Opinion ID: 1713041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: hyde

Text: Plaintiff Marcia Hyde was treated at the University of Michigan Hospital on July 8, 1974. On June 28, 1976, plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit in the Court of Claims, alleging that the hospital employees' negligent diagnoses and medical treatment caused Ms. Hyde to develop a serious post-surgical infection. Defendant Board of Regents asserted governmental immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer. Following a pretrial conference, a pretrial summary was filed on March 30, 1977. The summary indicated that the trial court had given plaintiffs permission to amend their pleadings to allege that the injury had arisen out of the performance of a proprietary function. [2] Further proceedings apparently were held in abeyance pending this Court's decision in Parker. After Parker was decided, defendant moved for accelerated judgment in April, 1979. Although Parker had held that public general hospitals are not immune from tort liability, defendant argued that this holding should not be given retroactive effect. Before a decision was rendered, this precise issue was resolved by Murray v Beyer Memorial Hospital, 409 Mich 217; 293 NW2d 341 (1980). Murray held that Parker was to be applied to all cases pending on December 27, 1978, in which an express challenge to governmental immunity had been made and preserved. Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint alleging that defendant had been engaged in a proprietary function until October 29, 1982. Defendant moved again for accelerated judgment, claiming that plaintiffs had not made or preserved an express challenge to its governmental immunity until the amended complaint was filed. Since the filing occurred long after Parker was decided, defendant argued that Parker was inapplicable. Plaintiffs countered that they had expressly challenged defendant's immunity prior to Parker at the pretrial conference and the challenge had been preserved by the pretrial summary. The trial court accepted defendant's argument and entered a judgment for defendant in an order filed February 9, 1983. A majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed. [3] Plaintiffs' application for leave to appeal was pending in this Court when Ross was issued. We thereafter granted leave to appeal. 424 Mich 858 (1985).