Opinion ID: 2513985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Allowing Henderson & Kay To Represent Leslie Over Richard's Objection.

Text: Richard argues that his legal representation at the termination trial was marred by an actual conflict of interest. Under Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct 1.9 [15] and 1.10, [16] Richard argues that Henderson & Kay should have been disqualified from representing Leslie, since the subject matters of the criminal case and termination proceeding were substantially related, Henderson & Kay took a position materially adverse to Richard in the termination proceedings, and the ethical wall put in place by the court did not cure the conflict. To remedy this abuse of discretion, Richard asserts that the termination order must be reversed and a new trial be granted. Richard essentially argues that because Kay had an actual conflict under Rule 1.9 and personally could not have represented Leslie in the termination, all members of the firm of Henderson & Kay had an imputed conflict under Rule 1.10. Therefore, Richard reasons, Henderson should have been precluded from representing Leslie in the termination proceedings on the basis of his imputed conflict.
A lawyer's duty to former clients is codified in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a). Where the previous representation and current litigation cover the same or substantially related matters and the current client's interests are materially adverse to those of the former client, the lawyer shall not represent the current client unless the former client consents. [17]
Richard argues that the subject matter underlying his attempted SAM conviction and the termination proceeding are substantially related to one another. As Richard reasons, Kay represented Richard at the change of plea and sentencing in the attempted SAM prosecution. Subsequently, the alleged conduct underlying his conviction was used as a central allegation in the petition to terminate his parental rights. Directing us to Daniels v. State [18] and Aleut Corp. v. McGarvey, [19] Richard concludes that, under any possible test, the issues in these two cases were substantially related. The state argues that the CINA case and the criminal case were not substantially related because the elements the state was required to prove in the criminal and CINA cases were different. The state characterizes Cynthia's sexual abuse as being a minor factor in the termination proceeding and disagrees with Richard's claim that Daniels and Aleut Corp. establish a standard for determining when two issues are substantially related. During the pretrial proceedings, however, the state conceded that the two matters were related. At the pretrial conference, the state asserted: The crux of the matter is what was the subject matter.... [T]he subject matter is directly related to this case. [Richard] in that case sexually assaulted his daughter, and his rights as a father are being implicated here, so I don't think the fact that sentencing took place in February or maybe it was March is relevant, really. And I also don't think it's particularly relevant that it was the result of a plea bargain. I'd say the majority of cases resolve in plea bargain, but that doesn't mean there aren't substantive negotiations and thought processes that go into that. Where a party concedes a fact at trial, that fact cannot later be contested on appeal. [20] Though the parties were not yet at trial when the state made its concession, the matter had to be decided before trial since it involved trial counsel. The state's concession at the conference, therefore, bars its contention of this point on appeal. Even if this argument was not waived at trial, we find that the matters are substantially related. In Aleut Corp., we held that an attorney may not represent a third party against a former client where there exists a substantial possibility that knowledge gained by him in the earlier professional relationship can be used against the former client, or where the subject matter of his present undertaking has a substantial relationship to that of his prior representation. [21] In its petition to terminate parental rights, DFYS contended that Richard had not remedied his conduct or the conditions in his home since the children were first adjudicated to be in need of aid and that, as a result of his behavior, he had been sentenced to three years in prison for the sexual abuse of his daughter. Further, in its pretrial memorandum, the state referred to Richard's SAM conviction and concluded that the cycle has not been broken, the issues that brought the children into state custody persist. DFYS also alleged that the treatment and counseling offered to Richard had not had any effect. In its decision, the trial court found that based upon his no contest plea in 4BE-S99-752 CR for Attempted Sexual Abuse of a Minor in the 2nd Degree, clear and convincing evidence exists that [Richard], at the least, placed [Cynthia] at the risk of sexual abuse. The court went on to say that, [n]onetheless, and notwithstanding the above, both Richard and Leslie placed the children at substantial risk of sexual assault. This paragraph indicates that, although there was other evidence supporting termination under other subsections of AS 47.10.011, Richard's attempted SAM conviction clearly exerted some influence over the court's decision to terminate Richard's parental rights. While the trial court found reasons other than the sexual abuse supporting termination, that result could not have been known to the court at the time it decided the conflict of interest issue. Brian Kay represented Richard in his sexual assault case. The conviction resulting from Richard's no contest plea in that case played a role in the termination of his parental rights. As such, we find that Kay's prior representation was substantially related to the termination proceeding.
