 reference. The district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on the basis of the scope of the FBI's search. With respect to the CIA, plaintiff complains that summary judgment was improper because the CIA's affidavits were not sufficiently detailed to enable plaintiff to challenge the adequacy of the CIA's search. Plaintiff further argues that, in any case, it is clear that the CIA's search was inadequate because a 1963 memorandum released to plaintiff contains a reference to other records, which have -28- not been disclosed. According to plaintiff, the potential existence of other records with no explanation by the CIA for its failure to produce those other records demonstrates the inadequacy of the CIA's search for responsive documents. Plaintiff's argument regarding the sufficiency of the CIA's affidavits is unpersuasive. The CIA submitted several public declarations by John H. Wright, its Information and Privacy Coordinator, explaining that the CIA conducted two searches first, of officially released documents15 and, second, of the records of the three Directorates where it believed responsive records would be found, including the Directorates of Operations (records of clandestine foreign intelligence and counter intelligence activities), Intelligence (records interpreting important world events), and Administration (records of employees). Wright's declaration of December 7, 1988 sets forth in a very general manner the method by which the CIA retrieves documents.16 The Wright declaration further explains that 15. The search of officially released documents yielded one responsive document, which was forwarded to plaintiff. This document, a March 20, 1963 memorandum, states that the CIA had no connection with plaintiff's husband or the flight in question. 16. The Wright declaration explains that the CIA's records systems are diverse, decentralized, and compartmentalized in order to enhance security of documents by minimizing accidental disclosure of sensitive information. With respect to the CIA's method of retrieving documents, the declaration states the following: -29- 3. The nature and design of the CIA records systems are determined by the nature of the Agency's intelligence activities and responsibilities. Documents are generally retrievable if they are in a file which contains a collection of documents on the same subject, and the subject is indexed in a system that alerts a searcher to the existence and location of the file, or if the document is individually indexed in a system that alerts a searcher to the document. If information is stored other than on paper, it must be indexed in a manner which alerts the searcher to its existence and location. The manner in which the CIA indexes information for storage and retrieval purposes varies according to the nature of the intelligence activity that the records are intended to support. Our ability to retrieve data from a given records system is determined by what information has been stored in the system and how the system is designed for retrieval purposes. 4. It is crucial to note that the CIA records storage processing and retrieval systems are designed and programmed to respond to the particular intelligence responsibilities and problems of the component using the system. For example, a component charged with political analysis of a particular foreign power may organize its files under various subjects--names of prominent politicians, party names, geographical concentrations of power, etc. Another component, with a different intelligence mission, may set up its files in a totally different fashion. Accordingly, the structure of particular records systems are not uniform but, rather, differ according to the intelligence responsibilities of the component maintaining the system. Moreover, some records systems are such an integral part of the associated intelligence activity that the record system necessarily bears the same classification as the intelligence activity. . . . 5. When Privacy Act and FOIA requests are received in the Information Services Division (ISD), the initial reception point for all such requests received by the CIA, a determination is made by experienced personnel in ISD as to what components of the Agency might reasonably be expected to possess records which might be responsive to each request. Copies of the requesting letter are then forwarded to each such component with instructions that a search be made for any responsive documents. This initial step is called tasking of the components. Searches are then routinely made among all indices that -30- some of the record systems searched in response to plaintiff's FOIA request are classified.17 According to Wright, a detailed discussion would entail the disclosure of classified information, including information revealing intelligence sources and methods. Since public disclosure of additional details about the CIA's structure and its FOIA search here was not possible, the CIA submitted an in camera declaration detailing the searches conducted by the CIA for responsive documents. After reviewing the public and in might logically have any information relating to . . . the substance of request under the FOIA. In this regard, it is necessary to understand that the search for records in each individual component is dependent upon the component's unique indexing system. The indices are the source of any clues into the existence and location of responsive records. For example, the indexing systems for records contained in the Directorate of Operations (DO) are not the same as those used in the Office of Security (OS). Therefore, the search for records in each component must be carried out by an individual who has knowledge of that component's indexing system. . . . The declaration, however, provides no details as to the CIA's search for documents responsive to plaintiff's FOIA request. 17. The National Security Act, 50 U.S.C. 403g, provides in relevant part: In the interests of the security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United States and in order further to implement the proviso of section 403(d)(3) of this title that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the Agency shall be exempted from . . . the provisions of any other law which requires the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. -31- camera declarations of Mr. Wright, we are satisfied that the CIA's search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents. See Safecard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1201. As the CIA has provided relatively detailed affidavits demonstrating the reasonableness of its search, we reject plaintiff's argument regarding the 1963 memorandum's reference to other records. As the district court noted, the fact a 1963 document refers to the existence of other records does not independently generate an issue of material fact rendering summary judgment improper so long as reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits demonstrate the reasonableness of the agency's search performed in 1990. See, e.g., Miller, 779 F.2d at 1385. As to the Customs Service, plaintiff contends that summary judgment on the adequacy of the agency's search was improper because (1) the Customs Service improperly limited its search to its automated Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS); (2) the declarations submitted by the Customs Service are inconsistent; and (3) the Customs Service did not search possible border crossing records for the period prior to 1982 because it would involve significant effort. Plaintiff's first two arguments are interrelated and neither has any merit. The Custodian of Records for all electronic records, Ellen Mulvenna, submitted three separate -32- detailed affidavits explaining the structure of the Customs Service's record systems. Plaintiff suggests that the Mulvenna declarations are inconsistent because the first declaration states that the original TECS records date back to the early 1970's and the second declaration states that all investigatory records, including records in the 1960's, are included in the TECS. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, these statements appear to be fully consistent. According to the later Mulvenna affidavits, the TECS system was created in 1970. At that time, all existing records were placed in the TECS. Therefore, as explained in the third Mulvenna affidavit, the Customs Service's search was appropriately limited to the TECS system since [a]ny information on Plaintiff's missing husband that might have been contained in the records of the U.S. Customs Service as of the date that the TECS system was created in 1970 would have been placed in the TECS data system. Plaintiff's challenge to the adequacy of the Customs Service's search is also unpersuasive. While the government's declarations acknowledged that a search of border crossing data would involve significant effort, they also made clear that such data only exists for dates after 1976, fifteen years after plaintiff's husband disappeared. It would seem reasonable, therefore, not to have searched the -33- border crossing data, quite apart from any special effort involved. Plaintiff's challenges to the State Department's searches also lack merit. Plaintiff complains that (1) the State Department did not identify who conducted the search or specify the background and experience of that person; (2) the State Department's declaration leaves open the inference that some sources that are only 'likely' to contain information were not searched; and (3) the declaration does not include a comprehensive listing of 'decentralized record systems.' There is, however, no general requirement for an agency to disclose the identity and background of the actual persons who process FOIA requests. Plaintiff relies on Weisberg, 627 F.2d at 371, which reversed a district court's grant of summary judgment because the agency affidavits did not denote which files were searched or by whom, [did] not reflect any systematic approach to document location, and [did] not provide information specific enough to enable [plaintiff] to challenge the procedures utilized. Plaintiff reads Weisberg too broadly. See Perry, 684 F.2d at 127 (noting that Weisberg involved rather special facts that tended to cast considerable doubt on the adequacy [of the agency's search] because the agency's own assertions supported an inference that specifically identified material, solicited by the requester, might have remained in the -34- agency's possession.). The point of Weisberg and subsequent cases is that search methods should be ones reasonably calculated to locate the requested information, assuming it exists. The State Department's declaration suffices to demonstrate that its search methods met this standard.18 Plaintiff's second argument is that the State Department's declaration leaves open the inference that some sources that are only 'likely' to contain information were not searched. See Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68 (agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are likely to turn up the information requested). Plaintiff appears to base this inference upon a letter from the State Department declaring that it searched the two record systems most likely to contain the information requested. However, a subsequent State 18. The State Department's declaration explains that responsive records, if they existed, would likely be expected to be contained in two records systems, namely: the Central Records; and the Office of Overseas Citizens Services [OCS]. While name searches of two of the three categories of Central Records files (the Automated Document System and the Lot Files) turned up no records, a name search of the personality cross-reference to the Central Foreign Policy Files (a third category of Central Records) identified twenty-three responsive documents which had been sent to the OCS for action. The OCS retirement manifests along with a document-by-document search revealed that nineteen of these documents had been destroyed in May, 1979, in accordance with approved disposition schedules, leaving only four documents responsive to this request [that] were not destroyed. Three of these documents were produced to plaintiff with no excisions, and the fourth was produced with minor excisions based on personal privacy grounds pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6. -35- Department declaration by its Information and Privacy Coordinator, Frank M. Machak, declared that searches were conducted of all record systems that were likely to contain the information requested. Finally, plaintiff's demand for a comprehensive listing of 'decentralized records systems' is also unfounded. There is no requirement that an agency search every record system. Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68. Nor is there any requirement that an agency provide a comprehensive list of record systems unlikely to contain responsive records. Rather, an agency need only provide [a] reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all files likely to contain responsive materials . . . were searched, see, e.g., id., as well as a general description of the structure of the agency's file system demonstrating why further search would be overly burdensome, see Church of Scientology of Cal., 792 F.2d at 151. Because the State Department's affidavits fully meet this standard, summary judgment on the adequacy of the State Department's search was inappropriate.19 19. Plaintiff also suggests, without further argument or explanation, that the State Department should have searched the records of the Cuba Desk and the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs. Plaintiff's suggestion seems factually misguided. It appears that the records of the Cuba Desk (the formal name for which is apparently the Office of Cuban Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs) were