Opinion ID: 352524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analysis of the State Court Construction of Challenged Statutes and General Order.

Text: 11 After this appeal was filed, the Circuit Court of Cook County, County Division, County Department, handed down an unreported opinion dealing with the above statutory provisions in In the Matter of Daniel Doe, 76 Co 2436 (November 22, 1977). In that case, an emotionally disturbed adoptee, represented by the same counsel as these plaintiffs, sought knowledge of his familial background at the suggestion of his psychiatrist, and the court decided that the adoption record should be released on the following conditions: 12 It is therefore ordered that ______ be appointed as investigator and friend of the court to investigate this matter. He shall contact the biological parents and the adoptive parents, give them notice of the pendency of this proceeding and that the records will be released if the evidence of substantial harm is not presented to this Court. The biological parents and the adoptive parents will be given leave to intervene and show by a preponderance of the evidence that substantial harm will transpire if the relief requested is granted. Absent such a showing, this Court will order the adoption records be opened for petitioner's examination, and the original birth certificate be opened for the petitioner's inspection. Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 4, § 9.1-18, Ch. 1111/2 § 73-17. 13 If the investigator is unable to locate the biological parents or the adoptive parents within a reasonable period of time, the petitioner will be required to publish notice of the pendency of this proceeding for 30 days in a publication of general circulation. If no appearance is made, and no showing of substantial harm is presented, the relief requested will be granted. 14 In the well-reasoned opinion, the state court judge noted that no Illinois appellate court had yet interpreted the statutory provisions in question but that most states requiring the sealing of adoption records permit the unsealing of those records upon a showing of good cause. Judge Schneider observed that in Scotland adoption records have been open to any adoptee who has reached the age of 17, and that Parliament recently enacted a similar law for England and Wales. After noting the arguments that the Illinois statutes might violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, be inconsistent with the penumbra of rights emanating from the Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution or be unconstitutionally vague, the court concluded that under the Illinois statutes, the rights of adoptees, their biological parents, and their adoptive parents have to be weighed against possible detrimental effects. Consequently, the court adopted the above procedure to balance those rights, and on the basis of the unique facts in each case, arrive at an equitable and just solution. 15 It is thus apparent that the Daniel Doe court would not limit the unsealing of adoption records to cases where adoptees can show a probable and serious hereditary problem or critical medical reasons, as claimed by plaintiffs (Br. 3, 5) or where genetic, medical, psychological or other problems manifest themselves as requiring such information or where neither party objects to the disclosure. 8 Instead in Daniel Doe the following standard has seemingly been read into the statutes and General Order: the petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, as an adult, he or she has a real and immediate need for such records, and if such a showing is made, the biological and adoptive parents in order to avoid unsealing must show by a preponderance of the evidence that substantial harm will transpire if the relief requested is granted.