Opinion ID: 1231210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Maras Matters

Text: In May 1983, Barta agreed to represent Jacqueline Maras in her dissolution action for a fixed fee of $2,500.00, without payment of a retainer. Barta discovered that real property owned by Ms. Maras and her husband, in which the Marases had substantial equity, was foreclosed with the redemption period about to expire. Barta made speedy arrangements to find a company to redeem the property, saving the Marases' equity interest. The company, S-Kids Co., sent a $2,000 down payment check (dated July 8, 1983) to Barta as an initial payment to Ms. Maras of her share of the profits from the redemption sale. Ms. Maras and then Barta's secretary endorsed the check, and the check was cashed. Barta kept $1,000 in cash as part of his agreed fee and gave the other $1,000 in cash to Ms. Maras, without giving Ms. Maras a receipt for her payment. Mr. Maras did not answer in the dissolution proceeding, and on July 21, 1983, Barta proved up the dissolution by default. The default judgment was highly favorable to Ms. Maras. Following the entry of the judgment, Mr. Maras then contacted his attorney and indicated in a phone conversation to Ms. Maras that he would reopen the dissolution action; however, the order reopening the dissolution was not issued until August 1, 1984. In late July 1983, Mr. Maras and Ms. Maras gave their attorneys permission to negotiate a discounted immediate payment from the S-Kids redemption sale, since both were in desperate need of money. Barta negotiated an immediate payment of $26,000, which the Marases agreed to share equally. Barta received the $13,000 Jacqueline Maras share on August 1, 1983 and deposited it in his client trust account. Two days later, Barta paid himself $8,000 from the trust account without consulting his client. The referee found this $8,000 fee from the $13,000 settlement unreasonable. On this date, before the reopening of the dissolution proceeding and after the default dissolution decree and the conclusion of the hastened S-Kids sale, Barta was representing Ms. Maras only in a promissory note dispute with the State Bank of Kerkhoven, which was not settled until September 1984. Ms. Maras felt unable to dispute Barta's retention of her funds from the S-Kids Co. sale because she had no receipts or other documents to prove the payments. We believe the evidence supports the referee's findings and conclusions of law that Barta's payment to himself of the $8,000 from the Maras trust account without her consent and approval and for work which had not yet been performed violated DR 1-102(A) and DR 9-102(A) and (B), Minn. Code Prof. Resp., which were effective at the time of Barta's conduct.