Opinion ID: 1595336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Margaret Jones.

Text: ¶ 62. Ross maintains that the trial court refused to allow him to impeach Jones with prior inconsistent statements made in her statement to Wells and that it erred in refusing to admit the statement into evidence. The record demonstrates that defense counsel laid the proper foundation for the introduction of impeachment evidence: BY MR. PANNELL: So that wouldn't come as any surprise to you, that I would have both a tape and a transcript of what you said at that time [in a September 10, 1997, statement made to defense investigator Herbert Wells]? BY MR. HOOD: Your Honor, we haven't been provided with anything like that in discovery. BY THE COURT: All right, go ahead. If the discovery issue comes up, I'll rule on it at the proper time. The trial court allowed defense counsel to use the contents of Jones' statement to Wells to probe inconsistencies between her testimony at trial, her initial statement to police, and her statement to Wells. The State subsequently objected to defense counsel testifying: BY MR. PANNELL: You said that you saw [Yancey's wallet] on the inside [of Hale's residence] today. You said back on July 1 [, 1996,] [in your first recorded statement] that you saw it on the outside. You said when you talked to Mr. Wells on the 10th of September [1997,] that you saw it on the outside. BY MR. HOOD: Objection, you Honor. I object, number one, to him testifying and making any statement about a transcript. BY THE COURT: I sustain that objection. Limit it to cross-examination. After the State completed its redirect examination of Jones, defense counsel moved to have her second recorded statement, made to Herbert Wells, introduced into evidence: BY MR. PANNELL: Your Honor, we move to have her voluntary statement [made to Herbert Wells] into evidence [sic]. I believe there are contradicting statements in there. BY THE COURT: You can have it marked for identification if you want to, if you want to do that for the record. . . . . BY MR. HOOD: If Tom wants to move it in, we may not have an objection. BY A JUROR: Can the jurors look at identification? BY THE COURT: Items of evidence that are marked for identification, the Court has not ruled on its admissibility yet. It's just marked for identification, all right. BY MR. HOOD: Your Honor, we don't have any objection to it being introduced into evidence. BY THE COURT: Let it be marked as received as an exhibit to the testimony of that witness. [DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 1 WAS MARKED AS RECEIVED.] Despite the State's willingness to have the statement admitted into evidence, the record demonstrates that it was only marked for identification at that time. The trial court did not elaborate on its grounds for reserving its ruling. After the testimony of Deputy Wilbanks and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel argued that Wells' statement fell under an exception to the discovery rule, and therefore should have been admitted: BY MR. PANNELL: Yesterday we were prevented from reading from the statement that we took from Margaret Ann Jones on the grounds we had not provided it to [the State] in discovery. We took a second look at this discovery rule, and Rule 904(c)(1), (2), or (3) does not require us to provide them with impeached material nor work product, both of which this is. BY THE COURT: I've forgotten what it was you objected to. BY MR. PANNELL: They objected to me reading from this statement and contradictory statements that Margaret Ann Graves Jones had given on the grounds it had not been discovered to them. This is work product and is also for impeachment, and the rule does not require us to provide that to them. BY MR. LUTHER: As I recall, he was granted  BY THE COURT: I sustained that objection on a completely different ground as I recall. Do you plan on calling a witness back or something? BY MR. PANNELL: No, but I want to get this  BY THE COURT: You can mark it for identification if you want to. [DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 4 WAS MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION.] BY MR. HOOD: Your Honor, we still, just for the record, have not been provided with that copy of that. BY THE COURT: It's up here if y'all want to look at it. It's been marked for identification. Though it is unclear, the objection the trial court sustained was presumably the State's objection to defense counsel testifying. The trial court neither ruled that the proper foundation had not been laid for the introduction of the statement, nor excluded the statement as a violation of the discovery rule. On appeal, Ross again argues that Jones' statement to Wells was introduced for the purpose of impeachment and represented work product and was therefore exempted from the discovery rule or, in the alternative, that the trial court erred in failing to order a continuance pursuant to U.R.C.C.P. 9.04. ¶ 63. Prior inconsistent statements used to impeach a witness need not be disclosed to opposing counsel unless opposing counsel has requested that such statements be disclosed. See M.R.E. 613(a). However, if a statement is introduced into evidence not only for impeachment, but also to bolster the substantive case of a party, then the admission of the statement may nevertheless be subject to the reciprocal discovery rule under Rule 9.04 of the Uniform Code of Circuit and Chancery Practice (U.R.C.C.P.). See, e.g., Coates v. State, 495 So.2d 464, 466 (Miss. 1986) (finding that, where statement was impeachment evidence but also outlined defendant's substantive theory of the case, evidence was subject to the discovery rule, and the trial court's exclusion of the statement was not error); see also Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 869 (Miss.2003) (citing Coates v. State and affirming that where the statement