Opinion ID: 853330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Post-Conviction Procedural Rulings

Text: Ben-Yisrayl asserts that the post-conviction court denied him the right to full and fair litigation at his post-conviction hearing when the court refused to assist Ben-Yisrayl in securing additional relevant information possessed by the government. (Appellant's Br. at 54.) Ben-Yisrayl claims that access to information regarding the relationship between Ivory Maxwell, a State's witness, and Mark Becker, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, was crucial to a reliable outcome in this case. We conclude it was not. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held, [T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. We have previously recognized that this holding applies to evidence impeaching the credibility of a State's witness. See Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170, 120 S.Ct. 1195, 145 L.Ed.2d 1099 (2000) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)). The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Ben-Yisrayl sought the additional evidence concerning the relationship between Maxwell and Becker to show that Maxwell was a paid confidential informant in Ben-Yisrayl's case and to discredit Maxwell's testimony. ( See Appellant's Br. at 56). After examining the content of Maxwell's testimony and the effectiveness of defense counsel's cross-examinations, the post-conviction court found that the evidence that Ben-Yisrayl sought was not material. [15] The court said, It is clear that counsel conducted a very thorough cross-examination of Maxwell, got him to admit some inconsistencies between his testimony and his previous statements, and even got Maxwell to suggest the Petitioner's alleged statement about the shotgun might not be an admission that Petitioner had done some damage with the shot gun ... It is hard to see how information as to Maxwell's alleged cooperation with law enforcement would have added much to the effect of the cross-examination.... There is simply no reasonable probability that the allegedly impeaching information would have led to a different result. (P-C.R. at 1077-78.) Ben-Yisrayl has failed to show that the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to an opposite conclusion. Consequently, we will not disturb the post-conviction court's ruling. Ben-Yisrayl next contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request for transcripts from the jury selection in his earlier trial on these charges, which ended in a mistrial. (Appellant's Br. at 56.) He asserts this information is necessary and relevant to discover whether the misconduct in jury selection presaged the alleged misconduct in closing argument. (Appellant's Br. at 57.) We disagree. The mistrial occurred with the first attempt to impanel a jury for Ben-Yisrayl's trial based on an improper comment by the prosecutor. (P-C.R. at 1214-16.) Ben-Yisrayl moved for a second mistrial during closing argument claiming that the prosecutor committed reversible error when he challenged defense counsel to explain why a person would voluntarily confess to a crime that he did not commit. Ben-Yisrayl, 690 N.E.2d at 1148-49. The trial court denied this motion and on direct appeal we determined that the prosecutor's statement could not have reasonably been interpreted by the jury as a suggestion to infer guilt from the defendant's silence. Id. at 1149. We determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a mistrial because doing so did not subject Ben-Yisrayl to grave peril. Id. In his post-conviction proceeding, Ben-Yisrayl sought to establish a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct by linking the prosecutor's improper comments from the mistrial with those made at closing argument. (P-C.R. at 1214.) The post-conviction court observed that the statements from the mistrial were made to an entirely different jury and were dissimilar to those made at closing argument. (P-C.R. at 1213.) The court characterized Ben-Yisrayl's request for the discovery of the transcripts from the jury selection of the mistrial as a fishing expedition. (P-C.R. at 1218.) We agree. Any error that occurred in the first proceeding was remedied when the court declared a mistrial.