Opinion ID: 1771774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 39

Heading: Canebrake Incident

Text: ś 88. Puckett alleges that the trial court erred in allowing into evidence testimony concerning a prior bad act, specifically the Canebrake incident. Before trial, the prosecution brought a motion in limine to determine the admissibility of evidence concerning why Puckett was fired by David Griffis. [10] A hearing was held on the motion prior to trial. Defense counsel conceded evidence that Puckett was fired by Griffis would probably be admissible, but the reason why he was fired would not. ś 89. During Griffis' testimony, the prosecution only asked how Puckett left Griffis' employment. Upon Griffis' response that Puckett was fired from his employment, the prosecution did not inquire as to any details regarding the reason Puckett was fired. ś 90. During Griffis' cross-examination, defense counsel introduced a letter of recommendation for Eagle Scout, [11] which Griffis' had written for Puckett prior to his termination. Thereafter, the following colloquy ensued: Q. (MR. ADELMAN) At Canebrake, was Matt an employee of yours or an employee of Canebrake's? A. (DAVID GRIFFIS) Canebrake's. Q. Did you terminate him or did Canebrake terminate him? A. I did. Q. But he was an employee of Canebrake's? A. Yes. Q. When you terminated Matt, you told him that he was terminated. Was there any type of hostile reaction or anything like that? A. No. Q. Did you in fact offer to recommend him for other employment? A. No. I didn't. Q. You just told him he was terminated and that appeared to be the end of the matter? A. I told him why he was terminated. Q. As you indicated, there was no hostile reaction or anything like that? A. No. Before re-direct, the prosecution asked for a hearing outside the jury's presence and argued that during Griffis' cross-examination, Puckett had opened the door for the jury to know why he was terminated by Griffis. The prosecution then made a proffer of Griffis' proposed testimony, and the trial court allowed it into evidence. ś 91. Puckett maintains that this testimony does not meet the requirements of Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) which specifically provides as follows: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Specifically, Puckett argues that this prior incident has no probative value regarding `opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identify [sic] or absence of mistake or accident.' Puckett further maintains if the State is alleging `motive' as a basis for this exception, the substantial distance in time between the two events defeats this argument. Puckett cites no authority for his contention that the distance in time between the two events defeats it being used as proof of motive and this Court does not find that a three (3) month time span is so substantial as to defeat the argument that Puckett's motive for murdering David's wife was to get back at David for firing him from his employment. ś 92. Additionally, this Court finds the testimony was properly allowed into evidence under Miss. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). As this Court previously stated, The defendant in a criminal case may offer his good character to evidence the improbability of his doing the act charged. Miss. R. Evid. 404(a)(1); IA Wigmore, Evidence § 56 (Tillers rev. 1983). [The defendant] offered this evidence when he stated that he would not hurt anyone in order to obtain money. The prosecution may then offer evidence of a pertinent trait to rebut the same. Miss. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). The prosecution may not offer evidence of the accused's character unless and until the accused has raised the issue by offering evidence of his good character. If and when the accused has raised the issue of his character, the prosecution may then offer evidence of the accused's bad character. ... A defendant's character is put in issue when he states that he has a good character or a good record, or when he otherwise offers evidence of good character. (emphasis added) 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 169 (1985). Rowe v. State, 562 So.2d 121, 123 (Miss. 1990) (footnote omitted). Consequently, in the case at bar, once Puckett offered evidence of his good character in the form of the glowing recommendation letter from Griffis and the fact that he did not act hostile upon his termination, this opened the door for the prosecution to offer evidence in rebuttal proving otherwise. Accordingly, this testimony was properly admitted under Rule 404(a)(1). ś 93. Puckett further alleges that he is entitled to reversal because of the failure of the Court to follow the requirements set forth by this Court in Bounds v. State, 688 So.2d 1362, 1373 (Miss.1997). In Bounds, this Court cited Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95 (Miss.1995), for the proposition that in the future whenever 404(b) evidence is offered, and there is an objection which is overruled, the objection shall be deemed an invocation of the right to a MRE 403 analysis and a limiting instruction. Bounds, 688 So.2d at 1372 ( citing Smith, 656 So.2d at 100). Puckett's argument would be correct had the testimony been admitted under Rule 404(b). However, since we find the testimony admissible under Rule 404(a), the trial court's failure to issue a limiting instruction sua sponte is harmless error.