Opinion ID: 44183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lewis’s Sentence Under the Eighth Amendment

Text: Lewis argues for the first time on appeal that the district court’s 262-month sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence is grossly disproportionate to his underlying offenses that involved a small amount of cocaine base and his non-violent criminal history. He further argues that mandatory minimums outside of the federal system as high as 262 months’ imprisonment for possessing less than 50 grams of cocaine base are unusual, and that mandatory minimum sentences unconstitutionally violate separation of powers principles, citing no authority for these propositions. Finally, he argues that some alternative method other than the mandatory guidelines should have been used to impose his sentence. Where, as here, no timely constitutional objection was made in the district 16 court, we will review only for plain error. United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001). (“If the defendant either does not raise the constitutional objection or does not raise it in a timely fashion, he is entitled only to plain error review.”). Under plain error review, an appellant must show there was (1) an error (2) that is plain (3) which affects the appellant’s substantial rights and (4) affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1775, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). “The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1185, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). In evaluating an Eighth Amendment challenge, we must first make “a threshold determination that the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the offense.” United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367, 368 (11th Cir. 1995). In Brant, we upheld as constitutional a 188-month sentence imposed for manufacture of marijuana, explicitly noting that the career offender provisions of the sentencing guidelines did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Brant, 62 F.3d at 368. In the absence of the career offender provisions, the defendant could have been sentenced to 70 months. Id. Moreover, the “Supreme Court has squarely 17 rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to a 40-year sentence imposed under Virginia law for possession of nine ounces marijuana.” Id. citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 371-375, 102 S.Ct. 703, 704-706, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982). We have also held that the provision found in 21 U.S.C. § 841, mandating a sentence of life imprisonment for a felony drug offense committed after two prior convictions for felony drug have become final, is constitutional and not violative of the Eighth Amendment.3 United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 248, 250-51 (11th Cir. 1992). Similarly, the provisions of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), requiring a 15-year minimum mandatory sentence if a felon convicted of weapon possession has three prior convictions for either violent felonies or serious drug offenses do not violate the Eighth Amendment. United States v. Reynolds, 215 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000). Contrary to Lewis’s assertions, his prior drug convictions are not entitled to leniency because they involved no theft or violence. Lewis had no fewer than six different state convictions for drug trafficking at the time he was sentenced, demonstrating a need to curb his recidivism. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29, 123 S.Ct. 3 In Willis, the government chose to use the provisions found in 21 U.S.C. § 851, which require it to file an information giving notice of its intention to use prior convictions to enhance a defendant’s sentence. Willis, 956 F.2d at 250. In the present case, the government appears to have had the option of doing the same, and did not exercise that right, relying on the “career offender” provisions instead of the mandatory sentence requirements of § 841. 18 at 1189-90 (stating, in the context of California’s “three strikes” sentencing law: “In weighing the gravity of Ewing's offense, we must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. Any other approach would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature's choice of sanctions.”). Even the district court was struck by Lewis’s criminal history, stating: “I’ll tell you what, Mr. Lewis. Yours is the longest rap sheet I’ve seen in years. And I’m not exaggerating about that. This is a terrifically long rap sheet.” Given Lewis’s history of drug trafficking, and our various holdings that enhanced sentences do not violate the Eighth Amendment, any error the district court committed by imposing a 262-month sentence was neither “plain” nor “obvious,” nor were Lewis’s substantial rights violated in any way. IV. Lewis’s Sentence Enhanced by Prior Convictions Lewis argues for the first time on appeal that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury under Blakely v. Washington by enhancing his sentence on the basis of his prior convictions and criminal history. Where, as here, no timely constitutional objection was made in the district court, this Court will review for plain error. Candelario, 240 F.3d at 1306; United States v. Rodriguez, No. 04-12676, manuscript op. at 15 (11th Cir. Feb. 4, 2005). 19 Under plain error review, an appellant must show there was (1) an error (2) that is plain (3) which affects the appellant’s substantial rights and (4) affects the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 730, 113 S.Ct. at1775. The career offender provision of the guidelines states: “[a] defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). If a defendant is found by a judge to be a career offender under § 4B1.1(a), the defendant’s offense level is enhanced under § 4B1.1(b) if the offense level under § (b) is greater than the otherwise-applicable offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). To decide the issue presented by Lewis on appeal–that his sentence violated Blakely because the district court, rather than a jury, made the findings necessary to increase his sentence under § 4B1.1–we must review the applicable Supreme Court precedent pertaining to sentence enhancements based on prior convictions, and consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, ___ L.Ed.2d ___(2005), which was announced after the present parties filed their appellate briefs. 20 “In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence.” United States v. Marseille, 377 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2004). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court declined to revisit Almendarez-Torres, and it held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489-90, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (emphasis added). In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied the rule it announced in Apprendi to the State of Washington’s Sentencing Reform Act. 542 U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2534-36, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). There, the Supreme Court struck down an upward departure imposed under Washington’s sentencing system that was based solely on judicial factfinding, clarifying that the relevant “statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct at 2534-38 (emphasis omitted). In Marseille, we refused to interpret the Supreme Court’s rationale in 21 Apprendi as overruling the prior Supreme Court decision in Almendarez-Torres. 377 F.3d at 1257. We further concluded that Blakely “does not take such factfinding out of the hands of the courts.” Id. at 1257-58 n.14; see also United States v. Guadamuz-Solis, 232 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that AlmendarezTorres remains the law after Apprendi). In Booker, the Supreme Court concluded that its holding in Blakely applied to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and it reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi: “Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2005). Accordingly, insofar as the district court’s enhancement of Lewis’s sentence under § 4B1.1 merely involved a determination that Lewis had prior convictions, the enhancement did not implicate Apprendi, Blakely, or Booker, as those cases clearly exempt prior convictions from the types of facts that must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a sentence enhancement. Therefore, the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise. V. Lewis’s Sentence Enhancements Based on Drug Quantity 22 Lewis argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury under Blakely by enhancing his base offense level on the basis of an additional 19.7 grams of cocaine base allegedly seized from him during an arrest that occurred prior to the offenses charged in his indictment. Specifically, Lewis argues that, but for the inclusion of the 19.7 grams of cocaine base, he would have been given a base offense level of 30 rather than 32. Assuming arguendo that the district court erred by basing its sentence on an additional 19.7 grams of cocaine base not charged in Lewis’s indictment, “once the court of appeals has decided that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was harmless, [i.e.], that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 201, 203, 112 S.Ct. 1120-21, 117 L.Ed.2d 341 (1992). Here, the additional 19.7 grams of drugs attributed to Lewis at sentencing did not affect his sentence in any way, as he was found to be a career offender, mandating a minimum base offense level of 34. As noted above, the career offender provisions of the guidelines, based as they are on prior convictions, do not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury. Accordingly, any error the district court may have committed by making factual findings regarding drug quantities for sentencing purposes was 23 harmless as it did not impact Lewis’s sentence. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Lewis’s prior convictions or by permitting a witness to testify that he had previously purchased drugs from Lewis, and this Court should affirm Lewis’s conviction. Moreover, Lewis’s sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, nor did it violate his Sixth Amendment right to a jury because his sentence was based on his career offender status, which need not be proven to a jury under current Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent. Based on the foregoing, we affirm Lewis’s convictions and sentences. AFFIRMED. 24