Opinion ID: 1058895
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ola as a Charitable Beneficiary

Text: We next address Ola's contention that she was not a beneficiary of the YMCA's charitable bounty at the time of the attack, and therefore her tort action should not be barred by the YMCA's otherwise applicable charitable immunity. Ola specifically argues that any charitable activities undertaken by the YMCA are too far removed from the negligence at issue to immunize the YMCA against liability. We disagree. The trial court found that because Ola paid a discounted membership fee, she received the pecuniary benefit of financial assistance and therefore, was a recipient of the YMCA's charitable bounty. Ola argues that this finding implicitly holds that the YMCA owes a duty of care to members who pay full price dues but owes no duty to members who pay discounted dues. We reject Ola's argument. The fact that an organization receives compensation from those who are able to pay for services received does not remove its charitable immunity. Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 104, 81 S.E. 13, 14 (1914). Thus, a court's decision to sustain a plea of charitable immunity rests solely on the organization's status as a charitable entity, not on the beneficiary's financial status. The rich and the indigent stand on the same footing as to protection against such negligence. Weston's, 131 Va. at 597, 107 S.E. at 788. In Virginia, a person is a beneficiary of charity if he or she has a beneficial relationship to the charitable organization. Roanoke Hospital Ass'n v. Hayes, 204 Va. 703, 707, 133 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1963). However, mere membership in a class eligible to receive future benefits, conditioned upon circumstances which might never occur, is too remote and speculative to merit beneficiary status. Thrasher, 239 Va. at 342, 389 S.E.2d at 701. Relying on this Court's precedent, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that an individual need not receive financial assistance from a charitable entity to be a beneficiary of that organization. Instead, a beneficiary is a person who receives something of value, which the organization by its charitable purpose, undertakes to provide. An individual is a beneficiary of [charitable] bounty if that individual's interaction with the entity is related to the charitable purpose of the [organization]. Egerton v. R.E. Lee Memorial Church, 395 F.2d 381, 384 (4th Cir.1968) (tourist entering historic church to view stained glass is a beneficiary); see also Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F.2d 507, 509 (4th Cir.1934) (Plaintiff became a beneficiary of the charity of the defendant when she entered upon its premises for the purpose of viewing the paintings and other exhibits which it had collected). We noted in Weston's, that a person who pays the full price for services is still a beneficiary of the charitable work of the charitable organization because that entity could not provide those services without charitable contributions: The public charity which the patient pays for the privilege of enjoying is the hospital building, with all its equipment and management, the care and nursing, and the rules and regulations under which it is operated, whereby it is kept sanitary and is made comfortable. All of these are provided by charity before the patient applies for admission, and he pays for the privilege of enjoying them as he finds them, and his payments go to the further maintenance of the charity of which others coming after him are to enjoy the benefits. He is receiving the benefits which charity has provided. In this sense, he is a charity patient. 131 Va. at 596-97, 107 S.E. at 788. Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the same conceptual basis in determining that a student was a beneficiary of a private college's charity even if he paid full tuition: [I]t is equally clear both that the eleemosynary or charitable nature of an educational institution is not destroyed by the fact that it makes a charge for tuition, and that the payment of tuition by its students does not prevent their being considered beneficiaries of the charity.... In a very direct and practical sense, therefore, not only are such institutions engaged in a work of charity, but the pay[ing] student as well as others is a beneficiary thereof. And, apart from the fact that what such a student pays does not equal the cost of his education, he is a beneficiary of the charity for the reason that but for the charitable gifts made to the institution and the charitable work which it is carrying on, it would not exist to serve him. These principles are settled by the overwhelming weight of authority. Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir.1929). We reiterated the holdings in these cases in Richmond v. Richmond Memorial Hospital, 202 Va. 86, 94, 116 S.E.2d 79, 84 (1960), noting that paying clients as well as those who do not pay are the beneficiaries of charitable bounty because but for the charitable gifts made to the [organizations] and the charitable work which they are carrying on they would not exist to serve [anyone]. Id. Under this well-reasoned precedent. Ola clearly was a beneficiary of the YMCA's charity, not because she received membership at a reduced fee, but because she was participating in the YMCA swimming program at the time of her injury. The parties stipulated that just prior to the attack, Ola had used the YMCA's swimming pool. As the trial court noted, Swimming clearly provides an excellent means of maintaining physical and mental well-being and thus can be characterized as a part of the YMCA's charitable benefits. Thus, whether Ola paid a full or reduced membership fee, she was a beneficiary of the charitable bounty of the YMCA because she actually used YMCA facilities which depend on charity for their existence and operation.