Opinion ID: 1288237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Detective Guillermo's Entrance Into The Hauanios' House

Text: The right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is firmly embedded in both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution [16] and article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution. [17] State v. Pau`u, 72 Haw. 505, 509, 824 P.2d 833, 835 (1992). Determining whether a particular governmental activity violates this right involves answering a two-step inquiry: (1) was the governmental activity in question a search in the constitutional sense; and, if so, (2) was it a reasonable search. See State v. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. 23, 28, 575 P.2d 462, 466 (1974). The prosecution contends that Detective Guillermo's initial entrance into the Hauanios' house was justified under both the United States and the Hawai`i Constitutions. The prosecution asserts two arguments to support this contention. First, the prosecution argues that because Detective Guillermo entered the Hauanios' house for a limited purpose and as part of an ongoing criminal investigation  an investigation that the Hauanios voluntarily initiated by calling the police  the Hauanios had a diminished expectation of privacy. The prosecution therefore argues that Detective Guillermo's entrance was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution. Second, the prosecution argues that, even if Detective Guillermo's entry was a search, it was conducted pursuant to a valid consent and was therefore reasonable.
Before we address the reasonableness of a given governmental activity, we first must determine whether the activity in question amounts to a search in the constitutional sense. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Kaaheena, 59 Haw. at 28, 575 P.2d at 466. In making this determination, we focus on the privacy expectations of the individual whose person or property is being examined. Kaaheena, 59 Haw. at 28, 575 P.2d at 466. Indeed, the primary purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. State v. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124, 136, 856 P.2d 1265, 1272 (1993) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). In ascertaining whether an individual's expectation of privacy brings the governmental activity at issue into the scope of constitutional protection, this court utilizes the following two-prong test, borrowed from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 516, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967): First, one must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Second, that expectation must be one that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. Bonnell, 75 Haw. 124, 139, 856 P.2d 1265, 1274 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted). There is no question that a person generally has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in his or her home. Nor is there any question that the expectation of privacy in one's home is one that society recognizes as objectively reasonable. See United States v. United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) ([P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.). The prosecution concedes as much; [18] however, the prosecution contends that, because Detective Guillermo's entrance into the Hauanios' home was for a limited purpose, i.e., taking photographs, and pursuant to an ongoing criminal investigation  an investigation that the Hauanios voluntarily initiated by calling the police  the Hauanios' expectation of privacy in their house on the day in question was diminished. We disagree. The prosecution's argument seems to suggest that for some indefinite period of time the police could return to the Hauanios' home, reenter it without the Hauanios' permission, and take photographs with impunity, all in the name of the Hauanios' diminished expectation of privacy. This argument is without merit. By calling the police to report a robbery sometime around midnight on Friday, November 6, 1992, the Hauanios did not somehow voluntarily give Hawai`i law enforcement officials an implied license to enter their house, including their master bedroom, to take pictures and search for evidence relating to the criminal investigation while they were at a hotel. When the police initially entered the Hauanios' home to investigate the robbery that had just taken place, they did so with the Hauanios' permission. Thus, during the course of this initial investigation, the Hauanios' expectation of privacy in their home was, as the prosecution contends, diminished. However, that permission terminated when the police and the Hauanios closed the doors and left the Hauanios' residence. As soon as this occurred, the Hauanios' expectation of privacy in their home was completely restored. Indeed, after the police finished their initial investigation, Kelly informed them that she and Daniel were afraid to remain at their home and that her mother, who was present at the time, would know how to contact them. When the Hauanios gave the police the information necessary to contact them, it is reasonable to infer that they expected to be contacted if the police intended to reenter their home. The Hauanios and the police left the Hauanios' residence between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 7, 1992. Before everyone left the premises, the front door, which had been damaged when the robbers first broke in, was barricaded shut and the door on the side of the house, which could not be locked, was closed. These actions are indicative of the Hauanios' intent not to allow uninvited persons to enter their home while they were at the hotel. We therefore reject the prosecution's argument and hold that Detective Guillermo's entrance into the Hauanios' home, whatever the purpose, over six hours after everyone had left was a search in the constitutional sense.
