Opinion ID: 2246592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Constitutionality; Burden on Defendant

Text: Defendant next makes a series of challenges to the death penalty itself. We hold here, however, as we have in several other cases, that these challenges are without merit. Defendant first contends that the Illinois death penalty statute unconstitutionally places the burden of persuasion on the defendant. Although defendant does not specifically so state, we assume, via the process of elimination, that this portion of defendant's argument is based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Illinois death penalty statute states, in pertinent part, as follows: If the jury determines unanimously that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(g).) Defendant contends that this language unconstitutionally places the burden upon him to prove that death should not be imposed and creates a mandatory rebuttable presumption in favor of the death penalty. (See Francis v. Franklin (1985), 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344. We have repeatedly stated that no such unconstitutional burden-shifting is encompassed in the statute. People v. Jones (1988), 123 Ill.2d 387, 426-27, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648 (the statutory scheme does not have the effect of casting on a defendant the burden of establishing mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty), citing People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 147-48, 97 Ill.Dec. 430, 492 N.E.2d 1303; People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 546-47, 94 Ill. Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949; People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 49, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223. See also People v. Guest (1987), 116 Ill.2d 72, 107 Ill.Dec. 188, 506 N.E.2d 1243; People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill.2d 170, 102 Ill.Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355; People v. Del Vecchio (1985), 105 Ill.2d 414, 86 Ill.Dec. 461, 475 N.E.2d 840. Defendant contends, irrespective of the wealth of authority upholding the constitutionality of the Illinois statute, that the Illinois Supreme Court cases present a conflict. In People v. Olinger (1986), 112 Ill.2d 324, 351, 97 Ill.Dec. 772, 493 N.E.2d 579, we stated that once the State established the existence of statutory aggravating factors defendant had the burden of coming forward with evidence of mitigating factors. We note, however, that the burden of coming forward with evidence and the burden of proving a fact are entirely different concepts. (See McKoy v. North Carolina (1990), 494 U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (White J., concurring).) It can hardly be termed a burden for defendant to put forth into evidence mitigating factors. These exist in every instance. In fact, the jury is specifically permitted to consider mitigating factors regardless of from what source it finds them. After these mitigating factors are presented, the jury or judge then engages in a process of balancing mitigating and aggravating factors to determine whether the death sentence is appropriate in a particular instance. There is no presumption that the death sentence is appropriate. We note also that the following statement from People v. Owens (1984), 102 Ill.2d 88, 114, 79 Ill.Dec. 663, 464 N.E.2d 261, is not inconsistent with the law in Illinois as we have restated it in other cases: When there is no mitigating factor for the court to weigh against an aggravating factor that has been found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, the statute obligates the judge to impose the death sentence, as the sentencing court here observed. In Owens, the State bore its burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating factor. The defendant did not put forth any mitigating factors and, because the jury could not find sufficient mitigating factors elsewhere, the defendant was appropriately sentenced to death. Neither Owens nor any other Illinois death penalty case has required a defendant to overcome a presumption that the death penalty is proper. The Illinois statute requires only that, where the State presents evidence that the death penalty is appropriate, the defendant must also present evidence that it is inappropriate or otherwise leave himself at the mercy of the jury to find a sufficient reason not to impose the death sentence. After that, the sentencer is charged with making an individualized determination of the propriety of the death sentence in each particular case. This scheme is consistent with existing constitutional precedent. Defendant's argument, therefore, is without merit. Defendant next argues that, even if the Illinois death penalty statute is not facially unconstitutional, it was made so in this case by the jury instructions and the prosecutor's remarks during the sentencing hearing. Defendant specifically challenges several instructions that informed the jury that the court would sentence defendant to death if the jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence. (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 7C.04, 7C.06, 7C.08, 7C.09 (2d ed. Supp. 1987).) Defendant also challenges several statements that the prosecutor made in which he reiterated the contents of these instructions. Defendant makes his first challenge to these instructions and statements in this appeal. Where no objection was made at trial or in a post-trial