Opinion ID: 878551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the propriety of a lump sum award

Text: The standard for review of a workers' compensation decision respecting lump sum awards was carefully set forth in Krause v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (Mont. 1982), 641 P.2d 458, 460-61, 39 St.Rep. 394, 397: The general rule is that disability payments under the Workers' Compensation Act are biweekly. They may, however, at the discretion of the Workers' Compensation Division, be converted into a lump sum settlement. While lump sum settlements are an exception to the general rule, they are not looked upon with disfavor and should be awarded without hesitancy where the claimant's interest would be best served. Willoughby v. Arthur G. McKee & Co. (1980), Mont., 609 P.2d 700, 702, 37 St.Rep. 620; Utick v. Utick (1979), Mont. [181 Mont. 351], 593 P.2d 739, 741, 36 St.Rep. 799; Laukaitis v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth (1959), 135 Mont. 469, 472-73, 342 P.2d 752, 755. The denial of a lump sum settlement will not be reversed on appeal unless the Workers' Compensation Court is shown to have abused its discretion. Willoughby, supra; Utick, supra; Kuehn v. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. (1974), 164 Mont. 303, 521 P.2d 921; Kent v. Sievert (1971), 158 Mont. 79, 489 P.2d 104; Legowik v. Montgomery Ward (1971), 157 Mont. 436, 486 P.2d 867. In the instant case, claimant Ruple expends approximately $598 per month in payments for his mobile home, truck, a personal loan and lot rental. By converting his disability benefits into a lump sum, which at his life expectancy from January 1, 1983 would entitle him to about $51,000, Ruple hopes to retire his indebtedness and purchase a lot for his mobile home at a cost of between $15,000 and $20,000. He contends that the result will permit him to better live on the Social Security disability benefits he receives. The Workers' Compensation Court noted that Ruple is capable of meeting his monthly expenses on his current income notwithstanding his indebtedness and concluded that there was no pressing need for the kind of lump sum conversion requested, although the court gave him the option of seeking a partial lump sum award to cover indebtedness on the truck and personal loans. We find no abuse of discretion in the formulation of this judgment. The record clearly supports the court's findings concerning Ruple's financial condition. Ruple is capable of meeting his current expenses, and there is no evidence of increased and burdensome expenses in the near future. The court was also justified in concluding that a partial lump sum payment might be in Ruple's best interests. Ruple offered no testimony on the specifics of any proposed transaction for the purchase of a mobile home lot, other than to say that he thought he knew where he could purchase land. As far as the other loans were concerned, the court was obviously quite generous in permitting Ruple to prove his case for a partial lump sum before the Division. The facts of this case are unquestionably distinguishable from those in cases like Utick, supra, where we held that it was an abuse of discretion to deny conversion of benefits to a lump sum award. Ruple has not been treated unfairly by compensation authorities and has not presented the kind of detailed investment plan which compensated for claimant Utick's failure to demonstrate a pressing need for conversion of his disability benefits. The mere fact that Ruple is indebted does not require either the Workers' Compensation Court or this Court to convert some or all of his benefits. To do so would be to stretch our decision in Kuehn v. Nat'l Farmer's Union Property and Cas. Co. (1974), 164 Mont. 303, 521 P.2d 921, Ruple's primary authority, far beyond its facts. Because the evidence of Ruple's wife's income was properly considered and because the judgment of the lower court does not reflect an abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court. HARRISON, WEBER, SHEEHY and SHEA, JJ., concur.