Opinion ID: 1330405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Surviving Spouse's Right to an Elective-Share

Text: At the outset, the distinction between construing the language of a will and determining what legal effect a will shall have should be made. When construing a will, the goal normally is to ascertain the testator's intent. For instance, when a testator uses ambiguous words, courts may be asked to interpret the meaning of those words in order to derive the testator's intent. See e.g. Foster v. Foster, 196 W.Va. 341, 472 S.E.2d 678 (1996) (interpreting the language in a holographic will). On the other hand, when determining the legal effect of a will, the focus shifts to whether the will complies with the law, i.e., whether the will violates any positive rule of law or public policy. If a testator attempts to make a disposition forbidden by law[,] it will not be effectuated... regardless of the testator's intent. Weiss v. Soto, 142 W.Va. 783, 791, 98 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1957). [11] As tersely explained by this Court in McCauley v. Henry, 143 W.Va. 770, 105 S.E.2d 129 (1958), [s]trictly speaking, the actual intention of a testator has nothing to do with the legal effect of his expressed intention ... [No matter how] clearly a testator may express his intention, the legal effect which shall and must be given to it by the courts is purely a question of law. 143 W.Va. at 776, 105 S.E.2d at 133 (citation omitted). For instance, in numerous cases a testator's intent is defeated for the reason that the law did not permit that intention to be carried out, such as occurs when a will violates the rule against perpetuities. Id. Thus, in the present case, we place no significance on Appellant's assertion that the revised legislation undermines his father's intent. The critical issue before this Court is not the intent of the testator. [12] Rather, the issue for this Court to resolve is what legal effect the testator's intent has, given the statutory changes. [13] In this light, we observe that it generally is held the operative effect of the will and the rights of the parties thereunder are governed by the law in force when the rights of the parties accrue, which is ordinarily the law in existence at the time of the death of the testator. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 587(f) at 724 (1957) [14] ; accord McCauley v. Henry, 143 W.Va. at 776, 105 S.E.2d at 133 (1958) [15] ; see also Syl. Pt. 5, Arnold v. Turek, 185 W.Va. 400, 407 S.E.2d 706 (1991) (Statutory changes in the manner and method of distributing the proceeds of a judgment or settlement for wrongful death will not be given retroactive effect, and the statute in effect on the date of the decedent's death will control.). On appeal, Appellant does not dispute that the statutory revisions were in effect at the time of his father's death but, instead, argues it would be inequitable to apply the law under the facts of this case. Essentially, Appellant is asking this Court to ignore the effective law and forfeit Appellee's rights pursuant to the repealed statutes. Given that our legislature specifically repealed the abandonment provision at the same time it amended West Virginia Code § 42-3-1 (permitting a surviving spouse to take an elective-share percentage of the augmented estate), [16] we cannot judicially engraft a modified form of the abandonment provision back into the code. [17] Instead, we follow the predominant rule that declares the issue of whether abandonment, or other types of misconduct, should result in a forfeiture of a surviving spouse's right to an estate is a determination best left to the legislature, not the courts. [18] As explained by the Alabama civil appellate court in Pogue v. Pogue, 434 So.2d 262 (Ala.Civ.App.1983): The great weight of authority is against any finding of an `implied exception' to the descent and distribution statutes. In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, the fact a surviving spouse abandoned the deceased spouse does not bar the surviving spouse's right to inherit under descent and distribution. 434 So.2d at 264 (citations omitted). Moreover, as the issue is within the plenary control of the state legislature and depends entirely upon the provisions of the statutes regardless of any other person's ideas or motions of right or wrong, it is irrelevant whether the inheritance statutes comport with the court's or counsel's idea of justice, morality or natural right. In re Scott's Estate, 90 Cal.App.2d 21, 202 P.2d 357, 359 (1949). [19] In an analogous situation, this Court reached the same result. In White v. Gosiene, 187 W.Va. 576, 420 S.E.2d 567 (1992), we were asked to decide whether a father, who abandoned his daughter, was entitled to share equally with the mother in a settlement reached for their daughter's wrongful death. 187 W.Va. at 578, 420 S.E.2d at 569. At the time the daughter died, there was no statute foreclosing a parent who abandoned a child from sharing in a wrongful death award. Id. at 585, 420 S.E.2d at 576. Therefore, we concluded in syllabus point five: In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a parent who abandons a child is not precluded from recovering or sharing in a wrongful death recovery where the wrongful death act mandates distribution of damages recovered thereunder in accordance with the laws of intestate succession. Writing for the Court, the Honorable Thomas B. Miller, Justice, explained it is loathe for this Court to interfere with the legislative determination as to those persons who should be entitled to the benefit of this statutorily created right of action, even where it results in injustice. Our role is to interpret the law, not to create it. Id. at 584, 420 S.E.2d at 575. [20] If Appellant's accusations against Appellee in this case are correct, we agree with Appellant that permitting Appellee to take an elective-share percentage of the augmented estate strikes the consciousness as being unjust. However, as is evident in the cases mentioned above, it is not the responsibility of the courts to legislate the rules of descent and distribution. Moreover, `[a]t common law no degree of misconduct by the surviving spouse resulted in a forfeiture of his or her rights in the estate of the deceased spouse.' In re Estate of Kostick, 514 Pa. 591, 526 A.2d 746, 747 (1987) (citation omitted). As spousal forfeiture is purely a creature of statute, this Court cannot impose a forfeiture without statutory authority. [21] Thus, we hold, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, abandonment will not bar a surviving spouse from exercising his or her right to take an elective-share percentage of an augmented estate pursuant to West Virginia Code § 42-3-1 (Supp.1992). Notwithstanding, Appellant further argues the doctrine of estoppel may `operate to cut off a right or privilege conferred by statute....' Quoting 28 Am.Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 34, at 639 (1966) (footnotes omitted). Therefore, even if Appellee has a statutory right to take an elective share, Appellant contends she should be barred by her prior actions. Before the doctrine of equitable estoppel can operate to cut off a statutory right, however, the essential elements of equitable estoppel must be present. [22] As to the elements of equitable estoppel, we have said: The general rule governing the doctrine of equitable estoppel is that in order to constitute equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais there must exist a false representation or a concealment of material facts; it must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive of the facts; the party to whom it was made must have been without knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts; it must have been made with the intention that it should be acted on; and the party to whom it was made must have relied on or acted on it to his prejudice. Syl. Pt. 6, Stuart v. Lake Washington Realty Corp., 141 W.Va. 627, 92 S.E.2d 891 (1956). [23] We find Appellee's conduct fails to establish these elements. [24] Assuming Appellee's alleged conduct is true, the act of abandonment did not misrepresent or conceal anything from the testator. Certainly, the testator was fully aware his wife did not live with him. In addition, it is inconceivable that Appellee abandoned her husband with the intention he would not divorce her or that Appellee knew the legislature would pass sweeping statutory reforms nearly ten years later which would permit her to take as a surviving spouse despite her abandonment. As courts cannot create estoppels where none have arisen from the act of the party sought to be estopped, [25] we will not apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to this case. [26] Moreover, the real basis of Appellant's complaint does not arise because of Appellee's actions. Instead, Appellant's objections are more accurately directed against the legislature for changing the law and bestowing Appellee with a statutorily-created right to elect against the testator's will. If the law had not changed, Appellee's actions, if proven, would have barred her from taking anything except the two items listed in the will. Under the law at the time of death, however, Appellee's alleged actions were no longer considered a bar. We will not usurp the legislature's power to designate those persons eligible to take under the elective-share statute by applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel for actions the legislature no longer considers a bar to taking an elective share. [27] B.