Opinion ID: 569341
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: james daniel walton

Text: 36 Walton's most serious claim on appeal is that the district court violated his sixth amendment right to counsel by peremptorily dismissing his pretrial motion for substitution of counsel. 37 Walton was arraigned in Milwaukee on February 3, 1989, at which time the district court set an April 3, 1989, trial date. Walton was represented at the arraignment by a court-appointed attorney who had been assigned Walton's case the day before. On March 20, six weeks after his arraignment and two weeks before trial, Walton's attorney met with him for the first time since the arraignment. Apparently the meeting did not go well; that same day, counsel filed on Walton's behalf a motion to withdraw. Counsel represented in an affidavit that during his meeting with Walton: 38 the defendant became very abusive and angry and indicated that he desired a different attorney to represent his interest. [T]he defendant refused to discuss the matter any further ... and ordered the guard to remove [counsel] from the jail cell. 39 Walton's counsel concluded that it would be in the defendant's best interest that new counsel be appointed. Without holding a hearing or engaging in any further inquiry, the district court denied Walton's motion, stating that: 40 [i]n a multidefendant case I can't allow defendants to 'fire' their attorneys, especially on the eve of trial. Mr. Walton is advised that he will go to trial, or plead out of the case, on April 3 as scheduled. No new attorney will be appointed so he should cooperate with [appointed counsel]. 41 Walton contends on appeal that the district court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on his request for new counsel. He argues that a district court, faced with a motion for new counsel, and little knowledge of the substance of the complaint--as was indeed the case here--has a duty to inquire into the basis for the client's objection to counsel and should withhold a ruling until reasons are made known. Brown v. United States, 264 F.2d 363, 369 (D.C.Cir.1959) (Burger, J., concurring), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911, 79 S.Ct. 1299, 3 L.Ed.2d 1262 (1959). We agree. 42 That such an inquiry must take place follows from the very nature of the law governing attorney substitution motions. Attorney-client conflicts only justify the grant of a substitution motion when counsel and defendant are so at odds as to prevent presentation of an adequate defense. United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 333 (7th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Morris, 714 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir.1983) (grant of motion warranted where conflict is so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense). Unless a substitution motion or the accompanying affidavit of counsel is extremely detailed--which, as here, is often not the case--a court cannot make such a determination without conducting a proper hearing at which both attorney and client testify as to the nature of their conflict. For this reason, the courts of appeals have held that  'the district court must engage in at least some inquiry as to the reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction with his existing attorney.'  McMahon v. Fulcomer, 821 F.2d 934, 942 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.1982)); see also United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 n. 1 (10th Cir.1987) (the district court should make a formal inquiry into the defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with present counsel when substitution of counsel is requested); Hillsberg, 812 F.2d at 333 (defendant [should be] given an opportunity to state his reasons for the [substitution] request); United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir.1986) (Where the accused voices objections to appointed counsel, the trial court should inquire into the reasons for the dissatisfaction.); Thomas v. Wainright, 767 F.2d 738, 741 (11th Cir.1985) (same); Morris, 714 F.2d at 673 (In order to exercise its discretion properly the court must elicit from the defendant the reasons for his objections to counsel.) 43 As our excerpts from Walton's motion suggest, his substitution request was clearly not sufficiently detailed to allow the district court to dismiss it out of hand without further inquiry. The district court was required to make a more detailed investigation of the nature of Walton's conflict with his attorney and thereby maintain the integrity of Walton's sixth amendment right to counsel. Its failure to do so was an abuse of its discretion. 44 We must then address whether the court's error was harmless. Walton argues that in conducting this inquiry we must reverse his conviction if he was indeed entitled to have his substitution motion granted. We take a different view. Courts allow defendants to change attorneys in certain circumstances to ensure that they are afforded the effective assistance of counsel. It follows that the court's peremptory denial of Walton's motion was harmful only if it resulted in a violation of this sixth amendment right. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1964), Walton must therefore demonstrate that the performance of the attorney he was saddled with was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, and that but for counsel's deficiencies, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 45 Walton contends that his attorney's performance was indeed deficient. He points first to the fact that his attorney did not meet with him to discuss the merits of his case until 13 days before trial, six weeks after his arraignment. This delay, suggests Walton, made the adequate preparation of a defense impossible--no lawyer could lay the groundwork for a defense that properly tested the conspiracy allegations against him in such a short time. Walton's principal complaint is that at his initial meeting with counsel he expressed a desire to present an alibi defense, but his attorney refused to investigate the viability of such a defense by interviewing alibi witnesses. These witnesses, Walton contends, would have testified that he was elsewhere at the times when the government's witnesses testified that he was participating in the conspiracy. 46 Walton's allegations are serious. Thirteen days is not a great deal of time to mount a defense in a complex multidefendant drug conspiracy. Even more troubling is the apparent refusal of Walton's attorney to investigate the possibility of an alibi defense. As disturbing as counsel's refusal is, however, we are unable to determine on the record before us whether it constitutes conduct that falls below the sixth amendment's standards. Defense attorneys have a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. As no investigation was made here, the question is whether the decision of Walton's counsel not to engage in one was reasonable. Such a decision would be reasonable if, during their meeting, Walton gave his attorney reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Or, as this court has put it, counsel's failure would be excused if he could make a rational decision that investigation is unnecessary. Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 580, 583 (7th Cir.1984). We note that courts have often had difficulty characterizing as a rational or reasonable exercise of professional judgment counsel's complete failure to investigate potential alibi witnesses as was the case here. See United States v. Debango, 780 F.2d 81, 85 (D.C.Cir.1986); United States v. Wolf, 727 F.2d 656, 658 & n. 3 (7th Cir.1984); Crisp, 743 F.2d at 584; Thomas v. Lockhart, 738 F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir.1984). Nevertheless, without a clue as to why Walton's counsel acted as he did, and without a better understanding of the alibi defense Walton wished to present, we are unable to evaluate the adequacy of counsel's representation. A remand for an evidentiary hearing would therefore seem appropriate. See United States v. Myers, 892 F.2d 642, 649 (7th Cir.1990). 47 The government concedes the troubling nature of Walton's allegations, but argues that any error or failure on the part of counsel was not prejudicial. If the government is correct in this regard, there would be no need for a remand, as Walton would necessarily be unable to establish a sixth amendment violation. 3 We turn, then, to our prejudice inquiry. To prevail under Strickland, Walton must establish a reasonable probability that his attorney's performance affected the trial's outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Montgomery v. Petersen, 846 F.2d 407, 414 (7th Cir.1988). Whether such a reasonable probability exists depends, of course, on the nature and strength of the government's case against him, and the nature of his attorney's failures. 48 Four individuals testified against Walton. Randy Friedl testified that Walton first showed up at the marina in the late fall of 1986 to work on Andrini-Varga's boats and that at that time, Walton did not join the conspiracy. Walton was, however, living in a house which doubled as a processing point for newly imported marijuana. This posed problems, according to Friedl. Every time we were to do a move and bring [in] marijuana ... they had to get him out of there. There was a conflict. Tr. at 1385. The solution, according to Friedl, was simple. [A]fter that they brought him into the organization being that he always knew what was going on. Id. The testimony of three government witnesses corroborated Friedl's statement. Brandt, Cleary, and Schmidt testified that Walton was involved in the conspiracy's importation operations between February 1987 and January 1988. Brandt and Cleary testified that Walton manned a boat during the pickup of air-dropped marijuana in February or March of 1987. Cleary also placed Walton at the warehouse where the contraband was packaged the next day. Brandt, Cleary, and Schmidt all placed Walton on a boat during a marijuana's packaging for shipment. Brandt also testified that Walton was involved in a pick-up sometime in October 1987, and Schmidt testified that Walton manned a boat in an unsuccessful air-drop operation in early December of 1987. Finally, Brandt and Cleary placed Walton on boats both at the beginning and end of January 1988 when two unsuccessful air-drops were attempted. 49 Walton argues that the testimony of his alibi witnesses would have proved that he was elsewhere during the drug ring's attempts to import marijuana in December 1987 and January 1988. Even if this were true, however, the government's witnesses have tied him to importation operations in the spring and summer of 1987. Walton does not suggest in his brief that his alibi witnesses would have refuted that portion of the government's case. In light of the fact that Walton's alibi witnesses would not have made a dent in a significant part of the government's formidable case, we conclude that any failure on the part of his attorney to investigate and present an alibi defense was not prejudicial.
50 Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentences of drug offenders are tied to the quantity of controlled substance involved in the charged offense. See § 2E1.1. Those convicted of conspiring to violate the drug laws are criminally responsible for the total quantity of drugs in which the conspiracy they joined can reasonably be estimated to have dealt. See § 1B1.3; United States v. Sergio, 934 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir.1991); Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1389. Walton challenges the district court's computation of the amount of marijuana relevant to the determination of his sentence. He argues that the district court sentenced him on the basis of a quantity of marijuana--6,600 pounds--without having made explicit factual findings to support this figure. The transcript of the sentencing proceedings indicates that the district court found Walton responsible for the conspiracy's importation of 6,600 pounds of marijuana, but that it indeed made no effort to detail why that quantity was chosen. Our reading of the transcript suggests that the district court found Walton's liability so evident as not to require any sort of detailed explanation. However obvious the evidence and the amount may have seemed, we agree with Walton that the district court erred in not establishing with greater specificity the quantity serving as the basis of Walton's sentence. 51 The evidence ties Walton to the conspiracy's activities from February 1987 to January 1988, and hence to the importation of 4400 pounds of marijuana (1400 lbs. in February, 1500 lbs. in July, and 1500 lbs. in October). The evidence also indicates that the conspirators--Walton included--attempted to import a total of 3000 pounds of marijuana in January 1988. Quantities involved in such attempts are also considered under the Guidelines in calculating base offense levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4 (If a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy or an attempt to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed.). Walton contends that the amounts involved in the successful smuggling runs ought not to be considered in calculating his base offense level because he was acquitted by the jury of the substantive importation charges (counts 24, 25 and 27 of the indictment) relating to these episodes. Nothing in the guidelines, however, prevents a judge from taking account of conduct in which the defendant engaged, whether or not an acquittal prevents the imposition of criminal penalties directly on that conduct. United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1332 (7th Cir.1990). The jury's acquittal of Walton on the substantive importation counts means only that it did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in the charged conduct. At sentencing, the district court could have nevertheless considered the importation episodes if it had established Walton's involvement by a (less demanding) preponderance of the evidence standard appropriate in sentencing matters. See id. at 1333 (collecting cases); United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495, 1496 (7th Cir.1990). The district court made no such finding; it did not detail which importation episodes it considered in arriving at its calculation, nor did it find that a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that Walton participated in the importation activities that were the basis of the substantive charges of which he was acquitted. Such specificity was especially necessary in light of the fact that Walton argued that he joined the conspiracy months after it had begun and therefore should not be held liable for its earliest importations. We therefore vacate Walton's sentence and remand Walton's case to the district court for the appropriate factual findings and resentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Tolson, 760 F.Supp. 1332 (N.D.Ind.1991).