Opinion ID: 507345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary and Procedural Errors

Text: 11 Defendants allege the trial judge committed numerous evidentiary and procedural errors. Defendants contend that their prior guilty pleas should not have been admitted into evidence, at least not without allowing defendants to explain the circumstances surrounding those pleas. Defendants also maintain that the district judge should have recused himself from the case because his conduct throughout the trial indicated his bias and prejudice toward the defendants. Lastly, defendants assert that the district judge committed reversible error by personally marking the jury form before giving it to the jury, and by sending the amended complaint, which was not admitted into evidence, back with the jury to be used in their deliberations. 12 We must determine whether any of these actions by the trial judge constituted error, and if so, whether the error affected a substantial right of the defendants. Only if an error prejudiced a substantial right of a defendant may a court of appeals reverse a lower court decision. See King v. Gulf Oil Co., 581 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir.1978); 1 Int'l Air Industries, Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943, 96 S.Ct. 1411, 47 L.Ed.2d 349 (1976) (on appeal, trial errors which do not effect substantial rights of parties are to be disregarded). 13 Whether an error is harmless or prejudicial depends on the facts of each case. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761-63, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1246-47, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). 2 The specific action constituting error cannot be viewed in a vacuum; the entire record must be examined to determine whether the error influenced the jury. See Dunn v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 123 F.2d 815 (5th Cir.1941). An error is presumed harmless unless it affected the substantial rights of a party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; 3 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2111. The party asserting error has the burden of proving that the error prejudiced a substantial right of that party. Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.1978).
14 During the civil trial the government introduced the defendants' guilty pleas from the prior criminal investigation of the kickback scheme. Defendants objected to the admission of their pleas on several grounds. Defendants argue that since the district judge granted summary judgment on the issue of liability, there was no reason to allow the guilty pleas into evidence in the civil trial. By doing so, defendants contend, the district court improperly and prejudicially merged the civil case with the criminal case. Defendants maintain that even if the guilty pleas were relevant to the issue of damages, the prejudice inherent in the pleas far outweighed the necessity of introducing them. Finally, defendants assert that if the guilty pleas were relevant and admissible, the district court should have allowed the defendants to present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the pleas; in particular, the district judge should have allowed defendants to cross-examine Assistant United State Attorney Truncale about the events which occurred at the time the defendants plead guilty. 15 When an issue is resolved in favor of the United States in a criminal prosecution, that issue may not be contested by the same defendant in a subsequent civil suit brought by the government. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 962, 85 S.Ct. 650, 13 L.Ed.2d 556 (1965). This rule applies in all civil cases brought by the United States where a defendant previously has been found guilty, either by a jury verdict or by a guilty plea. See Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 71 S.Ct. 408, 95 L.Ed. 534 (1951); In re Raiford, 695 F.2d 521 (11th Cir.1983). See also Sell v. United States, 336 F.2d 467 (10th Cir.1964) (in False Claims Act case, prior criminal conviction estops defendant contesting same issue in subsequent civil proceeding). 16 In the case at bar, the issues determined by the guilty pleas of the defendants were: (1) that all of the defendants were guilty of criminal conspiracy to violate the Act; (2) that three of the defendants were guilty of substantive violations of the Act; and (3) that the defendants admitted to paying a total of at least $577,400 in kickbacks generated by their inflated invoices. In this civil case the defendants were sued on the same conspiracy and the same substantive violations of the Act as those to which they plead guilty in the criminal case. Thus, defendants are precluded from contesting those issues here. 17 Under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), a defendant's own statements are not hearsay and are admissible against him in court. Whether to admit evidence is within the trial judge's discretion. Fed.R.Evid. 104. So long as that evidence is relevant to the issues at trial and its probative value is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion, the evidence may be admitted. Id., Fed.R.Evid. 403. A trial judge's decision to admit evidence may be overruled only if it was arbitrary or unreasonable. See United States v. Cole, 670 F.2d 35, 36 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 18 The issue at trial was the amount of damages, if any, the United States should be awarded for the defendants' malfeasance. Thus, the guilty pleas which contained defendants' admissions of the monetary amount of the kickbacks they paid were relevant. The pleas were not unfairly prejudicial to defendants since the judge had already granted summary judgment on the issue of liability, and the total damages the jury awarded were not excessive. 19 Defendants' supposition that they should have been allowed to present the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the their pleas is mistaken. Any dissatisfaction defendants had concerning the surrounding circumstances should have been pursued by an appeal from their criminal convictions. Collaterally attacking their pleas in the civil trial by introducing evidence of the surrounding circumstances would have confused the jury. It is within the trial judge's discretion to exclude evidence that would confuse the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403. See United States v. Castell, 584 F.2d 87, 89 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 925, 99 S.Ct. 1256, 59 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979); United States v. Tidwell, 559 F.2d 262, 267 (5th Cir.1977). The district judge in the case at bar did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence. 20 Lastly, the district judge correctly prohibited the defendants from cross-examining Assistant United States Attorney Truncale about letters he wrote to a probation officer regarding the defendants' cooperation in the criminal case and about the alleged promise of no further action against the defendants. As explained, supra, there was no evidence in the record of any compromise agreement and even if there was, Truncale had no authority to make such an agreement. Also, as discussed supra, evidence of the defendants' previous cooperation with the government was collateral to the civil case and would have confused and misled the jury. 21 Truncale testified on direct only as a summary witness, see Fed.R.Evid. 1006, United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 491-92 (and citations therein) (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978), to recapitulate various charts and other evidence the government introduced for calculation of a fair market value for the mobile home set-ups. Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 611(b), cross-examination of Truncale was limited to the subject matter of the direct examination. Moreover, as an Assistant United States Attorney, Truncale was covered by Justice Department regulations. Under 28 C.F.R. Sec. 16.21 et seq., defendants who wish to solicit testimony on cross from an Assistant United States Attorney which goes beyond the scope of the testimony given on direct must receive prior approval from officials at the Justice Department. The defendants in the case at bar failed to comply with these regulations as the trial judge noted when he ruled to limit their cross-examination of Truncale.
