Opinion ID: 2442854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Common Law Mandamus

Text: A writ of common law mandamus may issue from any court of law in Maryland. See Md.Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.) § 3-8B-01 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. We have long held that common law mandamus is a remedy only in cases involving ministerial acts, and not discretionary ones. See Wilson v. Simms, 380 Md. 206, 223-24, 844 A.2d 412, 423 (2004) ([W]here the exercise of discretion is permitted, mandamus ordinarily will not lie.); see also Green v. Purnell, 12 Md. 329, 336, 1858 WL 3256, , 1858 Md. LEXIS 31,  (1858) (holding that mandamus cannot issue in a case where discretion and judgment are to be exercised ... it can be granted only where the act required to be done is merely ministerial....). In short, common law mandamus is inapplicable when it interferes with the legislative prerogative[.] Glen Burnie Improvement Ass'n v. State Appeal Bd., 213 Md. 407, 412, 132 A.2d 451, 453 (1957); see also 2-26 Antieu on Local Government Law § 26.18 (2d Ed.) (stating that mandamus will lie only where an agency or official has engaged in ministerial functions, as opposed to either quasi-judicial or legislative functions). Common law mandamus will not lie in this case according to these principles. As we have already held, the Council's actions were legislative; they did not rise to the level of even quasi-judicial action, much less mere ministerial action. Only when an official's duties are absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a set task can they be fairly defined as ministerial. James v. Prince George's County, 288 Md. 315, 326, 418 A.2d 1173, 1179 (1980) ( quoting Doeg v. Cook, 126 Cal. 213, 58 P. 707, 708 (1899)). Ministerial acts are duties in respect to which nothing is left to discretion [and are] distinguished from those [allowing] freedom and authority to make decisions and choices. State, Use, Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 113, 151 A.2d 137, 139 (1959). There is no doubt that the Council, in voting on the resolutions at issue here, was exercising its discretion. Indeed, at the November 27, 2007, hearing on Shore Lands's property, Shore Lands's counsel stated: Our position is not that because we're at the five year period [associated with a W-2/S-2 classification] that [reclassification] automatically has to happen. Our position is we have satisfied the requirements in the water and sewer plan. The designations are the result of a planning process.... [I]f we had a six to ten year [designation] and we met the other requirements in the plan, we still would have the right to come in and ask for an upgrade to the designation. It's not a prohibition or guarantee, but the requirements of the water and sewer plan mean something and the County is obligated to follow those. (Emphasis added.) Because the Council was acting in a legislative capacity, and not a ministerial one, common law mandamus does not lie in this case.