Opinion ID: 2108691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expansion of the Inherently Dangerous Activity Doctrine to a Contractor's Employees

Text: In Vannoy v. City of Warren, 15 Mich.App. 158, 166 N.W.2d 486 (1968), the Court of Appeals purported to expand the scope of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine to hold a landowner liable not to a third party, but to the estate of a deceased employee of an independent contractor. The Court expressly rejected the landowner's argument that the doctrine applied only to third parties and not to the employees of an independent contractor engaged in the inherently dangerous activity. Id. at 164-165, 166 N.W.2d 486. The Court stated that limiting the exception to third persons violate[d] the absolute character of the duty.... Id. at 164, 166 N.W.2d 486. In McDonough v. Gen. Motors Corp., 388 Mich. 430, 201 N.W.2d 609 (1972), a plurality of this Court reversed a directed verdict for the defendant landowner, concluding that the inherently dangerous activity exception could be applied to impose liability on the owner for injuries to a subcontractor's employee. The plurality quoted Justice COOLEY's formulation of the rule that this Court cited in Inglis: `If I employ a contractor to do a job of work for me which, in the progress of its execution, obviously exposes others to unusual perils, I ought, I think, to be responsible,    for I cause acts to be done which naturally expose others to injury.' [ McDonough at 438, 201 N.W.2d 609, quoting Inglis, supra at 319, 136 N.W. 443, quoting 2 Cooley Torts (3d ed.), p. 109.] Without explanation, the plurality assumed that the others quoted above included the contractor's employees and not only third parties. Justice BRENNAN dissented, [5] contending that the inherently dangerous activity exception protects strangers and does not apply to a plaintiff who was himself actively engaged in the inherently dangerous activity. McDonough at 453, 201 N.W.2d 609. His dissent stated: The application of this well settled exception is clear in cases where the injured person is a stranger to the inherently dangerous activity. In Inglis [ supra ], the inherently dangerous activity was burning, and the plaintiff was a neighboring landowner; in Grinnell [ supra ], the danger was explosion, the plaintiff a purchaser of a stove; in Watkins [ supra ], the dangerous activity was elevated steel construction, the plaintiff a mason contractor; in Olah v. Katz, 234 Mich. 112, 207 N.W. 892 (1926), the danger was an open pit, the plaintiff a neighboring child; in Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165 (1861), the danger was an open ditch, the plaintiff a passer-by; in Darmstaetter v. Moynahan, 27 Mich. 188 (1873), the danger was a wall of ice in the roadway, the plaintiff a sleigh rider; in McWilliams v. Detroit Central Mills Co., 31 Mich. 274 (1875), the danger was a railroad switching operation, the plaintiff a passer-by.... Indeed, there are almost no cases which have come to notice in which the suit is brought by or on behalf of a plaintiff who was himself actively engaged in the inherently dangerous activity. Those few precedents which are cited seem to be founded upon other grounds.    [T]he rule of liability is designed to protect innocent third parties injured by the execution of an inherently dangerous undertaking. The rule is not designed, nor was it ever intended to benefit the contractor who undertakes the dangerous work, or his employees. Thus, if I employ a contractor to remove a tree stump from my yard by use of explosives, I am liable to my neighbor whose garage is damaged by the concussion. This is because it is I who have set the project in motion; it is I who have created the unusual peril; it is for my benefit that the explosives were used. As between myself and my neighbor, I ought not to be permitted to plead that it was the contractor's negligence and not my own which damaged his property. But if the contractor should blow up his own truck, I should not be liable. He is the expert in explosives and not me [sic]. I had neither the legal right nor the capability to supervise his work. The same would be true if the contractor's workman had injured himself, or been injured by the carelessness of a fellow workman or the negligence of his employer. Neither the contractor nor his employees are others, as contemplated in Cooley's statement of the rule. Indeed, they are privy to the contract which creates the peril. The mischief of today's decision is not its result, but its logic. One assumes that a company like General Motors has no want of access to expertise. It may well have safety engineers on its payroll far more knowledgeable about structural steel than the decedent's employer. But to predicate liability here on the Inglis; Olah; Wight and Watkins line of cases is to impose upon many, many other, less sophisticated defendants the same burden to attend to the safety of the employees of independent contractors. [ McDonough, supra at 453-456, 201 N.W.2d 609.] In Bosak v. Hutchinson, 422 Mich. 712, 724, 375 N.W.2d 333 (1985), this Court relied on Vannoy and McDonough for the proposition that the inherently dangerous activity exception has, on occasion, been applied to employees of contractors performing dangerous work. This Court did not provide further analysis of this issue, however, given its holding that assembling a crane after hours, the activity involved in that case, did not constitute a dangerous activity, but a routine construction activity. Id. at 728, 375 N.W.2d 333. Further, in Justus v. Swope, 184 Mich.App. 91, 457 N.W.2d 103 (1990), on which the trial court in the instant case relied, the Court of Appeals stated, The inherently dangerous activity doctrine has, thus far, been found to impose liability in cases involving owners fully capable of recognizing the potential danger. Id. at 96, 457 N.W.2d 103, citing McDonough; Vannoy , and others. The Court declined to impose liability on mere homeowners, id. at 96, 457 N.W.2d 103, for injuries that an employee of an independent contractor sustained while removing a dead tree from the homeowners' yard. The Court stated that it was unreasonable to expect the homeowners to be cognizant of the particular risks inherent in tree removal. Id. at 97-98, 457 N.W.2d 103. Thus, the Court seemingly would have imposed liability if the homeowners had been aware of such risks. The Court opined that imposing liability in that case, however, was exactly the fear that Justice BRENNAN expressed in his dissent in McDonough.