Opinion ID: 3029095
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 1275, 1277–78 (N.J. Super. Ct. L. Div. 1991).

Text: Second, Pote submitted to Fletcher-Harlee the terms on which it could complete the work. Was this an acceptance? Obviously not. Even if the Fletcher-Harlee communication were an offer, Pote’s response could be no more than a counteroffer because its terms were materially different from those in the solicitation letter. Mortin v. 4 Orchard Lane Trust, 849 A.2d 164, 170–71 (N.J. 2004); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) (“A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer.”). More importantly, because the submission expressly disclaimed Pote’s intention to be bound, it could not be an offer. As quoted above, an offer is made when the offeree is justified in thinking that “his assent . . . will conclude” the deal. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 24 (1981). Here, the very terms of Pote’s letter state that Fletcher-Harlee’s assent would not. No offer and no acceptance mean no contract. The District Court properly dismissed Fletcher-Harlee’s breach of contract claim.