Opinion ID: 801832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Barreira's Prior Statements

Text: Rivera claims that the district court improperly denied the introduction of extrinsic impeachment evidence in the crossexamination of government witness Barreira and that this violated his constitutional right to confront the witness against him. Rivera sought to impeach Barreira with a sworn affidavit given to state prosecutors upon his arrest. The affidavit contained Barreira's sworn assertions that the gun that was confiscated from him on the day of his arrest -- the .357 Magnum that he had taken from Chito -- was the same gun used for the drive-by shooting and, consequently, the murder of Torres.5 Subsequent ballistic evidence 5 Rivera also sought to admit certain certified translations of audio recordings of testimony given by Barreira in state court proceedings. Counsel for Rivera admittedly failed to submit the transcripts to the court below as rejected impeachment material for the record, and Rivera's briefing on appeal is bereft of any -9- revealed, however, that the confiscated .357 Magnum was not a match for the one used in the murder. Accordingly, Barreira's testimony at trial acknowledged that he had made a mistake in his earlier statements by incorrectly assuming that [the .357 Magnum] was the revolver that was used in the Torres murder. Barreira stated that he had made this assumption because [] the day that [he] asked Chito to give [him] the revolver was the same day that Valdo ordered [him] to take the revolver from Chito in connection with the botched drive-by. Rivera argues that Barreira's prior sworn statements establish a discrepancy regarding the gun that makes his testimony at trial less credible, and his prior statements more significant for impeachment purposes. We disagree. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment secures a right to cross-examination in order to test 'the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony.' United States v. González-Vázquez, 219 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Carty, 993 F.2d 1005, 1009 (1st Cir. 1993)). However, as we have explained, this right is not unlimited. When a witness's credibility is at issue, the trial court may limit crossexamination as long as the court allows 'sufficient leeway to description whatsoever of what, if any, material statements those transcripts contain. We nonetheless assume, based on the nature of Rivera's argument on appeal, that they contain parallel misstatements by Barreira as to the gun in question and would therefore have a similar effect upon the question on appeal. -10- establish a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation.' Id. (quoting United States v. LaboyDelgado, 84 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, on appeal from a trial court's decision to impose such limitations, we first review the record de novo to ascertain whether the court, overall, gave the defendant a reasonable chance to develop the whole picture. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d at 28 (emphasis added). If we determine that the defendant's opportunity to impeach adverse witnesses met or exceeded this constitutionally-guaranteed threshold, we review for abuse of discretion the district court's decision to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination in order to avoid confusion of the issues or extended discussion of marginally relevant material. United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Barreira's testimony at trial acknowledged that he had made a prior statement in which he had mistakenly characterized the confiscated revolver as the murder weapon. Barreira's acknowledgment at trial of the discrepancy between his prior statement and the subsequently-gleaned ballistics information clarified to the jury the precise conflict that Rivera was interested in highlighting through the affidavit. The district court's failure to allow Rivera to introduce Barreira's prior sworn -11- statement as extrinsic evidence therefore did not prevent the jury from obtaining a reasonably complete picture of the witness' veracity, bias, and motivation. Laboy-Delgado, 84 F.3d at 28 (quoting United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990)). Defense counsel had ample opportunity to explore this avenue of impeachment and to ensure[] that the jury understood [Rivera's] concerns about the witness, at which point the district court was entitled to move the trial forward. Byrne, 435 F.3d at 22. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 478 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting no Confrontation Clause issue [was] presented where reasonable opportunity to test [the witnesses'] veracity and motives was offered). We therefore hold that the district court did not deprive Rivera of his confrontation rights by denying his request to admit prior statements by Barreira as impeachment material. Moreover, we conclude that the district court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. While the previous statement might be superficially inconsistent with Barreira's testimony at trial, his explanation upon questioning by both parties, i.e., mistaken belief, did away with the inconsistency; and so the trial court found. See United States v. Martin, 694 F.2d 885, 888 (1st Cir. 1982) (alleged inconsistent statement of witness made prior to trial not allowed as extrinsic impeachment evidence where defendant-appellant was unable to demonstrate that the offered -12- testimony was in fact inconsistent with statements made at trial); see also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975) (A basic rule of evidence provides that prior inconsistent statements may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. As a preliminary matter, however, the court must be persuaded that the statements are indeed inconsistent.).