Opinion ID: 1247623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Consequences of Viewing the State Bar as a Governmental Agency.

Text: (6) If the bar is considered a governmental agency, then the distinction between revenue derived from mandatory dues and revenue from other sources is immaterial. A governmental agency may use unrestricted revenue, whether derived from taxes, dues, fees, tolls, tuition, donation, or other sources, for any purposes within its authority. Two Court of Appeal decisions illustrate the point. In Erzinger v. Regents of University of California (1982) 137 Cal. App.3d 389 [187 Cal. Rptr. 164], certiorari denied, 462 U.S. 1133 [77 L.Ed.2d 1368, 103 S.Ct. 3113], students at the University of California objected that the compulsory student registration fees included a fee for health services which included abortions. The Court of Appeal, noting that the Board of Regents is a governmental agency, treated the fee as equivalent to a tax, and held that one could not refuse to pay a tax because of ideological or religious objections to the use of the money. In Miller v. California Com. on Status of Women (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 693 [198 Cal. Rptr. 877], appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 806 [83 L.Ed.2d 15, 105 S.Ct. 64], plaintiffs attacked the commission's expenditures incurred in lobbying for the enactment of the equal rights amendment. The Legislature responded by enacting Government Code section 8246, which expressly authorized such lobbying. [17] The Court of Appeal found the statute controlling. (7) Rejecting the claim that commission lobbying infringed the rights of dissenters, it wrote that the claim failed to distinguish between the government's addition of its own voice and its silencing of others. `That government must regulate expressive activity with an even hand if it regulates such activity at all does not mean that government must be ideologically neutral.' (P. 700, quoting Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978) p. 588.) Government may not compel citizens to express a particular viewpoint, nor delegate to nongovernmental entities the power to extract funds to support political and ideological activity not directly related to the entity's purpose. ( Ibid., citing Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, supra, 431 U.S. 209.) `But none of this means that government cannot add its own voice to the many that it must tolerate, provided it does not drown out private communication.' ( Ibid., quoting Tribe, op. cit. supra, p. 590.) If the government ... cannot appoint a commission to speak on the topic [of the status of women] without implicating plaintiffs' First Amendment rights it may not address any other `controversial' topics. If the government cannot address controversial topics it cannot govern. (P. 701.) [18] (1d) We conclude that the State Bar, considered as a government agency, may use dues for any purpose within the scope of its statutory authority. The concurring and dissenting opinion disputes this conclusion, arguing that even if the bar is a governmental agency its use of dues should be subject to restrictions hitherto imposed only on labor unions and other private associations. But no precedent supports the imposition of such restrictions on a governmental agency. Moreover, as we have previously explained ( ante, pp. 1165-1166), applying the labor union test to the bar would impose upon the bar the massive burden of analyzing all proposed activities under vague and uncertain standards designed for organizations of quite different purpose and structure, and would probably discourage the bar from carrying out its statutory functions. [19] (8) Having decided that the bar may use dues for any authorized purpose, we next inquire into the scope of its authority. As previously noted, section 6031, subdivision (a) authorizes the bar to aid in all matters pertaining to the advancement of the science of jurisprudence or to the improvement of the administration of justice. In the context of lobbying and amicus curiae activities, this language should be read broadly. Laws are the business of lawyers. The drafting of a proposed law, the understanding of the relationship between that law and existing legislation, and the appreciation of the practical impact of the proposed legislation are matters which often require expert legal knowledge and judgment. Whatever the subject of the proposed law, it is likely that among the members of the State Bar are some with the needed expertise, whose collective advice can lead to significant improvements in the legislative proposal. The state has a valid interest in drawing upon [lawyers'] training and experience in order to promote improvements in the administration of justice and to advance jurisprudence. The better attuned the legal machinery is to the public's needs of health, safety, and welfare, the better the state will be able to perform its job of protecting and serving the public. The input and feedback on proposed legislation and court rules is invaluable to the state in fine-tuning its legislative and judicial systems. ( Falk I, supra, 305 N.W. 201, 231-232 (opn. of Williams, J.) fns. omitted.) [20] Thus we do not distinguish between proposed legislation of substantive character and that which aims only at procedural changes. Substantive legislation has procedural effects, as, for example, when a change in tort law affects the number of cases settled and the number going to trial. And even if the proposed bill seems at first glance to relate entirely to substantive matters unrelated to the practice of law, the advice of expert practitioners could still be crucial; an example might be a bill concerning community property which has consequences, unforeseen by its author, upon estate planning or federal tax liability. We conclude that a bill-by-bill, case-by-case, review of bar lobbying and amicus curiae briefs is unnecessary and unworkable. We do not impose such scrutiny on lobbying and litigating by other governmental agencies. The Legislature is well aware of the bar's activities, and that the bar's authority for those activities derives from section 6031. Knowing these matters, the Legislature has annually approved bar dues, some of which go to support lobbying and amicus curiae briefs, and has amended section 6031 to prohibit one specific activity  the rating of appellate judges. We infer that the Legislature essentially approves a broad construction of the statute which would permit the bar's existing activities. (9) Holding a conference of delegates also falls within the bar's authority. (Cf. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, supra, 466 U.S. 435, 448, 455-456 [80 L.Ed.2d 428, 446-447] (union conventions).) Plaintiffs, however, assert that some of the resolutions debated and passed by the conference fall beyond the boundary. The examples they cite, however, do not support this assertion; all but one relate to proposed changes in California law and that one relates to federal court jurisdiction, a subject which affects the practice of law in California. (10a) The bar's actions in connection with the 1982 election present a different issue. We have no doubt that the bar's actions related to the administration of justice. Indeed few matters bear as directly upon the administration of justice as the standards for the appointment and retention of judges. In Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, however, we set out a special rule limiting state agency participation in election campaigns. We there stated that absent clear and explicit legislative authorization, a public agency may not expend public funds to promote a partisan position in an election campaign. (17 Cal.3d at pp. 209-210.) Informational or education expenditures, on the other hand, require no such explicit authorization, for an agency has implicit power to make `reasonable expenditures for the purpose of giving voters relevant facts to aid them in reaching an informed judgment....' (P. 220, quoting Citizens to Protect Pub. Funds v. Board of Education (1953) 13 N.J. 172 [98 A.2d 673, 676].) We recognized that [f]requently ... the line between unauthorized campaign expenditures and authorized informational activities is not so clear.... In such cases, the determination of the propriety or impropriety of the expenditure depends upon a careful consideration of such factors as the style, tenor and timing of the publication; no hard and fast rule governs every case. (17 Cal.3d at p. 222, fn. omitted.) The present case is one of those we anticipated in Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206. Anthony Murray's inaugural speech was delivered about three months before the 1982 election, and clearly referred to that election. (The speech itself, of course, cost the State Bar nothing; the issue concerns its being publicized through press release and educational materials.) Some of its language is quite strident; he denounces the idiotic cries of ... self-appointed vigilantes ... [and] unscrupulous politicians. Some portions of the speech are restrained and educational in tone: he describes the history of the concept of judicial independence from the failed impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase to the present day and the role and philosophy of the bar, [21] and presents statistics concerning this court's review of criminal cases. The speech did not mention any justice by name, or urge the retention of any or all of the justices. [22] The bar's subsequent press release simply describes the speech, highlighting Murray's assertion that the only legitimate basis for refusing to retain or for recalling a justice is a showing of incapacity or misconduct in office. The educational packet, sent to local bar associations and other interested groups, contained Murray's speech, a sample speech entitled The Case for an Independent Judiciary (a quite restrained and philosophical exposition), sample letters to organizations which might provide a speech forum, and a sample press release. It also included fact sheets on crime and conviction rates, judicial selection and retention, and judicial performance and removal criteria. It concluded with quotations concerning judicial independence from Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, and others. [23] (11), (10b) The bar may properly act to promote the independence of the judiciary; such conduct falls clearly within its statutory charge to advance the science of jurisprudence and improve the administration of justice. In the present case, however, the nature and timing of the 1982 publication (see Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 222), indicate that it is a form of prohibited election campaigning. The material was distributed approximately one month before an election in which six justices of this court came before the voters for confirmation. It is the kind of material which a state election committee distributes to local committees to aid them in the campaign. Its style and tenor is appropriate to that end; it is basically informative and factual, but without claim of impartiality, and includes such practical tools as a form letter to groups which might host a speaker. While intended to educate the reader because its authors believed an informed campaigner would be a more effective campaigner, its primary purpose, we believe, was to assist in the election campaign on behalf of the justices. We conclude that in preparing and distributing this material, the State Bar exceeded its statutory authority. (12) In view of the absence of any prior authority in California construing section 6031, and the obvious difficulty of the issue, we cannot fairly hold the governors personally liable for the 1982 expenditures. The bar has long been concerned with promoting and defending the independence of the judiciary. It formally endorsed the initiative which established the present system of judicial retention elections in place of partisan elections. [24] It has frequently debated and proposed measures for merit selection and life tenure for judges. As we noted earlier, it is charged with an ethical obligation to defend the judiciary from unfair attack. (See fn. 21, ante. ) Under these circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law that the Board of Governors could reasonably believe that it had the authority to take action in opposition to what it perceived to be an attack on an independent judiciary. Under Stanson v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206, 226-227, such a reasonable belief precludes personal liability.