Opinion ID: 2981142
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Hamilton

Text: Broyles asserts that Hamilton was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need when she made “an incompetent, and inadequate medical determination” that his condition was nonemergent following his initial phone call and written health care request filed on August 20, 2005. No. 10-1447 Broyles v. Correctional Medical Services, et al. Broyles also suggests that Hamilton may be responsible for the health care unit’s failure to schedule Broyles to be seen by a nurse on August 23 as promised. In order to be held liable for deliberate indifference, a prison official must know of and disregard an excessive risk to an inmate’s health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837-38. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. However, a claimant is not necessarily required to prove that the prison official had actual knowledge of the substantial risk; rather, one may conclude that a prison official knew of a severe risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. Id. at 842-43. The seriousness of Broyles’s condition and the risk posed by delay were not obvious. Therefore, Broyles had to allege facts that could prove both that Hamilton was aware of facts from which she could draw an inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed to Broyles’s health and that she in fact drew that inference. See id. at 837. The only facts Broyles alleges that Hamilton knew consist of his phone call and written health care request on August 20, which described a partial blur in the vision of his right eye. Broyles’s complaint alleges Hamilton was responsible for failing to ensure that he see a nurse on August 23; however, he did see a nurse on August 24 and the nurse found nothing abnormal with his eye. In essence, Broyles disagrees with Hamilton’s determination that his condition was non-emergent. “An allegation of mere negligence in diagnosis or treatment is not actionable under § 1983.” Clark v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 98 F. App’x 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97); Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d 592, 595 n.2 (6th Cir. 1983). The complaint contains no allegations that Hamilton specifically knew Broyles faced a No. 10-1447 Broyles v. Correctional Medical Services, et al. substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that substantial risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it as is required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.