Opinion ID: 1919001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court made sufficient findings concerning the reasonableness of the award of attorney's fees granted in favor of hinds county.

Text: ¶ 30. BellSouth argues that the circuit court's findings of fact did not support the attorney's fees award it granted. Miss. R. Civ. P. 41 allows the trial court to grant voluntary dismissals and to condition the dismissals upon terms and conditions that it deems proper. Carter, 557 So.2d at 1192. Moreover, it is well within the trial court judge's discretion under Rule 41(a)(2) to assess attorney's fees as a curative condition. However, while the trial court has considerable discretion in determining whether to assess fees, and if so, in what amount, this discretion must be predicated on facts. Furthermore, precedent requires that the assessment of attorney's fees be reasonable. ¶ 31. The reasonableness of attorney's fees is governed by Rule 1.5(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct and these guidelines are unambiguous. Rule 1.5(a) clearly requires that: A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Miss. Rules of Professional Conduct 1.5(a). These factors are also known as the McKee factors as they were laid out for the first time by this Court in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982). ¶ 32. Recently, in Mabus v. Mabus, 910 So.2d 486 (Miss.2005), we stated that the reasonableness of attorney's fees are controlled by the applicable Mississippi Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 factors and the McKee factors. Id. at 489. In Mabus, the chancellor actively pursued and confirmed both the reasonableness of and necessity for the amount of attorney's fees submitted by the prevailing attorneys in the case. Id. at 489. In this way, the chancellor applied Rule 1.5(a) and used the McKee factors as his rudder while determining the reasonableness of each attorney's fee submission. ¶ 33. In Carter, we determined that while the chancellor's decision to award attorney's fees was well supported and within the sound discretion of the trial court, the reasonableness of the amount of the attorney's fees was never substantiated. Moreover, we reasoned that, Since there was no evidence regarding any of the above [ McKee ] factors, then the trial court should not have conditioned the nonsuit on an estimate. Although a judge may take judicial notice as a means of establishing one or more of the components of a claim for attorney's fees, it would not be appropriate for him to take judicial notice of every factor without hearing some evidence, unless the fee is a basic fee that is usual and customary within the trial court's jurisdiction. Carter, 557 So.2d at 1193 (emphasis added). ¶ 34. This Court has stated the importance of issuing a complete rule 1.5(a) analysis and gave reference to what it expects by way of credible evidence. The McKee factors should have been applied by the trial judge in determining the amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded, and any award should be supported with factual determinations. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Cook, 832 So.2d 474, 487 (Miss.2002) (citing Browder v. Williams, 765 So.2d 1281, 1288 (Miss.2000)). This Court ultimately vacated the fee award granted in Miss. Power & Light and remanded the matter back to the trial court stating, [t]he trial judge should reconsider this issue in light of the McKee factors and support a new award ... based on findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 35. In the case of In Re Estate of Gillies, 830 So.2d 640 (Miss.2002), we stressed the importance of making a reasonable fee determination. Id. at 645. In citing to both Mississippi, as well as federal precedent, we stated what is controlling is what is reasonable. Mauck v. Columbus Hotel, 741 So.2d 259, 271 (Miss. 1999). This Court further noted that the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 are almost identical to the lodestar factors established by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 272. We went on to specifically cite United States Supreme Court precedent as follows: The United States Supreme Court adopted the lodestar method of calculating reasonable attorney fees. In calculating the lodestar fee, [t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer's services.... In re Estate of Gillies, 830 So.2d at 645 (citing Mauck, 741 So.2d at 271) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983)) (emphasis added). We also stated: [T]he chancellor determined a reasonable fee, based on the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. He also considered the eight factors enumerated in Rule 1.5, as is required by Mauck. In doing so, he followed the proper procedure that this Court has established for determining reasonable attorney's fees. Thus, he did not abuse his discretion, and this assignment of error is without merit. In re Estate of Gillies, 830 So.2d at 646. ¶ 36. In today's case, the circuit court judge not only failed to make any substantive findings of fact, he made a blanket endorsement of Hinds County's attorney's fee submission without making any kind of reasonableness determination. In issuing the final orders, the circuit court made minimal findings. Paragraphs one, two and five found in both orders provide as follows: 1. The herein action was filed on or about August 30, 2000 for ad valorem tax relief in the amount of Four Hundred Four Thousand and Five Dollars ($404,005.00). The parties have conducted a substantial amount of discovery in this matter. 2. On or about February 7, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the herein case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The court notes that the litigation herein was vigorously pursued by the plaintiff for approximately three years. 5. The plaintiff seeks to dismiss the herein lawsuit almost three years after it was filed. Defendants hired counsel to vigorously defend said lawsuit. Depositions were taken and MCTA [BellSouth] produced thousands of documents during discovery. Hinds County had to review many thousands of documents in connection with this matter. Notably, the above findings, which were issued for both appeals, were inaccurate as to the 2002 appeal, wherein the tax controversy involved only $137,170.85 in total and was pending in court for less than three months. To this end, the 2002 appeal involved no discovery and hence no documents were produced or reviewed by Hinds County. ¶ 37. The circuit court entered identical orders in two cases which had different factual backgrounds. From the record before us, it is apparent that the circuit judge did not consider the reasonableness of Hinds County's attorney's fee submission and seemed convinced by the simple rationale that a suit in court for three years involving thousands of pages of discovery must be worth over $100,000.00 in legal fees. While this rationale might prove to be correct, the trial court's actions in arriving at the amount of attorney's fees and expenses are not consistent with our decision in McKee, and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hensley. Also, in Browder, we expressly stated that [t]he reasonableness of an attorney's fee award is determined by reference to the factors set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. 765 So.2d at 1288. Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial judge should have applied these factors in determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded and supported that award with factual determinations. Id. To hold otherwise, would be to obligate this Court to make an original reasonableness determination and, in so doing, deprive us of our proper judicial function as a reviewing appellate body. ¶ 38. When a trial court makes such attorney's fees awards, it should do so with caution and clarity. While Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) expressly confers upon the trial courts the discretion to assess attorney's fees, this discretion should be appropriately exercised with findings of fact and conclusions of law to undergird both the award and the amount of the attorney's fees and related expenses. ¶ 39. We have accordingly expressly enumerated the standard by which such a reasonableness determination be made and have mandated that a trial court consider the eight factors enumerated in Rule 1.5 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. While the trial judge has the discretionary prerogative to make such a determination, and this Court affords substantial deference to such discretion, a judge's discretion is not unfettered. Moreover, trial court judges must follow the appropriate procedure and make the requisite findings of fact necessary to insure a losing litigant is only made to compensate his adversary for fees and expenses which were reasonably incurred. Based on the record before us, we are thus constrained, as a matter of law, to find that the trial court in today's case abused his discretion in failing to undergird his attorney's fees award with specific findings consistent with MRPC 1.5 and McKee.