Opinion ID: 2093466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the Occupancy of a Hotel Room Is Property

Text: At common law, the crime of larceny was the felonious stealing, taking and carrying, leading, riding or driving away the personal goods of another    with the felonious intent to deprive the owner of his property. People v. Pastel, 306 Ill. 565, 568, 138 N.E. 194 (1923). Under this traditional definition of larceny, the occupancy of a hotel room clearly could not have been the subject of the crime. Eventually, the common law crimes were codified by statute. As the State correctly notes, for at least 50 years prior to the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961, some items that would not have been subject to the crime of larceny at common law were nevertheless property subject to statutory theft. For example, in Moline Water Power Co. v. Cox, 252 Ill. 348, 96 N.E. 1044 (1911), this court held that waterpower created by a waterfall was property under the theft statute at the time. This court explained: [Water] [p]ower is not a chattel. It is not a tangible entity. It manifests itself only by its results. But it is property, and is bought and sold in the market as freely as the products of the farm. At common law it could not be the subject of larceny, which must be of goods and chattels, but it is now protected by statute to the same extent as other forms of property, and the unauthorized connection of any gas, water or electric current with a motor or other appliance is a misdemeanor, punishable by law. (Crim.Code, par. 117.) The use of a fall of water artificially impounded is that taking of that which has been produced by the combination of artificial means and natural forces, and partakes of the nature of a profit à prendre. It is, in fact, an interest in the aggregate of rights constituting the water power, which is real estate. Moline Water Power, 252 Ill. at 357, 96 N.E. 1044. Similarly, in People v. Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, 336, 11 N.E.2d 403 (1937), this court held that the defendant was properly charged with larceny of electrical energy because larceny under the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, ch. 38, par. 380) had wider application than at common law. The larceny statute then said, `Larceny shall embrace every theft which deprives another of his money or other personal property, or those means or muniments by which the right and title to property, real or personal, may be ascertained.' Menagas, 367 Ill. at 336, 11 N.E.2d 403, quoting Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, ch. 38, par. 380. Our Criminal Code underwent revision in 1961 and the section dealing with crimes against property was entirely reorganized. `Formerly, in Illinois, there were some seventy-four separate sections which dealt in one form or another with the obtaining of property of another with the intent to permanently deprive such other or the true owner of the property or its beneficial use. All lawyers and judges are too familiar with the highly technical differences between larceny, larceny by trick, embezzlement, false pretenses, confidence game, and the many variations to require detailed comment. Suffice to say that, with the exception of robbery, burglary, arson, and criminal damage and trespass to property, which are covered respectively in Articles 18, 19, 20 and 21, the Committee intended to codify the entire range of offenses against property into Articles 16 and 17, and to abolish completely the labels and highly technical distinctions which had developed through centuries of case law and statutory amendments.' People v. McCarty, 94 Ill.2d 28, 34, 67 Ill.Dec. 818, 445 N.E.2d 298 (1983), quoting Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 38, art. 16, Committee Comments-1961, at 18 (Smith-Hurd 1977). With this background in mind, we turn to the question of whether the use of a hotel room is property that can be the subject of theft by deception under section 16-1. We note that this inquiry requires the interpretation of two separate statutes. First, we must determine whether the use of a hotel room is property under section 15-1. Second, if the answer to the first question is yes, we must determine whether one who obtains such property by deception can be charged under section 16-1. The Davis court and the appellate court in the present case seem to have conflated these two inquiries. Section 15-1 does not define the term property only as that term is used in section 16-1. It defines the term property as it is used in this Part C. 720 ILCS 5/15-1 (West 2000). Part C is titled Crimes Against Property. In addition to the crimes of theft, robbery, burglary, and arson (720 ILCS 5/16-1, 18-1, 19-1, 20-1 (West 2000)), which were known at common law, part C defines offenses such as computer