Opinion ID: 2778230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pantlitz-Wilkinson’s Remaining Arguments

Text: Pantlitz-Wilkinson also argues that his New Jersey conviction does not render him removable and that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by conceding that it does. The BIA did not reach the first of these arguments because it concluded that (1) PantlitzWilkinson did not support his claim of ineffective assistance as required by In re Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), and (2) the IJ was otherwise justified in relying on counsel’s concession of the charges. We see no basis to disturb either ruling. First, Lozada sets forth three procedural requirements for asserting a claim of ineffective assistance. See Contreras v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 578, 585 n.5 (3d Cir. 2012).6 We do not apply “a strict, formulaic interpretation of Lozada,” but we have upheld its requirements as a reasonable exercise of the BIA’s discretion. Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). In this case, Pantlitz-Wilkinson did not submit the 6 These requirements are that the alien: (1) support the claim with an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts; (2) inform former counsel of the allegations and permit former counsel an opportunity to respond; and (3) indicate whether the alien has filed a disciplinary complaint and, if not, explain why. See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 585 n.5. Although our decisions most frequently address these requirements in the context of motions to reopen, the BIA could have construed Pantlitz-Wilkinson’s brief as such a motion if he had properly supported this claim, and the same considerations govern on appeal. See Garcia-Martinez v. DHS, 448 F.3d 511, 514 (2d Cir. 2006). 8 documents or information required by Lozada to the BIA with his brief or any other filing. To the contrary, his only mentions of Lozada were his assertions in his brief that “the requirements of Lozada are not dispositive” and that a “previous filing”—which he neither identified nor attached—satisfied those requirements. (A.R. 13-14.) We cannot fault the BIA’s reliance on Lozada in light of what Pantlitz-Wilkinson presented to it.7 Moreover, even if Pantlitz-Wilkinson had satisfied the Lozada requirements, and as discussed at the close of this opinion, Pantlitz-Wilkinson has not asserted a valid claim of ineffective assistance because he has not shown prejudice. See Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584-85. Second, the BIA did not err in concluding that the IJ otherwise reasonably relied on counsel’s concession of removability. In doing so, the BIA cited 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c), which expressly permits IJs to rely on admissions of removability. See also Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here the alien concedes removability, the government’s burden [to prove it] is satisfied.”) (quotation marks omitted). The BIA also cited In re Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (1986), which recognizes that aliens generally are bound by the admissions of their counsel. We too 7 In addition to his brief, Pantlitz-Wilkinson filed with the BIA a notice of appeal (A.R. 62-69) and a motion for an extension of time to file his brief (A.R. 55-56). Neither of these filings nor any other document in the administrative record mentions Lozada or indicates any attempt to comply with its requirements. Pantlitz-Wilkinson has attached various documents evidencing an attempt to comply with Lozada to his petition for review and his brief in this Court, but we must “decide the petition only on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A). 9 have recognized that “[a]n alien is generally bound by the actions of his attorney,” CallaCollado v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 680, 683 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), as have other courts in similar situations, see, e.g., Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 191-92 (2d Cir. 2009). Pantlitz-Wilkinson has raised nothing suggesting that this general principle should not apply here. He argues that he contested the allegations and charges against him while he was still proceeding pro se, but the only specific allegation he contested was an allegation regarding a weapons conspiracy that did not form the basis for his charges of removability. (A.R. 84.) Then, after Pantlitz-Wilkinson obtained counsel, counsel expressly conceded both the factual allegations and the charges of removability contained in the Notice to Appear. (A.R. 103.) And after that concession, although PantlitzWilkinson was represented at times by different members of the same law firm, he never protested the concession before the IJ and instead answered “yes” when the IJ asked him if counsel was authorized to speak for him. (A.R. 107-08, 115.) Pantlitz-Wilkinson also argues that there is insufficient evidence in the record to sustain the charges of removability. “Admissions by parties,” however, “are not subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure that the admissions are fully supported by the underlying record.” Hoodho, 558 F.3d at 191. “Where, as here, the record evidence does not plainly contradict the concession of an attorney, we see no basis to second guess the decision of an IJ to accept that concession and conduct removal proceedings accordingly.” Id. at 187. 10 The record in this case does not “plainly contradict” counsel’s concession that Pantlitz-Wilkinson was convicted of a controlled substance violation. An alien is removable if he or she has been “convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Pantlitz-Wilkinson was convicted of conspiring to violate a statute that makes it illegal to “manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under [one’s] control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1); (A.R. 136, 148). Pantlitz-Wilkinson argues that the Government did not prove that he was convicted of a controlled substance violation because it did not establish the specific substance involved and thus did not establish that the substance was controlled under federal law. See Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 F.3d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc). But Pantlitz-Wilkinson was charged with conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine, heroin, marijuana and methylenedioxa- and methylenedioxy-methamphetamine, commonly known as Ecstasy (A.R. 140-41), and all of those substances are controlled under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. § 812, sched. II(a)(4) (cocaine), sched. I(b)(10) (heroin), sched. I(c)(10) (marijuana), sched. I(c)(1)-(2) (Ecstasy). Moreover, PantlitzWilkinson himself, before obtaining counsel, expressly admitted before the IJ that “I was convicted of, of the marijuana possession.” (A.R. 84.) Thus, Pantlitz-Wilkinson cannot 11 be heard to complain that his counsel conceded this charge.8 Nor does the record “plainly contradict” counsel’s concession of the aggravated felony charges. A conviction under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1) does not categorically constitute an illicit trafficking aggravated felony under the hypothetical federal felony route, but only because the statute criminalizes the distribution of a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration, which is only a federal misdemeanor. See Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381-82 (3d Cir. 2003). As explained above, PantlitzWilkinson was charged with possessing with the intent to distribute, not just marijuana, but cocaine, heroin and Ecstasy as well. Although Pantlitz-Wilkinson’s judgment does not specify that he pleaded guilty to a conspiracy involving any of those substances, it does not establish that he did not. The record is instead at most inconclusive on that point, and an inconclusive record is not sufficient to override counsel’s concession of removability. See Hoodho, 558 F.3d at 189-90. For a similar reason, Pantlitz-Wilkinson cannot show that he was prejudiced by counsel’s concession in the context of this proceeding—i.e., that “the challenged order of removal is fundamentally unfair, because there is a significant likelihood that the IJ would not have entered an order of removal absent counsel’s [alleged] errors.” 8 Pantlitz-Wilkinson appears to invoke the exception for “possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), but his statute of conviction prohibits possession with the intent to distribute and not simple possession. As part of Pantlitz-Wilkinson’s guilty plea, a charge of simple possession of marijuana was dismissed. (A.R. 136.) For the same reason, Pantlitz-Wilkinson was not eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). 12 Contreras, 665 F.3d at 584-85 (quotation marks omitted). There is no question that Pantlitz-Wilkinson is removable for being convicted of a controlled substance violation. Nor did Pantlitz-Wilkinson apply for any form of relief, let alone any form of relief for which he would have been eligible but for counsel’s concessions. Pantlitz-Wilkinson has never claimed that he faces persecution or torture in Guyana. Thus, the only form of relief for which he conceivably might have been eligible would have been cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). If he had applied for cancellation of removal, however, he would have borne the burden to prove his eligibility for that relief. See Syblis v. Att’y Gen., — F.3d —, No. 11-4478, 2014 WL 4056557, at  (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2014). That burden would have required him to prove, inter alia, that he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3). An inconclusive criminal record that does not specify the substance involved in the offense is not sufficient to meet that burden. See Syblis, 2014 WL 4056557, at .