Opinion ID: 2751914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 3 Sentence.

Text: The defendant's remaining claim of error targets his sentence on the firearm possession charge (count 3). His thesis is that the sentence imposed must be vacated because it exceeds the statutory maximum. Inasmuch as this claim is raised for the first 2 The defendant likewise laments that the AUSA referenced certain facts not otherwise before the court concerning the defendant's involvement of his common-law partner's son in the robbery. While this reference may have been overzealous, it was not objected to and, in all events, this aspect of the government's advocacy in no way communicated support for a sentence beyond the upper range of 137 months, fully in line with the Agreement. -15- time on appeal, our review is for plain error. See Duarte, 246 F.3d at 60. The statute of conviction for count 3 is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The maximum sentence authorized by Congress for a violation of this statute is 10 years (120 months). See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). In this case, count 3 was grouped with count 1 for purposes of calculating the applicable offense level. See USSG §3D1.2(a). The court warrantably determined that the GSR was 130 to 162 months and then imposed a 150-month concurrent sentence on each of the two grouped counts. With respect to count 3, this sentence constituted clear and obvious error. Guideline calculations simply cannot usurp a maximum level of imprisonment established by Congress. See United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 786 (1st Cir. 1995). Nor does grouping by some mysterious alchemy blend the maximum penalties for each of the grouped counts. See USSG §5G1.2, comment. (n.1) (explaining that when a defendant is sentenced for multiple convictions, the separate statutory maximums limit each sentence). Consequently, the 150-month sentence on count 3 is above the maximum sentence permitted by law. Notwithstanding this manifest error, the government argues that resentencing is unwarranted because the incorrect sentence did not affect the defendant's substantial rights and, therefore, did not amount to plain error. This argument is -16- premised on the defendant's identical and concurrent 150-month sentence on count 1. We have not adopted a uniform rule about whether, without a preserved claim of error, a defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of a statutory maximum is entitled to relief even though his overall period of immurement will not be affected. Compare, e.g., United States v. Matos, 611 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (denying relief), with United States v. GarcíaOrtiz, 528 F.3d 74, 84-85 (1st Cir. 2008) (granting relief). Although particular cases may differ, flexibility exists and, under normal circumstances, our discretion should be exercised in favor of trimming back an excessive sentence. Our reasoning follows. To begin, in an appropriate case, leaving intact a sentence that exceeds a congressionally mandated limit may sully the public's perception of the fairness of the proceeding. That perception, in turn, may threaten respect for the courts and may impair their reputation. From the defendant's standpoint, collateral consequences may arise as a result of an above-the-maximum sentence imposed on a particular count. The existence and extent of these collateral consequences are notoriously difficult to predict, but they have the potential to harm the defendant in a myriad of ways. See United States v. Bossany, 678 F.3d 603, 606-07 (8th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that mere presence of an excessive sentence in a -17- defendant's record has the potential of causing prejudice). It strikes us as both unwise and unfair to place the risk of such harm on the defendant where, as here, the excessive sentence is easy to correct. See United States v. Kincaid, 898 F.2d 110, 112 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to place risk of future prejudice flowing from erroneous sentence on defendant). In the last analysis, correcting such an error will rarely tax judicial resources and may (depending on what an uncertain future brings) provide some small benefit to the defendant. When (as in this case) there are no countervailing circumstances, we believe that the interests of justice ordinarily will tip the scales in favor of relief. That ends this aspect of the matter. Because the sentence on the firearm possession charge (count 3) exceeds the statutory maximum, we direct the district court, on remand, to enter a modified sentence of 120 months on that count. See United States v. Barnes, 251 F.3d 251, 261 (1st Cir. 2001).