Opinion ID: 2067933
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Duren Element

Text: [¶ 32] Although underrepresentation in the jury pool has not been demonstrated using the absolute disparity test, we also address and apply the third Duren element. The third Duren element requires the challenging party to show that underrepresentation of the distinctive group, both generally and on the particular jury selection panel, occurred as a result of systematic exclusion from jury pools. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366, 99 S.Ct. 664. Systematic exclusion means exclusion inherent in the particular jury-selection process utilized. Id. [¶ 33] Holland argues with respect to the third Duren element that he made an offer of proof at trial that the racial composition of his jury pool is consistent with other Androscoggin County jury pools, which he contends the court should have considered. However, the issue for consideration relevant to the third Duren element is not racial composition of jury panels, but rather juror summonsing and selection practices and the extent to which such practices are shown to result in systemic exclusion of minorities from jury pools. [¶ 34] There is no evidence in the record to suggest that, even if underrpresentation had been shown, it was due to systematic exclusion of any group in jury selection processes. Maine jury selection practices are designed to ensure that no such systemic exclusion could occur. Maine statutory law provides that all persons chosen for jury service be selected at random from the broadest feasible cross section of the population of the area served by the court [and] that all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered for jury service. 14 M.R.S. § 1201-A (2008). A person may not be excluded from jury service on account of, among other things, race, color, national origin, or ancestry. 14 M.R.S. § 1202-A (2008). [¶ 35] A source list of prospective jurors is created from a list of licensed drivers, persons issued identification cards from the State, and any other person in the county who requests to be placed on the list. 14 M.R.S. § 1252-A(1) (2008). [12] A secondary list, called a master list, may be created from the source list when the court deems the volume of names on the source list too cumbersome to draw names. 14 M.R.S. § 1252-B (2008). [¶ 36] Names are selected at random by computer from the source or master lists, and questionnaires are sent to determine whether the recipient is qualified to serve on a jury. 14 M.R.S. §§ 1252-A(2), 1252-B, 1253-A, 1254-A (2008); see Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual § 1-1 (4th ed. 2009). Random selection refers to the selection of names in a manner immune from the purposeful or inadvertent introduction of subjective bias, so that no recognizable class of the population on the lists from which the names are being selected can be purposely or inadvertently included or excluded. 14 M.R.S. § 1203-A(5) (2008). The court may excuse a prospective juror from service based on information provided on the juror qualification form due to undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, public necessity, or inability to serve due to mental or physical disability. 14 M.R.S. § 1213 (2008). [¶ 37] Holland stated that his jury pool was developed in accordance with all statutory provisions, but failed to show how the use of lists of licensed drivers or state-issued identification cardholders, or anyone else who requests that his or her name be included on the source list, see 14 M.R.S. § 1252-A(1), results in systemic exclusion of African-Americans or other minorities. See generally United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27, 39 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that it has been long-recognized that use of voter registration lists are an appropriate jury selection method). [13] As the trial court noted, the questionnaires sent to prospective jurors seek no information concerning their race, making it impossible for individuals of any particular race to be systematically excluded from the jury pool. [¶ 38] Additionally, the fact that none of the eighty-one prospective jurors who actually appeared for jury selection at Holland's trial were, by outward appearance, African-Americans or other minorities is insufficient to support the conclusion that there is, per se, systemic exclusion of such groups from the Androscoggin County jury pool. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 168 (4th Cir.1981) (declining to create a per se exception to the requirements set forth in Duren in a case in which the panel from which a petit jury in West Virginia was selected contained no Mexican-Americans); cf. McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir.1999) (stating that a one-time example of underrepresentation of a distinctive group wholly fails to meet the systemic exclusion element in Duren ) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 39] Finally, it is unknown how many African-Americans were in any jury pool other than Holland's. The court observed that African-Americans had been represented in small numbers in pools over the past twenty-five years. Contrary to Holland's contention, we view this as more of an anecdotal remark than the court taking judicial notice of a fact, and regardless, the court's fact is of no probative value because it included no specific numbers. We are likewise unpersuaded by Holland's offer of proof that the assembled jury pool was typical to the racial outcome, which he suggested he could support only by calling the clerk. See State v. Albert, 495 A.2d 1242, 1243 (Me.1985) (In making an offer of proof the party offering the evidence must ensure that the trial court is fully advised as to the relevancy and admissibility of the proposed testimony.). [¶ 40] Thus, Holland has not demonstrated a representation problem pursuant to either the second or third Duren elements and failed to establish a prima facie claim of a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section violation.