Determining whether a search is reasonable depends primarily on whether prior judicial approval has been obtained. It is well-established that a search by law enforcement officials without a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause is presumptively unreasonable under both the United States and Hawai`i Constitutions. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. at 514; State v. Paahana, 66 Haw. 499, 504, 666 P.2d 592, 596 (1983). Indeed, such searches are invalid unless they fall within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Mahone, 67 Haw. 644, 646, 701 P.2d 171, 173 (1985). In this case, there is no question that Detective Guillermo did not obtain a search warrant prior to entering the Hauanios' home. Thus, the [prosecution] has the burden of overcoming [the] initial presumption of unreasonableness by proving that the search falls within one of the well-recognized and narrowly-defined exceptions to the general warrant requirements[.] Paahana, 66 Haw. at 504, 666 P.2d at 596 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)). A search conducted pursuant to a voluntary and uncoerced consent by the person whose property is being searched is one such exception to the warrant requirement. Mahone, 67 Haw. at 646, 701 P.2d at 173. The prosecution contends that the consent exception to the warrant requirement applies in this case. Thus, the prosecution challenges the portion of COL 4 that provides: The entry by Guillermo was an entry without consent[.] In making this challenge, the prosecution does not claim that Detective Guillermo obtained the necessary consent from the Hauanios via the telephone conversation between Kelly and her mother. Rather, the prosecution's argument hinges upon whether Kelly's mother had authority to consent to a search of the Hauanios' home. In addition, the prosecution concedes that Kelly's mother did not have actual authority to consent to Detective Guillermo's entrance into the Hauanios' house; instead, the prosecution argues that she had apparent authority.
The doctrine of apparent authority was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). In Rodriguez, the Court faced the issue: Whether a warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not [possess such authority.] Id. at 179, 110 S.Ct. at 2796. In a divided opinion, written by Justice Scalia, the Court held that such an entry is valid. [19] The relevant facts of Rodriguez can be summarized as follows: On July 26, 1985, the police were called to a residence in Chicago where they were met by a woman named Gail Fischer. Id. Fischer, who showed signs of a severe beating, informed the officers that she had been assaulted earlier that day by a man named Edward Rodriguez in an apartment. Id. She stated that Rodriguez was asleep in the apartment. Id. She then agreed to travel to the apartment with the police and unlock the door with her key so that the officers could enter and arrest him. Id. [20] During her conversation with the police, Fischer referred to the apartment in question as our apartment several times. Id. She also stated that she had clothes and furniture at the apartment. Id. Accompanied by Fischer, the police officers drove to the apartment. Id. at 180, 110 S.Ct. at 2797. They did not obtain an arrest warrant for Rodriguez, nor did they seek a search warrant for the apartment. Id. At the apartment, Fischer unlocked the door with her key and gave the officers permission to enter. Id. Once inside, the officers observed in plain view drug paraphernalia and containers filled with white powder. Id. They proceeded to the bedroom where they found Rodriguez asleep and saw additional containers of white powder in two open attaché cases. Id. The officers arrested Rodriguez and seized the drugs and related paraphernalia. Id. Rodriguez was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Id. At trial, he moved to suppress the evidence seized at the time of his arrest. Id. In support of his motion, he claimed that Fischer had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and lacked the authority necessary to consent to the entry. Id. The trial court granted Rodriguez's motion, holding that at the time Fischer consented to the officers' entry, she did not have common authority over the apartment. Id. [21] The court rejected the prosecution's contention that, even if Fischer did not possess common authority over the premises, there was no Fourth Amendment violation if the police reasonably believed at the time of their entry that she possessed the authority to consent. Id. (emphasis in original). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects. The State of Illinois petitioned for leave to appeal and the Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition. Id. at 180-81, 110 S.Ct. at 2797-98 (citing 125 Ill.2d 572, 130 Ill.Dec. 487, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989)). The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. Id. at 181, 110 S.Ct. at 2797-98 (citing 493 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 320, 107 L.Ed.2d 311 (1989)). The Rodriguez majority began by explaining that the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition of warrantless entries into a person's home does not apply in instances where voluntary consent has been obtained either from the person whose property is being searched or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. Id. (citations omitted). [22] Moreover, the burden of establishing the existence of common authority rests upon the State. Id. The majority then agreed with the lower courts that the State of Illinois had not met its burden of establishing that Fisher possessed common authority over Rodriguez's apartment. Id. However, the majority rejected Rodriguez's argument that the Fourth Amendment requires government officials to be factually correct when they make the determination of whether an individual actually possesses the authority necessary to consent to a search. The majority then explained what it called the general rule with respect to what is necessary to satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment: It is apparent that in order to satisfy the `reasonableness' requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government  whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer executing a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement  is not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable. Id. at 185, 110 S.Ct. at 2800. The Rodriguez majority further explained that [b]ecause many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. Id. at 186, 110 S.Ct. at 2800 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). The majority then stated that it saw no reason to depart from this general rule with respect to facts bearing upon the authority to consent of a search. Id. Accordingly, the majority announced the following test for determining the constitutional validity of a warrantless search pursuant to the consent exception to the warrant requirement: [D]etermination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man [or woman] of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises? If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid. Id. at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2801 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The majority then remanded the case for consideration of the question whether the officers reasonably believed that Fischer had the authority to consent to a search of Rodriguez's house. Id. at 189, 110 S.Ct. at 2801-02. Thus, emerged the doctrine of apparent authority on the federal level.
While the concept of apparent authority is well-recognized on the federal level, this court has always required a showing of actual authority to satisfy article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution. See Mahone, 67 Haw. at 647, 701 P.2d at 173-74 (A third party cannot waive another's constitutional right to privacy unless authorized to do so. Thus, the consent of a third party cannot validate a warrantless search unless the third party possessed authority to consent.); State v. Matias, 51 Haw. 62, 67, 451 P.2d 257, 260 (1969) (holding that an individual's constitutional right to privacy cannot be waived by another unless he or she has authorized that other person to do so). To be sure, consent of a third party is only effective if it is shown `that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.' State v. Brighter, 63 Haw. 95, 99 n. 3, 621 P.2d 374, 378 n. 3 (1980) (citations omitted). In this appeal, it is undisputed that Kelly's mother did not possess actual authority to consent to the search of the Hauanios' home. Acknowledging our tradition of requiring actual authority, the prosecution nevertheless urges this court to adopt the federal concept of apparent authority. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to do so. As the ultimate judicial tribunal in the state, this court possesses the final and unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution. Bonnell, 75 Haw. at 136, 856 P.2d at 1272 (quoting State v. Quino, 74 Haw. 161, 177, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (1992) (Levinson J., concurring), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1849, 123 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993)). In exercising this authority, it is well-established that as long as we afford defendants the minimum protection required by the federal constitution, we are free to provide broader protection under our state constitution. Quino, 74 Haw. at 170, 840 P.2d at 362 (citing State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138, 142 n. 2, 433 P.2d 593, 597 n. 2 (1967)); see also State v. Bowe, 77 Hawai`i 51, 57, 881 P.2d 538, 544 (1994) (emphasizing that `[w]hen the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a provision present in both the United States and Hawai`i Constitutions does not adequately preserve the rights and interests sought to be protected, we will not hesitate to recognize the appropriate protection as a matter of state constitutional law.'). In the area of searches and seizures under article I, section 7, we have often exercised this freedom. See, e.g., Quino, 74 Haw. at 170, 840 P.2d at 362 (declining to adopt the definition of seizure employed by the United States Supreme Court and, instead, choosing to afford greater protection to the citizens of Hawai`i); State v. Kim, 68 Haw. 286, 289-90, 711 P.2d 1291, 1293-94 (1985) (declining to adopt the federal standard and requiring police officers to have a reasonable basis of specific articulable facts to believe a crime has been committed before ordering a driver to get out of the car after a traffic stop); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 661-62, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985) (holding on