Opinion ID: 3133690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The History of DBCP Litigation

Text: This case involves dibromochloropropane (“DBCP”), a powerful nematocide, or nematode worm killer. The Ninth Circuit described DBCP as follows: Tough on pests, it’s no friend to humans either. Absorbed by the skin or inhaled, it’s alleged to cause sterility, testicular atrophy, miscarriages, liver damage, cancer and other ailments that you wouldn’t wish on anyone. Originally manufactured by Dow Chemical and Shell Oil, the pesticide was banned from general use in the United States by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1979. But the chemical companies continued to distribute it to fruit companies in developing nations. Patrickson v. Dole Fruit Co., Inc., 251 F.3d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 2001). Although much of the following history of the multi- 1 The Honorable Gary W.B. Chang presided. 3  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  jurisdictional DBCP litigation is not contained in the record, it has been extensively chronicled in published (and unpublished) opinions from other jurisdictions. The instant case “represents one front in a broad litigation war between these plaintiffs’ lawyers and these defendants.” Id. 1. Carcamo and Delgado: The DBCP War Begins in Texas The war began in August 1993, when “a putative class action, Jorge Carcamo v. Shell Oil Co., was filed in the District Court of Brazoria County, a state court in Texas. The action . . . defined the putative class as ‘[a]ll persons exposed to DBCP, or DBCP-containing products . . . between 1965 and 1990.’” Chaverri v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 896 F.Supp.2d 556, 560 (E.D.La. 2012)(footnote omitted; first ellipsis added; second ellipsis in original. On March 29, 1994, the Carcamo plaintiffs moved for class certification. Id. Before the Texas state court could hear the motion, however, the Carcamo defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (“Texas district court”). Id. The statutory basis for removal was the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), as there were defendants impleaded into the case who were purportedly owned by the State of Israel. Id.; see also Marquiniz v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 2014 WL 2197621,  (D. Del. May 27, 2014). 4  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  After removal, the Texas district court consolidated Carcamo with another DBCP case, Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., originally filed in Galveston County (collectively, the “Carcamo/Delgado case”). Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 560; Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 231 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2000). The Carcamo/Delgado defendants moved to enjoin any further DBCP litigation anywhere in the United States. Canales Blanco v. Amvac Chemical Corp., 2012 WL 3194412,  (Del.Super. Aug. 8, 2012). 2. Abarca: Posturing in Florida Fearing that the Texas district court would grant the Carcamo/Delgado defendants’ motion for an injunction against any further DBCP litigation anywhere else in the United States, the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs filed, on June 9, 1995, a class action lawsuit entitled Abarca v. CNK Disposition Corporation, on behalf of 3000 individuals, in Florida state court. Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 562 & 562 n.14. The Abarca plaintiffs never served their Complaint. 896 F.Supp.2d at 562 n.14. In its order dated July 11, 1995 (discussed in greater detail in the next section), the Texas district court entered a narrower injunction than the defendants originally sought, enjoining only the Delgado named plaintiffs from filing any further DBCP complaints in the United States. Canales Blanco, 2012 WL 3194412 at ; Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 562 n.14. 5  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Therefore, the Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs, “no longer fearing the broad injunction defendants had requested and prior to them being served, voluntarily dismissed Abarca on July 12, 1995.” Canales Blanco, 2012 WL 3194412 at . 3. The War Continues in Texas This brief interlude in Florida thus concluded, the war continued in Texas. In addition to moving for an injunction against United States DBCP filings, the Carcamo/Delgado defendants had also moved to dismiss the complaints for forum non conveniens (“f.n.c.”). Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 560. The Texas district court granted the motion in its “Memorandum and Order” dated July 11, 1995 (“July 11, 1995 order”), and this order is the focus of the instant Application. Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 890 F.Supp. 1324 (S.D.Tex. 1995). The July 11, 1995 order is 41 pages long. The first six pages lay out the procedural history in the cases consolidated before the Texas district court. 890 F.Supp. at 1335-41. The next 10 pages explain the Texas district court’s reasoning for asserting federal jurisdiction over the case due to the presence of the impleaded Israeli companies, pursuant to the FSIA. 890 F.Supp. at 1341-51. Then, the Texas district court delved into its lengthier (23-page) f.n.c. analysis, including a survey of the availability of legal remedies in each of the plaintiffs’ home countries, culminating in a dismissal of the consolidated 6  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  cases for f.n.c. 890 F.Supp. at 1351-75. Recognizing the difficulty litigating these cases in the plaintiffs’ home countries, the Texas district court allowed the parties another 90 days within which to expedite discovery in the U.S., as follows: The court concludes that the overwhelming majority of the relevant sources of proof are more readily available to the parties in the home countries of the plaintiffs and that this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. Nevertheless, because foreign fora might not afford plaintiffs as many opportunities for discovery as they desire, to ensure that plaintiffs have access to evidence located in the United States no case will be dismissed until 90 days have elapsed after the entry of this Memorandum and Order. During that time plaintiffs may pursue expedited discovery against defendants under the supervision of this court. 