Opinion ID: 589983
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Waiver

Text: 32 The Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation is distinct from that under the Sixth Amendment, which attaches at the commencement of formal judicial proceedings against an accused and applies regardless of whether the accused is in custody. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 398, 97 S.Ct. at 1239 ([T]he right to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him--'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' ). In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment is violated when a defendant's own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel, were used against him at trial. Id. at 206, 84 S.Ct. at 1203. It is undisputed that Self's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached well in advance of his June 12 confession. 33 To establish a valid waiver of this right, the state must prove an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242. The waiver inquiry is dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023. Moreover, courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, 97 S.Ct. at 1242. [T]he critical inquiry is whether the prosecution has sustained its heavy burden of establishing that [Self] was fully informed of and understood his rights and whether, having once expressed his decision to exercise them, he later changed his mind and knowingly and understandingly declined to exercise them. United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1202 (5th Cir.1974). Waiver by a defendant of his constitutional right to consult with or to have an attorney present does not require an express statement or disavowal. Waiver may be inferred from the language, acts, conduct and demeanor of a defendant. Id. at 1204. 34 In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule: [A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 484, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. The Edwards rule was developed for the Fifth Amendment; but, in Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), it was made applicable to the Sixth as well. Edwards established a new per se rule and to that extent overruled Johnson v. Zerbst. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 652, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1346, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). Accordingly, the rule does not apply retroactively and is, therefore, unavailable to Self. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. at 650, 104 S.Ct. at 1345. 35 Nevertheless, Self contends that, prior to Edwards, this circuit held that once the right to counsel had been invoked, questioning could not resume unless the suspect initiated the contact. He relies on United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.1969), in which the court stated: Where there is a request for an attorney prior to any questioning, ... a finding of knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to an attorney is impossible. 409 F.2d at 493. 36 Subsequent cases interpreting Priest make it clear, however, that the language relied on by Self is not as absolute as it seems. In 1979, our en banc court resolved the apparent variance: We construe Priest to bar inquiry as to waiver when, prior to any questioning, the suspect makes an unequivocal request for an attorney's presence, as was done in Priest, and when the request is disregarded and the questioning proceeds. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 485, 62 L.Ed.2d 409 (1979). Shortly thereafter, this was repeated in Blasingame v. Estelle, 604 F.2d 893, 895 (5th Cir.1979). Likewise, shortly before the 1979 en banc opinion, this court, in Government of Canal Zone v. Gomez, 566 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir.1978), cited Priest for the proposition that, when a suspect requests counsel during questioning, but the request is ignored and interrogation continues, a knowing and intelligent waiver is very difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Id. at 1291. 37 However, for cases such as this, to which Edwards is not applicable, when interrogation ceases after the accused requests counsel and then, after a period of time, resumes, the question of whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his rights is a question that can be answered only on the facts of each case. Gomez, 566 F.2d at 1291. 38 Waiver has been found and the confession admitted when the interrogation was continued at the behest of the accused, and where intervening events between the denial of counsel and the later confession helped dissipate the taint of the earlier violation. Central to the outcome of these cases was the belief that the suspect should not have been prevented from changing his mind once he had stated that he desired an attorney. 39 Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted). 40 Other pre-Edwards cases decided after Priest make it clear that this circuit recognized that waiver is indeed possible after an accused has requested counsel. See, e.g., Biddy v. Diamond, 516 F.2d 118, 122 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) (when a person knows her rights, and has even exercised the right to counsel, talking with counsel, later voluntary admissions can constitute a waiver of the rights to counsel and to remain silent); United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d at 1202, quoted above; United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945, 947 (5th Cir.1973) (An arrestee can change his mind after requesting an attorney.); United States v. Green, 433 F.2d 946, 948 (5th Cir.1970) (The right to have counsel present can be waived.). The district court applied the correct, pre-Edwards, rule of law in determining waiver vel non. 41 Accordingly, in making our independent federal determination whether Self's confession was voluntary, the state findings are critical; and our focus is on whether the district court erred in holding that they are not fairly supported by the record. Because the district court differed with so many state findings, we must present a detailed analysis of the voluminous record, including the state habeas transcript of approximately 1,200 pages. 42