Opinion ID: 543635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion for Acquittal

Text: 47 After a two day trial, a jury found Reis guilty on Count One of the superseding indictment, which charged him with possession of ammunition by a felon, and on Counts Four and Five, 4 which charged him with possession of a firearm by a felon. The jury, however, turned in a verdict of not guilty on Count Two, which also charged possession of a firearm by a felon. 48 In his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal after Discharge of Jury filed pursuant to Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Reis had asked the court to acquit him on Count Five, which related to the Colt Diamondback Revolver found in the glove compartment of his car, because, he asserted, the evidence was so scant that the jury could only speculate as to his guilt on that count. He pointed out that a government witness named John Wells had testified that he sold Reis the weapons at issue in both Counts Two and Five, and Reis claimed that because the jury acquitted him on Count Two, it must not have found any of Wells' testimony to be credible, including that relating to the weapon in Count Five. Reis also pointed out that the jury had sent out a note asking about the circumstances surrounding the search of Reis' car, arguably indicating they were confused about Count Five. 49 The court denied the motion for acquittal, and Reis now appeals that denial. 50 In reviewing a decision on a Rule 29(c) motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,[T]he test that the court must use is whether at the time of the motion there was relevant evidence from which the jury could reasonably find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government ... bear[ing] in mind that 'it is the exclusive function of the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts and draw reasonable inferences.'  51 United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 111 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 780 (7th Cir.1986)). 52 Applying the test in this case, we note that the jury heard evidence that the weapon at issue in Count Five was found in the car Reis had been driving, and also that Wells, while claiming to have sold that gun to Elite Security, actually turned the gun over to Reis himself. Taken in conjunction with Reis' prior felony conviction, this is ample evidence to support the verdict in Count Five. 53 To the extent Reis claims that the verdict in Count Five is inconsistent with the jury's verdict in Count Two and that such inconsistency requires his conviction on Count Five to be reversed, we remind him that [i]t is well-settled ... that [c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each Count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 190, 76 L.Ed. 356, 358-59 (1932); United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d at 110; United States v. Abayomi, 820 F.2d 902, 907 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 866, 108 S.Ct. 189, 98 L.Ed.2d 142 (1987). Because it is just as likely that the jury exercised lenity with respect to Count Two, than that the jury improperly convicted him on Count Five, it would be error to reverse the conviction solely because of an apparent inconsistency. See United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d at 111. Furthermore, even deciding if the verdicts were inconsistent in the first place would require the court to delve into matters of witness credibility--a task properly left in the hands of the jury. The fact that the jury may have disbelieved Wells' testimony about one transaction does not automatically mean they disbelieved his story about the second transaction. 54 As for Reis' claim that the jury's request for information on the circumstances surrounding the search of the car indicates uncertainty or confusion in deciding Count Five, we believe the note indicates nothing more than curiosity on issues not relevant to their decision. 5 The note, if anything, reveals the jurors did not disbelieve the evidence of the firearm being found in Reis' car, but only wondered if the police had obtained that evidence legally. 55 In sum, we find no error in the district court's denial of Reis' post-trial motion for acquittal on Count Five. 56 AFFIRMED.