Opinion ID: 683222
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: substantive impact of the 1990 amendment.

Text: 56 In Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 110 S.Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990), the Supreme Court held that under the pre-1990 amendment version of the VWPA, restitution could only be ordered for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. Id. at 413, 110 S.Ct. at 1981. The Defendant in Hughey was indicted on several counts of unauthorized credit card use and several counts of theft by a postal worker. After pleading guilty to a single count of unauthorized credit card use, Hughey was nonetheless sentenced to restitution for all of the charges underlying his indictment. Id. at 413-14, 110 S.Ct. at 1981-82. The Supreme Court's decision overturning this broad restitution sentence left open the question of how broad a restitution sentence could be imposed when the conduct of which a defendant was convicted involved a criminal scheme or conspiracy. See United States v. Cronin, 990 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir.1993). Taking the position of a majority of other circuits, we interpreted Hughey to say that even where the offense of conviction involves a conspiracy or scheme, restitution must be limited to the loss attributable to the specific conduct underlying the conviction. United States v. Sharp, 941 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Pivorotto, 986 F.2d 669, 673 n. 5 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 90, 126 L.Ed.2d 58 (1993); United States v. Jewett, 978 F.2d 248, 252 (6th Cir.1992); United States v. Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096, 1097-98 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Stone, 948 F.2d 700, 703-04 (11th Cir.1991). But see United States v. Bennett, 943 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir.1991) (interpreting Hughey to say that restitution could be awarded for injuries caused by a criminal scheme that were not part of the specific offense underlying the conviction). 57 When Congress amended the VWPA in 1990, it appeared to overrule this Court's decision in Sharp. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3663(a)(2); see United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 533 n. 8 (9th Cir.1992). The relevant provision of the 1990 VWPA amendment states, 58 For the purpose of restitution, a victim of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity means any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 59 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3663(a)(2). Section (a)(2) acts to clarify the definition of victim in Section (a)(1), which states, The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted under this title ... may order, in addition to ... any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3663(a)(1). 60 Most cases examining the impact of the 1990 VWPA amendment have found that it effected a substantive expansion of the previous law of restitution, in that it partially overruled the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the VWPA in Hughey. United States v. Cronin, 990 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir.1993) (noting that Congress has amended the statute in favor of broad restitution); United States v. Jewett, 978 F.2d 248, 252 (6th Cir.1992) (same); United States v. Seligsohn, 981 F.2d 1418, 1422 (3d Cir.1992) (noting that the 1990 amendment was intended to change the Hughey interpretation of the statute by enlarging the courts' power to order restitution beyond that permitted by Hughey ); United States v. Arnold, 947 F.2d 1236, 1237 & n. 1 (5th Cir.1991) (suggesting that the 1990 amendment increased the restitution penalty available). But see United States v. Welsand, 23 F.3d 205, 207 (8th Cir.1994) (stating that the 1990 amendment does not explicitly extend the contours of the word 'offense' ). We have previously acknowledged in dicta the substantive impact of the 1990 VWPA amendment, United States v. Jackson, 982 F.2d 1279, 1282 n. 1 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that this Court's restrictive interpretation in Sharp has been overruled by the 1990 VWPA amendment). 61 Thus, the consensus of courts addressing the issue is that the 1990 VWPA amendment did have a substantive impact on the amount of restitution a court could order when a defendant is convicted of an offense involving a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. Despite some statements to the contrary, see United States v. Baker, 25 F.3d 1452, 1457 n. 7 (9th Cir.1994), and Welsand, 23 F.3d at 207, we will accept the majority view that the 1990 VWPA amendment did have a substantive impact on the law of restitution. 62 Finding that the conduct DeSalvo was charged with did not continue past the effective date of the 1990 amendment to the VWPA, and that that amendment did have a substantive impact on the law of restitution, we must reverse the restitution order imposed as part of DeSalvo's sentence in that it violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution. 9 Thus, DeSalvo's restitution sentence in the amount of $970,166.75 shall be overturned and the case be remanded to the District Court for resentencing pursuant to the pre-amendment version of the VWPA.