Opinion ID: 152256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Text Must be Read in Context

Text: Read in isolation, there is little dispute that the term loss to the victim or victims is broad enough that it might encompass a tax revenue loss to the government. But it is blackletter law that we may not read statutory terms in isolation. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) (The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.  (emphasis added)); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.); United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984) (We do not ... construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole. Thus, the [term in question] must be read in light of the immediately following phrase.... (footnote omitted)); see also Harbison v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 1492, 173 L.Ed.2d 347 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (We do not construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole. This certainly applies to reading sentences as a whole. (citation, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted)). Often, although a phrase sweeps broadly when read in isolation, surrounding statutory text clarifies that Congress actually intended a narrower meaning. Applications of that simple rule of construction appear throughout the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. For example:  The [relevant] term ... is not defined in the statute, and, out of context, its ordinary meaning could include [the situation at hand]. However, we must not analyze one term of [the statute] in isolation. When [the statute] is read as a whole, the better interpretation is that [the term does not encompass the situation at hand]. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 852, 121 S.Ct. 1946, 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001) (citation omitted).  If considered in isolation, the [relevant] phrase ... could embrace a wide [definition]. After all, in ordinary meaning and usage, [the term has a broad definition]. ... The definition of words in isolation, however, is not necessarily controlling in statutory construction. A word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text [and upon other considerations]. Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486, 126 S.Ct. 1252, 163 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2006) (citation omitted).  [T]he dissent's point that subsection (a) seems clear when read in isolation proves nothing, for `the meaningor ambiguityof certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.' When subsection (a) is read in context, there is no avoiding the question, `What could Congress have been getting at with both (a) and (c)?' Corley v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1566 n. 5, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citation and alteration omitted).  Petitioner's interpretation of [the statutory provision] might be plausible were we to interpret that provision in isolation, but it simply is not tenable in light of the [statute's] surrounding provisions. We must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 99, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (plurality) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The panel's analysis defies that rule of construction by concluding that the meaning of subsection (i) is plain without regard to the very next clause in the same sentence. See Amended Op. at 1053 (concluding, before considering subsection (ii), that: Thus, according to the plain meaning of the statutory language, subsection (i) encompasses tax revenue losses to the government). In subsection (i), Congress gave general treatment to losses while, in subsection (ii), Congress gave specific treatment to tax revenue losses. Without regard to any other analysis, both logic and Supreme Court precedent require us to conclude that the meaning of subsection (i) is not plain and to look to other indicators of congressional intent. [1] The panel forcefully defends its conclusion that the meaning of subsection (i) is plain for the simple reason that each and every other indicator of congressional intent points to the opposite conclusion: Congress intended subsection (ii), and not subsection (i), to cover tax crimes.