Opinion ID: 2461173
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Heading: The sources and functions of the public trust doctrine in Nevada

Text: With the foregoing discussion in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments regarding the public trust doctrine in this matter. Lawrence argues that this state has adopted the public trust doctrine and, consequently, that the disputed land is not transferable. But as Justice Rose recognized, although Nevada law embraces public trust doctrine principles, this court has never expressly adopted that doctrine. Further, as the caselaw noted above indicates and common sense dictates, the public trust doctrine does not always prohibit the transfer of trust land. Clark County argues that we should not adopt the public trust doctrine to review the Legislature's conveyances of trust property, because the public trust doctrine is rooted in common law and, thus, cannot supersede legislation. See, e.g., Gwathmey v. State through Dept. of Envir., 342 N.C. 287, 464 S.E.2d 674, 682-84 (1995) (explaining that, in North Carolina, the public trust doctrine has not been codified in the state constitution, and thus, while the common law doctrine creates a presumption that the state did not transfer public trust lands in a manner inimical to the public trust, the state legislature, as representatives of the people, was free to do so without reservation of any public trust rights). In addition, as it contended during oral argument, Clark County asserts that adopting the public trust doctrine is unwise because, in Clark County's estimation, the doctrine assigns to courts the allegedly impossible task of determining if at any point a given parcel of land was beneath a navigable waterway to ascertain its trust status. In so arguing, however, Clark County fundamentally misapprehends the sources and functions of the public trust doctrine in Nevada and exaggerates the difficulty of determining a land parcel's trust status.
As an initial matter, we note that the public trust doctrine is not simply a common law remnant. Indeed, in addition to the Nevada caselaw discussed above, public trust principles are contained in Nevada's Constitution and statutes and are inherent from inseverable restraints on the state's sovereign power.
Article 8, Section 9 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the gift or loan of public funds and credit: The State shall not donate or loan money, or its credit, subscribe to or be, interested in the Stock of any company, association, or corporation, except corporations formed for educational or charitable purposes. Similar provisions in other state constitutions are referred to as gift clauses, as they generally prohibit gifts of taxpayer funds. In considering Nevada's gift clause, we have stated that transactions disbursing public funds must be struck down if not made for a public purpose. State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 332-34, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322-23 (1973). We have also closely examined such transactions to ensure that the state actually receives valuable benefit. See Clark County v. Lewis, 88 Nev. 354, 357, 498 P.2d 363, 365 (1972). Our caselaw stresses the importance of the dispensing state entity reviewing [a]ll facts, figures and necessary information when making a dispensation; when the entity has done so, it will not be second-guessed by the courts. Id. Thus, the Legislature's ability to dispose of the public's resources is expressly limited by the gift clause, at the core of which lays the principle that the state acts only as a fiduciary for the public when disposing of the public's valuable property. See Brennan, 89 Nev. at 332-34, 512 P.2d at 1322-23; Lewis, 88 Nev. at 357, 498 P.2d at 365. The public trust doctrine is based on that same principle upheld by the gift clause: the state must carefully safeguard public trust lands by dispensing them only when in the public's interest. Stated differently, the public trust doctrine, like the gift clause, requires the state to serve as trustee for public resources. We see no reason for treating public trust waterways any differently than public money and credit, insofar as the state must act as trustee to preserve the public's interest in that property. Therefore, we conclude that the constitutional policy contained in the gift clause infers the people's intent to constrain the Legislature's ability to alienate public trust lands as well as public funds.
