Opinion ID: 2538686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carlstad and McLean

Text: Carlstad and McLean filed different types of collateral attacks on their judgments. Carlstad filed a PRP, while McLean filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A PRP is filed in the Court of Appeals, and a motion to withdraw guilty plea is filed in superior court. 1. Carlstad PRP. PRPs are special proceedings over which the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction (concurrent with the Supreme Court) and are governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. RAP 1.1(e), 16.3(c), 16.17. A PRP attacking a judgment must be filed within one year of the petitioner's judgment becoming final. RCW 10.73.090(1). Carlstad's judgment was final on April 17, 2000. Therefore, the one-year deadline for him to file his PRP was April 17, 2001. RAP 18.6 determines when a PRP may be considered filed. RAP 18.5, which applies to service and filing of PRPs, states that [p]apers required or permitted to be filed in the appellate court must be filed with the clerk. RAP 18.5(c). Although the mailbox rule is available for the filing of some documents, it is not available when filing a PRP: A brief authorized by Title 10 [Briefs] or Title 13 [Review by the Supreme Court of Court of Appeals Decision] is timely filed if mailed to the appellate court within the time permitted for filing. Except as provided in rule 17.4 [Filing and Service of Motion  Answer to Motion], any other paper, including a petition for review, is timely filed only if it is received by the appellate court within the time permitted for filing. RAP 18.6(c) (emphasis added). Carlstad filed his PRP alleging unlawful restraint pursuant to RAP 16.4(b) and (c). Because the filing of his PRP is not based on Title 10, Title 13, or RAP 17.4, under the plain language of RAP 18.6(c), his PRP is timely filed only if it is received by the appellate court within the time permitted for filing. Carlstad's PRP was not stamped received by the Court of Appeals until April 18, 2001, one day after the time permitted for filing. Here, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected the Hurt decision that adopted the mailbox rule. Carlstad, 114 Wash.App. at 453-54, 58 P.3d 301. The Court of Appeals first noted that Hurt was inapposite because it did not involve RAP 16.17 and RAP 18.6(c), which specifically preclude application of the mailbox rule for PRPs. Id. at 456, 58 P.3d 301. The Court of Appeals relied on its Robinson reasoning and noted that Hurt mentioned neither CrR 8.4 nor CR 5(e). Id. at 456-57, 58 P.3d 301. Carlstad's PRP was not timely according to the plain language of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We, therefore, affirm the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Carlstad's PRP. 2. McLean motion to withdraw guilty plea. A motion to withdraw guilty plea is filed in superior court and, if filed after the judgment is final, is governed by CrR 7.8. CrR 4.2(f). To obtain relief from the judgment, a defendant must make a motion stating the grounds upon which relief is requested. CrR 7.8(c)(1). The superior court may transfer the motion to the Court of Appeals for consideration as a PRP if such transfer would serve the ends of justice. CrR 7.8(c)(2). Like a PRP attacking a judgment, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within one year after the judgment becomes final. RCW 10.73.090; CrR 7.8(b). McLean's judgment was final on January 21, 2000. The deadline for his motion to withdraw guilty plea was January 21, 2001. Because January 21, 2001 fell on a Sunday, his deadline was extended to Monday, January 22,2001. CrR 8.1; CR 6(a). McLean asserts that CR 5(e) defines where a paper should be filed (with the clerk of the court), but, unlike RAP 18.6(c), it does not define when a filing occurs. McLean contends that CR 5(e) is almost identical to the federal rule at issue in Houston v. Lack . But the court rule analyzed in Houston differs from the court rule at issue in Mc-Lean. The Houston Court based its decision on the fact that the federal rules did not set forth criteria for determining the moment at which the `filing' has occurred. Houston, 487 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct, 2379. The Houston Court analyzed Fed. R.App. P. 3(a), which defines appeal without defining filing. This case concerns CR 5(e), which is the definition of filing. Filing occurs when the papers are filed with the clerk of the court, not when papers are sent to the clerk of the court. Elsewhere in CR 5, a version of the mailbox rule is explicitly adopted for the service of papers. CR 5(b)(2)(A). That mailbox rule could just as easily have been adopted for filing papers with the court, but it was not. Interpreting CR 5(e) in conjunction with CR 5(b)(2)(A) leads us to the conclusion that the mailbox rule for pro se prisoners would be inconsistent with our court rules. [4] The Court of Appeals in McLeav rejected the Hurt decision as well. McLean, noted at 115 Wash.App. 1030, 2003 WL 264749, at . The court agreed with Carlstad's analysis that CR 5(e), particularly considered in context with CR 5(b)(2)(A), provides a definition of filing inconsistent with the federal mailbox rule. Id. Although both Hurt and McLean addressed motions to withdraw a guilty plea, the McLean court ultimately rejected Hurt because it failed to consider CrR 8.4, CR 5, and Robinson. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals and affirm the dismissal of McLean's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was not timely filed.