Richard next argues that his interests were materially adverse to Leslie's in the termination proceedings. On appeal, the state claims that Richard and Leslie's positions were aligned, as neither wanted the state to terminate their parental rights. Further, the state now maintains that it would not advance Leslie's case to show that Richard was an abusive father because under AS 47.10.011 the state could terminate Leslie's parental rights based on Richard's conduct alone. This argument stands in direct contrast to DFYS's position at trial. As discussed earlier, at the pretrial conference, the state declared that it's clear that Mr. Kay would have a conflict to continued representation of [Leslie], when he represented Richard at the criminal matter as Richard and Leslie obviously... have separate interests. [Leslie] wants her child back, [Richard] wants his child back, he's in jail, they're separated, they don't, you know, have much contact together.... [T]hat's a clear conflict. Again, where a party concedes a fact at trial, that fact can not be challenged on appeal. [22] Even if the state had not conceded at trial that there was a conflict, we find its current argument to be without merit and its reliance on AS 47.10.011 to be misplaced. First, AS 47.10.011 governs an initial finding that a child is in need of aid. Alaska Statute 47.10.088 governs termination and, while section.011 is incorporated into section .088, more than a finding that a child is in need of aid is required to terminate parental rights. Given this statutory scheme, the state is simply inferring too much from the language of section .011. While certain subsections of AS 47.10.011 implicate the conduct of both parents, once a child has been found to be in need of aid, the state must then prove that the parent whose rights the state wishes to terminate has failed to remedy the conduct underlying the petition and that returning the child to the home would place the child at a substantial risk of physical or mental injury. [23] Contrary to the state's argument, none of these findings could be made against Leslie based on Richard's conduct alone. We conclude that Richard and Leslie's positions were materially adverse. At the time of termination, Leslie had married another man. Leslie testified that she didn't want Richard to have contact with the children because Richard had abused Leslie and sexually assaulted Cynthia. Leslie also testified that she didn't want Richard to have any contact with the children because Richard hit his children and masturbated in front of Cynthia and touched her inappropriately. In her closing argument, Leslie argued for the termination of Richard's rights based on the sexual abuse. Richard, on the other hand, testified that he had never touched Cynthia in a sexual manner. He stated that he was confused when he entered his plea of no contest to the attempted SAM charge. Though he was represented by counsel at those proceedings, Richard testified that he didn't understand what he was pleading to. As Richard maintained that he had not sexually assaulted Cynthia, while Leslie argued that the sexual assault was the main reason in support of the termination of Richard's parental rights, Leslie's interests were materially adverse to Richard's.
Richard contends that, according to Alaska Professional Conduct Rule 1.10, where one attorney in a law firm would be disqualified from representing a client, the entire firm is disqualified. Thus, he concludes that because Kay was disqualified, Kay's partner, Henderson, should be disqualified as well. In contrast, the state, analyzing the situation under Rule 1.9(b), Rule 1.10, and the accompanying commentaries, argues that because Henderson himself did not have a conflict, he should not be precluded from representing Leslie.
