Opinion ID: 25055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the Jury’s Verdict

Text: Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c) governs the use of advisory juries. Rule 39(c) provides: In all actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or . . . the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if the trial by jury had been a matter of right. However, “once litigants have consented--either expressly or implicitly--to a nonadvisory jury, the court must provide them advance notice if it intends to regard the verdict as advisory.” Alcatel 4 U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1999). Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c) does not require express consent by both sides to a non-advisory jury. Id. at 795 n.101. “If one party demands a jury, the other does not object, and the court orders a jury trial, this will be regarded as trial by consent.” Id. Because the Hesleps demanded a jury trial in their original complaint and the Nichols did not object, we find that the parties consented to a jury trial even though the Hesleps ultimately voluntarily dismissed their claims. However, we also conclude that the Nichols’ claim for unjust enrichment was an equitable one and not triable of right by a jury. See Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308,1323 (5th Cir. 1994); Bransom v. Standard Hardware, Inc., 874 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Tex. App.-- Fort Worth 1994, writ denied) (“An action for unjust enrichment is based on the equitable principle that a person receiving benefits which were unjust for him to ret ain ought to make restitution. . . . Recovery is based on fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience which give rise to an implied or quasi-contract to repay.”). Moreover, we are convinced that the district court gave the parti es advance notice, as is required under Alcatel, that the jury’s verdict would be advisory only. Though they now assert that the district court did not give them notice of its intent to regard the jury’s verdict as advisory only, the Nichols’ motion for the district court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law clearly demonstrates that the court provided such notice. The motion stated: “At the conclusion of Plaintiff’s evidence, the court announced that the jury verdict would be considered as advisory only for the stated reason that the remaining issue being submitted to the jury was based on an equitable cause of action.” Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s decision to consider the jury’s verdict as advisory only. 5 II. The District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Because the jury’s verdict was non-binding, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Am. River Trans Co. v. Kavo Kaliakra SS, 148 F.3d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1998). We find no error under this standard of review. Moreover, even assuming that the jury verdict was binding, we would find no error under the less deferential standard of review for grants of Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motions. See Murray v. Red Kap Indus., Inc., 124 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if, after considering the evidence presented and viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the fact s and inferences point so strongly in favor of the movant that a rational jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict.”). In Texas, where a person has “obtained a benefit from another by fraud, duress, or the taking of an undue advantage,” he may recover based on a theory of unjust enrichment. Heldenfels Bros. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). However, unjust enrichment is not an appropriate remedy “merely because it might appear expedient or generally fair that some recompense be afforded an unfortunate loss to the claimant, or because benefits to the person sought to be charged amount to a windfall.” Id. at 42 (internal quotations omitted); Acad. Corp. v. Interior Buildout & Turnkey Constr., Inc., 21 S.W.3d 732, 741 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, reh’g overruled). Furthermore, recovery for unjust enrichment is impermissible where the “same subject is covered by an express contract.” Acad. Corp., 21 S.W.3d at 741 (internal quotations omitted). The district court found that the Nichols’ unjust enrichment claim fails as a matter of law because there was no evidence that the Hesleps obtained a benefit through fraud, duress, or undue advantage and because the subject matter of the dispute was governed by an express contract, the 6 April 6, 1988, lease agreement. We find that district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and that its conclusions of law are in accord with Texas precedent. The Nichols cultivated and added improvements to the Hesleps’ land because of their mistaken belief that the parties had an agreement, not because of fraud, duress, or undue advantage. Also, the April 6, 1988, contract clearly provided that the land would be used for grazing purposes only. The existing contract between the parties was controlling and dictates that there be no recovery for the Nichols for unjust enrichment or any other theory under which they might have sought restitution.