Opinion ID: 792305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: It does so indicate.

Text: 125 Q. And then, at that point, there was some kind of conference with your client, Mr. Summerlin? 126 A. It does so indicate. 127 Q. And you had some discussion. At the conclusion of that discussion, Dr. Tatro, the witness, was withdrawn. And your client apparently was informed of his right to call any witnesses in mitigation, and he declined that right? 128 A. It appears from the record that that is the case. The discussion I had with him after Dr. Tatro was called as a witness, I have absolutely no recollection of what took place during that discussion. I wish I can, it might be very enlightening for one side or the other. 129 Summerlin did not testify as to the content of the conversation. As a result, there is no record of what Summerlin said, much less that he instructed his attorney not to present any penalty phase defense whatsoever. Thus, the characterization of this exchange as one of a client directing an attorney not to present a penalty phase defense is not supported by the record. Summerlin spontaneously objected to the presentation of one witness; there is no indication that he was instructing his attorney not to present any mitigating evidence and no aggravation rebuttal. In fact, Summerlin's counsel later clarified that Summerlin wished to rely on Dr. Tatro's earlier evaluation, which had been appended to the presentence report. Summerlin also expressed that he had great faith in Dr. Garcia, a psychiatrist who had examined Summerlin during the pre-trial period, indicating that he might not be adverse to the presentation of mental health evidence at the penalty phase hearing. This type of record is insufficient to establish that Summerlin wished to waive a mitigation defense or prevent the introduction of mental health evidence. See Silva, 279 F.3d at 839-40 (noting that the record did not support the conclusion that Silva precluded counsel from investigating any and all aspects of Silva's background; Silva merely instructed counsel not to call Silva's parents as witnesses during the penalty phase); see also Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 721-22 (9th Cir.2004) (defendant's opposition to calling family members or experts as witnesses does not excuse an attorney from interviewing experts and family members or from investigating documents containing mitigating evidence); cf. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 621-22 (9th Cir.2004) (the district court expressly found that Williams instructed counsel not to call any witness at the penalty phase, rejecting Williams's contention that he had merely instructed counsel not to call his parents). 130 However, even if Summerlin had instructed counsel not to present a mitigation defense, that fact would have no effect on the deficient conduct prong of Strickland because counsel had already demonstrated ineffectiveness by failing to thoroughly investigate the existence of mitigating factors. Although the allocation of control between attorney and client typically dictates that the client decides the `ends' of the lawsuit while the attorney controls the `means,' Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L.Rev. 315, 318 (1987), it does not relieve an attorney of the duty to investigate potential defenses, consult with the client, and provide advice as to the risks and potential consequences of any fundamental trial decision within the client's control. 131 This is especially true in capital cases, wherein the attorney defending the accused has the duty to render extraordinary efforts. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-1.2(c). These efforts include the duty to develop a plan for seeking to avoid the death penalty and to achieve the least restrictive and burdensome sentencing alternative which can reasonably be obtained. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 11.8.2 (1989). The defense attorney must explain developments in the case to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 4-3.8(a). For these reasons, a lawyer who abandons investigation into mitigating evidence in a capital case at the direction of his client must at least have adequately informed his client of the potential consequences of that decision and must be assured that his client has made [an] `informed and knowing' judgment. Silva, 279 F.3d at 838 (citing Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1198 (9th Cir.1993)); cf. Williams, 384 F.3d at 622-23 (noting that counsel reasonably investigated potential mitigating evidence and adequately conferred with Williams regarding what penalty phase defense might be presented). Further, a lawyer's duty to investigate is virtually absolute, regardless of a client's expressed wishes. Silva, 279 F.3d at 840 (citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, cmt. at 4-5.5 (2d ed.1980)); see also Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1089-90. 132 Under circumstances similar to the case at hand, we have concluded that the attorney's performance was constitutionally inadequate. In Silva, for example, the defendant had expressly instructed his attorney not to call his parents as witnesses. We concluded that this could not be construed as supporting an inference that he did not wish his family background to be investigated. Silva, 279 F.3d at 839. Further, in Silva, as in this case, the attorney did not ma[ke] a serious attempt to educate [the defendant] about the consequences of his decision. Id. at 841. We held that such conduct was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances and again amounted to deficient performance. . . . Id. Further, we concluded that, even when faced with client directives limiting the scope of defense, an attorney must conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client. Id. at 846 (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456-57 (9th Cir.1994)). [I]f a client forecloses certain avenues of investigation, it arguably becomes even more incumbent upon trial counsel to seek out and find alternative sources of information and evidence, especially in the context of a capital murder trial. Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1086 (quoting Silva, 279 F.3d at 847). Summerlin's attorney did none of this. 133 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this duty, even when the capital defendant is uninterested in helping and even actively obstructive to developing a mitigation defense. Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2462. Similarly, we have rejected the theory that a criminal defendant's instructions reduce an attorney's professional obligations even when the defendant attempts to curtail certain potential avenues of defense. Douglas, 316 F.3d at 1086; Silva, 279 F.3d at 838. 134 In the capital case context, there are additional due process concerns. A defendant's waiver must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990). This standard does not only mean that the defendant's waiver must be an informed decision, but also that it must be a competent one. If a client has elected to forego legal proceedings that could avert the imposition of the death penalty, then a court must make the determination whether he has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 314, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966). That decision must be made in the present posture of things, id., that is, a determination of capacity at the time of the decision to forego legal proceedings. 135 When all of these conditions have been met, we have sustained a criminal defendant's decision to limit a mitigation defense. See, e.g., Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1198. When the conditions have not been satisfied, we have not. See, e.g., Silva, 279 F.3d at 838. 1 136 Applying these principles to the case at hand, we can easily determine that Summerlin's attorney's decision not to present mitigation evidence cannot be excused by his client's apparently spontaneous objection to certain testimony at the penalty phase hearing. First, as we have discussed, Summerlin's attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation. Second, he did not consult with his client at all prior to the penalty phase hearing, much less provide the advice necessary for the client to provide informed consent to forego a mitigation defense. Third, the decision regarding which witnesses were to be called rested with Summerlin's attorney, not Summerlin. Fourth, the record does not support the conclusion that Summerlin's spontaneous reaction constituted an unequivocal direction not to conduct any penalty phase defense. Fifth, because the failure to provide a mitigation defense amounted to a concession that the death penalty should be imposed in this case, the court was obligated to make sure that this was a competent, voluntary, intelligent, informed, and knowing decision. Indeed, because the consequences were so dire— Arizona law mandated a penalty of death in this situation without the presentation of mitigating evidence—a showing that Summerlin's decision was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was required. Cf. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164, 110 S.Ct. 1717. In sum, Summerlin's spontaneous outburst cannot serve to excuse Summerlin's attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase hearing. D 137 Although we have concluded that Summerlin's attorney rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in investigating, developing, and preparing the penalty phase presentation of this capital case, that alone is not enough to justify habeas relief. Summerlin must also show that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance. Under Strickland, this means that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. Here, the evidence of prejudice is more than ample. 138 First, the failure to present a mitigation defense all but assured the imposition of a death sentence under Arizona law. At the time, Arizona law mandated the death penalty when the defendant had a qualifying prior conviction if there was no mitigating evidence. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703. Although Summerlin only had one prior conviction, the road rage aggravated felony conviction, it qualified as a dangerous felony. Without mitigating evidence, a death sentence was virtually assured. See Evans v. Lewis, 855 F.2d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir.1988) (noting that in Arizona, once an aggravating circumstance like a prior aggravated felony was found, death was inevitable without mitigating evidence, and thus holding that the failure to pursue psychiatric evidence constituted prejudicially deficient performance); see also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1268, 1270 (9th Cir.1998) (stating that in light of Arizona's statute, counsel's few asthenic comments at sentencing amounted to a virtual admission that the death penalty should be imposed upon his client). 