Opinion ID: 780155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: department of labor letter

Text: 66 Finally, Rudebusch challenges the admission into evidence of a letter written to the University by the regional director of the Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Joseph Franco. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision to admit this evidence at trial. United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1166 (9th Cir.2000). 67 The OFCCP letter explains the Office's continuing obligation to ensure that the University comply with its preapproved affirmative action policy in order to remain eligible for federal funding as a federal contractor. The letter specifically iterates OFCCP's conclusion that Hughes' actions in March 1993 were in compliance with the university's affirmative action program and its obligations as a recipient of federal funding. Rudebusch objected to its admission at trial on hearsay and relevance grounds. The court admitted the letter over these objections; however, immediately after the letter was read into evidence, the court provided the following instruction to the jury: 68 Ladies and gentlemen, now is the appropriate time for me to make a comment about the evidence. This evidence goes to one of the issues that you'll have to decide.... 69 Mr. Franco's statement or comment in the letter is simply some evidence which you may consider along with all the other evidence in the case in deciding... the claim to which the letter relates. Mr. Franco — you cannot use his judgment to substitute for your judgment in making the ultimate determination in this case. 70 If he were a witness here, and he is not, I may or may not have allowed him to make the statement he includes in his letter in that direct fashion. He is not, therefore, subject to cross-examination because he is not here, so you must take the letter in that context and consider it as some evidence, but not the ultimate evidence on this issue.... 71 Hughes argues that the letter should be admitted as a hearsay exception either as a business record under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) or as a public record under Fed. R.Evid. 803(8). Neither exception appears to offer him a safe harbor because the letter does not establish a sufficient foundation, but even if the letter was erroneously admitted, evidentiary error does not require reversal of a jury verdict unless a party's substantial rights were affected. Gilchrist v. Jim Slemons Imports, Inc., 803 F.2d 1488, 1500 (9th Cir.1986). Therefore, we must determine whether the verdict was more probably than not tainted by the error. Id. (citations omitted). Because this case is indistinguishable from Gilchrist, any error in admitting the OFCCP compliance letter was harmless. 72 In Gilchrist, we held that the district court erroneously admitted into evidence an EEOC letter of violation for an age discrimination action which had a great[] possibility of unfair prejudice. Id. As we noted, [a] jury may find it difficult to evaluate independently evidence of age discrimination after being informed that the EEOC has already examined the evidence and found a violation. Id. Nonetheless, we concluded that the error was harmless in light of a limiting instruction that mirrors the one given here. Id. at 1500-01 (the instruction read: The letter need be given no greater weight than any other evidence in deciding the age discrimination claim.... You the jury, and not the EEOC are the sole judges of whether or not there was a violation of the Age Discrimination Employment Act.). Coupled with the other evidence presented to the jury, Rudebusch's effort to distinguish Gilchrist is unpersuasive. Any error was harmless.