Opinion ID: 1953592
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judge Enmeshed in Other Matters

Text: Under situation three in Crampton, Judge Giddings was obligated to disqualify himself if he became `enmeshed in [other] matters involving petitioner....' Crampton, supra at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352, quoting Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971). In Johnson, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a trial judge should have recused himself because he lost a civil rights action brought by the same petitioner [15] facing contempt in a subsequent action. The Court concluded that [t]rial before `an unbiased judge' is essential to due process. Id. at 216, 91 S.Ct. at 1780, citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 205, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1484, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465, 91 S.Ct. 499, 505, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971). In isolation, Judge Giddings' conduct appears somewhat innocuous. However, each incident must not be considered in a vacuum; rather, they should be considered in relation to the judge's overzealous pursuit of the Governor. I agree with defense counsel that Judge Giddings' actions over an eleven-month period demonstrate that he became enmeshed in matters far beyond the scope of the Cain litigation and resulted in a violation of the department's due process right to an impartial decisionmaker. This conclusion is first supported by the fact that Judge Giddings recommended substantive changes to plaintiffs' motion to show cause why Mr. Truscott and Governor Engler should not be held in criminal contempt. [16] Initially, Judge Giddings recommended that plaintiffs separate their motion into individual counts. Next, he suggested that plaintiffs should not proceed against John Truscott, suggesting that the motion to show cause be brought only against Governor Engler. Finally, and most egregiously, he advised plaintiffs to consider including reference to inaccuracies in Governor Engler's letter of August 12[, 1994,] to the Attorney General. In doing so, the judge unmistakably recommended another ground on which plaintiffs could proceed against the Governor. [17] Judge Giddings unified the interest of the Governor and the department for purposes of this litigation and proceeded to assist plaintiffs in drafting a motion to hold the Governor in contempt. [18] This illustrates how the judge clearly became enmeshed in matters involving the Governor. He, in fact, became so enmeshed that he assisted a party before the court. Several actions of Judge Giddings before his assistance of plaintiffs further demonstrate that he became enmeshed in other matters involving Governor Engler and the department. The judge first filed a letter of complaint against the Governor with the Attorney Grievance Commission on October 21, 1993. Next, in November 1993, Judge Giddings appointed a spokesperson for the male prisoners. His purported basis for the appointment was that we have only gotten one side on most instances because of the practical problems. Id. However, after indicating that the Governor had released an untrue statement to the press, he candidly stated: This is a release ... that went to every newspaper. The more recent one went, as far as I can determine, to every major newspaper in the State.... I have to be able to respond to all of those. I shouldn't have to respond to any of them. That's not my job. I'm not a litigant. It's not my job. I would like to say to the newspaper person, hey, get your fanny down here. The court file is there. Read the Court file. [Emphasis added.] This makes it clear that the spokesperson was not only appointed to be the voice of the prisoner litigants, but also to be the voice of Judge Giddings. This was an explicit and improper manipulation of the litigation to respond to the criticism of Governor Engler. Additionally, Judge Giddings entered media contact orders on June 2 and 30, 1994. In his order dated June 2, 1994, the judge, sua sponte, ordered that any written remarks or press releases made by employees or agents of the state regarding the Cain litigation must be faxed to plaintiffs' spokesperson, to a member of plaintiffs' class, and to plaintiffs' counsel at the same time the remarks are made to the public. The order required the same of plaintiffs in regard to any press releases made by them. This was another attempt to obtain jurisdiction and control over the Governor (a person he perceived to be a party) and to address matters clearly outside the scope of the litigation. Each of these actions by Judge Giddings had one improper goal: to obtain control of the Governor in such a manner as to control the Governor's public opinion of the Cain litigation. [19] The judge's efforts unnecessarily consumed considerable time and judicial resources. Irrespective of whether the Governor's comments may be viewed as improper, the judge was sworn to proceed and remain focused on the merits of the case before himwhich he had increasingly become unable to do. Instead, he expended judicial resources to assert jurisdiction over the Governor to the obvious prejudice of the department. Defendant's reliance on Clemens, supra, a subsequent decision applying Crampton, is persuasive. Clemens affirms that the present set of facts warrant disqualification of Judge Giddings. In Clemens, the Court of Appeals followed Crampton and held that the risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge required disqualification without a showing of actual prejudice. The record in Clemens reflected a serious dispute between the plaintiffs' attorney and the trial judge regarding appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. The plaintiffs' attorney filed a complaint against the judge with the Judicial Tenure Commission. The complaint remained pending at the time of trial. The court held that these facts warranted disqualification of the trial judge because, under Crampton, the judge had been the target of personal abuse or criticism from a party before him, and the judge had become enmeshed in other matters involving the petitioner. Similar to the present case, the facts of Clemens suggested such a risk of actual prejudice on the part of the judge that due process required his disqualification.... Id. at 38, 329 N.W.2d 522. [20]