Opinion ID: 1223875
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: consumer expectation test

Text: In Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Haw. 71, 74-75, 470 P.2d 240, 243 (1970), having never had [a prior] occasion to rule on [the] matter, this court first embraced strict liability in tort [as] a sound legal basis for recovery in products liability cases. (Footnote omitted.) In doing so, we essentially followed the rule formulated in section 402A of the Restatement, [21] eliminating only the requirement that the defective product must have been unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user. Id. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243; see also Ontai, 66 Haw. at 240-41, 659 P.2d at 739. The rule, as thus adopted for this jurisdiction, provide[d] that where a seller or lessor, who is engaged in the business of selling or leasing a product, sells or leases a defective product which is dangerous to the user or consumer, and injury results from its use or consumption, the seller or lessor will be held strictly liable in tort for the injury. Ontai, 66 Haw. at 241, 659 P.2d at 739 (citations omitted); see also Stewart, 52 Haw. at 75, 470 P.2d at 243. Correlatively, in Ontai, we expressly approved and adopted the holding of the California Supreme Court in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (1978), that [a] product may be found defective in design, so as to subject a manufacturer to strict liability for resulting injuries, under either of two alternative tests. First, a product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner [ i.e., the consumer expectation test]. Second, a product may alternatively be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design [ i.e., the risk-utility test]. Ontai, 66 Haw. at 242, 659 P.2d at 739-40 (emphasis added). Thus, with respect to the consumer expectation test [u]nder our formulation of the rule of strict products liability,... [i]t is enough that the plaintiff demonstrates that because of its manufacture or design, the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer or user as to its safety. Id. at 241, 659 P.2d at 739 (citing Barker, supra, and Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972)). See also Masaki, 71 Haw. at 24, 780 P.2d at 579; Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 288, 740 P.2d 548, 549 (1987). None of the foregoing cases, however, involved the application of the consumer expectation test to a product that was allegedly defective by virtue of an open and obvious characteristic for purposes of strict product liability. As noted supra in section III.A.2, however, in the context of a claim of negligent design, we have observed that [t]he obviousness of the danger, unless it justifies the conclusion that the condition is not unreasonably dangerous, has been held not to preclude liability on the part of a manufacturer who negligently designs a machine. The obviousness of peril is relevant to the manufacturer's defenses ( e.g. [,] contributory negligence), and not to the issue of duty. The creation of any unreasonable danger is enough to establish negligence, even though the danger is obvious. And it is ordinarily a question for the jury as to whether or not a failure to install a safety device creates an unreasonable risk. Brown, 62 Haw. at 539-540, 618 P.2d at 273 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, Brown implies, at least in dictum, that the obviousness of the danger inherent in the use of a product may foreclose the possibility of the manufacturer's liability for the product's negligent design if the obviousness establishes as a matter of law that the product's condition is not unreasonable. It is in the spirit of the Brown dictum that Clark urges on appeal that [t]he jury should not have been instructed about the consumer expectation test ... due to the open and obvious nature of the hazard [ i.e., the blind zone] and [Navigation's] status as a sophisticated user. Clark's point of error apparently poses a question of first impression in Hawai`i. The logic of the proposition that an open and obvious danger inherent in the use of a given product precludes the imposition of liability pursuant to the consumer expectation test is self-evident. If the danger involved in using a product is obvious and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, see Plante, 771 F.2d at 620, and generally known and recognized, see Maneely, 108 F.3d at 1179, then the danger must necessarily be within the ordinary user's expectation. Therefore, the product, including the obvious and apparent danger involved in its use, cannot possibly fail to perform as safely as an ordinary user would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. See Ontai, 66 Haw. at 242, 659 P.2d at 740. Numerous federal courts, applying the law of various states that have adopted the consumer expectation test as a basis for establishing a product's defectiveness, have held that the obviousness of the danger posed by a feature of the product may preclude the imposition of liability on the manufacturer. See, e.g., Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 984 F.2d 135, 136 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that under the applicable Mississippi law, the consumer expectations test applies in product liability cases, and because the alleged defect as well as the danger was open and obvious to the ordinary consumer, the motorcycle was not `unreasonably dangerous'), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 993 F.2d 56 (5th Cir.1993) [hereinafter, Satcher I ]; Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 978 F.2d 1386, 1389-90, 1392 (5th Cir.1992) (holding, under