Opinion ID: 76910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Officers Violated Mercado's Constitutional Rights

Text: 17 The Fourth Amendment's freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures includes the right to be free from excessive force during a criminal apprehension. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In determining whether the officers' force was reasonable, we must determine whether a reasonable officer would believe that this level of force is necessary in the situation at hand. Ferraro, 284 F.3d at 1197 (citation omitted). Under Graham, courts should determine the objective reasonableness of a seizure by balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion against the governmental interest at stake. 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. In this case, the intrusion was severe. Mercado was hit in the head by a projectile fired from the Sage Launcher, causing serious brain injury. Although this weapon is classified as a less lethal munition, Orlando police regulations recognize that it can be used as a deadly weapon. 18 When determining the government's interest, we must consider factors that include the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. Furthermore, the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. 19 Because this situation does not involve a criminal arrest, our facts do not fit neatly within the Graham framework. Furthermore, because Florida does not recognize attempted suicide as a crime, Krischer v. McIver, 697 So.2d 97, 100 (Fla. 1997), it is impossible for this court to measure the severity of the crime at issue. 20 We must next consider the extent to which Mercado placed himself or others in danger. See Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1249-50 (11th Cir.2004) (granting qualified immunity to officer who used deadly force on a suicidal victim who posed an immediate threat of harm to himself, the officer, and others). The defendants claim that the use of force is justified because suicidal subjects sometimes make erratic moves that can jeopardize the safety of the officers on the scene. See Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir.2003) (noting that police were justified in using less lethal bean-bag rounds on the plaintiff who threatened to blow up his home by igniting propane and kerosene tanks outside his home). 21 However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mercado, we can find no indication that he made any threatening moves toward the police. See Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284-85 (9th Cir.2001) (denying officers qualified immunity after deploying a projectile bean bag and taking out the eye of a subject who was relatively cooperative and not a threat to the officers or others). Even though he posed no threat to the police, he was a threat to himself, and Florida law recognizes a compelling interest in preventing suicide. Krischer, 697 So.2d at 103. 22 Furthermore, Mercado was not actively resisting arrest, and there is no evidence that he struggled with the police. See Fernandez v. Cooper City, 207 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1377 (S.D.Fla.2002) (holding that officers were afforded qualified immunity for using force to subdue an emotionally unstable person who was actively resisting arrest). Arguably, Mercado did not have time to obey Padilla's order to drop the knife because Padilla discharged the Sage Laucher within seconds of making this request. 23 All of the factors articulated in Graham weigh in favor of Mercado. Because he was not committing a crime, resisting arrest, or posing an immediate threat to the officers at the time he was shot in the head, if Padilla aimed for Mercado's head, he used excessive force when apprehending Mercado. At this point, we must assume that Padilla was aiming for Mercado's head based on the evidence that Padilla was trained to use the Sage Launcher, that the weapon accurately hit targets from distances up to five yards, and that Mercado suffered injuries to his head. Padilla was aware that the Sage Launcher was a lethal force if he shot at a subject from close range. The officers were also aware that alternative actions, such as utilizing a crisis negotiation team, were available means of resolving the situation. This is especially true in light of the fact that Mercado had not made any threatening moves toward himself or the officers. 24 Thus, in the light most favorable to Mercado, Padilla violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he intentionally aimed at and shot Mercado in the head with the Sage Launcher. See Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir.1998) (denying qualified immunity for police officers when the suspect did not commit a serious crime, pose a threat to the officers or others, or actively resist arrest). 25 We further conclude, however, that Officer Rouse did not violate Mercado's Fourth Amendment rights. Although Officer Rouse did not fire the Sage Launcher, Mercado contends that she should be held responsible under a theory of supervisory liability. 26 [S]upervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The necessary causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. Alternatively the causal connection may be established when a supervisor's custom or policy ... result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so. The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in [his] individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous. 27 Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360-61 (11th Cir.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 28 Officer Rouse was in another room during the incident, and did not see Padilla aim or fire the gun. She did not tell Padilla to fire the Sage Launcher at Mercado's head. Given that Padilla was trained in the proper use of the launcher, that the Department's guidelines prohibited firing the launcher at a suspect's head or neck except in deadly force situations, and that (as explained below) there is no evidence that Padilla has used similarly excessive force in the past-all of which are undisputed facts in the record-Rouse could not reasonably have anticipated that Padilla was likely to shoot Mercado in the head either intentionally or unintentionally. Even under the failure to stop standard for supervisory liability, Rouse cannot be held liable. 29