Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Prosecutor's Argument Regarding Youth as an Aggravating Factor

Text: (33a) Defendant contends that the jury was allowed by the court and urged by the prosecutor to consider his youth as an aggravating factor. The only instruction bearing on this issue was factor (i) of CALJIC No. 8.84.1 which simply permitted the jury to consider The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. (See also ง 190.3, factor (i).) At the time of these killings, defendant was 18 years old. The flavor of the prosecutor's argument may be gained from considering the following portion of his remarks. After reciting the various statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, including factor (i), he stated: Viewing these various factors, one can see that, from the different philosophical, religious or moral view, one can consider a factor in aggravation or a factor in mitigation. It's up to the jury, the representatives of this community, to decide that. For example, age. Some people would say that, `Oh, the person is young. He should not be killed. That would be too much of a cruel and inhuman punishment for someone so young.' Another point of view or philosophy would be to lock one who is so young up for the rest of their life without the possibility of parole would be too cruel and inhuman to make a person suffer for that long. Another way of viewing age could be the person who is elderly, who commits a crime under the conditions in which the ultimate penalty can be imposed, if the person doesn't have much longer to live. The time in which is left to change that individual so that he can become a contributing, albeit in prison, member of society is too short to change, and, therefore, kill him; or a person who is elderly doesn't have that long to live, anyway. Don't kill him. Whether his age is a factor in mitigation or aggravation really depends upon a philosophical view, religious or cultural background. Apparently defendant did not object to this statement, and it seems clear a timely objection and admonition could have cured any harm. ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 775; Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1284.) We conclude that in any event defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's remarks or the instruction given. (34) We have held that ... mere chronological age, a factor over which one can exercise no control, should not of itself be deemed an aggravating factor. ( Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 789, italics deleted; see also Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1283-1284.) We have also noted, however, that: By the same token, mere chronological age of itself should not be deemed a mitigating factor. ( Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) As we noted in Lucky, ... the word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. ( Ibid. ) (33b) In the present case, instructions and the prosecutor's argument treated age as a somewhat neutral factor and left to the jury the determination of whether such age-related factors as the possible length of defendant's time in prison and the prospects for his change and improvement were or were not mitigating. The instructions did not tell the jury age was to be considered as aggravating; and the prosecutor (despite defendant's persistent contentions to the contrary) did not urge the jury to consider it as such. Clearly the prosecutor left the question entirely up to the jurors based on their individual views. (See also Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 716.) We conclude that the court's and prosecutor's handling of this issue could have had no improper impact on this verdict. [33]