Opinion ID: 1267209
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Heading: doctrine of absolute judicial immunity

Text: West Virginia has applied what is now known as the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity beginning with our decision in Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W.Va. 486 (1873), where members of the Tucker County Board of Registration acted in a judicial capacity to determine who had the right to be registered to vote. When one prospective voter was excluded and erased from the list of registered voters, he felt compelled to seek monetary damages from the members of the Board of Registration of Tucker County for the disgrace that he suffered by virtue of his exclusion as a voter among the good citizens of Tucker County. Judge Moore, speaking for this Court, and drawing on the seminal opinion of Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) (holding that judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly), held in Syllabus Point 1: Where the subject matter and the person are within the jurisdiction of the court, the judge, whether of a superior or inferior court, is not subject to a civil action for any matter done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions. Syllabus Point 1, Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W.Va. 486 (1873). Thus began an unbroken line of cases committing this State to the common law rule that shields a judge from civil liability for any act taken in the exercise of a judicial duty. In Pritchard v. Crouser , we summarized the status of the judicial immunity doctrine in the following terms: [w]hen acting in his judicial capacity a judge is immune from civil liability for any and all official acts. Pritchard v. Crouser, 175 W.Va. 310, 313, 332 S.E.2d 611, 614 (1985) (citing Fausler v. Parsons, 6 W.Va. 486 (1873) and State ex rel. Payne v. Mitchell, 152 W.Va. 448, 164 S.E.2d 201 (1968)). In Pritchard, Chief Justice Neely provides an informative summary tracing the heritage of the principles of judicial immunity and recognizing that despite its ancient roots, judicial immunity has flourished rather than withered in American soil. Id. at 313, 332 S.E.2d at 614. We held in Pritchard that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity precludes the award of costs against a judicial officer in a proceeding involving a writ of prohibition, finding no tenable distinction between costs and civil liability for damages with a resounding flourish: [j]udicial immunity in West Virginia is absolute. Id. at 318, 332 S.E.2d at 619. We did not deviate from our dedication to the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity when we last spoke on this subject in Carey v. Dostert, 185 W.Va. 247, 406 S.E.2d 678 (1991). Carey involved a civil action filed by a lawyer against a circuit judge based upon alleged defamatory comments made by the judge in an order to show cause entered in a companion case involving the lawyer. The comments were alleged to have been critical of the lawyer's professional reputation. The order was released, prior to its official entry, to a newspaper which published the details of the order in the county where the attorney practiced law. [8] This factual pattern produced the following syllabus points: 1. Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for actions taken in the exercise of their judicial duties. 2. A judge acting in his judicial capacity who provides the public with information contained in the public record, whether through the press or otherwise, or distributes copies of pleadings or other official court documents which are a part of the public record does not thereby give up the protection of judicial immunity. Syllabus Points 1 and 2, Carey v. Dostert, 185 W.Va. 247, 406 S.E.2d 678 (1991). Despite our continuous commitment to the principles of the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, we have not until now analyzed whether judicial immunity reaches beyond the traditional judicial environment to a national television broadcast. While we are guided in a general way by all of our prior decisions, we need to probe further into the question of what constitutes a judicial act for purposes of judicial immunity in order to find a resolution in this case. There are a number of opinions which trace the lineage of the common law doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. Two cases, however, stand as beacons to show the way to understanding and applying this time-honored tradition. The fusion of the holdings in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871), and Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), cast the threshold two-part test as to when absolute judicial immunity should protect a judge from civil liability. Absolute judicial immunity applies (1) to all judicial acts unless (2) those acts fall clearly outside the judge's subject matter jurisdiction. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351-352; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1104-05; see also Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981). If Judge Hey's comments were not judicial acts, then we need not probe further upon the question of jurisdiction. Because determining what is a judicial act is encumbered with doubt and confusion, we need to search for characteristics or markers which might be common to all judicial acts. In Stump v. Sparkman , the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, endorsed a two-factor test for determining whether a judge's act is a judicial one. The first factor is whether the act was a function normally performed by a judge. This turns on the nature of the act itself and not on the identity of the actor. The second factor is whether the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity; this factor looks to the expectation of the parties. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107. We first analyze whether appearing on a nationally televised program, dedicated to contentious discussion of politically and socially sensitive issues, in order to vindicate a position expressed in a decision in a pending case relating to the custody of a child, is not a function normally performed by a judge. This precise question appears to be one of first impression. We can speculate that this is so because what Judge Hey did, and where he did it, is not traditionally a judicial function. At this time, during our analysis of whether Judge Hey's comments were a judicial act deserving of immunity, we should try to understand why it is so important to protect a judge from the vagaries of being sued by every dissatisfied, disgruntled litigant. We must appreciate the reason for the doctrine of judicial immunity. Some of the policies that sustain the doctrine are expressed as follows: (1) insuring the finality of judgments; (2) protecting judicial independence; (3) avoiding continual attacks upon judges who may be sincere in their conduct; and (4) protecting the system of justice from falling into disrepute. These policies were first announced by Lord Coke in Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607). Jeffrey M. Shaman, et al., Judicial Conduct & Ethics § 14.01, at 491 (2d ed.1995). Today it is generally recognized that the most important purpose of judicial immunity is to protect judicial independence. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-28, 108 S.Ct. 538, 543-45, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). Judges are at the vortex of the adjudicative process, a process that inevitably will disappoint many. Holding judges personally liable for their decisions would produce judicial timidity that would strike at the very heart of an independent and impartial judiciary. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226-27, 108 S.Ct. at 543-44. Will the cause of judicial independence be jeopardized if we do not immunize the comments of a judge made during the course of a debate on national television regarding the merits of one of his decisions? We think not. Judge Hey was not exercising any judicial prerogative or discretion. He was attempting to publicly defend to a national television audience an order, the basis of which was to condemn a single parent for cohabiting with a person to whom she was not married. Judicial immunity is justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches. Id. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544. Granting Judge Hey immunity under the facts and circumstances of this case would be protecting Judge Hey only because he is a judge and not because of the function that he was performing. Id. If we were to cloak Judge Hey's remarks with the cover of judicial immunity, then we would be saying that any act performed by a judge, no matter under what circumstances, should be exempt from personal liability. We are prepared to protect the sanctity of the judicial immunity doctrine, but we are not prepared to make it so sweeping so as to mock the doctrine. We hold, then, that an appearance by a judge on a nationally televised program, dedicated to contentious discussion of politically and socially sensitive issues, in order to vindicate a position expressed in a decision relating to the custody of a child, is not a function normally performed by a judge. Next, we analyze the second factor of whether the parties dealt with Judge Hey in his judicial capacity. This factor requires an examination of the expectations of the parties. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1107, 55 L.Ed.2d 331. This factor is more problematic when applied to the facts of this case. Certainly, the parties expected that Judge Hey would adjudicate the controversy relating to the custody of their daughter Melissa; that decision is within a judge's discretion and judgment. A judicial act requires the kind of discretion or judgment aligned with the adjudication of a controversy (that is expected), and not the justification of that decision expressed during a public debate with someone taking a view in opposition to that decision (that is not expected). The only appropriate forum to argue the qualitative merits of Judge Hey's decision is the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (that is expected), and not a nationally televised program such as Crossfire (that is not expected). The only people who should be involved in arguing the merits of Judge Hey's decision are the lawyers for the respective parties (that is expected), and not the trial judge and another stranger to the case arguing the opposite view (that is not expected). Another and possibly more compelling reason why the comments of a presiding judge explaining and justifying his decision on a nationwide television program is not within the expectation of the litigants is that there are specific rules prohibiting that type of conduct. It is not unreasonable that all persons involved in a dispute requiring judicial resolution would expect that the judge resolving that dispute would conform to standards of judicial conduct. One of those standards demands that a judge shall not make any public or nonpublic comment about any pending or impending proceeding which might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness.... Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(9) (1992) (effective Jan. 1, 1993). [9] The parties and the lawyers involved in this custody dispute might very well expect that Judge Hey's decision would be the subject of comment, praise, and criticism, but by people tangentially associated with this type of social and legal issue, including scholars, social workers, religious leaders, and even other judges not connected to the case. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4(B) (1992) (effective Jan. 1, 1993) (A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice, and non-legal subjects, subject to the requirements of [the Code of Judicial Conduct]). We hold that because nothing regarding Judge Hey's conduct while a guest on Crossfire could have been remotely expected by the parties, the parties did not deal with Judge Hey in his judicial capacity vis-à-vis Judge Hey's defense of his order while he appeared on this television program. The only rational explanation why Judge Hey chose to be a guest on Crossfire and publicly comment about a pending case was that he wanted to justify his opinion to as many people as possible. Comments made in pursuit of personal notoriety and national recognition are not judicial acts and are therefore not protected against civil liability. [10] Succinctly stated, we hold only that when it is beyond reasonable dispute that a judge has acted out of personal motivation and has used his judicial office as an offensive weapon to vindicate personal objectives, and it further appears certain that no party has invoked the judicial machinery for any purpose at all, then the judge's actions do not amount to judicial acts. These nonjudicial acts, to state the obvious, are not cloaked with judicial immunity.... Harper v. Merckle, 638 F.2d 848, 859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816, 102 S.Ct. 93, 70 L.Ed.2d 85 (1981). Judge Hey asserts an additional reason why his conduct is deserving of absolute immunity. He argues that this Court's opinion in In the Matter of Hey, 188 W.Va. 545, 425 S.E.2d 221 (1992), which publicly censured him for his remarks on Crossfire, should be dispositive of the question of whether his comments on that television program constitute a judicial act and therefore grant him absolute judicial immunity from civil liability. [11] This argument is fallacious on at least two levels. First, the opinion in In the Matter of Hey was the result of a disciplinary action. We stated that because the doctrine of judicial immunity was not considered upon an adequate record, we would decline to address the application of that doctrine in the context of a judicial disciplinary procedure. Specifically, we recognized that the decision in In the Matter of Hey should in no way be treated as having precedential value on the question of when a judge has judicial immunity. Id. at 548, 425 S.E.2d at 224 n. 5. This should end the discussion. However, we also recognized in the body of that opinion that the issue of what constitutes a judge's official duties under the Judicial Code of Ethics is narrow and has no application outside of a judicial discipline proceeding under the Judicial Code of Ethics. Id. at 548, 425 S.E.2d at 224; see also Code of Judicial Conduct pmbl. (1992) (effective Jan. 1, 1993). Accordingly, any reference in the previous opinion relating to the public censure that the comments made by Judge Hey arose in the course of his official duties is not relevant to the disposition of the question which we are considering here as to whether or not those comments are deserving of judicial immunity to protect a judicial act.