Opinion ID: 576697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Chapman's Appeal

Text: 8 Prior to trial, Mr. Chapman filed a motion to suppress evidence, in which he challenged the search that was conducted at the time of his arrest following the Twelve Mile bank robbery. 3 Indiana State Trooper David Fouts and Sergeant Carlos Pettiford stopped Pezet's Ford Ranger after they learned that the Twelve Mile bank had just been robbed and that a vehicle matching the description of Pezet's vehicle was the getaway car. The officers also had been notified that three men were involved and that two of them might be hiding in the rear of the truck. In addition, they had been alerted that a black revolver had been displayed during the robbery. When Trooper Fouts first attempted to stop Pezet, he refused to stop until forced to the side of the road by Sergeant Pettiford. The officers then confirmed that two men were hiding in the back of the truck. As Mr. Chapman and Mr. Wright were escorted out of the truck, Trooper Fouts observed in the back of the truck, in plain view, what appeared to be the top of a money bag, a holster, and a dark ski mask. Magistrate's Report and Recommendation of Feb. 1, 1989 (R.12) at 5. 4 Both men, as well as Pezet, then were handcuffed and advised of their rights. After the airmen had been handcuffed, Sergeant Pettiford found two handguns underneath the carpet at the front of the truck bed. He also opened the money bag or duffel bag and found that it contained money. 9 The magistrate concluded that the officers' reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest Mr. Chapman and his colleagues because they attempted to evade capture, because two men were in the rear of the truck as reports had indicated, and because the duffel bag, ski mask, and holster were observed in plain view. Relying primarily on New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the magistrate further concluded that the search of the rear of the truck and of the duffel bag was a permissible search incident to the lawful arrest of Mr. Chapman. According to the magistrate, the search also was justified under United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), because the officers had probable cause to believe that the fruits and instrumentalities of the crime were to be found in the truck. The magistrate therefore recommended denial of Mr. Chapman's motion to suppress, and the district court denied his objections to the magistrate's recommendations on March 1, 1989. 10 In this appeal, Mr. Chapman repeats his contention that items seized at the time of his arrest on the highway following the Twelve Mile bank robbery should have been suppressed. Although he concedes that police had reasonable suspicion to stop the truck in which he was hiding, he contends that he was arrested without probable cause and that the search thus was not incident to a valid arrest. We thus must determine if his arrest was based on probable cause; furthermore, we must determine if the scope of the warrantless search was justified. 11
12 When probable cause exists to believe that an individual has committed a felony, police may arrest the individual outside his home without an arrest warrant. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). As the Court noted in Brinegar, when courts attempt after the fact to distinguish between mere suspicion and probable cause, the line must necessarily be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances. Id. 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S.Ct. at 1311. We review de novo the district court's legal determination that probable cause existed for the warrantless arrest, and apply the clearly erroneous standard to the district court's factual findings. See, e.g., United States v. Yakubu, 936 F.2d 936, 938 (7th Cir.1991) (per curiam); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1072 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 124, 112 L.Ed.2d 92 (1990); United States v. Ingrao, 897 F.2d 860, 862 (7th Cir.1990). 5 13 Based on our independent review of the record, we agree with the conclusion of the magistrate, which was adopted by the district court, that the Indiana officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Chapman. The officers knew that a bank robbery had just occurred and that the description of the getaway vehicle closely matched that of Pezet's new Ford Ranger. Pezet's initial refusal to stop his truck when the officers signalled him to pull over reinforced the reasonableness of the officers' belief that [the driver] had committed or was committing a crime. United States v. McCarty, 862 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir.1988). Sergeant Pettiford's suspicion momentarily might have been allayed when he recognized Pezet, whom he knew to be an airman at Grissom. Nonetheless, his suspicion and that of Trooper Fouts rose to the level of probable cause when they discovered two men hiding in the rear of the truck, just as their reports had indicated. Moreover, the observation of a holster and a ski mask--in July--would certainly justify experienced officers in concluding that Mr. Chapman and his cohorts were involved in the reported bank robbery. Under the totality of the circumstances standard, Mr. Chapman's warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause. 14
15 It is uncontrovertible that, once they legally had arrested Mr. Chapman, the Indiana officers were justified in conducting the warrantless search that uncovered the weapons and the money in the duffel bag. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), the Court held that 16 when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 17 It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment.... 18 Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 (footnotes omitted). 6 Such containers include luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like, id. at 461 n. 4, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 n. 4, and thus the duffel bag in this case was properly within the scope of the search. Although we find no error in the alternative rationale for the search relied on by the magistrate and district court--that officers had probable cause to believe that the fruits and instrumentalities of the robbery were to be found in the truck 7 --the Court in Belton made clear that  '[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.'  Id. at 461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). 8
