Opinion ID: 1700799
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Heading: General Nature of Emotional Distress Damage Claims

Text: Lawrence's claims for emotional distress damages are also based on his assertion that defendants were negligent in preparing his petition for bankruptcy. The federal government indicted him for bankruptcy fraud because of a statement deemed false that was made in the petition. Although he was acquitted of the charge, Lawrence says he suffered emotional distress that was caused by and was a foreseeable result of the negligent act of his bankruptcy lawyer. Lawrence did not suffer any physical harm and does not claim that his lawyers' acts were intentional. Thus, the tort we have recognized as an intentional infliction of emotional distress is not claimed here. See Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 917 (Iowa 1976), where we established the elements of this tort. We have also recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981). Regarding this tort, generally, a party may not recover damages for emotional distress in an action premised on mere negligence where the plaintiff has suffered no physical harm. Hamilton, 306 S.E.2d at 343; Niblo v. Parr Mfg., 445 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Iowa 1989). An exception to the denial of emotional distress damages in negligence actions unaccompanied by physical harm exists where the nature of the relationship between the parties is such that there arises a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional harm. Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa 1990); Niblo, 445 N.W.2d at 354. We have recognized recovery for emotional distress damages in actions which did not involve an intentional tort when a party negligently performed an act which was so coupled with matters of mental concern or solicitude, or with the sensibilities of the party to whom the duty is owed, that a breach of that duty will necessarily or reasonably result in mental anguish or suffering, and it should be known to the parties from the nature of the [obligation] that such suffering will result from its breach. Meyer, 241 N.W.2d at 921 (quoting Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949)). We have therefore recognized the propriety of recovery of emotional distress damages in actions involving: (1) medical malpractice resulting from the negligent examination and treatment of a pregnant woman and her premature fetus associated with the death of the fetus, Oswald, 453 N.W.2d at 639; (2) distress experienced by a son when he observed the negligence of another cause injury to his mother, Barnhill, 300 N.W.2d at 105-08; (3) the negligent delivery of a telegram announcing the death of a loved one, Cowan v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 122 Iowa 379, 386-87, 98 N.W. 281, 282-84 (1904); Mentzer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 Iowa 752, 768-69, 62 N.W. 1, 6 (1895); and (4) the negligent performance of a contract to perform funeral services, Meyer, 241 N.W.2d at 920. In assessing the level of stress necessary to support a claim we have adopted the following test from the Restatement (Second) of Torts: whether the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. Bethards v. Shivvers, Inc., 355 N.W.2d 39, 44-45 (Iowa 1984). In several cases we have held that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for severe emotional distress because the actions did not rise to the level required by our law following the Restatement. See, e.g., Tappe v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 477 N.W.2d 396, 403-04 (Iowa 1991) (court held that proof [fell] far short of proof necessary for severe distress where plaintiff felt upset and confused by confrontation with cardiologist, which was the worst thing that ever happened to him. Plaintiff alleged the cardiologist stated that the patient (plaintiff's wife) would never regain consciousness or live independently, that plaintiff would be broke after trying to keep her alive for three months, and that she would die anyway.); Vaughn v. Ag Processing, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 627, 636 (Iowa 1990) (plaintiff's complaint that he had been upset, grouchy, and nervous and that his sex life had deteriorated after supervisor made derogatory religious comments was insufficient to prove severe emotional distress); Bethards, 355 N.W.2d at 44-45 (no substantial evidence of severe emotional distress existed where plaintiffs were angry and lost sleep, `quivered' when the subject came up, and ... worried whether people thought [plaintiffs] owned a `junk farm.'); Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 1984) (evidence of being downhearted and depressed was too insubstantial to demonstrate severe distress); Poulsen v. Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 297 (Iowa 1981) (evidence that plaintiff was feeling as if he had lost everything falls short of required showing of severe emotional distress).