Opinion ID: 1991834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: (A) Assault Charges

Text: Robinson's principal challenge to his separate, albeit concurrent, [2] sentences for assault with intent to commit rape and assault with intent to commit sodomy, is that because his conduct took place within a short period of time, and in a confined area, it constituted a single, continuing assault for sexual gratification, i.e., one offense, for which he was subject to only one punishment. Appellant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by sentencing him twice for the same single offense. We disagree. The merger doctrine protects a defendant by preventing the government from taking conduct constituting one offense, and multiplying that offense into many charges subjecting the defendant to multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981), the Supreme Court stated, however, that [i]t is well settled that a single transaction can give rise to distinct offenses under separate statutes without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 344-45 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 1145-46 n. 3 (emphasis added). When more than one statutory offense arises out of a single transaction, the central question which must be addressed is what punishment the legislature intended to authorize for the relevant offenses. See id. at 336, 101 S.Ct. at 1140. This is because the [Double Jeopardy] constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the [sentencing] court does not exceed its legislative authorization. . . . Where Congress intended . . . to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution. Id. at 344, 101 S.Ct. at 1145. The familiar test for determining whether cumulative sentences offend constitutional requirements is set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 386 (1932). In Blockburger, the Court stated that [W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. When each statutory offense requires proof of a fact that the other does not, a presumption arises that the legislature authorized the imposition of cumulative sentences., Ball v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1672, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985); United States v. Coachman, 234 U.S.App.D.C. 194, 203, 727 F.2d 1293, 1302 (1984). In applying the Blockburger test, a court must compare the statutorily-specified elements of the offenses in question and not the facts of the case as alleged in the indictment. . . . Id. at 202, 727 F.2d at 1301. The offenses of assault with intent to commit rape and assault with intent to commit sodomy are governed by different statutes. The former is governed by D.C.Code § 22-501 (1981); [3] the latter by D.C.Code § 22-503 (1981). [4] A comparison of the essential elements of the two offenses [5] makes clear that each offense incorporates elements which are not components of the other. Moreover, each offense carries a different penalty and manifests a separate and distinct societal interest. Cf. Sweet v. United States, 449 A.2d 315, 321 (D.C.1982) (establishing that assault with intent to commit sodomy is not a lesser included offense of rape). The manner in which appellant committed the assaults against the complainant reinforces the separate and distinct nature of the two offenses. See Tuckson v. United States, 364 A.2d 138, 142 (D.C.1976). The first assault  the assault with intent to commit sodomy  occurred immediately after appellant forced his victim back into the car, after she had unsuccessfully tried to flee, and forced her head to his crotch with the demand for oral sodomy. The second assault  the assault with intent to commit rape  occurred when, after removing his victim's clothes, appellant climbed on top of her and attempted sexual intercourse. Under these circumstances, we believe that the first assault had come to an end when the attempt at forced sodomy failed, and that the second assault was the result of a fresh impulse. Blockburger v. United States, supra, 284 U.S. at 302-03, 52 S.Ct. at 181-82; see also Owens v. United States, 497 A.2d 1086, 1096 (D.C. 1985). In sum, because the government's evidence showed that appellant committed two separate offenses, each requiring proof of different elements, we conclude that the trial court's imposition of two separate and concurrent sentences for the two assault convictions did not constitute a constitutional infraction. Compare Thorne v. United States, 471 A.2d 247 (D.C.1983) (per curiam) (two burglary convictions  one for burglary with intent to destroy property and on for burglary with intent to assault  merged for purposes of sentencing where convictions arose from single entry and conduct violated only one statute).