Opinion ID: 3166759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construction of Perry’s 1924 Deed to Otis

Text: [¶33] We begin our analysis of the status of the Edwardses’ beach by addressing the operative legal consequences of Perry’s 1924 deed to Otis. We review the construction of deeds “de novo as a question of law.” Tarason v. 12 In light of our conclusion that the Town acquired a public easement over the way and cul-de-sac by dedication and acceptance, we do not address the Town’s alternative claim that it acquired a public easement over the way and cul-de-sac by prescription. 13 Both before and after trial, the Edwardses argued that the Scotts’ predecessors-in-title had not transferred any beach rights to the Scotts, and that even if the Scotts had acquired such rights, the beach area subject to that encumbrance was not located on the Edwardses’ property. The first time that the Edwardses raised lack of notice as a discrete issue regarding the beach easement’s viability was on appeal in their reply brief. We will not review this case on a theory different from that on which it was tried in the trial court. See Teel v. Colson, 396 A.2d 529, 534 (Me. 1979). 17 Wesson Realty, LLC, 2012 ME 47, ¶ 18, 40 A.3d 1005. In construing deeds, we strive to “determine the intentions of the parties to the deed as expressed in the instrument.” Reed v. A.C. McLoon & Co., 311 A.2d 548, 551 (Me. 1973). [¶34] A deed may create an easement “by grant, express or implied, where the grantor benefits the conveyed land with an easement over land retained by the grantor.” O’Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1042 (Me. 1987). An easement is created by express grant in a deed when the deed’s explicit language evidences the grantor’s intent to create an easement for the benefit of the grantee. See Reed, 311 A.2d at 551. When a deed conveys lots by reference to a plan depicting features designed to increase the lots’ value, the law may imply an easement in those features in order to secure to the grantee “those benefits, the promise of which, it is reasonable to infer, has induced [him] to buy portions of a tract laid out on the plan indicated.” Arnold v. Boulay, 147 Me. 116, 121, 83 A.2d 574, 577 (1951) (quotation marks omitted). [¶35] Perry’s deed to Otis conveyed three lots, described as (1) “lot No. 12 on plan of [Coopers] Beach made by A.D. Blackinton,” (2) “lot No. 13 on the [same] plan,” and (3) “the triangular strip shown on the [same] plan.” After describing the property conveyed, the deed also granted the “privileges of all streets laid out on said plan and the free use of the beach for bathing and boating purposes.” Though the 1924 deed conveyed property by reference to a plan 18 depicting an intertidal area, the deed did not give rise to a beach easement by implication. By explicitly granting Otis beach rights, Perry created an express easement appurtenant to the lots that she conveyed to Otis. See ALC Dev. Corp. v. Walker, 2002 ME 11, ¶ 14, 787 A.2d 770 (“Whenever possible an easement should be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for whose use the easement is created.”). 2. Succession of the Beach Easement as an Appurtenance [¶36] The Edwardses challenge the court’s conclusion that Otis’s beach easement passed through subsequent transfers of Otis’s estate as an appurtenance thereof, survived the division of that estate, and today benefits the Scotts’ property. [¶37] An appurtenant easement is created to benefit a dominant estate and generally passes with that estate, id., regardless of whether the easement is expressly mentioned in later conveyances of the dominant estate, Cole v. Bradbury, 86 Me. 380, 384, 29 A. 1097, 1098 (1894), and regardless of whether later conveyances divide the dominant estate, Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 5.7 (Am. Law Inst. 2000); see also Cleaves v. Braman, 103 Me. 154, 161, 68 A. 857, 860 (1907). However, an appurtenant easement can be terminated by an act of the dominant owner demonstrating a clear intention to extinguish the easement. Great Cove Boat Club v. Bureau of Pub. Lands, 672 A.2d 91, 94 (Me. 1996). Except as limited by the terms of an easement’s creation or transfer, 19 the dominant owner can apportion appurtenant benefits to some parts of the estate and extinguish those benefits as to other parts. Restatement (First) of