Opinion ID: 2221247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenged Jury Instructions.

Text: The city contends that the trial court's instructions were inadequate in several respects. On each challenged instruction the city offered its own proposed jury instruction and made timely objections. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 196. In determining whether the court's instructions fairly submitted to the jury all factual issues which were properly pleaded and supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction. Anderson v. Low Rent Housing Commission, 304 N.W.2d 239, 249 (Iowa) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086, 102 S.Ct. 645, 70 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Miller v. International Harvester Co., 246 N.W.2d 298, 300-01 (Iowa 1976). A. Estoppel. In its answer the city pleaded estoppel as a complete defense, alleging that because plaintiff told the arresting officer he was not injured, he should be estopped to deny the statement. The trial court thereafter instructed the jury it could consider plaintiff's alleged failure to complain about injuries as one of the factors bearing upon the reasonableness of the city's actions. It rejected, however, an instruction proposed by the city under which plaintiff could recover no damages if he told the policeman he was not injured and the policeman acted in reliance upon the statement. We agree with the court of appeals that the trial court did not err in rejecting that proposed estoppel instruction. The city's instruction was incomplete because it did not include one element essential to the use of estoppel as a defense, the requirement that plaintiff has made the representation knowingly and with the intention that it be acted upon. Dierking v. Bellas Hess Superstore, 258 N.W.2d 312, 315-16 (Iowa 1977); Holden v. Construction Machinery Co., 202 N.W.2d 348, 355-56 (Iowa 1972). Moreover, the party pleading estoppel must establish each of its elements by a preponderance of clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. Dierking v. Bellas Hess Superstore, 258 N.W.2d at 315. There is not substantial evidence here that plaintiff knew the full extent of his injuries when he allegedly told the officer he was not injured. To the contrary, the record shows that plaintiff was then in a state of shock and pain caused by internal injuries. Even viewed in the light most favorable to the city, the evidence here was insufficient to support the city's proposed estoppel instruction. B. Mitigation of Damages. The city also pleaded in its answer that plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages because he did not exercise reasonable diligence to obtain necessary medical attention. See R.E.T. Corporation v. Frank Paxton Co., 329 N.W.2d 416, 421-22 (Iowa 1983). On appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court's jury instruction was inadequate because it required proof that plaintiff consciously, intentionally, and continuously refused to ask for or accept aid. The trial court's entire instruction number twelve on mitigation of damages provided: If under the evidence and these instructions you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages herein, you are instructed that it was the duty of the plaintiff to make use of reasonable means to effect as speedy and complete a cure of his injuries as could be reasonably accomplished under all of the circumstances. If you find from all the evidence that plaintiff consciously, intentionally, and continuously refused to ask for aid or to accept it if ordered or suggested to him, then in that event you shall reduce plaintiff's claimed damages for pain and suffering consistent with such period of time and that he did not ask for or accept aid as above qualified. The burden of proving that plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages lies with the defendant. Id. at 422. We find, as did the court of appeals, that this instruction was well balanced. The court provided the appropriate standard of reasonableness with regard to plaintiff's duty to mitigate his damages. The trial court also tailored the wording of the instruction to the evidence presented by the parties. As the court of appeals wrote: The plaintiff was removed from the collision site by a police paddy wagon and transported to jail. There he was processed and put in a cell for the remainder of the night. He was removed from the cell the next day and taken to a court appearance. Instruction twelve above, while stating the reasonableness requirement, incorporated the continuing duty of the defendant's officers to give the plaintiff first aid after they knew or had reason to know that the plaintiff was ill or injured. See Lang v. City of Des Moines, 294 N.W.2d 557, 560-61 (Iowa 1980). We find nothing inappropriate or misleading in instruction number twelve. The trial court properly instructed the jury on the issue of mitigation of damages. C. Proof of Damages. The city also contends that the jury was not adequately informed about the plaintiff's duty to prove damages to a reasonable degree of certainty. The city requested instructions emphasizing the need for a reasonable basis for measuring the plaintiff's loss, if any, but the trial court formulated its own instruction on damages which provided in pertinent part: [Plaintiff] is entitled to recover such damages and only such damages as have been shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have been sustained as the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant. These are known in the law as compensatory damages, and the amount of the recovery will be the full, fair actual, present compensation for such damages as hereinafter instructed. Plaintiff shall be entitled to a sum as will reasonably and fairly compensate him for any physical pain and suffering he endured during the time he was denied reasonable medical attention. The period will begin at a time when he should have reasonably been transported to a hospital and ends with the time he was actually released from jail. The damages, if any you find, for pain and suffering cannot be measured by any exact standard but must rest in the sound discretion of the jury. Such discretion must not be exercised arbitrarily or out of passion or sympathy or prejudice for or against the parties but be based upon a fair, intelligent, dispassionate and impartial consideration of the evidence. This instruction fairly presented the ideas that were contained within the city's requested instructions. A trial court is free to choose its own language and need not use the wording suggested by the parties. Moser v. Brown, 249 N.W.2d 612, 616 (Iowa 1977). Plaintiff did not seek recovery from the city for loss of earnings, or disability, or even medical and hospital bills. He sought compensatory damages from the city only for physical pain and suffering, an element of damages not subject to a rigid test of reasonable certainty. We conclude that the trial court adequately instructed the jury on the law governing compensatory damages for physical pain and suffering. The instructions suggested appropriate guidelines for assessing the evidence and arriving at a fair verdict.