Opinion ID: 1170873
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Spontaneous Statement Exception

Text: To come within the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, an utterance must first purport to describe or explain an act or condition perceived by the declarant. (Evid. Code, § 1240, subd. (a).) Secondly, the statement must be made spontaneously, while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the perception. ( Id., subd. (b).) (1a) (See fn. 1.), (2a) Defendant disputes that the utterances were spontaneous. [1] When the dispatcher called Schmidt-Till, the following dialogue, played back at the trial, ensued: Schmidt-Till: Hello. Dispatcher: Erich? Schmidt-Till: Yeah. Dispatcher: This is the police department. Schmidt-Till: Uh-huh. (Affirmative.) Dispatcher: Have you been shot? Schmidt-Till: Three times. Dispatcher: Who shot you? Schmidt-Till: I'm not sure. I'm hurting. Dispatcher: Okay. There's an officer and an ambulance on the way. What did the guy look like? Schmidt-Till: I'll tell you when you get here. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: No. You tell me now so we know who we're looking for. Schmidt-Till: I can't talk. I've been shot in the mouth. Dispatcher: Erich, where were you shot? Schmidt-Till: In the mouth and in the stomach. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: Was it a white male or a black male? Schmidt-Till: White. Dispatcher: A white male? How  Schmidt-Till: I know his name. Dispatcher: You know him? Schmidt-Till: I just can't remember his name. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: How old is he? Schmidt-Till: About 35. .... .... .... .... .... Dispatcher: Was it a handgun? Schmidt-Till: Yes. (Groaning.) Also admitted into evidence was the subsequent conversation between Officer Strigotte and Schmidt-Till. Strigotte testified that he found the victim bleeding but conscious and talking on the telephone. He questioned Schmidt-Till regarding the incident, but from moment to moment had to halt the questioning because of the victim's obvious pain. Schmidt-Till reiterated that he knew his assailant but could not remember his name. In response to specific questions, he described the man's race, weight, height, and age. Strigotte also asked about the assailant's clothing, hair color, tattoos, scars, and facial hair, but Schmidt-Till could not remember these features. He did say that Reed was his roommate but was not the one who shot him; the gunman, he asserted, was a customer of Reed. In addition, he gave an account of how the shooting occurred. Strigotte conjectured that the questioning lasted approximately five minutes. He elicited the information through a series of questions, each of which was answered separately. In one sense, a spontaneous utterance is one that is voluntary and is initiated by, or at least not elicited from, the speaker. Under this literal interpretation of spontaneity, few of Schmidt-Till's statements would qualify. The dispatcher urged him to answer her questions, refusing to let him wait until help arrived. While his answers to Strigotte were more voluntary, none of the information was given on his own initiative, but likewise was elicited by specific questions. But spontaneous may also be used in a slightly different sense: to describe actions undertaken without deliberation or reflection. This is what is intended by Evidence Code section 1240, which codifies the earlier common law exception to the hearsay rule ( People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176 [81 Cal. Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259, 39 A.L.R.3d 541]). As this court stated in Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co. (1940) 16 Cal.2d 460, 468 [106 P.2d 895], the basis for the circumstantial trustworthiness of spontaneous utterances is that in the stress of nervous excitement, the reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the instinctive and uninhibited expression of the speaker's actual impressions and belief. (3a) The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is thus not the nature of the statement but the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterance  how long it was made after the startling incident and whether the speaker blurted it out, for example  may be important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. The fact that a statement is made in response to questioning is one factor suggesting the answer may be the product of deliberation, but it does not ipso facto deprive the statement of spontaneity. Thus, an answer to a simple inquiry has been held to be spontaneous. (See, e.g., People v. Washington, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 1176-1177; In re Damon H. (1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 471, 475 [211 Cal. Rptr. 623]; People v. Bernalley (1960) 185 Cal. App.2d 326, 329-330 [8 Cal. Rptr. 375].) More detailed questioning, in contrast, is likely to deprive the response of the requisite spontaneity. (See, e.g., People v. Keelin (1955) 136 Cal. App.2d 860, 866-870 [289 P.2d 520, 56 A.L.R.2d 355]; cf. Dolberg v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co. (1954) 126 Cal. App.2d 487, 488-490 [272 P.2d 527].) But ultimately each fact pattern must be considered on its own merits, and the trial court is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter. ( Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., supra, 16 Cal.2d at pp. 468-469.) (2b) On the record before us we conclude that the court did not err in admitting both conversations. It is true that we have rarely held the answers to such extensive questioning to be spontaneous utterances. (But see also People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 317-320 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) Nonetheless, there is no doubt that Schmidt-Till was excited, or perhaps more accurately, distraught and in severe pain. He was not merely an uninjured witness whose excitement might wane  and would thus be in a position to fabricate answers  through the sobering interrogation of an investigator. His responses were not self-serving. (Cf. People v. Keelin, supra, 136 Cal. App.2d at pp. 870-871.) Nor were the questions suggestive. (Cf. Wiley v. Easter (1962) 203 Cal. App.2d 845, 855 [21 Cal. Rptr. 905].) While he was being questioned, the intense pain of his gunshot wounds and the concern he rightfully had about his survival no doubt preoccupied him so that he could not have contemplated spinning a false tale. In sum, he had so little opportunity and incentive to deliberate that under these unusual circumstances we can dispense with the testimonial requirements of an oath and cross-examination. (Accord, People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320.) The mental state of the declarant, however, is but one of the two elements required for a spontaneous utterance. In addition, the statement must purport to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant.... (Evid. Code, § 1240, subd. (a).) (4a) Defendant contends that Schmidt-Till's statements that his assailant was acquainted with his roommate Reed, that defendant had purchased drugs from Reed, and that defendant's name was on the telephone list did not narrate, describe, or explain the shooting. We disagree. Although not independently admissible under this exception for their truth, these statements help describe the event by identifying the perpetrator. The claim that the assailant was one of Reed's customers not only helped identify him, but also aided in explaining the event as potentially drug-related. Defendant also stresses the requirement that the declarant must have perceived what he describes or explains. This, he suggests, rules out Schmidt-Till's comment that he believed his assailant entered the apartment to steal his roommate's drugs. But the statements regarding drug dealing, while they do not describe the attack, do help to explain an event perceived by the declarant and are, therefore, admissible. Since we hold that the admission of Schmidt-Till's statements as spontaneous utterances was not error, we need not decide whether they were also admissible as dying declarations.