Opinion ID: 2055437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: custody of travis ritter

Text: When custody of a minor child is an issue in a proceeding to dissolve the marriage of the child's parents, child custody is determined by parental fitness and the child's best interests. Ensrud v. Ensrud, 230 Neb. 720, 433 N.W.2d 192 (1988); Peterson v. Peterson, 224 Neb. 557, 399 N.W.2d 792 (1987). Thus, in a marital dissolution proceeding, child custody is denied to an unfit parent or a fit parent when the best interests of the child require such denial of custody. Nonexistent at common law, divorce is a matter within the exclusive and supreme province of the Legislature, subject to limitations imposed by the Constitutions, state and federal. Else v. Else, 219 Neb. 878, 880, 367 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1985). There is no statutory definition or characterization of a parent's fitness or unfitness in reference to a child custody issue in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage. Yet, parental fitness may be a factor in determination of a child custody question in a dissolution proceeding. For that reason, we adopt a definition or characterization for parental unfitness in relation to child custody in a marital dissolution proceeding: Parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which has caused, or probably will result in, detriment to a child's well-being. In re Johnson, 214 Kan. 780, 522 P.2d 330 (1974); In re Christina P., 175 Cal.App.3d 115, 220 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1985); Guardianship of a Minor, 19 Mass.App. 333, 474 N.E.2d 192 (1985). Cf. Matter of Adoption of JLP, 774 P.2d 624 (Wyo.1989) (termination of parental rights on account of a parent's unfitness). We have held that although a parent's extramarital conduct does not necessarily determine a child custody issue, such sexual conduct may be considered in determining custody of a minor child affected by a marital dissolution proceeding. Dunne v. Dunne, 211 Neb. 636, 319 N.W.2d 741 (1982). See, Krohn v. Krohn, 217 Neb. 158, 347 N.W.2d 869 (1984) (Although the mother engaged in extramarital activity at her home while her two minor sons were in, around, and about the house, there was no showing that the boys were exposed to the activity or that they were damaged in any way by the sexual conduct of their mother.... 217 Neb. at 161, 347 N.W.2d at 872); Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 341 N.W.2d 307 (1983) (The mother engaged in extramarital sexual activity at the minor children's residence, but [t]he record discloses that the live-in relationship was of but a brief duration, and has now ended. Although [the mother] had planned to marry [her extramarital sexual partner], she has since reconsidered those plans. This evidence alone did not establish that [the mother] was an unfit parent. 215 Neb. at 651, 341 N.W.2d at 314). When child custody must be decided in a marital dissolution proceeding, neither parent is presumed to be more fit than the other or granted custodial preference on the basis of gender. Kringel v. Kringel, 207 Neb. 241, 298 N.W.2d 150 (1980); Turner v. Turner, 205 Neb. 6, 286 N.W.2d 100 (1979). See, also, § 42-364(2). In determining a child's best interests in custody matters, a court may consider factors such as general considerations of moral fitness of the child's parents, including the parents' sexual conduct; respective environments offered by each parent; the emotional relationship between child and parents; the age, sex, and health of the child and parents; the effect on the child as the result of continuing or disrupting an existing relationship; the attitude and stability of each parent's character; parental capacity to provide physical care and satisfy educational needs of the child; the child's preferential desire regarding custody if the child is of sufficient age of comprehension regardless of chronological age, and when such child's preference for custody is based on sound reasons; and the general health, welfare, and social behavior of the child. Christen v. Christen, 228 Neb. 268, 271-72, 422 N.W.2d 92, 95 (1988). See, also, Gerber v. Gerber, 225 Neb. 611, 407 N.W.2d 497 (1987); Grace v. Grace, 221 Neb. 695, 380 N.W.2d 280 (1986). Applying the foregoing principles to the record presented in this appeal, nothing indicates that Susan's sexual conduct has been, or likely will be, a detriment, or otherwise injurious, to Travis Ritter. Consequently, we conclude that both Susan and