Opinion ID: 1637617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: missouri capital defendants are entitled to have a jury determine the facts rendering them eligible for the death penalty under section 565.030.4

Text: In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), decided three years after this Court affirmed Mr. Whitfield's conviction and sentence, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be expose[d]... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Numerous courts and commentators thereafter suggested that the principles underlying Apprendi were inconsistent with the principles underlying the Supreme Court's decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), that a judge could determine the aggravating facts necessary to impose the death penalty once a jury convicted defendant of first-degree murder. They were correct. Two years later, the Supreme Court applied the principles underlying Apprendi to the capital sentencing setting. The Court reasoned that, [c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. [4] Further, it found that Arizona's practice of labeling aggravating circumstances as sentencing factors rather than as elements of the offense of capital murder was a matter of form over substance and that, under Arizona's statutory scheme, Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.' Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, quoting, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court invalidated Arizona's capital sentencing scheme because it permitted a judge, rather than a jury, to determine the presence of aggravating factors required by Arizona law for imposition of the death penalty following a jury adjudication of a defendant's guilt of first-degree murder. In so holding, it extended to the capital sentencing setting Apprendi 's holding that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be `expose[d] ... to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone.' Id. at 588-89, 120 S.Ct. 2348, quoting, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348. The Supreme Court held that not just a statutory aggravator, but every fact that the legislature requires be found before death may be imposed must be found by the jury. And, in determining which factors fall within this rule, Ring cautioned that, the dispositive question ... `is one not of form, but of effect.' Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428, quoting, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels it must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Because Mr. Ring did not argue that Arizona's sentencing scheme required the jury to make a factual finding as to mitigating factors, the Supreme Court declined to specifically address whether a jury was also required to determine whether mitigating factors were present that called for leniency. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Instead, it set out the general principle that courts must use in applying Ring to determine whether a particular issue must be determined by the jury or can be determined by a judge, stating, [c]apital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. On remand, applying these principles, the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the contention that the requirements that mitigating circumstances be considered and weighed against aggravators were not factual predicates for imposition of the death penalty. See State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 65 P.3d 915, 942-43 (2003) ( Ring II ). It held, therefore, that, even if the presence of a statutory aggravator was conceded or not contested, resentencing would be required unless the court found that the failure of the jury to make these factual findings was harmless on the particular facts of the case. Id.
The State and Mr. Whitfield agree that, under Ring, a jury must determine all facts on which the legislature has predicated imposition of the death penalty. They also agree that sections 565.020 and 565.030 set out the requirements for imposition of the death penalty in Missouri. Section 565.020.2 provides that the punishment for first-degree murder shall be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole. Sec. 565.020.2. Section 565.030.2 requires that, in cases in which the state seeks the death penalty, the case shall be tried in two phases. In the first phase, the jury shall determine guilt. Sec. 565.030.2. Section 565.030.4 then provides that, [i]f the trier... finds the defendant guilty of murder in the first-degree, a second stage of the trial shall proceed at which the only issue shall be the punishment to be assessed and declared. Sec. 565.030.4. In the second, or penalty phase, the jury is required to be instructed to follow the four-step process set out in section 565.030.4: The trier shall assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation, parole, or release except by act of the governor: (1) If the trier does not find beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances set out in subsection 2 of section 565.032; or (2) If the trier does not find that the evidence in aggravation of punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in subsection 2 of section 565.032, warrants imposing the death sentence; or (3) If the trier concludes that there is evidence in mitigation of punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the statutory mitigating circumstances listed in subsection 3 of section 565.032, which is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation of punishment found by the trier; or (4) If the trier decides under all of the circumstances not to assess and declare the punishment at death. Id. Section 565.030.4 on its face requires that steps 1, 2, 3, and 4 be determined against defendant before a death sentence can be imposed. Id; see Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Mo. banc 1992). Step 1. Step 1 requires the trier of fact to find the presence of one or more statutory aggravating factors set out in section 565.032.2. Both the State and Mr. Whitfield agree