Opinion ID: 2606360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Double jeopardy, the prosecution's tactical decision to abandon its case regarding the charged offense after the close of the evidence, and the jury's subsequent inability to return a verdict

Text: We now turn directly to Quitog's claim that, after taking the position at the close of the evidence in his first trial that he was not guilty of attempted second degree murder and therefore effectively seeking to abandon its case regarding the offense charged in Count I, the prosecution should be precluded by principles of double jeopardy from changing its position thereafter by retrying him for attempted second degree murder. The prosecution responds to Quitog's claim with the observation that the [DPA's] argument that the evidence did not establish the requisite intent on [Quitog's] part and[,] therefore, [that Quitog] was not guilty of the charge of attempted murder was merely `argument' and not a binding `conclusion of law' as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The prosecution elaborates on its observation with the following analysis: The [prosecution] submits that accepting [Quitog's] argument and theory is to accept the proposition that[,] henceforth, the [prosecution's] admission is binding upon the courts as a conclusion of law. No longer will it be the appellate court's function to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence where the [prosecution] makes [an] admission in its closing argument that the evidence is insufficient to prove the elements of the charged offense. The admissions of the [prosecution], as expressed in its closing argument, will be all that is necessary for a dispositive determination as to the sufficiency of the evidence. To accept [Quitog's] argument is to accept the inherent principle ... that the [DPA's] admission is binding upon the jury. Accepting [Quitog's] theory and argument is to accept the proposition that the State, as the party prosecutor, by simply expressing an admission in it [sic] closing argument as to the state of the evidence, will now serve in the place of the jury. The [prosecution] would henceforth be making all factual determinations previously the province of the jury. The [prosecution] would be deciding which evidence is to be accepted for making a determination as to all the elements of the charged offense.... Another principle of law which would no longer be applicable is found in the [trial] court's instruction to the jury. The [trial] court gave ... an instruction which, in part, stated: Statements or remarks made by counsel are not evidence. You should consider their arguments to you, but you are not bound by their recollections or interpretations of the evidence. Under [Quitog's] argument and theory, the [prosecution's] argument to the jury would be elevated to a position of being not only persuasive, but would henceforth be controlling. Under [Quitog's] argument, the [prosecution's] argument to the jury would be binding on the jury[,] and the jury must not only consider the same, but ... must abide by the [prosecution's] recollection and interpretation as to what that evidence in the case was. The [prosecution] submits that one of the far reaching effects of accepting [Quitog's] theory here is to eventually dispense with the jury system. The functions of the trier of the facts would be placed upon the prosecution to be exercised and expressed through its closing argument in the form of admissions. (Record reference omitted.) Thus, according to the prosecution's slippery slope argument, in order for this court to hold, on the record in this case, that principles of double jeopardy preclude Quitog from being retried for attempted second degree murder as charged in Count I, it would be necessary for us to repudiate the longstanding propositions that (1) the arguments of counsel are not evidence, (2) the jury is the sole trier of the facts, (3) it is the exclusive province of the trial court to pass, as a matter of law, on the sufficiency of the evidence to submit to the jury, and (4) it is part of the appellate function to conduct an independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. In trotting out its somewhat hyperbolic parade of horribles, the prosecution simply misses the mark because none of the foregoing propositions is at risk in this appeal. First, it is axiomatic that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 661, 728 P.2d 1301, 1303 (1986). However, a prosecutor, during closing argument, is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and wide latitude is allowed in discussing the evidence. It is also within the bounds of legitimate argument for prosecutors to state, discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence. State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209, reconsideration denied, 83 Hawai`i 545, 928 P.2d 39 (1996) (citations omitted). In other words, closing argument accords the prosecution (as well as the defense) the opportunity to persuade the jury that its theory of the case is valid, based upon the evidence adduced and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Second, this court has adhered for over 140 years to the fundamental principle, `which lies at the foundation of jury trial in every country blessed with that institution,' that `the jury is to pass upon the facts and the court upon the law.' State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 515, 849 