Opinion ID: 608923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Turner

Text: 8 We start, as required by Abbott, by examining whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral objective. Through their affidavits and depositions, the prison officials explained that the prison had an interest in screening mail for escape plans, contraband, threats, or evidence of illegal activity. Although there is less of a security risk with outgoing mail precisely because the mail is going out of the prison, Abbott, 490 U.S. at 413, 109 S.Ct. at 1881, there is also no doubt that prison officials are justified in discovering and refusing to process mail that contains these matters. Id. at 412, 109 S.Ct. at 1880; Martinez, 416 U.S. at 412-13, 94 S.Ct. at 1881. This being the case, it is apparent that the regulation at issue is reasonably related to this legitimate purpose; only by discovering the contents of the mail can prison officials insure that mail containing improper matters is not sent outside the prison. 4 9 Determining whether alternative means for exercising the right asserted by the inmates exist is complicated by the difficulties in ascertaining the precise right that is asserted. If the right at issue is the right to communicate with the media and outside religious figures and institutions, there is no doubt that alternative means exist. The record reflects that inmates may use the phone to communicate with people outside the prison, and there is also an indication that, under certain circumstances, in-person meetings may be (and have been) arranged. Moreover, the challenged regulation does not bar communication via the mail; Smith is perfectly free to write to the media or the clergy about a wide range of subjects (including matters critical of the prison) without being censored. Recognizing this, Smith seems to argue there is no alternative means for exercising his right to unmonitored communication. We do not believe he has such a right. Certainly, constant monitoring of communications would be a problem of great constitutional dimension if we dealt with communications between non-inmates and the media or the clergy. However, there is no doubt, in light of both Martinez and Abbott, that prison officials have a legitimate interest in preventing inmates from communicating certain types of information. 10 Thirdly, we examine the impact on non-prisoners if the regulation were struck down. If this regulation, which represents the only method of identifying impermissible mail, were not allowed, mail containing threats, escape plans, etc. would be processed and delivered without the knowledge of prison officials. This has a tremendous impact on prison officials, who have a strong interest in preventing, deterring, and discovering escape plans. It also would have a strong impact on anyone receiving a threat from an inmate. 11 Smith finds much meaning in the fact that the prison officials could not identify an instance in which impermissible matters were included in media and clergy mail when those types of mail were treated as privileged. We do not find this factual allegation to be terribly important. First, neither of the defendants had anything to do with changing the classification, which change has effect over the entire Missouri prison system. The fact that no problems were encountered at Potosi does not mean Potosi should be exempt from an otherwise valid regulation. Second, and most importantly, prison officials do not need to wait for problems to occur before addressing them; prison officials are entitled to act preemptively in order to prevent problems from occurring in the first place. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 404-05, 94 S.Ct. at 1807. 12 Finally, we examine available alternatives to the regulation. Smith argues that the prison can (as it had in the past) maintain a list of media outlets and their addresses and allow mail addressed to the outlets to be sent to the mailroom sealed. The premise upon which Smith bases the efficacy of this procedure is that pre-identified media outlets would not be likely to facilitate escape plans, would not forward threatening letters, and would report to the prison authorities any illegal activity or contraband contained in mail sent by inmates. Cf. Burton v. Foltz, 599 F.Supp. 114, 116 (E.D.Mich.1984). However, the prison officials contend the making of such a list is not as easy as it seems. First, there would be a great deal of difficulty in identifying the media. Obviously, ABC News and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch would be included on the list. However, more problematic entities exist; for instance, would an extremist group's newsletter have to be included? If so, the prison's interests may be seriously undermined; the list would not necessarily enable the prison to satisfy its constitutionally-permissible objective of insuring that illegitimate communication is not sent out of the prison and acted upon by outsiders. If such groups could be excluded, the prison would face an impossible task in formulating the list as it struggled to determine which groups could be properly excluded, and by which standard such determinations would be made. These barriers convince us that the Constitution does not require the prison to maintain a list of members of the media to which inmates may send sealed mail. 5 13 Smith, recognizing the problems inherent in deciding who should and should not be included on a list, suggests the prison officials can meet their constitutional obligations by making a list of, for instance, twenty-five media outlets. We do not find this solution availing. First, Smith either has or does not have a right to unmonitored communication with the media; the Constitution would not grant him a right to unmonitored communication with only twenty-five members of the media. Second, a limited list does not avoid the problems we have recounted; problems would undoubtedly arise over who should be included and excluded from the list. 6