Opinion ID: 72406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Security Matters

Text: In its otherwise-qualified inquiry, the district court also reviewed the four factors suggested in Turner v. Safley46 to determine whether the defendants' security concerns disqualified the plaintiffs from participating in the programs.47 The trial court concluded that the likelihood of inmate resentment and fear of the HIV-positive prisoners made violence a reasonable worry, and that the wardens were therefore justified in separating the HIV-positive prisoners from the HIV-negative. 45 Arline, 480 U.S. at 288, 107 S.Ct. at 1131. 46 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). 47 For one program, interstate prisoner exchange, the district court pretermitted the rest of its otherwise-qualified analysis and concluded that legitimate penological concerns alone warranted the plaintiff's exclusion. Op. at 269-73. 42 Turner is not a Rehabilitation Act case, and the propriety of using its factors in considering a § 504 plaintiff's qualifications is new to this court. I must first dispose of a threshold matter: the prior panel's silence on this issue is not law of the case. The law-of-the-case doctrine comes into play only with respect to issues previously determined.48 An appeals court may impliedly resolve an issue.49 But for that resolution to govern all subsequent proceedings, the issue must necessarily have been decided.50 The doctrine does not embrace all issues that could have been addressed,51 even if addressing them would have been appropriate.52 An implied holding is at best what we have from the first panel's opinion, which is silent on Turner 's application. And we should not infer any holding at all on Turner from the panel's silence. After all, the issue was not before the court. Following the first trial, the district court denied the plaintiffs relief on their Rehabilitation Act claim on the finding that the plaintiffs were not otherwise qualified because the probability of transmission, in the prison environment, is significant in all programs, without an individuated assessment.53 The plaintiffs challenged this conclusion on one 48 Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1148 n. 18, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); accord, Burger King Corp. v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 15 F.3d 166, 168 (11th Cir.1994); Hester v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 941 F.2d 1574, 1581 n. 9 (11th Cir.1991). 49 Burger King, 15 F.3d at 168. 50 See Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir.1984) ([T]he law is clear that [the doctrine] comprehends things decided by necessary implication as well as those decided explicitly.) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 51 18 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 789 (1981). 52 See Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502, 512-13 (11th Cir.1996) (law-of-the-case doctrine did not apply, in part because the issue at hand—the constitutionality of prison regulations—was not briefed in the earlier appeal, which concerned the appropriate standard of constitutional review); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1218 n. 1 (11th Cir.1992) (first panel vacated a preliminary injunction solely because of an insufficiently developed record, despite a special concurrence pointing out—sua sponte—that the plaintiff lacked standing; second panel nonetheless was entitled to affirm a denial of relief based on its independent conclusion that the plaintiffs lacked standing), rev'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 656, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993). 53 Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F.Supp. 1564, 1582 (M.D.Ala.1990). 43 ground: that the district court could not have found the plaintiffs to be not otherwise qualified without individualized findings as to the risk of transmission in every program for every member of the class.54 Thus, because the Rehabilitation Act Turner issue was not raised in the briefs, the panel may have decided not to address an issue that was not properly presented. Many panels so decide.55 Furthermore, whether Turner 's factors may weigh into otherwise-qualified analysis was not an issue the court had to resolve before holding that the Rehabilitation Act requires a program-by-program qualifications assessment. There is, therefore, no law of the case relating to this issue. The issue is accordingly now before this court. This court should hold, as the Ninth Circuit has,56 that Turner 's factors are relevant to Rehabilitation Act claims arising in prison. Four reasons support this conclusion. First, Turner 's concerns apply equally to statutory claims even though Turner 's holding is limited to constitutional claims. In either case, federal judges have no business sitting in the warden's seat: [T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree.... Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have, as we indicated in Martinez [Procunier v., 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974) ], additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.57 54 Appellants' Br., Harris v. Thigpen, Nos. 90-7083, 90-7100, at 42-50. 55 See, e.g., United States v. Dieguimde, 119 F.3d 933, 934-35 (11th Cir.1997) (declining to address poorly briefed and possibly moot issue); Alabama Power Co. v. OSHA, 89 F.3d 740, 747 n. 7 (11th Cir.1996) (refusing to address issue not raised in trial court); Boca Ciega Hotel, Inc. v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 51 F.3d 235, 237 n. 6 (11th Cir.1995) (declining to address issue raised only in reply brief). 56 See Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir.1994). 