Opinion ID: 2575639
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: pacenza's arguments in defense of discipline

Text: ¶23 Besides his assertions that there is no clear and convincing evidence of his misdeeds, the attorney relies on four theories as complete defenses to the imposition of any discipline: 1) the lack of an attorney-client relationship between himself and the Richards; 2) that, despite the title defects, the contract for deed was sufficient to transfer his interest to the Richards; 3) the failure of the Richards to present him with the coin of the realm or cash in hand negating the requirement for him to present marketable title; and 4) the Richards letter to the Bar Association stating that all matters underlying the complaint had been resolved. None of these arguments are viable or convincing. ¶24 The lack of an attorney-client relationship between Pancenza and the Richards is immaterial. Rule 1.3, Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2001, Ch. 1, App. 1-A clearly provides that a lawyer committing any act contrary to prescribed standards of conduct, whether in the course of professional capacity, or otherwise, may be grounds for discipline. The principle is demonstrated by Oklahoma case law. [47] It is also unimportant whether the parties agree that a particular ethical violation occurred. This Court is not limited to analyzing those ethical standards recognized or cited by the complainant and the respondent nor by those charged in the complaint. [48] ¶25 Pacenza asks us to ignore his responsibility to act honestly as a practitioner of the bar. Essentially, the attorney asserts that he should be absolved of culpability on the misrepresentation count because a contract for deed may legally be entered when the conveyor of the property has no interest and that only if the Richards' presented him with cash in hand did he have any duty to clear the title. We will not reach the underlying legal arguments made by Pacenza. In disciplinary matters, we not only determine the lawyer's continued fitness to practice law, but we must do so while safeguarding the interests of the public, the courts, and the legal profession. [49] We cannot perform this function and allow the kind of mental jockeying that Pacenza proposes. [50] ¶26 Pacenza is convinced that the portion of the bankruptcy settlement resulting in the Richards being awarded damages and requiring a letter to the Bar Association stating that the underlying cause has been resolved should absolve him of discipline. Such is not the case under either the disciplinary rules [51] or the bar disciplinary opinions of this Court. [52]