Opinion ID: 2998279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application for Asylum and Withholding

Text: Ms. Rodriguez claims that the IJ conducted her asylum hearing in a manner that violated her right to due process. The IJ’s decision to deny her application was based largely on findings that she was not a credible witness and that she failed to provide corroboration for her account. We therefore first consider the IJ’s findings before turning 6 (...continued) see Fessehaye v. Ashcroft, 414 F.3d 746, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2005). The IJ’s determination that Ms. Rodriguez failed to corroborate the “linchpin of her claim,” by not providing evidence that the vehicle found near Mr. Flores was registered in her name, significantly contributed to the IJ’s ultimate denial of her petition. A.R.1308. Evidently, the IJ believed that corroborating evidence was available but not presented. Id. (“She apparently made no attempt to obtain proof from Guatemala that the automobile had been registered under her name. Similarly, although she asserted that she had a driver’s license in Guatemala, she was unable to corroborate that claim either.”). We review this determination under the standard established by the REAL ID Act. 14 Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 to the merits of Ms. Rodriguez’ due process claim.
Ms. Rodriguez submits that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was unsupported and that the IJ improperly and unreasonably required her to corroborate her claim that the car found near her husband’s body was registered in her name. Indeed, she points out that her expert witnesses, who were barred from testifying by the IJ, could corroborate much of her account of events in Guatemala. The Government responds that the IJ was in a position to evaluate Ms. Rodriguez’ credibility, and that the deference that this court owes to the IJ counsels against disturbing the IJ’s credibility findings. The IJ’s “[c]redibility determinations are accorded substantial deference, but they must be supported by specific, cogent reasons” and “must bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Ahmad v. INS, 163 F.3d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, the IJ’s “adverse credibility finding must be based on issues that go to the heart of the applicant’s claim. They ‘cannot be based on an irrelevant inconsistency.’ ” Sylla v. INS, 388 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 619 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004)). “[W]e will not automatically yield to the IJ’s conclusions when they are drawn from insufficient or incomplete evidence.” Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2003). In Ms. Rodriguez’ case, the IJ largely based its credibility determination on inconsistencies between her credible fear interview and her testimony at the hearing. The IJ recognized that most of the inconsistencies—that she gave Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 15 a false name to immigration officials, lied about the location of her children and about how she obtained a false passport—were irrelevant and did not go to the heart of her claim.7 Nor is there any basis for the IJ’s further comment that her false statements were a “demonstration that the respondent is willing to lie in order to avoid the consequences of her actions,” id.; Ms. Rodriguez testified that she feared the information would be provided to Guatemalan authorities and, importantly, the IJ did not find this testimony incredible. Indeed, testimony that an applicant gave false information to immigration authorities for fear of deportation to a persecuting country can be entirely consistent with a fear of persecution. See Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004); Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1998); In re O-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1079, 1082 (BIA 1998). Another inconsistency relied upon by the IJ—Ms. Rodriguez’ perceived lack of familiarity with the URNG—also was irrelevant to the question at hand: whether Mr. Flores was involved with the URNG and whether his political opinion was imputed to Ms. Rodriguez. The sole remaining basis for the IJ’s credibility determination, then, was described as the “linchpin” of Ms. Rodriguez’ claim: her failure to corroborate the fact that the car found next to Mr. Flores’ body was registered in her name. The IJ’s reliance on a lack of corroboration also fails because the car registration was irrelevant to the issues Ms. Rodri- 7 The IJ commented that “[t]hese statements, though they do not undercut the central elements of her asylum claim in themselves[,] are a further demonstration that the respondent is willing to lie.” A.R.1308 (emphasis added). 