Opinion ID: 1057861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the Defendants' Plea in Bar

Text: The Defendants' plea in bar asserted that Napper's action was barred by the Act's exclusivity provision found in Code § 65.2-307(A), which states: The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee when his employer and he have accepted the provisions of this title respectively to pay and accept compensation on account of injury or death by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death. The exclusivity provision does not apply, however, to a common law action for an employee's injury or death against an other party. Code § 65.2-309; Fowler, 260 Va. at 425, 537 S.E.2d at 314. The trial court applied the stranger to the work test when it sustained the Defendants' plea in bar, and the parties have not disputed that, with respect to the issue of whether the Defendants and Napper are statutory fellow employees, the stranger to the work test applies. We have previously observed that the stranger to the work test is derived from the language of Code § 65.2-309(A) . . . which recognizes the right of an injured worker to maintain a common law action for personal injury against an `other party.' Id. at 426, 537 S.E.2d at 314. We observed in Fowler that the stranger to the work test was first applied in Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946), and we stated: The remedies afforded the employee under the [A]ct are exclusive of all his former remedies within the field of the particular business, but the [A]ct does not extend to accidents caused by strangers to the business. If the employee is performing the duties of his employer and is injured by a stranger to the business, the compensation prescribed by the act is available to him, but that does not relieve the stranger of his full liability for the loss. . . . Id. at 426, 537 S.E.2d at 314 (quoting Feitig, 185 Va. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 75-76) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, the stranger to the work test requires that the facts of each case be analyzed to determine whether the defendant in a common-law action was, at the time of the plaintiff's injury, a stranger to the work in which the plaintiff was engaged. If the defendant was `no stranger,' then he was not an `other party' within Code § [65.2-309], and the common-law action against him is barred by Code § [65.2-307(A)]. Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 169, 327 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1985). We later explained in Fowler that the language from Whalen stating, the work in which the plaintiff was engaged, 229 Va. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105, means the work in which the plaintiff's employer was engaged. 260 Va. at 427, 537 S.E.2d at 315. Napper argues that the facts of this case are more akin to those in Stone v. Door-Man Mfg. Co., 260 Va. 406, 537 S.E.2d 305 (2000) (decided the same day as our decision in Fowler ) than to those in Fowler. In Stone, we addressed the question whether a worker in the employ of the owner of a manufacturing business was a statutory fellow employee of the architect and contractors involved in a construction project at the owner's plant. Id. at 409, 537 S.E.2d at 306. We concluded in Stone that `the work in which [Stone's] employer was engaged' was [Ford Motor Company's] `particular business' of manufacturing and selling motor vehicles and that [t]he defendants were strangers to that business. Id. at 419, 537 S.E.2d at 311 (citing Feitig, 185 Va. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 75; Whalen, 229 Va. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105). Accordingly, we held that Stone's common law action for personal injuries against the defendants was not barred. Id. It should be noted that in deciding Stone, we relied in large part upon our prior decisions in Feitig and Whalen. See Stone, 260 Va. at 415-20, 537 S.E.2d at 309-12. In Whalen, the issue was whether a general contractor's employee may bring a tort action against a subcontractor for personal injuries caused by the subcontractor's negligence on the job. 229 Va. at 166, 327 S.E.2d at 103. We applied the stranger to the work test and held that the worker's action was barred. Id. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105. In so holding, we stated that the subcontractor was no stranger to the work in which [the plaintiff's] employer was engaged, but was, on the contrary, performing an essential part of it. Id. Here, Napper argues that because the provision of cleaning and janitorial services, particularly as they relate to the building's common areas, was not part of Kastle's business, it follows that the Defendants were strangers to Kastle's business and may be subject to her action for damages. We agree. As we stated in Floyd v. Mitchell, 203 Va. 269, 274, 123 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1962): The test is not whether [a company], by engaging an independent contractor to perform some part of his business, thereby engages in the business of the independent contractor. It is whether the independent contractor is performing work that is part of the trade, business or occupation of the [company]. If he is, and in doing the work injures an employee of the [company], then the independent contractor, in the same fashion as any other employee of the [company], is not a third party against whom the injured employee's right of action is preserved; but the employee so injured is limited to the compensation provided by the Work[ers'] Compensation law. . . . (Emphasis added.) The issue in this case is whether the Defendants were other part[ies] under Code § 65.2-309 and therefore strangers to Kastle's particular business of operating a call center. Feitig, 185 Va. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 75. Based on our prior holdings in Fowler and Whalen, in resolving the issue whether a particular person or entity constitutes an other party under Code § 65.2-309 and is, accordingly, a stranger to another person's or entity's particular business, in this case a key consideration is whether, in providing. . . services to [Kastle], [ABM] was `performing an essential part' of [Kastle's] business. Fowler, 260 Va. at 428, 537 S.E.2d at 315 (quoting Whalen, 229 Va. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105). However, it is important to note that, while the parties have argued at great length regarding the essential nature of janitorial services as they relate to Kastle's business under the facts of this case, the test to determine whether the Defendants were other part[ies] under Code § 65.2-309 and, accordingly, strangers to Kastle's particular business, Feitig, 185 Va. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 75, is not merely whether the Defendants were performing a service essential to Kastle's business. Fowler, 260 Va. at 427, 537 S.E.2d at 314; Whalen, 229 Va. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105; Floyd, 203 Va. at 274, 123 S.E.2d at 372. Rather, the test is whether the Defendants were performing work that is part of [Kastle's particular] trade, business or occupation. Floyd, 203 Va. at 274, 123 S.E.2d at 372 (emphasis added); Feitig, 185 Va. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 75. While janitorial services may be considered essential to every business in the Commonwealth for obvious reasons, it does not follow that janitorial services are an essential part of every employer's particular trade, business or occupation. In Fowler, we considered the question whether the provision of cleaning and janitorial services is a part of an [employer]'s trade, business, or occupation. 260 Va. at 428, 537 S.E.2d at 315. We concluded that both the plaintiff's employer, Sears, and the company Sears hired to clean its store were involved in cleaning Sears' premises. Id. Specifically, we noted that Sears' employees cleaned up spills, swept the warehouse floor, and carried trash to the dumpster. [The cleaning company]'s personnel cleaned bathrooms, mopped floors, stripped floors, and performed other cleaning functions. Sears' personnel used [the cleaning company]'s cleaning supplies and equipment, which were stored in a closet provided on Sears' premises. When [the cleaning company] stripped floors, Sears provided half the signs needed to warn of possible danger. The combined efforts of [the cleaning company] and Sears were designed to accomplish Sears' goal of making its store clean, attractive, and safea goal necessary to the successful operation of Sears' [retail] business. And, by its participation in those efforts, [the cleaning company] was performing an essential part of Sears' business. Id. at 428, 537 S.E.2d at 315-16 (quoting Whalen, 229 Va. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we held that the hired cleaning company was not a stranger to Sears' business and affirmed the trial court's decision that the plaintiff's action against the cleaning company was barred by Virginia workers' compensation law. Id. at 424, 428-29, 537 S.E.2d at 313, 316. Unlike Fowler, however, the evidence in this case does not demonstrate that the Defendants were performing work that is part of [Kastle's] trade, business or occupation. See Floyd, 203 Va. at 274, 123 S.E.2d at 372 (emphasis added); Fowler, 260 Va. at 428, 537 S.E.2d at 315-16. Despite evidence that Kastle had Windex, Clorox, toilet paper and paper towel[s], there is no evidence that Kastle employees were required to or were, in fact, involved in performing any cleaning of Kastle's offices, let alone the building's common areas, including the bathrooms and the lobby where Napper was injured. Rather, the evidence demonstrated that Kastle employees were not allowed to clean the common areas or common bathrooms. Moreover, unlike Sears in Fowler, there is no evidence that Kastle worked with the Defendants to make its offices clean, attractive, and safe. See id. at 428, 537 S.E.2d at 316. While such a goal [was] necessary to the successful operation of Sears' [retail] business in Fowler, there is no evidence that Kastle's business was dependent upon, or included, receiving retail customers or clients at its offices; rather, the evidence demonstrated that Kastle's offices were not a place for receiving customers and clients as an essential part of its business. Id. at 428, 537 S.E.2d at 316. Consequently, the evidence does not demonstrate that the Defendants, by providing janitorial services to a building occupied by multiple tenants and in which Kastle leased space to operate a call center, were performing work that is part of [Kastle's] trade, business or occupation. See Floyd, 203 Va. at 274, 123 S.E.2d at 372. As a result, the Defendants were other part[ies] as contemplated by Code § 65.2-309 and strangers to Kastle's particular business of operating a call center. See Whalen, 229 Va. at 169, 327 S.E.2d at 105; Floyd, 203 Va. at 274, 123 S.E.2d at 372; Feitig, 185 Va. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 75. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in sustaining the Defendants' plea in bar because Napper's action against the Defendants is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusivity provision in Code § 65.2-307(A).