Opinion ID: 2123768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: and (5) Importance and credibility of appellant's testimony

Text: Appellant's version of the facts may be centrally important to the result reached by the jury. If so, this fact would support exclusion of the impeachment evidence if by admitting it, appellant's account of events would not be heard by the jury. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940. However, it is clear from the record that appellant's version was presented to the jury via the testimony of other witnesses. Moreover, no offer of proof was made as to any additional testimony appellant would have added if he had taken the stand. Both these factors support the trial court's decision to admit the evidence for impeachment. See State v. Lloyd, 345 N.W.2d at 246. Finally, because appellant's credibility was a main issue in this case, had he testified, there would have been a significant need for the admission of this evidence. Id. (citing Bettin, 295 N.W.2d at 546). The trial court is vested with great discretion in this area and we find no reason to overturn its ruling. We believe it important that trial courts are given latitude to make evidentiary determinations. Accordingly, we hold that, under the factors articulated in Jones, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing admission of appellant's prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Appellant asserts further that his right to testify in his own defense was violated by the court's admission of his prior convictions. Clearly, this right is protected by both the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution and Minnesota law. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2544, n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Minn. 1979); Minn.Stat. 611.11 (1992). Here, appellant was not kept from testifying; he made a decision not to testify based on the evidence that would have been admitted had he taken the stand. Appellant argues that the court's ruling effectively left him no choice. However, defendants often make decisions not to testify based on the potential damage that prior convictions could inflict on their credibility. The mere fact that a trial court would allow impeachment evidence if a defendant chooses to testify does not necessarily implicate his constitutional right to testify in his own defense. At a minimum, in order to prevail on this argument, appellant would have to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the probative value of the impeachment evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect; it is only when a trial court has abused its discretion under Rule 609(a)(2) that a defendant's right to testify may be infringed by the threat of impeachment evidence. Next we consider whether the trial court committed reversible error when it did not issue the jury instructions requested by appellant. The evidence in this case consisted largely of circumstantial evidence and inculpatory statements made by appellant to others. The defense believed that the witnesses to appellant's inculpatory statements were significantly impeached. Because the defense believed the jury might convict on circumstantial evidence alone, it requested the following instruction: A fact may be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence or by both. The law does not prefer one form of evidence over the other; however, in order to base a verdict solely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence must be such so as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except guilt. The court declined to give this instruction and instead gave the jury a pattern instruction identical to the requested instruction, but without the final independent clause referring to a verdict based solely on circumstantial evidence. Although the pattern instruction used by the trial court has been explicitly approved by this court, appellant argues that the trial court's ruling constituted reversible error. See State v. Turnipseed, 297 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Minn.1980); State v. Hardy, 303 N.W.2d 57 (Minn.1981). Appellant argues that the jury should have been instructed on how to handle circumstantial evidence in the absence of any direct evidence, and hence that Turnipseed's holding that such an instruction is not mandatory should be overruled. Appellant cites State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426 (Minn.1989), to bolster this assertion. In that case, the court used the rational hypothesis language requested by appellant to test the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Id. at 430. We believe that this test does not apply to jury instructions. We noted in Turnipseed that other courts have held that jury instructions are conceptually different from tests for the sufficiency of evidence, and that it is not always wise to read a sufficiency of evidence test to the jury. Id. at 312. Additionally, Turnipseed quotes Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated: There is some support for this type of instruction in the lower court decisions    but the better rule is that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an additional instruction on circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect. Here, appellant did not object to the reasonable doubt instructions. Therefore, under Turnipseed, the instructions were proper. Appellant next argues that he was denied a fair trial because of a comment made by counsel for the state in closing argument. Appellant believes that the following comment warrants a reversal of the verdict because it suggested that appellant had the burden to prove himself innocent. Now defense counsel indicated that the evidence would show that someone else committed that crime and you would come to know that. At that time no name was mentioned, nor I submit has there been any evidence submitted that anyone other than the defendant was ultimately responsible for the murder of Dale Yungk on April 14, 1990, back in Todd County. The context of this comment is important in evaluating its propriety. It is apparent that part of the defense strategy was to prove, or at least suggest, that another person was responsible for Yungk's murder. Defense counsel made the following statement in his opening argument: [B]y the time that you have heard all of the evidence in this case    you are going to find that neither my client nor Mr. Scott had anything to do with the murder of Dale Yungk, but    you as a jury collectively are going to have a good idea of who did. The prosecutor simply remarked that this had not been accomplished. Defense counsel did not object to the remark. Furthermore, the defense attempted to suggest in its closing argument that another person killed Yungk. It is established law that a prosecutor may not comment on a defendant's failure to call witnesses. See e.g., State v. Caron, 300 Minn. 123, 218 N.W.2d 197 (1974); State v. Bell, 294 Minn. 189, 199 N.W.2d 769 (1972). It is equally clear that the state bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt throughout the trial and that the prosecutor is prohibited from shifting the burden of proof to a defendant to prove his innocence. State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn.1984). However, we have held that a remark by a prosecutor on the lack of evidence regarding the defense's theory did not shift the burden of proof to the defense. State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d 656, 664 (Minn.1986). Additionally, the court has held that corrective instructions may cure certain kinds of prosecutorial error. Id. at 664; State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 590 (Minn.1982). In the instant case, the prosecutor's remark can be viewed as a comment on appellant's theory, and thus not improper. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that the closing arguments of counsel did not constitute evidence, and that the defendant was under no obligation to prove his innocence. Further, the comment was only one paragraph long in an argument that consisted of 48 pages of the trial transcript and the prosecutor's argument as a whole must be examined to determine whether it provides a basis for reversal. State v. Daniels, 332 N.W.2d 172 (Minn.1983). Because we believe that the statement was a permissible challenge to appellant's theory, it did not constitute error. State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d at 664. Appellant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by directing that his sentence run consecutively with a federal sentence which he is currently serving. Appellant was sentenced to a mandatory life term for his conviction for first-degree murder. However, he will not begin serving that sentence until he has completed a five-year federal sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Appellant admits that the trial court has discretion to impose consecutive sentences in this case, but nevertheless, asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. He argues that the criminality of his act does not warrant a consecutive sentence. Appellant's argument has no merit. Although we have previously held that when a trial court is silent on whether a sentence is to be served consecutively or concurrently, a later state-imposed sentence should run concurrently with an earlier federally-imposed sentence, see State v. Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn.1978), the trial court is given broad discretion within the sentencing guidelines to depart from presumptive sentences. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). In State v. Norris, 428 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 1988), cited by appellant, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and of five counts of assault in the second degree involving five separate victims. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment plus 300 months (60 months per assault) to run consecutively. In holding that only three of the five sentences for assault could be served consecutively, the court found that although the sentence was technically permissible, on the facts of the case, it unfairly exaggerate[d] the criminality of defendant's conduct. Id. at 71. Appellant argues that the consecutive sentencing in the instant case similarly exaggerated the criminality of his conduct, because the gun he was charged with possessing is the one he allegedly used to murder Yungk. However, appellant possessed the gun for at least four months prior to the murder. Given the leeway trial courts have in sentencing decisions and that appellant could have been prosecuted for the federal crime months before the murder took place, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to impose consecutive sentences. We now examine arguments made by appellant in his pro se brief. Appellant's first contention relates to the replacement of his appointed counsel. Appellant's attorney was hospitalized unexpectedly and as a result, a 30-day continuance was requested. The court elected to remove appellant's counsel and appoint a public defender to represent appellant. Appellant complains that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance violated his right to the attorney of his choice and that the attorney was not competent. While a defendant has the right to court appointed counsel, he does not have the right to choose the attorney; he must accept the attorney appointed by the court. State v. Fagerstrom, 286 Minn. 295, 299, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1970). Consequently, appellant's argument that the attorney originally appointed to take his case should have been granted a continuance has no merit. As to the competence of the counsel, the standard is expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the Court stated: The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In Minnesota, the standard for attorney competence is representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances. White v. State, 309 Minn. 476, 481, 248 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1976). In order for there to be a claim for ineffective assistance, there must be both serious error by counsel and prejudice resulting from that error, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Although appellant alleges that he disagreed with some of his counsel's tactics, he does not meet either prong of the stringent standard set forth in Strickland. Therefore, his ineffective assistance claim is denied. Appellant's second contention concerns the trial court's decision to keep out evidence that tended to show that a third party committed the murder. Appellant made an offer of proof at trial in order to show that Yungk had previously been beaten and threatened for stealing a large amount of money from two men. The trial court ruled that appellant failed to make the required connection between those persons and the present crime. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn.1977). Because the record does not reveal how this connection could be made, the trial court was correct in its ruling. Appellant's next argument relates to the testimony of Michael Olson. Olson testified that appellant admitted killing someone and that he wanted someone to kill Veronica Yarbough. Appellant asserts that the latter statement should not have been admitted because its admission was in violation of Minn.R.Evid. 403, which says evidence should be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. In other words, a close question favors admissibility. The trial court is given discretion in balancing the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect and its decision will not be overturned except where that discretion is abused. State v. Gavle, 234 Minn. 186, 48 N.W.2d 44 (1951). See e.g., State v. Dye, 333 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1983), in which we upheld a trial court's determination that evidence of a defendant's plans to flee was properly admitted. Counsel for appellant did not object to Olson's testimony, and we conclude that, in the absence of an objection, the admission of the statements did not violate the rule. Appellant next argues that the testimony of two other witnesses should not have been admitted. With regard to the first witness, counsel made no objection at trial and we fail to see how it prejudiced appellant. On the other hand, the second witness testified that Yungk seemed nervous around appellant and Scott. She arguably crossed into hearsay territory when, on being asked why she thought Yungk was nervous, she answered: Because of statements he made to me. Defense counsel repeatedly objected to this line of questioning. In State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427 (Minn.1982), the court held that hearsay statements concerning a murder victim's fear of a defendant are admissible only when three conditions exist. First, the victim's state of mind must be at issue. It is generally relevant only where the defendant raises the defense of accident, suicide or self-defense. Second, the trial court must engage in the Rule 403 weighing process and third, the trial court must issue a proper limiting instruction to the jury. Id. at 432. See also, State v. Ulvinen, 313 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. 1981). In this case, it does not appear that Yungk's state of mind was relevant, nor did the trial court give a limiting instruction directing the jury to accept the testimony only for determining the declarant's state of mind. Therefore, it appears that the trial court erred in its admission of this testimony. However, the part this evidence played was minor when compared with other testimony. Consequently, appellant would not meet the standard articulated in State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 64 (Minn.1981), for reversal: A defendant claiming error in the trial court's reception of evidence has the burden of showing both the error and the prejudice resulting from the error.    A reversal is warranted only when the error substantially influences the jury to convict. Finally, appellant's other arguments contained in the pro se brief are meritless. The lower court made no error upon which a reversal or new trial could be based. Affirmed.