Opinion ID: 867213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Various Juror Issues

Text: ¶ 38 Cota contends that the trial court erred by dismissing Juror 2 and designating Jurors 5, 9, and 13 as alternates. He also claims that the court erred by allowing Juror 10 to deliberate in the penalty phase after not deliberating in the guilt and aggravation phases. [7]
¶ 39 On the second day of trial, a witness testified that he had known Martinez for fifty years. The prosecutor later incorrectly called the period half a decade. After Juror 2 submitted a clarifying question, the matter was clarified. Later that day, the prosecutor stressed the term half a century. Juror 2 took offense and reported to the bailiff that she was humiliated, had missed several minutes of testimony because she was upset, and wasn't sure she could ever side with the State thereafter. Questioning by the court confirmed that she was upset. The next day, the State moved to strike Juror 2. The trial court granted the State's motion over Cota's objection, citing the juror's statements to the bailiff, her claim to be offended, and the fact that she missed testimony. ¶ 40 A trial court's findings regarding a juror's ability to be fair and impartial and its dismissal of a juror are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Garcia, 224 Ariz. 1, 16 ¶ 66, 226 P.3d 370, 385 (2010); State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 12, 951 P.2d 869, 877 (1997). The trial court should excuse a juror [w]hen there is reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.4(b). The reasonable ground may arise during trial. Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 13, 951 P.2d at 878. The record here supports the trial judge's decision.
¶ 41 Cota argues that the trial court erred by allowing Juror 10 to deliberate in the penalty phase after serving as an alternate in the previous two phases. But we have repeatedly rejected the argument that the same jurors must serve in all phases of a capital trial. See State v. Prince, 226 Ariz. 516, 527-28 ¶¶ 21-25, 250 P.3d 1145, 1156-57 (2011); Garcia, 224 Ariz. at 17 ¶ 71, 226 P.3d at 386. ¶ 42 Cota argues that these cases are distinguishable because the trial court here did not voir dire Juror 10 to see if she accepted the previous verdicts. But this is not required; the juror must simply be aware of her role in the penalty phase. Garcia, 224 Ariz. at 17 ¶¶ 70-71, 226 P.3d at 386. Although it may be advisable for the trial court to discuss this role with the juror individually, such discussion is not necessary where the entire jury is instructed properly, as it was here. Id.
¶ 43 During selection, jurors were told when the trial was scheduled to end. Unfortunately, the trial did not proceed as promptly as envisioned. Juror 9 had already made vacation plans for the week in which guilt phase deliberations finally were to begin. Jurors 5 and 13 both had already paid for tickets to leave town when the penalty phase began. On each occasion, the trial judge designated the jurors as alternates instead of releasing them or continuing the trial. ¶ 44 Alternates are supposed to be selected by lot by the clerk. Ariz. R.Crim. P. 18.5(h). However, designation of alternates by the trial judge does not require reversal in the absence of resulting prejudice. State v. Blackhoop, 162 Ariz. 121, 122, 781 P.2d 599, 600 (1989); State v. Martinez, 198 Ariz. 5, 9 ¶¶ 15-19, 6 P.3d 310, 314 (App.2000). Cota has not shown that he was deprived of a fair and impartial jury at any stage of the trial, and therefore cannot demonstrate prejudice. Blackhoop, 162 Ariz. at 122, 781 P.2d at 600.