Opinion ID: 1060390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: analysis of the complaint in this case

Text: Having found that in-house counsel are not categorically prohibited from maintaining retaliatory discharge actions against their former employers, we now examine whether the plaintiff in this case has stated such a claim in her complaint. As for the first element, the existence of an at-will employment relationship, the complaint alleges only that the Plaintiff became employed with Defendant Buckman initially as a legal assistant and that she began working as an attorney in Buckman's Legal Department after becoming licensed to practice law. Although we are unable to determine from the complaint whether this employment relationship is alleged to have been at-will or based upon an employment contract, we will presume that the plaintiff intended to allege an at-will employment relationship. See, e.g., Rose v. Tipton County Pub. Works Dep't, 953 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) (stating that the law initially presumes that an employee is an employee at will). Accordingly, viewing the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that the first element of this tort has been sufficiently alleged. The next issue, then, is whether the complaint alleges the existence of a clear public policy which is evidenced by an unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision. To establish this second element, the plaintiff argues that the ethical rules relating to the unauthorized practice of lawsuch as Disciplinary Rule 3-101(A), which places upon lawyers a mandatory ethical duty not [to] aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized practice of laware for the protection of the public interest and may serve as the basis for a retaliatory discharge action. We agree. It cannot seriously be questioned that many of the duties imposed upon lawyers by the Tennessee Code of Professional Responsibility represent a clear and definitive statement of public policy. Indeed, we have previously expressly recognized that specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated by the Supreme Court and authorized by the Tennessee Constitution and statutes, reflect public policy.... Swafford v. Harris, 967 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tenn.1998) (addressing Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C)); see also Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn.1991) (addressing Canon 2 and Disciplinary Rule 2-108). Although we need not conclude today that every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility reflects an important public policy, there can be no doubt that the public has a substantial interest in preventing the unauthorized practice of law. As this Court has acknowledged, the purpose of regulation[s] governing the unauthorized practice of law is ... to serve the public right to protection against unlearned and unskilled advice in matters relating to the science of the law. See Burson, 909 S.W.2d at 777 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Court of Appeals has recognized that regulations proscribing the unauthorized practice of law are designed to protect the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department could exercise little control. Bar Ass'n of Tenn., Inc. v. Union Planters Title Guar. Co., 46 Tenn.App. 100, 126, 326 S.W.2d 767, 779 (1959) (citation omitted). As such, we find here the existence of a clear public policy evidenced by the ethical duty not to aid in the unauthorized practice of law. To be clear, although the plaintiff was not under a mandatory ethical duty to report Ms. Davis's alleged unauthorized practice of law to the Board of Law Examiners, she certainly possessed a permissive duty to report Ms. Davis's conduct. [6] Ethical Consideration 1-3 is clear that [a]lthough lawyers should not become self-appointed investigators or judges of applicants for admission, they should report to proper officials all unfavorable information they possess relating to the character or other qualifications of applicants. As such, given the clear expression of this permissive duty, combined with the clear expression of public policy in Disciplinary Rule 3-101(A), we hold that the complaint has sufficiently alleged the existence of a clear public policy evidenced by an unambiguous provision of the Tennessee Code of Professional Responsibility. Next, we examine whether the complaint has sufficiently alleged that the plaintiff was discharged from her employment with Buckman. With regard to these allegations, we note that the plaintiff has asserted that she was constructively discharged from her position as in-house counsel. Although we have previously held that a claim of constructive discharge is not a claim in and of itself, such a claim does allege that a plaintiff's resignation was not voluntary due to the intolerable nature of the working conditions. See Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. L07, 974 S.W.2d 680, 687 (Tenn.1998) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted). Consequently, we now conclude that allegations of a constructive discharge are generally sufficient to establish the element of termination under a common-law action for retaliatory discharge, provided that the remaining elements of the tort are established. Cf. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 34 (Tenn.1996). Here, we find that the complaint has fairly raised an allegation that the plaintiff did not voluntarily leave her employment with Buckman. Importantly, after her final encounter with Ms. Davis, the corporation is alleged to have removed the plaintiff's computer; to have placed the plaintiff on temporary leave; and to have given the plaintiff a notice of termination. Under these circumstances, the allegation is fairly raised that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign, cf. id., and we therefore conclude that the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a termination of employment necessary to state a claim for relief. Finally, we examine whether the complaint alleges that a substantial factor in Buckman's decision to discharge the plaintiff was her adherence to her ethical duties under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Here, the plaintiff alleges that the sole motivation for the constructive discharge was her adherence to her ethical duties to report the unauthorized practice of law to the Board of Law Examiners. Accordingly, we conclude that the existence of this element has likewise been sufficiently alleged in the complaint and that, consequently, the plaintiff has stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge in violation of public policy.