Opinion ID: 1368513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Venue Pursuant to Section 28-65-202

Text: Appellant argues that Jefferson County was the appropriate venue for this guardianship action. Appellant does not deny that prior to Valeria's death, Dana's domicile was in Phillips County. He contends, however, that after Valeria's death, his actions established Dana's residence and domicile in Jefferson County. Thus, he argues that Phillips County was not the proper venue for this case. We disagree. Before we reach the merits of this point, we must address Appellees' argument that this issue is waived because Appellant did not immediately appeal the Jefferson County order and did not seek a second writ of prohibition from this court. An order fixing venue is not a final order under Rule 2 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate ProcedureCivil. Rather, it is an intermediate order encompassed by Rule 2(b), which provides: An appeal from any final order also brings up for review any intermediate order involving the merits and necessarily affecting the judgment. This court has held that once a final order has been entered and an appeal taken, the question of venue, once put in issue, is not lost by continuing through a trial of the matter. Heber Springs Lawn and Garden, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 275 Ark. 260, 628 S.W.2d 563 (1982) (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 270 Ark. 485, 606 S.W.2d 56 (1980)). See also Arkansas Savings & Loan v. Corning Savings & Loan, 252 Ark. 264, 478 S.W.2d 431 (1972) (holding that an order granting or denying a change of venue is not an appealable order); State v. Langstaff, 231 Ark. 736, 332 S.W.2d 614 (1960) (holding that an order granting or denying a change of venue is not final, because the case still stands for trial). Accordingly, Appellant's timely appeal from the final order in this matter preserves his challenge of the Jefferson County Probate Court's order fixing venue in Phillips County. We thus consider the merits of Appellant's argument on this point. Section 28-65-202(a) provides in pertinent part that [t]he venue for the appointment of a guardian shall be: (1) In the county of this state which is the domicile of the incapacitated person[.] Subsection (b)(1) requires the court in which the first action is commenced to determine where venue lies, and that [i]f the proper venue is finally determined to be in another county, the court shall transmit the original file to the proper county. Subsection (c)(4) provides that in the event of a transfer, the receiving court shall complete the proceedings as if originally commenced in it. In the present case, a hearing was held in the Jefferson County Probate Court to determine the proper venue for the guardianship. Based on the testimony presented, the court found that since her birth on June 14, 1994, Dana had resided in Phillips County, either in Appellees' home or in her mother's home, which was located directly across the street from Appellees' home. The court found that on the date of the accident, Dana was physically present in Jefferson County, at the home of Appellant's parents; however, the child's presence there was for the purpose of visitation only. The court found that on March 29, 1999, the date on which it granted Appellant's petition for temporary guardianship, Dana was domiciled in Phillips County. The court then transferred the case to Phillips County. We agree with the Jefferson County Probate Court that at all times relevant to this action, Dana was domiciled in Phillips County. There is simply no merit to Appellant's contention that the child was domiciled in Jefferson County after her mother's death. Indeed, the evidence shows that the only reason that Dana was physically residing in Jefferson County at that time was because Appellant had removed the child from Appellees' home pursuant to the order granting him temporary guardianship. This evidence is insufficient to establish the child's domicile in Jefferson County. Accordingly, we affirm the determination of venue in Phillips County.