Opinion ID: 1780883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: victim and third party fault

Text: The first issue we granted certiorari to consider is whether the Fund should be allowed to introduce evidence of victim and/or third party fault when a qualified health care provider has admitted liability and tendered $100,000.00 pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5). After settling with Dr. Seale for $100,000.00 and reserving their right to proceed against the Fund in accordance with LSA-R.S. 40:1299.44(C), the Halls filed a pre-trial Motion to Strike and/or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment asserting that their $100,000.00 settlement with Dr. Seale amounted to an admission of liability which precluded the Fund from contesting at trial matters other than damages and certain defenses raised in the Fund's objections to the Joint Petition for Settlement of a Medical Malpractice Claim. The Halls also argued that partial summary judgment on liability should be entered against the Fund, since after the settlement, there was no longer a genuine factual dispute that damages exceeded $100,000.00. Following a ruling from the district court prohibiting the Fund from proceeding with a comparative fault argument, the Fund applied for supervisory writs to the court of appeal. The court of appeal granted the Fund's writ application and reversed the ruling of the district court, explaining: The trial court erred in striking the relator's allegations of other-party fault. Although the court shall consider the liability of the health care provided as admitted and established where the insurer has paid its policy limits of one hundred thousand dollars, pursuant to La.R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5), the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated in Graham v. Willis-Knighton Med. Center, 97-188 (La.9/9/97); 699 So.2d 365, that the plaintiff retains the burden of proving that the malpractice at issue caused damages in excess of the $100,000 settlement. Furthermore, damages must be apportioned between all parties at fault according to La. Civ.Code art. 2323. Thus, given the allegations of potential liability on the part of actors other than the settling defendant, Dr. A. Kent Seale, issues of comparative fault (causation) remain as to damages in excess of $100,000. Hall v. Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. 01-397 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/1/01). The case against the Fund proceeded to trial. On June 28, 2001, the jury returned a verdict assessing fault as follows: Dr. Seale-85%; Mr. Vines-10%; and, Mrs. Hall-5%. Both the Halls and the Fund appealed. On appeal, the Halls urged the court of appeal to reconsider its prior ruling on the issue of the admissibility of evidence of victim and/or third party fault in a suit against the Fund where the qualified health care provider has tendered $100,000.00 and statutorily admitted liability. Relying on Graham and a recent per curiam opinion from this court, Conner v. Stelly, XXXX-XXXX (La.1/30/02), 807 So.2d 827, in which we reversed a district court ruling prohibiting the Fund from arguing or presenting evidence before the jury that victim or third party fault caused any of the damages in that case, the court of appeal declined the invitation to revisit its prior ruling and held that the jury was properly permitted to quantify the fault of Mr. Vines and Mrs. Hall. Hall v. Brookshire Brothers, Ltd., 831 So.2d at 1023-1024. Judge Thibodeaux dissented from the majority opinion on this issue, disagreeing with the majority's reading of Graham, and concluding that because our per curiam in Conner did not discuss the underlying facts or the reasons supporting our holding, it was not authoritative. Our grant of certiorari in this case was prompted in part by our desire to clarify the per curiam in Conner and to preclude any doubt that may exist as to the admissibility of evidence of victim and/or third party fault in a suit against the Fund for damages in excess of the $100,000.00 tendered by the negligent health care provider. The Medical Malpractice Act, adopted in 1975 in response to a perceived crisis in the delivery of health care arising from the burgeoning and increasingly prohibitive costs of medical malpractice insurance, seeks to further two competing goals: to ensure the availability of safe and affordable health care services to the public and to simultaneously limit the potentially significant liability exposure of health care providers. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So.2d 1256, 1261 (La.1978). In furtherance of these goals, the Act caps the total amount recoverable for all malpractice claims for injuries or death to a patient at $500,000.00 plus interest and costs, and limits a qualified health care provider's liability for the malpractice claims of any one patient to $100,000.00 plus interest. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) and (2). In the event that a medical malpractice claimant settles with the qualified health care provider for the $100,000.00 limit of liability, the claimant may then demand any excess amounts owed him or her by virtue of a judgment or settlement (subject to the $500,000.00 cap) from the Fund. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.42(C). Section 1299.44(C) of the Act outlines the procedure for determining the amounts in excess of the settlement, if any, to be paid from the Fund. Section 1299.44(C)(5) provides in pertinent part: In approving a settlement or determining the amount, if any, to be paid from the patient's compensation fund, the court shall consider the liability of the health care provider as admitted and established where the insurer has paid its policy limits of one hundred thousand dollars, or where the self-insured health care provider has paid one hundred thousand dollars. This court has been called upon to interpret Section 1299.44(C)(5) of the Act, and the particular provision the court shall consider the liability of the health care provider as admitted and established, on several occasions. See, e.g., Pendleton v. Barrett, 95-2066 (La.5/31/96), 675 So.2d 720; Jones v. St. Francis Cabrini Hospital, 94-2217 (La.4/10/95), 652 So.2d 1331; Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So.2d 1371 (La. 1990). Most recently, in Graham v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 97-0188 (La.9/9/97), 699 So.2d 365, we interpreted the quoted provision as follows: We now conclude that the legislative intent of liability in Section 1299.44 C(5) was that the payment of $100,000 in settlement establishes proof of liability for the malpractice and for