Opinion ID: 1967081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contemporaneous History

Text: The Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated in 1952; Rule 1531(b) replaced 12 P.S. § 2071. [4] The rules were promulgated by our Supreme Court, assisted by a Procedural Rules Committee. Specifically, the Court noted that its intent was to make changes in the equity rules: Equity Rule 92, adopted by the Supreme Court, May 13, 1940, and as amended Nov. 28, 1941, read as follows: Those Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court which are applicable to equity practice and procedure, shall prevail over any existing Equity Rules which are inconsistent therewith; and the Equity Rules are modified, or abrogated, to the extent of such inconsistency, as of the respective dates the dominant Rules of Civil Procedure became or become operative. Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, 1967 edition, Title 12, p. 19. (Emphasis added). The prior rules, including the rule on bonds, were suspended. See Pa.R.C.P. 1550(4), suspending 12 P.S. § 2071 absolutely. Crucial to our analysis is the fact that Rule 1531(b) contains different language than that previously utilized in Section 2071. Pa.R.C.P. 128 supplies, [p]resumptions in Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Court as aids in construction. One of the presumptions is that if the Supreme Court has construed the language used in a rule. . ., the Supreme Court in promulgating a rule on the same subject matter which employs the same language intends the same construction to be placed upon such language;.. . . Pa.R.C.P. 128(d). (Emphasis added). Although Rule 1531(b) covers the same subject matter as the prior rule, the Court chose not to employ the same language. Therefore, we may not presume that the construction of Section 2071 as exemplified by Azar v. Markle, supra , should be placed upon Rule 1531(b). See also Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, 1967 edition, Title 12, Ronald A. Anderson, Esquire, Repositories of Pennsylvania Civil Practice, p. XXII. We find that the use of different language suggests a different intent behind Rule 1531 and permits a different construction of the rule. See Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, Inc., 326 Pa.Super. 509, 474 A.2d 605 (1984), aff'd as modified, 510 Pa. 1, 507 A.2d 1 (1986) (it is a rule of statutory construction that a change in the language of a statute ordinarily indicates a change in the legislative intent). In further support of finding a change between the prior construction of the rule and a new construction of the current rules, is appellants' argument that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1952 in response to enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The language of the federal rule governing injunction bonds, F.R.C.P. 65(c), is different from the rule adopted in the Commonwealth. [5] Although the language is different, we deem federal practice helpful in ascertaining our Supreme Court's intentions when promulgating Pa.R. C.P. 1531(b); the federal rule and practice do not control but do illuminate the historical context in which our state's rules were promulgated. Many states, including Pennsylvania, promulgated new rules of civil procedure, intended to govern both law and equity actions, in response to the federal rules. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1008 at 48 (1973). Posting a bond in federal courts, as in Pennsylvania, is mandatory prior to issuance of injunctive relief. However, [t]he mandatory nature of the security requirement is ameliorated by the remaining portion of the first sentence of Rule 65(c), which states that the security required shall be `in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.' As a result of this passage, the discretion permitted a federal court sitting in equity is available to a court in setting the amount of security that is required by Rule 65(c). Accordingly, the judge usually will fix security in an amount that covers the potential incidental and consequential costs and either the losses the unjustly enjoined or restrained party will suffer during the period he is prohibited from engaging in certain activities or the complainant's unjust enrichment caused by his adversary being improperly enjoined or restrained. Wright & Miller, supra, § 2954 at 525. (Emphasis added). The security is set, in a balancing process, to cover foreseeable damages. Practice in federal courts is to allow recovery beyond the bond amount where actual damages exceed foreseeable damages covered by the bond, either by a motion pursuant to F.R.C.P. 65.1 or by suits at law for unjust enrichment or malicious prosecution. Wright & Miller, supra, § 2973 at 652.