Opinion ID: 2108152
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Janis Complaint

Text: In his first exception, Respondent writes: Respondent excepts to the Finding in paragraph 7 of the Circuit Court's Memorandum Opinion that he testified he simply assumed that the continuance would be granted.... Respondent stated he thought the continuance would be automatic under the circumstances, not that he assumed anything. This exception relates to Judge Rubin's findings concerning the Mebane case. We have reviewed the hearing transcript, and we agree with Respondent that he did not testify that he assumed a continuance would be granted in that case. He did, however, testify: I filed a motion for a continuance along with proof of the notice from another case that showed that I had to be in another courtroom at the same time, someplace else at the same time. And I just thought that automatically under the circumstances I would obtain the continuance and I didn't show up on the date and I thought that the continuance would have been automatic under those circumstances when I showed that there was a conflict. Jude Rubin fairly inferred from Respondent's testimony that Respondent assumed he would get a continuance upon proof that he had a conflict. We therefore overrule the exception. In his next exception, Respondent states: Respondent also excepts to the Finding in paragraph 8 of the Circuit Court's Memorandum Opinion that [Judge Rubin's] explanation that he believed the hearing in the Hooker case had been cancelled was not credible. The Finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Neither the testimony from the Respondent [] nor the testimony from the witness for the Complainant [] supports this finding in any way. Judge Rubin found that Respondent had filed a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion quashing a subpoena, then failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on the motion. Respondent's explanation for not appearing at the hearing was that, because one other motion filed by opposing counsel had been withdrawn, he thought that both matters had been taken off the calendar and [he] didn't show up. It is well-settled that the hearing judge may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon, when assessing the credibility of the witnesses. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 158, 939 A.2d 732, 742 (2008) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Walter, 407 Md. 670, 678, 967 A.2d 783, 788 (2009) (stating that the hearing judge was entitled to accept  or reject  all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness, including testimony that was not contradicted by any other witness). The hearing judge's factual findings, moreover, are entitled to significant deference. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kimmel, 405 Md. 647, 667, 955 A.2d 269, 281 (2008). Judge Rubin, as he had the prerogative to do, did not believe Respondent's explanation for not appearing at the scheduled hearing. We defer to that credibility determination, and overrule the exception, accordingly. In his next exception, Respondent states: Respondent also excepts to the Finding in paragraph 9 of the Circuit Court's Memorandum Opinion that contrary to his representation to the District Court Respondent did not inform his client of the court date. The Finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Nowhere in the transcript of the District Court proceedings in the Honsberger case does Respondent claim he informed his client of the trial date. To the contrary Respondent told the District Court he had attempted to reach his client but had been apparently calling the wrong telephone number. A transcript of the July 6 proceeding before the district court was made an exhibit at the hearing. We have reviewed the transcript, just as Judge Rubin must have done. The transcript discloses that Respondent wanted a continuance because his client was not present due to the fact that he had not been able to reach [his] client in a couple of weeks and the last time he had spoken to his client, she told him that she was going out of town for the 4th [likely, a reference to the Fourth of July holiday]. The district court, evidently under the impression that Ms. Honsberger's failure to appear was her fault, declined to grant Respondent a continuance. The trial went forward and the plaintiff in that case prevailed. Respondent filed a motion for new trial, attaching to the motion the affidavit of his client. That affidavit also was before Judge Rubin. In it, Ms. Honsberger swore that she had not received notice of the trial date from either the court or Respondent. She further swore that Respondent did not have the correct telephone number for her. Respondent and an attorney for the Peroutka firm who was present at the July 6 district court proceeding testified at the hearing before Judge Rubin. Each attorney addressed the various explanations Respondent gaveboth to Judge Rubin and, previously, to the district court judgefor not contacting his client. We have reviewed the testimony and the exhibits, and we note, as did Judge Rubin, that Respondent's explanations lack consistency. It is true, as Respondent argues, that [n]owhere in the transcript of the District Court proceedings in the Honsberger case does [he] claim he informed his client of the trial date. Yet, Judge Rubin was entitled to weigh the evidence and find, first, that Respondent in fact had not told his client about the July 6 trial date, and, second, that he had no good reason for failing to do so. In the latter respect, Judge Rubin was free to discredit Respondent's explanations for not informing his client of the trial date. Consequently, we overrule Respondent's third exception. Respondent's next exception addresses the court's findings concerning the Respass case. That exception reads: Respondent also excepts to the Finding in paragraph 10 of the Circuit Court's Memorandum Opinion that Byrd did not serve counsel for the plaintiff with a copy of his continuance motion. The Finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The motion included a certificate of service. Otherwise it would not have been accepted by the court clerk for filing. Assuming arguendo counsel for the plaintiff, in fact, did not receive the copy of the continuance motion, that fact would not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Respondent did not serve said counsel with the motion. Respondent argues in further support of the exception that the Peroutka firm never complained during litigation of the Respass case about the lack of service. We shall consider this exception together with Respondent's exception directed at Judge Rubin's finding, in paragraph 11 of the memorandum opinion, that Respondent had not mailed a notice withdrawing his client's appeal in the Harvey case, on April 10, 