Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hunt's Challenge to the Correction of the Indictment

Text: 102 Hunt contends that he is entitled to dismissal of count six of the superseding indictment (indictment), charging certain defendants with possession of the cocaine taken from Fernando Suarez and Pablo Perlaza when the latter were murdered. Hunt contends that although he was originally one of those named in count six, the district court dismissed that count against him and that it was therefore impermissible for the court to reinstate the count against him. The record does not support either Hunt's factual premise or his legal conclusion. 103 At the outset of the Miller Trial, the government voluntarily moved to dismiss count 11, which charged Miller with distributing cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a public school, along with two racketeering acts, neither of which contained allegations against Hunt. The district court granted that motion. Count six was not mentioned and was not dismissed. The court instructed the government to prepare a redacted indictment for trial. In complying with that instruction, the government inadvertently omitted Hunt's name from count six of the redacted document. The government apparently did not discover the omission until late in the trial. It moved to have the indictment corrected to restore Hunt's name as an accused in count six, and the court granted that motion. 104 It is well established that [u]nder the Fifth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to be tried only on the charges contained in the indictment returned by a grand jury. United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 89 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1091, 112 S.Ct. 1162, 117 L.Ed.2d 409 (1992). An unconstitutional amendment of the indictment occurs when the charging terms are altered.... Id. However, the correction of merely technical errors, such as typographical or clerical mistakes, is permissible where it does not alter the essential substance of the charging terms. See, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 27 F.3d 263, 266 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Lake, 985 F.2d 265, 271 (6th Cir.1993) 105 The insertion of a defendant's name into an indictment count, either by the government in providing a modified document, or by the court in instructing the jury, would plainly violate the Fifth Amendment if the grand jury had not included the defendant in that count. However, where the grand jury in fact indicted the defendant on the count in question, and there was neither a motion to dismiss him from that count nor an order dismissing him from that count, the inadvertent omission of his name from that count of the indictment is merely a clerical error. Where the error was discovered prior to the submission of the case to the jury, the court's decision to allow restoration of the defendant's name to that count is not ground for reversal unless restoration caused the defendant unfair prejudice. In the present case, it is plain that there was no such prejudice. 106 First, it is undisputed that the grand jury did in fact indict Hunt on count six. It is also undisputed that in moving to dismiss part of the indictment the government specified the allegations it wished to dismiss, and count six was not mentioned. It cannot reasonably be argued that the government's omission of Hunt's name was anything but inadvertent. Nor could Hunt reasonably have believed that the government meant to refer to count six in its motion since none of the allegations the government sought to dismiss had been directed at Hunt. 107 Although Hunt claims that he was prejudiced by the omission and late correction of the indictment because he was lulled into not defending against count six at trial, the record belies that contention as well. When the matter was raised at Hunt's sentencing, the district court asked Hunt's attorney whether, knowing that his client had been named in count six, he had believed the government had abandoned that charge. Counsel's response was as follows: 108 MR. SCHOENBACH [Attorney for Hunt]: I don't know what I thought then, Judge. It's been quite a long time. I noticed it immediately. 109 THE COURT: One would expect you noticed it, and I bet your client noticed it. 110 MR. SCHOENBACH: That's right. It was something that I didn't reveal to anyone, especially the government, to the close of the case, for obvious reasons. 111 Certainly, I can't say to you that I didn't prepare for confronting Count 6 immediately prior to the trial. I did, because Mr. Hunt was named in Count 6. 112 (Hunt Sentencing Transcript at 6.) The court thus summarized as follows: 113 THE COURT: Let me see if I understand. 114 You were a party to the conversation, and certainly present when the government announced that it was abandoning certain predicate acts, and that--and that for use at trial, a redacted indictment would be prepared. 115 Upon inspecting that redacted indictment, you noticed that Mr. Hunt's name no longer appeared as a defendant, or no longer appeared at all in Count 6 as alleged. His name had been, in effect--had appeared to have been dropped or omitted. 116 You chose not to bring that--as you said, for obvious reasons you chose not to bring that to the attention of the court or the United States Attorney. At the same time, you chose to modify your theory of the defense, based upon what you perceive to be a decision by the United States Attorney, unannounced in court, to abandon this charge against your client. 117 MR. SCHOENBACH: I think that accurately states my position, Judge. 118 (Id. at 8-9.) Thus, contrary to any suggestion that Hunt believed that count six had been dismissed against him, it is plain that he did not bring the omission to the government's attention precisely because he knew the omission of his name was inadvertent. In Hunt's counsel's own words, counsel noticed [the omission] immediately and did not reveal [it] to anyone, especially the government, to the close of the case, for obvious reasons; but he was prepared on count six immediately prior to trial because Mr. Hunt was named in Count 6. Having made a strategic decision to hope the government would not discover its error until too late for correction, any prejudice Hunt suffered by not defending against count six would be attributable only to his own tactical choice. 119 Further, the suggestion that Hunt did not defend against the allegations made in count six is hardly credible, for the substance of that count was expressly incorporated in another count against him. In both the unredacted and the redacted versions of the indictment, Hunt was charged with a RICO violation in count one, predicate act four of which was the very narcotics trafficking offense that was alleged in count six; the indictment's description of that predicate act stated that the conduct in question was as alleged in count 6. (Indictment count one, racketeering act four.) Thus, the need to defend against the conduct alleged in count six remained intact by reason of racketeering act four's express incorporation of count six. 120 In an effort to distinguish count six from racketeering act four as alleged in count 6, Hunt argues that racketeering act four's statutory reference was solely to 21 U.S.C. § 841, and that he was thus accused of violating RICO only as a principal, whereas count six cited in addition 18 U.S.C. § 2, which imposes liability on a defendant as an aider and abetter. In fact, however, count one cited 18 U.S.C. § 2 with respect to the entire RICO count. Accordingly, Hunt's attempted distinction is fallacious. 121 We conclude that the district court properly ruled that the government's omission of Hunt's name from count six of the redacted indictment was inadvertent and that the restoration of his name to that count caused Hunt no prejudice.