Opinion ID: 1163394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury Instruction on Voluntariness

Text: In her fourth claim of error, Witt contends the district court erred when it instructed the jury on the law of voluntariness as follows: An individual may chose [sic] to make statements to police officers of certain facts concerning an incident and such statements may be considered by you as evidence. You determine whether you consider such statements and how much weight you give them. If you do consider them, you must consider the totality of the circumstances under which the statements were elicited, including the conduct of the police and the voluntariness or involuntariness of the statements. Whether you consider any statement made by the defendant to law enforcement, and how much weight you give such a statement, is for you to decide. Witt contends this instruction misstates the law, that the jury should have been instructed that it must disregard Witt's statements if it determines those statements were not voluntary. We agree that this instruction is deficient, but conclude the error was harmless. All states employ one of two procedures in determining a confession's voluntariness, the orthodox rule or the Massachusetts rule. DAVID M. NISSMAN ET AL., Law of Confessions § 11:1 at 302-04 (1985). Under the orthodox rule, the judge hears all the evidence concerning a confession outside the presence of the jury. If the judge finds the confession is voluntary, the confession is submitted to the jury for the purpose of deciding what weight or credibility to give the confession. Id. at 301. The Massachusetts rule differs from the orthodox rule only in that, after the judge's in camera determination of voluntariness, the question of a confession's voluntariness, as well as the weight or credibility of the confession, is presented to the jury and it is instructed to disregard the confession if it finds it involuntary. Id. at 301. Wyoming follows the Massachusetts rule requiring submission of the confession and the surrounding circumstances to the jury for its determination of the confession's voluntariness. Dodge, 562 P.2d at 309-10; Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Wyo.1976); Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 580-81 (Wyo.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1006, 93 S.Ct. 432, 34 L.Ed.2d 299 (1972); Clay v. State, 15 Wyo. 42, 59, 86 P. 17 (1906). The instruction given by the district court did not inform the jury that it must first consider the claim by Witt that the confession was involuntary and then to disregard the statement if it found it to be involuntary. Only after determining the statement to be voluntary can the jury consider a statement made by the defendant to law enforcement officers, and determine the weight to be given the statement. This approach would comport with the law of Wyoming which requires the jury to independently pass on the question of voluntariness. Even finding fault with the instruction as given, we do not adopt Witt's contention that the failure to properly instruct the jury violated her due process right to a fair hearing on voluntariness. The United States Supreme Court has held that an accused is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of a confession are actually and reliably determined. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1782, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). In so ruling, the United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the New York procedure under which the trial judge made only a preliminary determination whether the confession could under no circumstances be deemed voluntary. Absent such a finding, if the evidence presented a fair question as to the confession's voluntariness, the New York rule required the question of voluntariness to be presented to the jury for resolution. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377, 84 S.Ct. at 1780. The United States Supreme Court found this procedure unreliable and constitutionally deficient because the jury is at once given both the evidence going to voluntariness and all of the corroborating evidence showing that the confession is true and that the defendant committed the crime. The jury may therefore believe the confession and believe that the defendant has committed the very act with which he is charged, a circumstance which may seriously distort judgment of the credibility of the accused and assessment of the testimony concerning the critical facts surrounding his confession. Jackson, 378 U.S. at 381, 84 S.Ct. at 1783. Following its holding in Jackson, the United States Supreme Court remanded for a hearing upon voluntariness before a judge. Id. at 394, 84 S.Ct. at 1790. The United States Supreme Court did not require a new jury trial unless, following the voluntariness hearing, the trial court determined the confession to be involuntary. Id. Due process requires an in camera judicial determination of voluntariness; Jackson did not hold that due process requires a jury to also pass on the question of voluntariness. Id. at 395, 84 S.Ct. at 1790. Because the constitutionally mandated portion of Wyoming's procedure is the trial judge's in camera determination of voluntariness, not the jury's determination, we need not, in reviewing the error, apply the constitutional harmless error analysis requiring our determination that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ramos v. State, 806 P.2d 822, 829 (Wyo.1991). We instead apply the harmless error analysis set forth in W.R.A.P. 9.04 which this Court has held requires Witt to prove a reasonable possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to her. Miller v. State, 755 P.2d 855, 862 (Wyo.1988). Witt failed to demonstrate that a reasonable possibility exists that the verdict would have been different if the jury had been instructed that it must disregard the confession if it determines it to be involuntary, instead of receiving the instruction that whether it considers the confession and the weight it gives the confession are for its determination. In the absence of such a showing, we find no reversible error.