Opinion ID: 1919348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence of Prior Criminal Charges.

Text: ś 32. Hodges claims that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution, on cross-examination in the sentencing phase, to refer to Hodges' two escape charges and his previous arrest for the burglary of a school in 1997 and burglary and attempted sexual battery in 1998. He asserts that this violates the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101, as evidence of bad acts is not one of the eight enumerated aggravating factors admissible in capital sentencing trial and that they were not relevant to any of the statutory aggravating factors. Hodges also claims that during the testimony of Hodges the court erred when it received into evidence the actual indictment for the previous burglary and sexual battery charge. Hodges argues that the indictment itself could not be used for impeachment or rebuttal.

ś 33. During direct examination, Hodges' sister, Lisa Hodges, testified that Hodges went to church and Sunday school and that he was a good kid that helped other people. She stated that Hodges did not fight and he obeyed his parents. She characterized him as being a nice, young boy growing up who had respect for his elders and was not violent towards other people. On cross-examination, the State sought to discredit this testimony. Hodges' sister was asked whether she knew that he had escaped from the jail twice and whether escaping from jail shows any respect. She stated that no it did not show respect for authority. ś 34. The State argues that this asserted error is procedurally barred because defense counsel never raised these issues during the sentencing phase. During the cross-examination, the defense counsel did object to this line of questioning. However, their objection did not state that they were objecting because it was improper character evidence. The defense, when he objected, said we are going to object to that testimony. That's nothing that's been revealed anywhere. This Court has stated that when the objecting party does not state with some degree of certainty the ground on which the objection is made, and failure to articulate some other available ground acts as a waiver as to the unstated basis. Materials Transp. Co. v. Newman, 656 So.2d 1199, 1203 (Miss. 1995). Failure of the defense counsel to articulate the ground upon which the objection is made, acts as a waiver. However, because this issue is raised in the direct appeal of a capital case, this Court will consider the merits of Hodges' argument. ś 35. The prosecution has no right to introduce evidence of wrongs and bad acts to prove Hodges' character or to show he acted in conformity therewith, unless it is competent rebuttal evidence in the face of the showing of Hodges' good character made on direct examination of this witness. Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 148 (Miss.1991) (citing Simpson v. State, 497 So.2d 424, 428-29 (Miss.1986); Winters v. State, 449 So.2d 766, 771 (Miss. 1984)). M.R.E. 404(b) provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The State questioned Hodges' sister about a prior bad act, the two attempts to escape jail. On direct examination, Hodges' sister testified that Hodges' character was good, that he respected his elders, did not disobey his parents, and that he was not a violent person and never fought. Her direct examination testimony opened the door to the State to ask these questions. There was testimony on direct that he was a good boy that respected his elders. The introduction of the two prior escapes from the jail was not error.
ś 36. During direct examination Chris Hodges testified that Hodges was soft spoken, easy going, never fought, was never disruptive and he never defended himself. Chris stated that Hodges was the type of person who would avoid conflict. He stated that Hodges was a good person who would not have done this type of crime. Chris claimed that Hodges' troubles were the direct result of his relationship with Cora. Chris specifically testified that Hodges did not have problems with authorities prior to the time that he got arrested and charged with burglary. On cross-examination, the State sought to discredit this testimony. Chris stated that Hodges did not have problems with the authorities prior to his burglary of Cora's house. He also stated that his problems stemmed from his relationship with Cora. On cross the State asked whether he knew that Hodges was charged with burglary of a school and burglary of another house along with sexual battery, all of which happened prior to the burglary of Cora's house and had nothing to do with his relationship with Cora. ś 37. As stated previously, the prosecution has no right to introduce evidence of wrongs and bad acts to prove Hodges' character or to show he acted in conformity therewith, unless it is competent rebuttal evidence in the face of the showing of Hodges' good character made on direct examination of this witness. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 148. On direct examination, Chris testified that Hodges' character was good and that he was not disruptive and not the kind of person to commit this crime. He also testified that Hodges did not have problems with the law prior to the charge of burglary of Cora's house and that the problems with the law stemmed from his relationship with Cora. This direct testimony opened the door to bring in the prior bad acts that occurred prior to the burglary of Cora's house and the bad acts that had nothing to do with Cora. The introduction of these other burglaries and the sexual battery was not error.
