Opinion ID: 2794362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employment-Based Conditions

Text: Spencer argues that the district court plainly erred in imposing occupational restrictions as special conditions of his supervised release because the restrictions are not reasonably related to his offense conduct and are not imposed to the minimum extent necessary. 4 There are several statutes and sentencing guidelines that affect our analysis, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3563, 3583; U.S.S.G. §§ 5D1.3, 5F1.5, but the nub of the case is that there needs to be “a reasonably direct relationship” between the occupational conditions and “the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(1); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) (using the phrase “reasonably related”); id. § 3553(a)(1), (2). The imposition of the conditions also needed to be “reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, [Spencer] will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which [he] was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(2); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). After stealing a passport, Spencer represented himself as the person described on the passport and presented that passport to federal officials in an attempt to avoid revealing his true identity. The district court’s decision to restrict Spencer’s access to self-employment and financial services jobs that involve sensitive information—such as personal identification documents and private financial records—is related directly to Spencer’s offense conduct. 4 Spencer did not object to the employment-based supervised-release conditions. Accordingly, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 2009). 3 Case: 14-50418 Document: 00513007728 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/16/2015 No. 14-50418 Moreover, the imposed conditions are reasonably necessary to protect the public by denying Spencer access to sensitive documents and information while on supervised release. Given the reasonably direct relationship between the conduct underlying Spencer’s crime and the employment-based restrictions, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err in imposing the special conditions for the term of Spencer’s supervised release. 5