Opinion ID: 3014665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rifle and Homemade Knife

Text: Kauffman learned about Latz’s rifle and homemade knife when he entered the house immediately after he and other officers brought Latz down on his front porch. The government argues that this initial entry into the house was a valid search incident to arrest. The Supreme Court has stated that during an arrest in a suspect’s home, officers may conduct a limited search incident to arrest: “[A]s a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, [police officers may] look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 13 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (emphasis added). Thus, a limited search of the immediate adjoining area, unlike a broader protective sweep, does not require reasonable suspicion. Kauffman’s initial search was limited: It extended only to the area immediately inside the door, and it occurred while Latz was on the porch, which adjoins the door. This constitutes a limited search incident to arrest, and reasonable suspicion therefore is not required. Latz relies on this Court’s decision in United States v. Myers, 308 F.3d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2002), in which a police officer searched the bag of a defendant who had been arrested in his residence and who was lying on the floor handcuffed during the search. We first held that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant. Id. at 254. We then issued what appears to be an advisory opinion on whether opening the bag would have been a valid search incident to arrest if, hypothetically, there were probable cause for the arrest. Id. at 266; see also id. at 284 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (“In a discussion which lacks any precedential value because it is unnecessary to its decision . . . the Majority has opined that the search of the backpack was not 14 incident to Myers’s arrest.”) (emphasis added). Even if Myers’ discussion of searches incident to arrest were not dicta, Myers would not control this case. First, Myers involved opening a bag, not a visual sweep. Second, in contrast to this case, Myers involved a search that was not contemporaneous with the arrest. Id. at 274. Most critically, we stated in Myers, “[n]othing on this record suggests that [the officer] was concerned that any confederate was lurking about.” Id. at 274. In this case, by contrast, the police had reason to fear an attack by a third party. They knew that Latz lived with Roth, they knew from the initial complaint regarding the air conditioning unit that Latz had guns in his house, and they knew from the NCIC background check that Latz owned two guns and was considered armed and dangerous. Kauffman testified that he “stepped in the doorway just to make sure there were no other issues,” and that he “looked to [his] lefthand side to make sure there wasn’t somebody around the corner and to make sure that that area was safe.” Under Buie, this is a search of “spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Reasonable suspicion therefore is not required. 15 Latz argues that Kauffman’s entry into the home was illegal because Latz was on the porch. But an attack could easily have been launched through the open door. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Kauffman’s search was not illegal. Accordingly, the subsequent warranted search was not tainted by an illegal prior search, and the District Court did not err in refusing to exclude the rifle and homemade knife.2