19 Prior to trial, Mr. Chapman filed a motion for severance. 9 Mr. Wright admitted in state court that he had been present during the Twelve Mile bank robbery, but claimed to have been too intoxicated to form the specific intent to rob the bank. In his motion to sever, Mr. Chapman argued that Mr. Wright's anticipated intoxication defense in the upcoming federal trial would be antagonistic to his own defense of nonparticipation. The magistrate concluded that the two anticipated defenses were not mutually antagonistic and thus recommended denial of Mr. Chapman's motion to sever. Mr. Chapman's objection to this recommendation also was denied by the district court on March 1, 1989. 10 A week later, the court denied Mr. Chapman's motion to have his case tried before the judge rather than a jury. 20 A joint jury trial began on June 19, 1989, and the court denied Mr. Chapman's renewed motion to sever. Mr. Wright testified in his own defense. He presented an alibi defense in regard to the Denver bank robbery, claiming to have been at his parents' home in Indianapolis at the time. He also testified that the Denver bank bait money found in his quarters was money that he had borrowed from Mr. Chapman. Mr. Wright claimed that Mr. Chapman and Pezet had admitted committing the Denver robbery. (Pezet, however, had been on duty in Columbus, Ohio, on the day of that incident. Mr. Wright also repeated his intoxication defense regarding the Twelve Mile robbery; in addition, he claimed that his participation had been induced by Mr. Chapman's threats.) 21 Mr. Chapman, who was conducting his own defense, sought to cross-examine Mr. Wright to bring out evidence that, during state plea negotiations, he had admitted participation in the Denver robbery. However, because Mr. Wright's plea had been withdrawn, the district court earlier had ruled that he could not be examined about the plea negotiations. 11 In response to the government's opposition to severance, Mr. Chapman observed, obviously as I moved for severance pretrial [and] throughout the course of the trial before we got to this point, the court was alerted that this would be a problem somewhere in the course of the trial. Tr. of June 27, 1989 at 806. The court concluded that Mr. Chapman's inability to cross-examine Mr. Wright on his prior inconsistent statement threatened to run[ ] afoul of the confrontation clause. Id. at 810. The court therefore severed Mr. Chapman out of the trial and ordered Mr. Wright's trial to continue. Mr. Chapman raised no objection at the time to the court's decision to allow Mr. Wright's trial, rather than his own, to continue. Mr. Wright's trial concluded with his conviction on all three counts. 22 On July 10, 1989, the day his second trial was scheduled to begin, Mr. Chapman filed a motion to dismiss in which he claimed that the second trial would violate his double jeopardy rights. The district court noted that at the time the severance occurred it was my understanding that you agreed once we got to that point if the trial was going to go forward it had to be Wright's rather than yours with Wright having testified and having dumped it pretty heavily on you during his testimony. Tr. of July 10, 1989 at 251. Mr. Chapman responded as follows: 23 [I]f I understood that bowing out of the trial at that point would have caused me to go through a separate jury trial without that first jury and without the possibility of impeaching Mr. Wright on what he said in that trial, I probably would have elected to stay in that trial even though Mr. Wright's testimony weighed heavily against me. 24 Id. After the government pointed out that Mr. Chapman himself had sought severance in the first trial and the court observed that the various severance motions had not been based on the Rule 410 issue that eventually forced the severance, the court denied the motion to dismiss. 12 At the end of Mr. Chapman's separate jury trial, he was convicted on all three counts. 25 Mr. Chapman now makes two related arguments in this appeal: (1) that the district court erred in refusing his pretrial severance motions and (2) that his mid-trial severance and consequent retrial violated his double jeopardy rights. We address each of these related issues in turn. 26
27 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14, courts are authorized to grant a severance of defendants if a joint trial would be prejudicial. However, a joint trial of co-conspirators is presumptively appropriate, and we review a district court's refusal of a severance motion under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Bond, 847 F.2d 1233, 1240 (7th Cir.1988). Severance is mandatory only if the anticipated defenses of two co-defendants are  'mutually antagonistic' --that is, only if the acceptance of one party's defense will preclude the acquittal of the other. United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 285 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031, 100 S.Ct. 701, 62 L.Ed.2d 667 (1980). 13 In a memorandum in support of his motion to sever, Mr. Chapman contended only that Mr. Wright was likely to admit participation in the Twelve Mile bank robbery and to rely on the intoxication defense that he had offered in state court. However, a jury could have believed that Mr. Wright lacked the specific intent to engage in bank robbery without necessarily concluding that Mr. Chapman was guilty of the same robbery. 14 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Chapman's pretrial severance motions. 28
