Opinion ID: 2598459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: vouching issue

Text: [¶ 18] Huylar, a forensic interviewer, former supervisor of the Department of Family Services' Child Abuse Investigation Unit, and current project director at a child advocacy center, interviewed the victim on December 18, 2000, and again on February 5, 2001. [7] According to Huylar, a forensic interview is a way to obtain the information from a child that is in a nonleading manner, that is open, that still respects the integrity of the investigation and preserving evidence, and does It's an assessment process. It's assessing what the child is giving to you based upon certain criteria, and then assessing it based upon those criteria to whether or not the, the disclosure was credible or not. The protocol for such an interview includes building a rapport with the victim and his or her family, a general developmental assessment of the victim, whether the victim understands the difference between the truth and a lie, establishing whether the victim is aware of why he or she is there (this helps in assessing their statements from that point on), and engaging the victim in normal conversation followed by very specific formal questioning regarding the incident at issue. Huylar videotaped her interviews with the victim in the instant case, and both videotapes were played for the jury. [8] [¶ 19] On direct examination, the following colloquy occurred between the prosecutor and Huylar: Q. And whenever you, when you did these interviews with [the victim], did you undertake to evaluate the information that she was able to provide you? A. Yes, I did. Q. And what was the most critical as a forensic interview[er] for you to be evaluating? A. Probably the most critical for me when I'm evaluating the child's interview and disclosure is the contextual details that they can give me. And when I'm, when I'm talking about contextual, I'm talking about those unique details that a person only who has witnessed something could give me. There are those details like: How did it feel? How did it smell? What did it look like? Did, did somebody interrupt the process? They're very specific details, and only a person that has witnessed them would be able to give those to me.... ... Q. And when you do these interviews, do you then prepare a report? A. I do. Q. And do you have a format for how you put that into report fashion and what you specifically note? A. I've, I do. The, the tapes that I then record, I then take and I write a report verbatim off of, off of those tapes. And in those I am then doing the assessment part of the interview. I'm looking for elements of coaching. I'm looking for elements of contextual details. I'm looking for other elements that would support it either being a credible disclosure or a noncredible disclosure. Q. Okay, and did you, in fact, make note of the, that assessment in your report on the interviews you did with [the victim]? A. I did. ... Q. Significant to you that each time she identified Grandpa she was clear who she was talking about? A. Yes, because it showed consistency. She was very consistent, and at no time did she have confusion when she was asked specifically about who did what. It was always that particular grandpa. Q. Okay. Did you make note of each of the contextual details you indicated you earlier were evaluating throughout the interview process in your report? A. I did. I did. Q. The ones that were of significance? In the second interview, was there something of significance that you particularly found? A. Well, she had a few more contextual details. She was able to now say whose lotion it was, and she named [her stepmother], who is a known person to her dad and lives in that home. So that was significant.... She talked aboutShe could do sequentially what she did, what happened next. And she talked about going and getting the lotion and then bringing the lotion back, and where she got it off the counter. Those are really significant because, again, for a three- and a four-year-old, those are pretty heavy-duty details. She'd have had to have some kind of experience to be able to describe that. Q. And you noted each of those in your assessment and in your report? A. I did. Cross-examination by appellant's trial counsel addressed primarily claimed inconsistencies in the victim's answers to Huylar's questions. On redirect by the prosecutor, Huylar testified as follows: Q.... [Appellant's trial counsel] was essentially indicating that you described, that you asked questions to evaluate a child's ability to give contextual details. And he says, Well, you didn't get her to say she knew what it felt like or smelled like. What contextual details did you obtain that you felt were significant? A. In the scheme of things you can't, you know, I, you can't say that you will have all of those elements in order for it to be credible. So I look for a broad range of things that would be contextual, and I found quite a few. In terms of that she was just wearing a top and he was wearing pants, and then the detail that she described there was that it popped out. That was a real contextual detail she'd have been able to witness to have been able to describe that. That the lotion smelled like shampoo; that she had to rub it on his lollypop, and that she was licked; and that Grandpa liked it but not with the poo-poo on it. Those are contextual details that she gave that supported the conclusion. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: [Y]ou have evidence that [the victim's] Statements are not only reliable; they are consistent; they are detailed, and with contextual detail; a description provided of her real-life experience, her real-life sexual abuse at the hand of this man, her grandpa... ... ... And it is what [the victim] reported that she consistently, clearly, and with her three-year-old detail said to Lynn Huylar in the taped interviews. After listing several details from the victim's interviews with Huylar, the prosecutor continued: All of these three- to four-year-old contextual details. Remember, [the clinical psychologist] explained the significance. The prosecutor argued the following during rebuttal argument: [A]nd you, with your life experience, know how to evaluate the weight of the testimony given. And you are allowed to believe your four-year-old [victim] because you know that when you hear a child in their contextual detailed setting explain to you what happened to them, that that's the best way to refute somebody's testimony. And you know, based on everything that you've heard, that [the victim] has no motive to lie, and would have had absolutely no way to tell a consistent, detailed account of what her grandpa did to her unless she had a life experience to be describing.... ... ... Remember all of those contextual details, Ladies and Gentlemen. Remember what [the victim] tells you, what she told you happened, what her grandpa did. Her grandpa is guilty. In Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357, 360 (Wyo. 1988), we said: It is well established in Wyoming that an expert witness cannot vouch for the truthfulness or credibility of an alleged victim. Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227, 233 (1986). In Lessard, we explained that the question of credibility is for the jury, who are themselves expert in that area. Consequently, the testimony of a psychologist or other expert on the issue of credibility does not assist them and therefore does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 702, W.R.E. [9] One additional reason we prohibit such testimony [is that] we do not need or want a parade of `truth or falsehood' experts invading the jury's traditional function by offering expert opinions of credibility. Wells v. State, 846 P.2d 589, 598 (Wyo.1992) (Cardine, J., specially concurring) (emphasis omitted). However, testimony assisting the jury in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does not comment directly on that witness' credibility or veracity is not invasive of the role of the jury. Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604, 618 (Wyo. 1993). [¶ 20] We conclude that Huylar's truthfulness criteria testimony and her assessment of the victim's credibility based on the content of the victim's interview responses directly vouched for the victim's credibility. It is evident that the purpose of Huylar's testimony was twofold: establish the foundation for admitting her videotaped forensic interviews with the victim and assess the credibility of the victim's disclosure based on the content of those interviews. According to Huylar, the very purpose of a forensic interview is to assess whether the victim's disclosure was credible or nota forensic interviewer is looking for elements that would support it either being a credible disclosure or a noncredible disclosure. In evaluating the information the victim provided, the most critical factor, according to Huylar, is whether such information contains contextual details, or those unique details that a person only who has witnessed them could provide. Specifically, Huylar was asked to describe what significant contextual details the victim provided during the interviews. Huylar did so and testified that she found quite a few contextual details that supported her conclusion, a conclusion she based solely on the content of, indeed the extent of, the contextual details contained in the victim's responses. As to the significance of these details, Huylar stated that for a three- and a four-year-old, those are pretty heavy-duty details, the victim would have had to have some kind of experience to be able to describe that, and that one particular contextual detail was a real contextual detail [the victim would] have been able to witness to have been able to describe that. [¶ 21] Huylar's testimony in the instant case is nearly identical in nature and extent to the testimony we found impermissible in Zabel and quite similar to the objectionable testimony in Wilde v. State, 2003 WY 93, ¶¶ 17-18, 74 P.3d 699, 708-09 (Wyo.2003), a case also involving Huylar's testimony. In Zabel, 765 P.2d at 358, the victims were ten and thirteen years of age, and Zabel was charged with four counts of taking immodest, immoral and indecent liberties with a minor. A clinical psychologist who evaluated both victims, which evaluation included a clinical interview, testified that in evaluating the authenticity of the victims' reporting, [10] she looked for emotionality linked to the reporting, inconsistencies in the reporting, the amount of anxiety around the reporting, secondary gains as a motive to fabricate, and antisocial tendencies. Id. at 358-59. The psychologist further addressed specifically whether she observed any of these characteristics in either of the victims, essentially testifying that she observed the characteristics of a child telling the truth in both victims, as opposed to those characteristics of a child who is fabricating. Id. at 360. [¶ 22] We found that this testimony was directed to whether the children were `fabricating' and toward [the psychologist's] search for `authenticity of the reporting,' that it was abundantly clear that she was discussing truthfulness criteria in connection with the victims' reports of the incidents of sexual abuse, and that she led the jury through her truthfulness evaluation, including her conclusions. Id. at 361-62. We also distinguished such testimony from testimony that we previously had found to assist the jury in understanding some peculiar aspect of the victim's behavior (i.e. that most rape victims ask their assailants not to tell anyone about the incident, that victims often delay in reporting sexual abuse or assault, and that it was typical behavior for an adolescent victim not to immediately flee the scene and report the incident). Id. at 360-61. We concluded that, considering the circumstances present in Zabel, and especially that the case turned on the question of whether the jury believed the victims or Zabel, the error amounted to plain error. Id. at 362-63. [¶ 23] In Wilde, 2003 WY 93, ¶ 19, 74 P.3d at 709, we found reversible error, especially given the difficult credibility issues the jury had to assess in [the] case, due to vouching for the victim's credibility in part based on Huylar's testimony. In that case, also involving the same prosecutor as the instant case, Huylar similarly testified regarding her forensic examination of two child witnesses, and emphasized that a part of her interview process is to determine if the child knows what telling the truth is and whether the child is suggestible, and when asked by the prosecutor if AM was able to provide a detailed account of the event at issue, Huylar answered that kids who have been sexually abused will be able to provide those [details]. Id., 2003 WY 93, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d at 709. Huylar continued that she gave much weight to the details AM provided, because a child cannot make up that sort of detail. Id., 2003 WY 93, ¶ 18, 74 P.3d at 709. Wilde's trial counsel had objected to virtually every erroneous question, and the district court sustained several of the objections and did its level best to keep the prosecutor on track; nevertheless, despite several warnings, admonitions, and sustained objections, the prosecutor continued down the path of reversible error. Id., 2003 WY 93, ¶ 19, 74 P.3d at 709. [¶ 24] The State contends that Huylar's testimony assisted the jury in assessing a child victim's ability to communicate information consistent with the environment in which the alleged abuse took place and in understanding Huylar's interview techniques. The State also attempts to equate such testimony with that concerning the behavioral characteristics of sexual misconduct victims.... According to the State, Huylar did not opine whether what the child was testifying to was credible, but merely noted in general, what features might signal authenticity in the story of an interviewee; therefore, any bolstering of the victim's credibility was incidental. [¶ 25] We do not agree. The State's contentions mischaracterize Huylar's testimony. Huylar testified that the purpose of her forensic interviews with the victim was for Huylar to assess the credibility of the victim's disclosure regarding what occurred between the victim and appellant. The most critical component to that assessment was whether the victim's interview responses contained sufficient contextual details to render the disclosure credible. The nature of this testimony is the very search for `authenticity of the reporting' and truthfulness criteria testimony we identified in Zabel, 765 P.2d at 361-62. Huylar's testimony as to the significance of the victim's ability to communicate contextual details during those interviews is nothing more than Huylar's expert opinion that the victim's disclosure was credible because Huylar, in her expert capacity, was able to discern sufficient contextual details based solely on the content of the victim's responses to Huylar's interview questions. Huylar's testimony clearly exceeded even the purposes for which the district court had admitted it. [¶ 26] We add that the State has not, in the instant case, established to our satisfaction that testimony of this nature assisted the jury in addressing an issue beyond the jurors' common experience, that such testimony amounted to objective scientific or specialized knowledge that assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's testimony or explaining some aspect of the victim's testimony, that such testimony was necessary to disabuse the jury of some widely held misconception about child sexual assault victims, or that such testimony was otherwise relevant to, or helpful in, explaining some factual issue or other contention in the case. See, for example, Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 366-67 (Wyo.1991) and Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 979 (Wyo.1988). The district court had already determined that the victim was competent to testify, and the victim did testify at trial. Nothing in either Huylar's testimony, or the portions of a clinical psychologist's testimony that also addressed truthfulness criteria, [11] suggests that this kind of testimony would assist the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility any differently from how it would evaluate the credibility of another witness. Expert testimony concerning the victim's truthfulness would be of no assistance to the jury. Montoya, 822 P.2d at 365. Counsel were capable of arguing, and at least in the instant case, the jury was capable of evaluating, whether the content of the victim's statements contained indicia of reliability in the absence of Huylar's expert testimony. [¶ 27] It is true that we have previously found that expert testimony that discusses the behavior and characteristics of sexual assault victims and the range of responses to sexual assault encountered by experts is admissible. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo.1987). Such testimony is relevant and helpful in explaining to the jury the typical behavior patterns of adolescent victims of sexual assault. Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo.1988). It assists the jury in understanding some of the aspects of the behavior of victims and, so long as there is no comment on the credibility or truthfulness of the victims, it does not invade the province of the jury. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo.1988). Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933, 939 (Wyo. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435 (Wyo.1993). However, in Zabel, 765 P.2d at 360-61, we distinguished testimony nearly identical in nature and scope to the referenced testimony in the instant case from testimony we had previously found to assist the jury in understanding some peculiar aspect of the victim's behavior. The State has similarly failed to establish a sufficient nexus between that testimony and the general symptoms or typical behavior tendencies of child sexual assault victims or a proper diagnosis that the victim had been sexually assaulted. See, for example, Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶¶ 7-23, 18 P.3d 1164, 1169-74 (Wyo.2001); Cook, 7 P.3d at 56-57; Humphrey v. State, 962 P.2d 866, 873 (Wyo.1998); Curl, 898 P.2d at 373-74; Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 746 (Wyo. 1993), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 959, 118 S.Ct. 388, 139 L.Ed.2d 303 (1997); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1022-23 (Wyo.1993); and Rivera, 840 P.2d at 938-39. Rather, Huylar's testimony in the instant case sought to evaluate the credibility of the victim's disclosure based solely on the content of the victim's responses to Huylar's interview questions. See Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 928 (Wyo.1999) and Rigler v. State, 941 P.2d 734, 740 (Wyo.1997). [¶ 28] Perhaps equally troubling is the following exchange during the cross-examination of Bilkie, who had served as a law enforcement officer for twenty years and testified immediately after Huylar: Q. [Appellant's counsel]. That's correct. You had the statements of the [Seward] family indicating that [the victim] disclosed her other grandfather as touching her. A. Yes, I had allegations from the Seward family that [the maternal grandfather] had done this. Q. And there was no investigation done on that, basically; correct? A. Once I clarified and [the victim] positively identified Mr. Seward, there was no other, no other place to go with the investigation. On [the maternal grandfather], there was no other evidence pointing towards him. Q. Well, let's assume that even if [the victim] was saying Mr. Seward was doing it, she is a young girl and we don't know whether or not those statements were valid, or at least in the time you did this do not know whether or not this occurred or not; correct? A. I based the credibility of [the victim] on the detail she gave in the interview. And based on experience, yes, I do believe that this happened to her. Q. Okay, but she's a three-year-old girl. A. Yes. Q. Okay, and you didn't know her from Adam before you did this interview; correct? A. No, but I'm experienced with children giving contextual detail. The detective's responses certainly exceeded a circumstance where he merely relied upon the statements in determining that sufficient probable cause existed to arrest appellant. See Ogden v. State, 2001 WY 109, ¶ 29, 34 P.3d 271, 278 (Wyo.2001); see also Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 859-60 (Wyo.1998) (statement that officer thought the informant was honest with him when they worked together not opinion that witness was truthful but recommending that such inquiries be avoided). Not only did he express an opinion that the victim was credible solely due to the content of her statements, his opinion tied directly into Huylar's expert testimony regarding the amount of contextual details contained in the victim's statements. See Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1339-41 (Wyo.1992). [¶ 29] We conclude that the vouching errors that occurred in the instant case were harmful. Credibility was the central issue in the casea close factual dispute existed regarding whether to believe the victim's testimony, or appellant's testimony, as to what occurred during the weekend of November 25, 2000. The evidence of appellant's guilt certainly does not rise to the level of overwhelming nor was any physical evidence introduced to support the State's case. Accordingly, because two witnesses essentially vouched directly for the victim's credibility based solely on the content of the victim's disclosure, and considering the prosecutor's utilization of that testimony during closing and rebuttal argument, we find that a reasonable possibility exists that the verdict might have been more favorable to the appellant if the error had never occurred.