Opinion ID: 2981807
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: applying the eaja

Text: Whether the EAJA applies to the ADEA is an issue of statutory interpretation that this Court reviews de novo. See Turner v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 680 F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 2012). Generally, under the “American Rule,” the prevailing party in a litigation may not recover his fees from the losing party, Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975), unless there is an express statutory authorization for fee-shifting, id. at 249–50, or a narrow common law exception that applies, id. at 257–59. The EAJA is an express statutory authorization for fee shifting that waives sovereign immunity and permits recovery from the government to eliminate financial disincentives for private parties to challenge unjustified government action and thereby deter unreasonable exercises of government authority. Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163–64 (1990). The EAJA contains two fee-shifting provisions for awards in court proceedings.2 Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 406–07 (2004). The first provision permits an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing private party, “unless expressly prohibited by statute,” “to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b). Subsection (b) does not create any substantive right to attorney’s fees other than what is already available under the common law or another applicable statute. The second provision, 2 The EAJA also provides for an award of attorney’s fees in an “adversary adjudication” before an administrative agency under the same circumstances as § 2412(d)—when the government’s position is not substantially justified. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). 7 Nos. 11-6426/27 however, requires an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing private party, “except as otherwise specifically provided by statute,” “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” Id. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Thus, in contrast to subsection (b), subsection (d) by its plain language creates a substantive right to attorney’s fees, where not provided for by another statute, if, among other conditions, the government’s position was not substantially justified. See Jean, 496 U.S. at 155, 158.
Whether the EAJA applies to the ADEA is an issue of first impression for this Court. The EEOC argues that, because the ADEA contains its own fee-shifting rule that specifically provides for an award to a prevailing plaintiff from a defendant, subsection (d) does not apply. Rather, the EEOC submits, only subsection (b) applies to permit a prevailing defendant to recover under the common law “bad faith” exception. However, subsection (d) applies where the suit lies solely against an agency of the United States, Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 406–07, and unless “otherwise specifically provided [for] by statute,” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Because the present case is advanced by the EEOC against a private party, the only basis for precluding application of subsection (d) would be in the language of the ADEA itself. That is, the ADEA must specifically provide for or preclude an award to a prevailing defendant to bar application of subsection (d). The EEOC unpersuasively argues that by negative implication, the ADEA specifically precludes an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing defendants under subsection (d). Despite mirroring Title VII in almost every other respect, the ADEA distinctly incorporates by reference a completely different remedial scheme, found under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 8 Nos. 11-6426/27 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The FLSA states in relevant part that “the court . . . shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff . . ., allow a reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.” Id. at § 216(b). By adopting this language, the ADEA notably departs from Title VII—the ADEA mandates fee awards specifically for prevailing plaintiffs while Title VII permits district courts in their discretion to award fees to either prevailing plaintiffs or defendants and specifically provides for the EEOC to be liable to the same extent as a private person. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416, 422 (1978) (holding that prevailing defendants in Title VII cases may be awarded fees where claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless”). Notably, the ADEA is silent on whether fees may be awarded to prevailing defendants. The EEOC argues that the absence of any language regarding an award to defendants, the statute’s specific mandate for fee awards to a prevailing plaintiff, and Congress’ conscious decision to depart from the remedial scheme of Title VII, demonstrate that the ADEA specifically precludes awarding fees to a prevailing defendant. However, any negative implication must give way to express statutory language. Subsection (d) applies absent specific statutory language to the contrary. Though § 216(b) does not provide for fee awards to defendants, Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1135 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendants may not recover attorney’s fees in defending FLSA actions), it does not follow that § 216(b) bars default fee-shifting statutes such as the EAJA from filling this void. Cf. Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 891–92 (1989) (rejecting any negative implication from the express coverage of only adversary agency adjudications by the EAJA, and holding that the EAJA also permits a fee award for non-adversary remand proceedings before the agency). Since the ADEA is silent on the 9 Nos. 11-6426/27 issue of fee awards to prevailing defendants, this Court has applied the common law bad faith exception to fill the void when analyzing whether a prevailing defendant should be awarded fees against a private plaintiff. See Morgan v. Union Metal Mfg., 757 F.2d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming fee award to the defendant employer in age discrimination case where the plaintiff maintained the action after rejecting a reasonable settlement offer). Because the government is a party here, it should follow that the EAJA applies to the ADEA because the former statute fills the void in the latter, providing prevailing defendants with a statutory right to attorney’s fees. See O & G Spring, 38 F.3d at 883; EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 817 (4th Cir. 1994). The EEOC’s argument for the ADEA to be treated the same as Title VII attempts to ignore the material distinctions in the two statutes’ language. Title VII is a “prevailing party” fee-shifting statute, see Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 422, and has a specifically outlined basis for awarding fees to a prevailing defendant. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 416. Title VII is a prime example of what subsection (d) means by “otherwise specifically provided by statute.” Unlike Title VII, the ADEA does not provide a basis for defendants to recover fees. The ADEA is completely silent on this point and, thus, we find that subsection (d)’s substantial justification standard applies. Accordingly, the district court’s application of the EAJA to the EEOC in ADEA cases was proper. 10 Nos. 11-6426/27