Opinion ID: 2382352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Collins/ComTech Duty of Care

Text: [¶ 9] Rice first argues that it was error for the district court to find as a matter of law that Appellees Collins and ComTech owed no duty of care to Rice in operating and maintaining an emergency communications system for Campbell County, when the failure of that system delayed the fire department's response to the fire that led to the destruction of Rice's building and property. [¶ 10] In order to maintain a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: 1) The defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care; 2) the defendant breached the duty; and 3) the defendant's breach was the proximate cause of injury or loss to the plaintiff. Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo. 2002). The existence and scope of a duty are questions of law for the court. Absent a duty, there is no actionable claim of negligence. Additionally, absent evidence that the defendant breached the duty by failing to exercise reasonable care, a claim of negligence is not sustainable. Id. A duty of care may arise by contract, statute, common law, or when the relationship of the parties is such that the law imposes an obligation on the defendant to act reasonably for the protection of the plaintiff. Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo.1995). [¶ 11] We begin with Rice's claim that Collins and ComTech owed him a duty of care based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Restatement contains the following provision: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 324(A) (1965). We have adopted this Restatement view of voluntary undertakings in the Good Samaritan context. See Berry v. Tessman, 2007 WY 175, ¶ 13, 170 P.3d 1243, 1246 (Wyo. 2007) (visitor Tessman tripped and fell into a naturally occurring marmot hole at a campground; because campground owner Berry had not undertaken to fix or free the area of marmot holes, there was no duty); Andersen, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011 at 1014. [¶ 12] Although this Court has adopted the Restatement as it applies to Good Samaritans, to do so in this case would be wholly outside of that context. Here, under Rice's argument, a private corporation doing business with a government entity would owe a duty to a private citizen. The Restatement does not contemplate that sort of expansion. [F]or purposes of liability under ... [section] 324A, it must be demonstrated that the services rendered either increased the risk of harm to the third party or consisted of the performance of a duty owed by the other party to the involved third party, or that the harm resulted from the third party's reliance upon the service renderer's performance. May Dep't Stores Co. v. University Hills, Inc., 789 P.2d 434, 441 (Colo.Ct.App.1989). The Restatement of Torts (Second) 324(a) only refers to a duty to avoid physical harm to a third person or his things; it does not include language expanding the duty to infliction of intangible harm to property rights. Braick v. Faxton-St. Luke's Healthcare, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 51595U, 2, 2004 WL 2903625 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2004) (emphasis added). [¶ 13] In this case, both Collins and ComTech were merely supplying services at the request of the county. Thus, the Restatement does not impose liability. However, that conclusion does not end our inquiry as to the question of duty. Rice also contends that the eight-factor test, when applied, determines that a duty existed. The eight factors utilized to determine the existence of a duty are: (1) The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, (5) the policy of preventing future harm, (6) the extent of the burden upon the defendant, (7) the consequence to the community and the court system, and (8) the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Berry, ¶ 8, 170 P.3d at 1245 (citing Mostert v. CBL & Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Wyo. 1987)). The court may also consider the magnitude of the risk involved in defendant's conduct, the burden of requiring defendant to guard against that risk and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant. Sponsel v. Park County, 2006 WY 6, ¶ 18, 126 P.3d 105, 110 (Wyo. 2006). [¶ 14] In its decision letter, the district court outlined the eight factors and concluded as follows in relation to them: 1. While the failure of such communication equipment causing a delay in the response of emergency services could have been foreseeable, it cannot be established that the delay contributed to [Rice's] harm. 2. The degree of closeness between the conduct of Defendants Collins and ComTech and the injury suffered is small. Three of the four repeaters in the County emergency communications systems were fully functional, and it cannot be conclusively established that the delay in response time contributed to [Rice's] harm. 3. While it is clear [Rice] suffered harm, it cannot be established that the Defendants' actions caused that harm. 4. Moral blame cannot be attached to the Defendants for failure in equipment used in the normal course of business and properly maintained. 5. While preventing future harm is always a concern for the court, imposing a duty of this magnitude upon those who provide service and equipment to emergency communication systems would ultimately hinder the ability of county governments to acquire such services. 6. Holding the Defendants responsible for the failure of communication equipment in this case would impose an unreasonably heavy burden on the Defendant. 7. The consequences to the community and court would be high as costs for the maintenance of emergency communication systems would increase and the likelihood of lawsuits would also increase. 8. Fire insurance is easily acquired and relatively inexpensive compared to the benefit. [Rice] could have been compensated for his damages through those means. We are in agreement with the district court. While we do not see a need to expound on the district court's sound reasoning as to every factor, we would like to address factors one and two in greater detail. We believe factors one and two, the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff and the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, are the crux of the issue in front of us. Our caselaw is instructive on these two factors. We have stated that summary judgment is proper when the causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's damage is almost entirely subject to conjecture and speculation. De Wald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 651 (Wyo.1986). [4] With respect to Collins' and ComTech's conduct in the instant case, it cannot be stated that the fire on Rice's property, and the resulting damage, was either's fault. After reviewing the record on appeal, we conclude that neither Collins nor ComTech owed Rice a duty of care.