Opinion ID: 2074048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion to Stop

Text: When reviewing the findings and judgment after an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress, this Court will defer to the factual findings of a Superior Court judge unless those findings are clearly erroneous. [5] Once the historical facts are established, the legal issue is whether an undisputed rule of law is violated. Accordingly, this Court reviews de novo whether police possessed reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a person. [6] After consideration of the record, we accept the Superior Court judge's interpretation of the facts. We review de novo his legal conclusion that the police did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop or detain Rollins. On appeal, the State contends that the Superior Court judge erred when he granted Rollins's motion to suppress because the police did have a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Rollins. The State contends that the trial judge erred in his evaluation of the police officers' assessment of the reasonable articulable suspicion standard because he considered each fact in isolation rather than looking at the totality of the circumstances. [7] As we address the State's contentions, we must first determine when the police actually detained Rollins. Then we must determine whether the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion at that time to make the stop. [8] A stop occurs when a police officer displays conduct that would `have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.' [9] Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a seizure requires either physical force or submission to assertion of authority. [10] Here, it is apparent that the police seized Rollins when they approached him in the courtyard and used physical force to grab him and bring him to their car. Under those circumstances, a reasonable person would not believe that he was free to leave. Therefore, this is the point in time when the detention occurred. We must next determine whether the officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop, detain and frisk him. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects individuals from `unreasonable searches and seizures.' [11] In Terry v. Ohio , the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer may `detain an individual for investigatory purposes for a limited scope and duration, but only if such detention is supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.' [12] The stop is only justified, however, if specific and articulable facts . . . together with rational inferences suggest that a suspect is involved in criminal activity. [13] 11 Del. C. § 1902 codifies the Terry principles: Questioning and detaining suspects. (a) A peace officer may stop any person abroad, or in a public place, who the officer has a reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand the person's name, address, business abroad and destination. (b) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer may be detained and further questioned and investigated. (c) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed 2 hours. The detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any official record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or arrested and charged with a crime. [14] This Court has interpreted the words reasonable ground in the Delaware statute to be equivalent to the reasonable and articulable standard in Terry. [15] The officer must be able to point to specific facts, which viewed in their entirety and accompanied by rational inferences, support the suspicion that the person sought to be detained was in the process of violating the law in order to satisfy the reasonable and articulable standard. [16] The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that courts should evaluate the reasonable articulable suspicion standard under the totality of the circumstances, rather than examining each factor in isolation. [17] Both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that [i]n some instances . . . lawful and apparently innocent conduct may add up to reasonable suspicion if the detaining officer articulates `concrete reasons for such an interpretation.' [18] The totality of the circumstances, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained officer in the same or similar circumstances, must be examined by both the trial judge and appellate court to determine if reasonable suspicion has been properly formulated. [19] The State has identified several factors that, when considered together, the State believes justify the Terry stop. The police were patrolling in an area that was well known for drug sales. As the police entered the courtyard in their patrol car, a woman shouted a warning that police were nearby in Rollins's direction. This prompted Rollins to look up, turn away, and quickly insert and remove his hand from his pocket. He then began to walk away from the officers. We must consider the totality of those factors in order to determine whether the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Rollins was engaged in criminal action in order to detain Rollins. The first factor to consider is that the neighborhood was well known as a high drug area. Officer Witt testified that based on his 11 years of experience and approximately 350 drug arrests, he knew the courtyard to be a location for drug sales. He testified that the courtyard is an ideal place for drug sales because there drug dealers can easily see the police approach and the courtyard presents multiple avenues of escape. In Wardlow, the United States Supreme Court noted, [O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. [20] In United States v. Johnson , the Court considered a high crime area to be a factor in its reasonable suspicion analysis. Following Wardlow, the Court in Johnson noted, While obviously insufficient by itself to amount to reasonable suspicion, the `fact that the stop occurred in a high crime area is among the relevant contextual considerations in a Terry analysis.' [21] Next, we will consider the bystander's warning shout of five-O [22] directed to Rollins. The Appellate Court of Connecticut, in State v. Williamson , considered a police warning as a factor in analyzing whether the police had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a defendant. [23] In Williamson, the officer observed that, upon his and other officers approach on the night of the incident, the defendant, after hearing someone yell `police' or some other word of alert, began running . . . The Court noted that [w]hile the police had no more than a generalized suspicion of illegal contact when they approached the [site of the incident], that suspicion became specific and focused on the defendant when he ran into the restaurant in response to the warnings that police had arrived. [24] We likewise conclude that the focused warning shout five-O contributed to the police officers' reasonable suspicion that Rollins might be engaged in criminal activity. Next we will consider Rollins's insertion and removal of his hand in his pocket when he saw the officers approaching. In United States v. Johnson , police observed a parked car with two passengers in a high narcotics area. The officers saw a young woman lean into the passenger's window and hand Johnson an object that they could not identify. As the police approached the vehicle, the woman walked away. One officer saw Johnson make a shoving down motion. [25] The court noted that Johnson's furtive gestures after the officer's display of authority contributed to the officer's reasonable suspicion. [26] Rollins furtive gestures can similarly be considered for the purpose of determining reasonable articulable suspicion. The final factor is that Rollins walked away from the officers. [27] As this Court noted in Cummings v. State , merely leaving the scene upon the approach, or the sighting, of a police officer is not, in itself and standing alone, suspicious conduct, however, it may be considered as a factor in the totality of the circumstances. [28] Although Rollins walked away as the officers approached him rather than run away, he nevertheless appeared to be intent on evading the police after the woman gave him a warning that police were in the area. Although it is possible that each factor, in isolation, could indicate seemingly innocent behavior, when we examine these facts under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Rollins may be engaged in criminal activity. They were, therefore, justified in detaining him and conducting a Terry pat down or frisk for their own protection.