Opinion ID: 672316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Postjudgment Interest on the Primary Judgment

Text: 25 Under 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1304(b), interest on judgments entered against the United States may be paid only when the judgment becomes final after review on appeal or petition by the United States Government, and then only from the date of filing of the transcript of the judgment with the Comptroller General through the day before the date of the mandate of affirmance. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1304(b)(1)(A). In other words, the prevailing plaintiff in an FTCA case is entitled to postjudgment interest only after the judgment is reviewed on appeal, and then only from the date the transcript of judgment is filed; and the interest runs through the day before the date of the appellate court's mandate affirming that judgment. Cardillo v. United States, 767 F.2d 33, 34 (2d Cir.1985). 26 Applying this statute, Judge Munson ruled that Andrulonis was entitled to postjudgment interest on the primary judgment from the date the transcript of judgment was filed (November 7, 1989) through the day before the first mandate of affirmance (March 11, 1991). Andrulonis argues, however, that postjudgment interest should continue to run through the date the Government actually paid her in satisfaction of her judgment (February 23, 1993). 27 Andrulonis believes that Congress intended the United States to satisfy its judgments promptly, and argues that section 1304(b) should be read generously to compensate plaintiffs for the lost use of their money during the period between the mandate of affirmance and the date of payment. In her words, the error of the lower court was in attempting a strict and literal interpretation of the statute rather than attempting to implement its intent. While we concede that the Government's delay in paying the judgment deprived Andrulonis of the use of her money, we must reject her invitation to disregard the statute's plain meaning. 28 Interest cannot be recovered against the United States, as sovereign, in the absence of an express waiver of immunity. See Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 310-11, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 2959-60, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986); see also United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588, 67 S.Ct. 398, 399-400, 91 L.Ed. 521 (1947); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 47, 49 S.Ct. 52, 53, 73 L.Ed. 170 (1928); see generally Randall Kennedy, Note, Interest in Judgments Against the Federal Government: The Need for Full Compensation, 91 Yale L.J. 297, 302-07 (1981). A statutory waiver of this no-interest rule must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign. Shaw, 478 U.S. at 318, 106 S.Ct. at 2963. While the United States has waived its immunity for interest in section 1304(b), we will not construe that waiver beyond what the language of the statute requires. See id. 29 The statute allows for interest against the United States only ... through the day before the date of the mandate of affirmance. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1304(b)(1)(A). Nothing in section 1304(b) requires the Government to satisfy its judgment promptly. And, nothing in the statute provides for an award of interest beyond the mandate of affirmance. Accordingly--the equities notwithstanding--Andrulonis is not entitled to additional postjudgment interest through the date of payment. See Desart v. United States, 947 F.2d 871, 872 (9th Cir.1991) ([n]o reported decision of this or any other court has held that a prevailing plaintiff in a FTCA action is entitled to interest against the government beyond the dates specified by section 1304(b)(1)(A)). 30 In the alternative, Andrulonis argues that she is entitled to interest at least through the second mandate of affirmance. Although the Government took a contrary position in the district court, it now agrees that Andrulonis is entitled to interest through the second mandate. The NYSDOH--fearful that it will owe a proportionate share of any additional interest awarded to Andrulonis--continues to argue that the district court was correct when it awarded interest only through the first mandate. 31 Although we do not believe ourselves bound by the Government's concession, we agree with the Government on the merits that Andrulonis is entitled to additional interest through the second mandate. Judge Munson interpreted the phrase mandate of affirmance in section 1304(b) to mean the one that issued following an appeal or petition by the United States. 31 U.S.C. Sec. 1304(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In this case, however, the United States did not appeal to the Supreme Court; the NYSDOH did. Since only the first mandate followed an appeal by the United States, Judge Munson concluded that the first mandate stopped the running of interest under section 1304(b). We disagree. 32 True, the Government did not itself petition the Supreme Court to review our decision. Nevertheless, we do not read section 1304(b)'s reference to an appeal or petition by the United States to exclude a situation where, as in this case, the United States actively joins a petition for review brought by its joint tortfeasor. Here, the Government's litigation posture in the Supreme Court was not merely that of a disinterested observer. The Government submitted a brief in support of the NYSDOH's petition, and asked the Supreme Court to vacate our decision in favor of Andrulonis. Indeed, the Government admitted in that brief that it was a party to the case under the Supreme Court's rules, and claimed the right to any substantive relief granted to the NYSDOH. Finally, we note that the Government's appellate efforts were entirely successful, since the Supreme Court granted the very relief it requested. We believe that the Government's actions in support of its joint tortfeasor's petition for certiorari were tantamount to an appeal by the Government itself for purposes of section 1304(b). 33 Even if we were inclined to agree with the district court that the Government is not to blame for the delay until the second mandate, we would nevertheless hold that the first mandate cannot control. A circuit court's mandate comprises its judgment, opinion and directions to the district court. Fed.R.App.P. 41(a). The Supreme Court vacated our first judgment, however. In so doing, it deprived our prior opinion of its legal significance and precedential value until our second mandate resurrected it. See Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991, 997 (9th Cir.1990); see also Falcon v. General Tel. Co., 815 F.2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.1987) (In essence, when a judgment is vacated 'all is effectually extinguished.' ). This Court accordingly entered a ministerial order vacating the first mandate, since by then it was but a brutum fulmen, an empty shell. We cannot believe Congress intended the mandate of affirmance in section 1304(b) to refer to such a hollow mandate. 34 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 992 F.2d 552 (5th Cir.1993), is not necessarily to the contrary. There, as here, protracted FTCA litigation produced two mandates of affirmance. In deciding which one stopped the accrual of postjudgment interest against the United States, the Fifth Circuit strictly construed section 1304(b) to award interest only through the earlier of two mandates. Transco Leasing, 992 F.2d at 556. We agree, of course, that section 1304(b) must be strictly construed; but our decision to award postjudgment interest through the second mandate does not rest on a charitable construction of that statute. Rather, we select the second mandate because of the intervening Supreme Court appeal in this case, a factor not present in Transco Leasing, as well as its effect upon our earlier mandate. 35 In sum, we hold that postjudgment interest on Andrulonis's primary judgment should run until February 13, 1993, the day before the second mandate of affirmance. 36