29 We also conclude that the district court did not violate Mr. Chapman's double jeopardy rights by severing his case in the middle of the joint trial and ordering his retrial. The district court finally granted Mr. Chapman's oft-repeated request for severance only after it concluded that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 prevented him from impeaching Mr. Wright with the latter's admission, during negotiations over his withdrawn state plea, that he had participated in the Denver bank robbery. Because Mr. Wright's trial testimony implicated Mr. Chapman in that robbery, the district court found that severance was required to protect Mr. Chapman's confrontation clause rights. Mr. Chapman made no objection to severance at this time; indeed, the severance was granted upon renewal of his earlier motions. The district court both carefully considered the tension between the rights of the co-defendants and, by delaying his decision for a day, gave Mr. Chapman adequate opportunity to decide if he still desired a severance and mistrial. 30 As this court made clear in United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 67, 98 L.Ed.2d 31 (1987), a defendant's double jeopardy rights are not violated when a trial court grants a defendant's own mistrial motion. 31 The court finally gave him the relief he sought so avidly, and the double jeopardy clause does not prevent retrial. Only when the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial does the manifest necessity standard come into play. 32 Id. at 1265 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2091, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)). Although Mr. Chapman later implied that he would not have sought a mistrial if he had understood that he faced retrial, see supra p. 1359 (citing Tr. of July 10, 1989), our review of the events leading to the severance convinces us that the district court was entitled to treat this as a consensual mistrial. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d at 1265. We also find no error in the district court's decision to sever Mr. Chapman's case rather than that of Mr. Wright. First, as we have noted, it was Mr. Chapman who sought such relief at the time it was granted. Furthermore, Mr. Wright already had presented his case when Mr. Chapman's confrontation clause problem arose. Finally, as the district court noted: 33 Had the court declared a mistrial with respect to Mr. Wright rather than Mr. Chapman, there is no suggestion Mr. Wright willingly would have remained on the stand for cross-examination. Had Rule 410 not precluded Mr. Chapman's intended cross-examination of Mr. Wright, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination likely would have done so. Mr. Chapman does not suggest that he would have been content with the striking of Mr. Wright's testimony and an admonition to the jury to disregard it. 34 Mem. op. of July 11, 1989 at 12.
35 Mr. Chapman also contends that the district court denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when it denied in part his petition for issuance of thirty-seven subpoenas pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b). The facts essential to resolve this challenge are as follows. 36 On May 30, 1989, Mr. Chapman petitioned the court to issue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b), subpoenas for thirty-seven witnesses necessary to his defense. On June 6, the district court held an ex parte hearing to determine which of the thirty-seven proposed witnesses were necessary to an adequate defense of Mr. Chapman. After a complete hearing, the court took the matter under advisement. On June 9, the court issued a sixteen-page ex parte memorandum and order analyzing Mr. Chapman's need for each witness, and concluded by granting the petition with respect to fourteen witnesses and denying the petition with respect to twenty-three witnesses. R.26. Recognizing that Mr. Chapman's pro se status may have led him to state the bases of his requests less articulately than counsel would have done, the court declared that close issues would be resolved in favor of Mr. Chapman. With regard to twenty of the denied witnesses, the court reasoned that their testimony would most likely be irrelevant, inadmissible, or not probative. With regard to the remaining three denied witnesses, the court reasoned that their testimony would only be relevant as cross-examination testimony, if indeed they testified for the prosecution. 37 The fourteen subpoenas were issued, and the witnesses were available in the courthouse, ready to testify, when the prosecution closed its case on July 14, 1989. After this considerable expenditure of judicial resources, including the costs of service and witness fees, which were waived under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b), Mr. Chapman chose to rest his case without examining any of the subpoenaed witnesses. 15 38 On appeal, Mr. Chapman contends that the district court denied him key witnesses to his defense such that he could not adequately present his defense to the charges in the indictment. Appellant Chapman's Supplemental Br. at 25. Mr. Chapman does not give reasons to support his contention that, contrary to the reasoning of the district court, the witnesses he was denied were necessary to an adequate defense. 39 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b) requires a court to subpoena witnesses for indigent defendants when the presence of the witnesses is necessary to an adequate defense. This court has held that a trial judge has wide discretion in determining whether to issue a given subpoena under rule 17(b). United States v. Garza, 664 F.2d 135, 141 (7th Cir.1981) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993, 102 S.Ct. 1620, 71 L.Ed.2d 854 (1982). We are persuaded by the district court's reasons for concluding that twenty-three of the thirty-seven proposed witnesses were not necessary for Mr. Chapman to present an adequate defense, and in the absence of any persuasive counterargument by Mr. Chapman on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Chapman twenty-three of the thirty-seven subpoenas he requested. The district court adequately respected Mr. Chapman's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process when it granted him subpoenas for fourteen witnesses.
