Opinion ID: 3029458
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexual Harassment by McCullough

Text: Hare concedes that she waited more than 45 days to report her February 2000 encounter with McCullough and that this violates EEOC regulations (29 C.F.R. § 1614.105).8 She argues, however, that her claim should be equitably tolled because Burke and other managers discouraged her from filing it. The District Court found Hare’s claim could not be equitably tolled, and, for the reasons stated below, we agree with this decision. At the outset, we note that equitable tolling “should be applied sparingly.” Podobnik v. U.S. Postal Service, 409 F.3d 584, 591 (3d Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, it is only appropriate in such circumstances as the following: “(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994). Hare presents no evidence on which we can equitably toll her claim. First, Hare 8 The 45-day time limit is applicable because Hare is a federal sector employee. 24 was fully aware that she had a claim. During her deposition, when asked how she felt immediately after her encounter with McCullough, she said, “I felt like I was being sexually harassed . . . .” App. at A39. Second, Hare’s managers did not mislead her with respect to her claim. To the contrary, they asked her not to file a claim because they recognized that she could do so. Third, the efforts on the part of Hare’s managers to dissuade her from filing a claim seem far from “extraordinary,” as they consisted of simply asking her not to do so. Finally, Hare presents no evidence that she was otherwise prevented from filing a claim. Hare also argues her sexual harassment claim against McCullough should be saved by the continuing violations doctrine. She argues his conduct should be viewed as part of a series of continuing hostile work environment violations, including Hare’s poor treatment by her managers after she began pressing her claim. We disagree. Hare was immediately aware of her being sexually harassed, and, consequently, the continuing violations doctrine does not apply. See Morganroth & Morganroth v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, P.C., 331 F.3d 406, 417 n.6 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining the doctrine “does not apply when plaintiffs are aware of the injury at the time it occurred”). Accordingly, this sexual harassment claim fails because Hare did not timely report it. 2. Gender Discrimination by Failure to Investigate Hare claims that, because she is a woman, Burke and others did not adequately investigate her charge that McCullough harassed her. This conduct, she claims, violates Title VII. Hare, however, does not fully develop this claim and cites no law supporting it. 25 In addition, she fails to show how the Post Office’s deficient investigation constituted an “adverse employment action” under Title VII. See Weston, 251 F.3d at 431 (explaining that an adverse employment action “effect[s] a material change in the terms or conditions of [a person’s] employment”). Accordingly, we have no basis to credit this claim. 3. Retaliatory Harassment Hare claims her managers retaliated against her not just because she complained, but because she was a woman who complained. As Hare explains in her brief, she would not have been harassed “had [she] been male.” Hare’s Br. at 65. The District Court did not address this claim of Hare’s. In Jensen, we considered the same two types of retaliation claims raised by Hare in this appeal: one based on retaliation for protected conduct in violation of § 2000e-3(a) (discussed supra), and one based on gender discrimination in violation of § 2000e-2(a). With respect to the latter, we explained as follows: As an abstract matter, retaliation against a person based on the person’s complaint about sexual harassment is not necessarily discrimination based on the person’s sex. If the individuals carrying out the harassment would have carried out a similar campaign regardless of the sex of the person making the complaint, the harassment, while actionable as illegal retaliation, would not also be actionable as discrimination based on sex. In reality, however, when a woman who complains about sexual harassment is thereafter subjected to harassment based on that complaint, a claim that the harassment constituted sex discrimination (because a man who made such a complaint would not have been subjected to similar harassment) will almost always present a question that must be presented to the trier of fact. In such a situation, the evidence will almost always be sufficient to give rise to a 26 reasonable inference that the harassment would not have occurred if the person making the complaint were a man. Jensen, 435 F.3d at 454. While the record shows Hare attributed her poor treatment to her filing a complaint with the EEOC, we cannot say on the evidence before us that she would have suffered the same treatment had she been a man. Accordingly, we hold that Hare’s retaliation claim based on gender discrimination should proceed on its merits.