Opinion ID: 178586
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Investigation of Brain Disorder

Text: We first address Crittenden's argument that trial counsel's investigation was inadequate because it did not turn up evidence of an organic mood disorder with bipolar features. He asserts that the factual basis for such a diagnosisa history of mood swings, aberrant behavior, and psychiatric treatmentwas well-documented and readily available to trial counsel. In his youth, Crittenden had been prescribed and responded well to lithium, a standard treatment for an organic mood disorder with bipolar features. According to Dr. Woods, its manifestations were readily apparent for many years and should have been easily discernable from a review of [Crittenden's] medical and social history. An adequate mitigation investigation would, Crittenden argues, have enabled his psychiatric experts to make that diagnosis before the penalty phase began. The California Supreme Court's rejection of this claim was not an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Trial counsel's performance in the penalty phase is assessed using the same `clearly established' precedent of Strickland  that applies to all IAC claims. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). In preparing for the sentencing phase of a capital trial, it is imperative that trial counsel undertake a diligent investigation into all reasonably available mitigating information. See Porter v. McCollum, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 452-53, 175 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009) (per curiam); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-81, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 630-31 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (describing the minimal type of `objectively reasonable' investigation any competent capital defense attorney should conduct in preparing a penalty phase defense). Counsel must conduct reasonable investigations or. . . make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The investigation supporting counsel's decision to stop investigating must itself be reasonable, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Stankewitz, 365 F.3d at 719, evaluat[ing] the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In addition to the mental health experts already consulted (Drs. Kaldor, Erickson, Seals, Bittle and Dublin), Crittenden's trial counsel retained Dr. Daniel Edwards, a psychiatrist, to perform additional testing on March 26, 1989. Dr. Edwards also reviewed the results of Dr. Seals' EEG/BEAM testing. The following day, Dr. Richard Sauer performed a neurological evaluation and found no abnormalities. Crittenden's trial counsel consulted Dr. Bittle again on April 25 to discuss the upcoming penalty phase. About a week later, Dr. Edwards submitted a report concluding that Crittenden had an Organic Brain Syndrome, Not Otherwise Specified. He wrote that a frontal lobe defect could account for significant features of Crittenden's brain dysfunction. The penalty phase began two days later. None of the seven mental health professionals trial counsel consulted before the penalty phase diagnosed an organic mood disorder with bipolar features. After being informed by Dr. Kaldor that there were certain organic mental conditions which are associated with aggressive behavior and poor impulse control, trial counsel explored this potential source of mitigating information. It is not disputed that the experts they retained were competent and qualified to evaluate Crittenden's mental impairments. Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir.1999) (emphasizing that effective assistance of counsel means employing experts who are qualified to perform the investigation necessary). Trial counsel therefore fulfilled their obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult. Caro, 165 F.3d at 1226. Their investigative duties were not then at an end, however, because in the preparing for the penalty phase, counsel must also present [appropriate] experts with information relevant to the conclusion of the expert. Id. Here, Dr. Kaldor took Crittenden's medical history and reviewed some of his medical records, although not the ones describing the lithium treatment. Dr. Erickson took his life history. Neither diagnosed an organic mood disorder. Dr. Bittle reviewed Crittenden's complete medical/psychological file, which at that time included his childhood records, and the reports of Drs. Kaldor, Erickson and Seals. He disputed Drs. Kaldor and Erickson's conclusion that Crittenden had an antisocial personality disorder, but also did not diagnose an organic mood disorder. Dr. Dublin's MRI study found that the structural integrity of Crittenden's brain was within normal limits. Dr. Sauer's independent neurological evaluation turned up no abnormalities. Even with the benefit of Dr. Seals' EEG/BEAM results, as well as his own clinical evaluation, Dr. Edwards did not diagnose an organic mood disorder. None of the experts suggested that additional background information or testing was necessary before they could make an accurate evaluation of Crittenden's mental health. At the end of the day, Crittenden's argument turns on a latter-day battle of experts that is insufficient to warrant federal habeas relief. Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560, 584 (9th Cir.2005). Dr. Woods' singular diagnosis of an organic mood disorder with bipolar features amounts to a difference in medical opinion, not a failure to investigate. See Fields v. Brown, 431 F.3d 1186, 1205-06 (9th Cir.2005), aff'd on reh'g in relevant part, 503 F.3d 755, 783 n. 24 (9th Cir.2007) (en banc). Trial counsel alerted the mental health specialists to the possibility that Crittenden might have organic brain damage and then provided them with relevant background information. [12] See Sims, 425 F.3d at 585-86 (rejecting IAC claim where counsel retained and informed well-qualified experts upon whom [counsel] could reasonably rely); cf. Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227 (criticizing trial counsel for failing to provide expert with the information necessary to make an accurate evaluation of [the defendant's] neurological system). That none of them happened to unearth the particular line of mitigating evidence Crittenden now presents does not compel the conclusion that the investigation was deficient. Attorneys are entitled to rely on the opinions of properly selected, adequately informed and well-qualified experts. Given the range of experts trial counsel engaged here, to impose upon them the additional duty to investigate independently of a request for information from an expert would `defeat the whole aim of having experts participate in the investigation.' Sims, 425 F.3d at 585-86 (quoting Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1038). When a reasonable investigation does not turn up signs of additional, reasonably available mitigating evidence, competent counsel may make the judgment not to pursue a line of inquiry further. See Bobby v. Van Hook, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 13, 19, 175 L.Ed.2d 255 (2009) (per curiam). We hold that the California Supreme Court's rejection of this subclaim was not objectively unreasonable. [13]