Opinion ID: 2056690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: additional factor of stigma

Text: [¶ 78] In addition to the Mendoza-Martinez factors, 372 U.S. at 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, the Court should also consider the additional factor of stigma, consistent with the Court's prior decisions. In State v. Freeman, 487 A.2d 1175 (Me.1985), this Court held that a civil drunk driving law was determined to have sufficient criminal characteristics to require constitutional safeguards; that civil law was deemed void, however, because a complementary criminal drunk driving law was already in effect. Id. at 1176-80. The Court recognized that the resulting stigma was highly suggestive of the true criminal nature of the procedure. Id. at 1178. In contrast, in State v. Anton, 463 A.2d 703 (Me.1983), it was the absence of stigma attached to traffic offenses that led, in part, to the Court's determination that there was no right to a jury trial in a case involving those charges. Id. at 708. Regarding Letalien, the stigma is due in part to the offense itself, but the magnitude of the effects of the stigma are indisputably heightened with Internet publication. The stigma renders SORNA of 1999 punitive. [¶ 79] In conclusion, because SORNA of 1999 is punitive and operates retroactively, I would hold that its application violates the ex post facto clause of the Maine Constitution independent of the protections afforded by the United States Constitution.