Opinion ID: 155810
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Marty next asserts that the government presented insufficient evidence to support convictions on each of the three counts. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). The three necessary elements to sustain a conviction under the felon-inpossession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), are a prior felony conviction, knowledge that the instrument possessed is a firearm, and possession of the firearm in or affecting interstate commerce. See United States v. Capps, 77 F.3d 350, 352 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2568 (1996). The only issue -6- the defendant raises regarding his conviction under § 922(g)(1) is whether he had possession of the stolen weapons. He argues that he had neither actual nor constructive possession of the firearms. Constructive possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1). See Mills, 29 F.3d at 549. One has constructive possession when he knowingly has ownership, dominion, or control over the object and the premises where it is found. See id. Marty owned the car in which he and Swiftbird transported the firearms. Marty had possession of the keys to the car, voluntarily allowed Swiftbird to load the guns into the car, drove Swiftbird and the guns to the pawnshop, and knew that he was carrying the guns in his car. He, therefore, knowingly had control over the objects (i.e., the firearms) and the premises (i.e., the car) where they were located. Cf. United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 946 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[Defendant] had dominion and control over the firearms because he had control of the keys to the trunk of the car.”). Thus, sufficient evidence existed to convict the defendant of being a felon in possession of firearms. Turning to Count II, a defendant may be convicted for possession of stolen firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) if he either had actual knowledge that the firearms he possessed were stolen or had reasonable cause to believe that the firearms were stolen. According to the trial testimony of Swiftbird and ATF agent Scot Thomasson, prior to Swiftbird and Marty’s third and final trip to the -7- pawnshop, Swiftbird told Marty that Swiftbird had stolen the firearms. The jurors also heard testimony that, equipped with the knowledge that the firearms had been stolen, Marty still drove Swiftbird and the firearms to the pawnshop where Swiftbird sold them. This testimony is evidence that Marty had actual knowledge that the guns were stolen prior to him transporting them in his car to the pawnshop. The jury believed that testimony, and their conclusion was not unreasonable. Marty contends in his brief, contrary to this evidence, that he did not assist Swiftbird in transporting the guns after learning that Swiftbird had stolen them. Thus, Marty argues not that the evidence was legally insufficient to convict him under § 922(j), but rather that the facts are different than determined by the jury. “Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991). There is nothing in the record to suggest that the jury’s findings were clearly erroneous, and thus, we uphold the conviction for possession of stolen firearms. Finally, Marty was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 371 with conspiring with Swiftbird to violate the felon-in-possession and stolen firearms statutes. To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the government must prove that there was an -8- agreement to violate the law, the defendant knew the essential objectives of the conspiracy, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily took part in the conspiracy, and the co-conspirators were interdependent. See United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1546 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 588 (1996). The government presented evidence at trial that was sufficient for a jury to find that each of these four elements had been satisfied. The evidence was as follows. First, Marty agreed with Swiftbird to use his car to transport Swiftbird and the stolen guns, in violation of federal law, to a pawnshop where Swiftbird sold them. Second, Marty knew that the essential objective of the conspiracy was to split the proceeds of the sale of stolen firearms. Third, Marty knowingly and voluntarily assisted Swiftbird in transporting the guns to the pawnshop. Fourth, Swiftbird and Marty acted together. Marty drove his car with the guns, and Swiftbird took the guns into the pawnshop to sell them. Marty received a portion of the sale proceeds. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Marty’s conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371.