Opinion ID: 844268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Claim VII. California's Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional

Text: Defendant raises a number of facial constitutional challenges to California's death penalty law, claims we have repeatedly rejected and find no persuasive reason to reexamine. As we recently observed in People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 208 [112 Cal.Rptr.3d 746, 235 P.3d 62], `[W]e reiterate that the death penalty statutes adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, are not impermissibly vague or overbroad, and do not result in an arbitrary and capricious or wanton and freakish penalty determination. [We] also have held that the statutes do not require that the prosecution carry the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase, that the jury make written findings or reach unanimous decisions regarding aggravating factors, or that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the aggravating factors have been proved, (2) the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or (3) death is the appropriate sentence.' The United States Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee ( Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220 [160 L.Ed.2d 621, 125 S.Ct. 738]; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531]; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428]; Apprendi v. New Jersey [(2000)] 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348]) have not altered our conclusions in this regard. ( People v. Whisenhunt. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 227 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 125, 186 P.3d 496].) `There is no violation of the equal protection of the laws as a result of the statutes' asserted failure to provide for capital defendants some procedural guarantees afforded to noncapital defendants.' ( People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 208.) Further, [t]he statutes are not invalid because they permit the jury to consider in aggravation, under section 190.3, factor (b), evidence of a defendant's unadjudicated offenses. ( People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 208.) `The use in the statutes, and in the standard jury instructions, of terms such as extreme, substantial, reasonably believed, and at the time of the offense in setting forth the mitigating factors does not impermissibly limit the mitigation evidence or otherwise result in an arbitrary or capricious penalty determination. The statutes, as translated into those standard jury instructions, adequately and properly describe the process by which the jury is to reach its penalty determination. There is no need to instruct the jury at the penalty phase (1) regarding a burden of proof, except as to section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), or the absence of a burden of proof, (2) regarding the meaning of the term mitigation, (3) that mitigating factors can be considered only in mitigation, (4) that if the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence, the jury must impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, or (5) that the jury is not required to impose the death penalty even if it finds the aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence. The trial court need not omit from the instructions any mitigating factors that appear not to apply to the defendant's case.' [Citation.] [¶] `There is no requirement that the trial court or this court engage in intercase proportionality review when examining a death verdict. A sentence of death that comports with state and federal statutory and constitutional law does not violate international law or norms . . . .' ( Id. at pp. 208-209.)
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.