Opinion ID: 149704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fed.R.Crim.P.11(b)(3)

Text: Rule 11(b)(3) [3] requires a district court taking a guilty plea to make certain that the factual conduct admitted by the defendant is sufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of the statute to which he entered his plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(3); Marek, 238 F.3d at 314 (construing Rule 11(f), the substantive predecessor to Rule 11(b)(3)). This, in turn, mandates that the factual basis be sufficiently specific to enable the district court to compare the conduct admitted by the defendant with the elements of the offense charged. Id. at 315. In assessing factual sufficiency under the plain error standard, we may look beyond those facts admitted by the defendant during the plea colloquy and scan the entire record for facts supporting his conviction. United States v. Tullos, 356 Fed.Appx. 727, 727-28 (5th Cir.2009) (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 74, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002)). Applied here, Rule 11(b)(3) compels us to determine whether there are sufficient facts in the record to establish that Trejo conspired to commit promotion money laundering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h) and 1956(a)(2)(A). [4] This requires finding facts that establish that the defendant: (1) conspired [5] (2) to transport funds between the United States and another country; (3) with the intent to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity. [6] United States v. Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546, 549-50 (7th Cir.2008) ( citing United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir.2000)). Because Trejo confines his factual insufficiency claim to the intent to promote element, our analysis will center solely on this component of the statute. Accordingly, we must first navigate this uncharted territory to determine what evidence is needed to satisfy the intent to promote element of § 1956(a)(2)(A). Then we must scour the record to determine if there are sufficient facts to satisfy the requirement in this case.