Opinion ID: 2996898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maintenance Exception

Text: 17 The amici note that the situation in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), concerned normal dam operations that resulted in changes to water quality. Here, by contrast, the sediment had settled out of the navigable waters, and the DNR’s opening of the flow structure control gates dredged those materials from their resting place and added them to the navigable downstream waters. No. 02-1863 25 Section 1344(f)(1) provides an exemption to the federal permit requirements “for narrowly defined activities specifically identified in paragraphs A-F that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively.” Envtl. Policy Div. of the Cong. Research Serv. for the Senate Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 95th Cong., 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, 420 (Comm. Print 1978) (hereinafter “Legislative History”). For these specified activities, a discharge of dredged or fill material “is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of this title [except 1317 of the CWA].” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1). In order to be exempt from the § 404 permit requirement, however, a party must show not only that it is exempt under one of the provisions in § 1344(f)(1), it also must show that its activities do not fall within the “recapture” provision, § 1344(f)(2). “Read together the two parts of Section 404(f) provide a narrow exemption for . . . activities that have little or no adverse effect on the waters of the U.S.” United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1994). The defendants bear the burden of establishing both that they qualify for one of the exemptions of § 1344(f)(1) and that 18 their actions are not recaptured by § 1344(f)(2). Turning first to the exemptions, the defendants maintain that their actions fall within the maintenance exemption set forth at § 1344(f)(1)(B). Paragraph (B) of § 1344(f)(1) exempts the discharge of dredged or fill material “for the purpose of maintenance, including emergency reconstruc- 18 Amici construe the recapture provision as containing two distinct elements: that the activity (1) has “ ‘as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject,’ and (2) has the consequence of impairing the flow or circulation of navigable waters or reducing the reach of such waters.” Amicus Br. at 8. 26 No. 02-1863 tion of recently damaged parts, of currently serviceable structures such as dikes, dams, levees, groins, riprap, breakwaters, causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and transportation structures.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(B). The regulations provide that “[m]aintenance does not include any modification that changes the character, scope, or size of the original fill design.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(2). We have construed § 1344(f)(1) narrowly because “Congress intended that Section 1344(f)(1) exempt from the permit process only ‘narrowly defined activities . . . that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively [and which do not] convert more extensive areas of water into dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach and size of the water body.’ ” United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting 3 Legislative History 420). The plaintiffs contend that the defendants do not fall within the exemption under § 1344(f)(1) for the following reasons: (1) There is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant’s actual purpose in draining the supply pond was “maintenance” or merely a pretext for dredging the pond without a permit; (2) The exemption does not include dredging that was not reasonably necessary or at least proportional to the maintenance performed; and (3) The dredging of the pond was not maintenance because it impermissibly modified “the character, scope, or size of the original fill design.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(2). We consider each of these in turn.
The plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the defendants actually raised the gate to perform No. 02-1863 27 maintenance on the dam or whether the “maintenance” was just a pretext to dredge the pond without a permit. In determining the “purpose” of the defendants’ actions, “reviewing courts have consistently looked beyond the stated or subjective intentions and determined the effect or ‘objective’ purpose of the activity conducted.” United States v. Sargent County Water Res., 876 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (D.N.D. 1994) (“Sargent County II”) (reviewing cases and noting that in those cases “[a]lthough each of the defendants stated a purpose facially worthy of an exemption, it was clear by their actions that the only ‘purpose’ each had was to circumvent the Act”). In Sargent County II, for example, the county’s stated purpose was to remove accumulated silt from an existing ditch. In evaluating whether that stated purpose was the county’s true purpose, the court observed: “Rather than approach the project haphazardly, it hired an engineer to determine the original depth, and it hired and directed a reputable contractor to perform clean-out maintenance work only. . . . The court has previously noted that the stated purpose [of maintenance] was confirmed by the actions of those who performed work on the drain.” Id. (emphasis added). The court found that the defendants’ activities of removing silt from a ditch fell within the § 1344(f)(1) exemption for “maintenance of drainage ditches,” noting that the defendants’ actions “were consistent with the stated intention of maintaining the drain.” Id. at 1099. Based on the record before us, we cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the defendants’ actions. The defendants were slow to repair, performed quite “haphazardly,” and let the supply pond drain substantially farther (and for much longer) than was needed to do the repairs. By 11:00 a.m. on May 18, 1998, the supply pond was drained to a level where the pump was exposed and the lower gate was open such that the defendants could inspect the gate. 28 No. 02-1863 However, the defendants allowed the gate to remain open for four more hours; during this time, the defendants had lunch, purchased supplies and examined other areas of the hatchery. At the end of the day, the defendants had not repaired, or even attempted to repair, the pump. The defendants also have not brought forth evidence explaining the importance or necessity of a test draw-down to the subsequent repair of the gates. Finally, the plaintiffs submitted evidence that the DNR had expressed an interest in dredging the supply pond in the years prior to the drawdown and had been informed that obtaining a permit for this action would be difficult. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and primarily noting the length of time during which the bottom gate was open and the pump was exposed without any attempt at making repairs, we hold that the plaintiffs have brought forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the defendants’ purpose in drawing down the water in the supply pond. On the basis of the record before us, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the purpose of drawing down the water in the supply pond was not to perform maintenance on either the pump or the dam, but rather was to dredge the supply pond without a permit.
