Opinion ID: 186276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the site–designation cases

Text: On February 14, 2002, the Secretary of Energy submitted to the President his recommendation that the Yucca Mountain site be developed as a repository. The recommendation was based in part upon the Secretary’s determination that the Yucca site satisfied DOE’s site-suitability criteria and in part upon a final environmental impact statement (FEIS), developed by DOE pursuant to § 114(f) of the NWPA. The day after receiving the Secretary’s recommendation, the Presi78 dent submitted to Congress his recommendation that the Yucca site be developed. Nevada exercised its right under sections 115 and 116 of the NWPA to submit to Congress a timely ‘‘notice of disapproval.’’ In the absence of further congressional action, this notice would have nullified the President’s site designation. See 42 U.S.C. § 10135(b). After legislative hearings at which Nevada and other parties testified and submitted documentary evidence, Congress enacted a joint ‘‘resolution of repository siting approval’’ (Resolution) overriding Nevada’s notice of disapproval and approving the Yucca site for a repository. See 42 U.S.C. § 10135(a), (c) (prescribing the form and effect of the Resolution). The Resolution was enacted pursuant to the legislative procedures prescribed by the NWPA, see 42 U.S.C. § 10135(d), (e), and was signed into law by the President on July 23, 2002. The legislation provides: Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa- tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there hereby is approved the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for a repository, with respect to which a notice of disapproval was submitted by the Governor of the State of Nevada on April 8, 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-200, 116 Stat. 735 (2002). In State of Nevada v. United States Department of Energy (No. 01-1516 and consolidated cases) (DOE Case), Nevada challenges the actions of the Secretary of Energy and the President leading to the approval of the Yucca site. In other words, Nevada does not challenge the legislation itself, but, rather, agency and executive branch actions that preceded the passage of the Resolution. Nevada’s primary claim is that DOE’s site-suitability criteria violate the NWPA by failing to incorporate certain geological considerations set forth in § 112(a) of the statute. In addition, Nevada asserts that the Secretary violated the NWPA by failing to complete site-characterization activities at Yucca before recommending the site and by failing to take 79 certain mandatory actions after allegedly determining that the Yucca site was unsuitable. Finally, Nevada challenges the FEIS, claiming that DOE violated procedural and substantive requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its implementing regulations. Nevada requests, on the basis of these alleged defects, that we set aside the site-suitability criteria, the Secretary’s site recommendation, the FEIS, and the President’s site designation. In State of Nevada v. United States (No. 03-1009), Nevada challenges the constitutionality of the Resolution approving the Yucca site. Nevada asserts that the Constitution requires Congress, when it regulates federal lands in a manner that imposes a unique burden on a particular state, to do so by means of facially neutral and generally applicable criteria. Nevada claims that the Resolution violates this asserted ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement and accordingly should be set aside. We will address Nevada’s challenge to the Resolution’s constitutionality first. We reject Nevada’s claim and uphold the Resolution. Yucca Mountain is located on federal land, and Congress has the authority under the Property Clause to designate the site for development as a repository. To the extent that the Constitution requires that legislation regulating federal lands have a rational basis, the Resolution meets this standard. In exercising its Property Clause power to enact the Resolution, Congress has not regulated Nevada’s activities so as to infringe upon State sovereignty interests of the type recognized under the Tenth Amendment. We find no viable basis in the Constitution supporting Nevada’s claim that Congress must in all instances exercise its Property Clause powers solely pursuant to neutral criteria that are generally applicable to all federal lands. Nevada cites no case law that endorses such a sweeping proposition and we have found none. Turning to the DOE Case, we hold that Congress’s enactment of the Resolution – which independently approved the Yucca site for development – was a final legislative action once it was signed into law by the President. The passage of 80 this law rendered moot Nevada’s challenges to the preceding site-selection-related actions of executive branch officials, federal agencies, the Secretary, and the President. Whatever the legal infirmities vel non of those actions, the Resolution is law and cannot be set aside absent a constitutional defect. Having found no such defect, we conclude that Nevada’s claims are moot. Congress has settled the matter, and we, no less than the parties, are bound by its decision. If DOE or NRC uses the FEIS to support future decisions relating to the Yucca project, Nevada may challenge the substance of the FEIS in the relevant proceedings. But any such challenge is not yet ripe and must await another day.

Before turning to Nevada’s constitutional challenge, we address the Government’s claim that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906 (1991), precludes consideration of the issues Nevada seeks to raise. In Watkins, Nevada challenged the constitutionality of the 1987 amendments to the NWPA, which limited site-characterization activities under the statute to Yucca Mountain. The Ninth Circuit held that Congress had the constitutional authority under the Property Clause to enact the 1987 amendments. Id. at 1553. The court went on to hold that none of the other constitutional provisions or doctrines relied upon by Nevada – including the Tenth Amendment, the Federal Enclave Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Port Preference Clause, and the equal footing doctrine – precluded Congress from exercising its Property Clause authority in this manner. Id. at 1554-58. We have no disagreement with the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of the claims at issue in Watkins. Indeed, many of the basic principles articulated in that decision are central to our resolution of the case before us. But we cannot agree that Watkins precludes us from considering the issues now raised by Nevada. For issue preclusion to apply, the same issue now raised must have been contested by the parties and submitted for 81 judicial determination in the prior case, the issue must have been ‘‘actually and necessarily determined,’’ and preclusion must not ‘‘work a basic unfairness’’ to the party that would be bound by resolution of the issue in the prior case. Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1078 (1993). The issues Nevada now seeks to raise simply are not precisely the same as those decided in Watkins. Nevada’s claim in the instant case requires us to determine whether the Constitution requires that a national nuclear waste repository site on federal land be selected on the basis of facially neutral, generally applicable criteria, and, if so, whether the Resolution violates this asserted ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement. No such issue was or could have been decided in Watkins. Most important, the two cases involve different statutes with different effects. The statute at issue in Watkins limited site-characterization activities under the NWPA to Yucca but did not select the site for development as a repository. The legislation challenged in this case, by contrast, approved the Yucca site for development and authorized DOE to seek a license to construct and operate a repository there. Moreover, the constitutional claims at issue in the two cases are distinct. Nevada did not challenge the 1987 amendments on the basis of the purported ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement that it now asserts. The Watkins court therefore had no opportunity to pass on the precise issues raised by the claim now before us. We are aware of no precedent – and the Government has cited none – remotely suggesting that a prior decision addressing the constitutionality of one statute bars consideration of a later challenge, on different constitutional grounds, to a different statute with different effects. In short, Watkins did not ‘‘actually and necessarily’’ determine the same issues raised by Nevada’s claim in the case before us, and therefore we are not precluded from considering and deciding those issues on the merits.
The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that ‘‘Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all 82 needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.’’ U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Under the Clause, ‘‘Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain.’’ Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that Congress’s power over federal lands is ‘‘without limitations.’’ Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580 (1987) (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 539). Accordingly, our role in reviewing Congress’s exercise of this power is narrow. We must determine whether the Resolution ‘‘can be sustained as a ‘needful’ regulation ‘respecting’ the public lands.’’ Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536. But in so doing, ‘‘we must remain mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress.’’ Id. The Property Clause clearly provides an adequate source of constitutional authority for Congress’s enactment of the Resolution. The disputed Resolution is a law ‘‘respecting’’ federal property. And we defer to Congress’s judgment that the Resolution is a ‘‘needful’’ regulation. See id.; United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940) (‘‘[I]t is not for the courts to say how [the public trust over federal lands] shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.’’ (quoting Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911))). Our review extends, at most, to determining whether there is a rational relationship between Congress’s stated end and its chosen means. See Peter A. Appel, The Power of Congress ‘‘Without Limitation’’: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 82 (2001); see also Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 535-36 (discussing the basis for Congress’s enactment of the statute at issue); cf. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 291 (1981) (‘‘The only limitation on congressional authority [preemptively to regulate private activities under the Commerce Clause] is the requirement that the means selected be reasonably related to the goal of regulating interstate commerce.’’). The Resolution easily passes this test. 83 The Resolution is best understood as a step in the repository-development process established by the NWPA two decades before. Congress enacted the NWPA on the basis of findings that the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste had created a ‘‘national problem’’ and that ‘‘the Federal government has the responsibility to provide for the permanent disposal of high-level radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as may be disposed of in order to protect the public health and safety and the environment.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2), (4). One of the primary purposes of the NWPA, therefore, was ‘‘to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance that the public and the environment will be protected from the hazards posed by’’ such wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b)(1). The Senate Committee Report on the Resolution referred back to the NWPA findings and reaffirmed the judgment that ‘‘[a] geologic repository is needed to isolate high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel from the public and the environment.’’ S. REP. NO. 107-159, at 4 (2002). The Report concluded that the Administration had adequately demonstrated that the Yucca site was likely to be suitable for development, subject to the outcome of future NRC licensing proceedings. Id. at 13. Approval of the site and continuation of the repositorydevelopment process therefore was determined to be in the national interest. Id. at 14. There clearly is a rational relationship between Congress’s stated purpose – the development of a geologic repository for the safe disposal of radioactive waste – and its decision to approve the Yucca site. It is not for this or any other court to examine the strength of the evidence upon which Congress based its judgment. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 541 n.10 (‘‘What appellees ask is that we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of Congress. This we must decline to do.’’). It remains only to determine whether the Resolution violates some other provision of the Constitution. See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1553-54 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968)). Nevada asserts that the Constitution requires 84 Congress, when it decides to use federal property in a manner that imposes a unique burden on a particular State, to choose the relevant site on the basis of facially neutral criteria that are applicable nationwide. The Resolution runs afoul of this ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement, as Nevada styles it, because Congress approved the Yucca site based on sitesuitability criteria that are applicable only to Yucca and that allegedly ‘‘reduce[d] to a virtual irrelevancy the actual geologic characteristics of the site.’’ Petitioners’ Br. at 24. The so-called ‘‘equal treatment’’ claim Nevada asserts is not based upon any specific provision of the Constitution, but rather on principles of federalism ostensibly inherent in the Constitution as a whole. Although Nevada purports to find support for its claim in the Guarantee Clause, the Port Preference Clause, the Uniformity Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the equal footing doctrine, its argument is based primarily on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Tenth Amendment in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). In Baker, the Court suggested ‘‘the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under the Tenth Amendment.’’ Id. at 512. Such a defect might arise, the Court indicated, where a State ‘‘was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless.’’ Id. at 513. Nevada argues that this occurs when Congress legislates in violation of the asserted ‘‘equal treatment’’ principle: ‘‘A State can negotiate and politick with other States when the issue before Congress is what general standards to apply in deciding where to bury nuclear waste, because all States have an interest in fair, reasonable and workable rules, given that all are at risk of being stuck with an unpopular burden.’’ Petitioners’ Br. at 53. Where, by contrast, Congress is asked to give an up-or-down vote on a single preannounced site, ‘‘then the State where that site is located loses its natural allies in the national political process.’’ Id. We find no basis in the Constitution for Nevada’s proposed ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement. Accordingly, we reject Nevada’s challenge to the Resolution. 85 To begin with, the Resolution does not infringe upon state interests of the kind protected by the Tenth Amendment. Baker, upon which Nevada bases its claim, construed the Tenth Amendment as broadly as possible to refer to ‘‘any implied constitutional limitation on Congress’ authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution.’’ 485 U.S. at 511 n.5 (emphasis added). Baker then unequivocally states that ‘‘the possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process might render congressional regulation TTT invalid under the Tenth Amendment’’ would be an issue only with respect to ‘‘congressional regulation of state activities.’’ 485 U.S. at 512 (emphasis added). Congress’s decision to designate Yucca Mountain for development as a repository does not in any way regulate Nevada’s activities; it merely prescribes the use of a particular piece of federal property. Nor, of course, does the Resolution ‘‘commandeer’’ the state legislative process or state officials so as to violate the Tenth Amendment constraint on federal powers recognized in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Congress’s decision to use the Yucca site as a repository does preempt Nevada from adopting conflicting legislation or regulations. But this is merely the natural and constitutionally unobjectionable result of the Supremacy Clause. See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543; see also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290 (‘‘Although such congressional enactments obviously curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result.’’). In short, while the designation of Yucca as a repository may impose a burden on Nevada, it does not infringe upon state sovereign interests of the limited type protected by the Tenth Amendment. Moreover, the Tenth Amendment limitation adumbrated by the Court in Baker applies to defects in the political process. But the ‘‘equal treatment’’ claim asserted by Nevada plainly goes to the substantive basis of congressional legislation over federal property and does not involve the political process at 86 all. The Court made clear in Baker that ‘‘nothing in TTT the Tenth Amendment [broadly construed] authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive basis for congressional legislation. Where, as here, the national political process did not operate in a defective manner, the Tenth Amendment is not implicated.’’ 