Another source of Nevada law that evinces the public trust doctrine is our statutory law, specifically, NRS 321.0005 and NRS 533.025. NRS 321.0005 provides, in pertinent part: The Legislature declares the policy of this State regarding the use of state lands to be that state lands must be used in the best interest of the residents of this State, and to that end the lands may be used for recreational activities, the production of revenue and other public purposes. (Emphasis added.) Thus, by its express language, NRS 321.0005 contemplates fiduciary-type duties with regard to the state's administration of state lands. NRS 533.025 provides that [t]he water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of the State whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public. Notably, NRS 533.025 does not provide that Nevada's water belongs to the state; rather, it belongs to the public. Thus, as Justice Rose proposed, NRS 533.025 provides grounding for the Nevada public trust doctrine. See Mineral County v. State, Dep't of Conserv., 117 Nev. 235, 247, 20 P.3d 800, 808 (2001) (Rose, J., concurring). So too does NRS 321.0005. Both provisions recognize that the public land and water of this state do not belong to the state to use for any purpose, but only for those purposes that comport with the public's interest in the particular property, exemplifying the fiduciary principles at the heart of the public trust doctrine. In sum, NRS 321.0005 and NRS 533.025 effectively statutorily codify the principles behind the public trust doctrine in Nevada.
The final underpinning of our formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power, as recognized in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892). In Illinois Central, the United States Supreme Court established the principle that [t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace. Id. at 453, 13 S.Ct. 110. In other words, because the state holds such property in trust for the public's use, the state is simply without power to dispose of public trust property when it is not in the public's interest. See id. (A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of a State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power; and any attempted grant of the kind would be held, if not absolutely void on its face, as subject to revocation.); Kootenai Environ. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983) ([A] state, as administrator of the trust in navigable waters on behalf of the public, does not have the power to abdicate its role as trustee in favor of private parties.); Coxe v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400, 402 (1895) (The title of the state to the seacoast and the shores of tidal rivers is different from the fee simple which an individual holds to an estate in lands. It is not a proprietary, but a sovereign, right; and it has been frequently said that a trust is ingrafted upon this title for the benefit of the public, of which the state is powerless to divest itself.). Under the public trust doctrine, the Legislature has the power only to act as a fiduciary of the public in its administration of trust property. The public trust doctrine is thus not simply common law easily abrogated by legislation; instead, the doctrine constitutes an inseverable restraint on the state's sovereign power. In sum, although the public trust doctrine has roots in the common law, it is distinct from other common law principles because it is based on a policy reflected in the Nevada Constitution, Nevada statutes, and the inherent limitations on the state's sovereign power, as recognized by Illinois Central. Accordingly, in the words of Justice Rose, it is appropriate, if not our constitutional duty, to expressly adopt the doctrine to ensure that the state does not breach its duties as a sovereign trustee, and we do so here. Mineral County, 117 Nev. at 248, 20 P.3d at 808 (Rose, J., concurring). Thus, contrary to the County's position, any legislation that purports to convey public trust lands is subject to judicial review. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 193 Ariz. 195, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (1999) (It is for the courts to decide whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority.).
With regard to Clark County's argument that adopting the public trust doctrine unwisely assigns to courts the difficult task of determining if, at any point, a given parcel of land was beneath a navigable body of water in order to determine its trust character, we disagree.
As an initial matter, the public trust doctrine is rooted in our constitutional and statutory law and inherent limitations on the state's power and, thus, cannot be relaxed simply because it may present courts with difficult factual questions. And in any event, Clark County overstates the complexity of determining the character of land for public trust doctrine purposes. Determining whether land is held in trust for the public by the state begins by reference to whether the land was submerged beneath navigable water when Nevada joined the United States on October 31, 1864, as Nevada joined the United States on equal footing with other states in every respect, State v. Bunkowski, 88 Nev. 623, 628, 503 P.2d 1231, 1234 (1972), and, consequently, obtained title to all land below the high-water mark of Nevada's navigable waters on the date of its admission to the Union. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10, 91 S.Ct. 1775, 29 L.Ed.2d 279 (1971); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 434, 13 S.Ct. 110; Bunkowski, 88 Nev. at 628, 503 P.2d at 1234. Thus, determining whether land is subject to the public trust does not require consideration as to whether land was at any time underwater, as Clark County claims. Rather, it requires consideration of whether the land was beneath navigable waters on October 31, 1864. See Bunkowski, 88 Nev. at 628, 503 P.2d at 1234 (explaining that, for purposes of determining state ownership, the factual question of whether the Carson River is navigable is determined by reference to its condition October 31, 1864). Further, determining the navigability of a segment of a body or channel of water, which under federal law refers to the ordinary and natural condition of the watercourse, may be accomplished through expert testimony, historical surveys, and news clippings from the relevant time, as the Arizona Court of Appeals recognized in Arizona Center for Law v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158, 164-65 (App.1991); see also State Engineer v. Cowles Bros., Inc., 86 Nev. 872, 874, 478 P.2d 159, 160 (1970) (A body of water is navigable if it is used or is usable in its ordinary condition as a highway of commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. (citing Brewer Oil Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86, 43 S.Ct. 60, 67 L.Ed. 140 (1922))).
