Opinion ID: 33422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: i. statutory interpretation of the adea

Text: 59 The majority's analysis begins with the premise that the RFOA exception of the ADEA facially appears as a safe harbor to employers. To the majority, the language of the RFOA exception clearly rejects the theory of disparate impact. The majority relies in part on a pre- Hazen dissent by Judge Easterbrook in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc., for the proposition that the RFOA exception is  incomprehensible unless the prohibition forbids disparate treatment and the exception authorizes disparate impact. 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir.1987) (emphasis added). 60 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, it is not at all clear from the text that the RFOA exception has no alternative interpretation other than to preclude disparate impact. The RFOA exception aside, the language of the ADEA and Title VII are similar in every other respect. Thus, I cannot conclude, in the absence of expressed language to the contrary, that Congress meant to apply the disparate impact theory to Title VII, but not to the analogous language of the ADEA. Until the United States Supreme Court expressly rules on this issue, I continue to believe that the majority viewpoint is in error. Despite the obvious similarities between Title VII and the ADEA, today's majority joins our fellow courts of the First, 1 Third, 2 Sixth, 3 Seventh, 4 Tenth, 5 and Eleventh 6 Circuits in disclaiming a disparate impact theory under the ADEA. 61 As shown through persuasive precedent from other circuits, however, there is another side to this debate. For example, while acknowledging that post- Hazen the availability of disparate impact claims under the ADEA is unsettled among the circuits, the Second Circuit held that it generally assesses claims brought under the ADEA identically to those brought pursuant to Title VII, including disparate impact. Smith v. Xerox, 196 F.3d 358, 367 n. 5 (2d Cir.1999). The Second Circuit is not alone. The Eighth Circuit has also stated that it continues to recognize the viability of ... [ADEA disparate impact] claims. Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114 F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir.1997); See also EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir.1999) (stating that the law of this circuit is that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA). Thus, precedent from other circuits show that a contrary facial interpretation of the RFOA is reasonable. 62 Moreover, the strongest argument against the language of the RFOA exception precluding disparate impact lies in the substantive provisions of the ADEA and Title VII. In a similar case, a concurrence by Eleventh Circuit Judge Barkett acutely noted: 63 [I]n every statutory discrimination case, a decision based upon legitimate business necessity will never support a claim for liability. Griggs itself recognized and repeatedly emphasized that disparate impact is a basis for relief only if the practice in question is not founded on business necessity, or lacks a manifest relationship to the employment. [401 U.S. 424, 430-31, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971)]. [The RFOA exception] of the ADEA adds nothing new. 64 ... In light of the parallels between the substantive provisions of the ADEA and Title VII, and in light of the fact that Congress has amended the ADEA several times but has never explicitly excluded disparate impact claims, a reasonable interpretation of the [RFOA exception] is that it codifies the business necessity exception to disparate impact claims. 65 Adams, 255 F.3d at 1327-28 (Barkett, J., concurring). 66 I find Judge Barkett's reasoning fully persuasive. Under a theory of disparate impact, employers will still be able to have employment practices and policies that may burden over-age workers in a disproportionate way. These practices will be permissible, despite the disproportionate impact, provided the employer shows they are supported by a business necessity. Upon proving business necessity, the burden shifts to the employee to show that the practice in question was established not because of the legitimacy of the necessity, but merely as a pretext for invidious stereotyping. Therefore, I am not persuaded that adopting a disparate impact theory will lead to any inconsistencies with the RFOA exception. 67 That said, the cornerstone of the majority's holding relies on an analogous provision in the Equal Pay Act (EPA). Because the RFOA exception does not exist under Title VII, the majority looks instead to the EPA, which precludes disparate impact claims via its any factor other than sex language. The majority attempts to show that the similarities between the RFOA and EPA any factor exception should be construed by courts to demonstrate that the RFOA should similarly prohibit disparate impact. See Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 170, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981) (juxtaposing the EPA's any factor other than sex language with Title VII's broadly inclusive prohibition against gender discrimination and stating that the language confine[d] the application of the Act to wage differentials attributable to sex discrimination.). 68 The flaw in the majority's logic is that the terms any and reasonable are not synonymous. Under the ADEA, an employer with a disparate impact policy may be liable for age discrimination if factors relied on were not reasonable. Pursuant to the EPA, however, if an employment policy causes wage differences among men and women workers, the employer will not be liable unless the policy in question was based solely on gender. Thus, the ADEA and EPA exceptions cannot be read to have the same meaning unless the word reasonable is omitted from the RFOA exception. In this light, the premise of the majority opinion appears little more than ironic in that when it compares statutory language of the ADEA and Title VII to preclude disparate impact, the court advocates a dissimilar reading of almost identical statutes. Yet, when comparing the ADEA to the EPA, with the intent of precluding disparate impact, the majority applies a similar reading of exceptions which differ significantly. I disagree with the majority's analytical approach and its reading of Gunther as indicating that the ADEA cannot bar some reasonable factors other than age practices which have a disparate impact on workers over forty. 69 Additionally, the majority's contention that the ADEA and Title VII are not similar statutes, insofar as their application of the disparate impact theory, disregards the doctrine of in pari materia. It has long been held that judicial interpretations of one statute may be informed by interpretations of similar statutes. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) ([When] Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.). Under this well established statutory canon, the interpretation of one statute may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or relationships. Nat. Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Dep't. of Interior, 526 U.S. 86, 119 S.Ct. 1003, 1013, 143 L.Ed.2d 171 (1999) (defining the doctrine of in pari materia, citing several cases where the Court applied this doctrine to aid in its construction of a variety of statutes, and arguing that the doctrine was now well established) on remand, 174 F.3d 393 (4th Cir.1999). 70 In the context of the ADEA and Title VII, adhering to this canon is particularly well suited because, as the majority concedes, the ADEA grew out of debates on Title VII. Furthermore, in pari materia has relevance because both aforementioned statutes apply to similar persons (here, the employees) and similar relationships (here, the employment context). Moreover, Congress carefully chose identical language for its statutes dealing with both discrimination against older workers and discrimination against those due to race or gender. Therefore, the majority should have applied the doctrine of in pari materia and interpreted the disparate impact theory as applicable to the ADEA.