Opinion ID: 2630723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Judge Err in Finding an Implied Easement from Prior Use?

Text: A trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 55 P.3d 304 (2002); Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a). When deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court. Id. It is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. On appeal, this Court examines the record to see if challenged findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Id. In order to establish an implied easement by prior use, the party asserting the easement must prove three elements: (1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). There is no dispute regarding the first two elements. The dispute centers solely upon the district judge's finding that the easement across Madsen's property was reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of Thomas's property. Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior use. Id. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Id. Because the implied easement from prior use is created at the time of severance, the issue of reasonable necessity is based upon the circumstances that existed at that time. Id. A later change in circumstances is not relevant to the creation of the easement. Id. The parcel now owned by Madsen was severed from Thomas's property by a gift deed dated August 5, 1996. [2] The dirt driveway had been used continuously for almost 100 years. Thomas testified that the driveway has been in existence since 1898 and that it had been used to access the red brick house since 1900 when the house was moved onto the property. The driveway adjoined a parking area on the west side of the red brick house, where the house's main entrance was. The driveway was also the sole access to the feedlot, to various outbuildings, and to the adjoining farmland. It was used as needed, including for driving farm equipment to and from the field; for trucks hauling hay, corn, and silage; and for delivering fuel to the red brick house. At the time of severance, Thomas was using the road at least twice a day to access his feedlot, and the red brick house was occupied by Dale Roy and his wife. Thomas's use of the dirt driveway was apparent. As the district judge found, It is obvious to anyone going on the property of Madsen that the driveway provides access to the red brick house and Thomas' feed yard, stack yard, outbuildings and field. It is obvious from the facts of this case that Thomas intended the driveway to be permanent. He testified that the driveway had been maintained as long as he could remember (he was age 74 at the time of trial), and since 1953 he had been maintaining it by spreading loads of gravel on it. When the parcel now owned by Madsen was severed in 1996, Thomas did not alter his use of the driveway, nor did he cease maintaining it. Madsen argues that part of Thomas's property borders the public highway and therefore it was not landlocked. He could have simply built another access road. Because an implied easement from prior use requires only reasonable necessity, not great present necessity, there is no requirement that the dominant estate be landlocked. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 991 P.2d 362 (1999). Thomas testified that because of the wet conditions in his adjoining field much of the year, he would have to build quite a foundation for a new road. The district judge found that constructing a road of the same quality would require considerable expense and time. The district judge viewed the premises and therefore had the advantage of correlating the evidence to the actual situation on the ground. It was for him to balance the respective convenience, inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts. Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 215 P.2d 812 (1950). [3] The district judge's finding that Thomas's claimed easement was reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of his property is supported by substantial and competent evidence. We therefore affirm the finding that Thomas has an implied easement by prior use.