Opinion ID: 71130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Immunity & Monell Immunity

Text: As the Supreme Court recently instructed, “[t]o survive a motion to 14 Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 354 (5th Cir. 2007). 15 King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“‘Discovery matters are entrusted to the ‘sound discretion’ of the district court . . . .’”) (quoting Richardson v. Henry, 902 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1990)). -7- Case: 09-20126 Document: 00511022513 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/08/2010 dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 16 In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court noted that, to assess whether the complaint alleges a sufficient factual predicate to support a §1983 claim, courts may “begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead” to state such claim.17 Judges of all stripes enjoy absolute immunity from suits for damages when the action complained of was taken in their judicial capacity, even if that action “was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of [their] authority.” 18 It is only for those nonjudicial actions or for actions that are taken “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction” that judges do not enjoy such immunity.19 For his complaint against Judge Mayes to survive, Burns had to allege facts directed at: (I) whether the precise act complained of is a normal judicial function; (ii) whether the acts occurred in a courtroom or appropriate adjunct spaces as the judge’s chambers; (iii) whether the controversy centered around a case pending before the court; and (iv) whether the acts arose directly out of a visit to the judge in his official capacity.20 16 Gonzales v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 18 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed. 2d 331 (1978) (re-stating that “the doctrine of judicial immunity was applicable in suits under . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (internal citations omitted). 19 Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991). 20 McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972). -8- Case: 09-20126 Document: 00511022513 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/08/2010 Not only has Burns failed in that regard, but he has utterly failed to identify even a scintilla of evidence that Judge Mayes’s actions were taken in anything but his capacity as the judge charged with adjudicating and overseeing the terms of Burns’s probation as a defendant properly appearing in the court that had jurisdiction over him and his case. Burns’s unsupported, conclusional assertions that Judge Mayes acted in an “administrative” or “ultra vires” capacity are therefore unavailing.21 In addition, the very fact that Burns has served his time and is no longer chafing against the conditions of community supervision imposed by Judge Mayes supports the district court’s dismissal of his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds of mootness.22 Similarly, for his suit against the County to survive, Burns must have pleaded facts to support his contention that the SAP Program constituted “the execution of an official policy or custom of the municipality23 that caused the constitutional injury that he claims. We have defined a “policy or custom” to be either: 1. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is 21 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (holding that a pleading that offers merely “labels and conclusions . . . will not do.”). 22 Soc. of Separationists, Inc., v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1286 (5th Cir. 1994) (“This court and others have often held that plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective relief against judges because the likelihood of future encounters is speculative.”). Accord, Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1452-53 (10th Cir. 1990) (dismissing § 1983 suit against state judge who revoked plaintiff’s probation and holding no actual controversy existence to warrant declaratory relief because of the extreme unlikelihood that plaintiff would ever be subject to probation revocation proceedings before that