Opinion ID: 1386729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Closing Argument Recitation of Prayer

Text: The Appellant contends that the lower court erred in permitting the State to twice recite the Now I lay me down to sleep prayer in closing argument. The Appellant also emphasizes that the prosecutor told the jury that the Appellant was guilty as charged during the recitation of evidence against the Appellant. In response, the State contends that the prosecutor was not stating a personal opinion, but rather was making reference to the substantial evidence pointing to the Appellant as the perpetrator. The State further maintains that prosecutorial statements, even if in error, will not be sufficient to reverse a conviction unless they clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice. In syllabus point six of State v. Sugg, 193 W.Va. 388, 456 S.E.2d 469 (1995) this Court explained the factors used in analyzing an allegedly improper prosecutorial remark, as follows: Four factors are taken into account in determining whether improper prosecutorial comment is so damaging as to require reversal: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters. Syllabus point five of Sugg elucidated that not every improper prosecutorial statement will result in the reversal of a defendant's conviction: A judgment of conviction will not be set aside because of improper remarks made by a prosecuting attorney to a jury which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice. In State v. Graham, 208 W.Va. 463, 541 S.E.2d 341 (2000), this Court also addressed the principles utilized in evaluating prosecutorial comments and stated as follows: In reviewing allegedly improper comments made by a prosecutor during closing argument, we are mindful that [c]ounsel necessarily have great latitude in the argument of a case, State v. Clifford, 58 W.Va. 681, 687, 52 S.E. 864, 866 (1906) (citation omitted), and that [u]ndue restriction should not be placed on a prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury. State v. Davis, 139 W.Va. 645, 653, 81 S.E.2d 95, 101 (1954), overruled, in part, on other grounds, State v. Bragg, 140 W.Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955). Accordingly, [t]he discretion of the trial court in ruling on the propriety of argument by counsel before the jury will not be interfered with by the appellate court, unless it appears that the rights of the complaining party have been prejudiced, or that manifest injustice resulted therefrom. Syllabus Point 3, State v. Boggs, 103 W.Va. 641, 138 S.E. 321 (1927). 208 W.Va. at 468, 541 S.E.2d at 346. In the present case, the prosecutor's recitation of the Now I Lay Me Down To Sleep prayer was improper and was not based upon properly introduced evidence. The prosecutor was inappropriately appealing to the sympathy and emotions of the jury and referencing a prayer which had already resulted in a defense counsel objection and the court's sustaining of that objection. However, as the State correctly identifies, not all improper prosecutorial statements will lead to reversal of a defendant's conviction. This Court concludes that within the particular circumstances of the present case, no clear prejudice or manifest injustice resulted from the prosecutor's remarks. An examination of the factors identified in Sugg reveals that the conviction in the case should not be reversed. The remarks were of limited duration and were somewhat isolated within the context of the prosecutor's attempt to summarize the evidence against the Appellant. Most importantly, syllabus point five of Sugg, quoted above, instructs that remarks which do not clearly prejudice the accused or result in manifest injustice will not trigger reversal of a conviction. 193 W.Va. at 393, 456 S.E.2d at 474. Examining all evidence presented in this case, we find no manifest injustice or clear prejudice. While the prosecutor's statements regarding the child's prayer were improper, they do not justify a reversal of the Appellant's conviction in these circumstances.