Opinion ID: 166964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuing Criminal Enterprise Challenges

Text: 18 The Atencios appeal on several grounds from their convictions under the continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) statute, which provides in pertinent part that: 19 (b) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be imprisoned for life ... if ... 20 (2)(A) the violation referred to in subsection (c)(1) of this section involved at least 300 times the quantity of a substance described in subsection 841(b)(1)(B) of this title.... 21 (c) ... [A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if— 22 (1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and 23 (2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter— 24 (A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and 25 (B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources. 26 21 U.S.C. § 848. The Atencios raise several challenges under the statute: (1) that the trial court violated their due process and Sixth Amendment rights by allowing the prosecution to prove that the enterprise as a whole, rather than the specific violations found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, involved the drug quantities required for a life sentence under § 848(b)(2)(A); (2) that there was insufficient evidence of those drug quantities because of flaws in the methods used by Agent Medina to extrapolate the amount of marijuana and cocaine over the length of the conspiracy; (3) that there was insufficient evidence that Eva Atencio held a position of organizer, supervisor, or manager over five or more persons under § 848(c)(2)(A); and (4) that the conspiracy charged in Count 2 is a lesser included offense of the continuing enterprise, and the Atencios' life sentences under both Counts 1 and 2 therefore violated double jeopardy.
27 Initially, the Atencios argue that the district court erred by confusing the relationship between the drug quantities described in § 848(b)(2)(A) 1 and the violations that make up the continuing criminal enterprise under § 848(c). Three interpretations of that relationship appear plausible. First, as the government argues, the statute might require merely that the enterprise as a whole involved either 30,000 kilograms of marijuana or 150 kilograms of cocaine. Second, as the Atencios argue, the statute might require that the specific violations necessary to make up the continuing series, each of which must be agreed upon by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 815, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), together involved an aggregate amount of marijuana or cocaine that satisfies the required quantities. Third, based on the language of § 848(b)(2)(A), the statute might require that any one felony violation that forms part of the series of violations must have involved the required drug quantities. 28 The district court apparently adopted the government's interpretation, issuing jury instructions that asked whether the offense charged in Count 1—that is, the continuing criminal enterprise—involved at least 30,000 kilograms of marijuana ... or 150 kilograms of cocaine. App. Vol. I, p. 111. The jury instructions in no way tied the drug quantities to the specific violations found in Counts 3-7 that made up the continuing series, and certainly did not ask the jury to conclude that any one of the places maintained for distribution in Counts 3-6, or the possession with intent to distribute charge in Count 7, by itself involved the required amount of marijuana or cocaine. 29 The Atencios argue that because the district court misconstrued the statute, the jury findings were not sufficient under § 848(b), and their mandatory life sentences therefore violate due process and the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-11, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995) (noting that due process and the Sixth Amendment give[ ] a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (reaffirming that facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be found by a jury). 30 Ordinarily, we review questions of statutory construction de novo. Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir.2004). In this case, however, as counsel conceded at oral argument, the Atencios neither raised their challenge below nor submitted a proposed jury instruction that comported with their interpretation of the statute. 2 The district court therefore had no opportunity to adopt the jury instructions that the Atencios now insist were required. See United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1303 (10th Cir.1999) (requiring that, to preserve the issue for review, a challenge must put the district court clearly on notice as to the asserted inadequacy of the jury instruction (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because the issue was not raised below, we review the district court's decision for plain error, and will reverse only if we find (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 31 Although we have not considered the relationship between the drug quantities required in § 848(b)(2)(A) and the violation described in § 848(c)(1), we have considered a similar question. In United States v. Almaraz, 306 F.3d 1031, 1034-35 (10th Cir.2002), the defendant argued that the requirement of action in concert with five or more other persons under § 848(c)(2)(A) referred to the specific violations agreed upon by the jury under Richardson. We disagreed, holding that the words undertook such violations in § 848(c)(2)(A) in fact referred to the continuing series of violations in § 848(c)(2), and that the jury was not limited to the agreed-upon violations in finding that the series involved five or more other persons. Id. at 1038-39. 