Opinion ID: 1946452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Refusal to Seek Immunity

Text: Finally, defendant argues that after Bogan reappeared, his testimony should have been stricken, and Bogan should have been compelled to testify under a grant of immunity. We note at the outset that a trial justice has no authority to order the state to seek immunity for a witness. Only the Attorney General may request an immunity hearing. G.L.1956 § 12-17-15. [7] See State v. Clark, 576 A.2d 1202, 1205-06 (R.I.1990) (holding that the trial justice properly refused to order the state to seek immunity because such action is the responsibility of the Attorney General and not within the province of the court). Even so, the Attorney General does not have unbridled discretion with respect to immunity proceedings. See Ferrell v. Wall, 889 A.2d 177, 187 n. 4 (R.I.2005) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) (Although the state may determine whether to seek immunity for a witness, it may not base such a decision on improper methods calculated to bring a wrongful conviction.)). Here, the Attorney General readily sought an order immunizing the witness to secure his testimony after he invoked the Fifth Amendment. Further, the record is devoid of any evidence of improper conduct by the state that allowed Bogan to go missing. The fact that Bogan appeared, after his former testimony was read into evidence, does not give rise to an inference of prosecutorial bad faith. Nor are we of the opinion that simply because Bogan reappeared at a later point in the trial, the state was bound to seek immunity so that he could testify for defendant. A trial justice may not compel testimony from a witness who has invoked a legitimate Fifth Amendment right, State v. Ducharme, 601 A.2d 937, 944-45 (R.I.1991), nor may he or she compel the state to seek to immunize the witness's testimony. See generally Ferrell, 889 A.2d at 187 n. 4. We are not confronted with a case in which the prosecution elected not to seek immunity for a witness in order to obtain an unfair advantage at the expense of defendant's right to confront his accusers. See United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 118, 119, 120 (2nd Cir.2006) (where defendant alleged a discriminatory use of immunity by the government). This record amply demonstrates the state's consistent and good-faith efforts to secure Bogan's attendance by seeking immunity and repeatedly requesting that Bogan be ordered to comply with the subpoena. Significantly, although there was a suggestion that Bogan might change his testimony and refuse to incriminate Ramirez, the state nonetheless proceeded with an immunity petition intending to compel his testimony. These facts undermine defendant's contention that the state sought to avoid calling Bogan to the stand so that it could introduce his previous testimony. The fact that Bogan remained steadfast in his refusal to testify (and therefore remained unavailable) is not the state's fault. His previous testimony properly was admitted when he was declared unavailable; the fact that he reappeared later does not alter that result. We deem this issue without merit.