Mississippi law, that forklift that backed into plaintiff was not a defective product pursuant to consumer expectation test because an open and obvious danger to an ordinary user precludes recovery against the product manufacturer under negligence and strict liability in tort and that, accordingly, an open and obvious defect preclude[d] [the plaintiff's] recovery against ... [ ]the manufacturer[ ], regardless of whether he knew, or should have known, of that danger) (footnote omitted); Toney, 975 F.2d at 165-66 (Mississippi has adopted the objective `consumer expectations' test to determine whether a product is unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective.... Thus it is clear that Mississippi law dictates that a manufacturer cannot be held liable for injuries caused by dangers arising from either a defective design or a sound but unavoidably dangerous design so long as the hazard is open and obvious `to a casual observer.'... Similarly, ... it has also been long established that if the hazard of an allegedly defective design is `apparent and obvious to a casual observer,' then the injured plaintiff may not recover on a negligence theory. (Emphases in original.) (Citations omitted.)); Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1406-07 (7th Cir.1994) (holding under Illinois law that because, pursuant to consumer contemplation test, a product is only considered defective or unreasonably dangerous if it fails to perform in a manner the ordinary consumer would expect, disposable cigarette lighter that produced small flame was not unreasonably dangerous for purposes of strict products liability, notwithstanding that small flame was used to ignite papers, causing deadly fire, where ability to start fire was one of lighter's inherent and obvious properties); Delvaux v. Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469, 474 (7th Cir.1985) (Under the open and obvious rule reintroduced by the consumer contemplation approach, the convertible design of the Mustang is unreasonably dangerous only if it presents dangers not apparent to the ordinary consumer or user.... Since the most obvious feature of a convertible is its lack of a roof, dangers which the ordinary consumer would associate with that feature will not support a strict product liability cause of action in Wisconsin. Among those dangers is the danger that, should the car be in a rollover accident, injuries ... will occur. We hold that, as a matter of law, a convertible automobile is not unreasonably dangerous because of its convertible design.); Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1439-40 (9th Cir.1995) ([T]he consumer expectations test ... allows a manufacturer or seller to escape liability when the unreasonable danger is open and obvious. (Citations omitted.)); Wilson v. Bicycle South, Inc., 915 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir.1990) (holding, under Georgia law, that, inasmuch as the open and obvious rule states that a product is not defective if the peril from which injury could result is patent or obvious to user, bicycle helmet, which did not cover entire head, was not defective product). The consumer expectation test for determining the defectiveness of products the use of which involve open and obvious dangers can result in finding products to be not defective that could easily have been designed safer without great expense or effect on the benefits or functions to be served by the product. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 99, at 698 (5th ed.1984). It is for this reason that Hawai`i and most other jurisdictions have forsaken consumer expectations as the sole basis for denominating a product as defective, opting at the very least to extend the analysis to include the risk-utility test. See, e.g., Ontai, 66 Haw. at 242-43, 659 P.2d at 739-40; Satcher v. Honda Motor Co., 52 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir.1995) [hereinafter, Satcher II ]; Saratoga Fishing Co., 69 F.3d at 1439-41; Barker, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d at 455-56; see generally John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a New Cloth for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects  a Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L.Rev. 493 (1996). Thus, a manufacturer may still be strictly liable under a product liability theory for injuries caused by a product, the use of which involves an open and obvious danger, in accordance with the risk-utility test. See, e.g., Satcher II, supra; Saratoga, supra . Moreover, in connection with a claim of negligent design, the obviousness of [the] peril is [merely] relevant to the manufacturer's defenses ( e.g. [,] contributory negligence), and not to the issue of duty, and, therefore, does not, in itself, immunize the manufacturer from potential liability. Brown, 62 Haw. at 539, 618 P.2d at 273 (citations omitted). However, consistent with the authority cited above, we agree with Clark that an open and obvious danger posed by a product's use cannot provide the basis for finding it defective under the consumer expectation test. Moreover, we have already held in this case, as a matter of law, that the danger involved in using the Series 510 straddle carrier was obvious and apparent, discernible by casual inspection, and generally known and recognized. See supra at section III. C.1.b. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court erred in instructing the jurors that they could find the straddle carrier defective if it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary user of the product would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, including reasonably foreseeable misuses.