Opinion ID: 2528595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Citizen Participation Act

Text: ¶ 33 In August 2007, Illinois joined more than 20 other states [1] in enacting anti-SLAPP legislation, in the form of the Citizen Participation Act (735 ILCS 110/1 et seq. (West 2008)). The term SLAPP was coined by two professors at the University of Denver, George W. Pring and Penelope Canan, who conducted the seminal study on this type of lawsuit. George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders, 12 Bridgeport L.Rev. 937 (1992). SLAPPs, or `Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,' are lawsuits aimed at preventing citizens from exercising their political rights or punishing those who have done so. Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh, 238 Ill.2d 620, 630, 345 Ill.Dec. 546, 939 N.E.2d 389 (2010) (citing generally Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 35 Soc. Probs. 506 (1988)). SLAPPs use the threat of money damages or the prospect of the cost of defending against the suits to silence citizen participation. Walsh, 238 Ill.2d at 630, 345 Ill.Dec. 546, 939 N.E.2d 389 (citing 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008)). The paradigm SLAPP suit is one filed by developers, unhappy with public protest over a proposed development, filed against leading critics in order to silence criticism of the proposed development. Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F.Supp. 523, 525 (N.D.Ill.1990). A SLAPP is based upon nothing more than defendants' exercise of their right, under the first amendment, to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Hogan, 740 F.Supp. at 525. ¶ 34 SLAPPs are, by definition, meritless. John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 395, 396 (1993). Plaintiffs in SLAPP suits do not intend to win but rather to chill a defendant's speech or protest activity and discourage opposition by others through delay, expense, and distraction. Id. at 403-05. In fact, defendants win eighty to ninety percent of all SLAPP suits litigated on the merits. Id. at 406. While the case is being litigated in the courts, however, defendants are forced to expend funds on litigation costs and attorney fees and may be discouraged from continuing their protest activities. Id. at 404-06. ¶ 35 The idea is that the SLAPP plaintiff's goals are achieved through the ancillary effects of the lawsuit itself on the defendant, not through an adjudication on the merits. Therefore, the plaintiff's choice of what cause of action to plead matters little. Mark J. Sobczak, Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act, 28 N. Ill. U.L.Rev. 559, 561 (2008). SLAPPs masquerade as ordinary lawsuits and may include myriad causes of action, including defamation, interference with contractual rights or prospective economic advantage, and malicious prosecution. Kathryn W. Tate, California's Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 801, 804-05 (2000). Because winning is not a SLAPP plaintiff's primary motivation, the existing safeguards to prevent meritless claims from prevailing were seen as inadequate, prompting many states to enact anti-SLAPP legislation. Id. at 805. These statutory schemes commonly provide for expedited judicial review, summary dismissal, and recovery of attorney fees for the party who has been SLAPPed. Id. ¶ 36 These characteristics of SLAPPs are reflected in the language of the Act, particularly section 5, which sets forth the public policy considerations underlying the legislation: § 5. Public Policy. Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of government, it is declared to be the public policy of the State of Illinois that the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in the process of government must be encouraged and safeguarded with great diligence. The information, reports, opinions, claims, arguments, and other expressions provided by citizens are vital to effective law enforcement, the operation of government, the making of public policy and decisions, and the continuation of representative democracy. The laws, courts, and other agencies of this State must provide the utmost protection for the free exercise of these rights of petition, speech, association, and government participation. Civil actions for money damages have been filed against citizens and organizations of this State as a result of their valid exercise of their constitutional rights to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in and communicate with government. There has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits termed `Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation' in government or `SLAPPs' as they are popularly called. The threat of SLAPPs significantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service, and the exercise of these important constitutional rights. This abuse of the judicial process can and has been used as a means of intimidating, harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for involving themselves in public affairs. It is in the public interest and it is the purpose of this Act to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government; to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law; to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs; and to provide for attorney's fees and costs to prevailing movants. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). ¶ 37 Section 15 of the Act describes the type of motion to which the Act applies: This Act applies to any motion to dispose of a claim in a judicial proceeding on the grounds that the claim is based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party's rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government. Acts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome. 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). ¶ 38 A claim under the Act includes any lawsuit, cause of action, claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or other judicial pleading or filing alleging injury. 735 ILCS 110/10 (West 2008). Government is defined as a branch, department, agency, instrumentality, official, employee, agent, or other person acting under color of law of the United States, a state, a subdivision of a state, or another public authority including the electorate. Id. ¶ 39 When a motion to dismiss is filed pursuant to the Act, a hearing and decision on the motion must occur within 90 days after notice of the motion is given to the respondent. 735 ILCS 110/20(a) (West 2008). Discovery is suspended pending a decision on the motion. 735 ILCS 110/20(b) (West 2008). However, discovery may be taken, upon leave of court for good cause shown, on the issue of whether the movants [ sic ] acts are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized from, liability by this Act. Id. The court shall grant the motion and dismiss the judicial claim unless the court finds that the responding party has produced clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized from, liability by this Act. 735 ILCS 110/20(c) (West 2008). ¶ 40 Section 25 provides that the court shall award a moving party who prevails in a motion under this Act reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion. 735 ILCS 110/25 (West 2008). Section 30(b) provides that the Act shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and intent fully. 735 ILCS 110/30(b) (West 2008). ¶ 41 In construing the statute, we bear in mind the familiar principles of statutory construction. Our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass'n, 236 Ill.2d 433, 440, 338 Ill.Dec. 907, 925 N.E.2d 1113 (2010). The most reliable indicator of the legislative intent is the language of the statute, which should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. All provisions of a statute should be viewed as a whole. Accordingly, words and phrases should be interpreted in light of other relevant provisions of the statute and should not be construed in isolation. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 60, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). We also presume, in interpreting the meaning of the statutory language, that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Id. Our review of an issue of statutory interpretation is de novo. Lee v. John Deere Insurance Co., 208 Ill.2d 38, 43, 280 Ill.Dec. 523, 802 N.E.2d 774 (2003). ¶ 42 Plaintiff argues that the Act is intended to apply only to actions based solely on the defendants' petitioning activities and does not immunize defamation or other intentional torts. In other words, if the plaintiff's intent in bringing suit is to recover damages for alleged defamation and not to stifle or chill defendants' rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government, it is not a SLAPP and does not fall under the purview of the Act. We agree. Looking at the statute in its entirety, it is clear that the legislation is aimed at discouraging and eliminating meritless, retaliatory SLAPPs, as they traditionally have been defined. ¶ 43 In deciding whether a lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to the Act, a court must first determine whether the suit is the type of suit the Act was intended to address. Under section 15, a claim is subject to dismissal where it is based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party's rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government. 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). This description of a claim subject to the Act must not be construed in isolation but in the context of the purposes described in the public policy section. One of the Act's stated purposes is to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). In the service of that goal, the Act describes a SLAPP suit as one which chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service, and the exercise of these important constitutional rights. Id. The Act further identifies a SLAPP as an abuse of the judicial process which can and has been used as a means of intimidating, harassing, or punishing citizens and organizations for involving themselves in public affairs. Id. ¶ 44 The description of a SLAPP in section 5 mirrors the traditional definition of a SLAPP as a meritless lawsuit intended to chill participation in government through delay, expense, and distraction. Indeed, this court has recognized that the purpose of the Act is to give relief, including monetary relief, to citizens who have been victimized by meritless, retaliatory SLAPP lawsuits because of their `act or acts' made `in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government.' (Emphasis added.) Walsh, 238 Ill.2d at 633, 345 Ill.Dec. 546, 939 N.E.2d 389 (quoting 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008)). ¶ 45 In light of the clear legislative intent expressed in the statute to subject only meritless, retaliatory SLAPP suits to dismissal, we construe the phrase based on, relates to, or is in response to in section 15 to mean solely based on, relating to, or in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party's rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government. 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). Stated another way, where a plaintiff files suit genuinely seeking relief for damages for the alleged defamation or intentionally tortious acts of defendants, the lawsuit is not solely based on defendants's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. In that case, the suit would not be subject to dismissal under the Act. It is clear from the express language of the Act that it was not intended to protect those who commit tortious acts and then seek refuge in the immunity conferred by the statute. ¶ 46 The Massachusetts Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in interpreting that state's anti-SLAPP law. See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Products Corp., 427 Mass. 156, 691 N.E.2d 935 (1998). The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute provides, in part: In any case in which a party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims against said party are based on said party's exercise of its right to petition under the constitution of the United States or of the commonwealth, said party may bring a special motion to dismiss. The court shall advance any such special motion so that it may be heard and determined as expeditiously as possible. The court shall grant such special motion, unless the party against whom such special motion is made shows that: (1) the moving party's exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party's acts caused actual injury to the responding party. In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (Emphasis added.) Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H (1994). ¶ 47 The court held that, [d]espite the apparent purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute to dispose expeditiously of meritless lawsuits that may chill petitioning activity, the statutory language fails to track and implement such an objective. Duracraft Corp., 691 N.E.2d at 943. Accordingly, the court adopted a construction of `based on' that would exclude motions brought against meritorious claims with a substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities implicated. Id. The court held that [t]he special movant who `asserts' protection for its petitioning activities would have to make a threshold showing through the pleadings and affidavits that the claims against it are `based on' the petitioning activities alone and have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the petitioning activities. Id. Imposing this requirement on special movants under the statute would, according to the court, serve to distinguish meritless from meritorious claims, as was intended by the Legislature. Id. ¶ 48 Our construction of the phrase based on, relates to, or is in response to, in section 15 similarly allows a court to identify meritless SLAPP suits subject to the Act. This interpretation also serves to ameliorate the particular danger inherent in anti-SLAPP statutes    that when constructed or construed too broadly in protecting the rights of defendants, they may impose a counteractive chilling effect on prospective plaintiffs' own rights to seek redress from the courts for injuries suffered. Mark J. Sobczak, Comment, SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act, 28 N. Ill. U.L.Rev. 559, 575 (2008). ¶ 49 Furthermore, construing the Act to apply only to meritless SLAPPs accords with another express goal in section 5: to strike a balance between the rights of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government. 735 ILCS 110/5 (West 2008). The Act's intent to strike a balance recognizes that a solution to the problem of SLAPPs must not compromise either the defendants' constitutional rights of free speech and petition, or plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts to seek a remedy for damage to reputation. See John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. 395, 397-98 (1993) (Plaintiffs must be able to bring suits with reasonable merit and defendants must be protected from entirely frivolous intimidation suits designed to chill legitimate participation in public affairs.). ¶ 50 We believe that, had the legislature intended to radically alter the common law by imposing a qualified privilege on defamation within the process of petitioning the government, it would have explicitly stated its intent to do so. See In re D.F., 208 Ill.2d 223, 235, 280 Ill.Dec. 549, 802 N.E.2d 800 (2003). The legislative history of the Act further supports our conclusion that the legislature intended to target only meritless, retaliatory SLAPPs and did not intend to establish a new absolute or qualified privilege for defamation. The sponsor of the bill in the Senate, Senator Cullerton, stated that the bill was intended to address the concern that certain lawsuits that could be filed that significantly would chill and diminish citizen participation in government or voluntary public service or the exercise of those constitutional rights. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 20, 2007, at 15 (statements of Senator Cullerton). Senator Cullerton then gave an example of the type of suit targeted by the bill: [L]et's say a community organization makes recommendations to a local alderman concerning zoning changes. They just give advice, then the party that might not agree with that decision, the vote of the alderman, they-that person, that landowner would file a lawsuit, not just against the municipality, but also against the community organization that gave the advice. Even though all they were doing was giving advice to their elected officials. So, that's what the purpose of the bill is. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 20, 2007, at 15-16 (statements of Senator Cullerton). The House sponsor, Representative Franks, also described a scenario as an example of a SLAPP: I can tell you in my county, it'd be in the Village of Richmond, there was [ sic ] two (2) gentlemen running for trustees who were ... who won but they were sued by a developer, threatened with bankruptcy, not being able to pay their legal fees, even though the ... the developer's lawsuit was thrown out on three (3) separate occasions and that would stop the type of abuse. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 31, 2007, at 58 (statements of Representative Franks). ¶ 51 The legislators' statements further support our interpretation that the Act was aimed solely at traditional, meritless SLAPPs. There was no discussion in the legislative debates about establishing a new privilege for defamation. We recognize that the legislature has the inherent power to repeal or change the common law and may do away with all or part of it. See, e.g., Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 519-20, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000) (passage of the Tort Immunity Act constituted an exercise of the General Assembly of its broad power to determine whether a statute that restricts or alters an existing remedy is reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare). We simply do not believe that, in enacting the anti-SLAPP statute, the legislature intended to abolish an individual's right to seek redress for defamation or other intentional torts, whenever the tortious acts are in furtherance of the tortfeasor's rights of petition, speech, association, or participation in government. Dismissal of a lawsuit pursuant to the Act is a drastic and extraordinary remedy. Not only is a suit subject to cursory dismissal within 90 days of the motion being filed, but the plaintiff is prohibited from conducting discovery, except through leave of court, and is required to pay defendant's attorney fees incurred in connection with the motion. In light of the severe penalties imposed on a plaintiff under the Act, we will not read into the statute an intent to establish a new, qualified privilege absent an explicit statement of such intent. ¶ 52 Several of the defendants concede that the Act applies only to meritless lawsuits, but they argue that the so-called sham exception set forth in the second clause of section 15 is sufficient to separate SLAPPs from meritorious suits. This exception states that [a]cts in furtherance of the constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome.  (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008). Defendants argue that, where petitioning activities are genuinely aimed at procuring a favorable governmental result, a plaintiff's lawsuit for alleged defamation occurring in the course of petitioning is, by definition, without merit. Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. ¶ 53 The sham exception tests the genuineness of the defendants' acts; it says nothing about the merits of the plaintiff's lawsuit. It is entirely possible that defendants could spread malicious lies about an individual while in the course of genuinely petitioning the government for a favorable result. For instance, in the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that defendants defamed him by making statements that plaintiff abused children, did not get along with colleagues, and performed poorly at his job. Assuming these statements constitute actionable defamation, it does not follow that defendants were not genuinely attempting to achieve a favorable governmental result by pressuring the school board into firing the plaintiff. [2] If a plaintiff's complaint genuinely seeks redress for damages from defamation or other intentional torts and, thus, does not constitute a SLAPP, it is irrelevant whether the defendants' actions were genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome. Thus, plaintiff's suit would not be subject to dismissal under the Act. ¶ 54 Turning to the merits in the case at bar, at issue is whether plaintiff's complaint should have been dismissed pursuant to the Act. At the outset, we note that all of the motions to dismiss in this case were filed under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)). A section 2-615 motion to dismiss challenges only the legal sufficiency of a complaint and alleges only defects on the face of the complaint. Board of Directors of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. The Hoffman Group, Inc., 186 Ill.2d 419, 423, 238 Ill.Dec. 608, 712 N.E.2d 330 (1999). A motion to dismiss based on the immunity conferred by the Act, however, is more appropriately raised in a section 2-619(a)(9) motion, which allows for dismissal when the claim asserted against the defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008)). Wright Development Group, LLC v. Walsh, 238 Ill.2d 620, 641, 345 Ill.Dec. 546, 939 N.E.2d 389 (2010) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by Thomas and Burke, JJ.). Immunity from tort liability pursuant to statute is an affirmative matter properly raised in a section 2-619 motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill.2d 359, 367, 278 Ill.Dec. 555, 799 N.E.2d 273 (2003) (construing section 2-201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 1994))). Since plaintiff has not been prejudiced by the motions to dismiss having been filed under section 2-615, we will treat the parts of the motions asserting immunity under the Act as if they had been filed under section 2-619(a)(9). See Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill.2d 441, 447, 272 Ill.Dec. 146, 786 N.E.2d 980 (2002); Gouge v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 144 Ill.2d 535, 541-42, 163 Ill.Dec. 842, 582 N.E.2d 108 (1991). ¶ 55 A motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a) admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim but asserts certain defects or defenses outside the pleadings which defeat the claim. Wallace, 203 Ill.2d at 447, 272 Ill.Dec. 146, 786 N.E.2d 980. When ruling on the motion, the court should construe the pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Czarobski v. Lata, 227 Ill.2d 364, 369, 317 Ill.Dec. 656, 882 N.E.2d 536 (2008). The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's complaint and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn in plaintiff's favor. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich, 231 Ill.2d 474, 488, 327 Ill.Dec. 45, 901 N.E.2d 373 (2008). The question on appeal is whether the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should have precluded the dismissal or, absent such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a matter of law. Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill.2d 112, 116-17, 189 Ill.Dec. 31, 619 N.E.2d 732 (1993). Our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 56 The procedure set forth in the Act provides the proper framework for our analysis. Section 15 requires the moving party to demonstrate that the plaintiff's complaint is based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party's rights of petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government. 735 ILCS 110/15 (West 2008); Walsh, 238 Ill.2d at 635, 345 Ill.Dec. 546, 939 N.E.2d 389. If the moving party has met his or her burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the responding party to produce clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the moving party are not immunized from, or are not in furtherance of acts immunized from, liability under the Act. 735 ILCS 110/20(c) (West 2008); Walsh, 238 Ill.2d at 636-37, 345 Ill.Dec. 546, 939 N.E.2d 389. Thus, defendants had the initial burden of proving that plaintiff's lawsuit was solely based on, relate[d] to, or in response to their acts in furtherance of their rights of petition, speech or association, or to participate in government. Only if defendants have met their burden does the plaintiff have to provide clear and convincing evidence that defendants' acts are not immunized from liability under the Act. ¶ 57 We conclude, based on the parties' pleadings, that plaintiff's lawsuit was not solely based on, related to, or in response to the acts of defendants in furtherance of the rights of petition and speech. Plaintiff's suit does not resemble in any way a strategic lawsuit intended to chill participation in government or to stifle political expression. It is apparent that the true goal of plaintiff's claims is not to interfere with and burden defendants' free speech and petition rights, but to seek damages for the personal harm to his reputation from defendants' alleged defamatory and tortious acts. Defendants have not met their burden of showing that plaintiff's suit was based solely on their petitioning activities. ¶ 58 We emphasize that we express no opinion on the actual merits of plaintiff's causes of action. We simply hold that plaintiff's lawsuit is not a SLAPP within the meaning of the Act and, thus, is not subject to dismissal on that basis. Upon remand, the circuit court should consider any remaining bases for dismissal raised by defendants, including that defendants' statements constitute protected opinion, that the statements are protected under the fair reporting privilege, and that plaintiff's complaint failed to adequately plead the required elements, including actual malice.