Opinion ID: 62990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis (a) Statutory Interpretation

Text: We first look to the plain language of the statute for guidance. For a conviction, § 201(b)(2)(C), in relevant part, requires that the official corruptly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of value ... in return for... being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of [his] official duty. By its terms, the statute does not require that the official actually commit the violation of his official duty; it only requires that he demand or agree to accept something of value in return for being induced to commit the violation. The statute also clearly requires that the official's demand be corrupt. Nonetheless, the plain language leaves ambiguity as to whether being induced requires that the official intend to commit the violation of his duty when he corruptly demands something of value in return for being induced, or whether it is sufficient that he corruptly demanded the payment while knowing that it was for the purpose of inducing him to violate his duty. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation or more than one accepted meaning. Kay, 359 F.3d at 743 (internal quotations and footnote omitted). If, after application of these principles of statutory construction, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, we may turn to legislative history. Id. Because the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation regarding this issue, we turn to its legislative history. Before 1962, §§ 201-13, relating to bribery and graft, each applied to different categories of persons. S.REP. No. 87-2213, at 7 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3856. In 1962, these separate sections were revised and consolidated under one bribery statute, § 201. Id. Analyzing this legislative history, the Second Circuit noted that [a] prior statute, 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1958), had required that a Congressman receive the bribe with the intent to have his action ... influenced. This ... left it unclear whether the Congressman must intend to take action or need only intend to receive money with awareness of the purpose for which the briber gives it. The present version, as revised in 1962, deletes intent from the description of the conduct specifically proscribed, and instead requires that the overall offense be committed corruptly. The specific conduct is rephrased as receipt of money in return for being influenced in official actions. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 841 (2d Cir.1982). The House Report on the revised bribery statutes clarified the meaning of the new language. The language used in subsection ([b])[paragraph (2) of section 201] [1] emphasizes that it is the purpose for which the recipient knows the bribe is offered or given when he solicits, receives, or agrees to receive it which is determinative of criminality. H.R.REP. No. 87-748, at 18 (1961). The report further indicated that this description of the section's intent requirement was consistent with the interpretation held by some courts of at least one of the predecessor bribery statutes. Id. For example, the report cited Whitney v. United States, 99 F.2d 327, 331 (10th Cir.1938), in which the Tenth Circuit affirmed an official's bribery conviction because [t]he evidence shows that he not only took but solicited money in connection with [an official act], and whether his action was influenced is immaterial. H.R.REP. No. 87-748, at 18. The applicable Senate Report did not address the issue, but it noted that § 201(b)(2) prohibits a public official's solicitation or acceptance of, or agreement to take, a bribe. S.REP. No. 87-2213, at 8 (1962), as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3852, 3857 (emphasis added). Valle claimed at oral argument that the Senate Report's language that the 1962 revision would make no significant changes of substance, id. at 4, as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3853, is in conflict with the House Report. We disagree. Clearly, the House Report was based on the then-current interpretation of the bribery statutes and did not introduce any change of substance. Furthermore, the full quotation of the portion of the Senate Report on which Valle relies is as follows: This consolidation would make no significant changes of substance and, more particularly, would not restrict the broad scope of the present bribery statutes as construed by the courts.  Id. (emphasis added). Valle also argued that the Senate Report refers to the intents in § 201(b)(2) as the same as the intents in § 201(b)(1). The actual language of the report is that [t]he same alternate intents are set forth here [in subsection (b)(2)] as in subsection (b)[(1)]. Id. at 8, as reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3857. This clearly refers to the three alternate intents in the three subparagraphs, § 201(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C), that parallel the three alternate intents in the three subparagraphs, § 201(b)(2)(A), (B), and (C). None of these observations in the Senate Report conflict with the House Report. This legislative history shows that Congress did not intend for a violation of § 201(b)(2)(C) to turn on whether the official intended to commit a violation of his duty. Instead, it indicates that Congress intended the statute to be violated when an official took the bribe, knowing that it was given for the purpose of inducing him to violate his official duty, whether or not he actually intended to follow through with the violation.