Opinion ID: 3134286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background to Section 2--1115.1

Text: Section 2--1115.1(a) provides: In all common law, statutory or other actions that seek damages on account of death, bodily injury, or physical damage to property based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory or doctrine, recovery of non-economic damages shall be limited to $500,000 per plaintiff. There shall be no recovery for hedonic damages. 735 ILCS 5/2--1115.1(a) (West 1996). Section 2--1115.1(d) provides that nothing in section 2-- 1115.1 shall be construed to create a right to recover noneconomic damages. The statute defines non-economic damages as damages which are intangible, including but not limited to damages for pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and loss of society. 735 ILCS 5/2--1115.2(b) (West 1996). Economic damages, defined as all damages which are tangible, such as damages for past and future medical expenses, loss of income or earnings and other property loss (735 ILCS 5/2--1115.2(a) (West 1996)), are not limited. By its terms, the statute defines compensatory or actual damages as the sum of economic and non-economic damages. 735 ILCS 5/2--1115.2(c) (West 1996). Thus, compensatory damages, i.e., damages which are intended to make an injured plaintiff whole, are limited by section 2-- 1115.1. The cap on compensatory damages for noneconomic injury is, as the parties acknowledge, at the heart of Public Act 89--7. The key role of this cap is reflected in the preamble to the Act, which contains 18 specific findings and eight listed purposes based on those findings. Eight of the 18 findings in the preamble pertain to noneconomic damages. These findings declare that: (1) limiting noneconomic damages will improve health care in rural Illinois, (2) more than 20 states limit noneconomic damages, (3) the cost of health care has decreased in those states, (4) noneconomic losses have no monetary dimension, and no objective criteria or jurisprudence exists for assessing or reviewing noneconomic damages awards, (5) such awards are highly erratic and depend on subjective preferences of the trier of fact, (6) highly erratic noneconomic damages awards subvert the credibility of such awards and undercut the deterrent function of tort law, (7) such awards must be limited to provide consistency and stability for all parties and society and (8) a federal executive branch working group determined that limiting noneconomic damages was the most effective step toward legislative reform of tort law because it reduces litigation costs and expedites settlement. In addition to the above legislative findings, the preamble to Public Act 89--7 states legislative purposes which relate to the limit on noneconomic damages. These purposes may be summarized as follows: reduce the cost of health care and increase accessibility to health care, promote consistency in awards, reestablish the credibility of the civil justice system, establish parameters or guidelines for noneconomic damages, protect the economic health of the state by decreasing systemic costs, and ensure the affordability of insurance. The preamble also declares, It is the public policy of this State that injured persons injured through negligence or deliberate misconduct of another be afforded a legal mechanism to seek compensation for their injuries. In the circuit court, defendants maintained that the Act and its specified goals represent a return to fairness, predictability, responsibility and rationality in the tort arena. Specifically, defendants argued that the limit on noneconomic damages provides rationality to the system of awarding damages for personal injury. Plaintiffs, in their motion for partial summary judgment, challenged the legislature's use of chiefly anecdotal evidence to justify the Act.[fn1] Citing a 1992 report from the National Center for State Courts, plaintiffs noted that businesses, not private personal injury plaintiffs, constitute the most active group of litigants in the state. Plaintiffs further argued that the uncontested empirical evidence that they presented in conjunction with their motion clearly shows that the legislative findings listed in the preamble do not provide a rational justification for the limitation of compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries. In support, plaintiffs submitted several affidavits with their motion for summary judgment on the constitutionality of section 2--1115.1. Neil Vidmar, Professor of Social Science and Law at Duke Law School in Durham, North Carolina, submitted an affidavit in which he explains that many of the assertions about medical malpractice litigation contained in the preamble of Public Act 89--7, as well as statements made at the hearing and debates which preceded its passage, have no empirical basis and were based on unsubstantiated perceptions or unreliable data. For example, the perception that damages caps result in a decrease in the number of medical malpractice cases filed was rebutted by the experience in Indiana, a state in which damages caps were adopted in 1975. Vidmar cites studies revealing that Indiana actually has experienced an increase in claims. See E. Kinney, W. Gronfein & T. Gannon, Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act: Results of a Three-Year Study, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 1275, 1286 (1991). Vidmar states that he is aware of no reliable evidence in the formal studies which indicate that a limit on noneconomic damages corresponds to a significant impact on the cost or availability of health care or that noneconomic damages and the costs of liability insurance are directly linked. In a separate affidavit, Marc Galanter, Evjue-Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School, agrees that there is little evidence, apart from anecdotes, to support the perceived deleterious effects of the present civil litigation system. He cites to an article he authored entitled Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1093 (1996). He maintains that the only consequences which clearly flow from the passage of Public Act 89--7 are increased profitability of insurance companies and a reduction in the payments to the most seriously injured tort victims. According to Galanter, court filings in the law division of the circuit court of Cook County have actually declined during the period from 1980 to 1994. Galanter asserts that arguments which rely on systemic costs of the civil litigation system and its negative effect on health care and jobs are purely speculative. Similarly, he states that the salutary effects attributed to the type of tort reform attempted in Public Act 89--7 are largely speculative. Galanter concludes that when comparing isolated instances or anecdotal evidence against the reliable empirical data that does exist, it is apparent that the findings which form the basis for Public Act 89--7 are erroneous. In addition to the above affidavits, plaintiffs offered the joint affidavit of Stephen Daniels, M.A., Ph.D., a senior research fellow at the American Bar Foundation in Chicago, and Joanne Martin, M.M., J.D., an assistant director of the same foundation. Their affidavit summarizes the key empirical findings of scholarly literature and compares them to the factual underpinnings of Public Act 89--7. Like Vidmar and Galanter, Daniels and Martin state that the facts which form the stated intention or goals of Public Act 89--7 are not substantiated by the empirical data and critical analyses found in published, scholarly literature. Daniels and Martin summarize data which show that only a tiny fraction of accidental deaths and injuries are pursued through the litigation system as claims for compensation. They further maintain, based on studies, that jury awards are not erratic or capricious, but rather relate closely to the severity of the particular injury. After considering the arguments of the parties and the materials presented, the circuit court invalidated section 2-- 1115.1 on the grounds that it violated the following provisions of the Illinois Constitution: special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, sec. 13), equal protection and due process (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2), separation of powers (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1), right to a jury (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 13) and right to a certain remedy (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 12). The circuit court held that no conceivable argument [could] be made in good faith to suggest that arbitrarily limiting [compensatory] damages complies with the [Illinois Constitution]. The court determined that section 2--1115.1 constitutes special legislation because it eliminates fairness and impartiality in the awarding of compensatory damages, thereby bestowing on certain tortfeasors a disproportionate, undeserved benefit of escaping liability for a portion of compensatory damages. The court further found that the affidavits filed in support of plaintiffs' opposition to the findings in the preamble to Public Act 89--7 demonstrate that there is no rational basis for section 2--1115.1. Our review of the circuit court's ruling is de novo. See Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 230. As such, our scope of review is not limited to or bound by any specific material relied upon by the circuit court. We acknowledge that the trial court considered the affidavits of Vidmar, Galanter, Martin and Daniels in its ruling on plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment. The materials were admitted in support of plaintiffs' claim that the provisions of the Act are not rationally related to its purposes. While we note that it was permissible for plaintiffs to introduce empirical evidence by way of affidavit, plaintiffs may not prevail on their constitutional challenges merely by showing that the General Assembly was mistaken in its legislative findings of fact. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 229-30, citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 1242, 58 S. Ct. 778, 784 (1938). Courts are not empowered to adjudicate the accuracy of legislative findings. The legislative fact-finding authority is broad and should be accorded great deference by the judiciary. Therefore, to the extent the affidavits of record may have been offered to contest the wisdom of the legislative enactment, we reiterate that the legislature is not required to convince this court of the correctness of its judgment that the civil justice system needs reform. See Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 229, citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111, 59 L. Ed. 2d 171, 184-85, 99 S. Ct. 939, 949-50 (1979); see also Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409 (1994). Our task is limited to determining whether the challenged legislation is constitutional, and not whether it is wise. Bernier, 113 Ill. 2d at 230.