Opinion ID: 2640657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Partial reaffirmation of Honeycutt and our retreat from Stroup v. State [13]

Text: Honeycutt remains valid authority insofar as it requires district courts to allow theory of the case instructions in sexual assault cases stating that an alleged perpetrator's knowledge of lack of consent is an element of sexual assault and, assuming supporting evidence has been presented, that a reasonable mistaken belief as to consent is a defense to a sexual assault charge. Thus, although we retreat from Honeycutt in one sense, we reaffirm it in another. While the court's instructions in this case stated that consent was a defense to the charges against Carter, they did not additionally state that a reasonable doubt on that proposition required that the jury render a verdict of acquittal. Going further, the instructions failed to indicate that a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted under a reasonable but mistaken belief of consent likewise gave rise to a duty to acquit. As explained below, this language is required under a reading of Honeycutt with our recent decision in Runion v. State, [14] and Crawford v. State, [15] all of which unwind, to a degree, the effect of our 1994 decision in the case of Stroup v. State. [16] Thus, under current authority, Carter's defense theory was not fully covered by the district court. By way of history, Stroup involved a murder conviction where the district court instructed the trial jury on the elements of justifiable homicide but refused to instruct that a finding of justifiable homicide necessitated a verdict of not guilty. We affirmed, concluding that this necessity was covered in the elements instruction on justifiable homicide. [17] This ruling fairly left the implication that general elements instructions, coupled with a standard reasonable doubt instruction, adequately state a defense theory of the case, thus making it unnecessary for district courts to explicitly include language stating the duty to acquit under theory of defense instructions. The dissent in Stroup argued that technical instructions defining when justifiable homicide may be found were insufficient for a fair trial when the instructions failed to advise that such a finding required acquittal. [18] The dissenting view developed no particular following for a time. However, we approved the insertion of such language in theory of the case instructions in Runion v. State, [19] requiring significance language in support of a defense in a murder case based upon reasonably perceived danger from the decedent. And, as stated, this requirement also now exists under Honeycutt in the context of sexual assault prosecutions. Thus, the approval of significance instructions in Runion and Honeycutt sub silentio embraces the dissenting view in Stroup. Finally, in our recent decision in Crawford, we explicitly held that district courts, upon request, must include statements of the significance of findings made in aid of theory of defense instructions. [20] In summary, the rejection of Carter's theory of defense instruction, which contained duty to acquit language, runs afoul of our recent embrace in Runion, Honeycutt and Crawford of the principles advocated in the dissenting opinion in Stroup. In line with those decisions, we now expressly reiterate that, if requested, theory of the case instructions must include the significance of findings made under the theory posited. [21]