Opinion ID: 1473284
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Heading: Under N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-1,

Text: notwithstanding the contrary provisions of any law or rule or regulation issued pursuant to law, a person shall not be disqualified or discriminated against by any licensing authority because of any conviction for a crime    unless the conviction relates adversely to the occupation, trade, vocation, profession or business for which the license or certificate is sought. Two exceptions to the statute are relevant in this case, both of which were relied on by this Court in In re Schmidt, 79 N.J. 344 (1979). In Schmidt we held that the RCOA did not apply to the Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) because that agency regulated a unique industry, susceptible to inherent evils and treated by the legislature in a special fashion. Id. at 354. In addition we held that the RCOA provisions did not apply to the ABC because the ABC was an exempt law enforcement agency under N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-6. Id. at 354-55. The Commission argues that it should be exempt from the RCOA for the same reasons that applied to the ABC. We disagree. Although we are well aware that the Commission holds broad regulatory powers in light of the strong public interest in the honesty of horse racing and parimutuel wagering, see, e.g., Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47 (1959); State v. Garden State Racing Ass'n, 136 N.J.L. 173 (E. & A. 1947); State v. Dolce, 178 N.J. Super. 175 (App.Div. 1981), and that the alcoholic beverage and racing industries have been previously grouped together by this Court, see Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, supra, 29 N.J. at 55, there are significant differences between the statutory schemes affecting the ABC and the Commission that require dissimilar treatment in respect of the RCOA. Under both Acts, licenses shall not be issued to persons who have been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. N.J.S.A. 5:5-34 (horse racing); N.J.S.A. 33:1-25 (alcoholic beverages). With regard to the alcoholic beverage industry, however, there are certain savings provisions that cut back on the apparent absolute authority of the director; similar provisions are not a part of the racing laws. Under N.J.S.A. 33:1-26, [p]ersons failing to qualify    by reason of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude may, with the approval of the director, and subject to rules and regulations, be employed by any licensee. In addition, N.J.S.A. 33:1-31.2 provides as follows: Any person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, may after the lapse of five years from the date of conviction, apply to the commissioner for an order removing the resulting statutory disqualification from obtaining or holding any license or permit under this chapter. Whenever any such application is made and it appears to the satisfaction of the commissioner that at least five years have elapsed from the date of conviction, that the applicant has conducted himself in a law-abiding manner during that period and that his association with the alcoholic beverage industry will not be contrary to the public interest, the commissioner may, in his discretion and subject to rules and regulations, enter an order removing the applicant's disqualification from obtaining or holding a license or permit because of the conviction. These sections remove the statutory disqualification in certain instances and thus serve the same purpose as the RCOA. [1] Since similar savings provisions are absent from horse racing legislation, we hold that the Commission is subject to the provisions of the RCOA. As stated by the court below, to exempt the Racing Commission from RCOA because of the nature of the controlled industry would be inevitably to initiate an erosion and abrogation of RCOA which, in our view, would improperly impinge upon and finally defeat the legislative intention. 183 N.J. Super. at 405. The Commission argues that it should be considered a law enforcement agency, thus exempt from the RCOA under N.J.S.A. 2A:168A-6. Although the Commission holds certain law enforcement powers, those powers are less significant than the powers held by the ABC, and are insufficient to qualify it for statutory exemption. In Schmidt, we pointed out the unique character of the ABC among licensing agencies in its broad law enforcement powers, noting particularly (1) the authority, under N.J.S.A. 33:1-4, of the Director, his deputies, inspectors and investigators to effect warrantless arrests for violations of the ABC act committed in their presence; (2) the authority and powers, under the same statute, of peace officers [2] to enforce the act; (3) the duty of inspectors and investigators to arrest all persons they have reasonable grounds to believe are committing or have committed a misdemeanor under Title 33; (4) the Director's power to inspect and conduct warrantless searches of licensed premises and to subpoena witnesses; and (5) the exemption of certain ABC officials from the provisions of the Concealed Weapons Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:151-43(p). [3] It was on the basis of these far-reaching powers that we perceived a legislative intention to set the ABC apart from other licensing agencies and to treat it as a law enforcement agency within the meaning of section 6 of the RCOA. We concluded therefore that the RCOA did not apply to the ABC. 79 N.J. at 354-55. In contrast to the broad powers noted above, the Racing Commission exercises limited powers, as described by the court below: [T]he enforcement of the act is not primarily the Commission's responsibility or within its authority but is rather the direct responsibility of the Attorney General and the county prosecutors.[ [4] ] It is true, as the Commission points out, that N.J.S.A. 5:5-77 accords it the power to appoint four persons to exercise the powers of municipal police officers to make arrests, execute criminal process and enforce both the criminal laws of the state and the provisions of the act. We do not, however, regard the limited powers of the commission to appoint four police officers to perform routine police functions as sufficient to warrant characterizing the Commission itself as a law enforcement agency. By that reasoning every municipality which employs police officers would also thereby become itself a law enforcement agency exempt from the RCOA. That was clearly not the legislative intention. We also recognize that the Commission has promulgated regulations suggestive of its law enforcement powers. But regulations adopted by an agency do not by themselves alter the agency's essential character as defined by its own enabling legislation. Nor are the regulations here relied on by the Commission unique to law enforcement agencies. They are, rather, typical of administrative agency powers. Thus, N.J.S.A. 13:71-23.18 requires Racing Commission officials and licensees to cooperate with the State police, N.J.A.C. 13:71-5.2 requires track security personnel to file daily reports with the State police, N.J.A.C. 13:71-5.2 requires track security personnel to file daily reports with the State police, N.J.A.C. 13:71-1.3 requires participants and patrons to abide by Commission rules and N.J.A.C. 13:71-23.17 requires judges who discover that a horse is drugged to notify the State Police and to authorize a search and investigation with the assistance of the State Police. It is thus plain to us that unlike the self-initiating and self-executing law enforcement powers of the personnel of the Division of Alcoholic Beverage, the Racing Commission is, except for its four appointed police officers, required both by statute and regulation to rely on conventional law enforcement services. [183 N.J. Super. at 403-04.]