Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Outburst

Text: After defendant delivered his allocution statement, the court called a sidebar conference. Neither the judge nor the attorneys were observing the jury at that time. A few minutes later, a spectator, allegedly the daughter of the Atlantic County Murder victim Sophia Fetter, rose from the gallery and shouted at a tearful juror: Who the hell are you crying for? We . The woman was quickly quieted and removed from the courtroom. Neither the judge nor the attorneys reacted to the outburst. The court simply instructed the jury on the allocution statement, making no reference to the outburst. Apparently, the jurors did, however, notice the outburst and reported to the sergeant-at-arms that they were concerned for their safety. The trial court did not directly address the jurors about the outburst. Instead, the court told the jury: [T]hings get somewhat testy, the court would make sure that everything is being done to make you feel secure in every regard. And if you have any concern about that, you know, please let us know, because that's what we're here for is to make sure that you feel secure and that you can go about your responsibilities without feeling any undue pressure from any outside forces. The jury recessed for four days. During the jury's recess, the trial court conducted a charge conference with the attorneys. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial because of the outburst, arguing that the jury had been prejudicially influenced by the incident. The court ruled that there was no evidence of prejudice requiring a mistrial. The court promised to inquire of the jury whether any individual felt unable to proceed according to the law and whether the specific juror who had been crying felt that her ability to perceive and evaluate the evidence had been compromised. The court explained that if the juror believed that she could not continue, she would be removed for cause. Defense counsel raised two concerns. First, counsel argued that any comment made by the court would highlight the prejudicial outburst in the minds of the jurors. Second, the defense was afraid that the court might focus the voir dire on the one juror who had been moved to tears despite the court's insistence that it would not focus on any one juror. Defense counsel believed that if defendant had a chance for life, it might be from this one emotional juror. Acknowledging that it had a responsibility to address the concerns of the jurors, the court addressed the jury: I'd like to ask you, to poll at this time as to whether or not any of you have experienced anything, whether it was when we last met, I believe it was Wednesday afternoon ... Or you read anything or saw anything, or has anything happened that would affect your ability to continue to serve in this case, anything at all? Noting that no juror raised their hands, the court moved on without giving a curative instruction or further individualized voir dire. Defense counsel now argues, despite his prior insistence that no individualized voir dire be conducted or instruction be given, that the trial court failed to inquire sufficiently whether prejudice resulted from the outburst. A more probing voir dire, asserts defendant, was necessary to determine if a mistrial should have been granted. If the court determined that a mistrial was not necessary, then a stronger and more immediate curative instruction was required. Defendant also claims that the outburst amounted to victim impact evidence because it was likely that jurors knew the identity of the woman in the courtroom. Finally, defendant contends that the instruction given by the court, four days after the incident, was insufficient because it failed to directly address the outburst and was too general in nature. Based on the nature of the outburst, the reaction of the jurors, and the inadequate response of the court, defendant argues that prejudice should be presumed and defendant's death sentence reversed. Defense counsel may not now argue that the inquiry made by the trial court was not sufficiently probing, when counsel insisted that the court refrain from making any individualized voir dire or from singling out any one juror. Defense counsel likewise cannot now argue that the court should have given a more immediate curative instruction, when it was defense counsel who insisted that the court not highlight the prejudicial outburst with a instruction to the jury. This Court has held that except in the most extreme cases, strategic decisions made by defense counsel will not present grounds for reversal on appeal. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 93, 586 A. 2d 85; accord State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 44, 583 A. 2d 747 (1991); State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 471, 117 A. 2d 473 (1955). Given the concerns raised by defense counsel and the limited nature of the outburst itself (both the judge and the attorneys who were at sidebar were not even aware it had occurred), the court's limited inquiry was reasonable and sufficient. The trial court recognized it had a responsibility to insure that the jury remain fair and impartial throughout the proceedings. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 75, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I ). The jury's impartiality is significantly threatened by extraneous influences arising from contact with non-record facts. Id. at 74-76, 548 A. 2d 846 (citation omitted). The determination of whether the appropriate response is a curative instruction, as well as the language and detail of the instruction, is within the discretion of the trial judge who has the feel of the case and is best equipped to gauge the effect of a prejudicial comment on the jury in the overall setting. State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 647, 477 A. 2d 323 (1984) (citations omitted). The trial court properly exercised its discretion and instructed the jury sua sponte, despite defense counsel's insistence that the court take no action. Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error. Winter, supra, 96 N.J. at 646, 477 A. 2d 323 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L.Ed. 2d 476, 484 (1968)). In White v. Smith, 984 F. 2d 163, 166-67 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 920, 113 S.Ct. 2367, 124 L.Ed. 2d 273 (1993), the court remarked: [W]here [a] communication is innocuous and initiated by a spectator in the form of an outburst, a hearing is not necessarily required. This is particularly true when, in this case, the trial court follows up with a statement to the jury, allaying any apprehensions. In this case, the brief outburst by a courtroom spectator did not operate to unduly prejudice the jury against defendant. The outburst was momentary, and the woman was immediately quieted and removed from the courtroom. Despite defendant's claim that the outburst amounted to victim impact evidence, there is nothing to suggest that the jury was aware of the identity of the spectator. Additionally, the outburst contained no factual information that could have influenced the jury. See Hunt v. State, 312 Md. 494, 540 A. 2d 1125 (1988) (upholding capital conviction despite trial court's failure to provide a curative instruction after victim's family members, who were never identified on the record, left courtroom crying), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 835, 112 S.Ct. 117, 116 L.Ed. 2d 86 (1991). The trial court polled the jury to ensure that nothing had affected their ability to continue. Lastly, in its final charge to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that neither bias, prejudice, nor sympathy were to play any role in their deliberations, except for sympathy generated by the mitigating factors. The jury presumably followed these instructions. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 271, 255 A. 2d 193 (citations omitted). We find that any prejudice resulting from the outburst was harmless error.