Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Asserted Errors Arising Out of Lack of Instruction on the Elements of Torture

Text: Defendant contends the court violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable sentence under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because the prosecution misused the law related to conspiracy, and effectively charged defendant with murder by torture, when it listed the torture of Mary Magoon as one of 10 overt acts in the conspiracy to commit robbery count (a noncapital offense for which defendant and Alvarado were charged and found guilty). Defendant further contends that the prosecutor's references to torture during the trial had the effect of trying defendant for murder by torture, even though neither codefendant was so charged, and the trial court did not instruct the jury in any definition of torture. Defendant does not specify whether the asserted error is based on prosecutorial misconduct in using the word torture or the trial court's failure to instruct the jury in the legal elements of torture, but we discern no error under either theory. Defense counsel never objected to the prosecution's use of the word torture in the information or at trial. For this reason, we consider any claim based on the prosecution's use of the word forfeited. ( Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1000, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) In addition, as we explain, even if defendant did not forfeit the issue, he fails to show prejudice.
Count 1 of the information charged both codefendants with conspiracy to commit robbery. It listed 10 overt acts: (1) arming themselves with nine-millimeter pistols; (2, 3) driving to Daniel Magoon's residence and entering it; (4) shooting and murdering Daniel Magoon; (5) torturing Mary Magoon; (6) shooting and murdering Mary Magoon; (7) shooting and wounding J.; (8-10) stealing Daniel Magoon's marijuana, nine-millimeter Helwan pistol, and money. The information charged murder generally, and did not specify first degree murder by torture under section 189. Defendants were not charged with the crime of torture under section 206, nor was torture alleged as a special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18). The prosecution submitted but, on defense counsel's objection, withdrew a first degree murder by torture instruction. The court did not instruct the jury on any torture definition. For the conspiracy count, defendant cites no authority holding the trial court was required to instruct the jury on the meaning of the word torture, as an overt act. A court has no sua sponte duty to define terms that are commonly understood by those familiar with the English language, but it does have a duty to define terms that have a technical meaning peculiar to the law. ( People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 334, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107.) In the information, the word torture was used in its commonly understood sense to describe an overt act, not as part of a legal definition of conspiracy. Overt acts are not required to be crimes. ( People v. Marquez (1994) 28 Cal. App.4th 1315, 1325-26, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 821.) Because there is no indication the word torture was being used in a technical legal sense, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to define the term in the conspiracy count. Even assuming the trial court erred in not instructing on the meaning of the word torture as an overt act, any error was harmless under any standard. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 [federal constitutional error assessed under harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837, 299 P.2d 243 [state law error assessed under reasonable probability standard]; People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, 502-504, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869 [instructional error subject to harmless error review].) Substantial evidence supported the other nine overt acts, any one of which also supported the jury's guilty verdict on the conspiracy count. ( People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1128, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641 [jury need not unanimously agree on the same overt act to convict for conspiracy].)
Defendant contends the court should have instructed the jury on the legal elements of torture. But because defendant was not charged with the separate crime of torture under section 206, or torture as a special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), the trial court had no duty to instruct on either. Murder by torture is a specified statutory basis for first degree murder. (ง 189.) The information charging defendant with murder did not specify first degree murder by torture, but the accusatory pleading need not specify the theory of first degree murder on which the prosecution intends to rely. (See People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 556-57, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 [information need not specify first degree murder by poison].) Of course, even though the prosecutor did not charge first degree murder by torture, he still might have presented the elements of murder by torture to the jury in the course of presenting his case. But even assuming the prosecutor in effect developed a murder by torture theory at trial and even assuming the trial court had a duty to instruct on first degree murder by torture, defendant can show no possible prejudice from the absence of the instruction. The jury was instructed on two theories supporting a guilty verdict for first degree murder: premeditation and felony murder. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder as to Mary Magoon based on either or both of those theories. There was no possible prejudice to defendant by the trial court's failure to provide the jury with a third theory for returning a verdict of first degree murder. Whether the jury accepted or rejected this third theory would not have changed the verdict of first degree murder it returned based on the other two theories.