Opinion ID: 4251388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: A district court's power to impose sanctions for contempt of court is regulated by statute. No inherent power to punish for contempt exists independent of K.S.A. 20-1201 et seq. State v. Jenkins, 263 Kan. 351, 352, 950 P.2d 1338 (1997). Thus, to impose a sanction against a contemnor, a court must follow the procedural requirements of K.S.A. 20-1201 et seq. In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1341, 38 P.3d 694 (2002). In this case, the district court's journal entry recites: The Court finds the Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Direct Criminal Contempt of Court, pursuant to K.S.A. 20-1203. Consequently, the district court was required to follow the procedural requirements set forth in K.S.A. 20-1203 as a condition precedent to imposing a sanction on Delacruz. That statute provides: That a direct contempt may be punished summarily, without written accusation against the person arraigned, but if the court or judge in chambers shall adjudge [the accused] guilty [of direct contempt] a judgment shall be entered of record, in which shall be specified the conduct constituting such contempt, with a statement of whatever defense or extenuation the accused offered thereto, and the sentence of the court thereon. (Emphasis added.) The journal entry in this case, filed on December 1, 2011, merely recited that the district court deliberates on the stipulation of facts, exhibits, applicable law and arguments of counsel and finds [Delacruz] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Direct Criminal Contempt of Court, pursuant to K.S.A. 20-1203. In other words, the recorded judgment of the court failed to specify the conduct constituting contempt and failed to state the defense or extenuation offered by the accused, both of which were statutorily required under the contempt authority that Judge McCarville chose to utilize. 10 In Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. 280, 200 P.3d 467 (2009), we emphasized the importance of a district court properly recording a statute-compliant judgment of contempt when utilizing K.S.A. 20-1203 as the contempt authority. There, the district court found plaintiff's attorney in direct contempt of court under K.S.A. 20-1203 for failing to appear for trial, in contravention of a direct court order for the attorney to be present. Although the attorney had clearly and explicitly told the district court why the attorney believed he should not have to appear for the trial, the journal entry contain[ed] no reference as to why [the attorney] failed to appear, i.e., 'a statement of whatever defense or extenuation [the attorney] offered.' The Harsch court held that the failure to include K.S.A. 20-1203's required content in the journal entry of contempt was a fatal jurisdictional defect that voided the direct contempt order, and the presence of the requisite information elsewhere in the record on appeal cannot cure the defect caused by [its] absence in the journal entry. 288 Kan. at 295; cf. Padron v. Lopez, 289 Kan. 1089, 1106, 220 P.3d 345 (2009) (failure to comply with procedural requirements of indirect contempt statute K.S.A. 20-1204a is jurisdictional). Harsch cited Jenkins, where this court discussed the compulsory statutory procedure for direct contempt: K.S.A. 20-1203 provides for summary punishment, but requires that a written judgment be entered, specifying the contemptuous conduct, defense or extenuating circumstances, and the sentence imposed. Failure to comply with 20-1203 is jurisdictional. See In re Gambrell, 160 Kan. 620, 623, 164 P.2d 122 (1945), reh. denied 161 Kan. 4, 165 P.2d 760 (1946). . . . Direct contempt orders have been held void for either failure to specify the conduct constituting the contempt or to state any defense or extenuation offered by the accused. See, e.g., State v. Flanagan, 19 Kan. App. 2d 528, 533, 873 P.2d 195 (1994). (Emphasis added.) Jenkins, 263 Kan. at 357. 11 Likewise, in State v. Williams, 28 Kan. App. 2d 97, 11 P.3d 1187 (2000), the district court's journal entry memorializing the sentencing hearing for a prospective juror found in direct contempt under K.S.A. 20-1203 failed to state the defenses or extenuating circumstances offered by the juror. When the prospective juror argued on appeal that the contempt order was void, the State countered with the argument that the purpose of the requirement of K.S.A. 20-1203 for a more detailed journal entry is to ensure a proper record for appellate review and that the hearing transcript's recording of [the prospective juror's] statement in her defense eliminates the need for such a journal entry in this case. 28 Kan. App. 2d at 101. The Court of Appeals panel rejected that argument, declaring that [t]he fact that we have access to a transcript of [the] sentencing hearing does not excuse the district court's obligations under K.S.A. 20-1203. 28 Kan. App. 2d at 102. Granted, K.S.A. 20-1203's requirement of a judgment of record that specifies the contemptuous conduct and the accused's defense or extenuation is preceded by statutory language that authorizes a summary punishment for a direct contempt without the need for a written accusation. One might presume the Legislature intended K.S.A. 20-1203's written judgment of record requirement to serve the purpose normally served by a written accusation of contempt. And, in this case there were written accusations of contempt from both the prosecutor and the presiding judge, and Delacruz was afforded the opportunity for a trial on those accusations with counsel to represent his interests. Perhaps more importantly, this court has recently revisited the notion of subject matter jurisdiction in the context of using that label for due process violations or procedural infirmities. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 304 Kan. 773, 811, 375 P.3d 332 (2016) (overruling long-standing precedent by holding that defective charging documents do not deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate criminal cases); State v. Ford, 302 Kan. 455, 465, 353 P.3d 1143 (2015) (disapproving of precedent that had 12 referred to procedural errors in the determination of defendant's competency to stand trial as depriving the district court of jurisdiction); cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 163 L. Ed. 2d 1097 (2006) (criticizing drive-by jurisdictional rulings where courts fail to distinguish between subject matter jurisdiction and other types of error); Sperry v. McKune, 305 Kan. 469, 486, 384 P.3d 1003 (2016) (citing to Chelf v. State, 46 Kan. App. 2d 522, 263 P.3d 852 [2011], for the proposition that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive district court of subject matter jurisdiction). But unfortunately, because Delacruz did not challenge the district court's jurisdiction or argue how the process utilized by the district court failed to comply with the mandates of K.S.A. 20-1203, the parties did not flesh out how the area of the law involved in this case fits within this court's changing concepts of subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, the answer on the merits is especially clear in this case. See Alvarado v. Holder, 743 F.3d 271, 276 (1st Cir. 2014) (holding that a court may put aside ambiguous jurisdictional questions under a statute when precedent clearly dictates the result on the merits); Sherrod v. Breitbart, 720 F.3d 932, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that a court may presume jurisdiction and reach the merits when the answer to the merits issue is especially clear); Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder County Soc. Serv., 569 F.3d 1244, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2009) (declining to consider a jurisdictional question where the party claiming jurisdiction would clearly lose on the merits); accord In re Todd, No. 110,958, 2014 WL 7152357, at  (Kan. App. 2014) (unpublished opinion) (Leben, J., concurring) (In sum, the jurisdictional issue presents a fairly close question, but Todd cannot win on appeal on the merits. In these circumstances, I would simply rule on the merits and affirm the district court's judgment, which denied relief.), rev. denied 302 Kan. 1010 (2015). Accordingly, we will presume, without deciding, that the district court in this instance did not lose jurisdiction to find Delacruz in direct contempt of court through a deficient journal entry. 13 FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION Delacruz has maintained from the beginning that he had a valid Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify because the immunity granted to him was not coextensive with his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We agree with that assertion.