Opinion ID: 2090292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Permissive Inference

Text: Defendant did not object to the court's permissive inference instruction at trial. Thus, his claims were not properly preserved following the charge and are only reviewable under a plain error standard. State v. Brooks, 163 Vt. 245, 250, 658 A.2d 22, 26 (1995). Jury instructions should be viewed in their entirety and must be well balanced and fair. See State v. Chambers, 144 Vt. 377, 382, 477 A.2d 974, 978 (1984). Error will be assigned only when the entire charge undermines confidence in the verdict, and only in extraordinary cases will we find plain error. See State v. Johnson, 158 Vt. 508, 513-14, 615 A.2d 132, 135 (1992). Plain error exists only in exceptional circumstances where a failure to recognize error would result in a miscarriage of justice, or where there is glaring error so grave and serious that it strikes at the very heart of the defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Pelican, 160 Vt. 536, 538, 632 A.2d 24, 26 (1993). The error must not only affect substantial rights, but also have an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations. See id. at 539, 632 A.2d at 26. Defendant acknowledges his burden to demonstrate plain error, but contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury determination of [a] simple factual dispute because of the trial court's permissive inference instruction. We disagree because we conclude that there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that defendant was guilty of operating a vehicle while he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, without relying on the permissive inference instruction. If it is axiomatic that facts are troublesome things, lack of facts can be equally troublesome. In this case, defendant did not put on any evidence. Evidence of post-operation drinking was placed before the jury by the investigating officer who testified that defendant told him that he had a couple, three beers after driving into the ditch. Evidence of the time of operation also was presented through the State's witnesses. From defendant's perspective, the best  and indeed, only  evidence of early operation was Trooper Snetsinger's testimony that when the officer arrived at the scene of the accident at 10:12 p.m., defendant gave conflicting statements as to when he ran off the road: either two-and-a-half-hours ago (approximately 7:45 p.m.) or 8:30 p.m. Of course, the jury also had before it the evidence of two disinterested witnesses who testified to their belief that defendant had driven into the ditch shortly before his arrival at Ms. Gilmore's house at 9:52 p.m. Defendant's assertion that the jury lacked evidence on the time of defendant's operation minimizes these statements, as well as Ms. Gilmore's additional testimony that defendant's vehicle was still running when she went to view where defendant had gone off the road. Thus, as to the charge of whether defendant operated a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201(a)(2), the jury did indeed have before it a simple factual dispute. If the jury believed the State's witnesses, the permissive inference instruction was irrelevant. [] There was ample evidence to support the State's theory that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of operation. The jury did not need to rely on the permissive inference instruction to reach its verdict because there was credible evidence to support a conclusion that defendant's visibly intoxicated state was very close in time to his operation of the vehicle. We are not prepared to find plain error without some demonstration, not made here, that the asserted error was the cause of defendant's conviction. If the instruction was error  a conclusion not reached here  that error did not rise to the level of plain error because it was not demonstrated to have `an unfair prejudicial impact on the jury's deliberations.' Pelican, 160 Vt. at 539, 632 A.2d at 26 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)).