Opinion ID: 6112100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Lifter Member”

Text: Below, the parties disputed whether the claimed “lifter member” in the ’718 patent invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6.8 Koki argued that it did, but the ALJ did not agree. He instead construed the claimed “lifter member” to mean a “rotatable component having lifting pins on its face surface.” J.A. 245–54. Koki claims the ALJ erred by not applying § 112 ¶ 6. We agree.
Under the text of § 112 ¶ 6, a patentee may draft claims “as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.” But such claims are construed to cover only “the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part). Whether claim language invokes § 112 ¶ 6 is a question of law we review de novo. Id. at 1346. We review any underlying findings of fact for clear error. Id. To determine whether § 112 ¶ 6 applies to a claim limitation, we ask “whether the words of the claim are understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.” Id. at 1348. If a limitation does not use the word “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Id. at 1349. But that “presumption can be overcome and § 112, para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates 8 Congress has replaced 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 with § 112(f), effective on September 16, 2012. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Because the application resulting in the ’718 patent was filed before that date, we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 112. Case: 20-1046 Document: 87 Page: 17 Filed: 01/21/2022 KYOCERA SENCO INDUS. TOOLS INC v. ITC 17 that the claim term fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. at 1348 (quotations and brackets omitted).
The “lifter member” limitation does not use the word means, so there is a presumption that § 112 ¶6 does not apply. But because that claim term does not recite sufficiently definite structure, that presumption has been overcome. A person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the claimed “lifter member” to have “a sufficiently definite meaning as the name for a structure.” See Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349. That phrase, alone, does not connote structure. It is a non-structural generic placeholder (member) modified by functional language (lifter). See, e.g., Mas-Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding “movable link member” was subject to § 112 ¶ 6). Indeed, no party claims lifter member has a plain and ordinary meaning to those skilled in the art. See J.A. 247 (finding no such meaning exists). Likewise, the surrounding claim language does not describe any structural detail about the “lifter member.” Cf. Inventio AG v. ThyssenKrupp Elevator Ams. Corp., 649 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding “modernizing device” denoted sufficient structure based on surrounding claim language). Claim 1 of the ’718 patent provides, in relevant part: A method for controlling a fastener driving tool, said method comprising:
cludes . . . (vi) a prime mover that moves a lifter member which moves a driver Case: 20-1046 Document: 87 Page: 18 Filed: 01/21/2022 18 KYOCERA SENCO INDUS. TOOLS INC v. ITC member away from an exit end of the mech- anism . . . (d) actuating said prime mover, thereby moving said lifter member and causing said driver member to move away from said exit end toward a ready position. This language requires the prime mover to move the lifter member and describes the lifter member’s function as lifting the driver member. It does not specify whether or how the prime mover is connected to the lifter member. Nor does the description of the lifter member’s function add any structural detail. The only thing a skilled artisan could glean from the claim language is that the lifter member is moved by the prime mover and lifts the driver member. 9 That is a purely functional description. Nothing in the written description provides a clear and unambiguous definition of “lifter member.” See MTD Prods. Inc. v. Iancu, 933 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining lexicography can avoid application of § 112 ¶ 6). At various points, the written description provides examples of a “lifter member.” For example, it explains that “the rotary-to-[linear ]lifter 100 is also sometimes referred to herein as a lifter member, or simply as a lifter.” ’718 patent at 8:50–52 (quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 21:26–28. But each of these passages provides an example of a lifter member, rather than a definition of the lifter member. There is no lexicography. And 9 Dr. Vallee’s testimony is not to the contrary. See J.A. 1612 ¶ 91. That testimony related to the “lifter member” term in other asserted patents: the ’296, ’297, and ’722 patents. The claim language in each of those patents contains an extensive structural description of the lifter member. See ’296 patent claim 1(d). The ’718 patent lacks such structural claim language. Case: 20-1046 Document: 87 Page: 19 Filed: 01/21/2022 KYOCERA SENCO INDUS. TOOLS INC v. ITC 19 the parties have not identified other language in the written description that indicates § 112 ¶ 6 should not apply to the claimed “lifter member.” For these reasons, § 112 ¶ 6 applies to the “lifter member” limitation, and it must be construed to cover only “the structure, materials, or acts described in the specification as corresponding to the claimed function and equivalents thereof.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1347 (quoting § 112 ¶ 6). Because the parties have not thoroughly briefed what structures correspond to the claimed “lifter member,” we leave that question for the Commission on remand.