Opinion ID: 865971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court properly excluded

Text: THE PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT TESTIMONY. ¶34. “The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of evidence, such as expert testimony, is an abuse of discretion.” Investor Res. Servs., Inc., v. Cato, 15 So. 3d 412, 416 (Miss. 2010) (citing Adcock v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 981 So. 2d 942, 946 (Miss. 2008)). This Court will not overturn a trial court’s decision on an evidentiary issue unless the trial court abused its discretion, meaning it acted arbitrarily and clearly erroneously. Hubbard v. 16 McDonald’s Corp., 41 So. 3d 670, 674 (Miss. 2010) (citing Kilhullen v. Kansas City So. Ry., 8 So. 3d 168, 172 (Miss. 2009)). “A trial judge’s determination as to whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is given the widest possible discretion and that decision will only be disturbed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Worthy v. McNair, 37 So. 3d 609, 614 (Miss. 2010) (quoting Sheffield v. Goodwin, 740 So. 2d 854, 856 (Miss. 1999)). ¶35. The admissibility of expert testimony is evaluated in light of Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702, which states: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. This rule emphasizes that it is “the gate[-]keeping responsibility of the trial court to determine whether the expert testimony is relevant and reliable.” M.R.E. 702 cmt. ¶36. For expert testimony to be admissible, it must be both relevant and reliable. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). “Relevance is established when the expert testimony is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” Hubbard, 41 So. 3d at 675 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591). To be reliable, “the testimony must be grounded in the methods and procedures of science, not merely a 17 subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Worthy, 37 So. 2d at 615 (citing Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 36 (Miss. 2003)) (citations omitted). ¶37. We have stated that “an expert’s testimony is presumptively admissible when relevant and reliable.” Hubbard, 41 So. 3d at 675 (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 39). “The weight and credibility of expert testimony are matters for determination by the trier of fact.” Id. (quoting Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Martin, 994 So. 2d 740, 747 (Miss. 2008)) (citations omitted). “Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.” Id. (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 36 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)). ¶38. Ultimately, if an expert’s testimony survives the threshold scrutiny under Rule 702, it is subject to further review under Rule 403. See Worthy, 37 So. 3d at 614 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595) (“The [trial] judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than lay witnesses.”). “[E]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading . . . .” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. Accordingly, “lack of reliable support may render [expert testimony] more prejudicial than probative” under Rule 403. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987). ¶39. Rawson’s deposition testimony concluded that, based on basic mathematics and the lack of skid marks, Holmes should have avoided the accident. Specifically, Rawson’s deposition testimony concluded that Denham was not negligent and did not create an 18 immediate hazard when turning, because there were no skid marks. Denham and Caldwell argued that the trial court should have admitted this deposition testimony because “several of the jury instructions hinged on the speed of Holmes’s vehicle and distance between the vehicles.” Denham, 2010 WL 1037494, at  (¶11). ¶40. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding that Rawson’s deposition testimony “was technical in nature and would have assisted the jury in understanding the evidence and determining the facts in issue.” Holmes, 2010 WL 1037494, at  (¶14). The Court of Appeals further found that, because the “testimony was based on the facts available from the accident scene . . . then this testimony should have been admitted.” Id. And the Court of Appeals reasoned that, because the jury had no expert testimony from which to determine the negligence of the parties, the jury “did not have sufficient information from which to reach a verdict.” Id. ¶41. In Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So. 2d 311, 315 (Miss. 1985), this Court first held that a properly qualified and examined expert witness could provide testimony on issues of ultimate fact regarding the cause of car wrecks without invading the jury’s province – essentially placing accident reconstructionist experts on equal footing with other experts. Under Daubert, however, Rawson’s testimony must still be both relevant and reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-2.
¶42. This Court agrees that Rawson’s basic mathematics and timing estimates, based on Holmes’s professed speed, were relevant. See Cato, 15 So. 3d at 418 (discussing the low 19 threshold for relevant evidence). Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court agreed that Rawson’s timing and distance estimates would have assisted the trier of fact.
