Opinion ID: 2537633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial court committed constitutional error in denying Fulgham's motion to suppress her June 2, 2003, custodial statement.

Text: ¶ 73. Fulgham provided the police two custodial statements [73] on two different occasions: May 12, 2003, and June 2, 2003. Fulgham concedes that the State did not introduce or mention either statement during the guilt phase. Neither statement was admitted into evidence during the sentencing phase, but was used to cross-examine a witness. Fulgham's assignment of error concerns only the second statement. ¶ 74. The court held a suppression hearing on March 18, 2006, and heard testimony regarding the voluntariness of the June 2, 2003, statement. George Carrithers, chief deputy of the Oktibbeha County Sheriff's Office, testified that at Fulgham's request, he had spoken with her on June 2, 2003. The record is unclear as to the starting time of this statement, but a transcript of the recording shows that Carrithers had Fulgham sign the following waiver at the beginning of her statement, which was some time prior to 2:45 p.m.: I, Kristi Fulgham, have this day, June 2, 2003, requested to speak to Deputy George Carrithers of the Oktibbeha County Sheriff's Department. It is my decision to speak to Deputy Carrithers and I have initiated the interview. No one has asked me to speak to Deputy Carrithers. I understand that I have an attorney and I also understand that I have the right to have my attorney, Stephanie Mallette present during any interview I give to Deputy Carruthers. However, I choose to waive my right to have my attorney present and I am making this decision to speak to Deputy Carrithers knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently and of my own free-will. Deputy Carrithers proceeded to record Fulgham's statement, and at 2:55 p.m. (at her request) Fulgham took a polygraph test. Fulgham continued her statement at 4:45 p.m. Emily Britt, a secretary with the Sheriff's office, and Eddie Young, the jail's administrator, witnessed Fulgham's statement and corroborated Deputy Carrithers's testimony. ¶ 75. As a courtesy, one of the deputies called Stephanie Mallette, Fulgham's counsel, and informed her that Fulgham had requested a polygraph. Mallette testified that she had instructed the deputy not to administer the polygraph. Mallette stated that she had arrived at the jail at 2:45 p.m. and was denied access to her client. According to Mallette, the deputy informed her the polygraph already had begun. ¶ 76. Fulgham argues the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the June 2, 2003, statement when the State used it to cross-examine Dr. Webb at the sentencing phase. Fulgham argues that the Sixth Amendment confers a bilateral, post-attachment right to counsel. In other words, Fulgham argues that her attorney can invoke the right to counsel on behalf of her client, Fulgham. Fulgham asserts that her right to counsel and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated when the police refused to allow Mallette access to her. Therefore, Fulgham argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing that portion of her statement that occurred at and after 2:45 p.m., the time at which Mallette had arrived at the jail requesting to speak with her client. ¶ 77. A trial court's finding that a defendant's statements were voluntarily given cannot be reversed unless the court applied an erroneous legal standard or was clearly erroneous in its findings of fact. [74] This Court has held the following regarding a defendant's right to counsel: An accused, after expressing a desire to deal with police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh'g denied 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981). Once the right to counsel has attached, and the accused asserts the right, he is protected from further police-initiated interrogation. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634-636, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1410-1411, 89 L.Ed.2d [631] 641-642 (1986). [75] Even if an accused has procured an attorney, the accused may still waive the right to have the lawyer present during any police questioning. Nothing in the Sixth Amendment prevents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing, on his own, to speak with police in the absence of an attorney. Although a defendant may sometimes later regret his decision to speak with police, the Sixth Amendment does not disable a criminal defendant from exercising his free will. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). [76] In line with this Court's ruling in Mettetal, we find that Fulgham voluntarily initiated the questioning and waived the right to have her attorney present during questioning. We find no merit in Fulgham's constitutional arguments. Therefore, the trial court not was not clearly erroneous in refusing to suppress the statement.