Opinion ID: 2972869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Period for Examining Discrimination

Text: Tartt’s argument that CPD discriminated against him in its refusal to re-hire him three months after his resignation often morphs into an argument that he (like black officers generally) was discriminated against by CPD during his tenure with the department, that is, before the department’s refusal to re-hire him, and that such discrimination contributed to his being forced to resign in March 2001. Tartt is barred, however, from bringing Title VII discrimination claims for incidents prior to CPD’s refusal to re-hire him, for two reasons. First, such claims are untimely. Tennessee is a “deferral state” for purposes of the federal discrimination statutes. Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2002); Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1992); see T.C.A. § 4-21-101. In a deferral state, when a plaintiff institutes the relevant state proceedings, as Tartt did with his THRC complaint, he must file his EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Weigel, 302 F.3d at 375-76 (applying 300-day bar to ADEA claim); Jackson, 5 961 F.2d at 578-79 (same); Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America, 101 F.3d 218, 221 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying 300-day bar in Title VII context in deferral state of Massachusetts); Pikulin v. City Univ. of N.Y., 176 F.3d 598, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying 300-day bar in Title VII context in deferral state of New York); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (holding that a Title VII plaintiff alleging a discrete act of discrimination, who files a grievance with the appropriate state agency, must file his EEOC charge within 300 days of the alleged act). While the 300-day bar is not jurisdictional, it does have the effect of a statute of limitations, and is not to be waived without good cause. Weigel, 302 F.3d at 376. Tartt did not file his EEOC charge until January 7, 2002, more than 300 days after his March 6, 2001, resignation from CPD. Thus, the 300-day bar prevents Tartt from claiming discrimination for acts prior to his resignation, which limits him to his claims of discrimination regarding his attempt to be re-hired in June 2001 (which was within 300 days of his January 7, 2002, EEOC filing). Second, even if Tartt had filed his EEOC charge early enough to capture events prior to his request to be re-hired, he would still be barred from pursuing such claims by the narrow scope of the discrimination claimed in his EEOC charge. Tartt’s EEOC charge claims only discrimination in CPD’s refusal to re-hire him, and alleges the earliest date of discrimination as June 21, 2001, (the date on which Hudgins allegedly told Tartt that he had to wait at least one year for re-hire). “It is well settled that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims unless the claimant explicitly files the claim in an EEOC charge or the claim can be reasonably expected to grow out of the EEOC charge.” Weigel, 302 F.3d at 379 (internal quotation omitted). The “judicial complaint must be limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation reasonably expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Id. at 380 (internal quotation omitted). An investigation 6 of Tartt’s claims of discrimination in the terms and conditions of his employment would not be “reasonably expected to grow out of” the EEOC’s investigation of CPD’s refusal to re-hire Tartt; therefore, because the EEOC has not had the opportunity to investigate Tartt’s pre-resignation claims, we lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain them.