Opinion ID: 2014418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: First-Degree Similar Fashion Murder

Text: Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a) (xi) provides that [a] person is guilty of murder in the first degree when . . . [w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; and . . . the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by rejecting his request to instruct the jurors to disregard his postmortem conduct (specifically, the mode of dismembering and discarding of his victims' bodies) when determining whether he committed first-degree similar fashion murder. [4] The gist of defendant's claim is that similar fashion relates solely to the killing acts underlying the first-degree murder charge, not to the entirety of each separate transaction. As defendant put it at trial, the element of similar fashion can be established only by reference to the nature and type of injuries inflicted and the instrumentality that was used or not used when committing the crime. He asserts that plain language compels this construction of the statute, as does the Legislature's avowed goal of creating a death-eligible crime sufficiently narrow to pass constitutional muster. We disagree. Defendant's proposed construction  to have caused the death of two or more additional persons . . . when committed in a similar fashion  is linguistically awkward. [C]ommitted in a similar fashion more naturally relates back to separate criminal transactions, the immediately preceding phrase. Relative or qualifying words of clauses . . . ordinarily are to be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding, and are not to be construed as extending to others more remote, unless the intent of the statute clearly indicates otherwise (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 254). Legislative history further supports this reading of the statute. The Assembly Codes Committee Bill Memorandum explains that subparagraph (xi) of Penal Law § 125.27 (1) (a), the death penalty statute's serial murder provision, makes an intentional killing first degree murder when the defendant has committed two or more additional intentional killings within a 24 month period in separate criminal transactions that were committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan (Mem of Assembly Codes Comm, Bill Jacket, L 1995, ch 1 [emphasis added]). From a commonsense perspective, there is no reason to hold that similarity must be shown by the killing act alone. Indeed, in People v Mateo (93 NY2d 327, 333 [1999] [ Mateo I ]), [5] we declined to adopt a comprehensive definition of similarity, because [t]o do so . . . would ignore the relative nature and contextual considerations inherent in any analysis and application of the `similarity' element ( id. ). Thus, we anticipated that similar fashion could, depending upon the circumstances of an individual case, encompass more than just the actual killing acts. Further, we specifically pointed out that, although Mateo shot all his victims, his various killings were not undertaken in a similar fashion because: the murder victims were of different ethnic and racial backgrounds and ranged in age from 16 to 20. A .45 caliber handgun, a .38 caliber handgun, a .25 caliber handgun, and a sawed-off shotgun were the varied weapons used to commit these murders. The motives for each shooting differed, as did the wounds inflicted by defendant upon his victims. Moreover, the locations of these multiple killings were different ( id. ). The factors that we enumerated go well beyond the nature and type of injuries inflicted and the instrumentality that was used or not used when committing the crime, which defendant asserts should delimit similarity. Postmortem conduct may well be relevant. [6] What counts is the similarity of the conduct, not whether it occurred before or after the victim's death. In all three murders underlying this case, defendant brought the women to the room where he lived and killed them by repeatedly beating them about the face and head with a heavy, blunt object, variously, a baseball bat (Jane Doe Medford), a dumbbell (Kelly Sue Bunting) and a hammer (Lisa Ann Warner). Defendant used such force that he split the victims' skulls open. Afterward, defendant hacked off the victims' hands or limbs and disposed of the bodies in garbage receptacles. To inhibit identification of his victims, one of whom remained unidentified at trial, defendant threw away their severed hands or limbs, again as trash, in locations away from the spots where he disposed of their bodies. There was, in short, sufficient evidence for the jury to convict defendant of first-degree similar fashion murder. We have considered defendant's remaining challenges to his conviction, and conclude that they also lack merit. Accordingly, the judgment of County Court should be modified by vacating the sentence of death imposed upon conviction of murder in the first degree, and remitting to County Court for resentencing in accordance with CPL 470.30 (5) (c) and Penal Law §§ 60.06 and 70.00 (5) and, as so modified, affirmed. Judgment modified, etc.