Opinion ID: 1708023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Existence of A Probable Meritorious Defense

Text: Alicia must also show a probable meritorious defense to the action to successfully obtain relief from the default judgment. Id. The party seeking relief must present facts either by answer or affidavit from which it could be inferred that upon a trial he would be entitled to a judgment more favorable to himself than the judgment from which he is seeking relief. Clarke, 423 N.W.2d at 821. An applicant for relief from a judgment satisfies the meritorious defense requirement, however, if he makes only a prima facie showing. National Surety Corp. v. Shoemaker, 86 S.D. 302, 310, 195 N.W.2d 134, 138-39 (1972). The rule does not intend that there should be two trials on the merits. Id. In the default divorce judgment, Alicia lost custody of all four of her children. In seeking relief from the default judgment, she premised her entire meritorious defense argument on a claim to custody of only the youngest child. [1] Alicia contended that Charles was not the natural father of the youngest child and, therefore, she had a superior right to custody of the child that would afford her a more favorable custody determination than the one in the judgment from which she was seeking relief. The circuit court disposed of Alicia's contentions by finding that: Alicia presented no facts to challenge the presumption established by law as to parentage of her child ... The presumption stands and no meritorious defense was presented by Alicia. She presented no facts from which it could be inferred that upon trial she would be entitled to a judgment more favorable than the judgment from which she sought relief. Notwithstanding this finding, the record reflects that, during the hearing on Alicia's motion for relief from judgment, she testified that Charles was not the youngest child's natural father and that Charles had had a vasectomy approximately one year before the child was born. Father's own testimony during the hearing established that, prior to the child's conception, he had had an effective vasectomy. In In re Kessler's Estate, 76 S.D. 158, 74 N.W.2d 599 (1956), this court found proof that the mother's husband had undergone a successful vasectomy and the mother's testimony that another man was the father of the child was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the child was illegitimate. Kessler's Estate, 76 S.D. at 165, 74 N.W.2d at 603. Based upon the facts presented by Alicia and the precedent of Kessler's Estate, supra , we hold that the circuit court's finding concerning Alicia's meritorious defense is clearly erroneous. See, Johnson, supra. See also, Selle, supra . Moreover, in determining whether Charles' nonpaternity of the youngest child could afford Alicia a more favorable custody determination regarding that child, we note that, at the time this action was commenced, SDCL 25-5-10 provided: The mother of an illegitimate unmarried minor is entitled to its custody, services, and earnings. In an action for the determination of paternity, the court may award custody of the child to either parent, considering the best interests of the child as to its temporal, mental and moral welfare. SDCL 25-5-10 (1984 Rev.). During the 1991 legislative session SDCL 25-5-10 was amended to read as follows: The mother of an unmarried minor born out of wedlock is entitled to its custody, services, and earnings subject to the court's right to award custody of the child to either parent, considering the best interests of the child as to its temporal, mental and moral welfare. SDCL 25-5-10. The amendment of SDCL 25-5-10 took effect on July 1, 1991 (SDCL 2-14-16), during the pendency of this action. Regardless of the amendment, we find that the following statement of this Court in Pribbenow v. Van Sambeek, 418 N.W.2d 626, 628 (S.D.1988) remains applicable: SDCL 25-5-10 follows the general rule that mother is initially entitled to the illegitimate child's custody. However, it also clearly provides that ... the court may award custody of the child to either parent, considering the best interests of the child. Additionally, commensurate with SDCL 30-27-23, when child custody is involved, preference is generally given to a parent over a nonparent. (emphasis original). As it did in Pribbenow, SDCL 30-27-23 provided during the duration of these proceedings that, [o]f two persons equally entitled to the custody in other respects, preference is to be given as follows: (1) to a parent[.] [2] The custody preferences of SDCL 25-5-10, Pribbenow, supra, and SDCL 30-27-23 would appear to provide Alicia a prima facie defense to Charles' adverse claim to custody of the youngest child if Alicia is able to muster sufficient proof that the child is an illegitimate child and not Charles' natural child. [3] Therefore, we conclude that mother has established a probable meritorious defense in this action. [4] Based upon the above analysis, we hold that both prongs necessary for relieving Alicia from the default divorce judgment have been met, i.e., excusable neglect and a probable meritorious defense. Accordingly, the circuit court's order denying mother relief from the default judgment should be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Clarke, supra . Reversed and remanded. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST, HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., participating.