Opinion ID: 397401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Interpretation of RICO

Text: 21 Appellants make three separate arguments that the trial court erred in construing RICO. First, they claim that the trial court should have struck the Underhill-Galanti murders from Counts One and Two of the indictment (the RICO charges) because the evidence failed to show that Thevis was associated with the enterprise at the time of the murders, and because the murders were not acts through which Thevis conducted the affairs of the enterprise. 22 This contention is without merit. As this court noted in United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978), proof of association with a RICO enterprise may depend wholly on circumstantial evidence. The record in this case contains such evidence. Although Thevis had purportedly sold his interest in the pornography business to his secretary, Laverne Bowden, for $16 million dollars, the note securing the sale was always in default. Thevis, therefore, could foreclose at any time and regain his interest in the business. Rodney Glen Smith, a cellmate of Thevis in 1977, testified that despite the sale, Thevis stated he still controlled his pornography empire; given the terms of the sale and the fact Thevis had contacted Ms. Bowden after his escape from jail in 1978, one could infer that Thevis' interest in the success of the pornography enterprise continued until the Underhill murder. The murder itself, moreover, neatly advanced Thevis' interests in the enterprise. The original indictment in the case sought forfeiture of all the assets of Global and Fidelity under RICO forfeiture provisions. 5 The Underhill murder was designed to prevent the government's key witness from testifying at trial, thus imperiling the government's entire RICO case and preventing both RICO criminal convictions and forfeiture. The murder, therefore, protected the integrity of the enterprise. Keeping the enterprise together was inextricably tied to furthering its business; hence the Underhill murder was a proper predicate act under § 1962. See United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1060-62 (5th Cir. 1981) (predicate acts only required to have sufficient nexus with enterprise to be properly charged under RICO). 23 Appellants' second argument is that the term enterprise as used in RICO does not include the specific association charged in this case. The RICO definitions section, 18 U.S.C. § 1961, states that an enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or other group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.... Appellants contend that because the indictment described the enterprise as a group of individuals associated in fact with various corporations, the enterprise alleged did not fall within the literal bounds of the statutory classifications. We reject this claim. 24 This specific question is one of first impression. We nevertheless are convinced, as was the trial court, United States v. Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 134, 137 (N.D.Ga.1979), that RICO covers the enterprise alleged in this case. Use of the verb includes in the statutory definition indicates congressional intent not to limit a RICO enterprise to the specific categories listed; rather, the language reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the word 'enterprise'. United States v. Turkette, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2533-34, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). See United States v. Elliott, supra, at 897 (quoting United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976)). Moreover, the House report accompanying RICO stated that enterprise included associations in fact, as well as legally recognized associative entities. Thus infiltration of any associative group by any individual or group capable of holding a property interest can be reached. House Rep.No.91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1970) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4007, 4032 (emphasis added). Although the term enterprise may have some limits, 6 the indictment in this case properly alleged an association in fact within the scope of § 1961. 25 Appellants' final argument is that RICO was not intended to apply to illegitimate enterprises such as the association alleged here. The Supreme Court has now decided this issue in United States v. Turkette, --- U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), holding that RICO applies to both illegitimate and legitimate enterprises.