Opinion ID: 1058342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, arguing that there is insufficient evidence as to the cause of the victim's death, insufficient evidence of premeditation, and insufficient evidence that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a felony. [3] We disagree. The standard for an appellate court reviewing a sufficiency challenge is whether, considering the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 276 (Tenn.2002); see also Tenn. R.App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn.1999). Because a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of guilt, the burden shifts to the defendant upon conviction to show why the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. See State v. Evans, 108 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn.2000); State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.1982). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn.2000); see also Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d at 558; Hall, 8 S.W.3d at 599. A verdict of guilt by the trier of fact resolves all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution's theory. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). Questions about the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact, and this Court does not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence. Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236 (citing Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659). Nor may this Court substitute its own inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence for those drawn by the trier of fact. Evans, 108 S.W.3d at 236-37.
The defendant contends that there was no credible testimony, either lay or expert, establishing that the victim died as a result of the stabbing. At trial, the State presented testimony of the two emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and the paramedic who were called to the scene of the crime. One EMT, Jerry Walker, testified that when he arrived at the service station, the victim had no vital signs and appeared to have suffered a wound to his right shoulder. He opined that the victim had died from a knife wound but admitted that he did not know for certain the cause of death. The second EMT, Ronnie Collins, described the knife wound as a pretty deep gash and stated that the victim was soaked in his blood. The paramedic, Tony Douglas, testified that he examined the body and found a moon-shaped puncture wound, two to three inches long, on the right side of the victim's chest. Douglas said that as a paramedic, he would describe the wound as fatal and opined that the victim died from loss of blood, although he admitted that he did not know for certain the cause of death. Direct expert testimony as to the cause of death is unnecessary. McCord v. State, 198 Tenn. 226, 278 S.W.2d 689, 690 (1955). Death may be presumed when the defendant's act is proven, the wounds are apparent, and there is no suggestion in the record that the deceased died from any cause other than that relied upon by the State. Id. at 690-91; Bryant v. State, 503 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tenn.Crim.App.1973); Franklin v. State, 180 Tenn. 41, 171 S.W.2d 281, 282 (1943). A non-expert, after describing a wound, may express an opinion that it caused death. See Owens v. State, 202 Tenn. 679, 308 S.W.2d 423, 424 (1957). The defendant admitted that he stabbed the victim. There is testimony of extensive bleeding as the result of a deep stab wound that was inflicted just before the victim died, and no evidence that the victim had sustained other injuries. EMT Walker and paramedic Douglas both opined that the stab wound had been fatal. This lay testimony is sufficient to sufficient to support the jury's verdict that the victim died as the result of the stab wound inflicted by the defendant.
The defendant also argues that the evidence fails to prove first degree premeditated murder. He contends that there was insufficient time for premeditation because the stabbing occurred immediately after the victim refused to return the stolen credit card to the defendant. The defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, defined as [a] premeditated and intentional killing of another. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1997). An act is premeditated if the act is done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. Id. at (d). Premeditation means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. Id. We have long recognized that premeditation may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 501 (Tenn.1997); State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 541 (Tenn.1992). Several circumstances may be considered indicative of premeditation, including: use of a deadly weapon on an unarmed individual; the particular cruelty of the killing; the defendant's threats or declarations of intent to kill; the defendant's procurement of a weapon; making preparations to conceal the crime before the crime is committed; destruction or secretion of evidence of the killing; and a defendant's calmness immediately after the killing. State v. Davidson, 121 S.W.3d 600, 615 (Tenn. 2003); Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660. Also, the jury may infer premeditation based upon the establishment of a motive for the killing. State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tenn.2001). In the present case, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer premeditation. First, the defendant stated that when he attempted to pay for the wrecker service and the credit card was rejected, he stabbed the victim and left because he knew [he] was wanted in other states. From these facts the jury could easily and reasonably infer that the moment the credit card was rejected the defendant realized that it would not be long before law enforcement authorities were notified and he would be apprehended for his earlier crimes. This establishes a motive for the killing. The jury could infer that the defendant's motive was to further elude capture by eliminating the victim as a witness. See Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 8 (establishment of a motive as ground for inferring premeditation). Further, the jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant exercised reflection and judgment in forming an intent to kill the victim as soon as the credit card was rejected, but prior to the actual act of killing. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d) (1997) (act is premeditated if done after the exercise of reflection and judgment). Additionally, the defendant's actions after stabbing the victim show that the defendant acted with a cool and calculating demeanor. See Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660 ([c]almness immediately following a killing is evidence of a cool, dispassionate, premeditated murder). Immediately after his attack on the victim, a witness observed the defendant walking in a normal fashion across the parking lot at the scene of the murder. Other witnesses who observed the defendant after the killing described him as behaving normally and calmly. Following the stabbing, the defendant drove the wrecker to a secluded location in order to remove his vehicle from the back of the wrecker. The defendant then returned to the service station, dragged the victim's body out of sight and removed the victim's gun, cash and credit cards. Afterward, the defendant ate a hamburger at a nearby restaurant, conversed with several persons at an Auto Zone store, then to a repair shop where he traded vehicles, and finally checked in to a motel room in Union City. In sum, there is sufficient evidence of the defendant's motive for the killing and the defendant's conduct and demeanor after the murder to support the jury's finding of premeditation.
The defendant next argues that there is insufficient evidence to show that the murder was committed in the perpetration of, or during an attempt to perpetrate, a felony because the theft occurred after the murder and was therefore an afterthought, collateral to the killing. Felony murder is [a] killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any ... theft. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1997). No culpable mental state is required for a felony murder conviction except the intent to commit the underlying felony. See Id. at (b). The felony murder rule applies when the killing is done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it. Farmer v. State, 201 Tenn. 107, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (1956). The killing must have had an intimate relation and close connection with the felony ... and not be separate, distinct, and independent from it. Id. (quoting Wharton on Homicide, § 126 (3rd ed.)). The killing may precede, coincide with, or follow the felony and still be considered as occurring `in the perpetration of' the felony offense, so long as there is a connection in time, place, and continuity of action. State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn.1999). Nevertheless, the intent to commit the underlying felony must exist prior to or concurrent with the commission of the act causing the death of the victim. Id. at 107. [A] jury may reasonably infer from a defendant's actions immediately after a killing that the defendant had the intent to commit the felony prior to, or concurrent with, the killing. Id. at 108. In this case, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that the defendant had the intent to commit the theft at the time of the murder. First, the jury could have rationally inferred that when the victim rejected the stolen credit card, the defendant formed an intent not only to kill the victim, but also to take the victim's property. Second, immediately after the murder, the defendant removed the victim's wrecker from the crime scene to another location, removed his vehicle from the wrecker, and then quickly returned to the crime scene to hide the victim's body and take his personal belongings. Each of these actions was intimately related to the killing, and this entire episode could be viewed as one continuous criminal transaction. Such reasonable inferences are sufficient to justify a finding that the defendant was guilty of felony murder.