Opinion ID: 782371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: third party consent

Text: 21 Having determined that Davis had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bag, we must next decide whether Smith had authority to consent to the search. The government has the burden of establishing the effectiveness of Smith's consent. See Welch, 4 F.3d at 764 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)). To meet its burden, the government must demonstrate that Smith had either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search. See Fultz, 146 F.3d at 1105; Welch, 4 F.3d at 764.
22 A third party has actual authority to consent to a search of a container if the owner of the container has expressly authorized the third party to give consent or if the third party has mutual use of the container and joint access to or control over the container. Fultz, 146 F.3d at 1105; Welch, 4 F.3d at 764. Because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Smith had express authorization from Davis to consent to a search of the bag, the government must prevail on a mutual use and joint access or control theory in order to demonstrate actual authority. 23 The government argues that even if Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bag, the search was legal because Smith validly consented to a search of the apartment and, as an occupant and lessee, she had authority to give consent to search anywhere on the premises. We rejected nearly identical arguments in Welch and again in Fultz. Welch held that a person cannot give the police permission to search someone else's purse even if the purse is located in a car over which both persons have control. 4 F.3d at 764 (The shared control of `host' property does not serve to forfeit the expectation of privacy in containers within that property.) (citing United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725-27, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In Fultz, the police had searched the appellant's cardboard boxes, which were stored in the garage of a house where he was staying intermittently. The court concluded that the relevant question was not whether the owner of the house had access to the garage, but whether she had mutual use and joint access to or control over the boxes.  Fultz, 146 F.3d at 1106. Because the record here, as in Welch and Fultz, does not in any way intimate that Smith had mutual use and joint access to or shared control over Davis' gym bag, it is clear that Smith lacked actual authority to consent to a search of the bag. 4
24 Under the apparent authority doctrine, a search is valid if the government proves that the officers who conducted it reasonably believed that the person from whom they obtained consent had the actual authority to grant that consent. Welch, 4 F.3d at 764; Fultz, 146 F.3d at 1105. The government contends that the officers reasonably believed that Smith had authority to consent to a search of the entire apartment. Again, however, we stress that the relevant question is whether the officers reasonably believed that Smith had authority to consent to a search of Davis' bag. And again, the situation here is not materially distinguishable from the situation confronted by the court in Fultz. 25 Smith indicated to the officers which bedroom was occupied by Davis and McMannis and stated that Davis occasionally stayed there. Although Officer Dyer testified that Smith told them the bedroom was a spare room, he also testified that Smith informed them that Davis' belongings were in the room. Because the officers were aware that Davis' belongings were in a specific area separate from Smith's belongings, they could not reasonably believe that she had control over them. See Fultz, 146 F.3d at 1106 (finding no apparent authority where officers were aware that appellant's boxes were in a specific area and homeowner informed them that the boxes were appellant's). Thus, the officers were aware of the actual facts that established Smith's lack of authority to consent to the search of Davis' bag. 26 Given the circumstances, to the extent that the officers believed that Smith's consent to search the apartment legally authorized them to search Davis' bag, they were either indifferent to known facts or mistaken as to the law. The apparent authority doctrine, however, is applicable only if the facts believed by the officers would justify the search as a matter of law. See Welch, 4 F.3d at 764-65. An officer's mistaken belief as to the law, even if reasonable, cannot establish apparent authority. Id. 27 In sum, Smith had neither actual nor apparent authority to consent to the search. Because Davis had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the gym bag, and because the government failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Smith's consent was valid, we hold that the search was illegal.