Opinion ID: 1188900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Former Civil Code Section 232 Proceeding

Text: Having rejected each of the father's arguments in support of the decision of the Court of Appeal to dismiss the appeal from the termination of parental rights as moot, we reinstate that appeal. Having solicited briefing on the propriety of the order terminating parental rights, we transfer that appeal to this court and conclude that the superior court's order should be affirmed. Former section 232 of the Civil Code provided that a child may be freed from the custody and control of his or her parents when the child has been in an out-of-home placement supervised by the juvenile court for a year, if the court finds that return of the child to the child's parent or parents would be detrimental to the child and that the parent or parents have failed during that period, and are likely to fail in the future, to maintain an adequate parental relationship with the child, which includes providing both a home and care and control for the child. The section also provides that: The court shall make a determination that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents which were designed to aid the parents to overcome the problems which led to the deprivation or continued loss of custody and that despite the availability of these services, return of the child to the parents would be detrimental to the child. (Former Civ. Code, § 232, subd. (a)(7).) (10a) The father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's order terminating his parental rights because there was no proper and sufficient evidence that he had failed to maintain an adequate parental relationship, and because there was no evidence at all to support the court's determination that he was likely to fail to maintain an adequate parental relationship with Jasmon in the future or that adequate reunification services had been offered to him. (11) A court may order termination of parental rights only if it finds the elements of the action under former Civil Code section 232 established by clear and convincing evidence. (Former Civ. Code, § 232 subd. (a) (7); In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 839 [191 Cal. Rptr. 464, 662 P.2d 922].) On review of the order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights, the reviewing court must determine whether there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings. ( In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 404, 414 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 680].) It is not our function, of course, to reweigh the evidence or express our independent judgment on the issues before the trial court. ( In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 833.) Rather, as a reviewing court, we view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment below and `decide if the evidence [in support of the judgment] is reasonable, credible and of solid value  such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that termination of parental rights is appropriate based on clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.]' ( In re Christina L., supra, 3 Cal. App.4th at p. 414, quoting In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 1317, 1326 [255 Cal. Rptr. 498], see also In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 836; In re Solomon L. (1987) 190 Cal. App.3d 1106, 1110 [236 Cal. Rptr. 2].) (12) Former Civil Code section 232, subdivision (a)(7) requires a finding, as a prerequisite to termination of parental rights, that the parents have failed, and are likely to fail in the future, to maintain an adequate parental relationship with the child. This finding is the equivalent of a finding of unfitness, a finding that is necessary at some point in the proceedings as a matter of due process before parental rights may be terminated. ( Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 850-851.) The superior court made the required finding, stated in the terms of the statute. (10b) Our review of the record has convinced us that there is substantial evidence in support of the trial court's determination that the father had failed, and was likely to fail in the future, to maintain an adequate parental relationship with Jasmon. The court had before it evidence that the father had a personality disorder that prevented him from putting aside his own needs and adequately caring for this child. There was credible evidence provided by persons who had observed the father's visits with Jasmon and psychologists who had observed and worked with Jasmon that throughout the proceedings, up to the time of the hearing on termination, the father had failed to establish any parental relationship with Jasmon. Many witnesses described his interactions with her as lacking in empathy and warmth. Various psychologists and social workers were of the opinion that he saw her as a possession, simply an extension of himself. There was evidence that he was unaware of the distress that other witnesses found it obvious she was experiencing during the transition plan. In addition, the juvenile court probation officer who prepared a report for the termination proceedings and testified at the hearing concluded that the father is no closer to having a parental relationship with his daughter today than he was in 1987. She testified that in her opinion, the father would never function adequately as a parent to Jasmon. Although the court discounted the evidence that the father was incapable of acting as an adequate parent to any child, it expressly concluded that he was incapable of meeting this child's extraordinary