Opinion ID: 864672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor erred by granting

Text: SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY. ¶7. In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, this Court’s standard of review is well settled: As to the review of a trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, we employ a de novo standard of review and the motion should be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Co., 826 So.2d 1206, 1209 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2001)] (citations omitted). See also Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362-65 (Miss. 1983) and its progeny. Richardson v. Sara Lee Corp., 847 So.2d 821, 823 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2003). Peden asserts that because the City put on no witnesses, the City offered no evidence in this matter. This Court disagrees. The City offered the trial court’s entire three-volume record in the annexation case as proof that the issues contained in Peden’s complaint were properly before Chancellor Patterson. “The trial court may take 4 judicial notice of available evidence in its own court files.” Gulf City Fisheries, Inc. v. Bobby Kitchens, Inc., 518 So.2d 661, 664 (Miss. 1988) (citing Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 354 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Miss. 1973); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 57, at 89-90 (1967); 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 50(1), at 1018 & § 50(2), at 1022). See also Miss. R. Evid. 201. ¶8. We note that Chancellor Patterson’s ruling in the annexation matter is not contained in the record on appeal. Mississippi appellate courts may not consider information that is outside the record. Dew v. Langford, 666 So.2d 739, 746 (Miss. 1995). The trial court's rulings are presumed correct, and this presumption will prevail unless the record shows otherwise. Id.; Myers v. Miss. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 749 So.2d 1173, 1174 (Miss. Ct. App.1999). Hardy v. Brock, 826 So.2d 71, 76 (¶ 26) (Miss. 2002). Thus, Peden has offered no evidence sufficient to show that summary judgment was improper. We find that summary judgment was proper where the chancellor found that a specially appointed chancellor had already found that the annexation was reasonable and that Peden’s complaint contesting the annexation was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The only remaining issue concerned preclearance under the Voting Rights Act, which was premature while this litigation was pending in the trial court. Vecchio’s testimony was insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Vecchio offered his lay opinion as to what the City had to do in order to successfully complete the annexation. This, too, was included in Chancellor Patterson’s order concerning the annexation. ¶9. Inasmuch as there are no disputed facts, the City met its burden, and summary judgment was properly granted. 5