Opinion ID: 1610846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of custom as bearing on decedent's common law duties as to lookout and control remains to be considered.

Text: As stated, the court submitted decedent's failure to maintain a proper lookout and his driver's failure to have the vehicle under control as specifications of decedent's negligence. Lookout, of course, is a common law duty. We assume at this point the specification of control was also treated as a common law duty rather than statutory, since what we have said in Division II would dispose of plaintiff's contention as to statutory control. Langner v. Caviness and American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Wusich, both supra, support the use of custom evidence when offered for purposes other than altering the effect of a statute, i. e., as bearing on the common law duty of due care. However, neither of these cases aids plaintiff's position here. As stated, at the hearing on the motion to suppress evidence prior to trial defendants moved the Court to suppress any evidence with respect to the showing of custom, usage or intention of the use of said road as a through highway for any purposes or by any means whatsoever. The motion was sustained and plaintiff's counsel gave no indication whatever than that he intended to offer evidence of custom for any other limited purpose. We set out the record: I do want to apprise the Court, as far as plaintiff is concerned, while we think custom and usage is important, we think the real issue here is what the board of supervisors and county engineer actually did in connection with this road. The fact stop signs were constantly in place and that the road was considered by them as a through highway and was held out to the public generally as a through highway, is the nub of our contention here. So while I do feel custom and usage has got something to do with it, I don't want the Court to think that is the most important thing we are going on, we feel the other is stronger. It is clear reference to the other was to what the county board and engineer actually did in connection with this road. Counsel does not contend he indicated in any manner at the hearing on the pretrial motion that he intended to offer evidence of custom for the limited purpose of its bearing on common law lookout and control. As a witness Brown was asked: Q. Mr. Brown, on July 24, 1965, as you approached this intersection where the collision occurred, what was your state of mind? A. Well, I thought I had the right of way. Defendant's motion to strike the answer on the ground it was given before counsel had a chance to object and an objection to it as wholly immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant was sustained and plaintiff made an offer of proof covering the same matter. Even then plaintiff did not indicate evidence of Brown's state of mind or intent was offered for the limited purpose of its bearing on his obligation to use due care. We held in Divisions I and II, supra, that evidence of custom was not admissible for the purposes of establishing Old Highway 18 as a through highway or as an excuse or justification for violation of a statute. Error does not lie in the exclusion of evidence claimed on an inadmissible ground even though it might have been admissible had it been claimed on another and different ground. Johnson v. Rockaway Bus Corporation, 145 Conn. 204, 140 A.2d 708, 710. See also Cotney v. State, 248 Ala. 1, 26 So.2d 603, 605, 607; In re Smead's Estate, 219 Cal. 572, 28 P.2d 348, 349; Hairgrove v. City of Jacksonville, 366 Ill. 163, 8 N.E.2d 187, 196; and Hudson v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 391 S.W.2d 441, 447. Where the objection has been sustained and the offeror contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose previously indicated by him may be admissible as bearing on other purposes, he has a duty to so state. Where the materiality is not apparent, the party offering it must disclose it. In In Re Repp's Estate, 241 Iowa 190, [195], 40 N.W.2d 607, 610, we quote with approval from Votaw & Hartshorn v. Diehl, 62 Iowa 676, [680] 13 N.W. 757, 18 N.W. 305, as follows: `The true rule, we think, is that, when it is apparent upon the face of the question asked the witness what the evidence sought to be introduced is, and that it is material, this is sufficient. But when this is not apparent, then the party seeking to introduce the evidence is required to state what he expects to prove, and thus make its materiality appear.' Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., Iowa, 144 N.W.2d 303, 313. Recent decisions of this court supporting this statement, although involving exhibits, are Olson v. Norwegian Mutual Ins. Assn., 258 Iowa 731, 737, 140 N.W.2d 91, 95; Englund v. Younker Brothers, Inc., 259 Iowa 48, 57-58, 142 N.W.2d 530, 535. The rule is well stated in Roach v. Snedigar, 76 S.D. 63, 72 N.W.2d 427, 429-430: 'The general principle is that the offer must be judged exclusively by its specific contents regarded as a whole. The principle leads to several consequences: (1) If the evidentiary fact desired to be offered is in itself apparently irrelevant, or otherwise dependent on other facts for its admissibility, the offer must contain a statement of the specific purpose, or of all the other facts necessary to admissibility.' Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. 1, § 17(b), p. 319. See also 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 102, p. 91.    [I]t was the duty of the appellants to make known to the trial court the limited purpose for which they claimed the excluded testimony admissible. To hold otherwise would be to require the court to cast about for reasons for which the same was offered. That should not be the burden of the court. Rather, when evidence that is apparently inadmissible is offered for a limited purpose, the proponent of the evidence should have the burden of making clear to the court his reason for the offer. The court is entitled to be advised of this fact before ruling on the offer. Further, the opponent would be in no position to make a proper objection unless he knew the limited purpose of the offer, or to request an instruction limiting the use of the evidence, if admitted, to the purpose of its admission. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 82 c contains a similar statement in substance. Since plaintiff did not indicate in the trial court evidence of custom was being offered as bearing on decedent's obligation to use due care, the court committed no error in disallowing the evidence when its admissibility was challenged. We recognize evidence may be clearly inadmissible for one purpose yet the same evidence may be proper and admissible for some other legitimate purpose. However, after defendant's objections had been sustained plaintiff never made known to the trial court the legitimate purpose now claimed for its admissibilty. IV. From what we have said in Division I we must conclude there is no merit in plaintiff's complaint of the court's instruction 7. As a matter of law it appeared this road was not a through highway. In view of the many references to this road as Old Highway 18 during the trial, we think this instruction was justified and was properly given. Affirmed. GARFIELD, C. J., and MOORE, STUART and RAWLINGS, JJ., concur. LARSON, SNELL, BECKER and LeGRAND, JJ., dissent.