Opinion ID: 792262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gilles' Claims

Text: 14 With respect to Gilles' malicious prosecution, false arrest, and First Amendment claims, the District Court held that Sergeant Davis was entitled to qualified immunity. [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). In determining qualified immunity, we first ask whether the facts alleged, viewed in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir.2002). If so, we then ask whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001)). 15 Whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that probable cause justified the arrest requires an examination of the crime at issue, disorderly conduct. Gilles was charged with disorderly conduct under Pennsylvania Criminal Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a). The statute provides: 16 (a) Offense defined. — A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 17
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20 (4) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor. 21 Under the statute, whether words or acts rise to the level of disorderly conduct hinges upon whether they cause or unjustifiably risk a public disturbance. Commonwealth v. Hock, 556 Pa. 409, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (1999). When the regulated conduct consists of speech, however, the statute must be carefully drawn or authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir.2003) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972)); Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 414 A.2d 54, 58 (1980) (disorderly conduct statute may not be used to punish anyone exercising a protected First Amendment right). Speech that does not receive First Amendment protection, in turn, include[s] the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or `fighting' words[.] Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). 22 Under the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, the issue is whether Davis' conduct violated Gilles' First Amendment rights. 4 The District Court held Gilles' speech constituted fighting words, those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Mem. Op. at -15 (W.D.Pa. Apr. 22, 2004) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72, 62 S.Ct. 766); 5 see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (To be punishable, words must do more than bother the listener; they must be nothing less than an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73, 62 S.Ct. 766). Put another way, fighting words are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574, 62 S.Ct. 766). 23 We believe that much of Gilles' speech was protected under the First Amendment. Crucial to this determination is that we view the facts in the light most favorable to Gilles (the non-moving party) under the summary judgment standard and the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 24 Of Gilles' questionable speech, some was derogatory language generically directed to the crowd ( e.g., by definition, there are thousands of fornicators on this campus, drunkards are everywhere on this campus). This type of language, when not personally directed at a particular member of the audience, is not likely to incite an immediate breach of the peace. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) (noting that fighting words are personally abusive epithets ... directed to the person of the hearer) (internal quotations omitted). Gilles also specifically directed insults to certain people (cigarette breath, devil, communist, etc. ). But on summary judgment, at least, we believe this speech in this context could be reasonably viewed as unpleasant but petty, and not sufficiently provocative to constitute fighting words. It bears noting that the videotape reveals that Gilles' speech and manner were in part and to some degree lacking in bite. For example, Gilles stated that every Mormon is damned to hell, but added a comical overtone by finishing the sentence, including, Donnie and Maria Osmond. His manner varied between hostile and jaunty, and sometimes exuded an air of theatrical exaggeration ( e.g., Gilles emphasized a point by fully extending his arms in front of him towards the sky, projecting his voice as one might do in a play). 25 Nonetheless, Gilles' epithets directed at the woman who identified herself as a Christian and a lesbian (Christian lesbo, lesbian for Jesus, do you lay down with dogs, are you a bestiality lover) were especially abusive and constituted fighting words. Where part of speech constitutes fighting words, the police may arrest for disorderly conduct even though other parts of the speech may be less provocative. See, e.g., Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 416 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir.2005) (conduct which is in fact disorderly is not insulated because it is perpetrated while engaged in a protest demonstration) (internal quotations omitted). 26 Even if the lesbian/bestiality invectives did not constitute fighting words, we believe Sergeant Davis is entitled to qualified immunity. Under the second step of the analysis, a police officer is entitled to qualified immunity unless it would have been clear to a reasonable officer there was no probable cause to arrest. See Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 437 (3d Cir.2000) (If there are cases that would make it apparent to a reasonable officer in [the arresting officer's] position that probable cause was lacking, qualified immunity is not available.) (internal quotations omitted); see also Kijonka v. Seitzinger, 363 F.3d 645, 648 (7th Cir.2004) (whether there was any reasonable basis to suppose there was probable cause ... is the test for qualified immunity). 27 Gilles' speech was rude, mocking, confrontational, and insulting. 6 When viewed on the videotape, the crowd responses span the spectrum from pettiness to genuine hostility. Many in the crowd were upset and angry with Gilles at the time Officer Davis intervened. 28 The words Gilles directed at the woman who identified herself as a Christian and a lesbian were abusive, akin to a racial slur. For a police officer confronting Gilles in the field, with little time to parse Gilles' speech, it was not unreasonable to believe Gilles engaged in disorderly conduct. 