Opinion ID: 204385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements in the Field

Text: Defendant was not informed of his Miranda rights before he made his statements to Rogers in the police car. But “[o]n its own terms, Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations. Thus, Miranda rights need only be given to a suspect at the moment that suspect is in custody and the questioning meets the legal definition of interrogation.” Id. (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted). The government conceded at oral argument that Rogers was interrogating Defendant; so the sole issue is whether Defendant was in custody. “An individual is in custody of the authorities under Miranda if he is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, or his freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “We therefore must determine whether a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation as the functional equivalent of formal arrest.” Id. (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable person does not have a guilty state of mind and does not have peculiar mental or emotional conditions that are not apparent to the questioning officer.” Jones, 523 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). -6- We have no bright-line rule for determining whether a person is in custody. The inquiry is fact intensive, focusing on a variety of factors. “First, we consider the extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will.” Id. at 1240 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Second, we look at the nature of questioning, where prolonged accusatory questioning is likely to create a coercive environment from which an individual would not feel free to leave.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Third, we determine whether police dominated the encounter by considering the following: Separation of the suspect from family or colleagues who could offer moral support; isolation in nonpublic questioning rooms; threatening presence of several officers; display of a weapon by an officer; physical contact with the subject; and an officer’s use of language or tone of voice in a manner implying that compliance with the request might be compelled. Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In weighing these considerations we keep in mind that “[g]enerally, Miranda warnings are not implicated in the context of a valid Terry stop.” United States v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1275 (10th Cir. 2009) (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted). As we have explained: [T]he typical police-citizen encounter envisioned by the Court in Terry usually involves no more than a very brief detention without the aid of weapons or handcuffs, a few questions relating to identity and the suspicious circumstances, and an atmosphere that is substantially less police dominated than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda. -7- Id. at 1275–76 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is a limited exception to this general rule, however, “if [police] take highly intrusive steps [such as handcuffing and questioning at gunpoint] to protect themselves from danger.” Id. at 1276 (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984) (declining to adopt a categorical rule that traffic stops require or do not require Miranda warnings). Applying the factors in Jones, we conclude that Defendant was subjected only to a typical noncustodial Terry stop. The second and third Jones factors argue strongly against custody. Rogers’s questioning of Defendant was not prolonged and accusatory. See United States v. Lamy, 521 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (one-hour interview during which the questioning was not “unusually confrontational” was not custodial interrogation). Before Defendant admitted that he had dropped a gun in the field, the entire encounter had lasted only three minutes. Rogers primarily asked what Defendant had dropped; only once did he ask, “Is it drugs?” R., Vol. 1 at 38. Rogers questions were not harassing. His tone was conversational. Also, the interview was not dominated by police. Defendant was alone; but he had not been forcibly separated from friends or family. The conversation took place near midday on a public street with only one officer present. Rogers never drew his weapon or raised his voice. Aside from the pat-down at the beginning of -8- the encounter, Rogers never touched Defendant or used force before Defendant made the statements. To be sure, the first factor is of some support to Defendant’s position. Rogers never specifically told Defendant that he did not have to answer questions or that he could leave. On the contrary, when Rogers asked Defendant to sit in the patrol car, he said, “Just don’t take off and go nowhere.” Id. at 37. And while Defendant was in the car, he asked whether he would be allowed to go if he told Rogers what he had dropped. On the other hand, Rogers told Defendant that he was not under arrest. Thus, the restrictions on Defendant’s freedom were no greater than in a classic Terry stop. And in light of the second and third Jones factors, those restrictions were not enough to constitute custody under Miranda. Defendant points out that after he admitted having a needle, Rogers could have arrested him and that he had told Rogers that he was on probation and had recently used heroin. He argues that in these circumstances a reasonable person would assume that he was under arrest. But there is a decisive difference between being arrested and merely being subject to arrest. “No Supreme Court case supports the contention that admission to a crime transforms an interview by the police into a custodial interrogation.” Chee, 514 F.3d at 1114 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “An unstated threat of coercion inherent in the officers’ power to arrest is, taken alone, not enough” to render a situation -9- coercive and custodial. Jones, 523 F.3d at 1241 (defendant not in custody even though officers told her that they had sufficient evidence to arrest her). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would not have understood his status as the functional equivalent of being under formal arrest. Defendant was not in custody when he told Rogers that he had dropped a gun in the field. Hence, no Miranda warnings were required. 1