Opinion ID: 794387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mitchell v. Shane

Text: 25 The district court also believed that judgment on the pleadings was compelled by our decision in Mitchell v. Shane, 350 F.3d 39 (2d Cir.2003). We disagree. 26 In Mitchell, an African-American couple brought FHA claims against the owners of a home. Joined as defendants were the realty firm seeking to sell the property and an individual employee of the realty firm. We concluded that summary judgment in favor of the realty firm and its employee was inappropriate because: (1) there was a genuine issue as to whether the employee treated the plaintiffs differently from prospective white purchasers; and (2) the employer realty firm could be vicariously liable for its employee's alleged transgressions under Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 282, 123 S.Ct. 824, 154 L.Ed.2d 753 (2003). Mitchell, 350 F.3d at 49-50. 27 We also determined, however, that summary judgment for the property owners was appropriate because the plaintiffs had failed to adduce evidence demonstrating that the owners were motivated by discrimination . . . [and had] knowledge of the prospective buyers' racial identity-an essential component of a plaintiff's prima facie case under the FHA. Id. at 48-49; see also Soules v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992) (plaintiff must show that a stated nondiscriminatory reason for denial of housing was pretext for discrimination). Caplaw argues that plaintiffs' similar failure to claim that Caplaw knew that they were African-American should preclude liability here. 1 28 Caplaw failed to recognize that Mitchell addressed only the direct liability, rather than the vicarious liability, of the property owners. See Mitchell, 350 F.3d at 49 (citing Soules, 967 F.2d at 822; Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383, 387 (7th Cir.1985)). While knowledge of a plaintiff's racial identity is a component of direct liability under the FHA, it is not required to establish vicarious liability based on another's wrongs. Meyer, 537 U.S. at 282, 123 S.Ct. 824. 29 The record was fully developed through discovery by the time of summary judgment in Mitchell. It was clear that the plaintiffs would have been sorely pressed to argue that the absentee property owners exercised control over their realtors. Mitchell, 350 F.3d at 42-46 (out-of-state sellers had little input in sale negotiations beyond accepting or rejecting bid). In the present case, however, it remains unclear whether Caplaw exercised control over LC Properties's dealings with prospective renters. And that is precisely the point. Plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to raise a claim for vicarious liability against Caplaw.