Opinion ID: 202030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Funds for Psychological Evaluation

Text: 25 Finally, we turn to Mastera's claim that the district court erred in denying his request for $900 to obtain a pre-sentencing psychological evaluation. We review the denial of such a request for abuse of discretion. United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 218 (1st Cir.1996). 26 Mastera contends that a psychological evaluation was necessary for him to prepare an adequate defense, since he is an alcoholic, suffered from sleep difficulties and racing thoughts, allegedly had mental health problems while incarcerated in the past, and had endured childhood abuse. He believes these facts might signify that he has a diminished capacity that would entitle him to a lower sentence. 9 [D]ue process requires that, where `the defendant's mental condition [is] relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer,' the government provide to indigent defendants expert psychiatric testimony at `the sentencing phase.' United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 391 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80, 83-84, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985)). Nevertheless, a trial judge is not required to grant every motion questioning an accused's competency. United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535, 1544 (1st Cir.1989). After a careful review of the evidence Mastera offers in support of his claim, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for funds. 27 Mastera presents four reasons for believing he might qualify for a diminished capacity sentencing departure. The evidence of alcoholism does not help Mastera because § 5K2.13 specifically prohibits a court from granting a diminished capacity downward departure if the [defendant's] significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants. This prohibition is buttressed by the policy statement in § 5H1.4 that [d]rug or alcohol dependence or abuse is not a reason for a downward departure. Thus, Mastera's alcoholism can be eliminated as an argument in favor of granting funds for a psychological evaluation. Moreover, current insomnia and racing thoughts, while indicative of some level of mental distress, are not probative as to Mastera's mental condition at the time he committed the crime of unlawfully possessing a firearm. 28 As to the child abuse, Mastera presented the sentencing court with a letter he had handwritten, entitled My Life, that described his violent and abusive childhood. Before imposing the sentence, the judge stated that he had received this document and reviewed it closely. Mastera argues that this case is comparable to the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Brown, 985 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.1993), which held that a district court had discretion to consider a defendant's account of severe abuse and neglect during his childhood. Id. at 481. However, the sentencing court in Brown explicitly stated its desire to depart downward but concluded that it did not have the authority to do so, and the Ninth Circuit held that it did, in fact, have that authority. See id. at 480, 483. In this case, by contrast, the sentencing court did read and consider Mastera's submission about the childhood abuse he suffered. 29 Finally, Mastera alleged to the district court, without providing specifics, that he had some history of psychological care during a prior incarceration. He argues that this allegation brings him within the ambit of Pellerito, in which the defendant moved for permission for a psychological evaluation and alleged, inter alia, that he was a long-time drug abuser [and] that he had been treated previously for mental illness. Pellerito, 878 F.2d at 1545. We held that the defendant's motion should have been granted. However, Pellerito is distinct from this case in one important way. 10 In Pellerito, the defendant's medicinal regimen, consisting of sedatives and anti-anxiety medications, was, at the time the request for an expert was made, a matter of record. Id. Mastera, in contrast, told the judge he was not on any medication, and, importantly, provided no corroborating evidence of any kind that he had a history of treatment for mental illness. 30 Having considered all the foregoing factors, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the judge to determine there was no warrant for Mastera to receive a psychological evaluation.