Opinion ID: 4530038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waived Issue and Separate Opinion

Text: In their brief to this Court, the Plaintiffs also assert that, even if they failed to substantially comply with Section 121(a)(2), they were still entitled to the 120-day extension of the statute of limitations provided in Section 121(c) because that extension is contingent upon a plaintiff’s compliance with Section 121(a)(2)(B) not upon a plaintiff’s compliance with Section 121(a)(2). The Plaintiffs recognize that this argument is inconsistent with several prior appellate court decisions, citing Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 560; J.A.C., 542 S.W.3d at 512; Dolman, 2015 WL 9315565, at ; and Roberts v. Prill, E2013-02202-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 2921930, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2014), but the Plaintiffs assert that these decisions failed to analyze properly the language of Section 121(c). The Plaintiffs failed to raise this issue in either the trial court or the Court of Appeals. “Issues not raised in the trial court or in the intermediate appellate courts may be deemed waived when presented to this Court.” Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 334 n.3 (Tenn. 2012) (citing Brown v. Roland, 357 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2012); In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 32 (Tenn. 2001); Alexander v. Armentrout, 24 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tenn. 2000)); see also Harmon v. Hickman Cmty. Healthcare Servs., Inc., 594 S.W.3d 297, 300-301 (Tenn. 2020) (deeming waived several issues raised for the first time in this Court). We conclude that the Plaintiffs have waived this issue. Inexplicably, Justice Kirby refuses to deem the Plaintiffs’ new issue waived in her separate concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion and instead declares that the Defendants waived the defense of waiver. In Justice Kirby’s circular analysis, the Defendants are at fault for not asserting waiver when the Plaintiffs raised an issue for the first time in their brief to this Court. Of course, the Plaintiffs have not argued that the Defendants waived the waiver defense (which presumably would mean, under Justice Kirby’s analysis, that the Plaintiffs waived the argument that the Defendants waived the waiver defense). Nevertheless, Justice Kirby makes that declaration—that the Defendants waived the waiver defense—and then proceeds to address the merits of the issue the Plaintiffs have plainly waived. Conspicuous by its absence is any citation to authority supporting Justice Kirby’s declaration that the Defendants waived the waiver defense. More importantly, Justice Kirby acknowledges that this Court’s authority and discretion to deem an issue waived exists independent of a litigant’s assertion of the defense. We exercise that authority without hesitation here, where the record on appeal is a textbook example of waiver. This record leaves no doubt that the Plaintiffs failed to preserve and raise in the courts below the issue Justice Kirby addresses on the merits and shows that the Plaintiffs first raised it in this Court. Moreover, only three months ago Justice Kirby authored an opinion that applied waiver in almost identical circumstances. See Harmon, 594 S.W.3d at 300-301 (“In Plaintiffs’ brief to this Court, they seek to raise several additional issues. Most of these arguments were not made to either the trial court or the Court of Appeals. We deem these issues waived. ‘Issues not raised in the trial - 17 - court or in the intermediate appellate courts may be deemed waived when presented to this Court.’” (quoting Hodge, 382 S.W.3d at 334)). In any event, notwithstanding the fundamental principle of waiver, Justice Kirby addresses the issue on the merits, faults the Court of Appeals (and presumably this Court as well as it denied applications seeking review of many of the intermediate appellate court decisions she now deems erroneous), and asserts that the Court of Appeals has frustrated the General Assembly’s intent by construing Section 121 as requiring plaintiffs to comply strictly with Section 121(a)(1) and substantially comply with Section 121(a)(2) to obtain a 120-day extension of the statute of limitations. Because the issue is waived, we need not expressly rebut each of Justice Kirby’s assertions. We are, however, constrained to make three observations. First, Justice Kirby’s statutory analysis renders Section 121(a)(2) meaningless and is inconsistent with the understanding of the statute’s meaning by persons who were familiar with the 2009 amendments. See, e.g., Day, supra, at 15 (“There is no penalty for giving more information than required by statute in the notice letter. However, those who fail to give the information required by the statute are at risk for an assertion that the notice is defective and does not operate to extend the statute of limitations.”). Second, Justice Kirby mischaracterizes in footnote 7 this Court’s decision in Stevens. This Court in Stevens dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice and did not decide whether the dismissal without prejudice would, as a practical matter, mean the plaintiff’s claim was time-barred because “the trial court did not reach this issue.” Stevens, 418 S.W.3d at 560. Third, and finally, Justice Kirby’s assertion that courts have misconstrued Section 121 and frustrated the General Assembly’s intent is refuted by the fact that in the eleven years since its enactment the General Assembly has not amended the statute to abrogate these allegedly erroneous judicial decisions. Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Ed. v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 847 (Tenn. 2019) (“[L]egislative inaction following a contemporaneous and practical interpretation of a statute is considered persuasive evidence of the Legislature’s intent to adopt that interpretation.” (Citations omitted)); Freeman Indus. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Tenn. 2005) (“[T]he legislature’s failure to express disapproval of a judicial construction of a statute is persuasive evidence of legislative adoption of the judicial construction.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). - 18 -