Opinion ID: 1169826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unequivocal Assertion of Right to Self-representation

Text: On February 10, 1988, after proceedings before other trial judges, this case was assigned to Judge Richard Kalustian. Six days later, Judge Kalustian found defendant competent to stand trial. On February 23, 1988, defendant appeared with counsel before Judge Kalustian. After the court set a trial date of April 5, 1988, defense counsel made an ex parte motion that defendant be ordered to provide samples of his blood, saliva, hair, and fingernails to assist counsel in preparing the defense case. Defense counsel informed the court that the motion was against the wishes of defendant, who perceived the motion as not helping him and therefore wanted to go pro per at this point. The following exchange between defendant and the court then occurred. [Defendant] Could I say something your honor? [¶] [The court] No. Let me do the talking. [¶] To start with, your request for an order ordering Mr. Marshall to submit to withdrawal of blood and saliva sample, a fingernail sample and hair sample, the court orders him to do that. You are ordered to give those samples, Mr. Marshall. [¶] [Defendant] Could I say something, your honor? [¶] [The court] Not on that subject. [¶] [Defendant] I would like to fire this attorney and go pro per because this is not  my right is being violated in this courtroom department P right now. (Italics added.) After defendant made a rambling statement, the court stated: Now is the time, Mr. Marshall, to let me know. Defendant replied: Now you asking me right now to explain to you the circumstances behind all this? The court responded: No, I am asking you to tell me why you want me to fire your lawyer and allow you to go in pro per.  (Italics added.) Defendant then said: If you give me another lawyer, it still won't do me no good on this capital case because I believe I am being used by this court in order to keep this court open for future. [¶] But let me say this, then I will be finished. I will take the pro per status.  (Italics added.) Following some additional remarks by defendant that wandered somewhat from the subject of self-representation, the trial court ruled: Thank you, Mr. Marshall. [¶] Request to relieve [defense counsel] is denied. And your request to proceed in pro per is denied. (Italics added.) The ruling was reflected in the court's written minute order stating, Defendant's motion to relieve counsel and proceed in propria persona are denied. (Italics added.) From this colloquy, the majority concludes erroneously that defendant was equivocal in his request to proceed without counsel, and that therefore the trial court did not have to honor it. As set forth above, at the February 23, 1988, hearing, not only did defendant's counsel advise the court of defendant's desire to go pro per, but defendant himself repeatedly said so. The trial court knew that defendant was asserting his constitutional right to self-representation, for the court twice at the hearing and later in its formal minute order specifically described defendant's request as one to proceed in propria persona. To support its conclusion that defendant's request was equivocal, the majority points to certain rambling statements by defendant at the hearing concerning topics other than self-representation. Those statements did not, however, in any way call into question defendant's unequivocal request for self-representation, as the trial court recognized when it repeatedly described the request as one to proceed in pro per. According to the majority, defendant was not sincere in asserting his constitutional right to proceed without counsel. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 26-27.) There is no constitutional requirement, however, that a defendant whose invocation of the right of self-representation is otherwise unequivocal must add the statement, I really, really mean it, or demonstrate sincerity in some other fashion not identified by the majority.