Opinion ID: 1917252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: Appeal of the instant case presents this court with one meritorious argument. At trial, the State based a significant portion of its case on the testimony of Anthony Spears, the truthfulness of which has been made questionable by Spears's later actions. After trial, Spears, an initial suspect, stated to Jackson, a former deputy sheriff, that he [Spears] had killed the victim. When given the chance to recant, Spears did not, stating he was protected by a double jeopardy bar to prosecution. Spears's admission is bolstered by the fact that he sold the murder weapon soon after the killing; that the admission is consistent with the defendant's first recorded statement to police; and that Spears had knowledge of the details of the killing that defendant denied having when he gave his second statement to police. Accordingly, Spears's admission to Jackson that he killed that old white lady and his failure to deviate from the admission when confronted indicate that another jury presented with all of the evidence would probably have reached a different result either in the guilt or the penalty phase of the new trial. It is appropriate to be skeptical when newly discovered evidence is offered after a trial. [17] Such evidence must be thoroughly and cautiously scrutinized. The finality of judgments is an important judicial and societal goal. Those who have been victimized and the families of those who have been victimized desire closure, especially in a brutal and senseless crime against an innocent victim. However, this newly discovered evidence puts at issue the degree of culpability and whether the death penalty is the appropriate sentence based on the newly discovered evidence. That determination must be made based on an evaluation of all of the evidence by a jury. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. VICTORY and TRAYLOR, JJ., dissents and assigns reasons. VICTORY, J., dissenting. I dissent from the majority's reversal of defendant's conviction and sentence and remand of the case for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Not only does the evidence at issue not meet the requirements for a new trial under La.C.Cr.P. art. 851(3), it is not even admissible as a statement against interest under La. C. Evid. art. 804(B)(3). Under La. C.Evid. Art. 804(B)(3), a statement against interest is admissible as an exception to the hearsay. Commentators have explained the reason for this exception as follows: The trustworthiness that generally lies at the basis of this exception to the hearsay rule derives from the circumstance that rarely does a person knowingly lie to his disadvantage. It is a common sense observation that if at the time a statement is made a person believes that his patrimony or liberty is hurt by the facts asserted in such a statement, he generally will not make the statement unless he believes the facts asserted therein to be true. George W. Pugh, Robert Force, Gerard A. Rault, Jr., and Kerry Triche, Handbook on Louisiana Evidence Law (West 2002). In this case, at the time Spears allegedly made the statement to Jackson that I'm going to kill you just like I killed that old white lady, he erroneously believed that he was in no danger of losing his liberty as a result of making the statement. Thus, all indices of trustworthiness are gone and the statement is not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Further, the legislators were careful to address the inherent dangers of statements against interest which exculpate the accused by strictly limiting their admissibility under Article 804(B)(3) as follows: A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. La. C. Evid. Art. 804(B)(3). Here, Spears' statement is not admissible because corroborating circumstances do not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. La. C.Evid. art. 804(B)(3). The majority reasons that the statement is admissible because it is corroborated by the physical evidence related to the shoe print, by Chaney's testimony, and by defendant's first statement, ... 835 So.2d at 452. In defendant's first statement, he told the police that he stayed in the kitchen while Spears and Charles Chaney shot the victim elsewhere in the home. In fact, Chaney was arrested and questioned about this crime based on defendant's first statement. However, defendant's first statement was clearly rejected by the jury, who obviously believed defendant's second recorded statement that he alone shot the victim and that he only named Spears and Chaney in the first statement because he felt that they had ratted him out. [1] In addition, far from corroborating Spears' statement to Jackson, the fact that defendant's shoe print was found in the house, albeit in the kitchen, clearly places defendant at the scene of the crime. On the other hand, no physical evidence whatsoever linked Spears to the crime scene. The jury also heard that defendant also confessed on two separate occasions to Detective Kevin Glob and Officer Glenn Houck, telling each of them that he went into the home alone to burglarize the home, was surprised to find the victim home, led her into the bedroom and accidently shot her. Likewise, the jury rejected the statement of Chaney, a convicted murderer who was also shown to be biased against Spears because they both dated the mother of Spears' child at the same time, that Spears admitted to him that he shot the victim. However, in spite of the fact that the jury, and the trial judge in his reasons for denying defendant's motion for a new trial, clearly rejected defendant's first statement and Chaney's testimony, the majority finds these statements to be the corroborating circumstances [which] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. I strongly disagree. Further, the statement is not grounds for a new trial under the newly discovered evidence provision of La.C.Cr.P. art. 851(3). In, State v. Jacobs, 99-991 (La.5/15/01), 803 So.2d 933, the defendant presented the defense at trial that he was not the triggerman and argued to the jury that the state's evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that a third person was the murderer. After the defendant's conviction, Davis (the owner of the getaway car) implicated a third person as the shooter. This Court held that while Davis' testimony possibly may have aided the defendant's case it was not indispensable to the third party gunman defense, which was presented principally to challenge the sufficiency of the state's evidence. Further, the Court found that the evidence did not meet the criteria of Art. 851(3) because [c]ourts treat with great skepticism belated exculpatory evidence provided by co-defendants who have resolved their own cases after the defendant's conviction. Generally such evidence is not a sufficient ground for granting a new trial. In the present case, the third party gunman theory was known, presented as evidence, and argued to the jury at defendant's trial, and the defense knew that Davis could have provided evidence on this issue. Likewise, in this case, the theory that Spears was the killer was known, presented as evidence, and argued to the jury at defendant's trial. Evidence that Spears was the killer was thus not newly discovered evidence. Further, [n]ewly discovered evidence affecting only a witness's credibility `ordinarily will not support a motion for a new trial, because new evidence which is `merely cumulative or impeaching' is not, according to the often-repeated statement of the courts' an adequate basis for the grant of a new trial. State v. Cavalier, 96-3052 (La.10/31/97), 701 So.2d 949 (citing Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 9, 77 S.Ct. 1, 5, 1 L.Ed.2d 1, 5 (1956)). In my view, the jury clearly convicted defendant of first degree murder and sentenced him to death because he confessed to the police on three separate occasions that he alone committed this crime. Further, in his second recorded statement to the police, he admitted that he only named Spears and Chaney as being involved in the crime because he felt they had ratted him out. In my view, the majority mistakenly orders a new trial based on evidence that is neither newly discovered, nor even admissible. For all of the reasons, I respectfully dissent. TRAYLOR, J., dissenting.