Opinion ID: 574322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pierre Perrelet's Identification

Text: 74 The defense also objects to Pierre Perrelet's identification of defendant Reuben Sturman. Perrelet was asked to identify his former customer. He responded by stating, [p]resumably the second gentlemen at the left side of the table in second place who is leaning on a briefcase is a customer of SBC whom I looked after in the past. This description identified Reuben Sturman. Defense seeks a reversal of Reuben Sturman's convictions since this identification was based on a presumption. From the context in which the word presumably was used, it seems sufficiently clear that the witness was identifying the defendant and the presumably was merely a euphemism. XII. DISQUALIFICATION OF DISTRICT JUDGE 75 Reuben Sturman argues that the district judge in this case was under a duty to sua sponte recuse himself because of his bias against the defendants. After pronouncing the sentence and judgment, the judge requested the defendants and their attorneys to approach the bench. He then stated that he had had to separate his feelings about the defendants' business from the defendants in imposing the sentence. He concluded, however, by noting that he had tried his best to keep his feelings about the type of business in which the defendants were engaged out of the sentencing and believed he had succeeded. 6 76 Reuben Sturman argues that the judge's comments indicate a bias which effected the entire four-month trial and previous years of motions and discretionary rulings. The defendant asserts that because the judge failed to recuse himself at the outset of the case, the convictions in the case must be reversed. 77 A federal judge is required to recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). This Circuit has determined that whenever a judge's impartiality is questioned, it must be determined whether a reasonable, objective person, knowing all the circumstances, would not have questioned [the judge's] impartiality. Hughes v. United States, 899 F.2d 1495, 1501 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 508, 112 L.Ed.2d 520 (1990); see also H.R.Rep. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 6351, 6354. 78 Under the test established in Hughes, this Court must look at all the circumstances surrounding the case to determine whether a reasonable person would believe the judge was impartial. Several factors support a finding that Judge White acted impartially during the trial. First, the defendants can point to no decision on the part of the judge that clearly demonstrated bias. The contentions in the appeal that raise abuse of discretion issues have been found to be without merit. Second, the sentences given the defendants, rather than exhibiting bias against the defendants, are substantially below the level requested by the government and appear fair under the circumstances. Third, this Court may take at face value Judge White's assertion that he set his feelings about the defendants' business aside. Judges, whether they are hearing tax evasion cases or vicious murder prosecutions, may have views about the nature and heinousness of the underlying crime. All judges, as part of their decisionmaking process, seek to set these feelings aside. Judge White merely articulated a tension all judges share. This Court holds that the defendants have failed to prove that Judge White's personal beliefs concerning pornography tainted the proceedings. 7 79