139 Second, this was not by any means a clear-cut death penalty case. The initial, very experienced, prosecutor did not believe he could succeed in obtaining a death sentence given the facts and applicable law. Indeed, the prosecutor assented to an extremely favorable plea agreement. Under the proposed plea agreement, Summerlin was to enter an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), which enabled him, without admitting guilt, to plead guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated assault and to be sentenced accordingly. The agreement stipulated that Summerlin would be sentenced to twenty-one years in prison for the murder of Ms. Bailey, of which he would be required to serve fourteen. The agreement was subject to court approval. If the court rejected the stipulated sentence, Summerlin could either (1) allow his plea to stand and be sentenced to a term of up to thirty-eight-and-one-half years, according to the court's sole discretion, or (2) withdraw his plea of guilty and have the matters proceed to trial and disposition. 140 This plea agreement was withdrawn after Summerlin's initial attorney and the prosecuting attorney were replaced. However, it is indicative of the fact that this was not a clear-cut capital case. 141 Third, a measure of assessing prejudice in a capital penalty phase proceeding is to reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. In doing so, we must bear in mind the Supreme Court's observation in this case that Arizona law required proof of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. at 2522 n. 1 (citing State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 614 P.2d 825, 828 (1980)). 142 In this case, there were only two aggravating circumstances relied upon by the sentencing judge. The judge based his decision as to aggravating circumstances on two statutory grounds: (1) that the defendant had a prior felony conviction involving the use or threatened use of violence on another person, Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-703(F)(2) (1981) (later amended in 1993); and (2) that Summerlin committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, id. § 13-703(F)(6). The sentencing judge found no mitigating circumstances. 143 Significant mitigating circumstances surrounded Summerlin's aggravated assault conviction. However, they were not presented to the sentencing judge. Summerlin did not have any other significant criminal history; this fact was also not presented at the penalty phase. 144 Counsel's failure to present evidence mitigating the prior conviction aggravator is particularly significant. Notably, the State's evidence in support of the only other statutory aggravating factor urged by the State—that Summerlin committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner—was not particularly strong. The Arizona Supreme Court has noted that these are admittedly broad subjective terms. State v. Vickers, 159 Ariz. 532, 768 P.2d 1177, 1188 n. 2 (1989). The assessment of whether a crime is heinous depends on the mental state and attitude of the perpetrator as reflected in his words and actions. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983) (citations omitted). Thus, proof of premeditation is especially important in determining whether the statutory aggravator has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 145 The basis of the State's premeditation theory was not that Summerlin had planned the crime; in fact, the State never contended that he did. Rather, the State's theory was that he formed the required premeditation almost instantaneously during the commission of the crime. Although instantaneous premeditation may suffice for establishing premeditation for the underlying conviction under Arizona law, see State v. Neal, 143 Ariz. 93, 692 P.2d 272, 276 (1984) (noting that the length of time could have been as instantaneous as it takes to form successive thoughts in the mind), instantaneous premeditation is not definitive for the purpose of establishing the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravator. The State relied on the facts of the crime to support the especially heinous, cruel, or depraved aggravator. The strong psychiatric evidence of Summerlin's lack of impulse and emotional control and organic brain dysfunction could have provided significant mitigating evidence countering the State's circumstantial evidence that the crime was committed in an especially heinous manner. In sum, the evidence underlying the aggravating factors was not strong, particularly when measured against the requirement that aggravating factors be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 146 In contrast, examining the available mitigating evidence that the Supreme Court has identified as significant, Summerlin's potential case in mitigation was strong. He had a compelling childhood history of physical and mental abuse: deserted by his father who was later killed in a police shoot-out; locked repeatedly in an ammonia-fumed room by his mother; and subjected to electroshock at his mother's insistence. He had learning disabilities, to the point of being considered functionally mentally retarded. He was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic and treated with anti-psychotic medications. He was also diagnosed as having an explosive personality disorder with impaired impulse control. One psychiatrist found indications of organic brain impairment, borderline personality disorder, and paranoid personality disorder. In his opinion, Summerlin is deeply emotionally and mentally disturbed, unaware of the motives underlying much of his behavior, and unable, because of his problems, to exercise normal restraint and control, once his highly unstable and volatile emotions are aroused. All of this was not only highly relevant as general mitigation, but was also evidence that could directly counter the other aggravating factor urged by the State, namely that the crime had been committed in a `heinous, cruel, or depraved manner,' in the balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors by the trial court. 