Opinion ID: 2690898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to Challenge Government Action

Text: {¶ 16} “When the suit is one challenging the legality of government action or inaction, the nature and extent of facts that must be averred (at the summary judgment stage) or proved (at the trial stage) in order to establish standing depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at issue. If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it. When, however,    a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else, much more is needed. In that circumstance, causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the response of others as well. The existence of one or more of the essential elements of standing ‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,’ and it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” (Emphasis sic; citations omitted.) Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), 504 U.S. 555, 561-562, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351. {¶ 17} In this case, the regulation (i.e., the zoning) was not directed at Clifton’s property. Therefore, the analysis in Lujan regarding causation and redressability is instructive in determining whether Clifton has standing to bring a regulatory-taking claim against the village.
{¶ 18} “[I]n ruling on standing, it is both appropriate and necessary to look to the substantive issues    to determine whether there is logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated    to assure 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO that [the litigant] is a proper and appropriate party to invoke” legal proceedings. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947. {¶ 19} “For a takings claim to prevail against a motion to dismiss in this court, the action complained of must be attributable to [a government entity].” May v. United States (2008), 80 Fed.Cl. 442, 445, citing Erosion Victims of Lake Superior Regulation v. United States (Fed.Cir.1987), 833 F.2d 297, 301. In the context of the regulatory-taking jurisprudence, whether a regulation constitutes a taking depends in large part upon the degree to which the regulation burdens private property. Generally speaking, the more severe the burden that the regulation imposes upon private property, the more likely it is that the regulation constitutes a compensable taking. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2005), 544 U.S. 528, 539, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 161 L.Ed.2d 876. More specifically, if zoning becomes too burdensome, it can result in a partial or total taking of the regulated property. See, e.g., State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. Mayfield Hts., 119 Ohio St.3d 11, 2008-Ohio-3181, 891 N.E.2d 320 (recognizing that it is possible that zoning could result in a partial or total taking of the property to which the zoning applies). {¶ 20} However, we can find no authority for the proposition that the zoning of a property is so burdensome on an adjacent property that is not subject to the zoning that it results in a taking of the adjacent property. Instead, we have found some precedent that indicates that a government’s regulation of property does not constitute a taking of an adjacent property. {¶ 21} In Fahoome v. St. Clair Shores (Mar. 17, 1998), Mich.App. No. 194020, 1998 WL 2016580, the city of St. Clair Shores rezoned property adjacent to the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff alleged that the rezoning of his neighbor’s property resulted in a taking of his property. The court held that there was no taking because the zoning was not specifically directed toward plaintiff’s property. 6 January Term, 2012 {¶ 22} Further, in Murphy v. Detroit (1993), 201 Mich.App. 54, 506 N.W.2d 5, the city of Detroit used its eminent-domain powers to purchase and raze 1,400 residential properties, pursuant to an urban-renewal plan. Business owners located adjacent to these properties filed inverse-condemnation claims against the city, alleging that the city’s actions caused a 75 percent decrease in their businesses and resulted in a de facto taking of their property. {¶ 23} The court in Murphy recognized that the value of the plaintiffs’ properties had greatly diminished because of the city’s actions and that the plaintiffs had purchased their property with the expectation that their customer base would remain constant. Id. at 57. However, the court pointed out that expectations are not rights. Ultimately, the court held that there was no taking because “[d]espite the diminution in value of plaintiffs’ land and buildings, resulting from defendants’ change in the way they used their land, defendants took no deliberate action directed toward plaintiffs’ property rights that deprived plaintiffs of possession or use of their land or buildings.” Id. {¶ 24} Together, Fahoome and Murphy can be interpreted to stand for the proposition that when a government’s taking or regulation of property causes incidental damage to an adjacent but unregulated property, the damage is not attributable to the government actor for the purpose of supporting a takings claim.
{¶ 25} Next, we examine whether a property owner has a redressable regulatory-taking claim against a municipality when the affected property is beyond the municipality’s corporate limits. In order to answer this question, we again look to the substantive takings law. {¶ 26} The remedy for an alleged regulatory taking is for the property owner to file a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the regulating government entity to initiate appropriation proceedings against the property 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO allegedly burdened by the regulation. State ex rel. Gilbert v. Cincinnati, 125 Ohio St.3d 385, 2010-Ohio-1473, 928 N.E.2d 706. {¶ 27} The government entity responsible for the zoning in the instant case is a village. Villages are municipalities. Section 1, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution (“Municipal corporations are hereby classified into cities and villages”). Municipalities have inherent and statutory authority to appropriate property, but the scope of this authority is limited. “Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, commonly known as the Home Rule Amendment, gives municipalities the ‘authority to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.’ ” Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, ¶ 7. A municipality’s home-rule authority includes the power of eminent domain. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich (1953), 159 Ohio St. 13, 14, 50 O.O. 6, 110 N.E.2d 778. However, aside from acquiring property to operate a public utility that serves its own residents, a municipality has no authority to exercise its inherent eminentdomain powers beyond its corporate limits. Britt v. Columbus (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 1, 67 O.O.2d 1, 309 N.E.2d 412, at paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 28} The General Assembly has also provided municipalities with statutory authority to use eminent-domain powers to acquire property that lies outside the municipality’s corporate limits “when reasonably necessary,” but only for certain enumerated public purposes. R.C. 719.02 and 719.01. However, none of the enumerated purposes listed in R.C. 719.01 include appropriating property for an alleged regulatory taking. {¶ 29} Thus, a municipality has no authority to initiate appropriation proceedings in response to a property owner’s complaint in mandamus alleging a regulatory-taking claim if the affected property lies outside the municipality’s limits. A municipality’s liability for a regulatory taking is limited to the property 8 January Term, 2012 that it is authorized to regulate, i.e., the property within its limits. Accordingly, a property owner has no redressable regulatory-taking claim against a municipality when the affected property lies outside the municipality’s corporate limits.