Opinion ID: 2219110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Conduct of Voir Dire

Text: Defendant raises four arguments in support of his contention that the conduct of voir dire represented an abuse of discretion. First, defendant maintains that questioning conducted in the presence of the entire venire was improper under the circumstances of this case. The record shows that defendant filed a motion requesting that the trial court conduct a sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors, which the trial court granted over objection. Some months later, however, when the case was ready for trial, no additional courtrooms were available in which the trial court could conduct the sequestered voir dire as had been originally contemplated. The trial court rejected a suggestion by defense counsel concerning a possible alternative as being logistically difficult considering security, and stated that it had likewise considered several alternatives, but none seemed feasible. Consequently, the trial court reversed its earlier ruling by stating that it would conduct voir dire in the presence of the entire venire. The parties might, however, exercise their peremptory challenges in chambers, out of the presence of the prospective jurors. During the general questioning of prospective jurors, the trial court inquired as to whether they had previous knowledge of the case. Those nine prospective jurors who had were then questioned in detail regarding that knowledge, and specifically asked whether they could remain fair and impartial. The questioning did not reveal the details of their knowledge. Each one of the nine prospective jurors were eventually either peremptorily excused or excused for cause. In People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill.2d 180, 95 Ill.Dec. 283, 489 N.E.2d 845, we considered this same issue. There, as here, the trial court ruled that, because of the lack of security and available facilities, voir dire could not be conducted as requested. The trial court allowed that individual, rather than collective, responses from jurors concerning death penalty questioning would be received, and directed counsel to avoid prejudicial wording of questions. We held that, while Supreme Court Rules 431 and 234 (134 Ill.2d Rules 431, 234) allowed the trial court, in the exercise of discretion, to conduct individual voir dire out of the presence of other jurors, it was not required to do so. ( People v. Neal, 111 Ill.2d at 198, 95 Ill.Dec. 283, 489 N.E.2d 845.) We found that the precautions taken by the trial court to prevent prejudice sufficiently dispelled any suggestion of taint caused by its failure to individually question jurors. As in Neal, the trial court here was constrained by physical and security factors which compelled that voir dire be conducted in the presence of all prospective jurors. Considering that the trial court sought to effectively eliminate the possibility of taint by individual questioning of those prospective jurors who expressed knowledge of the case, we do not find an abuse of discretion. Neither do we find that the trial court's directive to the prospective jurors to listen carefully undercut those preventive measures. Moreover, we do not find any suggestion of taint since every juror, thus individually questioned, was subsequently eliminated from the panel. Defendant next maintains that the trial court's questioning of the prospective jurors pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, improperly resulted in a jury that was conviction-prone and unrepresentative of the community. We have repeatedly held that the qualification of jurors pursuant to Witherspoon does not deny a defendant the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, nor does it result in a conviction-prone jury. ( People v. Flores (1989), 128 Ill.2d 66, 92, 131 Ill.Dec. 106, 538 N.E.2d 481; People v. Gacy (1984), 103 Ill.2d 1, 37-38, 82 Ill.Dec. 391, 468 N.E.2d 1171.) Since defendant has not presented any argument which we have not previously considered, and this case does not involve a unique factual situation, we decline to reconsider our stated position. Defendant's third contention is that the trial court erred in excluding a prospective juror for cause who was not irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty regardless of facts and circumstances. (See Gray v. Mississippi (1987), 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622.) We disagree. Exclusion was proper. A capital defendant's right to an impartial jury prohibits the exclusion of venire members simply because they voice general objections to the death penalty or express conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. ( Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d at 785.) The Court reasoned that the exclusion of venire members must be limited to those who were irrevocably committed    to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings and to those whose views could prevent them from making an impartial decision on the question of guilt. ( Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d at 785 n. 21; see Gray v. Mississippi (1987), 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622.) The relevant inquiry is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52; see Gray, 481 U.S. at 658, 95 L.Ed.2d at 633, 107 S.Ct. at 2051. In People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267, we applied the standard set forth in Witt and held that the trial court properly excluded a prospective juror based on his responses to Witherspoon questions. The prospective juror's responses had been equivocal as to whether he would ever impose the death penalty. However, he finally responded that it was true that he could not consider the death penalty. Recognizing that the trial court was in a superior position to ascertain the meaning which the juror intended to convey, we expressed our satisfaction that the juror was excused in compliance with Witherspoon. People v. Collins, 106 Ill.2d at 280, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267. In the present case, the juror in question first unequivocally stated that she had scruples against the death penalty. The juror then indicated that she did not possess such scruples regardless of the facts. When next asked, however, whether her scruples would impair her ability to determine guilt or innocence, she responded almost inaudibly that she did not understand the question. When asked the question again after a brief explanation, the juror replied, [N]o, I don't believe   , but the trial court could not hear anything except [N]o. When finally asked whether, if defendant was found guilty of murder, she could consider all the possible penalties available, including the death penalty, the juror replied, [N]o. In ruling on the matter, the trial court commented upon the juror's physical expressions, and the fact that she was a teacher, appeared intelligent, seemed to understand clearly, but also seemed reluctant to answer. Based upon this review, we are convinced that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that this juror's views would substantially impair the performance of her duties. Defendant's final related argument on this issue has two components. First, defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for attorney-conducted voir dire pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 234 (134 Ill.2d R. 234). Second, defendant claims that the trial court's stated standard voir dire procedure, generally disallowing counsel's direct participation, operated as an abuse of discretion. Supreme Court Rule 234 provides that [t]he court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the case on trial. The court    may permit the parties to supplement the examination by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper. (Emphasis added.) (134 Ill.2d R. 234.) Examination of prospective jurors by court or by counsel is    a matter of trial detail which courts can regulate in the exercise of judicial discretion. ( People v. Jackson (1977), 69 Ill.2d 252, 260, 13 Ill.Dec. 667, 371 N.E.2d 602.) Upon review, the Illinois appellate court has held that the standard for evaluating the court's exercise of discretion during the voir dire is whether the questions and procedures created reasonable assurance that any prejudice or bias would be discovered. People v. Sanders (1986), 143 Ill.App.3d 402, 405, 97 Ill.Dec. 519, 493 N.E.2d 1. Defendant filed a pretrial motion to permit defense counsel to participate in the full voir dire of the jury. Following arguments on the motion, the trial court outlined the voir dire procedure which it usually employed, which was to question prospective jurors itself, allow supplemental written questions, and permit sidebars during the actual questioning in the event sufficient information was not elicited. Beyond that, the trial court stated that it did not usually allow counsel to participate. The trial court acknowledged, however, that it would consider attorney participation in voir dire in exceptional circumstances. During the subsequent voir dire, the trial court questioned each prospective juror concerning, inter alia, biographical background, prior jury service and knowledge of the case, relationships and acquaintances with attorneys, victims, witnesses, defendants, police officers, judges, group affiliations, and racial prejudice. Jurors were Witherspooned and questioned pursuant to People v. Zehr (1984), 103 Ill.2d 472, 83 Ill.Dec. 128, 469 N.E.2d 1062. When the trial court conducted voir dire of the prospective juror who admitted to scruples concerning the death penalty, defense counsel asked to participate. The trial court, however, denied the request, stating that the juror might be influenced to change her responses. We believe that the questioning and procedures revealed by this record reasonably assured that prejudice and bias would be discovered. We can discern no reason whatsoever to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying counsel's participation. The trial court's usual procedure, even if routinely adhered to, fully comports with Rule 234 (134 Ill.2d R. 234). Accordingly, defendant's argument lacks merit.