Opinion ID: 1997619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Testimony From Other DuPont Employees About Their Relationship With Pensak Was Properly Excluded

Text: Pressman cross-appeals from a decision of the Superior Court to exclude the testimony of former co-workers regarding their fears of retaliation by Pensak. We review such a decision for abuse of discretion. Tice v. State, Del.Supr., 624 A.2d 399, 401 (1993). Pressman sought to present the testimony of two former co-workers that Pensak had retaliated against other employees. The trial court determined that such testimony conflicted with D.R.E. 404(b) [23] since it would be used to show that Pensak acted in conformity with a certain character, and it was unduly prejudicial. In light of the state of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The initial offer of proof provided by Pressman furnished an inadequate basis to admit the testimony. Pressman's counsel argued before the Superior Court that other dismissals will be evidence of the character and nature of Doctor Pensak's managerial abilities (emphasis supplied). Counsel stated, further, that the evidence will be relevant to show ... [Pensak's] propensity to do exactly what he did in this case (emphasis supplied). The trial judge correctly noted that D.R.E. 404(b) prohibits precisely such evidence. Pressman later asked the trial court to modify its ruling after DuPont's counsel asked Pressman why he did not directly inform Pensak's superiors of his significant scientific discoveries. While such a situation may warrant the introduction of uncharged misconduct evidence in order to explain or support a witness' testimony, [24] the trial court had before it here an earlier, explicit, attempt to introduce character and propensity evidence. In this context, the second decision to exclude the testimony was also not an abuse of discretion. We need not decide whether another or different basis for the offer of proof in a new trial of this matter would lead to a different result. Therefore, this holding is without prejudice, if a different basis for admitting the same evidence is advanced at a new trial.