Opinion ID: 2330749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The majority sensibly rejects BNSF's ejusdem generis argument

Text: ¶ 49 The majority correctly rejects the critical flaw in BNSF's reasoning: a misplaced reliance on the ejusdem generis canon. Under the ejusdem generis rule, a general phrase in a statute that is used in conjunction with specific phrases should be interpreted to incorporate only things similar to the specific phrase. See Simpson Inv. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 141 Wash.2d 139, 151, 3 P.3d 741 (2000). ¶ 50 Fundamentally, the language of subsection.030 simply does not follow the pattern associated with ejusdem generis. That canon properly applies where there is a list of specific terms followed by a general term, i.e., specific, specific, or general. See Sw. Wash. Ch., Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 100 Wash.2d 109, 116, 667 P.2d 1092 (1983). Here, we are interpreting language from former RCW 64.12.030, specifically the words cut down, girdle or otherwise injure, or carry off. [5] This language creates three categories of culpable action: (1) cutting down trees, (2) girdling or otherwise injuring trees, and (3) carrying off trees. Properly read, the general phrase otherwise injure modifies only girdle, not cut down or carry off. Thus, the general phrase does not appear in a specific, specific, or general list as ejusdem generis requires. Rather, the pattern is specific, specific or general, specific. ¶ 51 This is not just splitting hairs. The first phrase, cut down, refers to harvesting the tree, which results in killing the tree but making it available for something useful such as lumber or firewood. The second phrase, girdle or otherwise injure, refers to injuring the tree, not cutting it down. The third phrase, carry off, refers to capturing or transporting the tree. In other words, each represents a separate category of culpable action. Read this way, it is evident from the structure of the sentence that or otherwise injure modifies only the girdle category, not cutting down or carrying off, or even a general category encompassing all three. We are left with a specific way of injuring a treegirdlingfollowed by an expansive general termor otherwise injure. This is simply not the specific, specific, or general pattern to which the ejusdem generis rule applies. ¶ 52 Instead, it appears that the legislature, in using the phrase otherwise injure to modify girdle, intended to allow liability for all kinds of injuries to trees, not simply girdling. This reading is consistent with subsection .040, which allows liability for casual or involuntary trespass that is not necessarily direct in the sense of trespass vi et armis. ¶ 53 This reading ensures that otherwise injure does not render other terms in the statute superfluous as the majority suggests. See majority at 165. Since otherwise injure is associated only with girdle, the terms cut down and carry off retain independent meaning. The fact that girdle is included as an example of a specific type of injury does not make the term superfluous. ¶ 54 This reading of the statute is more consistent with the entire statutory scheme, and under this reading the ejusdem generis canon is not applicable. ¶ 55 But even if one accepts BNSF's flawed reading of the statute, the ejusdem generis rule still does not apply. This court is in agreement with our federal courts that the ejusdem generis rule has no application if there is a clearly manifested legislative intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires. Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 159 Wash.2d 868, 883, 154 P.3d 891 (2007); United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556, 567 (7th Cir.1973). ¶ 56 Here, there is such a clearly manifested legislative intent. It is plain that the legislature intended otherwise injure to encompass more than simply trespass vi et armis, because subsection .040 allows a plaintiff to recover for casual or involuntary trespass. RCW 64.12.040. As discussed above, direct action will almost never be casual or involuntary. [6] Thus, application of ejusdem generis contravenes a clearly manifested legislative intent by restricting the casual or involuntary language out of existence. In this situation, ejusdem generis should not be part of our analysis. Silverstreak, 159 Wash.2d at 883, 154 P.3d 891; Baranski, 484 F.2d at 567. ¶ 57 Even assuming there is no contrary legislative intent, BNSF's reliance on ejusdem generis is still misplaced. It does not make sense to apply the rule where a general phrase is modified by otherwise. The word otherwise means different or in a different way or manner. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1598 (2002). This alone manifests a legislative intent not to limit the general phrase to things comparable to the specific phrases, and other courts have refused to apply ejusdem generis to otherwise phrases for this very reason. City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 912 F.Supp. 1051, 1069 n. 4 (N.D.Ohio 1995), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. City of Toledo v. Beazer E., Inc., noted at 103 F.3d 128, 1996 WL 683505 (6th Cir.); People v. Reilly, 255 A.D. 109, 110, 6 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (1938), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 509, 19 N.E.2d 919 (1939). But see Gibson v. Dep't of Licensing, 54 Wash.App. 188, 192-93, 773 P.2d 110 (1989); Northlake Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Wylie, 34 Wash.App. 810, 813-14, 663 P.2d 1380 (1983). Indeed, under BNSF's reading, otherwise would mean comparable to, not different. We should not accept an interpretation that so drastically alters the meaning of an unambiguous word. Silverstreak, 159 Wash.2d at 884, 154 P.3d 891 (noting that `[o]therwise' means `differently' and that rules of statutory construction should not give it a contrary meaning (quoting Scribner-Bantom English Dictionary 641 (1977))).