Opinion ID: 776872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ford's Inconsistent Verdict Motion

Text: 82 Immediately after the jury returned its verdict but before the jury was excused, Ford moved for relief on the basis of an inconsistent verdict. The district court agreed with Ford that the jury verdict was irreconcilable, Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 588, but did not reach the issue of what relief would be appropriate because, as discussed above, it found the evidence insufficient to sustain a verdict for Jarvis and granted Ford's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 83 We find that any potential error related to the jury instructions and verdict sheet, and not to the jury's general verdicts and that, therefore, Ford's objection needed to conform to the strictures of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. We hold that the district court, in finding that Ford had not waived its objection, erred, as a matter of law, in not applying the Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 requirements that any objection must stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Applying this legal standard, we find that Ford's pre-trial statement that the court should charge either negligence or strict liability, but not both, failed to alert the court to the precise nature of Ford's objection and its legal grounding. Finding no fundamental error in the instructions, we order the district court to reinstate the jury verdict. 84 The charge given to the jury explained that 85 [p]laintiff brings this action on the basis of two theories of liability: Negligence and strict liability.... 86 . . . . 87 If you find that the cruise control system in the Aerostar was not defective and that Ford was not negligent, you will not reach the issues raised in the remainder of the charge. 88 If, however, you find either that Ford was negligent in the design of the 1991 Aerostar cruise control system, or that the 1991 Aerostar cruise control system was itself defective, you must next consider whether that negligence or defect was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury.... If you find that neither defendant's negligence nor the cruise control defect was a substantial factor in causing the injury, then plaintiff may not recover. 89 If you find that either defendant's negligence or the cruise control defect was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury, you will proceed to consider comparative fault.... 90 If you find either defendant's negligence or the cruise control defect was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injury, you must next consider whether the plaintiff was also negligent. (emphasis added). 91 From this charge, it is abundantly clear that the jury was instructed that it could find Ford liable under theories of either negligence or strict liability or both. The verdict sheet given to the jury accurately reflected this by indicating, after question 1(a) concerning strict liability, 11 IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 1(a) IS `NO', THEN PROCEED TO QUESTION 2(a). Question 2(a), concerning negligence, asked, Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Ford Motor Company was negligent in the design of the cruise control system in the 1991 Ford Aerostar? (Plaintiff's Burden of Proof), followed by blanks to check either yes or no. The jury checked the no blank in response to question 1(a), and yes in answer to question 2(a). 92 After the jury returned its verdict, and as the court was thanking its members for their service, counsel for Ford stated: 93 Your Honor, ... I must make a motion for an inconsistent verdict before the jury is dismissed and I'm doing that at this point in time. And the basis for that motion is by finding no on Question 1A that the cruise control was not designed in a defective manner, the jury cannot then find that Ford was negligent in the design of the cruise control system. The opposite would be so, but it can't be so in that direction. 94 Counsel for Jarvis argued that the verdict was rendered in accord with the jury charge. The court responded that it had believed it necessary to charge both theories of liability, despite its reservations, because it found no case law permitting the court to eliminate one of the claims from the charge. The court then refrained from dismissing the jury and asked for written submissions from the parties on the issue of the inconsistency in the verdict. The court subsequently granted Ford's motion, finding the verdict inconsistent. Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 586, 588. 95 Ford argues that it did not waive its objection to any inconsistency in the verdict because (1) it objected to the verdict after it was announced but before the jury was released; (2) counsel for Jarvis acknowledged that Ford's motion was timely; and (3) Ford had voiced its opposition to charging both theories before trial. The district court ruled only on the third contention, finding that Ford's pre-trial statements adequately preserved its objection. In reviewing de novo the district court's choice of legal standard, we hold that it did not apply the correct standard in ruling that Ford was relieved from the obligation of presenting a more explicit, precise, and reasoned objection before the jury deliberated. Applying the correct standard, we find that Ford did not satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. Ford's first two contentions, not addressed by the district court, both fail because they appear to rely on Fed.R.Civ.P. 49, which is inapplicable in this case.
