Opinion ID: 1665649
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The City of Athens

Text: In reversing the summary judgment in favor of the City, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: In its motion for a summary judgment and its submissions in support thereof, the City essentially argues that it owed no duty to the plaintiffs and, therefore, that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The City asserts that it owed no duty because § 11-49-3, Ala.Code 1975, places a duty on CSX to maintain the railroad crossing. The City also argued that if it owed a duty it did not breach that duty because it was not involved in the repair of the intersection. Merely because CSX owed a duty with respect to the safety of the motoring public does not mean that the City was relieved of its similar, coexisting duty. The negligence of two or more tortfeasors may combine to result in a single, indivisible injury for which both tortfeasors are liable. See Springer v. Jefferson County, 595 So.2d 1381 (Ala. 1992). The City failed to explain why the fact that CSX owed a duty operated to relieve the City of its duty. In this case, if there is substantial evidence indicating that CSX left a hazard in a public roadway overnight without adequate barriers or other warning devices, and that the City knew or should have known that that hazard was left in place by CSX without adequate barriers or other warning devices, the City owed a duty to warn the motoring public of that hazard. This duty is no different from that which the City would have had under § 11-47-190 to warn the public upon learning of a hazard created by any private citizen or other party in a public right-of-way after the hazard became known or should have became known to the City. . . . The City's motion for a summary judgment was based on its position that it did not owe a duty to warn the motoring public of any hazard created by CSX's performance of repairs. That position does not reflect Alabama law. Therefore, the City's motion for a summary judgment is due to be denied. 938 So.2d at 953-54. The City and the amici curiae maintain that the Court of Civil Appeals has erroneously imposed upon the City both a duty to maintain a railroad crossing and a duty to warn of a dangerous condition at a railroad crossing. The City argues to this Court, as it did to the Court of Civil Appeals, that because § 11-49-3, Ala. Code 1975, imposes upon a railroad the duty to maintain a railroad crossing and the the streets between their rails and for 18 inches on each side, the City had no duty whatsoever in this situation. The City and the amici curiae argue that the Court of Civil Appeals has created a theory of dual liability that will impose a significant burden upon the cities and counties of this State, and that this Court rejected the concept of dual liability in Yates v. Town of Vincent, 611 So.2d 1040 (Ala. 1992). We do not read the main opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals as broadly as do the City and the amici curiae. We agree with the views of Judge Murdock, expressed in his special concurrence, that the opinion does not impose upon the City the duty to maintain a railroad crossing and the adjacent portion of roadway the railroad is charged with maintaining; rather the opinion merely recognizes that if CSX had allowed a hazard to exist upon a public street without adequately warning the public of that hazard, the City had a duty to warn the public of that hazard if it knew or should have known that the hazard existed. Judge Murdock stated: I do not read the main opinion as taking the position that the City breached a duty to repair or maintain that crossing. Rather, I read the main opinion as merely stating that we cannot uphold a summary judgment that was entered solely on the basis of the notion that the City had no duty to warn its motoring public of hazards in public streets even if it knew or should have known of those hazards and knew or should have known that adequate warning was not being given by some other party with an obligation to do so. The City's obligation is not altered by the fact that the hazard may have come about as a result of maintenance or repair work by a private party within an easement that crosses the public street; the fact remains that the hazard is in a public street. 938 So.2d at 956. The City and the amici curiae rely heavily upon Yates v. Town of Vincent, supra, in arguing that the City did not have a duty coexistent with that of CSX to warn the public of defects in a roadway. That reliance, however, is misplaced. In Yates, this Court rejected the concept of jointly exercised traffic control in holding that the Town of Vincent owed no duty to maintain a stop sign at an intersection of county highways controlled by Shelby County. 611 So.2d at 1042-43. Yates supports the argument that the City owed no duty to maintain the railroad crossing or the portion of the roadway immediately adjacent to it, but it does not address the issue whether the City had a duty to warn the public of a defect that existed in a public street if it knew or should have known of the defect. The Court of Civil Appeals pointed out that the City has a statutory duty pursuant to § 11-47-190, Ala.Code 1975, to warn the public upon learning of any hazard created in a public right-of-way after the hazard has become, or should have become, known to the City. Section 11-47-190 provides: No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any person or corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness of some agent, officer or employee of the municipality engaged in work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty, or unless the said injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect or carelessness or failure to remedy some defect in the streets, alleys, public ways or buildings after the same had been called to the attention of the council or other governing body or after the same had existed for such an unreasonable length of time as to raise a presumption of knowledge of such defect on the part of the council or other governing body and whenever the city or town shall be made liable to an action for damages by reason of the unauthorized or wrongful acts or negligence, carelessness or unskillfulness of any person or corporation, then such person or corporation shall be liable to an action on the same account by the party so injured. The Court of Civil Appeals also cited several cases in which this Court discussed a city's duty to warn citizens of hazards in public streets, even if that hazard was created by another. See City of Bessemer v. Brantley, 258 Ala. 675, 679, 65 So.2d 160, 163 (1953) (It is the duty of the city to use reasonable care that no such danger shall remain in a public street where people have the right to travel, although it was caused by another.); City of Montgomery v. Moon, 208 Ala. 472, 473, 94 So. 337, 338 (1922) ('It is the duty of the municipality to guard and protect excavations made in the streets and sidewalks, or in such close proximity thereto as to endanger persons traveling on the street.' (quoting 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 2774)); City of Montgomery v. Ferguson, 207 Ala. 430, 433, 93 So. 4, 6-7 (1922) (jury charge that [m]unicipal corporations are due the traveler upon their public thoroughfare the duty of keeping those thoroughfares to the full width thereof in a reasonably safe condition for travel by night as well as by day, stated the general rule). We note, as did the Court of Civil Appeals in its main opinion, that although we hold that the City owed Franklin and her passengers a duty to warn of the dangerous condition at the railroad crossing, the existence of that duty would not, in and of itself, be sufficient to allow them to prevail on their negligence claim. Franklin and her passengers must prove the following elements: (1) that the City owed them a duty, (2) that the City breached that duty, and (3) that the breach proximately caused Franklin and her passengers to be injured. See Martin v. Arnold, 643 So.2d 564, 567 (Ala.1994). The Court of Civil Appeals noted: [W]hether the City ultimately is proven to have breached its duty is another question. For example, if the evidence were to show that CSX had in fact put in place adequate warning barriers, but that those barriers subsequently were removed, a question of fact might exist as to whether sufficient time passed between the removal of the barriers and the incident wherein the plaintiffs were injured so as to allow the inference that the City should have discovered the resulting danger and acted upon that discovery. 938 So.2d at 954 n. 1. We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that the City owed a duty to Franklin and her passengers to warn them of the danger in the roadway if the City knew or should have known that the danger existed; therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the summary judgment entered in favor of the City.