Opinion ID: 1347679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffectiveness Claims Decided Directly or in Substance on First Appeal

Text: We turn first to Gardner's fourth, fifth, and sixth claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which we dispose of summarily and not on the merits. Thereafter, we address, on the merits, the first three claims of ineffectiveness for reasons that will be explained. Gardner's fourth claim of ineffective assistance was counsels' coercion of Gardner to testify at trial. In essence, that claim was raised and disposed of on Gardner's direct appeal when the Court rejected Gardner's assertion that the admission of his prior inconsistent statements violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Gardner, 789 P.2d at 281-82. Gardner's claim now is that his attorneys coerced him to testify and that his coerced testimony led to that impeachment testimony. As an aside, we note that there is no evidence on record in this proceeding that supports any such coercion. Gardner's claim that his counsel was ineffective because they elicited testimony from Gardner on the stand that he had been convicted of other violent crimes was also essentially disposed of on the direct appeal and has also been addressed, at least in part, above. His argument is that the evidence of his prior felony conviction made the jury prone to convict him because of his `bad character.' Id. at 279. This Court held on direct appeal that it was error to admit that evidence but that it was not prejudicial. Id. at 290-91 (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by Stewart & Durham, JJ.). Gardner now asserts essentially the same argument under the guise of an ineffective assistance claim. Because that evidence was not prejudicial, as we have previously held, it cannot be the basis for an ineffectiveness claim. Gardner's claim that trial counsel should have requested a bifurcated proceeding to deal with the aggravating circumstance based on a prior felony conviction was also essentially disposed of on direct appeal. The Court held that although it was error not to hold a bifurcated hearing, the failure to bifurcate did not prejudice Gardner. Id. at 290-91 (Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined by Stewart & Durham, JJ.). The failure to request the hearing, the specific issue raised now, is essentially the same issue as that disposed of on the first appeal. The attempt to avoid a prior ruling by a hair-splitting distinction in the statement of the issue does not invoke Rule 65B or habeas jurisdiction.