Opinion ID: 2609061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: interest is mere expectancy

Text: The first hurdle for a spouse seeking to recover an employee's pension in 1967 was the doctrine enunciated in Williamson v. Williamson (1962) 203 Cal. App.2d 8, 11 [21 Cal. Rptr. 164], that in a divorce action pensions could be taken into account only to the extent that the employee had received benefits or was certain to receive benefits. The court stated: The principle established by these cases [ French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775 (112 P.2d 235, 134 A.L.R. 366); Cheney v. City & County of San Francisco (1936) 7 Cal.2d 565 (61 P.2d 754); Crossan v. Crossan, supra, 35 Cal. App.2d 39] is that pensions become community property, subject to division in a divorce, when and to the extent that the party is certain to receive some payment or recovery of funds. To the extent that payment is, at the time of the divorce, subject to conditions which may or may not occur, the pension is an expectancy, not subject to division as community property. (Italics added.) In earlier discussion, the court quoted language in Cheney v. City & County of San Francisco, supra, 7 Cal.2d 565, referring to the contingent event of death. (203 Cal. App.2d at p. 10.) Reading the two statements together, it appears the divorce court could not award future pension payments if they were conditioned on the employee's survival. In the instant case, such a rule would mean the divorce court could have awarded only an amount equal to the first two state pension payments received before the divorce decree. [3] Future payments were apparently subject to the contingency of survival. The first two payments were approximately $1,300, far less than the $100,000 award.