Opinion ID: 1930879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: whether the trial court erred with regard to discovery.

Text: ś 10. Here, King contends that the State failed to establish complete disclosure and that the prejudice to [him] was immense as even at trial new material was being used and that [t]oo many critical items just `slipped through the cracks.' He complains that the trial court's order on this issue was a mere excuse and [t]he trial court's decision ... after trial was mere justification. ś 11. Beyond citing a few general principles related to discovery requirements, the foregoing is the substance of King's argument in this assignment of error. He does not cite to any specific evidence the State failed to disclose nor does he pinpoint any specific ruling of the trial judge denying him disclosure of requested evidence in the State's possession. Indeed, in ruling on this issue as raised by King in his motion for a new trial, the trial judge stated as follows: 2. To the Court's knowledge, the State produced all documents, etc. requested by the defendants. There has been no complaint to the Court of any specific document, etc. that was not produced. 3. The Court is unaware of anything that the State did not disclose. There has been no complaint to the Court of any specific matter that was not disclosed. ś 12. The trial court has considerable discretion in matters pertaining to discovery, and its exercise of discretion will not be set aside in the absence of an abuse of that discretion. Gray v. State, 799 So.2d 53, 60 (Miss.2001). Judgments of the trial courts come to this Court clothed with a presumption of correctness, and it is the burden of the appellantâ Kingâ to overcome that presumption. Branch v. State, 347 So.2d 957, 958 (Miss.1977). Our law is clear that an appellant must present to us a record sufficient to show the occurrence of the error he asserts and also that the matter was properly presented to the trial court and timely preserved. Acker v. State, 797 So.2d 966, 972 (Miss.2001) (quoting Lambert v. State, 574 So.2d 573, 577 (Miss.1990)). See also Pulphus v. State, 782 So.2d 1220, 1224 (Miss.2001) (Issues cannot be decided based on assertions from the briefs alone. The issues must be supported and proved by the record.) (citing Robinson v. State, 662 So.2d 1100, 1104 (Miss.1995)). ś 13. Mere assertions that a discovery violation occurred, without proof, or any meaningful argument whatsoever as to what particular evidence was not disclosed, is insufficient to warrant reversal. King has failed to meet his burden of proof; no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated. ś 14. Next, King argues that he was not given exculpatory evidence. He argues that it was discovered after the subsequent civil case was dismissed against him that there was no hard medical or psychological inculpatory evidence against him. Apparently, he is arguing that he should have been told that fact and the failure to so inform him was a discovery violation. ś 15. Initially, King's argument relies on matters outside of the record and is thus improper for our consideration. See, e.g., Mason v. State, 440 So.2d 318, 319 (Miss.1983) (Facts asserted to exist must and ought to be definitively proved and placed before us by a record, certified by law; otherwise, we cannot know them.). Additionally, as the State points out, King fails to assert any error by the trial judge. Since King never gave the judge an opportunity to rule on this issue, our review of it has been foreclosed. See Leverett v. State, 197 So.2d 889, 890 (Miss.1967) (The Supreme Court is a court of appeals, it has no original jurisdiction, it can only try questions that have been tried and passed upon by the court from which the appeal is taken.). If King was dissatisfied with the State's disclosure of exculpatory materials, he was under a duty to bring that fact to the attention of the trial judge. The failure to do so amounts to a waiver of the issue. ś 16. King's argument, procedural bars notwithstanding, is as hard to follow as it is without merit. He concludes that this is a pure-form Brady question. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. However, in the case at bar, King has failed to reveal what exculpatory evidence the State had, but refused to disclose. There is simply no Brady questionâ pure-form or otherwiseâ in this case. King states that the case against him was just talk, innuendo and speculation.... That, however, is, a more apt description of the argument made by King on this issue. ś 17. King argues that because the State did not call either Lisa B. Yazdani, the psychologist, or Lacey O'Quinn, the DHS social worker (both of whom interviewed A.B.) their testimony would not have inculpated him; therefore their testimony would have exculpated him. This argument is nonsensical. As the State points out, these two reports, which were disclosed to King, were not exculpatory, but were inculpatory. Since King cites to no evidence that was withheld from him, and since he does not attempt to demonstrate the exculpatory nature of this allegedly withheld evidence, this assignment is without merit.