Opinion ID: 2071243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the merits of the district court judgment

Text: [¶ 12] When the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review the decision of the District Court directly. See Beck v. Beck, 1999 ME 110, ¶ 6, 733 A.2d 981, 983. Jaeckel argues that the District Court erred by dismissing her motion for relief from judgment and by enforcing the property division in the divorce decree despite her argument of promissory estoppel. [1] [¶ 13] Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, governing motions for relief from judgment, provides: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons; ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. Rule 60(b) also provides that motions brought pursuant to subsections (5) and (6) should be brought within a reasonable time. M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). We review a denial of a motion for relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Hamill v. Liberty, 1999 ME 32, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 616, 618. When the trial court has correctly understood the facts and the law relevant to its analysis, we will defer to its ability to give weight to the appropriate factors under the law, and will find an abuse of discretion only where the court made a `serious mistake' in weighing those factors. Id. (citing West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. State Tax Assessor, 1997 ME 58, ¶ 7, 691 A.2d 1211, 1213). [¶ 14] Jaeckel's motion for relief from judgment came fourteen years after the divorce decree was filed and six and one half years after she first became aware that there was a dispute regarding the ownership of the properties. The District Court's determination that these delays were unreasonable was not an abuse of discretion. Compare Zink v. Zink, 687 A.2d 229, 232 (Me.1996) (dismissal of Rule 60(b)(6) motion as untimely brought four years after judgment was not an abuse of discretion), with Scott v. Lipman & Katz, P.A., 648 A.2d 969, 972 (Me.1994) (court's determination that Rule 60(b)(6) motion was timely when filed 364 days after court accepted settlement was not an abuse of discretion). Therefore, the court did not err by dismissing her motion. [¶ 15] Furthermore, we find no error in the court's assessment of the merits of Jaeckel's motion for relief from judgment. Jaeckel bore the burden of demonstrating that the divorce decree should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b). See Beck, 1999 ME 110, ¶ 6, 733 A.2d at 983. Even assuming that the court accepted Jaeckel's representations that the parties had subsequently modified their divorce decree by mutual agreement, this does not necessarily require the equitable remedy of setting aside an otherwise final judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). In Beck we found that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying a husband's motion for relief from his prior divorce judgment and noted, [i]f [the parties] had agreed to relieve [the husband] of his child support payments and simultaneously relieve [the wife] of her mortgage payments, a court modification of the divorce judgment to reflect that agreement should have been sought. Id. at ¶ 7, 733 A.2d at 984. In this case, however, the court explicitly found that Tarbuck and Jaeckel had not reached an agreement altering the ownership of the property provided for in the settlement agreement. Therefore, the court's assessment of the merits of Jaeckel's motion for relief from judgment did not exceed the bounds of its discretion. [¶ 16] With respect to the court's decision to enforce the terms of the divorce decree governing the property division between the parties, Jaeckel argues that the court did not properly consider her claim of promissory estoppel. We have adopted the formulation of the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts: A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires. See Daigle Commercial Group, Inc. v. St. Laurent, 1999 ME 107, ¶ 14, 734 A.2d 667, 672 (citations omitted). [¶ 17] The court found, however, that one of the essential elements, i.e., a promise, was missing when it made its findings of fact in response to Jaeckel's Rule 52 motion: Subsequent to the divorce Plaintiff and Defendant held several discussions concerning management of the respective parcels of real estate resulting in an agreement that Plaintiff would manage the properties in Augusta and Pittston, Maine, while Defendant would manage the property located in North Hampton, New Hampshire. The parties did not reach an agreement as to the transfer of said properties, however. (Emphasis added.) We review findings of fact for clear error and will affirm unless there is no credible evidence in the record to support the findings. See Dowley v. Morency, 1999 ME 137, ¶ 13, 737 A.2d 1061, 1066-67. [¶ 18] Although Jaeckel testified that there was such an agreement, Tarbuck explicitly denied ever agreeing to give up his interest in the North Hampton property in exchange for Jaeckel giving up her interests in the Augusta and Pittston properties. We give deference to a trial court's determinations regarding credibility. See Estate of Siebert, 1999 ME 156, ¶ 10, 739 A.2d 365, 368. The District Court did not commit clear error by rejecting Jaeckel's representations that Tarbuck had promised to give up his interest in the North Hampton property and finding that the parties never reached a separate agreement regarding the ownership of the disputed properties. The court's finding that there was no promise on which Jaeckel could rely thereby foreclosed her argument of promissory estoppel in defense to the enforcement action. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the District Court enforcing the terms of the parties' divorce decree. Furthermore, because Jaeckel's arguments regarding the amount of arrearage were raised for the first time on appeal, see footnote 1, supra, we affirm the amount of child support arrearage awarded by the court.