Opinion ID: 1367509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Violation of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act

Text: Appellant next argues that the possession and sale of the marijuana by the police violated the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act, W.S. XX-X-XXXX et seq. Appellant contends that the violation of the Act by the police should lead to reversal of his conviction. While complaining that information about the alleged illegality was kept from the jury by a motion in limine, appellant concedes that the information was irrelevant to his subjective entrapment defense. We might add that it was also irrelevant to any other issue before the jury. We shall therefore ignore that portion of appellant's argument which addresses the motion in limine and concentrate on his claim that the police infraction of the law to obtain his conviction is relevant to the issue of whether the police violated his right to due process by engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct. Specifically, appellant contends that the officers violated W.S. XX-X-XXXX (1988) and XX-X-XXXX (1988). Section 35-7-1024 reads in part: (a) Every person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses any controlled substance within this state or who proposes to engage in the manufacture, distribution or dispensing of any controlled substance within this state, must obtain annually, on or before July 1, a registration issued by the board in accordance with its rules. W.S. XX-X-XXXX (1988) states: (a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Person is defined in the statute as: [any] individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership or association, or any other legal entity. W.S.XX-X-XXXX(a)(xviii) (1988). As the State points out, however, exception is made in this statute for law enforcement officers while in the course of their duties: All duly authorized peace officers including any special agents or other personnel appointed by the commissioner, while investigating violations of this act in performance of their official duties, shall be immune from prosecution under this act. W.S. XX-X-XXXX (1988). Appellant, however, contends that the immunity provisions of this statute did not apply here because there was no pre-existing violation to investigate when the police obtained and sold the marijuana. He also argues that while immunized, the possession was still illegal, and this illegality should factor into a due process analysis. We must first construe the statute to determine whether investigative immunity extends to the circumstances of this case. When enforcing or construing a statute, this court looks only to the intent of the legislature. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 219 (Wyo.1991). When the words used are clear and unambiguous, that language establishes the rule of law. Id. A statute is ambiguous only where its meaning is vague or ambiguous and subject to varying interpretations. Id., at 219-20. Only if the wording is ambiguous or unclear to the point of demonstrating obscurity with respect to the legislative purpose or mandate do we resort to additional construction. Id., at 219. The scope of the words while investigating violations of this act in performance of their official duties is sufficiently ambiguous that we must resort to further statutory construction beyond their plain meaning. Appellant argues that only a pre-existing violation may be investigated within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in appellant's view, officers may not possess and distribute controlled substances where that possession and distribution is designed merely to result in a violation of the Act. Appellant's view assumes a legislative intent to restrict police activities connected with narcotics enforcement. Often, the only method of catching violators of the narcotics laws is to employ the deception or ruse of setting up a sting. A controlled sale is as legitimate a tactic as a controlled buy, and may be more effective in putting drug dealers behind bars. A drug retailer will obviously be willing to purchase in larger quantities than he intends to sell in any given transaction. A controlled sale gives the police an opportunity to catch him with wholesale, rather than retail amounts, which more realistically reflects the volume of his drug business. In order to run such an operation, the police need controlled substances to sell to its targets. Absent immunity, no reasonable officer would engage in such an operation. Considering the comprehensive nature of the Wyoming Controlled Substances Act of 1971, see 1971 Wyo.Sess. Laws ch. 246, we believe that had the legislature wished to exclude controlled sales of narcotics designed to snare drug dealers, it would have explicitly prohibited such sales. Furthermore, where suspected dealers are targeted, as in this case, their suspected pre-existing violations provide the investigatory rationale for running the operation. Thus, a suspected violation of the Controlled Substances Act is being investigated at the same time as a new violation is occurring. Accordingly, the statute expressly or implicitly allows such operations, and the intent of this statute is to allow the police to be exempt from prosecution for technical violations of the controlled substance law which are incurred during their legitimate investigations of violations of the Controlled Substances Act. Turning to appellant's second contention that the quantity of marijuana involved should have been registered, § 3.26(a)(ii) of the Regulations of the Board of Pharmacy provides exemption from registration for any officer or employee of any state, or any political subdivision or agency thereof who is engaged in the enforcement of any state or local law relating to controlled substances and is duly authorized to possess controlled substances in the course of his official duties. For the same reasons as those favoring immunity, we believe that had the Board of Pharmacy intended to preclude enforcement activities involving reverse sting operations, it would have done so expressly. Even if the possession was unregistered or otherwise illegal, this does not implicate a violation of due process. The California Court of Appeals recently faced a similar situation. That court stated: The possession of the rock cocaine by Officer Qualls was not legal, but we conclude there was no violation of the statutes governing the disposition of the contraband. In any case, we fail to perceive in what manner the source of the cocaine, or Qualls' illegal possession of the contraband would have affected defendant's criminal conduct or had a bearing on his due process rights. People v. Wesley, 224 Cal.App.3d 1130, 274 Cal.Rptr. 326, 331 (1990), review denied (1991). The outrageous government conduct defense focuses on police conduct. We might someday be faced with illegal conduct by the police, immunized or not, serious enough to infringe on a defendant's right to due process. However, in this case, even if the actions of the police were illegal in a technical sense, they were not of the caliber to constitute an infringement of the defendant's due process rights. Accordingly, we hold that the acquisition and use for investigatory purposes without registration of the marijuana did not violate appellant's right to due process.