Opinion ID: 437633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Rigid View of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum

Text: 19 It is hornbook law that [w]hen served with a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum calling for the production as a witness of one lawfully restrained of his liberty, the sheriff, jailer, or other custodian of such person is bound to bring him into court to give his testimony .... 97 C.J.S. Witnesses Sec. 30c (1957). It is similarly the ancient learning that A prisoner produced in response to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is still in custody and the court or commissioner issuing the writ has no power to authorize the custodian to suffer his prisoner to go at large pending the proceedings in which he is called to testify, or to take him from the custody of one officer and put him in another. Id. There is no provision anywhere in traditional authority that permits modifications of this writ to allow custody to be transferred to federal officials before the courthouse is reached. Thus, this segment of Judge Gibbons' syllogism is probably correct. 20 The rigidity with which habeas corpus ad testificandum is viewed, however, rests in some tension with the flexible character of the All Writs Act, which has been held in three post-war cases to authorize the issuance of writs not precisely comporting than those of tradition. In Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1058, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 299, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1090, 22 L.Ed.2d 281 (1969), and United States v. New York Telephone Co., 434 U.S. 159, 171, 98 S.Ct. 364, 372, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), the Court has repeatedly interpreted the All Writs Act to be a legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve the rational ends of the law. Moreover, as the Supreme Court stated in Price, since 'law' is not a static concept, but expands and develops as new problems arise, ... the forms of the habeas corpus writ authorized by [section 1651] are not only those recognized in this country in 1789, when the original Judiciary Act containing the substance of this section came into existence .... Rather, it is a legislatively approved source of procedural instruments designed to achieve 'the rational ends of law.'  334 U.S. at 282, 68 S.Ct. at 1058. This expansive language must give pause to any court seeking to circumscribe the discretion of a district court that seeks to fashion equitable procedures for assuring the presence of witnesses in proceedings before it. 21 More than the mere language of the cited cases might suggest the All Writs Act to provide a source for the directive issued by the magistrate in this case. In Price the issue was whether a federal appeals court had power to permit a state prisoner to come forward to argue his own appeal. Despite the absence of any traditional writ or express statutory provision authorizing release of a prisoner on these grounds, the Supreme Court held that section 1651 gave the appeals court such power. In Harris, a case much like this one in that the district court perceived a need for greater fact finding than other statutes would have allowed, the Supreme Court held that, despite the absence of specific statutory authority, the district court could issue a discovery order in connection with the habeas corpus proceeding before it. In New York Telephone, the Supreme Court affirmed an order of the district court directing a telephone operating company to assist the FBI in installing pen registers. After summarizing the case law noted above, the Supreme Court stated there that the All Writs Act empowers federal courts to issue orders to persons who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice ... and even encompasses those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder justice. 434 U.S. at 174, 98 S.Ct. at 373. 22 I suppose, however, that there is a difference between the creation of new writs to satisfy new needs and the expansion or modification of existing writs. With the latter, the traditional forms and doctrines may be said to express the limits of the writ. To rephrase the matter in statutory parlance, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2241(c)(5) (1982), which gives federal courts authority to issue writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, may preclude reliance on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651 (1982) (the All Writs Act in modern garb) to create processes that mimic section 2241 writs in most of their features but which speak with their own voice on several critical issues. Thus, I cannot quarrel too much with a conclusion that the magistrate did not (and statutorily likely could not) issue a writ under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1651 directing the Marshals Service to share responsibility for transporting a state prisoner to federal court so that he might testify in civil proceedings. Instead, the magistrate issued a traditional writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, and tagged on a writ, arguably in the nature of mandamus, directing the marshals to share responsibility for transport. The question then becomes, of course, whether the magistrate had authority to issue this supplemental writ.