Opinion ID: 1392831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Extraordinary medical and custodial expenses

Text: This claim for damages relates to the medical, therapeutic and custodial costs associated with caring for a severely handicapped child. There is nothing exceptional in allowing this item of damage. It is a recognized principle of tort law to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another. W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 2 at 6 (5th ed. 1984); see K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 103 Nev. 39, 49, 732 P.2d 1364, 1371 (1987) (tort damages serve to make injured party whole). Extraordinary care expenses are a foreseeable result of the negligence alleged in this case, and Sundi Greco should be allowed to recover those expenses if she can prove them. This leads us to the question of how to compensate for these kinds of injuries. Sundi Greco correctly observes that Nevada law requires the parents of a handicapped child to support that child beyond the age of majority if the child cannot support itself. NRS 125B.110; see, e.g., Minnear v. Minnear, 107 Nev. 495, 814 P.2d 85 (1991). Nevada recognizes the right of a parent to recover from a tortfeasor any expenses the parent was required to pay because of the injury to his or her minor child. Frances v. Plaza Pacific Equities, 109 Nev. 91, 847 P.2d 722 (1993). Accordingly, Sundi Greco claims the right to recover damages for these extraordinary costs for a period equal to Joshua's life expectancy. Other states which require parents to care for handicapped children past the age of majority allow plaintiffs to recover these types of damages for the lifetime of the child or until such time as the child is no longer dependent on her or his parents. [8] We agree with these authorities and conclude that Sundi Greco may recover extraordinary medical and custodial expenses associated with caring for Joshua for whatever period of time it is established that Joshua will be dependent upon her to provide such care. The United States contends that if this court allows the mother to recover such extraordinary medical and custodial expenses, then it should require the district court to offset any such award by the amount it would cost to raise a non-handicapped child. To do otherwise, argues the United States, would be to grant the mother a windfall. See, e.g., Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 349-50 (N.H. 1986) (adopting offset rule). The offset rule has its origins in two doctrines: the avoidable consequences rule, which requires plaintiffs to mitigate their damages in tort cases, and the expectancy rule of damages employed in contract cases, which seeks to place the plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the contract been performed. Smith, 513 A.2d at 349. We conclude that neither of these doctrines is applicable to the case at bar. To enforce the avoidable consequences rule in the instant case would impose unreasonable burdens upon the mother such as, perhaps, putting Joshua up for adoption or otherwise seeking to terminate her parental obligations. See Norman M. Block, Note, Wrongful Birth: The Avoidance of Consequences Doctrine in Mitigation of Damages, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1107 (1985). With regard to the expectancy rule, it would unnecessarily complicate and limit recovery for patients in other malpractice cases if we were to begin intruding contract damage principles upon our malpractice jurisprudence. The rule for compensatory damages in negligence cases is clear and workable, and we decline to depart from it.