Opinion ID: 1127695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reviewability of Case-Closing Decisions by Commission Staff or Executive Director

Text: ADF & G and the Commission argue that decision of the Commission staff or executive director is not reviewable because the decision (1) is not an order under AS 18.80.135, (2) does not constitute final agency action, and (3) is an enforcement decision committed to the Commission's discretion and thus presumptively unreviewable. Each of these arguments fails.
The State and Commission first argue that a decision issued before a public hearing is not an order under AS 18.80.135 [5] and is thus not subject to judicial review. The State and Commission cite Hotel & Restaurant Union Local 878 v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights, 595 P.2d 653 (Alaska 1979), in support. Alaska Statute 18.80.135(a) expressly permits judicial review of an order of the commission.... Given the structure of the chapter, and the sequence apparently contemplated by AS 18.80.120, .130, and .135, it seems likely that § 135 deals only with review of orders issued by the Commission itself at the conclusion of hearings conducted by the Commission pursuant to § 130. Accordingly, § 135 is not concerned with review of some action by the executive director which is not an order as that term is used in Chapter 80. In Hotel and Restaurant Union Local 878, 595 P.2d at 654-55, we discussed the sequence of events contemplated by §§ 120 and 130. That discussion supports a conclusion that § 135 does not authorize review of a decision of the sort that closed Meyer's case. Assuming § 135 deals only with review of post-hearing Commission orders, it does not follow that § 135 affirmatively bars judicial review of the order closing Meyer's case. Moreover, all final administrative actions are presumed to be reviewable. This presumption controls unless it is rebutted by an affirmative indication of legislative intent that there be no reviewability. Johns v. CFEC, 699 P.2d 334, 339 (Alaska 1985); Sisters of Providence v. Department of Health & Soc. Servs., 648 P.2d 970, 976 (Alaska 1982); Alyeska Ski Corp. v. Holdsworth, 426 P.2d 1006, 1011 n. 16 (Alaska 1967). Section 135(a) does not express an affirmative legislative intention that file-closing decisions of the executive director or her staff be judicially unreviewable. We consequently apply the presumption of reviewability, and hold that such decisions are reviewable if they have the requisite finality. We also reject any suggestion that a decision's reviewability turns on whether it is labeled an order. As AS 44.62.560(e) confirms, the legislature imposed no such prerequisite for judicial review if agency action is unlawfully withheld or unreasonably withheld. [6] Rather, as discussed infra, the determinative question in deciding whether the decision is reviewable is whether it ended the case at the agency level and thus constituted final agency action. We also note that when Meyer last sought reconsideration of the executive director's file-closing order, the order of the Commissioner denying reconsideration informed Meyer that [a] person dissatisfied with a Commission Order dismissing the complaint may obtain judicial review by Superior Court in accordance with AS 44.62.560-44.62.570. It appears the Commissioner then considered that Meyer's order would be judicially reviewable.
In deciding whether a superior court order possessed the finality essential for appellate review, this court observed that, [t]he term finality is subject to several definitions. Mukluk Freight Lines, Inc. v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 516 P.2d 408, 411 (Alaska 1973). [7] The test in Alaska for determining whether a judgment is final is essentially a practical one. Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State, 620 P.2d 182, 184 (Alaska 1980). As the United States Supreme Court recently noted, [t]he core question [in determining when an agency action is final] is whether the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result of that process is one that will directly affect the parties. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 797, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2773, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992). Contrary to ADF & G's assertions, Ostman v. State Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 678 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1984), does not stand for the proposition that Meyer's ability to file a separate superior court discrimination claim renders the case-closing decision unreviewable. [8] ADF & G notes that we stated in Ostman that a final agency determination must be one which disposes of the entire case ... [or] one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. 678 P.2d at 1327 (quoting Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. City of Anchorage, 504 P.2d 1027, 1030-31 (Alaska 1972)). However, our quoted statement discusses the finality of a trial court decision. 504 P.2d at 1030-31. See also Mukluk Freight Lines, 516 P.2d at 411. An agency determination need not be one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment in order to be ripe for judicial review. Thus, we held in Ostman that agency rejection of a fishing permit application constitutes a final order which is reviewable in superior court where there is no more time to submit evidence or alter the decision through administrative means. 678 P.2d at 1326-28. Our holding in Ostman is contrary to ADF & G's argument. Case law from other jurisdictions is conflicting. New York, New Jersey and Iowa have held that Human/Civil Rights Commission dismissals based on no probable cause are judicially reviewable. See State Div. of Human Rights v. Blanchette, 73 A.D.2d 820, 423 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1979) (reviewing a Division finding of no probable cause under substantial evidence test); Sprague v. Glassboro State College, 161 N.J. Super. 