Opinion ID: 150955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abandonment Instruction

Text: In his proposed abandonment instruction, Young cited the Model Penal Code, in which the provisions concerning criminal attempt include references to the affirmative defense of voluntary renunciation. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(4). The code section provides that the defense applies only when the defendant: abandon[s] his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevent[s] its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.... [R]enunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, that increase the probability of detection or apprehension or that make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim. Id. The Model Penal Code lists two considerations for recognizing such a defense in attempt crimes: (1) renunciation of criminal purpose tends to negative dangerousness, and (2) to provide actors with a motive for desisting from their criminal designs, thereby diminishing the risk that the substantive crime will be committed. Model Penal Code § 5.01(4) cmt. 8 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). This issue of whether a defendant is entitled to an abandonment defense once an attempt has been completed, i.e., the defendant has the requisite intent and has completed a substantial step towards the crime, is an issue of first impression in our circuit. While we have stated, [i]n an attempt case, abandonment precludes liability, United States v. Robinson, 217 F.3d 560, 564 n. 3 (8th Cir.2000), we relied upon United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir.1982) in making that comment. Joyce, however, involved abandonment of an attempt prior to the completion of the attempt. Id. at 841. We hold today that a defendant cannot abandon an attempt once it has been completed. [8] We emphasize that all of our sister circuits that have faced this issue have either held that a defendant cannot abandon a completed attempt or have alluded to such a determination. See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 410-11 (2d Cir. 2003) (not formally addressing the issue but noting, [t]he only other circuits that have formally addressed the question have rejected the defense as a matter of federal law); United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir.1994) ([W]ithdrawal, abandonment and renunciation, however characterized, do not provide a defense to an attempt crime.); United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir.1974) (A voluntary abandonment of an attempt which has proceeded well beyond preparation as here, will not bar a conviction for the attempt.); United States v. Wales, 127 Fed.Appx. 424, 432 (10th Cir.2005) (unpublished) ([N]either this circuit nor any other circuit to have addressed the issue has held that abandonment or renunciation may constitute a defense to the completed crime of attempt.). Specifically, in Shelton, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Model Penal Code's approach and held that withdrawal, abandonment and renunciation, however characterized, do not provide a defense to an attempt crime. 30 F.3d at 706. The court explained: As noted, the attempt crime is complete with proof of intent together with acts constituting a substantial step toward commission of the substantive offense. When a defendant withdraws prior to forming the necessary intent or taking a substantial step toward the commission of the offense, the essential elements of the crime cannot be proved. At this point, the question whether a defendant has withdrawn is synonymous with whether he has committed the offense. After a defendant has evidenced the necessary intent and has committed an act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense, he has committed the crime of attempt, and can withdraw only from the commission of the substantive offense. We are not persuaded that the availability of a withdrawal defense would provide an incentive or motive to desist from the commission of an offense, especially since the success of the defense presupposes a criminal trial at which the issue would be submitted to the jury for decision. A remote chance of acquittal would appear to have an even more remote chance of deterring conduct. We recognize, of course, that attempt crimes pose unique issues. However, the interest of defendants in not being convicted for mere thoughts, desires or motives is adequately addressed by the government's burden of proving that the defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of the substantive offense. Id. (quotation omitted). We have previously held that completed crimes, other than attempt, cannot be abandoned. See United States v. Ball, 22 F.3d 197 (8th Cir.1994). Specifically, in Ball, defendants who had been convicted of entering a bank with intent to commit robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), argued that the district court erred by refusing an instruction on a defense theory: that, even had the defendants entered the bank with intent to commit a robbery, they subsequently abandoned or withdrew from their intention when they left the bank without pointing a gun or announcing a stick-up. Id. at 199. We held that the abandonment defense did not apply because the crime had been completed once the defendants entered the bank. Id. Because our circuit has already determined that the abandonment defense: (1) can apply to uncompleted attempt crimes, see Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841-42, and (2) has been rejected as a defense to completed crimes other than attempt, see Ball, 22 F.3d at 199, logically flowing from this analysis is the conclusion that, when a defendant has completed the crime of attempt; i.e., has the requisite intent and has taken a substantial step towards completion of the crime, he cannot successfully abandon the attempt because the crime itself has already been completed. We therefore adopt the Sixth Circuit's approach in Shelton, specifically reject the Model Penal Code approach, and hold that the defense of abandonment is not warranted once a defendant completes the crime of attempt. We acknowledge, that [a]fter a defendant has evidenced the necessary intent and has committed an act constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the offense, he has committed the crime of attempt, and can withdraw only from the commission of the substantive offense, not the attempt of such offense. Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706. As discussed above, Young completed his attempt because he had the requisite intent and took a substantial step towards completion of the enticement crime, all supported by the evidence discovered in his car, his travel to the hotel and attempt to check in, and his search for Emily once he could not obtain the hotel room. Because Young completed the essential elements of his attempt, Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706, he cannot now claim that he abandoned that plan. We therefore conclude that the district court committed no error in its decision to refuse Young's proffered abandonment instruction.