Opinion ID: 4200908
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: B. have long thought otherwise.

Text: ¶ 153 What the lead opinion is really saying is that it thinks the validity of a mother’s consent is particularly important. It says as much in asserting that the “requirement of consent is mandatory and jurisdictional because it goes to the soul of the adoption.” Supra ¶ 23. Fair enough. We don’t doubt that a mother’s consent is a crucial step in the proceedings. But subject-matter jurisdiction is different. Our law has long assessed subject-matter jurisdiction at the categorical level— encompassing only statutory limits on the classes of cases to be decided by the court and traditional limits on justiciability. A defect in consent fits in neither category. So if a consent problem is a jurisdictional problem then so are many other legal grounds for challenging the propriety of a district court’s decision. That cannot be—unless we are prepared to abandon the central tenets of finality and adversariness at the heart of our justice system. We are not. And we reject the lead opinion’s view that a defect in consent might deprive our courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding. D. Jurisdiction Is Proper Under the Lead Opinion’s Theory ¶ 154 If a defect in a birth mother’s consent really deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction, then the proper course would be an order of vacatur and dismissal.30 Yet the lead opinion 30 See, e.g., Ramsay v. Kane Cty. Human Res. Special Serv. Dist., 2014 UT 5, ¶ 17, 322 P.3d 1163 (“[W]hen a court determines it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it ‘retains only the authority to dismiss the action.’” (quoting Varian–Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); Salt Lake Cty. v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996) (“When it is ascertained that there is no jurisdiction in the court because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court can go no further, and its immediate duty is to dismiss the action. . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978)). 83 Adoption of B.B. Lee, A.C.J., Opinion of the Court in part would not dismiss the case. It would remand to allow the mother to decide whether to enter a valid consent. See supra ¶ 84 n.32. ¶ 155 That is telling. What it tells us is that even the lead opinion would not ultimately conclude that the district court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction over any of the issues it undertakes to review— namely the adjudication of C.C.’s consent and the denial of the E.T.’s motion to intervene. Even taking the lead opinion’s view of the cases at face value, there isn’t a single case for the proposition that a district court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether consent was validly given or to determine whether a party claiming an interest in the child may properly intervene in the proceedings. These are pre-adoption issues that, under any view, a district court has power to decide. ¶ 156 The lead opinion tries to split the baby. It concludes that the court has jurisdiction to take “valid consent” but lacks jurisdiction to take “invalid consent.” See supra ¶ 84 n.32. But there is no such thing as a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction that arises only if the court decides an issue one way. What the lead opinion is really trying to do is reopen the merits of the termination order. But the merits of the termination order are foreclosed from our consideration here for all of the reasons set forth in Part I.A above. ¶ 157 We leave the matter there. The contrary path articulated in the lead opinion would upend the settled law of subject-matter jurisdiction in troubling ways. We decline to take that path.