Opinion ID: 2556523
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Crawford Violation and Harmless Error.

Text: From a practical standpoint, this rather unique miscellaneous agreement allowed the State to employ an out-of-court statement against a non-declarant, Morris, with regard only to Bruton, but not Crawford. [19] Had the co-defendants been tried separately, the State could not have used Williams's statement against Morris, pursuant to Crawford, unless (1) Morris had enjoyed an opportunity to cross-examine Williams, or (2) the State had obtained a final guilty verdict or plea from Williams, thereby extinguishing his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. [20] In sum, to introduce directly the Williams against Morris, the State could have tried Williams first, or it could have refused to go along with the plea agreement and, thereby, force a bona fide joint trial (provided Bruton was satisfied). It could not proceed, however, as it did and, ultimately, circumvent Crawford. This is not to say the violation demands automatically a new trial for Morris. Like any violation of the Confrontation Clause, a Crawford violation is subject to harmless error review. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2278, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, 241 (2006) (assuming to be correct the Washington Supreme Court's conclusion that a statement violative of Crawford was nonetheless harmless); see also Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 628 S.E.2d 74, 77, 48 Va. App. 58, 64 (Va.Ct.App.2006) (en banc) (citation omitted) (It is well established that violations of the Confrontation Clause . . . are subject to harmless error review, . . . and Crawford does not suggest otherwise.). As we stated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976): [W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed harmless and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained ofwhether erroneously admitted or excludedmay have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict. In the present case, the taped statement (1) confirmed that, after the attempted robbery, Williams entered a white sedan, but (2) presented potentially conflicting evidence as to where Williams got into that vehicle vis à vis the crime scene or a more remote location. The former point is cumulative evidence, provided already by the officers, and so we consider it no further in our harm analysis. See Dove v. State, 415 Md. 727, 743-44, 4 A.3d 976, 985-86 (2010) (stating that cumulative evidence, which tends to prove the same point as other evidence presented during the trial or sentencing hearing, may render harmless otherwise reversible error). The latter point warrants additional reflection. To start, we recall the following exchanges, some of which were alluded to previously in this opinion. [Detective]: And where did you run[, after the attempted robbery]? [Williams]: I don't even know where I was at to be honest, but I ran towards Falls Road. [Detective]: Did you have anybody with you when you attempted to rob the store? [Williams]: No.    [Detective]: After you ran towards Falls Road, how did you get into the white [sedan] where the police attempted to pull you over? [Williams]: Basically, I just entered it. [Detective]: And the person driving, did they drop you off at your house in front of the door? [Williams]: Yeah.    [Detective]: What color was the vehicle that you got into at the scene? [Williams]: White. These remarks show that, early in the statement, Williams provided little evidence of a getaway plan (I don't even know where I was at to be honest, but I ran towards Falls Road.). Then, the detectives adopt, by the premise of their next question, a supposition (After you ran towards Falls Road. . . .). They ask about the person driving, but do not solicit, and do not receive, the driver's identity. Finally, the detectives asked about the color of the vehicle that Williams entered  at the scene.  Without parsing further the potentially ambiguous reference to at the scene, Williams responded simply, [w]hite. This last question and answer, therefore, could suggestin an indirect and conflicting waythat Morris may have been closer to The Wine Underground than Morris represented in his direct-examination responses. A reasonable jury could decipher the conflicting evidence, by parsing the wording of the question, and specifically its phrase at the scene, to connect this indirect evidence in a meaningful way to Morris. Framed rhetorically, but in another way, after the attempted robbery, did Williams r[u]n toward Falls Road, where he met Morris at Falls Road at Coldspring Lane, or did he dive into Morris's getaway car at the [crime] scene? The latter inference endorses the State's theory that Morris was the pre-ordained getaway driver for the intended robbery. [21] Morris took the stand and explained his exact location on that fateful morning. Such testimony was consistent with his unwitting participant defense, raised in response, in part, to Williams's statement. Viewed in its entirety, Morris's testimony addressed as well the victim's and officers' directly incriminating testimony, [22] as well as Williams's statement. Therefore, we cannot state, with the requisite conviction, that the error, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not influence the jury's verdict, with respect to Morris's guilt.