Opinion ID: 2091215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right of Sexual Privacy under the Federal Constitution

Text: The defendant first claims that his convictions under § 53a-71 (a)(8) violate his fundamental right of sexual privacy guaranteed by the constitution of the United States. Specifically, the defendant claims that, in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), the United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the right of privacy includes the right to engage in private noncommercial consensual sexual intercourse with individuals over the age of consent. Because the defendant was convicted under § 53a-71 (a)(8) for having consensual sexual intercourse with two of his students, N.R. and P.L., both of whom were over the age of consent when the sexual intercourse took place, the defendant claims that his convictions are unconstitutional. We conclude that the right of privacy guaranteed by the federal constitution does not encompass the right of a teacher to have sexual intercourse with students enrolled in the school system in which the teacher is employed. We further conclude that § 53a-71 (a)(8) rationally is related to a legitimate government interest and, therefore, that the defendant's convictions are constitutional. While there is no right of privacy found in any specific guarantee of the Constitution, the [United States Supreme] Court has recognized that zones of privacy may be created by more specific constitutional guarantees and thereby impose limits upon government power. . . . [T]he [court] has recognized a right to privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, specifically in the protections of the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments. . . . Justice Brandeis has referred to this right as the right to be let alone  the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. . . . [Aside from the unreasonable search and seizure privacy cases, the] other right of privacy cases, while defying categorical description, deal generally with substantive aspects of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. . . . The activities detailed as being within this definition . . . [include] matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. In these areas it has been held that there are limitations on the [s]tates' power to substantively regulate conduct. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has extended their protection only to the most basic personal decisions. . . . Nor has the Supreme Court been quick to expand these rights to new fields. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Michaela Lee R., 253 Conn. 570, 598-99, 756 A.2d 214 (2000). In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986), the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that criminalized private noncommercial consensual sexual intercourse between adults of the same sex. The court first considered whether the [f]ederal [c]onstitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. . . . Id. The court observed that the constitution provides heightened protection only to those fundamental liberties that are `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'; id., at 191, 106 S.Ct. 2841; or that are `deeply rooted in this [n]ation's history and tradition.' Id., at 192, 106 S.Ct. 2841. Because the proscription against homosexual sodomy has ancient roots; id.; the court concluded that it would be, at best, facetious, to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is `deeply rooted in this [n]ation's history and tradition' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'. . . . Id., at 195, 106 S.Ct. 2841. Having concluded that the Georgia statute did not implicate a fundamental right, the court addressed whether the statute was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id., at 196, 106 S.Ct. 2841. The sole rational basis for the statute, the court observed, was the presumed belief of the majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. Id. The court concluded that Georgia's interest in preserving morality was legitimate, and that the prohibition on homosexual sodomy rationally was related to this interest. The court noted that, [t]he law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, the courts will be very busy indeed. Id. Seventeen years later, in Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, the United States Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of a statute that criminalized private noncommercial consensual sexual intercourse between adults of the same sex. The court recognized that, in Bowers, it explicitly had upheld the constitutionality of such statutes. The court concluded, nonetheless, that in Bowers the court had misapprehended the claim of liberty there presented to it; id., at 567, 123 S.Ct. 2472; by asking whether the statute violated a fundamental right to engage in a particular sexual act. Instead, the court determined, the issue properly should be characterized as whether freely consenting adults have a liberty interest in intimate personal relationships fostered in the privacy of their own home. Id. With the question thus properly framed, the court reconsidered the validity of its holding in Bowers. The court observed that, in upholding the constitutionality of the Georgia statute at issue in that case, it had relied principally on the fact that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. Id., at 571, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Although [f]or many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles; id.; the court concluded that these principles are not dispositive. This is because the issue presented in Bowers, like the issue presented in Lawrence, was not whether the proscribed sexual act historically has been viewed as immoral, but, rather, whether the