Opinion ID: 1202658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative Purpose and the Presumption of Prospectivity

Text: The first and essentially the only real point of the majority opinion  intoned, however, with the drumbeat regularity of a Hindu mantra  is that the presumption of prospectivity is dispositive absent an express statement of legislative intent to the contrary. No matter how often repeated, however, the point is profoundly mistaken. This court has held that the presumption of prospectivity codified in Civil Code section 3 is relevant only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent. (Italics added, In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746 [48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948]; accord Fox v. Alexis (1985) 38 Cal.3d 621, 629 [214 Cal. Rptr. 132, 699 P.2d 309]; In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 587 [128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371]; Mannheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686-687 [91 Cal. Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17].) As Estrada counseled, That rule of construction ... is not a straightjacket. Where the Legislature has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent. (63 Cal.2d at p. 746; accord In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 587; Mannheim v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 686-687.) This has long been the rule. (See, e.g., Estate of Frees (1921) 187 Cal. 150, 156 [201 P. 112] [retroactive operation may be  inferred ... from the words of the statute taken by themselves and in connection with the subject matter, and the occasion of the enactment.... (Italics added.)].) And as this court has recently reaffirmed, An express declaration that the Legislature intended the law to be applied retroactively is not necessarily required. ( Fox v. Alexis, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 629.) The majority attempts to distinguish our holdings in Mannheim, supra, 3 Cal.3d 678 and Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d 583, on the ground that there is no evidence in this case to show the retroactivity question was actually consciously considered during the enactment process. (Majority opn. at p. 1211, italics added.) None of our prior decisions, however, has ever suggested that Civil Code section 3 requires proof of a conscious legislative decision that a statute or initiative should operate retroactively. On the contrary, Estrada, Mannheim, Marriage of Bouquet and Fox, supra, 38 Cal.3d 621, all emphatically reaffirm the traditional rule that legislative intent may  indeed must  in the absence of an express declaration be deduced from a wide variety of pertinent factors, including the context of the legislation, its objective, the evils to be remedied, the history of the times and of legislation upon the same subject, public policy, and contemporaneous construction.... ( Fox v. Alexis, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 629; In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 591; Mannheim v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 686-687; In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746.) The majority's fundamental misunderstanding of these basic principles leads it into other errors. Thus, the majority assumes that the drafters of Proposition 51 would have included a specific provision providing for retroactive application of the initiative measure if such retroactive application had been intended. (Majority opn. at p. 1212.) That is a false assumption. As we have seen, where the language of the statute is silent, the courts may not automatically assume that the enacting body must have intended that the law should apply prospectively. On the contrary, the presumption of prospectivity [i]s to be applied only after, considering all pertinent factors, it is determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative intent. ( In re Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 746, italics added.) Indeed, if we properly assume that the proponents of Proposition 51 were aware of the relevant law when they chose to remain silent, it is not unlikely that they assumed the Act would apply to all cases not yet tried, and thus had no reason to expressly so provide. As the majority notes, statutes which modify the recoverability of damages have frequently been held by this court to be applicable to cases not yet tried. (See, e.g. Tulley v. Tranor (1878) 53 Cal. 274; Feckenscher v. Gamble (1938) 12 Cal.2d 482 [85 P.2d 885]; Stout v. Turney (1978) 22 Cal.3d 718 [150 Cal. Rptr. 637, 586 P.2d 1228].) [1] Contrary to the majority's assumption, therefore, if anything may reasonably be inferred from the Act's silence (which I do not strongly advocate, inasmuch as the evidence of intent is controlling) it is that the Act should apply retrospectively to all cases not yet tried. Nor does Bolen v. Woo (1979) 96 Cal. App.3d 944 [158 Cal. Rptr. 454], the decision most closely on point according to the majority, suggest otherwise. The issue in that case was whether an amendment to the Civil Code (§ 3333.1) which abrogated the collateral source rule in actions against health care providers applied retroactively. The Bolen court noted that prior to passage of the legislation, the Legislative Counsel rendered an opinion which counseled that the statute would fall within the proscription against retroactive application.... (96 Cal. App.3d at p. 958.) Thus, [a]rmed ... with ... counsel's opinion on retroactivity ..., the Bolen court concluded, the Legislature's silence could be considered sufficient proof of its intent that the statute should apply prospectively. ( Id. at p. 959.) The majority's reliance on Bolen for the proposition that mere legislative silence triggers the presumption of prospectivity is clearly misplaced.