Opinion ID: 2628870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exceptional Minimum Sentence

Text: ¶ 21 Finally, Bobenhouse argues the trial court erred when it imposed an exceptional minimum sentence. He asserts it was error for the trial court and not the jury to determine the aggravating factors in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). [5] ¶ 22 We have previously held that Blakely does not prohibit judicial fact finding when the trial court imposes either an indeterminate sentence of life or a minimum sentence within that life sentence. State v. Clarke, 156 Wash.2d 880, 891, 134 P.3d 188 (2006). In Clarke, we noted that [b]ecause Clarke's sentence is indeterminate, his exceptional minimum sentence, although part of his punishment, is irrelevant under Blakely analysis because the relevant statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is life imprisonment. Here, the same is true of Bobenhouse's sentence, and we hold that Bobenhouse's sentence does not offend Blakely. ¶ 23 Bobenhouse further argues the trial court abused its discretion when it did not find that the underlying rape and incest charges (stemming from forcing the children to have sexual intercourse with each other) constituted the same criminal conduct for purposes of sentencing. Bobenhouse would have this court hold that first degree child rape and first degree incest involve the same criminal intent, sexual intercourse. But this argument has no merit. We have previously held that the Legislature intended to punish incest and rape as separate offenses, even though committed by a single act. State v. Calle, 125 Wash.2d 769, 780, 888 P.2d 155 (1995). Bobenhouse's argument must fail in light of the precedent set by our decision in Calle. ¶ 24 Finally, as to sentencing, Bobenhouse argues that the trial court committed an offender score error that affected the unpunished crimes factor. He asserts the trial court should have treated as the same criminal conduct the counts related to Jane and the counts related to the acts he committed directly against his son, John. Generally, where crimes encompass the same objective criminal intent and were committed at the same time and place against the same victim, they are considered the same criminal conduct. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). But, considering the offender score of each crime, we can still uphold the exceptional minimum sentence even if the crimes should have been treated as the same criminal conduct for purposes of sentencing. ¶ 25 Here, Bobenhouse's offender score for each of the child rape offenses is 20. A score of 9 permits imposing a sentence at the highest end of the standard sentencing range. Clerk's Papers at 214 (judgment and sentence, identifying offender score for current offenses). In other words, even if Bobenhouse's current offenses were treated as the same criminal conduct for purposes of sentencing, his offender score is greater than 9, which would result in some current offenses going unpunished if an exceptional sentence was not imposed. Any error in not treating Bobenhouse's crimes as the same criminal conduct was harmless, and the trial court's finding that the unpunished crimes factor was present was proper under RCW 9.94A.535(2).