Opinion ID: 1594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Whether the Prosecution Suppressed the Letter

Text: At a juvenile fitness hearing held on July 24, 1995, and attended by Micah, Miliotti and Velardo, DDA Semow, responding to a request for discovery, orally disclosed the substance of the July 10 letter: There is no immunity agreement for Mr. McLoren, other than I promised him in writing that nothing he said in this case about Marijuana, [sic] would be used as evidence against him. That is it. Counsel for Miliotti and Micah, as well as Velardo, were present. (Velardo pled guilty before trial.) Curt Leftwich, Miliotti's counsel, was the only attorney present at this hearing to also represent his client at trial. Leftwich did not cross-examine McLoren regarding his use immunity in the subsequent superior court jury trial. Semow also apparently mentioned the letter later at a pre-trial discovery hearing held on September 15, 1995, at which all trial counsel were present: Those will be available at 1:30: A July 10 letter from the district attorney [to McLoren's counsel]; an August 11 letter consisting of two pages; what appears to be a misdemeanor complaint, 95M00754, attached documents, a police report. A supplementary report bearing the number XXX-XXXXX-XXXX-XXX; and another complaint report bearing a D.R. number of XXX-XXXXX-XXXX-XXX. So that can be disclosed to counsel. Although all counsel attended this hearing, petitioners, with the exception of Miliotti, claim their counsel did not receive the July 10 letter. In early 2002, Miliotti's habeas counsel found a copy of the July 10 letter and the transcript of the juvenile fitness hearing in the file Leftwich gave to Miliotti's family after the trial and sent the transcript and a copy of the letter to Leftwich. In a declaration dated July 10, 2002, Leftwich stated that he did not recall ever having seen the letter. But he stated that the transcript of the juvenile fitness hearing refreshed his recollection that he had learned of the letter's existence when Miliotti's case was in juvenile court. Trial counsel for Hein and Micah also submitted declarations, in which they claimed not to recall receiving the letter. Jill Lansing, Hein's trial counsel, submitted a declaration in which she stated that she had no recollection of receiving the letter or having been told of any immunity agreement. She attached three discovery receipts from 1995, two of which predate the September 15, 1995, pretrial discovery hearing. None of the three referenced the July 10 letter. The receipts also do not reflect that counsel received any of the other material mentioned by Semow at that hearing. [6] Notably, petitioners do not claim that the prosecution failed to disclose those other documents. James Sussman represented Micah at trial but not at the juvenile fitness hearing. In a signed declaration, Sussman stated that he was unaware of the July 10 letter. Sussman prepared a writ challenging the findings of the juvenile court, but this was before the transcript of the July 24 juvenile fitness hearing had been made available. Although Semow had disclosed the entire contents of the letter on the record at that hearing, and Sussman admitted that he later reviewed the transcript for impeachment purposes after the writ was denied, he did not `pay attention to the discussions or arguments of counsel.' In the court below, the State did not object to the magistrate judge's factual finding that none of the petitioners, with the exception of Miliotti, received the July 10 letter or were apprised of its existence. However, the State now correctly argues that the prosecution fulfilled its Brady obligation to Micah by disclosing the existence of the July 10 letter to Micah's counsel at the juvenile fitness hearing. The State concedes that Hein and Jason meet the second Brady element. The magistrate judge did not dwell on this element of the Brady test, finding that the agreement was suppressed as to Micah as well as to Jason and Hein. After citing Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695-96, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004), for the proposition that the Supreme Court's decisions lend no support to the notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such material has been disclosed, the magistrate judge determined that the immunity deal was not disclosed because [t]he existence of the letter was not made clear to trial counsel. Holland v. Adams, No. CV-04-3407-SJO(MLG), slip op. at 20 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2007). Banks does not support the magistrate judge's finding as to Micah. Semow disclosed the July 10 letter on the record at the juvenile fitness hearing attended by Micah, Miliotti and Velardo. Even though Sussman, Micah's trial counsel, was not present at that hearing, he read the transcript, explaining that he did not pay attention to the discussions or arguments of counsel. Thus, the record supports a finding that Micah's failure to discover the July 10 letter was the result of his defense counsel's carelessness, rather than the prosecution's alleged misconduct. In reality, Micah is seeking to advance an ineffective assistance of counsel claim masquerading as a Brady claim. Micah is no doubt trying to cast a patina of prosecutorial misconduct on his counsel's failure to follow up on Semow's disclosure at the juvenile fitness hearing. [7] As to Jason and Hein, the record, as it stands, supports the conclusion that disclosure was not made to them although that non-disclosure, if it occurred, was likely inadvertent. At a pretrial discovery hearing, attended by all trial counsel, Semow mentioned that [a] July 10 letter from the district attorney [to McLoren's counsel]  presumably, the immunity letter  would be available at 1:30 the next day. However, it was apparently not included in the materials disclosed by the prosecution. In addition, Jason and Hein did not participate in the juvenile fitness hearing, and the record is silent as to whether transcripts of that hearing were made available to them. Jason and Hein, therefore, satisfy the second Brady element. Before turning to the materiality of the non-disclosure, we consider whether the prosecution presented false evidence or made improper arguments in summation.