Opinion ID: 167987
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The M ulei Instruction

Text: Heumann also contends that the district court gave an improper instruction concerning the definition of confidential information. The challenged instruction, instruction number 31, states: Only confidential information acquired during the course of employment may be protected, not the general knowledge of a business operation. Information already known to competitors or readily ascertainable elsewhere cannot be protected as confidential. Instr. No. 31, App. at 123. The district court proposed this instruction, taking the language directly from M ulei v. Jet Courier Service, Inc., 739 P.2d 889, 892 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); see also Harvey I, 338 F.3d at 1134 (quoting M ulei for the proposition that “‘confidential information acquired during the course of employment may be protected’”). Heumann argues, as she did before the district court, that the following sentence from M ulei should also have been provided to the jury in instruction number 31: M oreover, the general ability and know-how an employee brings into 10 A lthough the record does not include Heumann’s closing arguments, we note that Heumann fails to assert that she was prevented from presenting her argument to the jury. -18- employment, and the skill and experience acquired during it, are not the employer’s property; the right to use and expand these powers remains the employee’s. 739 P.2d at 893 (citations omitted). Heumann asserts that this additional language was necessary for the jury to understand that she had certain rights in the skills and experiences w hich she possessed both before her employment with ISR, as well as those she gained during her employment with ISR. W e are not persuaded that Heumann’s proposed third sentence from M ulei would have significantly altered the substance of the instructions given by the district court. Instruction number 31, as given, is an accurate statement of Colorado law and was sufficient to guide the jury’s understanding of the nature of confidential information. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to include the additional language from M ulei.