Opinion ID: 2610902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Trial Court Consideration of Victim Impact and Character Evidence

Text: After the jury rendered its verdict, and after the trial court denied defendant's automatic motion to modify the death verdict (ง 190.4, subd. (e)), but before formal sentencing, various relatives of the victims testified regarding personal characteristics of the victims, and expressed their wish that the death sentence be imposed. For example, victim Ariza's mother testified that her son had been a promising and decent young man, and a college student working to help pay his way through college. She testified that his death caused her family untold grief, pain and suffering, and she urged that the death penalty be imposed. Ariza's father likewise attested to his suffering over his son's death, which led to his alcoholism, drunk-driving conviction, loss of family and job. Similar, though less dramatic, testimony was elicited from the relatives of victims Rea, Metal, and Martin. Before sentencing defendant, the trial court indicated it had certainly considered the foregoing testimony. As we have previously noted herein in connection with a similar argument involving the jury's consideration of evidence regarding the victims' nonaggressive characters, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court deem most victim impact and victim character evidence irrelevant to the sentencing decision and potentially prejudicial to the defendant's plea for a lesser punishment. (See South Carolina v. Gathers, supra, 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876] [prosecutor's argument regarding victim's good character]; Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496 [victim impact statements].) Neither case involves the admissibility of victim impact or character evidence at a sentencing hearing by the trial court following the jury's verdict. (See People v. Siripongs (1988) 45 Cal.3d 548, 585-586, fn. 12 [247 Cal. Rptr. 729, 754 P.2d 1306].) Thus, we have stated that the Eighth Amendment considerations expressed in Booth/Gathers are not implicated in a modification hearing under section 190.4. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 994-995; see People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1043-1044.) Nonetheless, as we explained in Jennings, that section does limit the court's consideration to the evidence that was available to the jury. (46 Cal.3d at p. 994.) (27) As previously noted, the trial court announced its denial of the modification motion before hearing the family member testimony discussed above. After announcing its ruling, but before formally sentencing defendant, the court then permitted the family members to speak. Although the court indicated it had considered the family member testimony, it then outlined the considerable aggravating factors and evidence that it deemed supportive of a death sentence. The family victim testimony was not mentioned. A similar situation occurred in Siripongs, supra, where we observed that the victim impact evidence could not have affected the trial court's ruling because the court had denied the motion before hearing the challenged testimony. (See People v. Siripongs, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 585-586, fn. 12; see also People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1044 [trial court's consideration of victim impact evidence did not affect ruling denying modification]; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 274 [same]; People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 995 [same].) As we observed in Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, although the trial court did state it had read and considered a presentence report containing the victim impact evidence, the court in ruling on the motion referred only to the evidence presented to the jury and did not indicate his decision was influenced by that report or its contents. The situation presented here and in Lang is quite different from that in People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892], where the trial court in denying the automatic motion for modification of sentence expressly stated it was relying on facts found in an inadmissible probation report. In Lewis, the opinion orders a limited remand for another modification hearing. We conclude that under the circumstances in the present case, no such remand is required.