Opinion ID: 2976401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Causey’s Qualified Immunity

Text: Qualified immunity for a police officer in his individual capacity involves a two-step analysis. “[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001). If no constitutional violation occurred, the inquiry is over and summary judgment must be granted to the officer. Plaintiffs allege that Officer Causey violated the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, when he shot Mr. Davenport. “[T]here can be no question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). This “reasonableness requirement” means that “the force used to effect a particular seizure,” here the shooting, must be found reasonable after “careful[ly] balancing [] ‘ “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interest” ’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))). “The intrusiveness of a seizure by means of deadly force is unmatched. The suspect’s fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon.” Id. at 9. Given the extreme intrusion caused by use of deadly force, the countervailing governmental interests must be weighty indeed; “only in rare instances may an officer seize a suspect by use of deadly force.” Whitlow v. City of Louisville, 39 F. App’x 297, 302-03 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). The government’s interest in using deadly force to effect a seizure varies based upon the circumstances faced by the officers; “the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it,” and so the question is whether the amount of force used by the officer was excessive. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Garner stated that deadly force can be used when “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others . . . .” 471 U.S. at 11-12. “Probable cause,” while “incapable of precise definition,” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (unanimous), means that the facts and circumstances of which the officer is aware and are reasonably viewed as accurate are “sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that” deadly force is necessary, see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). There are certain facts and circumstances that have been held to be important when evaluating whether an officer has probable cause to believe deadly force necessary. The most common considerations are “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While these are the most common considerations, they are not “a magical on/off switch that [constitute] rigid preconditions” to determine whether an officer’s conduct constituted excessive force. Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (2007). Another consideration is “the number of lives at risk” from the suspect’s conduct, as well as the “relative culpability” of those at risk. Id. at 1778. We have also found that “ ‘the demeanor of the suspect,’ ” Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dep’t, 389 F.3d 167, 174 (6th Cir. Nos. 07-5168/5215 Davenport, et al. v. Causey, et al. Page 7 2004) (quoting Minchella v. Bauman, 72 F. App’x 405, 408 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished)), and “the size and stature of the parties involved” should be taken into account, id. More force is also proper, which could include deadly force, if the suspect was fighting with the police, Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2005), or was intoxicated and noncompliant, Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1104-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Every new case can also present new circumstances that are relevant in determining whether that particular situation required deadly force; there is no “easyto-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context,” Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778, and instead judges are to look to the “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act,” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370. The officer must also be given some leeway when a court analyzes the reasonableness of his decision. It is firstly important to remember what is a “reasonable” belief could also be a mistaken belief, and that the fact it turned out to be mistaken does not undermine its reasonableness as considered at the time of the acts. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Additionally, more leeway is provided to the officer in determining reasonableness when the “circumstances [] are tense, uncertain, [or] rapidly evolving,” and the officer is therefore forced to “make [a] split-second judgment[].” Id. at 397. We have stated this otherwise as a court being required to provide a “ ‘measure of deference to the officer’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary.’ ” Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Burchett v. Keifer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002)). This “measure of deference” “ ‘carries great weight’ when ‘all parties agree that the events in question happened very quickly,’ as here.” Untalan, 430 F.3d at 315 (quoting Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992). There are also facts and circumstances that should not be considered. The facts and circumstances are viewed objectively, from the perspective of a reasonable officer, and therefore the subjective intent or motivation of the officer is irrelevant. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. Also irrelevant, despite plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary, is whether or not the officer had other means of force at his disposal. “[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the best technique available as long as their method is reasonable under the circumstances.” Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160 (6th Cir. 1996); see Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The question is whether the undisputed facts ‘demonstrate that a hypothetical reasonable officer’ would have ‘known that his actions, under the circumstances, were objectively unreasonable,’ not whether [the] [o]fficer [] used the least intrusive means available.” (quoting Scott v. Clay County, 205 F.3d 867, 877 (6th Cir. 2000)) (citations omitted)); Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 775 (6th Cir. 2004). With these considerations in mind, we “slosh our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’ ” See Scott, 127 S. Ct. at 1778. There were many factors counseling force. For instance, Mr. Davenport was noncompliant with Officer Causey’s repeated instructions. Cf. Monday, 118 F.3d at 1104. Mr. Davenport also actively resisted arrest and attacked two officers, first Officer Causey and then Officer Pugh. Cf. Untalan, 430 F.3d at 317. Mr. Davenport’s son stated that his father had “a lot of physical strength and . . . brute force,” and he believed his father was “strong enough to injure a man that he struck . . . with his fist.” Mr. Davenport had used enough force to knock Officer Causey down and had delivered blows to Officer Causey, which provided Officer Causey an appreciation of Mr. Davenport’s strength. Officer Causey was a larger man himself with SWAT training and yet Mr. Davenport was able to knock him to the ground. Mr. Davenport had used closed-fisted blows, and “closed-fisted blow[s] . . . may constitute deadly force.” Sallenger v. Oakes, 473 F.3d 731, 740 (7th Cir. 2007). Mr. Davenport had also used closedfisted blows when attacking Officer Pugh, and he delivered these closed-fisted blows to Officer Pugh’s head, an area where blows may well be more likely to cause serious physical injury or death. Mr. Davenport’s demeanor was irrationally angry, cf. Solomon, 389 F.3d at 174, and he was a large Nos. 07-5168/5215 Davenport, et al. v. Causey, et al. Page 8 man, weighing 277 pounds and standing five feet, nine inches tall. Cf. id.; Monday, 118 F.3d at 1104-05. It is important to remember that Mr. Davenport had only been stopped for speeding, and yet was reacting in such a violent and angry manner. We must also add a measure of deference to Officer Causey’s on-the-spot determination in a rapidly evolving situation about the level of force Mr. Davenport was using, and therefore the appropriate level of force with which to respond. The total time from Mr. Davenport’s exit from his vehicle to Mr. Davenport being shot was one minute and eight seconds. The time from Mr. Davenport beginning to strike Officer Causey to Mr. Davenport being shot was, as we noted, merely four seconds. Once Mr. Davenport began his attack, things evolved very rapidly, which provided Officer Causey less time for, and requires us to give more deference to, on-the-spot decisionmaking. This situation is similar to Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 1997), where the Fifth Circuit held there was no constitutional violation from the officer’s use of deadly force. The two officers in that case were also facing a noncompliant and larger individual who “had violently and forcefully resisted the officers’ attempts to gain control of him.” Colston, 130 F.3d at 99. The suspect in that case had knocked unconscious one of the officers on the scene and had knocked down the other. Id. at 98. At that point, the suspect was standing above the officers and began walking in the direction of the officer’s vehicle. Because the conscious officer believed the suspect could either unleash a further assault on him while he was on the ground or the suspect could retrieve a weapon from the officer’s police car, the officer shot the suspect. Id. at 99-100. While neither Officer Pugh nor Officer Causey had been knocked unconscious, the situation here was similar enough to allow the use of deadly force without violating the Constitution. The officers were facing a large, violent, and angry individual who was unwilling to be brought under control by the officers. Mr. Davenport had already knocked Officer Causey to the ground and was delivering blows in rapid succession to Officer Pugh’s head. Indeed, Mr. Davenport was more dangerous than the defendant in Colston because Mr. Davenport never broke off his attack and there was no indication that he would. Even though when looking in retrospect “in the peace of a judge’s chambers” it may seem that serious physical injury or death was not imminent, we cannot say that a reasonable officer on the scene facing such a suspect and having to decide very quickly could not have reasonably believed it was. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). Our analysis is not changed by the assumed fact that, when viewing the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, the off-camera blow did not occur and Officer Causey did not see the whites of Officer Pugh’s eyes. While both would bolster Officer Causey’s decision to use deadly force, the circumstances provided sufficient cause for deadly force absent these two facts. Even though Officer Causey did cite the fact that Officer Pugh’s eyes rolled to their whites as a reason he decided to use deadly force, it was still reasonable for him to shoot Mr. Davenport under the circumstances. Again, as detailed above, Mr. Davenport was a large, violent, and angry man who was unwilling to comply with direction from the police and who had attacked two police officers in quick succession, with only four seconds having elapsed while he delivered at least five blows to the two officers. In those four seconds Mr. Davenport had struck Officer Causey at least twice and knocked him to the ground, and had struck Officer Pugh in the head three times, strikes which Officer Causey had observed. At the time he was shot, Mr. Davenport was preparing to strike Officer Pugh on the top of his head with his fist for a fourth time. As conceded by the plaintiffs, Mr. Davenport had given no indication that he planned on retreating, and, if the fight were scored on points, Mr. Davenport was winning. While Officer Causey may have been mistaken in deciding that deadly force was required and that there was no time to warn Mr. Davenport, we cannot say that, given the rapidly evolving circumstances, his decision was unreasonable. Id. Nos. 07-5168/5215 Davenport, et al. v. Causey, et al. Page 9