Opinion ID: 4027039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preemption of State Law on Federal Land

Text: The federal Constitution‘s property clause vests Congress with the power to ―make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.‖ (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.) Unlike the commerce clause, the property clause has no prohibitive effect when dormant. Instead, to displace the application of state law on federal land, Congress must act affirmatively. (Kleppe v. New Mexico (1976) 426 U.S. 529, 543 [―Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its territory. . . .‖]; Omaechevarria v. Idaho (1918) 246 U.S. 343, 346 [―The police power of the State extends over the federal public domain, at least when there is no legislation by Congress on the subject.‖]; see Granite Rock, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 580–581; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker (1905) 196 U.S. 119, 125–128 [rejecting the argument that the property clause by itself preempts states from regulating mining claims on federal land].) A state ―is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws‖ on federal land, unless those laws conflict with federal legislation or regulation; in the event of a conflict, of course, ―state laws must recede.‖ (Kleppe, at p. 543.) In the absence of any such conflict, state and federal laws governing the same land routinely coexist. (See, e.g., Granite Rock, at pp. 576– 577 [simultaneous state and federal mining permit requirements]; United States v. 5 Locke, supra, 471 U.S. at p. 89 [simultaneous state and federal mining claim filing requirements].) Dual sovereignty is the rule, federal exclusivity the exception. Rinehart asserts two federal land statutes supply a defense to his criminal convictions. He contends the laws under which he was convicted are preempted by the general mining act of May 10, 1872 (30 U.S.C. § 22 et seq.; popularly known as the Mining Law of 1872) and by title 30 United States Code section 612, enacted as part of the Surface Resources and Multiple Use Act of 1955 (Pub.L. No. 84–167 (July 23, 1955) 69 Stat. 367). These statutes contain no express preemption provision, do not occupy a relevant field that would foreclose state regulation, and do not impose obligations that would make it impossible to comply simultaneously with state and federal law. Rinehart‘s preemption argument rests instead on obstacle preemption, the principle that a state may not adopt laws impairing ―the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.‖ (Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 67; accord, Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 298, 312.) He bears the burden of demonstrating preemption. (Quesada, at p. 308.) In ascertaining whether preemption applies, ―[c]ongressional intent is the touchstone.‖ (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 318; see Wyeth v. Levine (2009) 555 U.S. 555, 565.) Obstacle preemption can play an important role in preventing states from creating, inadvertently or otherwise, functional impediments that materially constrain legitimate federal objectives. But it can also lead to the overzealous displacement of state law to a degree never contemplated by Congress. Accordingly, the threshold for establishing obstacle preemption is demanding: ―It requires proof Congress had particular purposes and objectives in mind, a demonstration that leaving state law in place would compromise those objectives, and reason to discount the possibility the Congress 6 that enacted the legislation was aware of the background tapestry of state law and content to let that law remain as it was.‖ (Quesada, at p. 312.) The State of California‘s role in protecting the waters and the fish and wildlife within its borders is long-standing, predating even the federal laws upon which Rinehart relies. Under English common law, the sovereign held title to the navigable waters within a land‘s borders in trust for the benefit of the people. (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 434.) Under this public trust doctrine, California became trustee of the state‘s waters, with responsibility for their oversight, from the beginning of statehood. (Ibid.) So too regarding the fish in the state‘s streams and lakes: ―The fish within our waters constitute the most important constituent of that species of property commonly designated as wild game, the general right and ownership of which is in the people of the state [citation], as in England it was in the king; and the right and power to protect and preserve such property for the common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law, and preserved and expressly provided for by the statutes of this and every other state of the Union.‖ (People v. Truckee Lumber Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 397, 399–400; see Stats. 1852, ch. 62, p. 135 [regulating to protect the state‘s salmon]; Geer v. Connecticut (1896) 161 U.S. 519, 528 [tracing the ancient roots of the recognized ―right of the States to control and regulate the common property in game‖], overruled on other grounds by Hughes v. Oklahoma (1979) 441 U.S. 322, 3263; Cal. Const., art. I, § 25.) 3 Hughes retracted Geer‘s 19th-century view that state regulation of fish and game was immune to commerce clause objections, but left otherwise undisturbed the several states‘ power ―to protect and conserve wild animal life within their borders.‖ (Hughes v. Oklahoma, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 338.) 7 Following the United States Supreme Court‘s lead, we traditionally have applied a strong presumption against preemption in areas where the state has a firmly established regulatory role. (Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc., supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 312–313; City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (2014) 59 Cal.4th 618, 631.) Rinehart contends no presumption should arise here because state law is being used to regulate conduct on federal land, where congressional power is plenary. (See U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.) The People disagree, urging that because the challenged state laws involve subjects traditionally within the state‘s regulatory purview, preemption is disfavored even on federal land. In the circumstances of this case, we need not resolve this dispute, because the conclusion we would reach with or without the presumption is unchanged: Rinehart has not carried his burden of establishing congressional purposes and objectives that require California‘s environmental regulations be displaced.