Opinion ID: 2350429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applying the Human Rights Act to the Tangible Benefits Contained in University Recognition

Text: Although the student groups were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that Georgetown's denial of University Recognition  including an endorsement  violated the Human Rights Act, the statute does require Georgetown to equally distribute, without regard to sexual orientation, the tangible benefits contained in the same package. If discrimination appears from the record, this court may sustain the statutory ruling on a ground different from that adopted by the trial court. Max Holtzman, Inc. v. K & T Co., 375 A.2d 510, 513 n. 6 (D.C.1977); see also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. District of Columbia, 316 A.2d 871, 875 (D.C. 1974); Wells v. Wynn, 311 A.2d 829, 829 n. 2 (D.C.1973). Our review of the record reveals no genuine dispute that the tangible benefits were denied on the basis of sexual orientation. The Human Rights Act was violated to that extent. [21] The Human Rights Act cannot depend for its enforcement on a regulated actor's purely subjective, albeit sincere, evaluation of its own motivations. Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence.... Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196, 29 S.Ct. 260, 265, 53 L.Ed. 465 (1909). It is particularly difficult to recognize one's own acts as discriminatory. Apart from organizations that failed to meet purely technical requirements such as a minimum membership, the record shows that Georgetown never denied University Recognition to a student group that was not mainly composed of persons with a homosexual orientation. Where, as here, those possessing characteristics identified by the legislature as irrelevant to individual merit are treated less favorably than others, the Human Rights Act imposes a burden upon the regulated actor to demonstrate that the irrelevant characteristic played no part in its decision. Georgetown failed to present facts that could show it was uninfluenced by sexual orientation in denying the tangible benefits. One nondiscriminatory reason asserted by Georgetown for its denial of the tangible benefits contained in University Recognition was that it could not give its accompanying endorsement to the student groups without violating its religious principles. But as the Human Rights Act, properly construed, requires no direct, intangible endorsement, Georgetown cannot avoid a finding of discrimination on that ground. The remaining nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by Georgetown may be summarized as follows: the purposes and activities of the student groups fell outside the boundaries set by Recognition Criteria, rendering them ineligible for the tangible benefits they sought and not otherwise qualified within the meaning of the statute, D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987); and, in any event, the denial of tangible benefits was based on the purposes and activities of the student groups, not on the homosexual status of their members, so that the sexual orientation of the students involved played no part in the decisionmaking process, id. In this case, the nondiscriminatory reasons asserted by Georgetown have the effect of fusing together what would normally be two separate inquiries  are the student groups otherwise qualified for the tangible benefits they seek, and, if so, did Georgetown deny those tangible benefits due to the sexual orientation of their members? Here, because the answer to both of those distinct questions is determined by objective reference to the purposes and activities of the student groups, what are normally two separate inquiries collapse into one: did the homosexual orientation of the group members cause them to be treated differently from other applicants? We are not bound by Georgetown's subjective perception of the purposes and activities to which it objected. Georgetown must view the purposes and activities of a student group in a way which is free from impermissible reliance upon factors unrelated to individual merit. Accordingly, if the homosexual status of group members entered into Georgetown's assessment of the purposes and activities of the student groups, albeit unconsciously, the denial of tangible benefits was itself based on sexual orientation. Put differently, it would be irrelevant that Georgetown saw itself as doing nothing more than applying neutral guidelines established by Recognition Criteria if sexual orientation had in fact influenced how those standards were applied. In denying GPGU's application for University Recognition Georgetown adverted to that group's expressed purpose (one of four) to provide a forum for the development of responsible sexual ethics consonant with one's personal beliefs. See GPGU Constitution ( quoted supra note 5). That purpose is at odds with Roman Catholic teachings. But GRC's constitution contained no comparable statement; Georgetown's stated objection was to GRC's much broader intention to [p]rovide lesbians and gay men entering the Law Center with information about Washington's gay community, including educational, cultural, religious, social and medical services. See GRC Constitution ( quoted supra note 6). Because GRC's purposes include an asexual commitment to serving the broad range of needs experienced by homosexual students, but no statement as to the propriety of homosexual conduct, Georgetown's objection to that organization must to some extent have been prompted by the sexual orientation of its members. That Georgetown's treatment of the gay student groups was not exclusively influenced by a specific objection to purposes and activities inconsistent with Roman Catholic dogma was further evidenced by Debbie Gottfried, the University's Director of Student Activities. In clarifying GPGU's status after it had obtained Student Body Endorsement, but had failed to obtain University Recognition, Gottfried wrote that the University would not change its position on what it feels would be interpreted as endorsement and official support of the full range of issues associated with this cause.  Letter from D. Gottfried to GPGU (Jan. 18, 1980) (emphasis added). At no time has Georgetown defined what it meant by the full range of issues associated with the gay student groups, despite its insistence that Roman Catholic doctrine favors the provision of equal civil and political rights to homosexually oriented persons and that its religious objection was directed only to the promotion of homosexual conduct. Gottfried's statement was later repeated by Dean Schuerman, who wrote that the University would not lend its endorsement, support or approval to the positions taken by the gay movement on a full range of issues  or the major activities and issues which, by definition, are associated with a gay organization.  Letter from Dean W. Schuerman to GPGU (Feb. 21, 1980) (emphasis added). Similarly, when Dean McCarthy turned down GRC's application at the Law Center, he wrote that the University would not lend its official subsidy and support to a gay law student organization because that would be interpreted by many as endorsement of the positions taken by the gay movement on a full range of issues.  