Opinion ID: 2744274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenged Balloting Practices

Text: Citizen Center complains of the potential for election officials in six Colorado counties to trace ballots to individual voters. This potential allegedly exists because: (1) each ballot has a unique number or barcode, (2) some ballots may be unique among the ballots cast on an electronic voting machine, and (3) some ballots may be unique within a batch of ballots. 3 R. vol. 1, at 25, 27-31, 33-34. According to Citizen Center, ballots are traceable when they bear unique numbers or barcodes. Unique numbers or barcodes are used in 3 The clerks state that traceable ballots are used to: “(1) prevent[] election fraud by ensuring that ballots are not duplicated or double counted; (2) prevent[] human error by establishing an electronic means of preventing double counting; (3) ensure[] that problematic ballots (such as those with improper marks, under-votes, and over-votes) can be quickly reviewed by bi-partisan election judges to determine the intent of the voter; (4) allow[] the processing of the [voluminous number of] ballots… submitted in a general election in a timely and orderly fashion; (5) allow[] a thorough and accurate post-election audit to help ensure that every vote[] [has] been properly counted; (6) and conduct[] an accurate canvass, required by law, in which election staff must execute a very detailed reconciliation of the election and ensure accurate accounting of ballots printed, received, and counted.” R. vol. 3, at 362; see id. at 351, 356. 4 three of the counties. Id. at 31, 33-34. In these counties, ballots are traceable because an election official who identifies a voter with a unique ballot can later identify the ballot as belonging to that particular voter. Id. at 27-34. Citizen Center also contends that election officials can trace ballots that are unique among those cast on an electronic-voting machine. In each of the six counties, officials record the date of voting, the machine’s unique identifier, and the precinct number or ballot style used by the voter. Id. at 27, 29-30, 32-33, 35. By comparing this information with available data, Citizen Center argues, election officials can trace a ballot whenever it is unique among the ballots cast on a particular voting machine. See id. at 27-30, 32-35. The potential for tracing also allegedly exists because some ballots may be unique within a single batch. Four of the counties (Mesa, Larimer, Jefferson, and Boulder) process and store mail-in (absentee) ballots in discrete batches. Id. at 25, 27, 29, 32. Each batch is associated with a batch sheet listing the names, voter identification numbers, precinct numbers, ballot styles, and other information for the voters whose ballots are included in the batch. Id. at 25, 27, 30, 32. Because batches are relatively small, some ballots may be unique within the batch. Thus, Citizen Center alleges that election officials will sometimes be able to 5 trace a ballot by comparing the content to information in the batch sheet. Id. at 25-26, 28, 30, 32.