Opinion ID: 2169253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion of Cross-examination Regarding Civil Complaint

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion in limine to exclude any testimony about a federal complaint filed by Kevin Fox, a former suspect in a murder case. Fox had been accused of the murder of his young daughter and he was interrogated by Guilfoyle and Ruettiger. The detectives were named defendants in the Fox case, which, at the time of defendant's trial, was pending in the Northern District of Illinois. Fox alleged that the detectives violated his civil rights, eventually coercing him into making a false confession that he had killed his daughter. DNA tests subsequently exonerated Fox and the charges against him were dropped. Defendant alleges that Guilfoyle and Ruettiger used interrogation methods on him similar to the ones they used on Fox, leading to a false confession by defendant. The trial court granted the State's motion in limine, noting that the allegations of the Fox complaint were not proof and that there was no evidence of disciplinary action taken by the police department against either Guilfoyle or Ruettiger. Defendant cites what he believes are similarities between his interrogation by the detectives and the interrogation alleged in the Fox complaint. He argues that the detectives were aware that their testimony in the instant case could have been used against them in the Fox civil suit to show a pattern of interrogation methods. Thus, the Fox suit gave the detectives a financial interest in minimizing what defendant calls the suggestive, emotional nature of their interrogation of him. According to defendant, the trial court's order deprived him of his sixth amendment right of confrontation. Generally, a decision on an evidentiary motion, such as a motion in limine, is committed to the trial court's discretion and a reviewing court will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill.2d 368, 392, 286 Ill.Dec. 124, 813 N.E.2d 181 (2004). A defendant has a fundamental, constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, which includes a reasonable right of cross-examination to inquire into a witness's bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely. However, the evidence used to impeach must raise an inference that the witness has something to gain or lose by his testimony; the evidence must not be remote or uncertain. People v. Coleman, 206 Ill.2d 261, 278, 276 Ill.Dec. 380, 794 N.E.2d 275 (2002). Case law establishes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to use the Fox case to impeach the detectives. For example, in People v. Davis, 193 Ill.App.3d 1001, 140 Ill.Dec. 792, 550 N.E.2d 677 (1990), a police officer had kicked the defendant in the groin, allegedly in self-defense. The defendant tried to cross-examine the officer about one prior and one pending civil rights lawsuit that alleged the officer used excessive force in making an arrest. The prior lawsuit had been settled for a nuisance fee. Davis, 193 Ill.App.3d at 1005, 140 Ill.Dec. 792, 550 N.E.2d 677. The officer's record with the police department showed no disciplinary action taken against him with respect to either suit. The trial court refused to allow the defendant to cross-examine the officer about the lawsuits due to the lack of disciplinary action and the fact that the pending lawsuit was not related to the defendant's case. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's decision, noting that any evidence of bias or motive must be direct and positive, not remote and uncertain. The court noted that it had found no case where mere evidence of a civil suit against a law enforcement officer charging dereliction of duty unrelated to the case at issue had been held to be proper impeachment. Davis, 193 Ill.App.3d at 1005-06, 140 Ill. Dec. 792, 550 N.E.2d 677. In contrast to Davis, we note, as did the Davis court, two other cases in which impeachment was held to be proper. In People v. Phillips, 95 Ill.App.3d 1013, 51 Ill.Dec. 423, 420 N.E.2d 837 (1981), the defendant was charged with attempted murder of a police officer. The defendant claimed that he was defending his brother from the officer, who had allegedly pulled his gun and was threatening the brother. The trial court granted the state's motion in limine preventing the defendant from cross-examining the officer with evidence that he had been suspended from the police force 15 times, including two instances in which the officer had improperly displayed his weapon and then filed a false report. The appellate court found this to be reversible error, noting that the officer might have been motivated to testify falsely to avoid a further suspension or termination, and to continue his medical coverage, given his serious injuries. Phillips, 95 Ill.App.3d at 1021, 51 Ill.Dec. 423, 420 N.E.2d 837. Similarly, in People v. Robinson, 56 Ill. App.3d 832, 14 Ill.Dec. 117, 371 N.E.2d 1170 (1977), the officer was suspended from the police department at the time of the defendant's trial for committing an act of violence and was due to be reinstated in a few days. The defendant was on trial for allegedly striking the officer. The defendant claimed that he did not hit the officer and that the officer charged him with that offense to cover up the fact that the officer had lost his temper during the defendant's traffic stop and struck the defendant. The trial court would not permit the defendant to cross-examine the officer about his suspension. The appellate court found this to be error, noting that the defendant should have been allowed to show that the officer's testimony was influenced by a desire to return to active duty without further trouble and to avoid continued suspension. Robinson, 56 Ill. App.3d at 840, 14 Ill.Dec. 117, 371 N.E.2d 1170. Defendant here has not identified any disciplinary actions taken against either Guilfoyle or Ruettiger by the police department. Defendant has not cited, nor are we aware of, any case in which cross-examination of the kind proposed by defendant has been permitted solely on the basis of an unrelated pending civil case. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's motion in limine.