Opinion ID: 1351725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Department's Counterarguments

Text: The Department makes two arguments in support of its interpretation of § 005.01B(3). First, the Department argues that we should construe § 005.01B(3) so that it is consistent with federal law. In construing the income tax statutes, the Legislature has instructed us that any terms used shall have the same meaning as when used in a comparable context in the laws of the United States relating to federal income taxes, unless a different meaning is clearly required. Neb.Rev. Stat. § 77-2714 (Reissue 1996). By analogy, the Department argues that we should construe the terms in its regulations relating to income tax so that they are consistent with terms used in the I.R.C. Regardless of whether this is a correct rule of regulatory interpretation, it does not benefit the Department in this case. As noted above, I.R.C. § 6513(a), like § 005.01B(3), presumes that any return filed before the last day prescribed for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day. Unlike § 005.01B(3), however, I.R.C. § 6513(a) explicitly clarifies that the last day prescribed for filing the return ... shall be determined without regard to any extension of time granted the taxpayer. Thus, under the I.R.C., a claim for refund must be filed within three years of either the due date (without regard to any extension of time) or the filing date, whichever is later. Foster v. United States, 221 F.Supp. 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y.1963), aff'd 329 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.1964). This is the interpretation that the Department now urges us to give to § 005.01B(3). But it is not within the province of the courts to read a meaning into a regulation that is not there. See Shaul v. Lang, 263 Neb. 499, 640 N.W.2d 668 (2002). If the Department wanted the federal rule, I.R.C. § 6513(a) provided it with a clear and unambiguous model for adopting the rule. Instead of tracking the federal language, the Department chose to use the language it did, which shows that it did not intend for § 005.01B(3) to have the same meaning as the I.R.C. Second, the Department argues that the taxpayers' interpretation of § 005.01B(3) would make the regulation invalid because it would lengthen the time for claiming a refund beyond the 3-year limitation imposed by § 77-2793(1). This argument is inconsistent with the Department's position that § 005.01B(3) applies when a taxpayer files before its original deadline for filing. In effect, the Department claims that it cannot adopt a regulation that would presume a taxpayer filed on its extended deadline, because that would allow the taxpayer to claim a refund more than 3 years after it actually filed. But at the same time, it suggests that it can adopt a regulation that would presume a taxpayer filed on its original deadline, even though that would allow the taxpayer to claim a refund more than 3 years after it actually filed. The distinction is nonsensical. If the statutory language allows the Department to do the former, nothing bars it from doing the latter.