Opinion ID: 2585478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the legislature has precluded second parent adoptions except in limited circumstances

Text: This case turns on whether we deem Family Code section 8617 [1] directory or mandatory. The statute provides [t]he birth parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the adopted child, and have no right over the child. ( Ibid. ) As a general rule, adoption extinguishes the rights of the natural parents forever, although stepparenthood provides a narrow exception[] to this rule. ( Estate of Cleveland (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1700, 1707, fn. 8, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 590.) This norm reflects the imperative that there should not be any ambiguity about who is a child's real parent. [T]he effect of an adoption ... is to establish the legal relation of parent and child, with all the incidents and consequences of that relation, between the adopting parent and the adopted child. This necessarily implies that the natural relationship between the child and its parents by blood is superseded. The duties of a child cannot be owed to two fathers at the same time.  ( Estate of Jobson (1912) 164 Cal. 312, 316-317, 128 P. 938, italics added ( Jobson ).) The majority asserts the Legislature has merely described, rather than prescribed, this transfer of parental authority and responsibility, which is thus merely one option for the birth and adopting parents involved. Twice in the past decade, however, the Legislature has indicated otherwise. The logical starting point for construing section 8617 is section 9306, which concerns the adoption of an adult (person) rather than a child. The text is nearly identical: [T]he birth parents of a person adopted ... are, from the time of the adoption, relieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the adopted person, and have no right over the adopted person. (§ 9306, subd. (a).) In 1993, the Legislature added subdivision (b) to section 9306, which provides, Where an adult is adopted by the spouse of a birth parent, the parental rights and responsibilities of that birth parent are not affected by the adoption. (Stats.1993, ch. 266, § 2.) If, as the majority claims, there is no statutory restriction on second parent adoptions, subdivision (b) is superfluous. But the Legislature perceived no superfluity. On the contrary, [t]he purpose of this bill is [to] create an exception to the automatic severance of parent-child relationships. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 970 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) May 18, 1993, p. 2.) The Senate Judiciary Committee's analysis quoted section 8548 in observing existing law provided that a birth parent retains custody and control when a stepparent adopts a child. (See § 8548 [`Stepparent adoption' means the adoption of a child by a stepparent where one birth parent retains custody and control of the child].) Thus, no special subdivision (b) was needed for section 8617 because section 8548 served that purpose. There was no counterpart to section 8548 to provide for second parent adoptions of adults; section 9306, subdivision (b), therefore conformed the law for these circumstances. It is unclear why such distinctions were drawn between a stepparent adoption of minors and a stepparent adoption of adult children of spouses but the distinctions seem unnecessary and outmoded. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 970 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) May 18, 1993, p. 3.) The amendment to section 9306 indicates stepparenthood was the only context in which the ordinary transfer of duties and rights from birth parent(s) to adoptive parent(s) did not occur. The Legislature confirmed its understanding that second parent adoptions were not a universal option when it allowed registered domestic partners to participate in this procedure. As the Senate Rules Committee's Analysis explained, This bill expands California law on domestic partnerships by ... conferring on domestic partners various rights, privileges and standing conferred by the State on married couples .... [¶] ... [¶] [including] [t]he right of a domestic partner to adopt a child of his or her partner as a stepparent. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 25 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended Sept. 7, 2001, pp. 1-2.) Section 9000, subdivision (f), now provides that [f]or the purposes of this chapter, stepparent adoption includes adoption by a domestic partner. Against these two expressions of legislative limits on second parent adoption, the majority offers a six-sentence letter issued by the California Department of Social Services on November 15, 1999 (the Letter), abolishing any marital requirements for second parent adoption. (See maj. opn., ante, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 703, fn. 3, 73 P.3d at p. 558, fn. 3.) The letter purports to invalidate prior letters expressing a different policy, [2] which it characterized as an underground regulation inconsistent with the Administrative Procedure Actan apt description for the Letter itself. The Administrative Procedure Act (hereafter APA; Gov.Code, § 11346 et. seq.) establishes] basic minimum procedural requirements for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of administrative regulations. ( Ibid. ) The APA requires the government agency offering the regulation to provide, inter alia, a copy of the proposed regulation; a statement of reasons for the adoption, amendment, or repeal of a regulation; identification of every study justifying the change; a description of alternatives to the proposal; and the agency's reasons for rejecting those alternatives. (Gov.Code, § 11346.2.) The APA also provides for public input through either a public hearing or written comments. (Gov.Code, § 11346.8.) Because the California Department of Social Services failed to observe these procedures, the Letter did not comply with the statutory requirements, and is thus as much an underground regulation as any former rule. The Letter fails in substance as well as procedure. Government Code section 11349, subdivision (a), requires a `[necessity' for the rule, to effectuate the purpose of [a] statute, court decision, or other provision of law that the regulation implements, interprets, or makes specific.... Subdivision (e) requires `[reference' to the statute, court decision, or other legal provision. The Letter provides neither of these. Furthermore, the regulation must be[] in harmony with, and not in conflict with existing law. ( Id., § 11349, subd. (d).) Since, as noted, the Legislature has provided only narrow exceptions to Family Code section 8617, the Letter arguably conflicts with the law as it then existed. Nevertheless, the lesson of the majority opinion is that administrative agencies need not follow the dictates of the Legislature or this court, we will follow them. The California Department of Social Services' violation of the statutory law thus serves as its retroactive justification.