Opinion ID: 2980812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fear of Persecution1

Text: Substantial evidence does not compel a finding that Popovych will face persecution in Ukraine motivated by his membership in a particular social group or a political opinion imputed to him. He has not established a sufficient nexus to a protected ground. Such a nexus is required for a petitioner to be considered a refugee for purposes of asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Zoarab v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 777, 780 (6th Cir. 2008). His lawyers conceded that he was not a victim of past persecution, and he does not appeal that issue. The future persecution that he claims he will suffer must therefore be different from what he encountered before leaving Ukraine. The main evidence he provides on this point — the visit of two unknown men to his house with vague threats, and the accusation of misconduct lodged against Popovych — does not establish a sufficient likelihood. The fear that criminals may seek retribution against a police officer who has performed 1 The BIA erroneously stated that the REAL ID Act did not apply to Popovych’s case because it misstated the date on which Popovych’s application was filed. Because we would deny review under law existing both before and after the REAL ID Act, this error is harmless. 5 his duty does not constitute persecution based on a political opinion. See Tamara-Gomez v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 343, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2006). Suggesting that there will be future persecution by the government is too speculative. It was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that Popovych’s police work seeking out corruption was not an expression of political opinion that formed the basis of persecution. There is not enough evidence to establish that Popovych’s political opinions led to specific actions or that any such actions were perceived as political by his supervisors. Popovych makes much of the factual differences between his case and Marku, 380 F.3d 982, which the BIA and IJ relied on in reaching their decisions, but the case’s reasoning remains applicable. Marku was employed by a governmentowned company in Albania and was threatened by her supervisor when she refused to doctor the books to disguise losses. The IJ in her case found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that her persecutor had “imputed any political claim whatsoever to [her].” Id. at 985. Rather, the persecutor had acted “as a result of his fear that [Marku] would expose his criminal and corrupt activities.” Id. We determined that though Marku’s testimony suggested that she opposed government corruption “as an ideological matter,” she had presented “no evidence that any of her actions were ideologically motivated or that Sota, her alleged persecutor, perceived them as such.” Id. at 986-87. To support this statement, we pointed to the fact that Marku never publicly opposed corruption or attempted to expose her supervisor’s actions. Id. at 987. Furthermore, the evidence did not compel the conclusion that her supervisor was acting in response to a purported political opinion, rather than “out of fear of losing his job.” Id. at 988. Marku had not adequately demonstrated persecution on account of a political opinion. 6 The facts of Popovych’s case lead to a similar conclusion. Popovych’s profession was to investigate corruption, and he never took any steps beyond that charge. He never tried to complain to those higher up that his supervisors were pressuring him to decide cases on political grounds. He never attempted to expose corruption to the public or another government body. He never tried to broaden his investigative scope by taking on more cases than were assigned to him or working on cases that had been taken away from him. Nothing about his application or testimony suggests that his actions rose to the level of a whistle-blower or were interpreted as such by his supervisors. The pressure he testifies about from his supervisors appears to be based on his not doing what they were telling him to and thus getting in the way of their taking bribes, not his general opposition to the government. Popovych’s situation more closely resembles a personal dispute with a particular government official, which even if rising to the level of persecution does not satisfy the INA’s nexus requirement. See Zoarab, 524 F.3d at 781. This is not a situation like Bu v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 424, 426-27 (6th Cir. 2007), where we found that a union chairman who had staged a strike “protesting the factory officials’ corrupt acts” and was arrested for “organiz[ing] illegal meeting[s and] gather[ing] workers to disturb the public security” and then beaten had shown that a political opinion was imputed to him. Popovych has made no argument that he was targeted “as a political prisoner who was guilty of opposition to the government,” as in Bu. Id. at 429. Nor does the evidence he has submitted compel the conclusion that he will be arrested in the future. Marku expressly addresses Popovych’s argument that he will be persecuted because of his membership in a particular social group, namely “those working for the government who refuse to comply with its corruption.” Marku pointed to a similar group, but presented no evidence 7 compelling the conclusion that membership in such a group made her “particularly likely to be persecuted in Albania.” Marku, 380 F.3d at 987 n.8. Popovych’s evidence fails on similar grounds. Because Popovych has failed to show that the record compels reversal of the BIA’s asylum denial, he has similarly failed to show that the record compels reversal of his denial of relief under withholding of removal, since that ground has an even higher burden of proof than asylum. See Koliada v. I.N.S., 259 F.3d 482, 488-89 (6th Cir. 2001). Popovych’s argument that a remand is necessary because the BIA did not apply the proper standard when weighing the evidence used to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is without merit. The BIA cited the proper standard of review in its opinion explicitly, namely de novo review of legal standards, and stated that it agreed with the IJ’s legal conclusions, including burden of proof. The BIA opinion goes on to discuss the record and evidence from it. The BIA did exercise its authority, recognized in Matter of H-L-H & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 212 (BIA 2010), to “give different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge.” Even if it did not, this weighing appears to be an option the BIA can choose to decline, and so no remand is necessary to determine whether it did so in this case.