Opinion ID: 2061276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was there sufficient evidence to support the selectmen's denial of Edison's request for street crossing rights?

Text: Edison contends that the evidence at the hearings was insufficient to warrant the refusal of its applications. The court will review on certiorari only errors of law. Farmington River Water Power Co. v. County Commrs. 112 Mass. 206, 212, 213. Filoon v. City Council of Brockton, 252 Mass. 218, 223. It is open to Edison to contend that the evidence which preceded the selectmen's action was as matter of law insufficient to warrant such action, finding or conclusion. G.L.c. 249, § 4. If the selectmen acted on evidence insufficient as matter of law to justify their action, such action may be quashed.
The basic standard is to be found in G.L.c. 166, § 21. There it is stated that electric companies may cross streets with their lines but such companies shall not incommode the public use of public ways or endanger or interrupt navigation. The parties differ in the meaning of that standard. Edison argues strongly that the Statewide scheme of regulation for utility lines implicit in the statutes limits the scope of inquiry of the local boards and that they should not be allowed to frustrate the general interest by refusing street crossings on grounds which the Department has already considered. Edison further claims that the scope of inquiry by the selectmen is limited to one of detail, not whether the crossing should be allowed or whether lines should be underground but where poles should be placed and how constructed, the sole purpose of the statute being to allow the selectmen to minimize physical danger and inconvenience. Concord has argued that incommode is to be given a broader interpretation in that the second part of the sentence in its reference to endanger ... navigation suggests this is not the sole test or the statute would have referred to endangering both the traveling public and navigation. We are aided in our decision by reference to the legislative history of G.L.c. 166, §§ 21 and 22. The statute originated in St. 1849, c. 93, where the incommode clause appears substantially as it is today. Section 3, which has become c. 166, § 22, was much briefer. It said, The selectmen of any town, or mayor and aldermen of any city, through which the lines of such company are to pass, shall give said company their writing, specifying where the posts may be located, the kind of posts that may be used, the height at which, and the places where, the wires may be run ..., and went on to allow later alteration of the location by the aldermen. There were several subsequent changes, one in 1903 where c. 237 made some modification in the wording of the earlier statute, but the change was not substantial. The public hearing requirements which had been inserted in 1860, Gen. Sts. c. 64, § 3, relative to later alteration of the location of the poles were here extended to the original petitions but only for the purposes of initial location of the poles. A significant change occurred in St. 1911, c. 509. The essential changes in the section were the provision for more formal hearing procedure, which increased the importance of the selectmen's consideration of a petition, and the change of the apparently mandatory shall to a discretionary may. This later change was to conform with a previous court decision which had interpreted shall as may, and where it was stated that it was not mandatory that the towns petitioned grant permission for street locations. Suburban Light & Power Co. v. Aldermen of Boston, 153 Mass. 200, 202. It would thus appear that local boards were being given greater discretion in determining whether a utility line should be allowed to locate in a public way at all, and the history of the 1911 statute change supports this interpretation. It grew out of a special report to the Legislature made by the board of gas and electric light commissioners which was established by a resolve of the prior legislative session, Resolves of 1910, c. 55. That report, 1911 Pub. Doc. No. 35, as reported in 27 Gas and Electric Light Commissioners Report, pp. 314a-342a, was concerned in part with high tension transmission. The report said, at pp. 330a-331a, Without undertaking to insist upon an exact limit, the Board is of the opinion that overhead lines operated at very high voltages should, so far as practicable, be kept off the streets.... [An] opportunity for conflict between the interests of different communities may arise with respect to high-tension transmission lines which must of necessity pass across or through one or more cities or towns to reach their destination. Such lines, even if built on private rights of way, cannot extend far without crossing public ways, for which locations from the local authorities are necessary. If such a line is plainly in the interest of the public in several communities, its construction should not be defeated or seriously hampered at the will of a single city or town. The clear implication of this language is that while one town should not be allowed to defeat the general interest of several towns, one town, or several towns acting in concert, could defeat the installation of lines relating only to them, especially where high tension lines are concerned. Our reading of the legislative history is reinforced by reference to the case law, and the towns' discussion of the cases cited by Edison appears accurate. Although all of the cases deal with physical inconvenience, either implicitly or explicitly, none of them suggests that this is a necessary limit of c. 166, § 22. In fact, as one of the respondents points out, several of the cases imply precisely the opposite. In Pierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75, 78, the court said the local board could determine not only where but whether utility lines may be placed along the highways. In Suburban Light & Power Co. v. Aldermen of Boston, 153 Mass. 200, 204, the court said, It cannot, we think, be inferred, as the plaintiff urges, that it was intended that it was not to be in the power of local boards to defeat the operations of electric lighting companies the organization of which was authorized by statute. When we observe how many considerations, so far as the public is concerned, enter into the question whether the streets shall be used for electric lighting companies of a local character, ... it is not readily supposable that in regard to companies whose operations were confined to a single town all that was intended to be left to the board of aldermen or selectmen were questions of detail only. We conclude that both statutory history and case law impart to the selectmen a greater role than Edison concedes; how much greater a role remains somewhat unclear. Indeed, it