Opinion ID: 1834498
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Heading: Charter Compliance with Iowa Code Section 331.261

Text: In Merriam v. Moody's Executors, 25 Iowa 163, 170 (1868), Chief Justice John F. Dillon established a rule for the determination of local government power which came to be known as the Dillon Rule. City of Des Moines v. Master Builders, 498 N.W.2d 702, 703 (Iowa 1993). This rule held that municipal and county governments could only possess and exercise powers which were: (1) expressly granted by the legislature; (2) necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; and (3) those indispensably essentialnot merely convenientto the declared objects and purposes of the municipality. Gritton v. City of Des Moines, 247 Iowa 326, 331, 73 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1955). The effect of the Dillon Rule was to, render cities [and counties] incapacitated in numberless matters of vital importance to local governments. Master Builders, 498 N.W.2d at 703. The legislature and the electors responded by adding home rule amendments to the Iowa Constitution in 1968 and 1978 which removed the Dillon doctrine from Iowa law. Iowa Const. art. III, § 38A (added by amend. 25 in 1968) (municipal home rule); Iowa Const. art. III, § 39A (added by amend. 37 in 1978) (county home rule); Kasparek v. Johnson County Bd. of Health, 288 N.W.2d 511, 514 (Iowa 1980). The county home rule amendment expressly provides, [t]he proposition or rule of law that a county or joint county-municipal corporation government possesses and can exercise only those powers granted in express words is not a part of the law of this state. Iowa Const. art. III, § 39A. Section 39A gave counties power and authority to determine their local affairs subject to the limitation that they could not exercise powers inconsistent with state law. Id.; cf. Master Builders, 498 N.W.2d at 703-04. The parties to this matter have entered into a stipulation which provides that the Charter Commission does not have home rule authority and that the home rule amendments to the Iowa Constitution are not applicable to the Commission. The Board therefore asserts that, as a body of county government, the Commission is subject to the Dillon Rule and holds only those powers expressly granted by or necessarily or fairly implied in the relevant statutes. As a result, the Board contends that we must strictly construe those statutes which delineate the Commission's power. The Board argues that a narrow reading of the relevant statutes will demonstrate that in drafting the commonwealth charter, the Commission has exceeded those powers the legislature has expressly granted to it. The Commission accepts the stipulation but argues that the Dillon Rule does not control the limits of its authority because it does not perform governmental functions. The Commission instead asserts that we should construe statutes delineating the Commission's authority liberally because the statutes are remedial in nature and a liberal interpretation would best satisfy the purposes of the legislation. The district court agreed with the Commission and held that the Dillon Rule did not control the extent of the Charter Commission's authority because the Commission did not exercise governmental power. The district court therefore held that a liberal construction which would accomplish the legislature's purposes was appropriate for statutes dealing with Commission powers. When courts have considered application of the rule, the only determinative factor appears to have been whether the entities in question were creatures of the state legislature. Gritton, 73 N.W.2d at 815. The Board asserts that since the legislature expressly subjected the Commission to the Iowa Code chapter 21 open meeting requirements, it is a governmental body subject to the Dillon Rule. See Iowa Code §§ 21.2, 21.3, 331.234. We note the general rule that litigants may not bind the supreme court with stipulations as to law. State v. Aumann, 236 N.W.2d 320, 322 (Iowa 1975); Zeigler v. Simmons, 353 Mich. 432, 91 N.W.2d 819, 822 (1958); 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 5, at 539 (1974). The propriety of this rule is especially clear when the controversy at issue involves important public interests. North Platte Lodge 985 v. Board of Equalization, 125 Neb. 841, 252 N.W. 313, 314 (1934); 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 5, at 540. We will not be bound by a stipulation regarding statutory and constitutional interpretation. The district court, in its excellent analysis of the legal questions prompted by the commonwealth charter, referred to language in State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa 702, 711, 133 N.W. 895, 899 (1911), that it characterized as prophetic. Although springing from a constitutional question, the precept announced is equally applicable to the statutory construction issues in the case at bar, where we are charged with the responsibility of allowing, under law, the voice of the people to be heard. In 1911 our court said: The Constitution was intended to announce certain basic principles to serve as the perpetual foundation of the state. It was not intended to be a limitation upon its healthful development, nor to be an obstruction to its programs. New days bring new problems. Legislation must meet these problems as they come; otherwise our plan of government must prove inadequate. Manifestly, we ought not to be swift to adopt such a technical or strained construction of the Constitution as would unduly impair the efficiency of the legislature to meet its unavoidable responsibilities. Id., 153 Iowa at 711, 133 N.W. at 899. We therefore hold that the county home rule amendment, Iowa Const. art. III, § 39A, controls the extent of the Commission's powers since the Commission is a creature of the state legislature. The Dillon Rule does not govern our interpretation of those statutes which delineate Commission functions. We construe the statutes at issue liberally in order to promote the objectives of the legislature supporting their enactment. Bevel v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 426 N.W.2d 380, 382 (Iowa 1988); Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1983). In addition, we consider all relevant provisions together in order to best ensure promotion of the statutory goals. Sommers, 337 N.W.2d at 473.

