Opinion ID: 4204685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant Dr. Thomas Clafton

Text: Dr. Clafton was the Medical Director of the Wayne County Jail at the time Richmond was in the Jail’s custody. Through his position, Dr. Clafton was responsible for the daily medical care of the inmates in the Jail. Dr. Clafton saw Richmond during her January 11 followup medical appointment. At that point, Richmond’s medical records showed that her dressing had not been changed on six out of the sixteen days she had been in custody and that she had missed ten out of 48 dosages of Lortab. Richmond had also started to complain of inadequate treatment by January 11. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Dr. Clafton did anything to determine why Richmond’s dressing had not been changed on certain days or took any steps to ensure that his order regarding dressing changes and pain medication would be implemented every day as prescribed. Richmond argues that this is enough to constitute deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. It is insufficient for a doctor caring for inmates to simply provide some treatment for the inmates’ medical needs; rather, “the doctor must provide medical treatment to the patient without consciously exposing the patient to an excessive risk of serious harm.” LeMarbe v. Wisneski, 266 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir. 2001). Richmond need not show that any of the Jail staff consciously ignored her, “only that [her] serious medical needs were consciously disregarded.” Id. (citations omitted). The Boretti Court held that the evidence of the lack of the provision of care, in spite of evidence of the development of “an ongoing medical plan for the treatment of plaintiff’s wound” and in spite of the fact that the wound healed without infection, may be the basis of a claim of “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Boretti, 930 F.2d at 1154. At the time of Richmond’s January 11 appointment with Dr. Clafton and Nurse Shoulders, Richmond’s medical records show that the Jail staff failed to change Richmond’s dressing six times during her sixteen day confinement. Richmond also testified that she sought additional treatment from Dr. Clafton as late as January 24th, by which point the Jail staff had failed to change Richmond’s dressing on at least five additional occasions.3 After his first visit with her, Dr. Clafton did order that Richmond’s existing plan of treatment be continued. However, there 3 The staff missed two additional doses of Lortab after January 11, but by January 24 Richmond was capable of keeping her pain medication in her cell. No. 16-2560 Richmond v. Huq, et al. Page 10 is a question of fact regarding whether he reviewed Richmond’s chart, which showed that the plan of treatment had not been strictly been followed—that question is material to the determination of whether Dr. Clafton consciously disregarded the risk that Richmond’s serious medical need may not receive the treatment prescribed. The Defendants assert that Richmond’s claims against Dr. Clafton boil down to a disagreement over the adequacy and type of treatment Dr. Clafton ordered. Accordingly, the Defendants argue, this Court should be reluctant to second guess the Jail staff’s medical judgments “unless the medical treatment is so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Asplaugh, 643 F.3d at 169. The Defendants are correct that to the extent Richmond challenges the adequacy of her treatment, this Court is deferential to the judgments of medical professionals. However, as noted above, Richmond also argues that Dr. Clafton “fail[ed] to provide the care that was ordered.” See Appellant Brief at 42. As discussed, there is a question of fact whether Dr. Clafton viewed Richmond’s chart. A reasonable jury could find that Dr. Clafton reviewed or should have reviewed Richmond’s chart, which would have made him aware of the risk that the Jail medical staff had and would continue to fail to adhere to his prescribed plan of care, and that he subsequently disregarded that risk by failing to ensure that his orders were implemented as prescribed. This is especially true in light of Richmond’s welldocumented complaints. Such a finding of the failure to provide the prescribed plan of treatment may form the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Boretti, 930 F.2d at 1154. Thus, summary judgment in favor of Dr. Clafton on this claim is inappropriate. Richmond also claims that Dr. Clafton violated her Eighth Amendment right by not providing her with timely access to her psychiatric medication. However, Dr. Clafton treated Richmond on the same day that she was scheduled to see the psychiatrist, Dr. Hinchman. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Dr. Clafton could have provided Richmond with psychiatric medication sooner than Dr. Hinchman, whose care Richmond found to be satisfactory. As such, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Dr. Clafton on claims related to the timely provision of Richmond’s psychiatric medication. No. 16-2560 Richmond v. Huq, et al. Page 11