Opinion ID: 2143146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subsection (c-6) and section 5-5-4(b)

Text: The majority compares subsection (c) with subsection (c-6) of the Act and section 5-5-4(b) of the Code. These provisions deal with judicial determinations of factual innocence and provide that when a conviction has been set aside on direct review or collateral attack and the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was factually innocent the court shall enter an expungement order. 20 ILCS 2630/5(c-6) (West 2006). According to the majority, the legislature would have used this language if it intended to make expungement mandatory. 233 Ill.2d at 221, 330 Ill.Dec. at 708, 909 N.E.2d at 730. But, as Howard correctly held, stating that a petitioner may have a court order entered is also mandatory with respect to the circuit court. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 502, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472. This was another point of contention between the majority and the dissent in Howard, with the majority stating that the difference between the language in subsection (c) and section 5-5-4(b) is a distinction without a difference ( Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 504, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472); while the dissent believed that [t]he difference between section 5-5-4(b) of the Code and subsection 5(c) of the Act is huge ( Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 515, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472 (Fitzgerald Smith, P.J., dissenting)). Once again, the Howard majority was correct. Reaching this conclusion requires us to look past the superficial distinction that one phrase uses the term may and one uses the term shall, but look past it we must because the legislature used those terms with respect to different actors. Far from showing that the different phrasing indicates that the legislature intended a different result (see 233 Ill.2d at 221, 330 Ill.Dec. at 708, 909 N.E.2d at 730), it merely shows that one phrase is worded with the trial court as the subject and the other with the petitioner as the subject. Moreover, when we consider the different procedural postures of the two situations, the legislature's choice of words makes perfect sense. As I mentioned above, the legislature could not have used the phrase shall have a court order entered because that would mean that the petitioner was required to have an expungement order entered. There is no evidence that the legislature intended to require defendants who receive gubernatorial pardons to have their records expunged; it has merely given them that right, if they choose to exercise it. When worded to give the petitioner a choice whether to have an expungement order entered, the grammatically correct phrase to use would be that the petitioner may have a court order entered. With respect to the trial court, this is no different than saying that the court shall enter an order. By contrast, it is completely different from the language in subsection (a), which states that the trial court may    order the record of arrest expunged. The equivalent phrasing of subsection (a) with the petitioner as the subject would be that the petitioner may seek to have a court order entered. In short: the petitioner may have a court order entered is equivalent to the court shall enter an order; the petitioner may seek to have a court order entered is equivalent to the court may order the record expunged. And, as set forth above, when we consider that subsection (b), subsection (c-6), and section 5-5-4(b) of the Code all deal with the factually innocent, we have clear evidence that the legislature uses the wording that a petitioner may have a court order entered interchangeably with that stating that a court shall enter an order. The wording the legislature chose makes perfect sense when the procedural postures of the cases are concerned. Subsection (c-6) and section 5-5-4(b) are triggered by situations within the court system: there has been a reversal of a conviction or sentence or the conviction or sentence has been set aside on collateral attack, and the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was factually innocent. The legislature gives the trial court express directions on what it should do in this situation: enter an order expunging the record of arrest. By contrast, subsections (b) and (c) are triggered by events occurring outside the court system. Subsection (b) is triggered when a person learns that another has been arrested using his identity (20 ILCS 2630/5(b) (West 2006)) and subsection (c) is triggered when a person receives a gubernatorial pardon specifically authorizing expungement (20 ILCS 2630/5(c) (West 2006)). Thus, the legislature makes these people the subject of the sentence and gives them directions for what they need to do to have court orders entered expunging or correcting their records.