Opinion ID: 2747140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Statutory Duty

Text: The first factor set out in comment h asks a question: “Does [the statute] clearly let both the court and the actor know in advance what conduct is prohibited? Or is it posed in broad, general terms that will acquire specific meaning only if—and after—the court has determined to supply the tort remedy and expressed it for the benefit of the persons being affected?” That question has important implications in this case. On the one hand, the city’s duty under ORS 243.303(2) is specific: The city shall provide health insurance to retirees on the same basis as provided to current employees. That is, the legislature’s use of the word “shall” suggests that a strict liability standard of conduct might apply to a violation of the statute. On the other hand, however, the “insofar as and to the extent possible” clause modifies the statutory duty in a way that gives a local government a measure of flexibility and makes the applicable standard of conduct less certain. 370 Doyle v. City of Medford As discussed, plaintiffs have not asserted that the city violated any tort standard of conduct. The issue, however, is whether that failure breached the city’s statutory duty to plaintiffs. In that statutory setting, plaintiffs’ theory of liability bears close scrutiny. Although plaintiffs ask us to create a right of action that sounds in tort, they have not identified any existing tort claim that comports with their pleaded theory. For this court to create one, it would be necessary to pick among various elements that plaintiffs have not taken the trouble to identify. For example, if the proper theory is one of strict liability, plaintiffs have not explained how the statutory qualification of the city’s duty comports with such a standard.16 And, although plaintiffs alleged that the city intentionally failed to provide them with health insurance coverage, they have not asserted that, by doing so, the city intentionally breached its statutory duty. Neither have plaintiffs asserted negligence or other tort theories of relief, perhaps in recognition that those theories also do not fit the facts of this case. Whatever the reason for the omission, the statutory duty here would acquire a more specific (and, perhaps, unintended) meaning if this court were to adapt it to a tort theory that, among other elements, necessarily would include an associated mental state. Where, as here, the question is whether creation of a common-law right of action is both appropriate and necessary to effectuate the purpose of a statute, we are reluctant to supply elements of a common-law claim for relief that plaintiffs have failed to identify and whose creation could affect the nature of the statutory duty. See, e.g., Burnette, 284 Or at 712 (“If there is any chance that invasion into the field by the court’s establishment of a civil cause of action 16 There is the additional concern as to what damages would be recoverable in a judicially created strict liability claim. As discussed below, at most, plaintiffs would be entitled to recover economic damages in any common-law tort claim. However, plaintiffs have not cited any authority for the proposition that a strict liability claim would support the recovery of the economic damages that they seek here. In the context of strict products liability claims, this court has held that personal injury to person or physical damage to property is required. Brown v. Western Farmers Assoc., 268 Or 470, 478, 521 P2d 537 (1974); see also ORS 30.900 (defining “product liability civil action” as a civil action brought “for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage.”). Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 371 might interfere with the total legislative scheme, courts should err on the side of non-intrusion because it is always possible for the legislature to establish such a civil cause of action if it desires.”). B. The Adequacy of Existing Claims and Associated Remedies Plaintiffs remonstrate that, unless a tort claim is provided, there will be no effective means to enforce the city’s statutory duty. We disagree. Although no right of action is provided in the statute itself, the question remains “[w]hat other remedies are available in the court’s repertoire and how effective will they be? Will a declaratory judgment or the granting of an injunction prove better than the damage remedy because it is easier to administer or more effective? Do several remedies need to be available to the plaintiff either at his election or at the determination of the court in light of the particular facts? Restatement § 874A comment h. As we now explain, we conclude that an existing claim for relief and associated remedies are sufficient to effectuate the legislature’s purpose in enacting ORS 243.303(2). ORS 28.010 provides: “Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a judgment.” ORS 28.020 further provides: “Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under any such instrument, constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.” 