Opinion ID: 208049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inducing Infringement

Text: A party who actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Under this provision, [t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the alleged infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed.Cir.1990), quoted in DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed.Cir.2006) (en banc in relevant part). [A] finding of inducement requires a threshold finding of direct infringementeither a finding of specific instances of direct infringement or a finding that the accused products necessarily infringe. Ricoh, 550 F.3d at 1341 (citing ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1313). [I]nducement requires evidence of culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another's infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer's activities. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1306. A plaintiff may still prove the intent element through circumstantial evidence, just as with direct infringement, as discussed above. See id.; see also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed.Cir.2005) (A patentee may prove intent through circumstantial evidence.); Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed.Cir. 1988) (While proof of intent is necessary, direct evidence is not required; rather, circumstantial evidence may suffice.). Evidence of active steps taken to induce infringement, such as advertising an infringing use, can support a finding of an intention for the product to be used in an infringing manner. DSU Med., 471 F.3d at 1305 (citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932, 125 S.Ct. 2764). Microsoft argues that Lucent can't prove inducement because the software products are merely capable of infringing and the evidence didn't show the requisite intent to induce. As Microsoft sees it, all Lucent has shown is that `hypothetical direct infringement' might result if users choose particular options in each accused product. Relying on DSU Medical and Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed.Cir.2008), Microsoft contends that Lucent presented only the same circumstantial evidence regarding the alleged possibility of using the accused products to infringemarketing materials and help filesas evidence of intent to induce infringement of the Day patent. With regard to Outlook, for example, Lucent relied on materials generally describing Outlook's use of forms and its calendar feature. No evidence showed that Microsoft encouraged use of the date-picker or even mentioned the date-picker specifically. With regard to Money, the evidence showed that Microsoft encouraged customers to enter information by downloading it from the Internet, which avoids manually filling out the transaction form. And for Windows Mobile, Lucent presented evidence of general instructions on how to use the product and statements promoting its general use of forms and ease of use. None of these materials induces customers to use a composition tool to fill out a computer-based form. Appellant Br. 52 (citations omitted). Lucent responds, asserting that Microsoft both encouraged others to commit infringing acts and knew or should have known that its conduct would result in direct infringement. Lucent cites its expert's testimony as supporting the jury's finding that the infringing pop-up tool functionality is pervasive in the accused products; that the normal and intended operation of those products used the infringing functionality; and that Microsoft encouraged and intended users to infringe. Lucent also argues that the evidence established that onscreen pop-up tools are critical to the functionality of the accused products, and that Microsoft provided instruction, tutorials, and other materials directing users to operate the accused products in an infringing manner. Having perused the evidence, we agree with Microsoft that the evidence is not strong, but we are not persuaded that the jury was unreasonable in finding that Microsoft possessed the requisite intent to induce at least one user of its products to infringe the claimed methods. With respect to inducing infringement with Outlook, Lucent points to the following testimony of its expert. Q: Does Microsoft intend users to use the forms and the different tools that we just looked at? A: Yes, definitely. It would beyou'd be unable to use the application and avoid forms. Q: So would you say then the form entry and the predefined tools of Microsoft Outlook form a material part of the limitations of claim 19 of the Day patent? A: Yes. Q: And the Outlook is specifically designed to use these forms and these predefined tools? A: Yes, it is. Q: Does Microsoft know that Outlook was designed to perform in that fashion? A: Yes. Again, they designed it. So they know they designed it to do that. J.A. 07441-42. At one point, Lucent's infringement expert explained, on cross-examination, how certain Microsoft documentation encouraged users to use the infringing tool. Q: Okay. Let's look at [the document]. Access shared team calendars in Outlook 2003. View multiple calendars side by side to make scheduling meetings fast and more convenient. A: Right. Q: Is it the part about scheduling meetings A: That's correct. Q:that you now say is encouraging this method of Claim 19? A: Well, yeah. You schedule meetings using this appointment form. J.A. 07510. Additional circumstantial evidence lends further, albeit limited, support for the jury's factual finding of intent. And our review reveals slightly stronger circumstantial evidence of intent concerning Windows Mobile and Microsoft Money. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's denial of Microsoft's motion for JMOL that Microsoft did not induce infringement of the Day patent.