Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comparison of Defendant's Case to the B Cases[18]

Text: Whether defendant's sentence is disproportionate in comparison with the culpability levels of the comparison group must be determined by comparing the facts of those cases to the facts of defendant's case. As discussed above, supra at 324, 724 A. 2d at 164, in conducting this comparison, we identify in the comparison group all relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, both statutory and non-statutory, that are `rooted in traditional sentencing guidelines,' DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 184-85, 662 A. 2d 442. In comparing defendant's case to the other category B cases, we find that defendant's culpability level is high, and that his death sentence is not disproportionate. Defendant contends that his case is more like the life-sentenced cases than the death-sentenced cases. We disagree. We compare first the B(1) prior murderers. Each of the four cases in this category has the c(4)(a) (prior murder) aggravating factor, plus two or more additional aggravating factors. And, like Loftin, these four prior murderers have as an additional aggravating factor the c(4)(g) (felony murder) factor. Additionally, Booker, Fauntenberry and Koedatich have the c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factor. In this respect, at least, Loftin shares with these B(1) defendants a similar level of culpability. Yet, of the four defendants in the B(1) comparison group, only Koedatich received a death sentence for his crime, a sentence which was later reduced to life on retrial of the penalty phase. This apparent disparity compels us to take a closer look at the factors which set defendant apart from these B(1) defendants. The greatest distinguishing factor between Loftin and the B(1) defendants is that, with the exception of Fauntenberry, each B(1) defendant presented uncontroverted evidence that he suffered from some mental disease or defect. Bookers's psychiatrist testified that Booker had an I.Q. of 80 and suspected brain damage, and that he was experiencing a drug-and alcohol-enhanced psychotic episode at the time he committed his murder. Feaster had encephalopathy, an injury to the left frontal lobe region making him more violence-prone. Koedatich suffered untreated personality disorders as a child as well as untreated suicidal and homicidal tendencies as a teenager, and was diagnosed in prison as a sociopathic personality. In defendant's case, however, the State disputed defense evidence that Loftin suffered from a borderline personality disorder and introduced evidence that Loftin had a narcissistic or antisocial personality that did not impair his ability to act purposefully. Therefore, even though one juror found the c(5)(a) mitigating factor to exist in Loftin's case, uncontroverted evidence that other B(1) defendants suffered from a mental disease or defect could explain why their juries did not deem them to be deathworthy. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 384, 645 A. 2d 685. Loftin did present evidence in mitigation that he was deprived of a nurturing mother and a male role model, and that he was traumatized by the fire he set as a child that burned his family home to the ground. This evidence, however, is not as compelling as the evidence of chronic child abuse presented by the B(1) defendants. Booker was regularly beaten by his father and was forced to watch helplessly as his father beat his mother and ten siblings. Fauntenberry was mentally and physically abused by his many step-fathers and witnessed the physical abuse of his mother and the sexual abuse of his sister, acts that ultimately led to Fauntenberry's own sexual abuse of his sister. Feaster's parents were both alcoholics and his father was also abusive. Koedatich suffered severe, physical harm from his parents and was abandoned by them to his grandparents who neglected him. The absence of such evidence in Loftin's case, together with the fact that his claim of mental disease or defect was disputed, distinguishes his case from the B(1) comparison cases. Moreover, other considerations serve to distinguish Loftin from the life-sentenced B(1) defendants, Booker, Fauntenberry and Feaster. [19] Booker and Fauntenberry confessed, a fact that very well may have led to the jury's decision to sentence Booker to life and the prosecutor's decision to accept Fauntenberry's plea to noncapital murder. Loftin did not confess; he offered a confession in exchange for the promise of a lesser sentence. Feaster, also, did not confess, but he was only twenty-two-years old at the time of his offense, living with his parents and unemployed. Although Loftin was only twenty-six at the time of his murder, and two jurors found the c(5)(c) mitigating factor to exist, because Loftin was living an adult lifehe had trained to serve in the Navy, was married with two children, and owned a home the jury may have reasonably chosen to hold Loftin to a higher, adult standard. We turn to the B(2) and B(3) defendants. Of the nine defendants in the B(2) category, seven received a death sentence from their first penalty-phase jury or, in Biegenwald (1), from his first two penalty-phase juries. Of these seven death sentences, only Bey's was ultimately upheld and found to be proportionate. Two B(2) defendants, Godette and Vasquez, were permitted to plead to felony murder and received life sentences. The four B(3) defendants were all sentenced to life. The following discussion reveals that Loftin's culpability equals or exceeds that of Bey, if not that of the B(2) defendants whose death sentences were later reduced to life, and exceeds that of the life-sentenced B(2) and B(3) defendants. We note that the B(2) and B(3) defendants as a group are less culpable than the B(1) defendants because, in addition to having a prior murder conviction, their cases present one or no additional aggravating factor. For this reason alone, Loftin, a B(1) defendant himself, is more culpable than the B(2) and particularly the B(3) defendants. We first consider Bey, the only defendant currently on death row for a B(2) murder. Bey's murder of Carol Peniston was intensely violent, including sexual assault, beating, stomping and strangulation. In this respect, at least, his culpability exceeds that of Loftin whose only assault on Gary Marsh was a single gun shot to the head. In other respects, however, Loftin is more culpable than Bey. Bey testified that he was drunk and high on marijuana at the time of the Peniston murder; Loftin offered no justification or excuse for his crime. Bey offered uncontroverted evidence