Opinion ID: 2510122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recusal of Solicitor's Office/Questioning Solicitor as a Defense Witness

Text: Inman claims the judge abused his discretion by declining to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates [15] and refusing to allow defense counsel to question the Solicitor and members of his staff on the claim of intentional prosecutorial misconduct. [A] criminal defendant has a right to call the prosecuting attorney as a witness, subject to the trial court's usual discretion to exclude witnesses or evidence. State v. Quattlebaum, 338 S.C. 441, 453, 527 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2000) (citing State v. Lee, 203 S.C. 536, 28 S.E.2d 402 (1943)). In Quattlebaum, this Court emphasized that litigants, and especially defendants in criminal cases, should not be hampered in their choice of those by whom they choose to prove their cases. Id. However, a defendant's right to call a prosecuting attorney as a witness is not without limitation as this Court has stated: Although a prosecuting attorney is competent to testify, his testifying is not approved by the Courts except where it is made necessary by the circumstances of the case, and, if he knows before the trial that he will be a necessary witness, he should withdraw and have other counsel prosecute the case. The propriety of allowing the prosecutor to testify is a matter largely within the trial Court's discretion. Lee, 203 S.C. at 540, 28 S.E.2d at 403 (emphasis added). Other jurisdictions have agreed with this Court's limitation on a prosecutor as a defense witness and have further clarified that the testimony must be relevant and material to the theory of the defense ... [and] it must not be privileged, repetitious, or cumulative. Johnson v. State, 23 Md.App. 131, 326 A.2d 38, 45 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1974) (citing State v. Lee, 203 S.C. 536, 28 S.E.2d 402 (1943)), aff'd, 275 Md. 291, 339 A.2d 289 (1975). It is evident that this Court and courts from other jurisdictions disfavor defense counsel calling a prosecuting attorney to testify in a case in which he is participating as an advocate. See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 374 S.E.2d 303, 313 (1988) ([I]t is not desirable for the Commonwealth's Attorney to testify as a witness on a material point in a case. The circumstances are rare indeed where any lawyer may properly testify in a case in which he is participating as an advocate.); see also Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Prosecuting Attorney as A Witness in Criminal Case, 54 A.L.R.3d 100 (1973 & Supp.2011) (analyzing cases where the propriety of a prosecuting attorney's testifying in a criminal case on behalf of the prosecution or on behalf of the defendant was at issue; recognizing that such a decision is dependent upon the facts of the case, is discretionary, and generally does not require the prosecutor to withdraw or be recused from the case when called on behalf of the defendant). However, even if a prosecutor is called as a witness by the defense, it is not always necessary for a trial judge to recuse the prosecutor or the prosecuting office in its entirety. In fact, [t]here is no inherent right to disqualification when a member of the state attorney's office is called as a witness in a case prosecuted by a state attorney in the same office, unless actual prejudice can be shown. 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses § 229 (2004 & Supp.2011); People v. Superior Court of San Luis Obispo, 84 Cal.App.3d 491, 148 Cal.Rptr. 704, 710 (Cal. Ct.App. 5th Dist.1978) (The general rule is that a district attorney's office should not be recused from a case merely because one or more of its attorneys will be called as witnesses for the defense.). Applying the foregoing to the facts of the instant case, we find the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates and declining defense counsel's request to question the Solicitor. Initially, we note that the judge's determination of prosecutorial misconduct did not necessitate the recusal of the entire Solicitor's office as this allegation primarily involved the Solicitor. See State v. Doran, 105 N.M. 300, 731 P.2d 1344 (N.M.Ct.App.1986) (finding no merit to defendant's contention that entire staff of district attorney's office should have been disqualified where prosecutor testified at pretrial suppression hearing that was conducted by another assistant district attorney). Furthermore, defense counsel's primary reason for calling the Solicitor as a witness was to establish that he intentionally committed misconduct. Because a determination of prosecutorial misconduct is not necessarily dependent upon the intent of the prosecutor, such testimony was neither relevant nor material to the defense's claim. See People v. Hill, 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, 683-84 (1998) (discussing concept of prosecutorial misconduct and stating injury to appellant is nonetheless an injury because it was committed inadvertently rather than intentionally; recognizing that the term prosecutorial misconduct is a misnomer to the extent it suggests a prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind); Diggs v. State, 531 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ind.1988) (A prosecutor's warning of criminal charges during a personal interview with a witness improperly denies the defendant the use of that witness's testimony regardless of the prosecutor's good intentions.). We emphasize that a determination of a prosecutor's intent is applicable where the prosecutor intentionally goads the defense into moving for a mistrial [16] or the prosecutor's actions implicate the attorney-client relationship. [17] Neither of these situations is present in the instant case. Finally, any testimony from the Solicitor or members of his staff would have been cumulative as defense counsel submitted significant testimonial and documentary evidence regarding the Solicitor's use of this tactic in prior capital cases. Specifically, defense counsel cited the Laney case and offered evidence in the form of a trial transcript and testimony from the Public Defender that established the Solicitor employed a line of questioning as used against Dr. Loring to a defense expert regarding a potential violation of the South Carolina psychologist licensing statutes. Defense counsel also offered evidence that the Solicitor, in two capital trials that preceded Inman's case, did not challenge Dr. Loring's lack of a South Carolina license to practice social work. Based on this evidence, defense counsel was able to support its theory that the Solicitor knew the line of questioning was objectionable and only employed it in Inman's case after he realized that jurors in the Edens/Holloway case relied heavily on Dr. Loring's testimony in sentencing the defendants to LWOP rather than death. In view of the foregoing, we find the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to recuse the Solicitor's office and refusing to permit defense counsel to call the Solicitor and members of his staff as witnesses. See Lee, 203 S.C. at 542, 28 S.E.2d at 404 (concluding trial judge did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to call solicitor as witness where testimony would have been merely cumulative); see also Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (holding trial court did not err in refusing to allow defendant to call district attorney general and assistant attorney general as witnesses on issue of State's abuse of discretion in pursuing death penalty where defendant did not allege facts to show how his constitutional rights were violated); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 448, 374 S.E.2d 303 (1988) (concluding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to question Commonwealth's attorney on witness stand concerning reasons for which continuance had been granted and concerning possible violations of court order).