Opinion ID: 1723928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: THE MAYNARD v. CARTWRIGHT ISSUE

Text: At issue under Maynard v. Cartwright is the aggravating circumstance especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. At Jones' trial, the jury was allowed to consider this aggravating circumstance along with two others, engaged in the commission of a robbery and committed for pecuniary gain. Jones, 517 So.2d at 1300. There was no limiting instruction given in conjunction with the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance, although one was offered by the defendant but denied by the trial court. The jury found all three aggravating circumstances and found insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 364, 108 S.Ct. at 1859, 100 L.Ed.2d at 382, the aggravating circumstance especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel without a limiting instruction is unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, in Jones' case, this aggravating circumstance is invalid, leaving this Court in the position of having to determine whether in the face of an invalid aggravating circumstance Jones' death sentence can nonetheless be upheld by this Court or if the case must be remanded for resentencing. Subsequent to remand of Jones, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Clemons v. State, 535 So.2d 1354 (Miss. 1988), on the issue of whether or not this Court properly upheld the sentence of death in light of its finding that one of the two aggravating circumstances, especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, was invalid, pursuant to Maynard v. Cartwright . Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), we have decided, upon remand by United States Supreme Court, both Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004 (Miss. 1992), and Shell v. State, 595 So.2d 1323 (Miss. 1992). These decisions control our decision today in Jones on this issue.
In Clemons v. Mississippi , the United States Supreme Court held: Although we hold that the Federal Constitution does not prevent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance either by reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by harmless error review, we vacate the judgment below and remand, because it is unclear whether the Mississippi Supreme Court correctly employed either of these methods. 494 U.S. 738, 741, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1444, 108 L.Ed.2d 725, 733 (1990). Thus, the United States Supreme Court settled the question from a federal constitutional standpoint of a state appellate court's ability to reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in order to uphold a death sentence based in part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance. It has delineated, both in Clemons and in Parker v. Dugger, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 731, 112 L.Ed.2d 812 (1991), the process by which appellate courts must arrive at such a decision. However, considering this question as a matter of state law, we held in our decision in Clemons v. State that only the jury, by unanimous decision, can impose the death penalty; as to aggravating circumstances, this Court only has the authority to determine whether the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance. There is no authority for this Court to reweigh remaining aggravating circumstances when it finds one or more to be invalid or improperly defined, nor is there authority for this Court to find evidence to support a proper definition of an aggravating circumstance in order to uphold a death sentence by reweighing. Finding aggravating and mitigating circumstances, weighing them, and ultimately imposing a death sentence are, by statute, left to a properly instructed jury. Clemons, 593 So.2d at 1006. We reiterated this holding in Shell v. State, 595 So.2d at 1324. In light of Clemons and Shell, we again hold that as a matter of state law, we have no authority to uphold a death sentence in the light of an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance by reweighing remaining aggravating circumstances. Neither is there authority for this Court to find evidence to support a proper definition of an aggravating circumstance in order to uphold a death sentence by reweighing.
The United States Supreme Court's Clemons' opinion suggests that even if reweighing were not an appellate function, it was open to the Mississippi Supreme Court to find that the error which occurred during the sentencing proceeding was harmless, relying on Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. at 752, 110 S.Ct. at 1450, 108 L.Ed.2d at 741. In Jones' case, it is difficult to accept that beyond a reasonable doubt the jury's sentencing verdict would have been the same with or without the especially heinous factor. This factor was argued almost exclusively to the jury as a reason to impose the death penalty. As in Clemons, 593 So.2d at 1007; Shell, 595 So.2d at 1325; and Johnson v. State, 547 So.2d 59 (Miss. 1989), there is no way to throw out this aggravating circumstance and say with any confidence that the jury verdict would have been the same. However, the United States Supreme Court did leave open the possibility that this Court could ask whether beyond reasonable doubt the result would have been the same had the especially heinous aggravating circumstance been properly defined in the jury instructions; and perhaps on this basis it could have determined that the failure to instruct properly was harmless error. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754, 110 S.Ct. at 1451, 108 L.Ed.2d at 742. This statement indicates that this Court could apply its construction of the especially heinous factor adopted in Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979), to the facts of this case to determine if, with the narrowed definition, the jury verdict would have been the same. If we so found, we could perhaps find that failure to properly instruct the jury was harmless error. We are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that under the facts of this case a jury would have found that the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies  the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. Coleman, 378 So.2d at 648. Because we have no authority as a matter of state law to engage in a reweighing analysis, and because under the facts of this case we eschew harmless error analysis, we hold that it is for a jury, rather than this Court, to decide under the facts of this case and with proper and properly defined aggravating circumstances, weighed against mitigating circumstances, whether Jones shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.