Opinion ID: 2212249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Three-Readings and Single-Subject Requirements

Text: The defendant finally argues that his life sentence must be reversed because the 1980 amendment to section 33B-1 of the Act was not validly enacted and, thus, did not become law. As previously noted, the 1980 amendment broadened the types of felony convictions that could trigger the Act to include convictions that occurred prior to 1978 and convictions from jurisdictions other than Illinois. The defendant argues that the 1980 amendment to the Act is unconstitutional, and therefore cannot be applied to him, because the General Assembly failed to comply with the procedural requirements set forth in article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution when it enacted the amendment. Specifically, the defendant argues that the amendment was unconstitutionally enacted because: (1) the bill containing the amendment was not read by title on three different days before the House of Representatives; and (2) the bill containing the amendment was not confined to a single subject. We address each of these arguments in turn. Public Act 81-1270 originated in the Senate as Senate Bill 1524. At its inception, the bill sought to amend the Criminal Code of 1961 to make feticide a criminal offense. (See 15 Legislative Synopsis and Digest, 81st Ill.Gen.Assem. 1, at 332-33 (1980).) After the Senate approved the bill, it was introduced in the House of Representatives. The House amended the bill a number of times. One of the amendments to the bill deleted entirely the bill's original text, pertaining to feticide, and replaced it with a paragraph amending the Criminal Code to expand the types of felonies that could be used to trigger the Habitual Criminal Act. (See 15 Legislative Synopsis and Digest, 81st Ill.Gen.Assem. 1, at 332-33 (1980).) The Speaker of the House declared the amendment germane to the original subject matter of the bill. A second amendment to the bill was thereafter adopted by the House, which modified another section of the Criminal Code pertaining to residential picketing. (See 15 Legislative Synopsis and Digest, 81st Ill.Gen.Assem. 1, at 332-33 (1980).) The bill was thereafter adopted by both houses of the General Assembly, signed by the Governor, and became law on July 3, 1980. The defendant argues that Public Act 81-1270 was not validly enacted because the General Assembly failed to comply with article IV, section 8(d), of the Constitution, which provides: A bill shall be read by title on three different days in each house. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d).) The defendant argues that the House did not comply with this three-readings requirement. The State initially responds that the three-readings requirement was suspended by a majority of the members of the House of Representatives pursuant to its rules and therefore no violation of the requirement occurred. (See People v. Cannady (1987), 159 Ill.App.3d 1086, 111 Ill.Dec. 872, 513 N.E.2d 118.) Alternatively, the State contends that the House complied with the three-readings requirement. The State argues that the three-readings rule was satisfied because Senate Bill 1524 was read three times in the House. The State concedes that the bill was thereafter amended prior to enactment, but argues that amendments that are germane to the general subject matter of the bill are exempted from the three-readings requirement. ( Giebelhausen v. Daley (1950), 407 Ill. 25, 46-47, 95 N.E.2d 84.) The State argues that both the amendment and the original bill sought to revise the Criminal Code and, thus, the amendment was germane to the subject matter of the bill. (See People v. Gill (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 1049, 120 Ill.Dec. 328, 523 N.E.2d 1239.) The defendant responds that the amendment was not germane to the original subject matter of the bill, because the amendment enlarged the habitual criminal statute, while the original bill concerned feticide. We need not consider the arguments raised by the parties regarding the legislature's compliance with the three-readings requirement. We conclude that the enrolled-bill rule precludes this court from inquiring into the legislature's compliance with the procedural requirements for passage of bills. That rule, found in the last sentence of article IV, section 8(d), of the 1970 Constitution, provides: The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate shall sign each bill that passes both houses to certify that the procedural requirements for passage have been met. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d). As the Committee on the Legislature of the Constitutional Convention explained, this provision prohibits the judiciary from invalidating statutes on the ground that the legislature failed to comply with the procedural requirements for passage of bills set forth in article IV, section 8, of the Constitution. The committee report states: 3. Journal Entry and Enrolled Bill Rules Presently [under the 1870 Constitution] Illinois has the `journal entry' rule as distinguished from an `enrolled bill' rule. It is proposed that Illinois adopt the `enrolled bill' rule. The `journal entry' rule means that a piece of legislation can be challenged in the courts by pointing to a defect in its passage as reflected in the journal. Under this rule, a statute duely [sic] passed by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor may be attacked in the courts, not necessarily on its merits, but on some procedural error or technicality found in the legislative process. The `journal entry' rule, as a result, leads to complex litigation over procedures and technicalities. The `enrolled bill' rule would provide that when the presiding officers of the two houses sign a bill, their signatures become conclusive proof that all constitutional procedures have been properly followed. The `enrolled bill' rule would not permit a challenge to a bill on procedural or technical grounds regarding the manner of passage if the bill showed on its face that it was properly passed. Signatures by the presiding officers would, of course, constitute proof that proper procedures were followed.   . (Emphasis added.) (6 Proceedings 1386-87.) As the committee report explains, under the enrolled-bill rule, the signatures of the presiding officers of the House and Senate constitute conclusive proof that all constitutionally required procedures have been followed in the enactment of the bill. Whether or not a bill has been read by title on three different days in each house is a procedural matter, the determination of which was deliberately left to the presiding officers of the two houses of the General Assembly. Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago (1974), 57 Ill.2d 193, 198, 311 N.E.2d 116. Here, Public Act 81-1270 was certified by both the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and became law. Because the Act shows, on its face, that it was certified by the presiding officers of both houses, the enrolled-bill rule precludes this court from considering whether the legislature complied with the three-readings requirement set forth in article IV, section 8. Benjamin v. Devon Bank (1977), 68 Ill.2d 142, 11 Ill.Dec. 270, 368 N.E.2d 878; Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago (1974), 57 Ill.2d 193, 311 N.E.2d 116. The defendant next contends that Public Act 81-1270 was not validly enacted because the legislature failed to comply with another portion of article IV, section 8(d), which provides: Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d).) The defendant claims that Public Act 81-1270 violated this single-subject requirement. He argues that the subject matter of the original bill was feticide, and that subsequent amendments, pertaining to habitual criminals and residential picketing, added two unrelated subjects to the bill. This court has recognized that the single-subject rule is a substantive, rather than a procedural, requirement for the passage of bills and, thus, is subject to judicial review. ( Benjamin v. Devon Bank (1977), 68 Ill.2d 142, 147, 11 Ill.Dec. 270, 368 N.E.2d 878.) This court has held, however, that a legislative enactment violates the single-subject requirement only when the statute, on its face, clearly embraces more than one subject. See Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago (1974), 57 Ill.2d 193, 311 N.E.2d 116 (examination of journals, in violation of the enrolled-bill rule, not necessary because statute, on its face, clearly violated the single-subject requirement). In considering whether a statute embraces more than one subject, our court has recognized that the term subject, in the constitutional sense, is comprehensive in scope and must be liberally construed. ( Stein v. Howlett (1972), 52 Ill.2d 570, 582, 289 N.E.2d 409.) The single-subject rule is not a limitation on the comprehensiveness of a subject, which may be as broad as the legislature chooses, so long as the matters included have a natural and logical connection. ( People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis (1971), 49 Ill.2d 476, 487, 274 N.E.2d 87.) The constitutional requirement is designed to prevent the joinder of incongruous and unrelated matters in one statute. ( Geja's Cafe v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Authority (1992), 153 Ill.2d 239, 258, 180 Ill.Dec. 135, 606 N.E.2d 1212.) Hence, a statute may include all matters not inconsistent with, or foreign to, the general subject of the act. If all the provisions of an act relate to one subject, and are reasonably connected with it, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision. People ex rel. Ogilvie v. Lewis (1971), 49 Ill.2d 476, 487, 274 N.E.2d 87. Applying these principles here, it is evident that Public Act 81-1270 embraces but one single subject: amendment of the Criminal Code of 1961. The original bill introduced in the Senate, all subsequent amendments to that bill, and the bill in its final form embraced this same single subject. The defendant's challenge to the Act fails because it rests upon the mistaken premise that the subject matter of the bill, as originally conceived in the Senate, was feticide. In fact, Senate Bill 1524, at its inception, was meant to amend the Criminal Code; the bill in its final form was similarly designed to alter the Criminal Code. (See People v. Gill (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 1049, 1056-57, 120 Ill. Dec. 328, 523 N.E.2d 1239.) Accordingly, we reject the defendant's claim that the 1980 amendment to the Act violates the constitutionally mandated single-subject rule.