Opinion ID: 347528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: continuance for nixon testimony

Text: 96 Ehrlichman argues on behalf of all three appellants that the trial judge erred in denying their motions for a continuance until former President Nixon was physically well enough to be deposed. We find the contention without merit.
97 On September 4, 1974 Ehrlichman issued a subpoena to Mr. Nixon, returnable on September 30, the day before trial was to begin. Two weeks later the Government also subpoenaed Nixon. On September 18 Ehrlichman filed a one-paragraph motion for a 60-to 90-day continuance, stating that recent public accounts of Mr. Nixon's health suggest that he may be physically unable to testify when called at the trial as now set and that Mr. Nixon's personal appearance at trial is indispensable to Mr. Ehrlichman's defense. Doc. 303. The Government opposed the motion, arguing that it had just as much interest in securing Mr. Nixon's testimony, but that the factual basis for Ehrlichman's motion was entirely speculative. Doc. 306. The Government suggested that the court either conduct an immediate inquiry into Nixon's health or wait to see if Nixon appeared on the date on which the subpoena was returnable. On September 20th the District Court denied the motion for a continuance. Doc. 307. 98 At a pretrial conference held on September 24 Herbert Miller, Nixon's lawyer, reported that his client had been hospitalized the preceding day for tests. Miller requested that the subpoenas be stayed for two weeks until the tests were completed and he had an opportunity to make any appropriate motions regarding the subpoenas. With the assent of all parties it was agreed that Miller would report to the court on Nixon's health by October 3rd. Tr. of Sept. 24th hearing at 7-11. 99 Three days after the conference, Ehrlichman moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 15, for authorization to depose Nixon, for a severance, and for a continuance until Nixon was well enough to be deposed and for at least two weeks thereafter to conduct the deposition. Doc. 353. In this motion Ehrlichman noted that Nixon had informed the court that he was suffering from thrombophlebitis, and as a result requires present hospitalization and treatment. Ehrlichman then asserted that Nixon's condition had been complicated by the lodging of a blood clot in (his) lung, thereby precluding travel to the District of Columbia at this time. Reciting 30 areas in which Nixon was said to have sole and personal knowledge . . . to which he can be expected to testify, Ehrlichman contended that the interests of justice compel . . . a severance, continuance and deposition. The Government again opposed the motion, arguing that it was still premature to conclude that Nixon would be unavailable to testify or that his deposition should be taken. Doc. 354. Ehrlichman's motion was denied orally at the start of trial. Tr. at 3. 100 As agreed at the pretrial conference, on October 3rd Miller filed an affidavit reporting on Nixon's health. Miller's affidavit, based on a telephone conversation with Nixon's physician, stated that the testing of Nixon had been suspended shortly after he had been admitted to the hospital because a pulmonary embolus had been discovered; that a test performed on September 30 indicated the embolus was resolving itself; and that tests were resumed on the 30th and were to be completed by October 4th, at which time Nixon would be released from the hospital. The affidavit went on to state that for 3-6 months Nixon would be receiving anticoagulant medication, and that for an indefinite period of time until his condition stabilized Nixon would be required to avoid prolonged sitting, standing, or walking and any possible trauma. 116 On the basis of this prognosis, Miller filed motions to quash the two subpoenas issued to his client. Docs. 362, 363. 101 Ehrlichman replied to the motion to quash by renewing his motions for leave to depose, a severance, and a continuance, again noting and expanding on the issues on which Nixon's testimony was needed. Doc. 396. Haldeman filed a separate motion with the same requests, and listed 34 areas as to which Haldeman needed Nixon's testimony. Doc. 371. The Government did not respond to the appellants' motions, but opposed Nixon's motion to quash on the ground that the supporting affidavits failed to establish that Nixon would be unable to testify under any conditions at any time during the trial. Doc. 386. The Government argued that at most the court should appoint an independent panel of doctors to assess Nixon's health and ability to testify. The Government stated, however, that it would no longer insist upon Nixon's testimony as part of its direct case because it intended to authenticate the White House tapes with other proof. 102 On October 17 a hearing was held on the motion to quash. 117 At that time Miller reported that his client's prognosis was good, and predicted that within 3-4 weeks we would no longer wish to raise the health issue . . .. Tr. 2953. Ehrlichman's lawyer then stated that we are not pressing for an immediate disposition of this . . . (but) neither do we want to place ourselves in a position where we waive anything. The court deferred ruling on the motion to quash, and requested an updated medical report from Nixon within three weeks. Id. 2957. 