Opinion ID: 1450785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the jury instructions and special verdict

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the court erred in failing to give their Proposed Instructions Nos. 33 [28] and 34 [29] relating to a manufacturer's duty to warn of dangers involved in the use of a product. Plaintiffs point out that the only instruction given by the court relating to a manufacturer's duty to warn was couched in terms of the negligence of the manufacturer [30] and was inappropriate to their claim for strict liability. [31] We agree that the instruction given by the court was inappropriate for use in a strict liability case because it focuses on such negligence concepts and issues as whether the manufacturer had reason to know of the hazard involved in the use of the product, the manufacturer's duty to use reasonable care in giving a warning, and the manufacturer's reason to believe that the ordinary user would not recognize a danger. Moreover, the instruction does not define what an adequate warning would be. [32] We are in accord with those authorities which hold that in strict liability cases the need for and the sufficiency of a warning should be expressed without reference to negligence principles. [33] As the Supreme Court of Washington recently stated: [T]he objective of the rule of strict liability with respect to dangerous products is defeated if a plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant was negligent, or the latter is allowed to defend upon the ground that he was free of negligence. It is the adequacy of the warning which is given or the necessity of such a warning, which must command the jury's attention, not the defendant's conduct. Little v. PPG Industries, 92 Wash.2d 118, 594 P.2d 911, 914 (Wash. 1979). However, Instruction No. 33 proposed by the plaintiffs is seriously flawed because it fails to note that a product is only required to have warnings as to those hazards or dangers that would not be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the product. [34] In other respects, too, Proposed Instructions 33 and 34 could be more clear. Upon retrial the court, with the assistance of the parties, should be able to devise appropriate instructions on this subject. Various other objections are raised by the plaintiffs to the court's instructions pertaining to strict liability. After the trial of this case we decided Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979). In Caterpillar directions pertaining to the points raised are given. It is enough to say presently that upon retrial the instructions should be modified so that they are consistent with Caterpillar. The plaintiffs argue that strict products liability should be extended to cover landlords of residential property. The briefing on this important question is conclusory only, without adequate citations to relevant authorities. Under these circumstances we consider this claim of error to have been waived. [35] The plaintiffs also object to the from of the special verdict given to the jury. Specifically, the jury was required, upon finding for the plaintiffs, to: list the defect or defects which you found to be a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiffs; list the act or acts of negligence of [the landlords] which you found to be a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiffs; and list the act or acts of negligence of Raywall which you found to be the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiffs. We have considerable doubt as to whether requiring these detailed answers was appropriate. The definition of a product defect is essentially functional. A product is defective if, for example, it has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d at 885. The emphasis is on the failure of safe performance, rather than on the specific reasons for the failure. Id. Thus, as to strict liability, the special verdict form might have confused the jurors and lead them to believe that they had to find more than the law requires. Similarly, we think that requiring a detailed explanation of the act or acts of negligence of the appellees is undesirable. The jurors may not be able to agree on phraseology or on the details of the conduct found to have been negligent. There is a danger that the jury might be deterred by such a requirement from agreeing on a verdict which it otherwise would reach. We have considered the various other claims made by the plaintiffs and find them to be without merit. REVERSED AND REMANDED.