Opinion ID: 2321578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application to Appellants' Trial

Text: With this understanding of the framework for analysis under plain error review, we turn to analyze the evidence presented to the jury with respect to each appellant's role in Helm's murder.
The evidence showed that appellant Robles-Benevides was in the car that caught up with Helm as he tried to escape the group chasing him up 14th Street. In the car, Robles-Benevides struggled over a knife with Velásquez, who used a knife to stab Helm. Benítez testified that Robles-Benevides told him, when they were both in jail, that he had fought with Velásquez about who was going to have the knife: [Robles-Benevides] said to me that he had a blade with him. That when he was in [Bonilla's] car, that [Robles-Benevides] and [Velásquez] were fighting over a knife. .... [Robles-Benevides] said to me that [Velásquez] was asking him for the knife.... [Robles-Benevides] said that [Velásquez] kept on asking him for the knife because he wanted to stab the deceased. [Robles-Benevides] said to [Velásquez] that he was going to do it. And so they were fighting over the knife, the two of them. When they got close to where the deceased was, Carlos gave the knife to [Velásquez].... Although there was no evidence that Robles-Benevides stabbed Helm, the eye-witnesses testified that he personally participated in the attack: García saw him kicking and punching Helm; Alemán, Benítez and José Pérez saw him hit Helm; and Hallner testified that he saw him deliver a vicious kick to Helm's chest while he was lying on the ground. Robles-Benevides argued that that he had done so in self-defense, because Helm had hit him first. The jury verdict shows that it rejected Robles-Benevides's claim of self-defense. [65] He argues, however, that the evidence that he hit and kicked Helm and had struggled with Velásquez over the knife does not reasonably permit an inference that he intended to kill Helm, only that he gave up the knife that, as it turned out, was used by someone else (Velásquez) to kill Helm during the assault. We have explained the mens rea required for first-degree murder: First-degree premeditated murder is murder committed with the specific intent to kill after premeditation and deliberation. Williams v. United States, 858 A.2d 984, 1001 (D.C.2004). Premeditation means that the defendant formed the specific intent to kill the victim for some length of time, however short, before the murderous act. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Deliberation, which is separate from premeditation, requires that there was the reflection and turning over in the mind of the accused concerning his existing design and purpose to kill. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, in order for a charge of first-degree premeditated murder to be sustained, the evidence must demonstrate that the accused did not kill impulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity. Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1979). Kitt v. United States, 904 A.2d 348, 353 (D.C.2006). The government argues that in closing argument the prosecutor emphasized to the jury the significant role that Robles-Benevides played in the murder and pointed to his own premeditation and deliberation: What on earth do you think Carlos Robles-Benevides was thinking during that chase when he gave the knife to [Velásquez]?... he was fighting for that knife because he wanted to stab Mr. Helm. Premeditation and deliberation? That's right there. But the prosecutor made essentially the same argument to the jury with respect to appellants Bonilla and Villatoro, as to whom the government now concedes their first-degree murder convictions must be reversed. [66] Moreover, the prosecutor's argument that appellants had premeditated and deliberated was immediately followed by the prosecutor's offer to the jurors that they need not find for each and every one of these guys ... that this is premeditated and deliberated. Indeed, the jurors were relieved of any obligation to evaluate the evidence of individual intent by the prosecutor's erroneous admonition that all you have to do is conclude that the principals in this case, the guys who actually put the knives in Mr. Helm, Catinga [Velásquez] and Douglas [Ventura], that they premeditated and deliberated. With respect to appellants, the prosecutor advised, the only issue ... is one of foreseeability.... Now, what do you think is reasonably foreseeable when you're running up, when you're chasing this man and you're in a mob? We have held that there are instances where there is enough in the factual record to affirm a first-degree murder conviction on an aiding an abetting theory of liability despite an erroneous instruction like the one given in this case. In Kidd, a plain error case, we affirmed appellant's conviction for first-degree murder when he stood on one side of the victim while pointing a gun at his stomach; a second person stood on the other side with a gun; a third person came around the back and shot the victim in the head; and appellant immediately fled the scene. 