57 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (citation omitted). 44 These concerns are equally valid for both constitutional and statutory claims. In both cases, the judges run into the same problems of lack of experience and expertise when they begin to interfere with matters traditionally left to the legislative and executive branches. Here, moreover, Congress's enactment of the statute does not put a legislative stamp of approval on judicial intrusion into state prison administration. Congress apparently never thought about prisons when it passed the Rehabilitation Act. The words prison and prisoner do not occur in the legislative history. Section 504 does not mention prisons. In short, [t]here is no indication that Congress intended the Act to apply to prison facilities irrespective of the considerations of the reasonable requirements of effective prison administration.58 Second, federal judicial second-guessing of the legitimate penological decisions of state authorities, even when statutorily prompted, runs squarely counter to the most basic notions of comity. Prison administration is a core state function.59 It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons.60 In this realm, federal courts should await a clear statement from Congress before construing statutes as a license to dictate state policy.61 Taking the Rehabilitation Act's silence as to application in the prison environment to mean that its effect in prison is identical to that elsewhere does not comport with this clear statement rule. On the other hand, viewing § 504's otherwise qualified language as incorporating Turner 's 58 Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447. 59 Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1345 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied sub nom. Torcasio v. Angelone, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 772, 133 L.Ed.2d 724 (1996). 60 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). 61 Torcasio, 57 F.3d at 1345 (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2309, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50, 92 S.Ct. 515, 523, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971)). The Fourth Circuit has indeed held that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to state prisons at all because of the Act's lack of an appropriate clear statement. Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Correctional Servs., 7 A.D. Cases 454 (4th Cir.1997). While the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act to state prisons is law of the case for this panel, the issue may merit en banc attention. 45 factors, which carry an element of deference to prison authorities, provides a means of avoiding undue interference in state affairs without a clear congressional direction. Third, Arline 's standard, born in an action by a teacher plaintiff, is inadequate for the prison setting. While Arline acknowledges that the Rehabilitation Act does not require the federal-fund grantee, or its wards, to run significant risks of any kind,62 its rule views those risks as solely ones to health from the disease. In a classroom setting, or in the surgical theater,63 these risks may be the only dangers that the communicable disease poses. But in prison, mixing carriers of a virus that is considered loathsome, however wrongly, with those who do not have the virus runs the risk of violence. The district court so found, and cases elsewhere show that such violence is not unknown.64 This danger—whether or not it leads to HIV transmission—warrants consideration along with health risks, and Turner 's factors offer a vehicle for taking into account hazards that are unique to the prison context. Fourth, considering Turner 's factors in a prison Rehabilitation Act case is wholly consistent with the statute. As Arline 's holding makes clear, § 504 does not command the federal-fund grantee to endanger its wards.65 And in the employment context from which Arline sprang, Congress has embraced the principle of safety-threat limitations. This concern for safety enters into § 504 by way 62 Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 107 S.Ct. at 1130-31 (describing the inquiry under its standard as essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks) (emphasis added). 63 See Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1266 (4th Cir.1995); Bradley v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir.1993). 64 Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 520 (7th Cir.1995) (claim by HIV-positive inmates against prison authorities for disclosing his HIV-positive status and thus exposing him to attacks by other prisoners); Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 1524 (9th Cir.1993) ([W]henever inmates discover another inmate is HIV-positive ... threats are made against that inmate's life.), rev'd on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996); Adams v. Drew, 906 F.Supp. 1050, 1058 (E.D.Va.1995) (plaintiff inmate assaulted by other inmates solely because of his HIV positive status). 65 Arline, 480 U.S. at 287, 107 S.Ct. at 1131. 