Opinion ID: 2211525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Rebuttal Witnesses

Text: Defendants argue that a known and anticipated rebuttal witness must be disclosed; plaintiff argues that disclosure is not required. Support for both propositions is found in the case law. For example, in Chatman v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 531, 334 N.E.2d 673, the State was allowed to call an undisclosed witness to rebut factual testimony from another occurrence witness offered at trial. This Court noted that the failure to have listed the witness prior to trial was not material because the testimony offered was rebuttal which [the State] could not have been expected to anticipate. 263 Ind. at 546, 334 N.E.2d at 682. Similarly, in Smith v. State (1990), Ind., 553 N.E.2d 832, this Court held that where the State was unaware of the existence of a rebuttal witness until it had rested its case and there was no attempt to mislead the defendant, the State's failure to list the witness was excusable. In explaining the rule of nondisclosure of a rebuttal witness, this Court noted that it was obvious that the very nature of a trial gives rise to the likelihood that issues will be raised during the defendant's case which the State could not logically anticipate, and that the State is permitted to seek out and call persons to rebut hitherto-unexpected claims. Id. at 835. Also, in Tanner v. State (1984), Ind., 471 N.E.2d 665, this Court held that allowing a previously-unidentified witness to testify in rebuttal was not an abuse of discretion because it is impossible to anticipate the calling of such a witness. Id. at 667. These cases discuss the nondisclosure of a rebuttal witness in the context of a party's inability to anticipate the need for or lack of knowledge about the identity of a rebuttal witness and, therefore, tend to support the defendants' argument. McCullough points to language in other Indiana cases in support of her position that she had no obligation to disclose the identity of her rebuttal witness. For example, in Floyd v. State (1987), Ind., 503 N.E.2d 390, 394, this Court held that [t]he State is under no obligation to provide a defendant with a list of its rebuttal witnesses. Accord Smith v. State (1990), Ind., 553 N.E.2d 832, 835; Thompkins v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 163, 169, 383 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Given that the State was under no obligation to provide the defendant with a list of its rebuttal witnesses, the court was under no obligation to grant the defendant's motion for a continuance.) These cases tend to support McCullough's argument that Indiana law did not require disclosure of rebuttal witnesses under any circumstances. [1] After reviewing these cases, we hold that the Chatman line of cases expresses the better rule: the nondisclosure of a rebuttal witness is excused only when that witness was unknown and unanticipated; known and anticipated witnesses, even if presented in rebuttal, must be identified pursuant to a court order, such as a pre-trial order, or to a proper discovery request. Several sources persuade us that this is the better rule. First, a trial is, in part, a factual search for the truth. See Graves v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 383, 386 (addressing evidence which is potent ally important to the search for truth); Johnson v. State (1987), Ind., 507 N.E.2d 980, 986, cert. den. 484 U.S. 946, 108 S.Ct. 335, 98 L.Ed.2d 362 (rule regarding preservation of evidence is, in part, to make of the trial a search for truth informed by all relevant material); see also dissenting opinion of DeBruler, J., in Mauricio v. State (1985), Ind., 476 N.E.2d 88, 95 (the State may not insist that trials be run as a search for truth so far as defense witnesses are concerned while maintaining poker game secrecy for its own witnesses). Second, disclosure of the identity of all witnesses fulfills the objectives of Indiana's discovery rules. One of the purposes of our discovery rules is to provide parties with information essential to the litigation of all relevant issues, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement with a minimum of court involvement. Canfield v. Sandock (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 526, 528. The true spirit of the new discovery rules may be described as two-fold: (1) to provide for a minimum of court involvement in the discovery process, and (2) to allow for a more liberal discovery procedure. Chustak v. Northern Ind. Pub. Service Co. (1972), 259 Ind. 390, 395, 288 N.E.2d 149, 152-3. That our rules favor the disclosure of witnesses before trial is evident in Indiana Trial Rules 26 and 16. We are not persuaded by McCullough's argument that Sobek was not a known and anticipated rebuttal witness. McCullough argues that even if she anticipated the need for Sobek's testimony before trial, as demonstrated by her attorneys' consulting with him, she could not possibly know whether she would actually call Sobek until the defendant's experts testified. This is so, explains McCullough, because if defendants' experts had changed the opinions they expressed at their depositions, there would have been no need to rebut their testimony. We do not agree. A known witness refers to knowledge of the existence of that witness. An anticipated witness is one which a party or her counsel anticipates the need for at trial. Here, the comments of McCullough's counsel at trial demonstrate that he knew of Sobek as a potential witness, and that he anticipated using Sobek at trial. Thus, Sobek was a known and anticipated rebuttal witness. McCullough also argues that she was under no duty to supplement her answers to interrogatories because a pre-trial order had been entered. Clearly, had no pre-trial order been entered here, Indiana Trial Rule 26(E)(1) would have required McCullough to supplement her responses to Interrogatories 19, 20, and 21. However, McCullough is correct that the pre-trial order, once entered, controls, and any required disclosure revolves around interpretation of and compliance with the pre-trial order. Ind. Trial Rule 16; Whisman v. Fawcett (1984), Ind., 470 N.E.2d 73, 76; Hundt v. LaCrosse Grain Co. (1981), Ind. App., 425 N.E.2d 687, 692. Here, the pre-trial order does not address supplementation of answers to interrogatories and defendants made no request for supplementation after the pre-trial order was entered. Therefore, Trial Rule 26 did not mandate supplementation. Even so, the pre-trial order did require disclosure of witnesses, and we find the fact that the order did not refer specifically to rebuttal witnesses of no moment. The pre-trial order was sufficient to have required McCullough to include Sobek's name on her witness list. [2]