Opinion ID: 2220056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the batson hearing

Text: Having disposed of the matters originally raised by the defendant prior to our remand of the case to the trial court, we turn now to defendant's contentions regarding the State's use of peremptory challenges on black venirepersons. Defendant argues that the trial court's finding at the Batson hearing should be reversed because the trial court erred in (1) not requiring the prosecutor at the original trial to testify at the Batson hearing under oath and subject to cross-examination, and (2) finding that the State's explanations rebutted defendant's prima facie case. The jury in this case was selected in three different panels of four jurors each. The first panel was sworn when it was selected on April 23, 1984. The second and third panels were each separately chosen and sworn on April 24, 1984. On April 25, 1984, the jury was sworn as a whole and the trial began. Before the jury had been sworn as a whole, but after each of the three panels had been separately chosen and sworn, defendant moved that a mistrial be declared on the grounds that the State exercised its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from the jury. The State's only reply to the motion was the prosecutor's statement that the State would: stand on the record    that there was [ sic ] a number of things on a number of [the black venirepersons excluded by the State] that made them unacceptable. The State made no concerted attempt to exclude any race or nationality during the course of voir dire.  The trial court then denied defendant's motion. After the trial, defendant appealed directly to this court, arguing inter alia that his convictions should be reversed because the State had used its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from serving on the jury. In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S.Ct. 708, this court issued a supervisory order remanding the case to the trial court for a hearing on defendant's claim that the State unconstitutionally exercised its peremptory challenges on black venirepersons. The order directed the trial court to allow defendant to present evidence in support of his claim. The order further stated that if the trial court found that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial court should allow the State to present evidence that the black venirepersons were excluded for nonracial reasons. The order finally instructed that at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court shall make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and file those findings and conclusions with the clerk of this court within 63 days of this order, together with the record of the proceedings. At the hearing it was established that 2 of the 12 jurors were black. It was also undisputed that the State had exercised 15 of its 20 peremptory challenges on blacks. The record was not clear as to the race of two other members of the venire who had been peremptorily challenged by the State, but the trial court concluded that they were black. Based upon its finding that the State exercised 17 out of its 20 peremptory challenges on blacks, the trial court concluded that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination. In rebuttal, the State offered the testimony of one of the prosecutors in the case, who testified that the State exercised each of its peremptory challenges for race-neutral reasons. The prosecutor explained that he generally looked for jurors who had strong ties to their community. In particular, he sought jurors who were homeowners and had been employed at the same job for a number of years. He also looked for jurors who had families and whose families had roots in the community. He then explained his specific reasons for excluding each of the 17 black venirepersons. After hearing argument from both the State and defendant, the trial court orally stated its findings of fact regarding the State's explanations for excluding 16 of the 17 venirepersons. The court failed to make a specific finding in regard to the seventeenth venireperson. The court concluded by stating that it found that the State's peremptory challenges were based upon neutral reasons, thereby rebutting defendant's prima facie case. The transcript of the hearing was subsequently filed with the clerk of this court. Defendant argues that the trial court should have required the prosecutor to testify at the Batson hearing under oath and subject to cross-examination. Defendant further claims that the trial court should not have found that the State's explanations rebutted defendant's prima facie case of discrimination. The State, on the other hand, asserts that defendant waived his Batson argument by failing to raise it until after the jury had been sworn; failing to preserve a record of the black venirepersons stricken by the State; and failing to raise the Batson issue in his motions for a new trial. The State also argues that even if defendant did not waive the issue, the trial court's determinations in the Batson hearing should be upheld. We first address the State's waiver arguments. The State argues that defendant's failure to object to the State's peremptory challenges until after the last panel was sworn constituted a waiver. The State's argument is based upon the well-established rule that challenges to the composition of a jury must be brought before the jury is sworn. (See People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 61-62; People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342, 359.) However, it is equally true that the principle of waiver applies to the State as well as to the defendant. People v. O'Neal (1984), 104 Ill.2d 399, 407. In this case, the State did not raise the issue of the timeliness of defendant's objection to the State's use of