Opinion ID: 1233878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The jury's special verdict regarding drug quantity was proper

Text: The jury's special verdict attributed 50 or more grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine to Deitz. The verdict was based on a combination of the amount 9.5 grams of methamphetamine seized from Deitz following the 1998 Kentucky traffic stop, Dilts's testimony that Deitz offered to sell him 14.17 grams of methamphetamine, and Bloor's estimate that he had bought at least 56.58 grams of methamphetamine from Deitz. Deitz argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's special verdict because: (1) the alleged methamphetamine transactions were outside the scope of the conspiracy; (2) Bloor's testimony was inadequate to prove circumstantially that the substance contained methamphetamine; and (3) Bloor's estimate of drug quantity was unreliable. We reject each of Deitz's arguments. First, as we have explained, a reasonable jury could infer from Bloor's and Solgot's testimony that Deitz's frequent drug transactions during the 1990s, and the 1998 Kentucky traffic stop where Deitz was found to possess marijuana (114 grams), methamphetamine (9.5 grams), and cocaine (6.4 grams), were part of the underlying conspiracy. Thus, the jury was entitled to consider the evidence of Deitz's methamphetamine transactions with Bloor. Moreover, we find meritless Deitz's arguments that Bloor's testimony was inadequate and unreliable because Bloor did not describe the appearance of the substance and did not indicate the name by which Deitz referred to it, or state the price he allegedly paid. The case on which Deitz relies, United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 371-72 (6th Cir.1990), is easily distinguishable because it involved an improper drug-quantity calculation by a district court during sentencing rather than a special verdict by the jury. Further, Deitz's argument asks us to substitute our own evaluation for the jury's conclusion about the weight of the evidence and witness credibility, which we may not do. See Talley, 164 F.3d at 996.