Opinion ID: 2074655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether reiff's failure to appeal a school board decision to the circuit court pursuant to sdcl 13-46-1 precludes her from subsequently pursuing other legal remedies in the circuit court?

Text: Disposition of this case, both in the trial court and before this court, is controlled by SDCL 13-46-1. That statute, in pertinent part, provides: From a decision made by any school board, or by a special committee created under any provision of the school law relative to a school or school district matter or in respect to any act or proceeding in which such officer, board, or committee purports or assumes to act, an appeal may be taken to the circuit court by any person aggrieved, or by any party to the proceedings, or by any school district interested, within ninety days after the rendering of such decision. This court has often held that the appeal created by SDCL 13-46-1 is the exclusive means of challenging a school board decision. Cutshaw v. Karim, 256 N.W.2d 566 (S.D.1977); Stene v. School Bd. of Beresford Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 68, 87 S.D. 234, 206 N.W.2d 69 (1973); Murray v. Sioux Falls Board of Education, 88 S.D. 554, 225 N.W.2d 589 (1975); Sauer v. Bowdle Independent School District No. 36, 87 S.D. 584, 212 N.W.2d 499 (1973). In Cutshaw, supra, a teacher brought an action in circuit court seeking reinstatement and punitive damages after his contract was not renewed. There, as here, the appellees contended that the action was improperly brought as an ordinary civil action  rather than as an appeal under SDCL 13-46-1. In affirming a summary judgment in favor of the appellees, this court stated that SDCL 13-46-1 provides a specific and exclusive means of obtaining reversal of a school board's decision. Id. at 568. We went on to hold that any challenge to the school board's action should have proceeded under SDCL 13-46-1. Id. at 569. In Murray, supra, we held that since an appeal was not taken from the decision by the school board within the ninety day period provided by SDCL 13-46-1, the civil action commenced by the aggrieved party was properly dismissed. This court in Sauer, supra, likewise made it clear that the same result applies when, as here, the appellant also claims violation of due process. In that case a school teacher, contending that the school board's action did not meet due process requirements, brought a mandamus action to compel the school board to renew his teaching contract. As in Murray, the trial court dismissed the action because the appellant had not appealed the school board's decision under SDCL 13-46-1. Again, we affirmed, stating that This appeal statute does not seem restrictive. In fact it allows appeals `in respect to any act or proceeding in which such officer, board, or committee purports or assumes to act.' This would include purporting to act on improper notice or without proper hearing. Sauer, supra, 87 S.D. at 589, 212 N.W.2d at 502. We further stated that: Appellant pleads in his brief for a `well defined, simply stated, and understood remedy when their contractual position is unknown.' This was given to him in [SDCL] Chapter 13-46; it covers any conceivable situation where a teacher is aggrieved. Yet Appellant chose to pursue some other course without resorting to the complete and adequate remedy provided for him on appeal. Id. 87 S.D. at 590, 212 N.W.2d at 503. This court's decision in Moran v. Rapid City Area School Dist., 281 N.W.2d 595 (S.D.1979), further demonstrates that SDCL 13-6-41 also applies to Reiff's cause of action based on violation of first amendment rights. In Moran we said that the scope of review by the circuit court in SDCL ch. 13-46 hearing is limited to determining the legality of the school board's decision. Id. at 599. In so doing, the circuit court must examine whether statutory procedural requirements were complied with and must also determine whether state and federal constitutional requirements have been met. A violation of an individual's due process, equal protection, first amendment, or other rights guaranteed by our state or federal constitutions, even if there is full compliance with the statutory [procedural] requirements, is grounds for a determination that the school board acted illegally and therefore [that] its decision was illegal. Id. at 599. Clearly then, all of Reiff's causes of action, including her claimed violations of due process and first amendment rights, are within the scope of review afforded by SDCL 13-46-1. That statute covers any conceivable situation where a teacher is aggrieved. Sauer, supra, 87 S.D. at 590, 212 N.W.2d at 503. In attempting to insulate her civil rights claims from SDCL 13-46-1 by relying upon a line of cases indicating that state remedies need not be exhausted before bringing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action in federal court, Reiff overlooks two crucial facts. First, SDCL 13-46-1 encompasses all of her causes of action. Second, SDCL 13-46-1 is jurisdictional. It is the only statute that grants state courts jurisdiction to review school board decisions. Unless that statute and its remedy are relied upon, jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising out of a school board decision is lacking. Thus, the issue is not exhaustion of remedies, but jurisdiction. All of Reiff's causes of action are predicated upon her allegation that the School Board acted illegally in discharging her. This is the very purpose for which SDCL 13-46-1 was enactedto provide judicial review of the legality of school board decisions. In fact, SDCL 13-46-1 is part and parcel of Reiff's due process rights and guarantees. Thus, as the trial court states: The deprivation here did not occur because of some established state procedure;  it did not occur because of a failure of the state to provide [Reiff] with a post deprivation remedy and it did not occur because said post deprivation remedy was inadequate... The deprivation if any, occurred because [Reiff] failed to exercise her right to appeal under SDCL 13-46-1. Instead Reiff sought to directly invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court by commencing an ordinary civil action. The fact of the matter remains though, that when an appeal is not timely under SDCL 13-46-1, a circuit court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality of a school board decision. In this instance, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter under breach of contract theories, deprivation of civil rights theories or tort theories and properly granted judgment in favor of the School Board. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. WUEST, C.J., and HENDERSON, SABERS and MILLER, JJ., concur. GERKEN, Circuit Judge, for MORGAN, J., disqualified.