Opinion ID: 792064
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs are limited in the major life activity of working.

Text: 53 The Bryan Plaintiffs contend that their monocularity limits them in working. In the Poppink Act, the California legislature expressly recognized working as a major life activity, § 12926(k)(1)(B)(iii), and added that this is so regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of employments, id. § 12926.1(c). The district court concluded that, by enacting § 12926.1, the California legislature sought to disapprove Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-93, 119 S.Ct. 2139, which the district court characterized as holding that the exclusion from a single job with a single employer does not constitute a substantial limitation in `working' under the ADA. Relying on § 12926.1, the district court held that Plaintiffs' exclusion from the single position of full-time UPS package-car driver, notwithstanding their ability to perform other jobs (both within and outside of UPS), constitutes a limitation in working. 54 The terms class of jobs and broad range of jobs have commonly understood meanings in federal employment law. To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, ADA plaintiffs must show that they are precluded from a substantial class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139. Federal regulations define the term class of jobs as jobs utilizing ... training, knowledge, skills or abilities similar to the job from which the plaintiff is disqualified. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(B). So, for example, in Sutton, the relevant class of jobs was pilot positions that utilized the plaintiff's skills, and not the single job of global airline pilot. 527 U.S. at 493, 119 S.Ct. 2139. In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 524, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999), the relevant class of jobs was mechanic positions, and not the narrower category of mechanic positions that require driving a commercial motor vehicle. 55 The district court correctly ruled that the California legislature acted against this federal backdrop. In fact, the context of the legislature's statement about working in § 12926.1(c) demonstrates that the statement was regarded as an example of the ways in which the distinction between limitation and substantial limitation makes FEHA different from the ADA. In other words, FEHA's definition of disability is broader because, among other things, it encompasses a limitation in a particular employment, which must be something less than a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. 56 UPS attempts to defeat this close parallel by arguing that the word employment means occupation and not job, and therefore the legislature was not responding to Sutton's single job holding. In fact, employment can be used both in the sense of a general occupation and in the sense of a particular job. See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 743 (unabridged ed.1993) (defining employment as an activity in which one engages and employs his time and energies: as ... work (as customary trade, craft, service, or vocation) OR as an instance of such activity). Thus, dictionary definitions are less helpful than the background federal law in determining the legislature's intent. 57 Even if the district court interpreted particular employment too narrowly, however, we still would have to affirm its partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs with respect to working. Plaintiffs demonstrated that they are limited in working as commercial delivery drivers, not only because they are excluded from working as full-time package car drivers for UPS, but also because they are excluded from any commercial driving position that requires DOT 8 or state 9 certification. Thus, even if particular employment is interpreted more broadly than single position with a single employer, Plaintiffs' monocularity limits their ability to work in the occupation of commercial delivery driver. 58 The fact that Plaintiffs are eligible for other commercial driving positions, such as those that require only a Class C driver's license in California, Cal. Veh.Code § 12804.9, does not mean that they have not demonstrated a sufficient limitation to satisfy FEHA. 10 Within the realm of commercial driving positions, the regulations certainly make working more difficult than it would be for the average, unimpaired person with similar training, skills, and abilities. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (defining substantially limit[ed] in working as significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities  (emphasis added)). 59 In sum, we affirm the district court's partial summary judgment in the Bryan action because Plaintiffs are limited in working as commercial delivery drivers. 11 Because of the procedural posture of the Bryan action, we remand without addressing any of the FEHA defenses. By contrast, in Hogya, the district court's final judgment is before us, and we may affirm that judgment if we conclude that, at trial, UPS satisfied one of FEHA's defenses to liability. 60