Opinion ID: 3053462
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Express Easement Claim

Text: [3] McFarland contends that he is the holder of an express easement arising from the language of the Schoenberger 14048 MCFARLAND v. KEMPTHORNE Patent, which conveys the property “with the appurtenances thereof.” We rejected a similar argument in Fitzgerald II, where a property owner also claimed an express easement over federal land based on the term “appurtenances” in the land patent. 460 F.3d at 1267. “While the word ‘appurtenance’ will carry with it an existing easement, it will not create the easement.” Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Jenks, 129 F.3d 1348, 1355 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, unless an easement existed at the time of the grant, McFarland holds no easement. See Jenks, 129 F.3d at 1355. As discussed above, McFarland could not claim an easement at the time of the grant, and his argument is undermined by his own representation that his “predecessor’s . . . access into his property . . . was not protected by any county road easement or other guarantee of continued access.” McFarland cites Hunter v. United States, 388 F.2d 148, 153-54 (9th Cir. 1967), and Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304, 314 (1891), to support his claim of an express easement. Both cases are distinguishable. Hunter involved a question of what rights were appurtenant to an appropriated water right on federal land. 388 F.2d at 153-54. The court held that a grazing right was not appurtenant to the water rights because it was not necessary to the utilization of the water rights. Id. at 154. Similarly, Humphreys addressed whether an elevator was appurtenant to a railroad. 140 U.S. at 314-15. The discussion of the meaning of “appurtenant” in these cases in no way bolsters McFarland’s argument or blunts the holding of Fitzgerald II that an express easement must be expressly conveyed.