Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Denial of Automatic Application for Modification of the Death Verdict

Text: Section 190.4 provides for an automatic motion to modify the jury's death verdict. Pursuant to this statute, the trial court rules on the motion after independently reweighing the evidence supporting the aggravating and mitigating factors (§ 190.3) and determining whether in the court's independent judgment this evidence supports the death verdict. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1267, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) This court then independently reviews the trial court's ruling in light of the record, but we do not determine the penalty de novo. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends the trial court improperly failed to consider as mitigating factors the absence of criminal activity involving the attempted use of force or violence (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and the absence of any prior felony conviction (§ 190.3, factor (c)). Although the trial court recognized that the aggravating factors of prior felonies and violent criminal activity were not present, defendant urges that the court should have gone further and considered the absence of prior felonies or violent criminal activity as factors in mitigation. Defendant further contends the trial court improperly discounted or ignored defendant's youth and troubled background, her intoxication at the time of the murder, her mental disabilities, and the evidence suggesting that she acted under the substantial domination of another person in committing the murder. Defendant urges that each of these circumstances was mitigating and that the trial court therefore improperly failed to modify the jury's death verdict to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In denying the automatic motion for modification of the verdict, the trial court considered each factor set forth in section 190.3, finding that neither factor (b) nor (c) was present. The trial court further found that, although some evidence indicated that defendant committed the offense while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (§ 190.3, factor (d)), the evidence was insubstantial to justify a finding that this factor is present. With regard to section 190.3, factor (g), whether defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person, the court acknowledged that the jury had heard evidence that defendant committed the murder under the substantial domination of the second man. After observing that defendant had multiple opportunities to implicate another person during the course of her confession to Investigator Giffin, but failed to do so until she was represented by counsel, and noting the utter lack of physical evidence to support the presence or participation of another person in the murder, the court concluded that the evidence is grossly insufficient to even raise [the participation of another person in the murder] as a strong inference in this case, especially when you consider the numerous opportunities Mr. Giffin gave [defendant] on the videotape. With regard to section 190.3, factor (i), the age of the defendant at the time of the crime, the court acknowledged that the circumstance that the defendant was 18 years of age when she committed the crime might be a mitigating factor, but concluded that nonetheless there was no mitigation in this case because you have to put the age in context of what her background shows. The court observed that defendant was a high school dropout who had been on the streets and involved with the drug culture for a substantial period of time. The court concluded that in a streetwise sense, defendant was more mature than her age would indicate. Finally, with regard to section 190.3, factor (k), concerning extenuating circumstances of the crime, the trial court considered defendant's disadvantaged background, her early involvement with drugs, and her troubled relationships with her own father and with the fathers of her own children. The court found no mitigation, however, because although defendant was a young mother, she chose to use drugs. She chose to engage in acts of prostitution on the streets. She chose to hang out in the area ... where ... the drug culture is involved. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that defendant's background had no substantial weight, because defendant's drug and prostitution history were products of her own free will. In reviewing the circumstances of the crime, the court remarked that the murder of Autumn Wallace was one of the most senseless, brutal, vicious, callous killings that this court has ever seen. The court concluded that not having found the presence of any mitigating factors, the circumstances of the crime itself standing alone far outweigh any mitigating circumstances, if there are any, that are presented in this case. In ruling upon a motion to modify, `[t]he trial judge's function is not to make an independent and de novo penalty determination, but rather to independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then to determine whether in the judge's independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict. [Citations.]' ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1161, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321, italics omitted.) The trial court is not required to find that evidence offered in mitigation does in fact mitigate. ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1222, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) In the present case, the record indicates the trial court considered all of the evidence offered in aggravation and mitigation. The court noted the evidence of defendant's age and troubled background, her intoxication on the day of the murder, and her lack of felony convictions or history of violent criminal conduct. The court then independently weighed the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and found, as stated above, that the evidence of aggravating circumstances substantially outweighed that of mitigating circumstances. The court concluded that the findings of the jury were appropriate in light of the evidence presented. The trial court is not required to do more. ( Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1163, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1045, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.)