Opinion ID: 43298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The accomplice-witness instruction

Text: 17 Garcia contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). 7 The accomplice-witness instruction in Alejandro's jury charge, Garcia maintains, directed the jury to apply a mandatory conclusive presumption on an essential element of Garcia's charged crime. 8 The instruction in Alejandro's jury charge provided: 18 You are instructed that an accomplice witness, as the term is hereinafter used, means any person connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime, as such parties, by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before or during the time of the commission of the offense and whether or not they were present and participated in the commission of the crime. 19 . . . 20 The witness, Andrew Garcia, is an accomplice, if an offense was committed, and you cannot convict [Alejandro] upon [Garcia's] testimony unless you first believe that [Garcia's] testimony is true and shows that [Alejandro] is guilty as charged, and then you cannot convict [Alejandro] upon said testimony unless you further believe that there is other testimony in the case, outside of the evidence of the said Andrew Garcia tending to connect [Alejandro] with the offense committed, if you find that an offense was committed, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect [Alejandro] with its commission, and then from all of the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that [Alejandro] is guilty of the offense charged against him. 21 Because the instruction defined Garcia as an accomplice, the argument continues, the trial judge negated the presumption of innocence and permitted the jury to convict Garcia without proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to every element of his charged crime. The district court agreed with Garcia and granted habeas relief. 22 On appeal, the Director does not contest that the jury charge violated Sandstrom. Rather, the Director contends that a federal habeas court should review the trial court's error for harmless error and that the district court erred in granting habeas relief without considering whether the Sandstrom error was harmless. We address each issue in turn. 23 (1) Brecht harmless-error review is appropriate 24 The Supreme Court has recognized two categories of constitutional violations, trial error and structural defects. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). The former class is made up of those errors that may be `quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented.' Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir.1996) (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308, 111 S.Ct. 1246). Harmless error review is appropriate for the former class of errors but not the latter class. Id. Because the error alleged by Garcia falls into the former class, the error is subject to harmless error analysis. See Robertson, 324 F.3d at 304 n. 3 (A Sandstrom -type error has been held to be a `trial error' to which the harmless error rule applies.). 25 Holding, as we do, that the complained-of error is subject to harmless error analysis does not complete our inquiry. In Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), the Supreme Court declined to apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), on habeas review of a state-court conviction. Rather, [r]ecognizing the distinction between direct and collateral review, the Court adopted the standard announced in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710. Under this Brecht harmless-error standard, the relevant question is whether the state court's error `had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Id. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239). 26 Following the enactment of AEDPA, some courts questioned whether federal habeas courts should continue to apply the Brecht harmless-error standard or whether the proper role was to review the state court's application of the Chapman harmless-error standard under AEDPA. 9 In this circuit — at least when the state court did not perform its own harmless-error review—we simply apply the Brecht harmless-error analysis. Robertson, 324 F.3d at 306 (We hold that AEDPA's restrictions on federal review of state habeas decisions do not alter Brecht 's mandate for harmless error analysis by federal courts when state courts have failed to address the question of harmless error.). 10 Cf. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795-96, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (applying the Brecht harmless-error analysis in a post-AEDPA habeas proceeding where the state court found no error and, therefore, did not conduct a harmless-error inquiry). 11 And because here the state court did not perform a harmless-error analysis, it is enough for our purposes to follow Robertson. 27 (2) The Sandstrom error was harmless 28 The district court held that Garcia's Due Process rights were violated because the instructions relieved the State of its burden of proving by evidence Petitioner's guilt in the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In reaching this conclusion, the district court noted that the state trial habeas court recommended granting relief. In addition, after pointing out that Alejandro's conviction had been overturned on direct review because of the erroneous inclusion of the accomplice-witness instruction in his jury charge, the district court stated that [Garcia] should be given the exact same treatment as his brother. But the district court never assessed whether the Sandstrom error was harmless on the facts of Garcia's conviction. 29 The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the application of harmless-error review to Sandstrom error. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983) (plurality). The Johnson plurality makes clear that, if a defendant concedes the issue on which the erroneous instruction wrongfully instructs the jury, Sandstrom error may be harmless. See Johnson, 460 U.S. at 87, 103 S.Ct. 969. Even the narrowest view, that of the Johnson plurality, described an example in which Sandstrom error would be harmless: In presenting a defense such as alibi, insanity, or self-defense, a defendant may in some cases admit that the act alleged by the prosecution was intentional, thereby sufficiently reducing the likelihood that the jury applied the erroneous instruction as to permit the appellate court to consider the error harmless. Id. 30 In the Director's view, Garcia's case parallels Johnson 's example because Garcia's entire defense was that, while he committed the specific acts alleged, he did so under duress. As such, the Director contends, the Sandstrom error was harmless. The Director also points out that the duress instructions, which were included in each count's instructions for Garcia, ameliorate any persistent concern that the improper accomplice-witness instruction had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. We agree. 31 At worst, the jury was instructed that Garcia was connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, . . . by unlawful act or omission. But Garcia admitted as much in establishing his own defense. By admitting his participation in the criminal acts, Garcia rendered the accomplice-witness instruction error harmless. Moreover, the accomplice-witness instruction did not affect Garcia's duress defense adversely. 32 The additional instruction given to the jury regarding Garcia's duress defense eliminates any residual doubt as to the potential harm from the accomplice-witness instruction. The jury charge addressed the nature of Garcia's defense: 33 A defense set up by [Garcia] in this case is what is known as duress. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another. 34 Compulsion within the meaning of this section exists only if the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure. . . . 35 Appearing in three separate sections of Garcia's jury charge—one for each count against him—was an instruction on the application of Garcia's duress defense: 36 [I]f you find from the evidence . . . that [Garcia] did commit the offense . . . as alleged in the indictment and hereinbefore defined in this charge, but you further find . . . that Alejandro Garcia did hold a firearm to the head of Andrew Garcia while threatening the said Andrew Garcia to commit the offense. . . and that the threats of Alejandro Garcia were such threats of force as would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure, and that [Garcia] was in fear of imminent loss of life or serious bodily injury at the hands of Alejandro Garcia if he did not participate therein, then you will acquit [Garcia] and say by your verdict not guilty. Viewing the jury instructions as a whole, as we must, see United States v. Young, 282 F.3d 349, 353 (5th Cir.2002), the resolution of the harmless error inquiry is clear. In error, the trial court instructed the jury that Garcia had performed the acts alleged. But the trial court correctly instructed the jury that it could not convict Garcia—even if he had engaged in the proscribed conduct—if the jury found he committed the acts under duress. The initial error was rendered harmless by the nature of Garcia's duress defense. And the duress instructions properly stated Garcia's defense. Garcia's defense, which he reduced to the single question of duress, was rejected by the jury. Accordingly, we hold that the initial Sandstrom error did not have a `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' 12 Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239). See also Harris v. Warden, La. State Penitentiary, 152 F.3d 430, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding, in a pre-AEDPA case, erroneous jury instructions harmless under Brecht because the evidence and defense presented related to an issue unaffected by the error).