Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: applicability of res judicata to petition for post-conviction relief

Text: Montana law is bereft of any decision on whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to a prayer for post-conviction relief. As a general proposition, we have held: The doctrine of res judicata states that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to causes of action or issues thereby litigated, as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction. Meagher Co. Water Dist. v. Walter (1976), 169 Mont. 358, 361, 547 P.2d 850, 852. The doctrine bars reconsideration of an issue if four elements are present: (1) the parties or their privies must be the same; (2) the subject-matter of the action must be the same; (3) the issues must be the same, and must relate to the same subject-matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons must be the same in reference to the subject-matter and to the issues between them. Brannon v. Lewis and Clark County (1963), 143 Mont. 200, 207-208, 387 P.2d 706, 711. Aside from the bar of res judicata, this Court has consistently refused to allow relitigation in a collateral proceeding of issues determined in a direct appeal, In Re Quigg (1976), 168 Mont. 512, 544 P.2d 441, and Spurlock v. Crist (1980), Mont., 614 P.2d 498, 501, 37 St.Rep. 1146, in some cases by reaffirming the prior holdings. Digiallonardo v. Betzer (1973), 163 Mont. 104, 105, 515 P.2d 705. Accord, Orricer v. State (1970), 85 S.D. 293, 181 N.W.2d 461. In light of the dearth, if not complete absence, of guiding Montana case law in this regard, a review of the law as it has evolved and developed with regard to the applicability of res judicata to the Federal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, will aid. Historically the principle of res judicata was not seen to apply to writs of habeas corpus or petitions for relief under § 2255. See, Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus § 21.5; cf., Kelley, Finality and Habeas Corpus, 78 W. Va. Law Rev. 1 (1975). However, a new rule has been recognized regulating successive federal motions on grounds previously heard and determined. In Sanders v. United States (1963), 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, the Court stated: Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior application for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent application was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. 373 U.S. at 15, 83 S.Ct. at 1077. Where a trial or appellate court has determined the federal prisoner's claim, discretion may in a proper case be exercised against the grant of a § 2255 hearing. Where the trial or appellate court has considered and decided a federal prisoner's claim, it may be open to the § 2255 court to determine that, on the basis of the motions, files and records, the prisoner is entitled to no relief. See Thornton v. United States (D.C. Cir.1966), 368 F.2d 822 (dissenting opinion of Wright, J.). The res judicata rule has now come to a point in its evolution where it can be said with certainty that a ground for relief previously considered on appeal from a federal prisoner's conviction cannot be reconsidered on a motion attacking sentence under 28 U.S.C.S. § 2255. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure, § 649 at 401 (1976) and cases cited therein. Res judicata cannot be applied in such a manner as to deprive Coleman of the right to file a post-conviction petition and to use post-conviction procedure. However, res judicata can be used to bar the rehearing of issues already litigated under the rule in Sanders. This interpretation preserves the Montana post-conviction remedy by requiring judicial inquiry into the propriety of the sentence and of the detention, while preventing abuse of the procedure by relitigation of a claim previously considered and found insufficient. As discussed in Sanders, relitigation would mean a waste of judicial effort, risking a cluttering of the court's limited resources with collateral attacks already decided on the merits. As one court put it, judicial economy dictates restrictive limitations on reruns. United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey (7th Cir.1971), 452 F.2d 350, 357, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 854, 93 S.Ct. 190, 34 L.Ed.2d 98. Some states have gone beyond Sanders and statutorily prohibit more than one collateral attack on a single conviction. See Ill. Ann. Stat.C. 38, § 122-3 (1964); Mo.Sup.Ct.R. 27.26(d); Wyo. Stat.Ann.Tit. 7, § 7-408.3 (1963). We, therefore, adopt the Sanders criteria as previously quoted in this opinion. We affirm the holding of the District Court that the following twenty-seven issues have been considered previously and decided by this Court and Coleman has alleged no new facts or law with respect to these issues which require additional considerations: F, G, H, I, J, L, M, N, P, R, S, T, V, W, Y, Z, AA, DD, GG, HH, II, JJ, KK, LL, MM, NN, and PP.