Opinion ID: 1233761
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Type of Forum at Issue

Text: The City offers no support for its assertion that the ramp should be considered private property. We will therefore accept that a portion of the ramp is located on public property. That is not dispositive, however, because we must first determine the type of forum that is at issue. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998). The Supreme Court has identified three types of fora: the traditional public forum, the public forum created by government designation, and the nonpublic forum. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985)). Designated public fora must be created by purposeful governmental action. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 523 U.S. at 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633. As none of the parties argue that the government has made the ramp in this case a designated public forum, it must be either a traditional public forum or a nonpublic forum. Although public sidewalks have long been considered traditional public fora, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 761, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994), the Supreme Court has clarified that not all public sidewalks are public fora. In United States v. Kokinda, the Court distinguished a sidewalk that ran between a post office parking lot and a post office from a quintessential public sidewalk because, rather than being part of the transportation grid of the city, the sidewalk was constructed solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business. 497 U.S. 720, 727-28, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). The Court specifically noted that [p]ostal entryways ... may be open to the public, but that fact alone does not establish that such areas must be treated as traditional public fora under the First Amendment. Id. at 729, 110 S.Ct. 3115. Because the `sidewalk at issue [did] not have the characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity,' the Court held that it was a nonpublic forum. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727, 110 S.Ct. 3115. Here, the District Court analogized the sidewalk at issue to the postal sidewalk considered in Kokinda, stating: The Planned Parenthood ramp bears a striking resemblance to the sidewalk in Kokinda. Like the Kokinda sidewalk, the Planned Parenthood ramp runs parallel to the street-level sidewalk, which is a public passageway. They both lead from the parking area to the front door of the facility and were constructed solely for the passage of individuals engaged in business at the facility. Additionally, the Planned Parenthood ramp was constructed for the specific purpose of complying with the ADA, thereby ensuring that disabled patrons of the facility were able to negotiate the space between the parking area and the entrance of the facility. There is nothing in the record establishing that the ramp was constructed to facilitate expressive activity, daily commerce, or the life of the neighborhood. To the contrary, the ramp's purpose was singular, to effectuate access of patrons, both able and disabled, to the Planned Parenthood facility. To find otherwise would be absurd. App. at 14-15 (emphasis in original). We agree with the reasoning of the District Court. The diagram and images of the ramp in question in the appendix make clear that there is no way to build an entrance ramp to the Facility that would comply with the ADA that would not rest on top of a portion of what was formerly a public sidewalk. However, the ramp is distinct from the sidewalk and serves a separate purpose. We agree with the District Court that any other conclusion would be absurd. App. at 15. We conclude, as did the District Court, that the ramp is a nonpublic forum.