Opinion ID: 3021780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cognitive Function

Text: Learning, concentrating and remembering fall into the general category of cognitive function. This court has held such activities to be major life activities. See Gagliardo v. Connaught Laboratories, Inc., 311 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 2002) (concentrating and remembering “(more generally, cognitive function)” are major life activities); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 307 (“We accept that thinking is a major life activity.”); Emory, 401 F.3d at 183 (accepting learning as major life activity). Weisberg argues that he is substantially limited in his cognitive function. The physician report primarily relied on by Weisberg shows: 1) that his short term/working memory is “reduced” or “less than expected;” 2) that his reading comprehension ranks in the 25th percentile “using the norms for 18 year olds” and that “this is evidence for a considerable reduction of academic and vocational skills;” 3) his mental speed ranks in the 27th percentile and his response time is “marginally slow;” 4) his accuracy on a test of labeling the environment was “poor,” i.e., while the population’s average score is around 1 Weisberg also makes occasional reference to limitations in the major life activity of “caring for one’s self.” See R. Br. Appellant at 9. However, the only relevant evidence offered in support of such a limitation appears to be evidence suggesting that he has difficulty remembering to take his medicine regularly. We view this limitation as subsumed by the more general limitation in cognitive function. 9 85 percent, Weisberg’s was only 76 percent; and 5) that the accident had a significant “deleterious effect,” but not “impairing,” on Weisberg’s ability to perceive and respond to unfamiliar situations. In addition, the report shows that Weisberg is clinically depressed, experiences anxiety, and seems to have lost a sense of direction. Evidence in the record suggests that these limitations interfere with Weisberg’s ability to read for pleasure, keep track of appointments, remember peoples’ names, and remember to regularly take his medicine. However, other evidence in the record paints a more positive picture of Weisberg’s overall intellectual functioning. See Pl. App. at 54 (report of Kathy A. Lawler, D. Phil.) (noting that Weisberg scored in “Superior” range for Verbal and Full Scale IQ, in the “Very Superior” range for perceptual organization, but only in the “Average” range for working memory). The evidence in the record shows at most that Weisberg is impaired by his postconcussion syndrome such that he falls in the bottom quartile2 of the country on certain measures of cognitive function, but ranks highly or in the average range on other measures. “‘[S]ubstantially’ in the phrase ‘substantially limits’ suggests ‘considerable’ or 2 The parties dispute the relevance of the fact that Weisberg’s ranking in reading comprehension was stated relative to the norms of 18 year-olds. See Br. Appellant at 18; Br. Appellee at 19 n.1; R. Br. Appellant at 5-6. Nothing in the record suggests that norms of 18 year olds differ from the norms for the adult population as a whole and it is Weisberg’s burden to show that he is “disabled” under the ADA. Weisberg argues that the “figures must be adjusted for someone of Mr. Weisberg[’s] age, education and experience,” but the regulations specify that the relevant comparison is to the “average person in the general population,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1), not to the average person of similar age, education and experience. 10 ‘to a large degree.’” Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (2002). One must be “substantially” limited “as compared to . . . the average person in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). It is clear from the undisputed evidence that the overall picture of Weisberg’s cognitive function, as measured by tests, is that he is someone of high intellectual capacity, with only certain narrow and relatively minor limitations. Moreover, “the ADA requires those ‘claiming the Act’s protection . . . to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience . . . is substantial.” Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198 (quoting Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 567) (emphasis added). Weisberg testified to the real world consequences of his memory problems. With “out of the ordinary” frequency, people say things that he does not later remember their having said, or he asks his wife a question that he has already asked of her. Def. App. at 116. Similarly, he sometimes forgets that he is “supposed to be somewhere at a specific time,” or that he has “to do something” until somebody either reminds him or he notices that he has written it down. Id. He has “to use compensatory type things,” like keeping more records or having his secretary remind him, to make sure that he remembers to do things. Common experience tells us that these are not unusually restrictive limitations on cognitive function such that they amount to a “substantial limitation” indicating that Weisberg is “severely restricted” in this regard. Finally, Weisberg has addressed only the nature and severity of his impairment, which is only one of the three factors that the regulations specify should be considered in 11 determining whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity. He presents no evidence pertinent to the “duration or expected duration of the impairment” or the “expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(ii)-(iii). Accordingly, with respect to the major life activity of cognitive function, Weisberg has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that he is “disabled” under the ADA.