Opinion ID: 2828146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fraudulent Concealment Exception

Text: As the plaintiffs’ claims accrued at death, the claims are time-barred unless an exception or tolling mechanism applies. The plaintiffs argue that due to the hospital’s fraudulent concealment, the statute of limitation was equitably tolled, did not run, or that equitable estoppel prevents the hospital from relying on the statute of limitation as a defense. Though these are distinct legal concepts, under these circumstances they amount to an argument for a de facto exception to section 537.100 for fraudulent concealment. Faced with statutory language that does not provide the fraudulent concealment exception they seek, the plaintiffs contend that this Court should construe the limitation period for wrongful death found in section 537.100 to avoid frustrating the remedial purpose behind wrongful death. They argue that section 537.100 can be interpreted “with reference to its spirit and reason so that, even if a case falls within the letter of the statute, courts are not bound thereby if the case is not within the spirit and reason of the law and the plain intention of the legislature.” Essentially, they argue that the wrongful death statutory scheme’s purposes can be used to override or amend its statutory language. They believe Frazee was wrongly decided, particularly in light of law in other jurisdictions. 5 5 The plaintiffs cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions in support of a fraudulent concealment exception to section 537.100. This citation of authority is impressive and spans 12 This Court is presented with an extremely difficult decision. What occurred here is undoubtedly a tragedy, and the plaintiffs put forth what amounts to a compelling policy argument for why their suits should be allowed to proceed. This proposed “freewheeling” approach to statutory interpretation, however, is also troubling, particularly when the precedent of this Court counsels a different result. 6 1. Precedent Cautions Against Judicially-Created Exceptions As noted above, Frazee remains good law and is directly on point in this case. It unambiguously held that “[a] special statute of limitation must carry its own exceptions and we may not engraft others upon it.” 314 S.W.2d at 919. Despite the difficult result for the plaintiff, Frazee held that “[t]he legislature has not seen fit to enact for death actions either a tolling provision or a delayed accrual on account of fraud, concealment, or other improper act” and that it was “not the duty or the right” of the courts to add exceptions not provided for by statute. Id. at 919, 921. The principles of legislative deference as well as stare decisis must be respected. nearly 200 years. However, law from other states or the federal courts is not controlling in applying section 537.100. 6 The dissenting opinion argues this opinion ignores binding precedent on the interpretation of the wrongful death statute, citing O’Grady. Yet, notwithstanding the fact that O’Grady stated its holding was limited to the facts presented, 654 S.W.2d at 911, the language on which the dissent relies was made in a very different factual and legal context than here. And though the dissent casts aside the distinction, O’Grady does not control because it did not consider the statute of limitation. O’Grady weighed only the broad purposes behind the wrongful death statute. When a statute of limitation is also in play, however, its unique purposes should also be weighed. O’Grady never had to consider the purposes of the wrongful death statute in light of the purposes of the statute of limitation. Absent such analysis, O’Grady cannot conclusively determine this outcome. Frazee, however, which the dissent agrees is valid and binding, not only considered the wrongful death statute and section 537.100, but it did so in a similar context as this case – fraudulent concealment. Frazee controls over O’Grady. 13 Moreover, this is not the first time this Court has declined appealing policy arguments when applying statutes of limitation. In Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. banc 1968), this Court, in construing section 516.140, RSMo 1959, held that a plaintiff’s medical malpractice action was barred by the statute of limitation despite the claim that the injury – a foreign object left in the plaintiff’s back following a surgery in 1951 – could not have been discovered within the limitation period. This is because the statute of limitation did not contain a discovery provision. Id. at 313. In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument for the discovery rule, this Court stated that: This argument is appealing and has some force, so far as justice is concerned; in that respect the conclusion we reach is distasteful to us. But, the legislative branch of the government has determined the policy of the state and clearly fixed the time when the limitation period begins to run against actions for malpractice. This argument addressed to the court properly should be addressed to the General Assembly. Our function is to interpret the law; it is not to disregard the law as written by the General Assembly. Laughlin, 432 S.W.2d at 314. Addressing the result of Laughlin, the General Assembly in 1976 repealed section 516.140 and enacted section 516.105, a new special statute of limitation for medical malpractice actions with a specific provision that, for foreign objects left inside the body, the limitation period began to run from the date of discovery. 