Opinion ID: 1868866
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Policy of the Worker's Compensation Statutes

Text: ¶ 58 American Family argues that allowing insurers to reduce uninsured motorist limits in this situation is consistent with the public policy reflected in Wis. Stat. Chapter 102 (Worker's Compensation). According to American Family, Chapter 102 embodies a policy of denying recovery to claimants whose relationships to an injured person are remote. American Family notes this policy decision is embodied in Wis. Stat. §§ 102.48, 102.49, and 102.51, which limit a death benefit to dependents of the deceased. Therefore, American Family concludes, it is reasonable that the legislature would have intended that people like the Shiras, who were not financially dependent upon Scott, be denied uninsured motorist coverage. ¶ 59 While American Family is correct that the Shiras do not qualify as dependents under the WCA, the policies underlying the WCA and tort law differ. The WCA reflects a decision to limit the amounts recovered by injured employees to avoid imposing burdensome expenses upon employers. See Threshermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Page, 217 Wis.2d 451, 459-60, 577 N.W.2d 335 (1998) (explaining the compromise reached by the legislature to balance the interests of employers and employees); id. at 483, 577 N.W.2d 335 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (recounting the history of the compromise). The WCA ensures a minimal safety net for those financially dependent upon a deceased or injured employee by causing an employee to relinquish all common law remedies in exchange for the abrogation of the employer's defenses. See Page, 217 Wis.2d at 460, 469 n. 7, 577 N.W.2d 335. [13] ¶ 60 Tort law offers more than a minimal financial safety net. The purpose of tort law is to make an injured person whole. Though an insurer's potential obligation to pay under an uninsured motorist policy arises by contract, the insured's actual recovery is affected by common law remedies and common law defenses applicable in a tort action for negligence. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 2002 WI 31, ¶¶ 43-48, 68, 251 Wis.2d 561, 641 N.W.2d 662. The legislature has not imposed a compromise between insureds and uninsured motorist insurers that limits the recovery of insureds in exchange for depriving insurers of common law defenses available to tortfeasors. Cf. id., ¶ 68, 641 N.W.2d 662. Accordingly, we conclude the policy considerations at play in the WCA are not present here and do not preclude the Shiras from recovering under Scott's policy. ¶ 61 In addition, American Family suggests that our decision should adhere to the analysis in Seider. In Seider we considered whether the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance (OCI) exceeded its authority in adopting an administrative rule interpreting the valued policy law, Wis. Stat. § 632.05(2). The valued policy law provides that anytime real property that is owned and occupied by the insured primarily as a dwelling is wholly destroyed, . . . the amount of the loss shall be taken conclusively to be the policy limits of the policy insuring the property. § 632.05(2). The OCI promulgated an administrative rule that defined dwelling to exclude real property any part of which is used for commercial (non-dwelling) purposes other than on an incidental basis. . . . Wis. Admin. Code § INS 4.01(2)(e) (June, 1999). We invalidated the administrative rule because its restrictive definition of dwelling contradicted the plain and unambiguous meaning of dwelling in § 632.05(2). Seider, 236 Wis.2d 211, ¶ 6, 612 N.W.2d 659. ¶ 62 Seider does not control this case. Unlike in Seider, where the statute was unambiguous, Wis. Stat. § 632.32(5)(i)2. is either ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case or its plain meaning produces absurd results. Hence, this court has a duty to clarify the ambiguity or look beyond the plain meaning and state definitively what the law is.