Opinion ID: 2601946
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionally Adequate Process

Text: ¶ 37 The State first argues that offenders are not entitled to a hearing on current dangerousness because, whether currently dangerous or not, they are still required to register if they have been convicted of one of the offenses enumerated in Utah Code subsections 77-27-21.5(1)(f), (10)(c)(ii). Second, the State argues that offenders received all the process that is due when they are convicted of one of the enumerated offenses at a full and fair trial.
¶ 38 The State argues that Briggs is not entitled to a hearing because the fact he seeks to establish in that hearingthat he is not currently dangerousis irrelevant to whether he must register under the statute. In fact, the registration statute requires offenders to register solely on the basis of their conviction of one or more of the enumerated offenses. [39] The statute does not require that only currently dangerous offenders register. Therefore, the State correctly notes, even if Briggs is adjudicated non-dangerous, he is still required to register under the terms of the statute. ¶ 39 The State relies on Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe in which the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to Connecticut's sex offender registration law. [40] The plaintiff in that case, a convicted sex offender, argued that his right to procedural due process was violated because he had not had a hearing to determine whether he was currently dangerous before being listed on the registry. [41] As is the case here, the Connecticut registration statute required all convicted sex offenders to register without regard to whether they were currently dangerous, and thus it provided no hearing. The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's challenge, holding that any hearing on current dangerousness is a bootless exercise because current dangerousness was irrelevant to the statutory registration requirement and the content of the registry. [42] The only relevant fact was the plaintiff's prior convictiona fact that he had already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest at trial. [43] Indeed, the Connecticut sex offender registry did not purport to predict the current dangerousness of any registered sex offender, and it contained a disclaimer that Connecticut has made no determination that any individual included in the registry is currently dangerous. Individuals included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their past conviction record and state law. [44] ¶ 40 The State argues that under Connecticut Department of Public Safety, Briggs is not entitled to a hearing on his current dangerousness because current dangerousness is not a statutorily enumerated criterion of registration. According to the State, under Utah's registration statute, the only criterion that need be met in order for registration to be required is that an individual has been convicted of one of the offenses enumerated in subsections 77-27-21.5(1)(f) or (10)(c)(ii), and, therefore, as in Connecticut Department of Public Safety, an inquiry into current dangerousness would be irrelevant. Therefore, the State argues, the content or message of the registry on which the individual's name will be listed is irrelevant.