Opinion ID: 2306632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Judge Properly Instructed the Jury on the Issue of Reasonable Doubt.

Text: McNally contends that the trial judge erred in his reasonable doubt jury instruction. He argues that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury that it must be firmly convinced of McNally's innocence before acquitting him. Because McNally did not object timely to the jury instructions, we review the trial judge's instruction for plain error. [3] An error is plain when it affects the defendant's substantial rights, and thus, affected the outcome of the trial. [4] Though the instruction included superfluous language, the trial judge did not commit plain error by instructing the jury as he did. Jury instructions are not grounds for reversal if they are reasonably informative and not misleading. [5] Some inaccuracies in jury instructions are permissible. [6] A jury instruction is grounds for reversal only where the deficiency undermined the ability of the jury `to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict.' [7] All jury instructions are reviewed as a whole. [8] In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury in part: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. Therefore, if, based upon your conscientious consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you should find the defendant guilty. If on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility or, in other words, a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt by finding the defendant not guilty. McNally believes that the second paragraph of this instruction erroneously instructs the jury that he can only be acquitted if the jury has a reasonable doubt that he is not guilty, i.e. if the jury is firmly convinced that he is not guilty. While McNally is correct that a jury need not be firmly convinced that defendants are not guilty before acquitting them; [9] the jury instruction does not explicitly require McNally's interpretation. In Mills v. State , we upheld the exact instructions at issue here. [10] McNally concedes that the phrase reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty is permissible because of our holding in Mills v. State . [11] He contends, however, that the instruction can be fairly read to require the jury to be firmly convinced that McNally did not commit the acts charged in order to acquit him. He claims that the instruction creates a higher threshold for acquittal than is constitutionally permissible. [12] McNally misreads the instruction. The instruction requires a jury to be firmly convinced of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting him, not be firmly convinced of innocence before acquitting him. Thus, in order to convict McNally the jury must be firmly convinced of each element of the crimes as charged. Although we do not find plain error in the jury instruction, we urge the Superior Court to reconsider using the expression ..., you think there is a real possibility or, in other words, a reasonable doubt that the defendant is not guilty from their pattern instructions, to prevent any potential confusion. The resulting language could be simply phrased ... if you have a reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt,. ...