Opinion ID: 1632626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Status of the Office of County Judge

Text: The County Judge of Marion County, Eschol D. Hughes, resigned from office effective December 31, 1979. The County Legislative Body appointed a successor to serve until the August 1980 general election. Article VII, Section 1, Constitution of Tennessee provides that [n]o officeholder's current term shall be diminished by the ratification of this article. Judge Hughes was elected in 1974 for a term expiring in 1982. He, therefore, was under the protective umbrella of this proviso. The constitutional safeguard, however, is personal to the officeholder and protects his term, not the office. The Chancellor held that the office of county judge terminated with the resignation of the incumbent. We agree. The effect of Section 5-602(2), T.C.A., a codification of Section 16, Ch. 934, Public Acts of 1978, which implemented the local government provisions of the amended Constitution, was to designate the county judge of Marion County to serve as county executive until the regular August election in 1982. The Marion County Board of Commissioners insists that this was an invalid designation of an individual to fill an office, under Article XI, Section 17, Constitution of Tennessee. Irrespective of the language used, it is clear from the supplemental act that in order to avoid having duplicating offices, and purely as a transitional measure, the county judge was clothed with authority and charged with the duties attendant upon the office of county executive. We recognized this orderly transition in State ex rel. Maner v. Leech, 588 S.W.2d 534 (Tenn. 1979). Further, there can be no doubt that the Legislature upon creating a new office may fill the vacancy by appointment. Townsend v. Ray, 174 Tenn. 634, 130 S.W.2d 96 (1939). We find nothing unconstitutional in the action of the Legislature in designating the county judge to serve as county executive for the balance of his term. Nor do we find any constitutional infirmity in Section 5-603, T.C.A., providing that should a vacancy occur in the office of county judge, in these counties wherein the judge is temporarily serving as county executive: (1) If a vacancy occurs prior to the qualifying date [1] for the election of a county executive, the county legislative body shall appoint a county executive to serve until a county executive is elected in the regular August election. (2) If a vacancy occurs after the qualifying date for the election of a county executive, the county legislative body shall appoint a county executive to serve until a county executive is elected in the next succeeding general election or other county-wide election in such county. [2] We recognized, and tacitly approved this scheme, by dicta, in Leech v. Wayne County, 588 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tenn. 1979). Now we expressly approve it. We reverse so much of the Chancellor's decree as held that this section conflicts with Article VII, Section 2 of the Constitution of Tennessee. In our view it furthers the constitutional provision.