Opinion ID: 4529356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Legal Framework

Text: “We review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” Dixon v. Miller, 293 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2002). Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the “AEDPA”), a federal court cannot grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a claim that was “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” when “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000) (first alteration in original). An “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent, on the other hand, occurs when a state court “identifies the correct 4 governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. This is a “highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). To merit federal habeas relief under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. Consequently, a federal court may not issue a writ of habeas corpus “simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. 5 B. Strickland Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for evaluating Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See 466 U.S. at 669. First, a defendant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient – “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. Second, a defendant must establish that counsel’s deficient performance resulted in actual prejudice by showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance” under the first prong “must be highly deferential” and include “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. A court must make allowances for counsel’s strategic choices and apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Id. at 691. A court has flexibility in how it decides a claim of ineffective assistance. “[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Id. at 697. 6 Consequently, if a defendant does not successfully establish either the performance prong or the prejudice prong, the ineffective assistance claim fails, and the remaining prong becomes moot. See id. C. Review of Strickland Claims Under the AEDPA Both Strickland and the AEDPA require highly deferential standards of review. Accordingly, “[e]stablishing that a state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant petitioning for federal habeas relief must show, not that the state court applied Strickland incorrectly, but that the state court applied Strickland “in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). “The Strickland standard is rigorous, and the great majority of habeas petitions that allege constitutionally ineffective counsel founder on that standard.” Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2001). 7