Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 7
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prospective Juror R.R. excused for reasons other than his attitude toward the death penalty

Text: Under California law, a juror may be challenged for cause for one of the following reasons: (A) General disqualificationโthat the juror is disqualified from serving in the action on trial. [ถ] (B) Implied biasโas, when the existence of the facts as ascertained, in judgment of law disqualifies the juror. [Or] [ถ] (C) Actual biasโthe existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 225, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(C).) Code of Civil Procedure section 228 sets forth the grounds for a challenge based on general disqualifications and includes (b) [t]he existence of any incapacity which satisfies the court that the challenged person is incapable of performing the duties of a juror in the particular action without prejudice to the substantial rights of the challenging party. Code of Civil Procedure section 229 sets forth the grounds for a challenge based on implied bias and includes (f) [t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity against, or bias towards, either party. Prospective Juror R.R. expressed a marked antipathy toward the legal system and law enforcement in his questionnaire, which the trial court cited as the basis for his exclusion. Responding to a question asking whether something might distract him during the trial, R.R. marked YES and wrote: I find judges and lawyers pompous and boring. Responding to a question whether the nature of the charges would make it difficult or impossible for you to be fair and impartial, he answered in the affirmative and wrote: Obviously (since I haven't heard of the man), the defendant is not rich or famous. Consequently his justice will be harsher than people who are privileged. R.R.'s negative feelings about the judicial system apparently stemmed from his having been charged with assaulting with a deadly weapon someone he claims was the initial aggressor. R.R. felt that law enforcement's response to that situation was completely inadequate. The trial court also noted that R.R. had indicated he would change his opinion during deliberations if it were late in the day and he was tired because I get claustrophobic, especially if I feel I couldn't get outside if I wanted to (or if I knew I had to sit still/stay in). Based on our de novo review, we conclude R.R.'s answers expressed bias against the legal system and law enforcement and indicated his inability to engage in the deliberation process. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in excluding R.R. for cause. (Code Civ. Proc., ง 225.) Although we conclude the trial court did not err in excusing R.R., we also note defendant has cited no authority for his assumption that an error in excusing a juror for reasons unrelated to that juror's view on the imposition of the death penalty requires reversal. `[T]he general rule [is] that an erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause provides no basis for overturning a judgment.' ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].)