Opinion ID: 2555770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: PCRA Court Rulings

Text: In Issue 19, Appellant raises numerous allegations of PCRA court error, including (1) failure to transmit the entire record to this Court for review; (2) preclusion of his proffers of testimony during the PCRA hearing, thereby allegedly preventing him from developing the record; (3) preclusion of much material and relevant evidence, particularly testimony that supported his constitutional claims, and (4) denial of his motion for reconsideration. [46] We address each sub-claim in turn. In his first sub-claim, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court transmitted only those PCRA exhibits that were admitted into evidence, but did not transmit other exhibits [that the PCRA court] ruled inadmissible, even though those exhibits relate to issues that are the subject of this appeal. Appellant's Brief at 94. Appellant contends that it was error for the PCRA court not to forward to this Court the nineteen exhibits not admitted into evidence. [47] Notably, Appellant does not specifically challenge the PCRA court's rulings with regard to the admissibility of any of the exhibits at issue, and he does not even explain how any of the exhibits are relevant or material to the issues raised in this appeal. He merely complains that the inadmissible exhibits were not sent to this Court. It is the duty of the clerk of court to transmit to this Court the record on appeal, including the transcript and exhibits necessary for the determination of the appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1931(a)(1), (c). As an appellate court, we are limited to considering only those facts that have been duly certified in the record on appeal. Commonwealth v. Williams, 552 Pa. 451, 715 A.2d 1101, 1103 (1998). Appellant cites no authority for his implied assertion that inadmissible exhibits properly constitute part of the record on appeal. Furthermore, Appellant was free to challenge on appeal the PCRA court's evidentiary rulings with regard to the admissibility of any of the exhibits. He has not done so. Indeed, he has not set forth a single argument or citation to authority or legal principle to support the admissibility of any of the exhibits at issue. Appellant's bald assertion of error in the transmission of the record to this Court is entirely without merit. To remedy the non-existent problem in transmission of the record, Appellant seeks remandto what end, we have no idea, as no explanation is offered. This sub-claim is frivolous in the extreme. In his second sub-claim, which comprises three sentences and a footnote, Appellant asserts that he was precluded from preserving and developing the record because the PCRA court precluded his proffers of testimony throughout the PCRA hearing. Appellant's Brief at 94-95. During the hearing, the PCRA court made clear the reasons for its rulings with regard to the proffers of testimony. Appellant could certainly have challenged these rulings on appeal with proper argument and citations to relevant authority, but for whatever reason, he chose not to do so. Instead, Appellant merely lists, in a footnote, seven citations to the record where the PCRA court allegedly precluded counsel's proffer of testimony; each citation to the record is accompanied only by a phrase, which purports to summarize the proffer precluded, but which includes no argument as to the court's alleged error. Id. at n. 124. This sub-claim is completely undeveloped and unreviewable, and, accordingly, it is waived. [48] In his next sub-claim, Appellant similarly asserts that he was precluded from presenting material and relevant evidence in support of his constitutional claims by the PCRA court's evidentiary rulings during the hearing. As in the prior sub-claim, no argument and no citations to relevant authority accompany Appellant's bald assertions of PCRA court error. Appellant merely lists ten general areas in which he contends the PCRA court precluded evidence, and adds lengthy footnotes listing citations to the notes of testimony, with each cite accompanied by a parenthetical stating only a short summary of the testimony precluded. Appellant's Brief at 95-98. [49] Examples are necessary to appreciate the manner in which Appellant has set forth this sub-claim. In the following paragraphs, two of the ten general areas of evidence listed by Appellant, and their accompanying footnotes, are reproduced verbatim: The PCRA Court precluded ... evidence regarding the Clearfield incident that counsel should have developed and presented at trial and during the penalty hearing that would have supported Appellant's mental state defenses for this incident and challenged the prosecution's aggravation; Appellant's Brief at 95-96. The footnote at the end of this claim is as follows: See, e.g., PC 1/18/07, 57 (precluding expert testimony about the impact of the Clearfield incident on Appellant's pre-existing impairments; PC 2/22/07, 120-21 (precluding expert testimony about Appellant's mental state at the time of the Clearfield incident; the decedent's mental state; and the impact of the Clearfield incident on Appellant's pre-existing impairments). Id. at 96 n. 127. Similarly, another general area of evidence cited by Appellant is as follows: The PCRA Court precluded ... evidence of Dustin Spotz's history of violence and abuse both against Appellant and others that was relevant and material to both Appellant's mental state at, and following, the incident in Clearfield County that counsel was constitutionally obligated to investigate and develop in support of guilt-phase mental state defenses; in order to challenge the prosecution's aggravation; and in support of penalty-phase mitigation and that counsel was obligated to present to his mental health expert in order to ensure that Appellant