peremptory challenges when defendant initially filed its pretrial motion for a mistrial, but instead challenged the motion solely on its factual merits. The State also failed to raise the issue in either its initial briefs with this court or at the Batson hearing conducted by the trial court on remand. It was not until its supplemental brief, filed with this court after the Batson hearing had been conducted, that the State first raised the issue. We therefore conclude that the State has waived its argument that defendant's objection to the State's exercise of peremptory challenges was untimely. (See State v. Lee (Tex. App. 1988), 747 S.W.2d 57, 58 (State waived its objection on appeal to untimeliness of defendant's Batson motion by failing to so object at trial); see also People v. Colley (1988), 173 Ill. App.3d 798, 806 (State is estopped from arguing untimeliness of defendant's Batson motion where it failed to raise issue at trial).) We also find that the State has waived its argument pertaining to defendant's failure to include the issue of the jury's composition in its post-trial motion for a new trial since the State similarly failed to raise this argument until its supplemental brief with this court. The State did, however, raise in its initial brief with this court the argument that defendant failed to preserve an adequate record as to the race of the venirepersons excluded by the State. This argument is based upon the principle that a defendant may not challenge a State's peremptory challenge as being racially motivated unless there is evidence in the record that establishes the race of the excluded juror. ( People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 62.) In Evans, the parties had stipulated that five venirepersons stricken by the State had been black. The defendant in Evans also claimed on appeal that a sixth excluded juror had been black. This court held that defendant's challenge to the exclusion of the sixth juror was waived because there had been no evidence in the record that established the juror's race. ( Evans, 125 Ill.2d at 62.) However, there was no waiver because of a failure to make a record in Evans with respect to the venirepersons that the parties had agreed were black. Our review of the record in this case indicates that both defendant and the State agreed at the Batson hearing that 15 of the 20 venirepersons stricken by the State were black. Thus, as was the case in Evans, defendant has not waived his right to challenge the State's exclusion of these 15 jurors. There was a dispute, however, concerning the race of two other venirepersons excluded by the State. Although nothing in the record established the race of these venirepersons, the trial court at the Batson hearing, based upon defendant's representations, found that they had been black. In light of our decision in Evans (which, we note, was decided after the Batson hearing in this case had been conducted), we conclude that it was error for the trial court to have gone beyond the record to determine the race of the two disputed venirepersons. Accordingly, the trial court should only have considered the State's exclusion of the 15 venirepersons that the parties agreed were black in determining whether defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Evans, 125 Ill.2d at 62. Our conclusion that the trial court erred in considering the two additional venirepersons in assessing defendant's prima facie case, however, does not require us to reverse the trial court's finding that defendant established a prima facie case. In People v. McDonald (1988), 125 Ill.2d 182, 196, this court explained that a prima facie case may be established where a prosecutor has exercised a `pattern' of strikes against black veniremen (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723), or where a prosecutor has exercised his peremptory challenges against a group of veniremen being otherwise `as heterogeneous as the community as a whole,' sharing race as their only common characteristic (quoting People v. Wheeler (1978), 22 Cal.3d 258, 280, 583 P.2d 748, 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 905). In McDonald, this court rejected an argument that the trial court should have only considered the eight black venirepersons who had testified at the Batson hearing in that case, rather than all 16 blacks who had been stricken by the State, in assessing defendant's prima facie case. ( McDonald, 125 Ill.2d at 197-98.) This court went on to state, however, that: Even assuming that our review were limited to the veniremen who actually testified at the Batson hearing, we would still be compelled to find that defendants established a prima facie case of discrimination. Our review of the record indicates that the heterogeneity of the stricken veniremen does not change by merely reducing their number by eight. Again, the pattern of strikes the prosecutor exercised against these eight veniremen, along with the fact that they share race as their only common characteristic, compels us to conclude that defendants established a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonald, 125 Ill.2d at 198. In the present case, the 15 black venirepersons stricken by the State ranged in age from 19 to 59 and consisted of 12 women and 3 men. Their occupations, which were also diverse, included the following: steelworker, hostess, therapist, housekeeper, forklift operator, nurse, secretary, and personnel manager. Thus, the record demonstrates a pattern of strikes by the State against 15 venirepersons whose only common characteristic was that they were black. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination by the State in its use of peremptory challenges. We turn now to defendant's arguments. Defendant first argues that the prosecutor in the case, who testified as the State's witness at the Batson hearing, should have been required to testify under oath and be subject to cross-examination. We recently rejected this same argument in People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 24-26, a case decided while this appeal was pending, and, for the reasons stated in Young, we similarly reject it here. Defendant's second argument is that the trial court erred in finding that the State rebutted defendant's prima facie case of discrimination. Under Batson, once a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the State has the burden of coming forward with a neutral explanation for excluding each black venireperson which is related to the particular case to be tried. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.) Although the State's explanations need not rise to the level justifying a challenge for cause, a mere assertion that the prosecutor acted in good faith or without a discriminatory motive will not suffice. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.) Furthermore, the State cannot meet its burden by stating that the challenges were based upon an assumption that the venirepersons would be sympathetic toward defendant because of their shared race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Once the State has come forward with its reasons for striking the venirepersons, the trial court must then determine whether the explanations are sufficient to rebut defendant's prima facie case. To do so, the trial court must make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation in light of the circumstances of the case. ( People v. Hall (1983), 35 Cal.3d 161, 167, 672 P.2d 854, 858, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 75.) Because this determination is a matter of fact, turning largely on questions of credibility, the trial court's findings must be afforded great deference ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 89 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21) and will only be reversed if against the manifest weight of the evidence ( People v. McDonald (1988), 125 Ill.2d 182, 199). We are also mindful, however, that the exclusion of even just one minority venireperson on account of race is unconstitutional and would require reversal of the conviction below. ( McDonald, 125 Ill.2d at 200.) We therefore must examine the explanations offered by the State for excluding each of the 15 black venirepersons from serving on the jury. We note initially that the trial court found that four venirepersons were stricken from the jury because they had relatives who had been defendants in criminal cases. A fifth member of the venire was excluded because she was sickly and disabled and therefore would not be able to pay attention throughout the trial. A sixth venireperson was excluded because her job involved interpreting court procedures and policies, and the prosecutor thought she would try to do the same for the other jurors. Finally, two other venirepersons were excluded from the jury because they were single and unemployed and lacked ties to the community. One was a 19-year-old man who lived with his parents, and the other was a 47-year-old woman who lived in an apartment with her two adult sons, one of whom was also unemployed. Defendant does not argue, and our review of the record does not indicate, that any of these explanations were pretextual or not supported by the evidence. The ninth member of the venire excused from serving on the jury was described by the prosecutor as being a meek and sleepy juror who did not answer questions in a forthright manner. The prosecutor also felt uncomfortable with her demeanor. Defendant argues, and we agree, that explanations which focus upon a venireperson's body language or demeanor must be closely scrutinized because they are subjective and can be easily used by a prosecutor as a pretext for excluding persons on the basis of race. (See People v. Charron (1987), 193 Cal. App.3d 981, 991, 238 Cal. Rptr. 660, 666-67.) However, the trial court in this case stated that it was aware of the problems posed by subjective, demeanor-based explanations for excluding venirepersons. As a result, the court closely scrutinized the State's explanations and nothing in the record here indicates to us that the trial court's finding was erroneous. A tenth venireperson was stricken from the jury for three reasons. The first was that she lived in Hyde Park, a neighborhood in Chicago whose residents, the prosecutor felt, were more scholarly and open to new ideas than other Chicagoans. The prosecutor believed that these traits made Hyde Park residents unsuitable for jury duty because they would be less likely to base their findings of fact on the evidence in the case than other Chicagoans. The venireperson was also excused because her husband worked in the mental health field and because the way she described her job struck the prosecutor as being pretentious. Defendant argues that the explanation based upon the venireperson's Hyde Park residence was insufficient to meet the State's burden of proof. Citing State v. Slappy (Fla. App. 1987), 503 So.2d 350, defendant claims that the State cannot rely upon assumptions concerning traits allegedly possessed by a broad group of persons unless the State can show that (1) there is some element of truth supporting those assumptions and (2) those particular traits are possessed by the venireperson being excluded. Thus, defendant argues that the State must show that Hyde Park residents actually do tend to be scholarly, open to new ideas and not likely to base their findings of fact on evidence, and that Alexander shared these traits. We disagree. The Supreme Court in Batson instructed that the procedure to be followed in a hearing on the issue of a prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges should be similar to the one utilized in Federal Title VII