Opinion ID: 2067488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: last filing date

Text: Hullinger's first assignment of error, that the district court wrongly computed the last date by which his petition must have been filed in the district court, is controlled by §§ 81-8,227(1) and 81-8,213. Section 81-8,227(1) reads: Every tort claim permitted under the State Tort Claims Act shall be forever barred unless within two years after such claim accrued the claim is made in writing to the State Claims Board in the manner provided by such act. The time to begin suit under such act shall be extended for a period of six months from the date of mailing of notice to the claimant by the board as to the final disposition of the claim or from the date of withdrawal of the claim from the board under section 81-8,213 if the time to begin suit would otherwise expire before the end of such period. Section 81-8,213 reads: No suit shall be permitted under the State Tort Claims Act unless the State Claims Board has made final disposition of the claim, except that if the board does not make final disposition of a claim within six months after the claim is made in writing to the board, the claimant may, by notice in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration of the board and begin suit under such act. The interplay of these two statutes was discussed in Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491, 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991). The plaintiff's cause of action therein accrued on December 14, 1985, and he filed his claim with the claims board on September 8, 1987. Because he had utilized an improper form, he resubmitted it on October 15. On June 14, 1988, the defendant's insurer denied the claim, and on July 5, the plaintiff notified the claims board in writing that his claim was being withdrawn from its consideration. He then commenced suit in the district court on August 18. The defendant successfully moved the trial court for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations contained in the act. On appeal, the defendant argued that the time to begin suit in that case was not extended by 6 months as provided in § 81-8,227, because the statute of limitations would not otherwise expire before the end of the 6-month period. In other words, the defendant argued that § 81-8,227 provided a 6-month extension of the time to file suit only if there was some time remaining on the 2-year statute of limitations after the claims board had acted on the claim, or the claim had been withdrawn, and the time remaining was less than 6 months. According to the defendant, if there were no time remaining on the statute of limitations, then the time to begin suit would not otherwise expire before the end of 6 months because it had, in fact, already expired. In rejecting the defendant's argument, and reversing the grant of summary judgment, we wrote: The source of [the plaintiff's] predicament is § 81-8,213. As stated, that section mandates that before suit may be filed in court, a claim may not be withdrawn from the State Claims Board for at least 6 months. In order to comply with § 81-8,213, [the plaintiff], who filed his claim with the board in the 22d month after his claim accrued, was prevented from filing his lawsuit in the district court before the 24-month statute of limitations ran. In essence, one statute prevents filing of a claim in court and another section requires filing of that same claim in court. This appears to be a classic example of the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing. .... A statutory scheme which precludes one from withdrawing a claim from the State Claims Board and thereby prevents that person from filing suit before the statute of limitations runs leads to absurd, unjust, or unconscionable results. We, therefore, hold that a claimant who files a tort claim with the Risk Manager of the State Claims Board 18 months or more after his or her claim has accrued, but within the 2-year statute of limitations, has 6 months from the first day on which the claim may be withdrawn from the claims board in which to begin suit. 237 Neb. at 499-501, 466 N.W.2d at 532-33. The pleadings here reveal that Hullinger's cause of action accrued on March 26, 1990, when he was injured. He filed his claim with the claims board on March 24, 1992, more than 18 months after his claim accrued, but within the 2-year statute of limitations. Under Coleman, he therefore had 6 months from the first day on which his claim could be withdrawn from the claims board in which to bring suit. Section 81-8,213 prevented Hullinger from withdrawing his claim until 6 months after he made his written claim to the claims board. Thus, the first day on which he could withdraw his claim would be September 24, 1992. Accordingly, Hullinger had 6 months from that date in which to file suit in the district court; he therefore was required to file suit by March 24, 1993. However, Hullinger argues that his case is distinguishable from Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491, 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991), in that here the claims board took the affirmative action of setting the matter for hearing on a date certain. But there is nothing in the act which contemplates the tolling of the limitations period or the granting of an extension of the limitations period because the claims board has set a date for hearing. Hullinger argues further that the correct interpretation of Coleman is that a claimant has at least 6 months, rather than only 6 months, from the first day on which the claim may be withdrawn from the claims board in which to bring suit. But this contention overlooks our observation in Coleman that the holding therein ensures that effect is given to the legislative intent embodied in §§ 81-8,213 and 81-8,227 and that both are applied in a consistent and commonsense fashion. Furthermore, fourth-quarter claimants are given the same opportunity as those who file earlier to withdraw their claim and file suit within 6 months thereafter. 237 Neb. at 501, 466 N.W.2d at 533. The interpretation Hullinger urges would allow a claimant to file a claim with the claims board just before 2 years after the accrual of the cause of action, wait however long until just before final disposition of the claim by the claims board to withdraw the claim, and then receive an additional 6 months in which to file suit in the district court. Such an interpretation does not comport with the purpose of a statute of limitations, which provides a period of repose designed, if asserted, to prevent recovery on stale claims. Keefe v. Glasford's Enter., 248 Neb. 64, 532 N.W.2d 626 (1995). The mischief which a statute of limitations is intended to remedy is general inconvenience resulting from delay in assertion of a legal right which it is practicable to assert. Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962). The main purpose of a statute of limitations is to notify the defendant of a complaint against him or her within a reasonable amount of time so that the defendant is not prejudiced by having an action filed against him or her long after the time he or she could have had to prepare a defense against a claim. West Omaha Inv. v. S.I.D. No. 48, 227 Neb. 785, 420 N.W.2d 291 (1988). The district court correctly determined that Hullinger's action is time barred.