Opinion ID: 1182070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wanton misconduct.

Text: Plaintiff first assigns as error the sustaining of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict with respect to the second count, namely, wanton misconduct. In support of that contention plaintiff relies upon our decisions in Stephens v. City of St. Helens, 231 Or. 1, 371 P.2d 686 (1962); Taylor v. Lawrence, 229 Or. 259, 366 P.2d 735 (1961); Falls v. Mortensen, 207 Or. 130, 295 P.2d 182 (1956); and Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co. et al., 207 Or. 34, 293 P.2d 717 (1956). In those cases this court held that wanton misconduct is to be defined in the same terms as reckless conduct is defined in 2 Restatement of Torts § 500 (1934). [1] As a result, it was held in Falls v. Mortensen, supra 207 Or. at 135 and 147, 295 P.2d at 184, that: `   Wanton misconduct is an intentional doing or failing to do of an act when one knows or has reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor's conduct not only creates unreasonable risk of harm to others but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him.' To the same effect, see Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or. 366, 372, 354 P.2d 56 (1960). [2] Plaintiff recognizes that a further question arises as to the degree of danger that defendants' conduct created, but contends that this requirement was satisfied by the testimony of defendant Clark that he would not ride in a towed vehicle because of the possibility of physical harm if something goes wrong. After reviewing the testimony we hold that the possibility of physical harm to one riding in the cab of a heavy logging truck while it is being towed by a tow truck does not satisfy the requirement of the established definition of wanton misconduct that defendants' conduct must be such as to not only create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him. It follows that the trial judge did not err in sustaining defendants' motion for a directed verdict with respect to plaintiff's second cause of action, alleging wanton misconduct.