Opinion ID: 1419202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Corroborating Evidence as to Defendant Perry

Text: (1a) Penal Code section 1111 provides in pertinent part that A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.... At the close of the prosecution's case, the trial court ruled that Diana Moore was an accomplice as a matter of law. [3] Accordingly, the prosecution was required to produce evidence corroborating her testimony. (2) To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution must produce independent evidence which, without aid or assistance from the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the crime charged. ( People v. Luker (1965) 63 Cal.2d 464, 469 [47 Cal. Rptr. 209, 407 P.2d 9].) (3) The evidence need not corroborate the accomplice as to every fact to which he testifies but is sufficient if it does not require interpretation and direction from the testimony of the accomplice yet tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense in such a way as reasonably may satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth; it must tend to implicate the defendant and therefore must relate to some act or fact which is an element of the crime but it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the offense charged. ( People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 257 [324 P.2d 556]; see also People v. Luker, supra, 63 Cal.2d 464, 469; People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 82 [45 Cal. Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423].) (4) Although the corroborating evidence must do more than raise a conjecture or suspicion of guilt, it is sufficient if it tends in some degree to implicate the defendant. ( People v. Santo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [273 P.2d 249].) [T]he corroborative evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. ( People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 329 [1 Cal. Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116].) (1b) With the above principles in mind, we must determine whether sufficient evidence was introduced to corroborate the accomplice's inculpation of Perry. Sergeant Odiorne testified that on August 28, 1968, Diana Moore telephoned him and said that pursuant to a prior arrangement she was going to meet Perry. Thereafter, Odiorne and other officers followed Diana who was driving her father's car to the Montgomery Ward parking lot in Richmond. Perry could not be located but his automobile was parked in front of the store. Diana entered the establishment and talked with Darrel Walters, a friend of Perry, who told her that the latter had just left. [4] A short time later, Odiorne approached Walters and spoke with him. At the conclusion of the conversation, Walters gave Odiorne a set of keys to Perry's car and said that Perry had requested the keys be delivered to Diana so that she could drive the car to Vallejo. Although the keys were given to Diana before she and the officers left Richmond, she returned them to an officer who drove Perry's car to Vallejo while Odiorne and Diana followed in her car. En route to Vallejo, Diana told Odiorne that there were narcotics in Perry's car. Odiorne asked if he could search the car and Diana consented, advising him where the narcotics would be found. In Vallejo, the officers searched the car. They found ammunition and some narcotics paraphernalia in the trunk lid, a loaded gun in the tire well, and a substantial amount of narcotics and drugs under clothing in the trunk. An expert testified that the contraband would bring approximately $1,400 at street prices. On September 2d, Odiorne was at the house of Diana's parents when Diana received a telephone call from a person identifying himself as Perry. [5] At Diana's request, Odiorne picked up an extension phone and listened to the conversation. According to his police report and his testimony, the following conversation transpired: [6] `I'd like to see you, Diana.' `I'd like to see you, too.' `What's Odiorne looking for me for?' `You know what Odiorne's looking for you for.' `Is it about that Roy thing?' `Yes, it is.' `You know I didn't have anything to do with that.' `Well, that's the way it is.' `Well, did you get my stuff out of my car?' `What stuff?' `You know what stuff I mean.' `You mean your stash?' `Yes, that's right. You know I have about $1000.00 worth of stuff there.' `Yes, I know. That's why I am sitting on it.' `I have to get that stuff, because you know I have to run, Diana.' `I know.' Perry mentioned a gun and said, I can't be taken. Diana and Perry then discussed arrangements for a meeting. On the following evening, Odiorne and other officers were observing Diana as she stood on the porch of a building in Vallejo. About 10:30 p.m., a man and a woman drove up. When the man approached Diana and identified himself as the person sent by Perry, he was arrested. [7] The woman, later identified as Deborah Bray, was apprehended as she tried to escape. On the basis of information obtained from Deborah Bray, the police went to an apartment in San Francisco to find Perry. After searching the apartment, they proceeded to the basement which was dark as the lights had been extinguished. There they found Perry hiding behind a door and placed him under arrest. Nothing was found on his person, but his identification and two homemade hypodermic syringes were discovered on top of and inside cracks in a high partition of the room. In response to the corroborating evidence offered by the prosecution, Perry submitted the deposition of Calvin Elam, a bail bondsman in Vallejo. Elam stated therein that Perry got in touch with him in late August 1968 to find out whether Elam would post bail in connection with a nonsupport warrant Perry thought had been issued for him. According to Elam, he [Perry] wanted to know if the police were looking for him. So he wanted