Opinion ID: 1631295
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The facts of the case are set forth in this Court's 1992 opinion affirming Gore's convictions and sentence: Susan Roark was last seen alive on January 30, 1988, in Cleveland, Tennessee, in the company of Marshall Lee Gore. Gore had planned to travel to Florida with a friend from Cleveland. While waiting for his friend at a convenience store, Gore struck up a conversation with Roark. Gore then entered Roark's car, a black Mustang, and they drove away. Gore accompanied Roark to a party at the home of a friend of hers. Roark had planned to spend the night at her friend's home. Sometime between 11:30 and 12:00, Roark left to drive Gore home. She never returned. The following day Roark's grandmother reported her missing. She had been expected home by 7 a.m. that morning. Gore arrived in Tampa on January 31, driving a black Mustang. He convinced a friend to help him pawn several items of jewelry later identified as belonging to Roark. Gore then proceeded to Miami, where police subsequently recovered Roark's Mustang after it was abandoned in a two-car accident. Gore's fingerprint was found in the car, as well as a traffic ticket which had been issued to him while he was in Miami. On April 2, 1988, the skeletonized remains of Roark's body were discovered in Columbia County, Florida. The naked body was found in a wooded area which had been used as an unauthorized dumping ground for household garbage and refuse. Expert testimony established that the body was placed in its location either at the time of death or within two hours of death. The body could have been there anywhere from two weeks to six months prior to discovery. The forensic pathologist who testified for the State concluded that the cause of death was a homicide, given the situation in which the body was found and the fact that the neck area of the body was completely missing. The pathologist explained that this was probably due to some injury to the neck, such as a stab wound or strangulation trauma, which provided a favorable environment for insects to begin the deterioration process. Gore v. State, 599 So.2d 978, 980 (Fla. 1992). In Gore's postconviction case, this Court summarized the following additional relevant facts: In addition to this evidence, the State introduced the testimony of two other witnesses. Specifically, Lisa Ingram testified that she was riding in a car with Gore on February 19 when she saw a woman's purse in the back seat. She testified that Gore stated that the purse belonged to `a girl that he had killed last night.' [ Gore, 599 So.2d] at 983. We concluded on appeal that this testimony was admissible as an admission with regard to the Roark homicide. Id. Further, the State presented the collateral crime testimony of another victim, Tina Corolis: The testimony of Tina Corolis was admitted as evidence of a collateral crime. Corolis was a casual acquaintance of Gore's, whom she knew as Tony. In March of 1988, Gore called Corolis at her home and told her that his car had broken down and he needed a ride to it. After they had driven around for several hours, Gore revealed a knife, gained control of the car, and drove to a partially wooded dumping area off a dirt road. He put the knife to Corolis' stomach, forced her to undress, and raped her. He then dragged her out of the car, punched her face against a rock, strangled her, and stabbed her in the neck, arms, legs, and buttocks. Shortly thereafter Gore pawned several items of Corolis' jewelry and then proceeded to Kentucky in her car. Id. We concluded on direct appeal that the cumulative effect of the numerous similarities between the two crimes is the establishment of a unique modus operandi which points to Gore as the perpetrator of the Roark homicide. Id. at 984. The jury found Gore guilty of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and robbery. See id. at 980. The jury recommended a sentence of death by a vote of eleven to one, and the trial court followed this recommendation after finding the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Gore had previously been convicted of other violent felonies; (2) the murder was committed while Gore was engaged in a kidnapping; (3) the murder was committed for financial gain; and (4) the murder was cold, calculated, and premeditated. See id. at 986. The judge concluded that Gore's poor childhood and antisocial personality were insufficient mitigation to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. See id. Gore v. State, 846 So.2d 461, 464-65 (Fla. 2003). This Court affirmed Gore's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Gore v. State, 599 So.2d 978 (Fla.1992). The Court also affirmed the trial court's order denying Gore's motion for postconviction relief as well as Gore's habeas corpus petition filed with this Court. Gore v. State, 846 So.2d 461 (Fla.2003). Gore subsequently filed a pro se motion entitled Innocent Defendant's Motion for Postconviction DNA Testing Pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 3.853. In his motion, Gore sought DNA testing of a variety of items collected in connection with the murder investigation. Additionally, Gore appeared to request DNA analysis of a pair of bloody pants collected from the investigation of another case in which Gore was convicted of murderthe Novick case. [1] Gore also sought to have DNA samples collected from Tina Corolis and David Restrepo. [2] The trial court summarily denied Gore's motion as facially insufficient, finding as follows: The Defendant seeks to have DNA tests run on evidence that was collected near the victim. It should be noted that the victim was buried under a layer of leaves at an unauthorized trash dump in a rural part of Columbia County. The Defendant alleges, that because there is no physical evidence that ties him to the victim, crime scene, or county, DNA tests run on the evidence cited will reveal that he is innocent. The Defendant is incorrect in this assertion. The identity of the perpetrator of this crime is, was, and can be established without any direct physical evidence. Some of the means of identifying the Defendant are: the Defendant was the last person seen with the victim, the Defendant was in possession of the victims [sic] car (in which he was the last person seen with the victim), and the Defendant pawned personal items of the victims. Thus, the statutory requirement of a question of identity has not been met, and the Rule 3.853 motion is facially insufficient. State v. Gore, No. 88-607-CF at 1 (Fla.3d Cir. order dated July 11, 2006). Gore now asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion on the grounds that it was facially invalid. As explained below, we affirm the trial court's denial of Gore's motion for postconviction DNA testing.