Opinion ID: 2975842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suggested Elements

Text: The dissenting opinion in Frantz proposed the following elements for a constitutional tort claim of malicious prosecution: (1) a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment by someone not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity; (2) objectively unreasonable prosecutorial action taken to bring the plaintiff before the court, independent of any initial physical seizure; and (3) termination of the criminal proceeding in favor of the plaintiff. Frantz, 245 F.3d at 879-80 (Gilman, J., dissenting). In light of the more recent Sixth Circuit jurisprudence concerning this issue, I would suggest the following elements: 1. The defendant is a person who does not have absolute prosecutorial immunity for his or her conduct in the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff; 8 To emphasize that this constitutional tort is based on the Fourth Amendment and not on any due process grounds, the court said, “[s]eeking clarity in language, we decline to style Plaintiff's cause of action as an action for ‘malicious prosecution’ under § 1983. Rather, we characterize the cause of action simply as the right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from continued detention without probable cause.” Gregory, 444 F.3d at 750. Nos. 05-1371/1373 Peet, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al. Page 23 2. There was no probable cause for the initiation and maintenance of the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff; 3. The defendant intentionally influenced or participated in the initiation or the maintenance of the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff; 4. A person in defendant’s position would have known that the facts and circumstances were not sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the plaintiff had committed the offense with which the plaintiff was charged; and 5. The criminal prosecution of the plaintiff was subsequently terminated in favor of the plaintiff. B. Application of the Suggested Elements to the Facts of this Case There is no question that Pearson has no absolute prosecutorial immunity for his conduct in the criminal prosecution of the plaintiffs, that he intentionally influenced and participated in the initiation and maintenance of the criminal prosecution of the plaintiffs, and that the criminal prosecution was subsequently terminated in favor of the plaintiffs. The only questions are whether there was probable cause for the initiation and maintenance of the criminal prosecution of the plaintiffs, and whether a person in Pearson’s position would have known that the facts and circumstances were not sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the plaintiffs had committed the offenses with which they were charged. In my opinion, these questions in this particular case must be determined by a jury. The district court found, and I totally agree, that “[t]here may be enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Pearson’s alleged omissions and mischaracterizations regarding Bracey’s and Anderson’s statements.” J.A. at 46. The court nevertheless found, with reference to both questions of probable cause for plaintiffs’ arrests and probable cause to bind plaintiffs over for trial, that “Wilson’s eyewitness report” alone established probable cause. J.A. at 49. For the reasons discussed earlier, I believe that Wilson’s statements made prior to plaintiffs’ arrests, when considered with all of the facts and circumstances known to Pearson at the time of the arrests, were not sufficient, on Pearson’s motion for summary judgment, to establish probable cause for the arrests. In determining whether probable cause existed for the initiation of criminal proceedings against plaintiffs, however, the court may consider not only the evidence that existed at the time of the arrests but also other evidence gathered before criminal charges were actually filed. Therefore, although Wilson’s eyewitness identification of plaintiffs at the police lineups could not be considered in determining whether probable cause existed at the time plaintiffs were arrested, it may be considered in determining whether probable cause existed to file criminal charges against them, because the lineups took place before Pearson prepared his report and charges were filed. Indeed, the issue of probable cause for the prosecution of plaintiffs essentially hinges on Wilson’s personal identification of them because, as Pearson himself noted in his Progress Notes, her statement was out of line with the statements of all other witnesses. Wilson’s eyewitness identification at the police lineups, however, does not conclusively establish probable cause. This court has held: An eyewitness identification will constitute sufficient probable cause “unless . . . there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe that the eyewitness ‘was lying, did not accurately describe what he had seen, or was in some fashion mistaken regarding his recollection of the confrontation.’” This comports with the general notion that, since Nos. 05-1371/1373 Peet, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al. Page 24 eyewitnesses’ statements are based on firsthand observations, they are generally entitled to a presumption of reliability and veracity. Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Wilson v. Russo, the court said: The defendants maintain that a positive identification by a victim is sufficient by itself to establish probable cause that the identified party was the offender. While we agree that a positive identification by a victim witness, without more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable cause, this qualified precept cannot be rendered absolute. Independent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence of the witness's own unreliability that is known by the arresting officers could outweigh the identification such that probable cause would not exist. Each case must therefore be examined on its facts. 212 F.3d at 790 (emphasis added). For all of the reasons discussed earlier, I believe that Pearson had good reason to believe that Wilson, his key witness, was not a credible witness. It is undisputed that, no later than May 2, 2000, long before the preliminary hearing on May 24, 2000, he came to question her credibility. His Progress Notes on May 2, 2000 indicate that her statement was out of line with those of the other witnesses and he planned for Wilson to take a polygraph test. It is not clear from the record, however, whether he ever communicated this doubt to the prosecutor or to the preliminary hearing judge who bound plaintiffs over for trial or, if he did, when this was done. Pearson himself testified that he did not put that extremely exculpatory fact in his investigative report: “If any of us have any doubtfulness, then we’ll let the prosecutor know maybe on a piece of paper that witness may be questionable, but it never goes into the investigative report.” J.A. at 365. There is absolutely no evidence that Pearson ever noted his doubtfulness “on a piece of paper” given to the prosecutor.9 In my view, if Pearson concealed from the prosecutor his doubts about the credibility of his key witness, or did not make such a disclosure at a time and in a manner for this exculpatory information to be properly given to defense counsel and considered by the magistrate judge at the preliminary hearing, Wilson’s eyewitness identification of the plaintiffs at the police lineups should be given little or no consideration in determining whether there was, in fact, probable cause for the initiation and maintenance of the criminal prosecution against plaintiffs. Moreover, as noted in Wilson v. Russo, the substantial evidence of Wilson’s unreliability and the other independent exculpatory evidence known to Pearson could well outweigh the value of Wilson’s eyewitness identification such that probable cause would not exist. 212 F.3d at 790. At the very least, this is a question for a jury and not for the judge on defendants’ motion for summary judgment. With regard to the remaining suggested element, it is clearly, in my view, also a jury question as to whether a police officer in Pearson’s position would have known that the facts and circumstances were not sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that the plaintiffs had committed the offenses with which they were charged. 9 At some point, Pearson apparently turned his Progress Notes over to the prosecutor, but it is not clear when he did so. J.A. at 44, J.A. at 472. Nos. 05-1371/1373 Peet, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al. Page 25 While, in my opinion, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, it was error for the district court to find that Wilson’s “eyewitness report” alone was sufficient to establish probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of plaintiffs, there remains the issue of whether plaintiffs are estopped from asserting their claims for malicious prosecution because of the preliminary hearing finding of probable cause. C. Preliminary Hearing Finding of Probable Cause to Hold Defendants for Trial as Collateral Estoppel on the Issue of Probable Cause for the Prosecution The majority finds that the district court “properly granted summary judgment to the officers as to Spencer’s claim for malicious prosecution,” because “Spencer has the problem of the judicial determination of probable cause following the evidentiary preliminary hearing.” Maj. Op. Section II(C).10 The majority finds that because there is no evidence that Pearson or the county prosecutor supplied the magistrate judge at that hearing with any false information to establish probable cause, plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue. For the following reasons, I do not believe that the preliminary hearing in this case judicially precludes plaintiffs from pursuing their claims that the initiation and maintenance of the criminal proceedings following their arrests were without probable cause. First, under Michigan law of collateral estoppel, one of the four critical requirements is that “the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding.” Darrah, 255 F.3d at 311. Based on the limited evidence in the record, I believe that it has not been shown that plaintiffs had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause at the evidentiary preliminary hearing held on May 24, 2000. As noted earlier, it is not clear whether Pearson ever conveyed his doubts concerning the credibility of his key witness, Feanda Wilson, to the prosecutor or to anyone else prior to that hearing. According to plaintiffs, after Pearson came to question Wilson’s credibility, he did not go to the prosecutor. “He does nothing about that he doesn’t come forth, he doesn’t go to the prosecutor, he doesn’t tell anybody about it.” J.A. at 467. It is also alleged, and not denied, that this exculpatory information was not presented at the preliminary hearing. Appellants’ Brief p. 29. It is also difficult to tell, based on the limited record before us, what exculpatory evidence, if any, was made available and was presented at the preliminary hearing.11 Along with the request for an arrest warrant, Pearson allegedly “turned over all inculpatory and exculpatory statements to the prosecutor and to the defense attorney.” J.A. at 462. However, many witness statements were not taken until after the date the warrant request was prepared. J.A. at 471. The record on appeal does not indicate when these additional statements, some of which were clearly exculpatory, were turned over. At the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, counsel for plaintiffs indicated that some of this evidence, which was within Pearson’s exclusive control, was not made available until the criminal trial. J.A. at 468. Plaintiffs apparently subpoenaed McGlory and Bracey to testify at the preliminary hearing, but these witnesses failed to appear. J.A. at 276. According to plaintiffs – and it does not appear to be denied by Pearson: We didn’t even have the opportunity to put on McGlory or Bracey at the preliminary exam. The judge didn’t allow us. They weren’t 10 It is a problem shared by Peet and Spencer; both made claims of malicious prosecution and both were bound over for trial following the preliminary hearing. 11 The record on appeal includes only 11 pages of a 78-page transcript. J.A. at 276-286. Nos. 05-1371/1373 Peet, et al. v. City of Detroit, et al. Page 26 subpoenaed by the prosecutor. There wasn’t a continuance granted. We didn’t have the opportunity to present Latham at the preliminary exam. We didn’t have an opportunity to present Marion Benton or John Anderson at the preliminary exam. We didn’t have the opportunity to present Ken Smith at the preliminary exam. J.A. at 469. Under these circumstances, I believe that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether plaintiffs had a “full and fair” preliminary hearing. Second, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Sperle v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2002). In accordance with the established precedents of this court, in a § 1983 action the existence of probable cause is a question of fact to be determined by a jury, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. Gregory, 444 F.3d at 743; Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315. Moreover, we must review the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 675 (6th Cir. 2005). Under the circumstances of this particular case, in my opinion, there is, at the very least, a jury question presented as to both the probable cause for plaintiffs’ arrests and probable cause for plaintiffs’ prosecutions, both in alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. D. Qualified Immunity Finally, it is necessary to apply the two-step inquiry discussed above to determine whether Pearson is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims of wrongful prosecution. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, Pearson violated their Fourth Amendment rights by his conduct in influencing and participating in the decision to prosecute them. See Spurlock, 167 F.3d at 1005 (fabricating evidence and manufacturing probable cause, and wrongfully investigating and prosecuting the plaintiffs constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment). Moreover, as the court noted in Spurlock, the right to be free from malicious prosecution is clearly established under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1006 (citing Smith v. Williams, No. 94-6306, 1996 WL 99329, at  (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 1996)). Because Pearson’s conduct was not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, he is not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ claims of wrongful prosecution.