needs. The evidence was overwhelming that there was no parent-child relationship between Jasmon and her father, and that none had developed over these lengthy proceedings. This past failure was predictive of the future; as we have explained, a measure of a parent's future potential is undoubtedly revealed in the parent's past behavior with the child. ( In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 833.) We conclude the court reasonably found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the father had failed, and would continue to fail, to maintain an adequate parental relationship with Jasmon. (Former Civ. Code, § 232, subd. (a)(7); see also Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.) The father claims that the court found inability to be an adequate parent on the basis of circumstances that no longer existed at the time of the hearing, such as his drug dependency and early failure to comply with the reunification plan. Not so. The court noted these facts, but its comments were directed at the father's apparent failure to accept any responsibility for the fact that Jasmon had been placed in foster care in the first place. The court's finding regarding his ability to function as a parent was based on current circumstances. (13a) As to the adequacy of the reunification services, the father claims he was not offered any services designed to overcome Jasmon's anxiety at losing her foster parents. The father argues that problems which develop during the dependency proceedings, such as the child's bonding to foster parents, cannot be the basis of continued foster care unless the department of social services has provided reunification services geared to address the new problems. He relies on In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal. App.3d 1448 [234 Cal. Rptr. 84] (dealing with reunification services before the permanency planning stage) and In re Venita L., supra, 191 Cal. App.3d 1229, 1242 (same). (14) The Department was required to make a good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan ... [with] the objective of providing such services or counseling `as will lead to the resumption of a normal family relationship.' ( In re Christina L., supra, 3 Cal. App.4th at p. 414.) (13b) We are loath to prescribe exactly what services should be offered. We observe, however, that the Department did provide services geared to overcoming the problems caused by the extended dependency dispute. It was the purpose of the transition plan to overcome Jasmon's anxiety and distress at being returned to her father's custody. As for services directed at the father's ability to cope with Jasmon's special needs, the effectiveness of such services was limited by the father's failure to admit that his child was suffering any distress during the transition plan and to cooperate with the psychologist who was administering the plan. The evidence shows that during the reunification period as well as during the period of the transition plan, the father denied that Jasmon had any special needs or suffered any particular anxiety about losing her foster parents. The father was provided with a psychologist (in fact, a series of psychologists) whose primary task was to help him meet the challenge of becoming a parent to Jasmon. This counseling extended from the beginning of the reunification plan through the transition plan. None of the psychologists who testified, including the father's therapist, had any criticism of the transition plan. There was evidence that the father became so suspicious of the psychologist supervising the plan and treating his daughter that he refused to meet with him to discuss Jasmon's increasing anxiety. During the entire proceedings, the father was offered, and, indeed, took advantage of, multiple services, including, as we have noted, psychological counseling, parenting classes, and drug rehabilitation services. The services offered were reasonable under the circumstances. ( In re Christina L., supra, 3 Cal. App.4th at p. 417 [reasonable, not ideal, services required].) As we have noted, in an action to terminate parental rights under former Civil Code section 232, the court must determine not only whether the parent has failed, and is likely to continue to fail, to maintain an adequate parental relationship, but also whether return of the child to the parent would be detrimental to the child. (Former Civ. Code, § 232, subd. (a)(7); In re Brittany H. (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 533, 551 [243 Cal. Rptr. 763].) The father does not suggest that there was insufficient evidence of detriment to support the court's determination apart from the claim that a child's bond with the foster parents cannot be the sole basis for such a determination. (15) Even more than at the permanency planning stage, at the point that the court is to hear a subsequent action for termination of parental rights, it is clear that the court may find that the child's interest in stability outweighs the parent's interest in the care and custody of the child. At this late point, as we have said, reunification efforts have ceased and the state's purpose is no longer reunification, but to free the child for adoption or other permanent, out-of-home placement. (See In re Emily L., supra, 212 Cal. App.3d at p. 741; In re Shannon W., supra, 69 Cal. App.3d at pp. 961-962; see also In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 837.) The primary focus is to assure the best interests of the child. (Former Civ. Code, §§ 232, subd. (b), 232.5, 232.6; In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 837; In re Jonathan R., supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at p. 1221; In re Solomon L., supra, 190 Cal. App.3d at p. 1112.) Accordingly, at a hearing on termination of parental rights, the court may rely on evidence that the disruption of the child's bond with foster parents will cause the child serious, long-term emotional damage in determining whether, in the terms of the statute, it would be detrimental to return the child to the natural parent. (See In re Brittany H., supra, 198 Cal. App.3d at p. 552 [detrimental to return child to natural parent after four years with foster parents]; see also In re B.J.B. (1985) 185 Cal. App.3d 1201, 1209 [230 Cal. Rptr. 332] [detriment may be established by proof of bonding with foster parents].) In addition, we note that the court did have before it evidence that the detriment to Jasmon in returning to her father's care would arise not only because of the disruption of her bond with the foster parents, but also because of the father's unfitness to meet her extraordinary needs. (16) The father argues finally that we have required that the decision to terminate parental rights must be supported by evidence that severing the parental relationship is the least detrimental alternative available. (See In re Carmaleta B. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 482, 489 [146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514]; see also In re Micah S., supra, 198 Cal. App.3d at pp. 560-561; In re Solomon L., supra, 190 Cal. App.3d at p. 1114.) He argues the trial court failed to make a necessary determination that termination of parental rights was the least detrimental alternative for him. The father's argument elevates the desires of the parent over the welfare of the child, but the law focuses more on the interests of the child at this late stage of the proceedings  here nearly seven years after placement with the foster parents. (Former Civ. Code, §§ 232, subd. (b), 232.5, 232.6; In re Laura F., supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 837; In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 698 [114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244]; In re Jonathan R., supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at p. 1221, In re Micah S., supra, 198 Cal. App.3d at pp. 565-566 (conc. opn. of Brauer, J.); In re Solomon L., supra, 190 Cal. App.3d at p. 1114; In re Rico W. (1986) 179 Cal. App.3d 1169, 1176 [225 Cal. Rptr. 472].) As we said in In re Carmaleta B., supra, 21 Cal.3d 482, on review of the termination hearing, we must determine if the trial court's findings ... were supported by substantial evidence such that the situation contemplated by the statute [section 232] arises, and severing the parental relationship becomes the least detrimental alternative for the children.  ( Id. at p. 489, italics added; see also former Civ. Code, § 4600, subd. (c), now Fam. Code, § 3041.) As one court has explained in responding to a similar argument: Obviously, any alternative short of termination is less drastic to parental rights. While preservation of [the mother's] rights are an important consideration, once again, the focus of the court's inquiry is upon the welfare of the child. (Civ. Code, § 232, subd. (b).) ( In re Solomon L., supra, 190 Cal. App.3d at p. 1114.) Certainly, it is a weighty matter to decide whether a parent should be separated forever from a child, and the desire of the parent to achieve a family relationship is given consideration. (See, e.g., In re Victoria M., supra, 207 Cal. App.3d 1317, 1331; see also Adoption of Kelsey S., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 849.) But the court at the hearing under former section 232 was required to focus on selecting the alternative that was least detrimental to the child. (17) In the present case, the trial court did not make a specific finding that termination was the least detrimental alternative. An express finding is not required. ( In re Rico W., supra, 179 Cal. App.3d at p. 1176.) It is clear that the court in this case considered the alternatives presented through the testimony of witnesses and the admission of written reports into evidence, and concluded that termination of parental rights was the least detrimental alternative for the child. The court stated that although it might be too late to preserve Jasmon's psychological health completely, the court would not make any orders that would create further anxiety or emotional problems for her, or further impair her psychological health. The court clearly considered the father's desire to achieve a parent-child relationship. However, there was substantial evidence before the court that guardianship or long-term foster care would be detrimental to Jasmon because the child derived no benefit from any relationship with her natural father and because the uncertainty of her position would be prolonged indefinitely as long as the natural father could continue to litigate issues relating to custody and visitation. It was obvious from the father's understandable assiduity in litigating every possible issue in this case that he would continue to do so if his parental rights were not terminated. At the time of the hearing on termination of parental rights, Jasmon's future had been uncertain for a period of years. It was clear that further reunification services would be fruitless. Jasmon had suffered severely in the tug of war between her natural father, the Department, the foster family, and the courts. To permit this uncertainty to continue, even in the shape of disputes over visitation in the context of a guardianship or long-term foster care arrangement, would be inconsistent with the state's and the child's interest in avoiding further detriment to Jasmon. (See In re Angelia P., supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 923; In re Jonathan R., supra, 211 Cal. App.3d at p. 1222.) The conclusion of the trial court that termination of parental rights and adoption were the least detrimental alternatives for Jasmon was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of the superior court terminating the father's parental rights should be affirmed. The father argues that we still must reach certain issues he raised in the Court of Appeal with respect to the propriety of the juvenile court referee's orders at the final permanency planning hearing. The Court of Appeal did not reach these issues, apparently because it believed its reversal of the section 388 order rendered the new permanent plan a nullity and reinstated the earlier permanent plan directing that Jasmon's custody be returned to her father. We decline to reach these issues. Although the father claims that most of these errors affected the termination proceeding, he does not specify the issues to which he is referring, nor does he explain why they would have affected the termination proceeding. Nor do we see any way in which his claims would affect the latter determination. Thus, for example, the claim that the juvenile court referee erred in ordering the father to testify regarding his efforts at publicizing the case and to turn over his copies of Department reports and other notes would have no impact on the superior court's later de novo determination of the issue of termination of parental rights. Nor would his claims of error in admitting evidence affect the former Civil Code section 232 proceeding, as the evidence to which he objected was clearly not the sole basis for the superior court's decision, and, in fact, some of the testimony was presented again at the section 232 proceeding, and he does not suggest on appeal from the judgment in the section 232 proceeding that the admission of this evidence was error. His claims that the juvenile court referee should have selected the least detrimental alternative, namely, modification of the transition plan, and that the referee erred in determining that the child would not benefit from a relationship with her father are superseded by the judgment of the superior court that return of the child to her father would be detrimental. His claims with respect to form and notice of the section 388 motion would not affect the section 232 judgment because the success of the section 388 motion was not a procedural predicate to the filing of the section 232 action. He attacks as unconstitutional the referee's order that the Department file an action pursuant to section 232, maintaining that the Department's misconduct should vitiate the order. However, the juvenile court referee's order would not affect the superior court's determination, as the superior court considered the same evidence of misconduct and necessarily rejected it as a basis for a decision not to terminate parental rights. In such circumstances, it is clear that the order terminating parental rights renders the father's claims with respect to the earlier hearing moot. ( In re Kristin B., supra, 187 Cal. App.3d at pp. 604-605.) Finally, we reject the argument of the dissent that because the Department caused the child to be placed in a foster home, created the child's bonds to the foster parents, and disrupted the child's potential bond with the father, it would be fundamentally unfair to terminate the father's parental rights even if it would be detrimental to the child to be returned to his care. The factual assumptions of the dissent are incorrect. It was not the Department, but the child's parents who made it necessary to place the child in foster care and to keep her there. The father is far from being the innocent victim portrayed by the dissent. At age 24 he chose to enter into a sexual relationship with Jasmon's mother, who was then an emotionally troubled minor of 16, living in a halfway house for the mentally disturbed. The father admitted these facts under a promise by the court that they would not be used against him in any other proceeding, e.g., a statutory rape charge. When the child was born, the father had a 10-year history of drug and alcohol abuse, and had been hospitalized for mental illness. He had been living in an independent living center for the mentally ill for a year and a half when he entered the liaison with the child's mother. He lived with the child and mother outside of the halfway house until Jasmon was four or five months old, but then he left. His excuse for leaving his family was that the child's mother would not settle down. When Jasmon's mother brought the child to the Department, unable to care for her alone, the father was again in a half-way house for the mentally ill and had problems with drugs. The Department was also not to blame for the fact that the child had to stay in foster care for an extended period. As the superior court declared in its findings in support of the termination order, Mr. O[ ] did not jump into the reunification plan with both feet. There was a passage of almost 18 months before he could  it could even be reasonably said that compliance was had. The court noted that even the father's expert placed the responsibility on Mr. O[ ] for having used the drugs and the medications and the alcohol such as to create apparent personality disorders and a state in which he was unable to take care of the minor during the initial period. Again, the court declared that because of the father's inability to care for the child, [t]here was a period of almost 