Opinion ID: 2184813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Invocation of Fifth Amendment Right

Text: Haviland claims that the confession was taken in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination, citing the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. [2] He says his statement, I'm through with this, unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent. The State contends Haviland was merely saying he did not want to hear that he killed anyone. The prosecutor compared Haviland to someone putting hands over his ears and yelling, I can't hear you, I can't hear you. He believed Haviland was merely avoid[ing] Detective Helms' ... questioning.... (R. at 930-31.) The prosecutor also argued, He knows how to say the words, I'm not going to answer [any more] questions. (Id.) The advisement of rights form Haviland signed said, If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present you will still have the right to stop answering at anytime. (R. at 900.) Judge Kellams denied the motion to suppress. He noted that Haviland made no effort to consistently avoid the questions of the interrogating officer and did continue reluctantly and very slowly to give information. (R. at 933). He found that Haviland's intention was unclear. Id. The Fifth Amendment provides that No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... U.S. CONST. Amend. V. The contours of a defendant's right to remain silent were delineated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). In Mosley, as here, the resolution of the case turned on the interpretation of a single passage in Miranda: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cutoff questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100-101, 96 S.Ct. at 325 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-1628) (emphasis added). The issue presented is whether Haviland's declaration, I'm through with this, meant, I don't want to answer any more questions, an inquiry which is intensely fact-sensitive. Accordingly, this Court will not reverse unless the trial court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence and will look only to evidence favorable to the ruling. Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662 (Ind.1996); Schwartzkopf v. State, 539 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. 1989). Without reweighing the evidence, the transcript and videotaped interrogation reveal evidence sufficiently for us to conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Haviland did not invoke his right to remain silent. As the State argues, Haviland's conduct was childish, akin to children putting their hands over their ears and yelling loudly and saying, I can't hear you, I can't hear you. Although Haviland did not yell, his demeanor and the surrounding circumstances suggest the proverbial child in denial. He appeared only to be through with hearing that he had killed his uncle, not through with answering questions. Of course, a suspect in custody need not declare any particular words of legal magic to cut off questioning. When the interrogator became unsure of Haviland's intent, he asked, What do you mean, you're through with this? [3] Haviland responded, I said I'm through with it. I didn't kill nobody, you keep insisting I did and I didn't. Then, Haviland just kept on talking. Judge Kellams noted this, finding he made no effort to remain silent and not respond at all. (R. at 935.) Reluctantly, Haviland answered questions without pausing or indicating in any manner that he would no longer respond. He answered the detective's question by saying he did not do the crime, then continued talking. We agree with Judge Kellams that Haviland did not exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.