Opinion ID: 1058342
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Limitation of Testimony by Dr. Caruso

Text: Next, the defendant argues that the trial court erred during the sentencing hearing by preventing Dr. Keith Caruso, a forensic psychiatrist, from fully explaining the details of his diagnosis of the defendant's mental condition. Prior to Dr. Caruso's testimony a jury-out hearing was held, during which the State expressed concern that Dr. Caruso's opinion was based, in part, on the two prior murders the defendant had committed in Missouri and Oklahoma. Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 705 an expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference without disclosing the underlying facts or data upon which the opinion is based. However, on cross-examination, the expert may be required to disclose those underlying facts or data. Tenn. R. Evid. 705. This rule allows the prosecution to impeach the expert's diagnosis by inquiring into any of the defendant's prior bad acts contained in reports relied on by the expert in evaluating the defendant. See State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 712 (Tenn.1997). Any mention of the specific nature of the defendant's other crimes committed in Missouri and Oklahoma had been scrupulously avoided during trial. However, it became evident during the sentencing hearing that the State could rely upon Rule 705 to inquire about these other crimes if they were a basis for Dr. Caruso's diagnosis and opinion. To avoid thus opening the door to introduction of these crimes, the trial court limited Dr. Caruso's examination to evidence obtained from Kim Bowen, from the defendant's former employer, and from medical records and childhood history. While Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) (1997) permits great latitude in the introduction of evidence during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, the admissibility of evidence is ultimately entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Reid, 91 S.W.3d at 305. Absent an abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse such rulings on appeal. Id. The trial court allowed Dr. Caruso to testify about the defendant's bipolar disorder and substance abuse without being subjected to cross-examination regarding the defendant's prior commission of murders in Missouri and Oklahoma. By doing so, the trial court avoided any potential prejudice that would have resulted from revealing the defendant's prior crimes. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Dr. Caruso's testimony. The defendant also argues that the trial court erred by interrupting Dr. Caruso's testimony and thus distracting the jury from concentrating on his testimony. The interruption came while Dr. Caruso was giving a long explanation of the various factors that he believed led the defendant to commit the crime in this case. The trial judge stopped the testimony and called for a bench conference, where defense counsel was warned that Dr. Caruso's testimony was non-responsive and rambling. Following the bench conference, Dr. Caruso's examination resumed on a new topic. Upon reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court's actions did not reflect negatively on Dr. Caruso's testimony. There is no indication that the court acted intentionally to weaken the doctor's testimony. Rather, the trial court was exercising its discretion to curtail non-responsive answers and was actually protecting the defendant from Dr. Caruso's possible inadvertent disclosure of the defendant's other crimes.