Opinion ID: 1096859
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bills Relating to All Defendants

Text: The errors urged by the other bills may be disposed of briefly: 1. A male defendant cannot complain of the effective exclusion of women from jury service in Louisiana, or at least our state jurisprudence so holds. State v. Womack, 283 So.2d 708 (La.1973). (Owens Bill No. 1, adopted by all defendants.) 2. In the absence of a collusive material injury to the accused (and none is shown here), the trial court does not abuse its reasonable discretion by excusing members of the petit jury venire in advance of the trial. La.C.Cr.P. art. 783, see Official Revision Comment (b); State v. Williams, 258 La. 801, 248 So.2d 295 (1971); State v. Jugger, 217 La. 687, 47 So.2d 46 (1950). Further, although the trial court may attach absent veniremen, Article 783, it is not required to delay proceedings to do so, in the absence of material prejudice to the accused (and none is shown here). State v. Dallao, 187 La. 392, 175 So. 4 (1937). (Witherspoon and Clark Bill Nos. 1-9). 3. We find no error in the trial court's refusal to sustain a challenge for cause to the juror Harrist. (Witherspoon and Clark Bill No. 10.) Initially the prospective juror displayed some uncertainty as to the defenses of intoxication and insanity. However, after being instructed and further interrogated by the court, he seemed to understand the instruction, and he stated that he could apply the law as given to him by the court. State v. Leichman, 286 So.2d 649 (La.1973). Likewise, no error is shown in the trial court's failure to excuse prospective juror Hawkins for cause based on his possible distraction by worry over absence from his business. (Owens Bill No. 17.) 4. The photographs of the wounded police officers were probably inadmissible (Bill Nos. 11 and 12), for no substantial reason is advanced for their relevance. However, the photographs are not gruesome or unduly prejudicial. Since other testimony (admissible as part of the res gestae) showed that the officers were wounded in the respects shown, we find no reversible error. 5. Witherspoon was wounded in the shoot-out and brought to a hospital. The police officers were informed that a coat (which had been removed from him before they saw it) in the hospital room belonged to Witherspoon. In it, they found an envelope with the money and a check stolen in the robbery. The coat was identified by witnesses as similar to that Witherspoon was wearing at the time of the robbery. When he took the stand, Witherspoon himself admitted the coat seemed to be his and that he had taken the money. We find no merit to the objection that the admission of the money and check was erroneous, allegedly because the identification of the coat from which it was taken was hearsay. (Bill No. 13.) The other evidence introduced was likewise reasonably identified as that taken from the defendants. (Bill Nos. 14 and 15.) See State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1972). 6. Owens urges a bill of exceptions taken as to the admission of three vials of blood, one taken from each of the defendants on the night of the arrest. (Bill No. 23.) No objection was made to the previous testimony concerning the chemical analysis of the three blood samples, each of which contained a trace of barbiturates and of no other drugs. The state's apparent purpose in introducing the testimony was to negative the potential defenses indicated by voir dire questioning that specific criminal intent may have been negated by a drugged condition. La.R.S. 14:15(2). (In the fact, only the defendant Witherspoon attempted to advance such a defense.) The objection was in globo to the admission of all three blood samples. Pretermitting whatever merit there may have been had Owens individually objected to the admission of his own blood sample (on the ground that such was irrelevant to his own defense), no objection was made to the testimony that an analysis of his blood contained a trace of barbiturates, and we do not see that the subsequent admission of the vial itself was prejudicial. Additionally, when he himself took the stand, he freely testified that, as a seriously wounded Vietnam veteran with painful residual, he was required under doctor's prescription to take barbiturates. Therefore, even if the testimony was irrelevant as to him, we cannot see that it was prejudicial under the circumstances. 7. The remaining non-abandoned bills of all defendants, such as to the failure to give special instructions requested, or as to hold that a 75-year sentence for armed robbery constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, concern issues as to which the trial court's rulings are clearly correct under existing jurisprudence.