Opinion ID: 2626256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt.

Text: We have repeatedly held that we will not overturn a defendant's conviction if the prosecution's misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In order to determine whether the alleged prosecutorial misconduct reached the level of reversible error, we consider the nature of the alleged misconduct, the promptness or lack of a curative instruction, and the strength or weakness of the evidence against defendant. State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 198, 830 P.2d 492, 502 (1992); see also State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 853 A.2d 238, 246 (2004) (holding that the prosecution should not have asked the defendant to comment on other witnesses' credibility but that the misconduct did not warrant a new trial in light of the substantial evidence against the defendant). After considering these three factors, we conclude that the prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the prosecution's question was improper, the conduct was less egregious than that presented in those cases where we vacated the defendants' convictions and remanded for new trials. See, e.g., State v. Wakisaka, 102 Hawai'i 504, 78 P.3d 317 (2003) (vacating and remanding where the prosecution improperly commented on the defendant's failure to testify); State v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai'i 83, 95, 26 P.3d 572, 584 (2001) (vacating and remanding where the [prosecution's] characterization of [the defendant] as an `asshole' strongly conveyed his personal opinion and could only have been calculated to inflame the passions of the jurors and to divert them, by injecting an issue wholly unrelated to [the defendant's] guilt or innocence into their deliberations, from their duty to decide the case on the evidence); State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 728 P.2d 1301 (1986) (vacating and remanding where the prosecutor, in closing, repeatedly stated her personal belief that the defendant was guilty). Consequently, the first factor (the nature of the misconduct) weighs against Maluia. The second factor (the promptness or lack of a curative instruction), on the other hand, weighs in favor of Maluia: the circuit court not only failed to issue a curative instruction, but also prevented Maluia's counsel from questioning Maluia about his answer on redirect examination. The third and final factor (the strength or weakness of the evidence against the defendant), however, convinces us that the prosecutorial misconduct in the instant case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against the defendant included two eyewitness accounts from witnesses unconnected to the defendant or the victim. The evidence also showed that the defendant's BAC was 0.131, raising additional doubts as to the defendant's credibility. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.