Opinion ID: 773496
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Roger's Duty to Arbitrate

Text: 27 Rogers concedes that it is bound by the arbitration provision in the Subcontract. However, Rogers objects to arbitration on the basis of an exception to arbitration contained in the Subcontract. Specifically, Rogers claims that § 14.2(b) of the Bright/A-1 Subcontract expressly excludes from arbitration pass through claims, or claims asserted by Bright up the ladder to the Government. 13 Pursuant to this exception, the agreement to arbitrate between Rogers and Bright would not apply to any claim brought by Bright against Rogers if Rogers asserted that the claim, in whole or in part, was against the Government (Owner) since the contract between Rogers and the Government does not provide for binding arbitration. Based on the Magistrate Judge's findings, the district court concluded that the exception does not apply for two reasons: 1) Bright's REA was not a claim under the Subcontract; and 2) Bright's REA was never asserted against Rogers as required by the exception provision. 28 Our review of the record evidence accords with the findings of the Magistrate Judge. The arbitration exception set forth in paragraph 14.2 of the Subcontract does not apply because Bright's REA is not a claim under the Subcontract. The Subcontract provides that claims relating to the Government had to be submitted by Rogers in the manner and within the time elements provided in Contract Documents for like claims by the Contractor upon the [Government]. Subcontract, ¶ 6.2. The prime contract between A-1 and the Government required the Contractor (A-1 and later Rogers) to submit all claims in accordance with the Contract Disputes Act. 14 See Prime Contract, Article 37. Moreover, the prime contract provided that a demand for payment of money exceeding $50,000 was not a claim under the Contract Disputes Act until it was certified by the Contractor. 15 29 In the district court, Rogers conceded that Bright submitted a claim against the Government in an amount exceeding $1,000,000 for delays and damages caused by the Government. See Roger's Response to Bright's Motion to Compel. Ultimately, Rogers and/or Wausau advised Bright to submit its claim as an REA, rather than as a certified claim under the Contract Disputes Act. The parties agree that Bright's REA was never certified, as the prime contract required for any and all claims exceeding $50,000. See Prime Contract, ¶ 37. Thus, the REA is not a claim as defined in Article 37 of the prime contract, and Rogers may not rely on the arbitration exception in the Subcontract because that same Subcontract required Rogers to certify claims relating to the Government. See e.g., Woodrow Wilson Constr. Co., Inc. v. MMR-Radon Constructors, Inc., 635 So.2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (affirming arbitration order, under terms of subcontract providing for arbitration unless contractor submitted claim against owner, where general contractor did not submit claim against owner in accordance with procedures specified). 30 Given our decision that Bright's REA was not a claim subject to the arbitration exception under the Subcontract, we do not reach the district court's alternate basis for compelling Rogers to submit to arbitration. 16 We also do not address Roger's argument that Bright's claim did not require certification to be submitted as an REA, and alternatively that only Wausau could certify Bright's claim. Regardless of who was responsible for certification or whether Bright's claim should have been certified, the exception to arbitration does not apply because there is no claim as defined by Article 37 of the prime contract. See Aluminum, Brick & Glass Workers Int'l Union v. AAA Plumbing Pottery Corp., 991 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir.1993) (explaining that courts are not permitted to address defenses to disputes within the scope of an arbitration clause). 31 Bright's claim against Wausau and Rogers is simple. Wausau and Rogers had no right to settle Bright's million dollar claim against the government for any sum and certainly not for $10,000. This dispute clearly arises out of the contractual relationship between these parties and is covered by the arbitration clause. IV Conclusion 32 For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's order compelling arbitration as to both Rogers and Wausau and dismissing the underlying cases.