that this is a fact that normally must be found by the jury in order to impose a sentence of death. The State contends that steps 2, 3, and 4 merely call for the jury to give its subjective opinion as to whether the death penalty is appropriate, however, not to make findings as to whether the factual predicates for imposing the death penalty are present. It urges that the principles set out in Ring are not offended even if the judge rather than the jury determines those three steps. This Court disagrees. Step 2. Step 2 requires the trier of fact (whether jury or judge) to find that the evidence in aggravation of punishment, including but not limited to evidence supporting the statutory aggravating factors, warrants imposition of the death penalty. As noted, the State argues that this step merely calls for a subjective opinion by the trier of fact, not a finding. But, the State fails to note that this Court rejected this very argument in its opinion on Mr. Whitfield's appeal of his initial conviction, in which it remanded for the new trial at issue here. In that decision, this Court held that step 2 requires a finding of fact by the jury, not a discretionary decision. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 515. This holding is supported by the plain language of the statute. In order to fulfill its duty, the trier of fact is required to make a case-by-case factual determination based on all the aggravating facts the trier of fact finds are present in the case. This is necessarily a determination to be made on the facts of each case. Accordingly, under Ring, it is not permissible for a judge to make this factual determination. The jury is required to determine whether the statutory and other aggravators shown by the evidence warrants the imposition of death. [5] Step 3. In step 3 the jury is required to determine whether the evidence in mitigation outweighs the evidence in aggravation found in steps 1 and 2. If it does, the defendant is not eligible for death, and the jury must return a sentence of life imprisonment. While the State once more argues that this merely calls for the jury to offer its subjective and discretionary opinion rather than to make a factual finding, this Court again disagrees. The analysis undertaken in three recent decisions by other state courts of last resort, interpreting similar statutes, is instructive. In Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo.2003), the Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the death sentences of two capital defendants after determining that Colorado's three-judge capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional in light of Ring. Colorado's death penalty statute, like Missouri's, requires the fact-finder to complete a four-step process before death may be imposed. First, at least one statutory aggravator must be found. Second, whether mitigating factors exist must be determined. Third, mitigating factors must not outweigh the aggravating factors. Finally, whether death is the appropriate punishment is considered. The Supreme Court of Colorado described the first three of these four steps as findings of fact that are prerequisites to a finding by the three-judge panel that a defendant was eligible for death. Woldt, 64 P.3d at 265. It noted that states are sometimes grouped into weighing states that require the jury to weigh the aggravating circumstances against those in mitigation in arriving at their determination of punishment, and non-weighing states. It explained that, while in steps 1, 2, and 3 the jury is permitted to consider and weigh aggravators and mitigators, and to that extent Colorado's process is like that used in weighing states, Colorado is a non-weighing state in that, in step 4, in which the jury decides whether to impose death or to give a life sentence, the jury is permitted to consider all of the evidence without being required to give special significance to the weight of statutory aggravators or mitigators. Id. at 263-64. This last step thus affords the sentencing body unlimited discretion to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment instead of death. Id. at 265. Because Colorado's death penalty statute required a threejudge panel to make the first three of these findings, the statute was declared unconstitutional. Id. at 266-67. Similarly, in Johnson v. State, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev.2002), Nevada's Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of its capital sentencing scheme in light of Ring. Its sentencing scheme provides for a threejudge panel to determine punishment if the jury is unable to do so. Johnson noted that Nevada statutory law requires two distinct findings to render a defendant death-eligible: `the jury or the panel of judges may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.' Johnson, 59 P.3d at 460 (citation omitted). Johnson determined the requisite statutory finding that the mitigating circumstances are not sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances is at least in part a factual determination, not merely discretionary weighing. Id. at 460. It held that, as a result, the rule announced in Ring required a jury rather than a judge to determine the mitigating as well as the aggravating factor issues. Id. Finally, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Arizona rejected the state's contention that the requirement of Arizona lawthat the court weigh mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstancesdid not require a factual determination, stating: In both the superseded and current capital sentencing schemes, the legislature assigned to the same fact-finder responsibility for considering both aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as for determining whether the mitigating factors, when compared with the aggravators, call for leniency. Neither a judge, under the superseded statutes, nor the jury, under the new statutes, can impose the death penalty unless that entity concludes that the mitigating factors are not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. [sections] 13-703.E (Supp.2002) and 13-703.F (Supp.2001). The process involved in determining whether mitigating factors prohibit imposing the death penalty plays an important part in Arizona's capital sentencing scheme. Ring II, 65 P.3d at 943 (emphasis added). The Court continued: We will not speculate about how the State's proposal [to allow the judge to make these findings] would impact this essential process. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990) (`In some situations, a state appellate court may conclude that peculiarities in a case make appellate ... harmless error analysis extremely speculative or impossible.'); see also Johnson v. Nevada, 59 P.3d 450 (Nev.2002) (as applied to Nevada law, Ring ... requires [a] jury to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors under Nevada's statute requiring the fact-finder to further find whether mitigating circumstances are sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances). Id. Accordingly, the Court held that, even were the presence of a statutory aggravator conceded or not contested, resentencing would be required unless the court found that the failure of the jury to make these factual findings was harmless on the particular facts of the case. Id. This was a necessary result of applying Ring's holding that [c]apital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Missouri's steps 1, 2, and 3 are the equivalent of the first three factual determinations required under Colorado's death penalty statute, so that, as in Colorado, the jury is told to find whether there are mitigating and aggravating circumstances and to weigh them to decide whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty. These three steps are also similar to the aggravating and mitigating circumstance findings required under Nevada and Arizona law. As in those states, these three steps require factual findings that are prerequisites to the trier of fact's determination that a defendant is death-eligible. Step 4. Finally, in step 4 of section 565.030.4, the trier of fact is instructed that it must assess and declare the punishment at life imprisonment if it decides under all of the circumstances not to assess and declare the punishment at death. As under Colorado's statute, it is not until this fourth step that the trier of fact is given discretion to make the final determination whether to give a life sentence even if he or she has already found that the aggravators and mitigators would qualify defendant for imposition of the death penalty. As in Colorado, Missouri is considered a non-weighing state because of the discretion given to the jury at this point to impose a life sentence without regard to the weight it gave to aggravators and mitigators it found. See Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 515 (The jury does not make any discretionary decision in imposing the death penalty. On the other hand, the jury is given the constitutionally-required unlimited discretion to exercise mercy and reduce the sentence to life. [ Sec. ] 565.030.4(4)).
Turning to how these four steps were carried out here, the record reveals that Mr. Whitfield's jury returned a verdict stating that it could not agree on punishment. The record reveals that the jury was split 11 to 1 in favor of life imprisonment. When a jury returns a verdict stating the jurors cannot decide upon punishment, section 565.030.4 requires the judge to decide punishment and provides that [t]he court shall follow the same procedure as set out in this section [steps 1-4] whenever it is required to determine punishment for murder in the first degree. Sec. 565.030.4. The statute required the judge to independently go through the four statutory steps and make his or her own determination whether the death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. As required by section 565.030.4, once the jury deadlocked on Mr. Whitfield's punishment, the trial judge independently went through each of the four statutory steps, independently determined each fact against Mr. Whitfield, and imposed a death sentence. As a result, the death sentence imposed on Mr. Whitfield was not based on a jury finding of any fact, but rather was entirely based on the judge's findings that all four steps favored imposition of the death penalty. See sec. 565.030.4. This process clearly violated the requirement of Ring that the jury rather than the judge determine the facts on which the death penalty is based. [6]
Violation of Ring may not in itself automatically invalidate imposition of the death penalty. For, while Ring requires that a jury rather than a judge make the factual findings necessary for imposition of a death sentence, it implies that a court may find that the failure to require jury findings was harmless error. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, n. 7, 122 S.Ct. 2428. We therefore turn to that issue. In determining whether federal constitutional error may be considered harmless, Missouri has followed the test set out by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). See, e.g. State v. Driscoll, 55 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Mo. banc 2001). [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824. Under this test, the beneficiary of a constitutional error, the State, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. Step 1. In some other case, in which the facts on which the jury based its finding of statutory aggravators were not prior convictions, a harmless error analysis would have to be undertaken in step 1 based on the above principles. On the facts of this case, however, it was not error, harmless or otherwise, for the judge to find the presence of statutory aggravators under step 1, because here, the statutory aggravators submitted were Mr. Whitfield's previous convictions for seconddegree murder and manslaughter. Ring and Apprendi do not overrule prior Supreme Court case law holding that the presence of prior convictions, which are a matter of court record, may be found by the judge rather than by the jury without violating