Opinion ID: 1339905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the validity of the orders

Text: A careful study of the pertinent statutes leads us to conclude that Judge Bason did not have the authority to require Wake County to pay for Scott's treatment at the Brown Schools in Austin, Texas. Judge Bason's order of 16 September 1980 states that he was sending Scott to the Brown Schools for residential treatment pursuant to G.S. 7A-649(6). G.S. 7A-649 lists ten dispositional alternatives that a district court judge has available to him in dealing with delinquent juveniles. G.S. 7A-649(6) provides that a judge may [o]rder the juvenile to a community-based program of academic or vocational education or to a professional residential or non-residential treatment program. Participation in the programs shall not exceed 12 months. Obviously Judge Bason concluded that the Brown Schools provide a professional residential ... treatment program. G.S. 7A-647 provides district court judges with certain dispositional alternatives in dealing with delinquent, undisciplined, abused, neglected, or dependent juveniles. G.S. 7A-647(3) provides as follows: In any case, the judge may order that the juvenile be examined by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist or other qualified expert as may be needed for the judge to determine the needs of the juvenile. If the judge finds the juvenile to be in need of medical, surgical, psychiatric, psychological or other treatment, he shall allow the parent or other responsible persons to arrange for care. If the parent declines or is unable to make necessary arrangements, the judge may order the needed treatment, surgery or care, and the judge may order the parent to pay the cost of such care pursuant to G.S. 7A-650. If the judge finds the parent is unable to pay the cost of care, the judge may charge the cost to the county .... (Emphasis added.) Since our present Juvenile Code, G.S. 7A, Articles 41-54, was enacted by the 1979 General Assembly and became effective on 1 January 1980 (1979 N.C. Sess. Laws c. 815) the courts have had little opportunity to construe its provisions. It is fundamental that legislative intent controls the interpretation of statutes. Housing Authority of the City of Greensboro v. Farabee, 284 N.C. 242, 200 S.E.2d 12 (1973); Person v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163, 184 S.E.2d 873 (1971). In seeking to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, an act must be considered as a whole. State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 187 S.E.2d 706 (1972). Statutes which deal with the same subject matter must be construed in pari materia, e. g., Shaw v. Baxley, 270 N.C. 740, 155 S.E.2d 256 (1967), and harmonized, if possible, to give effect to each. E. g., Jackson v. Guilford County Board of Adjustment, 275 N.C. 155, 166 S.E.2d 78 (1969). The first section of our Juvenile Code, G.S. 7A-516, provides: This Article shall be interpreted and construed so as to implement the following purposes and policies: (1) To divert juvenile offenders from the juvenile system through the intake services authorized herein so that juveniles may remain in their own homes and may be treated through community-based services when this approach is consistent with the protection of the public safety; (2) To provide procedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity and that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles and parents; and (3) To develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the child, the strengths and weaknesses of the family, and the protection of the public safety. (Emphasis added.) While it is manifest that the express words of the statute which is set out above speak in terms of this article, it would be inappropriate for us to be oblivious to the public policy objectives which prompted the adoption of the new Juvenile Code by the 1979 General Assembly and which the legislature attempted to articulate in the introductory provisions of the legislation. Prior to the adoption of the Juvenile Code, judges of the district courts who were sitting in juvenile matters had little flexibility in making suitable provision for youthful offenders. Other than committing a juvenile to a county or regional detention home when such was needed for the protection of the community or in the best interest of the child, see G.S. § 110-24 (1978), the judges of the state were empowered only to place juveniles on probation, the conditions and duration of which were to be set out in the appropriate order entered in the cause. See G.S. § 110-22 (1978). In seeking to introduce greater flexibility in the juvenile justice system of the state, the General Assembly, we think, was echoing the sentiments of the Penal System Study Commission of the North Carolina Bar Association. In its report, As the Twig Is Bent, the Commission observed Certainly there are young people within our society for whom confinement and rigid discipline may be necessary for both their protection and society's protection. The State must provide a system of dealing with youngsters who become delinquent for whatever reason. It must afford young people maximum opportunities to overcome their problems and to become adults well equipped to take their places in society. Our present system does not achieve this goal.       We must establish a continuity of care that begins when the child is arrested and continues through and beyond his incarceration until all reasonable steps have been taken to assure his rehabilitation. North Carolina Bar Association Penal System Study Commission, As the Twig Is Bent 23 (1972); compare National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 611-12 (1976). While the term community-based program is a term of art, see G.S. § 7A-517(8) (Cum.Supp.1979), we feel that its usage by the General Assembly reflects its concern that responses to the problems of the juveniles coming before the courts be fashioned in a flexible manner so as to address the best interests of the child in ways other than probation and commitment to training schools. The same subsidiary concept at work in the introductory provisions of the Juvenile Code permeates all of its subsequent provisions: The relationship of family and friends is an important component in the rehabilitative program for a youthful offender, and institutionalization of a child ought not to be ordered except in an extraordinary situation. Otherwise, the stabilizing and motivational attributes of familiar surroundings is lost to the process. Indeed, the General Assembly has provided in concrete terms an expression of its concern in this regard by stating in G.S. § 7A-646 that The purpose of dispositions in juvenile actions is to design an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State in exercising jurisdiction. If possible, the initial approach should involve working with the juvenile and his family in their own home so that the appropriate community resources may be involved in care, supervision, and treatment according to the needs of the juvenile. Thus, the judge should arrange for appropriate community-level services to be provided to the juvenile and his family in order to strengthen the home situation. In choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions for a delinquent juvenile, the judge shall select the least restrictive disposition both in terms of kind and duration, that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case and the age and prior record of the juvenile. A juvenile should not be committed to training school or to any other institution if he can be helped through community-level resources. (Emphasis added.) As we observed earlier, G.S. § 7A-649 provides ten specific alternatives from which the court is empowered to select what it feels to be the most appropriate disposition for a delinquent child. The wide variety and scope of the alternatives which are embodied in the statute's formulation of dispositional alternatives leads us to conclude that it was the legislature's intention that the district courts exercise sound discretion in fashioning an appropriate response to each particular instance of delinquency. The tenth alternative which is provided by the statute is clearly the most severe: commitment of the juvenile to the Division of Youth Services in accordance with the provisions of G.S. § 7A-652. This alternative is the most severe in that it makes no change in the former practice of committing juveniles to state training schools when it was concluded that conditional probation was inappropriate on the facts of the case. Clearly, that alternative ought to be employed only when there is no reasonable alternative open to the court in its disposition of the matter. A close examination of the other nine alternatives provided by G.S. § 7A-649 indicates that all of them are subsumed within the concept of community-level services. It will be recalled that we earlier observed that community-based program is a term of art defined in the statute itself as being a residential or non-residential treatment program which serves a juvenile in the community in which he lives. Only G.S. § 7A-649(6) is in any way defined in terms of this term of art. Even then, its scope is limited to a program of academic or vocational education. Every other alternative provided by the statute, including the provision of G.S. § 7A-649(6) which authorizes commitment of a child to a professional residential or non-residential treatment program, can be employed in such a manner upon an appropriate court order that the concern of the Juvenile Code that the needs of an individual child be addressed in terms of programs which provide meaningful, community-level efforts which would serve to keep the child in familiar surroundings. It is apparent that such programs would be aided by the fact that a child's rehabilitation in such a program would be aided to a considerable degree by keeping the child among his family and friends, or at the very least, having them within reasonably close proximity to the location where the care is being provided to the child in question. G.S. § 7A-646 sets forth in clear terms the mandate of the General Assembly in providing for various dispositional alternatives for delinquent juveniles. The statute provides that ... the initial approach should involve working with the juvenile and his family in their own home so that the appropriate community resources may be involved in the care, supervision and treatment according to the needs of the juvenile. Thus, the judge should arrange for appropriate community-level resources to be provided to the juvenile and his family in order to strengthen the home situation.       