Opinion ID: 2344381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the reasonably-apparent prong creates an objective standard.

Text: {9} We have consistently interpreted legislation using the adverb reasonably as imposing an objective standard. In State v. Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170, we interpreted an acted reasonably requirement for self-defense as an objective, rather than subjective, element. Similarly, in Shull v. New Mexico Potash Corp., 111 N.M. 132, 134, 802 P.2d 641, 643 (1990), we contrasted the subjective good faith standard with the objective reasonable standard. Accord Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co., 108 N.M. 20, 27-28, 766 P.2d 280, 287-88 (1988) (same). As we explained in Rudolfo, 2008-NMSC-036, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), the [`acted reasonably'] requirement is objective in that it focuses on the hypothetical behavior of a reasonable person acting under the same circumstances as the defendant. In Plummer, the Court of Appeals applied an objective standard to the reasonably-apparent prong when it concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the server, who was unidentified, knew or should have known that the patron was intoxicated at the time the patron was sold alcohol. 114 N.M. at 247, 836 P.2d at 1268. {10} Our interpretation of the reasonably-apparent prong as creating an objective standard is in accord with how other jurisdictions have interpreted similar dram shop act language. In Becks v. Pierce, 282 Ga.App. 229, 638 S.E.2d 390 (2006), the Georgia Court of Appeals recognized that its dram shop act holds servers liable if a provider in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the patron was intoxicated. Id. at 393 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C.App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983), the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted its dram shop act to impose liability where the server knew or should have known that the patron was in an intoxicated condition at the time he or she was served. Id. at 594-95. In Perseus, Inc. v. Canody, 995 S.W.2d 202, 206-07 (Tex.App. 1999), the Texas Court of Appeals implicitly read its statute's apparent to the provider requirement to create an objective test. The Perseus court defined apparent, a term also used in our Dram Shop Liability Act, as [t]hat which is obvious, evident, or manifest; what appears, or has been made manifest. That which appears to the eye or mind; open to view; plain; patent. Id. at 206 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 88 (5th ed. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The court reasoned that [i]t is not the actual observation of conduct that makes the conduct `apparent.' Rather, conduct is apparent when it is visible, evident, and easily observed. Id. at 206. The court therefore concluded that the apparent language indicated an objective standard. Id. {11} The Perseus court explained its rationale for applying an objective standard, as follows: Were we to construe the statutory apparent to the provider requirement [to be subjective], then a provider of alcohol could always escape liability by merely turning a blind eye to signs of intoxication that are plain, manifest, and open to view. Surely this is not what the Legislature intended when it enacted legislation to hold providers responsible when they serve obviously intoxicated individuals. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court echoed this same concern in Riley v. H & H Operations, Inc., 263 Ga. 652, 436 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1993), reasoning that a construction of [its dram shop act] requiring actual knowledge would render the Act an ineffective sanction, since only when the defendant admitted its own knowledge could the plaintiff prevail. {12} Similarly, in Miller v. Ochampaugh, 191 Mich.App. 48, 477 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1991), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that Michigan's dram shop act requirement that the intoxication be apparent to an ordinary observer was an objective standard. The court reasoned, had the Legislature wished to create a subjective standard, it could have worded the dramshop act accordingly. Id. The Miller court also expressed concern that the adoption of a subjective standard would essentially do away with the dramshop cause of action, noting that a defendant could escape liability if the serving employee simply testified that he or she did not personally observe the patron to be intoxicated. Id. We agree and are persuaded that, in New Mexico, the Legislature intended the reasonably-apparent prong to require an objective standard of proof.