Opinion ID: 2220056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutorial Comments in Summation

Text: Defendant also claims that several different comments made by the prosecutors in closing arguments were so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. In the first set of challenged remarks, the prosecutors argued that the jurors enjoyed a unique opportunity    to do something about crime. Whereas in daily life We listen to it on the news, in the newspaper   . Everybody hears about crime. Nobody does anything about it. You have a unique opportunity to actually do something about crime on your streets. Embellishing upon this theme, the prosecutor concluded, You are the only ones that sit between this man, this ticking bomb, and that door. The remarks in this series were apparently intended to persuade the jurors to convict because by convicting they would prevent both crime in general, and further crime by this defendant. As such, they were proper. It is entirely proper for the prosecutor to dwell upon the evil results of crime and to urge the fearless administration of the law. ( E.g., People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill.2d 88, 105-06; People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill.2d 350, 360; People v. Wright (1963), 27 Ill.2d 497, 500-01.) Moreover, this court has previously held nonprejudicial remarks which were nearly identical to the remarks complained of here, and equally harsh. For example, in People v. Benedik (1974), 56 Ill.2d 306, 310-11, the prosecutor stated that he only wanted to `leave you with this, if this is a crime of violence, if a week from today or a month from today you may be seated at your breakfast table and you may be reading the newspapers and you may be saying to yourself, what, shaking your head in the negative, why isn't something being done about the violence in society today?' In People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill.2d 88, 105, the prosecutor stated that `[i]t's a sad commentary on modern America that people all too often become prisoners in their homes at night. They are afraid to walk the streets because they fear that exactly what happened to George Kallai would happen to them.' (102 Ill.2d at 105.) Finally, in People v. Wright (1963), 27 Ill.2d 497, 500, the prosecutor rhetorically asked the jury if they were going to let murderers walk the streets so they could kill someone else. Under these precedents, the prosecutorial comments in this case cannot be considered so prejudicial as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. A second remark that defendant claims was so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial was the prosecutor's admonition to the jury: Don't be confused as the defense wishes you to be. An objection to this comment was sustained. Defendant argues, correctly, that it is error for a prosecutor to accuse defense counsel of attempting to create confusion (see People v. Weathers (1975), 62 Ill.2d 114, 120), or of fabricating a defense (see People v. Emerson (1983), 97 Ill.2d 487, 498-99). However, the trial court's act of sustaining an objection to such a comment, taken together with the trial court's general admonition to the jury that it should disregard any comments to which the court has sustained an objection, may serve to alleviate any prejudice caused by a particular objectionable comment. (See People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill.2d 374, 390.) This is particularly true where, as here, the comment objected to was relatively innocuous. In both Weathers and Emerson, the two cases cited by the defendant, the challenged remarks were far more prejudicial. In Weathers, the prosecutor accused the defense attorneys of lying and of attempting to create a reasonable doubt by `confusion, indecision, and misrepresentation.' ( Weathers, 62 Ill.2d at 120.) In Emerson, the prosecutor speculated that the defense attorneys knew that they had to make something up, and that they therefore concocted a spurious attack on the credibility of the chief witness for the prosecution. ( Emerson, 97 Ill.2d at 498.) In contrast, the comment here challenged did not go so far as to accuse defense counsel of deliberately misleading the jury. Under these circumstances the sustained objection and curative instruction served to dissipate any prejudice this statement may have caused. Defendant also argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's statement that the standard of reasonable doubt is the same standard that's been used in this court room, in all the court rooms in this country, throughout the county, throughout the State, throughout the country, through our entire history. It's nothing new. There is nothing different about that standard of proof. That standard of proof does not require perfection. The quoted statement about the standard of reasonable doubt is nearly identical to the statements held proper in People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 277. Since defendant has not attempted to distinguish Collins or to argue that it should be overruled, we perceive no merit in defendant's argument. Finally, defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's comment that paraffin tests were no longer considered a reliable means of determining whether a person had fired a gun. The prosecutor's comments were in response to defendant's argument that the police should have administered a paraffin test to defendant, and were fairly based upon the testimony of an expert witness who stated that paraffin tests are no longer considered reliable because they can yield both falsely positive and falsely negative results. Therefore, defendant's argument lacks merit.