Opinion ID: 2994743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hatcher

Text: Hatcher challenges the introduction of certain evidence at trial. The government presented evidence that Hatcher had been indicted in the first round of GD indictments in August 1995, had been released on bond, and then failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to revoke his bond. A bench warrant was issued for his arrest and he was later apprehended after a police chase ended in a crash of his van, in which the police found 36 gem packs of crack. (The term gem pack refers, in the drug trade, to a small translucent blue plastic bag used to package cocaine base. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 780 n.1 (7th Cir. 1994).) The district court’s admission of this evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hunter, 145 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1998). The probative value of evidence of flight depends on the strength of the inferences that can be drawn from the flight to actual guilt of the crime charged. United States v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451 (7th Cir. 1995). Hatcher argues that he was running not to avoid prosecution, but to avoid pre-trial detention while he awaited prosecution. We fail to see how the latter motive is any less probative of guilt than the former. His bond was going to be revoked because of his continuing involvement in the drug conspiracy. It was reasonable for the jury to infer guilt of drug crimes from the fact that he ran from law enforcement personnel because he realized that they wanted to revoke his bond because of his involvement in drug crimes. Hatcher also challenges the evidence of the drugs found in his van. He argues that because the conspiracy charged in the indictment ended six months before the drugs were found, the evidence is irrelevant. See United States v. Betts, 16 F.3d 748, 758 (7th Cir. 1994) (discovery of drugs 14 months after conspiracy had ended had no probative value in establishing defendant’s knowledge and intent regarding the conspiracy). But the part of the conspiracy charged in the indictment here necessarily had to end the day of the indictment--Hatcher makes no attempt to establish that the drug conspiracy itself had actually ended. The district court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the evidence of flight. Finally, Hatcher challenges a reference to George Ogden made in the prosecutor’s closing statement. During trial, the prosecution alleged that 13-year old Ogden had been used by the gang leaders to engage the police in a firefight to divert attention from a secret GD meeting. The court refused to allow testimony stating that Ogden was the shooter and instead permitted only statements indicating that Ogden ran from the alley following the firefight. In the closing argument, however, the prosecutor referred to Ogden as the shooter. Hatcher moved for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. The district court denied the motion, and our review is once again for abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1438 (7th Cir. 1996). The district court found that the prosecutor’s comments had not so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). The judge told the jury, specifically in regard to this statement, that it was free to disregard any jury arguments that were not supported by the evidence. We assume that juries follow the instructions they are given. United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 426 (7th Cir. 1998). The judge’s cautionary words, coupled with the fact that this was a single remark from the prosecutor, satisfy us that the court’s decision to deny the new trial was not an abuse of discretion.