Opinion ID: 2637056
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of evidence of lie detector test

Text: Defendant contends the trial court denied him due process by ruling, on the prosecutor's motion in limine, that he could not mention he had taken, or was willing to take, a lie detector test. [8] Although defendant acknowledges that the results of such tests are inadmissible to prove or disprove a charge of murder or to attack or bolster a witness's credibility (Evid.Code, ง 351.1, subd. (a) [Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence in any criminal proceeding, ... unless all parties stipulate to the admission of such results]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 763-764, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267, overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232-238, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512; People v. Adams (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 109, 115-118, 125 Cal.Rptr. 518), he contends these principles have no application here. Defendant first argues that Evidence Code section 351.1 is inapplicable here, but he cites no authority for the proposition that the penalty phase of a capital trial is not a criminal proceeding within the meaning of the statute. Defendant essentially contends that the penalty phase involves only normative decisionmaking, not the determination of the truth or falsity of evidence, and that the policies dictating exclusion of polygraph results have no application here. We disagree. The truth or falsity of the Wanda B. incident was hotly disputed during defendant's penalty trial, and even with respect to character and background evidence commonly admitted in penalty trials, assessments of credibility are an inescapable part of the trier of fact's duty. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, the rationale behind the statuteโensuring the continuation of the long-standing rule of exclusion for evidence not established as scientifically reliable (see Review of Selected 1983 Cal. Legislation (1984) 15 Pacific L.J. 588, 589)โappears fully applicable to the sentencing phase of his trial. Alternatively, assuming the applicability of Evidence Code section 351.1, defendant contends due process nevertheless requires the admission of polygraph results as mitigating evidence under the rule of Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1. He urges such evidence would be relevant not to determining his guilt or credibility, but to demonstrating his reduced moral culpability, i.e., that he is mentally ill and delusional. We note, preliminarily, that in the trial court defendant made no offer of proof that polygraph tests would be relevant to establish his reduced moral culpability or that he was mentally ill or delusional. (See Evid.Code, ง 354, subd. (a) [no reversal of judgment for erroneous exclusion of evidence unless error resulted in a miscarriage of justice and [t]he substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means].) Assuming, for argument's sake, that defendant's omission should not result in a waiver of his claim, in the absence of any showing in the record that polygraph tests do provide reliable evidence bearing on moral culpability, we must in any event reject it. As defendant has provided only unsupported assertions in this regard, he fails to demonstrate that the trial court's ruling was erroneous or denied him due process.