16 Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 guez presented. Ms. Rodriguez never claimed that Guatemalan security forces intimidated her because she was the car’s registered owner; rather, she claimed that they intimidated her because she was the wife of a murdered dissident. The vehicle registration would have provided little by way of corroboration. Of much greater import was the proposed testimony of her expert witnesses, whom she claimed would have testified that the Guatemalan agents were suspicious of and scrutinized the activities of university students like Mr. Flores. Moreover, the experts might have corroborated her account by demonstrating that the alleged activities of the unknown individuals were consistent with the manner in which the government intimidated spouses of slain opposition figures.8 The IJ relied upon irrelevant inconsistencies in reaching an adverse credibility finding. The IJ’s credibility determination thus was unsupported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the irrelevant vehicle registration became the “linchpin” of Ms. Rodriguez’ case only because the IJ prevented her experts from testifying. We turn now to consider this exclusion in evaluating Ms. Rodriguez’ due process claim. 8 Even assuming that the car registration was critical to Ms. Rodriguez’ claim, any assertion that she was targeted because of the registration relied upon its absence from her car, and the resulting inference that it was absent because government agents took it when they murdered Mr. Flores. In this circumstance, “a reasonable trier of fact [would be] compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence [wa]s unavailable,” and the IJ erred in relying on the lack of corroboration. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 17
Ms. Rodriguez asserts that the IJ conducted the asylum hearing in a manner that violated her right to due process by barring the testimony of Professors Rothenberg and Cassel. Their testimony was critical to her claim, according to Ms. Rodriguez, because their expertise would provide both corroboration and context for the events that she described. She further argues that the IJ, in the interest of time, truncated her testimony and thus prevented her from fully presenting her case. Moreover, Ms. Rodriguez contends that the IJ ignored the expert evidence that was presented—Professor Rothenberg’s affidavit—in reaching a decision to deny her application. The Government responds that the IJ conducted the hearing, and required corroboration, within the bounds of its discretion and the process due. It points out that the IJ afforded Ms. Rodriguez an opportunity to give an offer of proof and, at any rate, had before it Professor Rothenberg’s affidavit. As for Professor Cassel, the Government argues that his proposed testimony was cumulative and that, if Ms. Rodriguez “believed that further information from Mr. Cassel might have helped her case, the solution was to obtain an affidavit from him.” Respondent’s Br. at 35. Indeed, the Government asserts, the experts could not have assisted Ms. Rodriguez because they had no knowledge about her alleged persecution. “[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993). Due process requires that the applicant be afforded “a meaningful opportunity to be heard,” Nazarova v. INS, 171 F.3d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1999), and a “reasonable opportunity to . . . present evidence on the 18 Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 alien’s behalf,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B). “Although what constitutes ‘a meaningful opportunity to be heard’ is far from clear, we distinguish between two types of situations when analyzing due process challenges.” Kerciku, 314 F.3d at 917. In the first situation, the IJ limits some testimony or frequently interrupts that of the applicant. The IJ does not violate due process by focusing the hearing in this manner to focus the proceedings and exclude relevant evidence. Id. “In the second type of situation, by contrast, the immigration judge violates due process by barring complete chunks of oral testimony that would support the applicant’s claims.” Id. at 918. This categorization, while helpful, is imprecise and the appropriate characterization of the IJ’s action is, in essence, a matter of degree. In the end, we must determine whether, given the totality of circumstances, the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to put on her case. Here, we must conclude that the actions of the IJ, when evaluated in their totality, deprived Ms. Rodriguez of her right to due process. We have reversed IJ determinations when the IJ “took over the questioning, so that in the end the judge, rather than the attorney, had elicited whatever testimony” the applicant offered. Podio v. INS, 153 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Kerciku, 314 F.3d at 918. Our review of the hearing transcript reveals that, in Ms. Rodriguez’ case, the IJ frequently interrupted her testimony and often allowed her counsel to ask no more than a few questions in series. Indeed, at times, the record may be read plausibly as indicating a certain hostility to Ms. Rodriguez. In any event, the frequency and length of the IJ’s interruptions raise significant concern as to whether this questioning was merely attempting to point Ms. Rodriguez in what the IJ Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 19 thought was “the right direction” or to “focus the hearings on relevant matters.” Podio, 153 F.3d at 510 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, at times, the IJ’s questioning clearly assumes the role of counsel for the Government. It goes beyond clarification or simply filling in the interstices of Ms. Rodriguez’ testimony and becomes de facto crossexamination of the witness. If the IJ’s overly active role in the presentation of Ms. Rodriguez’ testimony was our only concern, it would be a fairly close question as to whether there had been a denial of due process. There are, however, other concerns. More troubling than the IJ’s questioning was the strict time limit that the IJ imposed on Ms. Rodriguez, which in turn prevented her from presenting the readily avail- able testimony of Professors Rothenberg and Cassel—the former by telephone, the latter in person. Contrary to the Government’s apparent assertion, we have never required that an expert witness testify to the facts of the particular applicant’s claim. Rather, Ms. Rodriguez tendered the experts to demonstrate that portions of her account were consistent with the practices of the Guatemalan government, and thus to corroborate her testimony. Nothing in the curricula vitae of Professors Rothenberg or Cassel demonstrated that they were unqualified to offer expert evidence, and their testimony undoubtedly would have been helpful to the IJ in determining whether Ms. Rodriguez suffered past persecution. See Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that the “spirit” of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), applies to immigration proceedings). For example, Professor Rothenberg’s testimony was intended to demonstrate that the manners in which Ms. Rodriguez’ husband and uncle were killed were consis20 Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 tent with the practices of Guatemalan security forces. It is possible that this testimony would have alleviated the IJ’s concern that the men were victims of crime rather than of government persecution. Moreover, Ms. Rodriguez asserted that his testimony would demonstrate that the visits by mysterious agents were consistent with the state’s practice of intimidating victims’ spouses. Such testimony may have demonstrated that Mr. Flores’ political opinions had been imputed to his wife. In addition, according to Ms. Rodriguez’ offer of proof, Professor Cassel could demonstrate that the threat to Ms. Rodriguez in Guatemala survived the recent change of government; this testimony, potentially, directly addresses the IJ’s determination that Ms. Rodriguez faced no further threat.9 Indeed, with the benefit of the experts’ testimony, the IJ may have been able to confirm or discount suspicions that led to the denial of her application; for instance, perhaps the experts could indicate whether it is “remarkable that [Guatemalans] payed [sic] such close attention to the license plate numbers.” A.R.1310. The opportunity for the IJ to ask questions and for the experts to answer—an opportunity that the IJ liberally exercised with Ms. Rodriguez—could only have been accomplished with live testimony. Moreover, despite their potential value to adjudicating Ms. Rodriguez’ application, the IJ’s only explanation for not hearing Professor Cassel was the selfimposed time constraint; the IJ offered no explanation for excluding Professor Rothenberg’s telephonic testimony. 9 In her offer of proof, Ms. Rodriguez indicated that Professor Cassel could testify as to the current threat Ms. Rodriguez faced in Guatemala. In this respect, Professor Cassel’s proposed testimony differed from that of Professor Rothenberg. Thus, contrary to the Government’s assertion, Professor Cassel’s testimony was nonduplicative. Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138 21 In short, an evaluation of the record as a whole establishes that Ms. Rodriguez was denied her right to have “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” See Kerciku, 314 F.3d at 918. However, to establish a due process violation, we also require a petitioner to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by the IJ’s actions. See id. We find such prejudice in this case. The proposed expert testimony went to the heart of Ms. Rodriguez’ claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution. In addition, if the testimony presented by Professors Rothenberg and Cassel had corroborated Ms. Rodriguez’ account, the IJ might have reached a different conclusion as to her credibility. The testimony that Ms. Rodriguez sought to introduce “had the potential for affecting the outcome of” the proceedings, and she has established a due process violation. Podio, 153 F.3d at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted). The IJ thus reached a decision based upon an erroneous credibility determination and without the evidence necessary to evaluate Ms. Rodriguez’ application. In such circumstances, we generally require “a new hearing in compliance with due process,” and we therefore remand to give Ms. Rodriguez an opportunity to fully and fairly present her case. Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1993).10 10 Because we remand for a hearing that comports with due process, we need not address Ms. Rodriguez’ motion to reopen or the merits of her asylum claim. On rehearing, Ms. Rodriguez and the Government will have the opportunity to submit argument and evidence concerning the claims of poor health and hardship contained in her motion to reopen. See Uwase v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 2003). 22 Nos. 03-3868 & 04-3138