Opinion ID: 2745041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Statutory Claim

Text: In the alternative, GSMT sought relief under Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-53-104(c), seeking a declaration that its grant of authority to GSUSA was ultra vires. This Fourth Count of the complaint incorporated by reference the preceding allegations, stated that this statute was in place at the time, provided the language of the statute, specified that ERISA does not preempt the statute, and explained, “While GSMT avers that the Plan Documents do not authorize GSUSA to subject GSMT to unlimited liability under the Plan . . . , in the event that the Court may otherwise determine, then GSMT avers that such a grant of authority to GSUSA was ultra vires and void, and that GSMT is entitled to a declaration to such effect.” The district court properly dismissed this count of the complaint for insufficient pleadings. GSMT presents no arguments or factual support in the complaint for the contention 5 GSMT did not challenge the district court’s conclusions as to its fiduciary duty claims for failing to recognize an awkward gap in ERISA or that extension of federal common law here would promote ERISA’s fundamental policies. No. 13-6347 Girl Scouts of Middle Tenn. v. Girl Scouts of United States Page 18 that its grant of authority to GSUSA was ultra vires other than the bare assertion that it is. Trying to overcome this mistake now, GSMT argued that Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-62-102(g) required it to provide the Tennessee Attorney General 20 days’ notice before disposing of all or substantially all of its property other than in the ordinary course of business. In failing to do so, GSMT’s conveyance of so much authority to GSUSA was ultra vires. GSMT waited until its brief on appeal to make this argument,6 but asserts that the district court should have made the “permissible inference [] that such notice was not given.” GSMT argues this satisfies the pleading standards provided in Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994). However, Gazette relies on the now defunct Conley standard for motions to dismiss. See Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629-30 (6th Cir. 2009). Under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown— that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.7 In essence, GSMT invites the court to infer from the fact that Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-62102 existed at the time it submitted its complaint, that GSMT based its claim for declaratory judgment on its failure to comply with that statute, even though the complaint does not mention the statute or anything about providing notice to the Attorney General. GSMT presented no facts to support an inference of liability. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal “unless the failure to consider the issue will result in a plain miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Ninety-Three Firearms, 330 F.3d 414, 424 (6th Cir. 2003). Our consideration of GSMT’s argument now would undermine the substance of the current pleading requirements and produce an unjust result for GSUSA, which had no means of mounting a defense to such a naked claim. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the state statutory claim. 6 GSMT notes that the district court cited this Tennessee statute in its order. The district court’s citation was the first time this statute appeared in this case, and the citation had no relevance to the ultra vires issue. The district court simply referred to the statute to compare its structure to Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-53-104, in order to determine whether GSMT had standing under Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-53-104. It did not discuss the content of the statute, let alone apply it to the present situation. 7 That the district court quoted to Gazette does not revive the liberal Conley standard; the district court’s reliance on Gazette was flawed, but its ultimate conclusion was not. No. 13-6347 Girl Scouts of Middle Tenn. v. Girl Scouts of United States Page 19