Opinion ID: 776773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amount of drugs attributable to Lucas

Text: 27 Lucas next argues that the district court erred in finding that he was accountable for the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine that were originally concealed in Horton's car. According to Lucas, the evidence at the sentencing hearing established that he was responsible for only one ounce of crack cocaine. In addition, Lucas contends that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on him with regard to the drug quantity determination. 28 We review the findings of fact that a district court makes at a sentencing hearing under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 651 (6th Cir.2001). A district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous if, based on the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Sanford v. Harvard Indus., Inc., 262 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, the government must prove the quantity of drugs attributable to a particular defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 249 (6th Cir.1996). 29 Lucas contends that the district court's drug quantity determination was clearly erroneous because of: (1) the alleged inconsistencies in Horton's testimony, (2) the possibility that Horton fabricated his testimony to reduce his potential sentence, and (3) the presence of only $1,870 in Lucas's apartment, an amount that is clearly insufficient to purchase 595.8 grams of crack cocaine. 30 Although these considerations might raise doubts about the quantity of drugs that Lucas expected to receive, we conclude that the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Regarding Horton's testimony, the district court considered Lucas's allegations and determined that Horton was a credible witness. We find no reason to substitute our judgment for the credibility determinations of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe Horton's testimony and assess his demeanor on the witness stand. See Peveler v. United States, 269 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir.2001) (refusing to second-guess the credibility determination of the magistrate judge, based upon the general reluctance of this court to set aside credibility determinations made by the trier of fact, who has had the opportunity to view the witness on the stand and assess his demeanor). 31 In addition, the amount of money found in Lucas's apartment has little probative value, because the government presented testimony that drug dealers often work on consignment. Lucas's reliance on this evidence to support his argument that the district court committed clear error in attributing the entire quantity of drugs to him is therefore misplaced. 32 Finally, Lucas overlooks several key pieces of evidence that support the district court's finding. Most importantly, Horton testified that he was acting pursuant to Lucas's instructions when he met the man who turned over the package containing the 595.8 grams of crack cocaine. The district court also noted that although Lucas claimed that he limited his dealing to one-ounce quantities of crack cocaine, the entire shipment would have constituted only about 21 one-ounce parcels, which is not an overwhelmingly large inventory. Furthermore, the presence of 600 plastic baggies with their corners cut out in Lucas's apartment, resulting in as many as 1,200 drug-carrying containers, supports a finding that Lucas was a high-volume drug dealer who had experience selling large quantities of drugs. 33 As an additional matter, Lucas argues that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on him with regard to the quantity of drugs. His contention is based upon the following comment made by the district court at the sentencing hearing: 34 What we do know from certainty is that this [the crack cocaine] was coming here [to Louisville] and going to Mr. Lucas and but for the traffic stop of Mr. Horton, it would have ended up here. So I am going to overrule your objection on the quantity, Mr. Bouldin [Lucas's counsel], and find that you simply have not sustained the burden of proof necessary to lower this by indicating or finding that the quantity was less than what the shipment encompassed and that the government, through its evidence, has sustained its burden to show that it's more likely than not that it was, in fact, headed to Mr. Lucas. 35 Although this statement is not a model of clarity, we conclude that, contrary to Lucas's belief, the district court did not apply a hybrid burden of proof. Instead, the comment reflects the court's finding that the government had satisfied its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Lucas should be held responsible for the entire 595.8 grams of crack cocaine, and that Lucas failed to present sufficient evidence to counter the government's proof. 36 For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court's determination that Lucas was responsible for the entire quantity of drugs was not clearly erroneous, and that the district court did not improperly apply the burden of proof in making its finding.