Opinion ID: 741729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clearly Erroneous Test

Text: 16 To establish an exception to law of the case, Wood must show that Jeffries III was clearly erroneous. It was not. In fact, we find no error at all in Jeffries III. 17 On collateral review, trial errors affecting constitutional rights are subject to a harmless error analysis. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Lee v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 1296, 1298 (9th Cir.1994). Under the Brecht standard, a petitioner must show that the conduct had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. at 1714 (quotation omitted). Where the record is so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error, the error is not harmless and relief should be granted. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435-36, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). 18 Jeffries III held that the introduction of prejudicial information to a juror violated a defendant's right to a fair trial regardless of whether the source of that information was internal (e.g., another juror) or external (e.g., a bailiff). Jeffries IV stated that Jeffries III was incorrect in that the source of the prejudicial information did matter: if the source were internal rather than external, no presumption of prejudice existed. 3 This distinction was new. No prior case in the circuit had so held. 19 Juror knowledge of a defendant's past criminal record has long been recognized to be prejudicial. See United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir.1986) (observing that it is extremely difficult for jurors to ignore prior convictions when deciding guilt), modified, 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir.1986). The possible prejudice is even more likely when the past record is related to the crimes for which the defendant is on trial. United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir.1985) (observing the human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible in law: because he did it before, he must have done it again), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1023, 106 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed.2d 326 (1986); United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 872 (9th Cir.1980) (noting that evidence of past convictions of similar offenses raises the specter of he did it before, he could do it again). 20 Contrary to Wood's position, we find no defensible distinction to be made based solely on the source of the information. Rather, the appropriate focus should be on the nature of the information itself. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury requires the jury verdict to be based on the evidence produced at trial. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 546, 549, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965); United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir.1984). This requirement goes to the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury. Turner, 379 U.S. at 471, 85 S.Ct. at 549. 21 Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to confront those who testify against him or her and the right to conduct cross-examination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 998, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). When a juror communicates objective extrinsic facts regarding the defendant or the alleged crimes to other jurors, the juror becomes an unsworn witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir.1975); United States ex rel. Owen v. McMann, 435 F.2d 813, 817 (2d Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1373, 28 L.Ed.2d 646 (1971). That the unsworn testimony comes from a juror rather than a court official does not diminish the scope of a defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment. See Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that a juror's communication about the defendant's reputation for violence deprived the defendant of his rights to confrontation, cross-examination, and assistance of counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment). 4 22 Jeffries III correctly determined that the extrinsic information alleged to have been imparted here, Jeffries' prior robbery conviction, was especially harmful given the jury's adoption of two special findings that supported the convictions for aggravated first degree murder and the imposition of the death sentences. Jeffries III, 5 F.3d at 1191. 5 The aggravating circumstances warranting the penalty of death were (1) that the murders were committed to conceal the commission of a crime or the identity of a person committing a crime, and (2) the murders were committed as part of a common scheme or plan. The only crime referenced at trial was the crime known in common parlance as robbery; the only common scheme or plan involved the commission of robbery. 6 Thus, the introduction of Jeffries' past robbery conviction to jurors was without question extremely prejudicial. See Dickson, 849 F.2d at 406. 23 We agree with Jeffries III that the communication by its nature was intrinsically prejudicial and necessarily had a substantial and injurious influence on the verdict. Wood argues to the contrary, contending that the jurors engaged in little discussion about the conviction; that the person who made the comment was promptly told by another juror that consideration of the conviction was not permitted; and that two jurors who heard the improper comment stated in affidavits that they did not consider the prior conviction in reaching the verdict. However, these facts do not overcome the inherent prejudice. Jurors' testimony that extrinsic evidence is not harmful is not controlling. United States v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436, 440 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988). The effect of extrinsic prejudicial evidence on a juror's deliberation may be substantial even though it is not perceived by the juror and a juror's good faith cannot counter this effect. United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir.1978) (footnote omitted). Here, at least two jurors had nearly the entire trial to contemplate the impermissible communication. 24 Various factors might nonetheless suggest that the potential prejudice of the extrinsic information was diminished in a particular case and therefore that the extrinsic evidence did not substantially and injuriously affect the verdict. These factors include: whether the prejudicial statement was ambiguously phrased; 7 whether the extraneous information was otherwise admissible or merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial; 8 whether a curative instruction was given or some other step taken to ameliorate the prejudice; 9 the trial context; 10 and whether the statement was insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence in the case. 25 Having considered all of this, we conclude that the Jeffries III decision was not clearly erroneous--indeed that it was correct--and that the extrinsic material had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Lee, 42 F.3d at 1298 (quotation omitted).