Opinion ID: 1104871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Baldwin's Motion in Limine

Text: Before trial, Baldwin moved the trial court to preclud[e] the parties from making any reference to or submitting any evidence concerning the oral service territory agreement which Fairhope contends that it entered into with [Baldwin]. Baldwin argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Fairhope to present evidence of the alleged oral service-territory agreement between the parties. [9] Fairhope argues that Baldwin's motion in limine, seeking to exclude any evidence of the alleged oral service-territory agreement, was insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal and that Baldwin's objection to that evidence at trial, which was necessary to perfect Baldwin's appeal on this issue, was untimely. Fairhope further argues that even if the trial court did err by admitting the evidence, Baldwin cannot demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling. We agree. A motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence, which is denied by the trial court, is, unless the court clearly indicates to the contrary, the legal equivalent of an announcement by the court that it reserves the right to rule on the subject evidence when it is offered and is not a final ruling made in a pre-trial context. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. James, 646 So.2d 669, 673 (Ala.1994) (citing Baxter v. Surgical Clinic of Anniston, P.A., 495 So.2d 652 (Ala.1986)). This Court in Owens-Corning continued, stating as follows: An appellant who suffers an adverse ruling on a motion to exclude evidence, made in limine, preserves this adverse ruling for post-judgment and appellate review only if he objects to the introduction of the proffered evidence and assigns specific grounds therefor at the time of the trial, unless he has obtained the express acquiescence of the trial court that subsequent objection to evidence when it is proffered at trial and assignment of grounds therefor are not necessary. 646 So.2d at 669 (citing Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 466 So.2d 935 (Ala. 1985)). Baldwin argues that the trial court's denial of its motion in limine was unequivocal... absolute and unconditional and that an objection was therefore unnecessary. Baldwin's reply brief at 5. In support of this argument, Baldwin quotes the trial court as saying that [t]he issue that I think needs to be presented to the jury is, is there a contract, or is there not a contract between the parties. After that it seems to me all of this is just details. Baldwin's reply brief at 6. Although the trial court did make this statement, it was not made in reference to Baldwin's motion in limine. [10] The trial court denied Baldwin's motion in limine, saying: I am going to deny the motion in limine as to the oral agreement. I think we have got some other matters. Although the record certainly supports an argument that the trial court made statements indicating that it believed that the oral-agreement issue was dispositive, the record does not reflect that the trial court clearly indicated that further objections to the admission of evidence of the oral service-territory agreement were unnecessary or that Baldwin obtained the express acquiescence of the trial court that subsequent objections to such evidence were not required. Liberty National, 466 So.2d at 936. Therefore, Baldwin's motion in limine was insufficient to preserve this issue for appeal. Because Baldwin's motion in limine was insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of evidence of the oral service-territory agreement, we are left to address whether Baldwin took the appropriate steps during trial to preserve the issue for appeal. For Baldwin to preserve error, it had to make a timely objection ..., stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. Rule 103, Ala. R. Evid. See also Ex parte Williamson, 907 So.2d 407, 416 (Ala.2004) (`It is a generally accepted principle, as set forth in the Alabama Rules of Evidence, that a party against whom inadmissible evidence is offered must make a formal, specific objection. [2] Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 426.01(1) (5th ed.1996) (citing Rule 103(a), Ala. R. Evid.). The objection must also be timely. See Rule 103(a), Ala.R.Evid.; General Motors Corp. v. Johnston, 592 So.2d 1054, 1057-58 (Ala.1992).' (quoting Radford v. State, 783 So.2d 13, 15 (Ala.2000))). In order for Baldwin's objection to have been timely, it has to have been `raised at the point during trial when the offering of improper evidence is clear.' HealthTrust, Inc. v. Cantrell, 689 So.2d 822, 827 (Ala.1997) (quoting Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 426.01(3) (5th ed.1996)). Baldwin argues that it made a timely objection when the evidence was introduced. Baldwin's reply brief