Opinion ID: 1058511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of Subdivision Ordinance Standards

Text: Logan argues that the former Subdivision Ordinance did not comply with the provisions of Code § 15.2-2242(1), which permit local governing bodies to adopt procedures for granting exceptions under their subdivision ordinances. Logan contends that the former Subdivision Ordinance failed to articulate standards required by Code § 15.2-2242(1) to guide decisions regarding the approval of exceptions. According to Logan, the evaluative factors listed in former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90(b) provided little or no guidance for the granting of exceptions. Logan also contends that the language in former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67 regarding block lengths lacked any substantive standard for permitting an exception under that section. Initially, we do not consider Logan's argument that former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-67 was facially invalid because it lacked any standard to guide administrative review of its provisions. Logan did not make such an allegation in her amended bill of complaint and, therefore, the issue was not properly before the circuit court and is not before us in this appeal. See Board of Supervisors v. Robertson, 266 Va. 525, 538, 587 S.E.2d 570, 578-79 (2003); Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43, 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003). Accordingly, we confine our review to Logan's remaining allegations that former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and 90(b) were facially invalid. In considering Logan's argument, we observe that the General Assembly has required that all local governing bodies adopt subdivision ordinances. Code § 15.2-2240. Those subdivision ordinances must include the provisions specified in Code § 15.2-2241, and may contain certain optional provisions set forth in Code § 15.2-2242. The language of Code § 15.2-2242(1), which details one such optional provision, states that a subdivision ordinance may include provisions for variations in or exceptions to the general regulations of the subdivision ordinance in cases of unusual situations or when strict adherence to the general regulations would result in substantial injustice or hardship. Under this authority, the City Council included several provisions in the former Subdivision Ordinance authorizing the subdivision agent to grant exceptions to the Ordinance's requirements. When a legislative body delegates its authority to an administrative agent, that body must prescribe sufficient standards to guide the administrator in exercising the delegated authority. Bell v. Dorey Electric Co., 248 Va. 378, 382, 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1994); Ours Properties, Inc. v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 851-53, 96 S.E.2d 754, 756-58 (1957). Therefore, we consider whether former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and 90(b) prescribe sufficient standards to guide the subdivision agent's decision whether to grant exceptions under those sections. Former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65, entitled General requirements; exceptions from article, provided: The arrangement of lots, character of the subdivision, and extent, width, grade and location of all streets shall conform to the officially adopted master plan or parts, divisions or sections thereof and shall be considered in their relation to existing and planned streets, topographical conditions and public convenience and safety, and in their appropriate relation to the proposed uses of adjacent land; provided, however, that the agent may determine that the size or shape of the land, topography, proposed land use or other special conditions make compliance with all provisions of this article impractical and may make exceptions to provisions contained herein, provided such exceptions are not in conflict with provisions of other city ordinances. Because former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 did not define the term impractical, we employ the general definition of that word in considering the adequacy of the stated standards. See Adams Outdoor Adver., L.P. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 274 Va. 189, 196, 645 S.E.2d 271, 275 (2007); Hoffman Family, L.L.C. v. City of Alexandria, 272 Va. 274, 284, 634 S.E.2d 722, 727 (2006). The word impractical is defined as incapable of being put into use or effect or of being accomplished or done successfully or without extreme trouble, hardship, or expense. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1136 (1993). We also observe that former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-90(b) required that local streets have a minimum paved width of 30 feet. However, this section also provided for an exception to that requirement, stating that [i]n cases where the cross slope will not permit a greater width, the agent may modify the minimum paved width requirement in a manner that will result in the best possible utilization of the land to be subdivided, giving consideration to the topography of the land and general character and density of the proposed subdivision. Upon our review, we hold that former Subdivision Ordinance §§ 31-65 and -90(b) prescribed adequate standards for the subdivision agent's exercise of delegated authority consistent with the directive of Code § 15.2-2242(1). The subdivision agent was required to consider several factors under former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 before granting an exception to the stated ordinance requirements. That section also prohibited the agent from granting an exception to an ordinance requirement if the exception would be in conflict with any provision of any city ordinance. Absent such a conflict, former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-65 permitted the subdivision agent to grant an exception based on such factors as the size or shape of the parcel, its topography, the proposed land use, or other special conditions upon determining that compliance with the general subdivision ordinance requirements would be impractical. Under former Subdivision Ordinance § 31-90(b), the agent could not permit an exception from the minimum width requirement of 30 feet for payed local streets unless a situation presented by a cross slope indicated that such an exception was needed. This section further required that the agent consider the topography and character of the subdivision to achieve the best utilization of the land. Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that these provisions contained adequate standards to guide the subdivision agent's decisions whether to grant the allowable exceptions.