890 F.Supp. at 1367. The last paragraph in the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order read as follows: Other motions In addition to defendant’s motion to dismiss for f.n.c., a number of other motions are pending. Because Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez, and Isae Carcamo may be dismissed in 90 days, all pending motions in those cases not otherwise expressly addressed in this memorandum and Order are DENIED as MOOT. Id. (emphasis in original). The July 11, 1995 order also contained, pursuant to Fifth Circuit precedent, a return jurisdiction provision, which read Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for f.n.c. 890 F.Supp. at 1375. 7  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  On October 27, 1995, the Texas district court entered a final judgment dismissing the Carcamo/Delgado consolidated action based on the f.n.c. dismissal. Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 562. The Carcamo/Delgado plaintiffs appealed the judgment, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on October 19, 2000. See Delgado, 231 F.3d at 182. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 16, 2001. See Delgado v. Shell Oil Co., 532 U.S. 972 (2001). Meanwhile, while the appeal of the Texas district court’s judgment was pending, the war moved to our shores. 4. The War Moves to Hawaiʻi The instant case was filed on October 3, 1997. As had happened in Carcamo/Delgado, Dole impleaded the defendant Israeli companies, and the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Hawaiʻi pursuant to the FSIA. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 472 (2003). As the Texas district court had done, the Hawaiʻi district court dismissed the case for f.n.c. Patrickson, 251 F.3d at 798. On appeal, however, unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the Israeli companies were not organs of the Israeli government, and therefore, did not qualify as instrumentalities of a foreign state under the FSIA. 251 F.3d at 808. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal 8  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  courts did not have jurisdiction over the case, and ordered the Hawaiʻi district court to remand the case to Hawaiʻi state court. 251 F.3d at 808-09. The United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari to resolve the split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, and affirmed the Ninth Circuit. Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. 468. The instant case was remanded to Hawaiʻi state court, specifically the Second Circuit Court, and venue was later changed to the First Circuit Court. 5. Texas Epilogue The Delgado/Carcamo class action eventually returned to Texas, pursuant to the return jurisdiction clause in the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order, after the Costa Rican courts dismissed the Costa Rican plaintiffs’ claims for lack of jurisdiction. Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 561; Marquiniz, 2014 WL 2197621 at . The cases were reinstated in Texas state court. Chaverri, 896 F.Supp.2d at 562. In September 2007, a Texas state court dismissed the Delgado action after defendants settled with the named plaintiffs. Id. In June 2010, a Texas state court denied a motion to certify the class in the Carcamo action. Id. Thus, by 2010, the DBCP litigation war had ended; the remaining DBCP battles occurring on other fronts (e.g., in Hawaii, the Eastern District of Louisiana, and Delaware, according to our record on appeal) continued only to the extent 9  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  that the Texas action tolled the statute of limitations in those jurisdictions. B. An In-Depth Look at the Instant Hawaii DBCP Class Action
In this case, Gerardo Dennis Patrickson, Rodolfo Bermudez Arias, Benigno Torres Hernandez, Fernando Jimenez Arias, Melgar Olimpio Moreno, Leandro Santos, Herman Romero Aguilar, Elias Espinoza Merelo, Celestino Hooker Era, Alirio Manuel Mendez, and Carlos Humberto Rivera,2 individually and on behalf of others similarly situated (“Plaintiffs”), filed their Complaint (and First Amended Complaint) against Dole Food Company, Inc.; Dole Fresh Fruit Company; Dole Fresh Fruit International, Limited; Dole Fresh Fruit International, Inc.; Pineapple Growers Association of Hawaii; Amvac Chemical Corporation; Shell Oil Company; Dow Chemical Company; Occidental Chemical Corporation; Standard Fruit Company; Standard Fruit and Steamship Company; Standard Fruit Company de Costa Rica, S.A.; Standard Fruit Company de Honduras, S.A.; Chiquita Brands, Inc.; Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; Maritrop Trading Corporation; Del 2 On certiorari, only six named Plaintiffs remain in this action (Gerardo Dennis Patrickson, Benigno Torres Hernandez, Fernando Jimenez Arias, Elias Espinoza Merelo, Alirio Manual Mendez, and Carlos Humberto Rivera). Alirio Manual Mendez and Carlos Humberto Rivera stipulated to partially dismiss, without prejudice, all claims against Defendants Dole Food Company, Inc.; Dole Fresh Fruit Company; Standard Fruit Company; and Standard Fruit and Steamship Company. Roldolfo Bermudez Arias, Celestino Hooker Era, Herman Romero Aguilar, Leandro Santos, and Melgar Olimpio Moreno all stipulated to partially dismiss, without prejudice, all claims against all defendants. 10  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.; Del Monte Fresh Produce Company; and Doe Defendants.3 The Complaint alleged that the Plaintiffs were banana plantation workers from Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, who were exposed to DBCP, made by or used by the Defendants, and such exposure caused severe injuries to the Plaintiffs’ reproductive systems. The Plaintiffs alleged as causes of action the following: negligence, conspiracy, strict liability, intentional tort, and breach of implied warranty. They prayed for compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and appointment of class representative on June 13, 2008. Plaintiffs did not appeal the denial of class certification. Therefore, this case concerns only the named Plaintiffs.
On April 13, 2009, Dow filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Gerardo Dennis Patrickson, Benigno Torres Hernandez, Fernando Jimenez Arias, Elias Espinoza Merelo, Alirio 3 The parties later stipulated to dismiss, without prejudice, Chiquita Brands, Inc.; Chiquita Brands International, Inc.; Maritrop Trading Corporation; Dole Fresh Fruit International, Inc.; Dole Fresh Fruit International, Ltd.; Standard Fruit Company de Costa Rica, S.A.; Standard Fruit de Honduras, S.A.; Del Monte Fresh Produce Company, and Fresh Del Monte Produce N.V. (incorrectly named as Del Monte Fresh Produce and Fresh Del Monte N.V.). 11  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Manuel Mendez, and Carlos Humberto Rivera. Dow argued that on June 9, 1995 (over two years before the filing of the instant complaint on October 3, 1997), these six named plaintiffs filed the Abarca action, which made the same allegations as those in the instant case. To Dow, the Abarca action proved that these plaintiffs knew of their claims by June 9, 1995, and their causes of action accrued by that date. Therefore, because the Plaintiffs did not file the instant complaint within two years of having filed the Abarca complaint, their claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations found under HRS § 657-7 (1993)4 for tort actions.
Partial Summary Judgment The Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to Dow’s motion for partial summary judgment. They counter-argued that the Abarca action was a “purely defensive response to defendants’ efforts to enjoin the litigation of any additional DBCP cases by the Texas [district] court hearing the [Carcamo/]Delgado litigation.” With regard to the statute of limitations, the Plaintiffs asserted that the “continued pendency of the 1993 Carcamo putative class action (consolidated 4 HRS § 657-7 (1993) is entitled “Damage to persons or property” and provides, “Actions for the recovery of compensation for damage or injury to persons or property shall be instituted within two years after the cause of action accrued, and not after, except as provided in section 657-13.” HRS § 657-13 (1993), in turn, contains exceptions for infancy, insanity, and imprisonment, which are not at issue in this case. 12  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  into ‘Delgado’) suspended the running of the statute of limitations,” under American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414, U.S. 538, 554 (1974), which held that “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.” The Plaintiffs also noted that the United States Supreme Court extended American Pipe’s holding in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983), to allow tolling not only in cases where plaintiffs sought to intervene in a continuing action, but also where they sought to file an entirely new action. The Plaintiffs noted that this court adopted American Pipe and Crown, Cork in Levi, 67 Haw. 90, 679 P.2d 129. The Plaintiffs asserted that the Levi court made clear that “tolling provisions [extend] to all asserted members of the class, until class certification is denied.” 67 Haw. at 94, 679 P.2d at 132. Applying American Pipe, Crown, Cork, and Levi to the instant facts, the Plaintiffs argued that their Complaint was timely because the Hawaii statute of limitations was tolled by the 1993 filing of the Texas class actions. The Plaintiffs acknowledged that the Texas district court entered a f.n.c. dismissal order on July 11, 1995, but they argued that the Carcamo/Delgado putative class action was ultimately reinstated in Texas state court “as though it had never been dismissed” and 13  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  “remained pending until it was finally dismissed in September 2007.” Therefore, Plaintiffs argued, their 1997 Complaint was timely.
