Opinion ID: 6218017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hurst v. State

Text: McKenzie contends that this Court’s analysis of jury sentencing in Hurst v. State established substantive law that required his jury to find certain “elements” beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court has soundly rejected McKenzie’s “elements” argument and has explained that Hurst v. State jury sentencing determinations are not “elements” that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. See Poole, 297 So. 3d at 505. Moreover, to the extent that McKenzie argues that the Hurst v. State jury sentencing determinations constitute elements of a purported greater offense of capital first-degree murder, we have also rejected this argument: As we explained in Foster, there is no independent crime of “capital first-degree murder”; the crime of first-degree murder is, by definition, a capital crime, and Hurst v. State did not change the elements of that crime. Id. at 1251-52 (holding that when a jury makes Hurst determinations, “it only does so after a jury has - 17 - unanimously convicted the defendant of the capital crime of first-degree murder”). Wright v. State, 312 So. 3d 59, 60 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1251 (Fla. 2018)). VI. Constitutionality of the Prior Violent Felony Aggravating Factor McKenzie challenges the constitutionality of the prior violent felony aggravating factor, as set forth in section 921.141(6)(b), Florida Statutes. As the State argues and McKenzie concedes, this Court has repeatedly rejected this claim. See Gonzalez v. State, 136 So. 3d 1125, 1169 (Fla. 2014) (“[W]e have rejected claims that the prior violent felony and HAC aggravators are vague and overbroad.”); Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 618 n.5 (Fla. 2006) (rejecting as meritless a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the prior violent felony aggravating factor on vagueness and overbreadth grounds).