Opinion ID: 3046483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Case for an Evidentiary Hearing

Text: An adequate record upon which to evaluate trial counsels’ performance in this case has not yet been developed. Accordingly, a final judgment about their performance cannot be rendered at this time. We can and must make a judgment, however, about whether Siehl has shown enough to entitle him to an opportunity to create the necessary record. This involves two issues: (1) whether this is a situation in which AEDPA bars an evidentiary hearing in the federal habeas proceeding; and (2), if not, whether Siehl has proffered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that “a new hearing would have the potential to advance the petitioner’s claim.” Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2000). “AEDPA and uniform case law interpreting it provide that if the habeas petition ‘has diligently sought to develop the factual basis of a claim for habeas relief, but has been denied the opportunity to do so by the state court, [AEDPA] will not preclude an evidentiary hearing in federal court.’” Id. at 287 (quoting Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998)). Here, Siehl has shown that he diligently sought and was 17 denied an evidentiary hearing on the relevant issues before the Court of Common Pleas in his post-conviction relief proceeding. While this would not be a sufficient showing for purposes of AEDPA if the waiver issue had been finally resolved against him, we conclude that this was a sufficient showing given that Siehl may be able to show that there was no waiver because appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the ineffectiveness of trial counsel on direct appeal.4 Turning to the second issue, we also conclude that Siehl has shown enough to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing would have the potential to advance his claim to habeas relief. The record evidence and the evidence tendered by Siehl, including the MacDonell report, if credited, would suggest that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that “‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of [his trial] would have been different,’” i.e., a probability “‘sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 110 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). This prima facie showing is sufficient to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing in the District Court if through no fault of his own he was unable to establish the necessary record in the state courts. Counsel’s duty to investigate does “not force defense lawyers to scour the globe,” and limited investigation is reasonable where counsel has good reason to think further investigation would be wasteful. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 4 See supra note 3. 18 374, 383 (2005). Here, even if counsel may have had good reason to think that further investigation as to the identity of the print would be wasteful,5 they apparently did not have good reason to think that further expert opinion on the timing of the print would not be helpful. Moreover, because Smith’s preliminary report did not address the bloodstain evidence that was said to implicate Siehl, it would appear unreasonable that counsel had no expert opinion regarding that bloodstain evidence, the only other physical evidence linking Siehl to the murder. Although counsel’s strategic choices made after full investigation are “virtually unchallengeable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, in the absence of some explanation not found in the current record, the strategic choices of counsel here would appear to have been made without a full investigation. If so, they were not reasonable in light of the circumstances and facts known to counsel at the time. 5 We say “may have had” because Siehl insists that what little assistance trial counsel received from Smith contained numerous red flags which should have led them to realize that he was not competent to express an opinion on the origin of the fingerprint. With the hindsight benefit of MacDonell’s report, the red flags were indeed numerous. Even without that report, however, some of those red flags were sufficiently noticeable that further inquiry into counsels’ use and consideration of Smith’s “preliminary analysis” is clearly appropriate. As we have noted, that analysis contained no comparative analysis of the fingerprints, set forth conclusory findings with no scientific explanation or discussion, and failed to discuss the allegedly incriminating blood evidence. 19 Based on the current record, we find the situation before us much like that presented to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2007). There, the state maintained that Richey had deliberately set fire to a house, using accelerants, thereby occasioning the death of a child. There were no eyewitnesses, and there was some evidence suggesting that the fire was caused by careless smoking. Accordingly, the state’s scientific evidence of arson was fundamental to its case. Counsel retained an expert to evaluate that scientific evidence, and the expert advised that he agreed with the opinions of the state’s experts. Counsel accordingly did not challenge the state’s scientific evidence of arson. The Court found his performance deficient: The scientific evidence of arson was thus fundamental to the State’s case. Yet Richey’s counsel did next to nothing to determine if the State’s arson conclusion was impervious to attack. True, Richey’s counsel retained [an expert] to review the State’s arson evidence, so this case does not exemplify that most egregious type, wherein lawyers altogether fail to hire an expert. But the mere hiring of an expert is meaningless if counsel does not consult with that expert to make an informed decision about whether a particular defense is viable.