Opinion ID: 1968342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Site of the Offense

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense with which she was charged. Under D.C.Code § 11-923(b)(1) (2001), the Superior Court has jurisdiction of any criminal case under any law applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia. See Adair v. United States, 391 A.2d 288 (D.C.1978). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any time. Id. at 290. Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case must always be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Mitchell v. United States, 569 A.2d 177, 180-181 (D.C.1990), but it can be shown by indirect evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence. See Weatherholz v. District of Columbia, 109 A.2d 376, 377 (D.C.1954) (We cannot say that the prosecution must fail because proof of venue was by indirect testimony rather than by specific words). Further, the court can take judicial notice that the geographic locations mentioned in the testimony are in the District of Columbia. Id. Finally, and most importantly, there is a well-established presumption that an offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court in which the charge is filed unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise. . . . There is no such affirmative showing here. Adair, 391 A.2d at 290 (citation omitted). Appellant did not present any evidence to rebut the presumption that the offense took place in the District of Columbia. Appellant herself admitted that the offense occurred outside her place of employment at Union Plaza and that she was walking with Mr. Dunn on Florida Avenue when it occurred. Rather, she rests her argument on the failure of any government witness to state explicitly that the corner of Florida Avenue and Bates Street, where the assault occurred, is located in the District of Columbia. Given that Officer Jefferson testified that he worked at the Third District, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., and that he responded to Officer James' call for assistance within one minute while on patrol, the court could appropriately take judicial notice that the location of the offense was and is within the District of Columbia. See Weatherholz, 109 A.2d at 377. [14]