Opinion ID: 1656312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: breach of confidentiality and negligent infliction of emotional distress

Text: ¶ 16. As a question of law, we review the grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict de novo. Entergy Miss., Inc. v. Bolden, 854 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 2003). In reviewing a motion for a directed verdict this Court must decide whether the facts presented, together with any reasonable inferences, considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable jurors could not have returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Drennan v. Kroger Co., 672 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Miss.1996). ¶ 17. The pivotal question in the present case is whether the alleged disclosure of Robley's medical history occurred and, if so, whether such disclosure was unnecessary and unreasonable. We remain mindful of the absolute sensitivity of confidential medical information possessed by insurance companies, and the importance of protecting that information from improper disclosure. An insurance company's dissemination of an insured's medical records must be governed by the strict necessities of the situation. However, there are situations where limited disclosure is appropriate under the terms of the policy. ¶ 18. As written, the policy allows Blue Cross, within its discretion, to release its patient's medical records to the patient's physician. The wording of the policy indicates clearly and unambiguously the terms of the agreement. This Court must give effect to the plain meaning of clear and unambiguous language. Jackson v. Daley, 739 So.2d 1031, 1041 (Miss.1999). Robley argues that her medical records should not have been released, for two reasons. First, her records were not necessary to further Kelly's treatment. Second, that the records were released to Kelly's physicians and not Robley's physicians thereby violating confidentiality. ¶ 19. Although the language of the policy seems to give broad authority, Blue Cross does not have unfettered discretion to disseminate Robley's medical records. There still remains a dispute between McFarland and Mason as to whether the term drug seeker was used. There was evidence presented at trial by both which contradicts the other's story. This conflict should have been decided by the jury rather than the judge. From our review of the record, and giving due deference to the nonmoving party, reasonable jurors can disagree as to which party, McFarland or Mason, was telling the truth. This evidence brings into question whether there was a breach of confidentiality. ¶ 20. From the trial judge's bench ruling, it appears the basis of his decision was Robley's failure to present evidence of damages sufficient to prove a case of negligence. Thus, as a matter of law, the trial judge found that such evidence did not exist. With this conclusion we cannot agree. Robley's expert medical witness, Dr. Richard Strub, [2] testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that this disclosure could have caused Robley increased levels of stress and anxiety. Such an increase, in his opinion, aggravated her preexisting migraine headache condition. Dr. Strub described this as meaning [Robley] would have more migraines during those times when she was thinking about [the disclosure] or worrying about it or dealing with it. Further, that in his own observations, following the disclosure, her condition worsened and that she was having quite a bit of trouble. This evidence brings into question causation and damages. ¶ 21. While it is clear that the injuries alleged by Robley are unusual, their unique nature does not defeat her action. It is well established in this State, that in order for one to be liable in a negligence action the test is not whether they were able to foresee the particular type of injury suffered, but whether they could foresee an injury would result from their actions. M & M Pipe & Pressure Vessel Fabricators, Inc. v. Roberts, 531 So.2d 615, 618 (Miss.1988). One could foresee an injury might arise from the unnecessary and unreasonable disclosure of confidential medical records. Therefore, the uniqueness of the injuries claimed by Robley will not defeat her claim. ¶ 22. While Blue Cross had the right to disseminate Robley's medical records under certain conditions, the means of doing so must be both necessary and reasonable. In this case it is not clear, as a matter of law, that Blue Cross acted appropriately in disclosing Robley's medical records. We conclude that reasonable jurors could disagree. Blue Cross's disclosure must remain tailored to the related medical purpose. As a result, we hold that the trial judge erred in granting Blue Cross's Rule 50(a) motion.