Opinion ID: 2161315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Yopps v. State, 228 Md. 204, 178 A.2d 879 (1962)

Text: Arnold Yopps was found guilty at a court trial and sentenced to imprisonment. The verdict was rendered without affording defense counsel the opportunity to make closing argument and there was prompt protest. Defense counsel said to the trial judge: You didn't even ask me for argument in this case.... The judge's response was, Wouldn't change my mind about it. 228 Md. at 206. We reversed and remanded for a new trial. We observed that the action of the trial court was manifestly prejudicial to the right of the accused to be represented by counsel throughout the entire trial and amounted to a denial of his rights under Article 21 of the Declaration of Rights of this State. Id. at 208, 178 A.2d 879. Yopps was cited and quoted with approval in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 859-860, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2554, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975). Covington v. State, 282 Md. 540, 386 A.2d 336 (1978) Quenzill Covington went to trial upon a plea of not guilty. The case was tried before the court sitting without a jury on an agreed statement of the State's evidence. The statement was the product of plea negotiations. Covington declared that he had no additions or corrections to add to the statement. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the trial judge to determine whether the facts set out in the statement were legally sufficient to convict Covington of the crimes charges. Immediately upon Covington's assurance that he had no addition to the statement of facts presented by the State the judge said: All right. Based upon the facts given me by the State, I find that they are sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the [charge of distribution of heroin]. And, accordingly, I do find him guilty of the charge. 282 Md. at 543, 386 A.2d 336. The trial judge then invited counsel and Covington to make any comments they desired before imposition of sentence. No objection was made. Id. Covington was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. Covington v. State, 34 Md. App. 454, 367 A.2d 974 (1977). We granted Covington's petition for certiorari to consider the question whether the trial judge erred in finding him guilty `without first affording him the right to present closing argument.' 282 Md. at 543, 386 A.2d 336. A majority of the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. The Court called attention to what is now Maryland Rule 4-322(c) by which a litigant [must] make known to the court an objection to the action of the court at the earliest practicable opportunity. Id. at 543, 386 A.2d 336 (brackets in original). And it observed that under Rule 885 the Court did not ordinarily decide any point or question which does not plainly appear by the record to have been tried and decided by the [trial] court.... Id. at 544, 386 A.2d 336. It noted that no protest was made to the failure of the trial judge to permit argument on Covington's behalf. Id. It found nothing in the record to indicate that counsel was in any way prevented from raising the issue at trial in the same manner in which the question was raised in Yopps v. State, supra . In the absence of objection by Covington or his counsel, however, a majority of the Court believed that the proper determination of whether the trial court erred was by way of post conviction procedures, rather than on direct appeal. Noting that Covington was not represented on appeal by his trial counsel, the Court observed that [w]e are unable to read the mind of his trial counsel so as to determine why he did not raise the issue below. Covington, 282 Md. at 545, 386 A.2d 336. We left the answer to a post conviction hearing. Id. at 545-546, 386 A.2d 336. Smith, J., speaking for the majority, explained: At a hearing under the Post Conviction Procedure Act, evidentiary issues may be fully explored. Such exploration would develop whether trial counsel fully understood what was being done and was satisfied with it. It would be determined, for instance, whether he had advised the trial judge that although he wished to be heard on the sentence to be imposed he did not wish to argue the issue of guilt or innocence. It likewise would be determined whether as a part of the plea bargain the defense conceded the sufficiency of the evidence and desired only to be heard on the sentence. After such full development of the facts surrounding this incident, an appellate court will not be placed in the position of speculating as to whether the complaint might be appellate afterthought. The court will have before it a full record upon which to determine whether the right of closing argument on the facts was denied to Covington, whether he knowingly waived such argument, or whether such argument was waived as a matter of trial tactics. Our insistence that an appellate court reach its conclusions with full information before it in no way deprives Covington of any rights. We believe it to be by far the sounder approach to the administration of justice. Id. at 545-546, 386 A.2d 336. Spence v. State, 296 Md. 416, 463 A.2d 808 (1983) William Spence was convicted at a non-jury trial of burglary, robbery, assault and theft. Defense counsel was not afforded the opportunity to argue the case before the verdicts were rendered. Upon his objection, the court struck the verdicts and directed counsel to argue the case if he desired. Counsel moved for a mistrial, asserting that in the circumstances any argument would be a waste of time. The court denied the motion, whereupon counsel presented his closing argument. The judge stated that he had considered the argument but would adopt by reference all of his previous comments and findings and again rendered verdicts of guilty. Terms of imprisonment were imposed. Spence v. State, 296 Md. at 419, 463 A.2d 808. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed on direct appeal. Spence v. State, 51 Md. App. 359, 443 A.2d 648 (1982). We granted certiorari and reversed with direction to remand for a new trial. A majority of the Court concluded that the trial court violated the defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel when it rendered its verdict before counsel had presented closing argument and that striking the verdict and permitting argument thereafter did not cure the defect. Id., 296 Md. at 423, 463 A.2d 808. The majority expressed its view as follows: [A]t a bench trial, the presiding judge is obliged to display every indicia of having an open mind, subject to being persuaded by a logical and convincing argument, prior to announcing the verdict. Furthermore, the verdict is the moment which signals the defendant's fate. He is constitutionally entitled to an opportunity before that moment to attempt to convince the trier of fact that he is innocent or that he is not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Depriving him of this opportunity is tantamount to shortening his day in court and denies him a fair trial. In our judgment, the striking of the verdict cannot restore the same stage, nor create the same atmosphere of fairness. Id. at 423-424, 463 A.2d 808.