Opinion ID: 46734
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence from the Southern District of Texas

Text: Carvajal argues that the Mayes evidence is evidence of a conspiracy separate from the conspiracy for which he was indicted in the Eastern District. He claims several bases of error relying on this assumption. As a preliminary matter, the determination of how many conspiracies were proved at trial is a finding of fact within the province of the jury. United States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1150 (1995). We examine this finding with great deference, overturning it only if the evidence presented at trial would preclude reasonable jurors from finding a single conspiracy. Id. Having reviewed the trial record, we decline to disturb the jury’s finding on this point because there was evidence presented to show that there was a common goal among all the participants of the single conspiracy found by the jury and because the interactions of Carvajal and Mayes were beneficial to the conspiracy charged in the indictment. Id.; see also United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 761-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 870 (1994). We now consider each of Carvajal’s specific enumerations of error. First, Carvajal argues that the Mayes evidence should have been excluded by the district court under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) because it was extrinsic evidence that was unfairly prejudicial to him. The district court ruled that 4 the Mayes evidence was intrinsic to the crime charged, and we review that ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Torres, 114 F.3d 520, 525-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 922 (1997). “[E]vidence of acts committed pursuant to a conspiracy and offered to prove the defendant’s membership or participation in the conspiracy are not extrinsic evidence.” United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1431 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Campos Alvarez v. United States, 516 U.S. 1136 (1996). The evidence of Carvajal’s conversations and dealings with Mayes were intrinsic to the charged conduct because Mayes delivered drugs to Carvajal that he then sold to others, which was the conduct that was charged in the indictment. The government presented at trial a “logical hypothesis” about the evidence obtained from Mayes that connected that evidence directly to the charged behavior. United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 878 (1998). Therefore, this evidence was not “evidence of other crimes, acts or wrongs,” FED R. EVID. 404(b), but evidence of Carvajal’s involvement in the charged conspiracy. There was no abuse of discretion in admitting this evidence. Because the Mayes evidence was intrinsic to the crime charged, we also reject Carvajal’s argument that this evidence constituted a fatal variance in the indictment at trial. United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 375 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Because the . . . evidence proved facts that were alleged in the indictment, there was no variance.”). The indictment against Carvajal covered the time period of 1999-2003 and his activities with unindicted persons, meaning that Carvajal’s interactions with Mayes in 2002 are within the scope of the charging language of the indictment. There was no danger of transference of guilt in this case because the evidence at trial was about one conspiracy: 5 the conspiracy charged in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 858-60 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 987 (1997). Carvajal also raised a constructive amendment of the indictment argument based on the introduction of the Mayes evidence, claiming that the district court’s cautionary instruction on multiple conspiracies allowed the jury to infer any element of conspiracy based on the existence of a separate conspiracy. Because we find that the evidence Carvajal complains of was intrinsic evidence, there was no constructive amendment of the indictment because there was no separate conspiracy.