Opinion ID: 771084
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deference to the Agency's Interpretation of the Statute

Text: 35 The government argues that because Congress has delegated to the Department of Justice the authority to administer the statute in question that we must defer to the BIA's policy of not applying equitable tolling in the case of ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. 36 In deciding whether to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute, we must first consider whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If it has, that is the end of the matter. Id. Judging whether Congress has spoken is a matter of statutory construction over which [t]he judiciary is the final authority . . . and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. Id. at 843 n.9. Courts may employ the traditional tools of statutory construction in determining legislative intent for purposes of this inquiry. INS v. Cardoza Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (calling for the examination of the statute or its legislative history) (internal quotation marks omitted). 37 Because the issue of whether a limitations period creates a jurisdictional bar to untimely claims is itself a question purely of statutory construction, it fits squarely within the initial step in the Chevron analysis. When, as here, we are called upon to engage only in an exercise of statutory interpretation, we avoid the danger of venturing into areas of special agency expertise, concerning which courts owe special deference under the Chevron doctrine. See Bamidele v. INS, 99 F.3d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1996) (A statute of limitations is not a matter within the particular expertise of the INS. Rather, we consider this a clearly legal issue that courts are better equipped to handle.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110, 127 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding that the validity of the BIA's retroactive application of an immigration statute may be viewed as a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide, a question that is quite different from the question of interpretation that arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply [statutory] standards to a particular set of facts which involves the agency's particular expertise) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 38 As we have already noted, the text of the 1990 statute, its legislative history and purpose, and a subsequent legislative enactment all demonstrate that the general limits Congress imposed on motions to reopen were not intended to bar the accommodation of exceptional cases in which a motion would otherwise be untimely. 39 Even if we were not satisfied that the intent of Congress was clear, we would nonetheless reject the BIA's interpretation of the regulations. When Congress has not directly addressed an issue, our review is not merely for minimum rationality but requires that the administrative agency articulate a logical basis for its judgment. Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the agencies charged with administrating our immigration laws have offered no evidence whatsoever that Congress intended the limits on motions to reopen to establish a jurisdictional bar. The government's own interpretation of the statute, both in its administrative rule making and in its discussion of the rule in other BIA case law, itself supports our conclusion that exceptional cases are not subject to the general limitations imposed on motions to reopen, and therefore such limitations are not jurisdictional. 40 Failing to present any evidence to support its claim, the government argues that because Congress delegated to the agency the task of setting the exact duration of congressionally mandated filing deadlines, Congress necessarily conferred upon the agency the additional task of determining whether such deadlines were jurisdictional. See Respondent's brief at 24. We reject this contention. The power to establish jurisdictional bars resides with Congress and every indication points to the fact that Congress did not intend to create a jurisdictional bar for untimely motions to reopen.