Opinion ID: 1965747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Misrepresentation, Undue Influence, and Duress

Text: The plaintiffs also argue that the trial justice erred by failing to find misrepresentation, undue influence, and duress in the transfer of the stock shares and land. The plaintiffs' brief cites eighteen alleged errors in the trial justice's findings of fact relating to the claims of misrepresentation, undue influence, and duress. As previously stated, this Court will not reverse the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury unless the findings clearly are erroneous or unless she overlooked or misconceived evidence. Haydon, 900 A.2d at 1113. Concerning the claim of undue influence and duress, this Court has defined undue influence as the substitution of the will of [the dominant] party for the free will and choice [of the subservient party]. Filippi v. Filippi, 818 A.2d 608, 630 (R.1.2003) (quoting Tinney v. Tinney, 770 A.2d 420, 437-38 (R.I.2001)); Caranci v. Howard, 708 A.2d 1321, 1324 (R.I.1998). In determining what constitutes undue influence in a particular case, then, a trial justice ordinarily examines the totality of circumstances, including the relationship between the parties, the physical and mental condition of the grantor, the opportunity and disposition of a person wielding influence, and his or her acts and declarations. Filippi, 818 A.2d at 630 (quoting Tinney, 770 A.2d at 438). Duress similarly has been defined as a condition of mind produced by improper external pressure or, influence that practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes the person to do an act    not of his or her own volition. 25 Am.Jur.2d Duress § 1 at 446 (2004). The trial justice found that neither undue influence nor duress was present in this case. The trial justice found that James did not substitute his will for Mary's free will and choice during these donative transfers. The trial justice noted the fact that Mary kept an unimproved Jamestown lot for herself, which she later sold, demonstrated Mary's knowledge of assets and her intelligence. The trial justice also found that Mary intended to transfer stock to James once his indebtedness 'to the federal government was settled. The trial justice stated that Mary was a strong-willed woman who was not vulnerable to James's influence, and that Mary transferred her property to James and his daughters as a result of her own free will and choice. Finally, the trial justice found that this disposition of property was natural given the relationship at the time between James and Mary. The plaintiffs aver that the trial justice failed to make findings regarding what was said and/or not said, whether statements were true, whether there were material nondisclosures, belief by the plaintiff, and reliance. We reject the suggestion that a trial justice must resolve every disputed factual contention that may arise during a trial. A trial justice need not categorically accept or reject each piece of evidence in his decision for this Court to uphold it because implicit in the trial justices decision are sufficient findings of fact to support his rulings. Narragansett Electric Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87, 102 (R.1.2006); see also Mattera v. Mattera, 669 A.2d 538, 541 (R.I.1996) (This Court has held that even in the event that `a trial justice fails to expressly articulate findings of fact we shall not refuse to accord the decision the persuasive force usually accorded such decisions on review, for the reason that implicit in a decision are such findings of fact necessary to support it.') (quoting Duke v. Duke, 510 A.2d 430, 432 (R.I.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 864, 107 S.Ct. 219, 93 L.Ed.2d 147 (1986)) Here, the trial justice expressly found that Mary signed the stock-transfer documents willingly, voluntarily, without undue pressure having been asserted on her by anyone. Moreover, she did not accept Mary's version of the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the Jamestown property to James[,] finding rather that once the relationship with her son broke down, Mary wanted to believe that she was forced into a transfer of the Jamestown property and the stock in the family business to James; but that doesn't make it so. The trial justice concluded: The evidence is clear, the evidence is convincing. To sustain the claim of undue influence, the Court would have to find that James substituted his will for [Mary's] free will and choice. With respect to these donative transfers, the evidence suggests otherwise. [Mary] transferred her property to James and his daughters as a result of her own free will and choice. [Mary] is a strongwilled woman. She was not vulnerable to be being influenced by [James]. In spite of their close relationship, she had her own ideas and was not afraid to assert them. James may have enjoyed a relationship of trust and confidence with his mother, but he was her son. This is not a situation where the deeds constitute unexplained, unnatural disposition of her property to a stranger. Transferring the property to James was not the least bit unexpected or unnatural under the circumstances of her relationship with her family, the history among them, her wealth, and her age. With respect to the claims of duress, there is no evidence that James threatened to perform or did perform any wrongful act that coerced her into making the donative transfers that she would not have otherwise made. The only acts he purportedly performed to coerce her into transferring her interest in the Jamestown property was in the form of nagging. The Court didn't accept that testimony; but if he had nagged her, [Mary] is sufficiently strong to withstand the nagging as she proved by retaining a parcel that she sold for $48,000. There's no evidence that anyone misrepresented anything to [Mary]. She knew exactly what she was doing when she signed the documents. No one attempted to mislead her; and there was no misrepresentation. The import of the trial justice's findings is unmistakable. She assessed the veracity of the various witnesses, weighed the credible evidence, drew reasonable inferences from the evidence, made extensive findings of fact, discussed her findings and theory of the case at some length, and categorically rejected any allegation that Mary transferred the stock and real estate to James as the result of misrepresentation, undue influence or duress. We are satisfied that her findings are sufficient to support her legal conclusions, even though she may not have articulated specific findings with respect to each and every disputed fact. Moreover, we perceive no merit in plaintiffs contentions that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence, particularly in the context of this bench trial.