Opinion ID: 77655
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Polynice's Career-Offender Enhancement

Text: 35 In sentencing Polynice, the district judge imposed a career-offender enhancement based on Polynice's two previous felony convictions—one for resisting arrest with violence and the other for fleeing and eluding law enforcement, both in violation of Florida law. On appeal, Polynice challenges the enhancement. 36 Under the Guidelines, a defendant is a career offender if (1) he was at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence or involves a controlled substance; and (3) he has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A crime of violence is a federal or state offense carrying a sentence of more than one year imprisonment and, inter alia, involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (emphasis added). The first predicate crime of violence relied upon by the district court, resisting arrest with violence, is not in dispute. Polynice does challenge, however, the district court's characterization of the Florida offense of felony fleeing and eluding law enforcement as a crime of violence for purposes of the Guidelines' career-offender enhancement. 6 37 At the time of Polynice's conviction for fleeing and eluding, Florida law provided that one commits a second-degree felony if he willfully flees or attempts to elude a law enforcement officer ... and during the course of the fleeing or attempted eluding ... [d]rives at high speed, or in any manner which demonstrates a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3). The issue of whether fleeing and eluding under this provision constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2 is one of first impression in this circuit. But at least three other circuits have addressed the issue regarding fleeing and eluding under the laws of other states. Focusing on the potential risk of injury as the touchstone of § 4B1.2's definition of a crime of violence, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, construing Michigan, Wisconsin, and Oregon law, respectively, have held that felony fleeing is a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2. See United States v. Kendrick, 423 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir.2005) (holding that felony fleeing under Oregon law constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2); United States v. Rosas, 410 F.3d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir.2005) (holding that because Seventh Circuit precedent provides that fleeing law enforcement and endangering the operation of a police vehicle, in violation of a Wisconsin law, is, by definition, a violent felony, it is also a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2); United States v. Martin, 378 F.3d 578, 582-84 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that fleeing and eluding under Michigan law is a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2 because it involves a serious potential risk of physical injury). 38 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has held that fleeing and eluding under a Washington statute similar to the statute at issue here is not a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2 because, inter alia, the statute did not require that anyone actually be endangered by the defendant's conduct to sustain a conviction. United States v. Kelly, 422 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir.2005). 39 We find the reasoning of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits persuasive. As noted above, the language of the Guidelines makes clear that the potential risk of injury, rather than actual violence or actual injury, is the touchstone of a crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The dangerous circumstances surrounding a person's attempt to flee from law enforcement coupled with the person's operation of a motor vehicle most assuredly presents a potential risk of physical injury to others. And the stress and urgency of the situation will likely cause the person fleeing to drive recklessly, turning any pursuit into a high-speed chase with the potential for serious harm to pedestrians, other drivers, and the pursuing officers. See Kendrick, 423 F.3d at 809; Martin, 378 F.3d at 582. Indeed, collisions between fleeing vehicles and pedestrians or other vehicles sharing the road are common. United States v. Howze, 343 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir.2003). Moreover, by deliberately disobeying a law enforcement officer, the fleeing motorist provokes an inevitable, escalated confrontation with the officer when he is finally apprehended. Martin, 378 F.3d at 582. Such a confrontation inherently presents the serious potential risk of physical injury because the fleeing driver[,] intent on his goal of eluding the officer[,] faces the decision of whether to dispel the officer's interference or yield to it. Id. at 583 (citation and quotation marks omitted). In this regard, fleeing and eluding resembles the offense of escape, id. at 582; Howze, 343 F.3d at 921-22, which several circuits (including this one) have agreed constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines, even where the escape involves merely walking away from a non-secure facility. United States v. Adewani, 467 F.3d 1340, 1341 (D.C.Cir.2006); United States v. Turner, 285 F.3d 909, 916 (10th Cir.2002); United States v. Jackson, 301 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 955 (11th Cir.2001); United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 472 (8th Cir.2001); United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1062, 1068 (6th Cir. 1999). 40 Accordingly, we hold that felony fleeing and eluding, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3), is a crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. As such, we conclude that the district court did not err in holding that Polynice qualified as a career offender under the Guidelines.