Opinion ID: 559881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Title VII claim for failure to establish a prima facie case

Text: 13 Under Title VII, to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show participation in protected activity known to the defendant, an employment action disadvantaging the person engaged in the protected activity, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir.1990); DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 821 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455, 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987); Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 622 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir.1980). A causal connection may be established either indirectly by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct, or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against a plaintiff by the defendant. DeCintio, 821 F.2d at 115 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Once a prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a 'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' for its actions. Taitt v. Chemical Bank, 849 F.2d 775, 777 (2d Cir.1988) (citation omitted). Finally, should the defendant meet the burden of coming forward with a permissible reason for its actions, the plaintiff must then show that the reasons advanced were pretextual. Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.1990); see generally J.G. Cook & J.L. Sobieski, Civil Rights Actions p 21.22[F] (1990). 14 It is not disputed by the parties that Johnson engaged in protected activity when he filed a complaint with the DHR, nor is it denied that the union knew of the filing of the DHR complaint against Delco. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a); Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 580 F.Supp. 593, 595 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Regarding the second element of a Title VII retaliation claim, the district court found that Local 509's refusal to proceed with plaintiff's grievance until he withdrew his discrimination complaint against Delco constituted an employment action that was disadvantageous to plaintiff. The district court determined that an adverse employment action may be found where a plaintiff is deprived of the ability to expeditiously ascertain and enforce his rights under [a] collective bargaining agreement with his employer. See McCauley v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 714 F.Supp. 146, 152 (M.D.N.C.1987) (court unwilling to hold at summary judgment stage that the suspension of the grievance procedure upon learning of EEOC charge was not an adverse act). The statute itself provides that [i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for ... a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof ..., because he has ... participated in any manner in [a] ... proceeding ... under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a). In the context of retaliatory claims, the statute forbids unions from taking retaliatory action because a member files a charge with a state agency or with the EEOC. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the refusal to proceed with the grievance process because of the DHR complaint is an unlawful employment practice. 15 The final requirement necessary to establish a prima facie case under Title VII is proof of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment decision. See, e.g., Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209; Hollander, 895 F.2d at 85; Manoharan v. Columbia Univ. College of Physicians & Surgeons, 842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir.1988). The union argues, and the district court found, that Johnson failed to establish the requisite nexus. In support of this contention, the union maintains that it could not press forward with the grievance on account of Delco's policy and that its acquiescence in Delco's policy is insufficient to establish a retaliatory motive. We disagree with the union's contention and hold that Johnson has made out a prima facie case. 16 Johnson has established that Palma refused to proceed with his grievance unless he withdrew his DHR charge--the alleged first act of retaliation. In an affidavit submitted to the court, Johnson alleged that the union officials pressured him to withdraw his DHR complaint. The union concedes that it persuaded Johnson to withdraw his DHR complaint. Viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, we think this evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie retaliation case. Under well-established principles, a showing that the adverse action directly followed the filing of an administrative charge is sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. See DeCintio, 821 F.2d at 115. 17 Moreover, simply because Johnson filed his original charge against Delco and not against the union does not break the causal connection between the employment action and the protected activity nor preclude a finding of retaliation on the part of the union. In the usual case, an employee will seek the help of his or her representatives in resolving disputes between the employee and the employer. If an administrative agency charge is filed, it typically will be filed against the employer for engaging in a discriminatory practice. A dispute with the union arises only after the employee becomes dissatisfied with the extent of representation by the union in the resolution of the dispute. Therefore, the filing of a charge against only the employer initially does not negate retaliatory animus on the part of the union. The question becomes whether the union has retaliated against the employee for taking an action that is within his statutory rights. We think a plaintiff establishes retaliation by showing that the union acquiesces in a company policy that abridges the statutory rights of the plaintiff. 18 Nor do we agree with the district court that Delco's policy serves as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the union's decision not to proceed with the grievance process. Johnson claimed that Palma informed him that the union had established a good working relationship with representatives of the company and that [the DHR complaint] was 'bad form.'  Title VII, however, does not permit a union to refuse to file grievances on the ground that the employer looks with disfavor on ... such grievances. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2625, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987). 19 Employees who claim that they have been discriminated against have a right to seek dual remedies through collective bargaining agreements and Title VII or other relevant state and federal statutes. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019-20, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). An employer or union may not force an employee to elect either collective bargaining or a statutory remedy under Title VII. Id. at 48-51, 94 S.Ct. at 1019-21 (1974) (an individual may pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes). Both the right to submit a claim to an arbitrator and the right to submit the same claim under Title VII have legally independent origins and are equally available to [an] aggrieved employee. Id. at 52, 94 S.Ct. at 1022. Passivity on the part of unions in the face of company policies that preclude employees from pursuing both remedies cannot serve as a permissible reason for refusing to proceed with the grievance mechanism. Cf. Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees & Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 525 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir.1975) (union may be liable under Title VII as a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement that encourages the perpetuation of discriminatory employment practices). 20 We disagree with the union's contention that the Supreme Court in Lukens held that mere passivity is insufficient to establish a bad motive. There, the Supreme Court noted that the lower courts found  'far more' than mere passivity in the face of an impermissible policy on the part of the union, 482 U.S. at 666, 107 S.Ct. at 2623, but never held that mere passivity or acquiescence was insufficient to establish retaliation. See id. at 665-67, 107 S.Ct. at 2623-24. In any event, we think that the refusal to proceed with the grievance process because of a company policy amounts to more than mere passivity. 21 Regarding Johnson's claim that the union engaged in a second retaliatory act by refusing to take the grievance to arbitration after he filed the second DHR complaint, we think that there are factual issues that need to be resolved. The district court never addressed this claim because it found that the union was not liable for retaliation in connection with its original requirement that the DHR complaint be withdrawn in accordance with Delco's policy. Johnson, in his affidavit, alleged that Palma knew about the filing of the second complaint against Delco because he informed Palma. Palma contends that he decided not to proceed to arbitration prior to learning about the new complaint. Whether Palma knew of the filing of the second administrative complaint prior to deciding not to proceed with arbitration is a material fact in dispute and may not be disposed of by summary judgment. 22