Opinion ID: 788141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Of Appealability

Text: 17 We first address plaintiffs' argument that the order appealed from is interlocutory and non-final and, therefore, not appealable in accordance with the statutory provision conferring upon this Court jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Generally, a final order is an order of the district court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Clearly, the order under examination here is not such an order. 18 There are some narrowly drawn exceptions to the finality requirement, however. These exceptions allow an appeal to be taken from an interlocutory order where: (1) the order relates to injunctions, receiverships, and certain admiralty matters, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a); (2) the district court has certified for immediate appeal an order (i) that involves a controlling question of law, (ii) as to which there exists a substantial ground for difference of opinion, and (iii) the disposition of which may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); and (3) the order of the district court expressly directs the entry of a partial judgment in a multi-claim or multi-party action upon a determination that there is no just reason for delay. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); see Kahn v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 91 F.3d 385 (2d Cir.1996). Here, the order under review does not fit within any of these three exceptions to the rule of finality. 19 There is yet a fourth exception to the rule of finality. It is the so-called collateral order doctrine that had its genesis in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). In Cohen, a stockholder's derivative action was founded on diversity of citizenship. The defendant corporation sought to apply a state statute that required certain plaintiffs in such actions to post a bond as security for court costs. The district court there in question held that the statute was not applicable to the plaintiffs. Holding that order appealable, the Supreme Court wrote: This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221. 20 The collateral order doctrine is said to provide a narrow exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable as a matter of right. Schwartz v. City of New York, 57 F.3d 236, 237 (2d Cir.1995). To fit within the collateral order exception, the interlocutory order must `[i] conclusively determine the disputed question, [ii] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [iii] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.' Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317, 320 (2d Cir.1999) (allowing an appeal from a denial of an attorney's motion to withdraw as counsel) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454). 21 We conclude that the order under review falls within the collateral order exception. First, there is no question that the order constitutes a conclusive determination of the disputed issue, viz. whether the judgment bar prescribed by Section 2676 derails the Bivens action at bar. Second, that issue is completely separate and distinct from the merits of the action, which pertain to the liability of the individual defendants, as agents of the Government, for their acts and omissions in regard to the detention of the plaintiffs' goods. Finally, the order is one that will not be effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 22 The reason that the order will be effectively unreviewable after final judgment is that Section 2676, which the order addresses, confers statutory immunity from suit. As in the case of qualified immunity, the immunity claimed by the defendants here provides an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). In short, `the essence' of the claimed right is a right not to stand trial, Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 524, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988), and an order adjudicating that right is therefore effectively unreviewable on appeal, see Murphy v. Reid, 332 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2003). 23 While no case in this Circuit is directly on point, the Tenth Circuit, in a factually analogous context, determined that all three prongs of the collateral order doctrine [had been] plainly satisfied by the district court's holding that Section 2676[did] not bar [plaintiffs'] Bivens claim. Farmer v. Perrill, 275 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir.2001). We stand with the Tenth Circuit in that determination. To the extent that Brown v. United States, 851 F.2d 615, 619 (3d Cir.1988), is to the contrary, based on the determination that the denial of a Section 2676 judgment bar is not unreviewable on appeal, we reject it. We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the order here is not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because it does not present a question that is substantial, i.e., not doomed to failure under controlling precedent. Lawson v. Abrams, 863 F.2d 260, 262 (2d Cir.1988). The doomed to failure language applies only to an argument that has been considered and rejected in a prior case. Here, the application of the judgment bar to the dismissal of an FTCA claim by virtue of a statutory exception is a matter of first impression in this Circuit and, therefore, cannot be described as doomed to failure in either this Court or the District Court.