Opinion ID: 6348939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Two of Defendant’s issues concern the sufficiency of the evidence. Both derive from an inexplicable peculiarity in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. Although the statute refers to most illicit drugs by their common names—such as heroin, cocaine, marihuana, or methamphetamine—the relevant provision does not use the word fentanyl. Rather, it refers to that substance by its chemical name, N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vi), which a federal regulation says is “commonly known as fentanyl,” 28 C.F.R. § 50.21(d)(4)(vi). No witness at trial, however, used the chemical name; the testimony referred only to “fentanyl.” Defendant therefore argues that (1) there was insufficient evidence that he distributed the statutory chemical and (2) there was insufficient evidence that he knew that what he was distributing was the statutory chemical. The government does not dispute that its witnesses never mentioned the chemical name for fentanyl. But it contends that such testimony was unnecessary because Defendant “deliberately waived” the argument he raises on appeal “through his affirmative acceptance that the term fentanyl as used by the witnesses throughout trial was synonymous with its chemical name.” Aplee. Br. at 22. We agree. Defendant effectively stipulated that fentanyl was the substance identified in the statute by proposing the following jury instruction: DEFENDANT’S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 20 11 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 12 Fentanyl (also referred to as N-phenyl-N- [ 1- ( 2-phenylethyl ) - 4-piperidinyl ] propenamide) is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law. Likewise, Alprazolam is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law. R., Vol. I at 649. This was essentially the same as the instruction given to the jury: JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 27 Several of the following instructions will refer to controlled substances. Fentanyl (also referred to as N-phenyl-N- [ 1- ( 2-phenylethyl ) - 4-piperidinyl ] propenamide) is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law. Likewise, Alprazolam is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law. Id. at 1078.5 When the district court expressed some unease about the proposed instruction during the jury-instruction conference, defense counsel asked, “Can’t you just say Fentanyl is a controlled substance within the meaning of the law?” R., Vol. II at 1684. The government said that the chemical description should be left in the instruction: “[W]e always pair it together so that we’re putting defendants on notice, especially in counts where we’re seeking a mandatory minimum sentence.” Id. When the court said it would leave the instruction unchanged and asked defense counsel whether they could “live with that,” they both answered “yes.” Id. Defendant’s stipulation was not the product of carelessness by defense counsel in giving away a winning defense. Rather, this was part of a deliberate strategy: the 5 We recognize that the jury instruction refers to propenamide as opposed to the statutory term propanamide; this deviation from the statutory language appears to have been introduced by Defendant and does not change our analysis of the issue. 12 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 13 defense’s plea to the jury was that it “recognize honestly [Defendant’s] role in this and . . . punish him honestly for his role in this.” Id. at 1807. By conceding almost all the issues that could have been raised at trial (and which were likely lost causes anyway), the defense sought to focus the jury’s attention on the two issues it vigorously pursued: that Defendant was not a principal leader of the drug-trafficking operation and that he was not responsible for an overdose death. Litigating over the chemical composition of the fentanyl that Defendant, by his own admission, placed in fake oxycodone pills would have been contrary to this strategy, perhaps undermining the credibility of the defense. Waiver is the “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 570 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that a defendant waived an appellate argument by “intentionally adopt[ing] a litigation position that was fundamentally inconsistent with” that argument. Id. at 1184. That is certainly the case here. Defendant cannot successfully propose an instruction that equates fentanyl with the statutorily proscribed chemical and then contend on appeal that the two substances are different. Defendant next argues that the government failed to prove that he knew that fentanyl was a controlled substance or that the N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4- piperidinyl] propanamide compound listed in the statute was fentanyl. He says that he did not knowingly distribute N-phenyl-N-[1-(2-phenylethyl)-4-piperidinyl] propanamide since no one, “except possibly a trained chemist, would know just what 13 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 14 the compound was.” Aplt. Br. at 35–36. He also contends that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jurors that they needed to find that he knew that the particular substance he dealt with was controlled. We reject these arguments as well, but for reasons other than waiver. To engage in a CCE, a person must violate one of the federal drug laws. The CCE count in the indictment against Defendant references 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), which makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” The Supreme Court has identified two ways in which § 841(a)(1)’s knowledge requirement can be satisfied: (1) “by showing that the defendant knew he possessed a substance listed on the [federal drug] schedules, even if he did not know which substance it was” or (2) “by showing that the defendant knew the identity of the substance he possessed,” even if he did not know it was listed. McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. 186, 192 (2015). The Court provided the following illustration of how the second route could be satisfied: Take, for example, a defendant who knows he is distributing heroin but does not know that heroin is listed on the schedules. Because ignorance of the law is typically no defense to criminal prosecution, this defendant would also be guilty of knowingly distributing “a controlled substance.” Id. (citations omitted). At trial Defendant acknowledged that “about a milligram” of fentanyl was being placed in each pill that was being sold. R., Vol. II at 1649. Although the word fentanyl does not appear in any applicable provision of the Controlled Substances 14 Appellate Case: 20-4116 Document: 010110695524 Date Filed: 06/10/2022 Page: 15 Act,6 § 841(a)(1) speaks only in terms of “controlled substance[s],” which are defined and categorized in schedules published in the federal regulations,7 and “Fentanyl” is listed as a Schedule II controlled substance, see 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(c)(9). Under McFadden it was enough that Defendant knew that he was distributing fentanyl, regardless of whether he knew that it was a controlled substance. We also reject Defendant’s argument that Instruction 34 was erroneous. The statement in that instruction that “[t]he United States is not required to prove that the defendant knew the precise nature of the controlled substance,” R., Vol. I at 1087, is wholly consistent with McFadden.