Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Proof of Circumstantial Evidence for By-Own Conduct Murder

Text: Our dissenting colleagues contend that this case highlights the need to impose a higher burden of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt on the by-own-conduct determination in a capital prosecution based on evidence of a circumstantial nature. Unsatisfied with the jury's determination that defendant committed murder by his own conduct thus triggering his death eligibility, the dissent seeks to impose a heightened no doubt standard of proof on that determination when circumstantial evidence exclusively is involved. Although the desire for certainty is an understandably human, and humane, response when criminal consequences hang in the balance, we do not agree that the facts in this record warrant so dramatic an alteration in our jurisprudence. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof is imposed by our Code of Criminal Conduct for conviction of all offenses under the Code. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-13. In addition, murder convictions require certain precise findings, made by the jury unanimously applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, in order to proceed to a capital penalty phase as well as for imposition of a capital sentence. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c) (requiring for death eligibility finding that defendant committed murder by own-conduct); Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 511, 651 A. 2d 19 (holding jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed murder by own conduct to proceed to penalty phase). The elimination of all reasonable doubt from each and every juror's mind involves an extremely thorough and deliberate fact-finding process. It is a process that has worked well for hundreds of years. We are confident that no capital conviction in this State that has been upheld on appeal or on post-conviction review has posed a serious question about guilt. Careful review of the record in each case convinced the jury and this Court that no real doubt existed about the defendant's guilt by own conduct. All of our capital determinations were made using the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that appropriately instructs the jury concerning the necessary degree of certainty to render their determination reliable. See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), Preliminary Instructions to the Jury in Non-Capital Cases (Feb. 24, 1997) (explaining that prosecution must prove charges by more than a preponderance, but not necessarily to an absolute certainty, noting [i]n this world, we know very few things with absolute certainty). Although not dispositive, numerous jurisdictions have rejected the call for a different and heightened standard of proof where circumstantial evidence is involved. Of those federal circuit courts of appeal that have considered the question, all have declined to adopt a higher standard in the context of circumstantial evidence. See generally, United States v. Olbres, 61 F. 3d 967, 970 (1st Cir.) (So long as the evidence, taken as a whole, warrants a judgment of conviction, `it need not rule out other hypotheses more congenial to a finding of innocence.'), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 991, 116 S.Ct. 522, 133 L.Ed. 2d 430 (1995); United States v. Sawyer, 294 F. 2d 24, 31 (4th Cir.) (noting that prosecution is not required to exclude every hypothesis except that of guilty beyond reasonable doubt and stating that jury is responsible for weighing evidence to find guilt beyond reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 916, 82 S.Ct. 196, 7 L.Ed. 2d 132 (1961); United States v. Prieur, 429 F. 2d 1237, 1238 (6th Cir.1970) (holding it is not necessary that [circumstantial evidence] remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt). The federal courts follow the appellate standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia for assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, to support a criminal conviction. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 573. The Supreme Court explained that that standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Ibid. The Court explicitly declined to adopt a higher standard of proof for circumstantial evidence. Case law from other state courts has echoed the principles contained in the circuit court decisions, and has rejected arguments calling for a heightened standard for circumstantial evidence in capital cases. See People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E. 2d 521, 536 (2000) (applying Jackson v. Virginia standard in affirming capital murder convictions based on circumstantial evidence, noting that [c]ircumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided that such evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 393, 151 L.Ed. 2d 297 (2001); Commonwealth v. Begley, 566 Pa. 239, 780 A. 2d 605, 615-19 (2001) (applying Jackson v. Virginia standard to circumstantial evidence used to convict defendant of first-degree murder and kidnapping and to sustain his death sentence); State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W. 3d 516, 558 (Tenn.2000) (upholding capital conviction based on circumstantial evidence using appellate standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia ), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 953, 121 S.Ct. 2600, 150 L.Ed. 2d 757 (2001). In our state, the Reyes standard is in full accord with the federal appellate standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence. It is the apt standard of review here. Moreover, we do not deviate from the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard because circumstantial evidence is involved. We decline to reform our burden of proof jurisprudence simply because the dissent contends that the prosecution should not be able to retry defendant capitally based on its disagreement with the jury's outcome on the by-own-conduct finding.