Opinion ID: 1356134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: structures prohibited under the restrictive covenants

Text: ¶ 11 We first address whether Quail Point's restrictive covenants prohibit the erection of Erickson's workshop. Restrictive covenants that run with the land and encumber subdivision lots form a contract between subdivision property owners as a whole and individual lot owners; therefore, interpretation of the covenants is governed by the same rules of construction as those used to interpret contracts. See South Shore Homes Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's, 219 Kan. 744, 549 P.2d 1035, 1042 (1976); Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247, 1250 (1983); Tompkins v. Buttrum Constr. Co. of Nev., 99 Nev. 142, 659 P.2d 865, 866 (1983); 9 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 60.05, at 60-82 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1998); 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants § 170, at 591 (1995). Generally, unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as written. However, where restrictive covenants are susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations, the intention of the parties is controlling. See Powell, supra, § 60.05, at 60-82. The intention of the parties is ascertained from the document itself and the language used within the document. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Powell, supra, § 60.05, at 60-82. ¶ 12 Article I of the covenants provides in relevant part, No structure shall be altered, placed or permitted to remain on any `residential lot' other than one detached single family dwelling, a private garage, a guest house, and outbuildings for pets as hereinafter described. The parties do not dispute that Erickson's workshop does not fit neatly within those four types of structures. The confusion surrounding what structures may be erected arises from language contained in other articles of the covenants. Specifically, article VI requires that [n]o trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage, barn or other outbuilding erected on a building site covered by these covenants shall at any time be used for human habitation temporarily or permanently, nor shall any structure of a temporary character be used for human habitation. Article III addresses outbuildings further, requiring that [n]o outbuilding shall be erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain nearer than eight (8) feet to either side line of a lot unless no portion of said building extends nearer to the street line than sixty-five (65) feet. On the basis of its reading of articles VI and III, and in an effort to give effect to the covenants as a whole, the trial court held that, as a matter of law, the covenants do not prohibit the building of Erickson's workshop. The court reasoned that the term outbuildings for pets in article I is not limited to those buildings that only house pets, but, rather, the term includes trailers, tents, shacks, garages, barns, and the like. The trial court's interpretation of the language of a restrictive covenant, absent resort to extrinsic evidence, presents a question of law which we review for correctness. See, e.g., Buehner, 752 P.2d at 895. ¶ 13 The Swensons contend that article I specifically limits what structures may be built in Quail Point. Article VI, although referring to other buildings, specifically prohibits human habitation and does not expand the types of structures permitted under article I. Therefore, the Swensons argue, specific limitations in article I prescribing the structures Quail Point owners may build should prevail over the general language of article VI prohibiting the use of certain structures for human habitation. Erickson contends that if only the four types of structures in article I are permitted, the terms used in article VI (i.e., trailer, tent, shack, barn, or other outbuilding) are rendered superfluous. He also argues that the use of the term outbuilding in article III and its concern that outbuildings not be located within eight feet of a lot's side line unless they are sixty-five feet from the street implicitly suggests that the drafters of the covenants intended to allow outbuildings other than for pets, such as sheds, barns, and workshops. ¶ 14 A plain reading of articles I and VI reveals two distinct purposes. Article I's primary purpose is to limit the types of structures permitted on a residential lot in Quail Point. On this point, article I is clear and unambiguous; Quail Point homeowners may erect four permanent structures on their lots: (1) a single family dwelling; (2) a private garage; (3) a guest house; and (4) outbuildings for pets. Article VI's primary purpose is to prohibit human habitation of any structures other than a main dwelling or a guest house, as permitted by article I. ¶ 15 Close scrutiny of the language in article VI, however, diminishes the apparent inconsistency between article I and article VI. Use of the term building site instead of residential lot in article VI suggests that the drafters were concerned with preventing either builders or future homeowners from living in partially completed buildings (e.g., basements, garages, shacks, barns, or other outbuildings) or movable structures (e.g., trailers or tents) during prolonged construction on a residential lot or other unforeseen delay, or with preventing homeowners from changing the single-family residential character of the subdivision by having persons occupy buildings other than the main dwelling or guest house. The fact that article. VI lists three permanent structures (i.e., shacks, barns, or other outbuildings) not otherwise allowed under article I is not determinative, as the overriding intent of article VI is to prevent human habitation of additional structures. ¶ 16 It is also evident from the language of the covenants that Erickson's workshop does not fit neatly within the common and ordinary meaning of trailer, basement, tent, shack, garage [or] barn contained in article VI. Accordingly, even assuming that article VI expands the allowable structures under the covenants, the only term that could be read to allow the erection of Erickson's workshop is other outbuildings. [2] It is not this court's practice to override specific language with general provisions dealing with wholly distinct subject matter. Under the well-established rule of construction ejusdem generis, general language must be confined to its meaning by specific enumeration which proceeds it, unless a contrary intention is shown. See Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 421-22, 336 P.2d 122, 123 (1959); Edwin Q. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum. L.Rev. 833, 853 (1964). Here, no contrary intention is shown by any language of the covenants, and allowing the expansive reading put forth by Erickson would render the clear and explicit limitation in article I meaningless. The effect of Erickson's position would be to expand the four explicit allowable structures in article I to an infinite number of structures that could be said to qualify as other outbuildings under article VI. The drafters could not have intended such a result. ¶ 17 Finally, Erickson argues that because article III requires that no outbuilding be erected nearer than eight feet to either side line of a lot unless no portion of the building is within sixty-five feet of the street line suggests that Erickson's workshop is permissible under the covenants. According to Erickson, [I]t is ludicrous to believe that the drafters of the covenants were concerned that a dog house might be located nearer to the street than 65 feet. ¶ 18 Erickson's interpretation of article III is untenable. First, article III does not contradict the explicit limitations in article I on those structures that Quail Point lot owners may build. Article I allows a single family dwelling, a guest house, a private garage, and outbuildings for pets, and in no way contradicts article III's requirement that these outbuildings be erected no closer than eight feet from either side line of a lot unless they are sixty-five feet from the street line. Second, article III does not prohibit the location of outbuildings within sixty-five feet of the street line, as Erickson suggests. An outbuilding must be at least sixty-five feet from the street line only if it is within eight feet of the side line of the lot. ¶ 19 Finally, it is not for this court to second-guess the judgment of covenanting parties by including setback requirements for particular structures. It is this court's duty to enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the covenants. See Freeman v. Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 345, 423 P.2d 155, 159 (1967). The most reasonable interpretation of the Quail Point covenants is that they expressly prohibit the erection of Erickson's building because it is not a single family dwelling, a guest house, a private garage, or an outbuilding for pets.