Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recusal of PCR Judge

Text: Defendant claims that the PCR judge erred by denying defendant's motion that he recuse himself. In light of our determination to nullify the PCR court's findings and conclusions, and to decide this matter de novo, we find it unnecessary to dwell on this aspect of defendant's application. We address it briefly only to eliminate any question about our determination to utilize the record created in this matter.
Approximately two months after the conclusion of the PCR hearing, but before the court issued its decision, PCR counsel moved to recuse the PCR court from consideration of this application. The motion was based on an indictment, filed January 7, 1975, against defendant and his brother, alleging that they committed atrocious assault and battery and robbery. The indictment contains a signature for the then Acting County Prosecutor (now the PCR judge); however, three initials appear after the signature. Additionally, a motion for dismissal dated July 3, 1975, bears a signature of the then Acting County Prosecutor. That motion indicates that defendant has pled and been sentenced on other charges. No useful purpose would be served by further prosecution of this matter. The motion to dismiss was granted by a Judge of the Superior Court, although the judge's signature is illegible. The PCR court denied the motion to recuse. The court stated that it did not have any personal recollection of the prosecution or supervision of the unrelated indictment that issued twenty-five years earlier. The court also noted that someone else's initials after his signature demonstrates that he did not sign the indictment or personally prosecute the matter.
Given the PCR court's marginal, if any, participation in the unrelated indictment, and its remoteness to the present matter, we conclude that defendant has not established that reason existed that might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so, in violation of Rule 1:12-1. The evidence presented in support of this motion depicts, at most, mere ministerial involvement by the Acting County Prosecutor. That is not the sort of personal involvement that compels disqualification. Nor does that remote, unrelated indictment establish reason for questioning the judge's impartiality pursuant to Canon 3(c)(1). Finally, although an Administrative Directive, issued September 19, 1983, instructed trial judges to disqualify themselves from hearing a criminal matter involving a defendant who the judge, in his or her previous capacity, had personally prosecuted, that directive did not require the PCR judge to disqualify itself in this matter. The PCR judge stated that he had no personal recollection of such personal involvement and the indictment supports the judge's assertion that he did not sign the document; someone signed the document in his name. In these circumstances, we find no reasonable basis for defendant, counsel, or the public to question the PCR court's impartiality due to the indictment from a quarter century ago.