22 Defendants contend that the trial judge was biased and prejudiced against them as evidenced by his remarks made throughout the trial and that this sentiment was conveyed to the jury. A judge must disqualify himself if his impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if he has a personal bias or prejudice against a party. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. Usually, bias sufficient to disqualify a judge must stem from an extrajudicial source, except where such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown by otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party. Davis v. Bd. of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1685, 48 L.Ed.2d 188 (1976). A judge should be disqualified only if a reasonable person, apprised of all the facts and circumstances, would question the judge's impartiality. Hunt v. Am. Bank & Trust Co. of Baton Rouge, 783 F.2d 1011, 1015 (11th Cir.1986); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1110-11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). 23 It was unnecessary for the district judge to recuse himself. Many of the district judge's remarks of which defendants complain were made outside of the presence of the jury. Other remarks made by the district judge within the jury's presence did not indicate that the judge was biased or prejudiced against any of the defendants. See Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1983) (Neither a trial judge's comments on lack of evidence, rulings adverse to a party, nor friction between the court and counsel constitute pervasive bias.). The district judge treated both sides equally, chastising the parties only when necessary to control the tenor of the trial.
24 The jury rendered its verdict using a verdict form supplied by the trial judge. The verdict form set forth the name of each defendant, the counts of the complaint under which the defendant was sued, and a blank space for damages should the jury decide to award any against the particular defendant. The defendants, under separate counts, allegedly conspired to violate the Act and allegedly committed substantive violations of the Act. Prior to trial, the district judge had granted summary judgment against all of the defendants as to the conspiracy counts and against some of the defendants as to the substantive counts. Thus, all that remained as to those counts was a determination of damages. 25 Before he delivered the verdict form to the jury, the district judge marked the form to indicate to the jury that liability for those particular defendants on those particular counts already had been established. Personally bringing the form over to the jury, the district judge instructed: 26 Now you will see that in a few instances liability has already been determined, but not the amount of the liability. In those instances, in order to show you how to use this verdict form, I have taken the liability [sic] to go ahead and find for you, or for the Court, really, not for you, that William Donald Fountain on count one is liable. But that doesn't mean that he must pay damages. The amount of damages is up to you, as I have told you earlier. 27 Defendants contend that by marking the verdict form and personally approaching the jury box, the district judge exerted improper influence over the jury and in fact became a member of the jury. These assertions are frivolous. Neither action constituted error. It was imperative for the district judge to apprise the jury that liability for those particular counts had been established. Furthermore, the judge did not become a member of the jury when he approached the box; he merely ensured that the jury clearly understood to what he was referring in his instructions. 28 The day before this case was given over to the jury, the trial judge had the government amend the complaint to conform to the evidence presented at trial. In giving the amended complaint to the jury, the trial judge instructed them 29 The complaint ... will go with you to the jury room.... There has been a great deal cut out of the complaint that you will not have to be concerned with ... And you will have it to look at and decide what each defendant is charged with, if you see fit. The lawyers have told you what they are charged with. They made sketches of what they think they are charged with. And, of course, you will have an opportunity to look at the complaint in the light of those charts if you need to look at the complaint.... Bear in mind that the plaintiff, the government, has the burden of proving each material element of each count in the indictment [sic] by a preponderance of the evidence. And, of course, you will consider each count as it may apply to each defendant separately, and decide what that defendant under that count is responsible for, if anything. 30