Opinion ID: 1135482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parker's Motion for a Mistrial

Text: At trial, Oscars' brother testified that Parker was obsessed and had a fatal attraction to his sister. Parker contends that this testimony was so prejudicial that the court should have granted a mistrial. In Allen v. State, 99 Nev. 485, 490, 665 P.2d 238, 241 (1983), this court stated that when a motion for a mistrial has been denied, the appellant must prove that the inadvertent statement was so prejudicial as to be unsusceptible to neutralizing by an admonition to the jury. Parker contends that the fatal attraction remark was so highly prejudicial that it may have predisposed the jury to convict him. Although the term fatal attraction may have improperly summoned into the minds of the jurors images from the movie of the same title, Parker suffered little undue prejudice from it. The testimony effectively communicated Oscars' brother's belief that Parker had an obsessive attraction to Oscars. This evidence was highly relevant, and was supported by the testimony of three other witnesses. Also, the evidence presented during this eight-day trial was far more graphic and harmful to Parker than any one-time fatal attraction statement could have been. Although this fatal attraction statement aptly described Parker's obsessive infatuation with Oscars, the trial judge ordered the statement stricken and admonished the jury to disregard it. From the judge's admonition, the jury must have understood that it should not consider any peripheral connotations of the term fatal attraction. Furthermore, the prosecution did not use the fatal attraction statement again. In Owens v. State, 96 Nev. 880, 883, 620 P.2d 1236, 1238 (1980), this court held: Denial of a motion for a mistrial is within the trial court's sound discretion. The court's determination will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. The district court acted within its sound discretion in denying Parker's motion for a mistrial. Parker also contends that the prosecution introduced the fatal attraction statement deliberately to inflame the jury. This court has held that where a prosecutor solicits the prejudicial testimony, denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial will be deemed harmless error where the prejudicial effect of the statement is not strong and where there is otherwise strong evidence of defendant's guilt. Emmons v. State, 107 Nev. 53, 60, 807 P.2d 718, 722-23 (1991). Therefore, even if the district court erred in denying Parker's motion for mistrial, we conclude that the error was harmless because the evidence that supports Parker's guilt is overwhelming. [3]