Opinion ID: 2625336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction To Address The Merits Of The Prosecution's Appeal.

Text: As a threshold matter, Bohannon asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the prosecution's appeal. Relying on Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 32(c)(2) (1999), [9] Bohannon contends that the prosecution failed to file its notice of appeal within thirty days from the clerk's notation in the traffic calender of the district court's oral orders (1) granting Bohannon's motion to suppress and (2) granting Bohannon's oral motion to dismiss. Bohannon argues that the May 26, 2000 notation constituted the order from which the prosecution should have appealed, pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), and, therefore, that the prosecution's notice of appeal, filed on February 15, 2001, was untimely and mandates that this court dismiss the present appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Bohannon further asserts that, because the prosecution's notice of appeal did not expressly refer to the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal is expressly limited to the order granting the motion to suppress. Bohannon maintains, assuming arguendo that the prosecution impliedly incorporated the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration into its notice of appeal, the notice of appeal was nevertheless untimely pursuant to HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), which was in effect at the time the clerk noted the disposition of the foregoing motion in the traffic calendar. The prosecution responds that the district court's oral statement granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, noted in the traffic calendar by the clerk on May 26, 2000, did not constitute an appealable order, pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b)(1). Rather, the prosecution maintains that the written order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, filed-stamped by the district court clerk on January 25, 2001 and signed by Judge Devens on January 31, 2001, constituted the entry of the orders within the meaning of HRAP Rule 4(b)(1) and for purposes of appeal and, thus, that the prosecution's notice of appeal, filed on February 15, 2001, was timely. Moreover, the prosecution argues that, inasmuch as there was no judgment of conviction in the present matter, HRPP Rule 32(c)(2) is inapplicable to the present appeal altogether. Finally, with respect to Bohannon's contention that the district court's order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration was outside the scope of its notice of appeal, the prosecution asserts (1) that the very subject matter of the motion to reconsider was the propriety of the court's ... order granting the motion to suppress and (2) that the prosecution's right to appeal from the order granting [Bohannon's] motion to suppress under HRS [§] 641-13(7) ... encompasses a right to appeal from the ... order denying [its] motion to reconsider [the district court's] order granting the motion to suppress. We agree with the prosecution. A court always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a particular case. State v. Brandimart, 68 Haw. 495, 496, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1986); State v. Graybeard, 93 Hawai`i 513, 516, 6 P.3d 385, 388 (App.2000) (An appellate court has ... an independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction over each case and to dismiss the appeal sua sponte if a jurisdictional defect exists.). Moreover, compliance with the requirement of the timely filing of a notice of appeal[, as set forth in HRAP Rule 4(b)(1),] is jurisdictional. Id. at 497, 720 P.2d at 1010; Graybeard, 93 Hawai`i at 516, 6 P.3d at 388 (An appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect which cannot be waived by the parties or disregarded by the court in the exercise of its discretion.). For purposes of the present matter, we address the following two questions: (1) whether HRPP Rule 32(c)(2), see supra note 9, HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), see supra note 9, or HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), see supra note 1, triggered the time period within which the prosecution was required to file its notice of appeal and (2) whether the time for the prosecution's filing of its notice of appeal began to run on (a) May 26, 2000, being the date on which the district court clerk noted on the traffic calendar the district court's oral statement granting Bohannon's motions, (b) July 17, 2000, being the date on which the district court clerk noted on the traffic calendar the district court's oral statement denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, (c) January 22, 2001, being the date on which the district court signed its written order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, or (d) January 31, 2001, being the date on which the district court signed its written order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss.
