Opinion ID: 2623148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contractual Wills

Text: Whether a will is contractual in character involves a question of fact, the determination of which must be established by competent evidence. In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, Syl. ¶ 1. The firmly established rule . . . for the construction of wills, to which all other rules are subordinate, is that the intention of the testator as garnered from all parts of the will is to be given effect, and that doubtful or inaccurate expressions in the will shall not override the obvious intention of the testator. In construing a will the court must put itself as nearly as possible in the situation of the testator when he made the will and from a consideration of the situation and from the language used in every part of the will, determine as best it can the purpose of the testator and the intentions he endeavored to convey by the language used. [Citation omitted.] In re Estate of Tompkins, 195 Kan. at 471. The district court accurately described the evidence regarding whether the 1984 wills were contractual as uncontroverted. The only evidence consisted of the language of the wills and Fielder's testimony. Defendants contend that the 1984 wills were not contractual because no plural pronouns, contractual terms, or mention of consideration appear in their language. This court has stated that use of plural pronouns and contractual terms supports the presumption that wills are contractual, but this is not the end of the inquiry. This court has also held that separate wills without mention of an agreement between the testators, may be contractual wills if that interpretation is supported by the evidence. See Chronister, 203 Kan. at 371-72. In Chronister, 203 Kan. at 367, Herbert and Mabel Chronister executed a joint will leaving their estate to the surviving spouse for his or her own personal use and benefit forever and then to the nieces and nephews of Herbert. After Herbert died, Mabel changed her will to leave a large portion of the estate to her sister and her sister's children, with the remainder to Herbert's nieces and nephews. This court reviewed previous cases, finding that in some cases wills had contractual language contained therein, but in other cases wills have been construed as contractual on the basis of specific provisions or terms, one of the common denominators usually being a provision for the disposition of property after the death of the survivor. 203 Kan. at 369. We decided the joint and mutual will of Herbert and Mabel was contractual in spite of the language stating the estate passed to the survivor forever and said: [P]rovisions of like nature [in wills] have commonly been said to evidence, in the case of joint wills, an understanding between the joint testators by which they intended to bind themselves. 203 Kan. at 373. We held that identical disposition of property, the use of plural pronouns, the mutual exclusion of heirs, and a full and explicit provision . . . for disposition of the testators' remaining property after the death of the survivor in the joint will were indicative of the agreement between them. 203 Kan. at 373. In Tompkins, the will left the property to the surviving spouse with a right of disposal. Although the appellants claimed that meant the survivor had an unlimited right to dispose of the property, this court held the language did not authorize the survivor to breach the agreement between testators. See 195 Kan. at 472-73. In In re Estate of Wade, 202 Kan. 380, 389-90, 449 P.2d 488 (1969), a joint and mutual will contained no contractual language, but this court held that extrinsic evidence proved the existence of an agreement between testators Erman and Wilma Wade. The scrivener testified that Erman and Wilma negotiated the distribution of their property, reached an agreement, and documented that agreement in their will. This court held: In the Wade will there is no language stating it to be contractual, nor does the language used supply with clarity the evidence of an underlying obligation. . . . [Uncontroverted evidence showed] Erman and Wilma bargained until they reached a definite agreement as to the disposition of their property, and they expressed such disposition in the identical portions agreed upon in their joint and mutual will. 202 Kan. at 390. In an opinion affirmed and adopted by this court, the Court of Appeals set out factors that could be considered to determine whether a will is contractual. See Bell v. Brittain, 19 Kan. App. 2d 1073, 880 P.2d 289 (1994), aff'd 257 Kan. 407, 893 P.2d 251 (1995). The Court of Appeals stated: The fact that a will does not contain a reference to a contract is not conclusive in determining whether a will is contractual. The intent of the testators to be bound by a joint and mutual will need not be expressly recited, but may be determined circumstantially by language and other expressions used in the will. Language indicating a contractual will includes: (1) a provision in the will for the distribution of property on the death of the survivor; (2) a carefully drawn provision for the disposition of any share in case of a lapsed residuary bequest; (3) the use of plural pronouns; (4) joinder and consent language; (5) the identical distribution of property upon the death of the survivor; (6) joint revocation of former wills; and (7) consideration, such as mutual promises. 19 Kan. App. 2d 1073, Syl. ¶ 5. The Bell panel found that a mutual will meeting some of the stated provisions was contractual. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1077-80. Under the Bell facts, the will provided for a distribution at the death of the survivor, used plural pronouns, used language that appear[ed] to qualify as joinder and consent language[,] had identical distributions, and evidenced consideration. The will did not provide for a lapsed bequest; nor did it revoke all former wills. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1078-79. The panel also noted that the family of a predeceased son had been expressly disinherited. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1079. Based on these factors, the panel held that the will, on its face, evidenced an agreement between the testators that the parties intended the will to be joint, mutual, and contractual. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1079-80. As a result, the panel upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment. 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1079-80. The uncontroverted facts here lead to the same conclusion. The 1984 wills were nearly identical, leaving the entire estate to the surviving parent and then to the children and one set of grandchildren, evenly divided. Both of the 1984 wills left a grandfather clock to one of Sarah's daughters, and the wills provided for the family of Sarah's predeceased son, evidencing a full and explicit provision for the disposition of the estate at the death of the surviving spouse. See In re Estate of Chronister, 203 Kan. 366, 373, 454 P.2d 438 (1969). Further, Fielder testified that Sarah and John communicated their wishes to be bound by their agreement with each other to leave a portion of the estate's assets to one another's children. They also wanted the freedom to change the distributions to their own children. Under the circumstances, it is apparent that John and Sarah wanted the surviving spouse to ensure that the children of the deceased parent were included if the estate was not consumed during the surviving parent's lifetime. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that the 1984 wills were contractual and that Sarah retained the right to disinherit any of her children and grandchildren. Summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs was appropriate. Denial of summary judgment in favor of defendants and third-party plaintiffs also was appropriate.