Opinion ID: 702612
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voluntary Consent by Leon-Yanez.

Text: 9 When Leon-Yanez was first addressed by the officers, he immediately blurted out the fact that there was marijuana stored in the house. When the officers then asked if they could look, he said that they could. He also signed a written consent form, in which he indicated that he freely consented and had not been threatened or forced in any way. Now, however, he claims that his consent to the search was not effective because it was not voluntarily given. 10 That is a question of fact, and its resolution depends on the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir.1988). As we said in Castillo: 11 We have previously indicated that several factors must be considered in determining whether consent is voluntary. None of them are dispositive. These factors include: (1) whether defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officers have their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings have been given; (4) whether the defendant was told he has a right not to consent; and (5) whether defendant was told a search warrant could be obtained. The fact that some of these factors are not established does not automatically mean that consent was not voluntary. 12 Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Carbajal, 956 F.2d 924, 930 n. 3 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 272, 126 L.Ed.2d 223 (1993); Kelley, 953 F.2d at 566. 13 In other words, although we have established these factors to aid in the decisionmaking process, the full richness of any encounter must be considered by the district court. Here it is apparent that the district court did not clearly err in determining that the consent was valid. 14 The officers did not unholster their guns during the encounter with Leon-Yanez and did not threaten him in any way. In fact, they had merely asked Morning if someone else was there, whereupon she sent Leon-Yanez out to the door. He was not arrested, nor was she. He said that he resided there and that he paid all of the bills, but before the police could ask for his name he also said that marijuana was in the house. He added that it was not his. 15 Not surprisingly, the conversation then quickly flowed to a request by the officers to look in the house. When Leon-Yanez said that they could, they also obtained his signature on a written consent form which was in both Spanish and English. They then entered. They had not told Leon-Yanez that he could refuse consent nor had they given him Miranda 3 warnings or said that they could get a search warrant. But none of those is a sine qua non. They are simply factors. 16 While Leon-Yanez now says that he did not understand that he could refuse and that he had a questionable immigration status, which concerned him, the evidence showed that he had actually decided to cooperate even before any request was made. At least, he had decided to tell the officers that marijuana was in the house. 17 Leon-Yanez also complains that he was not told that Morning had said she would prefer it if the officers obtained a warrant, but he does not indicate how that was coercive as to him. If anything, it shows that she did not feel coerced at all, and there is nothing to indicate that the officers became more aggressive when they spoke with him or that they told him that she had consented. Of course, in considering his claims we are concerned with his Fourth Amendment rights, not with those of Morning. See United States v. Padilla, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 123 L.Ed.2d 635 (1993) (per curiam). 18 Every encounter has its own facts and its own dynamics. So does every consent. The district court assessed the evidence in this case and determined that Leon-Yanez's consent was, all things considered, voluntarily given. That determination was not clearly erroneous. 19