Opinion ID: 1479485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for New Trial or, Alternatively, to Vacate Judgment.

Text: Derrington filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, Super.Ct.Crim.R. 33, [36] or, alternatively, to vacate sentence. D.C.Code § 23-110(a) (1981). [37] He alleged that the government had not disclosed an agreement with Melson in exchange for his trial testimony, and had thereby violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights and his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing on the basis of the files and records. D.C. Code § 23-110(c). Derrington contends the trial court erred in denying him a new trial and used the wrong standard in declining to vacate the judgment, thus requiring a remand for a full hearing on the motion to vacate. We affirm the denial of his motion. Derrington claimed Melson recanted his trial testimony that Derrington was involved in planning the robbery and had only testified because the government had released him from jail prior to trial and promised to drop a pending rape charge against him. [38] The motion recited that the government dropped the rape charge after appellant's trial, declined to prosecute Melson on several other charges (except petty larceny) before trial, and filed several felony charges against him after the trial. In support of his claim of a deal, Derrington submitted Melson's affidavit in which he denied being able to overhear appellants' robbery-planning discussion, denied hearing Derrington tell Grayson to shoot anyone and denied seeing Derrington with a gun. Melson also stated he only testified because the prosecutor made sure he was out of jail before the trial and had promised me that the rape case would be dropped but that first he had to talk to another prosecutor before it could be dismissed. Derrington also submitted the affidavits of Melson's mother and godfather, in which they referred to Melson not wanting to testify at appellants' trial and their efforts to persuade the prosecutor to release Melson from jail and to drop the rape charges. This court will not reverse the denial of a motion for a new trial in the absence of a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court. Strickland v. United States, 389 A.2d 1325, 1327 (D.C. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 1258, 59 L.Ed.2d 481 (1979). Where the trial court has determined that asserted Brady [39] material would not have materially affected the verdict, the reviewing court is limited to a determination of whether that decision is reasonable and an independent review on direct appeal from denial of a motion for new trial is precluded. Davies v. United States, 476 A.2d 658 (D.C.1984). Where the basis for the new trial is a recanting affidavit, the first question is whether the trial court is reasonably well satisfied that the prior testimony was false. United States v. Kearney, 220 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 385, 682 F.2d 214, 220 (1982) (if trial court determines to credit the recantation, then the court must determine whether it would probably produce an acquittal in a retrial or if, without it, the jury might have reached a different conclusion); Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293, 300 & n. 26 (D.C.1982). We hold the record supports the trial court's findings, and there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the motion for new trial. The trial court found: Melson's recantation was not credible; his trial testimony was not false; his allegation of a deal for false testimony was meritless; and even if Melson's affidavit were believed, his revised testimony would not produce an acquittal at trial or cause a jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about Derrington's guilt since the allegations at best affected Melson's creditibility. For each of its conclusions, the trial court set forth its reasons and, upon review, we find the trial court's findings are reasonable and supported by the evidence in the record. Godfrey, supra, 454 A.2d at 300; Huggins v. United States, 333 A.2d 385 (D.C.1975); Heard v. United States, 245 A.2d 125, 126 (D.C.1968); Thompson v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 235, 188 F.2d 652 (1951). Compare Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). Although it is not entirely clear the alleged deal evidence is newly discovered, it is understandable that defense counsel did not pursue questions about Melson's pretrial release from jail in view of the potential damage an answer might do to his client. United States v. Leonard, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 36, 44, 494 F.2d 955, 963 (1974) (cross-examination not curtailed by absence of explicit government promises of leniency). [40] In view of Holland's and Wright's testimony, Melson's testimony was clearly not essential to proof of Derrington's guilt, and the evidence of a deal would have been limited to use as impeachment evidence. The trial court noted its skepticism about Melson's recantation since it came after he had been telling the same story for two years and while he was in jail when a perjury prosecution was unlikely. The testimony was also limited and did not extend to Melson's testimony about why he testified (because a man had been killed), or why he was able to overhear the appellants' conversation (Melson was on the telephone, but on hold several times). The trial court's evaluation of Melson's credibility and the likely effect of his further impeachment is supported by the record since he had already been subjected to vigorous cross-examination. The trial court's findings about the alleged deal are also supported by the record. It found there was no credible evidence Melson's testimony was false. Melson's affidavit did not suggest that his original report to the police was motivated by a deal. The affidavits of his mother and godfather confirmed only their meetings with the prosecutor in an effort to get Melson released from jail and the rape charge dropped and fell short of alleging there was a specific promise in exchange for Melson's testimony. Nor did the assertions in Derrington's motion contradict the prosecutor's explanations to the trial court that Melson's pretrial release occurred when he made bond in the rape case and was thereafter released, with the government's consent, by another trial judge in two other cases. The trial court also declined to vacate the judgment on the ground that the files and records show conclusively that Derrington was entitled to no relief. Derrington contends the record supports the claim in his motion and the trial court erred in concluding that there was a reasonable explanation for any such contradiction; he relies on Pettaway v. United States, 390 A.2d 981 (D.C.1978). The need for a hearing on a § 23-110 motion is diminished where a witness seeks to recant earlier testimony and the trial court has had the opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor and weigh the credibility of the witness at trial. Kearney, supra, 220 U.S.App.D.C. at 384, 682 F.2d at 219. On review of a motion to vacate sentence, the testimony must be considered most strongly in support of the jury's verdict. Id. at 387, 682 F.2d at 222. In our review of the alleged suppression of a deal, we review the nature of the promise, if any, and the effect its disclosure could have on the credibility of the witness. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). Derrington's claim is premised on the assertion that Melson was a key witness whose further impeachment would have affected the jury's verdict. He relies on Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue, supra, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. at 1178; United States v. Iverson, 205 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 637 F.2d 799 (1980); modified, 208 U.S. App.D.C. 364, 648 F.2d 737 (1981); and United States v. Leonard, supra, 161 U.S. App.D.C. 36, 494 F.2d 955. But unlike those cases, Derrington's conviction was not the result of a single key witness whose testimony was the difference between his acquittal or conviction by a jury; nor is there a confession of error by the government. Melson was not the only or necessarily the most damaging witness to Derrington. Moreover, Melson's credibility was explored at length during trial by both defense counsel, through cross-examination and closing argument, in their attempt to suggest to the jury that Melson's testimony was not worthy of belief. Although there is authority which generally encourages a court to hold a hearing on a § 23-110 motion, [41] we conclude that the allegations in Derrington's motion to vacate were insufficient to require the trial court to hold a hearing. Unlike Gibson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1214 (D.C.1978), on which Derrington relies, the record before the trial court permitted it to evaluate the likely effect on the jury had Melson's affidavit been truthful and assuming the truthfulness of Melson's relatives' affidavits. Compare Kearney, supra, 220 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 682 F.2d 214 (full record) with Gibson, supra, 388 A.2d 1214 (virtually no record since defendant pled guilty but his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel referred to matters outside record and, if true, entitled him to relief). The record supports the trial court's finding that Melson's trial testimony was credible and, viewing the evidence most favorably to the government, that further impeachment of his testimony would not have affected the verdict or raised a doubt which had not already been presented to the jury. Accordingly, we affirm appellants' convictions except for their convictions of armed robbery of Mr. Metheny, and remand with instructions to vacate those convictions and resentence appellants accordingly; we affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial or to vacate judgment.