32 In this case, allowing the prosecution to prove merely that the criminal enterprise as a whole involved 30,000 kilograms of marijuana or 150 grams of cocaine may well have been error. For that matter, the Atencios' proposed interpretation, under which the series of violations specifically found by the jury must involve those quantities in the aggregate, may well be erroneous. The text of § 848(b)(2)(A) refers neither to subsection (c), which defines the continuing criminal enterprise as a whole, nor to subsection (c)(2), which describes the continuing series of violations. Instead, § 848(b)(2)(A) requires that  the violation referred to in subsection (c)(1) of this section involved at least 30,000 kilograms of marijuana or 150 kilograms of cocaine. Subsection (c)(1) describes a single, specific violation— he violates any provision— on which the jury must unanimously agree. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816, 119 S.Ct. 1707. The violation in subsection (c)(1) also must be a felony, in apparent contrast to the other violations that make up the continuing series under subsection (c)(2). Compare 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(1) (requiring a violation of any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony), with 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (requiring a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter undertaken in concert with others and from which the defendant derives substantial income). Thus, although Almaraz provides some support for the government's position, it is by no means controlling. Unlike the five or more other persons requirement, which by its language and structural subordination to § 848(c)(2) modifies the series of violations, the drug quantity requirement in § 848(b)(2)(A) refers to the violation in § 848(c)(1). Based on the text of the statute, we acknowledge some doubt as to the correctness of the jury instructions in this case. But see United States v. Singleton, 177 F.Supp.2d 31, 40-41 (D.D.C.2001) (adopting the same interpretation of § 848(b)(2)(A) reflected in the jury instructions in this case). 33 Even if the district court's construction of the statute amounted to error that is plain, however, reversal is inappropriate on these facts because the error did not affect the Atencios' substantial rights, as required by the third prong of the plain error standard. See Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732. Normally, a defendant must make a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the `affecting substantial rights' requirement of plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). The burden to establish prejudice lies with the party that failed to raise its objection below. United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir.2005). In Fabiano, the defendant was convicted on charges of knowingly receiving child pornography, but the government conceded at oral argument that the jury instructions should have explicitly asked for a factual finding as to when the defendant acquired knowledge that the images depicted children. Fabiano, 169 F.3d at 1305. This Court assumed for the sake of argument that the instructions were erroneous, but nevertheless found no prejudice and declined to reverse the conviction because the evidence was overwhelming as to the defendant's guilt, even under the jury instructions proposed by the defendant. See id. 34 Given the extensive evidence, obviously credited by the jury, of the nature and scope of the Atencios' drug trafficking activities, the jury instructions now proposed by the Defendants would not have made any difference. Most damningly, the cocaine ledger seized by the government revealed receipts of 291 kilograms during a nine-month period from August 2002 to April 2003. According to the Agent Medina, extrapolating those data over the length of the conspiracy from January 1999 to May 2003, a complete set of ledgers would have reflected receipts of 1,891 kilograms of cocaine— more than ten times the 150 kilograms required under § 848(b)(2)(A). 3 Although the jury was not specifically instructed to find that the cocaine represented in the ledger was involved in one of the violations charged in Counts 3-7, the jury had good reason to believe that the drugs were related to Count 4, for maintaining the Pajarito Road residence. The cocaine ledger was discovered there, and Mr. Palma testified that he had seen 25 kilograms of cocaine in an RV parked there. On cross-examination of Agent Medina, defense counsel attempted to demonstrate that the Atencios had no involvement with cocaine whatsoever, and that their possession of chemicals used as a cutting agent for cocaine was innocent, but gave no indication that the cocaine in the ledgers in fact reflected activity from other locations. Moreover, the quantity of cocaine calculated by the expert witness so far exceeded 150 kilograms that the jury could have decided that 92% of the cocaine had no connection to the Pajarito Road residence, while still concluding that Count 4 involved the minimum drug quantity required under the statute. In this case, as in Fabiano, the jury had overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt, even under instructions that cured the alleged error of the district court. 35 Under these circumstances, the Atencios have not carried their burden of demonstrating that any error in the jury instructions prejudiced the result of their trial. We therefore decline to reverse their sentences for plain error. 36
