Opinion ID: 612996
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kansas Penn's Complaint

Text: Kansas Penn has not satisfied its pleading burden in this case, for several reasons.
As an initial matter, Kansas Penn alleges the conditions on its property did not amount to a public nuisance or otherwise violate applicable environmental laws or regulations. Aplt.App. at A11-12 (Compl.¶ 22). This allegation is not supported by factual content, and is merely a conclusion of law. Under Twombly and Iqbal, this is insufficient, and not entitled to a presumption of truth. The only specific factual allegation Kansas Penn offers in the face of the CCHD's nuisance notice  which itself provides significant detail  is the assertion that the property did not exhibit evidence of burning. Aplt.App. at A11 (Compl.¶ 22). While we take that as true at this stage in the proceedings, Kansas Penn ignores the specific other problems with the condition of the property  deteriorated buildings, the remains of a house foundation, and the presence of solid debris and waste. If Kansas Penn had provided factual allegations suggesting its property was not in violation of the relevant regulations, it could be considered obvious that CCHD treated it differently than other, similarly situated property owners. We take for granted that there are many properties in Cherokee County that are compliant with nuisance regulations, and also that CCHD has not sent notices to each of them. But because this theory of the case rests entirely on a legal conclusion about the condition of the property, we must look elsewhere for specific factual allegations showing that Kansas Penn was treated differently than other, similarly situated property owners. This we cannot find. First, Kansas Penn contends the CCHD has not sought to enforce the environmental laws cited in the [CCHD] Letter to [Kansas Penn] against any landowner or tenant in possession of real property in Cherokee County other than [Kansas Penn] since, at the latest, January 1, 2006. Id. at A14 (Compl.¶ 33). In other words, Kansas Penn asserts that during this three-year period only it received a nuisance notice from the CCHD. This may suggest Kansas Penn has received different treatment than other property owners in Cherokee County. But the fact that government action is infrequent, or that a formerly unenforced regulation is enforced, is not enough to create a federal cause of action. Olech requires more. Kansas Penn must also allege that some number of the property owners receiving different treatment were also similarly situated, thereby indicating that the enforcement action was arbitrary or for an improper motive. But Kansas Penn offers only conclusory allegations that other property owners are similarly situated. The complaint alleges that numerous parcels of land in Cherokee County exist in conditions comparable to the Subject Property or exhibit conditions similar to and in many cases much worse than those alleged by the [CCHD] to exist on the Subject Property. Id. (Compl.¶ 35). Again, this broad allegation is merely a formulaic recitation of a legal conclusion, and is inadequate to show that other properties with ramshackle buildings and visible debris have somehow gotten a pass from CCHD officials. As we discussed above, after Twombly and Iqbal, it is insufficient to simply allege that other, unidentified properties have comparable or similar conditions  the claim must be supported by specific facts plausibly suggesting the conditions on the properties and the properties themselves are similar in all material respects. These cursory allegations are inadequate to support any class-of-one claim. But they are particularly problematic here, where the complaint addresses the inherently subjective and individualized enforcement of health and safety regulations. Unlike Olech, this is not a case where the regulatory decision is a simple, one-dimensional inquiry, resolved with a tape measure. Rather, Kansas Penn challenges an act of regulatory enforcement that implicates a multiplicity of relevant (nondiscriminatory) variables, from the relative culpability of the defendants to the optimal deployment of prosecutorial resources, making it correspondingly more difficult to bring an equal protection claim. Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1214-15. Because Kansas Penn has failed to allege facts suggesting that other property owners were similarly situated in all material respects, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint.
Another aspect of the complaint is infirm as well. In addition to suing Hayes, the CCHD official who sent the notice at issue, Kansas Penn has named the members of the Cherokee County Board of County Commissioners in their individual and official capacities and the Cherokee County Board itself as defendants. But Kansas Penn has not sufficiently alleged liability for the individual commissioners and the County. In order for liability to arise under § 1983, a defendant's direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established. Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir.2006). Thus, when a plaintiff sues an official under ... § 1983 for conduct arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities, the plaintiff must plausibly plead and eventually prove not only that the official's subordinates violated the Constitution, but that the official by virtue of his own conduct and state of mind did so as well. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1198 (10th Cir.2010) (quotation omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action  where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants  .... each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.). Kansas Penn argues the following allegations show personal participation by the individual commissioners in the alleged violation: (1) that the Board voted to ratify Cherokee County's breach of contract suit against Kansas Penn; (2) that the attorney representing the County in the breach of contract suit also assisted in preparing the County's response to Kansas Penn's KORA request; (3) that Kansas Penn's property existed in the same conditions for years, but only prompted a response from CCHD after Kansas Penn withdrew its application to develop a casino and no other bidders emerged; and (4) that the individual commissioners and Hayes acted in concert in sending the CCHD notice. The first three of these allegations are plainly inadequate to establish the commissioners were personally involved in sending the CCHD notice. The fact that the commissioners might have felt animosity towards Kansas Penn, due to its withdrawal of the Facility Manager application and the subsequent breach of contract lawsuit, does not connect them to the nuisance notice. Nor does the fact that the County used the same attorney representing it against Kansas Penn in the contract suit to respond to Kansas Penn's KORA demands. These allegations are speculative, proposing that because the nuisance notice was sent after the County sued Kansas Penn, the notice was because of the lawsuit  and concomitantly, because the individual commissioners are involved in the lawsuit, they were involved in sending the letter. Such post hoc ergo prompter hoc logic does not create a conspiracy. Only the last contention, that the commissioners actually acted in concert with Hayes in sending the notice, is even relevant to this point. But this allegation is precisely the sort of naked assertion[] devoid of further factual enhancement that Iqbal instructs us to disregard. 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Though Kansas Penn provides detail suggesting that Hayes sent the notice (including an attached copy of the notice with his signature), it offers nothing to support the notion that the commissioners were involved. Kansas Penn does not even allege that Hayes reports to the commissioners, or that they had any professional contact whatsoever. Kansas Penn must show some active involvement by the Board in Hayes's enforcement action to link them to the deprivation of a constitutional right. Thus, even if Kansas Penn could show that Hayes acted arbitrarily, we see no basis for linking that act to the commissioners. As a final matter, under § 1983, a municipality is liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees only where the action was authorized by official municipal policy. Milligan-Hitt v. Bd. of Trs. of Sheridan County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.2008). Official policy may take the form of formal rules or understandings or, alternatively, a decision by a municipal officer who is responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 483, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Because Kansas Penn does not allege the CCHD notice was the product of a formal policy, the success of its claim against Cherokee County rests on whether the notice was authorized by a final policymaker. The individual commissioners likely qualify as final policymakers  such positions are commonly granted authority to make discretionary decisions that are not reviewable or constrained by the decisions of others. See Milligan-Hitt, 523 F.3d at 1228. But Kansas Penn has failed to state a claim against these defendants, and it does not even attempt to argue that Hayes, an employee in the CCHD, is a final policymaker. We therefore conclude the claim against Cherokee County must fail as well.