Opinion ID: 2028655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: May the Decree be Collaterally Attacked?

Text: Westinghouse further argues for reversal on the ground that the trial court judgment is an impermissible collateral attack on the federal Consent Decree. It argues that the validity of the decree, or the obligation of a signatory to comply with the decree, may not be challenged in this collateral state court proceeding. In contrast, the Conards say they merely seek to enforce the decree and protect the right of citizens to provide input on issues involving the NPDES permit. They claim it is unconscionable for Westinghouse to even suggest that [the Conards] have asserted an impermissible collateral attack on the federal court judgment entering the Consent Decree. Brief of Appellees at 7-8. According to the Conards, the public hearing requirement for the permit shows that Congress recognized that there is something inherently unfair about third parties, i.e., the parties to the Consent Decree, foreclosing comments by the Conards. Id. at 8. Notwithstanding the Conards' vehement arguments to the contrary, Westinghouse's collateral attack argument is not only conscionable, but a correct statement of the law. The Conards' challenge to the binding effect of the Consent Decree on the NPDES permitting process is indeed an impermissible collateral attack. The district court entering the Consent Decree explicitly retained jurisdiction over enforcement and interpretation issues arising under the decree. (Paragraph 137). The Conards' state court challenge is therefore an inappropriate attempt to enforce the decree. A collateral attack on a judgment is an attack made in a proceeding that has an independent purpose other than to impeach or overturn the judgment, although impeaching or overturning the judgment may be necessary to the success of the action. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 631 (1969); see also State ex rel. Lacy v. Marion Probate Court (1962), 243 Ind. 30, 35-36, 182 N.E.2d 416, 418 (defined as attack on judgment outside legally prescribed procedure for judicial review, which attempts to deny its validity, and may necessitate relief from judgment). The Conards' challenge to the binding effect of the PCB limitations set by the Consent Decree is a collateral attack on the decree because its substance inescapably implicates the decree and because validation of their claim would adversely affect implementation of the decree. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 755 F.2d 38, 42 (3d Cir.1985) (state court holding that state was not bound by its representatives' signatures on federal consent decree held a collateral attack on prior federal case resolving the issue); see also Striff v. Mason, 849 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir.1988) (Where an action appears to involve issues unrelated to a consent decree, but examination of the substance of the claim reveals that a consent decree is implicated and its implementation would be adversely affected, the action is properly considered a collateral attack on the decree.). [2] To allow a collateral attack contesting the terms of the consent decree in this case would raise the specter of inconsistent or contradictory proceedings, would promote continued uncertainty thus undermining the concept of a final judgment and would violate the policy of promoting settlement of actions alleging violations of federal law. See Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir.1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 301, 108 S.Ct. 586, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988). Permitting a collateral attack by the Conards would subject Westinghouse to the real possibility of inconsistent obligations in regard to acceptable PCB levels, and would defeat the purpose of the lengthy negotiations and intricately detailed settlement between the parties to the decree. The Conards pursued the proper course of action for challenging the effect of the Consent Decree when they moved to intervene in the lawsuit from which the decree issued. Judge Dillin denied their motion, finding it to be untimely. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Civil Action No. IP 83-9-C (S.D.Ind. 1985). The district court found that: (1) the Conards knew or should have known of their interests in the case at an earlier time and failed to act to protect such interests; (2) allowing intervention after such delay would prejudice the existing parties to the decree; and (3) the Conards' interests were adequately represented by the governmental parties. (Record at 54-57). Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a fact or issue where that fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in an earlier suit and that fact or issue is presented in the subsequent lawsuit. Sullivan v. American Casualty Co. (1992), Ind., 605 N.E.2d 134. Because the Conards previously litigated the issue of whether their interests were adequately represented by the existing parties to the Consent Decree, they are collaterally estopped to contend that their interests were not represented. The Conards, like all members of the public, were given reasonable notice and opportunity to submit objections to the Consent Decree before it was entered.