Opinion ID: 76390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: IDEA — Standard of Review

Text: 18 We review district court IDEA decisions under the standards set forth in K.C., 285 F.3d at 982-83 (whether an IEP provides a FAPE is a mixed question of fact and law subject to de novo review), and Walker County Sch. Dist. v. Bennett, 203 F.3d 1293, 1295 n. 6 (11th Cir.2000) (statutory interpretations are reviewed de novo). 19 Contrary to Loren's contention, summary judgment [in IDEA cases] has been deemed appropriate even when facts are in dispute, and is based on a preponderance of the evidence. Beth B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 n. 2 (7th Cir.2002). That is why the district court's decision is perhaps better described as judgment on the record. Id.; see also Slama v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2580, 259 F.Supp.2d 880, 882 (D.Minn.2003) (On motion for judgment on the record in an IDEA suit, the district court may make a decision on the merits, even if there exist, upon the stipulated [r]ecord, disputed issues of material fact) (citation omitted). 20 That means that the usual F.R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment principles do not apply in an IDEA case. 4 This is not surprising because no IDEA jury trial right exists. See Whitehead v. Sch. Bd. for Hillsborough Co., 918 F.Supp. 1515, 1518 (M.D.Fla.1996) (Because only injunctive relief and equitable damages are allowed under the IDEA, there is no jury trial right for IDEA claimants). The district court often conducts a bench trial on a stipulated record. Slama, 259 F.Supp.2d at 882 (quotes and cite omitted). 21 While many courts cite to the commonly applied Rule 56 standards without acknowledging these distinctions, see, e.g., M.D. v. Southington Bd. of Educ., 334 F.3d 217, 220-21 (2d Cir.2003), we find nothing to prevent district judges from factfinding under F.R. Civ. P. 52 in IDEA cases — even on a record bearing evidence tendered in addition to the IDEA administrative record — subject to the requirement that they accord due weight to administrative findings. 5 22 Reimbursement, after all, is a matter of equitable relief, committed to the sound discretion of the district court.... Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 999 (1st Cir.1990) (cites omitted; emphasis added), see also Kurz v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 273 F.Supp.2d 474, 480 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (If the award of statutory damages is seen as representing equitable relief then it should go without saying that no right to a jury attaches to claims for equitable relief) (quotes, cite and alterations omitted), so no jury-trial right exists on that score. And factfinding is not limited to bench trials involving live witnesses. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (Absent clear error, a district court's factfindings cannot be overturned even if they do not rest on credibility determinations, but are based instead on physical or documentary evidence or inferences from other facts). 23 Finally, in deferring to the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the district court must receive and thus review the records of the [state] administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(i). Where the district court does not receive any additional evidence or testimony, this court stands in the same shoes as the district court in reviewing the administrative record and may, therefore, accept the conclusions of the ALJ and district court that are supported by the record and reject those that are not. M.L., 341 F.3d at 1062.