Dow’s reply preliminarily pointed out that its motion for partial summary judgment had become, in effect, a motion for summary judgment, because the four other plaintiffs who were not the subject of the partial motion for summary judgment were in the process of dismissing their claims against the defendants. As to whether the Carcamo/Delgado class action tolled the statute of limitations on the Plaintiffs’ complaint, Dow argued that American Pipe, Crown, Cork, and Levi do not support the Plaintiffs’ argument that a class action pending in one jurisdiction tolled the statute of limitations in another jurisdiction. Dow argued that those cases involved subsequent claims brought by members of a putative class in the same jurisdiction. Dow argued that a majority of jurisdictions do not allow cross-jurisdictional tolling. Moreover, even assuming cross-jurisdictional tolling applied, Dow pointed out that any such tolling ended when class certification in Carcamo/Delgado was denied by the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order. That order denied “all pending motions in [the consolidated cases] not otherwise expressly addressed in this Memorandum and Order” as moot. 14  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Delgado, 890 F.Supp. at 1375. Dow attached the state court docket sheet for Carcamo as an exhibit to its reply to show that plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was pending when the Texas district court issued its July 11, 1995 order. The parties stipulated that the six named Plaintiffs in the instant case were putative class members in the Carcamo case. Lastly, Dow argued that Plaintiffs cannot rely on class action tolling after having filed the Abarca action while a motion for class certification in Carcamo/Delgado was still pending. The parties stipulated that the six named Plaintiffs were named parties in Abarca. 5. Hearing on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment At the hearing on Dow’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the parties focused on whether the July 11, 1995 order denied class certification in the Carcamo/Delgado case clearly enough to restart the Hawaii statute of limitations. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the July 11, 1995 order did not dispose of the Carcamo motion to certify a class action, because “that housekeeping order didn’t reference class certification specifically,” and “it wasn’t clear that [there] was a pending motion [for class certification]. It hadn’t been set for hearing. It hadn’t been briefed. It wasn’t argued.” Dow’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that the July 11, 1995 order was “the original denial of the motion [to certify the class] 15  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  and the original dismissal of the [Carcamo/Delgado] action”; therefore, the July 11, 1995 date set the limitations clock ticking once again. It became clear, however, that the circuit court intended to grant the partial motion for summary judgment in Defendants’ favor because it considered the filing of the Abarca case to be an effective “opt-out” of the Carcamo/Delgado class action. 6. Order Granting Dow’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Final Judgment; Notice of Appeal The circuit court granted Dow’s motion for partial summary judgment in an order dated July 30, 2009, as well as codefendants’ joinders in that motion. The circuit court filed its judgment on July 26, 2010, and the Plaintiffs timely appealed. 7. The ICA Appeal
On appeal, Plaintiffs focused on the significance of the Abarca filing, as that formed the basis of the circuit court’s order granting Dow’s motion for partial summary judgment on limitations grounds. The Plaintiffs argued that the filing of the Abarca complaint, which was never served and later voluntarily dismissed, did not commence an action for statute of limitations purposes, and did not manifest an intent to opt-out of the Carcamo/Delgado class action. Plaintiffs argued that, 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  because the putative class action in Delgado was not finally dismissed until September 2007, and because class certification was not denied in Carcamo until June 2010, Plaintiffs had two years from those dates from which to file a timely action; therefore, the Plaintiffs’ October 1997 Complaint was timely filed. The Plaintiffs argued that the defendants’ approach would frustrate the purposes of the class action tolling doctrine by forcing plaintiffs to prematurely commence individual actions out of an abundance of caution rather than relying on class actions to protect their interests. The Plaintiffs requested that the ICA reverse the circuit court’s judgment and order granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.
Only Dow filed a substantive Answering Brief, while other defendants filed joinders to it. Dow first argued that the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order in Carcamo/Delgado denied a pending class certification motion as moot; therefore, the Hawaii two-year statute of limitations began running on that date, and Plaintiffs’ October 3, 1997 Complaint was time-barred. Second, Dow argued that the ICA should not recognize crossjurisdictional tolling. Third, Dow argued that the Plaintiffs opted out of the Carcamo/Delgado class action by filing individual claims in the Abarca complaint. Moreover, the filing 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  of the Abarca action in June 1995 demonstrated that the Plaintiffs were aware of their claims at that time, over two years before they filed the instant complaint, and thus, beyond the Hawaii two-year statute of limitations governing their claims. Dow requested that the ICA affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
In their Reply, the Plaintiffs argued that the July 11, 1995 order was a “routine housekeeping order” incidental to the district court’s f.n.c. dismissal, which “did not specifically refer to the [Carcamo/]Delgado plaintiffs’ motion for class certification” when it ruled that “all pending motions” were moot. The Plaintiffs also argued that the ICA could recognize cross-jurisdictional tolling, as this court’s Levi opinion left open that possibility.
The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s Judgment. Patrickson v. Dole Food Co., No. 30700 (App. Mar. 7, 2014) (mem.) at 21. The ICA concluded [A]ll claims asserted by the Six Plaintiffs that have a two-year statute of limitations are time barred. The Abarca action establishes that the Six Plaintiffs were aware of their claims at least by June 9, 1995, when the Abarca complaint was filed. Moreover, even if we assume that class action tolling applied, such tolling ended on July 11, 1995, when [the Texas district court’s order] was issued, and the complaint in this case was filed more than two years later, on October 3, 1997. 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Id. at 15.