searched. The Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, on the other hand, is apparently concerned with remote issues such -36- With respect to the DIA's search, plaintiff contends that summary judgement was inappropriate because (1) a document that was forwarded from the FBI to the DIA in 1963 was not located by the DIA in its 1990 search; and (2) the DIA's declaration does not adequately explain the data bases searched or the procedures for information retrieval. As to plaintiff's first argument, the fact that a document once existed does not mean that it now exists; nor does the fact that an agency created a document necessarily imply that the agency has retained it. Miller, 779 F.2d at 1385. Thus the failure of the DIA to produce a copy of a document, identified in a 1963 memo, does not mean that the DIA's search in 1990 was inadequate, particularly when the DIA has demonstrated that its 1990 search was reasonably calculated to uncover responsive documents. Plaintiff's second contention also lacks merit. The DIA's declaration adequately explains the two data bases it searched. According to the DIA's declaration, the Central Reference Division of the DIA Directorate for Technical Services and Support searched its two data bases: the Intelligence Report Index Summary Archive (IRISA) and the All Source Document Index Archive (ASDIA). IRISA contains as arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, outer space and the coordination of military-related activities with foreign policy. The records of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, therefore, seem unlikely to contain any responsive documents. -37- bibliographic references to all human intelligence information reports held or produced by DIA. ASDIA contains bibliographic citations to all intelligence studies, contract reports, open source materials maintained in the DIA library. These two data bases, therefore, included all materials maintained by the DIA that were likely to contain responsive documents. A search of these two data bases failed to produce any information pertaining to plaintiff's husband. While the DIA's declaration could have described the actual search conducted in more detail, any arguable inadequacy of the search descriptions is no more than marginal and does not render the grant of summary judgment appropriate. See Perry, 684 F.2d at 127. Finally, plaintiff contends that the INS's search was inadequate because it took seventeen months to locate a responsive file and because the file was lost in 1985 and not found and turned over to plaintiff until after her appeal was taken in 1992. Neither of these arguments is persuasive. Plaintiff's first contention was raised initially in an untimely motion for reconsideration. Therefore, we review the district court's denial of this motion only for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., National Metal Finishing Co., 899 F.2d at 125. Delay in locating a document is significant only to the extent that evidence shows that the delay resulted from bad faith refusal to cooperate. Miller, 779 -38- F.2d at 1386; accord Perry, 684 F.2d at 128 (court upholds adequacy of agency search notwithstanding delay of over one and one half years); Goland, 607 F.2d at 355 (agency delay, by itself, is not indicative of lack of good faith). Because plaintiff presented no evidence to suggest that the seventeen-month delay resulted from bad faith, the district court properly denied plaintiff's untimely motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff's second argument fares no better. Essentially, plaintiff argues that the fact that a file was lost and then found undercuts the DIA's contention that its search was reasonable. See Goland, 607 F.2d at 369-70. In Goland, one week after the D.C. Circuit affirmed a district court's conclusion that the CIA had conducted an adequate search, see 607 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the CIA informed the Justice Department that it had discovered additional documents responsive to the plaintiff's FOIA request while the appeal had been pending. Although some of these documents were subsequently released to the plaintiff, the plaintiff sought to have the D.C. Circuit reconsider its opinion as to the adequacy of the CIA's search, arguing that the discovery of additional documents undercut the finding that the search had been reasonable. The D.C. Circuit rejected the argument, stating that [t]he issue was not whether any further documents might conceivably exist but -39- whether [the agency's] search for responsive documents was adequate. 607 F.2d at 369-70. Although the court noted that the discovery of additional documents may be evidence that a search is not thorough, the court was satisfied that the original failure to uncover the documents was wholly understandable and not inconsistent with the district court's finding that the search was thorough. Id. at 370, 372; see also Miller, 779 F.2d at 1386 (discovery of additional documents is not conclusive of agency bad faith since belated discovery may result merely from administrative inefficiency or reluctant diligence on the part of the agency); Perry, 684 F.2d at 128 (discovery of additional documents indicated neither artifice nor subterfuge but rather, at worse (sic), administrative inefficiency.). Similarly here, the INS submitted a declaration to the district court, explaining that the three-page document responsive to plaintiff's FOIA request was lost in transit from the Federal Records Center in Atlanta to the INS Central Office in Washington, D.C. More important, the INS submitted an additional declaration detailing the extensive steps taken by the INS to locate the missing file, including computer and manual shelf-by-shelf searches. In light of the detailed affidavits demonstrating the adequacy of the INS's initial search and the subsequent search for the missing file, we are not persuaded that the district court was incorrect in -40- concluding that the searches were reasonable and in good faith. Instead, the agency's initial inability to find the missing file appears to be the result of administrative inefficiency. Nor can we say that the agency's subsequent discovery and release of the lost file impugns the integrity of the INS's affidavits. Rather than bad faith, we think the forthright disclosure by the INS that it had located the misplaced file suggests good faith on the part of the agency. See Meeropol, 790 F.2d at 953 (what is expected of a law- abiding agency is that it admit and correct error when error is revealed.). In sum, we are satisfied, as was the district court, that each defendant agency presented reasonably detailed, nonconclusory affidavits demonstrating the reasonableness of their respective searches. We reject plaintiff's suggestion that the agencies' affidavits were insufficient to support summary judgment on the issue of the adequacy of the agencies' searches.