Opinion ID: 2055865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inspection of Record of Jury Commissioner

Text: During hearings on pretrial motions on January 5, 1970, counsel for defendant requested the court's permission to examine the records of the jury commissioner relating to the investigation made of the prospective jurors by that official. The jury commissioner is required by statute, G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-9-23, to conduct an investigation of all those who are drawn for jury duty. Section 9-9-23 requires that the jury commissioner make such investigations and that he    shall preserve a full record of such investigation, which shall not be disclosed to any person except by order of a justice of the superior court   . The court, apparently treating the request as a motion pursuant to the statute for an inspection of the jury commissioner's records, denied it. The defendant now contends that because of the denial of the motion, he was without material information as to the jurors' backgrounds to use in examining them on the voir dire and that the ruling, therefore, constituted prejudicial error. Counsel for defendant stated that he understood    that the Attorney General has a biographical sketch of each juror as to their education, their occupation, their place of birth. I would ask that the defendants be furnished with that information prior to impaneling. The court, treating it as a motion under § 9-9-23, said it would be inclined to deny it. At that point counsel for defendant stated that he believed the Attorney General has them on cards. Upon inquiry by the court as to whether the state possessed such records, the prosecutor said: We've discontinued that practice, in view of the availability of the Jury Commissioner's records to us or the defendants on motion. While the response was ambiguous, it was apparently accepted by the court and defense counsel as stating that he had no such records in his possession. Thereupon, counsel for defendant requested that he be allowed to examine such records. The court replied: You know, that is in here someplace. I don't think I'll take the time to look it up. It's there, but that is done in advance of trial. You can't move at this last minute for me to have the Jury Commissioner open his records. He then denied the motion. Again counsel for defendant asked the court to authorize him to inspect such records if the jury commissioner had no objection. To this the court responded: It isn't whether he has an objection or not. We have a statute that I'm not going to look up. Section 9-9-23 was construed, in pertinent part, by this court in State v. Busch, 59 R.I. 382, 388-90, 195 A. 487, 490-91 (1937). It appears that in 1937 it had become an established practice of the clerk of the Superior Court to furnish the state with information concerning the investigations made of potential jurors pursuant to a standing order of a justice of the Superior Court. In Busch the defendant argued that the information so furnished to the state deprived him of a fair and impartial trial. The court noted that it was conceivable that under that practice, circumstances might arise in a criminal case which would raise a serious question of whether the defendant was so prejudiced as to be deprived of an otherwise fair and impartial trial. As we then said, the statute was intended to operate to preclude indiscriminate examinations of the records of the jury commissioner. However, it is obvious that the statute was further intended to provide an equal opportunity for the parties to a trial to have available essential information concerning the jurors who comprise the panel. As we said in Busch, the motion is, of course, addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court went on to say: But, in a proper case and upon proper application, the above-mentioned statute permits the superior court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to order the disclosure of such information, or so much thereof as may be pertinent, by the clerk of that court. Id. at 390, 195 A. at 491. This court, however, noted that the record did not disclose that any motion had been made by the defendant for such an examination and indicated that had such a motion been made, a serious question could have been presented for its consideration. However, on the basis of the absence of such a motion, the court held that the defendant in Busch had not been prejudiced. The instant case, however, differs from Busch for in that case the state had the information, while the defendant did not. Here it was not established to the trial court's satisfaction that the state had such records in its possession, and, therefore, the question of the prosecution having an unfair advantage is not present. The question here is simply whether the denial constituted an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial justice and substantially prejudiced defendant. The primary purpose for the enactment of this statute was to make the voir dire a more meaningful procedure by providing available information relating to the members of the panel to counsel for both the prosecution and the defense. It is true that in this state counsel are furnished with a printed list of the potential jurors drawn for the jury during each jury period. This list informs counsel of the name, address, and occupation of each potential juror. However, a more comprehensive report as to the identity and background of the potential jurors is contained in the records of the jury commissioner's investigations, and the availability to counsel of such information assures a more adequate examination of potential jurors on the voir dire. The legislative intent, as we have said, is to make this information available to counsel subject to the approval of a request therefor by a justice of the Superior Court. The power granted such a justice is clearly negative, that is, designed to authorize a denial of the request where such inspection would have an adverse effect upon the duties of the jury commissioner or would impinge upon the effective administration of justice. We are persuaded that such a request should be denied only for compelling reasons. The trial justice here apparently based his denial on his view that it was a last minute attempt to have the jury commissioner open his records. The record discloses that the motion was made on January 5, 1970, and that the voir dire did not begin until February 17, 1970. We cannot agree that in such circumstances the request was untimely. We feel that its denial constituted error on the part of the trial justice. However, in our opinion, defendant was not prejudiced by this denial. The record indicates that he possessed the regular jury list indicating the name, address, and occupation of each potential juror. Apparently, this is the same information the state had, and nothing in the record suggests that the state had an unfair advantage. In such circumstances, we find nothing to demonstrate that the refusal of the trial justice to order the jury commissioner to release the requested information affected the jury's verdicts. As such, we conclude that the trial justice's denial was harmless error.