Opinion ID: 769403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Howard's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial

Text: 28 In addition to his Speedy Trial Act claims, Howard contends that the extended delays throughout his two prosecutions violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Although the passage of the [Speedy Trial] Act was in part an attempt by Congress to quantify the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, the legislation does not purport to be coextensive with that amendment. United States v. Gonzalez, 671 F.2d 441, 443 (11th Cir. 1982); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.). 29 In determining whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated, an appeals court reviews questions of law de novo and questions of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 208 (6th Cir. 1996). The landmark case examining the constitutional right to a speedy trial is Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker, the Supreme Court listed the following four factors that a court must examine to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. Three of these four factorsmilitate against Howard's Sixth Amendment claim. 30 First, in calculating the length of the delay, only those periods of delay attributable to the government or the court are relevant to Howard's constitutional claim. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 (We hardly need add that if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine.); see also United States v. White, 985 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1993) (excluding from the time counted towards a Sixth Amendment violation the time during which the defendant expressly participated in the delay.). The first, second, and fourth continuances prior to Howard's first trial were requested either solely or jointly by Howard. Thus the relevant delay before Howard's first trial was the three-month continuance discussed above in reference to Howard's Speedy Trial Act claim. The relevant delay prior to Howard's second trial--excluding the one-month continuance requested by Howard--was five months. A delay of five months is not per se excessive under the Sixth Amendment. See White, 985 F.2d at 275 (finding that a six-and-one-half-month delay was not excessive); United States v. Holyfield, 802 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that a five-month delay was constitutionally permissible). 31 The second factor considered in the Barker analysis is the reason for the delay. Delays intended to secure a tactical advantage weigh heavily against the government. See White, 985 F.2d at 275. As discussed above, the district court determined that the delays caused by the government in this case were not motivated by bad faith or attempts to seek a tactical advantage. Moreover, the four-month continuance sought by the government prior to Howard's second trial was prompted by the unavailability of a witness, which has been explicitly recognized as a legitimate justification for a continuance. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 ([A] valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.). 32 Turning to the third factor of the Barker test, Howard properly points out that he repeatedly asserted his right to a speedy trial and objected to the continuances sought by the government. In addition, Howard moved to dismiss both his first and second indictments for violations of the Speedy Trial Act, and successfully pursued this claim on appeal from his first trial. We agree that Howard persistently asserted his right to a speedy trial at all stages of this case. 33 The fourth and final factor set out in Barker is the prejudice suffered by the defendant. The most important factor under prejudice is possible impairment of the defense. White, 985 F.2d at 276. As discussed above, Howard has failed to identify any specific way in which his defense was prejudiced during either of his trials. On appeal, Howard cites Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), for the proposition that delay, in and of itself, may create a presumption of prejudice. Id. at 655-56 ([A]ffirmative proof of prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim. . . . [E]xcessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.). 34 The presumption of prejudice discussed in Doggett, however, is not automatically applicable whenever a defendant's trial is delayed. Pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly justifiable. Id. at 656. When the government prosecutes a case with reasonable diligence, a defendant who cannot demonstrate how his defense was prejudiced with specificity will not make out a speedy trial claim no matter how great the ensuing delay. See id. 35 Where there is evidence of negligence on the government's part, but no bad faith, the Supreme Court has declared that a presumption of prejudice may arise, dependingupon the length of the delay. See id. at 657. [T]o warrant granting relief, negligence unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice. Id. In Doggett, the Supreme Court noted an extraordinary 8 1/2 year lag between Doggett's indictment and arrest, id. at 652, and concluded that this delay was sufficient to create a presumption of prejudice to the defendant. The Court also noted that lower courts have generally found postaccusation delay 'presumptively prejudicial' at least as it approaches one year. Id. at 652 n.1. 36 Thus, even if we assume that the government was negligent in prosecuting Howard's cases, the length of the delays--three months and five months, respectively--would be insufficient to create a presumption of prejudice in the absence of any evidence of affirmative misconduct. Because the delays attributable to the government in both of Howard's trials were neither excessively long nor motivated by bad faith, we conclude that Howard's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated.