Opinion ID: 1714125
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The time between the crime and the confrontation.

Text: ¶ 39. Roughly two years passed between the shootings and the trial. ¶ 40. We find that the circuit court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Ms. Su said she immediately recognized the two assailants when they entered the store even though she and her brother were watching television. It is reasonable to believe that she redirected her attention toward the assailants almost immediately after their entry into the store because they had covered their faces and were carrying weapons. Horne makes much of the fact that they were in the store for only a matter of seconds, but we find that the short time frame did not render Ms. Su's testimony inadmissible; rather, the short time frame was a factor to be considered in the jury's assessment of Ms. Su's credibility. Ms. Su's first and second descriptions of Horne, both given the same night as the incident, were very accurate. Again at trial, two years after the shootings, Ms. Su was certain in her identification of Horne. ¶ 41. Based upon these factors, credible evidence exists to support the circuit court's determination that there was no substantial likelihood of misidentification in allowing the in-court identification. Therefore, we find this assignment of error to be without merit.
¶ 42. Horne contends that, as a result of his age and intoxication, he was unable to give a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights. After a hearing, the circuit court found that Horne was properly advised of his rights, that he waived the same, and that the confession was free and voluntary. ¶ 43. The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible it must have been given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements. Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 587 (Miss.1998) (citing Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 86 (Miss.1996)). [T]he prosecution shoulders the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. Morgan, 681 So.2d at 86 (citing Haymer v. State, 613 So.2d 837, 839 (Miss.1993)). This burden is met and a prima facie case made out by testimony of an officer, or other persons having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Morgan, 681 So.2d at 87. ¶ 44. Our review of whether Horne's confessions were voluntary is limited. The circuit court sits as a fact finder when determining voluntariness of a confession, and its determination will not be reversed unless manifestly wrong. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1204 (Miss.1996), overruled on other grounds by King v. State, 784 So.2d 884 (Miss.2001); Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899, 907 (Miss.1993). The State has the burden of proving all facts prerequisite to the admissibility of a defendant's confession beyond a reasonable doubt. Blue, 674 So.2d at 1204; Porter, 616 So.2d at 908. ¶ 45. We have held that, if the nature of the crime is one where the defendant could receive life imprisonment or death and if original jurisdiction in the case lies in the circuit court, it is not necessary that a minor have a parent present during interrogation. Blue, 674 So.2d at 1205. Horne's age has no special bearing on his ability to be questioned without a parent and voluntary waive his rights. Id. ¶ 46. Although Horne had been drinking and/or smoking marijuana prior to his arrest, Officer DeJarnette, Officer Adrian Dejuan Ratliff and Detective Richard Cox, who typed Horne's statement, testified that he did not appear intoxicated at the time of his arrest. The evidence, including the videotape which did not depict Horne in a state of intoxication, overwhelmingly established that intoxication was not a factor when Horne gave his statements. ¶ 47. There is no evidence in the record that Horne was coerced, threatened or enticed into giving his statements. The record does show that Horne was advised of his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions after he was taken into custody. He waived those rights each time he was so advised. The officers who took Horne's statement each testified that Horne voluntarily made his statement and that no threats or promises or other form of coercion were brought to bear upon him. This evidence is supported by the videotape wherein Horne reiterated that he was cognizant of his rights, that he waived them, and that he freely and voluntarily gave the statements. ¶ 48. We find that, because there is substantial evidence indicating that Horne understood his rights and voluntarily waived them, the circuit court's decision finding Horne's confessions admissible was not in error. There is no merit to this issue.
¶ 49. Horne complains that the circuit court would not allow him to show the color of his eyes to the jury unless he testified. In other words, Horne wished to establish an evidentiary fact (that the color of his eyes may or may not have been the color testified to by the State's witnesses) without taking an oath, testifying, or allowing the State to cross-examine him. ¶ 50. Defendants in criminal cases have been required to show a physical characteristic such as a scar in court, and such demonstrations have been held not to be a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. Lewis v. State, 725 So.2d 183, 188-89 (Miss.1998); Porter v. State, 519 So.2d 1230, 1232 (Miss.1988). However, where such demonstrations have occurred, there is no dispute as to the physical characteristic's particulars. In Lewis, for example, defense counsel requested that Lewis try on a pair of shoes to see if they fit. There was no issue of fact as to whether the shoes were his or as to whether they were on his feet when he was arrested. In the case sub judice, the color of Horne's eyes was very much disputed. ¶ 51. Horne's demonstration of the color of his eyes was irrelevant if there was no accompanying testimony that the color of his eyes on that particular day of trial was the same as on the day of the shooting. No proffer of such testimony was presented by the defense. ¶ 52. Nevertheless, the jury was able to observe Horne and the color of his eyes throughout the week-long trial. In fact, defense counsel specifically called the jury's attention to Horne's eyes during closing argument. If the circuit court erred by not allowing Horne's demonstration, it was harmless error.
¶ 53. Although parties are given great latitude in closing arguments, Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162, 163 (Miss. 1989), an improper closing argument may constitute reversible error if the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney's... argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision inflated by prejudice. Id. ¶ 54. Horne contends that the following argument by the State instructed the jury to stop the crime and gang activity in the neighborhood and to protect the community and to stop crime: And let me tell you the sad part of this case, and I'm going to close with this. Mr. Gaddis asked Ms. Essie Ellisshe asked Ms. Essie Ellis about the gangs. And that incident was the day before, I believe, if I remember the testimony night before this happened. But she asked her was it a dangerousyes, sir. Do you have gangs there? Do you have drug dealers there? Yes, you do. It's a bad neighborhood, isn't it? Yes. I can't go out at night. I can't go out at night. Here we are in the United States of American and people are a prisoner to their own home. They can't go out at night because of drugs and guns and gangs.    Yes sir. I'm fixing to finish it. You see, that's what happens, and when you look the other way, if you're in law enforcement, whatever profession you're in, and you walk by and look the other way when you know something's wrong and you ought to do something about it, then you've got to do something about it under the law. You create a new stand.    Maybe he's entitled to consideration, but we can't give it to him. We don't know. We have no way under the law. Our duty is to try to enforce the law and to protect everybody in that community. It's a tough, tough job, 24 hours a day, but especially when people are armed with these kinds of things. And I'm not going to hold us up here anymore, but his is not a 14 year old's toy. This is a killing machine. And you know the old saying? Guns don't kill people; people kill people. I agree with that. This gun couldn't have walked in that place and loaded itself and fired. People do it. ¶ 55. Horne has misinterpreted the State's remarks. The prosecutor did not instruct the jury to stop crime and clean up neighborhoods. He stated that it was the duty of people who work in law enforcement to stop crime and clean up neighborhoods. And Horne opened the door to the State's remarks about gang activity when he examined a witness about gang activity in the neighborhood. ¶ 56. This claim is without merit.
¶ 57. Because Horne was a juvenile and the death penalty was unavailable, the circuit court sentenced him to the only sentence currently available for capital murder, life imprisonment without parole. Ostensibly, there are two life sentences available, one with and one without parole. However, under Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3(1)(f), the Legislature has taken away the simple life sentence in capital murder cases: No person shall be eligible for parole who is charged, tried, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 99-19-101. See also Pham v. State, 716 So.2d 1100, 1103 (Miss. 1998) ([A]lthough under the relevant code provisions, while there is the apparent necessity of a choice between death, life, and life without parole, in reality there is really only a choice between death and life without parole in the capital case in this context.). Because there was no discretion in the sentence for the murder conviction to be imposed, we cannot find that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to order a pre-sentence investigation and report.
¶ 58. As discussed above, the circuit court had no discretion to sentence Horne to anything but life imprisonment on the murder conviction. Moreover, Horne never asked the circuit court to perform a proportionality review; therefore this claim is procedurally barred.