Opinion ID: 676060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the second trial, consent decrees, and appeal

Text: 25 While the first appeal was pending, the district court conducted a second trial. That trial involved challenges to other Board practices, including: written tests for eighteen more positions; various rules affecting promotional opportunities; the imposition of height, weight, and educational requirements for certain jobs; and the restriction of some job announcements and certifications to persons of a particular sex. United States v. Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1834, 1835, 1981 WL 27018 (N.D.Ala.1981), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.1983). The Board defended on the grounds that these practices either had no adverse impact upon blacks or women, or were sufficiently job-related to be effective predictors of future job performance. Id. As in the first trial, the City did not participate. In fact, the original plaintiffs' claims against the City never reached trial. 26 While the first proceeding was on remand and the second was at trial, the parties entered settlement talks that eventually suspended both proceedings. Once again, we resort to our summary of the facts from a prior decision: 27 After we ruled on the district court's decision concerning the written [police officer and firefighter] tests, [Ensley Branch, 616 F.2d at 812], the plaintiffs, in all three cases, entered into extensive negotiations with the Board and the City which culminated in two proposed consent decrees, one with the Board and one with the City. The former disposed of all of the plaintiffs' claims against the Board; the latter disposed of all the plaintiffs' claims against the City. 28 United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1514-15 (11th Cir.1983) (footnotes omitted). Thus, before the district court ruled on the remand of the first case or rendered a decision in the second case, the parties submitted proposed consent decrees that settled all claims against the City and the Board, including allegations of gender discrimination raised by the United States. Although these decrees provided retrospective relief such as back pay for some individuals, their keystone was an extensive regime of affirmative action for blacks and women. 29 At the heart of the Board decree was a requirement, subject to the availability of qualified applicants, that the Board annually certify blacks and women either according to racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree or in proportion to their representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher. The decree's minimum certification rates ranged from ten to fifty percent, depending on the position involved and whether the goal applied to blacks or women. The Board agreed to continue to certify according to these annual goals until satisfaction of the long-term goal; i.e., until the proportion of blacks and women employed by the City in any given job classification approximate[d] the respective percentages [of blacks and women] in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County. These provisions did not govern appointment of blacks to entry-level police and firefighter positions, with respect to which the Board decree simply adopted the remedies established by the district court's 1977 order on that subject. Nor did the decree state that the development of lawful selection procedures would terminate race- and gender-conscious certification requirements, which could potentially have continued forever. 5 30 The Board decree established several other significant obligations. First, the Board committed itself periodically to review its hiring and promotion procedures to ensure that the procedures either had no adverse impact or were sufficiently job-related to pass muster under Title VII. Second, so long as the Board's procedures--whether job related or not--had a disparate impact on blacks or women, the Board agreed to mak[e] a good faith effort to determine whether there [were] any alternative [testing procedures] ... which [would] reduce any adverse impact. Third, the decree prohibited the Board's prior practice of restricting job announcements on the basis of gender. Fourth, the decree mandated continued aggressive recruitment of blacks and women. 31 In broad outline, the City decree was quite similar to the Board decree. It too established annual goals for hiring and promoting blacks and women and a long term goal of parity between the proportion of blacks and women in any City job classification and the proportion of blacks and women in the civilian labor force. With a few exceptions, 6 the annual goals required the City to hire and promote blacks and women either according to racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree, or at the rate of black and female representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher. The City also agreed to request the Board selectively to certify ... qualified blacks and females whenever ... necessary to provide the City with a certification list that contains sufficient numbers of blacks and females to meet the [decree's] goals. 32 As with the Board decree, the City decree's annual goals were subject to the availability of qualified ... applicants. In addition, the parties reserved the right: 33 to adjust, through agreement and subject to the approval of the Court, any of the goals provided by this Decree where it can be shown that a professional degree, license or certificate is required to perform the duties of any particular job or jobs in the City's workforce and that blacks and/or women hold such degrees, licenses or certificates in percentage terms which are inconsistent with the goals provided. 34 The decree also stated that [n]othing herein shall be interpreted as requiring the City ... to hire, transfer, or promote a person who is not qualified, or to hire, transfer or promote a less qualified person, in preference to a person who is demonstrably better qualified based upon the results of a job related selection procedure. Other provisions obligated the City to strengthen its recruitment of blacks and women, prohibited any restriction of jobs by gender, and eliminated time-in-grade requirements for some promotional positions. 35 Although the consent decrees resolved the issues as between the parties to the original cases, several interested non-parties soon appeared to challenge the decrees, claiming that the decrees would adversely affect their employment opportunities. Chief among the objectors was the Birmingham Firefighters' Association (BFA), a labor association representing a majority of City firefighters, most of whom were white males. We return to our previous narrative for a description of the ensuing conflict: 36 The [district] court provisionally approved these consent decrees in June 1981, but reserved final approval until it convened a fairness hearing to consider the objections of all interested parties. The court held that hearing in August 1981, at which it considered, among others, the objections filed by the Birmingham Firefighters Association 117 (BFA), as amicus curiae. The day after the hearing, BFA and two of its members (BFA members) moved ... to intervene of right in each of the three cases, contending that the proposed consent decrees would have a substantial adverse impact upon them. The court denied their motions as untimely, and approved, and entered, both consent decrees. 37 Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1515 (footnote omitted). 38 Before approving the decrees, the district court rejected the merits of the objections raised at the fairness hearing by the would-be intervenors. The district court reasoned that the decrees [did] not preclude the hiring or promotion of whites or males, Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) at 1836, and that the City's hiring goals were expressly made subject to the caveat that the [City] decree is not to be interpreted as requiring the hiring or promotion of a person who is not qualified or of a person who is demonstrably less qualified according to a job-related selection procedure, id. at 1837. The court further noted that the provisions for potentially preferential treatment [were] limited both in time and in effect because they would expire on their own terms when the work-force parity goals were met and because either decree could be dissolved after a period of six years if the purposes of the decree had been substantially achieved. Id.; see also In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1, 3 n. 5, 1985 WL 1415 (N.D.Ala.1985) (describing the circumstances in which the decrees may be dissolved). In addition, the court reviewed the evidence of past discrimination against blacks and women and concluded that there is more than ample reason for the Personnel Board and the City of Birmingham to be concerned that they would be in time held liable for discrimination against blacks seeking promotional positions in the police and fire departments and against woman at all levels of hiring and promotion in those departments. Jefferson County, 28 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) at 1838. On appeal, this Court affirmed the district court's denial of the BFA's intervention motion. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1516-19. 39 Shortly after the district court approved the decrees and denied leave to intervene: 40 Seven individual white male firefighters ... filed a complaint in the district court against the Board and the City to enjoin the enforcement of the consent decrees on the ground that the operation of the decrees would discriminate against them in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. They applied for a preliminary injunction, which, after a hearing, the district court denied. 41 Jefferson County, 720 F.2d at 1515 (footnote omitted). In the same opinion in which we affirmed the denial of the BFA's motion to intervene, we also upheld the district court's denial of the preliminary injunctive relief sought by the seven individual white male firefighters. Id. at 1520.