Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: 19, b.36, b.231, c.1-74, f.3, h.3-9)

Text: The claims in this category allege that defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous decisions made by the trial court during voir dire. Four of the claims were adjudicated on defendant's direct appeal: that transfer of venue to Atlantic County was improper because of pretrial publicity in that county, see Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 76-79, 586 A. 2d 85; that jurors Wilkins, Smith, and Bader should have been excluded for cause because of their inability to be impartial, see id. at 80-87, 586 A. 2d 85; that juror Marzano should have been excluded for cause because he was incapable of fairly evaluating the testimony of law-enforcement officers, see id. at 87-89, 586 A. 2d 85; and that potential jurors Corrigan, Hart, and Scanny should not have been excluded for cause, see id. at 94-98, 586 A. 2d 85. Defendant has not presented new legal or factual arguments in support of those claims and we therefore find the claims to be procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-5. Adjudicating the remaining claims on the merits, we conclude that they do not warrant an evidentiary hearing and should be dismissed. Fifteen claims allege, in varying forms, that defense counsel's representation of defendant was ineffective because counsel did not adequately death qualify the jury during the voir dire in this case. In Marshall I, supra, we explained that in death-qualifying a jury, the court ask[s] of each potential juror thorough and probing questions about that juror's attitude concerning the death penalty, to ensure that each potential juror can fairly apply our state's death-penalty law. 123 N.J. at 90-93, 586 A. 2d 85. We viewed counsel's request to the trial court to limit death qualification of the jury as a debatable yet reasonable gambit designed to avoid a conviction-prone jury, and a well-considered strategic attempt to limit juror exposure to questions concerning capital punishment. Ibid. Defendant has presented nothing on PCR review that leads us to alter that conclusion. Thus, defendant's death-qualification claims do not present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant further asserts that even if counsel's decision to limit pretrial death qualification were reasonable, there is no justification for counsel's failure to request death qualification of the jurors after the guilt phase had concluded and defendant had been convicted. We need not reach the question whether the absence of a post-conviction death-qualification request was the product of a reasonable, strategic decision made by defense counsel. Instead, we address the prejudice component of the Strickland/Fritz test, and conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of a post-conviction death-qualification request because, even if that request had been made, it would have been denied. Post-conviction death qualification would necessitate the impanelling of separate juries for the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial, a result that is plainly inconsistent with this Court's decisions holding that a defendant's desire not to death qualify a guilt-phase jury is insufficient justification for impanelling two separate juries in a capital case. See State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 150, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II ); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 251-54, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987); cf. State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 133, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991) (noting that separate penalty-phase jury may be necessary when guilt-phase evidence is so prejudicial that the same jury could not fairly sit on both phases of the trial); State v. Biegenwald, 126 N.J. 1, 44, 594 A. 2d 172 (1991) (noting that two separate juries may be required in capital case in which State presents defendant's prior murder conviction as aggravating factor). Thus, defendant's claim concerning post-conviction death qualification does not set forth a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition to the suggested death-qualification questions, defendant points to sixteen other questions that trial counsel should have requested the court to ask each of the jurors during voir dire. The questions include inquiries concerning the jurors' attitudes toward guns, insurance policies, and the movie Jagged Edge. We have reviewed those claims thoroughly and conclude that none of them present questions that defense counsel was constitutionally required to request. Forty of defendant's claims present questions that defense counsel should have requested the court to ask individual jurors in order to follow up on the responses that those jurors gave to earlier voir dire questions. For example, defendant asserts that defense counsel should have probed further concerning the drug problem of juror Axelrod's daughter, the prior case in which juror Hill had served as a juror, and the marital status of juror Litwinczuk's parents. We find that all of those claims are entirely without merit. Many of the questions that defendant claims should have been asked actually were asked. The remaining questions now suggested by defendant would have been irrelevant to the issue of juror bias or simply unnecessary. Defendant also raises two claims alleging that the cumulative effect of counsel's failure to request more detailed questions on voir dire denied defendant the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. In our view, because defendant's individual claims are almost entirely without merit, even viewed cumulatively those claims do not erode this Court's confidence in the fairness of the jury selection. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698. We find that, on the whole, counsel's performance during voir dire was thorough and competent. Two of defendant's claims pertain to the trial court's decision not to excuse juror Stephen Calabro for cause. During the trial, Calabro informed the court that he was acquainted with one of the State's witnesses and that he was familiar with casino credit records, the subject about which the witness had testified. Calabro also noted that he had had a mid-trial conversation with another juror about the substance of the witness's testimony. The court questioned Calabro in camera outside the presence of the attorneys. After extensive questioning and numerous assurances from Calabro that he could remain impartial, the court elected not to excuse Calabro. We are satisfied with the trial court's questioning of Calabro and find no reason to disturb the court's discretionary ruling that Calabro was fit to serve as a juror in this case. Defendant claims that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request that he be present during the court's discussion with Calabro. However, the record reveals that counsel, after conferring with defendant, asked the court to question Calabro outside the presence of the attorneys so that the juror would not feel ... intimidated or picked on or singled out. Counsel's request does not reflect ineffective assistance of counsel. One of defendant's claims pertains to the trial court's decision to qualify Neil Marzano as a juror. In Marshall I, supra, we noted that the record indicates that Marzano responded no to a question on voir dire concerning whether he could fairly evaluate the credibility of law-enforcement officials testifying at trial. 123 N.J. at 88, 586 A. 2d 85. We noted that after asking that question, the trial court suddenly moved on to another area of inquiry, and defense counsel never referred to Marzano's negative response. Ibid. We concluded: [Marzano's] isolated negative answer, especially in the context of both the trial court's and counsel's total lack of response, is inexplicable. Even assuming that the transcript accurately reflects Marzano's answer, however, that isolated response, when considered in the context of the entire voir dire, does not demonstrate that the juror was unfit to serve. [ Id. at 88-89, 586 A. 2d 85.] On PCR review, defendant criticizes trial counsel's failure to move to exclude Marzano for cause or to request follow-up questions concerning Marzano's negative answer. However, in view of the fact that Marzano was fit to serve as a juror, see id. at 89, 586 A. 2d 85, even if the transcription of Marzano's answer is accurate, counsel's failure to take remedial action did not prejudice defendant. Accordingly, defendant has not set forth a prima facie case in support of his Strickland/Fritz argument. Defendant also sets forth general claims concerning the manner in which voir dire was conducted in this case. First, he contends that Zeitz was ineffective in failing to ask the trial court to allow attorney-conducted voir dire instead of the traditional court-conducted questioning. However, defendant fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the use of court-conducted voir dire in this case. As we noted in Marshall I, supra: With but few exceptions, the trial court consistently and repeatedly acquiesced in defense counsel's requests to reinterrogate prospective jurors about specific subjects. The trial court's conduct of the voir dire was thorough and meticulous, and was painstakingly responsive to counsel's concerns that the scope of inquiry about specific subjects required amplification. [123 N.J. at 94, 586 A. 2d 85.] This claim is without merit. Defendant also asserts that Zeitz was ineffective in failing to request additional peremptory challenges to offset the adverse impact of pretrial publicity in Atlantic County, the site of defendant's trial. However, we previously have concluded that there is no indication that any juror was so tainted by pretrial publicity as to affect the deliberative process     We are convinced that there was no `realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity.' Id. at 78-79, 586 A. 2d 85 (citation omitted). Thus, defendant was not prejudiced by Zeitz's failure to request additional peremptory challenges. Defendant also alleges that the trial court improperly focused the jurors' attention on the notoriety of this case by referring to the presence of television cameras in the courtroom. In respect of the television coverage, the trial court explained to the jurors: A trial ... is a public matter. The public is entitled to attend. Obviously, persons may wish to attend this trial in such numbers that they cannot physically come into the courtroom. The news media may think it appropriate to cover the trial, and the Supreme Court of this state has decided that cameras can be in the courtroom under certain controlled guidelines ... and that is how these persons come to be present in the courtroom. They are limited in number. They are not, as you know, permitted to televise or photograph the jurors. So, if you can, just ignore them. We find the trial court's comments on this subject to be entirely appropriate. Lastly, defendant claims that trial counsel did not provide effective representation of defendant in the course of asking the trial court to close the courtroom to the media during two pretrial hearings. Counsel had argued to the trial court that defendant's right to an impartial jury could be compromised if the media attended the hearings because news coverage of the hearings could infect the pool of potential jurors. The trial court denied the motion to close the courtroom, citing, among other reasons, defense counsel's failure to give notice of his motion to the media, as required by our decision in State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 72, 459 A. 2d 641 (1983). On that basis, defendant now argues that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel during the two pretrial hearings. However, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to give the requisite notice to the press. First, as the trial court noted, there were additional requirements of the Williams test for court closure that defendant could not satisfy, including demonstrating that an open court would result in a realistic likelihood of prejudice to a fair trial, id. at 63, 459 A. 2d 641, and that there were no reasonable alternatives to court closure. Moreover, there is no indication that any juror [at defendant's trial] was so tainted by pretrial publicity as to affect the deliberative process. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 78, 586 A. 2d 85. We thus conclude that defendant's claim is without merit.