Opinion ID: 613280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Marijuana Evidence

Text: Throughout Stevenson's three-day trial, the government elicited testimony from several witnesses that Stevenson had distributed and used marijuana. Stevenson argues on appeal that this testimony was bad acts evidence and was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides that evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is inadmissible character evidence, but may be admitted to prove the defendant's motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,.... Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). In its brief on appeal, the government does not assert a valid purpose for the marijuana evidence, but instead argues that Stevenson did not preserve the issue because his only objection to the marijuana evidence was based on relevancy and not Rule 404(b), and therefore our review is solely for plain error. Stevenson counters that his objection was sufficient to put the government and the court on notice that he was complaining about the admission of bad acts evidence. Alternatively, Stevenson claims that this court should nonetheless review his Rule 404(b) challenge for an abuse of discretion because the prosecution violated Rule 404(b) by not providing his attorney with the requisite notice of its intent to introduce such evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) ([U]pon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice of good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.). Whether Stevenson preserved the issue and whether the government's violation of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)'s notice requirement should excuse an insufficient objection to the marijuana evidence, however, is irrelevant because any error was harmless. [3] See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); United States v. Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir.2007) (Errors do not merit reversal when the government proves that they are harmless, that is, that they did not affect the outcome of the trial.). The evidence against Stevenson was overwhelming. Stevenson's supplier, Friends, testified at trial that he supplied Stevenson with huge quantities of cocaine over the years. Several couriers and trail-car drivers also testified, not just about their roles, but also about events they witnessed  Stevenson secreting the money and drugs in the speaker boxes; his cooking of the cocaine into crack; and his weighing, packaging, and selling large quantities of crack and cocaine out of his mother's house. Additionally, three of Stevenson's regular purchasers, to whom Stevenson fronted the drugs, also testified. Testimony from government agents concerning Stevenson's behavior also bolsters the testimony of the co-conspirators. Specifically, Stevenson led officers on a high-speed chase the evening of the attempted sting operation. After eluding officers, he then taunted them, leaving messages evidencing an awareness of guilt, i.e., it's my job to run and your job to catch me. Stevenson also changed his voicemail message to inform his friends and family members that there was a snitch and that they should dump their cell phones and trust no one. For his part, Stevenson called no witnesses and presented no evidence. Moreover, the references to marijuana, for the most part, were merely repetitive of the references to the charged crack and cocaine  e.g., Stevenson would come from St. Louis and buy kilograms of cocaine and pounds of marijuana from me. In fact, Stevenson argues on appeal that there was no reason for the additional marijuana evidence to be admitted because it was entirely cumulative and that of the 32 pages of trial testimony where marijuana evidence appears, 27 include the same or substantially similar testimony with respect to cocaine or crack. Appellant Brief at 30. But rather than bolster Stevenson's argument, this redundancy highlights why any error was harmless. It is also wrong to think that a jury would hear the same witnesses testify about marijuana and cocaine and crack and conclude that those witnesses must be truthful regarding the cocaine and crack because they also said that Stevenson had distributed or used marijuana. See United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375, 1384 (2d Cir.1970) (As the trial judge noted, [the witness'] testimony as to other crimes and criminal propensity was so closely bound up with his directly relevant testimony with regard to the [charged] hijacking that unless the jury believed the relevant testimony it is quite unlikely that it would have been influenced by the accompanying testimony of other crimes.). For all of these reasons, we conclude that any error related to the admission of testimony concerning marijuana was harmless.