Opinion ID: 618536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Consecutive Counts

Text: Richart argues, further, that the district court erred in running the two sixty-month sentences consecutive to each other. [W]e review the district court's decision to impose consecutive sentences for reasonableness. United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2010). Richart contends that the district court's decision to impose consecutive sentences was unreasonable because it violated U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 and because there was not a sufficient basis to run the counts consecutively. Section 5G1.2 states, in relevant part: (c) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is adequate to achieve the total punishment, then the sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. (d) If the sentence imposed on the count carrying the highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment. In all other respects, sentences on all counts shall run concurrently, except to the extent otherwise required by law. We have defined the phrase `total punishment' to mean `the precise sentence determined by the sentencing judge from within the appropriate [G]uidelines range.' Rutherford, 599 F.3d at 820 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1045-46 (8th Cir.2000)). However, the now-advisory Guidelines cannot mandate a sentence within the calculated range or concurrent sentencing. Id. at 821. In addition to the Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 are relevant `statutory concerns' for the district court to consider in reaching its ultimate sentence. Id. Section 3584 states that [i]f multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time ... the terms may run concurrently or consecutively, and directs that the district court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider ... the factors set forth in section 3553(a). Thus, [t]he applicability of § 5G1.2 to cases involving multiple counts is narrow. Rutherford, 599 F.3d at 821. Notably § 5G1.2 does not alternatively limit the district court's discretion to sentence consecutively when the total punishment is less than the statutory maximum. In other words, § 5G1.2 does not describe the only time a court may impose consecutive sentences. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also United States v. Jarvis, 606 F.3d 552, 554 (8th Cir.2010) (Although the court must consider the [G]uidelines when fashioning an appropriate sentence, the [G]uidelines do not control whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively. (internal citation omitted)). In fashioning sentences, whether concurrent or consecutive, a district court must still continue to determine the appropriate Guidelines range and then consider the § 3553(a) factors. Rutherford, 599 F.3d at 821. Here, the district court considered the Guidelines range, which the parties agreed was properly calculated to be between zero and six months, before considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a), as required by § 3584(b) and our precedents, in order to determine whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence. See id. The district court expressly stated that 120 months of incarceration is appropriate under 18 United States Code Section 3553(a). This finding reflects the district court's conclusion that, even after departing up to the statutory maximum on each count, concurrent sentences would not be sufficient under the facts of the case, and, therefore, consecutive sentences were required to achieve the appropriate total punishment. Richart contends that the decision to run the two sixty-month sentences consecutive to each other constitutes an additional upward departure independent of the upward departure from the calculated guideline range to the statutory maximum and the court procedurally erred in failing to explain and / or support sufficiently this departure. We reject this argument, too. As we explained in Part II.A.(ii), above, the district court adequately demonstrated consideration of the statutory sentencing factors in determining that 120 months' imprisonment was an appropriate sentence. The court did not procedurally err in achieving this objective by varying up to the statutory maximum on each count and running the two sentences consecutive to each other. The district court correctly calculated the advisory guideline range, properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, selected a 120-month sentence based on factual findings that were not clearly erroneous, and adequately explained the chosen sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586; Frausto, 636 F.3d at 995. Consequently, we find no procedural error in the district court's analysis.
Our second task on appeal, if we are certain that the district court's decision is `procedurally sound,' is to `then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.' Washington, 515 F.3d at 865 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586). A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight; gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or considers only the appropriate factors but ... commits a clear error of judgment. United States v. Saddler, 538 F.3d 879, 890 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotations marks omitted). Richart asserts error of all three types. First, Richart contends that the district court gave improper weight to her state sentence for Christina's murder, which the district court deemed inadequate. Specifically, she contends that the instant sentence was clearly driven by this one factor. Moreover, she asserts that the district court should not have considered her state conviction at all because this factor is already taken into account by the Guidelines in establishing the base offense level for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Second, Richart argues that the district court failed to give sufficient weight to the advisory guideline range. Finally, Richart contends that the factors relied on by the district court did not support a sentence of 120 months, which was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). We do not agree with Richart that the sentence imposed by the district court was driven solely by its belief that her state sentence for Christina's murder was inadequate. While the district court gave significant weight to the fact that Richart murdered her niece and to the uncertain amount of time Richart will actually serve in state prison, the court also gave several other reasons for concluding that the sentence imposed was appropriate, including: that Richart's lie was about something very brutal and caused harm to many people; that Richart successfully carried on the lie for a long period of time, and might otherwise have been convicted of a more serious offense than second degree murder; that Richart's crime would have gone undetected but for Donna Walker; and that 120 months' imprisonment provided just punishment and deterred others from committing similar offenses. Nevertheless, were we to conclude that the district court ought not to have considered Richart's state conviction at all, remand would likely be necessary. See, e.g., United States v. Bertling, 611 F.3d 477, 482 (8th Cir.2010) (To be sure, the district court discussed other reasons for varying from [the appellants'] advisory guidelines ranges, but that fact alone does not allow us to affirm the sentences.); accord United States v. Hunt, 521 F.3d 636, 649 (6th Cir.2008) ([I]t does not matter that the district court relied on a number ... of relevant facts in its sentencing, if it also relied on facts that it could not properly consider.). We do not believe, though, that Richart's state murder conviction was an improper or irrelevant factor for the district court to consider. We agree with the district court that the second-degree murder offense[ ] in no way enhanced under the [G]uidelines ... the sentence [Richart] received on either count.... It might have been relevant conduct for purposes of not giving her criminal history points, but it did not in any way affect the guideline calculation of either ... the conspiracy count or the substantive count. Further, as we explained in Part II.A.(ii), above, the circumstances of Richart's case take it outside the heartland of typical 18 U.S.C. § 1001 violations. Consequently, we disagree with Richart's argument that the fact that she killed her niece is already taken into account by the Guidelines in establishing the guideline range for a violation of § 1001. In any case, we previously have allowed variances based on factors already taken into account by the advisory guidelines, where the Guidelines do not fully account for those factors, or when a district court applies broader § 3553(a) considerations in granting the variance. Jones, 509 F.3d at 914 (internal quotations marks omitted) (affirming an upward variance based on the defendant's jailhouse misconduct even though that misconduct was also the basis for denying a two-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility, because the misconduct not only demonstrated his lack of acceptance of responsibility, but, ... [also] clearly was relevant to other § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 352 (8th Cir.2011) ([W]e have held that a district court may impose an upward variance based on facts already included in the advisory sentencing guidelines where the advisory guidelines do not fully account for those facts. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); see also United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2009) ([F]actors that have already been taken into account in calculating the advisory guideline range, such as a defendant's lack of criminal history, can nevertheless form the basis of a variance.); United States v. Roberson, 334 Fed.Appx. 787, 790 (8th Cir.2009) (unpublished) (affirming the district court's upward variance because [w]hile it is true the Guidelines accounted for the seriousness of the instant offense ... the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the Guidelines did not account for [its] extreme, dangerous, and random nature). Thus, even if though the guideline range for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 already accounts for the possibility that a suspect would lie to an interrogator in order to minimize his exposure to criminal prosecution, Robertson, 324 F.3d at 1032, the district court did not err in varying upward based on its determination that the Guidelines do not fully account for the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of Richart's offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A). Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by giving too much weight to an improper factor. United States v. Barrett, 552 F.3d 724, 727 (8th Cir.2009). We also disagree with Richart's assertion that the district court failed to give sufficient weight to the advisory guideline range. The district court acknowledged at sentencing that [t]he custody range is zero to [six] months under the [G]uidelines, but explicitly found that a zero-to-six month sentence is far, far too inadequate. Clearly, the district court did not fail to consider this relevant factor. See Saddler, 538 F.3d at 890 (A district court abuses its discretion ... when it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight.... (internal quotations marks omitted)). Therefore, we turn to Richart's argument that a 120-month sentence was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). Section 3553(a) provides that the sentencing court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)]. These purposes are the need for the sentence imposed: (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. § 3553(a)(2). In this case, the district court varied upward from the top of the advisory guideline range by fifty-four months on each count, and ran the two sentences consecutive to each other to achieve a total upward variance of 114 months from what Gall characterizes as the initial benchmark. 552 U.S. at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586. This upward variance is neither minor nor insubstantial, and [e]ven under Gall, `a [major] variance should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.' Washington, 515 F.3d at 867 (alteration in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586). The district court must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented, and upon determining that a non-Guidelines sentence is warranted, the district court must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. 