Opinion ID: 2354297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other penalty phase instructions.

Text: There is no requirement that a capital penalty jury be instructed that its findings on mitigation need not be unanimous. Caudill, supra, at 674-75; Mills, 996 S.W.2d at 492; Tamme, 973 S.W.2d at 37; Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 180 (1993).
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury specifically with respect to each non-statutory mitigating circumstance claimed by Appellant, such as his deprived family background and military service. However, in addition to instructing on the applicable statutory mitigating circumstance, the trial court instructed the jury that it could consider [a]ny other circumstance or circumstances arising from the evidence which you, the jury, deem to have mitigating value. Having so instructed the jury, the trial court was not required to give specific instructions regarding additional non-statutory mitigating circumstances claimed by Appellant. Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 938 S.W.2d 243, 248 (1996); Bowling, 873 S.W.2d at 180.
Penalty phase instruction number 12 instructed the jury that: You must reach a separate verdict on each count described in these instructions and a separate verdict on your recommendation as to whether the sentence should run concurrently or consecutively. Each verdict must be in writing, must be unanimous and must be signed by one of you as foreperson. (Emphasis added.) Verdict forms 6C, 6D, and 6E, as well as verdict forms 7C, 7D, and 7E, were provided for use by the jury if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the three enumerated aggravating circumstances existed. It was not necessary that each verdict form also instruct the jury that the verdict written on that form must be unanimous. Instruction number 12 informed the jury of that requirement. Further, the fact that instruction number 12 required that each verdict be unanimous did not create a substantial probability that reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge's instructions ... well may have thought that they were precluded from considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular such circumstance. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1870, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). An instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quotations omitted). The unanimity instruction specifically referred to each verdict. It did not instruct the jury that its findings must be unanimous or that it must reach a verdict on mitigating circumstances. Compare Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 325-26 (6th Cir.2000) (trial court's instructions violated Mills, supra, by requiring jury's  findings and verdict to be unanimous and requiring jurors to select yes or no as to existence of select mitigating factors) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 501 (6th Cir.2003), with Slaughter v. Parker, 187 F.Supp.2d 755, 814-15 (W.D.Ky.2001) (distinguishing Gall, supra , and upholding instructions identical to those given in this case).
The trial judge is not required to instruct the jury that aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances. Hodge, 17 S.W.3d at 854 (citations omitted); see also Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 807; Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671, 678 (1984).
Appellant claims instruction number 12 and verdict form 12A, instructing the jury to recommend whether Appellant should serve his sentences concurrently or consecutively, denigrated the jury's responsibility in imposing the death penalty. Tamme v. Commonwealth, Ky., 759 S.W.2d 51, 53 (1988). However, the jury fixed Appellant's sentences in their other verdicts. KRS 532.055(2) specifically requires that the jury only recommend whether the sentences it has fixed should run concurrently or consecutively. Of course, a death sentence cannot run concurrently or consecutively with another sentence; thus, the recommendation would only apply to the murder convictions if the jury returned a verdict of a term of years, a circumstance that did not occur here. Although Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 942 S.W.2d 876 (1996), held that KRS 532.055(2) does not apply in capital cases, it did not hold, as Appellant asserts, that it is error for the trial court to give the instruction during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Foley only held that the trial court did not err in failing to give the instruction. Id. at 886. Here, the capital penalty phase was combined with the so-called truth-in-sentencing phase of the trial because Appellant was convicted not only of two capital offenses but also of two Class B felonies and two Class D felonies. In view of the sentences of death for the capital offenses, the trial court properly treated the consecutive sentence recommendation as applicable only to the sentences for the lesser offenses.
Appellant argues that the trial court's capital verdict forms improperly directed the jury to automatically impose an aggravated penalty upon the finding of an aggravating circumstance. We have considered and rejected this argument on numerous occasions and continue to adhere to our prior holdings. E.g., Caudill, supra, at 674-75; Hodge, supra, at 854; Foley, 942 S.W.2d at 888-89.