Opinion ID: 839438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: burden of proof since sington

Text: Since Sington, lower courts and tribunals have closely analyzed a claimant's burden of proof, but the application of that standard has arguably been inconsistent. In Kethman v. Lear Seating Corp., 2003 Mich. ACO 205, p. 6, the WCAC interpreted Sington to require the claimant to demonstrate 1. his work qualifications and training, and what jobs they translate to, and 2. that he has a work-related physical or mental impairment which does not permit him to perform jobs within his qualifications and training and that he has lost wages, and 3. that he is either unable to perform or cannot obtain employment at all those jobs within his qualifications and training that pay his maximum income, which are reasonably available. The WCAC then stated that, after the claimant proves these three factors, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer, which may present evidence that there were jobs within the claimant's qualifications, training, and physical limitations that were reasonably available. Id. at 7. This analysis, in our judgment, constitutes an accurate summation of the Sington standard. In Peacock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 2003 Mich. ACO 274, p. 19, the WCAC sought to define qualifications and training, stating that this phrase encompasses formal education, work experience, special training, skills, and licenses. In addition, the WCAC described suitable jobs as a phrase that did not delimit the universe of potential jobs, but, rather, included those jobs that afford a plaintiff an opportunity for consideration to be hired because he possesses the minimum experience, education, and skill. Id. at 20. The WCAC's definitions, in our judgment, again constitute accurate summations of these terms. In Riley v. Bay Logistics, Inc, 2004 Mich. ACO 27, p. 7, the WCAC attempted to harmonize existing caselaw by summarizing the Sington factors required to prove a threshold disability as follows: 1. Has plaintiff established the universe of jobs for which he is qualified and trained, and how much do they pay? 2. Has plaintiff established his work related physical or mental impairment, which does not permit him or her to perform jobs within his qualifications and training causing him to lose wages? 3. Has plaintiff established that he was either unable to perform (or obtain because such jobs were not reasonably available) all the jobs within his qualifications and training that pay his maximum wage (for the purpose of establishing his Section 301(4) threshold disability). The WCAC also concluded that once the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer. Id. Numerous WCAC opinions have quoted the tests set forth in Kethman and Riley. However, these opinions have not always been consistent in their application of the Sington standard. There is a tendency to properly set forth the Sington standard, but then to apply the standard in a manner that effectively constitutes a reversion to Haske. One example is Riley itself, in which Sington was applied in a similar manner to that which occurred in the instant case. While Riley scrupulously analyzed the Sington standard of proof, the application of that standard was less compelling. For example, the WCAC determined that the claimant's work-related physical restrictions precluded him from performing each job that he had done in the past. Riley, supra at 6, 8. Taking into account that the claimant had only a ninth-grade education and lacked formal training, the WCAC concluded that the claimant was unable to perform any job within his qualifications. Id. The WCAC then inferred that the claimant had thereby established that he could no longer perform the jobs that paid the maximum wage that may have been available. Id. at 8. However, the WCAC opinion did not discuss the possibility that the claimant possessed any skills that could transfer to other job fields. In addition, there was no evidence presented regarding the availability of other jobs or the claimant's job search efforts. The WCAC continued to address the application of the Sington standard in Bacon v. Bedford Pub. Schools, 2005 Mich. ACO 47. The WCAC stated that a claimant carries the burden of establishing which jobs fall within the claimant's qualifications and training. Id. at 3. However, the WCAC determined that, because of the claimant's limited education and lack of job training, her testimony regarding her work history, education, and physical condition was sufficient to establish the universe of jobs that the claimant was qualified and trained to perform. Id. at 4, 7. This analysis, we believe, effected a reversion to the Haske standard in the name of Sington. Similarly, in Higgins v. Delphi Automotive Sys., 2005 Mich. ACO 136, p. 2, the claimant had testified at the hearing regarding her education, work experience, and inability to return to any of her previous jobs because of her work-related injury. The magistrate found that the claimant's job as an unskilled industrial production worker defined her universe of jobs because her previous jobs had been too remote to be significant. Id. The magistrate concluded that the claimant was disabled because her injury precluded her