Opinion ID: 654592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Locascio's Mere Presence Arguments

Text: 111 Locascio was convicted for crimes stemming from his role as the underboss of the Gambino Crime Family. The government established at trial that Locascio's function as underboss was to advise Gotti in the formulation of plans for the Gambino Family's criminal activities. His conviction was principally grounded on his presence in the Ravenite Apartment during discussions about the crimes for which he was convicted, even though he did not personally discuss many of those crimes. The government's theory was that only involved members of the conspiracy would have been allowed to attend these Ravenite Apartment meetings. Moreover, the government argued that Locascio's role as an advisor mandated that he not speak up at such meetings, unless it was to assist Gotti. 112 Locascio now argues that his culpability was presumed by his mere presence in the Ravenite Apartment and his mere exposure to conversations in which criminal conduct was discussed. Locascio contends that he was convicted not for his conduct but for his alleged position in the charged enterprise, which he argues essentially made him absolutely liable for anything that occurred. Therefore, he challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence against him and the district court's instruction that his functional presence in the Ravenite Apartment during discussions was sufficient to prove his participation in the various conspiracies.
113 Locascio's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence carries, as we have often stated, a heavy burden. In reviewing such challenges, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and credit every inference in its favor. SeeUnited States v. Skowronski, 968 F.2d 242, 247 (2d Cir.1992). Moreover, we will affirm the conviction if any jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt based on the reasonably drawn inferences from that evidence. Seeid. (Any challenge to the weight of the evidence is for argument to the jury, not a ground for reversal on appeal.); see alsoConcepcion, 983 F.2d at 382. 114 Locascio argues that the only proof of his participation in the conspiracy was that he was present in the Ravenite apartment when some of the actions were discussed. Locascio asserts that his mere presence is not enough to prove participation. SeeUnited States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1004 (2d Cir.1990) ([K]nowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not of itself make one a co-conspirator.). 115 Traditionally, conspiracy law has required more than mere presence or mere knowledge to sustain a conviction for conspiracy. See, e.g.,United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d 1002, 1010-11 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that defendant who lived for twelve days in a single room of a house found to contain drugs in basement could not be convicted of conspiracy to possess for mere presence in house); United States v. Nusraty, 867 F.2d 759, 764-65 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that mere presence at airport when acquaintance arrived carrying drugs could not justify conspiracy conviction); United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir.1983) (holding that defendant's presence in apartment in which drugs were found did not sufficiently support conviction). Rather, it is necessary for the government to introduce some evidence of participation in the conspiracy in order to sustain a conviction. Seeid. 116 Locascio, however, was not convicted for his mere presence. There is a distinction between mere presence and presence under a particular set of circumstances that indicate participation. SeeUnited States v. Gordils, 982 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1953, 123 L.Ed.2d 657 (1993); United States v. Soto, 959 F.2d 1181, 1185 (2d Cir.1992). The distinction is that, although one's presence in a setting where a conspiracy is being conducted or discussed may not by itself connote participation, presence coupled with extrinsic factors can support such a finding. The circumstances under which one is present may imply involvement. 117 The distinction between mere presence and presence under a particular set of circumstances is illustrated by a comparison of the two United States v. Soto cases, which involve two separate litigants and were decided nine years apart. Locascio cites the first Soto opinion, in which we reversed a conviction for a woman charged with a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. SeeSoto, 716 F.2d at 990. In that case, there was no evidence other than her presence in an apartment in which drugs were found to prove her involvement in the conspiracy. The defendant's circumstances, however, were unique: 118 While it would not be accurate to characterize Soto's presence at the apartment as merely transitory, we nevertheless consider the total circumstances of how Soto came to reside there to be highly significant. For here we have an individual newly arrived from Puerto Rico, accompanied by a child of tender years, clearly in need of shelter. To this end, as soon as she arrived in New York defendant took up residence at the ... apartment. Although the living arrangements there may not have been ideal, there is no indication that defendant had any other alternative. 119 Id. at 991. 120 In contrast, the second Soto case involved a man who similarly argued that the facts only indicated that he was merely present in the apartment in which drugs and guns were found. SeeSoto, 959 F.2d at 1185. The Court noted that there was more than mere presence in that case, in that the facts indicated that the defendant was working at a crack packaging station, and that: 121 [t]he jury could also have reasonably determined that only trusted members of the operation would be permitted entry into the apartment, because allowing outsiders to have access to an apartment with large quantities of narcotics in plain view could compromise the security of the operation. 122 Id. 123 In the first Soto case, it was the lack of corroborating evidence, the fact that there was nothing other than her presence, that formed the basis for the Court's opinion. In contrast, the second Soto opinion demonstrates that presence coupled with other signs of involvement will be enough to sustain a conviction. 124 In this case, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government indicates that, as the underboss, Locascio was present to help evaluate plans presented to Gotti and give advice as needed. Gotti, Locascio, and Gravano took extensive but ultimately unsuccessful precautions to ensure that their conversations in the Ravenite Apartment, the conversations constituting the bulk of the evidence against them, were not overheard. Considering the precautions taken to ensure security, and after hearing the tapes of what was discussed in that apartment, the jury was entitled to consider whether it was likely that Locascio would have been present during those conversations if he were not a participant. Although Locascio's mere presence would not be sufficient to sustain his conviction, the government did far more than establish mere presence.
125 Locascio argues that the district court improperly instructed the jury on conspiratorial liability. The instruction reads as follows: 126 Now, although mere presence or mere association with conspirators is not enough, it's a factor that you may consider among others to determine whether a defendant was a member of the conspiracy. The defendant's presence may establish his membership in a conspiracy, if all of the circumstances considered together show that his presence was meant to advance the goals of that conspiracy. 127 He must not only have been present, he must have known about the conspiracy, he must have intended by his presence to participate in the conspiracy or to help it succeed. 128 In other words, presence itself may demonstrate membership in a conspiracy only if that presence is a functional part of the conspiracy. 129 Locascio contends that this instruction improperly allowed the jury to convict him for his mere presence. Considering the above discussion, however, it is clear that the district court quite properly instructed the jury that presence under circumstances that advance the purposes of the conspiracy would be sufficient to support a finding of guilt.