Opinion ID: 774807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Board Err in Interpreting the INA?

Text: 35 Chong argues that the Board violated 8 U.S.C. S 1231(b)(3)(B) by not granting her an individualized hearing to determine whether she committed a particularly serious crime. We accord Chevron deference to the Board's interpretation of the INA. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999). Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to determining whether the INA is silent or ambiguous with respect to what constitutes a particularly serious crime, and, if so, whether the Board's answer is based on a permissible construction of S 1231(b)(3)(B). See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 36 The INA is silent concerning how the Board should determine whether an alien has committed a particularly serious crime when a court has convicted the alien of an aggravated felony for which the court sentenced the alien to less than five years imprisonment. The statute simply notes that the Attorney General is not precluded from determining that, notwithstanding the length of sentence imposed, an alien has been convicted of a particularly serious crime. 8 U.S.C. S 1231(b)(3)(B). In other words, where a court has sentenced an alien to less than five years for an aggravated felony, the statute grants the Attorney General discretion to determine whether that alien has committed a particularly serious crime.The Board has explained that when determining whether a crime is particularly serious, 37 consideration of the individual facts and circumstances is appropriate... This inquiry does not involve an examination of the respondents' family or community ties, or the risk of persecution in the alien's native country. To make this determination, we look to the conviction records and sentencing information. 38 Further, we do not engage in a retrial of the alien's criminal case or go behind the record of conviction to redetermine the alien's innocence or guilt. 39 In re L-S-, Interim Decision 3386, 1999 WL 219344 (BIA Apr. 16, 1999). As this language demonstrates, In re L-S-simply requires that an individualized examination or determination of the particularly serious crime issue be conducted, not that an individualized hearing be held. We conclude that the Board's interpretation of S 1231(b)(3)(B) is reasonable because it guides and channels the Attorney General's discretion to determine whether an alien like Chong has committed a particularly serious crime, thereby helping to ensure that the Attorney General does not make this determination in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner. 40 Moreover, we conclude that the Board's interpretation of S 1231(b)(3)(B) as necessitating only an individualized examination of the particularly serious crime issue, rather than an individualized hearing, is a permissible one. As we noted supra in Part II.B.1., when an alien already has been provided the opportunity to mount arguments and present evidence on the particularly serious crime question during a live removal hearing, due process does not require a second hearing on the issue. All that the Constitution mandates is an individualized determination, which the Board's construction affords. Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 549. Thus, we reject Chong's argument that the Board violated S 1231(b)(3)(B). 41 To the extent that Chong contends that the Board violated its precedent by not conducting an individualized determination of her case, we disagree. In fact, the Board did conduct an independent determination of the facts and circumstances of Chong's case. The Board noted that although Chong's two-year sentence was below the five-year term that requires an aggravated felony to be considered a per se particularly serious crime, the district court departed from the minimum sentence due to Chong's assistance to the INS. The Board stated: This is different from a sentence reduction due to a minor role in the offense or other mitigating factors. The Board examined the complaint against Chong and asserted that over several years, [Chong] handled money derived from selling drugs and arranged telephonic connections for people involved in the conspiracy to promote the distribution of large amounts of heroin. This examination of the record and sentencing information is all that Board precedent requires. 42