Opinion ID: 1407343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Uncharged Similar Conduct.

Text: At trial, the state introduced the testimony of two of appellant's victims other than Ms. Smith. Appellant contends that, under NRS 48.045(2) and Nester v. State, 75 Nev. 41, 334 P.2d 524 (1959), the district court abused its discretion in receiving evidence of other crimes. This contention is without merit. Although evidence of other crimes or bad acts is inadmissible to prove a person's character to show that he acted in conformity of that character, such evidence is admissible when introduced, as here, for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Nester v. State, 75 Nev. at 46-49, 334 P.2d at 527; NRS 48.045(2). At the time of the trial, nearly four years had lapsed since the commission of the several offenses. Ms. Smith was the sole eyewitness to the single crime now being charged and had seen the appellant only twice before this trial. Moreover, appellant was not arrested on the night of the incident. Thus, it was important that the state convince the jury of the identity of the perpetrator. This was accomplished properly by the witnesses who described the car driven by appellant and the manner in which appellant identified himself as Mike from California. In addition, each of the witnesses identified the gun obtained from appellant at the time of his arrest as being similar to the one used by their assailant. Finally, the evidence demonstrated the manner in which the victims were approached. Here, the trial court weighed prejudice against probativeness, thereby complying with the mandates of Nester and its progeny. See NRS 48.035. The lower court properly concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the claimed prejudicial effect. Moreover, the court gave the jury a proper cautionary instruction as to the limited purpose of the evidence. See McMichael v. State, 94 Nev. 184, 189, 577 P.2d 398, 401 (1978).