Opinion ID: 815370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right of Access is Limited

Text: It is beyond peradventure that “[t]he constitutional guarantee of a free press „assures the maintenance of our political system and an open society,‟ and secures „the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials.‟” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (citation omitted); see also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Without a free press there can be no free safeguard the right of the news media to observe and report on the election process in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” (Amicus Br. 1.) 11 society. Freedom of the press, however, is not an end in itself but a means to the end of a free society.” (footnote omitted)). For this reason, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment — in addition to protecting freedom of speech and the press — must also contain protections for some news-gathering activity. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (“[W]ithout some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”). Yet, the Supreme Court has held, time and again, that this First Amendment right of access to information is qualified and subject to limitations. In Zemel v. Rusk, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.” 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). Going further, the Court cautioned that: [t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen‟s opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment right. Id. at 16-17; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684 (“It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.”); Pell, 417 U.S. at 834 (“The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar 12 government from interfering in any way with a free press. The Constitution does not, however, require government to accord the press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally.”). Appellants are therefore correct in arguing that the First Amendment encompasses a right of access for newsgathering purposes. However, we decline to hold — as Appellant and the amicus curiae hope — that the press is entitled to any greater protection under this right than is the general public. The Supreme Court‟s pronouncement on this issue is unequivocal: “[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public generally.” Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684. Thus, while the First Amendment does protect Appellant‟s right of access to gather news, that right does not extend to all information.