Opinion ID: 2630926
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Use of Leg Brace Restraints During Jury Voir Dire (Letner)

Text: On Monday, November 20, 1989, the trial court, having concluded individual voir dire of the prospective jurors, began group voir dire of those prospective jurors who had not been excused. Before the proceedings began, however, defendants objected that, for the first time during the proceedings, the sheriff's deputies had required the two defendants to wear leg brace restraints under their pants. A sergeant with the sheriff's office told the court that the deputies had security concerns because Letner, while wearing normal restraints, had attempted to assault another inmate, and both defendants had been seen practicing martial arts kicks in the jail's exercise yard. (We also note that, as described above, Letner had escaped from custody while being extradited to California to face the present charges.) The trial court found that the leg braces did not appear to be unduly restrictive, could not be easily seen, and were not likely to create any possibility of prejudice. The court stated it therefore would defer to the deputies' decision to apply the restraints. The following day, after the jury had been empanelled, the trial court noted for the record that after its ruling the previous day permitting the use of restraints, Tobin's leg brace had been damaged and was unusable. The court stated it had determined that no other restraints should be imposed, and therefore defendants would not be restrained for the remainder of the trial. (15) Letner contends on appeal that requiring him to wear the leg brace on November 20, 1989, violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions to due process, to the assistance of counsel, and to present a defense. His contention is unpersuasive. The applicable rule is that `[a] defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.' [Citation.] `The imposition of physical restraints in the absence of a record showing of violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming conduct will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion' under state law. [Citation.] Under the federal Constitution, where a court ordered a defendant, without adequate justification, to wear restraints that were seen by the jury, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the unjustified shackling did not contribute to the verdict. [Citation.] `The trial court may not delegate to law enforcement personnel the decision whether to shackle a defendant.' [Citation.] ( People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 773 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820] ( Ervine ).) Despite Letner's speculation to the contrary, there is no evidence in the record that any of the prospective jurors were able to see his leg brace. Indeed, the trial court, during record settlement proceedings, found that the leg brace was not visible to the prospective jurors. In addition, Letner was restrained on the day prior to that on which the jury was empanelled, and it is unclear how many, if any, of the jurors who ultimately served on the jury would have seen the brace that day. Letner contends, however, that under the high court's decision in Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622 [161 L.Ed.2d 953, 125 S.Ct. 2007], respondent must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the prospective jurors did not see the leg brace. Deck does not support his contention. In that case, the high court observed that the record makes clear that the jury was aware of the shackles ( id. at p. 634), and held that where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. The State must prove `beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained' ( id. at p. 635, italics added). In Deck there was no dispute that the restraints were visible to the jurya circumstance that courts consistently have viewed as inherently prejudicial. In the present case, we do not presume the prospective jurors viewed the restraint, and there is no evidence in the record demonstrating they did observe it. There also is no evidence in the record that the leg brace was so physically restrictive or uncomfortable that Letner's ability to assist his attorney in conducting voir dire of the prospective jurors was impaired. Letner's reliance upon our decision in People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95] ( Mar ), in support of this aspect of his claim, is unavailing. First, that case concerned the use of a stun belt, a device worn around the defendant's waist, capable of delivering `an eight-second, 50,000-volt electric shock if activated by a remote transmitter which is controlled by an attending officer. The shock contains enough amperage to immobilize a person temporarily and cause muscular weakness for approximately 30 to 45 minutes. The wearer is generally knocked to the ground by the shock and shakes uncontrollably. Activation may also cause immediate and uncontrolled defecation and urination, and the belt's metal prongs may leave welts on the wearer's skin requiring as long as six months to heal. An electrical jolt of this magnitude causes temporary debilitating pain and may cause some wearers to suffer heartbeat irregularities or seizures.' ( Id. at p. 1215.) There is no evidence that the leg brace worn by Letner created a remotely comparable level of potential pain, injury, and humiliation, such that Letner's ability to concentrate and participate in the trial proceedings similarly might have been affected. The sole evidence in the record concerning any possible adverse physical effect of the brace was Tobin's statement to the trial court that the brace he wore was very uncomfortable. Second, in Mar the credibility of the witnesses, including the defendant, was a key issue, and the defendant stated on the record that wearing the stun belt made it difficult for him to think clearly and that it added significantly to his anxiety, and the trial transcript confirm[ed] that defendant was nervous while testifying at trial. ( Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1224.) In Mar, therefore, use of the stun belt could have affected a critical aspect of the defense case: the jury's perception concerning whether the defendant was truthful in his testimony. In the present case, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that Letner's ability to participate was affected in any manner by his wearing the leg brace, and the proceeding in question (a single day of jury voir dire) was not of the same critical importance to Letner's participation as was the defendant's testimony in his own defense in Mar. Accordingly, even were we to conclude that the trial court erred by choosing to defer to the sheriff's deputies in permitting the use of the leg brace for one day of the proceedings, any error was plainly harmless. ( Ervine, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 773-774 [the unjustified shackling of a defendant is harmless when the jury did not see the restraint and there was no impairment of the defendant's ability to communicate with counsel or participate in his or her defense].)