We note at the outset that HRPP Rule 32(c)(2), see supra note 9, by its plain language, is inapplicable to the present matter. The rule expressly provides in relevant part that [t]he notation of the judgment by the clerk on the calendar constitutes the entry of the judgment. (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as Bohannon's case never proceeded to a judgment of conviction, the district court having granted Bohannon's motion to suppress and thereafter having granted her oral motion to dismiss the case against her, there was simply no judgment of conviction from which the prosecution could have filed a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the May 26, 2000 notation of the district court's oral statement granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss by the clerk on the traffic calendar is irrelevant to the disposition of the present matter. The applicability of HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), however, requires a preliminary determination as to whether the prosecution's notice of appeal subsumed the district court's oral order denying its motion for reconsideration, noted by the clerk in the traffic calendar on July 17, 2000. A notice of appeal must be both sufficient in form and timely. See City and County of Honolulu v. Midkiff, 57 Haw. 273, 275-76, 554 P.2d 233, 235 (1976). With respect to the first mandate, this court has consistently recognized that the requirement that the notice of appeal designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from is not jurisdictional. Id. at 275, 554 P.2d at 235 (citations omitted). Further to the foregoing, a mistake in designating the judgment, or in designating the part appealed from if only a part is designated, should not result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake. Id. at 275-76, 554 P.2d at 235 (quoting 9 Moore's Federal Practice 203.18 (1975)) (emphases added). In the present matter, the prosecution's notice of appeal did not expressly refer to the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration, instead stating only that the State intends to contest the propriety of the Order Granting Motion to Suppress Items of Evidence .... We believe, however, that the prosecution's intent to appeal from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration can be reasonably inferred from its notice of appeal, inasmuch as the district court's order denying the motion for reconsideration was merely an extension of its order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss. Bohannon has asserted no persuasive argument that the failure expressly to include the district court's order denying the motion for reconsideration in the prosecution's notice of appeal was misleading ... to [her] detriment. Midkiff, 57 Haw. at 276, 554 P.2d at 235. That being the case, we hold that the prosecution's notice of appeal is sufficient in form, id., for purposes of an appeal from the district court's written order denying its motion for reconsideration, signed by the district court on January 22, 2001. With respect to the timeliness of the prosecution's notice of appeal, we must first resolve the apparent conflict between HRPP Rule 44(b)(1) and HRAP Rule 4(b). HRAP Rule (4)(b), which governs the time for filing appeals in criminal cases, provides in relevant part that [a] judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this subsection when it is filed with the clerk of the court. See supra note 1. Moreover, HRAP Rule 4(b)which, by its plain language, makes no distinction between proceedings in the district or circuit courtsrequires that a final and appealable judgment or order in criminal cases be in written form. See State v. Ho, 7 Haw.App. 516, 518-19, 782 P.2d 29, 31 (1989) (construing HRAP Rule 4(b) (1985)), overruled on other grounds in State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 30, 881 P.2d 504, 516 (1994). The State is authorized to appeal from a pre-trial order granting a motion to suppress evidence by HRS § 641-13(7) (Supp. 1988). In State v. Johnson, 50 Haw. 525, 445 P.2d 36 (1968), the supreme court held that Revised Laws of Hawai`i (RLH) 1955 § 212-2, which is now § 641-13, must be strictly construed.... We hold that the same rule of strict construction applies to the Rule 4(b) HRAP requirement that the State must file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. The State can only appeal from a written order or judgment filed with the clerk. Absent a written order of suppression, the State's notice of appeal in this case did not give rise to appellate jurisdiction. [Citation omitted.] Id. (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis added). By contrast, HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), which, as mentioned supra in note 9, was in effect at the time the district court announced its oral order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, provides in relevant part that [t]he notation of the decision or ruling on the calendar shall constitute the order and the entry thereof. HRPP Rule 44(b)(1) prescribes the procedure by which an order becomes final in the district courts; the order, however, does not become appealable until a separate written order has been filed with the clerk of the court in accordance with HRAP Rule 4(b)(3). [10] Accordingly, we hold that, in order to appeal a criminal matter in the district court, the appealing party must appeal from a written judgment or order that has been filed with the clerk of the court pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b)(3).
It is well settled that the right of appeal in a criminal case is purely statutory and exists only when given by some constitutional or statutory provision. State v. Oshiro, 69 Haw. 438, 441, 746 P.2d 568, 570 (1987). HRS § 641-13 (1993) enumerates the instances in which the prosecution may appeal a criminal case from the district and circuit courts, including, inter alia, appeals from an order ... sustaining a motion to dismiss, see HRS § 641-13(1), appeals from an order ... dismissing the case where the defendant has not been put in jeopardy, see HRS § 641-13(2), and appeals from a pretrial order granting a motion for the suppression of evidence, see HRS § 641-13(7). Inasmuch as the district court granted Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, the prosecution had the statutory right to appeal the district court's disposition. With respect to the timeliness of the prosecution's notice of appeal, HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), see supra note 1, which sets forth the time and place of filing a notice of appeal, prescribes that the notice of appeal shall be filed in the ... district ... court within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. HRAP Rule (4)(b)(3), see supra note 1, further provides that [a] judgment or order is entered within the meaning of [HRAP Rule 4(b)(1)] when it is filed with the clerk of the court. In the present matter, the record reflects that the prosecution filed its notice of appeal on February 15, 2001. We need not reach the question whether the January 22, 2001 written order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, on the one hand, or the January 31, 2001 written order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, on the other, triggered the thirty-day appeal period prescribed by HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), because the prosecution's notice of appeal was filed well within thirty days of both of the written orders. Accordingly, the prosecution's notice of appeal was timely, and this court has jurisdiction to address the merits of its appeal.