Opinion ID: 603513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sentence enhancement for habitual criminals

Text: 49 Having decided to uphold Knight's conviction, we now turn to the challenge to his sentence. Knight argues that the district court improperly enhanced his sentence based on a finding that he was a habitual criminal pursuant to V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 61 (Supp.1990), as amended by 1991 V.I.Sess.Laws 5759. Section 61 mandates a minimum ten-year prison term for convicted felons who subsequently are convicted of another felony. There is a time limitation, however, on which felonies may be utilized to establish the criminal history necessary to trigger the automatic ten-year sentence. A court may treat a defendant as a habitual criminal only if his subsequent felony conviction is within ten (10) years after the date the person has completed serving his sentence on the prior felony conviction. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 61(a). 50 At the time of Knight's current conviction, he had been out of prison for more than ten years, but had completed his parole term less than eight years earlier. Knight asserts that his sentence expired over ten years ago because the statutory term sentence encompasses only incarceration and excludes parole time. If Knight is correct, the district court erroneously categorized Knight as a habitual criminal and improperly increased his sentence. However, if a sentence includes parole, as the district court found, then ten years has not elapsed since Knight completed his sentence, and the court correctly invoked the ten-year automatic sentence for habitual criminals. Since whether the term sentence includes parole is a pure question of statutory construction, our review is plenary. Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 801 (3d Cir.1992). 51 It is axiomatic that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 2130, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 (1990). Courts presume that Congress expressed its legislative intent through the ordinary meaning of the words it chose to use, and if the statutory language is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the words ordinarily is regarded as conclusive. See Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). The plain meaning rule, however, is not absolute. A court may consider persuasive legislative history that Congress did not intend the words they selected to be accorded their common meaning. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981) (cited in Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 910 (3d Cir.1990)). A construction inconsistent with a statute's plain meaning, however, is justifiable only when clear indications of a contrary legislative intent exist. Consumer Party v. Davis, 778 F.2d 140, 147 (3d Cir.1985). In other words, if the statutory language is clear, a court must give it effect unless this will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of [the] drafters. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). 52 Because we are interpreting a criminal statute, another principle of statutory construction is relevant. The rule of lenity requires that any ambiguity concerning the meaning of a criminal statute be resolved in favor of the criminal defendant. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1007, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990). This doctrine applies not only to substantive criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose. See Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 2252, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir.1981). 53 Virgin Islands law mandates that the sentencing court impose a minimum of ten years imprisonment if the current felony conviction occurred within ten years after the defendant has completed serving his sentence on the prior felony conviction. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 61. Black's Law Dictionary defines a sentence as: 54 The judgment formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the defendant after his conviction in a criminal prosecution, imposing the punishment to be inflicted, usually in the form of a fine, incarceration or probation. 55 Black's Law Dictionary 1362 (6th ed. 1990). A sentence therefore includes all terms that are part of a criminal's punishment. 56 Imprisonment is obviously punishment because a criminal's liberty is severely restricted--he cannot leave the prison grounds and cannot see family and friends at will. Parole is also part of a criminal's punishment. When on parole, a criminal's liberty is still restricted, although less significantly than a prisoner's. For example, a parolee may not leave the Virgin Islands without written permission from the Parole Board and may not frequent places selling liquor. See V.I.Code Ann. tit. 5, § 4604 (1967). These restrictions on a parolee's freedom demonstrate that parole is a form of punishment. 57 Case law supports our common-sense reading of the statutory term sentence. The Supreme Court has assumed that the word sentence, not within the context of any particular statute, includes a parole term. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 1925, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) ([A] prisoner who ha[s] been placed on parole [is] still 'in custody' under his unexpired sentence.); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 n. 12, 103 S.Ct. 864, 879 n. 12, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (criminal offenders [may] serve their sentences on probation or parole) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 24-25, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2113, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979)); Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 555, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980) (sentences included prison term and special parole term). Moreover, this court explicitly has held that parole is a component of a sentence. See United States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir.1976). In Crusco, the district judge told a defendant who pled guilty that the maximum sentence he faced was seven years. The judge than sentenced the defendant to six years imprisonment and the three years special parole required by statute. The defendant sought to withdraw his plea asserting that he believed he would spend no more than four years in prison. He calculated this figure by subtracting the mandatory three year parole period from the maximum sentence of seven years. We found the defendant's belief that his maximum prison term would be four years to be justified in light of the district judge's explanation because [t]he definition [of a sentence] clearly encompasses a ... parole term. Id. 58 Because the plain meaning of the statutory term sentence includes parole, Knight bears the burden of demonstrating a clear indication of a contrary legislative intent in order to prevail. See Consumer Party, 778 F.2d at 147. Knight claims that the history of the statute's amendment clearly establishes that the legislature was referring only to imprisonment when it utilized the term sentence. We disagree. 59 As originally enacted, V.I.Code Ann. tit. 14, § 61 imposed a ten-year minimum sentence on felons with any previous felony conviction irrespective of the age of the prior conviction. The Virgin Islands legislature passed, and submitted to the governor, an amendment to this statute that placed a ten-year limitation on the use of a prior felony conviction to trigger the automatic minimum sentence. See V.I.Leg. 19-0008, 19th Leg. (1991), App. at 129. The governor vetoed this bill. In his veto letter dated November 13, 1991, the governor wrote that [w]hile several states have moved in this direction, they have done so with 'tolling' sections, meaning time spent in jail does not count toward the ten-year, felony-free proving period. App. at 127 (emphasis added). Responding to the governor's veto, the legislature redrafted the bill incorporating the current language. On the senate floor, Senator Brown stated that the amendment now include[s] the provision which the Governor pointed out was important to include. App. at 132. The reworded amendment was passed by the legislature and signed into law by the governor. 8 60 The dialogue between the governor and the legislature is hardly compelling evidence of an intent to exclude parole time from the definition of a sentence. The governor's veto letter merely described the approach other states had taken. The governor wanted an analogous provision to be included in the Virgin Islands habitual criminal statute, but he suggested only a vague concept, not a particular statutory scheme. His remarks, limited to a few sentences, contained neither details on how to implement this idea nor proposed language for the reworded amendment. The governor never discusses the effect of parole because there is no indication he considered this issue or any other particulars. Senator Brown's statement that the redrafted amendment addresses the governor's concerns refers to the fact that a tolling provision was added. Nothing in this exchange sheds any light on whether the legislature intended that the term sentence encompass parole time. In the absence of compelling evidence of a contrary legislative intent, we accord the term sentence its ordinary meaning--a sentence includes both imprisonment and parole.