Opinion ID: 1244591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equal Pay Claims.

Text: In another count of her petition Lara claimed Thomas violated both state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination between employees on the basis of sex. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1978) (Equal Pay Act); Iowa Code § 601A.6(1)(a) (1989) (Unfair Employment Practices). [1] The jury found in favor of Thomas on the equal pay claims, and the court agreed overruling both Lara's rule 179(b) motion and her motion to reconsider. The court concluded Lara's abilities, duties, and responsibilities were not substantially similar to those of the male employees. To make out a prima facie case under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act a plaintiff must show that an employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.... 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 2228, 41 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1974); Horner v. Mary Institute, 613 F.2d 706, 713 (8th Cir. 1980). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show one of four exceptions applies. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Corning Glass Works, 417 U.S. at 196-97, 94 S.Ct. at 2229, 41 L.Ed.2d at 10-11. Because we affirm the court's finding that Lara failed to demonstrate a prima facie case, we need not address the applicability of the exemptions. Lara argued that she worked as a veterinary assistant or technician and performed many of the same duties as the male veterinary technician, McGaffin; yet he was paid $6.25 per hour plus benefits, compared to her wage of $3.00 to $3.35 per hour. Zabel was paid between $4.40 to $5.00 per hour. During her employment with Thomas none of the female employees received a higher wage than Lara. In defense Thomas pointed out that Lara and the male employees did not perform work that was substantially equal. Moreover, two former female employees testified that when they worked for Thomas as certified veterinary technicians they earned $7.00 to $10.00 per hour. To determine whether Lara's work was substantially equal to that of the male employees we must look beyond the job title or description and examine the nature of the actual duties performed. See, e.g., Epstein v. Secretary, United States Dept. of Treasury, 739 F.2d 274, 277 (7th Cir.1984); EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1196 (5th Cir.1984); Horner, 613 F.2d at 713. McGaffin was licensed in Nebraska as a veterinary technician. His two year training included coursework in pharmacology and parasitology. Although Lara performed a variety of laboratory tests on animal samples and assisted with vaccinations, surgeries, and x-rays, she had no formal education or training in the field of veterinary medicine. Further, McGaffin testified he performed additional duties at the clinic and he trained Lara and supervised much of her work. Thus, it is clear the work performed by Lara and McGaffin was not substantially equal in terms of skill or responsibility, and it differed in terms of the degree of accountability and the importance of the required duties. See Epstein, 739 F.2d at 277; Horner, 613 F.2d at 713. Similarly, Zabel did not perform the same duties as Lara. Zabel was hired for a short period to break horses and to do odd jobs. He was a professional cowboy with extensive experience with horses. For the same reasons, we conclude Lara has also failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under Iowa law. See Mowrey v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 424 N.W.2d 764, 766 (Iowa App.1988); Iowa Code § 601A.6(1); 161 Iowa Admin.Code 8.51-8.54 (1991). There was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict rejecting Lara's claims of unlawful sex discrimination.