Opinion ID: 1354953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The District Court Failed to Provide Any Reasons for Hammons's Sentence

Text: Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), a district court is required to explain the reasons for imposing a particular sentence. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (Once the sentence is selected, the district court must explain it sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review.); Miqbel, 444 F.3d at 1177 n. 7 (applying the requirements of § 3553(c) to the revocation of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583). Although such explanation should come from the district court, adequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred from the PSR or the record as a whole. Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. We have stated that: a sufficient explanation will necessarily vary depending upon the complexity of the particular case, whether the sentence chosen is inside or outside the Guidelines, and the strength and seriousness of the proffered reasons for imposing a sentence that differs from the Guidelines range. A within-Guidelines sentence ordinarily needs little explanation unless a party has requested a specific departure, argued that a different sentence is otherwise warranted, or challenged the Guidelines calculation itself as contrary to § 3553(a). Id. In this case, the district court offered no explanation for imposing a ten month sentence upon Hammons. The district court did not discuss the applicable guideline range, nor did the district court address any of the applicable sentencing factors set forth in § 3553 and § 3583. Rather, the district court merely stated that he was sentencing Hammons to ten months of imprisonment. Indeed, the only statement the district court made regarding its decision was that I don't give sentences without careful consideration. That's the sentence. The government argues that the district court's reasons are clear from the record and the revocation hearing transcript. In particular, the government asserts that the reasons for imposing the sentence can be inferred from the three questions the district court asked Hammons regarding his drunk driving conviction. This argument fails because the three pointed questions the district court asked Hammons provide little, if any, insight regarding the reasons for imposing a ten month sentence. Furthermore, the reasons for the ten month sentence cannot be inferred from the Probation Office's Violation Report because the reasons in the Violation Report support a sentence of up to 180 days in a Residential Reentry Center. Such a sentence was rejected by the district court. Accordingly, we cannot say that the reasons for such a sentence are implicit from the record as a whole. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. In United States v. Waknine , this court recently held that a district court's failure to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors before imposing a within-guideline range sentence constituted plain error. 543 F.3d at 554 (citing Gall v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596-97, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). In Waknine, the error was patent insofar as the district court gave no reasons in reference to the § 3553(a) factors before imposing the sentence. Id. There was no contemporaneous announcement of the calculated Guidelines range or satisfaction of the requirement that the sentence be reconciled for reasonableness in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. Accordingly, we stated that: [a]lthough it is a close question whether Waknine can satisfy the third prong of the plain error test, we conclude that the district court's total failure to announce its calculated Guidelines range to the parties and to consider expressly the § 3553(a) factors is such a serious departure from established procedures that we will not reject the appeal because of the prejudice prong of plain error review. Id. at 554 (emphasis added). Given the flagrant nature of the district court's error, which seriously affects the public reputation of judicial proceedings, this court exercised its discretion to notice the forfeited error, and vacated Waknine's sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 555. Waknine controls here. Indeed, the district court's failure to follow established procedures in this case was arguably even more flagrant than in Waknine. First, whereas Waknine was sentenced before the Supreme Court's decision in Gall and our en banc decision in Carty, Hammons was sentenced in July 2008, well after both decisions had been published. Accordingly, the district court should have been aware of the requirement that it consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and state on the record the reasons for imposing Hammons's ten month sentence. Second, the district court in Waknine announced that it was sentencing at the mid-point of the Guidelines range, viewing the criminal history as I. 543 F.3d at 544. Although insufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 3553(c), this statement at least provided the district court's basic reasoning. Id. Here, the district court failed to provide any guidance with respect to its sentencing decision. Rather, the district court merely stated that it does not give sentences without careful consideration. As in Waknine, the flagrant nature of the district court's error alone is sufficient to establish plain error.