Opinion ID: 3184542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: We review a dismissal on claim‐preclusion grounds de novo. Harmon v. Gordon, 712 F.3d 1044, 1054 (7th Cir. 2013). Because the prior judgment is from an Illinois state court, Illinois preclusion principles apply. Hicks v. Midwest Transit, Inc., 479 F.3d 468, 471 (7th Cir. 2007); 28 U.S.C. § 1738. In Illi‐ nois, “[t]he doctrine of claim preclusion ‘provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction bars any subsequent actions between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action.’” Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2014) (cit‐ ing Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 665 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (Ill. 1996)). Thus, claim preclusion has three requirements under Illinois law: (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of the causes of action; and (3) an identity of the parties or their privies. Dookeran v. Cty. of Cook, Ill., 719 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 757 N.E.2d 471, 477 (Ill. 2001)). All three requirements of claim preclusion are satisfied in this case. The parties in Rose’s state and federal actions are the same, and the Circuit Court of Cook County’s February 2015 order dismissing Rose’s petitions for judicial review was unquestionably a final judgment on the merits. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 273 (“Unless … otherwise specifie[d], an involuntary dismissal of an action, other than a dismissal for lack of ju‐ risdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join an indis‐ pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the mer‐ No. 15‐1931 5 its.”).2 Nor is there any doubt that the state court was com‐ petent to resolve Rose’s federal claims. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[S]tate courts have inherent author‐ ity, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States.”). Rose asserts that the state court could not adjudicate his constitu‐ tional claims because the statute providing for judicial re‐ view of election board decisions, 10 ILCS 5/10‐10.1, authoriz‐ es only limited judicial review. He is wrong. The Illinois Su‐ preme Court has addressed this question and has held just the opposite: state courts may consider constitutional chal‐ lenges when reviewing election board decisions. Jackson‐ Hicks v. E. St. Louis Bd. of Election Commʹrs, 28 N.E.3d 170, 178 (Ill. 2015); Goodman v. Ward, 948 N.E.2d 580, 588 (Ill. 2011). This element of claim preclusion was therefore satisfied. Finally, Rose’s state and federal actions are identical for claim‐preclusion purposes. In Illinois as elsewhere, separate claims are considered the same cause of action if “‘they arise from a single group of operative facts, regardless of whether they assert different theories of relief.’” Chicago Title Land Trust Co. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Sales, 664 F.3d 1075, 1079–80 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (Ill. 1998)). See also Arlin‐ Golf, LLC v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 631 F.3d 818, 821 (7th 2 Although Rose also named the State of Illinois as a defendant, this had no effect on the case. The state is not a “person” for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Depʹt of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and any argument to the effect that the state did not follow its own laws is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100–01 (1984). 6 No. 15‐1931 Cir. 2011) (internal marks omitted) (“The transactional test permits claims to be considered part of the same cause of ac‐ tion even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence, so long as they arise from the same transaction.”). In both his state and federal action, Rose challenged the Illinois statute prescribing the four‐percent signature requirement for al‐ dermanic elections. He also challenged the Board’s decision, based on the four‐percent requirement, not to print his name on the ballot for the February 2015 election for Chicago’s 7th Ward. Both the state and federal actions are clearly predicat‐ ed on the same set of operative facts and are therefore the same cause of action under Illinois law. Rose’s addition of a § 1983 claim in his federal action does not change the analysis; it is merely a different theory of recovery arising from the same facts and circumstances that gave rise to the state action. See Stillo v. State Ret. Sys., 852 N.E.2d 516, 519 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (internal marks omit‐ ted) (“The assertion of different kinds or theories of relief still constitutes a single cause of action if a single group of operative facts give rise to the assertion of relief.”). Nor is it relevant that Rose never litigated his § 1983 claim in state court: “[c]laim preclusion applies not only to matters that were actually decided in the original action but also to mat‐ ters that could have been decided.” Walczak, 739 F.3d at 1017; see also Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83–85 (1984) (section 1983 claim precluded in federal court where plaintiff could have brought the claim in her earlier state court action). Rose argues that the two actions are different because Il‐ linois later amended its statutory signature requirement af‐ ter his state court proceedings were over. See 65 ILCS 20/21‐ No. 15‐1931 7 28 (2015) (current version of the statute, eliminating the four‐ percent formula and requiring at least 473 signatures on nomination petitions for every ward). But the amendment in question did not take effect until June 2015, and so did not apply to Rose’s nomination petitions or the Board’s decision not to place his name on the ballot for the February 24, 2015 election. Indeed, the amendment did not take effect until months after the conclusion of Rose’s district court proceed‐ ings. And while Rose now tries to frame his federal action as a pre‐enforcement challenge to the amendment’s validity, his federal pleadings––which do not even mention the amendment––tell a different story. Like his state court plead‐ ings, Rose’s operative federal complaint is directed exclu‐ sively at the four‐percent signature requirement of the stat‐ ute in effect when the Board denied him access to the ballot in January 2015. Rose cannot use his appeal as a vehicle to recreate his federal action or to assert new claims that he did not raise in district court.3 See Joyce v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 538 F.3d 797, 801 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal marks omitted) (a plaintiff “may not amend the complaint on appeal to state a new claim”). In sum, Illinois’s amendment to its statutory signature requirement governing aldermanic elections is un‐ related to the substance of Rose’s state or federal actions and 3 Rose first suggested that he was prospectively challenging the stat‐ ute’s June 2015 amendment in his responsive brief to the motions to dis‐ miss in district court. But Rose did not raise this claim in his amended complaint, and his fleeting reference to the amended version of the stat‐ ute in his response brief does not alter the factual basis of his federal ac‐ tion. See Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting the “axiomatic rule that a plaintiff may not amend his complaint in his response brief”). 8 No. 15‐1931 has no bearing on the preclusive effect of the state court judgment. Rose also argues that claim preclusion should not apply because he did not have an adequate opportunity to litigate his claims in state court. We accord preclusive effect to a state court judgment only if the plaintiff had a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate his claims in the prior action. Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 480–82 & n.22 (1982). “A plaintiff is afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims so long as the state court proceedings complied with the minimum procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Licari v. City of Chicago, 298 F.3d 664, 666–67 (7th Cir. 2002). We have little trouble concluding that the state court pro‐ ceedings to which Rose voluntarily submitted were constitu‐ tionally adequate. After a hearing, the Circuit Court of Cook County issued a thorough written decision carefully ad‐ dressing each of Rose’s claims and supporting arguments, including those raised for the first time in his amended memorandum of law. There is no indication that the state court proceedings were insufficiently extensive or substan‐ tively unfair, and the mere fact that Rose was displeased with the outcome of those proceedings does not amount to a violation of due process. Rose nonetheless complains that he did not have a fair opportunity to appeal the state court’s decision because his case became moot before the expiration of the statutory time to appeal.4 Putting aside the rather embarrassing implica‐ 4 Rose says that his case was mooted on February 24, 2015, when the 7th Ward alderman election was held without Rose’s name on the ballot. No. 15‐1931 9 tions of this argument (if Rose’s case is moot, why does he continue to advance it on appeal?), the fact remains that Rose had the same statutory right to appeal as any other liti‐ gant; he simply chose not to do so. His right to appeal was not rendered illusory merely because subsequent factual de‐ velopments in his case made an appeal less advantageous. Accordingly, Rose had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims in state court, and the minimum procedural re‐ quirements of the Due Process Clause were met.