Opinion ID: 2768865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney’s Fees Award to Defendants

Text: Barnes also contends that the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the following Defendants: McMillan, Keppler, Mast, Gaskins, Morgan, and VSU. 9 As set forth above, a prevailing plaintiff should generally receive attorney’s fees from the defendant in order to reimburse a plaintiff for what it cost him to vindicate his civil rights. Fox, 131 S. Ct. at 2213. On the other hand, with respect to a prevailing defendant, there is a different standard that reflects the very different equitable considerations at stake. Id. In 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Congress intended “to protect defendants from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis.” Id. (internal quotations marks and citation omitted). Thus, a district court may award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action if the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id.; Sullivan v. Sch. Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 1985). With respect to determining whether a claim is frivolous, the Supreme Court has cautioned:[I]t is important that a district court resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. 9 Barnes does not appeal the summary judgment in the Defendants’ favor on the merits of the claims against them. See supra note 5. 24 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 25 of 36 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1980). Instead, when determining whether a suit is frivolous, “a district court must focus on the question whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court’s finding of frivolity has been upheld in cases in which a plaintiff fails to introduce any evidence in support of his claim. Id. (citing Beard v. Annis, 730 F.2d 741 (11th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Dealers Tractor and Equip. Co., 634 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981); Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981); Harris v. Plastics Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1980)). In contrast, “[i]n cases where the plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to support their claims, findings of frivolity typically do not stand.” Id. (citing White v. S. Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1982); Plemer v. Parsons-Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983)). In addition, the following factors are considered when determining whether a claim is frivolous: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Id. However, these factors are “general guidelines only, not hard and fast rules.” Id. In § 1988 cases, the Eleventh Circuit has provided an additional factor: the attention given to the 25 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 26 of 36 claim. A “claim is not frivolous when it is ‘meritorious enough to receive careful attention and review.’” Cohen v. World Omni Fin. Corp., 457 F. App’x 822, 828 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 787 (11th Cir. 1991)). “Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189.
With respect to the first factor, the district court held that Barnes failed to establish a prima facie case as to all six Defendants. With respect to the second factor, the court recognized that VSU had offered a $5,000 to settle all claims as to all Defendants. 10 Nonetheless, the court opined that that offer “can hardly be considered a serious settlement negotiation, considering that Barnes asserted damages for millions of dollars.” Order at 35 (July 24, 2013). As for the third factor, none of the claims against these six Defendants went to trial. In considering the fourth factor, the district court stated that there “is no doubt that this case has been the subject of much judicial attention in the well over five years that it has been pending in federal court.” Order at 27 (July 24, 2013). However, the court concluded that as to these six Defendants, the level of attention afforded the claims against them did not rise to a level of extended review that would render them nonfrivolous. 10 Gaskins and McMillan state that they never engaged in settlement negotiations. 26 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 27 of 36
Accordingly, we must now determine whether the district court erred in ruling that Barnes’s claims were frivolous. The parties agree that we review the determination of whether the claims were frivolous for abuse of discretion. See Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005) (reviewing ruling that plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act were frivolous for abuse of discretion); Bonner v. Mobile Energy Servs. Co., 246 F.3d 1303, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (same standard of review in Title VII case). Of course, a “‘district court by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.’” Quintana v. Jenne, 414 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)). In determining whether a claim is frivolous, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-prevailing plaintiff.” Cordoba, 419 F.3d at 1179 (emphasis in original). Thus, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes with respect to each Defendant in determining whether Barnes’s claims against them were frivolous. As set forth below, we are persuaded that the evidence against the six Defendants establishes that Barnes’s claims against them were not frivolous. Cf. id. at 1181 (explaining that although the plaintiff’s “case was exceedingly weak on this point, it was not so weak as to make it frivolous for her to argue that [her 27 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 28 of 36 supervisor’s] knowledge of her disability presented a triable issue of fact”). The factors regarding frivolity are general guidelines only and not hard and fast rules. Sullivan, 773 F.3d at 1189. 11 Our precedent dictates that “[d]eterminations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Id. As explained below, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes. When the evidence against the Defendants is viewed in the proper light, we conclude that the claims are not without foundation. In other words, it was not unreasonable for Barnes to believe that the Defendants participated in his withdrawal from VSU. Cf. Bruce v. City of Gainesville, Ga., 177 F.3d 949, 952 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the plaintiff’s belief that he was terminated because of his disability was not unreasonable even though plaintiff did not “provide enough evidence to support denial of the [defendant’s] summary judgment motion”). Thus, as explained below, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to four of the six Defendants.
