Opinion ID: 3066046
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McCullough’s Claim Fails on the Merits.

Text: McCullough argues that when BOP calculated his eligibility for the pilot program, it improperly failed to take into account his good time credits. McCullough acknowledges that other courts have analyzed this issue and determined that good time credits do not apply for purposes of determining eligibility for the elderly offender pilot program. However, he claims that his case is distinguishable because those cases concerned post-PLRA convictions, whereas McCullough was convicted pre-PLRA. McCullough’s argument is unpersuasive. This is a novel issue in the Ninth Circuit, but we agree with the sound reasoning set forth by the Tenth Circuit in Izzo, 620 F.3d at 1260–61. In Izzo, the Tenth Circuit applied a plain language analysis of the statute to find that BOP ought not consider good time credits in determining eligibility for the elderly offender pilot program. Id. See also Collins v. Gee W. Seattle LLC, 631 F.3d 1001, 1004–05 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The starting point for our interpretation of a statute is always its plain language . . . . [W]e may not read a statute’s plain language to produce a result contrary to the statute’s purpose or lead to unreasonable results.”) (quotations and citations omitted). Section 17541(g)(5) states that, to qualify as an “eligible elderly offender,” an inmate must “ha[ve] served the greater habeas petitioner’s claim might be moot. W hile there is no case directly on point, such habeas cases are more analogous to the case at hand. See, e.g., Serrato, 486 F.3d at 565 (appeal not moot because petitioner “seeks relief in the form of reduction of [petitioner’s] supervised release”); Mujahid, 413 F.3d at 994–95 (same). MCCULLOUGH V . GRABER 9 of 10 years or 75 percent of the term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced.” 42 U.S.C. § 17541(g)(5). In Izzo, the Tenth Circuit explained: [T]he phrase ‘term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced’ unambiguously refers to the term imposed by the sentencing court, without any consideration of good time credit. . . . Congress unambiguously used the phrase ‘to which the offender was sentenced’ to modify ‘term of imprisonment’ in § 17541. With this modification clause, the ‘term of imprisonment’ unmistakably refers to the term imposed by the sentencing court. 620 F.3d at 1260. Other courts have come to the same conclusion, and there are no decisions to the contrary. See, e.g., Carreras v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 446 F. App’x 514, 515–16 (3d Cir. 2011) (“plain language of the statute unambiguously defines a term of imprisonment as that to which an inmate is sentenced, and does not contemplate inclusion of [good conduct time]”); Cavanaugh v. Johns, 459 F. App’x 261, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s order, which found BOP did not err “in refusing to consider [petitioner’s] vested good conduct time in calculating his eligibility for the Elderly Offender Home Detention Pilot Program”); Wright v. Haynes, 410 F. App’x 262, 264 (11th Cir. 2011) (“term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced . . . does not include any good conduct time”). McCullough argues that his pre-PLRA conviction status makes his situation distinct from these cases. This is because, for persons convicted prior to implementation of the PLRA, 10 MCCULLOUGH V . GRABER good time credits vest at the end of each year.4 In comparison, for those convicted post-PLRA, good time credits “vest on the date the prisoner is released from custody.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(2). However, this does not change the plain language analysis of the SCA, which considers the amount of time to which a prisoner was sentenced, not how much time the prisoner has served, or how much time remains on the prisoner’s sentence, either with or without taking into account good time credits. Furthermore, even if McCullough were eligible for the pilot program, his admission to the program would be at BOP’s discretion. Section 17541(g)(1)(B) clearly states that, under the program, “the Attorney General may release some or all eligible elderly offenders from the Bureau of Prisons facility to home detention.” See 42 U.S.C. § 17541(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added). For the foregoing reasons, even if McCullough’s appeal were not moot, his claim would fail on the merits. DISMISSED. 4 Prior to the 1996 amendments, 18 U.S.C. § 3624 stated: “A prisoner . . . shall receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of fifty-four days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term . . . .”