Opinion ID: 1210508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction to hear appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309

Text: Defendant contends that following our reversal of his convictions and death sentence in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, the prosecution was precluded from further prosecuting him for the same capital murder. He asserts that we were without authority to hear the appeal of his 1979 guilty plea and death sentence, and that therefore the subsequent trial violated the bar against double jeopardy. He presents five bases for this contention: (1) This court should have honored his request to waive the appeal; (2) the appeal was barred because his counsel failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause; (3) by entertaining the appeal, this court violated defendant's constitutional rights to control his defense, to due process, and to equal protection of the law; (4) the appeal was barred by the rule against advisory opinions; and (5) by entertaining the appeal, this court created an irreconcilable ethical conflict for the attorney appointed to represent defendant on appeal. It is difficult to see how this argument could benefit defendant. If we were to decide here that in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, we should have honored defendant's request to dismiss the automatic appeal, the guilty plea that formed the basis for the robbery and capital murder convictions in that case would still be invalid because, as explained earlier, the plea was impermissible under California law and therefore the trial court lacked the power to accept it. Moreover, even if that guilty plea were to be reinstated, so would defendant's sentence of death. In any event, we conclude that this court had the power to set aside the robbery and murder convictions arising from defendant's 1979 plea of guilty.
Defendant faults this court for not allowing him to waive the automatic appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, following his guilty plea to capital murder. He acknowledges that we rejected an identical contention in People v. Stanworth (1969) 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889. He argues, however, that Stanworth was wrong and should be overruled. We disagree. Section 1239(b) provides that an appeal of a sentence of death is automatically taken to this court. As we explained in Stanworth: This statute imposes a duty upon this court `to make an examination of the complete record of the proceedings had in the trial court, to the end that it be ascertained whether defendant was given a fair trial.'... [¶] ... We cannot avoid or abdicate this duty merely because defendant desires to waive the right provided for him. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 833, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889.) In taking a contrary view, defendant argues that the Legislature never intended to prevent capital defendants from waiving the right to an appeal. In support, he cites to a legislative committee report issued in 1935. This report was not discussed in People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889, and defendant asks us to take judicial notice of it. We do so. [4] In 1935, condemned inmate Rush Griffin was executed before his appeal had been heard. Griffin's attorney had filed a notice of appeal in the superior court, but the clerk's transcript of the trial proceedings was not forwarded to this court until three days after Griffin's execution. At that time, it was customary for the clerk of this court to notify the warden of San Quentin prison by letter that an appeal was pending, but because the superior court had not informed this court that the defendant had appealed, no such letter was written. The superior court sent the warden a letter mentioning the appeal, but the warden overlooked the letter and carried out Griffin's execution. (Special Com. to Investigate the Execution of Rush Griffin, Rep. (May 28, 1935) Sen. J. (1935 Reg. Sess.) p. 2427 (hereafter Special Committee Report).) The special legislative committee that looked into the matter concluded that the existing procedures of law are woefully inadequate with reference to the procedure for appeal of cases involving the death penalty. (Special Com. Rep., supra, p. 2428.) The committee recommended that legislation be enacted providing, among other things, for an automatic appeal ... in all cases in which the penalty of death is imposed and that the date of execution be set by the trial judge upon the receipt by him of the Appellate Court's order affirming the death penalty, and not as now provided when sentence is pronounced by the trial judge. ( Ibid. Legislation to so amend section 1239 was introduced in the state Senate on May 28, 1935, the same day on which the Special Committee Report was recorded in the Senate Journal. Both the Senate and the Assembly swiftly approved the proposed amendment; seven weeks later, the Governor signed it into law. The holding in People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889, that a capital defendant may not waive the automatic appeal provided by section 1239(b) is consistent with the legislative purpose reflected in the Special Committee Report just discussed. To prevent an execution before determination of an appeal, the committee recommended that legislation be enacted requiring that all cases in which the death penalty is imposed be automatically appealed to this court. (Special Com. Rep., supra, p. 2428, italics added.) Section 1239(b), which expressly provides for an automatic appeal in every capital case, implements this recommendation. If, as defendant contends, the Legislature's intent was to permit a condemned inmate to waive an appeal to a death judgment, it could easily have said so. It did not. We decided People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d 820, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889, almost 30 years ago. Since then, the Legislature has reenacted section 1239 (Stats. 1982, ch, § 4, p. 3355) and has amended it on two other occasions (Stats. 1975, ch. 1125, § 3, p. 2744; Stats. 1988, ch. 551, § 1, p.2013), but it has never altered section 1239's requirement that [w]hen ... a judgment of death is rendered, an appeal is automatically taken by the defendant. The quoted phrase forms the basis for Stanworth's holding that an appeal of a judgment of death may not be waived. `When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature thereafter reenacts that statute without changing the interpretation put on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts' construction of that statute.' ( People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 100-101, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 939 P.2d 1310; see also Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 226, 235, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 825 P.2d 767 [In the absence of legislative history suggesting otherwise, there is a very strong presumption that the Legislature intends that the same construction be given statutory language which has been readopted without change.].)
