Opinion ID: 792216
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of improper challenge to defense witness credibility.

Text: 18 Defense counsel objected when, during closing argument, one prosecutor said that defense witness LaShawn Winston had an incentive to make a deal with the defendant because he might be a witness at her upcoming trial. When cross-examined, the witness had specifically denied entering into a quid pro quo with Owens. The trial judge nevertheless ruled that the prosecutor's comment constituted fair argument. We review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct to which trial counsel objected de novo. United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 523 (6th Cir.2005). 19 A prosecutor may not express a personal opinion concerning . . . the credibility of a trial witness because to do so exceeds the legitimate advocate's role by improperly inviting the jury to convict on a basis other than a neutral independent assessment of the record proof. Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds by Mackey v. Dutton, 217 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir.2000). Counsel may argue for a reasonable inference that a witness is not credible, however, assuming there exists evidence from which to so infer. United States v. Collins, 78 F.3d 1021, 1040 (6th Cir.1996); United States v. Veal, 23 F.3d 985, 990 (6th Cir.1994). 20 In this case, there was sufficient evidence to support the prosecutor's comments. Stevie Jones testified inter alia that Winston and Owens robbed at least one bank together before Winston admitted that she was under investigation for another, unsolved bank robbery. If credited, these facts alone support the inference that Winston had some incentive to lie, which is all the prosecution argued. Accordingly, we affirm the district court. 21