Opinion ID: 3050279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of County’s General Plan

Text: Déjà Vu also claims the zoning ordinance violates California Government Code § 65860, which requires that “zoning ordinances . . . be consistent with the general plan of the county.” The district court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment because Déjà Vu failed to raise the claim in its complaint. Fantasyland, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. [11] A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The plaintiff need not detail all the supporting facts. The statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). TOLLIS INC. v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 13713 On appeal, Déjà Vu refers to its allegation that “the legislative record [fails to] establish that this statute significantly advances any ‘important’ governmental interest.” The state law claim is purportedly encompassed within this statement. [12] Déjà Vu’s argument is not persuasive. The above allegation was made in support of the following proposition: Defendant’s Zoning Amendment violates Plaintiffs’ and the public’s right to freedom of speech, press and expression protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitu- tion and Article I, § 2 of the California Constitution .... There is no accompanying reference to the relevant state statute and no assertion of a conflict between the ordinance and the County’s General Plan. As a result, the County did not have fair notice that Déjà Vu was asserting a claim under California Government Code § 65860. The district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue was therefore correct. C. District Court Severance of Unconstitutional Time Restraints Under San Diego County Ordinance § 6930(b), any person seeking to operate, enlarge, or transfer control of an adult establishment must first obtain a permit from the County. The district court found that the County’s permitting regime was unconstitutional because it granted the licensing body an unreasonably long period of time — 130 or 140 days depending on the calculation method — to consider a permit request. Fantasyland, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 1143-46. The court then severed the offending time limits from the ordinance. Id. at 114647. Déjà Vu now challenges the district court’s manner of severance. [13] We hold that the district court’s manner of severance was erroneous. Once the offending provision is removed, the 13714 TOLLIS INC. v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO text of the ordinance contains no time limits at all. A licensing requirement for protected expression is patently unconstitutional if it imposes no time limits on the licensing body. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228 (1990) (“[T]he licensor must make the decision whether to issue the license within a specified and reasonable time period during which the status quo is maintained . . . .”) (emphasis added). A severance is inappropriate if the remainder of the statute would still be unconstitutional. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 935 (9th Cir. 2004). [14] This conclusion does not require, as Déjà Vu contends, invalidation of the entire ordinance. The district court should have instead severed all provisions of § 6930(b) setting forth the permit requirement because they were not moored to a reasonable time limit, thereby leaving the ordinance’s other provisions intact. Owners of adult establishments would have to comply with the substantive provisions of the ordinance, but would not need to secure a permit prior to operation unless and until the time limit defect is corrected. We therefore remand to the district court to correct its severance order consistent with this opinion. Each party should bear its own costs. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.