Opinion ID: 349523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: suit against the district of columbia

Text: 43 Rieser's suit raises two threshold issues posed by the legal status of the District of Columbia. The first is the general question of sovereign immunity, while the second arises from a specific statutory notice requirement for suits against the District.
44 Congress in 1871 constituted the District of Columbia a body-corporate for municipal purposes, which may sue and be sued, . . . and exercise all other powers of a municipal corporation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the provisions of (the District of Columbia Code. 63 The Supreme Court early interpreted this language to limit the sovereign immunity of the District to that of an ordinary municipal corporation of a state. 64 The courts of this jurisdiction initially held that the district and its officers were subject to suit for acts in connection with proprietary functions of the District, but immune from liability for injuries arising out of the District's governmental activities. 65 This older governmental-proprietary test has relatively recently been rejected in favor of the more workable distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts. It is now settled that a District officer, and the District when sued for the acts of an officer under the theory of respondeat superior, are protected by sovereign immunity if the officer's acts are discretionary, but subject to liability if the acts were ministerial in character. 66 At issue in this case is the proper characterization of parole officer Abron's acts. 45 The courts generally define discretionary acts as those involved in the formulation of policy, while ministerial acts are defined as those related to the execution of policy. 67 Determining which official acts involve policymaking and which involve only implementation sometimes presents a difficult problem of line-drawing. To aid in this determination, this court has developed a touchstone: An action will be considered discretionary only if the prospect of liability for the decisions the officer must make in the course of his performance would unduly inhibit the officer's ability to perform his function. 68 46 Whatever the problems of line-drawing potentially raised by this doctrine, we conclude that Abron's acts in the present case were ministerial. Abron was not involved in the formulation of policy, but in the execution of policy as it affected an individual parolee. He was under a clear duty, defined by Department of Corrections policy, to disclose Whalen's full adult record in the referral form. Abron was similarly under a duty to provide adequate supervision for Whalen's parole. Potential liability for the negligent performance of these duties will not deter parole officers from performing them, but rather will encourage conscientious performance. Abron's actions in filling out the referral form, and in determining precisely when and how to speak to Whalen and his supervisors, were no less ministerial than the decision of a police officer to make an arrest, 69 the decisions of police officials in training and supervising police officers, 70 or the decisions of medical personnel at a public hospital in determining the proper course of treatment for a patient. 71 Rieser's action against the District of Columbia was therefore not barred by sovereign immunity. 72
47 While the District and its officers engaged in ministerial acts are thus unprotected by sovereign immunity, the Congress has interposed an additional procedural requirement for suit against the District, not applied to suits against other defendants. The District argues that Rieser failed to comply with this statutory requirement. D.C.Code § 12-309 (1973) provides: 48 An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Commissioner of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section. 49 Rieser gave no express written notice of any claim. The district court, however, found the requirement satisfied by police reports incident to Whalen's arrest for the Rieser murder, and by letters from the Department of Corrections and Parole Board to other District officials, including the mayor. 73 Counsel for the District conceded that these reports had provided the District notice of the time, place, . . . and circumstances of the injury. 74 The District contended, however, that it was not afforded notice of the causal connection between the injury and any negligent acts of its agents, and that it was entitled to but did not receive timely notice of Rieser's intention to bring suit. The statute, however, does not so provide. In its brief before this court, the District restates its argument somewhat: The District contends that it must have notice of circumstances giving rise to its liability. The key circumstances of Rieser's claim, the District argues, were (1) a failure to disclose fully Whalen's criminal background, and (2) a failure to provide adequate parole supervision. The District concludes that nothing in the police reports satisfied the notice requirement with regard to these crucial matters, and that the post-arrest letters cannot be considered because section 12-309 expressly mentions only police reports. We find that the police reports provided the District notice of the principal facts sufficient to lead it to those related facts which were peculiarly within its possession, and that the requirements of section 12-309 were satisfied. 50 The intent of section 12-309, recognized by the District in its brief, is to require that potential plaintiffs give the District reasonable notice so that it may investigate and ascertain the facts which may give rise to its liability. 75 The police report exception is designed to provide for instances in which the District has actual notice. 76 The police report need contain only the specificity that would be required of a written notice, 77 and a full detailed official report by the police, setting out the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury, section 12-309, satisfies the statutory requirement. 78 51 In the present case, it is undisputed that the police report correctly indicated the time and place of the rape and murder, the identities of Rebecca Rieser, her parents, and Whalen, and the fact that Whalen was a District of Columbia parolee working at McLean Gardens. 79 The letters in the record, if not themselves amounting to notice cognizable under section 12-309, conclusively show that the District had actual notice of the way in which all of these facts interacted to give rise to the District's potential liability. The District does not contend that it was deprived of an opportunity to investigate the matter further, and indeed, the letters suggest that a further investigation was undertaken. 80 The District has cited no support for the broad construction that it urges for the statutory words cause and circumstances, and our review of the cases and the legislative history reveals none. 81 In addition, nothing in the statute or the case law requires that the plaintiff give notice of intent to bring suit. On the facts of the present case, we conclude that the requirements of section 12-309 were clearly satisfied.