independent state grounds that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash bags and thus warrantless seizure of them violates article I, section 7, absent exigent circumstances); State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 282, 686 P.2d 1379, 1390 (1984) (providing broader protection on the state level for probationers subject to warrantless searches); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 367-69, 520 P.2d 51, 57-58 (1974) (providing broader protection under article I, section 7, in the area of warrantless searches incident to a valid custodial arrest than is provided on the federal level). Our willingness to afford greater protection of individual privacy rights than is provided on the federal level arises from our view [that] the right to be free of `unreasonable' searches and seizures under article I, section 5 [23] of the Hawai[`]i Constitution is enforceable by a rule of reason which requires that governmental intrusions into the personal privacy of citizens of this State be no greater in intensity than absolutely necessary. Kaluna, 55 Haw. at 369, 520 P.2d at 58-59 (emphasis added). Thus, each proffered justification for a warrantless search must meet the test of necessity inherent in the concept of reasonableness. State v. Fields, 67 Haw. 268, 282-83, 686 P.2d 1379, 1390 (1984) (emphasis added). At this point, we simply cannot say that it is necessary to allow third parties to consent to searches of an individual's personal and private belongings when they are devoid of any authority to do so. Our constitution guarantees more to the citizens of the State of Hawai`i. Moreover, unlike its federal counterpart, article I, section 7, specifically protects against invasions of privacy. [24] Allowing warrantless searches of an individual's home without the consent of someone authorized to give it, absent any exigent circumstances, would fly in the face of this protection. Indeed, an invasion of privacy is no less of an invasion if the governmental officials are reasonable in their mistaken belief that the third party possesses the authority to consent. This is because, regardless of whether the police acted in good faith, the individual's privacy is still invaded when the police search his or her personal belongings without permission. We further note that while the United States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule on the federal level is to deter illegal police conduct, see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) ([T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct[.]) (emphasis added); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619-20, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) ([T]he [exclusionary] rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct[.]) (emphasis added); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (stressing that the rule's major thrust is a deterrent one) (emphasis added), this court has yet to fully explicate the purpose of the exclusionary rule as it applies to article I, section 7. Although we acknowledge that the Hawai`i exclusionary rule serves the valuable purpose of deterring governmental officials from circumventing the protections afforded by the Hawai`i Constitution, see State v. Furuyama, 64 Haw. 109, 122, 637 P.2d 1095, 1104 (1981), we now pronounce that an equally valuable purpose of the exclusionary rule under article I, section 7, is to protect the privacy rights of our citizens. This pronouncement is consistent with our past interpretations of article I, section 7, whether or not the interpretations were based on the added privacy protection afforded by our constitution. It is also consistent with our decision today. We are not alone in departing from the federal rationale of the exclusionary rule. See People v. Wood, 201 Mich.App. 58, 505 N.W.2d 882, 886 (1993) (The [exclusionary] rule has a dual purpose: (1) protection of the right to privacy, and (2) deterrence of police misconduct.); State v. Rogers, 314 Or. 114, 118, 836 P.2d 127, 129-30 (1992) ([U]nlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule which has been based on deterring police misconduct, exclusions under Article I, section 9 [of the Oregon Constitution], have been based on the personal right to be free of an unlawful search and seizure.); State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246, 253-54, 834 P.2d 1008, 1012-13 (1992) (holding that the exclusionary rule is based on personal rights theory and not deterrence); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887, 896-99 (1991) (rejecting the federal good faith exception to the exclusionary rule and holding that the purpose of the exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania is to safeguard individual privacy rights). We therefore hold that, in order for a consent to search to be valid under article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, the individual consenting must actually possess the authority to do so. In so holding, we reject the prosecution's suggestion that we adopt the federal doctrine of apparent authority under the Hawai`i Constitution. Accordingly, because there is no question that Kelly's mother did not actually possess the authority to consent to Detective Guillermo's search of the Hauanios' house, we hold that Detective Guillermo's search of the Hauanios' house violated article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution. [25]