Opinion ID: 854140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Institutions for Juvenile Offenders

Text: Ratliff contends that Article 9, Section 2 of the Indiana Constitution, [t]he General Assembly shall provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders, [6] requires the State to place all juvenile offendersirrespective of their crimes or backgroundin institutions separate from adult prisons. Questions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by examining the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our Constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. Boehm v. Town of St. John, 675 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ind. 1996) (citing Ind. Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind.1994)). See also Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. 1994); Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 963 (Ind.1993); Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 412 (Ind.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094, 112 S.Ct. 1170, 117 L.Ed.2d 415 (1992). In construing the Constitution we look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the Constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412 (citing State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 391 (1871)). At Indiana's constitutional convention in 1850-51, the following text for Article 9, Section 2 was proposed: The General Assembly shall have the power to provide Houses of Refuge for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders. Comments of Delegate Bryant (Dec. 18, 1850), in 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, 1203 (Indiana Historical Collections Reprint, 1935). When this provision was subsequently discussed at the convention, Delegate James Bryant of Warren County moved to amend the proposed language to state that the General Assembly shall provide Houses of Refuge, so as to make it obligatory upon the General Assembly to provide houses of refuge for juvenile offenders, instead of referring the subject to the discretion of that body, as proposed by the reported section. Id. at 1903 (Jan. 29, 1851). He justified this amendment by stating, Since this Convention assembled, we have had a state of facts presented to us, such as I had previously no conception of. Id. That previously unknown information involved the fact that more than one-eighth of the whole number of convicts committed to the Indiana State prison from September, 1822, to November, 1850, were minors within the age of twenty-one years, and some of these as young as eleven years of age. Id. (emphasis in original). Delegate Bryant described this as an outrage upon civilization and humanity, concluding that he was persuaded that if these facts had been spread before the public, such a deep disgrace to the character of Indiana would long since have been swept away by the fierce indignation of the people. Id. Delegate Bryant then concluded that the object of all punishment was two-fold: the prevention of crime and the reformation of the offender. Id. He questioned how the framers could propose to diminish crime or reform offenders with a system which sends the children of the State, perhaps the victims of dissolute parents and neglected education, to this school of vice and infamy, where they cannot fail by means of the associations into which you thrust them, to be irretrievably ruined? Id. He urged, There is in this Convention, I am sure, but one feeling in regard to this matter, and that is, that this outrage upon all propriety and humanity shall no longer be. Id. He concluded, With such facts before us, it is the imperative duty of the Convention to arrest this evil, to prevent this iniquitous system from being any longer tolerated, and to compel the General Assembly to provide institutions where these juvenile offenders can be restrained, and at the same time reformed. Id. Delegate James Lockhart of Posey and Vanderburgh Counties echoed Delegate Bryant's indignation, arguing that there is no question that can be presented for the consideration of this Convention, that is of more importance than this. Comments of Delegate Lockhart (Jan. 29, 1850), in 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA, 1903 (Indiana Historical Collections Reprint, 1935). He noted that, Having occupied for several years past a high judicial position, I have often been pained to see the youth, the mere boy, branded as a felon, under our laws, and sent for a series of years to that worst of all prisons in the United Statesthe Jeffersonville State prison. Id. Delegate Bryant's amendment was adopted and the convention approved Article 9, Section 2. The resulting Constitution was thereafter ratified and became effective on November 1, 1851. Governor's Proclamation Declaring Constitution in Force (Sept. 3, 1851, in 1 CONSTITUTION MAKING IN INDIANA 1780-1850, § 149, at 420 (Charles Kettleborough, 1916)). Clearly, there was strong support at the convention for significant change from the