Opinion ID: 2352152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Weight Given to Clark's Earlier Crime

Text: The Superior Court considered Clark's 1973 assault on the three-year-old child as both a statutory and non-statutory aggravating factor. Counsel for Clark does not challenge the use of Clark's conviction of assault with intent to commit murder as a statutory aggravating factor. He argues that the circumstances of that 1973 crime should not have been double counted by being given separate weight as a non-statutory aggravating circumstance. In essence, counsel for Clark asks this Court to revisit its holding in Ferguson v. State, Del.Supr., 642 A.2d 772, 781-783 (1994). We conclude that the facts in this case do not raise the double counting issue addressed in Ferguson. A majority of this Court held, in Ferguson, that it was not plain error to permit the jury to weigh robbery and pecuniary gain as separate aggravating circumstances. The majority opinion noted that robbery and pecuniary gain are not always duplicative factors and that there is, therefore, a rational basis for the statutory scheme under which these two factors are treated separately. In their concurring opinion, two Justices acknowledged the conceptual validity of the majority's holding. However, since robbery and pecuniary gain were entirely redundant circumstances under the facts of that case, the concurring Justices felt that the jury should not have been permitted to double count them. This case is distinguishable from Ferguson in two respects. First, there was no jury in Clark's penalty hearing. As a result, there is no danger that the jury may have been confused. Second, there was no double counting involved. There are two different aspects to Clark's prior crime. The fact that he committed a felony involving violence upon another person establishes one statutory aggravating factor. The circumstances of that crime bear upon a different consideration  the character and propensities of the offender. The Superior Court properly considered both aspects of the 1973 crime in its weighing process and we find the double counting argument to be without merit.
The remaining aspect of this Court's statutory review is the determination of whether Clark's death sentence is proportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. To make this determination, this Court must analyze the universe of first degree murder cases in which there was a penalty hearing and the sentence imposed has become final. Consistent with our holding in Lawrie v. State, Del.Supr., 643 A.2d 1336 (1994) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 646, 130 L.Ed.2d 551 (1994), we consider those cases governed by the 1991 amendment to the death penalty statute to be directly applicable and therefore most persuasive in the proportionality analysis. Cases decided under the earlier statute still may be considered, but normally would not be considered significantly persuasive. Id. at 1350. We recognize that a definitive comparison of the universe of cases is almost impossible. Pennell v. State, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 1368, 1376 (1992). [S]entencing decisions involve `difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that buil[d] discretion, equity and flexibility into a legal system.' Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 342-343 (1993) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1777, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)). Recognizing these limitations, this Court looks to the factual background of relevant cases to determine the proportionality of the sentence imposed. Shelton v. State, Del.Supr., 652 A.2d 1 (1995). Clark's crimes bear similarities to other recent cases in which the death penalty was imposed. First, Clark committed a double murder. Multiple murders frequently have resulted in a death sentence. See Weeks v. State, Del.Supr., 653 A.2d 266, 274 (1995) (two victims killed in cold-blooded, calculated execution-style manner); Lawrie v. State, supra (four persons killed by arson); Red Dog v. State, supra (five deaths during the course of lengthy criminal career); Pennell v. State, supra (four women victims of this serial killer). Another factor common to Clark's crimes and other death penalty cases is the fact that the crimes were unprovoked, cold-blooded murders of helpless victims. See Weeks v. State, supra ; Shelton v. State, supra ; Lawrie v. State, supra ; Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 671 A.2d 1353 (1996). Finally, as in several other death penalty cases, Clark's victims were elderly people. Shelton v. State, supra ; Outten and Shelton v. State, Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1291 (1994); Sullivan v. State, Del.Supr., 636 A.2d 931 (1994) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 110, 130 L.Ed.2d 57 (1994). Counsel for Clark argues that the death sentence is not proportional when compared to the one other case involving a child who murdered his parents, see State v. Cohen, Del.Super., 634 A.2d 380 (1993), or when compared to other murder cases in which the defendant suffered from a mental infirmity. See Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 117 (1990); and State v. Shields, Del.Super., 593 A.2d 986 (1990). We disagree. In Cohen, the defendant pled guilty but mentally ill and did not share Clark's long history of violent criminal behavior. Sanders and Shields both preceded the 1991 amendment to the death penalty statute and, therefore, have limited value in the proportionality analysis. Moreover, although Clark suffers from mental disorders, none of those infirmities affected his ability to distinguish right from wrong or his ability to control his own behavior. Clark planned these brutal killings apparently even before he left prison. His elderly adoptive parents were resting in their own home when Clark shot each one in the head. This savage, unprovoked attack followed years of violent behavior in prison and a similar heinous assault on a small child. After careful review, we are satisfied that this case is substantially similar, for proportionality purposes, to other post-1991 death penalty cases where there were multiple killings, elderly victims and premeditation. We conclude that the death sentences here are warranted and are not disproportional.