Opinion ID: 200671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Sustain the Hobbs Act Conviction.

Text: 45 Finally, Capozzi challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the Hobbs Act conviction. He asserts that the government failed to meet its burden of establishing a nexus between his conduct and interstate commerce. Specifically, he asserts that his violent demand for reimbursement from Gardner Park did not have even a  de minimis effect on interstate commerce. 46 We review de novo a district court's determination that the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury. See United States v. Otero-Mendez, 273 F.3d 46, 50-51 (1st Cir.2001). In doing so, we examine all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with the verdict, and avoiding credibility judgments, to determine whether a rational jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Beckett, 321 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir.2003). The evidence adduced at trial showed that Gardner Park was a business that bought cars from out-of-state. Capozzi, unhappy with the truck that he had purchased from Gardner Park, threatened violence in an attempt to extort McGrath, the owner of Gardner Park, to reimburse him $4,000 for the truck. On these facts, the jury reasonably could have concluded that if the extortion had been successful, Gardner Park's assets would have been depleted by $4,000, at least until it could have resold Capozzi's truck to another customer. 47 One common method for the government to establish the required  de minimis effect on interstate commerce is to show that the defendant's activity minimally depletes the assets of an entity doing business in interstate commerce. United States v. Nguyen, 246 F.3d 52, 54 (1st Cir.2001). To establish a Hobbs Act violation, the government need not show an actual deprivation of assets, but only that a deprivation of the victim's assets would have occurred had the defendant succeeded in the extortion. See United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 122 (1st Cir.1988) (Attempted extortion is also proscribed by [the Hobbs Act] so that it is not material ... whether the property was in fact obtained by the defendant.). 48 Here, if Capozzi had successfully extorted McGrath into giving him $4,000 in exchange for the return of the truck, Gardner Park would have been at least temporarily deprived of the use of the money that Capozzi initially paid for the truck. Such a temporary deprivation of the assets of a company engaged in interstate commerce satisfies the  de minimis effect on interstate commerce element required for a successful Hobbs Act prosecution. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir.1995) (the temporary depletion of ... assets until repayment and the risk of non-payment would be sufficient to satisfy the de minimis interstate commerce requirement); see also United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 365 (7th Cir.1986) (Even a temporary loss of the use of money constitutes a deprivation of property under [the Hobbs Act].); United States v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir.1976) (under the Hobbs Act the loss of the use of money, even temporarily, must be considered a deprivation of property).