Opinion ID: 2180049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Custody

Text: The government first contends that the trial court erred in suppressing challenged statements made by Turner after he was informed of the search warrant, because he was not in custody when the statements were made. On appeal from the trial court's grant of a motion to suppress statements on Miranda grounds, our role is to ensure that the trial court had a substantial basis for concluding that a constitutional violation had occurred. See Goldston v. United States, 562 A.2d 96, 98 (D.C.1989). The trial judge's determination that Turner was in custody when he made the statements and that his Miranda rights were violated is ultimately a conclusion of law that we review de novo. See Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 363 (D.C.1990). Accord, e.g., Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 814 (D.C.1993); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102, 113, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). This court's review of the resolution of a motion to suppress evidence is limited. We will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and those findings will only be set aside if they lack substantial support in the record. See Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 1210, 1215 (D.C.1999). See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 461 A.2d 1025, 1030 n. 6 (D.C.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1052, 104 S.Ct. 734, 79 L.Ed.2d 193 (1984). Finally, we review the record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court, and we must sustain any reasonable inference that the trial judge has drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., Peay v. United States, 597 A.2d 1318, 1320 (D.C.1991) (en banc); Morris, 728 A.2d at 1215; Jones v. United States, 747 A.2d 558, 562 (D.C.1999). The trial court found that Turner was in police custody at the point when Detective Whalen executed the search warrant upon him. Therefore, any statements made from that point on were inadmissible because he was not advised of his Miranda rights. The government contends, however, that Turner was not in custody, but rather was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and thus did not need to be advised of his Miranda rights. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that [n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... The Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda established the means of safeguarding this privilege against compelled self-incrimination in the context of custodial police interrogation. 384 U.S. at 457, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (stating that the Miranda Court invited action to protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination). The purpose of the Miranda protection is to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which work to undermine the individual's will to resist.... Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 421, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). The government argues that the execution of the search warrant did not change what in essence had been a voluntary discussion with Turner into custodial interrogation, but rather that the search warrant acted merely to seize Turner for a brief period of time. In general, the issue of custody for purposes of Miranda has been the subject of many legal decisions, because Miranda creates as many close questions as it resolves [and thus] [t]he task of determining whether a defendant is in `custody' has proved to be `a slippery one.' Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 711-12, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On a fundamental level, seizure and custody are not synonymous. See Patton, 633 A.2d at 815 n. 7 (stating that although language used by this court has equated a Fourth Amendment seizure with a Fifth Amendment custody[,] the Supreme Court has made clear that the two concepts are not synonymous). A seizure occurs when the police have by word or conduct manifested to the suspect that he is not free to leave, and in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Id. at 814. Custody is clearly more than seizure alone. See Harris v. United States, 738 A.2d 269, 275 (D.C.1999). The Supreme Court stated that [b]y custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken away into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Supreme Court subsequently refined the definition of custody as it pertains to custodial interrogation by framing the factual issue as whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983); Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138; see also Morris, 728 A.2d at 1216; Patton, 633 A.2d at 815 n. 7; In re E.A.H., 612 A.2d 836, 838 (D.C.1992) (quoting Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517). The test for determining whether a person is in custody is an objective one and focuses upon how a reasonable [person] [7] in the suspect's position would have understood [his or her] situation. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The inquiry is based [upon looking at] the totality of the circumstances. See Patton, 633 A.2d at 814; Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346-47, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976); State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 494 A.2d 108, 117 (1985) (noting that the inquiry is an objective one, and the trial court must consider all the surrounding circumstances). Further, the court's examination of the totality of the circumstances must be informed by the underlying purpose of the Miranda rule, namely to protect individuals from compelled self-incrimination. See Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.) (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 433, 104 S.Ct. 3138), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 854, 117 S.Ct. 150, 136 L.Ed.2d 95 (1996). In order to determine whether the police questioning of Turner amounted to custodial interrogation, we must determine whether the circumstances presented in this case, as well as the events surrounding the execution of the search warrant, lead to the conclusion that Turner was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. See E.A.H., 612 A.2d at 838. The government principally relies on this court's opinion in E.A.H., to support their contention that