Opinion ID: 1249253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Compulsory Dues Under the First Amendment

Text: These principles have been extended by the Supreme Court to prohibit the state from exacting compulsory contributions to unions for purposes not germane to the collective bargaining process. The pivotal case in this area is Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209. There, the Supreme Court recognized that state laws authorizing unions and management to enter into agency shop agreements requiring every employee, whether or not a member of the union, to pay the union a service charge, impinge upon the employee's right to be free from compelled speech and association. Nevertheless, the court concluded that any interference with the employees' First Amendment rights was constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress. ( Id. at p. 222 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 276].) At the same time, however, the court found meritorious the argument that employees may constitutionally prevent the Union's spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative. ( Id. at p. 234 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 283].) [2] Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209, did not prohibit a union from spending funds for the expression of political views unrelated to its collective bargaining function; it merely held that dissenting employees may not be coerced into financing such activities. ( Id. at p. 235 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 284-285].) Nor did Abood attempt to formulate a standard for distinguishing between collective bargaining activities and undertakings unrelated to collective bargaining, or to prescribe the procedures necessary to ensure that objecting employees did not finance such nongermane speech. ( Id. at p. 236 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 285].) Subsequently, however, in Ellis v. Railway Clerks (1984) 466 U.S. 435 [80 L.Ed.2d 428, 104 S.Ct. 1883], the high court declared that a union activity may be financed out of compulsory dues if it is  normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate  the union's duties as exclusive bargaining representative. ( Id. at p. 448 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 442], italics added.) And in Chicago Teachers v. Hudson (1986) 475 U.S. 292 [89 L.Ed.2d 232, 106 S.Ct. 1066], the court held that the constitutional requirements for the Union's collection of agency fees include an adequate explanation of the basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such challenges are pending. ( Id. at p. 310 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 249].) Recently, in Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court extended the Abood analysis to an integrated state bar, reaffirming its earlier conclusion in Lathrop v. Donahue (1961) 367 U.S. 820 [6 L.Ed.2d 1191, 81 S.Ct. 1826], that the exaction of compulsory bar dues does not per se violate an individual's rights, but holding that the First Amendment prohibits the expenditure of members' dues on speech unrelated to the regulation of the legal profession. Reasoning by analogy from Abood and its progeny, the high court acknowledged the integrated bar's impingement on members' First Amendment rights, but held that the compelled association was justified by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14].) It followed that the California State Bar may constitutionally fund speech germane to these goals, i.e., necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or `improving the quality of ... legal service,' but may not finance activities of an ideological nature which fall outside of those areas of activity. ( Id. at p. 14 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14].) While declining to define [p]recisely where the line falls, the high court nevertheless observed that the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear: Compulsory dues may not be expended to endorse or advance a gun control or nuclear weapons freeze initiative; at the other end of the spectrum petitioners have no valid constitutional objection to their compulsory dues being spent for activities connected with disciplining members of the Bar or proposing ethical codes for the profession. ( Id. at pp. 15-16 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 15].) Neither Abood nor Keller addressed directly the constitutional standard to be applied in balancing the state's interests in the collection and use of a mandatory fee against the infringement of associational rights occasioned thereby. In upholding the imposition of compulsory union dues in Abood, however, the high court referred to  important government interests served by the union shop in the system of labor relations established by Congress. (431 U.S. at pp. 222, 225 [52 L.Ed.2d at pp. 275-276, 278], italics added.) Similarly, Keller 's discussion of the integrated state bar spoke in terms of  substantial public interests, and held that the expenditure of mandatory dues must be necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of effectuating those interests. (496 U.S. at pp. 13-14 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14], italics added.) Interestingly, neither decision explicitly applied a strict scrutiny standard, thus triggering the need for a compelling state interest and narrow legislative tailoring to accomplish the governmental objective. (See Elrod v. Burns (1976) 427 U.S. 347, 362 [49 L.Ed.2d 547, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2673].) One federal circuit court, as a result, has applied a middle-tier test to determine the constitutionality of mandatory student fees, inquiring whether the state interests served by the fees are sufficiently important or substantial to justify the First Amendment infringement. ( Carroll v. Blinken (2d Cir.1992) 957 F.2d 991, 999, cert. den. ___ U.S. ___ [121 L.Ed.2d 224, 113 S.Ct. 300] [We ... look to see whether the regulation `promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.']; see also Cantor, Forced Payments to Service Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association (1984) 36 Rutgers L. Rev. 3, 29-35 [hereafter Cantor]; but cf. Galda v. Bloustein (3d Cir.1982) 686 F.2d 159, 164.) Nevertheless, plaintiffs here maintain that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review. They note that in Chicago Teachers v. Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, the Supreme Court stated that a union's rebate procedures for dues expended in violation of Abood must be carefully tailored to minimize the [First Amendment] infringement. ( Id. at p. 303 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 245].) And in Elrod v. Burns, supra, 427 U.S. 347, the court observed generally that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny. ( Id. at p. 362 [49 L.Ed.2d at p. 559].) Although suggestive, these statements in Elrod and Hudson are less than altogether persuasive, particularly in light of the high court's pointed failure to endorse a strict scrutiny standard in the two seminal decisions  Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 1, and Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209  where one would reasonably expect it. I shall, accordingly, apply the standard expressly prescribed by the high court, inquiring whether the mandatory student fee serves important ( Abood, supra, 431 U.S. at p. 225 [52 L.Ed.2d at p. 278]) or substantial ( Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 13 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14]) state interests, and whether the ASUC expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred ( id. at p. 14 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 14]) to effectuate those interests. [3]