Opinion ID: 472146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subsequent Discovery Of An Unavailable Witness's Prior

Text: Inconsistent Statements 18 We turn then to the question of whether the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the prior inconsistent statements assuming that Dr. Schepers was not available for further examination or explanation. Judge Weinstein suggests that the trial court's discretion to dispense with the witness's opportunity to explain away the contradiction should rarely be exercised. The one clear situation to the contrary exists when the statement came to counsel's attention after the witness testified and the witness, through no fault of counsel is not available to be recalled. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, p 623, at 613-22 to -23 (1985). The appellant, of course, attempts to paint itself within this classic example by emphasizing that trial counsel had no knowledge of Dr. Schepers' prior inconsistent testimony until after he had testified and that the appellant was not responsible for his unavailability. 19 As to the knowledge of appellant's trial counsel, the lower court found that he had no specific knowledge of the three previous inconsistent statements at the time Dr. Schepers was testifying, and we accept that finding. More importantly, however, it is clear that counsel did have sufficient knowledge of Schepers' past performance to immediately recognize that his trial testimony deviated substantially and significantly from that general body of testimony. Counsel's familiarity with Dr. Schepers as a witness, a well-travelled and often used plaintiff's expert who had testified numerous times on the state of medical knowledge concerning the hazards of asbestos exposure, is well borne out by the record. Counsel candidly admitted at trial that he was astounded by the nature of Dr. Schepers' testimony concerning his involvement with National Gypsum where he ha[d] testified absolutely to the contrary before, [Rec. Vol. 7, at 339; Vol. 8, at 15], and that had he known that the doctor would answer as he did, the question would never have been asked. The problem, as we see it, is not that trial counsel learned of prior inconsistent statements by a witness after the witness testified. Rather, it appears from counsel's own admissions that he had sufficient knowledge to recognize the inconsistency while the witness was still on the stand, and failed to react in any discernible way to bring that discrepancy into issue while the witness was available. 20 In cases of true subsequent discovery, as in cases where the inconsistent statement occurs after the witness testifies, it is simply impossible to cross-examine the witness regarding the inconsistency while the witness is initially on the stand. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1169 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007, 98 S.Ct. 1877, 56 L.Ed.2d 388 (1978). Cf. Harre v. A.H. Robbins Co., 750 F.2d 1501, 1505 (11th Cir.1985) (counsel could not be faulted for failing to discover perjury during cross-examination where there was no discovery information to indicate testimony was false and perjury came to light only through witness's testimony at subsequent trial). In the instant case, however, trial counsel did not have such a complete lack of knowledge that would make questioning regarding the inconsistency impossible. Counsel understandably would have been hesitant to undertake extensive cross-examination without ready access to Dr. Schepers' exact prior testimony. Nevertheless, we are convinced that counsel had sufficient knowledge such that action of some kind was required, whether it be to generally inquire of the witness as to his unprecedented testimony or to alert the court to the fact that counsel sought to pursue the matter later after further preparation. Having failed to do either, counsel ran the risk that the witness would become unavailable, just as occurred here. 5 21 The appellant seeks additional support from the fact that the appellee's pretrial witness list described Dr. Schepers solely as an expert witness. The contention is that the surprise factual nature of his testimony created a situation where the appellant was completely unprepared to respond, justifying the presentation of the prior transcripts after the witness had left the stand. The problem with this argument, of course, is that defense counsel did not bring this contention to the trial court's attention in a timely manner while Schepers was testifying by motion to strike or otherwise, waiting instead to first broach the issue the next day at the close of its case in the context of presenting the doctor's prior inconsistent statements. If the appellant found Dr. Schepers' factual testimony to be a problem, it was obligated to notify the trial court at the time it arose. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). By failing to do so, opposing counsel and the court were essentially lulled into believing that there was nothing amiss as to Schepers' testimony, nor any reason in this regard to preserve his availability. See Bibbs, 564 F.2d at 1169 (one purpose of the traditional foundation requirement is to avoid unfair surprise by giving the opposite party an opportunity to draw a denial or an explanation from the witness on redirect examination); McGuire, 744 F.2d at 1203-04 (failure to put the defense on notice of prior inconsistent statement until after the witness was excused and had left town described by the court as a questionable trial tactic); 3 Weinstein, supra, at 613-24 (The impeaching party would seem sufficiently to comply with the rule [Rule 613(b) ] if he informs the court and opposing counsel at the time the witness testifies that he intends to introduce an impeaching statement and that his opponent may therefore prefer to keep the witness available to be called to explain it if he desires to do so.). In short, the time to object to the surprising factual nature of Schepers' testimony was while he was available, and having missed that opportunity, the appellant (perhaps unwittingly) contributed to his later unavailability. 6 This factor is relevant to the district court's discretion to exclude the prior statements under Rule 613(b). 22 On this record, we conclude that this case does not involve the type of subsequently discovered prior inconsistent statements that would require a lower court to admit those statements in the witness's later absence. Appellant's counsel admittedly had knowledge of both the expected substance of Schepers' testimony and his deviation therefrom as contrary to prior testimony. In addition, counsel's failure to timely raise the issue of the surprising factual nature of that testimony contributed to the witness's later unavailability. This is not a classic case of subsequently discovered prior inconsistent statements, the exclusion of which would be an abuse of discretion.