Opinion ID: 186155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Absence of McCaskill from the Hearing

Text: 43 The last of Stanfield's procedural arguments is that the court violated his right to present evidence on his behalf, see FED.R.CRIM.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C), by refusing to compel the presence of Seth McCaskill as a witness for the defense. Appellant Br. at 32. We reject the government's rejoinder that the subpoena for McCaskill was itself an abuse of process insofar as it was requested on April 9, only six days before the hearing. See Appellee Br. at 34 n.17. The timing of Stanfield's request is easily explained: his counsel received the Violation Report from the probation office only nine days before the hearing, see HOV Tr. at 101, and the order converting the status hearing to a revocation hearing was issued only three weeks before the hearing date. Nonetheless, we conclude that Stanfield's argument must fail. 44 When the court gave Stanfield the opportunity to elicit testimony from McCaskill by telephone, his counsel replied, That's not acceptable to me. Id. at 4; see also id. at 69 (court to counsel: The record will reflect that you're waiving your opportunity to examine this witness.). Counsel did not, however, request a continuance to allow McCaskill to appear. Cf. United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1023 (6th Cir.1977) (trial court erred in denying request for a continuance when witnesses subpoenaed by defense did not appear). By summarily rejecting the option of taking McCaskill's testimony by telephone, counsel foreclosed the development of a record from which we could have evaluated the extent, if any, to which Stanfield's due process rights might have been infringed by the substitution of the telephone examination for live testimony, and whether any infringement would have been harmless in the overall context of the hearing. Cf. United States v. Jacobs, 97 F.3d 275, 280-84 (8th Cir.1996) (court erred in allowing cross-examination of hospitalized witness by telephone at trial, but error was harmless). We decline to engage in an abstract and hypothetical examination of whether telephone testimony would be adequate under Morrissey and Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C).