Opinion ID: 2159693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the motion based on the murray affidavit

Text: In support of his motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, Arrington filed two handwritten affidavits, one executed by Arrington himself and the second executed by Andre C. (Mousey) Murray. Arrington alleged in his affidavit that he had encountered Murray at Lorton in 1994 or 1995, and that at that time Murray had spoke[n] of this crime and had told Arrington that that's what [Arrington] g[o]t for staying with them Bitches getting high [and] giving all your shit away. Arrington claimed that he attempted to pursue this information, but that he had been unable to remain in touch with Murray. Arrington related that in approximately January 2000, he ran into Murray again at a prison infirmary, and that Murray was then belatedly prepared to disclose what he knew of the case, including Murray's own involvement in it. Murray stated in his affidavit that in 1994, he, Arrington, Ms. Moore and Ms. Gray, together with several other individuals, were all members of a crack smoking club. Murray indicated that there had been tension between Arrington and Ms. Moore and that Ms. Moore had stolen some drugs and money. On February 28, 1994, according to Murray, myself and two (2) non-members [of the crack-smoking club] was getting high in the hallway of Ms. Moore['s] apt. bld. and that's when we encountered Ms. Moore and Ms. Gray entering the doorway. Non-member No. # one (1) suddenly pulled out a phony (toy) shotgun (this object is right today hidden in the basement of bld. 1414 1st St., S.W.[,] D.C. under some bricks) and insisted that money be given to him. In the interim, participant No. # three (3) closed the . . . door and guarded it so no one could enter. When no monies was produce[d] by either victim[,] participant No. # one (1) suggested that we take the young ladies to the basement for a shakedown. Remembering what Ms. Moore did to me and club members, I agreed. Once the complain[ ]ant and her girlfriend was searched Ms. Moore immediately stated, Mousey, don't let that guy do anything to me. After watching Ms. Moore tearfully cry, plead for freedom, I immediately turned my attention to participant No. # one (1) and told him that if he assault[ed] or even touch[ed] Ms. Moore or Ms. Gray that I would kill him. Soon after, I told Ms. Moore and her girlfriend to leave and that they should stop playing on men and tricking them out of their monies. The government filed an opposition to Arrington's motion, contending solely that the motion was procedurally barred. Noting that the nature of a motion is determined by the relief sought, not by its label or caption (citing Diamen v. United States, 725 A.2d 501, 507 (D.C.1999)), the government argued that the time constraints applicable to motions based on newly discovered evidence may not be circumvented by `merely designating this a § 23-110 motion' (citing Diamen, supra ; internal brackets omitted). The government asserted that Arrington's motion was based on newly discovered evidence, that it was therefore cognizable only under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33, that the time limitations of Rule 33 are jurisdictional, Diamen, supra, 725 A.2d at 506, and that the motion was untimely because it had not been filed within three years after verdict, as purportedly required by Rule 33. Arrington's motion was denied in a written order signed by Judge Patricia A. Wynn on December 22, 2000, and docketed five days later. Judge Wynn held that the motion was untimely because, according to the judge, it was not filed within two years of final judgment. The judge further expressed the view that the evidence was not newly discovered because [t]he defendant claims that he discovered this evidence... five or six years before the filing of his instant motion. The judge also believed that the evidence was not of such a nature that acquittal would likely result from its use (citation omitted), because, in her view, Murray's claims were inconsistent with the identification testimony presented by the prosecutor at Arrington's trial. Finally, the judge noted that this was Arrington's second motion pursuant to § 23-110, and that the court was not required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. § 23-110(e).
