Opinion ID: 1712255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Doris Poirrier

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause as to prospective juror Doris Poirrier based on her apparent predisposition to impose the death penalty. A prospective juror is properly excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment when the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. State v. Tate, 01-1658, p. 9 (La.5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 931, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). The substantial impairment standard applies to those who would vote automatically against capital punishment, i.e., those excludable under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), as clarified by Witt, as well as to those who would vote automatically for capital punishment, i.e., reverse- Witherspoon excludable jurors. State v. Divers, 94-0756, pp. 7-8 (La.9/5/96), 681 So.2d 320, 324; State v. Miller, 99-0192, p. 8 (La.9/6/00), 776 So.2d 396, 402. In the so-called reverse- Witherspoon situation, the basis of the exclusion is that the juror will not consider a life sentence and ... will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him. State v. Robertson, 92-2660 at 8 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d at 1284. See also, Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). Such jurors are not impartial, and cannot accept the law as given ... by the court, subjecting them to cause challenges under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(2) and (4). The trial court must, upon a challenge for cause, disqualify a potential juror unable to consider both life and death as penalties. Tate, 01-1658 at 17, 851 So.2d at 935; Divers, 94-0756 at 8-13, 681 So.2d at 324-327. As noted previously, a trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and these rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals an abuse of that discretion. Cross, 93-1189 at 7, 658 So.2d at 686; Robertson, 92-2660 at 4, 630 So.2d at 1281. A trial court's refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause is not an abuse of discretion, notwithstanding that the juror has voiced a seemingly biased opinion, when after further examination and instruction, the juror demonstrates a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and evidence. Tate, 01-1658 at 17-18, 851 So.2d at 936; Robertson, 92-2660 at 4, 630 So.2d at 1281. Thus, the prospective juror who simply indicates his or her personal preference for the death penalty need not be stricken for cause. Tate, 01-1658 at 18, 851 So.2d at 936; State v. Lucky, 96-1687, p. 6 (La.4/13/99), 755 So.2d 845, 850. Not every predisposition or leaning in any direction will rise to the level of substantial impairment. Tate, supra; State v. Taylor, 99-1311, p. 11 (La.1/17/01), 781 So.2d 1205, 1217. In the instant case, during voir dire, Poirrier responded to initial questioning from the trial court as follows: THE COURT: Ms. Poirrier, you indicated that you were for the death penalty. Would you automatically impose the death penalty if there was a conviction of First-Degree Murder or would you be willing to look at the circumstances of the crime and the person himself before making that decision? MS. POIRRIER: Oh, well I would look at it, but I'm one of the people who believe eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. THE COURT: Ma'am? MS. POIRRIER: You know, if you kill somebody, you don't deserve to live. THE COURT: I can't hear you, I'm sorry. MS. POIRRIER: I said if you took somebody's life, you don't deserve to live either. THE COURT: Would you automatically vote for the death penalty, irregardless or would you be willing to look at  MS. POIRRIER: I would be more willing to go for the death penalty. THE COURT: Okay. Would you automatically vote for it or could somebody persuade you otherwise? MS. POIRRIER: Well, it all depends, you know. But the chances of me voting for it would be greater. THE COURT: Okay. But there are some circumstances where you would not vote for it? MS. POIRRIER: Yeah, well, I mean they'd have to prove to me that he didn't do it. THE COURT: Well, that's my question. If you find as a juror that he did do it, would you automatically impose the death penalty or would you be willing to look at things such as  MS. POIRRIER: No, I'd automatically go for the death penalty. THE COURT: No matter what? MS. POIRRIER: No matter what. Following this exchange, defense counsel questioned Poirrier further: MR. ARMOND: Now, ma'am, earlier you said that if he's convicted, then you would vote for the death penalty, right? MS. POIRRIER: Yes. MR. ARMOND: Are you aware of the fact that the law says that if you find him guilty of all these elements  and they stole the statute from me (indicating)  if you find that a First-Degree Murder was committed during the perpetration of an armed robbery, okay, are you aware that the State mandates, requires that you sentence him to life unless you find at least one aggravated factor? Are you aware of that? MS. POIRRIER: No. MR. ARMOND: Could you follow that? MS. POIRRIER: I guess I'd have to. I don't want to be breaking the law. MR. ARMOND: So if the laws say he's guilty of First-Degree Murder, you're satisfied it's First-Degree Murder, you won't automatically vote for the death penalty, will you? MS. POIRRIER: No, the law says I can't, I can't. MR. ARMOND: But you really want to, don't you? MS. POIRRIER: That's right. At the close of the panel, the trial court queried the panel members generally: [I]f we get to the second phase of this case, which is the Penalty Phase, the law tells us there are certain things we consider that would be detrimental to the defendant, certain things we consider that would be beneficial to him. The detrimental things would be aggravating circumstances, and there is a list of those. Mitigating would be things that are in his favor that you are to consider. If I read a list of the aggravating circumstances to you and the mitigating circumstances to you, could you in your heart, your sole [sic], and mind give some attention to each one of those aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances and seriously consider them in making your decision whether to impose the death penalty or not to impose the death penalty? Would anybody have any problem with that? . . . . If I told you, you had to seriously consider the youth of this person, whether or not he was intoxicated. I'm not telling you how to vote, but I'm saying you have to consider all these factors in making your decision. Could you genuinely do that? . . . . Does anyone feel that they could not do that? Poirrier did not raise her hand or otherwise indicate that she would have difficulty following these instructions. [3] Nevertheless, at the close of the colloquy, defense counsel challenged Poirrier for cause, arguing that she was adamant in her pro-death penalty stance. The trial court denied the challenge for cause, explaining: I know that, but you rehabilitated here [sic] whenever you got her in there. She said that she would not automatically vote for the death penalty and that she would follow the instructions of the court. She was rehabilitated by the Defense, so I'm going to deny that challenge for cause. We do not find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling in this regard. Indeed, a review of Poirrier's entire voir dire examination reveals that after defense counsel and the trial court explained the penalty phase procedure and the law with respect thereto, Poirrier indicated a willingness to follow the law, including the instruction that she consider both a life sentence and the death penalty. Of course, as defendant points out, Poirrier confided to defense counsel that but for the law, she would want to impose the death penalty. Such a statement, combined with her remarks at the opening of voir dire that she believes in an eye for an eye and would automatically vote for the death penalty do raise concerns about her ability to afford defendant a fair trial. However, Poirrier was firm in her conviction that I don't want to be breaking the law, and the trial court apparently afforded great credibility to this statement in finding Poirrier sufficiently rehabilitated to survive the cause challenge. In State v. Lucky, supra , we pointed out there is no statutory or legal presumption in favor of any penalty, and individual jurors often have their own inchoate or unarticulated predispositions. Lucky, 96-1687 at 7-8, 755 So.2d at 850-851. Such personal predispositions do not offend the law, provided they do not substantially impair the juror's ability to follow the law. Significantly, we noted, it is in the determination of substantial impairment that the trial court's broad discretion plays the critical role. Id. Thus, for example, in Lucky, we upheld the trial court's denial of a cause challenge with respect to a juror who stated that he was predisposed to the death penalty and that the mitigating evidence would have to be substantial for him to recommend a life sentence. We found the record of the voir dire, taken as a whole, supported the trial court's assessment that the juror's responses did not significantly impair the performance of his duties as a juror. The juror indicated he would consider mitigating circumstances without rejecting any specific mitigating circumstance and simply suggested that only serious mitigating circumstances would incline him to a life sentence recommendation after a guilty verdict. Id. Similarly, in State v. Hart, 96-0697, pp. 7-10 (La.3/7/97), 691 So.2d 651, 656-658, we upheld the trial court's denial of a cause challenge against a juror who believed that the death penalty for an intentional killing ought to be the law, but who agreed to abide by the judge's instructions and to consider both life and death as possible sentences. We found the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the juror understood the law and was willing to follow that law regardless of his own opinions as to what he thought the law should be. Finally, in State v. Miller, supra , we upheld denials of cause challenges with respect to two prospective jurors who, like Poirrier, expressed a personal predisposition for the death penalty and, in addition, voiced support for the eye for an eye paradigm. In Miller, juror Ronald Lindsly expressed his opinion that if an individual purposefully takes somebody else's life th[en] they are accountable ... and ... deserve to die, and that if you take somebody's life you deserve to lose your own. He did not literally believe in the biblical notion of an eye for an eye. Miller, 99-0192 at 18-19, 776 So.2d at 408. Juror Majorie Roy, on the other hand, believed in like the Bible said, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, although she thought that she could consider a life sentence. She expressed her opinion that if you take [a] life then your life should be taken, that she would probably vote for death automatically if a guilty verdict was returned, and that she was not sure that [she] could impose a life sentence because [t]he lady [victim] got no choice. She didn't get a second chance. Id., 99-0192 at 20-22, 776 So.2d at 408-409. This court held that the trial judge did not err in denying the cause challenge as to juror Lindsly because, despite his eye for an eye discourse with defense counsel, he expressly agreed to consider both death and life sentences and to consider any mitigating evidence, as required by law. As to juror Roy, this court upheld the trial court's denial of the challenge for cause on the strength of the trial judge's assessment that Roy had candidly answer[ed] that she could consider a life sentence, and that her emotional quotation of biblical passages would not affect her stated ability to fairly consider voting for a life sentence. Id., at 99-0192 at 20-22, 776 So.2d at 408-409. As we cautioned in Miller, drawing the line in cases of this type is often extremely difficult. The trial court must determine the merits of the challenge on the basis of the entire voir dire, and on the court's personal observations of the potential jurors during questioning. Miller, 99-0192 at 14, 776 So.2d at 405-406. As a result, a reviewing court should accord great deference to the trial court's determination and should not attempt to reconstruct the voir dire by a microscopic dissection of the transcript in search of magic words or phrases that automatically signify the jurors' qualification or disqualification. Id. In this case, the trial court found that Poirrier's responses as a whole indicated she could put aside her personal opinions and act fairly. Based on our review of the entire colloquy, we do not find she expressed an unconditional willingness to impose a death penalty under any and all circumstances. See Tate, 01-1658 at 19, 851 So.2d at 936, quoting State v. Chester, 97-2790, pp. 14-15 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276, 1285-86. To the contrary, Poirrier acknowledged a sincere and serious obligation to follow the law, which the trial court found to be highly credible. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the defense's challenge for cause of Poirrier.