Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: examination of investigators under oath

Text: Prior to trial, Burns moved to examine law enforcement officials under oath to determine whether such officials had disclosed all exculpatory evidence to the Commonwealth's Attorney. The circuit court denied the motion but directed the Commonwealth's Attorney to explain the meaning of exculpatory evidence to the police officers and ask whether all exculpatory evidence had been given to the Commonwealth's Attorney. Burns now claims that the problem of police-concealed exculpatory evidence is pervasive... throughout the country and that the court's failure to grant Burns' motion impinged on [Burns'] constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. He also asserts the court's ruling violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and due process of law. This argument is without merit. First, to the extent that Burns raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, such a claim is not cognizable on direct appeal. Johnson, 259 Va. at 675, 529 S.E.2d at 781. Second, Burns has offered no authority for the proposition that he should have been allowed to examine the police investigators under oath merely to determine whether they had turned over all exculpatory evidence to the Commonwealth's Attorney. In Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that it is the individual prosecutor [who] has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Finally, Burns admitted that the Commonwealth's Attorney had disclosed all exculpatory evidence in his possession, and the circuit court directed the prosecutor to ensure that the investigators had provided all such evidence.