Opinion ID: 3172172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Commissioners’ Concurrence

Text: [¶15] Pursuant to 35-A M.R.S. § 108-A (2015), a majority of the appointed Commissioners constitutes a quorum, and the decision of a quorum is the decision of the Commission. It is undisputed that a majority of Commissioners—that is, two out of three—were present and made a decision in this case. However, Friedman argues that the two Commissioners did not adequately concur in their 10 decision because Commissioner Littell, he alleges, required an opt-out provision as a necessary part of his safety finding, whereas Commissioner Vannoy did not. [¶16] Friedman relies on the following two statements in Commissioner Littell’s Decision to support his assertion that the Commissioner predicated his safety finding on an opt-out provision for CMP customers: (1) “I find it is not a reasonable utility practice for CMP to fail to provide sufficient risk mitigation”; and (2) “[b]ased on the evidence reviewed herein and provided accommodations are made for those with medical treatment recommendations, CMP and analysis by other governmental and standards organizations in the record have established the relative safety of the AMI meters . . . .” [¶17] Other statements in the record, however, clearly dispel the notion that Commissioner Littell’s concurrence was contingent on medical accommodations. For instance, the Commission’s order explicitly states, under the heading DECISION, which appears prior to the individual opinions of each Commissioner, that [t]he concurring opinions below take a slightly different approach regarding customers with medical treatment recommendations to avoid the AMI meters. Commissioner Littell would have CMP provide an AMI meter with [the] transmitter off as part of the safety determination while Commissioner Vannoy would not impose the requirement. Both Commissioner Littell and Commissioner Vannoy concur that this difference in approach does not vitiate their concurrence regarding the safety of the AMI meters and network in use in Maine. 11 (Emphasis added.) In very similar wording, the Commissioners reiterated that their concurrence was not affected by the differing approaches. See Friedman et al., Request for Commission Investigation into Smart Meters and Smart Meter Opt-Out, Nos. 2011-00262, 2012-00412, Order at 8 n.5 (Me. P.U.C. December 19, 2014). Consistent with this, in his individual opinion, Commissioner Littell also states, “In addition to a finding of safety, I would concurrently adopt the low-cost and limited precautionary measures described below,” and further states, “I find . . . that low-cost and no-cost risk mitigation measures are advisable.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, when viewed in the context of the order as a whole, Commissioner Littell and Commissioner Vannoy unequivocally concurred in their determination that the CMP smart meters do not pose a credible threat to the health and safety of CMP customers. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 12 On the briefs: Bruce A. McGlauflin, Esq., Petruccelli, Martin & Haddow, LLP, Portland, for appellants Ed Friedman et al. Jordan D. McColman, Esq., Leslie E. Raber, Esq., and Mitchell M. Tannenbaum, Esq., Maine Public Utilities Commission, Augusta, for appellee Maine Public Utilities Commission Kenneth W. Farber, Esq., Central Maine Power Company, Augusta, for appellee Central Maine Power Company At oral argument: Bruce A. McGlauflin, Esq., for appellants Ed Friedman et al. Jordan D. McColman, Esq., for appellee Maine Public Utilities Commission Kenneth W. Farber, Esq., for appellee Central Maine Power Company Maine Public Utilities Commission case number 2011-0262 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY