Opinion ID: 3005897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New Trial Nisi Additur

Text: Petitioner argues the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order granting a new trial nisi additur because the trial court's decision was an appropriate exercise of discretion and was supported by compelling reasons. We agree. When a party moves for a new trial based on a challenge that the verdict is either excessive or inadequate, the trial judge must distinguish between awards that are merely unduly liberal or conservative and awards that are actuated by passion, caprice, or prejudice. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Durham, 314 S.C. 529, 530–31, 431 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1993) (citing Easler v. Hejaz Temple, 285 S.C. 348, 356, 329 S.E.2d 753, 758 (1985)). When the verdict indicates that the jury was unduly liberal or conservative in its view of the damages, the trial judge alone has the power to [alter] the verdict by the granting of a new trial nisi. Id. at 531, 431 S.E.2d at 558 (citing O'Neal v. Bowles, 314 S.C. 525, 527, 431 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1993)). However, when the verdict is so grossly excessive or inadequate that the amount awarded is so shockingly disproportionate to the injuries as to indicate that the jury was moved or actuated by passion, caprice, prejudice, or other considerations not found in the evidence, it becomes the duty of the trial judge and this Court to set aside the verdict absolutely. Id. (citing Easler, 285 S.C. at 356, 329 S.E.2d at 758). 'Motions for a new trial on the ground of either excessiveness or inadequacy are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.' Graham v. Whitaker, 282 S.C. 393, 401, 321 S.E.2d 40, 45 (1984) (quoting Toole v. Toole, 260 S.C. 235, 195 S.E.2d 389 (1973)). 'His exercise of such discretion, however, is not absolute and it is the duty of this Court in a proper case to review and determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion amounting to error of law.' Id. at 401–02, 321 S.E.2d at 45. Compelling reasons must be given to justify the trial court invading the jury's province in this manner. Bailey v. Peacock, 318 S.C. 13, 14, 455 S.E.2d 690, 691 (1995) (citing Pelican Bldg. Ctrs. v. Dutton, 311 S.C. 56, 61, 427 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1993)). At trial, Petitioner presented expert testimony that the Riley family suffered more than $228,000 in economic damages as a result of Riley's death. Petitioner also presented numerous witnesses who testified as to noneconomic damages suffered by his surviving family, all of whom testified about the type of caring and loving husband and father Riley was. Indeed, the evidence of noneconomic damages was so compelling and pervasive that the trial judge eventually ruled it had become cumulative under Rule 403, SCRE. During an in camera discussion regarding whether the trial court would permit further witnesses to testify about noneconomic damages, the experienced trial judge stated: I've been doing this a long time and I can't remember a trial that I was either involved in as a lawyer or as a judge where I've heard more glowing testimony and genuine testimony about the person's life and his service to his family and to the community. I mean, it's been—it's been very touching, to be quite frank with you; so tell me what else you want to do other than what you have already done. In his order granting the motion for a new trial nisi additur, the trial judge found the jury's verdict of $300,000 was inadequate in light of the evidence and testimony presented at trial. The trial judge stated: The evidence at trial showed that Benjamin Riley was a loving father and husband and a central figure not only in the lives of his family, but also within his church and his community. During the trial of this case, [Petitioner] Laura Riley testified, as did three of Riley's five adult children. . . . The family's testimony established Riley's support, both moral and economic, of his family, as well as genuine love, affection, esteem, and regard held by the testifying beneficiaries of the Estate of the decedent. The testimony established that throughout their married lives, Riley and his wife were best friends and companions. The family's testimony as well as that of non-family members, left no question as to the grief, emotional turmoil, and loss suffered. Their testimony showed that this family of beneficiaries, perhaps more than most wrongful death beneficiaries, suffered great loss under this element of wrongful death damages. In evaluating this issue on appeal, the court of appeals ignored the applicable abuse-of-discretion standard of review, instead focusing its inquiry on a de novo evaluation of whether, in its view, there was sufficient justification for invading the jury's province. This was error. Applying the correct standard of review to the trial court's findings, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting an additur of $600,000. In his order granting the motion, the trial judge gave a thorough recitation of the uncontested, and emotionally compelling evidence, including testimony and supporting exhibits that demonstrated both the pecuniary losses suffered by the Riley family and also the noneconomic compensable elements of loss that are recoverable in a wrongful death action. See Garner v. Houck, 312 S.C. 481, 488, 435 S.E.2d 847, 850 (1993) (finding damages for mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief, sorrow, and loss of society and companionship are recoverable in a wrongful death action) (citing Smith v. Wells, 258 S.C. 316, 188 S.E.2d 470 (1972)). It is clear from the record that the trial judge found the jury's verdict to be inadequate, yet not shockingly so, such that a new trial absolute would be warranted. In light of the trial judge's correct application of the law and the extensive evidence on the proper elements of damages in a wrongful death action, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the nisi additur. Further, it appears the decision of the court of appeals was based on the belief that a nisi additur is not available where any amount of noneconomic damages is awarded. This was an error of law. While the presence of some amount of noneconomic damages may be a factor mitigating against the granting of a new trial nisi additur, there is no categorical rule prohibiting a nisi additur where a jury verdict includes some measure of noneconomic damages. The court of appeals' new nisi additur categorical rule formulation would remove the discretion vested in trial court judges. Here, the trial court judge was well aware that the jury verdict included an award of noneconomic damages, yet he articulated compelling circumstances that he believed warranted the nisi additur. Under this record, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion. We reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court's grant of the new trial nisi additur. B. Reallocation and Setoff of Settlement Proceeds Petitioner argues the court of appeals erred in the reallocation and setoff of settlement proceeds. We agree. A non-settling defendant is entitled to credit for the amount paid by another defendant who settles for the same cause of action. Rutland v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 400 S.C. 209, 216, 734 S.E.2d 142, 145 (2012) (citing Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 312–13, 536 S.E.2d 408, 425 (Ct.App.2000)). The right to setoff has existed at common law in South Carolina for over 100 years. See, e.g., Rookard v. Atlanta & Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 89 S.C. 371, 71 S.E. 992, 995 (1911) (stating [t]he jurisdiction of the court to set off one judgment against another is equitable in its nature, and should be exercised so as to do justice between parties and noting the court's ability to order setoff is not founded on any statute or fixed rule of court, but grows out of the inherent equitable jurisdiction which the court exercises over suitors in it). Allowing setoff prevents an injured person from obtaining a double recovery for the damage he sustained, for it is almost universally held that there can be only one satisfaction for an injury or wrong. Rutland, 400 S.C. at 216, 734 S.E.2d at 145 (citation and internal quotations omitted). In 1988, these equitable principles were codified as part of the South Carolina Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (the Act), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-38-10 to -70 (2005 & Supp. 2014). Specifically, section 15-38-50 provides: When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and (2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-38-50. Thus, the Act represents the Legislature's determination of the proper balance between preventing double-recovery and South Carolina's strong public policy favoring the settlement of disputes. Chester v. S.C. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 388 S.C. 343, 698 S.E.2d 559 (2010). Despite a defendant's entitlement to setoff, whether at common law or under section 15-38-50, any reduction in the judgment must be from a settlement for the same cause of action. Hawkins v. Pathology Assocs. of Greenville, P.A., 330 S.C. 92, 113, 498 S.E.2d 395, 407 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Ward v. Epting, 290 S.C. 547, 351 S.E.2d 867 (Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to apply settlement for pain and suffering cause of action to judgment in wrongful death action)). Thus, where a settlement involves more than one claim, the allocation of settlement proceeds between various causes of action impacts the amount a non-settling defendant may be entitled to offset. There is no real dispute that Ford is entitled to offset whatever portion of the $25,000 is attributable to the wrongful death claim. Indeed, the Estate concedes as much in its brief. Thus, the real dispute is whether the court of appeals erred in reapportioning the $25,000 settlement between the survival and wrongful death claims. We find the court of appeals erred in reapportioning the settlement proceeds on the sole basis that the particular agreed-upon allocation between the survival and wrongful death claims did not seem to be, in the court of appeals' view, proportionately reasonable. Given the totality of the circumstances, and particularly in light of the reasonableness of the overall amount of $20,000 and the evidence in the record of Riley's conscious pain and suffering, we believe it was error to disturb the settling parties' agreed-upon allocation solely because the apportionment may have been advantageous to the Estate. See In re Wells, 43 S.C. 477, 21 S.E. 334, 337 (1895) (finding the party seeking departure from the application of standard set-off rules bears the burden of proof and must be prepared to justify such [reallocation] as fair, bona fide, and just, particularly where there is an executed contract between [the parties], which is not contested as between them but which is sought to be invalidated by third parties); see also Lard v. AM/FM Ohio, Inc., 901 N.E.2d 1006, 1018 (Ill. App. 2009) (Although the manipulation of an allocation can be evidence of bad faith in a settlement negotiation, it is not per se bad faith to engage in the advantageous apportioning of a settlement.) (citation omitted). Indeed, we agree with the approach taken by the Illinois Court of Appeals, which stated: A plaintiff who enters into a settlement with a defendant gains a position of control and acquires leverage in relation to a nonsettling defendant. This posture is reflected in the plaintiff's ability to apportion the settlement proceeds in the manner most advantageous to it. Settlements are not designed to benefit nonsettling third parties. They are instead created by the settling parties in the interests of these parties. If the position of a nonsettling defendant is worsened by the terms of a settlement, this is the consequence of a refusal to settle. A defendant who fails to bargain is not rewarded with the privilege of fashioning and ultimately extracting a benefit from the decisions of those who do. Lard, 901 N.E.2d at 1019 (citing Muro v. Abel Freight Lines, Inc., 669 N.E.2d 1217 (Ill. App. 1996)). The court of appeals erred in accepting Ford's invitation to reapportion the agreedupon allocation of settlement proceeds based on the purported impropriety of an apportionment favoring the Estate. Settling parties are naturally going to allocate settlement proceeds in a manner that serves their best interests. That fact alone is insufficient to justify appellate reapportionment for the sole purpose of benefitting Ford. Here, the trial court-approved allocation is unquestionably reasonable under the facts. In fact, Ford has never suggested that $20,000 for the survival action is unreasonable. Ford's effort to invalidate the allocation of settlement proceeds based on a percentages analysis is manifestly without merit under these circumstances. We reverse the court of appeals and hold that Ford is entitled to set off only the $5,000 the settlement agreement apportioned to the wrongful death claim.