96 On appeal, Ford first contends that its objection was timely because it was made before the jury was released. Although Ford cites no authority for this proposition, we assume that it relies on Fed.R.Civ.P. 49, governing special verdicts and interrogatories. Under Rule 49(a), a court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact, with objection to the omission of any issue of fact made before the jury retires. Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a). This rule does not apply when, as here, the jury is required to make determinations not only of issues of fact but of ultimate liability. Cf. Barrett v. Orange County Human Rights Comm'n, 194 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir.1999) (refusing to apply Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a) when the alleged error was not the omission of an issue from the verdict form but rather in the  instruction provided on the verdict form) (emphasis in original); James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 49.02[2][b] (3d ed. 1998) (Pursuant to Rule 49(a), the jury returns its special verdict in the form of written answers to separate questions concerning specific factual issues. The trial court then applies the law to those answers and enters judgment accordingly.). The dissent maintains that the verdict form may be seen as soliciting special verdicts under Rule 49(a), noting that the form was actually labeled special verdict. Post, at 67. We have held, however, that where a jury is instructed to apply legal principles and assign liability, the answers to the questions submitted to the jury are not special verdicts, despite the use of those words in the title appended to the form, and Rule 49(a) therefore does not apply. Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear Co., 975 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir.1992). 97 Neither is Ford's objection proper pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b). Under Rule 49(b), a court may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written interrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict. Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(b). If the answers to the interrogatories are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, the court may return the verdict to the jury or order a new trial. Id. Although an objection under Rule 49(b) to answers to the interrogatories may be timely if made before the jury is dismissed, Rule 49(b) is inapplicable here because the alleged inconsistency was not among responses to interrogatories regarding issues of fact, but between two general verdicts based on different legal theories. The dissent contends that these cannot be general verdicts, because a general verdict asks only the question of ultimate liability, and there cannot be more than one question of ultimate liability in a single cause of action. Post, at 66. However, as the dissent appears to concede, id. at 66 n. 1, and as Ford seems to concede by not invoking Rule 49, our precedent clearly holds otherwise. See Lavoie, 975 F.2d at 54 ([T]he alleged inconsistency to which defendant points is between two general verdicts on different legal theories and not between a general verdict and responses to interrogatories. Hence, the instruction given to trial courts under Rule 49(b) has no application.) (emphasis in original). 98 The statement by Jarvis's counsel that the motion is not untimely, therefore, is of little consequence. Though a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 49 might have been timely, it cannot, as a matter of law, provide any relief for a party challenging a conflict between general verdicts based on an instruction given in the jury charge and repeated on the verdict sheet.
99 Objection to an inconsistency between two general verdicts that is traced to an alleged error in the jury instruction or verdict sheet is properly made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. Yet to avail itself of relief under this Rule, a party must object before the jury retires to deliberate. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 (No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict.). We have previously emphasized that [f]ailure to object to a jury instruction or the form of an interrogatory prior to the jury retiring results in a waiver of that objection.... Surely litigants do not get another opportunity to assign as error an allegedly incorrect charge simply because the jury's verdict comports with the trial court's instructions. Lavoie, 975 F.2d at 55; see also Barrett, 194 F.3d at 349 (applying Rule 51 to an objection to an instruction provided on the jury form); cf. Play Time, Inc. v. LDDS Metromedia Communications, Inc., 123 F.3d 23, 29 n. 6 (1st Cir.1997) (The Rule 51 standard applies to the jury charge and any special verdict form.). In this case, Ford objected to the jury considering its liability under a negligence theory in question 2(a) after the jury had found Ford not strictly liable under question 1(a). This was explicitly permitted by the jury form that required that IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 1(a) IS `NO', THEN PROCEED TO QUESTION 2(a). As noted above, the same procedure was required by the charge to the jury instructing that Ford's ultimate liability depended on the jury's finding  either that Ford was negligent in the design of the 1991 Aerostar cruise control system, or that the 1991 Aerostar cruise control system was itself defective. (emphasis added). We find, therefore, that Ford's objection made after the jury returned the verdicts was untimely. 100 Ford also contends that it did not waive its objection to verdict inconsistency because, before the trial began, it made clear its position that the case should not go to the jury on both theories of liability. Ford claims that once the district court, knowing Ford's preference for charging one but not both theories of liability, decided to send the case to the jury under theories of both negligence and strict liability, Ford was not required to object to the jury instructions or the verdict sheet because it was reasonable to conclude that further objection would be unavailing, echoing the district court's finding that no further objection was necessary. We disagree. At no point in its ruling on Ford's preservation of its objection did the district court consider whether Ford had satisfied the appropriate legal standard that Ford stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. We find that Ford did not, and note that the district court's own comments lead to the same conclusion. 101
102 In their proposed jury instructions submitted prior to trial, both Ford and Jarvis requested that the court charge the jury on both negligence and strict products liability. 12 After receiving the parties' proposed requests to charge, the judge wrote to the parties asking them to clarify their positions with respect to the appropriate causes of action in this case. Letter from Judge Buchwald to the parties, July 6, 1999, at 2. The court inquired, inter alia, whether it would be sensible to follow the approach taken in Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 134-35 (2d Cir.1999), in which the plaintiff withdrew his negligence cause of action as duplicative of his strict liability claim, stating that the court's research indicates a substantial overlap in the elements of negligence and strict liability claims for defective design. Letter from Judge Buchwald to the parties, July 6, 1999, at 1-2. 103 Counsel for Jarvis responded that we do not regard the negligence claim and the strict liability claim as duplicative but, rather, we regard them as distinct, unlike the apparent factual situation referenced in Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.  Letter of George N. Tompkins, Jr. to Judge Buchwald, July 6, 1999, at 2. The letter explained that [t]his claim raises the question whether the defendant Ford acted reasonably in selecting the design for the Aerostar cruise control system, whereas the strict liability claim focuses upon the question whether the Aerostar cruise control system itself was unreasonably dangerous. Id. 104 Counsel for Ford, in its letter to the district court, responded only that [w]e have read the Pahuta case and agree with the Court that the Court should charge either negligence or strict products liability, but not both. Letter of Brian P. Crosby to Judge Buchwald, July 7, 1999, at 1. The letter offered no legal argument or citation to any other authority as to why both theories could not be charged. Id. The Pahuta case itself does not state that the two causes of action are necessarily duplicative. There, we mentioned in a footnote merely that [a]t the charging conference, Pahuta abandoned a negligence cause of action as duplicative of his strict liability claim. Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 134 n. 7. The parties appear to agree, with good reason, that our footnote in Pahuta did not decide the issue of the potential overlap of the two theories of liability for all future design defect claims brought under New York law. Tellingly, in arguing on appeal that the causes of action are duplicative as a matter of law, Ford makes no mention of Pahuta. 105 A few days after this exchange of letters, the parties met with Judge Buchwald in a pre-trial conference. There, Judge Buchwald began the discussion of the jury charge by stating: I don't believe that there's any authority that I'm aware of that would permit a court over the objection of a plaintiff to not charge negligence or not charge strict liability if the plaintiff wants them both charged. So since you want them both charged, I'll charge them. Pre-trial conference, July 12, 1999 tr. (Pre-trial tr.), at 27-28. Next, Judge Buchwald addressed a separate issue, raised in the prior correspondence, of Jarvis's failure to warn claim and whether it was part of either the negligence or strict liability claims. Pre-trial tr. at 28. In response, a speaker unnamed in the transcript but identified by Jarvis as counsel for Ford 13 stated: To me, it seems that the claim of the plaintiff here is one of negligence and certain product liability. Later discussion of the duty to warn contains the comment by an unidentified speaker, again identified by Jarvis as counsel for Ford as first stating: [T]hat gets negligence out of the case, as I see it. I mean, it's a product liability theory, plain and simple. Pre-trial tr. at 36. The court responded, So you don't want me to charge negligence? Id. The speaker, identified by Jarvis as counsel for Ford, answered: Well, we're going to reserve on that. We want you to leave negligence in for now.  Id. (emphasis added). The judge agreed. Id. 106 After the charge to the jury, Ford did not object to instructing the jury on both theories of liability or to the instruction in the jury charge and on the verdict sheet that the jury could find Ford negligent but not strictly liable. The district court, in later finding that Ford had not waived its objection, stated that: 107 Although it is true that defense counsel did not specifically object to our charge and special verdict questions on the ground that they could lead to inconsistent results, we cannot find a waiver because the defense's fundamental position on this issue had previously been expressed to the Court and, after our ruling at the pretrial conference, it was reasonable for defendant to conclude that future efforts to object would be unavailing. 