Letter from Dean D. McCarthy, Jr., to GRC (Feb. 26, 1980) (emphasis added). Georgetown thus ascribed to the student groups not only purposes and activities which they may have had, but also a host of others automatically assumed to be a necessary attribute of their homosexual orientation. Other conclusive evidence that Georgetown took homosexual orientation into account in its recognition procedures is supplied by the fact that on the same day as he denied University Recognition to GRC at the Law Center, President Healy wrote an essentially identical letter to the Chancellor of the Medical Center, despite the fact that no homosexually oriented students there had ever applied for such status. President Healy wrote: I am sure that you are aware that the Gay Students on the Main Campus have appealed Father Freeze's decision to me. That appeal has recently been denied.... Since you may be presented with a similar situation at the Medical Center, I want to point out that this decision applies equally to the Medical Center. Letter from President T. Healy, S.J., to Chancellor M. McNulty (May 8, 1980). This action amounted to an adverse decision without any consideration on the merits, in light of criteria neutral to sexual orientation, of the purposes and activities of whatever group might be formed sometime in the future. It is explicable only if Georgetown considered the predominantly homosexual orientation of some future student group at the Medical Center, and not just its specific purposes and activities, to be a factor of intrinsic relevance to a grant of University Recognition. That a predominantly homosexual orientation would be fatal to a bid for tangible benefits at the Medical Center establishes beyond any doubt that Georgetown was not oblivious to sexual orientation in its application of Recognition Criteria. It is apparent from this correspondence, all of which was before Judge Braman when he granted summary judgment on the discrimination issue, that Georgetown's denial of tangible benefits was not closely tied to specific purposes and activities of the student groups promoting the homosexual conduct condemned by Roman Catholic doctrine. The conclusion is inescapable that the predominantly gay composition of the student groups played at least some role in their treatment by Georgetown. By objecting to the student groups' assumed connection, by definition, to a full range of issues associated with the gay movement, rather than to specific purposes and activities inconsistent with its Roman Catholic tradition, Georgetown engaged in the kind of stereotyping unrelated to individual merit that is forbidden by the Human Rights Act. In short, the record reveals no genuine doubt that Georgetown's asserted nondiscriminatory basis for its action was in fact tainted by preconceptions about gay persons. Georgetown did not apply Recognition Criteria on an equal basis to all groups without regard to the sexual orientation of their members. Judge Braman's finding that Georgetown discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation is further supported by his express reliance on another provision of the Human Rights Act. The effects clause provides that [a]ny practice which has the effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed to be an unlawful discriminatory practice. D.C. Code § 1-2532 (1987). Under that section, despite the absence of any intention to discriminate, practices are unlawful if they bear disproportionately on a protected class and are not independently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason. As the legislative history demonstrates, the Council imported into the Human Rights Act, by way of the effects clause, the concept of disparate impact discrimination developed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). In Griggs, decided shortly before the Human Rights Act was passed in its original form as a municipal regulation, the Supreme Court interpreted the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 as prohibiting not only intentional discrimination, but also practices which prejudice protected groups and are not supported by some independent, nondiscriminatory justification. Griggs was expressly relied upon by the drafters of the Human Rights Act when the original regulation was adopted. Dr. Marjorie Parker, chairwoman of one of the committees that proposed the law to the pre-Home Rule City Council, explained to Council members that because the District regulation parallels the Civil Rights Act, the public could look to the federal model to answer many of their questions concerning the administration and enforcement of the Human Rights Act. District of Columbia City Council, Committee Report on Title 34, The Human Rights Law, 1 (Oct. 15, 1973) (available in the District Building) (hereinafter Parker Report II); see also District of Columbia City Council, Committee Report on Title 34, The Human Rights Law, 2 (Aug. 7, 1973) (available in the District Building) (hereinafter Parker Report I). The Parker Report II specifically cited Griggs and noted that it upheld the applicability of the Civil Rights Act in cases of unintentional discrimination. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original). During the passage of the bill, the Council retained the effects clause despite opposition from local employers. A submission from the Metropolitan Washington Board of Trade and the C & P Telephone Company resulted in the preparation of a memo distributed to Council members reaffirming the Parker Report's interpretation: The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power held that unintentional discrimination is just as liable under the Civil Rights Act as intentional discrimination. District of Columbia City Council, Memorandum on Proposed Draft Clarifications: Title 34, at 5 (Oct. 11, 1973) (available in the District Building) (emphasis in original). The memo added that [w]hile unintentional discrimination would be unlawful [under the Human Rights Act], a finding of such would probably prevent any judgment of damages against the perpetrator. Id. The Council made only inconsequential changes to the wording of the effects clause as originally proposed. A Human Rights Act violation was established with regard to Georgetown's denial of the tangible benefits. The evidence before Judge Braman may not permit the conclusion that Georgetown consciously denied benefits due to the sexual orientation of the student groups involved. It is nonetheless evident that the University allowed the homosexual orientation of the individuals involved  not just the purposes and activities of their student organizations  to creep into its decisionmaking. By failing to confine its objections to purposes and activities which it found offensive for reasons independent of the sexual orientation of the students, Georgetown discriminated. The position that a gay organization is by definition associated with a full range of issues reveals that sexual orientation was a factor in Georgetown's denial of tangible benefits. That statement established an intentional violation. D.C. Code § 1-2520 (1987); and, in any event, under the effects clause the Human Rights Act also prohibits unintentional discrimination, id. § 1-2532. Finally, none of the Human Rights Act's narrowly drawn exceptions avails Georgetown here. [22] The Human Rights Act having been violated with respect to the tangible benefits, we proceed to Georgetown's free exercise defense.