Opinion ID: 1759126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Postconviction and Habeas Corpus

Text: Unable to bring a motion for a new trial, El-Tabech brought this action pursuant to the Nebraska Postconviction Act alleging that he is innocent and as such, has a right to be free from wrongful incarceration under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 3, of the Nebraska Constitution. He further alleged in his operative petition that in the absence of a statutory procedure under which he could use the results of DNA testing to set aside his convictions and sentences, state-funded testing should still be compelled because he could use the results to seek a pardon. Finally, El-Tabech alleged that he has a property right in the ability to pursue relief from a wrongful conviction or sentence. The essential problem concerning El-Tabech's motion made under the Nebraska Postconviction Act is the requirement that there be a constitutional violation. Although El-Tabech couched the issue in terms of a due process violation, his motion is akin to a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Yet, El-Tabech could not bring a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence within the 3-year time limit because DNA fingerprinting was not available at that time. Section 29-3001 pertains to postconviction actions and provides in part: A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released on the ground that there was such a denial or infringement of the rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States, may file a verified motion at any time in the court which imposed such sentence, stating the grounds relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the sentence. Thus, relief under the Nebraska Postconviction Act is limited to denial or infringement of a prisoner's rights under the federal or state Constitution so as to render the judgment void or voidable. State v. Thomas, 236 Neb. 553, 462 N.W.2d 862 (1990). A motion for postconviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. State v. Carpenter, 186 Neb. 605, 185 N.W.2d 663 (1971). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), that it is constitutional for a state to require that a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence be brought within 30 days, even when there is no other statutory remedy available for bringing a claim of actual innocence. In so holding, the Court stated that the petitioner was not without a remedy because he could request executive clemency under state law. The Court in Herrera further held that under federal habeas principles, the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a prisoner is not a ground for relief. This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution not to correct errors of fact. 506 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. 853. The federal courts do allow an exception for prisoners who have made constitutional claims that would normally be procedurally barred when those prisoners sufficiently show a claim of actual innocence. This rule, known as the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception, is grounded in the `equitable discretion' of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent people. 506 U.S. at 404, 113 S.Ct. 853. Thus, the Court stated that this body of our habeas jurisprudence makes clear that a claim of `actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. Id. See, also, Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (distinguishing case from facts in Herrera based on existence of underlying constitutional claim). Concurring in Herrera, Justices Scalia and Thomas emphasized that there is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice ... for finding in the Constitution a right to demean judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction. 506 U.S. at 427-28, 113 S.Ct. 853 (Scalia, J., concurring; Thomas, J., joins). See, also, Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir.1993) (actual innocence is not itself constitutional claim and assertion of potential errors in DNA tests is claim of factual innocence, rather than claim of errors at law). In addition, another jurisdiction has stated that discovery is not required under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705 (Ind.App.1992). More specifically, it has been also held that there is no constitutional right to DNA testing. State v. Frazier, Nos. IN XX-XX-XXXXR1 to IN XX-XX-XXXXR1, 1995 WL 654433 (Del.Super.Aug.3, 1995). Jurisdictions that have allowed DNA testing or evidence as part of postconviction proceedings either have broader statutory provisions than those in Nebraska, have found a constitutional right under their state constitution, or were decided prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Herrera. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 171 Ill.2d 475, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 216 Ill.Dec. 773 (1996) (based on state constitution); Summerville v. Warden, 229 Conn. 397, 415, 641 A.2d 1356, 1365 (1994) (citing Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-471(a), habeas statute providing that court must `dispose of the case as law and justice require'); Mebane v. State, 21 Kan.App.2d 533, 902 P.2d 494 (1995) (citing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507 which is broader postconviction act; Sewell v. State, supra ) (decided prior to Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993)); People v. Callace, 151 Misc.2d 464, 573 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1991) (decided prior to Herrera ); Dabbs v. Vergari, 149 Misc.2d 844, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1990) (decided prior to Herrera ). Compare Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 471 (S.D.1999) (stating courts should consider reopening case if a `truly persuasive' showing of actual innocence lies close at hand). We determine that El-Tabech cannot bring his request under the Nebraska Postconviction Act, nor is there an alternate statutory procedure, such as habeas, under which his request can be brought. See, Hawk v. Olson, 145 Neb. 306, 16 N.W.2d 181 (1944) (habeas is not proper remedy to release one from prison who has been wrongfully convicted), reversed on other grounds 326 U.S. 271, 66 S.Ct. 116, 90 L.Ed. 61 (1945); Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N.W. 339 (1935). See, also, Rehbein v. Clarke, 257 Neb. 406, 598 N.W.2d 39 (1999) (habeas corpus in this state is quite limited in comparison to those of federal courts, which allow writ of habeas corpus to prisoner when in custody in violation of federal Constitution). We next consider whether there exists a common-law action under which El-Tabech's request may be brought.