then-existing state of affairs regarding juvenile incarceration. We agree with Ratliff that Article 9, Section 2 is unambiguous in requiring the legislature to provide institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders. Brief of Appellant at 11. However, while the Constitution clearly requires the General Assembly to create a House of Refuge to provide alternative reformation and incarceration opportunities for juvenile offenders, [7] what is not clear is whether the framers intended that every juvenile convicted of an adult crime be sent to the House of Refuge. Our review of the debates of the constitutional convention reveals no discussion of whether the House of Refuge should be the exclusive place for all juvenile offenders without regard to the nature of the juvenile's crime or the background of the juvenile offender. Noticeably absent from the text of Article 9, Section 2 is any adjective designating inclusivity, such as all juvenile offenders, every juvenile offender, any juvenile offender, or each juvenile offender. This absence is despite the fact that such adjectives were employed in many, if not most, other constitutional provisions. [8] Further, we find no historical evidence of contemporaneous public expectation that the new constitution was intended to prohibit the incarceration of any and every juvenile offender in an adult prison. In fact, other than replicating the constitutional debates entries, our search in several contemporaneous newspapers [9] uncovered no mention of any public debate or constituent reaction to Article 9, Section 2. The General Assembly initiated the implementation of Article 9, Section 2 four years after ratification with legislation declaring that, [t]he Constitution of the State of Indiana requires that the General Assembly shall provide houses of refuge, for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders, and whereas, common sense and common humanity demand that some steps should be taken at once within this State to separate the youthful convict from the veteran and hardened criminal.... 1855 IND. ACTS CH. XCIII, Preamble. The Act provided that the Governor, Treasurer of State, and Superintendent of Public Instruction ... are hereby authorized and directed to select and purchase for the State of Indiana ... an eligible site for a House of Refuge. Id. (§ 1). These state officials were directed to: (1) procure plans, specifications, and estimates, for the building or buildings necessary for such House of Refuge; (2) prepare and mature a system for the management and government of such House of Refuge; and (3) ascertain what laws will be necessary to put the [House of Refuge] into successful operation. Id. (§ 3). The General Assembly provided some guidance to these officials, directing them to design the House of Refuge as not simply a place of correction, but a reform school, where the young convict, separated from vicious associates may, by careful physical, intellectual, and moral training, be reformed and restored to the community, with purposes and character fitting him for a good citizen, an honorable, and honest man. Id. (§ 4). The resulting statutory scheme [10] created an Institution to be known as the House of Refuge for Juvenile Offenders. 1867 IND. ACTS CH. LX[V]II, § 1. Its Superintendent was to employ such methods of discipline as will, as far as possible, reform [the infants'] characters, preserve their health, promote regular improvement in their studies, trades and employments, and secure to them fixed habits of industry, morality and religion. Id. (§ 7). Significantly, this legislation did not require that all youthful offenders be excluded from the state prison in favor of the House of Refuge. The statute provided the various modes by which the Institution would receive into [its] care and guardianship infants under the age of eighteen years committed to their custody. Id. (§ 10). These modes were: 1. Infants committed by any Judge of a Circuit Court or Common Pleas Court on the complaint and due proof thereof, by the parent or guardian of such infant, that by reason of incorrigible or vicious conduct such infant has rendered his or her control beyond the power of such parent or guardian, and made it manifestly requisite, that from regard to the future welfare of such infant, and for the protection of society, he or she should be placed under such guardianship. 2. Infants committed by the authorities aforesaid, where complaint and due proof have been made that such infant is a proper subject for the guardianship of said institution, in consequence of vagrancy, or of incorrigible or vicious conduct, and that from the moral depravity, or otherwise, of the parent or guardian in whose custody such infant may be, such parent or guardian is incapable or unwilling to exercise the proper care or discipline over such incorrigible or vicious infant. 