Opinion ID: 2394791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Issue of Traceability, as Provided in Section 44-53-520(a)(7) of the South Carolina Code

Text: Petitioners argue that the court of appeals applied a totality of the circumstances test when determining whether the forfeiture complied with the traceability requirement of section 44-53-320(a)(7), and that it erred in doing so. More specifically, Petitioners argue the court of appeals placed too much emphasis on the drug dog alert to find the money was traceable to illegal drug activity. We disagree. In Pope v. Gordon , we addressed the standard to be applied to section 44-53-520(a)(7). 369 S.C. 469, 633 S.E.2d 148 (2006). In that case, the police seized the bank accounts of Gordon's carwash business, pursuant to a conviction for trafficking in crack cocaine. Id. at 473, 633 S.E.2d at 150. To draw the connection between the money seized and illegal transactions, the state presented evidence that Gordon paid for his monthly rent in cash, he failed to pay taxes for his business for the period in question, and that the portion of expenses that exceeded his business income was paid for in cash. Id. at 475, 633 S.E.2d at 152. In essence, Gordon's tendency to transact in cash was the state's primary argument that the money in the bank account was illegally gained. This Court affirmed the court of appeals' holding that the state failed to show probable cause that the money in the bank accounts was traceable to illegal drug transactions. Id. at 476, 633 S.E.2d at 152. In that case, the State urged this Court to follow the rationale used in United States v. Thomas, where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the government's seizure of property based on a totality of circumstances. 913 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir.1990). In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit found that the possession of unusually large amounts of cash was significant, and may be circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking. Id. at 1115. The court further relied on the fact that the defendant's cash expenditures vastly exceeded his legitimate income, he made numerous one way trips to Miami, and that he had a history of convictions for possession of drugs. Id. at 1115-16. This Court declined to use the Thomas rationale, finding that a totality of the circumstances analysis lessened the burden on the state to prove a nexus, and that it was in direct contravention to the traceable language used in the statute. Gordon, 369 S.C. at 476, 633 S.E.2d at 152. In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit held that probable cause in the context of forfeiture cases is the same standard employed in search and seizure cases. Thomas, 913 F.2d at 1114. This requires the court to `make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth... there is a fair probability' that the properties to be forfeited are proceeds of illegal drug transactions. Id. ( quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). We agree there is a parallel between government seizure under the Fourth Amendment and government seizure in civil forfeiture cases. Therefore, in evaluating traceability, a court may weigh the evidence presented to draw its conclusion. What a court may not do, and what the State urged this Court to do in Gordon, is draw inferences based on evidence that is unrelated to the property being seized. Notably, in Gordon, this Court did not construe traceability so narrow as to require bills be marked or serial numbers be recorded. Neither did this Court require the State prove to an absolute certainty that the money in the bank account was a product of illegal drug transactions. Rather, in that case, this Court sought to prevent the State from confiscating legitimately owned property by presenting evidence that was unrelated to the property being seized. Our hesitancy in using a totality of the circumstances test for determining traceability derives from a concern that unrelated circumstantial evidence will become a substitute for real evidence that money or goods are products of illegal activity. The concern that was present in Gordon is not present here. In this case, the court of appeals found that the probabilities, to the exclusion of all else, pointed to the conclusion that the money found in the safe was illegally gained. The courts below saw it significant that a large sum of cash was found hidden in a convicted drug dealer's bedroom, under his sole control, bundled in a way that is typical for drug transactions, and in close proximity to drug paraphernalia. The inferences made in Gordon need not be made here. Furthermore, we disagree with Petitioners' contention that a drug dog's alert should bear no weight when evaluating traceability. Although many courts have questioned the probative value of dog alerts due to contamination of the nation's paper currency with drug residue, these courts have not completely disregarded it as a form of evidence. See United States v. $78,850.00 in U.S. Currency, 517 F.Supp.2d 792, 797 (D.S.C.2007) (declining to take a position on the probative value of a positive alert, but stating that, based on the alert, it is more likely than not that the $433,890 was substantially related to a drug offense); United States v. Funds in the Amount of $30,670, 403 F.3d 448 (7th Cir.2005) (considering expert testimony that `scientific results indicate that circulated currency, innocently contaminated with [microgram] quantities of cocaine would not cause a properly trained detection canine to signal an alert even if very large numbers of bills are present'); United States v. $22,474.00 in U.S. Currency, 246 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir.2001) (stating a sophisticated dog sniff and other factors can tip the scales in favor of establishing probable cause). But see United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($36,634), 103 F.3d 1048, 1056 (1st Cir.1997) (finding that a dog reaction weighs some, but not a great deal, on the scale). While the drug dog's alert on the safe, standing alone, would not have proved the presence of drugs, the positive canine alert was a factor that the court of appeals rightly determined to be significant. Further, we note it is significant that the canine alerted on the safe and not the money. This fact alone distinguishes the case at hand from the cases cited above, and renders Petitioners' contamination theory questionable. Thus, in our opinion, the State established there was probable cause to believe a substantial connection existed between the money contained in the safe and illegal drug activity, both because the money was found in close proximity to illegal drugs, and because the money was traceable to illegal transactions. Therefore, the court of appeals did not err.