Opinion ID: 547283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rejection of Medical Opinions

Text: 35 Three physicians--two treating physicians and one advising physician--did not testify but their opinions in medical records that Rice was unable to work were submitted to the ALJ. 1 Rice contends that the ALJ improperly disregarded his treating physicians' opinions that he was unable to work. The ALJ clearly accepted the treating physicians' assessment that Rice suffers from fibrositis. The ALJ, however, rejected Dr. Emori's uncontroverted opinion that Rice was disabled as a result of his fibrositis. 36 A treating physician's opinion is afforded greater weight. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.1987). A treating physician's opinion is not, however, necessarily conclusive as to either a physical condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.1989). The ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion whether or not the opinion is contradicted; and the ALJ need not accept a treating physician's opinion which is  'brief and conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support its conclusion.'  Id. (quoting Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir.1986)); see also Davis, 868 F.2d at 328 (The only time the lack of positive findings can provide a proper basis for rejecting the treating physician's opinion is when substantial evidence does not otherwise support the opinion.) Where an ALJ chooses to disregard the opinion of a treating physician, he must set forth clear and convincing reasons for doing so if the treating physician's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor. Id. at 326 (internal citations omitted). 37 The ALJ disregarded Dr. Emori's opinion primarily based on the ALJ's determination that the treating physicians for the most part based their conclusion that Rice is disabled on Rice's subjective complaints of excess pain rather than clinical findings. The ALJ noted that: 38 [A]t no time did [Rice] have any swollen, inflamed or hot joints which the doctor could detect on physical examination. [Rice] persistently claimed diffuse muscoskeletal pain, fatigue and weakness.... There were no solid objective findings on any of these five examinations--just diffuse discomfort and complaints of triggerpoint tenderness.... None of the tests demonstrated any pathology. 39 Contrary to Rice's contention, the ALJ did not reject the treating physicians' opinion that Rice was disabled due to a lack of sufficient objective medical findings. The ALJ recognized that there are no objective tests which can conclusively confirm the diagnosis of fibrositis and, in this case, the ALJ did not disagree with the treating physicians' diagnosis. The ALJ did disagree, however, with the treating physicians' conclusion that Rice is totally disabled. 40 After a review of the record we agree that Rice's treating physicians' opinion that Rice was unable to work was based solely on Rice's subjective complaints of excess pain and limitations. Drs. Kho and Emori did not complete any type of assessment to evaluate whether or not Rice is able to perform work-related activities. Neither Dr. Kho or Dr. Emori made any specific physical findings or mechanical evaluations to support their conclusions that Rice is totally disabled. The only medical assessment to do work-related activities form was completed by Dr. Gell. The ALJ properly rejected the findings made by Dr. Gell in this form because Dr. Gell merely asked Rice the questions on the form and filled in the answers based upon Rice's responses. 2 41 While Rice's subjective complaints may support the diagnosis of fibrositis, these complaints are not substantial evidence that Rice is totally disabled. There was no testimony and no medical opinion in the record to the effect that diagnosed fibrositis in and of itself is totally disabling. In fact, Dr. Gell opined that most patients with this diagnosis are not totally disabled. 3 The treating physicians' reports are brief and conclusory with no clinical findings to support their disability finding. Because the record does not support the treating physicians' finding of impairment, the Secretary correctly rejected these opinions as they do not rest on substantial evidence. See Davis, 868 F.2d at 327-28.