Opinion ID: 441672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The legal nature of a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.

Text: 40 We turn now to plaintiffs' contentions that the FSOF licensing scheme violates their patients' due process right to terminate their pregnancies free of State interference. Because of the continued evolution in the law regarding abortions, we review the legal nature of this constitutional right before turning to the facts in this case. 41 The Supreme Court recognized in Roe v. Wade that the right of privacy ... founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). However, a woman's constitutionally protected right to choose to terminate her pregnancy by abortion is not an absolute right; rather, it must be considered against important state interests in regulating abortion. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2491, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154, 93 S.Ct. at 727. Because the right to choose abortion is a fundamental right, any state regulation restricting a woman's right to choose abortion must be supported by a compelling state interest. Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2491; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 155, 93 S.Ct. at 727. 42 The Supreme Court has recognized two compelling state interests that will justify State regulation of abortion: 43 First, a State has an important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life. Although this interest exists throughout the course of the woman's pregnancy, it becomes compelling only at viability, the point at which the fetus has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. At viability this interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn child is so important that the State may proscribe abortions altogether, except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. 44 Second, because a State has a legitimate concern with the health of women who undergo abortions, a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health [and] in maintaining medical standards. ... (T)his health interest does not become compelling until approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. Until that time, a pregnant woman must be permitted, in consultation with her physician, to decide to have an abortion and to effectuate that decision free of interference by the State. 45 Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2491-92 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). 46 Subsequent to its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court has several times found it necessary to evaluate state regulations that in some way affect a woman's ability to exercise her fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, supra; Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733 (1983); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 S.Ct. 2532, 76 L.Ed.2d 755 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 96 S.Ct. 170, 46 L.Ed.2d 152 (1975); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). 47 In Akron, one of its most recent abortion decisions, the Supreme Court rearticulated the guidelines for permissible state regulation of abortion. These guidelines control the analysis of the Michigan legislation being challenged here. 48 Akron teaches that during the first trimester of pregnancy the State may impose only regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right [to abort], and even these minor regulations ... may not interfere with physician-patient consultation or with the woman's choice between abortion and childbirth. Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2492-93 (emphasis added). Furthermore, these insignificant regulations must further important state health objectives, and the burden of demonstrating this rests on the State. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2493. 49 From approximately the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, the State 'may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.'  Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2493 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S.Ct. at 731) (footnote omitted). 50 Examples of permissible state regulation [during the first trimester] are requirements as to the qualifications of the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like. 51 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163, 93 S.Ct. at 732. 52 But even a second trimester abortion regulation that is reasonably related to maternal health cannot stand if it departs from accepted medical practice. Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2495. If a State requires the licensing of facilities that perform abortions or undertakes to regulate the performance of abortions after the first trimester, then the health standards adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish.'  Akron, 103 S.Ct. at 2493 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 195, 93 S.Ct. at 749).