Opinion ID: 1952386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Contract for payment of medical expenses

Text: [¶ 12] In Count I of his complaint, Searles alleged that St. Joseph's, through Simonds and Wheeler, orally agreed to pay for the medical costs associated with his basketball injuries. He summarizes his contract claim as follows: Paul Searles alleged that he entered into a contract with St. Joseph's [C]ollege, through its agents, under which the college promised to pay Paul's medical bills if he continued to play for the basketball team. Searles asserted in his response to an interrogatory that Coach Simonds told my parents and me that the School's insurance would pay for all of the medical bills relating to my knee problems. He said that to us on January 27, 1990, after a game against the University of Maine at Farmington, in Farmington, Maine. [6] Searles's mother testified in her deposition that Simonds told her husband after a basketball game that the school would get him fixedwe'll take him to the doctor's and will have him-have his knees fixed up. [¶ 13] To establish a legally binding agreement the parties must have mutually assented to be bound by all its material terms; the assent must be manifested in the contract, either expressly or impliedly; and the contract must be sufficiently definite to enable the court to determine its exact meaning and fix exactly the legal liabilities of the parties. VanVoorhees v. Dodge, 679 A.2d 1077, 1080 (Me.1996). The record does not contain evidence of the existence of a contract. Assuming as we must that Simonds did state to Searles's parents that the school would pay Searles's medical bills, such a statement is insufficient to constitute an offer to enter into a contract. In order to be legally operative and to create a power of acceptance, it is necessary that the offer shall contain all the terms of the contract to be made. It is not enough for one party to promise to do something. This party must also say what the other party must do in exchange. 1 Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1.11 (1993). For a contract to be enforceable, the parties thereto must have a distinct and common intention which is communicated by each party to the other. 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 27 (1991). There is no evidence as to the terms of the offer purportedly made by Simonds and no evidence that Searles and Simonds had an agreement that Searles had to continue to play basketball in exchange for the payment of his medical expenses. Simonds's comment to Searles's parents cannot be construed as anything more than a statement of intent given as reassurance, and an intention to do an act is not an offer to do it ... a mere expression of intention or general willingness to do something... does not amount to an offer. 17 A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 43(1991). The court properly entered a judgment in favor of St. Joseph's on the contract claim. Estate of Althenn v. Althenn, 609 A.2d 711, 714 (Me. 1992). The entry is: Judgment for defendants on Counts I, III and IV of plaintiff's amended complaint affirmed. Judgment for defendants on Counts II, V, VI and VII vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.