Opinion ID: 1038228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Remaining Lewis Considerations Favor

Text: Assimilation As mentioned, Lewis provides that a state statute will not be assimilated if, for example, (1) application of the state statute would conflict with federal policy; (2) application of the statute would effectively rewrite an offense definition that Congress carefully considered; or (3) the federal statutes reveal an intent to occupy so much of a field as to exclude use of the particular state statute. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 164. Much of the preceding analysis directly touches on these examples, but it bears specific mention that (1) Reed cites no federal policy with which Nevada’s per se drugged driving law could conflict; (2) it is uncontested that assimilating Nevada’s per se drugged driving law would not effectively rewrite an offense definition that the NPS carefully considered; and (3) the NPS has not indicated an intent to occupy the entire field of driving with a certain level of drugs in the blood. To the contrary, as set forth above, the NPS intentionally left gaps in Part 4 to be filled by nonconflicting state law. In sum, because there is no indication of an overriding federal policy with which Nevada’s per se drugged driving law interferes, see Souza, 392 F.3d at 1054–55, and because there is a gap in federal law with respect to punishing 24 UNITED STATES V. REED operators of vehicles who exceed a per se drug limit regardless of impairment, see id. (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 160), we agree with the district court that there is a gap in federal law which may be properly filled by Nevada’s per se drugged driving law. AFFIRMED.