Opinion ID: 1656179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The failure to instruct the jury on causation

Text: ¶ 33. Shumpert's final argument with regard to jury instructions concerns the trial court's failure to explicitly instruct the jury on causation. Shumpert also argues the instructions given should have been more precise in order to make it clear to the jury that if he did not aid and abet, then his blow(s) must have been the cause of death for him to be guilty. He cites Thompson v. State, 220 Miss. 200, 205, 70 So.2d 341, 342 (1954), for the rule that a person cannot be criminally responsible for the death of a person wounded if the death resulted from an independent cause. ¶ 34. The trial court did not err. Both the manslaughter and murder instruction contained language of causation. Further, the aiding and abetting instruction adequately incorporated causation language necessary to inform the jury of the difference between being held liable as a principal versus being held liable as someone who aided and abetted. The jury instructions, when read as a whole, adequately stated the law and informed the jury of its proper role in the case.
¶ 35. A trial judge enjoys a great deal of discretion as to the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Unless the trial judge abuses this discretion so as to prejudice the accused, the Court will not reverse the ruling. Walker v. State, 878 So.2d 913, 915 (Miss.2004) (quoting Jefferson v. State, 818 So.2d 1099, 1104 (Miss. 2002)). ¶ 36. Shumpert sought to introduce evidence to impeach Tommy Morris, a witness for the State, contending Morris reached into the pocket of Collier and stole some money. Shumpert argues this evidence is critical because Morris, who the State portrayed as a model citizen, was the only person who testified that Shumpert repeatedly kicked Collier. Shumpert concedes that the evidence can be used only for evaluation of Morris's perception of the events under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 608, which bars its use to attack his character. Shumpert claims the evidence is admissible to show that Morris was too consumed by his thoughts about taking the money from the pockets of a dying man to think clearly enough to correctly evaluate what transpired. In its motion to suppress, the State argued that Shumpert was attempting to use this evidence to inflame the jury, rather than for impeachment purposes. The State contends that the trial court's ruling not to admit the evidence was not an abuse of discretion and no substantial right of Shumpert's was violated. ¶ 37. The trial judge ruled that under M.R.E. 608 Morris could be questioned about this alleged theft, but his answer could not be attacked with extrinsic evidence. The trial judge properly read M.R.E. 608 to allow for impeachment by specific acts, other than criminal convictions, when the character trait of truthfulness of the witness is under attack. See M.R.E. 608(b). The trial judge correctly held that this can only be done by questioning the witness, excluding the use of extrinsic evidence. See M.R.E. 608(b). Morris was questioned on cross-examination about stealing money, and he denied it. The rules of evidence do not allow further questioning. Shumpert's argument that he sought to introduce this evidence to show that Morris was too concerned with stealing to accurately perceive what happened is not persuasive. This evidence goes directly to the credibility of Morris's testimony. The trial court did not err in its ruling.
¶ 38. Attorneys are allowed wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury, but they are not allowed to employ tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d 659, 661 (Miss.2000). If this Court determines the prosecutor did engage in misconduct during closing argument, the inquiry is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Id., citing Ormond v. State, 599 So.2d 951, 961 (Miss.1992). ¶ 39. Shumpert objected to, and now assigns error to, the following statement made by the prosecution during closing argument: Self-defense? I do not know why Dee Dee and Cornell jumped on Jimmy. Dee Dee and Jimmy have been jumping on a lot of people lately. Shumpert says this statement constituted misconduct because it referred to prior bad acts in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). This rule prohibits prior bad acts as character evidence to show that the defendant acted in conformity with those acts on the present occasion. The State argues this one statement was not enough to command reversal. ¶ 40. The prosecutor's statement was not improper. He was referring to a statement from Middlebrooks that was admitted into evidence as exhibit 3 over a general objection. The prosecutor may comment on any facts introduced into evidence and may draw whatever deductions and inferences that seem proper to him from the facts. Flowers v. State, 842 So.2d 531, 554 (Miss.2003). ¶ 41. However, even if this Court found the statement to be improper, there was no resultant prejudice. The statement constituted one sentence and did not refer to any specific incident, and it was already admitted into evidence in exhibit 3 over a general objection. Thus, we find this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 42. In Byrom, 863 So.2d at 847, this Court said: ... upon appellate review of cases in which we find harmless error or any error which is not specifically found to be reversible in and of itself, we still have the discretion to determine, on a case by case basis, as to whether such error or errors, although not reversible when standing alone, may when considered cumulatively require reversal because of the resulting cumulative effect. ¶ 43. A criminal defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial, only a fair one. Sand v. State, 467 So.2d 907, 911 (Miss. 1985). In this case, we have not found harmless error or any error. This argument without merit.