Opinion ID: 202346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relief under former section 212(c)

Text: De Araujo also contended in De Araujo I that the BIA deprived him of his constitutional right to due process by refusing to reopen proceedings because he was not granted a fair opportunity to establish his eligibility for relief from removal under former section 212(c) or to present his case to an IJ. Id. We determined that because we lacked jurisdiction to review De Araujo's claim that his assault conviction was not an aggravated felony, he remains removable on that ground, and we lack jurisdiction to reach his other claims on direct review. Id. (citing INA § 242(a) (2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)). Therefore, under pre-REAL ID Act law, we did not entertain De Araujo's other claims, which he could instead have presented as a habeas petition in the district court. However, the REAL ID Act made the courts of appeals the sole arbiters of final orders of removal or exclusion for both criminal and non-criminal aliens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), amended by REAL ID Act § 106, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. at 31011; Ishak, 422 F.3d at 28. Although relief from removal under former section 212(c) is a form of discretionary relief over which we generally have no appellate jurisdiction, the REAL ID Act carved out a narrow exception to permit the courts of appeals to consider constitutional claims or questions of law notwithstanding most -15- other jurisdictional bars of the INA.10 See Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(D)); Elysee v. Gonzáles, 437 F.3d 221, 223 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Mehilli v. Gonzáles, 433 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2005)). Under the terms of this limited jurisdictional grant, discretionary or factual determinations continue to fall outside the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, and BIA findings as to timeliness and changed circumstances are usually factual determinations. Mehilli, 433 F.3d at 93 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A constitutional claim would at least have to be colorable before a court will exercise jurisdiction to review such a claim or question. Id. at 93-94. In other words, a petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that Congress chose to remove simply by cloaking an . . . argument in constitutional garb . . . . To be colorable in this context . . . the claim must have some possible validity. Id. (quoting Torres Aguilar v. INS, 246 10 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), except as provided in subparagraph (D) . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of [discretionary] relief to removable aliens under section 212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240 B, or 245 [8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255]. Subparagraph (D) was added by the REAL ID Act to read: Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of [the Immigration and Nationality Act](other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section. -16- F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001)). Therefore, we review De Araujo's due process claims to determine whether they are indeed colorable constitutional issues. B. Analysis of De Araujo's due process claims To state a due process claim, an alien must possess a liberty or property interest. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972). The Supreme Court has long held that a permanent resident alien is protected under the Fifth Amendment and entitled to due process in the form of notice of the charges against him and a deportation hearing. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-98 (1953); Choeum v. INS, 129 F.2d 29, 38-40 (1st Cir. 1997) (It is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings. At the core of these due process rights is the right to notice of the nature of the charges and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.). However, an alien does not have a constitutionally protected interest in receiving discretionary relief from removal or deportation. United States v. López-Ortiz, 313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002). The Attorney General's suspension of deportation is an act of grace, which is accorded pursuant to his [or her] unfettered discretion. INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30 (1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Further, a constitutionally protected interest in receiving relief cannot arise from relief that the Attorney General has unfettered -17- discretion to award. See Fernández Pereira v. Gonzáles, 417 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2005) (Congress is not required to provide aggravated felons with an avenue for discretionary relief from deportation, and currently does not do so.). Moreover, while an alien may raise as a constitutional or legal claim arising from the refusal of [an] agency to even consider him for discretionary relief, he may not challenge the agency's decision to exercise or not exercise its discretion to grant relief. Saint Fort v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 203 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2002)); Arevalo v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (A right to seek relief is analytically separate and distinct from a right to the relief itself.). Here, the BIA clearly considered De Araujo for discretionary relief. The BIA received and read De Araujo's request to reopen proceedings sua sponte, and after considering the merits of De Araujo's motion, the BIA found that it did not support the reopening of proceedings in the exercise of the BIA's discretion. The BIA based its decision that De Araujo was undeserving of a section 212(c) waiver in the exercise of discretion on his four criminal convictions and apparent inability to comply with the terms of his probation. In addition, the BIA considered but did not find sufficient evidence from De Araujo's extremely limited affidavit that his convictions were -18- not vacated simply to avoid immigration consequences, which would render him ineligible to be considered for former section 212(c) relief. 8 C.F.R. 1003.2(c)(1) (A motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of submitting an application for relief must be accompanied by . . . all supporting documentation.); see also In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 625. On these facts, De Araujo raises no colorable constitutional claim of a due process violation. Nor has De Araujo raised a question of law for our review. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary denial of section 212(c) relief in this case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B); see also Elysee, 427 F.3d at 244 (holding that attacks on the balancing of factors engaged in by the IJ before deciding not to grant discretionary relief were not constitutional claims or questions of law). Furthermore, the decision of the BIA whether to invoke its sua sponte authority is committed to its unfettered discretion. Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 286, 292 (1st Cir. 1999). Thus, it is at least arguable that our review of this challenge would in all events be barred because we lack authority to review issues committed to the agency's unfettered discretion. Roberts v. Gonzáles, 422 F.3d 33, 37 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 821 (1985)). In any case, we find that we are precluded from reviewing De Araujo's claims. -19-