Opinion ID: 156393
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Application of Leon

Text: The more fundamental problem here lies in the inappropriate application of Leon’s good-faith exception to this anticipatory search warrant. As stated above, the problem begins with an anticipatory search warrant in which the magistrate judge must rest his probable cause determination on the expectation that a condition or conditions in the control of the executing officer will be satisfied. The officer’s sworn undertaking that he will only execute the warrant when he has caused or observed the essential conditions to occur totally vitiates any possibility that the execution is in good faith when the officer knows that the conditions did not occur. The majority’s application of Leon to these facts compounds the constitutionally objectionable nature of these activities by sanctioning improper police conduct. -15- Under Leon, the proper test of an officer’s good faith is “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. In determining whether an officer has acted in good faith in accordance with this objective test, a court should evaluate all attendant circumstances, see id., and assume that the executing officers have “a reasonable knowledge of what the law prohibits.” Id. at 919 n.20. When “a government agent asserts good faith reliance on a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant, the court must focus upon the existence vel non of objective good faith at the time of the warrant application.” Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 15-16 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986)). This means that in this case, where Inspector Carr was both procuring and executing officer, the pre-planned scheme and the application for, the issuance of, and the execution of the search warrant are not a series of selfsustaining independent events but must be analyzed in context, examining the totality of the circumstances. See Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1424, 1429-30. The Leon good-faith exception does not apply and suppression remains an appropriate remedy in four situations: (1) the magistrate judge issuing the warrant was misled by a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; (2) the magistrate judge wholly abandoned his or her detached and neutral judicial role; (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause -16- as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); or (4) the warrant was “so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citations omitted). In all of these circumstances, no reasonably well trained officer should rely on the warrant. Several of these limitations on the good-faith exception occurred in this case. This is not the typical Leon situation where an officer who did not procure the warrant is told to go execute it. That officer is not charged with the antecedent knowledge resulting from the procurement of the warrant. Nor is this a situation where the magistrate judge merely misjudged probable cause and the executing officer is innocently unaware of that misjudgment. By definition, in this anticipatory search warrant case, everyone, including the procuring and executing officer and the magistrate judge, was fully and consciously aware that when the warrant was signed, probable cause did not exist. They all knew that the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination was contingent upon the occurrence of future events, which were known by and in the control of Inspector Carr. The officers cannot reasonably and in good faith represent that they innocently relied on the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination to believe that the tapes would be found in Defendant’s residence when in fact they -17- knew only that the tapes had at one time been located at Defendant’s place of employment and that the condition designed to ensure that the tapes would be found at Defendant’s residence had failed. Because Inspector Carr was fully aware that the beeper had died and the conditions represented to the magistrate judge could not be met, any argument that he proceeded in good faith is absurd and incredible. In applying for a search warrant, whether anticipatory or contemporaneous, every affiant-officer worth his or her salt knows that he or she must present facts or allegations which make a probable connection, a nexus, between the contraband or illegal activity and the place to be searched. This is not a new or unsettled complexity of the law peculiar to anticipatory search warrants. Probable cause for anticipatory warrants, like all search warrants, “undoubtably requires a nexus between [the contraband to be seized or] suspected criminal activity and the place to be searched.” Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 937; see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1430-31 (Wood, J., concurring); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12-14. Defendant correctly argues that the good-faith exception does not apply because the affidavit’s failure to establish a sufficient nexus between the contraband and the location to be searched was a “readily observable, . . . non-technical defect [that] . . . should have been easily detected by an experienced postal inspector.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 12. Inspector -18- Carr not only should have easily detected the absence of a nexus during the execution of the warrant, but he knew, or should have known, that no such nexus existed when he applied for the search warrant. Because Inspector Carr was the chief investigative officer or case agent, the procurer of the warrant, and the executing officer, he and his team of law enforcement officers are charged with the knowledge that he did not present facts or allegations to the magistrate judge showing a connection between the place to be searched and the package containing the video tapes. Inspector Carr’s affidavit stated only that Defendant had been observed on three occasions picking up mail at a post office box in downtown Denver and walking back to his place of employment. The majority recognizes that the Inspector’s affidavit only obliquely mentions Defendant’s residence, stating that “it is anticipated that defendant, after picking up the tapes from the post office box, will go to his place of employment and after work to his residence.” Appellant’s App. at 95. Nothing in the affidavit traced any mail or package previously picked up by Defendant at the post office box to his residence. Nor did the affidavit show that Defendant stored other contraband in his home. Inspector Carr did not present facts, based on his experience or training, describing the nature of the crime or circumstances inherent in viewing pornography that link the crime or contraband to the suspect’s residence. See United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 975 (5th Cir. 1990); -19- Hendricks, 743 F.2d at 655. In light of recent publicity concerning the fact that employees are viewing Internet pornography at work on their company computers, 7 there is nothing probable about the suggestion that this working man would take child pornography to his home rather than his place of employment. The Inspector’s application for the beeper stated “that probable cause exists to believe that the package containing the mobile tracking device will be picked up at [Defendant’s post office box] and transported to other premises for viewing and use.” Appellant’s App. at 83 (emphasis added). He simply did not connect the video tapes to the residence in any way. Everything in the Inspector’s affidavit pointed to the fact that the package could be found at Defendant’s place of employment; nothing indicates that it could be at his residence. The government’s assertion that the affiant’s experience and expertise was relevant to the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination also supports my 7 With the advent of the “information superhighway,” companies are faced with the dilemma created by Internet access for their employees: Companies must balance the beneficial access to data with the detrimental and suspect access to pornography or other inappropriate personal uses. The Wall Street Journal reported that employees of IBM, Apple Computer, and AT&T were among the most frequent visitors to Penthouse magazine’s Web site, spending the equivalent of over 347 8-hour days in a single month. See Kane, supra at 3; Suspended Principal Will Have Other Duties, W IS . S T . J., Oct. 2, 1997 (Local), available in 1997 WL 12263311; Wayne Tompkins, Caught on the Web More Companies Monitor On-the-Job Internet Abuse, F LA . T ODAY , May 3, 1998 (Business), available in 1998 WL 11931216; Bruce Westfall, Clark College Fires Head of Security After Complaints, C OLUMBIAN , Apr. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 6520467. -20- conclusion that Inspector Carr should be held accountable for his knowledge. See Appellee’s Br. at 11. The Inspector testified that he had previously executed some ten to twenty anticipatory search warrants. See Appellant’s App. at 59-60. The Inspector’s expertise and experience in child pornography cases and in obtaining and executing search warrants in general shoulders him with the knowledge that a nexus is required between the place to be searched and the contraband. It is clearly and objectively unreasonable to suggest that an officer acted in good faith when he subjectively knew, or should have known, that he presented no facts or observations to the magistrate judge to support the requisite nexus. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 16; Smith, 478 S.E.2d at 244. This is exactly the type of misconduct that the exclusionary rule was intended to prevent. Although the Inspector knew that surveillance over the package was essential to the proper execution of the warrant and was clearly aware that Defendant could pick up the package at any time, he did not present facts in the affidavit establishing the reliability of the beeper, how long the beeper was expected to function, or what time Defendant was likely to pick up the package. The majority points out that the record does not state that Inspector Carr intentionally misled the magistrate judge. No precise statement is necessary to show how Inspector Carr failed to disclose all relevant facts to the magistrate judge; the affidavits and the sting operation demonstrate this deficiency. -21- Contrary to the government’s assertion and the majority’s opinion, it is not more logical to infer that Defendant would pick up the package “during his lunch break, thus allowing the beeper enough time to continue functioning until [he] got off work and proceeded to his residence.” Ante, at 28 n.9. The affidavit does not mention what time Defendant was previously observed picking up his mail and walking back to work. According to the record, the Inspector’s team of law enforcement officers began visually observing the post office box not just prior to the lunch hour but as soon as the Inspector delivered the package to the mailbox in the morning. See Appellant’s App. at 47-48. Therefore, not only is it entirely reasonable for the Inspector to anticipate that the package could be picked up at any time after delivery, but nothing in the record supports the notion that Defendant would pick up the package during his lunch break. It is also common sense to expect that someone might open a package when he receives it, thus triggering the beeper’s accelerated alarm mode which would wear out the batteries more rapidly. The Inspector should have informed the magistrate judge of the likelihood that Defendant could pick up and open the package at any time, thereby triggering the accelerated alarm of the beeper which would make its batteries run out more quickly. Because the record reflects no evidence that the beeper malfunctioned in any way, Inspector Carr should have informed the magistrate judge of the possibility that the beeper could stop functioning before it -22- tracked the package to Defendant’s home. These reasonable scenarios would affect the ability of the officers to maintain surveillance of the package, a condition necessary to the execution of the warrant. The Inspector may not proceed on “good faith” because his affidavit in support of the warrant was plainly submitted without full disclosure of all the relevant and reasonably foreseeable facts. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923; Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 16-17. The record reflects additional recklessness in the preparation of the search warrant affidavit. As previously discussed, Inspector Carr applied for the search warrant and the beeper order on the same day. Appellant’s App. at 78-85. In reviewing the record, it becomes apparent that the affidavit in support of the beeper order is virtually identical to the search warrant application. 8 The only significant difference between the two affidavits is as follows: The warrant affidavit pledges that the package will be kept under surveillance and the warrant will not be executed until the package is “received by an individual at [Defendant’s] residence” and “brought into the residence,” id. at 95, while the 8 The search warrant affidavit offers a professional description of the affiant and an explanation of the crime Mr. Rowland was suspected of violating. The electronic beeper affidavit states that the mobile tracking device will be attached to a package that is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation to identify persons suspected of trafficking in materials containing sexual exploitation of children. Using identical language and organization, both affidavits then describe the background facts of the sting operation and Defendant’s activities. See Appellant’s App. at 79-82, 88-96. -23- beeper order affidavit states, more specifically, that “[the] device is required to ensure the material in the package is not lost and to assist in identifying the perpetrator.” Id. at 81-82. Neither of the affidavits disclosed to the magistrate judge any facts showing the nexus between the video tapes and Defendant’s residence. It is facially evident from this comparison that the affiant utilized one set of facts for both affidavits without providing the additional facts necessary to demonstrate to the magistrate judge that there is a fair probability that the video tapes would be found at Defendant’s residence. 9 Based on the foregoing analysis, I believe not only that the good-faith exception of Leon should not be applied to the improperly executed anticipatory search warrant but also that the officers in the case could not rely in good faith on the warrant and its supporting affidavit. Inspector Carr, admittedly a well-trained officer, knew or should have known that the search was illegal despite the