Opinion ID: 1265027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudice Resulting From Deficient Performance

Text: Because we disagree with the District Court's analysis of the performance prong of Strickland, and this error alone requires us to reverse the District Court's grant of relief from Lewis's sentence, we do not need to provide an exhaustive analysis of the prejudice prong at this time; however, we will make two observations before moving on. First, the District Court incorrectly determined that de novo review was appropriate. As we have previously noted, the Supreme Court clearly held that the § 2254(d) standards apply when a state supreme court rejects a claim without giving any indication of how it reached its decision. Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 606 (3d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, federal habeas courts must distinguish between the denial of a claim without explanation and the failure to adjudicate a claim on its merits; only the former triggers the application of AEDPA's deferential standard of review. Here, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision can be interpreted as concluding that Lewis was not prejudiced by his counsel's conduct just as easily as it can be interpreted as concluding that his counsel's conduct was not unreasonable. Therefore, the District Court erred by not applying § 2254(d) to this aspect of Lewis's ineffective assistance claim. Second, if it becomes necessary to reconsider whether Lewis was prejudiced by any deficiencies in his counsel's performance, the District Court will need to engage in a meaningful reweighing of the aggravating and mitigating evidence in order to decide this issue. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.); see also Marshall, 307 F.3d at 103 (Given the unanimity requirement, the `reasonable probability of a different outcome' would mean that only one juror need weigh the factors differently and find that the aggravating factor did not outweigh the mitigating factors). Also relevant to the prejudice analysis is the issue of whether Lewis would have allowed trial counsel to present disparaging and negative information to show that he was mentally ill, brain damaged, and abused, especially in light of his desire to portray himself as a person of superior intellect and his attempts to control the presentation of his case. (Supp.App. 6-7, 9, 11-18; Tr. 6/16/83 at 12, 14-15; App. at 732-35.) Lewis has yet to provide any statement that the decision not to present background information in mitigation was other than his own choice. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 478, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836 (2007) (addressing a situation in which a client interferes with counsel's efforts to present mitigating evidence to a sentencing court and deferring to the state court's conclusion that prejudice could not be shown); Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d at 455 (reasoning that whatever counsel could have uncovered, [the defendant] would not have permitted any witnesses to testify, and was therefore not prejudiced by any inadequacy in counsel's investigation or decision not to present mitigation evidence); cf. Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d at 123 (At no time did my attorney explain to me that evidence concerning my character could or should be presented for the jury's consideration at the penalty hearing.).