Opinion ID: 4580877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Langlois’ Hostile Work Environment Claims

Text: Langlois also contends on appeal that the district court erred in rejecting her claims for hostile work environment under Title VII and the CFEPA. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining that Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination extends to “a discriminatorily hostile or abusive [work] environment”). In order to prove a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must show that her “‘workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 5 the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Demoret v. Zegarelli, 541 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2006)). Specifically, she must show that the conduct she complains of: (1) “is objectively severe or pervasive—that is, . . . creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive”; (2) “creates an environment that the plaintiff perceives as hostile or abusive”; and (3) “creates such an environment because of the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic].” Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). These same requirements apply to claims of hostile work environment under the CFEPA. See Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 556. Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to Langlois, we agree with the district court that a reasonable jury could not conclude that Langlois’ workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her work environment.” Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). First, Langlois alleges conduct that falls short of the requisite level of severity or pervasiveness necessary to establish an objectively hostile work environment. See Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 376-77 (2d Cir. 2002) (overturning a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff who had alleged twelve incidents contributing to her claim of a hostile work environment). Langlois offers no incident that is of a degree of severity that would give rise to a hostile work environment by itself. Cf. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding a valid hostile-work-environment claim where plaintiff alleged that her supervisor made one long, sexually explicit tirade against plaintiff in front of a large group). Indeed, the bulk of the conduct she complains of is reasonably expected in the school working environment: late-night emails about work-related matters, evaluations and follow-up meetings concerning work performance, criticism related to classroom management and teaching, 6 occasional rude interactions with bosses, and placement on a performance support plan after subpar evaluations. Second, Langlois has not demonstrated that, taken together, her allegations amount to a continuous or concerted series of incidents establishing a hostile work environment. The few isolated comments allegedly made by the school principal, mentioned previously, do not meet this threshold. See Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 713 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Although the alleged comments are despicable and offensive, they fail to constitute discriminatory behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to cause a hostile work environment.”). See also Clark Cnty. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam) (“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” (quotation marks omitted)). In sum, a reasonable factfinder could not find on this record that the conditions alleged by Langlois amounted to race-based hostile work environment. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Defendants-Appellees on Langlois’ hostile work environment claim. B. Langlois’ § 1983 Claims Finally, Langlois’ claims under § 1983 fail for the same reasons as stated above with respect to disparate treatment and hostile work environment under Title VII and CFEPA. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that with respect to § 1983 claims based on Title VII and CFEPA, the substantive elements are “generally the same . . . and the two must stand or fall together”); accord Patterson, 375 F.3d at 225. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees with respect to these claims as well.