Opinion ID: 1972217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: roadblocks

Text: Dicta from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse, supra , is the foundation for many state courts finding roadblocks such as the one in this case constitutional. However, no court has adopted a per se rule of constitutionality. Rather, these courts hold that, only where the efficacy of the roadblock in achieving increased safety and minimal intrusion upon society's rights are both shown by the state, can a seizure at a roadblock pass constitutional muster. Our analysis of the issue sub judice begins with the notion that [a]n automobile is a place where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 111, 307 A.2d 875, 877 (1973). When a vehicle is stopped by a police officer and its occupants are detained, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Section 8 has occurred. Id. See also Delaware v. Prouse, supra ; United States v. Martinez  Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Commonwealth v. Berry, 305 Pa.Super. 8, 451 A.2d 4 (1982). Cf., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Prouse involved a random stopping of motor vehicles to check an occupant's license and the vehicle's registration. The Supreme Court held that, except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. In dicta contained in the next two sentences of the decision however, the Court, in essence, signaled to local authorities that they could still stop vehicles absent any articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, so long as the haphazard stopping was replaced by a systematic and controlled alternative. Rogers, The Drunk-Driving Roadblock: Random Seizure or Minimal Intrusion?, 21 Crim.L.Bulletin 197 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Rodgers) (emphasis in the original). The Court stated: Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. What troubled the Court most in the scenario presented by Prouse was the use of unbridled discretion by the police in stopping an automobile. Id. The Court noted other alternative means of fostering the state's interest in highway safety, 440 U.S. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399, and that the marginal contribution of spot checks could not justify the magnitude of the intrusion upon an individual. Id. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400. Without probable cause or some articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion to believe there is a violation of the motor vehicle law, the Court could not conceive any legitimate basis upon which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more productive than stopping any other driver. Id. With this conclusion, we are in total agreement. Six years prior to the Prouse decision, our Supreme Court was faced with the question of random stops in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973), the Court held that in order to stop a single vehicle to check compliance with the Motor Vehicle Code, a police officer must have probable cause based on specific facts which indicate to him either the vehicle or the driver are in violation of the code. Id., 453 Pa. at 115, 307 A.2d at 879. We can find no compelling reason to deviate from this rule in situations involving a systematic stopping of vehicles. The intrusion upon the individual in systematic stops is no less an intrusion because of the mere fact that all vehicles travelling on the highway are stopped. While the discretion of the police officer is limited to a degree, we cannot sanction random seizures based on `luck and hunch' alone. . . which inconvenience citizens without any justification of substance. State v. Kirk, 202 N.J.Super. 28, 58, 493 A.2d 1271, 1288 (1985) (citations omitted). In short, systematic and random roadblocks are nothing more than fishing expeditions which constitute police seizure and detention in the absence of the faintest scintilla of criminal wrongdoing. Rogers, supra at 214. As noted supra, states that have grappled with the roadblock issue have unjustifiably avoided adopting a per se rule. It is apparent that the courts of these states also are not viewing the dicta of Prouse as a hard and fast rule for all roadblocks. In State v. Kirk, supra , the New Jersey Superior Court surveyed the decisions of many state courts and found a common theme running throughout the cases. If the road block was established by a command or supervisory authority and was carefully targeted to a designated area at a specified time and place based on data justifying the site selection for reasons of public safety and reasonably efficacious or productive law enforcement goals, the road block will likely pass constitutional muster. Other factors which enhanced judicial approval were (1) adequate warnings to avoid frightening the travelling public, (2) advance general publicity designed to deter drunken drivers from getting into cars in the first place, and (3) officially specified neutral and courteous procedures for the intercepting officers to follow when stopping drivers. Simply sending out officers to set up road blocks when and where they felt like it, without any command participation as to site, time and duration, and not based on articulated and rational law enforcement needs which justified the balance in favor of intrusion and outweighed the privacy, is a technique which has not survived constitutional scrutiny very well. Kirk, 202 N.J.Super. at 40-41, 493 A.2d at 1277-78. What we can discern from these cases is a concern over the unregulated discretion of field officers. Rogers, supra at 203. As a result, a number of courts have concluded that in the absence of factors indicating careful control and minimal discretion by police officers, the use of roadblocks is violative of the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983); Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1984); People v. Bartley, 125 Ill.App.3d 575, 80 Ill.Dec. 894, 466 N.E.2d 346 (1984); State v. McLaughlin, 471 N.E.2d 1125 (Ind.App. 1984); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392 (S.D. 1976); Koonce v. State, 651 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.App. 1983). The intrusion upon the individual's right of privacy outweighs the government's interests in highway safety in this situation. Courts upholding the constitutionality of roadblocks are not unmindful of their intrusiveness, but rather, stress that careful control and absence of discretion can bring the use of the roadblock within the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., State v. Golden, 171 Ga.App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); People v. Long, 124 Ill.App.3d 1030, 80 Ill.Dec. 332, 465 N.E.2d 123 (1984); State v. Garcia, 481 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. App. 1985); State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983); Kinslow v. Commonwealth, 660 S.W.2d 677 (Ky.Ct. App. 1983); State v. Shankle, 58 Or.App. 134, 647 P.2d 959 (1982); State v. Marchand, 37 Wash.App. 741, 684 P.2d 1306 (1984). While the arguments supporting the constitutionality of systematic roadblocks are persuasive, the rationale supporting them is flawed. No amount of control or limited discretion can justify the seizure that takes place in the complete absence of probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a motor vehicle violation has occurred. Certainly the Constitution of our Commonwealth affords its citizens the right to be free from intrusions where one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. An individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion, every time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. As Terry v. Ohio, supra , recognized, people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automobiles. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662-63, 99 S.Ct. at 1400-01. We hold that police roadblocks, which, without probable cause or a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed, stop all vehicles travelling on a public highway for the purposes of checking licenses, registrations, inspection violations, and for drivers operating vehicles under the influence of alcohol are so violative of our citizen's rights that they must be declared unconstitutional. Consequently, appellant's conviction is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished. WICKERSHAM, J., files a dissenting opinion. WICKERSHAM, Judge, dissenting: I dissent. I would recognize the validity of non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary roadblocks. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). I read nothing in the Pennsylvania Constitution that calls for a different interpretation than that espoused by our United States Supreme Court in the above cited cases. I would also note that the state legislature has recently passed amendments to Title 75 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code which authorize systematic vehicle inspection programs, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4704(A)(2) (as amended 1985, June 19, P.L. ___, No. 20, § 5, effective in 60 days) [1] and which give authority to police officers who are engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers to stop a vehicle . . . for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration . . . or [a] driver's license. . . . 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (as amended 1985, June 19, P.L. ___, No. 20, § 10, effective in 60 days), [2] without the requirement of articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of the code. In conclusion, I would find non-discriminatory, non-arbitrary roadblocks valid under the Pennsylvania Constitution; accordingly I would affirm the judgment of sentence in the case sub judice.