Opinion ID: 886036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 62 Did the District Court err in denying Anderson's counterclaim for tortious interference? ¶ 63 The District Court determined that Anderson did not establish a prima facie case that Grenfell tortiously interfered with Anderson's sublease. The District Court first noted that Anderson's claim for tortious interference in Count VI of his counterclaim stemmed solely from Grenfell's alleged interference in the contractual relationship between Anderson and Bice, wherein Grenfell sent to Bice a letter dated October 29, 1991, informing Bice that Anderson was in default on the lease and that Bice should thereafter remit payment on the sublease to himself rather than Anderson. The District Court further noted that Anderson, in his proposed findings and conclusions after remand, also alleged that Grenfell tortiously interfered with the contractual relations between he and Houldson. ¶ 64 In order to establish a prima facie case of interference with contractual or business relations, it must be shown that the defendant's acts (1) were intentional and willful, (2) were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiff in his or her business, (3) were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage or loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the actor, and (4) that actual damages and loss resulted. Bolz v. Myers (1982), 200 Mont. 286, 295, 651 P.2d 606, 611 (citation omitted). ¶ 65 The District Court found that Grenfell's lockout on October 28 and the letter of October 29, 1991, were based upon a good faith belief that Anderson was in default on the lease agreement for failing to pay rent and utilities, and that Anderson was in breach of the agreement for failing to remedy his default within the ten-day cure period, which ended on October 27, 1991. This finding was predicated upon the District Court's conclusion that Grenfell held a good faith belief that his default notice of October 17, although unclaimed by Anderson, constituted effective notice of default. ¶ 66 Noting that Anderson terminated the sublease with Bice by written letter of October 24, 1991, the District Court concluded that any interference by Grenfell with the Anderson Bice sublease occurred subsequent to Anderson's termination of the subtenancy, and further, that any alleged willful interference by Grenfell was based upon a good faith belief that his notice was sufficient and that his actions were justified. ¶ 67 Likewise, the District Court similarly concluded that any interference by Grenfell with the Anderson-Houldson sublease was also based upon a good faith belief that his notice of default was sufficient, and that Grenfell's actions did not constitute intentionally unlawful and willful interference with the Anderson-Houldson sublease for the purpose of causing damages to Anderson. Thus, the District Court ultimately concluded that Anderson did not establish a prima facie case of tortious interference with contractual or business relations by Grenfell. ¶ 68 Anderson asserts that the District Court's conclusion is contrary to the law of the case as determined in Grenfell I, and that based upon the doctrine of res judicata, the District Court erred by effectively reversing this Court's decision in Grenfell I. Anderson points to the language in Grenfell I wherein we stated: We hold that Anderson has presented sufficient credible evidence to support his claim for damages.... Grenfell I, ¶ 58. Anderson argues that the sufficient, credible, and overwhelming evidence presented at trial supports his counterclaim for tortious interference, and that the District Court's conclusion to the contrary is error based upon the above language of this Court. ¶ 69 In the original action, the District Court concluded that Anderson was the initial and sole breaching party, received actual and constructive notice of default, did not present credible evidence to support his claim for damages against Grenfell, and it thus did not reach the merits of Anderson's claim for damages. On appeal, this Court in Grenfell I reversed a number of the District Court's conclusions of law, including its conclusions that Anderson received actual or constructive notice of default prior to Grenfell's lockout, and remanded to the District Court for further consideration of Anderson's claims in light of our holding. See Grenfell I, ¶¶ 35, 44-46, 58-59. Reviewing evidence presented by Anderson, we stated: We conclude that Anderson, contrary to the District Court's conclusion, has presented credible evidence to support his claim for lost profits. Whether Grenfell is in fact liable for damages under any of Anderson's claims, as well as whether he could have foreseen Anderson's lost profits at the time their lease was made, are matters that should be addressed upon remand. Grenfell I, ¶ 64. ¶ 70 Decidedly, this Court did not make any ruling on the merits of Anderson's counterclaims against Grenfell, but merely reversed the conclusion of the District Court that Anderson presented no credible evidence to support his alleged claims. We remanded precisely for a determination on the merits whether Grenfell was, in fact, liable under any of Anderson's claims. Thus, we do not find Anderson's argument compelling that the District Court was bound by the doctrine of res judicata to find that Anderson had prevailed on the merits of his counterclaim alleging that Grenfell was guilty of tortious interference with Anderson's contractual or business relationships with either Bice or Houldson. ¶ 71 The fulcrum of the District Court's denial of Anderson's claim for tortious interference is the following: (1) The claim, as written, was based on the sublease between Anderson and Rick Bice; (2) Anderson terminated the sublease with Bice in a written letter of October 24, 1991; (3) Grenfell's alleged willful interference with this sublease agreement came after Anderson's letter terminating the Anderson Bice subtenancy; and finally (4), Grenfell's act of changing the locks on October 28, 1991, was done on the good faith belief that he had given proper notice of default and that Anderson was in breach of the lease agreement. The District Court thus concluded that Grenfell could not have tortiously interfered with the Anderson Bice sublease, as the sublease was terminated prior to Grenfell's lockout, nor did any willful interference occur with the Anderson Houldson sublease, as Grenfell believed, in good faith, that his lockout of Anderson was done with right and justification on his part. ¶ 72 Anderson cites extensively to portions of the trial transcript and much of his own testimony as evidence that Grenfell attempted to interfere with the Anderson Bice sublease on various occasions prior to October 24, 1991, citing to a dispute regarding Grenfell's alleged refusal to fix the air conditioning and to a dispute regarding Grenfell's claim of entitlement to reimbursement from Bice for work performed on the premises. ¶ 73 In considering this evidence, the District Court found that Grenfell admitted to conferring with Bice around the time of default regarding Bice taking over the entire premises and thereafter remitting the rent to Grenfell instead of Anderson. The District Court found, however, that Grenfell and Bice did not enter into a lease agreement until after Grenfell terminated the agreement with Anderson, and that Grenfell could not have thus willfully interfered. ¶ 74 This Court will not set aside a district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and we give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.; Tungsten Holdings, Inc. v. Olson, 2002 MT 158, ¶ 13, 310 Mont. 374, ¶ 13, 50 P.3d 1086, ¶ 13; Grenfell I, ¶ 24. A district court's findings are clearly erroneous if they are not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the trial court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if a review of the record leaves this Court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Tungsten, ¶ 13; Grenfell I, ¶ 24 (citation omitted). Additionally, in determining whether a district court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Grenfell I, ¶ 24 (citation omitted). ¶ 75 Upon review of the record and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Grenfell on Anderson's counterclaim of tortious interference with business or contractual relations, we conclude that the District Court did not err in finding that Anderson terminated the Anderson Bice sublease prior to any alleged tortious interference by Grenfell, nor did it err in finding that Grenfell terminated the lease agreement based upon a good faith belief that Anderson was in breach of the agreement. The District Court, therefore, did not err when it concluded that Anderson did not establish a prima facie case of tortious interference of business or contractual relations on either sublease. ¶ 76 The District Court's decision is affirmed accordingly.