Opinion ID: 1872240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Prior Inconsistent Statements Instructions.

Text: Mason first asserts that the court erred in refusing to give his requested instructions regarding prior inconsistent statements at the time of Wagy's and Prentice's testimonies. The instructions Mason requested with respect to Wagy's testimony read as follows: Members of the jury, the evidence that ... Wagy allegedly made statements that may be inconsistent with her testimony in court was brought to your attention only to help you decide if you believe what ... Wagy testified to in court and, if so, how much to rely on that testimony. If you believe that she said something different earlier, then it will be up to you to decide if what she said here in court was true. You may not consider what may have been said earlier as proof of [Mason's] guilt or of any fact contained in those earlier statements. Mason requested a similar instruction with respect to Prentice's testimony. To establish reversible error from a court's refusal to give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the tendered instruction. State v. Wisinski, 268 Neb. 778, 688 N.W.2d 586 (2004). The parties do not appear to dispute that the proposed instructions were correct statements of the law, and as Mason notes, the instructions were based on NJI2d Crim. X5.3. It further appears undisputed that the evidence supported the instructions because there was evidence that both Wagy and Prentice had made prior statements that were inconsistent with their testimonies at trial. Thus, resolution of this issue depends on whether Mason was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the tendered instructions. We conclude that Mason was not prejudiced and that therefore, the court's refusal to give the instructions was not reversible error. Mason argues that he was prejudiced by the refusal to give the instructions because it was critical to his defense to emphasize the numerous inconsistent statements made by the two witnesses whose testimonies served as evidence identifying him as the shooter. He argues that the instructions needed to be given at the time of those testimonies in order to properly focus the jury's attention on the significance of the prior inconsistent statements. We have stated that it is not error for a trial court to refuse to give a defendant's requested instruction where the substance of the requested instruction was covered in the instructions given. State v. Gales, 269 Neb. 443, 694 N.W.2d 124 (2005). All the jury instructions must be read together, and if, taken as a whole, they correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the pleadings and the evidence, there is no prejudicial error necessitating reversal. Id. In this respect, we note that in both the opening and closing instructions, the court instructed the jury regarding the use of prior inconsistent statements to assess witnesses' credibility. Ordinarily, these opening and closing instructions are sufficient. In the opening instructions, the jury was instructed that it would decide the credibility of witnesses and that in determining credibility it could consider, inter alia, previously [sic] statements or conduct of the witness that tends to support or to contradict the witness' testimony at this trial. In the closing instructions, the court similarly instructed the jury members that they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and that in determining this they could consider, inter alia, [a]ny previous statement or conduct of the witness that is consistent or inconsistent with the testimony of the witness at this trial. Also, contrary to Mason's argument that the jury's attention was not properly drawn to the significance of the prior inconsistent statements, we note that in the cross-examinations of both Wagy and Prentice there was substantial questioning regarding each witness' prior statements and the inconsistency of such statements when compared to their testimonies given at trial. In addition, Mason's closing arguments focused attention on Wagy's and Prentice's prior inconsistent statements. Because the substance of the requested instructions was covered in both the opening and closing instructions and because the jury's attention was directed toward the importance of the prior inconsistent statements, both in the cross-examinations and during Mason's closing arguments, we conclude that Mason has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the requested instructions at the time of Wagy's and Prentice's testimonies.