Opinion ID: 2053589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The State did not appeal. However, Sun filed a notice of appeal, which stated: COMES NOW the Petitioner, Sun Greenhaw, by and through Counsel and gives notice of her intent to appeal all findings and rulings adverse to her interests and the interests of her children including but not limited to the Findings, Conclusions, Ruling, and Order filed in the Linn County District Court on January 26, 1996. Richard argues that this notice of appeal was ineffective because it was filed by Sun and not by the State. According to him, Sun was not a petitioner under Iowa Code section 252A.2, and therefore, she was not a party to the district court case. Because she was not an aggrieved party in the district court, she could not appeal, according to him. See In re Marriage of Fields, 508 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1993) (parent was not petitioner under statute and could not sue for support under chapter 252A). It is true that Sun's notice of appeal gave notice of her intent to appeal all rulings adverse to her interests. But, she also appealed from all rulings adverse to the interests of her children. The children have a legally recognized interest in the case because they are the petitioners. See Iowa Code § 252A.2(5) (1993) (petitioner means dependent person); § 252A.2(3) (dependent includes child who is entitled to support). Because the children had an interest in the district court case, they would have been entitled to appeal the judgment, and Richard concedes that. Sun has the right, as next friend, to pursue the children's interests in a chapter 252A proceeding, Fields, 508 N.W.2d at 732, and that right logically and necessarily should extend to an appeal from the judgment in that case. See Davis v. Davis, 246 Iowa 262, 265, 67 N.W.2d 566, 568 (1954) (appeal in chapter 252A case by mother as next friend). Sun's notice of appeal did not say that she was appealing as next friend of the children. However, the question of whether her notice was sufficient to preserve the appeal rights of her children is subject to the general rule that notices of appeal are to be given a liberal construction. Notices of appeal should be liberally construed so as to preserve the right of review, and permit, if possible, a hearing on the merits; and only substantial compliance with the forms and requisites of the statutes or rules of court is required, and they should be held to have been complied with if the purpose of the statutes or rules has been accomplished. Thus, as long as the opposing party is not misled to his irreparable harm, a notice of appeal which can reasonably be construed as an attempt in good faith to appeal from an appealable decision is sufficient; and, as a rule the notice is sufficient if it reasonably shows that an appeal is intended and the judgment, order, or decree appealed from substantially states the other facts required by the statute to be shown. 4 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 371, at 421 (1993) (footnotes omitted); accord 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 327, at 98-99 (1995). In an analogous case, the administrator of a decedent's estate appealed in her capacity as administrator, although under California law, an administrator may not appeal from a decree of distribution; only a beneficiary has standing to appeal. The court said that, looking to the interests of the parties to litigation as of primary importance, [this court] has very liberally construed such a notice as one in which the designation of administratrix may be considered as descriptio personae. In re Perkins' Estate, 21 Cal.2d 561, 134 P.2d 231, 234 (1943). The California court held that it would consider the appeal to be by the individual as a beneficiary and not as the administrator, in the interests of justice. Id.; accord In re Estate of Hawkins, 194 Cal.App.3d 102, 239 Cal.Rptr. 464, 465 (1987). Our case law has shown a similar pragmatism in construing a notice of appeal. In a case involving the sufficiency of a notice of appeal from a tax assessment, we held that service of a notice on a named individual as chairman of the board of review instead of on the same person as clerk was substantial compliance because no one was misled. Superior/Ideal, Inc. v. Board of Review, 419 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Iowa 1988). We said: While it is true that service of notice of an appeal is a necessary prerequisite to jurisdiction under section 441.38, we see nothing in that statute, or elsewhere, to suggest jurisdiction should be sparingly recognized. Who could seriously argue that a notice directed to Robert DeCook identifying him as the chairman did not notify Robert DeCook as clerk that the appeal was pending? Id. Similarly, we might ask in the present case who could seriously argue that a notice of appeal filed by Sun for herself and her children was not in substantial compliance with our appellate rules simply because she did not state that she appealed as the next friend of her children. Her notice substantially complied with the requirement of appellate rule 6(a) that the notice shall specify the parties taking the appeal. Richard cannot seriously contend that he was misled. State ex rel. Phipps v. Phipps, 503 N.W.2d 391 (Iowa 1993), is an analogous case involving an erroneous caption in a chapter 252A petition in the district court. The petition stated that the action was brought on behalf of the mother instead of the child. We said [t]his is a nonfatal error correctable on remand by substituting the child's name. Phipps, 503 N.W.2d at 392; see also State ex rel. Blakeman v. Blakeman, 337 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 1983) (error in naming mother as petitioner not fatal). We conclude that, because the notice of appeal substantially complied with our rules and sufficiently notified the appellee of the nature of the appeal, we have jurisdiction of the children's appeal.