Opinion ID: 401016
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction over the Tribal Defendants

Text: 8 Ramey alleges a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341, because the Tribal Defendants deprived it of equal protection of the laws and due process of law by (1) denying it access to tribal courts, and (2) wrongfully withholding the contract retainage. In particular, Ramey cites § 1302 of the Act, which provides:No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall- 9 (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law. 10 Because of the alleged deprivation of rights guaranteed by the ICRA, Ramey asserts that the district court had jurisdiction over its claims by virtue of either 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), conferring jurisdiction over federal laws protecting civil rights, or § 1331, which confers jurisdiction over matters arising under the laws of the United States. 3 11 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978), the Supreme Court clarified the meaning and effect of § 1302 of the ICRA. The Court made clear that, aside from authorizing writ of habeas corpus actions as provided in § 1303, the ICRA leaves tribal sovereign immunity intact. Id. at 59, 98 S.Ct. at 1677. In this action, Ramey has alleged a claim for damages based on breach of contract. This type of injury does not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation to be redressed under the ICRA. 4 Therefore, the ICRA neither provides a jurisdictional basis for Ramey's claims nor waives the Tribe's sovereign immunity. 12 Ramey claims that even if the Tribal Defendants were sovereignly immune from suit, they waived that immunity by one or all of the following actions: (1) agreeing to an attorneys' fees clause in the contract; (2) entering into a loan agreement with the Bank of New Mexico obligating the Tribe to duly pay and discharge ... all claims of any kind ...; (3) submitting a certificate to the United States Economic Development Agency stating that the contract documents constitute valid and legally binding obligations upon the parties ...; (4) obtaining payment and performance bonds from a surety; (5) consenting to partial summary judgment with respect to the contract retainage; and (6) including a sue and be sued clause in its tribal corporate charter. 13 It is settled that a waiver of sovereign immunity 'cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.'  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58, 98 S.Ct. at 1677 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976)). The first four grounds upon which Ramey premises its claim of a waiver of sovereign immunity are simply attempts by Ramey to imply a waiver when no express waiver exists. There is no evidence that the Tribe expressly waived its sovereign immunity in any of these documents as Ramey claims. Compare Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 540 (10th Cir.), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982) (tribal council passed a formal resolution expressly waiving sovereign immunity). 14 Similarly, the Tribe's consent to entry of partial summary judgment on the retainage claim cannot be construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to Ramey's other claims. The United States may consent to be sued, and thereby waive its sovereign immunity. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1352, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980). The Indian Tribes' sovereign immunity is co-extensive with that of the United States. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514, 60 S.Ct. 653, 657, 84 L.Ed. 894 (1940); Namekagon Development Co. v. Bois Forte Reservation Housing Authority, 517 F.2d 508, 510 (8th Cir. 1975); Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 619 F.2d 801, 808 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1010, 101 S.Ct. 565, 66 L.Ed.2d 468 (1980); Hamilton v. Nakai, 453 F.2d 152, 158 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 945, 92 S.Ct. 2044, 32 L.Ed.2d 332 (1972). When consent to be sued is given, the terms of the consent establish the bounds of a court's jurisdiction. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. at 538, 100 S.Ct. at 1352; United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); Reynolds v. United States, 643 F.2d 707, 713 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 94, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981). In this case, the Tribe consented only to entry of judgment in the amount of the contract retainage it withheld; it did not thereby agree to be sued on any other claims. 15 Ramey also claims that because the Tribe consented to judgment in the amount of the retainage, the district court should have awarded interest on that amount. However, a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be strictly construed. Reynolds v. United States, 643 F.2d 707, 713 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 102 S.Ct. 94, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981); Hurley v. United States, 624 F.2d 93, 95 (10th Cir. 1980). The scope of the Tribe's consent to suit in this case precludes recovery of interest on the amount of retainage. 16 Finally, the presence of a sue and be sued clause in the tribal corporate charter cannot serve as a waiver of sovereign immunity in this case. The trial judge found that Ramey contracted and dealt only with the Mescalero Apache Tribe as a constitutional entity, and not with the Mescalero Apache Tribe, Inc., the tribal corporate entity. Record, supp. vol. 1, at 293. Section 476 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 476, authorizes Indian Tribes to organize a constitutional entity, and § 477 authorizes organization of a corporate entity. Most courts that have considered the issue have recognized the distinctness of these two entities. See, e.g., Gold v. Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, 478 F.Supp. 190, 196 (D.Or.1979); Boe v. Fort Belknap Indian Community, 455 F.Supp. 462, 463-64 (D.Mont.1978), aff'd, 642 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1981); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451 F.Supp. 1127, 1136 (D.Alaska 1978); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 170-75 (Alaska 1977). But see Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 150 Colo. 504, 374 P.2d 691 (1962). The trial judge recognized that the Mescalero Apache constitutional and corporate entities were separate and distinct. Record, supp. vol. 1, at 287. Although the evidence on these issues was disputed at trial, the record supports both of the district court's findings. Therefore, the consent to suit clause in the corporate charter of the Mescalero Apache Tribe, Inc. in no way affects the sovereign immunity of the Tribe as a constitutional entity. We find no error in the district court's determination that the Tribe maintained its sovereign immunity and therefore is not subject to jurisdiction. 5 The trial court also found that the Inn of the Mountain Gods is a sub-entity of the Tribe rather than a separate corporate entity, and is thus clothed with the sovereign immunity of the Tribe. Record, supp. vol. 1, at 290. Although the evidence on this issue also was disputed at trial, we do not believe that this factual determination was clearly erroneous. 17 Therefore, the district court properly dismissed Ramey's breach of contract and misrepresentation claims against the Tribal Defendants based on sovereign immunity. The only remaining claims to be considered are those against Boyle Engineering Company, which are based on negligence and misrepresentation rather than breach of contract.