Opinion ID: 1264451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Venue-Giving Defendant

Text: We turn our discussion to the circuit court's dismissal of Morris' case against Crown, the manufacturer of the product that Morris says caused his injury. Crown is not a West Virginia corporation, but it is the manufacturer of a product that was sold and distributed by a West Virginia corporation. It must first be recognized that Morris' suit against Crown is essentially a products liability case. Products liability suits typically allege that a manufacturer designed and/or produced a product and put the product into the stream of commerce, and that the product was unsafe or flawed in such a way so as to give rise to the liability of the manufacturer for injuries resulting from the use of the product. The alleged unsafeness or flaw(s) may be as a result of the actual design or construction of the product, or in the adequacy of warnings provided to the user(s) of the product. See generally Morningstar v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W.Va. 857, 253 S.E.2d 666 (1979) and its progeny. Products liability cases are a feature of every state's law, and manufacturers who put their products into the stream of interstate commerce expect that they may be called to account in court for the safety of the design and manufacture of their products in other stateseven though no culpable conduct by the manufacturer relating to the design or manufacture of the product occurred in the jurisdiction in which the claim against the manufacturer is brought. This fundamental principle of products liability law underlies our analysis. A second fundamental principle that must be recognized is that: This Court follows the venue-giving defendant principle, whereby, once venue is proper for one defendant, it is proper for all other defendants subject to process. Syllabus Point 1, Staats v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 125 W.Va. 473, 24 S.E.2d 916 (1943); McConaughey v. Bennett's Executors, 50 W.Va. 172, 179, 40 S.E. 540, 541 (1901). See also State ex rel. Kenamond v. Warmuth, 179 W.Va. 230, 231, 366 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1988); McGuire v. Fitzsimmons, 197 W.Va. 132, 137, 475 S.E.2d 132, 137 (1996); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Linville, 142 W.Va. 160, 164-165, 95 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1956); Webber v. Offhaus, 135 W.Va. 138, 146-147, 62 S.E.2d 690, 696 (1950); McConaughey v. Bennett's Ex'rs, 50 W.Va. 172, 179, 40 S.E. 540, 542-543 (1901). The principle of the venue-giving defendant has been an established feature of our law for more than one hundred years, and it is closely intertwined with our procedural rules on joinder. [8] Complementing and reflecting the longstanding venue-giving defendant principle in our case law and our procedural rules, the provisions of W.Va.Code, 56-1-1 [2003] state that venue for  any civil action or  the cause of action is appropriate wherein any of the defendants may reside ... and where one or more of the defendants resides. W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(a) and (b) [2003] (emphasis added). Crown argues that despite the fact that products liability cases are commonly brought against manufacturers in jurisdictions other than where the product was designed or built, and despite West Virginia's settled venue-giving defendant principle, because Morris is a nonresident of West Virginia, Morris must show separate acts by Crown that occurred in West Virginia ( i.e., Morris must separately establish venue for Crown) before Morris can join Crown as a defendant along with Jefferds in Morris' suit in West Virginia. In support of this argument, Crown points to language in W.Va.Code, 56-1-1(c)[2003] which would bar suit by a nonresident in West Virginia ... unless all or a substantial part of the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim asserted occurred in this state. Crown notes that W.Va.Code, 56-1-1(a) and (b) [2003] use the terms cause of action or civil action when saying that a case may be brought wherever one of the defendants is located, see discussion supra while W.Va. Code, 56-1-1(c)[2003] uses the term claim. Crown argues that Morris therefore must separately establish venue for his claim against Crown, by showing culpable acts or omissions by Crown that occurred in West Virginia. A rule in accord with Crown's argument would run counter to established principles of joinder and judicial economy. Modern economies operate in complex, multi-jurisdictional networks of designers, manufacturers, distributors, retailers, purchasers, and users. When reasonably possible, legal claims involving these sorts of parties that arise from particular incidents and injuries involving a product should be resolved in a unitary forum. As this Court recently stated in Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Parke-Davis, 217 W.Va. 15, 21, 614 S.E.2d 15, 21 (2005), quoting Board of Ed. v. Zando, et. al., 182 W.Va. 597, 603-604, 390 S.E.2d 796, 802-803: [t]he fundamental purpose of inchoate contribution is to enable all parties who have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries to be brought into one suit. Not only is judicial economy served, but such a procedure also furthers one of the primary goals of any system of justiceto avoid piecemeal litigation which cultivates a multiplicity of suits and often results in disparate and unjust verdicts. In the instant case, where a substantial part of the culpable acts or omissions of one joint tortfeasor (Jefferds) are alleged to have occurred in West Virginia, and where the culpable acts or omissions of a second joint tortfeasor (Crown) are alleged to have occurred outside West Virginia, a requirement that the plaintiff independently establish venue with respect to the out-of-state tortfeasor would effectively prevent joinder of the out-of-state tortfeasor. This would be an absurd result, contrary to all established procedure. Additionally, Crown's assertion that the statute's use of the word claim supports Crown's argument is not well-founded. Black's Law Dictionary, Centennial Edition, 6th Ed.1990, defines the term claim, inter alia, as [a] cause of action. In Barker v. Traders Bank, 152 W.Va. 774, 780, 166 S.E.2d 331, 335 (1969), this Court stated that Rule 8(a), R.C.P., contemplates a succinct complaint containing a plain statement of the nature of the claim together with a demand for judgment. (Emphasis added). Cf. Sticklen v. Kittle, 168 W.Va. 147, 162, 287 S.E.2d 148, 156 (1981) (equating claim and complaint). There is certainly a sufficient overlap and identity between the ordinary meaning of the terms claim, civil action, and cause of action, as they are used in W.Va.Code, 56-1-1 [2003] so as to weigh against finding that the use of the word claim in W.Va.Code, 56-1-1(c)[2003] establishes a novel rule that would fragment cases, foster piecemeal litigation, and radically alter settled procedures. Additionally, Crown's suggestion that such a rule should be applied only to nonresidents runs headlong into the foregoing-discussed constitutional principles that strongly disfavor discrimination on the basis of residency in access to the courts. Application of these principles further weighs against such a reading of the statutory language. For these reasons, this Court will not derive such an intent from the statute's use of the word claim, nor enforce such a rule. Following our settled law, we hold that W.Va.Code, 56-1-1(c) [2003] does not require a nonresident plaintiff to separately establish venue for each defendant. Based on this holding, the circuit court's dismissal of Crown as a defendant must be reversed.