Opinion ID: 2353930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Special Findings

Text: As to the January trial, appellant contends it was reversible error for the trial judge to deny his request for special findings. Rule 14 II(b) of the criminal rules of the trial court, which is virtually identical with Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that [i]n a case tried without a jury the court shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts specially. [Emphasis supplied.] Cases construing the Federal rule have held that a request made pursuant to this rule is the proper procedure by which a defendant may preserve a question of law for purposes of appeal. Cesario v. United States, 200 F.2d 232, 233 (1st Cir. 1952), and is [o]rdinarily, the remedy to rectify a misconception regarding the significance of a particular fact. Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 325 (9th Cir. 1958). Without a timely request for special findings, however, a general finding is sufficient. United States v. Devenere, 332 F.2d 160, 162 (2d Cir. 1964). [5] We think that these cases present a correct interpretation of Rule 14 II(b) of the trial court as well. The cited cases and the express wording of the rule establish that a defendant is entitled to special findings as a matter of right and not by judicial discretion, but it is a right which must be claimed. If not timely exercised, it must be construed as having been waived and its denial does not in itself entitle a defendant to a new trial. To hold otherwise would enable a defendant to secure a second trial without regard to the merit of any claim of error. In the instant case, appellant was represented from the beginning by competent counsel. At trial no request was made for special findings. Not until eighteen months after trial was such a request made. [6] Under the circumstances, we hold it was not error for the trial judge to deny appellant's request for special findings.