Opinion ID: 2967392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the life-without-parole instruction and

Text: MITIGATING FACTOR We next address Stitt’s argument that at the penalty phase, the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution entitled him to a jury instruction and to a mitigating factor that unequivocally informed the jury that he would be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole or release if he were not sentenced to death. We review allegations of a constitutionally defective jury instruction de novo. See United States v. Morrison, 991 F.2d 112, 115 (4th Cir. 1993) (Whether jury instructions were properly given is a question of law . . . .).
Stitt claims that he was entitled under the Eighth Amendment to a jury instruction and mitigating factor informing the jury that he would be sentenced to life in prison without parole if he was not sentenced to death. Specifically, Stitt relies upon Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), for the proposition that a defendant is entitled under the Eighth Amendment to have his jury instructed as to the meaning of sentencing considerations and alternatives. (Appellant’s Br. 36); see also Simmons, 512 U.S. at 172 (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that he would hold that the Eighth Amendment, in addition to the Fifth Amendment, requires a jury to be informed that a defendant is parole ineligible when future dangerousness is at issue). Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit, however, has held that the Eighth Amendment is applicable where the Government alleges future dangerousness but it is unlikely that the defendant will ever be released on parole, and we decline to do so in this case. See, e.g., Simmons, 512 U.S. at 162 n.4 (We express no opinion on the question whether the result we reach today is also compelled by the Eighth Amendment.); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 407 (4th Cir. 1998) (Simmons did not address whether the Eighth Amendment required an instruction on parole ineligibility.). Instead, both this Court and the Supreme Court have addressed the UNITED STATES v. STITT 15 issue of when an instruction on parole ineligibility is required under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Stitt also relies upon Simmons for his Fifth Amendment argument that where the defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and [the relevant] law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible. Id. at 156.10 Stitt further argues that the jury that sentenced him should have been informed that he was parole ineligible because the Government identified future dangerousness within and without the prison setting as non-statutory aggravating factors in its Amended Notice of Intent to Seek a Sentence of Death. Simmons has been narrowly construed, both by the Supreme Court and this Court. See, e.g., Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169 (2000) (refusing to accept Ramdass’s argument that the Court should ignore the legal rules dictating his parole eligibility under state law in favor of . . . a functional approach, under which . . . a court evaluates whether it looks like the defendant will turn out to be parole ineligible); O’Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1223 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (recognizing that this Court reads Simmons narrowly); Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 486 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that this Court has consistently refused to extend Simmons). This past term, the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, noted that Simmons applies only to instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison. Ramdass, 10 In analyzing whether a Simmons instruction is required in a particular case, a court must take into account the particular characteristics of the sentencing scheme at issue. See, e.g., Simmons, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994) (evaluating the constitutionality of a South Carolina sentencing scheme and finding that an instruction on parole ineligibility was required); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 177 (2000) (considering a Virginia sentencing scheme and holding that a Simmons instruction was not required); Shafer v. South Carolina, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 1265 (2001) (evaluating a South Carolina statutory sentencing scheme enacted after the decision in Simmons and determining that a Simmons instruction was required). 16 UNITED STATES v. STITT 120 S.Ct. at 2121 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.). Justice O’Connor pointed out in her opinion concurring in judgment that [w]here all that stands between a defendant and parole ineligibility under state law is a purely ministerial act, Simmons entitles the defendant to inform the jury of that ineligibility, either by argument or instruction, even if he is not technically parole ineligible at the moment of sentencing.11 Ramdass, 120 S.Ct. at 2127 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Stitt argues that his case falls within the parameters of Simmons because once the jury found that he intentionally killed the three victims or caused them to be killed, no downward departure was legally or practically possible under the Sentencing Guidelines, and he certainly would have been sentenced to life in prison without parole if he had not been sentenced to death. We disagree. Because the Government pursued the death penalty in this case, a separate penalty phase hearing was held before the jury that convicted Stitt. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(g) (A person shall be subjected to the penalty of death for any offense under this section only if a hearing is held in accordance with this section.). Under § 848(e), if, after the penalty phase hearing, the jury had not recommended that Stitt receive a death sentence, the district court would have been required to sentence Stitt to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(e)(1)(A); see 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 848(k) & (l) (recognizing the court’s authority in certain situations to impose a sentence, other than death, authorized by law); § 848(p) (stating that [i]f a 11 Although Justice Kennedy wrote the plurality opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion is the decisive one in Ramdass. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’ Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). UNITED STATES v. STITT 17 person is convicted for an offense under subsection (e) of this section and the court does not impose the penalty of death, the court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole) (emphasis added). Although, as Stitt points out, the district court then would have had to follow the Sentencing Guidelines in arriving at the proper sentence which, in this case, would likely have been life imprisonment for each of the three murders in furtherance of the CCE under United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A1.1 (1998),12 the Guidelines also allow the district court to depart from the assigned offense levels and impose a lesser sentence. United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1368 (5th Cir. 1995) (analyzing whether Simmons requires a parole ineligibility instruction in a § 848 death penalty case); see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. (noting that under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b) (West 2000), the sentencing court may sentence the defendant outside the range established by the applicable guidelines, if the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not read the statement in U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 application note 1 that [t]he [Sentencing Guidelines] Commission has concluded that in the absence of capital punishment, life imprisonment is the appropriate punishment for premeditated killing, to preclude unequivocally a downward departure by the district court in all cases involving an intentional killing. Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that the Guidelines do not eliminate all of the district court’s discretion in sentencing. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996); United States v. DeBeir, 186 F.3d 561, 565-66 (4th Cir. 1999). U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. K lists factors that the Commission believes may constitute grounds for departure. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. comment 4(b), at 7. However, the Commission recognizes that this list is not exhaustive and that there may be other grounds for departure that are not mentioned. Id. Therefore, in extraordinary 12 The base offense level for first degree murder under U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 is 43. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A1.1 (1998). An offense level of 43 translates into a life sentence. U.S.S.G. Chap. 5, pt. A. 18 UNITED STATES v. STITT cases, a sentencing court may depart from the designated sentencing range if ‘the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.’ Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)); DeBeir, 186 F.3d at 566 (same). Finally, the possibility exists that, because of a combination of . . . characteristics or circumstances that are not ordinarily relevant to a guidelines departure, an extraordinary case might differ significantly from the heartland cases covered by the guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing, even though none of the characteristics or circumstances individually distinguishes the case. DeBeir, 186 F.3d at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). If the grounds that the district court relies upon for departure are not covered by the Guidelines, certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline before the district court may depart. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. Therefore, the district court must make a refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing. Id. The district court must determine, largely by comparison with the facts of other Guidelines cases, [w]hether a given factor is present to a degree not adequately considered by the Commission, or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional way. Id. Stitt presented nineteen mitigating factors to the jury.13 A substantial amount of testimony was admitted which the district court might have considered as grounds for departure. For example, among the mitigating factors found by at least one of the jurors as to each count were the following: 13 The record would not necessarily have been the same on appeal had the jury not recommended, and the district court imposed, a sentence of death. Other information relevant to Stitt’s sentence presumably could have been presented to the district court prior to final sentencing in the event that the jury declined to recommend death. 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 848(e), (p). UNITED STATES v. STITT 19 -The victims consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in their deaths. -The other factors in the defendant’s background or character mitigate against the imposition of the death sentence. -Richard Thomas Stitt was subjected to a dysfunctional family setting in childhood. -Richard Thomas Stitt was abandoned and neglected as a child. -Richard Thomas Stitt was deprived of the parental guidance and protection which was needed as a child. -There are factors in Richard Thomas Stitt’s background which demonstrate that mercy should be considered. (Appendix C.) In addition, the jury found, as to counts five and seven, that Stitt was under unusual and substantial duress regardless of whether the duress was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charge and that Stitt committed the offense under severe mental