Opinion ID: 1452126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Converted Wetlands

Text: As noted, the dispute regarding the USDA's converted wetlands determination centers on the word possible as used in the phrases making the production of an agricultural crop possible and such production would not have been possible. 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6)(A). Clark argues for a strict definition of the term possible that would exempt from Swampbuster protection any land upon which any quantity or quality of agricultural commodity could have been grown prior to manipulation. The USDA interprets the term possible in a practical sense, treating as conversion those actions that make a wetland more suitable for growing agricultural commodities. See National Food Security Act Manual § 514.20(d) (3d ed., amend.4, Sept. 1999) (Making production possible means manipulation: which allows ... production of an agricultural commodity where such production was not previously possible, or making an area farmable more years than previously possible, or which reduces crop stress and allows increased crop yields....). The USDA's position also is reflected in Finley's December 10, 2004 letter to Clark in which he stated, Your manipulation by filling in on this wetland area is considered an alteration that makes the area more farmable which is a violation of the Swampbuster provisions. (Emphasis added). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, that language is conclusive absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. Therefore, if the intent of Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute's language, the judicial inquiry must end. United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir.2000) (internal quotation omitted). In reviewing statutory language, we do not read individual words in isolation, but rather, we read them in the context in which they are used and in the context of the statute as a whole. In re Benn, 491 F.3d 811, 814 (8th Cir.2007). Read in isolation, the term possible might appear unambiguous, and Clark's strict interpretation might seem appropriate. We believe, however, that read in context, the phrases containing the word possible are ambiguous. The phrases describe the production of agricultural commodities  commercial biological processes in which success might be measured by several different standards, for example, strictly in terms of technical growth or in terms of commercial feasibility. As aptly noted by the district court, Clark's position, if accepted, would exclude from protection all wetlands that were in any measure farmable prior to manipulation. The USDA described Clark's position as follows, [Clark's] construction would mean that, if the land could have occasionally produced one stunted ear of corn or pod of soybeans prior to being filled, there could be no conversion of a wetland triggering the [16 U.S.C.] § 3821 bar on participation in federal farm programs. Appellee's brief at 17. We agree that such a result would be absurd as it would remove from protection vast areas of wetlands. We find no suggestion in the Swampbuster provisions that Congress intended to exclude from protection all wetlands that might support some de minimis growth of agricultural commodities. Further, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the general purpose of the statute, which we previously recognized as an effort to combat the disappearance of wetlands through their conversion into crop lands.... Gunn v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 118 F.3d 1233, 1235 (8th Cir.1997). In addition, Clark's preferred interpretation would render the language of 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6)(B)(ii) superfluous. That subsection provides that a wetland is not considered a converted wetland if natural conditions (e.g. drought) permit the occasional production of an agricultural commodity not assisted by an action of the producer that destroys natural wetland characteristics. Id. Clark's interpretation of the term possible would necessarily exclude from the definition of converted wetlands any and all wetlands that might from time to time be production-capable regardless of whether or not a manipulation to the land destroys natural wetland characteristics. Id. Under Clark's view, a categorical exemption would precede and render superfluous the manipulation limitation contained in § 3801(a)(6)(B)(ii). The USDA's interpretation of the term possible, as reflected in Finley's letter and in the National Food Security Act Manual, is not contained in a regulation born of the rulemaking process, and does not appear to have the force of law. St. Mary's Hospital, 416 F.3d at 914 (internal quotations omitted). As such it is not entitled to the high level of deference afforded under the rule of Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Nevertheless, the interpretation arises from the agency's application of its technological expertise based on a body of experience and informed judgment and is therefore entitled to respect. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, 65 S.Ct. 161. For the reasons set forth above, we believe the USDA acted within its authority in interpreting an ambiguous statutory term, and we find the USDA's interpretation to be a persuasive, practical, and permissible interpretation of the statute. Applying this definition, it is beyond dispute that Clark manipulated the wetlands in question for the purpose of making the production of an agricultural commodity more feasible. She admitted this in her court filings and in a January 1, 2005 letter to the COE. Because the definition of the term converted wetland focuses on purpose or effect in the alternative, the USDA was not required to prove that Clark, through manipulation of the wetlands, was successful in her efforts to make the production of an agricultural commodity possible. 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6)(A).