Opinion ID: 782360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Searcy's Unreasonable Application Claim

Text: 27 Searcy next argues that his conviction involved an unreasonable application of the federal law laid down in a trio of Supreme Court cases: Van Arsdall, Davis, and Olden. A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Supreme Court has emphasized that [t]he `unreasonable application' clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1174, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ([A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.). We have taken this to mean that substantial deference is due state court determinations: the statute commands deference to the state court's judgment by using the word `unreasonable,' which is stronger than `erroneous.' Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334 (7th Cir.1997); see also Lockyer, ___ U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1175 (cautioning against conflating error with unreasonableness). Under such a deferential regime, a reasonable state court judgment is one at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case ... even if it is not well reasoned or fully reasoned, or even if it is one of several equally plausible outcomes. Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 523 (7th Cir.1999) (quotations omitted). 28 From the trio of cases he cites, Searcy distills this governing legal principle: Courts may not completely foreclose cross-examination regarding witness bias. In Davis, the Supreme Court emphasized that [t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.... [T]he exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (quotation and citation omitted). The importance of permitting a defendant broad scope in cross-examining the witnesses against him was reaffirmed by the Court in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431, and Olden, 488 U.S. at 231, 109 S.Ct. 480. 29 But it is also well established that a defendant does not enjoy an unlimited right to pursue any subject on cross-examination, as the Supreme Court has made clear: 30 It does not follow, of course, that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. On the contrary, trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. 31 Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Lower courts have applied this language to justify limitations on cross-examination into subjects for which there is no proper foundation, see Reddick v. Haws, 120 F.3d 714, 717 (7th Cir.1997) (finding that limitation on cross-examination was appropriate when the defendant could neither lay a rudimentary foundation for the circumstances [into which he wished to inquire], nor establish when the underlying conduct took place, despite the considerable leeway the trial court was willing to give him on this); United States v. Lin, 101 F.3d 760, 767-68 (D.C.Cir.1996) (Highly prejudicial questioning of the sort proposed here, however, requires a reasonable grounding in fact.); Bui, 170 F.3d at 243-46, or into matters that are unduly speculative, see United States v. Lo, 231 F.3d 471, 482-83 (9th Cir.2000) (affirming limitation on cross-examination into fraud allegations because of the highly speculative nature of those allegations). 32 In Searcy's case, the district court found that the Illinois courts had unreasonably applied the Van Arsdall-Davis-Olden principle by precluding the defense from cross-examining the State's key witnesses about their biases and motives. Searcy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19899, at . But that is too broad a characterization of what the state courts did. They did not foreclose any inquiry into the bias or motivation of key prosecution witnesses; such a complete limitation would clearly violate the rule of Davis, Van Arsdall, and Olden. Rather, the state courts required that before Searcy could question Johnson and Brooks about Bowman negotiating to act as a police informant, he provide, by competent evidence, a sufficient factual basis for those questions—what the trial court judge called the linchpin of this issue. The question in this habeas case, therefore, comes down to whether the trial court, in requiring a (rather substantial) showing of factual support for Searcy's informant questions, went beyond imposing a reasonable limit (based on foundation concerns) on Searcy's ability to confront the witnesses against him. 33 At trial, Searcy offered several items of evidence that he said provided a factual basis for his informant questions, the most important of which was the testimony of Officer Washington. The officer was prepared to testify that at the time of Bowman's arrest, there was another individual present (Clinton Boyd) who was close enough to have heard Bowman protest that the police had got the wrong guy and that they should go after Country (Brooks's nickname). He would testify that after the arrest, he began to negotiate a deal whereby Bowman would work as a police informant in exchange for lenient treatment in connection with his drug arrest, but that Bowman was killed before the deal could be finalized. Officer Washington was apparently unable to testify, however, that Clinton Boyd had told either Johnson or Brooks of Bowman's accusatory statement at the time of his arrest, that Clinton Boyd was even aware of the negotiations over Bowman's informant status, or that anyone else had learned of the negotiations and informed either Johnson or Brooks. 