Opinion ID: 1540077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of the ZBA to Grant the Variance Pursuant to Section 4353

Text: [¶ 15] The jurisdiction of a town board of appeals is a question of law that must be ascertained from an interpretation of statutes and local ordinances, and it is reviewed de novo. Sanborn v. Town of Sebago, 2007 ME 60, ¶ 6, 924 A.2d 1061, 1063. When a municipality has established a board of appeals and directly or by implication authorizes appeals from code enforcement officers, planning boards, or other initial decision-makers, such appeals must be taken first to the board of appeals unless the municipal ordinance explicitly requires that such appeals proceed directly to the Superior Court. See 30-A M.R.S. § 4353(1); Thomas v. City of S. Portland, 2001 ME 50, ¶ 2, 768 A.2d 595, 595. Dismissing a direct appeal from a planning board in Thomas, we observed that [d]irect appeals from a decision of a planning board to the Superior Court on issues of zoning are allowed only if the municipal ordinance so provides. Id. ¶ 2 (citing Hodsdon v. Town of Hermon, 2000 ME 181, ¶ 3, 760 A.2d 221, 222). Because South Portland had a board of appeals and its zoning ordinance made no provision for a direct appeal to the Superior Court, we concluded that Thomas had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before appealing directly to the Superior Court from a Planning Board decision. Id. [¶ 16] Title 30-A M.R.S. § 2691 (2008) permits municipalities to establish boards of appeal. See also 30-A M.R.S. § 4353. In general, a board of appeals has jurisdiction over two types of appeals: (1) appeals from the official or board responsible for enforcing zoning ordinances pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. 4353(1); and (2) appeals with respect to any [other] matter, to the extent that the municipality has by charter or ordinance specified the precise subject matter that may be appealed pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(4). Sanborn, 2007 ME 60, ¶ 7, 924 A.2d at 1064 (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 17] We review the interpretation of statutes and of local ordinances de novo as questions of law. Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 5, 960 A.2d 1178, 1180; Jade Realty Corp. v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 80, ¶ 7, 946 A.2d 408, 410. In interpreting a statute or ordinance, we look first to the plain meaning of its language to give effect to the legislative intent, and if the meaning of the statute or ordinance is clear, we need not look beyond the words themselves. Jade Realty, 2008 ME 80, ¶¶ 7, 9, 946 A.2d at 410-11 (quotation marks omitted). When interpreting a statute, we consider the entire statutory scheme to achieve a harmonious result. Kane v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 2008 ME 185, ¶ 12, 960 A.2d 1196, 1200; see also Jade Realty, 2008 ME 80, ¶ 9, 946 A.2d at 411 (In construing the language of an ordinance, the ordinance is to be considered as a whole.). [¶ 18] Section 4.A.2. of the Reorganization of the Town of Mount Desert Zoning Board of Appeals authorizes the ZBA to hear variance requests and authorize variances as provided in Title 30-A MRSA Section 4353. Section 4.B. further provides that the ZBA may grant a variance only in accordance with State law (30-A MRSA Section 4353 or as amended). Accordingly, pursuant to its ordinance, the ZBA has jurisdiction to hear and grant variances to the extent provided in 30-A M.R.S. § 4353. [¶ 19] Section 4353 provides, in part, that [t]he board of appeals shall hear appeals from any action or failure to act of the official or board responsible for enforcing the zoning ordinance.... 30-A M.R.S. § 4353(1). In deciding any appeal, the board of appeals is empowered to [g]rant a variance in strict compliance with [§ 4353(4)], the implication being that a board of appeals may grant a variance from a zoning ordinance. 30-A M.R.S. § 4353(2)(C). [¶ 20] The Superior Court concluded that the Mount Desert Land Use Zoning Ordinance was a land use ordinance, not a zoning ordinance, because its driveway setback requirements applied to the whole Town rather than to certain districts in the Town. Therefore, the Superior Court held that the ZBA lacked authority to grant variances pursuant to section 4353, which the court concluded or presumed was limited in applicability to zoning ordinances. [¶ 21] The Mount Desert Land Use Zoning Ordinance does not specify any other mechanism to appeal the code enforcement officer's decision or to seek a variance from the driveway setback limit. [6] Therefore the necessary result of the Superior Court's interpretation would be either that: (1) there is no opportunity to seek a variance in response to a properly denied driveway permit application, or (2) every request for a set back variance must be presented as a M.R. Civ. P. 80B appeal for de novo determination by the Superior Court. The first alternative would raise a constitutional due process concern that we should seek to avoid. See Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 2002 ME 52, ¶ 12, 794 A.2d 62, 68 (observing that courts must construe ordinances, and legislative enactments generally, so as to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality). The second alternative would involve the Superior Court, as a fact-finder, in deciding local variance requests that are best addressed in the first instance by a local decision making process, in conflict with our case law and tradition. In Sanborn, 2007 ME 60, ¶ 7, 924 A.2d at 1063, we emphasized that when a municipality adopts a zoning ordinance, it is required to establish a board of appeals. Addressing a claim that, as Wister asserts here, a building ordinance applicable town-wide was not a zoning ordinance and thus 30-A M.R.S. § 4353 did not apply, we held that pursuant to section 4353, the board of appeals had jurisdiction over approval or denial of an application of a limitation that had town-wide effect, when the building ordinance was appealed along with a zoning ordinance, and requiring a separate appeal for the building ordinance aspect of the matter would be a waste of resources. Id. ¶¶ 10-11, 924 A.2d at 1064-65. [¶ 22] We reiterated the preference stated in Thomas, 2001 ME 50, ¶ 2, 768 A.2d at 595, that issues related to municipal permits, approvals or variances be first addressed to a municipal board of appeals: As a matter of public policy, it is appropriate for the ZBA to take jurisdiction of Building Ordinance issues when a Shoreland Zoning Ordinance issue has been appealed to it. Requiring parties to litigate in court without first going through an administrative process is contrary to the policies that we have recognized in a number of cases in which we have held that people who are aggrieved by a decision of a CEO or a planning board must first take their case to the board of appeals. See, e.g., Hodsdon v. Town of Hermon, 2000 ME 181, ¶ 5, 760 A.2d 221, 222-23 (stating that even though the municipality has not enacted an ordinance giving the board of appeals the authority to hear a land use appeal, the plaintiff must go to the board of appeals before filing an appeal in the Superior Court); Freeman v. Town of Southport, 568 A.2d 826, 828 (Me.1990) (recognizing the purpose of the board of appeals statutes is to require that disputes over zoning laws be reviewed, at least initially, by the local zoning board of appeals). Sanborn, 2007 ME 60, ¶ 11, 924 A.2d at 1065. In this case, the Mount Desert Land Use Zoning Ordinance does not explicitly require that appeals from CEO decisions proceed directly to the Superior Court. Pursuant to section 4353(1) and our case law, then, Moore was required to appeal the denial of the driveway permit by seeking a variance from the ZBA. [¶ 23] In prior decisions addressing other issues there is dicta that the Superior Court may have construed to suggest that section 4353(4) empowers a municipal board of appeals to grant setback variances from zoning ordinances but not from other land use ordinances. See Lewis v. Town of Rockport, 2005 ME 44, ¶ 15, 870 A.2d 107, 111 (implying in dicta acceptance of the parties' contention that section 4353 is limited to the grant of variances from zoning ordinances); see also York v. Town of Ogunquit, 2001 ME 53, ¶ 12, 769 A.2d 172, 177 (Zoning Ordinance provisions are specifically subject to the variance analysis mandated by 30-A M.R.S. § 4353(4)). We did apply the section 4353(4) variance analysis in a case in which landowners were granted a variance by the zoning board of appeals from setback requirements applicable to their single-family home, a decision an abutting landowner appealed. Goldstein v. City of S. Portland, 1999 ME 66, ¶¶ 1-4, 728 A.2d 164, 164-65. However, we had no occasion to address in the decision whether the setback ordinance was a zoning ordinance or not. See id. ¶ 4 n. 1, 728 A.2d at 165. [¶ 24] In an opinion distinguishing zoning ordinances from other land use ordinances, we held that, applying a predecessor statute, a city ordinance that prohibited the removal of gravel from any land in the city, except as permitted by the Planning Board, was a general and uniform citywide regulation, not zoning which involves a particularistic division of the city into zones for the purpose of applying different proscriptions and `reasonable application of different regulations' in the different zones. Benjamin v. Houle, 431 A.2d 48, 49 (Me.1981). Thus, we held in Benjamin that a ZBA established pursuant to the precursor to 4353 lacked authority to hear a non-zoning ordinance matter of citywide application. Id. at 49-51. However, we then noted that when questions arise regarding different limitations and land use regulations in various zones, questions of ordinance interpretation and of fairness and equal treatment multiply, and it also becomes desirable to have a municipal review mechanism through which variances and special exceptions may be granted. Id. at 50. [¶ 25] Whether an ordinance is labeled as regulating zoning or land use or, as in the case of the Mount Desert ordinance, both, makes no difference in application of section 4353. Section 4353 applies to govern the standards for local board of appeals' consideration of applications for variances from specific requirements such as setback limitations. [¶ 26] As we indicated in Sanborn, consideration of variance requests has long been a primary business of local boards of appeal. See R.S. 1954, ch. 91, § 97 (board of appeals to review, as authorized by ordinance, the alleged erroneous refusal of building permits and to permit exceptions to or variances from regulations....). To suggest that the ZBA could not consider a variance request from a setback requirement found in a land use ordinance of town-wide application would represent a significant departure from current practice. We decline to do so. The ZBA properly considered Moore's setback variance request in this case.