Opinion ID: 186846
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 10 This court reviews de novo issues of law related to sentencing. United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C.Cir.2006). Under Booker, we also review the sentence itself for reasonableness, 543 U.S. at 260-61, 125 S.Ct. 738, in light of the sentencing factors that Congress specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 442 (D.C.Cir. 2005). And, as we recently held, a sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Dorcely, 454 F.3d at 376; accord United States v. Rita, 177 Fed.Appx. 357, 358 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 551, 166 L.Ed.2d 406 (2006) (No. 06-5754); United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir.2006) (holding sentence 22-months below Guidelines range unreasonable), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 551, 166 L.Ed.2d 406 (2006) (No. 06-5618).
11 Watson first argues the district court failed to sentence him de novo, as required by our decision in Watson I. This argument is ultimately based upon the district court's having first denominated the hearing a status conference and having initially told Watson's counsel the proceeding would not include his resentencing. 12 This terminological objection is of no substantive moment: The parties had submitted supplemental sentencing memoranda analyzing the § 3553(a) factors, and when Watson's counsel asked whether the hearing was for sentencing and was told it was and that the court would grant his motion for sentencing de novo, she expressed no reservation about going forward. The defendant was clearly prepared to argue the matter and did so. In substance, the proceeding, whatever it was called, was a sentencing hearing at which the district court sentenced Watson de novo.
13 In the course of resentencing Watson, the district court stated, incorrectly, that Watson was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 240 months. In fact, the maximum under the felon-in-possession statute was 120 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Watson contends this mistake led the district court to conclude his sentence of 108 months was, as the district court put it, considerably less than the statutorily-available sentencing maximum. The Government responds that Watson's failure to disabuse the district court — indeed, counsel expressed agreement with the court's misstatement of the maximum — makes the error subject to review for plain error, if at all. Further, the Government contends, the error did not substantially affect the court's choice of sentence within the recommended sentencing range, and therefore was not prejudicial. 14 We agree with the Government in part: Because counsel for Watson did not object, we will review the record only for plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Under this standard, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (error harmless if it does not affect substantial rights). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 15 In this case there was an error, it was plain, and we have no trouble seeing its effect upon Watson's substantial rights: The district court's misimpression that a sentence of 108 months was considerably less than the statutorily-available sentencing maximum was apparently the basis upon which the court suggested it had taken the relevant mitigating factors into account and was imposing a significantly lesser sentence. Thus, it appears there might have been a materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C.Cir.2005), had the district court had the proper sentencing range — either the 115-month Guidelines maximum or the 120-month statutory maximum — rather than the supposed 240-month statutory maximum as its frame of reference. In short, it appears the district court thought it was imposing a sentence considerably less than, but instead imposed a sentence quite close to, the maximum. 16 We conclude the district court's erroneous premise gave it the mistaken impression it was being lenient and the error thus infected Watson's sentence. Cf. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2d Cir.2005) ([L]eaving in place an error-infected sentence that would have been materially different absent error and that could be readily corrected would `seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Indeed, it would seriously affect all three. (footnote and citation omitted)). We therefore reverse Watson's sentence.
17 As we have seen, the district court did not make a finding regarding the advisory Guidelines range applicable to Watson's sentence. The Government concedes this was a mistake. See, e.g., United States v. Coumaris, 399 F.3d 343, 351 (D.C.Cir. 2005) (under post- Booker sentencing regime, a sentencing court is required `to consider Guidelines ranges' applicable to the defendant (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 245, 125 S.Ct. 738)). Because, as seen in Part II.B above, we reverse and remand for the district court to correct a plain error, we need not decide the effect (if any) this error had upon Watson's sentence. 18 Nor need we resolve the issue raised by the district court's reliance upon the defendant's acquitted conduct. In Dorcely, upon which the Government relies, we upheld a sentence enhanced by the judge applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to acquitted conduct. In that case, however, the sentencing judge had presided over the trial and thus seen and heard the evidence supporting the charges of which the defendant was acquitted by the jury pursuant to the standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 454 F.3d at 370-71. In this case the sentencing judge did not preside over the defendant's prior trials; indeed, as far as the record reveals, the judge had not seen any evidence introduced to prove the charges of which the defendant had been acquitted in prior cases. Upon resentencing, we trust the district court will explore the significance of this distinction.