Opinion ID: 2515107
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of statutory factors and evidence

Text: The superior court considered the modification of an existing award of custody and visitation, an action governed by AS 25.20.110(a). [5] Modification of child custody requires a determination of the best interests of the child by weighing nine factors set out in AS 25.24.150(c). [6] Gretchen concedes that the court considered the eight expressly identified factors in the statute, but argues that the court abused its discretion by not considering other evidence under the ninth catch-all provision of the statute. Gretchen specifically argues that the court should have considered the need for the mother and child to reunite and related testimony from Gretchen's family therapist and the custody investigator. Gretchen points to evidence of: (1) the rift between Gretchen and her daughter; (2) the likelihood that a rotating physical custody schedule combined with therapy would help the relationship; and (3) Gretchen's commitment to therapy. Gretchen argues that by not considering this evidence, the court abused its discretion in reaching its determinations. The superior court's determination of the daughter's best interests included a discussion of each of the factors specified in the statute. In its discussion of the second factor (each parent's capability and desire to meet the child's needs) the court noted the rift between Gretchen and her daughter, but concluded the testimony of both the custody investigator and Gretchen's therapist suggested that Gretchen and her daughter would be unlikely to achieve a normal, healthy relationship. The custody investigator testified she was concerned about the potential for conflict  including physical conflict  between Gretchen and her daughter and that conflict might be exacerbated by a rotating physical custody schedule. Gretchen's family therapist testified at length about relationship problems between Gretchen and her daughter. He testified that a two-week rotating physical custody schedule would benefit the relationship, but also testified to maybe a fifty-percent chance of success with therapy over a two- to three-year period. Contrary to Gretchen's argument, the court expressly considered the issue Gretchen has raised and therefore did not abuse its discretion by failing to separately consider that issue under the catch-all provision of AS 25.24.150(c)(9). Gretchen also argues that the superior court erred by considering the daughter's custody preference without first determining that the daughter had the capacity to form a preference or specifying how much weight it was giving the daughter's preference. The court did consider the daughter's capacity to form a preference, expressing some doubt about the independence and integrity of the daughter's judgment. But the custody investigator concluded the daughter was mature enough to express a preference, and in 2004 the court had found the daughter was sufficiently mature to express a preference. If anything, the court's expression of doubt regarding the daughter's judgment suggests that it gave her preference less weight than it otherwise might have. Given the court's previous assessment and the custody investigator's conclusion that the daughter had the capacity to express a preference, it was not error for the court to consider the daughter's preference. Gretchen argues that the superior court gave too much weight to the custody investigator's testimony and failed to consider the testimony of the family therapist who had been seeing both Gretchen and her daughter. Gretchen suggests that when [the custody investigator's] testimony is viewed in the context of the entire trial record, the trial court's reliance on that testimony is erroneous and ignores the basic needs of a child-parent relationship and its importance. But Gretchen also argues that the superior court did not follow the recommendations of [the] custody investigator. It is unclear from Gretchen's briefing whether she believes the court gave too much weight to the custody investigator's report and testimony, or insufficient weight. The court did rely heavily upon the findings of the custody investigator, but the record does not suggest the court gave the custody investigator's findings more deference than they were due. The custody investigator spent significant time and energy compiling thorough reports on this family, and the court relied upon these reports because they were the product of a lengthy and impartial investigation. We have noted that a trial court need not credit every witness's testimony equally, provided that `the evidence as a whole supports the court's decision.'  [7] Because the evidence supports the court's conclusions, reliance on the custody investigator's findings was not erroneous.