Opinion ID: 30626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Properly Exhausted Claims

Text: We now turn to the claims that Ransom exhausted in state court. Denial of a new trial on guilt/innocence Ransom argues that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals violated his due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying him a new trial on guilt/innocence and by reversing only the punishment portion of his trial after finding jury selection error.6 Ransom contends that his conviction as well as his sentence should have been reversed because the voir dire error is a structural defect not subject to harmless error analysis. The district court properly recognized that the issue is not whether the error is harmless but whether the error affected the guilt/innocence stage of the trial. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals based its decision not to reverse the guilt/innocence phase of Ransom’s trial on two Supreme Court cases and several Texas state cases. In Witherspoon 5 The district court ruled that four of these claims, numbers 4, 9, 11 and 12 on the list in fn. 3 supra, were moot because they arose from the penalty phase of the first trial, and Ransom won a retrial of his penalty, rendering it unnecessary for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to rule on those issues in the first appeal. We agree with this alternative ruling as well. 6 The State conceded that the Texas trial court committed reversible error by granting the State’s challenge for cause against venireman Harold Freeman based on his statement that “it would take more than the evidence supporting the defendant’s guilt for capital murder to persuade him beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a continuing danger to society.” Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Initially the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Ransom’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, but on rehearing the Court affirmed Ransom’s conviction, vacated his sentence, and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 7 v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 1775, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the excusal for cause of a venireman based on conscientious scruples about the death penalty would invalidate a death sentence but would not necessarily affect a capital murder conviction. In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 545, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1790, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968), the Supreme Court held that Witherspoon error did not require reversal of a defendant’s conviction where the defendant had been given a life sentence instead of the death penalty. In both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that unless a defendant presents evidence that voir dire error necessarily produced biased jurors with respect to guilt, the defendant’s conviction will not be affected. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517-18, 88 S. Ct. at 1774-75, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 782-83; Bumper, 391 U.S. at 545, 88 S. Ct. at 1790, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 800-01. Because Ransom has not presented any evidence that the voir dire error in his case resulted in a jury biased with respect to guilt, his claim is without merit; he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. We therefore deny his request for a COA on this claim. Exclusion of testimony at resentencing Ransom argues that his due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the state trial court prohibited Ransom from introducing the testimony of Assistant Attorney General Alan Levy that if Ransom were given a life sentence, the State would try Ransom for the attempted murder of prosecutor Bob Gill and would seek a consecutive maximum 8 sentence of twenty years. Ransom contends that this evidence was relevant to the issue of future dangerousness because it would have shown that if the jury gave him a life sentence, he would have been confined for the rest of his life in a secure prison environment. The district court properly recognized that the admissibility of evidence at capital sentencing is an issue left to the States, subject to certain federal requirements. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2121-22, 147 L. Ed. 2d 125, 138 (2000). The court denied habeas relief because the state courts rejected the evidence on state law grounds and Ransom did not cite to, and the district court could not find, any precedent holding that federal due process requires the admission of this type of evidence during the punishment phase of a capital murder trial. Because reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s resolution of this claim debatable, Ransom is not entitled to a COA on this claim. Constitutionality of the Texas death penalty statute Ransom next argues that the Texas death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied, violating the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, because it precludes appellate review of relevant mitigating factors, leaving capital juries with unfettered discretion to assess the death penalty.7 7 With respect to this claim and Ransom’s next claim, the state’s argument on procedural bar was rejected by the district court, and the state has not questioned that ruling on appeal. We therefore reach the merits of the claims. 9 First, because Ransom has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in his case, he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty statute on the ground that appellate courts do not conduct a sufficiency review of the mitigation special issue. “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact[.] . . . Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. . . . Third, it must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 364 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Because Ransom has not sought any form of sufficiency review by the Texas or federal courts, he has not been denied the review which he claims is constitutionally deficient. He therefore has not suffered an injury in fact, nor has he shown that his alleged injury could be redressed by a favorable decision. Nevertheless, even if Ransom had standing to bring this claim, it is without merit. “In providing for individualized sentencing, it must be recognized that the States may adopt capital sentencing processes that rely upon the jury, in its sound judgment, to exercise wide discretion.” Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 974, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 2636, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750, 761 (1994). As long as the class of criminal defendants subject to capital punishment is narrowed, it is constitutionally permissible to allow a jury, rather than an appellate court, to recommend mercy 10 based on mitigating evidence. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2951, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 283 (1989); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1775, 95 L. Ed. 2d 262, 288 (1987) (petitioner not entitled to proportionality review of the death sentence); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 5051, 104 S. Ct. 871, 879, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 40-41 (1984) (same); Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1999) (same). Furthermore, this Court has held that even though Texas appellate courts do not review jury verdicts under the mitigation special issue, meaningful appellate review is afforded through review of the future dangerousness special issue. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). Because reasonable jurists would not find the district court’s assessment of the constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty statute debatable or wrong under Supreme Court precedent or precedent from this circuit, we deny a COA on the claim. Denial of motion for mistrial Ransom contends that his due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because the state trial court did not take action in response to his motion for mistrial and because a biased juror served on his jury. Ransom’s motion for mistrial alleged that during a break at trial, Ransom’s half-brother, Tyrone Calloway, offered to help juror Richard Harding pull paper towels out of the dispenser in the men’s 11 restroom. Harding allegedly told Calloway that he did not “need any damn help from no nigger.” Contrary to Ransom’s allegation, the trial court did respond to Ransom’s motion for mistrial. Without objection, the trial court held the motion in abeyance until the end of trial, then held a hearing at which Harding and Calloway testified. The trial court found that the incident did not occur and that there was no evidence of actual bias or proof that Ransom was denied a trial by a fair and impartial jury. The Supreme Court “has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S. Ct. 940, 945, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 85 (1982). Ransom was afforded a hearing at which he failed to prove actual bias, and he has not presented clear and convincing evidence that the state trial court’s findings were incorrect. Because reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s resolution of this claim, we deny Ransom’s request for a COA.