Opinion ID: 1881558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Four Factors Considered Together

Text: ¶ 51. Taken as a whole, the record before this Court reveals no clear error by the trial court in dismissing the case, as its decision was based on substantial evidence. The State has failed to adequately justify the delay between arrest and indictment, and has failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to Woodall. I find that the trial court correctly held that the weight of the Barker factors favors Woodall. ¶ 52. As this Court has ruled, dismissal stands as the sole remedy for a violation of the right to speedy trial. Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1064 (Miss.1985). In the case at bar, I believe the trial court correctly weighed the Barker factors to find that Woodall's Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial had been violated, and was therefore correct in dismissing the indictment against Woodall. ¶ 53. A one-year delay between Woodall's arrest and indictment was presumptively prejudicial. I would hold that because the State failed to show good cause for the delay, and because Woodall suffered prejudice as a result, the circuit court properly granted his motion to dismiss for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The decision of the circuit court was based on substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. GRAVES, J., JOINS THIS OPINION.