Opinion ID: 2977492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Michel Abboud’s Sentence

Text: The first step in procedural reasonableness review consists of ensuring that the district court correctly calculated the applicable guidelines range. Bolds, 511 F.3d at 579. “[T]he Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” in the district court’s sentencing analysis to ensure fair sentencing “administration and to secure nationwide consistency.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596. “In reviewing the district court’s calculation of the Guidelines, we still review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 579.
Michel Abboud first argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights because his sentence was based on facts not admitted by him or found by a jury. Specifically, he argues that the district court erred by increasing his offense level based on the amount of funds laundered when it was the district court that calculated the amount. In support of his argument, Defendant refers to Cunningham v. California, 547 U.S. 270 (2007). However, this Court has previously held that Cunningham did not alter our post-Booker decisions concerning the Sixth Amendment’s limitations on a district judge’s factfinding authority during sentencing. United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2008). Post-Booker, “district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, the district court did not mistakenly apply the Guidelines as mandatory. “Where, as here, the district court recognized the advisory nature of the guidelines, the increase in a defendant’s sentence based on facts not admitted by the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Conatser, 514 F.3d at 527. Defendant next argues that the district court erred in its calculation of the amount of funds laundered. The district court calculated the amount of funds laundered to be over $10 million. This is the amount of funds that were “bled” from the kite over the course of the check kiting scheme. Defendants used these funds to operate their business, in effect giving themselves a no-interest loan. This amount is independent from the amount of the bank fraud loss, which was calculated to be $2.3 million at the time the fraud was discovered. In determining the amount of funds laundered, the district court relied on the amounts contained in the money laundering counts of the indictment. The district court’s factual determination is supported by the trial testimony of Special Agent David Morgan, who identified the financial transactions in the money laundering counts, and established that the funds involved were derived from the check kiting scheme. Therefore, the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining the amount of funds laundered. Defendant further argues that the district court erred in denying Defendant’s request for an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Defendant had the burden of proving acceptance of responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Gilbert, 173 F.3d 974, 979 (6th Cir. 1999). The district court’s determination that Defendant failed to meet that burden should be reversed “only for clear error, and great deference is afforded the court’s determination in light of the credibility issues involved.” Id. The district court found that Defendant continued to assert his innocence, which did not entitle him to a departure for acceptance of responsibility. Because an expression of innocence is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, the district court’s determination was not clearly erroneous. Finally, Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying him a departure under USSG § 5K2.0, for the case being outside of the heartland of the money laundering Guidelines. As part of the Guidelines calculation, the district court must determine whether a departure under Chapter 5 of the Guidelines is appropriate. United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2006). This Court has previously held that a district court’s decision to deny a Guidelines-based departure is not subject to review in the narrow context of the advisory Guidelines calculation, so long as the district court was aware of its authority to do so. Id. In this case it is clear that the district judge was aware of this authority. Although the district court's denial of the downward departure is not reviewable in the above narrow context, Defendant’s sentence remains reviewable for reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 510 F.3d 593, 600 (6th Cir. 2007). We are not prevented from reviewing the district court’s failure to grant a non-Guidelines variance or the overall reasonableness of his sentence based on the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 370 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the district court’s decision to impose a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, see United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2469-70 (2007), and because Defendant provides no valid reason to rebut the presumption, his argument is rejected. Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that Michel Abboud had an offense level of 30.
Defendant next argues that the district court erred in considering his post-sentencing state conviction when determining his Criminal History Category. On a general remand for resentencing, a district court sentences the defendant de novo, “which means that the district court may redo the entire sentencing process including considering new evidence and issues.” United States v. Moor, 131 F.3d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1997). However, a Booker remand is not a general remand. In United States v. Worley, this court held that “because the purpose of a Booker remand is to ensure that the defendant’s sentence is consistent with the Sixth Amendment, the district court may consider only those facts that existed at the time the defendant was first sentenced.” United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 323 (6th Cir. 2007). “The goal of the [Booker] remand is to determine if, at the time of sentencing, the district judge would have imposed a different sentence in the absence of mandatory guidelines. Post- sentencing events or conduct simply are not relevant to that inquiry.” Worley, 453 F.3d 706, 706 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original). As such, “the district court [is] not permitted to consider the defendants’ post-sentencing conduct for purposes of Booker resentencing.” United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 333 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, the order of remand was for resentencing in light of Booker. Such a remand “did not require or permit consideration of factors postdating the original sentencing hearing.” Worley, 453 F.3d at 707. Defendant’s state law conviction was not in existence at the time Defendant was first sentenced. Therefore, it should not be considered for the purpose of determining Defendant’s Criminal History Category. The government argues that the decisions of this Court that have vacated a district court’s sentence based on the district court’s consideration of post-sentencing conduct have been limited to situations where the district court took the defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts into account. See, e.g., Keller, 498 F.3d at 323. Unlike post-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, which are discouraged from consideration by district courts by a Guidelines policy statement, USSG § 5K2.19, consideration of a defendant’s criminal history is properly considered under the Guidelines, USSG § 4A1.2(a)(1). However, the rationale behind Worley is not whether a post-sentencing factor is disfavored by the Guidelines. “Worley is predicated . . . on the conclusion that consideration of post-sentencing factors is incompatible with the limited scope of a Booker remand, that is, reviewing whether the defendant would have received the same sentence had the Guidelines been advisory, rather than mandatory, at the time of the original sentencing.” United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 324 (6th Cir. 2007). To increase a defendant’s Guidelines range based on a post-sentencing conviction is inconsistent with this purpose. The government also argues that the conviction should be taken into account because the conduct underlying the conviction occurred before the original sentencing. However, it was the conviction, not the underlying conduct, that the district court relied on to increase Defendant’s Criminal History Category. Therefore, the district court erred in taking Defendant’s post-sentencing conviction into account when calculating Defendant’s Criminal History Category. “A remand will not be required, and an error deemed harmless, however, when ‘we are certain that . . . any such error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.’” United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). However, “it is unclear that an error in determining the Guidelines recommendation can ever be considered harmless post-Gall.” United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 330 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the district court began its sentencing analysis from an incorrect benchmark, we cannot find that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it begun its consideration from the correct Guidelines range. Therefore, we vacate Michel Abboud’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.