Opinion ID: 1169826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Mental Competency During Trial

Text: (12a) Notwithstanding the jury's finding that defendant was mentally competent to stand trial, defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court did not, on its own initiative, make a renewed inquiry into defendant's mental competency during and after the trial. Specifically, he asserts that the court was required to make further inquiries because reasonable doubts about his mental competence were raised by statements he made in court before jury selection, to a probation officer before sentencing, and in court after denial of the statutorily mandated motion for modification of the verdict of death (§ 190.4, subd. (e)). In support, defendant points to certain unusual statements he made before jury selection about his having large amounts of money and being born in Spain; statements he made to the probation officer to the effect that he was a god, that the President and Governor were conspiring against him, and that the conspirators would be beheaded; and statements he made after trial about attorneys and other trial participants previously involved in his life, about the court's loss of its budget, and about himself being the victim of entrapment. (13) When, as here, a competency hearing has already been held and the defendant was found to be competent to stand trial, a trial court is not required to conduct a second competency hearing unless it `is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence' that gives rise to a serious doubt about the validity of the competency finding. ( People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1153 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) More is required than just bizarre actions or statements by the defendant to raise a doubt of competency. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 727 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729], quoting People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 358 [222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925].) In addition, a reviewing court generally gives great deference to a trial court's decision whether to hold a competency hearing. As we have said: `An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant's conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper.' ( People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 727, quoting People v. Merkouris (1959) 52 Cal.2d 672, 679 [344 P.2d 1].) (12b) We cannot say as a matter of law that here defendant's statements in question were a substantial change of circumstances requiring the trial court to hold a second competency hearing. As noted above, a defendant's bizarre statements, standing alone, are not sufficient. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the statements failed to establish a substantial change of circumstances. ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 543 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].)