Opinion ID: 2824353
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Connected together

Text: In Weber, we clarified that for two charged crimes to be 'connected together' under NRS 173.115(2), a court must determine that evidence of either crime would be admissible in a separate trial regarding the other crime. 121 Nev. at 573, 119 P.3d at 120. We also stated that evidence of a crime may be admissible in a trial for another crime if it is admissible under NRS 48.045(2) and satisfies the requirements in Tinch by being relevant, .. . proven by clear and convincing evidence, and [having] probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Tinch v. State, 113 Nev. 1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997)). However, in stating this test for the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, we failed to consider the difference between the procedural issue of joinder of offenses and the evidentiary issue of admitting evidence of other crimes. See Solomon v. State, 646 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (observing that the procedural issues of joinder and severance are not the same as the evidentiary issue of other crimes evidence and they call for different analyses). The admissibility of evidence of 'other crimes, wrongs or acts' is an evidentiary issue that may arise at any time during the course of a trial, and the district court's evaluation of that evidence's relevance, reliability, and risk of unfair prejudice is necessary to ensure that the evidence is subjected to some form of procedural safeguard before it has a chance to influence the jury. See Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 51 n.3, 51-52, 692 P.2d 503, 507 n.3, 507-08 (1985) (quoting MRS 48.045(2)), superseded in part by statute as stated in Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 45, 83 P.3d 818, 823 (2004). In contrast, the joinder of offenses is a procedural issue that is decided before a trial and does not compel the same SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A )94D4(4 safeguards as evidence that is introduced after a trial has started. See generally Brown v. State, 114 Nev. 1118, 1126, 967 P.2d 1126, 1131 (1998) (recognizing joinder as a procedural rule). In a joinder decision there is no need to prove a defendant's participation in the charged crimes by clear and convincing evidence because [aill crimes charged, and, therefore, amenable to the possible joinder, are the considered products of grand jury indictments or criminal informations and therefore are of equal stature. Solomon, 646 A.2d at 1070; accord State v. Cutro, 618 S.E.2d 890, 894 (S.C. 2005). Similarly, weighing the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice does not provide a meaningful safeguard against improper joinder because it fails to account for the public's weighty interest in judicial economy, see Tabish, 119 Nev. at 304, 72 P.3d at 591; Solomon, 646 A.2d at 1071, and the question of unfair prejudice can be addressed separately through the prejudicial joinder statute, NRS 174.165(1). However, the district court must still consider whether the evidence of either charge would be admissible for a relevant, nonpropensity purpose in a separate trial for the other charge, see generally Bigpond v. State, 128 Nev., Adv. Op. 10, 270 P.3d 1244, 1249-50 (2012) (modifying the first Tinch factor to reflect the narrow limits of the general rule of exclusion), but we conclude that this is the only Tinch factor that the district court must consider when deciding whether charges are connected together for purposes of joinder.