Opinion ID: 544343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Discharge

Text: 5 Ten categories of circumstances which can forestall a debtor's receipt of a discharge in bankruptcy are described in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 727(a). Calder does not dispute that an omission of assets from a Statement of Affairs or schedule may constitute a false oath under section 727(a)(4)(A). Farmers Co-op. Ass'n v. Strunk, 671 F.2d 391, 395 (10th Cir.1982). To trigger section 727(a)(4)(A), the false oath must relate to a material matter and must be made willfully with intent to defraud. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, p 727.04 at 727-54 to -57 (15th ed. 1987). 6 We agree with the bankruptcy court that each of Calder's omissions was a material matter that would support denial of discharge. The omitted information concerned the existence and disposition of Calder's property. See In re Chalik, 748 F.2d 616, 618 (11th Cir.1984) (The subject matter of a false oath is 'material,' and thus sufficient to bar discharge if it bears a relationship to the bankrupt's business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of his property.). Calder has argued that he should not be denied a discharge of his debts because the undisclosed bank accounts and mineral interest were worthless assets. However, a recalcitrant debtor may not escape a section 727(a)(4)(A) denial of discharge by asserting that the admittedly omitted ... information concerned a worthless business relationship or holding; such a defense is specious. Id. 7 Calder's primary contention on appeal is that the bankruptcy court erred in denying him discharge on the basis of the omitted information because these omissions were not made fraudulently within the meaning of section 727(a)(4)(A). Calder contends that the nondisclosures were merely the result of inadvertence. As Calder points out, much of his testimony at the trial on the objection to discharge, not surprisingly, was to the effect that he did not act with a fraudulent intent. Furthermore, Calder asserts that he did not disclose the transfer of income from the Redlac Partnership to his wife's bank account after April, 1984, because that transfer was a gift and the Statement of Affairs only required disclosure of gifts ... to family members made during the year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. 8 The problem in ascertaining whether a debtor acted with fraudulent intent is difficult because, ordinarily, the debtor will be the only person able to testify directly concerning his intent and he is unlikely to state that his intent was fraudulent. Williamson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir.1987). Therefore, fraudulent intent may be deduced from the facts and circumstances of a case. In re Devers, 759 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir.1985); see also Farmers Co-op. Ass'n, 671 F.2d at 395 (Fraudulent intent of course may be established by circumstantial evidence, or by inferences drawn from a course of conduct.). The bankruptcy court's ultimate determination concerning fraudulent intent will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Williamson, 828 F.2d at 252. 9 In this case, several facts and circumstances, not disputed by Calder, support the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Calder acted fraudulently in making false oaths in connection with his bankruptcy. First, Calder, as the bankruptcy court noted, is an experienced attorney practicing exclusively in bankruptcy law. He should be aware that those who seek shelter of the bankruptcy code must provide complete, truthful and reliable information. In re Tully, 818 F.2d 106, 110 (1st Cir.1987). Furthermore, it is significant that there was not one but four separate omissions from Calder's Statement of Affairs and Schedule B-1. See Williamson, 828 F.2d at 252. Finally, as the bankruptcy court also noted, records of the Redlac Partnership continued to reflect Calder's interest in the partnership after April, 1984. Thus, there is no indication that Calder absolutely and irrevocably divested himself of domination and control over his future partnership income in April, 1984. In view of these facts, we cannot say that the bankruptcy court's finding of fraudulent intent was clearly erroneous.