motion, the challenge is waived. ( People v. Huckstead (1982), 91 Ill.2d 536, 543-44, 65 Ill.Dec. 232, 440 N.E.2d 1248.) His objection, therefore, is waived. Defendant asserts that we should nevertheless address his challenges because the proffered instructions and the prosecutor's statements amounted to plain error. We decline to do so, however, because we find that the proffered instructions and the comments of the prosecutor did not misstate the law, let alone deny defendant a fair trial. We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant's argument that this court should address his challenges irrespective of the fact that he failed to object to the instructions or the prosecutor's remarks at trial or in a post-trial motion because the instructions are Illinois pattern instructions. Stating objections to the trial court is not simply a ministerial act. There are at least five significant reasons for stating objections to the trial court, as the appellate court of Illinois has noted: (1) [T]o insure that the trial court is informed of possible errors so that the court has an opportunity to correct those errors; (2) to give the reviewing court the benefit of the judgment and observations of the trial court with regard to the issues raised on appeal; (3) to prevent a defendant from objecting to that in which he has acquiesced during the course of trial; (4) to eliminate unnecessary reviews and reversals; and (5) to prevent the possibility of unlimited litigation. ( People v. Lett (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 467, 470-71, 18 Ill.Dec. 744, 378 N.E.2d 208.) In light of this statement, with which we concur, we find no merit in defendant's argument that we should review matters, irrespective of the fact that no objection was raised in the trial court, when counsel perceives that such an objection holds little hope for success. Defendant next argues that the Illinois death penalty statute facially violates the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution because it imparts a presumption that death is the appropriate penalty, which defendant must overcome. Defendant acknowledges that we have repeatedly addressed and rejected this argument, but he argues that a recent Federal court of appeals ruling should persuade us to reconsider. We will not. In Adamson v. Ricketts (9th Cir.1988), 865 F.2d 1011, 1041-44, the court ruled that the Arizona death penalty statute, which is similar to ours, is unconstitutional because it imparts a presumption of death that abrogates the Supreme Court mandate in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961, that the capital sentencing determination take into account the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense. We note first that we are not bound by constitutional precedent set by a Federal court construing the law of another State. We also remain convinced that the Illinois death penalty statute is constitutionally permissible. The Adamson court found that the language in the Arizona statute, sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, creates a presumption of death once an aggravating circumstance is found. Defendant contends that the language in the Illinois statute, sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, makes our statute unconstitutional as well. We think, however, that the result in Adamson turned on the language in the Arizona statute that places the burden on the defendant to establish mitigating circumstances: The burden of establishing the existence of the circumstances set forth in subsection G [mitigating circumstances] of this section is on the defendant. (Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-703 (Supp. 1983-84).) In Illinois, no such burden exists. The Illinois statute specifically confers upon the State the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of aggravating factors. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(f).) The jury may consider mitigating factors, however, regardless of from where they are found. The jury is charged with determining whether the mitigating factors which it finds, regardless of where it found them, outweigh the aggravating factor or factors that the State is charged with proving. The Adamson court acknowledged this distinction. (865 F.2d at 1043 n. 51 (distinguishing Campbell v. Kincheloe (9th Cir. 1987), 829 F.2d 1453).) The Campbell court, which was also a panel from the Ninth Circuit, affirmed the constitutionality of the Washington capital punishment statute regardless of the fact that it too requires the court to impose the death sentence if it cannot find sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. (829 F.2d at 1466.) In light of this, we are not persuaded that we should abandon a wealth of precedent that establishes that the Illinois death penalty statute does not violate the eighth amendment. We note finally that the United States Supreme Court has apparently put this argument to rest in Blystone v. Pennsylvania (1990), 494 U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255. Defendant also argues that the Illinois death penalty statute violates the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution because it places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to establish sufficient mitigating circumstances to preclude the death sentence. As we stated earlier in this opinion, this court has repeatedly addressed this issue and rejected it. See, e.g., People v. Jones (1988), 123 Ill.2d 387, 123 Ill.Dec. 944, 528 N.E.2d 648.