Opinion ID: 3014242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 3d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1994). To

Text: establish plain error, a defendant must VII. Admission of Alleged prove that there is “(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is Prior Consistent Statements ‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affects substantial rights.’ If all three conditions are met, an Mitchell’s final objection is to what appellate court may then exercise its he regards as the admission of certain discretion to notice a forfeited error, but prior consistent statements by the only if (4) the error ‘seriously affects the government’s key lay witness, Kim fairness, integrity, or public reputation of Chester. Mitchell contends that, judicial proceedings.’” Johnson v. following his attack on Chester’s United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) credibility during cross-examination, the (citations omitted). government on redirect sought to rehabilitate her by introducing prior The government’s redirect consistent statements. Mitchell’s examination of Ms. Chester elicited three argument is that the District Court erred things. First, she had met with FBI in letting the prosecution proceed as it agents and given them a statement. did because those statements were Second, that statement included hearsay not within any hearsay discussions of Mitchell, Bookie, and T’s exception. We conclude that, in fact, no activities. Third, she had testified before hearsay was introduced, and therefore regarding their activities. (This Mitchell’s objection fails. testimony was in Mitchell’s first trial, though the jury, of course, did not learn Although counsel for Mitchell this.) The examination did not establish objected at pertinent points during the the contents of those prior statements, redirect examination of Chester on merely their existence and subject matter. various specific grounds, no hearsay The prosecution used the existence of objection was made. Thus Mitchell has these prior statements during closing failed to preserve this objection for arguments to bolster Chester’s credibility appeal. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1); with a “dog that did not bark” argument. United States v. Sandini, 803 F.2d 123, That is, the prosecutor offered the jury 126 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that specific the line of reasoning that if these 53 statements existed, and they were statements were introduced. Rule harmful to Ms. Chester’s credibility, then 801(c), which defines “hearsay,” Mitchell surely would have introduced concerns only “statements,” and so the them. The fact that he did not, the first question to ask is whether the prosecutor argued, must mean that they government elicited a statement. were not inconsistent, and that Ms. “A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or Chester was in fact a reliable and written assertion or (2) nonverbal consistent witness.31 conduct of a person, if it is intended by Mitchell claims that the government the person as an assertion.” Fed. R. introduced Chester’s prior consistent Evid. 801(a). Nonverbal conduct is statements (to the FBI and at Mitchell’s plainly not at issue. Chester’s prior first trial) to rehabilitate her in the wake statements may be oral or written of attacks on her credibility during cross- assertions, but they were not actually examination. While the government’s introduced. Testimony about the motive was to rehabilitate Ms. Chester, existence of a statement is not itself a we do not agree that any hearsay “statement.” Furthermore, to the extent that Chester testified that certain matters were discussed on prior occasions, that 31 The relevant portion from the testimony was not “offered . . . to prove prosecutor’s closing argument was: the truth of the matter asserted,” Fed. R. Indeed, you heard, [Ms. Evid. 801(c), and thus not inadmissible Chester] had testified in a prior under Rule 802.32 Thus the District proceeding. Did you hear counsel take the notes from that and say, 32 well, isn’t it true you said In fact, the entire situation is something different before? No. analogous to the typical unremarkable I suggest to you that the reason nonhearsay use of out-of-court was because she didn’t. statements. For example, testimony that Did he take that statement that “I heard another tenant in my building the agent took from her, the seven complain to the landlord about a page statement and say, now dangerous condition on the stairs” is didn’t you say something admissible to prove that the landlord had different? notice (but not that the stairs were in a  dangerous condition). In that case, You didn’t hear [defense testimony that someone spoke to the counsel] try to impeach her with landlord does not involve any the statement that she had given to “statement” at all, and the subject matter the agents back in December of of the conversation is not “offered . . . to 1991. prove the truth of the matter asserted,” App. 1991a, 1994a. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). 54 Court committed no error. APPENDIX: Colloquies with the District Court Regarding Admissibility of Moreover, even if Chester’s Mitchell’s Proposed Experts. testimony were hearsay, we would not reverse Mitchell’s conviction, because With the exception of identifying the the third prong of the Johnson plain error prosecutor and defense counsel, the test is not met. The “substantial right” following transcripts are verbatim the implicated in erroneous admission of transcript supplied in this Court. We hearsay in a criminal trial is the Sixth have not attempted to repunctuate it, but Amendment Confrontation Clause. See, have noted possible errors in e.g., Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The transcription or in speaking. What Clause has little weight when the follows is the District Court’s colloquy declarant is actually on the stand, as was with counsel following its ruling on the the case here. Moreover, the whole issue admissibility of the government’s expert was collateral (it went only to testimony: credibility), and Mitchell had done a THE COURT: Counsel, the matter relatively unconvincing job of presently pending before the undermining Ms. Chester’s credibility on Court is in reference to the cross-examination. In our view, defense motion to exclude the rehabilitated or otherwise, the jury would Government’s fingerprint have given the same weight to Ms. identification evidence and based Chester’s testimony. on the Daubert hearing and also Kumho, this court denies the defendant’s motion and pursuant VIII. Conclusion thereto, this court is not going to The judgment of the District Court make a determination as to the will be affirmed. particular area of scientific knowledge and technical or specialized knowledge. We are going to grant the motion with respect to the expert pursuant to Rule 702 and as stated in Kumho, not only would it be difficult to prove, but almost impossible for a