is arguable from the authorities cited that the discretion of the local board is not circumscribed by the phrase incommode the public use of public ways. Nothing makes the refusal of a board to grant crossings dependent upon such a finding, especially if the two sections of the statute are read separately. Undoubtedly, incommode is one of the factors which should be considered and a line which would incommode should not be permitted. It does not follow, however, that a line which does not incommode must be permitted. There is nothing in the statute which requires the local board to grant the crossing even if the line would not incommode and its decision might be upheld as long as it was not arbitrary nor capricious. But it seems to us that even if incommode is adopted as a standard, that standard is to be read broadly in view of the foregoing. In fact the word itself carries broad connotations. [2] We do not feel inclined to adopt the restrictive meaning of incommode which has been urged upon us. We are not of the opinion that its application is limited to that which may cause any insignificant physical inconvenience or danger to the traveling public. Various showings involving distinct molestation and annoyance were voiced at the hearings. We find nothing wrong in the selectmen's determination that such annoyances may involve aesthetics. The presence of power lines across a public way can, in our view, disturb natural beauty sufficiently to create real annoyance to the public users of the way, particularly in a day when such beauty seems to be a rapidly diminishing public asset. Where review by the Department is not available under c. 166, § 28, certiorari is available but it does not give the court the power to judge the local authorities' decision by the same standard of review which the Department would apply. Rather the court should overrule the selectmen only if there is a lack of substantial evidence to support a finding of incommodity in the broadest sense. The case law and legislative history support giving the local authority a large measure of discretion. It should not be overruled unless it has behaved arbitrarily or unreasonably.
1. Who has the burden of proof at the hearings and upon judicial review? The selectmen, in discharging a quasi judicial function, can deny the construction of the lines unless such action would be arbitrary or unreasonable. As stated in Ansell v. Boston, 254 Mass. 208, 211, if the exception which permits the selectmen to refuse to grant crossings is part of the enacting clause, which by the above description it is, then the burden is on the proponent of the lines to demonstrate it is not within the excepting clause. In Almeida Bus Lines, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util. 348 Mass. 331, 342, it was stated that the burden is on the appealing party to show that a decision of the Department is invalid. The situation obtaining on these petitions is similar to that of the Almeida case and the burden was on Edison to establish a record sufficient to indicate the error of the local authorities. As a general matter Edison had the burden of demonstrating that the lines would not incommode the public and demonstrating on review that it met that burden. 2. What is meant by evidence sufficient as matter of law? General Laws c. 249, § 4, allows the petitioner to contend that the evidence which formed the basis of the action complained of... was as matter of law insufficient.... Although the language is different from that used in G.L.c. 30A, § 14 (8) (e), where the standard is substantial evidence, the two would seem close enough that the law concerning the latter, which is more complete, could be applied by analogy. International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Commn. of Wisconsin, 157 Wis. 167, 175. Substantial evidence is defined in c. 30A, § 1, as such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Newton v. Department of Pub. Util. 339 Mass. 535, 548. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd. 305 U.S. 197, 229. The standard is stated more fully by Professor Jaffe: And so when a finding is attacked the judge must decide whether experience permits the reasoning mind to make the finding; he must decide whether the finding could have been made by reference to the logic of experience. He will conclude that the finding is unreasonable (either because it was badly reasoned or not the result of reasoning) when in his experience or in common experience as he knows it the evidence points to no felt or appreciable probability of the conclusion or points to an overwhelming probability of the contrary. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 598. 3. Does experience permit the reasoning mind to make the findings made by the selectmen from the evidence presented? The transcripts of each of the three hearings and the examination of the exhibits reveal that most of the evidence and the controversy at the hearings were concerned with the subjects of economics and aesthetics. Edison's testimony was given largely through Leslie J. Weed, its engineer who testified at each hearing and submitted written reports. He described the proposed line and route, the specifications and desirability of the proposed system, and gave it as his opinion that the line would not incommode the public. Statements were also made at each hearing by counsel for Edison. Objections by those opposed to granting the petitions were voiced along various lines: (1) increased public use of one of the roads to be crossed; (2) aesthetic considerations; (3) psychological disturbances; (4) danger from falling or sagging wires; (5) danger from radiation; (6) prospective decline in market values of homes near by; (7) attractive nuisance for children; (8) possible danger to birds and animal life. Upon our reading of the legislative and case law history, as well as our understanding of the meaning of incommode, all of this evidence was pertinent. It is quite clear that all of the people present at the hearings, save for the proponents speaking for Edison, felt a high level of annoyance for various reasons. Reverting to our interpretation of incommode, there would appear to have been ample evidence to allow the reasoning mind to conclude that these lines would incommode the public. Furthermore, we cannot say that aesthetic factors are not determinative in the light of the statutory history and our case law. See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commn. 354 F.2d 608, 614-617 (2d Cir.). There is thus sufficient evidence to support the findings of the three boards of selectmen regardless of whether they are seen as employing general discretion or discretion within the interpretation of incommode which we have given. We conclude that the order in each case should be Petition dismissed.