Opinion ID: 2968018
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparate Treatment of Similarly Situated

Text: Caucasian Jurors The State exercised peremptory challenges against nine prospective African-American jurors. Kandies claims that six of these jurors — Randleman, Jinwright, Rawlinson, Hines, McClure, and Oliver — were struck despite being similarly situated to Caucasian jurors who were accepted by the prosecution. See Bell v. Ozmint, 332 F.3d 229, 241 (4th. Cir. 2003) ([C]omparative juror analysis clearly is a relevant consideration in the Batson analysis for determining whether the prosecutor’s explanation was pretextual.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1155 (2004). Jurors Randleman and Jinwright The prosecutor articulated two reasons for striking Juror Randleman. First, in answering background questions posed by a questionnaire which prospective jurors completed in advance of jury selection, Randleman failed to disclose that she had been convicted of a criminal offense. Prior to voir dire, however, the prosecutor performed a criminal records check that revealed Randleman ha[d] been convicted of worthless checks and two speeding violations. J.A. 131. Second, the prosecutor perceived Randleman to be hesitant when asked whether she had any feelings about the death penalty. J.A. 131. With respect to Juror Jinwright, the State’s proffered basis for exercising a peremptory challenge was Jinwright’s former employment at a day care center where she cared for three- and four-year-old children. Moreover, the prosecutor believed, based on her voir dire testimony, that Jinwright, like Randleman, was hesitant on the death penalty question. Id. Kandies did not reply to the state’s proffered reasons for using its peremptory strikes against Randleman and Jinwright. Thus, the trial court denied the Batson motion, finding that the State has enunciated clear and logical bases and grounds for the exercise of peremptory KANDIES v. POLK 55 challenges and said grounds . . . are not for improperly racially discriminatory motives. J.A. 135. On direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Kandies argued that the prosecutor passed several similarly situated white jurors, proving the pretextual nature of the State’s explanation for its peremptory strikes against Randleman and Jinwright. Kandies, 467 S.E.2d at 75. The court concluded that Kandies’ pretext argument was flawed with respect to Randleman and Jinwright because Kandies had simply picked ‘a single factor among the several articulated by the prosecutor . . . and match[ed] it to a passed juror who exhibited that same factor.’ Id. at 75-76 (quoting State v. Porter, 391 S.E.2d 144, 152 (N.C. 1990)). The court explained that it had previously rejected such an approach to determining pretext under Batson as it ‘fail[ed] to address the factors as a totality.’ Id. at 76 (quoting Porter, 391 S.E.2d at 152). Kandies argues that the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was unreasonable specifically because the State accepted prospective Caucasian jurors who expressed a hesitancy on the death penalty, but used the same factor as a basis for striking Randleman and Jinwright. Even if Kandies were correct that various Caucasian jurors accepted by the State expressed virtually identical views about the death penalty as Randleman and Jinwright, this does not a fortiori demonstrate that Randleman and Jinwright were similarly situated such that the State’s race-neutral reasons were necessarily pretextual. Indeed, Batson is not violated whenever two veniremen of different races provide the same responses and one is excused and the other is not. Matthews, 105 F.3d at 918. In Bell v. Ozmint, we held that a state court decision rejecting a Batson claim was not unreasonable where African-American and Caucasian jurors expressed similar views of the death penalty, but the State peremptorily struck only the African-American juror. The State offered two race-neutral reasons for its use of the peremptory challenge: the African-American juror’s feelings about the death penalty and the similarity in ages between [the juror’s] children and [the defendant]. 332 F.3d at 241. Because the Caucasian juror did not have children of the same approximate age, the court concluded that the jurors were not similarly situated, despite the apparent similarity of their views on the death penalty. See 56 KANDIES v. POLK id. at 242; see also Matthews, 105 F.3d at 918 (finding Caucasian jurors were not similarly situated to African-American juror who was struck because of his views on the death penalty and his criminal record where there was no evidence that any white juror seated had a criminal record.). Kandies’ argument fails to acknowledge that the prosecutor offered other reasons for striking these jurors even before mentioning that they were unsure about the death penalty. With respect to Randleman in particular, this argument utterly ignores the obvious and concrete distinction between her and the Caucasian jurors he claims were similarly hesitant about the death penalty. Randleman’s juror information form indicated that she had not been convicted of a crime when, in truth, the State’s record check listed convictions for writing bad checks and committing speeding violations. Unquestionably, a prospective juror’s criminal record alone, even if there was no failure to disclose, is race-neutral on its face. See Matthews, 105 F.3d at 917-18. Kandies has not shown that any of the prospective Caucasian jurors he believes held similar views on the death penalty had a criminal record or, if so, failed to disclose it. I see no clear and convincing evidence that the State struck Randleman based on race. Kandies counters that because the prosecutor did not introduce evidence of Randleman’s criminal history, the basis