employment discrimination cases. (See Batson, 476 U.S. at 94-98 nn. 18-21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 86-89 nn. 18-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1721-24 nn. 18-21 (citing Title VII cases).) Under Title VII, once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his action. ( Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 257-58, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 217-18, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096.) The plaintiff may then attempt to demonstrate that the proffered explanation is merely pretextual, hiding the defendant's true discriminatory motive. ( Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257, 67 L.Ed.2d at 218, 101 S.Ct. at 1096.) Similarly, in Batson the Court stated that once a defendant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination, the prosecutor need only articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.) The defendant may then attempt to rebut the prosecution's explanation as being pretextual. (See People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 27.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. The two elements that defendant argues the State is required to show with regard to peremptory challenges based on a venireperson's membership in a group  (1) that the group possesses the undesirable traits and (2) that the venireperson also possesses those traits  are merely important factors that the trial court should consider in evaluating the legitimacy of the explanation articulated by the State. For example, if the State excluded an accountant from the jury solely because of the State's belief that accountants tend to be politically liberal and sympathetic to individuals, and it was demonstrated that there was no basis for this assumption about accountants, then the trial court might conclude that the State's explanation was pretextual. Similarly, if the accountant in the above scenario were excused, and the evidence during voir dire clearly demonstrated that the accountant-venireperson did not share the traits of liberalism and sympathy toward individuals, the trial court again might find that the State's explanation was pretextual. In the present case, the trial court judge, who stated that he was familiar with the Hyde Park neighborhood, having attended law school and worked there for a number of years, concluded that there was some basis for the State's assumptions about Hyde Park residents and so accepted the State's explanation for striking Alexander. Although we might not agree, we do not find that the court's conclusion was contrary to the evidence. The eleventh person excluded from the jury was stricken because he was a steelworker who had previously been a schoolteacher and had done graduate work in education. This job change from teacher to steelworker struck the prosecutor as strange and something which raised questions as to what the venireperson's feelings or prejudices might be. Furthermore, the venireperson had been a music major in college and was married to a schoolteacher. The prosecutor explained that he generally excused schoolteachers and spouses of schoolteachers because they tend to be sympathetic toward individuals and give them the benefit of the doubt. The prosecutor also felt that teachers tend to go beyond the law and the restrictions placed upon them by trial judges when they serve as jurors. The prosecutor also stated that he generally excluded musicians because they tend to be creative and willing to move beyond the strictures of the law. Defendant argues that the State's reasons for excluding the eleventh venireperson should be rejected for several reasons. First, defendant asserts that the venireperson met all of the general criteria that the State itself said it used for selecting jurors. He was a 53-year-old married man with seven children. He owned the home that he had lived in for 15 years and he worked at the same job for the past 14 years. Thus, according to defendant, the venireperson clearly had strong ties to his community. Second, defendant asserts that the State's concern about teachers serving on the jury is without merit because the State allowed a white teacher to serve on the jury. Finally, defendant, in an argument we have already rejected, claims that the State was required to show that teachers and musicians in general, and this venireperson in particular, possess the traits which were the basis for the peremptory challenge. In People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 23, we observed that if a prosecutor rejected a minority venireperson for possessing certain characteristics, but did not reject a white venireperson sharing those same characteristics, it does not follow that this in itself shows that the prosecutor's explanations were pretextual. We explained that: Though a part of the prosecutor's explanations may have been applicable to white jurors who were not challenged, the white jurors may have, in some other respect, exhibited a trait which the prosecutor reasonably could have believed would make him or her desirable as a juror. ( Young, 128 Ill.2d at 23-24.) Likewise, the converse is true as well. Though a minority venireperson may otherwise possess all of the traits which the State is looking for in a juror, he may possess an additional trait which makes him undesirable. On the other hand, although it is not conclusive, evidence that a stricken minority venireperson possessed the same characteristics as a nonminority juror on whom the State chose not to exercise a peremptory challenge should certainly be given great weight by the trial court in evaluating the State's explanations. See People v. McDonald (1988), 125 Ill.2d 182, 199-200. In the present case, there is little merit to defendant's contention that, since the State allowed a white teacher