Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In Camera Review of R.S.'s Dependency Files and Counseling Records

Text: ś 33 In Camera Review, Generally: The United States Supreme Court has held that for due process to justify in camera review of a record that is otherwise deemed privileged or confidential by statute, the defendant must establish a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). There must be a `plausible showing' that the information will be both material and favorable to the defense. Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)). Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that it would impact the outcome of the trial. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57, 107 S.Ct. 989. A reasonable probability is probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The decision whether to conduct an in camera review of privileged records is subject to abuse of discretion review. State v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d 525, 550, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). ś 34 In Ritchie, the defendant was prosecuted for sexually abusing his daughter. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 43, 107 S.Ct. 989. He argued that his daughter's Children and Youth Services (CYS) file might contain the names of favorable witnesses or other exculpatory evidence, and thus, the trial court erred in refusing to conduct and in camera review of the CYS file. Id. at 44, 107 S.Ct. 989. Even though it was impossible to say whether any information in the CYS records would actually support Ritchie's arguments, the Court held that the defendant was entitled to have the file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contained information that probably would have changed the outcome of Ritchie's trial. Id. at 57-58, 107 S.Ct. 989. ś 35 In Kalakosky, this court evaluated whether the trial court should have conducted an in camera review of a sexual assault victim's counseling file, which is subject to a qualified privilege by statute. RCW 70.125.065 requires a written motion and affidavits setting forth specifically the reasons why the defendant is requesting discovery. The court concluded, based upon the statutory language, that before a rape victim's privacy should be invaded by a review of crisis center counseling notes . . . the defendant must make a particularized showing that such records are likely to contain material relevant to the defense. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d at 550, 852 P.2d 1064 (emphasis added). The Kalakosky court concluded that the motion in that case, which stated only that the counseling notes `may contain details which may exculpate the accused or otherwise be helpful to the defense,' did not make the required particularized showing. Id. at 544, 550, 852 P.2d 1064. [11] ś 36 In sum, mere speculation is not enough to justify in camera review and a defendant must establish a basis for his or her claim that the records in question contain material evidence. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. 989. Based on the statutory language protecting rape crisis center records, a particularized showing is required to support review of those records. See RCW 70.125.065; Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d at 550, 852 P.2d 1064. ś 37 Counseling Records: On direct, when the prosecutor asked R.S. if she had discussed the rape with anyone else, she reported that she had discussed the incident in counseling at a rape crisis center. Gregory objected and outside of the presence of the jury, his counsel argued that the State should not be allowed to present evidence regarding counseling when the defense could not have access to the counseling records. The trial court concluded that the State did not [go] into the content of the counseling but rather only mentioned the fact that she has received counseling. RRP at 2086. ś 38 The defense may not circumvent the statutory requirements for in camera review of a rape crisis center file. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d at 549, 852 P.2d 1064. In this case, the defense did not submit a written pretrial motion supported by affidavits, as required by RCW 70.125.065(1). Gregory cites to no place in the record where defense counsel made a motion for in camera review of the counseling records at all. We conclude that Gregory did not meet the statutory requirements for in camera review. [12] , [13] ś 39 Dependency Files: The defendant requested that the trial court review in camera the dependency files of R.S.'s children. Gregory claimed that the files might contain evidence of recent prostitution activities that might be admissible under the rape shield statute. Defense counsel explained that R.S. had admitted that she had entered drug treatment in April 1999 because of a pending dependency action. He asserted that because she had not cleaned up her act before April 1999, it was likely that the dependencies were open in 1998 when the rape occurred. He argued that if caseworkers were aware of any prostitution activity in 1998, the file would reflect that awareness. ś 40 The trial judge denied Gregory's request, believing R.S. had been forthcoming in her interview when she stated that the dependency centered around her drug addiction and theft to support her drug habit. The trial court granted defense counsel's request to interview R.S. again, this time asking questions about recent prostitution activity. The trial judge believed that R.S.'s answers to these questions would directly provide the sought after information, and thus, in camera review of the files was unnecessary. The trial judge also cited the children's privacy as a reason for denying in camera review. The defense countered that if R.S. denied recent prostitution, in camera review of the dependency files would ensure that they contained no evidence that would impeach R.S. on