Opinion ID: 1354339
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Individualized targeting and disfavored group analysis

Text: In the alternative, Wakkary submits that the agency erred in its assessment of whether he would be individually targeted for persecution by refusing to consider evidence that Wakkary belongs to a disfavored group. The BIA reasoned that our holding in Sael regarding the evidentiary relevance of an asylum applicant's membership in a disfavored groupis simply inapplicable to claims for withholding of removal. As a result, the agency ignored a large amount of record evidence that is pertinent to whether Chinese Christians in Indonesia are widely disfavored, discriminated against, and, in a substantial number of instances, persecuted on account of their race and religion. We disagree with the agency's refusal to consider this evidence in evaluating the future persecution issue. At the same time, we do recognize that the disfavored group mode of analysis needs clarification, as it has been misunderstood by both the agency and some other circuits. Moreover, we note that in practice, the impact of the disfavored group mode of analysis is likely to be of considerably less significance in withholding than in asylum cases, due to the different standards of proof for these two forms of relief. Still, even though this evidence will not often change the outcome of a withholding claim, it is nevertheless relevant, and the BIA erred in not considering it.
We begin by briefly reviewing the development, in the asylum context, of what has come to be calledperhaps unfortunately, as the terminology may be misleading disfavored group analysis. We first recognized the evidentiary relevance of an asylum applicant's membership in a disfavored group in Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.1994). Kotasz explained that although the asylum regulations provide two ways to establish a well-founded fear of future persecutionshowing a pattern or practice of persecution, or showing a likelihood of being individually singled out, see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii) these two categories of future-fear claims should not be understood to require discrete sorts of evidence. As Kotasz emphasized, [g]roup membership is an aspect of nearly all asylum claims, not a special problem limited to pattern or practice cases. Id. at 853. Indeed, Kotasz noted, the most common individualized persecution scenario is one in which, although members of the disfavored group[ ] are not threatened by [a pattern or practice of] systematic persecution of the group's entire membership, the fact of group membership nonetheless places [the individual] at some risk. Id. The singled out path is not reserved solely for those applicants whose would-be persecutors seek them out personally, by name. Rather, Kotasz recognized that one's chances of being singled out from the general population and subjected to persecution is often strongly correlated with the frequency with which others who share the same disfavored characteristics are mistreated and persecuted. So, in a case in which the asylum applicant attempts to show that he faces a reasonable likelihood of being singled out individually on account of a protected characteristic, [p]roof that the government or other persecutor has discriminated against a group to which [he] belongs is ... always relevant, because that proof says something about the chances that he, as a member of that group, will be persecuted. [10] Id. Based on this common-sense evidentiary proposition, Kotasz held that once an applicant establishes that he is a member of a group that is broadly disfavored, the more egregious the showing of group persecutionthe greater the risk to all members of the groupthe less evidence of individualized persecution must be adduced to meet the objective prong of a well-founded fear showing. Id. (emphases added); see also Mgoian, 184 F.3d at 1035 n. 4. Since Kotasz, we have found petitioners from a number of groups to have established that they are members of disfavored groups for asylum purposes. See, e.g., El Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.2004) (stateless Palestinians born in Kuwait); Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182-83 (9th Cir.2003) (ethnic Albanians in Kosovo); Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (9th Cir.1996) (ethnic Indians in Fiji). We first applied disfavored group analysis to the asylum claim of a member of Indonesia's Chinese Christian minority in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.2004). In Sael, we found that the record evidence, documenting centuries of popular and official discrimination against the Chinese and Christian minorities in Indonesia, establishe[d] that ethnic Chinese are significantly disfavored in Indonesia. 386 F.3d at 927. Accordingly, Sael, as a Chinese Christian woman, had to demonstrate a `comparatively low' level of individualized risk in order to prove that she ha[d] a well-founded fear of future persecution. Id. We concluded that Sael met her burden of showing individualized risk by adducing evidence of her past personal experiences of threats, vandalism, and threatened violence by native Indonesians. Id. at 927-29. These experiences, even [though] not sufficient to compel a finding of past persecution, were indicative of individualized risk [of future harm]. Id. at 928-29. When viewed in the context of the country-conditions evidence of widespread discrimination against Chinese Christians, Sael's evidence of individualized risk compelled the conclusion that her own fear of future persecution was objectively well-founded. Id. at 929.
