Opinion ID: 3046981
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is CDM a proper defendant?

Text: In a claim for wrongful denial of benefits under ERISA, the proper defendant is the plan itself or a person who controls the administration of benefits under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). Evans argues that CDM shared discretionary authority with MetLife to interpret the Plan, determine eligibility for benefits, and make claims decisions. CDM says that it had no such authority, and therefore cannot be subject to liability. The District Court held that CDM was not a proper defendant. Evans points to two sections of the Plan to support her position that CDM is a proper defendant: first, the “Statement of ERISA Rights,” which says “You have the right to have the Plan administrator review and reconsider your claim.” (App. 110.) Another section of the Plan says that “[i]n carrying out their respective responsibilities 3 under the Plan, the Plan administrator and other Plan fiduciaries shall have discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Plan and to determine eligibility for and entitlement to Plan benefits in accordance with the terms of the Plan.” (App. 109.) In the ERISA information section, CDM is listed under “Name and Address of Employer and Plan Administrator.” This, Evans argues, shows that CDM is a plan administrator and a proper defendant. CDM points out that the Plan specifically delegates to MetLife the discretion to determine eligibility for benefits: “MetLife in its discretion has authority to interpret the terms, conditions, and provisions of the entire contract.” (App. 86.) It argues that the Statement of ERISA Rights is a generic statement required by federal law, and not a substantive contract provision. See Cruthis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 356 F.3d 816, 818 (7th Cir. 2004). CDM also points out that the “respective responsibilities” portion of the discretionary authority section does not support Evans’s contention that CDM determines eligibility for benefits. Exercising control over the administration of benefits is the defining feature of the proper defendant under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and Evans has not shown that CDM has any authority or responsibility for administering benefits under the Plan. The use of CDM’s address in the contact information for “Employer and Plan Administrator” does not show that CDM has discretion to determine eligibility. See Curcio v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 4 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1988) (“Unless an employer is shown to control administration of a plan, it is not a proper party defendant in an action concerning benefits.”). The Plan’s language makes it clear that MetLife, not CDM, has discretion to interpret the contract’s terms. Evans is correct that the Plan does not specifically give MetLife exclusive discretion, but she has presented no evidence that CDM had any role in benefits determinations. Indeed, her communications about the Plan during the period she was seeking disability benefits were directed toward MetLife, not CDM. CDM was not responsible for administering benefits or determining eligibility, and therefore is not a proper defendant. We will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to CDM.