Opinion ID: 1472630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Banther's Claims

Text: Banther's claim that the earlier conspiracy acquittal collaterally estopped the State from arguing an accomplice-liability theory based on an agreement, implicates the similar language employed by the conspiracy and accomplice-liability statutes. The conspiracy statute provides that when a person, intending to promote or facilitate the commission of a class A felony ..., agrees to aid another person in planning of the felony ... and the other person commits an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy, [that person] is guilty of conspiracy in the first degree. [22] An accomplice, on the other hand, may act unilaterally, without a preexisting agreement, by spontaneously deciding to aid, counsel, or attempting to aid another, or by agreeing to aid a principal in planning or committing a crime. [23] In State v. Travis, the Superior Court stated that the use of the [disjunctive] or instead of the conjunctive and  in the accomplice statute implicitly recognized accomplice liability based on [a defendant's] unilateral decision to aid in the commission of an offense. [24] We agree that the use of the disjunctive or in the accomplice-liability statute allows the jury to find that a defendant either aided or counseled another without actually agreeing to do so in advance. Nonetheless, there are problems advancing that theory in this case to support the jury instructions given and the State's argument to support its theory of substantial planning. In an effort to convince the jury that Banther acted as an accomplice by aiding Schmitz's plan to murder Ravers, the State implied that Banther and Schmitz acted jointly when they worked together to murder Ravers. The State's repeated argument to the jury never addressed the kind of unilateral spontaneity discussed in Travis. The State's references to Banther's planning focused on concerted actions, which although not labeled as a conspiracy, nonetheless operated as the functional equivalent of the agreement element that is fundamental to a conspiracy. The State's repeated argument that Banther and Schmitz acted together, coupled with the trial judge's instruction that Banther could be convicted as an accomplice if he agree[d] to plan the murder with Schmitz, focused on the central element of the conspiracy statute  an agreement. The State's arguments, the trial judge's ruling on Banther's motion in limine, and the trial judge's inclusion in the accomplice charge of the element of agreeing to aid in planning the murder, diverted the jury from its appropriate focus. Those arguments and instructions should have focused the jury on whether the facts supported beyond a reasonable doubt that Banther had independently engaged in substantial planning of Ravers's murder and that Banther had acted unilaterally to carry out that plan. Instead, as if Banther had never been acquitted of having agreed with Schmitz to aid in planning the murder, the trial judge allowed the State to focus on Banther and Schmitz having worked together on an agreed plan to murder Ravers. Simply barring the use of the technical word (in the minds of a lay jury) conspiracy did nothing to address the legal consequence of the jury's earlier acquittal of the charge of conspiracy to commit murder. In these circumstances, we cannot be confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury could fairly conclude that Banther aided Schmitz independently, and in the absence, of an advance agreement to do so. In a multicount indictment charging a defendant with both conspiracy and an underlying felony relying on planning as the overt act advancing the conspiracy, we concede the State could argue and the trial judge could instruct the jury that an argument to aid would be a basis for accomplice liability. Rather than raise the specter of collateral estoppel, the statutory overlap would go to the evidence necessary to prove the elements of each offense. Similarly, a single felony charge on an accomplice-liability theory would permit the State to argue scenarios falling within the broad explicit range of the accomplice statute, including an agreement to aid in the planning or committing of that single felony. Here, however, the jury's previous acquittal on the conspiracy count collaterally estopped the State from arguing to the jury facts that indicated Banther agreed to aid Schmitz in planning the murder. [25] The State's evidence of substantial planning could only be presented on the basis of Banther's individual, independent and spontaneous actions  not on the basis of a theory that he and Schmitz had worked together on the plan. The earlier jury must have rejected the fact of an agreement between Banther and Schmitz, to find Banther not guilty of conspiracy to murder Ravers. [26] As a consequence, the State was collaterally estopped from advancing an accomplice-liability theory predicated on Banther agreeing to aid Schmitz in planning the murder. The earlier acquittal on the conspiracy count necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for a conviction as an accomplice to the first-degree murder charge, i.e. that Banther agreed to aid Schmitz in planning the murder. [27] To fully implement the collateral estoppel effects of the conspiracy acquittal and to protect Bather's Constitutional right against double jeopardy, the trial judge should have limited the State to arguing that Banther's actions alone, independent of any agreement or working with Schmitz, constituted counsel[ing] or attempt[ing] to aid Schmitz. In his jury instructions, furthermore, the trial judge should have accounted for the earlier acquittal by tailoring the jury charge to exclude any reference to a bilateral agreement between the parties. The earlier jury finding that Banther and Schmitz did not agree in advance to kill Ravers  a finding implicit in the conspiracy acquittal  removed that issue from the jury's consideration at the second trial. By instructing the jury that they could convict if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that Banther agreed to aid Schmitz in planning or committing the offense, and by allowing the State to argue that Banther and Schmitz planned together  to commit the murder, the trial judge allowed the State to relitigate the fact of an agreement that is necessary for a conviction of conspiracy but that serves as only one basis for accomplice liability. Because the trial judge failed to enforce the collateral estoppel provisions of Section 208 and as a consequence subjected Banther to being placed in jeopardy again for the conspiracy charge on which he had previously been acquitted, he erred as a matter of law. [28]