Opinion ID: 2518270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Asserted Error Relating to the Exclusion of Evidence of Irene's Prior Sexual Conduct as Corroboration for Defendant's Testimony

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred also in excluding evidence that Irene had engaged in intercourse earlier that day, which could have corroborated his testimony that he saw semen between her legs in her privates when she was in his room. In excluding this evidence, the trial court remarked that the alleged conduct was earlier in the day. As such, it's not specifically corroborative of the defendant's claim of visible semen in the afternoon at 4:00. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Furthermore, it's offered to apparently corroborate the defendant's utterly fantastic and inherently unbelievable and incredible claim that the complaining witness on her own initiative, despite refusing to come up before, on her own initiative came up to the defendant's room after recent sex with [her] boyfriend and without drying herself in a condition where she would be uncomfortable, wet and unappealing, where her object was apparently to trade sex for a laptop because she didn't have any money, and in achieving that object, she was to present herself to the defendant. In that condition, she would be presenting herself to the defendant in an obviously unappealing and unattractive condition, which would have the direct effect of defeating the very object of her visit. [¶] On this record, the court does not feel that there has been a sufficient showing that would require the court to exercise its discretion to allow in the testimony regarding her consensual sexual activities that day. [¶] So, this is sort of equivalent to a man essentially walking around with damp jockey shorts with the object of being desirable to a woman with whom he didn't have a close relationship. The Court of Appeal, on the other hand, found that the evidence was relevant to corroborate defendant's testimony that he saw semen in her privates and concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in rejecting defendant's version of events as incredible and unworthy of belief. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The probative value of the corroborating evidence was slight at best. Even if a fact finder were to fully credit defendant's testimony that he saw semen in her privates, that fact would not have shed much light one way or the other as to whose version of the events, defendant's or Irene's, was the true one. Under either version of what occurred, Irene was naked, thus affording defendant the opportunity to see her privates. Yet the presence of semen would have tended to undermine defendant's account since, as the trial court stated, if Irene had plotted to entice defendant into giving her the laptop in exchange for sex, one would expect that she would have taken at least the most minimal steps to make herself desirable. Likewise, defendant testified that he took off his shirt and approached Irene even after he had observed her conditionwhich is presumably the opposite of how one would have acted if he had seen semen in her privates and had become disgusted. (5) Moreover, as the trial court also found, defendant's claim that there was visible semen in her privates several hours after Irene had intercourse and despite her having worn panties in the interim defies gravity and common sense, and defendant offered no medical foundation that could link his observations to her prior conduct. ( Smith v. State (Ct.Spec.App. 1987) 71 Md.App. 165 [524 A.2d 117, 128].) The trial court thus rejected the offer not because it found defendant to be a witness who was not credible, but because the link defendant was attempting to draw between Irene's conduct and the visible condition of her privates several hours later was unbelievable. (See Wilson v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 865, 877-878 [130 Cal.Rptr. 292].) The probative value of evidence that is inherently so improbable as to be unworthy of beliefor evidence that is very close to that levelis obviously quite low. ( People v. Casas (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 889, 897 [226 Cal.Rptr. 285].) The potential prejudice of this evidence, on the other hand, was substantial. ( U.S. v. One Feather (8th Cir. 1983) 702 F.2d 736, 739 [the policy of the rape shield law to guard against unwarranted intrusion into the victim's private life . . . may be taken into account in determining the amount of unfair prejudice].) For some jurors, the fact that the victim has engaged in sexual conduct outside of marriage automatically suggests a receptivity to the activity or is proof that the victim got what she deservedneither of which is a rational or permissible inference. ( U.S. v. Kasto (8th Cir. 1978) 584 F.2d 268, 271-272.) In addition, the Legislature has determined that victims of sexual assault require greater protections beyond those afforded other witnesses against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasion of privacy (see generally Government of Virgin Islands v. Scuito (3d Cir. 1980) 623 F.2d 869, 875-876), and defendant's inquiry would have violated those interests, particularly the state interest to encourage reporting by limiting embarrassing trial inquiry into past sexual conduct. ( Wood v. Alaska (9th Cir. 1992) 957 F.2d 1544, 1552.) Finally, defendant had little need to establish that Irene had actually engaged in sex that day in order to support his contention that he was disgusted by the appearance of her privates, since it can be difficult to distinguish visually between seminal fluid and cervical mucus, which is a normal discharge that increases around the time of ovulation. (Carlson et al., The New Harvard Guide to Women's Health (2004) p. 403.) Defendant's testimony depended on his belief that what he saw was seminal fluid, and counsel made precisely that point in argument: Maybe it wasn't. He didn't have a microscope. It might not have been. It might have been a normal female secretion that gave that appearance . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] He did testify that that's what it was, and that's what he thought it was. Hence, he had little need for proof that what he observed was actually semen. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence that Irene had engaged in sexual intercourse earlier that day. We likewise reject defendant's claim that this ruling deprived him of his right to confront witnesses or his right to present a defense. ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36].)