Opinion ID: 441810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the waiver provision is unconstitutional.

Text: 43 The Richmond Municipal Code permits the City Council, at its discretion, to waive the 20-day notice requirement if it finds unusual circumstances. RMC Sec. 11.84.030. Unfettered discretion to license speech cannot be left to administrative bodies. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). Such discretion grants officials the power to discriminate and raises the spectre of selective enforcement on the basis of the content of speech. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58, 85 S.Ct. 453, 465-66, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). The dangers of discretion are particularly evident in parade permit schemes, where waivers will often be sought for politically controversial causes. It is precisely when political and social pressures are most likely to affect decisionmaking that objective standards to govern discretion are most essential. Blasi, supra, 68 Mich.L.Rev. at 1484. 44 Both parties acknowledge that the language of the Richmond ordinance is constitutionally objectionable on its face, since it grants officials unfettered discretion to restrict speech. See Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976); Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148, 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948). The government argues, however, that the waiver provision is susceptible to a narrowing construction that can save it from constitutional infirmity. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407, 29 S.Ct. 527, 535, 53 L.Ed. 836 (1909). This argument is unpersuasive. 45 Not all statutes are susceptible to saving constructions. Although courts have been hesitant to articulate a general standard, the rule seems to be that laws will be saved if they can be readily reconstructed to avoid privileged activity. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 844, 918 (1970). The Richmond waiver provision fails this test. 46 The saving construction proposed by the government would read provisions which, on their face, govern police decisionmaking, into the guidelines for City Council decisionmaking. Thus, unusual circumstances would mean only those instances when another parade was scheduled for the same time and place as the requested parade, or when the requested parade would unduly burden vehicular traffic. We refuse to adopt this construction. First, this reading tortures the plain language of the Richmond ordinance. Second, although this construction would give content to the word unusual, the grant of discretion remains unfettered. The Richmond waiver provision is substantially overbroad and not readily susceptible to saving construction. It is therefore unconstitutional. 47