Opinion ID: 2050716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Granting of Special Exception With Variances

Text: Petitioners contend that the Board erred as a matter of law in granting the special exception because the criteria for the granting of a special exception must be met without a variance. [8] In support of its proposition that the criteria for a special exception must be satisfied without a variance, petitioners rely on Chester Haven, supra, and Umerley v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County, 108 Md.App. 497, 672 A.2d 173 (1996). Although neither Chester Haven nor Umerley decided the issue before this Court, petitioners point to language in Chester Haven, that was cited in Umerley, to support the idea that variances cannot be used to avoid meeting the expressed criteria required for the grant of a special exception. In Chester Haven, the Court of Special Appeals stated: The attempt to follow this procedure creates fundamental and conceptional problems with the generally accepted proposition that, if the express conditions necessary to obtain a conditional use are met, it is a permitted use because the legislative body has made that policy decision. Does the legislative intent that the use be permitted remain if the conditions are not met but are eliminated by an administrative body granting a variance? Upon such an occurrence, the application for a conditional use becomes dependent upon the granting of the variances. Under those circumstances, the presumption that a conditional use is permitted may well fall by the wayside. The policy that establishes certain uses as permitted is predicated upon the satisfaction, not avoidance, of conditions. Conditions the legislative body attaches to the granting of a conditional use normally must be met in accordance with the statute-not avoided. In any event, even if such a procedure would pass muster, if the variance process fails, the entire application fails. Chester Haven, 103 Md.App. at 336, 653 A.2d at 538. While the Court of Special Appeals in Chester Haven realized that this could be an issue, it did not resolve the issue; it decided the case based upon the failure of the variance process itself. The Anne Arundel County Code provides the standards for granting a variance and when variance procedures cannot be utilized. The Code, Article 3, section 2-107, states in relevant part: § 2-107. Standards for granting variance. (a) The County Board of Appeals may vary or modify the provisions of Article 28 of this Code when it is alleged that practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships prevent carrying out the strict letter of that article, provided the spirit of law shall be observed, public safety secured, and substantial justice done. A variance may be granted only after determining: (1) that because of certain unique physical conditions, such as irregularity, narrowness or shallowness of lot size and shape, or exceptional topographical conditions peculiar to and inherent in the particular lot, there is no reasonable possibility of developing the lot in strict conformance with this article; or (2) that because of exceptional circumstances other than financial considerations, the grant of a variance is necessary to avoid practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship, and to enable the applicant to develop such lot. ... (d) This section does not apply to Title 1B or § 15-104A of Article 28 of this Code. [9] [Emphasis added.] The Code grants the Board the authority to grant variances from sections within the code, except for the titles and sections enumerated in section 2-107(d) aforesaid. The local legislative body clearly knew that it could except certain parts of the Code from the application of the variance provisions. The section relating to the granting of a special exception for an automotive service station, located in Article 28, section 12-206, the special exception provision at issue here, was not one of the sections that was excepted. We have held that when there is an express exception to a statute, additional exceptions should not be implied. See Taylor v. Friedman, 344 Md. 572, 581, 689 A.2d 59, 63 (1997) (Taylor's position is reinforced by the rule of statutory construction dealing with statutes that express a general rule, followed by one or more specific exceptions to the general rule. Under those circumstances, a court ordinarily cannot add to the list of exceptions.); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 416 A.2d 734, 737 (1980) (Where a statute expressly provides for certain exclusions, other should not be inserted.). Accordingly, in an ordinance in which certain matters are excluded from the applicability of variance relief, it can be inferred that the legislative body's intent is that all other areas are susceptible to variance relief. The concerns about the intention of the legislative body, expressed in Chester Haven, are thus resolved. The legislative body has, by excluding portions of the code from the variance provisions, while not excluding others, expressed an intent that variance provisions be applied to all areas not excluded. That includes the special exception provision at issue here. We discussed the granting or denial of a special exception in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981), when we stated that: This Court has frequently expressed the applicable standards for judicial review of the grant or denial of a special exception use. The special exception use is a part of the comprehensive zoning plan sharing the presumption that, as such, it is in the interest of the general welfare, and therefore, valid. The special exception use is a valid zoning mechanism that delegates to an administrative board a limited authority to allow enumerated uses which the legislature has determined to be permissible absent any fact or circumstance negating the presumption. The duties given the Board are to judge whether the neighboring properties in the general neighborhood would be adversely affected and whether the use in the particular case is in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the plan. Whereas, the applicant has the burden of adducing testimony which will show that this use meets the prescribed standards and requirements, he does not have the burden of establishing affirmatively that his proposed use would be a benefit to the community. If he shows to the satisfaction of the Board that the proposed use would be conducted without real detriment to the neighborhood and would not actually adversely affect the public interest, he has met his burden. The extent of any harm or disturbance to the neighboring area and uses is, of course, material. If the evidence makes the question of harm or disturbance or the question of the disruption of the harmony of the comprehensive plan of zoning fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board to decide. But if there is no probative evidence of harm or disturbance in light of the nature of the zone involved or of factors causing disharmony to the operation of the comprehensive plan, a denial of an application for a special exception use is arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. Turner v. Hammond, 270 Md. 41, 54-55, 310 A.2d 543, 550-51 (1973); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Board of Appeals of