at 6. Fairhope, on the other hand, argues that Baldwin failed to object in a timely manner. Fairhope's brief at 40. The record supports Fairhope's argument. During Fairhope's cross-examination of Baldwin's first witness, John Larson, at one time a supervisor of engineering and engineering services for Baldwin, the following colloquy occurred, without objection: Q. Now, you had a number of discussions, did you not, over the years with Mr. Aaron Norris [of the City of Fairhope] here concerning electric territories and who was going to serve particular subdivisions and who was going to serve particular customers as they came up, did you not? A. We have had multiple conversations, yes. Q. And Mr. Norris in those multiple conversations on this subject told you consistently, did he not, that the city of Fairhope was going to serve subdivisions and customers within its city limits, based on an agreement that had been entered into between Baldwin EMC and Fairhope, correct? A. I've heard Mr. Norris mention that there was an agreement, but, as far as us discussing an agreement, no, I've never discussed an agreement with Mr. Norris. Q. But he told you on these occasions that they were going to serve these customers based on this agreement, did he not? A. He said he was going to serve this subdivision because it was in the city limits. Q. Because there was an agreement that they could serve in the city limits? A. I don't know if that was in every conversation or not. Q. He told you that on at least some of the occasions, did he not? A. He has mentioned that to me. Q. You never objected to that, did you? A. No, because I do not know of any agreement. Q. You never denied the existence of an agreement to him, did you? A. No, because I didn't discuss it with him. .... Q. In fact, the City of Fairhope sent [Baldwin] a letter which said that under our agreement we have no intent to serve any customers off of this line outside the city limits, didn't they? A. I don't know if it was mentioned in there of any agreement. But it just said that they did not plan to serve any of our customers. But I don't believe there was any mention of an agreement in that letter. On redirect, Baldwin's counsel had the following exchange with Larson: Q. Let me see if this is a fair statement. Did Mr. Norris ever at any point in time dispute the fact that if you go by the closer-to rules, the territory, the premises that we are arguing about, are in [Baldwin's] service territory? Did he ever dispute that? A. Not that I remember. Q. What Mr. Norris said was that he felt like the City had a right to serve it under some preexisting oral agreement? A. That's what I understand. That's correct. Q. If it's in the city limits, the City can serve it, regardless of what [the Act] said? A. That's correct. Q. Did he ever produce for you any sort of agreement to that effect? A. No, he did not. Q. Have you ever seen any acknowledgment of an agreement to that effect in [Baldwin's] files? A. No, I have not. From these exchanges it is clear that Baldwin not only failed to object to the introduction of evidence concerning the oral agreement, but also elicited evidence concerning it. It does not appear that Baldwin objected to Fairhope's admission of evidence concerning the alleged oral agreement until Fairhope's direct examination of Jim Nix, a former mayor of Fairhope, in which the following occurred: Q. Was there ever any concern expressed to you by Baldwin about the fact that City of Fairhope might be going outside its city limits to pick up electric customers? A. Well, they didn't like it. Q. Didn't like it. Was there anything said to you about that by anybody from Baldwin EMC? A. Yes. Don Sutherland, he was the manager at the time. He talked to me. That's when we worked out an agreement with him. [BALDWIN'S COUNSEL]: We object to any testimony concerning the agreement for the reasons we argued to Your Honor this morning. THE COURT: Overruled. [BALDWIN'S COUNSEL]: We ask that we be given a standing objection so that we don't need to repeatedly object. THE COURT: You have your objection. Baldwin argues, without citing any authority, that it was unnecessary for [Baldwin] to object to this testimony during Fairhope's cross-examination of [Baldwin]'s witness (Larson) because his brief testimony was not substantive evidence that the parties had entered into an agreement nor did it address in any way the contents of the claimed agreement. Baldwin's reply brief at 7. Baldwin's argument is unpersuasive. Larson's testimony, as quoted above, appears, in fact, to be substantive evidence as to the existence of the alleged oral agreement and, in some measure, the substance of it. This was the exact type of evidence Baldwin sought to exclude with its motion in limine. See Baldwin's motion in limine ([Baldwin] seeks the issuance of an order precluding the parties from making any