Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The State's Remarks at the Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant's ninth point for review is that the State improperly argued that defendant should be sentenced to death because he would kill someone if he received life in prison, that the jury should weigh the aggravation against the mitigation and that defendant displayed no remorse for the murder. The State conceded that defendant had said he was sorry, but commented that he was sorry he was sitting in jail awaiting his trial. The State then argued, He didn't show any remorse, and he shows no remorse. Defendant argues that the State cannot argue that a defendant has shown no remorse when he has. People v. Gosier, 145 Ill.2d 127, 153-54, 163 Ill.Dec. 823, 582 N.E.2d 89 (1991). Defendant argues that he told the assistant State's Attorney from felony review that he was sorry, that he wanted to do the right thing, and that he would change places with Rose Newburn if it were possible. That was remorse. The State contends that in Gosier this court did not set forth a rule of law regarding commentary on a defendant's lack of remorse, as defendant seems to imply in his brief. Rather, the issue in Gosier was whether the prosecutor had made a blatantly untrue statement when he argued that the defendant had shed no tears for what he had done considering the fact that the defendant had broken down in tears several times before the jury, and the detective in the case had testified that the defendant had cried during their interview. Gosier, 145 Ill.2d at 153-54, 163 Ill.Dec. 823, 582 N.E.2d 89. Here, there was no such incorrect statement of fact. The prosecutor conceded during his remarks that defendant had said that he was sorry, but argued that the apology alone was not enough to show genuine remorse, thereby distinguishing this case from Gosier. Further, this court has consistently held that `a convicted defendant's remorse or the absence of it is a proper subject for consideration at sentencing.' Bannister, 232 Ill.2d at 91, 327 Ill.Dec. 450, 902 N.E.2d 571, quoting People v. Burgess, 176 Ill.2d 289, 317, 223 Ill.Dec. 624, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997), quoting Barrow, 133 Ill.2d at 281, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240. Defendant also asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that defendant should be sentenced to death because he would kill someone if he were to receive life in prison. This court has held [t]he fact that a defendant is parole-ineligible does not prevent the State from arguing that the defendant poses a future danger, as the State may reasonably argue that defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and that executing him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other inmates or prison staff. People v. Mertz, 218 Ill.2d 1, 56, 299 Ill. Dec. 581, 842 N.E.2d 618 (2005). In People v. Hudson, 157 Ill.2d 401, 457, 193 Ill.Dec. 128, 626 N.E.2d 161 (1993), this court found that the prosecutor's statement that the defendant will kill again if he is given the chance was proper because it was supported by the evidence and based upon testimony regarding prior misconduct. Defendant argues that the State presented no evidence that [defendant] threatened to kill anyone. We agree with the State that there was testimony, however, that defendant sexually assaulted a young girl while holding an ice pick to her friend's throat, that he had an actual prior murder in his background, and that he had threatened violent behavior in prison, including possession of a weapon. Finally, defendant contends that the State improperly argued that death was mandatory if the mitigation did not outweigh the aggravation. Under the Illinois death penalty statute as it existed at the time of the crime, the defendant had to show that there is mitigation sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. People v. Olinger, 112 Ill.2d 324, 351, 97 Ill.Dec. 772, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986). Defendant's argument fails, however, because the prosecutor's argument was essentially a correct statement of the law. As he noted, the law under which defendant elected to be sentenced did state that [i]f the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(g) (West 2002). In stating that all the jurors had to find was that the aggravation outweighs the mitigation, the prosecutor was simply rephrasing the standard, to explain that all the jurors had to decide was that the mitigation offered was not justification to preclude the death penalty. Here, the remarks in question did not substantially prejudice defendant, particularly since there was an overwhelming amount of evidence offered in aggravation, including testimony regarding defendant's 133 disciplinary infractions in the Department of Corrections, his prior murder conviction, and his prior sexual assault.