Opinion ID: 2001774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McGarrett's Proposed Jury Instructions.

Text: McGarrett argues the trial court erred in denying that lesser included instructions be read to the jury. He offered lesser included instructions for grand theft, aggravated assault, and simple assault as alternative instructions to first-degree robbery. However, before a lesser included offense instruction is given, two testsone legal, the other factualmust be satisfied. State v. Tammi, 520 N.W.2d 619, 620-21 (S.D.1994); State v. Latham, 519 N.W.2d 68, 72 (S.D.1994) (citations omitted). The requirements of the legal test mandate: (1) All of the elements of the included offense are lesser in number than the elements of the greater offense; (2) The penalty for the lesser included offense must be less than that of the greater offense; and (3) Both offenses must contain common elements so that the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense. Tammi, 520 N.W.2d at 621 (citing State v. Wall, 481 N.W.2d 259, 264 (S.D.1992)). The legal test also requires that the essential elements of the lesser offense must be incorporated into the corpus delicti of the greater offense. Id. (citing State v. Black, 506 N.W.2d 738 (S.D.1993)). We have held that when the legal test is not satisfied, it is not necessary to consider the factual test before denying the lesser included instruction. Id. McGarrett was charged and convicted for robbery under SDCL 22-30-1, which is defined in relevant part as the intentional taking of personal property ... in the possession of another from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear[.] McGarrett submitted numerous alternative lesser-included instructions to robbery for jury consideration. One of his proposals was an instruction for grand theft, which provided that the defendant took money from the possession of another with the value in excess of $500, with the intent to deprive it from its owner. See SDCL 22-30A-17. McGarrett also proposed that aggravated assault be instructed upon as an alternative to robbery. The language of aggravated assault criminalizes attempting to put the person in fear of imminent serious bodily harm, whether or not the defendant had the actual ability to do so. See SDCL 22-18-1(4). Finally, McGarrett's instruction for simple assault under SDCL 22-18-1(1) provided that the defendant ... attempted to cause bodily injury to [the victims] and ... had the actual ability to cause the injury. See SDCL 22-18-1(1). The trial court denied McGarrett's proposals, finding that they did not pass the tests for lesser included offenses of first-degree robbery. We agree. First, grand theft requires the stolen property be in excess of $500. In contrast, robbery can be committed without complying with that dollar amount. The legal test was not satisfied. Furthermore, both simple and aggravated assault require an attempt or causation of bodily injury. However, neither of these elements are necessary for first-degree robbery. State v. No Heart, 353 N.W.2d 43, 46 (S.D.1984). Consequently, the third prong of the legal test for lesser included offenses was not met for either of these lesser included proposals. The trial court did not err in denying these instructions. McGarrett further argues the trial court erred in denying his lesser included instruction for carrying a concealed pistol without a permit (SDCL 22-14-9). As previously indicated, every element of the lesser included offense must be contained within the greater offense charged. The trial court gave an appropriate instruction setting forth the elements of SDCL 22-14-12. [] McGarrett did not object to this instruction. A necessary element of SDCL 22-14-9 is that the concealed weapon must be carried without a permit as provided in chapter 23-7, which is not an element of the offense charged under SDCL 22-14-12. Therefore, it is obvious McGarrett's proposed lesser included instruction did not comply with the legal test, and was properly rejected by the trial court. McGarrett also advocated a lesser included instruction be given for simple assault (SDCL 22-18-1(1)) in conjunction with his charge for aggravated assault (SDCL 22-18-1.1(5)). Again, simple assault fails the legal test for a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Latham, 519 N.W.2d at 72; State v. Marshall, 495 N.W.2d 87, 88 (S.D.1993). Simple assault under SDCL 22-18-1(1) requires proof of three elements: (1) the defendant must attempt to cause bodily injury to the victim, (2) other than a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties, and (3) has the ability to cause the injury. Marshall, 495 N.W.2d at 88. In contrast, aggravated assault (SDCL 22-18-1.1(5)) requires the proof of two elements, namely: (1) attempts to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm, (2) by means of physical menace with a deadly weapon. Latham, 519 N.W.2d at 72. Since the elements of simple assault are greater than aggravated assault, prong one of the legal test is not met. Id. (citing State v. Tapio, 459 N.W.2d 406, 408 (S.D.1990); State v. Gillespie, 445 N.W.2d 661 (S.D.1989); State v. Scholten, 445 N.W.2d 30 (S.D.1989)). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying this lesser included instruction. Finally, McGarrett argues the trial court erred by refusing his proposed instruction regarding State's failure to call Surrell as a witness. This instruction required the jury to infer that, due to Surrell's absence, any testimony would have been unfavorable to the State. The language read: If it is peculiarly within the power of either the government or the defense to produce a witness who could give relevant testimony on an issue in the case, failure to call that witness may give rise to an inference that this testimony would have been unfavorable to that party. No such conclusion should be drawn by you, however, with regard to a witness who is equally available to both parties or where the testimony of that witness would be merely cumulative. The jury must always bear in mind that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or the duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. McGarrett cites United States v. Anders, 602 F.2d 823, 825 (8th Cir, 1979), as authority for his proposition. Nevertheless, the defense failed to show any evidence that State possessed the sole power to produce Surrell to testify or that he was under its control. People v. Bustos, 725 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Colo.1986); State v. Anderson, 867 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Mo.App.W.D.1993); Anders, 602 F.2d at 825. The court, in Anderson, stated: If a witness is equally available to both parties or unavailable to either party, the trial court should not permit counsel to argue to the jury ... that an adverse inference arises from the state's failure to call the witness. Id. at 576. McGarrett could have subpoenaed Surrell to testify, but failed to do so. See State v. Sprik, 520 N.W.2d 595, 602 (S.D.1994); State v. Foell, 416 N.W.2d 45, 46 (S.D.1987). Hence, the trial court did not err in refusing McGarrett's instruction. Upon consideration of the other four issues raised by McGarrett, we conclude that no further meritorious claims exist based on settled law in South Dakota. Therefore, we decline to address them and affirm the jury's verdict in all respects. We affirm. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS and KONENKAMP, JJ., concur. GILBERTSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was submitted, did not participate.