Opinion ID: 2632549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Record Supported the Finding of Necessity for the Wiretaps Within the Meaning of Section 629.52(d)

Text: Defendants attack Judge Fidler's finding of necessity on a number of grounds. None has merit.
Defendants complain first that the affidavit included boilerplate discussion of the limitations of traditional investigative techniques and failed to identify any ways in which the investigation into this drug trafficking conspiracy differed from drug trafficking conspiracies generally. Although it is true that `[generalities, or statements in the conclusory language of the statute, are insufficient to support a wiretap application' ( U.S. v. Cline (10th Cir.2003) 349 F.3d 1276, 1280-1281), the affidavit here did not simply reiterate conclusory language. It instead analyzed with particularity the limitations of each alternative investigative technique in achieving the goals of this investigation. That many of those limitations are common to most drug conspiracy investigations does not necessarily preclude a finding of necessity. ( U.S. v. Thompson (8th Cir.2000) 210 F.3d 855, 859.) In cases of this nature, the same reasons for futility of certain investigative techniques will frequently recur. But the fact that drug investigations suffer from common investigatory problems does not make these problems less vexing. ( U.S. v. Milton (8th Cir.1998) 153 F.3d 891, 895.) There is thus no requirement that the government establish that an individual narcotics investigation differs in some particular way from an ordinary narcotics investigation. Necessity is a function of the specifics of the case, not its uniqueness. If a seemingly `ordinary' drug investigation requires a Title III wiretap, and the government establishes that necessity with the particulars of a given investigation, no more is needed. The ordinariness of the investigation does not preclude a finding of necessity for the use of wiretaps to further the investigation. ( U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at pp. 5-6.) Defendants' reliance on United States v. Kalustian (9th Cir.1975) 529 F.2d 585, which contained some contrary language in suppressing electronic surveillance evidence in a gambling investigation, is misplaced. There, no mention was made of the defendants or the particular circumstances to be investigated. ( United States v. Tufaro (S.D.N.Y.1983) 593 F.Supp. 476, 489.) Hence, Kalustian teaches no more than that an affidavit composed solely of conclusions unsupported by particular facts gives no basis for a determination of compliance with the necessity requirement. ( United States v. Spagnuolo (9th Cir.1977) 549 F.2d 705, 710; see also United States v. Williams (D.C.Cir.1978) 580 F.2d 578, 588 [distinguishing Kalustian as involving generalized and conclusory statements that other investigative procedures would prove unsuccessful].) By contrast, the affidavit here described with particularity the problems with conventional investigative techniques, including those posed by the fact that the identity of the user and the location of Target Telephone # 1 were unknown. Defendants' reliance on U.S. v. Blackmon (9th Cir.2001) 273 F.3d 1204, in which a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit suppressed the fruits of a wiretap in a narcotics investigation, is likewise unconvincing. In that case, the panel majority found that the affidavit contained material misstatements, including untrue claims that surveillance of Blackmon had been attempted and had failed and that cooperating informants possessed only limited knowledge concerning the scope of the criminal enterprise, and omitted any discussion of the potentially successful use of informants, including one who had special access to Blackmon. ( Id. at p. 1209.) Because of these defects, the court elected to review the affidavit, purged of its misstatements, de novo, without deferring to the judicial finding of necessity below. ( Id. at p. 1211 (dis. opn. of Wardlaw, J.); see U.S. v. Yeje-Cabrera (1st Cir.2005) 430 F.3d 1, 8 [distinguishing Blackmon ].) Here, however, we have found (and defendants have conceded) that the judicial finding of necessity below should be reviewed deferentially and that the affidavits contain no material misstatements or omissions. Inasmuch as the Ninth Circuit has subsequently explained that its holding in Blackmon was premised on a finding that the affidavits supporting the wiretap applications were plagued by material misstatements and omissions ( U.S. v. Fernandez (9th Cir.2004) 388 F.3d 1199, 1237), we do not find Blackmon persuasive here. ( U.S. v. Canales Gomez (9th Cir.2004) 358 F.3d 1221, 1225 [distinguishing Blackmon on the ground that [n]o such misstatements are alleged in this case]; accord, U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at p. 6.)
