Opinion ID: 2015196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsequent Modification

Text: With this understanding of the distinction between court-imposed maintenance and maintenance agreements, we may proceed to the issue at hand. May a court subsequently modify a maintenance agreement upon the petition of one party and over the opposition of the other? In most cases the answer is no. Where the issue involves the property disposition contained in an approved settlement agreement, the Dissolution Act is unambiguous: The disposition of property settled by such an agreement and incorporated and merged into the decree shall not be subject to subsequent modification by the court except as the agreement itself may prescribe or the parties may subsequently consent. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-10(c) (West 1979). The answer is also clear where the issue involves maintenance that the court has ordered under § 9(c), as further regulated by § 11(e): Provisions of ... an order for maintenance ordered under section 9(c) of this chapter may be modified or revoked. Such modification shall be made only ... upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable.... Ind.Code Ann. § 17(a) (West Supp.1995). As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, this provision refers to the modification of only court-imposed maintenance, not of approved maintenance agreements. Roberts, 644 N.E.2d at 175; Bowman, 567 N.E.2d at 830. Nevertheless, Ronald argues that this section should be so extended. His argument is not unprecedented. As originally enacted § 17(a) of the Dissolution Chapter did not authorize the modification of court-imposed maintenance obligations. See Dissolution Act, sec. 1, 1973 Ind. Acts at 1594. [12] Nevertheless, the Dissolution Act authorized courts to award incapacity maintenancethe only type then permissible subject to further order of the court. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-9(c)(West 1979) (amended 1984). Thus, the Court of Appeals decided to apply the changed circumstances standard of § 17(a). See Farthing, 178 Ind.App. at 341, 382 N.E.2d at 945 (1978). Moreover, in a majority of states, maintenance obligations arising under settlement agreements may be subsequently modified by a court. In these states, the maintenance obligations may be increased or reduced upon the same terms as any other [maintenance] decree. Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States § 19.13, at 462 (2d ed.1987); see also John J. Michalik, Annotation, Divorce: Power of Court to Modify Decree for Alimony or Support of Spouse Which Was Based on Agreement of Parties, 61 A.L.R.3d 520 (1975). On the other hand, both the Uniform Act and the Study Commission's proposed act prohibited modification of maintenance obligations if the settlement agreement contained a non-modification clause and, in the absence of such a clause, permitted modification only if changed circumstances rendered them unconscionable. Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 316(a); Proposed Dissolution Act § 217(a). This strict standard was designed to discourage former spouses from using the modification process repeatedly for vexatious purposes only. Proposed Dissolution Act § 217 comment (a); accord Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 316 comment (This strict standard is intended to discourage repeated or insubstantial motions for modification.). In addition to this legitimate concern for vexatious litigation, we believe modification of maintenance agreements approaches the limits of a court's statutory authority. As we have explained, the legislature intended to place severe restrictions on the power of courts to impose maintenance obligations. We have also noted that courts should exercise their authority to review settlement agreements with great restraint. Finally, it is obvious that a disgruntled former spouse should not be permitted to use the modification process to wage a collateral attack on a maintenance obligation. Farthing, 178 Ind. App. at 341-43, 382 N.E.2d at 945-46. A few cases in somewhat analogous situations have found that courts lacked authority to modify maintenance awards. In Luques v. Luques, 127 Me. 356, 143 A. 263 (1928) (per curiam), the court reasoned that because a husband cannot be compelled without his consent to provide ... support for a wife against whom he has obtained a divorce for her fault, the court could not modify a decree for her future support based on his consent unless he consented to the subsequent modification. Id., 143 A. at 265 (emphasis added). Applying a former statute, New York's Appellate Division reached a similar result. In denying a wife's petition to increase her maintenance, the court reasoned that where the husband is entitled to a divorce based on the wife's misconduct, she has no right to support.... While the husband's agreement waived the alimony-bar provision of [the statute], it did so only to the extent agreed upon.... Greenberg v. Greenberg, 175 A.D.2d 18, 571 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (1991); accord Lamberti v. Lamberti, 158 A.D.2d 449, 551 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (1990). We think these cases, though not directly on point, establish a general principle applicable in the present case. Where a court had no authority to impose the kind of maintenance award that the parties forged in a settlement agreement, the court cannot subsequently modify the maintenance obligation without the consent of the parties. In essence, the parties must agree to amend their settlement agreement, because the sole authority for the maintenance obligation originally derived from their mutual assent. [13] In approving or rejecting any submitted modification agreement, a court should apply the same standard it would use in evaluating an initial settlement agreement. We now hold that a court has no statutory authority to grant a contested petition to modify a maintenance obligation that arises under a previously approved settlement agreement if the court alone could not initially have imposed an identical obligation had the parties never voluntarily agreed to it. We therefore disapprove Pfenninger.