Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay statement

Text: Setiawan wanted Luis Rivera-Melendez (Rivera), a codefendant who had pleaded guilty, to testify that he was present at Teton's murder and that Cascote, not Setiawan, was the killer. But Rivera invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify. The district court ruled that Rivera's testimony risked selfincrimination and deemed Rivera unavailable as a witness. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1). Setiawan then attempted to call a defense attorney, Miriam Ramos-Grateroles (Ramos), who had been present when Setiawan's attorney interviewed Rivera in prison. Ramos testified - 15 - outside the jury's presence that Rivera told Setiawan's counsel that he witnessed Cascote shoot Teton at a drug point. Setiawan argued that Ramos's testimony relaying Rivera's out-of-court statement was admissible under the statement-against-interest exception because the statement placed Rivera at a drug point, exposing him to criminal liability. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The district court excluded the statement. The court reasoned that Ramos's testimony would be inherently unreliable because she would not be subject to cross-examination about the drug-trafficking conspiracy or the murder. The court's ruling did not depend on either criterion relevant to admitting evidence under Rule 804(b)(3), namely, that the hearsay statement must be against the out-of-court declarant's interest and the statement must be corroborated. See id. The court's basis for excluding the hearsay statement i.e., that Ramos would not be subject to cross-examination about the conspiracy or murder -- was improper. In-court witnesses who relay hearsay statements are never subject to cross-examination about the substance of out-of-court statements. The Federal Rules of Evidence exclude hearsay statements generally, see Fed. R. Evid. 802, in large part because of an opponent's inability to cross examine the in-court witness on the substance of the out-of-court statement. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994). The Rules provide exceptions to admit certain hearsay - 16 - statements, however, because either the substance of the statement, see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(4) (statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment), or the way the declarant makes the statement, see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) (excited utterance), provides a measure of reliability sufficient to warrant admission, even though neither the out-of-court witness nor the in-court witness is subject to cross-examination on the statement's substance. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598–99. Additionally, when the district court excluded the testimony because it was inherently unreliable, the court usurped the jury's role. Reliability and credibility of in-court witnesses are matters for the jury to determine. See, e.g., United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1300 (1st Cir. 1997). In fact, we have rejected precisely what occurred in this case. In United States v. Seeley, this court agreed with a Second Circuit decision holding that Rule 804(b)(3) does not require the trial court to make a special assessment of the credibility of a witness who relays an out-of-court declaration against penal interest. See United States v. Seeley, 892 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 1983)). Undoubtedly, a district court may exclude evidence on grounds other than credibility, see, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 403, but credibility of in-court witnesses is exclusively the jury's province, see Seeley, 892 F.2d at 3. As a result, the district court improperly excluded - 17 - Ramos's testimony when it concluded the testimony would be inherently unreliable because the government would not be able to cross examine her about the murder or conspiracy. The district court erred by excluding testimony that should have been admitted under Rule 804(b)(3).