Opinion ID: 197017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blakey's Pro Hac Vice Admission

Text: B. Blakey's Pro Hac Vice Admission The plaintiffs also appeal the district court's denial of admission pro hac vice of their attorney, G. Robert Blakey (Blakey). On May 15, 1995, the plaintiffs moved for Blakey's -24- admission pro hac vice. The district court denied the motion on June 2, 1995. On June 12, 1995, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the court's order; the district court denied the motion for reconsideration on September 25, 1995. The district court articulated two grounds for denying Blakey's pro hac vice admission. First, the district court noted that a previous motion by the plaintiffs seeking the admission pro hac vice of another of their attorneys, Spaloss, had already been granted. Second, the district court expressed concern about the amount of attorney's fees being generated by the plaintiffs.5 The Supreme Court has recognized that in many District Courts, the decision on whether to grant pro hac vice status to an out-of-state attorney is purely discretionary. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 651 n.13 (1987). However, the plaintiffs argue that the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island is not one of those courts. Local Rule 5(c) of the District of Rhode Island provides in pertinent part that [a]ny attorney who is a member in good standing of the bar of the United States Supreme Court, of any other United States District court, or of the highest court of any state, shall on motion be permitted to appear once in a calendar year in a case or group of related cases in association with a member of the bar of this court who is actively engaged in the practice of law within the State of Rhode Island . . . . D.R.I. R. 5(c) (emphasis added). The plaintiffs argue that in 5 A successful civil RICO plaintiff may collect reasonable attorney's fees in addition to treble damages. 18 U.S.C. 1964(c). -25- contrast to the Local Rules of the other districts in this circuit, Rhode Island's rule does not by its terms provide for the court's discretion. Compare D.R.I. R. 5(c) (shall on motion be permitted to appear) with D. Me. R. 3(d)(1) (may at the discretion of the Court . . . be permitted to practice); D. Mass. R. 6(b) (may appear and practice in this court in a particular case by leave granted in the discretion of the court); D.N.H. R. 5(b) (may at the discretion of the court); D.P.R. R. 204.2 (may be permitted). The plaintiffs assert that the District of Rhode Island has promulgated a rule under whose clear language pro hac vice admission is not discretionary. As a result, the plaintiffs claim, the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it had discretion to deny Blakey's pro hac vice admission, or alternatively, the district court abused whatever discretion it had. We do not consider the issue of whether this pro hac vice rule, which may be nondiscretionary, nonetheless leaves some discretion to deny admission. Even assuming that discretion existed, the district court's denial of such admission to Blakey was an abuse of that discretion. The district court's two articulated grounds simply cannot support its action. The district court stated that [w]e already have one pro hac vice . . . [and we're] not going to take more than one on a case. We may take judicial notice of the fact that the District of Rhode Island has permitted multiple pro hac vice admissions in proceedings that were contemporaneous with the instant case. See -26- Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995). Furthermore, regarding expense, in the instant case defendants were represented by more than ten attorneys, the plaintiffs by two; additionally, if the court was concerned about excessive attorney fees, it could have addressed that matter later, if and when the plaintiffs submitted their attorney fee application. While it may be that Blakey has no right to pro hac vice admission, see Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 452 (1979) (holding that an attorney does not have a federal right to state court pro hac vice admission), the rights of the plaintiffs are another matter. Particularly here, where the plaintiffs identified specific, logical reasons for their request,6 we conclude that the district court's decision, based on criteria that are not set forth in writing, that do not reasonably support its action, and that do not appear to respond to any general policy of the District of Rhode Island, amounts to an abuse of discretion.