Opinion ID: 789837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Government's closing arguments

Text: 45 Della Rose cites five instances during the government's closing arguments in which he believes the prosecutors made inappropriate remarks that were prejudicial to him. No objection was raised as to four of the remarks, meaning that our review is limited to one for plain error alone. In order to establish plain error, Della Rose must show not only that the remarks denied [him] a fair trial, but also that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different absent the remarks. United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 46 We detect in the prosecutors' remarks no error sufficient to warrant a new trial. The one statement to which a timely objection was made concerned the prosecutor's previous experiences with Della Rose's counsel, whom he said was really good, had intimidated me in the past in other cases, and had smack[ed] me around. Tr. 658. The prosecutor promptly moved on once the defense objected. Although Della Rose rightly observes that these remarks had nothing to do with the evidence and tended to cast the trial in terms of a joust between the prosecutor and defense counsel, Della Rose Br. at 38, we can see no way in which Della Rose's rights were materially harmed by the remarks. 47 As for the other remarks, none rise to the level of plain error. When the prosecution asked the jury, Do you believe James George and all the corroborative evidence that supports his testimony, or do you believe Steven Della Rose and all the lies he told Ben Geach and the ARDC and at a civil deposition under oath to cover his tracks?, Tr. 610, he was echoing a view of the case posited by defense counsel himself, who had previously suggested to the jury that the case would come down to whom the jurors believed. Tr. 53, 57-58. We do not think that the remark can reasonably be construed as an invitation automatically to acquit Della Rose if jurors thought that George or another prosecution witness had lied or conversely to convict him unless it could identify a government witness who had lied. Cf. United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 386-87 (7th Cir.1978). Nor do we believe that the prosecutor improperly remarked on the defendant's decision not to testify in this case when he contended that there was no evidence other than the self-serving statements in Mr. Della Rose's testimony [in the civil litigation] and Mr. Della Rose's letter [to the A.R.D.C.] that George had visited Della Rose's office in April or May, as the defense posited. Tr. 614. As there is no reason to believe that Della Rose was the only witness who could have testified as to when George stopped by Della Rose's office (Della Rose had a secretary, for example), we do not think the remark can be understood as an implicit comment on the fact that Della Rose himself did not testify. The prosecutor's characterization of something that Della Rose had said in his letter to the A.R.D.C. as the most ridiculous statement I've ever heard, Tr. 623, could be understood in part as a legitimate comment, based on the trial evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, on the credibility of the letter's assertions. See United States v. Patterson, 23 F.3d 1239, 1250-51 (7th Cir.1994). To the extent that the I've ever heard portion of the remark verged on the prosecutor offering a personal opinion on credibility, see id. at 1250, it was not so serious as to have deprived Della Rose of a fair trial. Finally, the prosecutor's suggestion that Della Rose, a former prosecutor himself, produced to the A.R.D.C. photocopies rather than originals of the documents in George's file, and destroyed the original settlement check payable to George, in order to make it more difficult for a handwriting expert to detect a forged signature, Tr. 660-61, was an argument with a basis in inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the testimony. It was therefore within the realm of proper argument.