Opinion ID: 1946583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: I. Did the trial court err in failing to sustain in its entirety appellant's motion in limine concerning a phone call from appellant's wife to the wife of the victim immediately prior to the shooting?

Text: At the outset of the trial, the defense sought by motion in limine to exclude any testimony concerning a telephone conversation between appellant's estranged wife, Genelle Davis, and Sue Watson, the wife of the victim. The basis of the motion was the statutory incompetency of a spouse as a witness set forth in Miss Code Ann. § 13-1-5. The trial court ruled that the state could bring out the fact of the telephone conversation but would not be allowed to go into the substance of the conversation. Sue Watson's testimony at trial included the following: Q. The phone rang and someone called, right? A. True. Q. Who was on the telephone? A. Belle. Q. And who is Belle? A. Belle Davis. Q. Is that Stanley Davis' wife? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay, did you know her personally? A. Yes, sir. Q. And have you talked with her on the phone before? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay, while you were on the phone with her, what happened? A. If I can't tell you what she had warned me of, BY MR. JOHN FARESE: Your Honor, we are going to object and move for a mistrial. BY JUDGE BIGGERS: Counselor, this witness evidently doesn't understand what she is allowed to testify to and what she cannot, do you need some time to instruct her some, we are getting into a very dangerous area. BY MR. YOUNG: All right, let me talk to her for just a minute. I don't think she understands. A. Yes, I think I do, continue on if you want to. Q. You cannot tell,  A. I can tell what I saw, is that true? Q. You can tell what you saw, you can't tell what Belle told you over the telephone, you can tell anything you saw but anything outside if Stanley Davis wasn't present, it is hearsay so you can tell what happened while you were on the telephone, what you saw, who you saw, who was present and what happened. A. I saw a red pickup, I saw like fire coming out of the end of a gun and the shots went right by me and one of them hit my husband and Stanley Davis was driving that red Ford Pickup. Appellant contends that the admission of this testimony amounts to a violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-5, which provides as follows: Husbands and wives may be introduced by each other as witnesses in all cases, civil or criminal, and shall be competent witnesses in their own behalf, as against each other, in all controversies between them. Either spouse is a competent witness and may be compelled to testify against the other in any criminal prosecution of either husband or wife for a criminal act against any child, for contributing to the neglect or delinquency of a child, or desertion or nonsupport of children under the age of sixteen (16) years, or abandonment of children. But in all other instances where either of them is a party litigant the other shall not be competent as a witness and shall not be required to answer interrogatories or to make discovery of any matters involved in any such other instances without the consent of both. (Emphasis added). With the exception of the class of cases enumerated in the statute, the prosecution is prohibited from calling a defendant's wife to testify against her husband without the consent of both spouses. Wallis v. State, 254 Miss. 944, 183 So.2d 525 (1966); Outlaw v. State, 208 Miss. 13, 43 So.2d 661 (1949). In Bayse v. State, 420 So.2d 1050 (Miss. 1982), this Court noted that the statutory prohibition extends to the introduction of out-of-court statements made by the spouse. 420 So.2d at 1054. Ford v. State, 218 So.2d 731 (Miss. 1969) prohibits only testimony by a third party as to the substance of the party's conversation with a defendant's spouse and not testimony as to the fact that a conversation with the spouse took place. Mrs. Watson exceeded the trial court's ruling on appellant's motion in limine by her reference to what she [appellant's wife] had warned me of ... but did not delve into the substance of the telephone conversation. In this Court's opinion, the admission of the testimony of Sue Watson regarding the phone call from appellant's wife was not prejudicial error requiring reversal under this Court's decision in Ford v. State, supra .