Opinion ID: 470998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: instruction on and admission of hearsay testimony

Text: 167 Jacek Odoner challenges both the court's instruction at the time of the admission of hearsay statements of codefendant Pogodzinski and the court's admission of hearsay testimony from John Gingras. 168 As discussed earlier in section I(E) supra, the better course would have been for the trial court to refrain from commenting to the jury about the procedure for admitting coconspirator hearsay. See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1136 (7th Cir.1978); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980). We nevertheless conclude that the court's statements did not prejudice any of the defendants or improperly influence the jury's decision. The court's comments did not amount to a clear and unambiguous signal to the jury that the judge was satisfied that a conspiracy existed. Furthermore, the jury had ample evidence, see section III(H) infra, to determine, based upon Odoner's acts, that Odoner was a member of the cocaine conspiracy. Odoner, therefore, was not deprived of an impartial jury, and reversal is not warranted on that ground. 169 Odoner also challenges the trial court's admission of hearsay testimony by John Gingras under the coconspirator's statement exception of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). 34 Gingras testified that Anthony Peters told him that he (Peters) had sent Edward Odoner, defendant Jacek Odoner's brother, out west with $778,000 and that Ed Odoner never returned. 170 Odoner argues that Gingras' testimony about Ed Odoner should have been excluded to avoid confusing the jury and creating an aura of guilt by association. Odoner thus does not challenge the district court's Santiago determination, 35 but rather mounts an evidentiary attack based on Fed.R.Evid. 403. 36 171 It is fundamental that the balancing of prejudice and probativeness under Rule 403 is committed to the trial court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse. United States v. Falco, 727 F.2d 659, 665 (7th Cir.1984). A trial judge has broad discretion in making this determination, United States v. Vincent, 681 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir.1982), and his decision must be accorded great deference. Falco, 727 F.2d at 665. 172 Odoner has not made a clear showing of abuse of discretion by his conclusory statements that the testimony about Edward Odoner confused the jury and necessarily resulted in guilt by association. Odoner does not explain or present any foundation for these conclusions, and we find no support for them in the record. The government presented sufficient evidence to establish Odoner's participation in the conspiracy based upon Odoner's own acts. see section III(H) infra. The jury had no reason to resort to guilt by association to convict Odoner. As stated earlier in response to Lawrence Peters' severance motion, see section II(E) supra, we believe the jury was capable of separating the evidence and determined each defendant's guilt or innocence based only upon evidence implicating that defendant. Nothing in the record suggests that the jury convicted Odoner based upon isolated hearsay concerning his brother. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the hearsay testimony of John Gingras.