Opinion ID: 782941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Smaldone

Text: 25 In Smaldone, the Court reviewed the district court's dismissal of a habeas petition on timeliness grounds. See Smaldone, 273 F.3d at 135. The petitioner was convicted in state court, and after his conviction was affirmed on appeal, he sought collateral relief in state court. While his state court petition was pending, the petitioner filed a federal habeas petition, which was dismissed without prejudice because, as his state court petition had not yet been acted on, the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies. The petitioner's attorney believed that when a petitioner was pursuing state remedies, the one-year limitations period of AEDPA was reset and began running anew after the state court issued its decision. The petitioner accordingly filed his renewed federal petition, through counsel, within one year of the denial of relief in the state courts. Unfortunately, the attorney was wrong: the rule is not that the one-year period is reset by the filing of a state petition, but that the time is tolled during the pendency of the state petition. The federal petition which the attorney eventually filed was untimely under this rule. We held that the petitioner's attorney's error did not justify the application of equitable tolling. See id. at 138-39. 26 Equitable tolling ... is only appropriate in rare and exceptional circumstances. To merit application of equitable tolling, the petitioner must demonstrate that he acted with reasonable diligence during the period he wishes to have tolled, but that despite his efforts, extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented successful filing during that time. 27 This Circuit, like her sisters, has found attorney error inadequate to create the extraordinary circumstances equitable tolling requires. 28 Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (collecting cases). The district court interpreted this language to bar the application of equitable tolling to any case in which the cause of the petition being untimely was the malfeasance of the petitioner's attorney. See Baldayaque, 2002 WL 31094962, at . We do not believe that Smaldone 's holding is so far-reaching. 29 Smaldone relied on the Court's holding in Geraci v. Senkowski, 211 F.3d 6, 9 (2d Cir.2000), that a mistake by counsel as to the calculation of time remaining to file a petition did not constitute extraordinary or unusual circumstances that would justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA's one-year limitation period. While it is true that the attorney errors present in Smaldone and Geraci did not constitute extraordinary circumstances sufficient to support equitable tolling, Smaldone does not dictate that the actions of a petitioner's attorney could never constitute extraordinary circumstances. See Chapman v. ChoiceCare Long Island Term Disability Plan, 288 F.3d 506, 512 (2d Cir.2002) ([T]he kind of attorney errors at issue in cases where equitable tolling was denied differ materially from the error at issue in the instant case.). It is not inconsistent to say that attorney error normally will not constitute the extraordinary circumstances required to toll the AEDPA limitations period while acknowledging that at some point, an attorney's behavior may be so outrageous or so incompetent as to render it extraordinary. 30 Weinstein's actions in this case are distinguishable from the attorney conduct in Smaldone and Geraci. The attorneys in Smaldone and Geraci made simple mistakes about the rules applied to the deadlines for filing of habeas petitions. Such mistakes are ordinary. Weinstein's actions, taken together, were extraordinary. 31 In spite of being specifically directed by his client's representatives to file a 2255, Weinstein failed to file such a petition at all. By refusing to do what was requested by his client on such a fundamental matter, Weinstein violated a basic duty of an attorney to his client. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 800 F.2d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1986) (As a matter of professional responsibility, an attorney owes a duty of loyalty to his client. This duty encompasses an obligation to defer to the client's wishes on major litigation decisions.). 32 Weinstein did no legal research on Baldayaque's case. Weinstein failed to comply with Rule 1.1 of the Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, which requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client, [which] requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. (emphasis added). Had Weinstein made a cursory review of the law, he would have discovered that it was not too late to file a section 2255 petition when he met with Rivera and Marquez in 1997; in fact, he would have discovered that he had until May 1998 to file such a petition within the limitations period. 33 Weinstein never spoke to or met Baldayaque. When his letter to Baldayaque was returned, Weinstein made no effort to locate Baldayaque. Weinstein failed to keep [his] client reasonably informed about the status of [the case] and failed to explain [the] matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit [Baldayaque] to make informed decisions regarding the representation, as required by Connecticut Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4. 34 Weinstein's actions were far enough outside the range of behavior that reasonably could be expected by a client that they may be considered extraordinary. In Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000), we held that the confiscation of the petitioner's legal papers by a corrections officer shortly before the section 2255 filing deadline was `extraordinary' as a matter of law. That was so even though the usual problems inherent in being incarcerated do not justify equitable tolling. Likewise, while the normal errors made by attorneys may not justify equitable tolling, extreme situations such as the one presented here require a different result. Accordingly, we hold that an attorney's conduct, if it is sufficiently egregious, may constitute the sort of extraordinary circumstances that would justify the application of equitable tolling to the one-year limitations period of AEDPA.