Opinion ID: 747770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Mann Act and the Road to Section 2423(b)

Text: 20 Though enacted in 1994, the statutory antecedents of § 2423(b) date back to the early part of this century. The first restriction of this sort was the Mann Act, enacted in 1910 as a weapon against the so-called white slave trade in which young women were forced into prostitution or sold outright. The Mann Act, as originally enacted, prohibited the knowing transportation in interstate commerce of any woman or girl for the purpose of debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose.... Act of June 25, 1910, § 2, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (amended 1986). Congress made the statute gender-neutral in a 1986 amendment, retired the purpose test for interstate transportation, and clarified the amorphous phrase any immoral purpose by narrowing the statute's coverage to illegal sexual activity. 5 21 Section 2423 evolved from this same legislative initiative as an effort to protect minors from predatory sexual conduct by adults. The legislation originally mirrored the Mann Act except for its application limited to minors and to transportation by common carriers, as well as its use of the phrase with the intent rather than for the purpose of engaging in immoral conduct. Subsequent amendments eliminated the common carrier requirement and heightened § 2423's resemblance to the Mann Act by adopting the same any illegal sexual activity language from § 2421. In 1994, Congress created § 2423(b) in a further attempt to expand the protection of minors. The new statute punishes mere travel in interstate commerce--even if no transportation of a minor was involved--if the defendant is found to have traveled for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act (as defined in another Code section) with a minor. 22 Judicial interpretations of the Mann Act necessarily color our reading of § 2423(b) for a number of reasons. As described above, § 2423(b) and the Mann Act are part of the same general legislative framework. More importantly, the crucial language of § 2423(b) employs the same for the purpose of phrase used in the original Mann Act and construed by the Supreme Court and a number of lower courts. See, e.g., United States v. Kinslow, 860 F.2d 963, 967 (9th Cir.1988) (applying Mann Act purpose standard to § 2423 cases), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 829, 110 S.Ct. 96, 107 L.Ed.2d 60 (1989). 6 Our interpretation of the statutory language in § 2423(b) would necessarily impact that body of precedent; Defendants recognize that reversing their convictions on this basis would seriously erode, if not overrule, our Mann Act cases interpreting the relevant for the purpose of language. We are the first court of appeals to consider the scope of § 2423(b), 7 and, for the reasons described above, we find it prudent and helpful to draw upon our Mann Act precedent in this task. 8