Opinion ID: 880569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the district court err in refusing to admit testimony of the commissioner's compliance officer, jerry keck?

Text: In hearing the dispute between Mahan and Cenex, Keck found that there was probable cause to believe that Cenex discriminated against Mahan on the basis of age. Mahan offered the determination testimony at the District Court. Mahan directs our attention to Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence which allows public records and reports. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any form, of public officers or agencies, setting forth ... (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to an authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. However, the rule as adopted in Montana, Rule 803(8)(iv) M.R.Evid., states: [Not excluded by the hearsay rule are] ... records, reports, statements, or data compilations in any form of a public office or agency setting forth its regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. The following are not within this exception to the hearsay rule: ... (iv) factual findings resulting from special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident. The Commissioner's comments to the Montana Code provides that it adopted the uniform rule (1974), rather than the federal rule because it was clearer than the Federal Rule and because it expressed better policy with certain reports in requiring the official to testify rather than admitting his report as a hearsay exception. The Commission carefully considered the exceptions to Rule 803(8), before adopting the uniform rule. The very investigation information that the federal rule allows is specifically excluded in the Montana rule. The District Court did not err in excluding the testimony offered by Mahan. Another consideration concerning whether the testimony of the compliance officer is allowable is whether as an expert witness he can testify as to the determination he made for the Human Rights Commission. Rule 704, M.R.Evid., states: Opinions on ultimate issue. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 704 (the rule being identical to the Montana rule), 56 F.R.D. 183, 284-85 (1972) indicates: ... that the basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them when helpful to the trier of fact. ... the rule is not intended to allow all opinions and would exclude those which would merely tell the jury what result to reach . .. It was Keck's intention to testify that he determined that Mahan had been discriminated against because of his age. This is a determination for the jury to make. The issue here is not so complex that the jury is not able to determine whether there was age discrimination. Moreover, there was other sufficient evidence offered by both parties from which the jury could make a reasonable determination of whether there was age discrimination.