Opinion ID: 1442874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Treaty and Customary International Law-Based Challenges

Text: Finally, petitioners argue that under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol), Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6557, and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), the agency has an obligation to ensure that aliens will not be returned to a country in which they are likely to face persecution or torture. On that basis, petitioners claim that the BIA's actions violated their rights under international law because, if removed, they will be persecuted for violating China's family planning policies. Petitioners also argue that the BIA's interpretation violates customary international law in general and the principles of non-refoulement and protection of refugees sur place in particular. But neither the Protocol nor the CAT are self-executing treaties. See Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir.2007) (CAT); Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir.1982) (Protocol); see also Purwantono v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.2007) (Protocol); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 632 (3d Cir.2006) (same); Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 404 n. 3 (6th Cir.2005) (CAT); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 132 (3d Cir.2005) (same); cf. Medellin v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1365, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008) (CAT). They therefore do not create private rights that petitioners can enforce in this court beyond those contained in their implementing statutes and regulations (i.e., the INA). See Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir.1976) (It is only when a treaty is self-executing, when it prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon for the enforcement of such rights.). And we have determined that the BIA's rulings are fully consistent with the framework of the INA and its relevant regulations. Furthermore, even if the treaties were self-executing, there is a strong presumption against inferring individual rights from international treaties. United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir.2001); see also Medellin, 128 S.Ct. at 1357 n. 3 (collecting cases in the courts of appeals acknowledging such a presumption). Accordingly, we reject petitioners' treaty-based argument. Petitioners have also presented no evidence that the BIA's interpretation of the statutory provisions conflicts with principles of customary international law. And even if there were a conflict, United States law is not subordinate to customary international law or necessarily subordinate to treaty-based international law and, in fact, may conflict with both. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 91 (2d Cir.2003); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (noting that Congress may shut the door to the law of nations entirely[ ] ... at any time (explicitly, or implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the field), just as it may modify or cancel any judicial decision so far as it rests on recognizing an international norm as such). We have said repeatedly that when there is a conflict between a statute and customary international law, the statute controls. See Pierre, 502 F.3d at 119 (An act of Congress will govern in domestic courts in derogation of previous treaties and customary international law.); Oliva v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir.2005) ([C]lear congressional action trumps customary international law. This rule, of course, applies in immigration matters. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Thus, petitioners' argument based on customary international law also fails.