Opinion ID: 389134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The SAA As Enacted

Text: 7 Prior to 1916, the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred any suit by a private owner whose vessel was damaged by a vessel owned or operated by the United States. Recognizing the inequities of denying recovery to private owners and the difficulties inherent in attempting to grant relief to deserving private owners through private Acts of Congress, Congress provided in the Shipping Act, 1916, that Shipping Board vessels employed as merchant vessels were subject to all laws, regulations, and liabilities governing merchant vessels. 39 Stat. 730, 46 U.S.C. § 808. In The Lake Monroe, 250 U.S. 246, 39 S.Ct. 460, 63 L.Ed. 962 (1919), (the Supreme) Court held that the Shipping Act had subjected all Shipping Board merchant vessels to proceedings in rem in admiralty, including arrest and seizure. Congress, concerned that the arrest and seizure of Shipping Board merchant vessels would occasion unnecessary delay and expense, promptly responded to the Lake Monroe decision by enacting the Suits in Admiralty Act. The Act prohibited the arrest or seizure of any vessel owned by, possessed by, or operated by or for the United States. 46 U.S.C. § 741. In the place of an in rem proceeding, the Act authorized a libel in personam in cases involving such vessels, if such a proceeding could have been maintained had the vessel been a private vessel, and provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel. 41 Stat. 525, 46 U.S.C. 742 (1958 ed.). 8 United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 170-71, 96 S.Ct. 1319, 1323-24, 47 L.Ed.2d 653 (1976) (footnote omitted). In short, Congress sought through the SAA to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against Government vessels or cargo. But the scope of the waiver was confined to the problem generated by the Lake Monroe decision, namely, the arrest of Government shipping activity. The solution was the substitution of an in personam action against the United States for the in rem proceedings the libelant would most often otherwise have had to rely on in admiralty in an action against a private person or property. Hence the restriction in the original Act of the waiver of immunity to claims against such vessel and such cargo. Note 1, supra. 8 9 Conditioning the waiver of immunity in the SAA on the res that is the object of an admiralty claim rather than on the nature of the cause of action that is its subject, however, left a class of maritime claims outside the scope of the SAA. Claims of negligence that did not involve Government vessels or cargo were simply not covered. (T)hese Acts (the SAA and the PVA, supra note 8,) were not generally interpreted to encompass all actionable maritime claims against the United States. Maritime tort claims deemed beyond the reach of both Acts could be brought only on the law side of the district courts under the Federal Tort Claims Act. United Continental Tuna, 425 U.S. at 172, 96 S.Ct. at 1324-25. 9 10 Were this the extent of the law on the subject, our job would be much easier. The negligence alleged in this complaint gave rise to no cause of action in rem against Government vessel or cargo, was not the concern of the drafters of the SAA, and consequently does not preempt the operation of the FTCA under § 2680(d). 11 In 1960, however, Congress amended the SAA, striking the proviso of the first sentence of § 742 and adding the phrase or if a private person or property were involved. That section now provides that, (i)n cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the United States .... (Emphasis added.) The operative sentence of § 742, despite continued references to such vessel, such cargo, and the vessel or cargo charged with liability, is now open to the inference that the Government argues, namely, that any maritime tort is comprehended by the Act, as amended, thus completely preempting the operation of the FTCA in maritime tort actions against the Government. Eleven years later, in De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971), this court accepted the Government's argument, but now, with some guidance from the Supreme Court, we are inclined to the former view.