Opinion ID: 2262015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the guardianship decision

Text: I believe the majority's opinion fails to take into consideration some of the factual background that was the basis for the trial judge's guardianship decision. The majority also fails to take into consideration two basic legal principles: 1) when a trial judge sits without a jury, an appellate court will not set aside the trial court's judgment on the evidence unless it was clearly erroneous, Maryland Rule 8-131(c); and 2) a trial judge's choice of guardian of the person will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Kicherer v. Kicherer, 285 Md. 114, 119, 400 A.2d 1097, 1101 (1979). The trial judge, Fader, J., made a carefully considered, very difficult decision. He was not clearly erroneous and did not abuse his discretion. In reviewing whether a trial court was clearly erroneous in rendering its decision, this Court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. A trial court's decision will not be clearly erroneous where there was substantial evidence on the record to support the trial judge's decision. I.W. Berman Prop. v. Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 12, 344 A.2d 65, 72 (1975). To put the trial court's decision in perspective, we must examine the earlier federal litigation that engendered the instant suit. In 1985, the Veterans Administration (V.A.) contacted Deanna Mack, who was then living in Florida, and inquired whether she wished to have her husband Ronald transferred from Maryland to a V.A. hospital in Florida. She declined to authorize the transfer. In a conversation with a nurse several years later, Deanna learned that by virtue of her Florida plenary guardianship, she might be able to order that Ronald's nutrition and hydration tube (the gastrostomy tube) be removed even without court approval if Ronald were hospitalized in Florida. Deanna contacted a Florida attorney who apparently advised her that the preferable course of action would be to have Ronald transferred to Florida and to secure a Florida court order authorizing the V.A. to remove the gastrostomy tube. Deanna, through counsel, filed a petition in Florida to remove the gastrostomy tube and simultaneously filed a request in Maryland that the V.A. release Ronald to her for transfer to a V.A. hospital in Florida. Apparently, the only way that Ronald's father, Ronald W. Mack (whom, in deference to his seniority, I will refer to as Mr. Mack), could stop the V.A. from releasing Ronald for transfer to Florida, and to his certain death, was to seek an injunction. Mr. Mack filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland seeking to enjoin Ronald's transfer to Florida. The District Court, Garbis, J., recognized that if Deanna were Ronald's guardian, then the V.A. would have to comply with her request to release Ronald to her for transfer to Florida where she resides. Judge Garbis further recognized that, once Ronald was in Florida, Deanna would proceed with her litigation to have the gastrostomy tube removed. If, however, Mr. Mack were Ronald's guardian, then the V.A. would abide by his wishes regarding whether Florida's or Maryland's V.A. hospital would care for Ronald. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Garbis noted that V.A. counsel acknowledged that there is a question regarding the status of Deanna V. Mack as guardian. Therefore, until her status is clarified to the satisfaction of the V.A., [Ronald] will not be released to her custody. However, if the V.A. were to be satisfied that Deanna V. Mack was, in fact, [Ronald's] guardian, it would comply with her demand. Judge Garbis issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Ronald's transfer to Florida pending a determination in a state court as to whether Deanna V. Mack is, in fact, the duly authorized guardian of the person of Ronald W. Mack. Deanna and Mr. Mack filed the instant guardianship petitions in compliance with Judge Garbis' request that the parties expeditiously obtain a state court determination as to who is the guardian of Ronald's person. That determination would then resolve the issue of whether the injunction against Ronald's transfer to Florida would remain in effect or be terminated. Judge Fader in his carefully crafted opinion noted: This case came to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County as a result of a Temporary Injunction issued by The Honorable Marvin J. Garbis, Associate Judge of the United States District Court for Maryland, Civil Action, MJG-91-1314, dated May 30, 1991, forbidding the Fort Howard Veterans Administration Hospital from discharging Ronald W. Mack from that hospital, except upon order of court which temporary injunction, in effect, left it to this court to decide the underlying issue of guardianship.[52] Judge Garbis issued his order, upon the Complaint of Ronald's father and sister, when Deanna V. Mack stated her intention to the Fort Howard Hospital personnel that she wanted to take her husband back to Florida for the purpose of withdrawing his life-sustaining medical treatment, i.e., the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration. [52] A copy of the decision and temporary injunction issued by Judge Garbis is a part of the court file. The undisputed testimony from Deanna, as well as the report of the guardian ad litem, established that if Ronald were transferred to Florida, Deanna intended to and would be able to secure a court order to remove Ronald's gastrostomy tube. It was reasonable for Judge Fader to conclude that if Deanna were appointed guardian, the preliminary injunction would probably be lifted and Ronald would be transferred to Florida. The V.A. had already stated that if Deanna were Ronald's guardian it would comply with her demand. [1] Once Ronald was in Florida, Deanna would be able to have his gastrostomy tube removed. I submit that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ultimately appointing Mr. Mack the guardian of Ronald's person. Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl.Vol.), Estates and Trusts Article, ง 13-707(a) provides that when a court appoints a guardian, spouses are entitled to a higher priority than parents; however, for good cause, the court may pass over a person with priority and appoint a person with a lower priority. Estates and Trusts Art., ง 13-707(c)(1). The determination of whether good cause exists is purely within the discretion of the court. See Kicherer, 285 Md. at 119, 400 A.2d at 1101. Thus, the standard of review of the Court's determination is whether the court below abused its discretion in finding good cause to bypass Deanna Mack and appoint Mr. Mack as guardian. See id. Even the majority agrees with the trial judge that Deanna's views with regard to removing the gastrostomy tube are a factor in an overall determination. 329 Md. 188, 206, 618 A.2d 744, 753 (1993). This Court, nevertheless, reverses Judge Fader because it believes he treated Deanna's views as the sole factor in awarding guardianship and decided the issue by treating Deanna as disqualified.... Id. at 206, 618 A.2d at 753. Judge Fader did no such thing; he determined guardianship based primarily on the issue that all parties recognized was the overriding issue in this case. The evidence not only permits, but compels, the conclusion that Deanna was seeking this Maryland guardianship of the person over Ronald for one predominant, if not sole purpose โ to have Ronald's gastrostomy tube removed. The trial judge's decision was not based on Deanna's views about removing Ronald's gastrostomy tube โ the decision was based on Deanna's intent to remove Ronald's gastrostomy tube, and her apparent ability to carry out that intent if she were appointed guardian. The trial court as well as this Court have decided Ronald should remain on artificial life support. If Deanna were appointed guardian, it is reasonable to assume the V.A. would transfer Ronald to her home state, Florida, where Deanna's views would be Ronald's fate. Judge Fader did not abuse his discretion in addressing this as the predominant reason for denying Deanna's guardianship. The majority also reverses the trial judge for not addressing the other factors bearing on the issue of guardianship. Specifically, it complains that there was no finding whether Deanna could or would fulfill the duties of guardian. There was no finding on Ronald, pere's, contention that his geographical proximity to Ronald weighted the best interest scale in favor of appointing the father as guardian. Id. at 204, 618 A.2d at 752 (footnote omitted). I submit these remaining issues did not need to be further addressed by the trial judge because, as a matter of law, they could only favor Mr. Mack, rather than Deanna. In fact and in law, the issue of geographical proximity favors Mr. Mack. Mr. Mack lived close by and visited Ronald approximately once a week. Deanna has moved to Florida, approximately 1,000 miles away from Ronald, and she acknowledges that over the last few years she was only able to visit Ronald once or twice a year. As to geographical proximity, the majority acknowledges that, as a matter of law, appointment of a resident is preferred. Id. at 204 n. 3, 618 A.2d at 752 n. 3. Indeed, the majority opinion cites two cases for that proposition: Rosin v. United California Bank, 226 Cal. App.2d 166, 37 Cal. Rptr. 830, 833-34 (1964); In re Boutz' Guardianship, 24 Cal. App.2d 644, 76 P.2d 154, 157 (1938). Both of these cases cited by the majority contain the following statement: `While in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, a nonresident may be appointed guardian, such appointments are not favored, the rule being that a resident should be appointed rather than a nonresident, unless some very strong reason for appointing the latter is made to appear.' Rosin, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 833 (quoting Boutz, 76 P.2d at 157). With respect to Deanna's ability to fulfill the duties of guardianship, prior to seeking this reappointment as Maryland guardian Deanna had demonstrated no interest in performing most of the duties usually associated with guardianship of a person. Approximately seven years ago, Deanna, at her own request, was removed as the Maryland guardian of Ronald's person, and Mr. Mack acted as Ronald's caretaker, if not his legal guardian since that time. It was Mr. Mack, not Deanna, who remained close to Ronald. It was Mr. Mack who, after Deanna renounced her prior Maryland guardianship, supervised Ronald's medical treatment, visited regularly, and provided the attention, kindness, and affection that a guardian should provide. Deanna moved away from Ronald and, for over a half-dozen years, lived with and had a child by another man. Seven years ago, she resisted V.A. efforts to have Ronald transferred to the state where she lives. Her contacts with Ronald were minimal over the last few years and her visits dwindled to approximately one per year. The only way Deanna could be in a position to effectively supervise Ronald's care would be if Ronald were moved to Florida, and it was undisputed that if Ronald were moved to Florida, the care and treatment he would get there would be removal of his gastrostomy tube. In light of the evidence adduced at trial and the trial judge's authority under ง 13-707(c)(1) of the Estates and Trusts Article to reorder the statutory priorities, I do not understand how the majority can hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in appointing Mr. Mack guardian of the person of his son. There is no need to remand the case and no need for Judge Fader to further address the issues of geographical proximity and ability to fulfill the duties of guardian.