Opinion ID: 791970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Anti-Nullification Instruction

Text: 15 Carr argues first that the district court erred in instructing the jury that if it concluded that the government had proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would have a duty to convict Carr. Carr contends that the instruction was in error because, by suggesting to the jury that it could not acquit if it found the government had met its burden, the district court's instruction erroneously and impermissibly suggested that the jury could not engage in jury nullification. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 608 (2d Cir.1997) (defining nullification as a juror's intentional disregard of the law as stated by the presiding judge). 16 Because Carr did not raise this objection at trial, we review the district court's instruction for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 17 The framework of the analysis for plain error pursuant to Rule 52(b) is the four-pronged test set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 18 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2003) (in banc) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655, 667 (2d Cir.2001) (in banc) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 32, 160 L.Ed.2d 10 (2004). The district court instructed the jury: 19 If there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt ... the government obtains a conviction. If there is a reasonable doubt, then there is an acquittal. 20 ... [I]f after a consideration of all of the evidence, you have such a firm belief or conviction of the defendant's guilt on the count you are considering, the kind of belief or conviction that you would be willing to act upon without hesitation in matters of importance in your own lives, then you will say that there is no reasonable doubt. You'll say that the government has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. And in that event it is your duty to find a verdict of guilty on that count. 21 On the other hand, if after a consideration of all the evidence or the lack of evidence, . . . if you have the kind of doubt which would cause you to hesitate in acting on important matters in your own lives, then you'll say that you have a reasonable doubt, and in that event it is your duty to find a verdict of not guilty. 22 Trial Tr., Aug. 18, 2003, at 1133. Later in its instructions, the court elaborated, [I]f... you decide that the government has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the count you are considering, you will enter a finding of guilty, and you will not be dissuaded by any circumstance, whether sympathy or any other factor[,] in complying with that duty. Id. at 1166. 23 The district court thus suggested to the jury that nullification was not an option. Carr argues that such a suggestion is prohibited. We disagree. 24 Our case law makes clear, as Carr concedes, that a trial court is not required to inform a jury of its power to nullify. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir.1996) (While juries have the power to ignore the law in their verdicts, courts have no obligation to tell them they may do so. It appears that every circuit that has considered this issue agrees.); see also id. at 19-20 (citing cases). Nothing in our case law begins to suggest that the court cannot also tell the jury affirmatively that it has a duty to follow the law, even though it may in fact have the power not to. 25 In Thomas, this Court t[ook] th[e] occasion 26 to restate some basic principles regarding the character of our jury system. Nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as instructed by the court — in the words of the standard oath administered to jurors in the federal courts, to render a true verdict according to the law and the evidence. Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 225 (4th ed.1996) (emphasis supplied). We categorically reject the idea that, in a society committed to the rule of law, jury nullification is desirable or that courts may permit it to occur when it is within their authority to prevent. 27 Thomas, 116 F.3d at 614 (footnote omitted). The Court continued: 28 [I]n language originally employed by Judge Learned Hand, the power of juries to nullify or exercise a power of lenity is just that — a power; it is by no means a right or something that a judge should encourage or permit if it is within his authority to prevent. It is true that nullification has a long history in the Anglo-American legal system, and that the federal courts have long noted the de facto power of a jury to render general verdicts in the teeth of both law and facts. However, at least since the Supreme Court's decision in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102, 15 S.Ct. 273, 39 L.Ed. 343 (1895) (holding that, while juries are finders of fact, it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them), courts have consistently recognized that jurors have no right to nullify. 29 Id. at 615 (internal citations other than to Sparf omitted; emphasis in original). 2 30 We do not appear to have addressed directly the use of language similar to that employed by the district court. But the District of Columbia Circuit, considering a challenge very similar to Carr's, specifically approved of instructions that included the following language: 31 The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence, or to produce any evidence. If you find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense with which the defendant is charged, and which I will define for you, it is your duty to find him guilty. On the other hand, if you find the government has failed to prove any element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find him not guilty. 32 United States v. Pierre, 974 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C.Cir.1992) (per curiam), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1012, 113 S.Ct. 1665, 123 L.Ed.2d 283 (1993). The court concluded that it was proper for the district court to instruct the jury that it had a duty to find appellant guilty if the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense with which he was charged. 3 Id. at 1357. 33 We agree with the D.C. Circuit. We can find no basis for a conclusion that the district court's instruction was, in this regard, erroneous. There being no error, it follows a fortiori that there was no plain error. See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 129.