Opinion ID: 416888
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty Status of the Plaintiff When the Negligent Act Occurred

Text: 36 The duty status of the plaintiff, while not dispositive, is often taken into account when deciding whether an activity is truly incident to service. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d at 142; Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1339; Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d at 132. Once again, however, the duty status distinction cannot be mechanically applied to answer the incident to service question. On the contrary, Johnson's duty status is relevant only insofar as it bears on the relationship between the activity leading to the injury and his military service. 37 Johnson was undeniably an active member of the Air Force at the time of the accident and thus on active duty status. In and of itself, however, his active duty status is not relevant to our inquiry. Rather, the fact that he was on active duty merely proves that he was not an inactive reservist or a discharged veteran. Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1339. The important question is whether the service member on active duty status was engaging in an activity that is related in some relevant way to his military duties. In this case, Johnson's off-duty work as a bartender bears no such relevant relationship to the military disciplinary structure that the Feres doctrine was meant to safeguard. See supra at 1436. On the contrary, Johnson's work was similar to the sort of second job in the civilian sector that any off-duty service member might undertake. In short, he was in the same position that any civilian employee of the NCO Club might have been in at the time of the government's negligence. The fact that Johnson was off-duty for the day is, under the circumstances presented here, sufficient to eliminate any relevant links between his activities and his military service. 3 38