from performing any of the jobs she had done in the past for the same employer. Id. at 3. The WCAC affirmed, stating that the magistrate had found credible the claimant's testimony that she was unable to perform any of the jobs she previously had with defendant. Id. at 5. Again, the WCAC effectively reverted to the Haske standard in describing the burden of proof. On the other hand, in Stanton v. Great Lakes Employment, 2003 Mich. ACO 129, pp. 2-3, the claimant's work-related injury precluded him from being able to perform most of his previous jobs because they required him to stand all day. However, the claimant had applied for an estimated 50 jobs, some of which were the types of jobs he had performed in the past, and others were jobs that he had never performed. Id. at 1-2. The claimant had also contacted the previous employer from which he had earned his highest pre-injury wages but received no offer. Id. at 4. The WCAC determined that the claimant had satisfied the threshold level of disability on the basis of the following factors: the severity of the claimant's injury; that most of his training and qualifications required significant standing and walking; that the claimant had proved his desire to return to work by applying for an estimated 50 jobs; that the claimant had not been offered employment by his employer or another employer; that the employer had not accommodated the claimant's physical restrictions; and that no job had been made known to him for which he failed to apply. Id. at 3. The burden of going forward then shifted to the employer, which produced no evidence that there were actual jobs available at the maximum wage within the claimant's qualifications and training. Id. at 4. Stanton's application of the Sington standard represented a much more accurate and thorough analysis than the analyses of previous cases. In Nowak v. East Lansing, 2005 Mich. ACO 83, pp. 1-2, the claimant was a patrol officer who suffered a work-related injury to her knee. The WCAC stated that the magistrate's finding that the claimant's work-related injury prevented her from working as a patrol officer did not establish a disability under Sington. Id. at 4. The claimant had continued to work full-time as the head of the parking enforcement unit for the employer and received her full salary. Id. at 4, 8. The WCAC remanded to the magistrate to determine whether the claimant's new position fell within her qualifications and training, whether it constituted a regular job for which there was a substantial job market, and whether the job paid the maximum salary. Id. at 8. If so, then the claimant would not be able to satisfy the definition of disability under Sington. Id. Again, this analysis comports with the standard set forth in Sington. If the employer was paying the claimant her full salary because the new job merited that salary, rather than as an accommodation for her injury, then the claimant had not suffered a loss in wage-earning capacity. Stanton and Nowak represent accurate summations of what is required in the application of Sington to the facts of a WDCA case. A claimant must do more than demonstrate that his work-related injury prevents him from performing a previous job. Sington, supra at 161, 648 N.W.2d 624. It is insufficient to merely articulate the Sington standard and then overlook necessary steps in its application. Rather, MCL 418.301(4) requires that the claimant prove a limitation in wage earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training resulting from a personal injury or work related disease to establish a prima facie case of disability. Therefore, the claimant must first prove a work-related injury. Sington, supra at 155, 648 N.W.2d 624. Second, that injury must result in a reduction of the claimant's wage-earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training. Id. After reviewing the inconsistencies in the WCAC opinions since Sington, we set forth the following practical application of the Sington standard in this case. First, the injured claimant must disclose his qualifications and training. This includes education, skills, experience, and training, whether or not they are relevant to the job the claimant was performing at the time of the injury. It is the obligation of the finder of fact to ascertain whether such qualifications and training have been fully disclosed. Second, the claimant must then prove what jobs, if any, he is qualified and trained to perform within the same salary range as his maximum earning capacity at the time of the injury. Sington, supra at 157, 648 N.W.2d 624. The statute does not demand a transferable-skills analysis and we do not require one here, but the claimant must provide some reasonable means to assess employment opportunities to which his qualifications and training might translate. This examination is limited to jobs within the maximum salary range. There may be jobs at an appropriate wage that the claimant is qualified and trained to perform, even if he has never been employed at those particular jobs in the past. Id. at 160, 648 N.W.2d 624. The claimant is not required to hire an expert or present a formal report. For example, the claimant's analysis may simply consist of a statement of his educational attainments, and skills acquired throughout his life, work experience, and training; the job listings for which the claimant could realistically apply given his qualifications and training; and the results of any efforts to secure employment. The claimant could also consult with a job-placement agency or career counselor to consider the full range of available employment options. Again, there are no absolute requirements, and a claimant may choose whatever method he sees fit to prove an entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. A claimant sustains his burden of proof by showing that there are no reasonable employment options available for avoiding a decline in wages. We are cognizant of the difficulty of placing on the claimant the burden of defining the universe of jobs for which he is qualified and trained, because the claimant has an obvious interest in defining that universe narrowly. Nonetheless, this is required by the statute. Moreover, because the employer always has the opportunity to rebut the claimant's proofs, the claimant would undertake significant risk by failing to reasonably consider the proper array of alternative available jobs because the burden of proving disability always remains with the claimant. The finder of fact, after hearing from both parties, must evaluate whether the claimant has sustained his burden. Third, the claimant must show that his work-related injury prevents him from performing some or all of the jobs identified as within his qualifications and training that pay his maximum wages. Id. at 158, 648 N.W.2d 624. Fourth, if the claimant is capable of performing any of the jobs identified, the claimant must show that he cannot obtain any of these jobs. The claimant must make a good-faith attempt to procure post-injury employment if there are jobs at the same salary or higher that he is qualified and trained to perform and the claimant's work-related injury does not preclude performance. Upon the completion of these four steps, the claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability. The following steps represent how each of the parties may then challenge the evidence presented by the other. Fifth, once the claimant has made a prima facie case of disability, the burden of production shifts to the employer to come forward with evidence to refute the claimant's showing. At the outset, the employer obviously is in the best position to know what jobs are available within that company and has a financial incentive to rehabilitate and re-employ the claimant. Sixth, in satisfying its burden of production, the employer has a right to discovery under the reasoning of Boggetta if discovery is necessary for the employer to sustain its burden and present a meaningful defense. Pursuant to MCL 418.851 and MCL 418.853, [3] the magistrate has the authority to require discovery when necessary to make a proper determination of the case. The magistrate cannot ordinarily make a proper determination of a case without becoming fully informed of all the relevant facts. If discovery is necessary for the employer to sustain its burden of production and to present a meaningful defense, then the magistrate abuses his discretion in denying the employer's request for discovery. For example, the employer may choose to hire a vocational expert to challenge the claimant's proofs. That expert must be permitted to interview the claimant and present the employer's own analysis or assessment. The employer may be able to demonstrate that there are actual jobs that fit within the claimant's qualifications, training, and physical restrictions for which the claimant did not apply or refused employment. Finally, the claimant, on whom the burden of persuasion always rests, may then come forward with additional evidence to challenge the employer's evidence. This precise sequence is not rigid, but rather identifies the nature of the proofs that must precede the fact-finder's decision. Should it become evident in a particular case that a different sequence is more practical, the parties may present their evidence accordingly. However, the magistrate must ensure that all steps are completed in some fashion or another, that all the facts necessary to the determination of the case are presented, that each side has been accorded an adequate opportunity to respond to the other's proofs, and that the statutory burden of proof is respected. After that point, the magistrate can properly determine whether the claimant has satisfied his obligations under MCL 418.301(4). We reiterate that MCL 418.851 places the burden of proof on the claimant to demonstrate his entitlement to compensation and benefits by a preponderance of the evidence. This burden of persuasion never shifts to the employer, although the burden of production of evidence may shift between the parties as the case progresses. Because a claimant does not prove a disability under MCL 418.301(4) by merely demonstrating the inability to perform any previous jobs, the burden remains on the claimant to demonstrate that there are no available jobs within his qualifications and training that he can perform. Only after the claimant has first sustained this statutory burden of proof does the burden of production shift to the employer to show that there are jobs that the claimant can perform.