Opinion ID: 543684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impeachment of Hill

Text: 7 Roach and Sellers both argue that the district court improperly prevented them from impeaching Hill's credibility in several respects. 3 8
9 In October 1986, Hill voluntarily admitted himself to the psychiatric wing of a hospital, informing the hospital staff that he had an acute problem with drug and alcohol abuse. Hill testified in camera, however, that he had made up the drug addiction story, and had in fact checked into the hospital because his wife had just left him, he was kind of crazy and didn't know what to do, and thought maybe [he] would get some sympathy. Blood and urinalysis tests taken by the hospital turned up negative for illegal drugs. Hill had used cocaine and marijuana in the past, however, by his own admission and, apparently, according to other evidence. Hill left the hospital without checking out later on the same night he was admitted. 10 The defendants make a threefold argument against the district court's exclusion of this evidence. First, the defendants contend that it constituted psychiatric evidence bearing on Hill's mental capacity. Nothing in the defendants' proffer, however, suggested that Hill had ever suffered from any mental illness as such, aside from drug or alcohol abuse, and the proffered evidence certainly did not suggest that he suffered any mental disorder at the time of the November 1987 interrogation which might have impaired his ability to perceive events. Cf. United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir.1974) (evidence admissible concerning witness's mental incapacity at a time about which he proposes to testify); accord United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir.1983) (admissibility of a history of psychiatric disorders ... having specific relevance to the facts at issue ) (emphasis added). 11 Second, the defendants contend that Hill's prior drug use was admissible impeachment evidence. Hill denied, however, and the defense could proffer no evidence, that he had used illegal drugs during the year prior to November 1987. There was certainly no evidence that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the interrogation. Because of the extreme potential for unfair prejudice flowing from evidence of drug use, this Court has held that such evidence may properly be limited to specific instances of drug use [during] relevant periods of trial and the transaction charged in the indictment. United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir.1982); accord Jarrett v. United States, 822 F.2d 1438, 1446 (7th Cir.1987) (A witness's use of drugs may not be used to attack his or her general credibility, but only his or her ability to perceive the underlying events and testify lucidly at the trial.). Furthermore, prior instances of drug use are not relevant to truthfulness for purposes of Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). See United States v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 841-42 (11th Cir.1984). 12 Third, the defendants contend that they were entitled to cross-examine Hill under Rule 608(b) concerning his admission that he lied to the hospital staff. This isolated untruth, however, which was apparently motivated by extreme emotional distress, would seem to have little if any conceivable relevance to his credibility at trial. See United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108, 118 (1st Cir.1980) ([T]he district court is not bound to allow examination into every incident, no matter how remote in time and circumstance, that may possibly bear upon the witness' veracity.). We note that Rule 608(b) provides that specific instances of prior conduct may ... in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination. (Emphasis added.) 13 For these reasons, there was no abuse of discretion as to this item. 14
15 The defense made a rather murky proffer of evidence regarding comments which Roach claimed Hill made to him during the ride back from the interrogation. According to Roach, Hill expressed fear of an associate to whom he owed money regarding past drug use, and also expressed fear of his father-in-law and wife. Hill allegedly indicated that he was afraid the associate or his father-in-law might find out he had been down at the Sheriff's Office, and might suspect that he had talked to the police. The defense had earlier suggested, but could not proffer any significant evidence, that Hill and Hill's father-in-law were jointly involved in the theft from Farmer's business. 4 The claimed relevance of this proffered evidence to whether Hill had a motive to fabricate his account of the interrogation, or whether someone other than Farmer beat him, appears to rest on an exceedingly tenuous chain of speculation. We have no difficulty concluding that any conceivable relevance was vastly outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, see Fed.R.Evid. 403, and that the district court therefore had discretion to exclude this evidence. Any error was plainly harmless in any event. 5 16
17 The defendants contend that evidence of a prior conviction of Hill for misdemeanor theft should have been admitted for impeachment purposes under Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2). It is established in this Circuit, however, that crimes such as theft, robbery, or shoplifting do not involve dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). See United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597, 598-99 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971, 101 S.Ct. 2049, 68 L.Ed.2d 350 (1981) (shoplifting); 6 United States v. Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 638 n. 15 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2162, 64 L.Ed.2d 794 (1980) (bank robbery); see also Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352, 358-59 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (theft). 7 But see United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir.1979) (holding that burglary and petit larceny have bearing on credibility). The district court therefore acted properly within its discretion in excluding this evidence. 18
19 Finally, the defendants challenge the district court's exclusion of evidence of a prior unrelated theft committed by Hill, on which charges were pending at the time of the interrogation. 8 While the defendants argue the admissibility of this evidence as prior conduct bearing on truthfulness under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b), theft, as discussed in Part II(A)(1)(iii) above, has no such bearing. The defendants' alternative theory is that this pending charge gave Hill a motive to fabricate his account of the interrogation. As with the proffered evidence discussed in Part II(A)(1)(ii) above, this theory seems hopelessly speculative and vastly outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice. The principal cases cited by the defendants are inapposite in that they involved promises of leniency or immunity as to pending charges against a witness in return for testimony. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wainwright, 763 F.2d 1390, 1392 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 106 S.Ct. 2290, 90 L.Ed.2d 730 (1986); United States v. Garrett, 727 F.2d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). 9 20 As to all the foregoing impeachment issues, the defense appears to have followed a strategy of putting Hill on trial in place of Roach and Sellers. For the reasons discussed above, the district court properly kept this trial focused on the relevant issues.