Opinion ID: 2426901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Date Alleged in the Indictment

Text: Girod also moved for acquittal below based on the failure of the government to prove the date charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. The indictment charged her with making false statements on or about August 26, 2006, but the testimony from trial showed that the false statements were made on April 26, 2006. Girod argues this four-month discrepancy constitutes a material variance from or constructive amendment of the indictment under Chambers. We disagree. A constructive amendment occurs when the government changes its theory during trial so as to urge the jury to convict on a basis broader than that charged in the indictment, or when the government is allowed to prove `an essential element of the crime on an alternative basis permitted by the statute but not charged in the indictment.' United States v. Robles-Vertiz, 155 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Salvatore, 110 F.3d 1131, 1145 (5th Cir. 1997)). In this Circuit, an allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the offense charged in the indictment and, `within reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.' Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir.1970) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1982) (In this circuit, it is established that the prosecution is `not required to prove the exact date; it suffices if a date reasonably near is established.') (quoting United States v. Grapp, 653 F.2d 189, 195 (5th Cir.1981)); see also United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 259-60 (5th Cir.2006) (same). The discrepancy between the indictment and the evidence at trial therefore is not a constructive amendment, as the date is not an essential element that was proved on an alternate basis and the Government's theory of guilt at trial did not change. A variance occurs when the proof at trial depicts a scenario that differs materially from the scenario charged in the indictment but does not modify an essential element of the charged offense. United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir.2005). We determine whether a variance occurred by comparing the evidence presented at trial with the language of the indictment. See United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir.1998). If a variance did occur, we reverse only if the variance prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights. See Delgado, 401 F.3d at 295; Medina, 161 F.3d at 872. In determining whether a variance resulted in prejudice, we employ a harmless-error analysis. United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1491 (5th Cir.1995). The discrepancy in dates is not a material variance. A five-month variance between the date alleged and the date proved is not unreasonable as a matter of law as long as the date proven falls within the statute of limitations and before the return of the indictment. United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1089 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds by United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir.1998) (en banc); see Russell v. United States, 429 F.2d 237, 238 (5th Cir.1970) ([W]ithin reasonable limits, proof of any date before the return of the indictment and within the statute of limitations is sufficient.). Because the April 26, 2006 date is only four months apart from the date charged in the indictment and there is no dispute that it falls within the statute of limitations, Girod's argument that this variance warrants overturning her convictions fails. Moreover, a variance between allegations and proof is fatal only when it affects the substantial rights of the defendant by failing to sufficiently notify him so that he can prepare his defense and will not be surprised at trial. Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1036. The Government used the on or about designation in the indictment, explained the context in which the false statements were made, and explained the specific statements that were false and made to federal investigators. Girod's false statements charged in the indictment were: (1) that an employee from ANBNO was present in her house for two hours per day with each child for a total of 6 hours per day; (2) that ANBNO employees came to her house every day for 6 hours per day, 7 days per week during the entire time her children were enrolled with ANBNO; and (3) that AKASIA LEE did not pay her $72 per week every two weeks, or pay her any amount, for billing Medicaid services rendered to GIROD's children. This was sufficiently specific to put Girod on notice of which statements the Government intended to prove were false. Indeed, Girod has not demonstrated that she was surprised or prejudiced in any way by the August 26, 2006 date in the indictment. In sum, we affirm Girod's convictions on all grounds.