Opinion ID: 160331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Striking of Mr. Juarez's Testimony

Text: 24 Although the [s]triking [of] the testimony of a witness is a drastic remedy not lightly invoked, United States v. McKneely, 69 F.3d 1067, 1076 (10th Cir. 1995), we review the district court's decision to strike testimony for abuse of discretion. See id. 25 During her trial, Ms. Fuentez asserted an entrapment defense, arguing that Officer Sedillo and Mr. Olguin pressured her to sell drugs. She also attempted to establish entrapment as a matter of law by demonstrating a circular transaction occurred, i.e., the government supplied her the drugs through Mr. Olguin and he purchased the drugs from her through Officer Sedillo. In support of that defense, she called Mr. Eloy Juarez to testify on her behalf. 26 Before Mr. Juarez testified, the district court informed him of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Mr. Juarez then testified that Mr. Olguin gave him an ounce of cocaine in March 1997, asking him to hold it because Mr. Olguin feared being caught by the police while possessing it. 27 The government then requested a bench conference, during which it urged the court to once again remind Mr. Juarez of his right to counsel. The court did so, and Mr. Juarez requested an attorney, then met with a court-appointed attorney during the court's recess. 28 When direct examination resumed, Mr. Juarez asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, refusing to answer any further questions regarding the ounce of cocaine at issue in the March 1997 transaction. The government moved to strike Mr. Juarez's testimony on the basis that the invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege denied it the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 1 At the time of the objection, there was apparently some confusion as to whether the government's motion to strike referred to all of Mr. Juarez's testimony or merely to his invocation of his rights. 29 However, during the jury deliberations, the jurors forwarded a question to the judge indicating they were aware that Mr. Juarez had testified to the receipt of drugs from Mr. Olguin, then later asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege. The jury stressed the importance of their considerations, stating this is critical. Supp. App. vol. VI, at 20. The district judge then instructed the jury to disregard any uncounseled testimony to which Mr. Juarez later invoked his Fifth Amendment right. 30 When Mr. Juarez invoked his Fifth Amendment rights after returning from a recess to confer with counsel, the government moved to strike his earlier testimony to the effect that Mr. Olguin had given him an ounce of cocaine in March of 1997. Ms. Fuentez sought to use this testimony to advance her theory of entrapment as a matter of lawthat the government had supplied the cocaine through Mr. Olguin, delivered it through Mr. Juarez and purchased it through Officer Sedillo. Unfortunately, the district court did not strike the testimony at that time, and later the jury sent a question to the judge which resulted in his striking the testimony after the jury had begun deliberations. 31 While the government notes that its inability to question Mr. Juarez means that his testimony would have to be stricken, Ms. Fuentez argues that this striking removed evidence in support of her entrapment defense from the jury. In addition, she argues the striking of the testimony proscribed any opportunity to present the evidence in other ways, in violation of her Fifth Amendment right to due process and her Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. 32 The right to present witnesses is essential to due process just as the right to present witnesses under the Sixth Amendment is meaningful only if those witnesses may present their testimony. See United States v. Esparsen, 930 F.2d 1461, 1469 (10th Cir. 1991). These rights, however, are not absolute, as one cannot invoke her Sixth Amendment rights in support of her presentation of a half-truth, free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1988); see Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1469 (Reaching the truth is a fundamental goal of trials and cross-examination is critical to the process.). 33 We further explained in Esparsen that [a] defendant cannot invoke due process or compulsory process rights to immunize his witnesses from cross-examination on issues relevant to the truth of the direct testimony. . . . When the refusal to answer cross-examination questions involves collateral matters, we have held in the analogous situation of a prosecution witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment that the testimony should not be struck. 34 Id. (internal quotations omitted); see United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 1981). 35 When a nonparty witness takes the stand and testifies, he obviously waives whatever privilege he may have had to refuse to answer the questions that he answers. United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 661 (9th Cir. 1980). The district court, in its order denying Ms. Fuentez a new trial, and in retroactively striking Mr. Fuentez's testimony, correctly balanced all of these competing concerns by drawing a line between direct and collateral matters. Id; United States v. McKneely, 69 F.3d 1067, 1075-76 (10th Cir. 1995). 36 Because Mr. Juarez's testimony regarding his handling of the cocaine went to matters put at issue by the indictment, that is, Ms. Fuentez's involvement in the transaction, the testimony was non-collateral, or direct. See McKneely, 69 F.3d at 1076; Williams v. Borg, 139 F.3d 737, 742-43 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining distinction between collateral and non-collateral testimony). Because the truth-seeking function of the court would be impaired, and because the questions Mr. Juarez refused to answer were germane to issues in the indictment, the testimony was not collateral. See McKneely, 69 F.3d at 1076; Esparsen, 930 F.2d at 1470. Because his testimony was not reliable without subsequent cross-examination, it was properly, although very belatedly, excluded. 37 The government admits, in rare candor, that it may have been better for the district court to strike the testimony immediately after Juarez invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, but counters with the argument that any error would be harmless because the only other source available to Ms. Fuentez to make this argument would have been Mr. Olguin, who was subpoenaed but did not show up at trial. The defendant simply asserts, without explanation, that the court deprived the defendant of the opportunity to call Mr. Olguin or other witnesses who could have provided the same factual testimony as Mr. Juarez. Aplt's Br. at 14. 38 Although Ms. Fuentez did not point to specific evidence on appeal, the record indicates that Mr. Olguin did not respond to a subpoena to appear. We note that the government's witness, Officer Sedillo, acknowledged during cross-examination that he did not want Mr. Olguin to testify as a witness in this case, but there is no evidence Officer Sedillo had contact with Mr. Olguin immediately before the trial. Further, Mr. Olguin was not designated to be a material witness and the expected content of his testimony was not certain. During trial, several hours after it was apparent Mr. Olguin had not arrived to testify, Ms. Fuentez requested the court to grant a continuance, issue a bench warrant for Mr. Olguin, and moved for a mistrial, all of which the court denied. Finally, during the recess while the jury was deliberating, Ms. Fuentez also asked for a grant of immunity for Mr. Juarez: the government declined and the court refused to order the government to do so. 39 Although it would have been preferable for the court to have ruled at the time of the first motion, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in its decision to correct that error when it became clear that the jury was confused.