Opinion ID: 2978290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Rulings by District Court

Text: Heard argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying any discovery and then proceeding to grant summary judgment in favor of defendants. We assume that Heard’s August 15, 2006 supplemental response and attached affidavit qualifies as a request for additional discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f).6 We have explained that “[t]ypically, when the parties have no opportunity for discovery, denying the Rule 56(f) motion and ruling on a summary judgment motion is likely to be an abuse of discretion.” CenTra, Inc. v. Estrin, 538 F.3d 402, 420 (6th Cir. 2008). However, we have also “upheld the denial of Rule 56(f) motions when the court 6 Rule 56(f) provides: If a party opposing the motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:
(2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order. FED . R. CIV . P. 56(f). 20 deems as too vague the affidavits submitted in support of the motion,” and we have done so “even when the parties were given no opportunity for discovery.” Id. Further, “we have affirmed the denial of Rule 56(f) motions when the parties were given insufficient time for discovery if further discovery would not have changed the legal and factual deficiencies.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, the district court denied Heard any discovery, except with respect to Heard’s claim against Masker, and did not rule on Heard’s August 15, 2006 Rule 56(f) motion for discovery. As explained above in our discussion of Heard’s various claims against defendants, Heard failed—except as noted above—to specify in his discovery requests and Rule 56(f) motion what he hoped to uncover through discovery that would have created genuine issues of material fact as to his various claims. Because “further discovery would not have changed the legal and factual deficiencies” of Heard’s various claims, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery except as we have previously noted. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Heard’s motion to recuse. See United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 405 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1218 (2006). Heard’s motion for recusal was without merit because he presented no evidence that either the magistrate judge or the district judge had any personal bias or prejudice against Heard or in favor of any of the defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 144. Further, Heard did not show that the judges’ impartiality could reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. § 455. 21
The district court did not err in denying Heard’s motion for appointment of counsel. The appointment of counsel in a civil proceeding is justified only by exceptional circumstances, which are absent in this case. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 606 (6th Cir. 1993).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify the class and appoint Heard as class representative. Heard is an incarcerated pro se litigant without legal training who is representing himself and is not able adequately to represent the proposed class. See FED . R. CIV . P. 23; Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Ability to protect the interests of the class depends in part on the quality of counsel, and we consider the competence of a layman representing himself to be clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.” (citation omitted)).
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Heard’s motion for a default judgment pursuant to FED . R. CIV . P. 55. The district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on August 22, 2006, but Masker did not file an answer until March 26, 2007. On April 2, 2007, Heard filed a motion for a default judgment, citing Masker’s failure to file a timely answer. The district court denied Heard’s motion on April 25, 2007, stating that “[d]efault was never entered in this case.” R. 165 (Order 4/25/07). “Prior to obtaining a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry of default as provided by Rule 55(a).” 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2682, at 13 (3d ed. 1998). Rule 55(a) provides that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 22 has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” FED . R. CIV . P. 55(a). Because Heard did not first seek entry of a default from the clerk of the court, it was procedurally improper for Heard to move for entry of a default judgment.