Opinion ID: 1356054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Conduct the Trial with Sufficient Seriousness and Decorum

Text: Defendant contends his attorneys, Frank O'Connor and Russell Swartz, did not conduct themselves with the seriousness and decorum appropriate to a trial in which a human life is at stake, and the trial court erred by failing to control this inappropriate conduct. Well-conceived judicial humor can be a welcome relief during a long, tense trial. Obviously, however, the court should refrain from joking remarks which the jury might interpret as denigrating a particular party or his attorney. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 753-754, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Here, defendant's primary complaint is not of misconduct by the court, or even the prosecutors, but by his own attorneys. Accordingly, his real claim is that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. [Citation.] `A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211-1212, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) Defendant has shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice. Defendant claims counsel did not take the trial seriously. During jury selection, while discussing the possibility of a penalty phase, one of the defense attorneys told a prospective juror that the defense was not conceding guilt. Counsel said, We intend to go out there and have a lot of fun in the next couple weeks trying the case. Another time, when cross-examining a witness during the guilt phase, counsel referred to the defense attorneys' having fun. These references to having fun were clearly a colloquial way to say the defense would test and attack the prosecution case, not that the trial was merely a game. We have reviewed the remaining comments defendant has culled from a lengthy transcript and find nothing inappropriate. Counsel did make some lighter comments, a few in front of the jury, but nothing suggesting counsel did not take their overall responsibility very seriously. Defendant also complains of counsel's occasionally self-deprecating humor, which he claims was selling the defense short. Again, we have reviewed the comments and see nothing inappropriate. The humor was directed at the attorneys themselves, not at their client or the strength of their case. Defendant also claims counsel displayed unreasonable obsequiousness towards Sergeant Jarrett and, to a lesser extent, other persons. [3] Jarrett was the designated investigating officer who remained with the prosecutors in the courtroom and testified about part of the investigation. Defense counsel did indeed make clear to the jury, often in humorous ways, that the defense was not attacking Jarrett or his testimony. At one point, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel told the court that Jarrett was one of the few people that's trusted by both sides in this case. Defendant argues that when defense counsel said in closing argument that he `[w]ouldn't dream of attacking Larry [Jarrett],' he was in essence saying he wouldn't dream of attacking the prosecution's case against his client. On the contrary, counsel did attack the prosecution's case; they attacked it vigorously. They strongly challenged the credibility of Edwards and other lay witnesses. They did not, however, attack everything and everyone. Often it is effective to make clear to a jury that the defense is not challenging the investigators, but rather the testimony of lay witnesses like Edwards, who had an obvious motivation to minimize his own culpability. No doubt Jarrett was a credible witness. Even today, defendant cites no part of his testimony that counsel should have attacked or, indeed, anything inconsistent with the defense theory of the case. Counsel's statement that he was not going to attack Jarrett was a prelude to his argument that Jarrett's testimony aided the defense. Competent counsel may reasonably choose not to attack every prosecution witness, but only those who are vulnerable and clearly adverse to the defense case. Competent attorneys, including competent criminal defense attorneys, have varied styles in front of juries. Some are hard-charging, others soft-spoken; some try to gain the jurors' confidence by humor or other means, others are always businesslike; some profess incredulity at all opposing evidence, others save their ammunition for specific targets. Competent attorneys might adopt different styles for different cases. No single right way exists to try a case. Here, counsel used humor on occasion and attacked the credibility of the lay witnesses rather than the investigation or investigators. We see nothing incompetent in this style or approach. Counsel could reasonably believe it the most effective way to try this particular case before this particular jury. Defendant contends the court erroneously failed to control the alleged inappropriate behavior. We need not discuss the scope of the court's duty to control a defense attorney's behavior or style in the courtroom, for here there was no misbehavior to control. Defendant also complains of one jocular comment the court made to the jury when resuming the trial after a hearing in its absence. Defendant has forfeited the complaint because he did not object at trial. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 753, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) The lack of an objection is also understandable, as the comment was innocuous. At no time did either court or counsel cross the line from the proper to the improper. ( People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 512, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249.) Moreover, even if we were to assume that any of the exchanges were improper, there is no suggestion of prejudice to defendant. The trial as a whole, especially the portion in front of the jury, was conducted with appropriate solemnity. ( Ibid. ) On another point that defendant claims is related, he argues that the court inadequately admonished the jury when recessing. (See § 1122; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 564-565, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244.) Early in the trial, the court instructed the jurors not to discuss the case or form any opinions about the facts until the matter had been submitted to them. Then the parties stipulated that the court need not repeat that admonition at every break, and it often did not do so. In light of the admonitions actually given and the parties' stipulation, we conclude both that defendant has waived the contention and that he has suffered no prejudice. ( People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 822-823, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204; People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 565, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 174-175, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.)