Opinion ID: 2257808
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Framers' Failure to Provide Crime Victims with a Remedy

Text: Furthermore, we note that the victims' rights amendment does not expressly provide a cause of action for damages. While the absence of a remedy does not ipso facto defeat the Bandonis' contention that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, it is an additional indication that the victims' rights amendment does not provide a sufficient rule by which the rights given may be enjoyed or protected. See Shields, 658 A.2d at 929. The Bandonis' argument that the true intent of the framers was to provide a cause of action for damages would be more persuasive were we presented with evidence demonstrating that the framers simply overlooked the issue of noncompliance or enforcement. On the contrary, while drafting the amendment the framers had the benefit of considering ง 12-28-7. This section provides that [f]ailure to afford the victim of a felony offense any of the rights established by [the Victim's Bill of Rights] shall not constitute grounds for vacating an otherwise lawful conviction, or for voiding an otherwise lawful sentence or parole determination. Section 12-28-7. Clearly this section raises the specter of noncompliance. It is equally apparent that not only could the framers have provided for an enforcement mechanism, they in fact debated doing so and in the end declined to provide such a provision in article 1, section 23. An early version of a proposed constitutional amendment, which was not ratified, contained the following provision: SECT. 2. ENFORCEMENT OF SUCH FIGHTS. A victim of crime whose complaint is filed in and brought before any Court of the State of Rhode Island shall have the independent right to sue at law, in equity or by any other proper proceeding to compel compliance with the aforesaid rights provided in Section 1 of this Amendment and the Court hearing such suit may in its discretion allow said victim bringing such suit to recover a reasonable attorney's fee. Another version of a proposed amendment (Resolution 86-140), was sent to the Committee on Style and Drafting, stating that [t]hese rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall have recourse in the law for any denial thereof. The committee, however, struck out this last sentence, and Resolution 86-140 was subsequently ratified to become article 1, section 23. The Bandonis ask us to ignore the final version of article 1, section 23, arguing that notwithstanding the fact that the enforcement provision was struck down by the Committee on Style and Drafting, the framers' intent was eminently clear that a crime victim should be able to enforce these rights through a cause of action for monetary damages. But in order for this argument to have any merit, we would have to disregard our well-established rules of construction, which provide that [e]very clause of the constitution    be given its due force, meaning, and effect, and [that] no word or section can be assumed to have been unnecessarily used, or needlessly added, City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 45 (R.I. 1995), or unnecessarily omitted. Instead we must assume that the framers carefully weighed and considered the words in each clause and intended those terms to imply a definite meaning. See id. Like the Bandpmos, the dissent also looks beyond the clear and unambiguous words of article 1, section 23, and directs our attention to the Constitutional Convention's history wherein the dissent contends the framers in fact intended for victims to have enforceable rights in the courts. Because the dissent purports to have reached this conclusion after having examined primary sources, we find it necessary to respond in detail to offset any suggestion that we have taken liberties with the historical record in this case. We simply view the following historical events in a different light, colored by long-standing and traditional precepts of constitutional interpretation. The dissent contends that Resolution 86-140 was resoundingly approved (minus the language providing for a remedy, of course) only after the delegates were assured that the style committee's changes were made only `for the economy of language.' As we shall demonstrate, however, neither the record in this case nor the case law the dissent cites actually supports this theory. First, we have great difficulty agreeing that the Committee on Style and Drafting altered the text of Resolution 86-140 but only for the economy of language. To demonstrate our point, we have reproduced the changes (both additions and deletions) that the Committee on Style and Drafting made to Resolution 86-140 after its initial passage on the floor of the Convention. As demonstrated below, whatever the reasoning for the committee's changes may have been, the rationale of economy of language is not cogently supported. [12] Sec. 24. VICTIMS' RIGHTS. All per sons within this state who are A victims of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Whenever possible, Such persons shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for their any injuriesy or losses caused by from the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. They Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim. These rights shall be enforceable by the victims of crime and they shall recourse in the law for any denial thereof. Likewise, it is equally apparent that the deletion of the last sentence expressly providing that crime victims shall have recourse in the law and substituting for it the clause such other compensation as the state may provide is nothing short of a substantive alteration. Thus, it is not only the deletion of the language providing for recourse in the law for any denial of rights that is of moment to our analysis but also the inclusion of the language and shall receive such other compensation as the state may provide. (Emphasis added.) Practically speaking, it is impossible for the Bandonis to receive such other compensation as the state may provide, as article 1, section 23, contemplates, because the state itself has not provided for such other compensation. On this issue even the dissent acknowledges that the state has not acted to give victims remedial protection when they are deprived of their [rights]. Other courts are in accord with this reasoning. For instance, in State v. Rodrigues, 63 Haw. 412, 629 P.2d 1111, 1114 (1981), the Hawaii Supreme Court construed the phrase as provided by law in its constitution as a direction to the legislature to enact implementing legislation. See also Wann v. Reorganized School of District No. 6 of St. Francois County, 293 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo.1956) (the phrase as provided by law`lays down only a general principle and directs the legislature to provide the rules by which the general right which it grants may be enjoyed and protected. In other words, it is clear that subsequent action by the legislature is contemplated to put the provision into operation ). (Emphasis added.) We are of the opinion that considering the framers' decision to provide crime victims with such other compensation as the state may provide, knowing that neither the Constitution nor the General Laws provide crime victims with such other compensation, the real separation-of-powers violation that the dissent alludes to would be for this Court to create a remedy. To support the conclusion that article 1, section 23, is self-executing, the dissent relies on two textually identical secondary sources for the proposition that the framers intended to mandate enforcement while leaving specific provisions or mechanisms to the determination of the general assembly and the courts.  However, simply stated, these two sources incorrectly cite to the Constitutional Convention's Judiciary Committee report. Indeed, the report only states its resolve to mandate enforceability while leaving the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms to the General Assembly. See Report of the Judiciary Committee Relating to Victims of Crime Resolution (86-140) at 5. Not once throughout its entire report does the Judiciary Committee ever mention, or even imply, that the creation of specific provisions or mechanisms should also be left to the courts. The record simply does not support this conclusion. In addition we also have trouble accepting the dissent's conclusion that Resolution 86-140 was approved only after the delegates were assured that the style committee's changes were made only `for the economy of language.' Our review of the Convention proceedings finds no such assurances, promises, or even any inquiry from the floor about the modifications to Resolution 86-140. Instead our inspection finds only a reading of the proposed amendments with Resolution 86-140 being introduced by the words that [t]his resolution on victim[s] rights was redrafted for the economy of language and it now reads as follows. From this single sentence the dissent surmises that delegates received explicit assurances that Resolution 86-140 was modified only for the purpose of economy of language and that no other substantive changes were made. On the contrary, when the Convention president introduced Resolution 86-140, he prefaced the voting by stating: Essentially, this adds a section to the constitution requiring that victims of crime shall, as a matter of right be treated by the agents of the State with dignity and respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Such person shall be entitled to receive from the perpetrator of crime financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime and shall receive such other compensation as the State may provide. Before sentencing a victim shall have the right to address the court regarding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim. That is Resolution 86-140, as amended.  (Emphasis added.) Moments after the president's reading of amended Resolution 86-140, delegates overwhelmingly passed this version of Resolution 86-140 (without the recourse in law language) by a margin of ninety-three to one. However, even if the delegates did receive explicit assurances as the dissent suggests, statements by individual legislators or framers are not to be given talismanic significance. See Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263, 106 S.Ct. 1834, 1840, 90 L.Ed.2d 248, 257 (1986). On this point we find the recent opinion of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in State of Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994), to be particularly instructive. In Narragansett Indian Tribe the First Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with the question of whether Congress intended the newly enacted Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to repeal the jurisdiction granted a decade earlier in the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act, thereby subjecting the Narragansett Indians to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of the State of Rhode Island. In a manner reminiscent of the dissent's two-pronged approach, the state in Narragansett Indian Tribe argued (1) that the preliminary version of the gaming act contained a provision safeguarding the settlement act's grant of jurisdiction from implied repeal (safeguarding provision) and (2) that despite the fact that the safeguarding provision was deleted prior to the gaming act's final passage, Rhode Island's Senators received explicit assurances from the bill's sponsor and floor manager that the settlement act's grant of jurisdiction would not be repealed. Id. at 698. The record supports the state's assertions and establishes that the following colloquy took place on the floor of the United States Senate: Mr. PELL.    In the interests of clarity, I have asked that language specifically citing the protections of the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 95-395) be stricken from 5.555 [the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act]. I understand that these protections clearly will remain in effect. Mr. INOUYE. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. Pell], and assure him that the protections of the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 95-395), will remain in effect and that the Narragansett Indian Tribe clearly will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of the State of Rhode Island. Mr. CHAFFEE. Mr. President, I too would like to thank the chairman [Mr. Inouye]   . The chairman's statement makes it clear that any high stakes gaming, including bingo, in Rhode Island will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of our State. 19 F.3d at 698. (Emphases added.) Despite the explicit assurances in Narragansett Indian Tribe, the First Circuit had little trouble rejecting the state's claims since [i]n the game of [constitutional] interpretation, [constitutional] language is the ultimate trump card. Id. at 699. Likewise, in the case at bar, we too have little trouble rejecting the purported assurances raised by the dissent. The simple, and indeed unmistakable, fact is that when the constitutional framers decided to add article 1, section 23, to our Constitution, they did so by means of an exercise that requires putting pen to paper. As the First Circuit articulated in rejecting an argument similar to the dissent's: Once Congress has spoken, it is bound by what it has plainly said, notwithstanding the nods and winks that may have been exchanged in floor debates and committee hearings. After all, it is not the proper role of legislators to use unwritten assurances or side arrangements to alter the clear meaning of agreed language. And the judiciary must stand as the ultimate guarantor of the integrity of an enacted statute's text. In sum, once Congress has spoken, a court cannot override the unambiguous words of an enacted statute and substitute for them the court's views of what individual legislators likely intended. Any other rule imports a virulent strain of subjectivity into the interpretive task and, in the process, threatens to transfer too large a slice of legislative power from Congress to the courts. 19 F.3d at 699-700. In order for us to give primary effect to the contemporaneous words of one individual's planned remarks moments before a final vote on Resolution 86-140, we would have to turn a blind eye to our well-established rules of constitutional construction, which states that it is presumed the language in an enactment was carefully considered before it was finally adopted and that when words in the constitution are free of ambiguity, they must be given their plain, ordinary, and usually accepted meaning. Sundlun, 662 A.2d at 45. This we shall not do. Furthermore, our conclusion that the Committee on Style and Drafting made substantive amendments to Resolution 86-140 is buttressed by a source none other than the dissenting opinion. On the one hand the dissent insists the resolution was redrafted solely for the purpose of the economy of language and was not intended to alter the substantive meaning of Resolution 86-140. However, on the other hand, the dissent bases the conclusion that article 1, section 23, is self-executing on the ground that it establishes a specific individual right to address the court prior to sentencing. This specific individual right, however, was not in the original version of Resolution 86-140 and only found its way into the final version after the committee altered the text for the economy of language, changes that the dissent has already told us were not intended to alter the substantive meaning of Resolution 86-140. [13]