Opinion ID: 4174704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strickland Performance Prong

Text: We begin with Strickland’s performance prong. When assessing whether a petitioner has demonstrated that his attorney’s representation was constitutionally deficient, we look to “the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, and evaluate whether counsel’s performance “fell below an 10 We may begin our analysis with either of Strickland’s two prongs and follow “the practical suggestion in Strickland [that we] consider the prejudice prong before examining the performance of counsel prong” where that approach “is less burdensome to defense counsel,” Lilly, 536 F.3d at 196, or makes it “easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Here, however, neither of those circumstances pertain, as we have a fully developed record from the PCRA hearing at which counsel already testified, the District Court addressed both deficiency and prejudice, and our review of the particular deficiencies alleged here may provide guidance to trial courts and defense counsel that will benefit, not burden, the criminal justice system. See id. (encouraging reviewing courts to review ineffectiveness claims in a way that does not “become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result”). We therefore will address both components of the Strickland inquiry. 17 objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms,” id. at 688. Vickers has met this standard here because his attorney’s failure to ensure that he properly waived his right to a jury trial was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and that this right may only be ceded by a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1973); Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1942). And the importance of this fundamental right is reflected in both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Pennsylvania Criminal Code, which mandate that all waivers of jury trials be in writing, signed by both parties, and approved by the court on the record. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23; 234 Pa. Code § 620. Of course, the touchstone is whether a defendant’s jury-trial waiver is knowing and voluntary, so that the failure to comply with these procedures does not per se establish a constitutional violation. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Parrott, 476 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (3d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. Mallory, 941 A.2d 686, 697-98 (Pa. 2008). At the same time, however, compliance provides strong assurance ex ante that the defendant has been fully apprised of his right to a jury trial and that his waiver is not subject to constitutional challenge. As we have previously encouraged of our colleagues in the District Court in the context of Rule 23 colloquies, such on-the-record assurances by the defendant himself that his waiver is knowing and voluntary will “help[] insulate a jury-trial waiver from later attack by a defendant 18 who claims he did not fully understand the nature of the right before he forfeited it . . . [and] will create a record capable of withstanding subsequent challenges, satisfy the court’s responsibility, facilitate intelligent appellate review, conserve scarce judicial resources, and enhance the finality of criminal convictions.” Lilly, 536 F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under prevailing professional norms, competent defense counsel is expected to ensure a criminal defendant receives the benefit of those well-established procedures. Vickers’s counsel, on the other hand, did not conduct any investigation to determine whether Vickers had been given an appropriate colloquy before his case was scheduled for a bench trial, and simply “assumed there had been a normal waiver at the bar and whatnot like that,” App. 99-100. Had counsel taken the minimal step of reviewing the case file, the docket, or the trial court record to confirm there had been a formal waiver—or had he simply inquired of the trial court, opposing counsel, prior defense counsel, or his own client to verify that a proper waiver had occurred—he would have discovered his assumption was in error and he could have ensured, consistent with the Pennsylvania Code, that the judge engaged in an appropriate colloquy and that Vickers waived his jury trial right in writing before proceeding with a bench trial. Yet, he did not. Nor did counsel review the colloquy form privately with Vickers to confirm that Vickers was apprised of all attendant aspects of his jury-trial right before he waived that right. Although we are sympathetic to the difficult position in which counsel was placed when he inherited this case only weeks before trial, prevailing professional norms required and continue to require counsel in this circumstance to verify, through a review of the record or an inquiry with the court or 19 prior counsel, that the client formally waived his jury trial right. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (holding that counsel’s failure to examine court file on past conviction prior to sentencing constituted deficient performance); cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (finding deficient performance where attorney failed to file a suppression motion “not due to strategic considerations, but because . . . he was unaware of the [constitutional violation]”). Because counsel failed to do so here, his conduct fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.