Opinion ID: 2301516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State's Waiver Argument

Text: As a preliminary matter, the State asserts that, pursuant to the provisions of Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 2000 Supp.), Art. 27, § 645A(c)(2), [20] Petitioner's Brady claims (I and VIII) were waived, having been raised for the first time in the post conviction proceeding. Petitioner counters that, in fact, it is the State's waiver argument that has been waived in accordance with Md. Rule 8-131(a), [21] as it was not presented to the Circuit Court during the post conviction proceedings, and, accordingly, was not addressed by the hearing judge in his opinion of 30 January 2001. Moreover, Petitioner asserts the State's waiver claim fails on its merits, as the factual predicate for the State's violations did not become apparent until Detective Marll's testimony during the evidentiary hearing on the post conviction petition, at which point Petitioner filed a timely supplement to his amended petition for post conviction relief to include the newly discovered Brady claims. [22] We agree with Petitioner's arguments.
Petitioner's claims of Brady violations relate to the examination of Charles Johnson, and related corroboration testimony of Detective Marll, stemming from Johnson's meeting with Detectives Marll and Tincher on 23 November 1994. During that meeting, Johnson provided the detectives with non-public information concerning the murders of Ms. Johnson and Bradshaw that allegedly only the murderer would know. Johnson's statement indicated that he had not been promised any favors in exchange for the information in his statement. The statement was silent as to whether he asked for any favors. On 14 December 1994, Petitioner's then trial counsel asked the State to provide all Brady material. [23] The State complied on 9 February 1995 by making available to Petitioner its file containing allegedly all relevant documents, [24] stating that [a]t the present time, there is no information known to the State which is exculpatory, in any manner to the Defendant. Likewise, in the State's 11 December 1995 response to Petitioner's motion to compel the State to comply with Md. Rule 4-263(a)(1), [25] the State reiterated its open file policy, explaining that [t]he State has not put itself even in the position of determining what could be exculpatory, and furthermore claiming that its actions taken in this regard were  well beyond the discovery requirements of Maryland Rule 4-263. None of the documents in the State's files indicated that Johnson at any time sought a personal benefit for his cooperation, nor was there documentation indicating that there had been any unsuccessful attempts by the police to verify the information Johnson provided them at the 23 November 1994 meeting. Charles Johnson first testified on 18 January 1996 at a suppression hearing regarding Petitioner's alleged jailhouse confession to Johnson. Johnson stated that his intention in contacting the police initially was to speak with them on Petitioner's behalf. [26] When asked if he requested a deal for the information, Johnson responded that he didn't right out ask for a deal.... [He] didn't feel as though [the police] could offer [him] a deal. Petitioner's counsel nonetheless challenged Johnson's motive in contacting the police, relying on his known 13 January 1995 plea agreement with the State on a pending robbery charge. Johnson responded: [T]he only thing they have done is, well, I was found guilty on the charge that I was charged with, and as far as I know, I haven't been sentenced to anything, but I believe that my armed robbery charge was reduced to a robbery, because I wasn't involved in the robbery. [27] Similarly, at trial, Johnson testified that his sole motivation in contacting the police was to speak on [Petitioner's] behalf that [Petitioner] didn't intentionally go in there with the intent or premeditation to kill Miss Johnson, that it happened because he panicked.... At the sentencing proceeding, Johnson denied Petitioner's counsel's accusation that he intended, from the outset, to lie about Petitioner's alleged confession in order to seek a deal on his pending charges. Detective Marll denied at trial that any inducements had been offered to Johnson in exchange for the information. On direct examination, the prosecutor pointedly asked Detective Marll about any agreement between Johnson and the police: [State:] Had you or Detective Tincher made any promises to Mr. Johnson concerning any information that he would provide you? [Detective Marll:] No, sir, we did not. During Petitioner's sentencing hearing on 27 January 1998, Detective Marll was questioned on direct examination by the State about his interview with Johnson: [State:] [D]uring the course of your conversations with [Charles Johnson] and then obtaining a written statement from Mr. Johnson, did he at any time ever ask you for any promises or favors in return for the information he was giving you? [Detective Marll:] No, sir, he did not. Detective Marll also testified that the police had verified each and every non-public statement that Johnson had provided them at the meeting. In its initial closing argument at trial, the State argued Johnson's credibility as a witness to the jury and his altruistic motives in contacting the police: Mr. Johnson told us the truth .... he came in here and told the truth because it was the right thing to do. In the State's rebuttal closing, the prosecutor again emphasized Johnson's credibility as a witness, and reinforced the fact that he had no deal when he provided the police with his statement. The prosecutor stated: [Charles Johnson] walked in here and said the truth, he complied with his plea agreement .... he's telling you the truth. [I]t's untrue that anyone went to Charles Johnson and said, hey, let's cut you a deal so you can tell us some info. No, Charles Johnson went to the police and gave them information about Clarence Conyers. And there was no deal when he told the police, November the 23 rd of 1994 he gave them a seven-page statement about what he knew and what Clarence Conyers had told him. No deals at that time. He told them what he knew. In the sentencing phase, the State commented again on Johnson's credibility as a witness, noting that Johnson's statements were all true .... all accurate, and that he came in [to court] and told [the jurors] the truth.... Petitioner's counsel nonetheless argued, at both trial and sentencing, that Johnson was simply a lying jailhouse snitch, motivated by self-interest in obtaining his subsequent plea agreement with the State regarding his robbery charges. Petitioner underscored the benefit Johnson received from the State, which allowed him to reduce a potential, maximum jail term of 244 years on the nineteen count indictment for robbery, to a recommended sentence of one to six years, for, inter alia, his guilty plea to a one count misdemeanor charge of conspiracy to commit robbery, and his agreement to testify truthfully at Petitioner's trial. [28] While Johnson's testimony was addressed by this Court in other contexts in the two prior direct appeals, [29] Petitioner never raised there a claim relative to the State's failure to disclose potential impeachment evidence concerning Johnson or the State's use of assertedly not fully accurate testimony. On 2 October 2000, Detective Marll again testified at the post conviction hearing about his 23 November 1994 meeting with Johnson. On this occasion, however, Detective Marll indicated that indeed Johnson had queried the detectives about a possible deal. When Detective Marll informed Johnson that the police did not have the authority to commit to a deal, but would refer his inquiry to the State's Attorney's office, Johnson declined to sign his written statement, electing instead merely to initial the pages. Detective Marll also revealed, for the first time, that several statements Johnson provided the police during the 1994 meeting either were disproved subsequently by the police or were found by them to be unverifiable. On 26 October 2000, Petitioner filed a timely supplement to the amended petition for post conviction relief raising, for the first time, the claim that the State denied Petitioner due process, and specifically, that (a) the State failed to disclose that Johnson had requested a benefit, that he refused to sign his statement absent a commitment to receive a benefit, and that Detective Marll agreed to pass along Johnson's request to the State's Attorney's office; (b) the State failed to correct Johnson's and Detective Marll's prior testimony denying that Johnson initiated an inquiry regarding receipt of a benefit for his cooperation at both the trial and sentencing proceedings; (c) the State failed to provide to the defense documentation in its possession indicating that there had been any unsuccessful attempts by the police to verify the non-public information Johnson provided in his 1994 meeting with police; and, (d) the State failed to correct Detective Marll's sentencing testimony that he had verified each and every non-public statement made by Charles Johnson during the 1994 meeting. Petitioner's claims of Brady violations were addressed and argued on the merits in Petitioner's Memorandum of Law Supporting Post Conviction Relief, filed 4 December 2000, and the State's responsive Memorandum of Law Opposing Post Conviction Relief, dated 21 December 2000. The State did not argue waiver of the Brady claims during the post conviction proceedings, and, accordingly, the hearing judge did not address waiver in his opinion of 30 January 2001. The State first raised the waiver claim in its Response in Opposition to Application for Leave to Appeal from Denial of Post Conviction Relief in a Capital Case, filed with this Court on 19 April 2001.
