Opinion ID: 2981381
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Character Vouching

Text: In the second instance of prosecutorial misconduct, Petitioner alleges that the prosecutor engaged in improper vouching by commenting on B.V.’s credibility during opening statement. The prosecutor stated that B.V.’s testimony would be “much more important and much more credible” than DNA evidence or other physical evidence. The prosecutor also commented that B.V. was “going to tell [the jurors] the truth” and “she knows she’s telling the truth.” Petitioner also claims that the statement of “glad I’m on this side” constituted evidence of improper vouching. We continue to analyze Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim under the standard set forth in Darden. See Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam). “Improper vouching occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the witnesses’s credibility thereby placing the prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness.” United States v. Reid, 625 F.3d 977, 982 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 550 (6th Cir. 1999)). Comments are deemed improper if 8 No. 09-3957 they are “blunt” or “imply that the prosecutor has special knowledge of facts not in front of the jury or of the credibility and truthfulness of witnesses and their testimony.” Francis, 170 F.3d at 550. The Ohio Court of Appeals found Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct without merit because regardless of whether the comments were improper, “they did not render Rector’s trial unfair.” Rector, 2002 WL 32098116, at  10. In addition, the state court of appeals concluded that the prosecutor’s remarks were “fleeting references” rather than “points of emphasis” and the trial court “instructed the jury that opening statements and closing statements are not evidence” to be evaluated by the jury. Id. The state appellate court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. We are concerned that the prosecutor’s comments during opening statement were improper because the prosecutor injected her personal beliefs at trial by stating that B.V.’s testimony was more credible than the DNA evidence and that B.V. would speak truthfully. We have previously cautioned against improper vouching, particularly in the context of sexual abuse cases, which almost exclusively rely on the credibility of witnesses: Cases involving sexual abuse exert an almost irresistible pressure on the emotions of the bench and bar alike. Because such cases typically turn on the relative credibilities of the defendant and the prosecuting witness, however, a strict adherence to the rules of evidence and appropriate prosecutorial conduct is required to ensure a fair trial. Martin v. Parker, 11 F.3d 613, 616–17 (6th Cir. 1993). The DNA evidence in this case was inconclusive and Petitioner did not testify at trial; therefore, the only witness who could testify to the actual events was B.V. Petitioner’s counsel attempted to discredit B.V. by suggesting that the 9 No. 09-3957 prosecutor prepared written statements that B.V. memorized and recited at trial and that B.V. could not remember the dates of the alleged incidents. Regardless of the propriety of the prosecutor’s comments, the state appellate court reasonably concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial that would violate Petitioner’s due process rights as established under Darden. The trial judge minimized any potential prejudicial effect on the jury by providing a curative instruction. The judge stated to the jury that they “are the sole judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” The judge also explained to the jury what factors they should consider to assess a witness’ credibility. In addition, the prosecutor limited her comments to her opening statement and there is no evidence that the prosecution continued to refer to B.V.’s credibility throughout the trial. Thus, the prosecutor’s conduct was not “so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] the entire atmosphere of the trial or so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant.” Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 641 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964) (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 639. The “instances of impropriety” were mainly “isolated from the other sets of remarks and probably were not deliberate.” Francis, 170 F.3d at 552. For these reasons, we agree with the state appellate court’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s statements during trial did not render Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair so as to violate his due process rights, and we deny habeas relief on this claim. 10 No. 09-3957