Opinion ID: 1633716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Reading of prior statement of witness

Text: Both Jones, in his Point II, and Hedge, in his Point V, argue that the trial court erred in allowing the prior statement of a witness to be read into the record as a prior consistent statement. They contend that the statement constituted inadmissible hearsay. The State called James Blackwell, one of the men present at the time of the murder who was charged with the crime but not tried with Jones and Hedge. He was questioned, on direct examination, about what he did and what he observed on the night in question. On cross-examination, counsel for both Hedge and Jones pressed Blackwell about a statement he had given to the police soon after the crime occurred in which he described his actions when he witnessed Jones and Sims fighting. I saw Gary going for his knife, the statement read. I tried to get to Gary but I saw him stab Dutch twice. Under cross-examination, Blackwell explained that he meant that he hollered at Jones when he said that he had tried to get to [him]. As he put it, I'm just a country boy. During re-direct examination, the State showed Blackwell his statement and asked him to read the first paragraph. The following colloquy then occurred at the bench: MR. TINER (HEDGE'S ATTORNEY): We object to the witness reading any statement. He's here and he can testify live as to what his recollection is and he can use this to refresh his recollection. But we are objecting to his reading the statement which the Court has already denied him the opportunity to admit. THE COURT: Court simply said that would not be admitted into evidence as substitutive evidence. Certainly he may refer to it and examine it, may read from that statement. In other words, you inferred or implied that he had changed some of his testimony, a recent fabrication. If he made a statement, then that may be offered to rebut any allegation, insinuation of recent fabrication. For that purpose your objection will be overruled. MR. TINER: The point is, Your Honor, that we have inferred that he has changed his mind on it. That's what we're objecting to. THE COURT: If he made a prior statement consistent with his sworn testimony here, then it may be appropriate to show it. MR. MOONEY: Actually he did. THE COURT: He may either be asked to read the statement himself for refreshing his memory MR. MOONEY: It was consistent. THE COURT: read it out loud, he may read the prior inconsistent statements. MR. TINER: Your Honor, it's our position that his testimony was consistent with his statement. THE COURT: Was consistent? MR. TINER: Yes, sir. MR. DAVIS (PROSECUTOR): And I was at a different cross-examination, Your Honor, because they challenged him on what was in his statement for twenty minutes. MR. TINER: We didn't challenge him, we just asked him about it. THE COURT: All right. Court will overrule the objection. You may proceed. The witness was then allowed to read the statement in its entirety. A prior statement by a witness testifying at a trial is not hearsay if it is consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Ark.R.Evid. 801(d)(l)(ii). The word recent, describing the fabrication, is merely a relative term, meaning that the challenged testimony was supposedly fabricated to meet the exigencies of the case. Brown v. State, 262 Ark. 298, 556 S.W.2d 418 (1977). But the principle has no application when a witness had the same motive for fabrication when the statement was made as he had when he testified in the case. Id. See also Cole v. State, 307 Ark. 41, 818 S.W.2d 573 (1991); Pennington v. State, 24 Ark.App. 70, 749 S.W.2d 680 (1988). According to Jones and Hedge, Blackwell had the same motive for fabrication when he gave his statement to the police as he had when he testified at trial. He was arrested and charged with the same crime. The prior statement was given to the police in connection with the investigation. Blackwell's motive was unchanged throughout, they insist he sought to absolve himself of any appearance of guilt in the homicide. While there appears to be some superficial merit to this line of reasoning, it is evident, from a perusal of the exchange between the attorneys and the trial court at the time the objection to the reading of the statement was made, that defense counsel shifted their grounds for objection even as they lodged it, arguing first that he has changed his mind and then asserting that the testimony was consistent with his statement. The sudden substitution of the basis for the objection prompted the prosecutor to remark in exasperation that I was at a different cross-examination. By the end of the colloquy, Hedge's attorney was explaining that defense counsel had not challenged the witness on the statement but had just asked him about it. It is a distinction too subtle to withstand scrutiny. The record does not reflect that Jones actually objected on this point. He has thus failed to preserve the issue for appeal. Hedge, whose argument we may consider, claims that defense counsel used the statement Blackwell gave the police to impeach the witness but made no charge of recent fabrication in relation to the statement. This claim is simply untenable in the light of the course pursued during cross-examination, where defense counsel suggested to Blackwell that you remembered it [the events recorded in the statement] a whole lot better than you do here almost two years later, and the initial defense statement in the sidebar dialogue that we have inferred that he has changed his mind on it. (Emphasis added.) As Rule 801(d)(1)(ii) indicates, a charge of recent fabrication may be either express or implied. The implication here was, to say the least, quite strong. Given the confused posture of Hedge's objection (which seemed to entail an improvisational abandonment of the original grounds) and the failure of Jones to lodge a formal objection at all, added to the fact that the jury had already heard parts of the statement during the cross-examination, we cannot say that the trial court erred in allowing the entire statement of witness Blackwell to be read.