Opinion ID: 3214771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FTCA Claims against the United States

Text: On appeal, Bonilla argues that the district court erred by dismissing his FTCA claims on sovereign immunity grounds. We disagree. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1000 (1994). The FTCA was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort. Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1441, 1443 (2013). The United States waives sovereign immunity in § 1346(b) of the FTCA, which provides: [T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). However, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) creates an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as an exception to that exception, by providing that the waiver in § 1346(b) “shall not apply to”: [a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply 7 Case: 15-15327 Date Filed: 06/20/2016 Page: 8 of 15 to any claim arising . . . out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Thus, while § 2680(h) carves out an exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the commission of certain enumerated intentional torts, the United States may still be liable for those torts when federal “investigative or law enforcement officers” commit them. See id.; see also Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). Section 2680(h) defines an “investigative or law enforcement officer” as “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Here, the district court properly dismissed Bonilla’s FTCA claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. All of Bonilla’s FTCA claims maintain causes of action for intentional torts from which the United States is immune. Bonilla’s false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims are barred under the plain language of § 2680(h). See id. Additionally, Bonilla’s negligence and emotional distress claims, though not enumerated in § 2680(h), are still barred because they are derived from the same conduct that forms the basis of the enumerated causes of action. See Metz v. United States, 788 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[A] cause of action which is distinct from one of those excepted under § 2680(h) will nevertheless be deemed to ‘arise out of’ an excepted cause of 8 Case: 15-15327 Date Filed: 06/20/2016 Page: 9 of 15 action when the underlying governmental conduct which constitutes an excepted cause of action is ‘essential’ to plaintiff's claim.”). Bonilla nevertheless argues that the waiver of sovereign immunity for intentional torts committed by “investigators or law enforcement officers” applies to this case in two ways. First, Bonilla contends that Hoffman’s conduct “went far beyond her prosecutorial duties such that she was acting in the role of an investigative or law enforcement officer for purposes of the FTCA.” According to Bonilla, the United States does not enjoy sovereign immunity where a federal prosecutor commits certain tortious acts in an investigative or law enforcement capacity. With respect to Hoffman’s conduct, prosecutors do not qualify as “investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) as they are not empowered to execute searches, seize evidence, or make arrests. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); 28 U.S.C. § 547 (setting out the duties of U.S. Attorneys). Nor does the complaint allege that Hoffman performed any of these functions. Accordingly, based on the allegations in this case, Hoffman does not qualify as an “investigative or law enforcement officer” under the plain meaning of § 2680(h), and sovereign immunity precludes FTCA liability arising from her allegedly tortious conduct. 9 Case: 15-15327 Date Filed: 06/20/2016 Page: 10 of 15 Second, Bonilla argues that, regardless of Hoffman’s conduct, the complaint sets forth detailed allegations of tortious misconduct by DEA agents and other federal law enforcement officers. According to Bonilla, the United States does not enjoy sovereign immunity where DEA agents, who are clearly law enforcement officers, commit certain tortious acts. With respect to the DEA’s conduct, we have no doubt that DEA agents qualify as “federal investigative or law enforcement officer[s]” under § 2680(h), which means that the United States does not enjoy sovereign immunity from claims based on the DEA’s commission of certain intentional torts. See Nguyen, 556 F.3d at 1260. However, the complaint does not contain sufficiently specific allegations relating to the DEA’s actual conduct to state an FTCA claim against the United States. The complaint alleges numerous instances of misconduct by Hoffman and the United States in general, but contains very few allegations concerning the actual conduct of the DEA or other federal law enforcement officers. Indeed, Hoffman is the only agent of the United States who the complaint ever identifies by name. All we can glean from the complaint is that unidentified DEA agents (1) coordinated a drug-smuggling investigation with Colombian law enforcement, (2) arrested Bonilla on June 28, 2012, upon suspicion of drug-smuggling, (3) paid “bonuses” to Colombian narcotics officers for their investigative efforts, and 10 Case: 15-15327 Date Filed: 06/20/2016 Page: 11 of 15 (4) received from Bonilla’s attorney and Colombian agents some evidence tending to exculpate Bonilla. These allegations, accepted as true, do not establish the unlawfulness of Bonilla’s arrest and detention and, therefore, do not state a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment, or any of the other related causes of action that form the basis of Bonilla’s FTCA claims. 3 Additionally, none of Bonilla’s FTCA counts contain any allegations even mentioning the conduct of the DEA or other federal law enforcement officials. At most, one could speculate that Bonilla’s allegations concerning the “United States” and “U.S. authorities” refer to the actions of the DEA or other federal law enforcement officials. However, complaints that do not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” will not survive dismissal. See Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Ultimately, we are left with nothing more than Bonilla’s vague, threadbare, and conclusory allegations concerning the conduct of the DEA, which do not state an FTCA claim against the United States that is plausible on its face. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245; Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188. In sum, under § 2680(h), sovereign immunity precludes FTCA liability arising from the tortious conduct alleged in the complaint. Hoffman is not an 3 Bonilla’s allegation that his attorney and criminal investigator repeatedly provided the DEA with evidence that “unequivocally proved [his] innocence” amounts to nothing more than a “legal conclusion[] masquerading as fact[]” that does not prevent dismissal. Oxford Asset Mgmt., 297 F.3d at 1188. 11 Case: 15-15327 Date Filed: 06/20/2016 Page: 12 of 15 “investigative or law enforcement officer,” and while a DEA agent is, the allegations regarding the DEA’s conduct is not sufficiently specific to state a claim. Because the complaint does not state a claim against the United States based on the conduct of an “investigative or law enforcement officer,” the “investigative or law enforcement officer” exception in § 2680(h) does not apply and the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from Bonilla’s FTCA claims.