Opinion ID: 1969101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Amount, if any, Due Under the Policy.

Text: In this phase of its appeal, London disclaims any liability for the $10,000 judgment because of certain exclusionary language found in the Other Insurance section of its uninsured motorists endorsement. If, however, we refuse to recognize this exclusion, defendant claims that the most it owes its insured is $5,000. The Other Insurance section contains two clauses. One is called an excess-escape clause while the other is referred to as a pro-rata clause. The excess-escape clause provides that if plaintiff is injured while occupying a vehicle not owned by her, the insurance provided in her policy shall apply only as excess insurance over other similar insurance available to her and then    only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance. The pro-rata clause states that where plaintiff has other similar insurance available to her, her    damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance    and her insurer is liable only for its pro-rata share thereof. The insurer's share is then defined as being the ratio between the limits of liability and the total limits of liability of all other available insurance. Since plaintiff was injured while a passenger in Alice's car, London seeks to eliminate its liability by invoking its excess-escape clause. It points to American's $10,000 uninsured motorists coverage and then maintains that its liability to plaintiff has, because of the excess-escape language, been reduced to zero. We do not agree. The efficacy of London's position must be determined by an examination of the scope and purpose of § 27-7-2.1. The pertinent language of that statute reads that no automobile liability policy shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemented thereto for the protection of persons insured thereunder    who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles   . The limits of such coverage are established by a reference to provisions of § 31-31-7. Section 27-7-2.1 gives an insured the right to reject the uninsured motorists endorsement. A survey of cases in which an insured's damages equal or exceed the multiple coverage afforded him by various insurance contracts with uninsured motorists protection shows that there is a difference of opinion as to whether the Other Insurance section (be it an excess-escape clause or a pro-rata clause) is to be recognized and upheld. Some jurisdictions have given effect to such clauses [5] and others have declined to give them validity. [6] Our statute requires the insurance industry to make uninsured motorists coverage available in this state. It speaks of a policy and protection for those insured thereunder who are legally entitled to collect damages from the uninsured. The Legislature fixes a minimum, rather than a maximum, standard of protection. There is no ceiling upon the insured's right of recovery. We think it plain, as did the court in Patton, n. 6, that state legislatures were aware, as they enacted uninsured motorists legislation, that the insureds are often injured while in an automobile owned by someone other than them. Had our General Assembly intended to limit the recovery of an injured insured to one policy, even though such a person is covered by more than one policy, the Legislature would have so expressed itself. It is our belief that § 27-7-2.1 is intended to protect an insured against his actual loss. Since the statute explicitly states without any equivocation whatever that each policy issued must supply the required minimum degree of protection, we cannot afford any recognition to the excess-escape clause of the subject policy. If we would do otherwise, we would subvert the purpose of the statute. We, therefore, affirm the trial justice's refusal to enforce the excess-escape clause of London's policy. Earlier, in Aldcroft v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408, we refused to recognize a Limits of Liability clause which provided for a reduction in the damages payable under the uninsured motorists endorsement by the amount of workmen's compensation or such other similar disability benefits paid the insured. We said in Aldcroft that there is nothing in § 27-7-2.1 which authorizes the issuance of a policy providing for protection in any lesser amount than that mandated by the statute. What was said in Aldcroft applies with equal force in the instant case. In joining those jurisdictions which have, in cases similar to this present appeal, declined to give effect to the Other Insurance provisions, we emphasize that our statute allows recovery of the full amount of the coverage so long as the amount of the recovery does not exceed the amount of the insured's actual loss. As the court said in Harleysville, supra, 429 Pa. 389 at 395, 241 A.2d 112 at 115, We do not wish to imply that injured parties may be permitted to pyramid separate coverages so as to recover more than the actual loss. We believe that there is merit to the insurer's argument that its liability is limited to $5,000. The minimum limits of uninsured motorists protection are fixed by certain provisions of chap. 31, title 31, already referred to earlier as the Financial Responsibility Act. The Act provides that, except in certain specific instances, any owner or operator of a motor vehicle involved in an accident must render a report concerning the accident to the Registry of Motor Vehicles. The Registry can require the owner or operator to deposit with it so much security as in the Registry's opinion will satisfy any judgment for damages resulting from the accident. Section 31-31-7 establishes the amount of an automobile liability policy which will exempt a driver from the security deposit requirements of the Act. In 1964, when plaintiff purchased her uninsured motorists coverage, § 31-31-7 called for a $5,000/10,000 liability policy. On May 5, 1964, P.L. 1964, chap. 171, was enacted. This Act doubled the minimum limits of the policy called for by § 31-31-7 from $5,000/10,000 to $10,000/20,000. The Act stated that it was to take effect January 1, 1965. The insurer now contends that since its policy was delivered in 1964, it is responsible only for the statutory minimum in effect at that time. We agree. While the uninsured status of an automobile is to be determined by the policy limits effective on the day of the mishap, the extent of London's liability is established by looking at the date of the delivery of its policy to plaintiff. This is because of the plain direct language of § 27-7-2.1. As noted before, the Legislature has declared that no automobile liability insurance policy shall be delivered or issued unless the protection described in § 31-31-7 is given the insured. The critical time is the date of the delivery or issuance of London's policy. At the time London delivered its policy to plaintiff, it was bound to provide her with up to $5,000 worth of protection. Accordingly, the trial justice erred when he found London liable in the amount of $10,000.