Opinion ID: 1451124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reference to Failure to Testify

Text: During closing argument, the following colloquy occurred: DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: If you don't mind, your Honor, thank you. I want to specifically direct the jury's attention to camera 1 and camera 3. Camera 1 being at the top left and camera 3 being at the bottom left. Frame by frame. There has been no denial that the defendant is not the person armed with the weapon. There has been no proof submitted to you that the defendant DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, may we approach? BENCH CONFERENCE: DEFENSE COUNSEL: I move for a mistrial. This is a reference to the defendant's right not to testify. DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Your Honor, it's not. I've indicated that there's been no proof submitted DEFENSE COUNSEL: He said there's been no denial is what you said. THE COURT: Motion will be denied. But you've got to be careful DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: I will your Honor, thank you. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, without waiving the motion for denialthe motion for mistrial, the State Supreme Court requires that we move for an admonition. I think an admonition is insufficient, but I'm required in order to preserve the mistrial motion to request the admonition. THE COURT: What do you desire that I say? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Excuse me? THE COURT: What do you desire that admonition be? DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, first, as I said, anything would be insufficient. I think what you have to say is that any implication that the defendant has an obligation to deny anything is erroneous or DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: That's fine, your Honor. That's fine. THE COURT: Do you want me to say it that way? DEPUTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: That's fine. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. BENCH CONFERENCE CONCLUDED. THE COURT: Members of the jury, before we proceed further, let me give you an admonition. Anything Mr. Morledge said that would imply that the defendant has any obligation to deny anything is erroneous and will not be considered by the jury in its deliberation in any manner. Jefferson argues that the prosecutor's comment, that [t]here has been no denial that the defendant is not the person armed with the weapon[,] was clearly a reference to his failure to testify. He claims that this comment was an unacceptable incursion into his Fifth Amendment right not to testify at trial. Jefferson contends that, due to the nature of the comment, he should have been granted a mistrial and that the admonition given was not sufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the comment. We disagree. When a prosecutor is alleged to have made an improper comment on a defendant's failure to testify, we review the statements in a two-step process. Armstrong v. State, 366 Ark. 105, 233 S.W.3d 627 (2006). First, we determine whether the comment itself is an improper comment on the defendant's failure to testify. Id. The basic rule is that a prosecutor may not draw attention to the fact of, or comment on, the defendant's failure to testify, because this then makes the defendant testify against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. A veiled reference to the defendant's failure to testify is improper, as well. Id. Should we determine that the prosecutor's closing argument statement did indeed refer to the defendant's choice not to testify, we would then determine whether it can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the verdict. Id. The State asserts, and we agree, that the prosecutor's comment was not a veiled reference to Jefferson's failure to testify; rather, as pointed out by the State, the prosecutor made the comment in response to defense counsel's remarks in opening statements to the jury that he was not going to insult your intelligence, and that the jury was likely to convict Jefferson of theft by receiving of the car and fleeing. Further, defense counsel stated that it was also highly likely you would convict him of doing something illegal, wrong, at the store whether you determine it's aggravated robbery or whether you possibly determine it's a so-called simple robbery, or whether you determine it's something else, but I assume ... you will find him guilty of some offense there, and punish him appropriately for that. Here, the prosecutor's statement referred to defense counsel's remarks during opening statement regarding Jefferson's involvement in the crime. Thus, this was an indication, completely aside from Jefferson's own nonappearance on the witness stand, on which the prosecutor was free to comment. See Green v. State, 365 Ark. 478, 505, 231 S.W.3d 638, 658-59 (2006). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jefferson's motion for mistrial. In addition, any prejudice which might have resulted was cured by the circuit court's admonition to the jury that it should ignore any comment by the prosecutor that might have implied that Jefferson had an obligation to deny any of the allegations. See, e.g., Gates v. State, 338 Ark. 530, 2 S.W.3d 40 (1999).