Opinion ID: 325324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: maintenance craft jobs.

Text: 28 The two issues raised on appeal relating to I.P.'s employee selection practices for skilled craft jobs, are governed by different theories under Title VII. The first challenge, I.P.'s use of a battery of standardized tests 16 as selection devices for maintenance craft jobs, 17 rests upon the determination of whether these tests constitute subtle examples of present discrimination. The second issue, temporary enlargement of the minority entry level age limitation for the skilled crafts, is governed by considerations of whether such relief is necessary to dispel the effects of past discrimination and render whole the former discriminatees. Thus we treat these issues separately, but we do not intimate that test validation and entry-level age adjustments may be exclusive remedies for skilled crafts applicants. Our considerations on appeal do not diminish I.P.'s obligation to undertake positive measures to dispel the residual effects of admitted prior discrimination under Title VII, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14, or under the Executive Order 18 program, 41 C.F.R. § 60--3.14. See generally, Note, Remedial Minority Employment, 56 Minn.L.Rev. 842, 844--845 (1972). The determination of the perimeters of affirmative relief, however, is committed to the district court on remand in the exercise of its inherent 'equitable power to remedy past wrongs' 'once a right and a violation have been shown.' Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). 29 In analyzing the legitimacy of testing devices as prerequisite to employment, several principles are significant. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,supra, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. at 853, the Supreme Court held that employment practices which '(operate) to exclude Negroes (and) cannot be shown to be related to job performance' were 'artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment' and therefore were prohibited. The Court also held that 'Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement (has) a manifest relationship to the employment in question,'id. at 432, 91 S.Ct. at 854, and that the EEOC guidelines on Employer Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607, expressed the will of Congress and were thus a measure relevant to demonstrating manifest relationship to employment. Griggs, supra, at 434, 91 S.Ct. 10. That burden, however, does not shift to the employer until the plaintiff has shown a discriminatory effect of the challenged employment requirement. Id. at 431, 91 S.Ct. 10; Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., supra, 509 F.2d at 52--53; United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 912 (5th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 1973); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1972). Yet such a showing of discriminatory impact may be prima facie established by statistical data. Gilmore v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., supra, 509 F.2d at 52 (cases therein cited). 30 The district court here concluded that the evidence was 'insufficient to show any substantial impact of the Company's testing program as to the ability of blacks to obtain employment at the defendant's Pine Bluff mill.' However the evidence relating to racial success on the tests was meager. I.P. either did not maintain such records or withheld them for they were not available upon plaintiffs' discovery requests nor inquiries at trial. The court apparently relied upon the statistic urged by I.P. that 2 of the 5 incumbent black applicants for transfer to maintenance craft positions were accepted, while only 7 of 59 white applicants were selected. Thus black opportunity for transfer was 40% while white opportunity was only about 11.9%. These figures are somewhat elusive, however. First, the statistical population itself, incumbent employees seeking transfer, represents a discriminatorily conceived pool and does not reflect a typical composition of applicants for maintenance craft positions at Pine Bluff based upon geographical minority population. Second, the two blacks who successfully transferred did so after I.P.'s 1968 commitment to provide affirmative promotional and transfer relief for incumbent former discriminatees. Finally, evidence of a test's discriminatory effect is not confined to the ultimate hiring and rejection ratios. 'The use of any (unvalidated) test which adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer or any other employment . . . opportunity of classes protected by title VII constitutes discrimination'. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 912 n. 5; Chance v. Board of Examiners, supra, 458 F.2d at 1176. 31 Better evidence of the test's racial impact can be found in the testimony of the personnel director at Pine Bluff who was aware of no black success 19 in 1962 on the Wonderlic and Bennett tests for production transfer eligibility. This was confirmed by one of the Pine Bluff black employees. Similarly he did not believe that any blacks passed the production battery of tests in 1967 or 1968. There is, however, some conflicting evidence on this latter point for one of plaintiffs' witnesses testified that two blacks passed in 1968. The fact remains, however, that as late as 1971, only two blacks had been hired into the apprentice program at Pine Bluff. Black employees were virtually excluded even from production transfer until 1968 and passing scores for production transfer were even lower than minimal scores for skilled craft admittance. And company officials, notably the Industrial Relations Manager at Pine Bluff, were aware of and expressed disappointment over the poor minority success on the test batteries. 32 This statistical evidence, then, though partly based on tests administered to production employees, is sufficient to show the recially disparate impact of the skilled crafts' testing program, see also Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Director and Commissioner of Civil Service, 504 F.2d 1017 at 1019 (1st Cir. 1974), and to shift the onus of validation to I.P., which appropriately came forward with evidence of attempted validation the district court determined to be adequate. The legal issue, then, on review in this case resolves to the sufficiency of the validation study as persuasive evidence that the test battery is truly predictive of job performance. For this we turn to the EEOC guidelines. 33 Under the guidelines, '(e)vidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.' 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c). Three procedures are cited as the generally acceptable methodolgy for satisfying those requirements: criterion-related validity, content validity, and construct validity. 20 The latter two are permissible only where criterion-related validity is not feasible. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a). Here I.P. undertook a predictive criterion-related validity study for higher than entry level jobs, a permissible undertaking for a validity study under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(1). Supervisor raters were asked to rate workers in the sample under a paired comparison rating technique. 21 The rating lists were then matched with test battery results to determine whether those tests had been an adequate measure of job performance. We note several deficiencies in this validation study. 34 Sample deficiencies and lack of differential validation. The samples were small and they included no minority skilled craft employees. Neither was there a differential validation study performed. Under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(1), '(w)here a validity study is conducted in which tests are administered to present employees, the sample must be representative of the minority groups currently included in the applicant population.' Under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b) (5), data must be generated and results separately reported for minority and nonminority groups wherever technically feasible. 