Opinion ID: 6323200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the plain-error standard

Text: Time and again, this Court has emphasized “ ‘ “the importance of preserving issues for appellate review” ’ ” and expressed its disfavor of considering “ ‘ “unpreserved claims of error,” even unpreserved claims of constitutional error.’ ” 2 “As a general rule, appellate courts will not grant relief on belated claims of error unless the proponent establishes, among other things, that the unpreserved error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” 3 This general rule exists for good reason: “ ‘ “[A]nyone familiar with the work of courts understands that errors are a constant in the trial process, that most do not much matter, and that a reflexive inclination by appellate 2 People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 115; 869 NW2d 829 (2015), quoting People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 653-654; 821 NW2d 288 (2012). See also Carines, 460 Mich at 761-762, citing People v Grant, 445 Mich 535; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). 3 Cain, 498 Mich at 112 (emphasis added). 2 courts to reverse because of unpreserved error would be fatal.” ’ ” 4 “Preservation serves ‘the important need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around[.]’ ” 5 It is with this basic understanding of appellate law that this Court in Carines adopted the plain-error standard set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v Olano for forfeited constitutional errors. 6 “[I]n order to receive relief on his forfeited claim of constitutional error, defendant must establish (1) that the error occurred, (2) that the error was plain, (3) that the error affected substantial rights, and (4) that the error either resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 7 Although the third prong generally requires a defendant to establish “prejudice,” i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings, there exists a special “category of cases, yet to be clearly defined, where prejudice is presumed or reversal is automatic.” 8 Errors in these cases are referred to as “structural errors” because “they ‘affect the framework within which the trial 4 Id. at 115, quoting Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 134; 129 S Ct 1423; 173 L Ed 2d 266 (2009). 5 People v Pipes, 475 Mich 267, 277; 715 NW2d 290 (2006), quoting Grant, 445 Mich at 551. 6 Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764, citing United States v Olano, 507 US 725; 113 S Ct 1770; 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993). 7 Vaughn, 491 Mich at 664-665 (quotation marks omitted; emphasis added), citing Carines, 460 Mich at 763. 8 Vaughn, 491 Mich at 666 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 3 proceeds’ and are not ‘simply an error in the trial process itself.’ ” 9 As we stated in People v Vaughn, another case involving an unpreserved claim of error regarding a defendant’s right to a public trial: While the Supreme Court of the United States has specifically reserved judgment on whether an unpreserved structural error automatically affects a defendant’s substantial rights, this Court’s decision in People v Duncan[10] has explained that structural errors are intrinsically harmful, without regard to their effect on the outcome. Accordingly, our caselaw suggests that a plain structural error satisfies the third Carines prong. Nevertheless, even if defendant can show that the error satisfied the first three Carines requirements, we must exercise discretion and only grant defendant a new trial if the error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Although denial of the right to a public trial is a structural error, it is still subject to this requirement. While any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, the plain-error analysis requires us to consider whether an error seriously affected those factors.[11] In People v Cain, this Court reaffirmed Vaughn’s holding that even with respect to unpreserved structural errors, “a defendant is still not entitled to relief unless he or she can 9 United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 148; 126 S Ct 2557; 165 L Ed 2d 409 (2006) (brackets omitted), quoting Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 309-310; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991). Structural errors are distinguishable from “trial error[s],” which are errors that “occur[] during presentation of the case to the jury” and “may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether [they are] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US at 148 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 10 People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 51; 610 NW2d 551 (2000). 11 Vaughn, 491 Mich at 666-667 (quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted). 4 satisfy the four requirements set forth in Carines.” 12 “While meeting all four prongs is difficult, as it should be, the plain-error test affords defendants sufficient protection because . . . [a]pplication of a plain-error analysis to unpreserved structural error does not deny that error close consideration . . . .” 13 Reviewing courts must “ ‘consider carefully whether any forfeited error either resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ ” 14 “[T]he fourth Carines prong is meant to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis.” 15 II. PROBLEMS WITH THE MAJORITY OPINION’S FRAMEWORK Rather than follow the traditional plain-error framework outlined in Carines and applied in Vaughn, the majority opinion carves out an exception for unpreserved structural errors. The Court concludes that all structural errors defy the third prong of Carines because they render a trial fundamentally unfair, undermine the reliability of the guiltdetermining process, and affect the framework within which the trial proceeds. As to the fourth Carines prong, the majority opinion shifts the burden to the prosecution to show why the forfeited structural error did not result in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of defendant’s trial. I discern a number of problems with the Court’s newfound framework. 12 Cain, 498 Mich at 116. 13 Id. (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). 14 Id. at 116-117, quoting Vaughn, 491 Mich at 655 n 42. 15 Id. at 121. 5 As an initial matter, I am troubled by this Court’s sua sponte decision to modify the current plain-error standard with absolutely no notice to the bench and the bar. Nothing in this Court’s order for supplemental briefing even hinted at the notion that this Court was considering altering our traditional framework, nor did our order invite traditional interest groups, such as the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, to file briefs amicus curiae. 16 Also, defendant did not request such a change in the law in his application for leave to appeal. Instead, defendant’s supplemental brief advocates for this new standard in the alternative; that is, only if this Court concludes that defendant cannot satisfy his burden under all four Carines prongs. By adopting a new standard of appellate review for unpreserved structural errors without notice to the bench and the bar, this Court deprives interested parties from weighing in on this jurisprudentially significant issue, which has far-reaching ramifications in our state’s criminal law jurisprudence. These prudential concerns are particularly heightened considering that the majority opinion goes further than the Supreme Court of the United States or this Court has previously been willing to go. “Despite its name, the term ‘structural error’ carries with it no talismanic significance as a doctrinal matter. It means only that the government is not entitled to deprive the defendant of a new trial by showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 17 As we stated in Vaughn, the Supreme Court of the United States “has expressly distinguished plain-error analysis from harmless-error analysis” by 16 See People v Davis, 507 Mich 853 (2021). 17 Weaver v Massachusetts, 582 US ___, ___; 137 S Ct 1899, 1910; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). 6 “repeatedly with[holding] judgment on whether a structural error automatically satisfies the third prong of plain-error analysis, implying that structural errors do not entirely defy plain-error analysis, even if they do defy harmless-error analysis.” 18 We also explained in Vaughn that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v United States “rejected the argument that Olano does not apply to a claimed structural error because it had ‘no authority’ to create ‘out of whole cloth’ an exception to the traditional forfeiture analysis simply because the claimed error was structural.” 19 By concluding that all unpreserved structural errors defy the traditional plain-error framework, automatically satisfy the third Carines prong, and presumptively satisfy the fourth Carines prong, the majority opinion breaks new ground with little discussion of this Court’s previous concerns about keeping harmless-error review and plain-error review conceptually separate. Further, this Court in Cain specifically rejected the majority opinion’s new burdenshifting framework, stating: The dissent’s theory that the structural nature of the error presumptively establishes the fourth prong is inconsistent with this Court’s recent holding in Vaughn, that even with regards to a structural error, a defendant is not entitled to relief unless he can establish that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and that while any error that is structural is likely to have an effect on the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, the plain-error analysis requires us to consider whether an error seriously affected those factors.[20] 18 Vaughn, 491 Mich at 656 n 42 (emphasis omitted), citing Puckett, 556 US at 140. 19 Id. at 655, quoting Johnson v United States, 520 US 461, 466; 117 S Ct 1544; 137 L Ed 2d 718 (1997). 20 Cain, 498 Mich at 118 n 4 (quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted). Although the majority opinion recognizes that “not every public-trial violation will in fact lead to a fundamentally unfair trial,” Weaver, 582 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1911, it fails to give due 7 This Court now adopts the dissent’s theory in Cain and overrules Vaughn’s application of the plain-error standard for unpreserved structural errors without any mention of the doctrine of stare decisis. 