Defendant contends that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear his 1979 automatic appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal. Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, because it arose from a plea of guilty and the trial court did not issue a certificate of probable cause as, defendant contends, is required under section 1237.5. Section 1237.5 requires a defendant to obtain from the trial court a certificate of probable cause when appealing from a conviction resulting from a plea of guilty. In 1979, when defendant entered his plea of guilty in this case, section 1237.5 provided in relevant part: No appeal shall be taken by [a] defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere ... except where: [¶] (a) The defendant has filed with the trial court a written statement, executed under oath or penalty of perjury[,] showing reasonable ... grounds going to the legality of the proceedings; and [¶] (b) The trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause for such appeal with the county clerk. (Italics added.) Defendant points out that he did not file with the trial court the requisite written statement and the trial court did not issue a certificate of probable cause. Accordingly, he argues, this court lacked jurisdiction to entertain his appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309. Defendant acknowledges that to require a defendant sentenced to death to obtain a certificate of probable cause would be inconsistent with section 1239(b), which, as previously explained, provides that a judgment of death results in an automatic appeal without any action by [the defendant] or his 69... counsel. (Italics added.) Defendant argues, however, that because section 1237.5's certificate of probable cause requirement was enacted more recently than section 1239(b)'s automatic appeal provision, section 1237.5 controls. He invokes the principle of statutory construction that in the event of a conflict between two statutes, effect will be given to the more recently enacted law. ( Blealstein v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 152, 160, 208 Cal.Rptr. 428.) Principles of statutory construction guide us in achieving our ultimate task, which is to ascertain the Legislature's intent. ( People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 937, 67 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 941 P.2d 1189.) As we explain below, after examining the purpose of section 1237.5 we conclude that the Legislature did not intend that provision to apply to appeals from judgments of death based on a plea of guilty. The purpose for requiring a certificate of probable cause is to discourage and weed out frivolous or vexatious appeals challenging convictions following guilty and nolo contendere pleas. [Citations.] The objective is to promote judicial economy `by screening out wholly frivolous guilty [and nolo contendere] plea appeals before time and money is spent preparing the record and the briefs for consideration by the reviewing court.' [Citations.] ( People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75-76, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 851, 913 P.2d 1061.) This goal is inapplicable to an appeal from a sentence of death because, as we have explained, the Legislature has imposed on this court a duty to examine the record in all death sentence cases to determine whether the proceedings leading to the conviction and sentence were conducted fairly. ( People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 833, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889.) We therefore reject defendant's contention that in enacting section 1237.5, which generally requires a certificate of probable cause in cases involving a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the Legislature intended that requirement also to apply to automatic appeals in capital cases.
