Opinion ID: 460404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Arrangement Existed Concerning Enforcement of United States Law Around the Rosangel

Text: 21 Romero-Galue did not address what may constitute an arrangement to create customs waters around a particular vessel. 6 The appellants contend that a formal, written agreement is necessary. We do not agree. First, requiring a formal agreement would be contrary to the common understanding of the statutory language. Second, the realities of enforcing narcotics laws on the high seas and the limited scope of the consent lead us to conclude that no formal agreement is necessary, and that consent may be relayed by electronic communications such as radio or telephone. 22 The statute refers to a treaty or other arrangement. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(j) (emphasis added). If the United States were relying on a treaty in the current matter, obviously we would look for some sort of compact, formally signed and solemnly ratified. Black's Law Dictionary 1346 (5th ed. 1979). However, here the United States is relying on an arrangement. Appellants point to nothing in the statute or legislative history which indicates Congress did not intend the word to be given its ordinary meaning. Nor do we know of any special meaning of the term in the context of international law. An arrangement is simply a settlement or adjustment, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 120 (1976), and the term contemplates no particular form. 23 Requiring execution of a formal agreement would defeat the purpose of the statute, which is to allow enforcement against particular vessels found hovering off the coast. Obviously, a vessel laden with marijuana would not leisurely lay at anchor just beyond four leagues from our shore while United States diplomats journeyed to Honduras, or other appropriate nation, negotiated an agreement, and awaited the approval of the proper bodies within the party nations. It is doubtful that the pride of our diplomats would be offended by this court's observation that during the course of obtaining such an agreement, convoys of vessels could journey back and forth laden with contraband. Once an agreement was in force, the smugglers could simply obtain a different vessel. 7 24 Nor would a formal agreement serve any useful purpose. All that the law contemplates is that the foreign nation give express consent to the enforcement of United States laws with respect to the particular vessel. The consenting nation's rights under international law or treaty remain unchanged, as the consent applies only to the particular vessel involved. Consent is a simple notion; it can be granted or refused, and no formal agreement is necessary to understand either option. 25 Finally, in the legislative history Congress noted that [t]he time required to obtain prior consent to board 'mother ships' on the high seas has apparently been significantly reduced, indicating that it intended to take advantage of such consent. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979). The record in this case demonstrates that such an arrangement existed. Honduras specifically consented to the United States asserting jurisdiction over the ROSANGEL. 8 26 C. No Treaty is Necessary Before the United States Seeks to Make Arrangements Regarding Vessels 27 The appellants also argue that even if the consent of Honduras satisfies the statutory requirement for an arrangement, the statute only authorizes arrangements with treaty nations. Accordingly, they argue that because no treaty between Honduras and the United States authorizes arrangements, no arrangement existed within the meaning of section 955a(c). The appellants contend that Romero-Galue supports their position. 757 F.2d at 1154. 28 This contention also fails. First it runs contrary to the statutory language. The definition of customs waters refers to treaty or other arrangement. 19 U.S.C. Sec. 1401(j) (emphasis added). The appellants' argument would amend the definition to read treaty or other arrangement executed pursuant to a treaty. We decline to rewrite the work of Congress. Appellants point to nothing in the statute or legislative history that indicates Congress contemplated that the United States would negotiate treaties before it began to seek arrangements regarding particular vessels. On the contrary, the legislative history refers to successful initiatives to reduce the time necessary to obtain consent to board ships. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1979). If Congress did not intend to take advantage of these successful initiatives until treaties were negotiated, surely Congress would have mentioned the necessity to undertake such negotiations forthwith. Appellants advance no congressional purpose, and we can think of none that such a treaty requirement would serve; if the United States can achieve its goal of arrangements without a treaty, then why would Congress require one? Such a requirement would be directly contrary to the express statement of Congress that it intended to reach all acts of illicit trafficking. H.R.Rep. No. 323, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979). 29 Nor is Romero-Galue supportive of the assertion. Romero-Galue involved a telephonic relay of consent, and nothing in the opinion indicates the alleged arrangement was authorized by a treaty. Indeed the Romero-Galue court remanded for a determination of whether a treaty or other arrangement existed. 757 F.2d at 1154 (emphasis added). Accordingly we hold that nothing in the Marijuana on the High Seas Act requires a treaty before the United States may seek an arrangement. 30