Opinion ID: 167864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Dismissed as Procedurally Barred

Text: M r. Amos challenges the district court’s ruling that he is procedurally barred from pursuing two prosecutorial misconduct claims: (1) that the -3- prosecution secured his conviction through the use of coerced and perjured testimony; and (2) that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence. M r. Amos raised these claims for the first time in a motion for postconviction relief in state court under K.S.A. § 60-1507. The state district court denied M r. Amos’s requests for an evidentiary hearing, appointment of counsel, and postconviction relief on the ground that he had not shown good cause for using a postconviction proceeding as a second appeal. Under Kansas law, “those issues that could have been presented, but were not presented, are deemed waived. W here a defendant’s claim has not been raised at trial or on direct appeal, such a default prevents the defendant from raising the claim in a second appeal or a collateral proceeding.” State v. Neer, 795 P.2d 362, 365-66 (Kan. 1990). The state district court found that the claims raised in the motion for postconviction relief should have been raised in M r. Amos’s direct appeal, and therefore summarily denied the motion. M r. Amos appealed that decision in state court, but he admits in his petition that the appeal concerned only the denial of an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. The state appellate court therefore did not address whether his prosecutorial misconduct claims were barred on procedural grounds. Accordingly, those claims are procedurally defaulted: the state court deemed the arguments waived, and M r. A mos never challenged that ruling in state court. See Smith v. M ullin, 379 F.3d 919, 925-26 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding procedural -4- default based on failure to raise claims on direct appeal under state procedural rules). A federal district court may review procedurally defaulted claims under § 2254 only if the petitioner “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thom pson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). M r. Amos contends that he had “cause” for failing to raise his claims on direct appeal for two reasons: (1) that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective, and (2) that he had limited access to legal resources. Although attorney error can constitute “cause” for a defendant’s procedural default, it must rise to the level of a constitutional violation and, accordingly, must be presented as an independent claim to state courts. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451-52 (2000). Because M r. Amos has never presented an independent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the state courts, any attorney error cannot serve as cause for the procedural default. M r. Amos also argues that his limited access to legal resources is sufficient cause for his failure to comply with state procedural rules. To overcome procedural default based on a claim of limited access to legal materials, a petitioner must provide “specificity regarding the alleged lack of access and the steps he took to diligently pursue his federal claim.” M iller v. M arr, 141 F.3d -5- 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). Here, M r. Amos alleges simply that he has “been unable or hindered at various times from filing or preparing legal pleadings.” App. for COA 3i. Such allegations lack “specificity” concerning the pleadings or filings he was unable to complete as a result of his allegedly limited access to legal materials. M oreover, the record suggests that M r. Amos had ample opportunity to raise these claims on direct appeal. In a motion for a new trial, M r. Amos in fact raised both of his prosecutorial misconduct claims, but his appellate counsel elected not to pursue them further. M r. Amos subsequently sought and obtained permission to file a supplemental brief pro se on direct appeal, expressly for the purpose of addressing additional issues not raised by counsel. Despite receiving two extensions, M r. Amos never filed a supplemental brief. After four months, the Kansas Supreme Court deemed the brief abandoned and proceeded to hear arguments on the issues raised by his appellate counsel. Given the lack of specificity concerning M r. Amos’s access to legal materials, and the Kansas courts’ commendable efforts to accommodate his desire to raise additional issues, we cannot say that M r. A mos has established “cause” for his procedural default. Because M r. Amos cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice for his procedural default and makes no claims of a fundamental miscarriage of justice, -6- jurists of reason could not find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. The district court also found that M r. Amos’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally defaulted. M r. Amos has never asserted this claim before any state court, either on direct appeal or in a request for postconviction relief. Any motion for postconviction relief is now timebarred in state court. See K.S.A. § 60-1507(f)(1) (imposing a one-year limitation period, which runs from the termination of direct appellate review). Accordingly, this claim is procedurally defaulted, and the district court correctly refused to consider it.