21 weight to this principle in its articulation of its rebuttable presumption under the fourth Carines prong. The majority states that “[t]here is substantial overlap between the characteristics of structural errors (i.e., they necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair) and the standard under the fourth Carines prong (serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings).” Ante at 18 (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added). However, “[a]n error can count as structural even if the error does not lead to fundamental unfairness in every case.” Weaver, 582 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1908; see also Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US at 149 n 4 (rejecting the notion that “fundamental unfairness” is the sole criterion of structural error and stating that structural errors do not “always or necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair and unreliable”). Indeed, we recognized in Vaughn that “[t]he right to a public trial is of a different order because the violation of that right does not necessarily affect qualitatively the guiltdetermining process or the defendant’s ability to participate in the process.” Vaughn, 491 Mich at 657 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, while there may be some overlap between the characteristics of structural error and the “fairness” principles encompassed in the fourth Carines prong, this will not always be the case, as there are other considerations unrelated to the fairness or reliability of the proceedings that can contribute to an error being labeled “structural” such that it defies harmless-error analysis. See Weaver, 582 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1908-1910 (explaining that there are at least three broad, nonexclusive rationales for why an error may be deemed “structural”—(1) “if the right at issue is not designed to protect the defendant from erroneous conviction but instead protects some other interest”; (2) “if the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure”; or (3) “if the error always results in fundamental unfairness”—and that public-trial violations have characteristics of all three). 21 People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 212; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) (“Deciding to overrule precedent is not a decision that this Court takes lightly. Indeed, this Court should respect precedent and not overrule or modify it unless there is substantial justification for doing so.”). See Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 464; 613 NW2d 307 (2000) (establishing a three-part test to determine whether to depart from stare decisis). 8 The majority opinion’s new framework also largely ignores the broader teachings of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Weaver v Massachusetts. 22 The issue in Weaver was whether the burden of proving prejudice for an unpreserved publictrial violation changed when the defendant raised that claim of structural error on collateral review via an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim rather than on direct review. 23 The Court ultimately concluded that the burden remained on the defendant to show prejudice under either the traditional ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard articulated in Strickland v Washington (i.e., “ ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different’ ”), or a less “ ‘mechanical’ ” framework that focused on “ ‘the fundamental fairness of the proceeding’ ” (i.e., that the attorney’s error rendered the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair). 24 Particularly relevant is the Court’s discussion as to why placing the burden on the defendant, who failed to preserve the claimed error on direct appeal, was appropriate: The reason for placing the burden on the [defendant] in this case . . . derives both from the nature of the error and the difference between a public-trial violation preserved and then raised on direct review and a public-trial violation raised as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. . . . 22 Weaver, 582 US ___; 137 S Ct 1899. 23 Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1905. 24 Id. at ___; 137 S Ct at 1911, quoting Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694, 696; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). The Court in Weaver accepted, “for analytical purposes,” the defendant’s argument “that under a proper interpretation of Strickland, even if there is no showing of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, relief still must be granted if the convicted person shows that attorney errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” Weaver, 582 US at ___; 137 S Ct at 1911. The Court ultimately deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the defendant’s interpretation of Strickland was correct. 9 [W]hen a defendant objects to a courtroom closure, the trial court can either order the courtroom opened or explain the reasons for keeping it closed. When a defendant first raises the closure in an ineffective-assistance claim, however, the trial court is deprived of the chance to cure the violation either by opening the courtroom or by explaining the reasons for closure. Furthermore, when state or federal courts adjudicate errors objected to during trial and then raised on direct review, the systemic costs of remedying the error are diminished to some extent. That is because, if a new trial is ordered on direct review, there may be a reasonable chance that not too much time will have elapsed for witness memories still to be accurate and physical evidence not to be lost. . . .