Gaithersburg, 257 Md. 183, 187-88, 262 A.2d 499, 502 (1970); Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, Inc., 202 Md. 279, 287, 96 A.2d 261, 264 (1953); Anderson v. Sawyer, 23 Md.App. 612, 617, 329 A.2d 716, 720 (1974). These standards dictate that if a requested special exception use is properly determined to have an adverse effect upon neighboring properties in the general area, it must be denied. Id. at 11-12, 432 A.2d at 1325. We discussed the granting of a special exception in Board of County Commissioners for Cecil County v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 550 A.2d 664 (1988), when we stated, after discussing the standard for judicial review of the grant or denial of a special exception stated in Schultz, that: In summary, where the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular special exception use and location proposed would cause an adverse effect upon adjoining and surrounding properties unique and different, in kind or degree, than that inherently associated with such a use regardless of its location within the zone, the application should be denied. Furthermore, if the evidence makes the issue of harm fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board's decision, and should not be second-guessed by an appellate court. The Schultz test accords with the general standard for judicial review of the ruling of an administrative agency, which we have defined as whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached; this need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment. Supervisor of Assess. v. Ely, 272 Md. 77, 84, 321 A.2d 166 [, 170] (1974). Id. at 217-18, 550 A.2d at 668. In Stacy v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 189, 210 A.2d 540 (1965), we examined the granting of a special exception and a variance. Ernest Kendall purchased a piece of property with the intention of applying for a special exception to open a child care home. The special exception was granted by the County Board of Appeals for Montgomery County. This ruling was appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which reversed the decision of the Board of Appeals on the ground that the building failed to meet the requirements of the zoning ordinance as to distance. [10] While his case had been pending on appeal, Mr. Kendall realized that the building did not meet the distance requirement so he applied for a variance from the distance requirement. His application for the variance was granted by the Board of Appeals. The Board of Appeals' decision to grant the variance was appealed to the Circuit Court, which affirmed the decision. Appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellants' first contention on appeal was that where one purchases realty with the intention to apply for a variance from restrictions imposed by a zoning ordinance, he may not contend that such restrictions caused him peculiar hardships that entitle him to the special privileges he seeks. [11] Id. at 192, 210 A.2d at 541-42. The Court of Appeals found that Mr. Kendall did not know he was going to need a variance when he bought the property and that the need for the variance was not determined until after the special exception had been granted. The Court went on to state that: There is a marked distinction between variance and special exception in Montgomery County. A special exception within the meaning of the zoning ordinance is one which is controlled and which is expressly permissible in a given zone. It is granted by the Board, after a public hearing, upon a finding that conditions of the zoning ordinance are satisfied. A variance is authorized under the terms of the zoning ordinance where the literal enforcement of its terms would result in unnecessary hardships. By Section 104-22(a)(1) of the Montgomery County Code, the County Board of Appeals is authorized to [g]rant variances from the strict application of this chapter when by reason of exceptional narrowness, shallowness, or shape of specific parcels of property    or by reason of exceptional topographical conditions or other extraordinary situations or conditions of specific parcels of property, the strict application of these regulations or amendments thereto would result in peculiar and unusual practical difficulties to, or exceptional or undue hardship upon, the owner of said property; provided that such relief or variances can be granted without substantial impairment of the intent, purpose, and integrity of the general plan   . It is further provided that this provision shall not be construed to permit the Board under the guise of a variance, to change the use of land. See Montgomery County v. Merlands Club, 202 Md. 279, 96 A.2d 261. The Board heard the testimony of Clinton Frey, Jr., a surveyor, who, after having been qualified as an expert, testified as to the unusual shape of the property. The Board exercising its discretion in accordance with its expertise in zoning matters, determined from all of the evidence that all criteria had been met by the applicant to sustain the granting of the variance. We find that the court below was not in error in affirming the decision of the Board in granting the variance as provided in Section 104-22 of the Montgomery County ordinance under the circumstances presented in this case. Id. at 193, 210 A.2d at 542 (alteration in original). While the facts in Stacy are slightly different from the facts in the case sub judice, and the question raised for the first time in Chester Haven and squarely presented in the case sub judice was not presented, nor addressed in Stacy, the Court, in that case, nonetheless affirmed the granting of a variance in a special exception case. The Anne Arundel County Code, while prohibiting the application of variances from applying to certain sections of the Code, does not restrict Article 28, section 12-206, which contains the criteria for the granting of a special exception for an automotive service facility. The drafters of the Code obviously understood that they could restrict the application of variances as to certain sections within the Code. They chose to not restrict the application of variances to special exceptions. We hold that the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals may grant a special exception and, at the same time, also may grant area variances from the specific criteria provided in section 12-206(b) of Article 28 (Zoning Ordinance) of the County Code. In the case sub judice, respondents substantially satisfied the criteria for the granting of a special exception. The two variances granted by the Board were for modifications of criteria that did not cause adverse effects upon the neighborhood or allow a use for the parcel that was outside of the special exception provisions of the general zoning plan. The two variances did not change the objectives of the Code to make the special exception satisfy certain criteria; the variances only allowed a slight modification that still enabled the special exception to fall into the comprehensive zoning scheme of that area. As utilized in this case, the variance procedure did not change the essential nature of the special exception use sought by the applicants. The Board did not err as a matter of law by granting the two minor variances that enabled respondents to satisfy the criteria for the granting of a special exception.