Opinion ID: 3003989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sentencing Process

Text: Corcoran claimed that the Indiana trial court considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances,—i.e., Corcoran’s future dangerousness, his victims’ innocence, and the murders’ heinousness—in contravention of state law. See Bivins v. State, 642 N.E.2d 928, 955-56 (Ind. 1994) (outlawing the use of non-statutory aggravating circum- 6 Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 stances under Indiana state law). The trial court disagreed, stating that “in balancing the proved aggravators and mitigators, [the trial court] emphasizes . . . that it only relied upon those proven statutory aggravators.” See Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 498 (Ind. 2002) (quoting the trial court). But this finding of fact, that the trial court did not consider non-statutory aggravators in the balancing process used to determine Corcoran’s death sentence, was obviously in error, if we are to believe what the trial court added next. Specifically, it stated that its “remarks at the sentencing hearing, and the language in the original sentencing order,”—both regarding the use of the three non-statutory aggravators about which Corcoran complained—“explain why such high weight was given to the statutory aggravator of multiple murder.” See id. (emphasis added). In other words, the court added weight to a statutory aggravator based on the non-statutory aggravators. And factor weighting is part of factor “balancing,” the very process in which the trial court disclaimed reliance on non-statutory aggravators. So unlike the Indiana Supreme Court, we are far from “satisfied that the trial court has relied only on aggravators listed in Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b).” Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495, 499 (Ind. 2002). Indeed, we find this an “unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the trial court’s proceedings, thus warranting habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Nothing in this opinion prevents Indiana from adopting a rule, contra Bivins, 642 N.E.2d at 955-56, perNos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 7 mitting the use of non-statutory aggravators in the death sentence selection process. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (permitting their use under federal law). But the state trial court must reconsider its sentencing determination, and this time may not find, contrary to logic, that it both did and did not consider nonstatutory aggravating circumstances when it sentenced Corcoran to death. Also, the trial court should address Corcoran’s age (at the time of the murders, he was twenty-two) as a mitigating factor in order to cure a different fact-finding error by the Indiana Supreme Court. Corcoran claimed that the Indiana trial court failed to consider six of the ten mitigating circumstances Corcoran proffered: (1) his age; (2) his substantially impaired ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform that conduct with the requirements of the law; (3) his inability to competently assist in his defense; (4) his forethought to protect his seven-year-old niece during the murders; (5) his good behavior in jail before sentencing; and (6) his admission of guilt “at all stages of the legal process” including the trial. When the trial court first sentenced Corcoran, it explicitly discussed and rejected the last five of these mitigators—but not Corcoran’s age—as either false or non-mitigatory. State of Indiana v. Corcoran, No. 02D04-9707-CF-465, at 3-6 (Ind. Super. Ct. Aug. 26, 1999). When the Indiana Supreme Court later advised it to clarify only whether it had used non-statutory aggravators, it is unsurprising that the trial court declined to reiterate its analysis of the five mitigators it had previously rejected. But at no time did the trial court 8 Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 offer an explanation for rejecting Corcoran’s age as non-mitigatory, as was required by Indiana law. See Corcoran, 774 N.E.2d at 501 (requiring the trial court to “list specific facts and reasons that led the court to finding [mitigating circumstances’] existence”). Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court’s finding of fact, that the trial court “analyzed” and “rejected” Corcoran’s age in its sentencing order, id. at 500, was obviously in error, because the sentencing order makes no mention of Corcoran’s age except to note that Corcoran proffered it as a mitigator. Nor did the Indiana Supreme Court cure this oversight by itself evaluating Corcoran’s age as a mitigator. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 748-49 (1990) (finding that a state appellate court satisfies the constitutional requirement of an individualized and reliable sentencing determination in capital cases by itself weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances). In weighing and rejecting Corcoran’s age as non-mitigatory, the Indiana Supreme Court found dispositive that “Corcoran [was] well past the age of sixteen where the law requires special treatment” and thus that the trial court had not “abuse[d] [its] discretion.” Corcoran, 774 N.E.2d at 500; cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (raising the minimum death-eligible age to eighteen). But as we discussed above, the trial court had not exercised any “discretion.” Rather, it had failed altogether to intimate any consideration of Corcoran’s age. Thus, in erroneously finding once again that the trial court had exercised its discretion, the Indiana Supreme Court weighted Corcoran’s age under an abuse-of-discretion standard, Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182 9 rather than the more searching standard required under Indiana law. See Monegan v. State, 756 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ind. 2001) (“Focusing on chronological age, while often a shorthand for measuring culpability, is frequently not the end of the inquiry for people in their teens and early twenties. . . . There are both relatively old offenders who seem clueless and relatively young ones who appear hard and purposeful.”). Again, nothing in this opinion prevents Indiana from adopting a rule, contra Corcoran, 774 N.E.2d at 501, permitting a court to take account of mitigating factors that have been properly admitted into evidence, without explicitly discussing its consideration of those factors on the record. See, e.g., Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 797 (2001) (requiring only that the sentencer be able to give adequate mitigating effect to mitigating evidence). And nothing in this opinion prevents Indiana from finding Corcoran’s age irrelevant to selecting his death sentence. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551. But as the state trial court conducts its new sentencing hearing, to rectify the factfinding error with respect to non-statutory aggravators discussed above, it should also discuss whether it finds Corcoran’s age to be a mitigating circumstance. This will prevent non-compliance with Indiana law, and—more pertinent to our inquiry on federal habeas review—cure the Indiana Supreme Court’s “unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the trial court’s proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 10 Nos. 07-2093 and 07-2182