Opinion ID: 2190887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority to Retain Investigator

Text: For his sixth, and final, point, Williams argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying authorization at the Rule 37 hearing to retain an investigator to probe into issues of jury bias and misconduct. Williams notes that during the Rule 37 litigation, he moved for authorization of funds for an investigator and explained:  That the case was tried in Lincoln County, the site of the prison from which Williams was found to have escaped. A substantial percentage of the residents have association with the prison system, either personally or through family members. The deceased, Cecil Boren, had been an official of the prison system.  That jury selection was obviously a crucial component of the trial. In the event that any jurors falsely represented to the Court and counsel that neither they nor their families had association with the prison system or the Boren family, such false representations would entitle Williams to relief and would give him grounds to amend or supplement the Rule 37 petition to include a juror misconduct claim.  That a withholding of relevant evidence of relationships in fact was the scenario presented in the important Supreme Court case of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Williams explains that Rule 37.5(j) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the following: (j) Compensation of appointed attorney. Compensation to be paid to attorneys appointed under this rule, as well as the fees and expenses to be paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services, shall be fixed by the circuit and appellate courts in their respective proceedings at such rates or amounts as the courts determine to be reasonable. All compensation and reasonable expenses authorized by the courts shall be paid pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-91-202(f), or as otherwise provided by law. Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.5(j) (2006). Williams argues that Rule 37.5, as well as its legislative counterpart, Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-91-204 (Repl.2006), is an attempt to comply with the opt-in provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2261, which provides in pertinent part: (b) This chapter is applicable if a State establishes by statute, rule of its court of last resort, or by another agency authorized by State law, a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal to the court of last resort in the State or have otherwise become final for State law purposes. The rule of court or statute must provide standards of competency for the appointment of such counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (1996) (emphasis added by appellant). [3] According to Williams, an investigation is warranted in order to determine whether the jurors were telling the truth about potential bias during voir dire. He adds that the reasonableness of the request is highlighted by the fact that the investigation would only cover the thirteen people who actually sat on the jury during the guilt or penalty phase. [4] Williams admits that he does not know specifically whether there might have been any misrepresentations made by the jurors who were selected for his trial because the circuit court denied him the resources with which to discover such information. He relies on Williams v. Taylor, supra , for his contention that the investigation of the jurors who actually sat on a jury is a reasonable litigation expense in postconviction proceedings. Williams asserts that this court should reverse and remand for the provision of funds, or, otherwise, the federal court will provide the funds for the investigation. He further opines that an affirmance of the circuit court's ruling on this matter will have a repercussion far beyond what happens to him. He explains that Arkansas has not yet been deemed an opt-in state and adds that the 2006 amendments to § 2261 have placed the original decision regarding opt-in status in the hands of the United States Attorney General, with de novo review by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. According to Williams, affirming the circuit court would contradict the public policy of the State of Arkansas, and would render risible the State's claim that Arkansas has a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 2261(b) (1996). He maintains that were the State to argue that a mechanism is in place for reasonable litigation expenses, the denial of funds to do the very thing blessed by a unanimous Supreme Court decision renders the State's position ludicrous. Williams concludes that this court should reverse the circuit court's denial of relief with instructions to authorize funds for such an investigation. As a beginning point, we believe that our standard of review for the trial court's decision denying funds for an investigation is abuse of discretion. On the merits of the issue, we conclude that Williams has failed to demonstrate the need for an investigator. Both parties quote language from Williams v. Taylor, supra , that states that the State does not have an obligation to pay for an investigation when the claims have not been developed in any respect. See Taylor, 529 U.S. at 443, 120 S.Ct. 1479 (We do not suggest the State has an obligation to pay for investigation of as yet undeveloped claims; but if the prisoner has made a reasonable effort to discover the claims to commence or continue state proceedings, § 2254(e)(2) will not bar him from developing them in federal court.). Nothing required Williams's counsel to rely exclusively on an investigator to investigate whether one of the thirteen jurors had failed to disclose information accurately during voir dire or in the completion of their respective jury questionnaires. The obvious question is why Williams's counsel for his Rule 37 petition did not investigate the matter initially himself for purposes of his Rule 37 petition to determine whether any juror seated for the trial was dishonest in his or her voir dire responses. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in failing to authorize funds for an investigation absent any proof that such an investigation was warranted. Even Williams remarked in his brief on appeal: We do not know whether any similar misrepresentation occurred in Kenneth Williams's trial because the circuit court denied Williams the resources with which to find out. The circuit court obviously believed that more had to be shown to warrant the expenditure of investigative funds. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. Affirmed. IMBER, J., not participating.