Opinion ID: 1719983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: presentence examination report.

Text: Following his conviction, the defendant was committed to the H&SS Department for a presentence social, physical and mental examination, pursuant to sec. 975.01, Stats. [5] Pursuant to sec. 975.04 (1), [6] an eight-page report of the results of the examination and the recommendations of the department was sent to the trial court. This report, which did not recommend specialized treatment for the defendant, contained a psychiatric re-evaluation which stated in part: Mr. Moore was rather concerned as to how to approach the present examination. He claimed he wanted to maintain his innocent position for purposes of his appeal. However, he did state that he wanted to discuss the offense in regard to his being considered for the Sex Crimes Program. I did inform him that if he did admit to the offense and discuss the offense, that such information would be in the Hospital records and the referring court would receive a copy of our records. With this understanding, he did proceed to discuss the offense. The victim was a lady that he had known for a period of time and lived upstairs in the same apartment. He claimed that she was somewhat `provocative' and that he did approach her to have intercourse, but was turned down . . . `When I couldn't get it the straight way, like I wanted, then I resorted to raping her.' The reasons for the imposition of the sentence and the factors considered by the trial court are set forth in twelve pages of the record. At no time did the trial court refer to the foregoing statement contained in the presentence social, physical and mental examination. The trial court did, however, make a careful and extensive record of the factors it relied upon when imposing sentence. Those factors included a substantial record of past criminal activity, which the trial court described in detail. It then reviewed the aggravated circumstances of the crime itself, as established by the overwhelming evidence at trial. On this record, the trial court sentenced the defendant, pursuant to sec. 975.05, Stats., to the maximum possible term, a thirty-year sentence to run consecutively to a previously imposed sentence which he was serving at the time of his conviction. The defendant now contends that he was prejudiced by the submission to the court of the inculpatory psychiatric report, and he asserts that divulgence of this information deprived him of equal protection and due process of law, and is contrary to sec. 905.04, Stats. The defendant first points to limitations imposed upon the admissibility of psychiatric information obtained in ch. 971, Stats., examinations, and argues that principles of equal protection demand that similar limitations be imposed upon ch. 975 examinations. This argument is untenable. Sec. 971.18, Stats., provides: 971.18 Inadmissibility of statements for purposes of examination. A statement made by a person subjected to psychiatric examination or treatment pursuant to this chapter for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall not be admissible in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding on any issue other than that of his mental condition. [15] This provision, which has reference to examinations conducted before or during trial, codifies the rule of State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, 34 Wis.2d 607, 150 N.W.2d 318 (1967). That case stands for the proposition that where an accused has made inculpatory statements during a compulsory mental examination, before conviction, his privilege against self-incrimination should be recognized and protected; as the defendant correctly asserts, under these circumstances, submission to a compulsory mental examination should not be dependent upon a waiver of the accused's privilege against self-incrimination. State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, supra, at 619, 622, 623. These principles do not preclude consideration of a psychiatric report at the sentencing stage, however. This court held in State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, supra , that compulsory examinations must be allowed a wide scope, and that they may deal with matters within the privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege can be protected, and an accused's right to a fair trial guaranteed, the court held, by a sequential order of proof in which the issue of guilt is determined before issues of mental condition are considered. Thus the evidence derived from the examination will not be admitted while the jury is determining the issue of guilt. State ex rel. La Follette v. Raskin, supra, at 623. [16-17] For the same reason, consideration of a presentence psychiatric report at the time of sentencing does not infringe upon the rights of the accused under the fifth amendment. The issue of guilt has already been determined. In Cross v. State, 45 Wis.2d 593, 173 N.W.2d 589 (1970), a convicted defendant argued that his temporary commitment to a sex deviate center for examination deprived him of a fair trial. This court rejected this contention, and said: . . . At that stage he had already . . . been found guilty. This commitment for an examination had no relationship to the issue of guilt. Cross v. State, supra, at 603. In the present case, therefore, as in trials employing the sequential order of proof prescribed by Raskin, supra : . . . The defendant cannot be prejudiced because he has already been convicted, so the self-incrimination privilege has no application. . . . Note, Compulsory Mental Examinations and The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1964 Wis. L. Rev. 671, 681. In addition, any possibility of prejudice is eliminated by the particular facts of this case. The psychiatrist's report stated that the psychiatrist specifically informed the defendant that if he admitted the offense, the referring court would receive a copy of the information, and also stated that the defendant understood this fact. Further, the trial court made no mention of the report, much less the inculpatory statements, in its meticulous review of the relevant sentencing considerations. It is clear, therefore, that there was no violation of equal protection. [18] The defendant's second theory is that he has been denied due process of law because the compulsory mental examination presents him with an unpleasant choice. If he incriminates himself in an effort to obtain sex deviate treatment, and special treatment is not recommended, he runs the risk of a harsher criminal sentence, but if he withholds the incriminating information, he reduces the likelihood that he will receive special treatment. [19] Whatever the risks inherent in the defendant's position, they are not of constitutional dimensions. A determination by the department that the defendant should not receive specialized treatment does not subject him to a grievous loss or deprive him of liberty or property without due process of law; there is no entitlement to such treatment. Schmidt v. State, 68 Wis.2d 512, 520, 228 N.W.2d 751 (1975). It cannot be said that the use of the presentence report is fundamentally unfair. [20] The defendant also insists that sec. 905.04(4) (b), Stats., prevents a trial court from considering the contents of a presentence report, other than the bare recommendation to grant or deny specialized treatment. This argument flies in the face of the language and purposes of sec. 975.04. Sec. 905.04(4) (b), Stats., creates an exception to the physician-patient privilege for examinations ordered by a judge with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise. The defendant would construe the particular purpose for which ch. 975 medical and mental examinations are ordered to be narrowly limited to the bare yes-or-no determination with regard to specialized treatment, and would extend a physician-patient privilege over the communications and information which led to the physician's recommendation. [21] However, sec. 975.04, Stats., expressly provides that a report of the results of the examination and the recommendations of the department shall be sent to the court. This language leaves no room for the construction proposed by the defendant. The department makes its recommendation as to treatment. When the department recommends treatment, the final determination as to whether the defendant is to be committed for such treatment is made by the court. Sec. 975.06.