Opinion ID: 2809802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ATC’s Counterclaims

Text: For its second point on appeal, ATC argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because Landers failed to present a prima facie case and that a genuine issue of material fact existed on each of ATC’s following counterclaims.
In proving an abuse-of-process claim, ATC needed to establish the following elements: (1) a legal procedure set in motion in proper form, even with probable cause and ultimate success; (2) the procedure is perverted to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) a willful act is perpetrated in the use of process which is not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. S. Ark. Petroleum Co. v. Schiesser, 343 Ark. 492, 36 S.W.3d 317 (2001). The test of abuse of process is whether a judicial process is used to extort 6 Cite as 2015 Ark. 268 or coerce. Routh Wrecker Serv., Inc. v. Washington, 335 Ark. 232, 980 S.W.2d 240 (1998). The key to the tort is the improper use of process after its issuance to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed. Harmon v. Carco Carriage Corp., 320 Ark. 322, 895 S.W.2d 938 (1995). Thus, it is the purpose for which the process is used, once issued, that is important in reaching a conclusion. Sundeen v. Kroger, 355 Ark. 138, 133 S.W.3d 393 (2003). Here, in its counterclaim, ATC alleged abuse of process, stating that the eviction lawsuit was a “perverted” procedure “to accomplish an ulterior purpose . . . the extortion and coercion of ATC into signing a document [lease agreement] which changes the terms and conditions of the Partnership Agreement.” In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Landers cited Union National Bank of Little Rock v. Kutait, 312 Ark. 14, 846 S.W.2d 652 (1993), as authority for its contention that “to establish the tort, process must have issued after the initiation of the suit and used for a coercive or improper purpose.” ATC did not respond. We conclude that ATC’s initiation-of-suit allegation supporting an abuse-of-process claim is not enough to support an abuse-of-process claim. Because ATC did not offer proof with proof on this issue, we hold that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on the abuse-of-process claim.
ATC claimed that Landers fraudulently induced ATC into an oral partnership by promising it free use of its property for at least nine months. The five elements of the tort of fraud are (1) a false representation of a material fact, (2) knowledge that the representation is 7 Cite as 2015 Ark. 268 false or that there is insufficient evidence upon which to make the representation, (3) intent to induce action or inaction in reliance upon the representation, (4) justifiable reliance on the representation, and (5) damage suffered as a result of the reliance. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 369 Ark. 365, 255 S.W.3d 424 (2007). As the factual basis for this claim, ATC stated in its counterclaim that Landers knowingly permitted ATC to construct and finish out in excess of $100,000 worth of improvements to the property and “feigned compliance” with a partnership agreement for more than nine months by allowing ATC to use the property without charge. ATC never established that Landers made a false representation of a material fact. Landers stated that it allowed ATC to occupy the premises free of charge for nine months; that ATC occupied the property at will; and that Landers’s request for a written lease did not constitute fraud. Thus, we conclude that, without satisfying the first element, ATC’s claim for fraud fails.
We previously stated that unlawful detainer is founded on a breach of contract. See, e.g., McGuire, 13 Ark. 448. We also previously noted that the parties did not enter into a written contract. Because we held that the circuit court did not err in granting Landers’s motion for summary judgment on its complaint for unlawful detainer, we hold that the circuit court did not err in dismissing ATC’s claim for breach of contract.
ATC further contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of specific performance. Specific performance is an equitable remedy that compels 8 Cite as 2015 Ark. 268 the performance of an agreement or contract on the precise terms agreed upon. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Barber, 356 Ark. 268, 149 S.W.3d 325 (2004). The essential elements of a contract are (1) competent parties, (2) subject matter, (3) legal consideration, (4) mutual agreement, and (5) mutual obligation. City of Dardanelle v. City of Russellville, 372 Ark. 486, 277 S.W.3d 562 (2008). This court cannot make a contract for the parties but can only construe and enforce the contract that they have made; if there is no meeting of the minds, there is no contract. See id. Here, because there was no contract between ATC and Landers, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment on ATC’s specific-performance claim. For these reasons, we see no error on the part of the circuit court, and we affirm on this point.
ATC also argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of promissory estoppel. To prove promissory estoppel, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant made a promise; (2) the defendant should have reasonably expected the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance on the promise; (3) the plaintiff acted or refrained from acting in reasonable reliance on the promise to its detriment; and (4) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Glover, 326 Ark. 736, 934 S.W.2d 204 (1996). Detrimental reliance is an equitable principle that may be presented as an alternative to a breach-of-contract claim. See id. In the case at bar, ATC sought to enforce the oral partnership agreement because ATC expended approximately $100,000 in labor and materials to renovate and make improvements to the Landers property. In its affidavit, ATC described its version of the oral agreement and 9 Cite as 2015 Ark. 268 stated that it “relied upon and based its decision to expend significant time and money to move into the subject real property and renovate the same upon the mutual promises and agreements by and between [ATC and Landers].” Thus, in its affidavit, ATC provided proof with proof that there was an agreement or promise between the parties and that ATC allegedly relied on that agreement in expending money to improve the property. Given our well-established standard of review, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether ATC detrimentally relied on Landers’s promise to use the property and what improvements were actually made by ATC. For these reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s ruling on the issue of promissory estoppel and detrimental reliance and remand for further proceedings.