Opinion ID: 1672000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Sentencing Order and Proportionality

Text: For his last claim of error, Walker contends that his death sentence is disproportionate because the trial court erred in finding the heinous, atrocious or cruel; cold, calculated and premeditated; and pecuniary gain aggravators and also improperly failed to consider certain statutory and nonstatutory mitigators established by the evidence. As noted previously, the trial court's finding that the HAC aggravator existed here is supported by the record and this factor has been established regardless of whether Ms. Jones was conscious when she was thrown into the canal. Adams, 412 So.2d at 857 (fear and emotional strain preceding victim's death may be considered as contributing to heinous nature of capital felony); see also Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 421 (Fla. 1986) (factor of heinousness is applicable where method of killing is strangulation). As to the CCP aggravator, the trial court's finding that the defendant carefully, calmly and with reflection, planned to lure Joanne Jones to a place where she could be abducted, enlisted the assistance of his brothers to kill her, and then proceeded according to plan, is supported by the record and consistent with other cases where we have approved this aggravator. See Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983 (Fla.1991) (advance procurement of weapon and ample time for reflection supported CCP notwithstanding contemporaneous finding that defendant acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbance); Koon v. State, 513 So.2d 1253 (Fla.1987) (luring victim from home and advance procurement of murder weapon supported CCP). With respect to the pecuniary gain aggravator, Walker argues that the evidence was insufficient to submit this aggravator to the jury and further failed to preclude the reasonable hypothesis that this domestic murder was motivated by anger rather than financial gain. We have stated that this aggravating factor is established where the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to obtain money, property, or other financial gain. Finney v. State, 660 So.2d 674, 680 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1096, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996); see also Allen v. State, 662 So.2d 323 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1107, 116 S.Ct. 1326, 134 L.Ed.2d 477 (1996). In this case, Walker encouraged Ms. Jones to have an abortion when he learned about the pregnancy, later stating that he could make her life miserable in the event she chose to have the baby. Shortly after Quinton's birth, Ms. Jones asked Walker to contribute to the child's support. When he refused she sought a court order award of support. Within weeks of the final order awarding support, Walker murdered Ms. Jones and his infant son. In his confession, Walker stated that he and Ms. Jones were arguing about the child support award in Sewell Park before he killed her. We find that the defendant's pecuniary motive in avoiding child support permeates this case and this aggravating factor is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding mitigating circumstances, Walker claims that the trial court's finding that the no criminal history mitigator has been proven by clear and convincing evidence indicates that the trial court applied too stringent a standard of proof when considering all possible mitigators. We previously rejected this claim in Henry v. State, 613 So.2d 429, 432-33 (Fla.1992). In this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the standard of proof for mitigators and the language about which Walker complains does not establish that the trial court failed to follow those instructions. Walker next argues that the trial court improperly rejected the substantial impairment statutory mitigator, § 921.141(6)(f), where Dr. Eisenstein's expert opinion that it existed was supported by psychological data and the defendant's life history. The trial court rejected the opinion testimony of Dr. Eisenstein concerning the existence of this mental mitigator because Walker's conduct demonstrates rather than negates an ability to understand the criminality of [his] actions. In addition, contrary to Walker's assertions, the expert testimony was rebutted by the State, and Walker's other mental health expert, Dr. Toomer, could not say with certainty that this statutory mitigator existed. Consequently, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion in rejecting this statutory mitigator. See Johnson, 660 So.2d at 646-47 (contradictory evidence regarding mitigating factor supports trial court's conclusion that factor does not exist); Walls, 641 So.2d at 390-91 (stating that debatable link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor, usually means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve). As to the nonstatutory mitigator of Walker's abusive childhood, however, we agree with Walker that the trial court erred in rejecting this factor and giving it no weight in the sentencing process. The trial court acknowledged that the evidence supported the existence of this mitigator but then improperly rejected it because Walker had demonstrated good behavior in his adult life. This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that evidence of abuse of the defendant is mitigating in nature. See Elledge v. State, 613 So.2d 434, 436 (Fla.1993); Clark v. State, 609 So.2d 513, 516 (Fla.1992). Moreover, we have expressly rejected the rationale upon which the trial court in the instant case dismissed this mitigator. See Nibert v. State, 574 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla.1990) (The