Opinion ID: 1060577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of Death PenaltyElectrocution and Lethal Injection

Text: The defendant asserts that death imposed by electrocution, or by any means, is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of both the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. This Court has previously rejected the argument that death by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. See State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722, 737 (Tenn.1994); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 268 (Tenn.1994); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 258 (Tenn.1993); State v. Smith, 857 S.W.2d 1, 23 (Tenn.1993); State v. Bane, 853 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tenn.1993); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 179 (Tenn.1991). We continue to adhere to the view expressed in those decisions and therefore reject the defendant's assertion that death by electrocution is cruel and unusual punishment. However, in his brief in the Court of Criminal Appeals and his initial brief in this Court, the defendant mentioned in passing that execution by lethal injection also constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. After noting that no Tennessee Court had addressed the issue because lethal injection had not been an option in Tennessee until 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeals, citing cases from other jurisdictions concluded that lethal injection is not constitutionally prohibited. We initially requested supplemental briefing and oral argument on the question of whether lethal injection constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. However, after further consideration of the record and circumstances of this case, we have concluded that a determination of the constitutionality of lethal injection in this case would deprive this defendant of an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate this issue. In this case, the issue can be raised and determined in a petition for post conviction relief. Lethal injection was not a method of execution in Tennessee at the time the defendant was tried and sentenced. Accordingly, the defendant had no opportunity to specifically challenge and litigate the constitutionality of lethal injection in the trial court. In 1998, following the defendant's trial, the General Assembly enacted legislation which afforded to defendants sentenced to death the option of choosing lethal injection as the method of execution. See 1998 Tenn.Pub. Acts 982 (effective May 18, 1998) (amending Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-23-114). Recently, the General Assembly enacted legislation which adopted lethal injection as the default method of execution in Tennessee. See 2000 Tenn.Pub.Acts 614 (effective March 30, 2000) (amending Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-23-114). Even though this defendant had no opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of lethal injection prior to his trial and sentencing, the State in its supplemental brief argues that this Court should declare lethal injection a constitutional method of execution. In support of its argument, the State points out that thirty-six states utilize lethal injection as a method of execution, that cases from many other jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection as a method of execution, [3] and that lethal injection has been upheld each and every time a defendant has raised a cruel and unusual punishment challenge. Although we appreciate the thorough legal research provided by the State, we decline to determine the constitutionality of lethal injection in this appeal. In light of the fact that lethal injection became a method of execution in Tennessee only after this defendant was tried and sentenced, we conclude that a determination of the constitutionality of lethal injection in this case would deprive this defendant of an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate this issue. In this case, the issue can be raised and determined in a petition for post conviction relief. [4]