Opinion ID: 844147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Habeas Corpus and Abuse of the Writ

Text: The right to habeas corpus is guaranteed by the state Constitution and ―may not be suspended unless required by public safety in cases of rebellion or invasion.‖ (Cal. Const., art. I, § 11.)5 Frequently used to challenge criminal convictions already affirmed on appeal, the writ of habeas corpus permits a person deprived of his or her freedom, such as a prisoner, to bring before a court evidence from outside the trial or appellate record, and often represents a prisoner‘s last chance to obtain judicial review. ― ‗ ―[H]abeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside . . . and although every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an empty shell.‖ ‘ ‖ (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 828, fn. 6, quoting Frank v. Mangum (1915) 237 U.S. 309, 346.) ―Historically, habeas corpus provided an avenue of relief for only those criminal defendants confined by a judgment of a court that lacked fundamental jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction over the person or subject matter‖ (Harris, at p. 836), but that view has evolved in modern times and habeas corpus now ―permit[s] judicial inquiry into a variety of constitutional and jurisdictional issues‖ (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 476). ―Despite the substantive and procedural protections afforded those accused of committing crimes, the basic charters governing our society wisely hold open a final possibility for prisoners to prove their convictions were obtained unjustly. [Citations.] A writ of ‗[h]abeas corpus may thus provide an avenue of relief to those unjustly incarcerated when the normal method of relief—i.e., direct 5 The United States Constitution has a similar provision. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2 [―The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.‖].) 12 appeal—is inadequate.‘ ‖ (In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 703-704; see In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 777 [―there may be matters that undermine the validity of a judgment or the legality of a defendant‘s confinement or sentence, but which are not apparent from the record on appeal‖ for which habeas corpus is appropriate].) Although habeas corpus thus acts as a ―safety valve‖ (see Ledewitz, Habeas Corpus as a Safety Valve for Innocence (1990-1991) 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 415) or ―escape hatch‖ (Comment, Repetitive Post-Conviction Petitions Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Can the Pennsylvania Supreme Court Tame the ―Monster‖? (1981-1982) 20 Duq. L.Rev. 237) for cases in which a criminal trial has resulted in a miscarriage of justice despite the provision to the accused of legal representation, a jury trial, and an appeal, this ―safety valve‖ role should not obscure the fact that ―habeas corpus is an extraordinary, limited remedy against a presumptively fair and valid final judgment‖ (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, italics added). Courts presume the correctness of a criminal judgment (In re Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1240), for before the state may obtain such a judgment, ―a defendant is afforded counsel and a panoply of procedural protections, including statefunded investigation expenses, in order to ensure that the trial proceedings provide a fair and full opportunity to assess the truth of the charges against the defendant and the appropriate punishment‖ (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 777). Following a conviction, the defendant has the right to an automatic appeal, assisted by competent counsel. (Ibid.) If a criminal defendant has unsuccessfully tested the state‘s evidence at trial and appeal and wishes to mount a further, collateral attack, ― ‗all presumptions favor the truth, accuracy, and fairness of the conviction and sentence; defendant thus must undertake the burden of overturning them. Society‘s interest in the finality of criminal proceedings so demands, and 13 due process is not thereby offended.‘ ‖ (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 474, quoting Gonzalez, at p. 1260.) This limited nature of the writ of habeas corpus is appropriate because use of the writ tends to undermine society‘s legitimate interest in the finality of its criminal judgments, a point this court has emphasized many times. In In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 776, for example, we explained: ― ‗[T]he writ strikes at finality. One of the law‘s very objects is the finality of its judgments. Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known. ―Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.‖ [Citation.] And when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the ― ‗erosion of memory‘ and ‗dispersion of witnesses‘ that occur with the passage of time,‖ [citation], prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication. . . .