Opinion ID: 201884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuing Representation

Text: 22 Feddersen contends that the continuing representation doctrine precluded application of the discovery rule until 2001. In jurisdictions where it applies, that doctrine, which recognizes that a person seeking professional assistance has a right to repose confidence in the professional's ability and good faith, Greene v. Greene, 56 N.Y.2d 86, 451 N.Y.S.2d 46, 436 N.E.2d 496, 500 (1982), tolls the statute of limitations `while the defendant attorney [in a malpractice case] continues to represent the plaintiff,' Rosen Const. Ventures, Inc. v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., 364 F.3d 399, 406 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Cantu v. St. Paul Cos., 401 Mass. 53, 514 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1987)). 23 First, Feddersen's continuing representation argument fails because New Hampshire has not adopted the doctrine. In another case involving a legal malpractice plaintiff who was forced to retain counsel to defend himself from the consequences of a defendant attorney's likely malpractice, the New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically decline[d] to adopt the continuing representation rule. Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 782 A.2d 902, 906 (2001). This case is in federal court on diversity grounds. While Feddersen no doubt had good reasons to initiate his suit in federal court, he cannot expect us to adopt a new rule of state law that the state's highest court refused to adopt only four years ago, in a case similar to this one. We have warned, time and again, that litigants who reject a state forum in order to bring suit in federal court under diversity jurisdiction cannot expect that new trails will be blazed. Ryan v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 916 F.2d 731, 744 (1st Cir.1990). 24 Second, even if we applied the continuing representation doctrine (as it is defined in the Massachusetts cases to which Feddersen refers us), we would not resolve this appeal in Feddersen's favor. The continuing representation doctrine ... has no application ... where the client actually knows that he suffered appreciable harm as a result of his attorney's conduct. If the client has such knowledge, then there is no `innocent reliance which the continued representation doctrine seeks to protect.' Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 763 N.E.2d 1065, 1070 (2002) (quoting Cantu, 514 N.E.2d at 669). Here, as noted, Feddersen knew that he had been harmed by the defendants; he did not rely innocently on their assurances to the contrary.