Opinion ID: 3033210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facially Overbroad

Text: Section 1140 regulates two types of conduct. The first type of conduct relates to the intentions of the speaker. This prong states that a speaker cannot use nineteen phrases, including “social security,” “in a manner which such person knows or should know would convey . . . the false impression that such item is approved, endorsed or authorized by” SSA. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-10(a). The second type of conduct is objective with regard to the reader, and prohibits the use of the proscribed phrases “in a manner which reasonably could be interpreted or construed as conveying the false impression that such item is approved, endorsed or authorized” by SSA. Id. Both prongs also cover communications that convey the false impression that the author has “some connection with the SSA.” Id. This Court has held that it will strike down a regulation of speech on its face “if its prohibitions are sufficiently overbroad–that is, if it reaches too much expression that is protected by the Constitution.” DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 314 (3d Cir. 2008). In other words, this Court must find that the very existence of the regulation at issue “will inhibit free expression to a substantial extent.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 246-44 (2002) (invalidating the Child Pornography Prevention Act as facially overbroad because the statute reached a “substantial” amount of protected speech, such as speech that neither appealed to the prurient interest nor was patently offensive, including speech that had 6 serious “literary, artistic, political, and scientific value”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (“[T]he overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”); 181 South Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The overbreadth claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, from the text of the law and from actual fact, that substantial overbreadth exists.”). In United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008), the Supreme Court implied that it disfavors facial challenges, preferring to review circumstances under which the challenged statute actually infringes protected speech. The Court noted that the overbreadth doctrine tends “to summon forth an endless stream of fanciful hypotheticals” that may potentially implicate the infringement of protected speech. Id. at 1843. The Court further stated that the “‘mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.’” Id. at 1844 (quoting Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984)). The Court described hypothetical scenarios discussed at oral argument, and noted that if those situations came to pass, the affected parties could bring an as-applied challenge. Id.; see also Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (“Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. . . . Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that 7 courts should not . . . formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”). As previously discussed, the first prong of Section 1140 prohibits the use of words such as “social security” in a manner that the speaker “knows or should know would convey” the false impression of government approval or endorsement. Like other forms of public deception, fraudulent charitable solicitation is unprotected speech. Illinois v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 611-12 (2003). Therefore, the prong of Section 1140 that contains the “knowing” standard is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Likewise, the First Amendment does not protect a speaker who uses the prohibited language in such a way that he or she “should know” that the message will mislead or deceive the reader. The second part of Section 1140 requires closer analysis because it does not require that the speaker “know” or “should know” that the language could mislead the reader. Rather, the second prong of the statute prohibits the use of the language in such a way that the reader could reasonably interpret as conveying governmental endorsement. Because this prong does not have a scienter requirement for the speaker, it could possibly reach some protected speech. However, it is wholly unclear that such non-deceptive speech reaches a “substantial” amount of protected speech. NTU has failed to provide any significant examples of protected speech falling under the statute and its counsel essentially disavowed the overbreadth claim at oral argument. Given the lack of 8 evidence of the second prong’s “substantial” burden on protected speech, we find that the objective prong of Section 1140 is not overbroad. We note that the Fourth Circuit has also examined a similar facial challenge to Section 1140 in United Seniors Ass’n, Inc. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 423 F.3d 397, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2005). As in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that, while the objective prong of Section 1140 could reach some protected speech, any such speech constituted, “at most, a minuscule portion of the speech reached by the statute.” Id. at 407. For these reasons, we reject NTU’s facial challenge.