Opinion ID: 2536526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsequent Indications of Intent

Text: We have previously recognized the General Assembly's power to make the legislative intent behind a statute clear in a subsequent version of the statute. See Tacorante, 624 P.2d at 1329-30 (recognizing that subsequent bill amended the effective date of part of a prior bill); see also Pinellas County Planning Council v. Smith, 360 So.2d 371, 372 n. 1 (Fla.1978) (cited with approval in Tacorante, 624 P.2d at 1330) (allowing legislature to correct clerical error in effective date clause). The legislature has exercised this power with a prior version of the very statutory scheme at issue in this case. Before 1982, the statute of limitations for sexual assault on a child was three years. § 16-5-401, C.R.S. (1981). In 1982, the General Assembly amended the statute to extend the statute of limitations to ten years. § 16-5-401, C.R.S. (1982). As originally amended, the statute did not indicate whether it was to apply prospectively to crimes committed on or after its effective date, or whether it was intended to reach back as far as possible to cover crimes committed in the past for which the previous statute of limitations had not yet run. However, realizing its mistake, the General Assembly amended the statute again to add a section indicating the legislature's intent for the new ten-year statute of limitations to apply retroactively. [5] When determining the appropriate statute of limitations to apply to crimes allegedly committed in 1980, this court used that subsequent declaration of legislative intent to hold that the amended ten-year statute of limitations applied. People v. Holland, 708 P.2d 119, 120-21 (Colo.1985) (We conclude that the specific and explicit indication of legislative intent in section 16-5-401.1, is sufficient to overcome the general presumptions [of prospective application of statutes]. . . .). It has now been seven years since the adoption of the 2002 amendments at issue in this case. The legislature has made no attempt to clarify its intent regarding the retroactive or prospective applicability of this statute. In fact, the legislature again amended the law in 2006 to completely eliminate the statute of limitations for sexual assault on a child. See § 16-5-401, C.R.S. (2006). In doing so, it clearly indicated its intent for that change to apply retroactively. The substantive amendments to the bill indicate that it is to apply to sex offenses against children committed on or after July 1, 1996, and to sex offenses against children committed before July 1, 1996, for which the applicable statute of limitations in effect prior to July 1, 2006, has not yet run on July 1, 2006. Ch. 119, sec. 1, § 16-5-401, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 410, 411. The effective date clause for the 2006 amendments simply states, This act shall take effect July 1, 2006, ch. 119, sec. 5, § 16-5-401, 2006 Colo. Sess. Laws 410, 414, with no indication of any legislative intent for the amendments to apply only prospectively. In sum, we have no attempt by the legislature to clarify its intent behind H.B. 02-1396. We are left with the statute as written, which is contradictory on its face; the legislative history of the statute, which does not compel a particular result; and the presumption of prospective application, which the language of the statute simultaneously enforces and rebuts. Confronted with conflicting language and finding no guidance through the use of statutory construction aids, we are unable to definitively determine whether the General Assembly intended the eighteen-plus-ten statute of limitations to apply retroactively or prospectively.