Opinion ID: 2638992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Volunteer Fire Fighters as Volunteers or Employees and/or Workers

Text: The parties additionally dispute whether volunteer fire fighting is nevertheless an employment covered by the IIA. Specifically, they dispute whether the IIA classifies Doty as an employee and/or worker who would fall within the scope of the IIA, or alternatively a volunteer to whom the IIA would not apply. Doty asserts that she meets the definition of `volunteer' found in RCW 51.12.035 and as such cannot be an employee under the IIA. The Town counters that RCW 51.12.035 is limited in scope, and the definition Doty relies on specifically excludes volunteer fire fighters and is thus irrelevant to the issue of whether Doty was a volunteer. The Town proffers, in the alternative, that Doty was an employee under the IIA because she received wages for her services, was under the direction and control of the Town, and is a public officer. The initial inquiry, in defining volunteer, is the relevancy of the specific exclusion of volunteer fire fighters from the definition of `volunteer' in RCW 51.12.035(2). The legislature enacted RCW 51.12.035(2) with the intent to provide limited medical aid benefits to local government and nonprofit volunteers. When the legislature did so, volunteer fire fighters had been similarly covered under the VFFA for 40 years. See LAWS OF 1945, ch. 261, codified at ch. 41.24 RCW; see also LAWS OF 1935, ch. 121, superseded and repealed by LAWS OF 1945, ch. 261, § 27. The exception of volunteer fire fighters from this subsection was logically a consequence of the similar benefits already provided by the VFFA. See RCW 51.12.035(2) (excepting fire fighters covered by chapter 41.24 RCW (emphasis added)). [3] In fact, the legislature's intentional reference to and exclusion of volunteer fire fighters from this provision implies that the legislature, in other circumstances, conceptualizes volunteer fire fighters as volunteers and not employees and/or workers. If the legislature considered volunteer fire fighters employees, its reference to them in the context of volunteers would have been odd and meaningless. RCW 51.12.035. Thus, despite their exception from the medical aid benefit provision for general volunteers, volunteer fire fighters remain volunteers under the IIA as long as they meet the definition and are not, by their status or compensation, employees and/or workers covered by the IIA. Therefore, while not applicable to the facts here, RCW 51.12.035(2) remains relevant as it conveys the legislature's intent with regard to the definition of nonemployee volunteers. Specifically, a nonemployee volunteer constitutes someone who provides services (1) by his or her own free choice and (2) receives no wages. Cf. RCW 51.12.035(2). A volunteer retains his or her volunteer status even if he or she [is] granted maintenance and reimbursement for necessary incidental expenses. Id. Of course, such a person must also not meet the IIA's definition of an `[e]mployee' and/or `[w]orker.' RCW 51.08.180, .185. The determinative issue becomes whether, in this instance, Doty's service as a volunteer fire fighter constituted an employment covered by the IIA or volunteer service. The IIA instructs that `[w]orker[s]' encompass every person ... who is engaged in the employment of an employer. RCW 51.08.180. [E]mployment, in turn, constitutes services performed by an individual for remuneration. RCW 51.08.195. Additionally, the IIA instructs that [w]henever... any municipal corporation ... shall engage in any work, or let a contract therefor, in which workers are employed for wages, this title shall be applicable thereto. Former RCW 51.12.050 (1999) (emphasis added), amended by LAWS OF 2001, ch. 138, § 2. These definitions reflect the common sense notion that volunteers and employees are mutually exclusive categories with juxtaposed definitions. Thus we examine first whether the stipend and statutory benefit premiums paid by the Town constitute sufficient remuneration or wages within the contemplation of the IIA, second whether Doty volunteered her services of her own free choice, and finally whether Doty is a public officer, and on that basis alone, an employee under the IIA. Wages under the IIA: The IIA sets forth in detail how wages are calculated, but does not definitively establish a definition of what constitutes wages. [4] According to RCW 51.08.178, wages refer to the hourly, daily, or monthly wage that the employee receive[s] from the employer as part of the contract of hire. [5] RCW 51.08.178(1). Whether salaried or paid hourly, wages, simply stated, refer to the monetary remuneration for services performed. Id. Significantly, wages under the IIA are juxtaposed with moneys that may be provided volunteers under the IIA, that is maintenance and reimbursement for actual expenses necessarily incurred in performing his or her assigned or authorized duties. See RCW 51.12.035(1), (2), .140(1)(c), .170. First, do the $6 per call and $10 per drill stipend paid by the Town to its volunteer fire fighters constitute wages under the IIA? In light of our Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW, it is highly unlikely that our legislature would consider the stipend the Town paid Doty as constituting remuneration for the fire fighting services she performed. Doty received the same small stipend amount regardless of the duration of the call and the extent of the services performed. This is not remuneration for her services, but more reasonably, maintenance and reimbursement for expenses incurred in performing her assigned duties, such as reimbursement for travel and food expenses a volunteer inevitably incurs in responding to calls. Second, does the portion of the VFFA premiums paid by the Town constitute wages under the IIA? The VFFA mandates that local governments using volunteer fire fighters shall make provision by appropriate legislation ... [to] provid[e] protection for all its fire fighters and their families from death, sickness, injury, or disability arising in the performance of their duties as fire fighters. RCW 41.24.020(1). It also establishes that local governments may make provision ... allowing any member of its fire department to enroll under the retirement provisions of the VFFA. RCW 41.24.020(2). The record reflects that the Town paid premiums on Doty's behalf for both death and disability benefits and retirement pensions. CP at 194. [6] The Town asserts that Cockle v. Department of Labor and Industries instructs that health benefits must be considered `wages' for purposes of the IIA. Resp't's Reply Br. at 13 (citing Cockle, 142 Wash.2d at 808, 16 P.3d 583). This reliance on Cockle is flawed. In Cockle, we addressed only what elements of compensation paid to an employee constituted remuneration in the form of `the reasonable value of board, housing, fuel, or other consideration of like nature received from the employer as part of the contract of hire ....' Cockle, 142 Wash.2d at 805, 16 P.3d 583 (quoting RCW 51.08.178(1)). In so doing, we concluded that employer provided health benefits were core, nonfringe benefits critical to protecting the basic health and survival of workers ( id. at 823, 16 P.3d 583) constituting other `consideration of like nature.' Id. at 805, 16 P.3d 583 (emphasis omitted). However, the disability, sickness, injury, and death benefits provided under chapter 41.24 RCW are not analogous to the full health care coverage provided in Cockle. Id. at 811, 16 P.3d 583. These statutory benefits are more akin to limited disability and life insurance provisions, and only arise if the death, sickness, injury, or disability aris [ es ] in the performance of their duties as fire fighters.  RCW 41.24.020(1) (emphasis added). The VFFA does not provide comprehensive medical insurance coverage and could be better, albeit crudely, described as reimbursement for expenses incurred in the performance of duties. As such, the statement the Town relies on from Cockle is inapplicable in this instance. [7] These potential benefits do not represent any `lost earning capacity' of a volunteer fire fighter, see Cockle, 142 Wash.2d at 822, 16 P.3d 583 (quoting Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 798, 947 P.2d 727 (1997)), but are simply insurance in the event of injury or death. They are not remuneration for services performed. A separate question is whether the permissible pension benefits allowable under the VFFA, for which the Town paid premiums, constitute remuneration for services performed. The VFFA provides pension benefits for volunteer fire fighters who have served a minimum of 10 years. See RCW 41.24.170. Amicus L & I urges this court, rather than looking to whether the Town provided Doty with `wages' under the IIA, to discern whether the Town provided valuable consideration in any form [in] exchange[ ] for labor. Br. of Amicus L & I at 10. [8] It then asserts that providing monetary pension benefits based on years of service should be rightfully considered as deferred compensation for services rendered. Id. at 14. It is true that a bare analysis of the monetary wages provided may be insufficient. Cf. Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wash.2d 70, 72, 76, 785 P.2d 805 (1990) (in determining whether juror was employee of county we made no inquiry into the sufficiency of wages). Additionally, it is true that in Cockle, upon which the parties heavily rely, and more recently in Gallo v. Department of Labor & Industries, 155 Wash.2d 470, 120 P.3d 564 (2005), we dealt with a different issue than that presented here, i.e., the calculation of benefit payments, not the disputed classification of an injured individual. Nevertheless, Cockle 's and Gallo 's characterization of certain consideration as wages remains relevant by analogy. Wages, broadly defined as remuneration for services performed, remains a crucial distinguishing feature between volunteers and employees and/or workers under the IIA. In that vein, Cockle and Gallo remain instructive. Relevant here, in Gallo we rejected the inclusion of retirement benefits in calculating lost wages and consideration of like nature because they were not immediately available to the worker and not critical to the `basic health and survival' of the injured worker at the time of injury. Gallo, 155 Wash.2d at 482-483, 120 P.3d 564 (2005). In short, pension benefits do not qualify as consideration like in nature to IIA wages. Moreover, as is immediately evident from the structure of RCW 41.24.170, a volunteer's receipt of any pension benefits under the VFFA is highly speculative. RCW 41.24.170 permits pension benefits whenever any participant has been a member and served honorably for a period of ten years or more and provides a calculation based on length of service. The speculative nature of the statutory pension benefits, and the fact that they are not immediately available to an injured volunteer, counsels against defining them as wages or remuneration. This case provides an excellent example of why these highly speculative benefits should not be considered wages under the IIA. Here, there is no indication in the record that Doty in fact worked the minimum 10 years and thus will ever be eligible for a VFFA pension. To hold that this speculative and now possibly unattainable benefit alone transforms Doty from a volunteer into an employee would create an absurd result, and one not likely intended by the legislature. The legislature's contrary intent is evident in the fact that under the IIA, volunteer fire fighters are generally considered nonemployee volunteers. Cf. RCW 51.12.035(2); see supra at 14. To hold Doty is an employee under the IIA, in this instance, would be to say that the Town compensated Doty for her services, when Doty will possibly never be eligible for the pension benefits alleged to transform her status. We hold that the Town did not provide Doty with wages or remuneration for services performed so as to render her a worker and/or employee. Exercise of Free Choice: Next, we turn to the second definitional element of a `volunteer,' that is whether he or she performs services brought about by [his or her] own free choice. RCW 51.12.035(2). In this regard, the Court of Appeals conclusion that Doty did not receive wages and therefore is not covered by the IIA is analytically incomplete. For example, in Bolin v. Kitsap County , this court held that an individual injured while commuting home from jury service was an employee of the county and thus covered by the IIA. 114 Wash.2d at 71, 76, 785 P.2d 805. We so held despite the fact that the county paid the juror only $10 per day and reimbursed him for his travel expenses at a rate of 20.5 cents per mile. Id. at 71, 785 P.2d 805. In fact, in holding that the juror was a covered employee, we did not even address whether the compensation constituted wages under the IIA. Rather, we found that the juror's service was involuntary and as a juror he was under a superior court judge's control. Id. at 72-73, 76, 785 P.2d 805 (citing Robert A. Naragon, Note, Jurors as Nonvoluntary Employees under Workmen's Compensation Law, 74 DICK. L. REV. 334, 334-46 (1969)). Recognizing that the doctrine of judicial immunity prevented a common law tort action, we found that rejecting the existence of an employeeemployer relationship would deprive[ ] [the juror] of his only means of redress. Id. at 73-74, 785 P.2d 805. In sum, it was Bolin's involuntary status, coupled with the superior court's right to control, that rendered him an employee. We, thus, must also address this second factor of right to control. The determinative involuntary nature of juror services readily distinguishes Bolin from the case at hand. See contra Bolin, 114 Wash.2d at 73-74, 785 P.2d 805. Here, Doty's service was unquestionably voluntary, as [she] had the freedom to choose whether or not she would respond to any given alarm or attend any given drill, and the Town had no control over when, or even if [she] would perform volunteer fire fighting services. Reply Br. of Appellant at 4. [9] Despite the proper characterization of Doty's services as voluntary rather than involuntary, the Town nevertheless asserts that Doty does not perform services by her own free choice, cf. 51.12.035(2), but rather subject only to the Town's right to control [Doty's] performance of ... duties. Resp't's Reply Br. at 10 (citing Novenson v. Spokane Culvert & Fabricating Co., 91 Wash.2d 550, 555, 588 P.2d 1174 (1979)). In support of this position the Town cites a state statute dealing with volunteer fire fighters which instructs that they serve `under the direction or general orders of the chief ... in accordance with the rules and regulations of the fire department.' Id. at 11 (quoting RCW 41.24.010(5)). However, this misses the point. Of course, any fire department is dependant upon adherence to rules and regulations for the safe and efficient performance of duties. In fact, nearly all volunteers are subject to the control and supervision of the agency or organization with whom they volunteer their services. Doty exercised her free choice when she voluntarily made the effort to join the Town's volunteer fire fighter department, and then, at her own discretion, elected when to respond to calls and whether to attend drills. Doty volunteered her services, without expectation of remuneration, of her own free choice and absent any compulsion on the part of the Town. Contrast Bolin, 114 Wash.2d at 72, 785 P.2d 805. In sum, Doty meets the definition of volunteer drawn from RCW 51.12.035(2). The Town did not provide Doty with remuneration for her volunteer fire fighting services, and she volunteered her services of her own free choice. Volunteer Fire Fighters as Public Officers: Lastly, the Town relies on RCW 51.08.185, enacted in 1972, to assert that volunteer fire fighters are employees under the IIA by virtue of their status as public officers. In 1972, the legislature amended the IIA to clarify that all officers of the state, state agencies, counties, municipal corporations, or other public corporations, or political subdivisions are to be included within the IIA's definition of an `[e]mployee[].' LAWS OF 1972, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 43, § 4, codified at RCW 51.08.185. While the Town relies on this section and an attorney general opinion opining that volunteer fire fighters are in fact public officers, see 1973 Attorney General Opinion No. 24, to assert that volunteer fire fighters are employees under the IIA, this assertion is flawed. RCW 51.08.185 merely instructs that `[e]mployee' shall have the same meaning as `worker,' and public officers are to be included and not excluded from such definition. This enactment simply eradicated the antiquated common law distinction between general employees and public officer employees. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pease, 126 Wash. 163, 167, 217 P. 1005 (1923) (in 1923 this court commented that [a] city fireman, instead of being considered an employee of a city, is in fact a public officer and engaged in a governmental duty); see also 4 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 78.03 (2004). The current IIA makes no such distinction and therefore such employees now fall under its provisions. RCW 51.08.185 still instructs that employees must be `worker[s]' under the statute and thus does not purport to create a classification of covered public officers who would not otherwise be considered workers or employees under the IIA. [10] Because we determined above that Doty is a volunteer and not an employee and/or worker under the IIA, her mere status as a volunteer fire fighter does not change this determination nor our holding. [11]