Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Peremptory Challenges (Alleged Batson/Wheeler Error)

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecution's striking of Hispanic prospective jurors violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 84-89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ), and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler ). The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against three Hispanic jurors: M. A., L. H., and Y. M. Alvarado made an objection to each excusal under Batson/Wheeler, in which defendant joined. The prosecution argued that the codefendants had not made a prima facie showing, given that one Hispanic juror, P. G., was on the panel. The trial court found no prima facie showing and denied the motion, basing its ruling on a review of the jurors' voir dire transcripts, which disclosed neutral grounds for the challenges, and on the presence of at least one Hispanic juror on the panel, P. G. Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based solely on group bias. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed that Batson states the procedure and standard to be employed by trial courts when challenges such as defendant's are made. `First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. [Citations.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, [i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. [Citation.]' ( People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 66-67, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622 ( Cornwell ), quoting Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129, fn. omitted ( Johnson). ) The high court clarified that a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. ( Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 170, 125 S.Ct. 2410, revg. in part People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302, 1318, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270 [requiring the defendant to show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias].) `When a trial court denies a Wheeler motion without finding a prima facie case of group bias, the appellate court reviews the record of voir dire for evidence to support the trial court's ruling. [Citations.] We will affirm the ruling where the record suggests grounds upon which the prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in question.' ( Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321, quoting People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 135, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) As a preliminary matter, defendant contends that because the trial court did not articulate the standard it used to determine whether he established a prima facie discrimination case, we must presume it used the then current strong likelihood standard. Defendant asserts that this standard sets a higher threshold than the Batson standard of an inference of group bias. Defendant also claims that because the trial court used the incorrect standard, its ruling is entitled to no deference. [15] But as we have held in analyzing Batson/Wheeler claims, [r]egardless of the standard employed by the trial court, and even assuming without deciding that the trial court's decision is not entitled to deference, we have reviewed the record and, like the United States Supreme Court in Johnson ... [we] are able to apply the high court's standard and resolve the legal question whether the record, supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race. ( Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 73, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622, italics omitted; Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 40 Cal. Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321.) As to the three challenged jurors, defense trial counsel sought to establish a prima facie case of discrimination solely on the circumstance that the prosecutor struck three individuals of Hispanic ancestry, and that defendant was the same. On appeal, defendant contends that a prima facie case is established because the prosecutor struck three of the only four Hispanics called to serve on the jury. In the alternative, defendant claims that the fact that all three struck jurors were Hispanic women supports a prima facie case of discrimination against Hispanic women as a cognizable class. We will assume, without deciding, that defendant's claim of discrimination as to Hispanic women specifically (as opposed to Hispanics generally) is not forfeited on appeal because he failed to present it below. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1016, fn. 12, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775 ( Lewis and Oliver) . ) We have held that, although a prosecutor's excusal of all members of a particular group may establish a prima facie discrimination case, especially if the defendant belongs to the same group, this fact alone is not conclusive. ( Guerra supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101-1102, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 119, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887 ( Crittenden) ; but see Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166, 173, 125 S.Ct. 2410 [the removal of all three African-American prospective jurors established a prima facie case].) The prosecution did not excuse all Hispanic jurors, and defendant is a Hispanic man not a Hispanic woman. In any event, as discussed below, the record discloses race-neutral grounds for the prosecutor's peremptory challenges. ( Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1101, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321.)
During voir dire, Prospective Juror M. A. stated that Spanish was her primary language, and that she did not speak English well or understand many words. She stated she did not have any strong feelings either for or against capital punishment. Defense counsel moved to excuse M. A. for cause because she lacked sufficient skills in both written and spoken English, and because her problems with speaking and understanding English could affect her ability to interact with the other jurors during deliberations. The prosecutor agreed and also requested that she be excused for cause. Trial counsel for Alvarado opposed the for-cause challenge. The trial court denied the challenge, and stated the parties would have to deal with excusing M. A. as a peremptory challenge. Defendant contends that because the trial court denied the challenge for cause based on M. A.'s limited English language skills, this ground is not a valid basis for a peremptory challenge either. But the circumstance that a juror is not subject to exclusion for cause does not, on its own, support an inference that group bias motivated the peremptory challenge. ( Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 70, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) The record demonstrates both the prosecutor and defendant's own counsel were reasonably concerned about the prospective juror's English language skills and, on this basis, the prosecutor was entitled to excuse her.
During voir dire, Prospective Juror L.H. stated she tended to favor life imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, as the appropriate punishment. She observed that she could keep an open mind, but would have to be really convinced before returning a death verdict. Although the trial court had explained at some length that neither side bore a burden of proof in the penalty phase, when asked by the prosecutor if she would place a burden of proof on either party regarding the appropriate punishment, she responded, Prosecution. At best, L.H. appeared equivocal about the death penalty, and at worst, she appeared biased against it. Defendant claims that although she stated during voir dire that she would lean toward imposing life imprisonment, she also said she could keep an open mind. That a juror is equivocal about his or her ability to impose the death penalty is relevant to a challenge for cause, but does not undercut the raceneutral basis for a prosecutor's decision to excuse a prospective juror peremptorily. ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) The record strongly suggests the prosecutor had grounds for concern about her possible bias against the death penalty, and on this basis, was entitled to excuse her.
During the court's voir dire, Prospective Juror Y.M. stated she had strong religious beliefs against the death penalty and she could not return a death sentence. During the prosecution's voir dire, she again expressed religious reservations against the death penalty, but asserted she could sit as a juror in this case. The trial court denied the prosecutor's for cause challenge of Y. M., but allowed the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge on Y. M. after finding that Y. M. had strong feelings against the death penalty. The record suggests the prosecutor had reason for concern about Y. M.'s possible bias against the death penalty, and on this basis, he was entitled to excuse her.
In addition, defendant claims that, even if Prospective Jurors L. H. and Y. M. exhibited a bias against the death penalty, most Hispanic women actually feel this way, so that any disqualification of a Hispanic woman based on her beliefs about the death penalty would constitute improper bias against this group. We note that defendant points to no evidence in the record to support his speculation about Hispanic women's beliefs. In any event, we have recently rejected a similar contention. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1016, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) A prosecutor may excuse prospective jurors, including members of cognizable groups, based on personal, individual biases those prospective jurors actually express, even if the biased view or attitude may be more widely held inside the cognizable group than outside of it. ( Ibid. )