Opinion ID: 1745096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Unquestionably, the prudent path between sovereign immunity and jural rights is a formidable legal quagmire to traverse. As a number of my esteemed colleagues on the bench have observed through the years, immunity is an area fraught with complexities which have divided the courts and confounded jurists. However, the complexity in immunity analysis has much to do with the courts' genuine attempt, over time, to eliminate the guesswork from determining when immunity has been properly and constitutionally recognized. Naturally, striking the appropriate balance has been no small task. At times during this endeavor, proponents and recipients of immunity have bumped against Kentucky's jural rights or open courts doctrine. While the doctrine is not without its critics, it is a deep-rooted aspect of the Commonwealth's legal canon. And, although some would liken it to legal fiction, we are disinclined to reach such a conclusion. Indeed, thirty-nine (39) other states contain similar such provisions in their state constitutions. Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 Or. L.Rev. 1279 (1995). In fact, the doctrine traces its genesis back to the Magna Carta and was espoused by no less venerated a jurist than Sir Edward Coke who, in his historically significant Second Institute, envisioned it as a vehicle to ensure the integrity of the judicial process by stating that justice was not for sale, and to avoid undue interference with the judiciary in the courts of law by outside forces. [1] Id. at 1281, 1317. Over a century after Coke penned his Second Institute, the doctrine rang true with the American Colonies who feared that the British Crown was meddling in the colonial courts. Id. at 1288. Thus, the doctrine found its way into early state constitutions. Nonetheless, we have been called upon, here, to examine the General Assembly's recognition of immunity in this state's fire departments, which inherently dredges up considerations of sovereign immunity and jural rights. Thus, the matter is one of constitutional interpretation and common law application. As such, this Court is bound, as it has oft been in the past, to articulate a plausible and constitutionally sound solution to an immunity problem while respecting the doctrine of jural rights. That this area of the law is complex in undeniable; however, this does not mean, as the minority suggests, that the remedy is to wipe the slate clean with regards to the evolution and history of the common law in this arena. As always, the doctrine of stare decisis remains an ever-present guidepost in our undertaking. Stare Decisis compels us to decide every case with deference to precedent. Thus, it is with anything but a cavalier attitude that we broach the subject of changing the ebb and flow of settled law [and while], we do not feel that the doctrine compels us to unquestioningly follow prior decisions when this Court finds itself otherwise compelled, we recognize that ` stare decisis [is] the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion.' Chestnut v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Ky.2008) ( quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-265, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, (1986)). The open courts provision appears in our constitution, Ky. Const. § 14, which was ratified in 1891, and was linked with §§ 54 and 241 and ascribed the moniker of jural rights doctrine in 1932 in Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932). This is a longstanding common law principle of nearly fourscore years, to which this Court should defer  unless we are strongly compelled otherwise, which we are not.