Opinion ID: 1035557
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Smith and the Use of Confidential Informants As

Text: Trial Witnesses In Smith v. Illinois, the Supreme Court expressly distinguished Roviaro, and its attendant balancing, as applicable only where the informant did not testify under alias at trial (or did not testify at all). See 390 U.S. 129, 133 (1968). The Court explained that a government witness’s “name and address open countless avenues of in-court examination and out-of-court investigation. To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” Id. at 131. Smith, however, did not mandate a per se rule requiring disclosure in open court of any government witness’s name and address. Research reveals two cases, unaddressed by the parties, in which courts addressed situations, like this one, in which government witnesses whose true names were provided to the defense were permitted to testify at trial under pseudonyms. See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Maso, No. 07-10858, 2007 WL 3121986 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished). Those courts concluded that such testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause, under the balancing framework set forth in Alford, Smith, and Roviaro, because the witnesses had a reasonable fear for their safety, and the non-disclosure of their true identities did not unduly 20 Case: 11-41376 Document: 00512323905 Page: 21 Date Filed: 07/29/2013 Nos. 11-41376 c/w 11-41392 hamper the defendants’ ability to prepare their defenses. Celis, 608 F.3d at 832–33; Maso, 2007 WL 3121986, at .