Opinion ID: 4350922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In‐Concert Liability Claim

Text: We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting all well‐pleaded facts in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable in‐ ferences in the plaintiﬀ’s favor. Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc., 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiﬀ must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausi‐ bility when the plaintiﬀ pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In‐concert liability is a relationship between tortfeasors in which one tortfeasor acting in concert with others “is legally responsible for the actions of the other individuals.” Woods v. coerced an underage girl into consuming alcohol to the point of uncon‐ sciousness, provided minimal care for her in their home, and prevented others from calling 911. Id. at 846. The court determined that plaintiff’s theory was not that defendants failed to act at all (i.e. one of nonfeasance) but that defendants voluntarily undertook a duty of care for decedent, which they negligently performed, and affirmatively prevented others from caring for her. Id. at 856–57. Thus, defendants’ alleged affirmative misconduct was misfeasance, which does not require proof of reliance by the injured party. Id. That is not the case here, as Hutchison’s claims are premised upon Fitzgerald’s failure to act rather than any affirmative mis‐ conduct. 12 No. 18‐2203 Cole, 693 N.E.2d 333, 337 (Ill. 1998). Illinois has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 to determine whether in‐ dividuals have acted in concert to commit a tortious act. See id. at 335–36. Section 876 provides that a tortfeasor is liable for harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another if he (a) “does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him”; (b) “knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives sub‐ stantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to con‐ duct himself”; or (c) “gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, sepa‐ rately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876. To be liable un‐ der § 876, the “defendant’s conduct must be ‘more than be‐ nign,’” and “[t]he defendant must actively participate in the tortious conduct of another.” Rogers v. Reagan, 823 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (quoting Sanke v. Bechina, 576 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). Hutchison only raises arguments under subsections (b) and (c) of § 876. He claims that Fitzgerald acted in concert with Borkholder by “allowing, directing and encouraging Borkholder and its employees to operate forklifts without a critical safety device, a backup alarm,” and by “failing to rec‐ ommend the installation and/or repair of the backup alarm on the Caterpillar forklift, despite other forklifts and trailers at Borkholder’s Metamora facility having backup alarms.” Be‐ cause liability under subsections (b) and (c) is based on the defendant’s “substantial assistance” in the tortious conduct, a plaintiﬀ must demonstrate “that the defendant did not merely fail to act, but also assisted the third party.” Simmons v. Homatas, 925 N.E.2d 1089, 1100 (Ill. 2010). No. 18‐2203 13 Hutchison cannot succeed on his in‐concert liability claims because his allegations against Fitzgerald are premised upon Fitzgerald’s inaction—i.e. Fitzgerald’s failure to install and/or repair a backup alarm on the Caterpillar forklift. He conclu‐ sorily asserts that Borkholder committed a tort “by operating a forklift without a critical safety feature, a backup alarm” (ig‐ noring that such an allegedly “critical” feature was not man‐ datory under any regulations) and argues that Fitzgerald sub‐ stantially encouraged Borkholder’s tortious conduct by fail‐ ing to make a recommendation to install an alarm. In Sim‐ mons, however, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that a defendant cannot be held liable under in‐concert liability for failing to act; rather, a defendant must “aﬃrmatively assist[]” in the tortious act. 925 N.E.2d at 1100; see also Kohn v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (“[I]t is not enough that a defendant assist or encourage another to en‐ gage in a tort; rather, to subject a defendant to liability, the assistance or encouragement must be substantial, not merely slight.”); Umble v. Sandy McKie & Sons, Inc., 690 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (“We do not equate failing to prevent certain conduct with actively encouraging that conduct.”); Sanke, 576 N.E.2d at 1218 (“[S]ection 876 require[s] such af‐ firmative conduct that one’s own actions create a duty.”). Hutchison has not pleaded any aﬃrmative conduct on the part of Fitzgerald that would amount to substantial assistance under § 876(b) or (c).5 5 Nor are there any nonconclusory allegations in the operative com‐ plaint that Fitzgerald knew Borkholder’s conduct constituted a tort. See Norman v. Brandt, 929 N.E.2d 14, 20 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[S]ection 876(b) applies when the person did not commit an act that would be a tort, but that person gave substantial assistance or encouragement to another party 14 No. 18‐2203 The nonconclusory factual allegations in the operative complaint do not establish a plausible inference that Fitzger‐ ald substantially assisted Borkholder in breaching a duty to Hutchison.6 As such, we aﬃrm the dismissal of his in‐concert liability claim.