Opinion ID: 2462046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Legal Standard Used in the District Court

Text: This court has repeatedly held that `[w]hen the custody issue lies only between the parents, the paramount consideration of the court is the welfare and best interests of the child. The trial court is in the best position to make the inquiry and determination, and in the absence of abuse of sound judicial discretion, its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations omitted.]' In re Marriage of Rayman, 273 Kan. 996, 999, 47 P.3d 413 (2002) (quoting In re Marriage of Whipp, 265 Kan. 500, 506, 962 P.2d 1058 [1998]). See also K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3) (mandating best interests standard, taking into account all relevant factors). Under an abuse of discretion standard, the trial court's decision is protected if reasonable persons could differ upon the propriety of the decision as long as the discretionary decision is made within and takes into account the applicable legal standards.... [A]n abuse of discretion may be found if the trial court's decision goes outside the framework of or fails to properly consider statutory limitations. State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 340, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007) (citing State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36-38, 127 P.3d 986 [2006]); see State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 (2010). Determination of the correct legal standard raises a question of law subject to de novo appellate review. See In re M.F., 290 Kan. 142, 150, 225 P.3d 1177 (2010) (citing State v. Moore, 287 Kan. 121, 135, 194 P.3d 18 [2008]). Adiel argues that district judge's memorandum decision shows that the judge followed Johnson into error by applying an incorrect legal standard to evaluate the evidence before him. In his view, first Johnson and then the district judge demanded that he demonstrate a compelling reason to have J.D.H.'s living arrangement changed. This pattern of analysis, Adiel asserts, improperly allocated to him a burden of proof to alter the status quo  or forced him to overcome a presumption or super factor in favor of residential custody remaining with Monica. See K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(C): Neither parent shall be considered to have a vested interest in the custody or residency of any child as against the other parent, regardless of the age of the child, and there shall be no presumption or that it is in the best interests of any infant or young child to give custody or residency to the mother. Although such a pattern may govern when a change in custodial status is sought, see K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(2) (court may change any prior order of custody, residency, visitation, parenting time when material change of circumstances shown), it does not govern an initial custody determination under K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B). Monica reads the district judge's memorandum decision differently. She believes that the district judge properly applied the best interests of the child standard pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B), and she emphasizes that the statute's list of factors is not exclusive. Monica argues that the district judge was forced to look outside the box for a reason to appoint one party over the other as residential custodian, and he made a legally legitimate choice to place persuasive weight on the living arrangement that had existed for all of J.D.H.'s life. The majority of the Court of Appeals panel first ruled that Adiel failed to raise this issue before the district court. It nevertheless addressed the merits, concluding: Our review of the trial court's memorandum decision convinces us the correct legal standard and statutory factors were applied in this case. In particular, in its `Summary of the Court's ruling,' the trial court explicitly stated that after weighing the evidence it had reached a conclusion to award Monica residential custody based on `[J.D.H.'s] best interests.' Harrison, 44 Kan.App.2d at 241, 235 P.3d 547. The majority determined that the trial court explicitly identified the proper statutory factors to be considered in determining the best interests of the child. Harrison, 44 Kan.App.2d at 241, 235 P.3d 547. The district judge's use of the phrase compelling reason was never made in the context of referencing a legal standard, but instead merely to reference the weight of the evidence in favor of maintaining the existing residency arrangement. Harrison, 44 Kan. App.2d at 241-42, 235 P.3d 547. Moreover, there was no showing the trial court relied on Johnson for any legal standard. Harrison, 44 Kan.App.2d at 243, 235 P.3d 547. Judge Caplinger dissented on the merits of this issue, accepting Adiel's argument that the district court erred by demanding proof of a compelling reason to change residential custody. Harrison, 44 Kan.App.2d at 261-62, 235 P.3d 547. She would have remanded the case to the district court with instructions to consistently apply the `best interests of the child' standard to this initial custody determination. Harrison, 44 Kan. App.2d at 262, 235 P.3d 547. We are satisfied that this issue has been adequately preserved for appellate review. The question of whether the district judge applied the correct legal standard in evaluating the evidence did not fully surface until the filing of his memorandum decision. Adiel then took advantage of his appeal to the Court of Appeals as a timely opportunity to raise it. We granted an unlimited review of the matter, which means we are free to examine any issue that was before the Court of Appeals. See Supreme Court Rule 8.03(g)(1) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 68). Turning to the merits, the parties do not dispute that the best interests of the child must control a district judge's initial custody determination. See K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3); see In re Marriage of Rayman, 273 Kan. at 999, 47 P.3d 413; Jensen v. Runft, 252 Kan. 76, Syl. ¶ 2, 843 P.2d 191 (1992). Further, the parties have not alleged a lack of substantial competent evidence to support the district judge's factual assessment. The only question, therefore, is whether the district court properly employed a best interests of the child analysis, upon which all agree. K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(B) provides a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered by a district court in determining the best interests of the child: (i) The length of time that the child has been under the actual care and control of any person other than a parent and the circumstances relating thereto; (ii) the desires of the child's parents as to custody or residency; (iii) the desires of the child as to the child's custody or residency; (iv) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with parents, siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (v) the child's adjustment to the child's home, school and community; (vi) the willingness and ability of each parent to respect and appreciate the bond between the child and the other parent and to allow for a continuing relationship between the child and the other parent; (vii) evidence of spousal abuse; (viii) whether a parent is subject to the registration requirements of the Kansas offender registration act, K.S.A. 22-4901, et seq., and amendments thereto, or any similar act in any other state, or under military or federal law; (ix) whether a parent has been convicted of abuse of a child, K.S.A. 21-3609, and amendments thereto; (x) whether a parent is residing with an individual who is subject to registration requirements of the Kansas offender registration act, K.S.A. 22-4901, et seq., and amendments thereto, or any similar act in any other state, or under military or federal law; and (xi) whether a parent is residing with an individual who has been convicted of abuse of a child, K.S.A. 21-3609, and amendments thereto. We must carefully review the language the district judge used in his memorandum decision to decide whether he applied the required legal standard, including these factors and others merited by the case. The district judge's memorandum decision discusses at least (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi) among the statutory factors, and his summary of his ruling explicitly invokes best interests of the child. We note that the judge acknowledged Adiel's allegation of alienation unrelated to Monica's religious practices, specifically her failure to communicate on school-related functions, which left Adiel unable to participate. The judge also explicitly recognized and evaluated the evidence concerning Adiel's accusation that Monica left J.D.H. home alone. Regarding the latter, the judge stated: While these events should not be minimized (whether it was one occurrence or two, it was one or two too many), they do appear to be isolated occurrences. Taking into account consideration [of] the bigger picture, there is no evidence that [J.D.H.] is suffering from neglect. Although Adiel also had alleged poor hygiene, the district judge found that photographs submitted by Adiel depicted the normal dirt and grime that children of [J.D.H.'s] age attract during regular play and that there was no evidence that [J.D.H.'s] hygiene was of concern to his teachers. The judge next considered the [i]nteraction of the child with his parents and the willingness of each parent to respect the bond between the child and the other parent. He concluded: He gets along well with both parents, and is well bonded to both parents. The judge agreed with Johnson's observation that J.D.H. `would thrive in the primary residential custody of either parent.' The judge then addressed other acts of alienation, namely Adiel's allegation that Monica did not keep him informed of important school events. The judge stated: It is clear from the evidence presented at trial that Mother is less concerned about involving Father in events important to [J.D.H.] than she should be and that [t]he effort by one parent to undermine a child's relationship to the other parent can form the basis for a change of custody. He concluded, however, that Monica had not intentionally tried to harm Adiel's relationship with J.D.H. and that, in fact, J.D.H. and Adiel have a healthy relationship. The judge also considered the desires of the parents and J.D.H., stating that [b]oth parents desire to be the residential custodian and [J.D.H.] seems comfortable with both parents. The judge also placed great weight on the [l]ength of time [J.D.H.] has spent with each parent and his adjustment to his home, school and community. He determined that Mother has been [J.D.H.'s] primary residential custodian since birth and that J.D.H. was well adjusted and a very successful student. Although the length of time a child has spent with one of his or her parents is not listed in the statute, it is certainly an appropriate consideration. See La Grone v. La Grone, 238 Kan. 630, 633, 713 P.2d 474 (1986) (one factor: which parent has had actual care, custody of child during child's lifetime). Finally, the judge noted: Once those factors related to religion are removed from this case, what is left is a very bright little boy who is well adjusted to his current living environment. He thus reached the same conclusion Johnson had reached in his written reports, that is, that residential custody should remain with Monica. The district judge's choice to place great weight on the length of time J.D.H. had spent with each parent and his adjustment to his home, school, and community was selected as part of application of the correct legal standard and was not an abuse of discretion for deviation from that standard. Placing great weight on the length of time a child has spent living with a parent as part of a court's analysis of the best interests of the child was different from treating a parent as though he or she has a vested interest in the custody or residency of that child, which would have been impermissible pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(3)(C). Further, as the Court of Appeals majority noted, the judge's decision did not reference K.S.A. 60-1610(a)(2)(A), the statute governing modification of a prior custody order, and the district court's decision did not use the term material change of circumstances. Harrison, 44 Kan.App.2d at 242, 235 P.3d 547. Rather, the judge plainly arrived at his ultimate decision on residential custody by exploring what would best serve J.D.H.'s best interests. There is no reversible error on this issue.