Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maryland ERA Jurisprudence Before Burning Tree I

Text: Because I disagree with the majority about the meaning and purpose of the ERA, and because the legislative history of the ERA is so sparse, [14] I set out in some detail the principal cases interpreting the ERA decided by this Court before Burning Tree I, in the period between 1972 and 1985, because they afford better guidance regarding the interpretation of the ERA than any other extant source. That case law provides the backdrop for the opinions in Burning Tree I and supports the position that strict scrutiny applies in the instant case. In Maryland State Board of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 498, 312 A.2d at 217-18, a group of cosmetologists mounted a constitutional challenge to a statutory scheme that prohibited them from cutting and shampooing men's hair on the same basis as women's. One of the statutes at issue, Section 529(a) of Article 43, Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Supp.), defined the professional services performed by cosmetologists as work . . . for the embellishment, cleanliness and beautification of women's hair. [15] A different statute, Section 323 of Article 43, Maryland Code (1957, 1973 Supp.), defined the corresponding services performed by barbers without limitation to the sex of the client. [16] Under this scheme, cosmetologists who applied to men's hair the same techniques they customarily used on women's hair, risked the loss of their licenses and even criminal prosecution. Kuhn, 270 Md. at 500-01, 312 A.2d at 218-19. In holding that Article 46 was inapplicable, id. at 505-06, 312 A.2d at 221-22, this Court said that the statute [did] not discriminate against cosmetologists of either sex; nor, for that matter, [was] there discrimination based on sex between barbers. Id. at 505, 312 A.2d at 221. The Court conceded that if a group of males, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, were complaining that because of their sex, they were being denied the services of cosmetologists, the result would have been different. Id. at 505-06, 312 A.2d at 221. Rather, Article 46 was inapplicable because the statute at issue treated every cosmetologist and barber exactly the same, and because the victims of discrimination were not parties to the case. Therefore, Kuhn stands for the proposition that sex-based classifications trigger the ERA if the challenging party is the target of discrimination. [17] In Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. at 510-11, 374 A.2d at 902, this Court considered whether the common law duty of paternal support of minor children survived the enactment of the ERA. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held: The words of the E.R.A. are clear and unambiguous; they say without equivocation that Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex. This language mandating equality of rights can only mean that sex is not a factor. Id. at 511-12, 374 A.2d at 902-03. Therefore, the ERA mandated that the parental duty of child support was shared jointly by both parents, in derogation of the common law rule. Id. at 517, 374 A.2d at 905. In its interpretation of the Maryland ERA, the Rand Court examined cases from a number of other states construing similar provisions in their own constitutions. Id. at 512-16, 374 A.2d at 903-05. At the conclusion of its analysis, a unanimous Court stated: It is thus clear that the tests employed under constitutional provisions dealing with equality of rights range from absolute to permissive. Like the Supreme Court of Washington, however, we believe that the broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the amendment is cogent evidence that the people of Maryland are fully committed to equal rights for men and women. The adoption of the E.R.A. in this [S]tate was intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity of sex-based classifications. Id. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 904-05. Because the Supreme Court of Washington did not consider whether the sex-based classification at issue . . . satisfied the rational relationship or strict scrutiny test, but instead found an `overriding compelling state interest' intrinsic to the ERA, id. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903, [18] the clear implication is that this Court endorsed a near-absolute level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications. Other cases prior to Burning Tree I invalidated sex-based classifications on the basis of Article 46. For example, in Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980), this Court considered whether the common law cause of action for criminal conversation remained viable in light of the ERA. At common law, the cause of action for criminal conversation was available only to a man. The gravamen of this action was adultery. Its elements consisted of a valid marriage and an act of sexual intercourse between a married woman and a man other than her husband. The fact that the wife consented, that she was the aggressor, that she represented herself as single, that she was mistreated or neglected by her husband, that she and her husband were separated through no fault of her own, or that her husband was impotent, were not valid defenses. Id. at 586-87, 414 A.2d at 930 (citations omitted). The Court applied Article 46, as construed in Rand, to abrogate the cause of action for criminal conversation. Id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933. In the present case, the majority interprets Kline to buttress its view that the ERA must be applied under a benefits/burdens analysis. See op. at 258-59 & n. 24, 932 A.2d at 594 & n. 24; Kline, 287 Md. at 592, 414 A.2d at 932 (explicating this Court's holding that it would be unconstitutional to impose a burden on fathers which was not equally imposed on mothers); id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933 (Thus, Maryland's law provides different benefits for and imposes different burdens upon its citizens