‖ (Quoting McCleskey v. Zant (1991) 499 U.S. 467, 491.) More recently, this court opined that ―[o]ur cases have long emphasized that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy ‗and that the availability of the writ properly must be tempered by the necessity of giving due consideration to the interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality of judgments.‘ ‖ (In re Morgan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 932, 944.) ―As one legal scholar put it: ‗A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of the underlying substantive commands [punishing criminal acts]. . . . There comes a point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility.‘ (Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners (1963) 76 Harv. L.Rev. 441, 452–453.)‖ (In re 14 Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 805.) ― ‗ ―No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation.‖ ‘ ‖ (In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 831, quoting Mackey v. United States (1971) 401 U.S. 667, 691 (conc. & dis. opn. of Harlan, J.).) Given the ample opportunities available to a criminal defendant to vindicate statutory rights and constitutional guarantees, and consistent with the importance of the finality of criminal judgments, this court has over time recognized certain rules limiting the availability of habeas corpus relief. Sometimes called ―procedural bars‖ (see, e.g., In re Martinez (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 950, fn. 1; In re Lawley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1239; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 121; Jackson v. Roe (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3d 654, 656, fn. 2), these rules require a petitioner mounting a collateral attack on a final criminal judgment by way of habeas corpus to prosecute his or her case without unreasonable delay, and to have first presented his or her claims at trial and on appeal, if reasonably possible. Strict limits exist for claims not raised in a litigant‘s first habeas corpus petition. These rules establish what the high court, addressing a similar issue, described as ―a background norm of procedural regularity binding on the petitioner‖ (McCleskey v. Zant, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 490), and permit the resolution of legitimate claims in the fairest and most efficacious manner possible. Untimely claims, or claims already presented to this court and resolved on the merits, are as a general matter barred from consideration. Claims alleging the evidence was insufficient to convict, or that police violated a litigant‘s Fourth Amendment rights, are not cognizable on habeas corpus for other, nonprocedural reasons. These rules, essentially barriers to access deemed necessary for institutional reasons, are of course subject to exceptions designed to ensure fairness and orderly 15 access to the courts, but the judicial machinery is structured to allow one accused or convicted of a crime—in the vast majority of cases—to vindicate his or her rights well before a postconviction, postappeal writ of habeas corpus becomes necessary. Because a criminal defendant enjoys the right to appointed trial counsel, to a jury trial, and to an appeal, the various procedural limitations applicable to habeas corpus petitions are designed to ensure legitimate claims are pressed early in the legal process, while leaving open a ―safety valve‖ for those rare or unusual claims that could not reasonably have been raised at an earlier time. The procedural rules applicable to habeas corpus petitions are thus ―a means of protecting the integrity of our own appeal and habeas corpus process‖ (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 778, fn. 1, italics omitted) and vindicate ―the interest of the public in the orderly and reasonably prompt implementation of its laws and to the important public interest in the finality of judgments‖ (id. at p. 778). In short, our procedural rules ―are necessary . . . to deter use of the writ to unjustifiably delay implementation of the law . . . .‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 764.)6 Insisting on the prompt presentation of legal claims, most normally at trial and on appeal, but certainly by the time of the first habeas corpus petition, also works to conserve scarce judicial resources, for collateral challenges to final criminal judgments exact a heavy cost on the judiciary. ―Successive petitions . . . waste scarce judicial resources as the court must repeatedly review the record of the trial in order to assess the merits of the petitioner‘s claims and assess the prejudicial impact of the constitutional deprivation of which he complains.‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 770; cf. McCleskey v. Zant, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 491 6 We discuss these procedural bars in more detail below. 16 [―Federal collateral litigation places a heavy burden on scarce federal judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.