Opinion ID: 615359
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment Claims

Text: The District Court properly granted summary judgment on claims regarding Blanchard’s administrative complaints. A prisoner does not have the constitutional right to a prison grievance procedure. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 138 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“I do not suggest that the [prison grievance] 4 procedures are constitutionally mandated”); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). A prisoner, however, has a constitutional right of access to the courts. Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008). An access to the court claim requires that a prisoner demonstrate that defendants’ actions prevented him from litigating a nonfrivolous, arguable legal claim. See id. at 205-06. Blanchard alleged that Gallick was lax with providing him forms to file administrative complaints; that Troutman and Wolever withheld his complaints; that Kaminski, Mattack, and Vitale refused to assist him with the administrative complaint forms; and that Motta, Martinez, Dodrill, and Watts withheld a complaint and should have ordered defendants Kaminski, Mattack, and Vitale to assist him in completing administrative complaint forms. Blanchard, however, has not presented any evidence to show that defendants’ actions deprived him of the right to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim.2 Accordingly, summary judgment was properly granted.
We agree with the District Court that Blanchard failed to present evidence that supported his claim that defendants violated his equal protection rights. “To bring a successful claim . . . for a denial of equal protection, [a] plaintiff[] must prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of 2 At most, Blanchard alleged that Wolever blocked his medical administrative complaint no. 471779 from being filed in a timely manner. The District Court noted that Blanchard had raised an access to the court claim against Wolever regarding administrative complaint no. 471779, which was dismissed by the District Court for failure to state a claim and affirmed by this Court. See C.A. No. 10-4746. 5 Phila. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 196 (3d Cir. 2009). This requires Blanchard to demonstrate that he received different treatment from that received by other individuals similarly situated. See id. at 196-97. Blanchard alleged that Gallick showed special treatment to Caucasian inmates, and not African-American inmates, in assigning cellmates. Blanchard, however, failed to support his conclusory allegation with any evidence. In contrast, Gallick, who was responsible for cell assignments, stated in his declaration that Blanchard “does not have any known separatees, therefore, he is able to be celled with any appropriate inmate.” Gallick acknowledged that Blanchard had requested that he not share a cell with inmates from certain cities or members of certain gangs. Gallick stated that Blanchard’s requested restrictions were impossible to meet, and that Gallick based cellmate assignments on several factors, including known separatees, criminal history, institution disciplinary history, and the nature of the housing space available. Blanchard’s mere conclusory allegation, without more, cannot support a violation of equal protection. See Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1146 (3d Cir. 1972) (“Conclusory statements . . . [are] insufficient to avoid summary judgment.”). Accordingly, the District Court properly granted summary judgment as to Blanchard’s equal protection claim.
The District Court properly rejected Blanchard’s claim that Gallick and Troutman did not provide him protections in assigning cellmates. The Eighth Amendment imposes “a duty upon prison officials to take reasonable measures to protect prisoners from 6 violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997). To establish a failure to protect claim, an inmate must demonstrate that: (1) he is “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm;” and (2) the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to his health and safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). A substantial risk of serious harm “may be established by much less than proof of a reign of violence and terror,” but requires more than a single incident or isolated incidents. See Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1985). This does not require that an inmate must suffer an assault before obtaining relief. Id. Deliberate indifference is proven by showing that an official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The record supports that Blanchard repeatedly requested new cellmate assignments and instructed that he not be assigned to share a cell with inmates from certain cities or members of certain gangs. Blanchard, however, has set forth no evidence that there was a serious threat to his safety. The evidence indicates that the extent of his altercations with his cellmates after the 2008 incident was two threats from Allen. These threats do not rise to the level of a substantial risk of serious harm to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Riley, 777 F.2d at 147. Moreover, the record does not demonstrate that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. After Allen threatened Blanchard for the second time, Blanchard was placed in the Special Housing Unit, and Blanchard was then assigned a new cellmate. Additionally, when Blanchard complained 7 about his September 2010 cellmate, his cellmate was quickly reassigned. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment.