Opinion ID: 1454512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurors dismissed for cause

Text: During the voir dire process the trial court questioned jurors concerning their attitudes, views and opinions toward the death penalty. Based on responses given during this process the State posed additional questions concerning the death penalty to four specific jurors. Based upon the responses given the State challenged three of those jurors pursuant to I.C. § 19-2020(9). [6] Before ruling on the State's challenges, the trial court also posed a series of questions and subsequently dismissed all four jurors for cause. Enno asserts that these four jurors were improperly excluded for cause, thereby denying him of his right to a fair trial under the Idaho Constitution and United States Constitution. Enno first argues that the excused jurors' bias did not reach the level required in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and all four were therefore, wrongly excluded. Secondly, Enno argues that the manner in which the four jurors were excluded essentially granted the State an additional four peremptory challenges and denied him the corresponding right to exclude jurors who, upon concluding the defendant was guilty, would automatically vote for first degree murder instead of a lesser included offense. Enno does not assert that death qualifying a jury is per se improper, but that the manner in which the qualifying procedure was conducted in this case denied him his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. A. Exclusion of Jurors Objecting to the Death Penalty under Witherspoon. We will first address Enno's argument that the four jurors were improperly excluded for cause. In Witherspoon the United States Supreme Court held that the state infringes upon a defendant's right under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to a trial by an impartial jury if the jury imposing or recommending the death penalty was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Id. 391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the United States Supreme Court clarified its decision in Witherspoon by stating: This line of cases establishes the general proposition that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. The State may insist, however, that jurors will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 420, 105 S.Ct. at 850 (quoting from Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). (Emphasis in original.) When jurors acknowledge that the potential imposition of the death penalty could affect their deliberations it may only indicate that they would be more emotionally involved or would view their task with greater seriousness and gravity. Such an effect does not demonstrate that prospective jurors are necessarily unwilling or unable to follow the law or obey their oaths. Id. The proper inquiry to be posed in this procedure is whether or not the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Witt , the juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable clarity. Id. In Idaho the trial judge, rather than the jury, sentences defendants found guilty of capital crimes. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989). The fact that a jury does not involve itself with the sentencing phase of the criminal process does not bar the state from death qualifying the jury. The United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), held that the Constitution does not prohibit death qualifying juries prior to the guilt phase of a trial. In State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 736 P.2d 1327 (1987), this Court upheld the constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2020 and the procedure of death qualifying a jury in a capital case even though the jury does not participate in the sentencing process. As this Court held in State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 880, 736 P.2d 1327, 1333 (1987), I.C. § 19-2020(9) provides that even though punishment is not a jury question, it is proper to exclude a juror if he or she objects to the death penalty. 112 Idaho at 880, 736 P.2d at 1333. Further, in affirming the district court we noted in Johns that the constitutionality of this particular type of statute has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); State v. Creech, 99 Idaho 779, 589 P.2d 114 (1979); and State v. Wilson, 41 Idaho 616, 243 P. 359 (1925); see State v. Johns, 112 Idaho at 880, 736 P.2d at 1333. The death qualifying jury selection procedure is well established in Idaho and approved in a substantial body of case law from the United States Supreme Court. The utilization of this procedure by the trial court in the instant case was not error. B. Trial Court's Decision to Dismiss Jurors is Discretionary. Since death qualifying a jury is a recognized and proper procedure, we must now determine whether the trial court erred in excluding the four jurors following their questioning by both the court and counsel. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the United States Supreme Court determined that the appropriate standard of review under federal habeas corpus review of a case involving the death qualifying of a jury is a presumption of correctness. [7] Id., 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853. In Wainwright the United States Supreme Court determined that great deference must be given to the trial judge who is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Id. The reason is that the determination of demeanor and credibility are peculiarly within a trial judge's province. Id. 469 U.S. at 428, 105 S.Ct. at 854. The United States Supreme Court's determination that exclusion of jurors pursuant to a Witherspoon challenge in the trial judge's discretion is in accordance with our own Idaho law. In State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989), this Court held it was within the trial judge's discretion to determine whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict and that absent an abuse of discretion the trial court's decision will be affirmed on appeal. See also State v. Merrifield, 109 Idaho 11, 704 P.2d 343 (Ct.App.1985). After a careful review of the record we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The record supports a finding that the four jurors dismissed for cause had views on imposition of the death penalty that would substantially impair the performance of their duties or would interfere with their judgment on the case. The dialogue between the trial court and the four jurors clearly sets forth the views of the jurors on this issue: THE COURT: I want to examine those three particular individuals and Mrs. Nelson a little further, Mr. EchoHawk, and then I'll rule on your motion. Mr. Coutis and Mr. Tatum and Mr. Wheatley and Mrs. Nelson, my question is going to be directed to you, and I want to explain one thing. First of all, it is not the jury's responsibility, under Idaho law, to determine a sentence in a case. It's the Court's decision, and if there is a conviction, regardless of what it is for, in this case, it will be my responsibility to impose sentence. However, what we want to explore is whether or not what a potential sentence might be might affect your view of the evidence for determining either guilt or innocence. We want you to be able to follow the law, as I will explain it to you, and make a decision as to guilt or innocence in this case based on the evidence and the instructions, not what you perceive potential sentences may be, and that's where the question comes down. With that additional explanation, of those four of you who indicated those earlier responses, are any of you in a position that you would say, regardless of the evidence presented by the State, I simply cannot return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder because I know that there is a potential death sentence? That's the question, plain and simple. Mr. Coutis? JUROR COUTIS: I don't think I could. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tatum? JUROR TATUM: I wouldn't. THE COURT: Mr. Wheatley? JUROR WHEATLEY: No. THE COURT: And Mrs. Nelson? JUROR NELSON: No, I wouldn't. THE COURT: All right. I will excuse each of the four of you for cause. (Emphasis added.) As stated in that dialogue by the trial court, each of the jurors stated that they would not return a guilty verdict regardless of the evidence presented because of the potential of a death penalty sentence. A careful review of the entire jury voir dire process reveals that on other occasions jurors Nelson and Coutis indicated that they would have difficulty following the court's instructions concerning intoxication. Juror Tatum indicated earlier that he would have trouble hearing enough evidence to convict someone of first degree murder. Juror Wheatley also specifically indicated earlier in the voir dire process that he could not follow the court's instructions knowing that a possible death sentence could be given. In Wainwright the United States Supreme Court stated that: [D]eterminations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Id. at 469 U.S. 424-25, 105 S.Ct. at 852. The findings of the trial court that these four jurors should be dismissed for cause are fairly supported by the record and we find no abuse of discretion. C. Fairness of Death Qualifying Procedure Utilized. We will now consider Enno's second argument that the application of I.C. § 19-2020(9) in death qualifying the jury in this case is unfair because it gave the State four additional peremptory challenges and denied Enno the corresponding right to exclude jurors who, upon concluding the defendant was guilty, would automatically vote in favor of a first degree murder conviction rather than a lesser included offense. We first note that Enno did not challenge any jurors for cause on this point during the voir dire process. Secondly, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2020(8), [8] any jurors who exhibited an unqualified opinion or belief that the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged should be dismissed for cause. Enno accepted the jury panel and passed all jurors for cause following the voir dire process. We note that Enno's counsel, a competent and experienced criminal defense lawyer, asked questions during the voir dire process in an attempt to find jurors who might exhibit bias or to determine whether any of the jurors exhibited an unqualified opinion or belief that defendant was guilty of the offense charged. No responses were elicited. It is clear from the record that the jury panel passed for cause by Enno was an impartial jury. There is no evidence that any of the jurors were biased or partial in favor of conviction prior to hearing the evidence. The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of jury impartiality in Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986), as follows: [McCree argues that] when the State tips the scales by excluding prospective jurors with a particular viewpoint, an impermissibly partial jury results. We have consistently rejected this view of jury impartiality, including as recently as last Term when we squarely held that an impartial jury consists of nothing more than  jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. Id. at 476 U.S. 178, 106 S.Ct. at 1767. (Emphasis in original.) The record reveals that the jurors passed for cause were individuals who would conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. Neither the law nor the facts in the record support Enno's argument concerning alleged impartiality of the jury and we affirm the trial court's decision excusing the four jurors for cause pursuant to I.C. § 19-2020(9).