Opinion ID: 3015863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion Made Pursuant to 60(b)(4)12

Text: Relief under 60(b)(4) is appropriately sought when the a judgment is void. A judgment can be voided on two grounds: (1) if the rendering court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or (2) if it acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862. 10 A court that is not the one which rendered the underlying issue, but one in which another court’s decision is registered. 11 The New Jersey Judge quoted the following from Wright & Miller: Relief under Rule 60(b) ordinarily is obtained by motion in the court that rendered the judgment. If a judgment obtained in one district has been registered in another district, as provided by Section 1963 of Title 28, it is possible that the court in the district of registration has jurisdiction to hear a Rule 60(b) motion. Indeed, several courts have ruled that it is proper for the registration court to entertain a Rule 60(b) motion when the basis for the motion is that the judgment is void for a lack of jurisdiction. 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2865 (1973). The New Jersey Court further noted that the Texas Order had not been registered in the New Jersey district. 12 While Chusid does not specify which component of his motion is based on Rule 60(b)(4), his argument suggest that it is only applicable to the request to stay the Texas Order. 10 While 60(b)(4) motions are ordinarily raised in the court that rendered the decision, they can be raised elsewhere. For example, a number of Courts of Appeals have approved a registering court’s reliance on Rule 60(b)(4) to void a judgment when the judgment involved a default judgment and the rendering court was without jurisdiction over the defendant. See Harper Macleod Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 394-95 (5th Cir. 2001). As there is no dispute that the Texas Court has jurisdiction over the Chusids, the only basis under 60(b)(4) for voiding the Texas Order is if it is shown to violate due process. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862. While most motions made pursuant to Rule 60(b) may be reversed only for an abuse of discretion, determinations that a judgement is void under 60(b)(4) are subject to plenary review. See Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978). As noted by the Second Circuit, “under Rule 60(b)(4) a deferential standard of review is not appropriate because if the underlying judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a District Court to deny a movant’s motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).” Cent. Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Herbert, 341 F.3d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Local Rule 7.1(e) of the Northern District of Texas states that a response and brief to an opposed motion must be filed within 20 days from the date which the motion is filed. We presume, without deciding, that the Texas Court violated Local Rule 7.1 when it approved the settlement three days after a motion seeking approval was filed. We have not considered 11 whether a rendering court’s failure to follow its own local rules constitutes a due process deprivation upon which relief from judgment could be granted. Two Courts of Appeals, when confronted with a similar issue, reached different results. In United States v. 1982 Sanger 24’ Spectra Bd., a forfeiture proceeding, the district court, contrary to its local rules, struck petitioners’ claims and their answer to the verified complaint without allowing petitioners to reply to the Government’s motion. 738 F.2d 1043 (1984). In considering whether the district court committed an act upon which a Rule 60(b) motion can be based, the Ninth Circuit held that “although a failure to follow a local rule may not rise to the level of a due process violation, nonetheless when the effect is conclusively to dispose of a claim, failure to provide notice is a serious procedural irregularity which in this case justifies relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).” Sanger, 738 F.2d at 1046. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the claimants were entitled to relief from judgment pursuant to 60(b)(4). The Seventh Circuit, however, issued a somewhat contrary ruling in Blaney v. West, 209 F.3d 1027 (7 th Cir. 2000). In Blaney, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s case sua sponte because of a service defect. While the plaintiff attempted to correct the problem by refiling and reserving the suit, the second suit was also dismissed because the statute of limitation had expired. The plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b)(4) motion for the first suit, claiming the judgment was void because he had not received notice before the court entered the dismissal. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s failure to receive notice 12 before the judgment entry did not rise to the level of a violation of due process because the plaintiff received notice from the judgment itself and had ample opportunity to move for reconsideration of the judgment. Id. at 1032. We find the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Blaney more analogous to this case. Here, the Texas Court approved the settlement between Appellee Croft and the Receiver three days after the Receiver moved for approval. The settlement terms included Crofts taking judgment on all counts of the complaint in the New Jersey Action in the amount of $240,000. There was ample time between the date that the Texas Order was issued and when the New Jersey Court discharged the attachment and restraints on the New Jersey property for Chusid to seek a stay or otherwise make his case before the Texas Court. In the Texas Court, Chusid could have filed a motion for reconsideration, a Rule 62 motion, a Rule 60(b) motion, or an appeal to correct any harm suffered by Chusid’s inability to respond to the proposed settlement. The Chusids knew that the Receiver was marshaling their assets, which included the New Jersey property. The Chusids are not challenging the Receiver’s authority to take control of the New Jersey property, but, instead are challenging the Receiver’s decision to use the New Jersey property to settle the claims that Croft has against the assets held by the Receiver. Any objections the Chusids may have had to the settlement are independent of any claim they would have against the Receiver. Here, the Texas Court’s approval of the settlement within three days simply does not rise to the level of a due process 13 violation. Therefore, we conclude that the Texas Court’s actions do not provide the basis for relief pursuant to 60(b)(4). In sum, we affirm because the New Jersey Court was within its sound discretion to deny Chusid’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion and because the action of the Texas Court does not render the Texas Order voidable pursuant to 60(b)(4). We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 14