Opinion ID: 752161
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficient Time for Discovery

Text: 34 The defendants first argue that the district court should not have adjudicated their liability under state law without giving them more time to conduct discovery. They rely on Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states as follows: 35 Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 36 District courts have wide latitude in controlling discovery, and [their] rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1416-17 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Foster v. Arcata Assoc., Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1467 (9th Cir.1985)). Nevertheless, a district court should continue a summary judgment motion upon a good faith showing by affidavit that the continuance is needed to obtain facts essential to preclude summary judgment. See McCormick v. Fund American Cos., Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir.1994). Thus, the defendants must show (1) that they have set forth in affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that these sought-after facts are essential to resist the summary judgment motion.
37 References in memoranda and declarations to a need for discovery do not qualify as motions under Rule 56(f). Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.1986). Rather, Rule 56(f) requires litigants to submit affidavits setting forth the particular facts expected from further discovery. We have stated that [f]ailure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment. Id. 38 The record does not show whether the defendants ever actually submitted affidavits setting forth the particular evidence that they had hoped to elicit from further discovery. It appears from the record that the defendants only implicitly moved for more time to conduct discovery. For instance, when addressing the defendants' request for an extension of time, the district court did not refer to any specific motion by the defendants. Instead, the district court stated that the [d]efendants imply that they will request further time for discovery of the facts upon which plaintiff bases its motion. The defendants' apparent noncompliance with the terms of the statute provides an adequate ground for us to affirm the district court's denial of the defendants' request for more discovery. See id.
39 In any event, as we have emphasized, [d]enial of a Rule 56(f) application is proper where it is clear that the evidence sought is almost certainly nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir.1991). 40 Here, the defendants wanted more time to discover the source of the groundwater contamination at Stanley Park. There is undisputed evidence, however, that workers at Victor Industries dumped trichloroethylene at the 20th Street Property for almost twenty years, that groundwater under the 20th Street Property is contaminated with trichloroethylene, that a well located between the 20th Street Property and the Louisiana Pacific Property is contaminated with trichloroethylene, that the Louisiana Pacific Property is not contaminated with trichloroethylene, and that the groundwater is flowing from the 20th Street Property toward Stanley Park. Given these uncontroverted facts, evidence that the 20th Street Property was not the source of contamination at Stanley Park is almost certainly nonexistent or is the object of pure speculation. Id.
41 Moreover, Rule 56(f) mandates that the party seeking the continuance must show that it lacks the 'facts essential' to resist the summary judgment motion. McCormick, 26 F.3d at 885. But the facts that the defendants hope to elicit during discovery are not essential to resisting California's summary adjudication motion. 42 The undisputed evidence that trichloroethylene contaminated the soil and groundwater at the 20th Street Property is sufficient to establish the defendants' liability under California law. To succeed on its summary adjudication motion, California need not prove that property other than the 20th Street Property suffered from contamination. Under California law, the pollution at the 20th Street Property constitutes a public nuisance and violates California's environmental laws. See Carter v. Chotiner, 210 Cal. 288, 291, 291 P. 577 (1930) (polluted water is a public nuisance); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25358.3 (when a release or threatened release of hazardous substances endangers the environment, those responsible may have to take remedial action). Therefore, any additional data about contamination at property other than the 20th Street Property is not relevant to oppose the summary adjudication motion. See McCormick, 26 F.3d at 885 (concluding that additional testimony would have made no difference on summary judgment, because the allegedly omitted material would not have altered the total mix of information available to the plaintiff). 43 The defendants therefore have not satisfied the requirements of Rule 56(f). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defendant's request to stay summary adjudication and continue discovery.