ś 38. During direct examination, Sharon Green, Hodges' sister, testified that Hodges was never any trouble, was a normal child and never got into fights. On cross examination the State asked Sharon whether she was aware of the other difficulties he had, namely the burglary of the school, and the burglary and sexual assault of another victim. However, the defense never objected to these questions during the cross-examination. The law in Mississippi mandates that counsel must contemporaneously object to inadmissible evidence in order to preserve the error for appeal. Rushing v. State, 711 So.2d 450, 453 (Miss.1998); Lester v. State, 692 So.2d 755, 795 (Miss.1997). This rule is generally applied to situations in which no objection is made during trial and the issue is subsequently raised on appeal. Crosswhite v. State, 732 So.2d 856, 861 (Miss.1998). This is exactly what we have in the case sub judice. Defense counsel never objected to this evidence during the questioning and now they are raising it on appeal. This issue has been waived and was not preserved for appeal. ś 39. Procedural bar aside, this issue is without merit. As stated previously, the prosecution has no right to introduce evidence of wrongs and bad acts to prove Hodges' character or to show he acted in conformity therewith, unless it is competent rebuttal evidence in the face of the showing of Hodges' good character made on direct examination of this witness. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 148. Her direct examination testimony opened the door to the State to ask these questions regarding Hodges' previous crimes. Furthermore, this evidence was already placed before the jury during the cross of Chris Hodges.
ś 40. Hodges also argues that the admission of these prior bad acts were prohibited, since they were not relevant to any of the statutory aggravating factors enumerated in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5). Hodges alleges that the State is only allowed to offer evidence that is relevant to the statutory aggravating circumstances. However, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(1) provides that at the sentencing hearing evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. This Court has stated that the statute does not limit the evidence that can be presented at the sentencing phase to evidence relevant to the aggravating circumstances. West v. State, 820 So.2d 668, 670 (Miss.2001). As discussed above, these prior bad acts were introduced when the defense opened the door to Hodges' character. Since § 99-19-101(1) allows any evidence that the court deems relevant to sentence and because these acts were relevant to rebut the direct testimony of Hodges' character, this assignment of error is without merit. This Court has also held that [t]he State is allowed to rebut mitigating evidence through cross-examination, introduction of rebuttal evidence or by argument. Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1202 (Miss.1999) (quoting Turner v. State, 732 So.2d at 950). As stated previously, these prior bad acts were admissible as proper rebuttal evidence. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
ś 41. Hodges also claims that the trial court erred when it received into evidence the actual indictment for the previous burglary and sexual battery charge. Hodges argues that the indictment itself could not be used for impeachment or rebuttal and that its use violates with the rules of evidence. ś 42. On direct examination, during the sentencing phase, Hodges was asked it's true that in the past you've been charged with some other crimes, isn't it? Hodges answered this question saying that he had only been charged with one other crime, which was the burglary of Cora's house. Hodges testified that he was charged with that one other crime and he served his time in the RID program. On cross-examination, the State asked you testified that you were charged only with one charge; is that correct? Hodges again said that he had only been charged with one crime. The State then asked Hodges whether he recalled the other three crimes, the burglary of the school and the burglary and sexual assault of another female victim. Hodges said that he did not recall the three other crimes. The State then handed Hodges a copy of the indictment which showed one of the crimes and Hodges said that he did not recognize it. The State then showed Hodges another indictment which showed the burglary of the other victim's house and the attempted sexual battery of the other victim. Hodges then admitted that he was charged with these other crimes. The State moved to introduce these indictments into evidence in which the Court allowed. Hodges did not object to the introduction of these indictments. ś 43. If no contemporaneous objection is made, the error, if any, is waived. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 597 (Miss.1995) (citing Foster v. State, 639 So.2d at 1270). Since Hodges never objected to the introduction of these indictments, the issue is procedurally barred. Procedural bar aside, this issue is without merit. ś 44. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 608 provides in part: (b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. This Court has held that specific instances of conduct under our Rules of Evidence may not be proved by extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes; they may only be inquired about on cross-examination. Jackson v. State, 645 So.2d 921, 923 (Miss.1994) (citing M.R.E. 609 & Lewis v. State, 580 So.2d 1279, 1287 (Miss. 1991) (emphasis omitted)). In Jackson, the State attempted to impeach a defense witness with extrinsic evidence of specific instances of that witness' conduct. 645 So.2d at 923. This Court held that such attempts at impeachment are clearly forbidden by Rule 608(b). Id. at 923-24. However, in Jackson, this Court held that the rule violation did not rise above harmless error. Id. at 924. We are not required to reverse a case based solely upon the showing of an error in evidentiary ruling. A denial of a substantial right of the defendant must have been affected by the evidentiary ruling . . . Id. (citing Newsom v. State, 629 So.2d 611, 612 (Miss. 1993)). ś 45. Although the introduction of the indictment was improper impeachment evidence, such error was harmless. The jury, on many previous occasions throughout the sentencing phase, heard testimony regarding these other crimes. Hodges was not denied a substantial right by the introduction of this indictment. ś 46. The State argues that the introduction of this indictment was not improper because it was used to rebut Hodges' inferences and direct statements that his prior criminal history was insignificant. Indeed, this Court has held that [t]he State is allowed to rebut mitigating evidence through cross-examination, introduction of rebuttal evidence or by argument. Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1202 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Turner v. State, 732 So.2d at 950). ś 47. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this issue is without merit.