940 A.2d at 128. We held that [o]n the record before us, reasonable jurors could infer and conclude... that beyond a reasonable doubt [appellant] had thought about and reflected on killing [the victim], and further that he had the specific intent to participate in the killing.... Id. Based upon that evidence, which was countered only by defendant's self-serving statement that he was home at the time of the killing, and, importantly, the prosecutor's emphasis at the outset and end of its case before the jury on the elements of premeditation and deliberation, we were convinced that the first-degree murder conviction was based on the jurors having inferred `from the facts and circumstances surrounding [the] murder,' that [the defendant] had `the requisite mens rea. ' Id. (quoting Kitt, 904 A.2d at 353). In Downing v. United States, 929 A.2d 848 (D.C.2007), another plain error case, we likewise affirmed a first-degree murder conviction despite an erroneous aiding and abetting instruction, where we concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that [the defendant] had any intent other than to kill ... nor could a reasonable juror have concluded that the actions taken by [the defendant] were anything other than deliberate and premeditated. Id. at 863. In Downing, the evidence showed that the defendant, who was the first in the group to suggest killing the victim, directed others to the location where the murder took place, took the victim out of the car when they arrived at the location, and stood next to the person who actually fired the fatal shot. See id. Finally, in Wilson-Bey, on harmless error review, we affirmed appellant Wilson-Bey's first-degree murder conviction, where the evidence showed that after declaring I am going to kill that bitch for having beaten up her younger sister, Wilson-Bey led a group armed with various weapons to the victim's apartment, swung her knife multiple times at the victim, and stabbed the victim near the eye. 903 A.2d at 845. Based on that evidence, we determined that [a]ny impartial trier of fact who credited the prosecution's evidence would ... be bound to conclude that ... Wilson-Bey intended to kill the decedent, tried to kill her, and succeeded in doing so, either by personally causing her death or by abetting a knife-wielding confederate who actually inflicted the fatal wound if... Wilson-Bey did not. Id. at 846-47. Although we agree with the government that the evidence against Robles-Benevides was significant, and without a doubt sufficient for conviction of first-degree murder, it was not so compelling that we can say that there is no reasonable probability that the verdict was unaffected by the error. See Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333. Neither Robles-Benevides's statement to Velásquez (as related by Benítez) that he was going to do it while they struggled over the knife in the car, nor his participation in the assault that resulted in Helm's death reflected the personally-expressed intent to kill of the assailants whose convictions we affirmed in Wilson-Bey and in Kidd, or the cool-headed direction and control of the fatal shooting in Downing, where we found the evidence overwhelming. Downing, 929 A.2d at 863-64. And, unlike in Kidd, where we relied on the prosecutor's emphasis to the jury that first-degree murder required premeditation and deliberation, see 940 A.2d at 128, in this case the prosecutor urged that the only issue that the jurors needed to decide was whether the killing of Helm was foreseeablethe very theory we concluded in Wilson-Bey is contrary to the aiding and abetting statute. 903 A.2d at 837. Rather, we find this case analogous to the more ambiguous situations in Wilson-Bey and Coleman, where we reversed the first-degree murder convictions of Marbury and Jones, respectively. In Wilson-Bey, we reversed defendant Marbury's conviction for first-degree murder as an aider and abettor because taking the evidence as a whole, an impartial juror might readily have a reasonable doubt whether Ms. Marbury in fact formed an intent to kill [the victim], as distinguished from an intent to join with others in beating up [the victim] and her friends. 903 A.2d at 845. There, cooperating witnesses testified that Marbury and her friends went to the victim's apartment to find out why she had beaten up Marbury and to fight her and her friends. Id. Unlike her sister (Wilson-Bey) whose first-degree murder conviction we affirmed, Marbury did not wield a knife and stab the victim. Also, while a witness's testimony that Marbury openly declared her intention to kill that bitch may have permitted the jury to find that she had deliberated and premeditated on the intent to kill, see id. at 844, we noted that the strength of that testimony was weakened by substantial impeachment. See id. at 845. Here, it is undisputed that Robles-Benevides did not use a knife at any time during the assault on Helm. Although it can be inferred from the evidence that, more than any other appellant, Robles-Benevides knew that a knife was in the equation when they reached and attacked Helm, this situation is indistinguishable from Marbury's, where a group of eight, including both [Marbury and Wilson-Bey], armed themselves with knives and baseball bats and set out in a van for [the victim's] apartment. Id. at 823. Furthermore, just as Marbury's comment that she was going to kill that bitch was impeached, Benítezwho was the sole witness to relate the conversation during which Robles-Benevides said that he wanted to do it as he struggled with Velásquez over the knifewas also impeached. Defense counsel pointed out that Benítez had pleaded out of trial and had a motive to testify favorably for the government by falsely accusing Robles-Benevides. Defense counsel suggested in cross-examination that it was really Benítez who had the knife, and that the government pressured him to finger Robles-Benevides instead. Gilfredo López, who had been in jail with Robles-Benevides and Benítez, testified that Benítez told him that the government wanted Benítez to testify that Robles-Benevides passed a knife to Velásquez. In Coleman, defendant Jones gave a machine gun to his confederate, Coleman, who then shot the victims to death, after Jones equivocally said: fuck em. 948 A.2d at 550-51. We held that while the evidence was sufficient to convict Jones for second-degree murder, see id. at 551, it was not so overwhelming to ease our concern that the jury might have convicted based on