onto the jury, the State's explanation was pretextual. Our conclusion is based upon the fact that by the time the white teacher was questioned during voir dire, the State had exercised all of its peremptory challenges. As a result, the State had no choice as to whether or not it should exercise a peremptory challenge. Consequently, no inference of discrimination arises in this case from the fact that a white teacher served on the jury. The trial court agreed that there may have been something suspicious about a person who was a teacher, and who had even done graduate work in education, leaving the teaching profession to take a job as a steelworker, an occupation described by the trial court as being a job of conceivably a lesser status. We cannot say that this finding of fact by the trial court is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The twelfth venireperson excluded by the State was the second to last venireperson examined on April 23. At the end of the day, the first panel of four jurors was selected. All of the other members of the venire who had been questioned that day, with the exception of this twelfth venireperson, were excused. The next day, 11 more venirepersons were examined before any further challenges were allowed. The prosecution explained that by this time he could recall little about the twelfth venireperson. On the other hand, he had a fresh recollection of the 11 jurors that had been questioned that day. Due to this lack of recollection and therefore lack of information concerning the twelfth venireperson, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge. The trial court found that this explanation rebutted defendant's prima facie case. Citing Batson, defendant argues that the State's explanation was insufficient to rebut defendant's prima facie case because it was not `clear and reasonably specific.' ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 n. 20, quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981), 450 U.S. 248, 258, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 218, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096.) According to defendant, the State's explanation essentially amounted to an admission that it had no explanation. Defendant misconstrues the State's explanation. While it is certainly true that the State cannot rebut a prima facie case of discrimination by stating that it does not know why it exercised its peremptory challenges (see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (prosecutor [may not] rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive)), that is not what the State is attempting here. Instead, the State in this case knew precisely why it exercised its challenge: the State exercised its challenge because due to the timing and order of questioning during voir dire, the prosecutor had lost his recollection of the twelfth venireperson. As a result, the prosecutor did not have enough information about the venireperson to feel comfortable with having her on the jury. This explanation is race-neutral, clear and reasonably specific. Nevertheless, defendant argues that such an explanation should not be allowed because otherwise the State could always justify its use of peremptory challenges by claiming that it lacked sufficient recollection; thus making a mockery of Batson. We do not share defendant's fears, however, because such an explanation will usually only be credible where a unique set of facts, such as those that occurred in this case, is present. Unless such facts are present, we are confident that defendants will be able to prove, and trial courts will find, that explanations based upon a lack of recollection are pretextual. The thirteenth person excused by the State worked as a barber and as a forklift operator. The prosecutor stated that he thought that the venireperson would probably have a loss of income if he had to serve on the jury. The prosecutor also stated that he excluded the venireperson because the venireperson's wife was a schoolteacher. However, the prosecutor testified that the main reason he exercised a peremptory challenge was not because he [the venireperson] was married to a teacher. Rather, it was because the venireperson had a friend who was a politician who also happened to be a lawyer. That the prosecutor was concerned about the fact that the venireperson's friend was a politician, rather than the fact that he was a lawyer, is demonstrated by the following colloquy from the Batson hearing: [PROSECUTOR]: When asked about whether [the venireperson] knew any lawyers, he responded that he knew one. He was a friend by the name of Fred   . Your Honor indicated in the record that you seemed to know that individual and asked, wasn't he a city councilman, and  THE COURT: Actually, this juror lived in Evanston. I think the lawyer's name was   . I don't know how the name Fred got in the record. [PROSECUTOR]: I recall there was a discussion about, you know, the lawyer that he mentioned and the fact he was a city councilman, and there was some smiling between the two of you, and the fact that he was impressed or whatever, that you recognized or knew that person that he had mentioned. That left me with the thought about, who is this [friend]. He's obviously a political person in Evanston. I did not know him. I didn't know if he was a candidate or a politician that was interested in one specific issue or no issues; if he was a person that was a pro-abortion or ban-the-bomb or whatever. I did not know this man, I did not know his politics. The contact between [the venireperson] was left very up in the air between [the venireperson and the friend] who is a friend or an associate. I believe he used the words, both friend and associate. So again, I had a situation where I did not know the importance of [the friend] in [the venireperson's] life, and I thought it best, and