34 In addition to Officer Washington's testimony, Searcy offered the testimony of Tonita Mills, who stated at trial that she had previously bought drugs from both Johnson and Brooks, and that she had witnessed Brooks arguing with Bowman immediately prior to his murder. Searcy contends that her testimony adds to his factual predicate by demonstrating that Brooks and Johnson had a reason to fear Bowman's informing on them (by showing that they actually were drug dealers) and that Brooks was angry at Bowman for some reason, causing them to argue. Searcy also noted that during the voir dire of Johnson outside the presence of the jury, Johnson admitted that he knew both Clinton Boyd and Bowman, and that he had spoken with Bowman between his arrest and murder. Searcy suggests this evidence, taken together, provides a sufficient basis from which the jury could reasonably infer that Johnson had in fact learned of Bowman's informant activities. 35 Both the Illinois trial court and the Illinois appellate court found that Searcy's evidentiary proffer was insufficient to avoid problems of innuendo and insinuation. The district court disagreed, finding that the state courts should have allowed cross-examination on the issue of Brooks's and Johnson's motivation for murdering Bowman. The district court concluded that [g]iven the theory of bias and motive at stake, the centrality of Brooks's and Johnson's testimony to the prosecution, and defendant's good faith predicate, the limitation on Searcy's cross-examination of Brooks and Johnson violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Searcy, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19899, at . As demonstrated by the district court's opinion, that determination required the balancing of several factors. See id. at  (Confrontation Clause violations do not lend themselves to simple straightforward analysis, but rather involve a balancing of many factors.). Presumably, the state courts weighed the same factors as the district court—the theory of the defense, the importance of the testimony of Johnson and Brooks to the prosecution, and the strength of the proffered factual predicate for the line of questioning—but came to a different conclusion. 36 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, for a federal habeas court to reject the state courts' application of federal law, the state courts' conclusions must be more than incorrect or erroneous. While we would have preferred that the trial court had accepted a less substantial factual showing before allowing cross-examination, or that Searcy have been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses based on the proof he had offered, our view of the correct conclusion is not dispositive. Our review is limited to the question of whether the state courts' resolution of the issue was objectively unreasonable. Lockyer, ___ U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1174. A federal court's deference to the state court's resolution of the issues involved is even more important when such resolution requires the weighing of factors against one another: when the constitutional question is a matter of degree, rather than of concrete entitlements, a `reasonable' decision by the state court must be honored. Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 881-82 (7th Cir.1997) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the trial transcript discloses an informed and highly professional discussion among the judge and opposing lawyers on this issue. 37 In this case, we cannot say that the Illinois courts' determination that Searcy had failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for his desired line of questioning was objectively unreasonable. On the contrary, the Illinois courts' decision was at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case ... even if it is not well reasoned or fully reasoned; that decision was, at the least, one of several equally plausible outcomes. Schaff, 190 F.3d at 522. 38 Searcy's offer of proof in support of his cross-examination effort was far from a slam dunk. The testimony of Officer Washington and Tonita Mills, as well as the admission by Johnson that he both knew and had spoken with Clinton Boyd, simply established that it was possible for Boyd to have heard Bowman's statement regarding Brooks at the time of his arrest, and that it was possible for Boyd to have mentioned this to Johnson, who then possibly told Brooks. The evidence proffered by Searcy did not suggest how Boyd, Johnson, or Brooks had become aware (if indeed they had) that Bowman had moved beyond making a you got the wrong guy statement at the time of his arrest to begin negotiations to serve as a police informant. Finding the offer of proof insufficient to support the line of questioning Searcy desired was a plausible (even if, in our opinion, incorrect) conclusion by the state trial and appellate courts. 39 While it is true that when the testimony of a witness is central to the prosecution's case, a defendant should be given the maximum opportunity to cross-examine that witness, Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.1980), that does not mean that a defendant will be given every opportunity, no matter how speculative, confusing, or irrelevant the line of questioning may be. While a close question in this case, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the Illinois courts to have required Searcy to demonstrate a factual basis for the informant line of questioning (even if we disagree with the level of proof the Illinois courts required). Because that decision was not objectively unreasonable, it is entitled, under AEDPA, to deference from a federal habeas court.