Opinion ID: 1134779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: clemency process

Text: In his last issue on appeal, Rutherford asserts that the circuit court erred in summarily denying his claim that Florida's clemency process is arbitrary and capricious and thus violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Again, Rutherford relies on the ABA Report and argues that he was denied due process by the dismissal of his second clemency petition because there are no rules governing the process and the denial of his petition was the equivalent of flipping a coin. [4] The circuit court correctly denied this claim for relief. In King v. State 808 So.2d 1237, 1241 n. 5, 1246 (Fla.2002), this Court concluded that the defendant's claim that Florida's clemency process violates due process and equal protection was meritless. In Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 252 (Fla.2001), this Court considered the defendant's claim that he was denied due process during a second clemency proceeding because he was denied the right to present mitigating evidence and denied the right to counsel. The Court concluded that its prior decision in Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.1986), controlled: In Bundy v. State , this Court rejected a similar argument: In the final claim raised under his 3.850 motion, appellant contends that he must be allowed time to prepare and present an application for executive clemency before sentence may be carried out in this case. In the death warrant authorizing appellant's execution, the governor attests to the fact that it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate. It is not our prerogative to second-guess the application of this exclusive executive function. First, the principle of separation of powers requires the judiciary to adopt an extremely cautious approach in analyzing questions involving this admitted matter of executive grace. Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So.2d 312 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 232, 54 L.Ed.2d 159 (1977). As noted in In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So.2d 561, 562-63 (Fla.1976), [t]his Court has always viewed the pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly within the domain of the executive branch of government. See also Ex Parte White, 131 Fla. 83, 178 So. 876 (1938). 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.1986), quoted in Provenzano v. State, 739 So.2d 1150, 1155 (Fla.1999). As in Bundy and Provenzano, Glock now seeks counsel for a second clemency hearing. Although Glock contends that Provenzano and Bundy differ from this case because the Governor, rather than Glock, has initiated the clemency proceeding, this is a distinction without a difference. Moreover, for the reasons stated in Bundy, we reject Glock's arguments with regard to his right to present evidence. Accordingly, we find no due process violation and no merit to Glock's clemency claim. Glock, 776 So.2d at 252-53. In Bundy, this Court also declined to say that the executive branch was required to go through the motions of holding a second proceeding when it could well have properly determined in the first that appellant was not and never would be a likely candidate for executive clemency. Bundy, 497 So.2d at 1211. In Rutherford's case, there is no dispute that he was given the opportunity to be heard and was represented by counsel during his first clemency proceeding. Further, we reject Rutherford's argument that the ABA Report requires us to reconsider our prior decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to Florida's clemency process. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Rutherford's constitutional attack on the clemency process.