Opinion ID: 1374852
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Social Interaction

Text: The freedom to make personal bonds with others and to enter into social associations according to one's inclinations is essential to a free society. That freedom fosters diversity and acts as a critical buffer between the individual and the power of the state. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, 104 S.Ct. at 3250. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty. Id. at 618, 104 S.Ct. at 3249. Of course not all personal relationships implicate elements of personal liberty. Id. at 620, 104 S.Ct. at 3251. Determining the extent of state power to override personal choice in such matters entails a careful assessment of where that relationship's objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to the most attenuated of personal attachments. Id. Relevant factors include size, purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics that in a particular case may be pertinent. Id. The fundamental right to define one's identity necessarily includes the right to associate with those of one's own choosing. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18, 104 S.Ct. at 3249-50. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963), the Court stated: This Court has repeatedly held that rights of association are within the ambit of the constitutional protections afforded by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.... It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the `liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. 372 U.S. at 543-44, 83 S.Ct. at 892-93 (citations omitted) (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 1170-71, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958)). The First and Fourteenth Amendments therefore guarantee a significant degree of individual autonomy in choosing those with whom one wishes to associate on a social basis. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19, 104 S.Ct. at 3249-50. In the private sphere, individuals have the freedom to pursue their own inclinations as to purely social relationships without having to submit to a state-imposed orthodoxy. As to an individual's autonomy in choosing social relationships, Justice William O. Douglas stated: The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs to be established. Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 1974-75, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting on unrelated ground); see also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313, 84 S.Ct. 1814, 1862, 12 L.Ed.2d 822 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ([I]t is the constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to any person....). Freedom of association protects more than the right to associate for political purposes. It protects the individual from the power of the state to compel unwanted associations not only in highly intimate relationships such as marriage, but also in less intimate relationships such as social groups. Human nature requires social relationships; and those relationships should be of one's own choosing, free of governmental compulsion or interference. It is clear, of course, that the law does not tolerate customs or personal practices that discriminate against various groups by preventing them from freely participating in employment and from enjoying access to all public accommodations or essential public services. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964). Nevertheless, zeal in extirpating indefensible discrimination from public life ought not be allowed to swallow the right of individuals to associate in purely social relationships with those whom they will. Clearly there is some tension between the need to prevent discrimination in the public sphere and freedom of association in the private sphere, but that cannot justify granting unwarranted predominance to one value at the expense of the other. In Roberts, the Court stated that prohibiting discrimination in the allocation of publicly available goods and services furthered a compelling state interest and that by limiting that prohibition to public, quasi-commercial conduct, such as that engaged in by the Jaycees, the state abridge[d] no more speech or associational freedom than [was] necessary to accomplish that purpose. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3256, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Nevertheless, the Court reemphasized the limits on state power over expressive association in stating: There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. Id. at 622-23, 104 S.Ct. at 3252-53 (emphasis added). Roberts thus holds that the characteristics of each association determine its associational freedoms. Although the record regarding those characteristics in this case is somewhat sparse because the Commission suspended the Moose and Elks Lodges' licenses solely on the basis of the lodges' bylaws, the available record facts all tend to support the conclusion that, according to Roberts, the Moose Lodges are private associations. Unlike the Jaycees and the Elks Lodges in this case, the Moose Lodges do not open their facilities or their activities to the public. Only members or first and second time prospective member guests are allowed inside the facilities. The Moose Lodges are selective in their membership and do not encourage nonmembers to participate. Accordingly, they have the constitutional right to associate with persons of their own choosing, and neither the state nor any regulatory agency has the power to impose membership restrictions on them; they can be as selective in their membership as they desire. The majority claims that Roberts supports its position that the state may constitutionally impose its orthodoxy on private association if they hold a liquor license. Roberts does not support that conclusion. Roberts held that the Jaycees, who excluded women from membership, was not an organization that had the characteristics of a private association and therefore was not entitled to a plenary right of free association. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621, 623-29, 104 S.Ct. at 3251, 3252-56. In holding that no freedom of intimate association was implicated in that case, the Court stated: [T]he local chapters of the Jaycees are neither small nor selective. Moreover, much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of the association involves the participation of strangers in that relationship. Accordingly, we conclude that the Jaycees chapters lack the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women. Id. at 621, 104 S.Ct. at 3251. Contrary to the majority's claim, Roberts did not focus on the size of the national organization. It was Justice O'Connor, in her opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, who discussed the size of the national organization and stated that it was undeserving of associational rights. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631, 104 S.Ct. at 3257 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & in judgment). The majority of the Roberts Court expressly focused on the size of the local chapters of the Jaycees. 468 U.S. at 621, 104 S.Ct. at 3251. The lack of selectivity of both the local chapters and the national organization was another important factor, as was the fact that nonmembers, both women and men, already participate[d] in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to associate with one another. Id. [1]