Opinion ID: 2997347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim Against Mayor Johnson

Text: The Liquor Act authorizes Mayor Johnson, as local liquor control commissioner, to impose fines or revoke or suspend licenses for violations of the Act. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-5. Selling alcohol to a person under the age of 21 constitutes a violation of the Act. 5/6-16(a)(i). The Liquor Act establishes the procedures that must be followed before these sanctions may be imposed: “[N]o such license shall be so revoked or suspended and no licensee shall be fined except after a public hearing by the local liquor control commissioner with a 3 day written notice to the licensee affording the licensee an opportunity to appear and defend.” 5/7-5. The Liquor Act also permits the temporary closing of a business without a prior hearing in certain limited circumstances: If the local liquor control commissioner has reason to believe that any continued operation of a particular licensed premises will immediately threaten the welfare of the community he may, upon the issuance of a written order stating the reason for such conclusion and without notice or hearing order the licensed premises closed for not more than 7 days, giving the licensee an opportunity to be heard during that period, except that if such licensee shall also be engaged in the conduct of another business or businesses on the licensed premises such order shall not be applicable to such other business or businesses. Id. Killinger asserts that the mayor violated these procedures by summarily closing G’s without issuing a written order, 6 No. 04-1492 explaining his reasons, or holding a hearing while the bar was ordered closed (between 10:00 P.M. on August 10th and 2:00 A.M. on August 11th). The order summarily closing G’s was also overbroad, according to plaintiff, because it applied to both the bar and restaurant areas of G’s. Although the mayor later held a hearing to address the propriety of imposing a fine and suspension, Killinger contends that he was never afforded an opportunity to challenge the summary closing itself. Plaintiff argues that, by violating Illinois law, the mayor also violated his federal due process rights. Killinger also asserts that the Due Process Clause requires the authorities to hold a hearing before temporarily closing his business, see, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971), even though the Liquor Act does not. We do not reach the merits of Killinger’s due process claim against Johnson, however, because we agree with the district court that the mayor is protected by judicial immunity. Absolute judicial immunity shields judicial and quasijudicial actors from liability for civil damages arising out of the performance of their judicial functions. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13 (1978). In determining whether an official enjoys judicial immunity, we examine “the nature of the responsibilities of the official in question.” Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd., 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2001). “[I]mmunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988). Following this functional approach, we have held that an Illinois local liquor control commissioner enjoys absolute immunity when deciding whether to renew or revoke a liquor license. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 951 (7th Cir. 1983). Our conclusion in Reed was based upon the authority conferred and the limits imposed upon a commissioner by Illinois law: No. 04-1492 7 He may not revoke without finding that the licensee has violated the law; he may make that finding only after notice and hearing; and he “shall reduce all evidence to writing and shall maintain an official record of the proceedings.” In addition, revocation is . . . appealable to the state Liquor Control Commission. Id. (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, ¶ 153 (1983)).2 Reed applies with equal force to a local liquor control commissioner’s decision to suspend a license, impose a fine, or summarily close a licensee’s business. A suspension or fine may be imposed based on the same findings and subject to the same procedures as were at issue in Reed. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/7-5. Moreover, although the findings and procedures relevant to a summary closing differ somewhat from those highlighted in Reed, we find a commissioner’s action in this regard analogous to the issuance of a temporary restraining order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b), clearly a judicial function. Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986); cf. Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 948 n.19 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the issuance of a temporary order of child custody constitutes a judicial function). Mayor Johnson was therefore performing a judicial function when he temporarily closed G’s, fined Killinger, and suspended his license. Killinger does not seriously dispute that such actions would normally qualify as judicial functions. He argues, however, that by ignoring the procedures mandated by the Liquor Act, Mayor Johnson acted outside of his jurisdiction and was thereby stripped of the immunity typically afforded quasi-judicial actors. Killinger asserts that judicial immunity does not apply to “actions, though judicial in nature, 2 The 1983 version of Paragraph 153 of Chapter 43 of the Illinois Revised Statutes is a prior codification of the Liquor Act. 8 No. 04-1492 taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). Although this is a correct statement of the law, it does not support plaintiff’s case. A quasi-judicial actor enjoys immunity “for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1391 (7th Cir. 1990). Stated otherwise, an official does not act “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction,” Waco, 502 U.S. at 12, merely because he violates a procedural rule. Mere procedural violations establish, at worst, that the official acted “in excess of jurisdiction.” The Supreme Court has illustrated the distinction as follows: [I]f a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune. Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 n.7 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871)). As discussed above, the Liquor Act vests the mayor with the authority to issue fines, suspend licenses, and summarily close licensees’ businesses for short periods. The mayor did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction by exercising this authority, even if he failed to comply with the procedures mandated by the Act. Because Johnson enjoys absolute immunity from liability arising out of these actions, we need not reach the merits of plaintiff’s claim against the mayor in his individual capacity. No. 04-1492 9