Opinion ID: 1337331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Misconduct of the Solicitor

Text: Appellants contend they suffered prejudice by reason of prosecutorial misconduct in several particulars: (a) cross-examination and jury argument suggesting appellants might escape or be released unless put to death; (b) jury argument concerning appellants' failure to testify; (c) jury argument referring to this Court's opinion in State v. Plath , 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E. (2d) 221; (d) generally inflammatory speech in closing argument. (a) Two episodes of cross-examination are involved in this appeal. The first incident occurred after the direct examination of Professor Bruce Pearson, an anthropologist at the University of South Carolina, whose opinion was that life imprisonment represented a mode of expressing societal disapproval superior to capital punishment. Counsel for Arnold specifically questioned the witness about life imprisonment in South Carolina as he had observed it in the course of five years as a regular, weekly visitor to the Central Correctional Institute in Columbia. The following passage is illustrative (with emphasis added): Question: Now, should this jury bring back a life imprisonment verdict, would John move into other quarters? Answer: Well, as the prison is now set up, people serving life terms would be sent to either the old cell block or one of the barrack type wards. Question: Would John's life or quality of living actually improve if he went into the general population or would it even get worse? Answer: Well, it's hard to say ... when you know that they are going to lock the key and close the door behind you and you are not going to leave [it] doesn't make too much difference if they have you in a big luxury hotel, if you were locked in , it would still be a prison and I can assure that CCI is not a luxury hotel. Question: If Mr. Arnold went to general population, would his life improve markedly? Answer: Well, that's a difficult question to answer. In some ways it would improve but in other ways it would remain the same, I think. Question: We are still dealing with loss of liberty. Answer: That's right. Immediately following this exchange, and in response to questions by counsel for Plath, the witness described life imprisonment as a form of slavery. Clearly the thrust of this defense testimony was to demonstrate the permanence and deprivation entailed in life imprisonment. Since the witness claimed an intimate knowledge of CCI, and based his testimony upon that knowledge, it was not amiss for the State to pursue his claim more closely. In the course of this inquiry the allegedly prejudicial matter arose. Specifically the witness was asked if he had investigated the case of a particular inmate who had escaped while serving a life term. The escape evidently took place while the inmate was performing errands outside the prison walls. Portions of the offensive interrogation follow: Question: Now, what I want to know Doctor, knowing you were going to come back here and testify and knowing that I told you about Lewis Bostick ... did you investigate it to see whether or not when you send somebody to life imprisonment at the penitentiary, it doesn't really mean they are confined in a cell for the rest of their life, have you investigated that? Answer: That is really not an area that I have taken as part of my studies. Question: Well, why wouldn't it, doctor, wouldn't that be important to tell a jury ... if you tell them they are going to be locked up in a cell the rest of their life, wouldn't it be important to know that that's not a correct statement? Answer: (No response.) This identical line of questioning was the subject of exception in State v. Plath , 277 S.C. 126, 140-141, 284 S.E. (2d) 221, 229. On that occasion we held the inquiry to be proper as a test of the information upon which the witness based his opinion. After the passage of three years, and in light of the expert's claimed familiarity with the life imprisonment regime, we believe the State and the jury were doubly entitled to know why the witness had not investigated this rather extraordinary episode. His unexplained failure to do so was directly relevant to his credibility as an unbiased social scientist. Appellants next protest the State's cross-examination of witness Cathy Brazell, a social worker engaged in prison ministry. Mrs. Brazell testified about her religious work with appellant Plath and her belief in the genuine character of his religious conversion. On direct examination she also related that her son had been the victim of a tragic slaying, stressing thereby her belief in prayer and forgiveness. On cross-examination, the State produced a letter written to the Solicitor by the same witness and prompted by her own son's death. In the letter she complained that the multiple murderer, Donald H. Pee-Wee Gaskins, was allowed to move freely about the prison as a messenger boy notwithstanding his compound life sentences. See State v. Gaskins , 270 S.C. 296, 242 S.E. (2d) 220. Appellants strenuously object to this cross-examination and to subsequent jury argument based upon it. They contend the subject matter was irrelevant and not responsive to any testimony of defense witnesses. They believe themselves to have been prejudiced by the introduction of an arbitrary factor into the sentencing deliberations  that is, speculation as to possible escape or premature release. We find that the record, read as a whole, fails to support appellants' claims. The course of this trial dramatically demonstrates why this Court has prohibited testimony on the theory and propriety of capital punishment as such. In this case, the defense sought to portray life imprisonment as preferable to capital punishment as a matter of social policy. With the exception of Dr. Neidig's testimony, the entire defense of appellant Arnold was based upon an attempted showing that capital punishment was an ineffective instrument of deterrence, a crude device for expressing social disapproval, and even a counterproductive approach to control of crime. As noted above, defense witness Pearson drew a picture of life imprisonment as slavery, a condition of irretrievable loss which he invited the jury to contemplate through vivid recollection of many years' experience in teaching and counselling inmates of CCI. This testimony was elaborated and bolstered through cross-examinations by counsel for appellant Plath. Parenthetically, we note and reject Plath's inconsistent contention that he was improperly denied a limiting jury instruction on the alternative penalties. We find, moreover, that the trial judge amply explained the binding effect of a jury recommendation in both his jury instructions and in the