Rule 1.9(b) governs representation of a person by an attorney whose former firm had previously represented a client with interests materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired confidential information. [24] Rule 1.10(a) bars a firm's representation of a client when any member of the firm would be prohibited from representing that client under Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9, or 2.2. [25] While the commentary to Rule 1.9(b) mentions vicarious disqualification (another term for imputed disqualification), the text of Rule 1.9(b) indicates that this commentary is discussing a different form of imputed disqualification than the one at issue here. The state argues that the commentary rejects any rigid per se approach to disqualification in favor of a two pronged `functional analysis' which looks at whether (i) confidences are preserved and (ii) adverse positions to the client are avoided. Maintaining that Richard and Leslie did not have legally adverse positions and that confidences were preserved under Rule 1.9(c), the state concludes that there was no reason for Henderson to have been disqualified from representing Leslie. This two-pronged functional analysis, however, does not impact our analysis under Rule 1.10(a). Once a lawyer is deemed to have a conflict under Rule 1.9, that lawyer is disqualified from representing another client with an adverse position in a substantially related matter unless the previous client consents. In situations where it is not immediately clear that an attorney has a conflict with a client of a prior firm, the functional analysis should be undertaken to determine if the attorney has acquired confidential information relevant to a substantially related matter on which the attorney would be asked to take a position adverse to that former client. Where an individual attorney is conflicted out under either of these scenarios, that conflict is imputed to the attorney's entire firm under Rule 1.10(a). Thus the functional analysis described in the comment to Rule 1.9 applies only to determine whether there is a conflict in the first place and not to ascertain whether the conflict should be imputed to other members of the conflicted attorney's firm. As the comment to Rule 1.10 explains, each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty [owed] by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. [26]
Richard argues that the purpose behind vicarious disqualification is to protect the former client's confidences where a member of a law firm had acquired knowledge material to current litigation. As Kay had an actual conflict of interest, Richard contends, Henderson's statement to the court that his firm did not have a conflict of interest because he had no knowledge of Richard's criminal matter was simply a wrong legal analysis of [Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct] 1.9 and 1.10. The state responds by asserting that since Kay no longer had access to Richard's criminal file and there was no evidence that Henderson and Kay had shared any confidences regarding Richard, there was no reason to impute to Henderson any conflict Kay might be found to have. The commentary to Rule 1.10 states that the rule of imputed disqualification found in Rule 1.10(a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client. As the comment explains: Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty [owed] by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. [27] Thus, as a plain reading of Rule 1.10(a) indicates, because Kay had a conflict in representing Leslie, that conflict must be imputed to Henderson, thereby barring either of them from representing Leslie at the CINA hearing.

The state argues that Richard's motion to disqualify Henderson from representing Leslie was untimely and that Richard's delay resulted in a waiver of any conflict. The state alleges a two-month delay from the time Richard was made aware of the potential conflict to the time he raised the issue in court. At a minimum, the state contends, Richard's delay contributed to the factors that weighed against disqualification of Henderson & Kay. Richard argues that Kay's notice at the calendar call that he had a conflict did not constitute a waiver of his right to object to the firm's conflict. Richard further maintains that there was no opportunity to discuss the conflict with his attorney prior to the pretrial conference and that any delay was not designed to gain tactical advantage. The state cites Jackson v. J.C. Penney Co. [28] for the proposition that failure to make a reasonably prompt motion for disqualification may result in the conflict being waived, as considerations of the right to choice of counsel, expense, and delay support a requirement that motions to disqualify be brought promptly. Courts in other jurisdictions have also held that motions to disqualify counsel should be made with reasonable promptness after the potential conflict is known. [29] Other courts, however, have held that, absent a showing of improper motive, delay should not be considered in deciding motions to disqualify. [30] There is no evidence in the record that Richard waited until the pretrial conference to object to Henderson & Kay's representation of Leslie to gain a tactical advantage or to harass either Leslie or the state. Rather, the record indicates that the pretrial conference was the first time Richard had personally heard of the potential conflict. The delay was two months, much shorter than the periods allowed in other cases. [31] Furthermore, at the calendar call, Kay indicated that he would advise the court of the status of any potential conflict his firm had within a couple of weeks. It appears as though no such advice was ever received by the court or counsel. Given the lack of evidence indicating an improper motive and the importance of having counsel free from conflicts of interest, the two-month delay in bringing the motion to disqualify did not result in the waiver of Richard's right to challenge the conflict.
