Opinion ID: 2163109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the Circuit Court Order Internally Self-Contradictory?

Text: We disagree with the appellate court's conclusion that the circuit court order is internally self-contradictory. The circuit judge was being asked to make two decisions based on distinct but remarkably similar criteria. He dealt first with the requested change from single-family residential to restricted industrial and open-space zoning. Concluding that this change was proper, he turned to the second question, whether a special-use permit should issue for the interim use as a sanitary landfill. The lengthy oral presentation of findings on overlapping criteria was obviously difficult to follow. This does not, however, mean that the findings are internally inconsistent. Zoning ordinances, which must bear a reasonable relation to the public health, safety and welfare, are presumed valid. The party challenging the zoning bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence ( National Boulevard Bank v. Village of Schaumburg (1980), 83 Ill.2d 228; Exchange National Bank v. County of Cook (1962), 25 Ill.2d 434, 439-40) that application of the ordinance to his property is unreasonable and arbitrary and bears no substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or welfare. ( Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines (1976), 64 Ill.2d 172; County of Cook v. Priester (1976), 62 Ill.2d 357; La Salle National Bank v. City of Evanston (1974), 57 Ill.2d 415.) A party seeking a special-use permit bears a similar burden. ( Duggan v. County of Cook (1975), 60 Ill.2d 107, 110, disapproved on other grounds in Board of Education v. Surety Developers, Inc. (1975), 63 Ill.2d 193.) Therefore, the circuit judge in this case was required to determine separately whether Sexton had met its burden on each of the two questions. When the circuit judge considered the evidence relating to the requested change from R-4 to P-2 and I-1 zoning he was guided by the standards announced in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill.2d 40, 46-47. These include (1) the existing uses and zoning of nearby property, (2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions, (3) the extent to which the destruction of plaintiff's property values promotes the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the public, (4) relative gain to the public compared to hardship imposed upon the individual property owner, (5) the suitability of the subject property for the zoned purposes, and (6) the length of time the property has been vacant as zoned, considered in the context of land development in the vicinity. The circuit judge concluded that, with respect to each of these six factors, Sexton had shown that the R-4 zoning was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, as was the denial of the request to rezone the property to P-2 and I-1. Next the judge turned to the separate question of the special-use permit for the sanitary landfill. He once again considered the six La Salle National Bank factors as they related to this question and, in addition, the six special-use standards established by the Cook County zoning ordinance. Those six standards are: 1. That the establishment, maintenance, or operation of the special use will not be detrimental to or endanger the public health, safety, or general welfare. 2. That the special use will not be injurious to the use and enjoyment of other property in the immediate vicinity for the purposes already permitted, nor substantially diminish and impair property values within the neighborhood. 3. That the establishment of the special use will not impede the normal and orderly development and improvement of surrounding property for uses permitted in the district. 4. That adequate utilities, access roads, drainage and/or other necessary facilities have been or are being provided. 5. That adequate measures have been or will be taken to provide ingress and egress so designed as to minimize traffic congestion in the public streets. 6. That the special use shall in all other respects conform to the applicable regulations of this Ordinance and other applicable County regulations, except as such regulations may in each instance be modified by the Board of Commissioners pursuant to the recommendation of the Zoning Board of Appeals. 1976 Cook County Zoning Ordinance sec. 13.10  F. To obtain a special-use permit, an applicant must satisfy all six of these standards. In this case, the trial judge discussed each standard and found that standards (3) through (6) had been met. Referring to the second standard, the judge said both that there has been no substantial diminution and impairment of property values within the neighborhood and also that this Court cannot say that the use of this property as a sanitary landfill will not be injurious to the use and enjoyment of other property in the immediate vicinity, to wit, the Village of Richton Park. Sexton argues that these two statements are inconsistent and that the latter is also inconsistent with the finding on standard (3) that it does not appear to me from all of the evidence that the existence of this landfill site seriously impacted or prevented the development of the residential property within the Village of Richton Park. Similarly, with regard to the first standard the judge said, I do believe, and I so find, that the operation of this special use sanitary landfill will not endanger the public health, safety, or general welfare. But I cannot say that Sexton has shown, by a clear preponderance of the evidence, that this special use as a sanitary landfill will not be detrimental to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Sexton argues that the findings with respect to endangerment and detriment are self-contradictory and that since the judge found no endangerment, his inability to find no detriment is inconsistent and must therefore be disregarded. The appellate court agreed, but we view the findings differently. Zoning is primarily a legislative function ( La Salle National Bank v. City of Evanston (1974), 57 Ill.2d 415). In the construction of a zoning ordinance, [e]ffect should be given to the intention of the drafters by concentrating on the terminology, its goals and purposes, `the natural import of the words used in common and accepted usage, the setting in which they are employed, and the general structure of the ordinance.' ( Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of Cook (1978), 71 Ill.2d 510, 520. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that surplusage will not be presumed, and each word, clause, or section must be given some reasonable meaning, if possible. ( People v. Warren (1977), 69 Ill.2d 620, 627; Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections (1976), 65 Ill.2d 453, 466; Hirschfield v. Barrett (1968), 40 Ill.2d 224, 230, cert. denied (1969), 393 U.S. 1062, 21 L.Ed.2d 706, 89 S.Ct. 716.) The Cook County board of commissioners established six special-use standards, and we must give meaning to each one. If we were to adopt Sexton's suggestion and construe development as equivalent to either use and enjoyment of other property or substantially diminish and impair property values we would render one of the standards meaningless. This could not have been the legislative intent. Similarly, where a standard is two-pronged, we attribute a distinct and independent meaning to each prong. Use of the word nor in the second standard indicates the legislative intent to give separate meanings to use and enjoyment of property and to property values and to prohibit interference with either. Similarly, use of the word or in standard (1) indicates that detrimental and endanger have separate meanings. Cf. Campbell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America (1958), 15 Ill.2d 308; People v. Vraniak (1955), 5 Ill.2d 384, 389-90. Because the words have distinct meanings, it must be logically possible to reach a positive result with respect to one and a negative result with respect to the other. The circuit judge understood this when he made separate findings on each of the special-use standards. Although we do not challenge his finding that the operation of the sanitary landfill did not substantially diminish and impair property values within the neighborhood for the reasons explained above, we do not regard it as inconsistent with his findings that he was unable to conclude that a landfill would not be detrimental to the public health, safety or general welfare and injurious to the use and enjoyment of homes in Richton Park. Although the oral pronouncement may not have been a model of clarity, it was not internally inconsistent, and it cannot be voided on that ground.