Opinion ID: 691321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of Work Performed under the Contract

Text: 49 Linan-Faye argues that the trial court improperly selected isolated phrases from correspondence between the parties in its determination that the phrase work performed in paragraph 17 of the contract 16 refers only to physical construction and not to preparatory work. The district court conceded that the contract documents, which include the contract's General Conditions and its Supplement to the Standard Form Agreement, failed to define the term work. Linan-Faye Construction Co., 847 F.Supp. at 1206. Based on an analysis of the word work as used in several paragraphs of the contract, the district court concluded that work could not include preparatory work until after Linan-Faye began physical construction on the project. Id. at 1207. We conclude that the district court erred in determining this disputed issue of fact. 50 Paragraph 8(a) of the General Conditions of this contract is the paragraph from which the district court draws the most support for its conclusion that work under the termination for convenience clause does not include preparatory work. The court's reading of this paragraph, however, is too strained to support a grant of summary judgment. Paragraph 8(a) of the General Conditions states: 51 Progress payments will be made at approximately thirty (30) day intervals; and in preparing estimates, acceptable work in place, material delivered to and properly stored on the site, and preparatory work done will be taken into consideration. If the contract covers more than one project, a separate estimate shall be furnished for each. 52 App.Vol. II at 42. From this paragraph, the district court deduced that expenses for preparatory work were recoverable only if the contractor begins the physical construction required under the contract. Linan-Faye Construction Co., 847 F.Supp. at 1207. This conclusion is unjustified. 53 There is nothing in the language of paragraph 8(a) that speaks to situations where HACC terminates Linan-Faye for convenience after Linan-Faye has performed preparatory work, but before it has begun physical construction. If anything, the language of this paragraph demonstrates that both parties considered preparatory work to be a compensable cost because the paragraph states that preparatory work will be taken into consideration in preparing estimates for compensation. Thus, the district court erred in concluding that this paragraph is dispositive. 54 The district court's survey of numerous other paragraphs containing the word work also produces inconclusive results. According to the court, paragraph 2 which requires the contractor to furnish all necessary labor, materials, tools, equipment, water, light, heat, power, transportation, and supervision necessary for performance of the work, and paragraph 22 which allows the contractor to request from the architect drawings which will [be required] in the planning and production of the work  somehow indicate that work performed under paragraph 17 does not include preparatory work. Id. at 1206 (emphasis added). These provisions, on their face, do not appear to support any such conclusion. In addition, the district court determined that paragraphs 26, 29 and 35, which refer to the contractor's obligation to protect work completed to date and to the warranty as to work done, support the conclusion that work performed under the termination for convenience clause does not include preparatory work. Once again, if anything, these provisions merely beg the question of how to define work under paragraph 17 of the contract. Finally, the court refers to paragraphs 7 and 31 that speak to obligations of the contractor before and shortly after commencing work under the contract. Unfortunately, these paragraphs also do not illuminate whether the parties considered preparatory work to constitute compensable work for purposes of the termination for convenience clause. 17 55 Linan-Faye asks for the opportunity to present testimony and cross-examine witnesses concerning the intent of the parties in using the phrase work performed in paragraph 17 of the contract. Based on the evidence mustered by the district court, we cannot conclude that there is no dispute as to this issue. Further, this issue is material to the question of what constitutes proper compensation under paragraph 17. Therefore, Linan-Faye should be allowed to present the evidence that it feels is appropriate to determine the intent of the parties. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for HACC on this disputed issue.