Opinion ID: 1891312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process and Section 90.404(2)(b)

Text: Collateral crime evidence violates a defendant's right to due process if it is so prejudicial that it denies the defendant a fair trial. See LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027; Castillo, 140 F.3d at 883. Like the federal courts applying federal rule 403, we conclude that the application of section 90.403 should always render evidence inadmissible when it has such a prejudicial effect. In other words, if the potential prejudice is so great that admission of the collateral crime evidence will violate the defendant's right to a fair trial, then the probative value of the evidence must be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. § 90.403. As Judge Altenbernd observed in the decision below: [T]he new statute does not simply open the courthouse to all propensity evidence. As demonstrated in this case, section 90.403 still requires the trial court judge to act as a gatekeeper, weighing the probative value and the prejudicial effect of the proffered testimony. The testimony is introduced with a cautionary instruction to the jury, which is repeated in the final charge. The case law still requires that such testimony not become a central feature of the trial. Under these circumstances, when an issue of identity is not in dispute, we cannot conclude that this new rule of evidence violates the fundamental fairness required by due process. McLean, 854 So.2d at 802. [10] The trial court's gatekeeping function is critical. In every case, the trial court must conduct the weighing required by section 90.403. As the Ninth Circuit noted, [b]ecause of the inherent strength of the evidence that is covered by [Rule 414], when putting this type of evidence through the [Rule 403] microscope, a court should pay careful attention to both the significant probative value and the strong prejudicial qualities of that evidence. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027 (alterations in original) (quoting Doe v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1268 (9th Cir.2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To guide the trial courts in deciding whether to admit evidence of prior acts of child molestation when it is offered to corroborate the victim's testimony, we discuss the steps that the trial courts should take. [11] Of course, before even considering whether to allow evidence of prior acts to be presented to the jury, the trial court must find that the prior acts were proved by clear and convincing evidence. In assessing whether the probative value of evidence of previous molestations is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, the trial court should evaluate: (1) the similarity of the prior acts to the act charged regarding the location of where the acts occurred, the age and gender of the victims, and the manner in which the acts were committed; (2) the closeness in time of the prior acts to the act charged; (3) the frequency of the prior acts; and (4) the presence or lack of intervening circumstances. This list is not exclusive. The trial courts should also consider other factors unique to the case. Factors other than the potential for unfair prejudice are also pertinent in a section 90.403 analysis. The trial court must determine whether the evidence of the prior acts will confuse or mislead jurors by distracting them from the central issues of the trial. Also necessary is an assessment whether the evidence is needlessly cumulative of other evidence bearing on the victim's credibility, the purpose for which this evidence may be introduced. Further, in accord with our precedent, the trial court must guard against allowing the collateral-crime testimony to become a feature of the trial. Finally, if requested, the trial court shall give an appropriate cautionary instruction both at the time the evidence is presented and in its final charge to the jury.