Opinion ID: 853754
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Heading: The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana Constitution

Text: Questions arising under the Indiana Constitution are to be resolved by examining the language of the text in the context of the history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the purpose and structure of our constitution, and case law interpreting the specific provisions. Indiana Gaming Comm'n v. Moseley, 643 N.E.2d 296, 298 (Ind.1994). In construing the Constitution, `a court should look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when the constitution or any part thereof was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy.' Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 412 (Ind.1991) (quoting State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 391 (1871)). Because the intent of the framers of the Constitution is paramount in determining the meaning of a provision, Eakin v. State ex rel. Capital Improvement Bd. of Managers, 474 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ind.1985), this Court will consider the purpose which induced the adoption, id. at 65, in order that we may ascertain what the particular constitutional provision was designed to prevent, Northern Ind. Bank & Trust Co. v. State Bd. of Fin., 457 N.E.2d 527, 529 (Ind.1983). When this State was founded in 1816, the framers and ratifiers adopted a double jeopardy provision which provided that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused ... shall not ... be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence. IND. CONST. art 1, § 13 (1816). However, our ability to discern the framers' intentions is limited because the journal of the 1816 Constitutional Convention does not report the delegates' remarks or disclose procedural matters informative to the issue. [7] When the present version of our Constitution was adopted in 1851, the original double jeopardy provision was only slightly modified. Article I, Section 14 provides in part: No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. [8] The provision was adopted with no debate and has not been modified to date. The `cardinal principle of constitutional construction [is] that words are to be considered as used in their ordinary sense.' Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 929 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Tucker v. State, 218 Ind. 614, 670, 35 N.E.2d 270, 291 (1941)). Contemporaneous with the adoption of the 1851 Constitution, offense was defined as a crime or transgression of law. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 768 (1856). This definition of offense, however, does not explain the meaning of same offense, which has become a term of art. It is not surprising that, [f]or decades, commentators and judges have attempted to define which offenses are the same, and the problem continues to be the focus of much of the contemporary scholarly criticism of double jeopardy doctrine. Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive Penalties, 144 U. PA. L.REV. 101, 129 n. 81 (1995). Despite the lack of discussion at the 1850-51 Convention regarding Indiana's Double Jeopardy Clause, this Court has recognized that the intent of the framers and ratifiers derived from English common law double jeopardy principles. See State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282, 284 (1879) (That no person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence is a common-law principle, which, we believe, is incorporated into the constitution of each of the States which compose the United States.). With the understanding that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is one of the least understood and most frequently litigated provisions of the Bill of Rights, Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1442, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, 728-29 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), [i]t has always been an accepted judicial technique to have resort to the common law in order to ascertain the true meaning of the double jeopardy clause, Jay A. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 283 (1963) (hereinafter Sigler, History ). Thus, understanding our Double Jeopardy Clause requires that we go beyond its text. The common law is helpful in determining the framers' understanding of the term same offense. Scholars trace double jeopardy principles back to ancient Greek, [9] Roman, [10] and biblical [11] sources. While some historians trace double jeopardy protections in England to the dispute between King Henry II and Archbishop Thomas à Becket in 1176, [12] the earliest treatise on the English common law, published in the late twelfth century, did not directly mention double jeopardy protections. Sigler, History, supra, at 291 (referring to RANULF DE GLANVILLE, A TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE KINGDOM OF ENGLAND COMPOSED IN THE TIME OF KING HENRY THE SECOND). In the English case reporters between 1290 and 1535, the word `jeopardy' occurs only eleven times in reports involving criminal cases, and in only three of these instances was it used in the statement that a man's life shall not be twice `put in jeopardy' for the same offense. Marion S. Kirk, Jeopardy During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L.REV. 602, 604-05 (1934) (footnotes omitted). During the 1600s and 1700s, double jeopardy protections were further examined by Lord Edward Coke and William Blackstone. [13] Lord Coke only found double jeopardy protections in the three pleas of autrefois acquit (former acquittal), autrefois convict (former conviction), and former pardon. Sigler, History, supra, at 296. By the late 1700s, a fourth plea of autrefois attaint [14] was also recognized. Id. Writing 100 years after Coke, Black-stone began using the phrase jeopardy more often, noting that the plea of autrefois acquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same offence. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND  (1769). As a further indicator of the framers' understanding of the common law of double jeopardy, we note that the early American colonies departed in some respects from English common law, recognizing broader double jeopardy protections. For example, the bar against double jeopardy for Lord Coke depended on the reasons for the prior acquittal, [15] whereas early American double jeopardy law barred retrial for any prior acquittal. Blackstone described double jeopardy protections as applying only to criminal felony prosecutions, whereas early American double jeopardy protections applied to all criminal prosecutions. Under English common law, jeopardy did not attach until a verdict or acquittal was actually rendered, thus allowing retrials following hung juries or mistrials, whereas early American double jeopardy law barred reprosecution in certain hung jury or mistrial circumstances. Further, early English double jeopardy protections were developed in the context of criminal law practice and procedure different from that which existed and continues to exist in this country. When Coke formulated the double jeopardy prohibition against second prosecutions for the same offense, there did not exist the same number of closely related offenses as we have today. As one commentator has noted, the law distinguished among rape, arson, and murder, but not between `intimidating any person from voting' and `interfering with his right to vote.' Larry Simon, Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 279 (1965). [16] At the time of Henry III there were only eleven felonies. In Coke's time the number had risen to thirty. Id. at 279 n. 75. By the time the U.S. Constitution was ratified, England had 160 different felonies. Id. Also, early American colonies and states embodied double jeopardy principles in statutory and organic laws, unlike England. In 1641, the Bay Colony of Massachusetts drafted the Body of Liberties, which led to the adoption of the Massachusetts Code of 1648. The fact that the Bay Colony reduced double jeopardy protection to a written form and expanded it beyond the common law guarantee demonstrates that the colonists regarded the concept to be fundamental. Charles L. Cantrall, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 735, 765 (1983). [17] Although New Hampshire was the first (and only) state to include double jeopardy protections in its state constitution prior to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, [18] id. at 766, almost every state has now included some type of protection against double jeopardy in its state constitution, Sigler, History, supra, at 307-08; Simon, supra, at 262. As states developed and applied their respective double jeopardy principles, two divergent analyses appeared for determining whether the offenses are the same: (1) the behavioral approach; and (2) the evidentiary approach. Id. at 269-70. The behavioral approach focuses on the defendant's conduct rather than on the prosecutor's evidence. Courts which use this approach adopt an act, transaction, or intent test. Id. at 270 (emphasis omitted). This behavioral approach (also referred to as the same transaction or same conduct approach) was explicitly rejected early by the Indiana Supreme Court in State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879). [19] The Elder Court noted that two lines of Double Jeopardy Clause interpretation appeared throughout the nation. One line held that state double jeopardy clauses provide a more liberal rule ... in favor of the accused. Id. at 284. This more liberal rule was the same transaction/conduct test, which prohibited multiple prosecutions arising out of the same state of facts, although they may include several offences. Id. at 285. Under the other line of interpretation, the evidentiary approach, state double jeopardy clauses mean no more than the common-law principle. Id. at 284. After reviewing Indiana court decisions and the decisions from other state and federal courts, the Elder Court rejected the more liberal test, stating that it could not adopt the rule held in some States, that the accused can not, in any case, be convicted but once upon the same facts when they constitute different offences.... Id. at 286-87. The evidentiary approach (also referred to as the same evidence test) is apparent in the English common law case of The King v. Vandercomb & Abbot, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. 455 (1796). That court explained the test as follows: if crimes are so distinct that evidence of the one will not support the other, it is as inconsistent with reason, as it is repugnant to the rules of law, to say that they are so far the same that an acquittal of the one shall be a bar to a prosecution for the other. Id. at 717, 168 Eng. at 460. [20] However, American jurisprudence in the last two centuries provides no single, generally accepted articulation of the same evidence test. Rather, the test has assumed three separate formulations: a required evidence test, [21] an alleged evidence test, [22] and an actual evidence test. [23] Simon, supra, at 269-270. See also Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119, 288 S.E.2d 185, 188-90 (1989) (discussing these three tests in extensive detail). In discerning the approach required by the Indiana Constitution, we first note that [e]arly decisions of this Court interpreting our Constitution ... have been accorded strong and superseding precedential value. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind.1994). [24] In seeking the proper interpretation of our Double Jeopardy Clause, we draw from cases involving subsequent prosecutions because double jeopardy claims in multiple punishments cases did not emerge until after 1930, [25] and because this Court has not distinguished between double jeopardy protections in multiple punishment cases and those in subsequent prosecution cases. Our double jeopardy case law appears to fall into five different subsequent prosecution categoriesthose following a conviction; [26] a mistrial or the discharge of the jury or defendant; [27] a successful appeal; [28] an acquittal; [29] and a civil action. [30] Our earliest jurisprudence demonstrates that this Court did not limit itself to any single formulation of the evidence test, such as an actual evidence test, a required evidence test, or an alleged evidence test, in determining whether the offenses were the same. In the cases most contemporaneous (1859 to 1884) with the adoption of the 1851 Constitution, this Court did not identify a singular test or restrict the double jeopardy inquiry to the statutory elements or charging instruments, but instead considered all of the circumstances and evidence available to the reviewing court to determine whether the offenses were the same. After the ratification of our Constitution in 1851, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether the convictions were the same offense in Wininger v. State, 13 Ind. 540 (1859). In Wininger, the defendant was first convicted of assault and battery and then tried for the crime of riot, each arising out of the same event. Noting conflict in the decisions of some of the sister states, the Wininger Court considered whether double jeopardy was violated, holding that the true rule, in prosecutions for offenses of this character, is, that where the gravamen of the riot consists in the commission of an assault and battery, then, a conviction for that assault, & c., would be a bar to a prosecution for a riot.... Id. at 541. However, where the commission of an assault and battery was merely incidental to the riot, then a conviction for the one would not bar a prosecution for the other.... Id. Thus, [t]he question would be, is the one act included in the other? [31] Id. Looking to the evidence introduced at trial, the Court reversed the second conviction, finding that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated because the gravamen of the riot was the assault and battery. Id. In Brinkman v. State, 57 Ind. 76 (1877), the defendant was indicted twice for selling alcohol to a minor on the same day. He was tried and convicted on the first indictment, and then tried and convicted on the second indictment. Addressing the defendant's double jeopardy claim, the Court looked to the testimony introduced at the first trial which established that the defendant had sold alcohol twice to the minor, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. Again, without reciting any particular test, the Court looked to the testimony introduced at the second trial and found that it, too, established that the defendant had sold alcohol twice to the same minor, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. However, the Court noted that nothing in the record of either the first or second trial identified whether the convictions were for the morning sale or the afternoon sale, and that the indictments merely gave the date but did not differentiate between the time of day the crimes occurred. The Court found that a new trial was required because, by the mode, adopted by the prosecution, of giving evidence as to both sales on each indictment, both convictions may have been secured for the same selling. Id. at 79. The Court found this problematic because the jury in the first trial, having the evidence as to both alleged sales before them, [could have] found that [the morning sale] was not satisfactorily established, but that the [afternoon sale] was.... Id. Then, in the second trial: the evidence as to both alleged sales was given, and the court was satisfied that [the morning sale], regarded as not proved by the jury [in the first trial], was not proved [in the second trial], but that the [afternoon sale] was, and convicted the defendant [of the afternoon sale]; the conviction would be justified by the evidence for the State, and the defendant be twice convicted for the same offence [the afternoon sale]. Id. In Greenwood v. State, 64 Ind. 250 (1878), the defendant challenged his conviction for a second assault and battery because he had already been convicted of assault and battery upon a different victim arising out of the same fight. The defendant argued that, regardless of how many soever of assaults and batteries he may have committed during the period of excitement at the ball, they all amounted in law to but one offence.... Id. at 253. Without reciting a particular test, the Court looked to the testimony introduced at the first trial and, emphasizing the evidence presented, found that the defendant committed two separate assaults and batteries against two different victims arising from the same fight. Id. at 253-54. Thus, no double jeopardy violation occurred. In State v. Elder, 65 Ind. 282 (1879), the defendant was indicted for three counts of attempting to produce a miscarriage upon Elizabeth Bradburn by: (1) inserting an instrument into her uterus; (2) using the hand of another; and (3) administering a large quantity of medicine. Before the case went to trial, the defendant filed an answer asserting double jeopardy as an affirmative bar, arguing that he had previously been acquitted in a prosecution charging the murder of a certain child, unnamed, of one Elizabeth Bradburn, by... inserting [an] instrument into the uterus of the said Elizabeth Bradburn, and passing it about the fetus, thereby causing the miscarriage of the said Elizabeth Bradburn, and the death of said child. Id. at 283-84. The trial court found for the defendant and dismissed the second indictment. Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge Biddle [32] reversed, articulating the test as follows: if the facts show two or more offenses, but the lesser offence is not necessarily involved in the greater, and when the facts necessary to convict on a second prosecution would not necessarily have convicted on the first, double jeopardy will not prevent two convictions, even though the offences were both committed at the same time and by the same act. Id. at 285. In finding that the defendant was not being twice prosecuted for the same offense, the Court noted: An indictment for the murder of the unnamed child of Elizabeth Bradburn is by no means the same as an indictment charging the employment of certain means, with the intent to procure the miscarriage of Elizabeth Bradburn, although the same means were used to commit the offence in both cases. The lesser offence is not involved in the greater; the offences are not committed against the same person, and bear no resemblance to each other, either in fact or intent; the facts necessary to support a conviction on the [miscarriage charge] would not necessarily have convicted, nor would they even have tended to convict, upon the [murder charge]. Id. at 286. The Court concluded, We can not adopt the rule held in some States, that the accused can not, in any case, be convicted but once upon the same facts when they constitute different offences.... Id. at 286-287. The defendant in Jenkins v. State, 78 Ind. 133 (1881), was tried and convicted of assault and battery. He was also tried and convicted in a second trial for assault and battery, despite his claim of double jeopardy. The Court reversed the second conviction, noting that [i]t is always necessary for one who [claims double jeopardy] to show that the offence for which he was convicted is the same as that involved in the prosecution in which the evidence is offered. Id. at 134. Without reciting any particular test, it held that [t]he evidence fairly shows that the offence for which the appellant was convicted [at the first trial] is the same as that described in the indictment in the case at bar. Id. See also Foran v. State, 195 Ind. 55, 61, 144 N.E. 529, 531 (1924) (The offenses charged must not only be the same in law, as would be shown by the instruments which charged the offenses, but that such offenses must be the same in fact.). Beginning in Davidson v. State, 99 Ind. 366 (1885), however, this Court, without expressly overruling precedent or noting a change in jurisprudence, shifted its consideration away from the available evidence to the statutory requirements. [33] In his first trial, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully carrying a deadly weapon. In a subsequent prosecution, he was convicted of threatening to use a pistol during the same transaction. The Court found these convictions did not violate double jeopardy, even though the two prosecutions grew out of, and were based upon, the same transaction. Id. at 367. The Court stated that the test is whether the charged crimes are so far distinct that the evidence which would sustain one would not sustain the other. Id. at 368. The charged crimes were (1) unlawfully carrying a deadly weapon, and (2) threatening to use a pistol. The Court looked to the statutory elements and held that a material difference [existed] between the two offences defined by section 1984 [drawing or threatening to use a weapon], and those declared by section 1985 [carrying a concealed weapon or carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure someone], even conceding that the same pistol is used in every instance. Id. at 367. In State v. Reed, 168 Ind. 588, 81 N.E. 571 (1907), the Court found no double jeopardy violation when, in one trial, the defendant was charged with giving liquor to an intoxicated person in violation of statute and then convicted in a different trial (on the same day) of selling liquor to the same intoxicated person in violation of the same statute. The Court held that the statute defined three separate crimes: selling, bartering, and giving away liquor to an intoxicated person. Id. at 590, 81 N.E. at 572. The Court articulated the test as follows: `would the same evidence be necessary to secure a conviction in the pending, as in the former, prosecution?' Id. at 591, 81 N.E. at 572 (quoting Smith v. State, 85 Ind. 553, 557 (1882)). The Court then looked to the identity of the challenged conviction, focusing on the essential elements necessary to convict: Proof of a sale of intoxicating liquor by appellee to the person named in the indictment was one of the elements of the offense charged in this case, the proof of which was essential to conviction.... Id. However, in the former case, not a sale, but a gift, of intoxicating liquor by appellee to the person named in the affidavit was an essential element to be established by the evidence to secure conviction. Id. at 591-92, 81 N.E. at 572. Thus, the Court held, It is evident therefore that the evidence necessary to secure appellee's conviction of a charge of selling in violation of § 2219 ... would not have justified his conviction of the giving in violation of the same section charged in the former case. Id. at 592, 81 N.E. at 572. The defendant in Woodworth v. State, 185 Ind. 582, 114 N.E. 86 (1916), pled guilty to the charge that he sold alcohol to a person on May 1 without a license. The defendant was thereafter convicted of a separate charge of keeping and operating a place where alcohol was sold, also on May 1. The defendant contended that the evidence of the sale was also the evidence of keeping and operating the place and, therefore, that he was being convicted for the same offense. The Court rejected his argument without relying upon any particular test, finding that the statute defines two separate and distinct crimes. Id. at 585, 114 N.E. at 87. Looking to the statutory definitions, the court held: The gravamen of the first offense defined by the section of the statute under consideration is the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors by a person without a license, while that of the second offense defined is the keeping and operating of a place where such liquors are sold in violation of law, or the having of such liquors in possession for such purpose. Id. at 585-86, 114 N.E. at 87. In Durke v. State, 204 Ind. 370, 183 N.E. 97 (1932), the defendant was convicted of burglary and then convicted of conspiracy to commit a felony (burglary), arising out of the same transaction. He claimed double jeopardy prohibited the second conviction. The Court noted that `[t]he courts of this state ... have leaned more strongly to the identity of offense test, which is that the second charge must be for the same identical act and crime as [the first offense].' Id. at 377-78, 183 N.E. at 100 (quoting Foran, 195 Ind. at 60, 144 N.E. at 530). This test asks: `Would the same evidence be necessary to secure a conviction in the pending, as in the former prosecution.' Id. at 378, 183 N.E. at 100 (quoting Foran, 195 Ind. at 60, 144 N.E. at 530 (quoting Smith, 85 Ind. at 557) (other citations omitted)). Instead of looking to the specific evidence actually introduced at trial, the Court looked to what evidence would, in general, be necessary to secure convictions for both crimes: [T]he essential proof in a prosecution for burglary would not be sufficient to convict one charged with the crime known as conspiracy to commit a felony burglary. In the latter case the evidence must show a uniting or confederation of two or more persons to commit the burglary. In order to convict of the offense in the present case, it would not be necessary to prove actual participation in the felony, but in order to convict one charged with burglary, there must be proof connecting the party with the overt act. Id. Thus, a prosecution for burglary would not prohibit a prosecution for conspiracy to commit a felony (burglary). Id. See also Dunkle v. State, 241 Ind. 548, 551, 553-54, 173 N.E.2d 657, 659-60 (1961) (looking to well established rules of statutory construction, as well as upon the definition of the terms used ... [o]ur conclusion then is that to draw a weapon within the purview of § 448 ... is a separate and distinct offense from that of pointing or aiming a weapon under § 452.... Appellant was not therefore twice convicted for but one offense....). In 1978, the analysis under the Indiana Constitution was merged with the federal constitutional test: [34] Now that we are bound by the federal Double Jeopardy Clause, it is more necessary than ever that we be in line with federal