Opinion ID: 1551187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to Dismiss and for Directed Verdicts

Text: The defendant argues the trial court should have dismissed the five aggravated felonious sexual assault charges because the State failed to present a prima facie case based upon the language of the indictments. The language in each indictment is identical except for the specific act of sexual penetration described. Each indictment asserted, in pertinent part: 1. STEPHEN GOUPIL, IN CONCERT WITH AND AIDED BY DOUGLAS JENOT, ENGAGED IN SEXUAL PENETRATION WITH . . . [the victim], SPECIFICALLY [a particular act]. 2. STEPHEN GOUPIL AND/OR DOUGLAS JENOT THREATENED TO USE PHYSICAL VIOLENCE UPON [the victim], BY TELLING HER SHE WOULD BE HARMED OR KILLED IF SHE DID NOT SUBMIT TO THE ACT. 3. [The victim] BELIEVED GOUPIL AND/OR JENOT HAD THE PRESENT ABILITY TO EXECUTE THE THREATS 4. STEPHEN GOUPIL ACTED KNOWINGLY. The defendant argues that the indictments required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he verbally threatened the victim prior to each sexual assault by expressly telling her that she would be harmed or killed if she did not submit. He argues that, although the State presented evidence that the victim was verbally threatened before and while the defendant and Jenot searched her apartment, the State presented no evidence that she was verbally threatened before each separate sexual assault. The defendant points to the victim's testimony that her attackers did not verbally tell her that they would kill her or harm her prior to each separate sexual assault. To succeed on a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the defendant must show that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. All reasonable inferences derived from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Grimes, 152 N.H. 310, 311-12, 876 A.2d 753 (2005) (citation omitted). RSA 632-A:2, I(c) provides: I. A person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual assault if such person engages in sexual penetration with another person under any of the following circumstances: . . . . (c) When the actor coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use physical violence or superior physical strength on the victim, and the victim believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats. Although this issue is one of first impression, our decision in State v. Kulikowski, 132 N.H. 281, 564 A.2d 439 (1989), is instructive. In Kulikowski, the defendant was found guilty of, among other things, three counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault based upon indictments that alleged a violation of a prior version of the statute here at issue, RSA 632-A:2, III, which required proof that the defendant coerce[d] the victim to submit by threatening to use physical violence or superior physical strength on the victim, and the victim believe[d] that the actor ha[d] the present ability to execute these threats. Kulikowski, 132 N.H. at 285, 564 A.2d 439. In substance, the indictments in Kulikowski alleged that the defendant coerced his victim into submitting to a sexual act by repeatedly threatening her with physical violence or superior physical strength on numerous previous occasions, some of which occurred more than six years prior to the warrant for the defendant's arrest. Id. at 286, 564 A.2d 439. In that case, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the indictments, arguing that they failed to allege the element of coercion by present threats. Id. at 285, 564 A.2d 439. While we acknowledged that the threat and the act of sexual penetration must be close in time, we ruled that threats against the victim may be implicit and may arise from earlier incidents. Id. Thus, we concluded that the indictments were sufficient because they alleged present coercion occasioned by repeated prior threats. Id. Similar to our decision in Kulikowski, we conclude that there need not be an overt, express verbal threat prior to each separate act in order to satisfy the requirements of RSA 632-A:2, I(c) or the language of the indictments. As detailed above, the victim testified that her attackers repeatedly punched her face, head, neck and back, placed a knife to her neck, and threatened to kill her. She testified that, once she stopped screaming, she was told not to move or scream, or I'm going to cut you up. While the assailants initially searched the apartment, the victim was left blindfolded in the bedroom. When they returned, the assailant with the tattoo exerted physical force over the victim by sitting on her and ripping her clothes off. The victim testified that, while lying on the bed naked and blindfolded, she was afraid to fight back because [the assailant] made it very clear if I moved, if I resisted, if I screamed, I would . . . die, I would get cut. So I didn't fight back. The victim's testimony demonstrates that the threat of force and bodily injury was implicit and ongoing throughout the sexual assaults. There was no break in time between the assailants' initial entry and physical attack and the subsequent sexual assaults. Nor was there any significant break in time between the different sexual assaults. Although the assailant with the tattoo did not verbally tell her that he was going to kill her, use the knife on her, or beat her before each separate sexual assault, he did tell her repeatedly during the initial search of the apartment and after making her lie down on the bed that he would hurt her if she did not comply. We conclude, therefore, that the initial repeated verbal threats, along with the actual physical assaults and threats with the knife, constituted an implicit threat throughout the entire ordeal. We decline the defendant's invitation to interpret RSA 632-A:2, I(c) to require proof of a separate express verbal threat immediately before each separate sexual assault. We also decline the defendant's invitation to narrowly interpret the indictments as alleging an express verbal threat prior to each sexual assault. The threats were implied throughout the entire ordeal, see Kulikowski, 132 N.H. at 285-86, 564 A.2d 439, and the evidence presented at trial, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, supports the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss. We similarly reject the defendant's argument that the trial court should have directed verdicts of acquittal on all five counts of aggravated felonious sexual assault. In an appeal of the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant carries the burden of proving that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Surette, 137 N.H. 20, 22, 622 A.2d 1254 (1993). Given that this standard is the same as the one applied in reviewing the denial of the motion to dismiss the aggravated felonious sexual assault claims, this argument fails for the reasons given above.