Defendants argue next that section 629.52(d) does not set forth a lower standard of necessity for conspiracy cases. We agree that a mere allegation that a person is a member of a conspiracy ... is not a sufficient reason to obtain a wiretap ( U.S. v. Carneiro (9th Cir.1988) 861 F.2d 1171, 1181), but the People make no such argument here. They argue instead, correctly, that the fact of a conspiracy is a circumstance to be considered, along with all the other facts and circumstances, in determining whether conventional investigative techniques have failed, are unlikely to succeed if tried, or are too dangerous to try. For example, persons involved in a conspiracy almost invariably will discuss their plans, methods, and goals with other members of the conspiracy. A solitary criminal, on the other hand, is unlikely to discuss the crime with others. Concerted action, moreover, increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality. ( Callanan v. United States (1961) 364 U.S. 587, 593, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312; accord, People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 555-556, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75.) And, [u]nlike individual criminal action, which comes to an end upon the capture of the criminal, collective criminal action has a life of its own. Like the Hydra of Greek mythology, the conspiracy may survive the destruction of its parts unless the conspiracy is completely destroyed. For even if some or many of the conspirators are imprisoned, others may remain at large, free to recruit others eager to break the law and to pursue the conspiracy's illegal ends. ( U.S. v. McGuire, supra, 307 F.3d at pp. 1197-1198.) Thus, in many cases, the existence of a conspiracy will suggest not only that there will be communications in order to plan the crime, but that such planning will occur almost exclusively during such communications. Furthermore, the existence of the conspiracy may not only increase the likelihood any given crime will succeed, but also the likelihood the criminal enterprise will survive the arrest of less than all of its participantswhich is precisely what occurred when the government made its first round of arrests of members of the Arellano-Felix drug trafficking organization. In sum, the existence of a conspiracy, while not determinative, is an important factor in analyzing the necessity for a wiretap. (Cf. Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 140, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 [when the investigation is focusing on what is thought to be a widespread conspiracy more extensive surveillance may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the enterprise].) In this case, no one disputes that telephones were the primary means of communication among the conspirators. It would have been difficult if not impossible by means other than wiretap to determine the scope of the conspiracy or to develop enough evidence to successfully prosecute the conspirators. ( U.S. v. Carrillo (D.Colo.2000) 123 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1245; accord, U.S. v. Khan (9th Cir.1993) 993 F.2d 1368,1370, 1375.)
Defendants then argue that the government failed to exhaust several investigative techniques. As they concede, however, the adequacy of the showing concerning other investigative techniques is `to be tested in a practical and commonsense fashion,' [citation] that does not `hamper unduly the investigative powers of law enforcement agents' ( U.S. v. Smith, supra, 31 F.3d at p. 1297) and that 'does not mandate the indiscriminate pursuit to the bitter end of every non-electronic device' ( U.S. v. Bennett (9th Cir.2000) 219 F.3d 1117, 1122). The government `need only lay a factual predicate sufficient to inform the judge why other methods of investigation are not sufficient.' ( U.S. v. Williams (3d Cir.1997) 124 F.3d 411, 418.) We cannot say that Judge Fidler acted unreasonably in finding that normal investigative techniques had failed or were unlikely to succeed if tried in this case.
Defendants, pointing to a sealed portion of the affidavit that indicated the existence of a confidential informant, fault the affidavit for failing to explain why the investigation could not proceed through that informant. Yet defendants fail to explain how the informant could even have identified the user of Target Telephone # 1, whose identity and location were unknown, without raising suspicion. As the affidavit explained, members of the organization could be alarmed by an informant simply approaching one of them and could become concerned that the organization was under investigations. More generally, the affidavit recited that large-scale narcotics organization are compartmentalized in order to protect the organization and that confidential informants therefore would not be successful in identifying the full nature and scope of the organization. ( U.S. v. Canales Gomez, supra, 358 F.3d at p. 1226.) Under these circumstances, the government could reasonably have concluded that attempting to connect the informant to this part of the organization would have aroused the suspicions of other participants, thus endangering both its informant and the investigation, without providing sufficient information to achieve its goals. ( U.S. v. Carter (D.C.Cir.2006) 449 F.3d 1287, 1294; U.S. v. Guerra-Marez (5th Cir.1991) 928 F.2d 665, 671.)
