Opinion ID: 1470295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unlawful entry is an offense upon a person as well as an offense against property.

Text: Ms. Murphy's first contention is that the CPO was substantively improper because unlawful entry is not an offense upon a person, as required by the Intrafamily Offense Act, [6] but is instead an offense solely against property. The trial judge rejected Ms. Murphy's argument and concluded that unlawful entry is an offense against the person and can form the basis for entry of a CPO: It is in essence committed upon a person because it requires an interaction of people and it has the aspects of it, though it doesn't necessarily include physical violence [it] is so often connected with physical violence. And it is a charge that is routinely the basis of charges, convictions in domestic violence cases in the District of Columbia and also the basis for the issuance of protective orders through a temporary or protective order. And I'm of a view that it is subsumed in the nature of the offenses. . . . [T]here is an aspect of potential violence that is exactly what the intra-family type statutes are designed to address. . . . [T]he construction of a statute raises a `clear question of law,' and we review the trial court's ruling de novo.  Jackson v. United States, 819 A.2d 963, 965 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Ashton Gen. P'ship v. Federal Data Corp., 682 A.2d 629, 632 (D.C. 1996) (other citation omitted)). We agree with the trial judge that the offense of unlawful entry can be categorized as an offense upon a person under the Intrafamily Offense Act and, therefore, in some instances can serve as the basis for entry of a CPO. [7] D.C.Code. § 16-1001(5)(B) states that [t]he term intrafamily offense means an act punishable as a criminal offense committed by an offender upon a person . . . with whom the offender maintains or maintained a romantic relationship. (Emphasis added). It would be inconsistent with the Intrafamily Offense Act's purpose to set forth a rule in this case that precludes, in all cases of unlawful entry, a domestic violence complainant from obtaining a protective order against an offender with whom the complainant maintains or maintained a romantic relationship. It is not difficult to imagine such a scenario, or similar situations, escalating into actual violence being committed by the trespasser against the occupant. Unlawful entry statutes are designed, in part, to prevent such escalations of violence by criminalizing conduct that is likely to lead to violence. The Intrafamily Offense Act is designed not just to protect against actual intrafamily violence, but also against the threat of such violence. See Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1217 n. 6 (D.C.2005) (noting that the primary goal of the Intrafamily Offense Act was to protect victims of family abuse from acts and threats of violence); Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 929 (D.C.1991) (same). While unlawful entry statutes are designed in part to protect property rights, we reject Ms. Murphy's contention that this function precludes the additional purpose of the statute  protecting a person against violence or threats of violence. To the contrary, unlawful entry statutes (also termed trespass statutes) are also directed at the protection of public safety and the prevention of violence against a person who is the victim of the unlawful entry. See Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 21.2 at 224 (2d ed. 2003) ([T]he modern [trespass] statutes serve a purpose much like that underlying the common law offense; just as the criminal sanctions of the common law [offense] were imposed for the protection of public safety, so too trespass statutes . . . are directed at the prevention of violence or threats of violence.). The purpose of unlawful entry statutes in preventing violence or threats of violence against a person was recognized at common law, and this function of criminalizing unlawful entry has been adopted in contemporary case law in a number of states. See, e.g., State v. Tullo, 366 A.2d 843, 847 (Me.1976) (noting, at common law, criminal sanctions were imposed for trespassing to protect the public safety rather than to protect property rights); Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 283 Ala. 171, 214 So.2d 913, 923 (1968) (noting that trespass can be the potential cause of violence); People v. Goduto, 21 Ill.2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, 387 (1961) (recognizing that trespass can lead to violence and criminal sanctions are appropriate to protect the public). [8] Based on this understanding of the history and purpose of unlawful entry statutes to protect against violence or threats of violence against the person, in addition to protecting property rights, we conclude that an unlawful entry offense can, in some circumstances, support the entry of a CPO under the Intrafamily Offense Act. [T]he broad remedial purpose of the Intrafamily Offense Act . . . is to protect victims of family abuse from both acts and threats of violence. Robinson v. Robinson, 886 A.2d 78, 86 (D.C.2005) (citation omitted). Accordingly, unlawful entry offenses cannot be categorically excluded from the definition of offenses upon the person under the Intrafamily Offense Act.