Opinion ID: 2511886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the utah district court issues a warrant of execution and we uphold it

Text: ¶ 44 On March 10, 2010, the State filed an Application for Execution Warrant pursuant to section 77-19-9(1) of the Utah Code. Mr. Gardner filed a Memorandum of Facts and Legal Reasons Against Issuance of the Judgment, arguing that subsection (2) of that same statute required the district court to hold a hearing to determine if there were any facts or legal reasons why a warrant of execution should not issue. Mr. Gardner presented three claims that he argued constituted legal reasons against execution of the judgment: first, that his rights to equal protection, uniform operation of the laws, and due process were violated because he did not have paid counsel and state funding for investigators and expert witnesses while pursuing his post-conviction review; second, that executing his death sentence twenty-five years after his conviction constituted cruel and unusual punishment; and third, that the district court should consider the desires of Mr. Burdell's friends and family in determining whether to issue the warrant. The district court concluded that none of Mr. Gardner's issues constituted a legal reason against executing the judgment of death as contemplated by section 77-19-9. The district court concluded that it was limited to reviewing the case history to determine if all direct and collateral attacks on the judgment had been resolved, so it did not reach the merits of Mr. Gardner's claims. On April 23, 2010, the district court signed and issued an order for Mr. Gardner's execution, setting Mr. Gardner's execution date for June 18, 2010. ¶ 45 Mr. Gardner appealed the issuance of the death warrant to this court. The State argued, and we agreed, that issuance of the death warrant is neither a judgment of conviction nor an order that affects the rights of the defendant, so the issuance of Mr. Gardner's death warrant was not an appealable order. [168] Instead, and as the State conceded was proper, we considered Mr. Gardner's appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ and reviewed whether it was an abuse of the district court's discretion to deny Mr. Gardner's application for relief under section 77-19-9. [169] We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the statute only required the district court to review the procedural status of the case and to determine that no direct or collateral attacks on the judgment are pending, that no stays are in effect, and that there are no procedural defects in the warrant application process. [170] We also held that section 77-19-9 does not permit review of substantive claims that the underlying sentence is invalid. [171] Concluding that the district court's interpretation of the statute was correct and that it did not abuse its discretion, we denied Mr. Gardner's request for extraordinary relief. [172]