Opinion ID: 169974
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-trial Error

Text: The IADA is a compact “among 48 states, the United States and the District -7- of Columbia.” United States v. Coffman, 905 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1990). It provides procedures by which one correctional jurisdiction (such as Colorado state court) with charges pending against a prisoner housed in another correctional jurisdiction (for example, New Mexico state court) can arrange for transfer of the prisoner. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. IV. Its purpose is to afford the prisoner a speedy trial on pending charges. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. I. The IADA has a provision prohibiting the transfer of a prisoner back to the original jurisdiction prior to trial, i.e. the anti-shuffling provision. If such transfer occurs, the “indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. IV(e). After Jones was initially indicted, the United States Marshal’s Service lodged a detainer with the Florence facility, a copy of which was sent to Jones. It contained instructions for securing his right to a speedy trial under the IADA. Jones complied with these instructions and government officials processed the request as if the Act applied. However, after he made his request, the government filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to bring Jones to Denver, where he made his initial appearance on January 22, 2004. While the case was pending, Jones was transferred back to the Florence facility. As a result, Jones filed a motion to dismiss his case claiming his transfer back to Florence prior to trial violated the Act’s anti-shuffling provisions. -8- Jones concedes the IADA considers the federal correctional system a single jurisdiction and, under normal circumstances, it would not apply to Jones’s case. See United States v. Walling, 974 F.2d 140, 141 (10th Cir. 1992) (For the purposes of the IADA, the federal government “is considered a single state.”). Nonetheless, because the government treated his case as if the IADA applied, it is estopped by its actions and may not argue otherwise. The district court disagreed, stating the Act “speaks for itself and is reasonably plain that its applicability does not attach in these facts, regardless of what the Bureau of Prisons or the U.S. Attorney[’s] office may conclude.” (R. Vol. XI at 9.) We agree. Jones cites to Double J. Land & Cattle Co. v. United States Dep’t of Interior (Double J), for the proposition that the doctrine of estoppel against the government has vitality and is applicable here. 91 F.3d 1378, 1381 (10th Cir. 1996). [Appellant’s Opening Br. at 15-16] However, Jones fails to address two basic requirements for estoppel against the government to apply. Because “[e]stoppel against the government is disfavored,” we will not apply the estoppel doctrine against the government if doing so would “[1]‘frustrate the purpose of the statutes expressing the will of Congress or [2] unduly undermine the enforcement of the public laws.’” Id. at 1381 (quoting Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1489 (10th Cir. 1994)). As in Double J, the estoppel requested in this case falls within both of these exceptions. The IADA clearly states a Congressional intent that it not apply to transfers -9- between federal facilities. 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, Art. II(a). Its application here would undermine the enforcement of public laws by having a defendant’s criminal charges declared null and void. And, since Jones does not argue how he was prejudiced by his transfer or that it impeded the prosecution of his case, his attempt to procedurally extricate himself from a criminal indictment is particularly unavailing. The court did not err in denying Jones’s motion to dismiss.