Opinion ID: 615993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: JRAD and Due Process

Text: We begin with the BIA's denial of Solis-Chavez's motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. If successful, this claim could serve as a complete bar to removal. As we have noted, the effect of a JRAD is mandatory and prevents removal based on the conviction to which it applies. Although removal has serious consequences, it is a civil proceeding. Padilla v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1481, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). As such, aliens in immigration proceedings do not have a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Pervaiz v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 488, 489-90 (7th Cir. 2005). They do, however, have a due-process right to a fair hearing. Kay v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 664, 676 (7th Cir.2004). The BIA has a body of caselaw holding that an alien's due-process rights can be violated by his attorney's ineffective assistance in removal proceedings. See generally Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988). But see Surganova v. Holder, 612 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir.2010) (reviewing Lozada 's subsequent history and noting that the legal standards that the BIA wishes to follow for these claims [have] been in a state of flux). There are three requirements for relief on this ground. First, the alien must comply with certain procedural requirements. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 639. Second, the alien must show that he was prejudiced by his representative's performance. Id. at 638. Finally, [i]neffective assistance of counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case. Id. Here, the BIA determined (and the government does not dispute) that Solis-Chavez complied with the first requirement. The BIA concluded, however, that Solis-Chavez could not satisfy the second. Specifically, the BIA held that because the JRAD was untimely, counsel's concession of its invalidity did not deprive Solis-Chavez of a valid defense to removal. Accordingly, the Board concluded that he was not prejudiced by his counsel's performance and there was no reason to reopen the proceedings. As relevant here, the JRAD statute provides that immigration authorities may not use a conviction as a basis to remove an alien if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (repealed 1990) (emphasis added). The Cook County judge who handled Solis-Chavez's case entered the JRAD 68 days after sentencing. The BIA held that the expiration of the statute's 30-day postsentencing deadline rendered the JRAD ineffective. The analysis is not quite that simple. Solis-Chavez's judge clearly indicated at sentencing that she intended to consider a JRAD in due course. Indeed, the judge raised the JRAD issue herself. She informed counsel of the notice requirements and deemed Solis-Chavez an appropriate candidate. The judge viewed the case as very different from a lot of the other cases that might have been charged under the [sexual-assault] statute because the victim was not harmed in any substantial way. Moreover, Solis-Chavez had no criminal background. At the end of the sentencing hearing, the judge explicitly retain[ed] jurisdiction for 30 days, said the case was still on the call, and made it clear that she anticipat[ed] further proceedings in this matter. When the time came for those further proceedings, the judge was in the middle of a jury trial. She called Solis-Chavez's case during a break but under the circumstances did not have an opportunity to refamiliarize herself with the case or the JRAD issue. Solis-Chavez's counsel was not in the courtroom at that moment, so the judge continued the case until the next month. This is not uncommon in high-volume state trial courts, in which judges call dozens of cases each dayoften while in trialand attorneys juggle appearances in several courtrooms on the same day. The decision to continue the matter outside the 30-day window thus represents an oversight of a busy state trial judge, not an opinion on the merits of the JRAD. Had the judge been reminded of the JRAD clock, we are confident she would have handled the matter more delicately, especially in light of her previously announced intention to consider a JRAD. As it was, the judge entered the recommendation at the next hearing, without opposition from immigration authorities or the state prosecutor. There is no indication that she was unfamiliar with the facts of Solis-Chavez's case at that time. Importantly, the judge was plainly trying to retain jurisdiction for the express purpose of considering the JRAD. The government maintains that the missed deadline automatically makes the JRAD invalid, but this argument disregards the surrounding circumstances and treats the 30-day deadline as a jurisdictional requirement. Taking the second point first, we do not read the statutory time limit as foreclosing the judge's authority to continue a case postsentencing for the purpose of entering a JRAD. The statute says that the immigration consequences of a conviction are wiped out if the judge makes the recommendation at sentencing or within 30 days of sentencing, but it does not speak to the consequences of missing the deadline; the statute is silent on whether the expiration of that time limit eliminates the court's authority to enter a JRAD. Cf. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515-16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) (If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. (citation omitted)). In this regard the 30-day limit in the JRAD statute is similar to the statutory deadline at issue in Dolan v. United States, 130 S.Ct. at 2538. Dolan concerned the statutory time limit for setting victim restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), which provides that a sentencing court shall set a date for the final determination of the victim's losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing. In Dolan the district court specifically noted the restitution issue at sentencing but said there was not enough information in the record to determine the proper amount. An addendum to the presentence report was timely filed, but the court inexplicably scheduled the restitution hearing three months outside the 90-day postsentencing window. The Supreme Court held that the missed deadline did not deprive the court of the power to award restitution. Id. at 2539. Because the restitution statute does not on its face specify a consequence for noncompliance with its timing provisions, the Supreme Court declined to impose its own coercive sanction. Id. (quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Court characterized § 3664(d)(5) as a time-limiting statute that seeks speed by creating a time-related directive that is legally enforceable but does not deprive a judge or other public official of the power to take the action to which the deadline applies if the deadline is missed. Id. at 2538. The Court held that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless retains the power to order restitutionat least where, as here, the sentencing court made clear prior to the deadline's expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more than 90 days) only the amount. Id. at 2537. Dolan is instructive here. Like the restitution statute, the JRAD statute does not, by its terms, specify the consequence for noncompliance with its 30-day deadline. When the statute was in effect, the short statutory window prevented sentencing judges from entering a JRAD retrospectively or long after the sentencing hearing when the facts of the case have faded from memory. Janvier, 793 F.2d at 453-55. But the statute itself is silent on whether the 30-day time limit affects the court's authority to enter a JRAD or forecloses the possibility of a continuance beyond that time frame where the court has timely announced its intention to consider making the recommendation. As in Dolan, this statutory silence suggests that a missed deadline, even through [the court's] own fault . . . , does not deprive the court of the power to enter a JRAD. See Dolan, 130 S.Ct. at 2539. While we have not previously considered the validity of an untimely JRAD, we have addressed the effect of belated notice. In Cerujo v. INS, 570 F.2d 1323, 1324 (7th Cir.1978), the judge entered a JRAD at sentencing but without proper notice to immigration officials. We acknowledged the argument that the 30-day time limit and by analogy the notice requirement should be read as directory and not mandatory. Id. at 1325 (citing Velez-Lozano v. INS, 463 F.2d 1305, 1310 (D.C.Cir.1972) (Fahy, J., dissenting)). But we noted as well that the statutory language does not clarify the effect of a recommendation against deportation made without prior notice to the INS. Id. We held that at least where the government had not been prejudiced, it was appropriate to remand the case for notice and a new JRAD hearing. Id. at 1325-27. It's worth emphasizing that this case is not characterized by afterthought or deadline-manipulating gamesmanship. This is not, for example, a nunc pro tunc JRAD entered only after immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings. See Velez-Lozano, 463 F.2d at 1306-08. Nor was the sentencing judge asked to vacate the original judgment and reenter it in order to belatedly bring the case within the 30-day window. See Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1568 (9th Cir.1994). A retroactive attempt to obtain a JRAD would fall outside the statute's terms. Here, by contrast, Solis-Chavez's judge plainly intended to entertain a JRAD at sentencing but could not do so without notice to immigration authorities. She said she would retain jurisdiction so that notice could be given, and she adjourned the case for the express purpose of considering a JRAD once that prerequisite was accomplished. The case progressed steadily toward that end with no intervening events that call Solis-Chavez's motives into question or suggest that the judge's familiarity with his case had waned. The JRAD was entered at the second hearing without objection from immigration authorities or the state prosecutor. Accordingly, under these circumstances, and because the statute does not itself specify the consequences of noncompliance with the time limit, we see no reason to treat the missed deadline as invalidating the JRAD. By conceding the issue before the IJ, Solis-Chavez's attorney waived a complete defense to removal and therefore prejudiced his client's case. [1] It remains to be determined whether that concession rendered the administrative proceedings so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case. Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638. We remand to the agency for further proceedings to address this issue.