Opinion ID: 77923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: al-amin's access-to-courts claim

Text: Defendants argue that even if opening attorney mail outside an inmate's presence violates the Constitution, Al-Amin has not shown a constitutional violation because he never listed Karima as one of his attorneys and there was no evidence that Karima was Al-Amin's attorney. The problem for defendants is that in qualified immunity cases on interlocutory appeal, we accept the plaintiff's version of the facts and resolve only legal questions. See Andujar v. Rodriguez, 486 F.3d 1199, 1202 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 385, 169 L.Ed.2d 271 (2007); Robinson v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1257 (11th Cir.2005); Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1346 n. 7. Al-Amin testified that Karima was his attorney. All thirteen envelopes in issue were sent after Head's November 15, 2003 response sustaining Al-Amin's grievance about GSP improperly opening his attorney mail from Karima. Although Karima was not on the May 2002 list, defendants knew, at least by November 25, 2003, that Karima was Al-Amin's attorney and that her properly marked attorney mail should be opened only in Al-Amin's presence. After receiving Head's response, defendants even gave instructions that Karima's legal mail should be opened only in Al-Amin's presence. The thirteen envelopes were all marked legal mail with Karima's full name and law office address on them, but were opened before reaching Al-Amin. [16] Accordingly, we reject defendants' argument that Al-Amin has not shown constitutional violations on this basis.
Defendants alternatively argue that the law was not clearly established that opening attorney mail outside an inmate's presence violates his constitutional right to access to the courts. The Supreme Court has long held that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). [17] Further, under our binding precedent, a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the courts requires that incoming legal mail from his attorneys, properly marked as such, may be opened only in the inmate's presence and only to inspect for contraband. See Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir.1976); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.1978). [18] Defendants argue that Taylor and Guajardo are no longer good law due to the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Defendants point out that the Fifth Circuit, post- Turner, rejected the holdings of Taylor and Guajardo and argue that we should do the same. See Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816 (5th Cir.1993). Al-Amin responds that post- Turner, several other circuits have concluded that inmates have constitutionally protected rights to have properly marked attorney mail opened only in their presence. We review these cases in detail in order to explain why Taylor and Guajardo 's holdingsthat a prisoner has constitutional rights to have his attorney mail opened only in his presenceare not changed by Turner, and remain well-established law in this circuit. We begin with Taylor and Guajardo.
In Taylor, prison officials challenged a restriction, imposed by a district court order, forbidding them from opening an inmate's attorney mail except in that inmate's presence. Taylor, 532 F.2d at 464. The Taylor Court concluded that an inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts supports that portion of the district court's order requiring that incoming prisoner mail from . . . attorneys . . . be opened only in the presence of the inmate. Id. at 475. [19] In reaching this result, the Taylor Court weighed the burden on the prisoner's access to the courts against the legitimate governmental interest of prison security. Id. at 472. The Court noted that [b]efore procedures that impede a prisoner's access to the courts may be constitutionally validated, it must be clear that the state's substantial interests cannot be protected by less restrictive means. Id. The government interest was jail security as affected by the introduction of contraband into the jail and by the communication of escape plans or other . . . criminal activities. Id. at 473. The Court identified the basic prisoner interest in uninhibited communication with attorneys. Id. at 475. The Taylor Court concluded that [a]llowing the inspection of incoming inmate mail from [attorneys] only in the presence of the inmate accomplishes a compromise of [those] two important interests without sacrificing either of them. Id. at 477. [20] Prisoners are not inhibited in using this traditional communication medium to pursue their defense or to present their legal grievance. And jail officials are not denied the use of any mail procedure shown to be essential to jail security. Id. In other words, the inmate's presence insures that attorney mail will not be read and prison officials are assured that the mail contains no contraband. [21] Similarly, in Guajardo, prison officials appealed a district court's ruling that incoming attorney mail could be opened and inspected for contraband only in the inmate's presence. Guajardo, 580 F.2d at 757. The Guajardo Court followed Taylor 's holding that incoming [legal] mail could be opened only to inspect for contraband and in the presence of the inmate recipient. Id. at 758. The Court noted that Taylor 's requirement derived from the nature of the correspondence involved and that [t]he protection afforded extends only to attorneys representing or being asked to represent an inmate in either a criminal or civil matter. Id. at 758. The Court dismissed concerns about inmates using attorneys to violate prison rules because attorneys are bound by professional standards and would face criminal sanctions. Id. at 758-59. The Court concluded that [t]he danger to prison security, order and rehabilitation does not outweigh the right of access to the courts. Id. at 759.
