Opinion ID: 3063986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Valdez-Gonzalez

Text: 15 After entering his guilty plea, Valdez-Gonzalez moved to withdraw the plea, arguing that he was misinformed by his attorney regarding his options in going to trial versus pleading guilty. The court denied this motion and subsequently sentenced Valdez-Gonzalez to 245 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, ValdezGonzalez first argues that his guilty plea was invalid and must be withdrawn, because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert trial defenses and improperly advising him about the application of the guidelines, such that his decision to plead guilty was misinformed. He also contends that the district court erred in imposing two-level captain enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B), because there was no evidence presented to establish that the object of the conspiracy was to import or distribute drugs in this country. In other words, the Government did not show a jurisdictional nexus to the United States.
We review the denial of a request to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion, reversing only if the court’s ultimate conclusion is “arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v. Freixas, 332 F.3d 1314, 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d), a court may permit a defendant to withdraw his plea before the court imposes sentence for a “fair and just reason.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). In determining whether a defendant has shown a “fair 16 and just reason,” the court evaluates the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) whether the defendant had close assistance of counsel; (2) whether his plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal. Freixas, 332 F.3d at 1318 (citing United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988)). We conclude from the record here that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Valdez-Gonzalez to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not establish a fair and just reason for the withdrawal. Accordingly, we affirm Valdez-Gonzalez’s conviction.
We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Cartwright, 413 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1116 (2006). The guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement in a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant unlawfully imported or exported a controlled substance under circumstances in which . . . the defendant acted as a pilot, copilot, captain, navigator, . . . aboard any craft or vessel carrying a controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(2)(B). We have not adopted a rigid definition of the term “captain,” but rather, look to the facts of each case to determine whether the 17 enhancement was properly applied. See Cartwright, 413 F.3d at 1298. In United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320, 1229-31 (11th Cir. 2003), we rejected the appellant’s arguments that, in order for the captain enhancement to apply, the controlled substance actually must be imported, and because there was no actual importation into the United States and no evidence that the cocaine was destined to be delivered to the United States, the enhancement could not be applied. Because Valdez-Gonzalez was the captain of a vessel carrying a controlled substance that was intended to be unlawfully imported or exported, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in applying the captain enhancement here. Accordingly, we affirm Valdez-Gonzalez’s sentence as well.