Opinion ID: 1058852
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fitzgerald Cross-Examination

Text: Juniper contends that the trial court erred by disallowing cross-examination of Terence Fitzgerald regarding foot traffic to and from Keshia's apartment. Fitzgerald, a friend of Keshia's, testified that he obtained and paid the rent for the apartment in which Keshia and her children lived. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to ask Fitzgerald if the landlord had ever complained to him about foot traffic at Keshia's apartment. The Commonwealth objected on hearsay and relevance grounds. Juniper's counsel responded that the inquiry was simply offered to show why [Fitzgerald] ... went and talked to Keshia[-] because he received a complaint, not for the truth of [the `foot traffic' complaint]. Fitzgerald was then asked if he ever complained to Keshia about the traffic at the apartment and the Commonwealth again objected. Defense counsel then argued the question was relevant as to whether or not someone else was there or had the opportunity to be involved in these crimes. You have high traffic, and represented that she planned to introduce evidence that the [apartment] looked like it had been searched. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objections. Juniper assigns error to these rulings because he alleges the trial court disallowed questioning which would lead to relevant testimony tending to show [Juniper] did not commit the crime for which he was charged. Juniper cites the following statement of law in support of this assertion: In Virginia, evidence that a crime was actually committed by someone other than the accused is admissible for the purpose of generating a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. However, the evidence introduced must point directly to guilt of a third party. Thus, where there is a trend of facts and circumstances tending clearly to point out some other person as the guilty party, the [defendant] may introduce any legal evidence which is available tending to prove that another person committed the crime with which he is charged. The admissibility of circumstantial evidence tending to prove the guilt of a third person is left to the discretion of the trial court. Although circumstantial evidence tending to prove the guilt of a third party is to be liberally received, the evidence must be legally admissible. That is, the evidence must be relevant and material, and may not be hearsay. Weller v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 886, 890, 434 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added), aff'd in rehearing en banc, 443 S.E.2d 171 (1994). In Weller, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court disallowing testimony that the defendant proffered to implicate a particular individual, on the grounds that such testimony was inadmissible hearsay and irrelevant. Id. at 890-91, 434 S.E.2d at 333-34. In this case, Juniper's attempted questioning of Fitzgerald did not implicate another particular individual in the murders. Defense counsel merely alleged that there were other people who came to the apartment at unknown times, but never proffered any evidence to support this claim. As we have previously stated, [p]roffered evidence that merely suggests a third party may have committed the crime charged is inadmissible; only when the proffered evidence tends clearly to point to some other person as the guilty party will such proof be admitted. ... [A] large discretion must and should remain vested in the trial court as to the admission of this class of testimony. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 424, 593 S.E.2d 270, 287 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081, 125 S.Ct. 875, 160 L.Ed.2d 825 (2005) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 681, 529 S.E.2d 769, 784, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981, 121 S.Ct. 432, 148 L.Ed.2d 439 (2000)). Thus, we find the trial court correctly excluded the foot traffic question because it did not tend clearly to point to some other person as the guilty party. Id.