3. Infants who are destitute of a suitable home and of adequate means of obtaining an honest living, or who are in danger of being brought up to lead an idle and immoral life, and who may be committed to the guardianship of said Institution by the Trustees of the township where such infant resides, or by the mother, when the father is dead or has abandoned his family, or is an habitual drunkard, or does not provide for their support. Id. In addition to these enumerated modes, the statute also provided one other means by which an infant could be sent to the Institution: Any infant under the age of eighteen years, who shall under [state] laws ... be liable to confinement in the jail [or] penitentiary... may, at the discretion of the Court or Jury trying the cause, be placed in such Institution, until of legal age, under the exclusive control and guardianship of the ... Institution. Id. (§ 11) (emphasis added). In creating the House of Refuge, the General Assembly required that, before an infant could be placed in the Institution, the person or persons having charge of said infants, shall ascertain from the Superintendent whether they can be received. Id. (§ 15) (emphasis added). In situations when the infants could not be received into the Institution because they did not fall into one of the designated placement modes, the Act provided: [If the infants] cannot be received into said Institution, the cases of such infants shall be disposed of as if this act had never been passed and no proceedings taken under it. Id. (§ 15). It is clear from these statutes [11] the first enacted to initiate the implementation Article 9, Section 2 and the second enacted to fulfill that constitutional mandatethat the General Assembly did not believe that its constitutional mandate required every infant to be housed in the Institution rather than in the State Prison. Furthermore, we find nothing in our review of contemporaneous writings and reports to indicate any public protest or even any discussionregarding the fact that the House of Refuge would not serve as the exclusive place for juvenile incarceration. It also appears from our independent review of prison records that significant numbers of youthful offenders continued to be incarcerated in adult prison even after the creation of the House of Refuge. The Annual Reports of the Officers and Directors of the Indiana State Prison and the original Department of Correction Indiana State Prison logs reveal that, from 1836 through 1850before the constitutional convention at least two twelve-year-olds, three fourteen-year-olds, three fifteen-year-olds, five sixteen-year-olds, and thirteen seventeen-year-olds were sentenced to incarceration in the Indiana State Prison. [12] INDIANA STATE PRISON LOGS: DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF CONVICTS ON THE STATE PRISON OF INDIANA, Volume B, 1836-1855 (original logs located in The Indiana Commission on Public Records, Indiana State Archives). Significantly, during the five years after the House of Refuge was created, a substantial number of juvenile offenders were still being sentenced to the adult prison. In fact, in the five years after the House of Refuge was created, those juveniles who were sentenced to the adult prison were even younger and greater in number than those sentenced during the fourteen years preceding the constitutional convention. New incarcerations included at least 129 juveniles: three eleven-year-olds, two twelve-year-olds, four thirteen-year-olds, ten fourteen-year-olds, eleven fifteen-year-olds, thirty-four sixteen-year-olds, and sixty-five seventeen-year-olds. [13] Annual Report of the Officers and Directors of the Indiana State Prison, DOCUMENTARY JOURNAL OF INDIANA (1867-1872); INDIANA STATE PRISON LOGS: DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF CONVICTS ON THE STATE PRISON OF INDIANA, Volume 1, 1869-1877 (original logs located in The Indiana Commission on Public Records, Indiana State Archives). [14] Several other items hold particular historical significance. Of these 129 juveniles sentenced to adult prison after the House of Refuge opened, only 22 were thereafter transferred to the House of Refuge after serving part of their sentences in prison. Additionally, as the framers intended, the ratification of Article 9, Section 2 and the ultimate creation of a House of Refuge had a substantial impact on juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons, despite the fact that all juveniles were not incarcerated in juvenile institutions. Prior to the ratification of Article 9, Section 2, juveniles who committed relatively minor offenses were incarcerated with adult criminals who had committed much more serious offenses. In fact, from 1836 to 1850, the most common crime leading to juvenile incarceration in the adult prison was the minor offense of petit larceny. However, after the House of Refuge was created in 1867, the numbers of juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons for minor offenses dropped dramatically, with juveniles incarcerated in adult prisons primarily for more serious offenses, such as grand larceny and burglary. [15] Citing Acts 1945, Chapter 356, Section 22, Ratliff asserts that, [i]t was not until 1945 that the Indiana General Assembly finally fulfilled its constitutional mandate by statutorily prohibiting the placement of juveniles in adult institutions. Brief of Appellant at 11. This is an inaccurate representation of the Act of 1945. While one sentence of the Act provides that juveniles should not be detained in prison, the next sentence specifically provided exceptions to this prohibition: [A] child, whose habits or conduct are deemed such as to constitute a menace to other persons, may ... be placed in jail or other place of detention for adults, but in a room or ward separate from adults. 