crime, wireless service theft, and financial identity theft (720 ILCS 5/16D-1, 16F-13, 16G-15 (West 2000)). Part C is clearly intended to be broad in scope. The first sentence of section 15-1 states that the word property as it is used in part C means anything of value. The appellate court, relying on Davis, limited the meaning of anything to items of tangible personal property. Because part C encompasses much more than the crime of theft, we must examine the definition of property in section 15-1 without regard to what types of property might or might not have been subject to larceny at common law. See Concrete Materials Corp. v. Gordon, 395 Ill. 203, 207-08, 69 N.E.2d 841 (1946) (common law definitions must yield to definitions of employee, employer, and employment contained in the Unemployment Compensation Act); see also 34 Ill. L. & Prac. Statutes § 51 (2001) (The General Assembly has the power to make a reasonable definition of the terms used in an act, even though such definitions do not correspond with those contained in other acts. Statutory definitions control in the construction of the terms of an act, and the common-law definitions of those terms must yield to the statutory definitions). The plain meaning of the first sentence of section 15-1 is that property, when that term is used in any provision of part C of the Criminal Code, does indeed include any thing of value. We note that the Davis court inaccurately stated that section 15-1 only lists items which may be physically possessed and carried away. Davis, 203 Ill.App.3d at 845, 148 Ill.Dec. 859, 561 N.E.2d 165, citing People v. Zakarian, 121 Ill.App.3d 968, 972-73, 77 Ill.Dec. 366, 460 N.E.2d 422 (1984). Zakarian, in turn, relied on cases that predated the adoption of the Criminal Code of 1961. According to the Zakarian court, the test of whether property is embraced by the theft statute is not whether the property is corporeal or incorporeal or tangible or intangible. Rather, it is whether the property is capable of being taken and carried away by someone other than the owner. Zakarian, 121 Ill.App.3d at 972-73, 77 Ill.Dec. 366, 460 N.E.2d 422 (citing Menagas, 367 Ill. 330, 11 N.E.2d 403, and Woods v. People, 222 Ill. 293, 78 N.E. 607 (1906)). The legislature's inclusion, in 1961, of real estate and electricity and, in 1994, of telecommunications services in the statutory definition of property encompassed by the theft statute did away with this ancient rule. Real estate cannot be taken and carried away, yet it is property under section 15-1. Similarly, electricity and telecommunications services can be stolen but cannot be taken and carried away. See Menagas, 367 Ill. at 336-38, 11 N.E.2d 403 (describing the test for whether an item is personal property as whether it may be taken and carried away, transported from place to place, and bought and sold like other personal property, but noting that real property may also be the subject of larceny). The phrase anything of value is unambiguous. Clearly, the legislature intended to expand the definition of property to include not only items of tangible personal property but also other things of value such as real estate, electricity, and telecommunications services. The hospitality industry provides lodging to the public for profit. The market for hotel and motel rooms is vast. The use of a hotel room does have value. See Moline Water Power, 252 Ill. at 357, 96 N.E. 1044 (stating that waterpower is property because it is bought and sold in the market as freely as the products of the farm). We conclude that the use of a hotel room is a thing of value as that phrase is used in the first sentence of section 15-1. The appellate court, however, construed the word includes in the second sentence of section 15-1 to limit the types of things that come within the definition of property. The State argues that the weight of authority favors interpreting includes as a term of enlargement or illustration. Defendant argues that the appellate court properly construed the term as one of limitation. Article 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 contains General Definitions. Section 2-10, which was not cited to this court by either party, states: `Includes' or `including' means comprehending among other particulars, without limiting the generality of the foregoing word or phrase. 