586; Washington, 515 F.3d at 867. However, even though the sentence imposed is outside the advisory Guidelines range, our substantive review of Richart's sentence is narrow and deferential. Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.). Thus, it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentencewhether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines rangeas substantively unreasonable. Feemster, 572 F.3d at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted). We may consider the extent of [any variance from the Guidelines range], but must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. We may not require extraordinary circumstances to justify a sentence outside the Guidelines and are prohibited from the use of a rigid mathematical formula that uses the percentage of a departure as the standard for determining the strength of the justifications required for a specific sentence. Feemster, 572 F.3d at 462 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 47, 128 S.Ct. 586). While we must ensure that the district court gave serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and explained its conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications, id. at 462 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 128 S.Ct. 586), the fact that we might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court, Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. In this case, as noted, the district court explained that a 120-month sentence was appropriate because: Richart's lie was about something very brutal; Richart's crime in murdering her niece would have gone undetected but for Donna Walker; Richart successfully carried on the lie for a long period of time and, absent the lie, might have been convicted of a more serious offense than second degree murder; it was unclear how much time Richart would actually serve in state prison; Richart's lie caused harm not just to Christina but to many other people; and 120 months' imprisonment provided just punishment for Richart's offense and sends a message to deter others from committing similar offenses. Viewing the district court's sentencing decision with due deference, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. See United States v. Mangum, 625 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir.2010). [A] sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the section 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence. United States v. Lozoya, 623 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (rejecting appellants' argument that the circumstances were not extraordinary enough to justify upward variances of sixty-five and forty-three months). Simply because the district court weighed the relevant factors more heavily than Richart would prefer does not mean the district court abused its discretion. See id.; see also United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the appellant must show more than the fact that the district court disagreed with his view of what weight ought to be accorded certain sentencing factors); Mangum, 625 F.3d at 470 (Where a district court in imposing a sentence makes an individualized assessment based on the facts presented, addressing the defendant's proffered information in its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, such sentence is not unreasonable. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). We may notit bears repeatingset aside a sentence merely because we would have decided that another one is more appropriate. A district court's sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need only be a reasonable one. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121, 1134 (8th Cir.2011) (holding that although this court's assessment of whether two co-defendants were similarly situated for purposes of weighing § 3553(a)(6) would be different than the district court's, viewed through the lens of Gall, ... the district court acted within its broad discretion (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Garate, 543 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir.2008) ( Gall is quite clear that the fact that we may have weighed some facts differently, ... or that we, in applying our own individual decades of prior experience as sentencing judges in both the federal and state systems, would not have imposed the same ... sentence had we been sitting as the sentencing court, `is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.' (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586)). Indeed, this court has previously upheld comparable, and even larger, absolute month variances, in deference to the sentencing judge's institutional advantage in finding facts and judging their import under § 3553(a). Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52, 128 S.Ct. 586; see, e.g., United States v. Foy, 617 F.3d 1029, 1038 (8th Cir.2010) (affirming a 218-month upward variance because (1) [w]e are not entitled ... under our deferential review to overturn a sentencing decision because we might have reasonably concluded a different sentence was appropriate; (2) the district court provided as our precedent requires, substantial insight into the reasons for its determination; and (3) the district court's explicit justifications rest largely on the kind of defendant-specific determinations that are within the special competence of sentencing courts (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Azure, 596 F.3d 449, 456 (8th Cir.2010) (affirming the district court's decision to run two sentences consecutively in order to achieve a 180-month sentence, which was 84 months above the top of the advisory guideline range for each count); United States v. Dehghani, 550 F.3d 716, 723 (8th Cir.2008) (affirming an upward variance of 105 months to achieve a sentence of 432 months' imprisonment, and explaining that [b]ecause the sentencing judge is in a superior position to weigh the relevant factors under § 3553(a), the fact that we might reasonably conclude `that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court') (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586); United States v. McDonald, 267 Fed.Appx. 477, 478-79 (8th Cir.2008) (unpublished) (recognizing the Supreme Court's rejection of an appellate rule that requires extraordinary circumstances to justify an extraordinary variance, and affirming a 130-month downward variance [u]nder the more deferential abuse-of-discretion review outlined by the Supreme Court in Gall (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Larrabee, 436 F.3d 890, 894 (8th Cir.2006) (affirming an upward variance of 128 months). Ultimately, the district court determined that the circumstances of Richart's offense were not typical, but were particularly egregious and out of the ordinary, justifying a significant upward variance. Giving deference to the district court as required by Gall, we cannot say that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors. See Kane, 639 F.3d at 1136 (Because of the substantial deference district courts are due in sentencing, we give their decisions about what is reasonable wide berth and almost always let them pass. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Particularly given the impermissibility of proportionality review after Gall, 552 U.S at 49, 128 S.Ct. 586, we see no basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Richart to 120 months' imprisonment. See, e.g., United States v. Bear Robe, 521 F.3d 909, 911 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Austad, 519 F.3d 431, 435 (8th Cir.2008) (opining that before Gall, the defendant's sentence might have presented a closer issue, but recognizing that [i]n light of Gall, ... although it is uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one, the justification need not be precisely proportionate (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly, we find that Richart's sentence is substantively reasonable and affirm the judgment of the district court.
