Opinion ID: 182629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tellez’ Motion for Acquittal Based on Variance

Text: “The court of appeals reviews the question of whether a variance has occurred de novo.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 235.
“Within the context of a conspiracy, a variance constitutes reversible error only if a defendant demonstrates that he was prejudiced by the variance and that the indictment alleged one conspiracy, but the evidence can be construed only as supporting a finding of multiple conspiracies.” Id. at 23536. Furthermore, “whether single or multiple conspiracies have been shown is usually a question 13 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 of fact to be resolved by the jury and is to be considered on appeal in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 856 (6th Cir. 1994). “To obtain reversal of a conviction because of a variance between the indictment and the evidence produced at trial, a defendant must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) the variance must be demonstrated and (2) the variance must affect some substantial right of the defendant.” United States v. Budd, 496 F.3d 517, 521-22 (6th Cir. 2007). Prejudice to a defendant’s substantial rights due to a variance generally comes in two main forms. One form of prejudice is if the “defendant is not enabled to present his defense and . . . [is] taken by surprise by the evidence offered at trial” due to the degree of variance between the indictment and the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 527. A second form of prejudice, which this Court has dubbed “the primary risk” in variance cases, is “the transference of guilt from defendants involved in one conspiracy to defendants in another conspiracy.” Caver, 470 F.3d at 237. This second risk “increases in direct proportion to the number of defendants, and the number of conspiracies demonstrated at trial.” Id. In this case, Tellez was convicted of conspiring to distribute, or conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in connection with the alleged drug conspiracy. At trial a significant amount of evidence was presented connecting Tellez to the conspiracy. Chapparo testified at trial that he delivered cocaine to Tellez more than twenty times, that he picked up drug proceeds from Tellez more than twenty times, and that Tellez helped him count drug proceeds more than twenty times. Chapparo also identified Tellez’ voice on several calls intercepted on Chapparo’s phone line in which delivery of cocaine and payments for cocaine were discussed. Arturo likewise testified that Tellez was involved in the conspiracy, and that Arturo would give cocaine to Chapparo to deliver 14 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 to Tellez. Arturo also identified Tellez’ voice in several intercepted calls discussing distribution of several dozen kilograms of cocaine, and payment collection. Tellez’ brother and cousin also testified against Tellez pursuant to plea agreements stemming from a federal cocaine conspiracy charge in Texas. Tellez’ brother and cousin testified that they brought and sent Tellez cocaine from Texas to Nashville. The evidence does tend to show that Tellez was involved in two conspiracies, one based in Nashville, and one based in Texas. However, to the extent that there was a variance between the indictment and the evidence at trial in the number of conspiracies demonstrated, this variance did not affect Tellez’ substantial rights. The nature of the two conspiracies was sufficiently similar, as was the evidence of Tellez’ roles, such that Tellez was not in danger of being surprised by the evidence presented against him at trial. Nor was Tellez more likely to be convicted for involvement in the Tennessee conspiracy based on evidence presented regarding the Texas conspiracy. With or without Tellez’ brother’s and cousin’s testimony, ample evidence was presented at trial demonstrating that Tellez was involved in a conspiracy to distribute the 500 grams or more of cocaine for which he was convicted. E. Use of Acquitted Conduct in Calculating Tellez’ Offense Level 1. Standard of Review “This court reviews a constitutional challenge to a defendant's sentence de novo wherever the defendant preserves the claim for appellate review. Where a defendant fails to make an . . . objection, this court must review the claim for plain error.” United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 601 (6th Cir. 2003). 15 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 2. Analysis Tellez contends that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the sentencing court’s finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he was responsible for conspiring to distribute at least 50 kilograms of cocaine, although the jury only convicted him for conspiring to distribute 500 grams of cocaine. Tellez does not contend that the district court failed to find that he was responsible for 50 kilograms of cocaine by a preponderance of the evidence. He limits his challenge to the constitutional issue. This Court held in United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), that “the Sixth Amendment [does not] prevent[] a district court from relying on acquitted conduct in applying an advisory [sentencing] guidelines system. In the post-Booker world, the relevant statutory ceiling is no longer the Guidelines range but the maximum penalty authorized by the United States Code.” Id. at 384 (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, “a post-Booker sentencing court may consider even acquitted conduct if it finds facts supporting that conduct by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Mendez, 498 F.3d 423, 427 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Tellez’ Sixth Amendment argument was foreclosed by this Court’s en banc decision in White. F. Firearm Enhancement to Tellez’ Sentence 1. Standard of Review “A district court’s finding that a defendant possessed a firearm during a drug crime is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.” United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003). 16 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 This Court reviews the district court’s finding of sentencing facts for clear error. The district court’s application of the enhancement framework “will only be clearly erroneous when, although there may be some evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 663. This Court “will uphold the district court’s decision as long as it has interpreted the evidence in a manner consistent with the record. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 664. 2. Analysis Under the Sentencing Guidelines, firearm enhancement analysis has two steps, First, to meet is initial burden, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant possessed the firearm while committing a drug trafficking offense. Second, if the government is successful in meeting its initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 312 (6th Cir. 2005). Tellez contends that there is insufficient evidence that he possessed a gun in connection with the commission of the conspiracy to support the firearm enhancement. Several witnesses testified that they saw Tellez with a “Dillinger” when he was delivering cocaine, and one witness testified that he sold Tellez a Smith and Wesson. Tellez contends that these witnesses are not credible, and that the government failed to conclusively connect Tellez with a firearm. Although the strength of the evidence connecting Tellez with a gun is questionable, concluding that Tellez possessed a firearm is a “permissible view[] of the evidence.” Darwich, 337 F.3d at 664. Moreover, Tellez 17 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 provides no evidence that it was “clearly improbable” that any gun in his possession was not used in connection with the conspiracy. Davidson, 409 F.3d at 312. The district court thus did not plainly err in applying the firearm enhancement to Tellez. G. Application of Career Offender Status to Tellez and Refusal to Depart Downward 1. Standard of Review “This Court reviews de novo a lower court’s determination that a defendant is a career offender for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wood, 209 F.3d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 2000). In so doing, “[t]his Court reviews a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.” United States v. Galloway, 439 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir. 2006). “Moreover, [this Court] review[s] a district court’s factual findings in applying the Sentencing Guidelines for clear error.” Id. This Court reviews a district court’s “ultimate decision” regarding a downward departure “for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Smith, 278 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2002). However, “[t]he Court reviews de novo the issue of whether the district court was aware of its authority to depart downward.” Id. 2. Analysis A defendant qualifies as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines if “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance.” SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1. “In order to determine whether a defendant’s prior conviction is a controlled substance offense for purposes of § 4B1.1, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a categorical approach. Generally speaking, only the fact of the prior conviction and the 18 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 statutory definition of the predicate offense are used to determine whether a prior conviction is a controlled substance offense.” Galloway, 439 F.3d at 322 (internal citations omitted). Tellez’ three prior felony convictions for controlled substance crimes, place him within the definition of a career offender. This Court “generally presumes that district judges are aware that they have [the] discretionary authority [to depart downward from a career offender status].” Smith, 278 F.3d at 610. However, on review this Court can find “that the usual presumption that sentencing courts are aware of their authority to depart does not apply” when a defendant’s “case [falls] outside of the heartland of cases in which the career offender provision is usually applied.” Id. This Court’s downward departure case law is inapposite. Although the district court did find that Tellez was a career offender, this finding did not affect Tellez’ sentence. Tellez was sentenced at an offense level of 37. This offense level is one point more than his base offense level of 36, but one point less than his base level of 36 plus the two-point firearm enhancement. This produced a discretionary Guidelines range of 360 months to life. The district court ultimately sentenced Tellez to 300 months. Although the district court did not explicitly state that it was not considering Tellez’ career offender status, the point calculation used, and Tellez’ sentence of 60 months below the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range, demonstrate that it was not a consideration in the district court’s sentencing. H. Procedural and Substantive Reasonableness of Tellez’ Sentence 1. Standard of Review 19 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 This Court reviews preserved sentencing challenges “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard for reasonableness.” United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2009). However, “[w]here a defendant fails to properly preserve an issue for appeal, that claim is subject to review for plain error only.” Id. at 580. 