Opinion ID: 152512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Applicability of Laches

Text: The plaintiffs next argue that even if the equitable considerations relevant in Cayuga are also applicable here, the defendants have nevertheless failed to establish the elements of a laches defense, so the plaintiffs' possessory claims may still proceed. The United States argues, in addition, that it is not subject to laches when acting in its sovereign capacity and that the district court therefore erred in applying laches against it. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. This matter is indistinguishable from Cayuga in terms of the underlying factual circumstances that led the Cayuga court to conclude not only that the laches defense and other equitable defenses were available, but also that laches actually barred the claims at issue in that case. Here, as in Cayuga, a tremendous expanse of time separates the events forming the predicate of the ejectment and trespass-based claims and their eventual assertion. In that time, most of the Oneidas have moved elsewhere, the subject lands have passed into the hands of a multitude of entities and individuals, most of whom have no connection to the historical injustice the Oneidas assert, and these parties have themselves both bought and sold the lands, and also developed them to an enormous extent. These developments have given rise to justified societal expectations (expectations held and acted upon not only by the Counties and the State of New York, but also by private landowners and a plethora of associated parties) under a scheme of settled land ownership that would be disrupted by an award pursuant to the Oneidas' possessory claims. See Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 275. By Cayuga 's logic, moreover, this is true no matter what specific relief such an award would entail, whether actual ejectment, damages for ongoing trespass liability, or, instead, payment of the fair market value of the property in a single lump sum. As the Court in Cayuga concluded, disruptiveness is inherent in the claim itselfwhich asks this Court to overturn years of settled land ownershiprather than [being] an element of any particular remedy which would flow from the possessory land claim. Id. We have used the term laches here, as did the district court and this Court in Cayuga, as a convenient shorthand for the equitable principles at stake in this case, but the term is somewhat imprecise for the purpose of describing those principles. As Cayuga recognized, [o]ne of the few incontestable propositions about this unusually complex and confusing area of law is that doctrines and categorizations applicable in other areas do not translate neatly to these claims. Id. at 276. The Oneidas assert that the invocation of a purported laches defense is improper here as the defendants have not established the necessary elements of such a defense. It is true that the district court in this case did not make findings that the Oneidas unreasonably delayed the initiation of this action or that the defendants were prejudiced by this delayboth required elements of a traditional laches defense. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961) (Laches requires proof of (1) lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.); Veltri v. Bldg. Serv. 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 326 (2d Cir. 2004) (A party asserting the equitable defense of laches must establish both plaintiff's unreasonable lack of diligence under the circumstances in initiating an action, as well as prejudice from such a delay. (internal quotation marks omitted)). This omission, however, is not ultimately important, as the equitable defense recognized in Sherrill and applied in Cayuga does not focus on the elements of traditional laches but rather more generally on the length of time at issue between an historical injustice and the present day, on the disruptive nature of claims long delayed, and on the degree to which these claims upset the justifiable expectations of individuals and entities far removed from the events giving rise to the plaintiffs' injury. In Sherrill, the Supreme Court concluded that standards of federal Indian law and federal equity practice barred the New York Oneidas from obtaining declaratory and injunctive relief that would have exempted them from state property taxation for former reservation lands recently reacquired through market transactions. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (internal quotation marks omitted). More specifically, the Court determined that the tremendous expanse of time that had passed between the initial, allegedly unlawful transactions and the eventual initiation of the action at issue, as well as the intervening economic and regulatory development of the subject lands, had given rise to justifiable societal expectations that would be disrupted by that remedy. See id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478 ([T]he distance from 1805 [when the land at issue was transferred] to the present day, the [plaintiff's] long delay in seeking equitable relief against New York or its local units, and developments in the city of Sherrill spanning several generations . . . render inequitable the piecemeal shift in governance this suit seeks unilaterally to initiate.); see also id. at 215-16, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (noting the existence of justifiable expectations, grounded in two centuries of New York's exercise of regulatory jurisdiction); id. at 219-20, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (discussing the possibility for the disruption of such expectations were the plaintiffs to be granted the remedy sought). The Supreme Court discussed laches not in its traditional application but as one of several preexisting equitable defenses, along with acquiescence and impossibility, illustrating fundamental principles of equity that precluded the plaintiffs from rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold. Id. at 214, 125 S.Ct. 1478; see also id. at 217-20, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (finding support for the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim was barred by equitable considerations in the three preexisting defenses of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility); see also id. at 221, 125 S.Ct. 1478 (noting that the relevant equitable considerations evoke the doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility). Moreover, the Supreme Court made no mention of unreasonable delay by the New York Oneidas, as distinguished from delay alone, or prejudice to the particular defendants, as opposed to the disruption of broader societal expectations. Sherrill, then, did not involve the application of a traditional laches defense so much as an equitable defense that drew upon laches and other equitable doctrines but that derived from general principles of federal Indian law and federal equity practice. Id. at 213, 125 S.Ct. 1478. This Court's analysis in Cayuga was similar. Although the Cayuga court, like the district court in this case, employed the term laches to describe the defense upon which its decision rested, see Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 277, it also expressly indicated that it based its conclusion on the same reasoning that the Supreme Court had employed in Sherrill, see id. at 275 ([W]e conclude that possessory land claims of this type are subject to the equitable considerations discussed in Sherrill. ). Additionally, when the Cayuga court, after concluding that the claims asserted by the plaintiff in that case were subject to the Sherrill defense, addressed the subsidiary question whether those claims were thereby barred, it considered only factors equivalent to those addressed in Sherrill, see id. at 277, and, indeed, rejected the Cayugas' contention that their claims were barred only if the elements of a traditional laches defense were met, see id. at 279-80 (concluding that a finding of no unreasonable delay did not preclude the conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were nevertheless barred in light of, inter alia, the Supreme Court's ruling in Sherrill,  id. at 280). The United States contends that Cayuga wrongly altered the traditional laches analysis by making any inquiry into unreasonable delay irrelevant. U.S. Br. at 38. We conclude, in contrast, that Cayuga applied not a traditional laches defense, but rather distinct, albeit related, equitable considerations that it drew from Sherrill. Either way, we are bound by Cayuga and therefore reject the Oneidas' and United States' contention that the district court erred by failing to consider the elements of a traditional laches defense. Finally, the intervention of the United States on behalf of the Oneidas does not change this outcome. Although the United States is traditionally not subject to delay-based equitable defenses under most circumstances, see, e.g., United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416, 60 S.Ct. 1019, 84 L.Ed. 1283 (1940), Cayuga expressly concluded that the United States is subject to such defenses under circumstances like those presented here (i.e., a lengthy delay in asserting the relevant cause of action, the absence of an applicable statute of limitations for the great majority of this delay, and an intervention to vindicate the interests of an Indian nation). Indeed, on facts virtually indistinguishable from those here, the Cayuga court concluded that whatever the precise contours of the exception to the rule against subjecting the United States to a laches defense, this case falls within the heartland of the exception. Cayuga, 413 F.3d at 279. [7] Although the United States contends that this holding was in error, see U.S. Br. at 20, this argument is not properly before us and we do not consider it, instead adhering faithfully to Cayuga. See Sullivan, 424 F.3d at 274.