Opinion ID: 1746085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was Martin's Invalid Waiver Cured By the Appointment of Standby Counsel and Standby Counsel's Participation in the Trial?

Text: In addition to recognizing a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation in Faretta, the Supreme Court also held that a trial court may appoint `standby counsel' to assist the pro se defendant in the defense. 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581 n. 46. The trial court may appoint standby counsel even over the defendant's objection. Id. The purpose of the appointment of such counsel is to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. Id. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, the Court spelled out what role standby counsel may play consistent with the protection of the defendant's Faretta rights. 465 U.S. 168, 170, 104 S.Ct. 944, 947, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, 128 (1984). In spelling out that role, the Court imposed two general limitations upon standby counsel's unsolicited participation at trial. First, [t]he pro se defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the trial. Id. at 174, 104 S.Ct. at 949, 79 L.Ed.2d at 131; see also Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. Therefore, [i]f standby counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of importance, the Faretta right is eroded. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S.Ct. at 951, 79 L.Ed.2d at 133. Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that the defendant is representing himself. Id.; accord Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 658. As we said in Rater, [e]ssentially, standby counsel has two purposesto act as a safety net to ensure that the litigant receives a fair hearing of his claims and to allow the trial to proceed without the undue delays likely to arise when a layman presents his own case. 568 N.W.2d at 658. In McKaskle, the Court also recognized that the defendant can waive his or her Faretta rights: Participation by counsel with a pro se defendant's express approval is, of course, constitutionally unobjectionable. A defendant's invitation to counsel to participate in the trial obliterates any claim that the participation in question deprived the defendant of control over his own defense. Such participation also diminishes any general claim that counsel unreasonably interfered with the defendant's right to appear in the status of one defending himself. Id. at 182, 104 S.Ct. at 953, 79 L.Ed.2d at 136. Given this limited role of standby counsel, it is well-settled that the appointment of standby counsel is insufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the court has failed to conduct an inquiry to ensure the defendant's waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent. Rater, 568 N.W.2d at 661 (citing United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121, 1128 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956-57 (10th Cir. 1987)). The State, however, argues that, when standby counsel actually plays an active role in the criminal proceedings, then that involvement is sufficient to cure a defective waiver. The State cites only McKaskle to support its argument. McKaskle is not directly on point because the Court did not explain how participation of counsel could cure a defective waiver. Rather, the court was explaining how a defendant who invites the participation of counsel may not later claim that counsel inappropriately interfered with defendant's right to self-representation in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Nevertheless, some courts have used McKaskle's control-of-litigation standard in assessing whether standby counsel's participation cured the defective waiver. On this point, we note the Court in McKaskle concluded that standby counsel's participation in the trial did not interfere with the defendant's control over his defense. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 185, 104 S.Ct. at 954, 79 L.Ed.2d at 137. Significantly, in that case, standby counsel's participation consisted of informing the court of the whereabouts of witnesses, supplying the defendant with a form needed to elect to go to the jury at the punishment phase of the trial, explaining to the defendant that he should not argue his case while questioning a witness, and questioning a witness to lay a proper foundation for the introduction of an exhibit. Id. In Briscoe standby counsel participated in the presentation of the defendant's defense by making the opening statement, raising several objections, proffering evidence at the defendant's request, completing the direct examination of one witness, and making several motions. Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that notwithstanding this participation, the defendant, not standby counsel, continued to conduct all other aspects of his own defense and to make all of the strategic decisions normally made by counsel. Briscoe, 606 A.2d at 111 (citing McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77, 104 S.Ct. at 949-50, 79 L.Ed.2d at 132). The court further concluded that the record in this case does not support a conclusion that [the defendant's] standby counsel in any sense controlled the course of the litigation or undermined [the defendant's] `appearance before the jury in the status of a pro se defendant.' Id. (quoting McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 185, 104 S.Ct. at 954, 79 L.Ed.2d at 137). Based on this reasoning, the court held that standby counsel's participation did not cure the defendant's admittedly ineffective waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. Similarly, in United States ex rel. Axselle v. Redman , the federal district court recognized that under certain circumstances the performance of standby counsel may cure a defective waiver. 624 F.Supp. at 339 (a case of forced choice between proceeding with present counsel or proceeding pro se). However, the court concluded this was not one of those cases. Standby counsel at the defendant's request made an objection for him and moved for a mistrial that was overruled. Counsel also made three later objections and a motion for judgment of acquittal. On the last day of trial, the defendant specifically asked counsel to address the court on his behalf to introduce certain documents into evidence. The defendant conducted the examination of witnesses, testified in his own behalf, and made the opening and closing arguments to the jury. Citing McKaskle, the court refused to interpret defendant's requests of standby counsel as proof that counsel controlled the course of the litigation. Id. at 340. Here, Wolfe's participation fell well short of curing the defective waiver. Martin unquestionably controlled his defense. The record reveals that Martin formulated and directed his defense theories. He made an opening statement, conducted most of the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, made a motion for judgment of acquittal, and made a final argument. In contrast, Wolfe's role was limited. He was out of the courtroom during all of the State's case in chief and half way through Martin's defense. The only witness he examined was Martin, and the record shows that Martin directed a portion of this questioning. While Wolfe did make a motion to reopen the case, he made the motion at Martin's request. Wolfe also introduced certain evidence, but again this happened only after Martin requested Wolfe's assistance to do so.