Opinion ID: 1573959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the hughes appeal

Text: In their separate appeal Danny and Nettie Hughes present three grounds upon which they seek a reversal of the judgments against them: (1) The court erred in permitting recovery for permanent injury as to appellee Bonnie Barbour New; (2) the damages awarded in several of the cases are so disproportionate to the injuries suffered as to indicate passion and prejudice of the jury against the appellants; and (3) improper closing argument and prejudice in calling defendants as witnesses, as if on cross-examination. In answer to the first point raised by these appellants it is noted that the instruction given by the trial court did not authorize recovery in behalf of appellee New for permanent injuries. The word permanent does not appear in the instruction. This has particular significance in this case because there were instructions in the case, relating to other claimants, in which allowances for permanent injuries were submitted. The total award to Bonnie Barbour New was $15,000. Her medical expenses were shown to have been nearly $1,200; she suffered fractures of both arms. The fractures in her left arm required surgery for open reduction; she was hospitalized on two separate occasions incident to setting the bones in her arms. Medical evidence reflected that her fractures have healed satisfactorily and that she should suffer no permanent disability or impairment of function in her arms. Her left arm bears four surgical scars incident to the open fracture reduction, and the evidence indicates that these scars will permanently exist. At the time of the second trial in August, 1964, she testified that she continued to experience pain in her arms. She told of suffering from a nervous condition resulting as an aftermath of the wreck experiences. She sustained other relatively minor injuries, but the chief injuries were to her arms. We are unable to say that the verdict appears to us at first blush as having been rendered as the result of passion or prejudice. There is no doubt that the claimant has suffered extensive pain and discomfort, both mental and physical. The entire incident was a traumatic one, calculated to affect her mental and physical well being. While we regard the award as liberal, we are not persuaded that it is excessive. Cf. Siler v. Williford, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 262 (1964), in which an award of $15,000 was upheld. We regard the present case as substantially indistinguishable from the Siler decision. Coupled with the prime assault on the verdict in favor of appellee Bonnie Barbour New, the appellants present a shotgun attack on all the verdicts for the claimants. The chief argument is that inasmuch as the jury returned no verdict less than $300, and in some of those verdicts for $300 the injuries were minimal, there is thereby demonstrated a pervading taint in all the verdicts. We are not favored with citation of authority to support this argument, nor are we persuaded by it. We are indisposed to cull this voluminous record for minute inspection of each claim; if appellants seriously contend that the verdicts are excessive they should point out the basis for their argument. In their brief the appellants Hughes make brief reference to verdicts of $300 each returned in behalf of Johnny Hammond, Sidney Beckham, Phillip Trinkle, Mike Keith and Jerry Thornton. They omitted reference to the $300 award to R. W. Riddle. It is true that the personal injuries sustained by these claimants were not severe, and the verdicts so indicate. They did have some minor injuries, and underwent the relatively harrowing experience of the accident. We have no disposition to regard the verdicts as to them as so excessive as to reflect passion or prejudice. The same view is taken of the other verdicts mentioned in brief for appellants Hughes, namely: David Beckham, $600; Glen Cox, $750; Robert Burke, $500. As respects the award of $3,000 in behalf of Bobby Lusby, we consider this to have been a liberal award, but not an excessive one. Despite the medical testimony of one physician that he could find no objective symptoms in this claimant, there was other medical proof indicating that the claimant had sustained such a blow on his head as resulted in a personality change. We are disposed to believe that the appellants Hughes regard the other verdicts in behalf of the bus passengers as temperate since they do not specifically attack them. It is not to be presumed that the jury rendered temperate verdicts in ten of the claims of the students while evincing passion and prejudice as to eleven of them. The appellants Hughes level a somewhat more concentrated attack on the $20,000 verdict returned in favor of the estate of Claude Ferrell, the bus driver. It is pointed out that the actual earnings of Ferrell aggregated only $850 per year; he was 56 years old at the time of his death, with an expectancy of 12.3809 years. Appellants cite Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Stephens, 298 Ky. 328, 182 S.W.2d 447, as authority for reversal here. While some of the reasoning in the cited authority is apposite it is well to observe that the quantum of damages recoverable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (the pertinent basis of the claim in Stephens) is substantially different from the measure of damages for wrongful death under KRS 411.130. The appellants Hughes correctly recognize our rule in such cases by citing Spangler's Adm'r v. City of Middlesboro, 301 Ky. 237, 191 S.W.2d 414, in which it is stated that the measure of damages in a wrongful death action is    the destruction of the deceased's power to earn money. For Ferrell's estate it was shown that he worked at his income-producing job, driving the school bus, about 20 hours per week. This averages about $1.35 per hour for the hours worked. The evidence reflects that the decedent's wife had been an invalid for several years, and that he devoted virtually his entire time, except while driving the school bus, in attending her. It is clear that he had a legal and moral duty to provide this type of care for his invalid wife. It would seem immaterial whether he worked out and earned the money to hire the tasks done, or stayed at home and performed them himself. As noted, our rule of damages in such cases is the destruction of the power to earn money  not the destruction of decedent's income from the particular work in which he was engaged at the time of the wrongful death. Decedent's potential for earning money is a proper consideration. Cf. Temperly v. Sarrington's Adm'r, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 863, 868-869. Obviously, in case of a claim for wrongful death of a small child the potential for earning is the only gauge, but we have held frequently that recovery may be had in such cases. Cf. McCallum v. Harris, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 438. Another point raised by appellants Hughes relates to an alleged remark in closing argument by one of counsel for some of the bus passengers. However, the argument complained of is not in the record; there is no showing of record that any objection was made to the argument until after its completion  and the showing then is not sufficient to incorporate into the record, by affidavit or otherwise, the substance of the remarks, or whether they were in response to arguments of opposing counsel. In this state of record, there is no question presented for appellate review. Ramey v. Ruth, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 292. The final point raised by appellants Hughes pertains to what they urge as improper conduct in calling appellants Danny Hughes and Kepple Roland to the witness stand. This occurred at the second trial when only the issue of damages was being tried. The trial judge required the claimants to explain what they expected to prove by these witnesses, and upon being informed that they proposed to elicit evidence relating to the force of the collision between the car and the bus, the court declined to permit examination of the witnesses. Appellants contend this was prejudicial in that it exhibited these persons before the jury. The argument is completely without merit, because these litigants, it must be presumed, were present in court anyway during the entire trial. We are at a loss to understand how it could be suggested that error prejudicial to the appellants was thus committed. The judgments are affirmed upon the appeals of Danny Hughes and Nettie Hughes, and reversed upon the appeals of Kepple Roland and Board of Education of Owen County, with directions to grant the latter appellants a new trial upon the issue of liability only.