Opinion ID: 1281413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Automatic Motion for Modification of Sentence

Text: In every case in which the death penalty is returned, section 190.4, subdivision (e) requires the trial judge to review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances ... and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons for his findings. (61) Defendant urges four grounds of error in the court's ruling on the automatic motion for modification of sentence: (1) that the trial court improperly found the murder was willful, intentional, deliberate and premeditated; (2) that the court improperly considered as an aggravating circumstance defendant's leading or dominant role in the criminal scheme resulting in the victim's death (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]); (3) that the court improperly relied on the probation report; and (4) that the court erred in using the same underlying facts and special circumstances twice  to render defendant death eligible and as a circumstance in aggravation for imposing a sentence of death. It is abundantly clear, both from the record of the hearing on the motion and the detailed written findings filed by the court, that it carefully reviewed the evidence within the framework of the statutory factors set forth in section 190.3, and made its own independent findings that the aggravating outweighed the mitigating circumstances in this case. We have previously determined that the evidence amply supported the jury's verdict of willful, premeditated and deliberate first degree murder. ( Ante, pp. 239-240.) So too did it support the trial court's parallel finding in ruling on the application for modification of sentence. Secondly, the trial court did not improperly consider the absence of a mitigating factor as an aggravating factor. The court properly weighed the evidence and found defendant was not under the substantial domination of another person (Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor (g)), but that he in fact was the dominating force in executing the crimes. The trial court properly found factor (g) inapplicable. In its consideration of the related concerns of factor (j) (whether the defendant was an accomplice and his participation in the offense was relatively minor) the court again weighed the evidence and found that defendant was the dominant actor and that he was personally responsible for killing the victim. With respect to factor (j), the court stated it found this factor is an aggravating factor rather than a mitigating factor. Although the court's choice of language was unfortunate in view of People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, there is no error requiring reversal. The evidence, as weighed by the trial judge, clearly showed that defendant dominated his younger companions and that, once the plan to rob and kill the victim was finalized, defendant told Tillery to stay behind, armed himself with his rifle, ambushed the unwitting victim from atop a ledge of rocks, and personally fired the fatal shot. These facts are all circumstances of the crime which the trial court was entitled to consider in aggravation (factor (a)). The necessary logical consequence of these facts, that any mitigation under factors (g) and (j) would be nonexistent, does not render it improper for the court to consider these circumstances of the crime in aggravation. (62) Thirdly, we have observed that consideration of a probation report is not relevant to the trial court's determination on an application for modification of penalty under section 190.4, subdivision (e). ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1329 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221].) Under the statutory provisions the court reviews the evidence presented to the jury which, of course, does not include the probation report. However, as in Williams, any error must be deemed nonprejudicial; absent evidence in the record to the contrary, we must assume that the court was not improperly influenced by the report in ruling on the application. ( Ibid.; cf. In re Contreras (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 549, 555 [119 Cal. Rptr. 757] [appellate court must assume the sentencing court was not influenced by irrelevant matters in the probation report]; People v. Ozene (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 905, 915 [104 Cal. Rptr. 170] [same].) Finally, as already discussed ( ante, pp. 272-273), there is no merit to the claim that the jury or court, in ruling on the motion, improperly considered the facts of the crimes and special circumstances to both find defendant death eligible and aggravate sentence. ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1188-1190.)