Opinion ID: 178736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady v. Maryland Violations

Text: This Circuit applies two standards in reviewing determinations regarding alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court “reviews denial of a motion for a new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of discretion standard. However, the district court’s determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted.); see also United States v. Heriot, 496 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2007).
In this case Defendant claims that the delay in the prosecution’s disclosure of a form completed by prosecution witness Agent Borchgrevink, containing possible impeachment material at the end of the first day of trial, constituted a Brady violation. According to the government the form was generated when Agent Borchgrevink paid “Slim” for information. 5 No. 08-6445 Defendant contends that the government improperly delayed disclosure of information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In a criminal case the prosecution has a constitutional obligation to disclose to the defendant all exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Robinson v. Mills, 592 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999)). “Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates dues process where the evidence is material to either guilt or ro punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. To succeed on a Brady claim a defendant must show “(1) that the evidence in question [is] favorable; (2) that the state suppressed the relevant evidence . . . ; (3) and that the state’s actions resulted in prejudice.” Robinson, 592 F.3d at 735. In this case, Defendant failed to establish any of the elements required to demonstrate a Brady violation. Regarding the first requirement, Defendant states that “[t]he United States’ decision not to disclose Mitch/Slim’s involvement prior to the trial precluded Mr. Hogan from furnishing the jury accurate facts about the buy/bust operation from the beginning of trial.” ( Br. of Appellant, at 15.) Although Defendant describes the form in question as “exculpatory,” Defendant nowhere explains the basis for this description. As a result, “Defendant presents his argument on [the Brady] issue in a perfunctory manner, providing no explanation of how the disclosed material would have altered his defense.” United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 759 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that “[n]o Brady violation occurred in this case.”). Regarding the second element, prosecution’s disclosure of the form in question at the close of the first day of trial does not constitute suppression. “Brady generally does not apply to 6 No. 08-6445 delayed disclosure of exculpatory information, but only to a complete failure to disclose.” United States v. Kuehne, 547 F.3d 667, 698 (6th Cir. 2008). Brady requires “only the production of material for its effective use at trial.” United States v. Bencs, 28 F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 1994). Only when “the delay itself causes prejudice” does the delay violate Brady. Kuehne, 547 F.3d at 698. Although Defendant states that the delayed disclosure “precluded Mr. Hogan from furnishing the jury accurate facts about the buy/bust operation from the beginning of trial,” (Br. of Appellant at 15), this bare statement is insufficient to support the contention that the delay itself prejudiced Defendant. Moreover, it is undisputed that to cure Defendant’s complaints of prejudice subsequent to the government’s disclosure of the form, the district court provided Defendant with the opportunity to call any additional witnesses or re-cross examine any witnesses, and also offered Defendant a continuance to prepare for trial in light of the disclosure. (2 Tr. of Record at 127.) However, Defendant failed to avail himself of any of these opportunities. This Court has consistently held that when the district court allows defendant to cure any prejudice due to delayed disclosure by calling or re-cross examining witnesses, “Defendant’s failure to do so is not attributable to the government’s violation of the principles set forth in Brady.” See, e.g., Blackwell, 459 F.3d at 759; United States v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); Bencs, 28 F.3d at 561. Finally, Defendant’s bare allegation that disclosure of Agent Borchgrevink’s impeachment form “was prejudicial, and a violation of Brady,” does not satisfy Brady’s materiality requirement. Brady stated that the prosecution’s suppression of favorable evidence “violates due process where 7 No. 08-6445 the evidence is material to guilt or punishment.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Under the Brady standard, “favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (internal citations omitted). Although Defendant alleges that the delayed disclosure resulted in prejudice, Defendant does not describe the nature of the prejudice. Moreover, the disclosed evidence was relatively inconsequential. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no Brady violation, nor did it err in refusing to grant Defendant a new trial for the alleged Brady violations. Defendant has not demonstrated the form’s materiality for Brady purposes, nor did Defendant avail himself of the remedies offered by the district court.