Opinion ID: 3014253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 104-469(I), at 12, 107, 118-25 (1996)).

Text: Bamba’s interpretation of the statute as The legislative history and applying to only a narrow class of admitted framework of the INA further bolsters our aliens is inconsistent with this broad interpretation of the statute. Admittedly, a Congressional intent to expedite the review of the legislative history does not removal of criminal aliens. Cf. Zhang, reveal Congress’s specific intent with 274 F.3d at 108 (holding in context of 8 respect to the application of § 1228(b) to U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) that “[i]n light of parolees. However, the legislative history that goal [of expediting the removal of does evince a broad Congressional intent aliens convicted of aggravated felonies], to expedite the removal of criminal aliens. we think it is unlikely that Congress meant “[I]t is beyond cavil that one of Congress’s to deny judicial review of removal orders principal goals in enacting [the Illegal only for aliens who had been lawfully Immigration Reform Responsibility Act of admitted to the United States and to allow 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. such review for aggravated felons who had C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996)] was to never been admitted”). Moreover, expedite the removal of aliens who have Congress’s intent to apply the expedited been convicted of aggravated felonies.” proceedings to all aliens who are not Zhang v. INS, 274 F.3d 103, 108 (2d Cir. lawfully admitted as permanent residents, 2001) (citing Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d including parolees, is reflected in § 1228’s 919, 925 (11th Cir. 2001)); see also title—“Removal of Aliens Who Are Not Hernandez-Vermudez, 356 F.3d at 1014 Permanent Residents.” 10 (“Congress clearly intended to expedite the removal of criminal aliens who are not l a w f u l p e r m a n e n t r e si d e n ts . ” ). 10 “Sometimes legislative history is itself We acknowledge that “the title of a ambiguous. Not this time. There simply is statute . . . cannot limit the plain meaning no denying that in enacting the Violent of the text.” Brotherhood of R. R. Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 of 1994,8 and [IIRIRA],9 Congress U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947); see also intended to expedite the removal of Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 235 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that “a title alone is not controlling”). However, a title can be 8 Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title XIII, § examined “[f]or interpretive purposes . . . 130004, 108 Stat. 1796, 2026-28 (1994). [to] shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase.” 331 U.S. at 529. In this case, to 9 IIRIRA § 304(c), Pub. L. No. 104-208, the extent that the class of aliens covered Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-597 (1996). by § 1228’s expedited removal provision is 9 Bamba contends that the framework aliens, and not paroled aliens like Bamba of the INA supports his interpretation of 8 who have not been “admitted.” U.S.C. § 1228(b). Specifically, he points The problem, however, is that to the fact while IIRIRA united the Bamba advances no rationale for why bifurcated “exclusion” and “deportation” Congress would have intended to preserve proceedings into a single “removal” a distinction between “deportable” and proceeding, see Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 “inadmissible” aliens in the context of F.3d 414, 415 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004), the Act expedited removal of aggravated felons. still maintains some distinctions between As elaborated above, any such distinction aliens who have been admitted and are is irrational, applying a less stringent “deportable” and those aliens who have standard to those aliens who have not been not been admitted and are “inadmissible.” admitted. Moreover, Bamba’s argument See Appellant Br. at 12-14 (citing, e.g., In fails to acknowledge the existence of other re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I & N Dec. 616 language in § 1228(b) indicating that the (BIA 1999); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2)).11 provision was intended to apply to Bamba therefore argues that because inadmissible aliens. Recall that the Congress used the term “deportability” and provision explicitly provides that “[a]n not “inadmissibility” or “deportation and alien is described in this paragraph if the inadmissibility,” it must be presumed that alien—(A) was not lawfully admitted for Congress specifically intended § 1228(b)’s permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § e x p e d i te d adm inistrati v e r e m o v al 1228(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). proceedings to apply only to “deportable” ambiguous, we find it persuasive that IV. Congress entitled the section “Removal of While our Court has not previously Aliens Who Are Not Permanent addressed the issue in this case, other Residents.” 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) (emphasis circuit courts considering the question added). have uniformly concluded that § 1228’s 11 expedited removal provision applies to all For example, while the alien has the aliens not admitted for permanent burden in an application for admission of residence, including parolees. establishing that he is “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not As noted by the District Court, in inadmissible,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A), Bazan-Reyes v. INS the Seventh Circuit the government has “the burden of considered and rejected precisely the same establishing by clear and convincing argument that Bamba now advances. 256 evidence that, in the case of an alien who F.3d 600, 604-05 (7th Cir. 2001). In has been admitted to the United States, the support of its interpretation of § 1228(b), alien is deportable,” 8 U.S .C. § the Seventh Circuit explained: 1229a(c)(3)(A). 10 Nothing in that section who are not “admitted” are exempt from § prohibits its application to 1228(b)’s expedited removal of aggravated parolees, and, as the felons. See Hernandez-Vermudez, 356 government points out, F.3d 1011.13 While acknowledging that construing the statute to the statute “can be read” to exempt aliens forbid its application to who are not admitted, the Ninth Circuit parolees would provide concluded that such a reading is at odds more favorable treatment for with the language and the legislative parolees than for lawfully history of the statute. See id. at 1014.14 admitted aliens. We cannot Bamba points to no authority from belie ve that Congress intended such a result. We find it more plausible that 13 t h e r e fer e n c e to § In Hernandez-Vermudez, the Ninth 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) simply Circuit examined the meaning of the operates to incorporate the statute in the context of a claim that an definition of aggravated illegal immigrant, rather than a parolee, felony set out in that section was exempt from the expedited removal to elucidate which non- provision because he was not “admitted.” lawful resident aliens may The analysis with respect to interpretation be placed in expedited of the statutory scheme, however, is proceedings. equally persuasive in the context of parolees. Id. at 605.12 14 The position of the Seventh and In a slightly different context, the Ninth Circuits is also supported by the Ninth Circuit has recently joined the Second Circuit’s decision in Zhang v. approach taken by the Seventh Circuit, INS. In Zhang, the court examined the rejecting the argument that immigrants scope of § 1225(a)(2)(C)’s jurisdiction- stripping provision for aggravated felons. The appellant argued, as here, that 12 Bamba’s attempt to distinguish §1225 (a)(2 )(C)’s r e f e r e n ce to Bazan-Reyes on the ground that it has §1227(a)(2)(A )(iii) limited th e been overruled by subsequent Seventh j u r i s d ic t i o n -s t r ip p i n g p r o v i s io n ’ s Circuit case law is unpersuasive. The case application to aliens who were admitted. cited by Bamba in support of this The court rejected this interpretation. 274 proposition—Dimenski v. INS, 275 F.3d F.3d at 107-08. Rather, the Second Circuit 574 (7 th Cir. 2001)—not only does not concluded that the reference was included explicitly overrule Bazan-Reyes but is “not for its description of persons but based on immigration law prior to the solely for its cataloguing of crimes.” Id. at enactment of IIRIRA. 108. 11 other circuit courts suggesting a contrary interpretation of the statute. We now join the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Bazan-Reyes and the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez-Vermudez, and hold that § 1228(b)’s expedited removal provision is applicable to all aliens convicted of an aggravated felony who are not lawfully admitted for permanent residence, including parolees.