Opinion ID: 694116
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Ratzlaf v. United States.

Text: 42 Knapp next contends that under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) the government is required to prove he knew money laundering was unlawful. The trial court gave no such instruction, thus Knapp asserts error. Knapp relies on Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994). 43 In Ratzlaf, the Court was construing the statutory language willfully violated. The court reasoned 44 We do not dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is no defense to a criminal charge. In particular contexts, however, Congress may decree otherwise. That, we hold, is what Congress has done with respect to 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5322(a) [providing a person willfully violating this subchapter ... shall be fined not more than $250,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both] and the provisions it controls. 45 Id. at 663 (citations omitted). In this case, the money laundering statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), does not require willfulness. Thus, Ratzlaf does not apply. See United States v. Santos, 20 F.3d 280, 284 n. 3 (7th Cir.1994) (Unlike the criminal enforcement provision at issue in Ratzlaf, 31 U.S.C. Sec. 5322(a), the money laundering statutes ... 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(a)(3)(A), do not contain a willfulness requirement and, instead, contain specific and detailed requirements concerning the defendant's intent and knowledge.). 46