Opinion ID: 2996334
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The award of medical expert fees.

Text: Each party in a lawsuit ordinarily bears the burden of its own attorneys’ fees unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.V. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983). Section 28 of the Longshoremen’s Act provides the authority for fee and cost-shifting in black lung cases. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a). Section 28(d) of the Longshoremen’s Act provides: In cases where an attorney’s fee is awarded against an employer or carrier there may be further as- sessed against such employer or carrier as costs, fees and mileage for necessary witnesses attending the hearing at the instance of claimant. Both the necessity for the witness and the reasonableness of the fees of expert witnesses must be approved by the hearing officer, the Board, or the court, as the case may be. The amounts awarded against an employer or carrier as attorney’s fees, costs, fees and mileage for witnesses shall not in any respect affect or diminish the compensation payable under this chapter. 33 U.S.C. § 928(d). Zeigler argues that section 28(d) does not provide statutory authority to shift the cost of fees charged by Hawker’s medical experts. It relies on W.V. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), to support is position, but Casey is inapposite. Casey dealt with the recovery of expert fees under the former 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the text of which only provided for the recovery of attorneys’ fees.2 That is not the case here; the text of section 2 Congress legislatively overruled Casey by amending § 1988 to provide that a court, in its discretion, may include expert (continued...) 8 Nos. 01-3211 & 01-3998 28(d) of the Longshoremen’s Act addresses “the reasonableness of the fees of the expert witness” within the context of assessing “as costs, fees and mileage for necessary witnesses” to an employer against whom attorneys’ fees also were assessed. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Casey cited section 28(d) as one of the statutes that “explicitly shift[s] attorney’s fees and expert witness fees.” 499 U.S. at 92 and n.4 (emphasis in original). Zeigler next posits that the fees of a medical expert may not be shifted when that expert does not formally attend the hearing but instead submits medical reports that are admitted into evidence before the ALJ. According to Zeigler, the plain language of section 28(d) limits fees for witnesses to “necessary witnesses attending the hearing at the instance of the claimant.” (Emphasis added.) The Director asserts that expert fees are recoverable whether or not the expert actually appears at a hearing.3 2 (...continued) fees as part of the attorneys’ fee award. See Pub. L. 102-66, § 113(a)(2), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 3 The Benefits Review Board has a long history of awarding claimants the fees for their expert medical reports when the physicians do not appear at the oral hearing. See, e.g., Branham v. E. Assoc. Coal Corp., 19 Black Lung Rep. 1, OWCP No. 236-525867, BRB No. 91-2179 BLA, 1994 DOLBRB LEXIS 639, at  (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1994) (rejecting a Casey argument that an employer could not be liable for costs of a deposition witness who did not appear and testify at a hearing, and stating that “the Board has previously interpreted this statutory language and held that an expert need not testify at the administrative hearing in order for claimant’s counsel to be reimbursed for the costs of obtaining a physician’s opinion”) (citing Hardrick v. Campbell Inds., Inc., 12 B.R.B.S. 265, 270 (1980); Vacchio v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 16 B.R.B.S. 190, 195 (1984); Cahill v. Int’l (continued...) Nos. 01-3211 & 01-3998 9 We begin our analysis of Zeigler’s claim by looking at the language of the statute. The primary rule of statutory interpretation is that words used in statutes must be given their ordinary and plain meaning. United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 291 (7th Cir. 1998). Zeigler argues that the word “attend” means “to be present at.” However, the word has alternative meanings that we find instructive. For instance, Webster’s indicates that “attend” can also mean “to be present,”“to take care of, minister to,” “to serve,” and “to take care or charge.” See WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 85 (2nd ed. 1997). Indeed, the term “present” itself is not dispositively clear, as its definition includes the terms “being . . . under consideration” and “being before the mind.” Id. at 1029. Accordingly, we do not find the word “attending” to be unambiguous, and believe that in the context of these hearings it includes the testimony and reports of expert witnesses that have been presented to the ALJ and thus are “under consideration” and “before the mind.” We note that other terms in the statute perhaps appear clear in isolation, but are similarly indefinite and ambiguous in the context of the statute and regulations. See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy Land Found. For Relief & Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002). For example, the term “hearing” is not defined in the statute or the regulations and is used with qualifying 3 (...continued) Terminal Operating Co., Inc., 14 B.R.B.S. 483, 489 (1981); Pernell v. Capitol Hill Masonry, 11 B.R.B.S. 532, 541 (1979)). 