Opinion ID: 2135955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: forcible entry and detainer statutes

Text: On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the tenant essentially argued that because his lease is a farm lease, URLTA as it existed on March 25, 1990, was inapplicable to his case, and that therefore the county court lacked jurisdiction. The landlord agrees that URLTA does not apply to farm leases, but argues that the forcible entry and detainer statutes do apply to farm leases and that those statutes provide the county court with jurisdiction over this case. In finding that the forcible entry and detainer statutes do not apply to farm leases, the Court of Appeals relied on § 76-1408 of URLTA. Section 76-1408 provides: Unless created to avoid the application of sections 25-21,219 and 76-1401 to 76-1449, the following arrangements are not governed by sections 25-21,219 and 76-1401 to 76-1449: ... (7) Occupancy under a rental agreement covering premises used by the occupant primarily for agricultural purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals held that § 76-1408 explicitly excludes farm leases not only from URLTA, but also from § 25-21,219, which grants jurisdiction to the district and county courts over forcible entry and detainer proceedings. An examination of the forcible entry and detainer statutes, URLTA, and their legislative histories shows that excluding farm leases from the forcible entry and detainer statutes is inconsistent with the purposes of those statutes. In 1974, the Legislature enacted URLTA. See 1974 Neb.Laws, L.B. 293. Section 8 of L.B. 293, which became § 76-1408 of URLTA, originally stated: Unless created to avoid the application of this act, the following arrangements are not governed by this act.  (Emphasis supplied.) When the statute was published, the Revisor of Statutes changed this act to read sections 25-21,219 and 76-1401 to 76-1449. (Emphasis supplied.) Sections 76-1401 to 76-1449 constitute Nebraska's URLTA. The inclusion by the Revisor of Statutes of § 25-21,219 as part of URLTA apparently occurred by mistake. L.B. 293 stated that one of its purposes was to amend section 24-568, which later became § 25-21,219. This reference to § 24-568 (§ 25-21,219) apparently caused the Revisor of Statutes to mistakenly cite that section, along with §§ 76-1401 to 76-1449, in designating URLTA. See § 76-1401. The Legislature's intent that § 25-21,219 not be included in URLTA can further be determined by how L.B. 293 amended § 24-568 (§ 25-21,219). That amendment stated: This section [§ 24-568 (§ 25-21,219) ] shall not apply to actions for possession of any premises subject to the provisions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Thus, the only reason the Legislature referred to § 24-568 (§ 25-21,219) in URLTA at all was to differentiate the proceedings governed by URLTA from those governed by the forcible entry and detainer statutes. In light of this amendment, it would be inconsistent to include § 25-21,219 as part of URLTA. We also note that the Legislature corrected this error in 1991 when it eliminated § 25-21,219 from the designation of URLTA in § 76-1401. See 1991 Neb.Laws, L.B. 324; § 76-1401 (Cum.Supp.1992). This court addressed a similar situation in State v. Karel, 204 Neb. 573, 284 N.W.2d 12 (1979). In Karel, the court determined that when publishing a comprehensive Nebraska Rules of the Road bill, the Revisor of Statutes had substituted certain specific statutory sections for the words this act. This substitution had erroneously resulted in the charge of first-offense drunk driving being classified as a traffic infraction, for which a defendant would not be entitled to a jury trial, rather than as a misdemeanor, for which a defendant would be entitled to a jury trial. The court in Karel noted that under Neb. Rev.Stat. § 49-705(1) (Reissue 1988), the Revisor of Statutes had the authority, in preparing supplements and reissued or replacement volumes of the Revised Statutes, to renumber and rearrange sections. However, section 49-705(1) also makes clear that any such changes made by the Revisor of Statutes cannot change the substantive meaning of any statute as enacted by the Legislature. Because the Revisor's substitution changed the meaning of the Nebraska Rules of the Road bill, the Karel court held that first-offense drunk driving was not a traffic infraction and that the defendant in that case was entitled to a jury trial. Similarly, in publishing URLTA, the Revisor of Statutes substituted specific statutory sections for the words this act. In doing so, the Revisor impermissibly changed the meaning of URLTA and the forcible entry and detainer statute. See § 49-705(1). Therefore, we find that Nebraska's forcible entry and detainer statutes do apply to farm leases, and we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on this issue. See Otto v. Hongsermeier Farms, 217 Neb. 45, 348 N.W.2d 422 (1984) (appeal of judgment in forcible entry and detainer proceedings involving farmland).