Opinion ID: 383662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: leonhard's claims

Text: 35 We deal first with the claims on behalf of Leonhard, which assert that each group of defendants violated Leonhard's constitutional rights. Among the defenses interposed was the bar of the statute of limitations. For the reasons below we agree that Leonhard's claims are time-barred. 17
36 The gist of Leonhard's claims against the federal defendants is that, commencing on or about August 15, 1967, various federal officials violated his constitutional rights by removing and concealing his children from him until July 1975. Leonhard's claims are apparently based directly on the United States Constitution, under the principles of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). Since this action was not commenced until June 30, 1978, more than ten years after removal of the children, the defendants contend that it is time-barred. The merit of their contention depends on when Leonhard's causes of action accrued and what period of limitations is applied. 37 Leonhard contends that the statute did not begin to run until July 1975. He argues that his claim accrued anew each time he wished to visit his children and was unable to do so: Each time he was deprived of these rights, a new cause of action accrued and continued to accrue until July 11, 1975, when Appellant and his children were reunited. (Brief at 57). There are a variety of possible dates on which Leonhard's claim may be deemed to have ripened for statute of limitations purposes, but none of them as late as that he urges. 38 Under general principles of law, a cause of action accrues when conduct that invades the rights of another has caused injury. When the injury occurs, the injured party has the right to bring suit for all of the damages, past, present and future, caused by the defendant's acts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 899, 910 (1977). The earliest allegedly wrongful act which resulted in Leonhard's loss of his children occurred sometime in 1967, when Leonhard's children were removed from New York and first concealed from him. 18 39 At common law this general principle is subject to the modification that a claim to redress a continuing wrong will be deemed to have accrued on the date of the last wrongful act. Thus, in New York, (d)espite the general principle that a cause of action accrues when the wrong is done, regardless of when it is discovered, certain wrongs are considered to be continuing wrongs, and the statute of limitations, therefore, runs from the commission of the last wrongful act. N.Y.Civ.Prac. Law (hereinafter CPLR) § 203 note (McKinney 1972) (McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries C203:1). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, comment c (For false imprisonment, the statute begins to run only when the imprisonment ends, since the period of imprisonment is treated as a unit.) This rule is well illustrated by the decision in Montgomery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251, 257-59 (1928). There a mother, who had been awarded custody of her daughter following a divorce, sought damages for the abduction of the daughter by her estranged husband and his parents, which had resulted in a nine-year separation of mother from daughter. In response to an assertion that the two-year statute of limitations barred the mother's claim, the court observed that if the abduction consisted of an unbroken chain of wrongful acts at least some of which occurred during the two years immediately preceding suit, the statute would not bar the action, stating that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until there is a cessation of the overt acts constituting the wrong. 161 N.E. at 259. But if all of the overt acts preceded that two-year period, the statute would have run. Id. Accord: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, comment c: When there has been a loss of services over a considerable period of time by a continuous series of acts, as when a child is withheld from the custody of his parents, the injured party recovers only for that to which he was entitled within the statutory period before suit. (Emphasis added.) Thus if we are to apply the common law modification to determine when Leonhard's causes of action arose, we will have to determine the date of the defendants' last overt act. A preliminary question is whether common law rules should be applied. 40 Although we must look to state law to determine what period of limitations applies, see text following note 21 infra, the issue as to when Leonhard's cause of action accrued remains a question of federal law, Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282, 285 (2d Cir. 1974), and there are persuasive reasons in the present case for eschewing application of the common law accrual principles appropriate for torts such as abduction. First, the defendants at all times dealt with the children's mother, who had custody of them and who joined in and consented to their relocation and concealment. A claim for abduction or false imprisonment would thus be untenable. See part V. C. infra. Moreover, there were reasons for the defendants' actions which strongly implicate federal interests. Their actions were concededly part of their efforts to deal with a very serious problem, organized crime, and to make an agreement, a deal, with a government informant. (Statement of plaintiffs' counsel at hearing in district court.) The procurement of testimony against alleged