Opinion ID: 164260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compliance with regulations

Text: 19 Petitioners first argue that the BIA failed to comply with the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) and (e). Pet'rs' Opening Br. at 22. 7 Because it is clear that the BIA member acted pursuant to § 3.1(e)(5), we consider whether he complied with that regulation. Petitioners argue he did not because his decision made no indication that the Board had actually reviewed the record below. Id. at 24. We disagree. In affirming the IJ's decision, the BIA member cited Matter of Burbano, 20 I & N Dec. 872, 874, 1994 WL 520994 (BIA 1994), with the parenthetical note that adoption or affirmance of a decision of an [IJ], in whole or in part, is simply a statement that the Board's conclusion upon review of the record coincides with those that the [IJ] articulated in his or her decision. Order, Admin. R. at 2 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). 20 Furthermore, the regulation does not require the Board to specifically state that it has reviewed the record. We assume the BIA member reviewed the record prior to deciding to adopt the IJ's decision. Absent any indication to the contrary, we presume BIA members do their job thoroughly. See Yuk v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1222, 1232, No. 02-9546, 2004 WL 79095, at  (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 2004) (`That a one-sentence order was entered is no evidence that the BIA member did not review the facts of [petitioner's] case.' (quoting Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.2003))). 21 Petitioners also argue that the BIA member should have referred this case to a three-member panel pursuant to § 3.1(e)(6), because, they assert, the IJ's decision contains significant errors of law and fact. Pet'rs' Opening Br. at 24. The government responds that the single BIA member's decision to decide a case by means of § 3.1(e)(5) is a decision committed to the absolute discretion of the BIA and therefore not subject to judicial review because it requires an assessment of not only whether a particular case was correctly decided, but also whether, against the backdrop of an extraordinarily large caseload, the case involves such novel or complex issues that a full Board decision is required. Resp't's Br. at 17-18. 22 The government has made this argument in various cases around the country without success, although the argument has sometimes only been unsuccessful in dicta. See Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 731-32 (6th Cir.2003) (assuming, without deciding, that judicial review properly is employed to assess whether the BIA correctly designated a case for summary affirmance); Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 206-07 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that [e]specially when the Board's review of an IJ's decision often hinges on Circuit court precedent, we are well-equipped, both statutorily and practically, to review a decision to streamline); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 852-53 (9th Cir.2003) ([W]e do not embrace the government's argument that the streamlining decision is inherently discretionary.). Review by a three-member panel under § 3.1(e)(6) is permissible only if the case meets the specified regulatory criteria. Those criteria, including such things as (a) the need to settle inconsistencies between IJs, (b) the need to establish precedent construing laws, regulations or procedures, (c) the need to review the particular IJ's decision because it fails to conform to law or precedent or contains clearly erroneous factual determinations and (d) the need to resolve a case of major national import, are all well within our capability to review and assess. Indeed, they are the kinds of issues we routinely consider in reviewing cases, and they have nothing to do with the BIA's caseload or other internal circumstances. Thus, at least for the purposes of this case, we are able to review the BIA member's decision to decide this case under § 3.1(e)(5) rather than § 3.1(e)(6). 8 As our review of the merits of petitioners' case will reveal, we find no error in that decision. 23