Opinion ID: 1881047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The first motion for additional time.

Text: ¶ 21. First, we notice that the justification offered to the trial court by plaintiffs' counsel for the first extension of time, does not exactly match the justification offered to this Court. When speaking to this Court, plaintiffs' counsel offered as good cause the association of a second law firm. This firm wished to ensure itself that the proper parties were being sued before serving process [so] as to avoid suing an innocent party. The desire to avoid unnecessary litigation is certainly good cause. (Emphasis added). Upon review of the motion, we find the following representation to the trial court as the claimed basis for the request for additional time: Counsel for plaintiffs were recently associated on this matter by the law firm of Jimmy D. Shelton & Associates. The 120 day period for service of process provided in Rule 4 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure will lapse prior to present counsel having an opportunity to properly review the immediate lawsuit. After several attempts, Plaintiffs' newly associated counsel has been unable to properly confer with plaintiffs Shannon Montgomery and John David Montgomery. Counsel is of good faith belief that additional time will allow plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint that will simplify the issues to be presented to the Court, thereby promoting judicial economy. ¶ 22. As we read it, the motion says nothing about the new firm's need to ensure itself that the proper parties were being sued before serving process as to avoid suing an innocent party. The motion indicates counsel made several unsuccessful attempts to confer with the clients. We are also told that counsel anticipated an amended complaint to simplify the issues. Thus, regarding the need for the first extension of time, the representations made to this Court do not match the representations made to the trial court. ¶ 23. Furthermore, we are not told when Greer, Pipkin and Russell was associated on the case by Jimmy D. Shelton & Associates. Assuming it was close to the end of the 120-day period for service of process, [5] we are unable to locate any evidence whatsoever that plaintiffs' counsel diligently attempted to serve process during the months prior to associating this firm. To the contrary, it appears counsel did not make any attemptdiligent or otherwiseto serve process. Plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating good cause why such service was not made within that [120-day] period. Instead, plaintiffs attempted to demonstrate why the newly associated firm required an additional 120-days for service of process. ¶ 24. The burden is upon the plaintiffs to demonstrate good cause for failure to timely serve process. Holmes, 815 So.2d at 1184. More is required than simple inadvertence, mistake of counsel, or ignorance of rules. . . . Watters v. Stripling, 675 So.2d 1242, 1243 (Miss.1996). The standard is strict, and requires diligence. Bang v. Pittman, 749 So.2d 47, 52 (Miss.1999); Moore v. Boyd, 799 So.2d 133, 136 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (citing Black v. Carey Canada, Inc., 791 F.Supp. 1120, 1126 (S.D.Miss.1990));. In all of these respects, plaintiffs are woefully deficient. In short, with respect to the first motion for time, plaintiffs completely failed to demonstrate good cause as required by Rule 4(h).