Opinion ID: 6938606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Initial Confession

Text: In its initial brief the state conceded that Craig’s initial confession was improperly admitted into evidence violating his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Now the state seeks to revoke that concession in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Davis v. U.S., — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2352, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), where the Court considered how law enforcement officials should react when a suspect requests counsel in a manner insufficiently clear to invoke the prohibition on additional questioning. During questioning by the Naval Investigative Service, the defendant said “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2353. The investigators questioned him about his request, to which he responded “No, I’m not asking for a lawyer,” “No, I don’t want a lawyer.” Id. Later, the defendant said “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else.” Id. The Court found that the questioning of the defendant did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda. The Court held that a suspect must unambiguously request counsel. Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. A suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.” Id. An ambiguous or equivocal request for an attorney does not require the cessation of questioning. Id. The state says that Craig’s request for a lawyer was an equivocal one, and that not honoring the request did not violate any of his rights. The clarification of the law announced in Davis does not control this case. The factual differences between Davis and the case here are striking. Craig was not equivocal in his request like the defendant in Davis. Davis was indecisive about his request for counsel; he never undoubtedly requested a lawyer. Craig clearly stated that he wanted a lawyer, but he was not provided one, and the questioning did not cease. In Davis the Court announced an objective test to determine whether a suspect requested counsel. Detective Fandry testified that he did not believe Craig was requesting an attorney because he manifested characteristics that he (Craig) typically performed when he was lying. This did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness. A reasonable officer would have concluded that Craig requested assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court established in Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85, that once a defendant requests counsel, questioning must immediately cease and any further communications without counsel, unless reinitiated by the defendant, will be inadmissible. The detectives here questioned Craig after he requested assistance of counsel by stating to Detective Fan-dry, “well if you have that against me, you might as well get me a lawyer.” This prohibited the detectives from questioning further. This violation of Craig’s Miranda rights renders his initial confession inadmissible. The initial confession provided law enforcement officials with probable cause to arrest Craig. Before the confession, the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. The only evidence available against Craig was Henry Lee’s statement. Q: BY MS. HENGHOLD [the prosecutor]: When you spent all day doing the photo lineup and working on the case, talking to Henry Newsome when Detective Fandry got there about 7:00 o’clock, is it true that the only thing— information you had implicating Donald Craig in the robbery, homicide, was the testimony of Henry Newsome who was implicated in the ease? A: [By Detective Singer] Yes. Q: And you had no other evidence against Donald Craig at that time? A: No, as a matter of fact, it wasn’t even sworn testimony, it was just a verbal statement. Tr. 134-35. The state prosecutor admitted that a suspect would not be arrested with only this scant evidence. Ms. Henghold: When you have a loosely knit probable cause, it doesn’t give you the right to make the arrest at that point. The arrest could not have been made just based upon a co-defendant’s statement, obviously.  Judge, what I will say — in any case where a codefendant has made a statement implicating somebody else, no arrest is made until you have some corroboration. Tr. 410. The other evidence could not fulfill the probable cause requirement necessary for a legal arrest. Police officials’ arrest without probable cause in violation of Craig’s Fourth Amendment rights rendered the arrest illegal.