Opinion ID: 1463283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Testimony of the Mother

Text: Under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, M.R.Evid. 803(2), the presiding justice allowed the prosecutrix's mother to testify to what her young daughter reported Walton had done to her earlier on the same day. Before admitting those hearsay statements for the truth of the matter asserted, [1] the trial court made preliminary findings pursuant to M.R.Evid. 104(a). We hold that admission of these statements was error because (1) the record does not support the preliminary findings necessary for admission of an excited utterance, and (2) the record demonstrates that the presiding justice misconceived the applicable rule. The trial court must make three findings before admitting a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception: (1) that a startling event occurred; (2) that the hearsay statement related to the startling event; and (3) that the hearsay statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by that event. M.R.Evid. 803(2). The trial court could and did find the first two requirements here. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the prosecutrix was under stress when she made the utterance. The record, however, does not support a finding that the prosecutrix was then under the stress of excitement. Apparently by agreement of the parties [2] and consistent with M.R.Evid. 104(c), the court entertained a voir dire examination of the prosecutrix's mother to determine the admissibility of the prosecutrix's statements made to her mother on the evening of February 20, 1980, containing the details of a sexual assault committed that afternoon. No other conclusion can be drawn from the mother's testimony but that the prosecutrix had been under stress for at least two days prior to the utterances in question. The prosecutrix described other sexual incidents occurring prior to February 20. The mother testified that her daughter was acting out, acting really different, and saying that her heart hurt and that she was really bad over a period of two days prior to the events on the evening of February 20. She further described her daughter just prior to the utterances in question as acting out, nervous, saying that she had been bad, that she had a black mark on her heart and that she was afraid of the defendant. Clearly, the child was under a great deal of stress and had been for at least two days. Equally clearly, the child's stress was not the stress of excitement caused by the events of February 20. We do not emphasize the duration of the stress, as much as the cause of the stress. In fact, the record does not support a finding of stress of excitement at all. The stress of conscience, of guilt, or of fear are not to be equated with stress of excitement. The trustworthiness of an excited utterance (and hence its admissibility without the necessity for cross-examination of the declarant) is based upon the theory that the impact of the event produces an utterance that is spontaneous and unreflecting. State v. Ellis, Me., 297 A.2d 91 (1972). In this case it is obvious that the victim's stress resulted from reflecting, even brooding, over several past incidents. The commentary to Rule 803(2) in the advisers' note and in R. Field & P. Murray, Maine Evidence § 803.2 (1976), make clear that the rule did not change existing Maine law, albeit pre-rule cases deal with the exception under the res gestae or verbal act rubric. The basis of the rule as well as the requisite circumstances for its application are set forth in Ellis. Under circumstances similar to this case in State v. King, 123 Me. 256, 122 A. 578 (1923), we described and distinguished the various ways in which the utterances of the prosecutrix may become admissible. We there found error in admitting details of the prosecutrix's complaint, citing State v. Maddox, 92 Me. 348, 42 A. 788 (1898), while reaffirming the well-established rule that the fact that a complaint had been made was admissible as part of the state's case in chief. King, 123 Me. at 258, 122 A. at 579; accord, State v. Ranger, 149 Me. 52, 59, 98 A.2d 652, 655 (1953); State v. Mulkern, 85 Me. 106, 26 A. 1017 (1892). We decline to broaden what has been a narrow exception to the hearsay rule, particularly in an area so fraught with danger to our conception of a fair trial. [3] As we said in State v. Maddox, 92 Me. 348, 354, 42 A. 788, 790 (1898): Sound public policy requires that the established rule as to this class of evidence, should be strictly adhered to and not extended. It is a species of evidence liable to abuse. . . . We vacate the judgment of conviction in this case because of the absence of evidence to support the admission of the hearsay statement of the prosecutrix. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. All concurring.