Opinion ID: 2498669
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permanency and placement hearings

Text: Paula next argues that as a grandparent she was entitled to notice of the permanency hearings that occurred in August 2009 and July 2010. OCS and the GAL do not dispute that OCS failed to provide notice, but they argue that the lack of notice did not prejudice Paula because, as the master found, any problems were cured by the subsequent hearing where Paula was present and able to participate fully. The master found that AS 47.10.088(i) relieved OCS of its duty to provide notice to Paula because she was not eligible for a foster care license. But Paula was entitled to notice of the permanency hearings. Alaska Statutes 47.10.030(d) [21] and 47.10.080(f) [22] provide that grandparents should receive advance written notice of all proceedings concerning the children, including permanency hearings. Paula is a grandparent and accordingly is entitled to notice under these statutes. Because Paula was entitled to notice of the permanency hearings, we turn to the question whether the failure to provide notice was a violation of Paula's due process rights. Paula argues that the failure to provide her with appropriate notice prejudiced her and impacted the outcome of the placement decisions. She argues that the master and the superior court improperly determined that the lack of notice was harmless error. She argues that harm was demonstrated because the master relied heavily on the children's bonding with the Dubovs in affirming OCS's placement decision and because she was unable to present her position to the court. OCS and the GAL respond that Paula was not prejudiced by the lack of notice, or alternatively, that any prejudice was cured by the hearing that was finally held to review placement. When determining the requirements of due process, we employ a three-factor test: [23] [I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and, finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.[ [24] ] We have held that [t]he crux of due process is opportunity to be heard and the right to adequately represent one's interests. [25] Generally, notice ensures these rights. [26] The government interest in not providing notice is rarely significant because notice requirements impose little fiscal or administrative burden upon government agencies. [27] Even if notice is inadequate, the opportunity to be heard can still be preserved and protected if a party actually appears and presents his or her claim. [28] Although we have never directly addressed the question of a grandparent's due process rights in CINA proceedings, we have previously noted that failure to provide notice might result in the violation of due process. [29] We have also stated that the placement of children and the involvement of grandparents in their grandchildren's lives are not matters to be taken lightly. [30] The legislature's requirement that OCS must provide grandparents with notice in CINA proceedings similarly strongly supports the idea that grandparents have a protectable interest in such proceedings. Because notice is required by statute, and because grandparents have a strong interest in the outcome of CINA proceedings, the first and third prongs of the Mathews test weigh in favor of finding a due process violation. However, the second prong of the Mathews test requires us to ask whether additional process would have benefited Paula. In other words, we must ask whether Paula was likely to have achieved a more favorable outcome if she had been given notice of the 2009 permanency hearings. Although the due process analysis is a flexible and contextual one focusing on the interest and not the outcome, [31] there must be some actual prejudice under the second prong and not merely the theoretical possibility of prejudice. [32] This appeal presents a close case. OCS plainly failed in its obligation to provide Paula with the notice to which she was entitled. As far as we can tell from the record, OCS has provided no excuse for its failure. Nonetheless, we still must determine the extent to which Paula's absence from the two permanency hearings may have prejudiced her case. A permanency hearing was held on August 26, 2009, shortly after Paula had returned to Alaska. Under CINA Rule 17.2(a), [t]he purpose of the permanency hearing is to establish a permanency plan for each child. Before the August 2009 permanency hearing, the permanency plan was adoption, and the permanency plan was not changed at the hearing. At the permanency hearing, the court was evidently told that the grandmother is okay with the plan now. The court found that placement with the Dubovs was reasonable in light of the permanency plan of adoption. At about this time, OCS substantiated two reports of harm made against Paula, and she was consequently denied a renewal of her foster care license. It is therefore unlikely that Paula's presence would have changed the result of the hearing. At the second hearing the superior court determined that continued placement with the Dubovs was appropriate, and a placement hearing was set to review OCS's denial of placement with relatives in Montana. Nothing in the record suggests that Paula was prejudiced by her absence from this hearing. The September 2010 placement hearing is more complicated. Under AS 47.10.030(d), Paula was entitled to notice of this hearing. But OCS again failed to provide the required notice and, in Paula's absence, there was a significant amount of testimony relating to Paula's parenting and the children's initial placement with the Dubovs. OCS relied upon this testimony at Paula's placement hearing. However, at her later placement hearing Paula was able to call witnesses and present her own evidence to contradict the testimony at the earlier hearing. For example, testimony at the September 2010 hearing regarding the conversation about Paula wishing to return to her status as just [a] grandma was further developed at Paula's placement hearing. Although OCS's dereliction prevented her from responding to the evidence against her at the September 2010 hearing itself, she was able to fully address the evidence ten weeks later in her own proceedings. It does not appear that Paula was prejudiced by this delay in presenting her evidence. Paula argues that the entire one-year period during which she did not receive notice of hearings prejudiced her case because the judge found that the children became deeply bonded with the Dubovs in that time. But this overstates the master's reliance on the bonding between the Dubovs and the children. Although the master did note the family bond and the children's marked improvement in behavior as factors in the decision to deny placement with Paula, they were only a few of the many elements the master considered. The master found that Paula was not a good placement in this case because she lacked parenting skills and OCS had received substantiated reports of harm to the children while in Paula's care. Moreover, the master found that Paula did not cooperate or work with OCS to facilitate a relationship with her grandchildren. Further, the master found that it was Paula's feud with Gulkana village and her allegations of harm against Mr. Dubov that prevented her bonding with the children, not the length of time the children were with the Dubovs. The crux of the due process claim here is that Paula was not afforded the opportunity to be heard until the hearings in November and December 2010. But although OCS failed in its duty to provide Paula with legally required notices, Paula later had a full opportunity to be heard. Had Paula not been provided with the opportunity to be heard, her due process rights would have been violated. But the subsequent hearings allowed her to adequately represent [her] interests, curing any due process violation stemming from OCS's failure to provide earlier notice. [33] After hearing from Paula and her witnesses and considering all of Paula's evidence, the master found that Paula was not a proper placement. The dissent argues that had Paula participated, and especially had she been present at the September 2010 placement hearing, she would have been better able to present her arguments and respond to the evidence against her. But Paula ultimately did get that chanceshe had a full hearing, after which the master made findings, which even now Paula does not challenge. Nonetheless, the dissent would allow Paula to reopen the children's adoption to give her another hearing on the precise issue that was already litigated at her placement hearing. The dissent would do this despite recognizing the considerable pain and potential anguish it could cause the children. [34] Here the children have lived with the Dubovs for almost three years, have been adopted by the Dubovs, refer to the Dubovs as their mom and dad, and are reportedly doing incredibly well with the Dubovs. Yet the dissent would give Paula essentially the same hearing she already had, despite the fact that Paula does not now challenge the critical factual findings on which the superior court based its decision that she was not a suitable placement. [35] The dissent further seems to suggest that it is relevant to our analysis that [w]e have been troubled many times in recent years by the State's failure to meet its statutory requirements concerning handling of children's cases. [36] The dissent remarks that although we have upheld the State's action[s] in those cases as good enough, it cannot join in this approach in the case before us. [37] But we address each case on its own merits, and our job is to determine whether the superior court has erred in its factual findings or legal conclusions. Any frustration with OCS should not lead us to adopt a last-straw doctrine of jurisprudence. Whether or not OCS may have tested the boundaries of acceptable effort in a past case has no bearing on whether Paula's rights were violated in this case. Further, although OCS failed to provide the required notice in this caseand we certainly do not condone that failureour job is to analyze whether this error was prejudicial in light of the later hearing where Paula had an opportunity to appear and be heard. Here the case turns on the question of prejudice. Given that Paula has not challenged any of the master's factual findings after the November and December 2010 hearings where she had a full opportunity to put on evidence and call or re-call witnesses and cross-examine them, we conclude that the prejudice from OCS's failure to provide the required notice was cured. [38] We conclude that Paula was entitled to notice of the permanency hearings and placement hearings after May 2009. But based on the superior court's unchallenged findings, we conclude that any prejudice was cured by Paula's ability to participate fully at the placement review hearings in November and December 2010. Paula's due process rights were therefore not violated.