Opinion ID: 198984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martinez-Velez's Conviction on Count 1

Text: 119 Martinez-Velez alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count 1. Specifically, he argues that his participation in the 1994 Easter caceria that resulted in the murder of two motorcyclists did not establish his participation in the drug conspiracy. In making this argument, Martinez-Velez attacks the credibility of government witness Ibanez-Maldonado. We conclude that this argument is without merit. 120 To prove a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government is obliged to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed and that a particular defendant agreed to participate in it, intending to commit the underlying substantive offense. United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993). Due to the clandestine nature of criminal conspiracies, the law recognizes that the illegal agreement may be either express or tacit and that a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances. United States v.Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 610 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). Accordingly, we have previously stated that proof may consist of circumstantial evidence, including inferences from surrounding circumstances, such as acts committed by the defendant that furthered the conspiracy's purposes. United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 853 (1st Cir. 1990). 121 Here, Ibanez-Maldonado testified that Martinez-Velez participated in the meeting at the King's Court mesa, the ensuing caceria, and the murder of the two motorcyclists in April of 1994. The evidence, consequently, shows that (1) appellant met with other conspirators at a Santiago-Lugo drug mesa, (2) appellant willingly joined members of the Santiago-Lugo organization in planning a caceria against the Rosario-Rodriguez brothers, and (3) during this caceria, appellant participated in killing two individuals who were members of a rival drug organization. As we have stated, the record contains abundant evidence that the cacerias were undertaken in order to regain control over the Davila drug distribution point. Accordingly, we conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that Martinez-Velez was a member of the Count 1 drug conspiracy and was prepared to kill to protect the conspiracy's interests. See United States v. Mangual-Corchado, 139 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 1998) ([T]he jury is entitled to rely on a chain of reasonable inferences, as long as each constituent inference is rooted in the evidence.). In reaching this result, we note that proof of direct participation in the sale of drugs is not required to convict in a drug conspiracy case. United States v. Marrero-Ortiz, 160 F.3d 768, 773 (1st Cir. 1998). 122 We also reject the challenge to Ibanez-Maldonado's credibility. We have previously stated, [c]redibility is not an issue for the appellate court. United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d 483, 489 (1st Cir. 1990). Here, Ibanez-Maldonado's testimony, even if uncorroborated, was sufficient to support appellant's conviction because it was not incredible or insubstantial on its face. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that Martinez-Velez has failed to demonstrate that no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 123