Iowa Code section 331.261(10) provides: The community commonwealth charter shall provide for the following: .... 10. A process by which the governing body of the community commonwealth and the governing bodies of the member cities provide by mutual agreement for the delivery of specified services to the community commonwealth. The Board asserts that the charter violates this provision because it does not provide a method for mutual agreement between each member city council and the Commonwealth Council on the transfer of services. The Charter Commission argues that the Mayors' Commission satisfies the requirement of section 331.261(10) because the cities' mayors are the cities' chief executive officers, hold veto powers, and are part of and represent the respective city councils. The term process means a particular method or system of doing something, producing something, or accomplishing a specific result. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1808 (1993). The result to which the legislature refers in section 331.261(10) is the delivery of specified services in the commonwealth. Under the charter, the method to achieve this result is by action of the mayors on the Mayors' Commission and the decision of the Commonwealth Council. That process, when completed, effectuates a mutual agreement for the delivery of services. Section 372.14(1) of chapter 372 on Organization of City Government states that the mayor is the chief executive officer of the city and presiding officer of the council. Except for supervisory duties that have been delegated to a city manager, the mayor supervises all city offices and departments. The mayor is also authorized to take command of the police and govern the city by proclamation in time of emergency or public danger. Within the city limits, the mayor also has all the powers conferred upon the sheriff to suppress disorders. Iowa Code § 372.14(2). A city mayor is further empowered to sign, veto, or take no action on an ordinance, amendment, or resolution passed by the council. Iowa Code § 380.5. These governing powers and functions by a city's mayor are numerous and provide representation of the city by its mayor in widely differing capacities. The legislature is well aware that Iowa cities are empowered to act variously by decisions of a mayor, a city council, or through other forms of government. By not stating, as it might have in section 331.261(10), that a city could only agree to a process for delivery of services by action of its city council, the legislature left to the Charter Commission the choice of selecting the method of process. Other jurisdictions typically define governing body to include both the mayor and city council of a city. See, e.g., City of Wichita, Kan. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 828 F.Supp. 851 (D.Kan.1993). Since the mayor is an integral part of the governing body of a member city, a commission consisting of mayors substantially satisfies the charge of the legislature in section 331.261(10) to the Commonwealth Commission to provide a process for the delivery of services. We also note that the construction urged by the Board runs counter to the liberal interpretation of this remedial legislation that we embrace in order to satisfy its purpose. To read into section 331.261(10) a requirement that only city councils can act would effectively scuttle much of the benefit predicted for the commonwealth form of government. Little would be changed from the present inert situation where intergovernmental agreements are authorized under Iowa Code chapter 28E, but seldom accomplished. Moreover, the legislature is not presumed to perform a useless act. See Slockett v. Iowa Valley Community Sch. Dist., 359 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1984). The process by which the Mayors' Commission and the Commonwealth Council mutually agree on the transfer of services satisfies the requirements of section 331.261(10).
Article IV of the charter provides for the creation of a commonwealth mayor. Among other functions, the mayor would hold the power to: (1) preside over the Commonwealth Council; (2) recommend appointment of the commonwealth manager, legal counsel, and clerk after consulting with the Council; (3) advise the manager during preparation of the annual budget; (4) represent the commonwealth at functions and before organizations and governmental agencies; and (5) appoint the members of all commonwealth boards and commissions subject to consultation with and a majority vote of approval by the Commonwealth Council. The mayor would be elected at large to a four-year term. The Board asserts that the relevant statutes do not authorize the creation of the office of commonwealth mayor and specifically that the creation of such an office violates Iowa Code section 331.261(2) which provides The community commonwealth charter shall provide for the following: ... 2. An elective legislative body established in the manner provided for county boards of supervisors under sections 331.201 through 331.216 and section 331.238. The Board argues that the new form of government must take the form prescribed in sections 331.201 through 331.216 for county boards of supervisors and that the office of mayor violates those provisions. In addition, the Board notes that the Commission proposed legislation in 1993 which would have included an express authorization for the creation of the office of commonwealth mayor. Since the Commission was unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts, the Board claims this indicates the legislature did not favor such an office. Moreover, the Board believes the existing statutory framework does not authorize a commonwealth mayor. The Commission asserts that Iowa Code section 331.238 authorizes the existence of the office of commonwealth mayor. The Commission explains that its unsuccessful legislation proposed making the mayor an entity separate from the Commonwealth Council and since this proposal did not pass, the Commission wrote the charter to include the mayor as part of the Council. The Board argues that the fact that the popularly elected mayor would preside over the council violates Iowa Code section 331.211(1)(a) which requires that a board of supervisors elect a chairperson to preside over its meetings. However, sections 331.238(2)(b) and (d) specifically authorize variations from section 331.211(1)(a). These sections provide: 2. An alternative form of county government... may include provisions for any of the following: .... b. A supervisor representation plan for the county which may differ from the supervisor representation plans as provided in division II, part 1. .... d. The method of selecting officers of the board and fixing their terms of office which may differ from the requirements of sections 331.208 through 331.211. The fact that the mayor may have greater powers than other supervisors in some areas is not fatal to the formulation because section 331.238 specifically provides for [t]he combining of duties of elected officials. There is also no prohibition in sections 331.201 through 331.216 against supervisors holding the authority to perform the functions granted to the mayor. The fact that the Commission failed in its lobbying efforts does not demonstrate that the existing statutes do not authorize the office of commonwealth mayor. We are aware that in the combative and compromising process of legislating there are many reasons for a failure of legislation to pass other than a rejection on the merits. Even without a fortified legislative directive, section 331.238 grants broad authority for alternative forms of government to differ from the prescriptions of sections 331.201 through 331.216 by: (1) including a differing supervisor representation plan; (2) providing a different method for selecting council officers; (3) employing different rules of procedure; and (4) combining the duties of elected officials. Iowa Code §§ 331.238(2)(b), (d), (e), (f). In addition, the last paragraph of section 331.261 provides The community commonwealth charter may include other provisions not inconsistent with state law. Sections 331.238 and .261 indicate an intention to grant the Commission broad powers to craft the new governmental form.
Iowa Code section 331.261(8) provides that the community commonwealth charter must contain [a] formula for the transfer of taxing authority from member cities to the community commonwealth governing body to fund the delivery of regional services. The Board asserts that this section required the Commission to place a precise mathematical formula in the charter. The Board further points to sections 331.261(7), 331.263(1), and 331.263(2) as evidence that 331.261(8) requires the inclusion of a precise mathematical formula. Specifically, the Board refers to section 331.263(2) which states, in part, that [t]he governing body of the community commonwealth shall have the authority to levy county taxes and shall have the authority to levy city taxes to the extent the city tax levy authority is transferred by the charter to the community commonwealth. The Board further points out that other statutes, when referring to formulas, refer to a specific mathematical representation. The Commission responds by arguing that we should read the reference in section 331.261(8) to a formula as merely requiring a method or process by which cities will transfer taxing authority to the commonwealth. The Commission asserts that since the charter does include a system for the transfer of taxing authority, this satisfies the requirement of section 331.261(8). Formula is not limited in definition to a group of numerical symbols. In fact, both parties in their briefs note that one definition of formula is a conventionalized statement intended to express some ... principle esp[ecially] as a basis for ... action. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 894 (1993). Article VII of the Charter provides a detailed methodology for the transfer of tax authority from the cities to the commonwealth. First, the Commonwealth Council, Mayors' Commission, city council of a member city, or group of commonwealth voters may identify a service for proposed transfer. If the Mayors' Commission decides that transfer of this service will meet the Article VII, section 1 efficiency goals, it then initiates a study of the service. Article VII, section 5 provides numerous factors which the Commission must analyze in determining the tax levy necessary to support the service. If the Commission decides to recommend the transfer of the service, it must present the report along with a resolution of transfer to the Commonwealth Council. The resolution must include [t]he property tax levy that the Commonwealth Government will levy and the fees and other sources of revenue it will utilize for each Member to deliver the service area for the initial fiscal year. If the Council accepts the resolution, the charter requires that the tax levy for the first fiscal year for delivery of the service will be that included in the resolution. After the first year, the Council estimates the cost and levy required to fund the service. Article VII clearly establishes a formula for the transfer of tax authority from the cities to the commonwealth. As the district court properly noted, in the context of a new form of government, a precise mathematical formula would be impractical if not impossible. Section 331.261(8) does not require a reduction of the methodology to a group of numerical symbols. The extent to which the proposed method may impact city credit ratings or tax rates is an issue for citizens to decide at the voting booth.