Opinion ID: 4644041
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extension of Stop

Text: “[A] police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 350 (2015). Thus, the “controlling rule is that a vehicle stop may last no longer than is required to accomplish the purpose of the stop.” Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 423 (Ky. 2013). As noted, after police briefly investigated Appellant—which involved questioning, checking his driver’s information and criminal/warrant background, removing him from the vehicle, and even consensually frisking his person—he should have been free to leave. That was enough time to accomplish the purpose of the stop, and officers could not constitutionally prolong the seizure past the time necessary to complete their initial purpose. 9 However, even if we agreed with the trial court that the “mission” of the police was to perform a welfare check on Appellant to ensure he was okay, that certainly should have been completed prior to performing the above-mentioned tasks. Officers had gathered enough information to ensure Appellant was not intoxicated, unconscious, in need of assistance, or otherwise suffering from a medical emergency—all which satisfied the purpose for the initial interaction. Further, officers testified Appellant had not broken any laws, and nothing occurred to create new reasonable suspicion to extend Appellant’s seizure. In spite of the fact officers had accomplished the purpose of the initial stop, they ordered Appellant to the front of the police cruiser, continued questioning him, and eventually asked to search his vehicle. Appellant refused to consent to the search, and police acknowledged this lack of consent. An officer then told Appellant to wait at the front of the cruiser while he searched around the exterior of Appellant’s vehicle. The officer walked around Appellant’s vehicle while holding his flashlight up to the windows and maneuvering his body position to enable him to see from different angles inside Appellant’s vehicle. Eventually, the officer spotted a bag of marijuana on the floorboard and called Appellant over to confirm its presence. After subsequently searching Appellant’s vehicle, police found more drugs and contraband. Appellant characterizes the officers’ search as “a fishing expedition,” and we must agree. This was an unconstitutional extension beyond the initial purpose of the interaction, as it was not supported by any new reasonable 10 suspicion to support the extension. Once the police ordered Appellant to the front of the police cruiser for additional questioning and further ordered Appellant to wait there while he performed a walk-around search of Appellant’s vehicle, it was no different than the police extending a stop to allow for a police dog sniff. In Davis v. Commonwealth, this Court reiterated United States Supreme Court precedent that a police dog sniff is not a normal part of a traffic stop, and if a traffic stop is prolonged for that purpose, it is unlawful. 484 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Ky. 2016) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55). There are times when police can extend a stop for such a purpose. “In order to extend a stop beyond the time required to complete its initial purpose, something must occur during the stop to create a ‘reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, No. 2019SC-0087-DG, 2020 WL 6390276, at  (Ky. Oct. 29, 2020) (quoting Turley, 399 S.W.3d at 421). However, “[i]f the traffic stop is prolonged beyond the time required for the purpose of the stop, ‘the subsequent discovery of contraband is the product of an unconstitutional seizure.’” Davis, 484 S.W.3d at 292 (quoting Epps v. Commonwealth, 295 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Ky. 2009)). It was error for the trial court to rule otherwise. The contraband found after the unlawful extension was the result of an unconstitutional search of Appellant and should have been suppressed. The Commonwealth argues that if we find the search and seizure unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule should not apply to exclude the evidence due to the independent source and attenuation doctrines. We 11 disagree. The exclusionary rule “often requires trial courts to exclude unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal trial,” but it has “several exceptions.” Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016). “[T]he independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source.” Id. The Commonwealth asserts this doctrine should apply because officers discovered the marijuana in Appellant’s vehicle “in plain view, independently from any constitutional violation.” However, the independent source doctrine only applies if the discovery of the evidence was “wholly independent of any constitutional violation.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). As we have held, the police committed constitutional violations while discovering the evidence; it was not found wholly independent of those constitutional violations. We also disagree with the Commonwealth that all requirements for the plain view exception were satisfied. This instance fails the first prong, that police “must not have violated the Fourteenth Amendment in arriving at the place where the evidence could be plainly viewed.” Hazel v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Ky. 1992). The police violated Appellant’s constitutional rights by unlawfully extending Appellant’s seizure to hold him at the front of the police cruiser. As such, the officer did not arrive in the place to discover the evidence without the constitutional violation. Therefore, the independent source doctrine does not apply to preclude the exclusionary rule. 12 “The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a defendant’s actions.” Strieff, 136 S.Ct. at 2061. It allows evidence to be “admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance.” Id. In Strieff, the Court held the evidence “was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the preexisting arrest warrant.” Id. at 2063. The Strieff factors are: “temporal proximity between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence,” “presence of intervening circumstances,” and “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. at 2061-62. These weigh against the application of the attenuation doctrine in this case. Also, the link between the officers’ unlawful seizure and discovery of the evidence is strong and direct, without any intervening circumstances. Therefore, the attenuation doctrine does not preclude the exclusionary rule. As we have decided this case on constitutional grounds, we need not address the remaining arguments about the testimony at trial, as they are not likely to recur on remand.1 The only remaining issue to be resolved is whether the trial court erred in entering a conviction for bail jumping. 1 Among these arguments is a contention the Commonwealth implied Appellant was a convicted felon during the guilt-phase of trial by asking two officers if they always found weapons during drug arrests and if there were some people who could not legally carry guns. Both officers responded that they did not always find weapons on drug dealers and that there were some individuals who could not carry guns. Neither of them mentioned that felons could not carry firearms or that Appellant was a 13