Opinion ID: 2745935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Judicial Decisions

Text: Constitutional and statutory prohibitions barring double jeopardy shield a defendant from multiple criminal punishments arising from the same offense (see US Const Amend. V [nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy . . .]; NY Const art. I, § 6 [No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense]; see also CPL 40.20 [A person may not be twice prosecuted for the same offense]; People v Wood, 95 NY2d 509, 513 [2000] [imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause]). Double jeopardy has a particular application to contempt matters and bars a subsequent prosecution where a prior contempt sentence serves a punitive rather than remedial purpose (see People v Colombo (405 US 9 [1972]). - 12 - - 13 - No. 159 The test for determining whether contempt is of the type that constitutes punishment in a constitutional sense is well articulated in Shillitani, and its companion case, Pappadio v United States. There, defendants were each incarcerated for their respective refusals to answer certain questions before the same grand jury (Shillitani, 384 US at 365-66). Both defendants were found guilty of criminal contempt, and each sentenced to two years imprisonment, subject to a purge clause that permitted defendants' release if they answered the questions before the end of the their respective sentences (id.). The United States Supreme Court rejected defendants' claims that they were confined without the benefit of indictment or jury trial, holding that the sentences were conditional, and therefore the actions constituted civil contempt proceedings not subject to the constitutional safeguards of indictment or jury trial (id. at 372). Essential to the court's decision was its determination that despite its obvious punitive aspects, imprisonment serves a remedial purpose if the court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness to testify (id. at 370, citing Nye v United States, 313 US 33, 42-43 [1941]). For, '[i]t is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, that often serve to distinguish civil from criminal contempt (id. at 369, quoting Gompers v Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 US 418, 441 [1911]). Where a defendant is held in contempt for the remedial purpose of compelling compliance, imprisonment continues until - 13 - - 14 - No. 159 such time as the contemnor acquiesces or is no longer able to do so (see Shillitani, 384 US at 371). Once the contemnor agrees, there is no remedial purpose to be served by continued confinement. The contemnor, therefore, holds the keys of their prison in their own pockets (id. at 368). In contrast, where a contemnor is sentenced to imprisonment for a definite period which cannot be affected -- that is, ended -- by the contemnor's compliance with the law, then the contempt is not remedial but punitive. As the Supreme Court has stated, [i]f the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period, the defendant is furnished no key, and [the defendant] cannot shorten the term by promising not to repeat the offense (Gompers, 221 US at 442-43). The court reaffirmed these principles in Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v Feiock (485 US 624, 632 [1988]). There, defendant challenged on due process grounds his contempt adjudication and subsequent incarceration for failure to make child support payments (id. at 628). Ultimately, the court found the record too underdeveloped and remanded (id. at 640-41). However, the court restated the legal rules applicable to determining the character of contempt and noted that [i]f the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if 'the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's order,' and is punitive if 'the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite - 14 - - 15 - No. 159 period' (id. at 632, quoting Gompers, 221 US at 440). Addressing a double jeopardy challenge to our Judiciary Law, the United States Supreme Court made clear that it is the nature of the contempt that matters. In Colombo, the court found defendant in contempt for his refusal to testify before a grand jury after being granted immunity. The court sentenced the defendant to 30 days imprisonment and a $250 fine. When defendant's appellate challenge proved fruitless, he offered to testify. When his offer was refused, defendant paid his fine and served his sentence. Subsequently, the People indicted the defendant under the Penal Law. Defendant unsuccessfully challenged his indictment on double jeopardy grounds, and this Court affirmed (People v Colombo, 25 NY2d 641 [1969]). The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that the trial court's determination constituted a judgment for criminal contempt within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the petitioner was sentenced to a definite term in jail and ordered to pay a fine, and neither the prosecutor nor the trial court considered his offer to testify as sufficient to foreclose execution of the sentence (Colombo, 405 US at 10-11). Thus, the contempt decision was not remedial but punitive, designed to inflict a sanction for past conduct rather than to compel the petitioner's testimony in the future.3 3 The defendant seeks to distinguish federal precedent by arguing that criminal contempt may be purged in New York, relying