Opinion ID: 885846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Did the termination of B.V.'s parental rights violate the Americans with Disabilities Act by imposing different standards for a parent with mental illness compared with standards imposed on other parents?

Text: ¶ 63 B.V. argues that the application of §§ 41-3-609(1)(e) and 41-3-609(4)(a), MCA, to the factual circumstances set forth here violates the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, under title 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (2000). B.V. contends that under the Act, a state government, including any department or agency, cannot subject a qualified individual to discrimination based on that individual's disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). ¶ 64 The ADA is intended to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency to persons with disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). To achieve that goal, Title II of the ADA in 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) provides, as pertinent here, that: [N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. ¶ 65 According to B.V., the foregoing Montana statutes, as applied to her, singled her out for termination of her parental rights under a different and substantially lower standard than those used for a non-disabled parent, in that actual wrongful conduct is required for all other parents. ¶ 66 While indicating that a majority of appellate courts have ruled that the ADA does not provide a defense to a parental termination proceedingalthough this Court has not addressed the issuethe State contends that this Court should decline to undertake a first-impression review here because it was never presented to the District Court and has not been properly preserved for appeal. ¶ 67 B.V. counters the State's argument by asserting that the ADA issue was presented to the District Court in her proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order which was submitted to the court following the April 28, 1999 hearing. ¶ 68 In Nason v. Leistiko, 1998 MT 217, 290 Mont. 460, 963 P.2d 1279, we set forth the rule that where a party fails to (1) raise an issue in the pleadings, (2) does not present argument on the issue during the hearing on the merits of the case, (3) does not move to amend the pleadings to conform to any evidence presented, and (4) raises the issue for the first time in a post-hearing memorandum which the district court does not address in its order, the issue has not been timely raised and may not be raised on appeal. See Nason, ¶ 18. ¶ 69 Applied to the case at bar, we observe that although no pleadings, per se, are involved, B.V. nevertheless failed to interject the issue of her ADA defense at any time during the proceedings. Critically, she did not offer any testimony or evidence or argument at the various hearings that would support the legal conclusion regarding her ADA defense found in her proposed findings and conclusions. ¶ 70 We also observe that following the April 28, 1999 hearing, the court ordered the submission of proposed findings and conclusions, which B.V. submitted on May 25, 1999. The court did not address the post-hearing ADA defense in its final decree. Further, although B.V. moved for a new trial following the entry of the final decree on June 11, 1999, she did not then raise or address the ADA defense at that time. ¶ 71 Accordingly, we conclude that B.V.'s belated allusion to a possible ADA defense in her post-hearing proposed conclusions of law was untimely and did not preserve the issue for our review. See Nason, ¶ 18 (recognizing that when party raises the issue for the first time in a post-hearing memorandum which the district court does not address in its order, the issue has not been timely raised and may not be raised on appeal). We hold that B.V. failed to timely raise the ADA defense as an issue in the District Court and, therefore, cannot raise the issue on appeal. ¶ 72 Finding no abuse of discretion in the findings, and no incorrect conclusions of law, we affirm the Decree entered by the District Court terminating B.V.'s parental rights to A.M. We Concur: KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., PATRICIA COTTER, JIM RICE, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, JJ.