Opinion ID: 2330749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The approach advocated by BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) would unnecessarily limit recovery for casual or involuntary trespass, contravening the plain language of our statute and placing us at odds with other jurisdictions

Text: ¶ 37 As the majority points out, our timber trespass scheme includes two statutes not just one, former RCW 64.12.030 (Code of 1881, § 602) and RCW 64.12.040. Subsection.030 is a basis for liability, while subsection.040 mitigates that liability in certain circumstances. At the time of the fire at issue in this case, former RCW 64.12.030 imposed treble damages on anyone who cut down, girdled or otherwise injured, or carried off a tree: Whenever any person shall cut down, girdle or otherwise injure, or carry off any tree, timber or shrub on the land of another person, or on the street or highway in front of any person's house, village, town or city lot, or cultivated grounds, or on the commons or public grounds of any village, town or city, or on the street or highway in front thereof, without lawful authority, in an action by such person, village, town or city against the persons committing such trespasses or any of them, if judgment be given for the plaintiff, it shall be given for treble the amount of damages claimed or assessed therefor, as the case may be. While subsection .030 creates liability and imposes treble damages, subsection .040 provides that treble damages are not always appropriate and allows a plaintiff to recover single damages when harm to timber is caused by casual or involuntary trespass: If upon trial of such action it shall appear that the trespass was casual or involuntary, or that the defendant had probable cause to believe that the land on which such trespass was committed was his own, or that of the person in whose service or by whose direction the act was done, or that such tree or timber was taken from uninclosed woodlands, for the purpose of repairing any public highway or bridge upon the land or adjoining it, judgment shall only be given for single damages. RCW 64.12.040. Subsection .040 also allows single damages recovery when there is a mistaken belief of ownership. Id. ¶ 38 When interpreting our timber trespass scheme, we must look at both subsections.030 and .040. As the majority points out, we construe statutes in context, examining all that the legislature has said on the matter, including provisions in related statutes. Majority at 161 (citing Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)). The majority criticizes Jongeward for focusing too narrowly on two words, `otherwise injure.' Majority at 161. I agree that analysis of statutory language cannot be artificially limited to a few select words. But the majority commits the same error as Jongeward, limiting its analysis to one word, trespass, and failing to account for the relationship between subsections.030 and .040. ¶ 39 As a result, the majority interprets subsection .030 in a way that undermines subsection .040. The majority holds that liability under subsection .030 must be a trespass vi et armis,  a direct act[] causing immediate injur[y]. Majority at 162. But it is a rare case that will involve direct action, comparable to cutting down or girdling, that is also casual or involuntary. The majority makes it extremely unlikely that any plaintiff will ever recover single damages, effectively reading those words out of the statute. ¶ 40 No other jurisdiction that we have found takes an approach anything like this. Nor is this approach advocated by the parties. [1] This statute and others like it have been litigated throughout the United States for over a century, and until now no court has ever superimposed upon a timber trespass statute the ancient common law distinction between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case. The reason for this is simple: doing so virtually eliminates single damages recovery for casual or involuntary harm, which is plainly actionable under many of these statutes including our own. ¶ 41 More to the point, the majority's approach belies the statute's history. We borrowed our timber trespass statute from Oregon, [2] and Oregon borrowed its statute from the New York Field Code. [3] This is significant, because neither Oregon nor New York bases its statutory analysis on the distinction between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case. Thus it is highly unlikely that our legislature, in borrowing those states' laws, somehow intended to create a law wholly unlike them yet completely identical in its text. I cannot take this illogical leap. ¶ 42 Not only is there no support for this ancient distinction in Oregon and New York law or our own case law, but three decades ago we abandoned the distinction between trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case in a statute of limitations case. In Stenberg v. Pacific Power & Light Co., we called the distinction fabricated, noting that it is `now rejected by most courts, and would appear to be slowly on its way to oblivion.' 104 Wash.2d 710, 718-19, 709 P.2d 793 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zimmer v. Stephenson, 66 Wash.2d 477, 482-83, 403 P.2d 343 (1965)). The distinction has been banished from our cases and discredited, and yet the majority would resurrect it now in a completely new context in which it has never been previously applied. We have no clear indication that our territorial legislature had this distinction in mind or that it was doing anything more than borrowing a useful statute from Oregon. Absent more compelling evidence of legislative intent, I would adhere to our more recent precedent abandoning the distinction. ¶ 43 The majority approach would effectively limit single damages recovery to the mistaken belief of ownership defense. See RCW 64.12.040. We should not equate casual or involuntary action with action taken under a mistaken belief of ownership. The legislature chose to include in the statute both casual or involuntary and the mistake of ownership defense, and we must assume that in using different words, the legislature meant to indicate different things. In re Pers. Restraint of Dalluge, 162 Wash.2d 814, 820, 177 P.3d 675 (2008) (When the legislature uses different words in the same statute, we presume the legislature intends those words to have different meanings.). Moreover, as discussed below, this interpretation is contrary to every other jurisdiction that has interpreted casual or involuntary as meaning accidental or negligent. ¶ 44 In ruling out liability for casual or involuntary trespass, the majority unnecessarily limits single damages liability for accidental, negligent, and involuntary conduct, placing us at odds with other jurisdictions with similar statutes. Equally troubling, the majority's approach contradicts Oregon, Alaska, and New York law. All have similar casual or involuntary trespass language. Thus, these states' interpretations are persuasive in interpreting our own statute. See Green River Cmty. Coll., Dist. No. 10 v. Higher Educ. Pers. Bd., 107 Wash.2d 427, 432, 730 P.2d 653 (1986); cf. State v. Carroll, 81 Wash.2d 95, 109, 500 P.2d 115 (1972). Oregon has long interpreted the [c]asual or involuntary language in its comparable timber trespass statute as encompassing accidental, as well as non-negligent, non-volitional trespass. Wyatt v. Sweitz, 146 Or. App. 723, 728, 934 P.2d 544, 546-47 (1997); Oregon & C.R. Co. v. Jackson, 21 Or. 360, 367, 28 P. 74, 75-76 (1891) (where trespass is not willful but casual or involuntary, single damages are appropriate). In Wyatt, the defendant was liable for casual or involuntary trespass after his truck slid off a roadway and damaged the plaintiff's trees. 146 Or. App. at 728, 934 P.2d 544. Likewise, in Matanuska, the Alaska Supreme Court drew the same conclusion, defining `casual' as by `accident or negligence.' Matanuska Elec. Ass'n v. Weissler, 723 P.2d 600, 607 (Alaska 1986) (quoting Viall v. Carpenter, 82 Mass. (16 Gray) 285, 286 (1860)). The court in Matanuska offered a few hypothetical examples of casual or involuntary trespass, including negligently swerving a bulldozer into trees and negligently igniting dynamite that harms trees. [4] See also Yarnell v. Baldwin, 130 Misc.2d 653, 659, 497 N.Y.S.2d 268, 273 (1985) (defining casual or involuntary as accidental, not deliberate). Oregon, Alaska, and New York all allow timber trespass liability based on accidental, negligent, or involuntary action. ¶ 45 Other courts across the nation have interpreted similar language in much the same way. See, e.g., Governale v. City of Owosso, 59 Mich.App. 756, 760, 229 N.W.2d 918 (1975) (defining [c]asual and involuntary as the opposite of deliberate and intentional); Pluntz v. Farmington Ford-Mercury, Inc., 470 N.W.2d 709, 711-12 (Minn.Ct.App.1991) (defining `casual' as `thoughtless or accidental or unintentional,. . . [h]appening or coming to pass without design, and without being forseen [sic] or expected; coming by chance, . . . unforseen [sic], unpremeditated . . . fortuitous' (alterations in original) (quoting Lawrenz v. Langford Elec. Co., 206 Minn. 315, 323, 288 N.W. 727, 731 (1939))). ¶ 46 In stark contrast, the majority opinion places us at odds with these jurisdictions by requiring direct action and thereby eliminating liability for negligent, accidental, or involuntary conduct. In reaching this result, the majority relies on the fact that we have never before found a defendant liable for negligent action under the timber trespass act. Majority at 165-66. But that is precisely why the federal courts certified this question to us: because it is novel and unresolved. The majority's argument from silence proves too much; we have also never held that negligent action does not trigger liability under the statute. The majority reaches that result for the first time in this case, eliminating a form of liability that our statute plainly supports. ¶ 47 This strange result causes our timber trespass scheme to contradict itself. It does not make sense to recognize that a plaintiff can in theory recover for casual or involuntary trespass, and yet at the same time adhere to a direct action requirement virtually ensuring no plaintiff will ever recover for such trespass. ¶ 48 Instead, we must interpret subsections.030 and .040 harmoniously, so that neither renders the other superfluous. G-P Gypsum Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 169 Wash.2d 304, 309, 237 P.3d 256 (2010) (`Statutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous.' (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. J.P., 149 Wash.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003))). BNSF, for its part, reaches an overt or directed action requirement only by misapplying the ejusdem generis canon and strict construction for penal statutes. We should decline BNSF's invitation to rely on these canons, instead recognizing that a plaintiff can recover single damages for casual or involuntary action under subsection .040.