Opinion ID: 1966073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for a Continuance Because of Last Minute Discovery

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice erred by denying his motion for a two-week continuance to investigate information contained in a memorandum that the state did not disclose to him until the morning of trial. The prosecutor represented to the trial justice that just before the trial was scheduled to start he reviewed his files and found an inter-police memorandum between two police officers. The prosecutor did not know whether defense counsel had a copy of the document, so he provided one to the defense. The substance of the memorandum, dated April 20, 1991, detailed information from a relative of the deceased. The memorandum indicated that the relative had recieved [ sic ] information 3rd hand concerning the identities of the murderers. The relative's source wished to remain anonymous, but reportedly was the mother of a girlfriend of one of the perpetrators. The source relayed to Mr. Confessor's relative the names of other people involved in the crime. According to the source, two other people involved in the murder had paid off a tab at a restaurant, and one had bought a house full of furniture. The source also said that Mr. Bido and another perpetrator were supposedly out of town possibly headed to the [Dominican Republic]. The relative that spoke with the anonymous source also followed one of the other suspects around town to a street address and copied his license plate number for the police. Mr. Bido's defense counsel represented to the trial justice that he found out about the police memorandum for the first time when the prosecutor handed it to him earlier that day. Defense counsel told the court that his investigative staff had located the person who provided the statement to the police earlier that afternoon, but that the person would not be able to talk until later that evening. Counsel explained that he was not sure what information he would glean from speaking with that person, and he said that he wanted to locate one of the other perpetrators named in the memorandum. Defense counsel requested a couple of weeks to investigate the leads. The trial justice declined to continue the ease. The court noted that jury impanelment would not begin until the next morning and that, since the defense had located the person who provided the statement to the police, there was an opportunity to adequately respond to the memorandum and begin an investigation. The court told defense counsel that since we're not going to start today, you should have an opportunity to follow up    this evening and see where that leads, and then we'll go from there. But, at this time the Court will deny the request for any further continuance. The trial justice also noted that there was no indication or allegation that the memorandum was hidden from the defense. Defense counsel did not renew the request for a continuance on the following day. Before this Court, Mr. Bido argues that the trial justice erred by declining to grant a continuance to investigate leads prompted by the memorandum. Because the memorandum contained information about the identities and locations of two of the perpetrators, defendant contends that the failure to grant the continuance deprived him of the opportunity to locate two men who could have exonerated him. Mr. Bido also asserts that the obvious significance of the document was such that the state should have known to turn it over promptly to the defense. Mr. Bido alleges that the prejudice from the late disclosure was enormous, and that it could have been rectified by the requested two-week continuance. We first observe, contrary to defendant's suggestion in his brief, that the state's eleventh-hour disclosure of the police memorandum did not constitute a violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although defendant now says he was prejudiced by the late discovery, he does not specify how Rule 16 was violated. We note that Rule 16(a)(8) requires the state to disclose all written or recorded statements of people whom the state expects to call as witnesses. In this case, neither the police officer who authored the memorandum nor the officer who received it were called as witnesses. Significantly, Mr. Bido never alleged a Rule 16 violation to the trial justice. In his reply brief, defendant suggests for the first time that, regardless of whether or not the memorandum was discoverable under Rule 16, the state was required to disclose the document under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and its progeny. As defendant acknowledges, however, because the memorandum was, in fact, disclosed, the only issue on appeal is whether the trial justice afforded him sufficient opportunity to deal with the information before the trial began. We review his ruling, therefore, under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Bergeron v. Roszkowslci, 866 A.2d 1230, 1235 (R.I.2005). We are satisfied the trial justice appropriately weighed both defendant's and the state's interests in considering the request for a continuance, and we conclude that his ruling was reasonable under the circumstances. Noting that investigators from the Public Defender's office already had been able to locate the informant named in the memorandum and that defendant should have an opportunity to follow up on that lead, the trial justice told counsel to contact the informant that evening and see where that leads, and then we'll go from there. But, at this time the Court will deny the request for any further continuance. Clearly the trial justice did not foreclose defendant from revisiting the issue depending on what transpired with the investigation that evening. Mr. Bido, however, never raised the issue again. We are of the opinion that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying the defense's request for a continuance.