Opinion ID: 657321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cosgrove's prima facie case

Text: 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits retaliatory termination of employees for opposing alleged discriminatory practices. Section 704(a) of the statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a) (1988), provides that: 15 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 16 This Court has previously held that the distribution and allocation of burdens of proof in retaliatory discharge claims follow the general disparate treatment analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See Sumner, 899 F.2d at 208. The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. This test has been further refined by the Supreme Court's holding in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), which, pursuant to Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), must be applied retroactively to the instant case. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 140-41 (2d Cir.1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a fact finder's rejection of an employer's asserted reason for its actions does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff at all times retains the ultimate burden of persuasion. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2747. Thus, once the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no longer relevant. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. The ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven 'that the defendant intentionally discriminated [or retaliated] against [her]'  because, as in the instant case, she engaged in a protected activity. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093). 17 For purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is violated when a retaliatory motive plays a part in adverse employment actions toward an employee, whether or not it was the sole cause. In addition, Title VII is violated when an employer is motivated by retaliatory animus, even if valid objective reasons for the discharge exist. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209; see also Davis, 802 F.2d at 642; DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, n. 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455, 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987). Once a prima facie case is established by a plaintiff, the burden of production shifts to the employer to demonstrate that a  'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason'  existed for its action, Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093), although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749; Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 142. The critical question is whether a plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff for engaging in protected activity. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209 (quoting Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984)). 18 A plaintiff in a section 704(a) retaliation claim must demonstrate, for the purposes of a prima facie case, that: (1) she was engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of plaintiff's participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against plaintiff based upon her activity; and (4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 208-09 (citation omitted); Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1993). To establish that an activity was protected, a plaintiff need only prove that she was acting under a good faith belief that the activity was of the kind covered by the statute. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209. Finally, a plaintiff may establish a causal connection indirectly by showing that the protected activity was followed by discriminatory treatment ... or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus. Id. The facts established at trial show that Cosgrove has met all prongs of the test: (1) Cosgrove filed an EEOC complaint against Sears; (2) Sears was aware of this, as early as November 1, 1977; and (3) Sears did not follow its own procedures for addressing employee performance deficiencies in terminating Cosgrove's employment. Thus, we are persuaded that Cosgrove has made a prima facie showing that Sears discharged her--retaliated--because she engaged in a protected activity--i.e., because she filed an EEOC complaint against Sears. 19