¶43. However, contrary to the language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, the mere existence of expert testimony– based on the facts available from an accident scene – does not mean that this testimony, although technical in nature, should be admitted as a matter of course. See M.R.E. 702 (“If . . . technical . . . knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness . . . may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data . . . .”). ¶44. Rawson’s deposition testimony reveals that Rawson concluded Holmes had been speeding. This opinion is based on Holmes’s admitted estimated speed. Based on this estimated speed, Rawson performed some basic mathematical calculations to determine the distance between Holmes’s car and Denham’s car.7 He also viewed several photographs and determined no skid marks existed. He then made a second conclusion: that Denham had not been negligent and that Holmes had failed to avoid the accident. Rawson reasoned that, based on the lack of skid marks, Holmes had not attempted to avoid the accident: [Defense Attorney]: If I understand it right, traveling at -- in excess of the speed limit was -- the basis of your opinion was simply the 45 miles per hour written on the police report. 7 Rawson indicated in his report that no physical evidence permitted him to test Holmes’s speed. 20 [Rawson]: That’s correct. [Defense Attorney]: Nothing else? [Rawson]: Nothing else. [Defense Attorney]: The failure to take appropriate action – and when you say that, are you saying to avoid the accident? [Rawson]: Yes, sir. [Defense Attorney]: Okay. Failure to take appropriate action to avoid the accident, it is simply by no evidence of skidding, no skidmarks on the pavement? [Rawson]: That’s correct. Rawson could not perform any tests to confirm or disprove Holmes’s estimated constant speed of forty-five miles per hour.8 As the Court of Appeals acknowledged, little physical evidence in this case lent itself to expert analysis in the field of accident reconstruction to aid the jury. ¶45. Reviewing Rawson’s conclusions based on the limited evidence in this case, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in finding this deposition testimony to be unreliable as expert testimony with regard to Rawson’s ultimate conclusion concerning causation and avoidance. But we agree with the Court of Appeals to the extent that the trial court should have permitted Rawson to offer his timing and distance estimates to aid the jury.
¶46. Rawson’s ultimate conclusion – that Holmes should have avoided the accident – assumed that Holmes’s estimated speed was correct and further assumed that Holmes had constantly maintained his estimated rate of speed until impact. 8 At trial, Holmes testified that he had told police that he estimated his speed to have been between forty and forty-five miles per hour. He also testified that he had slowed to thirty miles per hour when Denham’s car had turned into his lane. 21 ¶47. Rawson’s testimony hinges on precise timing – the difference between 3.12 seconds and 3.62 seconds. If these assumptions were incorrect, then Holmes would not have been 206 feet away from the plaintiff’s car when it began to turn. Consequently, his conclusions regarding accident avoidance and the fact that Denham did not create an immediate hazard most likely would have been altered. ¶48. Evidentiary weaknesses stemming from a lack of physical evidence in the plaintiffs’ case should not induce the introduction of unreliable expert testimony. See M.R.E. 702. Generally, however, when expert opinion is based on reliable methodology, the facts as applied in the methodology are a credibility determination for the jury. See Treasure Bay Corp. v. Ricard, 967 So. 2d 1235, 1240 (Miss. 2007). Here, Rawson relied on basic mathematics – an obviously reliable methodology – to create his timing and distance estimates. In reaching his conclusions, Rawson applied facts in the record, including Holmes’s estimated speed of forty-five miles per hour. ¶49. While Rawson’s timing and distance estimates arguably were shaky, the credibility of this portion of Rawson’s deposition was an issue for the trier of fact. See id. (“[E]xperts in many fields, including medicine, accident reconstruction and forensic pathology, frequently rely on histories provided by patients and witnesses.”); see also Hubbard, 41 So. 3d at 675 (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 36 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)) (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). 22 ¶50. Moreover, although the trial judge expressed concern over whether Rawson had performed a true accident reconstruction, this Court finds that Rawson’s testimony regarding his timing and distance estimates, based on common mathematics, did constitute expert testimony in the field of accident reconstruction. Although jurors could have performed Rawson’s common calculations, Rawson collected data from the accident using his specialized knowledge. He measured sight distances, timed cars, and determined the location of the accident from the available evidence. He interpreted this evidence and, ultimately, based on this limited evidence, he reached conclusions about causation and avoidance. As applied mathematically and at the accident site, Rawson’s expert analysis and methods regarding timing and distance estimates, were beyond the average juror’s “common knowledge” and should have been presented to the jury. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990); Smith v. Ameristar Casino Vicksburg, Inc., 991 So. 2d 1228, 1230 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); see also 9 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts § 115, 4 (2010) (Trial court should admit expert testimony if relying on the “‘knowledge and application of principles of physics, engineering, and other sciences [is] beyond the ken of the average juror.’”).
