Opinion ID: 2974916
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allegedly Coercive Interrogations

Text: “An employer violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act by coercively interrogating its employees about their union activities.” NLRB v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 750 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir. 1984). “The basic test for evaluating the legality of an interrogation is “‘whether under all of the 15 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.’” Dayton Typographic Serv. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1177 (1984)). Thus, we will consider the employer’s history of hostility toward the union, “the nature of the information sought, the questioner’s identity, and the place and method of interrogation.” Id.; see also Architectural Glass & Metal Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 1997). These cases, however, do not hold that employers may never question employees about union matters. If an employee has a “legitimate reason” he or she may question employees about union matters. Id. We have defined a “legitimate reason” as when “[t]he nature of the information sought would be related to a legitimate policy of the employer.” Architectural Glass, 107 F.3d at 434. Further, the Board has found questioning employees about participation in union movements to be permissible when that questioning is considered “causal and amicable” and where there is “no history of employer hostility towards or discrimination against union supporters.” Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, Inc., 277 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1218 (1985). Relevant for the present case is our holding in ITT Auto. v. NLRB because it addresses the issue of employers “offering anti-union buttons to employees.” 188 F.3d 375, 376 (6th Cir. 1999). In that case, we expressly held that this behavior is impermissible. Quoting the N.L.R.B., we held “that such behavior pressures employees to make a choice in public about whether to acknowledge their union sentiments and ‘effectively puts employees in the position of either having to accept or reject the [employer’s] proffer.’” Id. at 386-387 (quoting A.O. Smith Automotive Prods., 315 N.L.R.B. 994, 1009 (1994). 16 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354
As explained above, Reynolds and Groves were both approached by supervisors and offered “Vote No” buttons. DynCorp argues that these conversations were not intended to be coercive, nor were the questions delivered in a coercive way, and thus, that the Board did not have substantial evidence to support its finding that this inquiry was impermissible. However, DynCorp misstates the inquiry before this Court. We need not determine if the conversation between Reynolds and Wolfe actually did make Reynolds feel coerced or whether it was intended to do so. Instead, the question is whether it had the tendency to coerce. Dayton Typographic Serv., 778 F.2d at 1194. Because we have previously held that an employer’s offer of a “Vote No” button constitutes an impermissible interrogation, the inquiry before us is simple. ITT Auto, 188 F.3d at 386. This exchange constituted an impermissible interrogation.
Godbey’s interaction with management differed from those of Groves and Reynolds because he was not offered a “Vote No” button. Instead, Lawrence, a supervisor, asked him where his “ornament” was, which was a reference to the “Vote Yes” button Godbey usually wore. (J.A. at 4849). Admittedly, nothing about this incident taken alone would tend to coerce an employee. However, as the Board pointed out, this incident should not be considered in isolation. The fact that a number of these interrogations had taken place, the fact that they happened so close to the election, along with the fact that the questioning was being done by supervisors to their subordinates, all create substantial evidence that the questioning about Godbey’s wearing “Vote Yes” buttons was coercive in nature. Further, it was well-known that the supervisors did not support the union and 17 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 from their actions seemed hostile to those supporting the union. Lawrence’s reference to Godbey’s “ornaments” was obviously facetious, and the tone of the conversation in light of the atmosphere at DynCorp gives the conversation on the whole a tendency to coerce. This was not the environment the Board found in Sunnyvale Medical Clinic, Inc., where there was no reason for employees to fear anti-union animus. See 277 N.L.R.B. at 1218. By asking Godbey about his support of the union, the questioning necessarily had a coercive element to it. Thus, there was substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion and we therefore affirm this finding. c. Interrogation of Henderson and threat of onerous working conditions Henderson was also asked by Lawrence where his “medals of honor” were, which was a reference to Henderson’s “Vote Yes” button. (J.A. at 48). Lawrence then questioned Henderson about his involvement in the union organizing efforts, and when Henderson answered the questions and confirmed that he was involved in the campaign, Lawrence responded that he was “disappointed.” (J.A. at 49). The tone of this conversation weighs strongly in favor of the N.L.R.B.’s finding that it was coercive. Lawrence’s reference to “medals of honor,” again, was obviously facetious and that, coupled with his expression of “disappointment” at Henderson’s prounion loyalties creates strong evidence that this interaction was improper. Further, the mere fact that Lawrence put Henderson in the position to have to reveal his level of activity in the union campaign when Lawrence was such a vocal opponent was improper. It effectively placed Henderson in a position similar to those employees being offered buttons in that it forced him to have to disclose his loyalties to a superior who did not share those loyalties. See ITT Auto, 188 F.3d at 386. Accordingly, the Board had substantial evidence to support its finding that this was impermissible. 18 Nos. 05-1138; 05-1268; 05-1324, 05-2244, 05-2354 Henderson was then denied assistance that he had always received in the past, which he interpreted as a threat about how things would be if the union were elected. It is worth noting that there is some discrepancy about the timing of Moore’s and Lawrence’s refusal to give Henderson the assistance that he requested. Henderson originally testified that he was interrogated in early February. He also testified that he was denied his requested assistance on February 19, 2000, and counsel corrected him that it had to be January 19, 2000. Thus, DynCorp points out that if these dates are correct, Henderson was denied assistance before the interrogation, so the denial cannot be seen as a reaction to that interrogation. However, Henderson additionally testified that he remembered the denial of assistance to come “the very next day” after the interrogation. (J.A. at 552; J.A. at 557). Thus, it is just as likely that Henderson was confused about the actual dates of the events as it is likely that he was confused about which incident came first. It is not the job of this Court to decide which of these equally plausible explanations is more likely. Because there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the Board made, we must sustain its finding. Henry I. Siegel Co., 417 F.2d at 1214.