Opinion ID: 1435396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionality of rcw 9a.88.020

Text: The statute under which defendant was convicted provides: Chapter 9A.88 PUBLIC INDECENCY  PROSTITUTION  SEX CRIMES 9A.88.020 Communication with a minor for immoral purposes. Any person who communicates with a child under the age of seventeen years of age for immoral purposes shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor, unless such person has previously been convicted of a felony sexual offense or has previously been convicted under this section or RCW 9.79.130, in which case such person shall be guilty of a class C felony. [1975 1st ex.s.c. 260 § 9A.88.020.] Defendant contends this statute is unconstitutionally vague. He points particularly to the words immoral purposes and communication as insufficient to provide ascertainable standards to guide conduct. He further contends the statute is overbroad in that it may on its face prohibit speech which is protected by the First Amendment. [6] In determining the constitutional adequacy of a criminal statute subject to a vagueness attack this court will look at the whole statute in the context in which it appears in the criminal code. See State v. Carter, 89 Wn.2d 236, 570 P.2d 1218 (1977). The vagueness standard we applied in Carter, which is also applicable here, is whether persons of common intelligence and understanding have fair notice of the conduct prohibited, and ascertainable standards by which to guide their conduct. [7] The statute attacked here is the first provision in a chapter which prohibits conduct relating to exposure of the person, prostitution, and certain indecent liberties. Thus, structure of this chapter of our criminal code gives ample notice of the legislature's intent to prohibit sexual misconduct. This commonsense understanding of the intent of the statute is reinforced by the language of RCW 9A.88.020 itself, which escalates the misdemeanor to a felony where the defendant has previously been convicted of a felony sexual offense. The scope of the statutory prohibition is thus limited by its context and wording to communication for the purposes of sexual misconduct. In State v. Galbreath, supra , the court considered a vagueness challenge to the words indecent and obscene in a criminal statute protecting children. We said there: In our view, further and more detailed legislative delineation of the particular misconduct [prohibited by the statute] ... is neither dictated by any flux in social values nor otherwise constitutionally required. We are satisfied that any person of common understanding, contemplating a lewd exhibition of the private parts of his or her person before a child under the age of 15 years, need not guess nor speculate as to the proscription and penalties of the statute as it is presently written. State v. Galbreath, supra at 668-69. Here we also satisfied that any person of common understanding, contemplating asking a small child to climb into a van and engage in sexual activities need not guess as to the proscription and penalties of the statute. We therefore conclude the words immoral purposes in this statute are not unconstitutionally vague. Moreover, since the only language prohibited by the statute is language directed toward sexual misconduct with a minor it is not protected by the First Amendment, and the statute is not overbroad. As noted above, the State has a strong interest in protecting children against exposure to sexual speech which may be harmful. Ginsberg v. New York, supra . Speech directed at engaging minors in acts of sexual misconduct is therefore subject to regulation by the State, even though the words, spoken to an adult, may not be obscene. In this case, of course, the words spoken to the 4-year-old in an attempt to lure her into sexual acts with defendant were patently obscene. But even if the words spoken had not been obscene when spoken to an adult, they would nonetheless be subject to regulation under the State's compelling interest in protecting children. Defendant also contends, however, that the word communicate is vague and that its presence in the statute renders it unconstitutionally vague. This argument is not persuasive. The word communicate is one of common usage. It denotes both a course of conduct and the spoken word. State v. Rahn, 1 Wn. App. 159, 161, 459 P.2d 824 (1969). In the context of this statute, any spoken word or course of conduct with a minor for purposes of sexual misconduct is prohibited. A person of common intelligence and understanding has fair notice of the conduct prohibited by RCW 9A.88.020, and ascertainable standards by which to guide his or her conduct. The statute is neither vague nor overbroad.