Opinion ID: 2334045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty to Support Adult Son

Text: The first issue which we will address is whether, and if so, to what extent, the Father is obligated to support his adult son, Joseph, Jr. The Father argues that Joseph, Jr. has not been a poor person, as that term is defined in 13 Del.C. § 503, since the outset of this litigation, and, therefore, that he has no legal obligation to provide support for Joseph, Jr. The Father argues that there is adequate evidence in the record to support the Family Court's initial and subsequent determinations that Joseph, Jr. was, and is, able to support himself. It is also argued by Father that if he does have a duty to support his adult son, Joseph, Jr., the Melson Formula is not applicable in calculating that obligation. The Mother argues that the record supports a conclusion that Joseph, Jr. was, and is, a poor person, who is entitled to be supported by both of his parents. The theory advanced by the Mother to impose a portion of the support obligation for Joseph, Jr. upon the Father, derives from 13 Del.C. § 503, which provides: Except as expressly provided in § 501 and § 502 of this title, the duty to support a poor person unable to support himself rests upon his spouse, parents, or children, in that order, subject to § 504 of this title as to expenses described therein. If the relation prior in order shall not be able, the next in order shall be liable, and several relations of the same order shall, if able, contribute according to their means. (emphasis added). In this case, the Family Court initially found that Mother had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Joseph, Jr. was unable to support himself. Here the evidence concerning the ungifted child, now age 21 is (1) the opinion of the mother with whom he lives that he is unable to support himself and (2) the testimony of a psychologist that in repeated testing he has not scored better than an IQ of 75, that he is only capable of routine, manual tasks, and can only work in a sheltered workshop. Upon cross-examination the psychologist opined that the Social Security Administration, or Elwyn Training School might well train and place Joseph in paid work positions. Linda Clanton testified Joseph earned $200.00 last year from casual farm labor, and presently cares for [thirteen] head of horse. The father offers to provide a home and work position for Joseph which the mother declines (the [Family] Court assumes Joseph, an adult, has also declined the father's offer). The Court finds as fact that Joseph has not been shown by a preponderance of the evidence to be unable to support himself and thus, he is removed from the support Order.... Clanton v. Dalton, Del. Fam., File No. E-9276, Parrish, J. (Jan. 7, 1986). The Superior Court reversed that decision, finding it to be an abuse of discretion. Clanton v. Dalton, Del.Super., C.A. Nos. 86A-FE-3 and 86A-FE-16 (consolidated), Bifferato, J. slip op. at 2, 1987 WL 8693 (Feb. 5, 1987). We find that the applicable standard of appellate review requires a contrary conclusion. In an appeal from the Family Court, the standard and scope of appellate review is well established. Wife (J.F.V.) v. Husband (O.W.V., Jr.), Del.Supr., 402 A.2d 1202, 1204 (1979). [8] It extends to a review of the facts and law, as well as to a review of the inferences and deductions made by the Trial Judge. Id. An appellate court has a duty to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings. Id. However, appellate courts are also required to exercise judicial restraint, even though independently the appellate courts might have reached a different conclusion than the trial judge. Id. Since the Trial Judge heard and observed the witnesses [an appellate court] will not disturb the Trial Judge's findings of fact, and make contradictory findings, unless they are clearly wrong and justice requires their overturn. Id. Moreover, in reviewing the inferences and deductions made by the trial court, an appellate court will draw its own inferences and deductions only if those of the trial court are not supported by the record and are not the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. Id. In this case, the Family Court found that Joseph, Jr. had been employed in the past and was then presently employed, albeit on a limited basis. The Family Court found that, in the opinion of the Mother's own expert witness, Joseph, Jr. could be trained and placed in a paid working position. These facts led the Family Court to infer that Joseph, Jr. was able to support himself. We find that the initial factual findings which were made by the Family Court are supported by the record. We also find that the inference that Joseph, Jr. was able to support himself was the product of an orderly, logical deductive process. Therefore, as an appellate court, the Superior Court, in the exercise of judicial restraint, was obligated to accept the findings and inferences in the initial decision of the Family Court, even though, independently, it might have reached a different conclusion. Id. When this Court remanded this matter to the Family Court, for the purpose of supplementing the record regarding the status of Joseph, Jr., the Family Court found, as fact, that Joseph, Jr. had worked continuously since high school; had moved out of the Mother's home in October of 1987; had a Pennsylvania driver's license and drove to and from work each day; had a bank account; had owned a car and a truck; had been employed as a farm laborer for over a year; was earning approximately $196.00 per week; and that he had adequate money for his needs. The factual findings, which the Family Court made following this Court's remand, led it to do more than infer that Joseph, Jr. was capable of supporting himself. Those factual findings led the Family Court to conclude that Joseph, Jr. was, in fact, self-supporting. We find that conclusion and the evidentiary findings upon which it was based, are supported by the record. Therefore, the decision of the Superior Court, reversing the Family Court's initial determination with respect to Joseph, Jr., is reversed. The initial and subsequent decisions of the Family Court, which found that Joseph, Jr. was and is not a poor person unable to support himself, are affirmed. This case is remanded to the Family Court. The Family Court is directed to enter an appropriate order, denying the Mother's petition for support, with respect to Joseph, Jr. [9] Since we have determined that the Father has no obligation to support Joseph, Jr., we need not address the issue of whether the Melson Formula was the proper mechanism to determine support for an adult child. Nevertheless, we must examine the Melson Formula, in the context of the order that was entered, pursuant to the Father's duty to support his minor son, Jason.