Opinion ID: 1917348
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wisconsin appellate decisions

Text: ¶ 31 Four published appellate opinions offer potential guidance on the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2). Danks v. Stock Bldg. Supply, Inc., 2007 WI App 8, 298 Wis.2d 348, 727 N.W.2d 846; Bruttig v. Olsen, 154 Wis.2d 270, 453 N.W.2d 153 (Ct.App.1989); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984); and Ogle v. Avina, 33 Wis.2d 125, 146 N.W.2d 422 (1966). ¶ 32 Danks provides only the briefest interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2). There, liability for a personal injury was at issue. Danks was injured while assisting his supervisor load a truss onto a truck belonging to the manufacturer of the truss, Stock Building Supply. Danks, 298 Wis.2d 348, ¶ 1, 727 N.W.2d 846. Stock Building Supply had given specific written instructions that the truss was not to be lifted in the manner used at the time of the accident. Id., ¶ 6. When the truss failed due to the improper lift, it fell and Danks was injured. Id., ¶ 13. ¶ 33 Danks had several theories under which he attempted to impose liability on Stock Building Supply. One of those theories was concerted action liability, in which Danks contended that the lifting of the truss was undertaken in accordance with a common scheme or plan pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2). Id., ¶ 38. The court of appeals decision concluding that Stock Building Supply was not liable turned on the lack of an affirmative act of negligence by Stock Building Supply. Id., ¶ 22. ¶ 34 However, Danks does interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) as pertaining only to tortfeasors who take concerted action. Id., ¶ 39. Danks does not discuss the meanings of Concerted action or common scheme or plan, but it does note that those who act in concert will come within the parameters of subsection (2): Subsection (2) simply modifies subsection (1) of the statute to provide that all defendants who are legally responsible for causing a plaintiff's damages, and who acted in concert in so doing, are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's damages, irrespective of whether a given defendant's apportioned causal negligence is less than 51%. Id. Danks continues to conclude that § 895.045(2) plays no role to determine whether a given defendant may be held liable. Id., ¶ 40 (emphasis in original). Rather, a defendant must be liable before subsection (2) may be applied. Id. Stated otherwise, Danks determined that subsection (2) does not create a claim for relief, but instead applies only when a defendant is already liable for damages under the substantive law. That is, he or she is causally negligent to a greater extent than the plaintiff; and in addition, he or she participated in concerted action that resulted in the plaintiff's damages. Id., ¶¶ 39-40. ¶ 35 Collins precedes Danks and the 1995 revisions of Wis. Stat. § 895.045. There we discussed concerted action as a theory of liability and relied on the explanation of that theory by Professor Prosser. Collins, 116 Wis.2d at 184, 342 N.W.2d 37. In it we explained that: The concerted action theory of liability rests upon the principle that those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally liable with him. Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is that there be a tacit understanding. Id. (quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 46, at 292 (4th ed.1971)). However, we declined to apply the concerted action theory when the plaintiff, who sought damages from former manufacturers of the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) that caused an aggressive form of cervical cancer, could not identify the specific manufacturer of the DES that was taken by her mother. Id. at 186, 342 N.W.2d 37. ¶ 36 Collins explained that the concerted action theory required an agreement among the parties. Id. at 185, 342 N.W.2d 37. The allegation of Collins was that the defendants failed to adequately test [DES] or to give sufficient warning[s] of its dangers. Id. We noted that there had been a substantial amount of parallel action by the defendants in producing and marketing DES but that activity did not rise to the level of `acting in concert.' Id. We so concluded because there was no agreement that the testing and warnings would be inadequate, and it was that type of agreement that would have been required to show concerted action caused the plaintiff's harm. Id. ¶ 37 Collins is helpful to our analysis. For example, the specificity of the subject matter of the common plan in Collins that we concluded was necessary to support the concerted action theory of liability is important to our consideration of the specificity of the subject matter of the common plan at issue in the case before us. That is, the action that harmed Collins must have been that which was undertaken to further the drug companies' agreement. Id. In addition, Collins equated concerted action, the title of Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) with pursuance of a common plan, terms employed in the text of subsection (2). Id. at 184, 342 N.W.2d 37. ¶ 38 Bruttig also tackled the topic of concerted action. There the plaintiff, Brian Bruttig who was a minor, and two friends, also minors, engaged in a game of snowmobile tag. Brian was injured and recovery was denied because his liability was greater than that of either of the other two tortfeasors. Bruttig, 154 Wis.2d at 273, 453 N.W.2d 153. On appeal, Brian argued that he and the two defendants were equally negligent because the tag game created a situation of mutual stimulation where the negligence of each participant [was] entirely interrelated with that of the others and therefore each should be charged with the causal negligence of the other. Id. at 280, 453 N.W.2d 153. The court of appeals recognized the argument as the theory of concerted action liability in which the jury would not be permitted to apportion damages. Id. (citing W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts § 46, at 291 (4th ed.1971)). ¶ 39 The court of appeals noted that the concerted action theory of liability has never been explicitly adopted in Wisconsin. Id. at 280, 453 N.W.2d 153. It also noted that Brian had not raised this theory of liability in the circuit court. Therefore, it rejected his argument to apply it on appeal. Id. at 281, 453 N.W.2d 153. ¶ 40 Bruttig's discussion is helpful, as it reviews Brian's claim that the three boys acted in concert, which terms are similar to the title of subsection (2): Concerted action. Bruttig acknowledges that the theory that Brian is proffering is a separate theory of liability, that of `concerted action.' Id. at 280, 453 N.W.2d 153. This is significant because Wis. Stat. § 895.045(2) requires proof of a separate theory of liability for one who may already be a tortfeasor under subsection (1), in order to accord joint and several liability. Danks, 298 Wis.2d 348, ¶ 39, 727 N.W.2d 846. That is, subsection (2) requires a plaintiff to prove that the tortfeasor acted in accordance with a common scheme or plan and also that the common scheme or plan the tortfeasor acted in accordance with resulted in damages. Id. Subsection (2) is not applicable in every case where joint tortfeasors are present. ¶ 41 Our review of Wisconsin case law that touches on the concerted action theory of liability concludes with Ogle. In Ogle, we held that both negligent participants in a drag race were equally liable for a fatal collision resulting from their negligence, even though only one of the tortfeasors struck a third automobile causing injury. Ogle, 33 Wis.2d at 135, 146 N.W.2d 422. ¶ 42 In Ogle, two cars were racing at a high rate of speed in the same direction down a highway, when the lead car collided with the plaintiff's car. Id. at 128-30, 146 N.W.2d 422. In holding both defendants equally liable for the collision without specifically referencing concerted action, we applied the principles of concerted action: We think when there is an understanding to reach a common destination and in doing so illegal speed is used and the cars are driven so closely together as to be practically in tandem, or to constitute a unit, that we have a situation of mutual stimulation where the negligence of each participant is so related to the negligence of the other participants that the participants should each be chargeable with the causal negligence of the other as to speed and their percentage of causal negligence should be equal. Id. at 135, 146 N.W.2d 422. The mutual agreement to use excessive speed to reach an agreed upon destination formed the basis for the tortfeasors' concerted action. Id. ¶ 43 This court went on to explain in Ogle that the usual rule of apportioning causal negligence between tortfeasors whose negligence combined or concurred in causing injury does not apply with mutual fault for the injury that occurred. Id. Rather, the tortfeasors in Ogle each assumed the fault of the other and causal negligence was apportioned equally between them. Id. Badger Mutual argues that the concept of equal fault for tortfeasors in concerted actions is significant to the case before us because the parties have agreed to apportioned causal negligence. Richards maintains it has no relevancy.