A juvenile should not be committed to training school or any other institution if he can be helped through community-level resources. While it is true that one of the clear objectives of the juvenile justice system is to fashion a response to the problems of a child within its purview which addresses the particular needs of the child and is in the child's best interests as determined by the court, see In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 260 S.E.2d 591 (1979); compare State v. Burnett, 179 N.C. 735, 102 S.E. 711 (1920), that determination cannot be made in a vacuum. Indeed, in making its decision concerning the disposition of a juvenile, a court exercising its juvenile jurisdiction must also weigh the best interests of the state. See In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), aff'd. sub. nom., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). What is or is not in the best interest of the child must be determined in tandem with the perception of the legislature as to what is in the best interest of the state as enunciated by the terms of the Juvenile Code and by its general theme as deduced from the impetus behind its enactment. While G.S. § 7A-649 provides numerous alternatives to be employed in fashioning a suitable disposition for a juvenile delinquent, some of its provisions are not self-executing. It is conceivable that an appropriate disposition of a juvenile's case would require that resources other than those provided by governmental units be employed by the court. No doubt exists in our minds that the General Assembly envisioned such a situation emerging. This conclusion is made clear upon examination of the provisions of G.S. § 7A-647. In that statute, the legislature directed that In any case, the judge may order that the juvenile be examined by a physician, psychiatrist, psychologist or other qualified expert as may be needed for the judge to determine the needs of the juvenile. If the judge finds the juvenile to be in need of medical, surgical, psychiatric, psychological, or other treatment, he shall allow the parent or other responsible persons to arrange for care. If the parent declines or is unable to make necessary arrangements, the judge may order the the needed treatment, surgery, or care, and the judge may order the parent to pay the cost of such care .... If the judge finds that the parent is unable to pay the cost of care, the judge may charge the cost to the county. It would seem, therefore, that the dispositional alternatives enumerated by G.S. § 7A-649 are to be read in tandem with this provision. If it were not for this grant of authority, it is possible that the alternatives provided to the courts would, in some instances, be empty and unworkable. However, in invoking the authority to charge the cost of care to the county, the courts must be sensitive not only to the proper placement of the child. The courts must also consider what is in the best interest of the state in the utilization of its resources and those of its inferior components. Throughout the Juvenile Code, there is a consistent emphasis upon treating a child at the community level. We do not understand this emphasis to be taken in a literal fashion. To do so would be to foster an absurd result. It is manifest that not all areas in our state are privy to the same wealth and the resources which that wealth would make available within the confines of the geographic community. While we hasten to add that the best interests of the child will often be served by keeping the individual in his own home, subject to guidance and outpatient services of one kind or another, it need not necessarily be so. Our decision today ought not to be taken to mean that judges may not remove a child from his neighborhood and hometown or county. That would not be a reasonable interpretation of the statute and the legislative intent. Instead, we feel that the term community ought to be interpreted in a broad manner, connoting an interrelationship among persons who live in the same general area, but who also share the same laws, rights, and interests. See Sacred Heart Academy of Galveston v. Karsch, 173 Tenn. 618, 122 S.W.2d 416 (1938). In this regard, we find Judge Bason's order to be fatally defective. By making the detailed provisions of the Juvenile Code, with their repeated emphasis upon community-level services, we find it inconceivable that the General Assembly intended to vest the court with the authority to order a child committed to an out-of-state facility and charge the cost of the care so provided to the county. We commend Judge Bason for his longstanding concern for the welfare of juveniles who come before him. The record in the present case reveals the patience that His Honor exercised in dealing with Scott over a period of many months and his tireless efforts to secure effective help for a delinquent and disturbed youth. Such patience and expenditure of effort is a salutary example to the judiciary of this state. However, we are unable to conclude that the General Assembly intended to vest him with the authority which he sought to exercise in this case. Hopefully, this case and others like it, will prompt our state to develop an effective means of dealing with children of Scott's nature and disposition. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the District Court is Reversed.