Opinion ID: 2761209
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deference to the DOC's reasonable concerns

Text: about safety and security The district court ultimately dismissed the DOC's concerns as pretextual, reasoning that DOC was in fact acting in response to public and political criticism. The primary evidence -65- on record tending to support this theory includes a press interview by Commissioner Dennehy, Dennehy's relationships with a state senator and the lieutenant governor, and the acknowledgment that the DOC was aware of negative news coverage regarding Kosilek's request for surgery. In her testimony, Dennehy denied being influenced by such media and political pressures, and stated that the decision not to provide SRS was founded in bona fide security concerns alone. The district court, however, found this testimony non-credible, and this credibility finding is the sort of determination to which our court gives deference. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). Even accepting that Dennehy's motivations were colored by political and media pressure, however, does not take Kosilek's claim as far as it needs to go. As an initial matter, the fact that Dennehy was motivated in part by concerns unrelated to prison security does not mean that the security concerns articulated by the DOC were irrelevant, wholly pretextual, or -- most importantly -- invalid on the merits. In Battista, our court held that deference to the decisions of prison administrators could be overcome where those administrators admittedly relied on inflated data, identified a security concern only several years after refusing to provide treatment for an acknowledged medical need, and engaged in a pattern of changing positions and arguments before the court. Battista, 645 F.3d at -66- 455. Such gross delays and misstatements were not present here.16 Rather, the DOC testified consistently that it believed the postoperative security concerns surrounding Kosilek's treatment were significant and problematic.17 Even if not entitled to deference, see id., those concerns still matter insofar as they are reasonable and valid, and Kosilek did not put on any evidence showing that they wholly lacked merit.18 16 Great weight was placed on the fact that Dennehy told a reporter that there were significant security concerns about post-operative housing three days before she met with Superintendents Spencer and Bissonnette. The record reveals, however, that discussions about housing had previously occurred at Executive Staff Meetings, and Dennehy testified that she had conducted phone calls with both Superintendents prior to meeting to formalize their security report. This timeline, therefore, is far from sufficient to establish that the DOC's security assessments were unprincipled or invalid. 17 That the DOC may have, in the district court's assessment, engaged in a pattern of prevarication regarding whether they understood that SRS was being recommended by UMass as medically necessary, does not undercut the consistency with which they identified safety and security concerns -- concerns which are within their expert province -- that would arise from the surgery. 18 Kosilek did cross-examine Commissioner Clarke to show that a transgendered prisoner had safely been housed in a Washington State prison under his supervision. Left unexplored, however, were the numerous ways in which MCI-Norfolk's environment, facilities, or population might be distinct from this prison in Washington. Neither was there a comparison between that prisoner's criminal history and the criminal history of Kosilek. That an individual was housed safely by Commissioner Clarke while employed in another state does not rebut Superintendent Bissonnette's testimony that moving her to MCI-Framingham would cause climate problems in that particular prison. See Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 371 (1st Cir. 1978) (rejecting uniform housing conditions for detainees, without regard to their disparate criminal history, because Constitutional rights cannot be defined in terms of literal comparisons of this nature). -67- Second, when determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief, our focus must include current attitudes and conduct. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 ('[D]eliberate indifference[] should be determined in light of the prison authorities' current attitudes and conduct': their attitudes and conduct at the time suit is brought and persisting thereafter. (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 36)). Dennehy has not served as DOC Commissioner since 2007. Given the age of this litigation and the changes in DOC leadership that have occurred since the suit was filed, the district court's assumption that Dennehy's attitudes necessarily carried over to her successors and governed their actions is unsupported by the record. Although consideration of Dennehy's motivation is surely relevant, it is insufficient to show that the DOC continued to be motivated by public pressure even after her departure, or that this is what motivates the DOC presently. Indeed, it was Commissioner Clarke -- and not Dennehy -- who made the decision here. And the only evidence tending to show that Commissioner Clarke may have considered public and political criticism were two letters received by Clarke -- who did not respond -- from Massachusetts legislators. These letters, however, relate almost in their entirety to concerns about the cost of SRS, and the district court soundly rejected any argument that the DOC, or Clarke specifically, had adopted its safety and security measures as a pretextual means of addressing the cost concerns -68- raised by state legislators. Moreover, Clarke was never found by the court to be noncredible.19 The district court improperly imputed its belief that Commissioner Dennehy had acted out of concern for public and political pressure to its assessment of the motivations of future DOC Commissioners. This error ignores the requirement, in cases of injunctive relief, that a court consider the attitudes and beliefs of prison administrators at the time of its decision. Id. at 84546. The effect of this error is particularly clear given that Clarke has now been replaced by Commissioner Spencer, so that Dennehy is now several administrations and more than seven years removed from the decisionmaking process. Without proof that the DOC remains motivated by pretextual or improper concerns with public pressure, even if it was assumed that Dennehy was improperly motivated, the district court's finding that injunctive relief was required is unsupportable.