Opinion ID: 1233193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Issue Preclusion to the Board of Adjustment Decision

Text: The City sought a declaratory judgment to declare Christenson's rights to obtain approval of his site plan. The petition filed by the City asked the court to decide if the proposal violated the permitted-use and nonconforming-use ordinances. The doctrine of issue preclusion is implicated because Christenson claims the issues of permitted and nonconforming uses were the same issues raised and decided in the board of adjustment action. Issue preclusion, or direct or collateral estoppel, `means simply that when an issue ... has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.' State v. Seager, 571 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 1194, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 475 (1970)). In order for the prior determination to have preclusive effect in subsequent litigation, four elements must be met. These prerequisites are: (1) the issue concluded must be identical; (2) the issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) the issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) the determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 709 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981)). Furthermore, an administrative adjudication by an entity such as the board of adjustment can have a preclusive effect in a judicial proceeding. See Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Lagle, 430 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1988) ([I]ssue preclusion may arise through meaningful administrative proceedings....); Waylonis v. Baum, 281 A.D.2d 636, 723 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (2001) (It is well-settled that the doctrine of res judicata applies to the quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies, including municipal zoning boards. (Citations omitted.)). There are several requirements that must be met for an agency determination to have preclusive effect in a judicial proceeding. [3] However, the parties do not dispute that a decision by the board of adjustment can have preclusive effect. The question is whether the preclusive effect results under the circumstances of this case. It is helpful to first review the function of the board of adjustment and the authority of the City to review site plans in determining if the identity-of-issues element was satisfied in this case. Under the general statutory scheme of city zoning in this State, the power to grant variances and exceptions is exercised solely by the board of adjustment. Iowa Code § 414.7. Under the Johnston zoning ordinance, which is consistent with the prevailing view, the board of adjustment is authorized to overlook the strict letter of the ordinance and grant a variance under certain conditions to avoid undue hardship to a property owner, so long as the overall scheme and purpose of the ordinance is not offended. Johnston Municipal Code § 17.04.210(E)(2). Additionally, the board of adjustment is authorized to grant exceptions. Id. § 17.04.210(E)(3). This can be done by general authorization under section 17.04.210, see id. § 17.04.210(E)(3)(a) (allowing the Board to grant an exception to the zoning district regulations to permit the erection of a building and use of premises which the Board determines is reasonably necessary for the public convenience or welfare), or by some specific authorization under a specific ordinance, see, e.g., id. § 17.04.290.1(C) (stating maximum accessory building area may be modified by the Board of Adjustment as a Special Exception). Furthermore, the board is permitted to grant special use permits. See id. § 17.90.000(B) (allowing the Board to issue special use permits to allow certain unique uses of land, such as orchards, windmills, telecommunications towers, and driving ranges). The zoning ordinance in this case also provides for the submission of site plans of proposed uses and development of land to the city council after review by the planning and zoning commission. See id. § 17.80.020. We have previously recognized that this process allows the city to exercise oversight and control over the development of land through the enforcement of a city zoning code. Kane v. City Council, 537 N.W.2d 718, 722 (Iowa 1995). The site-plan process requires the submission of a map of the development and other information relating to the development. Johnston Municipal Code § 17.80.040. This information permits the City to make certain that the plan complies with all the zoning regulations, other city codes and regulations, and aesthetic and practical concerns, such as lighting, landscaping, and traffic considerations. Id. The site plan is approved if the requirements of the ordinance and regulations are met. See id. § 17.80.020(F) (stating city council may either approve or disapprove the site plan); cf. Van Vactor Farms, Inc. v. Marshall County Plan Comm'n, 793 N.E.2d 1136, 1144 (Ind.Ct. App.2003) (A plan commission's only task when reviewing an application for preliminary plat approval is to determine whether the proposed plat complies with the concrete standards set forth in the subdivision control ordinance, and the commission cannot deny an application on the basis of factors outside the ordinance. (Citation omitted.)). On the other hand, the process contemplates that use and zoning issues that arise from the face of a site plan be resolved before the city is required to approve the plan. See Bell Atl. Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 676 A.2d 1255, 1263 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1996). It is clear that Christenson sought a special exception under the special conditions set out in section 17.04.290.1(C) of the ordinance, and an area variance under the general variance powers of the board of adjustment. [4] Christenson's request was not made under section 17.04.210(E)(3) of the ordinance governing the general powers of the board of adjustment to permit exceptions to district regulations, and Christenson made no request for a special use permit under chapter 17.90 of the ordinance. Instead, the city ordinance permitted accessory buildings in the zoning area, and Christenson's application revealed that he sought a special exception to erect an accessory building larger than permitted under the ordinance and an area variance to make the building taller than permitted under the ordinance. Thus, the application submitted by Christenson did not seek a change in any use restrictions under the ordinance. He simply wanted to build an accessory building bigger than permitted under the ordinance. Similarly, the city zoning administrator initially viewed the application as a special exception and area variance. However, after the board granted the application, the City asked the board to reconsider its decision based on its position that an exception or variance could not be granted because the use of an accessory building, of any size, for horses was not permitted under the zoning ordinance. See Iowa Code § 414.7 (stating the city council may remand a decision to grant a variance to the board of adjustment for further study). The city attorney argued to the board of adjustment that the effect of the application was not merely to vary from the height and area restrictions of the ordinance, but also the use restrictions. Thus, at this point in the proceedings, the City claimed that the exception and variance for size could not be granted without a variance for use. The request for reconsideration by the City squarely injected the same issue before the board of adjustment as presented in this declaratory-judgment action. In both cases, the City argued that the intended use of the proposed structure for horses was prohibited by the zoning ordinance, and this contemplated use made the proposal impermissible. Thus, the fighting question is whether the board of adjustment decided this issue when it reaffirmed its prior resolution to grant the variance and special exception and whether it was material and necessary to its decision. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, at 250 (1982) (When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.). Unlike a use variance, which is premised on the illegality of the proposed use, see 8A Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.273, at 458 (3d ed.2003), an area variance presumes the legality of the use that prompts the need for a variance from dimensional restrictions, see 83 Am.Jur.2d Zoning and Planning §§ 757, 807, at 634, 670 (2003). Generally, this assumption is not challenged, and the propriety of the contemplated use of property is not actually raised as an issue in the variance proceedings. When presented with an application for an area variance, a board of adjustment can normally presume the contemplated use is permitted, and consequently, a determination of the legality of the use is unnecessary and collateral to the board's primary function to determine the need for the variance. Thus, a decision granting or denying a variance would not normally imply a decision that the contemplated use is either prohibited or permitted. However, when the proposed use is raised as an issue, the board of adjustment may find it necessary to decide the propriety of the contemplated use in performing its function to decide the necessity for a variance. See Schoepple v. Lower Saucon Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 658, 624 A.2d 699, 705-06 (1993) (holding the issue of use can be necessary to the adjudication by the board of adjustment of the underlying request for a variance when the issue is raised in the context of an issue the board of adjustment is required to decide). Thus, we must decide if Christenson's case falls within the circumstances that give rise to an adjudication of the issue of use, and, if so, whether the issue was actually decided and was a necessary matter for adjudication. The fundamental rationale of collateral estoppel or issue preclusion commands that the doctrine only be applied to matters that have been actually decided. 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4420, at 505 (2d ed.2002) [hereinafter Wright & Miller]; accord Iowa Sup.Ct. Bd. of Profl Ethics & Conduct v. D.J.I., 545 N.W.2d 866, 876 (Iowa 1996) (In deciding whether to apply issue preclusion in subsequent litigation, the focus is on what issues were actually decided in the prior litigation and what issues a party in subsequent litigation seeks to have precluded.). Prior litigation over an issue without a decision does not justify preclusion. 18 Wright & Miller § 4420, at 505. Of course, the party who claims the issue has been litigated and decided in a prior action has the burden of proving this contention. In re Marriage of Van Veen, 545 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Iowa 1996). The difficulty of deciding if the board of adjustment actually decided the issue of use in this case largely results from the absence of a written decision by the board following the reconsideration hearing. The board did, however, affirm [its prior decision] exactly the way it was. The board's prior decision included the following finding: Mr. Christenson has shown that the size of the structure is appropriate for the intended use as storage for equipment and an exercise area for horses. (Emphasis added.) In determining the actually-decided requirement of issue preclusion, an inference can be drawn that the requirement was met in those instances when the issue was necessary to support the result reached in the first action. 