Opinion ID: 2599419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review

Text: The appeals officer accepted McGrath's factual allegations as true, and the respondents did not dispute her version of events. Our review is therefore limited to the appeals officer's interpretation and application of NRS 616C.180. Because statutory construction is a question of law, our review of an administrative ruling concerning the application of a statute is plenary, rather than deferential. [1] When a statute's language is plain and unambiguous, we will give that language its ordinary meaning. [2] In interpreting the plain language of a statute, we presume that the Legislature intended to use words in their usual and natural meaning. [3] When, however, a statute may be given more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. [4] When an ambiguous statute is construed, it should be given a meaning that is consistent with what the Legislature intended, based on reason and public policy. [5] The plain, unambiguous language of NRS 616C.180 requires a claimant to identify a discrete, traumatic event that caused a stress-related injury NRS 616C.180 provides that injuries caused by job-related stress are compensable in specific enumerated circumstances: 1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, an injury or disease sustained by an employee that is caused by stress is compensable pursuant to the provisions of chapters 616A to 616D, inclusive, or chapter 617 of NRS if it arose out of and in the course of his employment. 2. Any ailment or disorder caused by any gradual mental stimulus, and any death or disability ensuing therefrom, shall be deemed not to be an injury or disease arising out of and in the course of employment. 3. An injury or disease caused by stress shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment only if the employee proves by clear and convincing medical or psychiatric evidence that: (a) He has a mental injury caused by extreme stress in time of danger; (b) The primary cause of the injury was an event that arose out of and during the course of his employment; and (c) The stress was not caused by his layoff, the termination of his employment or any disciplinary action taken against him. NRS 616C.180 therefore provides that claimants may receive workers' compensation for stress-related injuries or diseases, as long as those injuries arose out of and in the course of . . . employment. However, a claimant can show that a stress-related injury or disease falls under this definition only by satisfying the three conditions listed in subsections (3)(a)-(c). At issue here are the first and second conditions, which require McGrath to demonstrate that (a) she has a mental injury caused by extreme stress in time of danger and (b) the primary cause of the stress-related injury was an event arising out of and during the course of her employment. Furthermore, even if these conditions are met, NRS 616C.180(2) specifically excludes [a]ny ailment or disorder caused by any gradual mental stimulus from the definition of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and thus the statute bars compensation for such stress-related injuries.  Time of danger  McGrath first assigns error to the appeals officer's construction of NRS 616C.180(3)(a), which requires a claimant to demonstrate that she suffered a mental injury caused by extreme stress in time of danger. The first part of NRS 616C.180(3)(a) requires a claimant to indicate that he or she has suffered a mental injury. The Legislature has defined an injury, for purposes of the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act, as a sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result which is established by medical evidence. [6] The added requirement of time of danger makes clear that the injury must be caused by a potentially traumatic incident, as danger is generally defined as the state of being exposed to harm and liability to injury, pain or loss. [7] Therefore, the statute's plain language indicates that McGrath must demonstrate that she suffered a sudden and tangible injury as the result of extreme stress at a time when she was exposed to harm. McGrath contends that her injuries were caused by extreme stress in time of danger because, as a highway patrolwoman, she carries a firearm and is often involved in dangerous traffic stops. The record, however, contains no evidence that McGrath's injuries resulted from the extreme stress of a dangerous traffic stop. Furthermore, the mere fact that McGrath carries a firearm on patrol does not necessarily create a perpetual time of danger. Accordingly, the appeals officer properly determined that McGrath's status as a patrolwoman does not, standing alone, prove that her injuries were caused by extreme stress in time of danger.  Event  McGrath next contends that the event requirement in NRS 616C.180(3)(b) is ambiguous. We disagree. The Legislature has not defined the term event, as it is used in NRS 616C.180, and thus we look to the word's plain meaning. An event is generally defined as a noteworthy occurrence or happening . . . an unusual or significant development. [8] The statute's plain language, then, does not permit a claim for stress built up over the course of multiple incidents, but instead requires a claimant to demonstrate that his or her stress was caused by a discrete, identifiable occurrence. Furthermore, we have held that [w]hen construing a specific portion of a statute, the statute should be read as a whole, and, where possible, the statute should be read to give meaning to all of its parts. [9] NRS 616C.180 provides for compensation for a stress-related injury or disease. As noted above, the Legislature has defined an injury as a sudden and tangible happening of a traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result which is established by medical evidence. [10] And although other statutes indicate that a disease may generally result from several occurrences, [11] NRS 616C.180(2) expressly provides that any disease that results from a gradual mental stimulus is uncompensable. Therefore, the event requirement of NRS 616C.180(3)(b) is inextricably linked with the definition of an injurya sudden, tangible, traumatic experience.  Gradual mental stimulus  Finally, NRS 616C.180(2) excludes from coverage stress-related injuries caused by any gradual mental stimulus. The adjective gradual refers to a process of moving, changing, or developing by fine, slight, or often imperceptible gradations or modulations. [12] The statute's plain language, then, creates a dichotomy between those stress-related injuries brought on by a sudden occurrence or singular instance and those brought on by a gradual escalation of stress. In light of the statute's exclusion from compensation of stress-related injuries caused by any gradual mental stimulus and the plain meaning of the word event, we conclude that NRS 616C.180 unambiguously requires a claimant to identify a discrete, identifiable, traumatic occurrence that gave rise to stress. [13] The appeals officer correctly determined that McGrath is not entitled to workers' compensation pursuant to NRS 616C.180 Because Nevada workers' compensation law unequivocally requires a claimant to identify a discrete event in time of danger that caused a stress-related injury, we conclude that the appeals officer in this case correctly determined that McGrath's stress-related injury was not compensable. McGrath never identified a discrete event in time of danger giving rise to her stress-related injuries. Instead, she has consistently attributed the injuries to a buildup of stress over an eighteen-month period. Although we acknowledge that the alleged work-related harassment may have led to extreme stress, we conclude that McGrath does not qualify for workers' compensation coverage under NRS 616C.180. [14]