Opinion ID: 793667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Moore's Sentence

Text: 70 As we recently held in United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 547-49 (4th Cir. 2005), a district court commits plain error that affects a defendant's substantial rights when, operating under a pre- Booker mandatory guidelines regime, it imposes a sentence that exceeds the maximum guideline sentence authorized by the jury verdict alone. At first glance, it would appear that Moore has satisfied this standard. At sentencing, the district court found Moore responsible for 1,053,269 kilograms of marijuana, for a base offense level of 38. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2S1.1(a)(1) (2002) (directing that the offense level for money laundering is the offense level for the offense from which the laundered funds were derived); id. § 2D1.1(c)(1) (providing that the base offense level for 30,000 kilograms or more of marijuana is 38); id. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.10) (drug equivalency table). The district court also assessed an additional ten offense levels, finding that Moore had a leadership role in the conspiracy, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), used a minor in the commission of the crime, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4, possessed a firearm in connection with the offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), and was convicted under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956, see U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). Moore's total offense level of 48, combined with his criminal history category of III, yielded a guideline range of life imprisonment. 9 71 In contrast, the special verdict returned by the jury—which included specific findings concerning drug quantity as to some counts — authorized a guideline range of 292-365 months. This sentencing range corresponds to a base offense level of 34 (based on drug quantity) plus the two-level enhancements for possession of a firearm and conviction under § 1956 (neither of which, the parties agree, required additional judicial fact finding), for a total offense level of 38, and Moore's criminal history category of III. Because the life sentence imposed on Moore exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by the facts found by the jury alone, it would appear that Moore's Sixth Amendment rights were violated. See Hughes, 401 F.3d at 547. 72 The Government maintains, however, that there is no Sixth Amendment violation because the drug quantities charged in the indictment correspond with a base offense level of 36. When the firearm and § 1956 enhancements are added and combined with Moore's criminal history category, the resulting guideline range is 360 months to life imprisonment. Thus, the Government argues, Moore's life sentence does not exceed the maximum authorized by the facts found by the jury alone. See U.S. v. Evans, 416 F.3d 298, 300-01 (4th Cir. 2005). 73 We might find the Government's argument more persuasive if the district court had instructed the jury to determine Moore's guilt as charged in the indictment, or had at least directed the attention of the jury to the amounts charged in the indictment. This did not occur, however. Rather, in instructing the jury on the elements of the drug offenses, the district court made no reference at all to drug quantity. Moreover, when it instructed the jury regarding the quantities listed on the special verdict form as to some counts, the district court did not instruct the jury regarding the language of the indictment; it simply charged the jury that it was required to make findings beyond a reasonable doubt as to the quantities listed in the special verdict form. See J.A. 2349. These quantities corresponded to the various quantities set forth in 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005), not to the indictment. In light of these facts, we cannot accept the Government's argument that Moore's convictions alone are sufficient to establish the absence of a Sixth Amendment violation. 74 Nevertheless, we decline, pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), and United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc), to notice the plain error established by Moore. In Johnson, the Supreme Court considered on plain error review a perjury conviction in which the element of materiality was found by a judge rather than by the jury. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 463, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The Court ruled that the error was plain and assumed that it affected substantial rights. See id. at 468-69, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The Court declined to notice the error, however, because the evidence concerning the omitted element was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted. Id. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that, under the circumstances, noticing the error would seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings because [r]eversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 75 In Promise, we refused to vacate the defendant's sentence on plain error review despite the fact that the use of judge-made drug-quantity findings by the district court had created a Sixth Amendment violation. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 161-64. Following Johnson as well as similar circuit precedent, we reasoned that [t]here simply can be no doubt that had the indictment included the [requisite drug quantity], the jury would have found Promise guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 164. 76 The reasoning of Johnson and Promise applies with equal force here. Even though the Sixth Amendment required that the jury, rather than the trial judge, make the drug quantity findings that increased Moore's sentence, the evidence concerning drug quantity was overwhelming and uncontroverted, even at sentencing. And, while Moore challenged his guilt of the charged offenses, he did not maintain any challenge to the evidence concerning the quantity of drugs involved in the transactions to which various witnesses testified. There can be no question that the jury, having found that the offenses were committed, would have also determined that the offenses involved the specific amounts charged in the indictment. Cf. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-34, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002) (declining to notice plain Fifth Amendment error on the basis that evidence concerning drug quantity was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 164 & n. 3 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc) (suggesting, without discussing Johnson, that Sixth Amendment Booker violation should be noticed on plain error review even if evidence supporting judge-made findings was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted); United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369, 380 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to consider whether error should not be noticed on the basis of overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence; distinguishing Cotton ). We therefore affirm Moore's sentence. 10