Opinion ID: 2335399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Insanity Defense

Text: We also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant's request to present an insanity defense. Prior to trial, on September 20, 2000, appellant's counsel requested that the trial court grant leave to explore [the insanity defense] and to present it to the jury. The government argued that the motion was untimely since appellant had not given notice or satisfied other predicate conditions before attempting to introduce the defense. The trial court ruled that, [f]or the reasons stated by the government, the motion is denied. The procedure for presenting an insanity defense in the District of Columbia is established by statute: Insanity shall not be a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such proceeding, at the time the accused enters his plea of not guilty, or within 15 days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may for good cause permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecuting attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused of an offense shall be acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively established by a preponderance of the evidence. D.C.Code § 24-501(j) (2001) formerly D.C.Code § 24-301(j) (1981). In the District of Columbia, the defendant has the burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.; Patton v. United States, 782 A.2d 305, 311 (D.C.2001). To establish a prima facie case, the defendant must present sufficient evidence to show that `at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of a mental illness or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.' Patton, 782 A.2d at 311-12 (quoting Pegues v. United States, 415 A.2d 1374, 1378 (D.C.1980)). If a defendant fails to establish a prima facie case, the trial court is justified in not presenting the issue to the jury. See Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1377; Cooper v. United States, 368 A.2d 554, 559-60 (D.C. 1977). This court reviews a trial court's decision to deny presentation of testimony in support of an insanity defense for abuse of discretion. See Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1378. The possibility of presenting an insanity defense was repeatedly alluded to by appellant and his counsel throughout the pretrial proceedings, [6] but formal notice of intent to introduce the insanity defense was never filed, nor was any evidence introduced to support an insanity defense. It appears that appellant first entered his not-guilty plea on September 20, 2000, [7] the same day on which the trial court denied counsel's oral request to present an insanity defense; therefore, pursuant to the provisions of D.C.Code § 24-501(j), appellant still had fifteen days from that date to notify the court and the government that he wished to present an insanity defense. Thus, to the extent that the trial court denied appellant's motion on the grounds that it was untimely, it was in error. We nevertheless conclude, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying use of the insanity defense because appellant had not provided any evidence to support it. As noted, the burden is on the defendant to show that he has a substantial insanity defense, and if he cannot present at least a prima facie case of insanity, the trial court is justified in precluding the defense from being presented to the jury. See Pegues, 415 A.2d at 1377. Here, although there had been extensive psychological evaluations to determine appellant's competency to stand trial, no productivity examination was conducted to determine whether appellant's actions on the day of the robbery were the result of mental illness. When counsel requested permission to introduce the insanity defense, he did not proffer that he had an expert who would testify in support of an insanity defense-only that he had contacted the expert who had testified somewhat favorably for appellant during the competency hearings and that he needed to explore the matter further. [8] Given that appellant's psychological and mental condition had been an issue throughout pre-trial proceedings that spanned over eighteen months, and that the trial court had repeatedly inquired whether appellant was planning to pursue an insanity defense, there had been ample time to request a productivity examination or secure expert witnesses to support such a defense. On this record, where the request was made the day before jury selection began, one week before trial, and without any persuasive evidence to dissuade the judge from her previous finding that appellant was malingering, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse discretion in refusing to allow an insanity defense.