Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tapes

Text: In the Law Division, defendant challenged the authenticity of his two taped statements. The first statement, he contended, was inaccurate and incomplete. He denied making the second statement. During discovery, the State provided the defense with transcripts of the statements and copies of the tapes. Before trial, defendant moved for production of the original tapes to test their authenticity. His contention was that he needed the original tapes, not just copies, for testing. In support of this contention, defendant submitted an affidavit from Thomas J. Owen, an audio and voice identification expert. The defense offered to permit the State, if the original tapes were damaged, to admit copies at trial. Apart from a statement that defendant submits that the tapes are not accurate and that they have been `doctored,' defendant offered no facts supporting his allegation of tampering and fabrication. The trial court, finding no rational basis to warrant testing, denied defendant's request. Indeed, the court characterized the defense motion as solely a fishing expedition. Defendant then moved to suppress the tapes. At the suppression hearing, defendant testified. He stated that the first tape omitted some of his answers and included others that he had not given. He denied making the second taped statement and claimed that it was a complete fabrication. After defendant testified, counsel renewed his motion for access to the original tapes. The court held, however, that the evidence did not support defendant's allegations of tampering. In reaching that holding, the court found defendant's testimony to be incredible. During the guilt phase, the State admitted in evidence portions of the tapes. At the request of defense counsel, the trial court ordered the redaction of certain statements. The redacted portions of the tapes included defendant's statements that he wanted to die for his participation in the stabbing, his desire to kill anyone he encountered in prison, his threat that he would kill again, and his response regarding a stabbing incident occurring two months before Eck's murder. During summation, the State replayed a portion of defendant's redacted second statement. The court rejected a defense request for an instruction that it had denied defendant's motion for the production of the original tapes. Before the guilt-phase summations, the prosecutor moved to preclude defense counsel from arguing that the State should have tested the tapes. In response, defense counsel represented that he would not mention on summation that the tapes had not been subject to authenticity testing. Despite his representation, defense counsel in summation stated that the State could have sent the tapes to the FBI for testing, but had failed to do so. In response to the prosecutor's objection, the court provided the prosecutor with two options. First, the court offered to instruct the jury to disregard the challenged part of the defense summation. Alternatively, the court offered to permit the prosecutor to argue that defendant could have obtained the tapes to test their authenticity by submitting sufficient facts to establish a rational basis for that kind of testing. The court reasoned that, although it had denied defendant's motion for access to the original tapes, defendant could have obtained the tapes if he had presented an adequate factual basis. The prosecutor chose to respond to defense counsel's statements. Defendant now argues that the court's failure to inform the jury that it had denied his request for the original tapes, in conjunction with the prosecutor's summation, denied him a fair trial and due process.
We hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to obtain the original tapes for authenticity testing. Under the Rules of Court, defendant is entitled to records of statements or confessions, signed or unsigned, by the defendant or copies thereof. R. 3:13-3(c)(2). By producing copies of the tapes and transcripts, the State met its burden of production. Ibid; see State v. Russo, 127 N.J. Super. 286, 289, 317 A. 2d 369 (App.Div. 1974) (holding State need not provide defendant with transcripts of tapes at its expense); State v. Braeunig, 122 N.J. Super. 319, 328-32, 300 A. 2d 346 (App.Div. 1973) (holding defendant is entitled to access to tapes for purpose of transcribing contents therein); see also State v. Cook, 43 N.J. 560, 565, 206 A. 2d 359 (1965) ([T]he ordinary procedure has been to give defendants copies of their own statements as a matter of course....). Absent any showing of a factual basis supporting defendant's allegations of tampering and falsification, the State need not have turned over the original tapes for testing. Because we conclude that the State met its burden of production, we reject defendant's assertion that the prosecutor's failure to turn over the tapes constituted a violation of the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1963). A Brady violation occurs when a prosecutor fails to turn over material, exculpatory evidence to the defendant. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 189, 690 A. 2d 1 (1997) ( Marshall III ); State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 246, 678 A. 2d 642 (1996). Defendant argues that, by refusing to turn over the original tapes, the prosecution violated Brady. Brady 's focus, however, is on the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, not on challenges to the evidence's authenticity. See Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97 (finding constitutional violation in prosecutor's failure to notify defendant of existence of co-defendant's inculpatory statement); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567-68, 131 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1995) (finding Brady violation when prosecutor failed to inform defendant of existence of exculpatory evidence). The prosecution met its burden of disclosure by providing defendant with copies and transcripts of the taped confessions. Moreover, neither of these confessions were exculpatory. See State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 260, 571 A. 2d 914 (1990) ( DiFrisco I ) (finding no Brady violation where undisclosed evidence was not exculpatory). Defendant's argument, that the original tapes, if altered, would constitute