Until today, we have applied the disfavored group approach only to asylum claims. In Sael, we expressly reserved the question whether this mode of analysis is applicable in the context of withholding of removal claims as well. Sael, 386 F.3d at 930 n. 10. Wakkary's case presents that question squarely. When it dismissed Wakkary's appeal, the BIA held that Sael prescribes a reduced burden of proof for asylum seekers belonging to disfavored groups, which it considered to be incompatible with the higher, and less elastic, clear probability standard required for withholding of removal. In so ruling, the BIA misunderstood Sael 's holding. Disfavored group analysis does not prescribe a lower-than-usual burden of proof for the asylum claims of members of certain judicially-anointed groups. An individual seeking asylum must always show that he faces at least a ten percent chance of future persecution, whether he attempts to meet his burden by showing a pattern or practice or by showing a likelihood that he will be individually singled out. See Al-Harbi, 242 F.3d at 888. We have never held, in Sael, Kotasz, or elsewhere, that a member of a disfavored group must show only, say, a five or nine percent likelihood of persecution to be eligible for asylum. Instead, the lesser or comparatively low burden to which we averted in Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 854, and Sael, 386 F.3d at 927, refers not to a lower ultimate standard, but to the lower proportion of specifically individualized evidence of risk, counterbalanced by a greater showing of group targeting, that an applicant must adduce to meet that ultimate standard under the regulations' individually singled out rubric. The more evidence of group targeting an asylum applicant proffers, the less evidence of individually specific evidence he needs to reach that ten percent. In other words, the disfavored group concept simply describes the basic evidentiary proposition that an asylum applicant's membership in a group whose members are shown to have been widely targeted for discrimination, a substantial number of whom are shown to have been persecuted, is relevant evidence in assessing whether his fear of being personally targeted for persecution in the future rises to the requisite level of objective reasonableness. With this clarification, it should be apparent that our disfavored group cases do not invent a judicially created alternative to the statutory and regulatory scheme, Kho v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2007), or a lower threshold of proof, Firmansjah v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 598, 607 n. 6 (7th Cir.2005), as some other circuits have mistakenly assumed. See also Lie, 396 F.3d at 538 n. 4. Rather, our cases merely outline a method for weighing indicators of future individual risk, a method consistent with that employed in other circuits. The First Circuit, for example, recognized that in evaluating each claim on its facts, it may be that evidence short of a pattern or practice will enhance an individualized showing of likelihood of a future threat to an applicant's life or freedom. Kho, 505 F.3d at 55. Although the First Circuit regarded that possibility as a different matter from our disfavored group approach, in fact that fairly obvious evidentiary point is the essence of our disfavored group cases. In other words, when asking how likely it is that an individual applicant will be singled out in the future on the basis of his group membership, it is indisputably relevant (though of course not dispositive) how others in his group are treated. For, as the Fourth Circuit explained, an applicant will typically demonstrate some combination of [individual risk and group risk] to establish a well-founded fear of persecution. The more egregious the showing of group persecution[,] the less evidence of individualized persecution must be adduced. Conversely, a stronger showing of individual targeting will be necessary where the underlying basis for the applicant's fear is membership in a diffuse class against whom actual persecution is hap-hazard and rare. Chen v. INS, 195 F.3d 198, 203-04 (4th Cir.1999) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 853); see also Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir.1995). We see no reason why this evidentiary proposition should be applicable to asylum claims but not to withholding claims. The BIA correctly noted that asylum and withholding of removal have different quantitative standards of prooften percent for asylum, and more likely than not for withholding. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(iii); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449, 107 S.Ct. 1207; Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir.2000). To repeat, disfavored group analysis does not alter the quantitative standard of proof. Rather, it determines what sorts of evidence can be used to meet that standard, and, quite generally, in what proportions. What matters is that both asylum and withholding have the same qualitative criteria for eligibility, so the same sorts of evidence are relevant to determining whether an applicant's fear is objectively reasonable. Under the regulations, eligibility for both forms of relief depend upon the likelihood that the applicant will be persecuted in his home country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A) (asylum); id. § 1208.16(b) (withholding). And 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2), governing withholding, provides in substantially identical language to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii) (governing asylum) that a withholding applicant may demonstrate that his fear of future persecution rises to the requisite level of objective reasonableness either by showing a pattern or practice of persecution, or by showing that he will be singled out individually. Id. § 1208.16(b)(2). In sum, if an applicant's membership in a disfavored group is relevant to the objective reasonableness of his future fear in the asylum context, we see no reason, either in logic or in the statutory and regulatory design, why membership in a disfavored group should not similarly be relevant to assessing the likelihood of individual targeting in the withholding context. We hold that it is.