Turner's seizure during the execution of the search warrant did not rise to the level of a custodial detention and thus, Miranda warnings were not required. In E.A.H., we held that the defendant was not considered to be in custody when a search warrant was being executed on his home, even though he was compelled to remain on the premises while answering police questioning. [T]his court has twice rejected the notion that a person was in custody for Miranda purposes because he was questioned during the execution of a search warrant in his home, even though he was not free to leave. Id. at 838 (citing Tyler v. United States, 298 A.2d 224, 226-27 & n. 4 (D.C. 1972); Wells v. United States, 281 A.2d 226, 228 (D.C.1971)). The government argues that Turner's situation is factually similar to that of E.A.H., because Turner, like E.A.H. was compelled to remain at a certain location while a search warrant was being executed. We find Turner's situation, however, to be factually distinguishable from E.A.H. in two important respects. First, E.A.H. was being restrained in a room in his home while the search warrant was being executed. He was not, like Turner, being restrained in a law enforcement building, and the situs of the police questioning was a critical factor in our reaching the conclusion that the restraint on [E.A.H.'s] liberty during the brief questioning in a room in his home with the door open, did not approach a level comparable to that of a formal arrest. E.A.H. 612 A.2d at 839 (stating further that E.A.H. knew that it was unlikely that he was going to be arrested since his half-brother, who was interviewed before him, was not arrested). Second, the search warrant in E.A.H. was for weapons allegedly located in the house where he resided. In this case, Turner was faced with a search warrant that required him to surrender his body for the collection of his blood, saliva, and head and pubic hair. Although Turner, like E.A.H., was not allowed to leave nor was sure when he would be able to leave, Turner, unlike E.A.H., was detained in an unfamiliar police dominated environment being subjected to interrogation while undergoing invasive procedures upon his person. For purposes of Miranda, station house detentions are viewed in a different light than typical Terry seizures on the street. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, Justice Marshall, writing the opinion for the Supreme Court, drew a sharp distinction between those circumstances where an interrogation is exposed to public view, such as a traffic stop or other circumstance where the ability of the unscrupulous policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements is reduced, and those circumstances where interrogations take place in police dominated surroundings similar to the interrogation at issue in Miranda. In fact, in Berkemer, the Supreme Court held that station house interrogations are the standard against which all potentially custodial situations are to be measured. 468 U.S. at 438, 104 S.Ct. 3138. Although the government argues that this questioning took place in a nurses' station at the F.B.I. field office and not in a typical police station interrogation room, such distinctions are at best arbitrary when what most concerns the court is police dominated questioning that is away from the public view. Police questioning of a suspect in an F.B.I. building or in any police facility, regardless of where within the building or facility the questioning takes place, raises significant concerns for which Miranda warnings are an appropriate prophylactic against compelled self-incrimination. In this case, Turner voluntarily accompanied several police officers to an F.B.I. field office after being told that he would be released at the end of the conversation and taken anywhere he wanted to go. At that point, Turner was engaged in a process that was somewhat familiar to him as he had previously been questioned about the homicides by police officers in a police station and released. However, upon being informed that the police officers had a warrant, signed by a judge, compelling him to submit to an invasive procedure to secure hair samples and bodily fluids, Turner could fairly perceive that his situation had changed dramatically and that he was probably not free to leave. The existence of a search warrant for one's body, as opposed to one's home or for one's belongings, is the type of formality that a layperson might reasonably view as having all the indicia of a formal arrest regardless of police pronouncements to the contrary. This is especially true where it is clear that the person subject to the warrant would be restrained if they tried to leave. Contrary to the government, we find Turner's situation more analogous to the defendant's situation in United States v. Gayden, 492 A.2d 868 (D.C.1985), than to E.A.H. In Gayden, the defendant was interrogated by the police, at the police station, without being advised of his Miranda rights. The police advised Gayden that he was free to leave at any time, and during that time, he made three statements. Before Gayden made his third statement, he was confronted by the officers who claimed that his statements were contradictory. The trial court found that the defendant was in custody when he made the third statement. We agreed, citing to the trial court's memorandum, and holding that the police interrogation was done in such a manner as to imply that Gayden's situation had changed so significantly that he was no longer free to go. 492 A.2d at 873. As in Gayden, Turner understood that the circumstances surrounding his situation had changed after being advised of the search warrant. When Turner was initially picked up, Detective Whalen told him that he had a few questions for him, that he was not under arrest, and that afterwards he would be taken to a place of his choosing. However, once Detective Whalen advised Turner of the search warrant, Turner was no longer free to leave, but rather, was compelled to comply with the order. Therefore, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the trial court correctly determined that Turner was in custody when he was served with the search warrant because a reasonable person in Turner's position would feel there was a restraint on [his] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled that because of the Miranda violation, the challenged statements could not be used in the government's case in chief.