articulated by the State was not supported by the record and cannot serve as justification for a peremptory strike. This argument, in my view, bungles Batson’s analytical framework. It implies that the State, in coming forward with its race-neutral justification at the second stage of Batson, bears some evidentiary burden.4 That is not accurate. The State’s burden at that stage is merely to articulate a facially neutral reason for having 4 At least, this appears to me to be the thrust of his argument: It is . . . specious that the prosecutor relied on the purported criminal records of several prospective African-American jurors when nothing in the record supported these naked assertions. Nothing in the record supported this explanation, as the prosecutor did not introduce any evidence about these purported records. The State should not be permitted to justify its strikes with information not in the record, especially when a defendant does not have access to this information. Brief of Appellant at 30 (emphasis added). KANDIES v. POLK 57 exercised a peremptory strike. The prosecutor, in other words, simply must come up with a reason based on something other than the race of the juror. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. This is not a tall order, given that [t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68. As long as the State comes up with a reason — anything other than a mere denial of discriminatory intent — it has done all that is required at the second stage. See id. at 769. Whether the trial court believes the reason actually motivated the prosecutor is a question that must be answered at the third stage of the Batson analysis, and even then it is the opponent of the strike who shoulders the burden of proof. See id. at 768. Thus, the State’s reliance on Randleman’s criminal history was a perfectly appropriate race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, and it was Kandies, not the State, who was required to demonstrate otherwise. Kandies has not produced any clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court’s factual determination in this regard. With respect to Jinwright, who was purportedly struck because of her former day care employment and her feelings about the death penalty, Kandies again claims that the State did not strike similarly situated Caucasian jurors. The prosecutor was concerned about the link between a prospective juror’s employment and the Department of Social Services, explaining that defense counsel is aware of some of the problems in this case involving Social Services and if we get into that I certainly do not want a juror that was involved in a Day Care or Social Services type work. J.A. 168. Only two of the prospective Caucasian jurors had worked in a school-type setting with young children — alternate jurors Arlington and Spence. In both cases, however, there were obvious reasons for the State to accept the jurors. In Arlington’s case, her husband was a detective who had been on the job for 30 years. That this is an attractive factor for the prosecution — and one that makes her substantially dissimilar to Jinwright — is confirmed by the fact that Kandies challenged Arlington for cause and made clear that, had he not exhausted his allotment of peremptory strikes by that point in the trial, he would have excluded her. Spence testified that both her daughter and her parents were robbery victims, and that in both cases, the perpetrator was never found and brought to justice. She noted that she had been very angry about the crime against her daughter, but that she probably could be fair to both the 58 KANDIES v. POLK State and the defendant in a criminal case. J.A. 680. Again, Kandies’ argument that Spence and Jinwright are so similarly situated is undercut by the fact that he exercised a peremptory strike against Juror Spence. Kandies has not pointed to any clear and convincing evidence that would rebut the state court’s finding that the prosecution did not strike jurors Randleman and Jinwright with discriminatory intent. Juror Hines The next of Kandies’ Batson motions covered Juror Hines. Before exercising its peremptory challenge, the State moved to strike Juror Hines for cause after he indicated that he was the sole support for his family and the hardship imposed by jury service would impair his ability to serve. After the trial court refused to strike for cause, the State used a peremptory strike. Kandies again objected under Batson, arguing that, although Hines stated during voir dire that he held no strong feelings about the death penalty, he indicated he could consider either option in accordance with the court’s instructions. The prosecutor offered several reasons for excusing Hines: that Hines was worried about the loss of income that jury service would entail; that Hines claimed he ha[d] never thought about the death penalty before; that he failed to disclose on his juror questionnaire prior convictions for driving while impaired and driving without a valid license; and that during his voir dire testimony, he denied having a criminal history. J.A. 605.5 5 At trial, Kandies responded by renewing his motion that the State be required to share any information it gathered from any criminal record check performed by the prosecution. Kandies pursued this issue on direct appeal, arguing that the State was required to produce copies of all the criminal record checks for prospective jurors obtained by the prosecution. Kandies, 467 S.E.2d at 76. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that this information was not subject to disclosure under North Carolina law, and that Kandies had the burden of proof and had sufficient opportunity to produce evidence that the prospective jurors in question did not have criminal records. Id. at 77. KANDIES v. POLK 59 In rejecting this claim, the trial court noted two of the State’s bases for its peremptory challenges — Hines’ concern over missing work and his failure to disclose prior convictions — as well as the fact that two of the eight jurors that the State had accepted up to that point in the trial were African American. The trial court also noted that the State had accepted a third African-American juror, but Kandies used one of his own peremptory strikes to exclude that juror. On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. See Kandies, 467 S.E.2d at 76. Kandies now argues that the State did not strike two Caucasian jurors who were similarly situated to Hines because, like him, they expressed concerns about the impact of jury service on their employment. Again, this argument ignores the other race-neutral reasons articulated by the State. Kandies does not suggest that the Caucasian jurors who were concerned about their employment also had criminal records. Like juror Randleman, Hines is not similarly situated for purposes of a comparative juror analysis under Batson. See Ozmint, 332 F.3d at 241-42. Certainly, such evidence does not rise to the clear and convincing level required to rebut the presumption of correctness afforded the state court’s determination that the State had no discriminatory motive in striking Hines. Moreover, for the reasons already stated with respect to Randleman, the State’s failure to submit a copy of Hines’s record into evidence had no bearing on whether the State adequately discharged its obligation to articulate an explanation that was neutral on its face. Juror Oliver During the selection of alternate jurors, the State exercised a peremptory strike of Juror Oliver, who was African-American. The State responded to Kandies’ Batson motion by explaining that Oliver had difficulty hearing, as evidenced by her failure to follow the court’s instructions to refrain from watching television or radio broadcasts about the trial. The prosecutor’s primary concern was whether she would be able to hear and understand me as this case goes along. J.A. 969. Kandies countered that the State had accepted Caucasian jurors who had not followed the court’s preliminary instructions. The trial court rejected Kandies’ argument that the jurors were similarly situated, finding persuasive the State’s proffered reasons: 60 KANDIES v. POLK the juror’s apparent inability to hear the Court’s instructions . . . and the juror’s obvious inability to hear the questions of the District Attorney without requesting clarification on numerous occasions during the voir dire process. J.A. 970 (emphasis added). The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Kandies’ Batson claim to the extent it was based on Oliver, specifically mentioning the trial court’s own observation that Oliver was not able to respond to questions during voir dire without requesting clarification several times. See Kandies, 467 S.E.2d at 76. Kandies argues that the State accepted a number of Caucasian jurors who failed to strictly follow the instructions of the trial court, which regularly admonished prospective jurors during the voir dire process to avoid exposure to media accounts of the trial. In support of his argument, Kandies specifies three Caucasian jurors who indicated that they either read a newspaper account or listened to a television report about the trial after the jury selection process had begun. Kandies also claims that the prosecutor failed to thoroughly question all of the Caucasian jurors on their level of media exposure. Kandies’ argument, at best, misperceives the nature of the State’s concern, which was obviously Oliver’s hearing. Oliver’s numerous requests for the prosecutor to repeat his questions prompted the prosecutor to ask Oliver if she had difficulty hearing, to which she responded she did not hear very well and that everybody’s not talking loud enough. J.A. 967. The trial court’s conclusion that there was no discriminatory intent was also obviously based on Oliver’s inability to hear; the court mentioned her apparent failure to follow instructions as a manifestation of her hearing problem. See Kandies, 467 S.E.2d at 76. Kandies has not suggested that there were non-minority jurors who, like Oliver, could not hear or had difficulty following the proceedings but were accepted by the State nonetheless. In fact, the only other juror who apparently had hearing difficulty was Juror Massey, who was struck by the State because she had trouble understanding questions asked by the prosecutor during voir dire, continuously answered with difficulty, and because the prosecutor could not easily understand her responses. J.A. 131.6 Accordingly, 6 Kandies argues that the prosecutor’s belief that Massey could not easily understand the proceedings was a sham explanation for striking her KANDIES v. POLK 61 Kandies has not pointed to any jurors similarly situated to Oliver, except for race, who were treated differently by the State during its exercise of peremptory strikes. Thus, he has failed to come forward with clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court’s finding that there was no discriminatory intent. Jurors McClure and Rawlinson The prosecutor indicated that he struck Juror McClure because, among other things, a law enforcement officer present in the courtroom noticed him sleeping at least two times. Kandies did not refute this assertion at trial, nor does he point to anything now that would suggest this race-neutral reason was pretextual. With respect to Juror Rawlinson, the prosecutor noted that she did not express during voir dire a strong opinion with regard to the death penalty. The prosecutor also indicated that he asked employees of the local police department whether they had any knowledge of anyone on the jury panel from whom the jury would be selected, and learned that neither Rawlinson nor McClure were thought to be a good choice for a capital murder trial jury: [PROSECUTOR]: . . . . I discussed the jury panel with the High Point Police Department, and they indicated Mr. McClure and Mrs. Rawlinson would not be good jurors for this type of case. THE COURT: Do you want to elaborate on that, please? and was not supported by the record because Massey only asked the prosecutor to repeat one question, and the prosecutor never asked her to repeat any of her answers. Brief of Appellant at 29. This observation falls dramatically short of the clear and convincing evidence Kandies must produce to overcome the presumptive correctness of the state court’s factual determination that there was no discriminatory intent. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1). Here, in particular, we should be wary of substituting our judgment, based on the bare transcript, for that of the state trial court, who was present during the proceedings and observed this prospective juror first-hand. See Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 316 (4th Cir. 2000). 62 KANDIES v. POLK [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I asked most everybody and basically indicated anyone that they had any contact with prior to the trial. Primarily, the reason was that they were weak on the death penalty question. J.A. 167-68. Kandies did not object to the sufficiency of this particular reason offered by the State for using peremptory strikes against McClure or Rawlinson, nor did he request any further explanation from the State with respect to this basis. The trial court concluded that the bases offered by the prosecutor were valid and found that these prospective jurors were not struck by the State on the basis of race. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the reasons offered by the State were valid and that the trial court did not err in concluding that the exercise of peremptory challenges against McClure and Rawlinson was not motivated by impermissible racial discrimination. Kandies, 467 S.E.2d at 76. Because the prosecutor used their responses to questions about the death penalty as one of the bases for striking them, Kandies argues that McClure and Rawlinson also were subject to disparate treatment, as evidenced by the State’s acceptance of Caucasian jurors who were similarly situated because of weak or ambivalent views on capital punishment. With respect to McClure, Kandies has not pointed to anything in the record to suggest that there were Caucasian jurors that the State accepted even though they were nodding off in court or unable to pay attention. Once again, Kandies has simply ignored a race-neutral reason that clearly distinguishes the stricken juror from others accepted by the State. With respect to Rawlinson, there was no other prospective juror, except for McClure, who the State struck based on the juror’s prior contact with employees of the local police department and the employees’ impressions of the juror’s feelings about capital punishment. Again, this undercuts Kandies’ similarly situated argument. Kandies counters that the prosecutor’s purported reliance on the opinion of local police personnel, based on prior contact, that RawlinKANDIES v. POLK 63 son and McClure were weak on capital punishment was insufficient to provide a race-neutral basis for striking Rawlinson and McClure. Kandies argues that this explanation was little more than a hunch, and the very type of explanation that is inherently suspect. Brief of Appellant at 29 (emphasis added). Although this argument lacks precision, it appears clearly to be directed at step two of the Batson analysis, which is satisfied as long as the State does not offer a reason in which discriminatory intent is inherent. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). Indeed, Kandies argues that the basis articulated by the prosecutor was legally insufficient to survive a Batson challenge. Brief of Appellant at 29 (emphasis added). At step two, the trial court examines the prosecutor’s explanation to determine whether, as a matter of law, it is a valid race-neutral reason on its face. Id. at 359. Specifically, then, Kandies argues that reliance on feedback from the local police department cannot constitute a race-neutral basis because it is nothing more than an undefined feeling about a prospective juror. Brief of Appellant at 29. Cf. United States v. Horsley, 864 F.2d 1543, 1546 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (rejecting prosecutor’s explanation that he just [had] a feeling about him). But see United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1375 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (stating that a prosecutor’s intuition, standing alone, is a sufficient race-neutral reason for purposes of Batson). Batson instructs that the State must rebut a prima facie case by articulating a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted). Subsequent decisions clarified the limited nature of this requirement, which was imposed to prevent a prosecutor from satisfy[ing] his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769. Certainly, the explanation given by the prosecutor here is sufficient to satisfy Batson’s modest race-neutral requirement. It is specific and reasonably related to the case; it need not be persuasive, or even plausible. Id. at 768. On its face, the proffered explanation is based on something other than the race of the prospective jurors, which is all that is required. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. I note my concern, however, about this type of reason as it is virtually impossible for the defense 64 KANDIES v. POLK to effectively challenge. Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case, I cannot say that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Batson or its progeny.