Opinion ID: 1694550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court err in determining the proper allowance of child support?

Text: The standard for appellate review is that the chancellor's finding is affirmed unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. See, e.g., Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226, 1228 (Miss. 1993). Substantial evidence must support the decision. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss. 1987). [1] This Court has held it will enforce post-majority agreements for child support, during a child's college attendance. Crow, 622 So.2d at 1230. In this case, William contracted with his wife in 1983, at the time of the divorce, and made such an agreement. Therefore, the chancellor was correct in enforcing the agreement between these two contracting parties. William further asserts that the original agreement set collegiate child support at $100 per month. He argues that this amount represents his maximum obligation. He argues that subsequent court orders increasing child support did not expressly extend the increase for collegiate child support past majority and that the court's failure to do so ends his obligation to pay increased obligations after majority. The chancellor found that subsequent orders increasing Hope's child support referred back to the original divorce agreement. The chancellor found that William incurred increased obligations to pay during Hope's education implicitly through each modification. There was ample evidence in the record to support the chancellor's interpretation of the collegiate child support agreement. Hope testified that she received $250 per month until January 1993, six months after reaching majority. Clearly, William's actions demonstrated that he believed the collegiate child support agreement transcended Hope's majority. Furthermore, no later modifications limit the age for Hope to receive support. William himself entered an agreed order on March 15, 1991, obligating himself to pay $250 per month child support to Hope. William agreed to pay this amount in accordance with the applicable Divorce Decree. In addition, William's attorney stated that child support was indeed $250 per month. The attorney's statements constitute an admission under rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. As early as 1837, this Court has held that an attorney's statements are binding on his principal in limited circumstances. Wenans v. Lindsey, 2 Miss. 577, 578 (1837). Moreover, other evidence showed that William agreed to pay $250 directly to Hope after she reached majority, if she was attending college. Furthermore, and just as importantly, this original support order was subject to increase as changed conditions arose. Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410, 417 (Miss. 1983). Frances could have had the order modified by court order. The fact that William agreed to this change does not allow him to argue that no court order forced him to pay that amount. This Court affirms the chancellor's finding on the post-majority award of support for Hope's college education.