Opinion ID: 1980604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Examination by the State's Psychiatrist

Text: Appellant claims his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel were violated. Relying on Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), Taylor argues that the State's psychiatrist was required to identify himself as an agent of the State and to inform Taylor of his Miranda rights before his examination. We disagree. The defense raised the issue of the Taylor's mental stability early in the proceedings. In February 1991, the defense requested that the court appoint two disinterested physicians to determine if Taylor was competent to stand trial and to evaluate his sanity at the time of the shooting. The court appointed Dr. Ned P. Masbaum and Dr. Roger W. Perry to conduct the examinations. The doctors agreed that Taylor could understand the proceedings and assist in his defense and that he probably understood right from wrong on the night of the shooting. Two months later the defense formally filed notice of its intention to plead insanity. [5] At trial, the defense called four mental health experts to the stand: Gary and Pamela Porter, specialists in post-traumatic stress; Dr. Elgan Baker, a clinical psychologist and psychoanalyst; and Dr. John P. Wilson, a psychologist. Each testified that Taylor suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder after his combat experiences in Vietnam and that he did not know right from wrong at the time of the shooting. The State also had Taylor examined by a psychiatrist, Dr. David Crane, who testified that Taylor's descriptions of the night of the shooting revealed that he did know right from wrong.
Taylor contends that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to psychiatric examinations. This Court so held long ago. Haskett v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 206, 263 N.E.2d 529. Some years later, the U.S. Supreme Court held a defendant must receive Miranda warnings before participating in a court-ordered psychiatric exam if his statements are to be used to prove his future dangerousness in the penalty phase of a capital trial. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468, 101 S.Ct. at 1875. It is also well-established, however, that a defendant is not entitled to Miranda warnings when he raises the issue of his own sanity at the time of the offense. In Estelle, the Court limited its holding to cases in which the defendant neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468, 101 S.Ct. at 1876. Later in Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), the Court had occasion to apply this rule. In Buchanan, the defense joined the State in requesting a psychiatric examination of the defendant to determine if he should receive treatment pending trial. When the defendant raised the defense of extreme emotional distress at trial, the State responded by offering the physician's evaluation in rebuttal. The Court held that once a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. Id. at 422-23,107 S.Ct. at 2917-18. Such was our reasoning in Dickson v. State (1989), Ind., 533 N.E.2d 586, where a defendant pled insanity and then challenged his conviction when the court-appointed psychiatrists did not support his defense. We explained that [t]he necessity of advising appellant concerning his right to remain silent did not arise since the examinations were initiated and approved by him. Id. at 588; see also Mahaffey v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 380, 382 ([The defendant] initiated the psychiatric examination when he filed his special plea of insanity, and accepted the fact that he would be then subject to psychiatric examination and evaluation for the purpose of generating evidence admissible in the oncoming trial and useful to the prosecution in defeating his position.). Taylor was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to his interview with Dr. Crane. Taylor had ample opportunity to consult with counsel regarding his defense, and together they chose to plead insanity with full knowledge that Taylor might have to submit to psychiatric testing by the State. Furthermore, Dr. Crane did not err by failing to identify himself as an agent of the State. Crane did not misrepresent himself as a defense expert, and he expressly told Taylor the interview would not remain confidential. Supp. R. at 649. Moreover, Taylor's objection suggests only that had he known with whom he was meeting, he would have tailored his responses to his audience. This, of course, would defeat the purpose of the exam.
Taylor also argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. He does not claim he was denied the chance to consult with counsel. Rather, he complains the defense was not notified that Dr. Crane's examination would touch on the events surrounding the crime itself and that the doctor would testify concerning Taylor's statements about the shooting. This claim fails. A defendant is entitled to the opportunity to consult with counsel before submitting to a psychiatric examination by the State. In Estelle, the Supreme Court emphasized that a defendant must be given the benefit of the assistance of his attorneys in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination. 451 U.S. at 471, 101 S.Ct. at 1877. The Estelle Court also recognized the importance of notifying the defense to what end the psychiatrist's findings could be employed. Id. Later, in Buchanan, the Court reiterated that in order for counsel to perform effectively, counsel must be informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding. 483 U.S. at 424, 107 S.Ct. at 2919. When the defense of insanity is raised, of course, counsel is on notice that the State may examine the defendant and that the results of that examination may be used to rebut the insanity claim. So long as the testimony of the State's physician goes to the mental capacity of the defendant, the requirements of the Sixth Amendment have been satisfied. Id. at 424-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2918-19. The State may not, however, use a defendant's statements during such an examination to demonstrate his guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir.1968). As we have explained, the purpose of the exam is to evaluate the defendant's mental health, not to gather further evidence of guilt. The focus of the examination must be the defendant's mental health, and the physician's trial testimony must remain similarly focused. See Stolarz v. State (1983), Ind.App., 445 N.E.2d 114 (upholding conviction where State's psychiatrists not permitted to testify about what defendant told them regarding crime itself). The justification for permitting the State's examination is the maintenance of a `fair state-individual balance,' Albright, 388 F.2d at 724. The defendant may not plead insanity and then prevent the State from gathering reliable evidence bearing on that issue. As the Court explained in Estelle, [w]hen a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. On the other hand, the State may not misuse its access to the defendant by attempting to prove the defendant's guilt through the testimony of its physician. [6] If the court finds that the State is abusing the opportunity and using the defendant's statements to demonstrate guilt, it should not hesitate to exclude such statements. There will be cases, however, in which the defendant makes statements during the interview that are both probative of his sanity at the time of the crime and incriminating. See Phelan v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 542, 406 N.E.2d 237; see also Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996, 99 S.Ct. 597, 58 L.Ed.2d 669 (1978). In such cases, if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh its probative value, the statements may be admitted. This determination we leave to the sound discretion of the trial judge. In this case, the doctor's testimony did not prejudice the defendant. To the extent that Crane's testimony bore on the issue of guilt, it was cumulative of evidence already before the jury. Renica Johnson and Nicole Durham had already testified as eyewitnesses to the shooting, and both identified Taylor as the perpetrator. The State had shown further that the bullets removed from Tawana's body could have been the same type as those found in Taylor's apartment after the shooting. Ms. Smith had also testified, consistent with the testimony of Renica and Nicole, that Taylor broke into her apartment and beat her with a revolver. Furthermore, Crane's testimony was highly probative of Taylor's mental state at the time of the shooting. The defense theory was that Taylor suffered from post-traumatic stress as a result of service in Vietnam and that he was in a dissociative state when he shot Tawana. Consistent with this strategy, defense experts testified that Taylor believed he was in Vietnam on May 5 and that he had no memory of the murder. [7] In response, Crane testified he was suspicious of Taylor's alleged psychological impairment. Crane pointed to the fact that while Taylor did not admit shooting Tawana, he did recall many of the details of the incident, including that he had a gun and that he fired it. [8] Taylor's right to assistance of counsel was not violated by Dr. Crane's testimony. When the defense put Taylor's sanity in issue, it was fully aware that the State could have its own expert examine the defendant and testify at trial. The defense was also aware that the events of May 5 would play a role in assessing Taylor's mental state at that time. [9] Crane's testimony was highly probative of Taylor's sanity at the time of the crime. There is no indication that the doctor's testimony was offered for any reason other than to explain his assessment of Taylor's mental health. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Buchanan, the defendant had ample opportunity for consultation with counsel before raising the insanity defense, and counsel should have anticipated that the State would use such an examination to rebut the defense. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 424-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2918-19.