11 The other factors—(1) settlement offer (2) dismissal prior to trial and (3) level of attention afforded the claims—do not merit much discussion here. We are not persuaded that the $5,000 offer did not constitute a settlement offer, as the district court found. As for the second factor, it is undisputed that all these Defendants were dismissed prior to trial. In any event, even assuming these factors weighed in favor of the Defendants, we are convinced that the evidence proffered against the Defendants precludes finding that the claims against them are frivolous. 28 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 29 of 36 With respect to a claim of First Amendment retaliation, a plaintiff must show that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that that “conduct played a ‘substantial or motivating role’ in the alleged adverse employment action.” Walden v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2012). To establish a claim alleging denial of procedural due process, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). “[A]t a minimum, the Due Process Clause requires notice and the opportunity to be heard incident to the deprivation of . . . property at the hands of the government.” Id. (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).As previously set forth, we are remanding the retaliation claim against Zaccari to the district court, and the retaliation claims against the other Defendants are not before us. The district court found in favor of Barnes on the procedural due process claim and that is not before us on appeal. 12 To assess whether it was frivolous to bring these 12 It is undisputed that Barnes did not receive notice of the charge against him prior to the withdrawal or any kind of a hearing to address the charge. Indeed, the district court held that “[t]here was never any question but that [Zaccari] [withdrew] Plaintiff Barnes from Valdosta State University and denied Barnes due process.” Zaccari’s defense was that because Barnes was a clear and present danger, the emergency excused giving Barnes notice and a hearing. The district court, acting as fact-finder, ruled that “Zaccari could not, and did not, reasonably believe there was an emergency on the campus of VSU during spring 2007.” Accordingly, there is no question that Zaccari violated Barnes’s procedural due process rights in withdrawing Barnes from VSU without notice and a hearing. 29 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 30 of 36 claims against these six Defendants, we now consider evidence offered by Barnes against each Defendant.
Zaccari testified that McMillan was an integral part of his investigation of Barnes. In her deposition, McMillan testified that she had believed that Barnes would benefit from taking off the summer semester in 2007. In Zaccari’s affidavit, he stated that he “was aware of the concerns of [Barnes’s] therapists that he was decompensating and could have benefitted from a semester off.” There was evidence that McMillan, in her role as Barnes’s therapist at VSU, shared Barnes’s confidential information with Zaccari without obtaining permission from Barnes. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, McMillan’s conduct can reasonably be interpreted as assisting Zaccari in his efforts to have Barnes withdrawn and/or to punish Barnes for exercising his right to free speech. This conduct can be construed as a retaliatory act against Barnes. Although McMillan states that she repeatedly told Zaccari that Barnes did not constitute a threat to security, Zaccari testified that McMillan did not do so. Indeed, Zaccari testified that the first time he was aware of McMillan’s opinion that Barnes did not constitute a threat was after the withdrawal letter was delivered to Barnes. Based on this evidence, we conclude that it was not unreasonable for Barnes to believe that McMillan participated in having Barnes withdrawn. This evidence 30 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 31 of 36 demonstrates that Barnes’s claims against McMillan were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Thus, we reverse the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to McMillan.
In determining that Keppler was entitled to attorney’s fees, the district court relied upon Keppler’s testimony that he had nothing to do with Zaccari’s “final decision” to withdraw Barnes from VSU. Order at 41 (July 24, 2013). However, the district court ignored testimony that implicated Keppler in the decision to withdraw. There were notes from a meeting attended by Keppler and Zaccari that indicated that Keppler supported attempting to withdraw Barnes from VSU on an academic basis. Further, in Zaccari’s June 21, 2007, letter to VSU’s Board of Regents, he stated that to determine what actions should be taken with respect to Barnes, he “sought the advice” of members of his administrative unit, which included Keppler. The letter provided that Zaccari and his administrative unit “collectively decided that VSU [should] take necessary steps to minimize as much as possible any security risks.” Similarly, Zaccari testified that at a meeting on April 26, 2007, which included Keppler, “there was agreement from the group for us to initiate the plan that [he had] outlined.” Zaccari further testified that no one at the meeting expressed disagreement with him. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, we conclude that it was not unreasonable for 31 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 32 of 36 Barnes to believe that Keppler participated in having Barnes withdrawn. Barnes’s claims against McMillan were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Keppler.