reference to or submitting any evidence concerning the oral service territory agreement which Fairhope contends that it entered into with [Baldwin]. (emphasis added)). It is clear from the second question that Fairhope asked during its cross-examination of Larson that Fairhope was attempting to introduce the testimony Baldwin alleged was improper. Baldwin was required to object at that time, and it did not. HealthTrust, 689 So.2d at 827. It was not until the third witness of the day, who was the second witness to give testimony regarding the alleged oral agreement, testified that Baldwin objected. Therefore, Baldwin failed to timely object to the introduction of the evidence of the alleged oral agreement, and Baldwin's failure to timely object to this evidence, alone, is sufficient to preclude appellate review of this issue. [11] See Davis v. Southland Corp., 465 So.2d 397, 402 (Ala.1985) (Timely objection is a condition precedent to raising an error on appeal. Where a timely objection to the admission of evidence is not made, the party wishing to exclude the evidence cannot be heard to complain. (citing Sanford v. Sanford, 355 So.2d 365 (Ala.1978))). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Henderson, 342 So.2d 323, 327 (Ala. 1976) (Since there was no timely objection by counsel, there is no error for this court to review. (citing Prescott v. Martin, 331 So.2d 240 (Ala.1976); Johnson v. State, 272 Ala. 633, 133 So.2d 53 (1961); and Anderson v. State, 209 Ala. 36, 95 So. 171 (1922))). The earlier recited testimony of Larson also supports Fairhope's second argument that Baldwin cannot allege prejudice, even if the trial court's ruling on the evidence was erroneous. Baldwin, by eliciting testimony about the oral service-territory agreement on redirect examination and by failing to object to Fairhope's cross-examination of Larson, cannot now claim to have been prejudiced by similar evidence later admitted over its objection. See B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So.2d 667, 673 (Ala. 1979) (Even if it be conceded the testimony was inadmissible,... we find its admission was harmless error because other testimony of the same substance had previously been admitted without objection or motion to exclude. In Alabama the rule is that prejudicial error may not be predicated upon the admission of evidence which has been admitted at some other stage of the trial without objection or motion to exclude. (citing Coker v. Ryder Truck Lines, 287 Ala. 150, 249 So.2d 810 (1971); Turner v. Blanton, 277 Ala. 536, 173 So.2d 80 (1965); and Loftin's Rent-All, Inc. v. Universal Petroleum, 344 So.2d 781 (Ala.Civ.App.1977))). See also Hall v. Polk, 363 So.2d 300, 303 (Ala.1978) (Even if the admission of a hearsay statement is technical error, the error is rendered harmless by other evidence to the same effect received without objection.); Chrisman v. Brooks, 291 Ala. 237, 242, 279 So.2d 500, 505 (1973) (Prejudicial error may not be predicated upon admission of evidence which has been admitted without objection or motion to exclude at some other stage of the trial.). If Baldwin cannot assert prejudice, the error, if any, is harmless, and Baldwin's argument that the trial court's judgment should be reversed is without merit. Rule 103(a)(1), Ala. R. Evid. See also, Rule 45, Ala. R.App. P. (No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor new trial granted ... unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties.). Finally, even assuming that Baldwin could allege that it was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence, it does not appear that Baldwin has effectively made that argument. [12] The burden is on Baldwin to do so. See Middleton, 885 So.2d at 113-14 (`The burden of establishing that an erroneous ruling was prejudicial is on the appellant.' (quoting Preferred Risk, 589 So.2d at 167 (citations omitted))). First, the word prejudice appears only once in Baldwin's brief, and that is in connection with Baldwin's second argument. Baldwin's brief at 38. Second, Baldwin's only allegation of prejudice on this issue is its naked assertion that [t]he effect of the [trial court's] ruling was to permit the jury to return a verdict sanctioning an arrangement which violated the law. Baldwin's brief at 23. However, Baldwin later acknowledges in its reply brief that [t]his Court can draw no conclusion as to the basis for the jury's determination since only a general verdict was returned. Baldwin's reply brief at 16. Therefore, Baldwin has not met its burden of proving prejudice. Because Baldwin has not preserved for appellate review its objection to the testimony regarding the existence of an oral agreement and because Baldwin has not, and, in fact, cannot, demonstrate that it was prejudiced by the trial court's evidentiary ruling, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on this issue.