Opinion ID: 2520814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alaska Law Provides Two Methods for the Voluntary Termination of Parental Rights and the Adoption of ChildrenEither Method May Be Used in Private Party Adoptions.

Text: Today's opinion holds that the final order of termination is invalid because it is based on a relinquishment which might be voided if the Wilsons did not adopt the child. But the opinion also makes a second point, namely that relinquishments in private party adoption cases are simply impermissible. [35] As this point has nothing to do with the conditionality of any particular relinquishment, it would serve as a basis for invalidating the decree of termination in this case even if the relinquishment were not found to be invalid because of its conditional nature. The majority makes the point that private placement adoptions cannot be accomplished by a method involving relinquishments without any analysis or discussion of the terms of the Alaska Statutes. Instead, the majority relies on the commentary to the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994. [36] While the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 does contain a number of provisions making it clear that relinquishments can only be made to agencies, [37] the 1994 act has not been adopted in Alaska. As already stated, Alaska's laws pertaining to adoption were mostly passed in 1974 and were patterned on the 1969 Revised Uniform Adoption Act. Neither Alaska's statutes nor the 1969 Uniform Adoption Act contain provisions similar to the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act specifying that a relinquishment of parental rights may only be made to an agency. [38] To the contrary, Alaska law contains provisions that suggest that a relinquishment may be made in the context of a private party adoption. One very strong suggestion is found in AS 25.23.180(e)(2). This subsection permits a petitioner for adoption, necessarily a private individual, to file a petition for termination of parental rights in connection with an adoption proceeding. Adoption Rule 6(b) makes it clear that such a petition for termination may be based on a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights pursuant to AS 25.23.180(b). Thus a private individual may petition for termination based on a voluntary relinquishment given under subsection.180(b) in combination with the private individual's petition for adoption. This strongly implies that the relinquishment on which the private individual bases the combined petition for termination and adoption may permissibly have been given in favor of the private individual. Further support is found in subsection.180(a) which provides that parental rights may be relinquished and the relationship of parent and child terminated in or before an adoption proceeding as provided in this section. [39] Again, since adoption proceedings are only brought by private individuals this suggests that relinquishments may be used by private individuals in connection with adoption proceedings. Added support is found in subsection .180(b)(1) which provides that a relinquishment must either be signed in the presence of the representative of an agency or in the presence and with the approval of a court.... This suggests that relinquishments may be given in favor of private individuals, because signing before a court would not be necessary in the case of an agency taking a relinquishment. Finally, AS 25.23.180(b)(2) applies to signed relinquishments that do not meet the formal requirements of (b)(1) where the petitioner has had custody of the minor for two years ... and the court finds, after considering the circumstances of the relinquishment and the long continued custody by the petitioner, that the best interest of the child requires the granting of adoption. One would expect that relinquishments granted in favor of professional agencies would meet the formal requirements of (b)(1), whereas relinquishments in favor of private individuals are far more likely to be defective. [40] This savings clause thus seems squarely aimed at private party relinquishments. Alaska law clearly provides for two parallel methods that lead to the same end result of termination of parental rights and adoption. That these dual methods exist is uncontested. What is at issue is whether the relinquishment method may be used in private party adoptions. I will here briefly describe each method. The first method, the consent track, entails execution of a consent to adoption by the natural parent, filing a petition for adoption, and entry of an adoption decree. [41] The second method, the relinquishment track, does not require a consent to adoption, but entails execution by the natural parent of a relinquishment of parental rights, entry of a decree terminating parental rights, filing a petition for adoption, and entry of a decree of adoption. [42] There are different safeguards that apply depending upon which track is used. The change-of-mind period for the consent track is, as a matter of right, ten days after the consent is given and, by leave of court upon a showing that withdrawal of consent is in the best interest of the child, any time before entry of a decree of adoption. [43] By contrast, the withdrawal period as a matter of right under the relinquishment track is ten days after execution of the relinquishment without a provision for subsequent withdrawal by leave of court. [44] But consents to adoption need only be signed before a notary, [45] whereas a relinquishment must be signed in the presence of an agency or the court, and if the latter, must also be approved by the court after an inquiry as to the parent's understanding of the consequences of the relinquishment and the voluntariness of her assent. [46] Alternatively, written relinquishments that do not meet the formal requirements of AS 25.23.180(b)(1) may still be