Opinion ID: 2780544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Cause” to Work

Text: Under section 552, Nordstrom may not “cause” its employees to work more than six days in seven. That provision dates back to 1893, when it was enacted as part of the California Penal Code. See 1893 Cal. Stat. 54, § 301(1); Cal. Penal Code § 301(1), at 1044 (Deering 1893). But the legislative history sheds no light on the precise meaning of “cause” in this context.3 In Brinker, a putative class of hourly restaurant employees sued Brinker Restaurant Corporation, alleging that 3 The answer to this question may determine the outcome of Plaintiffs’ claims because, depending on the definition of “cause,” the employer may or may not have “cause[d]” them to work more than the requisite number of days. 14 MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM Brinker had failed to provide its employees with the meal and rest breaks required under California state law. 273 P.3d at 521. The question for decision was whether an implicit waiver, as distinct from a mutual written waiver, was effective to relieve the employer of liability for failure to provide such a break. The California Supreme Court held that an employer must relieve the employee of all duty during the requisite break, but that the employer has no duty to ensure that the employee does not in fact choose to continue to work during that time. Id. at 537–38. The district court relied on Brinker to conclude that, so long as an employee is not compelled to work in violation of the day-of-rest statute, the employer has not violated the statute. We are not persuaded that Brinker provides guidance here. The statutory text is different. California Labor Code section 512(a) prohibits an employer from employing someone for more than five hours per day “without providing” a meal period, for example. The verb to “provide” generally means to “supply.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1827 (unabridged ed. 1961) (noting that “PROVIDE and SUPPLY are often interchangeable”). The employer had only to “supply” a break, not also to ensure that each employee used what was supplied. By contrast, the question here is what act on the part of an employer counts as “causing” an employee to work more than the day-of-rest statutes allow. To “cause” can mean to “induce,” see id. at 356, so is it enough for an employer to encourage or reward an employee who agrees to work additional consecutive days? In another context, causation is defined in terms of the “natural and probable consequence” of one’s action. People v. Roberts, 826 P.2d 274, 300 (Cal. 1992). Is it enough for an MENDOZA V. NORDSTROM 15 employer to permit employees to trade shifts voluntarily, when a natural and probable consequence may be that an employee works more than the day-of-rest statutes allow? Brinker does not suggest an answer. Cf. Cal. Lab. Code § 513 (prohibiting an employer from “encouraging or otherwise soliciting” a request for makeup work time). In addition to the linguistic distinctions found in the relevant statutes, there are practical distinctions between meal and rest breaks and days of work. An employer knows that an employee is working on a particular day. But an employer may or may not know, and may even have no way to know, whether a particular employee chooses to keep working through a lunch break or rest break. As is the case with the other questions, the statutory text is unclear. California employers and employees need to know what the statute means. No legislative history or appellate decision clarifies the issue.