Opinion ID: 4245908
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment Speedy-Trial Right

Text: Pina also argues that his speedy-trial rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated. Appellant Br. at 9. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “The purpose of the speedy-trial guarantee is to protect the accused against oppressive pre-trial incarceration, the anxiety and concern due to unresolved criminal charges, and the risk that evidence will be lost or memories diminished.” Brown v. Romanowski, 845 F.3d 703, 712 (6th Cir. 2017). “The remedy for a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation is dismissal with prejudice.” Sutton, 862 F.3d at 554. The Supreme Court has articulated a four-factor test for evaluating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim: “(1) length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” United States v. Brown, 12 No. 16-4006 United States v. Demian Pina 498 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972)). “None of the factors is ‘a necessary or a sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial,’ but the factors are related and ‘must be considered with such other circumstances as may be relevant’ in ‘a difficult and sensitive balancing process.’” United States v. Young, 657 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). “The first Barker factor—the length of delay—serves as a threshold or ‘triggering mechanism’ for a speedy-trial analysis.” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). “That is, if there is no delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors.” Gardner, 488 F.3d at 719. A delay is “presumptively prejudicial” if it “approaches one year.” Id. Unlike the Speedy Trial Act, the Sixth Amendment time calculation begins “when the defendant is arrested or indicted, whichever is earlier.” Romanowski, 845 F.3d at 712–13. Pina was indicted on February 25, 2014. R. 5 (Indictment at 1) (Page ID #10). His trial began on June 22, 2015. R. 126 (Trial Tr. Day 1 at 2) (Page ID #599). Thus, Pina suffered a delay of 483 days, which is “presumptively prejudicial.” In assessing the second Barker factor, “the court considers who is most at fault” for the delay: “the government or the defendant.” Romanowski, 845 F.3d at 714. “Governmental delays motivated by bad faith, harassment, or attempts to seek a tactical advantage weigh heavily against the government, while neutral reasons such as negligence are weighted less heavily, and valid reasons for a delay weigh in favor of the government.” United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 455 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 13 No. 16-4006 United States v. Demian Pina 2006)). Pina contests only the 115-day delay caused by the second mental-health evaluation, Appellant Br. at 10, presumably because the remainder of the delay is mostly attributable to pretrial motions Pina made or continuances that he requested. Young, 657 F.3d at 415 (“When a party makes motions, it cannot use the delay caused by those motions as a basis for a speedy-trial claim.”); see, e.g., R. 29 (Or. re First Def. Mot. to Continue) (Page ID #87); R. 32 (Second Def. Mot. to Continue) (Page ID #90–92). But the reason behind this delay weighs in favor of the government. The government had a valid reason to ensure that the defendant was competent to stand trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (“[T]he failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right to a fair trial.”); cf. United States v. Murphy, 241 F.3d 447, 454 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding, in the context of a Speedy Trial Act claim, that “a defendant may not complain of delays occasioned by the trial court’s attempt to protect his interests”). The government does not contest that the third Baker—whether the defendant asserted his speedy-trial right—weighs in favor of Pina. Appellee Br. at 25–26. Pina moved the district court to dismiss the case against him for violations of his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right. R. 53 (Mot. to Dismiss at 3) (Page ID #284). The final Barker factor “requires a defendant to show that substantial prejudice has resulted from the delay.” Ferreira, 665 F.3d at 706 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “The prejudice prong exists to protect three interests: ‘(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the 14 No. 16-4006 United States v. Demian Pina possibility that the defense will be impaired.’” Young, 657 F.3d at 418 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). The last interest is the most important. Id. Pina argues that the extension of his pretrial incarceration due to the second mental-health evaluation fostered his distrust in the government, causing him to reject the multiple plea offers the government made.4 Appellant Br. at 11. Any post-trial regret Pina has at turning down all three plea offers extended by the government, however, is not prejudice attributable to the delay. Pina’s distrust of the government existed prior to his second mental-health evaluation. And Pina rejected the first, and most favorable, plea offer in June 2014, before the district court had even ordered the first mental-health evaluation. R. 125 (Best Case/Worst Case Hr’g Tr. at 17) (Page ID #594). After considering the Barker factors, we hold that the government did not violate Pina’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Although the delay between Pina’s indictment and trial was nearly sixteen months, much of this delay is attributable to Pina’s pretrial motions and motions for continuances. Furthermore, the portion of the delay for which the government is to blame weighs in favor of the government because it was seeking to protect Pina’s constitutional rights. Finally, Pina cannot articulate any prejudice arising from this delay. 4 Pina argues in passing that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial. Appellant Br. at 11. We have previously held, however, that a two-year delay is not so extraordinarily long as to entitle a defendant to relief in the absence of proof of actual prejudice. United States v. Jackson, 473 F.3d 660, 668 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus a delay of less than two years, as occurred here, cannot be used to satisfy presumptively this fourth factor. 15 No. 16-4006 United States v. Demian Pina