Opinion ID: 1389162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lay Witness Opinion Testimony

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in reversing an earlier ruling by the first trial judge in which the judge barred the introduction of opinion testimony by defendant's acquaintances identifying defendant as the person depicted in surveillance videotape pictures taken during the robbery and murders. Defendant essentially makes two claims in support of his argument. He first argues that the first judge's ruling on the admissibility of this testimony became the law of the case, and that by allowing this testimony, the second judge violated both the law of the case doctrine and the restrictions imposed by rule 16.1(d), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. We disagree. We begin by noting that both the law of the case laws and rule 16.1(d) are procedural rules. See Love v. Farmers Ins. Group, 121 Ariz. 71, 73, 588 P.2d 364, 366 (App. 1978), and rule 16.1(d). This court has previously explained law of the case as a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of that case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as those on which the first decision rested, and, according to some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits. Monaghan's Estate, 71 Ariz. 334, 336, 227 P.2d 227, 228 (1951) (citations omitted); see also 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 744 (1962); Annotation, Erroneous Decision as Law of the Case on Subsequent Appellate Review, 87 A.L.R.2d 271, 275 (1963). The term also has been used in discussing the question whether a judge is bound to follow a prior decision made in the same case by another judge in the same court. 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 744 (1962); see 1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶¶ 0.401, 0.404 (2d ed. 1992). The law of the case doctrine reflects the need for an end to litigation and a final decision that parties can rely on. Monaghan's Estate, 71 Ariz. at 336, 227 P.2d at 228. Despite our general adherence to this doctrine, we have recognized it as a rule of procedure, not substance. Love, 121 Ariz. at 73, 588 P.2d at 366; see also Dancing Sunshines Lounge v. Industrial Comm'n, 149 Ariz. 480, 482, 720 P.2d 81, 83 (1986). A court does not lack the power to change a ruling simply because it ruled on the question at an earlier stage. Love, 121 Ariz. at 73, 588 P.2d at 366. At the trial court level, the doctrine of the law of the case is merely a practice that protects the ability of the court to build to its final judgment by cumulative rulings, with reconsideration or review postponed until after the judgment is entered. 1B James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[4.-1] (2d ed. 1992). [T]his doctrine does not prevent a judge from reconsidering his or her previous nonfinal orders. Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 739 (Utah 1990). Nor does it prevent a different judge, sitting on the same case, from reconsidering the first judge's prior, nonfinal rulings. See Broyles v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Colo. 1985); Stepanov v. Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30, 36 (Alaska 1979); State v. Carden, 170 Mont. 437, 555 P.2d 738, 740 (1976). In fact, the court's discretion to reconsider an earlier ruling is reflected in one of our procedural rules, which provides: Finality of Pretrial Determinations. Except for good cause, or as otherwise provided by these rules, an issue previously determined by the court shall not be reconsidered. Rule 16.1(d), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although the power of a trial court to reconsider an earlier ruling under both rule 16.1(d) and the law of the case doctrine should not be used lightly, we review any such reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Defendant moved to exclude testimony of his acquaintances identifying him in the videotape, arguing that their testimony constituted expert testimony under rule 702, Arizona Rules of Evidence, and that the witnesses were not experts within the meaning of rule 702. To support his motion, defendant cited various cases involving experts who testified concerning the accuracy of eye-witness identification. In response to defendant's motion in limine, the state argued that it did not intend to introduce expert testimony, but instead intended to have individuals who knew defendant identify him as the person depicted in the videotape. This was explained again during oral argument, at which time Judge Ryan's predecessor requested some authority supporting the admission of such testimony. Judge Ryan's predecessor granted defendant's motion in limine without any explanation other than his statement that there is something about [this evidence] that just rubs me the wrong way, and I don't know what it is. Immediately after granting the motion, he stated that [u]nless you can show me authority to the contrary, we got some new stuff coming down the pike ..., after which he proceeded to discuss the motion for change of venue. The minute entry for this hearing noted only that defendant's motion was granted for reasons stated on the record. Sometime after this motion was decided, the case was transferred to Judge Ryan's calendar. The state, noting that the court left open the possibility of a rehearing on this motion, moved for a rehearing, arguing that this evidence was admissible under rule 701 and citing relevant case law. In his response opposing the rehearing, defendant did not challenge the state's claim that the trial court left this matter open; he merely argued that there was no good cause for the court to reconsider the earlier ruling, and thus rule 16.1(d) should preclude the court from entertaining this rehearing. In considering the state's motion for rehearing, Judge Ryan reviewed defendant's motion in limine, the state's motion for reconsideration, and defendant's response to the motion. Based on these