Opinion ID: 4512817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Fourth, Scully argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud because the Government did not prove he engaged in a scheme to defraud and that he 21 Case: 16-51429 Document: 00515332685 Page: 22 Date Filed: 03/04/2020 No. 16-51429 lacked the requisite intent. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, but our review is “highly deferential to the verdict.” United States v. Carbins, 882 F.3d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363, 376 (5th Cir. 2017)). We must “determine whether, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found that the evidence established the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mahmood, 820 F.3d 177, 187 (5th Cir. 2016)). We “draw all reasonable inferences and make all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.” Id. (quoting Mahmood, 820 F.3d at 187). To prove wire fraud, the Government must establish both a scheme to defraud and a specific intent to defraud. United States v. Spalding, 894 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 2018). Conspiracy to commit wire fraud likewise requires that the defendant joined the conspiracy with the “specific intent to defraud.” United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 700 (5th Cir. 2012). To establish that Scully engaged in a scheme to defraud, the Government must prove that he “made some kind of a false or fraudulent material misrepresentation.” Spalding, 894 F.3d at 181 (quoting United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 598 (5th Cir. 2016). Misleading omissions qualify as false representations. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 357 (2005). As for intent to defraud, this element is satisfied “when [a defendant] acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to himself.” United States v. Evans, 892 F.3d 692, 712 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Umawa Oke Imo, 739 F.3d 226, 236 (5th Cir. 2014)). A jury can infer intent from the facts and circumstances. United States v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 466-67 (5th Cir. 2002). 22 Case: 16-51429 Document: 00515332685 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/04/2020 No. 16-51429 Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Scully’s convictions for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and three substantive counts of wire fraud. First, a reasonable jury could conclude that Scully engaged in a scheme to defraud. Sliz testified that he was unaware that Scully and Kevin were receiving distributions from the suppliers, that Scully never discussed his sister-in-law’s control over Groupwell, N&D, and Siam Star, and that Scully denied knowing who owned those companies, while other evidence suggested he in fact knew it was his sister-in-law. Sliz testified that it was important for him to know whether Gourmet was overpaying for shrimp and whether the money was “disappear[ing],” because that money belonged to the company. Scully argues that he was only trying to save Gourmet and that Nataporn’s companies provided a great benefit to Gourmet. Even assuming those explanations somehow refute the evidence of the commissions Scully received, a jury was entitled to reject those explanations and instead credit Sliz’s testimony. See Spalding, 894 F.3d at 181; see United States v. Little, 889 F.2d 1367, 1368 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining that an “entity suffers a property loss when a contractor gives a kickback from his own money, even when he was the low bidder, because the contractor was willing to sell his product . . . for the stated price less the kickback amount”). Second, a jury could reasonably infer Scully’s intent to defraud from the facts and circumstances. See Rivera, 295 F.3d at 469. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, Scully was receiving commissions from Nataporn’s companies, thus bringing about financial gain, and acted knowingly and with specific intent to deceive because he concealed the commissions from Sliz and lied to about knowing who owned Nataporn’s companies. A jury was entitled to reject Scully’s argument that his only intent 23 Case: 16-51429 Document: 00515332685 Page: 24 Date Filed: 03/04/2020 No. 16-51429 was to save Gourmet and accept the other evidence—including Sliz’s testimony and the spreadsheets and correspondence describing the commissions—that showed Scully’s commission and his hiding it from Sliz. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to convict Scully of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. VI. Substantive Reasonableness of Scully’s Sentence Fifth, Scully argues his below-guidelines 180-month sentence is greater than necessary to satisfy the 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a) purposes and is therefore substantively unreasonable because the sentence overstates the seriousness of Scully’s offenses, is not necessary to protect the public, and does not promote respect for the law. “A sentence below the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Broussard, 882 F.3d 104, 113 (5th Cir. 2018). To rebut that presumption, a defendant must show that the sentence “(1) does not account for a factor that should have received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.” United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548, 558 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2013)). Scully does not contend that the district court failed to account for a factor, nor does he identify any irrelevant or improper factor to which the district court gave significant weight. He simply argues that the district court should have weighed the factors differently. We have “consistently declined to merely reweigh the sentencing factors,” United States v. Ayelotan, 917 F.3d 394, 409 (5th Cir. 2019), and we decline to do so today. 7 7 As his sixth and final point of error, Scully argues that the district court’s ordering him to pay more than $1 million in restitution violates the Sixth Amendment because the court, not the jury, made the factual findings to support the restitution. Scully recognizes that this argument is foreclosed by our precedent, see United States v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 24 Case: 16-51429 Document: 00515332685 Page: 25 Date Filed: 03/04/2020 No. 16-51429