Opinion ID: 1250238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment in the Absence of Specific Findings of Grounds for Termination of the Mother's Parental Rights

Text: Findings of fact creating the basis for termination were clearly not provided in the order granting summary judgment. The statute which recites the grounds for termination states: (a) The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear and convincing evidence: (i) The child has been left in the care of another person without provision for the child's support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional contributions, or incidental contacts and communications; (ii) The child has been abandoned with no means of identification for at least three (3) months and efforts to locate the parent have been unsuccessful; (iii) The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and efforts by an authorized agency or mental health professional have been unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health and safety would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the parent; (iv) The parent is incarcerated due to the conviction of a felony and a showing that the parent is unfit to have the custody and control of the child. W.S. 14-2-309 (1986). Then, for the order, the statute requires: The order terminating the parent-child legal relationship shall be in writing and shall contain the findings of the court. If the court terminates the parent-child legal relationship of either one (1) or both parents, it shall fix the responsibility for the child's support and appoint a guardian of the child's person or estate or both. W.S. 14-2-315 (1986). The dispositive order and decree entered in this case from which this appeal is taken provided: THIS MATTER having come before the Court on June 18, 1991, the Petitioner appearing through   , Assistant District Attorney, the child being represented by the Guardian Ad Litem,   , and the respondent having appeared through the person of her attorney,   , and the Court having before it the State's Motion For Summary Judgment and Affidavit[]s in support thereof, and the Affidavit of the Respondent in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Court having reviewed the motion and affidavit[]s and heard the argument of counsel and having considered the matter fully, hereby FINDS that there exists no issue of material fact as to whether grounds of the termination of the parental rights of [the mother] exist and that therefore the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment should be and is hereby GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to said ruling the parent and child relationship between [SVG] with a date of birth of May 5, 1988, and [the mother], be, and is hereby terminated and severed forever and that the permanent care, custody, and control of the minor child shall be placed with the Department of Family Services for adoptive placement. DATED THIS 27th day of June, 1991. Clearly, that decision provided no factual basis, defined within the strict scrutiny standard of clear and convincing evidence, for the decision that was made. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212 (Wyo. 1990). The substantial compliance with the termination statute is required. In re Adoption of Strauser, 65 Wyo. 98, 196 P.2d 862 (1948); Nugent v. Powell, 4 Wyo. 173, 33 P. 23 (1893). Since the present adequacy of actual findings will be resolved after retrial, we are left with the procedural appropriateness of the summary judgment decision for the termination of parental rights. Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624 (Wyo. 1989). The test of strict scrutiny and clear and convincing evidence required to be met in the parental termination renders the appropriate category of cases for summary judgment application to be, at most, significantly limited. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212. This court has not determined that summary judgment cannot ever be appropriate in the proper case, see for example Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624, where all of the historical facts were uncontroverted. However, where the petition is appropriately and diligently contested, summary judgment is seldom to be the procedural answer for parental rights termination. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212; In Interest of F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979); Matter of Christina T., 590 P.2d 189 (Okl. 1979). In any event, summary judgment was not appropriately granted in this case. The affidavit of the mother raises a clear factual conflict which renders that summary disposition unavailable to determine the fundamental interest of parental rights in a termination proceeding. The application not only crosses the parameters of the normal summary judgment standard, Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986), but then enters the particular problems of strict scrutiny and clear and convincing evidence required for parental rights termination. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). See also Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, reh'g denied 453 U.S. 927, 102 S.Ct. 889, 69 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1981). Proof by clear and convincing evidence is required `where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake,' such as the termination of parental rights, involuntary commitment, and deportation. Weiner v. Fleischman, 54 Cal.3d 476, 286 Cal. Rptr. 40, 816 P.2d 892, 898 (1991). The strict scrutiny rule for termination of parental rights has uniformly been stated and assiduously applied in the opinions written by this court. Matter of EB, 795 P.2d 1212; RW v. State ex rel. Laramie County Dept. of Public Assistance and Social Services, 766 P.2d 555 (Wyo. 1989), Thomas, J., specially concurring; In Interest of J.G., 742 P.2d 770 (Wyo. 1987); Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984); Matter of SKJ, 673 P.2d 640 (Wyo. 1983); Matter of Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568 (Wyo. 1983); Matter of Parental Rights of PP, 648 P.2d 512 (Wyo. 1982); Matter of Adoption of CCT, 640 P.2d 73 (Wyo. 1982); DS v. Department of Public Assistance and Social Services, 607 P.2d 911 (Wyo. 1980); Matter of Voss' Adoption, 550 P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1976). See also Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624. The mother should be given the right to testify in person, or at least by deposition, before losing her parental rights to her child. There is a factual and legal difference between abandonment and exclusion when termination of parental rights is at issue. Matter of Juvenile Action No. S 624, 126 Ariz. 488, 616 P.2d 948 (1980); Matter of Christina T., 590 P.2d 189; State v. Grady, 231 Or. 65, 371 P.2d 68 (1962). Cf. Annotation, Parent's Involuntary Confinement, or Failure to Care for Child as Result Thereof, as Evincing Neglect, Unfitness, or the Like in Dependency or Divestiture Proceeding, 79 A.L.R.3d 417 (1977). The evidentiary presentation of this case, as defined within the concepts of summary judgment and parental termination, could not justify the order entered when, as here, the mother denied abandonment, alleged exclusion, and strongly pursued her willingness and interest in retaining her parental rights. The factual conflict for jury resolution was overtly presented pursuant to W.S. 14-2-312 (1986), which provides in pertinent part: The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, including the right of a parent, child or interested person to demand a jury trial, are applicable in actions brought under this act. Finally, the requisite jury fee was paid. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976. Reversed.