Opinion ID: 169319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Crime Scene Testimony

Text: 19 Nevels also claims that the district court erred in admitting the government's crime scene reconstruction expert testimony. The expert testified that Nevels shot McLamb seven times at close range, leading to his death. Nevels contends that such evidence was both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial to the gun possession charges and should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 20 We review this claim under a plain error standard since Nevels failed to timely renew his objection at trial after the district court previously denied without prejudice his pretrial motion to exclude the testimony. See McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1544 (10th Cir.1991) (holding where a party objected to the admissibility of evidence in a motion in limine, but did not interpose an objection at trial, the issue was not preserved on appeal). Regardless of the standard of review, however, we find no error and affirm the district court's decision. 21 Rule 403 requires the trial court to balance the probative value of proffered evidence against the likelihood of unnecessary prejudice to the defendant. In performing the [Rule] 403 balancing, the court should give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value. Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., 202 F.3d 1262, 1274 (10th Cir.2000) (internal quote omitted). Moreover, [e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial if it makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly or apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. United States v. Leonard, 439 F.3d 648, 652 (10th Cir.2006). The assessment of the evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. 22 Here, the district court found that the reconstruction expert's testimony was probative considering that Nevels's theory of the case rested on self-defense or justification. In opening argument, Nevels's defense counsel raised the fact that McLamb was an armed fugitive and a violent man and repeatedly claimed that Nevels's possession of the gun at the time of the shooting was justifiable self defense. In essence, Nevels suggested that the gun was not his and he only gained possession of the gun (presumably from McLamb) to defend himself against McLamb. 3 The expert's testimony directly contradicted this scenario since the evidence showed that Nevels was the only one to fire a weapon and that the victim was shot at close range and in a defensive position. Accordingly, the expert testimony went directly to disproving an element of Nevels's affirmative defense and was thus relevant. 23 While the testimony about the nature of the killing might elicit some emotional response from the jury, Rule 403 does not protect a party from all prejudice, only unfair prejudice. Deters, 202 F.3d at 1274. Nevels has not shown unfair prejudice. First, the district court mitigated the effect of the testimony by instructing the jury that any evidence about McLamb's death was admitted only for the limited purpose of showing whether and under what circumstances Nevels possessed the gun. [ROA, Tr. 10, 606]. Second, the testimony was relevant to rebutting the defense of justification by establishing an alternative explanation to that offered by Nevels. Where the defendant's theory of defense directly provides for the introduction of rebuttal crime scene evidence, it cannot be said that the evidence was per se unfairly prejudicial. We leave it to the trial court to assess its prejudicial effect—the defense's invitation to introduce this evidence cannot be rescinded once its stratagem does not work, especially since the district court exercised care in instructing the jury regarding the scope of the evidence as it applied to the affirmative defense. Finally, we doubt the expert's testimony was especially prejudicial given the fact that Nevels's own defense counsel conceded the shooting in her opening statement. 24 Consequently, it cannot be said that the expert testimony's probative value [was] substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. The district court did not err in allowing the testimony.