Opinion ID: 199681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cross-Examination of Storella for Bias

Text: 28 We also ask whether DiBenedetto has made out a constitutional claim as to the inability to cross-examine Storella concerning his connection to the mob. The Supreme Court has recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17 (1974). [B]ias is 'always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 432 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Tracey, 675 F.2d 433, 437 (1st Cir. 1982)). However, the Supreme Court has also held that the Confrontation Clause does not 29 prevent[] a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness . . . . [T]rial judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 30 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). 31 Van Arsdall sets forth the test for determining whether a limitation on cross-examination violates the Confrontation Clause. The first question to be asked under the Van Arsdall test is whether the limitation prejudiced the examination of that particular witness. In other words, absent the limitation, would the jury have received a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility? Id. at 679-80; see also United States v. Twomey, 806 F.2d 1136, 1140 (1st Cir. 1986) (limitation on questions regarding witness's commission of two murders, giving him motive to cooperate with government, not prejudicial because cross-examination had established that he received a favorable sentencing recommendation in exchange for testimony). The second element of the Van Arsdall test is whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; if so, reversal is not warranted. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681. 32 Two decisions of this Court provide guidance in this case. In Lynn, we were confronted with the question of whether a trial court's complete foreclosure of cross-examination into a relevant and not fully explored area violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Lynn, 856 F.2d at 433-34. We held that, to meet the constitutional standard, the trial court must ensure that the jury is provided with 'sufficient information concerning formative events to make a discriminating appraisal of a witness's motives and bias.' Id. at 433 (quoting Twomey, 806 F.2d at 1140 (quoting United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1970))). We concluded that, [w]hile the cross-examination . . . was extensive, there were relatively few questions concerning [the witness's] continuing reasons to lie to please the government and therefore the constitutional standard had not been met. Id. at 433-34. 33 However, our decision in Lynn must be viewed next to our decision on the habeas petition presented in Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 1999), where we held that the Confrontation Clause does not give a defendant the right to cross-examine regarding every conceivable theory of bias. Id. at 242. Rather, [t]he threshold requirement imposed by the Confrontation Clause is satisfied as long as the defendant is given a fair chance to inquire into a witness's bias. Id.; see also United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990) (So long as a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation is developed, the judge enjoys power and discretion to set appropriate boundaries.). In Bui, we observed that a trial judge may circumscribe cross-examination if the party is unable to lay a proper evidentiary framework; where the offer is inherent[ly] speculative[], the trial judge may prohibit[] cross-examiners from mounting fishing expeditions. 170 F.3d at 244; see also United States v. Zaccaria, 240 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (refusal to allow inquiry into witness's drug trafficking, based solely on alleged admission to defendant, did not violate Confrontation Clause because some proof in the form of concrete facts must underlie any offering that can be accepted by a trial court as evidence). The question here is whether the bias alleged by DiBenedetto falls more within the ambit of the Lynn case, or the Bui case. The Commonwealth argues that Bui controls, while DiBenedetto cites Lynn. The SJC held that Storella had been sufficiently cross-examined as to his credibility, based on his repeated lies to investigating authorities, and as to bias, based on his need to cooperate with the government to avoid being charged with the murder himself. DiBenedetto, 693 N.E.2d at 1012. However, the bias alleged by DiBenedetto is bias of a different nature -- although Storella was cross-examined on bias towards the government, he was not cross-examined on bias towards a third party -- namely, the La Cosa Nostra leadership. Third-party bias is a proper topic for cross-examination. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50-52 (1984). 34 Nonetheless, the defense did have the opportunity to cross-examine Storella generally as to his motivation in developing the countless variations and embellishments to his account. Both defense counsel repeatedly asked Storella what he was afraid of, or what his concern was, at the time he gave his statements to the investigating authorities. Storella repeatedly answered that he was afraid of being charged with conspiracy to murder, never once indicating that he was concerned with breaking the La Cosa Nostra code of silence or otherwise angering the mob. Storella also testified under cross-examination that he was afraid of Bottari and Chiuchiolo because of their connections to a few known figures in the North End, indicating that, at least in his view, these two were not on the outs with the La Cosa Nostra leadership. Like the voir dire in the Bui case, Storella's responses to the general cross-examination questions indicate that Storella was not likely to provide the defendant with the answers he was seeking through more specific cross-examination on the Limoli murder. Based on the extensive questioning by the two defense attorneys regarding Storella's motives and credibility, and the speculative nature of the proffered line of inquiry, the trial judge did not offend DiBenedetto's Sixth Amendment rights in excluding cross-examination on the Limoli murder, even as to bias.