Opinion ID: 477760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellants' Double Jeopardy Claims.

Text: 18 Guaranteeing that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, the fifth amendment embodies a general policy against multiple prosecutions and punishments for the same crime. 19 The    idea [underlying the double jeopardy clause], one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty. 20 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). 21 Because judicial application of the clause recognizes a criminal defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 837, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949), the critical double jeopardy inquiry in the mistrial context is whether the defendant sought or consented to the mistrial, see Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir.1979). When the defendant requests a mistrial, he is deemed to have deliberately elected to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978). Absent the defendant's consent, a long-standing rule establishes that retrial is barred unless there was a manifest necessity for the mistrial declaration, the classic example of which is a hung jury. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). 22 At issue on this appeal is the one exception to the rule governing defense-requested mistrials. That exception allows a defendant to invoke the double jeopardy bar when his mistrial request is compelled by governmental misconduct so egregious that he must abandon his right to take his case to the first trier of the facts. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2088, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). In this case, appellants protest that the pretrial secret proceedings concerning the possible conflict with Peter's attorney ensured that once Bonilla's allegations against Salaway became known, appellants ultimately would be compelled to move for a mistrial. 23
24 In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 677-79, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2090-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), the Supreme Court enunciated the standard for measuring allegations that prosecutorial misconduct compelled a defendant's mistrial motion. Because appellants here assert claims of both prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, we must decide whether the same test should be applied to both allegations. Since we conclude that under the Kennedy standard appellants have no claim with respect to the conduct of the AUSA, the decisive inquiries on this appeal are whether a different standard should be applied to assess a judge's conduct, and, under whatever standard does apply, whether the trial judge's conduct precludes a retrial here. The Kennedy decision provides: 25 We do not by this opinion lay down a flat rule that where a defendant in a criminal trial successfully moves for a mistrial, he may not thereafter invoke the bar of double jeopardy against a second trial. But we do hold that the circumstances under which such a defendant may invoke the bar of double jeopardy in a second effort to try him are limited to those cases in which the conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. 26 Id. at 679, 102 S.Ct. at 2091 (emphasis added). In so holding, the Court disavowed earlier precedent that arguably afforded the double-jeopardy bar to defendants compelled to move for a mistrial, not as the result of any intent to provoke a mistrial, but due merely to prosecutorial or judicial over-reaching or prejudicial conduct. See id. (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 27 By quoting prior Supreme Court authority discussing prosecutorial and judicial misconduct as one unit, the Kennedy Court, the government argues, indicated that the conduct of judges and prosecutors should be similarly reviewed. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 678, 102 S.Ct. at 2090 (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557); cf. United States v. Singer, 785 F.2d 228, 240 (8th Cir.1986) (Kennedy Court referred to prosecutorial and judicial misconduct as if in one breath). Indeed, Justice Stevens's separate opinion in Kennedy noted that although that case dealt with allegations of only prosecutorial error, the exception to the general rule on defendant-requested mistrials also encompasses comparable judicial misconduct. 456 U.S. at 683 n. 12, 102 S.Ct. at 2093, n. 12 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the ninth and eleventh circuits have since addressed allegations of judicially provoked mistrials under the Kennedy standard, albeit without extensive analysis. See United States v. Mitchell, 736 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 94, 88 L.Ed.2d 77 (1985); United States v. Miller, 742 F.2d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1216, 105 S.Ct. 1194, 84 L.Ed.2d 340 (1985). 28 Appellants, on the other hand, urge that a judge should be held to a more exacting standard than a prosecutor, because the judge's function is to ensure a fair trial, while a prosecutor is acting as the defendant's adversary. Cf. Singer, 785 F.2d at 240. Thus, appellants contend that judges should be held to the alternative overreaching standard found in Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 1081, and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485, 91 S.Ct. at 557, and applied by this court in Drayton v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir.1979). 29 We reject appellants' invitation to declare a separate standard for judges from that enunciated in Kennedy. First, no Supreme Court authority suggests that a different measure should be employed to test judges' conduct; in fact, as we noted earlier, a long line of cases indicates that judges and prosecutors should be similarly treated in evaluating double jeopardy claims following a defendant-requested mistrial. See, e.g., Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 677-79, 102 S.Ct. at 2090-91 (quoting cases referring to prosecutors and judges); Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 33-34, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977) (examining judge's and prosecutor's conduct under the same standard); Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608, 96 S.Ct. at 1080 (referring to judicial or prosecutorial error); Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485 & n. 12, 91 S.Ct. at 557 & n. 12 (discussing a mistrial motion necessitated by judicial or prosecutorial impropriety). 