Opinion ID: 1614325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: motions regarding dna report

Text: ¶ 8. The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a discovery violation is abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 891 So.2d 179, 182 (Miss.2004). Further, this Court has stated not all failures to disclose exculpatory evidence constitute reversible error. Carr v. State, 873 So.2d 991, 999-1000 (Miss.2004). The question to be asked regarding a discovery violation is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different but for the governmental evidentiary suppression which undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Stephens v. State, 911 So.2d 424, 440 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). ¶ 9. Curry argues the State's failure to disclose the September 18, 2003, [1] DNA report until the first day of the fourth trial on June 7, 2004, was prejudicial. He asserts that the trial judge's denial of his motions for a continuance and/or a mistrial, was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, Curry contends the State violated Rule 9.04 [2] of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules, and this violation deprived him of a valuable defense. The rule states in relevant part: A. . . . the prosecution must disclose to each defendant or to defendant's attorney . . . the following [evidence] which is in possession, custody, or control of the State . . . the existence of which is known or by exercise of due diligence may become known to the prosecution: . . . 4. Any reports, statements, or opinions of experts, written, recorded or otherwise preserved, made in connection with the particular case. . . . 6. Any exculpatory material concerning the defendant. . . . E. Both the state and the defendant have a duty to timely supplement discovery. If, subsequent to compliance with these rules or orders pursuant thereto, a party discovers additional material or information which is subject to disclosure, that party shall promptly notify the other party or the other party's attorney of the existence of such additional material, and if the additional material or information is discovered during trial, the court shall also be notified. . . . I. If at anytime prior to trial it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such a party to permit the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such order as it deems just under the circumstances. U.C.C.C.R. 9.04. Curry argues the DNA report was exculpatory because it indicated the blood found on the knife recovered from Curry's residence was his, not Cummins's. ¶ 10. The trial judge, in accordance with the discretion granted him in U.C.C.C.R. 9.04, denied Curry's motions because the Reliagene report contained no new information, because Curry already possessed the exact same information from the Mississippi Crime Lab. The evidence was reanalyzed by Reliagene because the prosecution hoped for a more detailed analysis. However, that did not happen. According to Curry, had he possessed the Reliagene report he would have called the Reliagene analyst to the stand. He was not interested in calling the Mississippi Crime Lab analyst, preferring to call Reliagene because it is an private entity, separate from the State of Mississippi. Since the information in the report was duplicative, we decline to find reversible error on this issue. We do, however, caution prosecutors that when they choose not to disclose such evidence, they do so at their own peril. The final determination as to what constitutes exculpatory evidence is made by the court, not the prosecutor. In a situation such as this, there is no good reason why the new report was not given to the defendant, pursuant to Rule 9.04 E. ¶ 11. Curry's attorney questioned Officer Bingham about the Mississippi Crime Lab and Reliagene test results, and the jury heard Bingham say the tests revealed that the knife found at Curry's residence did not have Cummins blood on it. Even though the Reliagene report itself was not admitted into evidence, the substance of its conclusion was before the jury. Curry failed to show he was prejudiced by not possessing the Reliagene report until the first day of the fourth trial, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying Curry's motion for a new trial and motion for a continuance. ¶ 12. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the United States Supreme Court said [w]e now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (emphasis added). Curry did make a discovery request to the State for all reports, but the Reliagene evidence was immaterial because Curry already possessed precisely the same information. Therefore, the Brady rule has not been violated in this case. We find Curry's first assignment of error without merit.