Opinion ID: 222853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grievance Claims

Text: In support of their motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, defendants attached an affidavit from Dorina Varner, an administrative officer in the Department of Corrections’ Grievance Review Office, which stated that Verbanik had not sought final review of any grievance. The District Court dismissed Verbanik’s grievance claims because he did not seek final administrative review of those claims under the Inmate Grievance Review System. Verbanik concedes that he did not present his grievance claims through the entirety of established prison grievance process, but he argues that administrative 3 remedies were not available because defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances, and he feared further retaliation from defendants if he proceeded with the grievance process. Although we have held that administrative remedies may be unavailable when prison officials have thwarted an inmate’s attempt to exhaust by providing erroneous instructions about the grievance process, see Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2002), we have not addressed the specific question presented here: whether threats of retaliation can render administrative remedies unavailable. Other courts of appeals have concluded that retaliation or threats of retaliation against an inmate for pursuing a grievance may make administrative remedies unavailable to the inmate. See Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077, 1084 (11th Cir. 2008); Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2006); Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686-87 (2d Cir. 2004). The test for determining whether administrative remedies were available, set forth in Hemphill, is whether a “similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness” would have deemed the grievance procedures to be available. 380 F.3d at 688. In his second amended complaint, Verbanik claimed that he could not exhaust administrative remedies because defendants retaliated against him after he filed grievances by harassing him, writing falsified misconduct reports, and, on at least one occasion, leaving him in the Restricted Housing Unit shower for almost two hours. The District Court noted Verbanik’s argument but rejected it as “bald unsupported statements that he was unable to pursue his claims out of fear of retaliation.” Opinion at 6. This cursory consideration of Verbanik’s argument is troubling for two reasons. It does not appear to acknowledge that the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq., 4 requires that an inmate exhaust only those administrative remedies “as are available.” 42. U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover, the District Court rejected Verbanik’s arguments as unsupported after failing to provide him a meaningful opportunity to respond to defendants’ affidavit. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to “Plaintiff’s unexhausted claims” on the basis of an affidavit submitted in support of their motion. Opinion at 6-7. However, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if, on a motion to dismiss, “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56,” and all parties “must be given reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Although the defendants asserted that the District Court properly could consider the affidavit and other attachments in connection with their motion to dismiss, they also requested that the court “accept these documents and convert their motion into a motion for summary judgment.” Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint at 7 & n.3. The District Court did not convert their motion to a motion for summary judgment and did not otherwise provide Verbanik an opportunity to present all material pertinent to the question of exhaustion. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1989). Given these circumstances and what appear to be genuine issues of material fact as to the issue of retaliation, we cannot treat the District Court’s order as one granting summary judgment to defendants and then affirm its conclusion that, as a matter of law, Verbanik failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 5 572, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Brown, 312 F.3d at 112.