Opinion ID: 2785104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Section 8 to this Dispute

Text: Section 8 provides in relevant part that “[n]o restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant . . . who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbitration.” 29 U.S.C. § 108. Though the precise requirements of this obligation vary from case to case, there are “certain minimum steps” that are usually required: Unfair surprise should be avoided whenever possible. The representatives of management should meet with those of labor. Each side should listen to the contentions of the other side and each side should explain its position clearly and honestly, but not for as long a time as is customary in full-scale bargaining. In short, men of good faith must in good faith get together in a sincere effort to resolve their differences. 5 Section 8 also prohibits an injunction if the complainant “has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question.” Though Defendants do not invoke this provision here, the dissent does not explain why—in a different case involving the RLA—Congress would have intended to allow carriers or employees to escape the obligation to follow the law before seeking injunctive relief. 18 AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. Rutland Ry. Corp., 307 F.2d at 41. These basic requirements are consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad construction of Section 8. See Toledo, 321 U.S. at 57 (“One must not only discharge his legal obligations. He must also go beyond them and make all reasonable effort . . . .”). Our past decisions construing Section 8 have fleshed out these principles. In Switchmen’s Union of North America, we faced a dispute over the “bumping” of a railroad yardmaster. 398 F.2d at 445–47. In dismissing the union’s argument that Section 8 divested the district court of authority to issue an injunction, we concluded that the carrier had fulfilled its obligations both because “there was no unfair surprise” in the bumping of the yardmaster and because the carrier had attempted, “in good faith,” “to confer on the issue prior to the incident which led to the strike.” Id. at 447. San Antonio Community Hospital v. Southern California District Council of Carpenters concerned a union’s decision to display a banner disparaging the cleanliness of the workplace. 125 F.3d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1997). Considering the Section 8 issue, we held that it was sufficient that the employer “had engaged the Union on a number of occasions in an effort to resolve this dispute before seeking an injunction.” Id. at 1238. In this case, nothing in the record permits us to hold that ASIG satisfied Section 8’s “reasonable effort” requirement. Although the district court erred by failing to undertake a Section 8 analysis, the record reveals that ASIG sought an injunction from the district court without first attempting to AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 19 settle the dispute.6 Even if the employees lacked an identified union representative, that did not relieve ASIG of its obligations under Section 8 to make “every reasonable effort” to resolve the disagreement before seeking the injunction. We need not map out the precise contours of Section 8 here because ASIG’s failure to make any efforts to settle the dispute fell short of what Section 8 requires, and thus the district court erred by entering the injunction.7 The dissent responds by seeking to divert attention away from the conduct of ASIG. As far as we can tell, however, there is no authority for the dissent’s proposition that the actions of the employees may relieve the carrier from satisfying Section 8’s prerequisites. The dissent cites Switchmen’s Union of North America, Trans International Airlines, Order of Railway Conductors & Brakemen, and Butte as support for this proposition, but not one of these cases mentions the employees’ conduct as relevant to the Section 8 inquiry. In Switchmen’s Union of North America, we rejected the union’s Section 8 argument because the carrier had “performed its obligations under . . . the Railway Labor Act.” 398 F.2d at 447. In Trans International 6 The dissent chides us because there is “no district court finding of fact to that effect,” dissent at 56, but ASIG’s explicit “position is that it had no obligation to negotiate unless and until a representative was certified.” ASIG has never contended—as the dissent does now—that its single meeting with Popescu satisfied Section 8’s requirements. 7 Like the dissent, ASIG argues that even if it did not comply with Section 8 “the balancing of hardships and the public interest weigh in favor of issuing the injunction.” See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 243 F.3d 349, 365 n.11 (7th Cir. 2001). This court, however, has never recognized a public interest exception to the plain language of Section 8, and we decline to do so here. 20 AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. Airlines, we rejected the union’s Section 8 argument because the carrier’s “own conduct” was “not sufficiently likely to be found illegal or otherwise wrongful that [it] should be prevented from seeking injunctive relief.” 650 F.2d at 957. In Order of Railway Conductors, we noted that the carrier could not “claim[] an injunction against a strike” because the carrier had “positively rejected mediation.” 366 F.2d at 105. In Butte, we noted that the carrier was “also necessarily denied” from seeking an injunction because the carrier “had not exhausted its administrative remedies.” 268 F.2d at 60 & n.10. Neither these cases nor the dissent can deny the Toledo rule that a carrier must establish that it made every reasonable effort before seeking an injunction. 321 U.S. at 56-57 (“If a complainant has failed . . . to make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute, he is forbidden relief.” (emphasis added)). In the absence of any efforts by ASIG to comply with Section 8, the dissent’s discussion of what the employees did or did not do is simply a red herring.8 We emphasize that our conclusion is modest: we hold that a party must comply with Section 8 of the NLGA before seeking an injunction under the RLA. The dissent’s 8 We do not hold, as the dissent suggests, that injunctions are never available in RLA labor disputes. If a party seeking an injunction has exercised “every reasonable effort” to resolve the disagreement, Section 8 will not serve as a bar. What constitutes “every reasonable effort” will vary from case to case, and will depend in part on the actions (or inactions) of the opposing side. See Rutland Ry. Co., 307 F.2d at 40-41. The dissent is thus wrong to suggest that we hold that employers are barred from obtaining injunctions even if the employees refuse to negotiate or even if the employees are too fractured to engage in any meaningful negotiation. We hold only that employers must exercise “every reasonable effort” before seeking an injunction; no “reasonable” effort, which is what we face here, cannot be “every reasonable effort.” As noted supra, not even ASIG claims its efforts were reasonable. AIRCRAFT SERVICES INT’L V. WORKING WASH. 21 suggestion that our holding will disrupt commerce is fundamentally mistaken. As the Supreme Court has explained, “the purpose” of Section 8 “is to head off strikes,” not encourage them. Toledo, 321 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added). Section 8’s salutary mandate that parties make all reasonable efforts to settle labor disputes before seeking judicial intervention will help prevent, not cause, interruptions to commerce. By contrast, allowing injunctions when the necessary steps “have not been taken, not only violates the section’s terms,” but encourages parties to act unilaterally and avoid the reasonable steps that “when achieved, make unnecessary invocation of the court’s aid.” Id. This not only “defeats the purposes” of the NLGA, id., but those of the RLA as well. As noted above, the “over-all policy” of the RLA and the NLGA is the same: “to encourage use of the nonjudicial processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration for the adjustment of labor disputes.” Id. at 58 (emphasis added). Permitting a carrier to obtain an injunction to block a strike without pursuing these nonjudicial processes—as the dissent would have it—frustrates the goals of both statutes.