Opinion ID: 1133464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cross-examination of Officer Vargo

Text: Manard next contends that the State and Yardley each had the opportunity to extract the testimony they wanted from Officer Vargo. However, because of Bruton concerns, Manard was unable either to ask about any of the exculpatory statements or to rehabilitate himself after Yardley's counsel attacked Manard's credibility. There are two separate incidences where Manard claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine the witnesses against him: (1) when Vargo was called to the stand as a witness for the State; and (2) when Vargo was called as a defense witness for Yardley. We first review the cross-examination of Vargo as a witness for the State. Manard's counsel refused to cross-examine Vargo after Vargo testified in the State's case in chief. Counsel's refusal is suspect as invited error. See State v. Plunkett, 261 Kan. 1024, 1033, 934 P.2d 113 (1997) (litigants may not invite and lead a trial court into error and then complain of the trial court's action on appeal). Counsel proffered that he would elicit the following facts on Vargo's cross-examination. Manard: (1) wanted to tell his side of the story, and cooperate; (2) admitted being present at the shooting; (3) said Yardley shot the dude; (4) said he heard a lady yell at him as he was trying to get the car in gear; (5) said he was the driver; (6) indicated the original plan was to wait at a gas station until someone went inside to pay, and then steal their car; and (7) was emotionally upset while relating these details to Vargo, even crying at times. As the prosecution pointed out, Manard's counsel was free to elicit all of these facts except (3), that Yardley shot the dude. The district court did not prevent counsel from cross-examining Vargo as to the balance of the statements. Counsel's refusal to cross-examine erodes Manard's argument on appeal that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right. Manard's counsel also refused to cross-examine after Vargo was called in Yardley's defense. Yardley elicited testimony from Vargo concerning Manard's statement that he saw blood. Yardley used this testimony in closing argument to imply that Manard was the shooter, because only the shooter would have seen any blood. Manard argues that Yardley's questioning opened the door for a full cross-examination of Vargo and acted as a waiver of Yardley's confrontation rights. Manard cites no authority for this interesting waiver argument. Yardley should not have been allowed to elicit additional incriminating statements to support his theory that Manard was the shooter and Yardley was not present. Yardley's direct examination of Vargo went beyond the redacted version of Manard's statement. The redaction was ordered to protect Yardley's confrontation rights. Yardley took advantage of the redaction ruling by attempting to incriminate Manard as the shooter and exculpate himself. Yardley's approach created a contradiction of the complete statement. Manard's argument is that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the additional direct examination of Vargo by Yardley's counsel. We agree. Before we may declare any error of constitutional magnitude harmless, we must declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. State v. Bowser, 252 Kan. 582, Syl. ¶ 2, 847 P.2d 1231 (1993). The error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury convicted both Yardley and Manard of aggravated robbery and felony murder. The convictions reveal that the jury believed that Yardley was present during the crimes. Furthermore, the circumstantial and physical evidence against Manard and Yardley was overwhelming.