Opinion ID: 2115692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Public Nuisance Claims

Text: Plaintiffs contend that they stated valid causes of action for public nuisance, alleging that the collapses forced closure of their establishments, causing special damages beyond those suffered by the public. A public nuisance exists for conduct that amounts to a substantial interference with the exercise of a common right of the public, thereby offending public morals, interfering with the use by the public of a public place or endangering or injuring the property, health, safety or comfort of a considerable number of persons. A public nuisance is a violation against the State and is subject to abatement or prosecution by the proper governmental authority ( Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co., 41 NY2d 564, 568). A public nuisance is actionable by a private person only if it is shown that the person suffered special injury beyond that suffered by the community at large ( see, Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v Lindner, 59 NY2d 314, 334 [citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C, comment b ]). This principle recognizes the necessity of guarding against the multiplicity of lawsuits that would follow if everyone were permitted to seek redress for a wrong common to the public (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 821C, comment a ; Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va L Rev 997, 1007 [1966]). A nuisance is the actual invasion of interests in land, and it may arise from varying types of conduct ( Copart Indus. v Consolidated Edison Co., 41 NY2d, at 569, supra ). In the cases before us, the right to use the public space around Madison Avenue and Times Square was invaded not only by the building collapses but also by the City's decision, in the interest of public safety, to close off those areas. Unlawful obstruction of a public street is a public nuisance, and a person who as a consequence sustains a special loss may maintain an action for public nuisance ( Callanan v Gilman, 107 NY 360, 370). Indeed, in a populous city, whatever unlawfully turns the tide of travel from the sidewalk directly in front of a retail store to the opposite side of the street is presumed to cause special damage to the proprietor of that store, because diversion of trade inevitably follows diversion of travel ( Flynn v Taylor, 127 NY 596, 600). The question here is whether plaintiffs have suffered a special injury beyond that of the community so as to support their damages claims for public nuisance ( see, Graceland Corp. v Consolidated Laundries Corp., 7 AD2d 89, 91, affd 6 NY2d 900). We conclude that they have not. In Burns Jackson we refused to permit a public nuisance cause of action by two law firms seeking damages for increased expenses and lost profits resulting from the closure of the New York City transit system during a labor strike. We concluded that, because the strike was so widespread, every person, firm and corporation conducting a business or profession in the City suffered similar damage and thus the plaintiffs could not establish an injury different from that of the public at large. While not as widespread as the transit strike, the Madison Avenue and Times Square closures caused the same sort of injury to the communities that live and work in those extraordinarily populous areas. As the trial court in Goldberg Weprin & Ustin pointed out, though different in degree, the hot dog vendor and taxi driver suffered the same kind of injury as the plaintiff law firm. Each was impacted in the ability to conduct business, resulting in financial loss. When business interference and ensuing pecuniary damage is so general and widespread as to affect a whole community, or a very wide area within it, the line is drawn (Prosser, supra, at 1015). While the degree of harm to the named plaintiffs may have been greater than to the window washer, per diem employee or neighborhood resident unable to reach the premises, in kind the harm was the same. Leo v General Elec. Co. (145 AD2d 291) is inapposite. In Leo, the Appellate Division recognized a private right of action by plaintiff commercial fishermen who contended that defendant's pollution of the Hudson River with toxic polychlorinated biphenyls (commonly known as PCBs), created a public nuisance that had a devastating effect on their ability to earn a living. Plaintiffs were able to establish that their injuries were special and different in kind, not merely in degree: a loss of livelihood was not suffered by every person who fished the Hudson. By contrast, every person who maintained a business, profession or residence in the heavily populated areas of Times Square and Madison Avenue was exposed to similar economic loss during the closure periods. Thus, in that the economic loss was common to an entire community and the plaintiff[s] suffer[ed] it only in a greater degree than others, it is not a different kind of harm and the plaintiff[s] cannot recover for the invasion of the public right (Restatement [Second] of Torts § 821C, comment h ). Accordingly, in 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods v Finlandia Ctr., the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint granted and the certified question answered in the negative. In 5th Ave. Chocolatiere v 540 Acquisition Co., the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint granted in its entirety and the certified question answered in the negative. In Goldberg Weprin & Ustin v Tishman Constr., the order of the Appellate Division, insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, with costs. In 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods v Finlandia Ctr.: Order reversed, etc. In 5th Ave. Chocolatiere v 540 Acquisition Co.: Order reversed, etc. In Goldberg Weprin & Ustin v Tishman Constr. Corp.: Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, with costs.