Opinion ID: 885933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 15 Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in concluding that Deckert was not an employer as defined by § 39-71-117(1) and (4), MCA? ¶ 16 The resolution of this case involves the interpretation and application of §§ 39-71-117 and 39-71-118, MCA, which define employer and employee under the Montana Workers' Compensation Act. Because the Act applies to all employers, as defined in XX-XX-XXX, and to all employees, as defined in XX-XX-XXX, these provisions indirectly establish who must provide workers' compensation coverage and what workers are covered under the Act. Section 39-71-401(1), MCA. ¶ 17 Two subsections of § 39-71-117, MCA, defining employer apply to the case at bar. The first definition is specific to interstate motor carriers such as Deckert Trucking. It provides that (4) [a]n interstate or intrastate common or contract motor carrier doing business in this state who uses drivers in this state is considered the employer, [and] is liable for workers' compensation premiums.... Section 39-71-117(4), MCA (emphasis added). Applying this definition to the facts before it, the Workers' Compensation Court found that Deckert Trucking was doing business in Montana, that it was an interstate contract motor carrier, and that Geiger drove within Montana; however, the Workers' Compensation Court ultimately concluded that Deckert did not use Geiger and therefore was not his employer under this definition. ¶ 18 In concluding that Deckert did not use Geiger in his interstate trucking business, the Workers' Compensation Court focused on whether Geiger had benefitted Deckert. The findings of the Workers' Compensation Court indicated that Deckert had not received any percentage or other fee for the loads carried by Geiger, and that he had not received any financial benefit from Geiger's actual expenses of operating the truck since the signing of the contract and lease on April 1, 1999. Because the Workers' Compensation Court was unable to discern any `use' to which Deckert put Geiger after they entered into the truck and trailer contract and lease, the Workers' Compensation Court held that Deckert was not an employer under § 39-71-117(4), MCA. ¶ 19 The Workers' Compensation Court then applied a second, more general definition of employer which defines an employer as one who has a person in service under an appointment or contract of hire.... Section 39-71-117(1)(a), MCA (emphasis added). Applying the same reasoning mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Workers' Compensation Court ruled that Geiger was not in service to Deckert. Accordingly, the Workers' Compensation Court held that Deckert was not an employer under the Act. ¶ 20 Geiger maintains that the Workers' Compensation Court erred in concluding that Deckert was not an employer under the Act. First, Geiger argues that the Workers' Compensation Court's interpretation of use in the first definition is too narrow because it requires an employee to financially benefit or profit his employer. Geiger asserts that the Workers' Compensation Court's interpretation of use would allow a floundering business to avoid paying workers' compensation premiums for its employees solely because it was not turning a profit. ¶ 21 Because the resolution of this issue is dependent on the meaning of the word use in § 39-71-117(4), MCA, we look to the rules of statutory construction which require the language of a statute to be construed according to its plain meaning. If the language is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is required. Rausch v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 2002 MT 203, ¶ 33, 311 Mont. 210, ¶ 33, 54 P.3d 25, ¶ 33; Lovell v. State Compensation Mut. Ins. Fund (1993), 260 Mont. 279, 285, 860 P.2d 95, 99. ¶ 22 In the instant case, we believe that the statutory language of § 39-71-117(4), MCA, is clear. Use is defined as to put into service or apply for a purpose; employ.... AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1966 (3d ed.1992). The verb use in the statutory context of the Workers' Compensation Act means that the employer utilizes the driver to serve an end, a purpose. Geiger contends that Deckert used him for the purpose of making payments to the original creditor and in turn increasing Deckert's equity in the second truck. However, the fact that Geiger made a number of monthly payments under the contract and lease does not mean that Deckert used him to serve Deckert's trucking business. This benefit received by Deckert was contemplated in their sales contract and lease agreement not in a contract for hire. In fact, as of April 1, 1999, Geiger and Deckert's relationship more closely resembles that of debtor and creditor. We cannot hold that Deckert used Geiger under this definition of employer simply because Deckert received monthly installments according to a contract. If we were to make such a ruling, then any party facilitating the payment on a contract for the sale of equipment could be required to pay workers' compensation premiums for the debtor. Obviously, this is not the intent of the Act. ¶ 23 The trial court's reasoning that because Deckert did not use Geiger, Geiger was not in Deckert's service, is also sound. Accordingly, we agree with the Workers' Compensation Court that Deckert did not use Geiger, that Deckert did not have Geiger in service, and thus Deckert was not an employer under either definition.