Opinion ID: 1060382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Old Injuries

Text: The defendant also complains that during the guilt phase of the trial the State was allowed to introduce testimony and photographic evidence of healed scars and old bruises on the victim's body. Relying on State v. Hale, 840 S.W.2d 307 (Tenn. 1992), the defendant says that the introduction of this evidence of prior abuse for which he had not been convicted deprived him of his constitutional right to due process under Article I, § 8, of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The defendant also contends that the admission of this evidence deprived him of his right to an impartial jury under Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The State responds that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that this issue was waived when the defendant failed to contemporaneously object to the admission of this evidence and that the plain error doctrine does not apply because the record reflects that the defendant's failure to object was a tactical choice. The State alternatively asserts that, even if the issue is evaluated on its merits, the defendant is not entitled to relief because the evidence was relevant and admissible under established Tennessee authority to demonstrate Quintyn's condition at the time of his death. As the State points out, it is difficult to determine exactly what evidence the defendant is complaining about since he does not include specific references to the record and since he did not contemporaneously object to the admission of the evidence. Dr. Rice, the emergency room physician, testified that he saw a variety of bruises on the victim, some new some not so new; an area that appeared to have been caused by a cigarette burn; another area suspicious for a bite mark; scarring around the anus; and an older bruise on the victim's thigh. Dr. Patterson, the pathologist, referred to some old scars . . . that looked like they were either healed or partly healed, healed circular wounds on the victim's arms and legs resembling bites and cigarette burns, and older bruises and an old scar on the victim's back and buttocks. In any event, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that this issue was waived and that consideration of this issue under the plain error doctrine is not appropriate because the record indicates that defense counsel waived this issue for tactical reasons. See State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn.2000). As the intermediate court pointed out, the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing at which the defense argued that a jury-out hearing should be held under Tenn. R. Evid. 404 before any evidence was admitted showing injuries inflicted on the victim on occasions other than the date of his death. The State argued that this evidence was relevant to show that the victim's injuries were inflicted other than by accidental means. The trial court did not rule on the motion at the pre-trial hearing but specifically requested that the defendant renew the motion when the trial got to that point. Defense counsel did not renew the motion but instead cross-examined the physicians and other prosecution witnesses about these older injuries, apparently attempting to undermine the reliability of the medical testimony. For example, Dr. Rice described a mark on the back of the victim's knee as resembling a cigarette burn, but the victim's mother said, during cross-examination by defense counsel, that this mark was a scar from an insect bite. The victim's mother also said that the victim had a birthmark on his back and buttocks: the physicians had described these marks as bruises, although conceding they could be a birthmark. See Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 283 (When the State places objectionable evidence before the jury and defense counsel inquires at length about the evidence on cross-examination, any error in admitting the evidence is generally cured.) Defense counsel also repeatedly referred to these older injuries during closing argument. In so doing, defense counsel was attempting to convince the jury that the victim's mother, rather than the defendant, abused the child. Defense counsel pointed out the uncertainty of the physicians as to the precise timing of the fatal injuries and the discrepancy between the expert testimony, that some of the injuries were older, and the mother's testimony that the child had no bruises or injuries when she left for work on the morning of June 29, 1994. In sum, the record indicates that the defense allowed this evidence to be admitted without objection so that the defense could later attempt to show both that the medical testimony was unreliable and that the victim's mother rather than the defendant committed this offense. Under such circumstances, the defendant will not be allowed to complain on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence. Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 284. Our holding in this regard should not be construed as a determination that the evidence was not admissible. As the State asserts, there is Tennessee authority suggesting that the evidence was properly admitted. See Tenn. R. Evid. 401 and 403; See State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tenn.1997). The evidence did not show the identity of the person or persons causing these prior bruises and scars. The evidence generally described the victim's appearance when he was brought to the emergency room and generally explained the autopsy findings. The prosecution did not rely upon or emphasize this evidence to prove the defendant's guilt or the (i)(5) aggravating circumstance. Moreover, contrary to the defendant's assertion, Hale is not controlling or relevant to this evidentiary issue. In Hale this Court struck down the 1988 statute as unconstitutional because it required the jury deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence of first degree murder to also decide the defendant's guilt or innocence of uncharged misdemeanor offenses. The statute under which the defendant was convicted did not require or allow the State to offer prior instances of uncharged misdemeanor offenses to establish guilt of first degree murder.