Opinion ID: 6215723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Asportation Element

Text: ¶27 The supplemental instruction was also incorrect as to the asportation element because the trial court omitted half of the definition of asportation. As noted, the plain language of section 18-3-302(1) requires that the defendant (1) seized the victim and (2) carried the victim “from one place to another.” The supplemental instruction omits “from one place to another.” Garcia argues that the supplemental instruction accordingly allows a conviction even if the defendant does not carry the victim from one place to another. More specifically, he again asserts that the instruction makes “any movement” of the victim kidnapping. We agree that the supplemental instruction misstates the asportation element. ¶28 We carry out our duty to discern legislative intent through the plain language of the kidnapping statute by giving the phrase “from one place to 13 another” effect. In doing so, we, again, avoid reading the statute in a manner that would render the phrase superfluous. See McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. As “[w]e have consistently held[,] . . . the asportation element of second degree kidnapping is that the defendant moved the victim from one place to another.” Harlan, 8 P.3d at 476–77. To be sure, “substantial movement of the victim is not required” to satisfy the asportation element. People v. Fuller, 791 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo. 1990). Rather, we have upheld convictions with even minimal movement, as long as that movement was “from one place to another,” as required by the statute. See, e.g., Apodaca, 712 P.2d at 475; Yescas v. People, 593 P.2d 358, 359–60 (Colo. 1979). ¶29 Certainly, evidence that the defendant moved a victim will often fulfill the requirement that the defendant also moved the victim from one place to another. See, e.g., People v. Abbott, 690 P.2d 1263, 1270 (Colo. 1984) (explaining that movement of the victims from the front of a store to a trailer behind the store fulfilled the requirement of movement from one place to another). But proof that a defendant moved a victim does not always also constitute proof that the defendant moved the victim from one place to another. See, e.g., Harlan, 8 P.3d at 477 (explaining that “[i]n some cases, the factual circumstances presented at trial do not make it clear whether the defendant moved the victim from one place to another,” even when it is clear that the defendant did move the victim). 14 ¶30 Again, this case illustrates the point because the erroneous supplemental instruction would have allowed the jury to convict Garcia—even if it believed his sons’ testimony—simply because Kaehne somehow “moved, however short in distance” from inside the car to the alley. That is not second degree kidnapping.