Opinion ID: 1946688
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Association Exception

Text: The Dead Man's Statute is inapplicable and the adverse witness competent to testify [i]f one associated with the deceased was present when the transaction occurred and is alive and able to give his version of the facts. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Chichester, 352 So.2d 1371, 1374 (Ala.Civ.App.1977). In other words, aside from the issue of a third person's competency to testify under the third-person exception, under a different exception and test, a third person's presence actually may remove the incompetency of the adverse witness. Third persons generally found to have been associated with the decedent include: 1) a joint owner; id.; 2) a partner; Homewood Dairy Products Co. v. Robinson, 254 Ala. 197, 48 So.2d 28 (1950); Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1068 (1952); 3 S. Gard, Jones on Evidence, § 20.33 (6th ed. 1972); 3) a spouse; Hentz v. Darden, 394 So.2d 925 (Ala.1981); Lowery v. Stinson, 291 Ala. 415, 282 So.2d 244 (1973); 4) a son-inlaw; Sheppard v. T.R. Miller Mill Co., 332 So.2d 374 (Ala.1976); and 5) an agent; Reliance Insurance Co. v. Jack's Construction Co., 360 So.2d 292 (Ala.1978); 3 S. Gard, supra, at § 20.34. Thus, the final and determinative inquiry on this issue is: Were either of the third persons present during the transaction between Defendant Jesse Parker and J.R. Richardson sufficiently associated with J.R. Richardson to remove Jesse Parker's incompetency as a witness under the Dead Man's Statute? Leo Waters, who according to his testimony was present during the transaction, was a friend of Andrew Richardson and Jesse Parker. He knew J.R. Richardson, but he had no particular association with him. Clearly, Leo Waters, as a third person present during the transaction, was not associated sufficiently with J.R. Richardson under the association exception to remove Parker's incompetency. The other third person present during the transaction, T.E. Houston, Jr., is a real estate agent. Mr. Houston testified that he was a good friend of J.R. Richardson, that he had handled several real estate transactions for J.R., but that he did not prepare the Parker deedhe merely notarized it at the request of J.R. Richardson. As we have held, in some instances, a third person who is decedent's agent may be associated sufficiently with the decedent to render the adverse witness competent to testify. Reliance Insurance Co. v. Jack's Construction Co., supra . The instant facts as to the relationship between T.E. Houston, Jr., and J.R. Richardson, however, are insufficient, as a matter of law, to allow us to conclude that Mr. Houston's interests were clearly aligned with those of [J.R. Richardson] in this transaction and that Mr. Houston was sufficiently associated with the decedent and had a sufficient community of interest with him that we may safely rely upon [him] to give the decedent's version of the transaction, so as to render the association exception to the Dead Man's Statute applicable. Lowery v. Stinson, supra, 291 Ala. at 419, 282 So.2d at 247. We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in overruling Ms. Melvin's objection to Jesse Parker's testimony as violative of the Dead Man's Statute. For the sake of clarity, however, we emphasize that our holding with respect to the application of the Dead Man's Statute does not affect either the admissibility or the credibility of the testimony of the two third persons who witnessed the transaction between J.R. Richardson and Jesse Parker.