Opinion ID: 794639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Street Banner and Food Distribution Ordinances

Text: 39 As a preliminary matter, we must clarify which, if any, of the original challenges to the street banner and food distribution ordinances are still live. We must review the judgment of the District Court in light of [the] law as it now stands, not as it stood when the judgment below was entered. Diffenderfer v. Cent. Baptist Church of Miami, Fla., Inc., 404 U.S. 412, 414, 92 S.Ct. 574, 30 L.Ed.2d 567 (1972) (per curiam); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir.1971) (citing Diffenderfer ); see also Naturist Soc'y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir.1992) (Where a law is amended so as to remove its challenged features, the claim for injunctive relief becomes moot as to those features.). 40 As Food Not Bombs recognizes, the February 24, 2004 amendments to the street banner ordinance render the original challenge to that ordinance—premised on the distinctions drawn by providing exceptions for some private speech but not others—no longer viable. By precluding all private parties from putting up street banners and limiting such bannering to the City itself, the Council has now closed the designated public forum in which appellants sought to exercise their rights. See Currier v. Potter, 379 F.3d 716, 728 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that the government may close a designated public forum whenever it wants), cert. denied sub nom. Seattle Hous. & Res. Effort v. Potter, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2935, 162 L.Ed.2d 866 (2005); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983) ([A] state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the [designated public forum] . . . .). As the challenge to the street banner ordinance is moot, we vacate the district court's judgment insofar as it upheld the validity of that ordinance. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 24-25, 115 S.Ct. 386, 130 L.Ed.2d 233 (1994) (noting that vacatur is appropriate where mootness results from unilateral action of the party who prevailed below); Internal Revenue Serv. v. Pattullo (In re Pattullo), 271 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir.2001) (same). 41 Similarly, as Food Not Bombs also recognizes, amendments made subsequent to the filing of this suit render moot the challenge to the food distribution ordinance concerning city sidewalks, SMMC § 5.06.020. That ordinance as it now stands allows appellants to do precisely what they sought to do—engage in non-commercial food distribution on public sidewalks. As appellants have therefore abandoned any challenge to this food distribution ordinance, we vacate the district court's judgment insofar as it upheld its validity. 42 While Food Not Bombs' First Amendment challenge to the ordinance concerning distribution of food in public parks, SMMC § 5.06.010, is not moot, a facial challenge to that ordinance is not available. Food Not Bombs does not argue that food distribution is on its face an expressive activity. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n. 5, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984) (Although it is common to place the burden upon the Government to justify impingements on First Amendment interests, it is the obligation of the person desiring to engage in assertedly expressive conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir.1996) (By its terms, the ordinance here prohibits only sitting or lying on the sidewalk. . . . [T]hese are not forms of conduct integral to, or commonly associated with, expression. We therefore reject plaintiffs' facial attack on the ordinance.). Whether food distribution can be expressive activity protected by the First Amendment under particular circumstances is a question to be decided in an as-applied challenge, should one be brought. See S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir.2004) ([A] facial challenge is proper only if the statute by its terms seeks to regulate spoken words or patently expressive or communicative conduct, such as picketing or handbilling, or if the statute significantly restricts opportunities for expression. (citations omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 367, 163 L.Ed.2d 73 (2005); Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that the inquiry into whether the possession of firearms is an expressive activity is best suited to an as-applied challenge). 43 Food Not Bombs' challenge also asserts state preemption of SMMC § 5.06.010. 12 Under California law, `[a] conflict [between a local ordinance and state law] exists [only] if the local legislation [1] duplicates, [2] contradicts, or [3] enters an area fully occupied by general law, either expressly or by legislative implication.' S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir.2003) (last four alterations in original) (quoting Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal.4th 893, 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 215, 844 P.2d 534, 536 (1993)). The food distribution ordinance does not substantively duplicate or contradict state law; it simply states, for the public's information, that state law pertaining to food distribution applies in Santa Monica's public parks and on the City Hall lawn. SMMC § 5.06.010 (providing that distributors of free food must comply with [a]pplicable State health and safety standards regulating food service and distribution). The ordinance also does not duplicate or contradict the enforcement provisions of state law, as it includes no provision regarding the enforcement of state law. In any event, the state law enforcement provision vests primary enforcement authority in local agencies. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 113725. 13 Finally, it is not at all clear that the preemption provision cited by Food Not Bombs, id. § 113705, even applies to this sort of ordinance, as it purports to preempt only local regulation of retail food facilities. Because it adds no substantive regulations and contains no enforcement provisions, the ordinance does not intrude on the field covered by the state law health and safety preemption provision.