Opinion ID: 2622925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: [¶ 4] Brown raises this issue in Case No. 06-251: 1. The State's use of information obtained in a proffer for which Raymond Brown had been promised use and derivative use immunity as part of his plea agreement violated that plea agreement, and the court's refusal to grant relief from the judgment and sentence based on that plea agreement was an abuse of discretion. In response, the State queries: Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over [Brown's] W.R.C.P. 60(b) motion? If so, should [Brown] have been collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of whether a violation of his plea agreement occurred and, in any event, does the record show a violation of the plea agreement. In that case, Brown is represented by the Wyoming Public Defender, Appellate Counsel. [¶ 5] In Case No. S-07-0127 Brown, acting pro se, contends: 1. The district court's order dated 5/10/2007 denying Mr. Brown's pro se Motion Giving Notice That the Appeal Action (06-251) Has Been Mistakenly Docketed Prematurely before the Wyoming Supreme Court and Motion Seeking Appropriate Judicial Actions Consistent with the Protections Afforded by Procedural Due Process was in contravention of W.R.APP.P. Rule 2.04; 2.02(a) and (b); and controlling authority, which deprived Mr. Brown of procedural due process and a complete record on appeal. Moreover, said order was not in compliance with W.R.C.P. Rule 52(a), being void of any relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, the denial of the motion was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. 2. The district court's order dated 5/10/2007 denying Mr. Brown's Renewed Motion Giving Notice of a Conflict of Interest with Current Counsel David WestlingPublic DefenderAppellate Division and Renewed Request for Appointment of Substitute Counsel was in contravention of W.R.Cr.P. Rule 44(b)(1) and 44(e)(2)(A) and (B). Therefore, the denial of the motion was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Moreover, the court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into Mr. Brown's documented claim of a potential conflict of interest by affording an evidentiary hearing after being sufficiently apprised of the matter. Based on the totality of circumstances, this was an abuse of discretion. 3. The district court's order dated 5/10/2007 denying Mr. Brown's timely filed pro se Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 59 was based on inapposite Wyoming authority and therefore an abuse of discretion. 4. The district court's failure to timely resolve Mr. Brown's Motion for Appointment of Counsel for Indigent the Defendant to Pursue Appeal ProcessPursuant to [Wyo. Stat. Ann.] § 7-6-104(a)(vi) (or applicable rule/statute)orMotion for Appointment of Paralegal Services on this Appeal Action i.e., S-07-0127 was in contravention of W.R.Cr.P. Rule 44(a)(1) and 44(b)(1). Pursuant to the court's own advisement dated 12/06/2006 stating I have no problem appointing appellate counsel for thesethese motion[s] that he's filed in the district court, directly coincides with the court's order dated June 4, 2007 granting Mr. Brown's Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis on Appeal, which specifically referenced and included attorney's fees. Therefore, based upon the totality of circumstances, the error raised herein is an abuse of judicial discretion. 5. The district court's failure to timely adjudicate Mr. Brown's Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts Pursuant to Wyoming Rules of Evidence Rule 201, which was filed on 09/05/2006 and directly associated to Mr. Brown's issues on appeal now pending before this Court in Case Number (06-251) and (X-XX-XXXX) violates procedural due process, Rule 201(d), and further deprived Mr. Brown of a complete record for his appeals. Therefore, based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower court has abused its discretion. 6. The Wyoming Public Defender's Office, Appellate DivisionAttorneys Donna Domonkos' and David Westling's abandonment of their obligations as counsel of record to diligently advocate Mr. Brown's motions in the district court, which are directly associated with the matters on appeal in Case No. (06-251) and (S-07-127), constitutes blatant ineffective assistance of counsel. In response, the State contends:, Did the district court have subject matter jurisdiction over the motions that were denied in the court's order of May 10, 2007? If so, did the court err in denying them?