Opinion ID: 1060568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mens Rea Required for the Offense of Child Abuse: Nature of Conduct or Result of Conduct

Text: The defendant was found guilty of aggravated child abuse, which requires either child abuse or neglect under Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-401 and the additional element that the abuse or neglect resulted in serious bodily injury. We will next address whether the knowing mens rea required in the child abuse statute applies to the conduct of the defendant or to the result of that conduct. The defendant argues that the child abuse statute defines a result-of-conduct offense and, therefore, the statute requires that one must actually be aware that her conduct would result in serious bodily injury to the child victim. We disagree. A result-of-conduct offense requires that the culpable mental state accompany the result as opposed to the nature of the conduct. See generally Wallace v. State, 763 S.W.2d 628 (Tex.Ct.App. 1989). The focus is on whether the actor possessed the required culpability to effectuate the result that the legislature has specified. Generally, an offense may be classified as a result-of-conduct offense when the result of the conduct is the only element contained in the offense. An example of a result-of-conduct offense is second degree murder, which is defined as a knowing killing of another. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-210(a)(1). In second degree murder, the result of the conduct is the sole element of the offense. The nature of the conduct that causes death or the manner in which one is killed is inconsequential under the second degree murder statute. The statute focuses purely on the result and punishes an actor who knowingly causes another's death. The intent to engage in conduct is not an explicit element of the state's case in second degree murder. Accordingly, a result-of-conduct crime does not require as an element that an actor engage in a specified course of conduct to accomplish the specified result. In contrast, the child abuse statute sets forth both a conduct element and a result element. The child abuse statute provides, in pertinent part: Any person who knowingly, other than by accidental means, treats a child under eighteen (18) years of age in such a manner as to inflict injury or neglects such a child so as to adversely affect the child's health and welfare... Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-15-401 (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, Tennessee's child abuse and neglect statute may be broken down into two classifications, abuse and neglect, each of which have both a conduct and a result element. Child abuse requires that: (1) a person knowingly treat in such a manner a child under eighteen years of age; and (2) the child sustains an injury. Child neglect requires that: (1) a person knowingly neglect a child under eighteen years of age; and (2) the child's health and welfare are adversely affected. The defendant argues that the mens rea of knowing applies to the injury prong as well as to the treatment and neglect prong. The defendant cites Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), in support of her argument that our child abuse and neglect statute is a result-of-conduct offense. In Alvarado , the defendant was convicted of abuse or injury to a child after placing the child in scalding bath water. The defendant alleged that she did not know the bath water was hot enough to cause injury. The statute under which she was convicted defined the crime as: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence engages in conduct that causes serious bodily injury.... Id. at 37, n.1 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04, since amended). The court held that the statute under which Alvarado was convicted was a result-of-conduct offense and that the state had failed to show that she intended the scalding bath water to burn her baby. Id. The holding in Alvarado has been described as merely an effort to lessen the confusion arising from the legislature's unfortunate choice of words in the statute defining the offense of injury to a child, as it read at the time of that opinion. Navarro v. State, 863 S.W.2d 191, 196 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993). Moreover, Alvarado was subsequently interpreted as having little or no application in a prosecution under ... any other `result of conduct' statute that does not employ the confusing `engage in conduct' language formerly found in section 22.04. Id. at 196. The State of Texas has since amended the statute. Unlike Alvarado , the Tennessee child abuse and neglect statute is clear that knowingly modifies treats or neglects. The actus reus is modified by the clause other than by accidental means. Accordingly, the statute requires that the act of treating a child in an abusive manner or neglecting the child must be knowing conduct. For instance, the defendant must have knowingly left or abandoned her children in the car for more than eight hours. If the defendant had been unaware that her children were present in the car when she left her car parked in front of the hotel, the neglect of her children would have been accidental or unknowing. Contrary to the defendant's assertions, application of the mens rea to the actus reus of this statute precludes this statute from being a strict liability statute. Once the knowing mens rea is established, the next inquiry under the plain language of the statute is simply whether the child sustained an injury or, in the case of child neglect, whether the child suffered an adverse effect to the child's health or welfare. The legislature has employed the phrases so as to injure and so as to adversely affect when defining the injury aspect of the child abuse statute. These phrases clearly indicate that if an injury results from knowing abuse or neglect, the actor has committed child abuse. As a practical matter, the defendant's argument could render the child abuse statute ineffectual. Defendants in child abuse cases could argue that, while they in fact knowingly punished or spanked the child, they did not know harm would occur. See Alvarado, 704 S.W.2d at 37, n.4. We, therefore, reject the defendant's argument and hold that the mens rea of knowing refers only to the conduct elements of treatment or neglect of a child under the child abuse statute and conclude that the child abuse offenses are not result-of-conduct offenses.