Opinion ID: 2379994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Robert Adams

Text: Robert Adams (Adams) consulted respondent concerning a discrimination claim against his employer. They executed a retainer agreement which provided for a fee of $7,500.00 payable in five installments. Although the early payments were made, Adams failed to pay the last two installments. This circumstance prompted respondent to admonish Adams in writing that he had the right to withdraw from the case; Adams did not receive the letter. On April 4, 1995, respondent filed a complaint against the employer in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. When the employer moved for summary judgment on Adams' claims, respondent did not oppose the motion. When Adams inquired about the status of his case, respondent misrepresented that he had opposed the employer's motion for summary judgment. On April 24, 1996, the District Court granted the employer's unopposed motion for summary judgment. Respondent did not inform Adams that the case had been decided on its merits in favor of the employer, and continued to misinform Adams that the case was pending. In mid-August 1996, Adams discovered that his case had been dismissed. Upon inquiry by Adams, respondent insisted the case was still pending. Adams then confronted respondent about his failure to oppose the employer's motion for summary judgment. Respondent, however, continued to maintain that he had filed an opposition, but that it must have gotten lost. Respondent informed Adams that he would correct the situation. When Adams verified that his case had been dismissed, he filed a complaint with Bar Counsel on September 4, 1996. Hearing Committee No. 1 found that respondent (1) failed to represent Adams zealously and diligently and failed to act with reasonable promptness when he failed to file an opposition to the employer's motion for summary judgment and failed to notify Adams that the court granted the employer's unopposed motion, in violation of Rule 1.3(a), (c); (2) intentionally failed to seek the lawful objectives of Adams through reasonably available means when he abandoned Adams' case due to his inability make payments under the retainer agreement, in violation of Rule 1.3(b)(1); (3) failed to keep Adams reasonably informed about the status of the case when it had been decided on its merits in favor of the employer, and failed to notify Adams that he was withdrawing his representation due to Adams' failure to make retainer payments, in violation of Rules 1.4(a), (b); (5) failed to protect Adams' interests while a motion for summary judgment was pending when respondent terminated his services without notifying Adams or the trial court, in violation of Rule 1.16(d); (6) knowingly disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal when he unilaterally terminated his representation of Adams and failed to file a motion to withdraw his representation, in violation of Rule 3.4(c); and (7) engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation when he repeatedly advised Adams that he filed an opposition to the employer's motion for summary judgment when he had not done so, in violation of Rule 8.4(c). Hearing Committee No. 1 recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with all but thirty days stayed, and that respondent be placed on probation for one year with his practice subject to supervision by a practice monitor. B. Hearing Committee No. 10 Dr. Tepper Gill (Gill) retained respondent to represent him in a breach of contract action against his employer. Respondent filed a complaint on Gill's behalf in the Superior Court and the employer filed a counterclaim against Gill for losses incurred as a result of alleged unauthorized contracts entered into without appropriate authority. The litigation proceeded in a routine fashion until respondent failed to appear at a scheduled pre-trial conference on June 6, 2000. On May 26, 2000, respondent filed a motion to reschedule the pre-trial conference asserting that he had been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in a criminal case in Baltimore, Maryland on the same day as the pre-trial conference in the Gill matter. On June 2, 2000, the judge denied respondent's motion to reschedule the pre-trial conference. Because neither respondent nor Gill appeared for the scheduled pre-trial conference, the judge dismissed Gill's claims without prejudice and granted, sua sponte, a default judgment on the employer's counterclaim against Gill. A hearing was scheduled for ex parte proof on the employer's counterclaim. Respondent appeared at the hearing and represented that he never received the court's order denying his motion to reschedule pre-trial conference. The judge informed respondent that the matter had been dismissed because Gill also failed to appear at the pre-trial conference. The judge refused to vacate the order of dismissal and entered judgment on the employer's counterclaim in the amount of $318,910.00. In August 2000, respondent filed a motion to vacate the dismissal of Gill's claims, attaching a purported subpoena commanding him to appear in Baltimore on June 6, 2000  the date of the pre-trial conference in the Gill matter. The employer advised the court that the out-of-town criminal matter in which respondent was to appear as a witness never had a scheduled date of June 6, 2000, and that respondent had been