Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: The Trial Court's Inquiry Into the Numerical Division of the Jury

Text: The jury began its penalty phase deliberation at 1:45 p.m. on July 15, 1987. It was released on that day at 4 p.m. It resumed deliberations at 9:05 a.m. the next day, broke for lunch at noon, and returned at 1:05 p.m. A half-hour later it sent a note containing two questions to the court. In the first question, it inquired as follows: In the event this jury cannot decide 100% on the penalty phase of this case, what would be the [sentence] imposed? The trial judge responded with a question of his own: Without telling me exactly how the jury stands one way or the other, can you give me some idea ... about the numerical count, how it might stand? Seven/five, six/six, four/eight? The jury foreperson responded: Approximately ten to two, Your Honor. The court then asked whether continued deliberations might result in a verdict and received an affirmative answer from the foreperson. It then declined to answer the question, referring jurors to the instructions previously given and admonishing them not to speculate on the consequences of their failure to agree on a verdict. The jury resumed deliberations and was released that day at 3:55 p.m. It returned the next day at 9 a.m. and reached its verdict at 10:46 a.m. (56) Defendant argues that the court's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury was an impermissible coercive tactic. We have previously rejected this argument. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 776 & fn. 14 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113] [[A] neutral inquiry into numerical division, properly used, is an important tool in ascertaining the probability of agreement.].) By simply making the inquiry, the trial judge placed no pressure on the jury to reach a verdict and expressed no views as to the significance, if any, of its division. Thereafter, jury deliberation continued for some four additional hours over two days before the penalty verdict was reached. Defendant points to no evidence of undue pressure or influence on the jury resulting from the trial judge's remarks. (See People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 535 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) Accordingly, we decline his invitation to reverse the judgment. [21]