Opinion ID: 197921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims Against the Union

Text: 16 The action against the union was dismissed because the claim was viewed as a duty of fair representation claim masquerading in different garb. No duty of fair representation claim could be sustained in federal court for two reasons. 17 The first reason is that the remedy for any breach of the duty of fair representation lies with the Federal Labor Relations Authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 7118. Congress assigned this task to that agency as part of the overall scheme in the CSRA. Under the CSRA, the union is the exclusive representative of bargaining unit employees. And the union, in turn, owes a duty of fair representation: 18 A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit it represents and is entitled to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees in the unit. An exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership. 19 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(1). A breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice. See 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(8). And unfair labor practices are to be adjudicated by the FLRA. 20 The second reason is that, as the Supreme Court has held, no parallel private cause of action may be implied from the CSRA. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 533, 109 S.Ct. 1282, 1286-87, 103 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989) ([N]either the language nor the structure of the [CSRA] shows any congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to enforce federal employees unions' duty of fair representation.). 21 Thus, while the duty itself parallels the fair representation obligation of a union in the private sector that has been found implicit in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), id. at 532, 109 S.Ct. at 1286, the places to seek remedies for a violation of the duty of fair representation vary. If the CSRA and a covered federal employee are involved, as here, recourse is to the FLRA. There exists no equivalent to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ... which permits judicial enforcement of private collective-bargaining contracts. Id. at 534, 109 S.Ct. at 1287. Consequently, district courts cannot entertain federal employees' fair representation suits. Montplaisir v. Leighton, 875 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989) (citation omitted). 22 The enactment of the CSRA  'comprehensively overhauled the civil service system' ... creating an elaborate 'new framework for evaluating adverse personnel actions against federal employees.'  United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443, 108 S.Ct. 668, 671-72, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988) (quoting Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 773, 774, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1624-25, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985)). In some respects, the Act gives federal employees greater protections than private sector employees. In other respects, it alters the forum in which claims may be brought and the procedures used. See Roth v. United States, 952 F.2d 611 (1st Cir.1991) (CSRA preempts state law claim); Montplaisir, 875 F.2d at 8 (same). At times, federal employees must meet a more rigorous standard in order to obtain injunctive relief. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974) (discussed in DeNovellis v. Shalala, 135 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir.1998)). 23 The plaintiffs do not dispute that this general statement is indeed the law for duty of fair representation claims, but argue that they have been misunderstood. First, they say, they are different from plaintiffs in other cases such as O'Connell v. Hove, 22 F.3d 463 (2d Cir.1994), because they have actually exhausted their administrative remedies. Secondly, they say, the CSRA procedures failed due to violations and misinterpretations of federal law. More specifically, citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), they claim the union could not waive the individual rights of union members under the FLSA to get overtime back pay. 24 In this, it is the plaintiffs who misapprehend the law, not the district court. We start with the plaintiffs' last attempted distinction. In Barrentine, a 1981 decision, the Supreme Court held that a private sector employee could bring a federal court action alleging a violation of the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA after having unsuccessfully submitted the same claim to a grievance committee under the collective bargaining agreement. Barrentine was a private sector case, not involving a federal employee covered by the CSRA, and expressly recognized that the statutory enforcement scheme granted broad access to the courts, and [n]o exhaustion requirement or other procedural barriers are set up, and no other forum for enforcement of statutory rights is referred to or created by the statute. 450 U.S. at 740, 101 S.Ct. at 1444. Here, in contrast, another forum for enforcement of statutory rights of a duty of fair representation is contemplated by the statute and no implied right of action may be inferred from the CSRA. 25 The contention that this is just an exhaustion of administrative remedies case is also misplaced. Karahalios prevents such an argument. As Karahalios points out, the CSRA at Title VII: 26 provides recourse to the courts only in three instances: with specified exceptions, persons aggrieved by a final FLRA order may seek review in the appropriate court of appeals, § 7123(a); the FLRA may seek judicial enforcement of its orders, § 7123(b); and temporary injunctive relief is available to the FLRA to assist it in the discharge of its duties, § 7123(d). 27 489 U.S. at 532, 109 S.Ct. at 1286. None of those situations exist here. When the plaintiffs filed their duty of fair representation complaint with the FLRA, the General Counsel decided not to issue a complaint. But the General Counsel of the FLRA was to have exclusive and final authority to issue unfair labor practice complaints, and only those matters mentioned in § 7123 were to be judicially reviewable. Id. at 533, 109 S.Ct. at 1287 (citation omitted). The matter ends when the General Counsel of the FLRA decides not to issue a complaint. 28 There remains the argument that the strong federal interest in fair pay for employees found in the FLSA should trump the administrative scheme in the CSRA where there is a claim against the union. The Supreme Court has also foreclosed that argument in United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 668, 98 L.Ed.2d 830 (1988). In Fausto, the Court held that an employee seeking back wages under the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596, may not bring an action in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, in light of the comprehensive system established by the CSRA. 29 We hold here that federal claims under the FLSA against the union involving overtime pay and the union's duty of fair representation may not be brought in federal court due to the comprehensive scheme of the CSRA.