Opinion ID: 1965654
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sentencing claim

Text: The habeas court dismissed the petitioner's sentencing claim on the ground that it was in procedural default and that the petitioner had failed to show the cause and prejudice necessary to obtain habeas review under the standard articulated in Barile. Accordingly, we first must determine whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal because the petitioner did not satisfy that standard. If we conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion, we then must determine the merits of the petitioner's claim. See Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. at 612, 646 A.2d 126.
The petitioner argues that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Practice Book § 39-27(4) falls outside the realm of claims that must be raised at trial or on direct appeal. He thus maintains that his sentencing claim was not in procedural default, he was not required to demonstrate cause and prejudice, and the habeas court should have heard the claim on its merits. The respondent counters that the habeas court correctly determined that the petitioner's claim was in procedural default and that he did not show the cause and prejudice necessary to obtain habeas review. We agree with the habeas court that the petitioner's claim was in procedural default. We conclude, however, that the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal on the ground that the petitioner did not satisfy the cause and prejudice standard articulated in Barile because jurists of reason disagree regarding the proper standard to be applied in such cases. We therefore examine the legal underpinnings of the habeas court's decision and other relevant law bearing on this issue. As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable standard of review. The conclusions reached by the trial court in its decision to dismiss [a] habeas petition are matters of law, subject to plenary review. . . . [When] the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct . . . and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 217, 764 A.2d 739 (2001) (applying plenary review to question of whether habeas petition was appropriate vehicle for challenging deprivation of parental rights on basis of claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel). The habeas court's conclusion that the petitioner's sentencing claim was in procedural default involves a question of law. Our review is therefore plenary. Practice Book § 39-26 provides in relevant part: A defendant may withdraw his or her plea of guilty . . . as a matter of right until the plea has been accepted. After acceptance, the judicial authority shall allow the defendant to withdraw his or her plea upon proof of one of the grounds in [§]39-27. A defendant may not withdraw his or her plea after the conclusion of the proceeding at which the sentence was imposed. Two of the six grounds set forth in Practice Book § 39-27 for withdrawing a guilty plea following its acceptance are: (1) [t]he plea was involuntary, or it was entered without knowledge of the nature of the charge or without knowledge that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; Practice Book § 39-27(2); and (2) [t]he plea resulted from the denial of effective assistance of counsel. . . . Practice Book § 39-27(4). In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner did not withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to the rules of practice or file a direct appeal. Accordingly, the habeas court properly determined that his claim was procedurally defaulted. When a respondent seeks to raise an affirmative defense of procedural default, the rules of practice require that he or she must file a return to the habeas petition alleg[ing] any facts in support of any claim of procedural default . . . or any other claim that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Practice Book § 23-30(b). If the return alleges any defense or claim that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and such allegations are not put in dispute by the petition, the petitioner shall file a reply. Practice Book § 23-31(a). The reply shall allege any facts and assert any cause and prejudice claimed to permit review of any issue despite any claimed procedural default. Practice Book § 23-31(c). In discussing the principles that govern review of a respondent's affirmative defense that a habeas claim is procedurally defaulted, we have recognized that, as a general rule, [t]he appropriate standard for reviewability of habeas claims that were not properly raised at trial; Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 218 Conn. at 409, 589 A.2d 1214; or on direct appeal; Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 227 Conn. at 132, 629 A.2d 413; because of a procedural default is the cause and prejudice standard. Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate good cause for his failure to raise a claim at trial or on direct appeal and actual prejudice resulting from the impropriety claimed in the habeas petition. See id.; Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 409, 589 A2d 1214; see also Simms v. Warden, [supra, 230 Conn. at 617, 646 A.2d 126]; Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 428, 641 A.2d 1356 (1994).[T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance. . . . Valeriano v. Bronson, 209 Conn. 75, 83, 546 A.2d 1380 (1988). (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 40, 779 A.2d 80 (2001). [T]he existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the [petitioner] can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the [s]tate's procedural rule. . . . [For example] a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel . . . or . . . some interference by officials . . . would constitute cause under this standard. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 137, 629 A.2d 413, quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). A court will not reach the merits of the habeas claim when the petitioner fails to make the required showing. See Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, at 409, 589 A.2d 1214. The Appellate Court has not applied these legal principles consistently in cases in which a petitioner has entered an Alford plea and subsequently alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, but has not moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Practice Book § 39-27(4) or raised his claim on direct appeal. In Barile v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 80 Conn.App. at 788-89, 837 A.2d 827, the Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court's judgment dismissing the petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated the cause and prejudice required to overcome the procedural default resulting from his failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or to challenge his sentence through a motion to correct or on direct appeal. Id., at 789-90, 837 A.2d 827. In several other cases, however, the Appellate Court has concluded that similar claims were not subject to the usual rule requiring a direct appeal but were properly raised by way of a habeas petition. See Fernandez v. Commissioner of Correction, 96 Conn.App. 251, 255-56 n. 3, 900 A.2d 54 (2006); Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn.App. 772, 775 n. 3, 895 A.2d 246 (2006), rev'd in part on other grounds, 284 Conn. 433, 936 A.2d 611 (2007); [10] cf. Bowers v. Commissioner of Correction, 33 Conn.App. 449, 453 n. 3, 636 A.2d 388 ([t]he petitioner need not satisfy the cause and prejudice test to obtain review of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because, if a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his claim, he will necessarily have proven both cause and prejudice), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 929, 640 A.2d 115 (1994). To resolve this inconsistency in the law, we turn for guidance to Valeriano v. Bronson, supra, 209 Conn. at 76, 546 A.2d 1380, in which the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he had been denied effective assistance of appellate counsel when appealing his conviction. In Valeriano, we concluded that the cause and prejudice test is unnecessary when a habeas court is faced with a claim formulated within the narrow confines of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Although the cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, by definition, involves incompetence under sixth amendment standards. The United States Supreme Court . . . has concluded that, although ignorance or inadvertence is not cause, ineffective assistance of counsel is a legitimate ground for cause. Murray v. Carrier, supra, [477 U.S.] at 488[, 106 S.Ct. 2639]. That determination of ineffectiveness is made under the two part test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)]. If a petitioner can prove that his attorney's performance fell below acceptable standards, and that, as a result, he was deprived of a fair trial or appeal, he will necessarily have established a basis for `cause' and will invariably have demonstrated `prejudice.' See 3 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 27.4, p. 351 n. 80 (`[o]f course, if the basis for cause is itself a constitutional violation, then a separate showing of actual prejudice should not be necessary'). Although the wording of the tests is not identical and some authorities disagree; see, e.g., M. Marcus, `Federal Habeas Corpus After State Court Default: A Definition of Cause and Prejudice,' 53 Fordham L.Rev. 663, 731 n. 418 (1985) (`[w]here defendant has a viable sixth amendment ineffectiveness claim, his prejudice burden would he lighter than in [ Wainwright ] cases'); we conclude that once a defendant is denied a fair appeal that causes an unreliable conviction to stand under Strickland . . . it is obvious that his ineffective counsel worked to his `actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his [appeal] with errors of constitutional dimension.' . . . United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 [1982]; cf. Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 675 (9th Cir.1981) (if cause and prejudice standard satisfied, certainly sixth amendment violation sustained). The similarity of the second part of the Strickland . . . test and of the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test of Wainwright . . . makes a threshold showing of cause and prejudice unnecessary for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. Rather than factoring in the Strickland . . . test to find cause, we conclude that it is simpler and more appropriate to move directly to the Strickland test. Thus, if [counsel's conduct] is shown to be within the acceptable range of conduct or the result is reliable, then the habeas petition must be denied. If counsel does not meet the Strickland . . . level of competence and the result is not reliable, then the petition must be granted. There is no need to confuse this process by utilizing the cause and prejudice test. Valeriano v. Bronson, supra, 209 Conn. at 83-85, 546 A.2d 1380. We conclude that the same reasoning applies when a petitioner who has not moved to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Practice Book § 39-27(4), or challenged his plea on direct appeal, brings a habeas claim alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In such cases, the court need not apply the cause and prejudice test articulated in Barile, Wainwright, Johnson and Jackson in determining whether to grant the habeas petition because application of the two-pronged test in Strickland, as modified for guilty plea cases by Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), [11] accomplishes the same result. See Valeriano v. Bronson, supra, 209 Conn, at 83-84, 546 A.2d 1380. As we stated in Valeriano, [i]f a petitioner can prove that his attorney's performance fell below acceptable standards, and that, as a result, he was deprived of a fair trial or appeal, he will necessarily have established a basis for `cause' and will invariably have demonstrated `prejudice.' Id. We therefore conclude that, although the petitioner in the present case failed to withdraw his plea or to challenge his sentence on direct appeal, the habeas court abused its discretion when it denied the petition for certification to appeal on the ground that the petitioner had failed to satisfy the cause and prejudice test articulated in Barile. The court's determination was not merely debatable among jurists of reason but was incorrect in light of our conclusion in Valeriano that it is simpler and more appropriate to move directly to the Strickland test than to apply Strickland for the purpose of making a threshold showing of cause and prejudice under Wainwright, Jackson and Johnson. [12] Id., at 84-85, 106 S.Ct. 366. Accordingly, we examine the merits of the habeas court's determination regarding the petitioner's sentencing claim pursuant to the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland and Hill. [13] and See Simms v. Warden, supra, 230 Conn. at 612, 646 A.2d 126 (if petitioner succeeds in establishing abuse of discretion, he must demonstrate that judgment of habeas court should be reversed on its merits).
