Opinion ID: 1630596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Effect of the JCEA Action and BJCCA

Text: The taxpayers attack the validity of the judgment in the JCEA action, in which the trial court held that Act No. 99-669 was invalid because it failed to receive sufficient votes in the legislature. They argue that this Court's rationale in BJCCA is inconsistent with the trial court's rationale in the JCEA action. In BJCCA, as previously noted, this Court concluded that, under the facts there presented, whether certain contested bills received sufficient votes in the legislature for passage was a nonjusticiable political question over which the judicial branch lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. According to the taxpayers, the judgment in the JCEA action is likewise void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In its order of January 12, 2009, the trial court in the underlying declaratory-judgment action held: [T]he Court in BJCC[A] held that the determination of whether an Act is passed with a sufficient number of votes is a nonjusticiable political question, and that if the Legislature follows its own rules for the enactment of law, the judicial branch of government lacks jurisdiction to invalidate such enactments. Based on the BJCC[A] case this Court concludes that the trial court in the [ JCEA ] case acted without jurisdiction to determine the validity or invalidity of Act 1999-669. Because Act 2000-215 was declared unconstitutional in Richards v. Izzi, 819 So.2d 25 (2001), Act 2000-215 did not supersede Act 1999-669 nor did it effectively repeal Act 1999-669. Because the court in the [ JCEA ] case lacked jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the Legislature's vote to enact Act 1999-669, the [ JCEA ] ruling did not invalidate Act 1999-669. The issue of the validity of Act 1999-669 turns, therefore, on the precedent established by BJCC[A]. Based on the undisputed facts this Court finds that the Defendants' challenge to the constitutionality of Act 1999-669 raises a nonjusticiable political question. Act 1999-669 was enacted in accordance with the rules of the Legislature. Therefore, Act 1999-669 repealed Act 1967-406 by the express and unambiguous language of said Act 1999-669. The County argues that BJCCA is distinguishable from this case in that it dealt with the sufficiency of votes at a regular session of the legislature and, therefore, did not implicate concerns peculiar to a special session regarding the authority of the legislature vis-a-vis another branch of government, i.e., the executive branch. Act No. 99-669 was enacted at a special session, and the subject matter of the act was not designated by the Governor in the call for the special session. The County notes that pursuant to § 76, Ala. Const. 1901, [w]hen the legislature shall convene in a special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling such session, except by a vote of two-thirds of each house. The County points out that the dispute in BJCCA arose in the context of legislation passed at a regular session and governed by § 63, Ala. Const. 1901, providing for passage of a bill by a majority of each house, unless otherwise provided in the constitution. We must determine whether the court in the JCEA action impermissibly considered and ruled on a nonjusticiable political question, as the taxpayers contend, or whether it permissibly decided a question arising under provisions of the Alabama Constitution that strike the balance of power between the legislative branch and the executive branch of government and, therefore, does not involve a nonjusticiable political question, as the County contends. A court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction. `[T]he authority is clear to the effect that every court of general jurisdiction has judicial power to determine the question of its own jurisdiction.' Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S.Ct. 134, 83 L.Ed. 104 [(1938)]; Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Railway Co., 270 U.S. 266, 46 S.Ct. 263, 70 L.Ed. 578 [(1926)]. Baggett Transp. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 289 Ala. 666, 669, 270 So.2d 800, 802 (1972). In BJCCA, this Court exercised jurisdiction to determine the question of its own jurisdiction based on the facts before the Court in that case and found that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. The record in BJCCA showed the passage of certain bills by a majority of the legislature during a regular session under the rules and procedures by which the legislature determines that a bill receives a sufficient number of votes needed in order to pass. [6] This Court held that judicial review of the legislature's criteria for attaining a simple majority necessary for the passage of a bill was a nonjusticiable political question reserved to the legislature by the separation-of-powers provision of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. III, § 43. 912 So.2d at 205. The question before this Court in BJCCA was whether certain bills in a regular legislative session had passed in accordance with § 63, Ala. Const.1901. 912 So.2d at 207. The Court did not there deal with the interplay of another provision of the constitution, nor did the Court have facts before it indicating that a majority was not attained under any rule or procedure utilized by the legislature. In this proceeding there is a separate provision of the constitution in play, § 76, Ala. Const.1901, requiring a two-thirds majority in order to pass any act in a special session of the legislature the subject matter of which was not designated by the Governor in the call for the special session. The County argues that BJCCA applies only to legislation enacted during a regular session in accordance with § 63 and that it should not be extended to legislation enacted during a special session in accordance with § 76. The County maintains that it is appropriate for the judiciary to resolve issues pursuant to § 76 by resolving the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government. The County argues in its brief as follows: Section 122 of the Alabama Constitution gives the Governor the power to call a special session of the Legislature and requires the Governor to `state specifically in such proclamation each matter concerning which the action of the body is necessary.' Section 76 dovetails with § 122 and requires the Legislature to pass legislation by `two-thirds of each house', rather than by a simple majority, if it wishes to legislate on matters other than those identified by the Governor: `When the legislature shall be convened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling such session, except by a vote of two-thirds of each house.' Ala. Const., § 76. . . . County's brief, at 44-45. The County acknowledges this Court's statement in BJCCA that [o]ur Constitution