Opinion ID: 2779776
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: psychiatrists;

Text: (2) psychologists endorsed by the Indiana state board of examiners in psychology as health service providers in psychology; or (3) physicians; who have expertise in determining competency. 48 No. 12-2001 were not placed in the record. We can probably assume that he had the relevant expertise, but he was not asked to evaluate McManus for competency and did not in fact do so. Instead, Dr. Whitehead was brought in to get McManus “fixed up” to finish the trial. Although the judge failed to follow Indiana’s statutory procedure, that’s not a basis for federal habeas relief. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 14 (2010) (“Federal courts may not issue writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners whose confinement does not violate federal law.”); Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (“The Court did not hold [in Pate] that the procedure prescribed by [Illinois law] was constitutionally mandated, although central to its discussion was the conclusion that the statutory procedure, if followed, was constitutionally adequate.” (citations omitted)). A competency hearing may be constitutionally adequate yet fall short of Indiana’s statutory requirements. For the reasons we have explained, however, the judge did not conduct a constitutionally adequate competency hearing. The trial court’s failure to adjudicate the competency question under the standards established in Dusky, Pate, and Drope becomes significant for our review of the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision. As we have noted, the state high court deferred to the trial judge’s rulings. McManus I, 814 N.E. 2d at 260, 264. By subjecting a constitutionally inadequate trialcourt decision to deferential review, the Indiana Supreme Court did not adequately vindicate the federal due-process interests at stake. See Harrison v. McBride, 428 F.3d 652, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2005). No. 12-2001 49 Moreover, the state supreme court’s analysis was itself incomplete. Although the court recited the correct due-process standard early in its decision, McManus I, 814 N.E.2d at 260–61, the court never actually applied it. After acknowledging that the doctors’ testimony was equivocal, the court held that the “consensus of the witnesses was that the medications assisted McManus in participating in his trial.” Id. at 264. Reasonable minds can differ about whether the record fairly supports that interpretation. But asking whether the medications were “assisting” McManus does not resolve the competency question, at least not without further factual and legal analysis. The due-process inquiry asks whether the defendant had a present factual and rational understanding of the trial proceedings and the capacity to assist his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. Because the court never actually applied this standard, it too committed unreasonable error. Accordingly, although the standard of review under AEDPA is deferential, the record does not permit a conclusion that the state courts reasonably applied federal due-process standards in adjudicating McManus’s competency to stand trial.12 McManus prevails on this claim. 12 A slightly different way of looking at it is that a legal error infected the trial court’s fact-finding process, so the resulting factual determination is unreasonable. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Obviously, where the state court’s legal error infects the fact-finding process, the resulting factual determination will be unreasonable and no presumption of correctness can attach to it.”). In other words, the state supreme court affirmed an unreasonable factual finding on deferential (continued...) 50 No. 12-2001 This brings us to the question of remedy. Sometimes a retrospective competency hearing is possible, though for obvious reasons contemporaneous determinations are preferred. Young v. Walls, 311 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2002). A retrospective hearing may be a remedial option if “it is still possible to hold a meaningful retrospective hearing to determine if the defendant was fit to stand trial at the time of the original state proceedings.” Estock v. Lane, 842 F.2d 184, 188 (7th Cir. 1988). “The passage of even a considerable amount of time may not be an insurmountable obstacle if there is sufficient evidence in the record derived from knowledge contemporaneous to trial.” United States ex rel. Bilyew v. Franzen, 686 F.2d 1238, 1247 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 904 (5th Cir. 1976)). Compare Burt v. Uchtman, 422 F.3d 557, 566 (7th Cir. 2005) (granting the writ of habeas corpus where medication disrupted a defendant’s alertness during trial), with Young, 311 F.3d at 848–49 (noting that “when a defendant’s condition is stable, evidence adduced after trial allows a reliable reconstruction of the defendant’s mental state at trial”). Here, the problem extends far beyond the passage of time. McManus’s condition was highly unstable; the panic attacks might have resulted from changes in his medication, difficulties that would not be observable after he was stabilized. And regardless of what caused the attacks, the drugs administered to curtail them clearly affected McManus’s cognition during trial. We cannot see how new testimony before the district 12 (...continued) review. No. 12-2001 51 court could possibly provide the necessary information to retrospectively assess his competency under the applicable legal standard. Habeas relief is warranted.13