Opinion ID: 2518953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Benn's Remaining Arguments

Text: ¶ 16 Because we hold that Benn's retrial with the inclusion of the single act aggravating factor does not violate double jeopardy, we next query whether Benn's remaining arguments have merit.
¶ 17 Benn contends that the trial court in his second trial improperly admitted Pete Hartman's prior testimony. In Benn's first trial, Hartman testified that Benn tried to hire him to kill victim Jack Dethlefsen. Benn, however, directed his attorney not to cross-examine Hartman because he feared Hartman would kill or harm his family. [2] Benn's attorney mistakenly believed he had to follow his client's direction and did not cross-examine Hartman. [3] Hartman died before Benn's second trial, and the trial court allowed the State to introduce Hartman's testimony from the first trial. Benn contends that admitting his prior testimony violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation clause rights and ER 804. We review the trial court's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. State v. Neal, 144 Wash.2d 600, 609, 30 P.3d 1255 (2001). ¶ 18 Both the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause and ER 804(b)(1) bar admission of previous testimony of an unavailable witness, unless the defendant had a prior opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine the witness. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (holding that admission of out-of-court testimonial hearsay of an unavailable witness violates the confrontation clause unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness). ¶ 19 The Court of Appeals held that the admission of Hartman's testimony violated neither the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause nor ER 804(b)(1) because Benn had the opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine Hartman in his first trial. Benn contends that his belief that Hartman would kill or harm his family if he cross-examined him deprived him of any opportunity to cross-examine Hartman within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The Court of Appeals concluded that Benn had the opportunity to cross-examine Hartman despite his fearand that he `had a substantially similar interest in asserting [his] side of the issue.' State v. Benn, 130 Wash. App. 308, 320, 123 P.3d 484 (unpublished portion) (2005) (quoting United States v. DiNapoli, 8 F.3d 909, 912 (2d Cir.1993)). ¶ 20 We affirm the Court of Appeals and hold that Benn had the opportunity and similar motive to cross-examine Hartman in his first trial. Neither the court nor the State prevented Benn from cross-examining Hartman, and he had a similar motive in asserting his side of the issue. ¶ 21 Even if we were to conclude that the trial court erred in admitting Hartman's prior testimony, such an error is not grounds for reversal. Confrontation clause errors are subject to harmless error analysis. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). When an error is of constitutional magnitude, the court must apply the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt standard and query whether any reasonable jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the tainted evidence. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 425-26, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). [4] ¶ 22 In the instant case, Benn testified at trial that he came to the house of his victims and found them in a fight. He argued that victim Jack Dethlefsen shot victim Michael Nelson and then turned to shoot Benn. Benn testified that he fought for the gun and shot Dethlefsen in self-defense. Testimony at trial, however, revealed otherwise. For example, Benn's neighbor Anthony Miller testified that Benn asked him to provide an alibi for him. 13 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 1564-65. The evidence also revealed that Benn changed his version of the events. Benn originally called 911 to report that he found the two victims already dead. Barber shop owner Larry Kilen testified that Benn called him the day after the murders and told him that he went to the house and found the two victims already dead. 12 VRP at 1332. Benn then changed his story and claimed he shot both victims in self-defense after they attacked him. 19 VRP at 2507-10. He also claimed that a person held a gun to his head and made him shoot the two victims. Id. at 2511. Benn then drew a diagram while in jail that detailed the events and depicted him as the murderer. E.g., 18 VRP at 2453-61. Considering the other untainted evidence and Benn's varied version of the shootings, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d at 425-26, 705 P.2d 1182.
