Opinion ID: 2621328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Utah authority

Text: In 1954, the Utah Supreme Court decided Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co., [43] and relied heavily on Hurst in deciding that Salt Lake City voters could not initiate a residential rezoning ordinance even if it was legislative instead of administrative. The court began its analysis by acknowledging that the state's constitution reserved to voters the power to initiate legislation and to require that legislation be submitted to them by referendum for approval or rejection, then observed that the line drawn between administrative and legislative functions was not the only limitation on this power. [44] The court illustrated its point by citing cases, from several other states, holding that the powers of initiative and referendum did not extend to matters such as appropriations, tax assessments and utility rate regulations. [45] The Dewey court then considered whether the initiative and referendum powers extend to zoning matters. The court initially observed that many cases apply the provisions of a referendum act to zoning ordinances, but the court knew of no judicial authority that accepted zoning by initiative. [46] the court cited Hurst as authority [i]n point on this matter and holding that the constitutionally reserved power of initiative does not apply to a zoning ordinance, [47] and presented the Hurst court's reasoning in a long quote, which included the constitutional dictum and the holding that California's Zoning Act controlled over its initiative law. [48] The Dewey court rejected the initiative proponents' argument that the Hurst case was not controlling because the California court did not spell out the constitutional question involved and because the constitution's reservation of the initiative and referendum power to the people is supreme as to laws enacted by the state's various lawmaking bodies. [49] The court agreed, but decided that it could not give the principle the application contended for. [50] Instead, the court expanded on Hurst 's rationale. According to Dewey, the Utah Legislature acted within its power and delegated to local legislative bodies the power to zone, so that the need for a comprehensive plan might be met, and provided means for the protection of private property through notice and public hearings. [51] Dewey concluded: Thus, when appellants seek to initiate rezoning within the city without complying with the zoning statute, they are, in effect, attacking collaterally the very statute under which they claim their power to zone.... Appellants agree that the legislative body of the city has broad discretionary powers with regard to zoning of the city and that such body could not zone without complying with the procedural due process afforded by the statute. For the same reason, the electors of the city cannot by-pass those provisions of the statute as long as the zoning statute remains in force. The state legislature has here acted within its powers and unless that general law is affected by repeal or amendment by the legislature, or by referendum or initiative by the people of the state, the statute guides the zoning process of the cities and directs the means by which it is to be accomplished. [52] The Utah Supreme Court has not overruled Dewey, but it has limited it to zoning by initiative. Ten years after Dewey, in Bird v. Sorenson, [53] the court did not even mention Dewey when it ruled that a city council's ordinance rezoning property from residential to commercial use was administrative, rather than legislative, and was therefore not subject to referendum. The Bird court concluded: If each change in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered inoperative. Such changes are administrative acts implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current conditions. [54] In 1982, in Wilson v. Manning, [55] the Utah court reaffirmed its holding in Bird, and clarified its approach to zoning by initiative or referendum. The court acknowledged that its prior case law characterized the enactment of zoning laws and ordinances as legislative functions, and stated that the original enactment of a zoning ordinance would generally be subject to referendum. [56] The court noted that Dewey was not to the contrary, because an ordinance subjected to referendum has presumably been enacted in compliance with statutory notice and hearing requirements, whereas those requirements preclude voters from initiating zoning measures. [57] The court then stated that ordinances implementing the basic zoning enactment, such as by exceptions and variances, would generally be considered administrative acts not subject to referendum. [58] Although the Wilson court deemed the 10-acre rezoning ordinance before it administrative, and therefore not subject to referendum, it held out the possibility that major rezoning could be subject to referendum. The court stated that some amendments could constitute such material variances from the governmental unit's basic zoning law that it would make new law rather than merely implement and adjust the comprehensive plan. [59] The Utah Legislature subsequently enacted statutes governing zoning referendum filing standards and procedures. [60] Zoning initiatives are still not allowed in Utah.