Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State's Guilt Phase Summation

Text: The effect of the misconduct that occurred during the cross-examination of defendant's step-brother was exacerbated, defendant argues, by misconduct during the State's guilt phase summation. During his summation, the prosecutor stated the following regarding defendant's arrest: If he had walked out of there, he would have been given a license to kill. Before defense counsel could object (he had risen and was starting to object), the court dismissed the jury and left the bench. When the jury returned, the court issued a curative instruction, telling the jurors that such phrases as `a license to kill' have no part of the language which is appropriate for your consideration in this case.... I'm instructing you at this time to disregard the last comment during the last summation. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor was insinuating that defendant was a serial killer, responsible for other murders in Morris County. The trial court agreed with that interpretation of the prosecutor's remarks, but denied the motion: It's the prosecutorial equivalent of soiling the floor of the courtroom.... It was very close to a suggestion, but yet not a suggestion that you were going to let a serial murderer go ... and I frankly, I think that's probably what it was intended to do.... I'm satisfied that, because I took a recess and gave a strong cautionary instruction ... any damage done by that statement was ameliorated.... Defendant submits that this improper conduct was incurable. The State argues that the prosecutor's comments in summation were proper, noting that prosecutors are entitled to wide latitude in summation. State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413, 437 (1968), cert. den., 393 U.S. 1043, 89 S.Ct. 673, 21 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1969). The State also argues that the content of the prosecutor's statements could reasonably be inferred from the evidence. State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 125 (1982). Lastly, the State argues that even if the prosecutor's statements were objectionable, the trial court's curative charge removed any possibility of prejudice to the defendant. In fact, the State argues, the judge's curative instruction focused the jury's attention on its obligation to decide this case fairly, impartially, and objectively without bias, prejudice or sympathy. After a careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial court's quick action in immediately leaving the bench and its curative instruction prevented the prosecutor's statements from substantially prejudic[ing] the defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. State v. Bucanis, supra, 26 N.J. at 56. Here, as in the cross-examination context, supra, at 321, there was a timely and proper objection ... the remark was withdrawn promptly ... and the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 323. As we stated in State v. Ramseur , however, the fact that the prosecutor's misconduct in this case cannot be said to have prejudiced defendant in no way excuses it. Ibid. We therefore reiterate our warning to prosecutors in capital cases that this Court will not hesitate to refer on its own motion possible violations of the special ethical rules governing prosecutors to the appropriate district ethics committee for disciplinary action. Ibid.