Opinion ID: 874336
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the meaning of the words actually reside

Text: Idaho Code section 1-803 provides that the resident chambers of one district judge in the Second Judicial District shall be in Idaho County. Idaho Code section 1-809 provides, District judges shall actually reside at the place designated as resident chambers. Petitioner ran for and was elected to the district judge position that was required to establish resident chambers in Idaho County. The primary issue before us is whether Petitioner actually resides in Idaho County. Petitioner contends that the term actually reside is ambiguous. It is Petitioner's position that he can actually reside in several different locations at the same time. In his testimony before the Council he indicated he was actually residing in Grangeville even though he spent six if not seven days per week in another house in another county. During oral argument it was argued on his behalf that the term only requires physical presence in Idaho County, as infrequently as once every ten years. He also argued that the word actually is mere surplusage and that he has no idea why the Legislature may have used the word actually to modify reside. In Sweitzer v. Dean, we stated the standard for interpreting the language of a statute as follows: When interpreting the meaning of the language contained in a statute, this Court's task is to give effect to the legislature's intent and purpose. In construing a statute, the Supreme Court may examine the language used, reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statutes. It is incumbent upon this Court to interpret a statute in a manner that will not nullify it, and it is not to be presumed that the legislature performed an idle act of enacting a superfluous statute. The Supreme Court will not construe a statute in a way which makes mere surplusage of provisions included therein. 118 Idaho 568, 571-72, 798 P.2d 27, 30-31 (1990) (citations omitted). In addition, Statutory interpretation begins with the `literal words of the statute,' and those `words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a whole.' Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 641, 167 P.3d 774, 778 (2007) (citations omitted). The word reside means to dwell for a long time; have one's residence; live ( in or at ). Webster's New World Dictionary 1142 (3rd College Ed. 1988). Residence is defined as the place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile. Black's Law Dictionary 1335 (8th Ed. 2004). The word actually means as a matter of actual fact; really. Webster's at 14. Thus, in order to actually reside at his or her resident chambers, a judge is required to actually live in the designated county. In Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners of Blaine County, we defined residence as the place where one actually lives or has his home; a person's dwelling place or place of habitation; an abode; the house where one's home is; a dwelling house. 109 Idaho 412, 414, 707 P.2d 1051, 1053 (1985) (quoting Perez v. Health & Social Services, 91 N.M. 334, 573 P.2d 689, 692 (1977) (emphasis added)). The words actually reside or derivatives thereof have long been used in Idaho's legal history. They appear in section 5 of the Organic Act of the Territory of Idaho, 12 Stat. L. 808, ch. 117(1863), which provided that every free white male inhabitant above the age of twenty-one years who was an actual resident of the Territory at the time of passage of the act was entitled to vote and eligible to hold office in the Territory. Upon statehood, article VI, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution provided the right to vote to twenty-one year old male citizens who had actually resided in the state or territory for six months. Idaho Const., art. VI, § 2 (amended 1962). The words have also been written into a variety of statutes. In order to qualify for certain scholarship aid, students must actually reside in on-campus facilities. Idaho Code §§ 33-4302 and 33-4032A. The majority of members of an insurer that operates only in the State of Idaho must actually reside in the state. I.C. § 41-2835(4). Idaho Code section 50-102, which provides for the manner in which cities may be incorporated, restricts signatures on an initiating petition to qualified electors who are actual residents of the territory proposed to be incorporated. An earlier version of this statute was interpreted by the Court in Village of Ilo v. Ramey, 18 Idaho 642, 648, 112 P. 126, 128 (1910). There, we equated the words actual resident with inhabitant. An inhabitant is a person who dwells or resides permanently in a place as distinguished from a transient lodger or visitor. Webster's, at 1163. Some legislative history is also pertinent to our inquiry. Prior to 1967, Chapter 8, Title 1, Idaho Code, divided the state into eleven judicial districts. In 1967, Chapter 8 was repealed and re-enacted to provide for the seven judicial districts the state now has. 1967 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 51. The legislation established the resident chambers for all district judge positions and enacted Idaho Code § 1-809 in its present form. The short title of the legislation reads, in pertinent part, PROVIDING FOR THE RESIDENT CHAMBERS OF DISTRICT JUDGES; REQUIRING A DISTRICT JUDGE RESIDE AT RESIDENT CHAMBERS. Former Idaho Code section 1-901, which was repealed in 1975 (1975 Sess. Laws, ch. 242), had provided that a district judge may sit at chambers anywhere within his district. However, the new section 1-809 required district judges to actually reside at their resident chambers. It is rather clear the Legislature wanted district judges to live in the county where their resident chambers were located and to be a part of that community. Virtually every district judge who has been appointed or elected since 1967 has understood that section 1-901 requires that him or her to really live in the county designated as resident chambers. Indeed, there is strong evidence in the record that Petitioner understood this to be the case when he ran for the Idaho County position. Petitioner testified that he bought a house in Grangeville, that he took out a homestead exemption on that house and still maintained the exemption as of the time of the Council hearing on December 17, 2008, and that he registered to vote in Idaho County. Petitioner would not have taken a homestead exemption and registered to vote in Idaho County unless he clearly understood that this county was to be his primary residence. A district judge is presumed to know the law. State v. Leavitt, 121 Idaho 4, 6, 822 P.2d 523, 525 (1991); City of Lewiston v. Frary, 91 Idaho 322, 327, 420 P.2d 805, 810 (1966). It necessarily