Opinion ID: 2973988
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to conduct meaningful voir dire.

Text: Keith complains that his counsel’s repeated questions about jurors’ religious beliefs was “seriously unprofessional.” We believe, however, that read in context of the entire voir dire, Keith’s No. 01-4266 Keith v. Mitchell, et al. Page 11 counsel does appear to have been pursuing a consistent and reasonable strategy. As in Stanford, 266 F.3d at 454–55, it is apparent that trial counsel’s conduct during voir dire in Keith’s proceeding did not “permeate[] the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” Miller, 385 F.3d at 673. Defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges against those prospective jurors who expressed particularly strong religious beliefs. For instance, defense counsel inquired into a subsequently excused juror’s religious beliefs by asking how long he had been Catholic. When the juror responded, “All my life,” defense counsel may reasonably have felt that this indicated a more socially and politically conservative juror who would be less hesitant to impose the death penalty. Defense counsel was also quite active during voir dire, and exercised his entire initial allotment of peremptory challenges. In fact, he twice requested additional peremptory challenges. Thus it was not unreasonable for the Ohio Supreme Court to determine that defense counsel was pursuing an objectively reasonable voir dire strategy that he believed would empanel the best possible jury. 684 N.E.2d at 55. Even if we assume counsel’s voir dire strategy to be objectively unreasonable, Keith must still demonstrate prejudice to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In other words, he must show that counsel’s failure to conduct more comprehensive voir dire substantially undermined the fairness of the trial. This court has previously shown deference to counsel’s conduct of voir dire in light of trial counsel’s failure to ask specific questions: Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, Stanford’s counsel’s failure to ask lifequalifying questions during general voir dire did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. First, there is no evidence that any potential jurors were inclined to always sentence a capital defendant to death. Second, nothing in the record indicates that counsel’s failure to ask life-qualifying questions led to the impanelment of a partial jury. Third, considering the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable probability that, even if defense counsel erred, the sentencer would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. . . . Stanford’s trial was fundamentally fair and counsel’s failure to life-qualify the jury did not undermine the reliability of and confidence in the result. Stanford, 266 F.3d at 455. Keith has not shown what our precedents require: “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” where a reasonable probability “is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. 694. Instead, he relies on Gray’s presumption of prejudice—labeling Banks’s voir dire “not meaningful” and failing to offer any alternative. We are satisfied that even Keith’s hypothetical jury, selected through a different set of questions, when seated, would also have imposed the death penalty in this case. Given the extremely brutal and callous circumstances of these multiple murders, the district court did not err in finding that there was not a “reasonable probability” of a difference in outcome based simply on the possible seating of one or more of these scrupled jurors. 2. Failure to object to the removal of the scrupled jurors. Keith argues that his counsel specifically erred by failing to object to the trial judge’s removal of the three scrupled jurors. The argument supporting this point merely repeats those made in the claim that the trial judge should not have excluded three of the scrupled jurors. First, as discussed above in Part II.C.1, there is little indication that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective during voir dire. Like the court, Keith’s defense counsel observed the demeanor of the potential jurors and had access to additional information from each of their No. 01-4266 Keith v. Mitchell, et al. Page 12 questionnaires. He actively questioned all the prospective jurors. The fact that one prospective juror, whom Banks felt had expressed hesitation about the death penalty, was eventually placed on the jury demonstrates that Banks’s performance was not objectively unreasonable. Juror Candice Bores responded to the trial judge’s question of whether she could join in recommending the death penalty by stating that she could only if she “was totally sure and had no doubts.” The record reflects the court’s recognition of her continuing hesitation during follow-up questions. Bores’s selection undermines Keith’s argument that any other impartial jury would have reached a different result. In addition, Keith cannot show Strickland prejudice from his counsel’s failure to object. In the absence of any evidence that a different set of unbiased jurors would have had a “reasonable probability” of a different result, any erroneous exclusion of an impartial juror was harmless because we have every reason to believe the replacement was also an impartial juror. Keith does not dispute that he was convicted and sentenced by an impartial jury, and he presents no reason to think that a jury composed of a slightly different set of impartial jurors would have reached a different verdict or sentence. D. The Affidavit of Indigency Keith next complains that his rights to counsel and due process were violated when the state trial court failed to make sufficient inquiry on the record regarding his filing