Opinion ID: 775783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Narrow Construction to Avoid Constitutional Doubt

Text: 59 The Appellants first argue that, because their constitutional arguments are at least substantial, we should interpret the statute narrowly so as to avoid constitutional problems. They identify three different instances of alleged ambiguity in the statute that they claim provide an opportunity for such a narrow interpretation. 60 First, they contend that subsection 1201(c)(1), which provides that [n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title, can be read to allow the circumvention of encryption technology protecting copyrighted material when the material will be put to fair uses exempt from copyright liability. 12 We disagree that subsection 1201(c)(1) permits such a reading. Instead, it clearly and simply clarifies that the DMCA targets the circumvention of digital walls guarding copyrighted material (and trafficking in circumvention tools), but does not concern itself with the use of those materials after circumvention has occurred. Subsection 1201(c)(1) ensures that the DMCA is not read to prohibit the fair use of information just because that information was obtained in a manner made illegal by the DMCA. The Appellants' much more expansive interpretation of subsection 1201(c)(1) is not only outside the range of plausible readings of the provision, but is also clearly refuted by the statute's legislative history. 13 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841 (1986) (constitutional doubt canon does not give a court the prerogative to ignore the legislative will). 61 Second, the Appellants urge a narrow construction of the DMCA because of subsection 1201(c)(4), which provides that [n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing products. This language is clearly precatory: Congress could not diminish constitutional rights of free speech even if it wished to, and the fact that Congress also expressed a reluctance to enlarge those rights cuts against the Appellants' effort to infer a narrowing construction of the Act from this provision. 62 Third, the Appellants argue that an individual who buys a DVD has the authority of the copyright owner to view the DVD, and therefore is exempted from the DMCA pursuant to subsection 1201(a)(3)(A) when the buyer circumvents an encryption technology in order to view the DVD on a competing platform (such as Linux). The basic flaw in this argument is that it misreads subsection 1201(a)(3)(A). That provision exempts from liability those who would decrypt an encrypted DVD with the authority of a copyright owner, not those who would view a DVD with the authority of a copyright owner. 14 In any event, the Defendants offered no evidence that the Plaintiffs have either explicitly or implicitly authorized DVD buyers to circumvent encryption technology to support use on multiple platforms. 15 63 We conclude that the anti-trafficking and anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are not susceptible to the narrow interpretations urged by the Appellants. We therefore proceed to consider the Appellants' constitutional claims. 64