Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's Denial of Motion to Sever Count 19

Text: Charging Possession of Firearm by Convicted Felon Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to sever Count 19 as an abuse of discretion, arguing that the inclusion of his prior felony history resulted in clear prejudice and denied him a fair trial. Appellant moved for severance under Fed. R. Crim P. 14, which provides, in part, that if it appears a defendant may be prejudiced by joinder of offenses, the court may order an election of separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other 22 In addition to Haskins' testimony, the Government introduced into evidence a certified copy of the records of the FDIC establishing that after a diligent search of the agency's records, no evidence was found to indicate that First N.H.'s insured status was ever terminated on or before the date of the September 9, 1991, robbery. Further, Haskins' testimony regarding First N.H.'s interstate accounts was augmented by the testimony of another bank employee, Anita Ramsdell, who was in charge of opening new accounts, teller supervision, and maintenance of the bank vault. According to Ramsdell, the bank sold vault money to the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and on the morning of the robbery, the vault contained a large amount of money that was about to be shipped there. -39- relief justice requires . . . .  Trial courts are granted discretion under Rule 14 to take whatever steps are deemed necessary to minimize prejudice; [s]everance is only one remedy -- and certainly the most extreme -- in the federal courts' remedial arsenal. United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Here the record indicates that in ruling on Flynn's motion on the first day of trial, the court declined severance but decided not to disclose the details of Flynn's prior conviction(s) in reading Count 19 to the jury. Flynn's counsel later indicated that he would stipulate to his client being a convicted felon and stipulate that the court could instruct the jury in that regard. In its final instructions to the jury, the court indicated that the parties had stipulated to the fact of the prior conviction(s), without detailing the nature of the criminal acts at issue in them. The Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to sever Count 19 and in opting instead to limit the jury's exposure to the details of Flynn's prior criminal history. D. Statements Made During Prosecutor's Closing Argument Appellant asserts that the Government prosecutor made improper comments during his closing argument in which he allegedly injected his personal opinion and referred to facts outside the record regarding the truthfulness of Government witnesses. This Court has long held that a prosecutor may not place the prestige of the government behind a witness by making -40- personal assurances about the witness' credibility nor indicate that facts not before the jury support the testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821-22 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987); United States v. Rosa, 705 F.2d 1375, 1379-80 (1st Cir. 1983). Appellant specifically points to the following comments to support his argument of prosecutorial misconduct: Comment 1: Much comment has been made about deals. It would seem to me that a 17-year stretch in prison isn't much of a deal. Comment 2: Believe me. Richard Ferguson remembers what he remembers. So does Arthur Cosgro. So does Tom McQueeny. So does Brian Raineri. So do all the other witnesses in the case. Sometimes they don't match with each other. Sometimes they don't match with other people at the offenses. And that's fine. They're telling what they remember. These guys, as somebody said, are not great abstract thinkers. I think we can all agree to that . . . . Which is it? . . . . Do we know? No, we don't know. We can choose to believe which of those is accurate or who remembers better. Comment 3: These people believe, rightly or wrongly that they might have had some criminal exposure. Even if they did, I think we can all agree its substantially less than the individuals who are charged with the crimes in this indictment. Comment 2 was not the subject of contemporaneous objection and will be treated first. Absent plain error, the failure to object during the prosecutor's argument forecloses appellate review. United States v. Morales-Cartagena, 987 F.2d 849, 854 (1st Cir. 1993)(stating that plain-error standard -41- requires reversal of a conviction only if a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result). This Court does not find plain error. Other than the phrase, Believe me, which appears to be an expression of personal opinion only if read out of the total context, the prosecutor's comment does not improperly vouch for the credibility of Government witnesses. The comment merely points out that the witnesses, telling the story as they remember it, have generated a number of inconsistencies in the record and that it is up to jury to resolve these issues.23 The Court finds likewise that comment 1 falls within permissible boundaries. When read in context, the phrase it seems to me does not amount to improper vouching for the credibility of a Government witness because the comment is limited to the terms of the plea agreement. It is not error to inform a jury of the contents of a plea agreement, nor is it improper for the government to call attention to a witness' motivation for testifying. United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 156 (1st Cir. 1991).24 Especially here, where the record 23 Even if a contemporaneous objection had been made, comment 2 still does not rise to error sufficient to warrant a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Rodr guez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1989)(where prosecutor explicitly assured jury that witness would tell truth, error not reversible because it was counterbalanced by other statements of prosecutor telling jurors there was conflicting evidence on issues testified to by witness and reminded jury that they should determine issues of demeanor and credibility). 24 Appellant suggests that this comment misrepresented the plea agreement of Arthur Cosgro, who testified that the Government promised to recommend eight years at sentencing. This Court agrees with the Government, however, that the comment actually referred -42- indicates that defense counsel focused much of their crossexamination and closing arguments on the benefits to be bestowed on cooperating co-conspirators, the comment that a seventeenyear stretch in prison isn't much of a deal does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. See Martin, 815 F.2d at 822 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor told jury that each of the Government witnesses expects to go to jail; [t]he Government is going to recommend substantial jail, the maximum penalty is five years, and even with good time off, five years, four years in a Federal Penitentiary, that's no walk in the park). Appellant argues that in making comment 3, the prosecutor improperly interjected his personal opinion that Appellant was guilty and asserted that all other trial witnesses agreed with the Government's assessment. Appellant's interpretation of comment 3 is far-fetched. The most this Court can glean from the comment is that (1) the Government witnesses were motivated to testify, at least in part, because of the prospect of criminal prosecution and that (2) their involvement in the conspiracy, as disclosed by their testimony, when compared with the conduct alleged against defendants in the indictment, indicated that the witnesses were less culpable than defendants in the overall conspiracy. This comment is proper argumentation based on the evidence before the jury and does not amount to to the plea agreement of Richard Ferguson, who testified that the prosecution would recommend seventeen years. -43- improper vouching for the credibility of witnesses or a personal opinion as to the guilt of the defendants. Finding no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, we need not reach the issue of whether the comments in question were likely to have prejudiced Appellant by altering the outcome of the case. United States v. Rodr guez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 1989).