Opinion ID: 547203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preemption of the Intentional Interference with Contract Claim

Text: 23 Plaintiff argues that his claim against his supervisor, Valley, for intentional interference with contractual relations is not preempted, because the claim does not depend on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. He contends that adjudication of this claim requires only a determination of whether there was a contract that Valley interfered with for an improper motive. 24 We do not accept this contention. First, the conduct that allegedly constituted the wrongful interference with contractual relations was taken by Valley in his capacity as supervisor, and hence, as an agent on behalf of plaintiff's employer, Sexton. See Kneeland v. Pepsi Cola Metropolitan Co., Inc., 605 F.Supp. 137, 139 (D.Mass.1985) (claims against supervisory employees for malicious interference with contractual relations were preempted, because supervisors were acting as agents for employer whose conduct was governed by a collective bargaining agreement). Moreover, contrary to plaintiff's contentions, determining whether Valley improperly interfered with plaintiff's employment contract requires an examination of the rights of plaintiff and Sexton under the collective bargaining agreement. Under Massachusetts law, to establish a claim of intentional interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he had a contract with a third party [and] the defendant knowingly induced the third party to break that contract. United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811, 551 N.E.2d 20, 21 (1990). The determination of whether Valley induced Sexton to break its employment contract with plaintiff would require the court to decide whether Sexton was entitled to discharge plaintiff under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. In other words, the interference with contractual relations claim would require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. It is therefore preempted by Section 301. See Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir.1989) (Count III, alleging tortious interference with contractual relations, requires an examination of the collective bargaining agreement and the scope of the employment relationship.... This count is inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and is preempted by section 301.). Cf. Beard v. Carrollton Railroad, 893 F.2d 117, 122 (6th Cir.1989) (where breach of contract is essential element of state law claim for wrongful interference with contract, the claim would require interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and was therefore preempted by the federal Railway Labor Act). 4