Opinion ID: 1869140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Case Number 1940756Hall's Appeal

Text: Hall contends that the trial court erred in holding him liable as a matter of law for the amount Nationwide paid in settlement plus expenses and interest that remained after the contribution that we ordered from Alfa in Nationwide I. He contends that the trial court misinterpreted our holding in Nationwide I as it concerned his liability under the management agreement. Nationwide contends that the holding in Nationwide I as to Hall's liability under the management agreement mandates the summary judgment entered against Hall. In support of this contention, it quotes the following portion of our discussion in Nationwide I: [W]e conclude that Friedlander and Hall expressed in clear and unambiguous language an intention that Hall would indemnify Friedlander for all liability for damages arising from property damage in connection with the management of the apartment building and for all liability for personal injury suffered on the premises of the apartments. 643 So.2d at 557 (emphasis in original). This statement, Nationwide contends, indicates that Nationwide I held Hall to be liable, personally and individually, to indemnify Friedlander fully for the amount it paid to settle Packer's claims against it, which holding, it contends, is the law of this case. We disagree with Nationwide's contentions. On its face and considered alone, this statement might suggest that we had, in fact, determined all aspects of Hall's liability under the management agreement. That suggestion must be rejected, however, because we did not intend by that statement to blur the distinction between the species of claim to be indemnified and the extent of personal liability for, or mode of satisfaction of, that claima distinction that is crucial to this case. The only issue presented in Nationwide I by the trial court's ex mero motu disposition of Nationwide's breach-of-contract claim involved the species of liability arising under the management agreement. That issue was presented in the context of the rule adopted in Industrial Tile, Inc. v. Stewart, 388 So.2d 171 (Ala.1980), stated in Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 431 So.2d 932 (Ala.1983), as follows: [I]ndemnification for one's own negligence is available only where `the parties knowingly, even-handedly, and for valid consideration intelligently enter into an agreement whereby one party agrees to indemnify the other, including indemnity against the indemnitee's own wrongs, if expressed in clear and unequivocal language,' (emphasis added [in Brown ]), 388 So.2d at 176. 431 So.2d at 945 (first emphasis added). Thus, the narrow issue in Nationwide I relating to Hall was whether the provision in the management agreement under which Hall agreed to indemnify Friedlander from all damage suits and claims arising in connection with [the] property and from all liability for injuries to persons or property while in, on, or about the premises, evidenced clear[ly] and unequivocal[ly], Industrial Tile, 388 So.2d at 176, an intent on Hall's part to include indemnity for claims arising from Friedlander's own negligence, although the management agreement contained no language specifically referring to the negligence of [Friedlander]. Nationwide I, 643 So.2d at 556 (emphasis added). In concluding that it expressed that intent sufficiently to satisfy the rule, we answered the narrow question as to what was to be indemnified, namely, claims based on Friedlander's negligence. But we did not consider, address, or decide whether the management agreement was clear and unambiguous in every other respect. In particular, we did not consider whether the management agreement was ambiguous as to how Friedlander was to be indemnified, that is, whether he was to be indemnified solely through liability coverage, as Hall construes it, or through a combination of insurance and Hall's personal assets, as the trial court held. That question is a separate one and is the one we now address. As to the manner in which Friedlander was to be indemnified, the management agreementwhich was drafted by Friedlander provided: [Hall] agrees to carry, at his own expense, appropriate amounts of public liability insurance and such other liability insurance as may be reasonably applicable to this property[;] said policies shall be so endorsed as to protect [Friedlander] in the same manner and to the same extent as [Hall]. If these policies or endorsements are not furnished to [Friedlander] within 10 days after execution of this agreement, coverage may be secured by [Friedlander] and charged to [Hall], although [Friedlander] does not assume this responsibility. (Emphasis added.) The management agreement, including this provision in particular, is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible [of] more than one meaning. Files v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 554 So.2d 1068, 1069 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). Indeed, [t]he writing is un ambiguous if only one reasonable meaning clearly emerges. Id. (Emphasis added.) The agreement we have here is not an unambiguous writing. The first provision emphasized above requires Hall to purchase insurance in an amount sufficient to protect him and Friedlander equally. Arguably, at least, Hall and Friedlander