fact that a defendant had suffered through more than a decade of psychological and physical abuse during the defendant's formative childhood and adolescent years is in no way diminished by the fact that the abuse finally came to an end.). In addition, we find that the trial court failed to consider numerous nonstatutory positive mitigators that Walker was honorably discharged from the military; was gainfully employed; had family members who testified to his good qualities; and was a deacon in his church. [12] Contrary to the State's assertion that Walker failed to apprise the trial court of these nonstatutory mitigators in a reasonable manner, we find that Walker adequately addressed these various factors in his sentencing memorandum and in his motion for requested instructions on nonstatutory mitigators, which was expressly incorporated by reference in the sentencing memorandum to the court. This Court has repeatedly held that all mitigating evidence, found anywhere in the record, must be considered and weighed by the trial court in its determination of whether to impose a sentence of death. See Robinson v. State, 684 So.2d 175 (Fla.1996); Farr v. State, 621 So.2d 1368 (Fla.1993); Santos v. State, 591 So.2d 160 (Fla.1991); Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415 (Fla.1990); Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla.1987). We have just recently underscored this requirement in Reese v. State, 694 So.2d 678 (Fla.1997), wherein we remanded for a new sentencing under circumstances almost identical to those involved herein. The policy rationale behind our holdings is very simple yet powerful: While all judicial proceedings require fair and deliberate consideration by a trial judge, this is particularly important in a capital case because, as we have said, death is different. Crump v. State, 654 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla.1995) (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 17 (Fla. 1973)) (emphasis added). Since the ultimate penalty of death cannot be remedied if erroneously imposed, trial courts have the undelegable duty and solemn obligation to not only consider any and all mitigating evidence, but also to expressly evaluate in [their] written order[s] each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence. Campbell, 571 So.2d at 419; Ferrell v. State, 653 So.2d 367, 371 (Fla.1995) (reaffirming Campbell and establishing enumerated requirements for treatment of mitigating evidence). This bedrock requirement cannot be met by treating mitigating evidence as an academic exercise which may be summarily addressed and disposed of. To satisfy Campbell: This evaluation must determine if the statutory mitigating circumstance is supported by the evidence and if the non-statutory mitigating circumstance is truly of a mitigating nature. A mitigator is supported by evidence if it is mitigating in nature and reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence. Once established, the mitigator is weighed against any aggravating circumstances. It is within the sentencing judge's discretion to determine the relative weight given to each established mitigator; however, some weight must be given to all established mitigators. The result of this weighing process must be detailed in the written sentencing order and supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record. The absence of any of the enumerated requirements deprives this Court of the opportunity for meaningful review. Ferrell, 653 So.2d at 371 (emphasis added). Clearly then, the result of this weighing process can only satisfy Campbell and its progeny if it truly comprises a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of any evidence that mitigates against the imposition of the death penalty. We do not use the word process lightly. If the trial court does not conduct such a deliberate inquiry and then document its findings and conclusions, this Court cannot be assured that it properly considered all mitigating evidence. In such a situation, we are precluded from meaningfully reviewing the sentencing order. Id. Since that is precisely the case here, we must vacate the sentence of death and remand for a proper evaluation and weighing of all nonstatutory mitigating evidence as required by Campbell, Ferrell, Robinson, and Reese. Accordingly, we affirm Walker's convictions and his sentences for the noncapital felony offenses, but remand this case for a careful and proper reconsideration by the trial court to be completed within 120 days as to the sentences for capital felonies where Walker's abusive upbringinga significant mitigating factoras well as the other positive nonstatutory mitigators described above are accorded appropriate consideration and weight in the trial court's sentencing process. It is so ordered. OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. WELLS, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I fully concur with the majority's decision affirming Walker's conviction. I dissent from the majority's remand of this case for reconsideration by the trial court. The trial court's order shows that the court considered the evidence of the defendant's childhood but found that it was entitled to no weight. The trial court then wrote: The mitigating circumstances, both statutory and non-statutory were separately considered, and accorded appropriate weight. This statement sufficiently shows that the trial court followed the dictates of Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla. 1990). See Barwick v. State, 660 So.2d 685, 695-96 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1097, 116 S.Ct. 823, 133 L.Ed.2d 766 (1996). I would affirm the death sentence.