Opinion ID: 2972707
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cooper’s Memoranda and Verbal Assurances

Text: The Board was not allowed to view Question 22 in isolation, though. Rather it was required to view this statement in the context of Cooper’s other preelection activity. See, e.g., Torbitt & Castleman, 123 F.3d at 906. Cooper asserts that the Board failed to do so as it ignored Cooper’s other statements in its campaign literature, including its unequivocal pronouncement that it could not remove existing benefits simply because of unionization, and its verbal assurances that the employees could “count on” receiving their 2002 ROAM bonus. Cooper maintains that the overriding theme of its preelection statements was the uncertain impact that the collective bargaining process might have on wages and benefits, i.e., that future wages and benefits could go up, down, or remain the same. With respect to the statements in the memoranda, the Board determined, however, that a reasonable employee would be more likely to be intimidated by the specific question about the 12 ROAM bonus than to be assured by the other general statements that Cooper could not cut employees’ wages or benefits simply because they voted to unionize. We believe that this is a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, particularly given the context and the timing of the memoranda. See generally Torbitt & Castleman, 123 F.3d at 906 (holding that Board’s reasonable interpretation will not be set aside even if reviewing court might have come to a different, more plausible, conclusion based on the evidence). Both memoranda were issued by Cooper in response to numerous questions it received from employees about the impending union election--including a specific question from at least one employee as to whether employees would still be eligible for the 2002 ROAM bonus. Instead of assuring employees that receipt of the 2002 bonus was not in jeopardy regardless of the election outcome, Cooper chose a much more ambiguous approach by asking a general question about the ROAM bonus and combining its answer as to future eligibility with specific information about the amount and timing of the 2002 bonus. The effect of this was, at the very least, to create confusion as to eligibility for the 2002 bonus, as illustrated by Cooper employee, James Schulze’s testimony at the hearing that although he knew Cooper could not eliminate existing benefits, he interpreted Question 22 as “saying that if the union goes through that we may not be entitled to the bonus we already earned from the previous year.” Furthermore, the January 27 memorandum was issued just days before the election, leaving little time for employees to clarify the apparently conflicting information. See V & S Schuler Eng’g, Inc., 309 F.3d at 373 (noting that the Board must engage in closer scrutiny when the alleged unlawful actions occurred “on the doorstep of the election”). Cooper maintains, however, that even if Question 22 was ambiguous, Lemke’s statement at the facility-wide meeting held shortly before the election clearly indicated to the employees that the 13 2002 ROAM bonus would be paid regardless of the outcome of the election. When an employer makes a statement that would reasonably be viewed as an objectionable threat of retaliation, it may still cure or dispel the threat. In order to do so, however, the employer must, at a minimum, give employees a “clear assurance” that it will behave lawfully and will not follow through with the conduct threatened earlier. See Yuma Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 339 NLRB No. 14, 2003 WL 21236331, at . Vague assurances of fair treatment or generalized statements that appear to contradict the earlier threat are insufficient to purge the coercive conduct. See Noah’s N.Y. Bagels, 324 NLRB 266, 267 (1997); see also Kinney Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1430 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that conduct repudiating a threat must be “timely, unambiguous, specific in nature to the coercive conduct and free from other proscribed illegal conduct”). It is unclear whether Lemke’s meeting occurred before or after the distribution of the January 27 memorandum; it was an ineffective repudiation regardless. As the Board determined, if the facility-wide meeting occurred before January 27, the statements in the memorandum would call into doubt any representation by Lemke at the meeting. If the meeting occurred after distribution of the memorandum, it did nothing to dispel the coercive nature of Question 22. We agree with the Board that Lemke’s statements at the meeting arguably served to reinforce the threat. That is, the statement may have heightened the coercive effect of the January 27 memorandum: highlighting the amount of the bonus and the fact that it would not be approved for disbursement until after the results of the election were known. Although Cooper’s Board of Directors’ vote was only to approve the amount of the bonus that had already been earned, based on Cooper’s ambiguous statements, the employees reasonably could have believed that the Board of Directors had the power to refuse to approve the bonus if they voted to unionize. Cf. Adair Standish Corp., 912 F.2d 854 at 860. 14