Opinion ID: 2561911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the district court fail to apply the correct standard for the determination of capacity to execute a deed?

Text: [¶ 14] The appellant asserts that when the district court determined that he possessed mental capacity, it overlooked the requirement that the grantor must have the ability to recollect the decisions which he has made. Essentially, the appellant argues that for a deed to be valid, the grantor must have the present ability to recollect the decisions he made when he executed the deeds. In support, the appellant quotes and emphasizes the following from In re Estate of Morton: He must have sufficient mind and memory to understand all of these facts, and to comprehend these elements in their relation to each other, and a charge, in negative form, that capacity is lacking if testator is not able to know all of these facts, is erroneous, since he lacks capacity if he is unable to understand any one of them. He must be able to appreciate the relations of these factors to one another, and to recollect the decision which he has formed. Morton, 428 P.2d at 729 (emphasis added). The appellant claims to have limited recollection of many of the events that occurred while he was hospitalized and during his stay at the hospice and absolutely no memory of any of the conveyances made during his illness. As such, the appellant insists that the conveyances were invalid. [¶ 15] The appellant's argument is simply incorrect. As we noted above, when determining a grantor's mental capacity, the point of time to be considered is the time of execution of the deed. See supra ¶ 10. We found no authority to support the proposition that post-execution memory is a requirement to a determination of mental capacity. The appellee aptly points out that such a rule would create legal chaos, as the nursing homes of this country are full of individuals who have no recollection of wills or deeds they signed.