Opinion ID: 771966
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Habeas Review

Text: 34 Lindstadt's ineffectiveness of counsel claim was heard on the merits by way of his N.Y.C.P.L. §440 motion in the state appellate court. The Supreme Court has ruled that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §2254, 35 [a] writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied--the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Under the contrary to clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the unreasonable application clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. 36 Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2254) (O'Connor, J., concurring, writing for the majority in this part) (omissions in original). 37 The threshold question . . . is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final. Id. at 1511. In a petition for habeas relief alleging ineffective counsel, the question as to whether the matter is governed by existing Supreme Court precedent is easily answered because the merits of [such] claim[s] are squarely governed by [the Supreme Court's] holding in Strickland v. Washington. Id. (citation omitted). 38 The state court decision denying Lindstadt's appeal on the basis of ineffective counsel does not reference Strickland; instead, it relies on a standard articulated in People v. Baldi, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 898 (N.Y. 1981): [T]rial tactics which terminate unsuccessfully do not automatically indicate ineffectiveness. So long as the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of a particular case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation, reveal that the attorney provided meaningful representation, the constitutional requirement will have been met. (citations omitted) 39 The standard applied by the state court is not diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed to the standard articulated in Strickland. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1519 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is Lindstadt's case governed by any case in which the Court encountered a materially indistinguishable set of facts. See id. Relief is appropriate therefore only if the state unreasonably applie[d] [the governing legal] principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. 1 Id. at 1523.