Opinion ID: 853303
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invasion of Privacy and Corporations

Text: Felsher first argues that the trial court erred because the University is not entitled to an invasion of privacy claim. [4] (Appellant's Br. at 13.) Felsher asserts that the right to privacy has an intensely personal nature and therefore applies to real persons and not to corporations. ( Id. at 16.) Representatives of several news organizations, as amici curiae, support Felsher's petition to transfer stating, [W]ell established privacy law ... precludes corporations from bringing an action for invasion of privacy. (Amici Curiae Br. at 3.) [5] Amici accurately assert that no other state has recognized a claim for invasion of privacy by a corporation. ( Id. at 2.) The issue of whether a corporate entity is entitled to an invasion of privacy claim is one of first impression in Indiana. We begin our analysis by acknowledging the position taken in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652A(1) (1977): One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the interests of the other. This Court has previously observed that the term invasion of privacy is a label used to describe four distinct injuries: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of [name or] likeness, (3) public disclosure of private facts, and (4) false-light publicity. Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind.1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652A (1977)). In Doe, we examined the genesis of the privacy tort, apparently originating in an 1890 law review article written by Samuel Warren and future U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Id. Professor William Prosser later characterized the authors as heralding the emergence of a new, if ill-defined, right to privacy signaled by several decisions granting relief on the basis of defamation or invasion of some property right, or a breach of confidence or an implied contract. Id. (quoting William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 384 (1960)). In Doe, we also noted the Second Restatement's view that the four injuries involved in the privacy tort are only tenuously related. Doe, 690 N.E.2d at 684. We explained that the four wrongs were separate and united only in their common focus on some abstract notion of being left alone. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652A cmt. b (1977)). We indicated that recognizing one branch of the privacy tort does not entail recognizing all four. Id. at 685. Our discussion of this history and the Second Restatement served as a prelude to our decision not to recognize a branch of the tort involving the public disclosure of private facts. Id. at 682, 693. The only injury at issue here is appropriation. [6] The University argues that it may maintain an action for appropriation because the claim addresses a property interest rather than personal feelings. (Appellees' Br. at 8 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C cmt. a (1977) (right created by [appropriation rule] is in the nature of a property right....)).) The University also relies on Restatement § 652I, which says, Except for the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded. (Appellees' Br. at 8.) While we agree that an appropriation claim involves a privacy issue in the nature of a property right, we think the University's reliance on the exception set forth in the Restatement is misplaced. Each of the comments to Restatement § 652I negates the inference that a corporation is entitled to an appropriation claim. The first comment states that the privacy right is personal. The comment then states a rule : The cause of action is not assignable, and it cannot be maintained by other persons.... Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652I cmt. a (1977). The appropriation exception that follows addresses this rule, not the personal character of the right. The second comment discusses the general requirement that the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the individual whose privacy is invaded. Id., cmt. b. This comment states an exception for appropriation actions due to its similar[ity] to [an] impairment of a property right.... The exception is clarified as a recognition of survival rights in an appropriation action. Finally, the third comment declares, without exception, A corporation, partnership or unincorporated association has no personal right of privacy. Id., cmt. c. The comment then states that a corporation has no cause of action for any of the four forms of invasion covered by §§ 652B to 652E. Id. The following sentence in the comment indicates that although these sections (including § 652C) do not entitle a corporation claim, a corporation has a limited right to the exclusive use of its own name or identity in so far as they are of use or benefit, and it receives protection from the law of unfair competition. Id. This comment suggests the existence of an analogous right that corporations may be afforded by the law of unfair competition. [7] See id. ([T]his may afford it the same rights and remedies as those to which a private individual is entitled under the rule stated in § 652C.). Therefore, we think these Restatement sections do not support the position that a corporation may bring an appropriation claim resting on notions of privacy. Our assessment of the Second Restatement is consistent with an overwhelming majority of other states that have addressed the issue of corporate actions for invasion of privacy. Among the most recent of these is Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 691 N.E.2d 545 (1998). The Supreme Judicial Court noted that it had not previously been presented with the issue of whether a corporation has a corporate right to privacy entitled to the protection of [Massachusetts privacy right law]. [8] Id. at 548. The court held that because [a] corporation is not an `individual' with traits of a `highly personal or intimate nature,' its privacy law did not extend protection to the corporation. Id. Justice Margaret Marshall [9] noted that other jurisdictions have unanimously den[ied] a right of privacy to corporations. Id. (citations omitted). See also N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 197 N.J.Super. 249, 484 A.2d 729, 730-31 (1984) (corporation is incapable of the emotional suffering the privacy tort addresses: humiliation and intimate personal distress); L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 1425, 1430 (D.Conn.1986) (The law of privacy is [ ] concerned with the reputational interests of individuals rather than the less substantial reputational interests of corporations.); Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 168 Cal.Rptr. 361, 366 (1980) (A corporation is a fictitious person and has no `feelings' which may be injured in the sense of the tort.). [10] Although the Second Restatement suggests that unique circumstances may give rise to the expansion of the four forms of tort liability for invasion of privacy, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652A cmt. c (1977), we decline to do so today. Instead, we explore the nature of relevant Internet activities and look to business law for protection against the misappropriation of a corporation's name.