Opinion ID: 2967392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the richardson error

Text: Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), Stitt claims that the district court committed plain error when it did not instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous as to which three violations of Title 21 constituted the series of transactions that made up the CCE and as to which five persons Stitt managed or supervised during the CCE. under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(i) (West 2000) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2; being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2; and three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 2000) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2. The conspiracy conviction was vacated on the Government’s motion because it was a lesser included offense of the CCE. Mann was found guilty of conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and distribution of cocaine base. United States v. Brown, No. 99-4062(L), 2000 WL 930786, at  (4th Cir. July 10, 2000) (unpublished). Davis was acquitted of murder, but found guilty of conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and distribution of cocaine base. Id. Brown was convicted on all four counts with which he was charged. Id. This Court affirmed their convictions and sentences. Id. at . UNITED STATES v. STITT 5
After Stitt was convicted and sentenced, the Supreme Court held in Richardson that, in a prosecution for engaging in a CCE under 21 U.S.C.A. § 848, the jury must agree unanimously about which three crimes the defendant committed, Richardson, 526 U.S. at 818, to satisfy the statutory requirement that the defendant’s behavior is part of a continuing series of violations described in 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c)(2). Because Stitt did not object to the jury instructions before the district court, we review those instructions for plain error. See United States v. Rogers, 18 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating standard of review where defendant fails to object at trial). To establish plain error under Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 52(b), Stitt must show (1) that an error occurred; (2) that the error was plain; and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). Rule 52(b) is permissive, not mandatory. Id. at 735. Even where the first three requirements of plain error are met, the decision to correct the error is left to the discretion of the court of appeals and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 732 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the first element of the Olano test — that there be error — is met because the trial court, in compliance with then-existing Fourth Circuit precedent, failed to instruct the jury on the unanimity requirement of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848. See United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126, 129-30 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that under the plain meaning of § 848, as long as each juror is satisfied in his or her own mind that the defendant committed acts constituting the series, the requisite jury unanimity exists). Likewise, the error was plain. As the Supreme Court noted in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal — it is enough that an error be plain at the time of appellate consideration. Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Richardson (Nathaniel Richardson), 233 F.3d 223, 228 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that an error is plain when the action is contrary to the law at the time of appeal). 6 UNITED STATES v. STITT Although the first two Olano elements have been met, Stitt cannot satisfy the third element — that the error affect substantial rights. The requirement that the error affect substantial rights typically means that the defendant is prejudiced by the error in that it affected the outcome of the proceedings. United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133, 138 (4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing for plain error, this Circuit incorporates the harmless error test in the third prong of its plain-error analysis but shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to prove that the error was not harmless. See United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 713 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Rule 52(a) squarely defines harmless error as error that does not affect substantial rights.). Although Stitt argues that the district court’s failure to instruct the jury on the unanimity requirement constitutes structural error and, thus, is not subject to harmless error analysis, we disagree. Indeed, this issue has already been settled in this Circuit. We recently joined our sister circuits in holding that a Richardson error is not a structural defect; rather . . . it is subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 699 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Nathaniel Richardson, 233 F.3d at 228 (citing Brown for the conclusion that Richardson errors which have been preceded by objection at trial are subject to harmless error analysis). Because Stitt did not object to the district court’s failure to instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous as to which three violations of Title 21 constituted the series of transactions that made up the CCE, we cannot simply review to determine whether the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hastings, 134 F.3d at 243. Under plain-error review, it is not enough for Stitt to establish that it is impossible to tell whether the verdict returned by the jury rested solely on the misinstruction, for such a showing would establish only that the error was not harmless. Id. Rather, in order to establish the actual prejudice required by the third prong of plain-error review, [Stitt] must demonstrate that the erroneous [ ] instruction given by the district court resulted in his conviction. Id. at 244. Stitt was convicted of three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and three counts of murder during a CCE, all of which the Government argued were offenses constituting the continuing series of violations making up the CCE. These six offenses, under 21 UNITED STATES v. STITT 7 4 5 U.S.C.A. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C.A. 848(e)(1)(A) respectively, 4 Count two of the Superceding Indictment which charges Stitt with engaging in a CCE reads: THE GRAND JURY FURTHER CHARGES THAT: From at least late 1990, and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Eastern District of Virginia and elsewhere, the defendant RICHARD THOMAS STITT, unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly, did engage in a continuing criminal enterprise, that is, he did knowingly and intentionally violate Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841 and 846, including, but not limited to, those violations alleged in the instant indictment, which are realleged and incorporated by reference herein, and did commit other violations of said statutes, which violations were part of a continuing series of violations of said statutes undertaken by RICHARD THOMAS STITT in concert with at least five other persons with respect to whom he occupied positions of organizer, a supervisory position and any other position of management, and from which continuing series of violations the defendant RICHARD THOMAS STITT obtained substantial income and resources. (In violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 848 (a) and (c).) (J.A. 89.) The three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), which were charged as counts 18, 19, and 23 in the indictment, are clearly violations alleged in the instant indictment and thus are related violations . . . alleged to be predicate violations constituting the continuing series. See United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 699 (4th Cir. 2000). 5 See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 884 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is not error to instruct the jury that it might consider any murderin-furtherance violations found under § 848(e) among the predicate violations required to convict on the CCE Count). In this case, each of the three murder-during-a-CCE counts (counts 3, 5, & 7) state that Stitt [and specified co-defendants] while engaged in and working in furtherance of a Continuing Criminal Enterprise as defined by Title 21, United States Code, Section 848(c), as charged in Count Two of this indictment, which is realleged and incorporated herein . . . did knowingly, 8 UNITED STATES v. STITT clearly fall within subchapter I of Title 21 and are therefore the type of violations that can constitute predicate offenses in the ‘continuing series.’ Id. Thus, the jury’s decision to convict establishes that Stitt was unanimously found guilty of at least three predicate violations constituting the continuing series. See Brown, 202 F.3d at 700. Under such circumstances, Stitt cannot demonstrate that the erroneous instruction given by the district court led to his CCE conviction. As a result, Stitt’s substantial rights were not affected. Thus, the third element of Olano is not met. Finally, assuming arguendo that the first three Olano elements were met, the error in this case does not meet the final requirement of the Olano test — that the error seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736. [A] plain error affecting substantial rights does not, without more, satisfy [this standard], for otherwise the discretion afforded by Rule 52(b) would be illusory. Id. at 737. Any error, however, may seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence. Id. at 736-37 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, Stitt was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and three counts of murder during a CCE. Numerous witnesses testified that Stitt was the organizer and supervisor of a large drug conspiracy, that he engaged in numerous transactions involving substantial quantities intentionally, and unlawfully kill and counsel, command, induce, procure, and cause the intentional killing [of each of the three victims] and did aid, abet, and assist one another and others in the commission of said offense. (J.A. at 90, 93-4, 96-7.) Thus, each of these three murders specifically was found to have occurred in furtherance of, and while engaged in, the continuing series of violations making up the CCE. Any three of the total of six predicate offenses for which Stitt was convicted (the three counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and the three murders in furtherance of a CCE) are sufficient to constitute the three related drug violations necessary to satisfy the requirements of Brown. United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 699-700 (4th Cir. 2000). UNITED STATES v. STITT 9 of drugs, and that he ordered three men murdered to advance his criminal enterprise. Based upon these counts for which Stitt was charged and convicted, we conclude . . . that the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in this case are not seriously affected by the affirmance of the judgment of conviction and that the conviction should not be set aside merely because the jury was not instructed to isolate three violations among the [many] before it. Nathaniel Richardson, 233 F.3d at 230.6 As a result, we have no difficulty concluding that Stitt has not established plain error.
