Opinion ID: 2582182
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reason to Believe Standard

Text: ¶ 43 Although our case law has clearly established that a change applicant is required to show reason to believe that application approval will not result in impairment of vested rights, the content of that standard remains less than clear. The Searles argue on appeal that a protestant seeking to defeat application approval can only succeed by producing direct evidence of actual impairment. In the Searles' view, evidence of likely impairmentregardless of how likely that impairment ismay bewill always be insufficient to defeat application approval. ¶ 44 In his dissent in Crafts, Justice Oaks endorsed a view similar to that advanced by the Searles, opining that [a] change application should only be denied when, after resolving all contradictions in favor of the proponent of change, the evidence offered is so deficient that it provides no reason to believe that the proposed change could be made without impairing rights. 667 P.2d at 1083 (Oaks, J., dissenting). Although we concur, as did the Crafts majority, with Justice Oaks's understanding that the preliminary nature of the application process favors placing a burden on applicants that is not unduly onerous, we disagree with Justice Oaks's conception of that standard. ¶ 45 Adopting such a low quantum of proof would turn the state engineer into nothing more than a rubber stamp, approving every change application submitted. As mentioned above, the procedures put in place by the legislature do not allow experimentation simply for the sake of experimentation. To adequately serve its purpose, the application process must provide some meaningful barrier so that the floodgates remain closed to all applications except those with a sufficient probability of successful perfection. ¶ 46 With that concern in mind, we conclude that the reason to believe standard is best understood as falling between the preponderance standard applicable in final adjudications and Justice Oaks's conception of the reason to believe standard as the lowest of hurdles. Specifically, we reassert the validity of our prior, admittedly opaque pronouncements, and now clarify that a change applicant's burden is satisfied if there is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the changes outlined in the application can be perfected without impairing vested rights. In other words, to gain application approval, a change applicant must convince the decisionmaker that there is reason to believe that the use proposed in the application can be undertaken without impairing vested rights. However, before application approval is warranted, it must be clear that the decisionmaker's determination that there is reason to believe is grounded in evidence sufficient to make that belief reasonable. Cf. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 300 (establishing a reasonable belief standard for use in criminal probable cause determinations and providing that at the preliminary hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it). Just as the probable cause standard applicable to preliminary hearings in criminal cases serves the primary purpose of ferreting out . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions, State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980), so does the reason to believe standard serve to stem the flow of proposed changes in water use by arresting any proposal not supported by a reasonable belief that the change can be accomplished without impairing vested rights. ¶ 47 This standard is both workable and consistent with our prior cases that have analogized the reason to believe standard to the probable cause standard applicable during the preliminary phase of a criminal trial. See, e.g., Crafts, 667 P.2d at 1082 (Oaks, J., dissenting) (stating that the reason to believe standard is the practical equivalent of a probable cause determination in a criminal case); Dist. Court, 238 P.2d at 1135 ([The court] must determine from the evidence whether there is probable cause to believe. . . that such water can be diverted . . . without injury to or conflict with prior rights.). ¶ 48 Having articulated the proper conception of the reason to believe standard, we now address the appropriate allocation of the burden of proof before addressing the Searles' contention that a reason to believe showing can only be undermined by direct evidence of actual impairment.