Opinion ID: 2395704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Count SixIntentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: Finally, the Appellants alleged a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress or the tort of outrage. Included within the averments supporting this count were that Mrs. Roth has been caused to suffer and sustain intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and that the conduct of Defendant DeFeliceCare was atrocious, intolerable, and so extreme and outrageous as to exceed the bounds of decency and was intolerable in a civil society. The Appellants also averred that the emotional distress suffered by Plaintiff Roth was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. In Dzinglski v. Weirton Steel Corp., 191 W.Va. 278, 445 S.E.2d 219 (1994), modified on other grounds as stated in Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 203 W.Va. 111, 506 S.E.2d 554 (1997), the Court stated that: We first defined the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress in Syllabus pt. 1, Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982): One who by extreme or outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for bodily harm. This definition is patterned after Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts which requires that the conduct be so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Id. at 704-05, 289 S.E.2d 692. Dzinglski, 191 W.Va. at 283, 445 S.E.2d at 225. This Court also has held that in analyzing a tort of outrage claim in the employment context, The prevailing rule in distinguishing a wrongful discharge claim from an outrage claim is this: when the employee's distress results from the fact of his dischargee.g., the embarrassment and financial loss stemming from the plaintiff's firingrather than from any improper conduct on the part of the employer in effecting the discharge, then no claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress can attach. When, however, the employee's distress results from the outrageous manner by which the employer effected the discharge, the employee may recover under the tort of outrage. In other words, the wrongful discharge action depends solely on the validity of the employer's motivation or reason for the discharge. Therefore, any other conduct that surrounds the dismissal must be weighed to determine whether the employer's manner of effecting the discharge was outrageous. Id. at Syl. Pt. 2. The circuit court determined that because there were no allegations regarding the manner in which the discharge was carried out, there is no claim. Again, taking the allegations contained in the Complaint as true, the Court concludes that there were sufficient allegations supporting the Appellants' intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Mr. DeFelice called Mrs. Roth and asked her to come to the office. In complying with that request of her employer, Mrs. Roth was placed by her employer into unwantedly observing Mr. DeFelice and Ms. Kelly in a sexually compromising position. Because of that observation, Mr. DeFelice threatened Mrs. Roth not only with termination from her employment, but with possibly losing her respiratory therapist license, which was her means of making a living. Mrs. Roth was then terminated within the same week, ostensibly because Mr. DeFelice did not like how she dressed or the style and color of her hair. Given the proximity between Mrs. Roth's observation and her termination, there are sufficient allegations to support her claim that her emotional distress resulted from the outrageous manner by which the employer effected the discharge. Id.