members of organized crime will normally require appropriate protection of both the informant and his family. Relocation and concealment will commonly be part of this protection. To prevent intimidation, we would think the protection would begin prior to any disclosure to the putative criminals that the informant will testify. Thereafter the protection would continue in order to prevent reprisals: after the government has obtained the testimony of the informant, it would hardly seem prudent or conscionable for the government officials to turn and disclose the whereabouts of the informant's family. It appears, therefore, that once the family of an informant is concealed, the federal officials are virtually committed to continue that concealment for some period of time. Thus, it is the initial concealment which would give rise to a right of action, and subsequent acts in furtherance and continuation of the concealment should not give rise to new or renewed causes of action. If we apply this principle, Leonhard's cause of action accrued in 1967. 41 Even if common law accrual rules applied, however, Leonhard would not be able to justify his preferred 1975 date, since he does not allege that any of the defendants' acts occurred as late as 1975. 19 While the complaint alleges conclusorily that the federal defendants concealed the children until 1975 and refused his repeated requests to be informed of (their) whereabouts, no overt acts are alleged. And the affidavit of Rochelle, submitted to the district court by plaintiffs, shows only that the government concealed and supported Rochelle and the children until July 1970. 20 Thus, even applying common law rules, on the basis of the evidence presented by plaintiffs we conclude that Leonhard's claims accrued not later than July 1970. 21 42 The remaining question is within what period Leonhard was required to bring suit. Since Congress has not provided a statute of limitations for Bivens actions, we must use the most nearly analogous state statute of limitations. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). 43 In Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977), this Court held that the most appropriate statute for a Bivens action accruing in New York is either the three-year limitation provided by CPLR § 214(2) for an action to recover upon a liability imposed by statute, or the six-year limitation provided by CPLR § 213(1) for actions for which no limitation is specifically prescribed. In Regan we had no need to determine which of the two periods was the more appropriate because the action was barred under either statute. The same is true here. Since Leonhard's causes of action accrued no later than 1970, i. e., more than six years before the June 1978 commencement of this suit, the suit is barred.
44 Leonhard's complaint challenges only a single act by the state defendants: that they released Pascal Calabrese from custody prior to the date authorized by law. While the complaint is far from clear in this respect, it may be construed to allege that the release of Calabrese in 1968 violated Leonhard's constitutional rights and to seek relief under § 1983. 22 45 As to § 1983 actions, like Bivens -type actions, Congress has not specified a statute of limitations, and again we must look to state law. With respect to § 1983 actions brought in federal district courts in New York, this Court has repeatedly held that the appropriate period is the three-year limitation of CPLR § 214(2). Taylor v. Mayone, 626 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1980); Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 1980); 23 Leigh v. McGuire, 613 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded for further consideration, --- U.S. ----, 100 S.Ct. 2935, 64 L.Ed.2d 820 (1980); Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830, 98 S.Ct. 112, 54 L.Ed.2d 90 (1977); Kaiser v. Cahn, 510 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1974); Ortiz v. LaVallee, 442 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1971); Swan v. Board of Higher Education, 319 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1963); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136, 140 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.) (predecessor statute of § 214(2)), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825, 68 S.Ct. 166, 92 L.Ed. 400 (1947). 46 There is no reason to apply a different limitations period here. Since Calabrese was paroled in 1968, and Leonhard's complaint was filed in 1978, Leonhard's action against the state defendants is time-barred.
47 Leonhard's claim against the city defendants also is asserted under § 1983. The claim is that Giambrone, acting under color of law as an employee of the Buffalo police department and acting with the authority of the City, participated in the removal and concealment of Leonhard's children from him. 24 Although the complaint contains conclusory assertions that Giambrone and the City refused to reveal the children's whereabouts to Leonhard and impeded Leonhard's efforts to find them, it does not allege any overt acts on the part of Giambrone or the City after 1967. We conclude, therefore, that Leonhard's claims against Giambrone and the City accrued in 1967 when the children were removed, or in any event no later than 1970 when the last overt acts to conceal the children occurred. See part A above. Since a three-year period of limitations applies to these claims, see part B above, Leonhard's claims against the city defendants were properly dismissed.