Opinion ID: 169914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Quiet Title Act and sovereign immunity generally

Text: The concept of sovereign immunity means that the United States cannot be sued without its consent. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jacks, 960 F.2d 911, 913 (10th Cir.1992). Such consent may be found only when Congress unequivocally expresses its intention to waive the government's sovereign immunity in the statutory text. United States v. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d 922, 930 (10th Cir.1996) (quotation omitted). In cases concerning the United States' title to real property, the Supreme Court has construed the Quiet Title Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity providing the exclusive means for challenging such title. [4] Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 842, 106 S.Ct. 2224 (quoting Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983)). The Quiet Title Act states, in relevant part: The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights. This section does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands. . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). Thus, the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity is qualified by an exception for suits challenging title to lands held in trust for Indian tribes: when the United States claims an interest in real property based on that property's status as trust or restricted Indian lands, the Quiet Title Act does not waive the Government's immunity. Neighbors for Rational Dev., 379 F.3d at 961 (quoting Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 843, 106 S.Ct. 2224). Several questions are raised by the Secretary's invocation of the Quiet Title Act in the present context. First, does the Plaintiffs' suit qualify as a quiet title action so as to render a Quiet Title Act analysis applicable? If so, does the fact that Plaintiffs brought the Sac & Fox Nation case Challenging the Shriner Tract's trust status before the Secretary had actually taken the Tract into trust affect application of the Act? Finally, does either this court's order in Sac & Fox Nation purporting to retain Plaintiffs' right to contest the trust acquisition, or the Secretary's continued participation In this litigation up to the present, provide a means to avoid application of the United States' sovereign immunity in this case? B. Plaintiffs' suit is a quiet title action sufficient to invoke the Quiet Title Act Two of this court's recent decisions dealing with similar facts require that we treat Plaintiffs' suit as a quiet title action against, the United States, thus invoking the Quiet Title Act. In Neighbors for Rational Development, Inc. v. Norton , the Secretary took property owned by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico into trust, and the Pueblos subsequently made plans to develop the land. 379 F.3d at 959. Neighbors For Rational Development (Neighbors), an organization of local citizens, challenged the Secretary's decision as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law because the Secretary (1) failed to comply with [NEPA], and (2) failed to consider the `regulatory factors for trust acquisitions' in 25 § 151.10. Id. at 960. Neighbors argued that the Quiet Title Act did not apply because it was not an adverse claimant but a third party, and its suit was not a quiet title action but an APA challenge to the Secretary's decision to place the land in trust. Id. We held, however, that neither of these circumstances were relevant to our application of the Act. Instead, we held that a court faced with a suit challenging the United States' title to land held in trust for an Indian tribe must focus on the relief sought by the plaintiffs. Id. at 962. In this case, Neighbors asks the court to enter declaratory judgment that the trust acquisition is null and void. Neighbors also seeks to permanently enjoin [the Secretary] from converting the [Indian school] property to trust status without fully complying with all federal laws, regulations, and Guidelines, including the National Environmental Policy Act. We think these requests fall within the scope of suits the Indian trust land exemption in the Quiet Title Act sought to prevent. Id. at 961-62 (alterations in original). We based this conclusion on Congress's intent, as expressed in the Quiet Title Act, that third parties be prevented from interfering with the United States' obligations to the Indians. Id. at 962. In sum, we concluded, the Quiet Title Act precludes Neighbors' suit to the extent it seek[s] to nullify the trust acquisition. Id. at 965. A similar factual situation developed in Shivwits Band, 428 F.3d at 966. The Shivwits Band of Paiute Indians (the Shivwits) purchased tracts of land adjacent to a highway south of St. George, Utah, and after the Secretary took these tracts into trust, finalized several leases permitting an advertising company to erect billboards on the trust land. 428 F.3d at 970. When the State of Utah threatened criminal action and the City of St. George issued a stop-work order to the advertising company, the Shivwits filed a federal action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. The State and City counterclaimed, challenging the statute under which the United States took the land into trust and claiming, inter alia, that the taking of the land in trust and the approval of the [billboard] lease . . . violated [NEPA] and [DOI] regulations. . . . Id. Relying on our Neighbors for Rational Development analysis, we held that the Quiet Title Act barred jurisdiction to hear the State and City's arguments to the extent [they] sought to challenge the BIA's decision to take the property at issue into trust for the Band. Id. at 976. The relief sought by Plaintiffs' complaint in this case is functionally identical to that sought by the plaintiffs in Neighbors for Rational Development and Shivwits Band. Plaintiffs seek a determination that the Secretary's decision to place the Shriner Tract in trust is not within the scope of [her] authority, that the Agency did not comply with applicable procedures, and that its action is otherwise arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion, and that the Agency's Determination must be declared void ab initio . . . The complaint also seeks an injunction and/or an order of mandamus requiring the Agency to revoke the non-discretionary trust status of the tract and rescind all other trust actions and applications and activities concerning the same. Similarly, Plaintiffs' opening brief to this court requests that we invalidate the Secretary's decision as arbitrary and capricious, [and] declare void the trust determination of the Shriner Tract. As such, Plaintiffs' requested relief plainly presents a direct challenge to the United States' title for the Shriner Tract held in trust for the Wyandotte and therefore fall[s] within the scope of suits the Indian trust land exemption in the Quiet Title Act sought to prevent. Neighbors for Rational Dev., 379 F.3d at 962. Thus, unless facts exist which distinguish Plaintiffs' suit from those we dismissed in Neighbors for Rational Development and Shivwits Band, the United States' sovereign immunity prevents the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over this case. C. The timing of Plaintiffs' complaint in the instant case precludes application of the Quiet Title Act's waiver of sovereign immunity Plaintiffs argue that this case is distinguishable from Neighbors for Rational Development and Shivwits Band based on the timing of their challenge to the Secretary's decisions. In both of those cases, the United States already held title to the land in trust for the tribes at the time the suit challenging the Secretary's decision was filed; here, however, Plaintiffs emphasize that they filed a complaint challenging the Secretary's decision in Sac & Fox Nation prior to the Secretary's taking the Shriner Tract into trust. Thus, they argue, the Quiet Title Act's waiver of sovereign immunity permitted the court to hear their suit at the time it was initiated, and the. Secretary's subsequent actions did not divest the court of this jurisdiction. Although Plaintiffs claim that their challenge to the Secretary's decision was initiated prior to the Secretary taking the Shriner Tract into trust for the Wyandotte, they are referring to the complaint filed on July 12, 1996, which initiated the Sac & Fox Nation case. As discussed in the facts above, however, Sac & Fox Nation is not the case presently on appeal; it was officially closed by the district court's judgment remanding the case back to the Secretary on August 23, 2001. The district court in that case expressly disclaimed continuing jurisdiction, stating in a later order that any appeal of the Secretary's determination following the remand must be considered a new and separate action. The instant case is just such a new and separate action, filed on July 11, 2003 by a slightly different collection of Plaintiffs in the district court under a different case number. Notably, this complaint, by its own terms, challenges only the Secretary's March 2002 determination and June 2003 opinion; it mentions the Sac & Fox Nation case, but only as part of the previous history of litigation surrounding the Huron Cemetery in Kansas City, Kansas. It is thus clear that, despite the existence of certain common issues, Plaintiffs' claims in this case are focused upon the Secretary's legal and factual explanations rendered after the judgment and remand in Sac & Fox Nation rendered that case closed. We therefore look to the status of the Shriner Tract as of July 11, 2003  the date Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case  to determine whether the Quiet Title Act's waiver of sovereign immunity applies. As of that date, the Tract was already held in trust by the United States, having been taken into trust at some point prior to our publication of the Sac. & Fox Nation opinion in early 2001. See 240 F.3d at 1257. Thus, the Act's exception for Indian trust lands retain[ed] the United States' immunity from suit by third parties challenging the United States' title to land held in trust for Indians. Mottaz, 476 U.S. at 842, 106 S.Ct. 2224. As a result, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that a waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity applied at the time they filed the instant suit. [5] D. Neither a court nor the Secretary can preserve the rights of the parties to obtain judicial review of the trust acquisition in the absence of a valid waiver by Congress Plaintiffs argue that, even if the Quiet Title Act's waiver does not apply in this case, we should honor our order, issued in 1996 during an interlocutory appeal in the Sac & Fox Nation case, in which we ordered that the respective rights of the parties to obtain judicial review of all issues which have been raised in the complaint below shall be preserved after dissolution of the TRO. Sac & Fox Nation, 240 F.3d at 1257. In a similar vein, a suggestion was raised at oral argument that the Secretary's continued participation in this lawsuit waived, or estopped her from invoking, the United States' sovereign immunity. Well-settled law, however, establishes that neither