Opinion ID: 1169302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: SUBSECTION (i) STANDING

Text: The first part of the four-part test, subsection (i) of § 1-22-108(c), is really a standing requirement. It compels the district court to determine whether [t]he putative father's claim to paternity of the child is established. A putative father is defined for purposes of an adoption proceeding as the alleged or reputed father of a child born out of wedlock, whether or not the paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially determined. Section 1-22-101(a)(iv), W.S. 1977. The district court correctly held that appellant was a putative father under this definition. Next, § 1-22-108(d) tells us when the putative father's claim to paternity is established for purposes of a contest. It states: The putative father has no right to assert paternity in adoption, dependency or terminations of parental rights proceedings unless he is known and identified by the mother or agency, or unless he has lived with or married the mother after the birth of the child and prior to the filing of the petition to adopt, and unless prior to the interlocutory hearing of the adoption proceedings, he has acknowledged the child as his own by affirmatively asserting paternity as provided in W.S. 1-22-108. Although TG never lived with appellant after the birth of her child, she identified him as the natural father at trial. In addition, appellant acknowledged the child as his own when he filed a timely answer in which he affirmatively asserted his paternity. The district court correctly held that appellant had a right to claim paternity under § 1-22-108(d) and that his claim to paternity was therefore established for purposes of § 1-22-108(c)(i). RG argues that appellant had no standing to contest the adoption because he failed to establish his paternity within three years of GSD's birth as required by § 14-2-105, W.S. 1977. We agree with the district court, however, that the explicit standing requirement of § 1-22-108 must control in the adoption context. General legislation must yield to special legislation on the same subject whether provisions are found in the same statute or in different statutes. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295, 1299 (1979). Moreover, when the legislature defined putative father to include an alleged father whether or not the paternity rights and obligations of the father have been judicially determined, § 1-22-101(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, supra, it clearly indicated that an official declaration of paternity was not relevant to contested adoption cases. Finally, the rule of strict construction in favor of the contesting parent supports our reliance on the liberal standing provision of § 1-22-108(d). In summary, we hold that the district court correctly found that appellant had standing to contest the adoption and had established a claim to paternity as required by § 1-22-108(c)(i).