Opinion ID: 1408111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Limits

Text: Having concluded that provisions (a) and (k) of the preliminary injunction are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and do not infringe defendants' constitutionally protected associational interests, we must complete our inquiry by considering the limitations on the scope of the interlocutory decree as a matter of both public nuisance and constitutional law. We must ask, in other words, two questions: First, whether the activity enjoined under these two provisions reasonably falls within the statutory definition of a public nuisance as construed in People v. Lim, supra, 18 Cal.2d 872, 878, and second, whether the two provisions comply with the constitutional standard announced by the Supreme Court in Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. 753, that is, whether they burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant governmental interest. ( Id. at p. 765 [114 S.Ct. at p. 2525].) (15) That the conduct enjoined by the trial court meets the statutory definition of a public nuisance is clear from the account of conditions in Rocksprings recited at the outset of this opinion. To constitute a public nuisance under our Civil Code, conduct must be injurious to health, ... indecent or offensive to the senses, ... an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully obstruct[] free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any ... public park, square, street, or highway. (Civ. Code, § 3479.) In addition, the conduct must affect an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons. (Civ. Code, § 3480.) The many declarations filed with the superior court by the City in support of its request for injunctive relief meet these criteria. Gang members not only routinely obstruct Rocksprings residents' use of their own property  by such activities as dealing drugs from apartment houses, lawns, carports, and even residents' automobiles  but habitually obstruct the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of the public streets of Rocksprings. It is likewise clear from this record that the conduct of gang members qualifies as indecent or offensive to the senses of reasonable area residents: The hooligan-like atmosphere that prevails night and day in Rocksprings  the drinking, consumption of illegal drugs, loud talk, loud music, vulgarity, profanity, brutality, fistfights and gunfire  easily meet the statutory standard. Nor is it difficult to see how threats of violence to individual residents and families in Rocksprings, murder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings, assault and battery, vandalism, arson and associated crimes obstruct the free use of property and interfere with the enjoyment of life of an entire community. Do provisions (a) and (k) of the superior court's preliminary injunction meet the constitutional test formulated by the Supreme Court in Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. 753, 765 [114 S.Ct. 2516, 2525] by burden[ing] no more speech than necessary to serve an important governmental interest? We conclude both provisions satisfy the constitutional test. (16) As noted, provision (a) effectively forbids gang members from engaging in any form of social intercourse with anyone known to them to be a gang member anywhere in public view within the four-block area of Rocksprings. The provision's ban on all forms of association  standing, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view  does not violate the Madsen standard merely because of its breadth. The provision seeks to ensure that, within the circumscribed area of Rocksprings, gang members have no opportunity to combine. It is the threat of collective conduct by gang members loitering in a specific and narrowly described neighborhood that the provision is sensibly intended to forestall. Given that overriding purpose, the prohibitions enumerated in provision (a) are not easily divisible. Permitting two or more gang members to drive together but not sit, or to stand together but not walk, would obviously defeat the core purpose behind the proscription. Moreover, given the factual showing made by the City in support of preliminary relief  the carnival-like atmosphere of collective mayhem described above (see, ante, at pp. 1100-1101, 1120)  we cannot say that the ban on any association between gang members within the neighborhood goes beyond what is required to abate the nuisance. The effect of provision (a)'s ban on defendants' protected speech is minimal. To judge from the evidence placed before the superior court, the gangs appear to have had no constitutionally protected or even lawful goals within the limited territory of Rocksprings. So far as the record before the trial court shows, the gangs and their members engaged in no expressive or speech-related activities which were not either criminally or civilly unlawful or inextricably intertwined with unlawful conduct. According to the declaration of Officer Mikael Niehoff, an eight-year veteran of the San Jose Police Department: Illegal drug dealing by Sureno gang members, including VSL/VST, is a common practice, and the gang entity provides protection to the individual members, allowing them to establish areas where they can conduct their illegal activities. The protective shield of the gang has allowed individual members to commit crimes such as narcotic trafficking that result in personal gain. These crimes are committed in association with the gang because of the protection offered to the members by virtue of their gang affiliation. In the Rocksprings area, the fact that numerous narcotics transactions occurred is a direct result of the protective shield provided by VSL/VST. Individuals who claimed membership in VSL or VST were at liberty to deal drugs in a veritable `safe' zone. Does provision (a)'s prohibition on a gang member associating with even a single fellow gang member within Rocksprings transgress the test of Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. 753? Could not the restriction be limited to barring associations between, say, three other gang members? Two gang members? On such a highly particular question, we are compelled to defer to the superior knowledge of the trial judge, who is in a better position than we to determine what conditions on the ground in Rocksprings will reasonably permit. Outside the perimeter of Rocksprings, the superior court's writ does not run; gang members are subject to no special restrictions that do not affect the general population. Given the limited area within which the superior court's injunction operates, the absence of any showing of constitutionally protected activity by gang members within that area, the aggravated nature of gang misconduct, the fact that even within Rocksprings gang members may associate freely out of public view, and the kind of narrow yet irreducible arbitrariness that inheres in such line-drawing, we conclude that this aspect of provision (a) passes muster as well under the standard of Madsen, supra, 512 U.S. 753. (17) We reach a similar resolution with respect to provision (k). That provision forbids those subject to the injunction from confronting, intimidating or similarly challenging  including assaulting and battering  residents of Rocksprings, or any other persons who gang members know have complained about their conduct within the neighborhood. It has long been the rule, of course, that physical violence and the threat of violence are not constitutionally protected: The First Amendment does not protect violence. ( NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 916 [102 S.Ct. 3409, 3427, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215] (hereafter Claiborne Hardware ).) Because the conduct proscribed by provision (k) consists of threats of violence and violent acts themselves, it fall[s] outside the protection of the First Amendment because [such acts] coerce by unlawful conduct, rather than persuade by expression, and thus play no part in the `marketplace of ideas.' As such, they are punishable because of the state's interest in protecting individuals from the fear of violence, the disruption fear engenders and the possibility the threatened violence will occur. ( In re M.S., supra, 10 Cal.4th 698, 714, original italics.) [A] physical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. ( Wisconsin v. Mitchell, supra, 508 U.S. 476, 484 [113 S.Ct. 2194, 2199].) By the same token, utterance in a context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the Constitution. ( Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co. (1941) 312 U.S. 287, 293 [61 S.Ct. 552, 555, 85 L.Ed. 836, 132 A.L.R. 1200].)