Opinion ID: 853872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Mental Health Evaluations

Text: The defendant contends that the post-conviction court erred in rejecting his claim that his convictions and death sentences are unreliable and fundamentally erroneous, violating various constitutional provisions, because they are based in part on inadequate mental health evaluations. The defendant argues that the court-appointed experts only conducted testing for the limited purpose of determining competency and sanity, and that, because of the absence of a competent mental health evaluation, the defense was unable to determine to what extent Conner's mental health was relevant to the guilt or penalty phases of trial. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 132. He contends that the unreliable and incomplete evaluations prevented the development of evidence relevant to the circumstances of his admissions, the commission of the crime, and mitigating evidence. The post-conviction court found that the defendant failed to carry his burden of proof on the claim that there was impropriety in the manner in which his mental health evaluations were conducted. P.C.R. Record at 318. As noted by the post-conviction court, while trial counsel's request for a mental evaluation was for the purpose of determining competency to stand trial, the order issued by the trial court requested a report from two psychiatrists indicating the soundness and unsoundness of the defendant's mind on the date of the alleged offense. The trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine the defendant and provided funds for the defense to hire its own psychiatric expert to assist in the development of potential defenses. The defendant was evaluated before the trial by Ronald H. Hull, M.D.; Dwight W. Schuster, M.D.; Paul Frederickson, Ph. D.; and the defense's own expert, Joseph King, M.D. In the post-conviction proceedings, the defendant presented evidence from David Price, Ph.D., an expert routinely employed to critique and evaluate the evaluations of psychiatrists and psychologists. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 128. Dr. Price found fault with Dr. Frederickson's psychological testing and diagnosis, with Dr. King's diagnosis, and with the limited scope of the evaluations of Dr. Hull and Dr. Schuster. The defendant asserts that Dr. Price provided the post-conviction court with his opinion that the defendant potentially suffered from thirty-one mental health diagnoses. As observed by the U.S. Supreme Court, [p]sychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likelihood of future dangerousness. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1095, 84 L.Ed.2d 53, 64-65 (1985). Likewise, we have noted that [p]sychiatry is an extremely uncertain field dealing with the mysteries of the human mind where expert opinions can be expected to and do differ widely. Harrison v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1243, 1253 (Ind.1995). We recognize that a defendant may be entitled to the assistance of psychiatric expertise. The Supreme Court in Ake addressed a claim [9] that Ake was denied the means of presenting psychiatric evidence to rebut the State's evidence of his future dangerousness, an aggravating factor under the Oklahoma capital sentencing scheme. Focusing upon the probable value that the assistance of a psychiatrist will have and the risk attendant on its absence, Id., 470 U.S. at 84, 105 S.Ct. at 1096, 84 L.Ed.2d at 66, the Court held: [W]here the consequence of error is so great, the relevance of responsive psychiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the State so slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase. Id., 470 U.S. at 84, 105 S.Ct. at 1097, 84 L.Ed.2d at 67. [10] In the present case, the defendant was provided with extensive access to psychiatric assistance and testimony for his use at trial. Notwithstanding the ability of his post-conviction counsel subsequently to locate and present expert opinion disagreeing with the psychological and psychiatric evidence at trial, we decline to find constitutional infirmity, and we reject the defendant's claim that his convictions and death sentence are unreliable and fundamentally erroneous. He was not denied due process of law. The post-conviction court did not err in denying his claim on this issue.