Opinion ID: 2973556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Silberstein’s First Amendment Claim

Text: A. Whether Silberstein suffered a First Amendment Violation The Board Members also argue on appeal that it was not clearly established at the time of Silberstein’s termination that Silberstein’s letter to the newspaper was constitutionally protected speech, and thus claim that they are entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. We again engage in the two-step qualified immunity analysis, asking first whether the 3 An affidavit by Grooms avers that the Board was not consulted before this new job was listed as classified, and the Board’s opinion is that this job was and is an unclassified position. Regardless of the Board’s position on the matter, the fact that the job was originally listed as classified presumably reflects an understanding by someone employed by the city of Dayton that Silberstein’s position was classified, further supporting an inference that it was generally understood to be so. No. 05-3630 Silberstein v. City of Dayton, et al. Page 10 facts alleged by Silberstein, taken in the light most favorable to her, show the Board Members’ conduct violated her right to free speech under the First Amendment. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. To demonstrate First Amendment protection, a public employee must show (1) that the speech at issue addresses a matter of public concern, and (2) that the employer had no overriding state interest in efficient public service that would be undermined by the speech. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The district court opinion states that “defendants concede and this Court finds that Silberstein engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment” when she wrote and submitted her letter to the newspaper, and the opinion does not engage in any further analysis on the issue. In fact, however, although the appellants conceded in district court and on appeal that Silberstein’s speech touched on a matter of public concern, they do not appear to have ever conceded that Silberstein’s speech interest survives the Pickering balancing test. We conclude that the district court erred in finding that Silberstein’s letter was protected First Amendment speech. While Pickering provides the basic framework for analyzing a § 1983 First Amendment claim, this circuit employs a different test when a claim is brought by an employee who held a policymaking or confidential position. See Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir. 2002). In the cases of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the general prohibition against adverse employment actions on the basis of political patronage where an employee occupies a policymaking position. In Rose v. Stephens, this court applied the Elrod/Branti policymaking exception to a § 1983 First Amendment claim, holding that when an employee is in a policymaking or confidential position and is terminated for speech related to his or her political or policy views, there is a presumption that the Pickering balance favors the government. Thus, if Silberstein occupied a policymaking position as Assistant Chief Examiner, and if her letter to the editor related to her policy views, then her free speech interests presumptively lose out to the city of Dayton’s interests in efficiently running its government. In determining whether a government employee is in a policymaking or confidential position, the court looks to four distinct categories originally developed in the political patronage context in McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996). See Rose, 291 F.3d at 924; see also Roupe v. Bay County, 268 F. Supp. 2d 825, 831-32 (E.D. Mich. 2003). The categories include (1) positions specifically named in relevant law to which discretionary authority in carrying out law enforcement or political policy is granted; (2) positions to which a significant amount of category-one authority has been delegated, or positions not specifically named by law but inherently possessing categoryone type authority; (3) confidential advisors to category-one position-holders; or (4) positions that are part of a group of positions filled by balancing out political party representation or by balancing out selections made by different government bodies. Rose, 291 F.3d at 924. In determining whether a public employee falls into one of the four Testa categories, this court looks at the inherent duties of the position rather than the actual tasks undertaken by the employee. Latham v. Office of the Ohio Attorney Gen., 395 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 2005). A position need not fit perfectly into one of the “generic” categories in order to be a “confidential or policymaking” job. Id.; Feeney v. Shipley, 164 F.3d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1999). Silberstein’s job duties appear to have been quite broadly defined: Her main duties entailed working on special projects – such as statistical analysis of the historical job retention among police and fire recruits, and field research on possible training and testing methods the Board might implement – and a host of widely varying day-to-day tasks, including taking minutes, preparing portions of annual reports, and proofreading tests to be given to police and fire recruits. Silberstein testified that she had very little direct interaction with the Board Members. However, although she apparently took it upon herself to author the report expressing her concerns about the practical implementation of the suggested diversity rules, she viewed this research to be part of her “duty” to the Board to provide them with sufficient information on which to base their decision about the No. 05-3630 Silberstein v. City of Dayton, et al. Page 11 rule changes. In essence, Silberstein’s work appears to have had the potential to substantially impact the daily implementation of the city’s diversity policies. As in Latham, Silberstein was “responsible for making important policy implementation recommendations to a policymaker,” and her “inherent duties . . . [were] broad and limited primarily by the discretion of the policymaker.” 395 F.3d at 269. We conclude that Silberstein was a policymaking employee commenting upon matters of policy, and we therefore apply the Rose presumption to conclude that government interests outweigh Silberstein’s First Amendment interests. The Board’s alleged retaliatory action therefore does not constitute a constitutional violation. B. Whether Silberstein’s First Amendment rights were clearly established Having found that no First Amendment violation occurred, we need not address the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Silberstein’s First Amendment claim.