Opinion ID: 2344887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Abuse of Discretion Standard

Text: ¶ 25 When the court's inherent power to dismiss for want of prosecution is at issue the trial court's decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, in contrast to review of the mandatory directives in CR 41(b)(1). See Thorp Meats, 110 Wash.2d at 167, 750 P.2d 1251; Stickney v. Port of Olympia, 35 Wash.2d 239, 241, 212 P.2d 821 (1950). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. In re Guardianship of Lamb, 173 Wash.2d 173, 189, 265 P.3d 876 (2011). ¶ 26 In exercising its discretion, it was proper for the trial court to consider both the unacceptable litigation practices of BSA and the burdens that restarting the case would impose on the court and WaferTech after the lengthy delay. [1] These burdens would be considerable. WaferTech explained that many key personnel on the litigated project who were formerly at WaferTech have left the company, some without known whereabouts. These include the project manager, the director of facilities, the project estimator, the facilities/contract manager, the person responsible for procurement on the project, and the senior mechanical engineer for the project. Several expert witnesses originally retained are no longer available, WaferTech advised the court, and most of the team of attorneys previously representing WaferTech through the trial are no longer available. ¶ 27 The trial court noted the burden that would be placed on the court: [F]or us to resurrect the files in this case is going to be next to impossible.... [T]hat creates a hardship on both the Court as well as the parties in the case. Transcript of Proceedings (Aug. 26, 2009) at 13. The court stated: You know, this situation ... epitomizes why we have standards in terms of getting cases resolved. And standards for keeping cases going because situations like this arise where all of the original parties, and everything else are gone. Id. ¶ 28 In light of BSA's unacceptable litigation practices and the burdens that would ensue if the case was revived, the trial court properly exercised its inherent power to dismiss the case and its doing so did not contravene the strict construction we have placed on CR 41(b)(1) in light of the fact that the rule should not be applied here. ¶ 29 The majority concludes, however, that the plaintiff's practices were not unacceptable litigation practices justifying dismissal in the discretion of the trial court. Case law demonstrates the contrary is true. As the majority itself says, discretionary dismissals have been allowed for failures to appear and filing late briefs. Majority at 1028 (citing Apostolis v. City of Seattle, 101 Wash.App. 300, 305, 3 P.3d 198 (2000)). Other cases where failure to appear justified dismissal in the discretion of the trial court are mentioned above. Wagner, 10 Wash.App. 213, 516 P.2d 1051; Link, 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386; see also Alexander v. Food Servs. of Am., 76 Wash.App. 425, 429-30, 886 P.2d 231 (1994) (failure to appear is a failure to prosecute; court may exercise discretion to dismiss). Although arising in a somewhat different context, dismissal was also within the trial court's exercise of sound discretion based on failure to comply with an order to post funds required to perfect an administrative record for a trial court's review of a land use decision. Jewell v. City of Kirkland, 50 Wash.App. 813, 750 P.2d 1307 (1988). Jewell is instructive since the court explained the crucial importance of complying with the trial court's order in a timely manner and the need to eliminate unnecessary delay in land use cases. Id. at 821-22, 750 P.2d 1307. Thus, the plaintiffs failed to prosecute their action in a timely fashion. ¶ 30 Certainly if dismissals for these types of conduct are within a trial court's inherent authority to dismiss, then dismissal in the present case was well within the trial court's discretion.