Opinion ID: 2524595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral consequences doctrine

Text: The Attorney General also suggests we categorically bar petitioner's ineffective assistance claim as based on a collateral consequence of his criminal conviction. A defense lawyer's giving erroneous advice to a defendant about immigration consequences cannot violate the pleading defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel, reasons the Attorney General, because knowledge of immigration consequences is not a prerequisite to a determination that the plea was entered voluntarily. While potentially dire ( People v. Superior Court (Giron ) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 793, 798, 114 Cal.Rptr. 596, 523 P.2d 636), immigration consequences nevertheless are, in many jurisdictions including California, considered `collateral' consequences of a criminal conviction. ( Zamudio, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 198, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 999 P.2d 686; but see Peart v. State (Fla.2000) 756 So.2d 42, 47, fn. 5 [implying that, in light of state criminal procedural rule similar to § 1016.5, the court will no longer treat immigration consequences as collateral].) We have not articulated precise definitions of direct and collateral in this context, but some California courts have, as the Attorney General points out, called collateral any consequence of a plea that does not `inexorably follow' from a conviction of the offense involved in the plea. ( People v. Crosby (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 1352, 1355, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 159; accord, People v. Moore (1998) 69 Cal. App.4th 626, 630, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 658.) Indeed, the deportation consequences of a conviction are not inexorable in that deportation can be instituted only `upon the order of the Attorney General' (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)) of the United States, who retains discretion not to institute such proceedings. ( Zamudio, at pp. 204-205, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 463, 999 P.2d 686.) [7] Nevertheless, for the following reasons, we conclude that the collateral nature of immigration consequences does not foreclose petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. First, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that ineffective assistance analysis is highly case specific, noting that `[a]ttorney errors come in an infinite variety....' ( Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 57-58, 106 S.Ct. 366, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) Accordingly, in every case the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. ( Strickland, at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; accord, Roe v. Flores-Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 478 [120 S.Ct. at p. 1035].) Second, the collateral consequence doctrine and ineffective assistance claims have separate origins. Recognition of the right to competent representation in the guilty plea context directly stemmed from the [Sixth Amendment's] general principle that all `defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel' ( Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, quoting McMann, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441; see also McMann, at p. 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441 [distinguishing between the admissibility of a coerced confession and the competence of counsel in advising the confessing defendant to plead guilty].) The collateral consequences doctrine, on the other hand, originated as a policy-based adjunct to the due process requirement that a court ensure the guilty pleas it accepts are voluntarily given. [8] While the right to the assistance of counsel undoubtedly is `included in the conception of due process of law' ( Powell v. Alabama (1932) 287 U.S. 45, 67-68, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158), such that claims grounded wholly or partly in the latter may include reference to the former (see, e.g., McMann, at pp. 767, 770-771, 90 S.Ct. 1441), it does not follow that every jurisprudential limitation on courts' due process responsibilities applies (or should apply) without alteration to all types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Attorney General offers no logical or jurisprudential reason why we should truncate our examination of counsel's Sixth Amendment responsibilities to noncitizen clients by invoking a categorical concept adopted for policy and convenience in delineating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process responsibilities of trial courts. Nor does any binding authority require that reduction. To the contrary, even before the high court in Strickland expressly grounded the effective assistance guarantee in the Sixth Amendment's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688), 104 S.Ct. 2052, courts resolving ineffective assistance claims recognized a shift of scrutiny in recent cases from the rudiments of the trial to the quality of representation by counsel [that] reflects a shift from the general requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ... to the more specific [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel. ( Krummacher v. Gierloff (1981) 290 Or. 867, 627 P.2d 458, 461.) We acknowledged the point in People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, stating there that the former `farce or sham' ineffectiveness standard originated in decisions which held that the right to competent