Opinion ID: 1119447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: First-degree kidnaping.

Text: Doyle contends that the evidence adduced at trial does not support his conviction for first-degree kidnaping, arguing that sufficient evidence corroborating his admissions relative to the offense was lacking. The corpus delicti of a crime must be proven independently of the defendant's extrajudicial admissions. Hooker v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 89, 506 P.2d 1262 (1973). Thus, before the jury could find that Doyle kidnapped Ebony Mason, a case of willful detention for the purpose of committing sexual assault or murder must have appeared from evidence other than Doyle's conversations with others. In People v. Alcala, 36 Cal.3d 604, 205 Cal.Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126 (1984), cited by the State, the court described the nature and degree of independent proof required to corroborate a defendant's admissions: The independent proof may be circumstantial evidence ..., and it need not be beyond a reasonable doubt. A slight or prima facie showing, permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed, is sufficient. If the independent proof meets this threshold requirement, the accused's admissions may then be considered to strengthen the case on all issues. Id. 205 Cal.Rptr. at 785, 685 P.2d at 1136 (citations omitted). The court further stated: There need not be independent support for each fact testified to by the suspect witness; corroboration is sufficient for this purpose if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense [charged] in such a way as reasonably may satisfy a jury that the [witness] is telling the truth. (E.g., People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 82, 45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423, quoting People v. Lyons (1958) 50 Cal.2d 245, 257, 324 P.2d 556 (overruled on other grounds, People v. Green, [], 27 Cal.3d 1, 32-34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468).) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, although such evidence `is slight and entitled, when standing by itself, to but little consideration.'  ( Holford, [], quoting People v. McLean, (1890) 84 Cal. 480, 482, 24 P. 32). Id. 205 Cal.Rptr. at 785 n. 10, 685 P.2d at 1136 n. 10 (citations omitted). We conclude that sufficient circumstantial evidence of the offense of first-degree kidnaping exists to satisfy the corpus delicti doctrine. The offense of first-degree kidnaping is defined in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who willfully seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, decoys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any person by any means whatsoever with the intent to hold or detain, or who holds or detains, the person for ransom, or reward, or for the purpose of committing sexual assault, extortion or robbery upon or from the person, or for the purpose of killing the person or inflicting substantial bodily harm upon him, or to exact from relatives, friends, or any other person any money or valuable thing for the return or disposition of the kidnaped person, ... is guilty of kidnaping in the first degree. NRS 200.310(1). In addition, this court requires proof of asportation when the kidnaping is incidental to another offense where restraint of the victim is inherent with the primary offense. Hutchins v. State, 110 Nev. 103, 108, 867 P.2d 1136, 1139-40 (1994); Clem v. State, 104 Nev. 351, 354, 760 P.2d 103, 105 (1988), overruled on other grounds, Zgombic v. State, 106 Nev. 571, 798 P.2d 548 (1990). Asportation is not required, however, where the victim is physically restrained. Clem, 104 Nev. at 354, 760 P.2d at 105. Also, the kidnaping is not incidental to the underlying offense if the restraint increased the risk of harm to the victim or had an independent purpose and significance. Id. In the present case, Anderson testified at trial that he witnessed the victim voluntarily leave with Doyle and the others upon an offer to give her a ride home. Evidence of a struggle and the victim's savagely beaten body were eventually discovered at a secluded desert location nowhere near the victim's home. We believe that the evidence presented made it highly unlikely that Mason accompanied Doyle willingly to the death scene, and that, based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have surmised that Doyle was telling the truth when he admitted to participation in the kidnaping. Moreover, the confinement and movement of the victim to a secluded, untravelled desert area was not merely incidental to the sexual assault and murder; it had the independent purpose and significance of substantially lessening the risk of detection. Accordingly, we conclude that sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to establish the corpus delicti of first-degree kidnaping and, based on Doyle's admissions, Doyle's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.