Opinion ID: 1111564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: was it error for both confessions to be admitted and for the court to deny a severance?

Text: Gregory's confession stated, basically, that Edward started a fight between them, that the fight continued outside the trailer, that Edward fell to the ground and Gregory kicked him, that Gregory and Arlene left Edward on the ground with Harris, and that Gregory hit him several times with his fist during the fight. Harrison's statement was that Gregory, Arlene and Harrison got into a fight with Edward, that they chased him outside the trailer, that both he and Gregory hit him several times, and that Harrison hit him with a broom handle. Thus, each of the defendant's statements reiterated the same story of the incident: that it was a fight between Edward and all of the defendants. Neither of the confessions particularly implicated the other defendant more than the person making the statement. Both Harrison and Gregory testified at the suppression hearing and at trial. Gregory's testimony at trial corroborated the story of a fight, except that Gregory testified that his only contact with Edward was wrestling and that he left him sitting by a tree. Harrison testified at trial that no one involved in the fight had a weapon, and that they left Edward sitting by his car. Both men testified that the fight started when Edward hit Mary, and Gregory and Arlene added that Edward said at one point that he was going for his gun. The appellants cite Brown v. State, 340 So.2d 718 (Miss. 1976) for the proposition that the State should not have admitted the co-defendants' statements in its case in chief, since they were not properly admissible until after the defendants took the stand and were subject to cross-examination. The State correctly notes that no objection was made to the admission of the statements at trial on this basis. Furthermore, we may factually distinguish this case from Brown on several counts. First, the statements introduced in Brown consisted of an incriminating letter written from one co-defendant to another which incriminated both of them. In this case there are two statements, one from each appellant, in which they acknowledge the other's involvement in the crime, but primarily implicate themselves. Secondly, as recognized in the later case of Seales v. State, 495 So.2d 475 (Miss. 1986), if the trial court determines at a suppression hearing prior to trial that the statements contain particularlized guarantees of trustworthiness ... that is, that the statements corroborate one another on the core details of the crime, then the Brown procedure need not be followed. Id. at 479. Here, a suppression hearing was held, during which the statements were examined. It is true that the specific finding referenced in Seales was not made; however, it is equally clear that it was not requested since the defendants did not raise this issue. Had it been raised, it appears that the statements would be found to corroborate one another on the core details of the crime. The nature of these statements is not of the sort of rank post-arrest fingerpointing condemned in Mitchell v. State, 495 So.2d 5 (Miss. 1986) and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). Nor is it the reversible error found in Cruz v. New York, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162, where the confession of a non-testifying defendant was admitted. Finally, even though the jury was not instructed to consider each confession only against its maker, the record reflects that no such instruction was requested. Thus, this cannot be assigned as error. Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss. 1975). As to the failure to grant a severance, the general rule is that in non-capital cases the trial judge has discretion in refusing to sever cases. Rigby v. State, 485 So.2d 1060 (Miss. 1986). Therefore, where all the evidence at trial went to the guilt of both appellants and not to one more than the other, it is not error to try the defendants jointly. Blanks v. State, 451 So.2d 775 (Miss. 1984). Also, where the testimony of one defendant did not tend to exculpate himself at the expense of another and there does not appear to be a conflict of interest among the co-defendants, severance is not required. Duckworth v. State, 477 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1985). Such is the case here. The testimony of all of the defendants was that a fight broke out between them and Edward over his treatment of Mary John. All of the defendants admitted being part of the fight  none more so than any other. Their defense was self-defense and their assertion was that they left Edward outside the trailer, very much alive. The statements were properly admitted, and the evidence in this case did not mandate severance of the trials.