Opinion ID: 1117446
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Drummond's Claims Alleging Trespass, Conversion, and Fraudulent Suppression

Text: In its complaint, as finally amended, Drummond alleged, among other things, trespass to property rights (Count IV); conversion of coal to which Drummond claimed a superior right (Count V); and fraudulent suppression of the fact that United had entered into the lease with TRI (Count VI). At the close of Drummond's case-in-chief, the trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of TRI on Drummond's trespass and conversion claims. The trial court also entered a judgment as a matter of law for United on Drummond's fraud claim. Drummond alleges that the trial court erred in doing so. We first address Drummond's trespass claim. Our law on trespass is plain that the gist of any trespass action is the interference with a right to possession of property. Absent such right of possession, there can be no action based on trespass. Avery v. Geneva County, 567 So.2d 282, 289 (Ala.1990). The evidence at trial established that TRI did not mine coal on any portion of United's property that was subject to Drummond's tenancy at will. The evidence established that TRI mined only on those portions of the Carter Mine property that were not within the scope of Drummond's rights. For that reason, the trial court concluded that TRI could not have trespassed to Drummond's rights to the coal as a matter of law. As noted above, we agree with the trial court's ruling that once the four original leases expired Drummond remained on United's property as a tenant at will. In light of that and in light of the evidence established at the trial, we agree that TRI could not have trespassed on Drummond's rights  if TRI did not mine any coal from lands subject to Drummond's tenancy at will, TRI could not have trespassed on Drummond's right to such coal. We affirm the judgment as a matter of law in favor of TRI. We next address Drummond's conversion claim. As stated above, the evidence established that TRI did not convert any coal from those lands subject to Drummond's tenancy at will. TRI could not have converted any coal to which Drummond had a right if TRI did not mine on property subject to Drummond's rights. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment as a matter of law in favor of TRI on Drummond's conversion claim. Next, Drummond alleges that the trial court erred in entering a judgment as a matter of law in favor of United on its fraudulent-suppression claim. In that claim, Drummond alleged that United suppressed the existence of the lease between it and TRI. The trial court entered a judgment as a matter of law in favor of United on this claim, although it did not state specific reasons for doing so. The tort of fraudulent suppression is defined at § 6-5-102, Ala.Code 1975: Suppression of a material fact which the party is under an obligation to communicate constitutes fraud. The obligation to communicate may arise from the confidential relations of the parties or from the particular circumstances of the case. In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834 (Ala.1998), this Court recognized that in order to establish a fraudulent-suppression claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) [T]hat [the defendants] had a duty to disclose an existing material fact; (2) that [the defendants] suppressed this material fact; (3) that [the defendants'] suppression of this fact induced [the plaintiff] to act or to refrain from acting; and (4) that [the plaintiff] suffered actual damage as a proximate result. 729 So.2d at 837. During its case-in-chief, Drummond failed to establish the essential elements of its fraud claim. Drummond failed to present evidence indicating that it relied on the alleged suppressed fact in any way or that it was induced to act or to refrain from acting as a result of the alleged suppressed fact. As noted above, Drummond was not mining on United's property at the time United entered into the lease with TRI. Additionally, no evidence was presented to indicate that Drummond was attempting or was even planning to mine United's property at the time United entered into the lease with TRI. Without evidence of reliance, Drummond cannot establish the essential elements of its fraudulent-suppression claim. The trial court properly entered a judgment as a matter of law on this claim. Drummond's Claims Against Walter and JWR Alleging Breach of Contract or, Alternatively, Tortious Interference with Business Relations Drummond also appeals from the judgments entered in favor of Walter and JWR on Drummond's breach-of-contract claims and on Drummond's claims of tortious interference. [23] On appeal, Drummond bases its breach-of-contract claim against Walter on two theories: (1) that Walter remained liable under the 1972 and the 1991 agreements; and (2) that Walter, the parent corporation of United, acted as the alter ego of United, directed United to take the actions it did, and therefore was liable for United's breach of its agreement with Drummond. Drummond bases its breach-of-contract claim against JWR on direct liability only because JWR was a signatory to the 1991 agreement. (Drummond's brief in case no. 1041221/reply brief in case no. 1041029 at 27.) We agree with Drummond that the manner in which its breach-of-contract claims against Walter and JWR were handled in the trial