Opinion ID: 468796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and the Sentence.

Text: 15 Mitchell argues that his motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because the government relied on an in-court identification procedure instead of out-of-court line-up or photographic identification procedure. According to Mitchell, an in-court identification is inherently untrustworthy and should not be the basis of a conviction. Additionally, he argues that a key government witness lied and another witness presented contradictory testimony. These arguments were previously used by co-defendant Oglesby in his companion case. We rejected similar claims there, Oglesby, 764 F.2d at 1278-79, and do the same here. In taking the view most favorable to the government, there was substantial evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Dennis, 737 F.2d 617, 619 (7th Cir.1984). 16 Finally, the defendant argues that his sentence of twenty years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Mitchell notes that he has a record of only non-violent crimes, and that no one was injured in the crime under consideration. He contends these factors render the twenty-year sentence cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight Amendment to the United States Constitution. The sentence given to Mitchell was within the statutory limit; the maximum sentence for a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a) and (d) together is a fine of $10,000 and 25 years' imprisonment. No fine was imposed. Moreover, the sentence was under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4205(a) permitting release on parole after serving one third of the sentence. It is widely established that a district court has wide discretion in determining what sentence to impose, United States v. McCoy, 770 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972)), and as Mitchell's sentence was within the maximum provided by Congress, it is only subject to review on appeal for a manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Carter, 720 F.2d 941, 951 (7th Cir.1983). 17 Considering the violent nature of Mitchell's crime--he pointed a loaded .357 Magnum revolver at the bank's employees--along with his prior criminal record, 5 this Court cannot say that the district judge abused his discretion in sentencing him to less than the statutory maximum or that the sentence was disproportionate to the severity of his offense. Compare Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Mitchell has simply failed to demonstrate that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the purview of the Eighth Amendment. The judgment of the district court is 18 AFFIRMED.