Opinion ID: 1300960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Howser Attended the Medical Appointment at the Direction of ABB

Text: Under the FLSA, an employer must pay an employee a minimum wage per hour worked. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2000). Department of Labor regulations state that [t]ime spent by an employee in waiting for and receiving medical attention on the premises or at the direction of the employer during the employee's normal working hours on days when he is working constitutes hours worked. 29 C.F.R. § 785.43 (2007) (emphasis added). ABB argues that it is not required to compensate Howser for the September 3 appointment because there is insufficient evidence to prove that the appointment was made at the direction of ABB. Howser claims that her September 3 appointment was made at the direction of ABB because ABB's third-party worker's compensation administrator, Gallagher, scheduled the appointment and directed Howser to attend it. In support of her motion for partial summary judgment, Howser submitted two letters sent by Gallagher concerning the appointment. One letter was sent to Howser's physician and made the following statement: Please accept this letter as written confirmation that we have now scheduled [Cynthia Howser] for your re-evaluation of her alleged work related injury to her right upper extremity on or about 06-26-02. See Appellant's App. 32. On the same day, Gallagher sent a similar letter to Howser's worker's compensation attorney, which stated: Please accept this letter as written notification that we have now scheduled your client for a re-evaluation of her alleged injury to her right upper extremity on or about June 26, 2002. . . . Please advise your client of this appointment and should there be a problem with [her] attending, contact me and I will re-schedule. Id. at 33. The appointment was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. on September 3, 2004, and Howser was instructed to arrive 45 minutes early. These letters tend to establish that Gallagher scheduled the appointment for Howser. ABB does not present any specific facts to refute Howser's claim that Gallagher scheduled the appointment. Instead, ABB argues that the above letters contain inadmissible hearsay, and should not have been considered by the district court. However, the statements made by Gallagher in the letters are not hearsay because they are agent admissions. See Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Next, ABB argues that it never authorized Gallagher to make an appointment for Howser. It is undisputed that Gallagher is the third-party administrator of ABB's worker's compensation claims. (Reed Dep. 15, Appellee's App. 2; Saak Dep. 32-33, Appellant's App. 51). According to Beverly Reed, an assistant manager at Gallagher, Gallagher is an extension of ABB within the context of worker's compensation claims. (Reed Dep. 15, Appellee's App. 2). By virtue of Gallagher's relationship to ABB, Gallagher is an employer under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (an employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. . . .). Additionally, a U.S. Department of Labor opinion letter lends further support to the conclusion that ABB should be bound by the actions of its worker's compensation administrator. According to the opinion letter, an entity acting on behalf of an employer can bind the employer for purposes of directing medical appointments. The letter explains that [i]f the employer or the employer's agent (insurance carrier) arranged for the employee to see a doctor during the employee's normal working hours, the time spent traveling to and from and visiting the doctor's office would be compensable hours of work. 1987 DOLWH LEXIS 30, at  (Sept. 10, 1987). Because Gallagher was acting as ABB's agent when it directed Howser to attend the appointment, ABB must compensate Howser for the time missed. ABB counters that it has presented specific facts tending to prove that ABB did not instruct Gallagher to schedule any appointments for follow-up treatment for its employees. ABB refers to the deposition testimony of Dena Saak, the plant human resources manager. In the portion of testimony ABB refers to, Saak explains that she was not responsible for hiring Gallagher, and that she is not involved with the scheduling of follow-up appointments. The fact that Saak was unaware of how the appointments were made at Gallagher certainly does not contradict Howser's evidence that Gallagher made the appointment. Additionally, Saak admits that on occasion, when an employee needs follow-up care, she will leave a note for the employee that they need to contact Gallagher-Bassett. . . . (Saak Dep. 29, Appellant's App. 50). Saak's testimony tends to prove that ABB hired Gallagher to administer all aspects of worker's compensation claims, including the scheduling of follow-up medical appointments. In sum, ABB failed to present specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must-by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule-set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.); Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 709 (8th Cir.1999) (While we view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, mere allegations which are not supported with specific facts are not enough to withstand the motion.). ABB merely denies any role in the scheduling of the September 3 appointment. It did not present any specific facts that contradict Howser's claim that Gallagher scheduled the appointment or that Gallagher is an agent of ABB. The 3.8 hours Howser missed on September 3 to attend her doctor's appointment constitute hours worked under the FLSA, and therefore she must be compensated for that time. Because Howser was the only plaintiff involved in the original action that was not compensated for her time missed, the district court appropriately granted summary judgment in her favor.