exculpatory evidence under Brady, is too attenuated. His challenge is directed at the authenticity, not the disclosure, of evidence. As such, defendant must provide more than mere unfounded allegations of tampering to compel the prosecutor to turn over the original tapes for testing. At the hearing on defendant's motion for production of the original tapes, the trial court found no factual basis supporting defendant's allegation that the tapes were altered or defective. Consequently, the court denied defendant's motion for production. Additionally, the court, after hearing defendant's allegations regarding the tapes at a suppression hearing, concluded that his testimony in that regard [was] simply not credible. We do not perceive any reason to depart from traditional appellate deference to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615, 689 A. 2d 132 (1997). Defendant's allegations, moreover, consist of nothing more than bald assertions, which do not justify granting his request for possession of the original tapes. Cf. State v. Young, 242 N.J. Super. 467, 577 A. 2d 520 (App.Div. 1990) (refusing to require production of breathalyzer test ampules as part of discovery when there was no basis to believe such production would materially assist defendant's case). Captain King and Detective Stefanoni, who were present during the taping of the statements, denied defendant's claims that the tapes had been doctored and falsified. At trial, furthermore, both Williams and Bennett identified defendant's voice on both tapes. The trial court properly concluded that the jury could consider this evidence in making its determination regarding the authenticity of the tapes. See State v. Gallagher, 286 N.J. Super. 1, 18-19, 668 A. 2d 55 (App.Div. 1995), certif. denied, 146 N.J. 569, 683 A. 2d 1164 (1996); N.J.R.E. 701; see also U.S. v. Magana, 118 F. 3d 1173, 1209 (7th Cir.1997) (noting witness's identification of defendant's voice permissible when witness had previous opportunity to hear defendant's voice, albeit not necessarily during the commission of the crime), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1104, 140 L.Ed. 2d 158 (1998); People v. Buchanon, 186 A.D. 2d 864, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 933 (1992) (holding lay witness who knew defendant for fourteen years was competent to testify that defendant's voice was that on inculpatory recording). Defendant's unsubstantiated allegations did not provide grounds for the court to exercise its inherent power to order discovery when justice so requires. See Marshall III, supra, 148 N.J. at 269, 690 A. 2d 1 (quotation omitted). Nor did those allegations outweigh the State's interest in preserving the evidence. See State ex rel. W.C., 85 N.J. 218, 224, 426 A. 2d 50 (1981) (Whether discovery should be expanded involves exercising judicial discretion or, put another way, balancing the beneficial effects of discovery against its disadvantages.). Thus, the court did not err in refusing to permit defendant access to the original tapes. Defendant asserts, however, that he needed the original tapes to analyze their magnetic image. Such an analysis, according to defendant, could reveal whether the interrogating officers had stopped and started the tapes, a procedure that could have resulted in adding statements to or deleting them from the tapes. Defendant's argument concerning the second taped statement is more succinct. He asserts that it is a complete fabrication. He does not indicate, however, how a magnetic-imaging analysis would support his argument. If, as defendant alleges, the tape is a complete fabrication, a magnetic-imagining analysis would not reveal omissions suggestive of tampering. Thus, the most relevant information regarding the second tape would be evidence tending to prove that the voice on that tape is not defendant's. The State produced four witnesses: Captain King, Detective Stefanoni, Vicky Williams, and Carolyn Bennett, who identified defendant's voice on the second tape. Because defendant testified, moreover, the jury could make its own comparison of defendant's voice with that on the tape. If the jury, after such a comparison, believed that defendant had not made the second taped statement, it was free to disregard that statement. Cf. Brown v. State, 321 Ark. 413, 903 S.W. 2d 160, 163 (1995) (noting jury's ability to listen to tape and assess credibility of in-court voice identification). Against that background, defendant's discovery request emerges as nothing more than an unfocused, haphazard search for evidence. State v. D.R.H., 127 N.J. 249, 256, 604 A. 2d 89 (1992). Finally, although defendant's taped statements provided compelling evidence of his guilt, they were not the only evidence inculpating him in Eck's murder. Two witnesses, Williams and Bennett, testified that defendant had admitted to stabbing Eck to death. In addition, James Sireci placed defendant at the scene of the murder minutes before its occurrence. DNA tests revealed a 99.9994% probability that the blood found on the latex glove recovered by the police was that of defendant. That independent evidence of defendant's guilt distinguishes the instant case from State v. Thomas, 245 N.J. Super. 428, 586 A. 2d 250 (App.Div. 1991), appeal dismissed, 130 N.J. 588, 617 A. 2d 1214 (1992), on which defendant relies. In Thomas, the Appellate Division reversed the Law Division and granted the defendant's request for access to a rape kit for DNA testing. 245 N.J. Super. at 432, 586 A. 2d 250. Because of advances in DNA testing during the pendency of the appeal, the Appellate Division concluded that the test could definitively establish defendant's guilt or innocence. Id. at 436, 586 A. 2d 250. Underlying Thomas was the Court's recognition of the special circumstances of scientific advances in DNA testing. Here, defendant does not suggest any such special circumstances. On the record before us, nothing supports his allegation of tampering. Even if testing revealed evidence of tampering, moreover, the test results would not conclusively prove defendant's innocence. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's ruling that defendant did not provide a sufficient factual basis to justify access to the original tapes. If, however, defendant can make a sufficient showing, he may renew his request in a petition for post-conviction relief.
