Opinion ID: 3014069
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Heading: reasonable for a state to omit a

Text: provision for notice and a hearing in a Benn claims that MCES, Dr. statute created to deal with emergencies, Mukerjee, Dr. Zerby, and Dr. Quasim, all particularly where the deprivation at issue, of whom conceded that they were state in this case detention for a maximum of actors for purposes of the motion for several hours to permit an examination, summary judgment, violated both his continues for only a short period of time.” procedural and substantive due process Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 870 rights. We disagree. (3d. Cir. 1999); see also Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 974 (2d Cir. 1983);
(E.D.Pa. Dec. 30 1996); Luna v. Zandt, Benn argues that MCES and its 554 F.Supp. 68, 76 (S.D.Tex. 1982). doctors violated procedural due process by failing to comply with the MHPA and by Benn’s case clearly presented an failing to grant him a hearing before he emergency situation. Both his calls to the was involuntarily confined. This argument Horsham clinic and his note at the bottom 10 of his Contract for Safety suggested to the it may fairly be said to shock the doctors that Benn was highly unstable. contemporary conscience.” County of Furthermore, he was committed for a Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847, “short period of time” and was released fn. 8 (1998). Whether an incident “shocks upon Dr. M ukerjee’s evaluation that he the conscience” is a matter of law for the was no longer suicidal. While committed, courts to decide, see Rochin v. California, Benn was constantly evaluated by the 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), and we have MCES physicia ns. Under these pr e viously he ld that involun ta ry circumstances, we hold that the defendants commitment under the MHPA does not in did not violate Benn’s rights by not itself violate substantive due process. See granting him a hearing before he was Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d at 871 n. committed. 4 (“[T]he MHPA authorizes seizures that are ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Third, we see no evidentiary basis Amendment [and so] the MHPA meets the in the record for Benn’s claim that MCES rationality test imposed by substantive due maintains a policy that denied him his due process analysis.”) process rights. On the contrary, MCES guidelines track the MHPA, which does In this case, none of the specific not deny due process. See Monell v. conduct that Benn alleges shocks the Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. conscience. First, Benn’s complaints 658, 694 (1978). In sum, we hold that about Drs. Zerby or Mukerjee are Benn’s procedural due process rights were insufficient. Benn claims that Drs. Zerby not violated. a n d M u k e r j e e e x h i b i te d “ t o t a l incompetenc[e] . . . . [by failing] to
suicidal ideation which merited his Benn appears to argue that his involuntary confinement.” B r. of substantive due process rights were Appellants at 13. But whether or not Drs. violated in three ways. First, he claims Zerby and Mukerjee properly analyzed th a t D r s . Zerb y and M uker je e Benn’s condition, their conduct did not incompetently failed to recognize that he violate substantive due process. In view of was not suicidal. Second, he asserts that the events that led to Benn’s commitment he was kept in a room without a toilet. and the steps taken after his arrival at Third, he claims that he was forcibly given MCES, the doctors’ conduct was not antipsychotic medication. conscience-shocking. “[I]n a due process challenge to Second, Benn’s allegation that he executive action, the threshold question is was temporarily kept in a room without a whether the behavior of the governmental toilet is insufficient without further officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that aggravating evidence to meet the high 11 standard needed to state a substantive due m i s c onduct or gro ss process violation. As the District Court n e g l i g en c e , a c o u n ty pointed out, Benn failed to produce any administrator, a director of a evidence that the defendants were aware facility, a physician, a peace that he needed to use a bathroom or that o f f ic e r or a ny o t h er “MCES had a custom or policy of refusing authorized person who to allow patients to use the bathroom.” participates in a decision App. 31. that a person be examined or treated under this act, or that Third, the administration of a person be discharged, or antipsychotic drugs is not shocking to the placed under partia l conscience under the circumstances hospitalization, outpatient present here. We have held that care or leave of absence, or authorities may administer antipsychotic that the restraint upon such drugs over a patient’s objection “where the pers o n b e o t h e rwis e decision is a product of the authorities’ reduced, or a county professional judgment.” White v. administrator or other Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 112 (3d Cir. authorized person who 1990). See also Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d denies an application for 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983). In this case, voluntary treatment or for however, as the District Court noted, Benn involunta r y e me r ge ncy has not alleged that he objected to the examination and treatment, administration of the medication. App. 32. shall not be civilly or Under these circumstances, Dr. Zerby’s criminally liable for such conduct did not shock the conscience. decision or for any of its consequences.