of an affidavit of indigency and request for appointed counsel, thereby forcing Keith to trial without the effective assistance of counsel. He argues that his inability to pay counsel the fees demanded adversely affected counsel’s representation of him. He further argues that his affidavit of indigency alone, filed three weeks after arraignment and two months before trial, was sufficient to trigger a duty on the part of the trial court to inquire as to his financial status and his satisfaction, or lack thereof, with his retained counsel. Keith retained Banks as his attorney prior to his arraignment. Three weeks later, Keith decided or realized that he would be unable to pay Banks’s fee, and he filed an affidavit of indigency. Contrary to the claims of Petitioner, the affidavit did not ask for appointment of counsel. It read, I, Kevin Keith . . . , affiant herein . . . , does hereby depose and say: That I am without the necessary funds with which to pay for the costs of an Attorney and that I am without any possession, real or personal of sufficient value . . . with which to offer as security for such costs, and that I am a true indigent and pauper within the meaning of the law. There was no record of a pretrial inquiry into Keith’s affidavit, but in a post-trial Judgment Entry, the trial court judge stated: Why wasn’t there any action taken on Kevin Keith’s affidavit of indigency which he filed with the Court? It was explained that this affidavit of indigency and request for appointment of counsel was filed without the knowledge of Defendant’s attorney, James Banks. In fact there is some question as to whether or not Kevin Keith actually signed this affidavit as he was incarcerated and the notary was interviewed and claimed that she did not notarize this for Kevin Keith. Mr. Banks also indicated that if the Defendant backed out of his fee arrangement he would pursue this matter at no cost to the county because he felt it was his obligation. The Court recalled specifically asking the Defendant i[f] he agreed to proceed with his attorney and he offered no objection. As the Court explained to the appellate attorneys, it does not recall whether or not this was on the record during any of the proceedings, however, No. 01-4266 Keith v. Mitchell, et al. Page 13 this Court specifically remembers the look on Defendant’s face when the Court asked him the question. The Ohio Supreme Court considered and rejected this asserted error on direct appeal, noting that the affidavit itself expressed no dissatisfaction with Banks’s representation, but merely stated that Keith was without sufficient funds to pay counsel. Keith, 684 N.E.2d at 58-59. Once Banks agreed to waive his fee if necessary, that problem was eliminated. This claim is not cognizable on habeas because Keith relies upon state procedural rules and state case law to support his assertion that the state trial court should have, upon receiving the affidavit, inquired into his satisfaction with his attorney. Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 322 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1157 (2005), (an issue raising solely a violation of state law or procedure is not cognizable under § 2254); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (federal claim must have been adequately presented to the state courts). The federal cases Keith cites are, as the district court observed, “marginally relevant” and require, at a minimum, that the defendant must show some dissatisfaction with his attorney’s performance in order to trigger the inquiry Keith wants. United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1131 (6th Cir. 1990) (“We affirm the general principle that a district court usually must engage a defendant in person where he has expressed dissatisfaction with counsel and has sought to have him removed. In this case, however, the defendant never indicated that this was necessary. We think it clear that at a minimum ‘the defendant must show his hand. . . .’ Since the district court was not put on notice that Iles was dissatisfied with counsel and wished to have him removed or to have new counsel, the district court had no duty to inquire.”) (citations omitted). Thus, to the extent that this claim is properly cognizable under habeas, it fails because the affidavit failed to give the judge the required indication that Keith was dissatisfied with Banks or even that he wanted counsel to be appointed for him if Banks refused to serve without pay. Rather, the affidavit simply stated that Keith could not pay Banks, a problem that was solved when Banks agreed to represent Keith pro bono if necessary. E. Cumulative Effect of Trial Counsel’s Errors Finally, Keith argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors deprived him of a fair trial and entitle him to habeas relief. The State asserts that this claim was not exhausted in the state courts and is therefore barred from federal habeas review. Alternatively, the State argues that the claim is without merit. Because Keith did not raise his claim of cumulative error in the state courts, it is procedurally defaulted. See Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[t]he Supreme Court has not held that constitutional claims that would not individually support habeas relief may be cumulated in order to support relief.” Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 607 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Lorraine, 291 F.3d at 447); see also Millender v. Adams, 376 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 921 (2005). Finally, because the individual claims are all essentially meritless, Keith cannot show that the cumulative error violated his constitutional rights. See Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000).