Opinion ID: 1807546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether a claimant must show physical change of condition to reopen an award.

Text: SDCL 62-7-33 states: Any payment, including medical payments under § 62-4-1, made or to be made under this title may be reviewed by the department of labor pursuant to § 62-7-12 at the written request of the employer or of the employee and on such review payments may be ended, diminished, increased or awarded subject to the maximum or minimum amounts provided for in this title, if the department finds that a change in the condition of the employee warrants such action. (Emphasis added.) Initially, we point out that the record indicates Whitney admitted that his physical condition has not changed with respect to his back injury. Therefore, it is clear that there has been no physical change in condition. However, Whitney contends that change in condition was not only intended to mean physical but also economic change when reviewing reopening an award for permanent total disability. Our cases indicate the contrary, Stender v. City of Miller, 82 S.D. 334, 145 N.W.2d 913 (1966); Stowsand, supra ; Salmon, supra, as do various other jurisdictions. See also University Mechanical Contractors v. Industrial Commission, 135 Ariz. 365, 661 P.2d 215 (1983); Lucero v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 732 P.2d 642 (Colo.1987); Petrie v. Industrial Commission, 160 Ill. App.3d 165, 111 Ill.Dec. 858, 513 N.E.2d 104 (1987); Continental Airfilter Co. v. Blair, 681 S.W.2d 427 (Ky.1984); Wilson Concrete Co. v. Rork, 216 Neb. 447, 343 N.W.2d 764 (1984). In Lucero, supra, the Colorado court recognized that a few jurisdictions allow reopening without a showing of a change in physical condition due to the fact the statutes in those states generally imply or provide explicitly for that result. See, e.g., Hunt v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 569, 490 P.2d 575 (1971); King v. Piedmont-Warner Development, 177 Ga.App. 176, 338 S.E.2d 758 (1985); Mace v. Merchants Delivery Moving & Storage, 221 Va. 401, 270 S.E.2d 717 (1980). The Colorado court additionally noted that, generally, where state statutes provide only for reopening due to a change of conditions, courts in other states have construed that to mean a change of physical condition. See, e.g., Osborne v. Johnson, 432 S.W.2d 800, 804-5 (Ky.App.1968); University Mechanical Contractors, supra ; Petrie, supra ; Wilson Concrete, supra . Change in conditions, as that phrase is used in the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.S. § 922 (1986), has been interpreted by the federal courts to mean a change in the physical condition of the claimant. See Atlantic Coast Shipping Co. v. Golubiewski, 9 F.Supp. 315, 317 (D.Md.1934); Verderane v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 772 F.2d 775, 780 (11th Cir.1985); General Dynamics Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Program, 673 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.1982); Burley Welding Works Inc. v. Lawson, 141 F.2d 964, 966 (5th Cir.1944); and Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Lowe, 14 F.Supp. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y.1936). As the court in Lucero explained: The rationale behind these [federal] cases is a recognition of the fundamental principle that the workers' compensation laws were designed to compensate for diminishment of a worker's earning capacity due to specified physical or mental injuries. (citations omitted) The laws are not intended to protect against diminishment of a worker's earning capacity due to mass layoffs and other external fluctuations in economic conditions. Workers' compensation should not become, by way of strained construction, unemployment insurance. 732 P.2d at 647. We agree. A statute must be construed according to its manifest intent, and such intent must be derived from the statute as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. In Re Cancel. of Stabio Ditch Water Right, 417 N.W.2d 391, 394 (S.D.1987); Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757 (S.D. 1985). Courts must apply the law as the legislature enacted it, and must search for legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said rather than what it should have said or might have said. Stabio Ditch Water Right, supra at 394; State v. Galati, 365 N.W.2d 575 (S.D.1985). Our legislature certainly did not intend that the benefits to be derived from the worker's compensation law be an absolute financial substitute for salaried employment. Finally, this court has addressed this issue in a pre- Barkdull decision, Stender, supra . Therein we stated: A change in condition refers to a condition different from that which existed when the award was made. It must be a material and substantial change. As a general rule, it must be a change in the physical condition of the employee, affecting his earning capacity. (Emphasis added.) 82 S.D. at 338, 145 N.W.2d at 915. This remains the law today. We will leave it to the legislature to decide whether economic conditions should affect this issue in the future. See Lucero, supra . Because we require a change of condition to be physical, and since Whitney admitted that his physical condition has not changed, we conclude that he has not met his burden to show a change of condition to allow a reopening of the award. Although Whitney has presented other issues, we conclude that they are mooted by our holdings above. Affirmed.