Opinion ID: 1941530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Cooke Inferences

Text: The defendant also argues that the trial justice committed reversible error by giving the jury a flight instruction that allegedly imputed a consciousness of guilt to defendant. He argues that it was improper in this case for the jury instructions to permit the jury to employ the chain of inferences of guilt described in Cooke, 479 A.2d at 732-33. He contends that there was no occasion for that chain of inferences to be considered because he remained in the Providence area following the robberies and indeed was still in the Providence area when he was arrested approximately a month and a half after the robberies. It is well established in this jurisdiction that relevant evidence of flight may be introduced as a circumstance bearing on the question of guilt that may be presented to the jury for consideration. Cooke, 479 A.2d at 732; see In re Caldarone, 115 R.I. 316, 326, 345 A.2d 871, 876 (1975). [7] In determining whether a flight instruction is appropriate in a particular case, this Court in Cooke, 479 A.2d at 732-33, expressly adopted the four-part chain of inferences approach that is set forth in United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir.1977). [8] In adopting that approach, we held in Cooke that the probative value of flight as circumstantial evidence of guilt depends on the degree of confidence with which [that four-part] chain of inferences can be followed   . Cooke, 479 A.2d at 732. Those inferences are (1) something the defendant did led him [or her] to flee; (2) defendant fled out of consciousness of guilt; (3) defendant's consciousness of guilt derived from consciousness of guilt concerning the crime charged; and (4) defendant's consciousness of guilt concerning a crime charged reflects actual guilt of the crime charged. Id. at 732-33 (citing Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049). Since the third and fourth inferences are the most difficult to establish, this Court places great reliance on the proximity in time of the flight to the crime charged in order to establish these inferences. Cooke, 479 A.2d at 733 (quoting United States v. Howze, 668 F.2d 322, 324-25 (7th Cir.1982)); see also Gomez, 848 A.2d at 230. The defendant challenges the applicability to his case of both the first and second Cooke inferences viz., (1) that something defendant did caused him to flee and (2) that defendant fled out of a consciousness of guilt. He argues that those Cooke inferences of flight as evidence of a consciousness of guilt are inapplicable in this case due to the fact that, even though Anthony Perez warned him about the arrest of Charisse Robles and Matthew Palmer on June 5, 2003 (the second night of the robberies), he remained in the area despite that warning until his arrest approximately a month and a half later. We find this argument unpersuasive. Although it is true that defendant did not remove himself from the jurisdiction, he did, on more than one occasion, attempt to evade or elude law enforcement officers, which actions could fairly be viewed as flight ( i.e., evidence of a consciousness of guilt) for the purposes of the Cooke analysis. A reasonable jury could conclude that defendant fled from Officer Zincone by running into yards out of a consciousness of guilt. Similarly, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant attempted to maneuver his vehicle so as to evade Officers Zincone and O'Brien on the night of his arrest out of a consciousness of guilt. Additionally, defendant's initial insistence to police that his name was not Jason could have been at least a partial basis for a reasonable jury to infer defendant's consciousness of guilt. [9] It was for the jury to draw conclusions about the motivation for these acts after it heard the evidence. See Gomez, 848 A.2d at 230-31. We perceive no error in the trial justice's giving a flight instruction that authorized the jury to employ the chain of inferences described in Cooke. C