me to surrender him and get him out. By calling the police department and the sheriff's office, Elam determined that there were no outstanding warrants for Perry's arrest. We must decide whether the above evidence adequately corroborates the testimony given by accomplice Diana Moore. (5) The law is settled that [e]vidence of flight supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission. ( People v. Brooks (1966) 64 Cal.2d 130, 138 [48 Cal. Rptr. 879, 410 P.2d 383].) Flight tends to connect an accused with the commission of an offense and may indicate that an accomplice's testimony is truthful. (See People v. Santo, supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, 330; People v. Hoyt (1942) 20 Cal.2d 306, 312 [125 P.2d 29]; Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 464 at pp. 252-254.) As such, the flight of one who knows he is suspected of committing a crime may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. ( People v. Santo, supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, 330.) (6) Likewise, attempts of an accused to conceal his identity (see People v. Waller (1939) 14 Cal.2d 693, 702 [96 P.2d 344]) or his whereabouts (see People v. Winthrop (1897) 118 Cal. 85, 91 [50 P. 390]) may warrant an inference of consciousness of guilt and may corroborate an accomplice's testimony ( People v. White (1941) 48 Cal. App.2d 90, 95 [119 P.2d 383]). (1c) At trial, Perry argued that the corroborating evidence was insufficient for two reasons. First, he maintained that there was not enough evidence from which a jury could conclude that he was fleeing or attempting to flee from the area. Testing the sufficiency of the evidence to show flight and concealment, we note the testimony of Walters that Perry took off running when two police cars followed Diana into the Montgomery Ward parking lot where defendant had planned to meet her. Also, in the September telephone conversation with Diana, Perry acknowledged that Sergeant Odiorne was looking for him in connection with the Roy killing and then said, I have to get that stuff, because you know I have to run, Diana. The evidence indicates that subsequently Perry did try to get his stuff; in fact, he arranged to secure clothing, a gun, and the supply of narcotics under circumstances which suggest a desire for secrecy. Furthermore, when the police finally located defendant, they found him standing behind the closed door of a darkened basement. His identification was not on his person but had been placed on top of a wall partition where it was unlikely to be found. Thus, the record contains adequate evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Perry was attempting to flee and to conceal his identity and whereabouts. Second, defendant contended that the corroborating evidence was insufficient because there were several explanations for his flight other than consciousness of guilt of the Roy killing. Defendant asserted that he may have been fleeing because he thought a nonsupport warrant for his arrest was outstanding, because he feared arrest for the narcotics hidden in the trunk of his car, or because he knew he had violated his parole. This court has considered and rejected similar contentions on the theory that it is the jury's function to determine which of several possible reasons actually explains why a defendant fled. In People v. Armstrong (1896) 114 Cal. 570 [46 P. 611], the defendant was convicted of stealing a horse. The principal witness against the defendant was an accomplice whose testimony was corroborated by evidence showing that the three persons allegedly involved in the theft surreptitiously fled from the vicinity of the larceny, that a bridle stolen with the horse was found in the defendant's possession, and that the defendant expressed astonishment at being overtaken by the authorities. Regarding the evidence which indicated flight, this court said: True, there was evidence to show that before the theft of the horse the defendant was, as he put it, `taking precautions to avoid running into an officer,' being apprehensive of arrest for some breach of the peace, and his flight might have been ascribed to such apprehension; but this was a circumstance for the jury; they were not bound to attribute the consciousness of guilt indicated by flight to one disposing cause rather than the other. (At p. 574.) The same legal issue was presented in People v. Santo, supra, 43 Cal.2d 319 where the defendants were convicted of first degree murder, principally on the basis of an accomplice's testimony. To corroborate the accomplice's testimony as it pertained to two of the defendants, the prosecution relied upon the testimony of a nonaccomplice which tended to show that the three defendants had associated for the purpose of going to Mrs. Monahan's house on the night of her death and committing some crime. In addition, the prosecution introduced evidence showing that the defendants left their respective homes and moved to a motel one month after the murder and that they moved twice more before their arrest the following month. In Santo, the defendants contended that the evidence of their three changes of residence was insufficient for purposes of corroboration because their frequent movement was `upon the instigation and advice of an attorney upon whom they had every legal right to rely.' (At p. 330.) The defendants further argued that their conduct `may reveal some anxiety under the reported disappearance of Baxter Shorter [an accomplice who was known to have cooperated with the police], but nowhere does it show flight, concealment or consciousness of guilt in connection with the alleged murder of Mabel Monahan.' ( Id. ) Rejecting these arguments, this court stated: It is true that the evidence of the conduct of defendants between the time of the slaying and the time of the arrest does not specifically and directly evidence consciousness of