Ordinarily, an argument not raised in the proceedings below is not preserved for appellate review. See Md. Rule 8-131(a). See also Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650, 692-93, 759 A.2d 764, 786 (2000) (holding that appellant's argument relating to the inadequacy of a jury instruction was waived where there had been no timely objection in the lower court), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1115, 121 S.Ct. 864, 148 L.Ed.2d 776 (2001); Conyers II, 354 Md. at 148, 729 A.2d at 918 (acknowledging that Md. Rule 8-131(a) limits appellate review to those issues raised in or decided by the trial court); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253, 262, 658 A.2d 239, 243 (1995) (stating that [W]e ordinarily will not review an issue that was not presented to the trial court.); State v. Bell, 334 Md. 178, 187, 638 A.2d 107,112 (1994). This Court, in limited circumstances, however, may review an argument not made and preserved in the lower court. See Bell, 334 Md. at 188-89, 638 A.2d at 113 (noting that use of the word ordinarily contemplates circumstances where appellate review of issues not previously raised is appropriate); Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 236, 623 A.2d 630, 636 (1993) (recognizing that there are limited circumstances in which an appellate court may consider arguments not raised in the court below). Appellate review under these exceptional circumstances is discretionary, not mandatory. See Bell, 334 Md. at 188, 638 A.2d at 113. See also, e.g., Md. Rule 4-325(e) (conferring discretion on an appellate court acting on its own initiative or on the suggestion of a party ... [to] take cognizance of any plain error in the [jury] instructions, material to the rights of the defendant, despite a failure to object); Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 587, 602 A.2d 677, 694 (1992) (noting that as the cases hold with respect to errors of law generally, an appellate court may in its discretion in an exceptional case take cognizance of plain error even though the matter was not raised in the trial court) (citation omitted); Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223 (1979) (discussing exceptions to the general principle that an appellate court will not ordinarily consider an issue not previously raised). We often have stated that the primary purpose of Rule 8-131(a) is `to ensure fairness for all parties in a case and to promote the orderly administration of law.' Bell, 334 Md. at 189, 638 A.2d at 113 (quoting Brice v. State, 254 Md. 655, 661, 255 A.2d 28, 31 (1969) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). The State had an opportunity to raise its waiver claim during the post conviction proceedings, but instead chose to argue Petitioner's Brady claims on the merits. As a result, the post conviction court did not address waiver in connection with these arguments. While this Court may decide, in its discretion and under exceptional circumstances, matters not raised in the proceedings below, the State's contention does not merit exceptional treatment here. Nor has the State referred us to any legal authority that would support exempting the State from any of the general waiver rules in the present case. Moreover, the State's assertion that Petitioner's Brady claims were waived pursuant to Art. 27, § 645A(c)(2), is misguided. In pertinent part, § 645A(c)(2), states: When an allegation of error could have been made by a petitioner before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner actually took such an appeal),... in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, but was not in fact so made, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to make such allegation. (Emphasis added). The fundamental question the State advances here is whether Petitioner's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct relating to the testimony of Charles Johnson have been waived by his failure to challenge the violations at trial or in the direct appeals. Petitioner argues that it is axiomatic that you cannot waive what [you] could not reasonably know. We agree with Petitioner. Inherent in the language of § 645A(c)(2) is the presupposition that an opportunity to raise the challenge existed at the time of the lower court proceeding. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 345 Md. 122, 142, 691 A.2d 1255, 1265 (1997) (noting that defense counsel's acceptance of the jury panel was sufficient to bar any subsequent objection thereto); Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 271, 681 A.2d 30, 37 (1996) (recognizing that Oken's counsel's decision not to raise the adequacy of the voir dire on appeal was a deliberate one); Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 647, 684 A.2d 429, 437-38 (1996) (noting that petitioner's post conviction challenge to a jury instruction was waived by his failure to raise it when it was given). See also, e.g., Wyche v. State, 53 Md.App. 403, 407, 454 A.2d 378, 380 (1983) (noting that if a right alleged to have been violated is a non-fundamental right, waiver will be found if it is determined that the possibility existed for the petitioner to have raised the allegation in a prior proceeding, but he did not do so). (Emphasis added). In each of these instances the factual basis for the defendant's claim was available to the defendant, but was not properly preserved. That is not the circumstance in the case sub judice. Petitioner's trial and sentencing counsels, surmising from the known fact of the plea bargain, argued inferentially that Johnson's testimonial motivation, rather than the truth for its own sake, was entirely self-interest. The discrepancies between Johnson's testimony denying he requested a favor (when he did) and Detective Marll's corroborating testimony, however, were not revealed until Detective Marll's post conviction testimony. Similarly, there was no apparent discrepancy concerning police verification, vel non, of Johnson's 1994 statements regarding non-public information regarding the crimes until Detective Marll's post conviction testimony revealed otherwise. The State cannot frustrate trial counsel's access to the factual basis for making a Brady claim, then cry foul when Petitioner does not raise such a challenge on direct appeal. This Court is satisfied from review of the relevant portions of the record that the factual predicate underlying Petitioner's Brady claims relating to the testimony and examination of Charles Johnson did not arise until the post conviction evidentiary hearing, at which point Petitioner properly raised these issues. Indeed, the State provides no evidentiary support for its bald allegation that Petitioner waived his claim under the waiver provision of § 645A(c)(2). Accordingly, we shall review Petitioner's Brady claims on the merits.