Opinion ID: 2549094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Quash Execution

Text: Our disposition supra, Section III.A, renders McCurdy's first point of error moot. However, in the event a new or alias execution is sought, see HRS § 651-38 (1993), [1] we address McCurdy's argument to provide guidance to the circuit court and the parties. McCurdy asserts that a fundamental requirement of a valid writ of execution is that it accurately state whose property is subject to being taken. McCurdy points out that the District Court Rules of Civil Procedure's (DCRCP) standard execution form provides that the authorized officer levying an execution is commanded to levy upon the personal property of __________. DCRCP, Form 53 (2000). In addition, a standard execution form of the circuit courts contained in Jay M. Fidell and Emma S. Matsunaga's Hawai'i Collection Sourceboook (1990) similarly provides that the authorized officer levying an execution is COMMANDED TO levy upon the personal property of the defendant indicated above in this case. Jay M. Fidell & Emma S. Matsunaga, Hawai'i Collection Sourcebook § 4, 140 Form C-60(1) (1990). Pursuant to HRS § 651-32 (Supp.1998): Every district judge at the request of the party recovering any civil judgment in the judge's court, unless the judgment is duly appealed from, shall issue the judge's execution against the property of the party recovered against, which execution may be in the form established by the usage and practice of the issuing court [.] (Emphases added.) At the outset we observe that the DCRCP, in general, and DCRCP Form 53, in particular, are inapplicable in this case inasmuch as the DCRCP govern civil proceedings in the district courts. See DCRCP Rule 1 (2000) (These rules govern the procedure in the district courts ... in all suits of a civil nature.). Furthermore, as indicated above, HRS § 651-32 states that an execution may be in the form established by the usage and practice of the issuing court. (Emphasis added.) Use of the term may in the plain language of the statute demonstrates that an issuing court has discretion whether to use the established form. Therefore, even assuming Form C-60(1), found in the Hawai'i Collection Sourceboook, is a standard form of execution sanctioned by the Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP), noncompliance with the form does not make an execution per se void. See HRCP Rule 84 (2000) (forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate (emphasis added)). Generally, statutes prescribing the form and contents of executions should be followed, see Nepstad v. East Chicago Oil Ass'n, Inc., 96 Mont. 183, 29 P.2d 643, 644 (1934); Romoli v. Motta, 59 R.I. 201, 194 A. 733, 735-36 (1937), and if the execution contains all that is required by statute it is sufficient, Lebreton v. Lemaire, 43 S.W. 31 (Tex.Civ.App.1897). We point out that the only express statutory requirements under part II of HRS chapter 651 as to the form and content of a writ of execution are that it shall be made returnable within sixty days from the date thereof[,] HRS § 651-34, and it shall be addressed to the sheriff, or deputy sheriff, or a police officer of any county, and shall be signed by the clerk of the court, and impressed with the seal thereof. HRS § 651-37 (1993). [2] Therefore, it is not statutorily required in Hawai'i that an execution identify precisely whose property is to be levied upon. McCurdy cites to Douglas v. Whiting, 28 Ill. 362 (1862), and Capps v. Leachman, 90 Tex. 499, 39 S.W. 917 (1897), for the proposition that a failure to designate whose property is to be taken renders an execution void. In Douglas, the execution at issue commanded the sheriff that of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements of [__________] in your county, you make, or cause to be made, the amount of the recovery. 28 Ill. at 366. The Illinois Supreme Court held the execution null and void, stating only that [i]t is indispensable, before one's property can be sold under a judgment against him, there should be an execution against the property of the judgment debtor. Id. In Capps, the execution therein commanded the sheriff that of the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of the said [_________], you cause to be made the sum of nineteen hundred and twenty-nine dollars and ninety cents[.] 39 S.W. at 917. The Texas Supreme Court observed that the pertinent Texas statute prescribes, as a requisite to the execution, that it shall require the officer to satisfy the judgment out of property of the debtor, and it must have intended that the debtor's name should be given in the body of the writ. Id. at 918. The Capps court held the execution void for fail[ing] to name the person whose property was to be subjected to its satisfaction. Id. at 917. The instant case, unlike Douglas and Capps, does not involve the circumstance where a space on the execution was left glaringly open. Regardless, we are not convinced that a writ of execution is per se null and void simply for failing to follow a precise form in identifying the person whose property is subject to being taken. Rather, we think it prudent to examine the execution in full view of the facts and circumstances of the case. We, therefore, decline to follow Douglas and Capps here. Turning to the case at hand, Ditto asserts that, inasmuch as the writ of execution states that the personal property is to be seized in order to satisfy judgments entered in said action against Defendant JOHN A. McCURDY, JR.[,] the execution was sufficiently specific to the identity of the debtor. She argues further that, [e]ven if the writ of execution was in some way defective for not specifying that only [McCurdy]'s property could be taken, that defect does not translate into any sort of prejudice suffered by [McCurdy] himself to the extent that his property has been seized. [Ditto] still holds a valid multi-million dollar judgment against [McCurdy] and the November 22, 1999 writ of execution was a valid collection remedy. The only alleged harm suffered was the improper taking of Mrs. McCurdy's property. We cannot agree. As previously indicated, the execution in this case commands the authorized officer to levy upon any and all personal property found at Harbor Court, Apartment # 3502, 66 Queen Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96813 [hereinafter, the subject phrase]. Notwithstanding that McCurdy is identified as the judgment debtor elsewhere in the execution, we believe the absence of McCurdy's name in the subject phrase renders the language, any and all personal property, overly broad. As Ditto herself points out, several items of Mrs. McCurdy were improperly levied upon in connection with the execution. Although we cannot say with any certainty that this harm would have been avoided had McCurdy's name been included somewhere in the subject phrase, we cannot dismiss its significance. Therefore, should a new or an alias writ be pursued, we caution that more care should be taken in wording the execution in this regard. In other words, it is advisable that the writ of execution identify precisely whose property is to be levied upon.