Opinion ID: 1057414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statute’s Text

Text: Section 2401(b) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless . . . action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Perhaps where the majority goes wrong is in considering § 2401(b) as a stand-alone statute of limitations, rather than considering it in conjunction with the complementary administrative exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2675. The Court has instructed against such a restrictive view of 5 In Reed Elsevier, authors, some of whom had registered copyrights for their works and others who had not, sued publishers and electronic databases for copyright infringement. See id. at 158. The parties settled and filed a motion in federal district court to certify a class for settlement and approve the settlement agreement. See id. at 159. Ten freelance authors (“the Muchnick respondents”) objected. See id. The district court overruled those objections, certified a settlement class of freelance authors, approved the settlement, and entered final judgment. See id. The Muchnick respondents appealed, and the Second Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to certify a class of claims arising from the infringement of unregistered works. See id. at 159–60 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), which provides, in relevant part, that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made”). The Supreme Court reversed and held that § 411(a) imposed a non-jurisdictional precondition to suit. See id. at 166. 64 WONG V. BEEBE statutory conditions for bringing suit. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 601 (1990).6 Instead, courts should read together “provisions which qualify an [individual]’s right to bring . . . suit upon compliance with certain conditions.” Id.7 6 In Dalm, the respondent had been appointed administratrix of her employer’s estate. See id. at 598. In return for her services, she received fees from the estate and two payments from the employer’s surviving brother. See id. at 599. The respondent reported the latter payments as gifts and paid the appropriate gift tax. See id. The Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) audited the respondent’s income tax returns and determined that the payments should have been reported as income. See id. The respondent petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination but subsequently settled the case. See id. After she agreed to the settlement, the respondent immediately filed an administrative claim for return of the gift tax she had paid. See id. When the IRS failed to act on her claim within six months, she filed suit in district court, seeking a refund of “overpaid gift tax.” Id. at 600. The district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, because the respondent’s suit was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations: 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a). See id. The Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the doctrine of equitable recoupment should be applied to permit the respondent’s suit to proceed. See id. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the district court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the untimely action. See id. at 610. 7 In Dalm, there were two such provisions. See id. at 601–02 (stating that 26 U.S.C. § 7422, which provides that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary,” and 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), which provides that, if a taxpayer is required to file a return with respect to a tax, the “[c]laim for refund or credit . . . shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later,” were both relevant qualifications on a taxpayer’s right to bring a refund suit). Because both provisions established conditions on a taxpayer’s right to bring suit, the Court read them together. See id. at 602 (“Read together, the import of these sections is clear: unless a claim for WONG V. BEEBE 65 Here, two statutory provisions qualify an individual’s right to file suit for tort against the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). First, § 2675 provides that “[a]n action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages . . . , unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). This section requires that an administrative claim be made to the responsible agency, and it disallows suit until the denial of such claim is final. See id. No such administrative claims filing is needed to commence an action against a private person under applicable state law. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96 (reasoning that principles “applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States”). Section 2401(b) is § 2675(a)’s logical complement. It provides that: [a] tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits imposed by § 6511(a), a suit for refund . . . may not be maintained in any court.” (citations omitted)); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 167 (2012) (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”). 66 WONG V. BEEBE mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). This provision establishes the time limits applicable to presenting an administrative claim and beginning a civil action. As in Dalm, the import of these two sections is clear when they are read together: Unless an administrative claim is presented to the responsible agency before action is begun, and unless both the claim and the action are begun within the time limits imposed by § 2401(b), the tort claim against the United States “shall be forever barred.” B. Section 2401(b) Refers to Courts’ Jurisdiction. The majority holds, in a rather conclusory fashion, that § 2401(b) “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Op. at 15 (internal quotations and citations omitted). I disagree. While it is true that § 2401(b) does not mention the term “jurisdiction,” the same is true of several statutes of limitations the Court has found to be jurisdictional. See John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 134 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2501 jurisdictional, despite the absence of the term “jurisdiction”); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007) (same with respect to 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and (c))8; Dalm, 494 U.S. at 8 In Bowles, an Ohio jury convicted the petitioner of murder and sentenced him to 15-years-to-life imprisonment. See id. at 207. The petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and then filed a federal habeas corpus petition. See id. The district court denied habeas relief. See id. After the entry of final judgment, the petitioner had 30 days to file a notice of appeal. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)). He failed to do so. See id. Instead, he later filed a motion to reopen the period in which to file a notice of appeal WONG V. BEEBE 67 609 (same with respect to 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) and 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a)).9 The majority fails to appreciate a crucial difference between the statutes of limitations the Court has deemed jurisdictional and those to which the Court has applied equitable tolling: whether the statute expressly mandates a consequence for the failure timely to file. 1. Plain Statutes of Limitations: No Consequences Mandated for Failure Timely to File Some statutes of limitations require that certain actions be performed within a specified period of time without specifying consequences to be applied where the actions are not performed as prescribed. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[Subject to certain exceptions], no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), which allows district courts to extend the filing period for 14 days. See id. The district court granted the motion to reopen, but “inexplicably gave [the petitioner] 17 days,” instead of the 14 days permitted by statute. See id. The petitioner filed his notice of appeal after the 14-day period allowed by statute but within the 17 days allowed by the district court. See id. The Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, because the notice of appeal was untimely filed. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that “the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Id. at 214. 9 Unfortunately, the Court has not yet analyzed whether § 2401(b) is or is not jurisdictional. We must therefore use what tools the Court has given us in its discussions of similar statutory provisions and reason by analogy. 68 WONG V. BEEBE State court.”); 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (“In order to obtain review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims of a final decision of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, a person adversely affected by such decision shall file a notice of appeal with the Court within 120 days after the date on which notice of the decision is mailed . . . .”); F. R. Bankr. P. 4004(a) (“[A] complaint . . . objecting to the debtor’s discharge shall be filed no later than 60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors under §341(a).”). These statutes, as evidenced by the quotations above, are often written in mandatory terms. Significantly, while they make parties’ actions mandatory, they do not contain mandatory consequences for noncompliance. The Court has instructed that “if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.” Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 159 (2003).10 It makes good sense, 10 In Barnhart, the Court addressed 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a)’s requirement that the Commissioner of Social Security assign, before October 1, 1993, each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits to an operating company or related entity, which would then be responsible for funding the assigned beneficiary’s benefits. See id. at 152–53. The Commissioner did not complete all the assignments by the statutory date, and several coal companies challenged the Commissioner’s by then tardy assignments. See id. at 156. The companies obtained summary judgments in each case, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. See id. at 157. The Supreme Court held that it was “unrealistic to think that Congress understood unassigned status as an enduring ‘consequence’ of uncompleted work, for nothing indicates that Congress even foresaw that some beneficiaries matchable with operators still in business might not be assigned before October 1, 1993.” Id. at 164–65. Thus, it read the statutory deadline as “a spur to prompt action, not as a bar to tardy completion of the business of ensuring that benefits are funded . . . by those identified by Congress as principally WONG V. BEEBE 69 then, that the Court has regularly held that statutes of limitations lacking provisions specifying consequences do not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer to the courts’ jurisdiction. See, e.g., Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204 (holding that the terms of 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) “do not suggest, let alone provide clear evidence, that the provision was meant to carry jurisdictional consequences”); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) “does not set forth an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever its clock has run” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted))11; Reed Elsevier, responsible.” Id. at 172. 11 In Holland, the petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. See id. at 2555. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, and, on October 1, 2001, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. See id. On that date, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s oneyear statute of limitations for filing a habeas petition began to run. See id. On September 19, 2002 (i.e. 12 days before the one-year limitations period expired), a state-appointed attorney filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the state court, which automatically stopped the running of the limitations period. See id. In May 2003, the state trial court denied relief. See id. By February 2005, when the Florida Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case, the petitioner and his appointed attorney rarely communicated. See id. Indeed, the petitioner asked the Florida Supreme Court to remove the attorney from his case because of a “complete breakdown in communication,” including a failure to keep him informed of the case’s status. See id. The Florida Supreme Court denied the petitioner’s request. See id. at 2556. The petitioner subsequently wrote the attorney several times and emphasized the importance of filing a timely petition for habeas corpus in federal court once the Florida Supreme Court ruled against him. See id. In November 2005, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. See id. On December 1, 2005, it issued its mandate, and the federal habeas clock began again to tick. See id. Twelve days later, the one-year limitations period expired, with the petitioner never having been informed that the Florida Supreme Court had made a ruling. See id. at 2556–57. When the 70 WONG V. BEEBE 559 U.S. at 165 (holding that 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) “does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts” (citation omitted)); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) (holding that “the filing deadline[] prescribed in Bankruptcy Rule[] 4004 . . . do[es] not delineate what cases bankruptcy courts are competent to adjudicate”).12 These cases stand for the general proposition identified above: If the statutory text does not mandate dismissal as the consequence for noncompliance, the courts should not read the statute as having jurisdictional consequences (i.e. mandatory dismissal without exception). petitioner learned of the adverse ruling on January 18, 2006, he immediately wrote a pro se habeas petition and mailed it to the district court. See id. at 2557. The district court held that equitable tolling was unwarranted because the petitioner did not seek help from the court system to determine when the mandate issued. See id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held that the attorney’s negligence could never constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” sufficient to toll the limitations period. See id. The Supreme Court rejected the district court’s erroneous determination that the petitioner had not been diligent and the Eleventh Circuit’s rigid, categorical approach. See id. at 2565. It then held that § 2244(d)’s time limit was subject to equitable tolling and remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 2565. 12 In Kontrick, a creditor objected to a debtor’s discharge in a liquidation proceeding. See id. at 446. The applicable rule provided that such an objection had to be made within “60 days after the first date set for the meeting of creditors.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Bkrtcy. P. 4004(a)). The creditor’s objection was untimely under this rule. See id. The debtor did not file a motion to dismiss the objection as untimely, however, until after the Bankruptcy Court decided that the discharge should be refused. See id. The Bankruptcy Court held that the time limit was not jurisdictional, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. See id. at 447. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that Rule 4004(a) was not jurisdictional, so that “a debtor forfeits the right to rely on Rule 4004 if the debtor does not raise the Rule’s time limitation before the bankruptcy court reaches the merits of the creditor’s objection to discharge.” Id. WONG V. BEEBE 71 Instead, per Irwin’s instruction, the courts should presume equitable tolling may be applied to the statute in question, and then proceed to determine whether that presumption has been rebutted and, if not, whether the running of the timing provision should be tolled for equitable reasons. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–97.13 2. Consequence Statutes of Limitations: Mandatory Consequences for a Failure Timely to File In contrast, however, are statutes of limitations that specify the consequences of a party’s failure to adhere to a prescribed time limit. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (“No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of such judgment, order or decree.”); 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (“Any civil action under this section, except for an action brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced 13 Of course, if the court finds that the presumption has been rebutted or that no equitable considerations justify tolling the statute, it should dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with the statute of limitations. The key consideration here is that, when a statute does not specify mandatory consequences for failure timely to act, the court is permitted to rely on Irwin’s presumption that equitable tolling applies. Nothing in the text of that statute suggests that the presumption should not apply. 72 WONG V. BEEBE within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.”). Like the first category of statutes discussed supra, these statutes speak in mandatory terms. They do not, however, merely require that parties take actions at specified times. Instead, these statutes require the courts to respond in a certain way to a party’s failure to timely act by making the consequences of noncompliance, rather than just the acts, mandatory. It is clear, then, that there are two different kinds of mandatory provisions: (1) those that make certain actions mandatory on the parties but do not specify the consequences of noncompliance, and (2) those that also provide mandatory consequences for failures to act according to their prescriptions. The Court has mentioned the importance of this distinction in the past. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204 (holding a statute nonjurisdictional in part because its language did “not suggest, let alone provide clear evidence, that the provision was meant to carry jurisdictional consequences”); Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (noting that the nonjurisdictional statute did “not set forth an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever its clock has run” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). I agree with the majority that not all mandatory prescriptions are properly categorized as jurisdictional. See Op. at 18. But I also believe that, to determine which mandatory prescriptions are jurisdictional, we must pay close attention to precisely what Congress has made mandatory (i.e. a party’s action or the consequences for a party’s failure timely to act). Thus, when Congress has mandated that a particular consequence will accompany a party’s noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, courts are not free to impose other consequences or, as the majority does in this case, to fail to impose any consequence at all. WONG V. BEEBE 73 The reason is simple: When Congress mandates that a particular consequence be imposed, it limits the court’s power to act. When the consequence is that the claim “shall be barred” or the case “shall not be maintained,” Congress has spoken in jurisdictional terms.14 Cf. John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 134 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which includes “shall be barred” language, is jurisdictional); Dalm, 494 U.S. at 609 (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), which, when read with 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), includes “may not be maintained” language, is jurisdictional). The majority holds that John R. Sand & Gravel and Bowles “did not hold [the statutes at issue] jurisdictional based on the consequential language of the statute” but because of “a century’s worth of precedent and practice in American courts.” Op. at 19, n.3. But what was that “century’s worth of precedent” based on? The Court’s ancient recognition that some statutes of limitations have consequences. Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123, 125 (1883) (statute of limitation “forever barred” “every claim”); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227, 332 (1887) (holding that the express words of the act of 1863—stating claims were “forever barred”—was a condition to the right to a judgment against the United States and the court must dismiss the petition if the condition was not satisfied). Such consequences speak to “the courts’ statutory 14 I acknowledge that such a holding may conflict with Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997), but, for reasons discussed infra at 79–83, I believe that case is inconsistent with subsequent Supreme Court cases and is no longer good law. Further, by giving examples of when Congress has spoken in jurisdictional terms I am not relying on “magic words” that must be included. Op. at 19. These phrases are merely examples of terms which mandate that a particular consequence must be imposed, and that consequence is what makes the statute jurisdictional. 74 WONG V. BEEBE . . . power to adjudicate the case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). To illustrate this point, one asks: What statutory power does a court have to adjudicate a claim which, according to congressional mandate, “shall be barred” or “shall not be maintained?” The answer is simple: None.15 It seems natural, then, to conclude that when a statute includes such language, it speaks in jurisdictional terms. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994) (“[J]urisdictional statutes speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights of obligations of the parties.” (citation omitted)).16 15 This fact separates the two kinds of statutes of limitations. When a statute does not specify a mandatory consequence, the operation of Irwin’s presumption makes sense (i.e. courts can generally assume Congress intended equitable tolling to apply unless something suggests otherwise). When Congress specifies a mandatory consequence, however, courts should assume Congress meant what it said (i.e. that the consequence is mandatory and applicable in every case). 16 Unfortunately, while the Court has stated, on several occasions, that a particular statute does not speak in jurisdictional terms, see ante at 68, it has not clarified exactly when a statute does speak in jurisdictional terms. Still, the Court has held that the statutes in the second category above are jurisdictional. See John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 134 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which provides that “[e]very claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition is filed within six years after such claim first accrued,” is jurisdictional); Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) and (c), which provide that “no appeal shall bring any judgment, order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after entry of such judgment, order or decree,” except that a court may “extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause,” is jurisdictional); Dalm, 494 U.S. at 609 (holding that 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a), which, when read with 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a), provides that “unless a claim for refund of a tax has been filed within the time limits . . . , a suit for refund . . . may not be maintained in any court,” WONG V. BEEBE 75 Section 2401(b) falls into the second category identified above. It does not merely specify what a party must do; it specifies the consequences of a failure to act according to its time limit. If action is not begun within six months after the agency mailed its final denial of the claim, such claim “shall be forever barred.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). Because the court has no statutory power to adjudicate such a claim, I would hold that, unlike the statute considered in Holland, § 2401(b) “set[s] forth an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever its clock has run.” Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560. In that manner, and unlike the statute considered in Henderson, the language of § 2401(b) “provide[s] clear evidence[] that the provision was meant to carry jurisdictional consequences.” Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204. Thus, its pronouncement “speak[s] in jurisdictional terms” or, at the very least, “refer[s] in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 165.17 is jurisdictional). It has also mentioned the kind of language that would speak in jurisdictional terms. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204 (implying that jurisdictional language would include a suggestion “that the provision was meant to carry jurisdictional consequences”); Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560 (implying that a statute would speak in jurisdictional language if it “set forth an inflexible rule requiring dismissal whenever its clock has run” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In any event, as the majority acknowledges, the Court has instructed that Congress “need not incant magic words . . . to speak clearly.” Op. at 11 (quoting Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 824 (2013)). Thus, Congress need not explicitly state that a time limit is jurisdictional; it is free to specify consequences that relate to a court’s power to adjudicate cases and trust that the court will understand what those consequences mean. 17 While a statute that specifies mandatory consequences is jurisdictional, the reverse is not necessarily true. See, e.g., McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111–12 (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2675, which does not specify mandatory consequences for noncompliance, jurisdictional). This dissent 76 WONG V. BEEBE The majority calls my delineation of statutes of limitations a “grand theory”. Op. at 18. I appreciate their praise, but I humbly submit there is nothing “grand” about following the “clear evidence” provided by Congress and the Supreme Court. C. The Importance of the Term “Forever.” The majority escapes this rather straightforward conclusion with the assertion that “§ 2401(b) merely states what is always true of statutory filing deadlines: once the limitations period ends, whether extended by the application of tolling principles or not, a plaintiff is ‘forever barred’ from presenting his claim to the relevant adjudicatory body.” Op. at 15 (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117).18 The majority has does not imply that the specification of mandatory consequences is the only way for Congress to express its intent that a statute be jurisdictional. Congress may express its intent that a statute be jurisdictional in other ways (i.e. it need not incant magic words), and, indeed, a statute may be jurisdictional for reasons other than the text. See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166 (2010) (instructing courts, in determining whether a statute is jurisdictional, to look to the statute’s “text, context and relevant historical treatment” (emphasis added)). 18 I must confess that I have struggled to find which portion of the Court’s opinion in Kubrick supports the majority’s position about what is “ordinarily true of statutory filing deadlines.” Op. at 15. Surely it is not this portion: “Section 2401(b), the limitations provision involved here, is the balance struck by Congress in the context of tort claims against the Government; and we are not free to construe it so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to encourage the prompt presentation of claims.” Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117. And surely it is not this portion: “We should also have in mind that the Act waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing the statute of limitations, which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.” Id. at 117–18. I simply see no WONG V. BEEBE 77 simply written the term “forever” out of the statute, ascribing it no meaning nor importance at all. It is a mere “vestige of mid-twentieth-century congressional drafting conventions,”19 Op. at 18, and adds nothing that the statute would not say without it, because all statutes of limitations, if applicable, bar claims “forever,” see Op. at 15–17. But the majority fails to consider the standard canon of statutory construction that requires courts to give meaning, if possible, to each of a statute’s terms. See Lowe v. SEC., 472 U.S. 181, 208 n.53 (1985) (“[W]e must give effect to every word that Congress used in the statute.”); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012) (explaining that “[t]he surplusage canon holds that it is no more the court’s function to revise by subtraction than by addition.”). To the majority, the term “forever” is tautological; it has no meaning whatsoever. But that is not the view of well-established dictionaries at the time the statute was drafted. See, e.g., Webster’s New International Dictionary 990 (2d ed. 1943) (defining the adverb “forever” as “1. For a limitless time or endless ages; everlastingly; eternally,” and “2. At all times; always; incessantly,” and identifying “invariably” and “unchangeably” as synonyms). Usage of the term “forever,” as in “forever barred,” connotes something that obtains under any and all circumstances, something that is invariably so. But this is support for the majority’s position in Kubrick. 19 The majority’s deprecatory labelling is off by about 100 years. In U.S. v. Kendall, 107 U.S. at 124, the term “forever barred” in the act of March 3, 1863, was definitively interpreted. 78 WONG V. BEEBE nothing new. In Kendall v. United States, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute of limitations which included the phrase “forever barred” and stated: “What claims are thus barred? The express words of the statute leave no room for contention. Every claim-except those specially enumerated-is forever barred unless asserted within six years from the time it first accrued.” 