Opinion ID: 836201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jail credit

Text: The jail credit statute, MCL 769.11b, states: Whenever any person is hereafter convicted of any crime within the state and has served any time in jail prior to sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, ... [the court] shall specifically grant credit against the sentence for such time served in jail prior to sentencing. MCL 769.11b applies to any person, not just non-parolees who spend time in jail awaiting trial. Additionally, the jail credit statute applies to a variety of situations by requiring that any defendant shall be awarded jail credit when he is incarcerated awaiting sentencing because of being denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted.... The statute is silent with respect to the reason that a defendant is being held, and only requires that he spend time in jail because of being denied or unable to post bond for the offense of which he is convicted, which means that a defendant is entitled to jail credit on his new sentence as long as he cannot post bond for the new offense, regardless of the reason. However, the majority, by relying on this Court's decision in People v. Prieskorn, 424 Mich. 327, 381 N.W.2d 646 (1985), which interpreted the jail credit statute in a similar context, construes MCL 769.11b as requiring that a defendant be denied or unable to post bond because of the offense for which he is convicted in order to be eligible for jail credit. [2] Prieskorn held: We believe the sentence credit statute neither requires nor permits sentence credit in cases, such as the one before us, where a defendant is released on bond following entry of charges arising from one offense and, pending disposition of those charges, is subsequently incarcerated as a result of charges arising out of an unrelated offense or circumstance and then seeks credit in the former case for that later period of confinement.    We agree that the primary purpose of the sentence credit statute is to equalize as far as possible the status of the indigent and less financially well-circumstanced accused with the status of the accused who can afford to furnish bail.    Had the Legislature intended that convicted defendants be given sentence credit for all time served prior to sentencing day, regardless of the purpose for which the presentence confinement was served, it would not have conditioned and limited entitlement to credit to time served for the offense of which [the defendant] is convicted. [ Id. at 340-341, 381 N.W.2d 646. (citation omitted).] In other words, the majority agrees with Prieskorn's reasoning, which subtly alters the statute by requiring that a defendant must be denied or unable to post bond for a reason attributable to the new offense. Prieskorn's analysis is flawed for two reasons. First, Prieskorn's initial premise, i.e., that the jail credit statute was intended to equalize the existing disparate treatment between indigent and non-indigent defendants, is incorrect. MCL 769.11b simply states that any person who is denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted is entitled to jail credit on the sentence for the new offense. The statute does not state that its purpose is to remedy differing treatment of indigent and non-indigent defendants. Indeed, the requirement of MCL 769.11b that any person be awarded jail credit if the person is denied or unable to furnish bond conclusively rebuts Prieskorn's suggested purpose. That is, although a defendant may be unable to furnish bond because of indigency, he is never denied bond for that reason. Thus, the majority's resolution of whether MCL 769.11b applies to defendant in this case cannot rely on Prieskorn's stated purpose. Second, Prieskorn quoted the jail credit statute out of context by stating that the Legislature conditioned and limited entitlement to credit to time served `for the offense of which [the defendant] is convicted.' Id. at 341, 381 N.W.2d 646. A full reading of MCL 769.11b reveals that no such condition or limitation exists. MCL 769.11b merely requires that jail credit be awarded if a defendant is unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted.... Requiring that a defendant be unable to post bond for an offense is significantly different from stating that a defendant can only receive credit based on time served for the offense. In essence, both Prieskorn and the majority rewrite the phrase denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted to say unable or denied bond because of the offense for which he was convicted. This is not an interpretation consistent with the actual statute, and I therefore reject it. MCL 769.11b only requires that, if a defendant is incarcerated awaiting trial and is denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted, then he shall be awarded jail credit. The statute does not place an additional qualification or restriction on a defendant's right to receive jail credit by stating that the denial or inability to furnish bond must be because of the new crime. As a result, in a situation in which a defendant is arrested for a new crime while on parole, the defendant will be unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted because of a parole detainer that is placed on him by the DOC. [3] Further, if a defendant requests bond, it will be denied by the trial court for the same reason, in which case he will then be unable to post bond due to the denial. Thus, when a defendant is arrested for a new crime while on parole, and is ultimately convicted, as was defendant in this case, he is entitled to jail credit. If, however, a parolee is not actually convicted of the newly charged offense, then he obviously cannot be awarded jail credit because there is no new offense of which he is convicted. In that situation, the Parole Board must then make a new determination regarding how much of the unexpired portion of the defendant's original sentence must be served before the defendant can once again be paroled. See MCL 791.233; MCL 791.233e; MCL 791.234(11); MCL 791.238(2). If the Board determines that the defendant does have to serve an unexpired portion of his initial sentence, the defendant will then be awarded credit for time served on his original sentence. It is only in this scenario in which a defendant who is liable to serve the unexpired portion of his initial sentence under MCL 791.238(2) that the defendant must receive credit for time served toward his original sentence. Once the defendant serves that additional portion of his original sentence, he can be paroled again and, upon successful completion, have his sentence discharged. MCL 791.234(3) and (4). Returning to the scenario in which the defendant has committed a new crime while on parole, assume that the defendant spends exactly 1 year in jail between the time of his arrest and sentencing. During that time, the defendant is unable to post bond because of a parole detainer. Similarly, if the defendant does request bond, it will be denied by the trial court for the same reason. After being convicted of the new crime, the defendant is sentenced to a new 5- to 10-year term of imprisonment. The question then becomes whether the 1-year period that the defendant spent in jail is credited toward the original or new sentence. Recall that MCL 791.238(2) renders the reincarcerated defendant liable to serve out the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Additionally, the Parole Board does not make its determination of how much, if any, additional time the defendant must serve on his original sentence until he is convicted or acquitted of the new crime. [4] Thus, the determination whether to allocate the time a defendant spent in jail as time served on his original sentence or as jail credit toward his new sentence can only be made at the time of sentencing for the new crime, or shortly before, because the trial court may only award jail credit at sentencing and not at any time thereafter. Here, the hypothetical defendant was sentenced to a new term of imprisonment on the basis of his new criminal offense and was unable to furnish bond for this new offense while he was awaiting trial. Therefore, the parole credit statute applies, and the defendant is awarded 1 year of jail credit toward his new offense. However, awarding jail credit creates a tension between MCL 769.11b and the consecutive sentencing statute, MCL 768.7a(2), which requires that a defendant serve the remaining portion of his original sentence before beginning his new sentence, as described below.