Opinion ID: 2973040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The summary judgment order in favor of Siemens

Text: The district court erroneously stated in its summary judgment order that Siemens and Lee had stipulated to a licensor/licensee relationship. A licensor/licensee relationship is based upon premises liability, which generally applies only if Siemens had possession of or title to the premises on which Lee was injured. See Thompson v. Breeding, 351 F.3d 732, 738 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Kentucky law). Siemens’s primary argument is that it was not a licensor and thus owed no duty to Lee. Because Siemens neither owned nor controlled the area where the accident took place, this argument has merit. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Siemens constructed the makeshift stairway that wobbled and caused Lee to fall. Siemens argues in the alternative, however, that it did not breach a duty to Lee even if the relationship is characterized as that of a licensor/licensee. We find this argument also persuasive. Kentucky law defines the relationship between contractors on a project as that of licensor/licensee unless there is a mutual beneficial relationship. Brauner v. Leutz, 169 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943) (classifying the relationship between a painter and a builder as that of licensor/licensee where the painter borrowed the builder’s scaffolding but offered nothing in return). In the present case, Siemens and Delta, Lee’s employer, were both subcontractors on the same Worldport project. No mutually beneficial relationship existed, even though they worked in the same area of the site. As a result, the relationship can be characterized as that of licensor/licensee if we take as true (as we -6- No. 04-6481 Lee v. UPS, Inc. must for summary judgment purposes) Lee’s claim that Siemens was responsible for constructing the makeshift stairway. The scope of Siemens’s duty to Lee, assuming that he was a licensee, is a limited one. A licensor must “abstain from doing any intentional, wilful (and in some jurisdictions gross reckless) act endangering the safety of the licensee,” Brauner, 169 S.W.2d at 6, and “[t]here is no duty to warn a licensee of any danger or condition which is open and obvious or which should or could be observed by the licensee in the exercise of ordinary care.” Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that homeowners did not breach their duty to a party guest who injured himself when diving into the homeowners’ shallow swimming pool because the danger was “readily apparent”); see also Thompson, 351 F.3d at 737-38 (holding that a licensor did not breach a duty to the plaintiff because the wet, oily spot that she slipped on was open and obvious, even though she was distracted when she stepped on it). The district court properly ruled that Siemens did not breach its duty to Lee. Lee never claimed that Siemens intentionally or willfully injured him. The dangerous nature of the makeshift stairway over the conveyor, furthermore, was open and obvious. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Lee, we assume that Lee neither heard nor saw that the conveyor belt was running when he stepped onto the conveyor. Lee, however, still knew that he was crossing the conveyor, and he knew that he was crossing the conveyor on a makeshift stairway. Siemens was in no better position than Lee was to appreciate the danger of him doing so. But Lee argues on appeal that a new burden-shifting approach articulated in Lanier v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 431 (Ky. 2003), a slip-and-fall case, precludes summary judgment in -7- No. 04-6481 Lee v. UPS, Inc. favor of the defendants. Although Siemens argues in its brief that Lee did not raise the Lanier analysis below, Lee did, in fact, mention the case in his response to Siemens’s motion for summary judgment. In Lanier, the court held: [O]nce the plaintiff establishes that he or she fell as a result of a transitory foreign substance, a rebuttable presumption of negligence arises. At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show by the greater weight of the evidence that it exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises under the circumstances. Lanier, 99 S.W.3d at 435 (citation omitted). Lee claims, on the basis of Lanier, that his case should have survived summary judgment because Siemens did not meet its burden of proving that it exercised reasonable care. Although the Lanier court did articulate a new burden-shifting rule, Lanier is both factually and legally distinguishable from the present case. Wal-Mart, the defendant in Lanier, is a business invitor that owed a greater duty to its customers than Siemens owed to Lee. See McNay v. Shell’s Seafood Restaurants, Inc., No. 2003-CA-001958-MR, 2005 WL 384547 at  (Ky. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2005) (unpublished) (holding that “[t]he application of Lanier is limited to slip and fall cases brought by business invitees who have been injured as a result of slipping on a foreign substance”). The plaintiff in Lanier, moreover, did not see the clear, slippery substance that caused her to fall, 99 S.W.3d. at 435, so there was no discussion of the “open and obvious” doctrine. In contrast, Lee not only knew of the conveyor and its potential danger, but also admitted in his deposition that he would have used the makeshift stairway to cross the conveyor even if he had known that the belt was moving. This distinction is critical, because the Lanier court noted: “Presumably, had the customer -8- No. 04-6481 Lee v. UPS, Inc. had personal knowledge of the presence of the substance/object before the accident, [the customer] would not have stepped on it.” Id. at 434. Lee further argues that the open-and-obvious doctrine is outdated given the holdings in Lanier, Wallingford v. Kroger Co., 761 S.W.2d 621 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), and Horne v. Precision Cars of Lexington, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 364 (Ky. 2005). As discussed above, however, the Lanier decision did not involve an open and obvious hazard. Lee’s reliance on Wallingford is similarly misplaced. The deliveryman in Wallingford was injured after Kroger refused to clear the icy path he normally used, or to allow him to use another entrance. His injury occurred when he attempted to clear the path himself. Wallingford, 761 S.W.2d. at 624. The Wallingford court allowed recovery, but it cautioned that its holding does not permit someone “to walk blindly into dangers that are obvious, known to him, or would be anticipated by one of ordinary prudence.” Id. (citations omitted). Unlike the deliveryman in Wallingford, Lee took no precautions to avoid the open and obvious danger he faced. Horne is similarly distinguishable. In Horne, the plaintiff was a customer who tripped and fell on a concrete parking barrier in an auto dealer’s parking lot, injuring his wrist. Horne, 170 S.W.3d at 365-66. The court held that the parking barrier was not an open and obvious danger because an employee of the auto dealer had improperly parked a car in front of it. Id. at 370. In dicta, the Horne court also commented that even if the danger was open and obvious, the auto dealer could still be liable because it should have anticipated that the plaintiff was too distracted by the salesperson’s conversation to notice the barrier or to protect himself from it. Id. -9- No. 04-6481 Lee v. UPS, Inc. Horne does not control the outcome in Lee’s case. While the parking barrier in Horne was at least partially concealed from the plaintiff’s view, the makeshift stairway over the conveyor was open and obvious to Lee. Lee had worked at the Worldport for nearly two years before the accident, and he frequently crossed the conveyor. The court in Horne relied in part on the fact that Horne was distracted, and that the nature of auto sales, with its constant banter between salespersons and customers, led to such distraction. Id. In the present case, Lee could have checked to see if the conveyor was moving before stepping over it, and he had no reason to be distracted while doing so. Finally, Lee fails to establish causation. Regardless of the scope of Siemens’s duty or any breach thereof, Lee still would have suffered injury under the circumstances. Although Lee claims that he did not realize that the conveyor was moving or hear any warning signal, he also admits in his deposition that he would have crossed anyway: Q: [W]ould you have crossed the conveyor anyhow if you knew it was moving? A: Yes. Q: Okay . . . . you would have crossed it if you — if you had been warned that it was moving? A: Yes. Lee’s failure to establish causation precludes his recovery despite whatever duty Siemens might have owed him. See Cremeans ex rel. Cremeans v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, No. Civ. A. 04-343-KSF, 2005 WL 1883662, at  (E.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2005) (holding that even if the plaintiff had proven that the danger was not open and obvious, the failure to establish causation between a defective door and his smashed finger was fatal to the plaintiff’s claim). The district court in Cremeans also applied the open and obvious doctrine, signaling that the doctrine survives Lanier. Id. at . Because Lee failed to establish causation, and because Siemens had no duty to warn him - 10 - No. 04-6481 Lee v. UPS, Inc. of the obvious danger of crossing the conveyor on a makeshift stairway, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Siemens.