I thought it best, because of that lack of knowledge, to exercise a peremptory challenge. The trial court, in its oral findings of fact, stated that the venireperson related that [the friend] was his friend and I think that is a justification for using a peremptory challenge; the same reason that the Defense could, if a person said they had a friend who was a state's attorney. The trial court thus apparently found that the State was justified in its use of a peremptory challenge because the venireperson had a friend who was a criminal defense attorney. This reading of the court's finding is underscored by the fact that the court, during defense counsel's closing argument at the Batson hearing, responded to defendant's claim that the State's explanation was pretextual, by asking [w]hat about his friendship or association with a Criminal Defense attorney? We find the trial court's reliance upon the fact that the venireperson's friend was a criminal defense attorney to have been improper. Under Batson, it is the State's burden to articulate a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation for its use of peremptory challenges on minority venirepersons. ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 & n. 20, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89 & n. 20, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24 & n. 20, quoting Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 218, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096.) This burden, which the Court in Batson borrowed from Federal Title VII employment discrimination cases, is not a heavy one. ( Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co. (5th Cir.1984), 738 F.2d 1425, 1430.) However, the State is required to do more than merely list a series of facts. (See Uviedo, 738 F.2d at 1429-30.) The State must also articulate which facts were in fact the basis for the allegedly discriminatory act. (See Uviedo, 738 F.2d at 1429.) Furthermore, a court should not presume, or infer from the facts of the case, that an unarticulated neutral explanation exists. (See Uviedo, 738 F.2d at 1430.) Rather, a court must focus its inquiry on the reasons actually articulated by the State. The problem with the court's finding is that although the prosecutor mentioned as a matter of fact that the venireperson's friend was an attorney, the State never clearly and specifically articulated that this fact was the reason that the State exercised a peremptory challenge. (We also note that nothing in the record from either voir dire or the Batson hearing, with the exception of the trial court's question of defense counsel, which was apparently based upon the trial court's personal knowledge of the friend, indicated that the friend was a criminal defense attorney.) Instead, as the colloquy from the Batson hearing demonstrates, the only clear and reasonably specific explanation for the peremptory challenge articulated by the State regarding the venireperson's friend was the fact that the friend was a politician, and that this fact somehow reflected upon the venireperson's political beliefs. As a result, it was improper for the trial court to have based its conclusion that the State rebutted defendant's prima facie case upon the fact that the venireperson had a friendship with a lawyer. See Uviedo, 738 F.2d at 1430 (In Title VII cases, [i]t is beyond the province of a trial or a reviewing court to determine  after the fact  that certain facts in the record might have served as the basis for an employer's [discriminatory act]). Although we find that the court's ruling was erroneous, we cannot at this point hold that the State used its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. This is because there has not been a finding of fact regarding the explanations which the State did indeed proffer for excluding the thirteenth member of the venire. However, this court is in no position to make such a finding since such findings largely will turn on evaluation of credibility ( Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 89 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21), and credibility determinations are more appropriately left to the trial court ( People v. Cheek (1982), 93 Ill.2d 82, 94; see also People v. Hooper (1987), 118 Ill.2d 244, 257-58 (Clark, C.J., dissenting, joined by Simon, J.)). Accordingly, we must reverse the trial court's finding and remand to the trial court to reassess the evidence in the record and issue new findings of fact and conclusions of law in regard to the State's explanations for excluding the thirteenth venireperson. The fourteenth venireperson was excluded, according to the prosecutor's testimony, because she lived relatively close [within 3 1/2 miles] to the area where this incident had occurred. The prosecutor further testified that: it was because of a lack of information and lack of knowledge [in particular, a lack of information about the venireperson's husband] that I did not feel I had a good handle on [the venireperson]. I did not find her to be the kind of a juror that I was going to exercise automatically in any way, a peremptory challenge, but it was because of other jurors that I wanted on my jury that I believe [she] was excused. The trial court found that the State rebutted defendant's prima facie case because the court concluded that the venireperson lived within one mile of where defendant lived. According to the trial court, in this case, [the distance between the venireperson's and defendant's residences would have to have been] within at least a mile, in order to use a peremptory challenge. We hold that this finding was erroneous. In this case, the prosecutor testified that the venireperson lived near the scene of the crime; he never mentioned the fact that she lived near defendant. Nor was this fact raised by the State's Attorney arguing the