Opinion ID: 1696109
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor of policeman charles jackson?

Text: Public officials have qualified immunity in a civil action when they have been performing functions which are discretionary in nature. However, three exceptions exist to that rule which, if present, result in the loss of immunity. As stated in McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871 (Miss. 1989), When an individual who is a state government official is named as a defendant in a civil action, our law thus directs that he or she enjoy no immunity to a civil action for damages if his breach of a legal duty causes injury and (1) that duty is ministerial in nature, or (2) that duty involves the use of discretion and the governmental actor greatly or substantially exceeds his authority and in the course thereof causes harm, or (3) the governmental actor commits an intentional tort. Beyond that, a government official has no immunity when sued upon a tort that has nothing to do with his official position or decision-making function and has been committed outside the course and scope of his office. McFadden, 542 So.2d at 877 [quoting Grantham v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 225 (Miss. 1988)]. The difference between a ministerial function and a discretionary function was explained in Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922 (1935). A duty or function is ministerial if the duty is one that has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion. Marshall v. Chawla, 520 So.2d 1374, 1375 (Miss. 1988) [quoting Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 864-865, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935)]. Webb has asserted two causes of action against Officer Jackson. They are negligence and assault and battery. These are considered separately.
Negligence is not an intentional tort. Therefore, Officer Jackson enjoys qualified immunity unless he was involved in a ministerial duty or the duty was discretionary but he greatly exceeded his authority. If Officer Jackson loses his immunity under one of these two exceptions, Webb must prove, as in any other negligence action, that Jackson owed her a duty, that he breached that duty, that an injury resulted, and that the breach proximately caused the injury. Webb must also show proof of actual damages. Under Mississippi law, a person who handles firearms owes a duty to others which duty imposes the highest degree of care upon that person. As this Court has noted, [Firearms] are extraordinarily dangerous, and in using them extraordinary care should be exercised to prevent injury to others. We quote from Cooley on Torts (3d Ed), p. 1232, as follows: A high degree of care is necessary in the use or manipulation of loaded weapons in the presence or vicinity of other persons, and where injury results from a failure to exercise such care the defendant is liable. We take the following rule from Barrows on Negligence, p. 367: The bearer of loaded firearms is bound to exercise the utmost diligence in their handling and he is liable for any injury caused by their discharge, unless it appear that he was entirely without fault. Johnson v. Cunningham, 107 Miss. 140, 152, 65 So. 115, 118 (1914). Clearly, Officer Jackson did owe Webb a duty to use a high degree of care in handling his gun. Whether that duty was breached and whether Webb can prove her claim for damages are questions for a jury. If Officer Jackson loses his immunity under one of the two exceptions, Webb's action for negligence would involve genuine issues of material fact. We make no determination of whether Officer Jackson was involved in a discretionary or ministerial duty since that determination would make no difference to the outcome of whether summary judgment was proper on the theory of negligence. If performing a ministerial duty, Officer Jackson had no qualified immunity. If performing a discretionary duty, Officer Jackson would enjoy no immunity if he greatly exceeded his authority. The record contains two versions of the events, Webb's and Officer Jackson's. Webb contends that she was holding the dog when Officer Jackson fired his gun. If true, then he did exceed his authority. On the other hand, Officer Jackson says that the dog charged at him and he fired in an attempt to stop the dog. This act probably exceeded his authority if he failed to use extraordinary care. However, whose version to believe and whether Jackson failed to use extraordinary care are fact questions which should be determined by a jury. For that reason, summary judgment should not have been granted on that issue.
Assault and battery are intentional torts. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-35 (Supp. 1990) and City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So.2d 1212, 1217-1218 (Miss. 1990). Therefore, if Jackson is guilty of assault and battery, he would not be able to claim qualified immunity since a governmental actor is not immune from liability when he has committed an intentional tort. Assault occurs where a person (a) ... acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and (b) the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965). A battery goes one step beyond an assault in that a harmful contact actually occurs. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13 (1965). Where a person causes the apprehension of a battery although not intending to cause either a battery or the apprehension of such, he is not liable since [t]here is no such thing as a negligent assault. 1 Harper, James & Gray, The Law of Torts § 3.5 at 281 (2d ed. 1986). A defense to the charge of an assault or battery is that the person was acting in self-defense. In such a situation, he is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself against unprivileged harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes that another is about to inflict intentionally upon him. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 63 (1965). Although a person defending himself should apply as little force as is possible to meet the particular situation, [e]ven the most reasonable of men, confronted with the necessity of defending himself against a real or apparent attack, cannot be expected to measure accurately the exact amount of force necessary to repel it. It is only where there is a glaring discrepancy between the force applied and that which is necessary to prevent the apprehended harm, or where it is obvious that the actor knows or should know that he can defend himself by a lesser force that it is for the court to rule that the force applied is excessive. Otherwise it is for the jury to determine whether the force is or is not excessive. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 70, comment (1965). A police officer, in making an arrest or preventing an escape, may exert such physical force as is necessary to effect the arrest by overcoming the resistance he encounters, but he can not take the life of the accused or inflict upon him great bodily harm except to save his own life or to prevent a like harm to himself. Holland v. Martin, 214 Miss. 1, 9, 56 So.2d 398, 400 (1952). When a defendant pleads self-defense, an affirmative defense, he bears the burden of proof on that issue. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Stacy, 162 Miss. 286, 292, 139 So. 604 (1932). A plea of self-defense, which is disputed, is a question which should be submitted to the jury since the jury determines the credibility of the witnesses. Overing v. Skrmetta, 218 Miss. 648, 651, 67 So.2d 606, 608 (1953). The record in this case presents Webb's version of what occurred and Officer Jackson's version. Because their versions differ substantially, the issue of whether Officer Jackson committed the intentional torts of assault and battery should have been submitted to a jury. Whether Officer Jackson possessed the requisite intent to commit an assault is open to question. Webb claims that she was holding the dog when Officer Jackson fired the shot. If believed, then his claim of self-defense is very weak. On the other hand, Officer Jackson claims that the dog was charging at him and that he fired in an attempt to stop the dog. If believed, Jackson's version tends to negate an intent on his part to commit an assault. However, these are questions for a jury who must decide on the credibility of the witnesses. Since Officer Jackson loses immunity if he committed an intentional tort, summary judgment was improper.