guilt of the killing of Mrs. Monahan, any more than it evidences consciousness of guilt of the reported kidnapping of Shorter or consciousness of guilt of preparation for a `guano deal' [a business transaction which ostensibly was to take place at the first motel]. It was for the jury to determine the weight, if any, against defendants of such evidence. They could view the conduct of defendants as evidence of flight. ( Id. ) (7) As established by People v. Armstrong, supra, 114 Cal. 570 and People v. Santo, supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, the existence of explanations  other than consciousness of guilt of the crime charged  for conduct which may be interpreted as flight is relevant to the weight of the evidence showing flight, but not to its admissibility or sufficiency for the purposes of corroboration. (8) Unless a reviewing court determines that the corroborating evidence should not have been admitted or that it could not reasonably tend to connect a defendant with the commission of a crime, the finding of the trier of fact on the issue of corroboration may not be disturbed on appeal. [8] ( People v. Todd (1959) 175 Cal. App.2d 508, 523 [346 P.2d 529].) (1d) In the instant case, there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Perry's attempted flight and concealment were connected with Roy's death. Contrary to arguments presented by defendant at trial, Sergeant Odiorne's testimony concerning the telephone conversation of September 2 tends to show that defendant knew, prior to his flight from the police in Richmond, that he was being sought for the Roy killing. According to the officer's report, the conversation contained the following dialogue between defendant and Diana: `What's Odiorne looking for me for?' `You know what Odiorne's looking for you for.' `Is it about that Roy thing?' `Yes, it is.' Furthermore, under the rule that an appellate court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict (see People v. Redmond, supra, 71 Cal.2d 745, 755), we must uphold the trial court's disposition if, on the basis of the evidence presented, the jury's determination is reasonable. In the instant case, we conclude that the inference drawn by the jury was reasonable. Examination of the possible explanations for Perry's flight reveals that, more likely than not, he was attempting to escape apprehension for the commission of the crime for which he now stands convicted. First, according to the bail bondsman's testimony, Perry knew there was no nonsupport warrant issued for his arrest, and even were such a warrant outstanding, Perry indicated his willingness to surrender on that charge. Also, Perry's efforts to obtain a weapon would permit the jury to infer that he was attempting to avoid capture on a charge more serious than nonsupport. This is reinforced by his statement to Diana in the telephone conversation when the gun was mentioned: I can't be taken. Second, Perry's fear of being arrested for possession of narcotics could not have motivated his behavior because there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that he had knowledge that the police had discovered his contraband; in fact, Diana had assured him that she possessed his stash of narcotics and was sitting on it. The final alternate explanation for Perry's flight is that he thought the police sought him for parole violation, but as he did not testify, the jury was never informed of any possible reasons why Perry feared his parole might be revoked if indeed he was on parole. The unlikely possibility that Perry fled because of a parole violation unrelated to the present charges would not preclude the jury from finding that Perry's conduct was connected with Roy's death. [9] Thus, the evidence introduced to corroborate the testimony of accomplice Diana Moore reasonably tended to connect defendant's flight with the homicide, and we cannot disturb the implicit finding of the trier of fact on that issue. Although it has been suggested that People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373 [38 Cal. Rptr. 890, 392 P.2d 970] is controlling, that case is factually distinguishable from the one before us. The defendant in Robinson, who was subsequently convicted of first degree murder, voluntarily surrendered himself to the police and gave them two statements concerning his activities on the weekend when the crime occurred. A prosecution witness who was called upon to specify an alleged conflict in the defendant's statement was able to point to but one conflict in the repetition of a narrative covering [the defendant's] movements for three days.... (At p. 400.) While conceding that the making of conflicting or inconsistent statements may, in proper circumstances, indicate a guilty state of mind, the court concluded that a jury could not reasonably infer that the defendant's differing statements were made for the purpose of concealing his connection with the crime charged. ( Id. at pp. 400-401.) The present case differs from Robinson. When Perry learned that he was being sought by the police, rather than surrender himself as did the defendant in Robinson, Perry attempted to elude the police. [10] Moreover, the evidence here is such that a jury could reasonably connect Perry's attempted flight with the crime for which the accomplice's testimony incriminates him. Hence, any reliance on People v. Robinson, supra, 61 Cal.2d 373 is misplaced. To summarize, in light of the above authorities  most notably People v. Santo, supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, People v. Hoyt, supra, 20 Cal.2d 306, and People v. Armstrong, supra, 114 Cal. 570  we conclude that the evidence of Perry's attempted flight and concealment is sufficient to support an inference of consciousness of guilt for the killing of Roy, and that therefore this evidence is legally sufficient to corroborate the testimony of accomplice Diana Moore.