Opinion ID: 1405904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Evidence in Aggravation.

Text: (19a) Boyde correctly contends that certain evidence was improperly admitted because it did not relate to any of the statutory aggravating factors. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) Most of the evidence presented about Boyde's CYA commitment and parole falls into this category in that it did not pertain to a prior felony conviction (§ 190.3, factor (c)) or criminal activity involving force or violence (§ 190.3, factor (b)). The same may be said for testimony by officers about Boyde's untruthfulness, possession of stolen property and possession of marijuana in jail. Also improper was testimony by victims of other offenses about the impact that the event had on their lives. [5] Evidence of two other incidents was improperly admitted because the prosecution had failed to give proper notice, as required by section 190.3. Those incidents were the 1974 assault on Colleen Dietzman and Karen Smith and the 1976 robbery of Edward Wall. (20) We do not agree, however, with Boyde's contention that evidence of the escape plan was improperly admitted. Contrary to Boyde's claim, violent criminal activity need not have preceded the charged crimes to be admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 202 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) The plan called for use of a gun to subdue the guard if necessary and thus met the force or violence requirement for admissibility under factor (b). The remaining question is whether the evidence revealed the technically complete crime of conspiracy to qualify as criminal activity under factor (b). (See People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 72.) Boyde contends that a technically complete crime was not shown because there was no independent evidence of the agreement and no overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was established. (See Evid. Code, § 1223; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 430-431, fn. 19 [124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].) He is mistaken. He stipulated that the sending of the letters constituted the overt act. As to the agreement, Moore's actions are sufficient circumstantial evidence to show the agreement since all that is necessary is a prima facie showing before consideration of a coconspirator's admissions. (See People v. Jourdain (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 396, 404-406 [168 Cal. Rptr. 702]; People v. Perez (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 718, 728-730 [148 Cal. Rptr. 90].) Here we have Moore's receipt of Boyde's letter, his reading and studying it with English, their discussion of the maps and plans, and Moore's receipt of the second letter. Moore told English after receipt of the first letter that he was going to help Boyde. The fact that Moore testified that he never planned to help Boyde does not nullify the other evidence of his agreement; it merely went to the weight of the evidence for the jury to consider in determining whether the conspiracy had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions on conspiracy were sufficient; sua sponte instructions on the elements of the offense were not required. (See People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 68.) (19b) The evidence that was improperly admitted in aggravation was relatively insignificant in light of the properly admitted evidence of Boyde's commission of a string of four robberies in 1976, his involvement in the brick-throwing incident in 1974, and his conspiracy to escape from the jail while the current charges were pending. We therefore conclude that the improperly admitted evidence could not have affected the verdict or have misled the jury in its penalty determination.