Opinion ID: 1318519
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Casual

Text: MEA asserts that any such trespass was casual [7] and hence only single damages should be awarded. We have not previously interpreted casual in the Alaska tree trespass statute. MEA contends that the trial court found MEA's excessive cutting to be the result of negligence and mistake and hence the court should have found the clearing to be casual. MEA, however, mischaracterizes the trial court's findings. At the beginning of her oral findings, Judge Cutler did say that this was not a case where people were recklessly cutting down other people's trees without regard for them. Nevertheless, the court later described MEA's conduct as negligence verg[ing] on recklessness. In its written findings, the court concluded that [t]he treble damages statute should apply because of the negligent and near reckless conduct of the [d]efendant. MEA does not contest the finding of negligence. Rather it argues that negligence should be included in the definition of casual, and hence exempted from the treble damages provision. We disagree. The phrase casual or involuntary comes directly from the tree trespass statute in New York's Field Code of 1848. [8] In the mid-nineteenth century, casual meant casualty. See Viall v. Carpenter, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 285, 286 (Mass. 1860) (discussing casual and involuntary as used in Massachusetts statute governing tender of amends in trespasses to land. See R.S. ch. 105, § 12 (1836), codified as amended in 41 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 242, § 8 (West 1959)). Casualty, in turn, meant accident or negligence and contrasted with designedly and under a claim of right. Viall, 82 Mass. at 286. [9] At first blush, the common law definition of casual supports MEA's argument. Closer inspection of the statute and case law, however, reveals that the negligence signified by casual does not include a mistaken belief in the authority to cut trees. In Viall, the court noted that English common law distinguished trespasses committed under a mistaken belief in authority to enter from merely casual or involuntary trespasses: Under a similar statute in England ... it has been held that a trespass committed by mistake is not within the terms of the statute, because the act was voluntary. In such case, the entry on the land, being intended, was deemed not to be within the statute, although it might have been made under an erroneous impression as to the right of the tortfeasor in the premises... . If a party enters on land ex intentione, the law holds him responsible for all the consequences of his acts, and treats him as a wrongdoer, if he fails to justify his entry. It is only when by a casualty or without design he commits a trespass, that the law seeks to protect him ... . Id., (citations omitted, initial emphasis in original, final emphasis added). Thus, a trespass committed under a negligently mistaken belief in the right to cut [10] would not be casual since the trespasser intends to cut. Where the trespass is unintended, it is casual. For example, a bulldozer operator grading a road negligently swerves and plows down some trees. Since the operator had no intent to enter or cut the trees, the destruction occurred as a casualty. The operator is liable for single damages only. Or, an excavator negligently sets off dynamite and injures trees. Since the excavator intended no destructive entry, the damage occurred as a casualty. Or, a car careens negligently out of control and destroys a prize hedge. Again, the driver did not intend to enter the land or harm the hedge. In such examples, the defendants had no intent to enter or to cut the trees. Casual negligence thus means negligent conduct not involving an intent or design to enter or harm trees. Casual refers to whether the trespasser intended to cut, not the reason for an intended cutting. Once a trespasser forms an intent to enter the land, the trespass becomes willful and the plaintiff may recover treble damages. Iacobelli Construction v. Western Casualty and Surety, 130 Mich. App. 255, 343 N.W.2d 517, 521 (1983) (construing casual and involuntary in Michigan's tree trespass statute). MEA's negligent decision to exceed the scope of Weissler's permission to cut cannot qualify as casual negligence. MEA's agents intended to cut the trees under a mistaken belief that Weissler would approve. Since MEA's agents intended to cut, their actions were not casual.