Opinion ID: 2576193
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Heading: Under Unruh, Treating a Domestic Partner Registered Under the Domestic Partner Act Differently Than a Spouse Constitutes Impermissible Marital Status Discrimination.

Text: Plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief requires us to apply the law currently in effect. ( White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 773, 120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222, fn. 8 [`Relief by injunction operates in futuro, and the right to it must be determined as of the date of decision by an appellate court'], quoting American Fruit Growers v. Parker (1943) 22 Cal.2d 513, 515, 140 P.2d 23.) We must determine, therefore, whether BHCC currently violates the Unruh Act by denying plaintiffs, who are registered as domestic partners, the same benefits it extends to married couples.
The current version of the domestic partnership statutes, denominated by the Legislature the California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003 became effective January 1, 2005. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 2.) [3] The Domestic Partner Act permits same-sex couples and some opposite-sex couples in which one or both individuals are over the age of 62, who share a common residence, to file a Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State. (§ 297.) Section 297.5 grants domestic partners the same rights, protections, and benefits and imposes upon them the same responsibilities, obligations and duties under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses. (§ 297.5, subd. (a).) These rights and responsibilities are extended to current domestic partners, former domestic partners and surviving domestic partners. (§ 297.5, subds. (a)-(c).) The purpose of the Domestic Partner Act is set forth in uncodified portions of section 297.5, in which the Legislature declares: This act is intended to help California move closer to fulfilling the promises of inalienable rights, liberty, and equality contained in Sections 1 and 7 of Article 1 of the California Constitution by providing all caring and committed couples, regardless of their gender or sexual orientation, the opportunity to obtain essential rights, protections, and benefits and to assume corresponding responsibilities, obligations, and duties and to further the state's interests in promoting stable and lasting family relationships, and protecting Californians from the economic and social consequences of abandonment, separation, the death of loved ones, and other life crises. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 1, subd. (a).) The Legislature has found that despite longstanding social and economic discrimination, many lesbian, gay, and bisexual Californians have formed lasting, committed, and caring relationships with persons of the same sex, and that [e]xpanding the rights and creating responsibilities of registered domestic partners would further California's interests in promoting family relationships and protecting family members during life crises, and would reduce discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation in a manner consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 1, subd. (b).) Section 15 of the Domestic Partner Act, furthermore, requires that the act be construed liberally in order to secure to eligible couples who register as domestic partners the full range of legal rights, protections and benefits, as well as all of the responsibilities, obligations, and duties to each other, to their children, to third parties and to the state, as the laws of California extend to and impose upon spouses. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 15.) Section 297.5 effectuates the legislative intent by using the broadest terms possible to grant to, and impose upon, registered domestic partners the same rights and responsibilities as spouses in specified areas of laws whether they are current, former or surviving domestic partners. For example, pursuant to section 297.5, subdivision (c), a surviving registered domestic partner, [upon] the death of the other partner, is granted all the same rights and is subject to all the same responsibilities, from whatever source in the law, as those granted to and imposed upon a widow or a widower. Similarly, section 297.5, subdivision (d) states: The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses. The rights and obligations of former or surviving registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of former or surviving spouses. Subdivision (e) requires that, [t]o the extent that provisions of California law adopt, refer to, or rely upon ... federal law, and this reliance on federal law would require domestic partners to be treated differently than spouses, registered domestic partners shall be treated by California law as if federal law recognized a domestic partnership in the same manner as California law. (§ 297.5, subd. (e).) With respect to discrimination, subdivision (f) provides: Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights regarding nondiscrimination as those provided to spouses. (§ 297.5, subd. (f).) Moreover, with one exception pertaining to eligibility for long-term care plans, subdivision (h) prohibits any public agency in California from discriminating against any person or couple on the ground that the person is a registered domestic partner rather than a spouse or that the couple [consists of] registered domestic partners rather than spouses. (§ 297.5, subd. (h).) It is clear from both the language of section 297.5 and the Legislature's explicit statements of intent that a chief goal of the Domestic Partner Act is to equalize the status of registered domestic partners and married couples. It is in light of this intent that we must determine whether the Unruh Act precludes BHCC from granting married couples benefits it denies to persons registered as domestic partners under the Domestic Partner Act. We conclude that the Unruh Act does.
