Opinion ID: 4511896
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Housing Monitor Scott

Text: Mr. Turner suggests two ways that HM Scott failed to protect him: (1) he did not adequately assess Mr. Turner’s report or Mr. Stamps’s yelling that Mr. Stamps was threatening to kill him, and (2) he did not report the threats to other OCDC guards. Mr. Turner’s allegations do not establish a violation under the subjective element of deliberate indifference. “The unfortunate reality is that threats between inmates are common and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted); Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). “[S]ubjective awareness of only some risk of harm to a prisoner is insufficient for a deliberate-indifference claim.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1238. Rather, “officials must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to conclude that it presents a strong likelihood of injury, not a mere possibility.” Id. at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the initial altercation, Mr. Turner did not allege HM Scott knew Mr. Stamps presented a substantial risk of harm or that he informed HM Scott as to how or why Mr. Stamps would kill him. See Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227, 1238 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating court should consider “background information that might inform prison officials of obvious risks to [detainee]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). He did not allege facts to support an inference that HM Scott knew Mr. Stamps could obtain a weapon. He 7 did not claim that he asked to be separated from Mr. Stamps. Rather, he asserted that he “walked away from Stamps,” R. Vol. I, at 303, who went to his locked cell. Mr. Turner contends that HM Scott’s banging on the window showed that he knew Mr. Turner was at a substantial risk of serious harm. But the altercation stopped immediately after HM Scott banged on the window. Mr. Turner’s allegations about the initial altercation show that HM Scott abated a tense encounter shortly after he became aware of it by signaling the detainees to stop, which they did. As to Mr. Turner’s claim that HM Scott failed to inform other OCDC personnel of Mr. Stamps’s threats, the allegations do not show that HM Scott disregarded an excessive risk. Mr. Turner thus did not allege sufficient facts to state a claim of deliberate indifference against HM Scott based on the first altercation. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could not find that HM Scott was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that he actually drew the inference. He does not complain about HM Scott’s actions after Mr. Stamps was released from his cell. Mr. Turner failed to state a claim for a constitutional violation. The district court correctly granted qualified immunity to HM Scott.2 2 In his reply brief, Mr. Turner asserts that HM Scott violated OCDC policies and that, if Mr. Turner had been allowed discovery, he would have discovered those policies. But he did not allege in his operative complaint that HM Scott violated any policies. Because he failed to adequately present this issue to the district court, we will not consider it. See McDonald v. Kinder-Morgan, Inc., 287 F.3d 992, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”). 8