18 Wright & Miller § 4420, at 521. This inference, in turn, can also satisfy the essential to the judgment element of issue preclusion. Id. § 4421, at 545 (noting that the actually-decided principle and the necessity principle often overlap); see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, at 250 (When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.). In this case, the board of adjustment was asked to grant both an exception and area variance. Under the city ordinance governing the special exception, the Board was required to make a special finding that the need for the structure justified the extra area. Likewise, the variance for additional height required a finding of some form of hardship. Ultimately, the City claimed in the course of the proceedings before the board that the contemplated need did not justify an exception because the need was not permitted under the ordinance. Thus, use was clearly raised in the context of the issues the Board was mandated to decide in order to perform its role in granting or denying the exception and variance. To decide if the need for the structure justified the exception and variance, the Board necessarily had to decide if the use of the structure for horses was permitted under the ordinance as a continuation of a nonconforming use. We recognize a presumption of administrative regularity that accompanies actions by a board of adjustment. Johnson v. Bd. of Adjustment, 239 N.W.2d 873, 887 (Iowa 1976). This presumption means the board followed the applicable requirements of the ordinance in taking its action and found facts necessary to support its decision. Id. It also means the board applied the required standards to reach its decision. Id. It does not mean the correct decision was reached, but this is not a requirement of issue preclusion. In this case, we must presume that after the City introduced the issue of the proposed use of Christenson's structure into the proceedings, the Board considered the applicable provisions of the zoning ordinance raised as grounds to deny the application and concludedright or wrong (an issue we do not decide and leave to be determined in the certiorari action)that the proposed use was permitted under the ordinance, and consequently could be considered by the board in determining the need for an oversized building. The important factor in reaching this conclusion is that the board expressly relied on the proposed use of the building as an exercise area for horses in determining Christenson had demonstrated a need for an oversized building. Once the City challenged the legality of this use, the board could have taken the action it did, to confirm the grant of the application following the request for reconsideration, only if it found the intended use of the structure for horses was not proscribed by the ordinance. Therefore, we conclude that the issue of whether Christenson's proposed use of the structure was permitted under the zoning ordinance was actually decided by the board of adjustment when it voted to reaffirm its decision to grant a special exception and variance, notwithstanding the City's vigorous argument that this action would allow an illegal expansion of a nonconforming use. Moreover, the same facts and circumstances that show the nonconforming use issue was raised and decided also show the determination of the issue was material and relevant, as well as essential and necessary to the final decision. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, at 250 (When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.). Accordingly, the doctrine of issue preclusion applies to preclude the City from relitigating in the declaratory-judgment action whether Christenson's use of the property for horses was permitted under the zoning ordinance as a nonconforming use. The board of adjustment has a special and exclusive role in land-use development and is alone responsible to approve exceptions and variances to ordinances. This power cannot be usurped by the City in any manner, including the exercise of its site-plan authority. See Holland v. City Council of Decorah, 662 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Iowa 2003) (city council cannot bypass authority of a board of adjustment; to do so violates Iowa Code sections 414.17 and .12, fixing the jurisdiction of the board). The City too has an important role in making sure projects and proposals comply with all ordinances before issuing building permits. Thus, the grant of a variance or exception by the board of adjustment under one ordinance does not necessarily prevent the City from subsequently reviewing the proposal under its site-plan authority or its authority to issue building permits to determine if the proposal complies with other applicable ordinances. See Monat v. County of Cook, 322 Ill.App.3d 499, 255 Ill.Dec. 679, 750 N.E.2d 260, 266-67 (2001) (a variation granted by the zoning board of appeals does not prevent the commissioner of the department of buildings and zoning from reviewing the building permit application to determine if the building complies with other applicable ordinances). On the other hand, the City cannot use its site-plan authority to circumvent or overrule a decision by the board of adjustment by rejecting a plan on a ground properly decided by the board of adjustment. Instead, the City must seek a writ of certiorari to the district court from the decision of the board of adjustment when the City disagrees with the decision made. Iowa Code § 414.15. Unless and until the court in the certiorari action corrects the board's action, the board's decision that the use of the structure for horses is permitted under the zoning ordinance is binding on the City under issue preclusion. [5]