372 Doyle v. City of Medford Finally, ORS 28.080 provides: “Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application thereof shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith.” To establish a justiciable controversy under those statutes based on asserted statutory rights, a plaintiff must show that his or her “rights, status, or other legal relations” are “affected by” the relevant statute. Morgan v. Sisters School District #6, 353 Or 189, 195-96, 301 P3d 419 (2013). That requirement implicates three related but separate considerations. Id. The first consideration is that there must be “some injury or other impact upon a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law.” League of Oregon Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645, 658, 56 P3d 892 (2002). Plaintiffs here satisfy that requirement: They are members of the class of persons to whom the duty imposed by ORS 243.303(2) is owed, and they claim injuries based on the city’s asserted violation of that duty. The second consideration is that the injury must be real or probable, not hypothetical or speculative. TVKO v. Howland, 335 Or 527, 534, 73 P3d 905 (2003). Plaintiffs also satisfy that requirement: There is a present and actual dispute between the parties about the existence and scope of plaintiffs’ rights and the city’s obligations under the statute. The third and final consideration is that the court’s decision must have a practical effect on the rights that the plaintiff is seeking to vindicate. Kellas v. Dept. of Corrections, 341 Or 471, 484-85, 145 P3d 139 (2006). Again, that requirement is satisfied. A judgment to the effect that plaintiffs are entitled to health insurance benefits under the statute would afford plaintiffs a judicial declaration of rights that, at least prospectively, would vindicate their rights under ORS 243.303(2). Because plaintiffs satisfy the justiciability requirements for a declaratory judgment adjudicating their rights under ORS 243.303(2), they need not plead or prove what Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 373 would amount to a claim for relief apart from establishing their rights under that statute. See, e.g., Lewis v. Miller, 197 Or 354, 358-59, 251 P2d 876 (1952) (claim for declaratory relief is legally sufficient if it alleges facts showing the existence of a justiciable controversy); Central Or. Irr. Dist. v. Deschutes Co., 168 Or 493, 507, 124 P2d 518 (1942) (same); Walter H. Anderson, Declaratory Judgments 588-89 (1951) (to state a claim for declaratory judgment with respect to statutory rights, “the plaintiff’s pleading need not state what would amount to a cause of action apart from the statute”). In addition, plaintiffs have a right to seek supplemental relief under ORS 28.080 for any cognizable damages that resulted from a violation of ORS 243.303(2), such as economic damages for the cost of obtaining substitute health insurance. See Morgan, 353 Or at 200 (supplemental relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act includes an assessment of damages); Ken Leahy Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329 Or 566, 573-74, 994 P2d 112 (1999) (same); Lowe v. Harmon, 167 Or 128, 136, 115 P2d 297 (1941) (same). Finally, although it is true that the decision whether to grant declaratory relief sometimes has been described as “discretionary,” courts are justified in refusing such relief only where “more effective relief can and should be obtained by another procedure and    for that reason a declaration will not serve a useful purpose.” Edwin Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 302-03 (2d ed 1941) (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original) (cited with approval in Brooks v. Dierker, 275 Or 619, 624, 552 P2d 533 (1976)). That is not the circumstance here, where the city’s position is that plaintiffs have no right of action at all. In short, a claim for declaratory judgment would provide plaintiffs with both a declaration of their rights under ORS 243.303(2) and, if they prevail, the right to recover cognizable damages for past violations of the city’s statutory duty.17 Because declaratory relief would 17 In concluding that declaratory relief is available to determine the statutory rights that plaintiffs seek to vindicate, we note that this is not a case in which a special statutory proceeding has been provided. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 US 294, 296, 85 S Ct 377, 13 L Ed 290 (1964) (noting that ordinarily declaratory relief should not be granted in that situation). Nor is it a case in which the legislature has given an agency primary or exclusive authority to enforce a statute or a regulation. See Public Service Commission v. Wycoff Co., 344 US 237, 374 Doyle v. City of Medford be effective to redress the injuries that plaintiffs assert, the adequacy of such relief disfavors the provision of an additional common-law claim for relief sounding in tort. C. The Extent to Which the Action Will Aid or Supplement or Interfere With Existing Claims and Associated Remedies and Other Means of Enforcement Plaintiffs plausibly assert that judicial provision of an additional private right of action in this case would not interfere with any other vehicle for enforcement of the city’s duty under ORS 243.303(2). In particular, enforcement of the statute is not delegated to an administrative body authorized to investigate, correct, or adjudicate claims of noncompliance. Cf. Restatement § 874A comment h (“If application of the legislation has been placed in the hands of an administrative agency, for example, this may have been done with the intent that the agency exercise a discretionary enforcement or treat the matter from an administrative standpoint.”). Although the city suggests that enforcement of its statutory duty is better left to collective bargaining or federal law, those arguments are unconvincing. ORS 243.303(2) imposes a duty under Oregon law that its courts are, when their authority is properly invoked, equipped to vindicate. The ultimate question is what claims for relief and accompanying remedies are appropriate and needed to enforce that duty. Thus, this factor marginally favors plaintiffs, but does not furnish an answer to that ultimate question. D. The Significance of the Purpose the Legislative Body is Seeking to Effectuate To a certain extent, as applied here, this factor begs a larger question: Whether the statutory purpose is so important, as a matter of public policy, that the legislature would have provided an additional right of action if it had considered the matter. Needless to say, the statutory duty 73 S Ct 236, 242, 97 L Ed 291 (1952) (explaining that declaratory relief should not be used to “pre-empt and prejudge issues that are committed for initial decision to an administrative body”). Our recognition that declaratory relief is available to determine the existence (or nonexistence) of the statutory rights that plaintiffs press here should not be understood as a general authorization to disregard the limits that inhere in other statutory schemes. Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 375 to provide health insurance benefits to retirees is important. However, as noted, that purpose is not unfettered. It is limited to an extent by the flexibility that the legislature provided to local governments based on the “insofar as and to the extent possible” phrase in the statute. On balance, it is difficult to determine—based on the “significance” factor—whether creation of an additional common-law right of action, as opposed to declaratory relief, is necessary or appropriate to effectuate the legislature’s purpose. E. The Extent of the Change in Law This factor poses the questions of “[h]ow drastic is the change from established law?” and “[h]ow near is the factual situation before the court to an existing tort?” Restatement § 874A comment h. In this case, the answer to that question is clear and its implications are significant. Plaintiffs ask us to create a tort right of action that provides them with emotional distress damages. However, in the absence of the infliction of physical injury, this court has permitted tort recovery for psychic injury in three situations. Hammond v. Central Lane Communications Center, 312 Or 17, 22-23, 816 P2d 593 (1991). The first is where the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress. See Brewer v. Erwin, 287 Or 435, 454-58, 600 P2d 398 (1979) (evidence sufficient to go to jury on theory that defendant engaged in abusive conduct intended to frighten or distress plaintiff); Turman v. Central Billing Bureau, 279 Or 443, 445-49, 568 P2d 1382 (1977) (evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient). The second is where the defendant intended to commit an injury-inflicting act with knowledge that it would cause severe distress, and the defendant’s relationship to the plaintiff involves some responsibility aside from the tort itself. Hall v. The May Dept. Stores Co., 292 Or 131, 135-37, 637 P2d 126 (1981) (evidence sufficient to support verdict for employee against employer under theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress). Finally, the third arises where the defendant’s negligent conduct infringed on some legally protected interest of the plaintiff apart from causing the claimed psychic injury. See Nearing, 295 Or at 706 (1983) (recognizing that Oregon law allows recovery of damages for psychic harm when defendant’s 376 Doyle v. City of Medford conduct infringes some legal right of plaintiff independent of an ordinary tort claim for negligence); McEvoy v. Helikson, 277 Or 781, 562 P2d 540 (1977) (negligent delivery of passport, in violation of a court order, resulting in removal of plaintiff’s child). Here, as noted, plaintiffs did not allege that the city negligently violated the statute or, for that matter, that it acted with any other culpable mental state. And, importantly, plaintiffs have not alleged any physical injury that accompanied their asserted psychic injuries. Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to satisfy any exception to the general rule that tort damages for psychic injury in the absence of physical injury are not recoverable. In that circumstance, judicial creation of a right of action based on a tort claim permitting the recovery of such damages would constitute a significant departure from current law in this state. We discern no basis for concluding that the creation of such a remedy would be appropriate or necessary to effectuate the legislative purpose underlying ORS 243.303(2); accordingly, we decline to do so. Of course, noneconomic damages are a type of rem- edy, not a claim for relief. Therefore, this court could create a tort claim that would permit the recovery of economic damages alone if it were appropriate and necessary to do so. However, as explained, declaratory relief is adequate to redress plaintiffs’ economic losses, and it also provides them with an important declaration of rights that a tort recovery would not. Accordingly, we conclude that creating a tort claim that would include economic damages alone—the only cognizable damage remedy that plaintiffs seek—also would not be necessary to effectuate the purpose of the legislature in enacting ORS 243.303(2). F. The Burden That the New Claim Will Place on the Judicial Machinery Although the city suggests that creation of a common-law right of action to enforce ORS 243.303(2) would place a significant burden on the courts, it is not obvious why that would be so, and we decline to give weight to that factor here. Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 377 G. Balancing of Factors On balance, we conclude that the pertinent factors weigh against this court’s creation of a common-law right of action sounding in tort to enforce the city’s duty under ORS 243.303(2). The most significant factors, as applied here, are: (1) plaintiffs have failed to identify a cognizable common-law claim for relief whose creation is appropriate and necessary to effectuate the legislature’s purpose; (2) a declaratory judgment and supplemental relief are adequate to enforce the statutory duty; and (3) a significant change in existing law would result from judicial creation of a tort claim permitting the recovery of noneconomic damages in the circumstances here, and there is no other need to create a common-law tort claim where, as here, a declaratory judgment and supplemental relief would fully redress plaintiffs’ compensable injuries, if any. In contrast to those considerations, the other factors do not carry overriding weight in the balance.18 Accordingly, we decline to create an additional common-law right of action for the violation of ORS 243.303(2). We turn briefly to the concurrence, which has done a commendable job of advocating for the creation of a private tort right of action in these circumstances. As we see things, our most important differences of opinion involve (1) the import of the holdings in Nearing and Chartrand; and (2) the extent to which the court should be willing to fashion a new common-law right of action for violation of a statutory duty where there is no indication that the legislature itself intended to create a right of action. First, it appears that the concurrence concludes that Nearing and Chartrand involved the creation by this court of a common-law right of action to enforce a statutory duty. In particular reference to those cases, the concurrence writes: “Similarly, in this case, if this court were to recognize that plaintiffs have a tort claim for violation of ORS 243.303(2), 18 We do not suggest that comment h sets out an exclusive list of relevant considerations for determining whether judicial creation of a private right of action is appropriate or necessary to enforce a statutory duty. However, the parties have advanced no other relevant factors in this case. Accordingly, we leave the matter for further development. 378 Doyle v. City of Medford plaintiffs’ claim should be viewed not as a claim for negligence, nor as a claim that the city acted ‘willfully or intentionally or with some other state of mind.’ Instead, plaintiffs’ claim is a claim that the city violated the statute and that plaintiffs suffered damages as a result.” Doyle v. City of Medford, 356 Or 336, 386, __ P3d __ (2014) (Walters, J. concurring). We do not share that understanding of Nearing and Chartrand. Rather than involving judicially-created rights of action, those cases involved implied statutory liability claims; that is, the court concluded that the legislature itself had intended to provide a remedy for a statutory violation. The court explained it this way in Bellikka: “Statutory law may be important in several ways. This court has recognized that there are instances where the legislature has, in effect, created a tort. See, e.g., Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or 689, 696 P2d 513 (1985). Such statutory torts exist independent of any parallel common-law claim and can be pleaded independently, with or without an accompanying common-law claim. Holien v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 298 Or 76, 689 P2d 1292 (1984); Nearing v. Weaver, supra, 295 Or at 707.” 306 Or at 650. Similarly, in Gattman v. Favro, 306 Or 11, 15, 757 P2d 402 (1988) the court stated: “The question in a statutory tort context (as it was in Nearing   ) is whether the plaintiff has ‘pleaded an infringement by [the defendant] of a legal right arising independent of the ordinary tort elements of a negligence action.’ Nearing v. Weaver, 295 Or at 707. One significant difference between a statutory tort remedy and a common-law right of action is that if a statutory tort is created, foreseeability may be immaterial or has been determined by the legislature. See Chartrand   , discussed below. (‘The plaintiff [on remand] could and may after proper amendments claim damages on a theory of tort law unfettered by negligence concepts of foreseeability.’)” See also Solberg v. Johnson, 306 Or 484, 488, 760 P2d 867 (1988) (citing Gattman and characterizing Nearing Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 379 as a “statutory tort” case) (brackets in original).19 And, in Shahtout v. Emco Garbage Co., 298 Or 598, 600-01, 695 P2d 897 (1985), the court cited Nearing for the proposition that: “A law that is designed to protect some or all per- sons against a particular risk of harm may expressly or impliedly give persons within the protected class a right to recover damages if noncompliance with the law results in harm of the kind the law seeks to prevent.” In Cain, a case where this court did create a common-law cause of action, the court distinguished Nearing: “Common law principles of reasonable care and foreseeability of harm are relevant because this case does not fall within a mandated statutory duty such as that described in Nearing   . In Nearing, we held that common law concepts of negligence were irrelevant when police had a specific duty under ORS 133.310(3) to take a person who violated a court order into custody, and that violation of that duty could give rise to a civil action in tort. The statute mandated that police arrest a person if the person violated a court order. We contrasted the use of ‘shall’ in ORS 133.310(3) with the use of ‘may’ in the previous subsections, stating that ‘shall’ created a mandatory duty, while ‘may’ created only authority to act. 295 Or at 709[, 670 P2d 137]. Because ORS 161.336(6) states only that Providence may take a person into custody, the statute does not create a Nearing v. Weaver statutory tort.” 300 Or at 717-18 (emphasis in original). 19 As Professor Forell explained, in referring to Chartrand: “[T]he Oregon Supreme Court recognized that the legislature intended to create a tort action but did not expressly say so; therefore, this is a legislatively created statutory tort, not a court-provided statutory duty action.” Forell, 77 Or L Rev at 508. Likewise, in Nearing, “[The] court concluded that the legislature intended to create a tort action for people in Nearing’s situation and that neither unreasonable conduct nor foreseeability had to be proved. So long as it is determined that the statute has been violated, liability is to be imposed. As the Nearing court noted: ‘Here, the risk, the harm, and the potential plaintiff were all foreseen by the lawmaker.’ [Nearing, 295 Or at 708-09]. “The decisions in Nearing and Chartrand indicate that, when a focused statute expressly refers to civil liability in some manner and the statute or statutory scheme provides no civil or criminal remedy, the Oregon Supreme Court will recognize that the legislature, by implication, intended to create a statutory tort action.” Forell, 77 Or L Rev at 511-12. 380 Doyle v. City of Medford Which brings us to our caution about the cir- cumstances under which the court should create a new common-law right of action for the violation of a statutory duty where there is no indication that the legislature intended to create a right of action. In such circumstances, “[t]he action is in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and is stimulated by it, but what is involved is judicial rather than legislative modification of the existing law. The court is not required to provide the civil remedy, and yet judicial tradition gives it the authority to do this under appropriate circumstances. The court has discretion and it must be careful to exercise that discretion cautiously and soundly.” Restatement § 874A, comment d. There is good reason for such caution. This case illustrates why that is so. To begin with, plaintiffs have not identified any particular common-law tort on which they rely. The concurrence asserts that,” [i]f plaintiffs could identify such a tort, they would not need to ask this court for assistance.” Doyle, 356 Or at 390 (Walters, J. concurring). However, plaintiffs were required to plead and prove the elements of a cognizable common-law tort claim, so that a court responsible for ascertaining the legal sufficiency of their theory of recovery can make that determination. See ORCP 18 A (pleading that asserts a claim for relief shall contain “[a] plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief without unnecessary repetition”). To the extent that the concurrence asserts that plaintiffs were not required to identify a common-law tort because the alleged violation of the terms of the statute at issue in this case, without more, constituted