Opinion ID: 1938567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Implied Private Right of Action Under the Nurse Assignment Act

Text: The District argues that the Nurse Assignment Act does not create an implied private right of action. [9] In In re D.G., 583 A.2d 160, 166 (D.C.1990), we applied the three relevant factors in the four-part test established in Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2087-88, to determine whether a statute creates an implied private right of action. [10] Under Cort, the court must determine: First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted...? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088 (citations omitted). In this case, each of these criteria is met. First, without question, Parents United represents the class for whose especial benefit the Council enacted the Nurse Assignment Act. According to the legislative history: Many District public school students come from low-income households.... These students can greatly benefit from the availability of health care services in their schools.       Closely related to the shortage of nursing services during school hours is the issue of health personnel at school-sponsored athletic events.... Injuries to students which need immediate medical attention are not unusual at any type of physical competition.... Medical personnel trained in sports medicine would be able to advise students participating in sports how to best avoid injuries, and also be present at events to assure proper care is given to an injured student until a physician or an ambulance arrives. REPORT ON BILL 7-47, at 3. The Council accordingly enacted the Nurse Assignment Act for the primary benefit of the children attending the District's public schoolsthe class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088, and on whose behalf Parents United filed this suit. Second, we examine whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one. Id. This has become the most important factor of the Cort inquiry. See Suter v. Artist M., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1370, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (The most important inquiry here ... is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy sought by the plaintiffs.); see also Edwards v. District of Columbia, 261 U.S.App. D.C. 163, 166-67 n. 4, 821 F.2d 651, 654-55 n. 4 (1987) (intent of legislature is most important Cort factor). Unlike other provisions of the District of Columbia Code, [11] the Nurse Assignment Act does not expressly authorize private individuals to enforce the Act. Nor does it expressly prohibit private enforcement. In fact, the Nurse Assignment Act does not contain any provision for enforcement of the Act. In Cort, the Supreme Court indicated that such silence would leave room for an implied private remedy: [I]n situations in which it is clear that [the statute] has granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be controlling. Cort, 422 U.S. at 82, 95 S.Ct. at 2090 (footnote omitted). The District argues, however, that a more recent Supreme Court decision, Suter v. Artist M., ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1370, eclipses Cort, requiring Parents United to demonstrate an explicit legislative intent to create a private cause of action. We disagree. In Suter, the Court did not abandon the Cort test; it merely applied it in a manner that emphasized the second, legislative intent factor. See id. More specifically, in Suter, the Court addressed the question whether the clause of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act requiring reasonable efforts to reunite the familyas one of the conditions for federal assistance to state agencies responsible for investigating charges of child abuse and neglectcreated a private right of action against the state agency for persons whose parental rights had been terminated. A major portion of the Court's opinion focused on the fact that an implied private right of action was not necessary to put teeth in the reasonable efforts clause because the Act provided for other enforcement mechanisms. [12] The Court noted, for example, that detailed regulations required the state to submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services before federal funding would be approved. The regulations also required the state plan to include a provision for the state agency to make reasonable efforts to avoid removing a child from his or her home before the agency agreed to placement in foster care, and also to make reasonable efforts to assure the child's return to the home after placement in foster care. Id. ___ U.S. at ___ - ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1364-69. Because the Act clearly permitted the Secretary to withhold funding for a state program that did not comply with the reasonable efforts clause, whereas the Act did not expressly provide a private cause of action, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to create a private remedy for enforcement of the `reasonable efforts' clause. Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1370. Unlike the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act at issue in Suter, the Nurse Assignment Act provides no means of enforcement whatsoever unless a private right of action is implied. See Fountain v. Kelly, 630 A.2d 684, 690 (D.C.1993) (Social Security Act does not create implied private right of action for homeless residents placed in inadequate housing because specified remedy is revocation of federal financial assistance to District agency charged with providing emergency shelters, and nothing in Act or its legislative history suggests there is also private civil remedy). Moreover, the District has no attorney general to enforce compliance. Given the mandatory nature, as well as the specificity, of the Act's substantive requirements and funding provisions, we are persuaded that the Council did not intend the Nurse Assignment Act to be unenforceable by anyone other than the Council itself. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1033, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992) ([W]here there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 23 (1783)); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). Finally, Cort conditions recognition of a private right of action on its being consistent with the underlying purposes of the Legislative scheme. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78, 95 S.Ct. at 2088. The underlying purpose of the Nurse Assignment Act is to make medical services available to students in the District's public schools. See REPORT ON BILL 7-47. This was not accomplished until Parents United brought suit. Plainly, therefore, a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purposes of the Act. We conclude, accordingly, that the three applicable Cort criteria are met and that the Nurse Assignment Act thus creates an implied private right of action. Furthermore, because the District conceded that it had never complied with the Nurse Assignment Act and has raised on appeal only the issue of whether the Nurse Assignment Act creates an implied private right of action, it follows that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Parents United on the Nurse Assignment Act claim, as well as permanent injunctive relief mandating compliance.