Opinion ID: 2533183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Racial Discrimination as a result of death-qualification process.

Text: ¶ 35. At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court excluded thirty of the thirty-five prospective black jurors for cause. The record reveals that most (and Pitchford alleges in his brief that all) were excluded because they were philosophically unable to consider imposing a sentence of death. Pitchford argues that the disproportionate exclusion of blacks for cause creates a prima facie case that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated. In other words, Pitchford argues that, in general, the percentage of African-Americans who oppose the death penalty is higher than the percentage of whites. ¶ 36. This Court, addressing a similar argument, has held that a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race. [19] The gist of the holdings in these cases is thatin the context of the right to a trial by a jury of one's peersone's peers are not determined by one's race, so this argument has no merit. ¶ 37. Pitchford also argues that the trial judge's questioning and exclusion of four panel members was error. Pitchford argues that Witherspoon does not require exclusion of prospective jurors who cannot impose the death penalty. ¶ 38. Although Witherspoon does not address the issue, the following clear language from a subsequent case does: [ Wainwright v. ] Witt held that the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' 469 U.S. [412] at 424, 105 S.Ct. [844] at 852 [83 L.Ed.2d 841] (quoting Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526). Under this standard, it is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of Witherspoon [,] that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause. [20] ¶ 39. Although the four jurors in question indicated on their questionnaires that they could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances, Pitchford points out that, during voir dire, defense counsel asked these prospective jurors some variation of could you consider both, not could you vote for one. Could you consider, think about both and make a decision as to which one you wanted to vote for, to which they answered in the affirmative. However, the trial judge later undertook voir dire of those four panel members and asked them Can you consider the death penalty or would you not be able to consider it, to which each of the four replied that they could not consider it. ¶ 40. We find Morgan to be directly on point. The trial judge did not commit error by striking for cause the jurors who indicated they could not impose the death penalty. C. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Precluding the Defense From Questioning Prospective Jurors Concerning Their Ability to Consider Mitigating Evidence. ¶ 41. Pitchford next argues that the trial court improperly prevented him from asking potential jurors whether they would consider specific mitigating factors. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred: DEFENSE: ... Mr. Pitchford is 19, just turned 19, I think, or maybe 20. I'm getting old. Does anybody here who thinks what happened to you, if anything, or during your lifetime before you got charged with a crime should not count in deciding whether you receive life or death? STATE: Your Honor, I object again because we are getting into the jury deciding on mitigators and aggravators at this point. And this is definitely not proper. ¶ 42. The trial judge informed Pitchford's counsel that, while he would be allowed to ask questions as to whether the jurors would be able to consider the mitigating factors presented by the court, he would not be allowed to get into specifics. Pitchford's counsel responded, I certainly don't intend to do that, and continued his voir dire of the jury. ¶ 43. Voir dire of a jury is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion. [21] Pitchford now argues that it was error for the trial court to preclude his questions concerning the kinds of mitigation evidence he planned to introduce. ¶ 44. Pitchford cites no authority directly supporting this proposition. He cites Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, [22] Penry v. Johnson, [23] Tennard v. Dretke, [24] and Smith v. Texas, [25] each of which is inapposite. Although these cases discuss the type of mitigation evidence that may be presented to a jury and how it should be instructed for sentencing, they say nothing of the defendant's right to conduct voir dire. ¶ 45. In Trevino v. Johnson, [26] the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an argument almost identical to the one presented by Pitchford. The Court stated: Trevino ... argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to inquire during voir dire whether three prospective jurors were able to consider youth as a potentially mitigating factor. Trevino contends that youth is a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and that under Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the trial court's refusal to allow him to question the jurors regarding youth violated his due process rights. ... This circuit has previously stated that Morgan only involves the narrow question of whether, in a capital case, jurors must be asked whether they would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant. United States v. Greer, 968 F.2d 433, 437 n. 7 (5th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1208 (10th Cir. 1998) ([W]e have held that Morgan does not require a court to allow questions regarding how a juror would vote during the penalty phase if presented with specific mitigating factors. Other courts have issued similar rulings, holding that Morgan does not require questioning about specific mitigating or aggravating factors.) (citation omitted); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1113 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that Morgan only requires questioning during voir dire regarding whether jurors would automatically impose the death penalty, and it does not require specific questioning regarding mitigating factors), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S.Ct. 1699, 137 L.Ed.2d 825 (1997); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 879 (4th Cir.1996) (finding it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to allow detailed questioning during voir dire concerning specific mitigating factors), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414, 138 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997), and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414, 138 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997), and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414, 138 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997). After applying the AEDPA-mandated standard of review to these state-court findings and conclusions, we cannot say that Trevino has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right on this issue. We therefore decline to issue Trevino a [certificate of appealability] on this issue. [27] ¶ 46. We agree with this interpretation of Morgan, that is, a trial court is not required to allow questions regarding how a juror would vote during the penalty phase, if presented with specific mitigating factors. Thus, we find no merit in this assignment of error.