Richard argues that no screening procedure was implemented to allow Henderson to represent Leslie at the termination proceeding, asserting that no ethical wall saved the firm from an actual conflict of interest. The state, though, argues that an ethical wall did prevent any potential prejudice to Richard. The state also argues that proper screening mechanisms mitigate the need to disqualify, especially where there has been a delay in moving for disqualification. We have never before addressed the question of whether screening measures can allow a firm to represent a client that the firm would otherwise be prohibited from representing under Rule 1.10. While the Alaska Comment to Professional Conduct Rule 1.11 states that courts have recognized screening methods that prevent intrafirm exchange of confidential information, [32] we decline to import this comment into Rule 1.10. Rule 1.11 relates to successive government and private employment. While the text of Rule 1.11(a) [33] might be interpreted to include the public defender, as public defenders are public employees, the comments to Rules 1.10 and 1.11 indicate that the government employment envisioned by the drafters did not include public defenders. The reason for this distinction is explained in the commentary. Rule 1.11 prevents a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of a private client. [34] The comments to both Rule 1.10 and Rule 1.11 discuss Rule 1.11's application to a lawyer who had previously represented the government. [35] Unlike most public lawyers, public defenders do not represent the government or a public agency. Rather, they represent individual clients. Instead of working on behalf of the state, public defenders work on behalf of private individuals whose interests are often directly contrary to the interests of the state or society at large, despite the fact that public defenders receive their compensation from the state. [36] Given our conclusion that Rule 1.11 does not apply to the case of a public defender who has joined a private firm, we must determine whether to import the screening provisions of Rule 1.11 into Rule 1.10. The comment to Rule 1.10 specifically addresses the varying consequences of disqualification. As the comment states, [d]ifferent provisions are ... made for movement of a lawyer from one private firm to another and for movement of a lawyer between a private firm and the government. [37] The drafters could have written Rule 1.10 to allow the implementation of screening measures where a conflict of interest exists. Instead, they chose to draft a separate rule endorsing screening procedures only for attorneys transitioning between government and private practice. Accordingly, we decline to import the provisions of Rule 1.11 into Rule 1.10 and conclude that the screening measures found in Rule 1.11 do not apply to a Rule 1.10 conflict. [38]
Finally, the state argues that Richard failed to request reconsideration and therefore waived any further consideration of this matter. At the pretrial conference, Judge Curda, after stating that Henderson would not be disqualified and that an ethical wall would prevent the sharing of confidences, told the parties that if any of them felt the issue needed to be readdressed later that week, that party could notify his office. Although no papers were filed with the court requesting reconsideration, Richard asked for reconsideration prior to the start of trial. The court realized that Richard's statement challenging the propriety of Henderson's representation of Leslie was a motion for reconsideration, stating that it was going to deny reconsideration ...; going to deny the motion. While Richard did not file a written motion requesting reconsideration, the court recognized his oral request as a request for reconsideration; Richard therefore did not fail to ask for reconsideration.
Richard argues that the superior court's refusal to dismiss Henderson from Leslie's representation requires reversal of the court's order terminating his parental rights. The state, however, maintains that Richard did not suffer any harm, as the state only needed to prove that the children were in need of aid under one jurisdictional basis and evidence of Richard's conviction for sexual abuse of a minor would have come in as evidence in any event because it was a matter of record. We have not yet addressed the proper remedy for a failure to disqualify counsel because of a conflict of interest in a termination of parental rights proceeding. We begin with the propositions that the right to parent is a fundamental right, [39] and that appointed counsel is guaranteed for indigent parents when their parental rights are at stake. [40] Accordingly, a parent who faces termination of parental rights is entitled to an attorney who is free of any conflict. But this case does not present that problem: Richard was throughout the termination case represented by an independent, conflict-free attorney. Richard's argument relies upon the quasi per se rule of reversal adopted in LaPierre v. State and other cases from criminal law in which defendants allege a conflict of interest. [41] But those cases involve criminal defendants who had been represented by attorneys with conflicted interests. In that situation, the conflict obviously threatens to deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; the rule of almost automatic reversal simply recognizes that this constitutional right has been traditionally deemed nearly absolute. LaPierre's harmless error test, then, is uniquely tailored to the fundamental nature of the constitutional right it protects: the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel in the proceeding at issue. In the case at issue here, by contrast, Richard was not represented by the conflicted attorney; rather, his former attorney in an earlier matter improperly represented another partyRichard's codefendant, Leslie in the present action. In this situation, there is no reason to believe that the disputed conflict