We would end our clearly established law analysis with Taylor and Guajardo but for the intervening Supreme Court decision in Turner, which adopted a more deferential, reasonably related test for determining whether prison practices impermissibly burden inmates' constitutional rights. Although the prison regulations at issue in Turner involved inmate-to-inmate correspondence and inmate marriages, Turner is important because it held that when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261; see Van Poyck v. Singletary, 106 F.3d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1997) (stating Turner allows prison rules to burden inmates' constitutional rights when reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest). [22] The Turner Court identified four factors in determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation: (1) a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards, inmates, and the allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives to the regulation. Id. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Post- Turner, this Court has accorded wide-ranging and substantial deference to prisoner administrators in their execution of policies and practices that they consider necessary to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. See Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir.1999); Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 509-10 (11th Cir.1996). Such deference is justified because of the complexity of prison management, the fact that responsibility therefor is necessarily vested in prison officials, and the fact that courts are ill-equipped to deal with such problems. Lawson, 85 F.3d at 510. Before we apply Turner 's factors to the mail-opening issue here, we review the post- Turner split in other circuits about this issue.
Subsequent to Turner, the Fifth Circuit reconsidered Taylor and Guajardo and rejected their holdings under Turner 's reasonably related test. See Brewer, 3 F.3d at 825. The plaintiff-inmates in Brewer complained that their legal mail was opened outside their presence, despite a prison policy requiring otherwise. [23] Brewer involved broad legal mail which the Fifth Circuit described as legal mail from various courts, attorneys, and government officials. Id. at 818. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged prisoners' constitutionally protected right of access to the courts but concluded that what we once recognized in [ Taylor ] as being `compelled' by prisoners' constitutional rightsi.e., that a prisoner's incoming legal mail be opened and inspected only in the prisoner's presenceis no longer the case in light of Turner and Thornburgh.  [24] Id. at 820, 825 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit stated that Taylor 's requirements of the least restrictive means and a substantial or important government interest appear[ed] to have been modified by Turner 's instruction that when a prison practice impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, whatever those rights might be, such a practice is valid if it is `reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.' Id. at 823-25. The Fifth Circuit noted that the prisoners did not allege that their mail has been censored and they concede that such mail was opened and inspected for the `legitimate penological objective' of prison security, i.e., to detect contraband. Id. at 825. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the violation of the prison regulation requiring that a prisoner be present when his incoming legal mail is opened and inspected is not a violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights. Id. at 825. In contrast, several other circuits post- Turner have concluded that opening properly marked attorney mail outside a prisoner's presence infringes the constitutional right to access to the courts. See Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 877-78 (6th Cir. 2003) (concluding that no penological interest or security concern justifies opening attorney mail outside prisoner's presence when prisoner requested otherwise); Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1458 (3d Cir.1995) (disagreeing with Fifth Circuit's Brewer, and concluding the pattern and practice of opening inmate's properly marked incoming court mail [25] outside his presence fails the Turner reasonableness standard and violates inmate's rights to free speech and access to courts) ( abrogated in part on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996)); [26] see also Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 686 (7th Cir.2005) (stating, when a prison receives a letter for an inmate that is marked with an attorney's name and a warning that the letter is legal mail, officials potentially violate the inmate's rights if they open the letter outside of the inmate's presence); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351-52 (2d Cir.2003) (noting, [i]nterference with legal mail implicates a prison inmate's rights to access to the courts but concluding two