Opinion ID: 2156177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Distribution of Wrongful Death Settlement Proceeds

Text: [¶ 7] Bruce argues first that the court erred in its interpretation of the Florida wrongful death statute as it concerns how to distribute any excess proceeds that the court finds are not supported by the evidence in order to be recoverable under the statute. We agree. Originally, the court found that the excess was a windfall and awarded it to the Estate, in effect by default. The court clarified its characterization of the excess as a windfall in its subsequent order, but still determined that the excess belonged to the Estate. The court reasoned that the Florida wrongful death statute would have applied if Bruce had brought a court action, but the settlement proceeds were directed to the Estate and became property of the Estate; that Bruce, as the personal representative, had the duty of observing the same standard of care applicable to a trustee under 18-A M.R.S.A. § 7-302; and that the Florida wrongful death statute provides guidance as to the possible beneficiaries of the settlement funds, but that the court cannot base an award of damages on speculation. In effect, the court concluded that Bruce had received more than he was entitled to as a survivor and awarded the balance to the Estate by default. The court rejected Bruce's argument that he was entitled to the excess because no one else could be under the statute and concluded that the record shows that the settlement was paid to the Estate without any special regard for Bruce's potential claims. [¶ 8] The analysis of the Probate Court is flawed as a matter of law. Although no wrongful death action was filed in Florida, the underlying basis for negotiations with the insurance companies was the liability created by the Florida wrongful death statute. Although the releases signed by the personal representative were more general to reflect that the settlement was for any and all liability resulting from the accident that caused the decedent's death, the personal representative, through Florida counsel, represented to the insurance companies that it was demanding policy limits for the wrongful death of Phyllis Johnson. Moreover, but for the wrongful death statute, there would be no cause of action in which to recover the insurance proceeds. The right of action and remedy on account of death by wrongful act did not exist at common law, but is purely statutory. See Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631, 632 (1933). Thus, in this case, the right of action arising out of the death of Phyllis Johnson is governed by the Florida Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.16-768.27 (1997). The right of action is limited by and should not be extended beyond the meaning of the terms of the statute creating such cause of action. See Stokes v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 213 So.2d 695, 697 (Fla.1968); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Reed Const. Corp., 149 So.2d 578, 580 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1963). A right of action occurs under the Florida statute [w]hen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, [or] negligence, ... of any person, ... and the event would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.... § 768.19. The action must be brought by the decedent's personal representative, who shall recover for the benefit of the decedent's survivors and estate all damages, as specified in this act, caused by the injury resulting in death. § 768.20. [¶ 9] The statute provides that damages may be awarded, in relevant part, as follows: (1) Each survivor may recover the value of lost support and services from the date of the decedent's injury to her or his death, with interest, and future loss of support and services from the date of death and reduced to present value. In evaluating loss of support and services, the survivor's relationship to the decedent, the amount of the decedent's probable net income available for distribution to the particular survivor, and the replacement value of the decedent's services to the survivor may be considered. In computing the duration of future losses, the joint life expectancies of the survivor and the decedent ... may be considered. . . . . (3) ... all children of the decedent if there is no surviving spouse, may also recover for lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and for mental pain and suffering from the date of injury. . . . . (5) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or death may be recovered by a survivor who has paid them. (6) The decedent's personal representative may recover for the decedent's estate the following: (a) Loss of earnings of the deceased from the date of injury to the date of death, less lost support of survivors excluding contributions in kind, with interest. Loss of the prospective net accumulations of an estate, which might reasonably have expected but for the wrongful death, reduced to present money value, may also be recovered: 1. If the decedent's survivors include a surviving spouse or lineal descendants .... (b) Medical or funeral expenses due to the decedent's injury or death that have become a charge against her or his estate or that were paid by or on behalf of decedent, excluding amounts recoverable under subsection (5). . . . . § 768.21 (emphasis added). Survivors are specifically defined in the statute as the decedent's spouse, children, parents, and, when partly or wholly dependent on the decedent for support or services, any blood relatives and adoptive brothers and sisters. § 768.18(1). Net accumulations are defined as [T]he part of the decedent's expected net business or salary income, including pension benefits, that the decedent probably would have retained as savings and left as part of her or his estate if the decedent had lived her or his normal life expectancy. Net business or salary income is the part of the decedent's probable gross income after taxes, excluding income from the investments continuing beyond death, that remains after deducting the decedent's personal expenses and support of survivors, excluding contributions in kind. § 768.18(5) (emphasis added). [¶ 10] Thus, pursuant to the statute, the insurance companies theoretically could have paid the proceeds to the personal representative for the benefit of (1) Bruce for lost support and/or lost parental companionship, guidance and instruction and mental pain and suffering; (2) the grandchildren if they had been dependent on the decedent; and/or (3) the Estate for loss of prospective net accumulation and funeral expenses. See § 768.21(1), (3), and (6). Because the parties do not appeal the court's express or implied findings that there was insufficient evidence to find recovery by the grandchildren as survivors or the Estate for net accumulations, the only remaining categories within the purview of the statute under which the insurance companies could have paid the proceeds would be to Bruce for lost support and/or lost companionship and to the Estate for funeral expenses. The court found that the Estate should recover for any funeral expenses it incurred and the parties do not dispute this finding. The court erred, however, when it found that, although Bruce demonstrated he was a survivor within the meaning of the statute, he did not demonstrate that he was entitled to the remaining proceeds either for lost support or lost parental companionship, instruction, and guidance and thus allocated the excess to the Estate. The statute does not include any provision for the distribution of excess damages. Although the statute allows some discretion as to what may be considered in calculating the amount of damages, it does not permit discretion in determining the beneficiaries and the types of damages for each of the beneficiaries. [¶ 11] Although we do not approve of a personal representative, who is required by statute to proceed for the benefit of the survivors and the Estate, acting only to benefit himself as a survivor, such behavior does not affect the outcome of this case. The Florida statute provides a mechanism for other survivors to seek approval of any settlement as to amount or apportionment among the beneficiaries. See § 768.25; GREGORY S. HANSEN & CHARLES IAN NASH, LITIGATION UNDER FLORIDA PROBATE CODE, WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS § 12.18 (1997) (If the settlement occurs before a wrongful death action is filed, the court has the authority to approve the settlement agreement and proposed distribution of recovery.) Although the grandchildren did not seek approval in a Florida court, for practical purposes, they asked the Probate Court in Maine to make the determination. Yet, even now they offer no basis for inclusion of themselves as claimants under the statute. In fact, they stipulated that they only received small cash gifts for birthdays and holidays. Nor did they challenge the court's finding that there was insufficient evidence to find recovery by the Estate under § 768.21(6) for net accumulations. Thus, the court erred in looking beyond the statute to distribute proceeds to the Estate.