Opinion ID: 405967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review of arbitral decisions

Text: 11 The exceedingly narrow scope of judicial review of labor arbitration decisions is tailored to suit the vital role that the arbitrator plays in the scheme of federal labor law. Not only is the arbitrator himself a linchpin of the ongoing collective bargaining relationship, the expeditiousness and the finality of the arbitration process serve to defuse the chronic crises that inhere in the labor setting and thereby prevent these crises from developing into labor unrest. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-81, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1350-52, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). To the extent that the courts intrude into this scheme, they detract both from the central role of the arbitrator and the palliative effect of the arbitration process. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361-62, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). 12 In recognition of the limited judicial role in the arbitration process, courts have typically confined their scrutiny of awards to the broad contours of procedural fairness and arbitral impartiality. See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976); Sam Kane Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 477 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1001, 94 S.Ct. 355, 38 L.Ed.2d 237 (1973); Bieski v. Eastern Automobile Forwarding Co., 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968). Cf. United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (commercial arbitration awards can be vacated, inter alia, for corruption or fraud, evident partiality of the arbitrator, and prejudicial misbehavior of the arbitrator). 7 It is thus firmly established that courts will not review the substance of a labor arbitration award for ordinary error and that courts will not vacate an award because a judge might have reached a different result. See Safeway Stores v. American Bakery Workers, Local 111, 390 F.2d 79, 82-83 (5th Cir. 1968); Francesco's B., Inc. v. Hotel Employees Union, Local 28, 659 F.2d 1383, 1388-89 (9th Cir. 1981); R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law 585-86 (1976). See also S.Rep.No.1201, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2285, 2287 (Senate Labor Committee rejected version of Railway Labor Act that would have permitted courts to vacate arbitral awards on grounds of arbitrariness or capriciousness). 13 The substantive grounds for vacating labor arbitral awards that do exist are extremely narrow. In the railway labor field, 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q) provides that an arbitral award may be vacated for failure to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction. See also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (commercial arbitration award can be vacated when arbitration panel exceeds its jurisdiction). The courts have determined that this provision of section 153 is, in effect, a statutory codification of certain substantive grounds that would justify the vacation of an arbitral award in other areas of labor law. See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia Ry., 415 F.2d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1008, 90 S.Ct. 564, 24 L.Ed.2d 500 (1970). As exposited by the courts, there appear to be three interrelated grounds for such substantive review of arbitral awards: 14 (1) whether the award is irrational, see, e.g., Gunther v. San Diego & Arizona E. Ry., 382 U.S. 257, 261, 86 S.Ct. 368, 370, 15 L.Ed.2d 308 (1965) (wholly baseless and completely without reason); Safeway Stores v. American Bakery Workers, Local 111, 390 F.2d at 82 (if ... no judge, or group of judges, could ever conceivably have made such a ruling); S.Rep.No.1201, supra, at 3, reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, at 2287 (actually and indisputably without foundation in reason or fact); 15 (2) whether the award draws its essence from the letter or purpose of the collective bargaining agreement, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361; see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Central of Georgia Ry., 415 F.2d at 412 (arbitrator's award must have a basis that is at least rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the letter or purpose of the collective bargaining agreement); St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1137, 1147 (1977); and 16 (3) whether the arbitrator conformed to a specific contractual limitation upon his authority, see, e.g., Magnavox Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 410 F.2d 388, 389 (6th Cir. 1969); Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645, 362 F.2d 677, 680 (2d Cir. 1966); Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894, 899-900 (4th Cir. 1961). 17 Although these interrelated grounds for substantive review share a basic concern that the arbitrator perform his contractually mandated role in a conscientious and responsible fashion, 8 the third ground for review, that based upon specific contractual limitations, will not be equally applicable to every contract. See St. Antoine, supra, at 1142. Given the free play of the collective bargaining process, the parties to the contract could expressly grant the arbitrator power virtually to rewrite portions of the agreement, or expressly confine his authority within extremely narrow bounds. 9 See R. Gorman, supra, at 586-93. As a practical matter, the most prevalent modification of arbitral authority is a contractual clause prohibiting the arbitrator from adding to, subtracting from, or modifying the agreement in any way. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union No. 759, United Rubber Workers, 652 F.2d 1248, 1254 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing 2 BNA, Negotiations and Contracts P 51:281), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 3481, 72 L.Ed.2d --- (1982). 10 18 The collective bargaining agreement at issue in this case contains no such express constraint on the authority of the arbitrator to interpret the agreement. 11 See also Syufy Enterprises v. Northern California State Association of IATSE Locals, 631 F.2d 124, 126 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 2314, 68 L.Ed.2d 839 (1981); Federated Employers of Nevada, Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 631, 600 F.2d 1263, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1979); I.A.M., District No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 820, 90 S.Ct. 57, 24 L.Ed.2d 70 (1969); Truck Drivers Local Union No. 100 v. Quick-Freeze Cold Storage, Inc., 375 F.Supp. 725, 729 (S.D.Ohio 1974). Also, neither party suggests that the award is irrational. Therefore, the only substantive ground of review relevant to this case is whether the award draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 12