Opinion ID: 788794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 9 Molina's case presents an issue somewhat different from the typical issue presented under IIRIRA's permanent rules — whether our jurisdiction is limited or precluded by various jurisdiction-stripping provisions in the revised statute. See, e.g., Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291 F.3d 594, 598-99 (9th Cir.2002). Here, we focus on whether a case where no final order of removal has been issued falls outside of the jurisdiction granting provision of IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 10 Section 1252 mandates when and under what circumstances appellate courts have jurisdiction over final orders of removal. See, e.g., § 1252(a)(1) (providing that [j]udicial review of a final order of removal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 158); § 1252(b)(1) (deadline for filing petition for review based on date of final order of removal); § 1252(b)(3)(A) (service on Attorney General in the district in which the final order of removal ... was entered); § 1252(d) (prerequisites for review of a final order of removal). 11 Whether issuance of the removal order exceeded the BIA's authority, then, goes directly to whether a final order of removal exists which would provide jurisdiction under § 1252. Certainly we have jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction. Lopez-Molina v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir.2004). We therefore proceed to the merits of the Noriega-Lopez issue.