Opinion ID: 395131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appropriateness of Party Affiliation as a Ground

Text: 19 for Dismissal 20 The issue of fact just discussed whether or not plaintiffs were dismissed due to their political affiliation has legal significance because the Supreme Court has found that many such patronage dismissals are prohibited by the First Amendment. The same decisions enunciating these rights also provide exceptions allowing for certain patronage dismissals exceptions which both the district court and we find applicable to plaintiffs. 21 In 1976, the Supreme Court held that the dismissal of certain public employees solely because of their partisan political affiliation infringed their First Amendment rights of belief and association. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 349, 355, 372-73, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2678, 2681, 2689, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). The plurality opinion, sharply critical of this aspect of traditional patronage systems, did allow that patronage dismissals of employees in policymaking positions would still be justifiable. 427 U.S. at 367, 372, 96 S.Ct. at 2686-87, 2689. Admitting the difficulty of drawing a clear line between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions, the plurality suggested that employees who act as advisers, who formulate plans for implementing broad goals, or whose responsibilities are either not well defined or of broad scope are more likely to function as policymakers. 427 U.S. at 367-68, 96 S.Ct. at 2686-87. A concurring opinion, unwilling to condemn patronage systems so broadly, concluded that nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employees cannot be discharged solely on account of their political belief. 427 U.S. at 374-75, 96 S.Ct. at 2690. 22 More recently, the Court modified its formulation of the exception to the Elrod prohibition of patronage dismissals. Reasoning that those positions for which party affiliation is a very important legitimate consideration and those positions denominated policymaking are not necessively coextensive, the Court concluded that, the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 1295, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). In that case, the Court found that the dismissal by the newly appointed chief Rockland County, New York public defender of two assistant public defenders solely because of their political belief and affiliation was not justified. The assistants' primary responsibility was to represent individual citizens in controversy with the state, and the Court found that any policymaking ought to relate to these clients' needs and not to any partisan political interests. 445 U.S. at 519-20, 100 S.Ct. at 1295-96. 23 Thus it is left to the courts to decide in any particular case whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Guidance from the Supreme Court as to when party affiliation may be appropriate is limited to the facts of the Branti case and to a few examples offered by Justice Stevens in his Branti majority opinion. For instance, although the policymaking activities of a football coach do not make political affiliation a relevant factor, such affiliation would be an appropriate criterion for a nonpolicymaking position such as the assistants to a governor who assist in writing speeches. 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. at 1294-95. 24 In performing the kind of functional analysis called for, we would at least conclude that should a difference in party affiliation be highly likely to cause an official to be ineffective in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the office, dismissals for that reason would not offend the First Amendment. Duties of city solicitors of the City of York are enumerated in the city's Administrative Code. (The city is organized under the Optional Third Class City Charter Law, Act of July 15, 1957, P.L. 901, § 101, 53 P.S. § 41101 et seq. and has adopted the Mayor-Council Plan A form of government providing for an elected mayor and city council of five members, 53 P.S. § 41401 et seq.) 25 Section 2-35 of the Administrative Code specifies that the city solicitor (and any assistants deemed necessary by the mayor and city solicitor) shall be appointed by the mayor with advice and consent of the council and shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor. The city solicitor is the chief law officer of the city; has control over all city law matters; represents the city in all legal actions brought by or against the city; renders legal opinions to council, the mayor, the department heads, the administrative boards, and the city controller and city treasurer upon questions of law submitted by any of them in their official capacities; and maintains the city lien docket. The district court found it 26 difficult to perceive how any solicitor could effectively carry out the duties assigned under the Administrative Code without imparting some advice to City officials that would implicate policy or broad administrative goals.... Plaintiffs were in a position to thwart the goals of the new administration in numerous ways. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 2686-87. The officials in a new administration should be allowed the right to place loyal confidants whom they respect and trust in such delicate advisory positions. 27 Memorandum, p. 91a. And, as noted by the district court, other courts have recently concluded that attorneys with somewhat similar roles may legitimately be dismissed for political reasons. See Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 829-30 (7th Cir. 1977); De Quevedo v. DeJesus Schuck, 556 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1977); Catterson v. Caso, 472 F.Supp. 833, 837-38 (E.D.N.Y.1979). 28 Plaintiffs portray their role in the former administration as performing a kind of purely technical legal work for any official who might request it. They would allegedly supply the requested work whether by doing legal research, drafting ordinances and contracts, negotiating settlements, etc. in a manner neutral with respect to political goals and policies. Appellants' Brief, pp. 33-35. 29 That a city solicitor in a similar position could conceivably operate in such a legal/technical manner is a possibility that need not concern us here. Neither need we decide whether the plaintiffs in fact limited themselves to the role they described. In the face of plaintiffs' denials of a policymaking role, defendants might point to certain memoranda written by plaintiffs introduced during depositions that appear to touch upon policy concerns extending beyond narrow legal issues. See, e. g., Thompson Deposition, Exhibit Nos. 5, 8, 9 and 17, pp. 204a, 218a, 219a, 232a; Roberts Deposition, Exhibit Nos. 3, 4, 6, and 7, pp. 760a, 765a, 767a, 769a. 30 Plaintiffs argue for the opportunity to contest just such factual issues, relying heavily on Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1977). Rosenthal, an administrative assistant in the Commercial and Industrial Relocation Department of the Redevelopment Authority of Philadelphia was fired by the Authority's new executive director. Alleging that he had been fired for reasons of his political affiliation, Rosenthal also alleged that he held a nonpolicymaking position an allegation the truth of which was admitted by two of the four defendants in their answers. Finding that (e)vidence as to the nature of Rosenthal's duties, in the form of depositions, was imprecise and cut both ways, this court held that the district court's apparent weighing of the evidence and its resolution of the issue against Rosenthal on a motion for summary judgment was error, and we remanded for a full trial on this issue. 555 F.2d at 392-94. 31 Discussing the Elrod comment concerning the difficulty of drawing a line between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions, this court stated that, 32 the determination of status as a policymaker vel non presents a difficult factual question. Where there is evidence to support the employee's claim that he does not make policy, as there is here, he is entitled to a full trial on the issue. Indeed, the state bears the burden of persuasion on that question at trial. Certainly, then, it was improper for the district court to weigh the evidence and rule against Rosenthal on this issue on a Rule 56 motion. 33 555 F.2d at 394 n.5. 34 This court was criticizing, in particular, the district court's approach of apparently weighing the evidence to make a factual finding in the context of a summary judgment motion. 555 F.2d at 393 n.3. We did not there state that one's status as a policymaker could never be determined as a matter of law. Where, as a matter of law, a person is determined to have occupied a policymaking position, that person's claims to protection from patronage dismissal under Elrod and Branti are disposable on a motion for summary judgment. 35 In this case, we agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, the duties imposed on city solicitors by the York Administrative Code and the undisputed functions entailed by these duties e. g., rendering legal opinions, drafting ordinances, negotiating contracts define a position for which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement. In relying on an attorney to perform these functions so intimately related to city policy, the mayor has the right to receive the complete cooperation and loyalty of a trusted adviser, and should not be expected to settle for less. 36 The fact that the solicitors wear more than one hat by doing work requested by other city officials, e. g., the council, who might be of a different party affiliation than the mayor, is not enough to contradict this conclusion. The Administrative Code, as previously noted, contemplates that the solicitors shall serve at the pleasure of the Mayor. Sec. 2-35(a). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized how important it is that public officials having the power to appoint municipal attorneys feel confident in those attorneys. See Snyderwine v. Craley, 434 Pa. 349, 254 A.2d 16, 20 (1969); Naef v. City of Allentown, 424 Pa. 597, 227 A.2d 888, 890-91 (1967). 37 Finally, the allegation that the plaintiffs' role in the former mayor's administration may in fact have been highly constricted does not affect our conclusion. Under the Administrative Code it is contemplated that a mayor might rely upon the city solicitors for the legal advice necessary to implement policy. That one mayor may have chosen not to employ the solicitors in this manner should not stand as a bar to future mayors relying on solicitors to the extent allowed by the Code. To elaborate upon one of Justice Stevens' examples, while it is conceivable that a governor might employ speech writing assistants without regard to their political affiliation, we would not want to prevent governors in general from using political affiliation as a criterion for such positions. 38 This argument applies with equal force to the case of one such as Ness, whose duties were largely limited by Thompson and former mayor Kraut to the public housing area. Future mayors may well choose to distribute particular assignments among the solicitors in an entirely different fashion, and thus rely on their second assistant solicitor more extensively.