Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Scope of the Defendant's Consent

Text: The defendant next proffers a second ground for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court, namely, that the state did not prove that he actually had consented to a complete search of the Altima's passenger compartment. Relying on Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991), the defendant contends that, by extensively searching his car, Morgan exceeded the scope of his consent, which he claims was limited only to an invitation to check for beer on floor by the passenger seat. In response, the state also relies on Jimeno and argues that it was objectively reasonable for Morgan to construe the defendant's invitation as an actual consent to a search. We agree with the state and conclude that it was objectively reasonable for Morgan to interpret the defendant's consent as extending to a search of the Altima's passenger compartment and unlocked storage areas therein. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the [f]ourth [a]mendment is that of `objective' reasonablenesswhat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect? Id., at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801. The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. Id. Although objective reasonableness is a question of law [over which our review is plenary], the factual circumstances are highly relevant when determining what a reasonable person would have believed to be the outer bounds of the consent that was given. [36] United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1049, 123 S.Ct. 2114, 155 L.Ed.2d 1091 (2003); see also, e.g., United States v. Rich, 992 F.2d 502, 505 (5th Cir.) ([o]bjective reasonableness is a question of law that is reviewed de novo), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 933, 114 S.Ct. 348, 126 L.Ed.2d 312 (1993). In Jimeno, the Supreme Court concluded that it was reasonable for an officer to consider a suspect's general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag lying on the floor of the car. Florida v. Jimeno, supra, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801. The court noted that the terms of the search's authorization were simple because the defendant had granted the officer permission to search his car, and did not place any explicit limitation on the scope of the search, after the officer had informed [the defendant] that he believed [the defendant] was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. We think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to search [the defendant's] car included consent to search containers within that car which might bear drugs. A reasonable person may be expected to know that narcotics are generally carried in some form of a container. Id. Post- Jimeno case law makes clear that, on the basis of the exchange between Morgan and the defendant, Morgan reasonably could have understood the defendant's invitation to check the Altima as an invitation to search the interior of the car and unlocked compartments therein, including its center console. First, Morgan's question about the presence of anything illegal in the car reasonably is understood as directing the defendant's attention to contraband such as narcotics or weapons, despite the fact that he did not mention those items specifically. [37] See United States v. Canipe, 569 F.3d 597, 606 (6th Cir.) ([w]hen [the investigator] asked [the defendant] whether he had anything in his vehicle that might be unlawful or about which he should know, his questioning placed [the defendant] on notice that any unlawful item would be the subject of his search), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 655, 175 L.Ed.2d 499 (2009); United States v. Snow, 44 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir.1995) ([i]t is self-evident that a police officer seeking general permission to search a vehicle is looking for evidence of illegal activity); cf. State v. McConnelee, 690 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Iowa 2004) ([c]onsidering their conversation was limited to the nature of the leafy substance that was in plain view, we think it unlikely that the defendant would respond to the officer's comments with an unsolicited invitation to the officer to `search the whole car'). Moreover, a general consent to search a vehicle reasonably include[s] permission to search any container that might have held illegal objects. United States v. Canipe, supra, at 606; see also United States v. Snow, supra, at 135 ([i]t is just as obvious that such evidence [of illegal activity] might be hidden in closed containers); United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1118 (11th Cir.1991) (the defendant knew the officer was looking for drugs; therefore, both [the] defendant and the officer would reasonably interpret the consent as constituting consent to search in places where narcotics would reasonably be hidden); cf. United States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 351 (4th Cir.2009) (per curiam) (containers physically part of area to be searched are included within scope of consent, but consent limited to trunk does not physically encompass the interior of [a] vehicle). We further disagree with the defendant's reliance on the fact that Morgan never used the word `search,' in support of his argument that it is not linguistically and constitutionally reasonable to find that the defendant actually consented to the search of his car.... Case law, none of which is contradicted by the defendant in his brief, establishes that Morgan reasonably understood the defendant's invitation to check the carmade presumably in the hopes that Morgan would see only the beer on the floor by the passenger seat and then go on his wayas an invitation to search the vehicle. [38] See United States v. Neely, supra, 564 F.3d at 350 ([b]y asking whether [the officer] would like to `check' the trunk, [the defendant] consented to a search of his trunk); United States v. Walker, 922 F.Supp. 724, 731 (N.D.N.Y.1996) (concluding that defendant first gave permission to conduct a search when he told [the trooper] `you can check the car' while pointing at the vehicle); State v. Stephens, 946 P.2d 734, 735, 737 (Utah App.1997) (we conclude that [the police officer] could have reasonably believed that [the] defendant's general consent to `look' or `check' under the front seat for weapons or drugs extended to the contents of the leather case found under front seat). Accordingly, we conclude that Morgan did not exceed the scope of the defendant's consent by searching the interior of the defendant's Altima, including its unlocked center console compartment.