Opinion ID: 1154282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Products Liability Based on Negligence

Text: While this Court has addressed strict products liability several times, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, we have never been presented with a case requiring a determination of the duty, or standard of care, applicable to the manufacturer of drugs that are unsafe in some respects but that are necessary for the control of disease. Toner v. Lederle Laboratories, supra, 779 F.2d at 1432. Thus, we have never addressed the question of whether a product which is socially desirable or necessary, even though unavoidably unsafe, may expose the manufacturer of that product to a products liability action whether on the theory of strict liability or negligence. On such a negligence claim, or upon any negligence claim for that matter, we have indicated that there are certain basic concepts fundamental to any negligence action: duty, breach, proximate cause and damages, Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 257, 698 P.2d 315, 319 (1985). Or, as more accurately stated by Chief Justice Donaldson in Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135 (1980), cited by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: The elements of common law negligence have been summarized as (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980) (emphasis added). The majority opinion fails to adequately analyze the present case under these concepts fundamental to any negligence action. Instead the majority simply states the determination of negligence remains for the jury. That statement is inadequate and to the extent it is inadequate, it is also misleading and incorrect. The statement is correct only insofar as it applies to questions of fact. This Court has consistently held that if there is sufficient evidentiary support, all fact questions as to negligence are for the jury or trier of fact to decide. O'Connor v. Meyer, 66 Idaho 15, 154 P.2d 174 (1944). Questions of fact are usually raised in regard to elements (2), (3) and (4) above. [4] However, as both the quote and the holding in Alegria indicate, the question of duty is not for the jury, rather it is a question of law for the court to decide. Essentially, the question of the existence of a duty involves a legal determination that some relationship exists between the defendant and the plaintiff which gives rise to an obligation of conduct toward a particular person in the first instance. [D]uty is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff. Prosser at § 53. [W]hether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant ... is entirely a question of law to be determined by reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and precedents which make up the law; and it must be determined only by the court. Id. at § 37. The court is required to determine if, under the facts of a given case a duty is owed by defendant to plaintiff and, also, to determine the scope or extent of that duty. The existence of `duty' is a question of law. (Citations omitted.) `Legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage.' Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, [17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).] Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 732 (1980). Furthermore, a determination of the existence of a duty in a particular case involves consideration of several factors, including: `the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainity that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.' Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 732-33 (1980) quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968). The analysis is the same in a products liability case. The question of duty involves a consideration or balancing of all of the above factors. It is no part of the province of a jury to decide whether the manufacturer of goods is under any obligation for the safety of the ultimate consumer. Prosser at § 37. As indicated in the majority opinion this balancing of risk versus utility in a negligence case is the same as that required in a strict liability case where comment k is deemed applicable. There is little difference between a products liability action in negligence and one in strict liability relating to the definition of the unsafe character of the product which allegedly causes the injury. In negligence law, and as the jury was instructed in Instruction 27 in this case, the product must not expose the potential consumer to an unreasonable risk of harm. In strict liability, the product must not be in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. The determination in negligence law of whether the product presents an unreasonable risk of harm to the consumer is really no different from the determination in strict liability law that a product is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. The majority opinion acknowledges this, stating that there is, in reality, little difference here [in cases of improper design] between the negligence action and the action based on strict liability. [5] Ante at 342, 732 P.2d at 311, citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts, 659, n. 72 (4th ed. 1971), and quoting Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.L.J. 825, 841 (1973). Since there is little or no difference between the negligence test of unreasonable risk of harm and the strict liability test of unreasonably dangerous to the consumer, Comment k and its rationale applies to both products liability actions based on strict liability and those based on negligence. By definition, a product which is unavoidably unsafe is neither unreasonably dangerous to the consumer (the strict liability standard) nor does it create an unreasonable risk of harm to the consumer (the negligence standard). Nevertheless, the majority states, ante at 342, 732 P.2d at 311. We conclude that the principles of comment k do not literally apply to negligence claims. More specifically, comment k does not shield sellers of products from negligence claims. That statement exposes a misconception prevalent throughout the majority opinion that comment k immunizes certain products from strict liability claims ..., ante at 339, 732 P.2d at 308, and that if a product qualifies as `unavoidably unsafe,' [under comment k] the seller is held not to the strict liability standard but only to the standard of negligence. Ante at 336, 732 P.2d at 305. Comment k is not an immunity or a shield. Comment k merely limits the definition of defective products under Section 402A, excluding unavoidably unsafe products as being not defective, nor ... unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the semantical distractions of immunity and shields employed in the majority opinion tend to confuse rather than enlighten its products liability analysis. Those terms distract the reader's attention from the fact that whether a particular products liability claim is phrased in terms of negligence or strict liability, there must either be a product which exposes the potential consumer to an unreasonable risk of harm (Negligence Instruction 27), or a product which is unreasonably dangerous. Restatement (Second) § 402A. There is little difference between those two standards, as the majority opinion acknowledges. Ante at 342, 732 P.2d at 311.