Opinion ID: 2135804
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the pedersen place

Text: The Brteks argue in regard to the Pedersen place that a constructive trust should be imposed. A constructive trust is imposed when one has acquired legal title to property under such circumstances that he or she may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest in the property. In such a situation, equity converts the legal titleholder into a trustee holding the title for the benefit of those entitled to the ownership thereof. Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 235 Neb. 816, 458 N.W.2d 443 (1990); Ford v. Jordan, 220 Neb. 492, 370 N.W.2d 714 (1985). A constructive trust is a relationship, with respect to property, subjecting the person who holds title to the property to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the grounds that his acquisition or retention of the property would constitute unjust enrichment. Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, supra ; Knoell v. Huff, 224 Neb. 90, 395 N.W.2d 749 (1986). Generally, a court, sitting in equity, will not impose a constructive trust and constitute an individual as a trustee of the legal title for property unless it be shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual, as a potential constructive trustee, had obtained title to property by fraud, misrepresentation, or an abuse of an influential or confidential relationship and that, under the circumstances, such individual should not, according to the rules of equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy the property so obtained. Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, supra ; In re Estate of Lienemann, 222 Neb. 169, 382 N.W.2d 595 (1986). A party seeking the remedy of a constructive trust has the burden to establish the factual foundation, by evidence which is clear and convincing, required for a constructive trust. Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, supra ; Lone Oak Farm Corp. v. Riverside Fertilizer, 229 Neb. 548, 428 N.W.2d 175 (1988). The record simply does not support a conclusion that the Cihals had obtained title to [this] property by fraud, misrepresentation, or an abuse of an influential or confidential relationship, In re Estate of Lienemann, 222 Neb. at 177, 382 N.W.2d at 601, and the district court was correct in declining to impose a constructive trust. We next examine the requirements for a resulting trust, which was argued by the Brteks as to the Urbanek place, but not as to Pedersen. The court will impose a resulting trust when the circumstances surrounding a conveyance make it clear that the parties intended such a result. Superior Hybrids Co. v. Carmichael, 214 Neb. 384, 333 N.W.2d 911 (1983). A resulting trust has been defined to be one raised by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction, but not expressed in deed or instrument of conveyance. Superior Hybrids Co. v. Carmichael, supra ; Biggerstaff v. Ostrand, 199 Neb. 808, 261 N.W.2d 750 (1978). With respect to the underlying issues involving a resulting trust, the rules in this state have been well established. Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the whole or a part of the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom such payment is made. Superior Hybrids Co. v. Carmichael, supra ; Jirka v. Prior, 196 Neb. 416, 243 N.W.2d 754 (1976). The rationale for this rule is that individuals seldom give consideration to receive nothing. Superior Hybrids Co. v. Carmichael, supra ; Campbell v. Kirby, 195 Neb. 610, 239 N.W.2d 792 (1976). The burden is upon the one claiming the existence of a resulting trust to establish the facts upon which it is based by clear and satisfactory evidence. Superior Hybrids Co. v. Carmichael, supra ; Biggerstaff v. Ostrand, supra . Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved. Castellano v. Bitkower, 216 Neb. 806, 346 N.W.2d 249 (1984). As stated in Superior Hybrids Co. v. Carmichael, 214 Neb. at 387, 333 N.W.2d at 913: `Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the whole or a part of the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom such payment is made....' Although a resulting trust may not arise when the parties are sufficiently close so as to give rise to a presumption that a gift was intended, that presumption can be rebutted. When the Cihals purchased the Pedersen place by contract with Walter and Isabelle Pedersen dated July 12, 1963, there seemed to be no question that they were buying this farm as their own. They obtained the deed on December 23, 1963, and filed it for record that same day. The Cihals made payments to the Pedersens as follows: 7/12/63 $ 1,000.00 12/23/63 23,000.00 12/28/64 2,940.00 12/27/65 302.50 12/30/66 1,302.50 12/29/67 1,745.50 12/31/68 3,165.00 __________ Total $33,455.50 It was not until February 1968 that the Brteks ever suggested that an agreement was made between the Brteks and the Cihals for the sale of the Pedersen place to the Brteks. At that time, the Cihals had been the record titleholders and in possession for over 4 years. The Brteks have not established by clear and convincing evidence that when the conveyance was made to the Cihals, the intention was that the farm was being purchased for the Brteks, and therefore, no resulting trust arose. Whether the Pedersen transaction between the Brteks and the Cihals was intended to be a loan or gift to, or a sale from, the Cihals was not raised by the pleadings or argued in the briefs. Whether those issues can be decided under a prayer for general equitable relief we need not answer, because either claim would be barred by the statute of limitations. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 1989) provides in part: An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued.... An action upon a contract, not in writing... can only be brought within four years. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-206 (Reissue 1989). A cause of action in contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do the thing agreed to. Hooker and Heft v. Estate of Weinberger, 203 Neb. 674, 279 N.W.2d 849 (1979). Assuming the transaction regarding the Pedersen place was either a contract of sale or a failure to repay a loan, the Cihals would have been obligated to either execute a deed or repay the loan within a reasonable time after the final payment made by Agnes, Joe, and Jerry. The final payment made to the Cihals of any money related to the Pedersen transaction was February 26, 1974. This action was filed on September 9, 1986, more than 12 years 6 months after either action would have accrued. It seems to be Jerry's position that his cause of action did not arise until sometime in 1985, when he and Martha got into an argument about title to both the Urbanek and Pedersen places. Under cross-examination by Cihals' attorney, Jerry said that Martha told him in 1968 she would be giving him the deed to the Pedersen place, but that she refused to do so. On redirect by his own attorney, when asked what Martha had told Jerry about the deed to the Pedersen place, Jerry answered, [T]hat she would make it right with me, that she will eventually some day. I haven't seen that day today, to this day I ain't got the title. During Jerry's examination by his own attorney, he produced a letter written by Martha and mailed to Jerry's wife, postmarked April 14, 1972, which in part stated: Received your letter & was quite disappointed. We are doing the best we can. [T]he farm up the hill is ours. [I]t cost us $32000.00 and I can not sign it over to you. I gave permission that you could live there. [T]hat is I don't know how it will be yet. It seems to be the Brteks' position that during the next 12 years, Jerry kept waiting for this performance, and therefore, his action had not accrued. However, that did not toll the running of the statute. On the record before us, we must conclude that the statute of limitations had expired before this action was filed in 1986. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment of the district court confirming title to the Pedersen and Texel places in the Cihals and the home place in the Brteks is affirmed. AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED.