Opinion ID: 781722
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relationship between Domestic and International Law in Yousef's Prosecution

Text: 71 Jurisdiction over Yousef on Counts Twelve through Nineteen was based on 18 U.S.C. § 32. Yousef argues that this statute cannot give rise to jurisdiction because his prosecution thereunder conflicts with established principles of customary international law. Yousef's argument fails because, while customary international law may inform the judgment of our courts in an appropriate case, it cannot alter or constrain the making of law by the political branches of the government as ordained by the Constitution. 72 Principles of customary international law reflect the practices and customs of States in the international arena that are applied in a consistent fashion and that are generally recognized by what used to be called civilized states. That is, principles of customary international law consist of the  settled rule[s] of international law as recognized through the general assent of civilized nations. 25 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900) (emphasis added); id. at 686, 20 S.Ct. 290; see generally Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law 5-7 (5th ed. 1999) (explaining generally the principles of customary international law). 73 It has long been established that customary international law is part of the law of the United States to the limited extent that where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290 (emphasis added); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.1986) (noting that public international law is controlling only in the absence of controlling positive law or judicial precedent). 74 While it is permissible for United States law to conflict with customary international law, where legislation is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the interpretation that does not conflict with the law of nations is preferred. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804). 26 The Charming Betsy canon comes into play only where Congress's intent is ambiguous. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 128 (2d Cir.2001) (stating that United States courts `are not to read general words ... without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.' (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.1945) (emphasis added))). 75 If a statute makes plain Congress's intent (instead of employing ambiguous or general words), then Article III courts, which can overrule Congressional enactments only when such enactments conflict with the Constitution, see, e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962) (stating that, [i]n dealing with problems of interpretation and application of federal statutes, we have no power to change deliberate choices of legislative policy that Congress has made within its constitutional powers), must enforce the intent of Congress irrespective of whether the statute conforms to customary international law. Thus the Supreme Court stated in The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 3 L.Ed. 769 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.), that while courts are bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land, Congress may manifest [its] will to apply a different rule by passing an act for the purpose. Id. at 423. The Court reaffirmed this principle in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963), stating that Congress may enact laws superseding the law of nations if the affirmative intention of the Congress [is] clearly expressed. Id. at 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671; see also, e.g., Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C.Cir.1988) (holding that under domestic law, statutes supersede customary international law and that statutes are not subject to challenge on the basis of a violation of customary international law); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that the United States may violate international law principles if Congress enacts federal statutes that conflict with international law). It also is established that Congress may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law. United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir.1983). 76 In the event that there is no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision that the court must apply, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, a court should identify the norms of customary international law by looking to the general usage and practice of nations[,] or by [looking to] judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law ...[, or by] consulting the works of jurists writing professedly on public law, United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (Story, J.). However, materials beyond the laws and practices of States, such as the writings of jurists, 27 may serve only as evidence of these principles of customary international law, to which courts may look not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290 (emphasis added); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (relying on The Paquete Habana for the proposition that courts should identify the law of nations primarily from the official acts and practices of States and, secondarily, as evidence of existing state practices, from the writings of scholars). We adopted the teaching of The Paquete Habana and Smith on the appropriate use of the sources of international law in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61, 18 U.S. 153), and in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980), in which we emphasized that, to the extent that we rely on secondary writings by publicists as evidence of international law, we do so only for evidence of what the law really is,  id. at 881 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 77