documents, Judge Ryan concluded that defendant's motion in limine went only to the issue of the admissibility of identification testimony by expert witnesses under rule 702. Accordingly, Judge Ryan considered the admissibility of this evidence under rule 701 and concluded that the evidence was admissible. Although Judge Ryan did not have the record when he reconsidered defendant's motion in limine, the record suggests that his predecessor left this question open for reconsideration. Moreover, we find that Judge Ryan reasonably concluded that the only issue previously decided concerning this evidence was its admissibility under rule 702. Defendant's motion and the state's response argued the admissibility of this evidence under rule 702, and the minute entry reflected only that defendant's motion was granted for the reasons stated on the record. Accordingly, we find that Judge Ryan did not abuse his discretion in reconsidering admissibility of testimony from defendant's acquaintances that the person depicted in the videotape was defendant. We now address defendant's second claim in which he argues that the admission of this evidence essentially allowed the witnesses to testify as to the ultimate issue of defendant's guilt, which he argues is prohibited by this court's ruling in Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 680 P.2d 121 (1984). We disagree. The testimony of defendant's acquaintances concerning the identity of the person depicted in the pictures from the videotape taken during the robbery were admissible under rule 701, Arizona Rules of Evidence. That rule permits non-expert witnesses to give their opinions if their opinions are rationally based on their perception and helpful to the determination of a fact in issue. Although the jurors had the pictures before them and could make their own comparison between the person depicted in the pictures and defendant, they, unlike the state's witnesses, did not know defendant at the time the murders occurred. And, because defendant changed his appearance between the time of the crime and the trial, testimony from those who knew defendant at the time of the crime is particularly relevant. Because the state's witnesses knew defendant at the time of the murders, their opinions that the person depicted in the picture was or was not defendant was based on their perceptions. Moreover, their opinions assisted the jury in determining a fact in issue  the identity of the person on the videotape. Thus, this evidence was admissible under rule 701. See, e.g., United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1178-79 (9th Cir.1986) (admitting similar testimony under rule 701); United States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260, 261-62 (10th Cir.1979) (same). Despite defendant's claims to the contrary, admitting this evidence was not contrary to our decision in Fuenning, in which the defendant was charged with driving under the influence. In presenting its case, the prosecutor elicited a police officer's opinion whether defendant was driving under the influence. This court specifically stated that opinion evidence is usually admissible, even though the opinion `embraces an ultimate issue' of fact. 139 Ariz. at 605, 680 P.2d at 136, citing rule 704. We went on to say, however, that it was not advisable to ask for a witness's opinion of whether the defendant committed the crime with which he was charged. 139 Ariz. at 605, 680 P.2d at 136; see also rule 704, Comment (opinion evidence not permitted on how jury should decide case). The testimony in this case is a far cry from that of which we disapproved in Fuenning. The state did not ask the witnesses whether, in their opinion, defendant committed first-degree murder. Instead, the state tried to elicit through testimony from individuals who knew defendant at the time the picture was taken and who had seen him on the night of the murders, whether, in their opinion, the person depicted in the photograph was defendant. Although identification testimony embraces an issue of fact  the identity of the perpetrator, and perhaps evidence of guilt  the persons providing the identifications are not providing opinions of defendant's guilt or innocence or telling the jury how it should decide the case. Accordingly we find no error in the admission of this testimony. [6] SENTENCING ISSUES 1. Diminished Capacity In addition to his claims of trial error, defendant also raises various sentencing issues. Defendant's first argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to find that he had proved diminished capacity as a mitigating factor. The trial court found that defendant proved various non-statutory mitigating factors [7] including: 1. Traumatic childhood 2. Dysfunctional family 3. Substance abuse problem 4. Post-traumatic distress 5. Antisocial personality disorder produced in part by defendant's dysfunctional childhood. [8] Defendant claims that the 5 factors listed served as the predicate for his psychologist's opinion that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder to an extent sufficient to impair his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. [9] Accordingly, defendant argues, the court's finding that defendant failed to prove diminished capacity under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) was clearly erroneous. A defendant may establish a mitigating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) by proving that: The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution. Moreover, a defendant must prove the existence of this mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C); State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 648, 832 P.2d 593, 665 (1992). To prove that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, defendant offered the testimony of Mickey McMahon, Ph.D., along with a psychological report that Dr. McMahon prepared. After reviewing defendant's evidence, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to prove diminished capacity under § 13-703(G)(1). In his conclusion to his psychological report, Dr. McMahon stated: [I]t would appear that the client was intoxicated to some degree at the time of the offense. Whether or not the crime would have occurred if the client had not been intoxicated is open to conjecture; however, intoxication has traditionally been thought of as impairing an individual's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform it to the requirements of the law. In my opinion, intoxication was a primary ingredient that interfered with the client's ability to appreciate the full consequences of his behavior at the moment the offense occurred. By stating that intoxication was a primary ingredient that interfered with [defendant's] ability to appreciate the full consequences of his behavior, Dr. McMahon makes clear that defendant's capacity to appreciate the full consequences of his behavior was not significantly impaired by other factors. Although Dr. McMahon concluded that defendant was intoxicated to some degree at the time of the offense, the only support he provided for this conclusion was defendant's statements. When asked what defendant told him about the robbery and murder, Dr. McMahon stated: He was basically talking about being drunk at the time and not remembering much of anything. When later pressed, however, Dr. McMahon acknowledged that defendant told him that he was being railroaded and that he did not commit the crimes. When the state pressed further by confirming that defendant told him that he did not commit the crimes, and not that he was drunk, Dr. McMahon responded by saying: Well, he may have been drinking that evening. (Emphasis added.) The only other evidence that mentions the possibility of defendant drinking before the murders was the testimony that Jones and defendant had gone to the Short Stop before the murders to get some wine and that the two of them went back to the store at midnight to get something to drink. Nothing in the record suggests that defendant was intoxicated when he and Jones went back to the Short Stop the second time, nor does the record reflect how much alcohol, if any, defendant consumed that day. Moreover, even assuming that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense, his claim of diminished capacity under § 13-703(G)(1) still fails. To find a mitigating factor under this provision, defendant must prove that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) (emphasis added). Dr. McMahon did not conclude that defendant lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; rather, he stated only that defendant's alleged intoxication interfered with his ability to appreciate the full consequences of his behavior at the moment the offense occurred. There is a dramatic difference between the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct and the ability to appreciate the full consequences of one's conduct. In fact, the evidence of defendant's wiping down the security guard's empty holster demonstrates that defendant knew enough to try to cover up his acts. This evidence bolsters the trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to prove that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions was significantly impaired. Cf. State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 17, 870 P.2d 1097, 1113 (1994). Furthermore, defendant's argument that Dr. McMahon concluded that defendant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder to an extent sufficient to impair his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law is meritless. Defendant does not cite to anything in the record to support his claim. Dr. McMahon's written report addresses only defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. We searched the transcripts for evidence supporting defendant's claim, but the only testimony that remotely addresses this issue was general statements by Dr. McMahon about the tendency of persons suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder to act impulsively, and how the tendency to act impulsively increases when a person has been drinking. Essentially defendant presented evidence that individuals suffering from post-traumatic distress disorder are impulsive. Specifically, Dr. McMahon testified that such individuals have  some difficulties in inhibiting their impulses, and that [t]hey basically are not particularly good at controlling their emotions. (Emphasis added.) This court does not equate impulsiveness with the inability to conform one's conduct to the law. We conclude that a person's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of law is not impaired simply because a person has a tendency to act impulsively. Many people who act impulsively still manage to act impulsively within the bounds of law. Furthermore, much of the testimony regarding defendant's tendency to act impulsively hinged on the assumption that he had been intoxicated the evening of the offense. And, as we discussed above, defendant failed to prove that he had been drinking at all, let alone excessively, the evening of the offense. Other than this general statement concerning defendant's tendency to act impulsively, Dr. McMahon did not express an opinion on whether defendant's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly impaired. Moreover, we found no evidence in the record that would lead us to this conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to prove diminished capacity under § 13-703(G)(1). 2. Potential for Rehabilitation and Minimal Risk for Future Dangerousness Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to consider in mitigation evidence that he possessed potential for rehabilitation and presented a minimal risk for future dangerousness. Essentially defendant argues that the court refused to consider this evidence because the court asserted that potential for rehabilitation and lack of future dangerousness simply did not constitute mitigation at all. Not only do we disagree with defendant's characterization of the trial court's finding, but, after reviewing the evidence, we also find that defendant failed to prove either factor. As we have repeatedly stated: Defendant has the burden of proving the existence of mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court may take notice of evidence that tends to refute a proffered mitigating circumstance. State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 394, 814 P.2d 333, 351 (1991) (citations omitted). In his sentencing memorandum, defendant asked the court to consider the fact that he did not pose a risk of future criminal conduct as a mitigating factor, stating: Risk of Future Criminal Conduct There is ample evidence that given the defendant's background, his behavior in jail, and his personality, the defendant does not pose a risk while incarcerated. To support this claim, defendant offered Dr. McMahon's testimony that his condition could be treated and that he did not present a risk of future criminality. In rejecting defendant's claim that he posed no risk of future criminal conduct, the trial court stated: Doctor McMahon testified that he believed the defendant posed no risk as long as he was incarcerated. The court does not consider this to be a mitigating factor. Defendant mischaracterizes this finding as an assertion on the part of the trial court that the potential for rehabilitation and lack of future dangerousness simply did not constitute mitigation at all. The trial court clearly understood its responsibility in considering all nonstatutory mitigating factors offered by defendant. The trial court specifically stated that it had also considered nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, A.R.S. § 13-703(G), to determine whether there are mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court's statement meant only that the trial court determined that defendant did not prove the factor that he offered in mitigation. We agree with this conclusion. Again, the only evidence that defendant offered to support his claim that he was no longer dangerous was Dr. McMahon's testimony that he did not present a risk of future criminality. We find it a stretch to read this testimony as saying that defendant was no longer dangerous. Moreover, Dr. McMahon's written report and his testimony lead us to the opposite conclusion. In his report, when discussing the two primary ways that people respond to significant trauma, Dr. McMahon stated: One group suffers from periodic episodes of debilitating trauma, panic, and depression  avoiding any situation that retriggers the terrified, traumatic state they initially went through. The second group, rather comes to see the world as a jungle, where the strong eat the weak, and they, not wanting to be eaten [abused], decide that the best defense is a good offense. They then set out to become more hardened, more insensitive to the needs of others, so that they are able to intimidate others rather than ever risk being intimidated or abused themselves. It would appear that [defendant] has developed along this second path. (Emphasis supplied.) Dr. McMahon's testimony during the sentencing hearing reinforced our view that defendant is and will continue to be a dangerous individual. Dr. McMahon testified that he believed that defendant would continue to take from others, to be the strong versus the weak, whenever he felt threatened. And, even more importantly, he stated that defendant could perceive a threat that would not objectively be seen as a threat. Based on the evidence presented, we find no error in the trial court's failure to find that defendant presents minimal risk of future dangerousness. We reach a similar conclusion with defendant's claim that he has the potential for rehabilitation. Dr. McMahon testified that, at one time, the prevalent view was that people in defendant's position were not treatable, but that the current view is that defendant's condition is treatable. He also acknowledged that some people would disagree with this conclusion. This testimony was the only evidence presented supporting defendant's potential for rehabilitation. Substantial evidence, however, tended to refute Dr. McMahon's conclusion. For instance, even after having been convicted, defendant continued to deny that he committed the murders. Moreover, Dr. McMahon stated that defendant strongly disagreed with his findings and stated that defendant did not think that he or his family had any problems and that he did not want to drag any treatment through the courts. Defendant's denial both of committing the murder and of having any problems is consistent with his failure to seek the treatment that Dr. McMahon admitted was available to defendant for some of the 7 years that defendant was in prison. Merely because a condition can be treated does not lead us to conclude that a particular person has the potential for rehabilitation. Defendant's past failure to seek treatment and current denials refute his claims that he has the potential for rehabilitation. Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court's failure to make such a finding. 3. Witness Elimination Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding that the murders were committed in an especially depraved manner. The trial court found that defendant murdered the two victims to prevent them from testifying against him. Based solely on this finding, the court concluded that the state had proved that defendant committed the murders in an especially depraved manner under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). Citing the concurrence in State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 174, 823 P.2d 22, 41 (1991) (Feldman, C.J., concurring), defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding this aggravating factor because Arizona case law does not support such a finding. The state rebuts defendant's claim by arguing that murdering someone to eliminate that person as a witness falls within the definition of heinousness and depravity as set forth in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983), because it is a form of gratuitous violence. In Greenway, the trial court found that the murders were committed in a heinous and depraved manner under § 13-703(F)(6), based on its findings that (1) the victims were helpless, (2) defendant relished the murders, and (3) the murders were motivated by defendant's desire to eliminate witnesses. 