Opinion ID: 1684767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Representation of Other Clients

Text: Paragraphs 1 and 3 allege that, between 1994 and 1999, Dill represented certain clients in Alabama, in addition to those involved in this dispute. Evidence regarding that representation comes exclusively from the affidavit of John Hutchings. That affidavit states, in pertinent part: 11. Neither [Dill] nor any of its shareholders regularly does business in the State of Alabama. After a diligent personal review, the affiant is informed and believes and upon such information and belief states, that the only business conducted in the State of Alabama by any shareholder of [Dill] occurred during approximately the 1994 through 1999 time period when the affiant represented a group of related corporations controlled by a foreign national (who was residing in Alabama during that period) with respect to certain general business and international law issues. That representation did not involve or pertain to Alabama law. The affiant's representation of that individual was primarily performed through the use of the telephone, facsimile and U.S. mail systems. In fact, the affiant only made one trip to Alabama as part of that representationa trip which occurred in or around 1995. Moreover, the affiant, based upon his information and belief, further states that he has been in the State of Alabama only two other times for clients other than the one described above. These visits each lasted less than one day with the first visit occurring in the mid 1980's and the second visit occurring sometime between 1996 and 1998. Neither the affiant's representation of the foreign national, nor the two other trips he made to the State of Alabama, relate in any way to the allegations set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint in the above-styled action. .... 13. After a diligent personal review, the affiant is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief states, that neither [Dill] nor any of its shareholders have ever represented any individual residing in (or entity domiciled or organized under the laws of) the State of Alabama, other than as described in Paragraph 11 above. That representation, which did not relate to Alabama law and which has no relation to the facts set forth in the plaintiffs' Complaint in the above-styled action, began sometime in approximately 1994 and ended sometime in approximately 1999. Recently, [Dill] has been requested to provide limited representation to one of the foreign corporations of the group of related corporations referred to in Paragraph 11 above. [Dill] has agreed to provide such representation. .... 15. Neither [Dill] nor any of its shareholders derive or has derived any substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in the State of Alabama, other than the revenues earned from the representation described in Paragraph 11, above. Notably, the revenue earned from that single representation was not substantial in relation to the overall revenues of [Dill] during that same time period. (Emphasis added.) The affidavit is more instructive for what it omits than for what it reveals. Although it concedes representation of clients having some connection with Alabama over a period of years, both before and after the events giving rise to this action, it contains no specific information as to the nature of the contacts associated with that representation. For example, the clients not only are anonymous, but are not sufficiently described to determine their state, or states, of residency. Apparently, the corporations Dill represented were not organized under the laws of Alabama. Paragraph 13 of the affidavit specifically states that one of the clients was one of the foreign corporations of the group of related corporations [controlled by a foreign national who was residing in Alabama during that period]. Both paragraphs state that the representation did not involve Alabama law. Moreover, the affidavit is ambiguous as to which of those persons or entities was actually Hutchings's client. Hutchings once says that he represented a group of related corporations controlled by a foreign national. Elsewhere, he says that he represented the foreign national. The distinction is not one of mere semantics for purposes of a minimum-contacts analysis. If Dill's clients were, in fact, foreign corporations, the one trip Hutchings made to Alabama may have been the only contact with this state relatedeven tangentiallyto his representation. The distinction is important for purposes of the foreseeability of defending against a suit in Alabama. However, the materials filed in this case do not provide an evidentiary basis for resolution of this issue or similar contact issues. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the respondents' allegations allege that Hutchings has recently been retained to represent [that] same group of corporations controlled by the foreign national, and that [Dill] is [currently] receiving compensation from the Alabama resident for this representation. These allegations are irrelevant to an assessment of the nexus of Dill's contacts with Alabama. Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 731 (Ala. 2002) (`[o]nly contacts occurring prior to the event causing the litigation may be considered' (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir.1990))). Hutchings also states that he made a total of three trips to Alabama, only one of which related to the foreign national. The other trips were taken in connection with the representation of other clients, about whom we are told absolutely nothing. One of the trips was in the 1980's, and the other was in approximately 1997. Thus, evidence of contacts arising out of those attorney-client relationships is even less illuminating than that regarding Hutchings's representation of the foreign national. There is no evidence as to where the contracts were negotiated, originated, or were consummated, or whether third parties were involved in the formation of those attorney-client relationships. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of America v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1089 (1st Cir.1992) (in a contract case, the defendant's forum-based activities must be `instrumental in the formation of the contract'). There is no evidence of the nature, or the value, of Dill's services. There is no evidence as to where the litigationif anyoccurred. [C]ase law overflows on the point that providing out-of-state legal representation is not enough to subject an out-of-state lawyer or law firm to the personal jurisdiction of the state in which a client resides. Cape v. von Maur, 932 F.Supp. 124, 128 (D.Md.1996) (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223 (8th Cir.1987); Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury, & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.1986); and Mayes v. Leipziger, 674 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.1982)). The mere existence of an attorney-client relationship, unaccompanied by other sufficient contacts with the forum, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the non-resident in the forum state; more is required.  Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1392 (1st Cir.1995) (emphasis added). See also Porter v. Berall, 142 F.Supp.2d 1145 (W.D.Mo.2001), aff'd, 293 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir.2002); Elliott v. Van Kleef, supra. In the context of the attorney-client relationship, a lawyer's out-of-state activities, undertaken on behalf on an in-state client however substantialare immaterial to a minimum-contacts analysis. It is undisputed that the other attorney-client relationships ambiguously described in the Hutchings affidavit are unrelated to this litigation. Those amorphous contacts cannot, as the respondents insist, form the basis for general jurisdiction. The contacts are not regular or systematic. As described, they are, at most, random and sporadic. Thus, we are compelled to discount altogether the contacts with other clients as a basis for jurisdiction.