courts nor government officials can effectuate such waiver; only Congress holds that power. As discussed above, the Sac & Fox Nation plaintiffs sought and initially received a TRO preventing the Secretary from taking the Shriner Tract into trust while that case remained pending. Sac & Fox Nation, 240 F.3d at 1257. However, upon interlocutory appeal by the Wyandotte, this court dissolved the PRO preventing the Secretary from acquiring the Tract in trust [6] Id. In our July 15, 1996 order vacating the TRO, we explained that the order was not intended to prevent further review of questions related to gaming on the Tract: We hear this matter on an emergency basis and wish to preserve, as best we can, the rights of all parties. In order to do so, [We] take into specific consideration the statement of the United States Attorney and the counsel for the Wyandotte Tribe that acquisition by the Secretary of this land in trust will not affect or bar the ultimate resolution of whether this land can be used for Class III gaming pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act [IGRA]. . . . . In order to preserve the status quo, we grant the [Wyandotte's] emergency application for stay and hold that the temporary restraining order below is dissolved, subject to the conditions which constitute the law of this case, that the respective rights of the parties to obtain judicial review of all issues which have been raised in the complaint below shall be preserved, including standing of all parties, jurisdiction, compliance by the Secretary with all requirements of law, and the ultimate question of whether gaming shall be permitted on the subject land. Wyandotte Nation, 443 F.3d at 1249-50 (alterations in original). The Secretary argues that the July 15, 1996 order no longer carries any authority because Sac & Fox Nation, the case in which it was issued, is closed. We need not address whether the order remains applicable, however, because in the absence of an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, this court lacks authority to authorize a suit against the United States. [O]nly Congress, not the courts, can waive the sovereign immunity of the United States. Therefore, in the absence of clear congressional consent, then, there is no jurisdiction to entertain suits against the United States. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 960 F.2d at 913 (quotation, alterations, citations omitted); see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) ([I]t is not for this Court to examine the necessity [of sovereign immunity] in each case. That is a function of the Congress.). Congressional consent must come in the form of a statutory authorization: In order for a claim against the United States to be heard, first there must be, because sovereign immunity requires it, consent to be sued; and because, with the exception of the Supreme Court, the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is defined by statute, there must be, second, Congressional provision of a court with the authority to hear the claim and grant relief. Franklin Sav. Corp. v. United States, 385 F.3d 1279, 1289 (10th Cir.2004); see also Kelley v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1507 (10th Cir.1995) ([A] waiver of sovereign immunity . . . may not be, extended beyond the explicit language of the statute.). Nor can the actions of the Secretary, or any government, official or attorney, act as a waiver or abandonment of the United States' sovereign immunity. Because waiver must be unequivocally expressed by Congress, officers of the United States possess no power through their actions to waive an immunity of the United States or to confer jurisdiction on a court. The federal government's appearance in court through its officers and agents, therefore, does not waive the government's sovereign immunity. Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d at 931 (quotations, citations omitted); accord Richman, 124 F.3d at 1205 ([N]either the government's attorneys nor any other officer of the United States may waive the United States' sovereign immunity.). As a result of the strict jurisdictional nature of sovereign immunity, our waiver analysis is necessarily constrained to consideration of whether the Quiet Title Act itself waived the United States' sovereign immunity. Having already answered this question in the negative, the previous orders of this court and the conduct of the Secretary during litigation are simply irrelevant; without a valid congressional waiver, neither the district court nor this court possess jurisdiction to hear this case. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983) (It is axiomatic that . . . the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.); Murdock Mach. & Eng'g Co., 81 F.3d at 931 ([I]n the absence of governmental consent, the courts lack jurisdiction to restrain the government from acting, or to compel it to act. (quotation omitted, emphasis in original)). Although this result may seem inequitable in light of the Secretary's failure to raise this issue earlier and our prior, attempt to preserve judicial review through our order in Sac & Fox Nation, this [c]ourt has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements. Bowles v. Russell ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 2366, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007); see also United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 547 (10th Cir.2001) (Any waiver [of sovereign immunity] must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign and not enlarged beyond what its language requires. (alteration, quotation omitted)).