Opinion ID: 2819211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Classification of Texas Hold’em

Text: As discussed supra, non-banking card games are Class II gaming if they are either “explicitly authorized by the laws of the State” or “are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any location in the State.” § 2703(7)(A)(ii). The district court properly determined that Hold’em is not a Class II game because the Idaho Constitution and gaming statute explicitly prohibit poker.3 The Idaho Constitution provides that “[g]ambling is contrary to public policy and is strictly prohibited. . . .” ID. CONST. art. III, § 20. The constitution contains three exceptions for the lottery, parimutuel betting, and bingo and raffle charity games but reaffirms that the exceptions may not “employ any form of casino gambling including, but not limited to . . . poker.” Id. The enabling statute specifically prohibits poker by defining gambling as “risking any money, credit, deposit or other thing of value for gain contingent in whole or in part upon lot, chance, . . . or the happening or outcome of an event, . . . including, but not limited to, blackjack, craps, roulette, poker.” IDAHO CODE § 183801(1); see also § 3802 (gambling is a misdemeanor). Hold’em can only be Class II gaming if an exception in Idaho law applies.4 3 The parties do not dispute that Texas Hold’em is a type of poker. 4 The canon of statutory interpretation that ambiguities in federal statutes enacted to benefit Indians should be resolved in their favor, Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985), does not apply here because Idaho law is at issue and, regardless, the statute is unambiguous. 10 STATE OF IDAHO V. COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE The Tribe’s interpretations of Idaho law are not persuasive. Though skill undoubtedly plays a role in Hold’em,5 the game does not qualify for the statutory exemption for bona fide contests of skill, speed, strength or endurance. See IDAHO CODE § 18-3801. A contrary reading would impermissibly place the statute in conflict with the constitution’s prohibition on poker. See Bingham Cnty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 867 (Idaho 2002) (“[I]f the State Constitution and a statute conflict, the State Constitutional provision prevails.”).6 The Tribe’s interpretation would also force the specific prohibition on poker to yield to a general exception for “contests of skill.” See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550–51 (1974) (weighting the general in favor of the specific is impermissible, unless the drafters clearly intended the effect). The Tribe does not show that the legislature intended this effect. Nor does the “promotional contests” exception authorize Hold’em. In a handful of clearly distinguishable cases, courts have determined that gaming statutes permitting casino nights for charitable purposes establish that gaming is “explicitly authorized by the laws of the State” and that a Tribe may thus 5 See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, Thomas J. Miles & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Is Texas Hold’Em A Game of Chance? A Legal and Economic Analysis, 101 GEO. L.J. 581, 585 (2013). 6 Reading the statutory exception as permitting skill-intensive poker would produce the absurd result of giving a statute enabling a strict constitutional prohibition on gambling the effect of permitting it, depending on the level of skill involved in the game. “The Court disfavors constructions that would lead to absurd . . . results.” State v. Doe, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (Idaho 2004). STATE OF IDAHO V. COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE 11 offer those games. See, e.g., N. Arapaho Tribe v. Wyoming, 389 F.3d 1308, 1312–13 (10th Cir. 2004); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1031–32 (2d Cir. 1990). Unlike the statutes in Arapaho and Mashantucket, Idaho law does not permit social or charitable casino gaming. Rather, it permits “promotional contests and drawings conducted incidentally to bona fide nongaming business operations.” IDAHO CODE § 18-3801(4). The exception only allows contests when “prizes are awarded without [charging] consideration,” id., a category that does not include Hold’em. Uneven enforcement of the poker prohibition does not convert Hold’em into Class II gaming. Whether Hold’em is “played at any location in the State” is largely irrelevant because the statute is conjunctive and one of the conditions is not satisfied. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(A)(ii) (Class II games “are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are played at any location in the State”) (emphasis added). As poker is explicitly prohibited, it does not matter whether it is played in the State. Nor does the exercise of prosecutorial discretion show that poker is not prohibited by law. See generally Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 737 (9th Cir. 1996). Even if desuetude were a valid legal principle, the record shows that the State enforces the statute and has not disavowed it.7 7 The passage from Artichoke Joe’s California Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 722 (9th Cir. 2003), that “mere tolerance of class III gaming might be enough to satisfy § 2710(d)(1)(B)’s requirement,” does not compel a contrary result. Artichoke Joe’s addressed a separate provision of the IGRA, and is thus not on point. The case, even if it were on point, does not decide the question. Lastly, the passage is dicta that has never been adopted as a holding. 12 STATE OF IDAHO V. COEUR D’ALENE TRIBE