Opinion ID: 844200
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prospective Alternate Juror L.L.

Text: Defendant also challenges the trial court‘s excusal for cause of Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. The People contend that defendant forfeited any objection to the trial court‘s ruling on the basis of alleged Witherspoon/Witt error because in response to the prosecution‘s motion to dismiss Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. for cause, defense counsel submitted the matter to the trial court. ― ‗Hence, as a practical matter, he ―did not object to the court‘s excusing the juror, but . . . also refused to stipulate to it.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 733.) As we recently held in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 643, ―counsel (or defendant, if proceeding pro se) must make either a timely objection, or the functional equivalent of an objection, such as a statement of opposition or disagreement, to the excusal stating specific grounds under Witherspoon/Witt in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Nevertheless, . . . because at the time of this trial we had not expressly held that an objection is necessary to preserve Witherspoon/Witt excusal error on appeal, we do not apply this rule here. [Citation.]‖ In any event, we need not reach the merits of defendant‘s claim because Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. was under consideration solely as an alternate juror and no alternate jurors were ever substituted in defendant‘s case. In People 49 v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 617-618, we held that the error, if any, in excluding a venireman by reason of his views on capital punishment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where, at the time of the ruling, the regular panel of 12 jurors had been chosen, the prospective juror was under consideration solely as an alternate juror, and, as matters turned out, no alternate juror was called upon to participate in the deliberations of the jury. (See also People v. Terry (1969) 70 Cal.2d 410, 416, fn. 1 [noting that although there were prospective alternate jurors who were excused on the ground of their opposition to the death penalty, no alternates were substituted for any member of the trial jury]; People v. Risenhoover (1968) 70 Cal.2d 39, 56, fn.6 [same]; cf. In re Hill (1969) 71 Cal.2d 997, 1097, fn.6 [defendants were prejudiced by dismissal of prospective alternate veniremen in violation Witherspoon/Witt because one alternate juror participated in the deliberations in the penalty phase].) Similarly here, any error in excusing Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. could not possibly have prejudiced defendant.9 9 Defendant‘s citation at oral argument to Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648 is inapposite. In that case, the Court declined to adopt a harmless error analysis for the exclusion of a prospective actual juror in violation of Witherspoon/Witt even if the state retained unexercised peremptory challenges at the end of jury selection. (Gray, supra, at p. 664.) In so holding, it noted that the relevant inquiry in the harmless error analysis is ― ‗whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court‘s error‘ ‖ and concluded that the nature of the trial counsel‘s on-the-spot decisionmaking with respect to the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection ―defies any attempt to establish that an erroneous Witherspoon-Witt exclusion of a juror is harmless.‖ (Gray, supra, at p. 665.) By contrast, in the situation presented here, the alleged improper exclusion of a prospective alternate juror in a trial where no alternate juror sat on the jury, we can say with confidence that the composition of the relevant jury panel — the one from which the sitting jurors were selected — could not possibly have been affected by the trial court‘s alleged error. 50 2. Denial of challenges to five prospective jurors for cause Defendant challenged 10 prospective jurors on the basis of their views concerning the death penalty. The trial court granted five challenges, but denied the challenges as to Prospective Jurors E.R., P.P., P.N., B.D., and M.B. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to excuse for cause the five ―death inclined‖ prospective jurors and forcing him to use peremptory challenges to excuse these jurors. However, defendant, without objection, accepted the jury as finally constituted with five peremptory challenges remaining. ―As a general rule, a party may not complain on appeal of an allegedly erroneous denial of a challenge for cause because the party need not tolerate having the prospective juror serve on the jury; a litigant retains the power to remove the juror by exercising a peremptory challenge. Thus, to preserve this claim for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually exercise a peremptory challenge and remove the prospective juror in question. Next, the litigant must exhaust all of the peremptory challenges allotted by statute and hold none in reserve. Finally, counsel (or defendant, if proceeding pro se) must express to the trial court dissatisfaction with the jury as presently constituted.‖ (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186; see also People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 581 (Davis) [―the existence of unused peremptory challenges strongly indicates defendant‘s recognition that the selected jury was fair and impartial‖]; Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 892 [―it is possible that, despite counsel‘s initial misgivings about the composition of the jury, he ultimately was satisfied with the jury as sworn, and, had he expressed dissatisfaction, the trial court may have allowed him to exercise additional peremptory challenges‖].) Here, although defendant used peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors E.R., P.P., P.N., B.D., and M.B., he did not exhaust his peremptory challenges during jury selection, nor did he communicate to the trial court any dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately 51 impaneled. Defendant‘s claims of error as to these five prospective jurors, therefore, were not preserved for appeal. 3. The prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges Of the 22 peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution, defendant contends that ―most, if not all,‖ were exercised against prospective jurors who had expressed reservations against the death penalty, and that this violated his right to a fair and impartial jury because it ―purged‖ the panel of the life-inclined jurors that remained after the trial court‘s rulings on the challenges for cause. In order to preserve this claim for appeal, defendant was required at trial to object to the prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges. (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 907; People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1005.) He failed to do so and thus forfeited any claim of error regarding such use. Even assuming it were not forfeited, and that the prosecution in fact exercised all its peremptory challenges based on the prospective jurors‘ views concerning capital punishment, this claim still would fail on the merits. As defendant acknowledges, ―we have repeatedly rejected any claim of constitutional infirmity in a prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors with reservations about the death penalty.‖ (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 186; see, e.g., People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 432 [―Because both parties may exercise peremptory challenges to remove jurors with unfavorable attitudes, the practice does not produce a jury biased toward death.‖].)