of interest deprived Richard of his right to effective assistance of counsel in the present case. Although Henderson & Kay's conflict undeniably exposed Richard to a risk of prejudice by potentially enabling the firm to use previously gained confidences unfairly against Richard, this form of prejudice has little bearing on the interests protected by Richard's constitutional right to counsel: his right to effective representation in the present case by his own attorney. Throughout these termination proceedings, Richard received the services of a nonconflicted attorney whose loyalty and competence remain unchallenged. To be sure, improprieties directed against a defendant by a codefendant's attorney can cause serious prejudice and, in that sense, can hamper the defendant's attorney's ability to present a successful defense. But error of that kind is no different than any other error emanating from sources beyond the defense counsel's control. Because such errors do not derive from or reflect any shortcoming in the quality of the defendant's legal representation in the case at issue, they cannot fairly be said to infringe the defendant's constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Richard offers no authority to the contrary. The only case he cites involving a codefendant's improper representation by an attorney who formerly represented the defendant, State v. Sanders, [42] is readily distinguishable: because the conflicted attorney in Sanders initially represented the defendant in the same case, the conflict at issue there directly implicated the defendant's right to counsel in that case. We therefore see no reason to assume that Richard suffered the same kind of fundamental, constitutionally subversive harm that LaPierre and Cuyler presume will occur when a defendant's own counsel actively serves interests adverse to the defendant's. Moreover, Richard suggests no other sound reasons to apply a harmless error test like LaPierre's, which builds in a presumption of prejudice. Although he cursorily asserts that a presumption of prejudice is necessary because the prejudicial effects of conflicted representation may be difficult to prove, Richard fails to explain why this is so. The assertion that prejudice is difficult to prove may have considerable merit when a defendant is represented by a conflicted attorney, and perhaps even when a codefendant is improperly represented by an attorney who formerly represented the defendant in the same case. [43] But the inherent difficulty of proving prejudice does not seem self-evident when the conflict arises from former representation in a different proceeding. Assisted by current counsel, the defendant would presumably be able to recall or discover most previously revealed confidences and would be capable of identifying and guarding against their possible exploitation by defendant's former counsel. Hence, it would not seem unreasonable to require some showing of actual prejudice as a prerequisite to reversal. Nor would any deterrent purpose be served in this case by replacing the conventional harmless error test, which demands a showing of actual prejudice, with a rule that presumes prejudice. To the contrary, in the present case a reversal based on presumed prejudice would have perverse consequences: it would have no direct impact on the offending attorneys or their client; yet it would severely penalize the state and, consequently, the three children whose interests the state representseven though the state actively sought to disqualify Kay at the superior court level. This is not to say that a conflict like this could never have constitutional ramifications. But if the ethical breach in this case raises constitutional concerns, they center on notions of fairnessprocedural due process. [44] We can imagine circumstances in which representation of a codefendant by the defendant's former counsel might generate a risk of unfair prejudice so grave as to violate the defendant's right to due process. But beyond showing the bare existence of a conflict here, Richard points out no specific circumstances suggesting fundamental unfairness. Nor are any such circumstances readily apparent. Given the numerous allegations underlying the state's termination petition and the strength of its evidence, Richard's prior sexual abuse prosecutionthe case in which he was represented by Kaywas not essential to the superior court's decision. Richard's conviction in that case was a matter of public record. Given that any attorney representing Leslie, conflicted or not, would be free to exploit this information, it seems difficult to fathom what confidences Richard might have revealed in the prior proceeding that could have caused him any significant incremental damage. And finally, it seems relevant to consider that Kay personally played only a minor role in the termination case, representing Leslie in the case's earliest stages and then handing it off to Henderson. Once Kay stepped out of the picture, his firm made diligent efforts to screen him from Henderson. Although as an ethical matter these screening measures did not meet Rule 1.9's stringent requirements or authorize Henderson & Kay to represent Leslie, they did, as a practical matter, eliminate much of the risk of actual prejudice to Richard. They thus cut strongly against a finding of fundamental unfairness. Absent a more particularized showing of actual prejudice, then, we see no basis for concluding that the circumstances of this case implicate Richard's constitutional right to due process. It follows that the error in allowing conflicted representation is a non-constitutional error. For these reasons, we conclude that our conventional test for non-constitutional error must be used to determine if Henderson & Kay's ethical breach amounted to reversible error. [45] On remand, the superior court must determine if there is a realistic likelihood that Henderson & Kay's conflicting interest had any appreciable effect on the outcome of the termination proceedings.