Opinion ID: 1265458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Trial Court Abuse Its Discretion to Specially Set the Case for Trial Under Section 36, Subdivision (e)?

Text: The trial court also held that plaintiff's motion to specially set under section 36, subdivision (e) should be denied on discretionary grounds under section 583.410. [6] Subdivision (a) of that latter section states: The court may in its discretion dismiss an action for delay in prosecution pursuant to this article on its own motion or on motion of the defendant if to do so appears to the court appropriate under the circumstances of the case. Section 583.420, subdivision (a)(2)(A) makes clear that an action may be subject to discretionary dismissal only if it has not been brought to trial within three years. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case 44 days before the expiration of the 5-year deadline. (5) Before addressing the discretionary dismissal of this case, we first review the basic principles that are to guide a trial court's discretion in determining whether to grant a motion to specially set following an arbitration and trial de novo request. We begin with the declaration of legislative policy found in section 583.130: It is the policy of the state that a plaintiff shall proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action but that all parties shall cooperate in bringing the action to trial or other disposition. Except as otherwise provided by statute or by rule of court adopted pursuant to statute, ... the policy favoring trial or other disposition of an action on the merits [is] generally to be preferred over the policy that requires dismissal for failure to proceed with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of an action in construing the provisions of this chapter. In spite of this preference for disposition on the merits, the decision whether to grant a motion to specially set a case for trial remains within the sound discretion of the court. Section 36, subdivision (e), which governs motions to preferentially set, provides that the court may in its discretion grant a motion for preference served with the memorandum to set or the at-issue memorandum and accompanied by a showing of cause which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting this preference. A plaintiff is not automatically entitled to a preferential trial setting merely because a failure to specially set would lead to an expiration of the five-year statute. ( Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342 [228 Cal. Rptr. 504, 721 P.2d 590] ( Salas ).) Rather, he or she must generally make some showing of excusable delay in order to receive the preferential trial date. ( Id. at p. 349.) Once a threshold of excusable delay is shown, however, the trial court still retains discretion to deny the motion, but that discretion is not wholly unfettered: [the court] must consider the `total picture.' ( Salas, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 349; Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 1526, 1533 [242 Cal. Rptr. 605].) The factors to be taken into account in assessing this total picture are essentially the ones prescribed when a court is considering a motion for a discretionary dismissal under California Rules of Court, rule 373(e). [7] (See Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co., supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 560-561.) We have particularly emphasized the condition of the court calendar, dilatory conduct by plaintiff, prejudice to defendant of an accelerated trial date, and the likelihood of eventual mandatory dismissal if the early trial date is denied. ( Salas, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 349.) When, as here, a plaintiff makes a motion to specially set after the trial court has failed to recalendar the case in the postarbitration period, the court is confronted with a situation somewhat distinct from the typical trial preference motion. As discussed above, [s]ince the trial court alone has the power to order a matter placed upon its trial calendar, section 1141.20 imposes a duty upon the court sua sponte to recalendar the trial `in the same place ... it had prior to arbitration.' ( Moran, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 241, fn. omitted.) The modification of the Moran rule in part II of this opinion does not alter the existence of the trial court's statutorily imposed sua sponte duty, but rather recognizes that the existence of such duty does not result in the automatic tolling of the five-year statute. A motion to specially set in this context can be characterized, therefore, as a belated attempt by a plaintiff to compel the court to fulfill its duty to recalendar the case, rather than as simply plaintiff's attempt to regain the time she has lost by her own procrastination. Thus, the preference for disposition of an action on the merits incorporated in section 583.130 is reinforced in this situation by section 1141.20's mandate that plaintiffs not be penalized for undergoing arbitration. Put in figurative terms, whereas the chief policy concern behind section 36, subdivision (e) is to prevent a dilatory plaintiff from taking a `cut' in line, displacing other parties who had been diligently pursuing their causes ( Nye v. 20th Century Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 1041, 1046 [275 Cal. Rptr. 319]), the concern of