Opinion ID: 900485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Talk With Authorities

Text: [¶ 27.] Before trial, Wright moved to suppress all evidence of [t]he defendant's invocation of his right to have an attorney[.] His motion was granted. In their testimony, Ebach and Brubakken both referred to Wright's refusal to speak with them after learning they were investigating E.W.'s injuries. [8] Neither mentioned Wright's remark about an attorney. Wright objected to the testimony and moved the court to grant a mistrial. The court denied the motion finding that the testimony did not violate its order. [¶ 28.] For a violation of an in limine motion to serve as the basis for a mistrial and a later motion for a new trial, the order must be specific in its prohibition, and a violation must be clear. Robbins, 1996 SD 84, ¶ 6, 550 N.W.2d at 425 (citing Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 426 (S.D.1994)). Even when a violation occurs, a new trial will only be required if the violation prejudiced the party or subverted a fair trial. Kjerstad, 517 N.W.2d at 426 (citation omitted). [¶ 29] Wright's refusal to speak with Ebach and Brubakken was made before his arrest, before he received his Miranda warnings, and was not used for impeachment purposes by the State. While explaining the events that led to Wright's arrest, Ebach and Brubakken only mentioned that Wright did not want to talk after being told that they were investigating E.W.'s injuries. See Jones, 1998 SD 55, ¶ 34, 578 N.W.2d at 164 (stating there is no evidence in the record that the State sought to bring out this forbidden subject, directly or by allusion, by the brief reference to [the defendant's] pre-arrest silence through the detective); Phyle v. Leapley, 491 N.W.2d 429, 434 (S.D.1992) (stating [t]he circuit court found ... that the sheriff's testimony did not touch on the fact that [the defendant] invoked his right or refused to make a statement, but rather explained what happened when he arrested [him]. No constitutional procedural irregularities attended thereto). [¶ 30.] The trial court's order prevented the State from broaching Wright's invocation of his right to an attorney[.] The court heard the testimony of Ebach and Brubakken. It observed the effect on the jury. It denied Wright's motion for a mistrial, finding that the testimony did not violate its order and was not prejudicial to Wright. We ordinarily defer to these rulings. Robbins, 1996 SD 84, ¶ 6, 550 N.W.2d at 425. Wright has not shown the trial court abused its discretion. [¶ 31.] Defendant also claims the State indirectly alluded in its closing argument to his exercise of his right to remain silent. [9] Prosecutors are forbidden to call attention of the jury to the failure of defendant to testify. State v. Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 477, 482 (S.D.1980) (citing State v. Winckler, 260 N.W.2d 356 (S.D.1977); State v. Brown, 81 S.D. 195, 132 N.W.2d 840 (S.D.1965)). When the comments are indirect allusions, the test is whether a reasonable intelligent jury would understand the[m] to point out defendant's failure to testify. Id. (citation omitted). The prosecutor's comments here rebutted Wright's closing arguments. No reasonable juror could infer these comments to be a reference to Wright's silence as an indication of his guilt. Therefore, there was no error.