Defendants complain that the affidavit merely identified the limitations of pen registers and similar techniques and therefore could not establish necessity for a wiretap. We disagree. [Although the affidavit's assertions of inadequacy `might appear boilerplate, the fact that drug investigations suffer from common investigatory problems does not make these problems less vexing.' ( U.S. v. Thompson, supra, 210 F.3d at p. 859.) Moreover, the affidavit stated that the task force had already compared toll records for Target Telephone # 1 with the discarded target telephone, which had provided the basis for their suspicion that the users were the same or close associates, and announced that the task force intended to initiate a pen register on Target Telephone # 1. Because these alternate techniques had not (and could not) identify the persons making or receiving the communications, the contents of the conversations, or whether the communications were in furtherance of the drug operation, they could not significantly advance or achieve the objectives of the: investigation. ( U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1241; see also U.S. v. Decoud (9th Cir.2006) 456 F.3d 996,1007.)
Defendants once again fault the affidavit for relying on limitations that would apply to `most if not all narcotics investigations.' What defendants overlook, however, is that the affidavit also explained why those generic limitations applied to this investigation. In particular, defendants do not challenge Special Agent Diederich's statement that [a]t this time, I know of no locations at which to [execute] search warrants, given that the stash locations, the timing of deliveries, the identity of the user of Target Telephone # 1, or the user's location were all unknown. Defendants also challenge the affidavit's failure to discuss the possibility of searching their residence, which was known to the task forceyet offer nothing to suggest that probable cause existed to search their residence. (See U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1237.) More importantly, defendants fail to grapple with the affidavit's concern that a search conducted prematurely could compromise the larger investigation while providing minimal results. ( U.S. v. Carter, supra, 449 F.3d at p. 1294; U.S. v. Smith, supra, 31 F.3d at p. 1299.)
Defendants characterize the affidavit's analysis of physical surveillance as stating that it is just too bothersome to follow a suspect around while he does `trivial errands'  and assert that [b]lanket surveillance may be inconvenient and costly, but it can be done and does work. Yet, as the affidavit discloses, limited surveillance had already been conducted at defendants' residence without success, and the task force knew of no other locations at which to conduct surveillance, especially since the identity and whereabouts of the user of Target Telephone # 1 were unknown. Moreover, the affidavit's reference to trivial errands was merely to illustrate that without the wiretap, the task force would have to place the known targets under blanket surveillance, which would make it highly likely the surveillance would be detected and the investigation compromised. (See U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at p. 5; see generally U.S. v. Ashley (1st Cir.1989) 876 F.2d 1069,1075.)
Defendants' contention that the affidavit failed to provide a specific, particularized reason for rejecting this technique is belied by the affidavit itself, which reiterates that the address of the user of Target Telephone # 1 was unknown, that narcotics traffickers go to great lengths to destroy incriminating evidence (including carrying their trash away to a different site), and that trash removal by law enforcement poses the risk of detection. Although defendants suggest that the task force could have conducted a trash search of their residence, they have not shown that there was a basis for believing significant evidence would be uncovered though such a search. Defendants thus offer no basis for second-guessing the relative risks and benefits of trash searches in this case. ( U.S. v. Canales Gomez, supra, 358 F.3d at p. 1224.)