Defendant contends that if, as we held in People v. Stanworth, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pages 832-834, 80 Cal.Rptr. 49, 457 P.2d 889, section 1239(b) bars this court from dismissing, even at a defendant's request, an automatic appeal from a judgment of death, it is unconstitutional because it violates a defendant's right to control his defense. He asserts that this right arises from the provisions of the state and federal Constitutions entitling a criminal defendant to the assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const., Amend. VI; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Defendant relies primarily on Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, which holds that a criminal defendant has the right of self-representation at trial. But, as we noted in Massie I, `Faretta does not purport ...' ... to abrogate the rule ... that a capital defendant has no right to waive his automatic appeal. ( Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 624, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309.) Defendant points to isolated comments in federal cases that were decided after our decision in Massie I and state that a defendant has the right to decide whether to appeal. (See Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987[[T]he accused has the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his own behalf, or take an appeal .... (Italics added.) ]; Marrow v. United States (9th Cir.1985) 772 F.2d 525, 530 [The decision whether to appeal `must be the defendant's own choice,'... even after a guilty plea....].) We do not view these passing remarks, taken out of the context in which they arose in noncapital cases, as establishing a rule that a capital defendant who has been sentenced to death has a constitutional right to waive an automatic appeal. Defendant relies on a series of recent cases in which we have held that at trial a capital defendant may elect self-representation and present no mitigating evidence on his own behalf, notwithstanding California's interest in assuring a reliable penalty determination in capital cases. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1363-1373, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1062-1064, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 566,11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 809-811, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1030, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) These cases, he argues, demonstrate that the state's interest in the reliability of a capital trial does not outweigh a defendant's right to control the defense. No weighing, however, is required. Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, does not grant defendants the right to control their appeals, either by electing self representation ( People v. Scott (1998) 64 Cal. App.4th 550, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 315 [no right of self-representation on appeal]; In re Walker (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 225, 228-229, 128 Cal. Rptr. 291 [same]), by electing which issues to raise (see People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 173, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561 [court will not accept in propria persona filings in automatic appeal]), or (as urged by defendant) by waiving an automatic appeal. Defendant further contends that section 1239(b), which prohibits this court from granting requests by defendants sentenced to death to dismiss their automatic appeals, violates his right to equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. We disagree. As we have explained, the first prerequisite to such a claim is a showing that `the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' ( People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 223, 260 Cal.Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285, quoting In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549, italics omitted.) Section 1239(b) applies to individuals who, like defendant, have been sentenced to death. Defendant fails to identify any other similarly situated group that is affected differently by section 1239(b).
Defendant argues that because the automatic appeal in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, was taken against his wish, it did not present a case or controversy ripe for decision and therefore, lacking the power to render advisory opinions, we could not consider the appeal. He relies on Neary v. Regents of University of California (1992) 3 Cal.4th 273, 284, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 834 P.2d 119, in which we reiterated the well-established rule that we should avoid advisory opinions. Our decision in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, however, was not an advisory opinion, because its effects were real, not theoretical: it reversed defendant's robbery and murder convictions as well as his sentence of death. Moreover, our policy against advisory opinions does not deprive us of the power to hear an appeal notwithstanding the appealing party's request that it be dismissed. There is a `well-established line of judicial authority recognizing an exception to the mootness doctrine, and permitting the court to decline to dismiss a case rendered moot by stipulation of the parties where the appeal raises issues of continuing public importance.' ( State of Cal. ex rel. State Lands Com. v. Superior Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 61, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 399, 900 P.2d 648.) Defendant's convictions and death sentence were properly before us in Massie I, supra, 40 Cal.3d 620, 221 Cal.Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309, because they came within the automatic appeal provision of section 1239(b). We therefore had the power to hear the appeal notwithstanding defendant's request to dismiss it.
Defendant asserts that, by prohibiting a condemned inmate from waiving an automatic appeal, section 1239(b) creates an irreconcilable ethical conflict for defendant's appointed counsel. He points to the ethical duty of an attorney to follow the client's wishes regarding the objectives of the representation. (See ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.2(a) [A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of the representation.].) When a condemned inmate wishes to give up the right to an automatic appeal, defendant argues, section 1239(b) places the defense attorney in an impossible situation. As appellate counsel, the attorney is obligated to seek out grounds for reversal. (See generally, In re Smith (1970) 3 Cal.3d 192, 197, 90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969; People v. Feggans (1967) 67 Cal.2d 444, 447, 62 Cal.Rptr. 419, 432 P.2d 21.) Yet the attorney is also under an ethical duty to abide by the client's wish to seek dismissal of the appeal, thus resulting in the affirmance of the conviction and the sentence of death. As defendant puts it: To require that the attorney serve two masters, both the client and the state's abstract interest in avoiding the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty, is to deprive the capital defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel unfettered by conflicts of interest. We find no conflict of interest. It is true that an attorney must always respect and defer to those decisions properly reserved to his client. ( Davis v. State Bar (1983) 33 Cal.3d 231, 238, 188 Cal.Rptr. 441, 655 P.2d 1276.) But a defendant sentenced to death is not free to decide whether or not to appeal, because the Legislature has decreed that there be an automatic appeal in every capital case (§ 1239(b)) that cannot be waived. Contrary to defendant's assertion, defense counsel has no ethical obligation to comply with a capital defendant's request to abandon the appeal, for to do so is, as just explained, not permitted.