1945 IND. ACTS 346 § 22 (emphasis added). Since the Constitution was ratified in 1851, there has never been a comprehensive statutory prohibition against incarcerating certain juveniles in adult prisons. Further, in 1982 and 1983, successive resolutions by the 102nd and the 103rd General Assemblies recommended that Article 9, Section 2 be amended, substituting institutions for Houses of Refuge. See Pub.L. No. 231-1982; Pub.L. No. 383-1983. The amended Article 9, Section 2 was adopted at the general election held Nov. 6, 1984. [16] At the time the amended Article 9, Section 2 was ratified, the Juvenile Code did not prevent the incarceration of juveniles who were waived to adult court. See IND.CODE § 31-6-1-1 et seq. (1982). Despite the opportunity to include language in the new provision reflecting that all, every, any, or each juvenile must be incarcerated only in juvenile institutions, no such language was included. Considering the absence of all-inclusive language in the constitutional text, the debates at the constitutional convention, the implementing legislation enacted shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, and the language retained when the provision was amended in 1984, we hold that, although Article 9, Section 2 clearly requires that the General Assembly provide institutions for juvenile offenders, it does not require that all juvenilesirrespective of their crimes or backgroundbe housed only in such institutions. Accord Hunter v. State, 676 N.E.2d 14 (Ind.1996) (addressed in detail infra under Article 1, Section 18). We are cognizant that, in our role as guardian of the constitution, we are nevertheless a court and not a `supreme legislature.'  Bunker v. Nat'l Gypsum, 441 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ind.1982). The legislature has wide latitude in determining public policy, and we do not substitute our belief as to the wisdom of a particular statute for those of the legislature. State v. Rendleman, 603 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ind.1992). This case is analogous to Y.A. Fleener v. Bayh, 657 N.E.2d 410 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied, wherein the plaintiffs challenged the state's practice of not providing appropriate residential placements for all children who are mentally ill, in violation of Article 9, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution. Similar to the provision at issue here (Article 9, Section 2), Article 9, Section 1 provides that, It shall be the duty of the General Assembly to provide, by law, for the support of institutions ... for the treatment of the insane. IND. CONST. art. 9 § 1. The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's argument that the constitution places upon the General Assembly the absolute duty to care for the members of this class. Y.A. Fleener, 657 N.E.2d at 417. The court found that: At the risk of being too simplistic in our response to this argument, we merely state that the constitutional provision is not without limitations. These limitations may be imposed by common sense, and by the constraints placed upon government to wisely distribute and apportion available funds among the various needs and programs which exist and which must be established for the welfare of all citizens. In short, the constitutional provisions are to be construed in the light of reason and the logical intendment of the framers. The General Assembly, however, may not avoid the very real intendment of the constitutional mandate to care for the mentally ill and disturbed, by refusing to raise and appropriate adequate funds to provide not unlimited care, but adequate care. In the same vein, if the General Assembly has appropriated adequate funds and has appropriately delegated to the executive branch of state government the duty and responsibility for implementing an[d] carrying out the programs to meet the needs, then the executive may not refuse to carry out its responsibility. Id. The court then found that the unlimited care sought by plaintiffs in this lawsuit was not required. Id. at 418 (emphasis added). [17] Because Article 9, Section 2 does not require the placement of all juveniles in a separate juvenile facility, Ratliff's claim that her incarceration in the Women's Prison violates this provision does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.