Opinion ID: 199903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common Interest

Text: 48 The common-interest doctrine is typically understood to apply [w]hen two or more clients consult or retain an attorney on particular matters of common interest. Weinstein's Federal Evidence, supra, § 503.21[1]; Wigmore, supra, § 2312, at 603-09. In such a situation, the communications between each of them and the attorney are privileged against third parties. Weinstein's Federal Evidence, supra, § 503.21[1]; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 573; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 202 F.3d at 461. Similarly, the privilege applies to communications made by the client or the client's `lawyer to a lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest.' Weinstein's Federal Evidence, supra, § 503.21[2] (quoting Sup.Ct. Standard 503(b)(3)). 49 Whether one refers to either or both of these instances as common interest, joint defense, joint client, or allied lawyer doctrines does not change the outcome of this case. The common-interest doctrine, like the rule announced in Kovel, is not an independent basis for privilege, but an exception to the general rule that the attorney-client privilege is waived when privileged information is disclosed to a third party. Epstein, supra, at 196. 50 Our resolution of the Cavallaros' Kovel argument resolves their common-interest claim as well. Although the district court directed its inquiry toward the alignment of interests between all of the parties in the case and then decided that, [e]ven if there were a sufficient commonality of interest,.... [u]nder the strict confines of the common-interest doctrine, the lack of representation for [the sons and Camelot] vitiates any claim to a privilege, 153 F.Supp.2d at 60, we do not need to reach these issues. 51 Ernst & Young was not covered by the attorney-client relationship between Hale and Dorr and its clients. Even if the Cavallaros, their sons, and their respective companies all had an exact unanimity of interest, it would not render communications created by or shared with Ernst & Young privileged when Ernst & Young was providing accounting services, not facilitating communication of legal advice between Hale and Dorr and its clients. 52 The common-interest doctrine prevents clients from waiving the attorney-client privilege when attorney-client communications are shared with a third person who has a common legal interest with respect to these communications, for instance, a codefendant. The doctrine does not extend to prevent waiver when an accountant, not within the Kovel doctrine, is made privy to the attorney-client communications. In such an instance, the accountant does not share an interest in receiving legal advice from the lawyer and cannot logically be said to have an interest in common with the represented party or parties. Under Kovel, we know that when a client, a lawyer, and an accountant are present, the accountant's presence will destroy the privilege if the accountant is not necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer. 296 F.2d at 922. It follows that the client — in this case the Cavallaros — cannot resurrect the privilege by adding another party (their sons) and that party's accountant to the mix. This is true even if the sons share a common interest with the parents. To hold otherwise would be to create a loophole in Kovel whereby the privilege is undermined when a client and his attorney disclose information to an accountant who is not necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer, 296 F.2d at 922, but the privilege is preserved when the client brings another party with a common interest on board and that other party's accountant is present. 53 The Cavallaros' argument that every party to the communication need not have his own lawyer in order for the common-interest doctrine to apply, although relevant to the district court's reasoning, is in the end beside the point, whether or not the argument is valid. Our conclusion that the documents are not privileged under Kovel resolves the common-interest claim because the common-interest rule presumes a valid underlying privilege. There is no valid underlying privilege here because, by having discussions with, and disclosing the documents to, Ernst & Young, an accounting firm not necessary to permit Hale and Dorr to communicate legal advice to its client, the Cavallaros either waived the attorney-client privilege or undermined the privilege's confidentiality requirement. One cannot create a privilege, where previously there was none, simply by introducing a third party (with or without a common interest) into the circle within which documents are shared.