Opinion ID: 1773230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Appellant's first issue on appeal raises a jurisdictional challenge. Specifically, Vowell claims that the Club had an adequate remedy at law, which precludes equity jurisdiction. In response, appellee suggests that Vowell waived any objection to subject-matter jurisdiction because he admitted that jurisdiction was appropriate in his answer to its complaint. This threshold argument is meritless. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a defense that cannot be waived by the parties at any time nor can it be conferred by the parties' consent. See Moore v. Richardson, 332 Ark. 255, 964 S.W.2d 377 (1998). Although we discard appellee's waiver argument, we agree that equity jurisdiction was appropriate in this case. The Club sought relief for damages arising from Vowell's unilateral transfer of forty-nine deeds that were neither properly delivered to nor accepted by the Club. As a result, appellee sought both reformation of the instruments and associated money damages caused by the unilateral conveyances that prevented the Club from collecting expected monthly dues payments. Accordingly, appellee sought equitable relief based upon a tort theory of tortious interference with business expectancy. Moreover, although money damages were admittedly sought, the core of appellee's complaint centered upon the predicament caused by its forced acceptance of the forty-nine deeds and consequent inability to collect expected dues on those properties as well as 221 other lots transferred to an offshore corporation. We acknowledge that the Club mischaracterized the nature of equitable relief sought as reformation, rather than cancellation. Reformation requires either mutual mistake or unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud. See Roberson Enters., Inc. v. Miller Land & Lumber Co., 287 Ark. 422, 700 S.W.2d 57 (1985). Despite the imprecision, the nature of appellee's claim and the subsequent relief granted were equitable. The trial court's purported reformation was tantamount to cancellation of the deed transfers. [1] Further, this relief was accompanied by an injunction prohibiting further interference with the Club's business expectancies arising from its covenants and restrictions. In sum, we cannot say that the Club had an adequate remedy at law in view of appellant's unorthodox transfer of the first forty-nine deeds and subsequent transfer of 221 deeds to an offshore corporation in a thinly veiled attempt to thwart the chancery court's temporary restraining order. In any event, the clean-up doctrine afforded appellee jurisdiction in the chancery court. Pursuant to that doctrine, once equity properly acquires jurisdiction over a matter, it acquires jurisdiction for all purposes. In other words, provided a proper jurisdictional basis existed initially, an allegation of one equitable claim may bring an entire case in to the chancery court. See Towell v. Shepherd, 286 Ark. 143, 689 S.W.2d 564 (1985); see also Howard W. Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages § 2-3, at 16 (3d ed.1996). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the chancery court had proper subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the entire case.