Opinion ID: 1161575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Determining Whether Particular Causes of Action Are Preempted under FIFRA

Text: Having concluded that FIFRA preempts state law claims for failure to warn of the risks of using a pesticide, we now turn to the question whether plaintiffs' claims can fairly be so characterized. (See Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 523, 112 S.Ct. 2608 [we must look to each of petitioner's common-law claims to determine whether it is in fact pre-empted (fn. omitted)].) In determining whether specific claims are preempted by the 1969 Cigarette Act, [t]he central inquiry in each case, the high court said, is straightforward. ( Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 523-524, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) [W]e ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a `requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect to ... advertising or promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading. (Id. at p. 524, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) In this case, Cipollone continued, petitioner offered two closely related theories concerning the failure to warn: first, that respondents `were negligent in the manner [that] they tested, researched, sold, promoted, and advertised' their cigarettes; and second, that respondents failed to provide `adequate warnings of the health consequences of cigarette smoking.' [¶] Petitioner's claims are pre-empted to the extent that they rely on a state-law `requirement or prohibition ... with respect to ... advertising or promotion.' Thus, insofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a showing that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims are pre-empted. The Act does not, however, pre-empt petitioner's claims that rely solely on respondents' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to advertising or promotion. ( Cipollone, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 524-525, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) The court went on to consider petitioner's other causes of action, summarizing its holding as follows: [T]he 1969 Act pre-empts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the 1969 Act does not preempt petitioner's claims based on express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy. (Id. at pp. 530-531, 112 S.Ct. 2608.) In determining whether particular causes of action are preempted under FFRA, [w]e can do no better than to adapt the United States Supreme Court's approach in Cipollone: the central inquiry in each case is whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common law damages action constitutes a State `requirement[ ] for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from' the FIFRA requirements, giving that clause a fair but narrow reading. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b); Cipollone, at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2621. ( Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., Inc. (1995) 127 Wash.2d 67, 896 P.2d 682, 692.) When a claim, however couched, boils down to an assertion that a pesticide's label failed to warn of the damage plaintiff allegedly suffered, the claim is preempted by FIFRA. (See Andrus v. AgrEvo USA Co. (1999) 178 F.3d 395, 399 [implied warranty]; Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co., supra, 131 F.3d 656, 666 [negligent off-label misrepresentations]; Grenier v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc., supra, 96 F.3d at pp. 563-565 [negligence, express and implied warranty, and negligent design and manufacture]; Welchert v. American Cyanamid, Inc. (8th Cir.1995) 59 F.3d 69, 72-73 [express warranty]; Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro, supra, 54 F.3d at p. 562 [negligent testing]; Papas v. Upjohn Co., supra, 985 F.2d at p. 518 [negligence, strict liability, and implied warranty].) On the other hand, courts have rejected preemption challenges with regard to a wide variety of claims where they did not implicate requirements for labeling or packaging different from those required by FIFRA. (See Burt v. Fumigation Service and Supply, Inc. (W.D.Mich.1996) 926 F.Supp. 624, 631 [negligent design]; Reutzel v. Spartan Chemical Co. (N.D.Iowa 1995) 903 F.Supp. 1272, 1281-1282 [strict liability for defective design and manufacture]; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Dow Chemical Co. (D.Colo.1995) 886 F.Supp. 762, 767-768 [strict liability for defective design and manufacture and negligent design and manufacture]; Riggins v. Monsanto Co. (N.D.N.Y.1994) 862 F.Supp. 751, 757-761 [negligent testing, strict liability for defective design, and express warranty]; Jillson v. Vermont Log Bldgs., Inc. (D.Mass.1994) 857 F.Supp. 985, 990-992 [express warranty and negligent design and manufacture]; Bingham v. Terminix Intern., Co., L.P. (S.D.Miss. 1994) 850 F.Supp. 516, 521-522 [negligent testing and inspection, strict liability, and implied warranty]; Ackerman v. American Cyanamid Co., supra, 586 N.W.2d at pp. 214-215 [negligent design and testing]; McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag. Co. (1997) 285 Mont. 224, 947 P.2d 474, 478-479 [express warranty, implied warranty, and strict liability for defective design and manufacture].) We turn now to the causes of action tendered by the plaintiffs in this case. In their first cause of action, plaintiffs alleged that defendant Bayer negligently manufactured, formulated, produced, packaged and tested Morestan and Guthion. They also alleged that defendants Tri-Ag and its employee Osterlie negligently recommended the application of Morestan together with Guthion at certain concentrations and with certain other products. Their other causes of action, in the order recited in the complaint, were: strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity, negligence per se for violating certain sections of the Food and Agriculture Code, product liability, breach of implied warranty, misrepresentation, and trespass. As previously stated, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that all of plaintiffs' causes of action, in effect, challenged the adequacy of the warnings on Guthion's and Morestan's EPA-approved labels, and thus were preempted by FIFRA. In two summary judgment rulings, the trial court agreed, holding that all of the causes of action did allege inadequate labeling in one form or another, with the main issue being the failure of the labels to warn against mixing chemicals. In addition, the court held that plaintiffs failed to produce evidence indicating a cause of action for negligence against defendants Tri-Ag and Osterlie, and as to the cause of action for misrepresentation, failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to intent to defraud on the part of defendants. Because the Court of Appeal held that state law failure-to-warn claims are not preempted by FIFRA, it did not discuss the other points raised by the parties, in particular, defendants' contention that all of plaintiffs' causes of action were predicated upon alleged inadequacies in Guthion's and Morestan's EPA-approved labels. We remand that it may do so. For the guidance of the Court of Appeal on remand, we address one final issuethe extent to which FIFRA preempts actions based on so-called off-label statements, that is, statements made outside of the context of labeling or packaging; for example, claims made orally or in advertising materials. The critical question is whether the off-label statements merely repeat information in the label itself. ( Kuiper v. American Cyanamid Co., supra, 131 F.3d at p. 662.) Where off-label statements address matters outside the scope of the label, an action may well lie.