Opinion ID: 2799384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reckless Risk of Serious Bodily Injury

Text: Kantete argues that the District Court erred in imposing an increase under § 2B1.1(b)(15), which provides for a two-level enhancement if, among other things, the offense involved “the conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(15). We perceive no error. The District Court applied the enhancement because of two thefts that each involved a risk of death or serious bodily injury. The first was an armed carjacking of a 2009 Jaguar that one of Kantete’s co-conspirators admitted re-tagging for her. The second involved a stolen vehicle that Kantete agreed to purchase in a recorded conversation with “Thugger,” a member of the Bloods gang, who advised Kantete that the driver of the stolen vehicle “was getting chased by the police and . . . sideswiped . . . another car.” (Supplemental App. 62.) Kantete does not dispute that these incidents involved a reckless risk of serious bodily injury. Rather, her principal argument against the application of the enhancement is that the District Court placed undue emphasis on these incidents when the bulk of the other thefts did not involve such a risk. However, Kantete provides no support for the 5 proposition that § 2B1.1(b)(15) does not apply where some portions of the offense involve a reckless risk of serious bodily injury but others do not, and § 2B1.1(b)(15) requires only that the offense “involved” a reckless risk of serious bodily injury, not that every instance of conduct in the course of the offense have done so. Kantete also contends that “the Government could not even confirm that Kantete was specifically involved with [the] carjacking.” (Appellant’s Br. 28.) But under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), Kantete need not have been present during the carjacking for it to be considered part of the relevant offense conduct. She is responsible for “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” and there is substantial evidence in the record to fulfill each of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)’s requirements. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). As explained in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), because Kantete “order[ed] high-end vehicles, many of which can only be operated through a ‘smart key,’” it was “reasonably foreseeable that one of the ways thieves got vehicles with smart keys was through carjacking.” (PSR ¶ 135.) Moreover, Kantete does not contend that the District Court failed to make sufficient findings as to the elements of § 1B1.3, and any such objection is therefore waived. See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 6 passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2