Opinion ID: 1426747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflict with General Laws

Text: Article XI, section 11 requires a local law yield to a state statute on the same subject matter if that statute preempts the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or if a conflict exists such that the two cannot be harmonized. Brown v. City of Yakima, 116 Wash.2d 556, 559, 561, 807 P.2d 353 (1991). Respondents do not argue that the Legislature has preempted the field of conduct governed by the Ordinance but, rather, contend the Ordinance conflicts with various state laws. `In determining whether an ordinance is in `conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa. Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 140 N.E. 519 [(1923) ]. Judged by such a test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute permits,' State v. Carran, 133 Ohio St. 50, 11 N.E.2d 245, 246 [ (1937) ]. City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wash.2d 106, 111, 356 P.2d 292, 92 A.L.R.2d 192 (1960). An ordinance must yield to state law only if a conflict exists such that the two cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wash.2d at 561, 807 P.2d 353; accord Schampera, 57 Wash.2d at 111, 356 P.2d 292 (Unless legislative provisions are contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist, they are not to be deemed inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail. Bodkin v. State, [132 Neb. 535], 272 N.W. 547 [ (1937) ].). In this case, we must examine whether the Ordinance conflicts with chapter 88.02 RCW, chapter 88.12 RCW, chapter 90.58 RCW, chapter 43.99 RCW, or the public trust doctrine. The trial court found the Ordinance conflicted with chapter 88.02 RCW, the state vessel registration statute. In essence, the trial court found that the Ordinance forbid an activity the statute impliedly allowed. We have previously addressed a similar argument and established an analysis to be followed. In State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett Dist. Justice Court, 92 Wash.2d 106, 594 P.2d 448 (1979), we reviewed a Snohomish County ordinance that prohibited the use of internal combustion motors on certain lakes in Snohomish County. Schillberg, 92 Wash.2d at 107, 594 P.2d 448. A person charged with violating the statute challenged the law on the ground that it conflict[ed] with [chapter 88.12 RCW]. Schillberg, 92 Wash.2d at 107, 594 P.2d 448. We found no conflict and stated: The provisions of [chapter 88.12 RCW] are concerned with safe operation of motor boats and do not in any way grant permission to operate boats in any place. A statute will not be construed as taking away the power of a municipality to legislate unless this intent is clearly and expressly stated.... There being no express statement nor words from which it could be fairly inferred that motor boats are permitted on all waters of the state, no conflict exists and the ordinance is valid. Schillberg, 92 Wash.2d at 108, 594 P.2d 448 (citations omitted). Schillberg certainly lays to rest any claim that the Ordinance conflicts with chapter 88.12 RCW. However, we hold Schillberg controls the discussion of whether the Ordinance conflicts with the state's vessel registration statute, chapter 88.02 RCW. The Legislature did not enact chapter 88.02 RCW to grant PWC owners the right to operate their PWC anywhere in the state. The statute was enacted to raise tax revenues and to create a title system for boats. See RCW 88.02.120. RCW 88.02.020 provides, in pertinent part: Except as provided in this chapter, no person may own or operate any vessel on the waters of this state unless the vessel has been registered and displays a registration number and a valid decal in accordance with this chapter.... [5] On its face, the statute prohibits operation of an unregistered vessel. Nowhere in the language of the statute can it be suggested that the statute creates an unabridged right to operate PWC in all waters throughout the state. Registration of a vessel is nothing more than a precondition to operating a boat. No unconditional right is granted by obtaining such registration. Statutes often impose preconditions which do not grant unrestricted permission to participate in an activity. Purchasing a hunting license is a precondition to hunting, but the license certainly does not allow hunting of endangered species, RCW 77.16.120, or hunting inside the Seattle city limits, see Seattle Municipal Code 12A.14.071 (banning discharge of a firearm). Reaching the age of 16 is a precondition to driving a car, but reaching 16 does not create an unrestricted right to drive a car however and wherever one desires. Schillberg states that the Legislature must expressly indicate an intent to preempt a particular field. In this case, the registration statute does not contain language preempting the regulation of this activity to the State. See RCW 46.08.020. We will not interpret a statute to deprive a municipality of the power to legislate on particular subjects unless that clearly is the legislative intent. Southwick, Inc. v. City of Lacey, 58 Wash.App. 886, 891-92, 795 P.2d 712 (1990). The San Juan County Ordinance does not conflict with the state's vessel registration statute; it is a routine application of the police power. The Ordinance does not conflict with other statewide statutes and laws, specifically chapter 90.58 RCW, chapter 43.99 RCW, and the public trust doctrine. Although the trial court found it unnecessary to address these issues, the parties have thoroughly briefed and argued these issues, and [w]e may affirm or reverse the summary judgment of the trial court based on our own resolution of the constitutional issues. Washington Ass'n of Child Care Agencies v. Thompson, 34 Wash.App. 225, 230, 660 P.2d 1124 (1983) (citing Simpson v. State, 26 Wash.App. 687, 615 P.2d 1297 (1980)). The waters of San Juan County are among those regulated by the Shoreline Management Act of 1971(SMA), chapter 90.58 RCW. However, banning the use of PWC is consistent with the aims of that chapter. Our conclusion is supported by a policy statement in the SMA, which provides in part: It is the policy of the state to provide for the management of the shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. This policy is designed to insure the development of these shorelines in a manner which, while allowing for limited reduction of rights of the public in the navigable waters, will promote and enhance the public interest. This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto. The legislature declares that the interest of all of the people shall be paramount in the management of shorelines of state-wide significance. RCW 90.58.020 (emphasis added). The ban of a