Opinion ID: 2304700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Accomplice Liability Generally

Text: In Chance's case, the unlawful act was the assault on Keesser and the consequential offense not specifically agreed upon in advance was the homicide. Chance argues that an instruction with regard to accomplice liability for an offense that is consequential to the originally contemplated unlawful act should only be given in a felony-murder situation. This Court explained why Chance's contention is without merit in Collins v. State, Del.Supr., No. 232, 1994, 1995 WL 120655 Holland, J. (Mar. 10, 1995) (ORDER). In Collins, the victim was unable to identify which assailant assaulted him during the commission of a robbery. Id. The State sought to hold Collins responsible for the assault committed during the course of the robbery on the theory of Section 271(2) accomplice liability. Id. This Court held that the Superior Court properly instructed the jury that if it found that Collins was an accomplice to the robbery, he could be held responsible for all reasonably foreseeable consequential criminal offenses committed by his confederates in furtherance of the robbery. Id. In Collins, the Superior Court instructed the jury that it could find Collins guilty of acts performed by another if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins intended, that is, it was his conscious object or purpose, to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense and Collins had aided, counseled, or agreed ... to aid the other person in committing the offense. Id. The Superior Court's instructions then continued: Further, if you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that a principal-accomplice relationship existed between the participants with respect to the robbery and you find it is [reasonably] foreseeable that as a consequence of the robbery other offenses might be committed in furtherance of the robbery, then all participants are equally responsible for the consequential crime or crimes without the jury having to find a defendant specifically intended the result of the consequential crime or crimes. Id. If the Chance jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that a principal-accomplice relationship existed between Chance and others with respect to the assault on Keesser, then each of them could be held responsible for the consequential death of Keesser without the jury having to find that Chance specifically intended the result of the consequential offense, i.e., homicide. The record reflects that the Superior Court's initial charge to the Chance jury fairly conveyed that import. Accordingly, although the instruction to the Chance jury with regard to general liability for a consequential offense was not as precise as the instruction in Collins, the instruction as given to the Chance jury was not erroneous. Cf. Probst v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 114 (1988).