Opinion ID: 2099336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Danielle Brueske's Reputation for Untruthfulness

Text: The defendant's first contention on appeal is that the trial justice erred in excluding Lynn Saucier's testimony with respect to her assessment of Danielle Brueske's reputation for untruthfulness in the community. When defendant attempted to elicit testimony from Lynn Saucier regarding Ms. Brueske's reputation for credibility/veracity in the community, the trial justice called the attorneys to sidebar; and then, outside the presence of the jury, he allowed defense counsel to conduct a voir dire examination of Ms. Saucier with respect to the reputation issue. Prior to the commencement of the voir dire examination, Ms. Saucier had already testified in open court that she had personal knowledge of Ms. Brueske's reputation as to truthfulness ( vel non ) in the community as a result of her [s]peaking with other people in [Ms. Saucier's] classroom at the time [they] were in [Diman School of Practical Nursing] [7] and as a result of her having been employed at the same nursing facility where [Ms. Brueske] used to work. During the voir dire examination, Ms. Saucier further testified that she had known Ms. Brueske throughout the course of their one year nursing program at Diman School of Practical Nursingboth in the classroom and also socially. She further testified that they both knew each other's friends. Ms. Saucier testified that she used to see Ms. Brueske at least daily; however, she added that they had not spoken to one another since July 26, 2006. [8] Ms. Saucier testified that she learned of Ms. Brueske's reputation as to truthfulness through [s]ituations that [she had] experienced personally with [Ms. Brueske] as well as conversations held with other classmates that may have gone to high school with [Ms. Brueske] or people that [Ms. Saucier has] worked with in the nursing field. Ms. Saucier testified that Ms. Brueske's reputation within that community is that she is not truthful, that she basically lies about everything. After hearing Ms. Saucier's voir dire testimony, the trial justice ruled that her testimony fell far below the standard of the rule. The trial justice held that there was an insufficient showing of a proper foundation for Ms. Saucier to testify as to Ms. Brueske's reputation for truthfulness within the community. The trial justice therefore excluded Ms. Saucier's testimony as to her or anybody else's knowledge of the reputation of the complaining witness in this case. Rule 608(a) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence reads as follows: The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. It is clear, therefore, that testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule 608(a) in the form of either opinion evidence [9] or reputational evidence. [10] State v. Benoit, 697 A.2d 329, 331 (R.I.1997) (stating that character evidence may be proven by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Lopes, 767 A.2d 673, 676 (R.I.2001); see generally 1 McCormick on Evidence, § 43 at 201-06 (Kenneth S. Broun, 6th ed. 2006). However, we need not tarry longer with an extended discussion concerning opinion evidence under Rule 608(a) since it is clear from the record that the testimony which defense counsel was seeking to elicit from Lynn Saucier was in the form of reputational evidenceas opposed to opinion evidence. It is well established in this jurisdiction that testimony of a character witness called for the purpose of establishing another witness's reputation in the community for veracity is generally admissible. State v. Cote, 691 A.2d 537, 540 (R.I.1997). However, we have also indicated that a witness may not testify to the reputation of another witness unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Id. (emphasis added); see also Lopes, 767 A.2d at 677 ([A] witness must establish that he or she has personal knowledge of another person's reputation before he or she can proffer an opinion concerning that reputation   .); see generally Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 478, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948) (Jackson, J.) ([T]he witness [as to reputation] must qualify to give an opinion by showing such acquaintance with the defendant, the community in which he [or she] has lived and the circles in which he [or she] has moved, as to speak with authority of the terms in which generally he [or she] is regarded.). Although in bygone times a reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness was most often based solely on the community where the person at issue lived, today the reputation of a person may also be established on the basis of any substantial group of people among whom he [or she] is well known, such as the persons with whom he [or she] works, does business, or goes to school. McCormick on Evidence, § 43 at 204; see also United States v. Oliver, 492 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir.1974) ([C]ourts have readily extended the concept of community to include the community in which one works, as well as where one lives.); Dynes v. Dynes, 637 N.E.2d 1321, 1323 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (The trend of modern authority is to allow evidence of the witness's reputation in the workplace.); State v. Caldwell, 529 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Iowa 1995) ([I]n modern times one's reputation may be better known where a person works than where a person resides.); State v. Land, 121 Wash.2d 494, 851 P.2d 678, 680 (1993) ([T]here should be no restriction necessarily limited to the community in which the witness sought to be impeached lives, and    the realities of our modern, mobile, impersonal society should also recognize that a witness may have a reputation for truth and veracity in the community in which he [or she] works and may have impressed on others in that community his [or her] character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.). We have additionally stated that, in addition to the requirement that the reputational witness have personal knowledge of the reputation in the community of the witness sought to be impeached, [t]he crucial time when the character of the witness under attack has its influence on his [or her] truth-telling is the time when he [or she] testifies. State v. Sepe, 122 R.I. 560, 568, 410 A.2d 127, 132 (1980) (quoting McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 44 at 92 (Edward W. Cleary, 2d ed. 1972)); see also Cote, 691 A.2d at 541. And we have clarified the just-quoted principle as follows: Testimony concerning a witness's reputation for truthfulness as of any time before trial is admissible if the trial justice determines the evidence not too remote to be significant. Cote, 691 A.2d at 541 (some emphasis added). We have required the party seeking to admit reputational evidence to establish a foundation for the admissibility of reputation evidence either by means of an offer of proof or by requesting a voir dire examination. Cote, 691 A.2d at 541. We have also stated that the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to satisfy the requirements of knowledge of the [witness's] reputation in the community, the timeliness of that knowledge and its proximity to the time of trial. Id. We note that a party seeking to admit evidence of a witness's reputation within the community for untruthfulness need not elicit from the proffered witness specific instances of untruthfulness. See Oliver, 492 F.2d at 947 (stating that [s]pecific incidents may only be inquired into on cross-examination of a witness testifying as to character for truthfulness and holding that it was improper for counsel to inquire as to specific incidents when laying a foundation for reputation testimony during voir dire). Although the above-summarized criteria are somewhat demanding, we have nonetheless acknowledged the competency of negative-reputation evidence when the character witness is sufficiently familiar with [the challenged witness's] residence or circle of acquaintances. See Cote, 691 A.2d at 541. The defendant contends that the proposed testimony by Ms. Saucier was well within the confines of Rule 608 and should have been allowed. The defendant further contends that he was particularly prejudiced by the exclusion of such evidence because Ms. Brueske's credibility was the ultimate issue in this case. The prosecution counters by stating that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this reputational testimony since, according to the prosecution, defendant did not establish an adequate foundation for such testimony. However, we need not decide whether the trial justice abused his discretion in excluding Lynn Saucier's proposed testimony with respect to Danielle Brueske's character for untruthfulness in the community because we are of the opinion that any such error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the voluminous evidence before the jury with respect to Ms. Brueske's remarkable history of untruthfulness. While testifying in open court, Ms. Brueske admitted to having engaged in a pattern of mendacious and deceitful conduct vis-á-vis defendant and vis-á-vis the man who had recently become her fiancé. She explicitly admitted to having lied to each of them. It is noteworthy that, during his closing argument, defense counsel quite appropriately employed a false in one thing, false in all theme and argued to the jury as follows with respect to the credibility of Ms. Brueske: [S]he lied to any number of people that she knows. She acknowledged on the stand [that] she lied to this person, to that person, to her lover. So she is used to lying. She lied during that period of time, and she acknowledged that she lied to people that she loved and cared for her. Why wouldn't she lie to you?    [J]ust because she is reciting the same story, as she did before, doesn't make it true. In view of the substantial amount of evidence that did reach the jury with respect to Ms. Brueske's mendacity, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of Lynn Saucier's reputational testimony, if error at all, constituted harmless error. See State v. Perez, 882 A.2d 574, 590 (R.I.2005); see also State v. Robinson, 989 A.2d 965, 978 (R.I.2010); State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1276 (R.I.1998); State v. Danahey, 108 R.I. 291, 294-97, 274 A.2d 736, 738-39 (1971); see generally Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).