Opinion ID: 1923517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Police Power Does the Municipality have the Power to Enact the Ordinance?

Text: While there is no State enabling act which specifically authorizes a municipality to adopt an ordinance regulating parking lots such as that at the Center, ample authority for such an enactment may be found in the general police powers which are vested in municipalities. N.J.S.A. 40:48-1 contains an extensive list of matters on which municipalities are specifically empowered to enact legislation. N.J.S.A. 40:48-2 provides generally: Any municipality may make, amend, repeal and enforce such other ordinances, regulations, rules and by-laws not contrary to the laws of this state or of the United States, as it may deem necessary and proper for the good government, order and protection of persons and property, and for the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, and as may be necessary to carry into effect the powers and duties conferred and imposed by this subtitle, or by any law. This second provision has been construed as an express delegation of State police powers to local governing bodies. This power is in addition, rather than merely ancillary, to the sundry detailed authorizations for municipal action contained in our statutes. N.J. Builders Ass'n v. Mayor, E. Brunswick Tp., 60 N.J. 222, 227 (1972); Summer v. Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 552 (1969); Fred v. Borough of Old Tappan, 10 N.J. 515, 520-521 (1952). Additional force attaches to this general delegation of power by the constitutional directive that any law concerning municipal corporations formed for local government ... shall be liberally construed in their favor. N.J. Const. (1947), Art. IV, § VII, par. 11. Furthermore, the Town of Kearny, which is subject to the Optional Municipal Charter Law (Faulkner Act), has been provided with other powers which are codified as N.J.S.A. 40:69A-1, et seq.: The general grant of municipal power contained in this article is intended to confer the greatest power of local self-government consistent with the Constitution of this State. Any specific enumeration of municipal powers contained in this act or in any other general law shall not be construed in any way to limit the general description of power contained in this article, and any such specifically enumerated municipal powers shall be construed as in addition and supplementary to the powers conferred in general terms by this article. All grants of municipal power to municipalities governed by an optional plan under this act, whether in the form of specific enumeration or general terms, shall be liberally construed, as required by the Constitution of this State, in favor of the municipality. [ N.J.S.A. 40:69A-30] Ordinances, as well as statutes, are accorded a presumption of validity. Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 564 (1975); Collingswood v. Ringgold, 66 N.J. 350, 358 (1975). The presumption is not irrebutable but it imposes a burden on the party seeking to overturn the ordinance. Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, supra, 68 N.J. at 564; Collingswood v. Ringgold, supra, 66 N.J. at 358; Moyant v. Paramus, 30 N.J. 528, 535 (1959). The presumption may be overcome only by a clear showing that the local ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable. Vickers v. Gloucester Tp. Com., 37 N.J. 232, 242 (1962), cert. denied 371 U.S. 233, 83 S.Ct. 326, 9 L.Ed. 2d 495 (1963); Kozesnik v. Montgomery Tp., 24 N.J. 154, 167 (1957); Local Bd. of Health, Berkeley Tp. v. Johnson, 73 N.J. Super. 384, 391-392 (App. Div. 1962). A review of the cases which have construed the police power statutes leads us to conclude that attempts by defendant to regulate plaintiff's parking facility clearly fall within the purview of the municipal police power. In Garden State Racing Ass'n v. Cherry Hill Tp., 42 N.J. 454 (1964), for example, this Court sustained an ordinance which regulated a parking lot operated in conjunction with a privately owned race track. Although the principal issue in that case concerned the propriety of certain licensing fees, the Court observed: There is no question that a municipality could regulate parking lots under the general police power enactment, R.S. 40:48-2. 42 N.J. at 461. There, as here, the parking area which the municipality sought to regulate was a privately owned business. [6] In addition to these police power provisions, other statutes may provide a more specific legislative basis for regulating individual aspects of plaintiff's operation. For example, N.J.S.A. 39:4-197 permits municipalities to regulate entrances and exits of public parking places. N.J.S.A. 40:48-2.46 enlarges this power by authorizing requirements for placement and types of lighting and ... [for] installation and maintenance of internal traffic directional lines. Similarly, a specific statutory basis for the fencing provisions of the Kearny ordinance may be found in N.J.S.A. 40:67-1 (e) which empowers local governments to: Cause the owners of real estate abutting on any street or highway to erect fences, walls, or other safeguards for the protection of persons from injury from unsafe places on said real estate adjacent to or near such street or highway ... [7] Although application of the above statutes to the case at bar may present interesting questions of law, see note 7 supra, it is unnecessary for us to resolve them. We hold that the Kearny ordinance is amply supported by the municipal police power expressly delegated to the town in N.J.S.A. 40:48-2.