Opinion ID: 1834622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the limitation impinges upon the conscientious attorney's fifth amendment right to property

Text: The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution forbids government expropriation of private possessions stating, nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. Section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution 1890, on the other hand, provides that private property shall not be taken or damaged [19] for public use except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public. As a consequence of this language, in discussing the cases sub judice on this ground, we do so relying solely on our state constitution without reaching the federal question. Cf. DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439 n. 3 (Alaska 1987) (Alaska's constitution affords property owner broader Fifth Amendment protection than the Federal Constitution; therefore, no need to consider federal claim). Under the federal constitution, the right to practice law has been held to be a property right within the meaning of the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment... . Weiner v. Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, 145, cert. denied 385 U.S. 958, 87 S.Ct. 393, 17 L.Ed.2d 304 (1966) (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.2d 796 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957)). As a matter of federal law, [f]rom this it follows that an attorney from whom services are demanded and by whom they are given has a property right in his fee for those services which ... should be based on their just and reasonable value. Weiner, 148 S.E.2d at 145; Bias v. State, 568 P.2d 1269, 1270 (Okla. 1977); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193, 195 (1968); Warner v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 858, 87 S.Ct. 108, 17 L.Ed.2d 85 (1966); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976); Knox County Council v. State, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405, 408 (1940). But Cf. DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 443 (measure of value will not necessarily reflect any specific attorney's normal rate of compensation, but rather will reflect the compensation received by the average competent attorney operating on the open market); Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1113 (Petitioners seek only reasonable and not market value compensation. Token compensation is no longer an alternative. ) (emphasis added). Although this Court has not explicitly stated so, we have recognized for a long time that lawyering, as well as other vocations, is a fundamental right for [l]iberty, in its broad sense, must consist of the right to follow any of the ordinary callings of life without being trammeled ... The right to follow any of the common occupations of life is an inalienable right... . It was formulated as such under the phrase `pursuit of happiness' in the [D]eclaration of [I]ndependence ... This right is a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen. Wilby v. State, 93 Miss. 767, 772-73, 47 So. 465, 466-67 (1908) (quoting State v. Smith, 42 Wash. 237, 84 P. 851, 854 (1906)); see also Moore v. Grillis, 205 Miss. 865, 39 So.2d 505, 511 (1949). By virtue of this language, it is obvious that the attorneys' work must be property. Therefore, if an attorney is compelled to part with his property for public use, [it is] only on full payment for it and any right in relation to it. Sarphie v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 275 So.2d 381, 383 (Miss. 1973) (emphasis in the original). Cf. Delisio, 740 P.2d at 439 (the intent of the Alaskan takings clause is to ensure that individuals are not unfairly burdened by disproportionately bearing the cost of projects intended to benefit the general public). We, however, remain mindful of our decision in Young, 255 So.2d at 321, which addressed this takings issue and followed the position that the Alaskan Supreme Court announced in Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (1966). Aside from the fact that we have impliedly overruled the dicta in Young, supra, the Alaskan Supreme Court has taken the additional step and expressly overruled Jackson. See, DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 439. In Young, this Court noted that an attorney, as an officer of the court, is obligated to provide services for indigents without payment. The Court indicated that this principle is so firmly established in the history of the courts and the legal profession that it may be said to be a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the court. 255 So.2d at 321 quoting Jackson, 413 P.2d at 490. While reflecting on that same language, the DeLisio Court held that [w]e are now convinced that the attorney may not be denied reasonable compensation on the basis of this tradition. 740 P.2d at 441. Today, we likewise see no reason why tradition alone should prohibit an attorney from receiving reasonable compensation for services rendered to the public. While further addressing this takings issue in Young, the only other case that this Court principally relied on was United States v. Dillon. Quoting from Dillon, this Court stated: Appellant's brief contains a very complete and scholarly treatise which in our view establishes an obligation on the part of the legal profession to represent indigents upon court order, without compensation ... [T]he obligation of the legal profession to serve indigents on court order is an ancient and established tradition, and that appointed counsel have generally been compensated, if at all, only by statutory fees which would be inadequate under just compensation, and which are usually payable only in a limited types of cases ... [T]he vast majority of the courts which have passed on the question have denied claims of appointed counsel for nonstatutory just compensation, pointing out that representation of indigents under court order, without a fee, is a condition under which lawyers are licensed to practice as officers of the court, and that the obligation of the legal profession to serve without compensation has been modified only by statute. An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order. Thus the lawyer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is called upon to fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a `taking of his services.' 255 So.2d at 320-21 quoting Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966) (citations omitted). [20] As noted in Jewell, however, the historical argument advanced in Dillon was decimated in a law review article by Professor David Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyers' Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 735, 740-53 (1980). 383 S.E.2d at 543 (emphasis added). Accord. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d at 841 (The later cases reflect a definite trend toward recognizing that the historical condition which the duty to provide free legal services evolved no longer exists in modern America); DeLisio, 740 P.2d 437, 441 ([c]ompulsory representation of indigent defendants without full compensation ... is neither as traditional nor as venerable as had been previously supposed. More importantly ... tradition alone, regardless of this venerability, cannot validate an otherwise unconstitutional practice). Another court has explained it this way: An attorney who is appointed to represent an indigent without compensation is effectively to give away a portion of his property  his livelihood, other professionals, merchants, artisans, and state licensees, are not similarly required to donate services and goods to the poor. The lawyer's stock in trade is intangible  his time fortified by his intellectual and personal qualities, and burdened by his office expenses. To take his stock in trade is like stripping the shelves of the grocer or taking over a subdivision of the builder. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App.3d at 348-49, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (quoting Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 438, 444 (1965); see also, Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky.L.J. 710, 715 (1972); see also Lynch, 796 P.2d at 1156-57. Cf. Family Division Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir.1984) (attorneys' pro bono requirements do not constitute a taking; however, an unreasonable amount of required uncompensated service might so qualify. Moreover, at some point the burden on a particular attorney could become so excessive that it might rise to the level of a taking of property). In light of these fundamental principles, it is obvious and we so hold that just compensation was not paid to Messrs. Bright, Singleton, Horn and Powell, and others like them. In a different context we have determined that [v]alue ... refers to the familiar appraisal and economic concept of fair market value. Trustees of Wade Baptist v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 469 So.2d 1240, 1244 (Miss. 1985); see also Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Owen, 308 So.2d 228, 230 (Miss. 1975) ( [value equals] difference between fair market value before and after taking); Mississippi State Highway Commission v. McArn, 246 So.2d 512, 514 (Miss. 1971). The money counsel received in the cases sub judice amounted to no more than token compensation, and it simply was confiscatory of their time, energy and talent. Makemson, 491 So.2d at 1115. The effect of the statutory limitation has impinged upon counsel's services, their property. See, Morris, Constitutional Law: Validity of Attorney Fee Caps in Indigent Cases: Mississippi's Challenge, 9 M.C.L.Rev. 373, 390 (1989). So that other counsel will not be compelled to sacrifice as counsel in these cases, we do establish appropriate guidelines. Before detailing these guidelines, however, we must discuss other concerns which require that we act.