Opinion ID: 2326713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Green's Videotaped Statement

Text: Jury selection began in appellant's case on Wednesday, April 9, 2008, and the presentation of evidence began on April 10. On the preceding Thursday, April 3, the government turned over to the defense for the first time a copy of the videotaped statement that Green gave to police on January 20, 2007, the day of the shooting. [11] The transcript of the videotaped statement indicates that Green gave police his address and telephone numbers, told police that he heard one bang and that the shooter, who had the gun in his right hand, was wearing a three-quarters length jacket that looked like a light color green and was about thirty-one, thirty-two, something like early thirties and probably about 6', somewhere under maybe 6' ... 6' ... 6'1 maybe and solid... probably around about two ... probably about two fifty [pounds]. [12] Green also told police that when the shooter stood up to the security dude [Caldwell, who, the record suggests, weighed in the neighborhood of 300-315 pounds and was about 6 feet 3 inches tall], they look almost the same size. Thus, as the trial judge recognized, Green gave police a physical description that could not match Mr. Mackabee. [13] At the next court appearance on April 7, defense counsel challenged the government's delay in turning over the Green videotape as a Brady violation and asked the trial court to dismiss the case, to impose some other sanction, or at least to grant a continuance. The trial court agreed with defense counsel that it isn't even a close question that Green's statement was exculpatory Brady information. [14] The court declined to order the sanctions that the defense requested, however, because, as the colloquy ensued, the court learned that the government had turned over to the defense, as page 121 of a 178-page discovery package sent to defense counsel on February 15, 2007 (the February 2007 discovery package), a copy of a police officer's (redacted) handwritten notes of the statement given by Green. In pertinent part, the notes read: B/M Ear 30's 6'-6'1 SOLID BLD. 250 POSS. GREEN COAT 3/4 LGT GUN IN Rt. HAND SHINY GUNsilv. ONLY 1 shot. The court regarded the fact that the government had produced these notes in its discovery packet as a very important fact, observing that the notes enabled the defense to see, a year earlier, that some witness describes the person with a gun in his right hand who presumably is the shooter. Although acknowledging defense counsel's complaint that the redacted notes (unlike the videotape) did not disclose identifying information about the witness, the court observed that defense counsel had since February [2007] the description that ... was the only exculpatory part. The court told defense counsel that, had she asked the government for contact information about the witness and met with a refusal and then asked the court to require the government to disclose the witness's identity, you would have had the name (presumably, because the court would have ordered disclosure). The prosecutor told the court that no one in his office had yet interviewed Green, but gave the court his contact information. The court concluded the discussion by giving defense counsel Green's contact information. During her brief (six transcript pages) cross-examination of Green at trial, [15] defense counsel elicited Green's testimony that the man with the gun was almost the same size as [Caldwell] and was built like [Caldwell], and was [b]etween 200 and 250 pounds. [16] Counsel also elicited Green's agreement that he turned and looked at the man as he came into the club (i.e., did not merely see the man's back), and thereafter couldn't identify the shooter in the photographs that included a photo of appellant. In addition, counsel confronted Green with his videotaped statements to police that the man with the gun wore a light-colored green coat and had a solid build (statements that Green denied making). Counsel emphasized the same points in closing argument, inter alia, asking the jury whether appellant look[s] anywhere near the size of Earl Caldwell[.] Upon this record, appellant argues that the government suppressed material exculpatory information until it was too late for [appellant] to use it effectively in developing and presenting his defense, and that the trial court's failure to find a due process violation under Brady  and to impose sanctions was reversible error. Appellant highlights the statement by a prosecutor (not one of the prosecutors who tried the case), in her cover letter accompanying the February 2007 discovery package, that, [i]n response to your request for Brady information, please note that the government is not aware of any such information in this case. In light of that statement, appellant argues, the defense had no reason to think that what was contained in the officer's notes (a description that could not match Mr. Mackabee) was an eyewitness's description of the shooter. Accordingly, appellant asserts, even if the officer's notes sufficiently memorialized the statement contained in the videotape, his counsel was not alerted to the exculpatory information that she needed to investigate and otherwise prepare his defense. The principle established by Brady is that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Accordingly, the prosecution must disclose exculpatory material at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case, even if satisfaction of this criterion requires pre-trial disclosure. Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 970 (D.C. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For there to be a true Brady violation, (1) the evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2)[the] evidence must have been suppressed by the [government], either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have ensued, meaning that the suppressed evidence must have been material. Fortson v. United States, 979 A.2d 643, 662 (D.C.2009) (quoting Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 65 (D.C. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [17] Evidence is material where there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1783, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (citation omitted). A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Appellant has the burden of proving a Brady violation. United States v. Wright, 506 F.3d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir.2007); United States v. Stokes, 261 F.3d 496, 502 (4th Cir.2001); Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir. 2000). As we explained recently in Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094 (D.C.2011), whether a defendant has established a violation by the government of its obligations under Brady presents a mixed question of fact and law, calling for us to review the [trial] court's legal conclusions on a de novo basis and its factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 1120. Where the issue to be resolved is not one of historical fact[] relevant to the Brady issues, id. at 1121, but instead concerns the legal consequences of historical facts, id., our review is de novo. Id. at 1123. We agree with appellant (and the government does not dispute) that the description that Green gave of the perpetrator during his videotaped interview was exculpatory, but we cannot agree that the government's delay in turning over the videotape amounted to a true Brady violation. [18] Suppression in the Brady sense would have occurred if the material was not `disclos[ed] in sufficient time to afford the defense an opportunity for use.' United States v. Douglas, 525 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir.2008) ( Brady material that is not `disclos[ed] in sufficient time to afford the defense an opportunity for use' may be deemed suppressed within the meaning of the Brady doctrine. (quoting Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir.2001))); see also Edelen, 627 A.2d at 971 ([W]here the defendant receives potentially exculpatory information in time to use it effectively at trial, his conviction will be sustained.). In this case, however, defense counsel, who had the videotape and the contact information for Green a few days before trial began and several days before her cross-examination of Green, was able to make effective use of Green's videotaped statements at trial. As described above, in cross-examining Green, defense counsel highlighted for the jury Green's opportunity to see the shooter as he came into the club (and thus, not to see just the shooter's back), and emphasized, both through cross-examination and in closing argument, the disparity between Green's description of the shooter and appellant's characteristics. Defense counsel made particularly effective use of a detail contained in the videotape but not in the officer's notesi.e., that when the shooter stood up to [Caldwell], they look almost the same size. Appellant does not suggest how, had Green's videotaped statement been turned over earlier, his counsel could have used its contents any more effectively at trial. [19] Appellant also contends that the delayed disclosure of Green's videotaped statement deprived appellant of the opportunity to investigate a potential third-party perpetrator matching the description that Mr. Green gave the police. This argument also is not persuasive, because we agree with the trial judge that the officer's notes contained what was unambiguously a description of the perpetratorthe same description of the assailant recorded in the videotape. In addition, as discussed infra, the documents related to Swails alerted the defense to the need to investigate a possible third-party-perpetrator defense. Finally, appellant's mere speculation that earlier contact with Green might have led the defense to discovery of additional exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish a Brady violation. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish `materiality' in the constitutional sense.).