Opinion ID: 1246974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: voir dire examination of veniremen rogers and willis

Text: THE COURT: If there is any juror that entertains such a conscientious opinion that he would under no circumstances vote for the death penalty, will you so indicate? Miss Rogers, what is your feeling? MISS ROGERS: I wouldn't vote for the death penalty. Q BY THE COURT: Do you have any conscientious objection to finding the defendants guilty under those circumstances, is that what you are telling the Court? A Yes. THE COURT: Who else? MR. WILLIS: I am. Q BY THE COURT: Mr. Willis? A Yes. Q What do you have to say? A I don't believe I could send a man to death. I don't believe I could vote to go to the gas chamber. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... . BY MR. LENOIR: Miss Rogers, by saying you don't believe that you could vote for the death penalty, you're not saying you couldn't find a person guilty of an offense? A No, I am not saying that. Q And you are not saying that, either, are you, Mr. Willis? A I am not saying it. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... . MR. BOAGS: Miss Rogers, it is your belief that no matter what the person did that you could not vote the death penalty? MISS ROGERS: Yes, that is my opinion. Q By MR. BOAGS: No matter how heinous the crime? A Yes, sir. Q You cannot think of a situation where you could say the death penalty would be a proper one? A No. Q What if  I would like to give you an example. Say, if a person is proven he killed 10 persons, children and women, and very heinous-type crimes. Then this person, after he was arrested, said, `Yes, I did it and if released I will do it again, and that besides the 10 I killed, for every $100 that you give me, I will show you where the body of another is that I killed.' And if all those facts are proven and the man testified in court substantially the same way, do you think you could impose the death penalty on that person? A I don't know about that type of person. I never heard of that type of person. Q Well, if you were sitting on a case like that, do you think you could impose it? A I really don't know. Q What I am getting at is this. In the abstract, you know, it is easy to discuss these subjects about death and life, and what I believe is that it is always a question of degree. A That is right. Q And what I am trying to find out from you is if you agree with me that the death penalty is a question of degree? A Yes. Q And would it be fair to say, then, if the proper case was presented to you that you possibly could vote the death penalty, is that right? A All I can say is it depends on the degree. Q If the proper case was presented, you would vote it? A I don't know. I would have to get all the facts. Q Right. I would assume that. May I have a moment, your Honor? (Pause) MR. BOAGS: Mr. Willis, you have heard the questions I have just asked, is that correct, sir? MR. WILLIS: Yes, sir. Q Would it be fair to say if I asked you the same questions, your answers would be substantially the same? A Yes. Q Also, with you it would be a question of degree, is that right? A Sure. MR. BUGLIOSI: May I briefly inquire of the jurors? THE COURT: Yes. MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Willis and Miss Rogers, before my colleague, Mr. Boags began questioning you  he has a rather prolific imagination  I believe you said that you both were opposed to the death penalty, is that correct? MISS ROGERS: Yes. MR. WILLIS: Yes. .... .... .... .... MR. BUGLIOSI: Miss Rogers, you realize that the People in this case are asking for the death penalty? You understand that? MISS ROGERS: I do now. I didn't know it, but I do now. Q We are asking for the death penalty in this case, and I believe you indicated you are basically opposed to the death penalty, is that correct? A That is correct. Q The murder in this case involves an alleged robbery and a killing during the commission of the robbery. Now, because you are opposed to the death penalty and because the People are asking for the death penalty in this case, would you rather not sit as a juror? A Yes, I would rather not. .... .... .... .... MR. BUGLIOSI: Miss Rogers, would you be willing to vote for a verdict of death under any particular circumstances? MISS ROGERS: I can't think of any circumstances now. Q So there are no circumstances that enter your mind which would conceivably cause you to vote for a verdict of death, is that correct? A No. MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I will make a motion to excuse Miss Rogers for implied bias. MR. LENOIR: Object to that. The lady said she could not think of any circumstances. She is not saying there are no circumstances. THE COURT: The motion will be denied. MR. BUGLIOSI: What about, Miss Rogers, this ridiculous, preposterous, absurd hypothotical by Mr. Boags about an individual killing 10 babies and then saying, `I will show you where another baby is for every hundred dollars you give me.' Would you vote for a death penalty in a case like that? MR. LENOIR: Object to the question. THE COURT: The form of the question is improper. The objection will be sustained. MR. BUGLIOSI: Would you vote for the death penalty in a case like that, ma'am? MR. LENOIR: Object to that. THE COURT: The question is ambiguous. The objection is sustained. MR. BUGLIOSI: If you do have a factual situation, Miss Rogers, wherein a man killed 10 children, and when they found the man, when they apprehended him, he said, `For each $100 you give me I will show you where another child is buried,' would you vote for a verdict of death in a case like that? MR. LENOIR: Object to that on the ground it is an improper question, asking the juror to prejudge a set of facts. THE COURT: Objection sustained. MR. BUGLIOSI: Your Honor, I believe that it is identically or substantially the same question asked by defense counsel, Mr. Boags. THE COURT: Do you want to have the record reread? MR. BUGLIOSI: Yes, your Honor. MR. LENOIR: I will withdraw the objection in the interest of time. THE COURT: You may proceed. Repeat the question, please. (Record read by the reporter.) MISS ROGERS: I don't know if I would or not. I really couldn't say. MR. BUGLIOSI: Wasn't your first answer, Miss Rogers, you don't think you would? MR. LENOIR: I will object to that as misleading. MR. BUGLIOSI: I did hear her say something. THE COURT: The reporter doesn't have any answer. MR. BUGLIOSI: What about you, Mr. Willis? I take it that you are also opposed to the death penalty? MR. WILLIS: Yes. Q Would you rather not sit on this case as a juror? MR. BOAGS: Object to that as an improper question. THE COURT: Objection sustained. MR. BUGLIOSI: This case, Mr. Willis, involves a killing during the perpetration of an alleged robbery, because the People are asking for the death penalty in this case. Are you opposed to sitting on the case? MR. WILLIS: For that reason only. Q For the reason that we are asking for the death penalty? You do not want to ask for it in this case? A I don't think I would be fair to the State. I don't think it would be fair to the State for me to sit on it. THE COURT: Then you are indicating to the Court you do have a bias or prejudice in this proceeding? MR. WILLIS: I am against capital punishment, yes. MR. BUGLIOSI: People would make a motion, your Honor, to excuse Mr. Willis on the ground of implied bias. THE COURT: The juror will be excused. MR. BOAGS: For the record, your Honor, may I object? MR. LENOIR: Both defendants object, your Honor. THE COURT: Objection is overruled. .... .... .... .... . MR. BUGLIOSI: Miss Rogers, getting back to you, did you hear Mr. Willis' remark that because of his opposition to the death penalty he did not feel he could give the prosecution a fair trial? Did you hear him say that? MISS ROGERS: Yes. Q Do you feel basically the same way? A I could give a fair trial. Just because I opposed  I think I could be fair. Q Well, you say that you could be fair. I can't ask you to prejudge the facts because the trial hasn't started, you haven't heard any of the evidence, but inasmuch as the prosecution is asking for the death penalty, and the defense, if it ever goes to the penalty trial, will obviously be asking you to come back with the verdict of life, as opposed to death, do you feel right now you are inclined in the direction of life? A Yes, I would be. Q So even before you have heard any of the evidence, you are biased, if anything, in favor of life? A That is right. MR. BUGLIOSI: I make a motion, your Honor, under Section 1074, Subdivision 8 of the Penal Code, on the ground of implied bias. MR. LENOIR: Objection. She said she could be fair. THE COURT: Objection sustained. .... .... .... .... ... Mrs. Bowman, if you thought that this was a proper case for the imposition of the death penalty, would you personally be willing, and would you personally have the courage to vote for a verdict of death? MRS. BOWMAN: Yes. MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. West, how about you, sir? MR. WEST: Yes, sir. MR. BUGLIOSI: Mr. Smith? MR. SMITH: Yes. MR. BUGLIOSI: Miss Rogers? MISS ROGERS: No. Q Even if you thought it was a proper case, you would not have the courage to vote for a verdict of death?
MR. BUGLIOSI: I make a motion, your Honor, to excuse the juror on the ground of implied bias. THE COURT: The motion is granted. MR. BOAGS: Will the record reflect we are objecting? THE COURT: Objection is overruled. PETERS, J. I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it affirms the judgments of guilt, but I dissent insofar as the majority opinion affirms the judgments imposing the death penalty. In my view, the trial court erred in excusing two jurors for cause, and each such error alone requires reversal of the penalty judgment as to each defendant. The trial court committed error, as conceded by the majority, with regard to the admission of Dr. Tweed's testimony, and I believe this error requires reversal of the penalty judgment as to Milton. I also believe that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct in his argument to the jury in the penalty trial.