Opinion ID: 1702383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. whether baine was improperly convicted upon a void indictment?

Text: Baine argues that since his indictment originally included acts committed outside the statutory limitations period, the charge was invalid. Prior to a 1990 amendment, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-1-5 required that child sexual molestation charges be prosecuted within two years. Baine's indictment was issued on June 21, 1988 and charged the following: COUNT III. That JOHN E. Baine, a/k/a Red Baine ... between April 1, 1986, and January 30, 1988 ... did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously, for the purpose of gratifying his lust or indulging his depraved licentious sexual desires, did handle, touch or rub with his hands the breast area and the private parts of [L.E.], a female child under the age of fourteen (14) years, and he, the said JOHN E. BAINE, was over the age of eighteen (18) years. Approximately 3 months of the time span indicated in the indictment, the period from April 1, 1986 to June 21, 1986, falls outside the statute of limitations. Recognizing the infirmity, the state moved on March 13, 1989, to amend the indictment by deleting and omitting the words and figures `April 1, 1986' and adding in its place instead `June 22, 1986.' The court granted leave to amend. Baine maintains that the trial court erred in allowing the amendment. Under the terms of the original indictment, he contends, the alleged crime was fully performed on April 1, 1986. Subsequent alleged molestations occurring between April 1988 and January of the following year were merely successive acts. According to his argument, therefore, the crime charged under the original indictment fell entirely outside the limitations period; the amendment, in effect, converted an indictment charging an non-prosecutable offense into a one subject to prosecution. Baine cites Hatton v. State, 92 Miss. 651, 46 So. 708 (1908), a case wherein a defendant had been charged with the seduction of a female under the age of eighteen and of previously chaste character. The seduction occurred on June 15, 1905, and repeated acts of intercourse occurred between then and December, 1906. The defendant was indicted on September 7, 1907. This Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that the two-year statute of limitations barred the state from prosecuting the crime. The Court reasoned that while it is true that after the original seduction there were successive acts of coition up to December 1906, still each successive act was not a separate offense of seduction. In Norton v. State, 72 Miss. [128], on page 136, 16 South. [264], on page 267 [1894] ... the court, through Whitfield, J., now Chief Justice, announces what we regard as the only sensible rule in these words: She who is, at the time of the alleged seduction, already unchaste, may be still further debauched, but not seduced. This is the true rule. Rapes may be perpetrated in multiples, but there can never be but one seduction ... by the same man of the same woman. Hatton, 92 Miss. at 653, 46 So. 708. Hatton obviously does not support Baine's argument. Unlike seduction, child sexual abuse is not a crime which occurs once and for all. More akin to rape, acts of child molestation may be perpetrated in multiples. To accept Baine's reasoning would mean that a person could furtively molest a child for two years and then continue to do so with impunity, having no fear of legal sanction. Clearly, the indictment charged a continuous course of criminal conduct and not merely a series of successive acts stemming from an original crime. See Shelton v. State, 445 So.2d 844, 848 (Miss. 1984) (child abuse occurring over long period of time is an ongoing continuing and purposeful course of criminal conduct) (quoting Aldridge v. State, 398 So.2d 1308, 1312 (Miss. 1981). Baine also argues that the amendment was one of substance and not mere form. This Court has often held that trial court have no authority to grant substantive amendments to indictments. See, e.g., Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592 (Miss. 1988); State v. Allen, 505 So.2d 1024 (Miss. 1987); Harden v. State, 465 So.2d 321 (Miss. 1985). Unless time is an essential element or factor in the crime, however, an amendment to change the date on which the offense occurred is one of form only. According to Wilson v. State, 515 So.2d 1181 (Miss. 1987): An indictment for any offense shall not be insufficient for omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed in any case where time is not of the essence of the offense, nor for stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offense to have been committed on a day subsequent to the finding of the indictment or on an impossible day, or on a day that never happened. Id., 515 So.2d at 1182; see also Norman v. State, 385 So.2d 1298 (Miss. 1980) (state allowed to amend to show proper month crime committed); Archer v. State, 214 Miss. 742, 59 So.2d 339 (1952) (state allowed to amend indictment to show year offense was committed). In addition, Rule 2.05(5) of the Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice expressly state that [f]ailure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient. Baine's indictment was not void, and the trial court did not err in allowing the state to amend it.