Opinion ID: 1730049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Summoning Witnesses: Production of Papers

Text: Witnesses may be summoned by the Board, its President, its Secretary, any Grievance Committee, any Chairman of a Grievance Committee, or by the Commissioner, their appearance and testimony required, the oath administered, depositions taken, and the production of books, papers and other documents required in all respects as provided by law. (239 Ala. XXVIII) Two papers were served on petitioner. One paper is entitled: NOTICE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS and is signed by counsel for the Alabama State Bar. It has not been pointed out to us where rule or statute provides that counsel may issue a subpoena, and, indeed, the notice does not expressly command petitioner to attend the hearing. It may well be that petitioner could not be held in contempt if this notice were the only process served on him. The subpoena duces tecum is under the hand of: S/ John B. Scott Secretary, Alabama State Bar We think common knowledge justifies us in taking notice that this is the hand of the secretary of the board of commissioners. § 24, Title 46, Code 1940. To comply with the letter of § 35, Title 46, the description should be: Secretary of the Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar. This paper commands the sheriff to summon petitioner to appear before the commissioner and there to testify. It seems to us that the examining commissioner was appointed and the day set as required by Rule 12 of Section B, and that subpoena was issued as provided by § 35, Title 46, and Rule 19. We hold that the commissioner had authority to take testimony and that the process served on petitioner was sufficient to satisfy the statute and rule. Authority of the examining commissioner and proper service of sufficient process being shown, it follows that the court did not err in holding petitioner in contempt for the reason that the examining commissioner did not have lawful power to compel petitioner's attendance and to take his testimony. Petitioner relies on the following statement: We may say further that an attorney, whose conduct is under investigation by the Grievance Committee is not compelled to appear before such committee, but when he does so his appearance must be deemed and treated as voluntary. Lewis v. Gerald, supra, 236 Ala. at page 94, 181 So. at page 309. In Lewis v. Gerald, supra, the court held that an attorney, who had been investigated by the Grievance Committee, was not entitled to read and inspect the evidence which that committee had acquired relating to charges of unprofessional conduct on the part of the attorney. Whatever may be the force of the statement from Lewis v. Gerald quoted above, the statement does not apply to the instant case because the instant petitioner has not been summoned to appear before the Grievance Committee. He was summoned to appear before an examining commissioner who was appointed by the president of, and who is taking testimony for, the Board of Commissioners. Petitioner's first reason to show error is not well taken. Second, petitioner argues that neither the examining commissioner nor the Board of Commissioners of the State Bar are qualified to act against petitioner because they have not been sworn as all officers are required, by Section 279 of the Constitution of 1901, to be sworn. Section 279 applies only to state officers. State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Lane, 181 Ala. 646, 62 So. 31. We do not think that either the examining commissioner or the Board of Commissioners are state officers in the constitutional sense, and, therefore, are of opinion that Section 279 has no application. These commissioners are officers of the State Bar, which is an association of attorneys. The members of the association are not state officers. The attorney does not hold an office or public trust in the constitutional or statutory sense of that term, but is an officer of the court exercising a privilege or franchise. In a sense he is an officer of the state with an obligation to the public no less significant than his obligation to his clients. It is an office held during good behavior, and is one of which he can be divested only upon good cause shown and after proper judicial proceedings. See Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (U.S.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366; Bar Ass'n of Boston v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) 116; Ex parte Faulkner, 1 W.Va. 269; 6 C.J. 568, and authorities cited. In Re W. Marvin Clifton, 115 Fla. 168, 173, 155 So. 324, 326. We think it follows that the examining commissioner and the Board of Commissioners are not state officers, in the constitutional sense, and that § 279 does not apply to them. Petitioner asserts that, because he had filed with the Board of Commissioners a motion to quash the service of the notice and subpoena duces tecum, the matter was in the hands of the Commissioners and a quorum of the Commissioners was necessary before there could be a proper ruling as set out in Title 46, Section 33 of the Code of Alabama of 1940. As already noted, § 33, Title 46, provides that the Board of Commissioners shall establish rules of procedure in cases involving professional misconduct and the Board has established such rules. We do not find in § 33 any requirement that a quorum of the Board must act on a motion to quash before a commissioner appointed according to the rules can take testimony, and, therefore, we are of opinion that action by the Board on the motion was not a condition precedent to the action taken by the circuit court in the order now under review. We hold petitioner's second reason