Opinion ID: 1169826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Right to Self-representation

Text: Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution, the accused in a criminal proceeding has a right to the assistance of counsel and the correlative right to proceed without counsel. ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 807 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2527].) As the United States Supreme Court explained in Faretta : The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who must be `informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,' who must be `confronted with the witnesses against him,' and who must be accorded `compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Although not stated in the Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representation  to make one's own defense personally  is thus necessarily implied by the structure of the [Sixth] Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. ( Id. at pp. 819-820 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2533], fn. omitted.) The constitutional right to conduct one's own defense has two characteristics that are often overlooked or misunderstood. First, it is an independent constitutional right found in the structure and history of the constitutional text. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 819-820 & fn. 15 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2533].) As the Faretta court stated, the right of self-representation is equal, not inferior, to the right to counsel. ( Id. at p. 832 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2539].) [1] Second, the choice of self-representation is personal to the defendant. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. ( Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834 [95 S.Ct. at p. 2541].) Indeed, the high court has said that the right to self-representation exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity and autonomy. ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 178 [104 S.Ct. 944, 951, 79 L.Ed.2d 122].) Therefore, so long as the defendant is mentally competent, it is irrelevant whether others consider the defendant's decision unwise. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 399 [113 S.Ct. 2680, 2686, 125 L.Ed.2d 321]; Faretta v. California, supra, at p. 836 [95 S.Ct. at pp. 2541-2542].) Just as important, it matters not what the defendant's motivation is unless it is a desire to disrupt the trial proceedings. (See Adams v. Carroll (9th Cir.1989) 875 F.2d 1441, 1444-1445; Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 891-892 [144 Cal. Rptr. 610, 576 P.2d 93].) Thus, a defendant's invocation of the right to self-representation is valid even if asserted in response to a trial court's ruling the defendant did not like. ( Adams v. Carroll, supra, at p. 1445 [defendant's assertion of right to self-representation conditioned on, and in reaction to, court order does not make assertion equivocal].) A trial court must honor a request for self-representation when the defendant unequivocally asserts it within a reasonable time before trial and does not do so to delay or disrupt the proceedings. (See, e.g., People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187]; U.S. v. George (9th Cir.1995) 56 F.3d 1078, 1084; Adams v. Carroll, supra, 875 F.2d at p. 1444; U.S. v. Flewitt (9th Cir.1989) 874 F.2d 669, 674.) Here, defendant unequivocally asserted his right to defend himself, and there is no evidence that he did so to delay or disrupt the proceedings, as discussed below. [2]