Opinion ID: 885205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Did the District Court err when it reduced the jury verdict pro tanto based on Schuff's prior settlement with the other named defendants?

Text: ¶ 102 On cross-appeal, Schuff argues that, aside from the constitutional question, the District Court erred when it offset the jury award by the amount she received in settlement with the other named defendants. Schuff primarily focusses on the equitable nature of such a  pro tanto  offset, and argues that under the specific facts of this case, Klemens is not entitled to any equitable reduction of the jury award entered against it. We disagree. ¶ 103 The District Court determined that Klemens was entitled to a pro tanto offset of the amounts Schuff received through her settlement, pursuant to this Court's decision in State ex rel. Deere v. District Court (1986), 224 Mont. 384, 730 P.2d 396, superseded in part by statute as provided in Plumb v. Fourth Jud. Dist. Court (1996), 279 Mont. 363, 927 P.2d 1011. In that case, which similarly involved multiple defendants, we held that an award entered against remaining tortfeasors is to be reduced by a dollar credit in the amount of consideration paid by the settling tortfeasor ... Deere, 224 Mont. at 386, 730 P.2d at 398. Thus, the District Courtnotwithstanding any adjustment for attorney's feeseffectively reduced Schuff's jury verdict by the undisclosed sum received in settlement with the other defendants. ¶ 104 The principle of pro tanto reduction provides that when a joint tort-feasor settles with a claimant, the claimant's recovery against the remaining tort-feasor is to be reduced dollar-for-dollar by the consideration paid by the settling tort-feasor. Boyken v. Steele (1993), 256 Mont. 419, 421, 847 P.2d 282, 284 (citations omitted). The pro tanto rule applies only if two or more concurrent or joint tortfeasors cause a single indivisible harm. See Jim's Excavating Serv., Inc. v. HKM Associates (1994), 265 Mont. 494, 514, 878 P.2d 248, 260; Azure v. City of Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 234, 248, 596 P.2d 460, 468 (concluding that a pro tanto deduction is not allowed where the plaintiff's injuries are divisible). ¶ 105 Schuff does not argue that the settling defendants and Klemens did not cause a single indivisible harm. Nor does she argue, as a matter of equity, that Klemens will not be paying its fair share of the damages once the jury award is reduced by the amount of the settlement. See, e.g., Roland v. Bernstein (App.1991), 171 Ariz. 96, 828 P.2d 1237, 1239 (stating that a rule allowing a non-settling tortfeasor to escape liability by reason of the faulty assessment of probabilities by a settling tortfeasor might discourage settlement by the last tortfeasor, and these considerations have lead most courts considering the question to apply the rule disallowing reduction for settlements). Rather, she emphatically argues that, as an equitable doctrine, it would be inappropriate to grant Klemens' claim for pro tanto reduction in view of the default judgment entered against it for its discovery violations. In other words, the default judgment entered against Klemens was not punishment enough. Schuff's authority for this proposition is tenuous, at best, and ignores the underlying principle of the pro tanto, or dollar-for-dollar award reductionthat an injured party is entitled to but a single satisfaction for a single injury. See Maddux v. Bunch (1990), 241 Mont. 61, 67, 784 P.2d 936, 940. ¶ 106 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err when it reduced Schuff's jury verdict award by the amount received prior to trial in settlement with the other named defendants. Issue 5.