Opinion ID: 887281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the District Court err when it revoked Tracy's ten-year suspended commitment to the Department of Corrections and reimposed a sentence of ten years at the Montana State Prison, with five years suspended?

Text: ¶ 14 Tracy argues that by sentencing him to imprisonment at MSP instead of committing him to DOC for placement in an appropriate facility or program, the District Court imposed a greater sentence, which is precluded by § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA (1999). ¶ 15 The State asserts Tracy's arguments must fail because the Legislature amended § 46-18-203, MCA, in 2003 to permit a judge to impose additional restrictions when an offender has violated the terms and conditions of a suspended or deferred sentence as long as the length of the sentence or commitment is not increased. The State points out that the amended statute applies to any offender whose suspended or deferred sentence is subject to revocation regardless of the date of the offender's conviction and regardless of the terms and conditions of the offender's original sentence. Section § 46-18-203(9), MCA (2003). ¶ 16 We have consistently held that a person has the right to be sentenced under the statutes which are in effect at the time of the offense. Dexter v. Shields, 2004 MT 159, ¶ 13, 322 Mont. 6, ¶ 13, 92 P.3d 1208, ¶ 13; State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47, ¶ 24, 309 Mont. 1, ¶ 24, 43 P.3d 318, ¶ 24; State v. Brister, 2002 MT 13, ¶ 26, 308 Mont. 154, ¶ 26, 41 P.3d 314, ¶ 26; State v. Stevens (1995), 273 Mont. 452, 455, 904 P.2d 590, 592. We have done so because imposition of a sentence under statutes not in effect at the time the offense was committed is an ex post facto application of the law and therefore unconstitutional. State v. Azure (1978), 179 Mont. 281, 282, 587 P.2d 1297, 1298. It is a violation of Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 31, of the Montana Constitution, to apply a statute enacted subsequent to the time a defendant commits an offense, which increases a defendant's punishment. State v. Suiste (1993), 261 Mont. 251, 253, 862 P.2d 399, 400. ¶ 17 In this instance, the offenses for which Tracy is now serving the Cascade County sentence in question were committed in December of 1996. Thus, even though Tracy cites the 1999 version of § 46-18-203, the 1995 version is applicable. This statute states: If the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of the suspended or deferred sentence, the court may: (c) revoke the suspension of sentence and require the defendant to serve either the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence; . . . Section 46-18-203(7)(c), MCA (1995). ¶ 18 A sentence to MSP is not the same sentence, or a lesser sentence, than a commitment to DOC for placement in an appropriate facility or program. A person committed to DOC for an appropriate placement is not necessarily incarcerated in a detention facility. Had Tracy been committed to DOC he could have been eligible for placement in some programs under the Montana Community Corrections Act, codified in Title 53, Chapter 30, Part 3, MCA, even though he was in the custody of DOC. ¶ 19 The Montana Legislature did amend § 46-18-203, MCA, effective April 17, 2003. Section 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA, now provides: If the judge finds that the offender has violated the terms and conditions of the suspended or deferred sentence, the judge may: (iii) revoke the suspension of sentence and require the offender to serve either the sentence imposed or any sentence that could have been imposed that does not include a longer imprisonment or commitment term than the original sentence; ... ¶ 20 The 2003 amendments to § 46-18-203, MCA, authorize the District Court's December 16, 2003, sentence. However, as noted above, even though the reimposed prison sentence does not include a longer term than the original DOC commitment, it does impose an additional, more burdensome, condition requiring Tracy go to prison. Thus, the application of the 2003 version of § 46-18-203, MCA, to Tracy is an ex post facto application of the law which cannot stand constitutional muster. Said sentence must be vacated.