Opinion ID: 2239887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Hope II

Text: In Hope II, this court outlined the Batson procedure in great detail. (137 Ill.2d at 452-62, 148 Ill.Dec. 252, 560 N.E.2d 849.) Batson essentially provides for a three-step process for the evaluation of a claim that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges in a violation of the equal protection clause. The defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the prosecution has exercised its peremptory challenges on the basis of race. If the requisite showing is made, the burden then shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-89. In Hope II, we determined that defendant made a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson and that the trial court's contrary finding was in error. ( Hope II, 137 Ill.2d at 466, 148 Ill.Dec. 252, 560 N.E.2d 849.) We maintain that analysis and conclusion. Next, the Hope II decision concluded that the trial court's finding of no purposeful discrimination cannot be said with confidence to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. ( Hope II, 137 Ill.2d at 472, 148 Ill.Dec. 252, 560 N.E.2d 849.) On remand, we reconsider and rule otherwise. A factual finding at a Batson hearing is entitled to great deference on appeal and will be set aside only if clearly erroneous. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 90 n. 21; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d at 409.) Such deference applies in the absence of exceptional circumstances. ( Hernandez, 500 U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1870, 114 L.Ed.2d at 410.) We find such exceptional circumstances to be present in the instant case. In light of our previous determination that a prima facie case was shown by defendant, our further discussion is limited to the explanations offered by the prosecution for its peremptory challenges. Those explanations, set out in Hope II, 137 Ill.2d at 444-47, 148 Ill.Dec. 252, 560 N.E.2d 849, were pretextual in nature. The prosecutors cited the backgrounds of some of the black venire members. They cited the age and job status of those members. They cited the members' experiences as crime victims. Examination of the record reveals, however, that young blacks were excused while young whites served. An unmarried black was excused while single whites served. An unemployed black was excused while an unemployed white served. Black crime victims were excused while similar whites served. This court has held prosecution explanations not credible where similar inconsistencies have been displayed. ( People v. McDonald (1988), 125 Ill.2d 182, 125 Ill.Dec. 781, 530 N.E.2d 1351.) The prosecution's reasons are a collection of vague common characteristics and include repeated reliance upon the alleged demeanor of jurors or mistaken allegations about the jurors. Examined as a whole, they appear pretexts for racial discrimination.