Opinion ID: 1303713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: Inadequate Sympathy Instructions

Text: (34) Defendant contends that the jury was inadequately instructed regarding the aggravating and mitigating factors it might consider in determining penalty. Specifically, defendant complains of the trial court's failure to explain that evidence of mitigating factors related solely to defendant's background and character could be considered and used as a basis for a sentence less than death. Defendant contends that instructions based merely upon the catchall provision of the 1977 law (any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime) are constitutionally inadequate. (See former § 190.3, subd. (j).) We rejected a related claim under the 1978 death penalty law, holding that similar broad language in that law (see § 190.3, subd. (k)) permits the sentencer to consider all mitigating character and background evidence, and that the 1978 law is therefore constitutionally adequate in that regard. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516]; see People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, 178.) For the same reason the 1977 law is valid on its face. A majority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court, upon reviewing our Brown decision, stressed the necessity of analyzing the record in each case to determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and read in conjunction with the prosecutor's arguments, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. (See California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, ___ [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943, 107 S.Ct. 837, 842] (conc. opn. by O'Connor, J.), ___ [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 952, 107 S.Ct. at p. 850] (dis. opn. by Brennan, J.), ___ [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 953, 107 S.Ct. at p. 842] (dis. opn. by Blackmun, J.).) We have undertaken such a review, and we conclude that there exists no legitimate basis (see opn. of O'Connor, J., id., at p. ___ [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 943, 107 S.Ct. at p. 842]) for believing that the jury was misled regarding its sentencing responsibilities. Our review of the record indicates that the prosecutor made no remarks during jury argument which might have so misled the jury. The prosecutor originally outlined defendant's background and character evidence and argued that none of it extenuated the offense or reduce[d] it down in way of mitigation, amelioration in extenuating circumstances. After defense counsel responded by commenting upon defendant's good qualities as expressed by his family, and shown by his commendable war record, the prosecutor acknowledged that the jury could have mercy. Feel sorry for him. Give him all the benefit of sympathy you can conjure up for him. The prosecutor concluded, of course, that the death penalty was nonetheless the appropriate penalty on weighing the various aggravating and mitigating factors. Defense counsel then gave his own concluding plea for the jury to exercise its discretion in favor of life imprisonment. In sum, the closing arguments presented the jury with a balanced mixture of explanation and advocacy. Nowhere did counsel misrepresent the scope of the jury's sentencing responsibilities. Moreover, in the present case we note that the trial court substantially modified the standard jury instructions in order to clarify the jury's sentencing responsibilities. First, the court explained that although the jury previously had been instructed (in connection with the special circumstances trial) not to be influenced by pity or sympathy for the defendant, I instruct you that in this, the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the Defendant would be proper considerations if you should find them to be warranted in these circumstances. (Italics added.) Moreover, in instructing the jury regarding the statutory mitigating factors, the court sua sponte partially clarified the catchall factor (§ 190.3, subd. (j)) to explain that extenuates means tends to lessen the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse therefor. We conclude that the jury could not have been misled regarding the scope of its penalty discretion.