Opinion ID: 4669093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Justification under New York Law

Text: Tardif also contends that the district court erred by instructing the jury on the availability of a justification defense to assault and battery claims under New York law. “We review a claim of error in the district court’s jury instructions de novo . . . .” Sheng v. M&TBank Corp., 848 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2014)). “A jury charge is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard, or if it does not adequately inform the jury of the law.” Dancy v. McGinley, 843 F.3d 93, 116 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1996)). In describing the purported error in this case, Tardif takes the position that under state law, “any force used” in a non-arrest context “must give rise to a claim for assault and battery,” and no justification is permitted. Appellant’s Br. at 38-39. Contrary to Tardif’s contention, New York courts have never articulated such a sweeping theory of assault-and-battery liability and we decline to do so here. Instead, as set forth below, we hold that New York law—consistent with federal Section 1983 excessive force jurisprudence—permits a police officer to use an 33 objectively reasonable degree of force in the performance of a public duty, including a non-arrest situation. The elements of New York assault and battery and Section 1983 excessive force claims are “substantially identical.” Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 94-95 (2d Cir. 1991). Under New York law, civil assault “is an intentional placing of another person in fear of imminent harmful or offensive contact.” Charkhy v. Altman, 678 N.Y.S.2d 40, 41 (1st Dep’t 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Girden v. Sandals Int'l, 262 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 2001). Civil battery “is an intentional wrongful physical contact with another person without consent.” Charkhy, 678 N.Y.S.2d at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Girden, 262 F.3d at 203. To succeed on assault or battery claims in the law enforcement context, a plaintiff must also demonstrate that the defendant officer’s conduct “was not reasonable within the meaning of the New York statute concerning justification of law enforcement’s use of force in the course of their duties.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 391 (2d Cir. 2005); accord Jamison v. Metz, 541 F. App’x 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order). 34 New York Penal Law § 35.30 establishes a justification defense for an officer’s use of force in the performance of several enumerated public duties. The statute states, in relevant part, that: A police officer . . . may use physical force when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect [an] arrest, or to prevent [an] escape from custody, or in self-defense or to defend a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force. N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(1). 13 Section 35.30(1) “requires the jury to conduct precisely the same analysis as does the reasonableness standard” under the Fourth Amendment. Heath v. Henning, 854 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, per the text of the statute, the use of physical force “when and to the extent [the officer] reasonably believes such to be necessary,” is the “functional equivalent” of an objective reasonableness standard. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30(1)). Although Tardif argues that this justification defense is limited to 13Although codified in New York’s penal law compilation, New York courts have applied Section 35.30 to both civil and criminal claims against police officers. Compare Brunelle v. City of New York, 702 N.Y.S.2d 648, 648-49 (2d Dep’t 2000) (applying the justification statute to civil action against the City by police officer seeking to recover damages from injury sustained from fellow officer in the course of performing their duties), with People v. Colecchia, 674 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1st Dep’t 1998) (applying the justification statute to manslaughter charge against police officer). 35 the circumstances enumerated in Section 35.30(1), and thus cannot apply to a nonarrest situation involving crowd control, we disagree for several reasons. First, we have never limited public authority defenses under New York law to arrest situations. To the contrary, as noted above, we held in Nimely that, even though justification is a defense under New York Penal Law, a lack of justification is part of a plaintiff’s burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of an officer’s action “in the course of their duties.” 414 F.3d at 391. Second, both the penal law and case authority in New York make clear the limited grounds for justification articulated in Section 35.30 are not meant to be exhaustive as it relates to any police action. With respect to the statutory framework, New York Penal Law § 35.05(1) states, in relevant part, that “use of physical force . . . is justifiable and not criminal when . . . [it] is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions.” Id. (emphasis added); see also People v. Mattison, 428 N.Y.S.2d 355, 357 (3d Dep’t 1980) (“[Section 35.05(1)] is chiefly meant to afford limited protection when provisions defining malum prohibitum offenses are violated in the performance of official responsibilities.”). 