Opinion ID: 1356134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: abandonment of restrictive covenants

Text: ¶ 20 Erickson contends that even if article I prohibits his structure, that covenant has been abandoned by Quail Point owners. We therefore address whether Quail Point lot owners have abandoned the restrictions, as evidenced by their construction of numerous other structures, mainly small storage-type sheds and other similar structures, since recording the covenants in 1973. ¶ 21 Restrictive covenants are a common method of effectuating private residential developmental schemes. See Powell, supra, § 60.06[3], at 60-104 to 60-112. Property owners who purchase land in such developments have a right to enforce such covenants against other owners who violate them. See Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 480-81 (Utah 1981); Powell, supra, § 60.07[c], at 60-121. Conduct by property owners within a development, however, may terminate and render unenforceable a particular covenant where such conduct so substantially changes the character of the neighborhood as to neutralize the benefit of the covenant, see Crimmins, 636 P.2d at 479, or constitutes evidence of the abandonment of the covenant. See Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah Ct.App.1995). ¶ 22 The case law is uniform that before an abandonment of a covenant may be found there must be substantial and general noncompliance with the covenant. B.B.P. Corp. v. Carroll, 760 P.2d 519, 524 (Alaska 1988); Tompkins, 659 P.2d at 867. One court has stated that in order for there to be an abandonment, a covenant must be habitually and substantially violated. Reading v. Keller, 67 Wash.2d 86, 406 P.2d 634, 637 (1965) (internal quotations omitted). The violations must be so substantial as to destroy the usefulness of the covenant and support a finding that the covenant has become burdensome. See Keller v. Branton, 667 P.2d 650, 654 (Wyo.1983). If the original purpose of the covenant can still be accomplished and substantial benefit will continue to inure to residents, the covenant will stand. See Tompkins, 659 P.2d at 867. This court in Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, 535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975), in determining whether a covenant should no longer be enforceable because of changed conditions, stated: Before a change will vitiate a covenant, it must be of such a magnitude as to neutralize the benefits of the restriction, to the point of defeating the object and purpose of the restrictive covenant. The change required to afford relief is reached, where the circumstances render the covenant of little or no value. Here, the purpose of the restriction is yet a valid one, and the contemplated benefits to the plaintiff still exist. The purpose of the covenant has neither ceased nor become useless. Id. at 1261 (citing Metropolitan Inv. Co. v. Sine, 14 Utah 2d 36, 41, 376 P.2d 940, 943 (1962)). Evidence of abandonment must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See Metropolitan, 14 Utah 2d at 41, 376 P.2d at 943. ¶ 23 Courts are uniform that no abandonment of a covenant will be found where violations are of a minor nature and do not destroy the general building scheme, see Reading, 406 P.2d at 636; if the violations are slight, unimportant, and unsubstantial, Guyton v. Yancey, 240 La. 794, 125 So.2d 365, 371 (1960); or if the violations are inoffensive. See Keller, 667 P.2d at 654. ¶ 24 Typical of the cases where an abandonment of a covenant has been found is B.B.P., 760 P.2d 519. There, a covenant required all lot owners to cut and destroy all poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees on their lots to make room for the more desirable spruce and birch. See id. at 520. However, lot owners learned through experience that strict compliance was impossible because poplar, cottonwood, and aspen trees are extremely hardy, and they sprout from roots and reseed themselves. Even bulldozing all of those trees would not bring a lot into compliance because they would soon spring back, and bulldozing would cause excessive erosion. See id. at 521. As a result, none of the lots were in full compliance with the covenant, and only eighteen of the approximately eighty-eight residents had taken substantial steps toward compliance. See id. The court held that the covenant had been abandoned because the evidence revealed substantial and general noncompliance. The court noted that in order to fully comply, each resident would be required to cut and thin trees each year, far exceeding the cutting that was apparently contemplated by the covenant originally. Thus, the residents would be subject to a far heavier burden than they originally bargained for. Full compliance was found to be impossible to achieve and even substantial compliance would be extremely burdensome. See id. at 524. ¶ 25 In contrast to that case where an abandonment of a covenant was found, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Keller, 667 P.2d 650, found no abandonment of a covenant which prohibited front yard fencing. Twenty lots out of approximately 120 to 130 lots had some kind of front yard fence. They were decorative fences, and the court held that they were not fences in the ordinary sense of indicating boundaries or holding something in or out. See id. at 654. The court emphasized that in order to find an abandonment of a protective covenant, the breaches acquiesced in must be so great or so fundamental or radical as to neutralize the benefit of the restriction to the point of defeating the purpose of the covenant. In other words, the violations must be so substantial as to support a finding that the usefulness of the covenant has been destroyed, or that the covenant has become valueless to the property owners. Id. ¶ 26 Courts have also found that the erection of churches in a subdivision restricted to residential purposes technically violated the covenant, but the violation was too slight and inconsequential to effect material change, character, and use of the restricted territory. See, e.g., Mechling v. Dawson, 234 Ky. 318, 28 S.W.2d 18, 19 (1930). Similarly, in Cowling v. Colligan, 158 Tex. 458, 312 S.W.2d 943 (1958), the Supreme Court of Texas held that even though the subdivision had allowed several churches to be built there in violation of a covenant restricting the use of the lots for residential purposes the violation was so trivial in character that it did not operate as a waiver of the right of lot owners to enforce the covenant against business or commercial development, and it did not indicate an abandonment of the covenant. See id. at 946. ¶ 27 Thus, we adopt the test articulated by the court of appeals in Fink, 896 P.2d 649 for determining whether the owners in Quail Point Subdivision have abandoned the restrictive covenants. We must examine: (1) the number, nature and severity of the then existing violations; (2) any prior act of enforcement of the restriction; and (3) whether it is still possible to realize to a substantial degree the benefits intended through the covenant. Id. at 653-54. ¶ 28 In the instant case, nineteen of fifty-two Quail Point lots had garden and storage sheds that did not comply with the four building types allowed under article I. While the building of small storage sheds may technically violate article I, the violation is unsubstantial. The evidence indicates that the storage sheds have an average size of eight by ten feet and are approximately seven and a half feet in height, having an average of ninety-one square feet. These small sheds typically fit unobtrusively in a back corner of the lot, not on a foundation, and are used to store garden and yard tools. They are not occupied by lot owners and could be not much larger than an outbuilding for pets, which is expressly allowed under the covenant. ¶ 29 On the other hand, the woodshop built by defendant Erickson stands twelve feet high and is substantially larger than a storage shed. The building contains at least 288 square feet and may be as large as 384 square feet. It has a foundation and is occupied by Erickson for woodworking. Erickson testified that he intends to move his bandsaw into the workshop and buy other power tools. The Swensons' and Erickson's lots adjoin at the rear. The Swensons are directly impacted by the large structure built by Erickson. ¶ 30 There is a substantial difference between a small, unobtrusive, unoccupied and readily movable storage shed in the corner of a lot and a substantially larger and taller woodworking shop. The technical violation of the covenant here, the small storage sheds, can in no wise be deemed an abandonment. The original purpose of the covenant can still be accomplished, and substantial benefit can continue to inure to residents of the subdivision. The slight violation by lot owners in erecting small, unoccupied storage sheds does not render the covenant useless. See Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1261. There is no other occupied structure in the subdivision comparable to the large shop built by Erickson in which to conduct woodworking. We thus conclude that there has been no abandonment of the restrictive covenants by the lot owners.