P.2d 58, 75 (1993) (quoting Lewis v. Davis, 1 Haw. 141, 142 (1854)) (brackets omitted); see also State v. Williamson, 72 Haw. 97, 103, 807 P.2d 593, 597 (1991) (The function of the jury is to decide questions of fact[.]). Thus, we have no quarrel with the notion that [t]he jury is the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. State v. Estrada, 69 Haw. 204, 229, 738 P.2d 812, 828 (1987) (citation omitted); see also State v. Riveira, 59 Haw. 148, 154, 577 P.2d 793, 797 (1978). Third, we acknowledge that [t]he standard to be applied by the trial court in ruling upon a motion for a judgment of acquittal is whether, upon the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and in full recognition of the province of the [trier of fact], a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Pone, 78 Hawai`i 262, 265, 892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995) (quoting State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 528, 865 P.2d 157, 164 (1994)) (some brackets in original and some added). Finally, fourth, we have repeatedly stated that evidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or a jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 135, 913 P.2d 57, 61 (1996) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted) (emphasis added); see also Wallace, 80 Hawai`i at 391-92, 910 P.2d at 704-05; Pone, 78 Hawai`i at 265, 892 P.2d at 458; State v. Reed, 77 Hawai`i 72, 81, 881 P.2d 1218, 1227 (1994); In re John Doe, Born on January 5, 1976, 76 Hawai`i at 92-93, 869 P.2d at 1311-12; State v. Silva, 75 Haw. 419, 432, 864 P.2d 583, 589 (1993); State v. Batson, 73 Haw. 236, 248, 831 P.2d 924, 931, reconsideration denied, 73 Haw. 625, 834 P.2d 1315 (1992). Quitog suggests in his appellate brief that, [i]n the instant case, termination of the first trial was not brought about by trial error but by insufficient evidence. Quitog is half correct. Although the trial court's declaration of a mistrial as to Count I was not prompted by trial error, see supra note 21, neither was it the result of a judicial determination of the legal insufficiency of the evidence. See id. Rather, the trial court's declaration was the product of the jury's advisement that it was deadlocked over the question whether Quitog was guilty of first or second degree assault, thereby giving rise to the trial court's assessment that there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Indeed, nothing in the record on appeal indicates that Quitog's trial was marred either by trial error or by legally insufficient evidence. That is precisely why the trial court correctly denied Quitog's motions for a judgment of acquittal, ruled that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case as to all counts, and permitted the case to go to the jury for deliberations. [26] After listening to the closing arguments of counsel, the jury deliberated and, as the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence, see Estrada, 69 Haw. at 229, 738 P.2d at 828, returned guilty verdicts as to the offenses charged in Counts II and III but deadlocked as to Count I after communicating its inability to distinguish between Assault 1 and Assault 2offenses included within Attempted Second Degree Murder for purposes of HRS § 701-109(4). See supra notes 4, 9, and 10. On the other hand, the record also establishes that the DPA, in his effort to persuade the jury of the validity of the prosecution's case (and subjectively believing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the Attempted Murder in the Second Degree charge and that, in [his] role [as a prosecutor] to seek justice, ... [it] was the proper thing to do), went out on a limb by exhorting the jury that it should find for the Defense not guilty as to Count One, Attempted Murder in the Second Degree ..., but guilty of Assault in the First Degree. See section I, supra. In doing so, the DPA effectively sought to take the charged offense of attempted second degree murder off the table by declining to prosecute the offense further [27] and pursuing a first degree assault conviction. Although, for reasons that will be explored infra in this section, the DPA failed to obtain a first degree assault conviction, the record establishes that he succeeded in taking the charged offense of attempted second degree murder off the table. As noted supra in section I.B, by agreement of the parties, the trial court instructed the jury, inter alia, regarding the included offenses of assault in the first and second degrees in connection with count I. See supra note 16. State's Instruction No. 6, as modified by agreement, advised the jury that it could consider whether Quitog was guilty or not guilty of assault in the first degree [i]f and only if [it found]... Quitog not guilty of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, or [if it was] unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to this offense[.] See id. The jury's communication of May 8, 1995, see section I.D, supra, reflected that the jury was considering whether Quitog was guilty of first degree assault. This fact is significant in light of the sound presumption of appellate practice that jurors are reasonable and generally follow the instructions that they are given, State v. Loa, 83 Hawai`i 335, 359, 926 P.2d 1258, 1282 (1996) (quoting State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 46, 904 P.2d 912, 931, reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai`i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We