representation derived solely from the due process clause and has been thoroughly discredited. ( Id. at p. 422, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) [C]ourts now recognize that the right to competent representation at trial is grounded in the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. [Citation.] Accordingly, constitutionally adequate assistance can no longer be measured by the due process standard of [ People v.] Ibarra [(1963) 60 Cal.2d 460], 34 Cal.Rptr. 863, but instead must be determined by a standard bottomed on the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. ( Ibid., fn. omitted.) The United States Supreme Court has never embraced the collateral consequences doctrine the Attorney General urges us to adopt in this case. In fact, on review of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding that parole eligibility is a collateral rather than a direct consequence of a guilty plea, of which a defendant need not be informed in order for the plea to be considered voluntary ( Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 55, 106 S.Ct. 366), the high court, instead of itself invoking that doctrine, applied [t]he longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea[, i.e.,] `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant' ( id. at p. 56, 106 S.Ct. 366). Nor has the high court ever suggested that ineffective assistance claims based on the giving of erroneous immigration advice ought categorically to be barred. Rather, recognizing the tremendous personal stakes involved in deportation and exclusion, the court has admonished, [i]n this area of the law, involving as it may the equivalent of banishment or exile, we do well to eschew technicalities and fictions and to deal instead with realities. ( Costello v. Immigration Service (1964) 376 U.S. 120, 131, 84 S.Ct. 580, 11 L.Ed.2d 559.) Some cases applying the collateral consequences doctrine to bar immigration-based ineffective assistance claims purport to draw legal support from the high court's observation in Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, that a defendant must be made fully aware of the 'direct consequences ' of a guilty plea before the plea may be considered voluntary under the Fifth Amendment. ( U.S. v. Mora-Gomez (E.D.Va.1995) 875 F.Supp. 1208, 1211, fn. 7; see, e.g., U.S. v. Banda (5th Cir.1993) 1 F.3d 354, 356; U.S. v. Del Rosario (D.C.Cir.1990) 902 F.2d 55, 59.) Brady, however, was not an ineffective assistance case. The high court there held that [w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts ( Brady v. United States , at p. 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463), expressly deriving that rule from the constitutional guarantee of jury trial and the Fifth Amendment's ban on compelled self-incrimination. As Brady did not consider the ineffective assistance of counsel issues before us in this case, it is no authority for deciding them one way or the other. ( Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 287, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259; People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 482, fn. 7, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580.) The Attorney General cites our decision in People v. Barella (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 267-272, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37 for the proposition that a defendant does not have to know the collateral consequences which follow his plea in order for the plea to be constitutional, but Barella also is inapposite. There, we held unanimously that a defendant is not entitled to withdraw or set aside a guilty plea on the ground that the trial court, in accepting the plea, failed to advise the defendant of a limit on good-time or work-time credits available to the defendant. ( Id. at p. 272, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37.) In so holding, we noted that [t]he United States Supreme Court has `never held that the United States Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary' ( id. at p. 267, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37) and stated that conduct and work credits are not `traditional direct consequences of a plea' because they result from the defendant's conduct after he arrives at prison and do not `follow inexorably from the plea' ( id. at p. 270, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 975 P.2d 37). Thus, Barella addressed the court's role in meeting Boykin-Tahl [9] record requirements so as to assure that a defendant's guilty plea is voluntary, not counsel's obligation to provide effective assistance at every critical stage in the criminal process as required by the Sixth Amendment and California Constitution, article I, section 15. ( In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 933, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747.) The high court, as discussed, has never equated these two sets of obligations, nor does the Attorney General offer any persuasive reason why we should reach out to do so in this case. Defense counsel clearly has far greater duties toward the defendant than has the court taking a plea. Effective counsel, for example, has a general duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of the case enabling counsel to make informed decisions about how best to represent the client. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) [10] The court has no such duty. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. ( Strickland, at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) Again, the court has no such duties. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and the more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions ( ibid.); the court's function and duties quintessentially exclude such assistance, advocacy and consultation. For the foregoing reasons, to tie defense counsel's Sixth Amendment duties to the constitutional minima the due process clause requires of courts, by carving out, for erroneous advice concerning immigration consequences, an exception to the general requirement that counsel perform with reasonableness under prevailing professional norms ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052), would be illogical and counterproductive. A few cases applying the collateral consequences doctrine to bar immigration-based ineffective assistance claims have expressed a concern that, as a matter of policy, to permit such claims is to take the first step on a long, slippery slope that could spawn endless litigation over effective assistance of counsel claims. ( State v. Christie (Del.Super.Ct.1994) 655 A.2d 836, 840.) The concern has no basis in law or logic. That a particular ineffective assistance claim might, depending on the circumstances, be viable despite the collateral nature of immigration consequences simply does not entail the viability of everyor even any  subsequent ineffective assistance claim that happens also to refer to a consequence similarly deemed collateral, and nothing we say here should be taken as suggesting the contrary. In People v. Reed (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 593, 601-602, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, for example, the court rejected the defendant's ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to advise him of a statutory limit on good time prison credits. The Attorney General cites Reed for its partial reliance on the federal courts' collateral consequences doctrine. (See id. at p. 597, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 615.) But Reed is distinguishable. Unlike this case, Reed did not involve allegations of an affirmative misrepresentation in response to a specific inquiry from the defendant. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Reed expressly held open the possibility such misrepresentation might constitute ineffective assistance. ( Id. at p. 601, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 615.) On several counts, deportation is far more significant than [some] other [collateral] consequences, such as losing one's driver's license or losing the right to vote. (Fordham Note, supra, 16 Fordham Int'l L.J. at p. 1140, fn. omitted.) Perhaps nowhere outside of the criminal law are the consequences for the individual so serious. ( Wallace v. Reno (D.Mass.1998) 24 F.Supp.2d 104, 112.) Accordingly, that we decline to bar as collateral ineffective assistance claims based on erroneous immigration consequences advice plainly cannot determine the result in another context. Ultimately, [i]n any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) Finally, the Legislature's enactment of section 1016.5, mandating specified immigration warnings in all plea cases, is a circumstance that distinguishes this case from cases involving other types of collateral consequences. Under the statutory mandate, defendants who wish to plead guilty are entitled to receive from the court some advice regarding immigration consequencesa general warning of three immigration consequences that may occur. (See § 1016.5(a).) In evaluating the court's advice, [t]he defendant can be expected to rely on counsel's independent evaluation of the charges, applicable law, and evidence, and of the risks and probable outcome of trial. ( In re Alvernaz, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 933, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747.) The [defendant's] interest underlying [an ineffective assistance] claim is his interest in having, before he judges the desirability of the plea bargain, a general knowledge of the possible legal consequences of facing trial. ( Wofford v. Wainwright, supra, 748 F.2d at p. 1508.) That interest will flow, presumably, more from a particular consequence's practical import than its formal categorization as collateral or direct. Classifying immigration consequences as collateral does not diminish their status as material legal principles that may significantly impact the particular circumstances surrounding a given plea. ( People v. Pozo (Colo. 1987) 746 P.2d 523, 529.) Accordingly, that adverse immigration consequences may for certain due process purposes be collateral to petitioner's conviction should not preclude application of the ordinary Strickland standards to his ineffective assistance claim based on alleged immigration misadvice. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither the existence of section 1016.5 nor the collateral nature of immigration consequences constitutes a per se bar to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel's misadvice about the adverse immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Therefore, we may not in this case avoid the circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry required by Strickland. ( Roe v. Flores-Ortega, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 478 [120 S.Ct. at p. 1035]; see also Hill, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 57-58, 106 S.Ct. 366; U.S. v. Mora-Gomez, supra, 875 F.Supp. at p. 1213.) Accordingly, we shall proceed to apply Strickland's familiar reasonableness standard to the circumstances of the instant case. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052.)