Opinion ID: 1822704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Labor and Industry Review Commission's Decision

Text: ¶ 15. Catlin appealed the ALJ decision to LIRC. In July 2001 LIRC reviewed the case and reversed the ALJ's ruling. LIRC did not consult with the ALJ regarding the credibility of the witnesses because LIRC believed that its reversal of the examiner's decision was not based upon any differing assessment of witness credibility. It found that Crystal Lake could have made reasonable accommodations in the factory and modifications to Catlin's duties that would have allowed Catlin to return to work as the department head. LIRC found that as of the day that Catlin sought reinstatement she was physically able to perform most of the jobs in the wholesale packing department; LIRC, Fair Employment Decision, Finding 14, p. 3 (May 5, 2000), but that she could not perform some of the heaviest physical tasks. Id., Finding 15, p. 4. More specifically, LIRC found that Crystal Lake could have altered Catlin's job duties and exempted her from certain activities that she was no longer physically capable of performing, and that doing so was well within the bounds of reasonable accommodation. LIRC determined that the refusal to modify Catlin's job duties to exempt her from performing the heavier physical tasks, constituted a denial of a reasonable accommodation that Crystal Lake could have provided without hardship. Id., Finding 16, p.4. In a memorandum opinion explaining its findings, LIRC stated in part: LIRC has previously found that it is reasonable to require an employer to restructure the physical demands of the job in order to accommodate a disabled employee, provided this can be achieved without hardship to the employer. Fields v. Cardinal TG Co., ERD Case No. 1997-02574 (LIRC, Feb. 16, 2001). [6] ¶ 16. LIRC also found that, in order to perform her job duties, Catlin needed some physical modifications to the workplace. LIRC, Fair Employment Decision, Findings 17-18, pp. 4-5 (May 5, 2000). LIRC determined that Crystal Lake's refusal to make physical modifications also constituted denial of a reasonable accommodation that Crystal Lake could have provided without hardship. Id., Finding 19, p. 5. Furthermore, LIRC found that at the time Catlin sought to return to work she did not even need an accessible bathroom. [5] Thus, the cost of putting in an accessible bathroom, even if it was $47,000 as the employer claimed, was not a basis upon which Catlin could lawfully be denied reinstatement. LIRC ordered Crystal Lake to reinstate Catlin, provide make whole remedies [6] to her, and pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs.