Opinion ID: 38495
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We review the bankruptcy court’s factual

Text: Sam Dillon and his wife filed for chapter 13 findings for clear error and its legal conclubankruptcy about three years after Dillon had sions de novo. See Lambert v. Miss. State Tax received a chapter 7 discharge. The Texas Comm’n, 179 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1999). Commission on Environmental Quality Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if we (“TCEQ”)SSthe Texas state agency charged have a definite and firm conviction that a miswith enforcing environmental lawsSSfiled a take has been made. See Mabey v. Southwesttimely claim against Dillon in connection with ern Elec. Power Co., 150 F.3d 503, 513 (5th the chapter 13 filing for governmental fines, Cir. 1998). “Strict application of the clearly penalties, and other liabilities arising from al- erroneous rule is particularly important whe[n] leged unlawful operation of public water utili- the district court has affirmed the bankruptcy ties. The Dillons objected to TCEQ’s initial court’s findings.” Coston v. Bank of Malvern, claim, asserting that they should not be fined 987 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992). for periods before or during the pendency of their chapter 7 proceeding. TCEQ amended The Dillons are pro se, so their briefs are its claim to assert an unsecured interest in liberally construed and not held to the standard $337,000 in fines and penalties only for unla- of exactitude expected of briefs by attorneys. wful operation allegedly conducted between See, e.g., Amin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 706 the dates of the chapter 7 discharge and the F.2d 638, 640 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983). But, “pro chapter 13 filing. se litigants have no general immunity from the rule that issues and arguments not briefed on The bankruptcy court denied the Dillons’ appeal are abandoned.” Geiger v. Jowers, objection to TCEQ’s amended claim, finding 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4572, at  n. 6 (5th that the debtor had continued to operate the Cir. Mar. 21, 2005). water systems after the chapter 7 discharge. Because TCEQ’s unsecured claim exceeded III. $290,925 (the maximum amount of non-con- The Dillons assert that the trustee, TCEQ, and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) are liable for violating a plethora of federal stat-  utes, Texas regulations, and provisions in the Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has United States and Texas constitutions. As a determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited threshold matter, we refrain from considering circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. the claims made against the IRS, because they 2 are wholly irrelevant to the issues presented by The Dillons point to nothing in the record the instant appeal; the IRS is not a party to this that is probative of their assertion that TCEQ’s action, and the asserted liability has no claim was forged and fraudulent. Mere colorable impact on the issues that are present conclusional assertions do not demonstrate vis-á-vis the parties that are properly part of that the bankruptcy court was clearly erronethis action. Moreover, because the Dillons ous in its factual finding that the claim was merely string-cite the provisions and fail to in- legitimate. Even assuming arguendo that the clude any facts or brief any argument explain- bankruptcy court erred in approving TCEQ’s ing why these laws were violated or how claim for $460,000 when it had requested only finding liability under them would affect the $337,000, that would not affect the disposition disposition in the district and bankruptcy of the case, because $337,000 plainly exceeds courts, the claims are deemed waived for in- the $290,525 jurisdictional threshold limit for adequate briefing.1 chapter 13 bankruptcy relief established by § 109(e).