Opinion ID: 2343627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Complaint of Ernestine E. Easy

Text: In February 2004, Ernestine E. Easy (hereinafter `Ms. Easy') retained Respondent to represent Shakia Rouzer (hereinafter `Ms. Rouzer') in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore City on charges of first and second-degree assault, destruction of property, use of deadly weapon, and burglary in the first degree. The charges arose from a domestic dispute with Ms. Rouzer's child's father. The initial contact to employ Respondent was made by Ms. Rouzer's great aunt, Ernestine E. Easy (hereinafter `Ms. Easy') and Ms. Rouzer's mother, Angela Lacruze (hereinafter `Ms. Lacruze'). Respondent agreed to represent Ms. Rouzer in her criminal matter in District Court for the fee of $1,500. Respondent and Ms. Lacruze signed the retainer agreement on or about February 25, 2004. Ms. Easy paid Respondent a sum of $400 on February 25, 2004. In addition, Ms. Lacruze paid Respondent $1500 on that same date. Combined, the payments made by Ms. Easy and Ms. Lacruze exceeded the $1,500 provided in the retainer agreement for the District Court representation of Ms. Rouzer. Ms. Rouzer's preliminary hearing was scheduled for March 23, 2004. However, Respondent did not enter his appearance on behalf of Ms. Rouzer. Moreover, on March 23, 2004, Respondent failed to appear for the preliminary hearing. As a result of Respondent's failure to enter his appearance on behalf of Ms. Rouzer, an Assistant Public Defender was assigned to represent Ms. Rouzer on the day of the hearing. During the preliminary hearing, the Assistant State's Attorney entered a nolle prosequi on the charges of first degree assault and burglary in first degree, and placed the remaining charges on the stet docket. Based on these findings of fact, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated each of the Rules of Professional Conduct with which he was charged. Thus, in each of the cases, the court found a violation of Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.16(d), and 8.4(d). With respect to the Rule 1.3 violations, the hearing court's conclusion followed from the respondent's having, after being engaged to provide legal services to Ms. Frisby, failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in providing legal services for which he had been engaged. The Rule 1.4 violations were premised on the respondent's failure to keep his clients reasonably informed as to the status of their matters and to respond to inquiries regarding the status of their cases to the extent reasonably necessary to permit [them] to make informed decisions regarding the representation, as, for example, in the case of Wanda Owens, by not explaining that he had filed a complaint on her behalf after she discharged him and that he had failed to perfect service on the defendants. That, upon being terminated, the respondent did not take steps in any of the cases to protect the interests of his clients constituted the basis for finding the 1.16 violations. The hearing court concluded, from the totality of the respondent's conduct in each case, that the administration of justice was prejudiced thereby. In Frisby, Owens, Branch, Gresham and Washington, the hearing court, in addition, concluded that the respondent committed a violation of Rule 8.1(b). That conclusion followed from the factual findings in those cases that the respondent failed to respond to the lawful demands for information made by Bar Counsel. There were more violations found. In Frisby, the hearing court concluded that, by not abiding by the client's decisions concerning her objectives and by not consulting her as to the approach to be taken, the respondent also violated Rule 1.2, while in Branch, the additional violation found was Rule 1.1, the hearing court determining that the respondent's representation was not competent, and in Gresham, Washington and Easy, it was a Rule 1.5(a) violation. The latter violation was, as characterized by the hearing court, that Respondent did not render services of any value, Respondent collected and has retained an unreasonable legal fee. Finally, in Hawkins and Easy, the hearing court determined that the respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c). In Hawkins, the dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation consisted of the respondent's inform[ing] Ms. Hawkins that he was still working on her personal injury matter, when, in fact, he had not done any work on her case. In Easy, it was two-fold, first by misrepresenting to Bar Counsel the sole reason for the dismissal of Ms. Rouzer's case and then by failing to pay the civil default judgment entered against him in the District Court. Neither the petitioner nor the respondent took exceptions to the hearing court's findings of fact or conclusions of law. As indicated, the respondent did not appear for the hearing on the default judgment. He did, however, appear at oral argument before us and seek to challenge the findings and conclusions, which he neither challenged below nor to which he filed exceptions in this Court. As we did at argument, we decline to consider the respondent's belated challenges. [13] The petitioner filed Petitioner's Recommendation For Sanction, in which it seeks the respondent's disbarment. Although the respondent appeared at oral argument, he did not file any pleading; he simply asked for a postponement and, that request having been denied, sought to avoid disbarment or significant sanction. In support of its disbarment recommendation, the petitioner emphasizes the number of cases in which the respondent was found to have violated Rules of Professional Conduct, the nature of the conduct those violations reflect  implicating competence, diligence, client relations, the quality of the legal process, and personal honesty and integrity  and the fact that the respondent, in nearly every case did not cooperate with Bar Counsel's investigation. It also relies on Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Wallace, 368 Md. 277, 793 A.2d 535 (2002). In that case, the respondent was found to have committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Responsibility, including, as in this case, Rules 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a) 1.16(d), 8.1(b) and 8.4(c) and (d), arising out of six separate complaints. The respondent was disbarred, despite having no prior disciplinary history. Our sanction decision was influenced, and dictated, by the volume and severity of the complaints against the respondent. Id. at 293, 793 A.2d at 545. We explained: Respondent has engaged in a pattern of conduct that only the most severe sanction of disbarment will provide the protection to the public that this procedure is supposed to provide. Respondent's lack of diligence, his lack of preparation, his failure to communicate with his clients, his charging of unreasonable fees, his failure to account for and return monies, his misrepresentations, and his failure to comply with Bar Counsel's requests all lead us to the most severe sanction of disbarment. Id. What we said in Wallace is applicable largely to the facts of the case sub judice. In seven separate complaints, the respondent has been found: to have acted with a lack of diligence in handling his clients' matters; to have failed to communicate with his clients or respond to their inquiries; not to have acted to protect his clients' interest, upon the termination of his services; and to have acted, and performed his representational responsibilities, in a manner prejudicial to the administration of justice. In five of the cases, the respondent was found, in addition, to have failed to comply with Bar Counsel's requests for information. In two of the cases, the respondent was found to have charged an unreasonable fee and to have engaged in dishonest, fraudulent and deceitful conduct, making misrepresentations to his clients. And there is no mitigating evidence or circumstances evident in this record. See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. West, 378 Md. 395, 416, 836 A.2d 588, 600 (2003) (noting that [t]he primary distinction between Wallace and the instant case is the lack of mitigating factors in the former case). Accordingly, as in Wallace and, consistent with the petitioner's recommendation, the most severe sanction of disbarment, 368 Md. at 293, 793 A.2d at 545, is warranted. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761(c), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST PATRICK J. MUHAMMAD.