30 Second, a less exacting test for judges would not necessarily serve the interests of criminal defendants in general. Inevitably some errors will be made during every criminal trial, and trial judges should feel free to grant a mistrial when they conclude that a given error is incurably prejudicial. Since there is no way, under the amorphous overreaching standard, to decide accurately when such a trial error would cross the line, trial judges would frequently be left to consider the potential bar of double jeopardy before granting a mistrial at the defendant's request. In doubtful cases, judges would likely be less willing to grant otherwise meritorious mistrial requests. Thus, by discouraging trial judges from granting mistrials, the less exacting test for judges now urged by appellants would tend to erode the very protections the double jeopardy clause was meant to provide, a consequence the Supreme Court has cautioned against: 31 If a mistrial were in fact warranted under the applicable law, of course, the defendant could in many instances successfully appeal a judgment of conviction on the same grounds that he urged a mistrial, and the Double Jeopardy Clause would present no bar to retrial. But some of the advantages secured to him by the Double Jeopardy Clause--the freedom from extended anxiety, and the necessity to confront the government's case only once--would be to a large extent lost in the process of trial to verdict, reversal on appeal, and subsequent retrial. 32 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676-77, 102 S.Ct. at 2089-90. 33 Applying Kennedy's intentional misconduct test to judges as well as prosecutors will maximize the protections afforded criminal defendants by leaving judges free to grant a mistrial in the event of perceived prejudicial trial error, while at the same time guarding against the rare judge who, sensing an acquittal, might overstep his authority and seek to provoke a defendant's mistrial motion. Reprosecution after such intentional misconduct the double jeopardy clause will not tolerate, for the system breaks down when a judge intercedes to manipulate the process and deprive a defendant of his right to go before his first trier of the facts. See United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 n. 3, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 1590 n. 3, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). 34 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the intentional misconduct standard, which in Kennedy was held to govern evaluation of the conduct of prosecutors under the double jeopardy clause following a defendant's request for a mistrial, should also apply to reviewing a trial judge's actions. In so deciding, we note that any inconsistency between this holding and our earlier decision in Drayton, 589 F.2d at 121-22, is mandated by the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Kennedy, since the broader language in Drayton had relied on earlier Supreme Court authority that referred to both judges and prosecutors, authority which was expressly limited in Kennedy, id. at 121; see Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 677-79 & n. 8, 102 S.Ct. at 2090-91 & n. 8. 35
36 A careful review of the record in this case reveals no conduct by either Judge Walker or the AUSA intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679, 102 S.Ct. at 2091. Indeed, the judge's and the prosecutor's actions--although in hindsight perhaps not the best possible choices--were scrupulously designed to avoid any prejudicial impact on the trial. 37 Judge Walker found that the facts and circumstances allowed no inference that the prosecutor in this case intended 'to subvert the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause' , United States v. Rivera, 634 F.Supp. 204, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676, 102 S.Ct. at 2089), that finding is fully supported by the record. Upon discovering Bonilla's allegation that Salaway had suborned perjury in an unrelated state action, the AUSA promptly advised the judge of the potential conflict and sought a hearing to advise Peter of his rights. Far from acting to provoke a future mistrial motion by appellants, the AUSA cooperated fully with the court in seeking to avoid that result. 38 Similarly, there are no objective facts and circumstances from which to infer an intent by the district judge to provoke appellants' mistrial motions. See Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 679-80, 102 S.Ct. at 2091 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the objective facts and circumstances govern the analysis of intent to provoke a mistrial). To begin with, appellants' claim is inherently implausible; it borders on the ludicrous to suggest that two weeks prior to trial the judge acted with an intent to provoke the later mistrial motions. Judge Walker did candidly acknowledge that, in retrospect, it might have been better to include all parties in the pretrial discussions of Salaway's possible conflict of interest. However, the omission of appellants from those discussions does not indicate any intent to provoke a mistrial. One can fairly infer two things from the pretrial events: (1) a scrupulous effort by Judge Walker to protect one defendant from a serious possibility that his attorney might have a conflict that could deny him a fair trial, and (2) a commendable desire to protect, if possible, the professional reputation of two members of the bar from possibly unfounded accusations of criminal misconduct. 39 The district judge's desire to avoid a mistrial is further borne out by his rulings on the various mistrial motions made by appellants. After learning of Salaway's potential conflict from material produced by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3500, Pedro, Sonia, and Laguer moved for a mistrial on the ground that there would be spillover prejudice from the allegations of misconduct by co-defense counsel Salaway. This motion was denied as premature. When Peter Rivera reconsidered his position and moved for a mistrial to obtain new counsel, the other appellants renewed their mistrial motions contingent upon the resolution of Peter's motion and whether Salaway remained in the case. Even when the court subsequently granted Peter a severance and mistrial, the court continued the trial as to the other appellants. It was not until Laguer's counsel brought out Salaway's name in cross-examining Bonilla that Judge Walker finally granted appellants' third set of mistrial motions. Had he conducted the earlier in camera proceedings with an intent ultimately to provoke appellants' mistrial motions, surely he would have granted, rather than denied, the earlier motions. We conclude that the objective facts and circumstances allow no inference that the judge intended to provoke a mistrial, see Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675, 102 S.Ct. at 2089, his own conclusion in that regard, therefore, is fully supported by the record. 40 From the detached, unhurried perspective of our appellate review we note that this whole problem might have been circumvented by expressly limiting the scope of Bonilla's examination. A direction to all counsel to avoid identifying Salaway as the attorney who had allegedly suborned perjury would have preserved to defendants the opportunity to challenge the credibility of the government's informant witness, and at the same time excluded from the trial the collateral, irrelevant fact that one of defendants' counsel had participated in the witness's prior perjury. We also note that if counsel for Laguer had focused on the true issues of this case, rather than forcing a cumulative credibility issue, or possibly seeking the potential strategic advantage of a mistrial, he would have realized that all reference to Salaway was surplusage at best. The trial could then have proceeded without Salaway's name ever being mentioned, and the jury would have been unaware of the potentially prejudicial information. 41