Opinion ID: 215941
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Watson's Discriminatory Termination Claim

Text: Mr. Watson claims that he was terminatedin his capacity as a trainer and as a driverbecause he was HIV-positive. See Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 44 (Once the upper management for Defendant England learned of Plaintiff Watson's disability, they moved to terminate Plaintiff Watson.). Because Mr. Watson has offered no direct evidence of discrimination, we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to each claim of discriminatory termination. MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that Mr. Watson can make out a prima facie case of discrimination. See Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1165 (assuming, without deciding, that the plaintiff had established a prima facie discriminatory termination claim under the ADA (citing Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1235, 1237 (10th Cir.2004); McCowan v. All Star Maint., Inc., 273 F.3d 917, 923 (10th Cir. 2001))). Applying the burden-shifting test, we conclude that both of Mr. Watson's termination claims fail as a matter of law, and therefore the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in C.R. England's favor.
When C.R. England removed Mr. Watson from his trainer position, the stated reasons for the removal were: (1) he sat up with [his] student and burned up [his] h[ou]rs; (2) he refused a load; and (3) he deadheaded ... over 1000 miles home. EEOC App. at 432. The supervisor further conveyed to Mr. Watson that she would remove any trainer[,] especially a brand new trainer for any one of th[o]se reasons, and that he did not use good judgment[,] especially knowing that [he] w[as] on an automatic 90 day probation. Id. These stated reasonswhich on their face are legitimate and non-discriminatorysatisfy C.R. England's exceedingly light burden. Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1013 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1363 (10th Cir.1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The burden, therefore, shifts to Mr. Watson. In attempting to demonstrate that C.R. England's proffered reasons for the removal are pretextual, Mr. Watson asserts that the company's justifications are not supported by the record. Specifically, he argues that (1) there is no evidence that Plaintiff Watson improperly allocated hours for his student; (2) he refused the load because he was extremely frustrated with at least three load cancellations in a row; and (3) although [he] deadheaded home, Defendant England cites no rule or company policy which would require the termination of a trainer for deadheading home. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 44-45. [15] In determining whether the proffered reason for a decision was pretextual, we examine the facts as they appear to the person making the decision,  Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Watts v. City of Norman, 270 F.3d 1288, 1295 (10th Cir. 2001)); we do not look to the plaintiff's subjective evaluation of the situation, see McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 149 F.3d 1125, 1130 (10th Cir.1998). Regarding the supervisor's belief that he had inappropriately burned up his hours, Mr. Watson had told the driver manager that he had run out of hours. When asked why this was the case, Mr. Watson did not explain and instead simply refused the load. Moreover, regardless of whether Mr. Watson actually misallocated his hours, we are only concerned with whether the employer held a good-faith belief that he had done so; the evidence before us demonstrates that it did. See Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir.2005) (indicating that the relevant inquiry concerns the belief of the employer that the employee engaged in misconduct, not whether the actual facts, as shown by evidence extrinsic to the employer's assessment, may have been otherwise.). In the end, Mr. Watson has not put forth any evidence that undermines the sincerity of C.R. England's stated justificationthat is, he has not demonstrated it is unworthy of belief. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1071 (10th Cir. 2004). In regard to Mr. Watson's load refusal, he does not dispute that he refused the load, and the evidence confirms that he did. Instead, Mr. Watson attempts to demonstrate pretext by giving a justification for his refusal, stating that he was extremely frustrated with at least three load cancellations in a row. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45. However, we fail to see how this excuse demonstrates pretext. [A]n employer's exercise of erroneous or even illogical business judgment does not constitute pretext. Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69 F.3d 1523, 1535 (10th Cir.1995). And Mr. Watson's [m]ere conjecture that the employer's explanation is pretext is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.1999). As to C.R. England's final justification that he deadheaded home while training a new driverMr. Watson asserts that this is pretextual because the company cites no rule or company policy which would require the termination of a trainer for deadheading home. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45 (emphasis added). However, Mr. Watson cites no controlling precedent that in any way supports the proposition that an employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification must be based upon an official company rule or policymuch less be required by such a rule or policyand we are not aware of any such precedent. See Medlock v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 608 F.3d 1185, 1192-93 (10th Cir.2010) (rejecting the argument, asserted by the plaintiff in an age discrimination case, that an otherwise reasonable justification for a business decision somehow loses its legitimacy simply because it reflects an exercise of managerial judgment rather than a ministerial execution of written policyas if a manager could not legitimately fire an employee for vandalizing property, stealing from co-workers, or assaulting a customer absent a formal company policy specifically addressing such misconduct). It is true that a failure to follow company policy can support a finding of pretext in some circumstances. See Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1119 (10th Cir.2007) (It is well-established that pretext can be shown by `evidence that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances.' (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir.2000))). However, we discern no basis for concluding that an otherwise reasonable justification by an employer should be deemed pretextual merely because it is not directly reinforced by an official rule or policy. This facially untenable idea... is belied by countless employment discrimination cases decided on the basis of legitimate business justifications without any reference to formal policies necessarily legitimizing those justifications. Medlock, 608 F.3d at 1193. Accordingly, Mr. Watson's argument does nothing to cast doubt on C.R. England's otherwise legitimate and non-discriminatory justification. In sum, Mr. Watson has not met his burden to demonstrate that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1166 (quoting Stinnett, 337 F.3d at 1218) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Watson next argues that C.R. England terminated his employment as an independent-contractor driver for the company due to his HIV status. As discussed above, after Mr. Watson deadheaded to Florida he remained there for a period of more than two weeks with his leased truck; he did not accept new loads, generate any income, or make lease payments on his truck. During this time, C.R. England attempted to contact Mr. Watson, but received no response. On March 4, 2003, C.R. England terminated Mr. Watson's Lease Agreement, and Opportunity Leasing repossessed his truck. In justifying the severance of the relationship, C.R. England cites Mr. Watson's (1) poor performance, which includes failing to respond and accept loads, and (2) the fact that he defaulted on his lease (i.e., falling too far in the []hole to recover, EEOC App. at 435). C.R. England Br., No. 09-4217, at 41. Again, these justifications satisfy C.R. England's exceedingly light burden, Goodwin, 275 F.3d at 1013, which shifts the burden to Mr. Watson to demonstrate pretext. Mr. Watson does not attempt to undermine the justifications regarding his poor performance or his failure to make required payments under the lease agreement; therefore, he has not shown that these legitimate, non-discriminatory justifications are unworthy of belief. Stover, 382 F.3d at 1071. Because Mr. Watson has not demonstrated that these justifications were pretext masking discriminatory animus, Proctor v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1208 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Piercy, 480 F.3d at 1198) (internal quotation marks omitted), this claim is without merit. Although Mr. Watson does not attempt to undermine the justifications discussed above, he does attack an alleged third justificationthat he abandoned his vehicle. Mr. Watson argues that he never abandoned his vehicle, which clearly shows pretext. Watson Opening Br., No. 09-4217, at 45. However, the record demonstrates that C.R. England never justified the termination on the ground that Mr. Watson had abandoned his truck. The record evidence that Mr. Watson identifies related to vehicle abandonment is unavailing. Specifically, Mr. Watson points to the deposition of Kimberly Cage, the manager of training operations, who testified that another C.R. England employee had told her four years prior that Mr. Watson had abandoned his truck. Watson App. at 619 (Dep. of Kimberly Cage, dated July 11, 2007). Examined in context, this single statementwhich was not otherwise used to justify the terminationis not enough to establish pretext, particularly in light of the above-cited justifications, which we find to be legitimate and nondiscriminatory. See Zamora, 478 F.3d at 1178 ([T]his Court frequently examines statements and events in context to determine their legal effect or whether they genuinely create a disputed question of material fact.). Accordingly, Mr. Watson cannot demonstrate that C.R. England's justifications for terminating the lease agreement were pretextual, and the district court committed no error in entering judgment in the company's favor.