Opinion ID: 1887352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Additional Images Found on Greenlaws' Computer

Text: Before trial, the State moved in limine to introduce more than thirty pages of pornographic images from the Greenlaws' computer. The defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to demonstrate that the evidence was admitted for a purpose other than character or propensity; (2) the State failed to show clear proof that the defendant was the person who downloaded the images on to the Greenlaws' computer; and (3) the evidence was substantially more prejudicial than probative. The State counters that the images show that the defendant acted knowingly in downloading child pornography, as opposed to adult pornography, and not by accident or mistake. Although [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. N.H. R. Ev. 404(b). The purpose of Rule 404(b) is to ensure that the defendant is tried on the merits of the crime as charged and to prevent a conviction based upon evidence of other crimes or wrongs. State v. Cook, 158 N.H. 708, 711, 972 A.2d 1059 (2009). We review the trial court's ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant's case. Id. at 712, 972 A.2d 1059. Because the trial court ruled on the admissibility of the images before trial, we consider only what was presented at the pretrial hearing. State v. Glodgett, 144 N.H. 687, 694, 749 A.2d 283 (2000) (quotations and brackets omitted). To be admissible under Rule 404(b): (1) the evidence must be relevant for a purpose other than proving the defendant's character or disposition; (2) there must be clear proof that the defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Costello, 159 N.H. 113, 118, 977 A.2d 454, 457 (2009). The State must prove the admissibility of the bad acts. Id. Here, the defendant challenges the trial court's decision under all three prongs of the Rule 404(b) analysis. Because the trial court made no findings with respect to any of the three prongs, and the defendant did not object to the lack of findings, we review the record to determine whether it supports the trial court's implicit finding that each prong was met. But see State v. McGlew, 139 N.H. 505, 508-10, 658 A.2d 1191 (1995) (requiring trial courts to make specific findings to support their evidentiary rulings under Rule 404(b)). [T]o meet its burden under the first prong, the State is required to specify the purpose for which the evidence is offered and articulate the precise chain of reasoning by which the proffered evidence will tend to prove or disprove an issue actually in dispute, without relying upon forbidden inferences of predisposition, character, or propensity. State v. Kim, 153 N.H. 322, 327, 897 A.2d 968 (2006). That chain of reasoning must demonstrate a sufficient logical connection between the prior acts and the permissible purpose for which the State offers the evidence. Costello, 159 N.H. at 118, 977 A.2d at 457-58 (quotations omitted). To be relevant to intent, evidence of other bad acts must be able to support a reliable inference, not dependent on the defendant's character or propensity, that the defendant had the same intent on the occasions of the charged and uncharged acts. State v. Pepin, 156 N.H. 269, 277, 940 A.2d 221 (2007) (quotations omitted). We will find sufficient support for a reliable inference of intent only if the defendant's intent in committing other bad acts and the defendant's intent in the charged offenses is closely connected by logically significant factors. Id. (quotations omitted). Here, the defendant was charged with possession of child pornography, which required the State to prove the defendant knowingly possessed a visual representation of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct. RSA 649-A:3, I(e). A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance that is a material element of an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist. RSA 626:2, II(b). The evidence found on the Greenlaws' computer is probative of the defendant's intent and knowledge because he sought out websites containing child pornography. These websites were accessed repeatedly during the time that the defendant stayed at the Turners' apartment. Evidence that the defendant sought and viewed child pornography on a regular basis is relevant to show the defendant acted knowingly. See United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 343 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 932, 121 S.Ct. 2556, 150 L.Ed.2d 722 (2001) (upholding admission of evidence of other acts in child pornography case to show defendant acted knowingly); United States v. Schene, 543 F.3d 627, 643 (10th Cir.2008) (upholding admission of uncharged images of child pornography to show defendant knowingly possessed charged images). The images were also probative of the defendant's lack of mistake or accident. The defendant told the police that he possessed adult, but not child pornography. The images were relevant to show the defendant sought out child pornography and did not accidentally acquire images of child pornography in pursuit of adult pornography. The defendant next argues that the trial court erroneously admitted the uncharged images under the second prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis because there was no clear proof that he accessed the material. The clear proof requirement is satisfied when the State presents evidence firmly establishing that the defendant, and not some other person, committed the prior act. State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 512-13, 917 A.2d 214 (2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 834, 128 S.Ct. 63, 169 L.Ed.2d 52 (2007). To establish clear proof, the State presented the FTK report to demonstrate that any and all child pornography websites and images viewed, downloaded, and visited by users of the Greenlaws' computer occurred only during the time that the defendant lived with the Turners. The other people who had access to the computer testified that they never used it to access pornography. In addition, the images found on the Greenlaws' computer were similar to those found in the manila folder and on the CDs. The FTK report and testimony of the witnesses constitute clear proof that the defendant accessed the material found on the Greenlaws' computer. Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court erroneously admitted the uncharged images under the third prong of the Rule 404(b) analysis because there was a substantial danger that the jury would consider the defendant's responsibility for the additional images when deciding his guilt. Under the third prong of Rule 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. State v. Beltran, 153 N.H. 643, 649, 904 A.2d 709 (2006). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury's sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, or provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision upon something other than the established propositions in the case. Id. It is not, however, evidence that is merely detrimental to the defendant because it tends to prove his guilt. Id. Among the factors we consider in weighing the evidence are: (1) whether the evidence would have a great emotional impact upon a jury; (2) its potential for appealing to a juror's sense of resentment or outrage; and (3) the extent to which the issue upon which it is offered is established by other evidence, stipulation or inference. Costello, 159 N.H. at 123, 977 A.2d at 461. We accord considerable deference to the trial court's determination in balancing prejudice and probative worth under Rule 404(b). Id. Particularly pertinent to determining this balance is whether the evidence is relevant to prove an issue that is actually in serious dispute. Pepin, 156 N.H. at 278-79, 940 A.2d 221. First, we consider the probative value of the evidence. Costello, 159 N.H. at 123, 977 A.2d at 461. Determining the probative value of evidence entails analyzing how relevant it is. Id. Relevant evidence may have limited probative value. Id. Here, as discussed above, evidence that the defendant used the Greenlaws' computer to access child pornography websites and images was highly probative of his knowledge because the State had to prove every element of the crime at trial, including that the defendant knowingly possessed the child pornography. Next, we consider whether the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant from admission of this evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. [W]hile evidence of a prior offense or bad act is always prejudicial, the prejudice is frequently outweighed by the probative value of the evidence when the defendant's knowledge or intent is a contested issue in the case. Kim, 153 N.H. at 331, 897 A.2d 968. As noted above, the challenged evidence was probative of the defendant's knowledge. In addition, the evidence from the Greenlaws' computer was not likely to have any greater emotional impact upon the jury than the charged images. Here, the images found on the Greenlaws' computer were the same type of child pornography and child erotica as were found in the Turners' apartment. The jury was also shown portions of the videos found on the PTCH Vicky CD and the images found in the manila folder. Although the images may have been prejudicial, we cannot conclude that the evidence was so inflammatory as to substantially outweigh its probative value. Costello, 159 N.H. at 123, 977 A.2d at 461. Affirmed.