Property § 488 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1944). The effectiveness of an extinguishment depends upon a finding of the dominant owner’s intent. Great Cove Boat Club, 672 A.2d at 94. [¶38] The Edwardses contend that the Scotts’ grantors intended to apportion their beach rights to the property that they retained, and to extinguish those rights as to the property that they conveyed to the Scotts. They argue that this intent is demonstrated by the Scotts’ deed. That deed (1) conveys a portion of Otis’s estate and land that was not included in Otis’s estate, (2) grants an express easement of access, and (3) is silent as to the beach. We are unpersuaded. Neither the express access easement nor the division of Otis’s estate manifests a clear intention to extinguish the beach easement. Though the admixture of a part of Otis’s estate and property not included in Otis’s estate might suggest an intention to extinguish appurtenances of Otis’s estate, the court did not err in determining, in the absence of other indicia of intent, that the Scotts’ grantors did not extinguish the easement. Cf. id. at 95 (concluding that an instrument evidenced an intent to extinguish an easement when the instrument’s terms were inconsistent with the easement’s continued existence). 20 3. Location of the Beach Easement [¶39] The Edwardses finally contend that the court erred in its location of the beach easement and in its determination that that easement burdens their property. Specifically, the Edwardses argue that Otis’s deed is ambiguous as to the precise location of “the beach,” and that the court erred by disregarding extrinsic evidence that Perry intended to burden only the beach in front of lot 24 as depicted on the Blackinton Plan. [¶40] Here, the 1924 deed conveys the “privileges of all streets laid out on [the Blackinton Plan] and the free use of the beach for bathing and boating purposes.” The deed expressly refers to the plan for the purpose of locating an easement over particular streets and, in the same sentence, grants use of “the beach.” This language indicates that Perry intended to designate the location of the beach by reference to the Blackinton Plan, which depicts an intertidal area without labels or limitations. The record establishes that the Edwardses’ beach was included in the intertidal area shown on the plan, and that Perry owned the Edwardses’ beach at the time of her 1924 conveyance to Otis. [¶41] Considering the plain meaning of the deed’s language and the plan’s illustration, we conclude that those documents are not ambiguous as to the location of “the beach.” When construed in conjunction with the plan’s unrestricted depiction of an intertidal area, the deed’s reference to “the beach” has a plain and 21 obvious meaning: to grant rights to the intertidal area depicted on the plan. In view of these consistent and clear indications as to the location of “the beach,” the court did not err in disregarding extrinsic evidence of Perry’s intent, or in concluding that “the beach” easement includes the Edwardses’ intertidal area. [¶42] The court correctly determined that the beach easement passed with the portion of Otis’s estate that is now included in the Scotts’ property, and correctly construed Otis’s deed to grant rights over the intertidal area located on the Edwardses’ property. We therefore uphold the court’s conclusion that the Scotts have a right to use the Edwardses’ beach for “bathing and boating purposes.” The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: David A. Soley, Esq., and Glenn Israel, Esq., Bernstein Shur, Portland, for appellants Darlene F. Edwards and Lewis M. Edwards III William H. Dale, Esq., and Mark A. Bower, Esq., Jensen Baird Gardner & Henry, Portland, for appellee Town of Owls Head Judy A.S. Metcalf, Esq., and Ryan P. Dumais, Esq., Eaton Peabody, Brunswick, for appellees Cynthia S. Blackman, Nathalie M. Scott, Willis A. Scott Jr., Eliot A. Scott, and Constance M. Scott 22 At oral argument: David A. Soley, Esq., for appellants Darlene F. Edwards and Lewis M. Edwards III William H. Dale, Esq., for appellee Town of Owls Head Judy A.S. Metcalf, Esq., for appellees Cynthia S. Blackman, Nathalie M. Scott, Willis A. Scott Jr., Eliot A. Scott, and Constance M. Scott Knox County Superior Court docket number RE-2011-47 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY