Opinion ID: 275377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Jury Instructions Concerning the Hearsay Declarations

Text: 21 Appellant's final claim of reversible error arises from the trial judge's instruction to the jury when he permitted the admission into evidence of Valentine's recounting of Wilson's statements made by Wilson to Valentine out of appellant's presence. The judge, without expressly finding a conspiracy to have been demonstrated, told the jury that it should only consider such testimony if it first found a prima facie case of conspiracy to have been established. These instructions were reaffirmed in his charge when he submitted the case at the end of trial. 22 In deciding whether to admit hearsay statements made by conspirators against their co-conspirators '   we think that the better doctrine is that the judge is always to decide, as concededly he generally must, any issues of fact on which the competence of evidence depends, and that, if he decides it to be competent, he is to leave it to the jury to use like any other evidence, without instructing them to consider it as proof only after they too have decided a preliminary issue which alone makes it competent.' United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 231 (2 Cir. 1950), aff'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951). The reason for the rule is there stated: 'It is difficult to see what value the declarations could have as proof of the conspiracy, if before using them the jury had to be satisfied that the declarant and the accused were engaged in the conspiracy charged; for upon that hypothesis the declarations would merely serve to confirm what the jury had already decided.' 183 F.2d at 230-231. 23 Here, the trial judge determined that there had been a sufficient showing of conspiracy when, after a discussion of the legal requirements he admitted the Valentine testimony recounting Wilson's statements, see United States v. Stadter, 336 F.2d 326, 330 (2 Cir. 1964). This decision was confirmed and became obvious when he denied appellant's motion for acquittal on this ground, see United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 266 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, Lessa v. United States, 361 U.S. 863, 80 S.Ct. 119, 4 L.Ed.2d 102 (1959). 24 Under the rule announced in United States v. Dennis, supra, the learned trial judge after thus determining the admissibility of the statements by the challenged instruction unnecessarily gave the jury an opportunity to second- guess his decision. United States v. Nuccio, 373 F.2d 168 (2 Cir. 1967); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736-737 (9 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, Palermo v. United States, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S.Ct. 1625, 12 L.Ed.2d 498 (1964). The instruction and the charge were both unduly generous to appellant. United States v. Stadter, supra at 330. An error of this sort, so favoring a defendant, provides no basis for a reversal of a judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict. United States v. Stromberg, supra at 266. 25 Judgment of conviction affirmed.