Opinion ID: 755768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Austin's Remaining Claims

Text: 28 Although Austin's first amended complaint alleged claims of libel, slander, and thwarting of the EEOC investigation, she omitted these claims from her proposed second amended complaint. The district court concluded that Austin had therefore abandoned these claims. 1 Similarly, the district court concluded that Austin had dropped her case against Smith because that defendant was not named in the proposed second amended complaint. 2 29 The district court's dismissal raises the seemingly novel issue of whether, by requesting leave to file an amended complaint that omits earlier alleged claims and/or defendants, a pro se plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned the omitted claims as well as all claims against the omitted defendants. Although an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original, and renders it of no legal effect, see Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir.1994) (quotation marks omitted), and [a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived, King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1986), the amended complaint here was proffered but disallowed by the district court. 30 Ultimately, the question of abandonment is one of intent; ordinarily it makes perfect sense to hold that a party who seeks to file an amended pleading that omits a claim intends to abandon the claim, irrespective of whether the amended pleading is permitted by the court. Where the party is proceeding pro se, the question is less easily resolved. A pro se party may not fully understand the superseding effect of the second pleading, even when it is allowed much less when it is disallowed. Moreover, there is an element of unfairness in the adverse party's benefitting from the terms of a pleading that it has successfully opposed. Finally, because [a] pro se plaintiff who brings a civil rights action should be fairly freely afforded an opportunity to amend [her] complaint, Frazier v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir.1988) (quotation marks omitted), the pro se plaintiff would normally be allowed to reallege claims omitted from the second pleading once she had been informed that the effect of that pleading was to abandon those claims. 31 There is no need to decide this issue, however, because in her reply brief Austin concedes that she opted to sacrifice (i.e., abandon) her libel and slander claims and apparently her thwarting claim by omitting them from her proposed second amended complaint. Austin has not asserted any of these claims in her main brief on appeal; nor has she appealed from the district court's dismissal of her action as against the individual defendants omitted from her proposed second amended complaint. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(6) (the appellant's brief must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented); LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir.1995) (although not generally held rigidly to the formal briefing standards set forth in Fed. R.App. P. 28, pro se appellants can be deemed to have abandoned issues they fail to raise before this court). Therefore, these omitted claims, as well as all claims alleged against the omitted defendants, have been abandoned. In sum, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Austin's libel, slander, and thwarting claims and the dismissal of the entire action as against the individual defendants not included in Austin's proposed second amended complaint. 32 When the district court dismissed all of Austin's federal claims and determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider any remaining state claims, it declined to permit Austin to amend her complaint to add a claim under section 296 of the New York Executive Law. In light of our decision to vacate and remand some, but not all, of Austin's federal claims, the district court must reconsider whether to permit Austin to amend her complaint to add the claim under section 296 of the New York Executive Law. Finally, we express no opinion as to any possible disposition of a future motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.