Opinion ID: 199558
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Acco-Bristol

Text: admission of habit or routine practice. Here, by contrast, the testimony from the Musillos and Jones was admitted without objection by the appellants, who now argue that this evidence is not sufficient to establish CWR's pickup and delivery practices. This argument fails. Once routine practice evidence has been admitted, Rule 406 does not limit the district court's consideration of such evidence, or the weight that it may be given. 25Ashlandalso mounts a misnomer defense, arguing that UTC did not name the proper party in its pleadings when it sued Ashland Chemical Inc. rather than Ashland Chemical Co. According to stipulations of fact by the parties, Ashland Chemical Inc. was incorporated in 1989 and merged into Ashland Oil Inc. in 1993. In 1996, Ashland Oil Inc. changed its name to Ashland Inc. Ashland Chemical Co., which operated the Great Meadows, New Jersey facility from which CWR transported hazardous waste, was a division of Ashland Oil Inc. in 1977. While Ashland Chemical Inc. may technically be an inaccurate reference to Ashland Chemical Co., there is no question that Ashland received adequate notice that it was being sued, and that it owned the Great Meadows facility from which the liability at issue here stemmed. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(c)(3), Advisory Committee Notes 1991 Amendment (An intended defendant who is notified of an action within the period allowed . . . for service of a summons and complaint may not under the revised rule defeat the action on account of a defect in the pleading with respect to the defendant's name . . . . [A] complaint may be amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or misidentification.); Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (Plainly, the new language [of Rule 15(c)(3)] comprehends a situation where the original complaint sues the correct party but identifies him by a technically incorrect name.). There is no question here that UTC sued the correct party and that judgment was entered against that party. As a result, we reject Ashland's misnomer defense. - 50 - Acco-Bristol Division of Babcock Industries maintained a manufacturing facility in Waterbury, Connecticut in 1977. This facility produced controls for oil and gas lines through processes involving electroplating, soldering, welding, and degreasing machine parts. Wastes produced by Acco included 1,1,1-TCA, a soap and cyanide waste stream, and acid sludge. Acco typically put the waste in 55gallon drums for disposal. CWR twice picked up waste from Acco during the spring and summer of 1977, collecting 50 drums on April 6 26 and 24 drums on June 28. On June 29, CWR received a check in the amount of $324 for these pickups. A Capuano Dumping Charge Slip, also dated June 29, indicates that CWR delivered a full load of 79 drums to the Davis site. The evidence at trial indicated that drivers directed to the Davis site by the Capuanos at Sanitary Landfill sometimes presented Capuano dumping receipts to William Davis. Davis testified that he used these slips to verify the amount of waste dumped on his property and to help him prepare invoices for Sanitary Landfill. In keeping with this practice, Davis sent a bill to Sanitary Landfill on June 29 for 79 gallons of waste. Based on this evidence, the district court inferred that the 24 drums of Acco waste went to the Davis site in CWR's shipment on June 26 The district court declined to infer that the shipment picked up by CWR on April 6 went to the Davis site because there were no Davis slips within three days of that date. - 51 - 29. We cannot conclude that this determination is clearly erroneous. Acco points out that on June 27 and 28, CWR picked up 99 drums of waste from various customers -- 20 drums more than were dumped at the Davis site. However, at least 17 of those drums were picked up from customers who frequently disposed of waste oils. Because CWR tended to sell waste oil to salvagers, as we have noted, the district court's conclusion that the 24 drums of Acco's waste were part of the 79 drums sent to the Davis site on June 29 was reasonable. Acco argues that the district court erred in relying on the Capuano slip to infer the presence of Acco's waste at the Davis site because the slip does not specify a transporter. Specifically, Acco claims that CCC or another waste company, rather than CWR, Acco's only transporter, could have brought the waste delivered on June 29. However, testimony at trial makes clear that by June 1977, CCC was dumping waste directly at the Davis site without stopping at Sanitary Landfill first. Thus, it is not likely that the June 29 Capuano Dumping Charge Slip accounted for waste hauled by CCC. As a result, we cannot say that the district court's findings that the Capuano slip referred to waste dumped by CWR, and that Acco's waste was part of that delivery, was clearly erroneous. See Dedham Water, 972 F.2d at 463.