Opinion ID: 1935963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court deny gollott a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution, and article iii, section 26 of the mississippi constitution, because of prosecutorial misconduct in procuring the assistance of the circuit clerk in an effort to stack the jury with jurors having a penchant to convict?

Text: Gollott asserts that the alleged assistance provided by the Circuit Clerk of Hancock County to the State in jury selection violates his right to a fair trial. Gollott asserted that since the Circuit Clerk, Pam Metzger, was an officer of the court, her assistance violated the impartiality of the trial, infringing upon Gollott's rights. On the second day of trial, the defendant's counsel motioned for a dismissal of the indictment, or in the alternative, for a mistrial for alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The allegations charged that the assistant district attorney sought information from the circuit clerk in jury selection. A hearing outside the jury's presence was held and Pam Metzger testified that after she followed statutory procedures to draw a jury, and before voir dire, the Assistant District Attorney asked her questions about the jurors. She answered the State's questions with information she knew about the jurors. She did tell the State which jurors she recommended to keep or strike. Metzger testified that she assisted the defense, when asked, and that it was her practice to assist anyone. The trial judge did not have the knowledge of this assistance. The record does not state the information Metzger volunteered about the jurors. Gollott is correct in stating that the courts guarantee him a right to an impartial jury trial. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1450-51, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 498-500 (1968). Gollott is also correct in asserting that courts have held that participation of an interested official in juror selection is a due process violation. Anderson v. Frey, 715 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, Frey v. Anderson, 464 U.S. 1057, 104 S.Ct. 739, 79 L.Ed.2d 198 (1984). The question arises as to what is an interested official, and what participation must occur for a due process violation to occur. Our caselaw makes it clear that both circuit clerks and sheriffs are officers of the court who have duties involved in empaneling a jury. Addkison v. State, 608 So.2d 304, 312 n. 4 (Miss. 1992) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-53 (1972)); Reining v. State, 606 So.2d 1098, 1101 (Miss. 1992). As such, both officers qualify as interested officials under this caselaw. The next question to address is what constitutes participation. Pilchak v. Camper, 741 F. Supp. 782, 787 (W.D.Mo. 1990), aff'd 935 F.2d 145, 148 (8th Cir.1991) disallowed a deputy sheriff's selection of jurors. Anderson disapproved of a sheriff selecting bystander jurors for panels. 715 F.2d at 1308-09. This Court has stated [i]t was never intended that the power of determining who was and who was not fit for jury service should be committed to the judgment of those charged with the duty of drawing the jurors from the jury box for service during a term of court. Reynolds v. State, 199 Miss. 409, 414, 24 So.2d 781, 783 (1946). In this case, the circuit clerk did not select any jurors. The district attorney did. The circuit clerk was instead providing information to the district attorney upon request. This Court has held that even a sheriff, otherwise barred from selecting a jury, may provide information to a district attorney in selecting a jury. See, e.g., Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360, 1371 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979). Openness of the official to all inquiries is the determinative factor. There is no reversible error here.