Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct: Arguing Future Dangerousness, Alleged Griffin Error

Text: In his guilt phase closing argument, Prosecutor Pacheco made the following comments: Ask yourself what exactly [defense counsel] are ... saying in their closing argument. What are they telling you? Did they tell you he didn't do it? No, they didn't tell you that. They told you basically [the evidence does not show guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt, be afraid, be fearful beyond a reasonable doubt. Well, [the applicable standard is] not beyond any doubt. The judge is going to tell you that. Remember, it's not possible to be perfect. If you apply a perfect standard to imperfect evidence, everybody is going to be acquitted. No one ever will be convicted. This man will walk free. This man will be out there in the streets with you and I. Defendant objected to this argument, asserting the argument was improper and asked that the jury be admonished. The trial court did not make an express ruling, merely stating: I think counsel should argue the evidence rather than the consequences of the jury's decision. Let's stick with the evidence. The prosecutor then continued: If he wasn't there, where was he? Everyone else says he was there. Where was he? No alibi witness took the stand and said he was with me that night watching T.V. You didn't hear any of that, did you? All of the evidence points to one man. One man only. The defendant. Don't be afraid to convict him. You know he did it. We all know that he did it. It's up to you. The prosecutor ended his argument shortly thereafter. Following the close of argument, defense counsel reiterated their objection to the prosecutor's comment that an acquittal would lead to defendant being out in the street with the jury. The prosecutor informed the court that, for his argument, he was relying on People v. Hughey (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 240 Cal.Rptr. 269. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial or, in the alternative, to have the jury specifically admonished that the prosecutor's comments on this topic were improper and that the jury should disregard them. Counsel also argued that the jury is not to decide this case either on public passion or any concern for the consequences of the decision, strictly on the facts. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, explaining: There is no reference to committing other crimes. The District Attorney is arguing the evidence and the effects of the evidence and the fact that the evidence is not perfect; and if it were, if this jury requires perfect evidence, then [p]eople would be acquitted [in] every case that came in. I think that's a fair comment. As to the state of the evidence and whether it has to be perfect or just beyond a reasonable doubt[, the court will define those terms in the instructions]. The court further explained: I do not find that the statements were misconduct. I did admonish the jury that they will decide the case on the evidence. I think that's sufficient. Defendant claims five separate errors arose from the portion of the prosecutor's argument quoted above. He claims the prosecutor improperly: (i) argued defendant would pose a danger in the future; (ii) appealed to the passions and sympathy of the jury; (hi) invited the jury to rely on speculative matters; (iv) implied he knew facts not in evidence; and (v) commented on defendant's failure to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 ( Griffin) . To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, a criminal defendant must make a timely objection, make known the basis of his objection, and ask the trial court to admonish the jury. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673 [criminal defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless he objected on the same ground at trial].) As we explained in the analogous situation of a civil case in which it was alleged that one attorney made prejudicial comments in closing argument: The purpose of the rule requiring the making of timely objections is remedial in nature, and seeks to give the court the opportunity to admonish the jury, instruct counsel and forestall the accumulation of prejudice by repeating improprieties, thus avoiding the necessity of a retrial.... In the absence of a timely objection the offended party is deemed to have waived the claim of error through his participation in the atmosphere which produced the claim of prejudice. ( Horn v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 602, 610, 39 Cal.Rptr. 721, 394 P.2d 561.) Failure to make a specific and timely objection and request that the jury be admonished forfeits the issue for appeal unless such an objection would have been futile. ( Hill, supra, at p. 820, 72 Cal. Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) (i) Defendant first contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by urging the jury to consider his future dangerousness. This claim was unquestionably preserved because defense counsel complained of Pacheco's comment that an acquittal would lead to defendant being out in the street with the jury. However, we agree with the trial court that there was no misconduct. The prosecutor reasonably relied on People v. Hughey, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 1383, 240 Cal.Rptr. 269, in which the Court of Appeal, in rejecting the defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, stated that [suggesting that a defendant will commit a criminal act in the future is not an inappropriate comment when there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the statement. ( Id. at p. 1396, 240 Cal.Rptr. 269.) In light of the unprovoked and vicious attack defendant perpetrated, there was sufficient evidence to support the prosecutor's argument. Moreover, even were the comment improper, it could not have prejudiced defendant. To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury, the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we `do not lightly infer' that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor's statements. [Citation.] ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) In this case, the remarks were brief and fleeting, asserting nothing the evidence did not already suggest: defendant posed a danger to people in the community. Any misconduct was thus harmless. (ii) Defense counsel made but passing mention of defendant's second claim, that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' passions and sympathy. Assuming this ground was preserved for appeal, we find no misconduct. The prosecutor's argument, while forceful, did not clearly appeal to the jurors' passions and prejudices. (iii) & (iv) Defense counsel nowhere mentioned that one basis of their objection to the prosecutor's argument was that it encouraged the jury to rely on speculative matters or implied knowledge of information not presented to the jury. Accordingly, these two claims were not preserved for appeal. Even were we to conclude these issues were properly preserved, they are baseless. We often have explained that a prosecutor may engage in vigorous argument before the jury, drawing reasonable deductions from the evidence. ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) The prosecutor here did no more than this. (v) Defense counsel similarly failed to preserve a claim of Griffin error by objecting on that basis at trial. Even assuming the issue was preserved, however, there was no error. Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, protects a defendant's right not to have the prosecutor comment on his failure to testify. A prosecutor is permitted, however, to comment on a defendant's failure to introduce material evidence or call logical witnesses. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 372, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) By directing the jury's attention to the fact defendant never presented evidence that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, the prosecutor did no more than emphasize defendant's failure to present material evidence. He did not capitalize on the fact defendant failed to testify. Accordingly, there was no Griffin error.