section 1141.20 is to allow plaintiffs who have engaged in arbitration to keep their place in line for trial eligibility. ( Moran, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 241-242.) When, as here, the case is not returned to the civil active list and calendared for trial because of the court's failure to comply with section 1141.20, the fact that a motion to specially set now seeks to rectify that error should weigh in plaintiff's favor. Nonetheless, the trial court still retains discretion to deny a motion to specially set made by a plaintiff who has failed to promptly request a timely trial date in the postarbitration period. A plaintiff who waits an unreasonably long time in acting to correct the court's failure to recalendar the case may be unable to claim excusable delay and therefore may be subject to dismissal. (See Karubian v. Security Pacific Nat. Bank (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 134, 139 [199 Cal. Rptr. 295].) The court may also have reason for denying a plaintiff's motion when it determines that the accelerated trial date is actually prejudicial to the defendant. One of the purposes behind section 583.410, in addition to encouraging diligence by the plaintiff, is to `promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.' ( Corlett v. Gordon (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 1005, 1016 [165 Cal. Rptr. 524].) Although courts should not presume that a delay in prosecution is prejudicial to a defendant ( City of Los Angeles v. Gleneagle Dev. Co. (1976) 62 Cal. App.3d 543, 563 [133 Cal. Rptr. 212]), a showing of actual prejudice can be a critical factor in granting a motion to dismiss or denying a motion to specially set ( Corlett, supra, at p. 1016). Moreover, a motion to specially set under the circumstances of this case may be denied inasmuch as it is supported by plaintiff's pre-arbitration conduct of the litigation. As explained in part II of this opinion, if a plaintiff is vulnerable to a discretionary dismissal for want of prosecution before arbitration under section 583.410, then undergoing the arbitration process and benefiting from the recalendaring under section 1141.20 does not necessarily immunize the plaintiff against such a motion. (6) In sum, a trial court may use a plaintiff's motion to specially set the case for trial as an opportunity to correct its own failure to calendar or recalendar the case after arbitration under section 1141.20; but these considerations can be outweighed by the plaintiff's unreasonable delay either before or after arbitration, as well as by prejudice to the defendant from an accelerated trial date. (7) When reviewing a discretionary dismissal or a denial of a motion to specially set on discretionary grounds, an appellate court must presume that the decision of the trial court is correct. `All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.' ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [86 Cal. Rptr. 65, 468 P.2d 193].) Although a lower court is obliged to consider the relevant factors when ruling on a discretionary motion to dismiss, it is not compelled to state in written or oral form its reasons for granting a discretionary dismissal. ( Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 562.) The burden is on the party challenging the trial court's decision to show that the court abused its discretion. ( Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.) Thus, even if there is no indication of the trial court's rationale for dismissing an action, the court's decision will be upheld on appeal if reasonable justification for it can be found. We uphold judgments if they are correct for any reason, `regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the court reached its conclusion.' ( United Pacific Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co. (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 925, 933 [266 Cal. Rptr. 231].) (8) In the present case, a review of the transcript and the trial court's order reveals little of the trial court's rationale for denying the motion to specially set. But we cannot say that the order itself is unreasonable. We note in this case that there was a lapse of three years and seven months between the time of the filing of the complaint and the filing of the first at-issue memorandum  a period during which, except for the propounding of form interrogatories and a single request for documents, the case lay dormant. Nor is there any evidence in the record of active settlement negotiations or delay by defendant. (Cf. Jepsen v. Sherry (1950) 99 Cal. App.2d 119, 122 [220 P.2d 819]; Forneris v. Krell (1945) 69 Cal. App.2d 280, 283 [158 P.2d 937].) Although plaintiff did conduct a successful arbitration, she then waited over six months  and less than two months before the expiration of the five-year deadline  to bring to the court's attention the lack of a trial date. And the fact that defendant made no showing of prejudice is not determinative: when a plaintiff fails to make a showing of excusable delay, the trial court remains within its discretion in dismissing the case despite the lack of actual prejudice. (See Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 332 [216 Cal. Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58].) In short, we cannot say, in light of plaintiff's delay both before and after arbitration, that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the case.