Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request to Empanel a Separate Jury

Text: Defendant claims the trial court violated state law and his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution when it denied his motion to empanel a separate jury for the penalty phase. We conclude the trial court did not err. Defendant's guilt phase strategy was to argue the state had failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the charged crimes. After defendant was convicted, his counsel moved to empanel a new jury for the penalty phase, arguing that his penalty phase defense would be inconsistent with what was argued at the guilt phase. At the penalty phase, defendant intended to establish that he had admitted his guilt to his family and counsel early on in the proceedings, that he felt remorse, and that he had wanted to plead guilty, but was talked out of it by his attorneys. Defense counsel argued that, in light of the strategy employed during the guilt phase, the currently empaneled jury would disbelieve defendant and his attorneys. The trial court denied defendant's motion, noting that his guilt and penalty phase strategies were not inconsistent, different defense attorneys would be handling the guilt and penalty phases, the court would admonish the jury that defendant's exercise of his right to a trial was not to be considered during deliberations, [8] and that, even if the two strategies were arguably in tension with one another, tactical decisions do not constitute good cause to empanel a separate jury. The trial court concluded that a new jury was not warranted under state law or under the federal Constitution. (9) Section 190.4, subdivision (c) provides that the same jury that decided guilt in a death penalty case shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury . . . . (Italics added.) While a trial court retains discretion to empanel a separate jury, there is a `long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty.' [Citation.] ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 114 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357]; see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 119 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166]; People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1069 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68].) We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to empanel a separate penalty phase jury for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1069.) Defendant contends that his desire to employ allegedly conflicting strategies constituted good cause to empanel a separate penalty phase jury. We disagree. Even assuming defendant's guilt and penalty phase strategies were in tension with one another, a counsel's tactical decision to present inconsistent defenses do[es] not, without more, constitute good cause. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 115; see People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 252 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643]; People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 737-738 [276 Cal.Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142].) Additionally, defendant's assertion that his and his counsel's credibility would be undermined was too speculative to establish sufficient good cause. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 253; People v. Taylor, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 738.) Nor were defendant's constitutional rights violated by having the same jury decide the guilt and penalty phases. The high court has repeatedly rejected such claims, explaining that the federal Constitution permits the same jury [to] sit in both phases of a bifurcated capital murder trial. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 180 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758]; see Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402, 417 [97 L.Ed.2d 336, 107 S.Ct. 2906].) This court has reached the same conclusion. ( People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 115; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1244 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) Nothing warrants revisiting the issue. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a separate jury.