Opinion ID: 1231990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Issues Regarding Sentencing Procedures

Text: Defendant asks us to reconsider the following holdings: (A) The court need not instruct sua sponte that life imprisonment without parole means a defendant would never be considered for parole. ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) (B) The court properly responded to a jury inquiry about the possibility of a change in the law allowing parole by admonishing the jury not to speculate about any possibility of a change in the law, and that the case must be decided on the basis of the law as it is now. ( People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1064-1065 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680].) (C) The court need not delete assertedly inapplicable aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors from the jury instructions. ( People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 251 [250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25].) (D) It was not necessary to clarify the section 190.3, factor (b) instruction to state that it refers to violent criminal activity other than the crimes charged in this proceeding. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 703-704.) (E) The section 190.3, factor (d) reference to extreme mental or emotional disturbance is not unconstitutionally limiting in view of the existence of the catchall provision of section 190.3, factor (k), regarding mitigating circumstances. ( People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1064.) (F) The 1978 death penalty statute is not unconstitutional even though it does not require findings that (i) death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt, (ii) aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, (iii) aggravating circumstances were true beyond a reasonable doubt, and (iv) written findings and jury unanimity on aggravating factors. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) (G) The trial court need not instruct the jury to affirmatively consider mercy and sympathy toward a defendant. ( People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 1067.) (H) It is not unconstitutional to use the same felony for felony-murder and special circumstance eligibility. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 272 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) We see no reason to reconsider these holdings and decline to do so.