Opinion ID: 2596737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Impossibility of a Court's Undertaking Independent Resolution without Impinging Upon Coordinate Branches of Government

Text: Turning now to the fourth Baker factor, the Supreme Court demands a finding of nonjusticiability if no decision can be rendered without impinging upon legislative authority. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. In addition to the considerations specified in the previous sections, a ruling by this court that more funding must go towards education would almost certainly take funding from other state programs. Such a broad imposition on legislative fiscal authority is clearly beyond the proper judicial scope. See Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 406-07 (Fla. 1996) (refusing to define an adequate education for fear that the courts would necessarily be required to subjectively evaluate the Legislature's value judgments as to the spending priorities to be assigned to the state's many needs, education being one among them.). [10] Overall, the first four Baker factors each yield a conclusion that defining a thorough education is not a justiciable question that should be heard in this court. Baker presents an established, cogent standard for weighing political questions, and this court should adhere to its conclusion that this case demands dismissal for want of justiciability. III. Lujan and the Proper Political Question Standard Based on the above discussion of the Baker factors, I believe that this court should not exercise its jurisdiction to decide this case but rather should find the issues posed to be nonjusticiable. My adoption of the political question doctrine and the lack of justiciability in this case should not be interpreted, however, to impose an absolute bar on educational questions in the courts. Rather, I believe that some cases involving the education clause should be adjudicated in this court. The difficulty is deciding, in a principled way, which ones present a justiciable question and which ones a political question. As noted previously, the political question doctrine draws from the earliest days of the judiciary, and the reasoning underlying creation of the principle elucidates the difficult questions confronting this court today. Speaking of the first United States Supreme Court decisions that defined the role of the judicial branch, Rachel Barkow observed: It was appropriate at that time for courts to engage in a threshold inquiry to determine how much interpretive room a constitutional delegation of power gave the branch receiving that power. While the courts remained responsible for declaring the boundaries, it was recognized that the Constitution contemplated room for the political actors to give substantive meaning within those boundaries. Rachel Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 Colum. L.Rev. 237, 252 (2002) (emphasis added). When this court found Lujan justiciable, it did so as part of the threshold inquiry to give substantive meaning to the constitutional term uniform. In holding that [t]he constitutional mandate which requires the General Assembly to establish `a thorough and uniform system of free public schools,' is not a mandate for absolute equality in educational services or expenditures, the Lujan court defined the boundary of the General Assembly's power to lie beyond absolute equality in spending. 649 P.2d at 1018. But it did so without impinging upon the General Assembly's constitutional power over education; it did so without stepping beyond the bounds of the judicial branch and defining exactly what funding levels will equal a thorough and uniform education in this state. The Lujan court was careful to stress that [o]ur decision today declares only that [the education system at the time] is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 1025. It further emphasized that, whether a better financing system could be devised is not material to this decision, as our sole function is to rule on the constitutionality of our state's system. Id. Turning now to the far different question presented in this case, plaintiffs here ask the court to move beyond a threshold inquiry and actually design and implement a better financing system. Lobato, 216 P.3d at 32 (plaintiffs demand an injunction compelling defendants to design, enact, fund, and implement a school financing system....). This request is truly remarkable in light of Lujan's narrow holding. Lujan, 649 P.2d at 1025. Instead of asking within what boundaries must the General Assembly make educational policy, plaintiffs want this court to enter into an unbounded inquiry into what makes the best financing system for students. While the question is undoubtedly important, it is a question which, in my opinion, is specifically reserved for the General Assembly, not the courts. [11] I believe that it is just such a distinction between properly defining constitutional parameters and improperly determining the policy questions within those boundaries that should guide this court in the future. [12] The Baker factors employed above together with a common sense view of political questions can and should guide the Colorado courts on these matters. I hope the General Assembly will address any educational disparities that might threaten the health of this state, but I also refuse to commit the courts to the resolution of this clearly legislative policy determination. IV. Conclusion Constitutions must necessarily be interpreted to meet the needs of changing times, but the critical, constitutionally-prescribed boundary separating the executive and legislative powers must remain constant. Lamm, 704 P.2d at 1378. I would hold today that this court should apply this unquestionably prudent logic to the judiciary as well, reinforcing the boundaries between all three branches of government. Education funding in this state may represent a crisis demanding resolution, but that resolution must take place within the constitutionally-prescribed forum as the inherent policy determinations in such a remedy lie outside the scope of this court. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding justiciability.