Opinion ID: 2507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jass's Sentencing Challenge

Text: Jass challenges her 65-year sentence as unreasonable on various grounds, the majority of which we address in the summary disposition issued today. See United States v. Jass, ___ Fed.Appx. ___. Here, we focus only on Jass's claim of procedural error in the application of a two-level enhancement to her Guidelines calculation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2003). While we conclude that the conduct here at issue does not fall within the plain meaning of § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B)(ii), any Guidelines calculation error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the district court expressly stated that it would have imposed the same below-Guidelines sentence regardless of the enhancement's applicability.
In the aftermath of United States v. Booker , we review sentences for reasonableness, 543 U.S. 220, 262, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a deferential standard limited to identifying abuse of discretion regardless of whether a challenged sentence is `inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,' United States v. Jones, 531 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)); see United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189-90 (2d Cir.2008) ( en banc ). Our review proceeds in two steps: first, we must be satisfied that the district court complied with the Sentencing Reform Act's procedural requirements, United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (emphasis omitted); and second, if the sentence is procedurally sound, we must consider [its] substantive reasonableness by evaluating whether the District Judge abused his discretion in determining that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors supported the sentence imposed, Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. at 597, 600; United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. Jass argues that her sentence was infected by procedural error because the district court incorrectly calculated her Guidelines range to include the two-level enhancement provided in § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B)(ii) for the use of a computer... to ... solicit participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct. See Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. at 597 (recognizing failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range as procedural error that can render sentence unreasonable); United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190. When confronted with a challenge to a sentencing court's application of a particular guideline, we review the court's interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de novo, United States v. Sero, 520 F.3d 187, 189 (2d Cir. 2008), and we accept its findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, United States v. Guang, 511 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir.2007); see United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190.
The construction of § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B)(ii) is a question of first impression for our court. [9] In the 2003 version of the Sentencing Guidelines applicable to Jass's sentence, that section stated: If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material, the offense involved... (B) the use of a computer or an Internet-access device to (i) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, or to otherwise solicit participation by a minor in such conduct; or (ii) solicit participation with a minor in sexually explicit conduct, increase by 2 levels. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) (2003). [10] Before resolving Jass's particular legal challenge to the application of this guideline to her case, we explain why we consider a related issue waived.