Opinion ID: 1826904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying collins' batson objection.

Text: Collins next argues that the State used its peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner to exclude prospective black jurors from the jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Specifically, Collins complains that the explanations given by the State were not race-neutral and were effectively rebutted by Collins. Under Batson, a defendant must show that (1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to excuse a venire person of the defendant's race; and (3) that there is an inference that the venire persons were excluded on account of their race. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1296 (Miss. 1994) ( quoting Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d 69). In sum, these components constitute the prima facie showing of discrimination necessary to compel the state to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Miss. 1987) ( quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723). The burden then shifts to the State to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for challenging the jurors. Ibid. ( quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23). However, the State's explanation is not required to rise to the level of justification as required for a challenge for cause. Harper v. State, 635 So.2d 864, 867 (Miss. 1994); Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1989); Wheeler v. State, 536 So.2d 1347, 1351 (Miss. 1988). The record reflects that Collins objected to the peremptory challenges exercised against prospective juror number 24, Ms. Erma Wright and number 87, Ms. Ruth Jackson. During this objection, defense counsel conceded that the State accepted two black jurors, but noted that all other prospective jurors are white. Although the trial court did not expressly find that a prima facie case of discrimination had been made, it then proceeded into the full-fledged analysis and thus required the State to proffer its reasons for the peremptory strikes. [3] The pivotal inquiry then is whether the State was able to present a race-neutral explanation for each of the peremptory strikes. Griffin v. State, 607 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Miss. 1992). Determining whether there lies a racially discriminatory motive under the State's articulated reasons is left to the sole discretion of the trial judge. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1350 (Miss. 1987). Moreover, a trial judge's factual findings relative to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges on minority persons are to be accorded great deference and will not be reversed unless they appear to be clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at 1350. With regard to Juror Wright, the State indicated that she had worked either with law enforcement or at the Crime Lab, I'm not sure, but she's been accused of borrowing some dope out of the Crime Laboratory and was excused from employment related thereto. After being questioned by the Court, the State indicated that law enforcement tells me that she was released because of that. The State also indicated that because Ms. Wright was a black female she would be ideal in this case to serve as a juror. At best borrowing dope is grounds for termination from employment, at worst it is criminal activity. Despite the characterization, the State was privy to information that this juror had been terminated because she borrow[ed] dope from her employer. This information was received by the State from law enforcement, and the State acknowledged that it was unsure whether or not the district attorney's office was involved in that matter. This Court was faced with a similar situation in Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577 (Miss. 1988). There, we held, [t]he State's information from law enforcement as to the possibility of Street's involvement in criminal activity is not in the record, but again, it does not have to be. Johnson at 584 ( citing Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1352-53). [4] This Court concluded that possible criminal activity was a race-neutral explanation. In light of Johnson, we also find the State's reasons for excluding Juror Wright were race-neutral. The State exercised its second peremptory challenge to strike Jackson. Following a Batson objection, the State gave two bases for excluding Jackson. First, the State indicated that Jackson lived in the neighborhood where this incident took place. Second, the State indicated that Jackson had not been entirely truthful during voir dire when jurors were asked whether any of their family members had been prosecuted by the District Attorney's office. The State possessed information that Jackson was a relative of an individual currently under indictment for two counts of murder and being prosecuted by the same District Attorney's office. In Griffin v. State, 607 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Miss. 1992), this Court held that striking minority jurors whose family members had been convicted of crimes was race-neutral. Moreover, in Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1989) this Court upheld the prosecutor's explanation that jurors were struck because the prosecutor believed that one prospective juror was related to someone who had been tried for a felony by the District Attorney's office. We again hold that the prosecutor's explanation in the case sub judice was race-neutral and therefore withstands Batson scrutiny. Collins, however, insists that he effectively rebutted the explanations provided by the prosecutor. However, the record only reveals rebuttal by defense counsel as to Ms. Jackson. Defense counsel rebutted by stating my rebuttal on that would be, number one, Ms. Jackson did not respond and, therefore, responded negatively when Mr. Horan asked, Have you or any member of your family been prosecuted; and number two, he asked the question or the Court asked the question, Has anyone heard anything about this case, and no one responded. The trial court was faced with information which indicated that Jackson failed to respond when she should have. Moreover, the challenge as to Jackson could have risen to the level of a challenge for cause although it is not required to do so. A juror is disqualified within Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-67 (Supp. 1994) where on voir dire examination he or she has withheld information or misrepresented material facts. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1300 (Miss. 1994) ( citing McNeal v. State, 617 So.2d 999, 1003 (Miss. 1993)). In Mack, this Court upheld the State's challenge for cause where the juror failed to reveal during voir dire that her husband had been tried and acquitted during the same term of court and another indictment was pending. See also Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1351 (Miss. 1987) (juror whose brother was convicted of armed robbery can easily be seen as being potentially prejudiced against the prosecution). Furthermore, Jackson lived in the same community as both the defendant and the victim. This Court has recognized that living near the defendant was a sufficient race-neutral reason. Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 584 (Miss. 1988). A thorough review of the record reveals that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the explanations given by the State were race-neutral, nor was this finding against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly overruled the Batson objection raised by Collins.