Opinion ID: 1404508
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Floyd has asserted a constitutional violation

Text: The appropriate standard to use in analyzing an excessive-force claim brought under § 1983 is determined by identifying the specific constitutional right infringed by the challenged application of force. Lustig v. Mondeau, 211 Fed.Appx. 364, 369 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)). [A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive forcedeadly or notin the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard[.] Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865. The first prong of the qualified-immunity analysiswhich examines whether the facts, as alleged by Floyd, are sufficient to describe a violation of his right to be free from unreasonable seizure by using excessive forcetherefore turns on the reasonableness of the officers' actions. Officer Quaine attempts to bypass this analysis by arguing that, because his shot missed Floyd, he did not seize Floyd within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. He goes so far as to argue that [a]ssuming, arguendo, that Floyd was not armed and posed no immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to Quaine and that Quaine violated all manner of recognized police procedures by shooting at and missing Floyd, he, nonetheless, did not violate Floyd's rights. As authority for this proposition, Quaine relies heavily on this court's prior statement that shooting at a fleeing felon, but missing, is not a `seizure.' Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 336 F.3d 515, 519 (6th Cir.2003) (citing Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1987)). Quaine's reliance on Adams and Cameron, however, is misplaced. The key distinction is that both of those cases involved police firing errant shots at a fleeing suspect. In Cameron, for example, police officers chased a burglary suspect and shot at him several times, but never hit him. During the course of the ensuing chase, however, Cameron ran onto a busy expressway and was fatally struck by a passing car. The court explained that Cameron was not seized by [the officer defendants]. Cameron elected to flee, not to be restrained. The officers' show of authority by firing their weapons, while designed to apprehend Cameron, did not stop or in any way restrain him. Just as clearly, when the pursuit terminated in an accident [causing the death of] the minor plaintiff, he was not restrained by, or as a result of, the officer's show of authority. Cameron's freedom of movement was restrained only because he killed himself by electing to run onto a heavily traveled, high speed freeway. The use of deadly force standing alone does not constitute a seizure, and absent an actual physical restraint or physical seizure, the alleged unreasonableness of the officers' conduct cannot serve as a basis for a § 1983 cause of action anchored in the Fourth Amendment. Cameron, 813 F.2d at 785 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Adams involved analogous facts, where police officers shot at and struck a suspect's car as he successfully fled the scene of a domestic dispute after the officers had attempted to detain him. The district court noted that the shots fired by Officer Backstrom at Adams's automobile did not impair Adams's movement. Adams, 336 F.3d at 520. Furthermore, the court emphasized that Adams was not hit by Officer Backstrom's bullets and was able to leave the scene unharmed despite Backstrom's use of his firearm. Even though the tire of [Adams's vehicle] was hit, it appears that the car still was operable and Adams reached his destination, his mother's house. Id. Unlike the suspects in Cameron and Adams, Floyd did not flee from Officer Quaine's show of authority. Floyd contends that he in fact halted in his tracks upon hearing Quaine's initial shot and even backed up slightly, quickly yelling, I don't have a gun. As this court has held, the various definitions of `seizure' contained in the precedents connote an intentional interference with a person's liberty by physical force or a show of authority that would cause a reasonable person consciously to submit. Peete v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 486 F.3d 217, 220 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs . . . when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. (brackets omitted) (alteration in original))). The facts as alleged by Floyd demonstrate that Quaine's firing his weapon at Floyd was a show of authority that actually had the intended effect of contributing to Floyd's immediate restraint. Quaine's act therefore amounted to a seizure of Floyd under the above definition. Cf. Cameron, 813 F.2d at 785 (concluding that no seizure had occurred as a result of errant shots fired by police officers at a fleeing suspect because the suspect continued to evade arrest and therefore was not restrained by, or as a result of, the officer's show of authority (emphasis added)). Moreover, Officer Reynoso's subsequent shot, which struck Floyd in the chest, clearly seized Floyd within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Officer Quaine, for his part, asserts that viewing his actions in relation to Reynoso's amounts to an unjustified effort to bootstrap Quaine's liability onto that of Reynoso. This court has held, however, that a police officer who fails to act to prevent the use of excessive force may still be held liable where (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring. Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir.1997); see also Smith v. Heath, 691 F.2d 220, 225 (6th Cir.1982) (holding that an officer was directly responsible for and personally participated in the deprivation of the Smiths' constitutional rights because he was present while the other officers unlawfully searched the apartment and thereby violated the Smiths' rights). Furthermore, Officer Quaine did not simply fail to protect Floyd from Officer Reynoso's use of force. Quaine's own use of deadly force escalated the situation by unambiguously signaling that such force was called for. He also participated in the tactical decision that he and Reynoso would confront Floyd in the latter's backyard at dusk by approaching Floyd with their guns drawn, without any verbal warning and, according to Floyd, running. Under these circumstances, the fortuity that Quaine's shot failed to strike Floyd as the officers apprehended him does not absolve Quaine of responsibility for his participation in the events surrounding Floyd's seizure. The question remains whether, as described by Floyd, the officers' actions in connection with Floyd's seizure in fact violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We must therefore determine whether the officers' actions are `objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. This court has previously held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer's use of deadly force to seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect. Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 696 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). Rather, the use of deadly force is constitutionally permissible only if `the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others. . . .' Livermore ex rel. Rohm v. Lubelan, 476 F.3d 397 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694). This court has highlighted three factors of particular relevance in assessing the reasonableness of an officer's use of force: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the police officers or others, and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest by flight. Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir.2006). Officers Quaine and Reynoso emphasize that they learned from Floyd's neighbor Wilmer that Floyd had brandished a shotgun in a threatening manner several hours earlier. But according to Floyd, he was never armed, the officers were using flashlights due to the impending darkness, he had his empty hands extended in front of him, and the officers ran around the corner and shot him in his own backyard without warning. The officers' contrary assertion that Floyd was in fact armed and fired first is simply irrelevant to our determination of whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged by Floyd. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151. As a matter of law, an unarmed and nondangerous suspect has a constitutional right not to be shot by police officers. Sample, 409 F.3d at 696. Furthermore, we conclude that, under the facts as viewed in the light most favorable to Floyd, the officers' use of deadly force to effect Floyd's seizure violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from such excessive force.