Opinion ID: 771476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factual Findings as Prerequisites to Jurisdiction

Text: 27 Tittjung posits that even if this Court does not agree that his previous arguments negate federal jurisdiction, the district court's omission of certain factual findings precludes a determination that Tittjung illegally procured his citizenship. The court below found this argument to be a substantive one which is precluded by res judicata and cannot be grafted upon a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Yet, in support of the proposition that certain factual findings are within the scope of a Rule 60(b)(4) review on subject matter jurisdiction, Tittjung cites to language in Fedorenko which states that In the lexicon of our cases, one of the jurisdictional facts upon which the grant [of citizenship] is predicated, was missing at the time petitioner became a citizen. 449 U.S. at 515-16 (internal quotation omitted). As we noted above, the term jurisdiction has so many uses that it is commonplace for confusion to ensue regarding the term. See United States v. Krilich, 209 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90. While we express doubt that this argument of Tittjung's is jurisdictional such that it properly comes within the scope of our review of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we assume arguendo that it does and proceed to analyze the claim. 28 Tittjung asserts that the district court was required to find that Tittjung made a material misrepresentation under DPA sec. 10, and that the invalid visa resulted in an unlawful admission, in order to find that Tittjung illegally procured his citizenship. We do not dispute that the language of sec. 10 of the DPA states that Any person who shall willfully make a representation for the purposes of gaining admission into the United States as an eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the United States. Nor do we contest that Fedorenko makes clear that under sec. 13(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924, a visa obtained through a material misrepresentation [is] not valid. 449 U.S. 515. However, we do not read sec. 10 of the DPA and sec. 13(a) of the 1924 Act as establishing an exclusive basis for visa ineligibility. To adopt Tittjung's reasoning, we would be forced to ignore the plain language of sec. 13(a) of the DPA as amended in 1950, something we cannot do. That Section states that No visas shall be issued under the provision of this Act, as amended . . . to any person who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national origin. Section 13(a) does not contain a fraud element, but rather provides wholly independent grounds for denaturalization. The district court in 1990 was well within its authority to find that Tittjung's service as an armed concentration camp guard meant that he had assisted in the persecution of persons because of their race, religion or national origin, 8 and that his assistance in persecution rendered him visa ineligible. Once that determination was made, the court did not and was under no obligation to assess whether Tittjung had made misrepresentations in order to procure his visa. 29 Requiring a finding of misrepresentation in order to determine illegal procurement would not only be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the DPA, but would be in direct conflict with previous federal case law on the matter. The approach taken in Tittjung, that once a determination of visa ineligibility is made on assistance in persecution grounds there is no need to address a possible misrepresentation basis for ineligibility, has been continually applied. For example, in Schmidt, after determining that the defendant had assisted in persecution thus making him ineligible for a visa and mandating his denaturalization, the district court found it unnecessary to decide whether he also entered unlawfully by misrepresenting such service to immigration authorities. See United States v. Schmidt, No. 88 C 9475, 1990 WL 6667 at  (N.D. Ill. Jan 3, 1990). Similarly, in Leprich, the court noted that the visa of a concentration camp guard would have been illegally procured under [DPA] Section 13 even if he had secured it without making misrepresentations. 666 F. Supp. at 969. See also United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254, 1265-66 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Kairys was visa ineligible even though there was insufficient proof of misrepresentation.). In light of this consistent approach, as well as because of the plain meaning of sec. 13(a) of the DPA, we hold that the district court was able to find that Tittjung illegally procured his citizenship without making the suggested factual finding. To the extent that Tittjung urges that the factual finding of misrepresentation was jurisdictional we see no jurisdictional error, let alone an egregious one, in the method employed by the district court in its 1990 decision.