Opinion ID: 1135482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Parker's Proffered Instruction

Text: Parker argues that the district court erred in refusing to use his proffered instruction on reasonable doubt. In making this assertion, Parker relies on his previous contention that the instruction which the district court actually used is unconstitutional. Because, as discussed above, the reasonable doubt instruction used by the court is not unconstitutional, we find that this assertion also lacks merit. In addition, the district court is not permitted to define the concept of reasonable doubt in any manner other than that set by the legislature in NRS 175.211. Milligan v. State, 101 Nev. 627, 631, 708 P.2d 289, 292 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870, 107 S.Ct. 238, 93 L.Ed.2d 163 (1986). Because the district court used the reasonable doubt instruction set forth in NRS 175.211, it did not err when it refused Parker's proffered instruction.