Opinion ID: 195230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: how much is too much?

Text: 12 In review of GMD's challenge to the jury's damages award, our inquiry is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the verdict as excessive. McDonald v. Federal Laboratories, Inc., 724 F.2d 243, 246 (1st Cir.1984); see also Toucet v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 991 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir.1993); Joia v. Jo-Ja Service Corp., 817 F.2d 908, 918 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008, 108 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed.2d 654 (1988). We will find such an abuse of discretion only if the jury's verdict exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based on the evidence before the jury. Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting Segal v. Gilbert Color Systems, Inc., 746 F.2d 78, 81 (1st Cir.1984) (citation omitted)); see also Toucet, 991 F.2d at 11. As stated in the oft-quoted Dagnello opinion: We must give the benefit of every doubt to the judgment of the trial judge; but surely there must be an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a question of fact with respect to which reasonable men may differ, but a question of law. Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d Cir.1961). See, e.g., Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 159, 89 S.Ct. 331, 333, 21 L.Ed.2d 309 (1968); Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 734 (1st Cir.1986); McDonald, 724 F.2d at 246 n. 2. Our determination of excessiveness must be based upon the evidence of damages viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Toucet, 991 F.2d at 11; Joia, 817 F.2d at 918; McDonald, 724 F.2d at 246. 13 We have frequently characterized the type of verdict that an appellate court may vacate for excessiveness as one that is grossly excessive, inordinate, shocking to the conscience or so high that it would be a denial of justice to permit it to stand. See, e.g., Toucet, 991 F.2d at 11; Doty v. Sewall, 908 F.2d 1053, 1062 (1st Cir.1990); McDonald, 724 F.2d at 246 (citing Grunenthal, 393 U.S. at 159, 89 S.Ct. at 333). All of these descriptions apply to the amount awarded in the present case. The only damages incurred by Anthony that the evidence can support are $1,335 in medical expenses, $3,000 in lost earnings for one missed week of flying, 4 and the amount attributable to Anthony's pain and suffering from a condition that requires him to take aspirin, wear special stockings, and to elevate his leg several times a day. No reasonable valuation of these damages could conceivably add up to $571,100 without shocking the conscience. 14 Anthony maintains that the damage award properly included amounts for lost wages from the period when he stopped flying in April of 1992 up until the trial and amounts for lost earning capacity due to his inability to work in the future. The record, however, does not support damages for past or future wages (except for the week immediately following the accident), because there is insufficient evidence to show that Anthony cannot work because of the injury to his leg. Although Anthony testified that the injury prevented and continues to prevent him from flying, his own evidence overwhelmingly contradicts this assertion. 15 In the first place, Anthony never testified that his leg injury physically impedes his ability to perform his job as a pilot. 5 Likewise, Anthony's expert, doctor Perez, never described any specific functional limitations that might prevent Anthony from performing tasks required of a pilot. In fact, Anthony flew for five months after the accident until the company he worked for ceased operations. The only reason Anthony gave for not being able to fly is that the FAA would not certify him. The FAA, however, never expressed any concern about Anthony's leg, despite the fact that doctor Perraud's medical report put the FAA on notice of the injury. The FAA only expressed concerns relating to Anthony's high blood pressure, a condition unrelated to the accident. Therefore, if there is any reason to believe that Anthony could not obtain an FAA health certification--and the record does not even establish that the FAA would, in fact, deny such a certification were Anthony to apply for one--it would be because of Anthony's hypertension and not because of the injury caused by GMD. Furthermore, Anthony presented no evidence regarding wage rates and projected working hours from which a jury could estimate lost future earnings. We consequently see no basis for awarding Anthony damages for lost earnings or lost capacity to earn in the future. See Quinones-Pacheco v. American Airlines, Inc., 979 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.1992) (To claim loss of earning capacity, a plaintiff must offer evidence from which a jury may reasonably determine the annualized stream of income that the plaintiff, uninjured, would probably have earned, and contrast it, over the period of proven disability, to a similar forecast of what the injured plaintiff's earnings are likely to be.); Parra v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 787 F.2d 507, 509 (10th Cir.1986) ([E]xpert medical testimony is necessary to establish that a loss of future earnings capacity was caused by such a non-obvious injury.). 