Opinion ID: 2212241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: deweys' cross appeal

Text: In their cross appeal, the Deweys assert that the trial court erred in reducing the rate of pre-judgment interest on the actual damage award from ten percent to six percent. They contend that the jury's award was justified because ten percent interest was the rate set forth in Curtis's original promissory note to them. See Hirschkorn v. Severson, 319 N.W.2d 475, 480 (N.D.1982); NDCC 32-03-04, 32-03-05, and 47-14-05. However, in this case the jury was instructed: If you return a verdict awarding damages to the Plaintiff, interest thereon at a rate not greater than six percent per annum from the date of the wrongdoing may be awarded in your discretion. The Deweys did not specifically object to this instruction. We believe that this instruction became the law of the case whether right or wrong. See Karst v. Vickers, supra ; Montana-Dakota Utilities Company v. Culver, supra . Unlike the erroneous instruction on imputing fraud and deceit which favored the complaining party on appeal, i.e., the Bank, [ supra at p. 444], the allegedly erroneous instruction on interest did not favor the Deweys, who complain about it. It was the Deweys' duty to object to this unfavorable instruction in order to claim that it was erroneous on appeal. See Bartholomay v. St. Thomas Lumber Company, supra . We believe that their failure to object to this instruction makes applicable the general doctrine of the law of the case. We conclude that the trial court did not err in reducing the rate of pre-judgment interest awarded by the jury to the maximum rate authorized by the unchallenged instruction. We have considered the other issues raised by the parties and deem them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment and post-trial orders are affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C.J., LEVINE and VANDE WALLE, JJ., and VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, concur. VERNON R. PEDERSON, Surrogate Judge, sitting in place of GIERKE, J., disqualified.