Opinion ID: 2053836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Title VI

Text: Plaintiffs also complain that the State public education financing system violates title VI and title VI's implementing regulations. Title VI provides: No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance (42 USC § 2000d). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of race or national origin in programs receiving Federal financial assistance ( see , 42 USC §§ 2000d  2000d-6). The Supreme Court has ruled that there must be a showing of intentional discrimination to succeed on a title VI claim ( see , Guardians Assn. v Civil Serv. Commn. , 463 US 582). Guardians involved a challenge to the hiring and firing practices of New York City's police department. The principal issue was whether compensation could be awarded for a violation of title VI in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent. Although the Court was divided and no majority opinion issued, seven Justices concluded that proof of discriminatory intent is required in order to make out a violation of title VI ( see , Alexander v Choate , 469 US 287, 293). The instant complaint contains no showing of intentional discrimination. Plaintiffs also allege a violation of title VI's implementing regulations ( see , 34 CFR 100.3 [b] [2]), which provide that recipients of Federal funding may not: utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin. (Emphasis supplied.) The regulations incorporate a disparate impact standard. Under title VI's implementing regulations, proof of discriminatory intent is not a prerequisite to a private cause of action against governmental recipients of Federal funds ( see , Choate , supra , at 293-294). Proof of discriminatory effect suffices to establish liability under the regulations promulgated pursuant to title VI: actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities [can] be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title VI ( id. , at 293). Federal courts have consistently held that the evidentiary standards developed under title VII govern title VI cases as well ( see, e.g. , Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v State of Georgia , 775 F.2d 1403, 1417; Groves v Alabama State Bd. of Educ. , 776 F Supp 1518, 1523). Consequently, in order to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact: The plaintiff first must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral practice has a racially disproportionate effect, whereupon the burden shifts to the defendant to prove a substantial legitimate justification for its practice. The plaintiff then may ultimately prevail by proffering an equally effective alternative practice which results in less racial disproportionality or proof that the legitimate practices are a pretext for discrimination. ( Georgia State Conference , supra , at 1417 [citations omitted].) A validly stated cause of action under the title VI regulations thus has two components: whether a challenged practice has a sufficiently adverse racial impact  in other words, whether it falls significantly more harshly on a minority racial group than on the majority  and, if so, whether the practice is nevertheless adequately justified. ( Groves , supra , at 1523; see , Georgia State Conference , supra , at 1417; Quarles v Oxford Mun. Separate School Dist. , 868 F.2d 750, 754, n 3.) Statistics comparing benefit distribution or access patterns among members of the protected class and the over-all population play a key role in demonstrating an adverse racial impact ( see , Georgia State Conference , 775 F2d, at 1417 [plaintiffs made prima facie case through statistics showing that the racial composition differed from what would be expected from a random distribution]; Huntington Branch, NAACP v Town of Huntington , 844 F.2d 926, 938; Sharif v New York State Educ. Dept. , 709 F Supp 345, 362). Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to affirmatively defend the challenged practice by way of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason ( see , Larry P. v Riles , 793 F.2d 969, 982-983). If the defendant meets its burden and demonstrates that the challenged practice is justified or necessary, the plaintiff can still prevail by showing that less discriminatory alternatives were available to further the purportedly legitimate interest ( see , Abermarle Paper Co. v Moody , 422 US 405, 425). Applying the foregoing standards to this case, we conclude that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under title VI's regulations. The Appellate Division dismissed plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the State's role in allocating a lump sum to the New York City school system is not the function which results in the disparate impact on minority racial or ethnic groups; rather, it is the method by which plaintiff Chancellor of the City School District divides and suballocates those funds that may arguably result in the disparate impact complained of here. (205 AD2d, at 277.) The Appellate Division misconstrued the nature of plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs complain that it is the State's decisions concerning allocation of education aid which constitute the criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race (34 CFR 100.3 [b] [2]). The complaint challenges the manner in which the State allocates education aid, alleging that the present methodology has a disparate impact on the State's racial and ethnic minorities, the vast majority of whom attend New York City public schools. [9] The Appellate Division's reasoning fails to account for the fact that the City can only suballocate what the State allocates to it. If, as alleged, the State allocates only 34% of all State education aid to a school district containing 37% of the State's students (81% of whom are minorities comprising 74% of the State's minority student population), then those minority students will receive less aid as a group and per pupil than their nonminority peers who attend public schools elsewhere in the State, irrespective of how the City suballocates the education aid it receives. Initially, it is undisputed that New York State is the recipient of Federal funds for education. Moreover, plaintiffs complain of a benefit distribution practice which allegedly has the effect of subjecting minority students to discrimination on the basis of their race, color, or national origin. Plaintiffs support their allegations statistically, pointing to the disparity between the total and per capita education aid distributed to the City's predominantly minority student population as opposed to the amount distributed to the State's nonminority students. Since defendants have not yet advanced a substantial justification for the challenged practice at this procedural point, plaintiffs' cause of action under the title VI regulations should be reinstated (see , Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v State of Georgia , 775 F.2d 1403, 1417, supra; Groves v Alabama State Bd. of Educ. , 776 F Supp 1518, 1523, supra) . The order of the Appellate Division should be modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed. LEVINE, J. (concurring). I join with the majority of this Court in holding that plaintiffs have failed to allege legally sufficient causes of action under the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions or under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but have pleaded a valid cause of action under the United States Department of Education's regulations implementing title VI. I am also of the view that, under our prevailing liberal pleading standards, the complaint states a cause of action based upon a violation of the Education Article of the State Constitution (NY Const, art XI, § 1). The complaint invokes the definition of the State's educational duty under the Constitution set forth in Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free School Dist. v Nyquist (57 N.Y.2d 27) (hereinafter Levittown ) and alleges that the State's public school financing scheme denies them a sound basic education with minimal acceptable facilities and services ( id. , at 47-48). The complaint also refers to various specific educational deficiencies and alleges that the State's funding scheme denies New York City public school students the opportunity to achieve even basic literacy. These allegations, in my view, are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss, despite the inclusion and heavy reliance upon various other factors which I consider essentially irrelevant to a determination of whether the current State school aid formula violates the Education Article of the State Constitution. I write separately regarding plaintiff's Education Article claim because the constitutional standard for a sound basic education articulated by the majority may be read to extend the State's funding obligation well beyond that envisaged by the Levittown Court or justified by the language or history of the adoption of the Education Article.