Opinion ID: 2959836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inherent Mobility

Text: The government argues that the defendants’ physical distance from the vehicles and the government’s control of the vehicles as they were being searched does nothing to mitigate the application of the automobile exception, which, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, does not turn on the immediate mobility of the automobile. Rather, the government relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), that, where there is probable cause to search a vehicle, “a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.” Id. at 809. The government notes that the district court relied almost exclusively on the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Coolidge, and contends that Coolidge has been significantly eroded by more recent developments in Fourth Amendment law, namely Ross and its progeny. The defendants generally counter that the automobile exception is justified by vehicles’ mobility, and that their vehicles were not “readily mobile” within the meaning of the relevant caselaw because the defendants had been taken away from their vehicles, had no notice of the search, and could not have moved the vehicles even if they had wanted to do so. The district court’s finding that the defendants’ temporary, voluntary presence in the police barracks for questioning pursuant to the ruse meant that the vehicles were not readily mobile, and that searches of them were therefore not within the automobile exception, was in error for two reasons. First, the district court erred in determining that the vehicles were not -13- readily mobile within the meaning of the automobile exception simply on the ground that the drivers and passenger were with police officers at their barracks, undergoing questioning concerning the ruse developed by the officers. Whether a vehicle is “readily mobile” within the meaning of the automobile exception has more to do with the inherent mobility of the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction, thereby precluding a search. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-51 (1970) (distinguishing a car, which is “readily movable,” from a “fixed piece of property”). The district court’s reading of “ready mobility” is in error because the district court appeared to regard the actual ability of a driver or passenger to flee immediately in the car, or the likelihood of him or her doing so, as a requirement for the application of the automobile exception. We rejected such a reading of “ready mobility” in United States v. Vassiliou, 820 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1987). Vassiliou was a contractor working for the United States on a military base. Following a fight with a subcontractor while on the base, the two were led to the military police station to settle the dispute. The subcontractor alleged that Vassiliou had pulled a gun on him and then hid the gun in the car. Based on this information, the military police conducted a warrantless search of Vassiliou’s vehicle and found the gun. Vassiliou sought to suppress the weapon, contending that the automobile exception did not apply “because his car was on a military outpost over which the military police had plenary jurisdiction and therefore was not mobile.” Id. at 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). He argued that, “[b]ecause entry to and exit from the post were controlled by the military police . . . he could not simply have driven away.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected Vassiliou’s argument and affirmed the district court’s denial of Vassiliou’s suppression motion because, regardless of the military’s -14- plenary control over the base, “Vassiliou could have left the military police station while a warrant was being obtained and disposed of the gun elsewhere on the base.” Id. We determined that the facts presented comprised “precisely the sort of exigent circumstances resulting from the automobile’s inherent mobility that the Supreme Court has recognized as justifying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Id. Like the defendants in the instant case, Vassiliou effectively claimed that he could not have accessed his car because he was in police custody, and that the vehicle was therefore not “readily mobile” as contemplated by the automobile exception cases. And indeed, like Vassiliou’s detention by military police on the base, the detention of the defendants in this case prevented them from accessing their vehicles. But just as the automobile exception was applicable in Vassiliou’s case, it applies here. Even where there is little practical likelihood that the vehicle will be driven away, the exception applies at least when that possibility exists. In this case, the police could not lawfully have detained the defendants in the police station had they not consented to remain there. Furthermore, the possibility existed that confederates in another car, of whom the police were unaware, might have observed the police intervention and might drive the car away. The district court erred in determining that the relative inaccessibility of the vehicles, occasioned by the defendants’ undergoing questioning at the police barracks, was sufficient to bring this search outside the ambit of the automobile exception. Thus we need not opine broadly on the continuing vitality of Coolidge, because our caselaw interpreting it has made clear that the district court’s understanding of “ready mobility” was in error. We additionally observe that the district court’s reasoning goes too far and would, if adopted, impermissibly graft onto the automobile exception a requirement of some additional -15- exigency beyond the inherent mobility of an operational vehicle—in this case, the immediate likelihood of the defendants returning to their vehicles and speeding away in them. In United States v. Ross, the Supreme Court made clear that a warrantless search would not violate the Fourth Amendment if there was probable cause to search a vehicle, “even though a warrant ha[d] not actually been obtained.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 809. The Supreme Court has reiterated this rule in subsequent cases, noting in Pennsylvania v. Labron that “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more,” 518 U.S. at 940, and in Maryland v. Dyson that no special exigency is required beyond a showing of the mobility of the automobile. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam). Thus, the district court’s inquiry into the existence of an additional exigency in this case—that is, the proximity of the drivers and passenger to the vehicles—is misplaced. The mere inherent mobility of the vehicle is sufficient to constitute the “ready mobility” the automobile exception cognizes. Second, the district court ignored the fact that the automobile exception has been justified by the Supreme Court not only because of automobiles’ ready mobility, but also because of the diminished expectation of privacy drivers and passengers enjoy while traveling in them. As the Supreme Court observed in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), “[e]ven in cases where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.” Id. at 391. Thus even if the vehicles searched in the case at bar were not “readily mobile” within the meaning of the automobile exception, a warrantless search of them would be justified based on the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by the drivers and passenger while traveling on the -16- Thruway.