107 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added). Forever, as in “forever barred”, has an inclusionary meaning—“every claim”—as well as a temporal meaning—for all time. Kendall has continued to be cited approvingly in Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. at 273,20 and John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 134, on the way to holding statutes of limitations “jurisdictional.” As used in § 2401(b), then, the term “forever” means that an FTCA claim is invariably barred unless a civil action is commenced within the six-month period following final denial of the administrative claim. Moreover, according to the majority’s theory, the fact that Congress included “forever barred” language in “various other statutes enacted in the mid-twentieth century,” see Op. at 17, must mean that Congress merely plugged boilerplate language into these provisions, without thinking or assigning any special meaning to the words it chose to employ. But the fact that Congress included the term in various limitations periods, and not all limitations periods, suggests the exact opposite is true: On the occasions when Congress used the term “forever barred,” it did so intentionally and for a reason. It is especially telling that Congress did not adhere to the majority’s claimed “drafting convention” when, in 1948, it drafted § 2401(a), the very section that precedes the one here in issue. See Act of 20 John R. Sand & Gravel held that Soriano is still good law. 552 U.S. at 137. WONG V. BEEBE 79 June 25, 1948, chap. 646, 62 Stat. 971 (June 25, 1948) (“Every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.”); see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (citations omitted)). The majority finally holds that if “forever” does mean anything, it merely focuses on time and emphasizes that “once barred, [a FTCA claim] is precluded permanently, not temporarily or until some later event occurs” and that “the word ‘forever’ cannot bear [the] weight” that I give it. Op. at 21, n.4. However, our canons of construction cannot bear the lack of weight the majority gives it, see Lowe, 472 U.S. 181 at n.53, and neither can our history. See Kendall, 107 U.S. at 125. I do not subscribe to the facile construct that we can read “forever barred” to mean nothing more than “barred.” Nor do I believe “forever” is a non-cipher. “We are not free to rewrite the statutory text.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111. By providing that claims not presented within the time prescribed “shall be forever barred,” Congress clearly expressed its intention that “every claim” (Kendall, 107 U.S. at 125) would be invariably barred, not sometimes barred so that equitable considerations might be held to extend the time in which to begin actions on such claims. 80 WONG V. BEEBE D. Ninth Circuit Precedent The majority relies on three of this court’s previous opinions to support its conclusion that § 2401(b)’s “shall be forever barred” language does not mean that the statute’s time limit is jurisdictional.21 See Op. at 16–17. It first relies on Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that § 2401(a) is not jurisdictional. In fairness, the majority notes that this opinion’s continued vitality was called into question by Aloe Vera of America, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 2009) (“To the extent that Cedars-Sinai is still valid after John R. Sand, the holding in Cedars-Sinai does not dictate the jurisdictional nature of section 7431(d).” (citation omitted)). It dismisses that statement, however, because it “was made 21 The majority also cites out of circuit authority—Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828, 832–33 (7th Cir. 2013); Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 194–98 (3d Cir. 2009); Perez v. United States, 167 F.3d 913, 916–17 (5th Cir. 1999)—for the proposition that § 2401(b) is subject to tolling. However, these cases are not persuasive. Arteaga holds that because 28 U.S.C. § 2674 meant to hold the government liable in the same way as a private individual, and equitable tolling is available to private individuals, equitable tolling is available under the FTCA. Arteaga, 711 F.3d at 833. However, the Arteaga court ignores the plain language of § 2401(b) which states “to the agency to which it was presented.” A private individual may not be held liable for an agency claim. Further, Santos ignores Congress’ clear intent when it concludes that “the placement of the separate statutory savings provision does not suggest that Congress intended it to preclude equitable tolling.” Santos, 559 F.3d at 196. See Pub. L. No. 773, 62 Stat. 869, 991 (1948) (“No inference of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, . . . in which any section is placed.”). Finally, Perez discussed the use of the phrase “forever barred” and found it was irrelevant, but failed to consider and attempt to distinguish prior cases interpreting the term, such as Kendall v. U.S. 167 F.3d at 915–918, and Finn v. U.S., 123 U.S. at 332. WONG V. BEEBE 81 without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions clarifying the distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional rules.” Op. at 16 n.2. Of course, this claim gets us nowhere, because Cedars-Sinai was also decided without the benefit of those decisions. Thus, we cannot blindly rely on Cedars-Sinai; instead, we must examine whether it accords with the Supreme Court’s most recent guidance.22 Cedars-Sinai’s analysis of the jurisdictional question is simple and brief. See Cedars-Sinai, 125 F.3d at 770. The court held: “Because the statute of limitations codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) makes no mention of jurisdiction but erects only a procedural bar, . . . we hold that § 2401(a)’s six-year statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, but is subject to waiver.” Id. (citations omitted). Two problems with Cedars-Sinai’s analysis lead me to conclude that it is no longer good law. First, Cedars-Sinai appears to erect an absolute rule that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional only when it specifically mentions the term “jurisdiction.” See CedarsSinai, 125 F.3d at 770. Since Cedars-Sinai was decided, however, the Supreme Court has advised that Congress “need not incant magic words . . . to speak clearly [about 22 The Court’s “recent guidance” includes John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008), Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010), Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010), Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011), and Auburn Regional Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817. 