Opinion ID: 4528739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Case Number 19-0755: Nicholas Blankenship

Text: In this matter, the DMV contends that the circuit court erred by entering its May 8, 2019 ex parte order staying the revocation of Mr. Blankenship’s driver’s license and ordering the DMV to produce the record of the underlying administrative proceedings. To support its argument, the DMV states that West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s) establishes precise procedures that a circuit court is required to follow when issuing a stay of an administrative license revocation and also directs which party is responsible for compiling the administrative record to be considered by the circuit court. By contrast, Mr. 4 Because we have determined that the DMV is entitled to the prohibitory relief it seeks with regard to Mr. Price’s circuit court proceeding, we need not consider the additional issues raised by the DMV in this matter. See supra note 3. Should Mr. Price wish to pursue his challenge of the OAH’s decision to 5 deny his request for an administrative hearing regarding the revocation of his driver’s license because it found his request to be untimely filed, he may apply for a writ of mandamus in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. See generally Holly v. Feagley, 242 W. Va. 240, 834 S.E.2d 536 (2019); Williams v. W. Va. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 226 W. Va. 562, 703 S.E.2d 533 (2010) (per curiam); State ex rel. Miller v. Reed, 203 W. Va. 673, 510 S.E.2d 507 (1998). 16 Blankenship responds that the circuit court did not err in its rulings staying the revocation of his driver’s license and ordering the DMV to prepare the administrative record of his license revocation proceedings. We will address the issues raised by the DMV in turn. 1. Stay of administrative revocation of driver’s license. The DMV first argues that the circuit court erred by entering an ex parte order staying Mr. Blankenship’s license revocation. As with our resolution of the DMV’s petition for writ of prohibition in Mr. Price’s matter, the DMV’s petition for writ of prohibition in this case also is governed by statutory law, and our consideration of the relevant language is guided by the rules of statutory construction. See generally Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (holding that effect must be given to the Legislature’s intent); Syl. pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (accepting plain meaning of clear and unambiguous statutory language); Syl. pt. 5, State v. Gen. Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (applying clear statutory language without further interpretation). A circuit court has the authority to stay the administrative revocation of a driver’s license to operate a motor vehicle in this State while the driver’s appeal of the administrative ruling is pending in the circuit court. However, this authority is not unlimited but, rather, is clearly defined both in its scope and in the manner in which such relief is to be granted. Pursuant to the relevant language of West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s), paragraph 2, 17 [a] person whose license is at issue and the commissioner shall be entitled to judicial review [of the OAH’s final order] as set forth in chapter twenty-nine-a of this code. Neither the commissioner nor the Office of Administrative Hearings may stay enforcement of the order. The court may grant a stay or supersedeas of the order only upon motion and hearing, and a finding by the court upon the evidence presented, that there is a substantial probability that the appellant shall prevail upon the merits and the appellant will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not stayed: Provided, That in no event shall the stay or supersedeas of the order exceed one hundred fifty days. . . . (Emphasis added). We previously have considered this statutory language, found it to be plain, and held that a circuit court has discretion as to whether to grant the requested stay, but that the aggrieved motorist must first request a stay by motion, the circuit court must hold a hearing on the motorist’s stay motion, and the circuit court must make the findings required by statute before it may grant the stay: “Before any stay may be granted in an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles revoking a driver’s license, the circuit court must conduct a hearing where evidence is adduced and, ‘upon the evidence presented,’ must make a finding that there is a substantial probability that the appellant will prevail upon the merits and that he will suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted.” Syllabus Point 2, Smith v. Bechtold, 190 W. Va. 315, 438 S.E.2d 347 (1993). Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Miller v. Karl, 231 W. Va. 65, 743 S.E.2d 876 (2013). Thus, “if the circuit court grant[s] the stay without conducting evidentiary hearings and without meaningfully analyzing the evidence adduced during the hearings, [t]he [circuit court has] 18 exceeded the legitimate powers granted to [the court] under the statute.” Bechtold, 190 W. Va. at 320, 438 S.E.2d at 352. Moreover, the circuit court may grant the requested stay only if it specifically finds that “there is a substantial probability that the [driver] shall prevail upon the merits and the [driver] will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not stayed.” W. Va. Code § 17C5A-2(s). In this regard, we specifically have held that [a] proffer is not sufficient to satisfy the evidentiary requirements of West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(s) (201[5]) for proof of irreparable harm. A stay or supersedeas of the order issued pursuant to West Virginia Code § 17C-5A-2(s) must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law which demonstrate that the circuit court has, upon the testimony or documentary evidence presented, made a finding that the appellant will suffer irreparable harm if the order is not stayed. Syl. pt. 3, Karl, 231 W. Va. 65, 743 S.E.2d 876. Finally, if the court stays the revocation order, such stay is limited to one hundred fifty days. See Syl. pt. 4, Karl, 231 W. Va. 65, 743 S.E.2d 876 (“A stay or supersedeas of the order issued pursuant to W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(s) (201[5]) must contain an express provision limiting the duration to no more than 150 days, although the circuit court is not precluded from issuing consecutive stays for good cause shown.”). During the proceedings below, Mr. Blankenship, as part of his “PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER,” requested the circuit court to stay his 19 driver’s license revocation during the pendency of the circuit court proceedings. However, it is undisputed that the circuit court did not hold a hearing on Mr. Blankenship’s request for a stay insofar as it entered its ex parte order granting the stay on the same day that Mr. Blankenship filed his review petition in the circuit court. Neither did Mr. Blankenship aver that there was a “substantial probability” that he would prevail on the merits of his appeal or that he would “suffer irreparable harm” if the circuit court did not grant the stay as required by the express language of West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s). Nor did the circuit court make findings as to either of these points in its May 8, 2019 order granting Mr. Blankenship’s requested stay. In fact, the only part of the statutory provisions for granting a stay that the circuit court followed in this case concerns the length of the stay because, in awarding Mr. Blankenship the stay he had requested, the circuit court limited it to “a period of 150 days.” Because both the clear statutory language of West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s) and the prior decisions of this Court considering this language dictate that a circuit court does not have the discretion to ignore these guidelines, but, rather, must faithfully follow these strictures in staying an administrative revocation of a driver’s license, we find that the circuit court erred as a matter of law in granting the stay in Mr. Blankenship’s case when it failed to follow the prescribed procedure for granting a stay. In this regard, the circuit court did not hold a hearing on Mr. Blankenship’s request for a stay, did not take evidence as to whether Mr. Blankenship would substantially prevail on the merits of his appeal and whether he would be irreparably harmed if his license 20 revocation was not stayed, and did not make findings as to Mr. Blankenship’s likelihood of success on appeal or the harm he would suffer absent a stay. Accordingly, we find that the DMV is entitled to the relief it requests in this regard and grant the writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court from enforcing the stay issued to Mr. Blankenship in its May 8, 2019 order. 2. Preparation of record of administrative proceedings. The DMV additionally argues that the circuit court erred by requiring it to prepare the record of the administrative proceedings for Mr. Blankenship’s appeal of his license revocation to the circuit court. This issue also is governed by statutory law, namely West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s), paragraph 2, and the rules of statutory construction again guide our analysis. See generally Syl. pt. 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s Comp. Comm’r, 159 W. Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361; Syl. pt. 2, Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108; Syl. pt. 5, Gen. Daniel Morgan, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353. Here, the DMV argues that the circuit court erroneously ordered it to prepare and submit the administrative record upon which Mr. Blankenship’s appeal to the circuit court is based. The preparation of the administrative record on appeal from an administrative license revocation proceeding is governed by West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s), the pertinent part of which provides: The party filing the appeal shall pay the Office of Administrative Hearings for the production and transmission of the certified file copy and the hearing transcript to the court. 21 Notwithstanding the provisions of section four, article five of said chapter, the Office of Administrative Hearings may not be compelled to transmit a certified copy of the file or the transcript of the hearing to the circuit court in less than sixty days. (Emphasis added). Unlike the other statutory language at issue in this matter, we have not previously considered this precise provision of West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s). Nevertheless, we find the enactment to plainly require that the party filing the appeal to the circuit court is the party responsible for arranging for the preparation and submission of the administrative record to that tribunal. In determining the meaning of statutory language, we look to the specific words employed by the Legislature to ascertain the legislative intent and meaning of the provision at issue. “It is not the prerogative of this Court to arbitrarily disregard the plain meaning of clearly written statutes.” McVey v. Pritt, 218 W. Va. 537, 540, 625 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2005). Instead, “the words of a statute are to be given their ordinary and familiar significance and meaning, and regard is to be had for their general and proper use.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Gen. Daniel Morgan, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353. Additionally, “courts may not find ambiguity in statutory language which laymen are readily able to comprehend . . . . Plain language should be afforded its plain meaning.” Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W. Va. 714, 718-19, 172 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1970). 22 The portion of West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s) that addresses the preparation of the administrative record specifically directs that the “[t]he party filing the appeal shall pay the Office of Administrative Hearings for the production and transmission of the certified file copy and the hearing transcript to the court.” (Emphasis added). This language plainly directs the appealing party to arrange for the submission of the administrative record to the circuit court. In this case, Mr. Blankenship filed the appeal from the OAH’s order in the circuit court, and, thus, Mr. Blankenship, and not the DMV, is the party responsible for ensuring the circuit court has the administrative record of the proceedings from which the appeal has been taken. Furthermore, the Legislature’s use of the word “shall” in this context makes this directive to the appealing party mandatory. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. W. Va. Pub. Emps. Ins. Bd., 171 W. Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982) (“It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.”); Syl. pt. 2, Terry v. Sencindiver, 153 W. Va. 651, 171 S.E.2d 480 (1969) (“The word ‘shall’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.”). Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court erred by disregarding the plain, and mandatory, statutory language of West Virginia Code section 17C-5A-2(s) that imposes upon the party appealing from the OAH to the circuit court the duty of arranging for the preparation of the record of the underlying administrative proceedings by paying the OAH “for the production and transmission of the certified file copy and the hearing 23 transcript” because the circuit court improperly shifted this burden to the non-appealing party. Accordingly, we grant the writ of prohibition requested by the DMV on this ground and prohibit the circuit court from enforcing its May 8, 2019 order requiring the DMV, as the non-appealing party, to file the administrative record with the circuit court.