Opinion ID: 1277007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adherence to Procedural Statutes

Text: ¶ 65 We precede our discussion of Wis. Stat. § 227.53(1)(c) and the reasonableness of All Star's actions with a review of the rules we use to resolve a dispute over whether a party has adhered to the procedures necessary to afford judicial review of an agency decision. ¶ 66 As we stated in Peterson, [w]e have long adhered to the rule that `strict compliance with procedural statutes is necessary to obtain jurisdiction to review administrative agency decisions.' Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (citing Trojan v. Board of Regents, 104 Wis.2d 277, 283, 311 N.W.2d 586 (1981); 519 Corp. v. DOT, 92 Wis.2d 276, 286-88, 284 N.W.2d 643 (1979); Brachtl v. DOR, 48 Wis.2d 184, 187, 179 N.W.2d 921 (1970)). However, as we also pointed out in Peterson, a companion rule to this proposition is that strict compliance depends upon the statutes clearly setting forth the procedural requirements to obtain review. Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 633, 594 N.W.2d 765 (citing Trojan, 104 Wis.2d at 284, 311 N.W.2d 586; Brachtl, 48 Wis.2d at 186-87, 179 N.W.2d 921). ¶ 67 Therefore, when a procedural statute lacks specific direction indicating whom is to be served with notice, there exists an ambiguity that warrants a liberal construction in favor of the party attempting to follow the procedural directive to obtain judicial review of an agency decision. Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 633, 594 N.W.2d 765. Under those circumstances, if a construction is reasonable that would afford the appealing party review and a determination on the merits, the procedural statute's ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of that construction. Kyncl v. Kenosha County, 37 Wis.2d 547, 555-56, 155 N.W.2d 583 (1968); see also Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 633, 594 N.W.2d 765; McDonough v. DWD, 227 Wis.2d 271, 282, 595 N.W.2d 686 (1999). ¶ 68 The rule to liberally construe in favor of the party seeking review of an agency decision comports with our recognition of the unfairness that can arise where ambiguities in procedural statutes create confusion about the proper method of service. We have said that where the petitioner has complied with the language of a procedural statute, even where it can be reasonably interpreted in more than one way, it would be extraordinarily harsh to cut off [the] petitioner['s] right to a review. McDonough, 227 Wis.2d at 282, 595 N.W.2d 686 (citing Trojan, 104 Wis.2d at 284, 311 N.W.2d 586). Once [a party] has exhausted his administrative remedies, having followed . . . administrative review procedures . . . he should not have to guess whom to serve to initiate the next step in the process and have his grievances heard in a court of law. State ex rel. Grzelak v. Bertrand, 2003 WI 102, ¶ 32, 263 Wis.2d 678, 665 N.W.2d 244; see also Sunnyview Village, Inc. v. DOA, 104 Wis.2d 396, 412, 311 N.W.2d 632 (1981). Therefore, where a procedural statute is ambiguous because it lacks specific direction[s] clearly indicating who[m] is to be served, service is sufficient for a court to acquire jurisdiction, if such service was reasonable under the circumstances. Grzelak, 263 Wis.2d 678, ¶¶ 23, 31, 665 N.W.2d 244. In sum, we analyze the action a party takes under an ambiguous procedural statute for judicial review of an agency decision by asking the question: Was service reasonable under the circumstances? See Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 633-34, 594 N.W.2d 765. ¶ 69 On multiple occasions, we have applied this test to conclude that a party achieved sufficient service by acting reasonably under the circumstances, even when the party served was not necessarily right. See Sunnyview Village, 104 Wis.2d at 412, 311 N.W.2d 632 (holding that service of a petition on the Department of Administration (DOA) and not the Division of Nursing Home Forfeiture Appeals (DNHFA) was a reasonable approach according to one interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in Wis. Stat. § 227.16(1)(a) when read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 227.01(1) and therefore, the petitioner had fulfilled the procedural requirements of § 227.16 and was entitled to its day in court); McDonough, 227 Wis.2d at 283, 595 N.W.2d 686 (concluding that where the interaction of statutes produced an ambiguity, a health care provider's service on the Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) and not the Department of Workforce Development (DWD), accomplished the necessary service where the health care provider's decision to do so was reasonable under the language of the statutes); Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 635, 594 N.W.2d 765 (concluding that when property owners served the State of Wisconsin rather than the DOT in the course of condemnation proceedings, they had taken reasonable action under one interpretation of an ambiguous statute and therefore, the property owners had successfully completed the statutory requirements to obtain review by the circuit court); Grzelak, 263 Wis.2d 678, ¶ 29, 665 N.W.2d 244 (concluding that where the procedural rules governing an inmate's service of a petition for writ of certiorari were ambiguous, the inmate's service of a petition on the warden rather than on the Secretary of the Department of Corrections (DOC) was reasonable, if incorrect, and successfully conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court to hear the petition). ¶ 70 With the existence of statutory ambiguities in mind, we have also previously recommended to agency decision-makers that they append specific and clear written notice to their final decisions, indicating the proper method of service necessary to obtain judicial review of the decision. McDonough, 227 Wis.2d at 283, 595 N.W.2d 686; Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 634-35, 594 N.W.2d 765; Sunnyview Village, 104 Wis.2d at 412, 311 N.W.2d 632. The purpose of such notice is to offer clarity where the statutes have created confusion. See Peterson, 226 Wis.2d at 634-35, 594 N.W.2d 765. ¶ 71 An agency's notice attached to its final decision can also play a role in our analysis of whether a party's course of action in attempting to fulfill procedural requirements was reasonable under the circumstances. However, the mere existence of such a notice does not necessarily mean that the notice offered sufficient clarity to determine a single, reasonable course of action. For example, in McDonough, we held that where the DWD, in its final order, simply referred the petitioner to one of the ambiguous procedural statutes at issue, the petitioner could not be faulted for serving the LIRC as opposed to the DWD because that course of action comported with one reasonable view of the statute. McDonough, 227 Wis.2d at 283-84, 595 N.W.2d 686. In sum, the effect of such a notice on the reasonableness determination will depend on the clarity of the notice.