Opinion ID: 2827454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: “fear” evidence

Text: Kilpatrick joins Ferguson’s argument that the district court erred by allowing witnesses to recount statements made to them by others for the purpose of establishing the witnesses’ fear of Kilpatrick and Ferguson. The defendants point to testimony by five witnesses and specify that they objected to each statement at trial. Ferguson and Kilpatrick say these statements were inadmissible hearsay. The government counters that the statements were not hearsay because they were not admitted for the truth of their content. Instead, the statements were admitted as circumstantial evidence of the extortion victims’ fear. The federal code defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). A statement is only hearsay if it is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). If an out-of-court statement is offered purely to show the Nos. 13-2500/14-1120 United States v. Kilpatrick, et al. Page 21 statement’s effect on the hearer, then this usage is not hearsay. See United States v. Williams, 952 F.2d 1504, 1517-18 (6th Cir. 1991). In extortion cases, statements by the victim indicating fear of the defendant are admissible to prove the “force or fear” element of extortion. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d 873, 877-78 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Tuchow, 768 F.2d 855, 865-67 (7th Cir. 1985). The victim’s fearful state of mind is a crucial element in proving extortion. The testimony of victims as to what others said to them, and the testimony of others as to what they said to victims is admitted not for the truth of the information in the statements but for the fact that the victim heard them and that they would have tended to produce fear in his mind. United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 845 (5th Cir. 1971); see also Williams, 952 F.2d at 1518. Because such fear-illustrating statements also often refer to acts of the defendant, courts should, upon request, instruct the jury that such statements may only be used as evidence of fear, not evidence of the defendant’s acts. See United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1036 (6th Cir. 1996). The evidence “may not be used to show that the defendants in fact made threats or otherwise made use of such fear.” Hyde, 448 F.2d at 845. Such “fear” evidence in extortion cases is similar to, but distinguishable from, evidence admissible under the hearsay exception at Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). Rule 803(3) allows witnesses to recount hearsay statements (that is, statements offered to prove the truth of the statements’ factual content) when the statement’s original declarant is expressing his or her thenexisting state of mind. In this case, the district court admitted some statements under Rule 803(3) and some statements under the Williams-Collins rule for extortion cases. The difference is this: when the out-of-court statement is an expression of fear being offered to prove the existence of the fear expressed in the statement, this is a hearsay statement that may be admissible under Rule 803(3). When, however, the statement is not the victim/declarant’s expression of his or her own fear, but a statement made to (or in the presence of) the victim by someone else that would tend to be a fear-inducing statement, such evidence is not hearsay. Ferguson’s brief challenges ten discrete snippets of testimony. We will focus on the two that appear to be the defendants’ strongest case. Whereas most of the challenged out-of-court Nos. 13-2500/14-1120 United States v. Kilpatrick, et al. Page 22 statements were made by people who themselves were also testifying witnesses at trial, these two pieces of testimony contained statements by people who did not testify at trial. Because the declarants themselves were not available for cross-examination regarding these two out-of-court statements, any error in admitting the out-of-court statements would be less likely to be harmless. The first example is from the December 19, 2012 testimony of Bernard Parker, an employee for a subcontractor in one of the disputed sewer contracts. Parker recounted what his colleague Tim Tousignant said to him about Ferguson’s insinuations that Kilpatrick would prevent a contract amendment from passing if Parker’s firm did not kowtow to his demands: Q. Okay. And what was Mr. Tousignant’s reaction?
Parker’s testimony was essentially that Tousignant said, “This is extortion, I feel blackmailed.” Clearly, this would be inadmissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. However, the statement also fits squarely within the Williams-Collins rule. As we explained in Williams, “testimony of victims as to what others said to them [is admissible to show] the fact that the victim heard them and that they would have tended to produce fear in his mind.” Williams, 952 F.2d at 1518. This analysis also applies to Parker’s testimony from later the same day. As Ferguson’s brief explains it: The court permitted, over objection, Parker to testify that [Parker’s colleagues from another company, Walbridge,] Penrod and Hausmann told him that they included Mr. Ferguson because “they were worried they weren’t going to get the project.” Here, the statement at issue from Parker’s colleagues was essentially, “we are worried we’re going to lose the project if we don’t do what Ferguson wants.” Such statements are admissible under the Williams-Collins rule because Parker heard them, and they would have tended to produce fear of economic harm. The district court did at times give limiting instructions concerning out-of-court statements. Regarding one of the statements Ferguson now challenges, the court instructed: Nos. 13-2500/14-1120 United States v. Kilpatrick, et al. Page 23 And I should just tell the jury that I have ruled that the statements that [the government] is about to elicit are admissible, but you should understand that they’re not admitted for the truth of what those statements are. In other words, he’s going to ask [the witness] what [another person] said, and they’re not offered for the truth of what she said, but just to establish the witness’s state of mind for what he did on this contract. Before the trial resumed on December 20, 2012, the district court held a conference with the attorneys concerning these hearsay objections. The court explained its reliance on Williams and Collins and assured defense counsel that the court would give a limiting instruction whenever counsel requested it. And the court gave evidentiary limiting instructions on several occasions. The court also sustained several hearsay objections during trial. The court was careful to distinguish between Rule 803(3) statements and non-hearsay statements. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to admit the challenged statements under the Williams-Collins rule. Ferguson argues that the court’s limiting instructions were insufficient. However, the district court offered to give the jury Williams instructions upon request, but defense counsel failed to request them. Counsel cannot now complain about the adequacy of the limiting instructions when they waived their opportunity to elicit more extensive instructions at trial. See Collins, 78 F.3d at 1036.