Opinion ID: 1188845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The D.S.W. Factors

Text: In determining whether the State owes a duty of care to the appellants, we consider a number of factors: [1] The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, [2] the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [3] the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [4] the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, [5] the policy of preventing future harm, [6] the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and [7] the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. See D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555-56 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App.3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (1976)) (adopting this method in a negligence action against a school district). We first address foreseeability, the single most important criterion for imposing a duty of care. See Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Alaska 1986). In Neakok, we applied the D.S.W. factors in a case involving the State's alleged negligent supervision of a parolee. Id. at 1124-25. We held that the State had a duty to supervise [a dangerous parolee] carefully [and] that this duty extended to anyone foreseeably endangered by him... . Id. at 1136. We reasoned that the dangerous parolee's victims were foreseeable and were significantly more identifiable than members of the public in general, because the parolee was released into an isolated village of less than 100 people that lacked resident law enforcement officers. Id. at 1123, 1129, 1131-32. We thus held that the trier of fact was not precluded from finding that the State had a duty to warn the village residents. Id. at 1132 n. 17. Although DFYS contends that sexual abuse was not foreseeable at the time it licensed Betty's day care facility, this assertion is without merit. Sexual abuse was a prevalent social concern in the early 1980's. See, e.g., Ch. 104, SLA 1982 (amending child protection law to include a reporting requirement for sexual abuse or sexual exploitation); former 7 AAC 50.205(f) (am. 9/28/85) (providing that [a] caregiver may not physically or sexually abuse a child). The fact that the State sought to regulate this area suggests that it recognized the vulnerability of young children left with strangers. The most important D.S.W. factor is met. The other D.S.W. factors also favor imposing a duty of care on the State regarding its investigation and licensing of child care facilities. On appeal, the State does not dispute that the Appellants have suffered greatly, or that the injury occurred as a result of incidents at Betty's Day Care. Although a licensing agency cannot be charged with preventing all such abuse, the agency's responsibility is a serious one. Incompetent or haphazard licensing investigations contribute to problems, and are morally blameworthy. The existence of the many laws and governmental agencies designed to aid and safeguard children demonstrates that the protection of a child's welfare is the responsibility not only of the child's parents, but also of society and government. [8] Strict adherence to the laws and licensing procedures should result in a lower incidence of child abuse. The sixth D.S.W. factor draws attention to the practical difficulties and the negative consequences that will almost certainly result from a decision requiring DFYS to use due care in conducting its licensing and investigations of day care facilities in order to protect children from potential physical and/or sexual abuse. There is a risk, for example, of encouraging defensive social work, or intervention where it is not needed. See Douglas J. Besharov, Protecting Children From Abuse: Should It Be a Legal Duty?, 11 U.Dayton L.Rev. 509, 547-48 (1986). We are also wary of exposing a deep pocket regulatory authority to possible tort liability for the purely criminal acts of licensed child care providers. Nonetheless, we hold that on balance the D.S.W. factors indicate that the State owes a duty of care to patrons of licensed day care facilities. The State's duty is not, as D.E. assumes, to prevent harm: it is only to take reasonable steps to prevent harm. [9] The burden of acting nonnegligently with regard to the areas an agency has chosen to regulate is not so great as to outweigh the arguments in favor of imposing a duty. [10]