Opinion ID: 2035801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Text: Plaintiffs next argue that we should overturn the tax because the General Assembly did not comply with constitutionally required procedures when it passed the Act. Specifically, the General Assembly did not comply with the three-readings requirement of article IV, section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution. The Authority does not dispute that the three-readings requirement was violated. Rather, it urges us to reaffirm our adherence to the longstanding enrolled bill doctrine. That doctrine flows out of the language in article IV, section 8(d), which says [t]he Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate shall sign each bill that passes both houses to certify that the procedural requirements for passage have been met. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 8(d).) This court has interpreted this language to mean that, upon certification by the Speaker and the Senate President, a bill is conclusively presumed to have met all procedural requirements for passage. Fuehrmeyer v. City of Chicago (1974), 57 Ill.2d 193, 198, 311 N.E.2d 116; Polich v. Chicago School Finance Authority (1980), 79 Ill.2d 188, 208-12, 37 Ill.Dec. 357, 402 N.E.2d 247. Two things are clear to the members of this court. The first is that, contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, the enrolled bill doctrine was clearly anticipated by the Framers of the Constitution. As noted in Benjamin v. Devon Bank (1977), 68 Ill.2d 142, 145-46, 11 Ill.Dec. 270, 368 N.E.2d 878, the Committee on the Legislature of the constitutional convention explained that the purpose of the enrolled bill doctrine is to avoid judicial nullification of statutes on purely procedural grounds: `Presently Illinois has the journal entry rule as distinguished from an enrolled bill rule. It is proposed that Illinois adopt the enrolled bill rule. The journal entry rule means that a piece of legislation can be challenged in the courts by pointing to a defect in its passage as reflected in the journal. Under this rule, a statute duely [ sic ] passed by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor may be attacked in the courts, not necessarily on its merits, but on some procedural error or technicality found in the legislative process. The journal entry rule, as a result, leads to complex litigation over procedures and technicalities. The enrolled bill rule would provide that when the presiding officers of the two houses sign a bill, their signatures become conclusive proof that all constitutional procedures have been properly followed. The enrolled bill rule would not permit a challenge to a bill on procedural or technical grounds regarding the manner of passage if the bill showed on its face that it was properly passed. Signatures by the presiding officers would, of course, constitute proof that proper procedures were followed.' Benjamin, 68 Ill.2d at 145, 11 Ill.Dec. 270, 368 N.E.2d 878, quoting 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1386-87 (hereinafter cited as Proceedings). The second thing that is apparent to this court is that the General Assembly has shown remarkably poor self-discipline in policing itself. Indeed, both parties agree that ignoring the three-readings requirement has become a procedural regularity. This is quite a different situation than that envisioned by the Framers, who enacted the enrolled bill doctrine on the assumption that the General Assembly would police itself and judicial review would not be needed because violations of the constitutionally required procedures would be rare. [W]e determined, in accordance with many other states that have adopted the enrolled bill rule and have found no difficulties, that    if they were to commit any fraud or chicanery, the legislature would certainly take care of them. 4 Proceedings 2881. Plaintiffs urge us to abandon the enrolled bill doctrine because history has proven that there is no other way to enforce the constitutionally mandated three-readings requirement. While plaintiffs make a persuasive argument, we decline their invitation. We do so because, for today at least, we feel that the doctrine of separation of powers is more compelling. However, we defer to the legislature hesitantly, because we do not wish to understate the importance of complying with the Constitution when passing bills. If the General Assembly continues its poor record of policing itself, we reserve the right to revisit this issue on another day to decide the continued propriety of ignoring this constitutional violation.