Opinion ID: 4377578
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Contract Against Dayton

Text: “A cause of action for breach of contract requires the claimant to establish the existence of a contract, the failure without legal excuse of the other party to perform when performance is due, and damages or loss resulting from the breach.” Lucarell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97 N.E.3d 458, 469 (Ohio 2018). The parties agree that the relationship between Doe and Dayton is contractual and that the Student Handbook lays out the contract terms. See Behrend v. State, 379 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (“[W]hen a student enrolls in a college or university, pays his or her tuition and fees, and attends such school, the resulting relationship may reasonably be -12- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton construed as being contractual in nature.”). We therefore ask whether Dayton failed to perform on the contract. Our review of Dayton’s actions is limited, recognizing that “contracts for private education have unique qualities and must be construed to allow the institution’s governing body to meet its educational and doctrinal responsibilities.” Valente v. Univ. of Dayton, 438 F. App’x 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2011) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ray v. Wilmington Coll., 667 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)). We “will not interfere in these matters in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” Schoppelrei v. Franklin Univ., 228 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967). “In confronting challenges to private school disciplinary proceedings, the appropriate question is thus ‘whether the proceedings fell within the range of reasonable expectations of one reading the relevant rules, an objective reasonableness standard.’” Faparusi v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 711 F. App’x 269, 277 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pierre v. Univ. of Dayton, 143 F. Supp. 3d 703, 713 (S.D. Ohio 2015)). Doe’s broad argument is that his proceedings were unfair and so the University breached general Handbook guarantees such as “ensur[ing] that respondents . . . are treated fairly in the University’s processes.” In light of the governing objective standard, we may not accept as sufficient Doe’s subjective claim of an unfair proceeding that reached the wrong conclusion. Nor may we derive an ideal of fairness by analogy to the procedural protections applicable in courts of law. See Doe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 872 F.3d 393, 400 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[The University] is not required to ‘transform its classrooms into courtrooms’ in pursuit of a more reliable disciplinary outcome.” (quoting Jaksa v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245, 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1984))). Rather, because our inquiry asks “whether the proceedings fell within the range of reasonable expectations of one reading the relevant rules,” Faparusi, 711 F. App’x at 277 (citation -13- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton omitted), we consider each instance of allegedly unfair conduct by the University and compare it to the governing Handbook provisions. Doe first raises two allegations centering on the Board’s failure to ask witnesses questions that he proposed. Before his hearing, Doe submitted a list of questions to be asked of each witness. He alleges that the Board asked none of them, thereby breaching the Handbook’s promise that “[q]uestions deemed relevant and appropriate by the [Board] will be addressed to the individual [witness] by the [Board] chair.” He similarly faults the Board’s decision after the Judiciary Review Committee gave him an opportunity to review the taped proceedings and propose another set of questions. At that point, the Board declined to reconvene the witnesses and pose the proposed questions because “none of those questions would provide additional information that could alter the determinations already made with regards to a code violation of sexual harassment.” Doe argues this was also error because the Board failed to apply the Handbook’s “relevant and appropriate” standard. The Handbook is divided into sections that lay out expectations for particular topics and types of proceedings. The section describing Board procedures in sexual harassment cases states that “the University Hearing Board process and procedure differs for cases that do not involve sexual harassment and harassment” and provides a cross reference to another section that lays out “the process for other Codes of Conduct.” The “relevant and appropriate” provision Doe cites is found in the cross-referenced section governing other conduct violations, not in the harassmentspecific procedures. The harassment procedures do not mention the “relevant and appropriate” standard. Instead, in harassment cases, “[t]he board determines the questions they will ask by considering the relevance of the content to their purpose, their need for the information in order to make a decision and the appropriateness of the question.” The Board’s “approval process is closed -14- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton to both parties,” and the Board “is not required to provide rationale for the acceptance or denial of any question.” The Handbook therefore did not oblige the Board to ask the questions Doe proposed before the hearing or to explain to Doe why his questions were not asked, and the Board properly considered its “need for the information in order to make a decision” when it rejected proposed questions that would not “alter the determinations already made.” Next Doe states that Dayton imposed “arbitrary and capricious time limitations on Doe that were not contained in Dayton’s policies.” He appears to reference the requirement imposed after the Judiciary Review Committee’s remand that he view the taped proceeding between January 12 and 17 and submit questions within one hour of the viewing. The one-hour limit was more generous than the Handbook, which allows parties only 10 to 15 minutes to generate questions from live testimony. As to the selection of dates, the Handbook is silent about how to navigate the unusual circumstance mandated by the Committee’s remand. The University may therefore have been obliged to pick a date in good faith. See Shimrak v. Goodsir, 2014-Ohio-3716, ¶ 25 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2014) (“[I]f a contract is silent on a point, ‘[t]he parties to a contract are required to use good faith to fill the gap.’” (quoting Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. v. Cox, 729 N.E.2d 398, 401 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999))). But see Lucarell, 97 N.E.3d at 469 (“[T]here is no violation of the implied duty [of good faith] unless there is a breach of a specific obligation imposed by the contract . . . .”). The University gave Doe three business days to review the hearing and indicated that it would “allow for an extension if there was good reason.” Doe does not allege that he provided such a reason and was ignored, so even assuming the University was obliged to act in good faith, we see no basis to conclude that it failed to do so. -15- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton Doe also argues that the University breached Handbook provisions by not allowing him to submit exhibits, call a witness, or access a medical record that Roe referenced during her live testimony. These arguments turn in part on the Board’s process for receiving evidence. Participants are not “permitted to submit information to the Student Conduct System outside of the investigation.” Doe concedes that he suggested witnesses and provided evidence to Swinton during the investigation. Pursuant to the Handbook, then, he could call a new witness or introduce new evidence only under “extraordinary circumstances,” and “[t]he University reserves the right to determine what is considered an extraordinary circumstance.” Doe does not allege that the University deemed his circumstances extraordinary, nor (assuming such a challenge would be permissible) does he explain why the University should have made such a determination. Barring him from submitting further exhibits or calling new witnesses thus comported with the Handbook. To the extent Doe wished to call a witness who had already testified to the investigator, the Board was bound by the Handbook provision that “witnesses are not compelled to participate in the University Hearing Board process.” The argument about Roe’s medical record fails for a similar reason. Because that record was not included in the investigatory report, it could not be provided to the Board—and so to Doe—at the hearing. Doe points to no Handbook provisions requiring production of documents that are referenced during the hearing but were not included in the report, and the University was not required to have such a process in place. See Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio, 418 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting “unanimous” agreement that “neither rules of evidence nor rules of civil or criminal procedure need be applied” at disciplinary hearings). -16- No. 18-3339, Doe v. Univ. of Dayton In sum, having compared the language of the Handbook to the procedures described in the complaint, we see no “clear abuse of discretion,” Schoppelrei, 228 N.E.2d at 336, in the University’s interpretation and implementation of its hearing procedures.