Opinion ID: 198819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Courtroom Seating Arrangements

Text: 22 Citing the small courtroom and the attendant security concerns, the district court directed that the defendants be seated in the front row of the spectator section, rather than beside their respective counsel at the defense table. John Meuse claims that the mandated seating arrangement prevented or restrained defendants from exercising their Sixth Amendment right to communicate with counsel at trial. Further, he argues that these arrangements improperly undercut the presumption of innocence, as the jury may have inferred from the isolated grouping of the defendants that they must be conconspirators, as charged, and because the court security officers rose to their feet each time defendants got up to consult with counsel, thus perhaps intimating to the jury that defendants posed a security risk. Finally, Meuse faults the district court for failing even to consider the alternative seating arrangement proposed by the defendants, which would have moved the defense counsel table forward two or three feet, thereby enabling the defendants to be seated in a row directly behind their respective counsel. 23 As courtroom seating arrangements depend[] upon such a variety of factors, e.g., the size of the courtroom, the number of spectators, the number of defendants and lawyers, acoustics, security provisions, etc., we will not disturb the trial court decision for anything less than a clearcut abuse of discretion. United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1981); cf. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that, in light of courtroom security concerns, appellate court normally defers to reasonable conditions for admitting trial spectators). Appellants have not met their burden. 24 First, the district court ruled that its seating arrangement was necessary due to the limited space available in the small courtroom, and by the obvious security concerns which might arise if ten people were to be seated at or behind the defense table. Under the district court plan, moreover, the five defendants were seated only four to five feet from the defense table, in the front row of the spectator section. The trial judge also assured the defendants that they could consult freely with their attorneys as they wished, either by walking the short distance to the defense table, or passing written notes. See United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 887 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding that arrangement caused no hindrance in communications). Thus, in practical terms the seating arrangement imposed no significant impediment upon defendants' Sixth Amendment right to consult with trial counsel. 25 Nor is it apparent that defendants sustained any other significant or unwarranted prejudice. The front row in the spectator section is not an inherently prejudicial location for seating criminal defendants. See Turkette, 656 F.2d at 10. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that seating the defendants as a group directly behind the defense table, as they proposed, would have lessened any slim chance that the jury would draw an improper inference of guilt by association. Moreover, their proposal presented logistical problems, as it required that ten persons be seated in a cramped area, which would block one of the gates in the bar rail and require that all witnesses be rerouted through the remaining gate. 26 Finally, their characterization of the court security officers' movements -- as defensive -- is subjective and conclusory. The record in no way suggests that the security officers' actions were either so dramatic or unusual as to influence the jury unduly. 27 We therefore discern no clearcut abuse of discretion in the district court ruling. See id. at 10. 10