Opinion ID: 1057992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abduction with Intent to Defile and Felony Murder

Text: Pursuant to Code § 19.2-327.12, the Court of Appeals may refer factual issues in a petition for a writ of actual innocence to a circuit court: If the Court of Appeals determines ... that a resolution of the case requires further development of the facts, the court may order the circuit court in which the order of conviction was originally entered to conduct a hearing ... to certify findings of fact with respect to such issues as the Court of Appeals shall direct. This statute gives the Court of Appeals broad discretion to certify to the circuit court issues of fact that must be resolved before deciding the merits of a petition. Johnson, 273 Va. at 322, 641 S.E.2d at 484. As we explained in Carpitcher, to be `material' within the meaning of Code § 19.2-327. 11(A)(vii), evidence supporting a petition for a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence must be true. 273 Va. at 345, 641 S.E.2d at 492. Because the Court of Appeals cannot hold its own evidentiary hearing to assess a witness' credibility, but must ultimately determine whether a recantation is true, Code § 19.2-327.12 provides a mechanism to assist the Court of Appeals in this task. Johnson, 273 Va. at 322, 641 S.E.2d at 484. When the circuit court conducts its evidentiary hearing, we have observed that [T]here is no mandatory formula for a circuit court's consideration of the credibility of a particular witness. As the trier of fact, the circuit court is charged with the responsibility of considering various factors, including the witness' demeanor, his opportunity for knowing the things about which he has testified, his bias, and any prior inconsistent statements relating to the subject of his present testimony. In addition, the circumstances of a particular case may raise other factors that the circuit court deems relevant in assessing a witness' credibility. Id. at 323, 641 S.E.2d at 485. In reviewing the circuit court's factual findings, we have explained that [s]uch factual findings are similar to circuit court findings made under Code § 8.01-654(C) in habeas corpus cases in which we have original jurisdiction and have referred factual issues to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing. Therefore, we will apply to the factual findings contained in the record of the Court of Appeals a standard of review similar to the standard we apply to factual findings entered in our original jurisdiction habeas corpus proceedings. We will be bound by the factual findings in the present record, as approved by the Court of Appeals, unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them. Carpitcher, 273 Va. at 342-43, 641 S.E.2d at 490. In Carpitcher, we observed that recantation evidence is generally questionable in character and is widely viewed by courts with suspicion because of the obvious opportunities and temptations for fraud. Unless proven true, recantation evidence merely amounts to an attack on a witness' credibility by the witness herself. Id. at 346, 641 S.E.2d at 492 (citations omitted). In considering Brown's recantation testimony here, as we stated in Lewis v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 612, 626, 70 S.E.2d 293, 302 (1952), while we know from his lips that [he] spoke falsely on one occasion, this does not establish that his testimony at the trial was false and the statements in the subsequent affidavit were true. At the circuit court's evidentiary hearing, Brown admitted that before signing the affidavit, [4] he gave six different statementsincluding one under oathregarding the circumstances of Evans' death, and each of them differed substantively from his affidavit and testimony before the circuit court. However, beyond its questionable reliability, Brown's recantation testimony was rife with conflicting statements. Brown stated that while he was at The Bayou, he wasn't looking to have sex with anybody, and he testified that Evans [s]parked no interest for [him]. However, he admitted that just a short time later, he defiled Evans' body by undressing her body in the car, moving his hand into her pants, and by attempting to have sex with her body when he and Turner placed her in the woods. These statements regarding Brown's sexual desire are inherently conflicting and undermine the credibility of his testimony. The inconsistencies are most glaring when we consider Brown's disparate accounts of Evans' death, both in the two affidavits and in his testimony before the circuit court. Brown's testimony during direct examination matched his statement in the first affidavit that when he began to strangle Evans she died almost instantly. Brown testified that her death was so quick that Turner would have had virtually no chance to react and try to save her. However, according to the second affidavit and Brown's testimony during cross-examination, Evans revived and Brown had to strangle her again to kill her. Before the circuit court, Brown affirmed the statement he made in the second affidavitthat after he began choking Evans, [she] became unconscious and I believed she was dead. I fell back in the seat, and