Opinion ID: 202945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments on Failure to Produce Evidence

Text: Mangual-Garcia also alleges that the prosecutor improperly commented on his silence during the rebuttal closing argument. Mangual-Garcia's attorney, during his closing argument noted that the prosecution had not provided any evidence that Mangual-Garcia was in New Jersey at the time of the charged conspiracy and noted in particular that the government had failed to provide a telephone or electric bill to show that Mangual-Garcia was in Newark. In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that Mangual-Garcia had not provided any evidence to the contrary, stating: Mr. Armenteros suggested, oh, they could have brought the electric bill, they could have brought the phone bill to prove who my client was. Defendants also could have done that; they don't have to. . . . Mangual-Garcia objected to this statement, and the district court immediately gave a curative instruction that the defendant did not have to present evidence because he was presumed innocent and the government had to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor then continued, saying [a]s the Court explained, they don't have to; that doesn't mean they can't, and Mangual-Garcia objected again. The court instructed the prosecutor to leave that subject matter because [it] w[ould] have to re-instruct the jury. [T]he Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (footnote omitted). If the prosecutor had been the first one to raise the issue by noting Mangual-Garcia's failure to produce documents showing he was not in Newark, the prosecutor's comments might be seen as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. See United States v. Stroman, No. 06-2133, 500 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847, 856 (1st Cir.1982) (noting that documents within a defendant's personal possession are protected by the 5th Amendment). However, the comments were only made in rebuttal after defense counsel had [himself] raised the issue of the government's failure to produce an electric or telephone bill. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 107 (1st Cir.2003) (emphasis omitted). By suggesting that the prosecutor could have produced such documents, the defense attorney indicated that these documents were available to persons other than the defendant. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor's response was not such that the jurors would probably interpret it as commentary on the accused's failure to take the stand. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the government's comment merely suggested that, if the documents were generally available (as defense counsel had suggested), either side could have produced them  without the defendant's taking the stand. Under the invited reply doctrine, the prosecutor's remarks were `invited,' and did no more than respond substantially in order to `right the scale,' [and do] not warrant reversing [the] conviction. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12-13, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). In a similar context in Henderson, defense counsel suggested that the government was hiding something by not producing a witness to the drug transaction, and the prosecutor responded in rebuttal by saying that the defendant could have produced this witness. 320 F.3d at 107. This court rejected the defendant's claim that this was an improper comment on his silence, concluding that defense counsel invited a response by raising the issue and [t]he prosecutor's remarks were limited and addressed only the defense counsel's own comments. Id. For the same reason, a new trial is not warranted in this case.