If land was beneath navigable waters when Nevada joined the United States, but is now exposed, whether that land remains subject to the public trust doctrine generally depends on the manner in which it became drywhether by reliction [2] or avulsion. [3] See Cowles, 86 Nev. at 875, 478 P.2d at 161. When the exposure is caused by reliction, the gradual and imperceptible exposure of the land, title to the dry water bed is passed to the adjoining shoreland owners. Id. The event causing the exposure of the water bed may be considered reliction even when the gradual changes to the water bed come about by artificial means: When the exposure is due wholly or in part to artificial causes and those causes are not the act of the party owning the shoreland the rules that prevail as to the ownership of the accreted or relicted land are the same as in the case of accretion or reliction solely by natural causes. Id. In contrast, when changes to the water bed occur by avulsion, that is, by sudden changes in the course of a stream, title is not taken away or bestowed. Peterson v. Morton, 465 F.Supp. 986, 997 (D.Nev.1979) (applying Nevada state law), vacated in part on other grounds by Peterson v. Watt, 666 F.2d 361, 364 (9th Cir.1982). Thus, because artificial actions, such as draining, damming, or channeling a waterway, may result in rapid exposure of the water bed, those events are often appropriately considered avulsions. See id. at 1003 (determining that where the strip of land in question became dry as a result of a sudden deliberate and obvious engineering relocation of the waters within the artificial banks of the permanently channelized river, such an event was considered an avulsion under Nevada law and therefore the state retained title to the land); see also New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 770-71, 784, 118 S.Ct. 1726, 140 L.Ed.2d 993 (1998) (holding that the federal government's filling of a portion of the Hudson River was an avulsion, and, as a consequence, ownership of the new dry land remained unchanged); Garrett v. State, 118 N.J.Super. 594, 289 A.2d 542, 546, 548 (N.J.Super.Ct. Ch. Div.1972) (the filling and rerouting of a tidal stream constituted an avulsion, and accordingly, the state retained title to the streambed). In Cowles, we applied the doctrine of reliction in determining that the state had lost its title to once-submerged land that had gradually and imperceptibly become dry. 86 Nev. at 874-75, 478 P.2d at 161. In the same way, the avulsion doctrine is useful for determining whether the state retains its title to land held in trust for the public after it has become dry. Applying these doctrines balances land gain and loss opportunities in a fair manner and operates as a disincentive to artificially diverting water from public trust lands in an effort to increase personal landholdings near navigable waters. See id. at 876-77, 478 P.2d at 162. Here, whether the disputed land became dry through reliction or avulsion is critical. If it was through reliction, the public trust doctrine does not apply to that land. But if the portion of the Colorado River covering the land was navigable at the time of Nevada's statehood, and the land thereafter became dry through avulsion, the public trust doctrine applies. And if the public trust doctrine applies, whether the disputed land is transferable turns on whether the transfer serves the public's interest in the land and comports with the state's trustee obligations, as discussed next.
