Opinion ID: 4536379
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Officials

Text: The Defendant-Appellant State Officials sued in their individual capacities are Governor Snyder and Treasurer Dillon. We have not had the opportunity previously to address their conduct. We hold that Plaintiffs-Appellees plausibly allege a constitutional violation as to Snyder, but we refrain from deciding this question for Dillon until the district court has an opportunity to reconsider in light of Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), No. 18-cv10726, 2020 WL 1503256, at  (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020).
Governor Snyder was in office for the entire relevant time period. He “was personally involved in the decisional process which led to the transition from DWSD to the KWA,” id. at 42, ¶ 114 (Page ID #17845), having himself coordinated the switch, id. at 43, ¶ 115–18 (Page ID #17846). And he knew that the Flint River would serve as the City’s interim water source until Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 32 the KWA went online. Id. at 44, ¶ 119 (Page ID #17847). Prior to the switch, a member of his staff warned him that it “could lead to some big potential disasters down the road.” See id. at 45, ¶ 127 (Page ID #17848). In spite of that warning, Snyder did not stop the switch from going forward. Soon after the switch, there was evidence of corrosion and accompanying lead and legionella contamination. See id. at 58–60, 62, ¶¶ 173, 177, 187 (Page ID #17861–63, 17865). On October 13, 2014, General Motors stopped using Flint River water at its engine plant out of fear that the water would corrode its machinery. Id. at 60, ¶ 179 (Page ID #17863). The next day, a member of Snyder’s executive staff expressed concern with the reports coming out about the water’s contamination and recommended that they ask the Emergency Manager to switch back to the DWSD “as an interim solution to both the quality, and now the financial, problems that the current solution is causing.” Id. at 60–61, ¶ 180 (Page ID #17863–64). Snyder’s legal counsel similarly stated that the dangers posed by Flint River water were “downright scary” and “advised that, ‘[t]hey should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.’” Id. at 61, ¶ 182 (Page ID #17864). Snyder evidently was unmoved. In January 2015, the University of Michigan turned off certain water fountains on its Flint campus after tests revealed high levels of lead contamination. Id. at 62, ¶ 185 (Page ID #17865). Around the same time, the GCHD reported a likely “association between the spike in Legionnaires’ disease reports and the onset of the use of Flint River water.” Id. at 81, ¶ 237 (Page ID #17884). Meanwhile, State officials had water coolers discreetly installed in State buildings located in Flint, without announcing their concerns to the public. Id. at 80, ¶ 235 (Page ID #17883). At some point in 2015, Snyder met with other government officials to discuss the serious threats posed by lead and legionella contamination, and his office even considered distributing water filters to protect Flint water users. Id. at 80, ¶ 233 (Page ID #17883); id. at 84, ¶ 249 (Page ID #17887). But ultimately Snyder did nothing. In addition to public reports from whistleblowers, Snyder’s own staff kept him personally apprised of the worsening crisis. In April 2015, Snyder’s chief of staff emailed Snyder and other staff members that “[t]he water issue continues to be a danger flag.” Id. at 87, ¶ 258 (Page ID Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 33 #17890). Soon afterward, Snyder’s Director of Urban Initiatives spoke to Snyder directly and “advised him of the growing concerns among Flint residents that they were being exposed to toxic levels of lead.” Id. at 89, ¶ 269 (Page ID #17892). Nothing came of it. All the while, Snyder kept the crisis under wraps and stood by as the public continued to be poisoned. The Governor’s own task force eventually would disclose that Snyder failed to act in part because of cost. Id. at 150–51, ¶¶ 420–21 (Page ID #17953–54). Finally, after more than a year into the crisis, Snyder relented and ordered the City of Flint to reconnect with the DWSD on October 8, 2015. Id. at 95, ¶ 287 (Page ID #17898). He declared a State of Emergency three months later on January 5, 2016, and disclosed the legionella problem on January 13, 2016. Id. at 97, ¶¶ 295–96 (Page ID #17900). “Without a state of emergency, plaintiffs were denied valuable resources that could have helped abate the harm that they were still suffering.” R. 798 (Op. & Order at 46–47) (Page ID #21148–49). Snyder argues in the first instance that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he acted (or failed to act) in reliance on the MDEQ and engineering firms’ assessments. See Appellant Br. (19-1472) at 37–40. Again, “those are facts to be fleshed out during discovery and are not appropriate to resolve at the motion-to-dismiss posture.” Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927 (citations omitted). For the same reason, his defense that any alleged disinformation or inaction arose from legitimate disagreements over “the nature and extent of the problems and the appropriate solution” is misplaced at this stage. See Reply Br. (19-1472) at 8–11. We agree with the district court that the allegations against Governor Snyder are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See R. 798 (Op. & Order at 39–47) (Page ID #21141–49). Unlike the executive defendants in Guertin, Snyder personally contributed to creating this crisis. The executives that we decided should have been dismissed in Guertin were Wyant, the Director of the MDEQ; Lyon, the Director of the MDHHS; and Wells, the Chief Medical Executive of the MDHHS. Guertin, 912 F.3d at 929–31. Wyant may have been “aware of some of the issues arising with the water supply post-switch,” but there were no plausible allegations that “Wyant personally made decisions regarding the water-source switch” or that “he personally engaged” in other conscience-shocking conduct. Id. at 929. As for Lyon and Wells, we noted that “[t]he complaint set[] forth no facts connecting Lyon and Wells to the switch to the Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 34 Flint River or the decision not to treat the water, and there [wa]s no allegation that they took any action causing plaintiffs to consume the lead-contaminated water.” Id. at 929–30. All that the plaintiffs alleged was a general “fail[ure] to ‘protect and notify the public’ of the problems with Flint’s water,” rather than allege a particular action taken by Lyon or Wells that would demonstrate their deliberate indifference. Id. at 930. Plaintiffs’ allegations here demonstrate that Governor Snyder personally was aware that Flint River water was contaminated and that he personally made the decision to switch the City from the DWSD to Flint River water. The allegations demonstrate that Snyder personally understood not just from public reports, but from his own staff, that Flint residents were being poisoned. Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate that Snyder downplayed the problem and delayed taking action to protect the people of Flint, first by refusing to switch back to the DWSD, then by failing to supply Flint residents with protective supplies, and finally by waiting three months after the City connected back to the DWSD to declare a state of emergency. Snyder’s alleged role in creating, failing to mitigate, and covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.9
Andy Dillon was Treasurer for the State of Michigan when the City was in the process of switching to Flint River water. Dillon was asked to assess the cost effectiveness of staying with the DWSD or switching to the KWA. See id. at 39–40, ¶ 104 (Page ID #17842–43). Dillon ultimately recommended to Snyder that the Governor authorize the City to switch to the KWA, after Dillon learned that the City could fund the switch with an ACO that would require use of Flint River water in the interim. Id. at 41, ¶ 107 (Page ID #17844). Dillon was part of the core team that developed the interim Flint River plan, see id. at 44, ¶ 119 (Page ID #17847), and he knew that the FWTP would need to undergo significant upgrades before it could treat the water 9 We note, without passing judgment, that the district court dismissed Governor Snyder from the action in Guertin. See Guertin v. Michigan, No. 16-cv-12412, 2017 WL 2418007, at  (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2017). It did so because there were no plausible allegations in that case that Governor Snyder personally was involved in the decision-making process for using Flint River water. Id. The plaintiffs’ theory in Guertin was that Snyder should be on the hook merely because he appointed the City Managers who helped to create and sustain the crisis. Id. The same cannot be said here, as Plaintiffs have alleged Snyder’s personal actions and knowledge in great detail. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533 Waid et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 35 properly, id. at 44, ¶ 122 (Page ID #17847). In spite of what he knew, the Treasury pressed the MDEQ to secure the ACO quickly, so that the switch to the Flint River would take place before the FWTP was ready. Id. at 130, ¶ 383 (Page ID #17933). Plaintiffs-Appellees ask that we remand for the district court to decide whether to dismiss Dillon from this case. Defendants-Appellants do not protest that request. After we accepted this appeal, the district court dismissed Dillon as a defendant in a separate Flint Water Crisis case, Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), No. 18-cv-10726, 2020 WL 1503256, at  (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020). The district court recently discovered that Dillon was not Treasurer at the time of the actual switch to Flint River water in April 2014. Id. at  n.13. In light of that, the district court found that Dillon did not have authority over the switch and, therefore, that he cannot be found liable. Id. Without passing judgment on that decision, we see no issue with Plaintiffs-Appellees’ request that we remand for the district court to decide in the first instance whether to dismiss Dillon in light of that fact. See Lopez v. Foerster, 791 F. App’x 582, 586 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Although we have jurisdiction to decide the qualified-immunity question, given the unique circumstances of this case, we remand to the district court to consider the issue in the first instance.”).