Opinion ID: 1786794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Statute Regarding the Amount of Time a Child is in Foster Care

Text: Ms. Williams asserts that section 211.447.2(1) [2] , which requires the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights when a child has been in foster care for at least 15 of the previous 22 months, is unconstitutional as it has been interpreted by Missouri courts. The main point of her argument is that the statute should not be construed so that 15 months in foster care is also grounds for termination of parental rights. Various Missouri courts, however, have interpreted this statute to make 15 months in foster care custody a ground for termination. [3] Before reaching the constitutional challenge, it is appropriate for this Court to consider construing the statute in such a way as to avoid the constitutional challenge. State ex rel. Union Electric v. Public Service Commission, 687 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Mo. banc 1985). Proper statutory construction starts with the words of the statute. In most cases, it ends there, as well. If the words of the statute are unclear or ambiguous, the Court may review the earlier versions of the law, or examine the whole act to discern its evident purpose, or consider the problem that the statute was enacted to remedy. Bachtel v. Miller County Nursing Home District, 110 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Mo.banc 2003). Ms. Williams argues that if section 211.447.2(1) is used as grounds for termination rather than solely a trigger for filing a termination petition, it violates the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution and of the Missouri Constitution because it permits termination of parental rights without a finding of unfitness. See, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in raising their children does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody to the State. Id. at 753, 102 S.Ct.1388. Section 211.447, the termination statute, sets out standards that guide the state as to when it should or must file a termination petition and guide a court in examining parental fitness and the best interests of the child when considering termination of parental rights. Subsections 2, 3, and 4 of section 211.447 contain subdivisions that direct or authorize a juvenile officer or the Division of Family Services to file a petition for the termination of parental rights and delimit criteria for filing. A reading of section 211.447 [4] in its entirety shows there is no constitutional issue. Subsection 2 of section 211.447 lists certain circumstances, the existence of which require the juvenile officer or the division to file a petition to terminate the parental rights of the child's parent or parents. This subsection does not label these circumstances grounds for termination. In contrast, subsection 4 of section 211.447 enumerates certain parental conduct, the existence of which permits a juvenile officer or the division to file a petition to terminate parental rights and explicitly labels these circumstances grounds for termination. Subsection 3 of section 211.447 provides exceptions to subsection 2 where the juvenile officer or division of family services may exercise discretion in filing a petition when the grounds ... for termination enumerated in subsection 2 exist. In addition, subsection 5, which sets out the requirements for termination, refers to the grounds for termination pursuant to subsection 2, 3 or 4 of this section. These references to subsection 2 in subsections 3 and 5 do not transform the filing trigger of section 211.447.2(1) into a statutory ground for termination of parental rights. Subdivision 1 of subsection 2 identifies temporal information available to the division that requires a termination petition to be filed, but that does not demonstrate parental unfitness. The length of a child's stay in foster care may have nothing to do with the parent's ability or inability to care for the child but, instead, may be due to circumstances beyond the parent's control, including the actions of the division itself. Subdivision 2 of subsection 2, a determination by a court that a parent has abandoned the child, and subdivision 3 of subsection 2, a determination by a court that a parent has committed certain criminal acts, on the other hand, identify conduct by the parents that requires a termination petition to be filed and that demonstrates parental unfitness and that are similar to grounds described in subsection 4. Moreover, all of the subdivisions in subsection 4 of section 211.447 that permit a termination petition to be filed and that are explicitly labeled grounds for termination identify conduct by the parent that demonstrates unfitness. An examination of the federal statutes relating to foster care provides further guidance in interpreting section 211.447.2(1). The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. sections 620-628, 670-679a, created a program in which the federal government reimburses states for certain expenses incurred in the administration of state foster care and adoption services. To qualify for these funds, states are required to make reasonable efforts to reunify children with their parents. In practice, these reasonable efforts resulted in numerous children being stuck in foster care for indeterminate periods of time while the states attempted to rehabilitate their parents. To remedy this and other problems with AACWA, Congress passed the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA) (Pub.L.105-89) (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.). In ASFA, Congress addressed the question of how long states must pursue the goal of family reunification under the reasonable efforts standard. ASFA requires that to retain eligibility for federal funding, a state shall file a petition to terminate the parental rights of [a] child's parents when the child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State for 15 of the most recent 22 months. 42 USC 675.5(E). Thus, the 15 months is intended as a deadline to trigger the filing of a termination petition and to begin permanency planning for the child. Subsection 2 of section 211.447 was enacted in 1998 to bring Missouri into compliance with the ASFA and tracks the language of the federal statute. By considering the history and the circumstances of the enactment of subsection 2 and harmonizing the provisions of the termination statute in its entirety, it is clear that the legislature did not intend section 211.447.2(1) as a ground for termination, but rather solely as a trigger for filing a termination petition.