Opinion ID: 1057839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Contributory Fault of Belz

Text: This case requires that we once again address the thorny problems created by the interplay between the tort system's doctrine of comparative fault and the workers' compensation system's doctrine of no-fault recovery. Because these issues involve questions of law, we review the rulings of the trial court de novo with no presumption of correctness. See Stewart v. Sewell, 215 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tenn.2007). The interaction of comparative fault and the Workers' Compensation Law was first addressed by this Court in Ridings . Like the instant case, Ridings involved an employee who was injured at work and who filed a tort claim against a third party. Although the third-party defendant acknowledged that the adoption of comparative fault does not allow an employer to be held liable in a tort action, the defendant argued that a jury may nevertheless attribute fault to an employer, thus reducing a third-party defendant's liability. Ridings, 914 S.W.2d at 81. We rejected this argument because we interpreted our previous decision, McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn.1992), to require that fault may be attributed only to those persons against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action in tort. Id. Because the plaintiff's employer was immune from tort actions under the Workers' Compensation Law, no fault could be attributed to his employer. Id. at 82. We next addressed the interrelationship of comparative fault and workers' compensation in Snyder . In that case, we reaffirmed Ridings but also held that third-party defendants must be permitted to argue that an employer was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Snyder, 955 S.W.2d at 256. This rule is based on the distinction between cause in fact, the cause and effect relationship between the defendant's tortious conduct and the plaintiff's injury, and proximate or legal cause, a policy decision made by the legislature or the courts to deny liability for otherwise actionable conduct based on considerations of logic, common sense, policy, precedent and `our more or less inadequately expressed ideas of what justice demands or of what is administratively possible and convenient.' Id. at 256 n. 6 (quoting Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 625 (Tenn. 1997)). We concluded that although an employer cannot be a proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries, an employer can be a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. We further concluded that depriving a defendant of the ability to argue that an employer was a cause in fact could preclude third-party defendants from offering a defense and would conceal large amounts of relevant evidence from the jury, thereby making discussion of the underlying facts difficult, if not impossible. Id. at 256. We therefore held that the jury may consider all evidence relevant to the events surrounding a plaintiff's injury but should be instructed that it may consider the actions of the employer only in assessing whether the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing the elements necessary to recover against the defendants. Id. at 257. Defendants, however, may not argue that an employer was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and juries may not attribute fault to employers. Id. In Carroll , we further discussed our holdings in Ridings and Snyder and held that juries are permitted to apportion fault to third parties who are immune from suit. 29 S.W.3d at 19. In reaching this conclusion, we refined the central rationale of Ridings by observing that [a] careful reading of McIntyre . . . suggests that neither the holding of the case nor its underlying rationale limits the attribution of fault only to persons against whom the plaintiff has a cause of action in tort. Id. at 18. Contrary to our reasoning in Ridings , we recognized that the doctrine of comparative fault is designed to create a tighter fit between liability and fault. Id. at 16. In an effort to maintain the tight fit between liability and fault, we declined to force juries to allocate the entirety of fault between parties who may not be wholly responsible for a plaintiff's injury. Id. at 19-20. Despite our holding that juries may allocate fault to immune parties and our clarification of the principal reasoning in Ridings , we did not overrule Ridings or Snyder . Instead, we held that those cases are uniquely applicable to the allocation of fault to an employer when the employer's liability is governed by the Workers' Compensation Law. Id. at 19. We reasoned that the continued relevance of Ridings and Snyder is justified by the fact that were it not for those cases, plaintiffs would be subject to a double reduction of their recovery against third parties who contributed to their on-the-job injuries. Id. The first reduction would occur when the jury apportioned fault to the employer. Id. The second would occur when the workers' compensation insurance carrier exercised its right to subrogation against the plaintiff's recovery from the third party. [2] Id. Because this unique situation occurs only in the context of plaintiffs whose recovery is governed by both the Workers' Compensation Law and the laws of the comparative fault system, Ridings ' and Snyder's applicability to this limited sphere of cases is justified. Id.; see also Dotson v. Blake, 29 S.W.3d 26, 29-30 (Tenn.2000) (Holder, J., concurring) (explaining the continued relevance of Ridings and Snyder ). With these considerations in mind, we now turn to Fischer's contention that Ridings , Snyder , and Carroll do not bar Fischer from arguing the comparative fault of Belz. Fischer's argument requires an analysis of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113 (2005), [3] which provides that a principal contractor (i.e., a general contractor) may be liable for injuries to employees of a subcontractor. Under this subsection, Belz, the general contractor, is liable for Troup's injuries because Troup was injured while working for Jolly, Belz's subcontractor. In exchange for this exposure to liability under the Workers' Compensation Law, Belz receives immunity from suit in tort. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-108 (2005). In addition, if Belz paid compensation to Troup, then Belz would be entitled to a subrogation lien against any judgment Troup received against a third party such as Fischer. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-112(c)(1) (2005). Fischer, however, argues that Belz did not pay benefits to Troup and therefore does not have a subrogation interest in the instant case. [4] If Belz does not have a subrogation interest, then there is no actual threat that Troup's recovery will be reduced a second time. Fischer argues that juries may apportion fault to employers when there is not an actual threat of a double reduction of a particular plaintiff's recovery. We disagree. In Carroll , we held that Ridings and Snyder continue to be uniquely applicable when a third-party defendant attempts to allocate fault to an employer whose liability is governed by the Workers' Compensation Law. 29 S.W.3d at 19; see also Dotson, 29 S.W.3d at 29-30 (Holder, J., concurring). Although our ruling was designed to prevent the unfairness of allowing an employer's right to subrogation to defeat an employee's tort recovery against a third party, we did not hold that Ridings and Snyder would be applicable only upon a showing that the plaintiff's tort recovery was actually in danger of being defeated in this way. Rather, we explained that the potential for double reduction of a plaintiff's recovery was prevalent enough to justify a special rule for cases when a plaintiff injured on the job files a tort claim against a third party. Carroll, 29 S.W.3d at 19. In other words, Carroll established a bright-line rule rather than the case-by-case analysis suggested by Fischer. If a jury's ability to apportion fault to an employer were contingent on a showing that a plaintiff's recovery will actually be subject to a double reduction, then in every tort case involving an on-the-job injury trial courts would be forced to determine and plaintiffs would be forced to prove whether an employer has or is likely to have a subrogation interest. Such a determination would be especially difficult in cases in which an employee's contested workers' compensation claim has yet to be settled or conclusively adjudicated. We decline to place this additional burden on plaintiffs and trial courts that already must navigate the murky waters where workers' compensation and comparative fault intersect. Instead, we hold that Ridings and Snyder are uniquely applicable to cases in which the plaintiff's recovery for an injury is governed by both the Workers' Compensation Law and the laws of the comparative fault system, regardless of whether there is an actual threat of a double reduction of plaintiff's recovery. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in prohibiting Fischer from arguing the comparative fault of Belz.