Opinion ID: 197654
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Right

Text: 15 The Speedy Trial Act (STA), 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1985), is designed to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy ... trial, and to serve the public interest in bringing prompt criminal proceedings. United States v. Saltzman, 984 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Noone, 913 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir.1990)). The STA provides that the government must bring a criminal defendant to trial no more than seventy days after the later of the filing date of the information or indictment or the date on which the criminal defendant first appears before a judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1985); see also United States v. Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d 520, 525 (1st Cir.1988). In calculating the seventy days the STA excludes certain time periods. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)-(9) (1985); see also United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d 1042, 1043 (1st Cir.1997); United States v. Thurlow, 710 F.Supp. 380, 381 (D.Me.1989). If a criminal defendant is not brought to trial within the seventy-day time limit required by § 3161(c)(1), as extended by operation of § 3161(h)(1)-(9), the penalty provisions of the STA mandate that the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1985); see also Sposito, 106 F.3d at 1043; Thurlow, 710 F.Supp. at 381. 16 Santiago argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. He says that the delay in his being brought to trial added up to twice the number of statutorily allowable days. In response, the government asserts that only forty-nine non-excludable days passed before Santiago was brought to trial. 17 We find no error in the district court's refusal to dismiss the superseding indictment. This court reviews the disposition of a STA issue for clear error as to factual findings and de novo as to legal rulings. See United States v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 1159, 1162 (1st Cir.1995). We conclude that fewer than seventy non-excludable days went by before Santiago was brought to trial. 18 a) November 4, 1994 to March 1, 1995 (Santiago's motion for 19 a continuance of trial) 20 The original indictment was returned on November 2, 1994. Santiago first appeared before a judicial officer of the district court on November 4, 1994. STA calculation begins with the latter of these two dates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1985). 21 November 4, 1994 is itself excludable because Santiago appeared before the district court on that day. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (1985) (proceedings concerning the defendant). That day is also excludable for another reason, to wit, the government's motion to detain Santiago without bail pending the detention hearing, which the court granted that same day. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1985). Section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes any delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion. Id. November 9, 1994 is excludable because of Santiago's arraignment and detention hearing on that day. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (1985). 22 Santiago contends that the period from November 10, 1994 up to and including November 21, 1994 is non-excludable. The government agrees. We therefore find a total of sixteen non-excludable days up to this point. 23 On November 22, 1994, Santiago filed a motion notifying the district court of his counsel's unavailability on January 12, 1995, the scheduled trial date, because of another trial. Santiago requested an indefinite continuance of the trial as set for January 12, 1995. The court granted this motion ten days later, on December 1, 1994, ordering counsel to notify the court when the other trial was over. The parties agree that the ten days the court took to decide the motion were excludable from the STA's seventy-day time limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1985). They likewise agree that December 2, 1994 was excludable, a pretrial conference being held on that day. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (1985). 24 Santiago asserts that the six days from December 3, 1994 to December 8, 1994 are non-excludable. The government contends that the indefinite continuance of the trial, granted at defendant's request on December 1, 1994, makes these days excludable. 25 The STA excludes any period of delay resulting from the court's granting of a continuance if the continuance was granted on the basis of findings that the ends of justice served outweigh the speedy trial interest. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1985). 1 An ends of justice continuance was granted here. Santiago contends, however, that the excludable time attributable to the continuance must be limited to the period of time between January 12, 1995, the original trial date, and February 2, 1995, the date defense counsel notified the court of his availability for trial. The government maintains that the entire three month period of time starting on December 1, 1994, the date the court continued the original trial date, and ending on March 1, 1995, the day the court set a new trial date, is excludable from the STA's seventy-day time limit. 26 We agree with the government. The period of delay resulting from the continuance began on December 1, 1994, when the January 12, 1995, trial date was canceled and the trial put on hold until further order. The period of delay remained in effect from then through March 1, 1995, when, after having been earlier advised of counsel's availability, the court set a new trial date. 27 There is no way to regard the period from the court's December 1 ruling to the original January 12 trial date as if no continuance were then in effect. The continuance ruled out all possibility of a trial while it lasted, relieving the parties of the need to prepare for trial on January 12, as previously scheduled, or at any time from December 1 until a new trial date was set. 28 Contending that a continuance of trial ends when the reason for it ends, Santiago argues that the twenty-seven day period beginning on February 2, 1995 and ending on March 1, 1995, during which the court was aware of defense counsel's availability but had not yet set a new trial date, cannot be excludable. To exclude that period, Santiago asserts, citing to United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 505-06 (1st Cir.1984), would give rise to an automatic additional period of exclusion after every ends of justice continuance between the notice that the event triggering the continuance of trial has ended and the court's order setting a new trial date. Santiago argues that his counsel's February 2, 1995 notice of availability left nothing for the district court to do but set a new trial date, a routine act. 29 We do not accept Santiago's argument. The period of delay caused by the ends of justice continuance included the time, following counsel's notice of readiness, that the judge reasonably required to schedule a new trial date. The mere announcement of counsel's availability did not automatically terminate the continuance of the trial. Setting a new date required consideration of the court's calendar; an available window had to be found. The court may not have been able to determine as soon as counsel's availability was known when its other obligations would allow the scheduling of a trial. The court took less than a month to schedule a new trial date, which was not an unreasonable delay. 30 We add that the twenty-seven days that elapsed before a new trial date was set can be viewed as separately excludable under the provisions of § 3161(h)(1)(F), which excludes the time pending disposition of a motion. By notifying the court of his availability for trial, defense counsel may be said to have impliedly moved for a new trial date. The court acted on the implied motion on March 1, 1995 by setting a new trial date of March 13, 1995. Motions that do not require a hearing may toll the seventy-day time limit for up to thirty days. See Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 329, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 1876, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986) (noting that the phrase prompt disposition in § 3161(h)(1)(F) so limits the amount of time that can be excluded). As already noted, the twenty-seven days taken by the court to determine a new date was reasonable enough. We conclude that the entire period from December 1, 1994 through March 1, 1995 was excludable for purposes of the STA, leaving us still with a total of sixteen non-excludable days at this point in time. 31 b) March 2, 1995 to October 18, 1995 (The government's 32 motion for a continuance of trial) 33 The new March 13 trial date did not stand for long. On March 10, 1995, the government moved to continue Santiago's trial in order to allow it to obtain permission to try the two juveniles, Ramos and Esquilin, as adults, in which event they would be eligible to be tried jointly with Santiago. Finding that the ends of justice would be served by continuing the trial pending resolution of Ramos's and Esquilin's adult status, the district court allowed the government's motion on March 13, 1995. The parties agree that the period of time from March 2, 1995, the day after the district court set the March 13 trial date, until March 9, 1995, the day before the government filed its motion to continue the new trial date, was non-excludable. They also agree that the days between March 10, 1995, the day the government filed its motion to continue the trial, and March 13, 1995, the day the district court granted the government's motion to continue the trial, were excludable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1985). The addition of the eight non-excludable days yields a new total of twenty-four non-excludable days. 34 c) March 14, 1995 to October 18, 1995 35 The parties disagree sharply over exclusion of the 219-day period beginning on March 14, 1995, the day after the district court granted the government's motion to continue the trial, until October 18, 1995, the day a superseding indictment against all three defendants was returned. The March 13 continuance was open-ended, although as Santiago acknowledges, that, in and of itself, did not make it invalid. Open-ended continuances are not prohibited per se. See United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1457-58 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Jones, 56 F.3d 581, 585-86 & n. 10 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 868 (3d Cir.1992); Rush, 738 F.2d at 508. But see United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565-66 (9th Cir.1990) (The Speedy Trial Act ... requires that an 'ends of justice' continuance be specifically limited in time....). This court has said, it is generally preferable to limit a continuance to a definite period for the sake of clarity and certainty; but at the same time it is inevitable that in some cases ... a court is forced to order an (h)(8) continuance without knowing exactly how long the reasons supporting the continuance will remain valid. Rush, 738 F.2d at 508. An open-ended continuance may, therefore, bring to bear a factor of reasonableness. See Lattany, 982 F.2d at 868 ([O]pen-ended continuances to serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length.); Rush, 738 F.2d at 508 (It may well be that some sort of reasonableness limitation is appropriate to prevent continuances from delaying trials unfairly and circumventing the dismissal sanctions in the Speedy Trial Act....). 