‖].) The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized the heavy burden this court shoulders in reviewing the ―staggering number of habeas petitions each year‖ in noncapital cases. (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at pp. 1125-1126].) These concerns are magnified in capital cases, where the appellate records typically are longer, the habeas corpus petitions filed are more extensive, and the legal fees paid are substantially higher than in noncapital cases. Repetitive petitions consume finite judicial resources, and evaluating them delays this court from turning its attention to timely filed first petitions that may raise an issue of potential merit. As Justice Robert Jackson once observed when commenting on the ―flood[] of stale, frivolous and repetitious petitions inundat[ing] the docket of the lower courts and swell[ing] our own‖: ―It must prejudice the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search.‖ (Brown v. Allen (1953) 344 U.S. 443, 536, 537 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.).) With this background in mind, we conclude a petitioner‘s failure, in a second or successive habeas corpus petition before this court, both to acknowledge the limitations of habeas corpus as an avenue of collateral attack and to make a plausible effort to explain why the claims raised are properly before the court, can be considered an abuse of the writ process. In this way, habeas corpus is no different from other types of civil writs that constitute extraordinary relief. (See People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1094 [― ‗The writ of error coram nobis is not a catch-all by which those convicted may litigate and relitigate the propriety of their convictions ad infinitum.‘ ‖]; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 1989) ¶ 15:1.2, p. 15-1 (rev. #1, 2011) 17 [addressing civil writs: ―Unlike appeals, which are heard as a matter of right, relief through writ review is deemed extraordinary . . .‖].) The abuse of the writ concept is not new; this court invoked it 100 years ago in Matter of Ford (1911) 160 Cal. 334. In that case, the defendant was at liberty, having posted bail before trial. Wishing to challenge the trial court‘s failure to grant his motion to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds, the defendant maneuvered to submit himself to the sheriff‘s custody for a short time so as to prosecute a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.7 ―It was evidently intended that the custody should endure no longer than was necessary to make this application and was solely for the purpose of making out a case to support the issuance of the writ.‖ (Id. at pp. 340-341.) Although his speedy trial issue likely had merit, this court nevertheless denied relief by relying on an abuse of the writ rationale: ―[V]oluntary imprisonment, had for the sole purpose of making a case on habeas corpus, was contrary to the spirit, purpose, and object of the writ and was an abuse of it.‖ (Id. at p. 342, original italics omitted, italics added.) Although we have had few occasions to address the abuse of the writ doctrine in the decades following Matter of Ford, supra, 160 Cal. 334 (but see In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 303 [―It should be noted that no question of the abuse of the writ of habeas corpus is before us . . .‖]), our cases have repeatedly said we do not condone abusive writ petitions. (In re Sanders, supra, 21 Cal.4th at 7 ―In previous eras, the custody requirement [for habeas corpus] was interpreted strictly to mean actual physical detention. [Citations.] This view has since been somewhat relaxed. Thus, ‗the decisional law of recent years has expanded the writ‘s application to persons who are determined to be in constructive custody. Today, the writ is available to one on . . . bail (In re Petersen (1958) 51 Cal.2d 177 [331 P.2d 24]) . . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1069.) 18 p. 721 [noting that this court ― ‗has never condoned abusive writ practice‘ ‖]; In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 769 [same]; see also In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 842 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.) [stating she does not ―countenance abuse of the writ‖]; Sanders, at p. 731 (dis. opn. of Baxter, J.) [noting this court‘s timeliness rules ―discourage abuse of the writ‖].) ―[C]ourts have regularly applied the doctrine of ‗abuse of the writ‘ and refused to entertain a claim presented for the first time in a second or subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus.‖ (In re Bittaker (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1012, fn. 3.) We addressed the abuse of the writ doctrine in a comprehensive way in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750. In that capital case, we had on April 5, 1990, affirmed both the guilt and penalty judgments on appeal (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583) and thereafter, on May 15, 1991, denied Clark‘s first habeas corpus petition. Three months after our denial, Clark filed a second petition raising several claims that were merely ―restatements or reformulations of arguments made and rejected on appeal or in the prior habeas corpus petition.