Opinion ID: 1131538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Greyhound's liability

Text: ¶ 8. Greyhound argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the chancellor's decision regarding liability. Specifically Greyhound argues that the Court of Appeals misconstrued Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-505 (1996) to require every driver on a through road to slow down as the driver approaches an intersection, even where the crossing road has a stop sign, because, as Greyhound asserts, the only duty of a driver on a through road is to react reasonably when the driver knows or should know that the driver on the crossing road will run the stop sign. Greyhound further argues that the opinion of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with Jobron v. Whatley, 250 Miss. 792, 168 So.2d 279, 284 (1964), and Vines v. Windham, 606 So.2d 128, 131 (Miss.1992). ¶ 9. In response, the Administrators argue that the factual findings of a chancellor are not to be reversed where they are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record, and because they were in this particular case, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the decision of the chancellor as to liability. Specifically, they argue that the chancellor's finding that the bus driver had a warning of several seconds before the impact is supported by the testimony of Greyhound's own witnesses and passengers. The Administrators further assert that Jobron, provides the reasonable interpretation to Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-505 which Greyhound argues it should be given. [1] ¶ 10. On this issue, the Court of Appeals found: We also hold the chancellor applied the proper legal standard in regard to the duty to keep a proper lookout. In Jobron v. Whatley, 250 Miss. 792, 168 So.2d 279, 284 (1964), our supreme court delineated the proper standard: Insofar as the appellee's having the right of way, or the right to assume that the driver of the other car would stop his car before entering the intersection, is concerned, this Court has repeatedly stated what the rule is, namely: That the motorist's right to assume that the driver of a vehicle proceeding toward an intersection will obey the law of the road, which requires him to stop before entering the intersection, exists only until he knows or in the exercise of ordinary care should know otherwise. Jobron is very similar to the case at bar as it involved a car having the right of way which was hit by a car which ran a stop sign. Id. at 280. A passenger in the car that was hit filed suit against both the driver who ran the stop sign and the driver of the car she was in for failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to properly control the car after seeing the other car approaching. Id. The trial court in Jobron granted a peremptory instruction to the driver of the car the passenger was in because the court felt the passenger failed to make an issue of negligence for the jury. Id. Based on the evidence presented, our supreme court held [c]ertainly it would be a question for the jury to determine, whether or not the appellee was guilty of negligence in failing to use her brakes and slow her vehicle down so that, when it appeared Dr. White was not going to obey the stop sign and bring his vehicle to a stop, she would have had her vehicle under control and would have been able to avoid the collision. Id. at 282. Turning to the case at bar, the bus driver had both the duty to slow down as he approached the intersection and a duty to brake when and if it became evident May was not going to stop for the intersection. The chancellor applied the correct legal standards. Therefore, we cannot disturb his opinion for any deficiencies with regard to the law. However, the chancellor also made factual findings that the bus driver breached both these duties. To uphold the chancellor's opinion both of these findings of fact must be supported with substantial credible evidence. Greyhound Lines, slip op. ¶¶ 14-16. ¶ 11. After examining the evidence found in the record, the Court of Appeals went on to hold: Substantial credible evidence supports the chancellor's finding that the driver breached his duty to slow down. First, the driver himself testified he did not start to brake until after impact. Also as stated above, evidence supports the findings that the driver was in fact speeding at 56 mph. Although there was no sign warning the driver of the intersection, this does not relieve him of his duty to slow down at that point a reasonable person would know an intersection was approaching. [Passenger] Weaver testified that he saw the lights of May's vehicle five seconds before impact. At that moment, the driver should be in the process of slowing down and keeping a proper lookout of the approaching car. Substantial credible evidence supports the chancellor's findings that the driver was not keeping a proper lookout. Under Jobron, a driver has no duty to take defensive action until such time as a reasonable person would know a car approaching an intersection will not stop. Id. From the testimony presented, the chancellor could conclude that a driver keeping a proper lookout and paying attention would have known that May's car was not going to stop at some time before impact. The evidence shows that Weaver saw May's car and saw that it was not going to stop. Weaver was so sure it would not stop that he yelled out. This testimony comes from a passenger sitting half way down the bus and to the left of the driver and point of impact. Weaver had time to see May's vehicle, decipher that it would not stop, and had time to yell out. [Passenger] Bryant, on the other hand, testified that he never even saw May's vehicle until impact. The reasonable inference is that a driver in the front of the bus and on the side of impact who was keeping a proper lookout would know or should have known that May would not stop sometime before Weaver's yell. Since the driver failed to see May's vehicle, and therefore, could not have possibly known it would not stop, the driver breached his duty to keep a proper lookout. Greyhound Lines, slip op. ¶¶ 18-19. ¶ 12. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-505 (1996) provides in relevant part: The driver or operator of any motor vehicle must decrease speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, or when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic. We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the chancellor's application of the statute to the present case. In Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So.2d 925 (Miss.1999), the appellants brought an action for injuries they sustained when a delivery truck allegedly crossed the center line of the road into their lane of traffic and forced them off the road while they were negotiating a curve. Id. at 927-28. The jury found in favor of the defendant. Id. On appeal, one of the questions before the Court was whether the trial court erred in giving an instruction that stated that Fielder had a duty to decrease her speed when approaching and negotiating the curve. Id. at 935. ¶ 13. There the Court stated: In regards to instruction D-14, the Fielders offer this Court no argument other than their objection made at trial. At trial, the Fielders objected on grounds that [i]t's not every curve in this road that a person is required to reduce the speed. The trial court overruled the objection. MBC [Magnolia Beverage Company] contends that the trial court properly gave instruction D-14, because Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-505 states, in pertinent part, that [t]he driver or operator of any motor vehicle must decrease speed when ... approaching and going around a curve. Miss.Code Ann. § 63-3-505 (1996). In Vise v. Vise, 363 So.2d 548 (Miss. 1978), this Court approved an instruction requiring the driver of a motor vehicle to decrease speed when approaching and going around a curve. Id. at 551. Therefore, according to statutory mandate and case precedent, we hold that the trial court properly granted instruction D-14. Read as a whole and in context, instructions D-13 and D-14 fairly announce the law and create no injustice; thus, no reversible error is found. Fielder, 757 So.2d at 936 (emphasis added). We therefore find Greyhound's argument on this issue is without merit. ¶ 14. Greyhound next argues that the Court of Appeals, as well as the chancellor, relied on short time estimates to support the judgment. Greyhound argues that such estimates have previously been held to be inherently unreliable, and therefore the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the estimates provided substantial evidence to support the factual findings of the chancellor. Greyhound further argues that the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with Yazoo & MVR Co. v. Lamensdorf, 180 Miss. 426, 178 So. 80 (1938). In response, the Administrators argue that the Court of Appeals did not rely on the testimony of any single witness in finding that Greyhound's driver had a several second warning within which to stop the bus, but rather based its holding on the testimony of all of the witnesses who were passengers in the bus at the time of the collision. ¶ 15. In Lamensdorf, the Court was faced with a challenge to the weight of the evidence where a single witness testified, contrary to all of the other evidence, that the decedent's vehicle had been stalled on a train track for some forty-five seconds and that the train which struck the vehicle in which the decedent was riding had ample time to stop. 180 Miss. at 449, 178 So. at 80. There, the Court found: That estimate by Brock cannot be reconciled with the surrounding facts as shown by all the other witnesses; and weighing it in the scales of all ordinary human experience and observation, as it is our duty to do, it must be pronounced as incredible as a reasonable probability. It is possible, as almost anything is possible, that the length of time did intervene as Brock estimates, but we repeat that as a probability it is incredible; and we suppose it is not now necessary to more than briefly refer to what we have so often heretofore said, to wit, that to present a possibility, rather than a believable probability, is not a sufficient basis for a verdict and judgment Id. ¶ 16. The Court went on to say: The scintilla of evidence rule has been discarded in nearly all jurisdictions, and is not recognized in this state; but verdicts must be based upon substantial evidence and that evidence must be reasonably believable. Whatever a jury here or there might chance to believe, we must require that the evidence upon which they act must be within state-wide legal standards, and one of these, as said, is that the evidence must be substantial and must be reasonably believable. Common experience and observation among all sensible men, who are impartial and without interest upon the issue, can lead to but one reasonable or substantial conclusion in respect to estimates of short periods of time, especially when that estimate, formed in a period of excitement, is in terms of seconds. So it is that all must agree with what the law books say on that subject: Estimates of the duration of short period of time into which much experience is crowded are notoriously inexact and are apt to be excessive, especially if the mind was in a state of anxiety or expectation, and a witness who assumes to measure time with accuracy under such circumstances discredits himself. 23 C.J. p. 37, and cases there cited. See, also, 2 Moore on Facts, p. 992 et seq. In this case, for instance, Brock estimated the time of the train from the bridge to the crossing at 15 seconds, while his wife said it was 3 seconds, and neither of them had it right. If we were to accept the estimate of 45 seconds by Brock as the duration of time that deceased was stalled on the track and discard all the other evidence, and allow this single estimate as sufficient in dependable substance to support a verdict, it would be to say that we will accept as substantially and controllingly dependable that which is declared by the authorities to be notoriously inexact and unreliable, and, moreover, would convict this train crew as bent upon homicide, and the deceased upon suicide, or at least that he was wholly indifferent to the most compelling motive or instinct which, under all circumstances and in every eventuality, incites men to action in their own behalf, namely, the instinct of self-preservation. 180 Miss. at 450-51, 178 So. at 80-81. ¶ 17. In Lamensdorf this Court held that testimony based on estimates of short periods of time could not be the sole basis for a verdict where the testimony was substantially contradicted by the testimony of the other witnesses and defied logic. In the present case, two passengers testified that they saw the car at least five seconds before the impact. One of the passengers, Jackie Wayne Weaver, testified that he yelled out simultaneously with the impact, and that portion of his testimony was corroborated by the testimony of another passenger, Robert Riley. We therefore find that Greyhound's argument on this issue is without merit, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the liability of Greyhound.