Opinion ID: 4575074
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Destruction of evidence was likely.

Text: Because Mr. Cruz’s arrest was supported by clear evidence of probable cause, we now turn to the second prong of the Aquino test, which has two parts: (1) the destruction of evidence must be likely and (2) the crime must be serious. Mr. Cruz only disputes the former. In determining whether the destruction of evidence was likely, “we are guided by the realities of the situation presented by the record” and “evaluate the circumstances as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious, and trained officers.” United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586 (10th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Creighton, 639 F.3d 1281, 1288 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr. Cruz contends that “there was no indication of loss or destruction of evidence when [Mr.] Cruz exited his home or stood outside.” Aplt. Br. at 20. More specifically, he argues that officers did not observe a drug buy before following Mr. Cruz into his home and did not see any other signs consistent with the destruction of evidence. Id. Under the circumstances presented, however, Detective Koppman’s belief that Mr. Cruz would try to destroy evidence was justified. While a drug buy was not 14 completed, officers reasonably believed that Mr. Cruz went out to the street to engage in a prearranged drug transaction; he appeared at the agreed-upon time and place and appeared to be looking for someone. Therefore, although the officers did not see the controlled substance, it was logical for the officers to believe that Mr. Cruz had the controlled substance on his person in anticipation of the drug deal. And it was reasonable for officers to believe that Mr. Cruz was going to destroy that evidence—a small quantity of drugs—when he fled into his home upon seeing the officers, where there was ample opportunity for the destruction. See Aquino, 836 F.2d at 1273 (holding that the destruction of evidence was likely even though the officers did not see or hear the destruction because there was “evidence that the source of the cocaine was growing suspicious [of police activity]”). As Detective Koppman explained at the suppression hearing, he believed that Mr. Cruz was going to destroy evidence when he fled because “[t]hat’s what narcotics traffickers do.” ROA, Vol. III at 26. Detective Koppman relied on his training and experience, testifying that “[i]f [narcotics traffickers are] running away from us, it’s usually because they have evidence that they don’t want to be found with, and they want to try to get rid of it. Usually flushing it. Flushing it or throwing it over a fence, throwing it on a roof. I’ve seen it all.” Id. The foregoing reasonably created an exigency under the totality of circumstances, despite the fact that the officers did not hear or see the evidence being destroyed. See Aquino, 836 F.2d at 1273. iii. Officers’ entry was limited in scope to the minimum intrusion necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. 15 Mr. Cruz does not dispute that the officers’ entry was limited in scope to the minimum intrusion necessary to prevent destruction of the evidence. He has therefore waived this argument. See United States v. Beckstead, 500 F.3d 1154, 1162–63 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that defendant waived an argument by failing to include the argument in opening brief). Regardless, the officers’ entry here was limited in scope to the minimum intrusion necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence. Officers went into the bathroom of the residence—where Mr. Cruz was located—and they did not search anywhere else in the house until they obtained Mr. Cruz’s consent to do so. See ROA, Vol. III at 32–36. iv. Officers’ warrantless entry was supported by clearly defined indicators of exigency not subject to police manipulation or abuse. As for the fourth prong, police manipulation is present only when officers “engag[e] or threaten[ ] to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Hendrix, 664 F.3d at 1339–40 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 462 (2011)) (alterations added). Although acknowledging the Supreme Court’s holding in King, Mr. Cruz relies on pre-King cases to argue that the police created the exigency here by setting up a controlled buy but failing to obtain a warrant. See Aplt. Br. at 22–23. King forecloses Mr. Cruz’s argument. King answered the following question: “Under what circumstances do police impermissibly create an exigency?” 563 U.S. at 471. In doing so, it rejected the rule that police are prohibited from relying on an exigency 16 where “it was reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances.” Id. at 464–65 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that it would create difficulties for law enforcement officers who must make quick decisions in the field). Rather, King held that the police only impermissibly create an exigency when they engage or threaten to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 462. Here, the officers did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. As discussed above, the officers had probable cause for Mr. Cruz’s arrest before he entered his home, and Mr. Cruz created the exigency of their having to enter his home when he fled from the officers. See id. at 470 (explaining that individuals who “elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent circumstances search that may ensue”). Moreover, we have concluded that similar investigative tactics do not violate the Fourth Amendment. For instance, in Hendrix, we concluded that a warrantless entry into a defendant’s motel room was justified where officers went “directly to the motel room at night without first seeking a warrant or further corroboration of the informant’s tip, [gave] a false name, and continually demand[ed] entry after initially being refused.” 664 F.3d at 1339. As in Hendrix, Mr. Cruz has not argued that the officers “threatened to enter the [residence] without permission unless admitted.” Id. at 1340. For these reasons, the fourth prong is satisfied. The officers’ warrantless entry was therefore justified under the destruction of evidence exception to the warrant requirement. 17