Opinion ID: 1309317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ambiguity Over the Scope of Jury's Sentencing Discretion

Text: (17a) After enumerating the 10 aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the 1977 death penalty statute, the court instructed the jury, pursuant to the terms of that law, that [a]fter having considered all of the evidence of this case and having taken into account all of the applicable factors upon which you have been instructed you shall determine whether the penalty to be imposed on the defendant shall be death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole. (Former § 190.3, 6th par.) The jury retired for deliberations, and was given copies of all the court's instructions. After a day of deliberations, the jury submitted a written question to the court, which read: According to our printed instructions, special circumstances found to be true in Counts I and II of the information fix the penalty as either life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. [Are] there any further criteria that can be used to determine one penalty as opposed to the other or is it simply the matter of our personal choice? (Italics added.) On receiving the jury's question, the court informed both counsel that in its view [i]t is not a matter of their personal choice, they are to follow the law, and I intend to so advise them and to reread the instructions. Defense counsel objected to the trial court's proposed response. He argued the note did not demonstrate that the jurors were confused about their responsibilities or about the guidelines set forth in former section 190.3 but rather they manifest a complete understanding of them, and they are saying `They aren't enough for us'.... The trial court rejected defense counsel's position and told the jury: It is not a matter of your personal choice. At the time that you were sworn you were sworn to follow the law as I read it to you. This takes it out of the province of its being your personal choice. [¶] You are to follow the law, regardless of what your personal choice may be. [¶] I again will emphasize there [are] no further criteria other than the instructions that have previously been given to you, and I will read the instructions again to you. After rereading the instructions, the court concluded: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I read the guidelines that are set forth by law. You are to use those guidelines and reach your decision. There [are] no further criteria that I can give you, and you are not to simply make it a matter of your personal choice. The choice must be according to the law that I have given to you. Regardless of what your personal choice in any given situation might be, that's not your duty. Your duty is not to follow your personal choice, but you are to follow what the law states that you must do, and that is what I have read to you in your instructions. Thank you. You may retire. After further deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of death. We think the jury's question to the court was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the question's use of the phrase further criteria for determining which penalty to impose suggests the jury had in mind the enumerated statutory factors and was inquiring whether there were additional criteria to which it could also resort. On the other hand, the question's use of the phrase personal choice suggests the jury was asking whether it could exercise unfettered and standardless discretion in choosing between the two penalties. In light of the ambiguity of the question it was entirely proper for the court to make it clear to the jury that it was required to consider and be guided by the enumerated factors, and that it could not simply disregard those factors in determining penalty. Defendant argues the court's comments were likely to have misled the jury about the scope of its sentencing discretion. He maintains that although the court could properly inform the jury that its sentencing decision should be based on consideration of the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, the comments went further and suggested that the sentencing decision was not a matter of the jury's own normative judgment as to the appropriateness of the alternative penalties, and that the law dictated that the sentencing decision be made on a basis other than the jury's personal choice. The Attorney General, in response, asserts the court's comments properly precluded the jury from disregarding the statutory factors and deciding the question of penalty without considering the enumerated guidelines. (18) As the United States Supreme Court recently reiterated, sentencers may not be given unbridled discretion in determining the fates of those charged with capital offenses. The Constitution instead requires that death penalty statutes be structured so as to prevent the penalty from being administered in an arbitrary and unpredictable fashion. ( California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 541 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 939, 107 S.Ct. 837, 839] (plur. opn.) citing Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 96 S.Ct. 2909] and Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726].) (17b) The 1977 death penalty statute provided such guidance. Former section 190.3 instructed the jury that, After having heard and received all of the evidence, the trier of fact shall consider, take into account and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in this section, and shall determine whether the penalty shall be death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In the present case, however, the jury asked the court whether the penalty decision was simply [ a ] matter of our personal choice? (Italics added.) (19) Under the Constitution, the jury must ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase. ( California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 542 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 940, 107 S.Ct. at p. 840].) The jury may not act on whim or unbridled discretion. A penalty determination based on jury consideration of mere personal choice would inject into the proceedings the very arbitrariness and uncertainty forbidden by the Constitution. ( Furman, supra, 408 U.S. 238.) (17c) Viewing the court's comments about personal choice in the context of the statutory instructions and counsel's argument thereon, we are confident that no error occurred. Nothing in the above-quoted statutory instructions delivered pursuant to the 1977 law suggests the jury may arrive at its sentencing decision without each juror making a personal decision about whether death is the appropriate penalty in a given case. Moreover, our review of the prosecutor's arguments discloses he never suggested to the jury an improper understanding of its sentencing discretion. He correctly told the jury, [y]ou're being asked in essence ... in this phase of the case, to make a decision. You all agreed on voir dire ... that you would consider both penalties after you heard all the evidence in this case.... [I]s this the type of murder that warrants the death penalty, or is it a lesser type of murder? Is there mitigation which would justify life imprisonment? [¶] That's your decision. It's an opinion. It's an opinion you have to reach.... In closing, the prosecutor returned to this theme: Now, I don't tell you one verdict or the other, but [the law] requires you, as you agreed, to fairly consider both verdicts, and determine if this is the kind of case for one or the other. In the same vein, defense counsel's argument was calculated to impress on the jury the personal responsibility of each juror for his sentencing decision. In this context, we believe the court's response to the personal choice question would not mislead a reasonable jury. We believe a reasonable juror would have understood he remained free to decide whether certain factors existed, to determine how the aggravating and mitigating factors should be weighed, and to determine what the sentence should be. We therefore conclude the jury was not misled about the scope of its sentencing discretion. (See People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 542 [230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516]; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1277.)