Opinion ID: 2515831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Legally Sufficient Disclaimer

Text: [¶ 14] Hoff stipulates that he was an at-will employee before 1991 but claims that the 1991 manual is an implied contract permitting discharge only for cause, and further argues that the disclaimer he signed in 1991 was ineffective because it was ambiguous. He argues that modifications of the manual adopted by the Board in 1997 cannot be applied to him because they constitute modifications from for-cause discharge to at-will employment that were not supported by proper consideration. Finally, he argues that the new board cannot terminate an implied for-cause employment contract created by agency personnel rules and regulations under Mariano & Associates v. Sublette County Comm'rs, 737 P.2d 323, 329 (Wyo.1987), [1] and its progeny. [¶ 15] The Health Department responds with several arguments in addition to its contention that the disclaimer is effective. It first claims that the Health Department, as a public entity, is free to change directors in policy-making positions with the new term of a board; secondly, the board is free to adopt new contracts at a new term, and, therefore, it was entitled to adopt a manual of new personnel rules and regulations in 1997 that undisputedly created an at-will employment contract; and finally, in the alternative to these arguments, contends that Hoff's acceptance of the $500 check suffices as sufficient consideration to bind him to the 1997 manual. [¶ 16] Our review indicates that the separate acknowledgement signed by Hoff in 1991 effectively established his employment status as at-will, and we need not consider any issues arising from the 1997 Board actions. The disclaimer signed by Hoff stated, in pertinent part: I, Kenneth L. Hoff, understand that the City of Casper-Natrona County Health Department Personnel Rules and Regulations is NOT a contract of employment, but is intended to give guidance and to establish fair and consistent personnel practices affecting employees. While conceding that the separately signed disclaimer is legally conspicuous, Hoff contends that a declaration that the rules are not a contract but establish fair and consistent personnel practices is ambiguous and, therefore, legally insufficient. Normally, the construction and interpretation of a contract is for the court as a matter of law. If the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be necessary to determine the intention of the parties from evidence other than the contract itself, and interpretation becomes a mixed question of law and fact. Sanchez v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 855 P.2d 1256, 1257 (Wyo.1993). [¶ 17] Hoff contends that the wording of this disclaimer is most similar to the disclaimer in Sanchez. We recently discussed Sanchez and noted: Notably missing from the disclaimer language... was a statement that the employer retained the power to fire an employee with or without good cause. Id. at 1259. Because this was a straightforward termination case involving the basic question of whether or not the employer could terminate with or without cause, the court determined that the disclaimer language does not tell the employee what he needs to know. Id. Bouwens v. Centrilift, 974 P.2d 941, 945 (Wyo.1999). Like this case, the issue in Bouwens was the clarity of a disclaimer, and there we adopted a contract formation analysis to decide if a contract had been formed by mutual assent. Id. at 946-47. Of concern here is whether Hoff could reasonably believe that the Health Department intended to make it legally bound to the provisions in the manual. Bouwens stated that the easiest way for a party to make clear an intention not to be legally bound is to say so. Id. at 947. The Health Department made clear its intention not to be legally bound by stating in a separately acknowledged disclaimer that the personnel rules and regulations were not a contract.