Opinion ID: 582485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Double Jeopardy--Merit's Prior Conviction for Contempt of Court

Text: 53 Merit contends that his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause were violated because an earlier conviction for contempt of court covered the same conduct alleged in the wire fraud and conspiracy counts for which he was convicted. Merit argues that because the scheme to defraud alleged in counts 1 and 14 involved the abuse of interairline travel privileges, as did the contempt proceeding, he has twice been placed in jeopardy. 54 Neither count 1 nor 14 alludes to the conduct that gave rise to the contempt conviction. Furthermore, the abuse of interairline privileges was only mentioned by one witness at trial, and the criminal contempt convictions were never mentioned. 55 Merit implies that the contempt conviction constitutes a wholly included lesser offense of the wire fraud and conspiracy counts. This argument is meritless. The most that can be said is that both convictions involved evidence of the same conduct. Merit relies on Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (The greater offense is therefore by definition the 'same' for purposes of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it.). Yet Brown recognized that where each conviction requires proof of a fact that the other does not, there is no double jeopardy, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes. Id. at 166 (quoting Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n. 17 (1975)). Comparing the offenses of contempt and wire fraud/conspiracy reveals that each requires proof of a fact that the other does not. 56 Nor does Grady v. Corbin, 110 S.Ct. 2084 (1990), support Merit's position. Proof of the Coral Air interairline abuse was neither required nor introduced to prove an essential element of the offenses in this case. Moreover, Grady reaffirms the principle that overlapping evidence in general is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 2093 & n. 12 (refusing to adopt test that would prevent the government from introducing in a subsequent prosecution any evidence that was introduced in a preceding prosecution.).