Opinion ID: 2362153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Expansion of Brady

Text: The suppression of material evidence violates Brady. In United States v. Bagley, [31] the United States Supreme Court expanded Brady's materiality test, holding that favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, `if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' [32] In Kyles v. Whitley, [33] the United States Supreme Court further expanded Bagley's definition of materiality. The Kyles Court held that while a Brady violation is triggered by the potential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence, a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal, [34] but rather whether in the absence of the undisclosed evidence the defendant received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. [35] Thus, according to the Kyles Court, a `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. [36] The Kyles Court also held that materiality is not a sufficiency of the evidence test. [37] In order to reverse a conviction based upon a Brady violation, one must show that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. [38] In this case, impeaching Johnson on bias may have been helpful or important to Jackson's case, even where the evidence, as presented, appeared to show that the State made no more than an implicit promise to Johnson regarding future leniency. The jury may well have been troubled, as are we, by an acknowledged and disingenuous prosecutorial practice of implicitly suggesting future possible leniency while maintaining that no actual promise of leniency had been made in order to avoid tainting a witness' credibility because of self-interest. The jury might well expect that, given their own life experiences with human nature, the implicit promise might enhance the propensity of a witness, hopeful of leniency if his testimony meets with the prosecutor's approval, to embellish his testimony in order to increase the likelihood of favorable treatment. The insidious nature of the practice would be obvious to all but the most gullible of jurors. Despite our concern that the prosecutors' tactics denied the jury the opportunity to evaluate fully and fairly Johnson's credibility, the potential for Johnson's credibility to be impeached did not put the case in such a light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. [39] Here, overwhelming evidence established Jackson's guilt. As noted supra, the Superior Court discussed the evidence that not only placed Jackson at the scene of the crime, but also implicated him in the murder of Girardi: the fact that Jackson presented no alibi for his whereabouts on the day of the murder; several witnesses stated that Jackson bragged about killing Girardi; several witnesses saw the fruits of the burglary in Jackson's apartment; and, a witness stated he saw Jackson place a bloody glove in a garbage can. In fact, trial counsel admitted, after consulting a shoe print expert in the hope of negating the State's sneaker print evidence of Jackson's presence at the scene, that the results were not favorable to Jackson. Further, and perhaps even more importantly, evidence independent of Johnson's oral recitation of Jackson's request that he kill Burton corroborated his testimony. The State presented independent evidence establishing that Jackson's handwriting matched the handwriting on the letter Johnson presented to the prosecutors and that Jackson's fingerprints were on both the letter to Johnson with information about Burton and the map to Burton's residence. It is difficult to imagine a more powerfully persuasive set of corroborating circumstances. In conclusion, we must find that the State violated Brady because the State's agents failed to inform Jackson's counsel that they implicitly promised Johnson future leniency on unrelated charges for his testimony about Jackson's plan to murder Burton. Despite, however, the State's offensive policy of eschewing plea agreements to avoid damage to witness credibility in favor of implicit future leniency, we affirm Jackson's conviction. We must because both the evidence corroborating Johnson's testimony and the circumstantial evidence supporting Jackson's presence at the scene and participation in the crime overwhelms any perceived lack of confidence in the outcome of the trial. [40] Jackson's trial, we conclude, resulted in a verdict worthy of confidence. [41] The Superior Court's decision denying the Motion for Postconviction Relief is AFFIRMED.