Opinion ID: 1262306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Contractor Defense

Text: The issue of the federal contractor defense was submitted to the jury by the following instruction: Contractors who are performing work for the United States government are immune from liability for negligent design or installation methods of equipment if it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that each of the following elements [is] present: (1) The contractors were provided with reasonably precise drawings and specifications as they relate to design and installation method. (2) The product produced by the contractors complied with the government's drawings and specifications as they relate to design and installation method. (3) The contractors informed appropriate government officials of any safety hazards they were aware of but the appropriate government officials were not aware of. If you do not find by a preponderance of the evidence that each of these elements is present, immunity does not apply to the contractors. Hazard contends that, while the instruction correctly reflects the criteria adopted in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 2518, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988), for establishing the federal contractor defense, submission of the issue to the jury was error. [1] The evidence, Hazard argues, showed that the criteria were met and, therefore, Hazard was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. As the Court said in Boyle, whether the facts establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the jury. Boyle, at 514, 108 S.Ct. at 2519. Only if no reasonable jury could find, . . . on the basis of the evidence presented, that the Government contractor defense was inapplicable, id., would Hazard be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A review of the record shows contradictory testimony on a number of matters relating to the Boyle criteria. For example, it is not clear whether the product complied with the government's plans and specificationsthe second prong of the Boyle test. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' administrator for construction projects at Fort Story in 1985, and the Corps' contract administrator for the project at issue here, both testified that the gate and pad were accepted and approved as tendered in conformance with the plans. However, their testimony also contained statements that the plans' specifications were not met if the wheels did not touch the ground, if the grade of the pad caused the gate to open by itself and if the rail at the top of the gate was bent and not flush with the pulley. Hazard discounts these comments, however, contending that acceptance of the project by the Army conclusively establishes compliance with the plans and satisfies the second prong of the test, citing Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corporation, 878 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1479, 108 L.Ed.2d 615, reh. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2199, 109 L.Ed.2d 525 (1990); Smith v. Xerox Corp., 866 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.1989); and Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 721 F.Supp. 1019 (S.D.Ill.1989). These cases are distinguishable from the instant case and do not support Hazard's proposition. In Niemann and Smith, the court found that product acceptance was probative evidence of compliance and was not contradicted by evidence tending to show that the product was not made in accordance with the plans. In the absence of such contradictory evidence, the court found the second prong of Boyle was met. 721 F.Supp. at 1027; 866 F.2d at 138-39. Here, there was testimony tending to show non-compliance with the plans, creating a jury issue as to the second prong of the criteria. In Harduvel, the court stated that [i]f a defect is one inherent in the product or system that the government has approved, it will be covered by the defense, 878 F.2d at 1317, but then went on to say that if the defect is merely an instance of shoddy workmanship the defense is inapplicable regardless of acceptance. Id. Again, the testimony here raised questions as to the workmanship and the adjustments made to correct the problems stemming from the angle on which the pad had been poured. Based on the conflicting testimony in this record, we agree with the trial court that whether Hazard met its burden of proving his entitlement to the federal contractor defense was an issue of fact to be determined by the jury.