such a tort, we respectfully disagree. When a court decides that a violation of the terms of a statute amounts to a common-law tort and provides damages as a remedy, it is difficult to conceive of that decision as anything other than the court doing what the legislature itself could have done if it had so intended, but failed to do. For the judiciary to assume that role comes close to occupying the status of an auxiliary legislative body, which, of course, we must take care not to do. See, e.g., Burnette, 284 Or at 712 (“Courts should exercise restraint in Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 381 fields in which the legislature has attempted fairly comprehensive social regulation.”). Instead, a court’s creation of a common-law right of action to effectuate the purpose of a statute ordinarily will consist of adapting or assimilating an existing tort to the contours of the statutory duty. In that vein, the Restatement contemplates that a judicially-created tort right of action will have substantive elements that are drawn from conventional tort principles: “Whether the tort action provided by the court in furtherance of the policy of a legislative provision is to be treated as an intentional tort, as negligence or a form of strict liability, or perhaps as involving all three (as in some existing torts such as misrepresentation), depends primarily upon construction of the statute itself. It also depends upon the nature of the established tort to which it is found to be most closely analogous and which is therefore expanded to cover it.” Restatement § 874A, comment j.20 Consistently with that premise, to date, this court has not created a common-law tort right of action that merely tracked the terms of a statute. Instead, this court in Cain adapted an existing common-law right of action— negligence—to effectuate the statutory duty that the court identified. The court first concluded that Providence had a duty to the plaintiff’s decedent that arose from the statutes governing community mental health, rather than from a general common-law duty of due care. Cain, 300 Or at 717. The court then turned to “common law principles of reasonable care and foreseeability of harm,” because the statute at issue was a permissive one. The court gave substance to that duty of reasonable care by referring to two statutes: “Although Providence did not have custody over Rijken, under the statute it could take him into custody or request 20 Understandably, plaintiffs did not plead that the city either negligently or intentionally violated its statutory duty. To do so would have added proof requirements that the legislature did not impose. Nor, as discussed, in light of the statutory condition that providing insurance coverage to retirees be “reasonably possible,” have plaintiffs asserted that a strict tort liability theory of recovery comports with the terms of the statute. 382 Doyle v. City of Medford that he be taken into custody if Rijken was ‘a sub- stantial danger to others because of mental disease or defect and [Rijken was] in need of immediate care, custody or treatment.’ ORS 161.336(6). The statute authorized Providence to exercise control over Rijken. ORS 161.336(10) provides: “ ‘In determining whether a person should be committed to a state hospital, conditionally released or discharged, [PSRB] shall have as its primary concern the protection of society.’ “This duty to protect the public does not evaporate once PSRB conditionally releases a person to a community mental health provider. ORS 161.336(6), read with subsection (10), authorizes mental health providers to take patients into custody to protect members of the public, which included the plaintiff’s decedent.” Id. at 718 (brackets in original). Having concluded that the statutes both imposed a duty and informed the standard of care, the court explained that the question then became “whether Providence reasonably should have foreseen that those acts posed a risk of the kind of harm to a person such as Cain, i.e., to someone using the streets, that occurred here.” Id. The court ultimately concluded that it could not determine, as a matter of law, that the harm Cain suffered was the reasonably foreseeable result of Providence’s failure to take Rijken into custody. Id. at 720. In sum, the right of action that the court created in Cain was grounded both in the statutes that created the duty Providence breached and in the common law of negligence. That approach is consistent with the Restatement, which states at section 874 A, comment f, that a judicially created common-law right of action “will ordinarily be assimilated to the most similar common law tort.” Although courts can modify the elements of a common-law tort or even create a new common-law claim with its own features, id., the issue is whether to do so would be consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy and needed to effectuate the legislative purpose. See Restatement § 874 A, comment h. As we have explained above, we conclude that there is no basis or need to do so here. Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 383