Opinion ID: 796361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ross's Motion to Suppress

Text: 11 Ross contends that the inculpatory statements that he made to law enforcement should be suppressed as involuntary. On suppression issues, we review a district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Williams, 431 F.3d 1115, 1117 (8th Cir.2005). A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination. United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir.2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1145, 125 S.Ct. 1292, 161 L.Ed.2d 105 (2005). In determining the voluntariness of a confession, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Id. We will affirm the denial of a motion to suppress unless the decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, is based on an erroneous view of the applicable law, or in light of the entire record, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Vega-Rico, 417 F.3d 976, 979 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir.2004)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1770, 164 L.Ed.2d 521 (2006). 12 At the suppression hearing, Officer Logan Wernet testified that Ross initiated the interview with the police by requesting to speak with them. After the officers gave him oral Miranda 1 warnings, Ross continued to agree to speak with them. Officer Wernet testified that Ross wanted to cooperate, apparently in an effort to help himself. Officer Wernet conceded that it was entirely possible that they told Ross that they would forward his request to cooperate to federal prosecutors. Nevertheless, Officer Wernet testified that he did not observe any signs that Ross's statements were not provided voluntarily and that Ross appeared neither upset nor agitated. Ross argues that he was depressed and under the influence of anti-depressant medication, though he failed to present any competent evidence establishing these facts. 2 He also argues that the officers' agreement to involve federal prosecutors led him to believe that he would receive leniency for his cooperation. 13 Even assuming that the officers in fact promised to forward Ross's information to federal prosecutors, there is no evidence that such a promise overbore his will and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination. A promise of this kind, without more, is not enough by itself to render Ross's statements involuntary. See United States v. Otters, 197 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir.1999) (collecting cases); see also LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 725-26 (ruling that even if a defendant's confession was induced by a promise, there must still be evidence that the authorities overbore defendant's will and capacity for self-determination). Without any evidence establishing that the officers overbore his will and critically impaired his capacity for self-determination, Ross's arguments fail. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ross's motion to suppress his statements.