Opinion ID: 160639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpreting 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C)

Text: 10 The above discussion of the transitional rules is relevant because, although we have not decided the extent of our jurisdictional inquiry under the permanent provision, we have addressed this question under AEDPA 440(a) and IIRIRA 309(c)(4)(G). Berehe v. INS, 114 F.3d 159 (10th Cir. 1997). In Berehe, we held that these transitional provisions foreclose all judicial review, including review of the jurisdictional facts, or conditions, upon which the jurisdictional bar is premised; that is, we decided we could not review whether an alien is removable under the relevant statutes. Id. at 161. We relied especially on the language of IIRIRA's transitional rule, which clearly forecloses appellate review: 'there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense . .  Id. (quoting IIRIRA 309(c)(4)(G) (emphasis added)). In light of this language, we held: No judicial review of the jurisdictional issue is possible where the alien is precluded from filing an appeal. Id. 11 In reaching this conclusion, we acknowledged the Seventh Circuit's contrary conclusion that the language of AEDPA 440(a) permits judicial review only in the case of an alien who is actually deportable for commission of a criminal offense listed in various enumerated sections. Id. (citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1997)). Under this approach, in order to determine whether the jurisdictional bar applies, courts may determine whether the petitioner is (i) an alien (ii) deportable (iii) by reason of a criminal offense listed in the statute. Yang, 109 F. 3d at 1192. Because the limitation on judicial review rests on certain conditions, the Seventh Circuit held courts retain jurisdiction to determine whether these conditions exist. Id. 12 In Berehe, we declined to adopt the Seventh Circuit's approach, but we explicitly distinguished the main Seventh Circuit opinion, Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997), recognizing that the Yang court only considered the AEDPA provision because IIRIRA's transitional provision did not apply to the facts of that particular case. 114 F.3d at 161. Accordingly, unlike our decision in Berehe, the Seventh Circuit did not construe IIRIRA's language that there shall be no appeal permitted. As we noted in Berehe, this language is particularly strong, preventing the filing of an appeal and therefore evincing clear congressional intent to foreclose all review. Id. The language of both AEDPA 440(a) and IIRIRA's permanent provision, 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C), however, is not as restrictive. In particular, IIRIRA's permanent provision provides no court shall have jurisdiction when an alien is removable for commission of certain criminal offenses. 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). We therefore conclude that the permanent provision is distinguishable from IIRIRA 309(c)(4)(G), and we are not bound by our decision in Berehe. 13 Instead, we hold that we retain jurisdiction under the permanent provision to determine whether the jurisdictional bar applies. We may therefore decide whether the petitioner is (i) an alien (ii) deportable (iii) by reason of a criminal offense listed in the statute. The permanent provision divests courts of jurisdiction only if an alien is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense. 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). It does not say that courts lack jurisdiction if the an alien is found deportable for commission of certain criminal offenses. Thus, the statutory language clearly requires that we determine whether certain conditions exist before dismissing the appeal. In holding we retain jurisdiction to conduct a limited review of jurisdictional facts, we follow the clear trend among our sister circuits. See, e.g., Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2000); Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2000); Aragon-Ayon v. INS, 206 F.3d 847, 849 (9th Cir. 2000); Liang v. INS, 206 F.3d 308, 323 (3d Cir. 2000); Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. INS, 194 F.3d 539, 542-43 (4th Cir. 1999); Diakite v. INS, 179 F.3d 553, 554 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (following Yang, 109 F.3d at 1196, in analyzing jurisdiction under AEDPA 440(a)).