Opinion ID: 109179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Multimember Districts

Text: From the above review of the North Dakota constitutional and statutory provisions and of the litigation of the past 12 years, two significant facts emerge: The first is that some multimembership on the house side of the Legislative Assembly traditionally has existed. This plainly qualifies as established state policy. [8] The second is that, in contrast, multimembership on the senate side, even as to the five districts, has never existed except as imposed (a) by the three-judge federal court by its 1965 Paulson decision; (b) by a majority of the three-judge court as a temporary expedient for the 1972 election only; (c) by the provisions of the 1973 act immediately nullified by referendum; and (d) by a different majority of the three-judge court as a permanent solution in the judgment under review. Thus only once has the Legislative Assembly provided for multimember senate representation and that effort was promptly aborted. Every other such provision in North Dakota's history has been court imposed. Multimember senate representation, therefore, obviously does not qualify as established state policy. This Court has refrained from holding that multimember districts in apportionment plans adopted by States for their legislatures are per se unconstitutional. White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765 (1973), and cases cited therein. On the contrary, the Court has upheld numerous state-initiated apportionment schemes utilizing multimember districts. See, e. g., Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U. S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965). And, beginning with Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S., at 577, the Court has indicated that a State might devise an apportionment plan for a bicameral legislature with one body composed of at least some multimember districts, as long as substantial equality of population per representative is maintained. Notwithstanding this past acceptance of multimember districting plans, we recognize that there are practical weaknesses inherent in such schemes. First, as the number of legislative seats within the district increases, the difficulty for the voter in making intelligent choices among candidates also increases. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U. S., at 731. Ballots tend to become unwieldy, confusing, and too lengthy to allow thoughtful consideration. Second, when candidates are elected at large, residents of particular areas within the district may feel that they have no representative specially responsible to them. Ibid. [9] Third, it is possible that bloc voting by delegates from a multimember district may result in undue representation of residents of these districts relative to voters in single-member districts. This possibility, however, was rejected, absent concrete proof, in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 147 (1971). Criticism of multimember districts has been frequent and widespread. Id., at 157-160, [10] and articles cited therein. See generally Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 666 (1972); Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral DistrictsDo They Violate the One Man, One Vote Principle, 75 Yale L. J. 1309 (1966). In Fortson v. Dorsey, supra , we held that the mere assertion of such possible weaknesses in a legislature's multimember districting plan was insufficient to establish a denial of equal protection. Rather, it must be shown that designedly or otherwise, a multi-member constituency apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population. 379 U. S., at 439. Further, there must be more evidence than a simple disproportionality between the voting potential and the legislative seats won by a racial or political group. There must be evidence that the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups. White v. Regester, 412 U. S., at 765-766. Such evidence may be more easily developed where the multi-member districts compose a large part of the legislature, where both bodies in a bicameral legislature utilize multi-member districts, or where the members' residences are concentrated in one part of the district. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S., at 88. [11] Whether such factors are present or not, proof of lessening or cancellation of voting strength must be offered. This requirement that one challenging a multimember districting plan must prove that the plan minimizes or cancels out the voting power of a racial or political group has been applied in cases involving apportionment schemes adopted by state legislatures. In Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690 (1971), however, which came to us on an application for a stay, we were presented with a court-ordered reapportionment scheme having some multimember districts in both bodies of the state legislature. We stated explicitly that when district courts are forced to fashion apportionment plans, single-member districts are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter. Id., at 692. Exercising our supervisory power, we directed the District Court to devise a single-member districting plan, absent insurmountable difficulties. Ibid. This preference for and emphasis upon single-member districts in court-ordered plans was reaffirmed in Connor v. Williams, 404 U. S., at 551, and again in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 333 (1973). In the latter case a District Court was held to have acted within its discretion in forming a multimember district as an interim remedy in order to alleviate substantial underrepresentation of military personnel in an impending election. [12] The standards for evaluating the use of multimember districts thus clearly differ depending on whether a federal court or a state legislature has initiated the use. The practical simultaneity of decision in Connor v. Johnson and in Whitcomb v. Chavis, supra , so demonstrates. When the plan is court ordered, there often is no state policy of multimember districting which might deserve respect or deference. Indeed, if the court is imposing multimember districts upon a State which always has employed single-member districts, there is special reason to follow the Connor rule favoring the latter type of districting. Appellants do not contend that any racial or political group [13] has been discriminated against by the multimember districting ordered by the District Court. They only suggest that the District Court has not followed our mandate in Connor v. Johnson , and that the court has failed to articulate any reasons for this departure. We agree. Absent particularly pressing features calling for multimember districts, a United States district court should refrain from imposing them upon a State. The District Court cannot avoid the multimember issue by labeling it, see 372 F. Supp., at 377, a political issue to be resolved by the State. The District Court itself created multimember districting in North Dakota, and it might be said to be disingenuous to suggest that the judicial creation became a political question simply by the passage of nine years. The District Court's treatment of this issue directly conflicts with its prior opinion in this case, where it allowed continuation of the multimember districts first established in the Paulson decision in 1965 only as an interim remedy. 372 F. Supp., at 367. The court there noted that in the largest multimember district, a voter would be asked to evaluate the qualifications of at least 30 candidates for the state legislature, a most formidable task. Id., at 366. Taking note of Connor v. Johnson , the court held in 1972 that it would be improper to permit multimember districts to remain permanently, and allowed continued use only for the impending election because of the great confusion that otherwise would result. The court appears now to have abandoned that position, with no suggestion of reasons for the abrupt change. It is especially anomalous that the court would continue with the multimember districting plan, when the Special Master who initially proposed it has disavowed use of permanent multimember districts. Dobson, Reapportionment Problems, 48 N. D. L. Rev. 281, 289 (1972). In contrast, the dissent in the District Court suggests a wide range of attributes of single-member districts. 372 F. Supp., at 391. One advantage is obvious: confusion engendered by multiple offices will be removed. Other advantages perhaps are more speculative: single-member districts may prevent domination of an entire slate by a narrow majority, may ease direct communication with one's senator, may reduce campaign costs, and may avoid bloc voting. Of course, these are general virtues of single-member districts, and there is no guarantee that any particular feature will be found in a specific plan. Neither the District Court majority nor appellee, however, has provided us with any suggestion of a legitimate state interest supporting the abandonment of the general preference for single-member districts in court-ordered plans which we recognized in Connor v. Johnson . [14] The fact that no allegation of minority group discrimination is raised by appellants here does not make Connor inapplicable. It is true that in 1973 the voters of North Dakota voted down a proposed constitutional amendment which would have re-established the State's tradition of single-member senatorial districts. At the same time the voters also rejected by referendum the Legislative Assembly's 1973 Act which would have continued the multimember format for five districts. We are unable to infer from these simultaneous actions of the electorate any particular attitude toward multimember districts. It simply appears that North Dakota's voters have not been satisfied with any reapportionment proposal, and that they are frustrated by the years of confusion since the obviously impermissible apportionment provisions of the State's Constitution were invalidated. We are confident that the District Court, with perhaps the aid of its Special Masters, will be able to reinstitute the use of single-member districts while also attaining the necessary goal of substantial population equality. Special Master Ostenson had indicated that it  `would not be terribly difficult to adopt single-member districts.'  See 372 F. Supp., at 392. [15] Unless the District Court can articulate such a singular combination of unique factors as was found to exist in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S., at 333, or unless the 1975 Legislative Assembly appropriately acts, the court should proceed expeditiously to reinstate single-member senatorial districts in North Dakota.