Opinion ID: 1382635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the trial court err by refusing to suppress appellant's confession and by impermissibly delegating a portion of his Miranda duties to the jury?

Text: The day after his arrest for the trooper's murder, appellant asked to speak with a SLED agent. He was taken to the Orangeburg County Law Enforcement Center where he met with Agents George Darnell and Kenny Mears. They informed appellant of his Miranda rights and he signed a waiver. Appellant then gave a tape recorded statement in which he told the agents that Blackwell shot the trooper. When appellant concluded his narrative, Agent Darnell asked, Is that all?, to which appellant responded, That's all I got to say. The agents then turned off the tape recorder. As the agents prepared to return appellant to the detention center, appellant said he wanted to talk further and asked if the agents could help his friend Elena Batkilina, who was in trouble in Florida. The agents told appellant Florida was outside their jurisdiction and there was nothing they could do to help her. Appellant then asked about the status of Blackwell and the children. Finally, he asked if he could be moved out of the infirmary into the general prison population. After several phone calls, the agents were able to obtain permission for appellant to move into the general prison population. Appellant then gave the statement at issue, inculpating himself in the trooper's death. Appellant's second issue on appeal raises several questions: (a) Did appellant unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent when he said, That's all I've got to say at the end of his first statement? (b) If so, was his request scrupulously honored? (c) Did the trial court err in not specifically ruling on whether appellant invoked his right to remain silent? A statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000). The voluntariness of a statement is determined from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Furthermore, the conclusion of the trial judge on issues of fact as to the voluntariness of a statement will not be disturbed on appeal unless so manifestly erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion. State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 429, 510 S.E.2d 714, 715 (1998). When a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, law enforcement officers must scrupulously honor it. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). However, before law enforcement officers are required to discontinue questioning, the suspect must clearly articulate his desire to end the interrogation. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 42, 503 S.E.2d 747, 750 (1998). Moreover, law enforcement officers may certainly speak with a suspect who reinitiates communication subsequent to an invocation of rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (once an accused requests counsel, police interrogation must cease unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police). We conclude appellant's statement That's all I've got to say, was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to discontinue questioning. In context, the statement was ambiguous, indicating either a desire to discontinue questioning or simply the end of his story. [4] See State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 979 P.2d 1239, 1247-48 (1999) (That's all I got to say not an unequivocal invocation of right to remain silent; it could just as easily have been interpreted as a statement that he had finished his explanation of the matter). However, even if the statement is interpreted to be an invocation of appellant's right to remain silent, it is uncontroverted that appellant himself reinitiated conversation with the agents after the tape recorder was turned off. The principle underlying Michigan v. Mosley is that the suspect, rather than the police, controls the time, duration, and subject matter of an interrogation. 423 U.S. at 103-104, 96 S.Ct. 321. Officers do not fail to scrupulously honor an invocation of rights when they engage in conversation initiated by the suspect. See State v. Kennedy, 333 S.C. 426, 430, 510 S.E.2d 714, 716 (1998) ([E]ven if this were a proper invocation of the right to counsel, petitioner waived this right when he initiated further discussions.). The trial court did not err in ruling appellant's second statement voluntary. Appellant asserts the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to specifically rule on whether he invoked his right to remain silent when he said, That's all I've got to say. Appellant's objection arises from the following comment made by the judge during the Jackson v. Denno [5] hearing: It is clear to me, it would be for the jury to determine, that this defendant did not say, I terminate the conversations, he said, I have concluded my statement, and that the testimony if believed by the jury, who will be the ultimate finder of the facts on the issue, that this defendant began the conversation again and not the interrogation by the officers. Appellant argues this constitutes an impermissible delegation to the jury of a portion of the trial court's Miranda duties. We disagree. In the first place, appellant never requested a more specific ruling from the court as to whether his statement, That's all I got to say invoked his right to remain silent. In any case, the trial judge ruled appellant was advised of his Miranda rights, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, and that his statement was, beyond a reasonable doubt, freely and voluntarily given without duress, without coercion, without undue influence, without reward, without promise or hope of reward, without promise or hope of leniency, without threat of injury, and without compulsion or inducement of any kind, and that such alleged incriminating statement or confession was the voluntary product of the free and unconstrained will of the defendant. The trial judge's extensive ruling regarding the voluntariness of the challenged statement fulfilled his duties under Miranda. The critical issue was not whether appellant invoked his right to remain silent after his first statement, but rather whether the second, inculpatory statement was voluntarily given. Even if one assumes appellant invoked his right to remain silent, his subsequent reinitiation of conversation validly waived that right. The judge did not err in failing to rule explicitly on the invocation issue because that issue was subsumed by the issue of the voluntariness of the statement. See State v. Reed, 332 S.C. 35, 43, 503 S.E.2d 747, 751 (1998) (appellant contended his invocation of the right to remain silent was not honored; the Court held the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress as the State met its burden of showing appellant's statement was voluntarily and freely given); see also Woods v. Armontrout, 787 F.2d 310, 315 (8th Cir.1986) (because trial court record was sufficient to establish voluntariness, subsidiary findings that police did not induce confession by coercion or promises implicitly made). Furthermore, read in context, the judge's comment it would be for the jury to determine clearly referred to the jury's role as the ultimate fact finder on the issue of the voluntariness of appellant's statement. See State v. Davis, 309 S.C. 326, 342, 422 S.E.2d 133, 143 (1992), overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999) (Once the court determines that a defendant received and understood his rights, the court allows a confession into evidence. It then is for the jury ultimately to decide whether the confession was voluntary.). The trial court properly ruled appellant's confession voluntary, then submitted it to the jury for the final determination of voluntariness.