Opinion ID: 202487
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver or estoppel

Text: Abbott's final fallback argument is that Hancock waived the right to cancel its 2003 payment by waiting until the fall of 2003 to notify Abbott that it considered its payment obligations terminated. We agree with the district court that Hancock did nothing that could establish a waiver or estoppel under Illinois law. In Illinois, waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right, claim, or privilege. Vaughn v. Speaker,533 N.E.2d -22- 885, 890 (Ill. 1988). It may be express or implied. Geier v. Hamer Enters. Inc., 589 N.E.2d 711, 722 (Ill. App. 1992). Equitable estoppel may be found where a party indicates through its conduct that it will not enforce its contractual rights in a timely fashion and the other party reasonably relies on that conduct to its detriment. See Geddes v. Mill Creek Country Club, 751 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ill. 2001). Abbott's waiver and estoppel arguments share a common problem: they do not establish that Hancock conveyed any intention to relinquish a contractual right or privilege. We discuss briefly Abbot's three principal waiver and estoppel arguments, resolving them on this common ground. Abbott first argues that Hancock should have made an earlier notification that it planned to terminate its payments. However, the contract does not contain any requirement that Hancock notify Abbott when a terminable event occurred. To the contrary, the contract states that Hancock's entire obligation [under the contract] shall be limited to providing [its] program payments. Further, the contract provides that [t]he waiver by either party hereto of any right hereunder or the failure to perform or of a breach by the other party shall not be deemed a waiver of any other right hereunder . . .. Hancock could not waive its right to terminate payments by failing to provide a notification that it was not required to make. -23- Abbott also contends that Hancock indicated that it was satisfied with the December 2002 2003 Preliminary Annual Research Plan by tendering its 2002 payment upon receipt of that document, and that Abbott relied on that payment as an indication that the December 20, 2002 plan was sufficient. But Hancock's payment for 2002 could not have been any indication that Hancock considered the 2003 Preliminary Annual Research Plan as compliant with Abbott's planning obligations. Even if Hancock considered the plan a breach by Abbott, Hancock had no choice but to make its 2002 payment. After all, the contract provided that Hancock's payment for the Program Year in which [an event that allows the termination of payments] occurs shall still be due and payable. Abbott's breach occurred in 2002. Hancock paid for 2002. That is merely what the contract required. Abbott finally claims that Hancock forfeited its right to deem the December 2002 2003 Preliminary Annual Research Plan a terminable event by failing to make a timely request for a 2003 Annual Research Plan that included planned spending for 2004. This argument represents an attempt by Abbott to shift its own responsibilities to Hancock. The contract made it abundantly clear that all responsibility for planning and funding rested with Abbott. Hancock's only obligation was to provide large payments when Abbott submitted conforming documentation. Given this arrangement, it was reasonable for both parties to accept the 2003 -24- Preliminary Annual Research Plan, submitted in December 2002, as Abbott's final word on the subject. That December 2002 plan allowed Hancock to terminate its payments because it did not manifest Abbott's intention to spend the contractually prescribed amount during the Program Term (and because any request for clarification of the document merely would have confirmed that Abbott did not intend to spend enough during the Program Term). Hancock did not have to ask for clarification before it deemed the December 2002 Plan a breach by Abbott allowing it to terminate its payments. Affirmed. -25-