Opinion ID: 1718612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Counties

Text: It is conceded that the counties' right to lease the river bed lands must stand or fall on KRS 56.220, heretofore quoted in full. The Federal District Court found although the first sentence in the County Leasing Statute (KRS 56.220) gave a seemingly unrestricted grant of power to lease   , yet the second sentence gave rise to a serious doubt as to the general scope and meaning of the statute, and resolved its doubt by concluding that the county was limited to sand and gravel leases if it had any statutory authority at all. On the other hand, the Henderson Circuit Court decided that the reference to sand and gravel did not limit the plenary power to lease which the Federal Court conceded was granted by the first sentence. The enactment of the statute (KRS 56.220, now) in 1926 undoubtedly had its origin in the desire to clear up any doubts about the power of the counties to exercise dominion over the vacant and unappropriated land in the Ohio River bed north of the thread of the stream, doubts which naturally followed this Court's ruling in Ware v. Hager, supra, declaring that land unpatentable under the general patent statute because the inundated land could not be suitably marked. The motivating cause in 1926 of the enactment of what is now KRS 56.220 was the uncertainty as to whether any unit of government had the legal power to execute leases or grant rights for the extraction of sand and gravel in that portion of the Ohio River bed, and hence the uncertainty as to whether any such leases theretofore executed were valid. The intention of the Legislature in its 1926 enactment (now KRS 56.220) is indicated by the title of the act itself (Ch. 184, Acts of 1926) which declared, An Act to amend an Act entitled, `An act concerning vacant and unappropriated lands,' approved February 2, 1893   . It is obvious that by declaring the river bed land north of the thread of the stream to be vacant and unappropriated land and giving the counties control thereof and permitting them to keep the proceeds from the disposal thereof as allowed in the disposition of upland vacant and unappropriated land, the General Assembly was filling the gap in the general patenting statutes caused by this Court's ruling in Ware v. Hager, supra, and was completing the legal machinery for the disposition of the north portion of the Ohio River bed. In such circumstances, plenary power to use or dispose of that portion of the river bed undoubtedly was intended by the Legislature, the same degree of power of disposition as was permitted in the case of upland vacant and unappropriated land, except that the vacant and unappropriated land in the river bed could not be sold in fee simple because of its nature (Ware v. Hager), but could be used or leased for county purposes, upon such terms and conditions as to it (the county court) seem beneficial to the county. The public purpose or policy behind all the statutes governing the disposition of vacant and unappropriated land is to encourage its development, War Fork Land Company v. Llewellyn (1923), 199 Ky. 607, 251 S.W. 663, and that being so, a narrow construction of KRS 56.220 which limits it to the granting of leases for the extraction of sand and gravel alone would militate against that policy. Our sketch of the history of the statute in Part I of this opinion (The Patentees) supports our conclusion that the General Assembly intended to give the counties the power over all that portion of the Ohio River, lying north of the thread of the stream, except accretions to islands privately owned    [to] use or lease the river bed for county purposes   , as fully as it might otherwise deal with vacant and unappropriated land. The right to execute depletion leases is clearly implied in the circumstances. What else would be the purpose of leasing the river bed? The judgment is affirmed. MONTGOMERY and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissenting. PALMORE, J., not sitting.