Opinion ID: 688356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Partnership Agreement

Text: 17 Good Samaritan claims that the Partnership Agreement is a contract that, applying Oregon law, must be read as a whole, giving effect to all of its parts. HSG argued on summary judgment that Good Samaritan's claims must fail because HSG had a contractual right under the Agreement to open its own MRI facility. The parties agree that the Agreement is fully integrated and that its relevant provisions are unambiguous. For this reason the district court upon deciding summary judgment on the breach of contract, determined the contract language must be construed in accordance with its plain meaning. See, e.g., May v. Chicago Ins. Co., 260 Or. 285, 292, 490 P.2d 150 (1971) (citing Libby Creek Logging, Inc. v. Johnson, 225 Or. 336, 339, 358 P.2d 491 (1960)). A fully integrated and unambiguous contract must be construed as a matter of law without resort to extrinsic evidence. Jarrett v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 81 Or. App. 242, 725 P.2d 384, 386-87 (1986), rev. denied, 302 Or. 476, 731 P.2d 442 (1987). 18 Applying plain meaning analysis to p 13.1, the trial court concluded that p 13.1 gave HSG the power to request the partnership's participation in opening a Vancouver facility provided that one of the following conditions was met: (1) the number of scans and the financial return from the Portland facility appear to justify an additional MRI machine; or (2) the partners agree to an additional machine. The trial court concluded that p 13.1 merely identifies Vancouver as a potential site for a partnership venture, it does not require partnership involvement in any Vancouver facility established by HSG. We agree and conclude that under the terms of p 13.1 HSG could block partnership involvement by simply requesting that no partnership action be taken. 19 Paragraph 13.1 is limited to circumstances under which the partnership can undertake to open an MRI facility in Vancouver and is silent as to whether HSG has a unilateral right to open a facility. This interpretation of p 13.1 is consistent with p 14.4, which permits Good Samaritan to purchase HSG's interest in the partnership ... if HSG participates in a substantial way, either directly or through an affiliated ... entity, in the installation of an MRI machine in Vancouver, Washington without requesting that the partnership do so .... This provision not only recognized the possibility that HSG might open it own MRI facility, but specifically provided Good Samaritan with an option to purchase HSG's partnership interest if HSG did open its own facility. If the parties intended that HSG be restricted in any way from opening an independent facility, then p 14.4's explicit reference to a non-partnership MRI facility would make no sense. Nothing about this paragraph suggests that the opening of a Vancouver facility would violate HSG's partnership obligations under the contract. 20 Article XVII contains provisions not to compete. Good Samaritan raises, for the first time on appeal, that p 17.2 and p 14.4 are inconsistent. We will not, in general, hear issues raised on appeal for the first time. See United States v. Reyes, 8 F.3d 1379, 1390 (9th Cir. 1993); Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985). We are not prepared to overturn our general rule because we see no merit in the petitioner's claim that p 17.2 and p 14.4 are necessarily inconsistent. Under the plain language of the contract, nothing prohibits HSG from opening an MRI facility in Vancouver, and we therefore conclude that HSG did not violate its partnership agreement with Good Samaritan.