2006, contrary to what he represented in his certificate of service. Respondent argues, for much the same reasons as he does in connection with the previous exception, that the finding is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Judge Rubin heard from Michele Gagnon, of the Peroutka firm, on the subject. She testified that Respondent was directed to send all mailings in the Respass case to her, but her office never received a copy of Respondent's motion for a continuance. Further, the office manager for the Peroutka firm swore in an affidavit that the office did not receive the motion for continuance anytime between June 12 and June 16. With regard to the notice withdrawing the appeal in the Harvey case, Judge Rubin had before him a copy of Respondent's Notice of Withdrawal of Appeal, with a certificate of service to the law firm dated April 10, 2006, as well as the envelope in which a copy of that document was mailed to the firm. The envelope was postmarked April 13, 2006. This evidence sufficed to permit Judge Rubin reasonably to infer that Respondent did not serve the Peroutka firm with a copy of his motion for continuance in the Respass case, and he delayed service of his withdrawal of the appeal in the Harvey case. We therefore overrule Respondent's exceptions relating to the findings in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the memorandum opinion. Respondent's next exception relates to Judge Rubin's findings in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the memorandum opinion. He argues: Respondent also excepts to the Findings in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Circuit Court's Memorandum Opinion that Byrd provided interrogatory answers but they were not under oath, as required by Maryland Rule 3-421(d). However, both sets of Answers to Interrogatories stated they were `affirmed.' The Circuit [C]ourt also made a Finding in paragraph 13 of the Memorandum Opinion that Respondent's statement that the Peroutka firm was playing games with discovery lacked credibility. In making this Finding, however, the Circuit Court contradicted its own statement in paragraph 19 of the Memorandum Opinion that the Peroutka firm may have been playing `hardball' with Byrd's clients. Maryland Rule 3-421(d) states that responses to interrogatories shall answer each interrogatory separately and fully in writing under oath[.] There is ample support in the record for the court's finding that the answers to interrogatories supplied by Respondent in the Sy and Faulkner cases were not under oath; indeed, Respondent does not deny the fact. Nor do we discern any inherent contradiction between Judge Rubin's finding in paragraph 13 that he did not believe Respondent's assertion that the Peroutka firm was playing games, and the judge's finding in paragraph 19 that the Peroutka firm may have been playing hardball with Respondent. We therefore overrule Respondent's sixth exception. Respondent's has two exceptions to Judge Rubin's conclusions of law set forth in paragraphs 15 through 19 of the memorandum opinion. First, he challenges Judge Rubin's conclusion that his, Respondent's, failure to timely mail documents affected the handling of the cases by opposing counsel violated Rule 1.4(a)(2). Respondent does not make a legal argument, and simply points out the lack of testimony that the Peroutka firm ever brought any of its complaints to Respondent's attention prior to seeking court involvement. This exception is much like the exceptions we have already addressed and, for the reasons we have stated, we overrule it. Respondent takes exception to the following statement by Judge Rubin in paragraph 19 of the memorandum opinion: [W]hen the court reviews the facts of the case as a whole, the court is convinced that Byrd's conduct evidences a regular, intentional disregard of the Maryland Rules in his handling of debt collection cases, a disregard that is not countenanced simply because the Peroutka firm may have been playing `hardball' with Byrd's clients. Respondent argues: Respondent has practiced law since 1980, focusing on debt collection cases since 2004 and has handled hundreds of debt collection cases brought by many different plaintiffs. The first and only charges ever brought against Respondent were filed by the Peroutka firm. Considering that out of the hundreds of debt collection cases brought by many different plaintiffs only the Peroutka firm (which may have been playing hardball with Respondent's clients) brought charges against the Respondent, the Circuit Court's conclusion that Byrd's conduct evidences a regular, intentional disregard of the Maryland Rules in his handling of debt collection cases is unsupportable, especially when the Circuit Court's conclusion in this regard is based on discreet incidents in only seven cases and where no good faith effort had been made to resolve the matters without court involvement. We disagree with Respondent. To begin, we read Judge Rubin's statement concerning the regularity with which Respondent disregarded the Maryland Rules of Procedure as limited to the cases that were the subject of the Janis complaint. Moreover, Judge Rubin's statement is a fair characterization of all the facts concerning Respondent's behavior in those cases. We therefore overrule Respondent's exception to that statement. [13] Judge Rubin determined that Respondent had violated the following MRPC provisions: With respect to the Mebane and Hooker cases, Respondent violated Rules 1.1 and 1.3 by failing to appear for a scheduled court proceeding. With respect to the Honsberger case, Respondent violated Rule 1.4(a)(2) by failing, without good reason, to notify his client of the trial date. With respect to the Respass and Harvey cases, Judge Rubin found that Respondent violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) by failing to mail documents on the dates represented in the certificates of service. With respect to the Sy and Faulkner cases, Judge Rubin found that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 by failing to serve interrogatory answers under oath. Finally, with respect to the Kaplan case, to which Respondent filed no exceptions, Judge Rubin found that Respondent violated Rule 1.1 by filing an untimely appeal. Respondent does not claim that the facts upon which Judge Rubin relied for each of those determinations, if supported by clear and convincing evidence, fail to support the stated rule violations. We are left, then, with determining whether Judge Rubin's findings of fact relating to the Janis complaint (including the facts we accept because we overruled Respondent's exceptions and those we accept because Respondent filed no exceptions) establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(2), and 3.3(a)(1), as Judge Rubin concluded. In our independent assessment of the facts, we hold that they do support those rule violations.