Opinion ID: 1369544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ex post facto admission of victim impact evidence

Text: Storey's first claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting that [v]ictim impact evidence was not admissible because when this offense occurred Booth and Missouri law prohibited it. When Storey killed Ms. Frey in 1990, the Missouri rules of evidence did not allow for victim impact evidence. In 1993, the Missouri legislature amended section 565.030 to allow it. Counsel testified that she should have made that objection, that the admission of victim impact evidence violated the ex post facto clause. The motion court held that [v]ictim impact evidence is admissible and this was proper victim impact evidence. Trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise this objection without a sound legal basis for doing so. The ex post facto clause is aimed at laws that are retroactive and that either alter the definition of crime or increase the punishment for criminal acts already committed. State ex rel. Cavallaro v. Groose, 908 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Mo. banc 1995). A mere disadvantage to an offender is not the standard for judging the ex post facto effect of the law. Id. [N]o ex post facto violation occurs if the change in the law is merely procedural and does not increase the punishment, nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, there was no change in the requirements, burden of proof, or penalty for first-degree murder by allowing victim impact evidence. Storey's mere disadvantage of having more evidence admitted in his third trial is insufficient to show an ex post facto violation. Cavallaro, 908 S.W.2d at 136. Counsel is not deemed ineffective for declining to make a non-meritorious objection. State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 167 (Mo. banc 1991).