damages of at least $100,000 resulting from the malpractice, which is a very significant benefit to the medical malpractice victim. However, at the trial against the Fund, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the admitted malpractice caused damages in excess of $100,000. Graham, 699 So.2d at 372. Our holding in Graham marked a departure from this court's previous interpretation of the statutory language in Pendleton, supra . [2] It reflects a recognition that the legislature intended the word liability in Section 1299.44(C)(5) to have the same meaning in the context of medical malpractice litigation as it does in any other tort case in which liability is admitted. See, Pendleton, 675 So.2d at 732 (Lemmon, J. dissenting). Delictual liability consists of fault, causation, and damage. Dabog v. Deris, 625 So.2d 492, 493 (La.1993); Morris v. Orleans Parish School Board, 553 So.2d 427, 429 (La.1989). To establish liability, a plaintiff must prove that defendant's fault caused some legally compensable damage. Liability implies some damage, but not specifically which damage or how much. Moolekamp v. Rubin, 531 So.2d 1124, 1126-1127 (La.App. 4 Cir.1988). Having proven that defendant's fault caused damage, a plaintiff must further prove what damage, by kind and seriousness, was caused by defendant's fault before the court can render an appropriate award. Id. A defendant is only liable for that damage caused by his or her fault. Fault is a broad concept, encompassing all conduct falling below a proper standard. Weiland v. King, 281 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1973), citing Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133 (1971). When a defendant stipulates to liability, that defendant acknowledges that his or her fault (substandard performance of a legal duty owed to plaintiff for the protection from certain risks of harm) caused the plaintiff to sustain some damage (in the case of the qualified health care provider under the Medical Malpractice Act, that defendant stipulates that the damage he or she caused is at least $100,000). However, there can be, and frequently is, more than one cause of a plaintiff's damages. Graves v. Page, 96-2201 (La.11/7/97), 703 So.2d 566, 570; Syrie v. Schilhab, 96-1027 (La.5/20/97), 693 So.2d 1173, 1179. Because a defendant is liable only for that damage caused by his or her fault, when a defendant stipulates to liability for fault, he or she does not thereby necessarily concede responsibility for 100% of the fault. In the same vein, when a health care provider tenders payment of $100,000.00, thereby admitting and establishing liability, that admission of liability is an admission of fault and causation of damages of at least $100,000.00. It is not an admission of the percentage of fault attributable to the health care provider; nor is it an admission as to the extent of the claimant's damages beyond $100,000.00. Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1299.44(C)(5) speaks directly and exclusively to the liability of the health care provider; it is silent with respect to the responsibility of any other actor. Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 requires that the fault of every person responsible for a plaintiff's injuries be compared, whether or not they are parties, regardless of the legal theory of liability asserted. [3] As we explained in Dumas v. State, Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism , XXXX-XXXX (La.10/15/02), 828 So.2d 530, 537: The comparative fault article, La. C.C. art. 2323, makes no exceptions for liability based on medical malpractice; on the contrary, it clearly applies to any claim asserted under any theory of liability, regardless of the basis of liability. Thus, in the trial against the Fund, wherein the plaintiff retains the burden of proving that the admitted malpractice caused damages in excess of $100,000.00, evidence that victim or third party fault caused any of the damages is clearly relevant and admissible. Conner, supra. While we are mindful that the Medical Malpractice Act, which substantially impedes the ability of an injured party to obtain full recovery of his or her damages, is in derogation of established rights and is to be strictly construed, Sewell v. Doctors Hospital, 600 So.2d 577, 578 (La.1992), in interpreting the language of a statute that is susceptible of different meanings we are obligated to apply and interpret the language of the statute in a manner which is consistent with logic and the presumed fair purpose and intention of the legislature in passing it. LSA-C.C. art. 10; City of Pineville v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 3352, XXXX-XXXX (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 609, 612. In this instance, our interpretation of the language of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5) is consistent with the overall purpose of the Act, which is to limit the liability of health care providers generally and thereby limit the skyrocketing costs of medical malpractice insurance. It is also consistent with specific provisions of the Act which make clear the legislature's intention to hold the Fund liable only for acts constituting medical malpractice. Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1299.41(I), for example, cautions that [n]othing in this Part shall be construed to make the patient's compensation fund liable for any sums except for those arising from medical malpractice. Similarly and significantly, LSA-R.S. 40:1299.44(D)(2)(b)(x) authorizes the Fund to defend against claims due wholly or in part to the negligence of a non-covered health care provider or a product manufacturer, or both, regardless of whether a covered health care provider has settled and paid the statutory maximum. These provisions evidence an intent by the legislature that the Fund be able to limit its liability by demonstrating that the negligence or liability of another caused the plaintiff's damages. It is consistent with our interpretations of the statutory language in Graham, supra, and Conner v. Stelly, supra. Admittedly, this interpretation of the effect of the admission of liability under LSA-R.S. 40:1299.44(C)(5) reduces the benefit that inured to plaintiffs under our prior jurisprudence. Nevertheless, as we pointed out in Graham, the plaintiff still receives a significant benefit in that the fault of the qualified health care provider is admitted, as is causation of damages of at least $100,000.00 in value. Graham, 699 So.2d at 372. Accordingly, we find that the lower courts did not err in following the precepts of Graham and, more recently, Conner, and allowing the jury to quantify the fault of Mr. Vines and Mrs. Hall.