Opinion ID: 1901249
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of Clinton's Fair Share Responsibility

Text: As we explained above, the developing characterization used by the trial court has been discarded as a remedial standard in favor of the growth characterization contained in the SDGP. Clinton Township, unlike the bulk of Hunterdon County, contains a substantial growth area, and is part of the SDGP's Clinton Corridor. The Current Development Character of this Corridor is defined as follows: This corridor extends westward from the Northeast Area along Interstate 78 to Clinton. The area includes older centers such as Somerville, Raritan and Clinton, but much of the land is either open or developed at very low densities. Many communities are within easy reach of northeastern New Jersey and New York employment centers by improved highways and interstates. [SDGP at 55]. In keeping with the planned growth policies of the SDGP, we hold that Clinton Township has the obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of the region's lower income housing need. A determination of the extent of that fair share obligation shall be made by the trial court on remand, consistent with the principles and procedures outlined in this opinion. Our remand for a fair share determination does not reflect disagreement with the fair share findings below. On the contrary, those findings were well reasoned and solidly grounded in the evidence at trial. We remand on this issue for the sole purpose of allowing the trial court to determine whether our rulings concerning the SDGP have any impact on what would otherwise be an unassailable holding as to Clinton's fair share. The SDGP placed approximately 40 percent of the township in a growth area, the balance being limited growth and agriculture areas. On remand the trial court should determine whether the fair share can be accommodated completely in the growth area consistent with sensible planning. If it can, then the fair share determination below shall stand; if not, it shall be revised appropriately. The trial court need not be concerned with the general growth pressure that any development in a growth area may exert on the neighboring limited growth or agriculture area, since those pressures are implicit in and presumably acceptable to the State Plan. They are, obviously, inevitable. Such general pressures, however, are to be distinguished from the site specific pressure of locating a large-scale development in such a fashion in a growth area as to make it highly likely that growth will occur where it is intended not to, namely, in the limited growth area. These matters are best left to the municipality and planners in redesigning the zoning ordinance. In that connection, the revised ordinance should obviously be tailored to encourage lower income housing only in the growth area. Once the trial court has determined Clinton's fair share obligation, it must ensure that this obligation will be met, using the remedies and procedures set forth above. We will comment separately here on the builder's remedy and the master.
As previously explained, builder's remedies will no longer be rare and will be granted as a matter of course where (i) the plaintiff-developer will provide a substantial amount of lower income housing, and (ii) the proposed project accords with sound land use planning. Satisfaction of both of these preconditions may be difficult in this case. As noted above, the topography of the Beaverbrook tract (which plaintiff still owns) makes construction much more difficult than on the Gobel tract (which plaintiff sold), especially if costs are to be kept down so that construction of lower income housing is economically feasible. In fact, plaintiff had originally planned to construct its lower cost housing only on the Gobel tract and may be unable to construct it on Beaverbrook. If, on remand, the trial court finds that Round Valley in fact has no plans to build lower income housing on its remaining Beaverbrook tract, no builder's remedy should be granted. We emphasize that it will not be sufficient for plaintiff to show that its proposed development on Beaverbrook will supply least cost housing. Our prior observations that least cost housing cannot be used to satisfy the Mount Laurel obligation unless and until it is demonstrated that the numerous affirmative devices set forth above cannot produce actual lower income housing relates to the overall ordinance and its validity; it is only in that respect that least cost housing is an acceptable substitute for the Mount Laurel obligation. When it comes to a builder's remedy, however, there is no substitute for low and moderate income housing. If the builder wants his remedy, he must prove to the satisfaction of the trial court that lower income housing, not just least cost housing, will actually result from it. Obviously, this may require very high density construction, subsidies, mandatory set-asides, and other devices; but whatever is required, lower income housing must result. What a substantial portion is will be up to the trial court. We do not mean to indicate that the presence of a substantial amount of least cost housing will not be influential in persuading the trial court that the provision of a lesser amount of lower income housing will be satisfactory. One may influence the other. As for the suitability of plaintiff's tract, there was some evidence offered suggesting environmental problems in the construction of multi-family dwellings on this property. [68] Therefore on remand there shall be further inquiry by the trial court as to the environmental factors affecting Beaverbrook in view of whatever plaintiff's new plans may be, for those plans have not yet been formulated. When these plans have been completed and the trial court is satisfied that they will indeed provide a substantial portion of low and moderate income housing, the environmental issue shall then be determined, including, as the trial court did in its initial decision, requirements that the appropriate environmental agencies pass on the development. We emphasize again that the mere fact that there may be a better piece of land for this kind of development does not justify rejection of plaintiff's builder's remedy. It is only if the proposed development of Beaverbrook is contrary to sound planning principles, or represents a substantial environmental hazard, that it should be denied. If, on remand, plaintiff is awarded a builder's remedy, the trial court shall determine whether the scope of the proposed project would effect a radical transformation of Clinton and, if so, whether it should be phased-in at a rate slower than now planned by plaintiff.
The appointment of a master by the trial court was not premature, contrary to the Appellate Division's determination. As stated above, we believe that upon invalidation of an ordinance and the issuance of an order to rezone, trial courts may, in their discretion, freely appoint a master to aid in the implementation of their order, and need not await voluntary compliance on the part of the municipality, as suggested by the Appellate Division. We disapprove, however, of the apparent delegation of judicial power by the trial court to the master in this case. It must in the end be the judge and not the master who decides what actions will constitute compliance with our mandate. In this case it is quite clear, at least from the trial court's language, that the court intended simply to adopt the master's determination as to compliance. We therefore reverse the Appellate Division judgment and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.