Opinion ID: 1987143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Motive to Injure or Destroy Plaintiff's Business.

Text: The agents complain of several actions by Hawkeye that allegedly interfered with their existing and prospective business relationships. They point to these actions as evidencing Hawkeye's intent to injure or destroy the independent agents' business. One act of interference upon which the agents rely is Hawkeye Bancorporation's formation of Hawkeye Investor Center, Inc. (HICI). HICI was a broker-dealer organized to sell securities, investments, life insurance, and annuities. A review of the documentation of this transaction reveals no indication that Hawkeye acted to injure FMS or its independent agents. Rather, these records show that Hawkeye had legitimate business concerns about the confidentiality of bank customer information, ownership of the customers, and the fairness of the current commission arrangement, prompting it to internalize its life insurance and annuity sales program. The agents also criticize Hawkeye's attempts to compile a list of its life insurance and annuity customers. This conduct, however, is entirely consistent with Hawkeye's decision that it was to its financial advantage and better for its customers that the life insurance and annuity business be handled in-house. Moreover, there is nothing inherently improper about Hawkeye's development of a customer list. See Ballagh v. Polk-Warren Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 257 Iowa 1334, 1343, 136 N.W.2d 496, 501 (1965) (holding a party has the right to use information obtainable from its own files in soliciting business). Furthermore, the agents introduced no evidence that Hawkeye's actions violated an industry-wide practice. Cf. Burke, 474 N.W.2d at 113-14 (holding company's actions in competing for clients was improper where such actions were unacceptable under industry standards). Its actions certainly did not violate any contractual rights of the independent agents who, under their contracts with FMS, had no ownership interest in this book of business. Thus, we conclude Hawkeye's identification of its life insurance and annuity customers does not support a finding that it acted with an improper motive. The agents also assert that Hawkeye, through HICI, directly competed with FMS for sales in violation of the 1990 contract between FMS and Hawkeye. We have already determined, however, that this competition, if it occurred, was not improper and did not violate any contractual obligation of Hawkeye to FMS. See Financial Marketing, 588 N.W.2d at 456. The agents place great reliance on other actions that it claimed were in breach of FMS's 1990 contract with Hawkeye: (1) failing to refer leads to the agents, (2) advising bank customers to stop doing business with the agents, (3) prohibiting the agents from meeting with bank customers on bank premises, and (4) having FMS agents who were Hawkeye employees meet with bank customers. These actions are not in violation of the 1990 contract, however, because that contract did not require that sales of life insurance and annuity products be made by FMS's independent agents as opposed to bank employees who were licensed through FMS. In fact, the agreement specifically required that FMS contract with all bank employees who were licensed to sell insurance or wanted to be so licensed. The only provision in the 1990 contract that could be interpreted to address independent agents is FMS's obligation to hire additional sales persons as business and referrals warrant. Thus, there was nothing improper about Hawkeye using its in-house FMS agents to sell life insurance and annuity products. This action does not evidence an intent to improperly interfere with the independent agents' relations with individual Hawkeye banks or with the agents' clients. Rather, Hawkeye's conduct is entirely consistent with its legitimate long-term plan to handle this business internally. In summary, the evidence shows that Hawkeye made a decision to sell life insurance and annuities without the assistance of outside general or writing agents. There is not substantial evidence that this decision was motivated by anything other than the bank's desire to improve its own financial condition and improve the service to its clients. See Berger v. Cas' Feed Store, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 597, 599 (Iowa 1996) (stating a party does not improperly interfere with another's contract by exercising its own legal rights in protection of its own financial interests); Wilkin Elevator v. Bennett State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1994) (holding that defendant's exercise of its legal rights to protect its financial interests did not support a finding that the defendant acted with the predominant purpose to injure or destroy the plaintiff); Hoefer v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Ins. Trust, 470 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Iowa 1991) (defendant's competition with plaintiff was insufficient to support a finding that the defendant acted with the purpose to injure the plaintiff). Hawkeye's proper efforts to achieve its goal, while having the incidental effect of adversely affecting the independent agents' business, do not evidence a predominant motive to injure or destroy the agents' present or future contractual relations. Cf. Financial Marketing, 588 N.W.2d at 459 (holding that substantially similar evidence did not support a finding that Hawkeye's motive was to financially injure or destroy FMS). Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that as a matter of law the agents could not recover on their claims of intentional interference. AFFIRMED.