Opinion ID: 1613220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Venue of the Witness-Tampering Charge

Text: Ivey was charged with tampering with a witness, § 13A-10-124, Ala.Code 1975. That statute provides: (a) A person commits the crime of tampering with a witness if he attempts to induce a witness or a person he believes will be called as a witness in any official proceeding to: (1) Testify falsely or unlawfully withhold testimony; or (2) Absent himself from any official proceeding to which he has been legally summoned. The indictment charging Ivey stated that Ivey had attempted to induce Scott Nordness to testify falsely or unlawfully withhold testimony in the case of Melissa Myers v. Stephen R. Windom. The evidence at trial showed that Ivey contacted Nordness to arrange a meeting to discuss Windom's allegations against Ivey and ATLA. The two agreed to meet at a service station between Birmingham and Jasper, apparently either in Jefferson County or in Walker County. Unknown to Nordness, Ivey recorded their conservation. During this meeting, Ivey presented, for Nordness to execute, an affidavit Ivey had drafted. That affidavit stated that Nordness had not bribed Myers to make the allegations against Windom. Later in the conversation, Ivey went over the proposed affidavit with Nordness, who said that the statements in the affidavit were true. Nordness signed the affidavit. He testified that the affidavit was, in fact, accurate and that Ivey had not asked him to testify falsely or to withhold testimony. Ivey claims that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that the alleged offense of witness tampering occurred in Mobile County; such evidence was essential to the prosecution of this charge in Mobile County. The State argues, however, that because the proceeding in which Ivey is alleged to have attempted to have Nordness testify falsely was initiated in Mobile County, venue for the charge was proper there. The State also contends that Ivey's alleged criminal scheme stretched to several counties, including Mobile County, and that this fact is further proof that venue was proper in Mobile County. The State cites § 15-2-6, Ala.Code 1975, which reads: When an offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, venue is in either county. The State contends that the witness-tampering charge was an integral part of Ivey's criminal scheme, and that where a crime occurs in one county but related events occur in another county, venue is proper in both counties. In Buffo v. State, 415 So.2d 1146, 1154 (Ala.Crim.App.1980), rev'd on other grounds, 415 So.2d 1158 (Ala.1982), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: In a criminal prosecution the accused has a constitutional right to a trial `[in] the county or district in which the offense was committed.' U.S. Const. Amendment VI; Ala. Const. [of 1901,] Art. I, § 6, [ Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 547 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), aff'd, 383 So.2d 564 (Ala.1980)]. Proof of venue is necessary to sustain a conviction, Grace v. State, 369 So.2d 318 (Ala.Cr.App.1979), and `must be properly laid to give jurisdiction.' Barlow v. Garrow, Minor 1 (Ala.1820). Unless otherwise provided by law, venue of all public offenses is in the county in which the offense was committed. Stokes v. State, 373 So.2d 1211 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 373 So.2d 1218 (Ala.1979). The burden of establishing venue is on the State. Willcutt v. State, 284 Ala. 547, 226 So.2d 328 (1969). See also § 15-2-2, Ala.Code 1975 (stating that [u]nless otherwise provided by law, the venue of all public offenses is in the county in which the offense was committed). In Ex parte Watts, 435 So.2d 135, 136-37 (Ala.1983), this Court held: Unless some special venue statute applies [to the criminal charge], an offense may be prosecuted only in the county where the accused has committed the unlawful act on which the prosecution against him is based.... . . . . Proof of venue is jurisdictional and without such proof ... a conviction cannot be sustained. The State concedes that the conduct it claims constituted Ivey's actual attempt to persuade Nordness to testify untruthfully or to suppress the truth took place during the taping of the conversation between Nordness and Ivey. However, the State maintains that the evidence must be viewed as a whole in order to infer Ivey's intent or motive. In Ex parte Hunte, 436 So.2d 806 (Ala. 1983), this Court determined that the proper venue for a charge of Medicaid fraud, § 22-1-11, Ala.Code 1975, was Mobile County, where the defendant prepared the false statement. In Hunte, the State argued that because the false statements had to be turned over to the Medicaid agency in order to recover funds, the proper venue was Montgomery County, where the Medicaid agency was located. This Court held that a prosecution under § 22-1-11 did not require reliance on the misrepresentations in order for the agency to finally approve payment; therefore, it wrote, [T]he crime [of Medicaid fraud] is complete, once one, with intent to defraud, makes or causes to be made or assists in the preparation of any false statement, representation or omission of a material fact in any claim or application for any payment. 436 So.2d at 808. We conclude that § 13A-10-124 does not require that the false testimony or the withholding of testimony be carried out in order for the charge of witness tampering to be complete. Section 13A-10-124 criminalizes the attempt to induce a witness to testify falsely. Here, the crime was complete when Ivey allegedly attempted to induce Nordness to testify falsely. The State conceded at oral argument that this conduct occurred during the taped conversation between Ivey and Nordness. That conversation, so far as the record demonstrates, occurred in either Jefferson County or Walker County. The State's reliance upon § 15-2-6 is misplaced, because that statute requires that the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties in order for venue to be appropriate in any such county. Here, the offense was complete upon the alleged attempt, which did not occur in Mobile County where Ivey was indicted. Thus, the State did not sustain its burden of proving that the offense occurred in Mobile County. Where no conviction can be had under the indictment, for failure to prove the essential acts or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the crime in the county where the defendant was indicted, a motion for judgment of acquittal is due to be granted and its erroneous denial requires that the judgment of conviction be reversed and a judgment of acquittal rendered. See Culligan v. State, 29 Ala.App. 29, 191 So. 405 (1939). We reverse the trial court's order denying Ivey's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the charge of tampering with a witness and render a judgment of acquittal.