Opinion ID: 2222251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: reasonable controversy and attorney fees

Text: Dawes' seventh assignment of error states that the review panel erred in determining that there was a reasonable controversy, such that Dawes was not entitled to waiting time penalties. Neb.Rev. Stat. § 48-125 (Cum.Supp.2002) authorizes a penalty of 50 percent of compensation payable where there is no reasonable controversy regarding an employee's claim for workers' compensation and payment is delinquent for 30 days. Hobza v. Seedorff Masonry, Inc., 259 Neb. 671, 611 N.W.2d 828 (2000). The penalty statute is to encourage prompt payment of benefits. Hollandsworth v. Nebraska Partners, 260 Neb. 756, 619 N.W.2d 579 (2000). In summary, the mandate for prompt payment of benefits requires that employees and insurers promptly handle and decide claims. If they do not, and there is no reasonable controversy about compensability, then penalties will be assessed. Hale v. Vickers, Inc., 10 Neb.App. 627, 635 N.W.2d 458 (2001). A reasonable controversy under § 48-125 may exist (1) if there is a question of law previously unanswered by the appellate courts, which question must be answered to determine a right or liability for disposition of a claim under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or (2) if the properly adduced evidence would support reasonable but opposite conclusions by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court concerning an aspect of an employee's claim for workers' compensation, which conclusions affect allowance or rejection of an employee's claim, in whole or in part. Guico v. Excel Corp., 260 Neb. 712, 619 N.W.2d 470 (2000). To avoid the penalty provided for in § 48-125, an employer need not prevail in the employee's claim, but must have an actual basis in law or fact for disputing the claim and refusing compensation. Mendoza v. Omaha Meat Processors, 225 Neb. 771, 408 N.W.2d 280 (1987); Hale, supra. As previously noted, the single judge made no finding regarding the existence of a reasonable controversy. The review panel resolved the issue as a matter of law by concluding that a reasonable controversy existed. We agree with this determination. As noted by the review panel, Wittrock presented the expert medical opinion of an orthopedic surgeon, who opined that Dawes' condition occurred as a result of a life-long wear and tear arthritic disease process ... and is not the result of any specific event, at work or elsewhere. The expert rejected the idea that repetitive labor was a cause of lumbar disk disease and concluded, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Dawes suffered from a severe degenerative disk disease which was not due to any specific injury. When there is conflict in the medical testimony adduced at trial, reasonable but opposite conclusions can be reached by the compensation court. McBee v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 255 Neb. 903, 587 N.W.2d 687 (1999). Here, Wittrock presented expert medical testimony that would have supported a finding that Dawes' condition was not the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-101 (Reissue 1998). While this opinion was not adduced until after the denial of benefits, it is evidence that Wittrock had an actual basis in law or fact for denying Dawes' claim. See Mendoza, supra . Consequently, the review panel did not err in determining that a reasonable controversy was presented. Dawes' final argument is that the review panel should have awarded attorney fees because Wittrock's appeal to the review panel did not result in a reduction of the award. Section 48-125 provides, in relevant part: If the employer files an application for review before the compensation court from an award of a judge of the compensation court and fails to obtain any reduction in the amount of such award, the compensation court shall allow the employee a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed as costs against the employer for such review.... Dawes contends [t]he review panel rejected all of defendants' assigned errors. Brief for appellant at 49. Dawes' argument is not entirely accurate. As previously noted, the review panel, finding merit in errors assigned by both sides, determined that the single judge erred in her calculation of Dawes' average weekly wage. The review panel remanded this issue for recalculation by the single judge, and no one contests that disposition before this court. `[R]eduction in the amount of such award,' within the meaning of § 48-125, ordinarily refers to the total amount of the award to the employee. Miller v. Meister & Segrist, 255 Neb. 805, 817, 587 N.W.2d 399, 408 (1998). Until Dawes' average weekly wage is recalculated on remand, it will be impossible to tell whether or not Wittrock's application for review will have resulted in a decrease in Dawes' award. Consequently, whether or not Dawes is entitled to attorney fees for proceedings in the compensation court is a matter that must be determined by that court after the case is remanded to the single judge. The review panel did not err by failing to award attorney fees prior to the final determination of Dawes' award.