Opinion ID: 203584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dennis' Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and any affidavits. Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). A 'genuine' issue is -7- one that could be resolved in favor of either party, and a 'material fact' is one that has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986)). We review summary judgment rulings de novo, construing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir. 2003). Even in retaliation cases, 'where elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.' Vives v. Fajardo, 472 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Benoit, 331 F.3d at 173); see also Thompson, 522 F.3d at 175 (When considering arguments for summary judgment, 'we must disregard improbable or overly attenuated inferences, unsupported conclusions, and rank speculation.' (quoting Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997))). We will reverse only if, after reviewing the facts and making all inferences in favor of the non-moving party . . . the evidence on record is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either side. Maymí v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). -8- As a preliminary matter, we note Dennis' citation to the the Supreme Court's ruling in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000), for the proposition that this court at summary judgment must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. According to Dennis, our consideration of Sylvania officials' declarations are impermissible under Reeves because the officials are interested parties. See id. ([T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.)(internal quotations omitted). Dennis misreads the scope of Reeves. At summary judgment we need not exclude all interested testimony, specifically testimony that is uncontradicted by the nonmovant. See Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2007) (We cannot believe that the law precludes a party from presenting his own testimony on a summary judgment motion . . . . The fact is that in considering a motion for summary judgment the court should believe uncontradicted testimony unless it is inherently implausible even if the testimony is that of an interested witness.). Indeed, the exclusion of interested testimony would make it difficult for an employer to present a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason when defending against a retaliation claim. -9- As the Sixth Circuit has noted, a rule barring all testimony from interested witnesses would lead[] to absurd consequences because defendants will often be able to respond only through the testimony of their employees. Stratienko v. Cordis Corp., 429 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Dennis' argument is unpersuasive given his failure to present evidence to contradict the declarations of Sylvania officials in which they present a non-retaliatory motive.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A:19 states that [i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person engaged in any activity to which this chapter applies to discharge, expel, or otherwise retaliate or discriminate against any person because he has . . . testified or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter. The New Hampshire Supreme Court looks to and finds instructive federal standards established under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in resolving retaliation claims under N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A. Madeja v. MPB Corp., 149 N.H. 371, 37879, 821 A.2d 1034, 1043 (2003). Thus, to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title VII or N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A, the plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a statutorily-protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the protected activity and the adverse -10- employment action were causally connected. Id. at 378 (citing Marrero v. Goya of P.R., Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 22 (1st Cir. 2002)). Under New Hampshire law, [i]f there is only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, as Dennis alleges here, a 'pretext' approach applies. In re Montplaisir, 147 N.H. 297, 300, 787 A.2d 178, 181 (2001) (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1983)). This pretext approach provides that an employee who carries her burden of coming forward with evidence establishing a prima facie case of retaliation creates a presumption of discrimination, shifting the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged actions. Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 55 (1st Cir. 2008). 'If the employer's evidence creates a genuine issue of fact, the presumption of discrimination drops from the case, and the plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of showing that the employer's stated reason for [the challenged actions] was in fact a pretext for retaliating . . . .' Id. (quoting Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 336 (1st Cir. 2005) (alteration in original)). Pretext can be demonstrated by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons . . . that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and [with or without the additional evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom] infer that the employer -11- did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons. Id. at 55-56 (quoting Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 168 (1st Cir. 1998) (alteration in original)).
In the instant case, it is a close question whether Dennis can establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Sylvania does not dispute that Dennis met the first two prongs of the prima facie test: Dennis (1) engaged in protected conduct by participating in the Green deposition and (2) experienced an adverse employment action by way of his termination. However, with respect to the third prong, Dennis relies on a series of strained inferences to establish a causal connection between the two. He states: if a jury believed Dennis's testimony . . . then it could infer . . . the attorneys believed that some of Dennis's testimony could have a negative effect on the company's position in the Green case; that [Vient] conducted her investigation into the Molina allegations with anger or resentment over Dennis's unflattering testimony the day before; and that the lawyers conveyed their concerns about the testimony to one or more of Sylvania's in-house personnel. (Emphasis in original). Dennis further emphasizes that Tracey, as Vient's direct supervisor, was responsible for supervising Vient's investigation into Molina's complaint. Dennis reasons that [a] jury could infer that Tracey and [Vient] talked regularly about [Vient's] -12- investigation of Dennis, and that Tracey heard [Vient's] concerns about Dennis's deposition testimony which had taken place the day before the investigation began. (Emphasis in original). Because Tracy directly advised Franz on the proper course to take in the Molina matter, Dennis contends that a jury could infer that Franz' decision to recommend Dennis' termination was influenced by Dennis' testimony in the Green matter. Moreover, Dennis asserts that Beckwith and Vient's concern with his testimony showed that they had a motive to retaliate against him and a motive to communicate among the management group about these issues. For purposes of summary judgment we are required to draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party. However, at this stage we need not credit inferences that rely on tenuous insinuation. Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 743 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, the nonmovant still has the burden of producing specific facts sufficient to deflect . . . summary judgment . . . . Mulvihill v. Top-Flite Golf Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2003). While Dennis insists that his retaliation claim naturally flows from a straightforward series of reasonable inferences, he has failed to provide specific facts indicating that his termination was caused by his allegedly unfavorable testimony in the Green matter. Instead, Dennis speculates about alleged communications between Sylvania's counsel and his direct -13- supervisors and imputes these attorneys' alleged motives and displeasure with Dennis' testimony to Franz and Hunt, the actual decisionmakers responsible for his firing. Dennis' contention that a jury could reasonably string together these inferences is speculative, especially in view of the fact that the only evidence that Dennis provides to demonstrate that Franz and Hunt knew about his deposition testimony is Franz' alleged reaction when conversing with Dennis about the Molina warning letter. Franz' body language of looking away and his statement that he knew nothing about [Dennis' unfavorable testimony] in response to Dennis' allegation that the firing was in retaliation for Dennis' deposition in the Green case is insufficient for a jury reasonably to infer that Franz or Hunt shared Vient and Tracy's alleged retaliatory sentiments. In addition, Dennis offers no evidence that Franz or Hunt, in arriving at their decision to terminate Dennis, consulted with anyone possessing a motive to retaliate against Dennis. Nothing in the record supports an inference of complicity. Bennett v. SaintGobain Corp., 507 F.3d 23, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that causation prong was unmet where plaintiff failed to provide sufficient proof that individual responsible for plaintiff's discharge consulted with and shared sentiments with middle manager who allegedly possessed retaliatory motive). -14- In addition to Dennis' inferential reasoning, we also consider the nearness in time between Dennis' deposition testimony in the Green case and his termination. As we have stated, Our law is that temporal proximity alone can suffice to 'meet the relatively light burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.' DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2008)(quoting Mariani-Colón v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., ex rel. Chertoff, 511 F.3d 215, 224 (1st Cir. 2007)). Given our analysis below, however, we need not decide whether the mere fact that less than two months elapsed between Dennis' deposition and his termination is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Though we doubt Dennis could prove causation, we nevertheless recognize that the employee's burden to establish a prima facie case in the retaliation context is not an onerous one. Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 26. However, even assuming that Dennis has established a prima facie case, his claim still fails because he cannot show that his termination was pretextual. Specifically, Dennis has not adequately countered the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons Sylvania has proffered for terminating Dennis. These reasons include Dennis' history of misconduct as well as Sylvania's reduction in force argument. As evidence of pretext, Dennis argues (1) that Sylvania had shifting rationales for firing Dennis and (2) that there is -15- a material dispute as to whether Dennis actually had a history of misconduct. With respect to the former, Dennis asserts that Sylvania's March 2005 response to Dennis' complaint to the Commission cited only his history of misconduct, while Franz' November 2006 deposition identified the reduction in force as the true reason for Dennis' dismissal. Regarding the alleged material dispute as to his history of misconduct, Dennis argues that the Serrechia matter should not be given any credence because it was allegedly purged from his file and that the Molina matter by itself did not warrant his termination. Both of Dennis' arguments suggesting pretext are unconvincing. First, Sylvania did not shift its rationale for terminating Dennis. The mere fact that Sylvania failed to include the reduction in force reasoning in its March 2005 response does not mean that it changed its story. This is especially true given the fact that the record reflects that Franz presented the reduction in force argument as early as October 2005 in a Commission interview –- over a year before the November 2006 deposition that Dennis cites for the alleged inconsistency. Second, the dispute surrounding Dennis' history of misconduct is not material because Sylvania had another reason to terminate Dennis' employment which was not contradicted. Franz explicitly stated in his deposition testimony that even if Molina had fabricated his complaint against Dennis, he would still have -16- replaced Dennis with Weinberg because of the reduction in force. Thus, even if we credit Dennis' argument that the Serrechia complaint was removed from his file and that Dennis' misconduct in the Molina matter by itself does not rise to a firing offense, Dennis would still lose: Sylvania's decision to replace Dennis with the better performing Weinberg as part of its reduction in force argument is a clear, specific reason[] for his termination separate from any retaliatory animus.7 Id. Dennis has failed to point to specific facts that would demonstrate any sham or pretext intended to cover up defendant's retaliatory motive. Id. Moreover, we should exercise caution in second guessing Sylvania's employment decisions. Courts should not act as 'super personnel departments,' substituting their judicial judgments for the business judgments of employers. Bennett, 507 F.3d at 32 (quoting Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991)).