presume that the jury followed the circuit court's instructions and first considered the evidence with regard to the Attempted Murder charge. Consequently, the jury would first have considered the charged offense and would have gone on to consider any lesser offense only if [it was] unable to agree that the prosecution had proven that [Quitog] was guilty of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 46, 904 P.2d at 931) (quotation signals omitted). Thus, the fact that the jury reached the [first degree assault] instruction at all signifies that it was unable to convict [Quitog] of attempted [second] degree murder. Id. Given the DPA's abandonment of the prosecution's position that Quitog was guilty as charged in Count I, see section I.C, supra, this is hardly a surprise. The jury's communications, however, establish not only that it was no longer considering whether Quitog was guilty of attempted second degree murder, but also that it ultimately deadlocked over whether Quitog had committed first or second degree assault. As we have noted, the communication of May 8, 1995 sought clarification as to whether it was necessary to find that Quitog had acted intentionally or knowingly with respect to the resulting serious bodily injury that he inflicted upon George Stanley in order to convict Quitog of assault in the first degree, as the DPA had exhorted it to do. See supra notes 15 and 16. The trial court's response that the jury should please refer to the jury instructions apparently failed to provide the needed clarification because the jury's communication of May 10, 1995 advised the trial court that it required some further explanation, definition and/or example regarding reckless[ness] in order to distinguish between Assault 1 and Assault 2. See section I.D, supra. In other words, the jury was indicating its inability to distinguish between intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury (assault in the first degree), on the one hand, and recklessly causing the same result (assault in the second degree), on the other. Moreover, the communication unequivocally informed the trial court that the jury was hung without further information or understanding. See id. Thirty-five minutes after been advised that [n]o further definition of Reckless [could] be provided, the jury's final communication declared that it was, indeed, terminally hung as to Count I. See id. Having had one full and fair opportunity to present [its] evidence to an impartial jury, see Lam, 75 Haw. at 200, 857 P.2d at 589, and Moriwake, 65 Haw. at 52, 647 P.2d at 710, the issue before us devolves into the question whether, under the circumstances of this case and for purposes of article 1, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution, it would be grossly unfair to allow the prosecution to retry Quitog for attempted second degree murder. See Lam, 75 Haw. at 199, 857 P.2d at 588; Washington, 434 U.S. at 503, 98 S.Ct. at 829. We hold that it would. Although there does not appear to be any precedent directly on point, various federal courts have barred retrials on double jeopardy grounds when the defendants's first trial has terminated without any determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and the prosecution's deliberate trial strategy was mutually exclusive with that which it sought to pursue on retrial. For example, in United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1991), [t]he defendants were originally indicted for first degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1988), assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(f) (1988), and other miscellaneous charges not material here. The defendants, who now appeal, were each found guilty of second degree murder. The jury did not pass upon the assault charge. The jury was discharged and no mistrial was declared on the assault count. On appeal, [the] defendants obtained reversals of their convictions for second degree murder based on insufficient evidence.... Thereafter, upon motion of the government, the district court, without a new trial, entered judgments of conviction against each defendant [on the assault charge].... .... ... The government [had] conceded that the fatal injuries caused by the automobile running over [the victim] could not constitute the serious bodily injury of the assault charge, but [had] argued that the jury [had] found that the assault and beating before the run-over occurred [had] caused serious bodily injury apart from the fatal injuries. In the alternative, the government [had] asked for a new trial on the assault charge against the eight defendants. Without reviewing the evidence, the district court held that assault resulting in serious bodily injury was a lesser included offense of murder, and that under the trial court's instructions the jury [had] necessarily found the defendants guilty of assault resulting in serious bodily injury before finding them guilty of murder. The court [therefore] entered summary conviction against the defendants on Count II of the original indictment, assault resulting in serious bodily injury. Id. at 407-08. On appeal, the defendants contended, inter alia, that their assault convictions were barred under double jeopardy principles. Id. at 408. The Cavanaugh court agreed. As a preliminary matter, the Cavanaugh court held that, under federal law, the trial court had erred in finding that assault resulting in serious bodily