Opinion ID: 887222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 10 Whether the District Court had the power to impose a servitude forbidding building on parts of the partitioned property. ¶ 11 Kellogg asserts that the District Court did not have the power to impose no build zones on the partitioned property. He points out that neither he nor Dearborn requested such a servitude in their pleadings. Additionally, he argues that the only statutory power given to referees (and thus to the district court) to impose a servitude on a party to a partition proceeding is the power to create roads. Section 70-29-205(2), MCA, allows referees to set apart a portion of the [partitioned] property for a way, road, or street.... Since the servitude in question here is not a way, road, or street, Kellogg reasons that neither the Referees nor the court possesses the power to impose a no build zone. ¶ 12 In addition to § 70-29-205(2), MCA, however, stands § 70-29-209, MCA. That statute states that when a partition cannot be made equally  that is, when it is not feasible to award each tenant-in-common an equal section of the property  the court may adjudge compensation to be made by one party to another on account of the inequality.... This refers to the ancient practice of owelty, through which a court avoids ordering a partition by sale when a property cannot be equally divided. See Kravik v. Lewis (1984), 213 Mont. 448, 455, 691 P.2d 1373, 1376. Section 70-29-209(2), MCA, grants the court broad powers in making this adjustment: In all cases the court has power to make compensatory adjustment between the respective parties according to the ordinary principles of equity. ¶ 13 Although owelty often arises in the form of a monetary award, historically these ordinary principles of equity have included the power to impose servitudes. For example, one partition case from Massachusetts involved a court granting an air and light easement to one tenant-in-common, thus imposing a servitude on another. Bornstein v. Doherty (1910), 204 Mass. 280, 90 N.E. 531, 532, cited in Matter of Marta (Del.1996), 672 A.2d 984, 987. In justifying this grant, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stated, There is no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court, in [partition] proceedings, to annex reasonable easements to one part of the land, and impose reasonable servitude upon another part.... A few years previous, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals squarely held: `Where lands are incapable of exact or fair division, the court has power to compensate by a charge upon the land by way of rent, servitude, or easement.' Martin v. Martin (1897), 95 Va. 26, 27 S.E. 810, 811 (quoting Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 1389). Given this expansive understanding of a court's equitable powers, and given that § 70-29-209(2), MCA, grants such powers to the district court, we conclude that it is within the court's powers to impose a servitude such as a no build zone. ¶ 14 Kellogg argues that, since neither party sought to impose a no build zone, the court exceeded its powers in imposing one. In seeking to have the property partitioned, Kellogg did not seek to have the property divided along a particular line. That was left to the discretion of the court. Likewise, even though neither party sought to impose no build zones, the court, in exercising its equitable powers, had the discretion to adopt the Referees' recommendation in that regard. ¶ 15 The dissent states that the issue of the no-build zone arose at the end of the litigation by way of judgment,  thereby inferring that Kellogg was caught off guard and should not be faulted for failing to raise constitutional objections. Such was not the case. When the referees' report recommending a no-build zone was filed, the District Court ordered the parties to file objections thereto before the Court decided whether to adopt the recommendations. Although Kellogg had advance notice that the District Court was entertaining adoption of the no-build zone and filed an objection contending that the recommendation exceeded statutory authority, he did not argue that the no-build zone constituted an unconstitutional taking of his property. Thus, in arguing that the judgment herein interferes with the fundamental constitutional right of [p]ossessing and protecting property under Article II, Section 3, of the Montana Constitution and amounts to an unconstitutional taking of Kellogg's property, the dissent addresses theories which were neither raised in nor addressed by the District Court. A party may not raise new arguments or change his legal theory on appeal because it is unfair to fault the trial court on an issue that it was never given an opportunity to consider. State v. Gouras, 2004 MT 329, ¶ 26, 324 Mont. 130, ¶ 26, 102 P.3d 27; State v. Carter, 2005 MT 87, ¶ 13, 326 Mont. 427, ¶ 13, 114 P.3d 1001, ¶ 13.