Opinion ID: 403539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: review of the mspb decision

Text: 27 As noted above, the legality of petitioner's dismissal is not an independent issue on appeal. Rather, both sides agree that the legality of his dismissal depends entirely upon the legality of his security clearance revocation. We, of course, must affirm the decision of the MSPB upholding the security clearance revocation if it is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (Supp. IV 1980). With these standards in mind, and considering in particular the Regulation at issue and the nature of the hearsay evidence in the record, we review in turn the charges which formed the basis of the Army's revocation decision.
28 In defending before the MSPB its decision to revoke petitioner's security clearance, the Army relied upon three alleged security violations by petitioner: (1) allowing an unauthorized individual access to an operational Army vehicle; (2) allowing a typewriter repairman access to a secure area; and (3) posting classified information in an unauthorized area. Lt. Colonel Koslosky explained that these constituted a (w)illful violation or disregard of security regulations, which is one of the possible bases for revoking a security clearance under the Army Regulation. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (14) (May 4, 1972); Tr. 105. Clearly there is a strong nexus between the willful violation or disregard of security regulations and one's ability to safeguard information. Understandably, then, these alleged security violations formed an important part of the Army's case. Indeed, Lt. Colonel Koslosky testified that, of the three bases for revoking petitioner's clearance-the psychiatric evaluation, the security violations and the incidents of alleged sexual misconduct-the security violations were probably most important( ). Tr. 10. He added that even one of the three violations would have justified submitting a letter of intent to revoke petitioner's clearance. Tr. 13. 29 The evidence presented by the Army on these alleged violations, however, was not commensurate with the importance it attached to them. The Army presented no direct evidence of any of the alleged violations. Rather, in each instance, the allegations were based entirely upon the hearsay statements of one of Hoska's co-workers in Berlin, David Hiley. Tr. 80. When asked by this court on appeal why the Army had not produced Hiley to testify at the MSPB hearing, Government counsel responded that Hiley had left the Army and his whereabouts were unknown. The Army also failed to produce the investigator who took Hiley's statements or to introduce any evidence corroborating Hiley's accounts or demonstrating their reliability. Moreover, the testimony offered by petitioner cast at least some doubt upon the veracity and reliability of the hearsay statements made by Hiley. 13 30 The Army not only failed to produce direct evidence, or reliable hearsay evidence, to prove the allegations in Hiley's statements; as discussed below, it also failed to demonstrate that the incidents constituted security violations. 31 The Car Washing Incident. The Army charged that petitioner had permitted an unauthorized individual access to an operational vehicle. Petitioner acknowledged that he had allowed his neighbor's son to wash an operational vehicle, but denied that this constituted a security violation. Tr. 68-69. The evidence presented by the Army to prove that the incident did constitute a security violation was wholly inadequate. Peter Nelson, the Army officer who reviewed the initial decision to revoke petitioner's clearance, described an operational vehicle as one that is usuall (sic) of a civilian nature, with civilian plates, and would not have any exterior markings associating it with a (sic) the U.S. Army or a particular intelligence organization. Tr. 50. He testified that he was not aware of any regulation forbidding the type of access to an operational vehicle permitted by petitioner, but stated that he thought such a regulation would be a reasonable (one) that most intelligence units would apply. Tr. 50-51. The Army offered no other testimony to prove that petitioner's conduct violated any security regulations or standard security practices. 32 Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that the German nationals in the motor pool, who were employed to service Army vehicles, were never cleared before being allowed access to operational (as opposed to covert) vehicles. Tr. 69. Petitioner also testified that there was no standard procedure or regulation either permitting or forbidding what he had done. Tr. 78-79. Charles Rubacky, petitioner's security manager, testified that allowing a neighbor to wash an operational vehicle, as petitioner had done, did not constitute a breach of security. Tr. 136. 33 Clearly, petitioner's conduct cannot, on the basis of the evidence offered, be characterized as a (w)illful violation or disregard of security regulations, the language of the Regulation invoked by the Army. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (14). 34 The Typewriter Repair Incident. The Army also alleged that petitioner had committed a security breach by allowing an unauthorized typewriter repairman access to a secure area, i.e., petitioner's workplace. Again, petitioner admitted that he had allowed a typewriter repairman into his office but testified that he had done so in accordance with standard procedures and only after taking all necessary precautions. Tr. 70-72, 79-80. He had escorted the repairman into the office, cleared the area of classified information, and ensured that the person's presence would not interrupt any work in progress. Tr. 70-71. Mr. Rubacky also testified that petitioner's conduct was in accordance with proper procedures and did not constitute a security violation. Tr. 136, 140. The Army's witness, Lt. Colonel Koslosky, did not know whether any security regulations specifically applied to this alleged security violation. Tr. 109. Indeed, he acknowledged that (i)f the individual (the repairman) is escorted ... and precautions are taken, then that is according to the units (sic) procedures, then that is an acceptable procedure.... Tr. 29. He also admitted that his overriding recollection (was) that there was a breach here because Mr. (David) Hiley testified there was a breach. Tr. 29-30. In short, the evidence presented does not support the conclusion that petitioner's conduct violated any security regulations. 35 The Alleged Posting of Classified Information. The Army alleged that petitioner breached security by posting classified information on an acetate overlay of a map in an unauthorized area. Petitioner admitted posting information concerning restricted areas in Poland on the map, Tr. 73, but denied that the information was classified or that it was taken from a classified source. Rather, he testified that he had taken the information from a German newspaper. Tr. 79, 94. Charles Rubacky testified that posting information obtained from a newspaper, as petitioner claimed he did, would not constitute a security breach. Tr. 138. Although the Army maintained that petitioner had improperly posted classified information, Lt. Colonel Koslosky testified that the Army's only basis for concluding that the information posted by petitioner was classified was the statement in that effect by David Hiley. Tr. 30. 14 On this critical question, therefore, the Army presented only the hearsay statement of David Hiley to counter petitioner's sworn testimony to contrary. Consequently, the record does not support the Army's allegation that petitioner willfully violated or disregarded security regulations. 36 In short, under any standard of proof, the evidence in the record could not support a conclusion that any of the three alleged security breaches constituted, in the applicable language of the Army Regulation, a willful violation or disregard of security regulations. The Army offered only the unsubstantiated hearsay statements of one of petitioner's co-workers, whose motivation was questioned by the evidence submitted by petitioner, to counter the testimony of both petitioner and Mr. Rubacky that petitioner had committed no breaches of security. Moreover, the Regulation invoked by the Army states that the various factors listed, including willful disregard or violation of security regulations, may, depending upon the degree of seriousness, be the basis for ... revocation of clearance. AR 604-5, P 3-1. The Army was unable to prove the petitioner violated any security regulation, much less that the violation was willful, and even less that the violation was serious enough to warrant revocation of his clearance. 15 Thus, the alleged security violations themselves do not constitute substantial evidence supporting the Army's decision to revoke petitioner's clearance, nor can they contribute to any measurable extent to a finding of substantial evidence.
37 The Army's concern about petitioner's mental stability was based on petitioner's psychiatric examination and evaluation in Frankfurt, West Germany. That evaluation, a four-page handwritten letter, concludes that petitioner has an obsessive-compulsive neurosis. App. 30-33. The evaluation provides no explanation of the term obsessive-compulsive neurosis, and the vague, tentative and conclusory statements that comprise the rest of the evaluation provide no guidance as to the practical significance of that diagnosis. The evaluation states, for example, that Hoska was tense and guarded, though he attempted to be open, friendly, and cooperative. App. 31. Similarly, the psychiatrist states in the evaluation that he had the sensation that somehow (Hoska) did not quite understand the reality of our interview together so that his behavior seemed the slightest bit inappropriate. My surmise is that this is a constant characteristic of his interpersonal relations. Id. The report concludes that 38 Mr. Hoska appears to be a person whose personality is grossly intact and appears to be, on the surface, convential (sic), but who is somewhat out of touch with powerful motivating feelings within himself and not quite in tune to the feelings and thoughts of others in his environment. This situation would make it almost inevitable that he would frequently become involved in misunderstanding (sic) with others and seem to do inappropriate things. 39 Id. at 32. No psychiatrist or psychologist testified at the hearing to explain the significance of the evaluation. Nor did the Army offer any evidence to indicate that the psychiatrist's hearsay evaluation was credible or reliable. It offered no evidence of the psychiatrist's qualifications or of the nature of the examination he conducted. Indeed, Lt. Colonel Koslosky testified that he knew nothing about the qualifications of the psychiatrist or the conditions under which the examination took place. Tr. 15-16. 40 Moreover, petitioner's testimony about the circumstances surrounding the psychiatric examination-the only such testimony-cast serious doubt upon the resulting evaluation. Petitioner explained that he was ordered, with little explanation, to go to Frankfurt for a psychiatric examination because questions about his stability had been raised. He was told that a brain scan and some other tests might be involved. He testified that he was perplexed as to why he was required to take an eleven-hour train ride to Frankfurt when he was stationed in Berlin. Petitioner explained that, under the circumstances, he was concerned that he might have been set up, that the examination might have been a put-up job. Indeed, upon arrival for the examination, the doctor told him that he had no knowledge of petitioner's case and that petitioner's appointment had been made under a fictitious name. Tr. 89-90. Certainly the circumstances described by petitioner at least suggest a rational explanation of why he might have appeared tense and guarded or why the psychiatrist had the sensation that somehow (Hoska) did not quite understand the reality of (the) interview .... 41 The Army acknowledged that the psychiatric evaluation alone could not justify the revocation of petitioner's security clearance. Tr. 99, 125. It is clear from the record, however, that, even in conjunction with other evidence, the psychiatric evaluation could not provide that additional amount of evidence that would justify a conclusion that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the Army's decision. As noted above, the Army offered no evidence to bolster the ambiguous and entirely unsubstantiated hearsay conclusions in the evaluation, nor did it offer evidence to explain how the evaluation demonstrated a significant defect in the judgment or reliability of petitioner. AR 604-5, P 3-1a (20). Moreover, although in some circumstances evidence of psychological problems surely might provide a rational nexus to an individual's ability to safeguard classified information, the psychiatric evaluation in this case clearly did not. The Army simply did not demonstrate how, as a practical matter, the evaluation indicated that petitioner was unable to protect the classified information to which he was entrusted. Finally, the testimony of Lt. Colonel Koslosky indicated that the Army failed to comply with its Regulation, which states that security clearance determinations must be based upon all available information, both favorable and unfavorable. Id. P 3-1a. Koslosky testified that, in deciding whether to revoke petitioner's clearance, no consideration was given to petitioner's medical records and career appraisals, all of which apparently concluded that he was mentally fit and stable. See Tr. 17-25. 42
43 The Army also relied upon evidence of incidents allegedly involving sexual misconduct or other indiscreet behavior by petitioner, which it viewed as immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct under the Regulation, AR 604-5, P 3-1a (17). See Tr. 111-12. In particular, much of the testimony focused upon several events that occurred while petitioner and his wife were acting as advisers on a girl scout trip through Germany. Having reviewed the testimony concerning all of these incidents, we conclude that it too is inadequate, even in conjunction with the other evidence presented by the Army, to support the MSPB's decision.
44 One of the central weaknesses in this portion of the Army's case, as in the rest of the Army's presentation, is that the allegations of misconduct were based entirely on hearsay evidence. 16 Many of these allegations were vitiated by the sworn testimony of petitioner and his wife describing the circumstances of the incidents involved. Thus, although the Army has maintained its position that all of the incidents of allegedly improper behavior together comprise a legitimate basis for revoking petitioner's clearance, the evidence shows that many of the incidents, as explained by petitioner, are so far removed from anything immoral or notoriously disgraceful as to be of no assistance to the Army. For example, the Army argued that petitioner had purchased beer for a minor girl scout in a restaurant during their trip through Germany. Petitioner acknowledged having purchased beer for the girl scout, Tr. 72, but explained that it was reasonable to permit the girl to sample a beer (she in fact took only one sip) because it was in a controlled environment in which he and his wife were present, it was not contrary to any local law or custom, and (t)he restaurant was full of young people of similar age ... many of whom were drinking beer. Tr. 82-83. Petitioner's wife recited the same account of the incident, emphasizing that allowing the girl to sample beer was not unnatural because in the surroundings there were young people drinking beer. Tr. 130. Similarly, the Army's bald and, given the evidence, misleading allegation that petitioner displayed pictures of nude females to girl scouts during the same trip was totally defused by petitioner's explanation of the incident. 17 Since the Army did not offer testimony disputing petitioner's accounts of either of these two incidents, it is clear that this evidence does not demonstrate immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct or otherwise provide a legitimate basis under the Army's Regulation for revoking petitioner's clearance. 18 45 Other allegations by the Army arguably demonstrate indiscretion by petitioner. For example, the Army appears to rely particularly heavily on a single incident in which petitioner admittedly recited an off-color rhyme in the presence of girl scouts. Merely showing indiscretion by petitioner, however, is inadequate under the Army's own Regulation to support the revocation of petitioner's clearance. Even if an incident such as this one could rationally be viewed as involving immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct, it is not clear from the Army's evidence that it is of a serious enough degree-an inquiry mandated by the Army Regulation-to justify revocation of petitioner's security clearance. 19 46 The critical weakness in this portion of the Army's case, however, is its failure to demonstrate a rational nexus between petitioner's allegedly immoral and notoriously disgraceful conduct and his ability to protect classified information. The MSPB decision in fact contains no discussion at all of whether such a nexus exists. 20 47
48 The Army's presentation before the MSPB did include general allegations of a rational nexus based upon all of the evidence against petitioner. In explaining their decision to revoke petitioner's clearance, the Army officers who testified invoked certain talismanic phrases-lack of reliability, instability, lack of judgment, indiscretion-that at least suggest a nexus to petitioner's ability to safeguard classified information. See Tr. 45-47, 56-57, 99-100. 21 We do not mean to condone any of petitioner's off-the-job behavior, or to suggest that it involved no indiscretion at all. Nor do we suggest that demonstrations of poor judgment or indiscretion can never constitute a sufficient showing of nexus. For several reasons, however, we believe the circumstances of this case demand a more concrete showing of a rational nexus between the various allegations of misconduct and indiscretion and petitioner's ability to safeguard sensitive information. 49 First, none of the incidents of allegedly improper behavior involved classified or sensitive information or the protection of such information. Second, none of the incidents in any way concerned the Army or the work petitioner performed in the Army. Nor were these the type of incidents that, by their very nature, had some obvious bearing on petitioner's ability to do his job and to safeguard sensitive information. 22 Third, the other evidence in this case that was explicitly work-related-such as petitioner's work evaluations and career appraisals, which the Army apparently never considered in deciding whether to revoke petitioner's clearance-contains no negative appraisals concerning petitioner's judgment, reliability or stability. On the contrary, they show that petitioner had performed stably and admirably in his position. See Tr. 23-25, 57-59; App. 49-54, 63; note 1 supra. (Furthermore, as shown above, the claims regarding the alleged on-the-job security violations are at best unfounded allegations and at worst patently frivolous charges.) Fourth, the Army does not contend that any of the incidents of improper behavior involved a violation of any law, local custom or Army regulation. 50 Finally, the rational nexus requirement is perhaps nowhere more important than where an adverse action is taken against an individual on the basis of lawful, consensual, social behavior that is considered by his superiors to be immoral or notoriously disgraceful. Without the limitations provided by the nexus requirement, such a standard would give the Army virtually free reign to purge itself of persons found to be distasteful under the sacrosanct guise of protecting the national security. As this court noted in Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.Cir.1969): A pronouncement of 'immorality' tends to discourage careful analysis because it unavoidably connotes a violation of divine, Olympian, or otherwise universal standards of rectitude. Id. at 1165. True to that maxim, the Army in this case has invoked standards of morality in depriving petitioner of his security clearance and his job, but has failed to provide any careful analysis of the connection between the incidents of allegedly immoral or improper behavior and petitioner's ability to execute the responsibilities associated with his Top Secret clearance. 51 Thus, under the circumstances of this case, in order to rely on its evidence of improper or indiscreet behavior in revoking petitioner's security clearance, the Army was required to show some specific connection between that evidence and petitioner's ability to safeguard the information to which the security clearance gave him access. This is not an onerous requirement. It merely compels the Army to comply with the standards of reasonableness and nonarbitrariness in its own Regulation. Because the Army has plainly failed to satisfy these standards, the adverse actions taken against Hoska cannot stand.