Opinion ID: 2613839
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Heading: Substantial Impairment of Access

Text: A long line of cases in Colorado have dealt with impairment of an abutting landowner's right of access and the effect of the impairment on the damage issue in an eminent domain proceeding. See, e. g., Shaklee v. County Comm., 176 Colo. 559, 491 P.2d 1366 (1971); Hayutin v. Highway Department, supra ; Thornton v. Colo. Spgs., 173 Colo. 357, 478 P.2d 665 (1970); Majestic Hts. v. Co. Comm., 173 Colo. 178, 476 P.2d 745 (1970); Troiano v. Colorado Department of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448 (1969), compare, Minnequa Co. v. Denver, supra ; Radinsky v. Denver, supra ; Gayton v. Colorado, 149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899 (1962); Boxberger v. State Highway Commission, 126 Colo. 526, 251 P.2d 920 (1952); Denver Bank v. Commissioners, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d 283 (1940); Denver Railway Co. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 P. 904 (1919); Pueblo v. Strait, supra ; Denver Circle R. Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 P. 714 (1887); Whitsett v. Union D. & R. Co., 10 Colo. 243, 15 P. 339 (1887). The varying factual patterns and the technical legal distinctions encompassed in the cited cases foreclose us from making more than a statement of the general rules that govern the determination of whether an abutting landowner has suffered substantial loss or impairment of access which is compensable. The general rule is that an abutting landowner is entitled to compensation for limitation or loss of access only if the limitation or loss substantially interferes with his means of ingress and egress to and from his property. Shaklee v. County Comm., supra ; Gayton v. Colorado, supra. In determining whether there has been substantial interference with a landowner's access, we have declared that inconvenience caused by the required use of a more circuitous route to gain access to property does not constitute substantial impairment of access. Hayutin v. Highway Department, supra ; Thornton v. Colo. Spgs., supra ; Toriano v. Colorado Department of Highways, supra; Radinsky v. Denver, supra . The rationale for denying compensation for limitation or loss of access manifested by circuity of route is that the inconvenience suffered by the landowner is identical in kind to that suffered by the community at large, and the landowner's inconvenience is only greater in degree. See Gayton v. Colorado, supra. Covey, Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, supra. In our view, whether or not property is actually taken is immaterial to the issue of damages to the remainder of the property for loss or limitation of access. The same criteria must be used in both instances. Compensation is only required when the remainder is damaged by a substantial limitation or loss of access. State Commissioner of Transportation v. Charles Investment Corporation, 143 N.J.Super. 541, 363 A.2d 944 (1976); State v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 207 S.E.2d 870 (1974). Any other result would create serious problems of fairness to landowners similarly situated. See State Commissioners v. Charles Investment Corporation, supra. In State v. Easley, supra, the Virginia State Highway Commission instituted condemnation proceedings to acquire a small portion of the Easley's land for improvement of a highway. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in permitting the commissioners to consider as damages to the remainder the reduction in access of the land to the highway as a result of the installation of curbing which had openings and provided Easley with reasonable access to the highway. The court stated that an abutting landowner's right of access to a public road is subordinate to the police power of the state to reasonably control the use of streets so as to promote the public health, safety, and welfare. The same principles were held to apply when regulation of access occurred conjointly with a compensable taking of property. Respondents rely heavily on the opinion in Boxberger v. State Highway Commission, supra . In Boxberger, supra, Justice Holland declared that a landowner could recover damages to the remainder of his property caused by a substantial impairment of access when part of his property was actually taken. The proper measure of damages, according to Boxberger, was the difference between the value of the land and its use for any and all kinds of purposes before the disturbance or destruction of such rights, and the value of the land minus any access or disturbed or inconvenient access to the highway. Id. at 535, 251 P.2d 920. To the extent that Boxberger is still good law today, the facts before us in this case are different and must be distinguished. In Boxberger, the landowner's access rights were taken in totality by the Highway Department. In view of the substantial impairment of access in the Boxberger case, it was proper to consider the limitation or loss of access in determining damages to the remainder. By contrast, the limitation of access in this case did not constitute a total taking or even a substantial impairment of access. Both the court of appeals and the trial court erred in concluding that the respondents' access had been substantially impaired based upon the rationale in Boxberger v. State Highway Commission, supra . The trial court's determination that respondents' access had been substantially impaired is a question of law, and thus, subject to review on appeal. Shaklee v. County Comm., supra , Narciso v. State, 114 R.I. 53, 328 A.2d 107 (1974). The record does not support a determination that respondents' access was substantially impaired as a matter of law. The before and after condition of respondents' land is of critical importance. Prior to the condemnation proceeding, respondents had two direct points of access onto State Highway 50. After the condemnation occurred, respondents' access was limited to the extent that it was necessary to travel approximately 300 feet east on the frontage road to gain access to State Highway 50. However, respondents retained two direct points of access to the frontage road. As a matter of law, the respondents' access was not substantially impaired. See, State Commissioner of Transportation v. Charles Investment Corporation, supra . (Where owner's access to the road immediately in front of his property is unchanged and unaffected, there is no deprivation of access such as to entitle the owner to compensation.) See also, Hayutin v. Highway Department, supra ; Thornton v. Colo. Spgs., supra ; Troiano v. Colo. Dept. of Hwys., supra; Radinsky v. Denver, supra . (Mere circuity of route occasioned by a public improvement does not constitute substantial impairment of access.) In the opinion of respondents' appraiser, access was impaired because of respondents' required use of a more circuitous route to gain access onto the highway. Damages to property occasioned by circuity of route are generally not compensable, and should not have been considered by the jury in determining damages to the remainder.