Opinion ID: 170190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Martinez's Sentencing Claim

Text: Martinez also argues the district court erred by denying him minor participant status, which would have reduced his offense level by two points. We find no clear error in the district court's decision.
On November 2, 2006, Martinez pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 872.3 grams of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The government prepared a Presentence Report (PSR), which related the following: Martinez accepted full responsibility by admitting he and Aguilar-Banuelos possessed methamphetamine with intent to distribute. Martinez stated he and Aguilar-Banuelos were going to receive a total payment of $2,000 for delivering the drugs. Martinez knew the drugs were inside the 4Runner. The PSR calculated a base offense level of 36 and, after a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, arrived at a total offense level of 34. Martinez, with no prior convictions, had a criminal history score of zero. A criminal history score of zero (category I) and a total offense level of 34 yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 151-188 months. Under the applicable statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841, the maximum term of imprisonment for Martinez's offense is life. Martinez filed two objections to the PSR. Martinez first argued he should receive the safety valve adjustment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) §§ 5C1.2 and 2D1.1(b)(7), reducing his offense level by two points. The district court granted the adjustment and recalculated the advisory range as 121-151 months. Second, Martinez argued he should receive a minor participant adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2(b)a reduction of two points in Martinez's offense level because of his minor role as compared to [Aguilar-Banuelos] and as compared to the whole chain of the transaction. 07-4040 R., Vol. III at 8. The district court denied the minor participant adjustment, but granted Martinez's request for a downward variance and sentenced him to 119 months incarceration, two months below the advisory guidelines range. On appeal, Martinez challenges the district court's denial of a downward departure based on his asserted minor participation in the crime. A minor participant adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2(b) applies only to a defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him substantially less culpable than the average participant. USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n. 3(A) (emphasis added). The determination is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case, and the district court, in weighing the totality of the circumstances, is not required to find, based solely on the defendant's bare assertion, that such a role adjustment is warranted. Id. at n. 3(C). Martinez challenges only the procedural reasonableness of the district court's application of the Guidelines. United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir.2007) (A direct challenge to the district court's denial of a downward departure is . . . treated as a [procedural] challenge. . . .). As the Supreme Court has directed us in reviewing challenges to procedural reasonableness, we must ensure the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceincluding an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). We defer to the district court's application of the Guidelines to the facts under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. [T]he abuse of discretion standard consists of component parts, affording greater deference to findings of fact (clearly erroneous) than to conclusions of law (erroneous). United States v. McComb, No. 07-5003, 2007 WL 4393142, at  n. 4 (10th Cir. Dec.18, 2007). We have previously explained a defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence whether an adjustment under USSG § 3B1.2 is warranted. United States v. Virgen-Chavarin, 350 F.3d 1122, 1131 (10th Cir.2003). Because denial of a minor participant status represents a finding of fact, we review the district court's decision for clear error. Id.
The district court committed no error in concluding Martinez did not qualify as a minor participant. Martinez claims he was a minor participant for two reasons: (1) he was less culpable than Aguilar-Banuelos, and (2) both Defendants were mere mules in the larger drug operation. Neither argument is persuasive. The district court disposed of the first argument by reasoning Martinez and Aguilar-Banuelos were fairly equal participants in the transportation of drugs in this case. Both defendants were present and agreed to transport the methamphetamine for $2,000, and both were entrusted with a large quantity of drugs. Both defendants fled the scene after they were stopped by law enforcement to avoid apprehension. 70-4040 R., Vol. III at 12. The district court thus found no evidence to suggest [Martinez] is substantially less culpable than, his co-defendant. Id. In order for us to disturb the district court's factual finding as clearly erroneous, we would have to conclude the finding lacks factual support in the record, or, after reviewing all the evidence, we would need the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Phelps, 17 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quote marks omitted). Under this standard, we have little difficulty in concluding the district court's culpability explanation was not clearly erroneous. Regarding Martinez's second argument, we have consistently refused to adopt a per se rule allowing a downward adjustment based solely on a defendant's status as a drug courier. United States v. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d 1519, 1524 (10th Cir. 1993). We explained, [d]rug couriers are an indispensable component of drug dealing networks. Id. To debate whether couriers as a group are less culpable would not be productive, akin to the old argument over which leg of a three-legged stool is the most important leg. United States v. Carter, 971 F.2d 597, 600 (10th Cir. 1992). The district court's decision whether to grant an adjustment under § 3B1.2 must therefore turn[ ] on the defendant's culpability relative to other participants in the crime. Rangel-Arreola, 991 F.2d at 1524 (emphasis added). The district court did so. In further support of the district court's determination, Martinez was indicted and sentenced only for the amount of drugs he personally transported. In other words, the court did not assess the total amount of narcotics involved in a larger conspiracy to traffic drugs. Martinez thus received a lower sentence than he would have as part of an overall distribution network. Accordingly, to grant Martinez an additional adjustment simply because he was a mule in a larger drug distribution enterprise would cede [Martinez] an undeserved windfall. United States v. James, 157 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir.1998) (denying a § 3B1.2 adjustment when the defendant's sentence was based not on the collective amount of drugs distributed by all members of the conspiracy, but only on the amount of drugs distributed by the defendant himself). [3] In sum, the district court did not commit clear error in concluding that Martinez was not entitled to a minor participant adjustment [4] As between the two Defendants, Martinez was not substantially less culpable. And both were important links in an overall drug trafficking chain.