Even under the disfavored group approach, an applicant for withholding of removal must show that his chance of future persecution is greater than fifty percent. Evidence of group discrimination will go part of the way toward meeting that bar how far depending upon how egregious and pervasive the showing of group discrimination is, see Mgoian, 184 F.3d at 1035 n. 4but, absent a pattern or practice of persecution, it can never go all the way. As we explained recently in the asylum context in Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1179, 1181 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), some evidence of individualized risk is necessary for the petitioner to succeed. In Lolong, we upheld the BIA's determination that an asylum applicant belonging to Indonesia's Chinese Christian minority failed to show an objectively well-founded fear of future persecution, because she had offered no evidence of her own individual risk. Id. at 1181 n. 6. Rather, Lolong rested her claim solely on evidence that Chinese Indonesian women as a group are targeted for violent attacks and rapes, and on evidence that family members and a friend had experienced anti-Chinese violence. We held that a general, undifferentiated claim based solely on the threat to the group as a whole is not sufficient for an individual petitioner to establish the requisite likelihood of persecution under the singled out individually rubric. Id. at 1179. Asylum applicants who attempt to show their eligibility for asylum in part by relying on their membership in a disfavored group must prove something more than their status as ... members of that group. Id. at 1181 n. 6. Similarly, in Sael, we emphasized that the petitioner's showing that she is a member of a disfavored group must be coupled with a showing that she, in particular, is likely to be targeted as a member of that group. Sael, 386 F.3d at 925. Sael met this burden by adducing evidence that she personally had been threatened, her home vandalized, and her car thronged by a mob who saw that she was Chinese. Id. at 927-28. An applicant for withholding of removal will need to adduce a considerably larger quantum of individualized-risk evidence to prevail than would an asylum applicant like Sael, assuming their disfavored group evidence is of equal severity and pervasiveness, because the ultimate bar for withholding is higher than the bar for asylum. As a practical matter, then, applying disfavored group analysis to withholding claims will not affect the outcome of most petitioners' cases. Most aliens seek both forms of relief as a matter of course. [11] If an applicant fails to demonstrate eligibility for asylum even with the help of disfavored group analysis (such that his chance of future persecution, even with the evidentiary boost that his membership in a disfavored group provides, is less than ten percent), then he will necessarily have failed to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal. See Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 2004). There are cases, however, in which the applicant's request for asylum fails not for lack of proof on the merits, but because his application is found to be time-barredas Wakkary's was initially, although we have remanded that decision. In such cases, the fact of the applicant's membership in a group proven to be disfavored could mean the difference between meeting withholding's more likely than not bar and coming up short. Given the high burden of proof for withholding, it is likely that evidence of group persecution not sufficiently widespread to amount to a pattern or practice will relatively infrequently succeed in filling the gap between individually-specific risk evidence and the requisite level of proof. But infrequently is not never. We hold that the BIA erred in precluding consideration of disfavored group evidence entirely with regard to withholding of removal.
At his removal hearing, Wakkary presented some evidence of past mistreatment that he suffered personally. The IJ dismissed these incidents as random encounters... not directed against [Wakkary] personally, which, being random, had little or nothing to say about Wakkary's chances of future persecution. The events were not random in any relevant sense. For each of these incidents, Wakkary provided circumstantial evidence that his harassers were motivated by anti-Chinese and/or anti-Christian sentiment. See Sinha v. Holder, 556 F.3d 774, 779-80 (9th Cir.2009) (rejecting an IJ's characterization of attacks on Indo-Fijian petitioners, in the context of widespread violence against their ethnic group, as random, because individuals of Indo-Fijian ethnicity were the specific targets of the widespread violence and because the petitioners presented specific evidence that [their] attackers had racially discriminatory motives, including testimony that their attackers berated them with racist epithets); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir.2003) (The use of [ethnic] slur[s during the attacks] amply establishes the connection between the acts of persecution and Baballah's ethnicity and religion.). Wakkary's attackers may not have known his name, but it is clear they targeted him, and not some other bystander, because he is Chinese and/or a Christian. The only way the IJ could have considered the incidents random is by ignoring this evidence of motive, as well as the broader evidence of widespread ongoing hostility towards the Chinese and Christian community. Refusing to weigh Wakkary's individually-focused evidence in light of the risk of mistreatment and persecution that all Chinese Christians in Indonesia face, the IJ saw only random chance at work. In fact, Wakkary has shown that there is a strong correlation between the harm he personally faces and the plight of Chinese Christians in Indonesia generally. Moreover, Wakkary testified to his position as a pastor and a religious leader within the Chinese Christian community a position that makes him particularly visible and vulnerable to attack on account of his group membership. See Kotasz, 31 F.3d at 854 n. 10 ([W]here a Christian sect is targeted, priests may be more at risk than ordinary church members ....); Mgoian, 184 F.3d at 1035 n. 4 (noting that evidence of the alien's individual risk level may include evidence that the alien has a special role in the group or is more likely to come to the attention of the persecutors[,] making him a more likely target for persecution.). The question for the agency on remand will be whether Wakkary has adduced enough evidence of individual risk, in combination with enough evidence that the ethnic and religious group to which he belongs is disfavored in Indonesia, to make out a clear probability of persecution upon return. The BIA never engaged in this inquiry, because it held the disfavored group evidencethat is, the country-conditions evidence concerning the widespread mistreatment and persecution of Chinese and Christian individuals in Indonesiato be entirely irrelevant to withholding of removal. Given our limited role in reviewing orders of removal, we may not decide in the first instance whether Wakkary's evidence is sufficient to meet the standard for withholding. Rather, because the BIA misunderstood our disfavored group cases and so did not take into account the disfavored group evidence, we are obliged to remand to the BIA for an appropriate decision based on all the relevant evidence. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002).