Opinion ID: 4311008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Contrary to” Controlling Precedent

Text: First, the state court applied the wrong legal standard. It is clearly established that the Sixth Amendment limits the trial court’s ordinary discretion to limit cross‐examination. The Supreme Court has held that ordinary rules of evidence must give way when they prevent a defendant from presenting evidence central to the defense, including through cross‐ No. 17‐2223 17 examination. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679–80; Davis, 415 U.S. at 319 (finding state’s interest in maintaining anonymity of juvenile oﬀenders was “outweighed by petitioner’s right to probe into the influence of possible bias” through cross‐examination); see also Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295–98 (finding that state could not apply common‐law evidentiary rule to limit cross‐ examination of key witness); id. at 302 (finding that hearsay rule cannot be applied mechanistically when it undermines fundamental elements of defense). And most important for our analysis—because we cannot take the Court’s precedents at too high a level of generality, Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006)—it is clearly established that a trial court violates the Confrontation Clause when it routinely applies Rule 403 balancing to limit cross‐examination by the accused on issues central to the defense. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679–80; see also Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2001) (granting habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1) for Confrontation Clause violation when Wisconsin applied § 904.03 to exclude “highly probative, noncumulative, nonconfusing, nonprejudicial evidence” that was “vital to the central issue in the case”). In Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court aﬃrmed a state su‐ preme court decision that found a Confrontation Clause vio‐ lation. The trial court had relied on the state’s Rule 403 to bar cross‐examination of a prosecution witness about possible bias stemming from charges pending against that witness. The Supreme Court agreed with the state supreme court that the Confrontation Clause was violated: [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose 18 No. 17‐2223 reasonable limits on such cross‐examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is re‐ petitive or only marginally relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for eﬀective cross‐examination, not cross‐examination that is eﬀective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fen‐