received competent, constitutionally required mental health assistance at trial and during the penalty hearing. Appellant's Brief at 96-97. The footnote at the end of this claim is as follows: See, e.g., PC 1/17/07, 40 (counsel prevented from eliciting evidence of Dustin Spotz's rages); id. at 176, 181 (precluding Dr. Blumberg from testifying regarding Dustin Spotz's history); PC 1/18/07, 96-98 (precluding Dr. Fox from testifying regarding Dustin Spotz's history of sexual abuse and the impact that history had on corroborating Appellant's allegations that Dustin sexually abused him). Id. at 97 n. 129. [50] We emphasize that the above paragraphs from Appellant's brief are only two examples of Appellant's ten areas of evidence and ten footnotes, which in total list 51 citations to the notes of testimony. In each of Appellant's areas of evidence, the format is the same as the examples above, which constitute the entirety of Appellant's argument. In no case does Appellant provide the slightest explanation or rationale to support his general claim that he was precluded from presenting evidence. These are generalized assertions; they are not arguments, much less reasoned and developed arguments supported with citations to relevant legal authority. Appellant's assertions are not reviewable, and this sub-claim is waived for utter lack of development. [51] In the fourth sub-claim of Issue 19, Appellant asserts that remand is required in order to permit him to amend his PCRA petition to include certain additional issues raised in his motion for reconsideration. The procedural background of this sub-claim is as follows. On June 26, 2008, the PCRA court filed an opinion and order denying all of Appellant's claims. On or about July 4, 2008, Appellant, acting pro se, sent a Letter to the Court, in which he alleged ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel, sought to remove PCRA counsel and represent himself, requested rescission of the PCRA court's order denying his petition, and set forth several issues that he wanted the PCRA court to consider. These issues were the following: (1) Appellant's competency to waive counsel at the time of trial; (2) ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel based on failure to elicit testimony that there was treatment available in prison for Appellant's psychiatric disorders, were he to be sentenced to a life term; (3) inconsistent verdict, grounded in the jury's finding of the subsection 9711(d)(6) aggravating circumstance (murder committed in the course of a felony), but not of second-degree murder; and (4) unnamed statutory deficiencies in the subsection 9711(d)(6) aggravating circumstance. On July 21, 2008, Appellant's PCRA counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, seeking to vacate the PCRA court's order; requesting consideration or reconsideration of the four issues raised by Appellant in his pro se Letter to the Court; and stating that to the extent that counsel failed to [present any issue of merit or any available evidence in support of a meritorious issue], those failures would have been ineffective. Motion for Reconsideration, filed 7/21/08, at 3. Notably, PCRA counsel did not unequivocally aver that they provided ineffective assistance with regard to any specific matter, nor did they provide any insight as to the form that their potential ineffectiveness might have taken. Nonetheless, the motion for reconsideration averred that [t]he appropriate remedy to enforce [Appellant's] right to effective assistance would be for [the PCRA court] to address the issues presented in [Appellant's pro se ] `Letter to the Court.' Id. On July 25, 2008, days after filing his motion for reconsideration with the PCRA court, Appellant filed the instant counseled appeal to this Court. There is no indication from the record that the PCRA court specifically addressed Appellant's motion for reconsideration. However, the PCRA court had already considered and rejected Appellant's claim that he was not competent to waive counsel at trial. See PCRA Court Opinion at 5-8; see also text, supra (discussion of Issue 2). In addition, the PCRA court, in a supplemental opinion, had considered and rejected Appellant's claim of an inconsistent verdict based on the jury's finding of both first-degree murder and the subsection 9711(d)(6) aggravating factor. See PCRA Court's Supplemental Opinion Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, dated 8/7/08, at 1-4; see also text, supra (discussion of Issue 10). In this appeal, Appellant now seeks remand to amend his PCRA petition to include the issues raised in his Letter to the Court and motion for reconsideration, and to allow the PCRA court to consider or reconsider the merits of those issues. Appellant's Brief at 99. In essence, Appellant seeks to file a second  and untimely  PCRA petition, raising four more issues, at least two of which have already been addressed by the PCRA court. Appellant cites no provision in the PCRA or other statutory or decisional law  undoubtedly because there is no such basis  upon which this Court can grant him the relief he seeks. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553, 782 A.2d 517, 524 (2001) (explaining that the practical effect of the legislative scheme of the PCRA as interpreted by this Court is to limit the opportunity for collateral relief in most cases to a single, counseled petition); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 519 Pa. 504, 549 A.2d 107, 112 (1988) (concluding that a second or any subsequent post-conviction request for relief may be entertained only for the purpose of avoiding a demonstrated miscarriage of justice, which no civilized society can tolerate). [52] Appellant's fourth sub-claim is frivolous. There is no merit to any of Appellant's numerous claims in Issue 19, and, accordingly, no relief is warranted.