Resolution of disputes over title to public trust land is a matter of state law. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484-85, 108 S.Ct. 791, 98 L.Ed.2d 877 (1988). Thus, state courts considering the public trust doctrine have developed their own frameworks for examining the administration of lands held in public trust. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C.Cir.1984) (In this country the public trust doctrine has developed almost exclusively as a matter of state law.). Although several approaches to making a determination regarding the transferability of public trust land exist, the approach taken by Arizona deserves concerted attention, as its constitution contains a gift clause nearly identical to Nevada's. [4] Moreover, Arizona's approach is instructive because it faces many of the same challenges that this state faces in maintaining its public trust property, given its arid desert climate and rapidly expanding urban population. See Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 Ariz. L.Rev. 1053, 1054 (1996). In Arizona Center for Law v. Hassell, 172 Ariz. 356, 837 P.2d 158 (App.1991), a case with facts and issues remarkably similar to those presented here, the Court of Appeals of Arizona extensively considered the relationship between the public trust doctrine and the Arizona gift clause. In Hassell, the Arizona Legislature enacted legislation relinquishing, through an uncompensated quitclaim, the state's claim to any interest in all watercourses other than the Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in all lands formerly within those rivers but outside their current beds. Id. at 162. The legislation also allowed record titleholder[s] of lands in or near the beds of the Gila, Salt, or Verde Rivers to obtain a quitclaim deed for just $25 per acre. Id. The Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest and several individuals (collectively, Arizona Center) commenced a lawsuit against Arizona Land Commissioner Milo J. Hassell, the state land department, and the State of Arizona (collectively, Land Commissioner). Id. at 163. Arizona Center sought to invalidate the legislation, alleging that it violated the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution... and the state's sovereign duty to protect the public [interest]. Id. (citations omitted). The trial court granted the Land Commissioner summary judgment, determining that [e]ven if the rivers were navigable at statehood, ... the state could legally relinquish its claims to the riverbeds for the purpose of `unclouding title.' Id. Arizona Center appealed. Id. Although the parties in Hassell briefed the gift clause and public trust issues separately, the Arizona Court of Appeals considered them in unison. Id. at 166. The court explained, Because the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution explicitly limits governmental freedom to dispose of public resources, it provides an appropriate framework for judicial review of an attempt by the legislative and executive branches to divest the state of a portion of its public trust. Id. Relying upon Arizona's gift clause jurisprudence, the Hassell court then fashioned the following test for reviewing the validity of dispensations of trust property: [W]hen a court reviews a dispensation of public trust property, ... public purpose and fair consideration[ ] must be shown.... [A]ny public trust dispensation must also satisfy the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. Id. at 170. Applying this test, the Hassell court concluded that the legislation being challenged was invalid under the public trust doctrine and [the gift clause] of the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 173. Because we find the reasoning enunciated in Hassell persuasive and harmonious with our own gift clause and public trust jurisprudence, we adopt the Hassell approach to reviewing dispensations of public trust property. Accordingly, when assessing such dispensations, courts of this state must consider (1) whether the dispensation was made for a public purpose, (2) whether the state received fair consideration in exchange for the dispensation, and (3) whether the dispensation satisfies the state's special obligation to maintain the trust for the use and enjoyment of present and future generations. Id. at 170. The first two considerations are common to any dispensation of public trust property, see, e.g., State ex rel. Brennan v. Bowman, 89 Nev. 330, 332-34, 512 P.2d 1321, 1322-23 (1973); Clark County v. Lewis, 88 Nev. 354, 357, 498 P.2d 363, 365 (1972), while the third consideration is specific to navigable waterways under the public trust. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 169-70. In addition, cognizant of the fact that public trust land may ... undergo[ ] such changes over time that it is no longer suitable for public trust purposes, id. at 170, when reviewing the third consideration, courts should also evaluate the following factors to determine whether a given conveyance comports with the state's trustee duties: [T]he degree of effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recreation and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust resource; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively with existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource ...; the impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is examined in light of the primary purpose for which the resource is suited, i.e. commerce, navigation, fishing or recreation; and the degree to which broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones. Id. at 170-71 (quoting Kootenai Environ. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht, 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085, 1092-93 (1983)). Finally, we note that when the Legislature has found that a given dispensation is in the public's interest, it will be afforded deference. See id. at 171; Lewis, 88 Nev. at 357-58, 498 P.2d at 365-66. This is not to say that the courts of this state will merely rubber-stamp the Legislature's finding. Hassell, 837 P.2d at 171. Rather, while courts will give the Legislature due deference, they will carefully examine whether the Legislature made an informed and appropriate conveyance under the rubric set forth above.