Opinion ID: 397893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prospective damages.

Text: 33 Olin next argues that the district court erred by failing to order reinstatement and allowing the jury to award prospective damages to Seymour. In his prayer for relief, Seymour did not request reinstatement, but asked for back pay and prospective damages against Olin for the wrongful discharge. Olin did not object to this prayer for relief in its responsive pleadings, and at no time did it make a motion to strike this portion of the prayer for relief. After the close of evidence in the case, immediately before the closing arguments, however, counsel for Olin objected to the jury charge which allowed the jury to award prospective damages. 34 The parties concede that when wrongful discharge suits are submitted to arbitration, the normal remedy is reinstatement with back pay. In § 301 suits, however, it is clear that the federal courts have the power to order either reinstatement or prospective damages. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 196, 87 S.Ct. at 919; Soto Segarra v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 581 F.2d 291, 297 (1st Cir. 1978). 35 Olin argues that where a company is found to have wrongfully discharged an employee, the court must award reinstatement unless it would not be feasible for the employer to reinstate the employee. The question of whether prospective damages can be awarded only where the equitable remedy of reinstatement is unavailable has not been squarely addressed in this circuit. A strong argument can be made that reinstatement should be awarded where possible since that is the normal practice in arbitration and since it is often difficult to value future earnings. However, some courts have characterized reinstatement as the more drastic and therefore less favored remedy in § 301 suits. 7 In the instant case, we need not decide this issue. We assume arguendo the standard urged by Olin-i.e., that prospective damages may be awarded only if reinstatement is impractical-but even under this standard the district court in the present case did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to award prospective damages. 36 There is substantial support in the record for the decision to award prospective damages on the ground that reinstatement was impractical in this case. There is evidence that in the period following this discharge, Seymour was unable to find work in the Tallahassee area. Seymour eventually found work in Atlanta, leaving his family in Wakulla County. After approximately a year, the Seymours sold their house and Seymour's family joined him in Atlanta. (Record, vol. IV at 82-3). Under these circumstances, the district court could properly conclude that reinstatement would be impractical because of the further dislocation of Seymour and his family that would be involved. 37 In addition, counsel for Olin led both the court and the parties to believe that reinstatement was not a feasible alternative in this case and allowed the case to be tried before the jury on the theory that any prospective relief awarded in the case should be in the form of damages. In his order denying defendants' motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, the district judge found that Olin had made  'specific and definite' refusals, through counsel, to countenance the remedy of reinstatement, should the plaintiff prevail. (Record, vol. II at 479). Even though Seymour's complaint requested prospective damages and not reinstatement, Olin made no suggestion to the court in responsive pleadings, motions or otherwise before trial that reinstatement was the proper remedy or that it was feasible in this case. Indeed, Olin's requested jury instruction No. 16 appears to contemplate an award of prospective damage if the jury were to find for Seymour. (Record, vol. II at 249). Olin did not object to the presentation of evidence relating to prospective damages on the ground that it was irrelevant because reinstatement was the proper remedy. In fact, Olin's first objection to an award of prospective damages occurred after the case had been fully tried to the jury. At the charge conference which was held following the close of evidence in the case, counsel for Olin took the position that equitable relief, preferably an order to arbitrate, was the proper remedy in the case. (Record, vol. VI at 196-97, 205-06). At that time, the district court asked whether Olin would take Seymour back, and we conclude that Olin's response was equivocal at best. Counsel for Seymour indicated some surprise that Olin had even mentioned reinstatement, stating that this was the first time they had expressed even remote interest in the subject. (Record, vol. VI at 198). The following day, immediately prior to closing arguments, counsel for Olin again mentioned that the court could not order prospective damages unless it was not reasonable to award reinstatement. (Record, vol. VII at 7). 38 The failure of counsel for Olin to put either the court or Seymour on notice that Olin was opposed to an award of prospective damages prior to the charge conference allowed the parties and the court to try the case without being aware of the possibility that reinstatement might be an issue in the case. In view of this failure and of the impracticality of ordering reinstatement in this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in submitting to the jury the issue of prospective damages. 39