Opinion ID: 45162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Competency to Proceed to Sentencing

Text: On appeal, Jones argues that the district court erred in finding him competent to proceed to sentencing.3 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from trying a defendant deemed incompetent. United States v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S. Ct. 1280 (2006). In order to be considered competent for trial, a defendant must have “‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,’” and he must have a “‘rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). When a district court is faced with conflicting expert reports, it “does not clearly err simply by crediting one opinion over another where other record evidence exists to support the conclusion.” Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming a district court’s finding of competence despite 3 We review a district court’s determination of a defendant’s competency to stand trial for clear error. United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous “only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 1278 (quotation marks and citation omitted). We review the district court’s denial of a defendant’s request for additional competency testing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Nickels, 324 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003). 9 differing expert opinions on the defendant’s competence). Although Dr. Butts provided a qualified advisory opinion that Jones was not competent, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to favor the more comprehensive report from Dr. Luis, which concluded that Jones was competent to proceed. First, Dr. Luis’s month-long evaluation of Jones, featuring a series of clinical interviews and objective psychological tests, was significantly lengthier than Dr. Butts’s initial two-day evaluation. See United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no clear error where the district court favored an expert opinion based on months of evaluation over a conflicting expert evaluation conducted over two days). Second, Dr. Luis considered a broader array of factors and utilized more resources in forming his expert opinion than did Dr. Butts.4 Finally, Dr. Butts’s conclusion was equivocal at best—despite her “qualified” advisory opinion that Jones was incompetent, she noted that “suspicion for malingering is high” and recommended more extensive testing to verify her findings. Dr. Luis conducted the more extensive evaluation and provided the definitive conclusion that Jones was competent.5 Accordingly, we cannot conclude 4 Although Jones argues that Dr. Luis’s report should not be credited because it did not consider Jones’s prior psychological reports, he does not explain how these prior reports would have affected Dr. Luis’s findings. Furthermore, even if these reports indicated a prior history of mental illness, past mental illness does not mandate a finding of incompetence. See Battle, 419 F.3d at 1299. 5 The additional neurological report that Jones might have brain lesions does not cast doubt on Dr. Luis’s conclusion because this additional opinion also found Jones competent to proceed. No objective medical tests were conducted to support 10 that the district court committed clear error in crediting Dr. Luis’s finding of Jones’s competence. The district court’s observations of Jones’s conduct in the plea colloquy also support its finding that Jones was competent. The court noted Jones’s composed demeanor and rational responses to its inquiries, during which Jones indicated that he fully understood the proceedings and plea agreement. Jones’s counsel at the plea colloquy also stated that Jones was lucid during his discussions about the plea agreement, and counsel indicated that he thought Jones was competent. Even if Jones was at times uncommunicative with his counsel, periods of uncooperativeness alone are insufficient to support a finding of incompetence. See Battle, 419 F.3d at 1299 (affirming the district court’s finding of competence despite the defendant’s antagonistic relationship with his counsel). Jones’s argument that the district court should have requested additional testing is also meritless. A court may order additional psychological testing if it “desires more information than is otherwise available to it as a basis for determining the mental condition of the defendant. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3552(c). In this case, Jones underwent an initial competency examination by Dr. Butts, a comprehensive month-long evaluation by Dr. Luis, and further neurological testing the report of possible lesions. In contrast, Dr. Luis administered an objective Booklet Category Test that indicated no organic brain damage. 11 conducted after the competency hearing. Because the district court had ample information from which to determine Jones’s competency and decided that it needed no additional studies, we conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones’s request for additional testing. For all these reasons, the district court did not err in finding Jones competent to proceed to sentencing.