Opinion ID: 2052464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the action.

Text: Marsdens next claim that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Robert and Herma Marsden from the action. Marsdens claim that Robert and Herma were not owners of the property under SDCL ch. 43-23 [3] due to their conveyance of the property to their children in December 1983, approximately one month after the dispute with Jensens arose. The record indicates that after Robert and Herma had conveyed the property, they continued to hold it under an oral lease from their children, who own the land as M & K Partnership. The record also evidences that Robert and Herma, after conveying the land to the children, executed as lessors a farm and ranch lease-purchase agreement respecting part of the subject property. [4] This court has previously held that the term owner may include one not holding the legal title to property. See Lien v. Rowe, 77 S.D. 422, 92 N.W.2d 922 (1958); see also Lord v. Black Hills Mining Corp., 68 S.D. 79, 298 N.W. 677 (1941). Other jurisdictions have held that the term is applicable to one who holds less than a full fee title in the subject property. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 189 Cal.Rptr. 276, 139 Cal.App.3d 917 (1983); Mason v. Rosewell, 107 Ill.App.3d 943, 63 Ill.Dec. 722, 438 N.E.2d 653 (1982); Siemer v. Schuermann Bldg. & Realty Co., 381 S.W.2d 821 (Mo.1964). Under our statutory scheme, the purpose of a statute is to be gathered from the whole act, and in determining the purpose one may resort to not only the statute itself, but also to the structure and scheme of the statute and to its historical background and legislative history. See State v. Douglas, 70 S.D. 203, 16 N.W.2d 489 (1944). Given the import and purposes of SDCL ch. 43-23, we will not accept a narrow, technical definition of the word owner in this case because Robert and Herma Marsden, although they claim to be former owners, still exercise some degree of dominion and control over the property. Their control is evidenced, among other things, by their execution of the lease-purchase agreement. In reality, they are the actual owners or beneficial or equitable owners. Bowers v. Viereck, 117 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ohio Com.Pl.1953). They certainly are not mere lessees. Thus, the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss Robert and Herma Marsden from the action. Marsdens further claim that the trial court erred in refusing to grant their motion to dismiss because Jensens failed to give notice of their intent to erect a legal fence to the title owners of the property, M & K Partnership. This issue has been rendered moot by our holding earlier herein. It has been asserted that to serve ... such delinquent owner a notice in writing, as is required in SDCL 43-23-5, [5] requires something more than mailing a letter. Clearly, the statutory scheme provided by SDCL ch. 43-23 is designed to provide an uncomplicated procedure so that a landowner may give his neighbor a meaningful opportunity to assist with the construction or repair of a boundary fence. Additionally, the statutes give the adjoining landowner a specific time within which to either erect or repair his share of the fence or to contribute to his neighbor who undertakes the work after appropriate notice. From reading the statutes as a whole, we do not believe that the legislature contemplated that a dissatisfied landowner must seek out a lawyer to commence some type of legal remedy initiated by a sheriff's service, rather than writing an appropriate letter himself. We might observe that in many, if not most cases, such a requirement would be counter-productive to amicable and neighborly relations. We believe that the notice provided here is sufficient and that it adequately fulfills the purpose of the statute. Mosher v. Schumm, 114 Colo. 441, 166 P.2d 559 (1946); Kruse v. Vail, 238 Iowa 1277, 30 N.W.2d 159 (1947); Hughes v. Brignac, 72 So.2d 22 (La.App.1954). It put Marsdens on notice that Jensens desired that they erect their share of the fence. Further, we point out by way of example, that under SDCL 15-6-5(a) and (b), service of a notice or demand may be made in various ways, including by mail. We believe that such notice is satisfactory for the purposes of SDCL 43-23-5.