40 Although the district court repeatedly warned Mr. Chapman of the perils of proceeding pro se, Mr. Chapman insisted on representing himself at trial. The court appointed standby counsel to assist Mr. Chapman, although the record reflects that Mr. Chapman repeatedly refused to cooperate with standby counsel. On appeal, Mr. Chapman accompanies his compulsory process challenge with a claim that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. 41 The first argument Mr. Chapman offers in support of this claim is that correctional officials at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Chicago (MCC), where Mr. Chapman was incarcerated before trial, denied him sufficient access to the MCC's law library. This court has consistently held that  'when a defendant (pretrial detainee) is offered the assistance of appointed counsel and refuses the same, no constitutional right exists mandating that the prisoner in the alternative be provided access to a law library should he refuse the services of court-appointed counsel.'  United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 743 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 227 (7th Cir.1983)), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3221, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (1989). 16 42 The next argument Mr. Chapman offers in support of this claim is that the assistance of standby counsel fell well below normal standards of representation. The record, however, does not reflect any shortcomings in the efforts of standby counsel, or that any actions of standby counsel prejudiced Mr. Chapman's defense in any way. The record does show that Mr. Chapman refused to cooperate with standby counsel and that the district court cautioned Mr. Chapman that he was squandering a valuable resource. 17 43 Mr. Chapman also contends that standby counsel totally betrayed appellants confidence with underhanded deception and trickery. While Mr. Chapman does not give examples to illustrate standby counsel's trickery, the record reflects that Mr. Chapman complained to the court that when he asked standby counsel to provide him with a copy of Indiana Code § 17-3-14-5, standby counsel sent him Indiana Code § 35-33-1-1. Mr. Chapman suggested to the court that standby counsel was possibly thinking for [him] and hampering his defense. In fact, as standby counsel reminded the court, Indiana Code § 17-3-14-5 was recodified in 1980 at § 35-33-1-1. Tr. of April 26, 1989 at 86, 89. 44 As a rule, a defendant who chooses to represent himself cannot later claim ineffective assistance of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Prihoda v. McCaughtry, 910 F.2d 1379, 1386 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir.1989) (and cases cited therein). Mr. Chapman has given this court no reason to create an exception to this rule.
45 Mr. Chapman's final contention is that the district court sentenced him illegally by an ex post facto application of the amended version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence). In 1978, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not intended to authorize consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2113(d) (armed bank robbery) because the latter section contains its own enhancement provision for use of a firearm. See Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978). However, as Mr. Chapman concedes, Congress authorized such consecutive sentences when it amended section 924(c) in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (CCCA), Pub.L. No. 98-473, § 1005(a), 98 Stat.1976, 2138-39 (codified as further amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988)). 18 Mr. Chapman contends that the effective date of this amendment was November 1, 1987, months after the May and July events that underlie his convictions. 46 In fact, the November 1987 effective date relates only to the Sentencing Guidelines authorized by Chapter II of the CCCA. 19 Chapter X, which contained the relevant amendment of section 924(c), had no express effective date and thus became effective when enacted on October 12, 1984. See United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 372, 379-80 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 68, 116 L.Ed.2d 43 (1991); United States v. Holloway, 905 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir.1990) (per curiam); United States v. Robinson, 865 F.2d 171, 172 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885, 892 (8th Cir.1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1074, 108 S.Ct. 1047, 98 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1988); see also United States v. Paiz, 905 F.2d 1014, 1029-31 (7th Cir.1990) (distinguishing between delayed effective date of Sentencing Guidelines and immediate effective date of Chapter V of the CCCA), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1319, 113 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991). We thus conclude that there was no ex post facto application of section 924(c) in this case.