Opinion ID: 2521574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: [¶ 4] Easums present the following statement of the issues: 1. Did the trial court err in rejecting the Appellants' treating physician's opinions relating to medical causation resulting from their properly performed differential diagnosis as insufficient to satisfy the reliable scientific methodology requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) (hereinafter Daubert ) and Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wy.1999) (hereinafter Bunting ). 2. Did the trial court err by redefining medical causation to require general causation based peer reviewed medical literature in addition to the medical causation derived from a differential diagnosis before treating physician testimony will be allowed? 3. In a case when the Appellants' treating physicians' opinions on causation were challenged by the Appellee's forensic experts on their credibility and upon the degree or level of electrical exposures required to cause neurological injury, was it proper for the Trial Court to find that there were no disputed material facts for jury determination and enter a Summary Judgment in this matter? Appellees Miller and Prime Power state the issues as: 1. Did the district court properly grant summary judgment to the defendant on the basis that plaintiffs could not prove that defendant's conduct was the proximate cause of Plaintiff Jeff Easum's injuries? (a) Did the district court properly find that plaintiffs' expert opinion that exposure to low levels of electricity causes reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD), to be based on speculation and contrary to well accepted science? (b) Is a medical doctor allowed to testify as to causation based on exposure to electricity when he lacks a basic understanding of the physiological effect of electricity on the human body and such conclusion is not based on sound methodology or good science? (c) Is a causation opinion by a medical doctor exempted from the basic requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993) and Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo.1999) when there exists no sound scientific or medical basis as to the cause of his differential diagnosis?