incidents of mail interference are insufficient to state a claim for denial of access to the courts because [the inmate] has not alleged that the interference with his mail either constituted an ongoing practice of unjustified censorship or caused him to miss court deadlines or in any way prejudiced his legal actions); Powells v. Minnehaha County Sheriff Dep't, 198 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir.1999) (concluding inmate stated constitutional claim based on officers opening legal mail when he was not present). [27] The Third Circuit in Bieregu noted that although reading legal mail would infringe the right of access more than simply opening and inspecting it, the only way to ensure that mail is not read when opened, and thus to vindicate the right to access, is to require that it be done in the presence of the inmate to whom it is addressed. 59 F.3d at 1456 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2984-85, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Although Bieregu involved court mail, the Third Circuit emphasized that interference with attorney mail probably infringes the right of court access even more than interference with court mail. . . . Of all communications, attorney mail is the most sacrosanct. Id. The Third Circuit pointed out that providing inmates with confidential reliable means of communication with their attorneys about grievances releases tension in the prisons and itself advances the state interest in maintaining institutional order and security. Id. at 1457. The benefits of such a safety valve advances, rather than frustrates, state interests. The Third Circuit also concluded that opening legal mail in an inmate's presence places no burden at all on guards, prisoners, and the allocation of prison resources: it is what the [prison] regulations have required since 1985. Id. at 1458. When opening mail in the prisoner's presence, the prison can check for contraband then, which satisfies the state's security interest. The Third Circuit, however, was careful to distinguish between a single, inadvertent opening of properly marked legal mail outside an inmate's presence and a pattern or practice of such actions. Id. The former may not infringe a prisoner's right to free speech, nor his right to court access absent a showing of actual injury. Id. [28] The Sixth Circuit also recently concluded that no penological interest or security concern justifies opening attorney mail outside a prisoner's presence when the prisoner specifically requested otherwise, and that the practice violates the prisoner's First Amendment rights. [29] See Sallier, 343 F.3d at 877-78. [30] Although not explicitly citing Turner itself, the Sixth Circuit articulated Turner 's reasonably related standard and cited to Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir.1994), which did use the Turner factors. Sallier, 343 F.3d at 873, 877; see Muhammad, 35 F.3d at 1084-86 (analyzing procedure of opening inmate's incoming mail from state attorney general outside of his presence and concluding, [a]ll four of the Turner factors indicate that the policy does not pass muster under the First Amendment right).
Applying Turner 's factors to this case, we conclude that our well-established law in Taylor and Guajardo  that inmates have a constitutionally protected right to have their properly marked attorney mail opened in their presenceis not changed by Turner and remains valid, well-established law. As to the first Turner factor, a valid, rational connection between the prison practice and a legitimate governmental interest, we fully recognize that the government has a strong interest in prison security. However, defendants do not dispute that attorneys are unlikely to send contraband, nor have they articulated a legitimate security interest in opening properly marked attorney mail outside Al-Amin's presence. Indeed, defendants can readily check for contraband if attorney mail is opened in the inmate's presence, and the DOC's own policy provides for opening attorney mail in the inmate's presence. Assuring the inmate of the confidentiality of inmate-attorney mail by opening such mail only in the inmate's presence actually advances the state's interest in promoting institutional order and security. See Bieregu, 59 F.3d at 1457. The first Turner factor thus favors Al-Amin. As to the second Turner factor, Al-Amin has no other means of exercising his access-to-courts right where that access depends on confidentially communicating with his attorneys. Even if prison officials vow to open but not read attorney mail, courts have noted the inmates' lack of trust in that vow and fear that their attorney mail will be read. Opening attorney mail only in the inmate's presence ensures that the inmate's correspondence with his attorney is not inhibited or chilled by his fear that this correspondence may be read by prison officials. See, e.g., Taylor, 532 F.2d at 476 (citing Robbins, 454 F.2d at 697). As to the third factor, there is no showing that opening attorney mail in an inmate's