Opinion ID: 203640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Tobin Make a Timely and Specific Request for Accommodation?

Text: The pivotal question in assessing the statute of limitations issue is whether Tobin made a specific request for accommodation that was denied during the statutory periods  in other words, on or after September 4, 2000 for purposes of the ADA, and on or after January 2, 2001 for purposes of Chapter 151B. Liberty Mutual asserts that the record contains no evidence of such a request. Tobin responds that the statute of limitations defense is waived because Liberty Mutual did not request an instruction asking the jury to make an explicit finding on whether a request and denial occurred during either of the two limitations periods. The timing of Tobin's requests for accommodation is an issue of fact the jury logically should have been asked to decide. However, the district court declined to reject the limitations defense based on Liberty Mutual's failure to request a more specific jury question. It noted that Liberty Mutual had raised the statute of limitations issue repeatedly, including in its pre-trial memorandum and in its motions for judgment following the presentation of evidence. The court thus went on to consider whether the jury had before it sufficient evidence to find that Tobin asked Liberty Mutual for an accommodation during the applicable statutory periods. We see no reason to disturb the district court's decision to proceed in this manner. The court concluded that the evidence was thin, but sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Tobin's requests for accommodation were made within the statute of limitations period for Chapter 151B and consequently the ADA as well. We agree with that assessment of the record. See Parker v. Gerrish, 547 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2008) (In reviewing decisions on motions for judgment as a matter of law, we review questions of law de novo, but review the sufficiency of the evidence drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prevailing party.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Dixon v. Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers, 504 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir.2007) ([W]e will set aside the jury verdict only if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of [the defendants], that a reasonable person could not have arrived at [this] verdict.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; second and third alterations in original). The court described the evidence as follows: The evidence of Tobin's requests for accommodations between September 2, 2000 and January 2, 2001 and between January 2, 2001 and January 10, 2001 was more generalized than specific but it built upon earlier specific evidence. Tobin testified that I continually made the same two requests for accommodations  additional service support and Mass Marketing  during his weekly meetings with his supervisor Nina Schwitters from February 1999 until his discharge in January 2001. While thin, this evidence, when coupled with evidence of meetings between Schwitters and Tobin, is sufficient.... As the district court acknowledged, there was no explicit evidence that Tobin requested accommodation on particular days within the statutory periods. But the evidence that he met with Schwitters at least weekly [11] and that he asked for MM assignments [o]ver and over again allows the inference that he was continuing to do so in the critical meetings toward the end of his tenure with Liberty Mutual. That inference is reinforced by notes that Schwitters made during a meeting with Tobin on January 2, 2001 indicating that Tobin complained about not being on a level playing field with other representatives. [12] Tobin later used the level playing field language in testifying that the disadvantage of his disability could have been overcome if he had received the requested accommodations. [13] Given Tobin's testimony that he repeatedly asked for the same accommodations in his meetings with Schwitters, it is reasonable to infer that his reference to the level playing field on January 2 was accompanied by another such request. Moreover, Schwitters' notes from the meeting include the notation No MM accts  confirming that assignment of the accounts was discussed. We are thus satisfied that the evidence in the record, though circumstantial, was sufficient to support a finding that Tobin followed his routine practice at the January 2 meeting and requested the accommodation of MM accounts. See Caldwell Tanks, Inc. v. Haley & Ward, Inc., 471 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir.2006) (A district court may grant a Rule 50 motion only when `after examining the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, it determines that the evidence could lead a reasonable person to only one conclusion, favorable to the movant.') (citations omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). The court's use of the sufficiency standard in evaluating the evidence reflected an assumption that the jury had found, albeit implicitly, that Tobin had requested the accommodations during the statutory periods. The court's assumption appeared to stem from the parties' discussion of the statute of limitations in connection with Special Verdict Question 4. That question asked if Tobin had established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that, with the requested accommodations, he would have been able to perform the essential functions of the job of sales representative. The court added the statute of limitations dates to Question 4 over Tobin's objection but with Liberty Mutual's acquiescence, and the jury consequently was required to find that Tobin would have been able to do the job [b]etween September 4, 2000 and January 10, 2001, and [b]etween January 2, 2001 and January 10, 2001. [14] At the charging conference, the court observed that this addition solve[d] the statute of limitations[] issue. In a footnote in its brief, Liberty Mutual asserts that the court applied the wrong standard because the jury never made an express finding on whether Tobin requested an accommodation during the limitations periods. The company claims that the court should have weighed the evidence itself instead of examining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding. In so arguing, Liberty Mutual apparently relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), which allows a court to make a finding based on its own review of the evidence when special verdict questions omit a material issue of fact that should have been resolved by the jury. [15] See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 915-916 (1st Cir.1988). Although we have reservations about whether the jury would have understood Question 4 to incorporate the pertinent statute of limitations question, Liberty Mutual has only itself to blame for that ambiguity. It did not propose a special verdict question explicitly asking the jury to determine whether a request was made within the statutory periods. In these circumstances, we again have no reason to fault the district court's conclusion that Question 4 solve[d] the statute of limitations[] issue. See id. at 918 (noting that parties ought not to be allowed to base an appeal on the ambiguities and omissions that were the natural consequence of their strategy). Hence we conclude that the district court properly found that Tobin's claims under both the ADA and Chapter 151B were timely. We therefore turn to the merits of those claims.