Opinion ID: 2379681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the issue of denial of confrontation by restriction of cross-examination

Text: At the trial, the direct examination of Bernice by the prosecutor included the following: Q. And did you go to the police station? A. Yes. Q. And did you give them a statement? A. Yeah. Q. And did you give them a false statement? A. Yes, I did. Q. And why did you do that?       A. For one reason, because he [defendant] asked me, and I was scared. Defense counsel twice attempted to elicit testimony to show that Bernice was taken to the police station under arrest  first, on cross-examination of Bernice and, second, on cross-examination of the arresting officer. The cross-examination of Bernice included the following: Q. Now, when you told Mr. Leach [prosecutor] that you initially gave a statement to the police department after you called the rescue squad and you went to the police headquarters, right? A. Yes. Q. And he asked you if that statement was false, and you said it was? A. Yes. Q. Is that right? A. Yes, the first one was false. Q. And you said it was false because you were scared. And what else did you say? A. Because Norman [defendant] told me to don't say that he hit him. Just say that he fell. Q. All right. The second statement that you gave the police department, you yourself was [sic] a suspect? MR. LEACH: Objection, Your Honor. Q. Were you not? MR. LEACH: Objection. THE COURT: Sustained. Need not answer. Q. You gave two statements to the police department, did you not? A. Yes. Q. All right. And the second statement is when both you and Norman [defendant] were arrested and put in a van and taken to the police station? MR. LEACH: Objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sustained. You need not answer. The defendant challenges the trial judge's refusal to admit evidence related to Bernice's arrest status as a result of this occurrence. [2] The focal point of this controversy is the fundamental right of a defendant under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to confront witnesses against him. Embodied in this guarantee is a defendant's right to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses as well as to present witnesses of his own. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-04, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1067-68, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965); see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1922-23, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 1022-23 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has declared the right of cross-examination to be a primary interest secured by [the confrontation clause] and has characterized it as the principal means by which to test the truth and veracity of a witness's testimony. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974). We too, under the guidelines of Davis and by the mandates of article I, section 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution, have defined this basic right. See State v. Anthony, R.I., 422 A.2d 921, 923-24 (1980). In Davis v. Alaska , the prosecution's key witness in a burglary trial was under a protective order prohibiting the defense counsel from questioning him on his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent and on his probationary status in regard to a prior burglary. The defense counsel sought to introduce the witness's status to show bias. In holding that the order violated the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the Court noted: [w]e do conclude that the jurors were entitled to have the benefit of the defense theory before them so that they could make an informed judgment as to the weight to place on [the witness's] testimony which provide `a crucial link in the proof    of petitioner's act.' Id. 415 U.S. at 317, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 354. In the case before us, the state's key witness, Bernice, was the sole eyewitness to the events immediately preceding Sonny's death. That being so, her testimony provided the crucial link in the proof establishing defendant's guilt. Her credibility therefore became the pivotal element on the issue of defendant's guilt. We addressed a similar problem in State v. DeBarros, R.I., 441 A.2d 549 (1982). In that case the defendant was totally precluded from cross-examining a crucial witness in respect to the issue of bias. In vacating the conviction, we recognized that [t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is `always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.' Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 354 (1974) (quoting 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 940 at 775 (Chadbourne rev. 1970)). We further observed: In respect to the limitation of the scope of cross-examination, we have recognized that the `Sixth Amendment right of confrontation guarantees an accused the right to an effective cross-examination in all criminal matters. It is the principal means by which the credibility of the witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be tested.' State v. Anthony, R.I., 422 A.2d 921, 923-24 (1980). This principle has been firmly established in Davis v. Alaska, supra . Such a right may not be given or withheld at the discretion of the trial justice. `[The] discretionary authority to limit cross-examination comes into play [only] after there has been permitted as a matter of right sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.' Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C.App. 1978) (quoting United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 857-858 n. 12 (5th Cir.1974)). R.I., 441 A.2d at 552. It is clear that the purpose of defense counsel's questions about Bernice's arrest status was to place before the jury an issue of bias and motive. She testified on direct examination that she gave the first, untrue account of Sonny's death because she feared defendant, who had instructed her to lie. The defendant, however, was not permitted to meet her explanation with evidence from which a trier of fact could infer that Bernice had other reasons that prompted her to change her story. In short, defendant was completely barred from raising the issues of motive and bias. This, we find, contravened defendant's constitutional right of cross-examination. See State v. DeBarros, R.I., 441 A.2d at 552. We reject the state's argument that because Bernice was never a suspect as a principal in Sonny's murder, defense counsel was merely harassing the witness and conducting a fishing expedition by his questions. On the night that defendant was arrested, both Bernice and defendant were transported to the police station in a police van. At the station, Bernice was led into one interview room, defendant into another; she had been given her Miranda warnings, and she had been notified that she was suspected of misprision of a felony. It could certainly be argued by defense counsel that Bernice's perceived status might have created a significant motivation to induce her to alter her earlier story in order to protect herself from prosecution. It was the jury's function to decide whether this motivation was sufficient to cause the witness to testify falsely concerning the events leading to Sonny's death. However, an essential factual predicate of this theory was not disclosed. We hold, therefore, that because Bernice's credibility was the vital element in establishing the defendant's guilt, the trial justice, by totally precluding the defendant from raising and probing the issues of motive, bias, or prejudice, effectively cut off the defendant's right to best Bernice's credibility fully and adequately. Thus, defendant's right to cross-examine as guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the parallel clause of article I, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution was abrogated. As in State v. DeBarros, supra , we cannot speculate or guess about the impact upon the jurors of the presentation of this theory of bias. We cannot state either `(1) that the defendant would have been convicted without the witness' testimony, or (2) that the restricted line of inquiry would not have weakened the impact of the witness' testimony.' R.I., 441 A.2d at 552. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal is sustained, the judgment of conviction is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new trial.