Opinion ID: 894934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court's Charge on Manufacturing Defect Failed to Include the Essential Element of a Deviation from Design

Text: The trial court submitted the pattern jury charge's definition on manufacturing defect. We agree with Ford, however, that the model charge is erroneous, as it does not include the requirement that a manufacturing defect must deviate from its specifications or planned output in a manner that renders the product unreasonably dangerous. We established this standard in American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, [16] and in three other cases since Grinnell was issued a decade ago, we have recognized, with essentially identical statements, the deviation from specifications or planned output requirement. [17] This requirement is separate from, and in addition to, the requirements that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer and that the defect was a producing cause of the plaintiffs injuries. [18] We note that the current Restatement of Torts essentially follows the same concept of a deviation from the manufacturer's design by providing that a product contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the product. . . .  [19] The requirement of a deviation from the manufacturer's specifications or planned output serves the essential purpose of distinguishing a manufacturing defect from a design defect. PJC 71.3 refers to a manufacturing defect in the product at the time it left the manufacturer. A jurywithout further guidancemay view any defect in a product at the time it leaves the manufacturer as satisfying the PJC's reference to a manufacturing defect, rather than making the essential distinction between a manufacturing and design defect. As it stood, the court's charge merely inquired whether a condition of the product rendered it unreasonably dangerous. That condition could have been a design defect or a manufacturing defect. The distinction is material. The danger of allowing a jury to conclude that the defect was or might have been a design defect is that [a] design defect claim requires proof and a jury finding of a safer alternative design. [20] The charge did not make such an inquiry. Moreover, requiring a deviation from specifications or planned output permits a jury to determine whether a specific defect caused the accident, rather than premising liability on a belief that a product failure, standing alone, is enough to find a product defect. Texas law does not generally recognize a product failure or malfunction, standing alone, as sufficient proof of a product defect. [21] Instead, we have held that a specific defect must be identified by competent evidence and other possible causes must be ruled out. [22] Our law requires more than finding an undifferentiated condition that renders the product unreasonably dangerous, which is all the court's charge mandated. While a products liability claim does not of course require proof of manufacturer negligence, the deviation from design that caused the injury must be identified. Otherwise, the jury is invited to find liability based on speculation as to the cause of the incident hi issue. Requiring proof of a deviation from manufacturer specifications or planned output also comports with our recognition that expert testimony is generally encouraged if not required to establish a products liability claim. [23] If juries were generally free to infer a product defect and injury causation from an accident or product failure alone, without any proof of the specific deviation from design that caused the accident, expert testimony would hardly seem essential. Yet we have repeatedly said otherwise. [24] For these reasons, we hold that the court's charge was fundamentally flawed in omitting the requirement that the product deviate, in its construction or quality., from its specifications or planned output, in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous.