Opinion ID: 867480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Medina/Armstrong Letters

Text: ¶ 44 Armstrong contends that Eazer acted in bad faith by introducing letters that Armstrong wrote to Medina while they both awaited trial in the Pima County Jail. In the alternative, Armstrong accuses the State of failing timely to disclose Armstrong's letters to Medina.
¶ 45 In direct examination, Medina testified that Armstrong had written letters to her in jail telling her never to take a plea, never to testify because if she did, the kids would get taken away. Armstrong objected to Medina's testimony about the letters' contents, raising hearsay and best evidence objections. Eazer contended the letters were admissible. The court found that Medina's testimony about the missing letters was admissible over Armstrong's objection. ¶ 46 On cross-examination the first issue defense counsel addressed was the letters Medina and Armstrong wrote to one another while in jail. When defense counsel showed Medina letters she had written to Armstrong while in jail, Eazer objected, claiming that Armstrong had never disclosed the letters. Defense counsel contended he found Medina's letters at the last minute in his materials while preparing for Medina's testimony. Defense counsel also said he believed that the letters had been disclosed by Armstrong's first counsel. [5] ¶ 47 Eazer asked that the court not allow defense counsel to cross-examine Medina on the letters until she had a chance to review them. The court refused and allowed the cross-examination to proceed. The State subsequently moved to preclude Medina's letters, contending that defense counsel had not acted on a good faith belief that the letters had been disclosed. The court declined to preclude any of Medina's letters. Defense counsel had Medina read from four letters in which Medina implicated David Doogan as the killer and said she would never take a plea unless it was to testify against Doogan. [6] The State objected when defense counsel moved to admit the letters, and the trial court held its ruling in abeyance. ¶ 48 Following defense counsel's cross-examination of Medina, Medina told Eazer that she had written letters in response to intimidating letters Armstrong had written to her. Medina said to Eazer, I have his letters, and you will see why I wrote those letters when you see his letters. Medina gave her attorney, Darby, permission to give Armstrong's letters to Eazer, who in turn, disclosed the letters to Armstrong's counsel the following day. ¶ 49 Outside the presence of the jury, Eazer renewed her objection to the admission of Medina's letters. She challenged the credibility of defense counsel's belief that the exhibits had been disclosed and pointed out that defense counsel refused to disclose the entire stack of letters from which he had pulled the objectionable exhibits, despite the fact that he thought they had all been disclosed previously. Further, Eazer put defense counsel on notice that she would explain the contents of Medina's letters by introducing the newly discovered and recently disclosed letters that Armstrong had written to Medina. Eazer claimed that defense counsel opened the door to the late disclosure by using Medina's letters. The court again held in abeyance its ruling on the admissibility of the letters and asked Eazer to identify which of Armstrong's letters she would seek to use. ¶ 50 The trial court held several additional hearings over the next three and one-half weeks regarding the admissibility of Armstrong's letters. During these hearings, defense counsel admitted he knew that Armstrong had written letters to Medina, but he did not question Medina about the contents of Armstrong's letters because Armstrong had told him the letters contained nothing important. Defense counsel stated he did not believe that Armstrong's letters still existed because the State had not disclosed them. As a remedy for the late disclosure of the letters, defense counsel sought to limit the use of Armstrong's letters to rebuttal of those issues raised in Medina's letters. ¶ 51 Eazer claimed there was no disclosure problem and contended she ought to be able to use Armstrong's letters not only for purposes of rehabilitating Medina's testimony, but also as admissible evidence against Armstrong. She requested permission to reopen her direct examination to address the new information raised in cross-examination. Specifically, she sought to admit letters that dealt with the issue of Armstrong's whereabouts the evening of the murder, claiming that those letters indicated Armstrong's attempt to communicate a plan to Medina. ¶ 52 With the exception of some smut talk, the court admitted Medina's letters. At Armstrong's request, the trial court went through Armstrong's letters one by one and initially only admitted those letters that were in rebuttal to Medina's letters, holding in abeyance its ruling on the admissibility of four other letters that might have indicated a plan. After protracted arguments by both parties, the court found the following: [T]here was no disclosure violation by the State pursuant to Rule 15. The Court further finds that pursuant to the Rule 401, these letters [Ex. 67, 74, 81, 96] are relevant. The Court further finds pursuant to 403 that their probative value outweighs any possible substantial prejudice or unfair prejudice to the defendant. The Court believes they're admissible in their entirety, either as rebuttal or as substantive evidence, against the defendant. The Court believes that given the nature of the evidence presented... the defense has created an unfair impression before this jury as to what the letter [s] meant. And the Court believes, therefore, the jury should have the entire picture of the relationship, and Ms. Medina can further explain why she wrote the letters. ¶ 53 Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial, claiming the judge's ruling denied Armstrong due process with regard to the presentation of a defense and would have a chilling effect on his right to testify under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court found no grounds for a mistrial and denied the motion.
