Opinion ID: 1443077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Depredation Order Violates the MBTA

Text: The plaintiffs argue that by delegating management authority to the states and other agencies, the Depredation Order violates the MBTA's requirement that any killings of protected birds be specifically authorized by the FWS. We agree with the district court, however, that the discretion granted to these third parties is limited and subject to adequate oversight by the FWS, and that the Depredation Order therefore does not contravene the MBTA. Delegation of statutory responsibility by federal agencies and officers to outside parties is problematic because lines of accountability may blur, undermining an important democratic check on government decision-making, U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925 (2004), and because outside parties, whether private or sovereign, might not share the agency's national vision and perspective, id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the D.C. Circuit that, absent statutory authorization, such delegation is impermissible. Id. The MBTA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means takings may occur, 16 U.S.C. § 704(a), and to adopt suitable regulations permitting and governing the same, id., but the statute does not specifically provide for this authority to be delegated to third parties. Because any unauthorized delegation of this authority beyond the agency would be impermissible, our inquiry focuses on whether the Depredation Order is, in fact, such a delegation. An agency delegates its authority when it shifts to another party almost the entire determination of whether a specific statutory requirement ... has been satisfied, U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 567, or where the agency abdicates its final reviewing authority, Nat'l Park & Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F.Supp.2d 7, 19 (D.D.C.1999). Agencies may seek advice and policy recommendations from outside parties, but they may not `rubber-stamp' decisions made by others under the guise of seeking their `advice.' U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 568. If all it reserves for itself is the extreme remedy of totally terminating the [delegation agreement], Nat'l Park, 54 F.Supp.2d at 20, an agency abdicates its final reviewing authority, id. at 19. In the case at bar, the authority delegated by Congress to the FWS under the MBTA bears little resemblance to the far narrower band of discretion afforded to those acting under the Depredation Order. The MBTA requires the Secretary to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to permit takings and killings of migratory birds. By contrast, third parties acting pursuant to the Depredation Order are limited to takings of cormorants, and cormorants only, and even then, solely to prevent depredations on the public resources of fish ..., wildlife, plants, and their habitats. 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(c). Even if we accept the plaintiffs' warning that the term depredation is not explicitly defined by the FWS and could include birds engaging in the natural behavior of eating fish with no evidence of harm to a fish population overall, the Depredation Order nonetheless restricts the species, locations, and means by which takings in response to such depredations could occur, thereby restricting the discretion that may be exercised by third parties acting under the Order. The Depredation Order therefore does not represent a delegation of authority but is, instead, a permissible grant of permission [conditioned] on the decision of another entity, such as a state, local, or tribal government, ... [with] a reasonable connection between the outside entity's decision and the federal agency's determination. U.S. Telecom, 359 F.3d at 567. By adopting a rule that provides local agencies discretion to determine what constitutes a depredation within a localized context, the FWS was exercising its broad permitting authority while incorporating obviously relevant local concern[s] as ... element[s] of its decision process. Id. As a practical matter, of course, by issuing the Depredation Order, the FWS has limited its ability to regulate in advance those takings that are authorized by the Order. In this regard, the Depredation Order differs from the permit and rulemaking system for handling requests for depredation permits set forth at 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.41-21.42, which prohibits depredation control efforts unless the FWS first affirmatively issues a permit or order, and which requires the FWS to consider beforehand evidence of damage caused or about to be caused by migratory birds. There is, however, no statutory requirement that the FWS provide prior authorization in the form of a permit for specific takings of migratory birds. The MBTA mandates only suitable regulations permitting and governing takings. 16 U.S.C. § 704(a). The regulations restricting the taking of migratory birds, even in the absence of an advance permitting scheme, satisfy this statutory requirement. It is also worth noting that the FWS does retain some authority to regulate takings under the Depredation Order before they occur. For example, the FWS must be notified 30 days in advance of depredation control efforts that would kill more than 10 percent of the double-crested cormorants in a breeding colony and may prevent any such efforts with simple notification. 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(d)(9)(i)-(ii). It may also suspend or revoke the authority of third parties to act pursuant to the Depredation Order if they do not adhere to the Order's purpose, terms, and conditions or if the long-term sustainability of double-crested cormorant populations is threatened. Id. § 21.48(d)(13). Finally, the Depredation Order requires third parties acting under it to submit annual reports detailing their activities. The reports are required to include, among other things, an assessment of the effectiveness of control efforts, a description of efforts made to minimize incidental takings, and a tally of the number of cormorants and other migratory birds killed. Id. § 21.48(d)(10). In light of this oversight power and monitoring authority, the FWS is amply equipped to monitor the nationwide status of cormorant populations and to respond to long-term effects on the species. We conclude that the Depredation Order does not violate the MBTA.