Opinion ID: 172041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Statutory Language

Text: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). The provision includes in its definition of a program or activity the operations of any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(1)(A). To establish a prima facie claim under § 504, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) plaintiff is handicapped under the Act; (2)[she] is `otherwise qualified' to participate in the program; (3) the program receives federal financial assistance; and (4) the program discriminates against plaintiff. Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 513 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir.2008) (citing Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp., 184 F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir.1999)). To recover compensatory damages under § 504, a plaintiff must establish that the agency's discrimination was intentional. Powers, 184 F.3d at 1152-53 (indicating that compensatory damages are available only upon a showing of intentional discrimination); see Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1140-41 (10th Cir.1999) (discussing same). Intentional discrimination does not require a showing of personal ill will or animosity toward the disabled person; rather, intentional discrimination can be inferred from a defendant's deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that pursuit of its questioned policies will likely result in a violation of federally protected rights. Powers, 184 F.3d at 1153; see also Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir.2001) (Deliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that . . . likelihood.). The parties do not dispute that the DMV falls within the ambit of the Act, and we assume without deciding that Marcia Barber is an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. [3] Therefore, the central issue remaining is whether the DMV intentionally discriminated against the Barbers when it denied Marcia Barber's requested accommodation.