Opinion ID: 2638442
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Superior Court Was Within Its Discretion in Dismissing DeNardo's Complaint.

Text: DeNardo argues that Judge Joannides was not within her discretion in dismissing his complaint for violation of a discovery order. We disagree. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37 affords trial courts broad power to enforce discovery orders by the use of sanctions. [8] Rule 37(b)(2)(C) provides in relevant part that when a party fails to obey an order to provide discovery, the court may enter an order dismissing the action. However, the sanction of dismissal is only allowed in extreme cases because `a party should not be barred from his or her day in court where an alternative remedy would suffice to make the adverse party whole.' [9] Because of the extreme nature of dismissal, the Rules of Civil Procedure require that before a case is dismissed the trial court must first find (1) that the non-complying party acted willfully to violate the order in question, (2) that there is resulting prejudice to the opposing party, and (3) that the imposed dismissal is sufficiently related to the violation at issue. In addition, the court must consider a reasonable exploration of alternatives to dismissal and whether those alternatives would adequately protect the opposing party as well as deter other discovery violations. [10]
DeNardo claims that the superior court's order deleting six categories of discovery from ABC's original motion to compel shows that his failure to comply with the court's order was not willful. Moreover, he argues that, if he had been allowed to answer ABC's motion to dismiss with the discovery material he sought from ABC, it would show that ABC had committed many misrepresentations. ABC responds that DeNardo willfully disobeyed the court's order. Willfulness in this context is defined as a conscious intent to impede discovery, and not mere delay, inability or good faith resistance. [11] Although the court did limit the amount of discovery that ABC had originally requested, this order in itself does nothing to show that the remaining discovery requests that were allowed were unwarranted, or that DeNardo's actions in failing to comply with the court's order were in good faith. If anything, the limiting order shows the superior court's effort to ensure that DeNardo was not being harassed through the discovery process, not that the remaining discovery was irrelevant. DeNardo also argues that if the court had granted his motion to compel he could have obeyed the court's order. However, we rejected this argument in Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. [12] In Hikita we held that a discovery request cannot be satisfied by a party claiming it is `attempting to ascertain the answers,' and putting off its obligation to a later date. [13] And, as in Hughes v. Bobich, [14] DeNardo's argument here misallocates the applicable burden of proof on the issue of willfulness. Once noncompliance has been demonstrated, the noncomplying party bears the burden of proving that the failure to comply was not willful. [15] DeNardo fails to meet this burden. Rather than showing that his failure to comply was not willfulfor example, by showing that the requested material was lostDeNardo repeatedly claimed that ABC had no right to the answers or documents. But the superior court had previously decided that ABC had precisely that right (and DeNardo has not appealed that finding). [16] DeNardo also claims that his actions were not willful because the information could be found in the public record or because ABC was already in possession of the relevant information. However, we do not require a complying party to devise creative ways to obtain information that the noncomplying party controls and refuses to produce. [17] In Hughes, we found that [b]ecause the evidence established a substantial and continuing violation ... and because the Hughes failed to meet their burden of disproving willfulness, the court could properly find that the Hughes' noncompliance was willful. [18] Similarly here, the evidence establishes a continuing violation of the court's order. While the violation may not be as egregious as violations in other cases, [19] DeNardo distinguishes himself by showing no intention of ever complying with the court's orders. In addition, ABC is correct that it is illogical for DeNardo to argue that he needs discovery from ABC in order to complete a discovery order compelling information from him. Additional discovery from ABC would, in no way, make DeNardo's driver's license or his prior work history easier for him to produce and DeNardo does not explain in his briefing why such discovery would help. Although he does not argue it, we also note that DeNardo's pro se status does not provide an excuse for his noncompliance with the court's order. [20] In her order, Judge Joannides specifically found DeNardo to be familiar with the litigation process based on other previous and pending actions with which he was involved. And, as we found in Coffland v. Coffland, [21] pro se litigants must make some attempt to comply with the court's procedure before receiving the benefit of the court's leniency. [22] DeNardo has made no effort to comply and therefore is not entitled to any special allowances based on his pro se status. The burden was on DeNardo to show his conduct in not answering ABC's discovery was not willful, but instead was good faith resistance. Because DeNardo did not meet this burden, we find his conduct to evidence a willful intent to impede discovery.
ABC argues it suffered prejudice as a result of DeNardo's failure to produce the requested information. Analysis of each category of requested information supports ABC's position.
ABC argues that it was prejudiced by DeNardo's failure to provide information regarding his prior residences and employers, information that might go towards DeNardo's credibility. A listing of DeNardo's prior residences, ABC claims, might have aided in determining jurisdictions to search for his criminal and litigation history. ABC is correct that information regarding DeNardo's prior residences and employers might have been helpful in determining which jurisdictions to search for his criminal and litigation history. In addition, it may have been helpful in determining DeNardo's credibility; credibility would likely be particularly important in resolving the underlying dispute here, which concerns an oral contract. [23] Knowledge of prior residences would allow ABC to contact past neighbors of DeNardo's who might give further information regarding credibility. Speaking to past employers would allow ABC to determine if DeNardo had had previous work-related problems and might also go towards determining his credibility in work-related situations. Because DeNardo's prior residences and employment history would have been helpful in determining how to uncover other relevant evidence as well as issues involving DeNardo's credibility, Judge Joannides did not err in finding ABC was prejudiced by DeNardo's failure to provide the information.