46 of § 504(d), which imports the standards under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) into § 504 in employment cases.66 Section 103(b) of the ADA,67 as interpreted, in turn permits discrimination against those who as a result of their disability pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.68 It would be anomalous to hold that although an authority may take safety of either the Rehabilitation Act plaintiff or his coworkers into account in taking adverse employment action against that plaintiff, a prison is not entitled to respect for its concern for protecting the safety of the plaintiffs here and their fellow inmates. Turner 's factors offer a means to implement these safety limitations in the prison setting. For these reasons, the district court did not err in taking into account the defendants' security concerns that lead to segregating the HIV-positive prisoners in the programs at issue. Nor did the district court err in its analysis of Turner 's factors.69 A key fact-finding, which was adequately based on survey evidence and the presence of an intervenor inmate class that opposes integration of the programs, is that there are still many inmates who would react negatively—indeed, violently—to integration. Application of Turner 's four factors to this case's circumstances in light of this fact supports the district court's conclusion that security concerns disqualify the plaintiffs. First, security is a classically legitimate penological concern, and the court could conclude that separating prisoners who, if mixed, would react violently, has a rational connection to preventing violence. This factor weighs against the plaintiffs. Turner 's second factor weighs in the plaintiffs' favor: they have no other way of participating in integrated programs. The third factor, however, weighs heavily against the plaintiffs; the district court could properly conclude, based on sufficient evidence of inmate prejudice, that mixing HIV-positive and HIV-negative inmates could cause ripple effects that threatened security, either because of anti-HIV prejudice or as a result of the 66 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994). 67 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994). 68 Id.; see E.E.O.C. v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir.1997). 69 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2262 (naming the four factors in its test). 47 necessary diversion of resources from elsewhere to surveil the integrated programs. Finally, the court properly concluded that there are no obvious, easy alternatives here: plaintiffs' implication that integration is an easy alternative because other prison facilities follow it does not undermine the court's conclusion. Given its findings concerning the substantially higher seroconversion rates and incidence of violence elsewhere, the court could properly find that integration elsewhere served the interests of security and health less reasonably than the policies under attack here. Thus, the district court's otherwise-qualified findings should be upheld. C. Isolated Versus Global Burden of Accommodation The Rehabilitation Act deems a disabled person qualified to participate in an activity if reasonable accommodations remove any disqualification.70 One of the plaintiffs' primary reasonable-accommodation suggestions was the hiring of more guards to provide the surveillance necessary to prevent the plaintiffs and HIV-negative inmates from engaging in high-risk behavior. The district court found that the plaintiffs' recommended level of security staffing would not prevent high-risk behavior, but implied that the Department of Corrections' claimed necessary level of staffing—60 additional guards all together—would adequately reduce the risk.71 This level of staffing, the court concluded, would place an undue financial and administrative burden on the already-strapped prison system.72 This conclusion was based on the effect system-wide of accommodating the plaintiffs in all the programs at issue: the court emphasized that it would see the forest as well as the individual trees.' 73 The plaintiffs claim that the district court erred either by failing to consider the burden in each program separately or, alternatively, by failing to pick particular programs to which limited resources should be allocated.74 The plaintiffs suggest that the 70 Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1525 (11th Cir.1991). 71 Op. at 51-53. 72 Id. at 53. 73 Id. at 51. 74 Appellants' Br. at 41-42. 48 court should have compared the cost of each individual guard to the Department of Corrections' entire budget to determine if each guard alone would be a reasonable accommodation. The district court did not err. Whether an accommodation imposes an undue burden on a defendant is determined by the hardships imposed by the plaintiff's preferred accommodation in the context of the particular agency's operations.75 And cost is a hardship properly taken into account in assessing whether the burden on a federal-fund grantee is undue.76 Assessing that cost accommodation-by-accommodation, and not in the aggregate, effectively defeats the purpose of the agency-specific analysis: it permits impositions of burdens that could nickel-and-dime an agency to extinction. That reasoning ignores, rather than examines, the context of the particular agency's operations. Thus, if the plaintiffs demand to be accommodated system-wide, the total cost to the Department of Corrections is the relevant cost for determining the agency's burden. Adding 60 guards at Tutwiler and Limestone, as the record suggests are needed to ensure security, would require a nearly 20% increase in guard staffing.77 The district court could conclude based on this record that accommodation by an increase in staffing would place an undue hardship on the Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs further fault the district court for not considering whether the Department of Corrections in fact needed all the guards it currently has stationed where they are currently stationed, and for not choosing certain programs for integration if it is indeed true that providing all the guards necessary would be an undue burden. The plaintiffs cite no evidence in the record, however, that indicates that any guards elsewhere are unnecessary. To the contrary, the record suggests that both 75 Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 286 n. 2 (11th Cir.1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187 (D.C.Cir.1993)). 