Opinion ID: 845746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: clear & convincing evidence

Text: Because the Trial Court here has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the enhanced benefits plan is both reasonable and necessary to allow that court to function serviceably in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities, we conclude that the circuit judge and the Court of Appeals clearly erred in holding that the Trial Court could compel appropriations for such plan. An appropriation is necessary when it is sought by the court to address a critical judicial need[] that affects that court's ability to function serviceably in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities. Wayne Co. I, supra at 33-34, 172 N.W.2d 436. A serviceable level of funding is the minimum budgetary appropriation at which statutorily mandated functions can be fulfilled. Wayne Co. Prosecutor, supra at 124, 286 N.W.2d 62. A function funded at a serviceable level will be carried out in a barely adequate manner, but it will be carried out. Id. To justify the conclusion that the enhanced benefits plan was both reasonable and necessary, the circuit judge and the Court of Appeals both relied on the claims of the Chief Judge that failure to provide the enhanced benefits would negatively affect employee morale. However, we believe that the Trial Court failed to demonstrate that there existed a morale problem that impaired the court's ability to function serviceably in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities. Wayne Co. II. Specifically, the Chief Judge testified that there probably would be people who would quit their jobs and that the Trial Court would have trouble finding new employees. However, the Chief Judge's opinion was utterly unsupported. The Trial Court failed to demonstrate that even one person had either left its employ or was planning to leave its employ as a result of the alleged inadequacy of the preexisting benefits plan. [9] Further, the Trial Court was unable to identify even one person who had refused an offer of employment because the preexisting benefits plan was inadequate. Even assuming for the sake of argument that there was sufficient evidence to support the Chief Judge's claim of declining morale, a claimed effect on employee morale, by itself, is not sufficient to invoke the inherent powers doctrine. The circuit judge and the Court of Appeals based their holdings on Gladwin Co. In Gladwin Co., the defendant funding unit determined compensation for court employees without taking into account the training, responsibilities, and duties of each position. As a result, for example, a probation officer was paid the same amount as a register, and a newly hired juvenile probation officer was paid the same wage as the defendant county's general clerical employees. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because of the morale problems caused by this unfair and inequitable pay scheme, the additional appropriations for salaries for the disputed positions were reasonable and necessary. Id. at 454-455, 401 N.W.2d 50. However, we note that declining employee morale alone was not the determinative factor in Gladwin Co. As noted by the Court of Appeals, the irrational pay scheme instituted by the funding unit had caused the court to fill the position of juvenile probation officer six times in less than 12 years. Further, the court had considerable difficulty attracting competent employees for the position, as demonstrated by the two occasions on which the position had gone unfilled for more than three months each. In other words, the irrational pay scheme had not just caused the court's employees to become demoralized, but such morale problems had specifically manifested themselves in the court's inability to hire and retain probation officers. Accordingly, we conclude that a claim that court employees suffer from a loss of morale is insufficient to support an inherent powers claim, absent some showing that the claimed morale problems have demonstrably caused court employees to be unable to carry out their constitutional responsibilities. Further, there is no evidence here that the productivity of court employees has diminished to such an extent that the court cannot carry out its constitutional responsibilities, or indeed that it has diminished to any extent. Rudi Edel, administrator of the Trial Court, testified that the court was not suffering from any speedy-trial problems either before or after the current funding controversy. Defendants' appendix at 1452a-1453a. [10] In fact, the court has continued to process its civil and criminal dockets adequately. [11] Id. Moreover, an audit conducted by the State Court Administrative Office determined that the Trial Court's quality control is excellent. Thus, unlike in Gladwin Co., there is no evidence that the claimed morale problems rendered the court incapable of carrying out any of its essential judicial functions. Even if we accept the Chief Judge's unsupported statements that some court employees may have one eye on another job and will be unhappy, the Trial Court has failed to demonstrate that those employees are unable to perform their jobs. In fact, the Trial Court's own expert testified that the employees were functioning within the ranges that are expected to be there by the State. Plaintiff's appendix at 852b. [12] Further, the Chief Judge admitted that his staff was soldiering on even in light of the potential loss of the enhanced benefits plan. In other words, even assuming that the employees were dissatisfied or unhappy, the Trial Court was, in fact, able to function as a court even without the enhanced benefits plan. The question in an inherent powers case is not whether all court employees are satisfied or happy, but, rather, whether they are able to perform their jobs in a manner that allows the Trial Court to function serviceably in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities. Also, the Chief Judge admitted at trial that he specifically asked for the best [pension] plan that's available. Trial transcript at 342. In other words, the requested appropriation, by its own terms, comprises the maximum necessary to improve employee morale, not what was reasonable and necessary to ensure that its employees could carry out the Trial Court's constitutional responsibilities. Finally, any claimed morale problems that did exist among the Trial Court's employees seem predicated upon the Chief Judge's own unilateral promise to provide the enhanced benefits. [13] To this extent, the Trial Court is seeking to require the counties to pay for a problem that it has arguably created. It cannot be that a court can claim a morale problem where the alleged problem is a function of unwarranted promises of benefit increases that it has made to its employees. Under the circuit judge's reasoning in this regard, any court could seek to invoke its inherent power to compel its funding unit to make an appropriation beyond what it was prepared to makeno matter how unreasonable or unnecessarysolely on the basis of such a unilateral promise. To adopt such a position would not maintain the balance of powers between the legislative and judicial branchesas the inherent powers doctrine is designed to dobut would instead impose a doctrine of judicial supremacy in favor of the branch of government least suited to make policy-driven appropriations and taxing decisions. [14] In light of insufficient evidence that the appropriation for enhanced benefits sought by the Trial Court was necessary to the ability of the court to function serviceably in carrying out its constitutional responsibilities, the Trial Court has failed to establish a right to compel funding from the defendants under the inherent powers doctrine. [15] Therefore, any increased benefits for the employees of the Trial Court must come through the ordinary processes of negotiation and bargaining between the Trial Court and the representatives of the people on the Crawford, Kalkaska, and Otsego county boards of commissioners; such benefits are not properly obtained by judicial order.