Opinion ID: 2338759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The danger of self-incriminationBishop's presence in the area.

Text: The judge's ruling that Bishop would not be required to take the stand was apparently predicated solely on the claim by Bishop's attorney that any admission by Bishop that he was present in the 600 block of 46th Place, S.E. at any time, no matter how remote, would tend to tie him to the block where the murder was allegedly committed, and would thus tend to incriminate him. In reality, however, Bishop lived on 46th Place, S.E., [12] and his presence in the vicinity of his home, many months before the homicide for which he was being prosecuted, could not any more constitute evidence of guilt than the easily proven fact that he lived in that vicinity. Particularly in light of Bishop's arrest on the block in question ten days after the date of Littlejohn's alleged offense, we conclude that this record presents only a mere imaginary possibility of danger, Mason, supra, 244 U.S. at 366, 37 S.Ct. at 622 insufficient to warrant the curtailment of Littlejohn's right to present witnesses in his own defense. The murder with which Bishop was charged was allegedly committed on November 25, 1994. Bishop's proffered testimony in the Littlejohn case would have placed him in the block in question on May 3, 1993, more than eighteen months earlier. There was no suggestion that on May 3, 1993, Bishop did anything unlawful. It is difficult to understand how Bishop's presence at the 600 block of 46th Place, S.E., near his home, more than a year and a half before the murder of which he was accused, could have appreciably affected a determination of his guilt or innocence. During his discussion with the attorneys, the judge believed that a possible concern might arise if it was the defense position at Bishop's trial that Bishop was never in the 600 block of 46th Place, S.E. Assuming that this concern was valid on a theoretical level, the record undermines it. Counsel for Littlejohn proffered to the court that Bishop had committed a drug offense in the 600 block of 46th Place, S.E. shortly after May 3, 1993, and that Bishop's presence there was a matter of public record. Without awaiting the details of counsel's proffer, the judge ruled that this information doesn't change my decision. It appears from Littlejohn's motion for a new trial that Bishop's drug offense was committed on May 13, 1993. The government has not denied this allegation. If the prosecution were able to prove in Bishop's case that the defendant was in the area eighteen months and eleven days before the alleged murder, then the danger that Bishop would be incriminated by admitting that he was also there eighteen months and twenty-one days before the offense was remote and speculative rather than real and substantial. Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Comm'n, 406 U.S. 472, 478 & n. 12, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 1675 & n. 12, 32 L.Ed.2d 234 (1972). [13] We are therefore unable to agree with the trial judge's view that testimony by Bishop as to his whereabouts on May 3, 1993 would necessarily be incriminating and that a question by question procedure would provide insufficient protection. Moreover, if the court had proceeded one question at a time, Bishop's residence on 46th Place, which had previously been disclosed to the court during voir dire, would surely have re-emerged. This would probably have disposed of the claim that Bishop would incriminate himself if he tied himself to an area in which, in fact, he lived.