Opinion ID: 2209605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: In the absence of a statutory or judicially recognized exception, the authority of a local police department is limited to its own jurisdiction. See Page v. Staples, 13 R.I. 306 (1881). There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, when the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect, they may cross into another jurisdiction pursuant to § 12-7-19. Second, in emergency situations, it may be necessary and appropriate for the police from one jurisdiction to exercise authority in another jurisdiction. See § 45-42-1; State v. Locke, 418 A.2d 843, 847 (R.I.1980); Cioci v. Santos, 99 R.I. 308, 315, 207 A.2d 300, 304 (1965). In the case presently before us, it is clear that the hot pursuit exception was not applicable. The record reveals that Sgt. Field was already in Jamestown when his suspicions concerning defendant were aroused. Thus, this was not a situation where a police officer lawfully pursued a suspect from his or her own jurisdiction into another jurisdiction in accordance with § 12-7-19. The defendant asserts that § 45-42-1 also was inapplicable to the instant case. He contends that it is only after a police chief, or one of his or her designees, specifically requests emergency assistance from another police department that the members of that second police department obtain authority to act in the other jurisdiction. In this case, defendant asserts that no such request ever was made and he points out that it was the Newport police officers' own superior officer who ordered them to the scene of the accident. He maintains that although Sgt. Field offered his assistance to Sgt. Donovan, there is no evidence that his offer was officially orverbally accepted. He additionally contends that § 45-42-1 is penal in nature and a strict construction of that statute clearly would have shown that the Newport police officers did not have jurisdiction to arrest him. Section 45-42-1 entitled Emergency police power, provides: When the police chief of a city or town within the state or his or her designee requests emergency police assistance from another police department within the state, the officers responding to the request shall be subject to the authority of the requesting chief and have the same authority, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities as a duly appointed police officer of the city or town making the request, until the requesting chief of police discharges and releases the assisting police officers to their own departments. It is a well-known canon of statutory construction that penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the party upon whom a penalty is to be imposed. State v. Smith, 766 A.2d 913, 924 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996)). However, § 45-42-1 is a not a penal statute. It is remedial, and therefore, strict construction would be inappropriate. Instead, we will apply our standard, well-established principles of statutory construction to determine whether the Newport police had jurisdiction to arrest defendant. It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. RIH Medical Foundation, Inc. v. Nolan, 723 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. DiCicco, 707 A.2d 251, 253 (R.I.1998)). When confronted with an unambiguous statute, we must apply the statute as written. Id. (citing DiCicco, 707 A.2d at 253). Moreover, when confronted with an unclear or ambiguous statute, there is room for statutory construction and we examine the statute in its entirety in order to `glean the intent and purpose of the Legislature.' Id. (quoting In re Advisory to the Governor, 668 A.2d 1246, 1248 (R.I. 1996)). In doing so, this Court `will not construe a statute to reach an absurd [or unintended]result.' Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 435 (R.I.2000) (quoting Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I.1996)). In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial justice reasoned that Jamestown police officer, Sgt. Donovan, was a designee of the Jamestown police chief because the police chief had scheduled Sgt. Donovan to carry out his duties as a police officer on the night in question. As part of those duties, Sgt. Donovan was required to handle any emergency situation that may have arisen. When the accident occurred, human lives and the safety of all persons on the Newport Bridge were at an extreme risk. The trial justice held that: once Sergeant Field had spoken with Sergeant Donovan, once the sergeant had indicated that he did in fact want Sergeant Field's assistance, that that conferred upon Sgt. Field at that point the powers, duties and privileges as articulated in 45-42-1.    it is clear to this Court that in passing 45-42-1 that the General Assembly clearly envisioned situations where one police department would need the assistance of another police department and would need the assistance for emergency situations such as this. After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial justice erred in her determinations. The record reveals that Sgt. Donovan was faced with a very serious accident scene, with the possibility of gasoline spilling onto the bridge and causing an explosion. Many lives were in danger due to the number of occupied vehicles that were trapped in the eastbound lanes between the scene of the accident and the toll booths. Time was of the essence in averting a catastrophe. When Sgt. Field arrived at the scene to offer his assistance, Sgt. Donovan immediately seized upon the opportunity to develop an emergency evacuation plan with him. As Sgt. Field's police cruiser was the only police cruiser available to implement their emergency evacuation plan, it was absolutely crucial that both the cruiser and Sgt. Field be empowered to set up the blockade and to control traffic. The defendant suggests that Sgt. Donovan was required to give an official or verbal `acceptance' to Sgt. Field's offer of assistance before jurisdiction could be conferred upon the Newport police pursuant to § 45-42-1. We disagree. The statute facilitates police departments in handling emergency situations in the safest and most efficient manner possible. Given the exigent circumstances confronting Sgt. Donovan, it is absurd to have expected him to engage in some stylized ritual in order to officially accept Sgt. Field's offer of assistance. Such a requirement would have placed an onerous burden upon him when time was of the essence in saving lives and property. When Sgt. Donovan formulated an evacuation plan with Sgt. Field, clearly he was both accepting Sgt. Field's offer of assistance and requesting Sgt. Field to help him to implement that plan. Considering that Sgt. Donovan, as designee of the Jamestown police chief, conferred the same authority, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities as a duly appointed police officer of the    town[,] § 45-42-1, upon the Newport police officers that were present at the scene, they necessarily had jurisdiction to control traffic and to arrest defendant. The policy of the state has been significantly changed from the rigidity of the holding in Page v. Staples, 13 R.I. 306 (1881), wherein a sheriff of the county of Providence lost jurisdiction by crossing through the county of Kent in order to reach his ultimate destination which was in Providence. Page has been distinguished in Cioci v. Santos, 99 R.I. 308, 207 A.2d 300 (1965), in which municipal officers from the town of Cumberland transported the defendant from a cell in Cumberland, where he tried to hang himself, to a hospital in Providence. This Court observed [i]t is our opinion that the dictates of public policy require also that police officers who have a citizen in their lawful custody be not deterred from acting to protect the well-being of such person,particularly in circumstances arising out of an emergency such as existed in the instant case. Cioci, 99 R.I. at 315, 207 A.2d at 304. Similar principles were enunciated in Locke, wherein a Charlestown police officer arrested Locke on probable cause to believe that he was intoxicated. The officer then transported the defendant to Westerly to administer a breathalyzer test because the town of Charlestown did not have breathalyzer equipment. The Court followed the reasoning in Cioci and held that the officer acted reasonably to protect the public from a drunken driver and to protect Locke from himself. Locke, 418 A.2d at 847. In the case at bar, the Legislature has made specific provisions for the cooperation of police officers who are from different municipalities in emergency situations where such cooperation requires the empowerment of the officers from another municipality to assist in maintaining the public safety. Certainly, no more dramatic example could be set forth of the need for cooperation by officers of an adjoining municipality to render assistance in maintaining order and protecting the safety of persons imperiled by an accident and fire on a bridge that joins the two communities. This is a classic example of the result which the Legislature intended to accomplish. Such intent should not be frustrated by demanding, unnecessary formalisms. Sergeant Donovan was clearly the designee of the Jamestown Police Chief and was in charge in the midst of an emergency situation. He accepted the cooperation of Sgt. Field and Lt. Kliever. The defendant's argument that the Newport officers lacked jurisdiction, pursuant to § 45-42-1 is without merit.