Opinion ID: 3011102
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Text of -47(m)(4)

Text: CIGNA insists that unless subsection 26 C.F.R. S 1.150247(m)(3)(vi) applies only to the acquisition of individual companies, the heading Acquired groups on -47(m)(4) would be without significance. CIGNA emphasizes the designation of [Reserved] on that regulation and points to various definitions which equate the terms reserved and reserve with notions of setting aside or apart and of deferring a determination. CIGNA then further claims that this interpretation of reserved accords with both the Commissioner's past administrative practice and the understanding of former high-ranking treasury officials. We are not convinced. We agree that use of the term reserved implies that something has been set aside. CIGNA, however, assumes that what was set aside was the subject matter of the regulation and further that the subject matter of the regulation was the treatment of the loss of nonlife members acquired as a group. Appellant's Br. at 24. It is equally likely that what was set aside was the numerical subsection -47(m)(4) and the space in the regulation it demarcates. 15 CIGNA further attempts to establish that the Commissioner's customary administrative practice[was to] interpret[ ] `reserved' in a regulation as a signal that there is no regulatory rule to govern the referenced subject matter by identifying some instances in which the Commissioner used that term to have that meaning. Appellant's Br. at 24. That is not conclusive. In fact, the Office of the Federal Register, Document Drafting Handbook (1991), suggests a different use for the term reserved. It describes reserved as a term used to maintain the continuity of codification in the CFR or to indicate where future text will be added. Id. at 27. We find nothing in the precedent that CIGNA cites to preclude the Commissioner from using the term reserved in accordance with the Document Drafting Handbook, rather than to connote the absence of a substantive rule. Finally, we accord little weight to the 1996 recollections of the several Treasury officials who submitted affidavits regarding the meaning of the reserved clause for acquired groups. In the first place, the affidavits are inconsistent: William McKee states that reserved means that no regulation addresses the treatment of the reserved issue, App. at 226, but Andrew D. Pike understood that the general rule would continue to apply until a special rule was created for acquired groups, App. at 229. Moreover, reliance upon remembered details from officials who lacked the ultimate authority to issue any proposed regulation has little support in the law. See Armco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 865, 867 (1987) ([N]o one's personal views can be accepted as a pronouncement of the intended meaning of the regulation.); cf. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 480 U.S. 123, 131 n. (1987) ([The] attempt at the creation of legislative history through the post hoc statements of interested onlookers is entitled to no weight . . . .). In sum, we, like the Tax Court, conclude that nothing in Regulation -47(m)(4) contradicts the Commissioner's interpretation of Regulation -47(m)(3)(vi) as applying to acquired groups. At most, Regulation -47(m)(4) is aneutral factor. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 109 T.C. at 109. 16