The plaintiffs argue that, in order for a dredging activity to fall within the maintenance exception, the dredging also must be reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance. The EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, as well, construe the maintenance exemption to carry a requirement of reasonable necessity. They state that the DNR’s activities are exempt as maintenance if the “draw-down and discharge of sediment was necessary to perform those maintenance functions.” Amicus Br. at 7. For the following reasons, we No. 02-1863 29 believe that the amici’s position—that the maintenance exemption carries with it a requirement that discharge of dredged material be reasonably necessary to the maintenance—is persuasive. We note initially that a requirement of reasonable necessity or proportionality comports with the legislative history of the statute. Throughout the legislative history, Congress repeatedly stressed that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions were intended to cover only a very narrow class of exemptions for activities “that cause little or no adverse effects either 19 individually or cumulatively.” 3 Legislative History 420. 19 See also 3 Legislative History 283 (“These specified activities should have no serious adverse impact on water quality if performed in a manner which will not impair the flow and circulation patterns and the chemical and biological characteristics of the affected waterbody and which will not reduce the reach of the affected waterbody.” (H.R. Rep. No. 95-830, at 99 (1977)); id. at 421 (“A case-by-case permit review would not be required for narrowly defined activities that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively, including those activities narrowly defined in 404(f)(1)(A-F).”); id. at 474 (“Federal permits will not be required for those narrowly defined activities that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively” even though “it is understood that some of these activities may necessarily result in incidental filling and minor harm to aquatic resources . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 529 (noting that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions “exclude[] from permit requirements, discharges of dredged or fill material in conjunction with the following activities that will cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively”); 4 Legislative History 870 (recognizing that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions were intended “to free from the threat of regulation those kinds of manmade activities which are sufficiently de minimus as to merit general attention at State and local level and little or no attention at the national (continued...) 30 No. 02-1863 Certainly there would be no guarantee against more than de minimus adverse effects on the environment if the discharge of dredged material was not required to be reasonably necessary or otherwise proportional to the maintenance performed. Additionally, several courts have spoken of § 1344(f)(1) exemptions as containing a reasonableness requirement. In Sargent County II, 876 F. Supp. at 1098, the district court determined that the defendants’ activities of removing silt from a ditch fell within the § 1344(f)(1) exemption for “maintenance of drainage ditches,” particularly where “the individuals involved in the clean-out of Drain 11 were competent and acted responsibly in carrying out their assigned tasks.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, in United States v. Zanger, 767 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 1991), the court found that defendants who graded, filled and changed the bottom elevation of a stream could not be exempt under the maintenance exemption because the exemption “is limited to ‘maintenance’ of certain ‘structures,’ ” and there were no structures involved. The court further explained that “even if there had been [structures], defendants’ filling goes far beyond any reasonable definition of maintenance or 20 repair.” Id. (emphasis added). (...continued) level” (emphasis added)); id. at 912 (stating that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions “should have only a minor impact on water quality if performed in a manner that will not impair the flow and circulation patterns and the chemical and biological characteristics of the affected waterbody, and that will not reduce the reach of the affected waterbody”). 20 The regulations also imply a requirement of reasonableness for the maintenance provision at least in the circumstance of (continued...) No. 02-1863 31 Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs and amici that, in light of the legislative history, existing case law and the rule that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions must be narrowly construed, see Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1240-41, the maintenance exemption should be construed so that only dredging that is reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance is exempt from the permit requirement. Applying this standard to the case at hand, we believe that the plaintiffs have brought forth sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the dredging of the pond was not reasonably necessary to either the maintenance of the pump or the alleged inspection of the gates. DNR engineers explained that the repairs could have been performed without a rapid draw-down, and in fact, both of the alleged repairs were later performed without any drawdown of the pond. Moreover, even if the repairs warranted a rapid draw-down and dredging of the pond, the pond was drained sufficiently to expose the plumbing by 11:00 a.m., and the bottom gate was fully open for inspection by the same time. However, the defendants kept the gates open, allowed the pond to continue “dredging” until 3:00 p.m. and never commenced the necessary repairs. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot say that the dredging of the pond—particularly from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.—was, as a matter of law, reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance. (...continued) emergency reconstruction of recently damaged parts. The regulations only exempt emergency reconstruction that “occur[s] within a reasonable period of time after damage occurs.” 33