Opinion ID: 2634775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Silence Asserted by Munson Was Protected by Both the Federal and State Constitutions, Regardless of Munson's Subjective Fear of Retaliation.

Text: We turn to the question whether a statement by a suspect that he was done talkin' is a valid invocation of the right to silence if it was not clearly motivated by fear of self-incrimination. If our answer is yes, then the police investigators were bound by Miranda and its progeny to respect that right; but if the request was not constitutionally-protected, then the investigators had no duty to stop the interrogation or to clarify Munson's intentions. We begin our analysis with the words of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section nine of the Alaska Constitution, both of which guarantee that no person shall be compelled in any criminal [case or proceeding] to be a witness against himself. These simple words form the basis of a criminal defendant's rights to counsel and to remain silent. [25] While the core protection is a prohibition on compelling a defendant to testify against himself at trial, [26] Miranda and our own cases under the Alaska Constitution show that this protection is enforceable in any setting where a suspect is subject to custodial police interrogation. [27] Indeed, because such an interrogation is inherently coercive, Miranda laid down concrete constitutional guidelines, which include the requirement to give a defendant the four specific warnings that comprise his so-called Miranda rights. [28] The failure to provide proper warnings or to obtain a waiver of those rights is generally sufficient to exclude any statements obtained. [29] This rule-based approach establishes a brightline standard for admissibility of confessions; [30] and the litmus test is not only whether the suspect voluntarily made a statement, [31] but whether his waiver of the right to silence or to counsel was knowing and intelligent. [32] Although Miranda's requirements sweep beyond the literal protections of the Fifth Amendment, [33] the U.S. Supreme Court has described Miranda as a constitutional rule. [34] Miranda makes clear that a defendant can invoke his right to silence and end the interrogation in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning. [35] If a suspect in a custodial interrogation indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries ... [36] Subsequent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have clarified the state's duties when a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment rights. A defendant has the right not only to cut off questioning entirely, but also to control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. [37] Additionally, the police must scrupulously honor[] a suspect's invocation of the right to silence. [38] No ritualistic formula or talismanic phrase is essential in order to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination; [39] all that is required to invoke Miranda's protections is a statement with sufficient clarity that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand it to be an invocation of the suspect's rights. [40] To validly invoke the privilege, the suspect must face some hazard of incrimination, but this threshold requirement is met whenever the answers elicited could support a conviction or might furnish a link in the chain of evidence leading to a conviction. [41] Thus, a proper invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda requires only three things: a custodial interrogation, [42] a statement that would reasonably be understood as an invocation of the privilege, [43] and the clear possibility from the context of the interrogation that a responsive answer might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. [44] Once a suspect makes an attempt to cut off questioning entirely, [45] his request must be scrupulously honored. [46] In the face of an unequivocal invocation of those rights, police interrogators have very limited discretion to inquire into the defendant's subjective intent because they cannot, even to clarify a suspect's intent, wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. [47] These principles convince us that a suspect in a custodial interrogation can validly invoke his rights even if he may be motivated by a reason other than preventing self-incrimination. [48] That is, so long as the suspect's apparent motives do not cast genuine doubt on his desire to stop questioning entirely, then the issue of why he wants to do so is constitutionally irrelevant: the officer must scrupulously honor the suspect's request. The bright line rules articulated by Miranda and its progeny exist precisely because it is inappropriate to require the police to make difficult judgment calls about a defendant's underlying motivations for invoking his rights. [49] It will not always be apparent whether a suspect is attempting to cut off questioning to prevent self-incrimination; or because he is emotional, tired, angry, confused, frightened, or overwhelmed; or because of a combination of reasons. And the cost of clarification is simply too great: Not only would inquiry into a suspect's motivations prove a quagmire for police interrogators, but it would radically diminish Miranda's protections. Almost every invocation of the right to silence or to counsel could contain some ambiguity on the suspect's motives. If the police were permitted to aggressively inquire into a suspect's subjective intent for invoking the right, the suspect could well believe that his rights are illusory. [50] While the context of Munson's statement suggests that he was more likely afraid of Sam Camanga than of incriminating himself, it was not for the interrogator to speculate about Munson's motives because the request itself was entirely unambiguous. The circumstances surrounding Munson's interrogation demonstrate that this approach provides the clearest possible guidance for applying the requirements of Miranda and Mosley during a custodial interrogation. The transcript of the interrogation shows just how relentless an interrogator can be when attempting to clarify a suspect's invocation of his rights. From almost the moment Munson's interrogation began, he was told that invocation of his rights was irrelevant since the police already had evidence linking him to the crime, including the tape recording in which Munson acknowledged his presence when Gorsche was killed. After reading Munson his Miranda rights, but before seeking a waiver of those rights, Detective Hoffbeck laid out his case against Munson. [Interrogator]: Ok. Now