Opinion ID: 2706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adverse Credibility Determinations

Text: In Yang's case, the BIA adopted and affirmed, then modified, the IJ's decision. In such circumstances, we review the IJ's decision minus the ground for denying relief that was rejected by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, we will address Yang's asylum claim as if it were not barred by the one-year filing deadline, as did the BIA. In cases such as Lin's where the BIA summarily affirms an IJ's decision without issuing an opinion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), we review the reasoning and decision of the IJ directly, treating it as the final agency determination. See Ming Xia Chen v. BIA, 435 F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir.2006). We owe particular deference to an IJ's credibility finding, mindful that the law must entrust some official with responsibility to hear an applicant's asylum claim, and the IJ has the unique advantage among all officials involved in the process of having heard directly from the applicant. Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir.2004), overruled on other grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296 (2nd Cir. 2007) ( en banc ). Hence, our review of an IJ's credibility assessment is an exceedingly narrow inquiry to ensure that the IJ's conclusions were not reached arbitrarily or capriciously . . . [and] that credibility findings are based upon neither a misstatement of the facts in the record nor bald speculation or caprice. Id. at 74 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We may, however, vacate and remand an adverse credibility determination if we find that the IJ has failed to act fairly in judging credibility and in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005), e.g., where the IJ based the credibility ruling upon speculation or upon an incorrect analysis of the testimony, id. at 400, or where the IJ unduly relied on inconsistencies that are relatively minor and isolated and do not concern material facts, Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 288 (2d Cir.2000) (internal citations omitted). Notwithstanding these types of errors, we may still affirm a credibility finding if we can confidently predict that there is no realistic possibility that, absent the errors, the IJ or BIA would have reached a different conclusion. Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 401.
The IJ determined that Yang was not credible based on: (1) Yang's failure to mention at his airport interview that he was ever arrested or beaten; (2) inconsistencies in his testimony regarding the chronology of events; (3) an implausible and inconsistent account of how he escaped from detention; (4) the IJ's observation that Yang appeared to be simply making up testimony when confronted by inconsistencies; (5) contradictory and implausible testimony regarding his employment; and (6) contradictory evidence regarding when Yang decided to leave China. These findings, which are supported by the record, are more than sufficient to support an adverse credibility determination. Furthermore, Yang acknowledged making the inconsistent statements at the airport, and because there is no evidence of any coercion in the interview transcript  and Yang provided no other indication that the interview transcript was unreliable  the IJ properly relied on that transcript and rejected Yang's various explanations as inadequate. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 179-80 (2d Cir.2004). Moreover, the IJ made clear that his findings were based, in part, on Yang's demeanor, and we normally afford such findings particular deference. See Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 73. Accordingly, the adverse credibility finding underlying the denial of asylum and withholding of removal is upheld. We note that while Yang's application included a request for CAT relief, the IJ did not address that request anywhere in his decision, nor did the BIA. Although we see little evidence in the record to support that claim, it is for the agency to make eligibility determinations in the first instance, see INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002). Because, for the reasons set forth below, we remand this case to the agency, the agency should also address Yang's eligibility for CAT relief on remand.
The IJ's adverse credibility determination in Lin's case is also supported by substantial evidence. The IJ based her determination on, inter alia, inconsistencies in Lin's testimony and application regarding when he was baptized. Since Lin's claims of persecution are based on his practice of religion, his inconsistent testimony regarding when and how many times he had been baptized constitutes a substantial discrepancy. The IJ, therefore, properly relied on Lin's inconsistent testimony in support of her adverse credibility determination. See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 308-09 (2d Cir.2003) (to form the basis of an adverse credibility determination, a discrepancy must be substantial when measured against the record as a whole). In addition, the IJ found that Lin had no identity documents that [were] good and an ID card that [was], in fact, fraudulent. Submission of inconsistent statements as well as a fraudulent document in support of an asylum application can constitute substantial evidence supporting an adverse credibility determination. See Borovikova v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 435 F.3d 151, 156-57 (2d Cir.2006); In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1083 (B.I.A. 1998) (determining that presentation of a false document in support of an asylum application can be fatal to the credibility of the applicant). Because the government's forensics report indicated that Lin's Resident Identification Card was a counterfeit, and Lin's only explanation was that it was bought from the public security office, the IJ reasonably concluded that this submission fatally undermined Lin's overall credibility. Id. ; id. The IJ also relied Lin's failure to call as witnesses his cousin  who was living in New Jersey  or members of his current parish in New York. An applicant's failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 341 (2d Cir.2006). Because Lin's testimony was not otherwise credible, the IJ properly relied on the lack of corroborative evidence. Moreover, here, the IJ warned Lin before his actual hearing that she (a) would give the letter attesting to his church membership no weight in the absence of a witness, and (b) would give his cousin's affidavit no weight whatsoever. In sum, the IJ's adverse credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence in light of the record as a whole. The factors that the IJ properly relied upon were central to Lin's claim of persecution. We note, however, that the IJ also relied on several factors that do not support such a determination. [1] Nevertheless, reviewing the record as a whole, we can confidently predict that the IJ would reach the same decision on remand, even absent the grounds improperly relied upon. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 338-39. Because the IJ permissibly determined that Lin was not credible and therefore did not meet his burden of proof for asylum, and because Lin's withholding-of-removal claim also depends on the credibility of his testimony, it necessarily follows that denial of withholding of removal was also correct. Zhou Yun Zhang, 386 F.3d at 71. Moreover, the IJ properly concluded that Lin had utterly failed to make out a claim under the Convention Against Torture for illegal departure, because Lin admitted that he had not departed China illegally, and there is no evidence in the record tending to show that Lin would be subject to torture upon his return to China.