35 Here, however, I.P.'s Pine Bluff Industrial Relations Manager, his assistant, and the expert psychologist called by I.P. all represented in their testimony that no attempts were made to conduct a differential validation, to include blacks in the validation studies, or even to maintain records of black performance on the standardized tests. Under the guidelines, the burden of establishing that noncompliance with any of the minimal validation standards is not technically feasible is on the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(b). It would seem that black performance on the tests could easily have been calibrated by I.P. since the tests have been administered to blacks since 1962 for both production and maintenance applicants. Similarly, balance in the racial composition of the samples could seemingly have been achieved, as well as differential validation, by selecting validation samples from other I.P. mills or even other companies within the industry where similar tests were employed and minority representation was adequate. Such statistics are permissible under the guidelines where (a) the studies pertain to jobs which are comparable, and (b) there are no major differences in contextual variables or sample composition which are likely to significantly affect validity. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.7. 36 I.P.'s casual disregard of the obligation to undertake differential comparisons on test results and in validation studies falls short of proof of technical nonfeasibility. The absence of differential validation and the deficiencies in the sample composition, therefore, render the study inadequate. See also United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 914--915, 916; United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 456 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906, 92 S.Ct. 1607, 31 L.Ed.2d 815 (1972). 37 Job Analysis. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3) establishes as one of the critical standards for validation that: 38 The work behaviors or other criteria of employee adequacy which the test is intended to predict or identify must be fully described . . .. Whatever criteria are used they must represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by careful job analysis. 39 Here there were no adequate job analyses performed. Raters were given general guidelines then directed to select the better of two employees in various pairs. The guidelines apprised the raters to consider factors such as quality of work on the job, quantity of work on the job, ability to work with others, ability to direct a crew if that were required of a job, job knowledge and safety awareness. There were, however, no individualized analyses for each of the different jobs under consideration. Although somewhat constrained, the rating process here was still principally subjective. We have in the past condemned the use of such nebulous standards. United States v. N.L. Industries, supra, 479 F.2d at 368; United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, supra, 416 F.2d at 137--138. Where, as here, subjective evaluations are used in the very process of test validation, a similar potential for abuse exists. Moreover, job analyses are intended to be a careful quantification of criteria that 'represent major or critical work behaviors' for the individual jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(3). 'A job analysis for one (job) . . . would not necessarily be suitable for another.' Walston v. County School Board of Nansemond County, 492 F.2d 919, 926 (4th Cir. 1974). There is no indication that these general guidelines here were individualized for the wide variety of jobs examined. The resulting absence of proper and careful job analyses, therefore, is fatal to the validation study. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 139; Western Addition Community Organization v. Alioto, 340 F.Supp. 1351, 1355 (N.D.Cal.1972). 40 Utility of the test. Several infirmities arise here. First, each of the battery tests was not validated for each job for which the test is a prerequisite of employment. 22 This offends 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) because a failing score on any one of the three tests disqualifies an applicant from employment in a skilled craft position at Pine Bluff. Since each test then effectively exercises an absolute veto prerogative, each must be validated to show significant correlation with respective job performance. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 138, 140. Additionally we note that for 9% of the cases considered there was no correlation between the test scores and job performance. If a test does not prove statistically significant for a given job, it cannot be employed as a selection criterion. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(c)(1). See also United States v. Georgia Power Co., supra, 474 F.2d at 915. Under Griggs, the test battery is prohibited for at least those 9% cases where the test bears no demonstrable relationship to the employment in question. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S.Ct. 849. Finally the evidence strongly suggests that the cutoff scores 23 have been set too high. For example 40% of the skilled craftsmen in a sample of machinists and mill-wright journeymen would have been unable to achieve admission to their respective crafts under the present standards. Some justification must be proffered for the level of cutoff adopted under these circumstances. See Walston v. County School Board of Nansemond County, supra, 492 F.2d at 927. 41 Thus we conclude that on remand the trial court should direct I.P. to conduct new validation studies conforming to the standards set forth herein and take such additional evidence as is necessary to permit the trial court to determine whether or not the administration of the tests has in fact resulted in a racially discriminatory hiring or transfer policy. If the trial court determines that the tests have had such result, it should then devise a remedy which will: (a) determine which tests are permissible under the standards set forth herein and the proper cut-off score for each test; (b) direct that prior applicants who have taken the tests and whose scores meet the revised standards be offered employment in maintenance craft jobs on a preferred basis as vacancies become available with the same seniority which would have resulted if they had been employed in maintenance craft jobs as of the time of their first application, and (c) offer all other members of the affected class an opportunity to take the tests under the revised standards and give hiring or transfer preference to those who pass the tests under the revised standards. 42 The second question on appeal concerning relief for minority maintenance crafts' applicants 24 is the request for temporary enlargement of the entry level age limitation. By reason of past discrimination, 25 because there was no showing of business necessity 26 for the present age limitation, and because I.P. presently permits incumbent production workers who have been bumped down to entry level positions in their departments to enter the apprenticeship programs up to the age of 36, the entry level age for admission to the skilled crafts apprenticeship programs should be enlarged to age 36 as to all members of the affected class, until the district court determines that there is sufficient minority representation in I.P.'s maintenance craft jobs. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 326 (8th Cir. 1971), modified on rehearing en banc, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1973). The details of this remedy are left to the district court on remand. 43