Opinion ID: 2582685
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Our prior cases

Text: The misconduct in Burrell involved conflict of interest and violation of a disqualification order. [31] This court ordered that Burrell be suspended from the active practice of law for 90 days with reinstatement conditioned on passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, [32] reasoning: Homer Burrell's representation of Lynne Burrell in a civil suit against James Hanger constituted a conflict of interest, which is a clear and significant violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. There is also more than adequate evidence in the record which demonstrates that Burrell violated the terms of the superior court's disqualification order. Actions like Burrell's seriously undermine the public's confidence in Alaska's legal system. Additionally, we think it of importance that Burrell demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the wrongfulness of his actions.[ [33] ] In In re West, the attorney intentionally notarized his deceased client's signature, knowing that the client's widow had falsified the signature at [the attorney's] direction. [His] motive was to induce the state to enter into a negotiated property-loss settlement which would have at least temporarily foundered if the client's fatal heart attack had been revealed. [34] We concluded that West's extensive practice experience provides the only significant aggravating circumstance [35] and agreed that mitigating factors included `mental disability or impairment at the time of misconduct' and evidence of `good character and reputation.' [36] West received a ninety-day suspension. [37] In In re Triem, the attorney received a ninety-day suspension followed by probation for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him by his client. [38] We noted that Triem has proven that public censure or a period of probation is not effective in influencing his conduct because he was already on probation for neglecting another client's case. [39] The court decided to impose a ninety-day suspension instead of the six months recommended by the ABA Standards because a ninety-day suspension will impose considerable hardship and will be a significant sanction for Triem, a solo practitioner in a small community. [40] Ford's actions in the current case are less serious than the conduct in In re West and Burrell, and arguably no more serious than the conduct in In re Triem. Because we are guided by the sanctions imposed in comparable disciplinary proceedings, it would be inappropriate to impose a longer sentence on Ford simply because the ABA generally recommends suspension be at least six months. Yet we agree that a suspension is necessary. Ford apparently believes that what he did was appropriate and he insists that a lawyer can refuse to obey an order and be right. Regardless of the propriety of the superior court's order, Ford failed to follow the proper avenues of legal recourse by appealing or seeking a stay. Ford's conduct before and after the incident demonstrates an ongoing disrespect for the legal process. This is not the first time the Bar Association found that Ford knowingly violated a court order. In 1998 Ford advised a client not to comply with an order to bring the parties' children back to Alaska for trial. Neither Ford nor his client appeared for trial. Whether one regards this as the attorney advising a client to ignore a court order, or as the attorney himself failing to comply with the trial calendering order, the disciplinary board concluded that Ford knowingly violat[ed] a court order. As in the current case, Ford expressed no remorse for his 1998 conduct. In defending his 1998 conduct, Ford wrote in a letter to Bar counsel that if he had to do it all over again, I doubt that I would have done much differently. It is significant that Ford was admonished in 1998 for knowingly violating a court order, the same type of violation that is now before us. We conclude that the 1998 admonition failed to deter Ford from knowingly violating the 2000 order. This indicates to us that he would be equally undeterred by public censure or probation, or any discipline short of suspension. There is no reported case in which we have imposed a suspension of less than ninety days. [41] Indeed, one member of this court declared that [a] ninety-day suspension is not so much a substantial penalty as it is an unpaid vacation because it allows [the attorney] merely to delay performing requested services.... If [an attorney's] misconduct is serious enough to warrant a suspension from practice, then he [or she] should be made to suffer the consequences of its actual cessation. [42] We do not view a ninety-day suspension here as insubstantial. Like Triem, Ford is a single practitioner and a suspension of ninety days will likely result in significant hardship. But we acknowledge that a sixty-day suspension might be perceived as a vacation. A suspension shorter than ninety days would be unlikely to deter Ford from future misconduct; a suspension longer than ninety days would be out of line with suspensions we have imposed for comparable violations.