Opinion ID: 1989995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: implied consent statute

Text: ¶ 12. We begin our analysis by considering whether the implied consent statute imposes an affirmative duty upon a police officer to inform a defendant that there is no right to counsel in the implied consent setting, and whether a defendant's request to consult with an attorney constitutes a statutory refusal to submit to a chemical test. ¶ 13. The Wisconsin Legislature enacted the implied consent statute to combat drunk driving. [3] Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 46 (citing State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 355-56, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983)). Designed to facilitate the collection of evidence, the law was not created to enhance the rights of alleged drunk drivers. [4] Id. ; State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 203-04, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980) (citing Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974)). Rather, the implied consent statute was designed to secure convictions. [5] State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d 251, 258, 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986) (citing Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d at 356). Given the legislature's intentions in passing the statute, courts construe the implied consent law liberally. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 47. [2, 3] ¶ 14. The implied consent law provides that Wisconsin drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2); Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 193; Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 109. Consequently, drivers accused of operating a vehicle while intoxicated have no right to refuse a chemical test. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 257. ¶ 15. The legislature determines what arresting officers must tell defendants prior to the administration of a chemical test. Id. at 259-60. Section 343.305(4) requires officers to advise the accused about the nature of the driver's implied consent, and the Informing the Accused Form meets the statutory mandate of alerting defendants to the law and their rights under it. Village of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 680, 683-84, 524 N.W.2d 635 (1994). The law requires no more than what the implied consent statute sets forth. Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 260. [4, 5] ¶ 16. Officers who administer a test under the implied consent statute are not required to advise defendants about Miranda [6] rights. State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 133, 227 N.W.2d 727 (1975) ( Miranda rules do not apply because request to submit to a chemical test does not implicate testimonial utterances). In addition, Wisconsin's implied consent statute makes no provision for a right to counsel. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 200. ¶ 17. Reitter contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, reflected in Wis. Stat. § 946.75, [7] conflicts with the Neitzel principle. Although Reitter does not challenge Neitzel in this appeal, he proposes that we recognize a broader rule obligating officers to advise defendants that the right to counsel does not pertain to the implied consent setting. ¶ 18. In Neitzel, we first reconciled any perceived tension between Wis. Stat. § 946.75 and the implied consent law by observing that the statutory obligations imposed upon drivers by the implied consent law are unrelated to the general, separate right to counsel. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 200. The legislature enacted the implied consent law after passing the general right to counsel statute, and the implied consent law made no provision for the right to consult with an attorney prior to administration of a chemical test. Id. The acknowledged rules of statutory construction lead to the conclusion that the legislature did not intend to extend the right to counsel when it subsequently enacted the more recent, narrower, implied consent statute. Id. ¶ 19. Reitter relies on a South Dakota federal district court case and a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case to urge expansion of the rule by requiring officers to alert defendants that the right to counsel does not exist. In Heles v. State of South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982), the court found the right to counsel attaches prior to the administration of a chemical test. See id. at 654. In Department of Transp. v. O'Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (1989), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that police officers have a duty to issue a warning (an O'Connell warning) that Miranda rights do not apply to the implied consent setting. ¶ 20. Reitter's reliance on Heles is misplaced. [8] The Eighth Circuit vacated the case as moot upon the death of the appellant, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); therefore, the decision is not precedent even in the federal court in which it was decided. Department of Pub. Safety v. Gates, 350 N.W.2d 59, 61 (S.D. 1984). [9] The South Dakota Supreme Court later declined to follow the Heles rationale and instead held that the right to counsel does not apply prior to the administration of a blood-alcohol test. Id. ¶ 21. Even if we were to apply the reasoning of Heles, the facts of that case, like those of O'Connell, pivot on one key distinction. In Heles and O'Connell, both courts addressed the possibility that the reading of Miranda warnings had confused the defendants about general rights to counsel and the absence of that right under implied consent laws. Heles, 530 F. Supp. at 649; O'Connell, 555 A.2d at 874. Fears that confused defendants might be misled into making uninformed and unknowing decisions to take the test prompted creation of the O'Connell warning. O'Connell, 555 A.2d at 878. [10] ¶ 22. A minority of other jurisdictions apply the confusion doctrine to situations in which a defendant might be misled by the interplay between Miranda rights and the lack of right to counsel under implied consent laws. See Gentry v. State, 938 P.2d 693, 696-97 (Mont. 1997) (collecting cases). Under the confusion doctrine, a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test will be excused if the defendant believed he or she had the right to invoke counsel before taking the test. Williams v. State, 973 P.2d 218, 221 (Mont. 1999). A defendant's access to the confusion doctrine, however, is premised on a reading of Miranda rights and a showing that the defendant actually was confused. Gentry, 938 P.2d at 696-97; McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 119 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807-08 (Cal. App. 1975); Haas v. State Dep't of Licensing, 641 P.2d 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Ehrlich v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d 211, 214 (N.D. 1991). [6] ¶ 23. Wisconsin has not adopted the confusion doctrine. In part, its application is unnecessary because Miranda warnings are not required in the implied consent setting. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d at 133-34. In addition, the provisions of the statute are neither confusing nor contradictory. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 693-94. Thus, our courts do not recognize subjective confusion as a defense. County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 280, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). [11] Even when a defendant claims confusion about the provisions of the Informing the Accused Form, repeated readings of its clear and unequivocal language trump a confusion defense. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 206. ¶ 24. In this case, Reitter does not rely on a confusion theory. Reitter advances neither of the two premises other states require for the defense: reading of Miranda rights and a showing of actual confusion. [12] Even if we were to extend the confusion doctrine to Wisconsin, this is not the case in which to do so. [13] Had Reitter claimed his insistence for a lawyer fell under the shadow of a Miranda warning, he might have made an argument for obligating the State to clarify any resulting right to counsel confusion. Instead, Reitter offers little that would tempt us toward embarking down the tangled O'Connell path. ¶ 25. This court has been reluctant to devise a `Miranda -like' card under the implied consent statute. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692. The legislature decides what must be told to persons before the administration of a chemical test, Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 259, and it is for the legislature, not this court, to add to the statutory scheme. ¶ 26. Although in Bryant we observed that the Informing the Accused Form could benefit from simplification, this court chose not to graft judicial language onto the statutory procedures. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692-93. Noting that police officers in the implied consent setting read instructions to defendants who may be intoxicated, we urged the Department of Transportation to adopt language that was plain and as simple and straightforward as possible. Id. at 693. We declined, however, to take the further step of telling the Department precisely how it should modify those forms. Id. ¶ 27. We conclude that an officer's only duty under these circumstances is to administer the information contained in the Informing the Accused Form. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 284. The simplified procedure envisioned in Bryant would be contradicted by obligating officers to inform defendants about rights they do not have. Requiring officers to address nonexistent rights undercuts the simple and straightforward approach and risks confusing a potentially intoxicated defendant. If police move beyond the consistent statutory procedures and attempt to explain the law's parameters, defendants will ignite the confusion defense. See id. at 273. Explanations that exceed the statute's language would cause an oversupply of information and encourage misled defendants to challenge an officer's compliance with statutory requirements. See id. at 280. This result would frustrate the legislature's intention to facilitate drunk driving convictions by offering defendants an avenue for litigating which presumed rights merit inclusion in an officer's explanation. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692 (admonishing frequent litigation of implied consent issues). ¶ 28. We therefore hold that where a defendant exhibits no confusion, the officer is under no affirmative duty to advise the defendant that the right to counsel does not attach to the implied consent statute. ¶ 29. Although we decline to impose duties beyond those created by the legislature, we prefer that every officer respond to defendants in a manner that is both direct and polite. Good practice should lead professional, courteous officers to advise insistent defendants that the right to counsel does not apply to chemical tests. Where a driver repeatedly asks to speak with an attorney, it would be courteous and simple for the officer to correct the accused's mistaken assumptions. Certainly officers must be cautious about engaging in explanations that exceed the statutory requirements and risk providing the defendant with an oversupply of information. Nonetheless, we see no harm in allowing the officer to state briefly that the right to counsel does not attach to the implied consent setting. [14] That said, we do see harm in transforming a common courtesy into an affirmative duty judicially superimposed on a legislative scheme. ¶ 30. We turn to the first of Reitter's two more specific arguments. Reitter contends that the circuit court erroneously revoked his driving privileges because Deputy Sipher failed to comply with the warning requirements of the implied consent statute. [7] ¶ 31. If an arresting officer fails to comply substantially with the statute, an order of revocation will be reversed. State v. Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d 709, 713, 503 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d 243, 249-50, 448 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1989)). Section 343.305(9)(a)5.b. of the Wisconsin Statutes requires arresting officers to inform defendants orally about subsection (4) or both subsections (4) and (4m). [15] The Informing the Accused Form conveys the duties of subsection (4) and complies with the statutory mandate. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 684. [8] ¶ 32. To contest the sufficiency of the statutory warning, a defendant must satisfy a three-pronged test, showing that: (1) the arresting officer either failed to meet or exceeded his or her duty to inform the accused driver under subsections (4) and (4m); (2) the lack or oversupply of information misled the accused driver; and (3) the arresting officer's failure to inform the driver affected the driver's ability to make a choice about submitting to the chemical test. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 280. ¶ 33. In this case, Deputy Sipher complied substantially with the first prong when he read the Informing the Accused Form to Reitter five times. Reitter contends Deputy Sipher violated the statutory guidelines because he made minor omissions in completing the Informing the Accused Form. [16] The statute, however, only requires arresting officers to inform defendants orally about the law; it does not mandate written completion of the form, and it does not obligate officers to fill out the form in any particular manner. Where officers fulfill the essential statutory requirements, substantial compliance is not fatal to an officer's execution of the implied consent statute. Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d at 250. ¶ 34. Reitter also fails to show that Deputy Sipher did not comply substantially with the second and third prongs of the test. Under the second prong, Deputy Sipher created neither a lack nor an oversupply of information that might mislead Reitter: on the contrary, Deputy Sipher rigidly followed the script of the Informing the Accused Form. [17] Thus, under the third prong, Deputy Sipher's level of compliance did not compromise Reitter's decision about whether to submit to the test. [9] ¶ 35. Because we find Deputy Sipher complied substantially with the implied consent statute, we conclude that the circuit court's revocation of Reitter's driving privileges was not in error. ¶ 36. We now address Reitter's second specific argument, namely that his repeated requests for an attorney did not constitute an unlawful refusal. When a Wisconsin driver gives implied consent to chemical testing, the driver has no right to refuse a test. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 48 (citing Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 255-57). Thus, any failure to submit to such a test constitutes refusal and triggers the statutory penalties. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 106. The statute only excuses failures resulting from physical disability or disease unrelated to the use of alcohol or controlled substances. Wis. Stat. § 343.305(9)(a)5.c.; Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 106 (citing Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 191, 366 N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1985)). [10] ¶ 37. The implied consent law does not require a verbal refusal. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 106. Rather, the conduct of the defendant may constitute an unlawful refusal. Id. Conduct that is uncooperative or that prevents an officer from obtaining a breath sample results in refusal. Id. [I]t is the reality of the situation that must govern, and a refusal in fact, regardless of the words that accompany it, can be as convincing as an express verbal refusal. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d at 192 (quoting Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Utah, 1979)). Thus, where a defendant's only conduct is an insistence on using the restroom, and the officer repeats the request to administer the test at least five times, the failure to submit constitutes a refusal. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 107. ¶ 38. A defendant who conditions submission to a chemical test upon the ability to confer with an attorney refuses to take the test. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 205. [18] In Neitzel, the arresting officer gave the defendant the opportunity to call an attorney prior to the administration of the chemical test. Id. at 195. Subsequently, the officer warned the defendant several more times that insistence on waiting for his lawyer would be construed as a refusal to take the test. Id. at 196. [19] This advisement, combined with the officer's repeated explanations in the clear language of the Informing the Accused Form, led this court to find that the Neitzel defendant had refused the test. Id. at 206. ¶ 39. In this case, Reitter contends he never articulated a refusal; [20] on the contrary, he told Deputy Roscizewski I'm not refusing. But Reitter's actions ring louder than his articulated words, and regardless of his words, he refused in fact. Like the Rydeski defendant, Reitter engaged in at least five exchanges with the deputies and prevented the officers from administering the test. Like the Neitzel defendant, Reitter listened to repeated readings of the Informing the Accused Form and was warned that his conduct could result in a refusal. Nonetheless, Reitter refused to answer Deputy Sipher's repeated question. Reitter was uncooperative and belligerent. Both Deputy Sipher and Deputy Roscizewski correctly concluded that Reitter had no plans to take the test until he had an opportunity to speak with his attorney. [11] ¶ 40. We thus find that Reitter's conduct constituted a constructive refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test.