presence burdens guards, prisoners, or the allocation of prison resources; as noted above, DOC policy already requires opening attorney mail in an inmate's presence. While opening all prison mail in an inmate's presence would pose an impermissible burden, we conclude properly marked attorney mail does not. As to the fourth factor, opening an inmate's attorney mail in his presence itself is the easy alternative; it fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 91, 107 S.Ct. at 2262. Thus, all four Turner factors weigh in Al-Amin's favor and Turner does not undermine Taylor 's or Guajardo 's holding. Both parties cite our post- Turner decision in Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.1991), but Lemon was a reading-attorney-mail case. [31] In contrast, Al-Amin claims a constitutional right to receive attorney mail unopened or to have attorney mail opened only in his presence, apart from his constitutional right to receive unread attorney mail. Thus, Taylor and Guajardo, binding precedent from our predecessor court, speak more directly to the mail-opening issue. Nonetheless, Lemon 's reasoning does support our conclusion that the Turner factors favor Al-Amin. Although not discussing Turner, the Lemon Court stressed that `[t]he basic prisoner interest is an uninhibited communication with attorneys' and that `[p]risoners have a vital need to communicate effectively with [their attorneys].' Id. at 1467 (quoting Taylor, 532 F.2d at 475) (third alteration in original). The Lemon Court shared Taylor 's concern that the essential role of postal communication cannot be ignored because the fact of incarceration sharply restricts an inmate's means of communication with his attorney. Id. The Court noted that opening mail in an inmate's presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail  and thus does not chill attorney-inmate communication. Id. (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 577, 94 S.Ct. at 2985). Given this Court's precedent in Taylor, Guajardo, and Lemon, we conclude that: (1) a reasonable official would have known in 2004-05 that opening properly marked, incoming attorney mail outside the inmate's presence is unlawful and unconstitutional; and (2) Turner did not change our well-established law in that regard. Al-Amin would be home free on his access-to-courts claim but for the Supreme Court's actual injury decision in Casey.
Subsequent to Taylor, Guajardo, and Lemon, the Supreme Court clarified that actual injury is a constitutional prerequisite to an inmate's access-to-courts claim. See Casey, 518 U.S. at 349, 116 S.Ct. at 2179, 135 L.Ed.2d 606; Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir.2006) (citing Casey and stating, in order to assert a claim arising from the denial of meaningful access to the courts, an inmate must first establish an actual injury), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2996, 168 L.Ed.2d 707 (2007); [32] Perrin, 170 F.3d at 1320 n. 13; Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir.1998); Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998). [P]rison officials' actions that allegedly violate an inmate's right of access to the courts must have impeded the inmate's pursuit of a nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil rights action. Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1290; accord Singletary, 143 F.3d at 1445 (identifying the limited types of legal claims protected by the access-to-courts right as nonfrivolous appeals from a conviction, habeas petitions, or civil rights suits). [33] In order to show actual injury, a plaintiff must provide evidence of such deterrence, such as a denial or dismissal of a direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil rights case that results from actions of prison officials. Wilson, 163 F.3d at 1290-91; see also Perrin, 170 F.3d at 1320 n. 13 (stating in an access-to-courts claim, plaintiffs must show `actual injury'-in other words, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that they had a legitimate claim that they were unable to pursue due to the prison's restrictions). Here, Al-Amin has not alleged the requisite actual injury. Al-Amin stated that his wife handled all his cases, including a lawsuit, a habeas corpus petition (not yet filed), and the appeal of his criminal conviction. However, Al-Amin's testimony contains only a conclusory allegation that the mail opening compromised his cases and does not identify how any legal matters specifically were damaged. At most, Karima's affidavit states conclusorily that [t]he violation of opening legal mail from my office over more than a three-year period has caused harm to the client/attorney privilege, confidentiality of legal matters, and in satisfying deadlines. Her affidavit provides no specific cases or claims being pursued, nor any deadlines missed, nor any effect on Al-Amin's legal claims. Because Al-Amin has not shown the requisite actual injury, the district court erred in denying defendants qualified immunity on Al-Amin's access-to-courts claim.