Civil Code section 51, subdivision (b) states: All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever. Enacted in 1959, the Unruh Act amended an 1897 version of Civil Code section 51 that was declarative of a common law doctrine requiring places of public accommodation to serve all customers on reasonable terms without discrimination and ... to provide the kind of product or service reasonably to be expected from their economic role. ( In re Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 212, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 ( Cox ).) Seminal decisions of this court construing the scope of the Act concluded that its protections were not confined to the enumerated categories in the statute but that these categories were illustrative rather than restrictive. ( Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 216, 90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992 [the Act prohibits a business from excluding a customer because of his association with another person of unconventional appearance]; Marina Point Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 735, 180 Cal.Rptr. 496, 640 P.2d 115 [the Act prohibits an apartment owner from refusing to rent an apartment to a family with a minor child]; O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790, 191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427 [the Act prohibits a condominium development from restricting residence to persons over 18].) We also concluded that in enacting the Unruh Act, the Legislature intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination in public accommodations. ( Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 72, 75, 219 Cal.Rptr. 150, 707 P.2d 212 [The Act is this state's bulwark against arbitrary discrimination in places of public accommodation].) We revisited these conclusions in Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1142, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873 ( Harris. ) In the process of doing so, we created a three-part analytic framework for determining whether a future claim of discrimination, involving a category not enumerated in the statute or added by prior judicial construction, should be cognizable under the Act. Harris involved a claim by women receiving public assistance that a landlord's policy requiring prospective tenants to have gross monthly incomes equal to or greater than three times the rent charged for an apartment (the minimum income policy) constituted economic status discrimination and was barred by the Unruh Act. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant's policy excluded persons who could pay the rent, but were unable to meet the minimum income policy. They maintained they were entitled to a trial to determine whether the policy constituted arbitrary discrimination under the Act. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1154, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) We held that the Unruh Act did not include within its ambit claims of economic status discrimination because economic status is fundamentally different than the categories either enumerated in the Act or added by judicial construction. In reaching this conclusion, we affirmed the principle articulated in our earlier decisions that the Act's enumerated categories are illustrative, rather than restrictive. Beginning with Cox in 1970, the Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifications not expressed in the statute. [Citations.] [¶] We generally presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court decisions. [Citations.] It has not taken specific action to overrule these cases. Moreover, the Legislature has amended the Act several times in the 20-year period since Cox [citation] was decided. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1155-1156, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) However, our examination of the legislative response to our prior decisions led us to conclude that the Legislature had not acquiesced in the broad proposition set forth in those decisions that the Act was intended to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination. Notwithstanding our language about `arbitrary discrimination' and `stereotypes,' the Legislature has continued to pay close attention to the specified categories of discrimination in the Unruh Act.... Thus, the Legislature's continued emphasis on the specified categories of discrimination in the Act (without adding the words `arbitrary,' `unreasonable,' or similar language to its provisions) reflects the continued importance of those categories in its proper interpretation. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1158-1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Having therefore concluded that the Unruh Act's ban on arbitrary discrimination was qualified by the continued importance of the enumerated categories, we considered whether the Act could, nonetheless, be extended to claims of economic status discrimination in light of both the language and history of the Act and the probable impact on its enforcement of the competing interpretations urged on us by the parties. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) We devised a three-part analysis to answer this question. First, in reviewing the statutory language, we discerned an essential difference between economic status and both the Act's enumerated categories and those added by judicial construction. We found that their common element was that they involve personal as opposed to economic characteristics  a person's geographical origin, physical attributes, and personal beliefs. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1160, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Thus, the first prong of the Harris inquiry is whether a new claim of discrimination under the Act is based on a classification that involves personal characteristics. Second, we asked in Harris whether a legitimate business interest justified the minimum income policy. We found it did. The minimum income policy is no different in its purpose or effect from stated price or payment terms. Like those terms, it seeks to obtain for a business establishment the benefit of its bargain with the consumer: full payment of the price. In pursuit of the object of securing payment, a landlord has a legitimate and direct economic interest in the income level of prospective tenants, as opposed to their sex, race, religion, or other personal beliefs or characteristics. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1163, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Third, we considered the potential consequences of allowing claims for economic status discrimination to proceed under the Unruh Act. We perceived two significant adverse consequences that would likely follow from plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of the Act. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1166, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) First, we believed it would involve courts in a multitude of microeconomic decisions we are ill equipped to make regarding the reasonableness of the criteria used by landlords to screen tenants unable to pay their rent regularly and on time throughout the tenancy. ( Ibid. ) Second, permitting prospective tenants to challenge such criteria on a case-by-case basis might induce landlords to abandon such neutral criteria as income, applicable to all prospective tenants regardless of their personal characteristics, and use subjective criteria that might disguise and thereby promote the very kinds of invidious discrimination based on race, sex and other personal traits that the Unruh Act prohibits. ( Id. at p. 1169, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Therefore we concluded that the minimum income policy did not violate the Act. ( Ibid. )
Both plaintiffs and BHCC rely on the analytic framework set forth in Harris to determine whether plaintiffs' marital status discrimination claim is cognizable under the Unruh Act. [4] We now consider each of Harris's three prongs on this issue.
