Opinion ID: 220681
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presumption of Vindictiveness

Text: With reference to the same Supreme Court authorities, the district court concluded that Goodell's case is on all fours with Pearce and that the narrow holding of Pearce remained the governing and clearly established federal law at the time of Goodell's resentencings. Goodell, 676 F.Supp.2d at 644-47. Applying Pearce, the court concluded that the presumption of vindictiveness does apply in this case. The Ohio Court of Appeals' contrary holding was thus deemed to be contrary to clearly established federal law. Id. at 645. Further, the court observed in a footnote that the presumption had not been rebutted. Id. at 647 n. 7. Therefore, habeas relief was conditionally granted. The district court's ruling rests fundamentally on the determination that Pearce defines the governing clearly established federal law. Indeed, Pearce is the seminal Supreme Court holding, recognizing that judicial vindictiveness in sentencing violates due process. Yet, as the district court recognized, the Supreme Court has had numerous occasions in the last forty years to narrow, clarify and explain the import of Pearce in the context of analogous resentencing situations. In McCullough, the Court recounted some of this history and attempted to distill its wisdom: Beyond doubt, vindictiveness of a sentencing judge is the evil the Court sought to prevent rather than simply enlarged sentences after a new trial. The Pearce requirements thus do not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial. Like other judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution], Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), we have restricted application of Pearce to areas where its objectives are thought most efficaciously served, 428 U.S. at 487, 96 S.Ct. at 3049. Accordingly, in each case, we look to the need, under the circumstances, to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 1982, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) (emphasis omitted). For example, in Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319, 90 S.Ct. 1730, 26 L.Ed.2d 262 (1970), we held that Pearce did not apply when the defendant conceded and it was clear that vindictiveness had played no part in the enlarged sentence. In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972), we saw no need for applying the presumption when the second court in a two-tier trial system imposed a longer sentence. In Chaffin [ Chaffin ], supra , we held Pearce not applicable where a jury imposed the increased sentence on retrial. Where the prophylactic rule of Pearce does not apply, the defendant may still obtain relief if he can show actual vindictiveness upon resentencing. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3223, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984). McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138, 106 S.Ct. 976. The McCullough Court thus recognized that the Pearce presumption does not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial, but only where the circumstances of the particular case give rise to a need to guard against vindictiveness. The presumption is inappropriate if there is no realistic motive for vindictive sentencing. Id. at 139, 106 S.Ct. 976. See also Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799-800, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (recognizing that the presumption applies only where the circumstances give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the sentence increase was the product of actual vindictiveness); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485 (same). The McCullough Court held that the circumstances do not give rise to a need to apply the presumption where, as here, the varying sentences were imposed by different sentencers. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140, 106 S.Ct. 976. In such circumstances, the court noted, a sentence `increase' cannot truly be said to have taken place. Id. The district court acknowledged that McCullough represented a direct challenge to Pearce.  Goodell, 676 F.Supp.2d at 645. Noting, however, that McCullough had stopped short of overruling Pearce, the district court narrowly construed McCullough as declining to extend the Pearce presumption, not in all cases where varying sentences are imposed by different sentencers, but only where, as in McCullough, the first sentencer was a jury and the second a judge. Id. at 646. This narrowing construction of McCullough 's broad language was justified, the district court reasoned, because Pearce itself had involved varying sentences imposed by different judges. The district court stated that the McCullough Court had no occasion to decide whether the presumption applies when the second sentencer is a different judge on the same court as the judge who originally sentenced the defendant. Id. Yet, the McCullough Court itself expressly disavowed this construction in footnote 3: Pearce itself apparently involved different judges presiding over the two trials, a fact that has led some courts to conclude by implication that the presumption of vindictiveness applies even where different sentencing judges are involved. See, e.g., United States v. Hawthorne, 532 F.2d 318, 323 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894, 97 S.Ct. 254, 50 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976). That fact, however, may not have been drawn to the Court's attention and does not appear anywhere in the Court's opinion in Pearce. Clearly the Court did not focus on it as a consideration for its holding. See Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049, 98 S.Ct. 897, 54 L.Ed.2d 801 (1978). Subsequent opinions have also elucidated the basis for the Pearce presumption. We held in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), for instance, that the presumption derives from the judge's personal stake in the prior conviction, id. at 27, 93 S.Ct. at 1983, a statement clearly at odds with reading Pearce to answer the two-sentencer issue. We therefore decline to read Pearce as governing this issue. See also n. 4, infra. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 140 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 976. The McCullough Court thus expressly rejected the notion that Pearce stands for the proposition that the presumption applies where there are two different sentencers absent other circumstances that give rise to a need to protect against vindictiveness. In Pearce, McCullough noted, there were other circumstances that drove the holding; namely, the State's failure to offer `any reason or justification' for the increased sentence. Id. at 142 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 976 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072). The district court did not overlook McCullough 's instruction, but concluded: Nevertheless, McCullough does not change the status of Pearce 's holding as clearly established law. Goodell, 676 F.Supp.2d at 646. The district court thus implicitly considered McCullough 's unambiguous teaching to be dicta beyond the scope of its holding and therefore impotent to alter the state of clearly established federal law. But we find additional guidance in McCullough 's note 4, where the Court further explained the background of the Pearce decision: Pearce was argued on the assumption that the Constitution either absolutely forbade or permitted increased sentences on retrial. None of the briefs advanced the intermediate position ultimately relied upon by the Court that the Constitution permits increased sentences only in certain circumstances. . . . Thus, . . . in formulating the standard set forth in Pearce, the Court was completely without the `sharpen[ing of] the presentation of issues' provided by the adversary process, `upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional issues.' . . . But even if Pearce could be read to speak definitively to this situation, we are not reluctant to tailor judicially created rules to implement constitutional guarantees, like the Pearce rule . . . when the need to do so becomes apparent. McCullough, 475 U.S. at 142 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 976 (citations omitted). Again, the Court endeavored to make clear that the rule Pearce stands for is not as broad as its language could be construed to mean and that it is, as a judicially created prophylactic rule, subject to tailoring by the Court. The Court unmistakably undertook a measure of tailoring in McCullough. It can hardly be denied, on a fair reading of McCullough, that the Court intended to make it clear that a presumption of vindictiveness does not apply where an increased sentence is imposed by a different sentencer absent other circumstances demonstrating a need to guard against vindictiveness. In fact, the McCullough majority opinion concludes: It is appropriate that we clarify the scope and thrust of Pearce, and we do so here. Id. at 144, 106 S.Ct. 976. The clearly established law inquiry begins with the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In determining the governing legal principles, Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, to be derived from the Supreme Court's holdings, we are hardly at liberty to ignore how the Supreme Court itself has later characterized, defined and tailored its holdings by the time of the state court decision being reviewed. In McCullough, the Supreme Court took pains to make clear that Pearce does not stand for the proposition that a presumption of vindictiveness arises whenever a defendant who has successfully challenged his conviction or sentence is subjected to harsher punishment on resentencing. Rather, McCullough teaches that the principle to be gleaned from Pearce, viewed in light of numerous intervening Supreme Court decisions, is that the presumption applies where the circumstances demonstrate a need to protect against vindictiveness. Or, in the terms used in Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800, 109 S.Ct. 2201, the presumption applies only where the circumstances give rise to a reasonable likelihood that the sentence increase was the product of judicial vindictiveness. That this clarified principle derived from McCullough has become clearly established is also attested to by our own prior precedents. See Gonzales v. Wolfe, 290 Fed.Appx. 799, 812-13 (6th Cir.2008) (following McCullough and holding presumption not warranted where different judge imposed sentence after defendant's successful appeal). In Gauntlett v. Kelley, 849 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.1988), too, we applied McCullough 's teaching as clarifying and defining the scope of Pearce: The Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply where the second sentencer has no motivation to engage in self-vindication, . . . and where the possibility of vindictiveness is highly speculative. . . . Further, when the sentences are imposed by different sentencers, the presumption does not apply because there has been no real increase in the sentence. Id. at 217 (citations omitted). Notably, seven of our sister circuits have similarly concluded that the presumption does not apply when the varying sentences are imposed by different judges. See United States v. Rodriguez, 602 F.3d 346, 358 (5th Cir.2010) (collecting cases). Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in its determination that the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision, applying the principles enunciated in McCullough, is contrary to clearly established federal law. [2] Rather, the Ohio Court of Appeals' determination that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply in this case is entirely consonant with governing federal law. The harsher thirteen-year sentence received by Goodell was imposed by a judge different from the judge who had imposed the original nine-year sentence. This fact clearly undermines the applicability of the presumption. Apart from the fact that Goodell's ultimate sentence is longer than his original sentence, there are no other circumstances suggesting a need for the presumption to protect against vindictiveness. Quite to the contrary, Judge Cook's careful explanation of the reasons for the longer sentence, spelled out in the course of two resentencing hearings and summarized above, directly refutes the notion that vindictiveness played a role. Hence, the Ohio Court of Appeals' determination that the presumption was not applicable is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. [3]