Opinion ID: 1671948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: penalty phase assistance of counsel

Text: Robinson next claims that defense counsel Pearl's performance was deficient during the penalty phase of his resentencing because he allegedly failed to investigate mitigation. We find that although counsel's performance may have been deficient in some respects, Robinson cannot demonstrate that he was so prejudiced as to merit a new penalty phase proceeding. To merit relief, Robinson must show not only deficient performance, but also that the deficient performance so prejudiced his defense that, without the alleged errors, there is a reasonable probability that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would have been different. Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1556-57 (11th Cir.1994). See also Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 570-71 (Fla.1996); Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.2d 107, 109 (Fla.1995). Relevant factors for inquiry include counsel's failure to investigate and present available mitigating evidence, along with the reasons for not doing so. Rose, 675 So.2d at 571. We recently dealt with a remarkably similar situation in Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874 (Fla.1997). As Robinson does here, Breedlove alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his background, failing to furnish mental health experts with relevant information which would have supported their testimony about mitigating factors, and failing to call family members and friends who would have testified about his childhood abuse, mental instability, and addiction to drugs and alcohol. Id. at 877. On appeal, we found as follows: Based upon this review of the evidence, we do not find that the alleged deficient performance resulted in prejudice which meets the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of the rule 3.850 motion on that basis. First, we note that both psychologists who had testified at the penalty phase stated at the postconviction hearing that although additional information from Breedlove's counsel might have been helpful, their opinions were unchanged as to matters about which they had testified, even considering the additional information. We further note our finding in our 1995 opinion that two state experts expressly stated that they found no evidence of organic brain damage or psychosis and one of them said Breedlove was malingering. Breedlove, 655 So.2d at 77. In light of these opinions, we do not conclude that but for counsel's alleged deficient performance with respect to the preparation of the experts, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty phase would have been different. Second, we do not agree that the failure to present the testimony of the friends and family members presented by Breedlove at the postconviction hearing meets the prejudice standard. This evidence addressed essentially two subjects: the alleged beatings of Breedlove by his father and his drug addiction. Moreover, we agree with the State's response that the presentation of each of these witnesses would have allowed cross-examination and rebuttal evidence that would have countered any value Breedlove might have gained from the evidence.[n.4] [n.4] For example, the State sought to introduce at the penalty phase rebuttal evidence that Breedlove had confessed to a similar murder in Broward County. Breedlove had admitted to burglarizing the home of a 63-year-old woman and to killing her. At the time of the original trial, Breedlove had not yet been convicted of this crime. Because Breedlove presented no evidence of his character, the court found that the prejudicial nature of this evidence outweighed its probative value. Valle v. State, 581 So.2d 40, 49 (Fla.1991); Medina v. State, 573 So.2d 293, 298 (Fla. 1990) (finding no ineffectiveness in not presenting witnesses where they would have opened the door for the State to explore defendant's violent tendencies). Even if the trial court had found mitigating circumstances in additional testimony from lay witnesses, the three aggravating factors we have previously affirmed overwhelm whatever mitigation the testimony of Breedlove's friends and family members could provide.[n.5] [n.5] Breedlove, 655 So.2d 74, 76 (1995). We addressed the effects of this type of claimed mitigation in Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla.1989), a case which is strikingly similar. In Tompkins, the defendant was convicted of the strangulation murder of a fifteen-year-old girl. The defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that counsel failed to investigate and present evidence of mitigation in the penalty phase. The trial court found that even though counsel was deficient in that regard, the mitigating evidence overlooked by counsel would not have changed the outcome and therefore did not demonstrate prejudice under the Strickland test. This Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the factors of an abused childhood and drug addiction did not counter three aggravating circumstances of being especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, of commission during a felony, and of prior violent felony convictions. Id. As here, the prior violent felonies were two rapes. See also King v. State, 597 So.2d 780 (Fla.1992); Mendyk v. State, 592 So.2d 1076, 1079-80 (Fla.1992); and Buenoano v. Dugger, 559 So.2d 1116, 1119 (Fla.1990). Similarly, the three aggravating factors the trial court set forth in Breedlove's sentencing overwhelm potential mitigating factors presented by witnesses at the 1992 postconviction hearing. Id. at 877-78. Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's denial of Breedlove's 3.850 motion because he failed to prove he was prejudiced by the non-presentation of additional mitigation. Id. at 878. In this case, the trial court found three nonstatutory mitigators on resentencing: Robinson had a difficult childhood; Robinson suffered physical and sexual abuse during childhood; and Robinson had a psychosexual disorder. Robinson, 574 So.2d at 109 n. 3. The lay witnesses Robinson identifies certainly could have presented more testimony regarding the first two nonstatutory mitigators, as well as presenting good character evidence about some of the loving relationships Robinson has had with several women and the good deeds he has performed. However, as in Breedlove, the State could have presented, in rebuttal, evidence that less than one week after the St. George murder, Robinson allegedly committed an armed robbery and rape with Fields after coming upon a woman with a disabled car on the interstate. [11] In other words, those alleged crimes were an almost exact replay of what happened with Ms. St. George, minus the murder. The trial court could have concluded that Pearl was not ineffective in not opening the door to this potentially devastating rebuttal evidence. Similarly, Pearl's decision to solely rely on Dr. Krop's testimony, while questionable, is also defensible. Moreover, as the State notes, despite the new information provided by postconviction counsel, Krop still believes that Robinson has some type of personality disorder and still has some type of sexual disorder. That Robinson has had some loving relationships with women does not change the fact that he was previously convicted of rape in Maryland, probably raped Ms. St. George, and allegedly raped another woman five days after the St. George murder in a similar criminal episode. With that said, Pearl certainly displayed suspect judgment in not closing the loop with Krop on investigating possible mitigation. Pearl should have been more proactive and more directly involved. In that sense, his performance was probably deficient. Yet, when taken as a whole, Robinson has not demonstrated error in the trial court's conclusion that no prejudice resulted from Pearl's relative inaction. Considering the five valid aggravators, the cumulative nature of the proffered lay testimony, and the modification of Krop's testimony, we find no error in the trial court's finding that Robinson has not demonstrated the prejudice necessary to mandate relief. Rose, 675 So.2d at 570; Breedlove. We affirm the trial court's denial of relief on this issue.