Opinion ID: 621469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: French’s FMLA Claim

Text: French’s claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) fails because he has not made a prima facie showing of a causal connection. To maintain a FMLA claim, a plaintiff must show that “a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Daugherty v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 544 F.3d 696, 707 (6th Cir. 2008). French provides no evidence to link his termination to his previous absences. Instead, French relies on his subjective “feeling” that Stempien’s behavior towards him changed after his return from leave in September 2004. French based this feeling on his perception that after his return, Stempien would “dump” work on him, showed greater interest in his whereabouts, and began closing her door when speaking with other attorneys. Such a subjective belief, no matter how genuine, is “insufficient evidence to establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1992). French counters that in 2004, he tried to return to work following leave and Stempien said, “you can’t come back to work, you’re falling apart.” There is no evidence linking - 18 - No. 10-3333 Gambill v. Duke Energy Corp. this stray comment, in which Stempien told French to extend his leave, to the decision to terminate his employment. Further, the comment occurred two years prior to French’s termination, and “[t]his Court typically [has] found the causal connection element [is] satisfied only where the adverse employment action occurred within a matter of months, or less, of the protected activity.” Dixon v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Randolph v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 453 F.3d 724, 737 (6th Cir. 2006) (six months sufficient); Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2004) (three months sufficient); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004) (less than a week sufficient); but see Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) (two to five months insufficient). The cases French cites in response are inapplicable because they apply only in a specific factual scenario: reinstatement cases where the supervisor could not retaliate until plaintiff returned to her former position. See, e.g. Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 335 (6th Cir. 2007); Porter v. Cal. Dept. of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 895 (9th Cir. 2005); Ford v. General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir. 2002). French’s case is factually distinct from Dixon, Porter and Ford because at all relevant times his supervisors had the capacity to retaliate against him, but did not. Cinergy’s decision not to retaliate during a two-year period eviscerates the purported temporal connection between French’s FMLA leave and his termination.