Opinion ID: 2614011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether a sufficient basis exists to issue a writ of mandamus

Text: This court may issue a writ of mandamus to control a district court's arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. Marshall v. District Court, 108 Nev. 459, 466, 836 P.2d 47, 52 (1992). The district court in the case at hand refused to certify a class because the class lacked the element of commonality. The Tenants and the Nevada Trial Lawyers Association (the NTLA), who filed an amicus brief supporting the Tenants' position, argue that if this court determines that the element of commonality exists, then the district court's refusal to certify a class constitutes arbitrary and capricious action justifying a writ of mandamus. The Tenants argue that this case is especially appropriate for a writ of mandamus because of the presence of substantial public policy concerns, predominantly legal issues and inevitable problems concerning discovery, notice, and large numbers of intervenors if class status is denied. Citing Johnson v. Travelers Insurance Company, 89 Nev. 467, 515 P.2d 68 (1973), the Tenants argue that dismissal of a class action is tantamount to dismissal of all members of the alleged class other than the named plaintiffs, in essence constituting a final judgment that can be appealed. The Tenants argue that the same concerns justifying the appeal in Johnson also justify their petition for a writ of mandamus. Bigelow responds that the Tenants unlawfully narrowed their issues on appeal because the district court order to dismiss the Tenants' countermotion for class certification did not single out a lack of commonality as the only justification for dismissal. [1] Bigelow asserts that the practical effect of denying reconsideration of the issue was to leave intact the original order as entered. Because the original order made no mention of the rationale justifying dismissal, Bigelow concludes that the Tenants must prove to this court that they satisfy all requirements of a class action. We conclude that this argument lacks merit. The Tenants do not argue that the original order denying their countermotion for class certification is not intact as entered. The effect of this original order remains unchanged. The rationale justifying the order remains subject to this court's inquiry. This inquiry may extend to the boundaries of the entire record, not just to selected portions. See State ex rel. Pitz v. City of Columbus, 56 Ohio App.3d 37, 564 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (1988) (culling facts from the record to justify the trial court's actions). The district court stated its rationale for denying class status in the court's order denying reconsideration of the issue of certification. The district court refused to amend that order. This court should not be compelled to ignore these facts in determining whether the district court's rationale for denying class certification was arbitrary and capricious. Bigelow also responds that the language of the minute order describing the court's rationale for denying reconsideration does not single out a lack of commonality as the only justification for dismissal. Bigelow concludes that this indicates the intent of the district court to refuse to narrow its refusal to certify a class to a lack of commonality. Bigelow quotes the following language to support this conclusion: [The court] felt the commonality element was missing and that it was not a class action.  (Emphasis supplied by Bigelow.) We conclude that this argument is without merit. Although conceivably this summary language could be interpreted to indicate that the Tenants' action was not a class action and lacked commonality, the full text of the minute order suggests an opposite interpretation, namely, that the court felt the Tenants' action was not a class action precisely because it lacked commonality. Furthermore, the court's order denying reconsideration cited commonality as the only obstacle to class status. The court refused to amend that order. We conclude, therefore, that the Tenants' concerns justify examining the district court's action to determine if it abused its discretion in refusing to certify a class.