Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Alleged attorney conflict of interest

Text: Defendant argues his trial counsel had a conflict of interest that adversely affected their performance. The information bearing on this conflict, he asserts, was contained in the probation and sentencing report read by the judge at the combined posttrial hearing addressing sentencing and new trial issues. Accordingly, he insists, the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to appoint new counsel to argue his motion for new trial, and to grant a new trial because of the conflict. We find defendant's claim unpersuasive. The pertinent facts are these: In his guilt trial testimony, defendant stated under oath that, on July 19, 1988, the day after Luis Reyna died in his presence, he went with Celebration Oberman to [meet] with [his] attorney, with whom he had some discussions, then went home and packed to leave. Under direct examination, he agreed that, as he had truthfully written to Oberman in his letter from jail of July 6, 1992, he decided to leave because (1) he thought that would stop the expected civil suits arising from the Mishell and Reyna cases, (2) he did not believe the police would allow him to remain free on bail, and (3) there had been death threats from Reyna's brothers. He also indicated he was then thinking about returning as soon as September or when I was next scheduled to appear in court. On May 20, 1993, following the guilt and penalty verdicts, a probation officer interviewed defendant for purposes of a sentencing report regarding the noncapital convictions. As cited by defendant, the report states the following: During his interview, defendant accused Oberman and Alexandra M. of lying, and claimed his attorneys had not fully discredited either witness though there was clear ammunition to do so. Defendant then asked whether the officer really wanted to hear what I feel were the mistakes made by my attorneys? What I feel should have been told the jury? Defendant said he was willing to impart this information, because he believed it was important and should have been presented to the jury, but your report to the court is probably not the place to have [it] brought out. It will come out at some later time appropriately. The officer responded that he was obliged to provide the court with all information he deemed relevant. The report further indicates that, while recounting his version of the Mishell and Reyna episodes (apparently including information defendant thought was not sufficiently presented to the jury), defendant stated, as at trial, that he dismembered Reyna's body to delay its identification because I needed time to confer with my [attorney] about what had happened. According to defendant, he did consult his attorney as soon as he was able to see me. At that meeting, which included Oberman and the attorney's investigator, defendant claimed, I told all of them exactly what happened. The advice that I was given by Tim [ Rien ] [one of defendant's trial attorneys] was that I should get out of the country as quickly as possible! You see that's some of the information which the jury never was given. My attorney never tried to impeach Celebration Oberman when she testified that the first time she ever heard about Reyna's death was when I told her while we were lying on a beach in Mexico. All Rien had to do was to put his investigator on the stand but he refused because, I assume, he has ambitions to be a judge and he has to maintain a clean record as an attorney in order to achieve that! (Italics added.) After completing his account, defendant again broached the subject of omitting these things from the report. He said, You see, this really isn't the time or the place to bring up these things. It would just complicate my relationship with my attorneys. I assume that they will need to assist me with my appeals. The report states that [o]ur response to this admonishment was that [defendant] should never have uttered anything that he wanted kept confidential from the Court. On September 8, 1993, the court held a combined hearing to address (1) defendant's pending motion for a new trial, (2) the pending motion for automatic modification of the death verdict, and (3) noncapital sentencing. At the outset, defendant was allowed to make a lengthy statement to the court. He reiterated his claim that there were lying witnesses at trial, conceding that I was one. I misstated some truth during the trial. While blaming various components of the system for the unjust result in his case, defendant directed mixed praise and criticism at his own attorneys. However, even though he had been told the probation officer's report would include his claim that Attorney Rien had advised him to leave the country immediately, he said nothing on that subject. After denying the new trial motion and the motion to modify the death verdict, the court announced it would pause to read, for the first time, the probation officer's report in order to undertake noncapital sentencing. [41] Having done so, the court did not comment on defendant's allegations against his attorney, as contained in the report. Neither did counsel for either side, though all had received advance copies. (§ 1203, subd. (b)(ii)(E); see id., former subd. (b).) The court imposed noncapital sentences, pronounced judgment, and concluded the proceedings. On appeal, defendant asserts the following: By advising defendant to commit the additional crime of interstate or foreign flight to escape murder charges (see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1073), Attorney Rien placed himself in a dilemma. Rien's trial duty to defendant required him to show that the true reason for defendant's flight was counsel's advice, not consciousness of guilt. Yet to do so would expose Rien's own violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (see rule 3-210 [attorney shall not advise violation of any law except upon good faith belief that law is invalid]). The adverse affect of the conflict on counsel's performance requires reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments. The right to effective assistance of counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution includes the right to representation free from conflicts of interest. [Citation.] ... To establish a federal constitutional violation, a defendant who fails to object at trial must show that an actual conflict of interest `adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' [Citations.] To show a violation of the corresponding right under our state Constitution, a defendant need only demonstrate a potential conflict, so long as the record supports an `informed speculation' that the asserted conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. [Citations.] ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 998, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) When a trial court is aware, or should be aware, of a possible conflict of interest between a criminal defendant and defense counsel, the court is required to inquire into the circumstances of the possible conflict and take whatever action may be appropriate. [Citation.] A trial court's failure to carry out its duty to conduct such an inquiry, or to take action based on the results of its inquiry, denies the defendant the right to due process. [Citation.] ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 999, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) We do not interpret these principles to mean that the court must inquire into every claim of conflict, however suspect and unfounded. In this instance, defendant's unsworn eleventh-hour assertion that his counsel advised him to engage in criminal flight was, in blunt terms, inherently incredible. During his extensive sworn testimony, which specifically included the subjects of his consultation with counsel and his reasons for fleeing, he did not mention it. Defendant's unsworn accusation against counsel was made only after the guilt and penalty verdicts had gone against him. And his statement to the probation officer was marked by inconsistency. On the one hand, he insisted that counsel's advice to flee was something the jury should have heard about. On the other hand, he proposed that this same information be omitted from the officer's report, because the time was not yet right to disclose it. Though advised that his accusations would indeed be included in the report, defendant did not allude to them in his subsequent, lengthy allocution to the trial courtin which he addressed perceived flaws in his legal representation. In the course of his allocution, defendant admitted he was among the witnesses who had lied at trial. The trial court obviously agreed with this assessment. In denying the automatic motion to modify the death verdict, the court declared itself satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, contrary to defendant's trial testimony, he had murdered Luis Reyna to prevent Reyna's testimony. Under these circumstances, the trial court was not obliged to credit, investigate, or act upon, defendant's last-minute effort to blame his flight on his counsel, rather than on his own consciousness of guilt. No error occurred. Even were we to credit defendant's claim, and to assume an actual or potential conflict of interest, defendant fails to raise an inference, or even a basis for informed speculation, that counsel's performance was adversely affected. In arguing otherwise, defendant suggests that evidence of counsel's advice, if presented, would have shown he did not flee for venal reasons of his own. But defendant has never said, on the stand or elsewhere, that counsel's advice was the reason he fled. And, as the People observe, such evidence might well have prejudiced the jurors by suggesting that [defendant's] own counsel found [his] explanation [of the events surrounding Reyna's death] so incredible that he advised [defendant] to flee rather than present it to a jury. In sum, we find no basis for reversal.