Opinion ID: 1236089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motivation of the judge

Text: The state argues that one factor to be weighed in determining the propriety of a judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial is the motivation of the judge in so ruling. Relying on Gori v. United States, [17] respondent contends that, when the trial judge acts in the sole interest of the defendant in declaring a mistrial, which is apparently the situation in the present case, this fact should weigh in favor of allowing retrial. In Gori, the trial judge declared a mistrial with neither approval nor objection on the part of the defendant. The precise reason for the mistrial was unclear. However, on review the United States Supreme Court assumed the judge had so acted in order to protect the defendant from prosecutorial misconduct. The court noted that a trial court judge may, for reasons he deems compelling, declare a mistrial without the defendant's consent and even over his objection where substantial justice cannot be obtained without discontinuing the trial. It further observed that the trial judge is best situated to intelligently make such a decision. The court, with four justices dissenting, then found retrial not precluded by the double jeopardy prohibitions, declaring: ... [W]e are unwilling, where it clearly appears that a mistrial has been granted in the sole interest of the defendant, to hold that it's necessary consequence is to bar all retrial. [18] The authoritativeness of this decision and the theory that judicial motivation should be a significant factor in determining the propriety of a judge's sua sponte declaration of mistrial was at least erroded, if not eliminated, by the plurality decision in United States v. Jorn. [19] Therein Justice Harlan, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall joining in the opinion and Justice Black and Justice Brennan joining in the judgment, concluded that appellate courts should not be limited in their review of a judge's sua sponte declaration of mistrial to a determination of which side benefited by the mistrial. Further, we think that a limitation on the abuse-of-discretion principle based on an appellate court's assessment of which side benefited from the mistrial ruling does not adequately satisfy the policies underpinning the double jeopardy provision. Reprosecution after a mistrial has unnecessarily been declared by the trial court obviously subjects the defendant to the same personal strain and insecurity regardless of the motivation underlying the trial judge's action. The Government contends, however, that the policies evinced by the double jeopardy provision do not reach this sort of injury; rather the unnecessarily inflicted second trial must, in the Government's view, appear to be the result of a mistrial declaration which unfairly aids the prosecution or harasses the defense. [20] A number of federal courts have considered the problem created by the contradictory statements in Jorn and Gori. In large part, these courts have concluded that judicial motivation in declaring a mistrial sua sponte should be given little, if any, weight in assessing the propriety of the mistrial. [21] I agree with the interpretation of these federal courts and therefore would find the fact that the trial judge was acting in what he felt to be the best interests of the defendant when he declared a mistrial is not determinative of the propriety of the judge's sua sponte declaration of mistrial.