court was confusing. However, because of our determination on the tenancy-at-will issue, we conclude that Drummond's contractual rights to United's coal arose out of the four original leases only. Thus, in order to establish liability against Walter or JWR for breach of contract, Drummond must establish that Walter or JWR had liability on the four original leases. However, Drummond has not asserted that Walter or JWR were parties to the four original leases; Drummond also has not asserted on appeal that Walter or JWR were or should be considered parties to the tenancy at will. Drummond asserts only that Walter and JWR are subject to liability on the 1972 and 1991 agreements. Because we have concluded that the 1972 and 1991 agreements were void for indefiniteness or, at best, that they were unexecuted agreements to agree, the 1972 and 1991 agreements created no obligations that United or anyone else could have breached. For this reason, we need not address Drummond's breach-of-contract claims against Walter or JWR. [24] Drummond also appeals from the dismissal of its tortious interference claim asserted against Walter and JWR. In its summary-judgment order, the trial court stated: Count three (3) of the complaint involves party defendants other than defendant United Land and TRI. This count claims that defendants Walter Industries, and JWR intentionally interfered with rights [Drummond] had under the 1972 and 1991 agreements. Applying the legal findings of this [court], [Drummond's] only rights arose out of the hold over tenancy after the leases expired. Therefore, these defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, since [Drummond] had no remaining rights under the 1972 and 1991 agreements at the time suit was filed. We note that in its claim of tortious interference, Drummond alleged that Walter and JWR interfered with Drummond's business relations arising out of the 1972 and the 1991 agreements. However, the trial court held, and we agree, that the 1972 and 1991 agreements were ineffective to create a contractual or business relationship with Drummond and United. Without evidence indicating that the 1972 or 1991 agreement was effective and binding, Drummond cannot prove that anyone wrongfully interfered with the purported relationship. However, we also note that the trial court held, and we agree, that Drummond and United had an ongoing business relationship  a tenancy at will that flowed from the expired original leases. A tenancy at will is a sufficient business or property interest to support a claim of tortious interference under the proper circumstances. See, e.g., Hall v. Integon Life Ins. Co., 454 So.2d 1338, 1344 (Ala.1984) (recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with at-will employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim; the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties). However, those proper circumstances are not present in this case. Drummond did not argue at trial that Walter and JWR tortiously interfered with its tenancy at will. We recognize that, at the time the trial court entered the summary judgment on the tortious-interference claim, Drummond was alleging that the 1972 agreement and the 1991 agreement were effective and that Walter and JWR had wrongfully interfered with the contractual relationship arising out of those agreements. However, after the trial court recognized that the only relationship existing between Drummond and United was that of a tenant at will, Drummond still did not assert, either exclusively or alternatively, that Walter and JWR had interfered with its tenancy-at-will relationship. In other words, Drummond did not attempt to restate its tortious interference claim to conform to the trial court's summary-judgment order, which it could have done. Additionally, on appeal, Drummond does not assert this theory either exclusively or alternatively; Drummond continues to argue that Walter and JWR interfered only with the contractual relationship arising out of the 1972 and 1991 agreements. However, we have agreed with the trial court that the only relationship in existence between Drummond and United as of the expiration of the four original leases was that of a tenant at will. Because Drummond has not asserted that Walter and JWR interfered with the only business relationship in existence between Drummond and United, Drummond's allegations will not support a tortious-interference claim against Walter or JWR. We must affirm the trial court's summary judgment on this issue. Drummond's Claim that the Trial Court Erred in Ordering Drummond to Remove the Dragline from the Flat Top Property We have concluded that Drummond remained on United's property under a tenancy at will. Upon termination of the tenancy at will, Drummond had no further rights in United's properties. As Drummond correctly stated in its brief filed with this Court: If Drummond has no interest [in the property], then, of course, it has to move the dragline. (Drummond's brief at 118.) Because Drummond no longer has a right to remain on United's properties, Drummond no longer has a right to leave its personal property on the Flat Top property. For this reason, the trial court properly ordered Drummond to remove its chattels from the property that was made the subject of the Flat Top lease. We affirm the order of the trial court issuing the permanent injunction ordering Drummond to remove its chattels.