Opinion ID: 1977041
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grievance Charges.

Text: The grievance complaint against Hurd alleged deceit of the court and opposing counsel in connection with three separate proceedings: an estate administration, a visitation hearing in a dissolution case, and a summary judgment hearing. A. The Koons Estate. William Koons died on August 11, 1975, and his estate was probated in Ida County District Court. Hurd was named executor and served as attorney for the estate. Several years after the estate was opened, the district court held a hearing on objections to Hurd's administration filed by the beneficiaries in the estate. Judge Dewie Gaul presided. The court concluded that several incidents of mishandling of the estate had been committed by Hurd and expressly found that he had lied in connection with one of the matters involved. The court ordered Hurd's removal as executor and attorney and ordered that he reimburse the estate for expenses. The court's express finding of falsification by Hurd concerned his statements to an attorney as to the date he had filed the inheritance tax return. Some background is necessary to understand this issue. The decedent's two children, sole beneficiaries of his estate, became upset with Hurd's alleged mismanagement of the estate and decided to retain an independent lawyer to represent them. They hired Laurel Boerner of Ida Grove. When Boerner pressed Hurd to complete the estate proceedings, Hurd sent him a sheet of paper on which were reproduced two receipts for inheritance tax payments, one receipt dated December 14, 1978, and the other dated December 9, 1979. On the bottom of the page, Hurd wrote this note to Boerner: I don [sic] not think that I will ever understand why it took so long to get this inheritance tax acquittance. I filed the return within the statutory time limit, but I could not get the acquittance until now. As you can see, I got a receipt of partial payment in December, 1978, and last Friday, I had to go to Des Moines personally to get the receipt showing full payment. I believe that I am finally in a position to close the estate. I am preparing the final report now. This note was discussed by Judge Gaul in the estate hearing: Exhibit U shows a note signed by the executor and stating I filed the return within the statutory time limit.... This statement the evidence shows is false. The return was filed at least ten months after the statutory time limit and apparently about 22 months after that limit, and no part of the tax due was paid until over two years after the statutory time limit. By reason of this failure to timely pay, for which no excuse was offered in evidence, the estate was assessed $156.60 in interest. The grievance commission reached the same conclusion. We believe the commission's finding is supported by a convincing preponderance of the evidence. B. The Visitation Hearing. Hurd represented a father in a child visitation matter arising out of a dissolution case. For purposes of confidentiality, we will refer to this father as Mr. W. See Iowa Code § 235A.14-.18 (1985) (requiring confidentiality of information in child abuse cases). Mr. W. was the subject of an investigation for sexual abuse of a child by a prior marriage. At the time of this investigation, an issue of child visitation in the dissolution action was pending before Judge Richard Vipond. Attorney David Blair, representing Mrs. W., had heard about the investigation and requested a hearing to discuss its impact on the visitation issue. The commission ruling sets out its findings on this charge: 1. The portions of the hearing concerning this matter were held in closed session. The full names of the litigants in this matter, involving visitation following a dissolution decree, will not be set out in full. 2. A dissolution of marriage decree had been entered but visitation had not been permanently determined. The parties had entered into a voluntary temporary agreement in which Mr. W. was allowed daytime visitation with [the] children of the parties for approximately a six-month period of time. The period of time by which the temporary agreement (approved by the court) was to be permanent was rapidly approaching. The respondent represented Mr. W., and David Blair, an attorney of Sioux City, represented Mrs. W. There had been no nighttime visitation before the matter set out herein. 3. In April, 1983, Mrs. W. was contacted by a representative of the Department of Social Services of the State of Iowa who advised her that there was an ongoing investigation by the Department of Mr. W. and a son concerning alleged sexual abuse of a child of the parties. Mrs. W. had not filed the complaint. 4. Mrs. W. disclosed this information to her lawyer, Mr. Blair. Mr. Blair, quite understandably, felt this was information that was of the type which should be brought to the attention of the presiding judge before any permanent visitation should be determined. 5. At a pretrial conference held May 5, 1983 at the Ida County courthouse, Mr. Blair (representing Mrs. W.), the respondent (representing Mr. W.), and Judge Richard Vipond were present. Neither Mr. W. nor Mrs. W. was present. At that time Mr. Blair, in the presence of Judge Vipond and the respondent, stated that his client had reported she had been notified by the Department of Social Services of the State of Iowa that there was an ongoing sexual abuse investigation with respect to Mr. W. and a son. The respondent stated this was a fabrication either of Mrs. W. or Mr. Blair and he professed having no knowledge of this claim. The judge concluded that the matter could not be disposed of by agreement so the matter came on for hearing the next day at the Ida County courthouse, May 6, 1983. 