the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. That law thus governs here. [7] Step 2. Whether the trial court's finding of step 2 was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt is a much more difficult issue for the State. Applying step 2, and in accordance with MAI-CR3d 313.42, Instruction No. 24 informed the jury that if it found a statutory aggravator, then it would be its duty to decide whether the aggravating circumstances are sufficient to warrant the imposition of death as a punishment of defendant. Here, the jury was instructed that it could consider all the evidence, including statutory and non-statutory aggravators, in making this decision and that if the jury did not unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that those aggravating circumstances you have found warrant the imposition of death as defendant's punishment, you must return a verdict fixing his punishment at imprisonment for life.... Yet, the jury did not return a life sentence but returned a verdict stating that the jurors could not unanimously agree on punishment. The judge then reconsidered the four statutory steps, found them against Mr. Whitfield, and sentenced him to death. In deciding whether the error in permitting the judge rather than the jury to make the second step determination was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court is cognizant of the fact that normally a jury is presumed to follow the jury instructions. See e.g. State v. Madison, 997 S.W.2d 16, 21 (Mo. banc 1999). Here, the jury was instructed to return a verdict of life imprisonment if it could not agree on step 2. The State argues this Court should presume that the jury followed this instruction even though the issue here is the imposition of the death penalty, citing a case applying such a presumption in a death penalty case where the jury could not agree on punishment and the issue of punishment fell to the judge, State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 919-920 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 954, 118 S.Ct. 377, 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1997). Smith is distinguishable, however. It permitted a presumption that the jury found the presence of an aggravating factor under step 1. Whether such factors existed was relatively straightforward. Smith did not address whether such a presumption could be made as to the findings required in steps 2 or 3. More importantly, Smith was decided prior to Ring's holding that the jury must make each factual finding necessary for imposition of a death sentence. Smith did not address whether a constitutionallymandated factual finding can ever be presumed to have been made, or whether an express finding is required in those circumstances. And, tellingly, it found a presumption proper as to the findings required in step 1 under a standard of review that placed the burden of proof on defendant to prove prejudicial error. Smith, 944 S.W.2d at 919-20. Here, however, because the judgment was entered based on the judge's findings of fact rather than those of the jury, Ring was violated, and the burden shifted to the State to show the Ring error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A presumption is simply inadequate to meet this high standard, and no affirmative proof sufficient to meet this standard has been offered by the State, as the record is silent in regard to the jury's findings. Tellingly, perhaps for this reason, the statute does not permit a trial judge to presume, based on the jury's deadlock, that the jury has decided any particular steps against defendant. Rather, the judge must go through each of the four steps and independently make his or her own factual determination as to each step, not merely steps 3 and 4. Step 3. Even were there a basis for this Court to hold, based on the jury instructions and verdict, that it can be presumed the jury unanimously found against defendant under step 2, and that such a presumption constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt of harmless error, no similar determination, much less presumption, can be made as to step 3. In regard to step 3, the jury was instructed that if it found that aggravators warranting the imposition of death were present, each of you must then determine whether one or more mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances so found to exist. The jury was informed that if all of the jurors agreed that one or more mitigators were present that were sufficient to outweigh the factors in aggravation, then it must return a verdict of life imprisonment. Unlike for step 2, however, the jury was not told in regard to step 3 that it had to return a verdict of life imprisonment if it could not unanimously agree whether the mitigating facts outweighed the aggravating facts. Sec. 565.030.4; see also MAICR3d 313.48; Thompson, 85 S.W.3d at 639. Under the instruction, if even one juror, but not all, determined there is evidence in mitigation of punishment ... which is sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation of punishment ..., the jurors would be unable to agree on punishment and, under the instructions, the jury would be deadlocked and would return a verdict form so stating. Here, the jury returned a verdict stating that it was unable to agree on punishment. This Court, and any court, can only act on the record, and the record does not show that the jury deadlocked after rather than before it made the requisite finding under step 3. [8] In sum, Mr. Whitfield's right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a jury determination of the facts rendering him eligible for the death penalty was violated, as his death sentence was entered not based on a jury finding of any fact, but rather entirely on the judge's findings. Because the record does not contain any basis for the Court to conclude the jury made the requisite determinations in steps 1, 2, and 3 against Mr. Whitfield before deadlocking, the State is unable to meet its burden of showing that this constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [9]