Opinion ID: 588143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment is Appropriate Based on Reed's Failure to Prove Discrimination.

Text: 15 Although we cannot affirm the district court's decision based on Summers, this court may affirm on any ground that finds support in the record. See Box v. A. & P. Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1376 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3311, 92 L.Ed.2d 724 (1986). Ironically, Reed's motion for summary judgment provides a basis for granting summary judgment in AMAX's favor. 16 In his motion, Reed claimed that he could prove race discrimination under the burden shifting test of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). McDonnell Douglas first requires the employee claiming discrimination to establish a prima facie case. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee's treatment. Id. After this, the employee must show pretext. Id. 17 In an attempt to meet the requirements of McDonnell Douglas, Reed submitted affidavits and other evidentiary material. Because this evidence, along with the rest of the evidence in the record, reflects no genuine issue of material fact in Reed's favor, we find that AMAX is entitled to summary judgment. See McCarty v. United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1088 (5th Cir.1991) (a court may allow summary judgment sua sponte against a nonmovant who has had the opportunity to prove the facts in dispute); Dayton Electric Mfg. Co. v. Apcom, Inc., 782 F.Supp. 389, 395 (N.D.Ill.1992) (same); see also Box, 772 F.2d at 1376 (this court may affirm summary judgment on grounds other than the district court's grounds if the losing party had an opportunity to submit evidence). 18
19 Reed failed to prove a prima facie case of race discrimination. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was a member of a protected class (2) who was qualified for his job (3) but was discharged while those in other classes were not. Andre v. Bendix Corp., 841 F.2d 172, 175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 855, 109 S.Ct. 144, 102 L.Ed.2d 116 (1988). If the plaintiff cannot meet one of the prongs of this test, summary judgment is properly entered in favor of the defendant. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Common v. Williams, 859 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir.1988). 20 To survive summary judgment, a party may not rest on the allegations in the pleadings; a bare contention that an issue of fact exists is insufficient to raise a factual issue. Billups v. Methodist Hosp. of Chicago, 922 F.2d 1300, 1302 (7th Cir.1991). A plaintiff raises adequate issues of fact when he presents evidentiary material which, if reduced to admissible evidence, may allow him to carry his burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55. 21 The materials attached to Reed's motion for summary judgment fail to address a critical element of the prima facie case, whether AMAX treated its white employees differently than Reed. Even an independent review of the voluminous record 3 produced only weak evidence on the issue. A few documents, including Reed's own affidavit (Document 88) and an Illinois Human Rights Notice of Substantial Evidence, suggest a discrepancy but do not assert personal knowledge of the facts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Others, including Reed's amended complaint (Document 85) and the IHRC complaint, contain unsupported allegations without any documentation. See Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023, 110 S.Ct. 725, 107 L.Ed.2d 745 (1990). To survive summary judgment, Reed should have provided the district court certified transcripts or affidavits from individuals with personal knowledge of the discrepancies. 22
23 Even if Reed had proven a prima facie case, he did not prove pretext. See Billups, 922 F.2d at 1302. An employer's proffered reasons for unequal treatment are pretextual if they are a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805, 93 S.Ct. at 1826. An honest explanation of the unequal treatment is not pretextual simply because it is poorly founded or unfair. Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Co., 824 F.2d 557, 559 (7th Cir.1987). 24 In Reed's case, the employer's proffered reason for the discrepancies was its planned-inadvertent sleep policy. Under this policy, employees who intentionally sleep on the job are treated more harshly than employees who mistakenly fall asleep. Reed claimed that the policy was a pretext because the defendant failed to notify the plaintiff and other employees of its alleged planned-inadvertent sleep policy. 25 Reed's claims about the sleep policy may establish unfairness, but not pretext. Reed presented absolutely no evidence proving that AMAX fabricated the policy to hide discrimination. See United Ass'n of Black Landscapers v. Milwaukee, 916 F.2d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1317, 113 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991). Thus, although we cannot allow summary judgment for the reasons given by the district court, we nonetheless affirm because Reed's claims do not establish race discrimination. 26