Opinion ID: 4576082
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Lara’s mental condition.

Text: As in United States v. Sims, 428 F.3d 945 (10th Cir. 2005), “the most troubling issue is whether, given [Mr. Lara’s] mental condition, his consent was nonetheless the ‘product of a rational intellect and a free will’ and made with a ‘mental awareness so that the act of consent was that of one who knew what he was doing.’” Id. at 953 (quoting United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 377 (10th Cir. 1985)). This mental 11 awareness “requires both understanding and judgment.” Id. But “our cases have never required perfect mental ability to find a consent to search was voluntary.” Id. In Gay, for instance, we concluded that the defendant’s argument that consent was involuntary had “no merit” where the defendant was so intoxicated that he “was staggering and swaying as he walked” and slurred his speech, but was able to answer questions and produce his driver’s license upon request. 774 F.2d at 375–77. In determining whether a district court’s finding of voluntariness was clearly erroneous, our cases have considered whether the impairment was apparent to the officers, emphasizing that our inquiry regarding impairment focuses on the individual’s condition at the time of the search, rather than at a later date. For example, in Sims, 428 F.3d at 953, we upheld the district court’s finding of voluntariness despite suggestions in the record that the defendant suffered from dementia, “a degenerative disorder that could ultimately affect [the defendant’s] judgment.” We reasoned that the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous given that the defendant did “not point[ ] this court to any specific evidence of the extent of his impairment at the time of his consent to search,” the police testified “that no aspect of [the defendant’s] dysfunction was apparent to them,” and there was no evidence that the officers “had attempted to exploit any of his vulnerabilities.” Id. Mr. Quezada-Lara contends that Mr. Lara’s dementia rendered his consent involuntary, and, for support, he relies on (1) the fact that he “had no idea where he was, or what was happening” at the suppression hearing, Aplt. Br. at 31; (2) his daughter’s testimony at the suppression hearing that he had dementia for five years, 12 id. at 32; and (3) medical records presented to the district court that were created months after the search, id. These arguments fail because, as in Sims, the agents here testified that no aspect of Mr. Lara’s dysfunction was apparent to them, and the district court credited that testimony. See ROA, Vol. I at 57. The agents testified that Mr. Lara was friendly, cooperative, showed no signs of dementia, and seemed to understand what was going on because his answers were responsive to their questions. See, e.g., id., Vol. II at 11, 74. For instance, when asked if he would consent to a search, Mr. Lara nodded affirmatively and signed the consent-to-search form. Id. at 79–80. He was also able to explain that he was Mr. Quezada-Lara’s grandfather, and that he lived in the home with him. Id. at 76. In addition, he knew that his daughter had gone to Mexico, id. at 94, and he told the agents that Mr. Quezada-Lara had come to the home earlier that day to take a shower, which agents confirmed when they found some of his clothing in the bathroom, id. at 19. Moreover, like in Sims, “the district court found no evidence that the police had attempted to exploit any of his vulnerabilities.” 428 F.3d at 953; see ROA, Vol. I at 57 (“[T]he record is devoid of evidence that the agents attempted to . . . exploit any of his vulnerabilities.”). Mr. Lara’s testimony at the March 30, 2018 suppression hearing says nothing about the extent of his impairment at the time of the search, given that the suppression hearing took place more than nine months after the search. The same is true of the medical records introduced. As to his daughter’s testimony that Mr. Lara had dementia at the time of the search, the district court found that her testimony 13 suggested that “his dysfunction was limited and perhaps not apparent because he was largely able to care for himself.” Id. In other words, while her testimony indicated that he had dementia (which was true of the defendant in Sims), it also indicated that the “extent of his impairment at the time of his consent to search” was not severe. Sims, 428 F.3d at 953. Moreover, Ms. Lara’s testimony does not show that the dysfunction was “apparent to [the agents].” Id. Indeed, the agents testified that no aspect of the dysfunction was apparent to them, which is consistent with his daughter’s testimony suggesting that his dysfunction was limited at the time of the search. And, in any event, “our cases have never required perfect mental ability to find a consent to search was voluntary.” Id. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Lara was mentally capable to consent.