Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legal standards governing defendant's claims

Text: Most of defendant's claims allege either that the State improperly withheld exculpatory evidence from defendant or that defense counsel did not adequately represent defendant at trial. Accordingly, we proceed to discuss the legal standards that will be applied to those two types of allegations. In State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 678 A. 2d 642 (1996), we summarized the scope of the State's constitutional obligation to provide criminal defendants with exculpatory evidence in the State's possession: In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215, 218 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Subsequent Supreme Court cases significantly expanded the scope of the Brady rule. For example, in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed. 2d 342, 351-52 (1976), the Court stated that the rule applies where the defendant has made only a general request for all  Brady material and even where the defendant has not made any request at all. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed. 2d 481, 490 (1985), the Court confirmed that Brady encompasses evidence that the defendant might have used to impeach government witnesses.... Most recently, in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1560, 131 L.Ed. 2d 490, 498 (1995), the Court emphasized that where multiple items of evidence have been suppressed, the prosecution's Brady obligation turns on the cumulative effect of such evidence. Thus, courts are obligated to consider the State's non-disclosures collectively, not item-by-item. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1567, 131 L.Ed. 2d at 507. [ Id. at 245-46, 678 A. 2d 642.] The focus of the Brady analysis often is whether evidence is sufficiently material to the defendant's case to come within the State's Brady obligation. In Knight, supra, we recounted the evolution of the test used by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether suppressed evidence is material for Brady purposes: In Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 104-112, 96 S.Ct. at 2398-2402, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 350-55, the Court stated that the standard for ascertaining whether suppressed evidence is material depends on the specificity of the defendant's initial request for the evidence in question. In cases where a specific request has been made, reversal would be required if the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2398, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 350. If the defendant has made only a general request for  Brady material or no request, reversal would be necessary if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Id. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2402, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 355. However, the Court subsequently abandoned the distinction set forth in Agurs, and held that, regardless of the specificity of the defendant's request, evidence is material for Brady purposes if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 494 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 496 (White, J., concurring); see Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1565, 131 L.Ed. 2d at 505. [145 N.J. at 246, 678 A. 2d 642.] In respect of whether New Jersey state law calls for a materiality test less demanding than that set forth in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed. 2d 481 (1985), we have stated: We look to the standard set forth in Bagley, supra, to resolve th[e materiality] issue. In State v. Marshall [I], 123 N.J. 1, 199-200, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), this Court declined to apply the Bagley materiality test where the defendant had made a specific request for the suppressed evidence, applying instead the specific-request standard found in Agurs. See also State v. Florez, 134 N.J. 570, 593, 636 A. 2d 1040 (1994) (noting, in dicta, two-tier approach that this Court has taken in Brady cases). However, the record in this case indicates that [the defendant] made no specific request for the Brady materials at issue. Accordingly, we need not resolve whether, as a matter of state law, we will continue to apply the less demanding Agurs test to the State's non-disclosures in a specific-request context. We recognize, however, that Bagley 's unitary standard is simpler to apply and that the difference between the Agurs and Bagley materiality standards may not be sufficiently substantial to justify retention of two different materiality tests for Brady violations. To the extent that Marshall [I] is inconsistent with that recognition, Marshall [I] may be understood to reflect our view that the defendant in that case had not established the materiality of the Brady violation even under the less demanding standard imposed by Agurs in specific-request situations. [ Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 247, 678 A. 2d 642.] We continue to adhere to the views we expressed in Knight concerning the advantages of the unitary Bagley standard, and we perceive no state-law basis on which to depart from the use of that standard in Brady cases. Thus, in this case we apply the Bagley test to all of the State's nondisclosures, including those that relate to documents that defendant had specifically requested before trial. In all instances, evidence is material for Brady purposes if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, supra, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 494 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385, 87 L.Ed. 2d at 496 (White, J., concurring). Defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are evaluated under the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984). In that case, the United States Supreme Court explained that a convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require a reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Ibid.; see State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987) (adopting Strickland test and recogniz[ing] the soundness and efficacy of both the substance and formulation of that test in defining state constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel). To establish that defense counsel was constitutionally deficient, the defendant must persuade the court that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. More specifically, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. The Strickland Court emphasized that [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694. A court evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must avoid second-guessing defense counsel's tactical decisions and viewing those decisions under the distorting effects of hindsight. Ibid. Because of the inherent difficulty in evaluating defense counsel's performance solely on the basis of the circumstances existing at the time of trial, the Strickland Court admonished courts to indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... Ibid. The second prong of a meritorious Strickland claim, the prejudice component, requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. Specifically, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. In making that evaluation, the court must consider the quantum and quality of evidence. As the Strickland Court noted, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support. Id. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 699. Before turning to the merits of the claims raised in defendant's petition for PCR, we also address the preliminary showing that a defendant must make to obtain an evidentiary hearing on PCR claims. Although no PCR rule requires that evidentiary hearings be held on PCR petitions, Rule 3:22-10 recognizes that the PCR court may exercise its discretion to conduct evidentiary hearings at which oral testimony is taken. See Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462, 609 A. 2d 1280. Post-conviction relief courts ordinarily should grant evidentiary hearings ... if a defendant has presented a prima facie [case] in support of post-conviction relief. Ibid. To establish such a prima facie case, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the merits. See id. at 463, 609 A. 2d 1280. Thus, in determining the propriety of an evidentiary hearing, the PCR court should ascertain whether the defendant would be entitled to post-conviction relief if the facts were viewed in the light most favorable to defendant. See id. at 462-63, 609 A. 2d 1280. If that inquiry is answered affirmatively, then the defendant generally is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in order to prove the allegations. We observe, however, that there is a pragmatic dimension to the PCR court's determination. If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief, see State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 590, 550 A. 2d 752 (App.Div. 1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 78, 556 A. 2d 1220 (1989), or that the defendant's allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing, see Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462-64, 609 A. 2d 1280; State v. Odom, 113 N.J. Super. 186, 192, 273 A. 2d 379 (App.Div. 1971), then an evidentiary hearing need not be granted. In response to an argument made by defendant in this case, we further note that an evidentiary hearing should not be granted for the purpose of permitting a defendant to investigate whether the State has failed to deliver discoverable materials to the defendant. The purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to permit the defendant to prove that he or she was improperly convicted or sentenced; it is not an occasion for the defendant to question witnesses in an indiscriminate search for additional grounds for post-conviction relief. In Section V, infra, we explain the proper means for obtaining discovery in PCR proceedings.