Opinion ID: 1901361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: ¶ 29. We find that only the Products Liability Act's procedural provisions were applicable to the case sub judice, according to the express terms of the Act. The controlling law applies a risk-utility analysis, not consumer expectation, for determining whether a product, alleged to be defective in design, is unreasonably dangerous. As such, it was reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury to apply the consumer expectations test in Instruction D-2. Due to the fact that the jury was not properly instructed, the circuit court's judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion. ¶ 30. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PITTMAN, C.J., McRAE, P.J., EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, COBB AND CARLSON, JJ. SMITH, P.J., Dissenting: ¶ 31. The basic issue in this case is what law applies, and whether the jury instructions were appropriate based on the answer to that question. It is my opinion that the majority errs in reversing this case, and I respectfully dissent. ¶ 32. This case arises from a singlevehicle accident. The decedent's beneficiaries brought suit against Mack Trucks, Inc. claiming that the brake system was faulty. This suit was filed in March of 1993. At that time, the law in Mississippi regarding products liability arguably utilized a consumer expectations test. The majority asserts that Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248 (Miss.1993), acknowledged Fifth Circuit cases that had stated such, but noted recent cases by the Court that had adopted the risk utility test. The majority today, and the majority in Prestage, are incorrect in this statement of the law. Prestage asserts that it was merely clarifying its earlier adoption of the risk utility test. Id. at 253. It states that two earlier cases, Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So.2d 1341 (Miss. 1988), and Hall v. Mississippi Chemical Exp., Inc., 528 So.2d 796 (Miss.1988), clearly adopted the risk utility test. However, this was not so clear, as Kussman v. V & G Welding Supply, Inc., 585 So.2d 700 (Miss.1991), followed those cases and clearly utilized the consumer expectations test. Thus, the consumer expectations test was the law at the time the case sub judice was filed. ¶ 33. Following Prestage, which was decided on March 25, 1993, the law in Mississippi unarguably accepted the risk utility test. Shortly thereafter, the Mississippi Legislature passed the Products Liability Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 2001) codifying strict liability law. Procedural provisions of the Act became effective for all cases pending on July 1, 1993, but the substantive provisions were not effective until July 1, 1994. The Act enacted into law a somewhat hodgepodge mixture of the consumer expectations and risk utility tests. ¶ 34. On July 1, 1994, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which changed their theory of the case claiming a design defect in the placement of the fuel tanks. Mississippi law is clear that an amended complaint relates back to the original date of the filing, thus the Act's substantive provisions should not apply. I agree with the majority that the correct law would be the risk utility test. However, I do not agree that the jury instructions given below result in reversible error. I do not believe the two given instructions are in conflict. Further, the overwhelming weight of the evidence is in favor of the verdict returned by the jury. ¶ 35. There is no reversible error in instructing the jury if all the jury instructions when read together, and taken as a whole, correctly state the law, are not misleading, and adequately cover the issues supported by the evidence. Lovett v. Bradford, 676 So.2d 893, 896-97 (Miss. 1996); O'Flynn v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas, 759 So.2d 526, 533 (Miss.Ct.App.2000). In this case, Instruction D-2 does not amount to an incorrect statement of the law. While it is true that Instruction D-2 is based on the Products Liability Act, as noted above it has been generally recognized that the Act is a mixture of the two standards. The instruction at issue here predominately sets forth a risk utility standard. There is some language that contemplates foreseeability within the instruction, however, I do not believe this language is completely opposed to the law as it stood prior to adoption of the Act. As this Court has noted  Prestage [did] not reject the consumer expectations test where no consumer could expect to be protected by an additional safety device that he obviously knew was not there. Cooper v. General Motors Corp., 702 So.2d 428, 443 (Miss.1997). ¶ 36. The given instruction was not error. Further, even if it was error, it does not rise to the level of reversible error. As I disagree with the majority's opinion that the given instruction was an incorrect statement of law, I dissent. WALLER, COBB AND CARLSON, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION.