Opinion ID: 1309099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: claim of harry honaker

Text: The claimant Honaker appeals from a final order denying his motion for payment of temporary total disability benefits from July 15, 1980, until the date he returned to work, August 20, 1980. Honaker sustained a compensable back injury on February 12, 1980. He filed for benefits and his claim was held compensable without objection by the employer. The commissioner commenced payment of temporary total disability benefits. The claimant was treated by Dr. S.S. Rikhy, who after examining him on May 12, 1980, certified on Commissioner's Form No. WC-219 that he would be able to return to work on July 15, 1980. Upon receipt of this information from Dr. Rikhy, the commissioner on May 21, 1980, issued an order which informed the claimant that he had been awarded an additional period of temporary total disability benefits payable up to, but not including July 14, 1980. It also advised the claimant that if he did not submit an up-to-date medical report on the form enclosed (WC-219) prior to the expiration of your present temporary total disability award or within thirty (30) days from the date of this order, whichever shall later occur, then his temporary total disability benefits would cease and his claim as to temporary total disability would be closed. On June 16, 1980, Honaker sought authorization to change physicians and see Dr. R.L. Anderson. This request was approved on July 8, 1980. Meanwhile by letter of June 10, 1980, the commissioner referred the claimant to Dr. C.A. Stevenson who examined the claimant on July 15, 1980. Dr. Stevenson found no permanent disability and recommended Honaker lose weight. On August 18, 1980, the claimant was examined by Dr. Anderson who released him to return to work on August 19, 1980. He returned to work on August 20, 1980. The claimant on appeal argues that the commissioner's May 21 order was improper under Mitchell, since it placed the burden on him to supply additional medical evidence of his temporary total disability or otherwise have his benefits terminated at a designated future date. We believe claimant's argument misconceives what we said in Mitchell. Our decision in Mitchell was directed at several problems that had arisen under the Workmen's Compensation Act procedures. The first was the practice of permitting employers to protest payment of temporary total disability and thereby trigger an evidentiary hearing over whether the claimant was entitled to a continuation of the benefits. These evidentiary hearings were often prolonged because of continuances and the inability to schedule physicians' testimony. This practice would culminate in the submission of the various hearings to the commissioner who would then decide whether temporary total disability benefits should be terminated. It was also the past practice for the commissioner, if the decision were made to terminate the temporary total disability benefits, to do so by an order which would retroactively terminate the benefits to a past date; this was usually tied to a doctor's report which stated that the claimant was not entitled to further temporary total disability benefits. This system created enormous delays and disturbed the orderly handling of claims. Moreover, because W.Va.Code, 23-4-1c, required the commissioner to continue to pay temporary total disability benefits during the time of the protest and also required in the event of an adverse ruling to the claimant that he repay the excess award, further inequities occurred. A claimant whose temporary total disability was protested under the old procedure might not have this issue resolved for a year or more. When it was resolved against him, the order would retroactively terminate his benefits and he would then be ordered to pay the deficiency. In Mitchell, we concluded that the interest of all parties would be better served if the commissioner were authorized to terminate temporary total disability benefits based on medical evidence in the file and supplied by the parties. We also recognized the necessity of some procedural due process standards, which we summarized in Mitchell: Thus, we hold that affording the following procedural due process rights fully comports with our State and federal constitutional standards: (1) a prior written notice to the claimant of the reasons for the consideration of the termination of his temporary total disability benefits; (2) the claimant's right to furnish within a reasonable period relevant countervailing information; and (3) the statutory right to an evidentiary hearing under W.Va.Code, 23-5-1, upon timely protest to an adverse order. W.Va. at, 256 S.E.2d at 10. (Footnote omitted) In Syllabus Points 2 and 3 of Mitchell, we recognized that the commissioner under W.Va.Code, 23-5-1 and 1c, had the power to make, refuse and modify awards based on credible evidence supplied by the parties, the commissioner's own forms and independent medical evaluations. [2] We also held that temporary total disability benefits could be terminated without the necessity of a prior evidentiary hearing if certain procedural safeguards were followed. [3] Following Mitchell, the commissioner in this case has sought to comply with its directions by utilizing a notice order that is keyed to the medical reporting form used by the claimant's doctor. When the commissioner received the claimant's medical form indicating that the claimant's temporary total disability would end on July 15, 1980, the commissioner then sent to the claimant the notice order. This order advised the claimant that his temporary total disability benefits would terminate as of July 15, 1980, unless further medical evidence was received to warrant continuation of the benefits. The order gave the plaintiff until that date to supply any additional medical evidence to show that continuation of temporary total disability benefits was warranted. We believe the notice period was reasonable. From a factual standpoint, although the claimant was examined by two other doctors after the notice order, neither was of the view that temporary total disability status was warranted. Consequently, we are of the view that the commissioner was correct in terminating the temporary total disability benefits in this claim.