Opinion ID: 1863727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legal framework for juror and venire bias

Text: ś 31. Cases concerning juror bias present difficult legal questions for this court. This is another such case. ś 32. In 1997, this court decided State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12. The main issue in Ramos was identical to the principal issue here: What is the appropriate remedy when a defendant uses one of his or her peremptory challenges to remove a prospective juror who should have been struck for cause? In Ramos, we [held] that the use of a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court error is adequate grounds for reversal because it arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a statutorily granted right, even though the defendant is found guilty by a fair and impartial jury. 211 Wis. 2d at 24-25. ś 33. Since Ramos, we have confronted a number of cases relating to juror bias. State v. Ferron, 219 Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998); State v. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d 270, 588 N.W.2d 1 (1999); State v. Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465, 589 N.W.2d 225 (1999); State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999); State v. Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736, 596 N.W.2d 760 (1999); State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999); State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 596 N.W.2d 736 (1999). In several of these cases, the principal issue involved the alleged bias of prospective jurors who never served. In these cases, the principal issue was not whether a defendant received a fair and impartial jury but whether the circuit court committed reversible error in jury selection by making an allegedly incorrect ruling on cause. [3] ś 34. In analyzing these cases, we have recognized three types of bias in examining whether a prospective juror or juror is impartial. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 716. [1] ś 35. The first type of bias is statutory bias. Wisconsin Stat. § 805.08(1) provides that a person meeting certain statutory criteria shall not be allowed to serve as a juror in a case regardless of his or her ability to be impartial. Id. at 717. This rule applies to a prospective juror who is related by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney appearing in the case, or has any financial interest in the case. Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1). [4] When a party alleges this type of bias, a question of law is presented and we review the decision by the circuit court de novo. See Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d at 744. Prospective juror D.F. did not fit within any of the categories constituting statutory bias. [2] ś 36. The second type of bias is subjective bias. This type of bias is revealed through the words and the demeanor of the prospective juror and refers to the prospective juror's state of mind. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717. Discerning whether a juror exhibits this type of bias depends upon that juror's verbal responses to questions at voir dire, as well as that juror's demeanor in giving those responses. Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d at 745. We recognize that the circuit court sits in the best position to judge this type of bias. Id. Thus, we will uphold the circuit court's factual finding that a prospective juror is or is not subjectively biased unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. ś 37. Subjective bias is not the primary type of bias at issue in this case; D.F. steadfastly maintained that she would be impartial and the circuit court believed her. ś 38. The third type of bias is objective bias. This is the type of bias central to this case. [5] The category of objective bias recognizes that in some cases bias can be detected from the facts and circumstances surrounding the prospective juror's answers even though he or she pledges impartiality. Delgado, 223 Wis. 2d at 283. Specifically: [T]he focus of the inquiry into objective bias is not upon the individual prospective juror's state of mind, but rather upon whether the reasonable person in the individual prospective juror's position could be impartial. When assessing whether a juror is objectively biased, a circuit court must consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire and the facts involved in the case. However, the emphasis of this assessment remains on the reasonable person in light of those facts and circumstances....[W]hen a prospective juror is challenged on voir dire because there was some evidence demonstrating that the prospective juror had formed an opinion or prior knowledge,...whether the juror should be removed for cause turns on whether a reasonable person in the prospective juror's position could set aside the opinion or prior knowledge. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718-19. The standard of review in objective bias cases is somewhat more intricate than for the other two types of bias. [3] ś 39. Whether a juror is objectively biased is a mixed question of fact and law. Id. at 720. The circuit court's factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Whether those facts fulfill the legal standard of objective bias is a question of law. Id. In addition, as we further explained in Faucher : This court does not ordinarily defer to the circuit court's determination of a question of law. However, a circuit court's conclusion on objective bias is intertwined with factual findings supporting that conclusion. Therefore, it is appropriate that this court give weight to the circuit court's conclusion on that question. The circuit court is particularly well-positioned to make a determination of objective bias, and it has special competence in this area. It is intimately familiar with the voir dire proceeding, and is best situated to reflect upon the prospective juror's subjective state of mind which is relevant as well to the determination of objective bias. We therefore give weight to the court's conclusion that a prospective juror is or is not objectively biased. We will reverse its conclusion only if as a matter of law a reasonable judge could not have reached such a conclusion. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 720-21 (citations and parenthetical information omitted). This case requires that we employ this latter standard of review in evaluating the circuit court's decision not to strike D.F. from the jury. ś 40. We note in passing that this court has been very hesitant to find that a category of persons is per se biased. State v. Louis, 156 Wis. 2d 470, 479, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990), cited with approval in Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d at 851.