Opinion ID: 3015328
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: between a place in--

Text: (A) a State and a place in another State; (B) a State and another place in the same State through another State; (C) the United States and a place in a territory or possession of the United States to the extent the transportation is in the United States; (D) the United States and another place in the United States through a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States; or (E) the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States; and (2) in a reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States or on a public highway. 12 scope of this statutory authority.
The District Court found that the ACCESS drivers were not within the authority of the Secretary of Transportation. The District Court determined that, in general, the Secretary’s authority extends to transportation in which there is “practical continuity of movement” across state lines. In applying this concept to the ACCESS drivers’ situation, though, the District Court adopted a particular, narrow interpretation of that term. The District Court found that “[t]he DOL [Department of Labor], in consultation with the DOT [Department of Transportation], addressed the issue of ‘practical continuity of movement’ as applied to intrastate bus drivers in a 1999 opinion letter, which adopted the reasoning of a 1974 DOT ruling. In the letter, John R. Fraser, Acting Administrator of the Wage and 13 Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, asserts that intrastate bus drivers would always be eligible for FLSA overtime compensation, except in one situation not applicable here.” The District Court then quoted the following passage from the Fraser letter: Section 204 [the predecessor to 49 U.S.C. § 31502]4 does not apply merely because the operation makes stops at airports, railroad stations or bus depots and picks up passengers who have had or will have a prior or subsequent interstate journey. The only case in which section 204 would apply to a local bus operation transporting passengers who have made or will make a prior or subsequent journey across a State line is one in which there is a through ticketing arrangement under which the passengers purchase a single ticket which is good for both the local bus ride and the subsequent interstate journey. After acknowledging that “the DOT, not the DOL, has 4 Section 204 of the MCA, like the current 49 U.S.C. § 31502, defined the range of transportation activities subject to DOT authority and therefore not protected by the FLSA. 14 the authority to interpret the DOT’s power under the MCA,” 5 the District Court went on to find that “the DOL’s interpretation must be given deference because the DOL and the DOT agree on the interpretation.” Because there is admittedly no “through ticketing arrangement” covering ACCESS passengers who also travel interstate, the District Court found that the MCA exemption did not apply, and that the ACCESS drivers remained eligible for overtime pay. In appealing the District Court’s ruling, PTC challenges the “through ticketing” test. To assess the “through ticketing” test, we will examine the sources on which the District Court relied. 5 The DOL has no independent authority to interpret the MCA, even though the MCA defines the scope of an FLSA exemption, because the DOL is not the agency entrusted with the administration of the MCA. See Friedrich v. U.S. Computer Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 411 n.3 (3d Cir. 1992). 15 First, looking back to 1974, it appears that what the District Court referred to as “a 1974 DOT ruling” whose “reasoning” was “adopted” by the DOL was in fact an unofficial interagency letter. On July 8, 1974, one Isaac Benkin, then Assistant Chief Counsel for Motor Carrier and Highway Safety Law at the DOT, wrote a letter (the “Benkin letter”) to the DOL’s Division of Minimum Wage and Hour Standards, purporting to answer several questions from the DOL about the scope of the DOT’s authority. One of the questions was the following: Does section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act [which then defined the aspects of the Secretary of Transportation’s authority relevant here] apply to privately operated transit systems utilizing motorbuses operating over fixed routes which may cross State lines or have stops or terminals at airports, railroad stations, or interstate bus depots? 16 Mr. Benkin’s answer to this question, in its entirety, read as follows: Section 204 applies if the bus operations are conducted across a State line. Section 204 does not apply merely because the operator makes stops at airports, railroad stations or bus depots and picks up passengers who have had or will have a prior or subsequent interstate journey. The only case in which section 204 would apply to a local bus operation transporting passengers who have made or will make a prior or subsequent journey across a State line is one in which there is a through ticketing arrangement under which the passengers purchase a single ticket which is good for both the local bus ride and the prior or subsequent interstate journey by air, rail, or bus. Mistakenly referring to the Benkin letter as a “ruling by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),” Mr. Fraser of the DOL relied on it twenty-five years later in two 1999 opinion 17 letters stating that certain categories of drivers apparently akin to the appellees in the case at bar were not within the MCA exemption, and were therefore subject to the FLSA’s overtime requirements. The District Court, in turn, relied on one of these DOL letters because the District Court found that the DOT shared the DOL’s interpretation. However, neither the 1974 Benkin letter nor the 1999 Fraser letter the District Court relied on has the formality and weight that would merit judicial deference.6 Some agency interpretations of statutes the agency administers are entitled to substantial judicial deference. Here, the ACCESS drivers contend that Mr. Benkin’s endorsement of a “through ticketing” test is entitled to deference under Chevron 6 One of the DOL letters also stated that the DOL had “confirmed with DOT that this ruling ha[d] not since been superceded.” This undocumented recital cannot be entitled to deference as an official DOT interpretation. 18 U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which requires judicial deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute entrusted to its administration. However, “[i]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters - like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not warrant Chevron-style deference.” Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). The informal and cursory Benkin letter falls into this category, and hence does not merit Chevron deference. The Fraser letter would similarly lack authority, even if the DOL had authority to interpret the MCA, which it does not. As this court has said, “[t]o grant Chevron deference to informal agency interpretations would unduly validate the results of an informal process.” Madison, 233 F.3d at 186. In the absence of Chevron deference, the ACCESS 19 drivers contend that the Benkin letter is at least entitled to the lesser degree of deference called for by Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). However, Skidmore deference is available only based on an agency interpretation’s power to persuade. The general rule, where Chevron deference is not warranted, is that “[t]he weight of [an agency’s] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. The materials at issue here simply provide no reasoning or analysis that a court could properly find persuasive. Accordingly, we are of the view that the “through ticketing” test utilized by the District Court is not a legal standard that suffices to determine whether the MCA exemption is applicable to the ACCESS drivers. We turn, then, to other 20 sources of guidance.