contains no identifiable textual limitation on the legislature's authority with respect to voting procedures that would permit judicial review of those procedures, 912 So.2d at 221, but argues that if the judicial branch did not review the voting procedures used to pass challenged legislation in a special session, the Governor's power could be compromised. Before the trial court, the County illustrated its argument with an example of an instance that, it said, would frustrate constitutional provisions such as § 76 that call for a heightened majority, i.e., if the legislative practice of counting the votes of those present and voting yielded a vote tally of 1-0. Under this scenario, 100% of the votes cast favor passage, 100% obviously exceeds the requirement of a two-thirds majority, and, under BJCCA, it is not within the power of the Court to second-guess a legislative rule that satisfies the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority. The County's attempt at a reductio ad absurdum argument would also apply with equal force to a vote of 1-0 at a regular session. Acceptance of the County's argument in this proceeding would require this Court to overrule BJCCA, which we neither have been asked to do nor are inclined to do. If facts were presented to this Court, for example, where the record reflected a bill not included in the Governor's call in a special session that was passed by a vote such as 4 to 3 (plainly not a two-thirds majority under any means of legislative calculation, as 4 out of 7 votes is less than two-thirds), then this Court, in the process of invoking its jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the question of its own jurisdiction, would face an entirely different set of facts. However, such facts are not here presented, just as the Court in BJCCA was not presented with facts reflecting that the bills being challenged did not receive a simple majority under any means of legislative calculation. From the record of the proceedings before the trial court in the JCEA action, it is clear that two-thirds of the legislature voted aye under the rules formulated by the legislature for reaching that conclusion. The court in the JCEA action should have looked no further. However, it went beyond that threshold and struck down Act No. 99-669 based on its view of the meaning of the requirement for a two-thirds majority. In so doing, the court in the JCEA action decided a nonjusticiable political question and acted without subject-matter jurisdiction; therefore, its judgment holding Act No. 99-669 invalid is void. Relying upon the principles in BJCCA, we again decline to become involved in a matter as to which the legislature is entitled to rely upon its own rules and procedures, i.e., determining the sufficiency of the votes cast to pass Act No. 99-669. The fact that we here deal with a different provision of the constitution concerning a special session as opposed to a regular session does not bar our application of the principles discussed in BJCCA. As the BJCCA Court stated: In the case before us today, there is no clear constitutional provision binding the legislature to a certain manner of determining whether [`two-thirds of each house'] has voted in favor of a bill [in a special session]. . . . [T]he judiciary should not question the determination by the legislative branch of whether a bill was passed by the requisite [two-thirds] vote of the house. To do so would be to demonstrate a lack of the respect due a coordinate branch of government. 912 So.2d at 221. Under the facts presented, the validity of Act No. 99-669 is a nonjusticiable political question; therefore, the void judgment in the JCEA action had no effect upon it and is not dispositive in this case. Our holding as to this issue requires that we pretermit any discussion of other arguments raised by the parties concerning the JCEA action. [7]
We concluded in Part V.A. that the trial court in the JCEA action lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of Act No. 99-669 because it was presented with a nonjusticiable political question. Only if this Court allowed BJCCA to have prospective application could the trial court's judgment in this proceedingholding that the judgment in the JCEA action was void for want of subject-matter jurisdictionbe reversed. The County contends that, assuming the judgment in the JCEA action is void, the ruling in BJCCA should be applied prospectively only. The County says BJCCA represents either a case of first impression establishing a new principle of law or an overruling of clear precedent on which litigants may have relied. In either event, according to the County, judicial discretion can be applied to determine whether BJCCA should be limited in its retroactive effect. In Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So.2d 291 (Ala.2008), the County says, this Court embraced the three factors outlined in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), for determining whether a decision should be applied prospectively: first, the decision must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied,. . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; second, the court must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation; and, third, the court must weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for `[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.' 990 So.2d at 313 (dissenting opinion of Harwood, J., in Cline v. Ashland, Inc., 970 So.2d 755, 761 (Ala.2007), attached as an appendix to and adopted as the opinion of the Court in Griffin ). The County concludes: These three factors overwhelmingly lead to the conclusion that this Court's decision in BJCCA should be applied prospectively. County's brief, at 60-61. The taxpayers cite authority from this Court stating the rule that retrospective application is the norm. See Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432, 439 (Ala.2001) (In general, with regard to civil matters, prospective-only decision-making within the realm of constitutional law is disfavored. `Since the Constitution does not change from year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective form does not make sense.' (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201, 110 S.Ct. 2323, 110 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring))). This Court was not confronted with a matter of constitutional magnitude in Griffin. We there dealt only with the construction to be accorded the term accrued in § 6-2-30(a), Ala.Code 1975. BJCCA dealt with the application of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers as set forth in § 43 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. Pursuant to our endorsement in Lyles of Justice Scalia's view that prospective-only application of a constitutional principle does not make sense, we decline to give BJCCA prospective application only. [8]