Opinion ID: 1166357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court Must State Its Reasons for Granting a Motion to Dismiss.

Text: Contrary to what the reader might infer from the majority opinion, the district court in this case gave no reasons for granting the dismissal requested by the prosecuting attorney. Absolutely none. The court's ruling is entered on the prosecutor's motion to dismiss and reads simply: It is so ordered. The minutes of the court, if any were kept of this ex parte request, have not been included in the record the State has brought to us on appeal. The State argues that reasons need not be stated in the court minutes because the prosecutor was here proceeding under I.C.R. 48 which requires that the district court's reasons be stated only when a dismissal is granted over the prosecutor's objection. [8] In its brief before this Court, the State, in effect, argues that the passage of I.C.R. 48 has repealed the provisions of I.C. § 19-3504: Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Idaho statutes provided that a felony complaint might be dismissed either by the court or by the prosecuting attorney. There was a requirement that the reasons for dismissal be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. Idaho Code, § 19-3504. Rule 48, which covers the same subject matter, provides that the prosecuting attorney may, with leave of the court, file a dismissal of a complaint, indictment or information. Rule 48 does not require a statement of reasons in the order of dismissal unless the court dismisses an action on its own motion over objection of the prosecuting attorney, in which case the court is required to spread upon the record its findings and reasons for dismissal. Rule 48(c). The effect of this change is to eliminate the requirement of a formal statement of reasons if the prosecuting attorney files a motion to dismiss. I am much saddened by the State's argument on this point and its apparent acceptance by the majority  who quote approvingly from I.C.R. 48 and hold I.C. § 19-3504 for naught. It is standard appellate practice in Idaho to interpret two statutes or a statute and a rule so as to save both, if that is at all possible. State v. Jennings, 95 Idaho 724, 726, 518 P.2d 1186 (1974). In the present case, where the rule addresses itself to one situation (dismissals over the objection of the prosecutor) and is silent about another (dismissals over the objection of the defendant), and where the statute is explicit on both, I see no reason for choosing between the two. The rule and the statute can be harmonized with no difficulty by giving effect to the clear requirements of both. But the State's argument strikes more deeply and implies that the passage of I.C.R. 48 has somehow repealed I.C. § 19-3504. The State, in effect, is advocating the supremacy of a recent court rule of procedure over a substantive statutory provision which has been the law in this jurisdiction for well over 100 years. I am unable to ascertain how or by what authority a procedural rule could purport to change statutory substantive law  or, indeed, why a rule should be promulgated which is at best a poorly drafted repetition of the substantive law in this area. What is clear, however, is that the provisions of I.C. § 19-3504 are substantive and not merely procedural. In an area such as this, as Justice Bakes noted recently in State v. Creech, Idaho, Case No. 12224, October 20, 1977, one must not confuse the procedure by which the Idaho courts conduct their business with the substantive law which governs the case. An order dismissing a criminal action which does not state the reasons presents a very obvious violation of I.C. § 19-3504 which states: The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action or indictment to be dismissed. The reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.  (Emphasis added.) Although this Court has never construed the precise language of this statute, the California Supreme Court has just recently, en banc and unanimously, stated its view of the identical provision: Secondly, we note that the dismissal of counts I and II is manifestly invalid under section 1385 because of the court's failure to comply with the following provision of the statute: `The reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.' (Italics added; see fn. 6, ante. ) It is settled law that this provision is mandatory and not merely directory. Recently in People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1968), 69 Cal.2d 491, 502-503, 72 Cal. Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138, while recognizing the broad right of a trial judge to dismiss in furtherance of justice, we adverted to the requirement that he `must state his reasons in the minutes' and took pains to point out that `[i]f the reasons are not set forth in the minutes, the order dismissing may not be considered a dismissal under section 1385.' [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) People v. Orin, 120 Cal. Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193, 198 (1975). [9] Thus, it has been said: `The statement of reasons is not merely directory, and neither trial nor appellate courts have authority to disregard the requirement. It is not enough that on review the reporter's transcript may show the trial court's motivation; the minutes must reflect the reason so that all may know why this great power was exercised.' [Citation omitted.] The underlying purpose of this statutory requirement is `to protect the public interest against improper or corrupt [fn. omitted] dismissals' and to impose a purposeful restraint upon the exercise of judicial power `Lest magistral discretion sweep away the government of laws.' [Citations omitted.] Ibid., 533 P.2d at 197-98. The Utah Supreme Court, interpreting statutory language identical to that of Idaho, has given the policy reasons for insisting that a district court state its reasons for granting a dismissal: Because of the nature of criminal proceedings, and because they are in the interests of and for the protection of the public there is a sound basis in public policy for requiring the judge who assumes the serious responsibility of dismissing a case to set forth his reasons for doing so in order that all may know what invokes the court's discretion and whether its action is justified. We conclude that the court erred in dismissing the seven cases in question. We therefore comply with the request in his memorandum submitted to this court: `If I am wrong, kindly reverse me.' In conformity with this request, the order of dismissal is therefore `kindly' reversed. Salt Lake City v. Hanson, supra, 425 P.2d at 775. And see, the many cases cited therein to the same effect. Unless there is some reason, and I see none, why we should not follow the decision of our neighboring states' highest courts in construing statutes identical to ours, the district judge's failure to state his reasons in the court's minutes renders his dismissal order in this case invalid.