Opinion ID: 2978633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Unreasonable Application of” Federal Law

Text: Under Strickland’s deficiency prong, Brown must show that his counsel’s representation fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged conduct might be considered sound trial -5- No. 07-4410 Brown v. Sheets strategy.” Id. at 689. Under the prejudice prong, Brown must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of [his trial] would have been different.” Id. at 694. Brown argues that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in four ways: (1) he failed to interview the victims adequately; (2) he failed to file a motion to exclude L.H.’s testimony as the result of tainted procedures; (3) he failed to object to hearsay statements; and (4) he failed to properly impeach K.H..1 Brown’s claim fails with respect to each of those grounds because the state appellate court was not unreasonable in its conclusion that, even if counsel’s conduct was deficient, Brown failed to show prejudice. First, even if trial counsel’s failure to interview L.H. and more adequately question K.H. demonstrates deficient performance, see, e.g., Landers v. Rees, 782 F.2d 1042, at  (6th Cir. 1985) (table) (explaining that a failure to interview the victim may be deficient), Brown did not present any facts that would have been discovered during those interviews that could have been used to impeach the victims during cross-examination, Elswick v. Parke, 861 F.2d 720, at -4 (6th Cir. 1988) (table) (rejecting defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because he could not show any facts that could have been used for impeachment, which facts would have been uncovered had trial counsel interviewed the victim before trial). Brown speculates that, “[g]iven the complainants’ failures to repeat the same story twice, defense counsel, by interviewing them could have most likely 1 Although he originally argued five grounds for ineffective assistance, Brown conceded at oral argument that he could not succeed on one of those grounds—trial counsel’s decision to call Clyde Haller. -6- No. 07-4410 Brown v. Sheets obtained yet a different version of the events.” This attempt at showing prejudice is too speculative. He does not point to specific facts that, had they been discovered, would have had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome. Similarly, Brown has not shown how he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to move to exclude L.H.’s statements. To succeed on this argument, he would have to show that there was a reasonable probability that the district court would have granted that motion and that the outcome would have been different without the evidence. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Brown argues that to succeed on such a motion, he needed to prove only that investigators used methods that raise doubt as to the reliability of the testimony, not that the testimony was fabricated. The cases on which he relies, however, are not relevant to determining whether or not to exclude witness testimony based on allegedly improper interview techniques. Instead, those cases address whether statements by children about alleged sexual assault made to medical personnel should be admitted under Ohio’s hearsay exception for statements made in the course of medical diagnosis. E.g., Ohio v. Dever, 596 N.E.2d 436, 444 (Ohio 1992) (explaining the factors that courts should consider in determining whether a child’s statement regarding sexual assault should be admitted pursuant to Ohio Evid. R. 803(4)). Because Brown has not presented a basis upon which the trial court would have granted a motion to exclude the testimony, he has not shown that the state appellate court was unreasonable in its conclusion that he could not show prejudice. -7- No. 07-4410 Brown v. Sheets Brown also contends that counsel’s failure to object to certain testimony as hearsay constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.2 The state appellate court rejected Brown’s claim for various reasons, including the fact that he did not set forth the precise statements at issue, and because the court concluded that any error was simply harmless error. Brown has failed to show that the state court’s conclusion was unreasonable. First, the statements to which he objects would likely have been admissible as non-hearsay statements. For example, some of the statements would have likely been admitted under Ohio Evidence Rule 801(D)(1)(b), which excludes from the definition of hearsay prior consistent statements offered to rebut charges of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. See State v. Nichols, 619 N.E.2d 80, 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“The courts in Ohio have generally interpreted this rule as including only those prior consistent statements which were made . . . before the existence of any motive to falsify testimony.”). Brown argued that L.H.’s testimony was influenced by suggestive interview techniques used by the investigating officers. Most of the testimony about which he complains could be classified as prior consistent statements offered to rebut his argument that L.H.’s testimony was unduly influenced by the interviews. The additional statements to which he objects were actually consistent with his theory of the case: that K.H. and L.H. were influenced by the conversations they had with family members, each other, and investigators. The questions that led to the objectionable statements were necessary to rebut Brown’s argument that family members and investigators used suggestive techniques. To the extent 2 We cannot accept the Warden’s argument that Brown forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in his petition before the district court. Although Brown’s petition focused on the Confrontation Clause—an issue which he has not raised on appeal—it cited Ohio’s hearsay rule and case law applying that rule. Accordingly he has not forfeited this claim. -8- No. 07-4410 Brown v. Sheets that any of the remaining statements were actually inadmissible hearsay, they were cumulative given the other admissible statements. Accordingly, Brown was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object to the statements at issue. Finally, Brown argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not use Detective Penrod’s report or the first amended bill of particulars to impeach K.H. and because he did not renew his request for a copy of the grand jury testimony, which could have also been used for impeachment. The state appellate court’s conclusion that Brown was not prejudiced by this failure was not an unreasonable application of federal law. Although there were inconsistencies between K.H.’s testimony and the report, first amended bill of particulars, and grand jury testimony, trial counsel explored the inconsistencies between K.H.’s and L.H.’s trial testimony and other prior statements. Although counsel emphasized numerous inconsistencies in their testimony, the jury still believed K.H. and L.H.. It is doubtful that further impeachment would have altered the outcome—in fact, given the age of the witnesses, trial counsel may very well have made a tactical decision not to further impeach them, so as not to negatively impact the jury’s perception of him. Thus, the state court did not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that this ground did not give rise to a successful ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. AFFIRMED. -9-