Opinion ID: 4541075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: While the Court of Appeals considered each of Dinkel's claimed errors individually, early in its decision the panel concluded that rape of a child requires no culpable mental state. The panel then held that Dinkel's defense theories based on forcible rape, blackmail, and her corresponding mental condition were not legally relevant because those theories would only negate mental culpability. 2018 WL 1439992, at -8. At this stage of our review we focus on only whether the panel erred when holding that Dinkel's forcible rape theory was irrelevant to her case. To examine this holding, we must interpret various statutes. We perform an unlimited review when interpreting statutes. State v. Russ, 309 Kan. 1240, 1242, 443 P.3d 1060 (2019). The legislative intent behind a statute governs our interpretation of that statute. Corvias Military Living, LLC v. Ventamatic, Ltd., 310 Kan. 824, 830, 450 P.3d 797 (2019). To identify this intent, we give common words their ordinary meanings. 310 6 Kan. at 830. If language in a statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not speculate about the legislative intent behind that clear language. 310 Kan. at 830. There are five ways to commit rape in Kansas. (a) Rape is: (1) Knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse with a victim who does not consent to the sexual intercourse under any of the following circumstances: (A) When the victim is overcome by force or fear; or (B) when the victim is unconscious or physically powerless; (2) Knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of mental deficiency or disease, or when the victim is incapable of giving consent because of the effect of any alcoholic liquor, narcotic, drug or other substance, which condition was known by the offender or was reasonably apparent to the offender; (3) sexual intercourse with a child who is under 14 years of age; (4) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse was a medically or therapeutically necessary procedure; or (5) sexual intercourse with a victim when the victim's consent was obtained through a knowing misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse was a legally required procedure within the scope of the offender's authority. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5503. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5501(a) defines 'sexual intercourse' as any penetration of the female sex organ by a finger, the male sex organ or any object. 7 The jury convicted Dinkel under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5503(a)(3), meaning it found Dinkel guilty of penetration of the female sex organ by a finger, the male sex organ or any object with a child who is under 14 years of age. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 215501(a); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5503(a)(3). K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202 governed the mental culpability requirements of criminal action at the time of the charged unlawful conduct. Its opening provision states that [e]xcept as otherwise provided, a culpable mental state is an essential element of every crime . . . . A culpable mental state may be established by proof that the conduct of the accused person was committed 'intentionally,' 'knowingly,' or 'recklessly.' K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202(a). This statute also describes the result if the statutory language does not provide a culpable mental state: if the definition of a crime does not prescribe a culpable mental state, a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly dispenses with any mental element. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202(d). Another statute, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5203(b), explicitly authorizes dispensing with a culpable mental state if the crime is . . . a felony and the statute defining the crime clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. There is no mental culpability language in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5503(a)(3). There is, however, mental culpability language in every other subsection describing the four alternative ways of committing rape. The Court of Appeals, citing K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202(d) and K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5203(b), held that this clearly indicate[d] a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described. 2018 WL 1439992, at . Consequently, the panel held that there is no mental culpability requirement for the crime of rape of a child. 8 After coming to this conclusion, the panel held that all of Dinkel's defenses were irrelevant. Regarding her forcible rape argument, the panel explained because the crime charged requires no intent, even a perfectly presented . . . rape theory showing lack of intent would not have been an adequate legal defense. 2018 WL 1439992, at . We do not agree with the panel's conclusion that whether K.H. forcibly raped Dinkel was irrelevant. As Dinkel argues, even if there is no mental culpability requirement for the charged crime—a conclusion we do not address today—whether she was forcibly raped affected whether she committed the actus reus of the crime. Dinkel points to K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5201, which requires voluntary conduct for criminal action. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5201 is titled Requirements of voluntary act or omission and provides: (a) A person commits a crime only if such person voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act, an omission or possession. (b) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit a crime unless a law provides that the omission is an offense or otherwise provides that such person has a duty to perform the act. No law criminalizes an omission with regard to the rape of a child. Consequently, Dinkel is guilty of rape of a child only if she voluntarily engage[d] in conduct. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5201. Dinkel asserts that [t]he victim of a rape does not voluntarily engage in sexual intercourse with the perpetrator. To decide whether Dinkel is correct, we must determine 9 what it means for conduct to be voluntary. Black's Law Dictionary defines voluntary as [d]one by design or intention. Black's Law Dictionary 1886 (11th ed. 2019). It defines conduct as [p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction, verbal or nonverbal; the manner in which a person behaves; collectively, a person's deeds. Black's Law Dictionary 369 (11th ed. 2019). According to these definitions, voluntary conduct is personal behavior done by design or intention. Black's Law Dictionary also provides a definition of a voluntary act, which is a term included in the title of the statute. A voluntary act is: A willed bodily movement; esp., the type of act that is necessary for the imposition of criminal liability when such liability is not predicated on an omission. Under both the common law and the Model Penal Code, a person cannot be held liable for a crime without engaging in a prohibited voluntary act or omission. A bodily movement that is a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual, is a voluntary act. Reflexes, convulsions, and movements made while unconscious, asleep, or under the influence of hypnosis are not voluntary acts. Black's Law Dictionary 32 (11th ed. 2019). Together, these definitions indicate that voluntary conduct or a voluntary act is personal behavior done by design or intention or [a] willed bodily movement. These unambiguous definitions support Dinkel's argument that her voluntariness in engaging in certain bodily movements is relevant to her charged crime. This leads us to the conclusion that any evidence K.H. physically forced the sexual intercourse and Dinkel did not intend any of the bodily movements that resulted in the sexual intercourse with K.H. is legally relevant to the voluntary act requirement of rape of a child under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5503(a)(3). The panel erred when it held otherwise. 10 We take a moment to acknowledge our potentially confusing use of the word intent in the context of the actus reus. We have described the voluntary act requirement as personal behavior done by design or intention and clearly held that Dinkel's intention with regard to her bodily movements was relevant to the act requirement. But the Legislature has also used the word intent to describe the highest level of mens rea, or mental culpability. See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202(b) (explaining that intentionally is the highest culpable mental state). This statute provides that [a] person acts 'intentionally,' or 'with intent,' with respect to the nature of such person's conduct or to a result of such person's conduct when it is such person's conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5202(h). Although the language overlaps, we see a difference between the voluntary act requirement of the actus reus and intentional mental culpability. A voluntary act is an intentional bodily movement, i.e., the intention to lift an arm or move a leg in a certain direction—whatever bodily movement is needed to complete the act requirement. In contrast, intentional mental culpability is the conscious desire to engage in conduct of a certain nature or produce a certain result—i.e., to desire injurious movement or a slap or a kick. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-520(h) (providing a definition of intent and implying that one must act intentionally with respect to the nature of such person's conduct or have a conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result). See also Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 269, 289 (2002) (voluntary act requirement must be met before it can be determined if the defendant satisfied the MPC's narrower mens rea requirements [purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence]); State v. Siracusa, 160 A.3d 531, 534 n.6 (Me. 2017) (The legal concepts of voluntariness and mens rea are distinct.). Consequently, even if Dinkel's rape defense was not relevant to a mental culpability requirement, it was relevant to the actus reus requirement. 11 We pause to address a separate line of reasoning the panel seemed to offer in support of its conclusion that forcible rape is irrelevant to whether one committed rape of a child. After deciding there is no mental culpability requirement for rape of a child, the panel noted that Dinkel contends that if the statute contains no culpable mental state, an unwilling adult who is forcibly raped by a child could be found guilty of this crime and concluded this argument is hypothetical and does not apply to the facts of this case. Dinkel, 2018 WL 1439992, at . The panel wrote that it could not conceive of a situation in which the lack of an intent element in this statute could lead to the prosecution of a victim rather than of the perpetrator of the crime. 2018 WL 1439992, at . The panel's comments suggest that its incredulity regarding Dinkel's claim she was forcibly raped influenced its decision that her forcible rape theory is not legally relevant. But appellate courts do not make credibility determinations. And, whether a defense theory is legally relevant does not rest on whether an appellate court believes it. Dinkel contends that the exact thing that the panel cannot conceive of has happened. If her theory is legally relevant, she should be able to present it to the jury—whether an appellate court can conceive of it happening or not. The panel's disbelief should not have factored into its consideration of whether her theory was legally relevant. With our conclusion, we face new questions: how did the voluntary act requirement go unaddressed until it reached this stage of review, and, more practically, was Dinkel's trial counsel ineffective for failing to argue that the State never established the actus reus of the crime? Before we consider any other aspects of this case, we remand it to the district court for the sole purpose of answering our question. We will retain jurisdiction and take this case up again after the district court has had a chance to hold a 12 Van Cleave hearing and determine whether defense trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the State did not establish the voluntary act requirement. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court with directions. Appellate jurisdiction is retained. HENRY W. GREEN, JR., J., assigned. 1 STEVE LEBEN, J., assigned.2 1 REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Green, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed to hear case No. 113,705 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the retirement of Justice Lee A. Johnson. 2 REPORTER'S NOTE: Judge Leben, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed to hear case No. 113,705 under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 20-3002(c) to fill the vacancy on the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss. 13