Opinion ID: 2972779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Terminable At-Will

Text: The district court held that “Chase’s September 1, 1994 contract was an indefinite term at-will contract” and then noted that “either party to an at-will contract may terminate the contract at any time for any or no reason.” Plaintiffs claim the district court erred in ruling that the parties’ contract was “at-will.” They assert Mr. Chase’s term of employment was indefinite, but that the agreement specifically defined the circumstances under which plaintiffs’ entitlement to commissions could cease. Thus, plaintiffs contend the payment terms were not terminable “at-will” without consequences. Employment contracts for an indefinite period are presumptively terminable at the will of either party for any reason or for no reason at all. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315 (1937). As noted by defendants, the agreement with plaintiffs did not set out its term, duration, or provide for the manner by which it could be terminated. Under those circumstances, as a matter of law, the agreement was terminable at will by either defendants or plaintiffs. Lichnovsky v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 414 Mich. 228, 242, 324 N.W.2d 732 (1982) (“An agreement which fails to provide for the term, duration or manner of termination is terminable at the will of either party”). Thus, the district court properly found defendants were not precluded from terminating Mr. Chase effective December 31, 2001.