Opinion ID: 2095080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the denial of the motion to reinstate counsel

Text: Having held that the court's original disqualification of Mr. Wood was not an abuse of discretion, we now turn to the separate issue of whether the court abused its discretion in denying appellant's motion to reinstate Mr. Wood a year later. [13] That motion, if granted, would have necessitated a delay in the trial, since it was made on the first day of trial, after the voir dire had begun, and Mr. Wood had had no contact with the case for several months. The grant or denial of such a motion is, again, a matter within the trial court's discretion. See Yancey v. United States, 755 A.2d 421, 427 (D.C.2000). On the record before us, we conclude that the court abused its discretion and that the case must be remanded for further proceedings. The trial began on a Thursday. During voir dire on Thursday morning, defense counsel learned that the government's witness list did not include Mr. Henderson. Immediately after lunch, he moved to stay the proceeding, strike his own appearance as counsel, and reinstate Mr. Wood as defense counsel. The prosecutor offered to tell the court why the government had kept Mr. Henderson off the list, but asked permission to do so ex parte because, for security reasons, she did not wish to endanger anyone. The court did not take the prosecutor up on that offer, remarking that Mr. Wood's status had already been determined by a prior judge [and] that there was a conflict or a potential conflict, and that as a result Mr. Wood should not continue to represent Mr. Pinkney. The court then denied appellant's motion to stay the proceedings, commenting that we are sort of in the middle of trial, and [defense counsel] is finally prepared and ready for trial. [14] Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion because it had an obligation to permit previously disqualified counsel to re-enter the case if it determined that the conflict no longer exist[ed]. We agree with appellant that, in ruling on the motion, the court abused its discretion. However, given the thin record before us on this issue, we are not prepared to say that the conflict no longer existed, or that the court should have reinstated Mr. Wood. Rather, for the reasons which follow, we base our decision on the trial court's failure to make any inquiry at all into these matters. As we have explained, [a] defendant has a constitutionally protected right to choose his own counsel, arising out of both the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and notions of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Yancey, 755 A.2d at 425. This right is not absolute, but must be carefully balanced against the public's strong interest in the prompt, effective, and efficient administration of justice .... United States v. Burton, 189 U.S.App. D.C. 327, 331, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (1978). In deciding whether to grant a continuance in order to permit the substitution of new counsel, the trial court must consider several factors: (1) whether other continuances have been requested or granted; (2) the inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, and the court; (3) whether the request is dilatory or contrived; (4) the degree to which the defendant contributed to the delay; (5) whether the defendant has attempted to arrange for competent additional counsel; (6) the degree of identifiable prejudice which would flow from the continuance; and (7) the complexity of the case. Leak v. United States, 757 A.2d 739, 744-745 (D.C.2000); see also Yancey, 755 A.2d at 428 (citing Burton, 189 U.S.App. D.C. at 332-333, 584 F.2d at 490-491). More generally, in deciding whether a trial court in any case has abused its discretion, the reviewing court should consider whether the decision maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether he relied upon an improper factor, and whether the reasons given reasonably support the conclusion. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365 (D.C.1979) (citation omitted). A trial court need not explain its reasoning in detail, but rather need only `perceive [these] salient factors' when exercising its discretion. Leak, 757 A.2d at 745 (citation and footnote omitted). It is clear from the record that the trial court neither perceived nor considered these salient factors. The court denied appellant's motion mainly because the litigants were sort of in the middle of trial and because Mr. Wood's successor counsel was finally prepared and ready for trial. In other words, [i]t is not apparent that the trial court considered anything in this case other than the demands of the criminal docket. Yancey, 755 A.2d at 428. Such insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. Burton, 189 U.S.App. D.C. at 332, 584 F.2d at 490 (citation omitted). What we have here is more than just a simple failure by the court to consider a relevant factor. See Johnson, 398 A.2d at 365. The court here failed to engage in the proper analysis, as articulated in Leak and Yancey, and to inform itself adequately before ruling. We therefore have no choice but to conclude that the court abused its discretion. Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that [a]ppellant found himself in circumstances not of his own making, Yancey, 755 A.2d at 428, and asked for Mr. Wood's reinstatement as soon as possible after learning that Mr. Henderson was not going to testify as a government witness. [15] The remaining question for us is to determine the proper remedy for this sort of abuse of discretion. The District of Columbia Circuit addressed this issue a few years ago in Childress, in which a defendant's attorney of choice was, as in this case, disqualified because of a potential conflict of interest. However, once the charges were divided into separate groups with each to be the subject of a separate trial, the potential conflict ceased to exist for one of the trials. The defendant then made known to the court that he wanted his chosen counsel reinstated, but his motion was denied. Because there was no longer a potential for conflict, the appellate court held that the trial court had erred in denying the motion. As to the remedy, the court observed that the gap in the record [16] ... leaves us without an adequate basis for determining whether and on what terms [defense counsel] would have reentered the case .... 313 U.S.App. D.C. at 175-176, 58 F.3d at 735-736. It therefore remand[ed] the matter to the [trial] court for an inquiry into whether [counsel of choice] would have been willing and able to re-enter the case .... Id. at 176, 58 F.3d at 736. The case before us is analogous to Childress, in that there is no indication in the record that Mr. Wood would have been willing and able to represent appellant when the trial actually took place. Although there are some differences between the two cases (for one thing, the chosen defense attorney in Childress died while the appeal was pending), we think they are sufficiently similar to warrant our following the course charted in Childress. That is to say: [W]e remand the matter to the [trial] court for an inquiry into whether [Mr. Wood] would have been willing and able to re-enter the case in [September 1997]. If, after a hearing, the [trial] court concludes that [Mr. Wood] would have re-entered the case ... the [trial] court must vacate his murder and [ADW] convictions.... [But if], on remand, the [trial] court concludes that [Mr. Wood] would not have re-entered the case ... we hold that [appellant] was not denied counsel of choice and that his murder and [ADW] convictions must stand. Childress, 313 U.S.App. D.C. at 176, 58 F.3d at 736. We assume that the court will need to conduct some sort of evidentiary hearing, and we expect that the court will address, to the extent necessary, the several pertinent factors that we identified in Leak, 757 A.2d at 744-745. Beyond that, however, we leave the details of the remand proceedings to the discretion of the trial court. As in Childress, if the court concludes that Mr. Wood would not have re-entered the case when appellant moved to reinstate him as counsel, then the judgment of conviction shall stand affirmed. But if the court finds that Mr. Wood was willing and able to represent appellant after learning that Henderson would not be a witness, and if the court can be assured that there would be no risk that Henderson's rights would be infringed by Wood's renewed representation of appellant, [17] it shall vacate the judgment and order a new trial.