Opinion ID: 1386737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fautenberry's Uncooperative Behavior

Text: The majority would excuse any failure on the part Fautenberry's counsel on the basis that Fautenberry refused to cooperate with Dr. Tanley. As the majority declares: Had Fautenberry not impeded Dr. Tanley's examination, the doctor presumably would have discovered, verified, and revealed any such brain damage. Maj. Op. at 625. The fault, however, for any failure to discover Fautenberry's brain damage, given all of the red flags in his medical history, cannot be placed at the feet of a man who is supposedly mentally impaired. Instead, aware of the various indicators of an organic brain impairment, it was solely the responsibility of Fautenberry's attorneys to pursue zealously evidence of an impairment. The American Bar Association's (ABA) Guidelines that establish the appropriate conduct for defense counsel in death-penalty cases specifically state that mitigating evidence must be pursued regardless of any statement by the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not to be collected or presented. 2003 GUIDELINES, Guideline 10.7(A)(2); id. at Guideline 10.7 commentary (The duty to investigate exists regardless of the expressed desires of a client.); GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (Am. Bar Ass'n, 1983) (1983 GUIDELINES). While the majority would excuse otherwise deficient performance when counsel claims that their client made it difficult for them to find mitigating evidence, the ABA demands that defense counsel go beyond the barriers that their client may erect. The ABA even recognizes that when pursuing mitigating evidence, [o]btaining such information typically requires overcoming considerable barriers, such as shame, denial, and repression, as well as other mental or emotional impairments from which the client may suffer. 2003 GUIDELINES, 10.7 commentary. While the ABA recognizes the challenges that defense counsel may face and exhorts counsel to continue pursuing mitigating evidence in the face of those challenges, the majority condones a halfhearted effort. Our precedent, like the ABA guidelines, also directs counsel to persevere in the search for mitigating evidence despite difficulties that the defendant may himself create. For instance, the Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of counsel when the defendant was even actively obstructive by sending counsel off on false leads. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381, 125 S.Ct. 2456. Similarly, we have noted that `defendant resistance to disclosure of information does not excuse counsel's duty to independently investigate.' Harries, 417 F.3d at 638 (quoting Coleman, 268 F.3d at 449-50). In a case where we noted that [t]rial counsel cannot be faulted for their client's lack of cooperation, Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 435 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 947, 123 S.Ct. 1621, 155 L.Ed.2d 489 (2003), neither could we fault trial counsel for a lack of effort; in that case, counsel arranged for an EEG, a CAT Scan, and an MRI, and counsel persisted in eventually obtaining the test results even when the defendant initially refused. Similarly, in Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1082, 121 S.Ct. 786, 148 L.Ed.2d 682 (2001), counsel was not held responsible when the defendant refused to allow a psychologist or psychiatrist to interview him, id. at 526-27, because there were no red flags indicating the potential for brain damage and increasing counsel's obligations. As I have already stated, counsel does not have an obligation to pursue outlandish leads; however, when there are indicators of a significant, potential mitigating defense, counsel has an obligation to pursue it. Regardless of whether or not there was a breakdown in communication between Fautenberry and his attorneys, his attorneys remained obligated to investigate fully the potential presence of an organic brain impairment. It is my conclusion, therefore, that Fautenberry has established that his counsel were defective: his counsel was on notice that there was a significant possibility of brain damage, they were under an obligation to investigate fully that possibility, they failed to comprehend the basic scientific limits of Dr. Schmidtgoessling's testimony, and their failure is not excused by Fautenberry's uncooperative actions. The last court in Ohio to address Fautenberry's ineffective-assistance claims was the Court of Appeals for Ohio's First District considering Fautenberry's petition for state-postconviction relief. The state court addressed only whether Fautenberry's counsel was defective and concluded that Fautenberry's resistance to meeting with Dr. Tanley precluded any finding of defective performance. See J.A. at 2325-29 (Op. of Dec. 31, 1998 at 3-7). The court stated that counsel's failure to do more, even if true, does not make the consequences of Fautenberry's own recalcitrance imputable to his attorneys, nor does it cast their performance outside the `wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' J.A. at 2328 (Op. at 6). While the Ohio Court of Appeals's holding is clearly contrary to Rompilla, Rompilla was not decided until 2005, well after the Ohio Court of Appeals's 1998 decision. Rompilla, however, was only the most recent case that the Supreme Court has decided on this matter; Strickland and Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987), both held that counsel is not deficient when they fail to investigate mitigating evidence only when they reasonably believe that such efforts would be wasted. See Burger, 483 U.S. at 794-95, 107 S.Ct. 3114; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Although these cases do not specifically address dealing with an obstinate client, such specificity is not necessary. [C]learly established law under [AEDPA] encompasses more than just bright-line rules laid down by the [Supreme] Court. It also clearly includes legal principles and standards enunciated in the Court's decisions. Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850-51 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1007, 123 S.Ct. 490, 154 L.Ed.2d 406 (2002). The lack of an explicit statement of a rule is not determinative because [t]he Court has made clear that its relevant precedents include not only bright-line rules but also the legal principles and standards flowing from precedent. Id. at 852. Because Fautenberry's counsel could not have reasonably believed that a medical examination would have been fruitless, their obligation to pursue that evidence did not wane simply because their client was being difficult; holding otherwise is contrary to clearly established federal law.