Opinion ID: 1167454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instruction as to reasonable doubt as related to the degree of the murder.

Text: [11a] Because defendant addressed his argument principally to the question of first or second degree murder, he maintains that the court should have specifically pointed the instructions concerning reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence to the issue of degree. Defendant did not submit instructions in this regard but nevertheless contends that By giving the circumstantial evidence instruction, said instruction discussed the fact of the defendant's right to acquittal. Since this was not properly before the jury, it is the defendant's contention that the instructions should have been made more understandable by relating them to the question of first or second degree. (Italics added.) [12] Although in criminal cases the court must instruct the jury on its own motion as to applicable general legal principles, even though the parties fail to propose such instructions, the court need not render particular instructions as to specific points unless the parties request them or they are essential to a fair trial. (See People v. Jackson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 375, 379-380 [29 Cal. Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d 937]; People v. Warren (1940) 16 Cal.2d 103, 116-117 [104 P.2d 1024].) [11b] Defendant's plea of not guilty remained before the court; all matter in controversy under that plea continued as live issues before the jury. Likewise, instructions which embraced defendant's right to acquittal properly remained before the jury. Neither the court nor defense counsel could withdraw from the jury's consideration the question of defendant's innocence without his personal consent. ( People v. Rogers (1961) 56 Cal.2d 301 [14 Cal. Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892].) The general instructions as to circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt were, moreover, implemented by the following instruction as to the degree of the crime: When, upon the trial of a charge of murder, the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but has a reasonable doubt whether such murder was of the first or second degree, the jury must give to such defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second degree. The court thus apprised the jury that it should consider not merely the issue of first degree murder or acquittal but that, in determining the degree of the crime, it should give defendant the benefit of any doubt. We cannot, therefore, conclude that defendant suffered prejudice in the court's instructions. The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to the penalty. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.