Opinion ID: 1801877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of Impermissible Bootstrapping

Text: Defendant contends that by imposing the 20-year sentence enhancement provided for in section 12022.53(c), the trial court engaged in impermissible bootstrapping. He relies primarily on People v. Briceno (2004) 34 Cal.4th 451 [20 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 99 P.3d 1007] ( Briceno ) and People v. Arroyas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1439 [118 Cal.Rptr.2d 380] ( Arroyas ). In Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th 451, we construed the language of section 1192.7's subdivision (c)(28) (hereafter section 1192.7(c)(28)), which provides that a conviction for any felony offense [that] would also constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22 is a serious felony. [4] Section 186.22's subdivision (a) defines the substantive offense of street terrorism, while subdivision (b)(1) provides for additional punishment when a defendant commits a felony for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The additional punishment is ordinarily a prison term of two, three, or four years (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)), but it is five years when the crime committed is a serious felony (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)). At issue in Briceno was whether section 1192.7(c)(28) applied only to the substantive offense of street terrorism described in section 186.22's subdivision (a), or whether it also applied to felonies that are subject to additional punishment under the latter statute's subdivision (b)(1). We held that the statute applied to both types of felonies. ( Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 456.) We cautioned, however: [W]hile it is proper to define any felony committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang as a serious felony under section 1192.7(c)(28), it is improper to use the same gang-related conduct again to obtain an additional five-year sentence under section 186.22(b)(1)(B). . . . [¶] . . . [N]othing in [the voter initiative that enacted section 1192.7(c)(28)] . . . suggests an intention of the voters to bootstrap, in the same proceeding, any felony offense committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang into a section 186.22(b)(1)(B) offense `as a means of applying a double dose of harsher punishment.' ( Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 465, last italics added; see also People v. Bautista (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 646, 657 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 845] [applying Briceno's reasoning to strike a sentence enhancement based on gang-related conduct]; People v. Martinez (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 531, 535-537 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 14] [applying the reasoning of Briceno and Bautista ].) Briceno cited with approval the Court of Appeal's decision in Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1439. (See Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 465.) In Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, the Court of Appeal addressed the interaction between section 186.22's subdivision (d), which provides that a misdemeanor committed to benefit a criminal street gang may, in the trial court's discretion, be punished as a felony, and section 186.22's subdivision (b)(1), which provides that a felony committed to benefit a criminal street gang is subject to an additional prison term. Arroyas held that when a defendant commits a misdemeanor to benefit a criminal street gang, the offense may be punished as a felony under section 186.22's subdivision (d), but it is not subject to the additional penalties of that statute's subdivision (b)(1) for felonies committed to benefit a criminal street gang. Arroyas held that the voters who enacted the initiative that added subdivision (d) to section 186.22 did not intend to bootstrap subdivision (d) misdemeanors into subdivision (b)(1) felonies. ( Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445, italics added.) Defendant here contends that under Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th 451, and Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, the trial court may not both (1) appl[y] the gang statute to raise the underlying offense into a more serious category, and (2) use[] the new category to impose an enhancement it could not have applied to the original, underlying offense. He argues that in his case, (1) the gang statute was used to elevate the underlying offense of shooting at an inhabited dwelling to a more serious category (that is, instead of being an offense that at the trial court's discretion is punishable by three, five, or seven years in prison, it became punishable by a sentence of life imprisonment, based on the trial court's finding that the shooting benefitted a criminal street gang); and (2) because the crime fell into this more serious category (that is, a crime punishable by life imprisonment) it in turn became the basis for imposing the 20-year sentence enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm. (§ 12022.53(c).) Defendant's argument, although superficially appealing, overstates the scope of our decision in Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th 451, and that of the Court of Appeal in Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1439. Briceno addressed two statutesone stating that a felony committed to benefit a criminal street gang is a serious felony (§ 1192.7(c)(28)), the other stating that a serious felony committed to benefit a criminal street gang is subject to additional punishment (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B))and Briceno concluded that when the former statute applies, the latter does not. Similarly, in Arroyas the Court of Appeal addressed two subdivisions of section 186.22one stating that a misdemeanor committed to benefit a criminal street gang may be punished as a felony (§ 186.22, subd. (d)), the other stating that a felony committed to benefit a criminal street gang is subject to additional punishment (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1))and Arroyas concluded that when the former subdivision applies, the latter does not. Thus, both Briceno and Arroyas considered the interplay between two statutory provisions that impose penalties for committing a crime to benefit a criminal street gang, and each concluded that the California electorate, which enacted those provisions through an initiative measure, did not intend to apply both provisions to the same crime. But unlike the provisions at issue in Briceno, supra, 34 Cal.4th 451, and in Arroyas, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th 1439, which were all enacted through a single initiative (Prop. 21), here the two provisions in questionsection 186.22(b)(4) and section 12022.53(c)appear in separate statutes enacted at different times. And unlike the provisions at issue in Briceno and Arroyas, all of which pertained to criminal street gangs, here only one of the two provisions at issuesection 186.22(b)(4)pertains to criminal street gangs. That provision states that specified conduct (here, shooting at an inhabited dwelling) is, in a specified circumstance (that is, to benefit a street gang), punishable by a 15-year-to-life sentence, while the other provision at issuesection 12022.53(c)states that crimes punishable by life imprisonment are, in a specified circumstance (that is, when committed by personally and intentionally discharging a firearm), subject to a 20-year sentence enhancement. In this case, defendant is subject to that additional 20-year term not because he committed a gang-related offense but because he committed a particularly heinous crime (that is, a crime so serious that it is punishable by life imprisonment). For the reasons just discussed, Briceno and Arroyas do not support defendant's argument.