Opinion ID: 2628700
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues of Comparative Negligence May Apply to Determinations of Restitution

Text: ¶ 25 The State next argues that Judge Laycock erred by assuming that comparative negligence principles might apply in this case. The State contends that the district court should have found as a matter of law that no allocation of fault should be assigned to Mr. Beach. When Mr. Jones pled guilty to negligent homicide, he did not admit that Mr. Beach was not negligent. ¶ 26 As noted above, the established facts in this case are very limited. With such a limited foundation of facts, it would be difficult for a court to assume anything. The State would have us sit as a finder of fact and hold that Mr. Beach was not negligent. We decline to do this. Judge Laycock did not assume that Mr. Beach was at fault; rather, she determined that given the scant facts known about the collision that appeared in the record, she could assume that a fact-finder in a civil action could assign a measure of fault to Mr. Beach. This was not error. ¶ 27 With such a limited factual basis, it would be difficult for a judge to make decisions about court-ordered restitution based on assumptions. The better course of action, as Judge Laycock decided, was to allow the facts to be established in a civil litigation setting. Such a determination was properly within her discretion. We therefore hold that issues of comparative negligence may be relevant in determining restitution, and Judge Laycock was right to recognize the limited factual basis and to therefore refuse to impose court-ordered restitution based on it. [4]