Opinion ID: 1528630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the applicability of the 1989 amendment

Text: The Defendant avers that the trial judge committed error because he should have charged the jury under the November 1989 amendment to the Tennessee death penalty statute since the trial and sentencing hearing occurred after that date. The offense occurred in July 1989. The capital sentencing statute was amended November 1, 1989. The Defendant was tried and sentenced in September 1991. The trial court instructed the jury under the capital sentencing statute as it existed prior to November 1, 1989. The changes in the 1989 Act involved in this case include the instructions regarding the burden of proof, the standard of proof and the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the definition of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. The issue thus presented is whether the General Assembly intended that the 1989 amendments to the capital sentencing statute apply to sentencing conducted after the effective date of the amendments for capital offenses committed before the effective date. Generally, a criminal offender must be sentenced pursuant to the statute in effect at the time of the offense. See State v. Reed, 689 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984); 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1462 (1989). The Defendant, however, relies upon T.C.A. § 40-35-117(b) which provides: Unless prohibited by the United States or Tennessee Constitution, any person sentenced on or after November 1, 1989, for an offense committed between July 1, 1982 and November 1, 1989, shall be sentenced under the provisions of this chapter. The State submits that the statute's reference to this chapter refers to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (Title 40, Chapter 35) and not to T.C.A. § 39-13-204, et seq., (Title 39, Chapter 13), which governs sentencing in capital cases. In the public act, the Legislature used the word act in place of chapter, which is found in the codification of the public act. 1989 Pub. Act. No. 591. The term act in the public chapter clearly refers only to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. The State further argues that T.C.A. § 40-35-117 does not govern the issue of whether the changes in the capital sentencing statute apply to those persons who committed their offense prior to November 1, 1989, but were sentenced after that date. Rather, the controlling provision is T.C.A. § 39-11-112, which provides: Whenever any penal statute or penal legislative act of the State is repealed or amended by a subsequent legislative act, any offense is defined by the statute or act being repealed or amended, committed while such statute or act was in full force and effect shall be prosecuted under the act or statute at the time of the commission of the offense. Except as provided under the provisions of § 40-35-117, in the event the subsequent act provides for a lesser penalty, any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act. The State argues that in determining whether the old or new statute applies, the question becomes whether the subsequent act provides for a lesser penalty. In this case, the punishment prior to November 1, 1989, for first-degree murder was either life or death. The punishment after the amendments to the Act did not affect the penalty: it remains either life or death. It cannot be said that a lesser penalty was provided by the subsequent act. Rather, the subsequent act merely changed various procedures to be followed at the sentencing hearing. We find it difficult to say that the amendments to the capital sentencing statute provide for a lesser penalty since the amendments mandate no specific result but change only the method by which the jury should reach its decision. Faced with the same question in State v. Brimmer, supra , we found controlling the general provisions of T.C.A. § 39-11-112 and the principles against retroactive application of statutes. We held the trial court correctly instructed the sentencing law in effect at the time the murder was committed. Likewise, in State v. Cazes, supra , where the offense occurred prior to the amendment, we found the jury instruction under the pre-1989 statute was appropriate. We accordingly find no error in the present case.