Opinion ID: 4516894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Hardship and Fraud Waivers

Text: In 2001, Azala married his first wife and received a conditional grant of lawful permanent resident (ʺLPRʺ) status. In 2003, they jointly filed an I‐751 petition to remove the conditions on his LPR status. In 2005, however, his then‐wife advised the 2 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (ʺUSCISʺ) under oath that Azala had paid her to marry him and that they had never lived as husband and wife. In 2006, after Azala and his first wife divorced and he had remarried, he filed a new I‐751 petition and asked for a hardship waiver of the joint petition requirement for removing the conditions on his LPR status obtained through his first marriage and for a fraud waiver to adjust status based on his second marriage. Our jurisdiction to review the denial of these waivers is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(4), 1227(a)(1)(H), 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Ahmed v. Holder, 624 F.3d 150, 153‐54 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that court lacks jurisdiction to review denial of fraud waiver); Contreras‐Salinas v. Holder, 585 F.3d 710, 713‐14 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding, with respect to denial of hardship waiver of joint petition requirement, that we at minimum lack jurisdiction to review ʺcredibility determinations and the weight given to evidenceʺ). Azala argues that the BIA improperly applied the REAL ID Act in affirming the IJʹs credibility determination in relation to the bona fides of his first marriage and gave undue deference to the finding of marriage fraud made by USCIS. While the application of an incorrect legal standard raises a question of law, see Khan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2007), Azalaʹs arguments are unavailing. First, on reconsideration the BIA corrected its error concerning which I‐751 application to remove conditions was under review, clarifying that the 2006 3 hardship waiver, rather than the 2003 joint I‐751, was before the IJ. Accordingly, the agencyʹs application of the REAL ID Act, which went into effect in 2005, was appropriate. Pub. L. No. 109‐13, § 101(h)(2), 119 Stat. 231, 305 (2005). We otherwise lack jurisdiction to review the credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(4), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Contreras‐Salinas, 585 F.3d at 713. Second, the IJ did not give undue deference to USCISʹs finding of marriage fraud. When an IJ reviews USCISʹs denial of an I‐751, the Government must prove, ʺby a preponderance of the evidence,ʺ that the marriage was not entered in good faith. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2). The IJ correctly stated this standard and found that the Government met its burden because Azalaʹs first wife ʺunequivocally state[d] that [Azala] provided her with money in exchange for an immigration benefit,ʺ which was ʺhighly probative as to the invalidity of his first marriage,ʺ and because Azala did not testify credibly about his first marriage. Supp. J. Appʹx at 610. Azala argues that his first wifeʹs statement was not unequivocal, but that challenge goes to the weight that the IJ afforded to the statement. Neither the weight of the evidence nor the credibility determination, however, are subject to judicial review. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(c)(4), 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). As to the fraud waiver, Azala has not raised any constitutional claims or questions of law. First, although the IJ stated, incorrectly, that Azala was not eligible for the waiver, the BIA did not rely on that finding. Moreover, there is no support in 4 the record for Azalaʹs contention that the IJʹs incorrect eligibility finding affected the alternative conclusion that he did not warrant a waiver as a matter of discretion. The IJ considered appropriate factors in her discretionary denial. See In re Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408, 412‐17 (BIA 1998) (listing factors). The IJ recognized Azalaʹs long residence in United States, lack of criminal record, history of consistently paying taxes, ʺstable employment history,ʺ and ʺessential support to his wife and child,ʺ but found that he did not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion because his fraud and incredible testimony were ʺserious adverse factor[s].ʺ Supp. J. Appʹx at 613; see In re Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 414 (observing that ʺfalse testimony under oath . . . is . . . considered an extremely serious adverse factor,ʺ even when that fraud is the basis for the waiver sought); see also United States v. Garcia, 166 F.3d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting effort to ʺdress upʺ a ʺpoorly disguised attack on the meritsʺ by ʺcouching [an] appeal in constitutional termsʺ) (citation omitted). Second, the record does not support Azalaʹs argument that the IJ denied him due process by discouraging testimony from his current wife and employer. Azalaʹs counsel conceded that these witnesses would not add any new information concerning the bona fides of Azalaʹs first marriage and did not ask to have them testify on any other issue. Further, Azala has not shown that he was prejudiced by their not testifying because the IJ recognized his steady employment and that he was a ʺcaring father and husband,ʺ but found that his marriage fraud outweighed the equities in his 5 favor. Supp. J. Appʹx at 613; see also Garcia‐Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (petitioner must show prejudice to make out a due process violation). Finally, Azalaʹs argument that the agency failed to adequately consider conditions in Algeria and other evidence of hardship to his wife and children in deciding whether to grant a fraud waiver is unexhausted. See Brito v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2008) (ʺ[W]hile not jurisdictional, issue exhaustion is mandatory. Indeed, in order to preserve an issue for review by this Court, the petitioner must not only raise it before the BIA, but do so with specificity.ʺ). On appeal to the BIA, he stated that ʺthe IJ did not fully consider the hardships that [Azalaʹs] family would face,ʺ but he failed to specify any evidence that the IJ ignored and, although Azala presented new hardship evidence in his motions to reopen, he did not claim that previously presented evidence was ignored. J. Appʹx at 19.