Opinion ID: 1165396
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fairness of the Identification.

Text: The facts surrounding the complaining witness's identification of Walker are in dispute. The central conflict is whether M.M. made the identification spontaneously or at the request of the officer. At the preliminary hearing, M.M. testified that she was sitting in the patrol car, in front of the apartment where the rape allegedly took place, and that the police requested her to look through the window to see if she could identify her assailants. [11] On cross-examination at trial she reiterated this testimony. She also testified at the preliminary hearing that she saw only two black men when she looked through the window; at trial she retracted this statement, insisting there were more men than that in the apartment. The testimony of the officers, however, indicates the identification was spontaneous. After arriving on the scene and interviewing M.M. in the upstairs apartment, Officers Reeder and Smidt proceeded to apartment no. 4, where the rape allegedly occurred. The two officers found the apartment occupied by six black males and one Alaska Native female. As a safety measure, the officers had the occupants open the curtains, so that the officers outside the apartment could see in. Officer Reeder advised the men of the rape allegation. No one volunteered any information, and Officer Reeder told them they would be taken to the station for an interview. At this time, Officer Reeder read the suspects their Miranda rights. Their departure was delayed while one of the occupants dressed. While waiting, Walker repeatedly asked if he could get a drink from the refrigerator. Officer Reeder finally consented, and Officer Smidt accompanied Walker into the kitchen. Officer Reeder testified that at this point he received a radio message from Officer Loy, who was outside the apartment building with the victim, M.M. The message was that M.M. had identified one of the five black men in the room as one of her assailants. Officer Smidt heard the radio contact but did not heard the radio contact but did not hear the contents. Officer Reeder asked Loy which of the two men standing next to him had been identified; Loy radioed back that it was the man dressing. Moments later Walker walked back into the living room from the kitchen, and Loy radioed that M.M. had identified him as the other assailant. The testimony thus shows that the officers inside the apartment were unaware that M.M. was outside scrutinizing the occupants until the first identification was made. The men were not paraded in front of the window one by one, as Walker contends, but were milling about. The entire occurrence was over in about twenty seconds. Officer Loy testified as to what took place outside the apartment. After M.M. put on her clothes, Officer Loy volunteered to take M.M. to the hospital. He testified that they went to his patrol car, which was parked in front of the building. According to him, as he bent down to unlock the back door, M.M. exclaimed that she saw one of her assailants. Officer Loy turned around and saw that she was pointing at a man visible through the picture window of apartment no. 4. The window was approximately four feet by six feet in dimension. Officer Loy stated the total sight distance was twenty to twenty-five feet. The men were plainly visible. Officer Loy radioed to Officer Reeder inside that M.M. had identified the man putting on his shirt. Walker then walked into view and M.M. identified him as her second assailant. Immediately thereafter, M.M. was escorted to the hospital. M.M. was excited, but not hysterical, when she made the identification. Relying on M.M.'s preliminary hearing testimony, Walker argues the identification was solicited by the police. He argues that the identification, under the totality of the circumstances, was impermissibly leading and suggestive and thus violative of his rights to due process of law. [12] He argues that M.M. was virtually certain, under the circumstances, to point out someone, and that the presence of the police officers could only have led her to believe that someone in the apartment must have been an assailant. Even if the police asked M.M. to look into the window, the question is the same: Was the identification procedure so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to [an] irreparable mistaken identification ... [as to deny] due process of law? Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1206 (1967), cited in Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 643 (Alaska 1977). This determination must be made based on the totality of the circumstances. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. at 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1206. In making this determination, the following factors must be considered: the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Holden v. State, 602 P.2d 452, 456 (Alaska 1979) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977)). We analyze these factors as follows. First, M.M. had ample opportunity to view Walker before the identification. She rode with him in the car from downtown to the apartment, she was in the apartment with him for some time, and she was assaulted by him. As in Holden, the identifying witness was also the victim. Second, the evidence shows that M.M. was sober throughout the incident. Nothing indicates that she was inattentive. Third, when Officer Reeder arrived on the scene, M.M. described one of her assailants as a black male, who had a dark complexion, fairly bushy hair, a moustache, and who was wearing black pants, dark boots, and a white shirt. Officer Reeder testified that when arrested Walker was wearing black pants, black boots, a real light gray shirt with print on it, and had a two- to three-inch Afro haircut. Walker also had a moustache. No other suspect matched the description to the extent Walker did. While the description she gave was fairly general, no one has suggested it was inaccurate. Holden, 602 P.2d at 456. Also, M.M.'s identification at the scene was certain and without hesitation or equivocation. M.M. testified that there was no doubt in her mind as to the accuracy of her identification when first made. Finally, although the record is unclear as to the exact time lapse between the crime and the identification, it was less than two hours. M.M. testified she was in the upstairs apartment less than an hour after the rape, and was being examined at the hospital approximately forty-five minutes later. As in Holden, this factor of reliability favors the state. The only consideration to weigh against the foregoing factors is the possibility that the police suggested that M.M. attempt an identification. No evidence indicates that the identification was set up to identify Walker. The six occupants of the apartment were not so distinctive in appearance as to conclude that Walker was singled out. Under the totality of the circumstances, the foregoing indicia of reliability are not overborne by any suggestive influence so as to constitute an invalid identification. The testimony relating to the identification was properly admitted.