Opinion ID: 1144829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Language Of The Warrant.

Text: The cornerstone of a decision on particularity is, of course, the language of the warrant itself and Stanford v. Texas, supra , furnishes us guidance here. The Supreme Court in Stanford invalidated a warrant authorizing a search for and seizure of books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas, and the operations of the Communist Party in Texas. Id. at 478-79, 85 S.Ct. at 508. In concluding the warrant belonged to a prohibited genre the Court said, [W]e think it is clear that this warrant was of a kind which it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to forbid  a general warrant. Id. at 480, 85 S.Ct. at 509. A significant case of recent vintage is Aday v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 55 Cal.2d 789, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415, 362 P.2d 47 (1961), where a search warrant setting forth numerous articles [8] to be seized was deemed invalid because its sweeping language caused it to closely resemble the condemned general warrant. The California Supreme Court held that except for a set of tax returns (which was suppressed on other grounds) and two named books, the warrant did not constitute legal authorization to search for or seize the articles. Id. at 796, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 419, 362 P.2d at 51. Thus, an all-embracing characterization of evidence sought may well vitiate an authorization. Courts have also found the following authorizations in search warrants to be constitutionally deficient: to seize certain property designed for use in the unlawful manufacture of intoxicating liquor; [9] paraphernalia which could be used to violate [certain Connecticut laws]; [10] $150,000 in merchandise; [11] furniture and household goods; [12] [e]vidences of indebtedness, [t]elephone bills showing calls between ... [defendant] and other persons and [a]ny papers showing names and addresses of associates of ... [defendant]; [13] and stolen property received and concealed upon [certain] premises in violation of [a statute]. [14] In United States v. Feldman, 366 F. Supp. 356 (D.Haw. 1973), the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii passed on the breadth of search warrant language. A warrant authorizing a search for and the seizure of marihuana in hashish form and documents and instrumentalities relating to the shipment and ownership of marihuana had been issued. In its execution, police uncovered hashish, telegram receipts, a passport and a yellow bag. The court concluded the evidence other than the hashish had been improperly seized because the term documents and instrumentalities relating to the shipment and ownership of marihuana did not meet applicable standards of specificity. The State cites several cases where search warrant language describing the scope of the search in broad general terms has been held sufficient to pass constitutional muster. The pertinent language in United States v. Honore, 450 F.2d 31 (9th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1048, 92 S.Ct. 728, 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972), closely paralleled that of the warrant in the instant situation, but with a notable difference discussed below. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Honore upheld a warrant authorizing seizure of various specifically named items and articles [of] personal property tending to establish the identify [sic] of the persons in control of the premises ... including but not limited to utility company receipts, rent receipts, cancelled mail envelopes, and keys. [15] More recently, in Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a search warrant where the crucial phrase was: together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown. There, the Court expressly found the scope of this language had been narrowed by limiting words immediately preceding it [16] and concluded, [t]he warrants, accordingly, did not authorize the executing officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses and Lot 13T. Id. at 481-82, 96 S.Ct. at 2749. A review of the foregoing cases and the relevant facts in the instant case convinces us that the portion of the pertinent warrant authorizing a search for and seizure of articles of personal property tending to establish ... identification ... is defective. We find the description of the articles to be seized pursuant to its authority even less particularized than the offensive wording in Stanford, Aday, and Feldman. There are critical differences between language commanding search for and seizure of articles of personal property tending to establish ... identification ... and the wording of the Honore, Wiley, and Andresen warrants. In Honore and Wiley broad general descriptions of the articles were particularized by specific examples of what was sought. Although the warrants were not models of specificity, the examples served to guide the executing officer and reviewing court in determining what items were or were not to be the objects of search and seizure. Absent such signposts, officers may [seize] ... one thing under a warrant describing another. Marron, supra, 275 U.S. at 196, 48 S.Ct. at 76. Andresen may be distinguished because broad language was substantially narrowed by reading the phrase together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime ... in conjunction with language focusing the permitted search on documents related to a particular parcel of land. No examples or other limiting language that could have effectively circumscribed the search and seizure of the executing officer were extant in this case. The breadth of the search the officer assumed was sanctioned is underscored by the wide variety of personal property listed in the police inventory, items that may or may not be useful in establishing identity, e.g., an envelope, film, cosmetic items, gold earrings, a key, a printed dress, and a black panty. The language in question too closely resembles the wording of a forbidden general warrant for us to ratify a seizure effected thereunder.