Opinion ID: 2741195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eighth Amendment Framework

Text: [¶12] The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment guarantees individuals the right to not be subjected to excessive sanctions or to punishments that are disproportionate to the crime committed. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2463; Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 18, 294 P.3d 36, 41 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II). The United States Supreme Court has in recent years decided a line of cases setting Eighth Amendment limitations on the sentencing of juvenile offenders, including, most recently, its 2012 decision in Miller. Because Miller addressed the constitutional parameters of imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on a juvenile offender convicted of homicide, that decision is of particular significance in addressing the issues presented by this appeal. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. We nonetheless start our discussion with the two decisions that preceded Miller because those decisions provided the backdrop for the Supreme Court’s holding Miller. [¶13] In 2005, the Court decided Roper v. Simmons, which held that offenders who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed could not be sentenced to the death penalty. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1200, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). In 2010, the Court decided Graham v. Florida, which held that a juvenile offender who committed a non-homicide offense could not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74-75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). In this Court’s decision in Bear Cloud II, the first decision in which this Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of Wyoming’s juvenile sentencing scheme in light of Miller, we summarized the Roper and Graham holdings as follows: Commencing in 2005, the United States Supreme Court issued a series of decisions pertaining to the Eighth Amendment’s effect on juveniles. In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), the Court held that “[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.” Id., 543 4 U.S. at 578, 125 S.Ct. at 1200. Importantly, the Court discussed differences between juveniles and adult offenders, including: (1) a juvenile’s “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility;” (2) a juvenile’s increased susceptibility to “negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure;” and (3) the idea that “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” Id., 543 U.S. at 569–70, 125 S.Ct. at 1195. These differences between juveniles and adults would play a pivotal role in Miller. .... Next, in Graham, the Court held that “for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.” Id., 560 U.S. at [74-75], 130 S.Ct. at 2030. The Court continued, “A juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his actions, but his transgression ‘is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’” Id., 560 U.S. at [68], 130 S.Ct. at 2026. Again the Court commented on the inherent differences between adult and juvenile offenders: No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence. Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of “irretrievably depraved character” than are the actions of adults. Roper, 543 U.S., at 570, 125 S.Ct. 1183. It remains true that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Ibid. These matters relate to the status of the offenders in question; and it is relevant to consider next the nature of the offenses 5 to which this harsh penalty might apply. Id., 560 U.S. at 68-69, 130 S.Ct. at 2026–27 (some citations omitted). Bear Cloud II, ¶¶ 21-23, 294 P.3d at 42. [¶14] Following the Roper and Graham decisions, the Supreme Court issued its 2012 decision in Miller, which ruled that the Eighth Amendment bars a court from sentencing a juvenile offender to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. The Miller Court held: The two 14–year–old offenders in these cases were convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In neither case did the sentencing authority have any discretion to impose a different punishment. State law mandated that each juvenile die in prison even if a judge or jury would have thought that his youth and its attendant characteristics, along with the nature of his crime, made a lesser sentence (for example, life with the possibility of parole) more appropriate. Such a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from considering a juvenile’s “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change,” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2026–2027, 2029–2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and runs afoul of our cases’ requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties. We therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2460. [¶15] In this Court's decision in Bear Cloud II, we observed as follows concerning the Miller court’s sentencing limitations: Notably, the Miller majority refused to categorically bar sentencing juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Court stated that [although] “we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require [the sentencer] to take into account how children are different, and how those differences 6 counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id., 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2468 (footnote omitted). The Court went on to note, however, that such sentences should be “uncommon”: But given all we have said in Roper, Graham and this decision about children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is especially so because of the great difficulty we noted in Roper and Graham of distinguishing at the early age between ‘the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.’ Id., 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. In sum, Miller requires a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles. By requiring that all children convicted of homicide receive lifetime incarceration without possibility of parole, regardless of their age and age-related characteristics and the nature of their crimes, the mandatory sentencing schemes before us violate this principle of proportionality, and so the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 567 U.S. at ––––, 132 S.Ct. at 2475. Bear Cloud II, ¶¶ 27-28, 294 P.3d at 43-44. [¶16] Using this Eighth Amendment framework, we turn to Mr. Mares’ sentence, his Rule 35 motion, and the certified questions.