Opinion ID: 3049421
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officers Goff and Conefrey

Text: We review de novo the district court’s order granting the Officers and City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a). See Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2002). “Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the evidence presented at trial permits only one reasonable conclusion.” Id.

Edgerly argues that the Officers arrested him without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. To deter- 7 As we discuss below, the Officers and City suggested that probable cause also existed to arrest Edgerly under California Penal Code sections 602.5 and 647(h). 8624 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO mine whether the Officers had probable cause at the time of the arrest, we consider “whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the Officers’] knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Although conclusive evidence of guilt is not necessary to establish probable cause, “mere suspicion, common rumor, or even strong reason to suspect are not enough.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration omitted). Generally, officers need not have probable cause for every element of the offense, but they must have probable cause for specific intent when it is a required element. Id. at 1072-73. [1] Also, shortly before the district court entered judgment for the Officers and City under Rule 50(a), the Supreme Court decided Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), reversing our decision in Alford v. Haner, 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003), and overturning our precedent holding that probable cause supports an arrest only if probable cause existed for the offense invoked by the arresting officers or a closely related offense. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153-55. The Court held that, because the probable cause standard is objective, probable cause supports an arrest so long as the arresting officers had probable cause to arrest the suspect for any criminal offense, regardless of their stated reason for the arrest. See id. Under Devenpeck, however, an arrest is still unlawful unless probable cause existed under a specific criminal statute. See id. at 156 (remanding for the Ninth Circuit to address whether probable cause existed to arrest respondent for “obstructing a law-enforcement officer or for impersonating a lawenforcement officer”); see also Alford v. Haner, 446 F.3d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding, on remand from Devenpeck, that probable cause existed because there was “sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of objective probable cause to arrest Alford for the misdemeanor offense of criminal impersonation in the second degree”). It is therefore not enough, as the Officers and City argue, that probable EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8625 cause existed to arrest Edgerly for some metaphysical criminal offense;8 they must ultimately point to a particular statutory offense. [2] We conclude that the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest Edgerly for any offense identified by the Officers and City. The Officers cited Edgerly for violating California Penal Code section 602(l), now section 602(m). Under this section, a person commits a trespass if he or she “willfully . . . [e]nter[s] and occup[ies] real property or structures of any kind without the consent of the owner.” Long before Edgerly’s arrest, however, the California Supreme Court had clearly established that section 602(l) “requires occupation of the property, a ‘nontransient, continuous type of possession.’ ” In re Catalano, 623 P.2d 228, 234 n.8 (Cal. 1981) (quoting People v. Wilkinson, 56 Cal. Rptr. 261, 264 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1967)). As Wilkinson explained, section 602(l) requires the specific “inten[t] to remain permanently, or until ousted.” 56 Cal. Rptr. at 262; see also Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 16.340 (6th ed. 1996) (requiring, for a conviction under section 602(l), proof that the defendant “entered and occupied the property with the specific intent to dispossess those lawfully entitled to possession”). [3] Here, the Officers knew only that Edgerly was not a resident of the Cooperative and that he had been on the property for a matter of minutes. On the basis of these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed that Edgerly had violated or was about to violate section 602(l). [4] Nor did probable cause exist to arrest Edgerly for any of the other criminal offenses suggested by the Officers and 8 In their brief on appeal, the Officers and City do not argue with specificity that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under a trespassing or loitering statute; indeed, they do not even mention any relevant statutes. They argue only that the Officers “had probable cause to arrest Edgerly for some type of trespass.” 8626 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO City to the district court. First, under California Penal Code section 647(h), loitering also has a specific intent requirement, for which the Officers clearly had no probable cause.9 Specifically, that section requires that the alleged loiterer “delay or linger” on the property “for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered.”10 Id.; see also In re Joshua M., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 664-65 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the California courts first added this “specific intent element” to the state’s loitering statute in 1961, and that “[t]he Legislature included this intent element when it redrafted [the loitering statute] as present section 647, subdivision (h)”); Cal. Jury Instr., Crim., No. 16.445 (6th ed. 1996) (requiring, for a conviction under section 647(h), proof that the defendant “had a specific intent to commit a crime if [he or she] discovered the opportunity to do so”). Second, the 2000 version of California Penal Code section 602.5 in effect at the time of Edgerly’s arrest, which prohibited “enter[ing] or remain[ing] in any noncommercial dwelling house, apartment, or other such place,”11 applied by its terms only to “structures of the most private character, i.e., places of habitation.” In re D.C.L., 147 Cal. Rptr. 54, 55 (Cal. App. 1978) (holding that unauthorized entry of a shed adja- 9 California Penal Code section 647(h) provides, in full: “[Everyone who] loiters, prowls, or wanders upon the private property of another, at any time, without visible or lawful business with the owner or occupant [is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor]. As used in this subdivision, ‘loiter’ means to delay or linger without a lawful purpose for being on the property and for the purpose of committing a crime as opportunity may be discovered.” 10 Although we recognize that the probable cause and qualified immunity standards are objective, see Lopez, 482 F.3d at 1072; Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2003), we note that the Officers and City do not argue, and the Officers did not testify, that the Officers had probable cause to believe that Edgerly was on the Cooperative property for the purpose of committing a crime. 11 Effective January 1, 2001, California amended section 602.5 to replace “other such place” with “other residential place.” 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 3 (S.B. No. 1486). EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8627 cent to a house does not violate the section).12 A reasonable officer would not have believed that Edgerly, who was standing in the Cooperative’s playground area, had entered or was about to enter a dwelling unit in the Cooperative in violation of section 602.5. Finally, probable cause could not have existed to place Edgerly under custodial arrest pursuant to California Penal Code section 602.8(a). As an initial matter, it is doubtful that the section applies to residential property, as it prohibits entering, without written permission, “lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence . . . [or] uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to a mile.”13 In any event, a first offense under section 602.8(a) is punishable only “as an infraction” and, under clearly established California law, “[i]n all cases . . . in which a person is arrested for an infraction, a peace officer shall only require the arrestee to present . . . satisfactory [proof of identity] and to sign a written promise to appear.” Cal. Penal Code § 853.5. “Only if the arrestee refuses to sign a written promise, has no satisfactory identification, or refuses to provide a thumbprint or fingerprint may the arrestee be taken into custody.” Id. Here, the Officers did not testify that Edgerly refused to provide identification, fingerprints, or a signed written promise to appear, or that they had reason to believe that he previ12 As In re D.C.L. also noted, to construe the section otherwise “would be inconsistent with the legislative intent expressed in [section 602(l)], in that a penalty could be imposed for an unauthorized entry of any noncommercial structure even though no substantial occupation occurred.” Id. (footnote omitted). 13 As the California Court of Appeal explained in Quarterman v. Kefauver, citing section 602.8(a), among other statutes: “This sampling of statutes suggests that when the Legislature refers to land as . . . under cultivation . . . the ordinary import of the description usually is to agricultural land . . . , or at least rural land as opposed to urban backyards.” 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 741, 745-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).” 8628 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO ously violated section 602.8(a). Thus, even if a reasonable officer might have believed that Edgerly had violated section 602.8(a), the Officers lacked probable cause to place Edgerly under custodial arrest on this basis. [5] In sum, the facts and circumstances within the Officers’ knowledge were not sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that Edgerly had violated or was about to violate any California criminal statute that permitted custodial arrest,14 and we therefore conclude that the Officers did not have probable cause to arrest Edgerly.15 See Beck, 379 U.S. at 91. 14 The Officers and City do not refer us to any relevant municipal code for which probable cause to arrest may have existed. 15 In Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, we recently held that city police officers had probable cause to arrest Blankenhorn for trespass under California Penal Code sections 602(j) and 602(n), now sections 602(k) and 602(o). See 485 F.3d 463, 473-75 (9th Cir. 2007). Blankenhorn, however, involved a unique set of facts distinct from those in the instant case, and dealt with two sections of the California Penal Code that clearly do not apply here. The officers arrested Blankenhorn at a shopping mall where, six months before, mall security had issued him written notice evicting and permanently banning him from the premises. Mall security also asked the officers to arrest Blankenhorn on the night of the arrest. In light of these circumstances, we held that “[r]easonable officers could have thought that Blankenhorn, knowing he had been banned a few months earlier, could have intended that his presence would constitute ‘injury to property rights’ or ‘interference’ with [the mall’s] business,” in violation of then-section 602(j). Id. at 473-74 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 602(j)). Likewise, we held that reasonable officers could have concluded that Blankenhorn violated then-section 602(n), by his “ ‘[r]efus[al] or fail[ure] to leave’ after being issued the Notice Forbidding Trespass.” Id. (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 602(n)) (alterations in original). In light of these differences, although Blankenhorn also involved an arrest for trespass under the California Penal Code, it does not affect our analysis of Edgerly’s unlawful arrest claims. EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8629
[6] We must also determine, however, whether the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest. As the Supreme Court explained in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), police officers are entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 claims unless (1) their alleged conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that right was clearly established. Id. at 201-02. In determining whether a right was clearly established, we do not consider the right as a “general proposition.” Id. at 201. Rather, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. [7] Here, the Officers violated Edgerly’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment by arresting him without probable cause. The qualified immunity analysis therefore distills down to a single particularized inquiry: whether “a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed [for the] arrest” under the circumstances. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). If so, the arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Conversely, if a “reasonable officer could [not] have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed,” then the arresting officers are not entitled to immunity. Id. at 227 (final alteration in original). [8] We conclude that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the arrest, it was clear under established California law that Edgerly’s brief and otherwise unremarkable presence within the Cooperative’s gated, outside area did not violate any criminal statute. See id. at 22728. First, as we explained above with regard to then-section 602(l), it was clearly established well before Edgerly’s arrest that a person committed a trespass under that section only if 8630 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO he or she had the specific intent to permanently dispossess the lawful owner of the property. Given Edgerly’s unremarkable presence on Cooperative property for a matter of minutes, no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under section 602(l). Similarly, no reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under section 647(h), in light of its express specific intent requirement. As we explained above, a person violates section 647(h) only if he or she lingers on private property for the purpose of committing a crime. Here, Edgerly was simply standing at the Cooperative’s playground area for about five minutes, and the Officers had no additional information that Edgerly specifically intended to commit a crime at that time. Nor could a reasonable officer have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly under the applicable version of section 602.5, since none of the facts known to the Officers suggested that Edgerly had entered or was about to enter any of the Cooperative’s dwelling units. As we explained above, and the California courts had emphasized prior to Edgerly’s arrest, the section applied by its express terms only to actual places of habitation—dwelling houses or apartments—not playground areas. Finally, even assuming a reasonable officer could have believed that Edgerly had violated section 602.8(a), a reasonable officer could not have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Edgerly for the violation. As we explained in Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, “in evaluating a custodial arrest . . . federal courts must determine the reasonableness of the arrest in reference to state law governing the arrest.” 341 F.3d at 950 (alteration omitted). Thus, because California law “prohibits arresting someone solely for being an unlicensed driver,” we concluded in Bingham that “[a]rresting Bingham solely on that basis clearly is not an action that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful.” EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8631 Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, too, no reasonable officer could have believed that it was lawful to place Edgerly under custodial arrest solely on the basis of section 602.8(a). As we explained above, California law prohibits custodial arrests for a first offense under the circumstances of the instant case. [9] In sum, we conclude that the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest Edgerly for any offense and, because no reasonable officer could have believed otherwise, that they are not entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest. We therefore reverse and remand for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Edgerly on the issues of probable cause and qualified immunity for the arrest, and for further proceedings on the issue of damages.
We also conclude that the district court erroneously entered judgment as a matter of law for the Officers on Edgerly’s § 1983 unlawful search claim. Viewing the evidence at trial in the light most favorable to Edgerly, a reasonable jury could find that the Officers’ search of Edgerly at the police station was unreasonable, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Also, because no reasonable officer could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that the search as described by Edgerly was constitutional, the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for the search. Because the evidence from trial permits more than one reasonable conclusion as to the constitutionality of the search, we remand for further proceedings.16 16 Notably, Edgerly does not argue that the search was unconstitutional because it followed in a “continuous and unbroken sequence” from the unlawful arrest. Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1965) (“If the arrest [was] unlawful, then liability could follow, as to [the arresting officer], for the arrest and the events which followed in legally unbroken sequence.”); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994) (hold8632 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
To determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2006). State law is also relevant in analyzing the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330 n.5 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Bingham, 341 F.3d at 950. [10] We have held that “arrestees charged with minor offenses may be subjected to a strip search only if jail officials possess a reasonable suspicion that the individual arrestee is carrying or concealing contraband.” Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999)). Similarly, California Penal Code section 4030(f) prohibits strip searches of persons arrested for minor offenses “except those involving, weapons, controlled substances or violence,” unless the officer has a “reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe such person is concealing a weapon or contraband.”17 ing that common law tort rules provide the appropriate starting point for assessing § 1983 damages, and that damages for false arrest tort claims “cover the time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment” (citation omitted)); United States v. Jenkins, 876 F.2d 1085, 1089 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[B]ecause Jenkins’ arrest . . . was illegal, no valid inventory search could have been based on that arrest.”). Because Edgerly did not raise this argument, we deem it waived and therefore do not address it. If the district court deems it appropriate on remand, however, it may allow Edgerly to raise this issue. 17 We recently held, however, addressing section 4030, that not all drug offenses provide reasonable suspicion for a strip search. See Way, 445 F.3d at 1160-62. We have also held that not all felony offenses provide the requisite suspicion. See Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 711 (9th Cir. 1990), implied overruling on other grounds recognized by Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1993). EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8633 [11] We have also held that visually inspecting a person’s naked body, even without a “visual examination of body cavities,” constitutes a strip search.18 See Giles, 746 F.2d at 615, 618. Additionally, California’s reasonable definition of a “strip search” informs our Fourth Amendment analysis in the instant case. See Reed, 909 F.2d at 330 n.5; see also Bingham, 341 F.3d at 950. California Penal Code section 4030(c) expressly defines a strip search as a “search which requires a person to remove or arrange some or all of his or her clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the underclothing, breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of such person.” [12] Viewing the evidence in light most favorable to Edgerly, a reasonable jury could find that the Officers strip searched him. According to Edgerly’s trial testimony, Officer Goff required him to arrange his clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of his undergarments, by asking him to pull his pants down to his ankles. Further, Edgerly’s testimony that Goff looked inside his boxer shorts permits a reasonable inference that Goff visually inspected his buttocks or genitalia.19 Therefore, if the jury credits Edgerly’s testimony, the Officers’ search was a strip search that required reasonable suspicion. 18 Although we have not expressly decided whether requiring an arrestee to expose only his or her undergarments constitutes a strip search, we have held in the border search context that such a search “tend[s] toward [a] strip search in that if conducted in public it can be said to result in embarrassment to one of reasonable sensibilities.” United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978). We further held that, although it is “hardly feasible to enunciate a clear and simple standard for each possible degree of intrusiveness,” such a search requires “suspicion . . . founded on facts specifically relating to the person to be searched, and [that] the search [be] no more intrusive than necessary to obtain the truth respecting the suspicious circumstances.” Id. 19 In their motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Officers and City conceded that, crediting “Edgerly’s version of the search, and, giving a most liberal interpretation of that search, . . . a visual search was conducted of his genitalia.” 8634 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO [13] The Officers, however, did not testify that they had reasonable suspicion for the search. Rather, they testified that they arrested Edgerly only for trespass, a minor offense not involving contraband, weapons, or violence. Also, Officer Coneferey testified that Edgerly was not required to lower his pants at the police station because there was no reason to believe that he was concealing a weapon or contraband. [14] Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that the Officers strip searched Edgerly; and, if the Officers did strip search Edgerly, they violated his Fourth Amendment rights, because they did not have reasonable suspicion for the search.20
Because the facts alleged by Edgerly show that the Officers’ conduct violated his constitutional rights, see Katz, 533 U.S. at 201, the qualified immunity analysis again turns on a single particularized inquiry: whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in light of clearly established law, that the search was constitutional. See id. at 201-02; see also Way, 445 F.3d at 1159-60. [15] We conclude that the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged conduct of strip searching Edgerly either by requiring him to reveal his undergarments or by visually inspecting his genitalia or buttocks. As we explained above, it is clearly established in the Ninth Circuit that post-booking strip searches without reasonable suspicion are unconstitutional. See Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1446. Moreover, California law expressly defines a strip search to include the 20 In determining the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment, a jury could also consider the fact that, if the Officers strip searched Edgerly, they violated California law regardless of whether they had reasonable suspicion for the search, because it was not authorized by Sergeant Schiff. See Cal. Penal Code § 4030(f) (“No strip search . . . may be conducted without the prior written authorization of the supervising officer on duty.”). EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO 8635 exposure of undergarments or visual inspection of buttocks or genitalia, see Cal. Penal Code § 4030(c), and provides that it is a criminal offense to knowingly and willfully perform such searches on misdemeanor arrestees such as Edgerly without reasonable suspicion. See id. § 4030(f), (n). In light of this clearly established law, no reasonable officer could have believed the police station search, as described by Edgerly at trial, to be lawful. See Way, 445 F.3d at 1159-60; see also Katz, 533 U.S. at 201-02.
[16] Because the analysis for Edgerly’s state law false arrest claim is the same as for his § 1983 unlawful arrest claim, we reverse and remand for the district court to enter judgment in favor of Edgerly and to address the issue of damages in further proceedings. See Gillan v. City of San Marino, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158, 167-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a police officer who unlawfully arrests an individual without probable cause is liable for false arrest, and that California Government Code sections 820.2 and 821.6 do not provide immunity from such claims); cf. Cal. Penal Code § 847(b)(1) (providing that officers are entitled to immunity from false arrest claims where they had “reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful”); Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 475 (holding that the arresting officers were entitled to immunity from appellant’s state law false arrest claim because the officers had probable cause for the arrest). Also, although the legal basis for Edgerly’s state law unlawful search claim is not entirely clear from his complaint or the district court’s orders, it appears to be California Penal Code section 4030(p), which provides a private right of action for persons unlawfully strip searched in violation of the section. If so, Edgerly’s state law unlawful search claim would depend on the same disputed factual issues as his § 1983 unlawful search claim, and turn on the jury’s resolution of these issues on remand. We therefore reverse and remand for 8636 EDGERLY v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO the district court to clarify the legal basis of this claim and to proceed accordingly.21 Edgerly’s claims for negligence and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, however, raise substantial legal and factual questions beyond the lawfulness of Edgerly’s arrest and search, such as whether Edgerly suffered severe emotional distress and what duties the Officers owed to Edgerly. Because the district court mistakenly concluded that Edgerly’s arrest and search were lawful, it did not reach these questions. We therefore remand these claims so that the district court can address the necessary questions in the first instance.