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner's sentencing claim. The amended habeas petition alleged that the petitioner's trial counsel had not adequately informed him regarding the sentence that would be imposed and the consequences thereof. . . . The petition also alleged that the petitioner had been misinformed by his counsel of the actual sentence that was to be imposed by the court. . . . The petition contained no specific facts, however, to support these allegations. Thereafter, the habeas court made the following findings of fact in its memorandum of decision. The [trial] court . . . conducted a thorough canvass of the petitioner and found the [plea] to be voluntary and understandingly made with the assistance of competent counsel. [14] The [trial] court's canvass included questions posed to both the petitioner and his attorney regarding their understanding of the sentences to be imposed in accordance with the plea agreement. The total effective sentence, according to this agreement, was to be for fifteen years to serve followed by ten years special parole. Both the petitioner and [his trial counsel] indicated their understanding that the plea agreement corresponded with the terms indicated by the [trial] court during the canvass. The [trial] court advised the petitioner that he faced a maximum term of eighty-five years and $65,000 in fines for the five counts [that the plea was] entered on. . . . According to the petitioner's testimony on direct examination at the habeas [hearing], [trial counsel] told the petitioner [before he entered his plea] that the state was not willing to offer less than fifteen years to serve to resolve the matter via a plea agreement. The petitioner informed [trial counsel] that he wanted less than fifteen years. The petitioner also testified that he did not know that he would get a fifteen year sentence; instead, the petitioner thought he would receive a ten year sentence. Nevertheless, the petitioner testified toward the end of the direct examination that he knew he was going to get fifteen years at sentencing. The petitioner further testified that he never wanted to go to trial in this matter and that, if he had gone to trial, he would have won. Lastly, the petitioner testified that, although he asked [trial counsel] about the withdrawal of his plea, he never advised [trial] counsel that he wanted to withdraw his plea. . . . [Trial counsel] testified [at the habeas hearing] that he went over the police reports and witness statements with the petitioner. Additionally, [trial counsel] went over the charges and explained the offense elements to the petitioner. [Trial counsel] explained what it meant to aid in committing a sexual assault, as well as the other offenses. [Trial counsel] also explained special parole to the petitioner. According to [trial counsel], the petitioner, who was very knowledgeable about the court system, was an intelligent client who understood what was being communicated to him. [Trial counsel] had no doubt that the petitioner understood that the plea agreement was for fifteen years to serve followed by ten years special parole. . . . [Trial counsel] testified that he could think of no reason why the petitioner would pursue an appeal. As we previously stated, in order to determine whether the petitioner has demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two part test enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland and Hill. See, e.g., Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, 234 Conn. 139, 151, 662 A.2d 718 (1995). In Strickland, which applies to claims of ineffective assistance during criminal proceedings generally, the United States Supreme Court determined that the claim must be supported by evidence establishing that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The first prong requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Id., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under the test in Hill, in which the United States Supreme Court modified the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for claims of ineffective assistance when the conviction resulted from a guilty plea, the evidence must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, supra, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. The standard of appellate review of habeas corpus proceedings is well settled. The underlying historical facts found by the habeas court may not be disturbed unless the findings were clearly erroneous. . . . Historical facts constitute a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators. So-called mixed questions of fact and law, which require the application of a legal standard to the historical-fact determinations, are not facts in this sense. . . . Whether the representation a defendant received at trial was constitutionally inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact. . . . As such, that question requires plenary review by this court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Copas v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 234 Conn. at 152-53, 662 A.2d 718. In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court explained that the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance. . . . [A] guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not a reasonably competent attorney and the advice was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. . . . Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. . . . Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or. omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 688-90, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In the present case, the petitioner claimed in his amended habeas petition, and continues to claim on appeal, that his trial counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to provide the petitioner with adequate and correct information regarding the sentence that the petitioner would receive in connection with his Alford plea. There are no facts in the record, however, to support this claim. Indeed, the habeas court's findings support the opposite conclusion. Among other things, the court specifically noted testimony at the habeas hearing that: the petitioner's trial counsel told the petitioner that the state was not willing to offer less than fifteen years to serve in exchange for his plea; the petitioner told his trial counsel that he wanted less than fifteen years; the petitioner knew prior to entering the plea that he was going to receive fifteen years at sentencing; trial counsel had no doubt that the petitioner understood that the plea agreement was for fifteen years imprisonment followed by ten years special parole; and trial counsel believed that the petitioner was intelligent, understood what was being communicated to him and was very knowledgeable about the court system. The habeas court also noted in its findings that the trial court's canvass included questions to the petitioner regarding his understanding of the sentence to be imposed under the plea agreement, that the petitioner understood that the plea agreement corresponded with the terms indicated by the trial court during the canvass and that the trial court found the plea to be voluntary and understandingly made with the assistance of competent counsel. On the basis of these findings, we cannot conclude that the petitioner's legal representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland, and, therefore, we need not reach the question of whether counsel's performance prejudiced the defense. The petitioner nonetheless argues that his counsel's performance was deficient with respect to the sentencing claim because he did not provide the petitioner with an adequate explanation of the implications of an Alford plea, thus leading the petitioner to believe, incorrectly, that he would be able to get back into court' for a hearing on his case after he entered the plea. The respondent replies that, to the extent that the petitioner claims that he did not understand an Alford plea, his claim is unreviewable because he failed to raise it before the habeas court. We agree with the respondent. The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this issue. The amended petition contained no allegations that the petitioner did not understand the consequences of an Alford plea, including how such a plea might affect his ability to institute further judicial proceedings or get back into court. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thereafter, the petitioner testified at the habeas hearing that he had not understood the implications of an Alford plea and that his trial counsel had never asked him if he wished to go to trial. He also testified that he was told by his trial counsel that he could `get back into court' by entering an Alford plea. He finally testified that, if counsel had informed him that he could bring an appeal, he would have appealed from the plea agreement before he filed the habeas petition. The habeas court made no findings of fact and did not rule on this matter, focusing instead on the sentencing claim and other questions that the petitioner expressly had raised in his amended petition. We conclude that the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel misinformed him because he did not explain that the petitioner would not be able to `get back into court' after he entered his Alford plea is unreviewable. This court is not bound to consider claimed errors unless it appears on the record that the question was distinctly raised and was ruled [on] and decided by the court adversely to the appellant's claim. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 68 Conn.App. 1, 7, 790 A.2d 463, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 903, 793 A.2d 1089 (2002); see also Practice Book § 60-5 ([t]he court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial). The petitioner in the present case did not claim in his amended habeas petition that he did not understand an Alford plea and its consequences but, rather, that he failed to understand his sentence, an entirely different issue. Although the petitioner testified at the habeas hearing that his trial counsel did not explain that he would not be able to `get back into court,' the habeas court made no findings or ruling on that issue, and he filed no subsequent motion for articulation for the purpose of obtaining such a ruling. Furthermore, the manner in which the sentencing claim was presented in the habeas petition did not suggest to the court that the petitioner was basing his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on his misunderstanding of the nature of an Alford plea and its effect on his ability to institute further judicial proceedings. Accordingly, our review of the petitioner's newly articulated claim would amount to an ambuscade of the [habeas] judge; (internal quotation marks omitted) id.; and we decline to do so. We conclude that the habeas court improperly dismissed the petitioner's sentencing claim but that the petitioner cannot prevail on the merits of that claim. We therefore remand the case to the habeas court with direction to deny the petitioner's habeas petition as to that claim.