Opinion ID: 1673978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sub-Issue: Whether 25 Prospective Jurors Should Have Been Excluded In View of Their Pre-Trial Beliefs?

Text: Through the first of the two sub-issues, GMAC contends that it did not receive a fair trial because, during voir dire, 25 of 36 prospective jurors related their belief that GMAC should have provided Ivy with pre-seizure notice even though pre-seizure notice is not required by law. Of these 25 prospective jurors, 10 were ultimately selected to sit on the jury. Thus, GMAC concludes: (1) 10 jurors had opinions on liability before they heard any evidence and the applicable Mississippi law; and (2) these jurors should be deemed incompetent since they `formed and expressed an opinion as to ... one of the material issues in the case.' See GMAC Brief at 11-12 (emphasis in original) (quoting 50 C.J.S. Juries § 234(e), at 985-86 (1947)). Ivy rejects GMAC's contention on the basis that these 25 jurors assured the trial judge that if [he] instructed them that the law did not require [GMAC] to give prior notice of [its] intention to seize the vehicle, [then] they could follow this law and [would] not hold the lack of prior notice against [GMAC].
Case law dictates that each juror [must] keep an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury. United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.1974). An open mind is critical because: [A]n opinion [prematurely] formed could only be removed, if at all, by evidence. This in effect shift[s] the burden of proof and place[s] upon the defendants the burden of changing by evidence the opinion thus formed. A juror having in discussion not only formed but expressed his view as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, his inclination thereafter would be to give special attention to such testimony as to his mind strengthened, confirmed or vindicated the views which he had already expressed to his fellow jurors, whereas, had there been no discussion and no expression of tentative opinion, he would not be confronted with embarrassment before his fellow jurors should he change the tentative opinion which he might entertain from hearing evidence. Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir.1945); accord United States v. Aaron Burr, 25 F.Cas. 49, 50 (C.C.Va. 1807) (Such a person may believe that he will be regulated by testimony, but the law suspects him, and certainly not without reason. He will listen with more favor to that testimony which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion; it is not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case.); State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419, 438 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1980) (Once a juror has expressed an opinion ... the die may well have been cast.). Of course, as a matter of institutional imperative, our law presumes that jurors follow the trial judge's instructions, as upon their oaths they are obliged to do. Parker v. Jones County Community Hosp., 549 So.2d 443, 446 (Miss. 1989); see also Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 35 (Miss. 1992). In order to take a case out of the general principle, the aggrieved party must sufficiently rebut the presumption that jurors followed the law as instructed. Parker, 549 So.2d at 446 (emphasis added); see generally Arledge v. McFatter, 605 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1992) (case in which plaintiff rebutted this presumption).
Neither GMAC nor Ivy disputes that: (1) 25 of the 36 prospective jurors related their belief that GMAC should have provided Ivy with pre-seizure notice; and (2) that these same 25 individuals assured the trial judge that they would follow the law as instructed notwithstanding their beliefs regarding prior notification. Application of the law to these facts leads this Court to conclude that GMAC failed to sufficiently rebut the presumption that the jurors followed the law as instructed.