720 ILCS 5/2-10 (West 2000). Although there have been no cases interpreting or applying this definition, its meaning is unmistakable. Either of these words, when followed by a listing of items, means that the preceding general term encompasses the listed items, but the list is not exhaustive. The preceding general term is to be construed as a general description of the listed items and other similar items. Based on this statutory definition, we conclude that in enacting section 15-1 the legislature intended the definition of property to include not only items of tangible personal property, but also other things of value. The enumerated items are illustrative of types of property that would not have been within the scope of the traditional common law definition of property that could be the subject of larceny, but are within the scope of part C of the Criminal Code. In light of this statutory definition, we reject the appellate court's suggestion that the term includes in section 15-1 is ambiguous because the words but is not limited to are not present. 361 Ill.App.3d at 712, 296 Ill.Dec. 864, 836 N.E.2d 387, citing Davis, 203 Ill.App.3d at 846, 148 Ill.Dec. 859, 561 N.E.2d 165 (Although the word `include' does not by itself necessarily limit general language, cases which support a broad or enlarging interpretation for the term `include' do so in order to give effect to a legislative intent to provide as large an access as possible to the general term. [Citation.] The word `include' is sometimes used to add to the general class a species which does not naturally belong to it. [Citation.] In this case, the items listed after `includes' should be considered an enumeration excluding all other things not in the specific category). The appellate court concluded that because the word includes is sometimes used to expand a general term and is sometimes used to enumerate specific items to be added to the general term, it is ambiguous. The court noted that if the legislature had intended for the items following the word includes to be merely illustrative of items of property, it could have written `property is anything of value including.' Based on the lack of such language and the fact that the includes language is in a separate sentence from the anything of value language, the court concluded that the second sentence was intended to convey that the items specifically enumerated were in addition to, not part of, the general class. 361 Ill.App.3d at 713, 296 Ill.Dec. 864, 836 N.E.2d 387. The legislature has on many occasions used the phrases including but not limited to or includes but is not limited to to indicate that the list that follows is intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. An electronic search of the Illinois Compiled Statutes reveals 1,749 statutes using the phrase including but not limited to and 249 containing the phrase includes but is not limited to. Over a dozen of these provisions are contained in part C of the Criminal Code of 1961, Offenses Against Property. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3, 16-18, 16-21, 16A-2.8, 16D-2, 16F-2 (West 2004). We conclude, however, that even in the absence of the phrase but is not limited to, the plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning of the term includes does not support the appellate court's conclusion. In determining the plain meaning of a statutory term, it is entirely appropriate to look to the dictionary for a definition. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 221 Ill.2d 381, 390-91, 303 Ill.Dec. 161, 851 N.E.2d 59 (2006) (using dictionaries to provide the definition of the word docket); People v. Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275, 292-93, 300 Ill.Dec. 91, 843 N.E.2d 349 (2006) (using dictionaries to provide the definition of the word involuntary); U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Clark, 216 Ill.2d 334, 347, 297 Ill.Dec. 294, 837 N.E.2d 74 (2005) (using dictionaries to provide the definition of the word compensation). According to Black's Law Dictionary, include means: To contain as a part of something. The participle including typically indicates a partial list . But some drafters use phrases such as including without limitation and including but not limited to  which mean the same thing. (Emphases in original.) Black's Law Dictionary 777-78 (8th ed.2004). The law dictionary refers the reader to the term namely, which means: By name or particular mention; that is to say namely wrongful termination and slander>. The term indicates what is to be included by name. By contrast, including implies a partial list and indicates that something is not listed. (Emphasis in original.) Black's Law Dictionary 1049 (8th ed.2004). Similarly, the editor of Black's Law Dictionary observes in another work that: [I]ncluding is sometimes misused for namely. But it should not be used to introduce an exhaustive list, for it implies that the list is only partial. In the words of one federal court, `It is hornbook law that the use of the word including indicates that the specified list . . . is illustrative, not exclusive.' Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. I.C.C., 645 F.2d 1102, 1112 n. 26 (D.C.Cir. 1981). (Emphases in original.) B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 431 (1995). Given the statutory definition of includes in section 2-10 and the plain and ordinary meaning of the word, the absence of additional verbiage such as but not limited to does not render section 15-1 ambiguous. In this section, the word includes is used to introduce a list of things of value that illustrate the meaning of the general term property. Defendant notes that the legislature has not changed the definition of property in the wake of Zakarian and Davis and argues that, if these cases had improperly construed section 15-1, the legislature would have acted to correct the error. He cites no authority for this proposition. This court has stated that `[w]here the legislature chooses not to amend a statute after a judicial construction, it will be presumed that it has acquiesced in the court's statement of the legislative intent.' Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill.2d 30, 50, 231 Ill. Dec. 914, 697 N.E.2d 699 (1998), quoting Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill.2d 478, 483, 75 Ill.Dec. 224, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983). This presumption, however, is merely a jurisprudential principle; it is not a rule of law. The fact the legislature has not amended the definition of property in the years since Zakarian (1984) and Davis (1990) were decided is of little weight when the meaning of the statute is unambiguous. We note, further, that Zakarian and Davis have not been extensively relied upon by Illinois courts. The appellate court's decision in the present case is the only published Illinois decision to cite Davis for its discussion of the meaning of property in the theft statute. Davis, in turn, is the only published Illinois decision to cite Zakarian for this purpose. Our decision in the present case necessarily overrules Zakarian, 121 Ill.App.3d 968, 77 Ill.Dec. 366, 460 N.E.2d 422, and Davis, 203 Ill.App.3d 838, 148 Ill.Dec. 859, 561 N.E.2d 165, with respect to the definition of the term property in the theft statute. The Davis court's conclusion that the labor of an employee does not belong to the employer is unaffected. Davis, 203 Ill. App.3d at 841-42, 148 Ill.Dec. 859, 561 N.E.2d 165. Because we hold that the use of a hotel room is a thing of value and is, thus, within the statutory definition of property in section 15-1, we need not consider whether registration as a guest in a hotel creates a leasehold interest that would be considered a chattel real at common law, as argued by the State, or an interest in real estate. We respond briefly to the appellate court's application of the canon of construction that a statute in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Davis, 203 Ill.App.3d at 846, 148 Ill.Dec. 859, 561 N.E.2d 165. The rule in Illinois is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed in favor of persons sought to be subjected to their operation. Barthel v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 74 Ill.2d 213, 220, 23 Ill.Dec. 529, 384 N.E.2d 323 (1978). Thus, in Barthel, this court declined to construe the Public Utility Act to abrogate the common law defense of contributory negligence because it did not plainly appear to be the intent of the legislature to do so. Barthel, 74 Ill.2d at 221, 23 Ill.Dec. 529, 384 N.E.2d 323. In the present case, the statutory terms property and includes are unambiguously defined. As noted above, a court will not engage in statutory construction if the statutory language is unambiguous. Collins, 214 Ill.2d at 214, 291 Ill.Dec. 686, 824 N.E.2d 262 (where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous it will be applied as written, without resort to extrinsic aids to statutory construction). See also 34 Ill. L. & Prac. Statutes § 50 (2001) (The purpose of all rules or maxims adopted by the courts for the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true intent and meaning of the law. These rules or maxims are not rules of law, but are merely aids used by the courts in arriving at the real intention of the legislature when that intention is not clearly manifest from the language used. These rules are useful only in cases of doubt, and are never to be used to create a doubt, but only to remove it). Thus, the maxim of strict construction has no application. Similarly, the rule of lenity need not be employed. Under this canon of statutory construction, penal statutes, where ambiguous, should be construed to afford lenity to the accused. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill.2d 218, 222, 207 Ill.Dec. 295, 647 N.E.2d 257 (1995). In such a circumstance, the penal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, with nothing taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill.2d 330, 337, 233 Ill.Dec. 639, 701 N.E.2d 489 (1998). Because section 15-1 is not ambiguous, there is no need for construction and the rule of lenity is not implicated.