Opinion ID: 2630631
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Police Exploitation of a Prior Illegality

Text: ¶ 61 The second prong of the test for determining valid consent involves an exploitation analysis. Whether a person's consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is ultimately a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271-72. Because the court of appeals concluded Hansen's consent was involuntary, it did not address the second prong of the test. Likewise, the district court did not address this prong because it concluded Hansen's detainment was lawful and that Hansen had voluntarily consented to the search. Although the district court did not make specific findings of fact regarding the issue of exploitation, remand is not necessary because the record is sufficient for us to conclude consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality, the unlawful detention.
¶ 62 Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights. See State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶ 15, 982 P.2d 73 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). When conducting an exploitation analysis, a court evaluates the relationship between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities. State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). Thus, the purpose behind excluding evidence obtained by police exploitation is `to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it.' Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)). ¶ 63 When conducting the exploitation analysis, we always keep in mind this deterrence purpose. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 612, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (Powell, J., concurring)). Moreover, we recognize the need for deterrence is strongest where criminal sanctions against the defendant may result. State ex rel. A.R., 1999 UT 43 at ¶ 16, 982 P.2d 73 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case.
¶ 64 An exploitation analysis requires looking at the facts of each case. The United States Supreme Court has noted three factors that have particular relevance in reviewing the facts: (1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and consent. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. ¶ 65 The `purpose and flagrancy' factor directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263. Where the purpose of the illegal conduct is to obtain consent, suppressing evidence derived from the illegal conduct clearly will have a deterrent effect. Id. at 1264. ¶ 66 Here, Officer Huntington testified, It's my practice to ask them for consent by stating, Do you have any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle? And if they say no, I say, Well, do you mind if I check. Officer Huntington employed this practice with Hansen, even though he had no reasonable suspicion of a further illegality. Seeking consent under such circumstances shows the purpose of the illegal detention was to exploit the opportunity to ask for consent. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 294. It also shows there was a direct connection between Officer Huntington's misconduct and Hansen's consent. ¶ 67 The incentive present in this case to violate constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely the type of incentive that must be removed .... Id. Since there was a direct connection between the purpose of the misconduct and Hansen's consent, suppressing the evidence derived from this misconduct should have a deterrent effect. ¶ 68 Next, we consider whether there were any intervening factors between Officer Huntington's misconduct and Hansen's consent that may have mitigated the illegality. Intervening circumstances may include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent or to consult with an attorney. United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1430 (8th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 605 (5th Cir.1982)). In this case, the record reveals no intervening circumstances, no clean break in the chain of events between the misconduct and the... consent. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274. Thus, the illegality of Officer Huntington's conduct was not mitigated. ¶ 69 Finally, we address the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and consent. A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citing Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1055). Here, the lapse of time was negligible. The illegal detention began when Officer Huntington asked Hansen if he had any contraband in his vehicle. Directly after Hansen answered, No, Officer Huntington requested and received permission to search Hansen's vehicle. Thus, no appreciable time passed between the illegal detention and the consent that would have allowed the taint of the misconduct to dissipate. ¶ 70 Based on the purpose behind Officer Huntington's misconduct, the lack of intervening circumstances, and the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and Hansen's consent, we conclude that Hansen's consent resulted from exploitation of the prior police illegality. We also conclude that the deterrent effect of suppressing evidence obtained from this type of search and seizure justifies its cost. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision that the district court erred in denying Hansen's motion to suppress.