Opinion ID: 2541878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Error in admission of lab results

Text: As proof that Appellant had been driving under the influence of methamphetamine, the Commonwealth sought to introduce the results of Appellant's blood test. A sample of Appellant's blood, taken at the hospital after the crash, was sent to the Kentucky State Police laboratory for testing. KSP lab technician Chad Norfleet performed the testing, and prepared and signed a Report of Laboratory Examination. The report indicated that Appellant's blood was tested for drugs and that said testing showed Appellant's blood contained Methamphetamine 0.037 mg%. Norfleet did not testify at Appellant's trial because he was attending training. Norfleet's co-worker, lab technician Amanda Sweet, reviewed Norfleet's report and documentation, and testified in his place. Sweet described the general procedures the KSP lab technicians are required to follow. She further testified that, having reviewing Norfleet's documentation, it appeared to her that he had followed the proper procedures. Sweet testified that Norfleet had tested Appellant's blood sample for drugs, and that Norfleet reported that the sample contained methamphetamine at a concentration of .037 milligram percent. Norfleet's report was admitted into evidence over defense objection on grounds that it was cumulative of Sweet's testimony. On cross-examination, Sweet acknowledged that she had not participated in, or observed, the testing of Appellant's blood, and that her knowledge was based solely on what was contained in Norfleet's report and documentation. On appeal, Appellant contends that, pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ____, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), his right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when the KSP lab report and its conclusions were admitted at trial in the absence of Norfleet. The Commonwealth agrees that Melendez-Diaz controls this case, and, because Norfleet did not testify, the admission of the lab results/report violated the Confrontation Clause. Appellant concedes the error was not preserved, and requests palpable error review per RCr 10.26. In the landmark case of Crawford v. Washington , the United States Supreme Court revisited the Confrontation Clause and overruled its decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). Crawford recognized that the purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of evidence, but that it is a procedural, not substantive, guaranteea constitutional right that cannot be usurped by state or federal rules of evidence or judicial determinations of reliability. Rankins v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Ky. 2007) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354). Accordingly, the Roberts test, which allowed cross-examination to be replaced by hearsay exceptions and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness as surrogate means of assessing reliability, was deemed by the Crawford Court as fundamentally at odds with the Confrontation Clause and original intent, and discarded. Id. Crawford held that the Sixth Amendment prohibits the admission of the testimonial statement of a declarant who does not appear at trial, unless the declarant is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford referred to testimonial statements, because it is statements of a testimonial character, as opposed to other hearsay, which cause the declarant to be a witness against the accused for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354). The issue before this Court was decided by the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527. Melendez-Diaz was charged with cocaine trafficking. Seized substances were sent to the state police lab for testing. At trial, the prosecutor submitted three certificates of analysis, which showed the results of the forensic analysis. The certificates, which were sworn to by the analysts who had performed the testing, stated that the substances tested were found to contain cocaine. The analysts themselves did not testify at trial, and the certificates were admitted over defense objection on grounds that the Confrontation Clause required the analysts to testify in person. The Court agreed, holding that, under Crawford, the certificates of analysis were testimonial statements, and the analysts were witnesses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 2532. Therefore, the Court held, [a]bsent a showing that the analysts were unavailable to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them, petitioner was entitled to be confronted with the analysts at trial. Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to Melendez-Diaz, the KSP lab report is a testimonial statement. The report, which states Appellant's blood was tested for drugs and found to contain methamphetamine, is essentially identical to the certificates of analysis held to be testimonial statements in Melendez-Diaz. Because the report is a testimonial statement, neither it, nor its contents, could be admitted at trial in the absence of the declarant, Norfleet. [1] The Commonwealth concedes this point. The error, however, is unpreserved. Defense counsel did not object to Sweet's testifying to the contents of the report. Although defense counsel objected to the admission of the report itself, the objection was not based on Confrontation Clause grounds, but on grounds that the report was cumulative of Sweet's testimony. [2] Accordingly, Appellant requests review per RCr 10.26. A party claiming palpable error must show a probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law. Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky.2006). Aside from the lab report, considerable other evidence supported the inference that Appellant was driving under the influence of methamphetamine. Deputy Sapcut observed Appellant driving in a reckless manner, and had the opportunity to observe Appellant immediately after the accident. Sapcut testified that Appellant was exhibiting symptoms which, based on his experience and training, were consistent with being under the influence of methamphetamine. Sapcut and other police officers testified as to smelling a strong odor associated with methamphetamine manufacturing coming from Appellant's car. In and around the car were found numerous items used in methamphetamine manufacturing. Most significantly, Appellant admitted he was a methamphetamine user, and that he had it in his system at the time of the crash. In light of the above, we see no palpable error.