Opinion ID: 217641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ex Post Facto/Due Process Violation

Text: Proceeding pro se, Mr. Fishman argues that his conviction for count one (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, must be vacated because it contravenes the Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution. More specifically, he argues that, because one of the statutes of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, did not go into effect until July 30, 2002, it is a violation of the Ex Post Facto clause to convict him on the basis of conduct which occurred before that date. He did not raise this issue below, so we review for plain error. We begin by noting that the Supreme Court has recently clarified the nature of this claimed constitutional violation. In United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010), there was a situation similar to our case, in that the defendant had been convicted of conduct (violation of the sex trafficking and forced labor statutes) occurring both before and after the effective date of the statutes making that conduct illegal. The defendant had not objected to the district court's failure to address this issue, by means of a jury instruction or some other means, so appellate review before the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court was for plain error. The Second Circuit and the defendant had characterized this as an Ex Post Facto Clause violation. The Supreme Court disagreed with that characterization, stating that it is actually a due process question. [I]f the jury, which was not instructed about the [statute's] enactment date, erroneously convicted [defendant] based exclusively on noncriminal, preenactment conduct, [defendant] would have a valid due process claim. Id. at 2165. [14] Then, examining the familiar plain error standard, the Supreme Court stated there was no reason why this kind of error would automatically `affect substantial rights' without a showing of individual prejudice. Id. The Court therefore remanded the case back to the Second Circuit for it to apply the plain error standard to the facts of that case, following the Supreme Court's guidance. On remand, the Second Circuit applied the plain error test and, at the third step of the test (whether the error affected the appellant's substantial rights) the court required the defendant to demonstrate that the error was prejudicial, noting that ordinarily, an error is prejudicial where there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 42 (2nd Cir.2010) (further quotation omitted). The court found, with respect to the forced labor statute, that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted [the defendant] absent the error. Id. There were two reasons for that conclusion. First, the Government presented post-enactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of the forced labor statute. Id. Second, the court found no reasoned basis to differentiate between [the defendant's] pre- and post-enactment conduct, and [it] f[ou]nd no reason to presume that the jury did so. Id. at 43. Additionally, the defendant himself offered no explanation of how his pre- and post-enactment conduct differed in such a way as to create a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted him without the due process error. The court vacated the sex trafficking conviction, however, stating: Unlike with the forced labor charge, the conduct supporting the sex trafficking charge differed materially before and after [the date of enactment], such that there is a reasonable probability that the erroneous jury charge affected the outcome of the trial and affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the proceedings. Id. at 44. We apply that analysis to Mr. Fishman's due process claim. Mr. Fishman makes two arguments in support of this claim. First, he argues that, inasmuch as conspiracies for violations of the wire and mail fraud laws, as well as the money laundering laws, do not require proof of an overt act, the conspiracy is complete upon the agreement itself. Reply Br. of Appellant at 3. As he also puts it, 18 U.S.C. § 1349 is violated upon agreement alone. Id. at 4. Thus, the entire conspiracy was completed before § 1349 went into effect. Furthermore, he claims that since the second superseding indictment did not specifically list an overt act occurring post-enactment, his due process rights were also violated because he was convicted of something for which he was never charged. `A conspiracy, once instituted, continues to exist until it is abandoned, succeeds, or is otherwise terminated by some affirmative act.' United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1320, 1322 (10th Cir.1992)). Accordingly, the conspiracy here began with the agreement, but it continued until abandoned, or until it accomplished its mission, or was somehow affirmatively terminated. So we reject Mr. Fishman's argument that the Caribou conspiracy was completed when the initial agreement was made. Additionally, since the conspiracies at issue here do not require proof of overt acts, it is not fatal to the government's case that it does not list a specific overt act in the indictment. The government concedes that it was error for the district court to fail to instruct the jury on the fact that § 1349 did not come into effect until July 30, 2002. We agree that is an error, which is plain. We must next determine, as did the court in Marcus, whether that error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial. As in Marcus, so too in this case, the government presented post-enactment evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of the conspiracy-to-commit-wire/mail-fraud statute. Marcus, 628 F.3d at 42. As we have previously indicated, there was, indeed, substantial post-enactment evidence of Mr. Fishman's conduct in furtherance of the worthless bond investment conspiracy. Additionally, we consider whether there is a reasoned basis to differentiate between [Mr. Fishman's] pre- and post-enactment conduct. Id. at 43. There is no such basis. The evidence outlined above provides no support for separating the conduct, nor does Mr. Fishman provide us with any persuasive analysis to the contrary. We therefore have no reason to presume that the jury differentiated between the two and convicted him on the basis of pre-enactment conduct only. In short, while it may have been an error for the district court to have failed to specifically instruct the jury that § 1349 was not effective until part way through the conspiracy, perhaps even a plain error, that error did not affect Mr. Fishman's substantial rights, nor did it affect the fairness of the proceedings. There was substantial evidence that the conspiracy continued long after § 1349 went into effect. Mr. Fishman alternatively argues that he withdrew from the conspiracy when he began cooperating with authorities. Withdrawal is generally not an available defense to a conspiracy that does not require an overt act. See United States v. Williams, 374 F.3d 941, 950 (10th Cir. 2004) (Because there is no overt act requirement under the drug conspiracy statute, withdrawal cannot relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility for a conspiracy charged under § 846, though withdrawal may limit a defendant's liability in situations not relevant here.). But, even in these non-overt act conspiracies, we have agreed that withdrawal may normally start the running of the statute of limitations. Id. n. 11. Thus, it can have some relevance even in a non-overt act conspiracy. So, assuming we are simply considering withdrawal in the context of whether it shows Mr. Fishman had abandoned the conspiracy before § 1349 came into effect, we conclude that his cooperation with authorities alone does not necessarily demonstrate that he withdrew. The burden of establishing the abandonment or withdrawal from the conspiracy is firmly on the defendant, Mr. Fishman. See United States v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir.1978) (In order to withdraw from a conspiracy an individual must take affirmative action, either making a clean breast to the authorities or communicating his withdrawal in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators.). Neither arrest nor incarceration automatically triggers withdrawal from a conspiracy. United States v. Gonzalez, 940 F.2d 1413, 1427 (11th Cir.1991). Given that there is ample evidence of Mr. Fishman's activities furthering the conspiracy during the time he claims he was cooperating with authorities, he has failed to carry his burden to show that he withdrew from or abandoned or completed the conspiracy before 18 U.S.C. § 1349 went into effect. Finally, and very significantly, the district court specifically instructed the jury that Mr. Fishman had raised as a defense the claim that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy prior to November 30, 2002. He argued that point to the jury and, by its guilty verdict, the jury found that he had not withdrawn. That jury verdict is amply supported by the record.