ABC claims that information regarding DeNardo's criminal and litigation history was necessary because it could have affected DeNardo's credibility, a necessary factor in resolving a disputed oral contract. DeNardo claims that such information is generally irrelevant, that character evidence is not admissible in a civil trial, and that, in any event, such information is available in the public record. As noted above, credibility is a necessary factor in resolving a dispute over an oral contract. [24] DeNardo's criminal history is thus possibly relevant as it might affect the fact-finder's view of DeNardo's credibility. DeNardo's previous litigation history is potentially relevant as well, and it might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
ABC argues that in order to properly determine damages, information regarding DeNardo's subsequent employment is required. DeNardo responds that ABC already possesses information regarding his subsequent employment and that his tax records are protected. We have held that [w]ithholding materials relating to a party's damages may seriously prejudice the adverse party by making it difficult or impossible to adequately assess the strength of the opponent's case, thereby leaving the opponent in a weakened position for settlement negotiations or other purposes. [25] That appears to have been the case here. In his complaint, DeNardo requested compensatory damages. However, as DeNardo knows from his own previous litigation,  `a plaintiff alleging breach of contract must present evidence sufficient to calculate the amount of the loss caused by the breach.'  [26] DeNardo argues that ABC has all of the information it needs because it knows he was subsequently hired by Alaska Economy RVs. However, [t]he purpose of awarding damages for a breach of contract is to put the injured party in as good a position as that party would have been had the contract been fully performed. [27] Therefore, by analogy to wrongful discharge cases, an employee is generally entitled to the amount of the agreed-upon salary for the unexpired term of his employment minus what he could earn by making diligent efforts to obtain similar work. [28] ABC has no way of knowing, absent DeNardo providing it, the salary information necessary to litigate or settle the issue of damages. Therefore, despite ABC possibly having some knowledge regarding where DeNardo was working shortly after he left ABC, DeNardo was required to provide the information ABC requested. Because whether DeNardo obtained subsequent employment and because information involving that employment was relevant to any damages regarding his claim for breach of contract, ABC was prejudiced by his failure to provide the requested information.
One of the alleged reasons for DeNardo's termination was his failure to provide a copy of his driver's license upon being hired by ABC, which claimed that driving RVs was a requirement of DeNardo's employment. ABC thus argues that whether DeNardo had a valid driver's license is at the very heart of this dispute. DeNardo claims this information is irrelevant because driving was not a requirement. This factual dispute was not susceptible to resolution during the pretrial period when discovery occurs. But ABC was entitled to discovery of information pertinent to the claim so that it could prepare for the litigation. Had the case proceeded to trial, and had the fact-finder concluded that a driver's license was a requirement of the job, it would clearly have been important to know if DeNardo possessed a license.
The trial court must be allowed to enforce its discovery orders with sanctions tailored to fit the circumstances. [29] The test for the validity of a discovery sanction that dismisses claims or orders facts or issues to be taken as established under [Rule 37(b)(2) ] is whether these claims or issues are `elements of the dispute that cannot be determined on the merits without disclosure of the evidence the Court has ordered the party to produce.' [30] If the dismissed claims are unrelated to the information the party refuses to supply, the discovery sanction constitutes punishment and is impermissible. [31] The credibility of a party is relevant to the issue of how to interpret an oral contract. [32] Evidence of DeNardo's credibility, which could be influenced by information gained from prior residences, and prior employment, was highly relevant to the dismissed claims. And subsequent employment, as well as tax information, are relevant to the issue of damages. Because the information requested was directly relevant to the claims at issue, the dismissal sanction was sufficiently related to the violation.
DeNardo claims Judge Joannides did not consider meaningful alternatives to the sanction of dismissal in her order as required by law. ABC contends that a lesser sanction in this instance would not have sufficed. While we have recognized that the trial court need not make detailed findings or examine every alternative remedy, we have held that litigation ending sanctions will not be upheld unless `the record clearly indicate[s] a reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives to dismissal.' [33] A conclusory rejection of all sanctions short of dismissing an action does not suffice as a reasonable exploration of meaningful alternatives. [34]  `[A] party should not be barred from his or her day in court where an alternative remedy would suffice to make the adverse party whole.' [35] [B]efore a court may impose litigation ending sanctions for discovery violations the record must clearly indicate a reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives to dismissal. [36] In her order, Judge Joannides stated, Lesser sanctions than dismissal have been attempted and have been unsuccessful. Plaintiff's violations are so numerous [that] sanctions other than dismissal will not adequately protect defendants. We agree. No alternate remedy would serve to make ABC whole. Prior to Judge Joannides taking over the case, Judge Shortell gave DeNardo ample chances to comply. First, he imposed a monetary sanction. Second, he issued a stay on proceedings. Each time, DeNardo responded with the same outright refusal. And finally, after DeNardo did not act within the sixty-day period allowed by the court, Judge Joannides granted ABC's motion to dismiss. DeNardo claims Judge Joannides did not consider lesser sanctions. At this point, though, she was not required to consider lesser sanctions. The record already indicated that lesser sanctions had been attempted unsuccessfully. DeNardo's violations had become so egregious, Judge Joannides acted well within her discretion in determining that no lesser sanction would deter DeNardo from future violations.