that he had an antisocial personality disorder and lacked the ability to control his anger; although Loftin claimed that he suffered from a borderline personality disorder, that claim was sharply contested by the State. And, finally, Bey offered evidence that his mother, an alcoholic, severely abused him and that his dependence on alcohol and drugs began as early as age nine; Loftin offered no comparable evidence of childhood or substance abuse. Based on these factors, we are convinced that Loftin's culpability is equal to or greater than that of Bey. We next consider the B(2) defendants who were initially sentenced to death: Biegenwald, Coyle, Erazo, Pennington, Purnell and Ramseur. Biegenwald's thrill motive was horrific; Coyle, Erazo, Purnell and Ramseur committed violent murders in great excess of what was necessary to end life; and Pennington killed a woman in front of her daughter. When compared to these aspects of the B(2) defendants' murders, Loftin's pecuniary-motive, execution-style murder, which created no risk to third persons, appears less deathworthy. This limited comparison, however, fails to take into account the aspects of these defendants' cases, absent from Loftin's case, suggesting that Loftin's death sentence was not an aberration. In particular, all but one of these cases involved provocation, to varying degrees, uncontroverted evidence of mental disease or defect, and/or evidence of severe childhood abuse. Biegenwald was abused as a child by his father, who was an alcoholic mental patient, and was institutionalized at age five, when he was diagnosed as a child schizophrenic and given some twenty electro-convulsive shock treatments. Expert testimony also established that he had an antisocial personality with paranoid traits and that he lacked the emotional capacity to conform his behavior to law. The penalty-phase jury in Coyle's case found that his victim had participated in the conduct which resulted in his death. Although the jury discarded the c(5)(a) mitigating factor, evidence was also presented that Coyle suffered from latent schizophrenia and substance-dependency, and was laboring under an extreme mental and emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. Both of Erazo's penalty-phase juries found that he suffered from an extreme mental and emotional disturbance, that he was under unusual and substantial duress at the time of the murder, and that his victim participated in the conduct which resulted in her death. Moreover, evidence at his retrial established that he suffered from a fractured skull caused by child abuse, seizures, and chronic low-level depression. Pennington produced compelling evidence that he was expelled from a school for emotionally disturbed children for being too disturbed. He was honorably discharged from his Vietnam duty with the Marines due to his mental condition and diagnosed with post-traumatic stress syndrome, subsequently acquitted of murder by reason of insanity, and diagnosed with a personality disorder and schizophrenia. Ramseur presented evidence of alcoholism, as well as paranoia and psychomotor seizures that combined could lead to violence under provoking circumstances; this evidence no doubt persuaded the jury to find the c(5)(a) and c(5)(d) mitigating factors in his case. When compared to these aspects of the defendants' cases, Loftin appears more deathworthy. In sum, Loftin is at least as culpable as this group of B(2) defendants who were initially sentenced to death. This analysis, however, does not account for Purnell (1A and 1B), who, like Loftin had a monetary motive. The fact that Purnell's penalty-phase jury, unlike Loftin's, failed to find the c(4)(f) (escape detection) aggravating factor differentiates Purnell from Loftin. More important, the jury in Purnell's case found that Purnell's victim solicited the conduct that resulted in his deatha mitigating factor clearly missing in Loftin's case. Turning to the life-sentenced B(2) and B(3) cases, unusual circumstances in the B(2) Godette and Vasquez cases help explain why their prosecutors accepted pleas. Godette can be distinguished from Loftin in that he volunteered a confession and was sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of thirty years, to run concurrently with the term of life imprisonment plus forty years that he was already serving for murder in North Carolina. In Vasquez's case, as pointed out by the State, the prosecutor reached an agreement to spare the thirteen-year-old victim's family the trauma of returning from their native Puerto Rico to relive the incident. Further, Vasquez agreed that the sentences on the charges of felony murder and aggravated sexual assault would be the maximum allowed and would be consecutively served, and that any merger argument would be waived. As such, the plea assured that the forty-five-year-old Vasquez would not be eligible for parole until age eighty-five. The B(3) defendants, all of whom were sentenced to life, are distinguishable for a variety of reasons. Unlike Loftin, none of the B(3) defendants killed for money but, rather, out of fear, anger or both. Biegenwald, Nieves and Williams each presented some evidence of provocation. Biegenwald broke up a struggle between his friend and the victim, Ward, who was clutching a gun, by shooting Ward. The penalty-phase jury in Nieves's case found that the victim solicited the conduct which led to his death. And it appears that Williams killed his mother after an argument over money and his girlfriend. Loftin presented no such evidence of provocation. See Loftin I, supra, 146 N.J. at 353, 680 A. 2d 677. Biegenwald, Muhammed and Nieves also presented uncontroverted testimony of mental disease or defect and/or substantial mitigating circumstances. Biegenwald suffered child abuse, childhood institutionalization with shock treatments, and schizophrenia as a child, and antisocial personality with paranoid traits as an adult. Muhummed was diagnosed as a sociopath. Nieves and his seventeen siblings grew up in abject poverty, he was beaten by his alcoholic father, one of his brothers was murdered, and another brother went to prison for avenging that murder. As discussed above, Loftin failed to produce uncontroverted evidence of mental disease or defect or comparable evidence of child abuse. These distinctions, in the aggregate, support the juries' determinations, or the prosecutor's in Muhummed's case, that the B(3) defendants, as compared to Loftin, were not deathworthy. As in Marshall II and Bey IV, we do not [here] find a pattern of life sentencing or the taint of an invidious factor that would require us to reverse [defendant's] death sentence. Ibid.