Opinion ID: 2630876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: How should the effect of a judicial comment be analyzed?

Text: ¶ 26 Because we have concluded that some of the references in the jury instructions qualified as judicial comments on the evidence, we must analyze their effect. Levy argues that judicial comments are either prejudicial per se under article IV, section 16, or structural errors subject to automatic reversal under Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). ¶ 27 Article IV, section 16 states that [j]udges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, nor comment thereon, but shall declare the law. Washington courts apply a two-step analysis when deciding whether reversal is required as a result of an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence in violation of article IV, section 16. Judicial comments are presumed to be prejudicial, and the burden is on the State to show that the defendant was not prejudiced, unless the record affirmatively shows that no prejudice could have resulted. State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825, 838-39, 889 P.2d 929 (1995); Lampshire, 74 Wash.2d at 892, 447 P.2d 727; State v. Stephens, 7 Wash.App. 569, 573, 500 P.2d 1262 (1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 83 Wash.2d 485, 519 P.2d 249 (1974) (the State has the burden of showing that the jury's decision was not influenced, even when the evidence is undisputed or overwhelming ); Bogner, 62 Wash.2d at 251, 254, 382 P.2d 254 (burden is not on the defendant to show prejudice; reversible error unless the record affirmatively shows that the defendant could not have been prejudiced by the error; citing cases, including State v. Amundsen, 37 Wash.2d 356, 223 P.2d 1067 (1950), where the court held that the burden was on the State to show no prejudice actually resulted); In re Detention of R.W., 98 Wash.App. 140, 144, 988 P.2d 1034 (1999); see State v. Manderville, 37 Wash. 365, 371, 79 P. 977 (1905). ¶ 28 The presumption of prejudice test has consistently been applied to oral comments made by a judge during the course of a trial. See Bogner, 62 Wash.2d at 252, 382 P.2d 254; Lampshire, 74 Wash.2d at 892, 447 P.2d 727. In one recent case involving a judicial comment on a specific element in a written jury instruction we did not explicitly apply the two-step presumption of prejudice analysis but found the comment to be tantamount to a directed verdict. Becker, 132 Wash.2d at 65, 935 P.2d 1321. Significantly, however, we did not expressly reject the presumption of prejudice analysis in Becker, we merely reached our conclusion without analyzing the comment's effect. We did not expressly abandon the two-step presumption of prejudice analysis in favor of a prejudicial per se standard. [2] ¶ 29 As an alternative basis for our ruling, both parties cite for different purposes to Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (holding that misstatements and omissions in jury instructions are trial-type errors subject to harmless error analysis, not structural errors subject to automatic reversal that affect the entire framework within which the trial proceeds). [3] Levy argues that judicial comments on elements are distinguishable from the trial-type errors at issue in Neder, such as omitted and misstated elements, and more akin to structural errors that are subject to automatic reversal. The State contends that the Neder harmless error test, which has been expressly adopted by this court in other criminal contexts, should also be applied to judicial comments. ¶ 30 There are qualitative differences between structural errors, trial-type errors, and judicial comments. A structural error resists harmless error review completely because it taints the entire proceeding. A trial-type error is harmless if it appears `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Neder, 527 U.S. at 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). A judicial comment is presumed prejudicial and is only not prejudicial if the record affirmatively shows no prejudice could have resulted. ¶ 31 With trial-type errors, the Neder harmless error analysis asks the court to determine whether the result could have been the same without the error, which is a different standard than the presumption of prejudice we apply in our judicial comment cases under article IV, section 16. A structural error taints the entire proceeding, whereas a judicial comment may not be prejudicial if the record affirmatively shows that no prejudice occurred. Further, judicial comments on the evidence implicate a state constitutional provision that has no parallel in the federal constitution and the existing state standard adequately addresses the state constitutional concerns. ¶ 32 We hold that the Neder harmless error analysis does not apply to judicial comment claims, although it is properly applied in other criminal contexts. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 147 Wash.2d 330, 340-41, 58 P.3d 889 (2002). We also conclude that judicial comments are not structural errors or prejudicial per se; that is, prejudicial without further analysis. We hold that a judicial comment in a jury instruction is presumed to be prejudicial, and the burden is on the State to show that the defendant was not prejudiced, unless the record affirmatively shows that no prejudice could have resulted.