Opinion ID: 469786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards Governing New Trial Motion

Text: 7 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow a motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence to be filed within two years after final judgment. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. The grant or denial of such a motion is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and an appellate court will reverse only if the district court misapplied the law or abused its discretion. United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285 (D.C.Cir.1982). In general, motions for a new trial based on newly-discovered evidence are governed by the five-part test of Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C.Cir.1951). Under Thompson, a new trial will be granted only when five conditions are met: 8 (1) [T]he evidence must have been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the new trial must show diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be material to the issues involved; and (5) of such nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. 9 Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1285 (quoting Thompson, 188 F.2d at 653). The government contends that Kelly has failed to meet the last three elements of the Thompson test. 10 The Thompson test does not, however, govern motions for a new trial when the newly-discovered evidence indicates that the original trial was marred by a sixth amendment or Brady violation. In the Brady context, the Supreme Court has substituted a test focusing primarily on the materiality of the undisclosed evidence, with a reasonable probability of acquittal as an essential element of materiality. See infra at 135. In the sixth amendment context, the Court has refused to apply traditional standards governing new trial motions because [t]he high standard for newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In assessing whether a new trial motion adequately alleges a sixth amendment violation, this court has looked not to the Thompson standards but to whether the motion has set forth evidence upon which the elements of a constitutional[ ] [violation] might properly be found. United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C.Cir.1976). 1 One such element, in the sixth amendment context, is prejudice. See infra at 136-137. 11 Thus, we must evaluate Kelly's factual allegations to assess whether he has made enough of a showing to warrant a new trial or a hearing on his new trial motion. A motion for a new trial can ordinarily be decided on the basis of affidavits without an evidentiary hearing, United States v. Kearney, 682 F.2d 214, 219 (D.C.Cir.1982), and a district court's decision not to hold such a hearing may be reversed only for abuse of discretion, United States v. Chagra, 735 F.2d 870, 873 (5th Cir.1984). In the circumstances of this case, however, we find that the District Court's failure to develop any evidentiary record or to make any findings constituted such an abuse. 12 Kelly's motion for a new trial was based on newly-discovered evidence that, he alleged, demonstrated violations of his sixth amendment rights and his fifth amendment rights under Brady v. Maryland. His motions were supported by affidavits from himself, his attorney, and Davenport. He originally requested a hearing on the motion but withdrew the request after the government failed to contest the relevant factual issues by submitting counteraffidavits. The government did file an opposition to Kelly's motion denying that Davenport was acting as a federal agent and that prosecutors had seen the stolen documents, but without any accompanying affidavits to back up their denials. The District Court denied Kelly's motion from the bench without explanation. 13 The District Court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing or to otherwise resolve the critical factual disputes raised by Davenport's affidavits and the government's negative responses to them. Kelly's affidavits portray his claims materially and resolutely, and evinc[e], a capability of mounting a serious challenge. United States v. Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 916 (D.C.Cir.1976). In the absence of countervailing sworn evidence from the government, Kelly's allegations are--as explained below--sufficient to warrant further factual inquiry. 14 Although the District Court's failure to adequately develop a factual record is a sufficient ground for our remand, we are also concerned that the trial court may have erred by applying improper legal standards, at least regarding Kelly's sixth amendment claim. A district court's denial of a new trial motion may, of course, be overturned for  'misapplication of the law.'  Mangieri, 694 F.2d at 1285 (citation omitted). The District Court gave no explanation for its denial of the motion, so we cannot be altogether certain of its legal grounds. But since neither party correctly argues the legal standards applicable to the sixth amendment claim in the briefs in our court, we are concerned that the trial court may have been misled on this complicated point. We have accordingly attempted to provide the court with some legal direction for the proceedings on remand.