Opinion ID: 2333091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did the court err in reference to its rulings on the testimony of Joseph Wise?

Text: Joseph Wise, a brother of the two defendants, had been confined to the Union County Jail for approximately 15 weeks as a material witness under substantial bail. He was arrested in Springfield, Massachusetts. When asked about the details of his conversation and the admissions made by the defendants after their arrival in Springfield, he developed a marked lapse of memory. The prosecutor pleaded surprise and advised the court he was about to neutralize the witness' testimony by proving contrary prior utterances. This process was proceeded with and is justified by State v. D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 397-398 ( E. & A. 1913); State v. Foster, 89 N.J.L. 45, 48 ( Sup. Ct. 1916); State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 558, 562 (1952). The witness was asked whether he did not recall testifying to a contrary effect before the grand jury, giving the details of his conversation with the three defendants relative to the hold-up and the shooting at the Tuscan Dairy on the morning in question. His reluctance to give incriminating testimony against his two brothers is understandable, but it should not be permitted to thwart the obligation of the State to prosecute relentlessly those who commit murder within our jurisdiction. Following the prodding and the refreshing of the witness' memory by the course already referred to, the court recessed for the day. The next day, without the prosecutor's being required to prove any further contradictory statements made by the witness, the witness recanted his previous testimony, attributing his poor previous recollection to the fact that no notice had been given him of the fact he was to testify. Without any prompting, he testified fully and freely as to the conversation had with the defendants and their respective admissions to him. He was not led or guided by the prosecutor. Counsel contends: The admission of such testimony tends to support the faltering testimony of a discredited, impeached or perjured witness and defeats the ends of justice. We cannot subscribe to this view. See State v. Guida, 118 N.J.L. 289 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), affirmed 119 N.J.L. 464 ( E. & A. 1938). What was done is justified by many decisions recorded in our books and was adequately and properly covered in the court's charge when it said: Naturally, there is an apparent conflict between some of the testimony that Joe Wise gave on the first day and some that he gave on the second day, and it is up to you to decide which is the truth. The testimony of Joe Wise is to be taken as a whole from the beginning to the end, that is, from the beginning of his testimony on the first day to the conclusion of his testimony on the second day, and the jury are at liberty to believe such part of it as you see fit and to reject such part as you see fit. You must apply your experience and common sense to the situation. You are the ones who must decide under all the facts and circumstances in the case which part of Joe Wise's testimony is true and which part is not true. Additionally, the testimony of Joseph Wise was in accord with all of the other testimony in the case, including the admissions made by the defendants themselves in their respective statements, and we see no prejudicial error in the disposition of this phase of the trial by the trial court. Nor is there error in the elimination of the word neutralize in the fifth request to charge and in the refusal to charge the sixth request as made by the defendants.