Opinion ID: 2976376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hamilton’s Retaliation Claim

Text: Under ERISA § 510, it is “unlawful for any person to discharge . . . or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for [1] exercising any right to which he [or she] is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or for [2] the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Thus, the Sixth Circuit recognizes two types of claims under this section: (1) an “exercise” or “retaliation” claim, such as the present suit, where “‘adverse action is taken because a participant availed [her]self of an ERISA right’; and (2) an ‘interference’ claim where adverse action is taken as ‘interference with the attainment of a right under ERISA.’” Dunn v. Elco Enters., No. 05-71801, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at  (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2006) (citing Mattei v. Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 797 n.4 (6th Cir. 1997)). Though the “interference” cases provide much of the relevant law in our Circuit, we look to recent retaliation cases in the district courts that have applied Sixth Circuit precedent for the specific parameters of Hamilton’s claim. See Urbano-Spencer v. Starfish Family Servs., Inc., No. 05-73064, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45316 (E.D. Mich. July 5, 2006); Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169. To state a claim under § 510, Hamilton must show that Defendants had a specific intent to violate ERISA. Schweitzer v. Teamsters Local 100, 413 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2005). Where, as here, there is no direct evidence of the employer’s motivation, we apply the familiar Burdine burdenshifting approach: First, Hamilton must establish a prima facie case of retaliation; if she does, the burden shifts to Defendants to articulate a legitimate reason for her termination; finally, Hamilton must show that the articulated reason was a pretext for retaliation. Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992); see generally Texas Dep’t of Comm’y Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under § 510, an employee must show that (1) she was engaged in activity that ERISA protects; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link exists between her protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at  (ERISA retaliation) (citing Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1986) (Title-VII retaliation)); Urbano-Spencer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45316, at . The first two requirements are not at issue: Defendants do not contest that (1) Hamilton’s efforts, including her Benefits Suit, to seek disability benefits, were protected activities; and (2) her termination was an adverse employment action. The question is whether a causal link exists between the two. Because we believe that Hamilton has shown a prima facie case of causation, we analyze this issue under the third step of the Burdine burden-shifting approach — whether Hamilton has shown the defendants’ proffered reasons for firing her were mere pretext for retaliation against her for bringing her Benefits Suit. As an initial matter, of course, an employee’s protected activities will be the cause of an employer’s retaliatory conduct only where the employer knew of those protected activities. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 387 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting that defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s conduct is “captured by the third prong [of the prima facie retaliation case]: the defendant must have known about the protected activity in order for it to have motivated the adverse action.”). Though this specific point regarding defendants’ knowledge of Hamilton’s Benefits suit was not litigated extensively in the district court (nor relied on by the district court in its decision), defendants have argued on appeal that Hamilton has failed to show the requisite No. 07-1208 Hamilton v. Starcom Mediavest Group, Inc., et al. Page 5 knowledge. Hamilton responds that because defendants did not rely on this argument in their motion for summary judgment below, they waived it. We find it unnecessary to decide this issue because we agree with the district court that Hamilton failed to show sufficient evidence of causation to get past summary judgment. In finding that Hamilton established a prima facie case, we first address her argument that the proximity in time between her benefits suit and her dismissal is evidence of causation. Hamilton filed her Benefits Suit on December 23, 2004. Her position was terminated on October 21, 2005, but she could colorably contend that the first adverse action against her was defendants’ failure to offer her a new position in September 2005. Thus, assuming the facts in the light most favorable to her, she suffered an adverse employment action (her first rejection) approximately nine months after filing her suit. “‘Although no one factor is dispositive in establishing a causal connection, evidence that the adverse action was taken shortly after a plaintiff’s exercise of protected rights is relevant to causation.’” Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at –15 (quoting Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000)). Indeed, some cases suggest that proximity alone — if covering a short time span — may suffice to show causation.1 Sixth Circuit law on this particular point is far from uniform, however, with other cases suggesting proximity alone may never be enough to show causation.2 Regardless of the tension in Sixth Circuit law on whether proximity alone may ever suffice to show causation, there is a consensus that proximity alone generally will not suffice where the adverse action occurs more than a few months — let alone nine months — after the protected conduct. See Nguyen, 229 F.2d at 567 (approving unpublished decision’s statement that “previous cases that have permitted a prima facie case to be made based on the proximity of time have all been short periods of time, usually less than six months”).3 Considering the nine-month period at issue here, Hamilton would have to provide additional evidence of causation to withstand summary judgment for failing to establish even a prima facie case. Cf. Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at , 23 (suit survives where defendant employer testified that he “was upset with [the p]laintiff for blowing the whistle on his ERISA violations” and fired the plaintiff “less than [four] months” later). Hamilton contends that four additional conditions present 1 DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 21-day period showed causation); Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that proximity may be “significant enough to constitute indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive”); Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 567 (“[T]here may be circumstances where evidence of temporal proximity alone would be sufficient to support that inference” of a causal link.); see also Humphreys, 966 F.2d at 1044 (noting, in ERISA interference case, that plaintiff showed causation where benefits were to vest two months after firing, though this was the “bare minimum that a plaintiff must show to meet the prima facie case threshold . . .”). 2 See Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at  (“‘[P]roximity alone may not survive summary judgment . . . nor does it necessarily imply causation.’”) (quoting Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am., 283 F.3d 818, 826 (6th Cir. 2002)); Urbano-Spencer, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45316, at  (noting that Nguyen Court’s statement that proximity alone may suffice is dictum); Light v. Mapco Petroleum, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45756, at (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 4, 2005) (stating that DiCarlo’s “holding does stand in contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s prior decisions, including in Nguyen, where the court appeared to underscore the fact that it previously had rejected the idea that temporal proximity alone is enough to establish causation.”). 3 See also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Absent additional evidence, this loose temporal proximity” of “disciplinary actions occur[ing] two to five months after Hafford filed charges” is “insufficient to create a triable issue.”); Cooper v. City of N. Olmstead, 795 F.2d 1295, 1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The mere fact that Cooper was discharged four months after filing a discrimination claim is insufficient to support an interference [sic] of retaliation.”). No. 07-1208 Hamilton v. Starcom Mediavest Group, Inc., et al. Page 6 here show a causal link — she was the only Broadcast Coordinator terminated, she was terminated during a period of time when defendants were hiring a large number of employees, she was not considered for several administrative assistant positions, and the human resources department vetted all of her applications for other positions despite the fact that they had animosity towards her because of her Benefits Suit. We address each of these arguments in turn and find that, while taken together they establish a prima facie case of retaliation, none of her contentions overcome the defendants’ proffered legitimate reasons for her termination. First and foremost, Hamilton contends that she makes a “core showing” of causation because Defendants terminated only her, and not any other Broadcast Coordinators, even though she was performing her job in a satisfactory manner. But there were only a finite number of positions available for Broadcast Coordinators, and Defendants fairly determined that candidates with more experience than she had were more qualified for the positions. For example, Hughes selected another candidate as Assistant Buyer who had more experience working in internet/digital group and with computer systems, and Stearn selected other candidates as Print Coordinators because they all had multiple years experience in similar positions whereas Hamilton had only one year of similar experience. Malin also selected another candidate for Interactive Billing Coordinator who had more experience coordinating digital media. Second, Hamilton notes that she “was terminated at a time when GM Planworks was hiring large numbers of new employees.” But she acknowledges that, at the same time, all Broadcast Coordinator positions, such as hers, were eliminated — she was not singled out. Third, Hamilton contends that she was not considered for available administrative-assistant positions. But Hamilton never applied for these positions. Had she done so, she would have a stronger argument. Fourth, Hamilton contends that her “vigorous pursuit of short-term disability benefits caused hard feelings with the human resources department” and that, during and after the reorganization, “every job opening and job interview [were] filtered through Human Resources.” But she raises little evidence of these purported “hard feelings” other than the “negative interactions” Kruslemsky described occurring before Hamilton filed her Benefits Suit. Additionally, there is no evidence that any hard feelings continued, let alone manifested in adverse action, nine months later when she was ultimately terminated. In sum, Hamilton fails to rebut any of defendants’ proffered legitimate reasons for her termination with sufficient evidence that those reasons were mere pretext for terminating her in retaliation for bringing her Benefits Suit. Thus, her claims cannot survive summary judgment.