Opinion ID: 3065354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is there Binding Agency Precedent On-Point,

Text: Requiring Our Deference? [6] The BIA’s opinion and the government on appeal both argue that this case must be resolved by deferring to the BIA’s opinion in Matter of Ozkok. This court must give deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to the “agency’s construction of the statute [that] it administers.” HernandezGuadarrama v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2005). However, in order to be entitled to Chevron deference, the agency’s construction must have been issued in “binding agency precedent on-point (either in the form of a regulation or a published BIA case).” Kyung Park v. Holder, 572 F.3d 619, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Two factors require us to conclude that Ozkok is not “binding agency precedent on-point.” First, Congress enacted the IIRIRA Amendment subsequent to Ozkok, so the language of Ozkok is no longer binding, at least insofar as it is not consistent with the text of the IIRIRA Amendment. Second, Ozkok did not address the particular situation present here— namely, whether a suspended fine is sufficient punishment to satisfy the definition of conviction. Ozkok addressed the imposition of probation and the actual enforcement of nonincarceratory penalties, but not the “imposition” of suspended non-incarceratory penalties. See Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 551-553. The government, in a Rule 28(j) letter of September 25, 2009 to the court, argues that the BIA’s opinion in Matter of Cabrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 459 (BIA 2008), removed any doubt that Retuta was “convicted” in the meaning of section 1101(a)(48). However, Cabrera, like Ozkok, only addresses sanctions actually imposed—in that instance, $458 in mandatory costs and surcharges, which it found to be a “punishment” or “penalty.” Id. at 460. The opinion does at one point obliquely suggest that the fact that there must be consideration of ability to pay before enforcing collection of costs 510 RETUTA v. HOLDER imposed on Cabrera “does not mean their imposition is not a punishment.” Id. at 462. Even if we were to accept, arguendo, the contention that the statute can permissibly be construed to regard the imposition of a small monetary sanction as a “punishment” or “penalty,” Cabrera would not guide our decision here, since Retuta’s fine was entirely stayed without specification of any conditions on the stay. Thus, Chevron does not dictate our determination of what, in the present context, the statute must be taken to mean. We must construe the statute for ourselves. 2. Does the Definition of “Conviction” Exclude Judgments Where the Sentence is the Suspension of a Non-Incarceratory Sanction? Retuta claims that, because the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) specifically includes suspended periods of incarceration, it was intended to also exclude suspended sentences that do not involve a prison sentence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B). The government, at oral argument, contended that the definition of “conviction” includes nonincarceratory suspended sentences because § 1101(a)(48)(B) should not be read to modify the preceding subsection. The government argues that subsection (B) was intended for the limited purpose of clarifying that, when immigration consequences attach to a period of incarceration, the entire sentence should be used, even if part of the period of incarceration has been suspended. According to the government, because subsection (B) was intended for this purpose it should not be read to limit the preceding subsection. When dealing with a matter of statutory interpretation, “ ‘we look first to the plain language of the statute, construing the provisions of the entire law, including its object and policy, to ascertain the intent of Congress.’ ” United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1996)). RETUTA v. HOLDER 511 Our reading of § 1101(a)(48) leads us to conclude that the definition of “conviction” does not include criminal judgments whose only consequence is a suspended non- incarceratory sanction. Our reading of subsection (A) and of subsection (B) confirms that an unconditional nonincarceratory suspended sanction cannot be a predicate for a “conviction.” [7] The text of subsection (A) does not include suspended non-incarceratory punishments. Congress placed the provision in section 1101, which contains an exhaustive list of definitions for use in construing the INA. Subsection (A)(ii) requires a “conviction” to have some punitive aspect by mandating that “the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.” Congress adopted this exact phrasing from the BIA’s Ozkok opinion. Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 551-52. At the same time Congress omitted a list of exemplars included in Ozkok. We must conclude that Congress intentionally omitted the exemplars, which included several minor sanctions such as “revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community service.”3 The minute order here required less from petitioner Retuta than any of the exemplars in the Ozkok opinion that Congress chose not to adopt. In fact, the minute order requires nothing of Retuta. He suffered no loss of wealth, nor loss of liberty. 3 The BIA’s second prong read in its entirety: “the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person’s liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to incarceration, probation, a fine or restitution, or community-based sanctions such as a rehabilitation program, a work-release or study-release program, revocation or suspension of a driver’s license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community service).” Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551-52 (BIA 1988). Congress appears not to have been the only body that found attaching removability to minor sanctions troublesome. See Romero v. Holder, 568 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that the IJ found that requiring enrollment in a three-month AIDS education program was not a “form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty”). 512 RETUTA v. HOLDER Finding the suspended fine at issue here to be a sufficient basis for removal would render the requirement of a “punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty” nearly meaningless. Cf. De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (focusing on whether a monetary sanction must be actually paid when considering whether it is a “punishment” or “penalty” as a predicate for ruling that restitution is a “punishment or “penalty” because “fail[ure] to make her payments . . . could ripen into a guilty plea and [the alien] would be subject to further punishment.”). Congress, legislating in the wake of Ozkok, could, had it wished to do so, have reduced the showing needed for a “conviction” to a mere finding of guilt, regardless of whether a sanction was imposed, but instead it chose to retain the requirement of a punishment, penalty, or restraint on liberty. [8] Furthermore, lest there were doubt as to subsection (A)’s meaning, Congress addressed the suspension of sanctions in subsection (B), choosing to include only suspended incarceratory sentences. By stating that suspended periods of imprisonment should be considered regardless of suspension, the statute makes clear that suspended sentences that are not periods of imprisonment are not included as punishments, penalties, or restraints on liberty. The placement of both subsections (A) and (B) in section 1101(a)(48) indicates they should be read together, as Congress could have placed subsection (B) in a section apart from the definition of conviction if its purpose was independent. Subsection (B), thus, modifies subsection (A)’s test of conviction to include a suspended period of incarceration as a “punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty.” See Francis v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing subsection (B) as intending to modify the definition of “conviction” developed in Ozkok). Subsection (B) therefore confirms that the text of section 1101(a)(48) excludes from the definition of “conviction” deferred judgments of guilt that only result in suspended nonincarceratory sentences. RETUTA v. HOLDER 513 [9] In short, we think it clear that § 1101(a)(48) does not contemplate that one who has been the object of a suspended fine is to be deemed to have suffered a “conviction.” We would add, however, that if we were to view the statute as ambiguous, we would think it our duty to resolve the ambiguity favorably to the alien, pursuant to the principle of lenity applicable with respect to the gravity of removal. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005). Removal is a harsh sanction, and profoundly so when, as here, the alien came to America as a small child and has spent almost two decades in this country. [10] We must decide whether Retuta suffered any punishment, penalty, or restraint on his liberty when his nonincarceratory fine was stayed without any conditions placed on him during its abeyance.4 We find he did not. 4 The government urges us to remand to the BIA based on I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002), for the BIA to reconsider whether a suspended non-incarceratory punishment is sufficiently punitive to meet the definition of conviction in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). Remand under Ventura is required when an agency has not made a determination so the court can gain the advantage of the agency’s expertise in the area and its informed discussion and analysis. Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17. We find Ventura inapposite to the situation before us. Unlike Ventura where this court made a determination on a factdependent matter of first impression that the BIA failed to reach, id. at 15, here, the BIA considered and ruled on the issue. The BIA concluded that Ozkok governed and that Ozkok found a suspended fine to be punitive. The fact that Ozkok preceded Congress’s definition of conviction and does not address suspended fines does not mean the BIA failed to take a position on the issue. The BIA did take a position on the issue and it is one with which, as explained above, we do not agree. Remand is not appropriate when the BIA addressed an issue and its opinion is reversed. See Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1161 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004). The parties filed supplemental briefs regarding the impact of the BIA’s decision not to rehear Retuta’s appeal following our Snellenberger decision. Because the BIA’s denial of rehearing addressed only the first point regarding the clarity of the minute order, we have given it no weight when considering remand of the section 1101(a)(48) issue. 514 RETUTA v. HOLDER C. Does Federal First Offender Act Apply? Lastly, Retuta has challenged the BIA’s finding that he was ineligible for relief under the FFOA because his rap sheet refers to other controlled substance convictions. Because we find that the government did not show Retuta to be removable, we need not address whether the FFOA could provide him with relief.