Opinion ID: 1406967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to an attorney at the circle m lineup

Text: We first focus our attention on the April 17, 1975 lineup at the Circle M Bar. While the police did give the mandatory Miranda warnings, they did not inform defendants of the right to have an attorney present at the Circle M lineup. The defendant urges us to hold that failure to provide counsel at this stage in the pre-trial process denies him his constitutional right to counsel as guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. 11 of the Alaska Constitution. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967), held that a lineup after an accused has been indicted is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which the accused has a sixth amendment right to counsel under the United States Constitution. This right is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. [4] The Wade and Gilbert decisions created a per se exclusionary rule for identifications based on post-indictment pre-trial lineups conducted in the absence of counsel. Wade and Gilbert, however, arguably left open the question of a defendant's right to an attorney during pre-indictment lineup procedures. The point at which the pre-trial right to counsel attaches under federal law in identification procedures was clarified by the Supreme Court in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). There the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the federal constitutional right to counsel does not attach until the accused has been indicted or formally charged with a criminal offense and, hence, does not apply to a pre-indictment lineup. This pre- and post-indictment distinction has been widely applied by federal and state courts. [5] The Supreme Court of Alaska has in the past adopted the United States Supreme Court's Wade-Gilbert holdings in McCracken v. State, 521 P.2d 499, 501-04 (Alaska 1974), and Davis v. State, 499 P.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Alaska 1972), cert. granted, 410 U.S. 925, 93 S.Ct. 1392, 35 L.Ed.2d 586 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). This court, however, has not yet had the opportunity to discuss the plurality decision in Kirby and to determine the issue of an accused's right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution at a pre-indictment lineup. [6] Although a plurality of the United States Supreme Court justices would not recognize a pre-indictment right to counsel, the Alaska Supreme Court is not limited by decisions of the United States Supreme Court or by the United States Constitution when interpreting its state constitution. The Alaska Constitution may have broader safeguards than the minimum federal standards. [7] Specifically, in Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342-43 (Alaska 1969), the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution was given broader application than the right to counsel provision of the sixth amendment had been given by the United States Supreme Court. The determination whether counsel is required at a pre-indictment lineup involves a difficult balance. On the one hand, the state has a legitimate concern in the prompt and purposeful investigation of an unsolved crime. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1883, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 418-19 (1972)(plurality opinion of Justice Stewart). Conducting an eyewitness identification procedure as soon as possible and while the memory of the eyewitness is fresh serves a valid purpose. Assuming the lineup complies with due process safeguards, the fresher the memory, the more accurate and trustworthy the identification may be. On the other hand, we must also view the suspect's legitimate right to be protected from prejudicial procedures. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 691, 92 S.Ct. at 1883, 32 L.Ed.2d at 418. The interests of a suspect in having counsel present involve the constitutional guarantee of right to counsel, the right to due process during the lineup procedures and the right to confront witnesses which insures effective cross-examination at trial. As we have stated: In evaluating evidence used at trial from a lineup without counsel, we are not merely concerned with the fundamental fairness of that lineup. We are also concerned with the need for counsel to be present in order to evaluate the circumstances and prepare his argument at trial sufficiently to provide the defendant with his sixth amendment right to confront identifying witnesses. [8] In balancing the need for prompt investigation against a suspect's right to fair procedures, we hold that a suspect who is in custody [9] is entitled to have counsel present at a pre-indictment lineup unless exigent circumstances exist so that providing counsel would unduly interfere with a prompt and purposeful investigation. [10] The facts of this case provide an example of both the general rule and exigent circumstances. The police were notified of a crime immediately after it occurred, were on the scene within one half hour, and discovered that an eyewitness thought she knew and could recognize one of the participants; they immediately pursued the suspect. Within two and one half hours, the police had located the suspect and notified the eyewitness who arrived to identify the suspect approximately 20 minutes later. The identification itself was made within three hours of the robbery. Here, the police were making every effort to conduct a lineup while the memory of the witness was fresh. Significantly, the lineup was held at 11:00 p.m., and providing a right to counsel at this late hour of the night might have postponed the lineup until the following day. Under these circumstances, providing counsel could have precluded the state's diligent efforts to obtain an identification while the facts were still fresh in the eyewitness' mind. We cannot find that providing counsel under these circumstances is practical, reasonable or mandated by our constitution. [11] On the other hand, we would apply the general rule and require that counsel be present under the circumstances of the later district court lineup, even though Blue had not yet been indicted. In contrast to the Circle M lineup, the district court lineup was held several days after the incident, not immediately following the crime. There was ample time to notify and have counsel present. Counsel, in fact, was present, and no identification evidence was lost. Under these circumstances, requiring counsel's presence does not substantially interfere with legitimate law enforcement. To the contrary, providing counsel will prevent constitutional errors and increase the likelihood that eyewitness evidence will eventually be admissible at trial. In summary, absent exigent circumstances, we hold counsel should be provided even though the lineup is before formal charges or indictment, but given the exigencies of this case, we hold that it was not necessary to afford Blue counsel at the Circle M lineup. [12]