Opinion ID: 783869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brown's Motion to Suppress

Text: 10 Relying upon United States v. McFarland, Brown argues that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence because the probationary search was no more than a ruse for a police investigation. 116 F.3d 316, 318 (8th Cir.1997). Stated differently, he argues that Allison was only a stalking horse for law enforcement. See United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 462 (2d Cir.2002). The government counterargues that United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001), eliminates the stalking horse theory. We agree with the government. 11
12 In McFarland, we agree[d] that a parole search is unlawful when it is nothing more than a ruse for a police investigation. 116 F.3d at 318. We also noted that parole officers may work with police officers provided the parole officers are pursuing parole-related objectives. Id. But, the Knights case teaches that traditional Fourth Amendment analysis-not official purpose-determines whether a probationary search is constitutional. Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587. 13 In Knights, the defendant agreed to a probationary condition that authorized probation officers and other law enforcement personnel to search his property. Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. The written consent form did not mention anything about purpose. Id. at 116, 122 S.Ct. 587. After a law enforcement officer discovered evidence during a probationary search, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress, finding the search was for investigatory rather than probationary purposes. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Knights, 219 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir.2000). The Supreme Court framed the question as whether the Fourth Amendment limits searches pursuant to such a probation condition to searches with a probationary purpose. Knights, 534 U.S. at 116, 122 S.Ct. 587. 14 The Court used the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test to determine the search's constitutionality. We turn first to that balancing in our analysis of Brown's probationary search. 15 In every Fourth Amendment case, courts must balance the competing values. On the one hand, we jealously guard privacy and our citizens' right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion. While on the other, we encourage zealous law enforcement to ensure our citizens can safely enjoy their liberties. Accordingly, to determine whether the Fourth Amendment forbids a search, we weigh the degree to which a search intrudes upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against the degree to which the government needs to search to promote its legitimate interests. Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. 16 An individual's status as a probationer informs both sides of that balance. Id.; see United States v. Vincent, 167 F.3d 428, 430 (8th Cir.1999). A probationary search pursuant to a search condition intrudes less upon protected privacy interests. [P]robationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. (internal quotations omitted). And when a probationer consents to a search condition, his already-reduced reasonable expectation of privacy diminishes significantly. Id. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 587. On the other side of the balance, to protect the innocent, the government legitimately needs more freedom to search probationers because the `very assumption of the institution of probation' is that the probationer `is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law.' Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). 17 In Knights, the Court therefore concluded that, when a probationer is subject to a probationary search condition, the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to search pursuant to that condition without a warrant based only upon that officer's reasonable suspicion that the probationer is violating his probation's terms. 4 Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587. The Court rejected the lower court's investigatory purpose analysis. It stated [b]ecause our holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis for examining official purpose. Id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587. And when it rejected any challenge based on the actual motivations of the officers, the Court confirmed that the Fourth Amendment does not require a stalking horse inquiry. Id.; see United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Stokes, 292 F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir.2002) (The Supreme Court put a stop to this line of reasoning.); United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 462-64 (2d Cir.2002). 18
19 The district court found that Brown was subject to a search condition that authorized probation officers to search his property upon developing reasonable suspicion. Brown does not challenge this factual finding. Thus, under Knights, we must examine both Brown's probationary condition and the facts upon which the probation officers acted. 20 We first address one distinction between the probationary condition in this case and the one in Knights. In Knights, the probationary condition authorized searches by both probation officers and law enforcement officers. Id. at 115, 122 S.Ct. 587. There, a police officer searched unaccompanied by probation officers. Id. Because the condition authorized searches by law enforcement officers, the Court spent little time analyzing the scope of the condition. Brown's case is slightly different. Here, the district court found that Brown's condition authorized searches by probation officers. But the probation officers brought drug task force agents along to assist with the search. The question is whether, given the scope of Brown's probationary condition, the presence of the additional personnel sways the balancing test. We hold it does not. 21 Under Knights, we must balance any additional privacy intrusion resulting from the presence of the additional personnel against the legitimate interests advanced by their presence. Probation officer Caley testified, and the district court agreed, that Caley performed the search and the task force agents acted only at his direction. Probation offices are neither designed nor staffed to conduct these types of searches alone. See Reyes, 283 F.3d at 469 (The `assistance of other law enforcement officers for protection ... and for taking possession of contraband is appropriate and recommended.') (quoting David N. Adair, Jr., Probation Officer Searches, 62 Fed. Probation 68 (June 1998)). Probation officers often must bring law enforcement along to ensure the probation officers' safety. See id. We hold the governmental interest in ensuring probation officer safety outweighs any marginal, additional intrusion into Brown's privacy resulting from the task force agents' presence. In short, when a probationary condition authorizes searches by probation officers, the Fourth Amendment does not require probation officers to choose between endangering themselves by searching alone and foregoing the search because they lacked the resources and expertise necessary to search alone safely. Thus, the Knights balance does not change and the government can prevail if Allison had a reasonable suspicion that Brown was violating the terms of his probation. 22 Allison had a reasonable suspicion that Brown was violating the terms of his probation. A drug task force agent called Allison and told her the task force suspected Brown's involvement in illegal activity. The agent also told her the task force had obtained a warrant to search Brown's business. Prior to receiving this call, Allison had been unable to confirm Brown's address. So, at a time Allison was unable to verify her probationer's address, a task force agent told her that the force not only suspected Brown's drug involvement, but also had produced enough evidence to secure a warrant to search Brown's business. Allison's suspicion was reasonable. We reject Brown's first argument.