As to the first prong of the Harris analysis, plaintiffs contend that marital status involves a personal characteristic like those categories already covered by the Unruh Act. BHCC, however, contends that marital status is nothing more than a legal status conferred by the state that does not involve personal characteristics. We agree with plaintiffs. We did not define the phrase personal characteristic in Harris, but we indicated that, at minimum, it encompassed both the categories enumerated in the Act and those categories added to the Act by judicial construction. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1160-1161, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Thus, the list would include sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition (Civ.Code, § 51, subds. (b),(c)), and unconventional dress or appearance, family status and sexual orientation ( Harris, supra, at p. 1161, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873) but not financial status or capability. ( Ibid. ) What those categories have in common is not immutability, since some are, while others are not, but that they represent traits, conditions, decisions, or choices fundamental to a person's identity, beliefs and self-definition. (See id., at p. 1160, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873 [unlike economic status, enumerated categories involve personal characteristics like a person's geographical origin, physical attributes and personal beliefs].) Under this standard, marital status is more like the existing categories to which the Act applies than it is to economic status. The kinds of intimate relationships a person forms, and the decision whether to formalize such relationships implicate deeply held personal beliefs and core values. Indeed, marriage itself is defined as a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman . . . . (§ 300.) Similarly, the decision whether to enter into a domestic partnership is motivated by personal values and beliefs. This point was recognized by the Legislature in its characterization of these relationships in the Domestic Partner Act as lasting, committed, and caring, and undertaken by two individuals to share lives together, participate in their communities together, and [for] many [to] raise children and care for other dependent family members together. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 1, subd. (b).) Thus, contrary to BHCC's argument, the decision to marry or to enter into a domestic partnership is more than a change in the legal status of individuals who have entered into marriage or domestic partnership. In both cases, the consequences of the decision is the creation of a new family unit with all of its implications in terms of personal commitment as well as legal rights and obligations. BHCC also relies on the analysis of Harris set forth in Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1455, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 ( Beaty) . Beaty is the only appellate decision that has considered whether marital status discrimination is cognizable under the Unruh Act. On the first prong issue, Beaty found that marital status, like the economic status involved in Harris, is a category that the Unruh Act was simply not intended to reach. As noted, in Harris we determined that economic status was fundamentally different than the categories enumerated in the Act as a reason to exclude it from coverage under the Act ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1161-1162, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873). Similarly, in Beaty, the Court of Appeal concluded that the strong public policy favoring marriage categorically precluded recognition of marital status discrimination under the Act. Since Beaty is critical to the parties' arguments, we discuss it at some length. Beaty involved a male couple. The two men had lived together for 18 years and had taken various legal steps to create a common life, including jointly owning many of their assets, among them their residence, and naming one another as each other's primary beneficiary for estate and life insurance purposes. The defendant insurer had issued them joint homeowners and automobile insurance policies, but refused to issue them an umbrella policy for a single premium because such policies were available only to married couples. ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the defendant's refusal to issue the umbrella policy constituted sexual orientation and marital status discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act. Their action was dismissed after the trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal cited Harris for the proposition that future expansion of prohibited categories should be carefully weighed to ensure a result consistent with legislative intent. [Citations.] ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, the court observed: In light of Harris, we decline plaintiffs' invitation . . . to include `marital status' as an additional category of prohibited discrimination. There is a strong policy in this state in favor of marriage [citations], and in the context here presented that policy would not be furthered (and in the case of an unmarried heterosexual couple, would actually be thwarted) by including marital status among the prohibited categories. It is for the Legislature, not the courts, to determine whether nonmarital relationships such as that involved in this case `deserve the statutory protection afforded the sanctity of the marriage union.' ( Id. at pp. 1462-1463, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) Unquestionably, there is a strong public policy favoring marriage. ( Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 1, 9, 192 Cal.Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904.) This policy serves specific interests not based on anachronistic notions of morality. The policy favoring marriage `is rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.' ( Laws v. Griep (Iowa 1983) 332 N.W.2d 339, 341.) Formally married couples are granted significant rights and bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by those who cohabit without marriage. ( Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582; Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 [observing that the structure of society itself . . . depends upon the institution of marriage].) [5] There are also practical interests served by the policy favoring marriage. For purposes of determining entitlement to rights and benefits, a marriage license provides a readily verifiable method of proof. ( Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 10, 192 Cal.Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904.) By contrast, a claim for such rights and benefits made by an unmarried couple presents numerous problems of standards and difficulties of proof regarding the depth and stability of the nonmarital relationship that create a potential for intrusions into rights of privacy and association. ( Ibid.; Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 275-276, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582.) A related interest supporting the public policy of promoting marriage is to minimize the risk of third parties who provide services or benefits from loss or fraud. ( Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 155, 158, 173 Cal.Rptr. 68 [upholding denial of cause of action for wrongful death to surviving partner of unmarried couple under former Code of Civil Procedure section 377 because an action based on a meretricious relationship presents greater problems of proof and dangers of fraudulent claims than an action by a spouse or putative spouse].) These policy considerations cannot justify denial of Unruh Act protection to domestic partners, whatever their application to other unmarried individuals and couples. To couples who meet the requirements of establishing a domestic partnership under the Domestic Partner Act and who have registered under that law, the Legislature has granted legal recognition comparable to marriage both procedurally and in terms of the substantive rights and obligations granted to and imposed upon the partners, which are supported by policy considerations similar to those that favor marriage. (§ 297.5, subd. (a).) Thus, under the Domestic Partner Act, domestic partners, like [f]ormally married couples, have been granted significant rights and bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by couples who cohabit or who have not registered as domestic partners. ( Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582.) Furthermore, as explained in the next part, the practical considerations served by the policy favoring marriage are now also promoted by the Domestic Partner Act. The Declaration of Domestic Partnership provides a readily verifiable method of proof for determining eligibility for services and benefits. Additionally, the mutual obligations undertaken by domestic partners, comparable to those of spouses, minimizes any economic risk to third parties that extend such services and benefits to domestic partners. Thus, in creating domestic partnerships, the Legislature has also created a policy favoring such partnerships similar to the policy favoring marriage. Additionally, the Legislature has made it abundantly clear that an important goal of the Domestic Partner Act is to create substantial legal equality between domestic partners and spouses. As noted above, subdivision (f) of section 297.5 states: Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights regarding nondiscrimination as those provided to spouses. We interpret this language to mean that there shall be no discrimination in the treatment of registered domestic partners and spouses. This reading comports with the Legislature's statement that the Domestic Partnership Act shall be construed liberally in order to secure to eligible couples who register as domestic partners the full range of legal rights, protections and benefits, as well as all of the responsibilities, obligations, and duties to each other, to their children, to third parties and as to the state, as the laws of California extend to and impose upon spouses.  (Stats. 2003, ch. 421, § 15, italics added.) Of special relevance to the Unruh Act issue presented here, the Legislature has found that expanding the rights and obligations of domestic partners would reduce discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation in a manner consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution. ( Id., § 1, subd. (b).) In light of this legislative action, we conclude that the policy favoring marriage is not served by denying registered domestic partners protection from discrimination under the Unruh Act. To the contrary, permitting a business to discriminate against registered domestic partners by denying them benefits or services it extends to spouses violates the comparable public policy favoring domestic partnership. We conclude that, consistent with the first prong of the Harris analysis, discrimination against registered domestic partners in favor of married couples is a type of discrimination that falls within the ambit of the Unruh Act.
