Opinion ID: 2049141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Superior Court Actions

Text: On May 6, 2005, David commenced the instant action in Newport County Superior Court by filing a verified complaint seeking (1) a declaratory judgment and (2) a temporary restraining order to prevent the sale of the properties. On June 22, 2006, David filed an amended verified complaint, again requesting declaratory relief pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. [7] In count 3 of his amended complaint, David sought a declaration that Karl had breached the contract to purchase the three units because he had failed to close on the properties within the time set forth in the Will (as extended by agreement of the Co-Executors) [which]    negates the Estate's duty to sell him any of the subject parcels. Karl answered the amended complaint and also filed a counterclaim and cross-claim, asserting that it was David and Attorney Field who, when they refused to convey the three parcels to him, had breached the contract that had come into existence when he accepted the offer set forth in the Offer Document. Karl contended that, in drafting the Offer Document, the coexecutors had intended that the credit provision in the Offer Document would allow him to use his intended distribution from Carolyn's Overall Estate as a credit for a portion of the purchase price. The parties thereafter filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On May 3, 2007, the parties appeared in Superior Court and participated in a hearing on their cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 27, 2007, the hearing justice issued a written decision and ruled that the credit provision clearly and unambiguously permitted Karl to use a credit from his anticipated share of Carolyn's probate estate onlyand not from the Overall Estate. Notably, the hearing justice stated that she did not resort to analysis of extrinsic evidence in reaching her decision; after having made reference to the parole evidence rule, she expressed her view that such analysis would be both unnecessary and impermissible. She therefore granted summary judgment in favor of David with respect to count 3 of his amended verified complaint. In the wake of the just-referenced ruling, Karl was granted leave to amend his counterclaim. He then added a count 3 to his original counterclaim. In count 3 of Karl's counterclaim, he sought reformation of the contract on the basis of mutual mistake; he again argued that the coexecutors had intended that, in purchasing such parcels as he might choose to purchase, he could use a credit from his expected share of the Overall Estate. David and Karl again filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On May 23, 2008, the same hearing justice as had ruled on the earlier cross-motions addressed the most recent cross-motions for summary judgment; she once again ruled in favor of David and declined to allow reformation of the contract. The hearing justice again declared that the Offer Document was clear and unambiguous and should be understood as David would have it. She held that the phrase pursuant to the terms of the Will in that document meant that, in seeking to purchase the subject properties, Karl was entitled to use a credit only with respect to his shares of Carolyn's probate estate and not with respect to shares due to him from the Overall Estate as would be distributed in accordance with the Trust Agreement. The hearing justice also found no evidence of mutual mistake, stating that [the coexecutors] understood the terms of payment    in the offer document to read and mean exactly what [was] stated as written. Partial final judgment was entered in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure on July 18, 2008. Karl filed a timely notice of appeal.