Opinion ID: 21127
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitation Act Protections under the Instant Facts

Text: 16 As an alternative basis for affirming the district court, we address, on an as applied basis, the interaction of the Limitation Act and the Coast Guard's statutory authority for the instant drug testing in the context of the particular facts of this case. Even if we were to assume arguendo that the regulatory duties imposed on the Coast Guard by Congress in connection with drug testing somehow come within the ambit of the Limitation Act, we would still have to determine the statutory scope of the express language of the Limitation Act in this context. 17 The Limitation Act works only to limit the liability of a shipowner for loss, damage, or injury by collision, or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred without the privity or knowledge of such owner[.] 9 Thus, we must decide whether the regulatory proceedings complained of by Petitioners here are the result of their acts that were done, occasioned, or incurred as part of the Hall accident that provoked the underlying limitation litigation. Stated differently, if we assume for the sake of argument that Petitioners actually failed to perform the required drug and alcohol testing and reporting, we would then have to determine whether such failure was part and parcel of the Hall accident or was instead a separate incident, distinct from the accident and the voyage. Not surprisingly, Petitioners contend that the regulatory penalties are forfeitures done, occasioned, or incurred as a result of the accident and are thus subject to limitation; and, no less surprisingly, the Coast Guard insists they are not. As this presents a mixed question of fact and law, our review is de novo. 18 We again find no jurisprudence directly on point. The parties invite us to consider, for guidance, the voyage test 10 and our own precedent establishing the distinct occurrence test. 11 Although we find neither test dispositive, we do note that the latter requires a factual inquiry into whether the vessel owner had the 'time and opportunity' to take the necessary action to avoid subsequent liability that is distinct from the initial liability imposing event. 12 Although Petitioners argue that further proceedings are needed to determine what, if anything, they could have done to prevent additional liability in the form of violations, we do not see it that way. The record before us is sufficient to establish definitively that, after Hall was injured, Petitioners had ample opportunity to comply with the Coast Guard requirements. We view the alleged failure to comply under this construction to be a distinct occurrence giving rise to an independent liability. Petitioners urge impossibility of compliance in light of the extremely traumatic nature of the Hall's injuries and the difficulty in obtaining blood samples given the massive transfusionsthat were necessitated; however, those parties will have ample opportunity to raise impossibility as a defense in the regulatory proceedings. This assertion simply has no bearing on the question of distinct occurrence. 19 Although both the facts and the timing make this a relatively close call, the more accurate characterization of the circumstances is that the administrative violations alleged to have occurred were distinct from, and subsequent to, the incident in which Hall was injured. They thus give rise to a liability, if any, that is not properly subject to the Limitation Act.