6. The very next day, at a May 6th hearing, Mr. W. not only admitted that there was an ongoing investigation by the Department of Social Welfare of him and a son concerning possible sex abuse, but he also stated that he had so advised the respondent approximately one week before the May 6th hearing at a meeting with the respondent which took about an hour. It is clear that the respondent, when he professed ignorance to Judge Vipond and Mr. Blair on May 5, 1983, of the matter of the sexual abuse investigation of his client and son, full well knew of this fact. At no time during the May 6, 1983 hearing did the respondent deny [he had] knowledge of this fact for approximately one week. In a case involving issues of custody or visitation, a court needs the wisdom of Solomon. It does not need half-truths and lies, yet these were Hurd's contributions to the hearing. The testimony of Hurd's own client, both before Judge Vipond at the visitation hearing and at the hearing before the commission, established that Hurd had lied at the district court hearing. According to the client, he not only discussed the sex abuse investigation with Hurd before the hearing but in fact they had discussed it in detail. And, when Hurd was confronted by his client's testimony at the visitation hearing, he offered no explanation. Attorney Blair, in his testimony before the commission, said there's no question that Hurd knew of the investigation of his client at the time of the visitation hearing. We agree with the commission's finding on this specification. C. The Summary Judgment Hearing. On February 18, 1981, Hurd commenced a foreclosure action as attorney for Donald and Carol Aspedon. G. Kent Renegar of the law firm of Boerner & Renegar filed an appearance for the First State Bank of Ida Grove, one of the defendants. During the pendency of the foreclosure proceedings, Hurd moved for summary judgment and sent notices to the adverse parties, including the bank. The Boerner law firm of Ida Grove still represented the bank. Edward Jacobsen, one of the firm members, was preparing to represent the bank at the summary judgment hearing. On the morning of the hearing, which was set for 1:30 p.m., Jacobsen was at the Ida County Courthouse waiting to see the presiding judge. Hurd was there. Jacobsen asked Hurd about the upcoming hearing and whether there would be a stipulated judgment of some kind. Hurd informed Jacobsen that he had received a release of the bank's claim to the property and suggested the bank would have no further interest in the matter. Jacobsen was surprised by this development; his client had not told him that Hurd had contacted the bank or that it had released its claim. Jacobsen called the bank, and one of the officers confirmed what Hurd had said. The bank, at Hurd's request, had in fact sent to him a quitclaim deed, or release, of its interest. (It is not clear whether the document was a release or a quitclaim deed. The witnesses referred to it both ways, and the original had been lost in the meantime, according to Hurd.) At the summary judgment hearing, Jacobsen immediately bore in on the circumstances of his client's release. How, when the Boerner law firm had been in the case from the beginning, did Hurd get a release of the bank's interest without their knowledge? The following exchange occurred: JACOBSEN: I want to inquire of Mr. Hurd on the record if he has [the release] and if he does, I want the court to order him to produce it so that we can see if in fact my clients have released their claims here. And, secondly, I'd like to inquire what the circumstances of any releases that were signed, and the circumstances surrounding the signing of those releases might have been. THE COURT: Do you have anything further? JACOBSEN: No I don't. THE COURT: Mr. Hurd, do you have any reply or response that you wish to make to the statement made by Mr. Jacobsen? HURD: I have no releases from either First State Bank or from United Builders that I know of in my file or with me or in my office. JACOBSEN: Why did you tell me this morning that First State Bank quitclaimed their interest? HURD: I had it in my mind that they did last fall. That just sticks with my memory. You know, I do lots of transactions every day and somehow I just have it in the back of my mind that we got some sort of a quitclaim deed from First State Bank, which surprised me when it came in the mail, but I don't see it in my file at the present time. Hurd later testified: I remember getting it in the mail, but I don't see it in my file today. I remember how surprised I was when the deed came in the mail, but for some reason it's not here in my file. As I look at my file today, it's not there, and I think it should be. But I think that a summary judgment would be just as good as a quitclaim deed. I think we're entitled to a summary judgment. At a later point, this statement was made by Hurd: In response to that [question about the release] I will say that I have gone through my files several times today and I do not see the quitclaim deed from First State Bank. It's very likely that that deed is lost and that in all probability I will never be able to produce it. After the summary judgment hearing, Jacobsen again talked to the bank officers. He found that two of them had previously talked to Hurd on the telephone regarding the release. They told him that, when the bank had not responded by releasing their interest, Hurd wrote a letter to them. One of the officers had also talked to Hurd in person, about the release, on the day the release was delivered to Hurd. After the summary judgment hearing, the bank furnished Jacobsen with a copy of this letter from Hurd which said in part: You might or might not have a right to redeem the property from tax sale pursuant to Chapter 447 of the Code of Iowa. However, you would have to spend more than $841.00 plus interest and penalties and filing fees in order to redeem the property from the tax sale. I would not think that you have enough interest in that real estate to warrant your additional expenditure in that amount. I am trying to perfect title for Don Aspedon so that he can take charge of the property and do something sensible with it. I wish you would communicate with this office and assist me in making title for Don Aspedon. The house that sits on the real estate is falling into shambles. Trees are growing out of the foundation. Structural damage is going to occur if we don't do something about it. The neighbors bitterly complain to the City Counsel when the lawn is not cared for. Please contact me as soon as you can and assist me as much as you can. Fortified with a copy of this letter, but apparently without telling Hurd he had it, Jacobsen confronted Hurd about it on the telephone. Hurd again denied ever contacting the bank about the Aspedon matter. The commission concluded that Hurd's statements to the court and to attorney Jacobsen were clearly false and knowingly false at the time he made them. We agree.