Stitt also claims that the district court erred by not requiring the jury to unanimously determine which five persons Stitt managed or supervised.7 In Richardson, the Supreme Court assumed, without 6 Stitt relies upon United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 887 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that [a]s to the murder counts, the Government was required to prove that the homicides were directly connected to the underlying CCE and that [a] mere temporal connection is insufficient. (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) Tipton merely notes that a substantive connection must be implied as an essential element of § 848(e). Tipton, 90 F.3d at 887 n.13. Here, as in Tipton, the Government’s evidence expressly linked each of the three CCE murders for which Stitt was convicted to a furtherance of the CCE’s purposes: either silencing potential informants or witnesses or settling a drug-related dispute. Id. at 887. Because the Government’s evidence showed that the murders were substantively connected to the CCE, the requirements of Tipton are satisfied. 7 Overwhelming evidence was presented at trial from which the jury could have concluded that Stitt acted in concert with five or more persons whom he supervised, organized, or managed in furtherance of the CCE. For example, co-defendants Marcus Reid, Jason Ortega, Jason Davis, Ivan Harris, Teo Smith, and Angela Signal testified that Stitt directed them, as well as co-defendants Kermit Brown and Percell Davis, to commit acts in furtherance of Stitt’s organization. Reid testified that he and many others, including persons known as Little Dread, K-9, Sadat, Heavy, Two Pound, Dawn, Little Tank, Little D, and Poochie, worked for Stitt selling, couriering, and distributing drugs. Reid also testified about numerous crimes of violence in which he, Stitt, and other members of the Stitt organization were involved. Ortega testified that he 10 UNITED STATES v. STITT deciding, that there is no unanimity requirement in respect to 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c)(2)(A), the statutory requirement which requires a defendant to have supervised ‘five or more other persons.’ Richardson, 526 U.S. at 824 (quoting 21 U.S.C.A. § 848(c)(2)(A)). The Court noted that the five or more person provision is significantly different . . . in respect to language, breadth, tradition, and other factors from the provision requiring unanimity as to which three crimes the defendant committed. Id. at 824. Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent in Richardson that, [w]ith respect to the requirement of action in concert with five or more other persons, every Court of Appeals to have considered the issue has concluded that the element aims the statute at enterprises of a certain size, so the identity of the individual supervisees is irrelevant. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 829 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Harris, 209 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Garcia, 988 F.2d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 255 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Moorman, 944 F.2d 801, 803 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. English, 925 F.2d 154, 159 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 107475 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1985). We agree that the identity of the individual supervisees is irrelevant. As long as the jurors unanimously conclude that the Government has proven the other required elements and that the defendant orgaworked as a hit man, drug courier, drug organizer, distributor, [and] basically anything and everything possible to keep the drug organization running smoothly in the organization which Stitt headed. (TT at 1621.) Ortega also testified that he killed James Gilliam on Stitt’s orders. Davis testified that he sold and redistributed crack for Stitt and acted as Stitt’s enforcer and bodyguard. Davis also testified that he killed Sinclair Simon after being ordered to do so by Stitt. Harris testified that he sold drugs and served as a protector for Stitt. On two occasions Stitt asked Harris to kill someone. Harris could not carry out the first request because he was incarcerated, and he refused to kill the second man. Teo Smith testified that he sold drugs for Stitt in North Carolina and Virginia. Angela Signal testified that she rented vehicles for Stitt. Stitt used these vehicles in his criminal activities. UNITED STATES v. STITT 11 nized, supervised, or managed five or more persons, we hold that the jury need not unanimously agree on which five persons were organized, supervised, or managed by the defendant.8 Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817; see Harris, 209 F.3d at 160 (noting, in the context of a challenge to a guilty plea, that even at trial, the government need not prove the identities of the five persons supervised in order to establish that element of a continuing criminal enterprise). In this regard, § 848 tracks the law of conspiracy, which generally has not required jurors to identify the defendant’s co-conspirators. Harris, 959 F.2d at 256; see also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375 (1951) (Of course, at least two persons are required to constitute a conspiracy, but the identity of the other members of the conspiracy is not needed, inasmuch as one person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown.). Precise details, like the identities of the underlings supervised by the defendant, are not essential elements of the CCE but rather merely historical facts as to which the jurors could have disagreed without undermining their substantial agreement as to the ultimate and essential fact of whether the requisite size and level of control existed. Jackson, 879 F.2d at 89. ‘[D]ifferent jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.’ Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991) (quoting 8 In Richardson, the Supreme Court noted that a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime. Where, for example, an element of robbery is force or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement — a disagreement about means — would not matter as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the Government had proved the necessary related element, namely that the defendant had threatened force. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 12 UNITED STATES v. STITT McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); Jackson, 879 F.2d at 88 (We have never required that jurors be in complete agreement as to the collateral or underlying facts which relate to the manner in which the culpable conduct was undertaken.). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err by failing to give an instruction requiring that the jury agree unanimously on which five underlings Stitt managed, organized, or supervised.