Opinion ID: 2327039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bishop's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal of Mayhem and AWIKWA

Text: Appellant Bishop argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the government's evidence was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of the charges of mayhem while armed (Carrington Harley) and assault with intent to kill (Joe Payne, Keith Williams and Michael Toland). In reviewing a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact. A motion for judgment of acquittal should only be granted if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Lay v. United States, 831 A.2d 1015, 1026 (D.C.2003) (quoting Gibson v. United States, 792 A.2d 1059, 1065 (D.C.2002)).
The elements of mayhem are: (1) that the defendant caused permanent disabling injury to another, (2) that he had the general intent to do the injurious act, and (3) that he did so willfully and maliciously. See Peoples v. United States, 640 A.2d 1047, 1054 (D.C.1994 (quoting Edwards v. United States, 583 A.2d 661, 668 (D.C.1990)). Appellant Bishop argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Carrington Harley suffered a permanent, disabling injury. We have stated that [t]he mayhem statute seeks to protect the preservation of the human body in its normal functioning and the integrity of the victim's person from permanent injury or disfigurement. McFadden v. United States, 395 A.2d 14, 18 (D.C.1978) (citation omitted). [4] At trial, Harley testified that he suffered six to eight gunshot wounds in his right hip area, and that one round hit his prostate gland and another shattered his rectum. Harley was forced to use a colostomy bag for a year, and, at the time of the trial, he still required a catheter. In addition, Harley's surgeon, Dr. Golocovsky, testified that Harley had permanent scars to his abdomen and abdominal wall, and that his abdominal muscles were permanently weakened. As a result, Harley faced an elevated risk of future intestinal, urinary, and sexual dysfunction. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant Bishop's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the mayhem charge because the evidence sufficed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Harley suffered permanent injuries, which rendered at least one organ of the bodythe stomachgreatly impaired in its functioning. See Peoples, 640 A.2d at 1054 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Appellant Bishop challenges three of his AWIKWA convictions claiming that the government failed to prove that Joey Payne, Kevin Williams and Michael Toland were in the zone of harm proximate to the intended victims at the time of the shooting such that appellant's intent to kill them could be inferred from his shooting at the intended targets, Newton and Harley. See Walls v. United States, 773 A.2d 424, 434 (D.C.2001). Specifically, Bishop argues that there was simply no evidence of where they were when the gunshots went off. He asserts that the only evidence was the hearsay statement heard by Kevin Williams, who testified about what Payne had told him. Williams (who had explained to the jury the relative positions of the shooters and the shooting victims) testified that before the shooting started, Payne told him and Toland to leave immediately, and they started walking towards Payne's car. As they walked, Williams turned to watch Newton and Harley, who were walking behind them. When the shooting started, Williams was hit in the right arm and a bullet grazed Payne's back. As a result of the shooting barrage, Newton was killed and Harley was seriously injured. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence presented sufficed to permit the jury reasonably to infer that Williams, Payne and Toland were in the zone of danger, and that under the concurrent intent doctrine, appellant Bishop had the requisite intent. See id.