We turn now to the issue of the propriety of the prosecutor's summation. In conducting our review, we consider the summation within the context of the trial as a whole. State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 323, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987). At trial, defendant's strategy was to identify Bryant as the aggressor in both attacks. Defendant's taped statements, however, indicated that he was also an aggressor. Defendant claimed that the State had fabricated and falsified the tapes. On cross-examination of the State's witnesses, defense counsel elicited testimony suggesting how the tapes could have been altered. Additionally, the defense elicited testimony from Captain King to the effect that if King believed someone had tampered with the tapes, he would have submitted them to the FBI for testing. Through this testimony, defendant sought to generate the inference that the tapes could have been altered. Implicitly, defendant contends that the State could have done more to verify the authenticity of the tapes. Defendant, however, never has offered any evidence that justifies submission of the tapes for testing. In the absence of test results, however, defendant tried to raise the specter of tampering. During summation, defense counsel departed from his representation that he would not delve into the State's refusal to test the tapes. The summation succeeded in casting a pall of tampering over the redacted tapes. Defense counsel stated: How was the first tape edited, how was the second tape prepared? These are questions you have to contemplate as you deliberate. But as you deliberate, remember there were two tape recorders in that room, both under the sole control of Captain King and Detective Stefanoni. And you know that tapes can be edited and tampered with, and Captain King even indicated to you that if he had an audio tape which he thought was tampered with, he would forward it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And again, Captain King did testify if he had an audio tape which he believed had been edited or tampered with in any way, that he would forward it to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for inspection. And, finally, remember that the Technical Service Unit of Burlington County Prosecutor's office can redact tapes. In fact, that is what was actually done with [the tapes]. You have been given only bits and pieces of what actually happened, and what was said from the time Robert Morton was arrested at 11:09 a.m. on February 25, to almost 10 p.m. that evening. Whose fault is that? Robert Morton can only provide you with his testimony, since he was under the complete control of Captain King. But why didn't Captain King choose to provide you with a complete record of what happened, rather choose by design or scheme only to provide part of the information? By arguing to the jury that the State should have tested the authenticity of the tapes, defense counsel contravened his representation to the court. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the redaction of the tapes, which the court ordered to eliminate information prejudicial to defendant, did not constitute tampering. The trial court acted within its discretion in offering the alternative of either issuing a curative instruction or allowing the prosecutor to address the issue in summation. See State v. Perry, 65 N.J. 45, 48, 319 A. 2d 474 (1974) (holding prosecutor's response in summation to heavy handed statements made by defense counsel in summation did not constitute prejudicial error); State v. Jenkins, 299 N.J. Super. 61, 68-69, 690 A. 2d 643 (App.Div. 1997) (holding prosecutor's comments on defendant's post-arrest silence were justified in response to defendant's direct-examination testimony and defense counsel's summation); State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. 247, 266, 670 A. 2d 1100 (App.Div.) (A prosecutor may respond to an issue or argument raised by defense counsel.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 587, 677 A. 2d 759 (1996); State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 379, 592 A. 2d 572 (App.Div.) (holding prosecutor's forceful statements in defense of integrity of investigation not error when made in response to defense counsel's summation comments describing State's case as a big lie, a disgrace, and an outrage), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393, 614 A. 2d 616 (1991). In his summation, the prosecutor responded: Now, you heard the suggestion raised by Defense Counsel if the prosecution wanted to demonstrate the authenticity of the contents of [the tape] they could have sent it to the FBI or to some other expert, in an attempt to obtain a scientific opinion as to whether the tape is or is not genuine. One thing you may not be aware of as laymen is that's not the exclusive province or ability of the prosecution. Both sides exchange to a limited degree information prior to trial. .... Both sides exchange information prior to trial. You've seen Defense Counsel cross-examining witnesses with copies of police reports that they've obviously been provided with by the prosecution. That is called discovery. Both sides also have the subpoena power. Robert Morton is the one who got on the witness stand and testified to you it's not his voice on the statement, and the contents of that statement are not genuine. If the defense wanted you to hear any evidence, any opinion, if there even would be such information, they had every bit as much opportunity as the prosecution did to present any evidence, conduct any inspections, or do any examinations of the tape they wanted to attempt to demonstrate that to you. It wasn't done; you've heard no such evidence. You also heard a very logical explanation from Captain King, he was questioned about that on cross-examination, []I could have the contents of the tape examined if I thought it wasn't genuine.[] King and Stefanoni believed the tape was a genuine, fluent tape, was genuine, it was the recording that they made in their presence. If the defense wanted to pursue any other line of argument or attack upon that statement, they had the opportunity to do so. That's all I'm going to say about it. That tape is genuine. It's a taped confession from Robert Morton. And with regard to the second statement, and his description of this crime, and how he committed it, the evidence shows that it's the truth. So, we close the book on that chapter and move on. The summation suggested that because defendant could have subpoenaed the tapes, he had access to them. In making that suggestion, however, the prosecutor failed to explain that defendant could have obtained the tape only by making an adequate factual showing. To this extent, the statement was both incomplete and inaccurate. In response, defendant requested a jury instruction that the court had twice rejected his request for access to the original tapes. The court denied the request. If the court had granted the request, the jury might have concluded that the tapes were genuine. Such an instruction could have redounded to defendant's detriment. Cf. State v. Bowman, 165 N.J. Super. 531, 537, 398 A. 2d 908 (App.Div. 1979) (holding prosecutor's statement to jury on summation that the trial judge had previously found defendant's confessions to be voluntary constituted reversible error). We conclude that the denial of defendant's requested instruction did not prejudice him. In addition, we hold that the prosecutor's statement, when considered in the context of the entire trial, did not constitute reversible error. See State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 59, 716 A. 2d 395 (1998) ([P]rosecutorial misconduct will not serve as the basis for reversal unless it was so egregious as to work a deprivation of a defendant's right to a fair trial.); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 163, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) ( Marshall I ) (holding improper closing statement by prosecutor not requiring reversal of defendant's conviction and death sentence), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1993); Johnson, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 265, 670 A. 2d 1100 (Prosecutorial misconduct must be clear and unmistakable and must substantially prejudice the defendant's fundamental right to have the jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense.) (citation omitted). When compared with cases in which closing statements have constituted reversible error, the prosecutor's statement in this case was not nearly so egregious. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 518-34, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988) (finding reversible error in prosecutor's summation in which he argued that the defense expert's testimony was fabricated, extolled the jury to send a message by sentencing defendant to death, stated, without evidentiary support, that defendant extorted food from other inmates while in prison, and instructed the jury that it was legally required to impose the death penalty); Jenkins, supra, 299 N.J. Super. at 69, 690 A. 2d 643 (holding prosecutor's statements in summation of her personal opinions regarding defendant's credibility to be reversible error); State v. W.L., 292 N.J. Super. 100, 110-111, 678 A. 2d 312 (App.Div. 1996) (finding reversible error in prosecutor's statements that were calculated to arouse sympathy for the victim and hate and anger against the defendant and that described the jury charge as boring, confusing, and ridiculous); State v. Acker, 265 N.J. Super. 351, 356, 627 A. 2d 170 (App.Div.) (finding reversible error in prosecutor's statements characterizing defense counsel as outrageous, remarkable, absolutely preposterous and absolutely outrageous, instructing jury that its function was to protect young victims of alleged sexual offenses as a group, and arguing without basis that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 485, 634 A. 2d 530 (1993); State v. Bruce, 72 N.J. Super. 247, 178 A. 2d 233 (App.Div. 1961) (holding prosecutor's summation in which he called defendants animals and brutes reversible error where such statements were not part of any testimony). Defendant has not included in the record any evidence of tampering or falsification. Nor has he identified any audible breaks or sounds suggesting that Officers King and Stefanoni selectively started and stopped the tapes. In sum, defendant has not offered any evidence, other than his own testimony, that it was not his voice on the second tape. By contrast, the State has introduced testimony identifying defendant's voice as that on both tapes. It has also introduced significant evidence of defendant's guilt independent of the tapes. In light of those facts, we find that the prosecutor's statements in summation did not constitute reversible error.