Opinion ID: 1841473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Place Warning Signals to Warn Approaching Vehicles

Text: There are state and federal components to Appellant Administratrix's next claim. For comparison we juxtapose the salient provisions of federal § 392.22 with state § 63-7-71. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-7-71(1) (1972) in relevant part reads as follows: (1) Whenever any motor truck or bus is stopped upon the highway ..., the driver or other person in charge of such vehicle shall cause such flares, fuses, reflectors, or other signals to be lighted or otherwise placed in an operating condition and placed upon the highway, one at a distance of approximately one hundred feet to the rear of the vehicle, one approximately one hundred feet in advance of the vehicle and the third upon the roadway side of the vehicle... . The situation presented by the federal regulation covering the placement of warning devices is similar, although the more recently drafted federal regulation makes provision for multi-lane divided highways such as is involved here. The regulation provides, in 49 C.F.R. § 392.22(b), as follows: (b) Placement of Warning Devices  (1) General Rule. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, whenever a vehicle is stopped upon the traveled portion of a highway or the shoulder of a highway for any cause other than necessary traffic stops, the driver shall as soon as possible, but in any event within 10 minutes, place ... warning devices... . (2)(v) Divided or one-way roads. If a motor vehicle is stopped upon the traveled portion or the shoulder of a divided or one-way highway, the driver shall place the warning devices required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section, one warning device at a distance of 200 feet and one warning device at a distance of 100 feet in a direction toward approaching traffic in the center of the lane or shoulder occupied by the vehicle. He shall place one warning device at the traffic side of the vehicle within 10 feet of the rear of the vehicle. Under either the state or the federal standard, because Long stopped his truck on a highway outside of a business district, he was required to put out reflectors or other signals. [10] Both the state statute and the federal regulation require the placement of three devices. One flashing blue lighted patrol car will suffice generically but not numerically. On these facts Long did not comply with the state and federal standards for placing three devices by the time the accident occurred, or more precisely, at the time of the accident Long had not yet complied. This does not mean, however, that Long was necessarily liable under either standard. [11] Under the state statute, a driver is not required to place flares, reflectors or other signals immediately. Hankins v. Harvey holds immediately means only that it be put out with reasonable and proper diligence, or promptly under all the facts and circumstances of the case. 160 So.2d at 69. There is a surface difference between the state statute and the federal regulation in the language describing the amount of time Long had to effect his warning light system. Whereas Mississippi's § 63-7-71(1) has been construed by this Court to require reasonable promptness and diligence under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, the federal regulation § 392.22(b)(1) requires that the driver shall act as soon as possible, but in any event within 10 minutes, ... We regard the state statute and the federal regulation as imposing essentially similar standards. Normally the reasonable promptness and diligence required by the state statute will require action in ten minutes. In any event, under the facts in this case, the witnesses have established a range of time between the moment Long stopped his truck until the fatal accident at between four and ten minutes. The evidence is certainly not so clear that we have an unquestionable violation of the time feature of either the federal regulation or the state statute. Where there is a conflict in the evidence and where more than one reasonable interpretation may be given the facts, whether the driver acted with reasonable promptness under the circumstances or within a ten minute time limit must be determined by the jury under proper instructions. See, e.g., Powers v. Malley, 302 So.2d 262, 264-65 (Miss. 1974) (issue should have been submitted to jury on proper instructions); Maness v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 271 So.2d 418, 425 (Miss. 1972) (issue is a jury question); Hankins v. Harvey, 248 Miss. 639, 656, 160 So.2d 63, 69 (1964) (same) (minority position of Kyle, J.); Planters Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Kincade, 210 Miss. 712, 717, 720-23, 50 So.2d 578, 581, 585 (1951) (same). Even though Long had not yet complied with the state or federal standard by placing three devices to warn oncoming traffic, we can only hold that reasonable minds could differ on whether Long acted with the required promptness and diligence. Unless on uncontradicted facts Long's ten minutes or his time for acting with reasonable promptness had expired, we do not reach the question whether he violated the numerical component of the requirement for putting out warning devices. Appellant Administratrix is not entitled to a peremptory instruction that Long violated either the state or federal traffic laws.