Opinion ID: 168090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

Text: 39 Defendant maintains that the mandatory life sentence imposed on him violates the Eight Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause because, he contends, it is grossly disproportionate to his offense. We cannot agree. 40 As we noted in United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 2000), the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), established a three-pronged analysis for reviewing Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges, but subsequently in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), the Court substantially narrowed that approach and instructed that courts should not go beyond the first prong in most cases. Thus, we examine the sentence at issue in relation to the crime only for gross disproportionality. Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir.1999). This analysis takes into account the Court's statement in Solem, 463 U.S. at 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, that the final clause [of the Eighth Amendment] prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed. Only if we find such gross disparity will we proceed further with the analysis. Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1282. It is only in the rare case that a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' Id. (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 6 See also United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738, 750-51 (10th Cir.2006). 41 This court does not appear to have issued an unqualified holding that mandatory life terms under the Three Strikes law do not violate this constitutional protection. But we have held that a life sentence plus a consecutive term of 45 years under this statute was not disproportionate for a defendant who had been convicted of multiple offenses involving robbery, extortion and the use of firearms and who had two previous convictions for robbery. United States v. Jones, 213 F.3d 1253, 1261-62 (10th Cir.2000). 42 We cannot conclude that this is a rare case in which the initial comparison of the offense and the sentence leads to an inference that the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the crime. In light of the holding in Harmelin that a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole is not grossly disproportionate when meted out to a first offender for possession of 650 grams of cocaine, it may be wondered if a life sentence would ever be grossly disproportionate for a serious violent felony like the one for which Mr. Gurule was convicted. We need not speculate on that, however, for we are certain that we cannot conclude that the sentence is grossly disproportionate when the defendant had twice before been convicted of a serious violent felony. Even in Solem, which as we have noted has been narrowed considerably, the Court made it clear that although the proportionality issue is to be focused on the crime for which the challenged sentence has been imposed, courts must also be mindful that legislatures may punish recidivists more severely than first-time offenders. United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir.1999) ( en banc ). 43 We must reject Mr. Gurule's Eighth Amendment argument.