Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Limiting Instructions on Evidence of Homosexuality

Text: The court, at the urging of the defense and over prosecution objection, admitted evidence that Debbie Cimmino had a homosexual relationship with Traci Bradley and that defendant was aware she was lesbian or bisexual. The court, without objection from either party, instructed the jury to consider such evidence only for limited purposes. Defendant now contends those instructions were improper restrictions on the use of relevant evidence. We conclude defendant waived his objection by failure to make it properly below and that giving limiting instructions was within the trial court's discretion. In a motion in limine, defendant argued evidence of Debbie's sexual orientation was relevant to show that one of her lovers, Bradley, could have contributed pubic hairs found at the scene; to impeach Lori Cimmino's expected testimony that she was close to her daughters and thus knew their lifestyle and habits (in particular their cleanliness and neatness); and generally to help paint a complete portrait of Debbie. The prosecution disputed the evidence's relevance, asserting the defense simply wanted to sully up Debbie Cimmino in a collateral way. The court ruled Bradley would be permitted to testify to her sexual relationship with Debbie for the limited purpose of explaining the hair evidence, but precluded additional evidence on the subject and its use to impeach Lori Cimmino. The court explained that while we do not discriminate in the law on the basis of sexual orientation, I cannot be blind when I'm considering possible prejudice of the feelings of some people in society. The court stressed its ruling limiting use of the evidence was tentative, as it had not yet heard any evidence, and counsel is free at any time to approach the bench and ask me to change the ruling based upon [the] evidence at that time. During his March 22 interview with the detectives, defendant was asked how he felt about Debbie being a lesbian. He replied he was not happy about it, but that was Debbie's own personal life. Before the tape of that interview was played for the jury, the court ruled, as the defense requested, that this exchange would be included only for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's state of mind at the time. Defense counsel did not object to that limitation on admission. The court subsequently instructed the jury the exchange was not to be considered for the truth of Debbie's sexual orientation, but only to aid in understanding defendant's further recorded statements and his state of mind concerning his relationship with Debbie at the time of the interview. Similarly, after Traci Bradley testified to her sexual relationship with Debbie, the court instructed the jury that the testimony was admitted only for the limited purpose of considering it in connection with the physical evidence found at the scene of the homicide. Again, defense counsel raised no objection to this limiting instruction. On appeal, defendant contends the evidence of Debbie's sexual orientation was not subject to any limitation on its use; hence, no limiting instruction was appropriate. He asserts that in addition to the two uses permitted by the court's instructions (to show defendant's state of mind during the March 22 interview and in connection with the hair evidence), the evidence was relevant to buttress the credibility of Zelma Cureton's testimony (Cureton testified Booker said the victims were lesbians) and to show a venturesomeness on Debbie's part consistent with her being defendant's lover (as he testified she was) or opening her door late at night to Izear Bookman, whom the defense contended might be the real killer. Neither of these bases of relevance was raised or discussed in the hearing on defendant's motion in limine, nor did defendant take advantage of the trial court's offer to reconsider its in limine ruling at any point during trial. A tentative pretrial evidentiary ruling, made without fully knowing what the trial evidence would show, will not preserve the issue for appeal if the appellant could have, but did not, renew the objection or offer of proof and press for a final ruling in the changed context of the trial evidence itself. ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1047, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 189-190, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949, overruled on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588.) `Where the court rejects evidence temporarily or withholds a decision as to its admissibility, the party desiring to introduce the evidence should renew his offer, or call the court's attention to the fact that a definite decision is desired.' ( People v. Moore (1954) 43 Cal.2d 517, 523, 275 P.2d 485.) If defendant wished to use the evidence of sexual orientation to support his third party culpability defense or (in an odd fashion) to buttress his testimony that he and Debbie were lovers, he could and should have presented those theories to the trial court, which could, if it agreed the evidence was relevant for those purposes, have revised its limiting instructions or given the jury a new instruction permitting wider consideration of the evidence. On the merits, the court did not abuse its discretion in instructing on limited use of the evidence. As defendant concedes, where evidence is inadmissible simply to show a person's character but is admitted on some other proper ground, the court may protect against the jurors' possible misuse of the evidence through a limiting instruction. (See Evid.Code, § 355.) Here, the court feared the evidence might be misused by one or more jurors as evidence of Debbie's character and as such might be prejudicial and distracting because of possible personal bias against homosexuals. We cannot conclude the trial court, which knew the jurors and the community from which they were drawn, was unreasonable in its apprehension or in its choice of remedy.