¶ 23 Benn contends that the trial court erred when it did not allow his attorney to cross-examine the State's experts with learned treatises. A party may use textbooks or treatises to cross-examine an expert witness if the witness recognizes the textbook or treatise as authoritative, regardless of whether the expert relied on the treatise in forming an opinion. Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash.2d 431, 437-38, 392 P.2d 317 (1964); accord ER 803(a)(18). The trial court in Benn's case prevented his attorney from using treatises to cross-examine the State's forensic experts Michael Grubb and Rod Englert. Specifically, Benn's attorney asked Grubb if he was familiar with Herb McDonnell's work in the area of blood spatter. 15 VRP at 1826. Grubb responded that he was familiar with the work, and Benn's counsel attempted to ask Grubb about McDonnell's definition of high velocity blood spatter. Id. The State objected on the basis that McDonnell was not a witness and not testifying. The trial court sustained the State's objection. Id. ¶ 24 The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have allowed Benn's attorneys to question the experts with the learned treatises under ER 803(a)(18). Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals concluded that Benn did not make an offer of proof to the trial court and thus could not demonstrate how the court's ruling harmed him. For support, the Court of Appeals relied on ER 103(a)(2), which states that a party may not predicate an error upon a ruling excluding evidence unless the admission affects a substantial right and the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. ¶ 25 Courts interpreting ER 103(a)(2) have excused the absence of an offer of proof where the substance of the excluded evidence is apparent either from the questions asked [or] the context in which the questions are asked. State v. Ray, 116 Wash.2d 531, 539, 806 P.2d 1220 (1991). The substance of the evidence was fairly apparent from Benn's questioning of the experts. However, even if the court were to consider the evidentiary error, the error must be prejudicial to warrant reversal. ¶ 26 Benn contends that the trial court's error precluded him from discrediting the experts regarding bloodstains found on Benn's shoes; however, he fails to describe how such testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial. Further, although he was not allowed to cross-examine the experts as to the treatise, he did cross-examine the experts on many other matters. See 14-16 VRP. In addition, although the trial court repeatedly prevented Benn's attorney from quoting McDonnell's treatise in his cross-examination of Grubb, Benn was nonetheless able to elicit his point that some experts believe that high velocity blood spatter must be less than 0.1 millimeter. See 15 VRP at 1833 (And you would agree that their interpretation of high velocity blood spatter would say it has to be less than .1 millimeter?). Thus, any alleged error was harmless.
¶ 27 Benn also contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence he wanted to use to impeach the State's expert Rod Englert. Benn first contends that the trial court improperly excluded a letter from the Ethics Committee of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences about Englert. The State argued that the letter was not discoverable or admissible. The trial court concluded that the letter contained mere unsubstantiated allegations and was collateral to the issues of the case. 3 VRP at 231. It thus denied Benn's motion to disclose the letter, sealed the letter from the parties unless opened by order of a court, and prevented Benn from impeaching Englert with the letter. The Court of Appeals concluded that it could not review the issue because neither party included the letter as part of the record on review. Likewise, without the letter or a request to unseal the letter, we are unable to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding the letter. ¶ 28 Benn also contends that the trial court improperly excluded Englert's testimony from other trials that Benn argued was inconsistent with his testimony in his trial. Although the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the trial court would have erred under ER 801(d)(1)(i) if it excluded prior, inconsistent testimony, it held that Benn did not make an offer of proof as to what the prior testimony was and how it was inconsistent. Thus, the Court of Appeals could not determine whether the trial court had in fact erred. See ER 103(a)(2). We agree and affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue.
¶ 29 Benn argues that the trial court improperly admitted an out-of-court statement of Jack Dethlefsen, one of the murder victims. The trial court allowed the State to ask Benn's brother Monte to testify that Dethlefsen told Monte that someone had previously beaten him up in the kitchen and he wanted to talk to Benn about the beating. 19 VRP at 2490. ¶ 30 The Court of Appeals concluded that although the trial court improperly admitted the hearsay statements, the error did not harm Benn. The Court of Appeals held that the statement was not important to the State's case and was actually consistent with Benn's case theory that the two murder victims had previously been in a fight with each other. We agree and hold that although the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of Dethlefsen, the error did not prejudice Benn and was harmless.
¶ 31 Benn contends that the prosecutorial misconduct in his first trial was so egregious that double jeopardy principles bar a retrial. The double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial following a mistrial when the State's misconduct is intended to goad the other party into moving for a mistrial. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). Benn concedes that he did not move for a mistrial in his case; rather, he raises the claim here to preserve it for possible federal review. Resp. to Pet. for Review at 18. Thus, this court denies Benn's argument as a basis for reversal of his conviction.