Opinion ID: 76728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Functionally-Consolidated Doctrine

Text: 20 The United States Supreme Court recognized the functionally-consolidated doctrine in Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001), and this Court recently addressed it in Hernandez-Martinez, 382 F.3d at 1307-08, 2004 WL 1946072, at -3. We examine both decisions. 21 In Buford, the federal district court determined that the defendant's prior state drug conviction and four state robbery convictions had not been consolidated for sentencing either formally or functionally. Although the defendant pled guilty to the state offenses at different times, the same state sentencing judge heard arguments in all five cases at the same time in the same proceeding. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court's application of the guidelines to the undisputed facts deferentially rather than de novo. 22 The Supreme Court, in Buford, affirmed the Seventh Circuit's deferential review, stating, the district court is in a better position than the appellate court to decide whether a particular set of individual circumstances demonstrates `functional consolidation.' Buford, 532 U.S. at 64, 121 S.Ct. at 1280. According to the Supreme Court, a district judge is more likely to be aware of which procedures the relevant state or federal courts typically follow and factual nuance may closely guide the legal decision, with legal results depending heavily upon an understanding of the significance of case-specific details. Id. at 64-65, 121 S.Ct. at 1280. The Supreme Court further pointed out that [i]n a case like this one, for example, under Seventh Circuit doctrine, the District Judge usefully might have considered the factual details of the crimes at issue in order to determine whether factual connections among those crimes, rather than, say, administrative convenience, led Wisconsin to sentence Buford simultaneously and concurrently for the robbery and drug offenses. Id. at 65, 121 S.Ct. at 1280 (emphasis added). In Buford, the Supreme Court concluded that the Seventh Circuit properly reviewed the District Court's `functional consolidation' decision deferentially. Id. at 66, 121 S.Ct. at 1281. 23 This Court followed Buford 's deferential-review standard in affirming the district court's career offender decision in Hernandez-Martinez. The defendant, in Hernandez-Martinez, had two prior state court convictions: (1) attempted murder in the second degree with a firearm; and (2) aggravated assault with a firearm. Hernandez-Martinez, 382 F.3d at 1306, 2004 WL 1946072, at . In fact, the defendant was arrested for the aggravated assault with a firearm while he was incarcerated as a pre-trial detainee on the attempted murder charge. Id. The defendant had pled nolo contendere to the two different state offenses on the same day before the same state judge who imposed concurrent sentences for the defendant. Id. 24 Under the circumstances presented in Hernandez-Martinez, this Court concluded that the district court did not commit clear error in determining that the defendant's offenses were not related under the guidelines because: (1) there was no formal consolidation order; (2) the cases had been assigned different docket numbers; (3) Hernandez-Martinez received separate judgments; and (4) Hernandez-Martinez was represented by two different attorneys at sentencing. Hernandez-Martinez, 382 F.3d at 1308, 2004 WL 1946072, at . 25 Smith's present appeal before us is similar. In Smith's prior state cases: (1) there was no formal consolidation order; (2) the cases had been assigned different docket numbers; and (3) Smith received separate judgments. While Smith's cases were heard by the same state judge at the same time, the district court determined that this was for the administrative convenience of the court. 26 We find no clear error by the district court in that determination or in refusing to consider Smith's prior state crimes as one conviction. In so doing, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that joint sentencing for administrative convenience is not `consolidated for sentencing' under Application Note 3 to § 4A1.2. United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1095 (7th Cir.2001); see also United States v. Carter, 283 F.3d 755, 758 (6th Cir.2002) (The fact that judgment was pronounced on the same day with sentences to run concurrently, without more, does not establish that the offenses were consolidated.... Further, given the separate entries of judgment and the absence of an order of consolidation, the record below does not demonstrate an intention on the part of the trial court to consolidate the cases.); United States v. Kates, 174 F.3d 580, 584 (5th Cir.1999) ([T]he simultaneous disposition of two separate cases does not amount to consolidation for guidelines purposes.). 2 27 The fact that Smith ultimately received concurrent sentences for his state convictions also does not render those convictions related under § 4A1.2. See Hernandez-Martinez, 382 F.3d at 1308, 2004 WL 1946072, at ; United States v. Jackson, 57 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir.1995). Rather, as in Hernandez-Martinez, we conclude that the district court did not commit clear error in sentencing Smith as a career offender under § 4B1.1(a).