Opinion ID: 2110453
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Use of the Doctor's Certificate.

Text: Under certain circumstances a physician's certificate may authorize the withdrawal of body specimens for alcohol testing. Iowa Code section 321J.7 provides: A person who is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering the person incapable of consent or refusal is deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided by section 321J.6 [the implied consent law], and the test may be given if a licensed physician certifies in advance of the test that the person is dead, unconscious, or otherwise in a condition rendering that person incapable of consent or refusal. The district court found substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge's finding that Lubka was incapable of refusing or consenting to the test. Such a finding will control on judicial review if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8) (court may modify, reverse or grant other appropriate relief if agency action is not supported by substantial evidence); Ramsey v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 576 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence means evidence that a reasonable person would accept as adequate to reach the same finding. Ringland Johnson, Inc. v. Hunecke, 585 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 1998). The evidence at the hearing included this testimony by the deputy: Q. [to the deputy] What did you door what did you say to him upon making contact? A. Introduced myself and my purpose of being there, and at that time I read the implied consent form to him. Q. When you say the implied consent form, are you referring to the advisory? A. Yes. Q. Is it at that time that you made the written request for a blood specimen of Mr. Lubka? A. Yes, it is. Q. What was his response to that request? A. He advised he didn't understand. Q. Did he indicate what, exactly, he didn't understand? A. That he couldn't remember anything, didn't understandthat he doesn't own a motorcycle, so, therefore, he couldn't have been involved in an accident with one. Q. What happened next? A. I toldasked himwell, he would have to make a decision, and he said he didn't hear that other partthe motorcycle later and once he didn't understand. So I reread the implied consent form to him. Q. And what was his response to the rereading of the form to him? A. Once again he said he didn't understand. Q. And then? A. I told him that he'd have to make a decision, and at that time [he] was consulting with his wife and they wanted to call an attorney, so I granted him permission to call whoever they wanted to call. .... Q. So what happened [after Lubka's wife contacted the attorney]? A. She come back and she told her husband that the attorney she contacted said not to test, said not to sign anything. Q. What was Mr. Lubka's response to that? A. I then asked Mr. LubkaI said, nowI told him it was still his choice, and, you know, I asked if he understood that his attorney said not to sign anything or not to take the test, and I asked him again, and he once again stated he didn't understand. Q. What did you do then? A. I asked him one more time, and he said he didn't understand. So I presented the doctor with the form indicating that he was incapable of rendering a decision and the doctor agreed with me and signed the form [and] withdrew the blood. Q. Why did you present the doctor with this form? A. Because it's the doctor's decision that renders somebody capable of making a decision. Q. So, apparently, you thought Mr. Lubka was incapable at the start? A. Yes. Q. Why is that? A. He justhe couldn't give me an answer. He wouldn't give me an answer. He kept repeating that he didn't understand. He told me that himself. Q. He never told you that he would take the blood test? A. No. Q. He never told you that he would refuse to take the blood test? A. No, he kept saying that he didn't understand. Lubka contends he was not incapable of making the decision because his wife, who had talked to an attorney, refused on his behalf by telling him in the presence of the deputy that he should refuse. The record shows, however, that even after Lubka's wife advised him to refuse the test he made no response except to say he did not understand. This issue, whether a spouse may make and communicate an implied-consent decision for a licensee, is apparently one of first impression in this court. Under our implied-consent statute, a licensee is deemed to consent to withdrawal of blood, breath, or urine. Iowa Code § 321J.6. The right to revoke that consent is, we believe, a personal one to be exercised by the licensee, if able, otherwise by a doctor's certificate. We find nothing in our implied-consent statute that suggests that decision may be made by another. Lubka, of course, could consent or refuse with the advice of another, such as an attorney or his wife, but in the end the decision was his if he was capable. We reject Lubka's legal argument that his wife refused a blood test for him, and we agree with the district court's conclusion that Lubka was incapable, under Iowa Code section 321J.7, of making the decision.