Opinion ID: 810377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues on merits

Text: The district court concluded that the only issues to be resolved on their merits were Mr. Lichfield’s claims that his counsel was ineffective in certain ways. As indicated above, these issues were: Mr. Lichfield’s claims that his counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to seek an agreement with the government for a §5K1.1 downward departure; (2) representing to Mr. Lichfield that the court could impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years; (3) failing to assert all positive aspects of Mr. Lichfield; and (4) failing to seek to have Mr. Lichfield tried in state, as opposed to federal, court. The district court correctly analyzed Mr. Lichfield’s ineffectiveness claims under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant asserting a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel must show that counsel’s performance (1) “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, and (2) resulted in prejudice, meaning “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional -7- errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Our review is “highly deferential” and we “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, a court “may address the performance and prejudice components in any order, but need not address both if [the defendant] fails to make a sufficient showing of one.” Boltz v. Mullin, 415 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to Mr. Lichfield’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to procure an agreement with the government for a USSG §5K1.1 downward departure, the district court found counsel’s performance was not deficient because the government retains enormous discretion in deciding whether to make a §5K1.1 motion. United States v. Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that the §5K1.1 “motion is ordinarily left to the Government’s discretion (unless the Government gives up that discretion as part of a plea agreement)”); United States v. Abston, 401 Fed. Appx. 357, 363 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (noting that “the government has almost boundless -8- discretion in deciding whether to move for . . . a [§5K1.1] departure”). 1 The court also found no prejudice, since the government was well aware of Mr. Lichfield’s assistance but declined to file a departure motion. Thus, the district court concluded counsel could have done nothing more. Regarding the claim of ineffectiveness based on the allegation that counsel told Mr. Lichfield that the court could sentence him below the mandatory minimum, the district court held that counsel “may” not have been ineffective, since the court does in fact have the authority to depart from a statutory mandatory minimum in certain circumstances. But even if the court did not have such authority, the district court concluded that Mr. Lichfield, having been informed both in writing and orally, was well aware that a statutory mandatory minimum applied. Thus, counsel’s statement did not prejudice him. On the ineffectiveness claim based on a purported failure to present all of Mr. Lichfield’s positive qualities, the district court rejected this claim on the ground that Mr. Lichfield fails to provide anything specific he claims his counsel should have presented. There was therefore no deficient performance. Additionally, the court determined that Mr. Lichfield failed to show prejudice because he was subject to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence. 1 While unpublished decisions are not binding authority, we cite this decision because we agree with its holding as stated. -9- The court also rejected Mr. Lichfield’s claim that his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to seek to have Mr. Lichfield tried in state, rather than federal, court. The district court noted that Mr. Lichfield was charged with violating a federal crime and he admitted, during the change in plea hearing, that he had violated federal law. Thus, this claim of Mr. Lichfield’s was meritless, and counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise it. See United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 797 (10th Cir. 2006) (“If the omitted issue is without merit, then counsel’s failure to raise it is not prejudicial, and thus is not ineffective assistance.”).