Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Financial-gain special circumstance.

Text: As previously noted, defendant's 1979 guilt jury found two special circumstances: that the murder (1) was intentional and carried out for financial gain (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(1)), and (2) occurred in the commission of a robbery ( id., subd. (a)(17)(i)). In Montiel I, supra, we struck the financial-gain special circumstance as inapplicable to this robbery case, where the homicide was not `an essential prerequisite to the financial gain sought by the defendant.' (39 Cal.3d at p. 927, quoting People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 751 [209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, 64 A.L.R.4th 723].) Nonetheless, at the prosecutor's request and with defense counsel's agreement, the instant trial court took judicial notice in the jury's presence that both financial-gain and robbery-murder special circumstances had previously been found true. The jury was later formally instructed that special circumstances had specifically been sustained. (Italic added.) The prosecutor made significant reference in his closing argument to the existence and separate significance of the two special circumstances. (22a) Defendant submits the prosecutor committed grievous misconduct, and the trial court serious error, by bringing the inapplicable special circumstance before the jury in direct violation of Montiel I. He asserts violations of the principles of collateral estoppel, due process, fair trial, double jeopardy, and reliable capital sentencing. It appears, as defendant suggests, that both court and counsel entirely ignored and disregarded our elimination of the financial-gain special circumstance in this case. The People concede the mistake. They offer no excuse, and we perceive none. The situation is serious and deeply troubling, and a reprimand to all concerned is in order. However, defense counsel's acquiescence waives direct claims of error and misconduct. Accordingly, defendant presents the issue in the context of ineffective assistance of his counsel, but counsel's lapse does not undermine confidence in the judgment. Even on this record, the danger that the penalty jury would improperly double count any duplicative aspects of the robbery-murder and financial-gain special circumstances was minimal. The jury knew the case involved an uncomplicated robbery-murder and must have understood that the financial gain finding referred only to money taken in the robbery. (See, e.g., People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 251-252 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) The prosecutor conceded that the two special circumstances overlap to a certain extent. Addressing the separate significance of the financial-gain finding, he said it not only indicated the serious crime of robbery, but also showed that the related homicide was intentional. (23)(See fn. 20.), (22b) Hence, he made no improper effort to exploit those aspects of dual-use overlap which we condemned in Bigelow and Montiel I. [20] Defendant notes that the prosecutor briefly exhorted the jury to count special circumstances. However, in context, the remark seems intended only to highlight the intentional aspect of the financial-gain finding. We therefore conclude that the financial-gain special circumstance was not exploited, and could not reasonably have been considered, in a manner which undermines confidence in the judgment. Hence, there is no basis for reversal.