Opinion ID: 2179808
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Scope of the Limiting Instruction

Text: The trial court instructed the jury as follows concerning the purpose for which the later uncharged Ocean City misconduct could be considered: During the trial, the State introduced evidence of other bad acts of the defendant. As I explained during the trial, in certain instances evidence may be admitted for a particular purpose only and for no other purpose. The evidence of prior bad acts is governed by a rule of evidence that has the force and effect of statutory law. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts, is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. If you believe any evidence concerning uncharged bad acts by defendant, and in that regard it is entirely up to the jury as to whether the evidence is believable, you may not use that evidence as proof that defendant is a bad person and therefore probably committed the offense alleged in the indictment. You are instructed your use of any such evidence presented on other crimes or bad acts only if you believe it and only as it relates to the proof of motive, intent, or plan, or another proper purpose. (emphasis added) The State contends that the trial judge satisfied 404(b) when he instructed the jury on four separate occasions throughout trial that they could not consider the uncharged Ocean City misconduct as evidence of Milligan's character. [7] Additionally, the State argues that the final instruction's non-specific reference to another proper purpose was mere surplusage that constituted harmless error. We disagree and find that the trial court's cryptic reference to another proper purpose was, as a matter of law, reversible error in this context. While the trial judge began the final instruction on this critical issue by stating that the evidence of other bad acts may be admitted for a particular purpose and for no other purpose, he followed that language with a litany of possibilities that included purposes totally unrelated to his careful, particularized findings purporting to justify admission which he articulated earlier in the record. Further, he ended the final instruction with language suggesting that the jury could consider another proper purpose in addition to the limited purposes for which he admitted the evidence in the first instance. It is important to note that it is irrelevant how many cautionary instructions were given throughout the trial because the final jury instruction failed to specify the limited basis for which the jury could consider the 404(b) evidence. The trial court's final instruction to the jury allowed them to consider the Ocean City incident for another proper purpose, without specificity, and encouraged consideration, without guidance, of any purpose contemplated by 404(b) or as the jury might presume to find proper. The trial court's failure to limit the jury's consideration of the evidence allowed them to speculate well beyond the very limited findings the trial court made in its decision to admit the evidence in the first instance. A careful reading of this Court's opinion approving the trial court's instruction in Pope v. State, [8] would reveal the necessary elements of a proper charge. First, the jury should be told the specific purpose or purposes for which the evidence may be used consistent with the record and the findings of the trial court supporting admissibility of the other crimes or uncharged bad acts. Second, the jury must be told, as in Pope, that the evidence may not be considered for any other purpose. Mere recitation of the general language found in 404(b), however accurate as a statement of law in the abstract, does not provide an adequate safeguard against an unfairly prejudicial effect. The final instruction should explain in plain and direct language the result of the trial court's balancing test of probative value against unfairly prejudicial effect and limit the jury's consideration of the evidence accordingly. This was precisely what the trial court did successfully in Pope. [9] The final instruction given over Milligan's objection failed to specify clearly the limited purpose for which the uncharged misconduct could be considered. A trial court's jury instruction can be a basis for reversal if the deficiency undermined the ability of the jury to `intelligently perform its duty returning a verdict.' [10] It is clear in this case that the challenged jury instruction was too broad in scope thereby permitting the jury to speculate beyond the parameters circumscribed by this Court in Pope. We find that the deficiency in the jury charge was misleading, improper, and undermined the ability of the jury to accurately and intelligently return an appropriate verdict free of unfairly prejudicial effect. [11]