Opinion ID: 879394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Paternal and Maternal Division

Text: The full cousins Mary Laslovich Puccinella, Ann Angela Laslovich Holleran, and Joseph Matthew Laslovich point out that under the judgment of the District Court the residuary estate of decedent Rose M. McEwan is divided among heirs from the decedent's mother's side of the family whereas the other claimants descend from the father's side of the family and that to exclude the claimants from the father's side in the distribution of the residuary estate is patently unfair. These cousins look to subdivision (4) of § 72-2-203, MCA, and that portion of it which states that where there are two or more collateral kindred in equal degree but claiming through different ancestors... . Their argument runs that all of the persons here claim through different ancestors who are in equal degree, in other words, the mother and father of Rose M. McEwan. Since the mother and father are each dead, half of the estate descends to the issue of the father and half to the issue of the mother. They contend that this is the only explanation for subsections (1) and (3) of § 72-2-203, providing for distribution by representation whereas distribution of (2) and (4) under the statute provide for division per capita. If we were to give effect to the argument made by these first cousins, the result would be to restore by interpretation what was refused by the legislature, that is the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, § 2-103, which call for a division between the paternal and the maternal sides. Since the legislature refused to adopt that kind of distribution in this situation, we must adhere to § 72-2-203(4), MCA, and determine that the residual estate in this case goes to the next of kin in equal degree, per capita. We see nothing in Estate of Gertrude Brown (1972), 158 Mont. 413, 492 P.2d 914, nor Estate of Ethel E. Evans, (Mont. 1985), 704 P.2d 35, 42 St.Rep. 1047, leading to a different conclusion.