Opinion ID: 1121495
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Convictions for Felonies Involving Violence

Text: The trial court concluded that defendant had been previously convicted of two felonies involving the use or threat of violence and therefore found the existence of the § 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance for each murder. The trial court based its finding on the fact that defendant had been previously convicted of attempted aggravated assault, a class 4 felony, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1001 and -1204(A)(1), and of aggravated assault, a class 6 felony, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-1203 and -1204(A)(8). In order to qualify as a § 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance, a prior felony conviction must be for a crime that, by statutory definition, involves the use or threat of violence on another person. State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 228, 782 P.2d 693, 704 (1989), citing State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 511, 662 P.2d 1007, 1018 (1983). Defendant argues that his prior convictions do not qualify in light of this court's decision in State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 804 P.2d 72 (1990), that, under the statutory definition of aggravated assault, it is possible to commit aggravated assault without the use or threat of violence. We reject defendant's analysis of this issue. In Fierro, the state presented no evidence indicating the specific subsection of the aggravated assault statute under which defendant had been convicted. Therefore, it was theoretically possible that Fierro had been convicted for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to another. Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 550 n. 9, 804 P.2d at 83 n. 9. Because the reckless infliction of physical injury does not necessarily involve the use or threat of violence, we determined that Fierro's prior Arizona conviction for aggravated assault did not qualify as a § 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance. Id. Here, however, the record shows that defendant was convicted under subsection (A)(8) of the aggravated assault statute for committing an assault while the victim [was] bound or otherwise physically restrained or while the victim's capacity to resist [was] substantially impaired. A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(8). We believe that a conviction under this subsection necessarily involves the use or threat of violence. The binding or restraining of a victim requires the exertion of any physical force so as to injure or abuse  and thus establishes the use or threat of violence. See State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 51, 579 P.2d 542, 555 (1978) (defining violence) (emphasis added). Likewise, an assault committed while a victim's capacity to resist is substantially impaired involves the use or threat of violence because the term resist implies an intentional injurious or abusive act by the assailant. The trial court correctly found defendant's conviction for aggravated assault to be a § 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance. Defendant's attempted aggravated assault conviction also qualifies as a § 13-703(F)(2) aggravating circumstance. As noted above, our concern in Fierro was that the defendant could have been convicted of aggravated assault for reckless conduct, 166 Ariz. at 550 n. 9, 804 P.2d at 83 n. 9, which does not establish the use or threat of violence. Here, however, defendant could not have been convicted of reckless behavior because attempt is a specific intent crime and by definition involves intentional conduct. A.R.S. § 13-1001(A)(2) (A person commits attempt if ... [he] ... [i]ntentionally does or omits to do anything which... is any step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in commission of an offense....) (emphasis added); Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 637 (3d ed. 1982) ([A]n attempt to commit any crime requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense.) (footnote omitted). We therefore find that the trial court correctly considered defendant's prior conviction for attempted aggravated assault to be an aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2).