Opinion ID: 1841590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Privilege

Text: ¶ 11. Wahl contends that Wis. Stat. § 13.96, as it interacts with Wis. Stat. § 905.01, creates a statutory privilege that, while not expressly stated, is implicit in LTSB's obligation to treat all information within its possession as confidential. Therefore, as the legal custodian of the information stored by the LTSB, he is not required to comply with the subpoena. [4] The State [5] contends that the confidentiality provision of § 13.96 prevents voluntary disclosure to one who does not have proper authorization to receive the stored data, but that it is insufficient to excuse noncompliance with a valid John Doe subpoena. We agree with the State. ¶ 12. When we are presented with a question of statutory interpretation, we attempt to ascertain and give effect to the meaning of the statute. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We begin with the words chosen by the legislature, giving them their plain and ordinary meanings. Id., ¶ 45. This is our initial focus, because as we have explained, We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language. Id., ¶ 44. We are aided in ascertaining the meaning of the statute by the statutory context in which words are placed. Id., ¶ 46. If the statute's meaning is clear on its face, we need go no further; we simply apply it. Id., ¶ 45. However, if the statutory language is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more ways, then it is ambiguous. Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 2003 WI 28, ¶ 19, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656. If the statutory language is ambiguous, we may consult extrinsic sources to ascertain legislative intent. Stockbridge School Dist. v. Department of Pub. Instruction Sch. Dist. Boundary Appeal Bd., 202 Wis. 2d 214, 223, 550 N.W.2d 96 (1996). Here, both positions presented are reasonable interpretations of Wis. Stat. § 13.96, because confidential data may, or may not, be privileged, depending on the circumstances surrounding the data and the type of request made. ¶ 13. Wisconsin Stat. § 13.96 was created by 1997 Wis. Act 27, § 18m as a response to the legislature's ever-increasing reliance on computer-assisted communications. The LTSB serves legislators who belong to all political parties, and it warehouses data that the recipients and creators may deem confidential. Section 13.96 provides in relevant part: The legislative technology services bureau shall be strictly nonpartisan and shall at all times observe the confidential nature of the data and information originated, maintained or processed by electronic equipment supported by it. Wahl relies on the § 13.96 mandate of confidentiality as a connection to Wis. Stat. § 905.01, which addresses privileges. He asserts this mandate creates an implicit statutory privilege. Section 905.01 provides: Except as provided by or inherent or implicit in statute or in rules adopted by the supreme court or required by the constitution of the United States or Wisconsin, no person has a privilege to: (1) Refuse to be a witness; or (2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or (3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or (4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing. ¶ 14. However, just because data is to be kept confidential, it does not necessarily follow that Wahl has a legal privilege not to produce it. The concepts of confidential and legal privilege are very different. ¶ 15. Confidential data is that which is meant to be kept secret. Black's Law Dictionary 294 (7th ed. 1999). Legal privilege is a broader concept. It includes having the legal right not to provide certain data when faced with a valid subpoena. [6] Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 85, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999). As we have held previously, not all confidential data is that over which the custodian or owner may assert a privilege. See Davison v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 75 Wis. 2d 190, 199, 248 N.W.2d 433 (1977) (concluding that a provision of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, then § H24.04(1)(n)2., which requires certain reports to be prepared in a manner that keeps the names of the patients and physicians confidential, creates no privilege to refrain from producing the reports); see also Wis. Stat. § 102.33(2)(b)4 (authorizing the release of otherwise confidential worker compensation records in compliance with a valid subpoena). ¶ 16. Additionally, privileges are the exception and not the rule; therefore, they are narrowly construed. Burnett, 224 Wis. 2d at 85. To accord a privilege here would simply delay the provision of communications that Wahl concedes legislators would likely have to provide if individual subpoenas had been served on them. [7] ¶ 17. Furthermore, it is a well-accepted legal principle, a fundamental tenet of our modern legal system, . . . that the public has a right to every person's evidence except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege. State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 505, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982). See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). Wisconsin Stat. § 905.01 reaffirms this fundamental legal principle, since it states that testimony and production of things requested is the general rule and provides exceptions only in very limited circumstances, as we have explained in Gilbert. See Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d at 508. Furthermore, we agree with the reasoning stated in Nixon that these exceptions . . . are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710. Accordingly, we conclude that the confidentiality requirement of Wis. Stat. § 13.96 does not create a privilege for Wahl to refuse to comply with the subpoena duces tecum of the John Doe judge.