Opinion ID: 162747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Prosecutor Demeaned And Ridiculed Mr. Le

Text: 85 Mr. Le next objects to two sets of comments that allegedly ridiculed and demeaned him in front of the jury. In particular, Mr. Macy called Mr. Le cold and a small man in stature [who's] cold as an ice sickle [sic]. Tr. vol IV, at 730-31, 735. Mr. Macy also said, [I]t takes a very special kind of a man to do something that cold, that cruel and then not be bothered by it. It takes a man like this defendant who has no consciousness of guilt or remorse for his vicious acts. Tr. vol. IV, at 743. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that Mr. Macy, in describing Mr. Le as cold and calculating, was commenting on Mr. Le's lack of compassion and was not engaging in unwarranted personal criticism or namecalling. Le I, 947 P.2d at 555. The Court of Criminal Appeals found the comment about Mr. Le's stature to be reasonable considering his height. 86 Personal attacks by a prosecutor are improper. See, e.g., Darden, 477 U.S. at 180-81, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (describing the prosecutor's use of the term animal as improper); Childress v. Oklahoma, 1 P.3d 1006, 1014 (Okla.Crim.App.2000) (discussing the prosecutor's referring to the defendant as a liar, comparing the defendant to a cornered rat, and characterizing him as the worst of the worst and stating that we do not condone such borderline argument); cf. Dennis v. Oklahoma, 879 P.2d 1227, 1234 (Okla.Crim.App.1994) ([P]ersonal attacks [by prosecutors against defense counsel] are clearly prohibited...). Mr. Le's allegedly calculating nature was a broad theme of Mr. Macy's closing arguments, and in the present context there was sufficient evidentiary support such that the remarks on this point were not improper. And while we can imagine no appropriate basis for referring to Mr. Le's height in the closing argument, we do not believe this comment rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Certainly, the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding on these comments was not unreasonable. 87 6. The Prosecutor Argued That The Jury Had A Moral Duty To Find For The State 88 The last comment Mr. Le objects to is Mr. Macy's suggestion at the end of the sentencing phase that the jury [could] only do justice in this case by bringing in a verdict of death. Tr. vol. IV, at 743. Mr. Le rightly suggests that it is error for a prosecutor to exhort a jury to impose a death sentence on the grounds of civic duty. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 247-48, 63 S.Ct. 561, 87 L.Ed. 734 (1943) (rebuking a prosecutor for telling the jury that [a]s a representative of your Government I am calling upon every one of you to do your duty). On direct review in this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that it had specifically condemned many of the comments made in [the] second stage, stating [as to comments made by Mr. Macy,] `[t]here is no reason for them and counsel knows better and does not need to go so far in the future.' Le I, 947 P.2d at 554 (quoting Duckett v. Oklahoma, 919 P.2d 7, 19 (Okla.Crim.App.1995)) (alterations added and in original); see also Hooker v. Oklahoma, 887 P.2d 1351, 1367 (Okla.Crim.App. 1994) (Such comments push the boundaries of permissible argument and we do not condone the prosecutor's disregard of the law and the trial court's warnings.); McCarty v. Oklahoma, 765 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Okla.Crim.App.1988) (reversing a conviction, remanding for a new trial, and stating that [s]uch argument was not based on evidence supporting any alleged aggravating circumstance, but was simply a statement of Mr. Macy's personal opinion as to the appropriateness of the death penalty and, as such, was clearly improper.). We agree with the Supreme Court that such comments, when made by a prosecutor, are offensive to the dignity and good order with which all proceedings in court should be conducted. Viereck, 318 U.S. at 248, 63 S.Ct. 561. The prosecutor has a duty not to misrepresent the law and not to misstate the jury's role. To the extent that Mr. Macy failed in this duty, his comments constitute error, although the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion is not clear on whether that court considered these comments to be error. Regardless, in light of the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Le's guilt, evidence of aggravating factors supporting the death sentence, the general content of the instructions to the jury, the Court of Criminal Appeals' determination that Mr. Macy's comments did not render the trial fundamentally unfair is not an unreasonable application of federal law. 7. Brecht Footnote Nine 89 Mr. Le argues that a footnote in Brecht creates another basis upon which he is entitled to habeas relief with respect to his claims of prosecutorial misconduct. See 507 U.S. at 638 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. 1710. We note that the district court addressed Mr. Le's Brecht argument in a separate section of its opinion, and we did not grant a COA with respect to this portion of the opinion. Therefore, we decline to address this argument. 8. Cumulative Error 90 Mr. Le argues that, considered cumulatively, the errors and assertions of error already discussed were sufficient in aggregate to deprive him of a fundamentally fair trial. This argument is similar to a traditional request for a cumulative error analysis. Our cases on prosecutorial misconduct make it clear that we must consider all the complained of conduct in toto because individual, harmless prosecutorial errors can add up to make a trial fundamentally unfair in the aggregate. See Trice, 196 F.3d at 1167. When reviewing a case for cumulative error, only actual errors are considered in determining whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was violated. See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470-71 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc) ([A] cumulative error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.). 91 Although it is clear that the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the cumulative effect of the majority of the improper comments, see Le I, 947 P.2d at 556 (Under the circumstances of this case, a thorough review of the record shows the combined effect of the errors in argument did not prejudice Le.), it did not consider the cumulative prejudicial impact of the two sentencing stage errors it failed to adjudicate. 11 Accordingly, this aspect of the Court of Criminal Appeals' adjudication of Mr. Le's cumulative prosecutorial misconduct claim was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), and therefore we examine this part of the cumulative error issue de novo. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1223 (10th Cir.1999). Because of the deference we usually accord state court decisions, we give some deference to the Court of Criminal Appeals' cumulative error analysis as far as it went. See Le I, 947 P.2d at 556 (finding no cumulative error sufficient to reverse Mr. Le's conviction and sentence based on the errors of the super aggravator argument and the misstatement suggesting Mr. Le formed the intent to kill the Nguyens before leaving Ohio). Thus, we focus on whether the two errors not addressed by the Oklahoma courts—the misstatements about Mr. Le snickering and the impermissible inference that Mr. Le had murdered before, both offered during closing arguments during sentencing— would tip the scales in light of the Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on the cumulative impact of the other errors. Further, because these two unadjudicated errors occurred during the sentencing phase, we will only consider whether the sentencing requires reversal. 92 When a state seeks to take a defendant's life, the Eighth Amendment requires that the proceedings conform to a heightened degree of reliability. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-30, 340, 105 S.Ct. 2633. As this court has noted, the Court in Darden indicated that prosecutorial misconduct may be grounds for habeas relief when it `manipulate[s] or misstate[s] the evidence ...' Paxton, 199 F.3d at 1218 n. 10. Here, one of the new errors involves a misstatement or mischaracterization of the evidence that came during closing arguments. We also have the impermissible inference made during closing arguments that Mr. Le had murdered before, something of which there was absolutely no evidence. These statements risk inflaming the passions of the jurors, for they encourage the jurors to attribute a higher level of culpability to the defendant than was actually present. 93 The comments we have discussed were, overall, inappropriate. Nevertheless, the general preceding discussion—including its consideration of the jury instructions, the failure of Mr. Le's counsel to object to many of Mr. Macy's comments, the overwhelming evidence of Mr. Le's guilt, and evidence revealing the presence of aggravating factors—convinces us that the jury was able to judge the evidence fairly in light of the prosecutor's conduct. See Tillman, 215 F.3d at 1129. Therefore, the sentencing was not rendered fundamentally unfair by the cumulative effect of the errors found, and Mr. Le is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his assertions of prosecutorial misconduct.