Opinion ID: 2554388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Argument for a New Category of Special Relationship

Text: Ms. McLean's other argument  that we should recognize a new category of special relationship applicable to this case  is a hybrid. It is derived in part from a provision of the contract between DOH and DSS in which DOH (a city agency) agreed to perform, in New York City, the registration duties assigned to DSS (a state agency) by statute. Under the heading Indemnification, DOH agreed among other things to be solely responsible and answerable in damages for any and all accidents and/or injuries to persons . . . or property arising out of or related to the services to be rendered. We find this provision to be without significance in this case. It is plainly designed to protect the State, by requiring the City alone to bear any liability that might arise. It does not create any liability that would not otherwise exist  and it does not create a special relationship between the City and any person or class of people. But Ms. McLean's argument is also derived from public policy. She suggests that the helplessness of young children, and the State's powerful interest in protecting them from neglect or abuse, should lead us to announce the existence of a special relationship between those who register child care providers and parents and children who need child care. This is, in substance, an invitation to relax the special relationship rule to accommodate an especially appealing class of cases. We decline the invitation. A well settled rule of law denies recovery in cases like this, and that rule, by its nature, bars recovery even where a government blunder results in injury to people deserving of the government's protection. The rationale of the rule, as we explained in Laratro (8 NY3d at 82), is that exposing municipalities to tort liability would be likely to render them less, not more, effective in protecting their citizens. Lawsuits, as we said in Pelaez (2 NY3d at 201), are not the only way of dealing with governmental failure  and might even impel governments to withdraw or reduce their protective services. In Lauer (95 NY2d at 101), we quoted our warning in Steitz v City of Beacon (295 NY 51, 55 [1945]) that a crushing burden should not be imposed on a governmental body in the absence of [statutory] language clearly designed to have that effect. These reasons forbid the making the sort of ad hoc exceptions to the special duty/special relationship rule that Ms. McLean seeks in this case.