Opinion ID: 182845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Barton Is Handicapped Under Chapter 151B

Text: Chapter 151B defines handicap to include (a) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities of a person; (b) a record of having such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such impairment. Ch. 151B, § 1(17); see also id. § 1(20) (defining the term major life activities to include working). As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has explained, [l]oosely speaking, the first prong protects only those persons with actual physical or mental limitations, while the third prong protects those persons who, whether actually impaired or not, may be the victims of stereotypic assumptions, myths, and fears regarding such limitations. Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 434 Mass. 233, 748 N.E.2d 956, 962-63 (2001). An employee's impairment, whether actual or perceived, substantially limits the employee in the major life activity of working only if the impairment precludes him from performing a class of jobs. City of New Bedford v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination, 440 Mass. 450, 799 N.E.2d 578, 590 (2003). A reasonable jury could conclude that Barton satisfies ch. 151B's definition of handicap because Clancy regarded him as having a physical impairment that substantially limited his ability to perform a range of jobs. Clancy's repeated criticisms of Barton serving as a basketball coach reflect his assumption that, because Barton had a back injury that left him physically unable to work as a firefighter and eligible for a disability pension, Barton was also physically unable to perform a range of jobs including that of a high school basketball coach. The regarded as prong is aimed at precisely this kind of stereotypic assumption[]. See Dahill, 748 N.E.2d at 963. [6]