Opinion ID: 1170931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felony-murder Robbery Special Circumstance.

Text: (22) Defendant contends that the felony-murder robbery special circumstance must be set aside because the court failed to instruct on intent to kill. In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], we held that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance of the 1978 death penalty law, whether applied to accomplices or to actual killers. ( Id., at pp. 153-154.) We have since overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], wherein we held that, with respect to the actual killer, the court need not instruct on intent to kill in connection with felony-murder special circumstances. Such an instruction is required only where there is evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. ( Id., at pp. 1138-1139.) Defendant correctly argues that the court erred in failing to instruct that a finding of intent to kill is required for a felony-murder special circumstance as to an accomplice who is not the actual killer. Defendant handed the gun to his accomplice before hitting Romero over the head with the bottles of wine; thereafter neither Romero nor Zamora directly observed defendant shoot Vasquez. Notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence that defendant was the gunman, because accomplice liability instructions were given here, defendant was entitled to an instruction that, under such theory of liability, the felony-murder special circumstance would require proof of his intent to kill. The error, however, was harmless for all the same reasons which required our rejection of defendant's claim of prejudicial Beeman error. ( Ante, at pp. 631-632.) Absolutely no evidence was presented suggesting defendant did not share the triggerman's purpose to kill all the witnesses to the robbery. Moreover, the guilty verdicts necessarily reflect that the jury found defendant's intent to kill Vasquez. Three persons were shot  Vasquez, Romero and Zamora. Only Vasquez died. Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to commit murder for the shootings of Romero and Zamora. The jury was instructed that this crime requires express malice. ( Ante, at p. 631.) Express malice, in this context, necessarily includes an intent to kill. (See People v. Murtishaw, supra, 29 Cal.3d 733, 764-765.) The jury verdicts finding defendant guilty on both counts thus determined that he intended to kill Romero and Zamora. The evidence manifestly shows a single intent as to all three victims in the liquor store shootings; it is inconceivable the jury would find that defendant intended to kill only the victims who survived, but not the one who died. It is virtually impossible to conclude on this record that anyone other than defendant was the actual killer. In any event, the record establishes beyond doubt that defendant acted with intent to kill in this case. Hence, the finding required by Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 [73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 102 S.Ct. 3368], is satisfied. ( Cabana v. Bullock (1986) 474 U.S. 376 [88 L.Ed.2d 704, 106 S.Ct. 689].)