Opinion ID: 787440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ortiz's Due Process Claim

Text: 26 If Ortiz's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim relating to his disciplinary hearing failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the claim could be dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2). In that case, only Ortiz's Eighth Amendment claim would remain, and, because it is unexhausted, it too would have to be dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See infra Part IV. Since the entire lawsuit would thus be disposed of, we would not reach the question whether a prisoner's action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims need be dismissed in its entirety under section 1997e(a). See id. We conclude, however, that the complaint does state a claim for a violation of Ortiz's due process rights. 27 [T]o present a due process claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he possessed a liberty interest and (2) that the defendant(s) deprived him of that interest as a result of insufficient process. Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Prison discipline implicates a liberty interest when it imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). 28 As a result of the Tier III hearing, Ortiz was sentenced to ninety days in SHU. According to his complaint, his treatment while in SHU was unusually harsh. 29 To be sure, with respect to normal SHU confinement, we have held that a 101- day confinement does not meet the Sandin standard of atypicality. Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 589 (2d Cir.1999). The duration of SHU confinement, however, is not the only relevant factor. We have said that under abnormal or unusual SHU conditions, periods of confinement of less than 101 days may implicate a liberty interest. See Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.2004) (SHU confinements of fewer than 101 days could constitute atypical and significant hardships if the conditions were more severe than the normal SHU conditions....); Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 232 n. 5 (2d Cir.2000) (We do not exclude the possibility that SHU confinement of less than 101 days could be shown on a record more fully developed than the one in Sealey to constitute an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin. ); Sealey, 197 F.3d at 586 (Both the conditions and their duration must be considered, since especially harsh conditions endured for a brief interval... might ... be atypical. (citation omitted)). In Palmer, we held that the defendant's confinement for seventy-seven days in SHU under unusually harsh conditions raised a question of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment on the issue of whether Palmer had been deprived of a liberty interest. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 66. The district court in the case before us thus erred when it dismissed Ortiz's due process claim based solely on the fact that his SHU confinement was for fewer than 101 days. 30 We need not delineate the precise contours of normal SHU confinement. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that, ordinarily, SHU prisoners are kept in solitary confinement for twenty-three hours a day, provided one hour of exercise in the prison yard per day, and permitted two showers per week. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65 n. 3 (citing N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 7, §§ 304.1-.14, 305.1-.6 (2003)). Ortiz alleges that for at least part of his confinement, he was kept in SHU for twenty-four hours a day, was not permitted an hour of daily exercise, and was prevented from showering for weeks at a time. First Amended Compl. ¶ 11. Based on these and Ortiz's other allegations relating to his treatment in SHU, we think that, if proved, they could establish conditions in SHU far inferior, Palmer, 364 F.3d at 66, to those prevailing in the prison in general. We thus conclude that Ortiz has alleged that the ninety-day SHU sentence imposed on him was, under the circumstances, a hardship sufficiently atypical and significant to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to the first part of the due process test. 31 In order for his due process claim to survive defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, however, Ortiz must also have alleged that the prison imposed the SHU sentence without providing due process. Giano, 238 F.3d at 225. For a prison disciplinary proceeding to provide due process there must be, among other things, some evidence to support the sanction imposed. Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 163 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the case of a prison disciplinary sanction based solely on the evidence supplied by a confidential informant, we have said that this some evidence standard requires some examination of indicia relevant to [the informant's] credibility. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir.1996)). See also Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 76-78, 2004 WL 1719285, - (2d Cir. Aug.2, 2004), 2004 U.S.App. LEXIS 15897, - (discussing due process requirement of some assessment of confidential informant credibility in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings). The complaint sufficiently alleges that the some evidence standard was not met to survive defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion in this respect. 32 Ortiz's First Amended Complaint thus successfully states a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. We must therefore decide whether the district court was nonetheless correct in dismissing Ortiz's action in its entirety because the Eighth Amendment claim had not been administratively exhausted.