Opinion ID: 876640
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Title of the Act

Text: The title of the Initiative as certified to the Governor by the Secretary of State, is follows: AN ACT EMPOWERING MONTANA VOTERS TO APPROVE OR REJECT ANY PROPOSED NUCLEAR POWER FACILITY CERTIFIED UNDER THE MONTANA MAJOR FACILITY SITING ACT; DEFINING TERMS; ESTABLISHING STATE SAFETY AND FINANCIAL LIABILITY STANDARDS FOR MAJOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES; EXEMPTING MEDICAL AND RESEARCH FACILITIES; PROVIDING FOR PUBLICATION OF EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLANS; INVALIDATING EMERGENCY APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR NUCLEAR FACILITIES; AMENDING SECTION 70-804, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947. The 1972 Mont. Const., Art. V, § 11(3), provides that an act shall contain only one subject, clearly expressed in its title. Relator contends the foregoing title of the Initiative is misleading in that it does not clearly express the subject matter. The source of relator's contention lies in section 4(1)(a) of the Initiative, which contains a requirement that no certificate to construct a nuclear facility may be issued by the board unless it first finds that no limits exist regarding the rights of a [person] to bring suit for and recover full and just compensation from the entities responsible for the nuclear plant and further that no legal limits exist regarding the total compensation recoverable from such responsible parties. Relator contends the clear import of the restrictions in section 4(1)(a) and other related provisions is to ban the construction of any and all power facilities in the State of Montana. He further contends the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, particularly Title 42, U.S. Code, § 2210, provides for a top total liability for a single nuclear incident of $560 million. Relator states this limitation of recoverable amount contained in the federal statute cannot be squared with the language in the proposed Initiative. Therefore, says relator, an applicant for a proposed nuclear facility in Montana could not comply with both the State and federal provisions respecting limits of liability and right to recovery, and in effect the passage of Initiative 80 would be a ban on the erection of any nuclear facilities in this State. Respondent and intervention petitioners answer relator's contention in two ways. First, they claim under the Price-Anderson Act the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has the power to waive the $560 million limitation in exchange for a promise from an applicant for permission to build a nuclear plant, that the applicant waives the usual common law defenses and statutes of limitation with respect to possible claimants and accept strict liability as to the plan, design, direction, maintenance and operation of the plant. Therefore, respondents contend there is no impossible clash between the proposed Initiative and the Price-Anderson Act. Second, they maintain there is a presumption against pre-emption as between State and federal regulations ( Savage v. Jones (1912), 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 715, 56 L.Ed. 1182); that utility siting is traditionally within State control ( Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Company (1947), 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447); and that Congress has not in any event pre-empted the whole of the nuclear power plant field, but at most a limited portion thereof ( Kelly v. Washington (1937), 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82 L.Ed. 3). The Attorney General, on behalf of respondent, Secretary of State, adds that Initiative No. 80 is not unconstitutional on its face and that until the Initiative has become codified as law, there is no justiciable controversy in existence now for this Court to decide. The Attorney General also contends the preponderant weight of authority throughout the United States is that enactment of legislation may not be enjoined on the grounds of alleged substantive unconstitutionality, citing Bardwell v. Parish Counsel (1949), 216 La. 537, 44 So.2d 107, 19 A.L.R.2d 514; State ex rel. Kittel v. Bigelow (1941), 138 Ohio St. 497, 37 N.E.2d 41; Unlimited Progress v. City of Portland (1958), 213 Or. 193, 324 P.2d 239 and cases annotated in 19 A.L.R.2d 519. We must agree with the Attorney General, that after examination of the provision of the proposed Initiative, on its face, the Initiative is not unconstitutional. This takes it out of the operation of State ex rel. Steen v. Murray (1964), 144 Mont. 61, 394 P.2d 761, where this Court did enjoin the Secretary of State from placing an Initiative on the ballot which was on its face unconstitutional because it would preclude the legislature from prohibiting gambling. We therefore examine the title of the Initiative based upon the provisions of the Initiative itself. We find the title conforms to the constitutional rule that the subject of the Initiative text be clearly expressed in the title. We make that determination based upon the rules of construction set out in State v. McKinney (1904), 29 Mont. 375, 74 P. 1095, and Evers v. Hudson (1907), 36 Mont. 135, 142, 92 P. 462.