Opinion ID: 3011158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Minimum Sentence Versus Sentence Imposed

Text: Section 1101(a)(43)(G) defines as an aggravated felony a theft offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment at least one year. The sentence is obviously missing a crucial verb. Graham argues that there are two options: The statute could apply to theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year or to theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least one year. He then argues that, because we should interpret ambiguous statutes to favor defendants, we should interpret the statute to mean is, not imposed, so that the minimum term for the theft offense has to be at least one year. Since petit larceny carries no minimum term, he contends, it is not an aggravated felony under his interpretation. Graham claims that the rule of lenity mandates his interpretation--courts should not interpret a statute to increase a penalty when the interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958). _________________________________________________________________ very same information. However, the change in the law governing the definition of aggravated felonies means that the issues are no longer the same, and therefore collateral estoppel cannot apply. Under the law as it existed at the time of Graham's previous reentry prosecution, theft convictions had to carry sentences of at least five years to qualify as aggravated felonies, but Congress amended the law to change five to one. Furthermore, the government did not object to the presentence report in the previous sentencing proceeding and the district judge adopted the report and its findings in its entirety. The matter was thus not actually litigated in the previous sentencing proceeding. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 316 (1983); In re Gober, 100 F.3d 1195, 1203 (5th Cir. 1996) (issue is not actually litigated if it is not denied by the other party); In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089 (3d Cir. 1992) (issues critical to judgment are nonetheless not actually litigated if the parties stipulate to them). 5 However, the rule of lenity does not apply simply because a statute requires interpretation. See Caron v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2007, 2012 (1998) (the rule is not invoked by a grammatical possibility); Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998) (the rule only applies if after seizing everything from which aid can be derived . . . we can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts will also consider other clear provisions of a law in order to interpret an ambiguous portion of the statute. See Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 1998). Graham's statutory construction is flawed. Before its amendment in 1996, section 1101(43)(G) defined aggravated felony in relevant part as a theft offense . . . for which the term of imprisonment imposed (regardless of any suspension of such imprisonment) is at leastfive years. The reference was clearly to the term imposed and not to the statutory minimum. Although the 1996 amendments created a typographical error by inadvertently removing the verb, there is no evidence that Congress intended to begin relying on the statutory minimum rather than the sentence actually imposed for a conviction. As we read the statute as a whole, even if is were the missing verb, the reference to term of imprisonment would still be to the term actually imposed, whatever the potential maximum might have been. What Graham really wants us to do is to imply the word minimum into the statute, so that the minimum term provided for by law would have to be at least one year to constitute an aggravated felony. The statute, however, never suggests that the proper referent is a crime's statutory minimum. As part of the 1996 amendments, Congress added a definitional provision at section 1101(a)(48)(B), providing that [a]ny reference [in S 1101(a)] to a term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in part.2 This _________________________________________________________________ 2. A further conforming amendment deleted the phrase imposed (regardless of any suspension of imprisonment) each place it appeared in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (N), and (P). 6 suggests that the actual term imposed is ordinarily the definitional touchstone. It is true, as Graham contends, that other language in section 1101(a)(43) refers to a term that may be imposed as opposed to one that is imposed. See S 1101(a)(43)(J) (covering racketeering and gambling crimes for which a sentence of one year imprisonment or more may be imposed); S 1101(a)(43)(T) (an offense relating to a failure to appear before a court . . . for which a sentence of 2 years' imprisonment or more may be imposed). Graham is correct that the may be imposed language of these provisions is inconsistent with a reading of section 1101(a)(48)(B) that would insist that every reference to a term of imprisonment refers to the term actually imposed. It is reasonable to read section 1101(a)(48)(B) instead as an instruction about how to treat suspended sentences. However, there is still no indication that Congress wished to make the statutory minimum for a crime relevant to the definition of aggravated felony. The fact that some provisions of section 1101(a)(43) refer to a term that may be imposed while others refer to crimes for which the term of imprisonment is at least 12 months, S 1101(a)(43)(P), demonstrate that Congress knows how to distinguish between the penalty authorized for a crime and the penalty actually imposed in a particular case. See also S 1101(a)(43)(R) (covering commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles with altered vehicle identification numbers for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year); S 1101(a)(43)(S) (covering obstruction of justice, perjury, subornation of perjury, and witness bribery for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year). The maximum possible penalty and the penalty actually imposed, then, may be relevant, but there is simply no evidence that the minimum penalty ever matters in determining whether a crime is an aggravated felony. We conclude that when Congress amended the law it did not intend to establish a minimum penalty threshold. Instead, it lowered the maximum penalty required to make a theft violation an aggravated felony. Cf. United States v. Cordova-Beraud, 90 F.3d 215 (7th Cir. 1996) (imposed 7 refers to the particular defendant's actual record sentence, or, if the sentence is indeterminate, its upper bound). Even construing the statute favorably towards Graham, there is no indication that we should consider the minimum possible penalty as opposed to the penalty actually ordered by the sentencing court. We therefore reject Graham's argument that a one-year sentence for a crime with no statutory minimum falls outside section 1101(a)(43)(G).