Opinion ID: 1930051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is bandy's sentence of life imprisonment without parole sufficiently disproportionate to his offense to violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment?

Text: Section 99-19-83 has been held constitutional under the following circumstances: where the primary offense was burglary and the underlying offenses were mayhem and manslaughter; Jackson v. State, 483 So.2d 1353 (Miss. 1986); where the primary offense was aggravated assault and the underlying offenses were two convictions of grand larceny; Adams v. State, 410 So.2d 1332 (Miss. 1982); where the primary offense was burglary and the underlying offenses were grand larceny and armed robbery; Pace v. State, 407 So.2d 530 (Miss. 1981); and where the primary offense was carrying a concealed weapon and the underlying offenses were rape, assault and battery, and escape; Baker v. State, 394 So.2d 1376 (Miss. 1981). In Baker, the Court quoted with approval the following language from Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980): [The statute's] primary goals are to deter repeat offenders and, at some point in the life of one who repeatedly commits criminal offenses serious enough to be punished as felonies, to segregate that person from the rest of society for an extended period of time. This segregation and its duration are based not merely on that person's most recent offense but also on the propensities he has demonstrated over a period of time during which he has been sentenced for other crimes. Like the line dividing felony theft from petty larceny, the point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction. 445 U.S. at 284-285, 100 S.Ct. at 1144-45, 63 L.Ed.2d at 397. Based on the rationale of these cases, the imposition of a life sentence on Mr. Bandy pursuant to § 99-19-83 does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.