Opinion ID: 901911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Fourth Amendment

Text: [¶15.] The Indian Civil Rights Act provides in relevant part: No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . (2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized[.] 25 USC § 1302(2). [¶16.] The text of the Indian Civil Rights Act is remarkably similar to the text of the Fourth Amendment, which provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. US Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. McCreary, 82 SD 111, 124-25, 142 NW2d 240, 247 (1966) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 81 SCt 1684, 6 LEd2d 1081 (1961)). The constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures requires generally that state and federal law enforcement obtain a warrant issued by a neutral judicial officer based on probable cause prior to the execution of a search or seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment. State v. Mattson, 2005 SD 71, ¶29, 698 NW2d 538, 548 (citing State v. De La Rosa, 2003 SD 18, ¶7, 657 NW2d 683, 685 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20, 88 SCt 1868, 1879, 20 LEd2d 889 (1968))). Warrantless searches are permissible under particular circumstances, however, [t]he State has the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls into a specific exception to the warrant requirement. Id. ¶30, 698 NW2d at 548 (citing State v. Hess, 2004 SD 60, ¶23, 680 NW2d 314, 324). [¶17.] The Fourth Amendment typically does not directly govern the conduct of tribal officials in Indian country. United States v. Schmidt, 403 F3d 1009, 1013 (8thCir 2005); United States v. Becerra-Garcia, 397 F3d 1167, 1171 (9thCir 2005); United States v. Clifford, 664 F2d 1090, 1091-92 n3 (8thCir 1981) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 US 49, 56, 98 SCt 1670, 1675, 56 LEd2d 106 (1978)); United States v. Erickson, 2008 WL 1803626,  (DSD 2008). However, tribal power to investigate violations in Indian country is constrained by the limits contained in the Indian Civil Rights Act, which was enacted to secure the right to be free of arbitrary and unjust actions by tribal governments. [2] Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 61, 98 SCt at 1678, 56 LEd2d 106 (quoting S.Rep. No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pp 5-6 (1967)). Additionally, the Indian Civil Rights Act has been extended to protect the rights of non-Indians while on tribal lands from unreasonable searches and seizures by tribal government. United States v. Terry, 400 F3d 575, 579-80 (8thCir 2005) (holding Indian Civil Rights Act required tribal police and Bureau of Indian Affairs officer to comply with reasonableness standards for search and seizure of non-Indian detained on reservation on suspicion of domestic abuse); United States v. Keys, 390 FSupp2d 875, 884 (DND 2005) (statements made by non-Indian defendant illegally detained and questioned by Bureau of Indian Affairs officer on reservation after non-Indian status verified, were obtained in violation of 25 USC § 1302(2) and were suppressed). [¶18.] Several courts have addressed the issue of whether a search and seizure conducted by tribal government is subject to the same reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(2). See Terry, 400 F3d at 579-80; Becerra-Garcia, 397 F3d at 1171; Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F2d 1176, 1180 (9thCir 1975); Keys, 390 FSupp2d at 884. Any such  Duro detention is subject to the reasonableness standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(2), and Fourth Amendment case law is applied to the particular alleged violation. Terry, 400 F3d at 579-80 (tribal officer must avoid effecting a constitutionally unreasonable search or seizure) (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 US 676, 696-97, 110 SCt 2053, 109 LEd2d 693 (1980)); Becerra-Garcia, 397 F3d at 1171 (holding Indian Civil Rights Act . . . imposed an `identical limitation' on tribal government conduct as the Fourth Amendment.); Clifford, 664 F2d at 1091 n3 (holding Fourth Amendment standards govern conduct of tribal officials by virtue of Indian Civil Rights Act); Erickson, 2008 WL 1803626 at  (holding Indian Civil Rights Act . . . imposed the same standards on tribal officers as the Fourth Amendment.). These courts generally assumed that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule applied when tribal government violated the reasonableness limitation in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(2), but did not provide any analysis for their supposition. Terry, 400 F3d at 580 (applying reasonableness standard in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 88 SCt 1868, 20 LEd2d 889 (1968) to Indian Civil Rights Act); Becerra-Garcia, 397 F3d at 1171; Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F2d at 1180; Keys, 390 FSupp2d at 884; Clifford, 664 F2d at 1090; Erickson, 2008 WL 1803626 at . [¶19.] People v. Ramirez, 148 CalApp4th 1464 (CalCtApp 2007), squarely addressed whether Congress intended the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to apply to searches and seizures conducted by tribal government in Indian country. The Ramirez court noted that the language of the Indian Civil Right Act, enacted in 1968, is almost identical to the language of the Fourth Amendment, and thus evidences a congressional intent to extend, as against the Indian tribes, `the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusions by the police  which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment.' Id. at 1470 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 US 25, 27-28, 69 SCt 1359, 1361, 93 LEd2d 1081(1949) overruled by Mapp, 367 US 643, 81 SCt 1684, 6 LEd2d 1081). The legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act lends support to this proposition. A central purpose of the Indian Civil Rights Act was to `secure for the American Indian . . . the broad constitutional rights afforded to other Americans,' and thereby to `protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.' Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 US at 61, 98 SCt at 1678, 56 LEd2d 106 (quoting S.Rep. No. 841, 90th Congr., 1st Sess., pp 5-6 (1967)) (citing generally Burnett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 `Indian Civil Rights' Act (1971-1972) 9 HarvLJ on Legis 557). The Ramirez court concluded that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(2), limits tribal power to conduct unreasonable searches and seizures to the same degree that the Fourth Amendment limits the power of the federal and state governments. Id. at 1471. [¶20.] The Ramirez court then turned its focus to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1473. It noted that at the time of the enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act in 1968, the United States Supreme Court had previously held in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US at 655-56, 81 SCt at 1692, 6 LEd2d 1081, that the exclusionary rule was `part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment's limitation upon governmental encroachment of individual privacy' and `an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.' Id. at 1473 (quoting Mapp, 367 US at 651, 658, 81 SCt at 1689, 1693, 6 LEd2d 1081). [3] The enactment of the Indian Civil Rights Act against the backdrop of Mapp evidences congressional intent to graft the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule onto 25 USC § 1302(2). Id. at 1473-75. Thus, we are required to review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence seized in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 USC § 1302(2) under Fourth Amendment case law, including application of the exclusionary rule.