Opinion ID: 168642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Possession Charge

Text: 35 Mr. Hall argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count Forty-Nine of the indictment, which charged that [o]n or about April 7, 2001 Mr. Hall knowingly distributed and possessed with intent to distribute . . . cocaine base and intentionally aided and abetted the same. To convict Mr. Hall of this charge, the Government was required to prove, at a minimum, that he (1) possessed the controlled substance; (2) knew he possessed the controlled substance; and (3) intended to distribute or dispense the controlled substance. United States v. Bowen, 437 F.3d 1009, 1014 (10th Cir.2006) (quotation omitted). Mr. Hall argues that the Government failed to prove that he possessed crack-cocaine because no law enforcement officer ever testified that they saw Mr. Hall with the drug on April 7; nor were there any witnesses who testified they received the drug from Mr. Hall. 36 The Government did not introduce into evidence crack-cocaine related to the alleged April 7 transaction; eyewitness testimony or video surveillance evidence putting Mr. Hall in possession of crack-cocaine on or around April 7; or testimony from any persons alleged to have purchased crack-cocaine from Mr. Hall on or about that date. The evidence related to this count of conviction included the transcripts of three telephone calls made between Mr. Hall and Mr. Small on April 6 and April 7 purporting to orchestrate a drug transaction. During the first call, the two discuss the price of drugs. Mr. Hall seeks to buy four but not at the price at which Mr. Small is willing to sell them. Four refers to the number of ounces of drugs Mr. Hall wishes to purchase. In the next phone call, the pair agree to meet the following morning, April 7. They speak again on April 7 when they agree to do two for . . . sixteen (meaning two ounces for sixteen hundred dollars). Video surveillance on April 7, shortly after the last telephone call, showed one man exiting a white pick-up truck and briefly entering Mr. Small's car. While watching the video at trial, City of Aurora Police Officer Steven Stanton identified Mr. Hall as the man who entered Mr. Small's car. 37 We confronted a similar factual scenario in United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir.1989). In that case, the defendant was charged with possession of heroin under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Similar to this case, the evidence that the defendant possessed the drugs in question on the day listed in the indictment included three recorded phone calls made by the defendant to a suspected drug dealer during which she arranged to purchase cocaine and heroin. Id. at 1096. Also during the call, the defendant arranged to meet the dealer at a specified time and place. Id. Police officers then surveilled the area and saw the drug dealer meeting with a white female driving a car registered to the defendant. Id. No witness observed a drug exchange between the two; nor did anyone testify to seeing the defendant with any drugs that day. Id. at 1097. The transaction was alleged to have taken place when the defendant briefly entered the drug dealer's car. Id. at 1096. The defendant later admitted to using heroin around the time alleged in the indictment. Id. We held that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the defendant possessed heroin. Id. 38 We acknowledged that [i]t is not necessary that the Government have direct evidence to support a conviction for possession, id., but explained that where the Government fails to seize and analyze the chemical composition of the alleged narcotic substance, there must be enough circumstantial evidence to support an inference that the defendant actually did possess the drugs in question, id. We noted that such evidence may include the following: 39 [E]vidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved in the transaction, evidence that the substance produced the expected effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit drug, evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the illicit drug, testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance, evidence that transactions involving the substance were carried on with secrecy or deviousness, and evidence that the substance was called by the name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in her presence. 40 Id. (quoting United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir.1976)) (alterations omitted). 41 On the evidence presented in Baggett, we stated that [i]f the prosecution is not going to present direct evidence of drug possession, its circumstantial evidence must include some testimony linking defendant to an observed substance that a jury can infer to be a narcotic. Id. at 1097. The prosecution in that case presented no evidence that the defendant actually possessed a substance and that the substance was a narcotic. While other courts have not gone so far as to require that evidence include an observed substance that a jury can infer to be a narcotic, there is little doubt that a defendant's own inculpatory statements captured on wiretaps must be corroborated by other circumstantial evidence of possession such that a jury may properly infer the specific drug was actually possessed. 42 In United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346 (2d Cir.1999), the Second Circuit similarly reversed a defendant's conviction for possession when the only evidence of the charge were his phone calls made purporting to sell the drug. As in this case, federal law enforcement officers investigated several individuals suspected of narcotics trafficking. On August 5 and 6, 1997, officers intercepted telephone calls between the defendant and others during which the defendant used coded phrases to arrange a sale of powder cocaine. Id. at 349. 4 He was later arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess and actual possession with intent to distribute cocaine on August 5 and 6. Id. 43 Though his conviction on the conspiracy charge was affirmed, the Second Circuit reversed his conviction on the possession charge. Citing this Court's opinion in Baggett, the court noted that the prosecution did not introduce into evidence cocaine, residue or paraphernalia; eyewitness testimony or video surveillance putting the defendant in possession of cocaine, or any substance resembling cocaine, on the relevant dates; or testimony from anyone alleged to have purchased cocaine from the defendant on or around those dates. Id. at 352. The defendant's uncorroborated, inculpatory statements did not sufficiently demonstrate that he possessed cocaine. Id. at 356. 44 By contrast, in United States v. Sanchez DeFundora, 893 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir.1990), we upheld convictions for distribution of cocaine though no cocaine related to those counts was seized or admitted into evidence. In that case, the government had presented testimony from a witness who purchased cocaine from the defendant on eight separate occasions—those eight transactions became the basis for eight counts of distribution against the defendant; she testified that she tried the cocaine and that when she ingested it it affected her in the same way as cocaine had affected her in the past. Id. at 1176. There was also corroborating testimony in that the witness was able to resell the substance as cocaine and that law enforcement officers later seized a substance in the defendant's possession that was determined to be cocaine, which we noted lend[s] credence to the conclusion that the defendant was dealing in cocaine. Id. 45 We see no meaningful difference between the evidence of possession of heroin in Baggett and the evidence of Mr. Hall's possession of crack-cocaine here. The Government suggests that other evidence supports the jury's conclusion that Mr. Hall possessed crack-cocaine: (1) law enforcement officers intercepted a call on April 9, 2001 during which Mr. Hall seeks to buy powder cocaine from Mr. Small; (2) law enforcement officers intercepted a call on April 10, during which Mr. Hall and Mr. Small discuss how to cook powder cocaine; (3) a witness testified that she delivered cocaine (powdered or crack—she was not sure which) to Mr. Hall at Mr. Small's request at some other time; and (4) on June 7, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Mr. Hall's residence and found drug paraphernalia including scales with cocaine residue on them and $2,700 in cash. While this evidence may be sufficient to establish that Mr. Hall possessed crack-cocaine at some time, the indictment charged Mr. Hall with possession and distribution on or about April 7, 2001. None of this evidence shows that Mr. Hall possessed or distributed crack-cocaine at that time. See Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) (Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith); see also Bryce, 208 F.3d at 352 (evidence that defendant possessed narcotic at some other time does not prove that he possessed it at the time specified in the indictment). In sum, we conclude that the Government's evidence is insufficient to sustain the possession and distribution conviction.