16 Out of the $571,100 verdict, Anthony only established, according to the most generous interpretation of the evidence, $1,335 in medical expenses and $3,000 for one lost week of work. That leaves Anthony with a whopping $566,765 in damages for pain and suffering. Although it is admittedly difficult to place a value on the pain and suffering of another individual, see Milone, 847 F.2d at 37 (citing Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 215 (1st Cir.1987)); McDonald, 724 F.2d at 247, such amounts are not immune from appellate review. Williams v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 817 F.2d 1030, 1038-41 (3d Cir.1987); Rivera v. Rederi A/B Nordstjernan, 456 F.2d 970, 975 n. 8. (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876, 93 S.Ct. 124, 34 L.Ed.2d 128 (1972). In this case, an award of $566,765 for Anthony's pain and suffering is so grossly disproportionate to his injury as to be unconscionable. Marchant v. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co., 836 F.2d 695, 704 (1st Cir.1988); see also Laaperi, 787 F.2d at 735-36; Bonn v. Puerto Rico Int'l Airlines, Inc., 518 F.2d 89, 94 (1st Cir.1975). 17 Anthony suffers from pain in his left leg and the inconvenience of having to lie down several times a day to elevate the leg. According to doctor Perez, Anthony has a 20% whole body disability and cannot stand or sit for prolonged periods of time. There is no evidence, however, that Anthony's injury has rendered him unable to perform any particular functions or engage in any particular activities; nor is there evidence that the injury has otherwise interfered with his professional, recreational, or personal life. 18 The injury to Anthony's leg is not particularly severe. Most notably, it required no major medical treatment. Aside from the initial administration of first aid and the subsequent referral by doctor Perraud, Anthony's entire medical treatment consisted of one visit to a doctor who prescribed elastic stockings and rest. Secondly, Anthony's pain is not so severe as to require anything more powerful than aspirin or Tylenol. Furthermore, there is no testimony or other evidence that Anthony's current condition is permanent. Although it would not be unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Anthony's pain and need to lie down will persist for some time in the future, Anthony's expert never stated or even implied that the condition in Anthony's left leg was permanent. On the contrary, doctor Perez described Anthony's treatment as a long, tedious process (emphasis added), implying that the treatment would lead to an improvement in Anthony's condition over time. 19 Anthony maintains that GMD's own expert testified that Anthony's varicose veins were incurable. Quite the opposite is true. The expert stated that Anthony's condition could be cured but that the varicose veins would return after treatment because, in the expert's opinion, the condition was caused by disease and not by trauma from the accident. While a reasonable jury could conclude that Anthony's postphlebitic syndrome and accompanying varicose veins may persist, there is nothing in the record to support a finding that Anthony will experience pain and be forced to lie down several times a day for the rest of his life. 20 We conclude, therefore, that the nature of Anthony's injury cannot justify a pain and suffering award that is over one hundred times larger than the $1,335 in out of pocket expenses and $3,000 in lost wages that Anthony incurred. See Betancourt v. J.C. Penney Co., 554 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1st Cir.1977) (The award for pain, suffering and such other intangibles as are permitted under Puerto Rican law would be roughly one hundred times the amount of past and future medical bills. We think such an award simply makes no sense. We cannot, in conscience, allow it to stand.). In sum, the minimal severity of Anthony's injury and the lack of evidence concerning any functional limitations--combined with the fact that Anthony went back to work one week after the accident, continued working until his employer ceased operating, and incurred only $1,335 in medical expenses--convinces us that $571,100 in total damages is excessive as a matter of law. See, e.g., Marchant, 836 F.2d at 703-04 (finding $600,000 excessive for wrist injury that would require daily heating and soaking and future physical therapy but did not detrimentally affect employment prospects); Betancourt, 554 F.2d at 1209-10 (finding $60,000 excessive for shoulder injury that would continue to cause pain but would not prevent plaintiff from working); Gautreaux v. Insurance Co. of North America, 811 F.2d 908, 913-16 (5th Cir.1987) (finding $483,000 excessive for knee injury that left plaintiff with a functional disability but did not prevent him from engaging in certain types of employment). Accordingly, we set aside the award.