Opinion ID: 2259309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: .... THE COURT: All right.

Text: Id. at 30, 590 A.2d at 551 (alteration in original). In contrast to the case sub judice, the defendant in Tibbs was given no explanation of the nature of a jury trial. The advice given was limited to questions relating to voluntariness, i.e., that Tibbs was not coerced or placed under duress in waiving his jury trial right. The record in the present case reflects a more extensive litany, notwithstanding that no specific advisement of the unanimity requirement was given. The trial judge explained to respondent the other fundamentals of a jury trial: that a jury would consist of twelve people and that, under either choice, the trier of fact would have to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Respondent and his trial counsel also had discussed the right to a jury trial prior to the hearing. Cf. State v. Kenney, 327 Md. 354, 364, 609 A.2d 337, 342 (1992) (holding defense counsel's on-record waiver on client's behalf of right to twelve-person jury after off-record discussion with him was valid). We may presume that respondent's counsel fully informed him of his rights during their pre-trial discussion. Id. at 362, 609 A.2d at 341 (citing Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 515, 206 A.2d 802, 806 (1965); Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 39, 192 A.2d 73, 77, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 886, 84 S.Ct. 160, 11 L.Ed.2d 115 (1963)). See also Ayala v. State, 226 Md. 488, 493, 174 A.2d 160, 163 (1961) (noting presumption that an attorney will conduct himself as the law and his duty require him to do. (citing Woodell v. State, 223 Md. 89, 95, 162 A.2d 468, 472 (1960))). The trial court completed the waiver inquiry by asking whether respondent had any questions or did not understand anything that had transpired, to which he replied: No, ma'am. The record, therefore, reflects that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant had some knowledge of his jury trial rights, at least enough to satisfy the trial court that respondent knowingly waived his jury trial right. See Tibbs, 323 Md. at 31, 590 A.2d at 551; Hall, 321 Md. at 182-83, 582 A.2d at 509; Martinez, 309 Md. at 134, 522 A.2d at 955. A review of this issue in other jurisdictions reveals a variety of approaches. Some states agree that defendants can knowingly and voluntarily waive their jury trial right without being informed specifically that a jury's verdict must be unanimous. See People v. Fields, 65 Cal.App.4th 698, 699, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 700, 702 (1998) (In accepting the waiver of the right to a jury trial, the trial court does not have a duty to sua sponte tell a defendant who is represented by competent counsel ... that a jury trial requires [an] unanimous verdict.) (citing People v. Tijerina, 1 Cal.3d 41, 45-46, 81 Cal.Rptr. 264, 459 P.2d 680, 682 (1969)); Tucker v. State, 547 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (holding Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a defendant to be informed that jury verdict must be unanimous before waiver of jury trial); People v. James, 192 Mich. App. 568, 571, 481 N.W.2d 715, 717 (1992) (holding waiver valid because Michigan law does not require that a defendant be informed of unanimity requirement); People v. Dennis, 210 A.D.2d 803, 804-05, 620 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (1994) (upholding waiver made knowingly and voluntarily even though trial court did not inform defendant of unanimity requirement). See also United States ex rel. Wandick v. Chrans, 869 F.2d 1084, 1088 (7th Cir.1989) (holding that states are not constitutionally required to follow litany guidelines recommended by federal courts for a knowing and voluntary waiver). A number of jurisdictions, including several federal circuits, recommend that defendants be informed of the aspects of a jury trial, including unanimity, before knowingly and voluntarily waiving their right to a jury, but do not so require. In State v. Redden, 199 W.Va. 660, 667, 487 S.E.2d 318, 325-26 (1997), for example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declined to set forth a specific formulation of the degree or kind of knowledge about the nature of the right to a jury trial, but implored the lower courts to inform defendants about unanimity anyway. That court backed away from its request in State ex rel. Ring v. Boober, 200 W.Va. 66, 73, 488 S.E.2d 66, 68, 73 (1997), when it affirmed a standard written jury trial waiver form that did not mention unanimity. The court reiterated that Redden specifically declined to adopt a specific list of things that a defendant must know before waiving his right to a jury trial. Id. See also United States v. Duarte-Higareda, 113 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (9th Cir.1997) (declining to impose a colloquy in every case but suggesting court should inform the defendant that ... a jury verdict must be unanimous.); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1432 (10th Cir.1995) (joining sister circuit courts that recommend but do not mandate waiver guidelines); Marone v. United States, 10 F.3d 65, 67 (2d Cir.1993) (suggesting that defendant be informed of fundamental attributes of jury trial, but Constitution does not require litany); United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852-53 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that trial courts should, but need not, conduct colloquy which describes unanimity); United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 273 (6th Cir.1983) (noting defendant would be sufficiently informed if unanimity requirement were made known, but technical knowledge not required); United States v. Anderson, 704 F.2d 117, 119 (3d Cir.) (declining to create supervisory rule mandating pre-waiver colloquy), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 838, 104 S.Ct. 129, 78 L.Ed.2d 125 (1983); Ciummei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 509-10, 392 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (1979) (We do not intend to create a rigid pattern but note that ... the judge might state that the ... verdict of the jury must be unanimous....); State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Minn.1991) (recommending that defendants be informed of all aspects of jury trial but affirming conviction of defendant not informed of necessity of unanimous verdict); State v. Ellis, 953 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997) (enunciating colloquy that would sufficiently inform defendant, including unanimity, but noting that procedural rule does not mandate it). Finally, some jurisdictions require trial courts to inform defendants fully of their jury trial rights, including that the jury must vote unanimously in order to convict. See United States v. Delgado, 635 F.2d 889, 890 (7th Cir.1981) (advising federal district courts to explain to defendants that juries must vote unanimously before conviction); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 536 Pa. 355, 374, 639 A.2d 763, 772 (1994) ([T]he trial court must conduct a colloquy wherein it apprises the defendant... that the [jury] verdict must be unanimous....); State v. Resio, 148 Wis.2d 687, 696-97, 436 N.W.2d 603, 607 (1989) (directing lower courts to advise the defendant that the court cannot accept a jury verdict that is not agreed to by each member of the jury.); cf. Lopez v. United States, 615 A.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C.1992) (holding defendant's waiver invalid because, inter alia, she was not informed of unanimity requirement). In Vermont, the requirement that the trial judge explain unanimity to the defendant before a waiver can be valid emanates specifically from a criminal procedure rule. State v. West, 164 Vt. 192, 199, 667 A.2d 540, 545 (1995) (noting rule requires judge to inform defendant pre-waiver that any verdict of guilty must be unanimous.). Therefore, it appears that a majority of jurisdictions either have no requirement that a trial court must describe jury unanimity to the defendant or only recommend that they do so before a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily waive his jury trial right. Applying these principles to the case at hand, the record reflects that the discussion between respondent, defense counsel, and the trial court provided respondent with sufficient information about jury trials and his right to have such a trial. Respondent possessed substantial knowledge of his jury trial right and, therefore, he knowingly waived that right. Knowledge, in this context means acquaintance with the principles of a jury and knowingly means acting consciously or intentionally in waiving the right to a jury. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 872; RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra, at 793. Because respondent's knowledge no longer need be full, it need not be complete or entire. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 672, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY, supra, at 573. The rule no longer requires a specific in-court litany of advice with respect to the unanimity requirement for the trial court to accept and permit the waiver, by a defendant, of his right to a jury trial. [6] Accordingly, the trial court did not err in accepting the waiver by respondent. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. BELL, C.J., joins in the result only.