Opinion ID: 203690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability under Article 1802

Text: We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Bisbal-Ramos, 467 F.3d at 22. The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could not have found in favor of the prevailing party. Id. Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code states that [a] person who by act or omission causes damage to another through fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141. As the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, individuals who suffer distress because a relative or loved one is tortiously injured have a cause of action under Article 1802 against the tortfeasor. Santini Rivera v. Serv. Air, Inc., 1994 P.R.-Eng 909527, No. RE-93-232, 1994 WL 909527 (P.R. Sept.12, 1994). To prevail on such a theory, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he has suffered emotional harm, (2) that this harm was caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant toward the plaintiff's relative or loved one, and (3) that the defendant's conduct was tortious or wrongful. See id. The cause of action is derivative and depends on the viability of the underlying claim of the relative or loved one. Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir.2007). In their cross-appeal, Mayor O'Neill and Guaynabo acknowledge that Puerto Rico law recognizes a cause of action for individuals in Méndez-Matos's situation, but argue that it requires proof of greater emotional distress than he established. Pointing in particular to Serrano v. Nicholson Nursery, Inc., 844 F.Supp. 73 (D.P.R.1994), Reyes v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 528 F.Supp. 765 (D.P.R.1981), and Hernández v. Fournier, 80 D.P.R. 93 (P.R. 1957), they assert that under Puerto Rico law, an individual must prove deep moral suffering and anguish, not merely a passing suffering, to recover for tortious injury to relatives or loved ones. [17] In contrast, they argue, testimony at trial established only that Méndez-Matos was momentarily angry or frightened. We do not decide if Puerto Rico law makes the distinction advanced by the cross-appellants. Instead, we assume that Puerto Rico requires more than proof of passing suffering to recover for tortious injury to relatives, and conclude that even on the standard the cross-appellants suggest, a rational jury could have found for Méndez-Matos on the evidence introduced at trial. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the testimony offered at trial established the depth and duration of Méndez-Matos's emotional distress. Méndez-Matos told the jury that he feared for his son's life after receiving a phone call from him, explaining that he had been detained by the Mayor and his escorts. During that call, Méndez-Ayala told his father that things looked ugly, and asked him not to come. Méndez-Matos came anyway, and when he arrived appeared really concerned. He was so upset about the treatment of his son, he confronted the Mayor and his armed guards, who surrounded him and gripped their weapons. Méndez-Ayala managed to call his father off, but Méndez-Matos was concerned that the Mayor's conduct was so illogical, anything might happen to his son. He initially refused his son's entreaty to leave, saying I'm not going to leave you here so you can get killed. Even after he left the government center, Méndez-Matos said, he feared for his son's life. In light of this testimony, it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Méndez-Matos met the standard of proof argued by the cross-appellants.