Opinion ID: 1251736
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Theory of Defense Instruction.

Text: Iowa Code section 711.4 pertinently defines extortion as follows: A person commits extortion if the person does any of the following with the purpose of obtaining for oneself or another anything of value, tangible or intangible, including labor or services: .... 2. Threatens to accuse another of a public offense. 3. Threatens to expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. .... 5. Threatens to ... cause some public official or employee to take ... action. It is a defense to a charge of extortion that the person making a threat other than a threat to commit a public offense, reasonably believed that the person had a right to make such threats in order to recover property, or to receive compensation for property or services, or to recover a debt to which the person has a good faith claim. In the marshaling instruction on extortion, the district court required the State to prove that Ross 1. wrongfully and intentionally threatened to accuse Rita Hierstein of a public offense; or expose Rita Hierstein to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or to cause some public official or employee to take some action against Rita Hierstein. 2. intended to communicate the threat towards Rita Hierstein. 3. made [the threat] for the purpose of obtaining something of value for [Ross] or another person, which [Ross] knew he was not entitled to receive. 4. did not reasonably believe he had a right to make threats in order to be paid for property or services or to recover a debt to which he had a good faith claim. In a separate instruction, the district court instructed the jury on Ross's theory of defense to the extortion charge: With regard to element four of [the marshaling instruction on extortion] whether the defendant reasonably believed that he had a right to make threats depends on the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the threat. If the defendant believed he had a right to make the threat and you find that a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe they had a right to make the threat, then the defendant would not be guilty of extortion if the threat was made to recover a debt to which the defendant had a good faith claim. Good faith means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Despite the fact that the court instructed on the defense in terms of the statutory language in section 711.4, Ross wanted more. He requested the court to give the following instruction on theft by check in Iowa Code section 714.1(6): With regard to element number 4 of [the marshaling instruction on extortion,] whether the defendant reasonably believed he had a right to make threatening statements depends on the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the statement: Theft by check is committed when a person: 1. makes, utters, draws, delivers or gives a check, and 2. obtains property or services in exchange for the check, and 3. the person knows that such check will not be paid when presented. If the State fails to prove that the defendant did not reasonably believe he had a right to make the threat, then the defendant must be found not guilty of extortion. Ordinarily, the district court must instruct on a defendant's theory of defense provided the defendant makes a timely request, the requested theory of defense instruction is supported by the evidence, and the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law. State v. Johnson, 534 N.W.2d 118, 124 (Iowa App.1995). Evidence in support of the requested instruction must be substantial. State v. Broughton, 425 N.W.2d 48, 51-52 (Iowa 1988). Evidence is substantial if it could convince a rational fact finder that the defendant has established the affirmative defense. Id. Under the evidence in this case, we think Ross was not entitled to his requested theory of defense instruction. There was no evidence that Rita ever received any property or services in exchange for the checks she gave FSN. Nor was there any evidence that at the time she issued the checks Rita knew the checks would not be paid when presented. In short, the evidence was insufficient to convince a rational fact finder that Rita had committed the crime of theft by check. In addition, we have serious reservations that defendants charged with theft by deception and extortion may ever advance alleged criminal conduct on the part of their victims as a defense to their extortion. We conclude the district court committed no error when it refused Ross's requested theory of defense instruction.