10 Nos. 01-3211 & 01-3998 language in the regulations,4 which indicates that there are various types of hearings in black lung cases.5 Thus, we cannot conclude that “hearing” used in this context necessarily means an oral presentation of evidence at a set date and time, as Zeigler contends. See United States Ex Rel Stinson v. Prudential Ins., 944 F.2d 1149, 1155 (3d Cir. 1991) (In “civil contexts the term ‘hearing’ does not necessarily take the form of a live, formal proceeding.”). The word “witness” similarly is not defined in the statute or regulations, and its various definitions lead us to conclude that it does not mean solely “a person who gives oral testimony at a hearing.”6 In addition, the statutes and regulations provide that a witness may testify by means of a written document. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 924, incorporated by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (the “testimony of any witness may be taken by deposition or interrogatories”); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406 (1971) (holding due process not 4 The regulation subpart governing hearings, 20 C.F.R. § 725 Subpart F, uses the terms “hearing,” id. §§ 725.450 et seq., “full evidentiary hearing,” id. § 725.452(c), “oral hearing,” id. § 725.452(d), and “formal hearing,” id. § 725.454(a). 5 Indeed, Webster’s indicates “hearing” can mean an “opportunity to be heard” or “a session in which testimony and arguments are presented.” WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 599 (2nd ed. 1997). Black’s Law Dictionary echoes this by defining “hearing” as “any setting in which an affected person presents arguments to an agency decision-maker.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (7th ed. 1999). 6 The dictionary defines a witness as including “one who is able to attest as to what took place,” “a person who gives testimony,” “a person or thing serving as evidence,” or “testimony or evidence.” WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1476-77 (2nd ed. 1997) (emphasis added). Black’s defines witness as “one who sees, knows, or vouches for something,” and “one who gives testimony under oath or affirmation (1) in person, (2) by oral or written deposition, or (3) by affidavit.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1596 (7th ed. 1999). Nos. 01-3211 & 01-3998 11 violated by introduction of an ex parte hearsay medical report); 20 C.F.R. § 725.458 (“The testimony of any witness . . . may be taken by deposition or interrogatory. . . .”).7 Indeed, the Longshore Men’s Act incorporates the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 33 U.S.C. § 919(d), which allow for evidence to be submitted on the record without a formal hearing. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 556(d). Reading this statute in context of the usual practice under the BLBA, see Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879-80 (7th Cir. 2002), we give deference to the director’s longstanding and reasonable interpretation of the statute.8 Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 122 S. Ct. 1265, 1270 (2002); North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12; cf. Heinz v. Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund, 303 F.3d 802, 812 n.17 (7th Cir. 2002). In most black lung cases, the parties present evidence in the form of medical reports and other written testimony; seldom do doctors and medical experts appear at an oral hearing to present evidence. Indeed, ALJs typically schedule numerous “hearings” on the same day, allotting no more than an hour or two for the introduction of evidence in the form of narrative reports and deposition testimony. If oral testimony of all medical experts were required in order for a 7 Testimony also is not defined in the statute or regulations. The dictionary defines “testimony” as “evidence in support of a fact or statement,” WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1330 (2nd ed. 1997), and Black’s defines it as “[e]vidence that a competent witness under oath or affirmation gives at trial or in an affidavit or deposition.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1485 (7th ed. 1999). “Expert testimony” is also termed “expert evidence,” which is defined as “[e]vidence about a scientific, technical, or professional issue given by a person qualified to testify because of familiarity with the subject or special training in the field.” Id. at 577-78. 8 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 12 Nos. 01-3211 & 01-3998 successful claimaint to recover their fees, hearings could take more than a day and would be more expensive (with the additional expense also shifting to the employer), medical experts would be unwilling to provide the necessary medical reports because of the time out of their practice that would accompany appearing at such hearings (the dates of which typically change), and the administration of the black lung program would be unduly burdened. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Leonard, 635 F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting the “undesirable burden that would be placed on both the administration of the black lung program and on the energy of the nation’s physicians if black lung medical examiners were required to attend each hearing”). We therefore reject Zeigler’s argument that Hawker can only recover the fees of his medical experts if they appear at the ALJ hearing, and hold that such fees may be recovered when their medical reports are submitted as evidence before the ALJ.