¶51. Under Daubert, all of Rawson’s relevant conclusions, however, must have been sufficiently reliable. We find that Rawson’s ultimate conclusion regarding causation and avoidance was not sufficiently reliable. Based on the lack of skid marks, Rawson concluded that Denham had not negligently caused an immediate hazard when she had turned in front 23 of Holmes. Rawson reasoned that if Denham had caused an immediate hazard, then Holmes would have applied his brakes and left skid marks or swerve marks. And since no skid marks existed, according to Rawson, Denham could not have been negligent. ¶52. But other than speaking generally about creating immediate hazards and pointing to the lack of skid marks, Rawson’s deposition testimony never clearly explained under the limited physical evidence why skid marks were required for a finding that Holmes had attempted to avoid the accident: [Defense Attorney]: Now, we can agree that in the general course of traffic, disregarding the events of this accident, in the general course of traffic, vehicles not turning left and in clear sight, they would have the right-of-way to vehicles turning left on the eastbound lane? [Rawson]: Unless they created an immediate hazard? .... [Defense Attorney]: Okay. So in this case, Ms. Denham created an immediate hazard? [Rawson]: No, she didn’t. [Defense Attorney]: And so in this case, if she didn’t create an immediate hazard, then how does Mr. Holmes not have the right-of-way? [Rawson]: He didn’t attempt to avoid the accident. [Defense Attorney]: Okay. And if I’m clear – I’m not clear. Can you state that again? [Rawson]: Had she created an immediate hazard, she would have caused him to respond by locking his brakes or swerving left or right to take immediate evasive action. She did not. She made her turn in sufficient time for him to have slowed by normal brake and still avoid the accident. [Defense Attorney]: Okay. And how does that situation – how does that eliminate his right-of-way? [Rawson]: Well, the law says if someone is turning and they don’t create an immediate hazard, they have the right-of-way. .... [Defense Attorney]: And is that the basis of your opinion that Ms. Denham held no negligence, is the fact that the rules of the road state that when a vehicle is turning left and turns – I’m sorry. I just – if you can state that for me again so I’m clear. 24 [Rawson]: Okay. If the vehicle that makes a left turn across traffic does not create an immediate hazard, the oncoming traffic has to yield to him or her. [Defense Attorney]: So if you make a left turn across oncoming traffic, the oncoming traffic then has the duty to yield to you? [Rawson]: Yes, sir. [Defense Attorney]: Which, I guess, would be the basis for your opinion that he should have avoided the accident? [Rawson]: Yes, sir. (Emphasis added.) Based simply on the absence of skid marks, Rawson concluded that Denham had not been negligent and that Denham had the right of way. Rawson also concluded that Holmes had not attempted to avoid the accident.9 ¶53. Even though “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence[,]” this Court cannot say that the trial judge acted arbitrarily by finding that Rawson’s ultimate conclusion regarding causation and avoidance did not satisfy Daubert’s reliability standard. Hubbard, 41 So. 3d at 675 (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 36 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596)). “[N]othing in . . . Daubert . . . requires a . . . court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.” Watts v. Radiator Specialty Co., 990 So. 2d 143, 149 (Miss. 2008). 9 On the other hand, Holmes testified that, once Denham had pulled in front of him, he slowed his truck to a speed of thirty miles per hour in an effort to avoid the accident. 25 ¶54. While this Court has allowed, when appropriate, an accident reconstructionist to opine as to ultimate conclusions regarding causation, Rawson’s ultimate conclusion as articulated in his deposition testimony, based on the lack of skid marks, contained an obvious “analytical gap.” Therefore, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in excluding this testimony. Simply stated, Rawson failed to connect the dots between the skid marks and the existing physical evidence; thus, as found by the trial judge, his conclusion regarding causation was unreliable. ¶55. Moreover, Rawson’s conclusion regarding whether Denham had created an immediate hazard was not based on specialized, technical, or scientific knowledge. See M.R.E. 702 (requiring “scientific, technical, [or] specialized knowledge”). As previously mentioned, Rawson opined that, because no skid marks were present in the black-and-white photographs, Holmes did not attempt to avoid the accident, although he had a duty to do so. However, Holmes testified that he did brake to avoid the accident, probably slowed to thirty miles per hour, and sought to circumvent Denham’s car in the gravel lot off the highway where the collision occurred. Durham, Holmes’s passenger, stated that Denham’s vehicle had pulled in front of Holmes’s truck at the last second. On the other hand, Denham and Caldwell testified that they never saw Holmes’s truck approaching, and that he must have been driving “crazy fast.” ¶56. Without clearly tying the physical evidence to the lack of skid marks, Rawson’s speculation “on the implication of the lack of skid marks would not have been superior to a conclusion a jury could [have drawn] for themselves” and, therefore, was not necessary. See 26 Garnett v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 935, 946 (Okla. 2008); Palmer, 564 So. 2d at 1355 (Miss. 1990) (“Expert testimony is required unless the matter in issue is within the common knowledge of laymen.”); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[E]xpert testimony is unnecessary . . . when ordinary experience would render the jury competent to decide the issue.”). ¶57. “A trial judge’s determination as to whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is given the widest possible discretion . . . .” Worthy, 37 So. 3d at 614 (quoting Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Pounders, 970 So. 2d 141, 146 (Miss. 2007)). Viewing Rawson’s deposition testimony in its entirety, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by not allowing into evidence expert testimony that was clearly speculative and based on insufficient data. But the trial court did abuse its discretion by not permitting the jury to weigh the credibility of Rawson’s distance and timing estimates, which largely were based on facts in the record and would have aided the jury.