Opinion ID: 2313088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Post-Conviction Claims of Ineffective Assistance

Text: Appellant also challenges the trial court's summary denial of two of his post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 is committed to the trial court's discretion, but the scope of that discretion is quite narrow. [17] The statute requires a hearing [u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. [18] Thus, [a]ny question regarding the appropriateness of a hearing should be resolved in favor of holding a hearing. [19] This court will affirm the trial court's denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing only if the claims (1) are palpably incredible; (2) are vague and conclusory; or (3) even if true, do not entitle the movant to relief. [20] [W]e must be satisfied that under no circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief. [21] Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel frequently require a hearing, especially where the allegations of ineffectiveness relate to facts outside the trial record. [22] The movant's only burden, prior to hearing, is adequately to allege facts which, if demonstrated, would establish ineffective assistance of counsel. [23] This means pleading with requisite particularity, in light of the full record before the court, that his trial counsel's performance was deficient under prevailing professional norms, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. [24] Appellant presents two distinct, though factually related, claims of ineffective assistance. First, he argues, his trial counsel was ineffective because she failed to ensure that the prosecutor did not use evidence derived from his immunized testimony at the CPO hearing, even though two prosecution witnesses  Parker and Detective Montague  were exposed to that testimony. Second, appellant claims his trial counsel also was ineffective because she failed to obtain a transcript of the complainant's testimony at the CPO hearing. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellant is entitled to a hearing on the first of these claims of ineffectiveness, but not on the second.
Appellant's claim that his defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to protect his right to immunity for his CPO hearing testimony presents us with a complicated issue. We must begin our analysis by examining the nature and extent of the statutory immunity in question, and how a criminal defendant may enforce it by requiring the prosecution to show that its evidence is not derived from the immunized testimony. Because we conclude that appellant was entitled to the protections he invokes, we then consider whether his allegations of ineffectiveness were sufficient to warrant a post-trial evidentiary hearing.
When a complainant seeks a civil protection order based on allegations of intrafamily offenses that are, or may also be, the subject of a criminal prosecution, the respondent is confronted with a potentially difficult choice  whether to testify in opposition to the petition for the CPO. The respondent has a Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. But remaining silent in the civil case may mean foregoing a defense to the petition and effectively conceding issuance of the CPO. This may result in drastic curtailment of the respondent's liberty. [25] The respondent thus may be under considerable pressure to testify in the civil proceeding. Yet if he testifies, and in effect waives his Fifth Amendment privilege in that proceeding, he runs the risk of furnishing the prosecutor with evidence out of his own mouth that could be used to convict him. The Council of the District of Columbia undertook to alleviate this dilemma when it enacted D.C. Law 4-144, the Proceedings Regarding Intrafamily Offenses Amendment Act of 1982. Section 3 of the 1982 Law amended the Intrafamily Offenses Act to remove the [then] current prohibition upon criminal prosecutions being brought against a family member if a civil protection order case against the same person is already being litigated in the Family Division of the Superior Court. [26] In place of that prohibition, the Council amended D.C.Code § 16-1002 by adding subsection (c). The first sentence of subsection (c) states that [t]he institution of criminal charges by the United States attorney shall be in addition to, and shall not affect the rights of the complainant to seek any other relief under this subchapter. At the same time, to ensure fairness to the defendant in the concurrent criminal and civil proceedings that henceforth would be authorized, the Council also added an immunity provision. This provision, the second sentence of D.C.Code § 16-1002(c), states that [t]estimony of the respondent in any civil proceeding under this subchapter [including a CPO hearing] and the fruits of that testimony shall be inadmissible as evidence in a criminal trial except in a prosecution for perjury or false statements. By employing the term fruits, Section 16-1002(c) prohibits derivative as well as direct evidentiary use by the prosecution of the defendant's CPO hearing testimony. In its report on the 1982 amendments, the Judiciary Committee explained the immunity provision as follows: Section 3 carefully creates due process protections for the potential situation where the same person is a respondent in a civil protection case and a defendant in a criminal case involving the same intrafamily conduct. Section 3 advances a rule of evidence in new D.C.Code, sec. 16-1002 rendering a respondent's testimony, as well as the fruits of that testimony, inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, section 3 provides that so long as the respondent is compelled to testify at a civil hearing, any statement made there cannot be used in a criminal trial (except for perjury or false statement), even for impeachment purposes. E.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979).[ [27] ] The reference to Portash is instructive. In that case, an analogous New Jersey statute provided that grand jury testimony by a public employee and the evidence derived therefrom could not be used against the employee in any subsequent criminal proceeding (other than a prosecution for perjury). [28] The Supreme Court held that because the statute overrode the employee's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the state could not constitutionally use the employee's grand jury testimony to impeach him at his ensuing criminal trial. [29] The Judiciary Committee's citation of Portash, for the proposition that Section 16-1002(c) similarly prevents use of a respondent's CPO hearing testimony for impeachment purposes in a criminal trial, indicates that the scope of the derivative use immunity provided by Section 16-1002(c) is likewise to be determined by reference to the requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court addressed those requirements more fully when it upheld the constitutionality of the federal use immunity statute in Kastigar. [30] The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 6002, provides that a witness who has asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege may be ordered to testify, on the condition that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order [31] (emphasis added). The Court held the statute constitutional because the protection it grants against direct and derivative use of compelled testimony is coextensive with the protection furnished by the privilege against self-incrimination. [32] It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. [33] In other words, the immunity from use and derivative use is an adequate substitute for the privilege because it leaves the witness and the [government] in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a grant of immunity. [34] Unlike the federal use immunity statute, D.C.Code § 16-1002(c) does not purport to authorize the government (or a private party) to secure court orders to compel a respondent to testify over invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination. The respondent who chooses to testify in his own defense at a CPO hearing is not compelled to do so within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. But the purpose of Section 16-1002(c) is similar to that of the federal immunity statute  to enable (if not to compel) witnesses to testify (in CPO hearings) without losing, in effect, the benefits of the privilege against self-incrimination. As implied in the legislative history of the statute, we therefore think the term fruits in Section 16-1002(c) must be construed to mean what Kastigar said would be necessary to accomplish that purpose: fruits must encompass any evidence directly or indirectly derived from the respondent's CPO hearing testimony. [35] Although the government on appeal professes some doubt about the scope of the term fruits, it does not propose an alternative construction, and no other construction commends itself to us in this context. [36] At least insofar as evidentiary use in a criminal trial is concerned, we understand Section 16-1002(c) to grant protection that is fully coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination. [37] The Supreme Court also held in Kastigar that a defendant need only show that he testified under a grant of immunity to require the government to bear the burden of showing that [its] evidence is not tainted by establishing that [it] had an independent, legitimate source for the disputed evidence. [38] The Court intended that this heavy burden of proof would afford very substantial protection, commensurate with that resulting from the privilege itself. [39] For example, the Court emphasized, the total prohibition on use bars the use of immunized testimony as an investigatory lead, and also bars the use of any evidence obtained by focusing investigation on a witness as a result of such testimony. [40] Lower courts have heeded Kastigar's words. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a prohibited `use' occurs if a witness's recollection is refreshed by exposure to the defendant's immunized testimony, or if his testimony is in any way `shaped, altered, or affected,' by such exposure [41]  even where the witness testifies from personal knowledge, [42] and regardless of the prosecutor's `fault.' [43] Thus, [i]t simply does not follow that insulating prosecutors from exposure automatically proves that immunized testimony was not used against the defendant. Kastigar is instead violated whenever the prosecution puts on a witness whose testimony is shaped, directly or indirectly, by compelled testimony regardless of how or by whom he was exposed to that compelled testimony. [44] A trial court must normally hold a hearing (a ` Kastigar hearing') for the purpose of allowing the government to demonstrate that it obtained all of the evidence it proposes to use from sources independent of the compelled testimony. [45] A defendant may have to make a threshold showing of the possibility of taint in order to get a hearing, but as Kastigar makes clear, the showing required is minimal; a credible proffer that prosecution witnesses may have been exposed to the immunized testimony is plainly enough. Ordinarily, the hearing should be conducted before trial, so that tainted evidence is excluded. But [w]henever the hearing is held, the failure of the government to meet its burden can have most drastic consequences.... [I]f the tainted evidence was presented to the grand jury, the indictment will be dismissed;[ [46] ] when tainted evidence is introduced at trial, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. [47] However, [d]ismissal of the indictment or vacation of the conviction is not necessary where the use is found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [48] The government argues that appellant would not have been entitled to a Kastigar hearing in this case, either because Section 16-1002(c) does not contemplate one, or because appellant was not compelled to testify at the CPO hearing over invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, on penalty of being held in contempt. [49] Neither argument is tenable. The reasoning in Kastigar is not confined to cases arising under [the federal immunity] statute. [50] Indeed, the requirements of Kastigar have been applied to information given by defendants to government agents in exchange for informal ( i.e., non-statutory) promises of immunity, [51] and to testimony covered by statutory grants of blanket immunity. [52] A Kastigar hearing, in which the government must establish that its evidence is not derived from the defendant's immunized testimony, is virtually the only way the defendant effectively can enforce his right to immunity. The government knows what evidence it intends to offer and how it obtained that evidence; it should know whether its evidence is tainted. Inasmuch as D.C.Code § 16-1002(c) unambiguously grants derivative use immunity to any respondent for his testimony in a CPO hearing, we see no basis for exempting the criminal prosecution of such a respondent from the dictates of Kastigar  including Kastigar's allocation of the burden of persuasion. The government simply ignores the plain language of the statute when it suggests there is no indication that the Council of the District of Columbia intended to impose a Kastigar -type burden on the government when it enacted Section 16-1002(c). The imposition of such a burden is precisely what is implied by the grant of the right to derivative use immunity. Furthermore, a Kastigar hearing is equally necessary whether the respondent testified in the CPO hearing voluntarily or under compulsion, because Section 16-1002(c) flatly forbids the evidentiary use of a respondent's CPO hearing testimony or its fruits in a criminal trial in either case. We have no authority to conjure up an exception to the express statutory command and drastically limit its effective scope to compelled testimony, as the government proposes. Moreover, engrafting such a limitation on Section 16-1002(c) would conflict with the general rule that a defendant who furnishes information under a promise of immunity is entitled to the benefits of that promise even if he does so voluntarily without first asserting his privilege to remain silent. [53] As we stated in Warren, [a]lthough technically [such a defendant] was not `compelled to testify,' it is a constitutional principle of long standing that evidence of guilt induced from a person under a governmental promise of immunity must be excluded under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. [54] The only support the government has mustered for its suggestion that the protections of Section 16-1002(c) apply only to compelled testimony is the last sentence in the excerpt from the Judiciary Committee report quoted supra: Moreover, section 3 provides that so long as the respondent is compelled to testify at a civil hearing, any statement made there cannot be used in a criminal trial (except for perjury or false statement), even for impeachment purposes. [55] The government contends this sentence shows that the Council meant to provide immunity only when a respondent asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is ordered to testify in a CPO hearing or be held in contempt. We are not persuaded. We will not disregard a clear statutory command on the basis of an isolated, ambiguous comment in the legislative history. [56] The government's reading of the cited sentence is inconsistent not only with the plain language of the statute, but also with the rest of the Judiciary Committee report. The Council would have written a very different statute had it intended to authorize the Superior Court to compel respondents to testify at CPO hearings (presumably at the behest of the complainant, as an exercise of judicial discretion) via grants of use immunity, while withholding such immunity from respondents who testify voluntarily. [57] There is no discussion in the Judiciary Committee report of compelling respondents to testify. We think the only reasonable reading of the sentence on which the government relies is that it employs the term compelled in a non-technical sense, to refer to any respondent who feels obliged to take the witness stand in a CPO hearing to defend himself, whether or not he is ordered to do so over his invocation of the Fifth Amendment. The evident purpose of the sentence, which begins Moreover, is not to announce a previously-unstated limitation on the broad new prohibition against derivative use, but merely to confirm that the prohibition extends to use for impeachment. We conclude that appellant would have been entitled to a Kastigar hearing to put the government to its burden of proving that its evidence at trial was not tainted by his immunized CPO hearing testimony. [58] We now turn to consider whether appellant alleged sufficient facts to require a hearing on his claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to request a Kastigar hearing.
Defense counsel knew or should have known that the complainant and the lead detective had been privy to appellant's immunized testimony, and that their exposure might taint their forthcoming testimony or other prosecution evidence at trial. If the government, put to the test, could not prove otherwise, appellant would have been entitled to substantial relief  e.g., exclusion of evidence at trial. The government might have been obliged to abort appellant's prosecution. Furthermore, as the record stands, it does not appear that counsel had a tactical reason to forego a Kastigar hearing. We have difficulty imagining such a reason. As the court said in Hylton, [p]utting the government to its burden ... was, so to speak, a freebie; it cost the defense nothing and the possible benefit ... was undoubtedly significant. [59] The Hylton court held trial counsel's unjustified failure to raise Kastigar in that case to be simply inexcusable. [60] Unlike in the present case, a post-trial evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claim was held in Hylton. The hearing revealed that counsel's decision was not a tactical one but instead rested on a misunderstanding of Kastigar.  [61] At the present stage of this case, we need only say that appellant has made a more-than-colorable showing of deficient performance. We give short shrift to the government's argument that trial counsel can hardly be deemed deficient for failing to request a Kastigar hearing when there is no case law or settled practice to establish her obligation to have done so in this specific context, i.e., when a criminal defendant has testified at a CPO hearing. Appellee's Brief at 45. [62] That is looking at the question too narrowly. A competent criminal defense attorney must be able to apply fundamental principles to new fact situations. As Hylton illustrates, whatever the specific circumstances, any defense attorney should appreciate that the prosecution must not use a defendant's immunized testimony or derivative evidence against him. The attorney's ignorance of Section 16-1002(c) or Kastigar is no excuse for doing nothing to protect the defendant from such use. Appellant's allegations also show a sufficient likelihood of prejudice at trial  a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different [63]  to warrant a hearing on his claim of ineffectiveness. On this score, it is enough to point out that Parker and the lead detective were exposed to appellant's immunized testimony. The allocation of the burden of persuasion at a Kastigar hearing means appellant's entitlement to relief is presumed unless the government proves the absence of taint and the independent derivation of its evidence. The government's ability to surmount such a difficult obstacle [64] in this case is doubtful, and we may not infer findings favorable to it. [65] The prosecutor's affidavit does not dispose of the matter: [a] government agent's denials that he made use of the immunized testimony, standing alone, are generally insufficient to meet the government's burden. [66] The prosecutor's good faith, which appellant has not questioned, is beside the point if the prosecution nonetheless was tainted by the use of his immunized testimony. [67] That Parker's trial testimony may have been generally consistent with her testimony before she listened to appellant [68] does not prove her later testimony was not affected more subtly, but nonetheless materially, by her reaction to what he said. Parker was not examined in the grand jury or at trial about the influence on her of appellant's immunized testimony. [69] It appears the government took no steps to prevent, cabin, or discover such influence, for the prosecutor averred that she did not speak with Parker about the CPO hearing when she prepared appellant's case for indictment and trial. Similarly, the government has not proved that its investigation was unaffected by appellant's immunized testimony. Appellant suggests that David Brox may have become a prosecution witness because Detective Montague or Parker heard appellant at the CPO hearing attribute some of Parker's harassment to Brox's enemies. On the present record, it is not clear how the government identified Brox as a potential witness, or whether it did so prior to the CPO hearing. Finally, it cannot be said at this stage that any use of appellant's immunized testimony or derivative evidence at trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the strength of the government's case against appellant. We do not yet know what, if any, evidence in the government's case should have been excluded. To answer that critical question, an evidentiary hearing is required on appellant's Kastigar claim.
We have no doubt that appellant's second claim of ineffectiveness sufficiently alleges deficient performance. Defense counsel had an undoubted duty to investigate the complainant's allegations and the possibility of impeaching her. [70] Counsel's duty to conduct a reasonably thorough investigation presumptively would have obliged her to obtain and review the readily available transcript of Parker's testimony at the CPO hearing, which previewed much of her testimony at trial. [71] No justification has been offered for counsel's failure in this regard. The ineffectiveness claim founders, however, on appellant's inability to plead prejudice with requisite particularity. We see no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had defense counsel obtained Parker's testimony from the CPO hearing. Appellant's main claim of prejudice is that his counsel lost the opportunity to impeach Parker's trial testimony. He identifies only one respect in which impeachment might have been possible. At trial, as in the grand jury, the prosecutor specifically asked Parker whether she had any contact with appellant on March 13, two days after he assaulted her. Parker answered that appellant called her on the phone that day and said, Bitch, if I go to jail, I'm going to fuck you up. This was the factual basis for one of the threats counts in the indictment. Appellant argues that defense counsel could have impeached Parker with her failure to mention the March 13 threat when she testified at the CPO hearing. But an attempt to impeach Parker with that omission would have accomplished little, in our view. At the CPO hearing, Parker was not asked about her March 13 contact with appellant. While Parker was asked  at the CPO hearing and at trial  why she did not appear for appellant's first assault trial, on neither occasion did she claim that appellant's threat dissuaded her. Rather, while Parker insisted at trial that she was afraid of appellant, she consistently explained that the reason she did not come to court was that she never received a notice to do so. Moreover, if defense counsel had impeached Parker with her omission at the CPO hearing, the government could have rehabilitated her and refuted the defense suggestion that she fabricated the March 13 threat in response to appellant's testimony. As appellant concedes, it is a matter of record that Parker reported the March 13 threat when she met with a victim/witness advocate in the United States Attorney's Office on September 12, 2000  two weeks before Parker heard appellant testify at the CPO hearing. [72] Appellant also argues that defense counsel's unfamiliarity with the CPO hearing testimony resulted in her being surprised by Parker's insistence at trial that her relationship with appellant ended in March. It is clear enough from the Monroe-Farrell inquiry that counsel indeed was surprised by this testimony. But appellant does not show that counsel's unpreparedness on this point made any difference to the outcome of the trial. Appellant's new trial motion proffers no testimony or other evidence that counsel could have obtained to contradict Parker  nothing, most strikingly, from appellant's mother or the day care personnel who were discussed in this connection before trial. While defense counsel might have questioned Parker and appellant somewhat differently about their relationship had she been better prepared, appellant does not describe any line of questioning that would have been more effective in the end. We see no reasonable likelihood that a difference in counsel's treatment of this essentially tangential issue would have changed the result of appellant's trial.