Opinion ID: 6931506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mantime Jurisdiction

Text: As noted, the injury to Mink occurred while a vessel was being navigated on navigable waters. We readily conclude that the instant case falls well within the admiralty jurisdiction. This ease satisfies both the traditional locality test for determining admiralty jurisdiction, and also the more recently articulated maritime nexus test, i.e., that the wrong must bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity. See Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d 345 (11th Cir.1994). The common formulation of the locality test was articulated by the Supreme Court in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36, 18 L.Ed. 125 (1866): “Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance.” Thus, to satisfy this test, a tort need occur only on navigable waters, which clearly occurred in this case. 3 Turning to the maritime nexus inquiry, we readily conclude that this ease has a maritime nexus. We must determine whether the “‘potential hazard to maritime commerce arises out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’ ” Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2995-96, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990) (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 675 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 2654, 2658 n. 5, 73 L.Ed.2d 300 (1982)). This case clearly poses a potential hazard to maritime commerce. In undertaking this inquiry, we “must assess the general features of the type of incident involved to determine whether such an incident is likely to disrupt commercial activity.” Sisson, id., 497 U.S. at 363, 110 S.Ct. at 2896. Mink argues that in the instant case there was no actual disruption of maritime commerce. However, as noted in Sisson, “[t]he jurisdictional inquiry does not turn on the actual effects on maritime commerce” nor upon “the particular facts of the incident in th[e] case.” Id.; Sea Vessel, Inc. v. Reyes, 23 F.3d at 350 and n. 8. Rather, eschewing a fact specific inquiry, the law requires that we examine the “general features” of this type of incident. In this case, the appropriate characterization is no more specific than injury to a passenger in proximity to the operator on a vessel during navigation in navigable waters. 4 Thus, although there was no actual disruption of maritime commerce in the instant case, there clearly was a potential disruption. Mink could have fallen forward, striking the pilot or controls, thus directly interfering with the navigation of the craft and potentially eaus-ing an accident with another craft. Or, the disruption of a serious passenger injury within such intimate confines could have distracted the pilot and indirectly interfered with the navigation of a vessel. We readily conclude that there was a potential hazard to maritime commerce. We also conclude that the potential hazard to maritime commerce “arises out of activity that bears a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” As indicated above, and focusing as we must on the general nature of the activity, the relevant activity is the navigation of a vessel on navigable waters. 5 Obviously, this is the very paradigm of traditional maritime activity. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 368, 110 S.Ct. at 2899 (Scalia, J. concurring). Mink argues that neither the locality test nor the nexus test is satisfied because the alleged design defect, e.g., failure to include handrails, occurred upon land. Both logic and precedent compel rejection of Mink’s argument. The defect could not have manifested itself, and the injury could not have occurred until the vessel was actually operated as a vessel in navigation. Thus, logically, the tort is a maritime tort. Moreover, precedent overwhelmingly indicates this result. The Supreme Court so held in East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). There, a defective part was installed in a vessel causing injury while the vessel was sailing on the high seas. The court concluded that such a case would clearly fall within the admiralty jurisdiction, and that products liability of that type was part of the general maritime law. 476 U.S. at 863-65, 106 S.Ct. at 2298-99. 6 Numerous cases from our sister circuit courts of appeal have also held that products liability actions involving pleasure craft in navigation fall within the admiralty jurisdiction. See Hassinger v. Tideland Electric Membership Corp., 781 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1004, 106 S.Ct. 3294, 92 L.Ed.2d 709 (1986) (defective mast); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Radio Corp., 618 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1980) (defective steering gyro); Jones v. Bender Welding & Mach. Works, 581 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.1978) (defective design caused damage to fishing vessel); Jig The Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954, 96 S.Ct. 1429, 47 L.Ed.2d 360 (1976) (negligent design of shrimp boat); Richards v. Blake Builders Supply, Inc., 528 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.1975) (explosion on pleasure craft); Anderson v. Whittaker Corp., 692 F.Supp. 764 (W.D.Mieh.1988), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 894 F.2d 804 (6th Cir.1990) (products liability suit where pleasure craft sank).