this point. Even so, the trial judge declined to change her ruling. [14] ś 41 RCW 13.50.010 and RCW 13.50.100 provide that dependency files shall be confidential and shall be released only under certain circumstances, none of which are being argued here. RCW 13.50.100(2). Therefore, in camera review of the dependency files would have been appropriate only if the Ritchie test was met. To justify in camera review, Gregory had to establish a basis for his claim that the dependency file would likely contain evidence of recent prostitution activities. ś 42 This case came down to a credibility contest between Gregory and R.S. The State, in closing argument, repeatedly emphasized that the ultimate determination for the jury in this case was who was more credible, Gregory or R.S. Because Gregory's version of events was that R.S. had consensual sex with him for money, admissible evidence of recent, factually similar prostitution would have been reasonably likely to impact the outcome of the trial. It is also reasonable to conclude that if the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) were aware of any recent prostitution activity, it would have been addressed in the dependency files. Moreover, R.S.'s deposition testimony indicated that at least one dependency was likely active during 1998. Thus, in camera review of the dependency files might have led to witnesses that could confirm or refute R.S.'s claim that she did not engage in streetwalking after 1995. In camera review of the files would not have unnecessarily delayed the trial because the trial judge had already agreed to allow for a second interview of R.S. On balance, the invasion of the children's privacy interests upon in camera review does not overcome Gregory's interest in obtaining a fair trial. We conclude that the trial judge should have reviewed the then-pending dependency files to determine if they contained information that could lead to admissible evidence that R.S. engaged in similar prostitution activity near to the time of this incident. [15] We hold that the trial court's failure to do so amounted to abuse of discretion. ś 43 The proper remedy for such an abuse of discretion is remand to the trial court for in camera review of the relevant files. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. If the information in the files would probably have changed the outcome of the trial, then the defendant is entitled to a new trial. But if nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, then the convictions can be reinstated. Id.; see also State v. Allen, 27 Wash.App. 41, 49, 615 P.2d 526 (1980); State v. Harris, 91 Wash.2d 145, 152, 588 P.2d 720 (1978). The intent on remand is to place the parties in the position they were in pretrial. United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1209 (9th Cir.2004). Thus, after oral argument in this case, we remanded to the trial court for review of the dependency files of R.S.'s children that were pending at the time of the rape trial. The trial court conducted review and submitted to this court public findings of fact and conclusions of law, supplemental sealed findings of fact, and the sealed dependency files themselves. [16] ś 44 The public findings of fact reveal that the dependency files contain R.S.'s criminal history, including reference to prostitution that occurred many years before the 1998 incident with Gregory. But the dependency files contain no information regarding prostitution activities as a reason for the dependency. RCP at 927, Finding of Fact (FOF) 6. Even so, the trial judge concluded that the dependency court's social file contains information that might have been used to impeach some of the answers [R.S.] gave at the August 8, 2000, [pretrial] interview with Mr. Gregory's attorney, but that information does not relate to prostitution or the consent issue raised by Mr. Gregory. RCP at 927, FOF 5. The trial judge concluded: Without deciding whether such information would have been admissible, material, or whether its exclusion was harmless error, to the extent either the defendant or the State would have used the information as evidence, or whether it would have led to evidence, the undersigned finds that it was relevant to the above-entitled case. RCP at 927, FOF 7 (emphasis added). [17] ś 45 In his supplemental briefing, Gregory argues that various evidence revealed in the dependency files was relevant, admissible, and material, and that its nondisclosure was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Both the United States Supreme Court and this court have held that due process guarantees criminal defendants access to material information in the possession of the court or the prosecution, including material impeachment evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 Wash.2d 766, 771-72, 854 P.2d 617 (1993); see also Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56-57, 107 S.Ct. 989; Alvarez, 358 F.3d at 1207-08 (Evidence affecting the credibility of . . . witnesses is material. . . .). Evidence is material, for the purposes of this due process rule, if there is a `reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,' or if the information probably would have changed the outcome of [the] trial. Knutson, 121 Wash.2d at 772, 854 P.2d 617 (quoting In re Rice, 118 Wash.2d 876, 887, 828 P.2d 1086 (1992) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985))); Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. A reasonable probability is `a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Knutson, 121 Wash.2d at 773, 854 P.2d 617 (quoting Rice, 118 Wash.2d at 887, 828 P.2d 1086). To be material, there must be more than a `mere possibility ' that evidence ` might have affected the outcome of the trial.' Id. at 773, 854 P.2d 617 (quoting State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 704-05, 718 P.2d 407 (1986)). ś 46 Wrapped up in this standard of