Opinion ID: 786958
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Public Accommodation

Text: 66 Events and Cowboys contend, however, that under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C), the provision elaborating what is meant by public accommodation, no publicly-owned facility may qualify as such. They propose that § 12181(7)(C) must be read as if it provided that a stadium is considered a public accommodation if it is a private entity. Because the stadium here is not a private entity, posit the private defendants, it cannot possibly be a public accommodation. 67 This interpretation ignores the statute's awkward drafting. Stadiums and other place[s] of exhibition or entertainment, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C), are never  entities,  private or public. The state of Nevada is a public entity, that is, [a]n organization (such as a business or a governmental unit) that has a legal identity apart from its members. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 438 (7th ed.2000). The Center itself, in contrast, is a physical location or facility. 11 To make sense of the statute, there must be some relationship between the private entity and the place of exhibition or entertainment to which access is sought. Nothing in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(6), the definitional provision, addresses that relationship. The statute is thus ambiguous as to what effect, if any, public ownership may have on Title III's coverage. 68 A Department of Justice (DOJ) regulation directly addresses this question, providing that a private entity that operates a public accommodation is subject to Title III, even if the location is not privately owned. Title 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 defines place of public accommodation to mean a facility, operated by a private entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of the following categories — . . . A motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment. (emphasis added). This regulation provides that operation, regardless of ownership, is the relationship between a private entity and a physical place that renders the entity responsible under Title III. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104. 69 DOJ has also issued a technical assistance manual, setting out examples of covered public accommodations. Those examples make clear that, under DOJ's interpretation, a public accommodation operated by a private entity leasing space from a public entity is covered by Title III. See Americans with Disabilities Act Title III Technical Assistance Manual Covering Public Accommodations and Commercial Facilities, § III-1.2000.B (1994 Supp.), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman3up.html [hereinafter Title III Technical Assistance Manual]. 70 The Title III Technical Assistance Manual provides, for example, the following illustration: 71 If the owner of a building is not covered by the ADA, is it possible for a private tenant to still have title III responsibilities? Yes. The fact that a landlord in a particular case is not covered by the ADA does not necessarily negate title III's coverage of private entities that lease or operate places of public accommodation within the facility. 72 ILLUSTRATION: A Federal Executive agency owns a building in which several spaces are rented to retail stores. Although Federal executive agencies are not covered by the ADA, the private entities that rent and operate the retail stores, which are places of public accommodation, are covered by title III. 73 Title III Technical Assistance Manual, at § III-1.2000.B (1994 Supp.). 12 The guidance provided in the technical assistance manual is an interpretation of the DOJ's regulation, see Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 833 (9th Cir.2000), and, as such, is entitled to significant weight as to the meaning of the regulation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994) (We must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations.). 74 We defer to the DOJ's reasonable interpretation of the statute, as is proper under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). As the agency directed by Congress to issue implementing regulations, see 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b), to render technical assistance explaining the responsibilities of covered individuals and institutions, § 12206(c), and to enforce Title III in court, § 12188(b), the Department[ of Justice]'s views are entitled to deference. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984)). Where the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the court must defer to the agency's answer [if it] is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. As this regulation was issued pursuant to an express statutory authorization, makes sense of an ambiguous statutory provision, and is fully consistent with the purposes and history of the ADA, it is binding upon us.