As a further ground for holding that the Unruh Act did not ban marital status discrimination, Beaty invoked the second prong of the Harris analysis and found that the insurer's denial to the plaintiffs of the umbrella coverage it issued to married couples was justified by legitimate business interests. (See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1162-1165, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Likewise, BHCC, relying on Beaty, also argues that its restriction of the spousal benefit to married couples serves legitimate business interests. In its discussion of the second prong of Harris, Beaty found that the legal unity of interest and the shared responsibilities attendant upon a marriage both minimized the economic risk to the insurer in providing such coverage to married couples and provide[d] a fair and reasonable means of determining eligibility for services or benefits. ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1464, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) By contrast, an insurer could reasonably conclude that the relationship of an unmarried couple lacks the assurance of permanence necessary to assess with confidence the risks insured against in a joint umbrella policy. ( Ibid. ) As discussed, these same concerns have been echoed in other decisions rejecting claims by unmarried couples to such benefits and services. (E.g., Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 275-276, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582; Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 9, 192 Cal.Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904; Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, supra, 118 Cal.App.3d at p. 158, 173 Cal.Rptr. 68.) These concerns, however, do not apply to registered domestic partners. Registered domestic partners occupy a legal status that, like marital status, is formalized, public and verifiable. (§§ 297, 298, 298.5, 299.) The Declaration of Domestic Partnership that registered domestic partners are required to file with the Secretary of State (§ 297, subd. (b)) provides an easily verifiable method of determining whether a couple is in a registered domestic partnership. Therefore, a business is no longer required to undertake a `massive intrusion' [citation] into [the couples'] private lives [and] inquire into their sexual fidelity and emotional and economic ties ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593) to determine whether these unions possess a sufficient assurance of permanence and legal unity of interests to extend benefits formerly reserved for spouses. Moreover, because the substantive rights and responsibilities granted to and imposed upon domestic partners are the same as those granted to and imposed upon spouses (§ 297.5), a business extending such benefits would have the same assurance against loss or fraud that it would have in the case of spouses. In light of this analysis, we find unpersuasive the various business interests BHCC claims are served by its policy of denying family membership benefits to any but married couples. BHCC claims that extending that benefit to members' friends might lead to overuse of its facilities, create a disincentive for such friends to apply for membership and would discourage its legitimate goal of creating a family-friendly environment by welcoming the immediate family of married members. French, however, is not simply Koebke's friend, but her registered domestic partner, with rights and responsibilities similar to that of a spouse. Extending the spousal benefit to her would not create the stampede on the fairway that BHCC appears to envision. BHCC also argues that denying French the spousal benefit contributes to the creation of a family-friendly environment. While creating a family-friendly environment may be a legitimate business interest, that policy is not served when a business discriminates against the domestic partner of one of its members. Rather, by so doing, the business violates the policy favoring domestic partnerships which, like the policy favoring marriage, seeks to promote and protect families as well as reduce discrimination based on gender and sexual orientation. Accordingly, we conclude that, while promoting a family-friendly environment may be a legitimate business interest, that interest is not furthered by excluding families formed through domestic partnership.
Lastly, in rejecting marital status as a category for purposes of Unruh Act protection, Beaty applied the third prong of the Harris test, which inquires about the consequences that will flow from permitting a plaintiff to proceed with a novel Unruh Act claim. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1165, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Beaty concluded that the consequence of allowing plaintiffs to proceed with their marital status discrimination claim would be that all de facto couples would be treated as a married unit in derogation of the strong policy in this state favoring marriage. ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1465, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, italics added.) In this case, however, allowing plaintiffs to proceed with their claim would not have this adverse consequence, because our ruling affects only registered domestic partners, not all unmarried couples. Moreover, the consequence of interpreting the Unruh Act to prohibit discrimination against domestic partners would have the positive effect of effectuating the Legislature's intent expressed in the Domestic Partner Act to create substantial legal equality between registered domestic partners and spouses.
BHCC argues that section 297.5 has no impact on whether the Unruh Act bars discrimination against domestic partners. [6] It contends that section 297.5 extends to domestic partners only such rights and responsibilities as are granted to and imposed upon spouses and, because spouses are not protected under the Act, neither are domestic partners. This argument misses the point. As discussed, consistent with the first prong of Harris, discrimination against domestic partners is a type of discrimination that falls within the ambit of the Unruh Act. Nonetheless, BHCC, following Beaty, argues that special policy and practical considerations unique to marriage should preclude courts from interpreting the Unruh Act to prohibit discrimination that favors married couples over unmarried ones. As we have explained, these rationales do not justify discrimination between married couples and domestic partners registered under the Domestic Partner Act. BHCC embraces the view expressed by the Beaty court that the inclusion of marital status in antidiscrimination statutes other than the Unruh Act shows that the Legislature's failure to add that category to the Unruh Act implies a legislative intent that such discrimination not be included within the Act. ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) Historically, however, the scope of the Act has been determined by both legislative amendments to the statute and judicial decisions, and the Legislature has not seen fit to continuously update the Unruh Act to include new forms of prohibited discrimination. (See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1154-1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Moreover, we are not concerned at this point with marital status discrimination generally but the discrimination against domestic partners outlawed in the Domestic Partner Act. The Legislature's failure to amend the Act to expressly prohibit such discrimination is a particularly weak barometer of legislative intent. ( People v. Anderson (2002) 28 Cal.4th 767, 780, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368.) For the same reason, we also reject BHCC's related argument that, because the only specific antidiscrimination provision in section 297.5 involves discrimination against domestic partners by public agencies (§ 297.5, subd. (i)), the Legislature did not intend to ban discrimination against domestic partners in public accommodations. No specific legislative declaration is required for this court to infer from the statements of legislative intent accompanying the Domestic Partner Act an intent that registered domestic partners should not be discriminated against in favor of married couples in public accommodations. BHCC also contends that, in order to qualify for protection under the Unruh Act, a category must involve a protected class under federal equal protection law. In a related claim, BHCC argues the enumerated categories have in common that they encompass a group broadly stigmatized by the wider society. But Harris did not hold that only classes protected under federal equal protection law were worthy of protection under the Unruh Act, nor did we require a history of stigmatization in order to bring a category within the ambit of the Act. Moreover, discrimination based on marital status implicates discrimination against homosexuals who, as the Legislature recognized in the Domestic Partner Act, have been subject to widespread discrimination. For example, in its findings with respect to section 297.5, the Legislature notes that gay, lesbian, and bisexual Californians have established lasting, committed, and caring relationships despite longstanding social and economic discrimination. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 1, subd. (b).) Additionally, the Legislature declared that one purpose served by expanding the rights of domestic partners is to combat such discrimination. ( Ibid. ) Citing subdivision (c) of Civil Code section 51, BHCC also argues that its policy passes muster under the Act because it applies equally to all unmarried couples and individuals across the enumerated categories of the Act, e.g., it applies equally without regard to race, religion, nationality, gender, etc. Subdivision (c) provides: This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person that is conditioned or limited by law or that is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition. A similar argument was made in Beaty which found that the Unruh Act was not intended to create a right of insurance access so long as the insurer's policy is applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, sex, religion, etc. [Citations.] ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1463, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) [7] Because the defendant's denial of umbrella policies to unmarried couples was not based on the enumerated categories in the Act, the Court of Appeal concluded the plaintiffs had not been singled out for arbitrary treatment. ( Ibid. ) If Beaty meant to suggest by this observation that only the enumerated categories in the Act can provide a basis for a claim of unlawful discrimination under the Act, the observation was inaccurate. As Beaty elsewhere acknowledges, in Harris we declined to overrule our prior decisions that extended the Unruh Act to classifications not expressed in the statute. ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) Thus, in Harris, we cited the statutory language relied on by Beaty for the limited purpose of showing that the Legislature's continued emphasis on the enumerated categories was evidence that it did not intend for the Act to ban all forms of arbitrary discrimination. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1158-1159, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) We did not hold that this legislative activity foreclosed judicial expansion of the Act to include new categories. We merely cautioned that the addition of new categories would have to be consistent with legislative intent. ( Ibid. ) As discussed above, extending the Act to protect registered domestic partners goes no farther than the express and implied legislative mandate against discrimination found in the Domestic Partner Act. We conclude that the Unruh Act prohibits discrimination against domestic partners registered under the Domestic Partner Act in favor of married couples. Therefore, to the extent plaintiffs' marital status discrimination claim implicates the Domestic Partner Act, BHCC is not entitled to summary judgment.