case for the State at the Batson hearing. The only reference to defendant's address were general statements during the State's Attorney's opening and closing arguments that two addresses were important in the case: defendant's address and the scene of the crime. The State did not, however, specify that the venireperson in particular lived near defendant. The court's finding that her address was within one mile of defendant's address was not based upon the record. Instead, it may have been based upon the court's personal knowledge. Thus, the State never articulated that the reason the venireperson was excluded was the fact that she lived near defendant. Accordingly, the trial court should not have considered this fact in assessing the State's explanation for its peremptory challenge. We therefore must remand to the trial court to issue new findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the fourteenth venireperson. The final venireperson who was excluded by the State had a husband who was unemployed. The prosecutor also explained that the venireperson's son had testified in court as a victim of an armed robbery and the venireperson was not asked during voir dire what the result of the case had been. As a result, the prosecutor did not know the disposition of the case or whether the venireperson had been satisfied with the treatment her son had received. The prosecutor concluded his testimony about the venireperson by stating that he excluded her because I did not feel I had a great amount of knowledge regarding [her]. Her ties to the community seemed to be tenuous, and in comparison to the other jurors I was considering at that time, I did exercise a peremptory challenge. The trial court failed to make a specific finding regarding the State's exclusion of this final venireperson. In the supervisory order remanding this case for a Batson hearing, this court instructed the trial court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. One of the purposes of requiring a trial court to make findings of fact is to provide appellate courts with a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision ( Bartsh v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (7th Cir.1987), 831 F.2d 1297, 1304) so as to allow for meaningful appellate review ( Gupta v. East Texas State University (5th Cir.1981), 654 F.2d 411, 415). This court recently held in People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 245-46, that the trial court's explicit finding in that case that the facts in the Batson hearing were not in dispute, and that all of the State's explanations for exercising peremptory challenges were legitimate, was sufficiently specific to allow for adequate appellate review. In the present case, however, the trial court made no explicit finding that the facts were not in dispute. Moreover, unlike in Mack, where the trial court found that all of the State's explanations were legitimate, the trial court here was silent on the question of the State's explanations for excluding the final venireperson. Accordingly, the trial court's findings here are not sufficiently specific to provide us with an adequate basis to review the court's decision. We therefore remand to the trial court to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law for this final venireperson. We note in closing that many of the State's explanations for excluding these last three venirepersons are based upon the fact that the State lacked certain information about them. In general, such explanations should be closely scrutinized since they can be easily utilized as a pretext for discriminatory challenges. (See People v. Turner (1986), 42 Cal.3d 711, 727, 726 P.2d 102, 111-12, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 665-66.) Courts, in evaluating such explanations, should consider whether the State made any attempt at discovering the unknown information (see Turner, 42 Cal.3d at 727, 726 P.2d at 111-12, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66) by, for example, requesting that supplemental questions be asked during voir dire (see 107 Ill.2d R. 234). Similarly, the State's explanation that two of the venirepersons were challenged because they were less desirable than other potential jurors should also be closely scrutinized since (1) both met the very criteria which the State itself stated it looked for in potential jurors: both were married with children and had been employed at the same job for a number of years (and one was a homeowner), and (2) the State failed to explain what characteristics made other potential jurors more attractive. In assessing this second explanation, the trial court should attempt to ascertain who the other venirepersons were who were being considered at the time the State exercised its challenges and compare their characteristics with those of the excluded venirepersons. In conclusion, therefore, we agree with the trial court that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination. We also agree that the State rebutted defendant's prima facie case for 12 of the 15 black venirepersons challenged by the State. We reverse, however, the trial court's conclusion that the State rebutted defendant's prima facie case regarding the State's exclusion of the three venirepersons described above. We retain jurisdiction and remand the case to the trial court to issue and file with the clerk of this court, in writing, new findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the State's explanations for excluding the three venirepersons described above. The trial court shall make its findings based upon the views expressed in this opinion and upon the evidence and arguments that were already presented at the Batson hearing. Neither the State nor defendant shall be allowed to present any further evidence or argument on this issue in the trial court below.