Opinion ID: 2386480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: bank's cross points

Text: Respondent Bank by its cross points questions the right of the Swilley-intervenors to prosecute this appeal and to maintain their suit. It argues that the trial court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Swilleys' suit against Alice Hughes in the absence of allegations in their petition that their claim against the James W. Hughes estate had been presented to and rejected by Mrs. Hughes as administratrix as required by Sections 298 and 314 of the Texas Probate Code, V.A.T.S. It then argues that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the other defendants to collect on the note and foreclose the lien, rights conferred upon the administratrix by Art. 1981, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stat., and Section 233, Texas Probate Code, in the absence of allegations of special circumstances such as existed in Chandler v. Welborn, 156 Tex. 312, 294 S.W.2d 801 (1956). Finally, it argues that since jurisdiction of the trial court was never invoked by proper pleadings, intervenors have no standing to prosecute an appeal and their attempted appeal is moot. It asks that the judgments below be affirmed or that the appeal and the case be dismissed. It will be noted that Bank's cross points are bottomed on the proposition that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction of intervenors' suit because the petition did not contain certain factual allegations. In support of its position Bank cites such cases as Jaye v. Wheat, 130 S.W.2d 1081 (Tex.Civ.App.Eastland 1939, no writ); Dempsey v. Gibson, 105 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Civ.App.Waco 1937, writ dism'd); Cain v. Church, 131 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1939, no writ); Gannaway v. Barrera, 74 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1934), rev'd on other grounds, 130 Tex. 142, 105 S.W.2d 876 (1937); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Warren, 72 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Civ.App.Eastland 1934, no writ); Lee v. Turner, 71 Tex. 264, 9 S.W. 149 (1888). The cited cases do hold, or clearly imply, that proper allegations in a petition in the two situations are necessary to invoke the court's jurisdiction. It will be noted, however, that all of the cases were decided before the effective date of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941. We do not read Butler v. Summers, 151 Tex. 618, 253 S.W.2d 418 (1952), as making a similar holding. We do not consider the cited cases as any longer authoritative on the pleading question. Rule 91, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the use of special exceptions to point out defect[s], omission[s],... or other insufficiency in pleadings, and Rule 90, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: ... Every defect, omission or fault in a pleading either of form or of substance, [1] which is not specifically pointed out by motion or exception in writing and brought to the attention of the Judge in the trial court ... shall be deemed to have been waived by the party seeking reversal on such account.... We have held that the provisions of the Rule also operate to forestall a prevailing party from supporting a judgment of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction by pointing to defects and omissions in a petition. Jud v. City of San Antonio, 143 Tex. 303, 184 S.W.2d 821 (1945). And see Texas Osage Co-op. Royalty Pool v. Kemper, 170 S.W. 2d 849 (Tex.Civ.App.Galveston 1943, writ ref'd); Metalab Equipment Co. v. Spring Branch Ind. Sch. Dist., 378 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.Civ.App.Houston 1964, writ ref'd n. r. e.), reversed with per curiam opinion 381 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.1964); Weisenberger v. Lone Star Gas Co., 257 S.W. 2d 331 (Tex.Civ.App.Fort Worth 1953, writ dism'd). A holding that the allegations in intervenors' petition were inadequate to invoke jurisdiction of the trial court and of the appellate courts would require a reversal of the trial court's judgment as to them and dismissal of the petition in intervention. Bank seeks also, however, to have the take-nothing summary judgment affirmed on that ground. This we cannot do. To do so would in effect be saying that a defendant's motion for summary judgment is per se a general demurrer to the petition. Certain court of civil appeals' opinions have indicated that a motion for summary judgment on the pleadings partakes of the office of a general demurrer. See Baxter v. Beaupre, 295 S.W.2d 718 (Tex.Civ.App.Galveston 1956, no writ); Barnard v. Kuldell, 349 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Civ.App.Houston 1961, no writ). Situations in which such a motion can be sustained, however, are very limited, and the case before us does not present such a situation. It is not a case in which the facts alleged by a plaintiff establish the absence of a right of action or an insuperable barrier to a right of recovery. See McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 Texas L.Rev. 285, 297.