Opinion ID: 1358769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Money to cover expenses qualifies as payment of something of pecuniary value

Text: Further, even if the Government could prove only that the $100 payment was for gas money, we do not agree that payment for expenses related to a murder contract cannot constitute consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. The murder-for-hire statute requires that the murder or intended murder be committed as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value. ... 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). We have not addressed directly the consideration element of murder-for-hire, but other circuits have held that the statute requires a mutual understanding that something of value will be exchanged for committing a murder. United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151, 154 (10th Cir.1997). Consideration in the law is, principally, [t]he inducement to a contract. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (6th ed.1991). State courts typically find that contractual consideration exists where there is a benefit on one side, or a detriment suffered, or service done on the other. Plastray Corp. v. Cole, 324 Mich. 433, 37 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1949) (citation omitted); see also Wood v. Lowery, 238 S.W.3d 747, 755-756 (Tenn.Ct. App.2007) (The court in University of Chattanooga v. Stansberry, 9 Tenn.App. 341, 343 (1928), defined consideration as `either a benefit to the maker of the promise or a detriment to, or obligation upon, the promise[e].'); Costanzo v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 161 Ohio App.3d 759, 832 N.E.2d 71, 79 (2005) (In Ohio, consideration is either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.) (citations and quotations omitted); Huff Contracting v. Sark, 12 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Ky.Ct.App. 2000) ([T]he term consideration is ... defined [as] `[a] benefit to the party promising, or a loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is made.') (citing Phillips v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 323, 171 S.W.2d 458, 464 (1943)). The plain meaning of § 1958's language undeniably contemplates a quid-pro-quo (or at least the promise of such) between the parties to the transaction, the murderer and the solicitor. United States v. Hernandez, 141 F.3d 1042, 1057 (11th Cir.1998); see also United States v. Hardwick, 523 F.3d 94, 99-100 (2d Cir.2008) (requiring quid pro quo, bargained-for exchange); United States v. Richeson, 338 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir.2003) (same). We agree with our sister circuits and hold that the consideration element of the statute requires a quid pro quo between the parties of something of pecuniary value. We find further that the payment of a mere $100, even if it were offered as having been related only to the expenses of the receiving party, was still paid as a quid pro quo for Bob's agreement to murder Christopher. Everyone has expenses of various kinds and, as we have earlier observed, money is fungible. In re Gray Elec. Co., No. 96-2518, 1998 WL 109989,  (6th Cir. Mar.4, 1998); cf. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605-06, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004) (It is true ... that not every bribe or kickback... will ... show up in the guise of a quid pro quo for some dereliction in spending a federal grant. But ... [m]oney is fungible. ... Liquidity is not a financial term for nothing; money can be drained off here because a federal grant is pouring in there.) (citations omitted). Defendant relies on United States v. Chong, 419 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.2005), in which the Ninth Circuit held that [m]oney to cover incidental expenses rather than as compensation for carrying out the murder-for-hire does not meet § 1958's requirements. Id. at 1083. While this language, in isolation, appears to support Defendant's position, the facts in Chong are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In Chong, the evidence at trial could not establish that anyone was given money in exchange for carrying out a murder. There was no doubt that money was given, but it was equally clear that it was not for a murder as murder had not yet been discussed. The Government was able to prove only that a person was given $100 to perform a dangerous job without knowing that the true character of the job was to perform a murder. Under those facts, the Ninth Circuit stated: As to the Bike Ming assignment, however, the evidence shows only that Casey volunteered for a dangerous assignment and wound up getting some walking-around money in the course of traveling to Boston. Money to cover incidental expenses rather than as compensation for carrying out the murder-for-hire does not meet § 1958's requirements. See [ United States v. Ritter, 989 F.2d 318, 321-22 (9th Cir.1993)] (holding that although defendant was paid $70 to build a bomb, the money was not payment for commission of the murder). On the record here, we hold that the jury had insufficient evidence to find that Casey agreed to travel to Boston to kill Bike Ming in exchange for something of pecuniary value offered by Chong or his co-conspirators. Id. at 1083-84 (footnote omitted). In view of the circumstances surrounding the payment in Chong, we do not interpret Chong as creating a bright-line rule that a payment of incidental expenses can never constitute consideration for a murder for purposes of § 1958. Instead, Chong establishes only that the payment must be made in consideration for the act of murder. This standard cannot be met where the future hitman is unaware that he will commit murder at the time he receives payment. See id. In this case, however, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that the $100 was given to Sullivan specifically connected to and as consideration for him to perform the murder. The nature of the job had been made amply clear on several occasions. The fact that Defendant called it gas money does not detract from the evidence that she agreed to pay that money as a form of consideration for Sullivan to murder Christopher. [1] While $100 is not a substantial amount of money, it is, nonetheless, money. To meet the requirements of § 1958 the [p]ayment need only be a quid pro quo contractual arrangement between the hiring and hired parties. United States v. Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir.2003) (citation omitted) (holding that two and a half ounces of heroin was sufficient to meet the requirements of § 1958(b)). The cash given to Sullivan fully meets the definition of anything of pecuniary value as it is something of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, a commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic advantage. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM judgment of conviction and the district court's denial of the Rule 29 motion.