Opinion ID: 1111358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: damages in wrongful death cases

Text: Given that only punitive damages are recoverable in an Alabama wrongful death suit (the predicate for the certified questions), I now address the peculiar interpretation that this Court has given our wrongful death statute (§ 6-5-410, Code of Alabama 1975, and its predecessors). Since there has been no compensation for death, but only punishment, are we to allow apportionment of all damages in wrongful death cases, but allow apportionment of only those damages in excess of those that compensate in cases involving personal injury, fraud, etc.? Certainly, there is a victim in a case involving death, just as there is in a personal injury case. Certainly, there is a loss that can be partially compensated for in a case involving death, just as there is in a personal injury case. In a case involving death, there is an interest of an uncompensated victim, just as there is in a personal injury case, and this interest should be kept foremost in mind in dealing with the compensable part of the loss and should be given maximum assurance that full compensation will be received for that compensable part of the loss. To allow apportionment of all damages in a wrongful death case, then, would give primacy to the defendant's right to fair punishment rather than to an uncompensated victim's right to maximum assurance that he or she will receive full compensation for all damages sustained. This is not the first time that the Court's peculiar interpretation of the damages aspect of our wrongful death statute has called into question its application of principles of basic fairness and suggested constitutional defects. See Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So.2d 373 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1211, 104 S.Ct. 2401, 81 L.Ed.2d 357 (1984), in which the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions cannot be maintained in Alabama against municipalities for wrongful death, even though § 1983 actions could be maintained if the same act caused only personal injuries, because municipalities are immune from punitive damages under § 1983. Justice Jones, in a strong dissent to this portion of the opinion, (pp. 379-80) included this: In my opinion, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution precludes our rejection of the § 1983 claim against the City. Therefore, before I address the issue of apportionment of damages in wrongful death cases, I must review the damages aspect of wrongful death cases. Other than strong judicial precedent, there is nothing embodied or expressed in § 6-5-410, Code 1975, that makes the damages recoverable for wrongful death only punitive. [A]nd recover such damages as the jury may assess ..., for the wrongful act, omission or negligence ... whereby the death... was caused, provided the [decedent] could have commenced an action for such wrongful act, omission or negligence if it had not caused death. § 6-5-410. Clearly, the Legislature did not use such terms as vindictive damages (§ 6-6-148, Code 1975), which was a phrase used in statutes enacted by the Legislature prior to 1860, the time of the enactment of the first wrongful death statute that the Court interpreted as permitting only punitive damages. See Black Belt Wood Co. v. Sessions, supra, at 1260-61. The present statute did not use the words exemplary damages, which were used in what is now § 6-5-71, Code 1975, Act No. 191, 1909 Ala. Acts, and in Code 1923, §§ 5674, 5675; and Code 1940, T. 7, §§ 121, 122. The Legislature did not use the term exemplary or punitive damages, which it used in what is now § 6-6-296, Code 1975, which phrase was also used when this section appeared as § 7470, Code 1923, and T. 7, § 955, Code 1940. It is obvious that the Legislature knew how to enact legislation authorizing punitive damages. The words of the present statute do not indicate that only punitive damages are recoverable. [S]uch damages: Such, as an adjective, is defined as of a kind or character about to be indicated, suggested, or exemplified and having a quality to a degree to be indicated. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1971) (emphasis supplied). The only things indicated, suggested, or exemplified in the remainder of the statute as to the kind, character, or quality of such are as the jury may assess ... for the wrongful act, omission or negligence... whereby the death ... was caused and provided the [decedent] could have commenced an action for such wrongful act, omission or negligence if it had not caused death. Such also means having a quality already or just specifiedused to avoid repetition of a descriptive term. Webster's, supra. No descriptive term precedes such in the statute. The statute begins with the clause A personal representative may commence an action and recover such damages.... Therefore, the essence of such must be determined from phrases that follow it. The word damages does not import only punitive damages. Damages is defined as pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his person, property or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another. Richmond & D.R.R. v. Freeman, 97 Ala. 289, 295, 11 So. 800 (1892); Rayford v. Rayford, 456 So.2d 833, 834 (Ala. Civ.App.1984); Black's Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968); C. Gamble and D. Corley, Alabama Law of Damages, p. 1 (1982). May assess: May is defined as to have the power: be able, have the ability or competence to, have permission to, have liberty to, and be in some degree likely to. Webster's, supra. Black's, supra, defines may as: An auxiliary verb qualifying the meaning of another verb by expressing ability, competency, liberty, permission, possibility, probability or contingency. Assess is defined as to determine the rate of and to determine the amount of or impose. Webster's, supra. Black's, supra, defines assess as: To ascertain; fix the value of. To fix the amount of damages or the value of the thing to be ascertained. To impose a pecuniary payment upon persons or property. The mere fact that as the jury may assess follows such damages does not make such damages only punitive any more than such words would make them only compensatory.