Opinion ID: 2616670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: STATE v. WITTENBARGER

Text: The third case before us involves several DWI Defendants whose cases were consolidated in Cascade District Court. The District Court suppressed the Defendants' DataMaster breath test results and ordered their cases dismissed under RCW 46.61.502(1). On the State's appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded for trial. The Defendants were then granted discretionary review in Division One of the Court of Appeals, after which their case was certified to this court and linked with the other cases in this opinion. The District Court's suppression rested on two grounds. First, the District Court held the breath tests were inadmissible for lack of foundation. The Superior Court reversed on RALJ appeal, finding the breath test results would be admissible if the State could establish on remand that the existing procedures and protocol were followed in evaluating the DataMaster machines. We affirm. Second, the court held the State's failure to preserve DataMaster maintenance and repair records violated the Defendants' due process rights. Again, the Superior Court reversed. As in State ex rel. Dawson v. South Dist. Court, we affirm this reversal, relying again on our analysis in the first case of this opinion, State v. Matthews. The Defendants' arguments that their due process rights were violated are virtually identical to the arguments made by the Defendants in the previous two cases. Because we have already considered the relevant due process arguments then, we only briefly outline our reasoning here. In short, the Defendants in this case requested certifications, CrRLJ 6.13 certificates, and other unavailable maintenance and repair records, claiming that these documents were necessary to their defense. As with the documents requested by the Defendants in Matthews, however, we find these records do not constitute material exculpatory evidence because they are not directly related to the guilt or innocence of a particular DWI defendant and because the Defendants have available alternative means of attacking the credibility of the test results. See State v. Straka, 116 Wn.2d 859, 885, 810 P.2d 888 (1991); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489-90, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988). Therefore, under Arizona v. Youngblood, supra , suppression is not required absent a showing of bad faith. Again, we have examined the record and have encountered no new or convincing evidence that the State acted in bad faith when it changed its record-keeping policy and eliminated these records. Accordingly, we find no due process violation. [15] Next, we examine the District Court's holding that the Defendants' DataMaster test results are inadmissible for lack of foundation under State v. Baker, 56 Wn.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960). Recently in State v. Straka, supra , we addressed this issue and found that when the State relies on results of machine breath tests in DWI prosecutions, the State must establish (1) that the machine was in proper working order, (2) that if chemicals were used in testing they were correct and correctly used, (3) that the operator was qualified and performed the test correctly, and (4) that the results are accurate. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 874-75 (citing State v. Baker, supra ). If the State satisfies this initial burden, the test results are admissible. If the defendant presents rebuttal evidence, the issue of the reliability of the test results is for the trier of fact. Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 875. Analyzing the first prong of this test, the District Court held that without the unavailable maintenance and repair records, the State could not possibly establish that the DataMasters were in proper working order. The District Court was also disturbed by a record of some unauthorized tests run on the DataMasters, which consisted of sample tests conducted by an unknown operator. The court found that the State must recertify the DataMaster machine after such unauthorized contacts in order to establish the DataMaster was in proper working order and lay an adequate foundation for the breath test results. [16] We find this conclusion to be in error and in direct conflict with our opinion in State v. Straka, supra , where we stated: When the [breath testing] protocols at issue here and existing Code provisions are followed, there is sufficient assurance of accuracy and reliability of the test results to allow for general admissibility of [DataMaster] test results.... Straka, 116 Wn.2d at 870. At all times relevant to the suppression hearings in this case, the current WAC provisions had not yet been enacted. Former WAC 448-12 governed the approval of the DataMaster and the administration of the breath test. While former WAC 448-12-015 and -016 required periodic evaluation and certification of the Breathalyzer machines, WAC 448-12-210 and -220 did not require a similar certification process for the DataMaster machines, presumably because DataMaster machines possess the ability to perform and record the results of a control test each time a breath test is administered. We find the District Court's decision to suppress the breath test results for lack of foundation to be an abuse of discretion. The existing WAC procedures and protocol (the same provisions that were in effect in Straka ) did not call for certification of the DataMaster machines and clearly did not call for recertification after each so-called unauthorized contact. Even under the current provisions there is no such requirement. Furthermore, there was no evidence before the District Court that the unauthorized contacts in any way had a negative impact on the DataMaster machines. We agree with the Superior Court's conclusion that if the State can meet its initial burden and establish it followed the approved protocol, the breath tests are to be admitted. Evidence of the unauthorized contacts could be used by the defense as rebuttal evidence to attack the credibility of the breath test results. The Superior Court's ruling reversing the District Court's suppression order and dismissal under RCW 46.61.502(1) is affirmed. ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, DURHAM, GUY, and MADSEN, JJ., concur. JOHNSON, J. (dissenting) If the majority is willing to convict DWI defendants solely on the testimony of a machine, it should provide a method to ensure the machine operates correctly. Yet, notwithstanding the wealth of evidence present in the record relating to machine errors, unauthorized machine contacts, and overall DataMaster accuracy, the majority places almost no burden on the State to prove the BAC DataMaster Verifier (DataMaster) machines do, in fact, yield correct results. The majority confuses a valid test result with one that is accurate and reliable. The majority presumes if the DataMaster spits out a number, that number is correct. Only by ignoring the record can the majority make this gigantic leap of faith. As forensics expert Dr. Richard Jensen explains: [A] test may be valid ie; properly performed and completed, based upon [the State Toxicologist's] subjective criteria, but still be inaccurate and unreliable. One must necessarily look to the evidence extrinsic to the breath test document to consider the latter question, evidence which is not being preserved under the program currently in force in Washington. Declaration of Richard E. Jensen, Ph.D., in Response to State's Clarifying Affidavits, at 7-8. Rather than requiring the necessary extrinsic evidence, the majority instead accepts a self-certifying breath test ticket as the sole proof of reliability and accuracy, and denies the defense any means of challenging this automated justice dispenser. I reject this approach because it is patently unfair and because it violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. At issue is whether a criminal defendant's constitutional due process right to a fair trial is violated by the State's failure to maintain repair and maintenance records on the machines used to measure breath alcohol. In Washington, destruction of evidence cases have been governed by a 2-part test that weighs the likelihood the destroyed evidence would have been exculpatory against the ability of the prosecution to have preserved the evidence. State v. Vaster, 99 Wn.2d 44, 659 P.2d 528 (1983); State v. Wright, 87 Wn.2d 783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976). The majority rejects this well-established test in favor of the federal analysis adopted in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L.Ed.2d 281, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988), and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984), and concludes the State's failure to preserve the evidence does not violate Defendants' due process rights. I disagree with this result because the majority has incorrectly analyzed the state constitutional issue under State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986), and because the Youngblood and Trombetta standard does not provide adequate due process protection as interpreted by this court.