Opinion ID: 412029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Threats

Text: 10 In his direct testimony, as part of the description of his deal with the government, Charles Huey testified that he was participating in the Federal Witness Protection Program. The government explains that it elicited Huey's testimony that he was in the witness protection program because it was relevant that it was financially aiding him and to rebut any inference that the government was buying his testimony. The fact that a witness is in the witness protection program and has received substantial benefit may be elicited during examination of the witness so long as the prosecution does not exploit any inference of threat from the defendant. See United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 387-88 (5th Cir.), appeal dismissed in part as moot sub nom. United States v. Holt, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 102 S.Ct. 2006, 2007, 2020, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, 474, rehearing en banc on other grounds, 681 F.2d 952 (5th Cir.1982). 11 The following was elicited on cross-examination by Wujs' counsel:Q. When did you tell the Government that you had some information and you wanted to know whether or not they were interested in working something out? 12 A. In February of 1981. 13 Q. In February of 1981. Now, what was your reason for making that suggestion to the Government? 14 A. At the time I felt that I was in danger. I felt that my wife was in danger. 15 MR. ECKARD: Objection, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Overruled. 17 [Side-bar discussion] 18 Q. Why did you go to the Government? 19 A. I felt at the time that there was a danger to myself and my wife, that it--I seen another incident take place that bothered me quite a bit. The conversations that I had had with Joe [Frankenberry] concerning coming down and talking to, with Joe coming down with Ben [Wujs], me setting up a meeting so that Joe and Ben could talk to John Sullivan, and when they were finished talking to John Sullivan, that they wanted to talk to Perry and when they were finished talking to Perry, they wanted to talk to John's wife, Dot, and I felt if they were willing to talk to those three, that I felt that there was a danger in it for my wife and I. 20 At side-bar, defendant's counsel had expressed the concern that Huey's testimony would move into areas involving contract killing in Uniontown or [sic] that is the basis for my objection. The testimony, however, did not move in that direction. 21 Defendant contends that the admission of this testimony was erroneous under the precedent of United States v. Carney, 461 F.2d 465 (3d Cir.1972) (per curiam), where we ordered a new trial because a witness testified that he did not like the defendant because the defendant tried to kill him and his two children. It is evident that the testimony in this case is far less direct or inculpatory than that in Carney. Huey's testimony was vague, did not directly implicate this defendant, and gave no specific basis for the apprehension of danger. In prior cases, we have upheld convictions in similar circumstances where a witness' testimony as to threats did not indicate that the danger or threat specifically emanated from the defendant. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 712, 716 (3d Cir.1973); cf. United States v. Barbone, 283 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.1960), cert. dismissed, 365 U.S. 805, 81 S.Ct. 686, 5 L.Ed.2d 688 (1961). See also Wallace v. United States, 412 F.2d 1097, 1102 & n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1969) (per curiam), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943, 949, 91 S.Ct. 1605, 29 L.Ed.2d 110, 119 (1971). In this case, the trial court considered defendant's claim that the introduction of this evidence warranted a new trial. In rejecting the motion, the trial court concluded that the testimony was not prejudicial to the defendant Frankenberry after noting that the witness did not expand on the nature of the incident referred to in his testimony or indicate who was involved. We agree.