Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Andrews's Representation Adversely Affected?

Text: 191 Under Cuyler, a defendant does not have the burden of showing actual prejudice--i.e., the defendant does not have to show that the result of the trial probably would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-69; United States v. Greig, 967 F.2d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir.1992). Instead, the defendant needs to demonstrate an adverse effect upon his representation, and Cuyler's adverse effect element establishes a relatively low threshold for a petitioner to cross. Beets, 986 F.2d at 1490 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). A limited presumption of prejudice arises from a showing of adverse effect because, as the Supreme Court has noted, it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. To establish an adverse effect on the basis of what an attorney failed to do, a defendant must demonstrate that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic--a viable alternative--might have been pursued. See, e.g., Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309. 192 In Beets's case, Andrews's failure to testify had an adverse effect on her defense, as Andrews's testimony was clearly a viable alternative. Throughout the trial, Beets attacked the remuneration element of the State's case on which her capital murder conviction rested. Andrews had significant testimony to offer bearing on the critical issue of whether the killing of Jimmy Don was for a remunerative purpose, specifically to obtain Jimmy Don's life insurance proceeds and pension benefits. If the jury reasonably doubted that Beets killed her husband for the insurance money, the murder was not a capital offense. 193 The majority downplays the importance of Andrews's testimony by referring to it as cumulative. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1276, 1277. Of course, as mentioned, Beets does not need to show that Andrews's testimony would have been successful, but only that it possessed sufficient substance to be a viable alternative. See Winkler, 7 F.3d at 309. Andrews's testimony clearly meets this standard, and the suggestion that his testimony is cumulative is simply based upon an erroneous reading of the record. As evidence of the cumulative nature of Andrews's testimony, the majority points to Beets's own testimony that she was unaware of Jimmy Don's death benefits before she visited Andrews. But the jury may well have discounted Beets's testimony because of its self-serving nature. 194 The majority also points to the testimony of Bruce Roberts, who stated that more than a year after Jimmy Don's murder, Beets seemed ignorant of his insurance and benefits. Roberts's testimony, however, was damaging in certain respects to Beets's defense. Although Roberts did testify that Beets's primary concern was ... with the fire insurance company and that Beets never pressured him to collect money from the City of Dallas, Roberts was also asked what Beets knew about benefits when she first came to him. In response, Roberts stated: 195 At the time I talked to her, she had one--well, it looked like part of a policy, as I recall, from the credit union in Dallas. She also knew that she had or was asking me to check into pension benefits. Basically, that's all the information she could give me. 196 Thus, Roberts did not definitively testify that Beets was ignorant about the possibility of collecting benefits. Further, Roberts did not, and could not have, testified that Andrews suggested to Beets that they pursue Jimmy Don's insurance and pension benefits because Roberts was not present at the meeting between Beets and Andrews at which that suggestion was made. 197 Other than Beets, only Andrews could have told the jury that he initiated the discussion regarding Jimmy Don's death benefits with Beets, and only Andrews could have testified that she appeared to lack knowledge of any such benefits. Further, only Andrews could have testified that it was at his suggestion that those death benefits were pursued. Any later interest or inquiry into benefits by or on behalf of Beets could have been attributable to this meeting between Beets and Andrews that took place long after Jimmy Don's murder. 198 Similarly, the majority's invocation of Denny Burris's testimony to downplay any adverse effect from the absence of Andrews's testimony is erroneous. Burris, a disinterested witness, stated that Beets inquired about Jimmy Don's insurance soon after the murder. The suggestion is that because Beets discussed insurance with Burris, a chaplain, the biased testimony of Andrews was unlikely to have swayed the jury and its absence was unimportant. First of all, it is again worth mentioning that any suggestion that Andrews's testimony would not have been successful to Beets's defense is irrelevant. Second, although Burris was a chaplain, his assignment was to discuss with Beets the benefits due to the widow of a fireman. [I]t was not a mission to console a widow with prayer where the widow's interest was insurance not intercession. Beets, 986 F.2d at 1491 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). Thus, the evidence of Beets's early focus on insurance, as the State would have it, is not so compelling. Finally, Burris's specific testimony did not show that Beets already knew about Jimmy Don's insurance and pension benefits. Rather, Burris testified that, several days after Jimmy Don's disappearance, Beets asked about insurance, if she would be covered and things like that. 199 In short, it is all too clear that Andrews's testimony was a viable alternative, and his failure to testify had an adverse effect on Beets's defense. I agree with the assessment of Judge Higginbotham in his special concurrence to the panel opinion: 200 Andrews's testimony was not merely cumulative. I cannot conclude that it would not have been helpful to Beets at trial. It certainly would have been in Beets's best interest for Andrews to have testified. Given the low threshold established by Cuyler, I would not reject [the district court's] conclusion that Andrews's failure to give this evidence at trial adversely affected the conduct of her defense. 201 Id. at 1491-92 (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring). 202 Our task is not yet complete, however, as the third Winkler inquiry still remains on the table: whether Andrews's withdrawal and testimony--the viable alternative--was not pursued because of the media rights conflict. This is a fact-bound question that the district court did not directly answer. 9 After hearing evidence, the district court found that Andrews obviously should have known of his dual status as witness and advocate prior to trial. The district court also concluded that Andrews pursued a course of conduct inconsistent with his client's best interest when he accepted employment or failed to withdraw and testify as a witness on Petitioner's behalf. 203 On the other hand, the court concluded that the media rights contract did not affect Andrews's performance at any conscious level. The court noted, however, that [t]he possibility exists that the media rights contract motivated Andrews at a subconscious level to remain in the case when he should have withdrawn and testified for Petitioner. To that limited extent, the two conflicts are intertwined. These statements suggest that the district court did not definitively resolve whether Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was attributable in some fashion to his actual conflict of interest arising from the media rights contract. 204 The majority holds that there is no need to remand this case to the district court for an explicit finding on whether the media rights contract caused Andrews to fail to withdraw for two reasons. First, the majority invokes, for the first time in the five years that this case has been in federal court, the presumption of correctness afforded by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) to the findings of fact made by the state trial court judge on Beets's state habeas petition. The state trial court found as a fact that [p]etitioner's grant of 'book rights' to the son of her counsel had no effect on the strategy of defense counsel. This finding was based on the trial court's own personal recollection of the trial and on Andrews's affidavit which stated that: 205 defense attorney had no conflict of interest throughout the proceedings by agreeing that book rights would be his entire fee, said defense attorney has no book rights, these rights were given to said attorney's son and were only given after the trial was into its third or fourth day, the State Bar of Texas has found said defense attorney committed no improprieties with regard to this matter. 206 At no point during the course of Beets's federal habeas proceedings has the State sought to invoke the presumption of correctness afforded by Sec. 2254(d). Beets filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing along with her federal habeas petition. When the State filed its response (and an amended response) to Beets's petition, it did not object to the hearing and, in responding to Beets's claim of an actual conflict of interest, the State asserted: 207 Respondent denies that there was any conflict of interest in this case. However, because the Court has scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue, rather than argue the claim at this time, Respondent will rely on the facts developed at that hearing. 208 (emphasis added). Finally, the State (appellant in this court) did not raise the preclusive effect of the state court's habeas findings in any of the many briefs it has filed with this court. Neither the panel opinion nor Judge Higginbotham's special concurrence mentions Sec. 2254(d) or Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981), or any of its progeny. In a last ditch effort to avoid dealing with the ambiguities in the federal district court's fact findings, the presumption of correctness has been resurrected despite the State's unwillingness to invoke it. Because no party has addressed the presumption of correctness, we cannot determine whether any of its exceptions applies. For example, we do not know the position of the State or Beets on whether the factfinding procedure employed by the state court was adequate to afford a full and fair hearing or whether the material facts were adequately developed at the state court hearing. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(3) and (4). This case should not be decided at this late date on a basis not raised by the parties. 209 The majority asserts as its second reason why, applying Cuyler, there is no need to remand for an explicit finding on causation the district court's statement that the court simply does not believe that the media rights contract affected Andrews'[s] performance at any conscious level. The majority ignores the district court's recognition of a possible connection between the media rights contract and what it termed the witness/advocate conflict and its failure to resolve the ultimate question whether they were related. The majority also ignores the contradiction inherent in the district court's opinion in finding the witness/advocate ethical problem to be an actual conflict (thereby implying that it stemmed from a divergence of interests between Andrews and Beets) while finding at the same time that the media rights contract (the likely source of the divergence) had no conscious effect on Andrews's performance. 210 In my view, because the district court did not explicitly decide whether Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was caused by the actual conflict engendered by the media rights contract, the wiser course is to vacate the district court's judgment granting the writ and to remand the case so that the district court may consider the question in the first instance. If the district court determines on remand that Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was caused by the actual conflict of interest arising from the execution of the media rights contract, with its powerful incentive to remain in the case, then Beets will have successfully demonstrated that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected [her] lawyer's performance, Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, and she will be entitled to habeas relief. The judgment granting the writ should then be reinstated. If, on the other hand, the district court concludes that Andrews's failure to withdraw and testify was not caused by the actual conflict stemming from the media rights contract, then that failure should be analyzed under Strickland. On this record, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of Beets's trial would have been different, and Beets has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. The writ should then be denied.