Opinion ID: 167714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The National Forest Management Act claim

Text: 44 Ecology Center's more substantive concerns emanate from the National Forest Management Act. Ecology Center identifies a variety of shortcomings in the Record of Decision, and concludes that it failed to comply with the Dixie National Forest Plan. In particular, Ecology Center notes the Forest Service's failure to maintain the Forest Plan's recommended requirements for the northern goshawk's habitat. In addition, according to Ecology Center, the Record of Decision makes no reference to the annual monitoring requirements for the northern goshawk, as required by the Forest Plan. Finally, the Forest Service has not explained why it will not follow the Conservation Strategy's preferred recommendation to thin the understory trees. Aplts' App. at A-58. Although the arguments raised by Ecology Center raise concerns, for the reasons explained below, we need not reach them in this opinion.
45 Forest plans may require particular standards to be followed regardless of later changes in the regulations. But this is not the case here. The Forest Plan does not explicitly reference or adopt § 219.19 of the 1982 rules, concerning the selection and monitoring of management indicator species. Utah Envt'l Cong. v. Bosworth, 443 F.3d 732, 748 (10th Cir.2006). Therefore, we cannot read the Forest Plan to adopt the 1982 rules. We thus must determine the standards under the appropriate regulation or transition rule. 46 The 1982 forest planning regulations at 36 C.F.R. Part 219 were superseded in November 2000, when new regulations were promulgated. 65 Fed.Reg. 67,568 (Nov. 9, 2000). Under the transition provision of the 2000 regulations, the Forest Service was required to consider the best available science when implementing site-specific projects within a forest plan. 36 C.F.R. § 219.35(a) (2001). The Griffin Springs Project is a site-specific implementation of the Dixie National Forest Plan. See Utah Envt'l Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219, 1221 (10th Cir.2004) (noting that a Forest Service project must be consistent with the applicable Forest Plan). 2 47 A 2004 Department of Agriculture interpretive rule explains that, during the transition period from November 2000 until promulgation of a final rule (in January 2005), only the transition provision of the 2000 regulations applied. 69 Fed.Reg. 58,055, 58,057 (Sept. 29, 2004). Thus, neither the remainder of the 2000 planning regulations nor any of the 1982 regulations were binding on site-specific decisions during this period. Id. (The 1982 rule is not in effect.... Projects implementing land management plans must comply with the transition provisions of Section 219.35, but not any other provision of the 2000 planning rule.). The preamble to the transition rule states that projects proposed during the transition period should be developed considering the best available science. Id. at 58,056. The preamble also advises that site-specific decisions entered into during the transition period are not to comply with the substantive provision of the 2000 planning rule. Id. 48 Given these guidelines, we have determined that the relevant date to consider is the date the final agency decision on the Project was made. Bosworth, 372 F.3d at 1221 n. 1 (applying [t]he regulations in effect at the time of the disputed Forest Service decision); see also Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 800 n. 3 (9th Cir.2005) (holding the 1982 regulations applicable here because they were in effect when the plan revisions challenged in this lawsuit were prepared); Forest Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 410 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir.2005) (holding the relevant date for the purpose of determining which rule applies is the date the final agency decision was made). Here, the Record of Decision was dated March 27, 2003. Therefore, we agree with the Forest Service that the 2000 transition rule was applicable to the Griffin Springs Project. 49 We next consider how to review the Forest Service's March 27, 2003 Record of Decision when the agency did not consider or mention the Project's compliance under the 2000 transition rule. 3 The Second Circuit recently resolved this issue. See Forest Watch, 410 F.3d at 118-19. The court, relying on Bosworth, 372 F.3d at 1221 n.1, determined that the 2000 transition rule applied to an environmental assessment issued in 2002. There, as here, the 50 Forest Service nowhere considered or mentioned [the 2000 transition rule's best available science] standard during the administrative process. Instead, the Forest Service reviewed the ... Project for compliance only with the 1982 Rules and the [Forest] Plan.... The exclusive application of the 1982 Rules and the failure to consider or mention the best available science standard amounted to conduct that is arbitrary and capricious. 51 Forest Watch, 410 F.3d at 119. The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to enter an order vacating the Forest Service's approval of the project. 52 Here, at oral argument, the Forest Service acknowledged that it made no mention of the 2000 transition rule's applicability until this court issued its 2004 decision in Utah Environmental Congress. At that point in time, the Forest Service argued before the district court that the 2000 transition rule applied. The Forest Service points to nothing in the record regarding the district court's resolution of this issue. At oral argument, the Forest Service maintained that the district court's application of the 1982 regime was harmless error. 53 According to the Forest Service, it followed the best available science, i.e., the Reynolds Report, in a manner consistent with the requirements of the applicable Forest Plan. Therefore, the Forest Service maintains that it necessarily complied with the 2000 transition provision and as such, the Second Circuit's decision in Forest Watch is inapplicable. However, the Forest Service's own actions suggest the Reynolds Report was not always treated as the best available science. 