Opinion ID: 2998210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The parties did not raise the issue of the district court’s jurisdiction, but the defendants argued, both in the lower court and on appeal, that Mrs. Geschke’s two fraud claims did not accrue prior to Mr. Geschke’s death and therefore abated. We asked at oral argument whether only the breach of contract claim should be considered for purposes of the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). We asked whether the damages potentially recoverable in the breach of contract action were above $75,000. After considering the parties’ supplemental briefing on this issue, we are satisfied that the district court had jurisdiction over Mrs. Geschke’s suit. Whether § 1332 supplies jurisdiction must be determined at the outset of a case; “events after the suit begins do not affect . . . diversity jurisdiction.” Johnson v. Wattenbarger, 361 F.3d 991, 993 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426 (1991), and other cases). We therefore look to Mrs. Geschke’s first complaint, the one the defendants removed to federal court, to see whether the case satisfies the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000. Each of Mrs. Geschke’s three claims sought compensatory damages in the amount of $20,000 to $50,000, plus prejudgment interest. The two fraud claims each also demanded an 6 No. 04-3205 award of punitive damages. “It is the case, rather than the claim, to which the $75,000 minimum applies.” Johnson, 361 F.3d at 993. The total amount at stake was thus clearly above that mark. Whether or not the defendants could succeed with their argument that the fraud claims abated upon Mr. Geschke’s death is immaterial to the jurisdictional question. Only if it were legally impossible for Geschke to win on claims totaling more than $75,000 would her suit fail for want of jurisdiction. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938); Johnson, 361 F.3d at 993-94. “Legal impossibility” in this sense differs from the standard for dismissal for failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); that there may be a plausible argument that the plaintiff’s claims must fail as a matter of law does not mean the court lacks jurisdiction to consider them. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Johnson, 361 F.3d at 993-94. If it were otherwise, “defendants would never win in diversity cases. They could at best achieve jurisdictional dismissals, followed by new suits in state court.” Johnson, 361 F.3d at 994. The defendants’ argument that the fraud claims failed to accrue before Mr. Geschke’s death or that if they did accrue, did not survive his death, hardly colors this suit as a “legal impossibility.” Though we need not decide the issue, the defendants are probably wrong about the ac- crual question. See Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (Ill. 1981) (under Illinois’ discovery rule, fraud claim accrues “when a person knows or reasonably should know of his injury and also knows or reasonably should know that it was wrongfully caused”). The question of the survival of the punitive damages aspect of the common law and statutory fraud claims is apparently unsettled in Illinois. See 755 ILCS 5/27-6 (Illinois Survival Act) (West 1994) (“In addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following also survive: . . . No. 04-3205 7 actions for fraud or deceit.”); Nat’l Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 383 N.E.2d 919, 924 (1978) (punitive damages can be recovered if the underlying action is predicated on a statute that specifically authorizes the recovery of punitive damages); but see Duncavage v. Allen, 497 N.E.2d 433, 442 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986) (Although Illinois Consumer Fraud Act permits court to grant prevailing plaintiff “any relief which it deems proper,” the Act does not explicitly authorize punitive damages, so an action to recover such damages does not survive under the rule of Nat’l Bank of Bloomington). In any event, because Mrs. Geschke’s claim for punitive damages was not legally impossible at the outset, her lawsuit meets the $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. We therefore proceed to the merits.