Opinion ID: 2966237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Woodard's decision to proceed pro se

Text: Woodard's next argument is that the district court denied her right to counsel by permitting her to represent herself. Specifically, she contends that the district court failed to warn her of the pitfalls of self-representation as required by Faretta v. California , 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). (5) We review the district court's decision that a defendant may proceed pro se for abuse of discretion. Proctor , 166 F.3d at 401. A defendant who seeks to relinquish her right to counsel must so state in unequivocal language. Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835. The waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Proctor , 166 F.3d at 401. The trial judge must explicitly make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether there is a competent waiver of the right to counsel, the judge must investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand. Proctor , 166 F.3d at 402 (quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies , 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948)). We are guided by the principle that [c]ourts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel. Id. The district court conducted the self-representation colloquy after completing the plea colloquy. In the plea colloquy, the court advised Woodard of the seriousness of the charge against her and the penalties she faced; described various substantive and procedural aspects of the trial, including empanelment, the government's burden of proof, opening and closing arguments, questioning of witnesses, the concept of reasonable doubt, and the nature of the sentencing guidelines; and confirmed her understanding of the plea process. The court had additional information about Woodard by way of the pre-plea presentence report (PSR), which described Woodard's college training, business experience, and experience with the judicial system (as evidenced by her prior convictions for drug trafficking and other crimes). After Woodard announced her wish to proceed pro se , the court warned her that it's a big mistake to represent yourself. It reminded her that she lacked the experience or ability of an attorney: You don't know how to pick a jury. You don't know . . . how to ask questions like a lawyer does. When Woodard held fast to her decision, the court suggested that she allow Hakala to handle the trial or to empanel the jury. It is true that the district court's colloquy cannot be fairly described as painstaking. In light of its knowledge of Woodard's circumstances from its questioning and the PSR, however, we think it was adequate to ensure that her waiver was knowingly and intelligently made. See United States v. LaBare , 191 F.3d 60, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding waiver in which defendant with prior convictions was told only that he would be a fool for representing himself); Kneeland , 148 F.3d at 11 (upholding waiver in which the court told defendant that he would be at a significant disadvantage if he proceeded pro se ); United States v. Benefield , 942 F.2d 60, 64-65 (1st Cir. 1991) (defendant with seventh grade education effectively waived right to counsel based on prior involvement in criminal trials).