majority may use the power of the [s]tate to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. Id. In answering this question, the court observed that its prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a[s]tate has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of liberty protected by the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 577-78, 123 S.Ct. 2472. In light of these two principles, the court concluded that  Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. [Bowers] should be and now is overruled. Id., at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. Having concluded that it was not constrained by the precedent established in Bowers, the court next addressed whether the statute at issue in Lawrence was constitutional. The court observed that, [t]he present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. . . . The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Id. In light of these facts, the court concluded that [t]he petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The [s]tate cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. Id. Because the statute further[ed] no legitimate state interest which [could] justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual; id.; the court concluded that it was unconstitutional. The defendant claims that Lawrence stands for the proposition that sexual privacy is a fundamental right entitled to strict scrutiny under the due process clause of the federal constitution. We need not determine whether Lawrence established a fundamental right of sexual privacy under the federal constitution because, even assuming arguendo that it did so, the defendant's sexual conduct in the present case would not be protected by that right. The defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with two victims, N.R. and P.L., both of whom were students enrolled in the school system in which the defendant was employed as a teacher. In light of the disparity of power inherent in the teacher-student relationship, we conclude that both victims were situated in an inherently coercive relationship with the defendant wherein consent might not easily be refused. Cf. Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed.Cl. 503, 519 (2005) (the nature of the relationship [between lieutenant colonel and private first class] while not directly within a chain of command, is such that consent might not easily be refused and thus it is outside of the liberty interest protected by Lawrence), appeal dismissed, 2006 WL 2572464, 2006 U.S.App. Lexis 23206 (August 31, 2006); Talbert v. State, CR 05-1279 (Ark. September 21, 2006) (defendant did not have fundamental right under Lawrence to use position of trust and authority as clergyman to engage in sexual conduct); Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 574 Pa. 460, 472, 832 A.2d 418 (2003) ([s]exual contact between correctional staff and inmates is obviously rife with the possibility of coercion, both subtle and overt, given the extensive power guards exercise over inmates and, accordingly, Lawrence is inapplicable). Accordingly, the right of sexual privacy purportedly delineated in Lawrence would not apply to the circumstances of the present case. We next address whether § 53a-71 (a)(8) rationally is related to a legitimate government interest. See Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 888, 792 A.2d 774 (2002) (if statute does not implicate a fundamental right, we review [it] under a rational basis test and [i]n such circumstances, the state must show only that the law is not arbitrary or capricious, that is, that it bears a reasonable relation to some legitimate state purpose). The state contends that the government has a legitimate interest in promoting a safe school environment. The state further contends that § 53a-71 (a)(8) rationally is related to this interest because it prohibits a teacher from using his or her position of authority to pursue sexual relationships with students enrolled in the school system in which the teacher is employed. We agree. It is beyond cavil that the government has a legitimate interest in providing a safe and healthy educational environment for elementary and secondary school students. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236, 97 S.Ct. 2593, 53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (we have no difficulty with . . . [concluding that a state has a] legitimate interest in protecting the health of its youth and in providing a fertile educational environment for all the schoolchildren of the [s]tate), overruled in part on other grounds by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 647, 376 A.2d 359 (1977) (Connecticut has for centuries recognized it as her right and duty to provide for the proper education of the young [internal quotation marks omitted]). To this end, the legislature reasonably could have concluded that school employees are given unique access to students, and are thereby vested with great trust and confidence by the school, parents, and public, and [the legislature could have] sought to preserve or strengthen that trust by unequivocally prohibiting school employees from misusing their access to students as a conduit for sex. Ex parte Morales, 03-05-00489-CR (Tex.App. July 21, 2006) (Texas statute that prohibited teachers from having sexual intercourse with students rationally was related to legitimate government interest). Moreover, the legislature reasonably could have concluded that a sexually charged learning environment likely would confuse, disturb and distract students, thereby undermining the quality of education in the state. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that the proscription on sexual intercourse between school employees and students in § 53a-71 (a)(8) rationally is related to a legitimate government interest.