Opinion ID: 1696612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the right of cross-examination

Text: When Eastburn, the narcotics agent who made the daily report and the case report, was called as a witness by the State, the defense attorney in cross-examination attempted to use the conflict between statements in the daily report and the direct testimony as the basis for impeachment by prior inconsistent statements. He was met with a barrage of objections. They included the objection that the witness could not identify the document [he said that he couldn't do so without comparing it with the original], that the document was stolen and subject to confiscation as stolen property, that the cross-examination went beyond the scope of the direct examination, that the document had not been used to refresh the recollection of the witness, and that the defense could not use the copy of the daily report for cross-examination unless it was first received in evidence. Several of these objections were sustained by the court. All should have been overruled. The right to cross-examine as to prior inconsistent statements has nothing whatever to do with the rules of evidence as to refreshment of recollection by a memorandum, nor with the Brady rule we have discussed above, nor the Jencks rule likewise discussed above. A prior inconsistent statement may be written, as in State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947), or oral, as in State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135 (N.D.1955). There is no requirement that the prior inconsistent statement, if written, be in evidence at the time the questions as to the prior inconsistent statement are asked. State v. Nagel, supra . Even hearsay may be admissible as an impeaching statement. State v. Columbus Hall Association, 75 N. D. 275, 27 N.W.2d 664 (1947). In holding that these extraneous rules of evidence or production of documents had something to do with the right of the defense to inquire as to prior inconsistent statements, the court erred. The consequence of sustaining the objections was that the defense attorney was unable to cross-examine Eastburn as to his prior inconsistent statements during the cross-examination of the witness. The defense attorney attempted to defuse the effect of these rulings: (1) by asking leave to withdraw the witness and lay a foundation for the daily report through other witnesses, (2) by asking the court to call the witness as a court witness and thereby permit cross-examination by both sides, and (3) asking leave to ask the impeaching questions without reference to the daily report. All of these requests were denied. At least one should have been granted, so as to cure the prior erroneous rulings and to allow appropriate cross-examination at the proper time during the trial. Still the defense attorney did not desist in his attempts to cross-examine, as most attorneys would have done by this time. He waited until the opening of the defense case, and then called two witnesses, former employees of the State Bureau of Criminal Investigation (one of whom was the friend of the defendant's father), to lay the foundation for introduction in evidence of the copy of the daily report. It was ultimately received in evidence. He then asked leave to recall Eastburn for further cross-examination, but was allowed to call him only as a defense witness. When he attempted to interrogate Eastburn on the prior inconsistent statements contained in the daily report, he was met with the objection that he could not impeach his own witness, and the objection was sustained. In all of this, the court committed multiple reversible errors of constitutional magnitude in depriving the defense of its right to cross-examine, by requiring introduction of the impeaching statement into evidence as a preliminary to the attempted impeachment; by requiring the defense to call the agent as its own witness; and by refusing to allow the defense to impeach him by prior inconsistent statements. The right to cross-examine is a constitutional right. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed. 2d 297 (1973). The right is absolute and the denial of the right as to material evidence is prejudicial error requiring a new trial. Knoepfle v. Suko, 108 N.W.2d 456 (N.D.1961). The right of cross-examination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the `accuracy of the truth-determining process.' [Citations omitted.] It is, indeed, `an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.' Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S., at 295. The right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution means more than being allowed to confront the witness physically. Our cases construing the [confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965), quoted in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Denial of the right of effective cross-examination is constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. Davis v. Alaska, supra . The trial court does have a right to inquire as to whether the cross-examiner has a reasonable basis for asking the questions as to prior inconsistent statements. Such an inquiry may be made in chambers, but it should be directed to the ascertainment of a reasonable basis for the attempt to impeach, not to the admissibility of a document containing the statement. The court could have inquired, in chambers, of the defense attorney whether he had a factual basis for the aspersions cast by the questioning as to discrepancies between the daily reports on the one hand and the case reports and the testimony of the agent on the other hand. The proper procedure for determining the factual basis for cross-examination by inquiry out of the presence of the jury is outlined in Goodman v. United States, 273 F.2d 853 (CA8 1960), and United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135 (CA3 1958). The purpose of such an inquiry is to make sure that the cross-examiner is not merely taking a random shot at a reputation imprudently exposed or asking a groundless question to waft an unwarranted innuendo into the jury box. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948). Here, the court erred in requiring the defense to call an obviously hostile and adverse witness as its own in order to cross-examine him as to prior inconsistent statements. This was error, where the witness was plainly hostile and unwilling and was the chief witness against the defendant. While North Dakota has recognized the voucher rule that one is presumed to vouch for the truthfulness of his own witness [George v. Triplett, 5 N.D. 50, 63 N.W. 891 (1895)] we have permitted cross-examination of one's own witnesses in case of surprise [George v. Triplett, supra ], and contradiction of one's own witnesses by other witnesses [Jacobson v. Mutual Benefit H. & A. Association, 70 N.D. 566, 296 N.W. 545 (1941)], as well as the calling of a witness as a court witness, thereby permitting cross-examination by both sides. See Hefty v. Aldrich, 220 N.W.2d 840 (N.D. 1974). The voucher rule will be rejected entirely if the newly proposed Federal Rules of Evidence are adopted. See Rule 607. It should be. Wigmore calls it a primitive notion, resting on no reason whatever, but upon mere tradition... IIIA Wigmore on Evidence, Chadbourn Edition, Sec. 898. The true extent of the voucher rule is probably simply that the party calling a witness is likely to be held responsible for the testimony of that witness in the eyes of the judge or jury, and jury arguments to that effect can be made, but the rule should never be used to prevent cross-examination of a witness who is adverse or hostile or one whom a party is required to call by the necessities of the case. The State here contends that the defendant was not prejudiced because the document in question, the daily report, was ultimately received in evidence and the defense attorney used the inconsistencies between it and the case report in his final argument. This is true, but by that time the trial was a shambles. Approximately two days had been spent in wrangling over irrelevancies and extraneous objections, both in and out of the presence of the jury. The trial tactics of both sides, and the defense in particular were in disarray. Most serious of all, the defense attorney was never able to cross-examine the principal State witness in any pointed and direct way. He was never able to put to the State's witness the series of questions designed to point out unmistakably to the jury his contention that the witness either lied when he made the daily report or that he lied on the witness stand and in the case report. The right to cross-examine is more than a right to introduce conflicting documents it is the right to confront a witness face to face and test his veracity and his accuracy by probing questions which compel direct answers. That right of the defendant was denied him. He was thereby deprived of what Wigmore called the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. 5 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Sec. 1367. We should always be alert to encroachments upon the right to a fair trial. It can be lost by erosion as well as by avulsion. In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the United States Supreme Court ruled that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We adopt that standard, and since we are unable to declare that the multiple errors in this case were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.