Opinion ID: 675758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Partee's Appeal

Text: 8
9 The district court enhanced Partee's sentence by two levels for obstruction of justice under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. As a basis for this enhancement, the district court relied on Partee's refusal to testify under a grant of immunity at Dismuke's trial. Partee contends that the sentencing judge improperly imposed the two-level enhancement because his refusal to testify at his co-conspirator's trial was not an obstruction of justice for the instant offense as required under Section 3C1.1. We agree. 10 Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that: [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. This court has defined the instant offense to refer solely to the offense of conviction. United States v. Polland, 994 F.2d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir.1993). See also, United States v. Gunning, 984 F.2d 1476, 1485 (7th Cir.1993) (Sec. 3C1.1 provided for a two-level enhancement of the offense level if the defendant 'willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing' of the offense of conviction.). Offense of conviction in turn refers only to the  'offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted.'  United States v. Rubin, 999 F.2d 194, 196 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.2(a)). Accord, United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 733 (11th Cir.1993) (offense of conviction refers only to the conduct charged in the indictment for which the defendant was convicted). Offense of conviction does not refer to a separate crime by someone else. See United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1260-61 (7th Cir.1993) (obstruction enhancement requires the defendant to act with specific intent 'to avoid responsibility' for the offense for which he was being tried); Polland, 994 F.2d at 1269 (section 3C1.1 does not contemplate enhancements for obstruction of justice if the relevant conduct impedes the investigation or prosecution of a separate crime). Here, Partee's offense of conviction was possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Partee's refusal to testify at Dismuke's trial had no impact on his possession conviction and, therefore, Partee did not attempt to avoid responsibility for the offense for which he was being tried. See United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1266. 11 In United States v. Banks, 751 F.Supp. 1161, 1166 (M.D.Pa.1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 52 (3d Cir.1991), the court followed this reasoning and concluded that an obstruction enhancement does not apply where the defendant testifies untruthfully in the case of another defendant. The Second Circuit later adopted this view in United States v. Valdez, 16 F.3d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir.1994) quoting from Banks:  'we are of the view that the term instant offense as used in the commentary and the guideline itself is probably limited to the offense or case against the defendant ... and does not encompass the case against [the codefendant]'  (quoting United States v. Banks, 751 F.Supp. at 1166). 1 12 The government maintains that instant offense as used in the Guidelines should encompass not only the defendant's own proceedings but those of a co-conspirator. In support of its position the government cites cases which broadly define instant offense. For example, in United States v. Bernaugh, 969 F.2d 858, 861 (10th Cir.1992), the court concluded that because the Guidelines provide that an  'offense' may include the concerted criminal activity of multiple participants ... the section 3C1.1 enhancement applies where a defendant attempts to obstruct justice in a case closely related to his own, such as that of a codefendant. Accord, United States v. Acuna, 9 F.3d 1442, 1446 (9th Cir.1993). Similarly, in United States v. Morales, 977 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th Cir.1992), the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's refusal to testify at a co-conspirator's trial after an immunity order has been issued constitutes an obstruction of justice because the prosecutions of both conspirators involved the same conduct. 13 In these cases, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits essentially define the term instant offense to include relevant conduct. Relevant conduct includes 14 all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured or willfully caused by the defendant; and in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, ... all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. 15 Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (B). Applying the relevant conduct provision to the offense of conviction creates an expansive view of conduct which looks  'to the totality of the criminal transaction in which the defendant participated and which gave rise to his indictment, without regard to the particular crimes charged in the indictment.'  United States v. Ignancio Munio, 909 F.2d 436, 438 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204, 1209 n. 12 (11th Cir.1989)). For example, in the section computing criminal history, the Guidelines define instant offense broadly: conduct that is part of the instant offense means conduct that is relevant conduct to the instant offense under the provisions of Sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant conduct). U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2, comment (n. 1). 16 Had instant offense been defined for purposes of Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, or by this court, to include relevant conduct, the government's reliance on Bernaugh, 969 F.2d at 861, and Morales, 977 F.2d 1330, would be persuasive. 2 But this court has opted against defining instant offense broadly and has instead defined it narrowly as offense of conviction, United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d at 1261; Polland, 994 F.2d at 1269, and offense of conviction refers only to the  'offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which the defendant was convicted.'  Rubin, 999 F.2d at 196 (quoting U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.2(a)). See also, Jennings, 991 F.2d at 733. We are bound by this definition, and applying it here we conclude that a defendant cannot receive an enhancement for obstruction of justice for refusing to testify at a co-conspirator's trial. 3 17 Our conclusion finds support in other circuits which have defined, as this circuit has, instant offense as offense of conviction. For example, in United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 958 (3d Cir.1994), the Third Circuit defined instant offense as offense of conviction 4 and then held that in order for the district court to apply a two-level upward adjustment, the facts showing Kim's obstruction must relate to the offense of possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, of which he was convicted, or its investigation, prosecution, or sentencing and not some other offense. Id. United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir.1991), also defined instant offense as offense of conviction and similarly concluded that conduct outside the charged offense should not have been considered under this [3C1.1] section. Similarly, here, the obstructive conduct, i.e. refusing to testify at a co-conspirator's trial, did not relate to Partee's charged offense--the offense of conviction. This does not mean that a defendant's disregard for a court order to testify under a grant of immunity will go unpunished; a district court could sentence a defendant to imprisonment for criminal contempt of court. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 401. See, e.g., United States v. Monteleone, 804 F.2d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir.1986) (affirming criminal contempt sentence of four years in prison for defendant's refusal to give testimony before the grand jury under a grant of immunity). 18
19 The district court denied Partee a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because Partee had received an enhancement for obstruction of justice. As discussed above, the district court erred in granting Partee an enhancement for obstruction of justice. This reason, therefore, cannot serve as a basis for denying Partee a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Another appropriate basis, however, may exist for denying Partee an acceptance of responsibility reduction. For instance, violating a court order to testify under a grant of immunity may support denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction. See United States v. Atterson, 926 F.2d 649, 661-62 (7th Cir.1991) (affirming the denial of an acceptance of responsibility reduction based in part on defendant's reluctance to testify concerning information he had provided to the United States Attorney). Whether this conduct should prevent Partee from receiving a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is, of course, for the district court to decide. See United States v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir.1990) (remand ordered after this court rejected the district court's rationale for denying an acceptance of responsibility reduction, even though there was other evidence in the record that the district court could have relied on to deny the two-point reduction). But cf., United States v. Beal, 960 F.2d 629, 635 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Blas, 947 F.2d 1320, 1330 (7th Cir.1991) (upholding district court's refusal to find an acceptance of responsibility, even though the judge failed to specifically state his reasoning because there was more than an adequate foundation in the record for such a finding). Therefore, we remand for findings and sentencing consistent with this opinion.