108 Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 589. 109 Future efforts to object were, however, availing. After the jury returned its verdict, counsel for Ford objected, and, after explaining the legal basis for its claim that the two causes of action were duplicative, the district court agreed. Id. Citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (1995), the court found a functional equivalence between the negligence and strict liability design defect claims. As a result, the court concluded that defendant's position that a finding of no defect and a finding of negligence are inconsistent as a matter of law in a product liability case is well supported. Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 586. Later reflecting on what had occurred before and during the trial, the district court stated: 110 While we readily admit that our pretrial research failed to learn of the wide acceptance of the equivalency of negligence and strict liability claims in design defect cases, we remain puzzled why this overlap was not brought to our attention given that defendant's attorney was also of counsel to defendant Ford in the Denny case. Although we are lacking in hard evidence, we similarly doubt whether plaintiff's three experienced counsel shared our unfamiliarity with this case law. Thus, we suspect that both sides elected for strategic reasons to refrain from informing us of the overlap and potential for inconsistent verdicts. Regardless, we analyze this case in conformity with the now-revealed governing case law. 111 Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 587 n. 8. 112
113 We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the legal standard for waiver under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982) (stating that if a district court's findings rest on an erroneous review of the law, they may be set aside on that basis and are not given the deference accorded to findings reviewed for clear error); Unicorn Tales, Inc. v. Banerjee, 138 F.3d 467, 468 (2d Cir.1998) (reviewing de novo district court's legal interpretation of civil procedure rule). We hold that the district court failed to apply the correct legal standard in ruling that the expression of Ford's fundamental position sufficed to preserve its objection to the jury instruction and verdict sheet. The district court neither mentioned Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 or its requirements nor applied them in substance. Applying the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 de novo, we find that Ford waived any objection.
114 Under Rule 51, an objection must stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Fed. R.Civ.P. 51. The purpose of the Rule is to allow the trial court an opportunity to cure any defects in the instructions before sending the jury to deliberate. Fogarty v. Near N. Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 162 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir.1998). The objections to a charge must be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 119, 63 S.Ct. 477, 87 L.Ed. 645 (1943); see also Martin v. United Fruit Company, 272 F.2d 347, 349 (2d Cir.1959) (requiring that an objection be specific enough to inform the trial judge of his alleged error so that he may have an opportunity to correct it) (internal quotation marks omitted). 115 The fundamental nature of Ford's position that the court should have charged negligence or strict liability but not both is called into doubt by Ford's own recommendation, made only a few days before taking this position in correspondence with the court, that the district court charge both theories. Ford's position that it believed that one but not both causes of action should be charged was taken only after Judge Buchwald asked the parties whether it would be sensible to follow the approach taken in Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 134-35, in which the plaintiff withdrew his negligence cause of action as duplicative of his strict liability claim. Id. Counsel for Jarvis declined the offer, claiming that Pahuta was limited to its facts and that, in this case, the two theories of liability were not duplicative. Letter of George N. Tomkins, Jr. to Judge Buchwald, July 6, 1991, at 2. 116 The statement by Ford that [w]e have read the Pahuta case and agree with the Court that the Court should charge either negligence or strict products liability, but not both, failed to state distinctly either the matter objected to or the grounds of the objection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. The specific objection that Ford asks this Court to read into its pre-trial correspondence is that the jury's finding that the cruise control system of the 1991 Ford Aerostar was not designed in a defective manner presumes that Ford was not negligent in the design of the cruise control system. Ford's statement that either negligence or strict liability, but not both, should be charged, does not distinctly state this objection. Ford's current contention is not that it was error to charge two theories of liability but rather that, after determining that Ford was not strictly liable, the jury should not have considered whether Ford was negligent. 14 Ford's conduct at the pre-trial conference, if anything, obscured any objection it might have made in its correspondence with the court. At the conference, the speaker identified by Jarvis as counsel for Ford explained that it seems that the claim of the plaintiff here is one of negligence and certain product liability. After the court later asked, [s]o you don't want me to charge negligence? the speaker, identified again by Jarvis as a counsel for Ford, responded, Well, we're going to reserve on that. We want you to leave negligence in for now. Pre-trial tr. at 36. Accordingly, Ford did not distinctly state the matter objected to. In fact, it appears to have asked the court to leave both causes of action in the jury charge. 