Opinion ID: 1399686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the district court committed reversible error in admitting certain expert testimony.

Text: Two Elk challenges certain aspects of the expert testimony introduced against him. He contends that the district court neglected to require the government to develop an adequate foundation for Dr. McPherson's testimony, and similarly erred with respect to the testimony and demonstrative exhibits presented by Dr. Mailloux and Dr. Hansen. Two Elk insists this was a critical mistake because he sought to sow doubt regarding when the injuries to A.R. happened and the doctors' testimony contravened Two Elk's theory. We conclude that the court committed no reversible error.
We review a district court's ruling admitting expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir.2008). Similarly, the abuse of discretion standard applies when we review a district court's rulings admitting exhibits. See C.L. Maddox, Inc. v. Benham Group, Inc., 88 F.3d 592, 600 n. 8 (8th Cir.1996). This court reviews for plain error the admission of any unobjected-to testimony. United States v. Collins, 340 F.3d 672, 682 (8th Cir.2003).
The district court may admit the testimony of a witness whose knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education merits expert status if (1) the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, Fed.R.Evid. 702, and (2) the evidence is relevant and reliable. Eagle, 515 F.3d at 800; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-91, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). A district court ... enjoys broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability, and [t]here is no requirement that the [d]istrict [c]ourt always hold a Daubert hearing prior to qualifying an expert witness. United States v. Kenyon, 481 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir.2007) (internal citations, quotations omitted). Accordingly, so long as the court is satisfied with the expert's knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and the expert's testimony is reasonably based on that expertise, the court does not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony without a preliminary hearing. Id. Nevertheless, [t]he district court must exclude expert testimony if it is so fundamentally unreliable that it can offer no assistance to the jury, otherwise, the factual basis of the testimony goes to the weight of the evidence. Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 940-41 (8th Cir.2005) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added). In child sexual abuse cases, `a qualified expert can inform the jury of characteristics in sexually abused children and describe the characteristics the alleged victim exhibits.' Eagle, 515 F.3d at 800 (quoting United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 765-66 (8th Cir.2001)). Such an expert may also offer a synopsis of the medical evidence. Id.
Over the defense's objection, Dr. McPherson testified regarding the definition of an acute injury and the characteristics of A.R.'s injuries that led him to believe that her injuries were not acute. Two Elk argues that there was no indication or testimony that [Dr. McPherson's] opinion was based upon a reasonable medical certainty. [13] As in Kenyon, however, Two Elk does not appear to have challenged Dr. McPherson's expertise. See Kenyon, 481 F.3d at 1061. Rather, Two Elk suggests that the district court must ensure that everything a medical expert says on the stand is individually supported by reasonable medical certainty. In support, Two Elk cites Graham v. Ozark Mountain Sightseeing, Inc., 181 F.3d 924, 926 (8th Cir.1999), for the propositions that medical experts ... must testify to a reasonable medical certainty and that [e]xpert testimony that defendants `probably' or `likely' caused the harm is insufficient.... Two Elk's reliance on Graham is misplaced. In Graham, the court addressed expert testimony offered to prove an element of a state tort cause of action. Id. In that particular situation, Erie compelled that Rule 702which generally is a procedural ruleyield to a state substantive rule requiring medical experts to testify to a reasonable medical certainty regarding causation. Cf. id. (citing Missouri case-law). In the federal criminal context we confront here, however, the Larson rule (which is derived from Rule 702 and Daubert ) applies. And there is little doubt that Dr. McPherson's testimony was reliable under Larson. Dr. McPherson explored the difficulties inherent in assessing how acute A.R.'s injuries were, but concluded that they were not acute. [14] As the district court determined, this testimony was likely to assist the trier of fact. At that point, it was up to the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in cross-examination. Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 481 F.3d 619, 627 (8th Cir.2007) (quotation omitted); cf. Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir.2003) ([N]othing in Rule 702, Daubert, or its progeny requires that an expert resolve an ultimate issue of fact to a scientific absolute in order to be admissible. (quotation omitted)). Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony; it follows that the court did not plainly err in doing so either.
Two Elk next objects to Dr. Mailloux's testimony comparing A.R.'s injuries to those he has witnessed in other pediatric examinations he has performed. Two Elk argues that the trial judge erred in admitting this testimony because there was nothing on the record to show that the comparison group was of a similar age or size to [A.R.]. Again, Kenyon teaches that the admission of Dr. Mailloux's testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 481 F.3d at 1061. In fact, by basing his testimony on the myriad other pediatric examinations he has performed, Dr. Mailloux did exactly what an expert witness should do: answer questions about A.R.'s injuries in light of his specialized medical expertise and his experience.