Opinion ID: 2162204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Privacy and Battery Claims

Text: [¶ 17] Champagne next contends that her notices of claim stated causes of action for invasion of privacy and for battery, and that the existence of genuine issues of material fact with respect to these claims precluded the entry of a summary judgment. Pursuant to 24 M.R.S.A. §§ 2903 and 2853, a notice of claim must set forth in writing and under oath the professional negligence alleged and the nature and damages alleged.... We have construed this phrase to require only ordinary notice-pleading. See, e.g., Dutil v. Burns, 687 A.2d 639, 642 (Me.1997); Jagoe v. Blocksom, 440 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Me.1982). Notice-pleading simply requires that a defendant be provided with fair notice of the claim against him, and is sufficiently performed by a rather generalized statement. Richards v. Soucy, 610 A.2d 268, 270 (Me.1992) (quoting 1 FIELD, McKUSICK & WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 8.2 at 192-93 (2d ed. 1970)). [¶ 18] Although Champagne's notices of claim satisfied ordinary notice-pleading requirements for her emotional distress claims, [7] they failed to notify the Defendants adequately that Champagne intended to bring claims for invasion of privacy and battery. Neither notice of claim averred the essential elements for invasion of privacy or for battery, nor did they supply adequate factual information to disclose the basis of an invasion of privacy or battery claim. See Loe, 600 A.2d at 1093 (claim for intrusion upon physical or mental solitude requires a physical intrusion upon premises occupied privately by a plaintiff for purposes of seclusion) (citing Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me.1977)); ZILLMAN, SIMMONS, & GREGORY, MAINE TORT LAW § 1.01 (1997) (central element of the tort of battery is a physical touching). Hence, the notices of claim did not state claims for invasion of privacy or battery.