Opinion ID: 2548767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Counsel at Penalty Phase

Text: ¶ 37 Kell's Amended Petition raised five claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the penalty phase. Again, Kell relies on assertions of per se deficiency and per se prejudice to satisfy the Strickland requirements. Like Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of trial, Kell's claims of ineffective assistance at the penalty phase are not the type of claims where we presume ineffective assistance and prejudice as a matter of law. ¶ 38 For three of these claims, [12] Kell does not point to any specific instances in the record to show that his counsel was ineffective. Instead, Kell makes only broad, bare allegations that counsel was ineffective. We reject these claims of ineffective assistance because Kell has not demonstrated how counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland. Additionally, even if we were to presume deficient performance, Kell fails to meet the second Strickland requirement of showing how the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different if not for counsel's allegedly deficient performance. ¶ 39 For Kell's remaining two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, [13] Kell provides specific instances of counsel's allegedly deficient performance but still fails to show how such actions fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. And again, Kell fails to establish prejudice by showing how the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different if not for counsel's allegedly deficient performance. ¶ 40 Accordingly, Kell's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of trial must fail, and we affirm the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on these claims.