Opinion ID: 3153279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The person violates paragraph A and:

Text: . . . . (4) The violation is against a structure that is a dwelling place. Violation of this subparagraph is a Class B crime[.] This definition of burglary describes at least two alternative offenses, only one of which includes, as an element of the offense, the entry or unauthorized presence in a dwelling. So if we know only that a person has been convicted in Maine of burglary, we do not know whether that person has been convicted of the type of burglary that constitutes a crime of violence under § 2k2.1. When confronted with ambiguity such as this arising out of a criminal offense that divides into alternative forms with materially differing elements, our established practice is to try to discern, if possible, which of a statute's alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013). In making this attempt, we look only to limited materials, often called Shepard documents, from the convicting court, such as charging documents, plea agreements, plea colloquies, and jury instructions. United States v. Serrano-Mercado, 784 F.3d 838, 843 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281, 2284). But here, as in Serrano-Mercado, this analysis is frustrated because the prosecution did not proactively tender - 6 - any Shepard documents, while MacArthur, in turn, voiced no objection either to the absence of such documents or to classification of his burglary offenses as crimes of violence. See id. at 844. McArthur now belatedly argues that, without proper Shepard documents officially confirming the relevant nature of his convictions, the district court erred in finding them to be for crimes of violence. Such an unpreserved argument failed in Serrano-Mercado, and fails here on plain error review. Indeed, the record here provides grist for an argument that MacArthur has actually waived any argument that he was not convicted of burglarizing two dwellings. See United States v. Jimenez, 512 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Turbides–Leonardo, 468 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2006). Most notably, while the PSR neither appended nor expressly referred to any state court document, and listed the offenses as Burglary, it also included a concise and unambiguous description of each offense. In each instance the PSR listed the formal offense, the date of conviction, the case number, and an express statement that MacArthur was convicted of entering a dwelling or a home, naming in each instance the occupant or owner of the dwelling or home. MacArthur and his counsel--who collectively would know whether MacArthur had burglarized an actual dwelling--voiced no objection, nor even demanded additional proof. Rather, they raised other objections to the PSR. MacArthur - 7 - thereafter filed two sentencing memoranda, and he appeared at sentencing with counsel. At the hearing, the district court carefully confirmed that MacArthur had read the entire PSR and that counsel had explained it to him. The following colloquy then took place: THE COURT: . . . But you do understand that, as I told you quite a little while ago, that there are matters in the report that reflect your criminal history, your background, where you were born and brought up, your schooling, your education, your work history, things of that sort, have you had an opportunity to review your background? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: It also describes in some detail the nature of the offense -- offenses here. Have you had an opportunity to review the description of the offenses? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Now, you realize, Mr. MacArthur, that I am going to rely on the contents of the report in determining your sentence. You understand that. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Knowing that the contents of the report may affect your sentence, is there anything in the report you believe is inaccurate? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. District courts regularly rely on all sorts of assertions contained in PSRs. See United States v. Fernández- - 8 - Cabrera, 625 F.3d 48, 54 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that it is settled beyond hope of contradiction that unobjected-to facts contained in a presentence report ordinarily are considered reliable evidence for sentencing purposes (quotations marks and citation omitted)). Here, the district court was given no reason not to rely on the express descriptions of the burglary convictions as instances in which MacArthur was indeed convicted of entering a dwelling. Error, if error there was by the court, is hardly obvious. Moreover, to reverse when there is no basis for finding that an objection by MacArthur likely would have led to a different result would make little sense, and might encourage defendants to turn withheld objections into sentencing reset buttons to be employed if the sentence exceeds expectations. Whether we should therefore invoke waiver to reject MacArthur's appeal, see Turbides-Leonardo, 468 F.3d at 38, we need not decide. His failure to show either obvious error or that the result likely would have differed but for the claimed error dooms his appeal even if we allowed him the benefit of plain error review. See Serrano-Mercado, 784 F.3d at 848. B. Acceptance of Responsibility MacArthur next challenges the district court's decision to deny him a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility - 9 - under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.3 MacArthur preserved this issue for review. Accordingly, review of the district court's factual determination that he has not accepted responsibility is for clear error, and review of the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines is de novo. United States v. Jordan, 549 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2008). MacArthur relies upon three arguments to support this claim. First, he contends, at least in his initial brief, that the district court's determination was based on an assault that he committed before he was charged with the federal crimes for which he was sentenced in this case. But as the sentencing transcript clearly demonstrates, and as appellate defense counsel admitted at oral argument, the district court based its March 12, 2014, sentencing determination on an assault that MacArthur committed after he pled guilty to the federal charges in this case. Second, MacArthur argues that the district court erred in relying on that assault because that conduct was unrelated to his crime of conviction. This argument is foreclosed by Jordan, in which this court held that in determining the propriety vel non of an acceptance-of-responsibility credit, [a district court] 3 Under § 3E1.1(a), a defendant receives a downward adjustment of two points [i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. Subsection (b) of that provision provides that an additional point shall be subtracted from a defendant's offense level where subsection (a) has been satisfied and certain other conditions are met. - 10 - may consider a defendant's commission of any post-indictment criminal conduct, whether or not it bears a significant connection to, or constitutes a significant continuation of, the offense of conviction. 549 F.3d at 60–61. Finally, MacArthur contends that the assault was not established by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing. The evidence presented, however, included a report from the corrections officer whom MacArthur assaulted on that date. The report described how MacArthur obstructed the officer's efforts to close MacArthur's cell door during a lockdown and how he hit the officer with a closed fist after the officer grabbed MacArthur and pushed him back against the cell wall. This report is enough to establish as not clearly wrong the district court's finding that MacArthur precipitated and committed the assault.