she woke up. I then choked her again until blood came out of her nose and [I was] certain she was dead at that time. Brown confirmed that [Evans] was not killed instantly or rendered helpless instantly but, in fact, revived and [Brown] had to choke her a second time. Finally, on re-direct examination, Brown testified that by stating that Evans revived, he meant that [s]he took in a deep breath, and he stated that it was only a matter of one or two seconds from the time that she revived until the time he began to choke her again. The circuit court's focus was upon the wrong issues. The circuit court stated that it finds that Brown acted independently in murdering the victim and that Mr. Turner had no role in the murder, and that Turner did not engage in the restraining of the victim. To the extent that this finding suggests that the offense of abduction did not occur, it is a conclusion of law that we review de novo. Commonwealth v. Morris, 281 Va. 70, 76, 705 S.E.2d 503, 505 (2011). Whether Turner committed abduction with intent to defile and whether Turner is guilty of felony murder under these facts are questions of law. We will focus upon the legal conclusions that the circuit court reached that are not entitled to the traditional deference we afford to credibility findings. Because Turner was found guilty of felony murder, the relevant question before us is not whether Brown acted alone in choking Evans or restraining her as Turner claims and as Brown now alleges, but rather whether Turner abducted Evans with the intent to defile her. The fact that Brown now confesses that he acted alone in restraining and choking Evans does not absolve Turner of his guilt. Code § 18.2-47 does not use the word restraint in its definition of abduction. Use of that word in the context of abduction comes from our case law. For example, in Jerman v. Dir., Dept. of Corrections, 267 Va. 432, 439, 593 S.E.2d 255, 259 (2004), the word restraint is used to describe how the particular facts of that case satisfied the elements of the offense. Concerning this case, the elements of the offense of abduction require seizing, taking, transporting, detaining or secreting another person with the intent to deprive such other person of his or her personal liberty. Code § 18.2-47. Significantly, the elements of the offense require that such acts be accomplished by force, intimidation or deception. Id. The issue in Turner's case is not restraint; rather, it is deception. In this regard the circuit court's finding that Turner did not restrain the victim does not address the issue of deception. A defendant is guilty of first degree murder under Code § 18.2-32 where the killing occurs in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction. This statute codifies the common law doctrine of felony-murder and, when supported by the evidence, operates to elevate to second-degree murder a homicide committed during the commission of a felony by imputing malice to the killing. Commonwealth v. Montague, 260 Va. 697, 700, 536 S.E.2d 910, 912 (2000) (citing Heacock v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 397, 403, 323 S.E.2d 90, 93 (1984); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 762, 284 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1981)). The felony murder statute applies where the initial felony and the homicide were parts of one continuous transaction, and were closely related in point of time, place, and causal connection. Haskell v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1033, 1041, 243 S.E.2d 477, 482 (1978). The question before us is a narrow one. Code § 19.2-327.11(A)(vii), requires that the newly-discovered evidence be material and when considered with all of the other evidence in the current record, will prove that no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Of course, in order to be material, the evidence must be true. Additionally, [e]vidence that relates to a matter that is properly at issue in the case is said to be material. Charles E. Friend, The Law of Evidence in Virginia § 11-1 at 431 (6th ed.2003). The newly-discovered evidence in this case is not material. Turner's assignments of error and argument focus upon proof of abduction with intent to defile. Brown's recantation focuses upon whether he alone restrained and choked Evans. The pertinent circuit court finding is that Brown acted independently in murdering the victim and that Mr. Turner had no role in the murder or in the restraining of the victim. Significantly, Brown's recantation and the circuit court's finding do not address the issue raised by Turner's assignments of error and argument. Turner argues that no rational trier of fact, upon consideration of Brown's recantation, could find Turner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of abduction with intent to defile. Because nothing in Brown's recantation is material to this issue, the evidentiary record on this issue, with and without the recantation, is essentially the same. Simply stated, nothing in Brown's recantation or the circuit court finding has any bearing on the question presented in this petition. Turner has not met his evidentiary burden under the statutory provisions.