Opinion ID: 2374292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 1. Abrogating as to motor torts

Text: In Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526 (Mass. 1976), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said at page 532 et seq.: The defendant further argues that even if interspousal immunity is not mandated by statute, a common law rule of such long standing should be abolished, if at all, by legislative and not judicial action. The defendant concedes, as he must, that it is within the power and authority of the court to abrogate this judicially created rule; and the mere longevity of the rule does not by itself provide cause for us to stay our hand if to perpetuate the rule would be to perpetuate inequity. When the rationales which gave meaning and coherence to a judicially created rule are no longer vital, and the rule itself is not consonant with the needs of contemporary society, a court not only has the authority but also the duty to reexamine its precedents rather than to apply by rote an antiquated formula. Chief Justice Vanderbilt described this interaction between the judiciary and the evolving common law in an oft cited passage from State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 505, 129 A.2d 715, 721, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 925, 77 S.Ct. 1387, 1 L.Ed.2d 1441 (1957): `One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes it adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its application in court. There is not a rule of the common law in force today that has not evolved from some earlier rule of common law, gradually in some instances, more suddenly in others, leaving the common law of today when compared with the common law of centuries ago as different as day is from night. The nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of law is applied it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs of the times have not so changed as to make further application of it the instrument of injustice. Dean Pound posed the problem admirably in his Interpretations of Legal History (1922) when he stated, `Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.' This court has frequently had occasion to effect through its decisions not insignificant changes in the field of tort law. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973), and cases cited at 166 n. 43, 302 N.E.2d 555. In the Diaz case, in rejecting the argument that the court should defer to the Legislature on the question of recovery for loss of consortium, we noted that `the Legislature may rationally prefer to act, if it acts at all, after rather than before the common law has fulfilled itself in its own way.' Id. at 166, 302 N.E.2d at 563. We are of opinion that this is an especially appropriate comment in the context of this case where the Legislature in G.L.c. 209, Section 6, has recognized the rule of interspousal immunity but has left the rule in its common law form, expressing the preference, at least implicitly, that this court continue to evaluate the usefulness and propriety of the rule. We further note that the argument that any change in the doctrine of interspousal immunity should come from the Legislature, not the judiciary, has been considered and rejected in many decisions abrogating the common law rule.    We conclude therefore that it is open to this court to reconsider the common law rule of interspousal immunity and, having done so, we are of opinion that it should no longer bar an action by one spouse against another in a case such as the present one. We believe this result is consistent with the general principle that if there is tortious injury there should be recovery, and only strong arguments of public policy should justify a judicially created immunity for tortfeasors and bar to recovery for injured victims. See Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 612, 621, 296 N.E.2d 461 (1973); Freehe v. Freehe, supra, 81 Wash.2d at 192, 500 P.2d 771. We have examined the reasons offered in support of the common law immunity doctrine and, whatever their vitality in the social context of generations past, we find them inadequate today to support a general rule of interspousal tort immunity. In arriving at this conclusion we are mindful that the rights and privileges of husbands and wives with respect to one another are not unaffected by the marriage they have voluntarily undertaken together. Conduct, tortious between two strangers, may not be tortious between spouses because of the mutual concessions implied in the marital relationship. For this reason we limit our holding today to claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. In Rupert v. Stienne, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974), the Supreme Court of Nevada rejected the suggestions that interspousal actions in motor torts may be fraudulent or collusive by saying the principle belies the centuries old trust in our jury system and that Our adversary system will ferret out the non meritorious claims.... (at p. 1015) The Court then commented that other permitted interspousal litigation was as likely to bring about family discord as actions for personal torts. In departing from the doctrine of interspousal immunity, the Court explicitly limited its decision to claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents. In Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1 (1978), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island pointed out that although in prior cases the Court had declared that the question of abrogation or retention of the doctrine should originate with the legislature, we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory when we refuse to consider an old and unsatisfactory court made rule. (at p. 2) The Court then spoke to the suggested issue of conjugal discord and adopted the views expressed in Lewis, supra, and restricted its holding to motor torts for the reasons stated in that case. Reasoning to the same effect were Richard v. Richard, 300 A.2d 637 (Vt. 1973) and Surratt v. Thompson, 183 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1971).