having these [ Miranda ] rights in mind now I wanta ask you ... I wanta tell you basically a couple of things that we ... that we know about. [Munson]: Uhhuh. [Interrogator]: And then at the end of that there if you wanta talk to us you can talk to us, OK? [Interrogator describes the evidence the police have collected, including the incriminating tape of Munson discussing the crime with a co-defendant.] [Interrogator]: Ok? So we have all that information about you ... the choice is up to you ... you wanta talk to us about it? [Munson]: I have a question about that. What happens to me if I talk to you guys? [Interrogator]: Whether you talk to us or not, the same thing is gonna happen to ya. [Munson]: So if I don't say anything ... the same thing'll happen to me? . . . . So I'm gonna go to jail? [Interrogator]: Of course, yes, you're going to go to jail. [Munson]: And it doesn't matter if I talk or anything? Right? At this point in the conversation, Detective Hoffbeck informed Munson that his cooperation could have an impact on how a judge approached sentencing, and he began to ask questions about the crime. Only when Munson began to answer his questions did the investigator ask if he was willing to speak with him. But when Munson attempted to revoke his waiver, and to assert his right to silence, Detective Hoffbeck again tried to convince him of the futility of remaining silent. [Munson]: What's gonna happen? Is Sam gonna know I'm saying this? [Investigator]: Maybe Sam's already talked to me. [Munson]: No, but ... [Investigator]: Eventually Sam is going to know, yes ... the answer to that is yes. Everybody ... everybody involved is going to know eventually ... yes they will. [Munson]: Well, I'm done talkin' then. [Investigator]: Before you make a final decision on that there ... play that tape there for him.... [Tape playing in which Munson acknowledges that he was present when Gorsche was killed.] [Investigator]: You've already said it ... [Munson]: I know but ... [Investigator]: So what's the point? You've already said it so ... Although the state conceded below that a defendant can invoke his right to silence for any reason  even a whim  and the police must respect his decision, the state nonetheless maintains that Munson never invoked his constitutional rights because his request was motivated by a fear of Sam Camanga and, thus, equivocal. [51] The state argued below that the investigator clarified Munson's equivocal request by playing the recording of his incriminating discussion with a co-defendant, and that Munson's later confession demonstrated that his concerns were allayed and his statements were voluntary. But the overall impact of the investigator's comments, as well as his specific response to Munson's request to terminate the interrogation, demonstrate the inherently coercive nature of a custodial interrogation and reinforce the need for clear standards to govern an interrogator's conduct in the face of a suspect's invocation of his Miranda rights. While it is the centerpiece of the state's position that Munson's request was equivocal, it is clear that Detective Hoffbeck understood that Munson was trying to cut off questioning entirely. Indeed, in his suppression hearing testimony, the investigator never claimed confusion or uncertainty concerning Munson's desire to stop the interrogation. [52] Yet instead of scrupulously honoring what literally was a present-tense, unequivocal, unconditional attempt to cut off all further questioning, the investigator brushed off Munson's decision and insisted that Munson needed to make yet another decision  a  final decision: Before you make a final decision on that there ... play that tape there for him.... The investigator then set in motion a prepared playback of a surreptitiously recorded conversation between Munson and a police informant; the playback was apparently intended to persuade Munson that his decision was wrong: that he might as well talk because the police had already secretly recorded him, he was already exposed, and  in the investigator's opinion  he didn't need to be afraid in any event. By the standard established in Rhode Island v. Innis , the investigator's tactic unquestionably amounted to further interrogation. [53] The court of appeals seems to have assumed that Munson's desire to cut off questioning became equivocal because he evidently acted for a specific reason other than the one specified by the constitution: avoiding self-incrimination. Yet this tacit premise does not hold up to scrutiny. Under Miranda, a defendant like Munson does not need to radiate constitutionally pure motives; he just needs to make a clear attempt to stop questioning entirely. If his apparent motives do not cast genuine doubt on what he wants (that is, to stop questioning entirely), then the issue of why he wants it is constitutionally irrelevant: the officer must scrupulously honor the defendant's clear attempt to cut off questioning entirely. [54] To be sure, a defendant may not assert the right to silence when the privilege against self-incrimination does not attach to the questioning. But for purposes of determining whether the privilege attaches, our case law requires us to pose a situation-specific, not a motive-specific, question. We do not inquire what reasons prompt the defendant's refusal to speak; we simply ask whether the state's questions present a real risk of incrimination: To establish a Fifth Amendment claim, parties invoking the privilege have the burden of demonstrating a valid reason to believe that their compelled statements might incriminate them. This burden is not great: To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. [55] Miranda itself recognizes that custodial interrogation inherently poses a sufficient danger of incrimination to sustain the privilege. Here, Munson was subjected to custodial interrogation and was read his Miranda rights. Because the interrogation certainly placed him at risk of self-incrimination, the privilege unquestionably attached. He had a right to invoke it by expressing a clear desire to cut off the interrogation entirely, regardless of his subjective intent in doing so. Of course Munson's apparent motives would have been relevant if the totality of circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including his apparent motives, cast genuine doubt on his desire to stop the questioning completely. LaFave recognizes that sometimes, [d]epending on the surrounding circumstances, even a statement which itself appears to amount to an assertion of the right to remain silent (e.g., `I ain't saying nothing') may be held to [be ambiguous