Opinion ID: 3165208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: preclusion of sarah khan’s tesimony

Text: Javidan argues that the district court’s decision not to order the government to grant immunity to one of her proposed witnesses, Sarah Khan (“Khan”) was a reversible error. Based on her brief, it also appears that she is attempting to assert a witness-intimidation claim as well. Due to the reasons explained below, we find that the district court’s decision not to order the government to immunize Khan was correct and that her witness-intimidation claim is meritless.
Shortly before trial, Javidan identified Sarah Khan (“Khan”), a patient data-entry employee at Acure, as a potential witness. Sometime before Khan was identified as a potential witness, the government alleged that it had learned that Khan was “engaged in fraud at Acure.” The government suggested the district court appoint counsel for Khan so that Khan could be advised of her rights, including her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Against Javidan’s protest, the district court provided counsel for Khan. The government made Khan’s counsel aware of the incriminating evidence it had against Khan. Not surprisingly, Khan followed her counsel’s advice and decided to interview or testify only in exchange for immunity, which the government refused to provide. Javidan filed a motion requesting that the district court conduct a hearing outside of the jury’s presence to determine if Khan’s testimony was admissible and whether the government should be required to extend immunity to Ms. Khan. The district court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury, in which the government proffered information it considered inculpatory. The district court was satisfied “relative to her invocation of the right.” Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 18
We review the district court’s decision whether to allow Khan to take the stand after being advised of her intention to invoke her Fifth Amendment right not to testify for abuse of discretion. United States v. McAllister, 693 F.3d 572, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Since Javidan did not raise her witness intimidation claim in the district court, we review that claim for plain error. United States v. Pierce, 62 F.3d 818, 831 (6th Cir. 1995). Witness Intimidation To establish a claim of witness intimidation, a defendant must present “government conduct which amounts to substantial interference with a witness’ free and unhampered determination to testify” and must prove that any inappropriate conduct was not harmless. United States v. Stuart, 507 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2007). Javidan argues that the prosecutor’s improper conduct “drove Kahn off the stand.” (Appellant Br. 31.) To support that argument, Javidan attempts to distinguish her case from this court’s ruling in Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2005). In Davis, after a defendant’s witness was called to the stand, the prosecutor requested a side bar with the judge, where he informed the court that the witness was a suspect and should be informed of his constitutional rights. Id. at 287. After questioning the witness, the district court appointed counsel to advise him of his rights. Id. On appeal, we found that the prosecutor’s conduct was not improper, especially considering a prosecutor’s ethical obligations, which include, Advis[ing] a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights against selfincrimination and the right to counsel whenever the law so requires. It is also proper for a prosecutor to so advise a witness whenever the prosecutor knows or has reason to believe that the witness may be the subject of a criminal prosecution. Id. (citing the ABA Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice § 3-3.2(b)). Although the facts of Davis are virtually analogous to her case, Javidan contends that since Davis was a habeas case its analysis should not apply, an assertion for which she cites no authority. (Appellant Br. 31.) Regardless of the fact that Davis was a habeas case, our determination with regard to the actions of the prosecutor are not limited to Davis, because the Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 19 government prosecutor in this case was bound by the same ethical obligations as the prosecutor in Davis. Javidan also attempts to distinguish her case from United States v. Stuart, 507 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2007). In Stuart, the defendant contended that the prosecutor’s references to perjury charges caused him and two of his witnesses not to testify. Id. at 398. This court found that the defendant’s assertions were unfounded and that the district court properly warned him about the penalties of perjury, while informing him that the ultimate decision about whether to testify was his own. Id. In fact, both the district court and prosecutor went out of their way to make sure that the defendant knew he was not being threatened. See id. Javidan argues that the district court in this case erred because, unlike the district court in Stuart, Khan was not advised that the decision about whether to testify was her own. (Appellant Br. 32.) Unlike the defendant in Stuart, Javidan does not contend that the government prosecutor threatened Khan with a perjury charge. Thus, such a reminder was not required or warranted. Lastly, Javidan alleges that the government prosecutor did not decide to “investigate” Khan until she was put on her witness list. (Appellant Br. 33.) Javidan, however, was not privy to the government’s plans. Nor, does she allege that she received this knowledge from someone who was. What is undisputed is that the prosecutor possessed information that criminally implicated Khan. Therefore, the prosecutor had an ethical obligation to act as she did. See Davis, 430 F.3d at 287. Since Javidan has not identified any inappropriate government conduct, her witness intimidation claim fails. Failure to Grant Immunity This court has long held that a district court is without authority either to grant immunity to a witness who asserts his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or to force the government to do so. United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 997 (6th Cir. 1999). However, we have discussed two limited situations when such immunity may be warranted: if it is necessary to enable a defendant to present an effective defense and/or where it is necessary to remedy prosecutorial misconduct. Id. Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 20 Under the prosecutorial-misconduct exception, due process requires an immunity grant when the prosecution abuses its discretion by intentionally attempting to distort the fact-finding process. Id. at 998. This court has acknowledged that this exception exists in other jurisdictions, but we have yet to adopt the exception itself. See, e.g.,United States v. Allebban, 578 F. App’x 492, 505 (6th Cir. 2014). Javidan urges us to adopt it in this case. (Appellant Br. 36.) But, even if we were inclined to explicitly adopt this exception, we could not do it in this case because, as detailed above, the prosecutor did nothing improper. The effective-defense exception is valid in the Sixth Circuit only if the government selectively granted immunity to its own witnesses but denied immunity to the defendant's witnesses. Id. (citing United States v. Mohney, 949 F.2d 1397, 1401 (6th Cir. 1991)). To do otherwise could deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. However, a defendant does not have an authomatic right to have his or her witnesses immunized simply because the prosecution relies on immunized witnesses to make its case. Id. Instead, the evidence must be so “egregiously lopsided” that an unfair trial would otherwise take place. Id. In this case, the government refused to grant immunity to one of Javidan’s witness, Khan. Even if we were to entertain the proposition that Khan was prepared to testify effectively for Javidan, it cannot be said that an unfair trial took place without her testimony. Moreover, Javidan does not allege that the government relied upon immunized witnesses to make its case, while refusing to immunize Khan. Thus, the “pick and choose” aspect of this claim is nonexistent. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in refusing to grant immunity to Khan. Alternative Measures Alternatively, Javidan argues that even if the district court decided not to grant Khan immunity, it should have still allowed Khan to testify, but precluded the government from crossexamining her about her alleged fraudulent acts or prevented the government from crossexamining her completely. (Appellant Br. 37.) No citation was provided to support this proposition. Thus, it need not be addressed. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 21 Javidan also argues that the district court could have compelled Javidan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege in front of the jury. (Appellant Br. 37.) She asserts that this alternative would have posed no risk on appeal because “it was specifically requested by the defense.” Id. She cites United States v. Sharpe, 996 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1993), in support of this contention. Her reliance in Sharpe is misplaced. Sharpe does not stand for the proposition that a defendant can compel the trial court to commit appealable errors as long the defendant promises not bring up the issue on appeal. The district court correctly decided this issue, see United States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 324-25 (6th Cir. 1983), and was not obligated to oblige Javidan’s request.