485 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted). If anything, therefore, Baker appears positively to preclude us from subjecting congressional legislation to the so-called ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement conjured up by Nevada. As noted above, Nevada purports to find support for its ‘‘equal treatment’’ claim in the Guarantee Clause, the Port Preference Clause, the Uniformity Clause, the Bill of Attainder Clause, and the equal footing doctrine. Nevada does not assert that the Resolution violates any of these provisions or doctrines taken individually, and it is clear that any such claim would fail. Rather, Nevada contends that these provisions and doctrines express fundamental principles of state equality and a general constitutional preference for legislation based on neutral and generally applicable criteria. Nevada attempts to distill these principles and to synthesize from them a novel constitutional ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement. But in so doing, Nevada effectively discards the text, the substantive context, and the jurisprudential history of each of the individual provisions or doctrines upon which it relies. The end product is an entirely new creation. It has no textual basis in the Constitution. And, perhaps not surprisingly, Nevada cites no juridical precedent or historical practice hinting at the existence of such a restraint on congressional authority over federal lands. We are aware, of course, that the Supreme Court has recognized – in the context of its state sovereign immunity and ‘‘commandeering’’ decisions – constitutional limitations on congressional authority that are not solely or strictly based upon the text of the Constitution. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-25; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). Those limitations, however, were rooted ‘‘in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of th[e Supreme] Court.’’ Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. The Court’s sovereign immunity decisions are premised 87 on the conclusion that, ‘‘as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.’’ Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. This preexisting immunity was ‘‘confirmed TTT as a constitutional principle’’ by the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 728-29. The Court’s recognition of the anticommandeering principle similarly was rooted in the history and structure of the Constitution, Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-23, and, ‘‘most conclusively,’’ in the Court’s prior jurisprudence, id. at 925. Nevada’s proposed ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement has no such roots in Supreme Court precedent or the history of the Constitution. As for Nevada’s contention that the requirement is inherent in the Constitution’s structure, we have already shown that the Tenth Amendment does not protect the type of state interests implicated by this case. As the following discussion makes clear, the inferential leap from the remaining constitutional sources relied upon by Nevada to the proposed ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement is too great to be plausible. The Uniformity Clause provides that ‘‘all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.’’ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Port Preference Clause provides that ‘‘[n]o Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another.’’ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6. These provisions have been narrowly construed to prohibit certain forms of direct discrimination between States within the legislative spheres to which the provisions apply: taxation and port-related commerce-and-revenue regulation, respectively. See, e.g., United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 8586 (1983) (upholding against a Uniformity Clause challenge an oil taxation scheme that had the effect of giving a unique exemption to Alaskan oil, on the grounds that the exemption was based on ‘‘neutral factors’’ and was not intentionally discriminatory); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433-35 (1856) (holding that 88 the Port Preference Clause prohibits only ‘‘positive legislation by [C]ongress’’ that gives ‘‘a direct privilege or preference to the ports of any particular State over those of another,’’ not federal enactments that merely confer ‘‘incidental advantages’’ on one port over others). Nevada correctly notes that the Supreme Court has upheld legislation challenged under these provisions on the grounds, inter alia, that the legislation was based on neutral factors or only incidentally burdened or benefitted a particular State. See id. The conclusion that tax or port-related legislation having these characteristics may be insulated from challenge under these provisions, however, cannot plausibly be converted into a constitutional mandate that all legislation whatsoever have such characteristics. The equal footing doctrine, upon which Nevada also relies, applies to the terms on which new states enter the Union. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 19596 (1987). Its principal application has been to guarantee that newly admitted States take title to the bed of all navigable waters in their territories, just as did the original thirteen States. Id. But the Supreme Court has made clear that the doctrine ‘‘negatives any implied, special limitation of any of the paramount powers of the United States in favor of a State.’’ United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717 (1950). This includes, of course, Congress’s exercise of its Property Clause powers. See Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1555 (rejecting Nevada’s equal footing challenge to the 1987 amendments to the NWPA). The other purported constitutional bases of the ‘‘equal treatment’’ claim are even more tenuous. The Guarantee Clause provides, in relevant part, that ‘‘[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government.’’ U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The Supreme Court has indicated that this provision is implicated only where legislation poses some ‘‘realistic risk of altering the form or method of functioning of [a State’s] government.’’ New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186. The Bill of Attainder Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, proscribes legislation singling out individuals for punishment. See, e.g., 89 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 447 (1965). The Clause cannot be invoked on behalf of a State. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966). We find it beyond serious dispute that Nevada’s proposed ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement cannot reasonably be inferred from the provisions and doctrines upon which Nevada purports to rely. We fail to see, moreover, how the constraints demanded by Nevada’s claim would be consistent with the plenary nature of Congress’s Property Clause authority or the considerable deference that we accord to Congress’s judgment in exercising that authority. Under Nevada’s proposed requirement, each time Congress decides to use federal property in a manner that incidentally burdens a State – for example by designating such property for use as a military installation, a prison, a dam, a storage or disposal site, or a conservation area – it must formulate neutral selection criteria and apply those criteria to every piece of federal property in the Nation before selecting a site. Courts presumably would be required to scrutinize the substantive basis of the legislation in question to ensure that the criteria were genuinely neutral and generally applied. This is far more intrusive than any requirement that there be a rational basis for Congress’s judgment that a particular regulation respecting a particular property is ‘‘needful.’’ The substantive constraint on legislation and the judicial role implicit in Nevada’s ‘‘equal treatment’’ requirement are, in our view, totally at odds with the broad interpretation given to Congress’s Property Clause powers. See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to legislation prescribing in ‘‘minute detail’’ the management of a single national forest on the grounds that Congress, in exercising its Property Clause powers, ‘‘is permitted to be as specific as it deems appropriate’’ and that ‘‘[i]t would be difficult if not impossible to control the use of federal lands without reference to specific actions affecting specific tracts of land’’); see also Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding no constitutional objection to the specificity of legislation requiring construction of a World War II Memorial on the National 90 Mall). As the Supreme Court declared long ago: ‘‘The power over the public land TTT entrusted to Congress [under the Property Clause] is without limitations. ‘And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.’ ’’ San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 2930 (quoting Light, 220 U.S. at 537) (footnotes omitted). For all of the foregoing reasons, we reject Nevada’s constitutional challenge to the Resolution. We now turn to Nevada’s challenge to the administrative and executive decisions leading up to the Resolution’s enactment.
1. DOE Criteria, Secretary’s Alleged Failure to Take Mandatory Actions, and Site Recommendations Nevada’s challenges to DOE’s site-suitability criteria, the Secretary’s recommendation, the FEIS, and the President’s recommendation are all directed to the fundamental question of whether the Yucca site was properly selected for development as a repository. Congress’s enactment of the Resolution, however, has rendered that question moot. The Resolution affirmatively and finally approved the Yucca site for a repository, thus bringing the site-selection process to a conclusion. No determination as to the soundness of the administrative and executive actions leading up to the Resolution’s enactment would undo the Resolution’s binding effects. ‘‘It has long been settled that a federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’ ’’ Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). Where Congress enacts intervening legislation that definitively resolves the issues a litigant seeks to put before us, the claims are moot and we are precluded from deciding them. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999); Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 35 F.3d 579, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1994); State of Nevada v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 1991); Bunker Ltd. P’ship v. United States, 820 F.2d 308, 311 (9th Cir. 1987). 91 There is no question that the Resolution is a law, enacted in accordance with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, section 7, clause 3 of the Constitution. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 756 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (‘‘The joint resolution, which is used for ‘special purposes and TTT incidental matters,’ makes binding policy and ‘requires an affirmative vote by both Houses and submission to the President for approval’ – the full Article I requirements.’’ (citations omitted)); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 459 n.140 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (stating that joint resolutions become law upon presentment to and approval by the President). As with any other statute, our interpretation of the Resolution begins with its text and the presumption that Congress ‘‘says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’’ Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992); see also Ann Arbor R.R. Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658, 666 (1930) (stating that a joint resolution is construed according to general rules of statutory construction). Congress, in enacting the Resolution, spoke in concise and unambiguous language: ‘‘[T]here hereby is approved the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for a repository, with respect to which a notice of disapproval was submitted by the Governor of the State of Nevada on April 8, 2002.’’ 