Opinion ID: 1985109
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Power of the Court to Direct a Verdict After a Mistrial.

Text: A. Scope of review. This issue turns on an interpretation of the relevant rules of civil procedure. Our review, therefore, is for correction of errors of law. See Neill v. Western Inns, Inc., 595 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1999). B. Discussion. The plaintiff relies on Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 200 to support his argument that the court has no authority to direct a verdict after the jury has been discharged. Rule 200 states that [t]he court may discharge a jury ... if they have deliberated until it satisfactorily appears that they cannot agree. The case shall be retried immediately or at a future time, as the court directs. Iowa R. Civ. P. 200 (emphasis added). [1] The plaintiff argues that rule 200 requires the court to order a case to be retried whenever a mistrial is declared. He cites two Iowa cases in support of his argument: Harden v. Illinois Central Railroad, 254 Iowa 426, 118 N.W.2d 76 (1962) and Mid-Country Meats, Inc. v. Woodruff-Evans Construction, 334 N.W.2d 332 (Iowa App.1983). We think the plaintiff's position ignores the interplay between rule 200 and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 243. Moreover, the cited cases do not support the proposition that retrial is mandatory after a mistrial. Initially we note that the very action the plaintiff contends the trial court was without authority to do is explicitly allowed under rule 243, which states: Any party may, on motion, have judgment in his favor despite an adverse verdict, or the jury's failure to return any verdict : . . . . (b) If the movant was entitled to have a verdict directed for him at the close of all the evidence, and moved therefor, and the jury did not return such verdict, the court may then either grant a new trial or enter judgment as though it had directed a verdict for the movant. Iowa R. Civ. P. 243(b) (emphasis added). This rule clearly addresses the situation in which the jury has failed to return a verdict, and clearly authorizes the court to direct a verdict in that situation. This result is consistent with the purpose of rule 243, namely, to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct its error in failing to sustain a motion for directed verdict where the movant was entitled to a directed verdict at the close of all evidence and moved therefor and the jury did not return such verdict. Bangs, 585 N.W.2d at 268. It would be illogical to conclude that a trial court is not authorized to reconsider whether a defendant is entitled to a directed verdict under circumstances in which the jury could not reach a verdict, yet may reconsider this question when a jury unanimously finds in favor of the plaintiff. We also note that federal courts interpreting a comparable federal rule of civil procedure have given the federal rule the same meaning we give rule 243. E.g., Powell v. Havner, 817 F.Supp. 90, 92 (D.Kan.1993) (The court retains the power, upon proper and timely motion, to have judgment entered in accordance with a party's motion for judgment as a matter of law even if a verdict was not returned by the jury after prolonged deliberations.); Stokes v. Children's Hosp., Inc., 805 F.Supp. 79, 81 (D.D.C.1992) (holding plaintiff's argument that court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's motion for directed verdict after mistrial was without merit when the applicable federal rule clearly states that ` if no verdict was returned, the court may . . . direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law' (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b))). We also think our interpretation of rule 243 results in no conflict with rule 200. Rule 243 permits the court to grant a directed verdict under appropriate circumstances, even when the jury has failed to reach a verdict. If a directed verdict is not warranted, then rule 200 directs the court to set a new date for trial. Under this reading of the rules, rule 243 and rule 200 have a logical interplay and both are given meaning. Cf. State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Iowa 1997) (When more than one statute is relevant, we consider the statutes together and attempt to harmonize them.). Additionally, this interpretation of the rules is consistent with our prior cases. The Harden case, upon which the plaintiff relies, is not on point. In that case, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for directed verdict, renewed after the jury had been dismissed, and ordered a new trial. Harden, 254 Iowa at 428, 118 N.W.2d at 77. In considering the defendant's subsequent appeal, this court held that the appeal was interlocutory because the district court's ruling denying a directed verdict and ordering a new trial was not a final adjudication. Id. at 429, 118 N.W.2d at 77. In the course of our discussion of this issue, we stated that [i]t was the mandatory duty of the trial court to retry this case without undue delay. Id. When considered in context, this statement did not mean that in every case the only option upon mistrial was the ordering of a new trial. Rather, in the context of Harden, in which the defendant's motion for directed verdict had been overruled, the court's only remaining alternative was to order a retrial. Thus, the holding and discussion in Harden is entirely consistent with the interpretation of rules 243 and 200 we have applied in the case before us. We also find no conflict with the court of appeals decision in the Mid-Country Meats case. In Mid-Country Meats, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant after the jury had failed to return a verdict. 334 N.W.2d at 334. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, not because the trial court lacked authority to direct a verdict under rule 243, but rather because the appellate court disagreed with the trial court as to the merits of the defendant's motion for directed verdict. Id. at 335. The court of appeals concluded the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to another jury, and therefore, under the record in that case, the appropriate action was an order for new trial. Id. Thus, the Mid-Country Meats case does not stand for the proposition that a mistrial always requires a retrial. To the contrary, it demonstrates the relationship between rules 200 and 243. When a directed verdict is appropriate, the court may direct a verdict upon a motion to reconsider made after a mistrial. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 243. On the other hand, when the moving party is not entitled to a directed verdict, a mistrial requires a new trial. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 200. In conclusion, rule 243 gives the trial court the authority to direct a verdict after the jury has been unable to reach a verdict. Therefore, the trial court here had the power to rule on the merits of the defendants' motion to reconsider their prior motion for a directed verdict, despite the fact that the court had declared a mistrial.