Opinion ID: 1730571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Prosecutor Engage in Purposeful Racial Discrimination in Striking Jurors Devezin and Price?

Text: Once the prosecutor has satisfied the second stage of the Batson procedure, [t]he trial court ... then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In reaching a decision the trial court should examine all of the evidence available; essentially, this involves a comparison of the arguments and facts in support thereof posited in the defendant's prima facie offering with the race-neutral reasons articulated by the prosecutor to determine whether the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination. [23] This comparison must be made in light of the record; although reviewing courts owe the trial judge proper deference in assessing the credibility of in-court testimony, we have already stated in this opinion that simple assertions of good faith by the prosecutor are insufficient to counter a valid Batson challenge. See Collier, supra, 553 So.2d at 818. Before we proceed, however, we note that the court of appeal clearly erred in assigning the ultimate burden of persuasion on the question of the existence of purposeful discrimination to the State. In rendering its decision as to jurors Devezin and Price, the court of appeal stated that in both instances [t]he State did not rebut defendant's prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Green, supra, 634 So.2d at 511. Batson, however, made it clear that the burden which shifts to the State after the defendant has made a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination is a burden of production; it is the defendant, as [t]he party alleging that he has been the victim of intentional discrimination, [who] carries the ultimate burden of persuasion. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 94 n. 18, 106 S.Ct. at 1722 n. 18. Accord, State v. Thompson, 516 So.2d 349, 354 (La.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 180, 102 L.Ed.2d 149 (1988); re'hg denied, 488 U.S. 976, 109 S.Ct. 517, 102 L.Ed.2d 551 (1988) (the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the defendant). The fact that a defendant has met his initial burden of making a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination does not mean that the defendant's arguments and evidence are sufficient to carry his ultimate burden of persuading the trial judge of the existence of such discriminatory intent; rather, a defendant's prima, facie showing only raises a necessary [24] inference of purposeful discrimination, an inference which the trial judge is free to accept or reject based upon the credibility of the State's proffered reasons and how those reasons play against the facts and circumstances surrounding the voir dire. Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. Thus, the proper inquiry in the final stage of the Batson analysis is not whether the State has disproved the existence of purposeful discrimination suggested by the defendant's prima facie case; rather, the question is whether the defendant's proof, when weighed against the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral reasons, is strong enough to persuade the trier-of-fact that such discriminatory intent is present. Any other approach violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Purkett, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 1770. With a proper understanding of the respective burdens in this case, we turn now to the specific reasons the court of appeal found that juror Devezin had been improperly struck from the panel. The prosecutor gave two reasons for striking Devezin, that her husband's uncle worked with juveniles and that she was weak on the death penalty. The court of appeal found these reasons insubstantial, noting that Devezin had denied her relative's work with juveniles would affect her as a juror and that her responses to queries about the death penalty do not indicate weakness. Although it is a close call, we agree with the court of appeal that the prosecutor's death-penalty related reason for striking Devezin, when viewed in the context of the record, was insubstantial. Devezin stated that she considered both the death penalty and life sentence to be severe, not too severe as the prosecutor recalled it. In addition, it is instructive that Devezin's responses to this line of questioning followed verbatim that of several jurors prior to her who were asked the same question, some of whom were removed and some of whom ended up on the jury. It may be that the prosecutor simply forgot what Devezin had actually said; this is, however, immaterial, since a mere assertion of prosecutorial good faith is insufficient in the context of a Batson challenge. We disagree with the court of appeal regarding the validity of the other reason the prosecutor gave for striking Devezin. The court of appeal relied upon Devezin's assertion that she had not spoken with Dr. Devezin about his work and that it would not affect her deliberations as a juror. However, the prosecutor in this case obviously perceived that this connection could consciously or unconsciously affect the juror's deliberations, a view perhaps supported in some part by Devezin's view of penal rehabilitation, and he was entitled to strike the juror on that ground alone. The trial judge, who was able to see and hear Devezin during voir dire, obviously felt that the prosecutor had a reasonable basis for making this call, and we find that the record, although scant, supports that determination. Juror Price was struck because of his employment with HANO, including his employment in the Magnolia Project over twenty (20) years before the time of trial, and a prior jury vote. The court of appeal found that the relationship of Price to the Magnolia Housing Project, and indeed the involvement of any Project residents with the case, was tangential. In addition, the court of appeal found that the statement about prior jury service is contradicted by the record. Green, supra, 634 So.2d at 511. Regarding the statement of prior jury service, while we disagree with the court of appeal's strong pronouncement that it is contradicted by the record, we do find that it is not supported by the record. There is nothing in the record demonstrating how the prosecutor became aware of Price's prior jury vote; the question was never asked of Price during voir dire, and the prosecutor never articulated or presented documentary evidence showing the basis of his knowledge of Price's vote. Although the State during oral argument was able to present a plausible, and possibly satisfactory, answer to our concerns, the statements of counsel during oral argument are not part of the official record which we review in this case. While we recognize that the defendant has the ultimate burden of persuasion in this case, we find that such an unsupported assertion, which has the appearance of being pulled out of thin air, is simply too insubstantial to resist the prima facie case offered by the defense. This leaves us with the second justification given by the prosecutor for striking Price, his employment with HANO and his relationship with the Magnolia Housing Project. The record refutes the court of appeal's conclusion that the evidence dealing with the Magnolia Project was tangential. See Note 16, supra. The recanted confession of Joseph Davis, a Magnolia resident, and the circumstances surrounding this confession took up much of the testimony at the first day of Green's trial. Davis's arrest and initial statement all occurred within the Magnolia Project's boundaries. Furthermore, Davis and several of his companions testified at trial and were identified in-court by other State witnesses. This testimony was presented by the State in an apparent attempt to defuse what the prosecutor anticipated would be the linchpin of the defense theory of the case, i.e. that another group of men had murdered Pamela Block. We find that evidence related to the Magnolia Housing Project and its residents comprised the vehicle by which Melvin Green sought to exculpate himself, and therefore cannot be considered tangential to the issue of his guilt. When the prosecutor's work-related reasons for excluding Price are viewed in light of the evidence the prosecutor legitimately (and correctly) anticipated would be discussed at trial, we find that the defendant's Batson challenge must fail. Melvin Green's trial offered the prospect of a great deal of evidence involving police activity in a housing project of just the sort Price had worked in and around for over twenty (20) years. In addition, Price's connections with the Magnolia Project, while dated, still offered the possibility that Price might be familiar with some of the personalities discussed in the case, and that this familiarity might in some way influence his deliberations in the jury room. Significant factors in our view are the long period of Price's employment, the specific on-site nature of his work (facility maintenance manager), and his former connection with the particular project involved in this case. While any of these factors alone would probably be insufficient to warrant the exercise of a peremptory strike, even in the face of the relatively weak showing made by the defendant in this case, together they support the trial court's determination that the prosecutor was not acting out of discriminatory motive when he exercised a peremptory challenge against Alfred Price.