Opinion ID: 563786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Increase of Defendant's Offense Level

Text: 53 Defendant's final contention is that the trial court erred in increasing his offense level. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for sentencing purposes that the defendant was an organizer or leader of criminal activity and that the defendant obstructed justice when he testified at trial. 54 We review factual findings by the sentencing court under a clearly erroneous standard. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e) (West Supp.1991). Such findings will not be reversed unless they are without factual support in the record, or unless after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3302, 111 L.Ed.2d 811 (1990). Where a question involves a mixture of both law and fact, but turns primarily on consideration of legal principles, a de novo review is appropriate. United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1468-69 (10th Cir.1990) (citations omitted). 55 In this case, since Defendant is challenging the sufficiency of evidence, a primarily factual question, the clearly erroneous standard applies. See id.; United States v. Backas, 901 F.2d 1528, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 190, 112 L.Ed.2d 152 (1990). 56
57 Sentencing courts may consider any reliable information, including hearsay, in sentencing a defendant. United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1563 (10th Cir.) (citing Beaulieu, 893 F.2d at 1180-81), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 88, 112 L.Ed.2d 60 (1990). This includes determination of a defendant's role in the criminal activity. Id. Prior to imposing sentence, the court increased Defendant's offense level pursuant to Sec. 3B1.1(c) of the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.). U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c) directs the sentencing court, [i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. 6 In making the increase, the court stated it was a very reasonable inference from th[e] evidence that Mr. Morgan was calling the shots and making the decisions and telling them how to go about it. The court also found Mr. Morgan had recruited a bunch of juveniles, young juveniles and was merely using these minors as his minions and had influenced them to assist in carrying out the robbery. 58 In Backas, we held that a defendant may be deemed a supervisor for purposes of U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c) upon a showing that the defendant exercised any degree of direction or control over a subordinate in the criminal scheme. 901 F.2d at 1530. Our review of the record fully supports the trial court's determination that Mr. Morgan was deserving of the two level increase provided in U.S.S.G. Sec. 3B1.1(c). The increase was justified and supported by sufficient evidence in the record, thus, we do not find the court was clearly erroneous in adjusting Mr. Morgan's offense level on this basis.
59 Defendant also argues the court's two level increase for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 was error. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 provides: [i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense level by 2 levels. 60 [T]he district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the facts of a particular case is entitled to due deference and its factual findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Urbanek, 930 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 160, 112 L.Ed.2d 125 (1990)). 61 The trial court made the following findings regarding Defendant's obstruction of justice: the Court thinks that the defendant engaged in significant conduct [by giving] ... his fabricated version of what took place and his lack of involvement; the Defendant maintained all the way along that he wasn't involved in this bank robbery; and the defendant was very much involved, and the fact that he said he wasn't is a fabrication and an untruth ... he lied about it. 62 As we have previously held, merely denying guilt or exercising one's constitutional right to testify is not a proper basis for an enhancement under Sec. 3C1.1. Keys, 899 F.2d at 988. However, an enhancement is justified where a defendant goes further and testifies falsely. We find the record amply supports the trial court's finding that the Defendant testified untruthfully, and therefore the enhancement of his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 3C1.1 was proper. United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1535-37 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3252, 111 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990). 63 Accordingly, we find the district court's findings regarding Defendant's role in the offense were supported in the record, and not clearly erroneous. Therefore, the court properly imposed sentence based on a total adjusted offense level of 23, and criminal history category of IV.