subpoenaed to appear on June 13, 2000. The judge entered an order denying the motion to vacate the dismissal [2] of Gill's claims and upholding the default judgment on the employer's counterclaim. Thereafter, the judge referred respondent to the Office of Bar Counsel. In response to Bar Counsel's complaint, respondent stated that he had never received the subpoena calling for his appearance in Baltimore on June 13, 2000, but learned from his friend  the defendant in the criminal matter  that the proceeding was scheduled for June 6. In his testimony before the Hearing Committee, respondent stated that he did not intend to deceive the court or opposing counsel, and that he assumed that he could proffer the subpoena that he created to serve as a substitute for that which he was supposed to receive. Respondent admitted, and Hearing Committee No. 10 found, that he fabricated the subpoena. In finding that Gill suffered a sizable default judgment on the employer's counterclaim as a consequence of respondent's actions, or lack thereof, Hearing Committee No. 10 found respondent to be in violation of Rules 1.3(b), 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), 8.1(a), and 8.4(c), (d). Hearing Committee No. 10 took into consideration the factual findings and recommended sanction of Hearing Committee No. 1, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of fitness. C. Hearing Committee No. 7 In September 1995, Lisa Hinton (Hinton) retained respondent to represent her in an employment discrimination action against her employer. Respondent advised Hinton that she could pursue her existing claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or file a claim with the Department of Human Rights (DHR), or bypass the administrative agencies altogether and commence litigation in the Superior Court or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In October 1995, respondent recommended that Hinton transfer her case from the EEOC to the DHR. Respondent concluded that Hinton's case before the EEOC could not proceed due to a jurisdictional question, but did not advise Hinton of this problem. Respondent drafted a complaint to be filed with DHR and forwarded a copy of it to Hinton for her approval. Respondent informed Hinton that he would arrange to have the EEOC defer its investigation to DHR, but did not make any effort to accomplish that task. Respondent believed that the EEOC would dismiss Hinton's complaint on jurisdictional grounds. The EEOC, however, dismissed Hinton's complaint on the ground that it would not be able to prove that she had been discriminated against on the basis of race or disability. Upon receipt of the EEOC's notice, Hinton had ninety days to file two judicial complaints. Nonetheless, respondent allowed the limitation periods to run as to each cause of action without discussion. In October 1996, DHR informed Hinton that it too was dismissing her case because of the EEOC's earlier dismissal. Hinton then contacted respondent and he advised her that he was going to challenge DHR's dismissal of her claim. Hinton began calling respondent at his office on a regular basis in an effort to talk with him about her case. Her attempts to reach respondent during this period were unsuccessful; she left messages asking respondent to return her calls, which he failed to do. When respondent sent Hinton a letter containing a draft complaint to be filed in court, Hinton informed respondent that she was dissatisfied with his services and was terminating him as her counsel. She requested that respondent return all papers she supplied to him, all writings his office produced regarding the case, and a billing statement accounting for all billable time chargeable to her case. In response to Hinton's letter, respondent promised to send a detailed billing statement, but failed to do so. Hearing Committee No. 7 found that respondent (1) neglected Hinton's case and caused her to lose her claims under Title VII, the ADA, and the D.C. Human Rights Act, in violation of Rules 1.1(a) and (b); (2) failed to represent her zealously and diligently within the bounds of the law for the same reasons, in violation of Rule 1.3(a); (3) failed to keep Hinton reasonably informed and sufficiently educated about the case to permit her to make informed decisions, in violation of Rules 1.4(b) and (c); and (4) failed to take timely steps to the extent practicable to protect Hinton's interests upon termination of the representation, in violation of Rule 1.16(d). Hearing Committee No. 7 recommended (1) that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, (2) that he make restitution payments (with interest at the legal rate) to Hinton, and (3) that his sanction should not run concurrent to that imposed in the other disciplinary matters. D. Proceedings Before the Board on Professional Responsibility All of the disciplinary proceedings were reviewed by the Board. The Board consolidated the Richard, Bean, Adams, and Gill matters adjudicated by Hearing Committee Nos. 1 and 10, and considered as well the second proceeding, heard by Hearing Committee No. 7, the Hinton matter. Upon review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of each Hearing Committee, the Board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years with reinstatement conditioned upon proof of fitness, and that he make a restitution payment of $2,250.00 to Richard, and $1,500 to Hinton.