Opinion ID: 2109848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: testimony of dr. carl floe.

Text: Dr. Carl Floe, a professor of metallurgy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was called by the plaintiff to testify as an expert with reference to the anchor bolt involved in the plaintiff's fall and resulting injury. In direct testimony, after he described the bolt and various tests which he performed on it, he was asked a hypothetical question which asked him to assume various facts and then concluded: [D]o you have an opinion with reasonable scientific certainty, based upon your education, training, experience and background in the metallurgy field, as to the cause of the breaking or failure of the bolt in question known as Exhibit 19? The witness answered that he did have such an opinion and he was then asked what it was. His answer is set forth in full in the margin. [6] Counsel for the club then moved that the answer be struck because [i]t contains `could,' `might well, or `may well,' and I submit it is not responsive to the question. Before ruling on the motion the judge asked the witness: In your answer you have said `could,' but that is your opinion based on reasonable scientific certainty, is it? The witness answered that it was, whereupon the judge denied the motion to strike. Counsel for the plaintiff then asked: And in your answer, you have dealt with probabilities based upon the hypothesis, is that right? to which the witness answered that he had. We now consider the several grounds on which the club bases its claim that it was error to deny its motion to strike the answer. The club argues that because the witness used the words could, might well, and may well in his answer, the net result was that the answer as a whole ... was merely guess or conjecture on ... [his] part. This argument is without merit because it totally ignores the two questions quoted above which were put to the witness by the judge and the plaintiff's counsel and his answers thereto. The basic issue is whether we are dealing with [a] mere guess or conjecture by an expert witness in the form of a conclusion from basic facts that do not tend towards that conclusion any more than towards a contrary one [and therefore] has ... no evidential value ( Ruschetti's Case, 299 Mass. 426, 431 [1938]; Hachadourian's Case, 340 Mass. 81, 85-86 [1959]; Berardi v. Menicks, 340 Mass. 396, 401-402 [1960]; Oberlander's Case, 348 Mass. 1, 5-6 [1964]; King's Case, 352 Mass. 488, 489-492 [1967]), or whether we are dealing with evidence which shows the existence of a causal relation between the condition of the anchor bolt and the injury to the plaintiff ( DeFilippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531, 534-535 [1933]; Duggan's Case, 315 Mass. 355, 358-359 [1944]; Josi's Case, 324 Mass. 415, 417-419 [1949]; Kerr v. Palmieri, 325 Mass. 554, 559-560 [1950]; Berardi v. Menicks, 340 Mass. 396, 401-402 [1960]). We hold that this case falls in the latter group. The club also argues that the answer of the expert witness should have been struck because it was not responsive to the question. The motion was to strike the entire answer, and it was not limited to any particular part which was claimed to be unresponsive. The first part of the answer was clearly responsive, and the court was not required to allow such a motion unless no part of the answer was responsive. Since [t]he motion to strike was too broad, for it included competent as well as incompetent evidence, it was properly denied. Bryer v. P.S. Thorsen Co. of Mass. 327 Mass. 684, 687 (1951). See Commonwealth v. Zaidon, 253 Mass. 600, 602 (1925). The club has urged on us the further argument that the answer of the expert should be struck because it included evidence incompetent because based upon unwarranted assumptions. This ground is not now open to the club because it was not included in the grounds stated to the trial judge as the basis for the motion. Having stated specifically the basis of ... [its motion], the defendants, in fairness, ought not to be permitted to urge other grounds in this court. Kagan v. Levenson, 334 Mass. 100, 107 (1956). Draper v. Turner, 339 Mass. 616, 618 (1959).