standards. Elmore v. State, 269 Ind. 532, 537, 382 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1978). Although the Elmore Court erroneously concluded that the federal Supremacy Clause [35] required that the federal test govern all Indiana claims, it is clear that this Court, by 1978, considered both the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause and the federal Double Jeopardy Clause to require the same testa statutory identity of offense or same evidence test. Id. (noting the obvious similarity between the state and federal double jeopardy standards). Thus, when the Elmore Court merged our state double jeopardy analysis with the federal double jeopardy analysis, it was not a radical departure from our then-existing state constitutional analysis. The Elmore Court defined Indiana's identity of offense or same evidence test: whether if what is set out in the second indictment had been proved under the first, there could have been a conviction, or stated another way: would the same evidence be necessary to secure a conviction in the pending, as in the former prosecution. Id. (quoting Foran, 195 Ind. at 60, 144 N.E. at 530). Similarly, the Elmore Court defined what it called the Blockburger `identity of offense' or `same evidence' test, id. at 540, 382 N.E.2d at 897, as `the difference or lack of difference in the evidence necessary to establish one particular crime as compared with that required to establish the other crime.' Id. at 537, 382 N.E.2d at 896 (quoting Dunkle, 241 Ind. at 551, 173 N.E.2d at 658) (citations omitted). From this comparison, the Elmore Court concluded that our method of analysis in cases involving multiple count offenders closely paralleled the methodology employed by federal courts for protecting Fifth Amendment guarantees. Id. In 1982, this Court in Tawney v. State, 439 N.E.2d 582 (Ind.1982), introduced a new approach, in which a reviewing court was required to look to the manner in which the offenses are charged and not merely to the statutory definitions of the offenses. Id. at 588. This analysis looked to the specific factual allegations regarding the means by which the charged offenses were alleged to have been committed. As we have noted, Tawney did not attribute this additional requirement to an independent state double jeopardy protection found in Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution. Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 834, 838 (Ind.1997). Rather, it relied upon lesser-included jury instruction case law. See Tawney, 439 N.E.2d at 588. During the twenty years following Elmore, this Court frequently decided double jeopardy issues by looking to the offenses as charged, believing that this approach was required by federal double jeopardy jurisprudence, and often referring in passing to the Indiana Constitution. We have recently recognized that this methodology is an inaccurate statement of federal double jeopardy law as established by Blockburger. Carter, 686 N.E.2d at 837; Grinstead, 684 N.E.2d at 486; Games, 684 N.E.2d at 474. Considering Elmore 's merger of Indiana double jeopardy law into federal constitutional analysis and its declaration that our state's double jeopardy jurisprudence must be in line with federal standards, 269 Ind. at 537, 382 N.E.2d at 896, it is not surprising that we did not separately evaluate the Indiana Constitution as an additional, independent source of double jeopardy protection. Instead, we generally addressed double jeopardy claims by applying the prevailing understanding of federal jurisprudence and merely referred to the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. This Court today recognizes that these post- Elmore, pre- Games cases do not constitute precedent regarding the application of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. Our action today should be understood to supercede these cases. [36] From our review of the constitutional text, the history and circumstances surrounding its adoption, and the earliest cases interpreting and applying the provision, we conclude that Indiana's Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to prevent the State from being able to proceed against a person twice for the same criminal transgression. While none of the early cases presented a comprehensive analysis, a generally articulated test, or a standard of review for double jeopardy claims, the holdings in these decisions do reflect a common theme. A criminal transgression was a person's conduct that violated a statutorily defined crime. In seeking to determine whether two criminal transgressions were the same, this Court in its earliest decisions did not restrict its review only to a comparison of statutory elements of the crime or to an analysis of the language in the charging instruments. Rather, this Court also reviewed the actual evidence presented at trial when available. Synthesizing these considerations, we therefore conclude and hold that two or more offenses are the same offense in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense. [37] Both of these considerations, the statutory elements test and the actual evidence test, are components of the double jeopardy same offense analysis under the Indiana Constitution.