would not be protected equally if, as Nationwide contends, Hall may be required to indemnify Friedlander from his personal assets. They would be protected equally only if Hall carried liability insurance in an amount sufficient to reimburse Friedlander fully for any claims against him. The second provision emphasized above further supports this construction. Pursuant to that provision, Friedlander could purchaseat Hall's expenseany amount of insurance it deemed necessary to ensure that it would be indemnified fully from claims against it. The logic of this latter provision loses much of its force under the position advanced by Nationwide. Nationwide, moreover, has essentially conceded the ambiguity of this provision. Specifically, at page 7 of the Appellant's Response to Application for Rehearing filed in this Court following its opinion in Nationwide I, Nationwide stated: Justice Houston, in dissent, raises the issue of whether the indemnity provision is ambiguous because, in addition to the hold harmless language, it also required Hall to carry liability insurance, thus raising an inference that Hall's liability may be limited to the `appropriate amounts of public liability insurance' that he was required to carry `to protect agent [Friedlander] in the same manner and to the same extent as owner [Hall].' While this concern is valid, it is premature. This Court's original opinion, remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, will give the trial court and the parties a chance to resolve that issue, which had not arisen under the trial court's previous ruling. It may well develop, either by agreement or ruling of the trial court, that Hall will not face personal liability in excess of that covered by his Alfa policy. (Emphasis added.) For these reasons, we cannot say that Hall's interpretation of the management agreement, although not the only one possible, is unreasonable, and, consequently, we cannot say that the management agreement is un ambiguous in this respect. Having concluded, as it is within our province to do, Dill v. Blakeney, 568 So.2d 774, 778 (Ala.1990), that the management agreement is ambiguous, we note that its meaning may be clarified by parol evidence of facts and circumstances aliunde and in pais.  Foster & Creighton Co. v. Box, 259 Ala. 474, 478, 66 So.2d 746, 750 (1953). In a case such as this one, and [w]hen ... there is such evidence[,] it becomes the province of the jury to ascertain the truth of the evidence and draw inferences from [it], and then on proper instructions interpret the contract in the light of the facts established by the evidence. Id. In opposition to Nationwide's summary judgment motion, Hall presented an affidavit, stating in pertinent part: At the time of this incident I was insured under a policy of insurance issued by [Alfa].... My insurance company, [Alfa], paid $300,000.00 to the Plaintiffs in the lawsuit entitled Packer v. Friedlander Realty, Inc., CV-88-2276 in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, to settle this matter. It is my understanding that the Supreme Court of Alabama has now required [Alfa] to pay an additional sum to [Nationwide] because [Friedlander] was an insured under the Nationwide policies and the Alfa policy. I enclose a complete copy of the [Nationwide] insurance policy and the excess liability insurance policy of Nationwide issued to [Friedlander]. These two policies provide $1,000,000.00 each in liability coverage.... These were the policies that were produced by Nationwide in a Federal Court declaratory judgment action between Nationwide and Friedlander, to which neither I nor [Alfa] was a party. That case was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern Division, and was Civil Action No. 89-0190-B. When I signed the management contract with [Friedlander], I met with Robert Keith of Friedlander, Inc. I provided the name of my insurance agent on the management agreement. There was not much discussion about the contract. I read the contract and the portion concerning indemnity.... It was my understanding from reading the contract that if my policy or the limits of that policy were not appropriate in amount to completely cover the indemnity clause in the management agreement, then [Friedlander] could obtain its own insurance coverage and I would be charged for the premium. It was never my understanding from my discussions with Robert Keith, and my reading of this contract, that I would be exposed to an open-ended indemnity agreement regardless of the amount of insurance available to me under [Alfa's] policy and notwithstanding the total amount of insurance available to [Friedlander]. In summary, the trial court was not bound by Nationwide I, as it apparently thought itself to be, to hold that the management agreement unambiguously required Hall to indemnify Friedlander from his personal assets for the amount of the claim exceeding the policy limits. On the contrary, the ambiguity of the provisions as to whether Friedlander was to be indemnified from Hall's personal assets, coupled with the extraneous evidence produced, precluded a summary judgment for Nationwide. Cf. J. Paul Jones Hosp. v. Jackson, Coker & Assocs., 491 So.2d 972 (Ala.Civ.App.1986) (Ambiguity in the contract precludes ... summary judgment). Consequently, as to Hall, the summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.