103 On November 7, 1974, Nixon's counsel filed his report. Doc. 452. It stated that nine days earlier Nixon had undergone surgery and experienced post-operative shock, hemorrhaging, and other complications. He had been on the critical list for a week, and was expected to be hospitalized for an additional ten days to two weeks. Thereafter, he would be precluded from any activity requiring substantial mental or physical effort . . . (for) two or three months. 118 104 On November 13, 1974 Judge Sirica appointed a panel of three physicians to make investigation concerning Nixon's condition and ability to testify. Doc. 472. On November 29 the panel submitted its unanimous report, estimating that, barring further complications, Nixon would be able to travel to Washington to testify by mid-February, to testify near his home in earlier February, and, starting January 6, would be able to be deposed in no more than two well-spaced daily sessions of no more than one hour each. Doc. 511. 105 After receiving the medical report, all three appellants filed motions to depose Nixon and to continue the trial until that was possible. Docs. 516, 524, 525, 526. Haldeman and Ehrlichman repeated the statements from their earlier motions concerning their need for Nixon's testimony; Mitchell listed a number of areas as to which Nixon's testimony allegedly would be vital to Mitchell's defense. Each appellant waived his right to a sequestered jury during the requested continuance. Docs. 524, 526, 527. Co-defendant Mardian filed a statement opposing the continuance and the suggestion to unsequester the jury, Doc. 529; co-defendant Parkinson opposed only the latter, Doc. 530. Mr. Nixon took no position other than to note that even if he were well enough to be deposed starting January 6, he would not be well enough to prepare prior to that date, and would need a substantial amount of time to do so. Doc. 532. The United States opposed the motions of all three appellants. Doc. 524. 106 In an opinion dated December 5, 1974, discussed infra, the court denied the motions. 119 The trial therefore proceeded as scheduled, and the last defendant completed his case on December 19. After a brief rebuttal case by the Government, the summations began the same day and stretched over the next week. The jury began deliberating on December 30 and returned its verdict on January 1, 1975.B. General Principles 107 Defendants sought a continuance here to enable them to produce an unavailable witness who, they alleged, could offer evidence favorable to the defense. Criminal defendants plainly have a substantial interest in being able to present the testimony of such witnesses to the jury. Indeed, this interest implicates constitutional values, since the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is in plain terms the right to present a defense. 120 On the other hand, the Government generally has a substantial interest in avoiding disruptions of a court's calendar and in having guilt or innocence promptly adjudicated. 121 Accordingly, in ruling on motions for continuances trial judges must carefully evaluate and then balance the defendant's need for the continuance against the Government's interest in going forward. Because no firm rules can be articulated as to when a continuance is required, 122 the decision to grant a continuance is vested in the trial judge's discretion, and reviewable only when such discretion has been abused. 123 108 From the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this and other circuit courts, at least some of the factors that should be considered by district judges in evaluating the competing interests can be readily discerned. First, the court must assess the likelihood as it appears from defendant's motion for a continuance, his supporting papers, and from anything else in the record that defendant will be able to and will produce the missing evidence if the continuance were granted. 124 Second, the court must assess the likelihood again based primarily on defendant's showing that the evidence will be favorable to the defense and, if so, that it will be significant. 125 Third, the court must determine whether the defendant acted with diligence in attempting to secure the missing evidence in time for trial. 126 Finally, the court should consider the length of the continuance being requested and the burdens that would be placed on the Government and the court if the request were granted. 127 C. Application of Law to Facts 109 In denying the final requests for a continuance, 128 the district judge focused on the delay and burden that would be entailed in securing Nixon's testimony, and on the likelihood that the testimony would be favorable to and significant for appellants' defenses. The court found that securing the testimony would necessitate a lengthy continuance, during which time the jury would have to be sequestered. 129 It concluded that the defendants had failed to justify such a prolonged continuance, 130 and had failed to show, as required by Rule 15, that a deposition of Nixon was necessary to prevent a failure of justice. 131 110 The District Court's exclusive focus on the burdens of a continuance and the likely significance of Nixon's testimony was entirely proper. Appellants were not responsible for Mr. Nixon's absence, and thus could not be taxed for lack of diligence in seeking a continuance. And although there was no guarantee that Nixon would recover his health so as eventually to be able to testify, there was nothing in the medical reports suggesting the contrary. Thus the dispositive question before the District Court was whether the burdens of granting an indefinite continuance outweighed the likely value of Nixon's testimony. 111 The District Court's conclusion that securing Nixon's testimony would have required a lengthy delay is abundantly supported by the record. The court relied on three factors in reaching its conclusion. First, it predicted, based on representations made to it by counsel, that all the evidence would be presented well before January 6th, the earliest possible date Nixon would be well enough to begin the deposition; 132 with hindsight, we know that all defendants rested two and one half weeks before January 6th. Second, the court agreed with Nixon's uncontroverted statement that even if he were physically able to be deposed starting January 6th, the deposition still could not commence then because he would need time to review his voluminous records. 133 Finally, the court noted that the deposition process itself would be very lengthy, since Nixon's health permitted only two hours of questioning per day. 134 Indeed, before learning of these time limitations, Ehrlichman and Haldeman each had estimated independently that deposing Nixon would take not less than two weeks to conclude. Thus Haldeman's estimate in his final motion for continuance that a month or more would be required to secure Nixon's testimony, and the Government's estimate of at least four or five weeks, seem, if anything, understated. 112 That granting a continuance of this duration would have entailed significant risks and costs is plain. First, leaving the case in limbo might have made it difficult for the court and the parties opposing the continuance Mardian and the Government to carry on their normal business during the continuance. Second, because of the public attention that would have been focused on the adjourned trial (and perhaps on the jurors), and because neither the Government 135 nor co-defendants Mardian and Parkinson had waived their rights to a sequestered jury, the court virtually would have been compelled to keep the jury sequestered during the continuance. 136 This obviously would have disrupted the lives of the jurors, the alternatives, and their guards, and would have been costly to the Government as well. Third, even with the jury sequestered, the Government and Mardian might have been prevented from receiving a fair trial. The jury might have resented the prolonged period of idleness and consciously or otherwise blamed all the defendants for it, and in any event, after a long delay the evidence would have been less fresh in the jurors' minds during their deliberations. Finally, regardless of prejudice, Mardian had a substantial interest in a quick ending to the cloud of uncertainty that had enveloped him, and the public a similar interest in a speedy resolution of this major trial. 113 The question before us, then, is whether, in light of these costs, the District Court abused its discretion in concluding that appellants had failed to show that Nixon's testimony would be of such importance as to warrant a continuance. After carefully reviewing the proffers of all three appellants, we conclude it did not. We reach this conclusion for three reasons. 114 First, not only was there no assurance that Nixon's testimony would be favorable to the defense, as the District Court observed, 137 but also, to a great extent, appellants failed to indicate what testimony they hoped to elicit. Appellants' proffers frequently listed topics they wanted Nixon to discuss, without explaining the reasons they wanted him to discuss the topics, i. e., what they expected to gain from his testimony on those topics. 138 115 Second, Nixon's testimony on many of the topics listed in appellants' proffers would have been cumulative of other evidence which was or could have been produced, as the District Court also noted. In several instances one or more appellants sought Nixon's testimony regarding conversations Nixon had with persons who were neither defendants nor unindicted co-conspirators; 139 in other instances, one appellant sought Nixon's testimony concerning discussions in which other appellants had participated; 140 in still other cases, appellants desired Nixon's testimony about conversations that either were taped or were closely related in time and subject matter to taped conversations. 141 Even where an appellant sought Nixon's testimony relating to an untaped, unique talk between Nixon and that appellant alone, Nixon's testimony still would have been cumulative of the appellant's own testimony, and because Nixon was himself an unindicted co-conspirator the corroborative value of his testimony was at best questionable, as the District Court observed. 