Opinion ID: 886776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Bailiff's Actions

Text: ¶ 21 Section 46-16-503(2), MCA, states: After the jury has retired for deliberation, if there is any disagreement among the jurors as to the testimony or if the jurors desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall notify the officer appointed to keep them together, who shall then notify the court. The information requested may be given, in the discretion of the court, after consultation with the parties. ¶ 22 In State v. Herron (1976), 169 Mont. 193, 545 P.2d 678, we held that the communications between the jury and the court via the bailiff violated then § 95-1913(d), RCM (1947), as defendant's attorney was not notified nor present and had no way to protect his client from the jury's confusion. Herron, 169 Mont. at 198, 545 P.2d at 681. Specifically, the jury in Herron asked the bailiff to convey a question to the presiding judge as to whether they should sign the first verdict form before proceeding to the their determination of the next charge. The jury was confused by two separate instructions given to them. The judge and the bailiff conversed off the record, not in the presence of the parties. Thereafter, the bailiff returned to the jury room, misadvising them that they were to arrive at only one verdict and should therefore only sign one verdict form. The jurors were confused by this instruction, given that the defendant was charged with multiple counts, and the jury ultimately failed to return a verdict. Herron, 169 Mont. at 195-96, 545 P.2d at 680. ¶ 23 Here, the bailiff advised the jury to find a common ground, and to keep working on it, after the jury told the bailiff that they were deadlocked. Ultimately, the jury convicted Steele of assault on a peace officer. However, unlike the bailiff in Herron, the bailiff here did not misadvise the jury. Rather, the judge later stated, while not condoning the bailiff's actions, that she would have advised the jury of the same. In addition, the jury here did not disagree as to any of the testimony received, nor did they desire information regarding the law, as the jury did in Herron. Hence, § 46-16-503(2), MCA, was not triggered, and the District Court did not err in denying Steele's motion for a mistrial on that basis. ¶ 24 While we do not conclude that the bailiff's comments to the jury require reversal on the facts here, we also want to make it clear that we do not condone the bailiff's actions. It is not within the prerogative of any court officerother than the trial judgeto give instructions to the jury regarding its deliberations, however seemingly innocuous those might be. The bailiff here apparently made it a practice to make similar comments to other jurieshe testified to having done it in the past. All we can say is that this bailiff is lucky; the next time he takes it upon himself to provide gratuitous advice to a trial jury, he might wind up costing the taxpayers thousands of dollars in retrying the case. We encourage the trial judges of this state to specifically instruct court officers and employees of the appropriate limits of their duties when dealing with trial juries.