Opinion ID: 2258485
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claimed Psychological Need for Fitness Requirement

Text: Bar Counsel argues for the first time in this court that respondent should be required to show fitness before reinstatement because of his psychological/emotional/mental state. The Board argues that, having failed to present the point to the Board, Bar Counsel has waived the argument. Alternatively, the Board contends that the record does not support a finding that respondent has psychological or emotional problems warranting a showing of fitness for reinstatement. Rather, the Board states that the evidence is more fairly characterized as [respondent's] acknowledgment of the misconduct and remorse, factors appropriately considered in mitigation, not aggravation, of sanction. We have held consistently that an attorney who fails to present an issue to the Board waives it and cannot present it for the first time to this court. In re Holdmann, 834 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C.2003) (citing In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C.), cert denied, 521 U.S. 1121, 117 S.Ct. 2515, 138 L.Ed.2d 1017 (1997); In re Ray, 675 A.2d 1381, 1386 (D.C.1996); In re Williams, 464 A.2d 115, 118 (D.C.1983)) (other citation omitted). In Holdmann, respondent argued for the first time before this court that public censure should not be imposed as reciprocal discipline because he agreed to private reprimand without an admission of the facts underlying the conceded disciplinary violations. Id. This court held that Holdmann had waived the issue by not presenting it to the Board. Id. Presentation of an issue in the first instance to the Hearing Committee and the Board provides an opportunity for a full development of the record. Unless Bar Counsel is held to the same requirement, respondents would be denied notice of Bar Counsel's claim and an opportunity to meet it at a meaningful time. In Holdmann, however, this court made clear that since the final decision lies with the court, it can relieve a party of the waiver, although it declined to do so in that case. Id. at 890. Similarly, there is nothing in this record to indicate that relief from the waiver is warranted. In any event, as the Board points out, the scant testimony upon which Bar Counsel relies for a fitness recommendation on this ground is more fairly characterized as an acknowledgment of the misconduct and remorse, factors appropriately considered in mitigation, not aggravation, of sanction. [10] See Dunietz, supra, 687 A.2d at 212 (holding concession of misconduct and remorse constitute mitigation evidence). Bar Counsel cites Steele, supra, 630 A.2d at 196, as support for the proposition that a possible psychological inability to comply with ethical obligations requires a showing of fitness for reinstatement even when the Board disagrees. Steele is distinguishable. In that case, we imposed a fitness requirement where the attorney neglected a legal matter, failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel and acknowledged unidentified personal problems that adversely affected her emotional stability and caused her to abandon a client's case. Id. at 201. The attorney stated in a letter to Bar Counsel that she had become more emotionally stable, but left unanswered the question whether she is sufficiently stable to practice law. Id. Thus, the attorney in Steele placed in question her continued fitness to resume practice, and this court found it necessary to impose a fitness requirement to assure that `[her] resumption of the practice of law [would] not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest.' Id. (quoting In re Roundtree, 503 A.2d 1215, 1217 (D.C.1985)). In contrast to the attorney in Steele, respondent is not before the court for neglect of a client matter, nor do the facts of record disclose a history of personal problems leading to emotional instability or raise questions as to respondent's present emotional stability. While respondent did not cooperate with Bar Counsel's investigation, conduct for which he is being disciplined, he did respond to Bar Counsel's initial inquiry, and he appeared at the hearing and represented himself pro se. We agree with the Board that the circumstances do not provide grounds for imposing a fitness requirement in a case of this type. See In re Steinberg, 761 A.2d 279, 284 (D.C.2000) (holding that an attorney's consultations with a psychiatrist for issues related to marital stress do not suggest the mental instability and lack of reliability that led to the imposition of fitness requirement in [ Steele, supra, 630 A.2d at 201]). [11]