certain type of activity is consistent with the limited reduction of rights allowed by the statute. Moreover, there is additional language in RCW 90.58.020: The department, in adopting guidelines for shorelines of state-wide significance, and local government, in developing master programs for shorelines of state-wide significance, shall give preference to uses in the following order of preference which: (1) Recognize and protect the state-wide interest over local interest; (2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline; (3) Result in long term over short term benefit; (4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline; (5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the shorelines; (6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the shoreline. Here, the Board concluded that [t]he maneuverability and ability to travel close to shore of PWCs make them able to harass wildlife and bird life unlike destination power vessels. Ex. 249, at 9 (Ordinance No. 3-1996). It also found that such attributes of PWC are inconsistent with the protection and preservation of the wildlife which inhabit the waters and refuges of the County. Ex. 249, at 8-11 (Ordinance No. 3-1996). Thus, the Ordinance appropriately favors the resources and ecology of the shoreline over recreational interests, RCW 90.58.020, and is consistent with the statute's purposes. The Ordinance does not conflict with chapter 43.99 RCW, the Marine Recreation Land Act of 1964, and its implementing regulations, which are set forth in Title 286 of the Washington Administrative Code. In enacting RCW 43.99.110, the Legislature created the interagency committee for outdoor recreation (IAC) for the purpose of expending the portion of unreclaimed fuel taxes paid by boaters to aqui[re] or improve[] marine recreation land on the ... fresh and salt waters of the state. RCW 43.99.010(2) (summarizing mission of IAC). According to Respondents, because the County has received substantial funds from the IAC, it must keep facilities open to all motorized vessels. See Br. of Resp'ts at 55-56 (citing CP at 1759-71; CP at 1133-36) (IAC Guidelines § 4.08(15)(A-D)). The document that Respondents cite as support for this proposition is an agreement accompanying a project grant from the IAC to the Washington State Parks and Recreation Commission for the purpose of developing boating facilities in San Juan County. Although the agreement states that all facilities covered by it shall be kept open for public use at reasonable hours and times of the year, it contains no language indicating that the County may not otherwise restrict the manner in which the public uses the facilities. CP at 1763. Moreover, the agreement provides that subject facilities are to be operated in accordance with all applicable ... local laws and regulations. CP at 1763. We do not find the Ordinance inconsistent with this agreement. Since as early as 1821, the public trust doctrine has been applied throughout the United States as a flexible method for judicial protection of public interests in coastal lands and waters. Ralph W. Johnson et al., The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. REV. 521, 524 (1992). The doctrine protects public ownership interests in certain uses of navigable waters and underlying lands, including navigation, commerce, fisheries, recreation, and environmental quality. Johnson, supra, at 524. The doctrine reserves a public property interest, the jus publicum, in tidelands and the waters flowing over them, despite the sale of these lands into private ownership. Johnson, supra, at 524. The state can no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can `abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.' Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash.2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989 (1987) (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892), aff'd, 154 U.S. 225, 14 S.Ct. 1015, 38 L.Ed. 971 (1894)). Due to the universally recognized need to protect public access to and use of such unique resources as navigable waters, beds, and adjacent lands, courts review legislation under the public trust doctrine with a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny, as if they were measuring that legislation against constitutional protections. Johnson, supra, at 525, 526-27. This court did not expressly adopt the public trust doctrine until 1987, but indicated then that the doctrine has always existed in Washington law. See Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 669-70, 732 P.2d 989. The doctrine in Washington prohibits the State from disposing of its interest in the waters of the state in such a way that the public's right of access is substantially impaired, unless the action promotes the overall interests of the public. Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology, 122 Wash.2d 219, 232, 858 P.2d 232 (1993). The test of whether or not an exercise of legislative power with respect to tidelands and shorelands violates the `public trust doctrine' is found in the following language of the United States Supreme Court: The control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining. Accordingly, we must inquire as to: (1) whether the State, by the questioned legislation, has given up its right of control over the jus publicum and (2) if so, whether by so doing the State (a) has promoted the interests of the public in the jus publicum, or (b) has not substantially impaired it. Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 670, 732 P.2d 989 (quoting in part Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453, 13 S.Ct. 110) (footnote omitted). We have previously acknowledged that the jus publicum interest encompasses the rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of navigation and the use of public waters. Caminiti, 107 Wash.2d at 669, 732 P.2d 989 (emphasis added) (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.2d 306, 316, 462 P.2d 232, 40 A.L.R.3d 760 (1969)). Nevertheless, we agree with the County that the Ordinance does not violate the public trust doctrine because the County has not given up its right of control over its waters. Although the Ordinance prohibits a particular form of recreation, the waters are open to access by the entire public, including owners of PWC who utilize some other method of recreation. While the Ordinance governs activities more appropriate for general state legislation, the State has failed to act. The San Juan County Ordinance cannot conflict with state laws that do not exist. Further, the Ordinance is consistent with the goals of statewide environmental protection statutes. Finally, it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this state.