Opinion ID: 2563933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Related to Aggravating Factor of Attempted Escape

Text: As noted above, the prosecution presented evidence, through the out-of-court statements of Cindy Keshmiri, who had been incarcerated with defendant in the county jail and worked on the food line, that defendant had asked Keshmiri for a knife and, after Keshmiri provided her with a hard plastic knife, asked her for aluminum foil. The prosecution theorized that defendant's acts constituted an attempted escape, and thus were admissible in aggravation as criminal activity . . . which involved . . . the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) Defendant raises a number of challenges to this evidence and to the court's related instructions regarding it, each of which is discussed below. 1. Absence of instruction that Keshmiri was an accomplice Defendant argues that, at the penalty phase, the trial court should have instructed the jury that Keshmiri was an accomplice to any attempted escape by defendant and that her out-of-court statements required corroboration. The trial court denied the requested instruction on the ground that the question whether Keshmiri was an accomplice was an issue for the jury. The trial court was correct. (28) An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. (§ 1111.) An accomplice's testimony is not sufficient to support a conviction unless it is corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant with the commission of the offense. ( Ibid. ) In this context, testimony includes an accomplice's out-of-court statements made under questioning by police or under other suspect circumstances. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 245 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710]; People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 525-526 [153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485].) The requirement of accomplice corroboration applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial. ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 244-245.) Whether a person is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 presents a factual question for the jury `unless the evidence presents only a single inference.' [Citation.] Thus, a court can decide as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice only when the facts regarding the witness's criminal culpability are `clear and undisputed.' [Citations.] ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 679.) To be an accomplice, Keshmiri would have had to act with knowledge of defendant's criminal purpose and with the intent to encourage or facilitate the commission of the offense. (See People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 90-91 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].) Providing assistance without sharing the perpetrator's purpose and intent is insufficient to establish that a person is an accomplice. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1227 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) In her out-of-court statements, Keshmiri admitted providing defendant with a plastic knife but denied any intent to facilitate a crime. Keshmiri told the investigating officer that when she handed defendant the knife, I didn't realize what I was doing I guess. Subsequently, when defendant commented that the guards did not carry guns, Keshmiri explained, that's when I took it to seem she meant to escape. That's why, that's why I freaked out. I took it as a joke to begin with . . . and then I said . . . that was stupid. That same day, Keshmiri voluntarily reported the incident to the authorities, explaining, I don't want to see somebody else get hurt over it. If the jurors believed Keshmiri's out-of-court statements, they reasonably could conclude that she did not intend to assist defendant in escaping from custody and therefore was not an accomplice. Consequently, the trial court did not err in permitting the jury to decide whether or not Keshmiri was an accomplice. 2. Absence of instruction for jury to determine whether Keshmiri was an accomplice Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, in accordance with CALJIC No. 3.19, that it was required to determine whether the witness Keshmiri was an accomplice and that defendant had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Keshmiri was an accomplice. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 982 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704] [trial court must inform the jury, on its own motion, of the jury's obligation to determine whether a witness is an accomplice].) Defendant contends the trial court's error in failing to direct the jury to determine explicitly whether Keshmiri was an accomplice was compounded by the court's instructions concerning the testimony of an in-custody informant, which, she asserts, erroneously informed the jury that Keshmiri was not an accomplice. The jury was instructed that an in-custody informant is a person, other than a co-defendant, percipient witness, accomplice, or co-conspirator, who testifies concerning a statement made by the defendant while both were in custody. (Italics added.) The jury explicitly was instructed that Cindy Keshmiri was an in-custody informant. Following these instructions, defendant contends, the jury assumed that because Keshmiri was an in-custody informant she was not an accomplice and that corroboration of her testimony was not required. (29) We must consider whether it is reasonably likely that the trial court's instructions caused the jury to misapply the law. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-527 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) [T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251], disapproved on another ground in People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445]; see Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 [116 L.Ed.2d 385, 112 S.Ct. 475] [alleged ambiguity in instructions must be viewed in light of the instructions as a whole and the entire record].) One could construe the instructions to mean that, because Keshmiri was an in-custody informant, and because an in-custody informant is someone other than . . . [an] accomplice, Keshmiri was not an accomplice. We view it as unlikely, however, that the jury engaged in such an interpretation. Although the trial court did not explicitly tell the jury to decide whether Keshmiri was an accomplice, the instructions given implicitly required such a determination. The jury was instructed that an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated, and the definition of an accomplice was provided. The jury also was given instructions concerning how it was to determine whether an accomplice had been corroborated. Defendant's interpretation would render the instructions on accomplice testimony entirely superfluous. We conclude it was more likely that the jurors correctly interpreted the instructions, in context, to mean that they were required to apply the instruction regarding in-custody informants only if they concluded that Keshmiri was not an accomplice. Furthermore, both parties in their arguments correctly interpreted these instructions. The prosecutor acknowledged in closing argument that the defense could argue that Keshmiri was an accomplice and that her statements required corroboration. Defense counsel observed that the instructions concerning accomplice testimony and in-custody informant testimony were given to the jury in the alternative. Defense counsel stated that the jurors could find that Keshmiri was an accomplice; however, [i]f you were to find that she was not an accomplice but an in-custody informant, the instructions would direct the jurors to be cautious in evaluating her testimony. We find no reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the instructions to require that it assume Keshmiri was not an accomplice. 3. Sufficiency of corroboration Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting Keshmiri's statements, because she was an accomplice and there was no corroborating evidence. The trial court agreed that Keshmiri's prior tape-recorded statements were not corroborated. Even if we assume the trial court was correct, that circumstance did not render her statements inadmissible because, as discussed above, the jury reasonably could have concluded that she was not an accomplice. The jury was instructed that [a] defendant cannot be found to have committed a criminal act based on the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect such defendant with the commission of the offense. If the jury determined that Keshmiri was an accomplice, we presume it followed the court's instructions and did not consider the allegation that defendant had committed an attempted escape. On the other hand, if the jury determinedas it could have, under the evidence presentedthat Keshmiri was not an accomplice, corroboration was not required. 4. Sufficiency of evidence of attempted escape (30) Defendant contends the trial court erred in permitting the jury to hear the tape recordings of Keshmiri's out-of-court statements, because they did not establish criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).) A jury cannot consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating factor unless it is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged conduct occurred and that it constituted a crime. ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 539 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032]; People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-774 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) The prosecution argued that the conduct described by Keshmiri constituted an attempt to escape from county jail, in violation of section 4532, subdivision (b). Defendant contends that, even assuming Keshmiri's statements were true, defendant's conduct amounted to no more than preparation to commit a crime, and not an attempt. (31) We review the record for substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that violent criminal activity occurred. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142]; see People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 698 [214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446].) To prove an attempt, `[s]omething more is required than mere menaces, preparation or planning.' [Citation.] ( People v. Miller (1935) 2 Cal.2d 527, 530 [42 P.2d 308].) `[T]he attempt is the direct movement towards the commission after the preparations are made.' ( Ibid. ) In the present case, Keshmiri's statements were sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant was planning an escape attempt and prepared for that attempt by obtaining a hard plastic knife, but it is questionable whether they were sufficient to establish an actual attempt. Even if defendant is correct that the evidence was insufficient to establish an attempted escape, however, we conclude that any error in admitting Keshmiri's out-of-court statements was harmless. The weakness of the evidence of an escape attempt, the numerous challenges to Keshmiri's credibility, her refusal to testify at trial, and the instruction requiring the jury to view her testimony with caution diminish the likelihood that the jurors gave significant weight to this evidence. Even if the jurors believed Keshmiri's statements, the incident she described was relatively trivial in comparison to the circumstances of the crimes of which defendant was convicted defendant murdered two individuals and attempted to murder a third during the course of three separate incidents of burglary and robbery. The prosecutor did argue to the jury that the evidence of an attempted escape demonstrated defendant's willingness to use violence, but did not focus on this evidence as a justification for the death penalty. Indeed, the prosecutor admitted that the evidence of defendant's escape attempt pales, quite frankly, in comparison to the factors in aggravation under [section 190.3, factor] (a), but it happened. We brought it to your attention and you can consider it and give it whatever weight you deem appropriate. Defendant contends that this evidence was harmful because it may have influenced the jury to conclude that defendant was an escape risk and that the public could not be protected from her if they sentenced her to life imprisonment. The weakness of defendant's plan and the absence of any evidence that defendant actually attempted to carry out that plan, however, render it unlikely that the jury considered her to be a serious escape risk. We find no reasonable possibility that this evidence influenced the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. 5. The trial court's refusal to excise portions of Keshmiri's statements Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to excise certain statements from the tape recording of Keshmiri's interview with law enforcement authorities, and that these statements were sufficiently inflammatory that they rendered defendant's trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of her rights to due process of law and to a reliable penalty determination. (U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.) After the trial court ruled that Keshmiri's out-of-court statements could be admitted as prior inconsistent statements under Evidence Code sections 1235 and 770, defense counsel objected to two portions of the statements: Keshmiri's comments that (1) she regularly teased defendant about why defendant was in custody, (2) she would bullshit with defendant about her killing people and would say duck when she goes by. Defense counsel argued that these statements were irrelevant and extremely prejudicial, because they suggested that defendant was willing to participate in humor about committing homicide. The trial court overruled defendant's objections, concluding that the statements were relevant to show Keshmiri's relationship with defendant. Defendant argues that the prejudicial effect of these comments outweighed their probative value. Although Keshmiri's comments about joking with defendant revealed something about Keshmiri's own character, defendant contends they also implied that [defendant] shared some morbid sense of jocularity regarding the very serious charges she was facing. On the other hand, defendant argues, these comments were not necessary to establish defendant's relationship with Keshmiri, because that relationship was fully established by other, less prejudicial portions of Keshmiri's interview with the officers. [8] We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion, which is established by a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice [citation]. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].) We find no abuse of discretion. When called to testify, Keshmiri denied knowing defendant and claimed that the Celeste Carrington she knew was an entirely different person. Keshmiri's out-of-court statement that she teased defendant regarding the killings helped to establish that the person she spoke about to the officers was indeed defendant, who had been charged with murder. Furthermore, Keshmiri's accepting attitude toward defendant and her crimes lent credibility to her statement that defendant approached her for assistance. The trial court's ruling was reasonable and did not deny defendant a fair trial.