Opinion ID: 2001143
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Heading: motion to dismiss for pre-arrest delay.

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court improperly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictments against defendant on the ground of pre-arrest delay. Defendant claims he was denied due process of law because police had probable cause to arrest him at the end of April, 1975, but did not secure an arrest warrant until June 27, 1975 (when the arrest warrant was issued) and did not arrest him until July 25, 1975. Defendant must establish actual prejudice resulting from the delay to make a due process claim concrete and ripe for adjudication. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 480 Pa. 340, 390 A.2d 172 (1978). Once defendant has shown actual prejudice, the court will inquire into the reason for the delay. The defendants themselves caused the delay between the arrests and the criminal incidents. Their assertion that better police proficiency might have resulted in their earlier apprehension contradict their planned intentions of remaining anonymous and undiscovered. In the absence of showing that the police deliberately and unnecessarily delayed the arrest to the prejudice of the defendants, the delay between the criminal episode and the arrest has no significance. Commonwealth v. Bunter, 445 Pa. 413, 282 A.2d 705 (1971); Commonwealth v. DeRose, 225 Pa.Superior Ct. 8, 307 A.2d 425 (1973); Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210 (D.C.Cir. 1965). Not only was there no deliberate police delay, but the evidence does not indicate that the defendants were prejudiced by the delay in any way. A mere allegation and assumption that delay dims memories is insufficient to establish delay upon which to base dismissal of an indictment. Appellant asserts that he was prejudiced by the delay because he was unable to prepare a defense to the charges during the period of time from which he was told he was going to be arrested until two months later when he was arrested. A delay in the arrest of a defendant for legitimate police purposes does not result in a denial of the defendant's right to due process of law, unless the delay prejudices the defendant's ability to defend himself. Wilson v. United States, 409 F.2d 184 (9 Cir. 1969). The record does not indicate that the delay prejudiced defendant's ability to defend himself.