injury under 18 U.S.C. § 113(f) was a lesser included offense of murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Id. at 410. Accordingly, the Cavanaugh court held that, [b]ecause the jury could have found that the assault [consisted of] running over [the victim] with the vehicle, there [was] no certainty that it also found that the defendants independently assaulted [the victim] and inflicted serious bodily injury before the fatal injuries resulting from the run-over by the ... vehicle. Id. at 411 (emphasis in original). The heart of the Cavanaugh court's analysis, however, is particularly germane to the present appeal: We find that the government at trial abandoned any theory that there were two separate and distinct criminal acts.... The government presented this case as one in which the alleged assaults before the run-over were an integral part of the actual murder. It is clear that this was the only way the government could establish most of the defendants' culpability for the murder.... Having concluded that the prosecution's deliberate action resulted in the trial terminating without a verdict on the assault charge, we must determine whether the principles of double jeopardy now bar the government from retrying the defendants on that count. We conclude that double jeopardy bars retrial under these circumstances. .... ... [T]he failure of the original jury to return a verdict on the assault count and the reasons it did not[] are the critical factors barring retrial. .... ... In this case, the trial ended without a factual determination of guilt or innocence on the assault charge, and we look closely at precisely why the trial terminated without the jury reaching a verdict on the charge. Had the trial terminated because of a deliberate election by the defendant, double jeopardy would not bar retrial. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2196-97, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). In contrast, when the trial terminates without a determination of guilt or innocence on a charge as a result of a deliberate, tactical decision by the prosecution, we examine whether the interests protected by double jeopardy principles would be offended by a retrial. .... We hold that principles of double jeopardy, which serves a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit, United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality), bar[] retrial for the assault charge when the government's deliberate trial strategy caused the first trial to terminate without the jury passing upon that charge. The prosecution could have presented the original jury with the theory it now wishes to advance on retrial. The defendants in this case should not be required to `run the gauntlet' a second time. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 446 [90 S.Ct. 1189, 1195, 25 L.Ed.2d 469]... (1970) (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 190, 78 S.Ct. at 224....) Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d at 413-17 (emphases added). See also Sizemore v. Fletcher, 921 F.2d 667, 673 (6th Cir.1990) (ruling that a second trial may be barred by double jeopardy if the first trial ended without a verdict for reasons of the prosecution's making); Saylor v. Cornelius, 845 F.2d 1401, 1403, 1408 (6th Cir.1988) ([W]here the first trial ended without a verdict on the relevant charge for reasons of the prosecution's making, a retrial on that charge would violate the protection the Double Jeopardy Clause affords against harassing reprosecution.... We believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial on [an alternative] theory because such a trial would be vexatious, regardless of the outcome of the jury's deliberation on the theory charged to it. It would be vexatious because the defendant underwent the jeopardy of a full trial, which is even more vexatious than the aborted or partial trials usually involved in double jeopardy cases, and the trial failed to terminate in a verdict for reasons that cannot fairly be charged to the defendant. (Citations omitted.)). Although they are factually distinguishable in certain respects, we expressly adopt the core analytical constructs of Cavanaugh, Sizemore, and Saylor, and apply them to the facts of the present case. As in Cavanaugh, the prosecution abandoned the theory that it could have presented [to] the original jury and that it now wishes to advance [against Quitog] on retrial. Id. at 413, 417. As in Cavanaugh, the trial terminate[d] without a determination of guilt or innocence on [the offense charged in Count I] following a deliberate, tactical decision by the prosecution. Id. at 416. Thus, as in Cavanaugh, the failure of the original jury to return a verdict on the [attempted murder] count and the reason it did not[] are the critical factors barring retrial. Id. at 415. Accordingly, as did the Cavanaugh court with respect to the federal double jeopardy clause, we hold that article I, section 10 of the Hawai`i Constitution bars retrial for [a] charge when the government's deliberate trial strategywhich is completely incompatible with another approach that it could have pursued, but expressly chose not toaccompanies the termination of the first trial ... without the jury passing upon that charge. See id. at 417. That being the case, we further hold that article I, section 10 forecloses the prosecution from retrying Quitog for attempted second degree murder, as charged in Count I of the complaint against him.