Opinion ID: 2365043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Relating to Victim's Ability to Accurately Recall Events

Text: [¶ 12] The purpose of Rule 412 of the Maine Rules of Evidence is to protect[] the State's strong and legitimate interest in preventing a trial from becoming a trial of the victim, rather than of the accused. State v. Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 9, 711 A.2d 851, 855. This interest, however, `is neither absolute nor paramount,' id. (quoting State v. Jacques, 558 A.2d 706, 707 (Me.1989)), and it must yield when it conflicts with a defendant's constitutional rights. See M.R. Evid. 412(b)(3). [¶ 13] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment establishes a defendant's right to conduct reasonable or `otherwise appropriate' cross-examination to expose facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to a witness's reliability. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). Accordingly, a defendant has a constitutional right, subject to the reasonable application of Rule 403, to introduce evidence of a victim witness's past sexual behavior to expose a possible motive to lie. See id. at 230-31, 109 S.Ct. 480. Similarly, we have held that a defendant has a constitutional right to present evidence otherwise barred by Rule 412 to rebut the presumption of a victim's sexual naivete. Jacques, 558 A.2d at 708. We also allow the admission of such evidence when the prosecution has opened the door by offering evidence of the victim's chastity, State v. Leonard, 513 A.2d 1352, 1355 (Me.1986), and when a statement by the victim about past sexual conduct is relevant for impeachment, Almurshidy, 1999 ME 97, ¶ 25, 732 A.2d at 287; see generally M.R. Evid. 412 advisory committee's notes to 1983 amend., Me.Rptr., 449-458 A.2d LXXI (recognizing that rule does not prohibit evidence when presented for impeachment or when prosecution opens the door). Each of these exceptions to the general prohibitions of Rule 412 stem from a defendant's constitutional right to effectively cross-examine and to present a proper defense. See generally Jacques, 558 A.2d at 708 (recognizing defendant's constitutional right of effective cross-examination and to present a proper defense). [¶ 14] In the present case, Robinson offered evidence relating to the first sexual assault to challenge the victim's stability, state of mind and credibility on the night in question because [p]ossible trauma caused by the first assault may have impaired her ability to recall the details of the second assault. This is the kind of evidence that would enable the jury to draw a proper inference relating to the credibility of the victim's testimony because it bears upon her ability to accurately perceive the events she related. Automatic exclusion of such evidence would violate the defendant's right to present a proper defense, and, thus, the evidence is admissible under Rule 412(b)(3). [¶ 15] Nonetheless, the court acted within its discretion by excluding the evidence, when offered for this purpose, pursuant to Rule 403. `[T]he Sixth Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial system.' Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991) (quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 241, 95 S.Ct. 2160, 45 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)). `[T]rial judges retain wide latitude' to limit reasonably a criminal defendant's right to cross-examine a witness `based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.' Lucas, 500 U.S. at 149, 111 S.Ct. 1743 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431). In the present case, the probative value of the evidence relating to the effect that the prior rape may have had on the victim's ability to recall the events of the evening was insubstantial because she otherwise testified at the trial that she was extremely drunk and possibly drugged to the point that she could not remember much of what happened after she left her friends' party. She also testified that she could not remember how she had made her way across town on foot and arrived at Robinson's apartment. The court acted within its discretion in concluding that the probative value of the details of the first rape on the issue of the victim's ability to accurately recall subsequent events was outweighed by the danger of confusion of the issues and undue delay resulting from a trial within a trial as to what occurred at the party and that, more generally, the evidence was cumulative. See M.R. Evid. 403.