¶ 54 Under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1(a)(2) (2003), the prosecutor must disclose [a]ll statements of the defendant within the prosecutor's possession or control. A statement is defined as, among other things, [a] writing signed or otherwise adopted or approved by a person. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 15.4(a)(1)(i) (2003). Armstrong's apparent contention is that Eazer violated a duty to disclose Armstrong's letters to him. Armstrong mischaracterizes the prosecutorial duty. ¶ 55 Generally, [t]he [S]tate cannot be held to disclose material that it does not possess. State v. McDaniel, 136 Ariz. 188, 195, 665 P.2d 70, 77 (1983). Under Rule 15.1, the State is obliged to disclose material information not in its possession or under its control only if (1) the [S]tate has better access to the information; (2) the defense shows that it has made a good faith effort to obtain the information without success; and (3) the information has been specifically requested by the defendant. State v. Rienhardt, 190 Ariz. 579, 585-86, 951 P.2d 454, 460-61 (1997). ¶ 56 In Rienhardt, this court addressed whether letters not in the prosecutor's possession were within her control. Id. at 585, 951 P.2d at 460. Rienhardt was charged, inter alia, with first degree murder. Id. at 582, 951 P.2d at 457. Before trial his girlfriend entered into a plea agreement in return for her testimony against Rienhardt at trial. Id. at 583, 951 P.2d at 458. The prosecutor questioned her about a group of undisclosed letters she and Rienhardt had written to each other while in pretrial custody. Id. at 584, 951 P.2d at 459. The undisclosed letters were in the possession of the girlfriend and her lawyer. Id. at 586, 951 P.2d at 461. ¶ 57 On appeal, Rienhardt claimed that the State violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.1 by failing to obtain copies of all relevant letters and disclose them to the defense. Id. at 585, 951 P.2d at 460. This court found no violation of Rule 15.1 because the girlfriend was an adversary represented by counsel and Rienhardt wrote the letters in question, was aware of their contents, and could have obtained them just as easily as could the State. Id. at 586, 951 P.2d at 461. ¶ 58 In the instant case, the trial court relied on Rienhardt and found the State did not violate Rule 15.1. The record supports this finding. Medina was a codefendant, represented by counsel. Eazer was unaware of the exact nature of the contents of Armstrong's letters until Medina told her at trial. Armstrong wrote the letters and thus knew their contents. Defense counsel was aware of Armstrong's letters and chose not to question Medina about them because Armstrong had told him they were not important. ¶ 59 During one of the hearings, the judge stated that he believed the State, while not in bad faith and not hiding anything, did not pursue a line of inquiry that was obvious, should have been obvious. Even so, Eazer had no duty to discover and disclose letters in the codefendant's possession. The State's failure to recognize the evidentiary value of letters not in its possession does not constitute a disclosure violation. Likewise, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Eazer acted in bad faith in presenting the letters. [7]