Opinion ID: 1767833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consumer Expectation Test v. Prudent Manufacturer Test

Text: The consumer expectation test, clearly set forth in the first clause of the definition section, derives from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A. Comment (i) to that section states that before a product is deemed unreasonably dangerous it must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, comment i; Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum, 69 Wis.2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (1975). [5] Under this test, a product is not unreasonably dangerous if the ordinary consumer would appreciate the condition of the product and the risk of injury. By contrast, the prudent manufacturer test imputes knowledge [6] of the condition of the product to the manufacturer. The test is whether, given that knowledge, a prudent manufacturer would market the product. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974). Some jurisdictions  notably Washington and Oregon  have, at times, concluded that the two approaches are really one, representing two sides of the same coin. Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash.2d 111, 587 P.2d 160, 164 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974). In explaining this conclusion these courts have suggested that a manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product ..., would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of consumers who purchase it. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 525 P.2d at 1037. Clearly, however, as the courts combining the tests have come to realize, the focus of the two tests is entirely different. The consumer expectation test is, by definition, buyer oriented; the prudent manufacturer test, seller oriented. Notwithstanding the difference in focus, these courts predict that the tests should produce similar results. Estate of Ryder v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 587 P.2d at 164. While this prediction may be accurate, we see distinct and important differences in the consumer expectation and the prudent manufacturer tests under our statute. First, the former requires the consumer to establish what an ordinary consumer purchasing the product would expect. The manufacturer or seller's conduct, knowledge, or intention is irrelevant. What is determinative is what an ordinary purchaser would have expected. Obviously, this test can only be applied to products about which an ordinary consumer would have knowledge. By definition, it could be applied only to those products in which  everyday experience of the product's users permits a conclusion... . Soule v. General Motors Corp., 8 Cal.4th 548, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 617, 882 P.2d 298, 308 (1994)(emphasis in original). For example, ordinary consumers would have a basis for expectations about the safety of a can opener or coffee pot, but, perhaps, not about the safety of a fuel-injection engine or an air bag. Alternatively, the prudent manufacturer test requires proof about the reasonableness of the manufacturer or seller's decision to market a product assuming knowledge of its dangerous condition. What the buyer expects is irrelevant under this test. In contrast to the consumer expectation test, the prudent manufacturer test is more applicable to those circumstances in which an ordinary consumer would have no reasonable basis for expectations. Accordingly, expert testimony about the prudence of the decision to market would be essential. The straight-forward, unambiguous language of our statute establishes two distinct tests for ascertaining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous: the consumer expectation test and the prudent manufacturer test. In addition to having completely different focuses, the two tests have different elements which require different types of proof. The two tests are neither mutually exclusive nor mutually inclusive. While the statute does not limit applicability of the tests, the prudent manufacturer test will often be the only appropriate means for establishing the unreasonable dangerousness of a complex product about which an ordinary consumer has no reasonable expectation. Likewise, it may form the sole basis for establishing liability for a product whose dangerousness is the result of a latent defect. We decline to weave the two tests into one. As the Oregon courts noted after revising their previous combined approach: [T]he distinction between the [two] tests is not merely academic. The result in some, perhaps most, product liability cases might be the same regardless of which test the jury applies; nonetheless, in some cases, the difference in the test can affect the outcome. A jury might well conclude that a product is not unreasonably dangerous under the cost/benefit calculus of an omniscient reasonable manufacturer but is still unsafe in a manner, or to an extent, not expected by an ordinary consumer... . The difference in perspective  reasonable manufacturer versus ordinary consumer  can, as a practical matter, make all the difference. Burns v. General Motors Corp., 133 Or. App. 555, 891 P.2d 1354, 1357-58 (1995).