Opinion ID: 1980604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Child Molestation Charges

Text: Finally, Taylor argues that the trial court should have excluded evidence relating to Tawana's charges that he molested her. First, he claims that the information was inadmissible because it was introduced to show his bad character and was unfairly prejudicial. Second, he argues that part of the testimony given by the officer in charge of Tawana's complaint was hearsay. At trial, the State introduced a four-count information, filed March 5, 1990, charging that in 1985 Taylor unlawfully fondled, touched, and had sexual intercourse with Tawana. The information also alleged that in 1987, he unlawfully fondled, touched, and had unlawful sexual conduct with her. In addition, Monica Endres, the officer who handled the case, testified about the circumstances surrounding the charges and recounted Tawana's explanation for the delay in coming forward. The exchange between the prosecutor and Officer Endres follows: Q: And when you talked with Tawana Smith, was she able to indicate to you why it took so long for her to come forward with some of the allegations contained in that information? A: Yes.... She said she was scared to tell, thinking no one would believe her, and also Mr. Taylor had threatened to kill her if she talked to anyone. R. at 1691-92. In Indiana's courts, [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... Lannan v. State (1992), Ind., 600 N.E.2d 1334,1336 n. 4 (adopting Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)). If a court finds that the evidence was offered to prove something other than the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit the charged crime, it must then determine whether its prejudicial impact substantially outweighs its probative value. Hardin v. State (1993), Ind., 611 N.E.2d 123, 128 (adopting Fed.R.Evid. 403). The State introduced the information to demonstrate Taylor's motive for killing Tawana. Its theory was that Taylor became so angry at Tawana and Phyllis for accusing him of child molesting that he lashed out at them. [10] While evidence of past sexual misconduct with children may be highly prejudicial, its probative value in this case was not substantially outweighed. We note that the State did not present details of alleged acts of abuse, but properly focused on the fact that the charges were made. [11] The trial court acted within its discretion in admitting this evidence. On the other hand, Officer Endres' testimony about Tawana's statements presents a related, but different, problem. Generally, a witness may not testify about out-of-court statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted. If the officer's statement was offered to prove that Taylor actually threatened or intended to kill Tawana, then it was hearsay. There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this rule. We have permitted testimony regarding the victim's state of mind to show the intent of the victim to act in a particular way. Carter v. State (1986), Ind., 501 N.E.2d 439, 441-42, (citing Mutual Life Ins. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285,12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892)); see also Dunaway v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 682, 686 (The statements indicate a fearful state of mind which would circumstantially explain her later action of attempting to hit defendant.). Such evidence is also admissible where the defendant puts the victim's state of mind in issue. See Lock v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 1155, 1159-60, cert. denied, 503 U.S. 991, 112 S.Ct. 1686, 118 L.Ed.2d 400 (1992) (We find that the statements made by the victim were properly admitted to prove that the relationship between the daughter and the victim was not completely benign, contrary to Lock's assertions at trial.). Finally, we have allowed such testimony in limited circumstances to explain physical injuries suffered by the victim at the hands of the defendant. See Nicks v. State (1992), Ind., 598 N.E.2d 520. Officer Endres's testimony about Tawana's statements is mixed hearsay and non-hearsay, and therefore does not clearly fall into any category. The first part of her statement, regarding the victim's state of mind, comes within the named exceptions to the hearsay rule. The second part, that Taylor had threatened to kill Tawana in order to quiet her, related to Taylor's conduct and therefore is inadmissible hearsay. That statement should have been excluded or stricken. Whether the admission of that single sentence requires reversal, however, is another matter. [12] We conclude the error was harmless because its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties. Fleener v. State (1995), Ind., 656 N.E.2d 1140. The eyewitness testimony of Renica Johnson and Nicole Durham that Taylor single-mindedly searched for Tawana while brandishing a .38 caliber revolver is evidence of intent to kill, and Nicole's testimony regarding Tawana's telephone conversation with Taylor earlier that evening yielded evidence that Taylor was enraged because of the child molestation charges. Additionally, Taylor's letter to Cathy Smith, [13] written prior to the murder, clearly demonstrates Taylor's hostile animus towards Tawana and Phyllis Smith. Taylor wrote: [T]oday we are all going to die. I'm going to send these witches to hell and I'm going too. Just to make sure they never raise [sic] again. [G]oing to miss you[,] Zake and Rhon. R. at 1628 (word stricken in original omitted). The record thus contains ample evidence that Taylor intended to kill Tawana and Phyllis in order to exact revenge. Taylor wrote the words today we are going to die before arriving at Phyllis Smith's apartment. [14] The State also provided evidence of Taylor's sanity via expert testimony. Incontroverted evidence showed that Taylor fled to Georgia after he attacked Tawana and Phyllis. These acts certainly demonstrated his appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct. The jury clearly understood that mental illness and insanity were important issues; it weighed the conflicting expert testimony, eventually concluding that Taylor was mentally ill. [15] In light of the evidence and the jury verdicts, we conclude that Taylor was not unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the officer's statement.