Opinion ID: 2775033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Barbary’s Constructive Amendment Claim

Text: Defendant Barbary argues that the district court erred in admitting Bennett’s testimony that Barbary and Bennett sold crack cocaine, powder cocaine, and heroin together in 1995 because the testimony resulted in a constructive amendment of the indictment, which alleged a drug conspiracy from 2000 to 2010 involving just cocaine and oxycodone. While we ordinarily review a constitutional issue de novo, United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2008), we review an unpreserved constructive-amendment claim only for plain error. United States v. Madden, 733 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Dortch, 696 F.3d 1104, 1112 46 Case: 13-10453 Date Filed: 01/30/2015 Page: 47 of 67 (11th Cir. 2012). 18 Under the plain-error standard, we will not correct an error raised for the first time on appeal unless there is an error that is plain; that affects substantial rights; and that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Madden, 733 F.3d at 1322. 19 Barbary’s constructive amendment argument is misplaced. Although an indictment may be constructively amended by presenting irrelevant evidence of uncharged offenses, there are many instances in which evidence of uncharged offenses is properly admitted in a criminal trial. Relevant here, evidence of uncharged offenses that are intrinsic to the charged conduct is admissible if (1) the uncharged offense arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) the evidence is necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) the evidence is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense. United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998). This Court has explained that “[e]vidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the 18 At trial, Barnes—but not Barbary—objected to Bennett’s testimony concerning Bennett’s 1995 drug sales with Barbary, stating, “Judge, I am going to object. This is 1995. It is outside the scope of the indictment.” Even assuming that an objection by a codefendant would be sufficient to preserve this issue on appeal for Barbary, this general objection was insufficient to raise the constructive-amendment argument that Barbary now makes on appeal. See United States v. Deverso, 518 F.3d 1250, 1255 (11th Cir. 2008). 19 In Madden, the Court noted that the defendant “cite[d] five cases for the proposition that a constructive amendment is a per se reversible error,” but the Court concluded that those cases did not alter its conclusion that traditional plain-error review applied because those cases involved defendants who objected to the district court’s constructive amendment. Madden, 733 F.3d at 1321-22 & n.5. 47 Case: 13-10453 Date Filed: 01/30/2015 Page: 48 of 67 crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.” Id. In this case, Bennett’s testimony concerning the 1995 drug dealings was necessary for the government to complete the story of the charged crimes, as it explained how Bennett came to know and participate in narcotics distribution with Barbary and Barbary-Jackson and why he helped them distribute drugs after his release from prison in 2000. This type of properly admitted intrinsic evidence did not broaden the possible bases for a conviction, and thus, did not constructively amend the indictment. See Lehder-Rivas, 955 F.2d at 1519 n.5. Because the evidence was properly admissible, its admission—and the government’s reliance on it to support its case—did not cause a constructive amendment of the indictment, and there was no error, much less plain error.