Opinion ID: 1759877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prospective Juror 57

Text: ¶ 70. Scott argues that the trial court erred in striking jurors who stated in the abstract that they opposed the death penalty but stated they could follow the law. The only juror that Scott alleged was improperly struck was Juror 57, Alma Wallace. The State contends that no objection was made by the defense, therefore procedurally barring the issue. The record contains an extensive individual voir dire on the State's challenge as to Juror 57 being stricken for cause. The record reflects the following exchange transpired: The Court: Ms. Wallace, did you indicate to us on yesterday that you are opposed to the death penalty? Juror 57: Yes, I did. The Court: Since you tell me you are, would the fact that your sitting on the jury involving potential consideration of the death sentence, would that in any way hinder you in reaching a verdict on the guilt phase or affect your ability to vote guilty or not guilty in the guilty phase. Juror 57: No. The Court: It wouldn't? Juror 57: No. The Court: If you're a member of the jury that return a verdict of guilty of capital murder in the guilt phase, would you automatically vote against the death penalty, even if the facts justify the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the law given to you by the Court allowed the death penalty to be returned by unanimous vote of the jury? Juror 57: Right. The Court: You're saying you would not automatically vote against the death penalty or you would automatically vote against the death penalty? Juror 57: I wouldn't automatically vote against it. The Court: What are some of the things you would take into consideration before you would vote one way or the other? Juror 57: Just the evidence, I guess.... The Court: The jury, on which you sit, has already under this analogy, reached a verdict of guilty. Now Mr. Mellen [State] has put on facts and circumstances showing why the death penalty should be imposed. Mr. Wong [Defense] will then have an opportunity to put on evidence to show why the death penalty should not be imposed. Now, could you made up your mind  would you make up your mind only after they have put on this evidence, or just because you're against the death penalty, you would vote against the death penalty regardless? Juror 57: I'd wait until after. The Court: Okay. You will wait until after. You'll sit objectively, in a fair and impartial manner, and listen to both sides. If the facts justified it and the law allow it, could you then vote to impose death? Juror 57: Yes. The Court: And if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, could you vote for life without parole? Juror 57: Yes.... State: What did you mean when you said that you are against the death penalty? Juror 57: I just don't believe that I could really vote for it. State: Okay. So in no circumstance would you vote for it because of your beliefs? Juror 57: Would I vote for the  State: For the death. Juror 57: Just because of my beliefs? State: Yeah. Juror 57: No. State: Are you saying you could not vote for death? Juror 57: I could vote for it, but it  really. State: Okay. Do you fell[feel] like you could not vote for the death sentence on somebody right now? Juror 57: Well. State: You're not sure? Juror 57: No. State: You know, the Judge asked those question. Did you understand that when he was talking about weighing and all that? Juror 57: I understand it, but I don't really get it. State: Well, it's difficult. I mean, we understand that. That's the only thing, maybe, we understand. But when the  when the jury decides, if they give the penalty of  or find him guilty of capital murder, then the jury has to decide if he gets death or not. And just simply from the evidence, from those things to justify the death penalty and then those things that would justify not giving death is a weighing for the jury. And some jurors simply cannot give death; just say they're against it. Some say they could follow the law and would do the weighing process. How do you feel, that you could not  Juror 57: I don't think I could do that. State: That's all. The Court: Mr. Wong. Defense: Ms. Wallace, let me see if I can try to clarify. You have  your opinion is, you are against the death penalty; is that correct? Juror 57: Yes. Defense: All right. But what is required if you are seated as a penalty phase juror, is that you must follow the law that's given to you by the Court, even though you have an opinion against the death penalty. Do you understand that? Juror 57: Uh-huh (affirmative response). Defense: You have to answer for her. Juror 57: Yes, sir. Defense: What the Court is asking you, is that you are sitting in the penalty phase. Juror 57: Uh-huh (affirmative response). Defense: You will follow the law as given to you by the Court in making your determination of life or death based on the aggravating circumstances that are presented to you and the mitigating circumstances that are given to you. From that, you must decide which weighs more. And for the  from that, you will make a decision whether life or death is the appropriate penalty. Do you understand that? Juror 57: Yes. Defense: And it will require you to put aside you opinion about the death penalty and follow the law of the case  in the penalty phase. And the question is, could you do that? Even if  even when the facts justify and the law allows it, could you impose the death penalty? That is the question. Juror 57: I don't  I don't think I can. Defense: All right. The Court: Thank you very much. (JUROR 57 EXCUSED FROM CHAMBERS.) (emphasis added). ¶ 71. The State submits that Juror 57 concluded that she could not impose the death penalty, and at a minimum, she definitely equivocated back and forth. Based on the record this Court agrees. This Court has examined the proper standard for exclusion of a juror in death penalty cases under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), as follows: In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the United States Supreme Court attempted to clarify the Witherspoon juror exclusion standard in death penalty cases. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The proper standard it as follows: is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. We note that, in addition to dispensing with Witherspoon's reference to automatic decision making, this standard likewise does not require that a juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of catechism .... many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings .... there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law .... deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-53; Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 345 (Miss.1988) (judgment vacated and case remanded in light of Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990)); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1335 (Miss.1987); Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 53-54 (Miss.1985). However, jurors who oppose the death penalty or believe it unjust, may serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50 (1986); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 128 (Miss.1991). Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 755 (Miss.1992) (quoting Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53). ¶ 72. In Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152, 1186-87 (Miss.1998), this Court was faced with a factually similar situation. Manning was convicted in the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County, Mississippi, on two counts of capital murder while engaged in commission of a robbery and was sentenced to death. Id. at 1152-53. Manning argued that potential juror, Chanteau Bowens, was excluded for cause in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). In Manning, the Court stated: Manning argues that it is clear from the record that Bowens was able to consider the death penalty, and that her statements concerning the imposition of it were unequivocal. This contention is not supported by the record. On her jury questionnaire Bowens stated that she could never vote to impose the death penalty. On individual voir dire, Bowens equivocated back and forth. She first said that she could give the death penalty if it was due. She also said that at the beginning of the sentencing phase she would be favoring life over death. Then, she again stated that if the evidence warranted it, she could give the death penalty. Next, she said that given the two options, she would have to choose life over death. Then, one more time, she said that she could vote for the death penalty.... It is clear from a reading of the record that Bowens was excused, over defense objection, because of her equivocation on the death penalty.... Affording the appropriate deference to the trial judge who saw and heard Bowens, we cannot say that he abused his discretion. Manning, 726 So.2d at 1186-87 (emphasis added). ¶ 73. This Court has held that the trial judge has wide discretion in determining whether to excuse any prospective juror, including one challenged for cause. King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 887 (Miss.2001). A trial judge does not commit reversible error by excusing for cause a prospective juror who gave contradictory responses, wavered on their position, and generally appeared confused regarding the death penalty issue. Id. at 888 (citing Dufour v. State, 453 So.2d 337, 341-45 (Miss.1984)). ¶ 74. This Court finds that this issue is without merit. Clearly, Juror 57 went back and forth on the death penalty issue. In fact, the record reflects that the last response given by Juror 57 was I don't think I can, when asked for the last time if she could impose the death penalty. Therefore, we find that after conducting an individual voir dire of Juror 57, the trial court did not err in striking Juror 57 for cause.