Opinion ID: 432207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ukiah's Asserted Right to a Hearing

Text: 22 Ukiah argues that having demonstrated the flaws in Sonoma's claims of superiority ... it was incumbent upon the Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing to further test and illuminate the factual predicate for those claims.... Brief for Petitioner at 37-38. Ukiah does not assert that its right to a hearing grows out of a regulation, statute, or the Constitution. Rather, Ukiah cites the judicially defined principle requiring the Commission to provide an adversarial hearing when genuine issues of material fact are in issue. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire v. FERC, 600 F.2d 944, 955 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 990, 100 S.Ct. 520, 62 L.Ed.2d 419 (1979); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1259-60 (D.C.Cir.1973). Even this principle, however, has been qualified: [M]ere allegations of disputed facts are insufficient to mandate a hearing; petitioners must make an adequate proffer of evidence to support them. Cerro Wire & Cable Co. v. FERC, 677 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C.Cir.1982). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524-25, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978). 19 23 Ukiah has been unable to specify any disputed issues of material fact. Ukiah does allege generally that Sonoma's receipt of the permit was unsupported by substantial evidence. In Section II, however, we found that the basis of the Commission's decision consisted of contractual and statutory interpretation. Both issues here are questions of law that do not require an oral hearing for proper resolution. We are thus required to affirm the Commission's decision that a hearing was not necessary in this case. 20