As noted above, the government opposed Arrington's motion in the trial court solely upon the ground that the motion was untimely under Rule 33 and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The trial judge expressed her agreement with the government's contention that the motion was untimely. The government has now abandoned the position that it took in the trial court, and the judge's ruling cannot be sustained. At the time Arrington was convicted, a defendant was permitted to file a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence at any time up to two years after the date of final judgment. See Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33 (1991). A judgment of conviction did not become final for purposes of Rule 33 until the appellate process had been completed and the appellate court's mandate had issued. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 705 F.2d 350, 351 (9th Cir.1983). [12] At the time Arrington's motion was filed, his direct appeal was still pending, and final judgment within the meaning of Rule 33 had not yet been entered. Rule 33 was amended, effective June 22, 1999, to provide that a defendant shall have until three years after the verdict or finding of guilt to file such a motion. Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33 (2001) (emphasis added). It is, at least, questionable, whether the new rule may be applied retroactively to render untimely a motion which would have been timely under the old rule, and the government does not contend in this court that the new rule may be so applied. Rather, the government assume[s] for the purposes of this brief that [Arrington's] case is governed by the old rule and that his motion for a new trial was timely. (Emphasis added.) The government has thus effectively conceded the unsoundness of the only ground upon which it had opposed Arrington's motion before Judge Wynn. Given the assumption on which the government is litigating this appeal, we conclude for purposes of this case that Arrington's motion was timely. The trial court's remaining reasons for denying the motion without an evidentiary hearing were not asserted by the government in the trial court, and we do not find them persuasive. Contrary to an observation in the judge's written order, Arrington did not claim that he discovered the evidence five or six years before filing the motion. According to Arrington's affidavit, Murray made certain remarks about the case in 1994. These remarks, however, were hardly a model of clarity, and they would not have provided Arrington with grounds for a Rule 33 motion. Subsequently, according to his affidavit, Arrington lost contact with Murray for several years, and it was not until the year 2000 that Murray provided the information on which Arrington's motion was ultimately based. The judge was also of the opinion that the proffered evidence was not likely to lead to an acquittal. The judge so ruled because, according to her, Murray's affidavit was contrary to the prosecution's evidence at trial. [13] In our view, however, this ground for the judge's ruling is too broad to be tenable; newly discovered evidence proffered by a defendant is, by its very nature, contrary to the testimony that led to his conviction. If a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence could properly be denied solely because the proffered evidence contradicts prosecution testimony, then the safety valve provided by Rule 33 would be altogether ineffective. In the present case, in particular, an evidentiary hearing to assess Murray's credibility would have been appropriate. Murray's affidavit included an admission of criminal conduct on his own part, and thus had at least some arguable potential for enhanced credibility. [14] Moreover, Murray's statement regarding the location of the phony toy shotgun could readily have been proved true or false as one indication of his credibility or lack thereof. [15] In its brief in this court, the government argues, somewhat curiously, that Murray's affidavit does not exonerate appellant. Murray admits [that] he and two other persons robbed Deon Moore but Murray never squarely states that appellant was not involved. This contention cannot be squared with the record. In his affidavit, Murray unequivocally stated that the robbery was committed by myself and two (2) non-members of the Crack Smoking Club. Murray further explicitly identified Jerome Arrington as one of the members of that club. By a simple process of elimination, Murray's affidavit made it clear that, according to Murray, Arrington was not a participant in the robbery. Moreover, Murray began his affidavit as follows: This Pro Se Affidavit is in support of Mr. Jerome Arrington's Claim[s] of Non Participation. Judge Wynn was quite correct in her observation that the trial court is not required to entertain successive motions for collateral relief on behalf of the same prisoner. See D.C.Code § 23-110(e). There are, however, circumstances in which it serves the interests of justice to consider a new motion containing significant and potentially exculpatory information not previously available to the defendant. Cf. Dantzler v. United States, 696 A.2d 1349, 1355-56 (D.C.1997). In the present case, several of the factors set forth in Herbin, supra, e.g., whether the proffered evidence was newly discovered, whether Arrington exercised diligence in his pursuit of the evidence, and whether the evidence was likely to lead to Arrington's acquittal, could be illuminated by an evidentiary hearing. We therefore vacate the decision in No. 01-CO-811 and remand for such a hearing.