Opinion ID: 6110045
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Toxicology Report

Text: Next, Drennan argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding a toxicology report showing the presence of a controlled substance in Amber's body. On May 30, 2017, the State filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of drugs found on the person or in the body of Amber. In its motion, the State explained that during the course of the autopsy, the medical examiner located a small bag of methamphetamine in Amber's pocket, and a urine screen returned positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine metabolites. The State argued that there is no evidence that the methamphetamine on Amber's person or in her body was in any way linked to her murder. Specifically, the State argued that the evidence should be excluded from introduction under Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. In response to the State's motion, Drennan argued that the issue before the circuit court was whether the presence of drugs in Amber's system was relevant to the body of evidence that the jury was asked to consider. Drennan argued that if Amber's actions were being put forth before the jury, then the jury had the right to know the context of those actions to properly determine what was more or less likely to be true. The circuit court granted the State's motion and explained that any relevance this evidence might have would be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect that it might have. However, the circuit court noted that it would consider any evidence during trial and would reconsider its ruling if necessary. Prior to Dr. Forsyth's testimony, Drennan requested that the circuit court reconsider the motion. A hearing on the motion was held in chambers. The circuit court ruled as follows: What I have heard thus far has been two (2) children testifying. And they went through a lot of questioning and -- and yes, there were some different answers. This was a year and a half or two (2) years ago. And the thing they didn't waver from and what I understood was, number one (1), that the defendant was the sole person in the custody of that  gun during this whole incident and, number two (2), that he raised that gun and he shot their mother in the neck. .... I fail to see, based on the testimony that I've heard, anything that would be relevant in regards to what if she ... being the victim, had methamphetamine in her system, which from my ... understanding, was not quantified and on her person. I just fail to see what would be relevant, but even if I have missed some relevance somewhere, under 403, the relevance would be substantially ... outweighed by the prejudicial effect, based on what I've heard so far ... my ruling stands. And, again, my ruling stays open. Later, Drennan again asked the circuit court to reconsider its ruling, and the circuit court ruled as follows: [B]ased on your motion to reconsider and ... your other motions ... the motion to exclude that is granted and my reasoning of--number one (1), is that whatever relevance it might have, and I see very little, but even if I'm missing some of that ... the--probative value would be outweighed substantially by the prejudicial effect. As [the State] has said, there's no quantification of the drugs that were--was in her system. You know, the jury could speculate just hearing--merely hearing that she had a metabolite of methamphetamine in her system. Based on the testimony I have thus far, there's no indication that she lunged or grabbed the gun or anything like that and we had two (2) children testify. Even though some of the things they remembered were different, but it was fairly consistent that, at least from their testimony, he raised the gun and fired. Nothing from their testimony indicated she was flaying at him. I understand your argument in that her actions were not normal on that day, but there's also testimony that, at least what could be inferred, they were having a heated argument of some type about the stopping or her not stopping[.] .... [T]he probative value of any of that evidence would be substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect. The circuit court has wide discretion in admitting evidence, and its discretion will not be reversed without an abuse of discretion. Huff v. State , 2012 Ark. 388 , 423 S.W.3d 608 (citing Hill v. State , 318 Ark. 408 , 415, 887 S.W.2d 275 , 278 (1994) ). Arkansas Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401. However, evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Ark. R. Evid. 402. Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ark. R. Evid. 403. On appeal, Drennan argues that there was proof at trial that Amber was driving erratically and flailing her arms. Thus, Drennan argues that Amber's use of methamphetamine can be tied to her erratic behavior, which in turn leads to the plausible argument that the discharge of the firearm was an accident. Further, Drennan contends that the testimony that the rifle was wrapped in a pair of jeans supported the defense's theory that Drennan accidentally shot Amber. In response, the State argues that this court rejected Drennan's precise argument in Jones v. State , 340 Ark. 390 , 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000). In Jones , the defense attempted  to introduce the victim's toxicology report into evidence. The defense claimed that the report could be probative of the issue of whether the victim was likely to have provoked the appellant to react as he did. The circuit court ruled that it was proper to exclude the report because it would be more prejudicial than probative and further noted that there was nothing to show that the cocaine had anything to do with the confrontation. Finding no abuse of discretion in the circuit court's decision, we affirmed. We explained that no evidence was introduced to demonstrate that the drug use was linked to the murder. Despite Drennan's arguments to the contrary, we agree that the present case is analogous to Jones . As in Jones , Drennan failed to introduce evidence to demonstrate that Amber's methamphetamine use was linked to the murder. Drennan points to Amber's erratic driving and the flailing of her arms in an attempt to demonstrate a nexus between her methamphetamine use and his discharge-of-a-firearm defense. However, as the circuit court noted, there was no quantification of the drugs in Amber's system. Stated differently, Drennan has failed to prove that Amber was under the influence at the time of the shooting. Thus, without more, the mere presence of methamphetamine on Amber's person and of methamphetamine and amphetamine metabolites in Amber's urine fails to demonstrate that Amber's drug use was linked to her murder. Considering the broad discretion of the circuit court in admitting evidence, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion when it concluded that the probative nature of the challenged evidence would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because Drennan received a sentence of life imprisonment, pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i), we are required to review the record for all objections, motions, and requests that were decided adversely to him. No reversible error has been found in our review. Affirmed.