Opinion ID: 197851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Likely Impact of the Mosso Statement

Text: 64 Petitioner argues that the extent of his participation in the beating was critical to two issues: whether he exhibited malice, which is a prerequisite to a finding of even second degree murder (requiring an intent to kill, an intent to do grievous bodily harm, or circumstances that would have led a reasonably prudent person to believe there was a plain and strong likelihood of death), and whether the killing was marked by extreme atrocity and cruelty, one of the two bases for a first-degree murder finding (the jury having explicitly ruled out the alternative basis, premeditation). Petitioner argues that Mosso's statement tilted the balance of the evidence, corroborating the testimony of Peloquin and Cassidy, who testified to more extensive involvement on his part than did Amaral and Ducharme. 65 As we have just concluded, we see no initial balance to be tilted. But assuming we are wrong in our assessment, what impact was likely from Mosso's statement? When we juxtapose Mosso's account against this critical body of evidence, we assess the likely effect as follows. Mosso's description of the beginning of the episode, ending with both him and Tamburro on the ground, adds nothing to other accounts except the highly unlikely detail that Tamburro, the smaller man who was content to let the transaction stand, started the fight. 66 Mosso's statement about petitioner's intervention and kicking Tamburro adds little to petitioner's own admission. It departs from petitioner's version by going beyond a single kick to a few kicks in the face and shoulder area. This observation concededly paralleled the testimony of Peloquin and Cassidy. If the number of kicks were the only important fact, and if Mosso's statement possessed earmarks of credibility, this might be a closer case. 67 But not only did the testimony of all four eyewitnesses point to a brutal boot-kicking of a defenseless, felled person in the head and upper body, inflicting multiple injuries, but Mosso's statement also had to have fared poorly in the jury's minds. In the first place, Mosso already had demonstrated his ability to fabricate, with a first statement in which he denied knowledge of Tamburro or any fight. Even more important, however, was the balance of the statement, in which Mosso portrayed himself as leaving the fray, asking petitioner to desist, and sitting in the car while petitioner continued kicking Tamburro for three minutes. This version not only contradicted all the eyewitnesses but also was inherently implausible. After all, it was Mosso who had paid the fifty dollars and was the initial fight participant. His further statement that he did not think he had inflicted any damage, and that all of the injuries had to be caused by his co-defendant, could not have affected the jury in any manner adverse to petitioner. 68 We therefore conclude that no reasonable jury could have been influenced in its determinations, not to mention substantially influenced, by Mosso's statement. We have been pointed to no place in the trial where it played a role except in the prosecutor's closing argument, a subject to which we now turn. Petitioner's claim is that, by coupling petitioner and his co-defendant with their reciprocal finger-pointing statements accusing the other, the prosecutor effectively canceled out petitioner's statement. 69 If the closing argument's use of the Mosso statement were both the dominant motif and the source of significant prejudice that otherwise would not have existed, the prevalence factor might be satisfied and perhaps the previous imbalance of evidence might be overcome. 70 But such is not the case here. In the first place, we note that petitioner is now asking us to ride two horses, going in opposite directions. On the one hand, petitioner asserts that the prosecutor's use of the Mosso statement increased the likelihood the jury viewed Sinnott's participation as greater than it was. On the other hand, he also asserts that the evil lies in the prosecutor's deft claim that each was pointing the finger at the other, and thus Mosso's statement improperly canceled out that of petitioner. It is difficult to see how the Mosso statement could at the same time add to the weight of the state's case and also be dismissed as another transparent attempt to shift blame. 71 Nevertheless, even though the finger-pointing argument was not made at trial or before the state court, we shall, like the district court, consider it. In homage to a search for prevalence, we note that in the course of an eleven-day trial, occupying 1,389 pages of transcript, the prosecutor's challenged remarks occupied at most four pages, one at the very beginning of his 37-page argument and three two-thirds of the way through. The significant fact is that the predominant part of the prosecutor's closing rested on the evidence, not the statements of the defendants. 72 More to the point is that the basic message conveyed by the prosecutor could and undoubtedly would have been conveyed had there been no Mosso statement, namely, that petitioner was obviously trying to shift blame. When counsel argues that, by showing that another defendant succumbed to the instinct of self preservation, the prosecutor unfairly demeaned petitioner, we cannot quite see the logic. But perhaps, apart from logic, there was some impact from the prosecutor's dramatic ploy of crossing his hands with fingers pointing. All we can say as to this is that at the very most any additional effect on the jury's deliberations was slight. 73 We are convinced from our meticulous review of this trial that the admission of the Mosso statement and the use made of it by the prosecutor in his closing argument did not in all probability have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the determinations of the jury.