Opinion ID: 2599164
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction Regarding the Readback of Testimony

Text: Defendant contends the trial court impermissibly restricted the jury's right to request to have testimony reread by instructing them that in order to hear the testimony the court must first deem it `material,' and that if any portion of a witness's testimony was requested, the entire testimony had to be reread. [5] He contends the instruction violated section 1138, which provides that during deliberations, if there be any disagreement between [the jury] as to the testimony, the court must give the jury the information required. The Attorney General responds, first, that defendant may not make this argument on appeal because he failed to object to the instruction at trial. We disagree. In People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 1007, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183, we considered whether defendant's lack of objection forfeited a claim of error in not rereading testimony at jury request. We recognized that section 1138 primarily concerns the jury's right to be apprised of the evidence, but we also noted that it implicates a defendant's right to a fair trial. ( People v. Frye , at p. 1007, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) We also noted that two Court of Appeal decisions had found the defendant did not have to object to preserve a similar claim. Those cases reasoned that a defendant should not be allowed to waive the jury's right to a rereading of testimony. ( Ibid., citing People v. Litteral (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 790, 145 Cal.Rptr. 186 and People v. Butler (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 273, 120 Cal.Rptr. 647.) Ultimately, we did not decide the forfeiture question in Frye and instead found any error harmless. ( People v. Frye, supra, at p. 1007, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) We have doubts that People v. Litteral, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d at pages 796-797, 145 Cal.Rptr. 186, and People v. Butler, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at pages 283-284, 120 Cal.Rptr. 647, correctly allowed a defendant to assert a violation of the jury's right to readback of testimony. In general, a defendant may assert, and thus may forfeit, his own rights, but not someone else's. (See People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 813, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 [a defendant may waive his own right to a public trial and may not assert on appeal a violation of the public's right].) But, unlike People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pages 1006-1008, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183, and the Court of Appeal decisions, the issue here is not whether the court erred in responding to the jury's request to reread testimony, but whether it erred in instructing the jury regarding readback of testimony. Even without an objection, a defendant may challenge on appeal an instruction that affects the substantial rights of the defendant.... (§ 1259.) Although the readback of testimony is primarily for the jury's benefit, it also implicates the defendant's (and prosecution's) rights. (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Accordingly, we conclude defendant may challenge the instruction on appeal despite the failure to object at trial. On the merits, the court did not violate section 1138. It did not refuse to provide any rereading of testimony; indeed, the jury did not request any. Defendant contends the instruction improperly discouraged the jury from doing so. Generally, he claims the instruction was an unwarranted modification of CALJIC No. 17.43, the standard instruction regarding the rereading of testimony. The CALJIC instruction, however, did not exist until 1993, after the trial in this case. (CALJIC No. 17.43 (1993 new) (5th ed.1988).) Specifically, defendant challenges the instruction in two respects. First, defendant objects to the court's implication that it would not permit the rereading of immaterial testimony. It is hard to evaluate this question in the abstract, for it is hard to imagine a jury requesting the readback of truly immaterial testimony. It may be that section 1138, properly construed, requires only the readback of material testimony, but we do not have to decide the question here. If the jury had requested a rereading of testimony, and the court had refused it on the basis that the testimony was immaterial, we could have reviewed that ruling. But that did not happen here. Whether or not the court could ever properly refuse to reread requested testimony by finding it to be immaterial, we see no prejudice from the instruction in this case. No reasonable jury would fail to request the readback of testimony it otherwise wanted merely because the court had implied it could only rehear material testimony. Second, defendant argues the court erred in advising the jury it would hear the entire testimony of any given witness. This portion of the instruction did not violate section 1138. That statute mandates the readback of testimony at jury request, but it does not forbid giving the jury more than it requests so it also receives the context. Defendant speculates the jury may have wanted a rereading of some part of Lonnie's testimony but chose not to request it because the entire testimony was lengthy. Because any request to rehear some of Lonnie's testimony would likely be directed to the direct testimony, we doubt defendant would have complained about rereading the entire testimony, the bulk of which was cross-examination. But in any event, the court made clear it would provide any requested rereading of material testimony. Merely informing the jury of the time it may take for rehearing testimony is not impermissible jury coercion. ( People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 202-203, 160 Cal. Rptr. 669.) We see no violation of the jury's or defendant's right to have the jury provided a rereading of testimony on request.