117 Neither did Ford state distinctly the grounds of its objection. In the pre-trial correspondence and conference, Ford made no legal argument for charging only one cause of action outside of the passing reference to our footnote in the Pahuta case. In that footnote, we mentioned merely that the plaintiff had voluntarily withdrawn a negligence charge. Pahuta, 170 F.3d at 134 n. 7. Ford cited no authority to show why the district court should find the negligence cause of action duplicative of the strict liability claim in this case. In recalling how it came to charge the jury under both theories, the district court remarked simply that the plaintiff had asked for the charge and that in one case, presumably Pahuta, the plaintiff[] had agreed to drop one of the claims. After the verdict, in ruling on Ford's motions, the district court rebuked counsel for not calling its attention earlier to the relevant legal authority in New York regarding the similarities between negligence and strict liability for product defects, indicating its suspicion that it appeared that this failure was a tactical decision made for strategic reasons to refrain from informing us of the overlap and potential for inconsistent verdicts. Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 587 n. 8. In this regard, it appears that the district court agreed that Ford did not distinctly state the grounds of its objection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. 118 On appeal, Ford claims that there was no need to object once the district court had announced at the pre-trial conference that it would charge both theories of liability because any further objection would have been futile. The credibility of Ford's assertion is undermined by Ford's later objection, demonstrating that Ford did not feel constrained at all. Far from futile, this later objection, now accompanied by a reasoned legal argument as to the potential overlap of the two causes of action, persuaded the district court that it should not have charged the jury on both theories. Ford cannot show the futility of future objection because it has not shown that the trial court had been clearly apprised of the possibility of error and had disagreed, or had been given an opportunity to correct the error and had declined to do so. Fogarty, 162 F.3d at 80 (finding waiver after court explicitly asked for both an objection and alternative language, and received, respectively, a vague answer and silence in response). Having failed to provide the district court with an adequate opportunity to consider and deny the objection, a party cannot later argue that any further objection would have been futile. The case Ford cites to support its proposition that objection is not waived if the district court had previously rejected its position, Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552 (2d Cir.1994), presented a very different factual situation. There, the plaintiffs requested a duty to intercede charge, which was subsequently expressly raised and discussed at length at the charge conference. Id. at 557. The court agreed to give the charge, but then retracted it and stated to counsel that if this is something that we raised the other day, you don't need to repeat yourself. Id. Under these circumstances, we found that further objection to the charge was unnecessary. Id. Because Ford failed to raise expressly its current objection, and thus the district court was never given the opportunity to consider its argument, Ford cannot claim that future objection would have been unavailing. 119 In making this argument, Ford relies on the finding of the district court that [a]lthough it is true that defense counsel did not specifically object to our charge and special verdict questions on the ground that they could lead to inconsistent results, Ford's fundamental position ... had previously been expressed to the Court and therefore it was reasonable for defendant to conclude that future efforts to object would be unavailing. Jarvis, 69 F.Supp.2d at 589. As discussed above, Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 requires more than the disclosure of a fundamental position desiring one jury charge over another. The federal rules instead require that Ford stat[e] distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. Finding that the district court failed to apply this standard, we do not owe deference to the district court's conclusion. See Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781 ([I]f a district court's findings rest on an erroneous review of the law, they may be set aside on that basis.). 120 For the reasons stated, under the principles of Rule 51 Ford has waived its objection to verdict inconsistency. As discussed above, we decline the dissent's invitation to ignore our jurisprudence in this area and shoehorn this case into Rule 49 in order to avoid this result. The policy concerns behind the dissent's dissatisfaction with what it perceives as inconsistent verdicts are no more compelling than those behind the principle of waiver. In this ten-year litigation, the issue of the jury charge was litigated extensively. Ford asked for this jury charge, presumably for strategic reasons, and was well apprised of the law of waiver. To excuse Ford from the well-established rules of waiver would permit precisely the sort of sandbagging that the rules are designed to prevent, while undermining the ideal of judicial economy that the rules are meant to serve.
