Opinion ID: 497015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Contentions of the Secretary

Text: 44 The Secretary's other contentions in support of his cross-appeal are that the district court was required to enjoin Continental from further violations of the Act, and that the court should have granted the Secretary a restitutionary injunction under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 217 requiring Continental to pay back wages, instead of merely a judgment under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216 ordering it to pay those wages. The Secretary's argument in support of the latter contention is that the purpose of a restitutionary injunction is ... to compensate employees who have not received their statutory wage and to correct 'a continuing offense against the public interest,'  and that an injunction would be enforceable against the employer itself through use of the court's contempt power, whereas the money judgment may be enforced only through execution on the employer's property. These contentions need not detain us long. 45 The decision whether or not to grant injunctive relief under Sec. 217 lies within the sound discretion of the district court. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207, 215, 79 S.Ct. 260, 265, 3 L.Ed.2d 243 (1959). We find no abuse of discretion in the form of the monetary award. The compensatory purpose of the Act generally will be as well served by a judgment for money damages as it will be by a restitutionary injunction in the same amount. The district court concluded that the Secretary had failed to present evidence of facts sufficient to demonstrate need for injunctive relief. In this Court, the Secretary has pointed to nothing in the record to suggest either that the violations by Continental would continue in the absence of injunction or that the Secretary will have any difficulty in collecting the damages awarded. Rather, the record shows substantial cooperation by Continental in the conduct of this lawsuit. It agreed to pay nearly $40,000 to settle a backpay claim on behalf of non-word-processing employees; it stipulated to the amount of overtime compensation due word processor operators under the Secretary's theory; and it spent $10,000 to update and computerize its recordkeeping procedures to facilitate compliance with the Act. These factors, while not foreclosing a grant of injunctive relief, indicate that the denial of such relief, where the Secretary has not persuaded the court of the need for an injunction, is not an abuse of discretion. 46 In light of this conclusion, we need not address Continental's contention that it would have been impermissible to grant relief under both Sec. 216 and Sec. 217 in the same action.