218, 391 A.2d 558, 561 (App.Div. 1978) (holding that the Division on Civil Rights did not abuse its discretion in finding no probable cause of discrimination and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a hearing before finding no probable cause); Oliver v. Teleprompter Corporation, 299 N.W.2d 683, 686-87 (Iowa 1980) (holding that a finding of no probable cause is a final decision and that the complainant was not limited to a thirty-day period in which to file a petition for judicial review of no probable cause finding). [9] In Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392 (D.C. 1991), the court held that a determination by the Office of Human Rights that there was no probable cause to believe that the Human Rights Act had been violated was a final agency action subject to judicial review. Id. at 397-99. As ADF & G points out, the District of Columbia court appeared to base its decision in part on the fact that the applicable statute did not authorize a human rights complainant to bring suit on her own behalf if the agency declines or fails to do so for lack of probable cause. 597 A.2d at 398. However, the District of Columbia has since indicated that this distinction is not pertinent. In Timus v. District of Columbia Dep't of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751 (D.C. 1993), the court held that an administrative convenience dismissal (which occurs under District of Columbia law after a finding of probable cause but before a hearing) was subject to judicial review even though the complainant had the right to a trial de novo in superior court. Id. at 761. Thus, although the court in Simpson had indicated that reviewability of an administrative convenience dismissal might depend on whether the complainant had the right to a de novo trial, 597 A.2d at 398, Timus indicates that judicial review is available in both instances. 633 A.2d at 769 (Ferren, J., concurring). In Demetry v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 752 P.2d 1070 (Colo. App. 1988), the court held that a decision of the Colorado Civil Rights Commission upholding the dismissal of a claim, based on a finding that no probable cause existed to sustain a claim of discrimination on basis of handicap, did not constitute final agency action and was therefore not subject to judicial review. Id. at 1072. The court cited federal cases involving claims brought before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. at 1071. The court found the reasoning of those cases  that an EEOC investigation is merely preparatory to further proceedings  persuasive because the complainant can bring a private cause of action in federal court if the EEOC finds no probable cause. Id at 1072. ADF & G also cites EEOC cases for the proposition that the proper response to an agency's determination of no probable cause at the agency level is filing a de novo claim in district court rather than seeking review of the agency's adverse determination. The EEOC cases note that Title VII provides no express or implied cause of action against the EEOC to challenge its investigation and processing of a charge, McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir.1984), and that the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides no right to judicial review of an adverse EEOC determination, Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 683-84 (7th Cir.1979). Alaska law is similar to federal law in giving the complainant the right to file an original action in superior court. See supra, note 4. However, Alaska's statutory anti-discrimination scheme materially differs from the federal scheme. First, Alaska's anti-discrimination statute gives the Commission a more aggressive mandate than that held by the EEOC. Clearly the legislature intended the Commission to be more than a simple complaint-taking bureau; the statutory scheme constitutes a mandate to the agency to seek out and eradicate discrimination in employment.... Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Constr. Camp Employees & Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942, 945 (Alaska 1976). Therefore, the limited role of the federal EEOC is of dubious assistance in ascertaining the scope of powers conferred by the Alaska legislature on the Alaska Commission for Human Rights: A cursory comparison reveals that the anti-discrimination legislation enacted in Alaska is not substantially similar to comparable federal laws.... Congress limited the adjudicatory and coercive enforcement of the EEOC powers in favor of reliance on private citizen action.... Id. at 945. Second, under Alaska law a hearing is mandatory when the Commission's executive director or designated investigator determines that substantial evidence supports a complainant's allegations and informal efforts to eliminate discrimination fail. AS 18.80.120. In comparison, under federal law the EEOC is only required to use informal methods such as private conference, conciliation and persuasion, and may bring a civil action if these efforts fail. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f). Finally, Alaska's APA potentially provides for more expansive judicial review than the federal APA. AS 44.62.560(e). See note 5, supra. Because the case-closing order was the final action taken by the agency and because the Alaska legislature intended to allow the courts to determine whether an agency's withholding of action is unreasonable or unlawful, the decision of the Commission staff or executive director in this case is ripe for judicial review. AS 44.62.560(e).
Citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985), and Vick v. Board of Electrical Examiners, 626 P.2d 90 (Alaska 1981), ADF & G and the Commission argue that the agency's determination that Meyer's case is not supported by substantial evidence is presumptively unreviewable because that determination is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. This presumption was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Heckler, where the Court reasoned that even where the legislature has expressed no intent to preclude review, review is not available under the federal APA if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. 470 U.S. at 831, 105 S.Ct. at 1655. According to the Court, this presumption helps avoid the problem of how to apply an abuse of discretion standard when there are no judicially manageable standards available for judging how and when an agency should exercise its discretion. Id. We reject the argument of ADF & G and the Commission that the presumption of unreviewability applies here. In Vick the question was whether a board decision not to process an accusation against a licensee was subject to judicial review. We stated concerning this issue: Questions of law and fact, of policy, of practicality, and of the allocation of an agency's resources all come into play in making such a decision. The weighing of these elements is the very essence of what is meant when one speaks of an agency exercising its discretion. 626 P.2d at 93. We further stated that [w]hen a matter falls within an area traditionally recognized as within an agency's discretionary power, courts are less inclined to intrude than when the agency has acted in a novel or questionable fashion. Id. Unlike Vick or Heckler, Meyer's case does not involve the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at all. The statute here provides that if the executive director or designated staff member conducting the investigation finds substantial evidence of discrimination, the investigator shall ... try to eliminate the discrimination complained of by conference, conciliation, and persuasion. AS 18.80.110. If the problem is not eliminated informally, the Commission shall conduct a hearing and issue an order at the completion of the hearing. AS 18.80.120, .130(a). Thus, the statute grants no discretion to discontinue the process once the investigator finds substantial evidence of discrimination, unlike the statutes at issue in Vick and Heckler. [10] This case is instead closely akin to Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975), which the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Heckler. The statute at issue in Dunlop provided: The Secretary [of Labor] shall investigate such complaint [by a union member] and, if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation ... has occurred, ... he shall ... bring a civil action.... 421 U.S. at 563 n. 2, 95 S.Ct. at 1855 n. 2. After investigating the complainant's claims, the Secretary of Labor declined to file suit and the complainant sought judicial review under the APA. The Supreme Court held that review was available and that the Secretary's decision not to file suit was not an unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 567 n. 7, 95 S.Ct. at 1858 n. 7. The Heckler Court stated that in Dunlop, [t]he statute being administered quite clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for exercise of its enforcement power. 470 U.S. at 834, 105 S.Ct. at 1657. The Heckler Court thus found Dunlop consistent with a general presumption of unreviewability of decisions not to enforce. Id. In Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392 (D.C. 1991), the court held that prosecutorial discretion was not an obstacle to review: In the present case, however, OHR was not purporting to exercise prosecutorial discretion, nor did it reject Ms. Simpson's complaint on the ground that it lacked resources for enforcement. Rather, OHR found that there was no probable cause to believe that the Human Rights Act had been violated. Whether right or wrong, that determination was not one of the kind to which the doctrine embraced by the District can reasonably be applied. We conclude the OHR's determination is subject to judicial review. Id. at 398-99. As Meyer correctly argues, the statute now before us provides no reason to dismiss a case other than a lack of substantial evidence. ADF & G and the Commission argue that the Commission staff and executive director have wide discretion to determine whether an allegation of discrimination is supported by substantial evidence. ADF & G makes the following argument: Whether a violation has occurred, whether the Commission's resources are best spent on one violation or another, whether the Commission is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the Commission's overall policies, and whether the Commission has enough resources to undertake the action at all are issues that the Commission, and not the courts, should decide. The Commission also argues that these discretionary issues are policy reasons why this court should find the decision of the Commission staff or executive director to be unreviewable: The Commission must have discretion to decide whether to prosecute. The Commission has an important policy interest in the results of each of its investigations because of its role in developing the body of civil rights law in Alaska and because of its statutory obligation to enforce Alaska's civil rights laws. The Commission must employ its limited resources in the most effective manner possible in order to meet these obligations. The Commission further argues that it will become nothing more than a complaint taking agency if it cannot exercise prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether a claim is supported by substantial evidence. These arguments strongly support judicial review of staff or executive director determinations that there is no substantial evidence. These passages indicate, as the Commission confirmed during oral argument, that the staff or executive director, contrary to statutory mandate, is closing cases not for lack of evidence of discrimination but to control budget and docket. We are sympathetic to the Commission's claim of lack of resources. We recognize that it might be highly desirable for the Commission staff to have the power to administratively dismiss cases which have individual merit but no widespread impact. However, if the Commission wants its staff to have this discretionary authority, it must be obtained from the legislature, not the judiciary. We cannot import these social, political, and economic concerns into the clear scheme of the existing statute. An opportunity for judicial review is also necessary because the federal EEOC may, and in some circumstances must, accord substantial weight to findings made by state authorities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 470 n. 8, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1892 n. 8, 1893-94, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.1979). [11] Furthermore, such findings may affect workers' perceptions of potential employers and vice versa. [12] Finally, as noted above, Alaska's anti-discrimination statutory scheme is a mandate to seek out and eradicate discrimination in employment, and did not simply create a complaint-taking agency. Hotel, Motel, Restaurant, Constr. Camp Employees & Bartenders Union Local 879 v. Thomas, 551 P.2d 942, 945 (Alaska 1976). A human rights complainant in Alaska has the statutory right to expect that his or her claim will be decided on the merits, not pre-determined by budgetary constraints.