The district court awarded attorney’s fees to Mast, stating that Barnes primarily relied upon “Mast’s alleged lack of action and his omissions as opposed to any affirmative action.” Order at 41 (July 24, 2013). The court further stated that Mast attended meetings that were called to discuss Barnes, “but Mast agreed with Keppler that Zaccari’s response was an overreaction.” Id. After reviewing the record, we are persuaded that the district court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes. We note that although Mast may not have interpreted Barnes’s conduct as threatening, he testified at his deposition that he did not inform Zaccari of his opinion. Additionally, Zaccari’s letter to the Board of Regents states that “Mast provided a copy of a document generated by Mr. Barnes, wherein he had posted my picture on an image of a parking deck with the words, ‘S.A.V.E. – Zaccari Memorial Parking Deck.’” It would not be unreasonable for Barnes to construe Mast’s giving this document to Zaccari as assistance in building a case to withdraw Barnes. Moreover, the record contains notes from a meeting indicating that Mast suggested that Barnes’s “veiled threat” 32 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 33 of 36 could be used as a basis for withdrawal for disorderly conduct. Again, we note that although Mast testified that he did not give Zaccari the above-referenced image generated by Barnes and that he did not remember suggesting a basis for Barnes’s withdrawal during the meeting, we must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes. In that light, we cannot say that Barnes’s suit against Mast was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to Mast.
Gaskins met with Zaccari on April 26, 2007, to discuss possible avenues for withdrawing Barnes from VSU. In her deposition, Gaskins admitted that she researched different VSU policies that could possibly be used to withdraw Barnes, and that she provided the results of that research to Zaccari. Gaskins also attended the May 3 meeting with Zaccari and other staff members in which Zaccari announced his decision to administratively withdraw Barnes. With respect to that meeting, this Court’s opinion in the instant case’s interlocutory appeal provided that Zaccari “did not ask those present [at the meeting] if he was making the right decision, and no one told him he was.” Barnes, 669 F.3d at 1301. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, we stated, 33 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 34 of 36 “Collectively though, the group agreed that Barnes should be withdrawn on May 7, a full four days later.” Id. 13 At Zaccari’s request, Gaskins drafted the letter that withdrew Barnes from VSU. On appeal, Gaskins relies heavily on the fact that she advised Zaccari in an attached memorandum that Barnes was entitled to a hearing. Although this evidence indicates that Gaskins did not participate in violating Barnes’s due process rights, it does not mean that she had no involvement in assisting Zaccari in having Barnes withdrawn in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. During his deposition, Mast testified that Zaccari said that he made the decision to withdraw Barnes from VSU “based on advice of counsel, University counsel, and Board of Regents’ attorney.” Additionally, after Barnes was withdrawn, the Board of Regents directed Zaccari to respond to Barnes’s request for a review of the withdrawal. Zaccari asked Gaskins to review the response he had drafted so that he could fully explain why he made the decision to withdraw Barnes. Gaskins testified that the draft response Zaccari gave her was in “very, very rough form,” and that she recommended modifications to the document. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Barnes, Gaskins: (1) researched VSU policies that could be used to withdraw Barnes; (2) drafted the 13 However, we note that Zaccari’s letter to the Board of Regents did not name Gaskins as part of his administrative unit that “collectively decided that VSU take necessary steps to minimize as much as possible any security risks.” Zaccari’s letter never mentions Gaskins. 34 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 35 of 36 withdrawal letter that she knew would violate Barnes’s due process rights if signed by Zaccari and delivered to Barnes without notice and a hearing; and (3) assisted Zaccari in defending his actions to the Board of Regents. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Barnes to believe that Gaskins participated in his withdrawal from VSU. We are thus unconvinced that Barnes’s claims against Gaskins were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
Barnes’s brief does not specifically challenge the district court’s ruling that his claims against Morgan and VSU were frivolous. Thus, Barnes has abandoned any challenge to the judgment awarding those attorney’s fees. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, because the district court awarded the attorney’s fees in a lump sum to VSU, Keppler, Mast, and Morgan, and did not distinguish the amount of attorney’s fees awarded as to each Defendant, we must remand to allow the district court to recalculate the attorney’s fees award to reflect only “reasonable attorney’s fees incurred because of, but only because of, frivolous claim[s]” against Morgan and VSU. Fox, 131 S. Ct. at 2215. In sum, because there was evidence showing that each of the first four Defendants took part in the decision to withdraw Barnes, the district court erred in finding that the claims were frivolous. Compare Richardson v. Bay Dist. Sch., 560 F. App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[j]ust because this evidence 35 Case: 13-13800 Date Filed: 01/12/2015 Page: 36 of 36 was ultimately not enough to create a jury question with respect to discrimination on the basis of gender discrimination does not make [the plaintiff’s] claim frivolous”), with Cazares, 638 F.2d at 1290 (upholding award of attorney’s fees because “there was no material, admissible evidence to support [the plaintiff’s] civil rights claim”). We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in ruling that Barnes’s claims against McMillan, Keppler, Mast, and Gaskins were frivolous, and we reverse the court’s judgment awarding attorney’s fees to those Defendants. With respect to the fees awarded to Morgan and VSU, we vacate the judgment awarding those fees and remand to allow the district court to recalculate the attorney’s fees award to reflect only the attorney’s fees incurred because of the frivolous claims against Morgan and VSU.