Opinion ID: 373862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statistical Evidence In An Individual Employment Discrimination Case

Text: 6 Statistical evidence is merely a form of circumstantial evidence from which an inference of discrimination may be drawn. The invocation of statistical data works no magical incantation. As with any circumstantial evidence, the usefulness of statistical evidence depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1857. Statistical proof may alone be used, without presentation of specific instances of discrimination, to establish a Prima facie case of employment discrimination. 33 Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977); Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at 339, 97 S.Ct. 1843; Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 181 U.S.App.D.C. 207, 216, 557 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 7 This is so in an individual action as well as in a class action. We have previously indicated, 34 and now explicitly hold, that statistical evidence may establish a Prima facie case of employment discrimination in an individual case. The trial court's conclusion that such evidence has less probative value in an individual action than in a class action is in error. 35 8 Statistical evidence is typically utilized in class actions to establish Prima facie case demonstrating a pattern-or-practice of unlawful discrimination. See Teamsters, supra, 431 U.S. at 336-40, 97 S.Ct. 1843. An individual claimant in a class action need additionally establish only that he or she is a member of the class and has been denied a promotion or other employment benefit during the period of the class discrimination in order to recover for particularized injuries. 36 An employer may defeat that right to recovery by sustaining its burden of proving either that the plaintiff's statistical proof of class discrimination is inaccurate or insignificant, or that the individual claimant was denied an employment benefit for lawful reasons. 37 9 Just as statistical proof of a broad-based policy of employment discrimination (provides) reasonable grounds to infer that individual (employment) decisions were made in pursuit of the discriminatory policy and . . . require(s) the employer to come forth with evidence dispelling that inference in a class action, 38 so too should the use of statistical evidence have equal force and effect in an individual discrimination case. The Supreme Court in the Teamsters case explained its rationale for permitting a plaintiff to present a Prima facie case in a class action through statistical evidence: 39 10 Although the prima facie case did not conclusively demonstrate that all of the employer's decisions were part of the proved discriminatory pattern and practice, it did create a greater likelihood that any single decision was a component of the overall pattern. Moreover, the finding of a pattern or practice changed the position of the employer to that of a proved wrongdoer. Finally, the employer was in the best position to show why any individual employee was denied an employment opportunity. Insofar as the reasons related to available vacancies or the employer's evaluation of the applicant's qualifications, the company's records were the most relevant items of proof. If the refusal to hire was based on other factors, the employer and its agents knew best what those factors were and the extent to which they influenced the decisionmaking process. 11 This same reasoning applies in an individual action. 12 B. Nature of Statistical Evidence Probative of and Sufficient to Prove a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination with Regard to Promotions 13 Appellant's statistical data included in what has previously been designated category number one compares the sexual composition of the upper grade and salary positions at NIH and NHLBI with the overall sexual composition of those organizations. This data is probative evidence from which a court may infer discriminatory animus. 14 The proper comparison is between the composition of the relevant work force and the qualified population in the relevant labor market. 40 In the context of a promotion case such as is presently before the Court, it would be expected that, absent discriminatory promotion practices, the proportion of the protected group in each of the job classifications and grade levels would approximate the proportion of the protected group with the minimum necessary qualifications for promotion in the employer's labor force as a whole. See Teamsters, supra, at 339-40 n.20, 97 S.Ct. 1843. 15 The trial court criticized Appellant's statistics due to the lack of detailed information regarding qualifications of those available for promotions. 41 However, only the Minimum objective qualifications necessary for one to be eligible for promotion must be considered in the statistical data presented initially by a plaintiff; not every conceivable factor relevant to a promotion decision must be included in the statistical presentation in order to make out a Prima facie case. 42 For example, if a doctorate was necessary for an individual to be eligible for a position in the upper grade levels at NIH or NHLBI, then statistics on the relevant labor market would have to be so limited. The quality of education received by those eligible candidates, although perhaps a relevant factor in employment and promotion decisions, would not have to be provided for in the statistics initially proffered to make a Prima facie case. Similarly, if a particular number of years of work experience were established as a minimum job criterion, then that would need to be reflected in the proffered statistics. If, however, work experience were only a factor to be considered in promotion decisions, a plaintiff's statistical data need not take that into account. 16 We are not suggesting that a plaintiff may not present statistical evidence of factors relevant to promotion other than the minimum objective qualifications necessary for eligibility. We are merely saying that he need not do so to establish a Prima facie case. The defending party, with the greater access to statistical evidence of other relevant factors, may utilize such evidence in its rebuttal presentation. 43 17 The record herein reveals that there are no minimum necessary objective qualifications for the senior scientific research staff position of independent investigator. 44 A doctorate is not a minimum necessary re quirement, and the required capabilities of innovation and creativity are subjective, not objective, criteria. Therefore, contrary to the district court's second Conclusion of Law, the bare showing made by Dr. Davis' category one statistics is adequate. 45 18 In a promotion case such as that presented to this Court, the organization in which the plaintiff is an employee is appropriately utilized as the relevant labor market. 46 At NIH approximately 75% Of the positions at GS-11 and above are filled by promotion from within rather than recruitment from without. 47 Therefore, Appellant's statistical data included in category number one, indicating a substantial disparity between the percentage of female employees in the upper grade and salary positions at NIH and NHLBI and the overall percentage of female employees in those organizational units, is sufficient to make out a Prima facie case of discrimination. 19 Appellant's statistical data included in category number two also constitutes probative evidence from which discriminatory intent might be inferred. 48 Absent discriminatory promotion practices, similar promotion rates for male and female employees in the higher job classifications and grade levels who possess the minimum objective qualifications necessary for those positions would be expected. Dr. Davis' statistical evidence indicated that male GS employees in the higher grades at NIH and NHLBI were promoted at a substantially higher rate than similarly situated female employees. 20 Appellant's statistical Prima facie case is bolstered by the subjective and ad hoc nature of Appellee's promotion decisions. No objective criteria were established to guide the promotion decisions of supervisors, branch chiefs and ad hoc promotion panels, who were predominantly male. 49 This Court agrees with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), Vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809, 96 S.Ct. 19, 46 L.Ed.2d 29 (1975), Reinstated with modification on other grounds, 526 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1975), which stated: 21 Greater possibilities for abuse . . . are inherent in subjective definitions of employment selection and promotion criteria. Yet they are not to be condemned as unlawful per se, for in all fairness to applicants and employers alike, decisions about hiring and promotion in supervisory and managerial jobs cannot realistically be made using objective standards alone. Thus, it is especially important for courts to be sensitive to possible bias in the hiring and promotion process arising from such subjective definition of employment criteria. 22 Appellee's promotion procedures are highly suspect and must be closely scrutinized because of their capacity for masking unlawful bias. 50 The lack of meaningful standards to guide the promotion decision, whereby there is some assurance of objectivity . . . encourage(s) and foster(s) discrimination. 51