Opinion ID: 1903200
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Antitrust Immunity under Parker

Text: In 1943, the United States Supreme Court decided Parker v. Brown, supra, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315. In Parker, a producer and packer of raisins had brought an action to enjoin enforcement by the state of California's department of agriculture of a uniform state marketing program that had been promulgated pursuant to state statute. Id., at 344-46, 63 S.Ct. 307. The raisin producer claimed that this program violated the federal constitution's Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act, the federal antitrust statute. [17] Id., at 348-49, 63 S.Ct. 307. Addressing the Sherman Act claims, the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the marketing act would violate the antitrust statutes. Id., at 350, 63 S.Ct. 307. Noting federalism concerns, however, the court concluded that the marketing program derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of the state and was not intended to operate or become effective without that command, and that the Sherman Act gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state. Id., at 350-51, 63 S.Ct. 307. The court then limited its holding, stating that a state could not give individuals Sherman Act immunity by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful. . . . Id., at 351-52, 63 S.Ct. 307. (Citations omitted.) Ultimately, the court concluded that [t]he state in adopting and enforcing the [marketing] program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit. Id., at 352, 63 S.Ct. 307. With respect to the application of state action immunity to municipalities, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have held that  Parker immunity does not apply directly to local governments ... a municipality's restriction of competition may sometimes be an authorized implementation of state policy, and have accorded Parker immunity where that is the case. (Citations omitted.) Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991). A municipality that desires Parker immunity must show that, under the state statutory scheme, it has both `authority to regulate' and `authority to suppress competition.' Electrical Inspectors, Inc. v. East Hills, 320 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Islandia v. Electrical Inspectors, Inc., 540 U.S. 982, 124 S.Ct. 467, 157 L.Ed.2d 373 (2003), quoting Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., supra, at 372, 111 S.Ct. 1344. The court's inquiry into the municipality's statutory authority to regulate the field in question has been described as not ... exacting because whether an ordinance is actually authorized by state statute suggests that as long as the local enactment is within a broad view of the authority granted by the state, whether it is actually violative of that statute is a question for state authorities, not one of federal antitrust law. Electrical Inspectors, Inc. v. East Hills, supra, at 118-19. Moreover, with respect to the municipality's `authority to suppress competition,' despite the requirement of a `clear articulation of a state policy to authorize anticompetitive conduct,' the statutory authorization need not be explicit; the requirement is met `if suppression of competition is the foreseeable result of what the statute authorizes.' Id., at 119, quoting Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., supra, 372-73, 111 S.Ct. 1344, and Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985). [18]