Opinion ID: 5648544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Decision to Re-Impose Same Sentence

Text: On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion and committed an error of law when it declined to 4 impose a sentence that most closely approximated the sentence in the plea offer and, instead, imposed the same sentence that it had previously imposed. The defendant asserts that the re-imposed sentence failed to neutralize the taint of the ineffective assistance of counsel and place him in the same position he would have been had there been no violation of the right to counsel. He argues that, in this way, the trial court failed to comply with the remand instructions in Fitzgerald. As a general proposition, a trial court is bound by the mandate of an appellate court on remand. State v. Abram, 156 N.H. 646, 650 (2008). “[I]n ascertaining what the mandate commands, the trial court need not read the mandate in a vacuum, but rather has the opinion of the appellate court to aid it.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). “In this way, the trial court may examine the rationale of an appellate opinion in order to discern the meaning of language in the court’s mandate.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). Thus, the trial court proceedings on remand must be in accord “with both the mandate of the appellate court and the result contemplated in the appellate opinion.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, we expressly instructed the trial court that it had the discretion to impose “the term of imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence [the defendant] received at trial, or something in between.” Fitzgerald, 173 N.H. at 583-84. As the defendant acknowledges, we specifically declined to define the boundaries of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, leaving “open to the trial court how best to exercise that discretion in all the circumstances of the case before it.” Id. at 582-83. Although we explained that, on resentencing, the trial court would have to “weigh various factors,” we did not delineate those factors or in any way limit the factors that the trial court could consider. Id. at 582 (quotation omitted). Nor did we limit the information upon which the court could rely. See id. at 582-84. In short, our opinion “neither expressly nor implicitly barred the trial court” from imposing the same sentence on the defendant that it originally had imposed. Abram, 156 N.H. at 651. Therefore, the trial court’s decision on remand to re-impose its original sentence was consistent with both the mandate in Fitzgerald and the result contemplated therein. See id. at 650.