116 Stat. 735 (2002), 42 U.S.C. § 10135 note. The Resolution’s meaning is clear on its face: It overrides Nevada’s notice of disapproval and affirmatively approves the Yucca site for the development of a repository. The practical effect of the legislation is to conclude the site-selection process and to permit DOE to seek authorization from NRC to construct and operate a repository at this site. The legislative history of the Resolution confirms this interpretation. The Senate Committee Report on the Resolution states that ‘‘[t]he purpose of [the Resolution] is to approve the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada for the development of a repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.’’ S. REP. NO. 107-159, at 1 (2002). The House Committee Report contains virtually identical lan92 guage. H.R. REP. NO. 107-425, at 2 (2002). Both Reports state that the effect of the Resolution’s enactment will be to allow DOE to go forward with its application for authorization from NRC to build and operate the repository. See S. REP. NO. 107-159, at 1 (2002); H.R. REP. NO. 107-425, at 7 (2002) (Congressional Budget Office Estimate). The floor debate on the Resolution likewise confirms that the members of Congress intended the Resolution to approve the Yucca site, conclude the site-selection process, and permit DOE to proceed to seek a license for the repository. See generally 148 CONG. REC. H2180-H2205 (daily ed. May 8, 2002); 148 CONG. REC. S6444-S6491 (daily ed. July 9, 2002). As Senator Murkowski, one of the Senate sponsors of the Resolution, declared, ‘‘The resolution TTT reaffirms the present recommendation of Yucca Mountain as a suitable site for this Nation’s permanent geologic repository TTT [and] gives the Department of Energy the go ahead to begin the licensing process with the Nuclear Regulatory CommissionTTTT’’ 148 CONG. REC. S5886 (daily ed. June 21, 2002). Representative Shimkus, one of the House sponsors, similarly stated that ‘‘[t]he vote that Congress will be taking today says that after 20 years of exhaustive scientific analysis the government is ready to designate Yucca Mountain TTT a safe site and move to the licensing phase for the development of an underground disposal facility.’’ 148 CONG. REC. H2185 (daily ed. May 8, 2002). There is good reason, moreover, to conclude that both Nevada and the Members of Congress understood that enactment of the Resolution would render moot most of the claims raised in this suit. Nevada, in its statement of the reasons for its notice of disapproval, notified Congress of its pending law suits challenging ‘‘the legal soundness of both the Secretary’s and the President’s Yucca Mountain site recommendations.’’ Statement of Reasons Supporting the Governor of Nevada’s Notice of Disapproval of the Proposed Yucca Mountain Project 5-6 (Apr. 8, 2002), reprinted in Add. of Leg. Materials at 10-11. Nevada asserted the central claim in the case now before us: that DOE changed its site-suitability criteria because Yucca could not meet the preexisting criteria. 93 Id. Nevada urged Congress to delay approval of the repository until its legal claims were decided by the courts and stated that direct legislative approval of the Yucca site would mean that ‘‘DOE’s bogus site suitability determination could never be reviewed on the technical merits.’’ Id. The Senate Committee Report considered and rejected Nevada’s objections to approval of the Yucca site, including the legal argument against the site-suitability criteria. S. REP. NO. 107-159, at 6-13 (2002). The authors of the Report reviewed the Administration’s case for selecting the Yucca site and concluded that the Secretary’s recommendation and the supporting documents and testimony ‘‘me[t] the burden of going forward imposed by the [NWPA].’’ Id. at 13. Nevada’s arguments, the Committee declared, did not ‘‘outweigh the national interest in proceeding’’ with the repository program. Id. at 14. Despite Nevada’s public prediction that approval of the Yucca site would render its site-selectionrelated claims unreviewable, Congress ultimately enacted the Resolution. In summary, everything in the text and legislative history of the Resolution confirms that Congress intended affirmatively to approve the Yucca site, thus concluding the siteselection process and permitting DOE to seek authorization from NRC to build and operate a repository at the site. In the absence of any constitutional defect in the Resolution, we have no authority to review the substantive basis for this decision. ‘‘Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto.’’ Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978). The Resolution’s meaning is clear, and we have already rejected Nevada’s sole constitutional challenge. There consequently remains nothing left for us to decide. No pronouncement from this court as to the legal soundness of the administrative and executive decisions preceding the enactment of the Resolution could provide Nevada with any effective relief. The Resolution is the law, the Yucca site has been finally approved, and DOE has been 94 authorized to seek permission from NRC to construct and operate the repository. Nevada concedes that its claims are moot to the extent that the Resolution affirmatively approved the Yucca site for development. Nevada argues, however, that the Resolution is merely a ‘‘legislative veto’’ that ‘‘cancels’’ Nevada’s notice of disapproval and restores the status quo ante. This narrow construction is untenable and must be rejected. The Resolution’s text and legislative history make inescapably clear that it not only ‘‘canceled’’ Nevada’s notice of disapproval but also affirmatively approved the Yucca site. Nevada’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First, the fact that the Resolution approves the Yucca site ‘‘with respect to which a notice of disapproval was submitted’’ cannot plausibly be read to limit the effect of the approval. Rather, this secondary clause merely makes clear that Congress intended its affirmative approval to override Nevada’s notice of disapproval. Nevada’s narrow focus on this language, by contrast, would render meaningless the Resolution’s primary clause: ‘‘There hereby is approved the site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, for a repository.’’ Contrary to Nevada’s assertions, our interpretation of the Resolution is entirely consistent with NWPA section 114(b). That provision states that DOE shall submit a license application to NRC if the President’s ‘‘site designation is permitted to take effect under section [115].’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b). The President’s site designation may be ‘‘permitted to take effect’’ under section 115 in one of two ways: without any further action if Nevada does not submit a timely notice of disapproval, or, if Nevada does submit such a notice, through enactment of a joint resolution meeting the requirements of section 115. See 42 U.S.C. § 10135(b), (c). Nevada submitted a notice of disapproval. Under this scenario, the President’s original site designation was nevertheless ‘‘permitted to take effect’’ precisely because Congress enacted a law affirmatively adopting that designation. We find no merit in Nevada’s contention that our interpretation of the Resolution somehow renders the NWPA’s judi95 cial review provision meaningless. Section 119 of the NWPA gives the U.S. courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over, inter alia, any civil action ‘‘for review of any final decision or action of the Secretary [of Energy], the President, or the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission under this part.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1). It is elementary that this provision does not supercede Article III of the Constitution, which requires that a case or controversy remain ‘‘live’’ in order for this or any other court to have jurisdiction. See Church of Scientology, 506 U.S. at 12 (‘‘[A] federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questionsTTTT’ ’’). Section 119 contemplates the possibility of actions challenging decisions of the Secretary and the President. But it does not follow that the section is rendered meaningless when, as a result of intervening legislation, a particular action challenging a particular decision becomes moot and therefore unreviewable. It should be noted, moreover, that section 119 continues to govern other suits challenging actions taken under the relevant portion of the NWPA. Nevada’s constitutional challenge to the Resolution, addressed on the merits above, was brought pursuant to section 119(a)(1). And section 119 presumably will govern future actions including, for example, any petitions for review of DOE’s final decision selecting an alternative for transporting waste to Yucca Mountain and NRC decisions relating to construction authorization or licensing. Finally, we reject Nevada’s contention that the Resolution’s meaning or effect is cabined by the fact that it was enacted pursuant to accelerated legislative procedures. We repeat: The Resolution is a law, validly enacted under Article I, section 7 of the Constitution, and its meaning is to be interpreted according to standard tools of statutory interpretation, beginning with its text. That the Resolution was enacted pursuant to the special procedures set forth in the NWPA has no particular bearing on our interpretation of its content. 2. The Final Environmental Impact Statement DOE’s Final Environmental Impact Statement was used to support the Secretary’s and the President’s recommendations 96 of the Yucca site. Insofar as Nevada’s instant challenge to the FEIS is intended to reverse the decision to select the Yucca site, the challenge is moot for the reasons stated above. The Resolution approved the site, and no finding that the FEIS is legally defective would change Congress’s final and binding decision. Because the FEIS is expected to play a continuing role in decision making related to the Yucca site, however, we clarify the limits of our holding. Section 114(f)(4) of the NWPA provides, in relevant part, that the DOE’s FEIS ‘‘shall, to the extent practicable, be adopted by [NRC] in connection with the issuance by [NRC] of a construction authorization and license for such repository.’’ 42 U.S.C. § 10134(f)(4). To the extent NRC adopts the FEIS, NRC’s responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act shall be deemed satisfied and ‘‘no further consideration shall be required.’’ Id. In addition, DOE is expected to use the FEIS to support one or more future decisions related to Yucca Mountain, including the selection of an alternative for transporting waste to the site. We agree with DOE that any challenge to the FEIS, insofar as it may be adopted in support of a future NRC construction-authorization or licensing decision or used by DOE in support of a future transportation-alternative selection, is not yet ripe for review. In determining ripeness, we assess ‘‘both the fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.’’ AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 692, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). In examining the fitness of an issue for our consideration, we are primarily concerned with whether the claims raise ‘‘purely legal questions [that] would TTT be presumptively suitable for judicial review,’’ or whether the court and the agency would instead benefit from postponing review until the agency’s policy has ‘‘crystallized’’ through implementation in a concrete factual setting. AT&T Corp., 349 F.3d at 699700 (quoting Better Gov’t Ass’n v. Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Where an issue is not yet fit for judicial review, we must weigh the benefits of postponing review 97 against the hardship suffered by the petitioner as a result of such delay. See id. at 700. Nevada’s substantive claims against the FEIS will not be fit for judicial review until the FEIS is used to support a concrete and final decision. DOE has not yet selected a transportation alternative or sought to use the existing FEIS to support such a decision. We do not yet know whether or to what extent NRC will adopt DOE’s FEIS in support of any decision to authorize construction or license the operation of a repository at Yucca. NRC has indicated that it may require that DOE supplement the FEIS, or it may itself supplement the FEIS. See NEPA Review Procedures for Geologic Repositories for High-Level Waste, 53 Fed. Reg. 16,131, 16,14243 (May 5, 1988) (Proposed Rule); 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(a) (2003). In the face of such uncertainty, it is clear that the relevant agency positions have not yet ‘‘crystallized.’’ Our review of the FEIS therefore would benefit from postponing consideration until the FEIS has been used to support a specific, concrete, and final decision. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 733-37 (1998) (withholding consideration of a forest management plan where it was uncertain whether and to what extent the plan would be used to support specific future logging decisions). Turning to the second prong of our ripeness inquiry, we conclude that withholding consideration of Nevada’s substantive claims at this time imposes no hardship on Nevada. Nevada itself has not sought immediate review of the FEIS insofar as it may relate to future DOE or NRC decisions. Putting the now-unreviewable site-selection decisions to one side, the effect of the FEIS will not be felt in a concrete way by Nevada until it is used to support some other final decision of DOE or NRC. Nevada may raise its substantive claims against the FEIS if and when NRC or DOE makes such a final decision. Our decision to postpone consideration of Nevada’s claims therefore works no hardship on Nevada sufficient to render its claims ripe. See id. at 735 (holding that requiring a party to participate in further administrative or judicial proceedings is not a hardship sufficient to outweigh 98 a determination that an issue is unfit for review); AT&T Corp., 349 F.3d at 700 (same). In reaching this conclusion as to hardship, we rely on the assurances of counsel for both NRC and DOE at oral argument that Nevada will be permitted to raise its substantive challenges to the FEIS in any NRC proceeding to decide whether to adopt the FEIS and in any DOE proceeding to select a transportation alternative. Oral Argument Tr. at 149-52, 169-71. It was noted at oral argument that an NRC decision to adopt the FEIS may present special concerns, because NRC is required under the NWPA to adopt the FEIS ‘‘to the extent practicable.’’ See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(f)(4). In setting forth regulations to govern review of DOE’s FEIS, NRC has acknowledged that it would not be ‘‘practicable’’ to adopt the FEIS unless it meets the standards for an ‘‘adequate statement’’ under the NEPA and the Council for Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations. See 53 Fed. Reg. at 16,142. We agree. The NWPA’s mandate that the FEIS be adopted by NRC ‘‘to the extent practicable’’ is intended to avoid duplication of the environmental review process. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-491, pt. 1, at 48, 53-54 (1982). But it cannot reasonably be interpreted to permit NRC to premise a construction-authorization or licensing decision upon an EIS that does not meet the substantive requirements of the NEPA or the Council on Environmental Quality’s NEPA regulations. See id. at 48 (‘‘The Committee intends that throughout the repository development program, the Secretary and other agencies meet the general requirements and the spirit of NEPA.’’ (emphasis added)). NRC’s current regulation governing review of DOE applications for construction authorization or licensing of a repository states that adoption of the DOE’s FEIS shall be deemed ‘‘practicable’’ unless: (1) TTT The action proposed to be taken by [NRC] differs from the action proposed in the license application submitted by the Secretary of Energy[,] and [t]he difference may significantly affect the quality of the human environment; or (2) Significant and 99 substantial new information or new considerations render such environmental impact statement inadequate. 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(c) (2003). The regulation also notes that, if the FEIS is adopted in accordance with this requirement, ‘‘no further consideration under NEPA or this subpart shall be required.’’ 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(d) (2003). When questioned at oral argument about the meaning of this regulation, Government counsel assured the court that NRC will not construe the ‘‘new information or new considerations’’ requirement to preclude Nevada from raising substantive claims against the FEIS in administrative proceedings. Oral Argument Tr. at 171. On January 15, 2004, following oral argument, counsel for NRC purported to clarify the Government’s position in a letter submitted to the court. Letter from Steven F. Crockett, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Jan. 15, 2004). The letter states that the relevant NRC regulations, including 10 C.F.R. § 51.109(c), ‘‘affect[ ] issues that can be raised and litigated at NRC administrative hearings, not issues that can be raised on judicial review.’’ Id. The suggested distinction makes no sense. Nevada’s claims have not been adjudicated on the merits here and presumably will not have been passed upon by any court prior to the relevant NRC proceedings. The claims thus would certainly raise ‘‘new considerations’’ with regard to any decision to adopt the FEIS. Moreover, as noted above, any substantive defects in the FEIS clearly would be relevant to the ‘‘practicability’’ of adopting the FEIS. Government counsel’s unequivocal representation to the court during oral argument that Nevada will not be foreclosed from raising substantive claims against the FEIS in administrative proceedings comports with the terms of the regulation and reflects a reasonable and compelling interpretation. Therefore, on the record at hand, there is no reason to assume that the regulation will bar consideration of Nevada’s substantive claims in the relevant NRC administrative proceedings. 100