Opinion ID: 852462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Creech Waive Direct Appellate Review?

Text: Creech argues that, despite the express language of the written plea agreement, he should not be deemed to have waived his right to appellate review of his sentence because (1) the judge advised him that he retained the right to appeal and (2) the trial judge made no express or implied finding that Creech intended to waive his appellate rights. We disagree. The Seventh Circuit has observed that [m]ost waivers are effective when set out in writing and signed. United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.1995). The content and language of the plea agreement itself, as well as the colloquy where necessary, govern [the] determination as to the validity of the waiver. Williams, 184 F.3d at 668. [A] specific dialogue with the judge is not a necessary prerequisite to a valid waiver of appeal, if there is other evidence in the record demonstrating a knowing and voluntary waiver. United States v. Agee, 83 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir.1996). In Williams, the defendant argued that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal, despite the express language in the written plea agreement, because the court, through certain statements at the sentencing colloquy, led him to believe that he retained the right to appeal. 184 F.3d at 668-69. At the plea hearing, the judge told the defendant that [he] waived [his] right to appeal in the plea agreement, but under certain circumstances [he] might nevertheless be able to appeal[,] and there are certain rights [he] may have left. Id. at 669. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the district court's statements were unclear, but nonetheless upheld the waiver stating that `inventiveness with the aid of hindsight is the principal threat to the stability of plea agreements, and therefore the major hazard to defendants' ability to obtain concessions for the rights they surrender.' Id. (quoting Wenger, 58 F.3d at 283.) The Court further emphasized that the defendant should not be freed from his bargain merely because the Court could `imagine potential changes in the procedures . . . used' or envision a more precise colloquy. Id. (quoting Wenger, 58 F.3d at 283). Similarly, Creech argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to appeal, despite the express language in the written plea agreement, because the court made statements at the close of the sentencing hearing that led him to believe that he retained the right to appeal. While we take this opportunity to emphasize the importance of avoiding confusing remarks in a plea colloquy, we think the statements at issue are not grounds for allowing Creech to circumvent the terms of his plea agreement. Creech does not claim that the language of the plea agreement was unclear or that he misunderstood the terms of the agreement at the time he signed it, but rather claims that his otherwise knowing and voluntary plea lost its knowing and voluntary status because the judge told him at the end of the sentencing hearing that he could appeal. [2] This is not a case in which a defendant failed to pursue a legal right after being instructed erroneously by the trial court that he lacked the ability to do so. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 853 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. Ct.App.2006) (where trial court erroneously informed defendant he could not appeal his sentence, defendant presents plausible entitlement to a belated appeal under Post-Conviction Rule 2); Baysinger v. State, 835 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005) (defendant was entitled to file a belated notice of appeal because the trial court failed to inform [him] of his right to appeal his sentence and instead informed him that by pleading guilty he was giving up `most' of his grounds for appeal). In those cases, defendants allege that but for the judge's statements they would have taken a different course of action. In contrast, Creech does not argue that he would have withdrawn his guilty plea or taken any different actions in the absence of the judge's statements. By the time the trial court erroneously advised Creech of the possibility of appeal, Creech had already pled guilty and received the benefit of his bargain. Being told at the close of the hearing that he could appeal presumably had no effect on that transaction. The federal authorities appear to take the same view. [3] As to Creech's second argument that the trial court should have made an express finding as to whether he intended to waive his appellate rights, neither the Indiana Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Indiana Code requires trial courts that accept plea agreements to make express findings regarding a defendant's intention to waive his appellate rights. Acceptance of the plea agreement containing the waiver provision is sufficient to indicate that, in the trial court's view, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver.