Opinion ID: 1580987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: preservation of constitutional challenges to the statute

Text: Before considering the constitutionality of the statute, we first consider whether the Osterbergs waived their constitutional arguments. In their amended answer, the Osterbergs argued that allowance of damages sought by Plaintiff ... would violate the freedom of speech and association clauses of the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. In their motion for directed verdict, the Osterbergs reiterated that [i]mposing the restrictions of the reporting and expenditure requirements of a specific political committee, along with the accompanying penalties, on your Defendants would be a violation of the free speech and association clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions, and explained that [t]hese restrictions burden the exercise of political speech and are not narrowly enough focused to serve a compelling interest of the state. In their motion to modify judgment and alternative motion for new trial the Osterbergs again raised these issues, stating that Chapter[s] 253 and 254 of the Texas Election Code, as applied to this case, are not narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest and are therefore in violation of the free speech and association clauses of the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. These post-verdict motions also alleged, for the first time, that the phrase acting in concert with one or more persons [5] is unconstitutionally vague. The Osterbergs asserted these constitutional defenses in four points of error on appeal. The court of appeals ruled that the Osterbergs waived their constitutional arguments because they asserted only broadly stated allegations, unsupported by further argument or evidence, which were insufficient to call the multiple specific constitutional challenges ... to the attention of the trial court. 952 S.W.2d at 125. The court of appeals also held that the Osterbergs could not raise their vagueness challenges for the first time in post-verdict motions. See id. (citing McCraw v. Vickers, 717 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The Osterbergs argue that the court of appeals erred in holding that they waived their First Amendment arguments. We agree. When deciding if a party has waived its federal constitutional claims in state court, we look first to Texas's procedural rules that govern when a party must raise those claims. [6] If we conclude that waiver has occurred under those rules, we then consider whether those procedural grounds are adequate as a matter of substantive federal constitutional law to protect the constitutional interests at stake. See, e.g., Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 282, 52 S.Ct. 556, 76 L.Ed. 1102 (1932) (Even though the claimed constitutional protection be denied on non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision of the state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis.). Applying Texas procedural rules, we consider whether the Osterbergs raised their federal free speech and association arguments with sufficient specificity to give the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issues. See Tex.R.APP. P. 52(a) (Tex. Sup.Ct. and Tex.Crim.App.1986, amended 1988, 1989, 1990, superseded 1997) (In order to preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling he desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context.); [7] McKinney v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 772 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.1989); see also In the Interest of Shaw, 966 S.W.2d 174, 182 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.) (The purpose of the requirement that a specific objection be lodged in the trial court is to ensure that the trial court has the opportunity to rule on the issue.). In their answer and their motion for directed verdict, the Osterbergs identified the constitutional rights at issue and the statutory provisions that, when applied, allegedly violate them. Although the statements in the pleading and motion were not paragons of specificity, they nevertheless identified for the trial court the issue to be ruled on and provided the trial court the opportunity to rule. We hold that the Osterbergs did not waive their First Amendment defenses to the application of Chapter 253. Concern for protecting First Amendment rights also supports this holding. When freedom of speech is at issue, the Supreme Court will find waiver only in circumstances that are clear and compelling. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). This case does not provide clear and compelling circumstances to justify finding that the Osterbergs' First Amendment arguments are waived. Although we decide the extent to which the United States Constitution protects the Osterbergs' conduct, we do not consider the extent to which the Texas Constitution provides an independent basis for protection because the Osterbergs furnished argument and authority only under the United States Constitution. Though noting that the Texas Constitution may provide broader free speech protections, the Osterbergs stated in their brief that [b]ecause the judgment here is unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution, it is not necessary to determine the independent ground of whether it is unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution. The Osterbergs thus provide no rationale to support a conclusion based on the Texas Constitution that differs from what the Federal Constitution allows. We thus consider only the Osterbergs' First Amendment arguments. See In re Bay Area Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse, 982 S.W.2d 371, 375 n. 4 (Tex.1998) (declining to consider whether the Texas Constitution provides an independent basis for protection); Tilton v. Moye, 869 S.W.2d 955, 956 n. 2 (Tex.1994) (same).