Opinion ID: 2565043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper argument in rebuttal closing argument

Text: ¶ 49 Third, Weber argues that the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by making prejudicial statements in rebuttal closing argument. Weber asserts that although prosecuting attorneys have some latitude to argue facts and inferences from the evidence, they are not permitted to make prejudicial statements not supported by the record. State v. Rose, 62 Wash.2d 309, 312, 382 P.2d 513 (1963) (citing State v. Heaton, 149 Wash. 452, 271 P. 89 (1928); Rogers v. Kangley Timber Co., 74 Wash. 48, 132 P. 731 (1913)). However, even improper remarks by the prosecutor are not grounds for reversal if they were invited or provoked by defense counsel and are in reply to his or her acts and statements, unless the remarks are not a pertinent reply or are so prejudicial that a curative instruction would be ineffective. Russell, 125 Wash.2d at 86, 882 P.2d 747 (citing State v. Dennison, 72 Wash.2d 842, 849, 435 P.2d 526 (1967); State v. Graham, 59 Wash.App. 418, 428-29, 798 P.2d 314 (1990)). ¶ 50 The State concedes that the prosecuting attorney's remarks in rebuttal closing argument were improper but asserts that they were unlikely to have affected the jury's verdict. Br. of Resp't at 17. In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecuting attorney, Andy Colasurdo, made the following statements: Now, there are cases that go before court all the time, like murders where there is no victim to explain what had happened. No eyewitness to the crime. Yet, we prove those. In another unit in my office, SAU, the Special Assault Unit where you deal with sex crimes Mr. Hall: Objection, your honor. There is no foundation for that type of evidence. The court: Overruled. Mr. Colasurdo: You deal with crimes against small children, crimes where a child has been molested. Mr. Hall: Objection, your honor. Also, no foundation for that type of argument. The court: Why don't you move on. Mr. Colasurdo: It's a legitimate argument, your honor. The court: Move on, counsel. Mr. Colasurdo: There are times for which there are no witnesses and for which there are, as I just mentioned, no evidence. Yet people are convicted of those crimes all the time. Why? Because a jury finds someone credible. VRP (June 30, 2003) at 70-71. However, defense counsel, Randall Hall, made the following statements in his earlier closing argument: Ladies and gentlemen, please take just 20 seconds and imagine, if you can, someone that you are very close to being accused of committing an awful crime, and what you would expect the jury to hear as evidence. Well, you would certainly expect to hear from eyewitnesses, wouldn't you? This case had eyewitnesses as well. But did you hear from them? No. . . . . That is the state's obligation to bring these witnesses in. Id. at 47-48 And defense counsel continued: Well, besides witnesses, wouldn't you like to hear or see something about physical evidence. . . . What didn't you see? You didn't see a gun. You didn't see fingerprints. . . . . How about a thorough search. . . . . They didn't do it. Why? They either didn't want you to have the information or they were negligent about how they conducted the investigation. The end result is the same. You don't have the information that you need to be able to make a decision in this case. Id. at 49-51. ¶ 51 The State argues that the prosecuting attorney's argument, although improper, was made in response to defense counsel's argument about the type of evidence that the State was required to produce. Br. of Resp't at 18. The State cites State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wash.App. 453, 471, 970 P.2d 313 (1999), in which the prosecuting attorney responded to defense counsel's argument that the defendant did not fit the profile of an eluder by stating that Ted Bundy did not fit the profile of a mass murderer. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecuting attorney's remarks were a rhetorical overreaction to a defense argument but that they did not deny the defendant a fair trial because they were addressed through the jury instructions. Id. ¶ 52 In this case, the prosecuting attorney's argument was clearly a response to defense counsel's argument. Additionally, the court instructed the jury to base its decision only on the testimony of witnesses and exhibits in the case and that the attorneys' arguments were not evidence. CP at 45-46. As a result, we hold that Weber has failed to prove that the prosecuting attorney's remarks were so prejudicial that they could not be cured by the jury instructions.