Opinion ID: 3010431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Perhaps anticipating the above analysis, BP

Text: contends that the fact that Barton & Pittinos worked with GIV to provide some elements of the competing package does not mean that Barton & Pittinos was not a competitor of the consultant pharmacists. Appellant's Br. at 23 (emphasis added). We accept the basic premise of B&P's argument, which is that market definition is not determined by formal labels, but rather takes into account the realities of competition. Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 826 (3d Cir. 1984). And we acknowledge that in defining markets some courts have recognized that a product should not be excluded from a market because it requires an additional input in order to be a reasonable substitute for other products in the market. Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 772 F.2d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). But we reject _________________________________________________________________ 6. B&P attempts to mask this defect in its argument by referring to the program as the Barton & Pittinos program rather than the SKB/GIV/B&P program. It thus asserts that Barton & Pittinos offered a better package at a lower price than the consultant pharmacists. Appellant's Br. at 22. As explained in the text, this assertion is simply untrue. 9 B&P's argument, because the realities of competition in this case are that the nursing homes could not have switched from the pharmacists to B&P alone and because we do not believe that the product itself can fairly be described as merely an additional input. The cases upon which B&P relies are readily distinguishable. In Telex Corp. v. Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975), the court held that Telex's and IBM's computer products were in the same market even though they were incompatible, because the interchange of these products was easy and practicable. Similarly, in Bhan, the court held that nurse anesthetists and M.D. anesthesiologists competed in the same market even though nurse anesthetists required the input of the supervision of an attending physician, because such supervision is not only easily obtainable but is actually a common practice in the medical profession. 772 F.2d at 1471. In contrast, in this case it is clear that the additional input required by B&P -- if the vaccine itself can be so characterized -- was not easily obtainable or practicable. Indeed, B&P was legally barred from buying, possessing, or selling the vaccine because it lacked the required prescription-drug license. Cf. Schuylkill, 113 F.3d at 415-16 (plaintiff could not show antitrust injury where it was prohibited by law from competing in the relevant market). B&P relies most heavily on Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 951 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, GTE, the defendant, published telephone directories and sold advertisements in them. Advertisers had a choice between purchasing advertisements and advertising consulting services as a package offered at one price by GTE or purchasing advertising consulting services from the plaintiffs, independent companies that placed ads with GTE. When GTE ended its practice of allowing independent companies to place ads, the plaintiffs remained free to sell advertising consulting services, but their business suffered because advertisers found it inconvenient to deal with the plaintiffs once they could no longer place the ads as well. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing because they 10 competed with GTE in the market for yellow-pages advertising consulting services. Id. at 1161-62. Yellow Pages might help B&P if the court had held that the plaintiffs competed with GTE in the market for sales of yellow-pages advertising despite the fact that the plaintiffs did not actually sell yellow-pages ads, but rather merely information about yellow-pages ads. If such were the case, the analogy to the instant case would be good: B&P, like the Yellow Pages plaintiffs, offered marketing and educational services concerning a product, but did not offer the actual product itself. But this is not what the Yellow Pages court held. The Ninth Circuit has reiterated in subsequent cases that its holding in Yellow Pages was that the plaintiffs and defendants did compete in the same market: the market for advising yellow page advertisers as to the form, content, and cost of yellow page advertising. Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1510 (9th Cir. 1997). Accord American Ad Management, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 786 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996). Yellow Pages thus does not provide a basis for holding that by marketing the vaccine B&P competed in the market for the package of marketing and distribution of the vaccine.7 B&P has not pointed us to, and we have been unable to locate, any case holding that an advertiser or broker has standing to sue for antitrust violations restraining trade in the market for sales of the good or service advertised or brokered. On the contrary, courts have held that advertisers and brokers of a good or service are not competitors of companies that actually supply the good or service. See, e.g., Bodie-Rickett and Assoc. v. Mars, Inc., 957 F.2d 287, 290-91 (6th Cir. 1992); S.D. Collectibles, Inc. v. Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir. 1992).8 _________________________________________________________________ 7. B&P does not contend that a distinct market exists exclusively for the marketing of the vaccine. 8. The district court, in reaching the same conclusion as we have, relied on evidence such as the deposition of B&P's president James Pittinos, in which Pittinos described B&P as an advertising and marketing agency which did not compete with wholesalers and pharmacists. See 942 F. Supp. at 237. 11 We therefore conclude that B&P did not compete with the pharmacists in the market for the package of marketing and distribution of the vaccine. Because B&P was thus not a competitor or a consumer in the market in which trade was allegedly restrained by the antitrust violations pled by B&P, we hold that B&P's alleged injury is not antitrust injury, meaning injury of the type that the antitrust statute was intended to forestall. AGC, 459 U.S. at 539. Accordingly, we agree with the district court's determination that B&P lacked standing to institute this private treble-damages action.9