follows that district judges must also comply with the law. Thus, we must assume that Petitioner understood the significance of obtaining and maintaining a homeowner's exemption and of voting in Idaho County. Idaho Code section 63-602G(1) allows for the exemption of a person's homestead as that term is defined in Idaho Code section 63-701(2). A homestead is the dwelling, owner-occupied by the claimant .... and used as the primary dwelling place of the claimant. I.C. § 63-701(2). Idaho Code section 63-602G(2)(a) specifies that the exemption may be granted only if the homestead is owner-occupied and used as the primary dwelling place of the owner. Subsection 2(c)(ii) requires the owner to certify to the county assessor that the homestead is his primary dwelling place. Subsection 2(f) states that the definition of primary dwelling place is the same as that in Idaho Code section 63-701(8). The latter provision says the primary dwelling place is: the claimant's dwelling place on January 1 or before April 15 of the year for which the claim is made. The primary dwelling place is the single place where a claimant has his true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment, and to which whenever the individual is absent he has the intention of returning. A claimant must establish the dwelling to which the claim relates to be his primary dwelling place by clear and convincing evidence or by establishing that the dwelling is where the claimant resided on January 1 or before April 15 and: (i) At least six (6) months during the prior year; or (ii) The majority of the time the claimant owned the dwelling if owned by the claimant less than one (1) year; or (iii) The majority of the time after the claimant first occupied the dwelling if occupied by the claimant for less than one (1) year. Idaho Code section 63-701(6) defines occupied as meaning actual use and possession. An owner need only apply once for homeowner's exemption, but must maintain eligibility on a yearly basis. I.C. § 63-602G(3). The current version of the homeowner's exemption was enacted in 2006. The earlier versions of the statute did not use the word homestead, but did require that the property be the primary dwelling place of the owner. Being a judicial officer, with full knowledge of the law, Petitioner would certainly not have applied for a homeowner's exemption on the Idaho County house unless he clearly understood that it was to be his primary dwelling place and that he was to maintain it as such for each subsequent year. Although one could certainly question his subsequent compliance with the foregoing statutes, that is a matter for pursuit, if any, by county officials (see Idaho Code section 63-602G(5), which empowers county officials to seek recovery of tax revenues lost to improperly claimed homeowner's exemptions) and not the subject of our present inquiry. Unless Petitioner understood that Idaho County was to be and remain the location of his primary residence, he would not have registered to vote and continued to vote in that county. According to Idaho Code section 34-107: (1) Residence, for voting purposes, shall be the principal or primary home or place of abode of a person. Principal or primary home or place of abode is that home or place in which his habitation is fixed and to which a person, whenever he is absent has the present intention of returning after a departure or absence therefrom, regardless of the duration of absence.    (4) A qualified elector shall not be considered to have gained a residence in any county or city of this state into which he comes for temporary purposes only, without the intention of making it his home but with the intention of leaving it when he has accomplished the purpose that brought him there. Indeed, the registration form signed by Petitioner on October 16, 2003, states: UNDER PENALTY OF LAW: By signing this card, I certify that I am a citizen of the United States and that I shall have been a resident of Idaho and the county for 30 days before the next election at which I vote ... It is obvious that Petitioner would not have signed a false certificate and equally obvious that he understood Idaho County was to be his primary home and fixed habitation. Although the evidence indicates that his subsequent compliance with the voting requirements is less than ideal, that is a matter for other authorities. One further fact demonstrates that Petitioner understood he was required to actually reside or really live in Idaho County. During his testimony at the Council hearing, he acknowledged having asked the Legislature to amend Idaho Code section 1-803 so he could reside in Clearwater County. If, as Petitioner has contended, he can actually reside in several different counties at the same time, there would be no need to obtain such a change in the law. While it is clear that Petitioner initially understood he was required to live in Idaho County, the record reflects that he was not doing so during the period preceding the time he was interviewed by Hamlin. It is not clear from the record when Petitioner began using his Lewiston house as his primary residence. What is clear is that he was not complying with the residence requirements of Idaho Code sections 1-803 and 1-809 when these proceedings were initiated because he was living in Nez Perce County. At some point Petitioner actually claimed Nez Perce County as his principal residence. This occurred when he registered his vehicles in Nez Perce County. The record does not clearly reflect when this occurred. Petitioner testified that as of December 17, 2008, his vehicles were registered in Nez Perce County. Idaho Code section 49-401B(5) provides in pertinent part: Every owner of a vehicle registered by a county assessor shall give his principal residence or domicile address to the assessor so that the proper county can be entered upon the registration. Failure to do so shall be unlawful.... For the purpose of vehicle registration, a person is an actual and permanent resident of the county in which he has his principal residence or domicile. A principal residence or domicile shall not be a person's workplace, vacation, or part-time residence. It is not entirely clear how one might reconcile this inconsistent certification but, again, this is a matter for consideration by other authorities and not particularly pertinent to the present inquiry. In sum, Petitioner is required pursuant to Idaho Code sections 1-803 and 1-809 to actually reside in Idaho County. That means he must maintain his primary residence in Idaho County, that he must be an inhabitant of Idaho County, and that he must really live in Idaho County. The evidence in the record indicates that he has not been actually residing in Idaho County for some time and this must change.