Opinion ID: 2625134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reference to Defendant's Invocation of Rights

Text: Defendant next argues that the State's introduction of evidence about his invocation of rights violated Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). He characterizes this error as one of prosecutorial misconduct, because the prosecutor used admissible evidence of his voluntary statements during the ride to Lawrence to open the door to inadmissible evidence of the earlier invocation of rights, and made improper comments designed to impeach defendant's credibility. We agree. Generally, it is constitutionally impermissible for the State to elicit evidence at trial of an accused's post- Miranda silence. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240; see State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 685, 887 P.2d 88 (1994). A Doyle violation occurs when the State attempts to impeach a defendant's credibility at trial by arguing or by introducing evidence that the defendant did not avail himself or herself of the first opportunity to clear his or her name, instead invoking the constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Brinkley, 256 Kan. 808, 820, 888 P.2d 819 (1995). The Doyle rule also applies when the State attempts to impeach a defendant's credibility by arguing that the invocation of his or her right to counsel evidences guilt. See Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240; State v. Edwards, 264 Kan. 177, Syl. ¶ 8, 955 P.2d 1276 (1998). As mentioned, at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, and again at the sidebar during trial, the defense objected to the admission of the fact that defendant had invoked his rights, but the district judge permitted officers to tell the jury they did not follow up on defendant's unsolicited statements because of the invocation. This ruling was error; there was no need for the explanation the officers gave. See State v. Dumars, 33 Kan.App.2d 735, 747, 108 P.3d 448, rev. denied 280 Kan. 986 (2005) ( Doyle violation occurs when a prosecutor elicits testimony from a detective that a defendant exercised his or her right to silence). To make matters worse, the State went beyond presenting the bare fact that defendant had previously invoked his rights. During Brown's trial testimony, after the prosecutor asked about defendant's interview in Topeka and elicited the fact that defendant invoked his rights, the following exchange occurred: Q [Prosecutor:]. Now I am accurately stating that after you asked him about the gun, that you don't ask him about any other  you don't ask any other question of him? A [Detective Brown:]. No. Q. But does he say, `I want you to know this,' and [say] `I didn't want this to happen'? A. That is right. Q. Did he ever tell you why it happened? A. No. Q. Did you ever stop him from telling you why it happened? A. No. Q. Did he ever mention he was defending himself and another person? A. No. In addition, the prosecutor called Jumisko to testify about the substance of defendant's spontaneous statements and then asked: Q. Now did he at any point elaborate on any of the statements that you wrote down? A. No. Q. And if he were to  would have started talking about the circumstances under which this happened, would you have allowed him to say  tell you whatever he wanted to tell you? A. If he had brought it up on his own, I would have written down what he said. This pattern continued when the prosecutor cross-examined defendant: Q. You agree with me that the first time that you  other than your lawyer, the first time you told anyone what you have told us here today is today; this is the first time? A. No, sir. Q. You agree that the Lawrence Police Department didn't stop you from telling them whatever you wanted to tell them; do you agree with that statement? A. Yes, sir. Q. When you went to Topeka, you said you went to a friend's house. A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you tell that friend what happened? A. No, sir. . . . . Q. You told [the man you met walking] that you shot a person in Lawrence; correct? A. No, sir. I told [him] `I killed a man last night' is what I told him. Q. And this is yes or no. At no point . . . did you ever tell him that you killed a man to defend yourself or another person? A. I didn't say anything about the incident. When evaluating a prosecutorial misconduct claim, this court first asks whether the complained-of conduct was outside the considerable latitude given a prosecutor in discussing the evidence. State v. Dixon, 279 Kan. 563, 590-91, 112 P.3d 883 (2005); State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83, 93, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004). We agree with defendant that the prosecutor committed misconduct with regard to defendant's invocation of his rights. In addition to explaining why the officers did not follow up on defendant's unsolicited statements, the prosecutor repeatedly asked about defendant's post- Miranda silence. We perceive no reason to have done so, except to imply to the jury that defendant's assertion of the defense of another should not be believed. We defer for the moment our discussion of whether this misconduct necessitates reversal.