2. Analysis Tellez objects to the reasonableness of his 300 month sentence, which is 60 months below the suggested Guidelines range of 360 months to life. This Court “review[s] all sentences – whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range – under a deferential abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). This reasonableness review “has two components: procedural and substantive.” Id. “Consequently, [the Court’s] reasonableness review requires inquiry into both the length of the sentence and the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 581 (internal quotations omitted). Before evaluating the procedural reasonableness of Tellez’ sentence, the Court must “determine what standard of review applies” by “determin[ing] whether [defendant] preserved these claims for appeal.” Id. at 578. As the Court held in United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004), “district courts are required, after announcing sentence, to ask the parties whether they have any objections to the sentence that have not previously been raised.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 578. If the defendant fails to raise an error “[w]here the sentencing judge complies with this procedure, the defendant generally forfeits the right to challenge on appeal any procedural errors to 20 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 which he did not object at the time of sentencing.” Id. Such errors will be reviewed for plain error only. All challenges raised at sentencing will be reviewed for reasonableness. Id. at 581. After sentencing Tellez, the district court asked whether Defendants objected to the sentence as required by Bostic. Tellez’ counsel replied that Tellez objected to the firearm and drug quantity enhancements, and to the court’s refusal to depart downward and sentence Tellez to a term of imprisonment closer to the statutory minimum. On appeal Tellez contends that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because: (1) the sentence is outside the appropriate Guidelines range as the district court misapplied the Guidelines by enhancing Tellez’ base offense level using acquitted conduct and a firearm enhancement; and (2) the district court did not adequately explain the chosen sentence. Procedural reasonableness review “begins with a robust review of the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 578. Specifically, [i]n reviewing sentences for procedural reasonableness [the Court] must ensure that the district court: (1) properly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range; (2) considered the other § 3553(a) factors as well as the parties’ arguments for a sentence outside the Guidelines range; and (3) adequately articulated its reasoning for imposing the particular sentence chosen, including any rejection of the parties’ arguments for an outside-Guidelines sentence and any decision to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 581. Tellez first challenges that the district court misapplied the Guidelines by using acquitted conduct and a firearm enhancement to increase his base offense level and advisory sentence range. This challenge was raised below and should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Herrera-Zuniga, 21 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 571 F.3d at 581. As previously discussed, the district court did not abuse its discretion in using either acquitted conduct or the firearm enhancement in calculating Tellez’ offense level. These facts were proved by a preponderance, and Tellez’ resulting sentence was below the statutory maximum. Tellez’ second challenge, that the district court did not adequately explain the chosen sentence – whether it was based on the offense level plus firearm enhancement, or career offender status – was not preserved for appeal. Tellez did not raise this challenge at the sentencing hearing. It should thus be reviewed for plain error only. To establish plain error, a defendant must show: “(1) error[,] (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected defendant’s substantial rights[,] and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Whether or not the district court erred in not clarifying whether Tellez’ sentence was calculated based on his offense level plus a firearm enhancement, or based on Tellez’ career offender status, Tellez fails to demonstrate that there was plain error. Any deficiency in the district court’s explanation did not affect Tellez’ substantial rights as either calculation produces an advisory Guidelines range of 360 months to life, from which the district court departed downward by 60 months. Tellez also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. A defendant “is not required to object to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence to preserve that issue for appeal.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 578. Substantive reasonableness review focuses on the appropriateness of “the length of the sentence.” Id. at 581. This inquiry “take[s] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 22 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 581. In this inquiry the Court “appl[ies] a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness” to “sentences within the Guidelines.” Id. The district court sentenced Tellez to 300 months, which is 60 months below the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. This sentence, like sentences within the Guidelines range, is subject to a “rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness.” Id. Tellez’ arguments regarding the substantive unreasonableness of his sentence focus on the court’s use of the firearm enhancement and acquitted conduct in calculating his base offense level. As discussed previously, the district court did not err in using these factors to calculate Tellez’ sentence. Thus this argument is insufficient to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness for Tellez’ below-Guidelines sentence.