Opinion ID: 2103748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Mitigation Contentions

Text: The defendant next contends that Indiana's death penalty statute is unconstitutional with respect to consideration of mitigating circumstances. In this regard, he presents three claims. First, the defendant asserts that the statute permits juries to act with unguided discretion, in violation of Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, in those cases where a defendant is unable to prove no significant history of prior criminal conduct, a statutory mitigating circumstance. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(1). The defendant argues that a jury would necessarily infer the converse premise, that the defendant does have a significant criminal history, and that a jury would consider this an aggravating circumstance. The defendant presents no support for this claim. We find none and conclude that the Indiana statute is not defective in this regard. The defendant next directs our attention to provisions in the statute which allow the jury to consider the fact that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed and that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or conform that conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(2), (c)(6) (emphasis added). He argues that this language prohibits consideration of less extreme emotional disturbances or less substantial impairments of a defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct and that such a prohibition violates Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, and Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973, which require that a capital jury must be allowed to consider all mitigating evidence. We disagree. A jury can consider as a mitigating circumstance [a]ny other circumstance appropriate for consideration. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(8). Finally, the defendant asserts that this catch-all mitigator, subsection 9(c)(8), dilutes the persuasiveness of a myriad of mitigating circumstances which may exist in a particular case. Brief of Appellant at 72. He provides no supporting authority, and we find no merit in this claim.