Opinion ID: 556527
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Quash the Subpoena

Text: 23 The district court ruled that the search warrants were overbroad as applied to Doe Three. The Government has not appealed from that ruling. The court ruled, however, that the subpoenas were valid as applied to Doe Three. Doe Three is, thus, the only party before us whose documents were surrendered to the court pursuant to the subpoenas. 24 Doe Two joined Doe Four's motion to quash the subpoenas. The subpoenas do not seek documents pertaining to Doe Two. Neither are the subpoenas directed to him. Thus, he lacks standing to challenge the subpoenas. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 1624, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (third party lacks standing to challenge subpoena even if a criminal prosecution is planned against the third party).
25 Ordinarily, the denial of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum is an interlocutory decree. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). This court has no jurisdiction over an appeal from such an order. Id. To obtain appellate review, the person resisting the subpoena must first refuse to comply and be held in contempt. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1581, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). He can then challenge the validity of the subpoena by seeking appellate review of the contempt order. Id. The Government argues that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal because Doe Four complied with the subpoena and the denial of the motion to quash was, thus, an interlocutory decree. 26 There is a well recognized exception to the rule precluding an appeal from a denial of a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum when the subpoena is directed to a third party. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13, 38 S.Ct. 417, 420, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918). A third party cannot be expected to risk contempt in order to protect the interests of the person whose papers were seized. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Niren, 784 F.2d 939, 941 (9th Cir.1986). In such circumstances, the target of the investigation may move to quash the subpoena. The denial of the motion is immediately appealable by the target of the investigation. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Lahodny), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.1982). 27 This exception is more difficult to apply when the third party is an attorney with an ongoing relationship with the person whose papers were seized. In several cases, we have refused to extend the doctrine to attorneys who were still actively representing the person whose papers were seized. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Niren, 784 F.2d 939 (9th Cir.1986), we refused to allow the immediate appeal of a motion to quash a subpoena directed to in-house counsel who was still employed by, and under the control of, the target client. In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated June 5, 1985, 825 F.2d 231 (9th Cir.1987), we declined consideration of an appeal from an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena served upon an attorney who was an active participant in the litigation, appealing from the district court's denial of his motion to quash on his own behalf. Id. at 237. 28 The June 5 decision, however, noted that other cases had held that the motion was immediately appealable when the attorney was, arguably, still representing the client. Id.; see e.g., Lahodny, 695 F.2d at 365 (an immediate appeal is proper when the subpoena is directed to a third party, here the appellant's attorney, because that party will not be expected to risk a contempt citation). 29 We are persuaded that we have jurisdiction over Doe Three's appeal from the denial of the motion to quash the subpoenas. There is no indication in the record before us that either Doe Four or Doe Two presently represents the target of the subpoenas. Moreover, Doe Four chose to comply with the subpoenas. Compliance, instead of refusing to produce the material described in the subpoenas, is the type of situation which made necessary the adoption of the exception authorizing intervention and immediate appellate review. 30 The Government argues that there is no jurisdiction in this court because each of the parties is asserting its own rights. While the Government's argument is well taken regarding Doe Four, it misses the point in regard to Doe Three. 31 Doe Four asserts that the subpoenas should be quashed because they violate its fourth amendment rights. Since it is the entity on whom the subpoenas were served, however, the rule established in United States v. Ryan, supra, requires it to decline to comply and be found in contempt before there is a final order over which an appellate court has jurisdiction. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971) (except in cases of a subpoena to a third party, denial of a motion to quash is not a final judgment so no appeal is available). 32 Doe Four has chosen a different course. It complied with the subpoenas. Under these circumstances, the district court's denial of Doe Four's motion to quash the subpoenas is an interlocutory order. We have no jurisdiction over Doe Four's appeal from the denial of the motion to quash the subpoenas. 33 Doe Three is in a different position. His situation is similar to the one this court confronted in Lahodny, supra. Doe Three must rely on Doe Four to protect his interests. Doe Four, however, elected to comply with the subpoenas. The only way to assure Doe Three that his interests will be protected is to allow him to take an immediate appeal from the order denying his motion to quash the subpoenas. Lahodny, 695 F.2d at 365. Cf. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 38 S.Ct. 417, 62 L.Ed. 950 (1918) (immediate appeal available when court order compelling testimony will injure third party).
34 We review the district court's factual determinations under the clearly erroneous rule, and review its decision to quash the grand jury subpoenas for abuse of discretion. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir.1986). 35 The grand jury has broad powers of investigation. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (grand jury has been accorded wide latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law). As the Supreme Court has explained: 36 It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. 37 Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919). Rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a grand jury may issue a subpoena. The rule imposes no limitations on the purposes for which it is issued, but provides only that the subpoena may be quashed if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c). This court has rejected arguments that an affidavit of need or relevance should be required before a grand jury subpoena is issued. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir.1983). 38 Doe Three merges his arguments against the validity of the warrants and the subpoenas. He contends that the subpoenas are the functional equivalents of the search warrants and should be treated as such. He points repeatedly to the fact that the subpoenas were served at the same time as the search warrants and that the federal agents attempted to enforce the subpoenas through immediate seizure of the documents. 39 Doe Three offers no legal authority to support this novel proposition. Subpoenas are not search warrants. They involve different levels of intrusion on a person's privacy. A search warrant allows the officer to enter the person's premises, and to examine for himself the person's belongings. The officer, pursuant to the warrant, determines what is seized. Moreover, if evidence or contraband of any sort is in plain sight, the officer may seize it, even if it is not listed in the warrant. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 1153, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). The person to be searched has no lawful way to prevent execution of the warrant. 40 Service of a forthwith subpoena does not authorize an entry into a private residence. Furthermore, the person served determines whether he will surrender the items identified in the subpoena or challenge the validity of the subpoena prior to compliance. 41 These differences are not eliminated by the fact that the search warrants and subpoenas were delivered at the same time. Moreover, in the instant matter the federal agents did not enforce the subpoenas on the date the search warrants were executed. In fact, the law firm was eventually given nearly a month to comply with the subpoenas. 42 Doe Three has not argued that compliance with the subpoenas is oppressive. Indeed, Doe Four has already complied with them. Instead, Doe Three argues that the lack of relevance, breadth, and circumstances in which the subpoenas were issued were such that they should be quashed. But he has failed to show that the papers that are described in the subpoenas are outside the scope of a legitimate investigation by the grand jury. He has failed to show that compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The district court did not abuse its discretion in partially denying Doe Three's motions to quash the subpoenas. 43