Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 41

Heading: 1. Unanimous Verdict and Intent to Kill

Text: Next, Lotter argues that he must be sentenced to life because the jury was not unanimous on the theory of guilt and failed to find an intent to kill. Lotter asserts that because the jury was not required to reach a unanimous verdict on either a theory of premeditated murder or felony murder, we cannot ascertain which theory the jury relied upon in reaching its decision to convict. However, this argument has been disposed of by State v. White, 254 Neb. 566, 577 N.W.2d 741 (1998), and State v. Buckman, 237 Neb. 936, 468 N.W.2d 589 (1991). Lotter also argues that the underlying felony alleged in this case, burglary, does not support a finding of a specific `intent to kill,' brief for appellant 110, which is required by the Eighth Amendment. Essentially, Lotter argues that the death sentence cannot be imposed pursuant to a felony murder theory when the underlying felony is burglary and is based on the intent to commit the felony of tampering with a witness, because such a burglary is not the `moral equivalent,' brief for appellant at 116, of premeditation. It is true that [b]efore a defendant can be sentenced to death, our Constitution requires that he be guilty of a certain degree of culpable conduct. Fairchild v. Norris, 21 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1146, 115 S.Ct. 1092, 130 L.Ed.2d 1061 (1995). In State v. Rust, 223 Neb. 150, 388 N.W.2d 483 (1986), we held that the imposition of the death penalty for felony murder did not violate the Eighth Amendment. We stated: [N]o specific intention is required to constitute felony murder other than the intent to do the act which constitutes the felony in question. In other words, the intent necessary to the crime of murder is constructively imputed through the intent to commit the underlying felony. Id. at 160, 388 N.W.2d at 492. In so holding, we acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), noting that in Enmund, the Court held only that the death penalty may not be imposed when the defendant did not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force be employed. However, the death penalty may still be imposed even when the defendant does not have an intent to kill and does not himself participate directly in the killing. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). As stated by the Supreme Court, Only a small minority of those jurisdictions imposing capital punishment for felony murder have rejected the possibility of a capital sentence absent an intent to kill, and we do not find this minority position constitutionally required. 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. 1676. In Tison, the Court held that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Id. In the instant case, the evidence not only indicates that Lotter was a major participant in the crime who manifested reckless indifference to human life, it indicates that Lotter directly participated in the killings. See Wisdom v. State, 918 P.2d 384 (Okla. Crim.App.1996). Considering Lotter's participation in the killings, there is no doubt that the death penalty may be constitutionally imposed in this instance.