Opinion ID: 484920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Estoppel of Partnership

Text: 17 Walsh argues that, as a matter of law, Placer is estopped from asserting that a partnership existed. We disagree. 18 Walsh alleges that (1) in Placer's memorandum of points and authorities in support of its motion to intervene as a defendant in the bankruptcy action, Placer referred to itself as fee-owner of the Waters' Edge Apartments; and (2) Placer affirmatively prayed for an order to sell the apartments under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 363(h), which only applies to property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety. 19 While Placer may not have been consistent in its characterization of the apartments property, its admissions of cotenancy do not amount to grounds for equitable estoppel. Detrimental reliance is a prerequisite for equitable estoppel. Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 539 F.Supp. 887, 902 (N.D.Cal.1982); See Shamrock Development Co. v. City of Concord, 656 F.2d 1380, 1386 (9th Cir.1981). Walsh has not shown how they might have relied on Placer's characterization of their ownership relationship. 20 Walsh argues that the court should impose judicial estoppel to prevent Placer from asserting that a partnership existed. He grounds his argument for judicial estoppel on two cases, Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir.1972), and Scarano v. Central R.R. Co. of New Jersey, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3d Cir.1953). The preclusion rule set forth in these cases is inapplicable here. That rule bars a plaintiff who has obtained relief from an adversary by asserting and offering proof to support one position from making a second inconsistent claim. Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513. Although Placer arguably gained an opportunity to purchase the apartments from Walsh by asserting section 363(h), inconsistent with its present claim that the apartments were held as a partnership, that opportunity cannot be construed as relief obtained from an adversary.