Opinion ID: 1372497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Causation Evidence from Other Medical Experts

Text: Lewis and Livingston next contend that even if the district court properly ignored their experts' testimony, other material in the record provides the requisite evidence of causation needed to prevent summary judgment. In regard to their negligence claims, Lewis and Livingston point to reports and statements from the MedWorks doctor, Dr. Metrou, as well as those from two of CITGO's experts, doctors Moisan and Cugell. As for Livingston's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, she refers us to evidence from another of CITGO's experts, Dr. Sweet. Turning first to both plaintiffs' simple negligence claims, we conclude that Metrou, Moisan, and Cugell provide no evidence of causation. In some instances, Lewis and Livingston grossly mischaracterize the content of the cited testimony. Metrou and Cugell, for example, both stated explicitly that hydrogen sulfide was not the cause of various respiratory injuries alleged in this case. Lewis and Livingston also point to testimony that arguably would help them prove the other elements of negligence at trial; but of course Lewis and Livingston must first survive summary judgment. To do so, they must present evidence of causation, which they still have not done, making summary judgment appropriate on the negligence claims brought by both of them. Finally, we consider other potential causation evidence relative to Livingston's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Livingston argues that statements made by Dr. Sweet, an expert retained by CITGO to testify concerning Livingston's psychological condition, provided the necessary evidence of causation. In his deposition, Dr. Sweet, a clinical psychologist specializing in neuropsychology, stated that the incident did cause [Livingston] some anxiety. He found that this anxiety was relatively mild and did not interrupt Livingston's daily activities. He noted that she had continued to work, but that she may go back and double-check somebody else's having made [her work area] safe. Based on the timing of the events and Livingston's statements, Sweet opined that Livingston's cautiousness was related to the hydrogen sulfide exposure. He concluded by saying the level of anxiety that she experiences now [probably] is not diagnosable and did not warrant care or clinical help. In granting summary judgment, the district court acknowledged Livingston's mild anxiety but concluded that Dr. Sweet did not find [that] Livingston suffered from any psychological disorders as a result of the incident. It appears that the court, by granting summary judgment for lack of causation despite this evidence, required a more substantial injury than the one diagnosed by Dr. Sweet for a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress to survive. The district court moved beyond the issue of causation and considered the implicit question contained therein: whether the caused injuryhere, mild anxietywas compensable. The district court concluded that it was not, and we agree. Implicit in causation is the existence of a compensable injury. A cause without an effect is not actionable under any form of negligence law. The Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed directly the magnitude of emotional injuries required for a claimant to recover on a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. A review of decisions by the Appellate Court of Illinois, however, makes clear that emotional injuries must surpass a threshold severity to be cognizable. See Hiscott, 257 Ill.Dec. 847, 754 N.E.2d at 850 ([T]o prevent trivial or fraudulent claims, ... recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress should ... be provided only for `serious' or `severe' emotional injury.); Majca v. Beekil, 289 Ill.App.3d 760, 224 Ill.Dec. 692, 682 N.E.2d 253, 255 (1997) (requiring medically verifiable manifestations of severe emotional distress to limit false or magnified claims and concluding that plaintiff's reasonable fears were not severe enough to justify compensation through the courts); Robbins v. Kass, 163 Ill.App.3d 927, 114 Ill.Dec. 868, 516 N.E.2d 1023, 1027-28 (1987) (concluding that crying, sleeplessness, increased migraine headaches and upset feelings were not sufficiently serious forms of emotional injury to merit recovery for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress); cf. Buckley v. Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 778 F.Supp. 449, 452 (N.D.Ill.1991) (recognizing that Illinois law requires the plaintiff in a negligent infliction of emotional distress action to demonstrate severe emotional distress but declining to find lack of severity as a matter of law). In Allen v. Otis Elevator Co., 206 Ill. App.3d 173, 150 Ill.Dec. 699, 563 N.E.2d 826 (1990), plaintiffs alleged emotional injuries suffered as the direct victims of an elevator breakdown in Chicago's John Hancock Building. Id. at 828-29. Plaintiffs claimed that as a result of being trapped in a crowded elevator somewhere near the Hancock Building's ninety-fifth floor, they suffered continued distress, nervousness and sweaty palms when on elevators, ... fears of heights or crowds, and, although they have taken elevators and airplanes since the incident, they have taken some actions to avoid taking elevators or using airplanes as a means of transportation. Id. at 833. A jury ruled in favor of the plaintiffs at trial, but the state appellate court concluded that the plaintiffs' alleged injuries were not severe enough to merit that conclusion and ordered a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict. Id. at 834. As support for imposing a severity threshold, the Allen court cited the state's requirement of physical illness or injury prior to recovery for emotional distress. Id. at 833 ([T]he physical illness or injury requirement indicates a desire to permit compensation only in cases involving serious emotional disturbance. (citing Robbins, 163 Ill.App.3d 927, 114 Ill.Dec. 868, 516 N.E.2d 1023)). Although the Illinois Supreme Court has subsequently disavowed the physical injury requirement, see Corgan, 158 Ill.Dec. 489, 574 N.E.2d at 609; see also Buckley, 778 F.Supp. at 452, many post- Corgan opinions continue to embrace the threshold requirement of a severe emotional injury, see Buckley, 778 F.Supp. at 452; Hiscott, 257 Ill.Dec. 847, 754 N.E.2d at 850; Majca, 224 Ill.Dec. 692, 682 N.E.2d at 255. Furthermore, we believe other policies underlying a severity threshold remain valid. It would be anomalous, for example, to require severe injury for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress but not for emotional distress that is caused by mere negligence. See Allen, 150 Ill.Dec. 699, 563 N.E.2d at 834; Robbins, 114 Ill.Dec. 868, 516 N.E.2d at 1027. In addition, the courts must have some mechanism, in situations such as this, to avoid wasting judicial resources on meritless claims. In Corgan, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that it [had] not lost its faith in the ability of jurors to fairly determine what is, and is not, emotional distress. 158 Ill.Dec. 489, 574 N.E.2d at 609. Nor have we. We agree that any claims of even arguable merit must be given to the jury to consider. But we also recognize our continued obligation to avoid wasting the time and resources of our judicial system. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (noting that summary judgment has become the principal tool by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources). When, as here, a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress so clearly falls below the threshold requirement of a severe emotional injury, we will not hesitate to dismiss it at the summary judgment stage. We conclude that Livingston's injurymild anxiety that causes her to recheck her work, but that only minimally interferes with her everyday life and for which she has not sought treatment does not rise to the level of severity required under Illinois law for an emotional injury to be compensable in a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.