Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of this Court's Prior Decision on Custody Determination

Text: Although, in People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 1112, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327, we reversed defendant's first conviction for the present crimes on grounds of juror misconduct, in that decision we also addressed the custody issue regarding the March 21 statement because the issue will arise on retrial ( ibid. ); we concluded defendant was not in custody ( id. at p. 1115, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327). The parties dispute whether this portion of our prior decision is law of the case in the present appeal. As the trial court on retrial reached the same conclusion without reliance on that doctrine, and as we now do the same, we need not decide whether the law of the case doctrine applies in these circumstances. Defendant contends our discussion and conclusion on the custody issue in People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 1112-1115, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327, deprived him, in violation of due process principles, of a fair and reliable determination of the issue on retrial, in that it presented the trial court with an irresistible incentive, in order to avoid reversal by this court, to make findings of fact and legal conclusions that accorded with those reflected in our prior decision. The record does not support this claim. The trial court conducted a full hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, at which the testimony of three officers and defendant himself was heard. After written and oral argument, the court ruled, making detailed findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses and the facts surrounding the March 21 interview, and drawing from those facts the conclusion defendant was not in custody at the time of that interview. We reject defendant's claim as entirely speculative, for he cites nothing, and we have found nothing in the record, suggesting the trial court's findings or decision were influenced by our prior decision. Citing some purported differences between the detectives' testimony in the first suppression motion hearing and that conducted on retrial, defendant also argues our prior discussion of the custody issue may have improperly influenced the testimony itself. Again, nothing in the record suggests such an effect. For a witness to testify somewhat differently on the same topic at sequential hearings is not uncommon. The remedy for a litigant who believes a witness is trying to improve his or her testimony is, of course, to question the witness about and, if necessary, impeach the witness with the prior testimony. (See Evid.Code, §§ 770, 780, subd. (h), 1235.) Defendant, who had a full opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses at the retrial suppression hearing, was not denied due process by any changes in their testimony.