Opinion ID: 3047100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: 1997 OIG Report

Text: In April 1997, while Trepal’s 3.850 appeal was pending in the Florida Supreme Court, the OIG Report issued. Among other things, the OIG Report criticized some of Martz’s testimony about Q1, Q2, and Q3 in the Trepal case. The OIG’s main criticism was that Martz’s testimony as to Q1 through Q3 was “stronger than his analytical results would support.” The OIG Report admitted “Martz could have properly opined that certain samples were consistent with thallium nitrate having been added to them.” However, the OIG Report criticized Martz for testifying that “thallium nitrate was added to the Coca-Cola” and that, in his opinion, thallium nitrate was in the Q1, Q2, and Q3 samples. The OIG Report also pointed out that Martz had run DP tests on Q1, Q2, and Q3 but IC tests on only Q1 and Q2. Because Martz did not run an IC test on Q3 (contrary to his trial testimony), the OIG Report opined that Martz did not have an analytical basis for stating Q3 was even consistent with the addition of nitrate. Third, the OIG Report faulted Martz’s trial testimony about the number of tests he performed. Martz was asked whether he had performed any tests other than the DP test to determine if there was thallium nitrate in the Coca-Cola samples, and Martz answered that he had done “one other test,” IC. But in fact Martz ran other tests besides DP and IC, which he did not mention at trial. Fourth, 26 the OIG Report criticized Martz for not performing certain additional tests such as (1) the “validation experiment of adding thallium nitrate to known unadulterated Coca-Cola” and running the DP and IC tests on this known sample, and (2) quantifying the nitrate he identified in Q1 through Q3 and comparing the amount of nitrate to the amount of thallium that Havekost found in those samples. Additionally, the OIG Report indicated that Martz’s notes were lacking in detail and in some instances inaccurate. The OIG Report concluded that Martz’s work on the Trepal case demonstrated “a lower threshold of scientific proof than is generally accepted in forensic science” and a “lack [of] appropriate scientific rigor in [Martz’s] approach to examinations.” I. Remand and Another 3.850 Evidentiary Hearing in Trial Court After the OIG Report was issued, and upon Trepal’s motion, the Florida Supreme Court stayed Trepal’s appeal and relinquished jurisdiction to the 3.850 court. Trepal then amended his Rule 3.850 motion to raise, among other things, a Giglio claim as to his convictions. The 3.850 court held an evidentiary hearing.
Trepal’s first witness was Martz. Martz discussed his methodology and testimony and acknowledged some errors, but ultimately held fast to his opinion at 27 trial that thallium nitrate had been added to Q1, Q2, and Q3, the full Coca-Cola bottles. Martz believed the OIG Report contained three major criticisms of his work in the Trepal case: (1) Martz gave a stronger opinion than the OIG believed was warranted when he opined the thallium nitrate “was added” to the samples instead of the results being “consistent with thallium nitrate having been added”; (2) Martz’s notes were incomplete and in places inaccurate; and (3) Martz said all three samples Q1 through Q3 were tested for nitrate, but Q3 was not tested using the IC. Martz acknowledged he could have done a better job of taking notes, and he erred in not mentioning that he did not run the IC test on Q3. But neither failure affected his final report or final opinion. Martz’s opinion was still that thallium nitrate was added to the Coca-Cola. Martz testified that “in hindsight, [he] probably should have” tested all three samples using the IC test, but “a lot of time if we have multiple samples, we wouldn’t test all of them. We would test a representative sample for the confirmatory test just to speed things up.” As to Q3, Martz did no other tests besides the DP test. Martz justified his conclusion that Q3 had nitrate in it, despite only running one test on that sample: I have 25 years of experience testing samples that are associated with 28 the case and doing representative samples from those cases, that if you take two out of three of the samples, they both have thallium in it, two of the three have nitrate, and the third one has a presumptive test for nitrate, I used my 25 years—or 20 years of experience working these type of cases to conclude that the third sample, even though I didn’t do the confirmative test, the only logical explanation would be nitrate. Martz also explained that the DP test is a presumptive screening test for oxidizing agents, such as nitrates. The DP test was positive for Q1, Q2, and Q3, and negative for an unadulterated Coca-Cola sample. A positive result is indicated by a blue color. At Trepal’s trial, Martz testified that when you pour DP into a solution that contains a nitrate, “you get a blue color.” However, that testimony failed to acknowledge that “there’s other chemicals that will give a blue color” in a DP test. Although Martz had first testified at trial that his conclusion that thallium nitrate was added to the Coca-Cola was based on the DP test, later in his trial testimony he clarified that he had also relied on the IC test results in reaching that conclusion.15 Martz testified that the IC is used as a “confirmatory test” to confirm the 15 Martz conducted four other tests on the Coca-Cola bottle samples: mass spectrometry (“MS”), x-ray diffraction (“XRD”), scanning electron microscopy (“SEM”), and liquid chromatography (“LC”). Martz’s MS testing of the samples “wasn’t successful,” and he did not rely on it for any of his conclusions. Martz tested the Q1 sample, but not Q2 or Q3, using XRD and SEM. The tests other than DP “were to give [Martz] negative results, and [he] didn’t need to repeat them on the other samples.” In short, Martz did not mention the testing other than DP and IC because his “opinion was basically . . . from the [DP] test and the [IC].” 29 results of the DP test. However, without a positive result on both tests, Martz “would not call it a positive nitrate.” Martz acknowledged that neither the DP nor the IC tests alone provide positive identification for nitrate (by themselves, each test can at best produce results “consistent with” nitrate). But Martz stated that if both tests are positive, then in his opinion you have proven the presence of nitrate. And, both the DP and IC tests were positive for the Coca-Cola in Q1 and Q2. Martz stated that “generally in forensic science, you do a multiple of tests, at least two, in order to prove something is present because of the fact that you can get false positives.” In the State’s cross-examination, Martz pointed out that the OIG never said Martz’s actual testing of the samples in the Trepal case was done improperly. The OIG merely questioned the documentation and testimony. Martz also opined that “based on the data [he] provided,” he did not believe anyone could say thallium nitrate was not added to the Coca-Cola samples. That is because thallium is present and there are elevated levels of nitrate.16 16 At the 3.850 hearing, two other FBI toxicology experts testified: (1) Thomas Jourdan, who worked in the FBI Lab’s Chemistry and Toxicology Unit from 1992 to 1997 and served as chief of the Materials and Devices Unit since 1997; and (2) Steven Burmeister, the chief of the FBI Lab’s Chemistry and Toxicology Unit. Both agreed that to a reasonable scientific certainty, thallium nitrate was added to Q1 and Q2, and they gave reasons for their opinions. Both could not testify as to Q3 because no IC test was run on Q3. In its ruling, the 3.850 court discounted the testimony of Jourdan and Burmeister, so we do not rely on it. 30
Trepal’s main witness in the state collateral proceeding was Marland Dulaney, Jr., a consulting toxicologist. Dulaney opined that he could not rely on the IC charts to a “reasonable scientific certainty” because Martz did not run proper standards and blanks. Martz did not run chloride or sulfate standards to confirm where chloride and sulfate ions appeared on the charts. Martz ran a nitrate standard, but did so by adding known nitrate to water, not to Coca-Cola. Dulaney did not dispute that thallium was present in the Coca-Cola samples. But Dulaney opined that all one can say with reasonable scientific certainty about Q1, Q2, and Q3 is that they contain thallium. Dulaney could not rule out the possibility that thallium nitrate was added to the Coca-Cola samples. Moreover, Dulaney could not testify that the thallium salt present in the Q samples was something other than thallium I nitrate, because he had insufficient information. Dulaney testified that Martz’s “approach is so bad, . . . it has so many holes that anybody can say anything that they want, because they have to make assumptions, and if you assume this and this and this, then this is true.” But the data provided no way to test the assumptions. Based on his review of the data, Dulaney opined that the conclusion that thallium nitrate was added to Q1 and Q2 cannot be made to a reasonable degree of 31 scientific certainty. According to Dulaney, adding nitrate to Coca-Cola and running an IC on it was “the fundamental step that would allow us to say that thallium nitrate was added to Coca-Cola,” and that was not done.
Frederic Whitehurst, the former FBI Lab examiner whose complaints began the OIG investigation, worked in the FBI Lab from 1986 to 1998. Whitehurst’s area of expertise was explosives, but he was familiar with the tests and equipment used in the Trepal case. Whitehurst opined that the IC testing in the Trepal case did not meet acceptable scientific standards. Whitehurst agreed with Dulaney that Martz should have run a standard in Coca-Cola instead of water “to see what effect the Coke and the instrument has on the chromatography.” Nonetheless, Whitehurst had no doubt that thallium was found in the CocaCola. But Whitehurst believed there were “too many unknowns” to conclude which form of thallium was added. However, Whitehurst admitted that, based on the test results he reviewed, Q1 and Q2 are consistent with thallium nitrate having been added to them, and neither he nor anyone else could, based on the data available, rule out thallium nitrate having been added to the samples. In 32 Whitehurst’s opinion, there was not enough data to say one way or another.17 J. Denial of Trepal’s Amended Rule 3.850 Motion On October 26, 2000, the 3.850 court issued a 36-page order denying Trepal’s amended Rule 3.850 motion. The 3.850 court found that “[n]o real attack [was] made on the findings of Q206,” the brown bottle from Trepal’s garage. Thus, the court limited its discussion on the testing of Q206 to the relationship of Q206 to Q1, Q2, and Q3, the samples from the full Coca-Cola bottles. As to Q1, Q2, and Q3, the 3.850 court found the following instances of false testimony by Martz at Trepal’s trial: (1) Martz stated a positive DP test indicates the presence of a nitrate (instead of saying the presence of an oxidizing ion, of which nitrate is an example); (2) Martz stated nitrate was not present in the unadulterated Coca-Cola (whereas the IC results indicated a nitrate could be present, although the DP test was negative); (3) Martz stated he ran IC tests on Q1, Q2, and Q3 (when he only tested Q1 and Q2); (4) Martz did not reveal he performed additional testing on the Q samples (beyond the DP and IC tests he 17 Trepal’s trial attorneys Jonathan Stidham and Dabney Conner testified at the 3.850 evidentiary hearing. Stidham and Conner testified that the comparison of the contents of the Q206 bottle to the Q1 through Q3 Coca-Cola bottles was important to the case, and thus defense counsel hired their own chemistry expert to try to disprove that the thallium in the Coca-Cola bottles came from Q206. However, the defense expert was not able to do so, and so they did not call him to testify. The defense expert’s analysis did not replicate Martz’s work and proceeded along completely different lines. 33 discussed at trial); and (5) Martz stated that the tests indicated thallium nitrate was added to Q1, Q2, and Q3 (instead of that the test results were consistent with thallium nitrate having been added to Q1 and Q2, and consistent with an oxidizing ion being present in Q3). The 3.850 court called Martz’s trial conduct “outrageous and shocking,” but noted that regardless, to prevail on any of his claims, Trepal must show he was prejudiced. Thus, “the court must look to the effect the evidence would have on the jury verdict, both in the guilt phase and the penalty phase.” As to Trepal’s Giglio claim, the 3.850 court discussed the materiality standard, as follows: [Trepal] claims a violation of Giglio for use of false testimony at trial. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). . . . Giglio holds that a conviction based on false or perjured testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known was false, violates due process when such information is material. The materiality prong is the same as that used in Brady. See Rose v. State, WL 1508576 (Fla. 2000). False information is material if “there is a reasonable likelihood that it could have [a]ffected the jury verdict.” Id. The 3.850 court determined that the materiality question “implies a comparison” between Martz’s “actual testimony” at trial and “what Martz could have truthfully testified to at trial.” Denying relief, the 3.850 court concluded that Trepal could not show 34 prejudice. The 3.850 court found that “given the test results that Martz could have rightfully testified about and considering all the other evidence in the case,” there was “no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different.”18 K. Rule 3.850 Appeal Trepal appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion to the Florida Supreme Court, which affirmed. Trepal v. State, 846 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2003) (“Trepal II”), receded from in part by Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 506 (Fla. 2003). As to Trepal’s Giglio claim, the Florida Supreme Court quoted at length the 3.850 court’s order. Trepal II, 846 So. 2d at 410-26. In particular, the Florida Supreme Court quoted the 3.850 court’s statements that: (1) the Giglio “materiality prong is the same as that used in Brady”; (2) “[f]alse information is material if ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that it could have affected the jury verdict’”; (3) in conducting the Giglio analysis, Martz’s “actual testimony should be compared to what Martz could have truthfully testified to at trial”; (4) in the 18 In full, the 3.850 court said: As to the guilt phase, the court finds . . . that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different. This case was based almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. The testing results of the Coke samples and Q206 were the only direct evidence of Trepal’s guilt. Even so, given the test results that Martz could have rightfully testified about and considering all the other evidence in the case, the court finds no reasonable likelihood that the guilt phase results would have been different. Although this is a circumstantial evidence case, the evidence was strong. Turning to the penalty phase, . . . . [t]he court finds that there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different. . . . 35 guilt phase, “there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different”; and (5) in the penalty phase, “there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different.” Trepal II, 846 So. 2d at 425-26 (emphasis added and omitted). The Florida Supreme Court then set forth its own analysis.19 Id. at 426-28. The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the 3.850 court’s conclusion “that Trepal was not impermissibly prejudiced by the testimony of Martz.” Id. at 426. To explain why, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the 3.850 court’s findings on specific false or misleading statements Martz made at Trepal’s trial: In the present case, the circuit court found that the following statements made at trial by Martz were improper for the following reasons: - Martz stated: “And when you pour that [i.e., diphenylamine or DP] into a solution which contains a nitrate you get a blue color.” (The circuit court, however, found as follows: when you pour DP into a solution that contains an oxidizing ion—which may or may not be a nitrate—you get a blue color.) - Martz stated: “Based on that test [i.e., the DP test] I concluded that thallium nitrate was added to the Coca-Cola.” (The circuit court, however, found as follows: all that could be concluded based on the DP test—in conjunction with the other tests—was that the test results were consistent with the presence of thallium nitrate.) - Martz stated: “No nitrates were present in the unadulterated Coca-Cola.” (The circuit court, however, found as follows: ion 19 The Florida Supreme Court noted that the Martz testimony claim involved a mixed question of law and fact. Trepal II, 846 So. 2d at 426. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the 3.850 court’s “ultimate ruling” de novo but its factual findings based on whether they were “supported by competent substantial evidence.” Id. at 427. 36 chromatography or IC testing showed the presence of a substance that could have been a nitrate in the unadulterated Coke.) - “In this particular case, when I tested the Coca-Cola [via IC] the results were positive for the nitrate ion.” (The circuit court, however, found as follows: the IC test can show only the presence of an oxidizing ion—which may or may not be a nitrate.) - Martz was asked: “Did you test each of the samples on the ion chromatograph to determine whether nitrate was present?” He responded: “Yes, I did.” (The circuit court, however, found as follows: Martz did not test each sample. He did not test the third sample, i.e., Q3, on the ion chromatograph.) - Martz stated: “On three samples that I tested, all three contained nitrate ions.” (The circuit court, however, found as follows: on two samples that Martz tested, all that he appropriately could have attested to was that the tests were consistent with the presence of a nitrate; and that on the third sample, the tests were consistent with the presence of an oxidizing ion—which may or may not have been a nitrate.) - Martz was asked: “Based on those two tests [i.e., DP and IC], is it your opinion that what was in those three Coca-Colas, sir, was thallium nitrate?” He responded: “That is correct.” (The circuit court, however, found—as noted above—that all that Martz appropriately could have attested to was that the tests were consistent with the presence of thallium nitrate.) Id. at 427 (brackets in original). The Florida Supreme Court then noted unchallenged, incriminating facts that existed regardless of Martz’s false testimony: Regardless of the above improprieties in the testimony of Martz (and regardless of the improprieties in his testing practices and omissions in his testimony), the following conclusions nevertheless can properly be drawn from the present record: [1.] Peggy Carr died from ingesting thallium (of an undetermined type). [2.] Of the various forms of thallium, only thallium sulfate and 37 thallium nitrate (sub-group I) dissolve in Coca-Cola without changing the appearance of the Coke or foaming out of the bottle. [3.] The brown bottle found in Trepal’s garage contained (a) thallium, and (b) an oxidizing ion consistent with the presence of a nitrate. [4.] Five empty Coca-Cola bottles found in the Carr household contained thallium (of an undetermined type). [5.] Tests on two unopened bottles of Coca-Cola found in the Carr household (a) showed the presence of thallium, and (b) yielded results that were consistent with the presence of a nitrate. [6.] Tests on a third unopened bottle of Coca-Cola found in the Carr household (a) showed the presence of thallium, and (b) yielded results that were consistent with the presence of an oxidizing ion (which may or may not have been a nitrate). Id. at 427-28. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the 3.850 court’s “factual findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, and the court properly concluded—based on those findings—that the prejudice suffered by Trepal was insufficient to warrant a new trial. We find no error.” Id. at 428. The Florida Supreme Court’s majority opinion did not state explicitly what materiality standard it was applying, and did not comment upon (whether to approve or disapprove) the materiality standard applied by the 3.850 court. In a special concurrence, two Florida Supreme Court justices clarified the different prejudice standards relating to Brady and Giglio claims. Trepal II, 846 So. 2d at 437 (Pariente, J., concurring). The concurrence explained its view that 38 the 3.850 court incorrectly stated that the Brady and Giglio materiality standards were identical. Id. at 438-39. Nevertheless, the justices concurred because, even if Martz’s false testimony satisfied the other elements of the Giglio test, the testimony “could not have led the jury to find other than that Trepal intentionally poisoned his neighbors with thallium, resulting in the death of Peggy Carr.” Id. at 439. Several months after Trepal II, the Florida Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, noted its precedent lacked clarity and explained that the Brady and Giglio materiality standards are different. Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 50506 (Fla. 2003). Under Brady, one must show “a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have produced a different verdict,” whereas under Giglio, one must show that “there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 506 (emphasis added). After Guzman, Trepal moved the Florida Supreme Court to reopen his appeal. Trepal argued that he was entitled to a new trial or, at least, a remand to the 3.850 court for a proper Giglio analysis. On December 6, 2004, in an unpublished decision, the Florida Supreme Court summarily denied relief “on the merits.” 39 L. Federal Habeas Proceedings On August 17, 2005, Trepal filed in the district court his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Trepal’s § 2254 petition claimed, inter alia, that Martz’s false testimony violated Giglio. On June 15, 2010, the district court issued a 75-page order denying Trepal’s § 2254 petition. The district court concluded Trepal did not show that the Florida Supreme Court’s Trepal II decision was contrary to or based on an unreasonable application of Giglio. The district court granted Trepal a COA on “[w]hether the decision in Trepal II, 846 So. 2d at 428—that ‘the prejudice suffered by Trepal as a result of Martz’s improprieties was insufficient to warrant a new trial’—is objectively unreasonable.”20 Trepal appealed to this Court.