Opinion ID: 2600739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Dog Sniff Search In This Case

Text: The prosecution argues that the use of a dog is not a search when the dog and its handler are lawfully in a public area. We disagree that this assertion applies here. The only reason the automobile stopped was because of Officer Miller's traffic stop. Cf. People v. Wieser, 796 P.2d 982, 986 (Colo. 1990)(where the object of a search was a public storage locker, the outside of which was made continually accessible to the public by virtue of a public right of way located next to it). The police detained this automobile for a drug search, just as they detained the objects involved in our Boylan and May cases. 1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we follow the rule of law established in earlier cases unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come from departing from precedent. People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo.1999). In Unruh, we rejected the prosecution's argument that a dog sniff search is always a reasonable intrusion. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379. Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has held differently under the Fourth Amendment, we nevertheless established that the balance between governmental and individual interests is best struck by requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to the dog sniff search of an object to which the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. We have adopted this Colorado Constitutional standard in cases that are analogous to stops of vehicles, namely, circumstances in which the possessor of the object searched had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See May, 886 P.2d at 282; Boylan, 854 P.2d at 810. In Unruh, we did not reach, but differentiated, dog sniff searches of luggage at airports or objects in public places from cases in which a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object triggers the requirement of reasonable suspicion for the dog sniff search. Unruh, 713 P.2d at 378 (analogizing to cases involving a Terry stop); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). We ascertain no compelling reason for departing from our prior precedent under the Colorado Constitution. Our reasoning in prior cases involving dog sniff searches and prolonged traffic stops applies to the case before us. Accordingly, we determine that Haley, Dunlap, and Daniels possessed a privacy interest in their persons and vehicle being free from unreasonable governmental intrusion, and the drug investigation following the traffic stop in this case required reasonable suspicion for the dog sniff search to proceed. See Boylan, 854 P.2d at 811 ([A] dog sniff search need not be justified by probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant, but instead only requires reasonable suspicion, similar to that required to stop and frisk a person suspected of involvement in imminent criminal activity.); May, 886 P.2d at 282; Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). When, as here, the purpose for which the investigatory stop was instituted has been accomplished and no other reasonable suspicion exists to support further investigation, there is no justification for continued detention and interrogation of citizens. People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81, 85-86 (Colo.1995); see People v. Ramos, 13 P.3d 295, 298 (Colo.2000); see also People v. Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d 141, 147 (Colo. 2001). In Redinger, 906 P.2d at 86, we said that police conduct requiring additional information after the purpose of the initial investigation is satisfied is not justified in the absence of another basis for detention and questioning. 2. No Reasonable Suspicion Reasonable suspicion warranting the continued investigation must be more than a hunch. Boylan, 854 P.2d at 812. Courts must consider the facts and circumstances known to the police officer at the time of the encounter in order to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists; this is an objective standard of reasonableness based on the circumstances known to the police at the time. Outlaw v. People, 17 P.3d 150, 157 (Colo.2001); May, 886 at 282. To satisfy its burden, the prosecution must show that the police had specific and articulable facts which, when taken together with the reasonable inferences from these facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion. Boylan, 854 P.2d at 811; Unruh, 713 P.2d at 379; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)(stating that determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior). At the suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that the police acted without reasonable suspicion. We agree. We determine here that the facts, when taken together, did not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic violation. When reviewing a motion to suppress, [w]e must defer to a trial court's findings of fact if those findings are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Pitts, 13 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Colo.2000); see also People v. Medina, 25 P.3d 1216, 1223 (Colo.2001). However, we must examine the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. See Medina, 25 P.3d at 1223. Like the trial court, we must review the totality of the circumstances known to the police officers at the time of the encounter to determine whether the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a search and seizure. Outlaw, 17 P.3d at 157. Therefore, we examine the encounter between Haley, Dunlap, Daniels and Officer Miller. First, as a preliminary matter, the police had justification to make the traffic stop. See People v. Ramos, 13 P.3d 295, 297 (Colo.2000)(holding that police officers are entitled to conduct an investigatory stop of a motorist if they have reasonable suspicion that the motorist has committed a traffic violation); People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1351, 1355 (Colo.1997)(holding that if an officer possesses an objectively reasonable suspicion that a traffic offense has been committed, the officer may request identifying information from the driver). Officer Miller observed Haley following another vehicle too closely; thus he had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. After a satisfactory examination of Haley's identifying information, Officer Miller told Haley he was free to go and obtained Haley's consent to search the luggage, which Haley proceeded to remove from the trunk of the car at the officer's request. The consensual search revealed no basis for reasonable suspicion, as the dog did not alert to the luggage. The facts known to the police were: (1) Haley, Dunlap, and Daniels rented the car in Sacramento for one week and were traveling to Kansas City; (2) the driver and passengers looked very nervous; (3) they were traveling from Sacramento, California; (4) Dunlap and Daniels did not know where they were going; and (5) Haley consented to a dog sniff of the luggage but not the car. The fact that Haley, Dunlap, and Daniels rented the car in Sacramento for one week and were traveling to Kansas City did not provide a reasonable inference of criminal activity. Traveling cross-country in a rental car in the company of others is not suspicious behavior. Officer Miller stated that he found it strange for three people to fly one-way to a city and then pay approximately $600 to drive back, rather than purchase return flights. However, people can choose land travel over air travel because they are visiting friends or tourist sites, or simply because they do not want to fly. The choice of means of travel at any time on the journey does not lend support to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir.1997)(finding that defendant's travel plans, flying one way to California and renting a car to drive back to Kansas, were not the sort of unusual plans that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Officer Miller observed that Haley and his passengers all exhibited nervousness. However, it is not uncommon for most citizens-whether innocent or guilty-to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by a law enforcement officer. Wood, 106 F.3d at 948; see also United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 879-80 (10th Cir.1994)(stating that nervousness is of limited significance in determining reasonable suspicion and that the government's repetitive reliance on nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion must be treated with caution). Officer Miller characterized California as a drug source, with a particular reference to San Diego. [10] There is no evidence in the record showing that Sacramento is a drug source; it is not close to an international border; nor, does this case involve an airport. We cannot assume as a basis for reasonable suspicion that cars traveling from California on I-70 in Colorado contain illegal drugs. Therefore, without further evidence showing that Sacramento is a drug source, this circumstance is of very little weight. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 496-96 (3d Cir.1995)(Florida is not the only `known drug center,' and the mere fact that defendant was from Florida cannot be a factor supporting reasonable suspicion. Presumably the vast bulk of people with cars registered in Florida are not drug smugglers, and they have a right to travel to Pennsylvania.). The prosecution argues that Dunlap's and Daniels's failure to identify their destination supports reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. However, an examination of the record demonstrates that Dunlap did not respond to the question and Daniels agreed, after hesitating, with the officer's suggestion that he was going home. [11] This was a consensual interview. Daniels and Dunlap's silence or hesitation in responding is not an inconsistency supporting reasonable suspicion. See Wood, 106 F.3d at 947 (stating that inconsistent information provided to an officer during a traffic stop may give rise to reasonable suspicion, but Wood's error in identifying the city where he rented the car is not the sort of inconsistency that warrants such a conclusion). Evaluating the circumstances in totality, we conclude that the police in this case lacked reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking and incorrectly employed Haley's denial of permission to search the car as reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop in order to conduct a drug investigation. The failure to consent to a search cannot form any part of the basis for reasonable suspicion. Wood, 106 F.3d at 946; see United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir.1999). Haley's conduct in reluctantly agreeing to a search of the luggage and refusing to consent to a search of the car is not a circumstance supporting reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir.1998)(Any other rule would make a mockery of the reasonable suspicion and probable cause requirements, as well as the consent doctrine. These legal principles would be considerably less effective if citizens' insistence that searches and seizures be conducted in conformity with constitutional norms could create the suspicion or cause that renders their consent unnecessary.); Karnes, 62 F.3d at 495 (holding that the fact that defendant granted consent to police to search some items and then refused to give consent to additional searches cannot support a finding of reasonable suspicion); United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C.Cir.1993)(The constitutional right to withdraw one's consent to search would be of little value if the very fact of choosing to exercise that right could serve as any part of the basis for finding the reasonable suspicion that makes consent unnecessary.). A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000). [12] The circumstances here did not give rise to justifying a drug investigation after the traffic violation investigation was concluded. See May, 886 P.2d at 282; Boylan, 854 P.2d at 812. In Boylan, we relied upon three facts for our determination of reasonable suspicion: first, a report of a civilian informant to a police detective that the defendant received cocaine shipments via Federal Express; second, the police had corroborating information from a confidential informant; and, third, a package addressed to Robyn Boylan came through the Federal Express office soon after the informants' information was provided. Id. at 811-12. We then held that each separate item of information standing alone would not have amounted to reasonable suspicion. However, the three in combination clearly satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement. Id. at 812. Here, the facts do not support reasonable suspicion. Allowing officers to pursue a drug investigation without any individualized reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing would subject travelers on our state's roads to unconstrained searches and seizures. See Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d at 495. We determine that the facts in this case, when taken together, did not justify the police finding reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the reason for the initial traffic stop. We agree with the trial court that the dog sniff search of the automobile for illegal substances required but lacked reasonable suspicion, in violation of Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution.