Opinion ID: 3051516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Washington Conviction

Text: [10] In 2001, Crawford pled guilty to conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (crack cocaine) in violation of the Washington Revised Code § 69.50.407, which provides: “Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this chapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” The government provided the district court with the amended information, Crawford’s plea agreement, several law enforcement affidavits supporting the plea agreement, and the state court’s judgment of conviction and sentence. The amended information charged Crawford with: Conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, committed as follows, that the defendant, Antonio Feliciano Crawford, in the State of Washington, on or about May 27, 1997, did knowingly and unlawfully conspire with at least one person other than the intended recipient to deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: crack cocaine, proscribed by RCW 69.50.407 [conspiracy] and 69.50.401(a) [controlled substance statute]. Crawford’s plea agreement, in a hand-written note, reflects that the elements of the crime are adopted “as in amended UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD 3213 info.” The plea agreement was signed by Crawford, defense counsel, the prosecuting attorney, and the state court judge. The state court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Crawford to 26 days’ imprisonment. [11] Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a predicate offense can qualify a defendant for career offender status if it is a “felony conviction[ ]” of “either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), where a “controlled substance offense” is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense,” id. § 4B1.2(b). The underlying controlled substance statute provides that “it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance.” Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401(1) (2005). The statute also provides that “[a]ny person who violates this section with respect to (a) A controlled substance classified in Schedule I or II which is a narcotic drug . . . is guilty of a class B felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten years . . .” Id. § 69.50.401(2)(a) (2005). [12] The district court concluded that the 2001 Washington conviction qualifies as a predicate offense because the maximum term for the crime was imprisonment for ten years based on the controlled substances statute. Crawford concedes that “[t]he conspiracy statute states that the maximum punishment may not exceed the maximum for the object of the conspiracy, in this case a Class B felony with a 10 year maximum.” To avoid the application of that ten-year maximum, Crawford cites Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.120(6) (re-codified in 2001 as Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.505(2)(b)), and argues that under Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act, conspiracy is an “un3214 UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD ranked” offense and, thus, the maximum sentence available is twelve months. [13] We rejected an almost identical argument in United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2005). In Murillo, we considered whether, for purposes of determining “whether a Washington state criminal conviction is of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year for purposes of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm),” the “maximum sentence for [a] prior conviction is defined by the state criminal statute, [or] the maximum sentence in the particular case set by Washington’s sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 1153. We held that the maximum sentence that makes a prior conviction under state law a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) remains, after Blakely, the potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute, not the maximum sentence which could have been imposed against the particular defendant for his commission of that crime according to the state’s sentencing guidelines. Id. at 1155 (emphases added). We explicitly rejected the idea that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 471 (2000), or Blakely affected this definition of a predicate conviction: Blakely did not change the definition of what constitutes a maximum sentence under state law for pur- poses of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). ... .... . . . Murillo’s argument has nothing to do with Apprendi or Blakely. While Apprendi, and corre- spondingly Blakely, involved the “maximum sen- tence” a judge may impose based on the jury’s UNITED STATES v. CRAWFORD 3215 verdict or the defendant’s admissions, Murillo attempts to extend Apprendi and Blakely to modify a crime’s potential punishment . . . . Murillo, 422 F.3d at 1154-55. Thus, Crawford’s argument is foreclosed by Murillo. The 2001 Washington conviction qualifies as a predicate drug offense, and the district court did not err in relying on that offense in determining that Crawford was a career criminal. AFFIRMED.