142 116 Third, Nixon could not have disputed the central propositions in the Government's case, and thus his testimony would have been of marginal significance. The Government's case against the appellants for the most part rested on evidence of their participation in discussions and decisions outside Nixon's presence from January 1972 to March 1973 and on tape recordings of their participation in discussions and decisions within his presence starting in March 1973. Nixon could not have directly contradicted testimony that Mitchell approved the Gemstone plan, see pages --------- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 51-52 of 559 F.2d supra ; suggested that files be burned, id. at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 53 of 559 F.2d; participated in the launching of the cover story and the knowing payment of hush money, id. at ---------, ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 54-57, 58 of 559 F.2d; and suggested that McCord be given veiled assurances of clemency, id. at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 56 of 559 F.2d. Nor could Nixon have contradicted the testimony that Haldeman was informed of the Gemstone plan before it was launched, and that both Ehrlichman and Haldeman were informed of the responsibility of CRP for the Watergate burglary shortly after it occurred, id. at --------- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 52-53 of 559 F.2d; that they each ordered that files be destroyed, id. at ---- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 53 of 559 F.2d; each used the CIA to stall the FBI investigation, id. at --------- of --- U.S.App.D.C., 53-54 of 559 F.2d n. 15; and each participated in the decision to raise and distribute hush money, id. at ---------, --------- of 181 U.S.App.D.C., at 55-57, 58 of 559 F.2d. Nixon could not even have impeached indirectly the credibility of the Government's key witnesses since Magruder and LaRue did not testify to any conversations with Nixon, and most if not all the conversations with Nixon that Dean testified about were taped. And of course Nixon could not have disproved what the tapes revealed. Thus Nixon's testimony would have been collateral to the essence of the defense cases, which consisted of denials of the Dean, Magruder, and LaRue testimony. 117 The limited significance of Nixon's testimony is clearly revealed by those portions of appellants' proffers that are specific. Because of the large number of topics listed on the proffers, we discuss only general problems with illustrative examples. 118 (a) In a few instances a topic listed on one of the proffers does not even appear relevant, let alone significant, to the issues involved in the trial. For example, Ehrlichman indicated he wanted Nixon to testify that Ehrlichman had urged the President in 1972 to discontinue prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg, and that Nixon had directed Ehrlichman in April 1973 to meet with the judge presiding over the Ellsberg trial. The proffer does not indicate why such testimony would be relevant, and Ehrlichman did not testify about these matters when he was on the witness stand. 119 (b) In a great number of instances Nixon's testimony was desired to establish a point not in contention. For example, Mitchell indicated he wanted Nixon to testify that matters discussed by Mr. Nixon with Mr. Colson presumably relating to clemency and matters discussed with Messrs. Dean, Haldeman and Ehrlichman on March 21, 1973 presumably relating to the payment of hush money were not conveyed by Mr. Nixon to Mr. Mitchell. But the Government never claimed otherwise. Rather, it showed that Mitchell was made aware by Dean that veiled assurances of clemency had been given to Hunt, see Tr. 2992-2993, 2998-2999, and by Dean and LaRue of Hunt's March, 1973 money demands, Tr. 3086-3090, 6728-6732. That Mitchell may not have been informed of the details of Nixon's conversations is of little consequence. 120 (c) In largest measure, appellants sought Nixon's testimony to provide indirect support to their defenses. For example, Haldeman and Ehrlichman each indicated they wanted Nixon to testify that he instructed them to speak to Dean about the Nixon Estate plan in June, 1972; not to make offers of clemency or to limit the FBI investigation; not to spend time on Watergate; and to meet at LaCosta to discuss strategy regarding the Senate Watergate Committee. Again, the Government did not contend that contrary instructions had been given. But Haldeman and Ehrlichman apparently desired this testimony in the hope that the jury would infer that they talked to Dean only about the Nixon Estate in June 1972, talked only about the Watergate Committee at LaCosta, and did not violate Nixon's instructions regarding work on Watergate, clemency, or the FBI. The weakness of these inferences is patent. 121 In sum, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested continuance. Accordingly its decision on this point must be affirmed. 122