Opinion ID: 1058461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plea in Bar and Motion to Dismiss

Text: According to the County, a fair reading of the Town's initial complaint reveals that the entire case was premised upon an appeal to the BZA that was premature. Therefore, the County maintains, the matter before the BZA was moot and there was no jurisdictional basis upon which the trial court could entertain the Town's requested declaratory judgment and temporary injunctive relief. Additionally, the County asserts that the Town's general prayer of such other further relief as may be required was an insufficient basis for the circuit court's exercise of jurisdiction notwithstanding the lack of an underlying BZA appeal. In response, the Town argues the case was not moot because the denial of the Town's initial BZA appeal did not resolve the underlying issues in the case. The intent of the [Declaratory Judgment Act] is to have courts render declaratory judgments which may guide parties in their future conduct in relation to each other, thereby relieving them from the risk of taking undirected action incident to their rights, which action, without direction, would jeopardize their interests. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bishop, 211 Va. 414, 421, 177 S.E.2d 519, 524 (1970). The Act is to be liberally interpreted and administered with a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people, Code § 8.01-191, but courts may only issue declaratory judgments in cases of actual controversy when there is antagonistic assertion and denial of right. Treacy v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 256 Va. 97, 103, 500 S.E.2d 503, 506 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not give trial courts the authority to render advisory opinions, decide moot questions, or answer inquiries that are merely speculative. Id. at 104, 500 S.E.2d 503 (citations omitted). By its terms, the PUGAMP is a comprehensive plan adopted by the County and the Town governing development within the UGA. However, the County's Planning Department and Planning Director maintained that HS-3's development would not require Town approval, and the Board of Supervisors subsequently authorized the County to seek a special use exception so that HS-3's development could proceed. Conversely, the Town consistently asserted that it had an equal right to determine whether the proposed school site was consistent with the PUGAMP. Clearly, a justiciable controversy existed between the County and the Town as to their rights under the terms of their joint agreement. See Criterion Ins. Co. v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 210 Va. 446, 449, 171 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1970) (When a justiciable controversy exists between two insurance companies as to their obligations under the terms of their respective policies, a declaratory judgment proceeding may be maintained by one of the companies against the other). The fact that the County BZA denied the Town's initial appeal as premature does not indicate that an actual case or controversy within the contemplation of the Declaratory Judgment Act did not exist. See Tazewell Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Brown, 267 Va. 150, 157-58, 591 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2004) (neither reinstatement nor resignation of school administrator mooted his claim of unfounded information in his personnel file). Furthermore, the Town alleged in plain and explicit language that the County's actions violated the Annexation Agreement, the PUGAMP, the localities' zoning ordinances, and Code §§ 15.2-2223 and -2232, and the Town fully set forth its supporting reasoning in its complaint. The Town's request that the County be required to ... comply with the governing law was therefore sufficient to allow the circuit court to determine whether the County could proceed with HS-3's development within the UGA without the Town's approval by adjudicating the localities' respective rights under the PUGAMP.
The County also contends that a declaratory judgment was not the proper vehicle for providing relief because the County had already acted and, therefore, the Town's rights, if any, had already accrued. We disagree. The Town sought a declaration of its rights under its written agreements with the County and the dispute presented would not be resolved upon a dispositive factual question. Therefore, declaratory judgment was a proper vehicle for relief. Although this [C]ourt and lower courts have ... given a liberal interpretation to the Declaratory Judgment Act, they have nevertheless recognized that the power to make a declaratory judgment ... will not as a rule [be] exercised where some other mode of proceeding is provided. Bishop, 211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524. Where a declaratory judgment as to a disputed fact would be determinative of issues, rather than a construction of definite stated rights, status, and other relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, the case is not one for declaratory judgment. Williams v. Southern Bank of Norfolk, 203 Va. 657, 663, 125 S.E.2d 803, 807 (1962) (quoting 16 Am.Jur., Declaratory Judgments, § 20 at 294-95). For example, in USAA Casualty Insurance Co. v. Randolph, 255 Va. 342, 344-45, 497 S.E.2d 744, 745 (1998), an employee filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act would bar him from instituting a tort action for injuries sustained while he was at his place of employment. We held that declaratory judgment was inappropriate because the case [did] not involve a determination of rights, but only involve[d] a disputed issue to be determined in future litigation between the parties, namely, whether [the employee's] injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. Id. at 347, 497 S.E.2d at 747. Similarly, in Green v. Goodman-Gable-Gould Co., Inc., 268 Va. 102, 108, 597 S.E.2d 77, 81 (2004), Goodman-Gable-Gould filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it had substantially performed its obligations under [its] contract with [Green] when Green requested Goodman-Gable-Gould withdraw from adjusting Green's fire loss claim. 268 Va. at 108, 597 S.E.2d at 81. We held declaratory relief was inappropriate because Goodman-Gable-Gould's actual objective in the ... proceeding was a determination of that disputed issue rather than an adjudication of the parties' rights, an issue which should have been litigated in the context of a breach of contract claim. Id. In contrast, rather than a determination of a disputed factual issue, the Town sought a declaration of its rights under its written agreements with the County. Therefore, this was a classic case where declaratory judgment [was] appropriate to `guide parties in their future conduct in relation to each other.' Reisen v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co., 225 Va. 327, 335, 302 S.E.2d 529, 533 (1983) (quoting Bishop, 211 Va. at 421, 177 S.E.2d at 524). The trial court did not err by deciding the question.