Opinion ID: 2612519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion Must Be Made Within Six Months

Text: A party seeking relief from a final judgment under the provisions of I.R.C.P. 60(b) must file a motion within six months after entry of the judgment and assert facts which bring the case within the purview of the rule. Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 691 P.2d 1217 (1984). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) is mandatory and states in pertinent part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud ... (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3) and (6) no more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. (Emphasis added.) Leroy Gordon filed his motion for modification substantially more than six months after the divorce decree and order for support was entered. Consequently, any attempt to modify or set aside the judgment and order pursuant to subsection (1), (2), (3) or (6) will not be allowed because the applicable time limit under I.R.C.P. 60(b) had clearly expired. Catledge v. Transport Tire Co., 107 Idaho 602, 691 P.2d 1217 (1984). Furthermore, a Rule 60 motion is directed to the sound discretion of the district court and it is well established that [M]otions under Rule 60(b) involve a nice balance between the interest in finality and the desire to achieve justice, and that the district courts, therefore, are given a very large measure of discretion in passing on those motions. The appellate courts pay considerable deference to that discretion in the district court. The appellate court readily can reverse if the district court has not exercised discretion, as when it mistakenly thinks it lacks power to act. It can readily reverse also if the district court has granted a motion when it was powerless to do so, or if otherwise it has erred as a matter of law. But it will not set aside the district court's exercise of discretion unless it is persuaded that under the circumstances of the particular case the action of the district court is an abuse of discretion. 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2872, p. 261 (1973); see also § 2857; Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 650 P.2d 677 (1982); Schraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 747 P.2d 775 (Ct.App. 1987). Leroy Gordon argues that the relief contemplated in I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) should apply in that it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application because he has discovered that he had no legal duty, i.e., guardianship, to pay support for Ginger. We disagree. A motion pursuant to the no longer equitable language of Rule 60(b)(5) however, implies some change in circumstances. The rule allows relief if it is no longer equitable for the judgment to have prospective application. This provision is not a substitute for an appeal. It does not allow relitigation of issues that have been resolved by the judgment. Instead it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable. 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2863, pp. 206-07 (1973). Therefore, we are of the opinion and hold that the condition for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) is similar to the requirements of I.C. § 32-709, i.e., some change in the circumstances of the parties is necessary to make the prospective application of the judgment inequitable. In this instant case both the magistrate and district courts determined that there was no change in circumstances. A review of the record supports those findings and the relief requested pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) is not warranted. Leroy Gordon also claims that the original decree is void and relief should be granted pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). Leroy claims that because he is not the natural nor adoptive father of Ginger he owes no duty to Ginger, and therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order child support for Ginger. In Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983), this Court stated: A void judgment is a ground for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4). However, in order for a judgment to be void, there generally must be some jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either because the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. (Citation omitted.) 105 Idaho at 306, 669 P.2d at 195. Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure comments on judgments void because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction as follows: In the sound interest of finality, the concept of void judgment must be narrowly restricted. And it is. By jurisdiction over the subject matter the cases mean that the court must have jurisdiction or power to deal with the class of cases in which it renders judgment... . . In brief, then, except for the rare case where power is plainly usurped, if a court has the general power to adjudicate the issues in the class of suits to which the case belongs then its interim orders and final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack, so far as jurisdiction over the subject matter is concerned. 7 Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure, ¶ 60.25[2], p. XX-XXX-XXX (1990) (emphasis added.) A judgment that incorrectly interprets a rule of law does not divest the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties. Brown's Tie & Lumber Co. v. Kirk, 109 Idaho 589, 710 P.2d 18 (Ct.App. 1985). In the present action, however, it is clear that the magistrate court had personal jurisdiction over Terry and Leroy Gordon, the parties to the divorce action. Furthermore, the magistrate court had subject matter jurisdiction over child support issues arising from the divorce. The magistrate had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the legal status of Ginger and to determine whether a duty existed for Leroy to pay child support for the children. We therefore hold that the magistrate court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and the decision, judgment and decree of the magistrate is valid. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a decision based upon a mistake. Such is the case in the instant action. The rule balances the interest in finality with the interests of justice and requires a motion for relief based upon mistake to be filed within six months. In this case Leroy Gordon failed to comply with that provision, and absent a real and substantial change in circumstances the magistrate is without power to grant relief. Because we have resolved this appeal on a procedural basis it is not necessary that we address or resolve the issue of whether a non-parent can be required to pay child support or whether the theory of equitable adoption is recognized in Idaho. There have been no substantial changes warranting a modification of the decree pursuant to I.C. § 32-709 and because the motion to modify was filed more than a year after the entry of the order, the decision of the district court is vacated and the original decree and order of the magistrate court ordering child support is affirmed. Costs to appellant; no fees on appeal. BAKES, C.J., and BISTLINE, JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.