Opinion ID: 2788747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Express Authority

Text: The law in Pennsylvania “is clear and well-settled that an attorney must have express authority in order to bind a client to a settlement agreement.” Reutzel v. Douglas, 870 A.2d 787, 789-90 (Pa. 2005).4 “The rationale for [that] rule stems from the fact that parties settling legal disputes forfeit substantial legal rights, and such rights should only be forfeited knowingly.” Id. at 790. Accordingly “a client’s attorney may not settle a case without the client’s grant of express authority, and such express authority can only exist where the principal specifically grants the agent the authority to perform a certain task on the principal’s behalf.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7 cmt. c (1958)). Pisarz argues that, because the District Court cited to Comment b of the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 7, it improperly used the standard for apparent authority rather than for express authority. We disagree. First, the District Court cited to Comment b only for the proposition that, if an attorney obtains the client’s express authority to settle a case but the client maintains some secret or unexpressed reservation or belief, “attorneys are not expected to be telepathists.” (App. at 253.) Further, the District Court found, after conducting an evidentiary hearing and reviewing all of the 4 We apply Pennsylvania law to the enforceability of the parties’ settlement agreement. Tiernan, 923 F.2d at 1033 & n.6. “The enforceability of settlement agreements is governed by principles of contract law.” Mazzella v. Koken, 739 A.2d 531, 536 (Pa. 1999). “As with any contract, it is essential to the enforceability of a settlement agreement that the minds of the parties should meet upon all the terms, as well as the subject-matter, of the [agreement].” Id. “Where the parties have agreed on the essential terms of a contract, the fact that they intend to formalize their agreement in writing but have not yet done so does not prevent enforcement of such agreement.” Id. 6 evidence, that “Pisarz granted Kolman Ely express authority to reach the October 11, 2012 settlement with PPL.” (App. at 254.) Based on the record presented to us, that factual finding is not clearly erroneous. Even if the District Court had applied the incorrect legal standard, we conclude on the facts presented here that Pisarz granted Kolman express authority to settle his case with PPL. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (we may affirm a district court for any reason supported by the record). Pisarz expressly authorized his attorneys to settle his claim for a lump sum and, indeed, one such settlement demand was made in his presence. Both Siegle and Kolman testified that Pisarz never indicated a desire to remain on the payroll at PPL or to have his pension continue to accrue indefinitely. The record here, taken as a whole, indicates that Pisarz previously and repeatedly sought to change his settlement demands, but his past inconstancy is no defense to the agreement he finally authorized. “Having second thoughts about the results of a valid settlement agreement does not justify setting [it] aside.” Hensley v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 277 F.3d 535, 540 (4th Cir. 2002) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Pisarz offered only his own conflicting and unsupported testimony to rebut the substantial evidence that he gave express authority to his attorneys. Accordingly, his effort to avoid the results of the exercise of that express authority fails.