was substantive evidence but was sought to be introduced as impeachment evidence, exclusion of the evidence was proper for failure to adhere to the rules of reciprocal discovery). This principle prevents a party from circumventing discovery rules by arguing that evidence was used merely for impeachment purposes. Coates, 495 So.2d at 466. In the present case, while elements of the statement taken by Wells might have been used to impeach Jones' testimony, introduction of the entire statement as impeachment testimony would have been inappropriate since a crucial element of Ross' defense was undermining Jones' credibility. Therefore, though the proper foundation was laid for the introduction of impeachment evidence, Wells' statement should not have been admitted as impeachment evidence, since it tended to prove Ross' theory of the case. ¶ 64. Ross argues in the alternative that the statement taken by Wells was work product and therefore exempted from discovery. U.R.C.C.P. Rule 9.04(B)(1) excludes attorney work product from discovery. [6] Work product encompasses materials that contain the opinions, theories or conclusions of the attorney. The statement, while indicative of the defense's approach, did not contain opinions, theories, or conclusions, and was therefore not work product for the purposes of discovery. Because the statement was not introduced solely for impeachment and did not constitute work product, defense counsel's failure to disclose the statement to the State was a violation of the discovery rule. ¶ 65. Ross maintains that, even if the failure to disclose was a discovery violation, the trial court erred in conclusively excluding it, rather than allowing the State to review the statement and request a continuance, if necessary. Ross correctly notes that, in making discovery rulings, trial courts must adhere to the guidelines first articulated in Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19 (Miss.1983), and later codified in U.R.C.C.P. 9.04(I). [7] Under Rule 9.04(I), evidence offered by a defendant in violation of the discovery rule cannot be rejected out of hand. Carraway v. State, 562 So.2d 1199, 1203 (Miss.1990). Instead, the State must be given the opportunity to meet the evidence and determine whether a motion for a continuance or a motion for a mistrial is necessary. Exclusion of the evidence is an extreme sanction and is only appropriate where the defendant's discovery violation was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage. Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 32 (Miss. 1988) (citing Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415, 108 S.Ct. 646, 655, 98 L.Ed.2d 798, 814 (1988)). Relying on Taylor, we have held that exclusion ought be reserved for cases in which the defendant participates significantly in some deliberate, cynical scheme to gain a substantial tactical advantage. Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598, 612 (Miss.1988). In all discovery matters, we are guided by our statement in Houston v. State: We must never forget, however, that the trial for life or liberty is not a game and that discovery rules, like other rules of procedure, are not an end in and of themselves but a means to the end that we dare call justice. To that end, we administer our discovery rules with a strong bias in favor of the court and jury receiving and considering all relevant and otherwise admissible evidence. Houston, 531 So.2d at 611. ¶ 66. In the present case, the trial court erred in failing to consider the admission of the statement in accordance with Rule 9.04(I). Nothing in the record indicates that defense counsel deliberately attempted to ambush the State with new evidence. The trial court did not find that the introduction of the statement was motivated by a desire to gain a tactical advantage. The State cannot claim that the introduction of the statement caught it unaware, since the statement was given by its own witness. ¶ 67. However, failure to follow Rule 9.04(I) does not inexorably require reversal. Rule 103 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence stipulates that error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and a timely objection is made, or the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by an offer of proof or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. The admission or exclusion of evidence constitutes reversible error only where a party can show prejudice or harm. Jackson v. State 594 So.2d 20, 25 (Miss. 1992). The relevant inquiry therefore is whether the trial court's failure to adhere to Rule 9.04(I) prejudiced Ross. ¶ 68. This Court has found prejudice where the trial court fails to follow the Box guidelines in excluding testimony that tended to support a defendant's account of events. See Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 33 (Miss.1988) (Even-handed application of the Rule requires the same procedure to be followed when the State objects to testimony because of a defendant's violation as when the defendant objects for the same reason. . . . [the] testimony being relevant and competent, it was prejudicial error to exclude it without following our procedural guidelines. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for another trial.). While Ross was allowed to impeach Jones with her prior statement on cross-examination, the exclusion of that statement from evidence did prejudice his case. Jones' testimony was the only direct evidence linking Ross to the crime. The jurors recognized the importance of her credibility, as evidenced by one juror's request to see the transcript. Given that Jones' credibility was the crucial issue in this case, and in light of the severity of the crime charged, we find that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding her statement from evidence without conducting a Box hearing pursuant to Rule 9.04(I).