29 At the least, reasonable minds could disagree whether Gilles' speech was protected. Subsequent to his arrest, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed all charges against Gilles, including the charge of disorderly conduct. Yet, Gilles has been convicted before for similar conduct. In a factually similar incident, the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld a disorderly conduct conviction for preaching to a crowd at a festival. See Gilles v. Indiana, 531 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ind.App. 4 Dist.1988). Holding it was readily apparent that Gilles used fighting words, the court focused on his use of the words whores, queers, AIDS people, drunkards, and scum of the earth. The court reasoned that Gilles placed his listeners in categories defined by sexual activity, sexual orientation, and sexually transmitted disease. This language was inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction. Id. at 223. In any event, that there is more than one judicial view of Gilles' conduct strongly suggests that qualified immunity is appropriate here. 30 Finally, whether it was reasonable to believe there was probable cause is in part based on the limited information that the arresting officer has at the time. See BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir.1986) (probable cause is a function of information and exigency); Colbert v. Angstadt, 169 F.Supp.2d 352, 360-61 (E.D.Pa.2001) (holding probable cause to arrest existed where the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge were sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that an offense had been committed). Sergeant Davis appears to have arrived at the scene fifteen to twenty minutes after Gilles began to speak. According to Davis, he was summoned to a near riot situation. He briefly spoke with members of the crowd about what had transpired. According to Davis, members of the crowd reported to him that Gilles was ... picking people out of the crowd individually and calling them names and questioning their sexual identity, questioning their sexual orientation. We see no reason why Davis' reliance on their accounts was unreasonable. 31 Taking account of the entire episode and the information Davis possessed at the time, we hold Davis is entitled to qualified immunity because it would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that Gilles did not engage in disorderly conduct. 7 While the Court of Common Pleas held Gilles' speech was insufficient to constitute disorderly conduct, it does not necessarily follow that the arresting officers are civilly liable for the arrest. Qualified immunity encompasses mistaken judgments that are not plainly incompetent. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991). Under qualified immunity, police officers are entitled to a certain amount of deference for decisions they make in the field. They must make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204-05, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). The reasonableness of the officer's belief should be judged from that on-scene perspective, not with the perfect vision of hindsight. Id.; see also Graves v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 848 n. 25 (9th Cir.2003) (The qualified immunity defense recognizes that officers make probable cause assessments in the field under pressure and therefore affords the officer leeway, permitting a reasonable mistake without resulting individual liability of the officer, when the law is not clearly established.)
32 The District Court granted summary judgment to defendants on Gilles' excessive force claim that his handcuffs were too tight. In these cases, summary judgment for an officer who claims qualified immunity is appropriate where, after resolving all factual disputes in favor of the plaintiff, [ ] the officer's use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 777 (3d Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). In Kopec, we reversed the grant of summary judgment, but cautioned that the opinion should not be overread as we do not intend to open the floodgates to a torrent of handcuff claims. Id. The plaintiff in Kopec contended he was in extreme pain, which would have been obvious to the arresting officer. In addition to repeated complaints about the pain, the plaintiff allegedly fell to the ground and began to faint. Id. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged permanent nerve damage in one wrist, for which a surgeon treated him for over one year. Id. at 774. 33 Gilles contends that two matters should have alerted Davis to his alleged pain. First, he notes that he loudly sang religious songs while in custody, in part, he says, to take his mind off of the pain. Even if true, it is not necessarily objectively reasonable to deduce from Gilles' singing that the handcuffs were causing him pain. Furthermore, Gilles testified that the purpose of his singing was primarily to rejoice in the fact that I was being persecuted for righteousness' sake for preaching the Gospel. Second, Gilles contends he complained of pain to unidentified officers who allegedly passed the information to Davis, who allegedly instructed them not to adjust the handcuffs. Unlike Kopec, where the plaintiff fell to the ground and fainted with pain, obvious visible indicators of Gilles' pain were absent (other than his alleged complaint that the handcuffs were too tight). As the District Court noted on viewing the videotape of the arrest, Gilles demonstrated no expression or signs of discomfort at the time he was handcuffed. Nor did Gilles seek or receive medical treatment after the fact. The only doctor Gilles ever saw relating to this incident was on April 13, 2004, two and a half years after the arrest. At that time, Gilles did not seek medical treatment, but rather an independent medical evaluation. The plaintiff in Kopec alleged permanent nerve damage for which a hand-surgeon had treated him for over a year. In this case, we hold the facts alleged constitute insufficient evidence as a matter of law for excessive force by handcuffing.
34 Gilles and Petit contend the Indiana University of Pennsylvania permit or registration policy and its application by Appolonia and Luckey violated their First Amendment rights. The District Court held Gilles and Petit had no standing to bring the challenge because they had not applied for a permit. 35 The traditional rules of standing require that the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, which is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The District Court held plaintiffs failed to show they personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of Indiana University of Pennsylvania's permit policy or the application of that policy. As the District Court found, Gilles and Petit never applied for nor were they denied a permit. Gilles and Petit appear to argue that Bradley Hoffman's after the fact application confers standing on them. The argument is meritless. 36 Under a First Amendment exception to the traditional standing rules, litigants are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). This exception is inapplicable to Gilles and Petit. The policy they challenge does not unduly restrict First Amendment freedoms, nor does it deter third parties from engaging in protected expression. By its terms, it merely allows the university to regulate the time, manner, and location of any and all solicitation activities on campus so as to ensure such activities do not create undue noise or disruption or interfere with the activities that normally occur in the area in question. Accordingly, we hold Gilles and Petit lack standing to challenge the permit policy.