Opinion ID: 2975869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Proof at Sentencing

Text: Schoeninger argues that “[t]he district court’s refusal to determine the sentencing guidelines enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt violates due process under the Fifth Amendment and the right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment” in light of Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 6 856 (2007). Appellant Br. at 11. Along with other circuits, we have previously rejected this argument, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham offers no support to Schoeninger’s argument. In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the Supreme Court held that mandatory application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment, and the Court excised the portion of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory, thereby rendering them advisory. With the Guidelines advisory, we have held that district courts may determine sentencing facts under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See, e.g., United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 540 (2006). In Mickens, we stated that “[b]y now, it is well established that the preponderance standard does not violate Booker, so long as the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, not binding.” Id. at 673 (citing cases from the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits); see also United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).1 The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Cunningham offers no support to Schoeninger’s argument. Indeed, in Cunningham the Court reiterated that every Justice “acknowledged that the Federal Guidelines would not implicate the Sixth Amendment were they advisory.” Cunningham, 127 S. Ct. at 866. The result in Cunningham was to strike down California’s sentencing system after the Court noted that California’s system “resembles pre-Booker federal sentencing” and that “California’s [system] does not resemble the advisory system the Booker Court had in view.” Id. 1 Schoeninger makes no argument that the district court viewed the guidelines as binding. 7 at 866 n.10, 870. Rather than help Schoeninger’s argument, Cunningham makes clear that an advisory system of guidelines and a preponderance standard do not implicate the Sixth Amendment. B. Whether the Affidavit Established Probable Cause to Search the Schoeninger Residence
“The standard of review for the sufficiency of an affidavit ‘is whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidence would be found at the place cited.’” United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir. 1991)). “This court pays great deference to the determinations of probable cause made by a state magistrate, whose findings ‘should not be set aside unless arbitrarily exercised.’” United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1376 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Pelham, 801 F.2d 875, 877 (6th Cir. 1986)). “Probable cause exists ‘when there is a “fair probability,” given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.’” Greene, 250 F.3d at 479 (quoting Davidson, 936 F.2d at 859). “In reviewing the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, this Court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 397 (6th Cir. 2002).
Schoeninger argues that the supporting affidavit in his case failed to establish probable cause because the affidavit “mainly related to defendant Dem[e]trius Meffer” and the affidavit “did nothing to connect the Schoeninger home to methamphetamine production, consumption or presence.” 8 Appellant Br. at 14, 16. Schoeninger also claims that information in the affidavit was stale,2 and he attacks the affidavit’s reliance on confidential informants. Id. at 16-19. Asserting that “[i]n this case, the basis for the purported reliability of the informant(s) is impossible to ascertain as there is no recitation of how the informant’s information was determined to be reliable or how it was corroborated,” Schoeninger argues that “the magistrate appears to have abdicated his duty to independently determine whether probable cause existed” to search Schoeninger’s residence. Id. at 17-18. Each of Schoeninger’s arguments lacks merit. First, although Schoeninger correctly characterizes the affidavit as focusing mainly on Meffer, the affidavit nonetheless contained ample information connecting the Schoeninger residence to suspected illegal activity at Meffer’s alleged lab. On February 12, 2005, COMET officers observed Schoeninger’s wife drive to Meffer’s suspected methamphetamine lab and, after receiving no answer to her knocking, use her cellular phone; at that time, other officers conducting surveillance of Meffer’s residence saw Meffer leave and travel to the lab, where he and Ms. Schoeninger met. The officers also described activity that reasonably appeared suspicious and was possibly meant to cover a drug transaction: Meffer raised the hood of her vehicle and made several trips in and out of the suspected lab, but carried no tools for working on the car. After Ms. Schoeninger left the suspected lab, officers observed Meffer leave to purchase more methamphetamine precursors such as propane, brake pads, and brake cleaner. Furthermore, on February 21, 2005, COMET officers 2 Schoeninger makes only two bare assertions that the affidavit contained stale information, see Appellant Br. at 16 (“the information contained therein is stale” and “[m]ost of the information was stale”), and he does not identify any particular information as stale. Most of the affidavit focuses on the results of the COMET officers’ month-long surveillance of Meffer’s suspected methamphetamine lab and is certainly not stale. In any event, an issue merely adverted to in a perfunctory manner in an appellate brief and not developed may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reed, 167 F.3d 984, 993 (6th Cir. 1999). 9 watched a van bearing out-of-state license plates drive to Meffer’s suspected lab; when the van’s driver received no answer at the lab, the officers followed as the van drove to Schoeninger’s residence in Algonac, which the van’s occupants entered. Combined with the information from a CI that “Patricia from Algonac” purchased methamphetamine from Meffer for sale and distribution, the van incident furnished a reasonable basis to infer that the Schoeninger residence, like Meffer’s suspected lab, was a source known for supplying methamphetamine, and a source known even to individuals outside the community. Finally, the affidavit noted that Schoeninger has a criminal history involving methamphetamine use and possession. Second, contrary to Schoeninger’s assertion that the officers failed to corroborate the CI’s information, the affidavit details significant corroborative action. For instance, the CI led officers to the suspected lab, described an individual known as “Patricia from Algonac” as a customer of the lab—and a dealer in her own right—and provided a physical description that matched Ms. Schoeninger’s driver’s-license information. Furthermore, COMET officers had personally observed Ms. Schoeninger visit Meffer’s suspected methamphetamine lab on another occasion, corroborating the CI’s claims that “Patricia” would go to the lab “and pick up meth . . . for sale and distribution.” J.A. at 89 (Aff. at 9). The incident involving the out-of-town van visiting the Schoeninger residence after unsuccessfully attempting to make contact at Meffer’s suspected lab also tended to confirm the CI’s assertion that Patricia from Algonac purchased methamphetamine in amounts sufficient for distribution. Finally, our cases demonstrate that probable cause existed to search the Schoeninger residence. Schoeninger portrays the affidavit in his case as similar to those in United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming suppression of evidence by district court), and United 10 States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing district court’s denial of motion to suppress). Schoeninger’s case, however, differs from each in significant ways. In Leake, we affirmed the district court’s suppression of evidence, citing two problems with the affidavit in that case. We noted that “the information provided by the anonymous caller in this case was not ‘rich’ in relevant detail” and that the officer’s “corroboration of the information provided by the caller was simply insufficient.” Leake, 998 F.2d at 1365. We concluded that “[u]ltimately, this case demonstrates the importance of taking sufficient time to verify an anonymous tip before a warrant is requested,” explaining that “[t]he supporting affidavit was too vague and [the officer’s] limited two-night surveillance was insufficient to verify important elements of the anonymous caller’s information.” Id. The affidavit and corroborative work in Schoeninger’s case stands in stark contrast to the facts in Leake: here, the affidavit spanned nearly twenty pages, contained extensive details regarding the purchases and visits of various individuals connected to the suspected methamphetamine lab, included information supplied not by an anonymous informant but by a corroborated confidential informant, and involved a nearly one-month period of surveillance. The differences between Schoeninger’s case and Weaver are likewise clear. In Weaver, we noted that “the only claim of possible wrongdoing [in the affidavit] is the averment that, within three days prior to the affidavit date, the informant was on the suspect[’s] premises and, while there, he saw some quantity of marijuana ‘expressly for the purpose of unlawful distribution.’” Weaver, 99 F.3d at 1378. The affidavit in Weaver was largely pre-printed, containing essentially no particularized information beyond that which “could arguably be obtained by any person passing the [suspect’s] house.” Id. at 1378-79. We specifically observed that although the officer had received 11 a tip about the defendant’s illegal activities, he “undertook no substantive independent investigative actions to corroborate his informant’s claims, such as surveillance of the [defendant’s] residence for undue traffic.” Id. at 1379 (emphasis added). In contrast, the affidavit supporting the warrant in Schoeninger’s case was not lacking for detail, and the officers conducted significant surveillance. Further, they corroborated the information that the CI provided: the CI led officers to the suspected lab and offered a description of “Patricia from Algonac” that matched the information on Ms. Schoeninger’s driver’s license. Although the government argues that we have “held that evidence of drug dealing is likely to be found where dealers live,” Appellee Br. at 19 (citing United States v. Miggins, 302 F.3d 384, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2002), we have recently emphasized that a suspect’s status as a drug dealer alone is insufficient to establish probable cause to search the suspect’s residence. See United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 525 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[O]ur case law does not ‘support[] the proposition that the defendant’s status as a drug dealer, standing alone, gives rise to a fair probability that drugs will be found in his home.’”) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747-49 (6th Cir. 2005) (describing cases as requiring some “connection between the residence to be searched and the facts of criminal activity that the officer set out in [the] affidavit”). In any event, the affidavit in this case contained evidence connecting criminal activity to the place to be searched. Beyond the CI’s assertion that Ms. Schoeninger engaged in the distribution of methamphetamine, the COMET officers’ surveillance revealed that an out-of-state vehicle proceeded to the Schoeninger residence immediately after an unsuccessful attempt to enter Meffer’s suspected lab, which tends to raise a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity would be found at the Schoeninger residence. The officers here also 12 relied on more than the CI’s bare assertion that “Patricia from Algonac” was a dealer and user who frequented a lab in New Haven, Michigan. The officers had the CI physically lead them to Meffer’s lab, the location from which the CI claimed to know that “Patricia from Algonac” purchased methamphetamine. Moreover, the officers had been conducting surveillance on that location for nearly a month, during which time they had observed Ms. Schoeninger visit the suspected lab under suspicious circumstances. In sum, our cases support affirming the district court’s denial of Schoeninger’s motion to suppress because the affidavit in this case bears little relation to those found problematic in prior cases and because the contents of the affidavit adequately established probable cause to believe that the officers would find evidence of criminal activity at the Schoeninger residence.