Opinion ID: 431064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Handguns, except

Text: (1) those validly registered to a current owner in the City of Chicago prior to the effective date of this Chapter. (2) those owned by Peace Officers who are residents of the City of Chicago. (3) those owned by security personnel. (4) those owned by private detective agencies licensed under Chapter 111.2601 et seq. Illinois Revised Statutes. 3 The ordinance does permit the transfer of handguns through inheritance. Sec. 11.1-3(e) 4 The district court also dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's pendent claim under the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff is pursuing in state court his claim that the Chicago ordinance violates the equal protection provisions of the Illinois Constitution. This appeal concerns only the federal claim 5 Of course, courts do not apply these so-called tiers of review rigidly or with mathematical precision. Where legislative classifications have not been facially invidious but have given rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, 457 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 2395, the Supreme Court has required that the classification reflect a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection and inquired whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State. 457 U.S. at 217-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2395. This intermediate level of review has been applied, for example, to legislative restrictions on access to education, Plyler v. Doe, supra, and to classifications based on gender, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336-37, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982), and legitimacy, Pickett v. Brown, --- U.S. ---, ---, 103 S.Ct. 2199, 2204, 76 L.Ed.2d 372 (1983) 6 Certainly the provision does not prevent the state or a city from outlawing private possession of machine guns or bazookas 7 The plaintiff in this case moved within the state of Illinois from Skokie to Chicago. He asserts that his movement within the state is protected by the federal constitution and that the Chicago ordinance penalizes that movement. The Supreme Court has expressly left open the issue whether the federal constitution protects intrastate travel to the same extent it protects interstate travel. See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 & n. 9, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 1080-81 & n. 9, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). The Court recently described the rationale for the right to travel in a way that might support its application to intrastate movement. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 2309, 2312 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982) (equal protection analysis applied to distinctions between old and new residents). Certainly it would be odd if the Chicago ordinance were constitutional as applied to those who move from within Illinois and unconstitutional as applied to those who move from other states. However, we need not decide this issue here; because the ordinance has only an indirect effect on travel, the ordinance withstands equal protection challenge even if intrastate travel is federally protected 8 Legislative classifications which disadvantage nonresidents or new residents are, of course, subject to the scrutiny of courts, and we must keep in mind the inability of new residents and nonresidents to protect their interests through the political process. Plaintiff in this case was not able to participate in the political process which produced the Chicago handgun ordinance. He was at that time a resident of Skokie, Illinois, and had no reason to be involved in Chicago politics or government. But the ordinance here is unlike statutes which restrict the rights of nonresidents or of a small group of recently arrived residents. Cf. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974) (durational residence requirement for free medical care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (durational residence requirement for voting); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978) (preference for hiring Alaska residents in energy industries violated privileges and immunities clause). Nonresidents and a small group of new residents with constantly changing membership may be unable to protect their interests through the political process. The groups who are disadvantaged by the Chicago handgun ordinance include those who did not own handguns, those who owned unregistered handguns and those who moved to Chicago after April 10, 1982. We have no reason to conclude that these groups have been relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1293, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) 9 The preamble to the ordinance reads: WHEREAS, The annual sales of firearms in the United States is [sic] ever increasing; and WHEREAS, Firearms, and especially hand guns, play a major role in the commission of homicide, aggravated assaults and armed robbery; and WHEREAS, The improper storage of firearms and ammunition is a major factor in accidental deaths and injury in homes; and WHEREAS, The City Council of the City of Chicago has found and determined that the convenient availability of firearms and ammunition has increased firearm related deaths and injuries; and WHEREAS, The City Council of the City of Chicago has found and determined that it is necessary and desirable to protect the residents of the City of Chicago from the loss of property and injury or death from firearms; and WHEREAS, The City Council of the City of Chicago has found and determined that proper registration of firearms in the community will aid in achieving these goals.... 10 At oral argument counsel for the city suggested that the city council might have included the grandfather clause to protect the property interests of handgun owners in Chicago. The record contains no other suggestions concerning the purposes of the clause 11 The ordinance was effective three weeks after its enactment. The three week period may have provided a brief amnesty opportunity for those who had purchased handguns but had not yet registered them. To the extent that handgun owners who had not registered their handguns took advantage of the amnesty, the grandfather clause reached beyond its purpose of protecting reliance interests. However, we have no grounds for concluding that this discrepancy undermines the primary purpose of the grandfather provision The ordinance also required all owners of registered firearms (including the handguns covered by the grandfather clause) to re-register their firearms within 180 days of the effective date of the ordinance. Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 11.1-7(b). Administrative problems later led the city council to extend the deadline for re-registration until February 2, 1983. Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, Illinois 11,713 (July 15, 1982). Because the extension applied only to those firearms already registered with the city prior to the effective date, the extension did not expand the coverage of the grandfather clause. 12 The ordinance provides only a temporary preference for the special class because the owners of registered handguns on the effective date may not replace those guns. The ordinance thus appears to be a first step in a gradual approach to the problems of handgun violence. See Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County Water & Sewer Auth., supra, 641 F.2d at 1098 (temporary preferences may be legitimate means for legislature adopting gradual solutions to problems) 13 If the ordinance had said that all residents of Chicago on the effective date could own handguns and that all those who moved later to Chicago could not, the classification would be unlikely to survive constitutional challenge. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26, 98 S.Ct. 2482, 2487-88, 57 L.Ed.2d 397 (1978) (privileges and immunities clause). It is difficult to conceive of a legitimate state purpose for such a classification. The narrow grandfather clause in the Chicago ordinance, by contrast, addresses a legitimate purpose and affects travel only indirectly