Opinion ID: 1136544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the formula or time-unit argument to the jury.

Text: However meritorious the defendant's contention that the legislature has encroached upon judicial terrain may be, we do not reach that constitutional issue in this case. Upon careful reconsideration of Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Haw. 408, 390 P.2d 740 (1964), we choose to overrule that part of the opinion which prohibited the use of formula arguments to the jury. There is obviously no market place for pain or suffering, so no objective standard can be used to aid the jury in determining damages. The usual test is rather simplistic and amorphous. Pain and suffering are measured by what the jury considers will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for the pain and suffering or anguish in light of the intensity and extent thereof as disclosed by the evidence   . Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 Haw. 408, 424, 390 P.2d 740, 750 (1964). However artfully the objections to the use of formula damages are phrased, since the case goes to the jury, at bottom it might be said that the question turns on the court's confidence in the ability of a juror to parse the testimony and determine for himself what is true or untrue, exaggerated or reasonable with respect to damages for pain and suffering. In our view the reconciliation and weighing of conflicting testimony is indeed in the jury's domain. The dearth of standards by which to measure individual pain and suffering, the common sense of jurors, and the presence of alternative judicial safeguards that are less intrusive into the juror's province lead us to approve the use of formula arguments by counsel. With proper guidance by the trial judge the objections advanced in Franco can be avoided and formula arguments can be usefully made by both sides. The trial judge should make it clear that the formula is just that, argument, and no more. Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co., 11 Utah 2d 23, 354 P.2d 575 (1960). He should emphasize that it is part of counsel's function as an advocate to persuade the jury and that formulas are but illustrations which serve only to focus the inquiry on the issue which the jury must ultimately resolve, the extent of money damages. Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Insurance Co., 365 F.2d 858, 861-862 (1966); Edwards v. Lawton, 244 S.C. 276, 136 S.E.2d 708 (1964). Although certainly not essential to this case, it is reassuring to note that since Franco previously uncommitted states have joined the growing majority which allow formula arguments. [4]