Opinion ID: 528529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Coercion Test and the Commerce Clause

Text: 14 We first explain why the provisions relating to the national speed limit must be upheld if Congress could impose those limits under an enumerated power, other than the Spending Power. 7 The central debate of the Spending Power cases has always been whether Congress may exercise authority beyond the strict limitations imposed by the other enumerated powers specified in the Constitution. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 66, 56 S.Ct. at 319. See generally Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 Stan.L.Rev. 1103 (1987). No one has yet questioned the right of the federal government to act, under the Spending Power, 8 within the ambit of those other enumerated powers. Certainly, Congress may use its Spending Power to encourage states to participate in cooperative and voluntary ventures within the parameters of the Commerce Clause. The reach of the Spending Power, within its sphere, is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress. If, pursuant to its regulatory powers, Congress could have achieved the objectives of the [Minority Business Enterprise] program, then it may do so under the Spending Power. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2773, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). 15 Nevada, however, argues that the federal government cannot engage in coercive conduct in the exercise of its Spending Power, even when the particular exercise is within the limitations of the Commerce Clause. We see two overriding arguments for rejecting appellant's theory, aside from the dubious vitality of the coercion test. First, if Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to order a state directly to comply with a particular standard such as a 55-mile-per-hour speed law, we see no reason why Congress should be prohibited from reaching that same result indirectly by withholding funds if the state fails to comply with that standard. Withholding funds is simply a lesser form of coercion than enacting a flat Congressional mandate with which a state is obligated to comply. A contrary view would elevate the form of the legislation over its function. 16 Second, we think appellant's claim can be answered by reference to the purpose of the coercion test. The coercion test flows from a fear that the federal government could wield its Spending Power to infringe upon integral state functions. The test serves, in theory, as a protection of the federalist system. However, if the congressional action passes muster under the Commerce Clause (or some other non-Spending power) and the restraints of the Tenth Amendment, see infra Secs. III and IV, there can be no reason to fear that the federal government is unconstitutionally intruding into areas of uniquely state concern. Since, as we explain below, no federalism concerns are implicated, the presence or absence of coercion is wholly irrelevant. 17 In short, if the Highway Act can be sustained under the Commerce Clause, the coercion test is simply inapplicable, whether or not that test applies in Spending Power cases not involving actions within the scope of the other enumerated powers. 18