Opinion ID: 1601643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the burden of proving falsity in defamation by implication.

Text: It has been said that there is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. [39] One might say the same of the case law regarding defamation by implication. As noted earlier, the federal circuits and the various state courts remain divided over both the viability and the analytical contours of a cause of action for defamation by implication. [40] For our part, we are not convinced that defamation by implication is so analytically distinct from defamation by explicitly false facts as to require a departure from the guiding principles of general libel and First Amendment libel law. In the absence of clear authority to the contrary, and in light of the current contours of First Amendment libel law, we conclude that an action for defamation by implication must still conform to the three guiding constitutional principles discussed above: speech on public matters initiates heightened First Amendment protection, true speech on public affairs cannot accrue liability, and a plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity. Additionally, a litigant alleging defamation by implication, like any other libel plaintiff, must demonstrate a statement or implication capable of defamatory meaning and prove falsity and fault by, at minimum, a preponderance of the evidence. [41] The properly framed issue in this private-figure/public-interest media report case is not whether, in the abstract, a plaintiff can ever prevail by alleging defamation by implication, but rather whether the plaintiffs have proven both statements (or implications) capable of defamatory interpretation and falsity. Our review of the plaintiffs' arguments and the alleged defamatory implications lead us to agree with the trial court that the plaintiffs here failed to carry their burden of proving the falsity either of the statements or the implications at issue.