1976 Mo. Laws 767 (codified as amended at section 516.105, RSMo 2000). Similarly, in Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. banc 1998), this Court again addressed the statute of limitation for a medical malpractice action under section 516.105, RSMo 1994. In Weiss, the plaintiff received a routine gynecological examination and was told she would be notified of any abnormal results. Id. at 116. The 14 plaintiff was not notified that the test indicated a cancerous or precancerous condition. Id. During another examination nearly four years later, she discovered she had Stage IIb endocervix cancer. Id. She brought a medical malpractice action based on failure to notify, arguing that because her injury was not capable of being discovered until the subsequent examination, her claim was not barred by the two-year limitation period of section 516.105, RSMo 1994. Id. at 117. Weiss rejected the various proffered discovery theories and held that the discovery exception added after Laughlin was limited to cases concerning foreign objects. Id. at 120. Citing the above language from Laughlin, the Court noted that the outcome was a hardship to the plaintiff but that “[t]he general assembly evidenced its clear intent to limit a discovery rule to cases concerning foreign objects. That is its prerogative. This Court must follow the policy determination expressed there.” Id. at 121. Additionally, the plaintiff’s argument that equitable estoppel should prevent the defendant from asserting the statute of limitation as a defense was rejected. Id. at 120. In response, during the next legislative session in 1999, the General Assembly amended section 516.105, adding a discovery exception for cases where the act of negligence is “negligent failure to inform the patient of the results of medical tests.” 1999 Mo. Laws 329. Frazee, Laughlin, and Weiss do not seek to incentivize fraudulent acts. Rather, they stand for the principle that it is this Court’s role to interpret the law, not rewrite it. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ argument here is one better made to the General Assembly, which is in the best position to determine policy on exceptions to statutes of limitation. See Hunter, 237 S.W.2d at 104 (exceptions to statutes of limitation are matters of public 15 policy for the General Assembly; exceptions are to be strictly construed and not enlarged by courts upon considerations of hardship). 7 It is further noted that, although the result the plaintiffs argue for is appealing, the method of using a common law equitable maxim to work around the dictates of section 537.100 is inherently problematic. Equity should not be deployed in a manner that countermands the clear intent and language of the legislature, particularly in regard to a statutorily created cause of action. This Court has previously held that: Equity Courts may not disregard a statutory provision, for where the Legislature has enacted a statute which governs and determines the rights of the parties under stated circumstances, equity courts equally with courts of law are bound thereby. Equity follows the law more circumspectly in the interpretation and application of statute law than otherwise. Milgram v. Jiffy Equip. Co., 247 S.W.2d 668, 676-77 (Mo. 1952) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Implicit in the plaintiffs’ argument is that all equitable maxims become a part of all statutory schemes unless expressly written out of the law by the legislature. This merely invites the future reexamination by courts of otherwise settled areas of statutory interpretation, and this Court declines to so hold. 7 There is also historical precedent for this view: It was at one time held in regard to these [statutes of limitations], that where by reason of the defendant’s fraud the existence of a cause of action was concealed, it would furnish an equitable exception to the express language of the statute. [B]ut the idea that implied and equitable exceptions, which the Legislature has not made, are to be engrafted by the courts on a statute of limitations is now generally abandoned. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 277 (Pomeroy, ed., 2d ed. 1874, reprint 2012). 16 2. Legislative Intent of Section 537.100 The plaintiffs argue that the legislature could not have intended for the wrongful death statutory scheme to operate in this manner and that the primary rule of interpretation is to give effect to the legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute. See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Mo. banc 2015). Though it is rendered somewhat tertiary in light of the plain language of section 537.100 and precedent regarding judicially created exceptions to special statutes of limitation, the legislative history of section 537.100 indicates a legislative intent not to provide the exception the plaintiffs seek. Prior to the result in Frazee, the General Assembly twice amended section 537.100 to add exceptions. In 1905, a one-year savings provision to allow a new suit following dismissal without prejudice was added. 1905 Mo. Laws 137 (codified at section 2868, RSMo 1906). In 1909, a tolling provision for defendants who abscond from the state to avoid personal service was added. 1909 Mo. Laws 463 (codified at section 5429, RSMo 1909). In enacting these two exceptions to the limitation period, the General Assembly declined to adopt an exception for fraudulent concealment. Yet it appears the legislature was well aware of how to provide for a fraudulent concealment exception to a statute of limitation as such an exception, currently codified at section 516.280, has existed in Missouri for over 150 years. See Limitation: art. 8, sec. 3, RSMo 1836. The legislature could have added a fraudulent concealment exception to section 537.100, but it did not. 17 Even after Frazee, the General Assembly twice more amended section 537.100 but has never seen fit to craft a fraudulent concealment exception. Instead, it chose to alleviate the result in Frazee by enlarging the limitation period – first from one year to two years in 1967, then to three years in 1979. 1967 Mo. Laws 665; 1979 Mo. Laws 631. The Court respects these legislative choices and “presume[s] that the legislature acted with a full awareness and complete knowledge of the present state of the law.” State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Mo. banc 1984).