Opinion ID: 1281505
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: The Judge's Findings in Context

Text: Prior to sentencing, the trial judge heard lengthy testimony and arguments on three interrelated motions โ defendant's motion for proportionality review, motion for new trial, and motion to modify verdict. It was defendant's theory that the prosecutor had unfairly sought the death penalty in this case, given charging practices in other similar homicides occurring around the same period of time. Defendant was therefore permitted to put on detailed information as to each of more than 28 cases and to examine the person who had been chief deputy of the Los Angeles District Attorney's office during the relevant period of time as to why death had or had not been sought in each of these cases, what factors were influential, and what penalty was ultimately imposed. From the more than 300 pages of testimony and arguments of counsel, it is clear that defense counsel was seeking to demonstrate not just abuse of discretion in charging, but also that death was not an appropriate penalty in the present case. It is also clear that defendant was asking that the trial judge exercise independent judgment to modify the verdict to life without possibility of parole. (Even the prosecutor, in arguing an issue early in the proportionality hearing, remarked that: In effect, the statute [an apparent reference to section 190.4, subdivision (e)] requires the court to review the evidence and in effect second-guess the jury in deciding the death penalty that's called for by the statute.) Defendant both in his written motion and in final argument asked the court to take away the jury verdict and impose life without possibility of parole not only because the death penalty should not have been sought but because the evidence required modification of penalty. The principal evidence against defendant was, in defense counsel's view, the confession, yet even in the confession and defendant's other statements to police, defendant maintained he had not committed rape since sexual contact had been consensual. Defense counsel therefore felt there was enough weakness in the evidence that modification was required. Responding to defendant's arguments, the prosecutor urged that the ultimate check on any abusive decision in charging the death penalty was the court's power under section 190.4, subdivision (e). In sum, nothing in the lengthy proceedings prior to the judge's ruling indicates a misunderstanding of the judge's power. It is against this background that we must view the trial court's own brief statements directly addressing the modification question. The court found sufficient evidence of both rape and sodomy to support the special circumstances. This implicitly rejected the arguments defendant had just made on weaknesses in the evidence and was a decision made by the judge in view of the evidence produced during the course of the trial and reviewing all of the evidence.  (Italics added.) The court also found aggravating factors outweighed mitigating and went on to indicate what circumstances of the crime it referred to. (See ง 190.3, factor (a).) One was that two murders were involved. This finding referenced more than the fact that defendant was charged with the multiple-murder special circumstance. It recalled also testimony by the chief deputy who had said that, even considering all 28 cases and the facts he now knew about defendant, he would still have sought the death penalty in this case because two deaths were involved and because the second killing was supported by eyewitness testimony as to defendant's demeanor and motivation. This provided more convincing proof of defendant's mental state at the time of both killings than would exist with circumstantial evidence alone. While the trial judge commented little during the proportionality hearing, this was one fact he had commented on, noting it was a big factor that the murders were a few days apart, negating any heat of passion defense. The other circumstance was that the killing was in conjunction with rape and sodomy. The court concluded ... based on those factors, the court believes that an independent review of those factors is required under Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (e). [ถ] The court has set out sufficient reasons for the court's decision and the exercise of the court's discretion in the matter. (Italics added.) Clearly, a more thorough review of the evidence and more perceptive analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors would have been helpful, but there is more here than was present in Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, and the judge made explicit his understanding that an independent review of the evidence was required.