Opinion ID: 6320188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Preliminary Injunction Factors

Text: Even if there was no procedural due process issue, the district court committed a clear error of judgment when it issued a preliminary injunction based on a lack of evidence demonstrating Mycroft was responsible for the conduct at issue. The only evidence Tumey directly pointed to at the hearing was temporal proximity. The testimony from both Tumey and his expert, Webb, was that there was an attack or uptick in harassing activity when a significant development in the litigation occurred. Subject to limited exceptions, however, court documents and court proceedings are open to the public. Too much weight cannot be placed on timing when, as in this case, public documents and proceedings are involved. Further, others in addition to Mycroft have an interest in curbing what has been described as the patent troll industry. As explained by the Supreme Court, it is well known that an industry has developed in which law firms use patents not for their intended use of producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining license fees. Some in this industry have used, or threaten to use, litigation as a way to extract licensing fees, even if the patent being wielded is invalid. Commil, 575 U.S. at 646. Justice Scalia expressed concern about court decisions that have the effect of increasing “the in terrorem power of patent trolls.” Id. at 649. While we need not decide if this case is part of the patent troll industry, we note that one of the patents in the underlying litigation has already been found invalid and the other one is under review by the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The heightened public interest about the issues before the district court is a consideration that should not be ignored when determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. See Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. __,138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943-44 (2018) (explaining a court must consider the three other factors, including whether the movant has shown that an injunction is in the public interest, because “a preliminary injunction does not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff’s showing of a likelihood of success on the merits”). -12- In searching the record for other possible evidence of a nexus to Mycroft, we note the honey pot that Webb created, which did not allow him to identify the perpetrator(s), as well as Mycroft’s expertise. While it is indisputable that Montgomery and Lewis have particular skill, expertise, and resources that render them capable of executing the cyber-attacks, they are not the only ones with the capability, nor are they the only ones, as described in the preceding paragraph, with motive to try to shut down or inconvenience litigation involving a suspected patent troll. There exists specific public interest in this particular case by Mycroft followers who seek to ensure the open-source network remains available. In conclusion, assuming as true each of the allegations regarding the nature and extent of the cyber-attacks and harassment and accepting as true the testimony proffered by and on behalf of Tumey at the hearing, there is a paucity of evidence in this record to find that Mycroft is behind the attacks. The attacks are unacceptable and deserving of redress, but for there to be a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits to warrant injunctive relief, Tumey must show that he has “at least a fair chance of prevailing.” Miller v. Honkamp Krueger Fin. Servs., Inc., 9 F.4th 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). To do so, he must make an adequate showing of a nexus between the unlawful conduct and the responsible individuals. On this record, Tumey has failed to meet his burden and the district court committed a clear error of judgment in finding he did. As to the other Dataphase factors, even if Tumey came forward with sufficient evidence to connect Mycroft to the unlawful acts, Tumey has not convinced us that money damages are insufficient to compensate him for the alleged injuries. See MPAY Inc. v. Erie Custom Computer Applications, Inc., 970 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 2020) (losses that are quantifiable and compensable with money damages necessarily means that the harm is not irreparable). The absence of irreparable harm “is an independently sufficient ground upon which to deny a preliminary injunction.” Grasso Enters., LLC v. Express Scripts, Inc., 809 F.3d 1033, 1040 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Watkins, 346 F.3d at 844). Given these findings, we need not resolve Mycroft’s constitutional claims regarding the breadth or nature of the injunction. -13-