Opinion ID: 1122990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: RCW 46.61.502 unconstitutionally relieves the State of proving an element of the crime

Text: As the majority holds, RCW 46.61.502(3) unconstitutionally shifts the burden to the defendant to show that he consumed the alcohol after driving. Majority op. at 1135 (this shift of burden flies in the face of the well-established principle that every person accused of a crime is constitutionally endowed with an overriding presumption of innocence ...). The majority so holds because the statute relieves the State of proving every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1135 (citations omitted). I agree entirely and think that the majority is right on point. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (state must prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Lively, 130 Wash.2d 1, 11, 921 P.2d 1035 (1996). Every accused is endowed with an overriding presumption of innocence which extends to every element of the crime. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275, 72 S.Ct. 240, 256, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); State v. McHenry, 88 Wash.2d 211, 558 P.2d 188 (1977). Any attempt to relieve the State of its burden to prove every element of the crime is a deprivation of the accused's liberty without due process of law. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); State v. Summers, 120 Wash.2d 801, 817, 846 P.2d 490 (1993). However, the majority's remedy falls short. The majority's solution addresses only the element of whether the accused consumed the alcohol after driving. It still relieves the State of its burden to prove the quintessential element of a DUI case, namely that the driver was drunk while driving (by test or observation or both). The State is now allowed to get a conviction for driving while under the influence without proving that the accused was under the influence while driving. This violates due process and common sense. In McLean v. Moran, 963 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir.1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held a Nevada statute similar to RCW 46.61.502 unconstitutional because it allowed the state to prove its case by showing that the defendant had a particular BAC level at the time of testing after driving and then allowed a conclusive presumption that the accused's BAC level was the same at the time of testing as at the earlier time of driving. The Ninth Circuit reasoned: Most experts agree that it ordinarily takes forty-five to ninety minutes to attain a peak BAC level on an empty stomach, and two to three hours if alcohol is consumed with or after a meal, while a few contend that the time lag between alcohol consumption and absorption into the blood stream is even longer. McLean, 963 F.2d at 1309-10. The Pennsylvania high court is in complete accord: [T]he most glaring deficiency of § 3731(a)(5) is that the statute completely fails to require any proof that the accused's blood alcohol level actually exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.  Barud, 681 A.2d at 166. Our statute has the same deficiency. This statute is facially unconstitutional and I would so hold. JOHNSON and MADSEN, JJ., concur.