based solely upon their sex. Such a result violates the ERA.). That view is simply a consequence of the particular issue posed in Kline, where the common law rule, like most sex-based classification schemes, drew categorical distinctions between males and females as classes. A more accurate interpretation of Kline results from a comparison of the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in that case. Because the elements of the tort of criminal conversation were a valid marriage and an act of sexual intercourse between the wife and a man other than her husband, it is obvious that the wife lacked a legally cognizable cause of action against the (hypothetical) mistress of her husband, whereas, at common law, the husband had a valid cause of action against the paramour of his wife. Kline, 287 Md. at 586-87, 414 A.2d at 930. But for the fact that the husband was male, he would have been unable to sustain the cause of action. It was obvious to the Court that the unequal rights under the law enjoyed by the wife, compared to the husband, could not survive the scrutiny mandated by the ERA. Id. at 593, 414 A.2d at 933 (A man has a cause of action for criminal conversation, but a woman does not.). The same conclusion results from a comparison of the legal obligations of the paramour and a hypothetical female mistress of the husband. At common law as it existed in this State up to 1980, for the act of engaging in sexual relations with the wife, the paramour was liable for damages to the husband. But for the fact he was male, the paramour would have suffered no liability. The hypothetical female mistress in our example could not have been sued for criminal conversation if she had engaged in sexual relations with the husband, even though she had engaged in the same conduct as the paramour. Clearly, such a sex-based classification scheme could not withstand the scrutiny mandated by the ERA. Id. (The common law cause of action for criminal conversation . . . cannot be reconciled with our commitment to equality of the sexes.). Therefore, the conclusion drawn from Kline is that analysis of sex-based classifications focuses on the rights and obligations of the particular person affected by the classification. See also Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 70, 501 A.2d at 825 (opinion of Murphy, C.J.) (The equality between the sexes mandated by the Maryland E.R.A. is of `rights' of individuals `under the law.')(emphasis added). Assuming other personal characteristics are held constant, the appropriate analysis under the ERA should compare the person affected by the challenged classification with a similarly situated person of the opposite sex, and then determine whether her rights or obligations have been altered. Viewed through this lens, it becomes clear that every sex-based classification that fails the benefits/burdens test must necessarily fail strict scrutiny at the individual level. This Court applied that analysis in the time span from 1972 until Burning Tree I. See Kline, 287 Md. at 591, 414 A.2d at 932, where the Court quoted approvingly from Rand's language that [t]he adoption of the E.R.A. in this state was intended to, and did, drastically alter traditional views of the validity of sex-based classifications. Rand, 280 Md. at 515-16, 374 A.2d at 905. It is also noteworthy that the Kline Court examined the legislative history surrounding criminal conversation and determined that, standing alone, history would have supported the inference that the General Assembly had intended to leave the common law doctrine in place. 287 Md. at 590-91, 414 A.2d at 931-32. In 1945, the General Assembly had abolished the closely related cause of action for alienation of affections, [19] but left standing the cause of action for criminal conversation. Id. at 590, 414 A.2d at 931-32. The crucial intervening fact during that time was the adoption of Article 46, which additional factor was of sufficient significance to persuade us that the action for criminal conversation [was] no longer viable. Id. at 591, 414 A.2d at 932. In Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981), this Court considered whether the common law doctrine of necessaries survived the enactment of the ERA. The majority determined that the ERA abrogated the doctrine, under which the husband had a legal duty to supply his wife with necessaries suitable to their station in life, but the wife had no corresponding obligation to support her husband, or supply him with necessaries, even if she had the financial means to do so. Id. at 520, 425 A.2d at 1013. The Court agreed unanimously that the ERA mandated sex-neutrality for the doctrine of necessaries. Compare id. at 532, 425 A.2d at 1019 ([E]xtend[ing] the common law necessaries doctrine to impose liability upon wives, or eliminating the necessaries doctrine in its entirety, both would satisfy the general purpose of the ERA to proscribe sex-based classifications.), with id. at 533, 425 A.2d at 1019 (Rodowsky, J., dissenting) (I agree that this Court has the power to decide, based on the ERA . . . that the necessaries doctrine applies alike to both sexes.). The majority relied on Rand in its determination that the words of the ERA clearly and unambiguously mandated equality of rights between men and women and `canonly mean that sex is not a factor.' Id. at 524, 425 A.2d at 1015, quoting Rand, 280 Md. at 512, 374 A.2d at 903. The dissenters likewise believed the ERA and acts of the General Assembly have made it plain beyond doubt that family support obligations are no longer exclusively imposed on the male. Id. at 533, 425 A.2d at 1020. Nowhere did the Court invoke comparisons of men and women as classes. See op. at 254, 932 A.2d at 591. To summarize, in the years prior to Burning Tree I, our cases construing the ERA consistently applied strict scrutiny to sex-based classifications. This Court repeatedly affirmed its commitment to uphold the will of the People of Maryland to eradicate state sanctioned unequal treatment based on the happenstance of a particular person's sex.