Opinion ID: 784041
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Racism Pervading the Charging Decision

Text: 146 Smith, who is African-American, argues that the ad hoc policies adopted by the Hamilton County Prosecutor's Office reflect a racial bias in charging and prosecuting capital offenses. According to Smith, based upon the 1980 census data prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Census, the population of Hamilton County was nineteen percent African-American in 1980. Further, since Ohio's current death penalty law became effective on October 29, 1981, roughly 62% of the death sentences in Hamilton County have been imposed upon African-Americans even though they consist of only 20% of the county's population. Smith contends that because the administration of capital punishment in Ohio is infected with racism, Ohio's administration of capital punishment, as applied to him, violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 147 The thrust of Smith's argument is that the death penalty is disproportionately applied to blacks, an argument we rejected in McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1333 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the evidence offered by McQueen amounts to the same kind of statistical studies that the Supreme Court found insufficient in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987)). Moreover, in Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 441-42 (6th Cir.2001), we rejected a challenge to Ohio's capital sentencing based on statistics similar to those Smith presents. In Coleman, the petitioner relied on a study finding a discrepancy between the Ohio representation in the Ohio population generally (9%), and on death row (49%). We held that [a]lthough the racial imbalance in the State of Ohio's capital sentencing system is glaringly extreme, it is no more so than the statistical disparities considered and rejected by the Supreme Court in McCleskey as insufficient to `demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the ... capital sentencing process.' Coleman, 268 F.3d at 441-42 (quoting McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 313, 107 S.Ct. 1756). 148 Smith also argues prosecutorial intent. [T]o prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, [a defendant] must prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756. The district court permitted discovery on this issue, In his deposition, the former Hamilton County Prosecutor, Judge Ney, stated that he met with supervisors in making the capital indictments and that the voting group consisted of six to eight persons. However, his former-first assistant indicated in a sworn statement that only Ney and himself would make the decision. Smith also points out that the Hamilton County Prosecutor's office has no written policies or procedures regarding the indictment of death cases. Regarding Smith's case in particular, they had no independent recollection of the defendant, the facts or anything surrounding this case. Ney also stated that no records would be kept of the decision to indict. Thus, according to Smith, Ney could not provide a race-neutral explanation. 149 Smith's claim must fail. Ney was not obliged to provide a race—neutral explanation. Further, his inability to provide an explanation supports the logic in McCleskey that [r]equiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Smith has not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of unconstitutional conduct in his case. See id. at n. 18, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Indeed, the only evidence he provides is Ney's inability to remember his case at all. This is not evidence of discriminatory intent.