Opinion ID: 853762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excused for Cause

Text: The trial court excluded for cause one juror who expressed strong views opposing the death penalty. In response to a question on the jury questionnaire about the circumstances under which he believed the death penalty would be appropriate, the juror responded [t]o save society or mankind as a whole when there is no defense. The prospective juror further explained this as [t]he Hitler argument and was then questioned at some length by the trial court, State, and defense counsel. The prospective juror stated during this questioning that he could recommend the death penalty in a case of an individual similar to Adolph Hitler and possibly Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. However, he later observed that this case involved the alleged killing of three individuals and agreed that he could never consider recommending the death penalty for such a crime. When asked whether he would be able to follow his oath as a juror and consider the death penalty as a viable option in this case he stated that he would not.
The relevant inquiry for exclusion of jurors for cause under the federal constitution is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). As the Court explained in Witt, the quest is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. That is what an `impartial' jury consists of.... 469 U.S. at 423, 105 S.Ct. 844. The Witt standard does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. Deference must be paid to the trial court who was able to see the prospective jurors and listen to their responses during voir dire. Underwood v. State, 535 N.E.2d 507, 513 (Ind.1989). In Indiana, juries in capital cases are instructed that they must consider whether the State has proven an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, and if that is done, they must then weigh the aggravator(s) against any mitigating evidence. Jurors who state at the outset that they will not recommend a death sentence even if the State proves one or more statutory aggravating circumstance are incapable of following the court's instructions and are accordingly properly excused for cause. The questioning described above demonstrated that this prospective juror's views on the death penalty would have prevented him from following the court's instructions and his oath. Dye contends that it was nevertheless error for the trial court to excuse the juror for cause because he stated that he could consider the death penalty under certain circumstances and in fact, believed it to be an appropriate penalty. As explained above, the relevant inquiry is not whether the prospective juror could recommend the death penalty in any conceivable case, including genocide or the most famous of mass murders. Rather, the issue is whether the jury can follow the court's instructions and the juror's oath in this case. In most reported cases, excused prospective jurors have stated blanket opposition to the death penalty. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 1041, 1047 (Ind.1992) (after being asked if there are any circumstances under which prospective juror could vote to recommend the death penalty, juror responded No sir); Benirschke v. State, 577 N.E.2d 576, 582-83 (Ind.1991) (prospective jurors indicated they were opposed to the death penalty and could not find a case where it would be appropriate); Underwood, 535 N.E.2d at 513 (prospective juror candidly expressed several times that she could not consider the death penalty); Burris v. State, 465 N.E.2d 171, 178 (Ind.1984) (all of the excused veniremen stated that under no circumstances would they consider imposition of the death penalty). We find no case from this Court directly addressing the issue Dye raises. However, several cases imply that the necessary inquiry is whether the prospective juror could recommend the death penalty in the case on trial, not in any case. In Davis, 598 N.E.2d at 1047, the prosecutor asked if a prospective juror could recommend the death penalty [u]nder any circumstances that you can imagine uh, as have been described to you in this case[.] The juror responded No and this Court upheld the removal for cause under Witt. We observed that [t]here need be no ritualistic adherence to a requirement that a prospective juror make it unmistakably clear that he or she would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment. Id. Similarly, in Daniels v. State, 453 N.E.2d 160, 167 (Ind.1983), this Court reviewed the removal for cause of a prospective juror who, after initially stating he did not believe in the death penalty, stated that he thought it might be warranted in the case of the assassination of a president. The following colloquy then took place between the trial court and the prospective juror: Q. Then other than the president you can't think of any instances or any circumstances involving a murder that you would feel would warrant recommendation of the death sentence? A. No. Q. And your feelings would preclude you from recommending the death penalty if the Defendant was found guilty, is that right? A. Yes, Ma'am. Id. at 167. Applying the then-existing federal constitutional standard of Witherspoon, [10] this Court upheld the exclusion. The basic logic of Witt is that it is proper to excuse jurors who are unable to carry out their duties in the case before them. A juror's willingness to recommend a death sentence under other circumstances is irrelevant to that inquiry. Because the prospective juror here stated that his views on the death penalty would render him unable to follow the court's instructions and his oath, exclusion was proper under the federal constitutional standard of Witt.
Most of our death penalty cases have been resolved under federal constitutional standards, presumably because that was how the issue was framed at trial and on appeal. See, e.g., Davis, 598 N.E.2d at 1046-47 (applying Witt); Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 961 (Ind. 1992) (applying Witherspoon); Benirschke, 577 N.E.2d at 582-83 (applying Witt); Evans v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Ind.1990) (applying Witherspoon while also quoting the statute); Underwood, 535 N.E.2d at 513 (applying Witt ). However, Dye also objected at trial on the basis of Indiana Code § 35-37-1-5(a)(3), which provides as one of several good causes for challenge that [i]f the State is seeking a death sentence, that the person entertains such conscientious opinions as would preclude the person from recommending that the death penalty be imposed. Accordingly, we must address whether the exclusion of this juror violated the statute, which arguably sets a higher bar than Witt. See generally 16B WILLIAM ANDREW KERR, INDIANA PRACTICE § 21.6d at 151-52 (1998). [11] Dye suggests that exclusion was improper under the statute because the prospective juror stated that he could consider the death penalty under some circumstances. The statute speaks in terms of preclusion from recommending the death penalty and does not specifically address whether the preclusion must be in the particular case only or in all cases, no matter how far afield their facts may be from the case at bar. The prospective juror in Dye's case stated opposition to the death penalty with a very narrow exception (Hitler) that did not apply to Dye's case. The juror went on to explain his unequivocal opposition to the death penalty under his limited knowledge of the facts of Dye's case (the killing of three children). Although his opinions may not have precluded a recommendation of death in every hypothetical case, they did preclude a recommendation of the death penalty in this case. For the same reasons already explained, we believe this is all that is required under the statute. Accordingly, because the prospective juror's conscientious opinions precluded him from recommending the death penalty in this case, exclusion was proper under Indiana Code § 35-37-1-5(a)(3). [12]