Opinion ID: 201456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the State Court's Vacation of Mateo's Criminal Conviction

Text: 31 As stated above, we focus on the vacation of Mateo's state criminal conviction as supportive of the district court's allowance of § 2255 relief. The state court allowed Mateo's motion to vacate his guilty plea on January 2, 2003. It did so for reasons Mateo had stated in support of his motion, to wit, inter alia, that the court had accepted his plea without inquiring whether the plea was made intelligently, with full knowledge and understanding of all the elements of the charge against him. 32 In a not dissimilar situation, where a state court subsequently vacated convictions used to enhance a federal sentence because of the lack of information necessary for defendant's pleas to be considered voluntary, we affirmed a district court judgment granting § 2255 relief. See United States v. Pettiford, 101 F.3d 199 (1st Cir.1996) (Aldrich, J.). 6 While that case involved the use of prior convictions to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, the underlying principle was the same as here. 7 As noted above, the Guidelines themselves make specific provision for not counting prior sentences resulting from expunged convictions or from convictions reversed or vacated for errors of law or because constitutionally invalid. See USSG §§ 4A1.2(j), 4A1.2, cmt. n. 6. As discussed in Pettiford, the ground for vacating Mateo's guilty plea and granting him a new trial, thus vacating his conviction, appears to have been a constitutional one. See Pettiford, 101 F.3d at 202 (characterizing the provision of the information necessary for [a defendant's] pleas to be considered voluntary as a constitutional requirement) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir.1996)). It was also, of course, an error of law. Following Pettiford, therefore, relief under § 2255 was warranted. 8 33 As in Pettiford, it is immaterial that the relief sought, based on the subsequent state court orders, came after Mateo's original and, when pronounced, perfectly correct, federal sentence. See Pettiford, 101 F.3d at 201 (rejecting the argument that only past offenses vacated prior to the federal proceeding may be discounted by the court, in effect etching the defendant's criminal history record in stone as of that moment). 34 It is true that, unlike in Pettiford, two of the three additional points here rested not simply on the fact of the prior conviction itself but, more specifically, on Mateo's having committed federal offenses while under any criminal justice sentence. See USSG § 4A1.1(d). That requirement was met here because of explicit further Guideline language making commission of an offense while a violation warrant is outstanding tantamount to commission of the offense while under a criminal justice sentence. See id. § 4A1.2(m). To be sure, a policy argument can be made that later vacation of the underlying conviction is irrelevant, as the federal offenses were indeed committed while a warrant was outstanding. But any such theory runs counter to limiting language in the Guidelines. The Guidelines deem a defendant to be under a criminal justice sentence if he commits a federal offense while a violation warrant from a prior sentence is outstanding, but only if that sentence is otherwise countable. Id. (emphasis added). 35 Here, no aspect of Mateo's probation sentence can any longer be considered to have been otherwise countable, since sentences for expunged convictions, or sentences resulting from convictions vacated because of errors of law or ruled constitutionally invalid, are expressly not to be counted for enhancement purposes. Id. §§ 4A1.2(j), 4A1.2, cmt. n. 6. See United States v. Dubovsky, 279 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir.2002) (expungement determined by considering whether the conviction was set aside because of innocence or errors of law). In contrast, the Guidelines provide that sentences resulting from convictions that have been set aside for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law should be counted, noting that: 36 A number of jurisdictions have various procedures pursuant to which previous conviction may be set aside or the defendant may be pardoned for reasons unrelated to innocence or errors of law, e.g., in order to restore civil rights or to remove the stigma associated with a criminal conviction. Sentences resulting from such convictions are to be counted. 37 Id. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 10. 38 The warrant here rested on Mateo's violation of his sentence of probation. Once the conviction was vacated for constitutional or legal error, the sentence of probation ceased to be countable as a criminal justice sentence. It follows from the Guidelines' express language that the violation warrant itself could no longer be deemed to have been under a criminal justice sentence. 9 39 The government argues that, even if there was an error under the Guidelines, that error is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Section 2255, which governs federal habeas, provides as follows: 40 A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. 41 28 U.S.C. § 2255. To be cognizable under § 2255, a non-constitutional claim of a legal error must amount to a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428, 82 S.Ct. 468, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). See also Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 773-74 (1st Cir.1994) (leaving open the question whether an error in the application of the sentencing guidelines could never constitute a `complete miscarriage of justice'). 42 Here, the government contends that Mateo's non-constitutional claim, namely, a misapplication of the Guidelines, does not result in a miscarriage of justice because any error resulted from Mateo's own failure to comply with the terms of his state probationary sentence. See Jamison v. United States, 244 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.2001) (counting prior conviction was not even remotely an injustice where prior conviction was dismissed only because, instead of returning for sentencing [after pleading guilty], as he had been ordered to do, [the defendant] fled and thereby initiated a series of delays in his sentencing, which eventually resulted in the dismissal of the indictment). 43 But because we find that the error was based, not on the state court's nunc pro tunc termination of Mateo's probation but, rather, on the vacation of the state conviction, we examine the latter state ruling to determine whether the error is cognizable under § 2255. Unlike the state court nunc pro tunc order which had no stated basis, the state order vacating Mateo's guilty plea and ordering a new trial rested upon the violation of Mateo's right to have entered a voluntary and knowing plea. We have described such a violation as one of constitutional dimension and, in any event, as a claim cognizable under § 2255 on the basis of which a district court may properly reopen a federal sentence. See Pettiford, 101 F.3d at 201 ([W]hether on constitutional or grounds otherwise subject to collateral attack, we concur with the district court's recognition of federal habeas jurisdiction.).