18 months or more when it would have been completely unreasonable to have even considered any kind of reunification. During this 18-month period, it was natural that the child would bond with the A.'s, but this bonding occurred because of the father's inability to be a parent  not because of any improper acts of the Department or the A.'s. The dissent claims there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that the father could not provide adequate parental care for Jasmon. It suggests we have simply accepted the prevarications of the Department in reaching a contrary conclusion. We do not, however, uncritically accept the claims of the Department regarding the father; rather, we find that substantial evidence supports the determination of the judicial fact finder in this case, a fact finder that received evidence, observed the demeanor of the witnesses, and concluded that parental rights should be terminated. Many judicial officers have reviewed the facts in this exhaustively litigated case  a case which the dissent would remand for further seemingly endless litigation. Only one referee, with reluctance, concluded that the father might possibly perform adequately as a parent. The others disagreed. The juvenile court at the final 1991 hearing made a finding that he could not perform adequately as a parent, declaring the evidence to be overwhelming. The superior court that ordered termination of parental rights also expressly determined that the father could not perform adequately as a parent. The dissent dismisses much of the evidence relied upon by the superior court as insubstantial because it was offered through the testimony of psychologists. In addition to the evidence already referred to, such evidence included the declaration of the psychologist treating the father near the time of the termination hearing that he no longer believed that the father was able to take on the responsibility of being a parent and that the father was unable to recognize the child's needs. It also included evidence of an independent psychologist that the father had a narcissistic personality disorder. Without the testimony of psychologists, in many juvenile dependency and child custody cases superior courts and juvenile courts would have little or no evidence, and would be reduced to arbitrary decisions based upon the emotional response of the court. It cannot seriously be argued that such evidence should be excluded, or denied substantial weight. Further, there was other evidence of the father's incapacity in this case, including testimony of observers who noted the father's strange inability to relate to the child. The child's biological mother was of the opinion that the father was totally unfit to be a parent. Finally, the father himself unwittingly provided evidence in support of the superior court's decision, demonstrating a total lack of understanding of his child's predicament. The dissent criticizes the Department and to some extent the A.'s for taking the child from her family, preventing reunification with the father, and trying to secure an adoption. The father's attorney at the termination hearing, however, told the court that he was making no argument that the foster parents had interfered with reunification. He told the court that it was not his position that the Department had sinister motivations  he claimed that the Department had been stupid rather than malevolent. The record does not support any conspiracy theory. There was a conflict of interest when the mother's social worker found that the mother had brought the child to the Department, and the social worker recommended to the Department's placement worker that the child be placed with the social worker's sister. Contrary to the assertion of the dissent, she did disclose to the placement worker that it was her sister, but the Department failed to inform the court or the parents of this fact. The first referee to consider this evidence concluded that neither the foster parents nor the social worker had any hidden agenda and that both were actually well motivated. I find no evidence of any evil motive, plan, scheme or design from the standpoint of interfering with either mother's or father's rights. The referee at a subsequent hearing, at which the father raised the issue again, concluded: The court finds that, while initially there may have been the appearance of improprieties early in the case, there was no act of collusion by Social Worker Reid or the foster parents to thwart reunification efforts. The foster parents have bent over backwards to assist in the reunification services. Mrs. A. testified that she scrupulously abided by the rules and regulations of the foster family manual of policies and procedures. It was stipulated that very early in the placement she developed the hope that the child would not be reunified with the father, but that she did not believe she had interfered with the reunification, but in fact believed she had done her utmost to assist in the reunification. Mr. A. testified that he and his wife both did everything in their power to support the reunification effort. The probation officer  not a Department employee  testified that she did not believe the foster parents tried in any way to thwart reunification with the father. The superior court expressly found no evidence that the foster parents had interfered with reunification. The child was placed in foster care at age six months because both parents were totally unable to care for her. She is now seven and a half years old. The determination of the superior court is supported by substantial evidence and this litigation should come to an end.