the `natural and probable consequences' theory. Id. at 554. In this case, Robles-Benevides only reluctantly relinquished the knife to Velásquez, who later stabbed Helm to deathas opposed to Jones who gave the machine gun to Coleman. In reversing Jones's conviction in Coleman we explained that the jury may not have understood the statement fuck emas an execution order because the jury also could have interpreted the comment as indicating a desire not to kill the victims, i.e., `never mind,' or a disinterested I don't care. Id. at 553. Similarly, Robles-Benevides's conversation with Velásquez in the car does not compel a finding that he had the specific intent to kill and that he premeditated or deliberated. Nowhere in the conversation did Robles-Benevides explicitly say that either he or Velásquez wanted to kill the victim. Rather, he said Velásquez told him that he wanted to stab the deceased, and that he fought over the knife because he himself was going to do it. Here, the jury could infer that, rather than killing Helm, Robles-Benevides expressed a desire to use the knife to inflict a wound by stabbing, and understood Velásquez to mean the same. While premeditation and deliberation can take place in a few seconds, see Downing, 929 A.2d at 862, and it is certainly possible that Robles-Bonilla premeditated and deliberated Helm's death during the car chase while fighting over the knife with Velásquez, it is at least equally plausible that he did not intend to kill Helm at all, but only to injure Helm by stabbing him with the knife. [67] Although the evidence in this case clearly established that Robles-Benevides participated in the assault on Helm, the evidence from which the jury could have inferred that he himself had the specific intent to kill Helm and did so with premeditation or deliberation was circumstantial and its source was impeached. The erroneous jury instruction, however, could well have relieved the jurors from having to make that assessment, by misleading them into convicting appellant of first-degree murder as an aider and abettor even if it found that, although Robles-Benevides did not himself premeditate or deliberate Helm's murder, the natural and probable consequence of his participation in the assault was Helm's death. As in Wilson-Bey, where we reversed Marbury's first-degree murder conviction because the jury might have been misled by the erroneous instruction, so that a juror who believed that Ms. Marbury's intent was merely to join in an assault ... could nevertheless reasonably find Ms. Marbury guilty of aiding and abetting armed premeditated murder, 903 A.2d at 845, the jury in this case also could have been misled into convicting Robles-Benevides of first-degree murder so long as it found that he hit and kicked Helm in the course of the assault that ended in a fatal stabbing by someone else. That is all the more likely here because, in addition to the erroneous instruction given to the jury, the prosecutor told the jurors in closing that all they needed to find in order to convict appellants of first-degree murder was that the principals had premeditated and deliberated, so long as the stabbing and killing were foreseeable. In the absence of compelling evidence that Robles-Benevides personally had the intent to kill and acted with deliberation and premeditation in doing so, the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the proceeding, Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052), and it would be a miscarriage of justice to let him stand convicted of a crime that he did not commit. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. We conclude, however, that on this record Robles-Benevides can be convicted of murder in the second degree. [68] See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996); Willis v. United States, 692 A.2d 1380, 1382-83 (D.C.1997). We have extended our ruling in Wilson-Bey to second-degree murder which requires a particularized showing of mens rea. See Coleman, 948 A.2d at 552-53 (citing Kitt, 904 A.2d at 356). For second-degree murder, the intent required is malice, which can be proven by evidence of a specific intent to kill, specific intent to inflict serious bodily harm, or wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable human riskalso known as depraved heart murder. [69] Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26, 38-39 (D.C.1990) (en banc). Second-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree premeditated murder, see Woodard v. United States, 738 A.2d 254, 259 n. 10 (D.C.1999), and the jury was properly instructed on second-degree murder. Here, the jury might not have found that appellant acted with premeditation and deliberation, or even had the specific intent to kill, but it surely must have found beyond a reasonable doubt that in his desire to use a knife (enough to fight over it with Velásquez) Robles-Benevides at least had the intent to inflict serious bodily harm, or that he acted with wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to human life when he gave the knife to Velásquez, knowing that he would use it to harm Helm. Moreover, such an intent could also be inferred even if the jury discounted the evidence that Robles-Benevides gave a knife to Velásquez (due to impeachment of Benítez and testimony of López), through his joining in a group assault and viciously kicking Helm. Thus, because the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction would not have affected appellant's substantial rights had he been convicted of second-degree murder while armed, [70] we reverse the conviction for first-degree murder while armed and remand the case to the trial court with the instruction to vacate that conviction and enter judgment of conviction and resentence for murder in the second-degree while armed.
