Opinion ID: 3162016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Particularly Serious Crime Exception

Text: Congress has long prohibited the Attorney General from deporting a person to a country if she determines that [an] alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1980); id. (1990); id. (1996). See Alphonsus v. Holder, 705 F.3d 1031, 1037-41 (9th Cir. 2013) (discussing the statute's history). An exception to that rule provides that withholding of deportation shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines - 9 - that . . . (B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2) (1980). In 1982, the BIA in Matter of Frentescu set forth a multi-factor test to determine whether a crime is particularly serious. See 18 I. & N. Dec. at 247 (In judging the seriousness of a crime, we look to such factors as the nature of the conviction, the circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and, most importantly, whether the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the alien will be a danger to the community.).7 In 1990, Congress amended § 1253(h)(2) by categorically designating all aggravated felonies as particularly serious crimes. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 515, 104 Stat. 4978, 5053 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. 1253(h)(2)). Then in April 1996, Congress passed AEDPA, which expanded the list 7 The BIA has also interpreted the exception to require only one determination, that is, an alien found to be convicted of a particularly serious crime is necessarily found to be a danger to the community. See Matter of Carballe, 19 I. & N. Dec. 357, 359–60 (BIA 1986). All circuits that have addressed the issue, including our own, have upheld this interpretation. See Kankamalage v. INS, 335 F.3d 858, 861 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003); Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 240 (6th Cir. 1996); Ahmetovic v. INS, 62 F.3d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1995); Al–Salehi v. INS, 47 F.3d 390, 391 (10th Cir. 1995); Kofa v. INS, 60 F.3d 1084, 1088 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Garcia v. INS, 7 F.3d 1320, 1322 (7th Cir. 1993); Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 559 (1st Cir. 1993); Martins v. INS, 972 F.2d 657, 661 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1986). - 10 - of aggravated felonies. See AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104–132, § 440(e), 110 Stat. 1214, 1277–78 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). At the same time, § 413(f) of that legislation created an override provision to the particularly serious crime bar, which was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(3). In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(3) read: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, paragraph (1) [requiring withholding of deportation] shall apply to any alien if the Attorney General determines, in the discretion of the Attorney General, that -- . . . (B) the application of paragraph (1) to such alien is necessary to ensure compliance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. AEDPA § 413(f), 110 Stat. at 1269 (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(3)). The BIA continued to apply the particularly serious crime bar without a separate danger to the community determination. See In Re Q-T-M-T-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 639, 656 (BIA 1996). However, in light of AEDPA § 413(f), the BIA began treating only aliens convicted of aggravated felonies with sentences of five years or more as per se convicted of particularly serious crimes and began subjecting aliens convicted of aggravated felonies with shorter sentences to a rebuttable presumption of conviction of a particularly serious crime, adjudged by whether - 11 - any unusual aspect of the alien's particular aggravated felony conviction . . . convincingly evidences that his or her crime cannot rationally be deemed 'particularly serious' in light of our treaty obligations under the Protocol. Id. at 654 (citing the Frentescu test in explaining how to apply 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(3) to aggravated felony convictions). AEDPA § 413(f) was short-lived. In September 1996, through the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress replaced deportation with removal proceedings, see Pub. L. No. 104–208, §§ 301–309, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575 to 3009-627, and in the new withholding of removal provision, omitted the language previously added by AEDPA § 413(f), see § 305(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009-602 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)). IIRIRA also eliminated the categorical designation of all aggravated felonies as particularly serious crimes. Id. Thereafter, the BIA returned to applying the Frentescu test to determine whether a conviction for an aggravated felony with a sentence shorter than five years or for a non-aggravated felony is particularly serious. See Alphonsus, 705 F.3d at 1041. Because INS placed Valerio in deportation proceedings in 1991, and final action was not taken in her case until well after 1996, Valerio's deportation proceedings are governed by former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), as amended by AEDPA § 413(f). See - 12 - AEDPA § 413(g), 110 Stat. at 1269–70 (1996) (stating that § 413(f) shall apply to applications filed before, on, or after such date if final action has not been taken on them before such date).8 B. Application of Former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), as Amended by AEDPA § 413(f) The government argues we must dismiss the bulk of the petition by suggesting that Valerio did not raise before the BIA the issue of whether AEDPA § 413(f) alters the particularly serious crime determination in her case, and so arguments about applicable law, which are raised by Valerio and amici curiae,9 are unexhausted. See Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (1st Cir. 2004). However, we do not have to address whether Valerio herself raised an appropriate challenge to the BIA's application of law, as the BIA itself raised the issue sua sponte. See MazariegosPaiz v. Holder, 734 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 2013) ([T]he administrative exhaustion requirement is satisfied as to particular issues when the agency, either on its own initiative or at the behest of some other party to the proceedings, has addressed 8 The provisions at issue in IIRIRA took effect on April 1, 1997, and do not apply to deportation proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997, and in which a final order of deportation issued after October 30, 1996, Prado v. Reno, 198 F.3d 286, 288 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999). 9 Two briefs in support of the petitioner have been submitted in this case, one by the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and the Immigrant Defense Project, and another by the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program of Harvard Law School. We acknowledge their assistance. - 13 - those claims on the merits, regardless of whether the petitioner himself raised them.); see also Meng Hua Wan v. Holder, 776 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 2015). The BIA addressed applicable law directly in a footnote at the beginning of its opinion, remarking on the IJ's erroneous use of removal law, stating that Valerio's application is governed by deportation law, and making the additional unbriefed determination that [t]he particularly serious crime analysis is the same under both provisions. We see no exhaustion objection that would preclude review. Here, Valerio's opening brief clearly raised the issue of applicable law and included discussion of AEDPA § 413(f), the fact that her case is governed by former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), and the import of international law to the application of the statute. We see no reason to conclude that she abandoned these arguments, on which amici have advanced variations.10 Still, when the BIA has not spoken on an issue that a statute has placed in its hands, remand is appropriate to give the 10 The government also contends that we cannot consider the arguments concerning the proper statutory interpretation of AEDPA § 413(f) because they were advanced in the first instance by two amicus briefs involved in the case. While it is true that amici may not present legal theories not argued by the parties, they may present variations on the arguments presented by a party. Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375 n.6 (1st Cir. 2003). Amici are permitted to assist the court in achieving a just resolution of issues raised by the parties. Lane v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 871 F.2d 166, 175 (1st Cir. 1989). They have done so here. - 14 - BIA an opportunity to address the issue in the first instance. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009). The government also argues that this court has already upheld the BIA's interpretation of former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), as amended by AEDPA § 413(f), so there is no reason to remand. See Choeum, 129 F.3d at 35. It is true that the BIA should on remand consider the effect of Choeum, but that does not obviate the need for remand. Choeum concerned an aggravated felon. This case does not. We leave it to the BIA to determine whether that difference is relevant and to articulate the particularly serious crime determination for a non-aggravated felon like Valerio. A single, unsupported assertion in a footnote, lacking rationale or precedent, stating that removal and deportation proceedings are treated the same is simply not enough, especially in light of the harsh consequences of deportation. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987). Accordingly, we remand to the BIA to interpret in the first instance and apply former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), as amended by AEDPA § 413(f), to a non-aggravated felon.