Opinion ID: 1472408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Guarantee Language

Text: Appellant also contends that by using the word, guarantee, the prosecutor improperly injected his personal opinion and implied that he had personal knowledge of the events he was summarizing. The government contends that the statement is not an outright expression of opinion and did not suggest any personal knowledge. The government concedes that such phrases as I guarantee should be avoided because of their potential for confusion. It contends, however, that the prosecutor was not expressing a personal opinion or indicating that he had personal knowledge of the events when he used this language. As stated previously, the key inquiry is whether the attorney is commenting on the evidence, which he may do, or expressing a personal opinion, which is taboo. Irick, supra, 565 A.2d at 36. We agree that the comment here was not an outright expression of opinion. In context, the language appears to have been used for emphasis in making arguments based on the evidence. As such, it remained within an acceptable range of argument. See id. (A comment will be within the acceptable range as long as it is in the general nature of argument and not an outright expression of opinion.) (citing Logan, supra, 489 A.2d at 490-91 (other citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). [11] Therefore, we find no error, and clearly no plain error. [12] Washington also contends that the prosecutor improperly indicated that he was not telling the truth by using phrases such as, that is all not the truth, [e]verything he told you about Aaron and Poo being out there that day, is not the truth, and his entire house of cards comes tumbling down with all the other things he told you up there that weren't the truth, but this is one he can't get away from. [C]haracterizing testimony as incredible is an accepted and proper form of comment on contradictory testimony so long as that characterization has an evidentiary basis. See Irick, supra, 565 A.2d at 35 (citing Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 130 (D.C.1980)). Here, the prosecutor's comments were based upon logical inferences from the evidence. The prosecutor was asking the jury to conclude that Aaron and Poo had not been out there that day, as some witnesses testified, and therefore appellant was not forthcoming about the events. The prosecutor made his point using facts and inferences from the evidence, including the testimony of Jackson and Exhibit 65.