Opinion ID: 1363702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: (2) The ALRB properly imposed a limited backpay remedial order sanctioned by the applicable NLRA precedents.

Text: Having concluded that the ALRB properly found Highland guilty of an unfair labor practice in this regard, we must determine the propriety of the ALRB's remedial order. In its order, the ALRB directed Highland to bargain with the UFW over the effects of its decision to sell the business. At the same time, the Board concluded that because of Highland's changed position and the employees' lack of any present economic bargaining power vis-a-vis Highland, a bargaining order, standing alone, would not adequately remedy the unfair labor practice in this case. Accordingly, in order to effectuate the bargaining order and to help ensure that Highland would not profit from its unfair labor practice, the ALRB accompanied its bargaining order with a limited back pay requirement that the NLRB has traditionally imposed to remedy comparable violations under the federal act. (See, e.g., Transmarine Navigation Corp. (1968) 170 N.L.R.B. 389 [67 L.R.R.M. 1419]; N.L.R.B. v. W.R. Grace & Co., Const. Products, supra, 571 F.2d 279, 283 & fn. 6.) [3] The NLRB fully explained the rationale for this type of remedial order in its seminal Transmarine decision, observing: It is apparent that, as a result of the [employer's] unlawful failure to bargain about [the] effects [of its termination of employment], the [employees] were denied an opportunity to bargain through their ... representative at a time prior to the shutdown when such bargaining would have been meaningful in easing the hardship on employees whose jobs are being terminated.... [¶] Under the circumstances of this case ... it is impossible to reestablish a situation equivalent to that which would have prevailed had the [employer] more timely fulfilled its statutory bargaining obligation. In fashioning an appropriate remedy, we must be guided by the principle that the wrongdoer, rather than the victims of the wrongdoing, should bear the consequences of his unlawful conduct, and that the remedy should `be adapted to the situation that calls for redress.' (170 N.L.R.B. at p. 389 (quoting Labor Board v. Mackay Co. (1938) 304 U.S. 333, 348 [82 L.Ed. 1381, 1391, 58 S.Ct. 904]).) The NLRB continued: Applying these principles to the instant case, we deem it necessary, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, to require the [employer] to bargain with the Union concerning the effects of the shutdown on its [former employees]. Under the present circumstances, however, a bargaining order alone cannot serve as an adequate remedy for the unfair labor practices committed by the [employer]. As we recently pointed out in Royal Plating and Polishing Co., Inc. [(1966) 160 N.L.R.B. 990, 997]: `The Act required more than pro forma bargaining, but pro forma bargaining is all that is likely to result unless the Union can now bargain under conditions essentially similar to those that would have obtained, had [the employer] bargained at the time the Act required it to do so. If the Union must bargain devoid of all economic strength, we would perpetuate the situation created by [the employer's] deliberate concealment of relevant facts from the Union which prevented the Union from meaningful bargaining.' ( Id., at p. 390.) Under these circumstances, the NLRB determined in Transmarine that [i]n order to assure meaningful bargaining and to effectuate the purposes of the Act, we shall accompany our order to bargain over the effects of the shutdown with a limited backpay requirement designed both to make whole the employees for losses suffered as a result of the violation and to recreate in some practicable manner a situation in which the parties' bargaining position is not totally devoid of economic consequences for the [employer]. ( Ibid. ) The limited backpay remedy that the NLRB adopted in Transmarine imposed a prospective requirement upon the employer to pay each terminated employee a daily sum equal to the employee's former wages during the mandated bargaining process. The order additionally provided that the employer's limited backpay obligation would terminate as soon as (1) the parties reached agreement on the issues subject to bargaining, (2) the parties bargained to a bona fide impasse or (3) the union failed to bargain in good faith. Finally, the NLRB also placed an absolute ceiling on the employer's potential monetary obligations under the order, specifying that in no event should any employee receive daily payments for a period of time exceeding the period it had taken the employee to obtain alternative employment after his termination. [4] Since the Transmarine decision in 1968, the NLRB has imposed virtually identical limited backpay remedial orders in numerous cases in which an employer failed to bargain with a union over the effects of its decision to go out of business (see, e.g., J.B. Enterprises (1978) 237 N.L.R.B. 383 [99 L.R.R.M. 1432, 1433]; Van's Packing Plant (1974) 211 N.L.R.B. 692 [86 L.R.R.M. 1581]; West Coast Schools, supra, 208 N.L.R.B. 725, 727-728 [85 L.R.R.M. 1257]; Walter Pape, Inc. (1973) 205 N.L.R.B. 719, 720-721 [84 L.R.R.M. 1055]; Interstate Tool Co., Inc. (1969) 177 N.L.R.B. 686, 687 [71 L.R.R.M. 1487]) and this administrative remedy has been specifically enforced by the federal courts. (See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. W.R. Grace Co., Const. Products, supra, 571 F.2d 279, 283 & fn. 6.) As we have noted, the ALRB's remedial order in this case was explicitly based upon this well-established federal precedent. In light of the governing ALRA provisions, we conclude that the ALRB acted within its authority in following these federal precedents. Section 1160.3, the section of the ALRA setting forth the remedial authority of the ALRB, was modeled largely upon the language of section 10(c) of the NLRA, [5] and the Legislature plainly intended to arm the ALRB with the full range of broad remedial powers traditionally exercised by the NLRB. (See, e.g., Virginia Electric Co. v. Board (1943) 319 U.S. 533, 539-540 [87 L.Ed. 1568, 1574, 63 S.Ct. 1214].) Indeed, insofar as the language of section 1160.3 does depart from the language of the comparable federal provision, it is clear that the drafters of the ALRA intended to broaden, not diminish, the ALRB's remedial authority. [6] In light of this statutory framework, and, of course, section 1148's mandate that the ALRB follow applicable precedents of the National Labor Relations Act, we can discern no basis for challenging the ALRB's remedial order in this case. Contrary to Highland's contention, our court's recent decision in J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 26 Cal.3d 1 casts no doubt upon the validity of the remedial order at issue. In Norton, unlike the present case, we were concerned with the ALRB's imposition of a type of make whole remedy which the NLRB itself has concluded that it has no authority to impose under the NLRA. [7] Although the drafters of the ALRA inserted specific language in section 1160.3 to make it clear that under the California act the ALRB is authorized to impose this somewhat controversial remedy (see fns. 6, 7 ante; Levy, The Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975, supra, 15 Santa Clara Law. 783, 802-803), the issue before us in Norton was simply whether the ALRB had exceeded the explicit authority afforded by section 1160.3 in concluding that this special make whole remedy should be applied across-the-board in all refusal-to-bargain cases, rather than on a more selective basis. In Norton we determined that the ALRB's across-the-board application of that particular make-whole remedy was not consistent with the legislative intent underlying the applicable language of section 1160.3, and we held that the Board was required to apply that make-whole remedy in a fashion more sensitively attuned to the fundamental purposes of the act. In the instant case, unlike Norton, the ALRB imposed a remedy whose validity is well-established under the NLRA. Moreover, the remedy was not imposed by the ALRB in an across-the-board manner but rather was applied in the specific, narrow circumstances that such remedy has long been found appropriate under the applicable federal precedent. Because there is nothing in section 1160.3 or any other provision of the ALRA to suggest that the Legislature intended to withhold from the ALRB the authority to impose this type of remedial sanction which has been repeatedly invoked by the NLRB under a similar statutory scheme, we conclude that the ALRB was authorized to impose such a remedial order in this case.