Opinion ID: 2258873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claimed Instructional Deficiencies

Text: Smith contends that the instructions in this case omitted improperly the hesitate or pause language which appears in the Redbook instruction and included a real possibility formulation which overstates the required level of doubt for acquittal and improperly shifts the burden of proof. With respect to the hesitate or pause language, which appears in the Redbook instruction, we have held that its omission from the reasonable doubt instruction is not constitutionally deficient where the instruction otherwise adequately conveys the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. See Butler, supra, 646 A.2d at 335, 337; see also United States v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1992) (Omission of the hesitate to act language is not necessarily reversible error.); United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, 952 F.2d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir.1992) (Instructions which have strayed from the `hesitate to act' formula have been upheld.). So long as the instruction, read in context, is not reasonably likely to be understood to allow conviction on less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, merely omitting a phrase from the approved Redbook instruction will not require reversal. See Butler, 646 A.2d at 337. But see Proctor, supra note 6, (reversing where deletion of this language was combined with substitution of belief for convinced or conviction). Therefore, we construe the instruction as a whole for sufficiency in reviewing the omission. In this case the trial court instructed the jury that [p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. The D.C. Circuit, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, concluded that `[t]he phrases firmly convinced and hesitate to act are essentially two ways of conveying the same definition of reasonable doubt.' Taylor, supra note 5, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 355, 997 F.2d at 1557 (quoting Velasquez, supra, 980 F.2d at 1278); see also Barrera-Gonzales, supra, 952 F.2d at 1271 (instruction with the real possibility language is similar to approved language of real doubt of guilt). This court has encouraged the use of the firmly convinced language as used in the Federal pattern jury instruction. Foreman, supra, 633 A.2d at 795. [7] The use of the firmly convinced language apprises the jury of the high level of proof required for conviction in a criminal case and does not in itself lessen the standard of proof. United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994); Velasquez, 980 F.2d at 1278. Given the use of the firmly convinced formulation here, absent some other deficiency in the instruction, reversal is not warranted. However, Smith argues that by equating reasonable doubt with a real possibility of innocence, the trial court shifted the government's burden of proof to the defense. He contends that, at the very least, the language creates an ambiguity which appears to alter the burden of proof by focusing upon whether the defendant has shown a real possibility of innocence, rather than whether the government has met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Although not approved by this court, the language challenged here has been approved by several of the Federal circuit courts. In Taylor, supra note 5, 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 356, 997 F.2d at 1558, the D.C. Circuit Court held that using a reasonable doubt instruction modeled on the Federal pattern jury instruction definition, like the one used in this case, is not reversible error where there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Id. On appeal from conviction of various drug distribution and possession charges, the appellants in Taylor contended that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt in a way that lowered the government's burden of proof and unconstitutionally shifted that burden to the defense. 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 355, 997 F.2d at 1557. In addition to challenging the firmly convinced language, the appellants contended that the real possibility language in the Federal pattern instructions impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense. 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 354, 997 F.2d at 1556. The circuit court concluded that the instruction, taken as a whole, was not erroneous. 302 U.S.App.D.C. at 355, 997 F.2d at 1557. In rejecting the argument that the real possibility language shifted the burden of proof, the court observed that (1) the instruction did not indicate which side should be the source of showing a real possibility of innocence; and (2) the remainder of the instruction eliminated any concern that the jury would perceive that defendant was required to show a possibility of his innocence. Id. In Taylor, the District Court indicated, no less than thirteen times, that it was the government which was required to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Further, the court gave no other standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also noted that although some circuit courts had criticized the Federal pattern jury instruction, none had found its use reversible error. Id. (citations omitted). In Barrera-Gonzales, supra, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the real possibility language misdescribed the government's burden of proof where the firmly convinced formulation was also included in the instruction. 952 F.2d at 1271. Likewise, in Williams, supra, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the use of language similar to the Federal pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt was reversible error. 20 F.3d at 131. In Williams, the District Court explained to the jury that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was such as leaves you firmly convinced of a defendant's guilt. Id. It further instructed [i]f, based on your consideration of all the evidence, you are firmly convinced that a defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, however, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. Williams, supra, 20 F.3d at 127. The court concluded on appeal that the charge as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the required level of proof. Id. As to the real possibility formulation, the court stated: We find no infirmity in this portion of the charge either. When read in the context of the charge as a whole, the instruction's real possibility formulation explains that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. In other words, the modifier real merely indicates that the jury is not to acquit a defendant if it can conceive of any possibility that the defendant is not guilty. This is because absolute certainty is unattainable in matters relating to human affairs. Id. at 131. In analyzing jury instructions similar to the contested instructions here, the Fourth Circuit, which has urged trial courts not to attempt a definition of reasonable doubt absent a request from the jury because of the risk of confusion or burden shifting, nevertheless has upheld an instruction similar to the one in this case. See United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 973 (4th Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1060 (4th Cir.1985)). The Court stated that: Contrary to the appellant's protests, the instruction did not shift the burden of proof on the question of real possibility. Instead it failed to allocate the burden. Other instructions, however, compensated for this omission.... The instructions taken as a whole properly described the prosecution's burden and the protection the law affords the accused. Therefore, the error, which introduced the unnecessary concepts of being firmly convinced of guilt and a real possibility of innocence, did not affect the substantial rights of the accused. It should be disregarded. Id. (citation omitted). Similarly, the First Circuit has held that use of instructions like the one given in this case, while not preferable, does not constitute reversible error. See Gibson, supra, 726 F.2d at 874; accord, United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir.1986). Each of these courts was persuaded that the charge, read as a whole, did not improperly shift the burden of proof or confuse the jury. While the real possibility formulation has been criticized by some federal courts, the language has not resulted in reversal where the instructions taken as a whole adequately apprised the jury that the government bears the burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., Porter, supra, 821 F.2d at 973; McBride, supra, 786 F.2d at 51-52. In reviewing this type of claim of instructional error, the question is whether the court's instructions, `as a whole ... correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.' Victor, supra, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. at 1243 (quoting Holland v. United States, supra, 348 U.S. at 140, 75 S.Ct. at 138). The proper focus is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Victor, 511 U.S. at 6, 114 S.Ct. at 1243. In making that assessment, among the factors for consideration are: (1) whether the court misstated the law; (2) whether the required standard of proof was adequately explained; and (3) whether the instruction was confusing. See Butler, supra, 646 A.2d at 337-38. Here, the trial court did not misstate the law and it adequately conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. [8] The trial court instructed the jury at least five times that the burden was on the government to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as that the defendant was not required to prove his innocence or produce any evidence. Therefore, we perceive no possibility that the jury misunderstood where the burden of proof was lodged. The court also provided a workable definition of what proof beyond a reasonable doubt means, employing the previously approved firmly convinced language. We agree with those federal circuit courts which have held that the inclusion of the real possibility formulation, at least in context with the remainder of the instruction given here and in those cases, did not indicate to the jury that the government had a lesser burden. See, e.g., Porter, supra, 821 F.2d at 973; Gibson, supra, 726 F.2d at 874; McBride, supra, 786 F.2d at 51. However, we caution the trial court that use of the real possibility language might pose a problem if the remainder of the instruction is inadequate to assure that no confusion or burden shifting results. In light of the serious risk of misdescribing the burden of proof, we again admonish the trial court to adhere to the approved language in this area. See Butler, 646 A.2d at 337-38. In this case, we conclude that the instructions as a whole did not misdescribe the burden of proof or create the reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the government's burden of proof. [9] Therefore, we find no reversible error.