Lastly, Richart objects to two of the special conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court. She argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing special condition one, which requires her to participate in sexual offender treatment, and special condition three, which forbids direct contact with minors absent written approval from her probation officer and prohibits her from entering areas children frequent. We review the district court's imposition of the terms and conditions of supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jorge-Salgado, 520 F.3d 840, 842 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court is afforded wide discretion in imposing conditions on a defendant's supervised release so long as they meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 667 (8th Cir.2007). Section 3583(d) requires that any special conditions imposed must be reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant's history and characteristics, the deterrence of criminal conduct, the protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the defendant's educational, vocational, medicinal or other correctional needs. See United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, such conditions must involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve these purposes and must be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. § 3583(d). Richart contends that special conditions one and three are unwarranted under § 3583 because the district court's factual finding that Richart physically and sexually abused the children in her care was clearly erroneous. See United States v. Douglas, 646 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that we review the district court's factual findings at sentencing for clear error). She concedes that if the district court did not clearly err in finding that she physically and sexually abused the children in her care, then the special conditions were proper. At sentencing, the district court overruled Richart's objection to the allegations in the PSR that Richart physically and sexually abused the children in her care based on the testimony of Agent Lowe. Lowe's testimony was as follows: Q: And let's address the allegation of physical abuse and sexual abuse against Christina, Michael, and Norman. Have you interviewed Michael Richart about this? A: Yes. Q: Have you interviewed Norman Richart about this? A: Yes. Q: The allegations of sexual and physical abuse, who does it come from? A: It comes from Norman and Michael. Q: And they said they were abused physically and sexually? A: Yes, they did. Q: By whom? A: Wanda and Bubba Richart. Richart asserts that Lowe's testimony is insufficiently reliable to support the district court's finding because it is uncorroborated hearsay. A district court has wide discretion at sentencing as to the kind of information considered or its source. United States v. Atkins, 250 F.3d 1203, 1212 (8th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1276 (8th Cir.1985)). `In resolving any ... dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing determination, the court may consider relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.' United States v. Pratt, 553 F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir.2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). In other words, relevant hearsay testimony may be considered if sufficiently reliable reasons demonstrate the testimony is probably accurate. United States v. Woods, 596 F.3d 445, 448 (8th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir.2005)). The determination of whether hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable to support a sentencing decision depends on the facts of the particular case, and is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Id. (quoting United States v. Cassidy, 6 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir.1993)). The district court recognized that Lowe's testimony was hearsay, but held that it was corroborated by other allegations in the PSR, namely that Norman was removed from Wanda and Bubba's care prior to Christina's death based on reports of abuse, and that Michael was removed from their care after Christina's death also because abuse was reported. Lowe's evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Donna Walker, who stated both at trial and at sentencing that Michael Richart came to live with her and her husband after his teachers reported suspected abuse. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Lowe's testimony was probably accurate. Woods, 596 F.3d at 448. In light of Lowe's and Walker's testimony, the district court's factual finding that Richart sexually abused the children in her care was not clearly erroneous. As such, special conditions one and three are reasonably related to the goals of § 3553(a). Bender, 566 F.3d at 751. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's imposition of the conditions of supervised release.