Opinion ID: 4198308
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: simply rely on the existence of any frequency,

Text: regularity, and proximity and (2) fail to offer any individualized evidence of exposure for any given Plaintiff, they come up short. Even were this evidence substantively permissible under Pennsylvania law, it would fail to be admissible under Daubert for three reasons. First, Melius’s testimony is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact regarding causation because it is nothing more than a radiation version of the impermissible “any breath” theory in Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts (the case in which that court first adopted the frequency, regularity, and proximity test in mesothelioma cases). See Summers, 997 A.2d at 1161 n.14 (“In Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 596 Pa. 274, 943 A.2d 216 (2007), this Court recently rejected the viability of the ‘each and every exposure’ or ‘any breath’ theory.”). The 60 Gregg Court explained that, in a so-called “any breath” theory of asbestos exposure, a plaintiff alleges that “any exposure to asbestos, no matter how minimal, is a substantial contributing factor in asbestos disease.” Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts, Co., 943 A.2d 216, 226 (Pa. 2007); see also Howard v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 78 A.3d 605, 608 (Pa. 2013) (per curiam) (“Bare proof of some de minimus [sic] exposure to a defendant’s product is insufficient to establish substantial-factor causation for dose-responsive diseases.”). Melius assumes that anyone who lived in the area of the Apollo facility was exposed to a sufficient amount of radiation. In Melius’s words, he “estimated that -- that they had a, um, substantial or significant exposure.” JA3227. Yet he did not “estimate a specific or associate a specific level of exposure with a -- with those terms.” Id. When asked about “significant exposure,” Melius agreed that “any exposure to a plaintiff that was above that plaintiff’s background would be a substantial exposure.” JA3315.25 Similarly, Melius said that, 25 This is in contradiction to, for instance, his admissions that he relied on different levels of cigarette usage to determine substantiality. See JA3300, 3308; see also JA3321 (“For cigarette smoking and lung cancer, it is reduced to ten or twenty percent increased risk compared to somebody who has never smoked after a period of say twenty years, maybe even after ten or fifteen years.”). 61 “[d]epending on how you use the meaning of significant,” he “would say” one millirem above background was “substantial.” JA3315–16. Second, Melius failed to offer individualized testimony as he was required to do for each Plaintiff. For instance, in Howard v. A.W. Chesterton Co., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained, “Relative to the testimony of an expert witness addressing substantialfactor causation in a dose-responsive disease case, some reasoned, individualized assessment of a plaintiff’s or decedent’s exposure history is necessary.” 78 A.3d at 608; cf. also Black v. M&W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1237–38 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an expert’s testimony when that expert “had not based his conclusion on the results of tests or calculations specific to” the plaintiff). Although Melius describes each Plaintiff’s smoking history and a few other features for most Plaintiffs, Melius fails to offer any “reasoned . . . assessment” of any individual’s exposure to radiation from uranium effluent. See, e.g., JA4782–84 (relying on reports about radiation released from the facility that do not show exposure to any of the individual Plaintiffs). He merely offers the conclusion that each Plaintiff’s “exposures to uranium and other radioactive materials released from the Apollo nuclear facility made a significant contribution to the development of” her or his cancer. E.g., JA3448. Even if such a conclusion were permissibly individualized, it would still be insufficient 62 to generate a genuine issue of fact because, under the Lone Pine order, only exposure to uranium is at issue here. Although Rost stresses that causation is an issue for the jury, we have never hesitated to grant summary judgment where one side fails to establish a genuine issue of fact concerning causation. See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 722–23 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff’s expert testimony “was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact” regarding causation); Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc., 167 F.3d 146, 150 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[B]ecause the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the key elements of Heller’s experts’ testimony necessary to prove causation, the grant of summary judgment will be affirmed.”). Finally, the Federal Rules of Evidence impose a duty on a district judge to act as a gatekeeper of expert testimony even when considering elements of a cause of action derived from state law. See Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 344, 358 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “evidentiary issues in this case are governed by federal . . . law” while Pennsylvania substantive law affected what facts would be relevant); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 609 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Although the standards for finding causation are governed by Florida law, we apply federal law to determine whether the expert testimony proffered 63 to prove causation is sufficiently reliable to submit it to the jury.”); cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“[A] gatekeeping role for the judge . . . is the balance that is struck by Rules of Evidence . . . .”). Thus, even assuming arguendo that Rost resuscitated “any breath” causation, Melius’s testimony would be too insubstantial to survive Daubert. Melius’s testimony provides only a perfunctory narrative for each Plaintiff, and an unexplained conclusion that radiation was the cause, presumably because each Plaintiff was exposed to some radiation. Such conclusory opinions of medical causation, even by qualified experts, are insufficient to establish causation of cancer by exposure to uranium effluent. See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665, 671 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Whatever Dr. Carlini understood by ‘with a reasonable degree of medical certainty,’ the phrase—the conclusion by itself—does not make a causation opinion admissible. The ‘ipse dixit of the expert’ alone is not sufficient to permit the admission of an opinion.” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997))). Although we have held that an expert can offer an opinion “absent hard evidence of the level of exposure to the chemical in question,” we have only done so where an expert could rely “on the temporal relationship and the nature of the plaintiff’s complaints.” Heller, 167 F.3d at 157. This, too, does not require a dose. But it requires 64 more than an assumption about the effect of living within a mile of the Apollo facility.