Opinion ID: 848785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the petition clause: is there a public-figure versus private-figure distinction?

Text: The majority acknowledges that the defamation action in McDonald was brought pursuant to North Carolina's common law, which requires a showing of actual malice to recover for defamation, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a public or a private figure. [1] The majority concludes that this application of state law by the United States Supreme Court strongly signaled its view that all Free Speech Clause and Free Press Clause defamation doctrine developed in the past forty years is to be imported without change to constitutional adjudications arising under the Petition Clause [2] and rejects an alternative interpretation, instead relying on Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001). The majority states: In interpreting the federal constitution, state courts are not privileged to provide greater protections or restrictions when the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from doing so. [ Ante at 733 n. 9.] In Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding that it was free to interpret the United States Constitution to provide greater protection than United States Supreme Court federal constitutional precedent provides. The Sullivan Court noted that such a possibility was foreclosed by Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975): We reiterated in Hass that while a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards, it may not impose such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from imposing them. [ Sullivan at 772, 121 S.Ct. 1876, quoting Hass at 719, 95 S.Ct. 1215 (emphasis in original).] The majority's reliance on Sullivan is misplaced for two reasons. First, requiring all plaintiffs to prove that defamatory statements were made with actual malice in Petition Clause defamation cases would not impose a greater restriction than that imposed by the United States Supreme Court in McDonald. In fact, it would apply the same standard utilized by the Court in McDonald. The majority's reliance on Sullivan is also misplaced because the United States Supreme Court has not specifically refrained from applying the actual-malice standard to private-figure plaintiffs in Petition Clause defamation claims. This remains, as acknowledged by the majority, a question not yet decided by the United States Supreme Court. Further, in McDonald, the United States Supreme Court held that the right to petition should be accorded no greater protection than other First Amendment expressions, inasmuch as absolute immunity was held inappropriate. McDonald did not hold that the right to petition was limited to the same protection as the rights to free speech and free press. The Court did not indicate a clear intent to import the veritable plethora of jurisprudence surrounding the rights to free speech and free press into Petition Clause defamation. Moreover, the principles articulated in McDonald do not support the interpretation employed by the majority. The question the Court was presented with in McDonald was whether the Petition Clause of the First Amendment provides absolute immunity to a defendant charged with expressing libelous and damaging falsehoods in letters to the President of the United States. [ McDonald at 480, 105 S.Ct. 2787.] The Court repeatedly examined the claim of absolute immunity in light of the actual-malice standard. Reviewing early state libel cases, the McDonald Court determined that there were conflicting views of the privilege afforded petitioners: some states afforded petitioners absolute immunity, while others allowed recovery for petitioning activity performed maliciously, wantonly, and without probable cause.... Id. at 483, 105 S.Ct. 2787, quoting, Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & R. 23 (Penn., 1815). The McDonald Court also noted that in White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How) 266, 11 L.Ed. 591 (1845), it did not recognize an absolute privilege, rather it concluded that the defendant's petition was actionable if prompted by `express malice....' McDonald at 484, 105 S.Ct. 2787. The McDonald opinion does not mention negligence; it simply holds that there is not absolute immunity for Petition Clause defamation. As scholars have noted: The text [of McDonald ] merely requires proof of actual malice `defined ... in terms ... consistent with New York Times v. Sullivan .' If the Court had intended to establish the entire public/private figure [dichotomy] for Petition Clause [defamation] cases, [it] would have discussed Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc . [Gary, First Amendment Petition Clause immunity from tort suits: In search of a consistent doctrinal framework, 33 Idaho L. R. 67, 110 (1996) (citations omitted).] McDonald is more commonly interpreted as employing the actual-malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); to interpret McDonald as incorporating the public-figure and private-figure dichotomy is a misreading of the case. Gary at 109; see also, 4 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law (3d ed.), § 20.53, p. 690 n. 3 (The Petition Clause does not require state libel law to expand the qualified privilege already afforded by New York Times. ).