‖ (In re Clark, at p. 763.) Although he presented other claims for the first time, these could have been raised on appeal or in the first habeas corpus petition because they were based on facts long known to Clark. This repetitive petition included no allegations suggesting why Clark was renewing stale claims, or why the new claims had not been presented to the court previously, either on appeal or in the first habeas corpus petition. (Ibid.) We concluded: ―This court has never condoned abusive writ practice or repetitious collateral attacks on a final judgment. Entertaining the merits of successive petitions is inconsistent with our recognition that delayed and repetitious presentation of claims is an abuse of the writ. [¶] ‗It is the policy of this court to deny an application for habeas corpus which is based upon grounds urged in a prior petition which has been denied, where there is shown no change in 19 the facts or the law substantially affecting the rights of the petitioner.‘ ‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 769.) Regarding the presentation of new grounds based on matters known to the petitioner at the time of a previous petition, we observed that ― ‗in In re Drew (1922) 188 Cal. 717, 722 [207 P. 249], it was pointed out that the applicant for habeas corpus ―not only had his day in court to attack the validity of this judgment, but . . . had several such days, on each of which he could have urged this objection, but did not do so‖; it was held that ―The petitioner cannot be allowed to present his reasons against the validity of the judgment against him piecemeal by successive proceedings for the same general purpose.‖ ‘ ‖ (Clark, at p. 770.) Our conclusion, we noted, was consistent with the abuse of the writ doctrine as applied in the federal courts, as explained in McCleskey v. Zant, supra, 499 U.S. 467 (Clark, at pp. 755-780, 787-790), as well as the rules in other states (id. at pp. 791-795). Clark thus reiterated the abuse of the writ doctrine in the modern era and established a strict pleading standard: ―[T]he petitioner . . . bears the initial burden of alleging the facts on which he relies to explain and justify delay and/or a successive petition.‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 798, fn. 35.) Because the petitioner in Clark did not ―state[] specific facts to establish that his newly made claims were presented without substantial delay‖ or explain why any of the claims were based on a legal error involving ―a fundamental miscarriage of justice,‖ this court denied the petition without ―consider[ing] the merits of any of the claims.‖ (Id. at p. 799.) Subsequent cases have echoed Clark‘s strict pleading standard. (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 805 [citing the Clark pleading requirement with approval when addressing a delayed petition]; In re White (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1453, 1481 [same].) Despite its in-depth discussion of the abuse of the writ doctrine, the consequences for the petitioner and his counsel in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 20 750, were relatively mild. Faced with a petitioner who had filed a successive and repetitive petition raising untimely claims, all of which had been either raised and rejected on appeal or in a prior habeas corpus petition, or which could have been (but were not) presented on appeal or in the first habeas corpus petition, we simply denied the petition summarily and did not consider the substantive merits of the claims. (Id. at p. 799.) In the years following In re Clark, however, perhaps out of an abundance of caution, this court has in capital cases continued to address the substantive merits of abusive and potentially abusive habeas corpus petitions. That is, when considering second and subsequent habeas corpus petitions, in addition to denying claims on procedural grounds (signified by the citation of various procedural bars in our denial orders), we have assessed the substantive merits of barred claims and denied them on those merits as well. In a capital case, a detailed and comprehensive first state habeas corpus petition serves an important purpose, for courts can rest assured that, between the trial, the appeal, and the habeas corpus petition, the defense8 has had ample opportunity to raise all meritorious claims, the adversarial process has operated correctly, and both this court and society can be confident that, before a person is put to death, the judgment that he or she is guilty of the crimes and deserves the ultimate punishment is valid and supportable. Indeed, a system of justice that does not allow for the fair and timely presentation of claims of innocence or the absence of fair procedure would lack credibility. These concerns perhaps underlie the decision of this court, and this state, to assume a generous postconviction position: 8 Our standards for counsel who are eligible for appointment to represent capital defendants on habeas corpus are high. (See In re Morgan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 938, fn. 4.) 