Opinion ID: 3047018
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The defense of outrageous government conduct

Text: Beckford also argues that the district court erroneously declined to instruct the jury on his theory that his criminal responsibility for the cocaine and firearm charges was limited due to outrageous government conduct. The proposed jury instruction read, in part, “[t]he defendant may be acquitted of any charges in the indictment if the jury determines that his offense conduct relating to that charge 21 was the result of outrageous government conduct.” (emphasis added). The instruction cited United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007). In Ciszkowski, this court stated, “[o]utrageous government conduct occurs when law enforcement obtains a conviction for conduct beyond the defendant’s predisposition by employing methods that fail to comport with due process guarantees.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1998)). A court may remedy outrageous government conduct by dismissing an indictment or by reversing a conviction. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. But this court has never held that outrageous government conduct could constitute a defense for the jury to consider. Given the lack of binding precedent on whether a jury may consider outrageous government conduct as a defense, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Beckford’s proposed jury instruction. See Beckford v. Dep’t of Corr., 605 F.3d 951, 961 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury consistent with our precedent.”).