Opinion ID: 950142
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Are the same;

Text: (2) Are spouses, former spouses, domestic partners, or former domestic partners; (3) Are “affiliates,” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(2), except that 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(B) shall not apply; (4) Are general partners in the same partnership; (5) Are a partnership and one or more of its general partners; (6) Are partnerships that share one or more common general partners; or (7) Have, or within 180 days of the commencement of either of the related cases had, an interest in property IN THE MATTER OF: MARSHALL 15 Gen. Order 11-01 (2011) (formerly, Gen. Order 99-02 (1999)). Elaine contends that assignment of the Debtors’ bankruptcy case to Judge Bufford was improper because the two cases were not related, notwithstanding the Debtors’ listing of the Vickie case in their 1015-2 Statement of Related Cases. The Debtors concede, and we agree, that the Debtors’ bankruptcy case is not technically related to Vickie’s case under Local Bankruptcy Rule 1015-2(a).14 However, the court has “broad discretion” to interpret the requirements of its General Orders. United States v. DeLuca, 692 F.2d 1277, 1281 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Because general orders and local rules not only implement due process and other statutory rights but also promote efficiency, we permit the district court broad discretion in determining their requirements.”); United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 154, 157 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that a general order requiring random reassignment when a case is returned to the clerk after a judge is disqualified “is a housekeeping rule for the internal operation of the district court which has a large measure of discretion in interpreting and applying it” (internal quotation marks omitted)). While not technically “related,” the Debtors’ and Vickie’s bankruptcy cases involved convoluted facts and issues, many of which had also been heavily litigated in the Texas probate court. Assignment of the case to Judge Bufford was within the court’s discretion and was in the interests of efficiency. that was or is included in the property of another estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), § 1115, § 1207, a n d / o r § 1306. 14 In fact, the Debtors explained that the cases were not technically related in the very Statement of Related Cases at issue here. 16 IN THE MATTER OF: MARSHALL Moreover, judges are vested with “inherent” authority to transfer cases among themselves “for the expeditious administration of justice.” United States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); see also Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1991) (“District court judges have broad discretion regarding the assignment or reassignment of cases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Had the Debtors’case been randomly assigned, it is likely that the assigned judge would have transferred the case to Judge Bufford, given his superior knowledge of the complex factual and procedural history of the parties’ dispute in the Texas probate court. Finally, a party has no due process right to random case assignment or to ensure the selection or avoidance of any particular judge absent a showing of bias or partiality in the proceedings. See Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that “a [party] has no right to any particular procedure for the selection of the judge[,]” so long as the decision is made “in a manner free from bias or the desire to influence the outcome of the proceedings”); Torbert, 496 F.2d at 157 (holding that non-random assignment of a case did not violate due process, particularly because there was no showing of actual prejudice resulting from the procedural irregularity). As discussed infra Section I.B., Elaine has not established actual or apparent bias on the part of Judge Bufford, and was therefore not prejudiced by the non-random assignment. IN THE MATTER OF: MARSHALL 17