Opinion ID: 3015223
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: CSG ’s disparate impact and reasonable

Text: accommodation claims Regarding the District Court’s consideration of CSG’s disparate impact and reasonable accommodation claims, we believe the Court’s analysis is flawed insofar as it followed inexorably from the Court’s erroneous determination that the regulation was facially discriminatory. Given that the Court’s grant of judgment on the disparate impact claim was based in large part on its erroneous determination that the Authority had not presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reclassifying the house, this ruling cannot stand. As to the reasonable accommodation claim, we find that there are too many questions of material fact surrounding this claim to support the Court’s conclusions that CSG met its burden of 36 proof and that the Authority failed in its burden.12 Further, on review of the record, it is clear that both parties (and the Court) were more focused on the discriminatory classification claim and, given the District Court’s error in finding a facially discriminatory classification, the record has not been adequately developed to support a grant of summary judgment on either of these claims. Accordingly, we will remand to the District Court for further proceedings regarding these claims. 12 The most striking factual dispute, evident to us from counsel’s post-argument correspondence to the Court, is whether a valid request for an accommodation was presented to the Authority (by CSG or the trust), or whether, if CSG had presented a valid request for an accommodation, the Authority responded. The existence of this issue undercuts the District Court’s theory that CSG should prevail on this claim, at least in part because the Authority failed to respond. Beyond this issue, the District Court has not explained the bases for its conclusion that CSG has met its burden of proof on a prima facie case for failure to grant a reasonable accommodation, i.e., that the requested accommodation was “‘(1) reasonable and (2) necessary to (3) afford handicapped persons an equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing.’” Lapid-Laurel, 284 F.3d at 457 (quoting Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597 (4th Cir. 1997)). 37