Opinion ID: 1891116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fela

Text: ¶ 20. Allen's second assignment of error is that the trial court should have allowed credibility determinations to be made by the jury inasmuch as FELA states a preference for the fact-finder to do so. Allen asserts that because no evidence existed in the record to prove willfulness, such as a signature on the workers' compensation forms, the trial court's determination was simply one of credibility. Allen's position is that the trial court, in taking away the credibility determination from the jury, deprived him of his right to a jury trial under FELA, which encourages the protection of railroad workers through litigation. Allen argues that the trial judge had no evidence to support his determination that the actions were intentional or willful, but rather only inferred it against Allen. The debate that ensues between the two sides in this case raises the query of when a procedural rule is essentially substantive because of its effect. Allen also cites other authority, which we find to be marginally relevant today, for the proposition that the evidentiary threshold is quite low for a FELA case to proceed to a jury. This may be so, but this fact is simply not dispositive of the question before us today. The trial judge did not consider the evidence to make a substantive determination of whether sufficient evidence existed to present a jury question of causation, but rather the trial judge examined evidence of Allen's discovery violations to make a procedural determination whether his pre-trial conduct was willful. Finally, Allen states that depriving FELA plaintiffs of the benefit of jury trials even in close or doubtful cases is to take away a goodly portion of the relief... Congress has afforded them under the statute. Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 354, 63 S.Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L.Ed. 1444 (1943). This is also no doubt true, but does not describe the case before us as we are not considering whether enough evidence was presented in a close case for a jury to consider it, as we would, for example, in reviewing a trial court's grant of a directed verdict. Although the harsh reality is that dismissal will forever deprive Allen of the opportunity to seek relief for the 2001 accident which is the subject of today's appeal, that is precisely the deterrent effect of Rule 37 sanctions. ¶ 21. In making its ruling, the trial court relied on the following holdings from Scoggins and Pierce: `A trial is a proceeding designed to be a search for the truth.' When a party attempts to thwart such a search, the courts are obligated to ensure that such efforts are not only cut short, but that the penalty will be sufficiently severe to dissuade others from following suit. Scoggins, 743 So.2d at 994-95 (quoting Sims v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1996)). The power to dismiss is inherent in any court of law or equity, being a means necessary to orderly expedition of justice and the court's control of its own docket. Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1388 (citing Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., 564 So.2d 1346, 1367 (Miss.1990)). Additionally, Rule 37 specifically allows for dismissal as a sanction in certain circumstances. Miss. R. Civ. P. 37. Conceding that FELA does govern this claim, Amtrak points out Allen's failure to cite relevant authority for his propositions and argues that allowing the jury to decide issues pertaining to procedure, discovery, abuse, and pre-trial misconduct, would divest the trial court of its own inherent right to govern procedural matters. With the above discussion still in mind, we need not re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence of Allen's discovery violations. Allen's concerns under this second issue are not entirely different from his concerns under the first issue discussed above, thus our disposition here is the same. This Court has stated its concern with virtually allowing a plaintiff to get away with lying under oath without a meaningful penalty, when that plaintiff has willfully failed to comply with discovery requests. Pierce, 688 So.2d at 1391. ¶ 22. Returning briefly to the substantive/procedural discussion raised in the briefs, this Court has noted that when FELA cases are brought in state court, federal law governs the substantive rights of the parties. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Gandy, 750 So.2d 527, 534 (Miss.1999) (citing Southwestern Ry. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 84 L.Ed.2d 303 (1985) (FELA actions in state courts are subject to state procedural rules)). The courts of this State may properly utilize the Mississippi procedural rules in hearing federal law claims, but look to the federal law at issue to adjudicate matters of substantive rights of the parties. King v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc.-Gulfport, 697 So.2d 439, 442 (Miss. 1997) (a maritime law claim). The trial judge in this case did nothing more than apply Mississippi procedural law to a dismissal under Rule 37. That Allen's substantive rights were affected when his case was dismissed is without doubt, but such is the nature and purpose of sanctions for discovery violations and hindering the discovery of truth in a lawsuit. To do anything less would not effectively dissuade others from doing the same. Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a less harsh penalty would not achieve the same results. As we stated above, the trial judge in this case was not making a determination of Allen's substantive rights under his claim, but rather a procedural determination of whether his pre-trial conduct was willful and warranted dismissal. As we have previously stated, [o]ur trial judges are afforded considerable discretion in managing the pre-trial discovery process in their courts ... Bowie v. Montfort Jones Mem'l Hosp., 861 So.2d 1037, 1042 (Miss. 2003). This proper exercise of judicial discretion includes, in appropriate cases, the right to dismiss a case due to discovery violations. Id. at 1042-43. For these reasons, we find this issue is without merit.