Opinion ID: 1388423
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory nature of question

Text: As noted above, we are restricted to deciding this case in light of the comprehensive statutory scheme that governs public entity liability. In appropriate cases, consideration of public policy may assist the court in construing a statute. However, because the clear legislative intent was to restrict government's liability, this court should not impose liability absent a clear indication the Legislature intended such result. The majority does not undertake such an analysis and refers only tangentially to the statutes. Its opinion offers no reasoned basis to conclude that the Legislature intended to bring all criminal misuse of an officer's status, power, or authority, however flagrantly unrelated to duty, within the scope of [the officer's] employment. Even assuming we were free to resolve the policy question, I am troubled by the majority's incomplete discussion of the competing public policies. Whether plaintiff should recover for her injuries is only one side of the equation. The other side is whether the taxpayers of the City should be forced to pay for those injuries. The public fisc is not infinite. To the contrary, in this era of limited public resources, every expenditure for one purpose requires a withdrawal of funds for another purpose. Compensating the plaintiff is a worthy and sympathetic goal. Whether it is more worthy than other public purposes is a question beyond our right or ability to answer. Professor Van Alstyne has testified that, [T]he costs and the funding problems are one of the most difficult problems in the whole field of tort liability ... in the area of government torts particularly.... (Hearings on Government Liability Before the Joint Com. on Tort Liability (Oct. 31, 1977) p. 33.) The inescapable truth is that in the modern era, payments from the public purse involve hard choices of priorities. For example, in 1986 the voters enacted Civil Code section 1431.1 to restrict liability for noneconomic damages. The voters' findings and declaration of purpose stated, Local governments have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire, and other protections because of the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance premiums. (Civ. Code, ง 1431.1, subd. (c).) The effect of tort judgments on public resources is significant. A court should not ignore fiscal reality when expanding the frontier of tort liability. If a court wishes to sit as a super-Legislature, the court should wrestle with the same vexing problems that arise in the legislative arena and should be subject to the same electoral pressures faced by legislators. Of course, the Legislature (or the electorate itself) is best equipped to consider empirical evidence, e.g., the frequency of police rape, and to make the hard choices as to where public money will be spent. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 740 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406] [leaving consideration of empirical data to the Legislature]; J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1028 [278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689] [noting importance of Legislature's consideration of empirical data].) We would do well to pay heed to the observation of an English jurist that public policy is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. ( Richardson v. Mellish (1824 Bing.) 103 Eng. Rep. 294, 303.) Courts should be extremely reluctant to decide for the public how its money should be spent. ( Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist. (1991) 53 Cal.3d 863, 941 [281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 809 P.2d 809] (dis. opn. of Baxter, J., noting importance of not interfering with community-based decisions).) The majority's legislative decision to allocate public funds is especially bothersome in light of the absence of any factual support for many of the majority's critical assumptions. The majority cites no evidence for its sweeping pronouncements that vicarious employer liability for police sexual misconduct will encourage preventive measures that do not hinder the vital law enforcement function. Indeed, both common sense and prior commentary by this court (see discussion, post ) suggest the contrary.