14 The New York Court of Appeals likewise, without 14Tardif’s assertion that the New York Pattern Jury Instructions (“PJI”) on a justification defense support her interpretation of New York law is also unavailing. Appellant’s Br. 36 any reference to limitations on the use of force to arrest situations, has described the analysis of a police officer’s use of force as more broadly focusing upon whether such force was “more than necessary under all the circumstances.” Jones v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 280 (1973) (analyzing force used by corrections officer during a riot at a prison under the same standard as would be used by the police in “making an arrest, maintaining someone in custody or investigating a traffic infraction”); see also Kline v. State, 278 N.Y. 615, 616 (1938) (finding that liability existed for an assault on plaintiff by troopers during a clash with a group of people on a highway trying to block a truck, where the force was “without cause or provocation and unjustifiable”); Disla v. City of New York, 986 N.Y.S. 2d 463, 465 (1st Dep’t 2014) (stating that “battery committed in the performance of a public duty” requires “excessive force”). Pursuant to this legal framework, New York courts have dismissed assault and battery claims in non-arrest situations where it was clear from the record that at 37 (citing 2A N.Y. PJI–Civil 3:4). The pattern instruction is based upon New York Penal Law § 35.30 and discusses the circumstances enumerated in that section, including an arrest. However, nothing in the PJI suggests that such situations are exclusive. To the contrary, the instruction at issue is broadly entitled “Battery Committed in Performance of Public Duty or Authority.” 2A N.Y. PJI–Civil 3:4 (emphasis added). Moreover, the comment for this instruction also broadly references “performance of a public duty,” which would undoubtedly include crowd control by a police officer. See id. cmt. at 24-25. 37 the use of force was justified and reasonable. In Harris v. City of New York, for example, the Second Department affirmed the dismissal of assault and battery claims because officers, while executing a search warrant for the plaintiff’s house, used “reasonable force to effectuate the detention of the occupants” by handcuffing them for the duration of the search. 62 N.Y.S.3d 411, 413-14 (2d Dep’t 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, in Ahmad v. City of New York, the First Department held that “minor contact between plaintiff’s and the officer’s hands did not constitute excessive force,” where an officer effecting a traffic stop on foot made contact with the plaintiff while reaching into the car for the gear shift. 15 101 N.Y.S.3d 48, 49 (1st Dep’t 2019). Finally, we note that Tardif’s position would render a police officer incapable of performing some of his or her most basic functions and responsibilities using reasonable force, without being subject to civil liability for 15 In this regard, New York law is entirely consistent with the scope of the analysis of a police officer’s use of force under the Fourth Amendment in both arrest and non-arrest situations. More specifically, in Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court recognized that, where the use of force occurs “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen,” courts should analyze the reasonableness of the use of force, which generally requires “a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). 38 assault or battery. In other words, if an officer’s ability to lawfully use any force is constrained to the narrow contours of Section 35.30, a police officer would have no authority to make any degree of physical contact in the performance of a plethora of non-arrest duties, such as patting down a suspect during a traffic stop, stopping a distracted pedestrian from walking into oncoming traffic, or engaging in basic crowd control on New Year’s Eve in a packed Times Square or at a large demonstration. Thus, Tardif’s interpretation of New York law is not only contrary to the relevant case authority, but also defies logic from a practical standpoint. See Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 56-57 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.) (“It is axiomatic, for instance, that government officials may stop or disperse public demonstrations or protests where ‘clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears.’” (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940))); see also Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 541-42 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Our sister circuits and district courts in this Circuit have routinely applied excessive force principles to crowd control situations. Training our focus on controlling authority, we see that this Court has repeatedly emphasized that officers engaging with protesters must 39 comply with the same principles of proportionality attendant to any other use of force.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, although neither of the two police encounters at issue on March 21, 2012 involved Tardif’s arrest, we hold that the district court correctly determined, under New York law, that the jury should be given an instruction regarding justification in connection with Tardif’s assault and battery claims involving Sergeants Mattera and McManus as it related to their alleged use of force on that date.