36 Santiago argues that, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, including the previous delays, the 219 day delay was clearly unreasonable. Much of that delay, he contends, was attributable to government foot-dragging and, therefore, lacked an element of defendant's involvement that has led us to exclude open-ended continuances in the past. See Lattany, 982 F.2d at 883 (holding that the length of a continuance was not unreasonable because of defendant's part in extending the delay). Santiago maintains that the docket entries for the transfer proceedings 2 are suggestive of governmental bad faith and needless delay. He points to the postponement of a March 21, 1995 evidentiary hearing for Ramos after the government said that it had not received notice of it. Santiago contends that this delay, in addition to other questionable delays, indicate that the government was not acting expeditiously in spite of knowing that he was still awaiting trial. And, finally, Santiago says he was misled into believing that the transfer proceedings would end momentarily. 37 We find little support for Santiago's charge that the transfer proceedings were protracted by governmental indifference and impropriety. Their duration does not seem extreme in the circumstances, and the continuance of Santiago's trial until it could be determined whether to try the minor codefendants with Santiago was reasonable, especially where Santiago raised no objection at the time. Cf. Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.1968) (noting the substantial public interest in joint trials). 38 The two juveniles' natural resistance to being tried as adults affords an obvious explanation for the time consumed by the transfer proceedings. The seriousness of the charges provided good reason for them to do everything possible to retain their juvenile status. That the adult classification issue was not simple is suggested by the fact that, although the district judge ultimately transferred both minors to adult status, the magistrate judge presiding over the transfer proceedings recommended the transfer of only one of them. The limited record that we have reflects delays arising from, among other things, difficulties in arranging for psychological evaluations of the two juveniles. At no time within this period did Santiago seek either to terminate the continuance of his trial or to expedite the transfer proceedings. 39 We conclude that the continuance for the transfer proceedings was not unreasonable or excessively long. Accordingly, we exclude the period between March 14 and October 18, 1995, pursuant to § 3161(h)(8)(A). This exclusion keeps the STA count at twenty-four non-excludable days at this point in the calculations. 40 d) October 19, 1995 to January 23, 1996 (Esquilin's motion 41 for a change of plea) 42 The October 18, 1995 superseding indictment, which included Ramos and Esquilin as defendants along with Santiago, did not restart Santiago's STA's clock because it was based on the original charges. See United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 240, 106 S.Ct. 555, 560, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Karsseboom, 881 F.2d 604, 606-07 (9th Cir.1989). 43 The parties agree that, with the exception of October 25, 1995, the days between October 19, 1995, the day after the filing of the superseding indictment, and November 13, 1995, the day before the filing of the government's motion as to Ramos to seal documents, were non-excludable. October 25, 1995 was excludable because it was the day that Santiago was arraigned under the superseding indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1) (1985). Adding these twenty-five non-excludable days gives a new total of forty-nine non-excludable days. 44 Because the superseding indictment pertained to all three, any defendant's motion resulting in excludable time tolled the STA clock for his codefendants. See United States v. Ortiz, 23 F.3d 21, 27-28 (1st Cir.1994); Torres Lopez, 851 F.2d at 526 (A pretrial motion resulting in excludable time for one defendant also stops the Speedy Trial clock for all codefendants. (citations omitted)); Rush, 738 F.2d at 503 (Every circuit court that has considered [§ 3161(h)(7) ] has held in essence that 'an exclusion applicable to one defendant applies to all codefendants.'  (citations omitted)). 3 Accordingly, November 14, 1995, the date the government filed its motion to seal documents as to Ramos; November 15, 1995, the date Ramos filed his motion for a change of plea; and November 16, 1995, the date the court granted the motion to seal as to Ramos and scheduled his change of plea hearing, are all excludable from Santiago's STA computation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), (h)(7) (1985). 45 Santiago argues that, with the exception of November 27, 1995, the period of time from November 17, 1995, the day after the court acted on the two motions, until December 3, 1995, the day before Ramos's change of plea hearing, is non-excludable. He concedes that November 27, 1995 is excludable because of the arraignment and detention hearings of Esquilin and Ramos on that date. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), (h)(7) (1985). The government, however, would exclude the entire period from November 17 through December 4, arguing that Ramos's change of plea motion was continuously under advisement until allowed at a hearing on December 4, 1995. We agree with the government, as discussed below, and exclude that period of time from the STA's seventy-day time limit. 46 Santiago also disputes any exclusion of the period of time from December 5, 1995, the day after Ramos's change of plea hearing, through January 17, 1996, the day before the filing of Santiago's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. Santiago contends that Esquilin's motion for change of plea, filed on December 1, 1995, was not excludable until at least December 26, 1995, when the court set January 19, 1996 as the date for Esquilin's change of plea hearing. This is so, he says, because Esquilin's motion required no disposition until December 26, (apparently because it was not yet scheduled for hearing), and because a contrary ruling would allow district judges to toll the STA clock by intentionally delaying their orders scheduling change of plea hearings. The short answer to this argument is that the exclusion provided by § 3161(h)(1)(F) applies without qualification from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on ... such motion, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1985); see United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 440 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 327 n. 25 (6th Cir.1988). 4 47 Santiago also questions the excludability of the post-December 26 period during which Esquilin's change of plea motion continued under advisement. As in the case of Ramos's similar motion, Santiago would have us deny excludability on the ground that Jenkins does not stand for the proposition that the entire period from the filing of a motion for a change of plea until the change of plea hearing is excludable. The holding in Jenkins, according to Santiago, dealt with a motion that did not require a hearing, to wit, a motion to use a jury questionnaire. 5 Santiago contends that the hearing referred to in both § 3161(h)(1)(F) and the Jenkins case is one that is necessary to decide the merits of the motion, and that such was not the case here. 48 We agree with the government that all of the days between the date a codefendant files a motion for a change of plea and the date of the change of plea hearing itself are excludable from the STA's seventy-day time limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F), (h)(7) (1985); accord Jenkins, 92 F.3d at 440; see also Henderson, 476 U.S. at 326-27, 106 S.Ct. at 1874-75; Sposito, 106 F.3d at 1044. 49 A change of plea hearing is essential to establish the knowing and voluntary nature of the defendant's guilty plea, and to determine the sufficiency of its factual basis. Until these factors are established, the court may not rule definitively on whether or not to accept the motion for change of plea. 50 Santiago argues that the district court in Thurlow sets forth a better reasoned view than the one we take. Citing to § 3161(h)(8)(C), the Thurlow court ruled that a delay caused by the general congestion of the courts is not a sufficient basis for the exclusion of time from the STA's seventy-day time limit. Thurlow, 710 F.Supp. at 383. The court thus concluded that an exclusion of time under the STA could not be granted for the period of time starting with the defendant's notice and ending with the court's hearing, because the delay was due solely to the court's scheduling requirements. See id. 51 We remain unpersuaded. A defendant's request to change his plea clearly constitutes a pretrial motion, a motion which automatically triggers an exclusion of time. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1985). The weight of authority is to this effect. In Sposito, Jenkins, Henderson, and other cases, courts have agreed that the entire time between the filing of a pretrial motion and the hearing on that motion is excludable from the STA's seventy-day time limit. See, e.g., Henderson, 476 U.S. at 326-27, 106 S.Ct. at 1874-75; Sposito, 106 F.3d at 1044; Jenkins, 92 F.3d at 440. Hence, the days between December 1, 1995, the date Esquilin filed his motion for change of plea, and January 22, 1996, the date of Esquilin's actual change of plea hearing, are all excludable. 52 On January 18, 1996, Santiago filed his motion to dismiss the superseding indictment for lack of a speedy trial. The district court denied the motion on January 23, 1996. 6 Both parties agree that these six days are excludable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (1985). January 23, 1996 was the first day of jury trial, bringing the STA clock to a stop in the instant case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1985). 53 We conclude that only forty-nine non-excludable days ran off the STA clock before the commencement of trial and that, therefore, no violation of Santiago's statutory right to a speedy trial occurred.