170 Ariz. at 166-67, 823 P.2d at 33-34. Chief Justice Feldman specially concurred, emphasizing that although killing to eliminate witnesses may be a factor in finding depravity, the court has never held that a finding of heinousness and depravity could be based solely on a finding that a murder was motivated by a desire to eliminate a witness. Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 174, 823 P.2d at 41 (noting that State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 715 P.2d 721 (1986), State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655 (1984), and State v. Roger Smith, 141 Ariz. 510, 687 P.2d 1265 (1984), did not hold that killing merely to eliminate a witness was an aggravating circumstance). We agree with Chief Justice Feldman's interpretation of our case law. This court first discussed the aggravating value of evidence that a defendant killed solely to eliminate the victim as a witness in Smith, 141 Ariz. at 511-12, 687 P.2d at 1266-67. In Smith, the trial court found that the murder of an unresisting store clerk during a robbery was committed in an especially depraved manner under § 13-703(F)(6). The court's finding was based solely on its determination that the victim's murder was senseless because Smith could have robbed the victim and escaped without harming him. Smith, 141 Ariz. at 511, 687 P.2d at 1266. Although disagreeing with the trial court's reasoning in dicta, this court went on to discuss facts in the record that would have supported a finding of depravity had the state proved them beyond a reasonable doubt. See Smith, 141 Ariz. at 511-12, 687 P.2d at 1266-67. In particular, this court stated that Smith's laughing and joking about the murder and stating that he murdered the clerk so the clerk would not be able to testify against him would tend to indicate an especially depraved state of mind. Smith, 141 Ariz. at 511-12, 687 P.2d at 1266-67. This court did not consider such facts, however, because the trial court did not include them in its special verdict. Thus, both defendant's conviction and his sentence were affirmed without a finding of depravity as an aggravating factor. The first case in which the court actually used a defendant's motive to eliminate a witness to support a trial court's finding that a murder was committed in a heinous or depraved manner was Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 691 P.2d 655. In Gillies, [t]he trial court found two factors indicative of heinousness and depravity: 1) the senselessness of the murder, and 2) the savage manner of death. Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 570, 691 P.2d at 661. We agreed with both of the trial court's findings. Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 570, 691 P.2d at 661. We went on to reject Gillies' argument that the trial court erred in finding that the murders were senseless because he had a reason for committing the murder: to avoid prosecution. Comparing Gillies to the court's decision in Smith, we stated: We believe elimination of witnesses, as a motive for murder, also illustrates heinousness and depravity. Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 570, 691 P.2d at 661 (emphasis added). Similarly in Correll, the trial court found that the murders were motivated by Correll's desire to eliminate witnesses to his crime. 148 Ariz. at 481, 715 P.2d at 734. The trial court considered this, along with other facts, in concluding that Correll committed the murders in a depraved manner under § 13-703(F)(6). 148 Ariz. at 481, 715 P.2d at 734 (also finding that murders were senseless and that victims, bound and gagged before being shot, were helpless). Neither Smith, Gillies, nor Correll can be read as holding that a murder is heinous or depraved under § 13-703(F) based solely on a finding that the murder was motivated by the desire to eliminate a witness. The only case in which the court accepted a finding of depravity based solely on a finding that the murder was motivated by a desire to eliminate witnesses was State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 71, 786 P.2d 395, 401 (1989). In support of its finding, the court in Marlow erroneously cited Correll, Gillies, and Smith, with no further discussion of the cases. We attribute the lack of discussion concerning this aggravating factor to the court's ultimate resolution of the case. In Marlow, the court struck two of the three aggravating factors found by the trial court. The court also concluded that the trial court had failed to consider substantial mitigating evidence present in the case. Based on these errors, and without any need to discuss the propriety of the remaining aggravating factor, the court reduced Marlow's sentence to life imprisonment. We are now faced with the question whether § 13-703(F)(6) permits this court to find that a killing is especially heinous or depraved based solely on a finding that the motive for the killing was to eliminate witnesses. We conclude that it does not. The court intuitively recognizes the potential deterrent value of making killings motivated by a desire to eliminate witnesses a per se aggravating circumstance. We note, however, that unlike other states that characterize a convicted murderer's motive to eliminate witnesses as a per se aggravating factor, [10] our legislature has characterized only one motive  pecuniary gain  as a per se aggravating circumstance. Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 174, 823 P.2d at 41. