Opinion ID: 2628773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CME Has Standing Under CLUDMA

Text: ¶ 9 To obtain standing under CLUDMA, a party must show that it is adversely affected by a county land use decision. Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801(2)(a). Because this requirement is identical to the first element of traditional standing, we rely on traditional standing case law to interpret the statutory requirement. Recently this court described an adverse effect as an actual or potential injury that is sufficiently particularized to give a party a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 23, 148 P.3d 960. Focusing on the personal stake, we explained in Sierra Club that as long as the injury has a direct effect on the complaining party, and the case presents a concrete dispute suited to resolution by the judiciary, others may also share their concerns and be subject to the same specific, individualized injuries. Id. ¶ 24. Yet, if the injury complained of is a general injury to the community, the party does not have a personal stake in the dispute, and thus, has not shown that it is adversely affected. Id. ¶ 10 Specific to land use cases, we have determined that to have a personal stake in the outcome of a land use decision, a party must own or occupy property within the jurisdiction of the decision-making body. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 15 Utah 2d 305, 392 P.2d 40, 42 (1964). [1] On May 12, 2005, when CME initiated this action, it owned parcel B of Section 29. Therefore, because [s]tanding is determined as of the time the action is brought, Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir.2005), CME has satisfied this requirement. ¶ 11 The appellees argue that while CME alleged a particularized injury, it failed to prove the potential of such harm; this argument is not supported by our case law. In most cases, a party must only allege an adverse effect to gain standing. Appellees rely on the court of appeals' recent decision in Specht v. Big Water Town to establish a proof requirement. 2007 UT App 335, 172 P.3d 306. In Specht, the court stated that to have standing to pursue a declaratory judgment a party must allege and prove special damages. Id. ¶ 11. What the court of appeals intended by this statement is unclear; the court did not discuss the extent of proof required because the plaintiff had not sufficiently alleged a particularized injury. Further, the interpretation of this holding offered by the appellees is not supported by existing precedent. Instead, all the cited cases in Specht merely stand for the position that a party must have standing to seek declaratory reliefsomething very different from requiring a party to prove its alleged harm at the standing analysis stage. See id. ¶ 12 This court rarely imposes a requirement that a party prove its alleged harm, or even causation, to establish standing. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 28 n. 3, ¶ 32, 148 P.3d 960. This makes sense because [s]tanding questions arise early in the litigation, usually before discovery and the introduction of the evidence; and to require a significant level of proof would be unduly burdensome because it would require litigants to invest the time and money in gathering the evidence necessary to prove their claim only to be denied standing. Id. ¶ 32. Thus, [g]enerally, the determination of whether a plaintiff has alleged a sufficient interest in order to satisfy the adverse impact part of the traditional test can be made on the face of the pleadings. Id., ¶ 28 n. 3. Only in rare cases is fact-finding required to assess a party's interest in a case. See id. For example, in Washington County Water Conservancy District v. Morgan, the court required the plaintiff to prove the existence of an adverse impact because the plaintiff's interest in the dispute depended upon whether [its] water originated from the same source as the defendant's. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 28, n. 3, 148 P.3d 960 (discussing Wash. County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT 58, ¶¶ 2, 19, 82 P.3d 1125). As a result, the court required the plaintiff to show a measurable connection between its water source and the defendant's. In contrast, in Sierra Club, we found it sufficient that the plaintiffs lived and participated in outdoor recreation near the site of the plant that the Air Quality Board approved, and determined that they need not undertake fact-finding to establish their interest. Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ¶¶ 22, 28, 148 P.3d 960. ¶ 13 In this case, the adverse impact alleged by CME is akin to that in Sierra Club. That is, the potential harm to CME caused by the extension of the conditional use permit to EnergySolutions' Section 29 property is the result of the proximity of CME to the property; this is apparent from the pleadings. EnergySolutions alleges that CME has not sufficiently shown that the potential harm it alleges was caused by the amendment of EnergySolutions' conditional use permit. We disagree. First, as discussed above, to gain standing a party is not required to prove its interest or causationat least not to the extent required at trial. Id. ¶ 32. Second, proof that storage of radioactive waste in Tooele County polluted neighboring properties in the past is sufficient to establish a more than speculative potential of future harm to neighboring properties, such as CME. To establish standing, an alleged harm can be actual or potential. Thus, under the statutory grant, CME has alleged a particularized injury sufficient to give it a personal stake in the underlying dispute over the amendment of EnergySolutions' conditional use permit; therefore, CME has statutory standing to assert an action for declaratory judgment. ¶ 14 Similarly, CME has sufficiently alleged a particularized injury arising out of the County's decision to redraw the hazardous waste corridor. As described by CME, the new boundaries of the corridor made it virtually impossible for [the] remaining Section 29 parcel to be used for waste disposal of any kind. We agree. Such exclusion directly affects CME and is sufficiently particularized to give CME a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute over the validity of the newly drawn hazardous waste corridor. Thus, we hold that the CME has adequately alleged an adverse effect and thereby has statutory standing.