Opinion ID: 1813789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: evidence of prior attempted sexual assaults

Text: We next address Freeman's claim that the court should not have admitted testimony regarding a prior uncharged attempted sexual assault. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion stating that it intended to offer evidence of the attempted sexual assaults. The State sought to offer the testimony of L.T. and L.P. regarding the details of two attempted sexual assaults committed by Freeman. The trial court granted the State's motion, apparently finding that the evidence of the prior acts was admissible under rule 404(2) to show the identity, mode of operation, and intent of Freeman. Rule 404(2) is a rule of inclusion, rather than exclusion, and it permits the use of evidence of prior activity except to prove the character of a person in order to prove that the person acted in conformity with that character. See State v. Newman, supra . An appellate court reviews the admission of other acts under rule 404(2) by considering (1) whether the evidence was relevant, (2) whether the evidence had a proper purpose, (3) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice, and (4) whether the trial court, if requested, instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for the limited purpose for which it was admitted. State v. Carter, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994). Because the exercise of judicial discretion is implicit in Neb. Evid. R. 401, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995), it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine relevancy and admissibility of evidence of other wrongs or acts under rules 404(2) and 403, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Eona, 248 Neb. 318, 534 N.W.2d 323 (1995); State v. Williams, 247 Neb. 878, 530 N.W.2d 904 (1995). Freeman did not complain about the evidence relating to the attempted sexual assault of L.T., and therefore, we do not discuss the admission of this evidence. However, we conclude that the evidence regarding the attempted sexual assault of L.P. was relevant. Sexual crimes are of a nature that evidence of other similar sexual conduct has independent relevance, and such evidence may be admissible against a defendant irrespective of whether that conduct involved the complaining witness or third parties. See State v. Carter, supra . Similarly, we conclude that the evidence of the attempted sexual assault had a proper purpose of establishing Freeman's identity and method of operation. L.P. was attacked as she was attempting to enter her apartment building. The assailant, who was wearing dark clothing, pinned her to the ground and lay on top of her. He displayed a knife and told her that if she did not shut up, he was going to kill her. He then told her that she was going to go with him. This attempted sexual assault occurred within 16 days of three of the eight sexual assaults charged in the case at bar. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the evidence had the proper purpose of showing the identity, plan, intent, or mode of operation of the assailant because of the similarities with prior incidents. Where the evidence intended to be offered has qualified under the first two prongs of the test for admission under rule 404(2), i.e., relevance and proper purpose, the determination of whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial depends upon whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the limited purpose of the admission of that evidence. See State v. Carter, supra . To this end, the trial court gave instruction No. 25, which read as follows: Evidence of the assaults of [L.T.] and [L.P.] was received for the limited purpose of proving plan, knowledge, and identity and for no other purpose. We conclude that the admission of this evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence.