Opinion ID: 1771702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 35

Heading: Exclusion of Mitigation Evidence in the Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it prevented him from presenting certain mitigation evidence in the penalty phase. As discussed above, at a hearing seeking funds for an expert on prison life, the court initially stated that testimony from the expert would not be admissible during the penalty phase. Later during the hearing, the court clarified that it would limit defendant to evidence of the mitigating circumstances in La.Code Crim.Proc. art. 905.5. The court ultimately refused to provide funds for the expert, and the defendant objected for the record. During the penalty phase, defendant presented testimony from an expert social worker, Dr. Cecile Guin, who testified about the decreasing number of incidents for which defendant had been disciplined since his incarceration. She explained that when defendant is in a large group, if it's lots of people, lots of chaos, he doesn't do well. But if you leave him alone, put him in a, you know, a structure with a controlled environment, then he does much better. The defense then asked if defendant could adequately function in a structured environment such as prison? The court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the question. Both this court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly stressed that a capital defendant has the right to introduce virtually any evidence in mitigation during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-606, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); State ex rel. Busby v. Butler, 538 So.2d 164 (La.1988). That evidence includes  any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (emphasis added). The nature of the penalty phase at a capital trial indicates the importance of the jury receiving adequate and accurate information regarding the defendant. Without such information, a jury cannot make the life or death decision in a rational and individualized manner. Busby, 538 So.2d at 169 (citing Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741, 745 ( 11th Cir.1985)). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (barring evidence on defendant's good behavior while in prison violates his right to present all relevant mitigation evidence); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (refusal to consider family history and childhood abuse of sixteen-year-old defendant facing the death penalty violates Eighth Amendment). Mitigation evidence bearing on the life or death sentencing decision is, of necessity, crucial. See State v. Weiland, 505 So.2d 702 (La. 1987) (conviction and sentence reversed for erroneous exclusion of crucial mitigating evidence). The Due Process Clause does not allow the execution of a person on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or explain. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (death penalty could not be imposed on basis of confidential information not disclosed to the defense). Defendant relies on the Skipper decision and argues that defendant's behavior and adaptability to prison life is not to be excluded as `irrelevant.' In Skipper, a capital defendant was barred from presenting the testimony of two jailers and one regular visitor to the effect that he had made a good adjustment during his time spent in jail. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 3, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The defendant and his wife had already testified that defendant had conducted himself well while incarcerated; however, the Court concluded that this evidence was the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving. The testimony of more disinterested witnessesand, in particular, of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their chargeswould quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Court reversed the death sentence and held that the exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of considering all relevant facets of the character and record of the individual offender. Id. The instant situation is distinguishable from that in Skipper. First, defendant did, in fact, present evidence which revealed that his behavior while incarcerated had shown improvement. In addition, despite a sustained prosecution objection, defendant's expert was able to testify that defendant does much better in a structure with a controlled environment. Under these circumstances, even if the court erred when it sustained the prosecutor's objection, the error did not prevent the jury from considering defendant's ability to adapt to prison life, nor did it introduce an arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberations during the sentencing phase.