Opinion ID: 1059114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: determination of injury

Text: The parties agree that Kruck breached his duty to the Shipmans on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy petition was filed. The issue in controversy is whether on that date, or at a later time, the Shipmans sustained injury or damage sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We have stated on more than one occasion that [d]amage is an essential element of a cause of action. Without some injury or damage, however slight, a cause of action cannot accrue. Keller, 232 Va. at 520, 352 S.E.2d at 332; see Stone, 232 Va. at 365, 368-69, 350 S.E.2d at 631-32; accord First Va. Bank-Colonial v. Baker, 225 Va. 72, 82, 301 S.E.2d 8, 13-14 (1983); Locke v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957, 275 S.E.2d 900, 904 (1981); Caudill v. Wise Rambler, 210 Va. 11, 13, 168 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1969). In the absence of any injury or damage, there is no cause of action. Rutter, 264 Va. at 313, 568 S.E.2d at 695. Moreover, we have said that it is immaterial whether all the damages resulting from the negligent act were sustained at the time that act occurred. The running of the limitations period will not be tolled by the fact that the actual or substantial damages did not occur until a later date. Stone, 232 Va. at 369, 350 S.E.2d at 632; Housing Authority v. Laburnum Corp., 195 Va. 827, 839, 80 S.E.2d 574, 581 (1954). In Virginia, [w]e have followed the general rule that the applicable period of limitation begins to run from the moment the cause of action arises rather than from the time of discovery of injury or damage, and we have said that difficulty in ascertaining the existence of a cause of action is irrelevant. Virginia Military Institute v. King, 217 Va. 751, 759, 232 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1977) (hereinafter VMI) (citing Laburnum, 195 Va. at 838, 80 S.E.2d at 580-81). In VMI we commented that this rule may produce inequities by triggering a statute of limitations when the injury or damage is unknown or difficult or even incapable of discovery.... Id. at 760, 232 S.E.2d at 900. Nevertheless, we concluded that it was the role of the General Assembly, not the judiciary, to change a rule of law that has been relied upon by bench and bar for so long. Id. We continue to adhere to that principle, Under Code § 8.01-230 the injury is deemed to accrue when the breach of contract occurs not when the resulting damage is discovered. Upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition the Shipmans incurred a legal injury. Although the injury could not be delineated as a sum certain or reflected as a final judgment on the merits, there was injury sufficient to commence a cause of action for legal malpractice. First and foremost, the Shipmans lost control of their assets to the Bankruptcy Trustee, including the power to revoke the Trust and receive the reversion. The filing of the bankruptcy, in and of itself, vested those rights in the Bankruptcy Trustee as a matter of law. 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 542, 544, 704 (2000). This injury in particular countermanded their express wishes to protect the Trust property from their creditors. Even the Shipmans' right to bring a legal malpractice claim vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee, which necessitated their initial nonsuit. See National Am. Ins. Co. v. Ruppert Landscaping Co., 187 F.3d 439, 441 (4th Cir.1999) (If a cause of action is part of the estate of the bankrupt then the trustee alone has standing to bring that claim.); Ellwanger v. Budsberg, 140 B.R. 891, 903 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1992) (state court actions for legal malpractice are property of the bankruptcy estate); Scarlett v. Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 579 (W.D.Mo.1990) (state court actions for legal malpractice are property of the bankruptcy estate). Further, the Shipmans admitted in their motion for judgment that in addition to the costs of repurchasing their residence, they incurred additional costs in legal fees, litigation costs, and other costs associated with the bankruptcy filing and litigation. (Emphasis added). The Shipmans' own pleadings thus admit that the filing fee for the bankruptcy itself is a recoverable damage. [5] As we note below, these damages need only be incurred, not paid. The unity of duty, breach, and damage required to establish a cause of action occurred on March 9, 1998, when the bankruptcy petition was filed. It was at that time the Shipmans' cause of action against Kruck attached, albeit vested in the Bankruptcy Trustee. Having determined that the Shipmans' cause of action existed as of the time the bankruptcy was filed, the question then becomes, under Code § 8.01-230, whether the Shipmans' right of action came into existence simultaneously with their cause of action or whether it accrued at another time.