Opinion ID: 866987
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Physical Abuse Evidence

Text: Prior to trial, Ramey filed a motion in limine requesting that the district court prohibit the introduction of any evidence about Ramey’s physical abuse of Yashare. During a hearing on the motion, defense counsel asserted that the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative, while the government argued that Ramey’s control over Yashare was highly probative of his own guilt and the value of the evidence therefore outweighed any prejudicial effect. The court ultimately allowed the government to introduce the evidence after holding that the abuse was “part of the story,” and that its probative value outweighed the danger of prejudice. 11 Case: 12-20044 Document: 00512235749 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/08/2013 No. 12-20044 The jury subsequently heard testimony from Yashare regarding her complicity in Ramey’s fraud and her explanation for her participation. She stated, for example, that she had been “trained and programmed . . . from birth up to 31” to obey her father, and that if she refused, she “would either get a whupping or choked or whatever.” Yashare further testified that she “regularly got beat with an electric cord or belt,” and that child protective services had removed her from the Ramey home for some period of time. On appeal, Ramey contends that the court erred under Rule 403 in admitting this evidence. He cites United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that evidence of domestic abuse presents an especially grave danger of prejudice. In Hands, the defendant (“Hands”) was charged with certain drug crimes. Id. at 1325. His wife testified on his behalf that during the time period covered in the indictment, she stayed at home fulltime and had never witnessed any drug-related activity at the home. Id. at 1325–26. Neither the defense nor the prosecution asked her about her relationship with Hands. Id. at 1326. Later, Hands took the stand in his own defense, and the prosecutor asked him on cross-examination about his use of certain firearms. Id. Hands volunteered that his handgun permit had been revoked, after which the prosecution asked whether he lost his permit as a result of beating his wife. Id. Over repeated objections, the district court allowed the government to continue with its line of questioning and, more damningly, also permitted the prosecutor to introduce photographs of Hands’s wife taken after the beating. Id. Hands appealed, arguing that the court erred in admitting the “graphic evidence” of his spousal abuse. Id. at 1325. The Eleventh Circuit agreed, concluding that under Rule 403, the evidence should not have been admitted. Id. at 1328–29. First, the court found that the evidence of spousal abuse had “minimal probative value” because it did nothing to establish whether Hands 12 Case: 12-20044 Document: 00512235749 Page: 13 Date Filed: 05/08/2013 No. 12-20044 was guilty of the drug crimes charged in the indictment. Id. at 1328. Furthermore, the court held that the domestic violence evidence—particularly the graphic photographs—was highly prejudicial, given its “arresting” nature. Id. at 1328–29. After observing that “the prosecution’s case was not overwhelming,” the court concluded that the error was not harmless and, accordingly, reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1329–35. Ramey’s reliance on Hands is misplaced. Unlike in Hands, the government did not attempt to introduce during Ramey’s trial gruesome photographs of his abuse of Yashare, nor did it attempt to elicit testimony to prove a general point about Ramey’s propensity for illegal or improper behavior. To the contrary, the evidence of Ramey’s abuse was tailored to its legitimate purpose, which was to demonstrate his control over, and implementation of, the fraudulent activity. Ramey’s influence over Yashare thus was highly probative of his own guilt—a conclusion that is especially clear given Ramey’s prior argument that, because he had not signed the bankruptcy petitions, he could not be held accountable for them.3 In short, the evidence of abuse demonstrated that the petitions were filed at Ramey’s direction, and that he was the mastermind behind the criminal activity. We therefore conclude that the evidence of Ramey’s abuse of Yashare was not unfairly prejudicial, nor, by extension, was its probative value substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Accordingly, we reject Ramey’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion in admitting it.