Opinion ID: 507204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lost Future Profits.

Text: 32 At trial the jury awarded plaintiffs 1.5 million dollars in damages. WPSC claims that this award was based on lost future profits and that such profits may not be awarded in this case for several reasons. 33 WPSC argues that lost future profits are not compensable under the theory of promissory estoppel. WPSC claims this issue is preserved for appeal. Their brief states, The jury was instructed, over objection, that they may award lost future profits under the promissory estoppel theory. This statement is misleading; we find no such objection nor instruction in the record. First, WPSC did not argue to the district court that lost profits are not recoverable in promissory estoppel. The objections that were made all went to the alleged speculative nature of the evidence on lost profits. Second, the jury was not instructed, as WPSC now claims, that it could award lost profits under the promissory estoppel theory. Instead, the jury was told: If you should find ... in favor of [plaintiffs] on their claim of breach of contract then you may award them their actual damages.... [Y]ou may award as such damages ... any loss of net profits. (Emphasis added.) 34 If there was error in the instructions it was not in the giving of the breach-of-contract instruction just quoted, but in the failure to give a further instruction telling the jury what form of damages to award if it found against plaintiffs on the breach-of-contract claim but in their favor on the issue of promissory estoppel. No such instruction was requested nor its omission objected to. Apparently WPSC did rely on the lost-future-profits argument in its motion for judgment n.o.v., but Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 provides that a party may not assign as error the failure to give an instruction unless objection is made before the jury retires to consider its verdict. WPSC's objection came too late. The court could have rectified the error WPSC alleges occurred if WPSC had called it to its attention by timely and specific objection. We therefore hold that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal. 35 Furthermore, even if we were to agree with WPSC that Wyoming law forbids the award of lost profits in promissory estoppel cases, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec. 90 illustrations 8 and 10 (1979); Tremblay v. Reid, 700 P.2d 391, 395 n. 1 (Wyo.1985) (the Wyoming Supreme Court has essentially adopted Sec. 90 of the Restatement), we cannot say that the alleged error in this case is patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial. Moe, 727 F.2d at 924. First, WPSC has not established that a significant portion of the jury's award was based on lost profits. There is evidence that plaintiffs spent a considerable amount of money in reliance on WPSC's promise. In addition, there is evidence that plaintiffs had already made a profit on their project and received an offer to take over the uncompleted project for payments totaling $1,768,500. A reasonable jury, when properly instructed, could return a sizeable verdict. We cannot say that an award of 1.5 million dollars is patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial. Therefore, no exception to the waiver rule is warranted. 36 WPSC also claims that even if lost profits can be recovered under a theory of promissory estoppel generally, in this case the lost future profits were speculative and therefore could not be recovered. It argues that [t]he Wyoming Supreme Court has never allowed a verdict to stand awarding lost future profits based on evidence as flimsy as that adduced in this case. WPSC seems to be arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motion for judgment n.o.v. on this issue because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the award. As we said above, judgment n.o.v. is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the opposite position. Prudential Fed., 763 F.2d at 1171. 37 We note initially that there is evidence of substantial reliance damages--it may be that the verdict contains no award for future profits at all. Since we must construe the evidence and inferences in favor of plaintiffs, this alone may be sufficient to uphold the verdict. In addition, the jury was carefully and repeatedly instructed not to award any speculative damages. Unless there is no evidence supporting the verdict under Wyoming law, we must assume that the jury followed the instruction given. Garrick v. City and County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir.1981). 38 Wyoming law requires that plaintiffs prove lost profits with reasonable certainty; however, absolute certainty with respect to proving loss of future profits is not required. Landmark, Inc. v. Stockmen's Bank & Trust Co., 680 P.2d 471, 476 (Wyo.1984); see also Albin Elevator Co. v. Pavlica, 649 P.2d 187, 191-92 (Wyo.1982) (applying the reasonable certainty test). Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's award under the reasonable certainty test. For example, there was evidence at trial of a preliminary appraisal estimating the value of the completed project at between fifteen and sixteen million dollars. There was also evidence of sales projections which, if believed by the jury, would justify a significant award. To support the sales projections, plaintiffs offered evidence that economic growth and increased housing needs were forecast for the area. Therefore, even if we assume that a portion of the 1.5-million-dollar verdict was attributable to lost profits, we cannot say that the evidence was too speculative to justify it. The court did not err in denying WPSC's motion for judgment n.o.v. on this ground. 39