Opinion ID: 2365445
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Special Instructions Requested by the Defense

Text: The defense requested 21 special jury instructions at the penalty phase. The trial court agreed to give four but rejected the others on the ground that the standard CALJIC instructions, particularly CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88, adequately conveyed their substance. Defendant contends the court's refusal to give all or part of seven of the rejected special instructions (special instructions H, I, J, N, P, R, and T) violated state law and his rights to trial by jury, a reliable penalty verdict, equal protection, and due process of law under the federal Constitution's Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court did not err. We repeatedly have held the trial court does not have to instruct the penalty phase jury that (1) the list of mitigating circumstances in the standard instructions is not exclusive, or that a juror may find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any substantial evidence to support it, no matter how weak (special instruction H); (2) there is no requirement that all jurors agree on any factor in mitigation (special instruction N); (3) a single factor in mitigation may outweigh any number of factors in aggravation, or that a verdict of life in prison without the possibility of parole is required if the jurors are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravation substantially outweighed mitigation or conclude that mitigation is equal to or outweighs aggravation, or that the jury may return a verdict of life in prison without the possibility of parole even if it concludes the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation (special instruction P) ( People v. Kelly, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 799; People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1176-1177 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068-1070 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388]; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 314-315 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585]); or (4) the law considers death to be a more extreme punishment than life in prison without the possibility of parole (special instruction T) ( People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 500-501 [113 Cal.Rptr.3d 850, 236 P.3d 1074]; People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1363 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 157 P.3d 950]; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 478-479). (9) Defense special instruction R would have told the jurors that, if they had a doubt about which penalty was appropriate, they had to give defendant the benefit of that doubt and fix the penalty at life in prison without the possibility of parole. In previous cases, we have held a penalty phase jury does not have to be instructed to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and impose life without possibility of parole if it has a reasonable doubt about which penalty to impose. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 741 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1160 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572].) Such an instruction is inaccurate because the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is inapplicable to the penalty determination. (E.g., People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1069.) Here, although the requested instruction omitted the word reasonable, the outcome is the same. As we have explained, trial courts need not and should not instruct the jury regarding any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase. ( People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 261 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 384, 232 P.3d 32]; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 753.) Contrary to this rule, the proposed instruction, with its reference to doubt, implies the existence of a burden of proof and is the functional equivalent of an instruction that there is a presumption that life in prison without the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence. The death penalty statute does not incorporate such a presumption. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 190 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980].) Defendant's analogy to People v. Dewberry (1959) 51 Cal.2d 548 [334 P.2d 852] is misplaced. Dewberry stands for the proposition that when the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt of both the offense charged and a lesser included offense, the jury must be instructed that if they entertain a reasonable doubt as to which offense has been committed, they must find the defendant guilty only of the lesser offense. ( Id. at p. 555.) These principles have no application in the capital sentencing context, which involves a normative judgment rather than a burden of proof. (See People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 658; People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 407.) Defendant further contends the trial court erred when it refused to give defense requested special instructions I and J, which highlighted specific defense evidence and issues. [21] The court properly rejected the instructions as argumentative and duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.85, which lists the aggravating and mitigating factors the jury may consider, and CALJIC No. 8.88. (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1159 & fn. 12; People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1067-1068 & fn. 18; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 559-561 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420].) Although defendant's proposed instructions differed from those in the cited cases because each item of defense evidence was prefaced with the word whether, this is a distinction without a difference. Defendant's instructions as a whole impermissibly invited the jury to `draw inferences favorable to [defendant] from specified items of evidence.' ( People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 560.) Defendant asserts the cumulative effect of the erroneous denial of his requested instructions was to mislead the jury as to its proper sentencing function. Because we find no error, there is no prejudice to cumulate.