Opinion ID: 1040721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offense Guideline

Text: Appellants argue that the District Court erred in identifying § 2S1.3 rather than § 2S1.1(a)(1) as the applicable offense guideline. We review an “application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Blackmon, 557 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 2009).3 Appendix A of the Sentencing Guidelines lists both § 2S1.3 and § 2S1.1 as applicable offense guidelines for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1960. See U.S.S.G. app. A. “If more than one guideline section is referenced for the particular statute,” Appendix A 2 Although the District Court did not explicitly state that it was applying the §3B1.1(a) enhancement, the Court adopted the Presentence Investigation Reports (“PSRs”) which applied the enhancement for each Appellant. Neither Appellants nor the Government dispute that the Court applied this enhancement. 3 Appellants contend that we should apply de novo review. However, the interpretation of a guideline provision is not at issue here. Rather, the issue is which offense guideline better fits the facts in this case. 3 instructs courts to “use the guideline most appropriate for the offense conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted.” Id. Section 2S1.3 applies to the operation of a money-transmitting business without complying with state and federal registration requirements in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1960(b)(1)(A) and (B). See id. §2S1.3 cmt. Section 2S1.1, on the other hand, applies to money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(C). See id. at § 2S1.1 cmt.; see also § 1960 (b)(1)(C) (referring to “the transportation or transmission of funds that are known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity”). Appellants argue that § 2S1.1(a)(1) is the applicable offense guideline because it more closely tracks the offense conduct charged against them. Although Appellants admit that the operation of an unlicensed money-transmitting business “is certainly a central allegation of Count Two,” they maintain that “the overwhelming weight of the alleged conduct describes service as the money laundering arm of illegal internet gambling businesses, through collection of bets and payment of winners, and through payment of invoices to vendors.” Appellants’ Br. at 37. Appellants’ offense conduct involved both the operation of an unlicensed moneytransmitting business and money laundering. The District Court relied on the formal charging language of Count Two of the Indictment and Appellants’ conduct in determining which offense guideline was more applicable. The language of Count Two – “knowingly conducted, controlled, managed, supervised, directed, and owned all or part of a money transmitting business . . . while failing to comply with the money transmitting 4 business registration requirements under Title 31, United States Code, Section 5330” – charges a violation of § 1960(b)(1)(B), which corresponds with offense guideline § 2S1.3. App. at 94. The Court’s reliance on the charging language was proper. Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in choosing § 2S1.3 as the more appropriate offense guideline.