Opinion ID: 2087265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Stacking of Uninsured Motorist Coverage

Text: Insurance policy provisions intended to limit the aggregation of coveragegenerally referred to as antistacking provisionsdo not undermine the legislative purpose supporting the mandate of uninsured motorist protection (see Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 73, par. 755a(1)). ( Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill.2d 330, 335, 312 N.E.2d 247, citing Morelock v. Millers' Mutual Insurance Association (1971), 49 Ill.2d 234, 239, 274 N.E.2d 1.) Public policy considerations, therefore, are no bar to an insurer's right to enforce provisions designed to so limit coverage. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1987, ch. 73, par 755a-2; Menke v. Country Mutual Insurance Co. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 420, 425, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539; Glidden, 57 Ill.2d at 335, 312 N.E.2d 247. Nor do antistacking provisions conflict, per se, with the so-called premium rule. (See Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 507, 513, 24 Ill.Dec. 832, 386 N.E.2d 36.) That rule holds that it is unfair to permit an insurer to collect premiums, be it for coverage afforded under separate policies or for separate vehicles under one policy, and thereafter apply a provision limiting or absolving liability. See Greenholt v. Inland National Insurance Co. (1980), 87 Ill.App.3d 638, 641, 43 Ill.Dec. 150, 410 N.E.2d 150 (involving aggregation of coverage for two vehicles under one policy); Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. (1978), 58 Ill.App.3d 439, 444, 16 Ill.Dec. 4, 374 N.E.2d 779 (involving aggregation of coverages under separate policies); but see Monsalud v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1991), 210 Ill.App.3d 102, 106, 154 Ill.Dec. 748, 568 N.E.2d 969; Maid v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 1065, 57 Ill.Dec. 459, 428 N.E.2d 1139 (stating only that the rule applies when premiums have been paid under separate policies). As for any contract, resolution of questions about the parties' obligations under an insurance policy, including what is contemplated for the payment of multiple premiums, must begin with the agreement's express terms. (See Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1977), 69 Ill.2d 167, 175, 13 Ill.Dec. 17, 370 N.E.2d 1044.) That language stands as the singular representation of the parties' intentions. (See Menke, 78 Ill.2d at 425, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539.) But ambiguities may be revealed in the terms used in view of the particular circumstances involved. Then it can no longer be said that the terms of the agreement conclusively show what the parties intended. The answer to what the insured expected to receive and the insurer provide must be determined through other means rooted in public policy. Those means entail adopting a construction of the agreement to benefit the insured over other possible constructions favoring the insurer. (See Menke, 78 Ill.2d at 423-24, 425, 36 Ill.Dec. 698, 401 N.E.2d 539; Glidden, 57 Ill.2d at 336, 312 N.E.2d 247.) The Premium Rule is but an explication of that general consideration. Greenholt, 87 Ill.App.3d at 641, 43 Ill.Dec. 150, 410 N.E.2d 150. The issue of whether coverage of the policies here may be aggregated, arising as it does from stipulated facts, presents a question of law. (See Plenderleith v. Edwards (1927), 328 Ill. 431, 435, 159 N.E. 780; see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shelton (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 858, 864, 126 Ill.Dec. 286, 531 N.E.2d 913.) That question involves the possibility of stacking as between the personal vehicle and business auto policies as well as under the business auto policy alone. For that reason, the possibilities must be independently considered. (See Squire, 69 Ill.2d at 175, 13 Ill.Dec. 17, 370 N.E.2d 1044 (acknowledging, in a case involving the stacking of coverage under separate policies, the court's prior consideration of an antistacking provision in relation to stacking of coverages under one policy in view of extra premiums paid); see also Greenholt, 87 Ill.App.3d at 639, 43 Ill.Dec. 150, 410 N.E.2d 150 (referring to two-way stacking).) As for each case, the critical point remains that an insurer is entitled to enforcement of unambiguous antistacking provisions to the extent that such provisions represent terms to which the parties have agreed to be bound.