Opinion ID: 1227345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Brown contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on Counts II, IV, and VII and that the district court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. Since his conviction on Count VII has been reversed for other reasons, we limit our discussion to the other counts. We review de novo, and will uphold the verdict if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d at 661 (quotation omitted). Count II charged the use, carry, possession, and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime on October 3, 2005, the day Monte Williams was shot. Cyrinthia Williams's testimony supports the jury's finding that Giles discharged a firearm on October 3. The jury instructions allowed Brown to be convicted if the discharge of the firearm was reasonably foreseeable to him and was in furtherance of the conspiracytwo elements established by Clarence Dennis's testimony. Count IV alleged the discharge of a firearm on May 3 and 4, 2005, and refers to the murders of Wilkinson, Dominguez, and Garcia. Brown argues that the government's case was flawed because its forensic examiner concluded that a revolver had been used, but George Moore testified that Brown had carried the kind [of gun] that spits bullets. Brown claims that meant a semiautomatic weapon. Any dispute about the type of firearm used does not cast doubt on his conviction in light of Moore's highly incriminating testimony about Brown's role in the murders. The district court did not err by concluding that the jury could reasonably find that Brown violated § 924(c) as alleged in Counts II and IV, either directly or by the reasonably foreseeable actions of his coconspirator. The district court also denied Brown's motion for a new trial, which we review for a clear and manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 956 F.2d 782, 786 (8th Cir.1992). The court may grant a new trial if the evidence weighs heavily enough against the verdict that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. Id. Brown contends that the district court failed to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of cooperating witnesses influenced by immense incentive to implicate him in the crimes. Brown does not provide any evidence that their testimony was rendered unreliable by the unidentified immense incentives. The district court had the opportunity to observe the testimony of these witnesses and assess their credibility, and it did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown's motion for a new trial. Kouris challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she intentionally joined the conspiracy charged in Count I. Separate proof that she engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is not necessary, see United States v. Morales, 445 F.3d 1081, 1084 (8th Cir.2006), and elements of conspiracy may be established by reasonable inferences from the evidence, see Henderson v. United States, 815 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (8th Cir.1987). Kouris traveled to Atlanta when Giles and Brown went there to negotiate a drug deal. Kouris's mother testified that she was visiting family, but the jury was entitled to make its own finding. Kouris also leased a storage unit in which police found 35 pounds of marijuana, a semiautomatic rifle, ammunition, and a bullet proof vest. Although Kouris contends that Giles made all the payments for the unit [4] and that a Crown Point employee could not recall having seen her visit it, as lessee Kouris had constructive possession over the unit's contents. At 1214 Applewood Drive, Kouris's apartment, the police found marijuana, a bullet proof vest, and a video camera containing footage of Giles and Brown counting large amounts of cash with more than a pound of marijuana visible on the table. The police found six ounces of marijuana and a scale when searching a house that she and Giles shared on 40th Avenue, and another four ounces of marijuana during a second search after Giles's arrest and Kouris's indictment. Kouris's constructive possession of marijuana and trafficking paraphernalia such as a scale, a firearm, ammunition, and bullet proof vests supports the jury's finding that she joined the conspiracy. See United States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 465 (8th Cir.1997) (defendant's control over apartment where heroin and related items were found was highly suggestive of his role in the heroin business); United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 39 (1st Cir.1991) (defendant leased apartment where heroin and packaging paraphernalia was found); United States v. Brett, 872 F.2d 1365, 1369 (8th Cir.1989) (possession of key to a house where cocaine and trafficking paraphernalia were found was sufficient circumstantial evidence linking defendant to conspiracy). From jail Giles asked Kouris to collect payment for marijuana deliveries, to conceal assets, and to contact prospective witnesses. Kouris argues that there was little corroborating evidence that she performed these tasks, but the jury could reasonably infer from Giles's apparent trust in her that she was involved in the conspiracy. Kouris and Giles talked in code, referring to distribution of petitions and soliciting signatures on these petitions. The jury could find that Kouris's ability to communicate in code while speaking to Giles in jail shows her previous involvement in the conspiracy. See Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d at 465 (content of phone conversations with another conspirator revealed the defendant's involvement in a drug distribution scheme). McGinnis, Moore, and Boyston testified that they had not dealt with Kouris in any drug trafficking and did not think Giles would trust her, but the jury could have found that their testimony was not credible or that they simply did not know about her role. Kouris contends that most of the government's witnesses provided no evidence against her, but a defendant may be convicted for even a minor role in a conspiracy, so long as that role is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc). After studying the record and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Kouris's conviction. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial.