Opinion ID: 885553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err in its May 16, 1996 Order as to the extent and severity of the sanctions imposed?

Text: ¶ 30 Lee admits that discovery sanctions are warranted for his abuses of the discovery process, but contends that the District Court's order was simply too severe. Specifically, he contends that his counsel, which withdrew from representation in 1997, should alone suffer the punishment. ¶ 31 Under Rule 37, M.R.Civ.P., a party's dilatory tactics in responding to discovery requests may result in sanctions. The court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized under paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule. Rule 37(d), M.R.Civ.P. ¶ 32 Under Rule 37(b)(2), M.R.Civ.P., a failure to comply with an order may result in: (A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; (B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party from introducing designated matters in evidence; and (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party. ¶ 33 Thus, the District Court, due to Lee's dilatory tactics coupled with the fact that the court had issued numerous orders seeking his cooperation in the discovery process to no avail ordered that Lee was liable, that the appropriateness of punitive damages was taken as established, and that trial would be limited to the issue of damages. Lee contends that such severitywhich amounted to a default judgmentwas an abuse of discretion. We disagree. ¶ 34 This Court's position is that dilatory abuse of discovery must no longer be dealt with leniently and that the transgressors of discovery abuses should be punished rather than encouraged repeatedly to cooperate. See Smith v. Butte-Silver Bow County (1996), 276 Mont. 329, 332, 916 P.2d 91, 92-93(reversing district court's dismissal with prejudice of non-compliant party's case). When litigants use willful delay, evasive response, and disregard of court discretion as part and parcel of their trial strategy, they must suffer the consequences. Owen v. F.A. Buttrey Co. (1981), 192 Mont. 274, 280, 627 P.2d 1233, 1236. Further, we generally defer to the decision of the district court regarding the appropriate sanction for discovery abuses. Smith, 276 Mont. at 336, 916 P.2d at 95. ¶ 35 Subject to the foregoing policy, we have identified certain criteria in reviewing whether a sanction is an abuse of discretion, or, as Lee contends, is too severe. We look to 1) whether the consequences imposed by the sanctions relate to the extent and nature of the actual discovery abuse; 2) the extent of the prejudice to the opposing party which resulted from the discovery abuse; and 3) whether the court expressly warned the abusing party of the consequences. See Smith, 276 Mont. at 339-40, 916 P.2d at 97. ¶ 36 Here, we conclude that Lee's intransigent approach to resolving this dispute satisfactorily fulfills all three of the above criteria and therefore no abuse of discretion occurred. The court here determined that liability as well as the appropriateness of punitive damages was established. This sanction still permitted Lee to contest damages at trial and, conceivably, prevail in persuading the court with sufficient evidence that little or no damages were actually warranted. See Dawson v. Billings Gazette (1986), 223 Mont. 415, 419-20, 726 P.2d 826, 829 (affirming jury verdict of zero damages against party found liable for its breach of good faith and fair dealing duty). Thus, he did not suffer the ultimate sanction. Rather, Lee personally showed little interest in adjudication on the merits for three years, and thus the District Court was forced to move from issuing orders to comply to imposing sanctions. We therefore conclude that consequences of the sanctions correlate with the nature of the discovery abuse. Likewise, the Maloneys, who immediately encountered prejudice in litigating this matter due to Lee's recalcitrance, should not have been expected to continue under a cloud of uncertainty due to potential further discovery delays by May of 1996. Finally, the court, in denying earlier motions for sanctions nevertheless warned Lee, as well as Century 21, that such consequences would be forthcoming should further uncooperative tactics continue. The court, in fact, displayed considerable patience and forbearance in reviewing the numerous motions to compel and requests for sanctions. ¶ 37 Further, we hold that Lee's contention that his counsel should shoulder the blame is without merit. See Landauer v. Kehrwald (1987), 225 Mont. 322, 325, 732 P.2d 839, 841 (concluding that although party may have been unaware of one discovery request, an attorney's attitude of unresponsiveness to the judicial process warrants the imposition of sanctions, including dismissal). See also Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co. v. Rowe (Iowa 1988), 424 N.W.2d 235, 241 (stating well-established rule that clients are responsible for the willful actions of their lawyers and in appropriate circumstances dismissal or default may be visited upon them because of the actions of their lawyers). ¶ 38 We conclude that Lee was well aware of the discovery process in this matter long before the court decided, in May of 1996, to issue sanctions, given the duration of the discovery and the partial and incomplete responses provided first by Century 21 and then by Lee himself. In light of the continuous pattern of non-compliance in this matter, which resulted in the court issuing orders on three separate occasions prior to its final order determining liability, we hold there was no abuse of discretion by the District Court in ordering sanctions against Lee.