Opinion ID: 2570367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Aggravating Factors Prior Convictions and Uncharged Conduct

Text: In this case, the trial court aggravated the possession sentence based on two categories of factors. First, the court aggravated the sentence for Lopez's driving with the excessive amount of alcohol, [and] killing another person in a vehicular homicide incident. Both of these facts are reflected in the jury's verdicts from the vehicular homicide trial. We find that the prior conviction facts adequately support the aggravated sentence in this case. Second, the court aggravated the sentence due to the failures at the treatment program, [and] the hot UAs that had been given during the deferral period. Because the prior conviction facts adequately support the aggravated sentence, we do not analyze the uncharged conduct constituting the second factor.
As stated above, for aggravated sentencing purposes, the Supreme Court has excepted the finding of prior conviction facts from the Sixth Amendment jury requirement. Prior conviction facts are Blakely -exempt in large part because these facts have been determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant in a knowing and voluntary plea agreement. Thus, as long as the prior proceedings were not constitutionally flawed, the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were adequately protected in the prior conviction proceeding. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)(a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees). Whether prior convictions are extraordinary aggravating circumstances is a determination made by the judge alone. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 8 (the sentencing judge's legal determinations must be based on properly received facts); see also, Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238 (abuse of discretion standard applied to sentencing determinations by sentencing judges). The critical point is that the underlying fact in a prior conviction analysisthat the defendant was previously convicted of certain crimesis one that has passed through the safeguards of the jury right or plea proceedings, and sentencing judges may consider these facts without further jury involvement. In this case, the trial court could permissibly aggravate Lopez's possession sentence based on his convictions in the vehicular homicide case. After lengthy discussion of Lopez's conduct during his deferral period, the court stated that he was aggravating the possession sentence for Lopez's driving with the excessive amount of alcohol, [and] killing another person in a vehicular homicide incident. Lopez was convicted by a jury of both of these acts. The unique facts of this case present some question as to whether the vehicular homicide convictions are prior convictions with regard to the possession sentencing. The vehicular homicide itself occurred after the possession offense. However, the convictions for the homicide were entered before the possession sentencing. We determine that, under the circumstances of this case, the vehicular homicide convictions are proper Blakely -exempt aggravating factors for the possession sentence because the facts are reflected in a jury's verdict that was entered before the possession sentence was imposed. The trial court determined the prior convictions to be extraordinary circumstances that supported an aggravated sentence for the possession conviction. Under the Apprendi-Blakely rule, this determination could properly rest on the prior conviction facts. The legal judgment that these facts are extraordinary aggravating circumstances to the possession offense is within the trial judge's discretion. Leske, 957 P.2d at 1044-45; Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238. In imposing sentence, the trial court must consider the nature and elements of the offense, the character and record of the offender, and all aggravating or mitigating circumstances, which include: unusual aspects of the defendant's character, past conduct, habits, health, age, the events surrounding the crime, pattern of conduct which indicates whether [the defendant] is a serious danger to society, past convictions, and possibility of rehabilitation. Leske, 957 P.2d at 1043 (internal citations omitted; alteration in original); § 18-1.3-401(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2004). The fact that Lopez drank to excess and drove recklessly, killing Mrs. Tinoco, is clearly relevant to unusual aspects of his character, his habits, and the danger he poses to society. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1043. The fact that this conduct occurred during the supervised deferral is relevant to his susceptibility to rehabilitation. See Allen I, 973 P.2d at 623-24 (sentence aggravated on basis of conduct during probation). We therefore determine that the aggravated sentence in this case was imposed constitutionally where the trial court deemed Blakely -exempt prior conviction facts to be extraordinary aggravating circumstances in this case. See Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238 (abuse of discretion standard applied to trial court sentencing determinations).
One Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt factor is sufficient to support an aggravated sentence. A sentencing judge can constitutionally consider any fact that was admitted by the defendant, found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, found by a judge after the defendant assented to judicial fact-finding for sentencing purposes, or related to a prior conviction. Under state law, that constitutionally permissible fact opens a wider sentencing range under section 18-1.3-401(6). The legislature may not require judges to impose enhanced sentences based on constitutionally impermissible judicial fact-finding. See Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 757 (it is no longer possible to maintain the judicial fact-finding that Congress thought would underpin the mandatory Guidelines system). Section 18-1.3-401(6) does not mandate a restricted or increased sentencing range based on judicial fact-finding. Rather, under that section, the existence of a constitutionally-permissible aggravating or mitigating fact widens the sentencing range on both the minimum and maximum ends, to a floor of one-half the presumptive minimum up to a ceiling of double the presumptive maximum. The sentencing judge then has full discretion to sentence within this widened range according to traditional sentencing considerations. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1043. Sentencing within this widened range under section 18-1.3-401(6), based on Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt factors, is both constitutionally and statutorily sound even if the sentencing judge also considered factors that were not Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt. One such valid factor supporting a discretionary aggravated sentence within the broadened section 18-1.3-401(6) range satisfies constitutional and statutory requirements for the protection of defendants. Thus, we do not consider whether the failures at the treatment program, [and] the hot UAs that had been given were proper aggravators in this case. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1043 (where the sentencing court finds several factors justifying a sentence in the aggravated range, only one of those factors need be legitimate to support the sentencing court's decision)(internal citations omitted).