Opinion ID: 3032334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Padilla and the REAL ID Act of 2005

Text: The primary consideration cutting against the universal application of the immediate custodian rule to immigrationrelated habeas petitions when we decided Armentero I, and at the time the Supreme Court handed down Padilla, was the fact that, at those times, many habeas petitions “filed by an alien detained pending deportation” did not concern aliens who were detained. See Armentero I, 340 F.3d at 1060 n.2 (noting that “non-detainees under INS control, such as those under an order of deportation or removal, may also file habeas petitions”). Instead, most immigration habeas petitions were challenges to final orders of removal.17 In such cases, in my 16 For example, upon a district court’s grant of a habeas petition, presumably the immediate custodian must first contact his superiors to ascertain whether the decision will be appealed before he may release the prisoner. 17 Of the six circuit cases cited in Padilla’s footnote 8 — where the Court reserved the application of the immediate custodian rule to immigration habeas petitions — the other five were challenges to removal/ deportation orders and not to present physical confinement. See RobledoGonzales v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2003); Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314 (6th Cir. 2003); Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688 (1st Cir. 2000); Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 1994). ARMENTERO v. INS 7387 view, under Padilla’s analysis of the immediate custodian rule, that rule would not have applied. See, e.g., 124 S. Ct. at 2719 (“[T]he immediate physical custodian rule, by its terms, does not apply when a habeas petitioner challenges something other than his present physical confinement.”). Several district courts have so decided since Padilla. See, e.g., Somir v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 2d 215, 216-18 & n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that Padilla does not apply to a petition challenging a removal order, not challenging “present physical confinement”); Campbell v. Ganter, 353 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336-38 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (same). With the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, however, immigration habeas petitions challenging “something other than . . . present physical confinement” have been largely, if not entirely, eliminated. The Act creates new 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), which provides that: Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this Act, except as provided in subsection (e). Id. § 106(a)(1)(B), 119 Stat. at 310. The Conference Report on the REAL ID Act states that “section 106 would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders. Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review only over challenges to removal orders.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 109-72, at 175 (2005).18 18 Whether, and to what degree, such a foreclosure of the writ may implicate the Suspension Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), is not an issue in this case, and therefore one upon which I express no opinion. 7388 ARMENTERO v. INS As the new statute is apparently intended to eliminate the class of immigration habeas petitions concerning challenges to removal orders, I consider the present petition on its own facts. This case does concern the propriety of physical confinement.19 Yet, although this case may initially appear close enough to the “core challenges” category described by the Padilla Court that the principles governing the proper respondent should be the same, the government is not willing to embrace that position, presumably because immigration detainees are kept in a wide range of facilities, including some as to which BICE exercises little day-to-day control. See Armentero I, 340 F.3d at 1068-69. I conclude that the government’s proposed respondent, the Field Office Director, is not proper, at least in Mariel Cuban cases.