21 vis-à-vis other states, we authorize more money to pay postconviction counsel, 9 authorize more money for postconviction investigation,10 allow counsel to file 9 In California, attorney fees for habeas corpus counsel in capital cases is governed by the Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising From Judgments of Death (hereafter Supreme Court Policies), policy 3, standard 2-1 et seq. Those standards in turn refer to the Payment Guidelines for Appointed Counsel Representing Indigent Criminal Appellants in the California Supreme Court. Guideline II.A provides for a per hour rate of $145. Guideline II.I.3.ii sets forth the benchmarks for particular tasks in habeas corpus cases. For separate habeas corpus counsel, the upper benchmark for client contact, investigation, and preparation of the petition and an informal reply is 690 hours, or over $100,000, excluding the fee for reviewing the appellate record, for which counsel can bill at 50 pages per hour. In a typical case in which the record (clerk‘s and reporter‘s transcripts) is about 10,000 pages, that translates into 200 hours of record review, totaling an additional $29,000. In our experience, counsel appointed to prepare and file habeas corpus petitions for death row inmates quite often earn well over the upper benchmark of $130,000. In many cases, capital habeas corpus counsel earn over $200,000 for a single case. In Florida, by contrast, capital habeas corpus counsel receives $100 per hour, up to $2,500 prior to filing the petition. Upon filing the petition in the trial court, counsel can receive up to an additional $20,000 (at $100 per hour) and can bill an additional $20,000 after the trial court grants or denies the petition. Thus, counsel can presumably earn up to $42,500, and more if he or she takes the case to the Florida Supreme Court. (Fla. Stat., § 27.711, subd. (4)(a)-(f).) In Texas, habeas corpus counsel is entitled to no more than $25,000 from the state in ―[c]ompensation and expenses‖ combined (Tex. Code Crim. Proc., art. 11.071, § 2A, subd. (a)), although an individual county can pay more. 10 Under our rules, habeas corpus counsel is preauthorized to spend up to $50,000 investigating a postconviction habeas corpus petition. (Supreme Ct. Policies, supra, policy 3, std. 2-2.1.) In Florida, the same attorney may spend, with trial court approval, $40 per hour for investigator services, up to a total of $15,000 (Fla. Stat., § 27.711, subd. (5)) and may spend, with court approval, up to $15,000 in miscellaneous expenses investigating postconviction claims (id., § 27.711, subd. (6)). More is available upon a showing that ―extraordinary circumstances‖ exist. (Ibid.) In Texas, habeas corpus counsel is entitled to no more than $25,000 from the state in ―[c]ompensation and expenses‖ combined. (Tex. Code Crim. Proc., art. 11.071, § 2A, subd. (a).) 22 habeas corpus petitions containing more pages,11 and permit more time following conviction to file a petition for what is, after all, a request for collateral relief.12 Any such justification for tolerating a detailed and comprehensive first petition all but disappears for second and subsequent petitions in this court. Absent the unusual circumstance of some critical evidence that is truly ―newly discovered‖ 11 There is no page limit for habeas corpus petitions in California. (See discussion, post.) In Florida, a first habeas corpus petition ―shall not exceed 75 pages (Fla. Rules Crim. Proc., § 3.851(e)(1)), and subsequent petitions ―shall not exceed 25 pages‖ (id., subd. (e)(2)). There is no page limit in Texas, but the strict time limits for filing postconviction habeas corpus petitions probably act to constrain the length of such petitions. (Tex. Code Crim. Proc., art. 11.071, § 4, subd. (a) [petition must be filed within 180 days after counsel is appointed or 45 days after the state‘s brief on appeal, whichever is later].) The same is probably true in Pennsylvania, where a petition for postconviction relief must be filed ―within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.‖ (Pa. Rules of Crim. Proc., rule 901(A).) 12 Supreme Court Policies, policy 3, standard 1-1.1 provides that, to be considered presumptively timely, a habeas corpus petition must be filed within 180 days of the final due date for the reply brief on appeal or within 36 months after counsel is appointed. Due to the difficulty in finding counsel, in many cases habeas corpus counsel is not even appointed until long after the appeal, meaning we may receive a first habeas corpus petition five or more years after deciding the appeal and still be required, under our rules, to consider the petition as timely. In Florida, by contrast, the petition must be filed within one year of the judgment‘s finality (Fla. Rules Crim. Proc., § 3.851(d)(1)), which in most cases occurs when the United States Supreme Court denies certiorari (id., subd. (d)(1)(A)). Florida apparently does not have the time lag in appointing counsel that we experience, as their rules provide for the appointment of institutional counsel or private conflict counsel ―[u]pon issuance of the mandate affirming a judgment and sentence of death on direct appeal.‖ (Id., § 3.851(b)(1); cf. Herrera v. Collins (1993) 506 U.S. 390, 410 [―Texas is one of 17 States that requires a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence to be made within 60 days of judgment.‖].) 