valid but only if the private party petitioning for adoption has had custody of the child for two years and the court, after considering the circumstances of the relinquishment and the period of custody by the petitioner finds that the best interests of the child requires granting the adoption. [47] That the relinquishment track may be used in private adoptions is supported by evidence of actual practice in Alaska over several decades. The record before us contains the unrefuted affidavits of two experienced adoption attorneys who state that the use of the relinquishment track has long been a normal and accepted practice in private adoptions in Alaska. [48] And two of our published cases confirm the use of the relinquishment track in private adoptions. In In re Adoption of F.H. the mother appeared before the probate master and executed documents relinquishing her parental rights to the Hartleys. [49] Over the opposition of both the state and the child's tribe, an adoption decree in accordance with the private relinquishment was entered and affirmed by this court. [50] S.O. v. W.S . is another case in which the relinquishment method was employed in a private adoption context. [51] As this case illustrates, parties have relied on the established and recognized practice described above. Further, as also noted, this practice finds much support in the Alaska adoption act. Because of these factors, the applicable rule of construction promoting the interest of children and disfavoring the disruption of bonded relationships based on adoptive placements also counsels in favor of an interpretation validating the existing practice. Today's majority opinion views the use of the relinquishment track in private party adoption cases as an end run around the relatively lengthy parental withdrawal period built into the consent track. [52] But one could say by the same logic that use of the consent track circumvents the greater protection inherent in the more demanding execution requirements pertaining to relinquishments. [53] In truth, it is not appropriate to regard the use of one track rather than the other as a circumvention of protections built into the other because both tracks are legislatively permitted methods of achieving the same end. The only public policy reason offered by today's opinion for setting aside the relinquishment is in order to disallow the circumvention of procedures inherent in the relatively lengthy parental withdrawal period allowed for adoptions under the consent track. [54] Since the time for withdrawal as a matter of right is exactly the same under state law for relinquishments and consents, what the majority appears to be saying is that the longer periods for withdrawing relinquishments as a matter of right provided by ICWA are desirable as a matter of public policy. My response to this is that the primary source of public policy employed by this court should be the Alaska Statutes. ICWA must be followed where it applies. But I do not think that ICWA should be regarded as a source for public policy based rulings where the periods it mandates do not apply and differ from the express provisions of Alaska law. Alternatively, or in addition, the majority may be saying that a period for withdrawing relinquishments not as a matter of right but by leave of court is desirable as a matter of public policy. Such a period is provided by state law in consent track cases but not in relinquishment track cases. My response to this is that the majority's policy judgment is at bottom a quarrel with the dual track system provided under Alaska law. The legislature has chosen to provide no period for withdrawal by leave of court after the ten day withdrawal as a matter of right period in relinquishment track cases, while providing a period for withdrawal by leave of court in consent cases. It is not for this court to say which choice is better. I note, for example, that the 1994 Uniform Adoption Act does not contain any period during which an effort can be mounted to withdraw either a consent or a relinquishment on general best interests grounds. [55] Thus although the majority seems to endorse the view that a long period for withdrawal by leave of court is best, the current thinking of the commissioners on uniform state laws is consistent with the procedures in Alaska's relinquishment track, namely that there should be no such period. Natural parents must be treated fairly. But their interests are subordinate to the goal of promoting the best interests of adopted children. [56] There is no question but that the procedures under either the consent track or the relinquishment track are fair to natural parents. The procedures under both tracks are designed to ensure that parents fully understand the consequences of their assent and that they have given it freely and voluntarily. Further, they are afforded a ten-day period during which, as matter of right, they may withdraw their consents or relinquishments. [57] In summary, the majority reaches its conclusion that the relinquishment method for termination and adoption may not be used in private party adoption cases without any analysis of the text of our adoption act. A textual analysis strongly suggests that the relinquishment track is intended for private as well as agency use. Alaska adoption practice over the years lends support to this view as does the applicable rule of construction favoring the interests of children and the maintenance of adoptive relationships. The policy reasons offered by the majority for its conclusionbasically that longer withdrawal periods are better than shorter onesconflict with the choices made by the Alaska Legislature and express the majority's preference for the procedures afforded in one of the two available methods in the Alaska Statutes. Since both methods are permitted, it is not for this court to say that one is inherently superior to the other.