37 The Atencios also challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, under either set of jury instructions, that their conspiracy involved 30,000 kilograms of marijuana or 150 kilograms of cocaine. We review the record for sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and determine whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1143 (10th Cir.2005). In doing so, we neither weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of witnesses. United States v. Darrell, 828 F.2d 644, 647 (10th Cir.1987). The jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence, but may not convict based on mere speculation or conjecture. United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 865 (10th Cir.1995). We therefore uphold convictions based on inferences that flow[ ] from logical and probabilistic reasoning. Id. 38 In United States v. Arras, 373 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (10th Cir.2004), the jury returned a verdict of guilty despite the fact that the government had presented no direct evidence that the defendant had transported more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, as required by the relevant statute. This Court upheld the conviction, holding that the jury's inferences of total drug quantities clearly flowed from logical and probabilistic reasoning, based on several factors: the amount of marijuana actually seized from the defendant when she was captured, the number of previous trips she had taken, and expert testimony comparing the amount she was paid for each trip with the going rate for marijuana. See id. Other circuits, applying the slightly less demanding clearly erroneous standard of review, have upheld findings of total drug quantities based on reasonable extrapolations from drug ledgers representing a brief period. See United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1572 (11th Cir.1994) (upholding the district court's finding that a conspiracy lasting four years involved more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, based on drug ledgers that recorded 130 kilograms of sales over a two-month period); United States v. Cagle, 922 F.2d 404, 406-07 (7th Cir.1991) (upholding the district court's finding that a conspiracy involved 3 kilograms of cocaine, based on an expert's extrapolations from a drug ledger listing definite quantities less than that amount). On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435, 1444-45, 1447 (11th Cir. 1995), rejected as clearly erroneous an extrapolation, based on quantities of cocaine from a single four-hour period on a payday Friday afternoon videotaped by police, over the 60 to 91 days that the conspiracy lasted, noting that there was no evidence that the four-hour period was a typical or average day or was in any ... way a valid indicator of drug activities on other days. Similarly, the Second Circuit in United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84, 89-90 (2d Cir.1993), rejected the district court's calculation of the total drug quantity by simply multiplying the amount of heroin found on the defendant when he was arrested by his total number of trips to Nigeria, because the government had failed to provide specific evidence of the total amount of heroin— such as drug records, live testimony, or a conservative estimate of [the] drug sales period and heroin seized— and instead engaged in mere surmise and conjecture. 39 Absent some extrapolation by the finder of fact, the evidence of drug quantities in this case was insufficient to support a jury verdict that the conspiracy involved 30,000 kilograms of marijuana or 150 kilograms of cocaine. The testimony at trial indicated first-hand knowledge of only 15,133 pounds (roughly 6,864 kilograms) of marijuana: 10,000 pounds transported by Ms. Quesada, 893 pounds transported by Mr. Duran, 3,500 pounds transported by Ms. Ramirez, 540 pounds observed by Mr. Gambino Madrid, and 200 pounds observed by Mr. Palma. [ See supra Facts section] The same testimony indicated first-hand knowledge of no more than 45 kilograms of cocaine: 4 or 5 kilograms transported by Ms. Quesada and 35 or 40 kilograms observed by Mr. Palma. 40 The jury nonetheless had sufficient evidence to find the required drug quantities, based on the drug ledgers and reasonable extrapolations from the ledgers and other testimony presented by the government. Agent Medina's method of extrapolation was analytically comparable to the reasoning upheld in Arras: it was based on drug quantities actually seized, the number of trips described by witnesses, and expert analysis of documents whose contents appear, based on the going rate for marijuana and cocaine, to reflect drug transactions. His conclusions did not represent mere speculation or conjecture, as witnesses at trial strongly corroborated the scope of the Atencios' conspiracy, testifying that they knew of at least seven other individuals who worked as drug transporters. [ See supra, Facts section] Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, we hold that the jury could have reasonably inferred, based on logical and probabilistic reasoning, that the charged conspiracy involved at least 30,000 kilograms of marijuana or 150 kilograms of cocaine. 41 The Atencios challenge Agent Medina's calculations, arguing that he made various auditing errors that resulted in a 17% overstatement of the quantities reflected in the marijuana ledgers. The largest single error, however, was simply a typo referring to the wrong trial exhibit. To the extent the other purported errors turn on factual disagreements about what the ledgers represent— for example, whether certain pairs of entries double-count the same drugs, coming in and going out—the defense raised that concern on cross-examination, and we are reluctant to substitute our own judgment for that of the jury. Regardless, even accepting all of the Atencios' criticisms at face value, a 17% reduction in Agent Medina's conservative estimate of 40,239 kilograms of marijuana would still yield 33,398 kilograms of marijuana, which is more than the 30,000 required to trigger a mandatory life sentence. Further, the Atencios apparently concede the accuracy of the cocaine ledger, which by itself documents 291 kilograms of cocaine trafficking, more than the 150 kilograms required to convict. 42 Alternatively, the Atencios challenge Agent Medina's extrapolations, making the extravagant claim that [t]he situation at bar in this case is exactly the same as the problem in United States v. Butler.  Aplt. Br. 33. In fact, the cases differ in several obvious ways. First, the cocaine ledger in this case captures nine months of transactions, as opposed to the mere four hours captured on videotape in Butler. The longer the period for which hard data are available, the more reliable any extrapolations over the length of the conspiracy. Second, the ratio between the cocaine ledger period and the duration of the conspiracy in this case is more than 1:6, an order of magnitude better than the 1:60 or 1:90 ratio at issue in Butler, suggesting a more reasonable inference on the part of the expert witness and the jury. Third, in Butler the court had good reason to believe that the Friday captured on videotape was a payday, and thus not a reliable indicator of activities on a typical day. See Butler, 41 F.3d at 1447. In contrast, the Atencios provided no evidence at trial, and have offered no reason on appeal, that the nine months of cocaine transactions documented in the ledger were not representative of their usual cocaine trafficking activities. The Atencios' reliance on Shonubi is also unpersuasive because in this case, the government has provided precisely the kind of evidence it lacked in Shonubi: drug records, live testimony to corroborate the quantities, and estimates of the total quantities based on the drug sales period. See Shonubi, 998 F.2d at 89. 43 At bottom, the Atencios object to the act of extrapolation itself, asking this Court to hold that, as a matter of law, drug ledgers reflecting transactions during a portion of a conspiracy cannot serve as a sufficient basis for projections of drug quantities for the entire conspiracy. We decline to adopt such a rule, and find sufficient evidence in this case from which a reasonable jury, relying on logical and probabilistic reasoning, could infer the required drug quantities. 44
45 Next, Eva Atencio alone challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that she acted in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A). Unlike the drug quantities discussed in § 848(b)(2)(A), the five or more persons requirement must be proven, at most, with respect to the series of violations discussed in subsection (c)(2), and not with respect to the agreed-upon violations (or any one felony violation) that makes up the series. See Almaraz, 306 F.3d at 1038-39 (10th Cir.2002) (analyzing dicta from Richardson, 526 U.S. at 823, 119 S.Ct. 1707). To satisfy this requirement, a defendant need not have had regular personal contact with the five persons she supervised, managed, or organized, as [t]he mere delegation of managerial and supervisory duties will not defeat an individual's ultimate status. United States v. Apodaca, 843 F.2d 421, 426 (10th Cir. 1988). The statute requires that the defendant hold a position of organizer, supervisor, or manager with respect to persons, which would appear to exclude a defendant who performed no duties beyond bookkeeping. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (requiring five or more persons with respect to whom [the defendant] occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or manager), with 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(1) (contemplating a separate role for principal administrator [or] organizer... of the enterprise). Still, the defendant need not be the only manager, and a co-manager of the enterprise can be included as one of the five others with respect to whom the defendant holds a supervisory position. Almaraz, 306 F.3d at 1040. 46 The government concedes that Eva Atencio was primarily in charge of the money. Aple. Br. 43. Her handwriting appeared in most of the drug ledgers, and she typically made payments to the drug transporters who made trips to Mexico. Yet the government also presented evidence that Eva Atencio held a supervisory position with respect to certain co-managers and drug transporters. The recorded conversation reveals that she gave specific directions to Mr. Duran, her father, and Popeye. The angry phone call recounted by Mr. Duran suggests that she also held a supervisory position with respect to her brother and unspecified loaders in Mexico. According to Mr. Palma, four named drug transporters (Rogelio, Carmen Romero, Blanca Guerro and her husband Paco) worked for both Edward and Eva Atencio. R. Vol. II, pp. 673-76. Further, both Mr. Palma and Mr. Duran characterized Eva as one of the bosses of the organization. Id. at 755; R. Vol. I, p. 404. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the record reveals that Eva Atencio held a managerial or supervisory position with respect to at least eight individuals, and possibly many others. The jury therefore had sufficient evidence to convict under § 848(c)(2)(A).
47 Finally, the Atencios argue that the district court violated their rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment by sentencing them under both Count 1, for the continuing criminal enterprise, and Count 2, for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846. As the government concedes on appeal, the conspiracy charge against the Atencios is a lesser included offense of the continuing criminal enterprise, Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996), and the district court erred by imposing life sentences under both statutes. Because we affirm the Atencios' convictions under the CCE statute, we remand the case to the district court with instructions to vacate their concurrent sentences for conspiracy. We need not address the Atencios' alternative argument that the district court committed plain error in sentencing them to life for conspiracy.