Opinion ID: 844227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Davis Standard Governing Postwaiver Invocations of Rights Under Miranda

Text: (4) In Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, the United States Supreme Court meticulously addressed the principles applicable to an adult suspect's postwaiver invocation of Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation. Although law enforcement officers are free to question a suspect who knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his rights under Miranda, if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation. ( Davis, at p. 458 [relying on Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880]].) The prohibition against further questioning in these circumstances is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prophylactic rule `designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.' ( Davis, at p. 458 [quoting Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350 [108 L.Ed.2d 293, 110 S.Ct. 1176]].) Whereas the question whether a waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary calls for an evaluation of the suspect's state of mind, the same cannot be said for determining whether a suspect's postwaiver statement requires the immediate cessation of police questioning. ( Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 428.) Davis could not make this more plain: To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry. [Citation.] Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel `requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.' [Citation.] ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 458-459.) Under the Davis standard, it is not enough that a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel. ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459; see McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 178 [the likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the test ...].) Rather, the suspect must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. ( Davis, at p. 459; see Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 432; Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1126 [question is not what defendant understood himself to be saying, but what a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have understood defendant to be saying].) Thus, because a postwaiver invocation determination contemplates reference to a reasonable officer's understanding of a suspect's statements in light of known or objectively apparent circumstances, the suspect's subjective desire for counsel is not relevant. As Davis explained, while requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects whobecause of fear, intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasonswill not clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present, it is the Miranda warnings themselves, whichwhen given to the suspect and waived prior to questioning are `sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.' ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 460.) Even though officers may ask questions to clarify whether the right to counsel is being invoked, they are not obligated to do so. ( Id. at p. 461.) The requirement of an unambiguous and unequivocal assertion likewise applies to a suspect's invocation of the right to silence. ( Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260]; accord, People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 947-949 [105 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 224 P.3d 877] [officers need not clarify whether defendant is invoking right to silence].) Not only is there no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel ( Berghuis, at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260]), but applying different rules would be difficult for law enforcement officials to implement in the interrogation setting, especially where the suspect's ambiguous statements may relate to both the right to counsel and the right to remain silent ( People v. Martinez, at p. 949). The rationale for requiring clarity is to protect lawful investigative activity, an obviously vital component of effective law enforcement. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that voluntary confessions are `a proper element in law enforcement' and `essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law.' ( Maryland v. Shatzer, supra, 559 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 1222].) Hence, after a suspect makes a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, the need for effective law enforcement weighs in favor of a bright-line rule that allows officers to continue questioning unless the suspect clearly invokes the right to counsel or right to silence. There are important practical and policy reasons supporting this rule. When the interrogating officers reasonably do not know whether or not the suspect wants a lawyer, a rule requiring the immediate cessation of questioning `would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity,' . . . because it would needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present. ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 460, citation omitted.) Likewise, in the right to silence context, [i]f an ambiguous act, omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult decisions about an accused's unclear intent and face the consequence of suppression `if they guess wrong.' ( Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260].) In such circumstances, suppression of a voluntary confession would place a significant burden on society's interest in prosecuting criminal activity. ( Ibid. ) Applying the reasonable-officer approach, Davis agreed with the lower courts that the petitioner's remark to investigators`Maybe I should talk to a lawyer'was not a clear and unambiguous assertion of the Miranda right to counsel. ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 462.) Similarly, in Berghuis v. Thompkins , the high court determined that a suspect's silence for nearly three hours during a custodial interrogation did not reflect an unambiguous assertion of the Miranda right to silence. ( Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. ___-___ [130 S.Ct. at pp. 2259-2260].) Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on the matter, there appears no persuasive basis for exempting juveniles from Davis 's reasonable-officer standard. The interest in protecting lawful investigative activity is equally weighty in the adult and juvenile contexts. (See Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 461.) At the same time, juveniles subject to custodial interrogation are adequately protected by the following safeguards. First, any custodial confession by a juvenile generally is not admissible if the juvenile did not receive proper advisement of the right to counsel and right to remain silent, or if the juvenile did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive such rights. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the primary protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings themselves. `[F]ull comprehension of the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.' ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 460.) Second, as in the case of an adult's Miranda waiver, determining the validity of a juvenile's waiver necessitates inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding a challenged interrogation, including the juvenile's age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and ... whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights. ( Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725.) Thus, for purposes of waiver determinations, courts must consider a juvenile's state of mind, as well as all other circumstances, including a request for a parent, in order to ascertain whether the juvenile in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his or her Miranda rights. ( Fare, at p. 725.) This approach allows the necessary flexibility for courts to take into account those special concerns that are present when young persons, often with limited experience and education and with immature judgment, are involved. ( Ibid. ) (5) Finally, courts must use `special care in scrutinizing the record' to evaluate a claim that a juvenile's custodial confession was not voluntarily given. ( Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 1166-1167 [quoting Haley v. Ohio (1948) 332 U.S. 596, 599 [92 L.Ed. 224, 68 S.Ct. 302]].) If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when [a juvenile's] admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. ( In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 55 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428].) Consequently, even when a juvenile has made a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, a court may consider whether the juvenile gave a confession after being `exposed to any form of coercion, threats, or promises of any kind, [or] trickery or intimidation ....' ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 383 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34].) [3] The constitutional safeguard of voluntariness ensures that any custodial admission flows from the volition of the juvenile, and not the will of the interrogating officers. [4] (6) Because juveniles have these protections, and because the need for effective law enforcement is the same in the adult and juvenile contexts, we are persuaded that juvenile postwaiver invocations are properly evaluated under the Davis standard. (Cf. Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 725 [holding juveniles and adults subject to same approach for Miranda waiver determinations].) Accordingly, once a juvenile suspect has made a valid waiver of the Miranda rights, any subsequent assertion of the right to counsel or right to silence during questioning must be articulated sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an invocation of such rights. ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 459; see Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260].)