individual voir dire of jurors. It is our settled view that such a defense is highly improper, for it invites the jury to intrude upon the strictly legislative function of determining the nature of crime and punishment under our Constitution. In the sentencing phase of a capital case, the jury shall understand the terms life imprisonment and death sentence in their ordinary and plain meaning without elaboration. In the sentencing phase of a capital case, the function of the jury is not to legislate a plan of punishment but to make the either/or selection called for by the language of 16-3-20(A), Code, which in pertinent part provides: A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life.... Such determinations as the time, place, manner, and conditions of execution or incarceration, as well as the matter of parole are reserved by statute and our cases to agencies other than the jury. As we have repeatedly stated, the sole function of the jury in a capital sentencing trial is the individualized selection of one or the other penalty, based upon the circumstances of the crime and characteristics of the individual defendant. By way of illustration, in State v. Woomer , 278 S.C. 468, 299 S.E. (2d) 317, 319, we recently held that psychiatric evidence of future dangerousness was not prejudicial in the circumstances of that case. Subsequently the United States Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle , ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3396, 77 L.Ed. (2d) 1090, 1107, has recognized the utility of such testimony under the view that, What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual whose fate it must determine. On the other hand, this Court has held irrelevant testimony regarding a defendant's potential adjustment to the controlled environment of life imprisonment. State v. Koon , 278 S.C. 528, 536, 298 S.E. (2d) 769, 773. The distinction lies in the lack of logical connection between adaptability to confinement and the specific personality or character traits which were instrumental in leading the defendant to commit the particular crime at issue. The dividing line is fine indeed, yet not impossible of discernment. A jury needs to know how a given defendant came to commit a given aggravated murder, to include aspects of his background, his character and the setting of the crime itself which may explain or even mitigate the conduct of which he has been found guilty. A jury does not need to know how often he will take a shower or whether or not he will be lonely and withdrawn during his tenure at CCI. It should not be necessary in the future for this Court to remind the bench and bar of the strict focus to be maintained in the course of a capital sentencing trial. In the case before us, defendants elected to enter the forbidden field of social policy and penology. It is neither surprising nor can it be deemed prejudicial that the State responded in kind, attempting to show through defendants' own witnesses that life imprisonment was not the total abyss which they portrayed it to be. We read both the State's cross-examinations and subsequent jury arguments in light of the record as a whole. We find nowhere that the Solicitor sought to predict or to argue that these appellants would escape or would be improvidently released. Rather, his argument, particularly in its concluding passage, simply placed before the jury the stark choice between death and life imprisonment, emphasizing that his job was concluded and that the decision was to rest with them. His references to the cross-examinations just discussed strike the candid reader as merely reminders to the jury that life imprisonment was by no means as hopeless as defendants would have it believed. The State was entitled to make this response. The appellants have shown no prejudice therefrom. (b) Appellants contend that in the course of his jury summation the Solicitor made prejudicial reference to their failure to testify. This claim takes his arguments out of context and disregards the entire thrust of the defense. From opening argument, through cross-examination of State witnesses, to final summation, counsel for both appellants stressed repeatedly the unfairness in the prosecution of this case. With indignation they pointed to the grant of immunity received by State's witness, Cindy Sheets, in contrast to the prospect of death for their clients. We cannot fault the defendants for offering to the jury this potentially persuasive argument. By the same token, however, we cannot deny the State an opportunity to explain the development of the case and the absolute necessity for testimony and cooperation by witness Sheets. This was done through examination of witnesses and argument to the jury. In final summation, the Solicitor did indeed refer to the fact that neither Plath nor Arnold would be testifying in the trial, a statement which drew objection from the defense and a prompt apology to the jury by the Solicitor. We believe that any possible prejudice was cured, and we decline to adopt appellants' view that the Solicitor's apology somehow made matters worse. Beyond this, we note that the jury was amply instructed by the trial court concerning the right of a defendant to remain silent and put the State to its proof. Accordingly we find, in the circumstances, that the Solicitor's argument worked no prejudice to the appellants. (c) Appellants object to portions of the Solicitor's argument which referred to this Court's decision in State v. Plath , 277 S.C. 126, 284 S.E. (2d) 221, particularly as we addressed the jury instruction on kidnapping as delivered in the original trial. Appellants interpret the argument as an effort to invoke the authority of this Court to preclude an independent jury determination on the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping. We find, however, that the passages complained of are not susceptible to this interpretation but are instead simply efforts by the State to explain the function of the jury at this trial and to argue to the jury the elements of kidnapping which the State had sought to prove. We see no way in which the jury in this case could have been misled by these arguments, especially in light of the trial judge's ample instructions both in the course of voir dire and at the conclusion of the evidence. (d) Finally, appellants complain of rhetorical flourishes engaged in by the Solicitor in his summation, especially his expressed hope that the jurors would have the guts to do your job. An inelegant turn of phrase or momentary lapse of good taste will rarely constitute prejudicial error, nor does robust language necessarily inject an arbitrary factor into a trial such as this one. Finding no prejudice here, we dismiss these claims of error as frivolous.