Opinion ID: 150720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spoliation Jury Instruction

Text: Booker next contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jurors that they could draw an adverse inference if they found that defendants destroyed documents relevant to Booker's claims.
At trial, Booker cross-examined three hospital employees about their deletion of email correspondence concerning Booker. Wong, who became Booker's immediate supervisor in the fall of 2004, testified that shortly after he began working at the hospital, he was informed that Booker had filed an administrative complaint against the hospital and that it was possible he could become a defendant, although he did not know the subject matter of her claims. Wong further testified that he regularly deleted all of the emails in his sent and deleted email folders every thirty days, and did not do anything in particular to preserve emails concerning Booker. Paul Romary, the hospital's executive director, testified that he received a copy of Booker's December 2003 letter of complaint. He explained that he received a hundred emails a day, some of which he deleted, and made no special effort to preserve his emails concerning Booker. Barbara McLaughlin, an executive vice president of the hospital and Wong's supervisor beginning in December 2005, testified that she never deleted any emails concerning Booker. Prior to trial, Booker submitted a proposed jury instruction on the spoliation of evidence: If the evidence indicates that a party has destroyed records relevant to a pending lawsuit or that may be relevant to a lawsuit that could arise in the future, you may reasonably infer that the party probably did so because the records would harm its case. The non-destroying party need not have offered direct evidence of a cover-up for you to infer that the party who destroyed evidence did so because the records were unfavorable to its position or would harm its case. The court refused to give the requested instruction, and Booker recorded her objection at the precharge conference. In its order denying Booker's motion for a new trial, the court again rejected Booker's claim that the jury should have been given the spoliation instruction. The court reasoned that because Booker did not present any evidence at trial that Wong or defendants engaged in the deliberate spo[li]ation of evidence, no instruction on an adverse inference was merited. Indeed, such an instruction would have been misleading and prejudicial to defendants.
Where a proper evidentiary foundation has been laid, a trier of fact may (but need not) infer from a party's obliteration of a document relevant to a litigated issue that the contents of the document were unfavorable to that party. Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 177 (1st Cir.1998); see also Nation-Wide Check Corp., Inc. v. Forest Hills Distribs., Inc., 692 F.2d 214, 217-218 (1st Cir.1982) (Breyer, J.). This adverse inference is based in part on the commonsense observation that a party who destroys a document (or permits it to be destroyed) when facing litigation, knowing the document's relevancy to issues in the case, may well do so out of a sense that the document's contents hurt his position. Testa, 144 F.3d at 177; accord Nation-Wide Check, 692 F.2d at 218. The inference is also based on prophylactic and punitive rationales: it serves to deter litigants from destroying relevant evidence prior to trial and to penalize a party whose misconduct creates the risk of an erroneous judgment. Nation-Wide Check, 692 F.2d at 218. Before an adverse inference can arise, the sponsor of the inference must lay an evidentiary foundation, proffering evidence sufficient to show that the party who destroyed the document knew of (a) the claim (that is, the litigation or the potential for litigation), and (b) the document's potential relevance to that claim. Testa, 144 F.3d at 177; see also id. at 178 (noting that adequate foundation depends upon evidence of institutional noticethe aggregate knowledge possessed by a party and its agents, servants and employees). A spoliation instruction is not warranted absent this threshold showing, because the trier of fact would have no basis for inferring that the destruction of documents stemmed from the party's consciousness that the documents would damage his case. A trial court's decision to give or refuse an adverse inference instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gilbert v. Cosco, 989 F.2d 399, 406 (10th Cir.1993); see also United States v. St. Michael's Credit Union, 880 F.2d 579, 597 (1st Cir.1989) (stating that trial court's decision to give or refuse missing witness instruction is committed to its sound discretion).
As an initial matter, Booker argues that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when it stated that because there was no evidence presented at trial that Wong or defendants engaged in the deliberate spo[li]ation of evidence, no instruction on an adverse inference was merited. [11] However, we understand the district court's reference to deliberate spoliation as simply a shorthand for the evidentiary foundation required to support an adverse inference. In other words, the district court concluded that Booker failed to make the required threshold showing that defendants destroyed emails (or permitted their destruction) while on notice of Booker's claims and the emails' potential relevance to those claims. Therefore, the jury would have no basis for inferring that defendants destroyed the emails out of a sense that the document's contents hurt [defendants'] position, and so a spoliation instruction was not warranted. Testa, 144 F.3d at 177; see also Nation-Wide Check, 692 F.2d at 219. Booker further contends that the court erred in finding that she failed to lay an adequate foundation for a spoliation instruction. She contends that she produced sufficient evidence at trial to prove that at the time defendants deleted the emails (or permitted their destruction), they had knowledge both of her claims against them and of the emails' potential relevance to those claims. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the evidence at trial was insufficient to merit a spoliation instruction. Booker presented no evidence that McLaughlin deleted any emails concerning her, whether potentially relevant or not. Indeed, McLaughlin testified repeatedly that although she sometimes deleted emails, she never deleted any emails concerning Booker. Booker did elicit testimony from Wong and Romary that they regularly deleted their emails and may have deleted some concerning her. However, she proffered no evidence that any of those emails were even potentially relevant to her claims in this case, or that defendants knew of their potential relevance. Although permitted to cross-examine Wong and Romary about their deletion of emails, Booker did not question either witness about the content of the deleted emails or about whether the emails were relevant to her claims. Furthermore, unlike many spoliation cases, this is not a case in which a document's potential relevance to the plaintiff's claims is apparent from the nature of the missing document itself. See, e.g., Testa, 144 F.3d at 177 (finding notice of potential relevance where company destroyed purchase order for delivery on date of plaintiff's injury, and company's defense from the start was anchored on the premise that it had no reason to anticipate any deliveries on the day in question); Blinzler v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (1st Cir.1996) (finding notice of potential relevance where hotel destroyed log of outgoing phone calls from day of hotel guest's death, and hotel knew of guest's death and of plaintiff spouse's persistent attempts to discover when the hotel placed the call for emergency aid). In sum, Booker produced evidence showing merely that two hospital employees, Wong and Romary, routinely deleted their emails, some of which may have concerned her. She produced no evidence that defendants destroyed emails with knowledge that the emails were potentially relevant to her claims in this case. Because Booker failed to establish the required evidentiary foundation for an adverse inference, the court properly concluded that a spoliation instruction was not warranted. [12]