121 Although Ford has not requested that we do so, this Court may review jury instructions and verdict sheets for fundamental error even when a litigant has not complied with the Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 objection requirements. See Shade v. Housing Auth. of New Haven, 251 F.3d 307, 312 (2d Cir.2001). Fundamental error is more egregious than the plain error that can excuse a procedural default in a criminal trial, see id., and is so serious and flagrant that it goes to the very integrity of the trial. Id. at 313 (quoting Modave v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 501 F.2d 1065, 1072 (2d Cir.1974)). We have found relief from fundamental error to be warranted when the jury charge deprived the jury of adequate legal guidance to reach a rational decision. Werbungs v. Collectors' Guild, Ltd., 930 F.2d 1021, 1026 (2d Cir.1991). Because the degree of overlap between negligence and strict liability for design defects is unsettled under New York law, the integrity of the trial was not endangered by the jury instructions and verdict sheet in this case. 122 Ford, on appeal, contends that [u]nder New York law, negligence and strict products liability claims for design defects are functionally the same and virtually indistinguishable. 15 Neither this Court nor the New York Court of Appeals has squarely endorsed such a rule. Traditionally, the New York Court of Appeals has held that negligence and strict liability provide distinct forms of relief in products liability. See Victorson v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d 275, 277 (1975) (Depending on the factual context in which the claim arises, the injured plaintiff, and those asserting derivative claims, may state a cause of action in contract, express or implied, on the ground of negligence, or, as here, on the theory of strict products liability.). 123 To be sure, more recently the New York Court of Appeals, in discussing the historical development of the law of products liability, quoted approvingly from a law review article in stating that `[i]n general,... the strict liability concept of defective design [is] functionally synonymous with the earlier negligence concept of unreasonable designing.' Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d 730, 735 (1995) (quoting Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 796, 803 (1983)). This statement was, however, dicta. The Denny court decided only that strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims are not identical under New York law, that the latter is not necessarily subsumed by the former, and that a jury's finding of no product defect was reconcilable with its finding of breach of warranty. Denny, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 662 N.E.2d at 739. 16 124 The statement that in general the relevant concepts are functionally synonymous is further tempered by the court's more reserved conclusion later in the opinion that [t]he adoption of [a] risk/utility balance as a component of the `defectiveness' element has brought the inquiry in design defects cases closer to that used in traditional negligence cases, where the reasonableness of an actor's conduct is considered in light of a number of situational and policy-driven factors. Id. at 738. In addition, in responding to the dissent's urging that the strict liability and breach of warranty causes of action can be merged, the Denny court pointed to the commentator upon whom the dissent relied as affirmatively criticiz[ing] courts that have failed to separate conceptually the notions of strict liability, negligence, warranty, and absolute liability. Id. at 738 (internal quotation marks omitted). We state no opinion as to how we might rule if required to decide whether, under New York law, the negligence cause of action in this case was duplicative of the strict liability cause of action and whether the dicta in Denny accurately reflects how the New York Court of Appeals would rule on the matter. Given the unsettled nature of the law in this area, however, we hold that there was no fundamental error in the jury instructions or the verdict sheet.