Opinion ID: 1790359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidence of beating.

Text: This is a sub-issue of the prior bad acts issue regarding Appellant's sexual abuse of his son, D.O. I agree with the majority opinion that evidence of the sexual abuse of D.O. is admissible to prove Appellant's motive for killing his wife, because she knew of the sexual abuse and had threatened to report it to the police. The sub-issue on which I dissent concerns admission of evidence that after the police interviewed D.O. about the sexual abuse, Appellant administered a beating to D.O. The majority opinion holds that this evidence is admissible under KRE 404(b)(1) for the other purpose of showing a sense of guilt. Ante, at 707. We have held that evidence of flight by a defendant from the scene of a crime or from arresting officers, as well as evidence of a defendant's efforts to bribe a juror or witness, or to fabricate evidence, is admissible to show a sense or consciousness of guilt. If one accused of crime flees, or attempts to bribe a witness, or a juror, or to fabricate evidence, all such conduct is receivable as evidence of his guilt of the main fact charged. It is in the nature of an admission; for it is not to be supposed that one who is innocent and conscious of the fact would flee, or would feel the necessity for fabricating evidence. Turpin v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 294, 130 S.W. 1086, 1087 (1910) (attempted bribery of juror). See also Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 107 S.W.3d 215, 219-20 (Ky.2003) (flight); Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779, 793 (Ky.2003) (giving false name and address to arresting officer); Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29-31 (Ky.1998) (subornation of perjury); Foley v. Commonwealth, 942 S.W.2d 876, 887 (Ky.1996) (Any attempt to suppress a witness' testimony by the accused, whether by persuasion, bribery, or threat, or to induce a witness not to appear at the trial or to swear falsely, or to interfere with the processes of the court is evidence tending to show guilt.); Collier v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Ky.1960) (threat to kill complaining witness if she did not take action to have charges dismissed); Davis v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 601, 265 S.W. 10, 11 (1924) (attempted bribery of witness); Wilhite v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 543, 262 S.W. 949, 950 (1924) (threat to kill witness and attempt to carry out threat after the witness testified before grand jury). In each of those cases, the evidence directly related to an attempt to avoid judicial proceedings or to spoliate evidence relating to the charged offense. Evidence that Appellant administered a beating to D.O. after D.O.'s interview with the police does not tend to show an attempt to avoid judicial proceedings or to spoliate evidence relating to the charged offense. In the first place, the charged offense was the murder of Appellant's wife, not the sexual abuse of D.O. In the second place, the evidence only ambiguously tends to show a consciousness of guilt of sexual abuse. The majority opinion assumes that Appellant beat D.O. as punishment for telling the truth or to discourage further disclosures, whereas Appellant could just as well have beaten D.O as punishment for telling a lie. Regardless, I find no authority for the proposition that a prior bad act can be admitted as circumstantial proof of another prior bad act that is admitted solely as circumstantial proof of a motive to commit the charged offense. The evidence more nearly proves by a specific instance of conduct that Appellant was a man of violent character who was likely to have killed his wife in a fit of rage. So viewed, the evidence is inadmissible under KRE 404(a) and 405(a), and I would direct the trial court to exclude it at retrial.