54 For example, Ecology Center vigorously disputes that the Forest Service applied the Reynolds Report's recommendations. It argues that the Griffin Springs Project will result in a percentage of old growth significantly lower than that required by the Conservation Strategy and the Reynolds Report. Similarly, Ecology Center points out that the Forest Service has not complied with the monitoring requirements of the Forest Plan, given the below-minimum-viability population of the northern goshawk. Ecology Center also challenges the Project's compliance with the Forest Plan and Reynolds Report provisions regarding canopy closure, snags, and decaying logs that provide habitat for the northern goshawk. In addition, the Forest Service presents no long-range scientific evidence supporting its assertion that the Project will actually increase the number of northern goshawk in the Project area. Aplts' Supp.App. at 39-44. In the same vein, Ecology Center argues, the Forest Service's contention that there are no nesting goshawks in the Project area seems to contradict this logic. 55 At oral argument, the Forest Service contended that there was no doubt the best available science was applied here, suggesting that the Forest Service had discretion to decide what constituted the best available science. The Forest Service insists that a remand would be futile because it is plain what those findings must be. Aples' Br. at 29 n. 5 (internal quotation remarks omitted). 56 The Forest Service argues that regardless of which regulatory scheme governs [our] review, on remand the Forest Service would be obligated to apply the 2005 regulations to this decision. Id. at 30 n. 5. We note that the 2005 regulations require the Forest Service to 57 document how the best available science was taken into account in the planning process; evaluate and disclose substantial uncertainties in that science; evaluate and disclose substantial risks associated with plan components based on that science and document that the science was appropriately arrogated and applied. 58 36 C.F.R. § 291.11(a)(1)-(4) (2005). These requirements underscore that the best available science is not just whatever the Forest Service finds on the shelf. The Forest Service may satisfy the 2005 regulations' requirements through the use of independent peer review, a science advisory board, or other review methods to evaluate to consideration of science in the planning process. Id. § 291.11(b). 59 At oral argument the Forest Service maintained that even though it did not argue the best available science standard below, that was harmless error because there is no question that it applied the best available science. It argues that because the plaintiffs have conceded that the Reynolds Report is the best available science, and that, in instances in which it has departed from that report, the agency has made a scientific judgment deserving of deference. 60 On this record, we must disagree. The Forest Service's approach is rather circular: while touting the Reynolds Report as the best available science, it is clear that the Forest Service has departed from its recommendations in several areas. It suggests that the Reynolds Report does not speak to aspen forests, yet aspen forests represent only a couple of hundred acres of this very predominantly spruce forest. Moreover, although the Reynolds Report suggests thinning from below, this project focuses on taking out the larger trees. Issues also exist about minimum canopy closures and the width of clearances. Thus, the Forest Service seems to use the Reynolds Report very selectively; when its conclusions differ with the report's best available science it simply argues that we must defer to its expertise. 61 As noted in the Conservation Strategy, [w]here site specific conditions differ from those described [in the Reynolds Report], the [Forest Service] must interpret and document [its] own specific value based on local data . . . using the 1992 habitat evaluation process [set forth in the Reynolds Report]. Aplts' App. at A-39. On this record, we are unable to determine whether the Forest Service's reliance on other available data satisfies the best available science requirements. Rather than resolve these disputes on appeal, we conclude that a remand is appropriate so that the agency itself can have the first chance to apply its own standards. 4 62 The demonstration of compliance with the applicable regulatory regime heightens the transparency and legitimacy of the Forest Service when it dons multiple hats: it is the institution that issues the legal provision, the institution that is subject to the provision, and the institution charged with the power to interpret the provision. For the Forest Service to assume it has satisfied all of its regulatory requirements based on a record that applied a now defunct regulatory regime is at odds with the agency's commitment to produce responsible land management and to attain the goal of sustaining social, economic, and ecological systems. 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.3, 219.10 (2005). Accordingly, we need not decide if Ecology Center's myriad of pointed arguments regarding Forest Services's failure to comply with the Forest Plan's habitat and monitoring requirements demonstrates that the Forest Service engaged in a clear error of judgment when it approved the Griffin Springs Project. We agree with the Second Circuit that we may not `properly affirm an administrative action on grounds different from those considered by the agency.' Forest Watch, 410 F.3d at 119 (quoting Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir.1999); and citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947)). [A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575. We hold that the Forest Service's exclusive application of the 1982 Rules and the failure to consider or mention the `best available science' standard amounted to conduct that is arbitrary and capricious, and we must reverse and remand on this limited basis. Forest Watch, 410 F.3d at 119.