Opinion ID: 2274559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Items constitute `evidence,' for tampering, after the police control the item.

Text: In Pennewell, we expressly adopted the reasoning of the Delgado and Vigue courts. [23] Although we stated a practical and useful rule to determine abandonment, we declined to draw the precise boundaries of evidence that falls within the scope of § 1269. [24] The court in Vigue relied on a New Jersey decision, [25] but declined to adopt expressly the rule that, as applied to possessory offenses, the statute should be construed to apply only to completed crimes. [26] We now adopt the Supreme Court of New Jersey's rationale articulated in State v. Fuqua , because that rationale comports with our statutory scheme, precedent, and fair public policy. Prosecutors and the courts should avoid leveraging misdemeanor drug possession prosecutions with additional, felony tampering penalties. We have noted that § 1269 recognizes evidence, for purposes of tampering, when [a defendant] knew the marijuana would be used in a prospective criminal trial. [27] This subjective test could apply to every possessor of an illegal drug with having the requisite belie[f] that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding. [28] This theory could unfairly aggravate drug possession crimes because by the very nature of contraband, if police discover a defendant possessing the contraband, they will seize it as potential evidence. We also must define more precisely what is meant by the defendant's belief regarding evidence that is  about to be used or produced. [29] About to infers procedural immediacy  not temporal immediacy. The statute applies to tampering with evidence related to any crime or official proceeding. Thus, § 1269 must apply to murder cases that have no statute of limitations, as well as lesser misdemeanors that the State might prosecute within only a few weeks or months. Unless and until the police have control of the item, a defendant may have no reason to believe that the police are about to use that item as evidence. The courts in Vigue and Fuqua observed this overinclusive theory whereby a defendant would be required to have the cocaine in plain view in order to avoid committing this crime [of Tampering with Evidence]. ... To avoid this result, the Fuqua court ruled that, as applied to possessory offenses, the statute should be construed to apply only to completed crimes. [30] The Fuqua approach draws a clear line for prosecutors and defendants, maintains felonious punishment for the serious crime of intentionally undermining evidence in an official proceeding, and prevents substantial overlap of misdemeanor possession and activity that constitutes felony tampering. Because a defendant completes the illegal act of possession as soon as he obtains the contraband, Fuqua is better understood as precluding a tampering conviction until the underlying crime ends. Although the Fuqua court drew a necessary line that separates mere `items' from `evidence' for § 1269 tampering, a better approach to separating `items' from `evidence' (with which a defendant may tamper) would be where the police have taken control of the item. Our holding in Sims v. State illustrates this application of § 1269: Sims took drugs from the top of a police cruiser, immediately after a police officer took the drugs from Sims and then turned his head. Sims had also dissolved drugs in his mouth before taking the drugs from the top of the police cruiser. We noted that his taking drugs from police control was [m]ost damaging to Sims. [31] Although he arguably tampered with evidence by initially dissolving the drugs in his mouth, he certainly violated § 1269 by taking drugs after the police had taken them under their control. An item also becomes `evidence' for the purpose of § 1269 when the police take constructive control of the premises. In Anderson, the police executed a search warrant allowing them to search for drugs in the defendant's house. [32] Upon entering the house, the police took constructive control of the premises named in the warrant. At that point, Anderson's belief that the State could introduce his bag of cocaine at trial was reasonable, because the police's probable cause and search made his trial procedurally imminent. That is, he acted to suppress the cocaine with a credible reason to believe that the State was about to introduce it as evidence. We also noted that Anderson, unlike Harris, had completed his act of suppression. The police, therefore, could not perceive either Anderson or the drugs during the act of suppression. Thus, Anderson could not fall within the Pennewell set of cases. In Fletcher, the police took constructive control of Fletcher's car and its contents, when they performed a traffic stop. [33] The testimony supporting Fletcher's concealment after the stop and following a substantiated belief that the police were about to produce the contraband in his car at trial, is consistent with our analysis here. Significantly, Fletcher's driver testified that Fletcher did not conceal the contraband until after the police stopped and took constructive control of their car. Had he acted before the traffic stop  that is, without a substantiated belief of procedural immediacy  Fletcher would have merely concealed an item, not evidence. Before the police take control of the item and make it `evidence' for the purpose of § 1269, the officers may instruct a suspect not to move or discard any objects. If the suspect disobeys the officers' instruction, the prosecutor may charge the defendant with a crime that appropriately reflects his disobedience. The State may not, however, successfully convict the defendant of Tampering with Evidence. The Commentary, discussed above, would also prevent the State from convicting a defendant of attempted tampering under § 531, where he conceals, e.g., an item that does not constitute evidence because the defendant has no belief of procedural immediacy. The General Assembly has criminalized certain acts of possession and use; the tampering statute does not aggravate those crimes when committed outside of the State's vigilance. Section 1269 punishes only those serious criminals who suppress items that constitute evidence. Harris could not suppress any evidence here by merely attempting to swallow an item in plain view of the police, even if a rational person could believe that he intended to swallow both the baggie and its contents.