Opinion ID: 1322788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA's Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal Law Requirement

Text: Smulls first argues that the Missouri trial court made no findings concerning the validity of the prosecutor's claimed race-neutral reasons for the strike, and therefore the court unreasonably applied federal law. Smulls fails to direct us to any Supreme Court case holding that the Constitution requires a trial court to make specific fact-findings in reviewing a Batson challenge. See Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 127 S.Ct. 649, 653, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006) (`[C]learly established Federal law' in § 2254(d)(1) `refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.') (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). In fact, federal law has never required explicit fact-findings following a Batson challenge, especially where a prima facie case is acknowledged and the prosecution presents specific nondiscriminatory reasons on the record. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (We adhere to the proposition that a state court need not make detailed findings addressing all the evidence before it.); see also McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir.2003) (Although reviewing courts might have preferred the trial court to provide express reasons for each credibility determination, no clearly established federal law required the trial court to do so.). A trial court's ruling on a Batson challenge is itself a factual determination, and we have repeatedly upheld rulings made without additional reasoning. See U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the trial court engaged in a full Batson analysis where the objector made a Batson challenge, the proponent of the strike offered a race-neutral explanation, both parties were allowed to argue their positions, and the trial court granted the motion without making any specific findings, implicitly finding the proponent's reasons to be racially motivated); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 430, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (upholding a state trial court's dismissal of a juror for cause and noting that the judge was [not] required to announce for the record his conclusion that [the] juror ... was biased, or his reasoning because the finding was evident from the record). We do not read the Supreme Court's most recent case addressing Batson to hold otherwise. See Snyder v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008). In Snyder, the Court refused to presume that the trial court credited the prosecutor's representation that he struck the challenged juror based on the juror's demeanor because the trial court had made no determination concerning the juror's demeanor. Id. at 1209. But, a number of factors led the Court to that conclusion. First, the trial court in Snyder did not state whether it based its ruling on the first proffered reason (claimed nervousness on the part of the juror), the second reason (other pressing time constraints  student teaching responsibilities), or on both, and the Court was unwilling to assume the trial court relied on the first reason when the Court found that the second reason did not stand up to scrutiny under the deferential standard. Id. at 1209, 1212. Notably, the Court applied the deferential standard to the second proffered reason, which it found lacking, even though the trial court made no findings concerning the second reason other than allowing the strike. Id. at 1209. Second, the Court rejected the second reason offered by the prosecutor, leaving the juror's alleged nervousness as the only potentially valid basis for the strike, and there was no evidence in the record that the prosecutor would have pre-emptively challenged the juror based on his nervousness alone. Id. at 1212. Third, the Court rejected the second reason for the strike because it was highly speculative and because the same reasoning would have applied with more force to specific white jurors, whom the prosecutor did not strike. Id. at 1211-12. Despite the reversal of the trial court in Snyder, the Court continues to recognize[ ] that ... determinations of credibility and demeanor lie peculiarly within a trial judge's province, and, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, [the Court will] defer to the trial court. Id. at 1208 (internal marks omitted). In our case, both proffered reasons withstand scrutiny, as discussed in more detail infra, such that we are not left to surmise whether one of the two reasons alone would support the strike as nondiscriminatory. There is no evidence here that the prosecutor's proffered reasons applied with greater force to white jurors who were not struck; in fact, the prosecutor used the same reasons  occupation and demeanor  to strike a white juror. In any event, Snyder was not clearly established law at the time of the state courts' rejection of Smulls' Batson claim and cannot provide the basis for habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In a related context involving the dismissal of jurors for cause who are substantially impaired in their ability to impose the death penalty, the Supreme Court recently explained that there is no requirement in a case involving the Witherspoon-Witt rule that a state appellate court make particular reference to the excusal of each juror. It is the trial court's ruling that counts. Uttecht, 127 S.Ct. at 2228 (internal citations omitted). Here, by denying the Batson challenge, the trial court implicitly found that the prosecution's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons were credible. No further fact-finding was required. The absence of additional findings is certainly not a misapplication of clearly established Supreme Court precedent as required for relief under § 2254(d)(1). Nor does the trial court's failure to make explicit findings relieve this court of its obligation to view the state trial court's findings as presumptively correct [3] or empower us to order the federal district court to reconstruct the record. [4] Prior to AEDPA, the presumption of correctness was contained in § 2254(d), which listed eight exceptions to the presumption. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994), amended by Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, § 104(4), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (1996). AEDPA's amendments to § 2254 jettisoned ... [the] situations which previously swept aside the presumption. Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 949 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 883, 123 S.Ct. 106, 154 L.Ed.2d 141 (2002). The presumption of correctness erected in its place at § 2254(e)(1), now simply provides that unless the petitioner can rebut the findings of fact through clear and convincing evidence, those findings of fact are presumed to be correct. Id. ; see also Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 358-59, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (Section 2254(e)(1) does not, as its predecessor did, create exceptions to factual deference for procedural infirmities.... Section 2254(e)(1) simply cannot be read to contain an implied sliding scale of deference.) (noting that the majority opinion does not appear to conflict with this view). Thus, regardless of the extent of the evidence considered by the state trial court, we may reject the trial court's factual findings only if those findings are proven incorrect by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1); see also Hall v. Luebbers, 341 F.3d 706, 713 (8th Cir.2003) (Each step of the Batson inquiry involves a factual determination entitled to a presumption of correctness unless overcome by clear and convincing evidence.), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 996, 124 S.Ct. 2031, 158 L.Ed.2d 505 (2004). Our suggestions to federal trial judges that they are well advised to articulate their findings concerning the validity of the prosecutor's asserted race-neutral reasons, see, e.g., Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir.1992) (We strongly suggest ... that trial judges [addressing a Batson challenge] make an on-the-record ruling stating their reasoning with appropriate references to the underlying facts as they determine them to be.), are, of course, not binding on state court judges. We therefore will presume the trial court's fact-findings to be correct unless Smulls can present clear and convincing evidence otherwise. § 2254(e)(1).