Opinion ID: 563891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The ALJ's Findings Regarding Edwards' Physical Condition

Text: 15 Claimant Edwards argues that the ALJ erred in not accepting Doctor Edwards' professional assessment that she should be restricted to part-time hours. This assessment, according to the claimant, was not opposed by any of the other doctors involved in the case and, in any event, could not have been rebutted by the opinions of consulting doctors because Doctor Edwards was her treating physician. 16 It is true that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to substantial weight unless good cause exists for not heeding the treating physician's diagnosis. E.g., Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961-62 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Here, however, good cause did exist to justify the ALJ's decision not to rely on Doctor Edwards' findings. First, Doctor Edwards' statement that Claimant Edwards was restricted to a four (4) hour work day contains no clinical data or information to support his opinion. The treating physician's report may be discounted when it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence or is wholly conclusory. Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir.1987). Second, approximately one week after limiting Claimant Edwards to four hours of work per day, Doctor Edwards' clinical notes indicate that he thought it appropriate that she return to work; however, these same clinical notes do not impose or suggest any limitation on the number of hours she could work. This casts doubt on Claimant Edwards' need to be limited to part-time hours; either such a limitation was not medically required in the first instance, or her condition (or Doctor Edwards' assessment of her condition) changed. Finally, approximately one week prior to suggesting part-time hours, Doctor Edwards candidly conceded that he was not sure that he could objectively assess Claimant Edwards' condition. If a treating physician is unsure of the accuracy of his findings and statements, there is certainly no legal obligation for the ALJ to defer to the treating physician's report. 17 Edwards next complains that the ALJ should have accepted her testimony about her pain because she had a good work history. However, Congress has set forth the conditions under which a claimant's complaints of pain may establish the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 423(d)(5)(A). This court has previously examined this section and ruled that a claimant must produce evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir.1986). Edwards has met the first requirement by producing evidence of an underlying medical condition. However, the ALJ determined that there were no clinical findings indicative of a back impairment of the degree of severity described by [Edwards]. Having reviewed the record as Landry requires, we hold that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion. Id. at 1553. 3 Consequently, Edwards has failed to meet either of the two conditions that would satisfy the second part of this test, and the ALJ was thus not required to grant Edwards benefits based on her complaints of pain. 18 Edwards also contends that the Secretary's prior finding of disability (from 1974 to 1977) is binding on the Secretary in the current application for benefits. The simple answer to this argument is that, from 1979 until 1985, Edwards was employed and earned income in excess of the earning guidelines used to determine whether an individual has engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1574(b)(2) (1986). Her ability to engage in substantial gainful activity meant that her prior disability had ceased, and thus is not binding on the Secretary in this second application for benefits. 19