Opinion ID: 2738522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: With Respect to the Transportation of Property

Text: The FAAAA preempts state laws related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added). The district court interpreted the second phrase as imposing an independent, and severe, requirement for FAAAA preemption. The district court explained that, [u]nlike the ADA, FAAAA preemption applies only [] to state statutes regulating the 'transportation of property.' Since Section 148B has a broad application to a swath of state wage and hour laws, which, in turn, apply to all employees regardless of the underlying industry, the district court determined that Section 148B failed to relate sufficiently to the transportation of property. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Dan's City, 133 S. Ct. 1769. There, the Court considered state law claims based on a New Hampshire statute that regulated the removal, storage, and disposal of abandoned motor vehicles after they had been towed, id. at 1776, and concluded that the state law claims were not preempted under the FAAAA, id. at 1775. The Court noted that the phrase, with respect to the transportation of property, in the FAAAA was a conspicuous addition to the ADA preemption provision. Id. at -22- 1778. The Court stated that the second phrase 'massively limits the scope of preemption' ordered by the FAAAA. Id. [F]or purposes of FAAAA preemption, it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the 'price, route, or service' of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law must also concern a motor carrier's 'transportation of property.' Id. at 1778-79. The district court's rule misreads the import of Dan's City. While Dan's City stated only that the law must concern a motor carrier's transportation of property, the district court required the law to regulate the motor carrier's transportation of property. Such a strict reading of the second phrase would effectively nullify the expansive reading of the first phrase. A general statute, whose effect was indirect but significant, would no longer be preempted. Although the Court expressed its understanding that the second phrase limits the scope of FAAAA preemption, it gave no indication that the second phrase in fact overrules all earlier precedent on the first phrase. Without a clear statement from the Court, we cannot assume that its opinion intended to do so. Instead, we understand Dan's City to ensure that FAAAA preemption does not apply when a state statute concerns motor carriers in matters unrelated to the transportation of property. In Dan's City, the Court acknowledged that a tow truck qualifies as a motor carrier, but stressed that the statute did not affect the -23- operation of tow trucks. 133 S. Ct. at 1776 n.1, 1779. Instead, the statute regulated the disposal of vehicles after their transportation by towing had ended. Id. at 1779. The Court stated it is not sufficient that a state law relates to the 'price, route, or service' of a motor carrier in any capacity; the law must also concern a motor carrier's 'transportation of property.' Id. at 1778-79 (emphasis added). This interpretation of the second phrase limits the scope of FAAAA preemption, as noted by the Court in Dan's City. The second phrase excludes from FAAAA preemption any state law that affects a motor carrier's prices, routes, or services outside the context of the transportation of property. The scope of FAAAA preemption would be far broader if it encompassed state statutes that affected motor carriers in any capacity. Instead, the FAAAA is carefully tailored to preempt only those statutes that affect a motor carrier's transportation of property. This excludes, for example, statutes that affect a motor carrier's transportation of passengers, statutes that affect a motor carrier's transportation of garbage, or, like in Dan's City, statutes that relate to motor carriers after the transportation of property has ended. The facts of this case are a far cry from Dan's City. Section 148B governs the classification of the couriers for delivery services. It potentially impacts the services the delivery company provides, the prices charged for the delivery of -24- property, and the routes taken during this delivery. The law clearly concerns a motor carrier's transportation of property. The district court must address on remand whether this effect on delivery companies' prices, routes, and services rises to the requisite level for FAAAA preemption.