Opinion ID: 3009669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Jury Costs

Text: Finally, Spain appeals from the district court's assessment of jury costs of $375 against her following the court's dismissal of her case. We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a court's imposition of sanctions under its 0 Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31; 82 S.Ct. at 1388-89. Spain's reliance on Coursen v. A.H. Robbins Co., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.), as amended, 773 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1985), is misplaced. In Coursen, which involved a claim of injury from a birth control device, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion to preclude the defendant from introducing evidence regarding their sexual history. 764 F.2d at 1341. Plaintiffs' actions were dismissed with prejudice when they then refused to proceed to trial. Id. at 1342. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court with instructions that plaintiffs be directed to proceed to trial or have their cases dismissed. Id. at 1343. Coursen is quite unlike the present case, however, in that the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court to give the plaintiffs the option to continue with the litigation due to the confusion surrounding the entry of the dismissal order and the resulting availability of appellate review. Here, there is no doubt that Spain had a complete understanding of the implications of deciding not to proceed prior to making that decision. 41 inherent power. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, __, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2138 (1991) (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 633, 82 S.Ct. at 1390). While federal courts possess the inherent power to punish conduct which abuses the judicial process, they must exercise the power with restraint and discretion. Chambers, 501 U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 2132 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463 (1980)). A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for abusive conduct. Chambers, 501 U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 2132-33. Because we believe that there are no grounds for finding that Spain abused the judicial process with respect to when she notified the court she would not proceed with the trial, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in assessing the jury costs against her. As we describe above, the district court precluded Spain from proceeding with her sexual discrimination and harassment and discrimination claims and issued its evidentiary exclusion decision on Thursday, July 15, 1993, the day that the jury was picked. The testimonial portion of the trial was to begin on Monday, July 19, 1993. However, on that morning, Spain informed the court she would not proceed with her remaining claims. The district court then dismissed her case with prejudice and assessed the jury costs against her. Perhaps Spain could have reached her decision not to prosecute her remaining claims and informed the court of her decision on the day that the court issued its first rulings and 42 the jury was picked, or even on the next day, Friday, July 16, 1993. Yet, even though the trial was set to begin only the following Monday, and the court was aware that Spain was contemplating abandoning her remaining claims, it set no time limit for her decision. See Boettcher v. Hartford Ins. Group, 927 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1991) (assessment of jury costs by district court reversed when case settled on day of trial). Thus, we find no basis in the record to support a conclusion that Spain and her attorney acted in bad faith or otherwise abused the judicial process in taking the weekend before reaching a final decision not to proceed.0 Moreover, as the district court imposed the sanction without affording Spain prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, its action raises due process concerns. See Eash, 757 F.2d at 570-71. While we could, of course, cure the due process problem by remanding the matter for reconsideration of the imposition of the sanction, we think that in view of the modest $375 assessment, it would be prudent to consider the matter on the record as it exists. Overall, we are convinced that the district court abused its discretion in assessing the costs of the jury against Spain.