Opinion ID: 1752570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Policy Underlying Official Immunity

Text: As we have said, [t]he public would suffer if government officers, who must exercise judgment and discretion in their jobs, were subject to civil lawsuits that second-guessed their decisions. Kassen, 887 S.W.2d at 8. Thus, official immunity is designed to protect public officials from being forced to defend their decisions that were reasonable when made, but upon which hindsight has cast a negative light. Police officers' particular need for immunity's protection is well-recognized: [n]owhere else in public service is official immunity more appropriate or necessary than in police work. In their routine work, police officers must be free to make split-second judgments ... based on their experience and training, without fear of personal liability. Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex.1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring). If police officers were subject to liability for every mistake, the constant threat of suit could dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible officers. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). These public-policy concerns in large part underlie the test that we articulated in Chambers. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. In Chambers, we said that courts should focus on what the defendant could have believed, that is, on the reasonableness of the officer's perception under the circumstances surrounding the incident, not on the facts as they appear through the clarity of hindsight. See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656; see also Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172 (4th Cir.1994). In sum, our approach to good faith has been shaped by a desire to avoid overdeterrence of energetic law enforcement. Rowland, 41 F.3d at 172.