Opinion ID: 3163494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burns’s Severance Motion

Text: Like Rollerson, Burns contends that the trial court erred in denying her severance motion because: (1) the majority of the charged conduct only related to Rollerson; (2) there were two separate incidents, one of which she was not charged for; and (3) trying her case with Rollerson‟s would result in prejudice. The government opposed the motion, arguing Burns could not show that manifest prejudice resulted from a joint trial. More specifically, the government contended that severance was not appropriate because the crimes arose from the same joint “crime spree” and the jury was capable of making and made independent determinations of guilt aided by court instruction. The trial court denied Burns‟s motion, ruling that limiting instructions would be given to explain to the jury that evidence of the burglary and assault was admissible only in regards to Rollerson. During trial, Burns renewed her motion for severance, which was again denied. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burns‟s severance motion because she was not prejudiced by the joint trial. This court will reverse such a denial only if a defendant shows that she 22 suffered “manifest prejudice” as a result of being tried jointly. Harrison, 76 A.3d at 834. “Manifest prejudice occurs only where the evidence of a defendant‟s complicity in the overall criminal venture is de minimis when compared to the evidence against his codefendants.” Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 930 (D.C. 1993). A defendant does not suffer manifest prejudice just because a significant portion of the government‟s trial evidence is applicable only to her codefendants. Walker v. United States, 982 A.2d 723, 729 (D.C. 2009). “This is so even though some of the evidence concerns prior criminal offenses or bad acts relating only to other codefendants.” Johnson v. United States, 596 A.2d 980, 987 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 490 (D.C. 1986)). Thus, the inquiry is only whether the trial evidence is “so complex or confusing” that the jury could not make “individual determinations about the guilt or innocence of each defendant.” Id. “It is accepted that in any trial involving multiple defendants, some amount of potential prejudice is permissible if outweighed by considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration.” Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 490 (D.C. 1986). “[T]he trial court‟s role is not to balance on a scale the comparative weights of the evidence as to each defendant.” Id. The fact that a defendant would have had a better chance of acquittal had she been tried alone is not, by itself, grounds for concluding that severance was improperly denied. Medley v. United States, 104 A.3d 115, 123 (D.C. 2014). 23 Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Burns‟s motion for severance because any prejudicial effect which resulted from her joint trial did not rise to the level of manifest prejudice necessary to require reversal. Burns‟s argument that severance was appropriate because her involvement in the Elvans Road incident was de minimis is unavailing. Although Burns was not charged with crimes arising from the Elvans Road incident, Burns played a central role in the events that led to Rollerson‟s crimes and her actions at that event show her motive to commit the assault later that day as she and Rollerson continued to seek out and punish the person who slashed her car tires. Thus, neither Burns‟s involvement in the Elvans Road incident nor her role in the “criminal enterprise” as a whole was de minimis. Moreover, this is not a case that was “so complex or confusing” that the jury would have been unable to make “individual determinations about the guilt or innocence of each defendant.” Hagans, 96 A.3d at 41. Indeed, throughout the trial and during closing arguments, both government and defense counsel reminded the jury that there were two separate incidents and that Burns was not charged with anything that happened on Elvans Road, only the assault that occurred on Bowen Road. Furthermore, during trial, after the government‟s presentation of evidence concerning the Elvans Road incident and before its presentation of evidence 24 concerning the Bowen Road incident, the trial court instructed the jury that “up to now all the evidence has been against Mr. Rollerson and the charges involving only Mr. Rollerson.” And, during final jury instructions, the trial court parsed the offenses specifically against Rollerson from those against both Rollerson and Burns, made clear the location of each offense, and instructed that evidence for counts 1-6 relating to Rollerson for the Elvans Road incident could not be used in reaching verdicts as to counts 7 and 8 relating to the Bowen Road incident in which Burns was charged. These instructions properly protected Burns from manifest prejudice or improper use of evidence against her. See Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 20 (D.C. 1978) (“[A]n appellate court will be extremely reluctant to reverse [a trial court‟s denial of severance] on grounds of prejudicial joinder when the trial court has minimized the prejudice through the efficacious use of cautionary instructions.”). Accordingly, we are satisfied that the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Burns‟s motion for severance.