Opinion ID: 474501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pickering, Schwartz, and Peters

Text: 50 On October 9, 1985, the district court refused to entertain the requests of defendants Pickering, Schwartz, and Peters for separate entry of judgment in their favor. They sought a judgment on the merits--rather than the judgment based on the absence of subject matter jurisdiction to which all defendants were entitled--because of their exoneration by a medical malpractice tribunal and plaintiff's subsequent failure to post the bonds necessary to continuing her action against them. 51 The district court, refusing to enter separate judgments, stated: 52 Now, you see, you're asking me to issue a judgment that would determine the merits. That's what you're asking me to do. And if I do not have diversity jurisdiction, I cannot enter a judgment that adjudicates the merits.... When I later ... determine [that I was without jurisdiction], I have to enter an order that has the effect of wiping out any adjudication I made ... while under the erroneous understanding that I had diversity jurisdiction. 53 This was a correct statement of the law. Even though the court had previously ordered dismissal of the action as to Peters, Schwartz, and Pickering, 602 F.Supp. at 464, judgment had not yet been entered. Before separate judgments could be entered, the court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court was required immediately to dismiss the action 29 --on jurisdictional grounds, not on the merits. Thus, the district court could not have entered separate judgments on the merits in favor of Pickering, Schwartz, and Peters. 30