Opinion ID: 1855273
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the lower court erred in denying the appellants' motion for recusal.

Text: ¶ 13. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-1-11(1991), provides: The judge of a court shall not preside on the trial of any cause where the parties, or either of them, shall be connected with him by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in the same, or wherein he may have been of counsel, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties. Section 165 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 contains essentially the same provision. Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 953 (Miss.1986). ¶ 14. When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional nor statutory provisions, the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to review only in case of manifest abuse of discretion. Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss.1985). ¶ 15. However, this Court in Rutland v. Pridgen also looked to Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct of when a judge should recuse himself to help establish a second standard. 493 So.2d at 953. The conduct of the trial judge in this case must be examined in light of the dictates of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Specifically, Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code which requires, in pertinent part, disqualification of a judge when his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. In other words, would a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, harbor doubts about [the judge's] impartiality? Rutland, 493 So.2d at 954. ¶ 16. Canons such as 3(C)(1) enjoy the status of law such that we enforce it rigorously, notwithstanding the lack of litigant's specific demand. Davis v. Neshoba County Gen. Hosp., 611 So.2d 904, 905 (Miss.1992). The standard by which we determine if a judge should have disqualified himself is an objective standard which this Court has adopted and is applied under Canon 3. McBride v. Meridian Public Improvement Corp., 730 So.2d 548, 551 (Miss.1998). A presumption of impartiality exists that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. McBride, 730 So.2d at 551. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a reasonable doubt. Id. On appeal, however, this Court presumes that a trial judge is qualified and unbiased, and this presumption may only be overcome by evidence which produces a reasonable doubt about the validity of the presumption. Beyer v. Easterling, 738 So.2d 221, 228 (Miss.1999). ¶ 17. The evidence adduced reveals that the trial judge, as lead attorney, had examined Dr. Summers as a witness at the trial of General Motors Corp. v. Jackson, 636 So.2d 310 (Miss.1992), and at depositions in other cases where Dr. Summers testified as a medical expert witness. The trial of the Jackson case was held sometime during1989-1990, and this Court's decision was in 1992. Dr. Summers was a treating physician of the plaintiff in the Jackson litigation. Dr. Summers testified he had been an expert witness over many years in cases in which Judge Yerger or his firm had represented General Motors. ¶ 18. Dr. Summers testified the tenor of the cross-examination was one of negativism, hostility, and vindictiveness and that it created a considerable amount of concern for him. The cross-examination would go to questions about him personally such as how much money he made, what companies he owned, and how much money he owned in the companies. According to Dr. Summers, his relationship with attorney Yerger over the years had been an ongoing adversarial relationship. Based on previous cases in which he had been involved as an expert witness, Dr. Summers had no doubt in his mind that Judge Yerger could not impartially preside over this case. ¶ 19. During the hearing of this matter, Judge Yerger stated he did not even recognize Dr. Summers initially in the courtroom on the day of the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion to compel and he did not remember the case nor the facts of the case. He was of the opinion that their relationship during the depositions and at the trial had been professional but vigorous. ¶ 20. The judge went on to say that he had no personal animosity towards Dr. Summers whatsoever, and really had not kept up with him over the years. Based on Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Judge Yerger concluded that he had no reason to be biased and there was no factual basis for any perception of any bias on the part of the court. ¶ 21. Dr. Summers did not overcome the presumption that Judge Yerger was qualified and unbiased. He did not prove that a reasonable person, knowing all the facts and circumstances, would harbor doubts about Judge Yerger's impartiality. ¶ 22. In summary, the judge did not manifestly err in refusing to recuse himself in this case under these particular facts. The judge's cross-examination of Dr. Summers more than five years ago does not create any reasonable doubt about the impartiality of the judge in this cause, and it was not an abuse of his discretion to deny the motion to disqualify.