Opinion ID: 1954195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the automobile collision judgment or in granting a new arm-raising trial.

Text: Bifurcation is appropriate in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy[.] SDCL 15-6-42(b). The trial court has discretion under proper circumstances to order separate trials of issues or claims raised in a case. Christiansen v. Strand, 81 S.D. 187, 194, 132 N.W.2d 386, 389 (1965). Nevertheless, the purpose of bifurcation is to `avoid prejudice,' not to create it. United States Gypsum Co. v. Schiavo Bros., Inc., 668 F.2d 172, 181 (3rd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 961, 102 S.Ct. 2038, 72 L.Ed.2d 485 (1982). In response to Fullmer's motions at the end of the second trial to set aside the automobile collision judgment and to grant a new arm-raising trial, the court concluded Fullmer had been prejudiced by the bifurcation and that there had been a serious miscarriage of justice. According to the changed testimony of Dr. Boyer, Fullmer's RSD was caused by the car accident or, according to the consistent testimony of Dr. Finley, Fullmer's RSD was caused by the arm-raising incident. The court noted that although the parties' experts agree that Fullmer suffers RSD, she has not been compensated for this injury. The trial court stated this was due to defendants' inconsistent positions at the trials: In other words, the bifurcation Order allowed Plaintiff to be whipsawed on the issue[s] of medical causation and damages. The trial court found its bifurcation order had been a mistake and was improper. Fullmer's motions were granted. Defendants assert the trial court erred when it granted these motions.
Motions to vacate judgment under SDCL 15-6-60 are in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless the record affirmatively shows that there has been an abuse of discretion. [3] Haggar v. Olfert, 387 N.W.2d 45, 51 (S.D. 1986). The trial court may grant relief from final judgment based on mistake, surprise, newly discovered evidence and for any other reason which justifies relief. SDCL 15-6-60(b)(1), (2) & (6). Although the trial court based its decision on each of these grounds, newly discovered evidence provides a sufficient basis upon which to affirm the trial court. To be granted relief from judgment on a claim of newly discovered evidence, Fullmer, the moving party, must establish that (1) The evidence was discovered after trial; (2) [Fullmer] exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence for trial; (3) The evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) The evidence is material; and (5) The evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a new verdict. Haggar, 387 N.W.2d at 51. Applying the facts to each part of the test, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. (1) It is beyond dispute that Dr. Boyer changed his opinion after the automobile collision trial. (2) Dr. Boyer's discovery deposition was taken just two weeks before the automobile collision trial. Dr. Boyer admitted during cross-examination in the arm-raising trial that his opinion on Fullmer's RSD did not change until after he had given his deposition and after the automobile collision trial. Fullmer was diligent in obtaining Dr. Boyer's evidence for the automobile collision trial. (3) Dr. Boyer's opinion testimony, as given in the second trial, was unique on the issue of causation of Fullmer's RSD. [4] (4) Dr. Boyer's changed testimony is obviously material, as the cause of Fullmer's RSD was the main damage issue in the battery trial and was expressly omitted by the parties from the automobile collision trial. (5) Lastly, had Dr. Boyer, the defense's expert, testified that the automobile collision caused Fullmer's RSD, there probably would have been a different verdict at the automobile collision trial, even though Fullmer's expert may have testified the arm-raising was the cause. The opinion testimony of Dr. Boyer does, therefore, constitute newly discovered evidence. We are not left with a conviction that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Fullmer's motion to set aside the automobile collision judgment.
Motions to grant a new trial under SDCL 15-6-59 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and ... will not be disturbed unless it appears affirmatively from the record that there has been an abuse of such discretion. Enchanted World Doll Museum v. Buskohl, 398 N.W.2d 149, 153 (S.D.1986); Haggar, 387 N.W.2d at 51. We have said that a clearer showing of an abuse of discretion is required when a new trial has been granted than where a new trial has been denied. J.H. Larson Elec. Co. v. Vander Vorste, 81 S.D. 296, 303, 134 N.W.2d 500, 504 (1965). A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: (1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial; ... (3) ... surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; ... (5) ... inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice[.] SDCL 15-6-59(a)(1), (3) & (5). The trial court based its decision to grant Fullmer's motion for a new battery trial on each of these grounds. Surprise provides a sufficient basis upon which to affirm the trial court. Dr. Boyer's discovery deposition was taken just two weeks before the first trial. As previously discussed, Dr. Boyer's testimony at the battery trial had changed substantially from the testimony he gave in his deposition. Although this change was in part due to the results of some medical tests done on Fullmer after the automobile collision case was tried, no defendant supplemented Fullmer's interrogatories as required. SDCL 15-6-26(e). [5] The burden to update testimony lies with the party who knows that the response though correct when made is no longer true[.] SDCL 15-6-26(e)(2). Defendants have not been diligent in informing Fullmer of their expert's change of opinion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial based on the surprise testimony of Dr. Boyer. We note that as a result of the bifurcation order and the inconsistent positions taken by defense counsel at the two trials, no jury has had the opportunity to make the particularized determination of whether Fullmer's RSD was caused by (1) the car accident, (2) the arm-raising or, (3) some other cause. The jury in the first trial had no opportunity to determine causation of Fullmer's RSD. The jury at the second trial was only given the opportunity to choose between (2) the arm-raising or (3) some other cause when determining causation. As a result of the trial court's initial bifurcation order, Fullmer has been done an injustice by the juries' verdicts which can only be corrected by a new trial. Hepper v. Triple U Enters., 388 N.W.2d 525, 530 (S.D.1986). As the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it set aside the automobile collision judgment or when it granted a new battery trial, we now look at the scope and conduct of this new trial.