Opinion ID: 1952727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We begin with an analysis of whether we have jurisdiction to consider a petition to review the administrative review afforded Powell by DCHA. See 14 DCMR § 1936.3 (1991). Our jurisdiction to hear a petition to review a decision by an administrative agency is limited to contested cases. See D.C.Code § 1-1510 (1999 Repl.); see also D.C.Code § 11-722 (1995 Repl.) (defining the jurisdiction of the court of appeals over administrative agencies). A contested case is a controversy involving a trial-type hearing that is required either by statute or by constitutional right, see Rones v. District of Columbia Dep't of Hous. & Community Dev., 500 A.2d 998, 1000 (D.C.1985) (citation omitted), and which is an adjudicative, as opposed to a legislative, determination. See Donnelly Assoc. v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Bd., 520 A.2d 270, 276 (D.C.1987). Because it is evident that Powell's termination from TAP is an adjudicative determination, see id. at 278 (defining an adjudication as a decision directed at the rights of specific individuals), whether we have jurisdiction depends solely on whether DCHA's decision was made in a trial-type hearing required by statute or the Constitution. Turning first to the statute authorizing TAP and the regulations implementing it, see J.C. & Assocs. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778 A.2d 296, 304 (D.C.2001) (holding that a right to a trial-type adjudication may arise under either statute or regulation), we find no requirement for a trial-type hearingand therefore no basis for our jurisdiction. The statute authorizing TAP is silent on due process protections. See D.C.Code § 45-2537 (2000 Supp.) (authorizing administrative appeal). [5] Regulations governing TAP provide the tenant an opportunity for [an] administrative review of the action as described in, see 14 DCMR § 1936.3 (1991), [6] but do not require substantive due process protections such as representation by counsel, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, fact-finding by an impartial adjudicator, or any of the other accoutrements of a trial-type hearing. [7] The administrative review, also referred to as an official review, see 14 DCMR § 1710.1, or a review meeting, see 14 DCMR § 1710.3, requires the official involved in the original decision and that person's supervisor, see 14 DCMR § 1710.3, to meet with the person requesting the review and reconsider the decision in light of any applicable information. See 14 DCMR § 1710.4. There are no formal processes required during the review meeting or in rendering the decision, other than that the DCHA staff participating in that meeting notify the claimant of the final decision within seven days of the review meeting, see 14 DCMR § 1710.5, which shall be the final administrative recourse on all matters of Tenant Assistance Program administration, see 14 DCMR § 1710.6. [8] If we have jurisdiction, therefore, it must be based on constitutional requirements. It is uncontested that Powell, as a recipient of a rental subsidy, has a constitutional right to due process before benefits may be terminated. Cf. Aikens v. District of Columbia Dep't of Hous. & Community Dev., 515 A.2d 712, 718 (D.C. 1986) (holding that participants in federally funded housing assistance have due process rights in the termination of benefits). Due process, however, is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (citation omitted). The question is whether the protections required here rise to the level of a trial-type adjudication that is a contested case. The Supreme Court held in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), that a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial was constitutionally required before the government suspended welfare benefits. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 (characterizing the holding of Goldberg ). The Goldberg Court held that the administrative agency must provide timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for the proposed termination; an effective opportunity [for the recipient] to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally; the opportunity for the appellant to retain counsel; an impartial decision maker; a decision resting solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the hearing; and a statement of reasons for the decision and the evidence relied upon. Id. at 325 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 893 (summarizing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 266-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011). To decide whether similar protections are merited before TAP benefits may be terminated, we consider three factors: (1) the nature of the private interest to be affected by official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the administrative and fiscal burdens of a substitute procedure. Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Our examination of the first factorthe nature of the private interest affected indicates that permanent disbarment from TAP requires similar due process protections as the temporary cessation of welfare benefits in Goldberg, where the Court emphasized that the property interest of the welfare beneficiary is heightened by its importance to obtaining essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. See 397 U.S. at 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011. TAP subsidies, like welfare payments, are designed to assist lower income families in obtaining the necessities of life. See D.C.Code § 45-2532 (1996 Repl.) (stating that the purpose of TAP is to aid[] lower-income families in obtaining a decent place to live); see also Aguiar v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 55 Haw. 478, 522 P.2d 1255, 1268 (1974) (holding that public housing is a variety of welfare subsidy the termination ... of which may jeopardize the economic survival of its recipients); cf. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-41, 96 S.Ct. 893 (commenting that recipients of income-based public assistance have a stronger due process interest in the continuation of benefits than recipients of other subsidies, such as disability payments). But unlike the temporary suspension of welfare benefits faced by the appellant in Goldberg, Powell has been permanently terminated from eligibility for housing benefits under TAP without regard to future need. See 14 DCMR § 1932.3. The similarity of the property interests involved here and in Goldberg, coupled with the permanent deprivation of TAP assistance, indicates that the property interest before us is a strong one demanding protection. DCHA counters that, assuming Powell had a property interest that entitled her to a trial-type hearing before her eligibility was terminated, she does not have a similar right to a post-termination hearing. Although Powell's administrative review had been initially scheduled to take place before her benefits ended, she requested a delay to seek counsel. According to DCHA, by this request she forfeited her due process rights based on an existing property interest, and she was in the position of a mere applicant at the time the hearing actually took place, citing Rones, 500 A.2d at 998. We disagree that the reasoning in Rones applies here. The loan applicant in Rones had no property interest because she had never received assistance in the past. See id. at 1001 n. 4. The same is not true for Powell. Moreover, it is illogical to argue that a person relinquishes a property interest by seeking the assistance of counsel to protect it. The second factorthe risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interestcounsels in favor of Goldberg protections as well, at least in matters which present complex factual and legal questions. Powell is accused, in essence, of common law fraud. [9] One of the elements of fraud is that the tortfeasor actually know that the misrepresentations are false, a subjective inquiry requiring the fact-finder to assess the state of mind of the person charged with fraud. See Jacobs v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 382 A.2d 282, 287 (D.C.1978). This is a fact-based inquiry based on documentation, determinations of witness credibility and inferences. Mathews explained that trial-type adjudications may be required where a wide variety of information may be deemed relevant, and issues of witness credibility and veracity ... are critical to the decision making process, 424 U.S. at 343-44, 96 S.Ct. 893, but not for more sharply focused and easily documented decision[s]. Id. Because termination of TAP eligibility for fraud can involve the evaluation of a wide array of information and witness credibility, it requires procedural protections to prevent error in adjudication. The fiscal and administrative burden of a trial-type adjudication, the third factor we consider, will be minimal. As is evident from this case, DCHA already allows for representation by counsel, presentation of evidence, cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and findings of fact. See Branch v. District of Columbia Dep't of Pub. & Assisted Hous., 661 A.2d 1102, 1104 (D.C.1995) (commenting that DCHA provides an independent trial-type review by a hearing examiner when terminating TAP benefits). Continuing to provide such protections will impose little or no additional cost on DCHA. We thus hold that, because of the importance of permanent ineligibility for rental subsidies to the subsistence of TAP participants, the fact-based nature of a fraud determination, and the minimal impact of imposing due process protections on the public purse, a trial-type hearing is constitutionally compelled. Cf. Davis v. Mansfield Metro. Hous. Auth., 751 F.2d 180, 185 n. 4 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that expulsion of public housing residents requires adequate notice, the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and a written decision by an impartial hearing panel based solely on evidence presented at the hearing); Gorsuch Homes, Inc. v. Wooten, 73 Ohio App.3d 426, 597 N.E.2d 554 (1992) (holding that, where termination of housing benefits depends upon resolution of disputed issues of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and to cross-examine adverse witnesses). But cf. Perry v. Royal Arms Apartments, 729 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that Goldberg protections for the termination of housing subsidies are not required where the eviction from public housing was already subject to due process protections under state law); Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.1983) (same). Therefore, we have jurisdiction of this contested case under D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (2001). [10]