Opinion ID: 1998744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prosecutor's Remarks During Rebuttal Closing Argument

Text: Defendant next contends that he was deprived of a fair eligibility hearing in violation of his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because the prosecutor remarked that by killing Maria, defendant at the same time eliminated a witness in a rape case. Defendant claims the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's objection and allowing the same comments to be repeated at the aggravation-mitigation phase, thereby prejudicing defendant's jury with an uncharged and legally unavailable aggravating factor. During rebuttal closing argument at the eligibility stage, the prosecutor stated: THE PROSECUTOR: Think about this: Why was Maria Djordjic murdered? He eliminated a witness in a rape case. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. THE COURT: It's a reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented in this case. During the prosecutor's closing rebuttal argument during the aggravation-mitigation stage, the prosecutor similarly commented: [Defendant] murdered her to eliminate a witness against him in a rape case. Defendant contends that under this court's decision in People v. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d 508, 535-36, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980), the trial court's ruling was erroneous as a matter of law because it allowed the jury to consider a legally unavailable aggravating circumstance. Defendant additionally relies upon this court's subsequent decision in People v. Adams, 109 Ill.2d 102, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985), where this court held a similar argument to constitute plain error and vacated the defendant's death sentence. Defendant admits that although defense counsel at trial objected to the prosecutor's remarks, the point was not preserved in defendant's post-trial motion. However, defendant contends that the trial court's ruling constitutes plain error. 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). In response, the State acknowledges that although the prosecutor's remarks may have been improper, the State nevertheless contends that no reversible error occurred. We find that the two challenged comments made by the prosecutor do not constitute error under either Brownell or Adams, which are factually distinguishable from the cause at bar. In Brownell, the defendant was found eligible for the death penalty on two grounds: that the murdered individual was killed in the course of two other felonies, aggravated kidnapping and rape (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6), now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(6) (West 1994)); and that the murdered individual was an eyewitness against the defendant (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7), now 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(8) (West 1994)). Brownell, 79 Ill.2d at 514, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. Section 9-1(b)(7) provided for imposition of the death sentence where the murdered individual was a witness in a prosecution against the defendant, gave material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution of the defendant, or was an eye witness or possessed other material evidence against the defendant. Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7). [2] In Brownell, this court, in construing the murdered-witness aggravating factor, determined that this statutory factor in aggravation does not allow the State to regard the slain individual as both the victim of a murder as well as a witness to the crime of his or her own murder. In reaching this conclusion, this court held that [w]e do not think this particular factual situation was intended by the General Assembly to be included within this aggravating factor. Rather, we think the General Assembly intended to include situations where, during an investigation or prosecution of a separate offense which has previously taken place, a witness is killed in an attempt to stymie the investigation or prosecution. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d at 525-26, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. Therefore, because the trial court determined that the defendant in Brownell was eligible for the death penalty on the basis of a nonexistent statutory factor in aggravation, and subsequently weighed this improper aggravating factor in reaching its decision to impose a sentence of death, this court vacated the defendant's death sentence and remanded the cause for a new sentencing hearing. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d at 535-36, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181. We determine that defendant's reliance upon Brownell is factually inapposite to the cause at bar. Unlike in Brownell, where the defendant was improperly found eligible for the death penalty pursuant to a nonexistent statutory aggravating factor, in the cause at bar neither did the State seek to prove defendant eligible for the death sentence based upon the section 9-1(b)(8) statutory factor in aggravation, nor was the jury instructed at either stage of the sentencing proceedings regarding this aggravating factor. Defendant was found eligible for the death penalty on four grounds, none of which was the section 9-1(b)(8) aggravating factor. Further, whereas in Brownell, the trial court's error continued into the aggravation-mitigation stage because the section 9-1(b)(8) statutory aggravating factor was weighed in arriving at imposing defendant's death sentence, there is nothing in the record in the matter at bar which indicates that the jury was improperly influenced by the prosecutor's comments. Defendant additionally challenges the prosecutor's remarks under People v. Adams, 109 Ill.2d 102, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985). In Adams, this court determined that remarks by the prosecutor at both the first and second phase of the sentencing hearing that the defendant qualified for the death penalty because he intended to, and did, kill a witness to a crime were so prejudicial as to entitle the defendant to a new sentencing hearing. The prosecutor in Adams told the jury in closing arguments at the eligibility phase: `It was an intentional deliberate killing. He intended to do away with the witness; he intended to kill him; and finally we have to show that the other felony was armed robbery.    I don't intend to belabor this phase of the hearing. I don't think that there is a lot to really argue about. The Defendant was clearly over the age of eighteen. He clearly committed the murder during the course of an armed robbery to get rid of the witness.    It was intentional, and Adams himself pulled the trigger; and I would ask you to sign the verdict finding the aggravating factors stating that Adams not only committed murder and armed robbery but he committed in the fashion that the Legislature has said if you do it that way with the intent, if you are the person who did it, if you do it to knock off a witness, then you qualify for the death penalty. ' (Emphasis in original.) Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 125-26, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. Further, at the aggravation-mitigation stage of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor in Adams stated: We only submitted one factor to you because it was very clear that that factor applied, and that was that the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony, he was killed by the Defendant, he was killed intentionally, and that he was committing an armed robbery. But there's another factor and another way that Adams qualified for falling into the category of the death penalty, and that was that the murdered individual was a witness in the prosecution or was an eyewitness or possessed other material evidence against the Defendant. [The victim], of course, was an eyewitness. So, there were actually two aggravating factors, although you only deliberated on one. Either one of which qualifies the Defendant for the death penalty.  (Emphasis added.) Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 127-28, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. This court in Adams determined that the prosecutor's comments improperly called for the jury to weigh as an aggravating factor a circumstance that under Brownell was nonexistent. Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 128, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. Based upon the entirety of the prosecutor's extended remarks, this court found reversible error because it was unclear whether the jury's deliberations and verdict were influenced by the prosecutor's improper argument. Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 128, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. We determine that the challenged remarks made by the prosecutor in the cause at bar do not constitute plain error. Generally, prosecutors are permitted wide latitude in their closing arguments. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d 422, 482, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294 (1993). As a result, a reviewing court will find reversible error based upon improper prosecutorial arguments only in those instances where the remarks are clearly prejudicial. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 482, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294. In determining whether the remarks are prejudicial, we have referred to the content of the language used, its relation to the evidence, and its effect on the rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 482-83, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294. Upon review of the challenged remarks made by the prosecutor in closing argument in the cause at bar, we find that the two brief statements alluding to defendant's elimination of a witness in a rape case do not approach the level of the comments found to constitute reversible error in Adams. In the cause at bar, the prosecutor did not, as in Adams, tell the jury that because defendant killed Maria to eliminate a witness in a rape case, this action independently qualified him for the death penalty. Moreover, the prosecutor in the instant matter neither emphasized the comments nor dwelled upon this argument. Therefore, we conclude that the two challenged sentences uttered by the prosecutor in the cause at bar are distinguishable from the prolonged and clearly prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor in Adams. In sum, we do not believe that the brief comments constituted error so fundamental or of such a great magnitude as to deprive defendant of a fair and impartial sentencing hearing. Further, we do not believe that the isolated comments had any effect on the jury's determination that the defendant was eligible for the death penalty. As noted, the eligibility determination rested on four separate grounds and indicates that the evidence was far from being closely balanced. On this record we decline to consider these comments as plain error. Defendant's second point of error regarding prosecutorial comments during rebuttal closing arguments at the eligibility phase is that he was denied a fair hearing because the State's rebuttal argument mischaracterized the defense as blaming the victim and as justifying the murder due to the victim's provocation. Defendant contends that the trial court improperly overruled defense objections to these arguments, thereby violating defendant's due process rights and the cruel and unusual punishment clause. During the State's rebuttal argument at the eligibility phase, defense counsel unsuccessfully objected to remarks made by the State. Defendant claims error in the following exchange: THE PROSECUTOR: Make no mistake, counsel stands up and tells you that a rage is built up and he just went off. Basically, Maria Djordjic is responsible for her own death because she said no to this man's advances. Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if  DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection. That was not my argument. THE COURT: The jury has heard the evidence, they have heard the arguments. They will draw their own inferences. Proceed. Defendant additionally claims error in the prosecutor's subsequent remarks to the jury: THE PROSECUTOR:    Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, if this was heat of passion being told no, then 75 per cent of the high school age males and college males would be in prison for first degree murder. This is not provocation. That is ridiculous. Make no mistake about it DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I never argued provocation at all. THE COURT: Do you have an objection?    DEFENSE COUNSEL: That's beyond the scope, if that's his argument. Its a misstatement of my argument. He is responding to my argument. THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, he talked excessively about rage  THE COURT: I disagree. THE PROSECUTOR:building up. He was spurned. THE COURT: You did. I think its invited argument. Proceed. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's mischaracterization of defense counsel's arguments as stating that the victim was responsible for her own death and/or that she provoked her murder are prejudicial and inflammatory, to the extent that a jury would find it offensive for defendant to blame the victim in this case. Defendant points out that during closing arguments at eligibility, although defense counsel argued that when Maria spurned his sexual advances defendant suffered an uncontrollable rage which led to the murder, counsel never blamed the victim for declining defendant's advances. Therefore, defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defense counsel's objections concerning the impropriety of the prosecutor's arguments. Defense counsel did not raise this claim for relief in defendant's post-trial motion; therefore, it is deemed waived. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Defendant nevertheless urges us to consider this claim under the plain error rule. However, because defendant cannot meet either prong of the plain error doctrine, we decline to consider defendant's claim as plain error. As stated, because a prosecutor has great latitude in presenting his closing argument, reversal is only appropriate where the remarks are clearly prejudicial to the defendant. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 482, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294. The trial court is in the best position to determine the prejudicial effect of a remark made during closing argument, and, therefore, absent a clear abuse of discretion, its ruling should be upheld. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 483, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court did not err in overruling defense counsel's objections to the challenged statements. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that defendant's murder of Maria was precipitated by an uncontrollable rage. As defendant himself points out in his brief to this court, defense counsel contended during closing arguments that once Maria spurned defendant's sexual advances, [a] rage built up, a well of emotion, if you will, a wave. And like a wave in the ocean, he couldn't stop it    this rage he can't control. Therefore, the prosecutor's statements validly questioned defendant's theory of the case and did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial. We additionally note that any alleged error resulting from this remark would also have been cured by the trial judge's instruction to the jury that the closing arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence. Peeples, 155 Ill.2d at 482, 186 Ill.Dec. 341, 616 N.E.2d 294. In sum, because we find that defendant did not suffer any substantial prejudice as a result of the trial court's rulings, and that the evidence at eligibility was not closely balanced, the plain error doctrine is not applicable to defendant's claim.