Opinion ID: 1386491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contemporaneous Objections to Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: The district court held in its Memorandum & Order of June 27, 2006, addressing the renewed motion for mistrial, that Davis had offered nothing to suggest that its ruling denying a motion for mistrial made during the trial, J.A. at 286 (Trial Tr. at 151:3-21), was legally erroneous; therefore, it concluded, as it did during the trial, that the curative instructions to the jury removed any harm, such that a mistrial would not be necessary. J.A. at 28-29 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 6-7). Davis argues that there were several instances of improper vouching for government witnesses, and that the government made several statements designed to cover up the inconsistencies in the testimony of their witnesses and bolster their credibility. Appellant Br. at 36-37. When we review claims of prosecutorial misconduct, we determine whether the prosecutor's statements were both improper and flagrant. Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 412 (6th Cir.2006). Prosecutors should put forth only proper arguments based on the evidence in the record. Id. (quoting Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 641 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 865, 126 S. Ct. 163, 163 L.Ed.2d 150 (2005)). Also, they must obey the cardinal rule that a prosecutor cannot make statements calculated to incite the passions and prejudices of the jurors. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, we have held that a prosecutor may not make improper comments `designed to completely undercut the defendant's sole mitigation theory, effectively denying him fair jury consideration.' Id. (quoting DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938, 124 S.Ct. 83, 157 L.Ed.2d 250 (2003)). We examine four factors when determining flagrancy: (1) the likelihood that the remarks of the prosecutor tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally made; and (4) the total strength of the evidence against the defendant. Id. (quoting Bates, 402 F.3d at 641). To reverse a conviction because of an improper nonflagrant statement, a reviewing court must determine that: 1) the proof of the defendant's guilt is not overwhelming; 2) the defense counsel objected; and 3) the trial court failed to cure the impropriety by failing to admonish the jury. United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 420-21 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926, 123 S.Ct. 2573, 156 L.Ed.2d 602 (2003). We will not overturn a verdict unless the prosecutorial misconduct is `so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial, . . . or so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant.' Id. at 421 (quotation omitted); Mason v. Mitchell, 320 F.3d 604, 635 (6th Cir.2003). [A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial based on Cook's statement. We appreciate that Cook personally acknowledged at oral argument that his statement was inappropriate. Although it was improper for Cook to insinuate that Davis would not have been prosecuted (as Bolden was not) if he was not truly guilty, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial because the statement was not flagrant and the district court immediately gave a cautionary instruction. Davis was prejudiced by the inference that he would not have been charged, as Bolden was not, if the prosecutor had known him to be innocent. Also, the evidence against Davis centered on his possession (or constructive possession) of cocaine; Cook's statement may have improperly influenced the jury to believe that if there were any doubt about whether the cocaine belonged to Davis, the young women (Ranisha Ewing and Geisha Bolden) would be going through criminal proceedings as well. In addition, the young women were the only witnesses who could testify as to the possession issue of August 24, 2005. However, Cook's statement was isolated and not deliberate. [3] In addition, the district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard any comments just made by Mr. Cook in response to Mr. Oldham's questions and repeated this instruction twice later in the trial as well. J.A. at 28-29 (Mem. & Order at 6-7); J.A. at 271-72, 277-78 (Trial Tr. at 136:14-137:2, 142:16-143:3). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, although Cook made an improper statement, there is no basis for us to hold that the district court abused its discretion by not declaring a mistrial.