Opinion ID: 1762045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Appellate Decisions

Text: The Court of Appeals has been inconsistent in its opinions addressing this issue. In several cases, it has applied the sixty-day limitations period to a suit for declaratory judgment even where TDOC did not convene a contested case hearing. For instance, in Bishop v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., 896 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994), the Court of Appeals considered a set of facts similar to that now before us. The incarcerated petitioner sought a declaratory order from TDOC regarding his sentence. Based on its review and determination of the merits of the petitioner's claim, TDOC declined to convene a contested case hearing and issue an order. Instead, TDOC notified the petitioner that it had considered his petition for declaratory order and that the petition was denied. Id. at 558. In its notification to the petitioner, TDOC set forth its reasons for determining that the petitioner's claim was without merit. The Court of Appeals considered TDOC's written communication to be a final order subject to judicial review under section 4-5-322 of the Act. Id. Because the petitioner did not file suit seeking a declaratory judgment until more than sixty days had elapsed after TDOC's response, the intermediate appellate court concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the matter. Id.; see also Frazier v. Whisman, No. M1997-00225-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 988187, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. July 19, 2000) (reiterating that a complaint for review of an agency decision rendered through a letter that responds substantively to the merits of the petition must be filed within sixty days of the letter); Johnson v. Tenn. Dep't of Corr., No. 01A01-9710-CH-00586, 1998 WL 652150, at , 1998 Tenn.App. LEXIS 636, at  (Tenn. Ct.App. Sept.23, 1998) (affirming dismissal of petition for declaratory judgment on basis of the petition having been filed more than sixty days after TDOC wrote a letter denying request for declaratory order); Copeland v. Bradley, No. 01A01-9409-CH-00435, 1995 WL 70602, at  (Tenn.Ct. App. Feb.22, 1995) (holding that where TDOC's response to a petitioner's request for a declaratory ruling showed that [the Commissioner] had read and understood [the] petition, and [TDOC's] denial of the relief sought was based on [a] reasonable ground, the sixty-day time limitation applied to the petitioner's complaint for a declaratory judgment in chancery court). In several other cases, however, the Court of Appeals has rejected application of section 4-5-322(b)(1)'s sixty-day limitations period to an inmate's suit for declaratory judgment after TDOC declined to convene a contested case hearing and issue a requested declaratory order. For instance, prior to Bishop , our Court of Appeals considered another situation in which an inmate petitioned TDOC for a declaratory order. See Taylor v. Reynolds, No. 93-552-I, 1994 WL 256286, at  (Tenn.Ct. App. June 10, 1994). TDOC responded by simply notifying the petitioner that it was refusing to issue the requested ruling. The petitioner then filed suit in chancery court for a declaratory judgment, which was dismissed as untimely. On appeal, the Court of Appeals recognized that, [w]hen [a petitioned] agency refuses to issue a declaratory order, . . . the Code is silent as to when a declaratory judgment must be sought in the chancery court. Id. Less than a year later, our intermediate appellate court reiterated in another unreported decision that [the] sixty day limit does not apply where the agency's final decision was not the result of a contested case hearing, but only of the refusal to convene such a hearing. Rienholtz v. Bradley, No. 01A01-9409-CH-00433, 1995 WL 33736, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.27, 1995). The court explained its rationale: We believe [this ruling] serves the important purpose of protecting the petitioner's right to be heard. . . . [W]e believe that an agency's refusal to even consider a petitioner's contentions might frequently operate in conjunction with the sixty day filing limit to foreclose the possibility of a meaningful examination of the issues. This may especially be so in the case of prisoners, because the necessary restrictions on their freedom of movement can make it difficult or impossible for them to file within the sixty day period. Id. at ; see also Hatton v. Bradley, No. 01A01-9406-CH-00306, 1995 WL 113301, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Mar.15, 1995) (holding that where TDOC summarily denied petitioner's request for a declaratory order, the sixty-day limit did not apply because the agency's final decision is not the result of a contested case hearing, but only of the refusal to convene such a hearing). Indeed, the amount of litigation generated by this issue prompted Judge Cantrell to note his concern over the uncertainty about the statute of limitations that continues to plague the courts in these cases. The issue was thoroughly aired in Taylor v. Reynolds, Rienholtz v. Bradley, and Copeland v. Bradley, but the Department [of Correction] continues to issue letters denying the request for a declaratory order, and the courts continue to apply the sixty day limit applicable to the appeal of a contested case. Either the Department needs to make clear that it is issuing a declaratory order or the legislature should clear up the statute of limitations applicable to a denial of a contested case hearing in response to a request for a declaratory order. Johnson, 1998 WL 652150, at , 1998 Tenn.App. LEXIS 636, at -4 (Cantrell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).