82 WONG V. BEEBE jurisdiction].” Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824.23 A requirement that Congress use the term “jurisdiction” runs afoul of this instruction. Moreover, the Court has clarified that a statute of limitations may be jurisdictional when it “speak[s] in jurisdictional terms or refer[s] in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added). As previously discussed, one way to refer to the courts’ jurisdiction is to “suggest . . . that the provision was meant to carry jurisdictional consequences.” Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1204. Cedars-Sinai failed to appreciate that, by providing that any claim not filed within the time specified “shall be barred,” § 2401(a) limited the courts’ power to act and, thus, referred to the courts’ jurisdiction. Second, Cedars-Sinai relied heavily on Irwin’s quotation of 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which the Court had deemed jurisdictional in Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957).24 After Irwin, there was initially good reason to 23 In Sebelius, the governing statute allowed health care providers to file, within 180 days, an administrative appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board from an initial determination of the reimbursement owed for inpatient services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries. See id. at 821 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(3)). The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, by regulation, authorized the Board to extend the 180-day limitation, for good cause, up to three years. See id. The Court held that the 180-day limitation period was not jurisdictional and that the regulation permitting a three-year extension was a permissible construction of the statute. See id. at 821–22. It further held that equitable tolling “does not apply to administrative appeals of the kind here at issue.” Id. at 822. 24 In Soriano, the petitioner, a resident of the Philippines, filed suit in the Court of Claims to recover “just compensation for the requisitioning by Philippine guerilla forces of certain foodstuffs, supplies, equipment, and merchandise during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands.” WONG V. BEEBE 83 believe Soriano had been overruled. See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 98 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Not only is the Court’s holding inconsistent with our traditional approach to cases involving sovereign immunity, it directly overrules a prior decision by this Court, Soriano v. United States.” (citation omitted)). Because it seemed Irwin had overruled Soriano, it also seemed the terms “shall be barred” were insufficient to make a statute jurisdictional. If that had been true, Cedars-Sinai may have been correct. But the Court has since clarified Irwin and reaffirmed Soriano’s vitality. See John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 137 (“[T]he Court [in Irwin], while mentioning a case that reflects the particular interpretive history of the court of claims statute, namely Soriano, says nothing at all about overturning that or any other case in that line. Courts do not normally overturn a long line of earlier cases without mentioning the matter.” (citations omitted)). Given this clarification, and Cedars-Sinai’s tension with intervening Supreme Court decisions, I would hold that it was incorrectly decided and is of no precedential value on this issue. See Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 782–83 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that circuit precedent is “effectively overruled” when its “reasoning or theory . . . is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of Id. at 270–71. The relevant statute of limitations provided that “[e]very claim of which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed . . . within six years after such claim first accrues.” Id. at 271 n.1 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2501). The petitioner filed suit more than six years after the alleged requisition claiming his delay was caused by World War II conditions in the Philippines. See id. at 271. The Court of Claims dismissed the suit without reaching the limitation question. See id. at 272. The Supreme Court affirmed and held that, by the time the petitioner filed suit, “his claim . . . was barred by statute.” Id. at 277. 84 WONG V. BEEBE intervening higher authority.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The majority then cites Partlow v. Jewish Orphans’ Home of Southern California, 645 F.2d 757, 760–61 (9th Cir. 1981), abrogated on other grounds by Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), and Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 616 F.2d 394, 396–407 (9th Cir. 1980), as instances where this court has held that the language “shall be forever barred” did not render a statute jurisdictional. See Op. at 17. Of course, these cases pre-date all of the Supreme Court’s recent guidance as well. For that reason, we should once again take a critical look at their reasoning before relying on them. The Partlow court held that equitable tolling could be applied to 29 U.S.C. § 255, the statute of limitations applicable to actions brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See Partlow, 645 F.2d at 760–61. Interestingly, the court did not conduct any in-depth analysis of the statute’s text, context, or historical treatment. Indeed, the Partlow opinion does not once quote the statute’s text or even mention the phrase “shall be forever barred.” See id. at 757–61. Instead, the court relied on opinions from two of our sister circuits, each of which held that § 255 could be equitably tolled. See id. at 760 (citing Ott v. Midland Ross, 523 F.2d 1367, 1370 (6th Cir. 1975), and Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1283–84 (10th Cir. 1972)). It then noted that “courts have often stated that equitable tolling is read into every federal statute of limitations.