Opinion ID: 2640798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ms. rhinehart waived her right to challenge defects in her bindover when she entered her guilty plea

Text: ¶ 15 Ms. Rhinehart next asks us to relieve her of the effect of her guilty plea because her preliminary hearing and bindover were infected with errors. Except in those instances in which errors affect the court's jurisdiction or where claims of error are expressly preserved for appeal, a conviction or guilty plea acts as a waiver of earlier procedural flaws. See, e.g., Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, ¶ 31, 165 P.3d 1195; State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989); State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988). As we explained in Parsons, The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations. 781 P.2d at 1278. ¶ 16 Ms. Rhinehart attempts to avoid falling prey to the general rule in two ways. First, she asserts that she did not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and therefore could not have waived defects in the preliminary hearing and bindover. Next, she insists that even if her plea were lawful, it is not the preliminary hearing and bindover itself with which she takes issue, but rather with constitutional deprivations of her right to confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing. She argues that since those constitutional defects are jurisdictional and not subject to waiver, we must take up their merits. We disagree. ¶ 17 We may with dispatch dispose of Ms. Rhinehart's reinvocation of her challenge to the lawfulness of her plea. Put simply, she cannot achieve through a challenge to the bindover what she was foreclosed from doing by section 77-13-6  assail the lawfulness of her plea. ¶ 18 We turn, then, to Ms. Rhinehart's claim that she was deprived of constitutional rights in the preliminary hearing and that these transgressions stripped the court of jurisdiction. We note at the outset that the Utah Constitution expressly permits the waiver of a preliminary hearing by the accused with the consent of the State. Utah Const. art. I, § 13. In light of this provision, it is difficult for us to conceive of why a constitutionally authorized waiver of a preliminary hearing would be foreclosed by the existence of defects, even constitutional defects, that occurred during the hearing. Of course, as Ms. Rhinehart properly notes, she never expressly waived her right to a preliminary hearing and, in fact, fought to exhaustion to prevail on her claims of preliminary hearing error. The fact that she put up a stern fight does not mean that she could not have surrendered and expressly waived her constitutional challenges by waiving her preliminary hearing. In our view, the entry of Ms. Rhinehart's guilty plea achieved the same waiver of her constitutional claims as a waiver of her preliminary hearing would have accomplished. ¶ 19 Finally, we find little merit in Ms. Rhinehart's claim that the alleged denial of her right to confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing implicated the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and was, therefore, immune from waiver. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court is powerless to adjudicate a case. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). Ms. Rhinehart directs us to State v. Marshall, an unpublished memorandum decision from our court of appeals, and its observation that a preliminary hearing is essential to a court's jurisdiction over a felony. 2005 UT App 269U, para. 2, 2005 WL 1405321. We are, of course, not bound by decisions issued by our court of appeals. We take note, however, that nothing in the court of appeals' decision leads us to conclude that defects in a preliminary hearing strip a district court of subject matter jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to assess the lawfulness of a preliminary hearing and bindover and to adjudicate waivers of defects in preliminary hearings and bindovers in the context of taking a guilty plea from an accused. ¶ 20 We have held that a district court is empowered to conduct a trial in the wake of an allegedly flawed bindover because a subsequent conviction beyond a reasonable doubt cures any bindover defect. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 26, 128 P.3d 1171. Ms. Rhinehart attempts to overcome this proposition with the contention that a guilty plea is not entitled to the same dignity as a unanimous jury verdict reflecting proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not evident to us why a guilty plea is inferior to a jury verdict in this respect, but more importantly, this argument fails to address the central question of why a district court may exercise subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a trial after a defective bindover but not take a plea.