Opinion ID: 777205
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States v. Orozco-Prada

Text: 14 In Orozco-Prada, the defendant was charged in a seven-count indictment with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, and cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance (Count One), and various substantive charges involving a money laundering scheme (Counts Two through Seven). Id. at 1079. The jury returned guilty verdicts against the defendant on all counts except Count Three. Id. Because Count One charged a conspiracy involving both cocaine and marijuana, a conviction on that count was punishable under different statutory provisions. Id. at 1083. 15 The statutory provision applicable to a cocaine conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), permitted a maximum sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment while the applicable provision governing conspiracies involving marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), set a five-year maximum term of imprisonment. The district court sentenced the defendant to eight years' imprisonment pursuant to the statutory provision applicable to a cocaine conspiracy on the theory that the evidence presented to the jury supported the inference that at least some of the money laundered was the product of cocaine sales. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083. 16 On appeal, we found the sentence improper, holding that in the absence of a special verdict, there was no way for [the district court] to know whether the jury intended to convict [the defendant] for a cocaine-related conspiracy, for a marijuana-related conspiracy, or for a conspiracy involving both drugs. Id. Adopting the procedure used by two other circuits faced with the same situation, see United States v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.1975); Brown v. United States, 299 F.2d 438 (D.C.Cir.1962), we withheld judgment on the Count One conviction, giving the government thirty days to consent to resentencing under the statutory provision applicable to a marijuana conspiracy, at which point we would affirm the conviction. If the government chose not to consent, we would vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial. Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1084. 3