Opinion ID: 1195187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The jury's finding of liability for punitive damages

Text: Where clear and convincing evidence exists, one circumstance in Hawai`i that warrants an award of punitive damages is when there has been some wilful misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences. Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 11, 780 P.2d 566, 572, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989) (citation omitted). Award or denial of punitive damages is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact. Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 138, 839 P.2d 10, 36, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not reverse a trier of fact's decision to grant or deny punitive damages. Id. at 138, 839 P.2d at 37. The trial court's instruction to the jury on punitive damages read in relevant part: In order to establish punitive damages should be awarded against Dr. McCurdy[,] plaintiff must have proven by clear and convincing evidence that Dr. McCurdy acted with willful misconduct and entire want of care which would raise presumption of consideration of indifference to the consequences of his act or omission. We note that the trial court misstated the standard for awarding punitive damages when it used the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive in its instruction; such error, however, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As stated previously, the jury needed only find either willful misconduct or entire want of care, to wit, gross negligence, in order to properly award punitive damages. See Masaki, 71 Haw. at 11, 780 P.2d at 572. The error merely operated to elevate the standard for awarding punitive damages, leaving Dr. McCurdy's substantive rights unaltered. In fact, the instruction erroneously afforded Dr. McCurdy more protection than required under prevailing law. Turning next to the jury's assessment of punitive damages, we agree with the ICA's holding insofar as we determine that there was, indeed, an abundance of clear and convincing evidence upon which the jury could rely to find that Dr. McCurdy's care of Ditto, from the outset, was grossly negligent and therefore reckless and consciously indifferent to the consequences that could arise. See Ditto, at 97-98, 947 P.2d at 972-973. For example, there was substantial evidence produced at trial, which, if believed, revealed that: the medical history portion of Dr. McCurdy's consultation was woefully inadequate; Dr. McCurdy did not properly inform Ditto of the risks or complications involved in the initial surgical procedure or any of the subsequent surgical procedures; he sent Ditto home after her second surgery, despite continued complications, to make room for other patients in his recovery room; he failed to properly suture her incisions, resulting in constant bloody discharges; he failed to document medications allegedly prescribed to Ditto; he failed to properly diagnose an obvious infection; and he allowed his medical assistant to suture Ditto's incision when he was not physically present.... It has long been the law in this jurisdiction that verdicts based on conflicting evidence will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence to support a jury's findings. State Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Corey, 53 Haw. 132, 141, 488 P.2d 703, 709 (1971) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920, 92 S.Ct. 1774, 32 L.Ed.2d 119 (1972). Contrary to Dr. McCurdy's contention, there was substantial evidence on which the jury could have based its award of punitive damages.... We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly allowed the issue of punitive damages to be considered by the jury and that the jury did not abuse its discretion in making the award. Ditto, at 97-98, 947 P.2d at 972-973. Irrespective of the fraud count, the evidence introduced at trial relating thereto, and the instructions relating to fraud, the evidence of Dr. McCurdy's gross negligence was so overwhelming and of such an egregious nature that the jury certainly could have found that punitive damages were warranted. Furthermore, the trial court provided separate and clear instructions on negligence, punitive damages, and fraud, making any possible incidence of prejudice flowing from the fraud claim doubtful and, at most, harmless. The presumption of harm resulting from the erroneous jury instructions on fraud is therefore rebutted, and we affirm the ICA's decision upholding the jury's finding of liability for punitive damages.