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). It then concluded that the statute should be tolled in the circumstances of that case. See id. at 760–61. WONG V. BEEBE 85 If it were unclear at the time Partlow was decided, it has since become abundantly clear that equitable tolling is not to be read into every federal statute of limitations. See John R. Sand & Gravel, 552 U.S. at 133–34 (explaining that some federal statutes of limitations—such as 28 U.S.C. § 2501, for instance—must be treated as jurisdictional, so that courts are forbidden to “consider whether certain equitable considerations warrant extending [the] limitations period[s]” they contain). Moreover, Partlow fails to conduct the kind of analysis required by the Court’s more recent decisions. See Reed Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 166 (providing that “the jurisdictional analysis must focus on the ‘legal character’ of the requirement, which we discern[] by looking to the condition’s text, context, and relevant historical treatment” (citations omitted)). For these reasons, I would hold that Partlow is today flat wrong, and of no precedential value on the question presently before the court. In Mt. Hood Stages, this court held that equitable tolling could be applied to 15 U.S.C. § 15b. See Mt. Hood Stages, 616 F.2d at 396. It is once again telling that the court did not conduct any in-depth analysis of the statute’s text or even mention the statute’s phrase “shall be forever barred.” See id. at 396–406. It is clear, then, that the decision was not based on a determination that the statute did not refer in any way to the courts’ jurisdiction. In a word, Mt. Hood Stages skipped the first, Court-required step of textual analysis for a consideration of the statute’s purpose in a regulatory scheme. See Reed Elsevier, 559 at 166.25 Instead, the decision was based on the court’s conclusion that “tolling the running of limitations serves the important federal interest in accommodating enforcement of the Sherman Act with 25 This dissent analyzes § 2401(b)’s purposes in Part III, infra. 86 WONG V. BEEBE enforcement of the Interstate Commerce Act, and is not inconsistent with the purposes of the Clayton Act’s limitation period.” Id. at 396. In particular, the Mt. Hood Stages court found that tolling would “contribute[] to a reasonable accommodation of the [Interstate Commerce Commission]’s responsibility for furthering the national transportation policy with the responsibility of the courts to effectuate the national antitrust policy.” Id. at 397. Because the case “involved subject matter Congress ha[d] given the Commission jurisdiction to regulate,” it “created a dispute only the Commission could resolve.” Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that, “[i]f Mt. Hood had filed [its] antitrust suit . . . prior to the Commission determination [of a particular factual issue],” accommodation of the Clayton and Interstate Commerce Acts would have compelled “the court . . . to dismiss or stay the suit pending the necessary administrative determination.” Id. at 399. Thus, “[c]ongressional purposes under the two statutory regimes would be served by tolling the statute of limitations during the Commission proceeding.” Id. at 400. For that reason, the court held that the statute of limitations could be “tolled pending resort to an administrative agency for a preliminary determination of issues within its primary jurisdiction.” Id. at 405; see also Pace Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 241 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[O]ur decision [in Mt. Hood Stages] rested on considerations of federal policy and primary jurisdiction which are not present here.”). Contrary to the majority’s implication, see Op. at 16, Mt. Hood Stages does not stand for the proposition that “shall be forever barred” does not refer to the courts’ jurisdiction. Indeed, a statute may refer to the courts’ jurisdiction and yet WONG V. BEEBE 87 not be jurisdictional, much like a statute which does not speak in jurisdictional terms may still be jurisdictional. See United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (holding that the timing requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 6511 are jurisdictional, even though the statute does not refer to the courts’ jurisdiction, because of the provision’s “detail, its technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of exceptions”). In short, even a statute that refers in some way to the courts’ jurisdiction may not be jurisdictional when, for example, Congress has created dual statutory regimes, such as those involved in Mt. Hood Stages, that essentially require tolling for their accommodation. Of course, there are no such dual regimes at issue in this case, nor does this case involve the sort of federal policy and primary jurisdiction considerations that animated the court’s opinion in Mt. Hood Stages. Thus, I would hold that Mt. Hood Stages offers no useful guidance on the question whether § 2401(b)’s language refers to the courts’ jurisdiction. In defense of Partlow and Mount Hood Stages, the majority states that these cases still “undermine the notion that Congress intended through the use of magic words . . . to establish jurisdictional bars in statutes allowing for civil suits against private parties.” Op. at 22, n.5. Of course, this argument is merely a straw man; we all agree that Congress never uses “magic words” to establish jurisdiction. See supra, Bea Dissent at 75, n.17.