Opinion ID: 1262473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Strike Veniremen for Cause.

Text: Eaton contends that the trial court erred in retaining four veniremen over his objections. As an appellate court, we must give deference to the trial court's decision whether to retain or exclude individual veniremen because the trial court sees and hears the juror. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426, 105 S.Ct. 844, 853, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); accord Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 563, 572, 385 S.E.2d 850, 855 (1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990) ( Spencer III ); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 693, 364 S.E.2d 491, 503, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 186, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988). For that reason, the trial court's decision in that regard will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of manifest error. Spencer IV, 240 Va. at 94, 393 S.E.2d at 619. The standard to be applied by the trial court in determining whether to retain a venireman on the jury panel is whether his answers during voir dire examination indicate to the court something that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); accord Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 549, 364 S.E.2d 483, 486, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988); O'Dell, 234 Va. at 695, 364 S.E.2d at 504.
During the voir dire examination of Frances B. Gouldthorpe, Eaton's counsel inquired about involvement with other criminal prosecutions. The juror said that she could not sit on a drunk driving case because she had had a previous tragic experience with respect to such an offense. After informing the juror that evidence of alcohol consumption was forthcoming, the trial court asked her if that evidence would affect her impartiality; she indicated that it would not. Eaton contends that he was prevented from engaging in meaningful inquiry regarding [Juror Gouldthorpe's] preformed opinions about cases involving alcohol consumption. Those opinions, he continues, might have affected the juror's impartiality. [3] We do not agree. The record clearly demonstrates that the trial court, by inquiring about the juror's ability to remain impartial, was satisfied that her prior experience with drunk driving cases would not prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror. We find nothing in the record to indicate otherwise.
Eaton's counsel asked venireman John Lutley numerous, lengthy questions regarding a defendant's presumption of innocence and a defendant's option not to take the stand in his own defense. Initially, Lutley voiced concern about Eaton's not taking the stand. However, when asked: You will listen to the evidence and fairly consider that along with the instructions? Lutley responded: Yes, and I understand that the case has to be made by the prosecution, not by the defense, I understand that. Over Eaton's objection, Lutley was seated on the jury. Eaton contends that Lutley was confused about the presumption of innocence and, therefore, unqualified to sit on the jury. [4] We disagree. Taking Lutley's voir dire as a whole, see Pruett, 232 Va. at 281, 351 S.E.2d at 10, the record indicates that Lutley understood the presumption of innocence. With regard to Lutley's potential desire that the defendant take the stand, the trial court found that he could disabuse [his] mind of [his] natural curiosity and decide the case on the evidence submitted and the law as propounded in the court's instructions. See Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 329, 362 S.E.2d 650, 662 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971, 108 S.Ct. 1249, 99 L.Ed.2d 447 (1988). We find no manifest error in the trial court's retention of juror Lutley.
During the voir dire of Phyllis J. Daines, Eaton's counsel posed several lengthy questions, essentially asking whether she would automatically impose the death penalty if Eaton were proved guilty. Initially, Daines answered, Yes. When the trial court asked her if she meant to say automatically, Daines emphatically stated: I would not automatically impose the death penalty. Eaton contends that Juror Daines was clearly death prone. On the contrary, the record indicates that she would not automatically impose the death sentence. Her only error was in responding yes to a lengthy and confusing question posed by Eaton's counsel which contained the word automatically. When the question was posed in clear and unambiguous terms by the trial court, the juror responded that she would abide by the trial court's instructions. There was no error in seating juror Daines.
Eaton contends that venireman Donald S. Cherry should have been excused for cause because Cherry stated that he would lean towards the death penalty if Eaton were convicted of capital murder. [5] However, taking Cherry's voir dire as a whole, the record clearly shows that he would give evidence in mitigation the same weight as evidence in aggravation. Based on the record, we agree with the trial court that Cherry was not death prone.