materiality are issues of admissibility; if evidence is neither admissible nor likely to lead to admissible evidence[,] it is unlikely that disclosure of the evidence could affect the outcome of a proceeding. Id. To be admissible, and possibly material, evidence must also be relevant. Id. Evidence is relevant if it makes the existence of a fact of consequence to the case more likely or less likely to be true than without the evidence. ER 401. Finally, the Ritchie Court held that despite a trial court's erroneous refusal to conduct in camera review, a conviction could stand if nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 107 S.Ct. 989. In considering the impact of nondisclosure, a court must consider whether the information was already known to the defense or whether reasonable diligence would have uncovered the information through alternative means. Cf. Thomas, 150 Wash.2d at 851, 83 P.3d 970 (nondisclosure does not result in a Brady violation if the defendant could have obtained the information himself through reasonable diligence). ś 47 In this case, R.S. told defense counsel in an interview on August 8, 2000, that her last drug use was in April 1999. However, the dependency file reveals that R.S. had a serious relapse in June 2000 and had to go into drug treatment. In addition, while R.S. told defense counsel that she did not believe the dependency court had ordered her to get drug treatment, the court, in fact, had done so. [18] ś 48 Evidence Rule 608(b) provides that specific instances of a witness's conduct, introduced for purposes of attacking the witness's credibility, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence, but may, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the witness. ER 608(b). In exercising its discretion, the trial court may consider whether the instance of the witness's misconduct is relevant to the witness's veracity on the stand and whether it is germane or relevant to the issues presented at trial. State v. O'Connor, 155 Wash.2d 335, 349, 119 P.3d 806 (2005). While R.S.'s lie to defense counsel about her recent drug use was not a lie under oath because the August 8, 2000 interview was not a deposition, it was a very recent lie in response to questioning from defense counsel in the context of this case. R.S.'s lie was relevant to her veracity on the stand and it was relevant to this case. See O'Connor, 155 Wash.2d at 351, 119 P.3d 806. Thus, it is likely that the trial court would have allowed defense counsel to cross-examine her on the subject. Cf. RRP 2100-01 (allowing cross-examination of R.S. regarding instances of dishonesty with police that were more remote in time). ś 49 The State argues that because there were other avenues for impeaching R.S., the lie to defense counsel would not have been likely to change the outcome of the trial and nondisclosure was harmless. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked R.S. about five convictions for theft in the third degree that had occurred over the course of the prior 10 years, about R.S. giving false names to police on several occasions throughout the 1990s, about R.S.'s use of alcohol, marijuana, and crack cocaine on the day of the rape, and about inconsistencies in her accounts to police. ś 50 These other avenues for impeachment call into question the materiality of R.S.'s lie to defense counsel. However, the theft convictions and the instances of giving false names to police were not recent, while the August 2000 lie to defense counsel had occurred only weeks before. The lie occurred in the context of questioning regarding this case, and it undercut any argument that R.S. had reformed her old ways. Moreover, the State in closing argument repeatedly emphasized that the ultimate determination for the jury in this case was who was more credible, Gregory or R.S. RRP at 2906 (Did [R.S.] tell you the truth, or did Allen Gregory tell you the truth? That's the determination that you are going to have to make.); 2910 ( [I]t's his word against [R.S.'s]. It's 50-50. He has got a 50-50 chance you are going to believe him.); 2913 (It comes down to credibility. The question is, who are you going to believe, [R.S.] or Allen Gregory?); see also 2967 (noting that R.S. admitted that getting in the car was stupid and arguing that if she were lying, she would have made up a better story). While the State asserts that other avenues of impeachment render this additional information superfluous, at least one court has held that where credibility is a central question, if there is a reasonable probability that the cumulative effect of the undisclosed impeachment evidence, together with the disclosed impeachment evidence, would have affected the jury's assessment of the witness's credibility, then the exclusion should be considered prejudicial. See Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). Materiality of this impeachment evidence is a close question, but it seems impossible to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that cross-examination illuminating R.S.'s recent lie would not have impacted the outcome of the trial. To the contrary, under the facts of this case, the additional impeachment evidence in the dependency files could have reasonably impacted the outcome of the trial and nondisclosure was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore reverse the rape convictions. ś 51 Of the evidence discussed in Gregory's supplemental briefing, this was the only evidence that the trial court found to be relevant. Despite Gregory's additional arguments, we also conclude that no other information revealed in the dependency files is material, and Gregory has failed to successfully challenge any other evidentiary ruling in this case. [19] Gregory has raised several additional claims of error in the rape case. In the event of retrial, those issues could arise again and thus, we proceed to address Gregory's other claims of error.