Defendants claim that the affidavit's discussion of these techniques completely ignore[s] the possibility of a confession being obtained, perhaps based upon a promise of leniency as well as the potential of detaining a material witness in custody, which might solve the problem of tipping off others with specific information. In truth, the affidavit considered the possibility that a high-level member of the organization might provide information in exchange for leniency but considered it unlikely because of fear of retribution against himself or his family. Special Agent Diederich considered it more likely that the conspirator who received such an offer would inform other members of the organization and thus jeopardize the investigation. Neither a promise of leniency nor the detention of a material witness in custody would alleviate these concerns. Moreover, granting immunity to an organization member who was at a sufficiently high level to provide significant information would insulate highly culpable members of the conspiracy from prosecution. ( U.S. v. Martinez, supra, 452 F.3d at p. 5.) The government's desire not to alert any of the targets of the investigation is reasonable. ( U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1236.)
Finally, defendants claim the affidavit was deficient in failing to consider two additional investigative techniques: aerial surveillance and witness relocation. Before analyzing these techniques, we note at the outset that courts are reluctant to impose their hindsight upon law enforcement agencies, and the proponent of the application need not establish that `every other imaginable mode of investigation would be unsuccessful.' ( U.S. v. Guerra-Marez, supra, 928 F.2d at p. 670.) In particular, [a]fter-the-fact suggestions by defense attorneys as to how an investigation might have been handled are entitled to little weight in the analysis.... The fact that the government could have taken some different or additional steps in its investigation does not demonstrate that the wiretap orders were issued in error, because `[t]he government need not exhaust or explain its failure to exhaust every conceivable investigative procedure before resorting to wiretapping.' ( U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1245.) Indeed, Congress acknowledged that [m]erely because a normal investigative technique is theoretically possible, it does not follow that it is likely. (Sen.Rep. No. 1097, supra, 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. 2190.) Neither of the techniques above was likely to have succeeded in fulfilling the goals of the investigation. Aerial surveillance falls within the affidavit's category of Physical Surveillance and suffers from the same limitations and the same risks as surveillance on foot or by automobile. Indeed, as recounted in the application for wiretap No. 00-04, the task force did engage in aerial surveillance on January 26, 2000. However, the helicopter lost the visual of the open trunk because it had to orbit, and a member of the organization subsequently became aware of the surveillance and employed countersurveillance techniques. Knowledge of the physical surveillance, of course, only increased the necessity for the wiretap. ( U.S. v. Decoud, supra, 456 F.3d at p. 1007; U.S. v. Ashley, supra, 876 F.2d at p. 1075.) As to placing cooperating high-level members of the organization into a witness relocation program, defendants have made no showing that any such person had wanted not only to withdraw from the conspiracy but also to relocate with his or her loved ones under a new identity. ( U.S. v. Carrillo, supra, 123 F.Supp.2d at p. 1236 [The investigators had no basis to believe any of the participants would be willing to cooperate].) Accordingly, approaching a member of the organization with an offer to enter a relocation program posed the same risk of compromising the investigation as did approaching a member of the organization with an offer of immunity. (See U.S. v. Gruttadauria (E.D.N.Y.2006) 439 F.Supp.2d 240, 248.) In neither circumstance can the affidavit be faulted for failing to identify these particular investigative techniques by name instead of by category, nor have defendants offered any reason for second-guessing law enforcement's assessment of the relative risks and benefits of either technique. As demonstrated above, the wiretap was not sought as the first step in this investigation, nor did the government bypass viable alternative techniques in a rush to use this extraordinary method of investigation. Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of eavesdropping devices ( Berger v. New York (1967) 388 U.S. 41, 63, 87 S.Ct, 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040) but, as our Legislature has recognized, that liberty must yield to the real needs of law enforcement in appropriate circumstances. (See § 630.) None of defendants' proposed alternatives, taken singly or in combination, offered a realistic prospect of exposing the extent and structure of the conspiracy without the assistance of wiretaps. ( U.S. v. Plescia (7th Cir.1995) 48 F.3d 1452, 1463.) In short, defendants have not shown that Judge Fidler acted unreasonably in concluding that the affidavit supporting the application for wiretap No. 00-02 established necessity for the wiretap.