Opinion ID: 222490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Counterclaim

Text: Multiut and Draiman's final counterclaim alleges that Dynegy violated section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), by charging Multiut more for gas than it charged Nicor Energy. They point to price differentials of up to ten cents per therm and contend that Multiut was injured by them. Proceeding under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, they seek treble damages and attorneys' fees. The district court found that Multiut and Draiman failed to offer any evidence that Multiut suffered injury and therefore granted summary judgment in Dynegy's favor even though it was not persuaded by Dynegy's other arguments. We review this determination de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in Multiut and Draiman's favor. E.g., Davis, ___ F.3d at ___. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it illegal to discriminate in price when an injury to competition is the consequence. Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). It is a prophylactic statute which is violated merely upon a showing that `the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition.' J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561, 101 S.Ct. 1923, 68 L.Ed.2d 442 (1981) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2(a)). To establish the secondary-line [2] violation of which they complain, Multiut and Draiman must show (1) that Dynegy's sales of natural gas to Multiut and Nicor Energy were made in interstate commerce; (2) that the gas was of like grade and quality; (3) that Dynegy discriminated in price between Multiut and Nicor Energy; and (4) that the discrimination may have injured competition, to Nicor Energy's advantage. See Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 176-77, 126 S.Ct. 860 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)); Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 556, 110 S.Ct. 2535, 110 L.Ed.2d 492 (1990) (same); see also ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 1 Antitrust Law Developments 490 (6th ed. 2007) (Proof of a violation under Section 2(a) requires (1) a difference in price, (2) in sales to two buyers purchasing from a single seller, (3) involving commodities, (4) of like grade and quality, (5) that may injure competition.). The competitive injury prong of this showing may be inferred from evidence that a favored competitor received significantly better prices over an extended period of time; the hallmark of such injury is the diversion of sales or profits from a disfavored purchaser to a favored purchaser. Volvo Trucks, 546 U.S. at 177, 126 S.Ct. 860. But mere demonstration of a competitive injury and the other elements of a violation does not mean that a disfavored purchaser has been actually `injured' within the meaning of § 4 [of the Clayton Act]. J. Truett Payne Co., 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923. Plaintiffs (here, counterplaintiffs) seeking to recover treble damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 must prove more than a violation of § 2(a), since such proof establishes only that injury may result. Id.; cf. Texaco, 496 U.S. at 572, 110 S.Ct. 2535 (noting distinction between liability and damages issues in the Robinson-Patman context). The burden of showing damages is not unduly rigorous, Texaco, 496 U.S. at 573, 110 S.Ct. 2535 (quoting J. Truett Payne Co., 451 U.S. at 562, 101 S.Ct. 1923), but plaintiffs must present some evidence of injury attributable to the price discrimination, see Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1282, 75 L.Ed.2d 174 (1983); J. Truett Payne Co., 451 U.S. at 568, 101 S.Ct. 1923 ([I]f there has been a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, petitioner is not excused from its burden of proving antitrust injury and damages. It is simply that once a violation is established, that burden is to some extent lightened.). As on their breach of confidentiality agreement counterclaim, Multiut and Draiman have failed to satisfy this obligation. Multiut and Draiman devote much of their briefing on this issue to an argument that they established a prima facie violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The district court rejected Dynegy's arguments for summary judgment on those grounds, however, so we are unsure why Multiut and Draiman have pursued this line of argument at the expense of attempting to establish an actual injury resulting from Dynegy's alleged price discrimination, an argument to which they dedicate a mere five sentences between their opening and reply briefs. In those five sentences, Multiut and Draiman contend that they have identified evidence of lost sales and profits resulting from Dynegy's price discrimination. They do not, however, give any indication of what that evidence was, or how it tied to Dynegy's actions. We assume they are referring to the $5 million lost profits figure reported only in the properly excluded Draiman declaration, and their expert's computation that the long-term difference in prices charged amounted to roughly $1.86 million, even though the expert expressly testified that he did no work relating to the Robinson-Patman counterclaim and, moreover, such computation is insufficient evidence of damages. See Texaco, 496 U.S. at 551, 110 S.Ct. 2535. Even if Multiut and Draiman are able to ultimately prove that Dynegy violated the Robinson-Patman Act, they have not presented admissible evidence from which a jury could find that Multiut was injured as a result. The district court properly entered summary judgment on this counterclaim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.