Opinion ID: 885093
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did the District Court exceed its authority when it ordered the Department to deliver M.P.M. and A.R.M. to their father's custody after the court had dismissed the TIA petition?

Text: ¶ 21 The Department contends that the District Court lacked the authority to order the Department to return M.P.M. and A.R.M. to the custody of their father. The Department argues that because the petition for TIA was dismissed, the Department was not authorized to act on behalf of the children. Therefore, the District Court could not order the Department to turn the children over to the custody of their father. The Department further argues that upon dismissal of the petition for TIA, the matter then became one involving a custodial issue over which neither the Department nor the court had authority. Section 41-3-403, MCA, establishes the procedures required once the petition for TIA and protective services is filed, and delineates what relief the court may grant when it determines that the protection of youths is required. It does not address what occurs upon the dismissal of a petition for TIA. ¶ 22 The only statutory provision discussing post-dismissal procedures is § 41-3-404(4)(a), MCA, entitled Adjudicatory hearingtemporary disposition. Section 41-3-404(4)(a), MCA, provides: If the court determines that the youth is not an abused or neglected child, the petition must be dismissed and any order made pursuant to 41-3-403 must be vacated. In this case, the orders made pursuant to § 41-3-403, MCA, granted the Department the authority to place the children in protective placement between the time of filing the petition for TIA and the show cause hearing. During that time, however, the Department did not place the children because they were already with their maternal grandmother. Therefore, when the District Court vacated the orders issued following the filing of the petition for TIA, as required by § 41-3-404(2), MCA, it did not have the authority to order the Department to place the children with their father. Nowhere in the statutory framework is the District Court authorized to grant the Department the authority to place the children with one parent as opposed to the other following dismissal of the petition for TIA. ¶ 23 We have stated in the past that [i]n determining legislative intent, an express mention of a certain power or authority implies the exclusion of nondescribed powers. See State ex rel. Jones v. Giles (1975), 168 Mont. 130, 133, 541 P.2d 355, 357 (citing Reed v. Reed (1956), 130 Mont. 409, 304 P.2d 590). The Legislature has adopted the methods by which courts may grant the Department the authority to act. Courts cannot authorize the Department to act where such authority has not been legislatively granted. See Reed, 130 Mont. at 414, 304 P.2d at 592. To do so would, in effect, act as a judicial amendment to the child abuse and neglect statutes, and such authority has not been committed to us. See Reed, 130 Mont. at 414, 304 P.2d at 592. ¶ 24 We conclude that the District Court exceeded its authority when it ordered that the children be turned over to the custody of their father after dismissing the petition for TIA. The judgment of the District Court by which it ordered the Department to return the children to the custody of their father is reversed. The District Court's dismissal of the petition for TIA is affirmed. J.A. TURNAGE, C.J., and WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR., JIM REGNIER, JAMES C. NELSON, and W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, JJ., concur.