Opinion ID: 2378566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the affidavit to support a nighttime search.

Text: The defendant contends that the facts presented by the affidavit were not such as to bring the case within the meaning of Rule 41(c), M.R.Crim.P. which says that [t]he warrant shall direct that it be served in the daytime, but if the affidavits are positive that the property is on the person or in the place to be searched, the warrant may direct it to be served at any time. (Emphasis added.) The Rule may be satisfied respecting affidavit positiveness, where the affiant's conclusion is based on hearsay from a reliable informant. See, United States v. Plemmons, 1964, 6 Cir., 336 F.2d 731; United States v. Arms, 1968, 6 Cir., 392 F.2d 300. We do recognize that Rule 41(c) requires a greater quantum of facts to be disclosed in the affidavit than that necessary only to support a belief that the property probably is to be found in the premises for which a daytime-search warrant is being sought. On the other hand, the factual recital need not be such as to generate belief beyond a reasonable doubt and exclude the possibility that the contraband might have been removed. The Rule does not require the magistrate to find positively that the property is in the place to be searched, but only that the affidavit is positive, i. e. discloses sufficient facts to warrant the affiant in asserting a positive belief. United States v. Arms, supra. The reason for the somewhat higher standard of factual assertions in affidavits to justify the issuance of nighttime-search warrants imposed by Rule 41(c) lies in the peculiar abrasiveness of official intrusions at such periods. Intrusion into an occupied home in the middle of the night is plainly a greater invasion of privacy than entry during the day. The Complaint Justice in the present case was dealing with a request for a nighttime-search warrant at about 7:15 in the evening of August 25, 1971 which he could infer would be executed in the early part of the evening and not in the middle of the night, since under Rule 41(c) the warrant commanded the officer to search the apartment forthwith and since proper police enforcement of the narcotic laws would seem to require the search to be made without unreasonable delay. We are of the view, as was the Court in United States v. Daniels, 1950, D.C. New Jersey, 10 F.R.D. 225, that the additional stricture imposed by the rule for authorization of a nighttime-search warrant consists in the following:    the rule requires nothing more than an explicit statement, supported by positive evidence, as distinguished from negative evidence, `that the property is in the place to be searched.' The explicit statement may not rest upon inferences drawn from the absence of evidence. The rule requires averments of fact sufficiently persuasive to support a reasonable inference that the property is in fact on the premises. A more rigid construction would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the property is in the place to be searched. Such a construction would enable the criminal to completely conceal an illegal enterprise behind an insurmountable barrier, provided, of course, he pursued it only at night. Having in mind that the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants (United States v. Ventresca, supra), we sustain the validity of the issuance of the search warrant for nighttime execution in the instant case within the limits of the facts disclosed in the reference affidavit.