The evidence established that Bonilla was the driver of the car that chased Helm, that he participated in assaulting Helm, and that he drove the getaway car after the murder. Bonilla admitted that he drove the car to the scene of Helm's assault and eventual murder, and told the police in a taped interview that he knew his passengers in the back seat carried knives. He also admitted that he came out of the car when the others got out to attack Helm, but denied participating in the assault. He explained that he drove the getaway car only to appease Velásquez, whom he had just seen knifing-supposedly knifing the black man. Alemán contradicted Bonilla, however, and testified that Bonilla punched Helm before he went back to his car. In convicting appellant Bonilla of first-degree murder and conspiracy to assault or to commit murder, the jury clearly rejected Bonilla's story that he was an innocent third party who simply thought he was giving his friends a ride. Bonilla, however, did not himself have a weapon and he is not reported to have expressed a purpose to kill Helm. He had no apparent individual motive to do so, and appears to have been swept up in the frenzy of the mob. See Frendak, 408 A.2d at 371 (contrasting premeditation of first-degree murder with impetuosity of second-degree murder in orgy of frenzied activity). Thus, while we agree with appellant (and the government concedes) that the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction may have led the jury to find him guilty of first-degree murder without finding that he had the requisite specific intent to kill with premeditation and deliberation, we disagree with appellant that the evidence is insufficient to enter instead a conviction for second-degree murder. Appellant is correct to point out that the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction would have been error and no less plain in the context of second-degree murder. But appellant fails to persuade us that the error affected his substantial rights if he were to stand convicted of second-degree murder. Here, the evidence was such that appellant would have been convicted of second-degree murder independent of the error. See Kidd, 940 A.2d at 127 (Given the government's proof, ... there was no reasonable probability that the incorrect aiding and abetting instruction had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of [appellant's] trial.). While Bonilla did not deny that he drove the assailants, he tried to distance himself as much as he could from the crime. Bonilla testified on direct examination that although he agreed to take appellant Robes-Benevides, Velásquez and Ventura in his car, he did so unwittingly and remained unaware of his passengers' motive until Velásquez ordered him to stop the car and saw Velásquez knife Helm. Bonilla testified that he stepped out of the car to close the doors that his passengers left open, and tried to flee the scene. But, according to Bonilla, Velásquez caught up with him when he was stopped at a red light, and Bonilla was too afraid to ask Velásquez to leave. Salamanca corroborated parts of Bonilla's testimony. He said that although he was blacked out when everyone got in the car, he woke up in time to see Velásquez reenter the car and order Bonilla to drive him to a gambling hall. If the jury had accepted Bonilla's story, not only would they have acquitted him of first-degree murder while armed, but also of conspiracy to assault or to commit murder. Although the conviction for first-degree murder is tainted by the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction, however, the conspiracy conviction is not. Thus, the jury clearly believed that Bonilla (1) shared a common understanding with his coconspirators that they were going after Helm to assault or kill him; (2) undertook to deliver the assailants to Helm; and (3) one of the coconspirators committed an overt act-which may have included Bonilla's driving them. See Pearsall v. United States, 812 A.2d 953, 960 (D.C.2002) (The elements of the crime of conspiracy to commit [a crime] are that: (1) two or more persons formed an agreement to commit a [crime]; (2) the defendant knowingly participated in the conspiracy with the intent to commit the offense; and (3) at least one person involved in the conspiracy committed one of the charged overt acts.). There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Bonilla conspired to assault and murder Helm. Contrary to Bonilla's testimony, both Rosa García and Benítez saw Bonilla waiting in the car with the doors open while his friends beat and killed Helm. Alemán saw him actually punch Helm before he reentered the car. Even if we take into account the weakness of each witness's testimony as discussed supra, Bonilla's own videotaped statement provided the strongest evidence that he knowingly involved himself in Helm's assault and murder: [Interpreter for Bonilla]: Theythey brought them with them to the car. When they got in the car they alreadythey already had them with them. [Police]: Okay, and [you] saw that? [Interpreter]: They already brought the knives. [Police]: Okay, but I'm saying [you] did see the knives? [Interpreter]: Yes. Bonilla, who had given this statement almost three weeks after the incident, tried to explain it away more than seven months later at trial. Bonilla explained that although he told the police that he had seen the knives when his passengers entered the car, I said that because presumably they were the ones who had the knives. They got out with the knives. But not that I had seen the knives. This explanation would have made little sense to the jury in light of Bonilla's testimony that he saw only Velásquez knifing Helm [71] although he reiterated that more than one person (they) had knives. The jury clearly discredited Bonilla's attempt to portray himself as a forced recruit by convicting him not only of first-degree murder while armed, but also of conspiracy to assault or to commit murder. See, e.g., Sparks v. United States, 755 A.2d 394, 399 (D.C.2000) ([I]t is the jury's province to resolve questions of credibility and to make reasonable inferences from the evidence.). Although Bonilla participated in the assault and may have known that the actual reason for driving his friends was to catch Helm, the evidence at most established that Bonilla participated with malice enough for conviction of second-degree murderbut not that he acted with premeditation and deliberation. See Kitt, 904 A.2d at 354 (reversing first-degree murder conviction for insufficient evidence where there was no proof that [defendant, who carried out a preconceived plan to rob and abduct] was carrying a handgun or that he was the shooter). In participating in the assault on Helm with the knowledge that one of his cohorts carried a knife, Bonilla acted with a wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to human life. There was no evidence that Bonilla was provoked or his actions justified, so as to mitigate a finding of malice. See Comber, 584 A.2d at 41. Therefore, since appellant had the requisite intent for second-degree murder, the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction would not affect appellant's substantial rights had he been convicted of second-degree murder. We therefore reverse Bonilla's conviction of first-degree murder while armed and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to vacate that conviction and enter judgment and resentence him for murder in the second degree while armed.
Evidence that appellant Villatoro premeditated and deliberated Helm's murder is even more tenuous. Villatoro initially set off the chain of events by picking a fight with the homeless man outside the nightclub. When Helm and his friends joined the fight in defense of the homeless man, some members of the gang pulled out a knife. Helm's friends retreated to the car, leaving Helm to fend for himself. Alemán saw Villatoro chasing Helm on foot, and three witnessesAlemán, José Pérez and Rosa Garcíasaw Villatoro kicking and punching Helm. The verdict finding Villatoro guilty of murdering Helm shows that the jury credited this evidence and found that Villatoro not only conspired, but himself participated in the attack on Helm. The government concedes that the evidence fails to show, however, that Villatoro acted with premeditation or deliberation to kill Helm as required for a conviction of first-degree premeditated murder. Villatoro's participation in the assault, even if he knew that some members of his gang intended to use a knife, only goes so far as to show that he had a wanton and willful disregard of an unreasonable risk to human life. See Coleman, 948 A.2d at 551. On this evidence, the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction would not have affected Villatoro's substantial rights had he been convicted of second-degree murder. Therefore, we reverse the conviction for first-degree murder while armed and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment and resentence him for murder in the second degree while armed.
Unlike his coappellants, Pérez did not submit a supplemental brief challenging his first-degree murder while armed conviction based on the erroneous aiding and abetting instruction. Understandably, the government does not address this issue. The evidence against Pérez, however, appears to be similar to that against Villatoro, whose first-degree murder while armed conviction the government concedes must be reversed. Like Villatoro, Pérez was among those who chased Helm on foot, and beat him. There is no evidence that he had a knife, or that he said or acted in a way that expressed his intent to kill Helm. In the absence of any briefing on the issue, we will not reverse Pérez's conviction for first-degree murder while armed. We note, however, that on remand, the trial court may, after hearing from the parties, determine whether the conviction should be reversed in the interest of justice, without imposing a bar of cause and prejudice.