Opinion ID: 2166571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: right of a represented defendant to file pro se motion alleging violation of speedy trial rights

Text: Mr. McKee alleges violation of his statutory right to speedy trial under section 545.780, violation of his constitutional right to a speedy and public trial under U.S. Const. amend. VI and violation of the promise of Mo. Const. art. I, sec. 18(a) that the accused shall have the right to . . . a speedy public trial. Respondent argues that this Court should not reach the merits of Mr. McKee's speedy trial claims because they were asserted in pro se motions by a defendant who was represented by counsel. In general, one must choose between self-representation and representation by counsel. As this Court recently noted, once the right to counsel is invoked, a defendant effectively cede[s] to his counsel the authority to seek reasonable continuances. State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 225 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Mo. banc 2007); accord State v. Williams, 34 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Mo.App. S.D.2001) (defendant . . . has no right to . . . a combination of self-representation and assistance of counsel). [8] Here, because Mr. McKee had counsel, but counsel never filed a speedy trial motion or called Mr. McKee's pro se motions up for hearing, Respondent argues the trial court never became obligated to address the motions in the first instance. By extension, Respondent argues that it would be inappropriate for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus. Since the right to a speedy trial has both statutory and constitutional origins, the Court will address whether Mr. McKee's pro se motions were effective to invoke his statutory right separately from the issue of whether they were effective to assert his constitutional right.
Mr. McKee claims that the trial court's inaction on his pro se motions violated his statutory right to a speedy trial under section 545.780. Section 545.780 states: 1. If defendant announces that he is ready for trial and files a request for a speedy trial, then the court shall set the case for trial as soon as reasonably possible thereafter. 2. The provisions of this section shall be enforceable by mandamus. Neither the failure to comply with this section nor the state's failure to prosecute shall be grounds for the dismissal of the indictment unless the court also finds that the defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The statute expressly states that it does not entitle a defendant to dismissal unless the constitutional right to speedy trial is also violated. Sec. 545.780(2); see also State v. Owsley, 959 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Mo. banc 1997) (statute provides that indictment cannot be dismissed where the defendant is not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial). [9] The statute's self-evident purpose is not to expand the constitutional right to a speedy trial, but rather to provide a mechanism for bringing a case to trial when a defendant seeks a timely resolution of his or her case. The statute accomplishes this purpose by requiring the court to set a case for trial as soon as reasonably possible after defendant announces that he is ready for trial and files a request for a speedy trial. Sec. 545.780(1). The statute limits the harsh remedy of dismissal for its violation to only those cases where there is also a constitutional violation, which should be analyzed separately from the statutory violation. See State v. Bolin, 643 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Mo. banc 1983) (distinguishing between the constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial). [10] Mr. McKee clearly intended to invoke the protections of Missouri's speedy trial statute in his pro se motions. In his August 15, 2007, motion, for example, he argued that at every trial setting defendant answered ready and available for trial. But section 545.780, in requiring that defendant announce that he is ready for trial, clearly contemplates that it is counsel, not the represented defendant, who must invoke this statutory protection. Any other interpretation of the statute could place defense counsel in an untenable position when, for example, a represented defendant announced ready for trial without consulting his or her counsel, and counsel was not, in fact, ready for trial. Trial would then have to proceed with counsel who could potentially be inadequately prepared. Since the statute provides a procedure for a defendant's trial to be held expeditiously, and since, where defendant is represented by counsel, it is counsel who will try the case, it therefore must be counsel's prerogative to announce when the defense is ready for trial for the purposes of Missouri's speedy trial statute. See Wolfrum, 225 S.W.3d at 412. In this case, while Mr. McKee did invoke his right to speedy trial, so far as the record shows (and the record submitted to this Court is by no means complete), Mr. McKee's defense counsel never announced ready for trial. Mr. McKee's pro se declaration that he was ready for trial was not effective to trigger the statute's protections, as it was counsel  not Mr. McKee  who would try the case. Therefore, this Court agrees with Respondent that Mr. McKee cannot claim a violation of the speedy trial act.
The outcome is different, however, in regard to Mr. McKee's constitutional right to a speedy trial. The constitutional right to speedy trial is unique in that its assertion, under some circumstances, can place the defendant in a conflicting position with defense counsel. Unlike the right to an impartial jury or the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, where defense counsel is often in a better position to understand the contours of the right and appreciate situations in which it has not been properly respected, the right to a speedy trial depends, in part, on circumstances that are uniquely experienced by the defendant. [T]he speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest, `to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial . . . and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.' United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (addressing distinction between right to speedy trial and right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982)). Although defense counsel may understand that pretrial incarceration is a vexing condition, the prejudice to the defendant that flows from this condition is neither experienced nor directly shared by defense counsel. A defendant, thus, has a reason, not necessarily shared by counsel, to want trial to proceed as expeditiously as possible. Even excellent defense counsel may not be prepared to go to trial and may seek a continuance, or multiple continuances, due to the press of other business or for other perfectly proper reasons unrelated to the defense of defendant's case. The individual defendant, whose right to a speedy trial is at stake, may not care about those other cases or those other reasons. The defendant incarcerated while awaiting trial is properly concerned with his own need to resolve the charges against him. The tension between the burdens on defense counsel and the defendant's desire to resolve the charges quickly appears to have arisen in this case, in which defendant repeatedly sought a speedy trial, and counsel appears never to have sought to bring the case to trial or to call up the speedy trial motions or motion to dismiss for hearing. Perhaps with this type of situation in mind, our court of appeals repeatedly has allowed a represented defendant to assert his right to a speedy trial through a pro se motion. See e.g., State v. Smith, 849 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Mo.App. E.D.1993) (filing of a pro se motion for speedy trial represents the first formal assertion of [the] right to a speedy trial); State v. McNeal, 699 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Mo.App. E.D.1985) (defendant timely asserted his right to a speedy trial in a pro se motion); State v. Morris, 668 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Mo.App. E.D.1984) (appellant asserted the right when he filed a pro se motion to dismiss based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial and [sec.] 545.780, the speedy trial statute). See also State v. Galvan, 795 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (Mo.App. S.D.1990) (delays under sec. 217.460, the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Law, should be calculated based on the day defendant filed his pro se request for speedy trial). [11] The federal courts, too, have allowed a defendant to assert speedy trial rights through pro se motions. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rothrock, 20 F.3d 709, 712 (7th Cir.1994) (construing pro se motion for speedy trial as effective to assert both statutory and constitutional rights). In light of this precedent and the unique and conflicting interests of defendant and of his counsel in regard to a request for speedy trial, this Court affirmatively holds what Missouri's court of appeals has long recognized: a represented defendant may assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial through a pro se motion. This Court then must determine whether Mr. McKee's constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated.