Opinion ID: 4554001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Concurrent Sentence Issue.

Text: Williams was serving parole for the 2015 Iowa conviction when he committed this federal offense. Parole had not been revoked at the time of his federal sentencing. Had parole been revoked, the advisory guidelines recommend “that the 1 The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. -2- sentence for the instant offense be imposed consecutively to the sentence imposed for the revocation.” USSG § 5G1.3, comment. (n.4(C)). Here, revocation was only anticipated. In these circumstances, the court “has discretion to determine whether a federal sentence should run concurrently with or consecutively to an anticipated state sentence.” United States v. Hall, 825 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 2016), citing Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 235-36 (2012). A district court should exercise this discretion “intelligently.” Setser, 566 U.S. at 242 n.6. In his objections to the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), Williams requested that his sentence “run fully concurrent” to the 2015 Iowa sentence. His Sentencing Memorandum explained that, if the State of Iowa proceeds to revoke parole, the Bureau of Prisons “is likely to deny credit for any time for which he is awarded Iowa credit.” Therefore, to credit Williams “with all the time he has served,” the Court should “order the sentences run concurrently, select the appropriate [federal] sentence, then reduce the sentence by the number of months between his first incarceration date of October 23, 2018 and the date of sentencing.” The Probation Officer responded: “Because the state sentence has not been revoked, the Court may run the term for the instant offense consecutive or concurrent to the state offense; however, the Court may also exercise its discretion and refrain from any such order” (emphasis added). At sentencing, the district court asked defense counsel to clarify the “5G1.3 argument” regarding an anticipated state prison term. Counsel responded that Williams’s parole had not yet been revoked “but he may be subject to revocation. The court has the discretion to run this sentence concurrently or consecutively with that [under USSG § 5G1.3(d)].” Counsel urged the court to “use that tool as another means . . . to exercise its discretion to give the defendant a reasonable sentence in this case.” Turning to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, counsel then argued that “the court should look at something substantially lower than what’s recommended under the advisory guideline range.” Government counsel, in urging -3- a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range, 86 months, responded that Application Note 4(C) to § 5G1.3 recommends that “the federal sentence be imposed consecutive to any revocation of parole.” At the conclusion of these arguments, the district court stated, “based on the 3553(a) analysis,” that it would impose a sentence at the bottom of the advisory range -- 77 months imprisonment with credit for time served since October 23, 2018. As to whether the State of Iowa may revoke parole and impose an anticipated term of imprisonment, “the court in its discretion is not going to address that.” Defense counsel made no objection to this last ruling. On appeal, Williams puts a new spin on this aspect of the sentencing proceedings. He now contends that the district court committed procedural error by failing to rule on his “objections” regarding the anticipated revocation of parole and his request for a downward variance on this ground. He asserts the district court “did not demonstrate an awareness that it was or might be consigning Williams to serve consecutive sentences,” “did not address at all Williams’s concern about the possible parole revocation,” and “appears not even to have addressed . . . whether Williams might be deemed by Iowa . . . to be in primary state custody” after his arrest and “the effect that this determination might have on the [Bureau of Prisons execution of the] sentence [the court] imposed.” This contention insults the intelligence of one of our most experienced sentencing judges. Though perhaps creative, it is also without merit for several reasons. First, in exercising discretion not to address Williams’s request that the sentence be made concurrent with an anticipated state sentence, the district court adopted the Probation Officer’s recommendation that it “refrain from any such order.” Thus, the premise for Williams’s contention that the district court erred in failing to rule is the assertion, first made in his brief on appeal without supporting authority, that the Probation Officer’s “view, unsupported by legal authority . . . is incorrect.” That is an issue of law, known to defense counsel when the district court ruled. As -4- Williams did not raise this issue to the district court, it was not preserved for appeal. See United States v. Collier, 585 F.3d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 2009). Second, the Probation Officer’s view is not “unsupported by legal authority.” Rather, it is supported by the most powerful of authorities, the Supreme Court of the United States. In Setser, after stating that a district court should exercise its discretion intelligently when dealing with an anticipated state sentence, the Court stated: “In some situations, a district court may have inadequate information and may forbear.” 566 U.S. at 242 n.6 (emphasis added); see United States v. Davis, 859 F.3d 572, 575 (8th Cir. 2017) (“The district court did not err by expressly not considering the fact that [the defendant’s] probation could possibly be revoked,” citing Setser.). Third, even without this controlling authority, it should go without saying that one way to exercise discretion is to decline to take up an issue because the proper exercise of discretion turns on future events. The district court clearly understood its discretionary authority -- identifying USSG § 5G1.3(d) as the relevant guideline -- and chose “in its discretion” to forbear for this reason. We review that decision for abuse of discretion. See Hall, 825 F.3d at 375-76. Labeling it a failure-to-rule procedural error is ludicrous. Finally, Williams does not argue the district court abused its discretion, and with good reason. Williams urged the district court to vary downward from the within-range sentence the court thought appropriate, applying the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, based on actions the Iowa Board of Parole, an Iowa state court, and the federal Bureau of Prisons might take in the future. Failure to explain why it did not vary downward for this reason when Williams did not request further explanation was neither an abuse of discretion nor plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 553 F.3d 598, 600-01 (8th Cir. 2009). -5-