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that [b]y failing to enumerate any other motive, the legislature has implied that other reasons for killing are not per se aggravating circumstances. Greenway, 170 Ariz. at 174, 823 P.2d at 41. Thus, we must analyze whether we are constitutionally permitted to find that a killing motivated by a desire to eliminate a witness, standing alone, supports a finding that a murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner under § 13-703(F)(6). The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has held that this court's interpretation of the term especially heinous, cruel, or depraved meets constitutional requirements. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 777-78, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3100-01, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), affirming our interpretation of the (F)(6) factor in State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 429-30, 661 P.2d 1105, 1130-31 (1983), which relied on the 5 factors set forth in State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983), and the definition of heinous and depraved set forth in State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 562 P.2d 704 (1977); see also Richmond v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 528, 535, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992), noting that Gretzler provided an adequate narrowing construction of [Arizona's (F)(6) factor]. (Emphasis added.) Because our decision in Gretzler is critical to the constitutional application of the cruel, heinous or depraved aggravating circumstance, we begin our analysis with a discussion of Gretzler. In Gretzler, we noted that this court has always recognized that the words `especially heinous, cruel, or depraved' were not intended to apply to all first degree murders. 135 Ariz. at 50-51, 659 P.2d at 9-10. We specifically stated that these terms apply to `a killing wherein additional circumstances of the nature enumerated ... set the crime apart from the usual or the norm.' Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51, 659 P.2d at 10 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In explaining the concept of heinous and depraved, we stated: [T]he statutory concepts of heinous and depraved involve a killer's vile state of mind at the time of the murder, as evidenced by the killer's actions. 135 Ariz. at 51, 659 P.2d at 10. We went on to discuss 5 factors, the existence of which can lead to a finding of heinousness or depravity: (1) the apparent relishing of the murder by the killer, (2) the infliction of gratuitous violence on the victim, (3) the needless mutilation of the victim, (4) the senselessness of the crime, and (5) the helplessness of the victim. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 51-52, 659 P.2d at 10-11. The court specifically noted that the senselessness of the crime and the helplessness of the victim, together or separately, when considered with other circumstances present in a particular case, may lead to the conclusion that an offense was heinous or depraved. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52, 659 P.2d at 11 (emphasis added). Although killing someone to eliminate that person as a potential witness does not fall squarely within any of the 5 Gretzler factors, this court has recognized the evidentiary value of this factor when refuting a defendant's arguments that a murder was not senseless because it was committed to avoid prosecution. See Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 570, 691 P.2d at 661. As we have repeatedly stated: [E]nding the life of a human being so that that person cannot testify against the defendant indicates a complete lack of understanding of the value of a human life. Correll, 148 Ariz. at 481, 715 P.2d at 734, citing Smith, 141 Ariz. at 512, 687 P.2d at 1267. Further, we agree that killing to eliminate a witness may be a factor in finding depravity because it demonstrates a cold-blooded, vile state of mind. See Knapp, 114 Ariz. at 543, 562 P.2d at 716 (defining heinous as hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad, and defining depraved as marked by debasement, corruption, perversion or deterioration). We cannot, however, conclude that this fact alone supports a finding that the murder was committed in a heinous or depraved manner. A finding that a murder was motivated by a desire to eliminate a witness is similar to a finding that the crime was senseless or the victim was helpless under Gretzler. And, only under limited circumstances will the senselessness of a murder or the helplessness of the victim  together or standing alone  lead to a finding that a murder was committed in a heinous or depraved manner. See Gretzler, 135 Ariz. at 52-53, 659 P.2d at 11-12, discussing State v. Lujan, 124 Ariz. 365, 373, 604 P.2d 629, 637 (1979) (unconscious victim was helpless but murder not heinous or depraved), and State v. Blazak, 131 Ariz. 598, 604, 643 P.2d 694, 700 (1982) (unnecessary killing of robbery victim and bystander not heinous or depraved). To find that a murder was committed in a cruel, heinous or depraved manner, enough evidence must be presented such that when it is considered, the court can conclude that the circumstances of the murder raise it above the norm of first degree murders. Blazak, 131 Ariz. at 604, 643 P.2d at 700; cf. Gillies, 142 Ariz. at 569-70, 691 P.2d at 660-61 (murder committed in savage manner and to eliminate witnesses). We concede that the two murders committed by defendant were the acts of a cold-blooded, vile mind. But such cold-bloodedness, without more, does not elevate this murder above the norm. See State v. Bernard Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 504, 707 P.2d 289, 302 (1985) (murder not heinous or depraved when defendant shot unresisting store clerk during robbery); Blazak, 131 Ariz. at 604, 643 P.2d at 700 (same finding when defendant shot robbery victim and 2 innocent bystanders). We therefore reject the trial court's finding that the murders were committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner under § 13-703(F)(6).