Opinion ID: 2514968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Heggland's Mandatory Minimum Sentence Should Be Sustained Based On the Maximum Term of Imprisonment for his Colorado Sentence Without Including the Mandatory Parole Period.

Text: Although the ICA incorrectly interpreted Heggland's period of mandatory parole which expired on November 21, 2004, after the PDD offense was committedto be part of the maximum term of imprisonment possible, the question of the applicability of mandatory minimum sentencing to Heggland is not extinguished. [12] In order for the mandatory minimum statute to apply, Heggland's PDD offense must have been committed within the maximum term of imprisonment possible after a prior felony conviction of another jurisdiction, viz., Heggland's Colorado conviction. HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f). Heggland's offense occurred on August 28, 2003. Although Heggland stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction in Colorado for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery, he did not stipulate to further facts about the conviction. At the time, Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery in Colorado had a maximum term of imprisonment of six years. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(A) (Westlaw, Colorado Statutes 1996Annotated). In its motion for sentencing, the prosecution argued that [e]ven if the Court, uses the maximum term of imprisonment (six years from Defendant's sentence on November 14, 1997 = November 13, 2003) and ignores the mandatory period of parole Defendant still committed the crimes in this case ... before November 13, 2003, such that HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f) would apply. Heggland contends, however, that the ICA relied upon incompetent evidence of his Colorado conviction, and that the prosecution failed to establish sufficient proof that Heggland's conviction fell within the ambit of HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f). Whether the mandatory minimum statute applies in this case depends on the date on which Heggland's term of imprisonment for his Colorado conviction began (the sentence date), and the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that date. As the name implies, mandatory minimum sentencing is not discretionary with the trial court. See State v. Delmondo, 67 Haw. 531, 533, 696 P.2d 344, 346 (1985) (If [the defendant] is found to be a repeat offender, the sentencing court is bound to impose the applicable mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.). However, the trial court must nevertheless assess whether the statute applies, based on arguments and the evidence proffered by the prosecution or stipulated to by the defendant. As made clear in the discussion below, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to credit the evidence of Heggland's prior Colorado conviction, given that Heggland stipulated to his prior conviction and failed to specifically challenge the facts about the conviction apparent from that evidence.