or equivocal]. [56] But as LaFave indicates, the ambiguity in these situations must arise from contextual circumstances suggesting that the defendant's reluctance is much more limited than wanting to stop the interrogation entirely. [57] Hence, if Munson's apparent fear, combined with other relevant circumstances, created a reasonable appearance that his categorical announcement that he was done talkin' was merely a tentative decision  or that it was fleeting, conditional, or even concealed a true desire to be questioned  then certainly his attempt to cut off questioning might fairly be characterized as ambiguous or equivocal. But here, as already noted, the circumstances hardly lend themselves to this characterization: Munson's announcement itself unequivocally and unconditionally declared his decision to cut off questioning; and the surrounding circumstances, including Munson's apparent motive for stopping, left little room for confusion. As noted, the investigator never claimed that he saw anything equivocal, ambiguous, or conditional about Munson's desire to stop questioning entirely. He understood that Munson wished to stop the questioning [58] but erroneously thought that he was free to press on despite Munson's wishes unless and until Munson formally invoked his Miranda rights by either asking for counsel or by refusing to continue talking. [59] Nothing in the circumstances surrounding Munson's declaration, in Munson's apparent motives for making the declaration, or in the declaration itself gave the investigator any reasonable basis to think that Munson was not making a final decision or that he was trying to do anything other than what he expressly declared that he wanted to do  to cut off the questioning entirely. At this point, Miranda and Mosley required the investigator to scrupulously honor the request, and precluded him from simply pressing on with his interrogation. The investigator's determination to ignore Munson's request seems particularly unreasonable when considered in light of the approach used in the interrogation leading up to Munson's request. The investigator began the interrogation by reading Munson his Miranda rights and asking if he understood them. But instead of asking immediately whether Munson wanted to invoke these rights, the investigator purposely delayed this question, saying that Munson would receive the opportunity to invoke his rights later, after the investigator provided some additional information. He then began to give Munson information that by any objective measure was bound to encourage cooperation, engage him in discussion, and produce incriminating statements. The additional information also created a considerable gap between the reading of Munson's rights and his opportunity to invoke them. In conducting the balance of the interview, the investigator believed Miranda required him to stop the interrogation only if Munson actually refused to talk or expressly invoked his right to counsel; on appeal, however, the state takes a different position. Despite the gap between the reading of Munson's Miranda rights and his first opportunity to assert them, the state now contends that Munson could invoke his rights only by making a demand to stop talking that clearly drew a connection between his desire to stop and his by-then-distantly read rights. But this position would allow the competitive enterprise of custodial interrogation to be carried a step too far. Viewed against this backdrop, the investigator's perfunctory dismissal of the clear and unequivocal attempt to cut of all further questioning, and his insistence on a new round of interrogation before allowing a final decision, could easily have convinced Munson that the investigator was determined to keep pressing his interrogation and was bound to deny Miranda's critical safeguard: Munson's ability to control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. [60] Upon hearing the demand for a final decision, any reasonable person in Munson's position would have recognized that his Miranda rights were merely illusory because the investigator had seized full control. Miranda exists to protect the rights of the criminally-accused in precisely these situations. An interrogator cannot try to convince a suspect that his silence is futile; the police cannot fail to honor a suspect's request by refusing to discontinue the interrogation... or by persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind. [61] Nor, as the prosecutor implied below, can Munson's confession be deemed voluntary by the fact that he continued to speak with the interrogators after the tape was played. As the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized: Using an accused's subsequent responses to cast doubt on the adequacy of the initial request itself is ... intolerable. No authority, and no logic, permits the interrogator to proceed ... on his own terms and as if the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the defendant might be induced to say something casting retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he wished to speak through an attorney or not at all. [62] That Munson continued to talk with the interrogator in the face of continued questioning does not diminish the validity of his request. Munson's constitutionally-protected right to silence attached as soon as he said I'm done talkin', and at that point the interrogator was bound to scrupulously honor Munson's request. Such bright-line rules exist both to protect the accused as well as to provide clear standards to guide law enforcement officers and the courts. The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in McGraw v. Holland. [63] Tina McGraw was sixteen years old when she was charged as an accomplice to a rape. [64] In response to a police interrogator's questions, she stated: I don't want to talk about it, and she indicated that her reason for not wanting to discuss the crime was because she didn't want to walk the streets and get[] shot and killed for tellin.' [65] The Sixth Circuit suppressed the resulting confession in part because it found no support, either in logic or in law, for the proposition that an otherwise unambiguous expression of a desire to remain silent can somehow become ambiguous if prompted by a fear of retaliation. [66] That the defendant's fear was so apparent should have made it even more clear that she really did not want to talk about the rape. [67] We agree with the Sixth Circuit that an otherwise unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent does not become ineffective merely because it appears to be motivated by fear of retaliation.