Opinion ID: 1445206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Jurisdiction for the State's Remaining Causes of Action

Text: Because we are obligated to consider our jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings, Enahoro, 408 F.3d at 883, we observe that our interpretation of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) as it relates to the State's second cause of action does not alter the district court's finding of jurisdiction over the other claims brought by the State in its amended complaint. The State, in its fourth cause of action, sought a declaration that it has negotiated in good faith with the Nation as required by the IGRA. However, the Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent source of federal subject matter jurisdiction, and requires an independent basis for jurisdiction. GNB Battery Technologies v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir.1995). When a declaratory judgment is sought, jurisdiction is determined by whether federal question jurisdiction would exist over the presumed suit by the declaratory judgment defendant. Id. Such an independent basis for jurisdiction exists with respect to this claimthe Nation's ability to bring suit against the State pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), which grants federal district courts jurisdiction over any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i). `[T]he separate and distinct jurisdictional question of constitutional dimension' of whether an `actual controversy' existed, GNB Battery Technologies, 65 F.3d at 620, is also met in this case, because the State's amended complaint pled that the Nation's complaint in arbitration included allegations that the State had engaged in bad faith negotiations in violation of the IGRA. With respect to the State's other substantive claims against the Nation, [4] the district court has supplemental jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) so long as they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact with the original federal claims. Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 500 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164-65, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997)) (stating that the common nucleus of operative fact standard was codified in the statute's grant of supplemental jurisdiction over claims so related to [the federal] claims . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy). Such, is the case here. The other claims brought by the State pertain to the same set of circumstances at issue in the federal claim under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii)the Nation and State's attempts to ascertain and resolve the impact the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decisions have on their gaming compact. Finally, the last two causes of action brought by the State are to enforce the Dispute Resolution provision in the Compact pursuant to the FAA as it relates to the arbitrable claims in the amended complaint. As we stated when this case first came before us, [t]he FAA by itself does not provide subject matter jurisdiction for any dispute; as a result, `there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction' to address an arbitration dispute. Ho-Chunk 463 F.3d at 659 (quoting America's MoneyLine, Inc. v. Coleman, 360 F.3d 782, 784 (7th Cir.2004)). Having found that all the claims which may be arbitrable are properly before the district court, the district court has jurisdiction over the State's claims to enforce the Dispute Resolution provision pursuant to the FAA. [5] Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-77, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995) (interpreting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Thus, the remaining question is whether the Nation's sovereign immunity barred the district court from hearing any of these claims.