Opinion ID: 2081910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Cross-Examination of Horace Green and Detective Corley

Text: All three defendants argue that the trial justice committed reversible error when he precluded them from cross-examining state witnesses concerning Green's bias and motive in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. The defendants aver that since Green was as deeply mired in the events leading to Bolden's death as anyone, was never charged with any crime, and was the primary witness for the state, they had a right to thoroughly cross-examine him concerning his reason for testifying as he did. The defendants contend that the trial justice limited their cross-examination of Green and Det. Corley, the police officer who interviewed Green, concerning precisely what charges Green avoided with his testimony. In applicable part, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right    to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Similarly, the Declaration of Rights, article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution, provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, accused persons shall enjoy the right    to be confronted with the witnesses against them. Accordingly, it is axiomatic that the trial justice may not totally prevent the defendant from exploring the issues of motive, bias, or prejudice in the testimony of the state's chief witness. State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1357 (R.I.1984). (Emphasis added.) The trial justice has no discretion at all under the confrontation clause to completely prohibit defense counsel from attempting to elicit testimony from a crucial witness to demonstrate bias upon his part. Id. (Emphasis added.) If the trial justice does so, he or she commits an error of constitutional magnitude under both the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and art. 1, sec. 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution. Parillo, 480 A.2d at 1357. However, it is also well established that the scope of cross-examination, even for the purpose of exposing bias [or motive], is not unlimited. State v. Doctor, 690 A.2d 321, 327 (R.I.1997). We have reviewed the testimony in this case and find that there was no per se violation of defendants' rights of confrontation. The defendants extensively cross-examined both Green and Det. Corley about the nature of, and the circumstances surrounding, the promise not to prosecute Green. In situations in which the trial justice does not totally prevent or completely prohibit the defendant from exploring the issues of motive, bias, or prejudice of the witness, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard on review. For cross-examination to satisfy constitutional guarantees, the trial justice is required to afford the accused `reasonable latitude' to establish or reveal bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives as they may relate to the case being tried. State v. Hazard, 745 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I.2000). [O]nce sufficient cross-examination has been allowed, the constitutional safeguards are satisfied, and any further cross-examination is left within the sound discretion of the trial justice. Id. The trial justice is afforded this discretionary latitude so that he or she may limit cross-examination on the basis of concerns of witness harassment, jury prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. State v. Wiley, 676 A.2d 321, 324 (R.I.1996). We will not disturb, absent a clear abuse of discretion, the trial justice's discretionary decision to limit the scope of cross-examination. State v. Walsh, 731 A.2d 696, 698 (R.I.1999). We are satisfied the trial justice afforded the defendants reasonable latitude to establish or reveal bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives on the part of Green. The record reflects that defense counsel questioned Green at numerous points about his motives for testifying. In response to defendants' cross-examination, Green admitted that he was concerned that he could be charged with a crime, that he did not know what charges could be lodged against him, that he did not ask the police what he could be charged with, and that he made an agreement that if he told the truth that [he] would not be charged. Detective Corley was also extensively cross-examined. Detective Corley testified that he told Green that if he told the truth he would not be charged with drug dealing, that he did not tell Green that there could be any other charges, and that Green did not inquire about any other charges. The defendants contend that they were prevented from asking Green about whether he was afraid that the police would charge him with robbery. Our review of the transcripts clearly demonstrates that, in the context in which it was asked, the question was not designed to probe Green's motive or bias, but rather to express defense counsel's incredulity with Green's version of events. Consequently, because the question clearly appears argumentative, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the state's objection to the question. The defendants also argue that the trial justice erred in preventing them from specifically inquiring whether Det. Corley told Green that he could be charged with murder or robbery. These questions are clearly repetitious; Det. Corley had just testified that he had not told Green that he could be charged with any other crimes, except for drug dealing.