Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Evidence of the Underlying Facts of Defendant's Prior Violent Crimes

Text: In the penalty phase, the prosecutor called as witnesses: (1) a law enforcement officer who had investigated the crimes leading to defendant's 1980 kidnapping conviction and (2) the victim of defendant's 1978 kidnapping, assault, and attempted rape convictions. Each testified in detail as to the respective facts underlying defendant's crimes. Cognizant of our prior holding that this kind of testimony is proper at the penalty phase where it is not the fact of conviction which is probative ... but rather the conduct of defendant which gave rise to the offense ( People v. Gates (1988) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301]), defendant advances a battery of constitutional arguments against consideration of the underlying facts of prior crimes at the penalty phase. (47) Initially, defendant argues that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by consideration at the penalty phase of what he calls stale evidence of his prior crimes. As defendant acknowledges, we have already rejected a contention that expiration of the statute of limitations precludes consideration of unadjudicated prior criminal conduct at the penalty phase. ( People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 192; see also People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 42-43 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109].) Here, defendant was charged with and pleaded guilty to crimes following the incidents presented to the jury. Having had an opportunity to litigate the facts of those incidents at the time of his convictions as well as at the penalty phase, he has no cause to complain of an inability to defend himself. There was no violation of defendant's rights. ( People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 640 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Defendant also renews the following claims of error that we have previously rejected: (1) that the same jury which convicted him of first degree murder was also allowed to consider his guilt of the prior crimes ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]); (2) that admission of prior violent crimes violates the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 17); and (3) that unadjudicated prior crimes related to his prior convictions should not be considered at the penalty phase ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 404-406). Nothing in defendant's argument merits reexamination of our decisions. In addition, we observe that defendant did not attempt to rebut or refute any of this evidence at trial (see People v. Hamilton, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 144) and that the jury was carefully instructed not to consider evidence of crimes other than those of which defendant had been convicted. The jury is presumed to have followed the limiting instruction. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 253 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) Under these circumstances, there was no error. Defendant also claims that the trial court improperly allowed testimony and other evidence concerning the victims of his prior violent crimes which he alleges was in violation of Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529]. As he acknowledges, we rejected this argument in Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, 640-641. The same is true of defendant's argument that the prosecution should have been compelled to accept his offer to stipulate to the facts of his other crimes. ( People v. McDowell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 551, 567-568 [250 Cal. Rptr. 530, 758 P.2d 1060].) In sum, defendant points to nothing in the record of his prior crimes that amounted to an inaccurate rendition of his prior criminal acts. In accordance with our prior decisions, this evidence was properly considered at the penalty phase.