23 under our law,13 or a change in the law,14 such successive petitions rarely raise an issue even remotely plausible, let alone state a prima facie case for actual relief. In the 18 years since In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 750, experience has taught that in capital cases, petitioners frequently file second, third, and even fourth habeas corpus petitions raising nothing but procedurally barred claims. As we explain below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the present case is an example of an abusive writ practice: voluminous in size and abounding in detail, the petition nevertheless raises claims almost all of which are procedurally barred. Many claims are barred for more than one reason. Counsel have an ethical duty to notify the court if an issue in the petition is procedurally barred. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068 [―It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her those means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.‖].) Petitioner was permitted three opportunities to allege facts explaining why a particular procedural bar did not apply: in the petition proper, in 13 To support a collateral attack, newly discovered evidence of innocence must cast fundamental doubt on the accuracy of the trial and, if believed, must undermine the prosecution‘s entire case and point ― ‗ ―unerringly to innocence.‖ ‘ ‖ (In re Lawley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1239.) New evidence also may relate to claims of jury or prosecutorial misconduct, or occasionally to other issues. 14 For example, following the high court‘s decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002) 536 U.S. 304, which held that execution of mentally retarded persons violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, some death row inmates whose initial habeas corpus petitions had already been denied by this court filed new petitions alleging they were ineligible for execution due to their retardation. This court issued orders to show cause in some of those cases despite the successive nature of the petitions involved, recognizing Atkins represented a change in the law excusing both the delay and successive nature of the petitions. 24 the informal reply (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b)(3)), and in the traverse filed in response to the People‘s return (People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 476477). Although normally the justification for raising a claim must be stated in the petition itself and not in later pleadings such as the informal reply or the traverse,15 in this case we will consider arguments raised for the first time in the 15 We explained the proper procedure in In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at page 781, footnote 16: ―The court determines on the basis of the allegations of the original petition . . . , as well as the supporting documentary evidence and/or affidavits, which should be attached if available, whether a prima facie case entitling the petitioner to relief if the allegations are proven has been stated. If so, the court issues an order directing the respondent to show cause why the relief sought should not be granted based on those allegations. When an order to show cause does issue, it is limited to the claims raised in the petition and the factual bases for those claims alleged in the petition. It directs the respondent to address only those issues. While the traverse may allege additional facts in support of the claim on which an order to show cause has issued, attempts to introduce additional claims or wholly different factual bases for those claims in a traverse do not expand the scope of the proceeding which is limited to the claims which the court initially determined stated a prima facie case for relief.‖ (Italics added; see People v. Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 478 [quoting italicized passage with approval]; Board of Prison Terms v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1235 [same].) For similar reasons, belatedly raising new claims or theories for the first time in the informal reply brief (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.385(b)(3)) is also improper. ―If the imprisonment is alleged to be illegal, the petition must also state in what the alleged illegality consists.‖ (Pen. Code, § 1474, italics added.) Although Clark spoke in terms of evaluating the petition along with ―the amended or supplemental petition, if any,‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 16), Clark also said that we will not ―routinely delay action on a filed petition to permit amendment and supplementation‖ (id. at p. 781). We have thereafter followed a policy to deny permission to file supplemental or amended petitions in capital cases and to require that new claims be raised in a separate petition. Supplements to shell petitions are excepted from this rule. (In re Morgan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 940-941.) The rule that a claim for relief must be supported by factual allegations in the petition itself, and not in the traverse, logically applies to a petitioner‘s contention that a particular procedural bar is inapplicable. Just as a habeas corpus (footnote continued on next page) 25 traverse because our order to show cause specifically directed petitioner to provide the court with such information.