Opinion ID: 2604100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Superior Court Err in Dismissing Russell's Claims Pursuant to State and Federal Law as Barred Under AS 09.10.070?

Text: Russell conceded below, and does not now argue to the contrary, that AS 09.10.070 governs both her state and federal law claims concerning unlawful discrimination. [8] Her argument as to both sets of claims is that the two-year period of limitations should not begin until 1985, when she allegedly discovered that Native Alaskan males less qualified than she had been admitted to the police academy, rather than when she was denied admittance in 1983. She contends that the discovery rule previously applied by this court and by the federal courts operates to delay accrual of her cause of action, and thus the commencement of the limitations period, because she could not reasonably have discovered all the facts essential to her cause of action  specifically, the hiring of Natives in her stead  until 1985 due to the Municipality's policy and practice of keeping its personnel files confidential. [9] In Gudenau & Co. v. Sweeney Ins., 736 P.2d 763, 766-67 (Alaska 1987), we said: The statute of limitations ordinarily begins to run on the date on which the plaintiff incurs injury. W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30, at 165 (5th ed. 1984)... . Our former practice has been modified by the adoption of the discovery rule method of tolling the operation of the statute of limitations. Greater Area, Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829-30 (Alaska 1982). Today the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action. Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Int'l, 694 P.2d 143, 144 (Alaska 1984). Applying the discovery rule to Russell's section 1983 claim, as well as her state claims, we conclude that the superior court's dismissal should be affirmed. [10] In our view the superior court correctly determined that Russell should have known of the existence of the facts alleged as comprising her cause of action in 1983. Under the discovery rule the relevant inquiry is the date when Russell reasonably should have known of the facts supporting her cause of action. See Greater Area Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (Alaska 1982). Ordinarily summary judgment on this issue would be inappropriate and a remand to the superior court would be required. [11] If, however, there are uncontroverted facts that indicate when Russell reasonably should have known that she had a cause of action, then this court can dispose of the question as a matter of law. [12] The parties do not dispute that Russell did not obtain actual knowledge of her displacement by Native Alaskan male candidates until 1985. However, upon being told that she was a minority bump from the police academy class, she had notice of facts sufficient to prompt a person of average prudence to inquire, and thus should be deemed to have notice of all facts which reasonable inquiry would disclose. [13] Vigil v. Spokane County, 42 Wash. App. 796, 714 P.2d 692, 695 (1986). Although Russell contends that she could not have known of the alleged discrimination until 1985 due to the protected status of the Municipality's personnel records, her action in filing administrative complaints in 1984 and 1985 concerning her denial of admission to the academy attest to her awareness of the existence of the alleged discrimination before the expiration of the two-year limitations period (if deemed to commence in 1983). [14] Russell does not allege that she discovered any new facts between the date of the denial in 1983 and the date of these filings, or between 1983 and the date of filing this action, that caused her to delay. Additionally, we hold that Russell's claims of fraudulent concealment by the Municipality of facts supporting her cause of action are without merit. [A] party who fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the existence of a cause of action may be estopped to plead the statute of limitations if the plaintiff's delay in bringing suit was occasioned by reliance on the false or fraudulent representation. [15] The settled rule is that the mere failure by a person to disclose a fact concerning a cause of action which arises against him does not suffice to toll the statute unless the defendant owed a duty of disclosure. [16] Establishment of estoppel generally requires the party seeking to assert it to show that the other party made some misrepresentation, or false statement, or acted fraudulently, and that he reasonably relied on such acts or representations ... and due to such reliance did not institute suit timely. [17] Although there can be circumstances where an inaction or silence combined with acts or representations can give rise to an appropriate situation calling for the application of the estoppel doctrine, id. at 632 n. 25, a plaintiff generally cannot invoke estoppel unless he has exercised due diligence in attempting to uncover the concealed facts. [18] The record in this case demonstrates that this is not an appropriate case for application of estoppel based on the Municipality's failure to disclose facts surrounding Russell's discrimination claim. Russell grounds her allegation of concealment on the Anchorage Municipal Code provisions which exempt personnel files from the general requirement that the Municipality make its records open to public inspection. See Anch.Mun.Code §§ 3.90.030, .040(B). Russell alleges no affirmative acts or representations by the Municipality on which she reasonably relied in refraining from bringing suit until 1986. Nothing in her complaint, affidavit, or memorandum filed in opposition to the Municipality's motion to dismiss suggests that she even sought to obtain any additional information from municipal officials concerning the denial of admission to the police academy once she learned that she was a minority bump. In the absence of a request from Russell for additional information, the Municipality was not under a duty to bring to Russell's attention facts concerning the characteristics or qualifications of other employment applicants. AFFIRMED.