147 The State suggests that no prejudice occurred because all of the mitigating evidence was contained in Dr. Tatro's letter attached to the presentence report. However, the report cited by the State was not a psychiatric evaluation prepared for the penalty phase. It was a letter from Tatro to Summerlin's former attorney that pre-dated the initial trial. The purpose of the evaluation at that stage, and the focus of the letter, was to determine whether Summerlin was competent to stand trial and whether a potential insanity defense was available. Tatro's conclusion was that no guilt phase defense was available under the M'Naghten test, which had been adopted by Arizona as the sole standard for criminal responsibility. State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982). To sustain a defense of legal insanity under the test, [a]n accused must have had at the time of the commission of the criminal act: (1) Such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act, or (2) If he did know, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. State v. Christensen, 129 Ariz. 32, 628 P.2d 580, 583 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). These considerations are far different from those involved in a penalty phase mitigation defense. We have cautioned that in presenting a penalty phase mitigation defense based on mental health, counsel should not merely rely on competency evaluations conducted at the guilt phase, which are prepared for a different purpose. Bean, 163 F.3d at 1078-79 (concluding that defense counsel was not reasonable to rely at penalty upon mental health evidence previously amassed for competency challenge); see also Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1043-44 (stating that investigation of mental health evidence for guilt phase does not excuse failure to develop mental health mitigation evidence for penalty phase). 148 Dr. Tatro was a psychologist, not a psychiatrist or a neurologist. As a result, it is perhaps understandable that Dr. Tatro's letter did not discuss a key mental health defense, namely that of psychomotor epilepsy. The evidence of psychomotor epilepsy was available to Summerlin's counsel, but he did not pursue it. For example, Dr. Leonardo Garcia-Brunuel, a psychiatrist who examined Summerlin in the early stages of the case, was prepared to testify that Summerlin had a temporal lobe seizure disorder and had a psychomotor seizure when he committed the murder. Dr. Garcia testified that this may have caused uncontrollable behavior. Other psychiatrists, who were available to Summerlin's attorney at the time, testified that they had not tested Summerlin for this condition, but if the diagnosis were correct, a psychomotor seizure would have strongly affected Summerlin's ability to control his actions after the onset of the seizure. This is significant mitigation testimony that was available to Summerlin's attorney but not presented in Tatro's competency letter. Further, Dr. Tuchler, one of Summerlin's other examining physicians, conceded at the state habeas evidentiary hearing that based on material that has been brought up subsequently, he believed that there may have been a complete loss of impulse control that affected Summerlin's ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Therefore, the notion that the Tatro letter presented a complete view of available mitigating factors is not correct. 149 When considered in the aggregate, the available mitigating evidence in this case is far more compelling than the evidence the Supreme Court held adequate to establish prejudice in Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534-38, 123 S.Ct. 2527. As the Supreme Court noted, [h]ad the jury been able to place petitioner's excruciating life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance. Id. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Although, for the purposes of resolving this issue, we evaluate prejudice in the context of judge-sentencing, the result is the same. The fact that Summerlin's counsel did not present evidence to mitigate the aggravated assault special circumstance, nor evidence to mitigate the alleged heinous, cruel, or depraved manner in which the crime was committed, undermines our confidence in the court's imposition of a death sentence, particularly since the State was required to prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, we conclude that the failure of trial counsel to investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase hearing has undermined our confidence in the sentence of death imposed by the trial judge. Had an adequate mitigation defense been presented, there is a reasonable probability that an objective sentencing factfinder would have struck a different balance. Id.; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (noting that a reasonable probability of a different result is less than the preponderance more-likely-than-not standard); Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2469 ([A]lthough we suppose that [the sentencer] could have heard it all and still have decided on the death penalty, that is not the test.). We therefore hold that Summerlin has established prejudice under the standards articulated in Strickland. He is entitled to habeas corpus relief. III 150 We have previously affirmed Summerlin's conviction. We reverse the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus as to the penalty phase and remand with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus as to the sentence unless the State begins resentencing proceedings within a reasonable time to be determined by the district court. Given our resolution of these issues, it is unnecessary to reach the other questions raised by Summerlin on appeal. 151 REVERSED AND REMANDED.