Opinion ID: 2520371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Defendant's Due Process Argument

Text: We now consider the defendant's argument that the confrontation clause entitles him to a broad cross-examination of witnesses against him, especially concerning their credibility. In support of that proposition, the defendant asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to examine witnesses is furthered by the exercise of his right of compulsory process, entitling him to compel the Alliance to comply with the subpoena duces tecum. The United States Supreme Court has identified two types of confrontation clause protections afforded the defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). Here, the defendant argues in essence that the Alliance's argument that the privilege protects records of assistance provided the victim interferes with his ability to prepare his defense adequately because he would be hampered in cross-examining the alleged victim by probing her motive and credibility. In Clark, 668 P.2d at 8, we rejected the argument that the physician-patient and psychologist-client privileges should be qualified and therefore subject only to a balancing test weighing the holding party's interest in the privilege against the challenging party's need for the information. Instead, since we found no such limiting language in the statute governing the privileges at issue, we held that the only basis for authorizing a disclosure of the confidential information is an express or implied waiver. Id. In District Court, 719 P.2d at 726, we addressed the issue of whether defining the victim's rights under the psychotherapist-patient privilege as absolute interfered with the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses. We acknowledged that the purpose of the right to confrontation and cross-examination, among other things, is to sift the conscience of the witness, and to test the recollection of the witness to determine if his or her story is worthy of belief. Id. We made clear, however, that the defendant's right to cross-examination is not absolute, explaining that under appropriate circumstances, the trial court may limit the defendant's right of confrontation. Id. As we saw it, the defendant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses must bow to the strong public policy interest in encouraging victims of sexual assaults to obtain meaningful psychotherapy. Id. We reasoned, The defendant's constitutional right to confrontation is not so pervasive as to place sexual assault victims in the untenable position of requiring them to choose whether to testify against an assailant or retain the statutory right of confidentiality in post-assault psychotherapy records. Id. at 727. We implied, however, that had the defendant made a particularized factual showing in support of his assertion that access to privileged communications of the victim was necessary for the effective exercise of his right of confrontation, the result would have been different. Id. [7] A year after our decision in District Court, the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). The Court dealt with the question of whether and to what extent the State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to the defendant's confrontational rights. Id. at 43, 107 S.Ct. 989. There, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting his 13-year-old daughter who had been placed in a state-created protective service agency. Id. The agency was charged with investigating the abuse of children in its custody. Id. The statute made investigative reports by the agency confidential, subject to eleven exceptions. Id. The defendant issued a subpoena to the agency to produce its files. Id. The Agency refused to comply. Id. at 44, 107 S.Ct. 989. The state supreme court reversed the trial court decision denying the defendant access to the files, on grounds that the decision violated the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses and his right to compulsory process. Id. at 46, 107 S.Ct. 989. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the former position and held that the right to question adverse witnesses does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Rather, the Court concluded that the right is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses. Id. at 53, 107 S.Ct. 989. Addressing the state supreme court's holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process required full access to the files, the court noted that it had traditionally evaluated such claims under the broader protections of the Fourteenth Amendment Due process clause. Id. at 56, 107 S.Ct. 989. As such, the Court held that compulsory process obligates the government (which necessarily includes a state-created protective services agency) to turn over exculpatory evidence to the accused. Id. at 57, 107 S.Ct. 989. The Court especially noted that the state confidentiality statute at issue unequivocally qualified the privilege, by contemplating  some use of [the agency's] records in judicial proceedings. Id. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. Here, the victim-advocate privilege excludes from the definition of victim advocate an advocate employed by any law enforcement agency. § 13-90-107(1)(k)(II). Unlike the state statute in Ritchie, moreover, our statute defines the privilege without exceptions. As noted in Clark, we reject the application of an ad hoc regime to determine the scope of the victim's rights under a statute that creates such a privilege. Accordingly, the defendant's compulsory process claim fails. We hold that neither the defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses, nor his right to compulsory process is violated by withholding records of any assistance the Alliance may have provided M.P.