Opinion ID: 2184368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirements for admissibility under the protected person statute.

Text: The Legislature has created special procedures for introducing evidence that is not otherwise admissible in cases involving crimes against children and the mentally disabled. See IND.CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1993 & Supp.1994). [6] To admit evidence under the protected person statute, the court must make a number of findings in hearings conducted outside the jury's presence. The statement or videotape must be made by a person who at the time of trial is a protected person, i.e., a person who is either under the age of fourteen or mentally disabled at the time of trial. § 6(b). The protected person must be found to be unavailable either because of incompetence by reason of inability to understand an oath or for reasons related to the well being of the witness based on professional testimony. § 6(d)-(e). The statement or videotape must concern an act that is a material element of the charged offense. § 6(c). The protected person must attend the hearing and either testify at trial or, if found to be unavailable as a witness, be available for cross-examination either at the hearing or when the statement was made. § 6(d)-(e). The time, content, and circumstances of the statement or videotape must be found to provide sufficient indications of reliability. § 6(d)(1). [7] In many child molestation prosecutions, as in this case, the account of the victim is importantand sometimes the onlyevidence as to the occurrence of a crime or the identity of the perpetrator, or both. The victim is often an incompetent witness if the statute comes into play. Trial courts consequently must use special care when making findings of sufficient indications of reliability under the statute because these findings act as the sole basis for finding the trustworthiness that permits introduction of otherwise inadmissible hearsay. Considerations in making the reliability determination under the statute include the time and circumstances of the statement, whether there was significant opportunity for coaching, the nature of the questioning, whether there was a motive to fabricate, use of age appropriate terminology, and spontaneity and repetition. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821-22, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3149-50, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) (listing factors bearing on whether hearsay statements exhibit particularized guarantees of trustworthiness for Sixth Amendment purposes). [8] Lengthy and stressful interviews or examinations preceding the statement may cast doubt on the reliability of the statement or videotape sufficient to preclude its admission. Miller v. State, 531 N.E.2d 466, 470 (Ind.1988) (Miller II ). There are undoubtedly many other factors in individual cases. Finally, although the original version of the statute required corroborative evidence before admitting out-of-court statements, see 1984 Ind. Acts, P.L. 180, § 1, it is now clear that corroboration should not be considered in evaluating the reliability of the statement. The current version of IND.CODE § 35-37-4-6, unlike its predecessors, does not limit admission of out-of-court statements to cases in which there is independent corroborative evidence of the crime. See 1990 Ind. Acts, P.L. 37, § 22, codified at IND.CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1993). [9] In light of all these factors, and for the reasons set forth below, we find no reversible error in this case.