76 See, e.g., Borkowski v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.1995); Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir.1995) (both identifying undue hardship analysis as a species of cost-benefit inquiry). 77 The record suggests, moreover, that the additional staffing would be more expensive. To get guards for the HIV unit, Limestone must currently pay those guards more. R.32 at 110. 49 Tutwiler and Limestone are already staffed significantly below the optimum.78 Nor do the plaintiffs propose a basis upon which the district court should have allocated any portion of the necessary additional guards. The plaintiffs thus failed to carry their burden of proof that alternate, less burdensome reasonable accommodations exist by moving correctional officers from other posts to HIV-protection posts. The district court's conclusion should accordingly be upheld. D. Reassignment to Another District Judge The plaintiffs in this case sought Judge Varner's recusal on a variety of grounds. Judge Varner refused to recuse himself, and the plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motion and suggest, in the alternative, that the case be assigned on remand to another judge. Among the reasons for this remedy they point to Judge Varner's remarks on the bench and in his opinion, the judge's law clerk's father-son relationship to the defendants' lead counsel, and the judge's possible learning of facts pertinent to the medical issues in this case from the judge's son, a physician. The majority properly concludes that the record does not sufficiently evince bias or impropriety that required Judge Varner to recuse himself under the Supreme Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 455.79 But the majority then adopts a middle course—reassigning the action—that leaves Judge Varner stained with impropriety's brush. This middle course is extreme and unnecessary in this case. Reassignment is rare in this circuit and is generally appropriate only when three factors weigh in favor of it: (1) whether the original judge would have had difficulty putting his previous views and findings aside; (2) whether reassignment is appropriate to preserve the appearance of justice; and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to the gains realized from reassignment.80 None of these factors points to reassignment in this case. 78 Warden Lobmiller of Tutwiler requested 179 guards in 1993 and was authorized to employ 90. R.35 at 13-14. The Limestone facility is approximately forty guards short of full staffing. R.32 at 106. 79 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). 80 Torkington, 874 F.2d at 1446. 50 The first prong is satisfied only by a showing of extreme conduct—for example, when a judge has willfully refused to follow this court's mandate,81 or when the judge has made such mistakes that in the court of appeals' eyes the court appears unjust.82 Judge Varner's greatest offense, however, is that he disagreed with the plaintiffs. Far from ignoring this court's mandate, his 475page opinion meticulously reviews the individual evidence about the location, circumstances, and security concerns for dozens and dozens of separate programs. Nor is the appearance of justice imperiled here. As the majority observes, Judge Varner's remarks do not show any bias mandating recusal,83 and the evidence of impropriety is also insufficient to warrant recusal. This court should on this record be as hesitant to direct reassignment as it is to find recusal to be mandated. Finally, the extraordinary waste of judicial resources that would result on remand if we shift judges after ten years of litigation and two trials counsels leaving the case before Judge Varner. I would therefore refuse to direct reassignment to another district judge. III. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate the district court's judgment and remand for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to reconsider, in light of plaintiffs' and defendants' evidence of prisoner classification, whether classification offers the basis for a reasonable 81 See, e.g., United States v. Remillong, 55 F.3d 572, 577 (11th Cir.1995) (reassigning case after the district judge stubbornly persisted in disregard of this court's mandate); Clark v. Coats & Clark, 990 F.2d 1217, 1230 (11th Cir.1993) (reassigning case when the district judge's opinion contained strong language expressing dissatisfaction with this court's decision). 82 See, e.g., Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir.1997) (reassigning case from district judge that had refused to rule on a motion to dismiss, ignored discovery objections, adopted one party's exaggerated statements verbatim, and precipitously imposed a default sanction on the defendant for inadequately complying with an unintelligible discovery order drafted by opposing counsel and signed by the judge). 83 Compare United States v. Microsoft, Inc., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-64 (D.C.Cir.1995) (judge rejected consent decree without modifications that would address conduct accused by a bestseller that the judge had read, but not mentioned in the complaint; judge also permitted intervenors and amici to proceed anonymously because of his bestseller-induced suspicion of Microsoft); Torkington, 874 F.2d at 1447 (judge grants judgment of acquittal early in prosecution case, which the judge called a waste of taxpayer money, based upon a prosecution witness's unelicited remark that violated a motion in limine). 51 accommodation of the plaintiffs' disability. I would otherwise affirm the district court's resolution of the issues presented on appeal. 52