Opinion ID: 693407
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the Issue Properly Before This Court?

Text: 38 Before addressing the merits of the district court's fiduciary status holdings, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to consider the issue. The question of jurisdiction arises because the district court addressed the summary judgment motion of the Plaintiffs in this action as well as that of the Secretary of Labor in the related action, Reich v. Pacific Lumber, No. C-91-1812-SBA (N.D.Cal. filed June 12, 1991). The current case and the Secretary's action were treated as related cases, and the two cases proceeded concurrently pursuant to the same pretrial order. On May 11, 1993, the district court heard arguments regarding motions in both actions concerning the fiduciary status of Defendants. However, at the same time, it heard arguments regarding Plaintiffs' standing as participants as discussed above. In an order filed on May 17, 1993, the district court held that defendants Hurwitz and Leone were plan fiduciaries and granted summary judgment on this point, but as to the other defendants, summary judgment was denied. At the same time, the district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing. 39 Because only Plaintiffs' action is being appealed at this time (the Secretary's action having been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal), it is asserted that the district court did not rule on the fiduciary status of Defendants in the case at bar, but only made the ruling as to the Secretary's action. PLC takes the position that the district court divested itself of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' action when it ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing, and so only ruled on the fiduciary duty question in the Secretary's suit. 40 In the preamble to the district court's May 17 order, the court summarized that at the hearing on May 11, 1993: 41 For the reasons stated at oral argument, the court ... granted plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary adjudication in both cases regarding the fiduciary status of defendants Charles Hurwitz and William Leone; denied the plaintiffs' cross motion and the defendants' motion for summary adjudication in both cases regarding the fiduciary status of defendants Maxxam, Inc., Maxxam Group, Inc., Paul Schwartz and James Iaco. 42 Defendants' motion for summary judgment for lack of standing in the Kayes case was taken under submission. 43 Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., Nos. C-89-3500 SBA, C-91-1812 SBA, 1993 WL 187730, at  1, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7280, at  1-2 (May 17, 1993). In the body of the Order, the district court held that Plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed their action. At the conclusion of this Order, the court stated IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT ... (2) The Secretary's motion for summary adjudication of the fiduciary status issue is GRANTED with respect to defendants Pacific Lumber, Charles Hurwitz, and William Leone. With respect to other defendants, the motion and cross-motion for summary adjudication of the fiduciary status is DENIED. Id.at  3, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7280, at  6-7. 44 The preamble to the order reveals that the court ruled on the fiduciary status issue in both cases. The court's statement in the written Order, holding that the Secretary's motion is granted in part and denied in part, reflects the fact that the court determined that Plaintiffs lacked standing and therefore dismissed their case. Once it found that Plaintiffs lacked standing, the district court no longer had jurisdiction over their claims and so only had to rule on the Secretary's motion at the conclusion of the Order. 45 We find that the issue of fiduciary status is properly before this court. The district court ruled orally on the issue as it related to both parties. The fact that it later found that Plaintiffs lacked standing does not change the finality of that order. 46