Opinion ID: 588860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 22 To invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court for attorney fees under the EAJA, the party seeking fees must file its application within 30 days of the final judgment in the action.... 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Secretary claims that the district court issued its final judgment in this action, finding the Secretary's decision unsupported by substantial evidence, on July 12, 1989 and this order became non-appealable on September 10, 1989. Young then had 30 days, or until October 10, 1989, to file an application for attorney fees under the EAJA. Young did not file an application until December 28, 1990, and thus the Secretary concludes that the application for fees was not timely filed and the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. The Secretary cites Melkonyan v. Sullivan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), in support of his position. 23 Judge Aspen's order of July 12, 1989 adopted Magistrate Judge Balog's recommendation that the case be remanded to the Secretary for additional findings. We must decide whether this remand order was the final judgment for Section 2412(d)(1)(B) purposes. This determination depends upon the nature of the remand pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 24 There are only two kinds of remands permissible under § 405(g): 25 Under sentence four, a district court may remand in conjunction with a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the Secretary's decision. Under sentence six, the district court may remand in light of additional evidence without making any substantive ruling as to the correctness of the Secretary's decision, but only if the claimant shows good cause for failing to present the evidence earlier. Congress' explicit delineation in § 405(g) regarding the circumstances under which remands are authorized leads us to conclude that it intended to limit the district court's authority to enter remand orders to these two types. 26 Melkonyan v. Sullivan, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2164 (footnote omitted). The Secretary contends that Young's action was remanded pursuant to sentence four because the district court reviewed the merits of the Secretary's decision and determined that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Essentially, the Secretary is arguing that the district court reversed the decision of the Secretary. However, nothing in Judge Aspen's Order of July 12, 1989, indicates that the district court intended to reverse the Secretary's decision. The Order merely states that this Court adopts Magistrate Balog's Report and Recommendation and, for the reasons set forth therein, remands this case to the Secretary for further proceedings. As noted earlier, Magistrate Balog recommended that the case be remanded so that the Secretary could make additional findings since the Secretary had failed to address the vocational expert's testimony. Furthermore, neither party's motion for summary judgment was granted, indicating that the district court did not affirm, modify, or reverse the Secretary's decision. Thus, we conclude that the remand order of July 12, 1989, was not a sentence four remand, and, consequently, was not a final judgment. 27 Next, we must consider whether the remand order in this case was a sentence six remand. Sentence six of § 405(g) provides in pertinent part: 28 The court may ... at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.... 29 In Melkonyan, the Supreme Court distinguished a sentence six remand from a sentence four remand as follows: 30 The sixth sentence of § 405(g), as we explained in [Sullivan v.] Finkelstein [496 U.S. 617, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) ], describes an entirely different kind of remand. Id., at , 110 S.Ct., at 2664. The District Court does not affirm, modify, or reverse the Secretary's decision; it does not rule in any way as to the correctness of the administrative determination. Rather the court remands because new evidence has come to light that was not available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding and that evidence might have changed the outcome of the prior proceeding. Ibid. 31 Melkonyan, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 2163. 32 The Secretary argues that it is beyond question that in this case the district court reviewed the correctness of the Secretary's decision, found the decision to be erroneous, and concluded that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. The Secretary concludes that the remand entered in this case could not have been a sentence six remand. Petitioner, however, argues that the remand order was neither a sentence four nor a sentence six remand, but that there is no issue as to the district court's authority to have issued the remand order since the Secretary acquiesced in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation by failing to object. Damato v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 982, 987 n. 3 (7th Cir.1991). 33 In the case at bar, neither party claimed that they had new evidence to present, nor did either party show that there was good cause for failing to present the testimony of a medical advisor. In these circumstances, we are reluctant to find that the remand in this case was a sentence six remand. In Melkonyan, the Supreme Court, after analyzing the legislative history of § 405(g), concluded that: 34 It is evident from [the legislative history] that Congress believed courts were often remanding Social Security cases without good reason. 35