not well taken. Third, petitioner asserts that under § 126, Subdivision 4, of Title 13, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to impose a direct and continuing contempt of court against an accused attorney who merely declines to appear before the Grievance Committee of the Alabama State Bar prior to trial. Ex parte Bullen, 236 Ala. 56, 181 So. 498. Petitioner misconceives the nature of the proceeding, in which he has been summoned to testify, in supposing that he is being summoned before the Grievance Committee prior to trial. He is on trial and is summoned as a witness before the examining commissioner appointed by the President of the Board of Commissioners. § 126(4) provides that the circuit court has authority to punish contempts by fines, not exceeding fifty dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding five days. In Bullen, petitioner had been sentenced to sever one hour in jail for contempt for refusing to answer a question. This court said he was guilty of a direct contempt and subject to punishment by fine or imprisonment, or both. From the citations, we understand petitioner's argument to be that, in the case at bar, if petitioner actually be in contempt, the court could have punished petitioner by a fine, not exceeding fifty dollars, or imprisonment, not exceeding five days, or both, but that the court could not order petitioner to be confined until he is willing to take the stand as a witness. We think petitioner is in error because of § 35, Title 46, and § 455, Title 7. § 35, Title 46, provides in part: . . . . Such summons or subpoena. . . . shall have the force of a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and any witness or other person . . . . who shall refuse to be sworn or testify . . . . shall be liable to attachment upon application. . . . to any judge of any court of record for the district where the investigation is conducted as in cases of contempt. § 455 of Title 7 recites: Any witness refusing to testify, unless privileged by law from testifying in the cause, must be committed to the jail of the county, there to remain without bail until he consents to testify. See Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 42 So.2d 17. In as much as the subpoena duces tecum here has the force of a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and refusal of a duly subpoenaed witness to testify subjects him to confinement unless he is privileged from testifying, and petitioner was duly subpoenaed and has refused to testify, he is subject to confinement, unless privileged by law from testifying in the cause. Petitioner's third reason does not show error. Petitioner's fourth and fifth reasons go to the question of privilege. Petitioner argues that he cannot be required to testify because § 43, Title 46, commands him to preserve the secrets of his clients, and because . . . The accused attorney beyond per adventure of a doubt is being called upon in this sort of case to take the stand and give testimony, which would involve a mental operation of his own client and that as a matter of state law, he is actually faced with a disbarible (sic) offense if he should reveal any of the secrets of his clients .... Petitioner has not taken the stand and no question has been propounded to him. To say now whether he will be privileged to refuse to answer any question would be sheer speculation. The possibility that a question might call for privileged evidence does not justify petitioner in refusing to take the stand. In reply brief, petitioner appears also to contend that he is being called to give evidence against himself in violation of Section 6 of Constitution of 1901. In a criminal case, the prosecution cannot call defendant as a witness against his will. If the proceeding against petitioner were a criminal case, the prosecution could not call petitioner as a witness, against his will, because he is the defendant. We do not think, however, that the proceeding in which he is called to testify is a criminal case. This court, in a disbarment proceeding, has said: This is not a criminal prosecution within the influence of section 6 of the Constitution, but is only quasi criminal. State v. Quarles, 158 Ala. 54, 48 So. 499; Thomas v. State ex rel. Stepney, 58 Ala. 365. Therefore, Buckley's Case (State ex rel. Attorney General v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 599) does not support the contention. It is well settled that the rules and principles of the law of evidence applicable to civil proceedings are also applicable to quasi criminal proceedings; that the defendant may be compelled to testify as a witness for the plaintiff, the testimony may be taken by deposition, and the failure of the defendant to testify may be commented on in argument. Smith v. State, 13 Ala.App. 411, 69 So. 406; Miller v. State, 110 Ala. 69, 20 So. 392; Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407. Ex parte Messer, 228 Ala. 16, 18, 152 So. 244, 245. Because the proceeding, in which petitioner is called to testify, is not a criminal case, we hold that the fact that he is the defendant is not a good ground entitling him to refuse to take the witness stand. We do not say that he may be compelled to answer a question when his answer to the question would incriminate him. No question has been asked, and here again we will not speculate. In this connection, see: Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117, 81 S.Ct. 954, 6 L.Ed.2d 156; In re Cohen, 9 A.D.2d 436, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990; Matter of Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658, 166 N.E. 2d 672. Error not being shown, the judgment is due to be affirmed. Affirmed. LAWSON, GOODWYN, and HARWOOD, JJ., concur.