Gary Ritter are parents fit to have custody of Travis. What is more important, however, is the respective environments which each parent offers Travis in view of the fact that his parents are unable to live together. While availability of Travis' playmates might be placed on a lower level for consideration in the custody question, other features of Travis' custody with Gary Ritter raise more practical, and yet critical, considerations in the child custody question. While Gary lives in Murray, he works in Omaha. There is no prospect that Gary's employment situation will change within the foreseeable future. This necessitates a babysitter for Travis during the period from 9 p.m. to 8 a.m. for each of the 5 days during which Gary works throughout the week and results in 11 hours of babysitting for Travis while Gary is working and traveling to and from work. When Gary sleeps during the day, or tries to sleep, someone will have to take care of Travis. Assuming that Gary will sleep at least 6 hours during the day, somebody, presumably a babysitter, will have to attend to Travis for 6 hours, which brings the babysitting time for Travis to 17 or 18 hours per day for 5 days of each week. With no reflection on Gary and his desire to be a good parent to Travis, even with the 2 days each week when Gary is not working and traveling to work, the vastly substantial amount of Travis' life will be spent with a babysitter. On the other hand, Susan has an established routine with Travis and Melissa. Susan works from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and leaves the children at a day-care center while she works. Susan is able to call upon Travis' grandparents, if and when the need arises. Cf. Kringel v. Kringel, supra (availability of grandparents produced a stable living environment for a child affected by a marital dissolution action and was a consideration in a child custody question). The time which a parent is able to devote to a child is a consideration in resolving a child custody question in a marital dissolution proceeding. See Mace v. Mace, 215 Neb. 640, 341 N.W.2d 307 (1983) (The mother is able to spend more time with the children than is their father, a medical student with several years of residency training ahead of him. 215 Neb. at 651, 341 N.W.2d at 314). See, also, Peterson v. Peterson, 224 Neb. 557, 399 N.W.2d 792 (1987); Turner v. Turner, 205 Neb. 6, 286 N.W.2d 100 (1979). Another factor regarding the custody of Travis Ritter is his physical separation from Melissa, with whom he has a strong sibling bond, if custody is granted to Gary Ritter. In Boroff v. Boroff, 197 Neb. 641, 648, 250 N.W.2d 613, 617 (1977), this court noted: Although this court has acknowledged that it is sound public policy to keep children together when possible, considerations of public policy do not, in all cases, prevent the splitting of the custody of the children when a marriage is dissolved; rather, the ultimate standard is the best interests of the children. [Citations omitted.] See, also, Richey v. Richey, 216 Neb. 565, 344 N.W.2d 642 (1984); State ex rel. Hamilton v. Boiler, 159 Neb. 458, 67 N.W.2d 426 (1954); In re Guardianship of Herten, 127 Neb. 88, 254 N.W. 698 (1934). The record is abundantly clear that Travis enjoys a healthy, loving, and close relationship with Melissa. In view of the testimony of witnesses and beyond the testimony of the parties, it appears likely that separation from Melissa will have a detrimental effect on Travis. The record leads to the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of Travis that he not be separated from his sibling, Melissa. As we have mentioned earlier in this opinion, the district court expressed no determination regarding the best interests of Travis Ritter in relation to the child custody issue. Perhaps implicit in the district court's custody order is a determination of Travis' best interests. Nevertheless, we conclude that the best interests of Travis require that his custody be granted to Susan Ritter and that, therefore, the district court abused its discretion in granting custody of Travis to Gary Ritter. Consequently, we reverse the district court's judgment concerning custody of Travis Ritter, and, on remand, the district court shall enter its order granting custody of Travis to Susan Ritter in conformity with our decision and opinion issued today in this case. In view of our decision, it is unnecessary to consider Susan Ritter's question about her visitation rights regarding Travis, and it is equally unnecessary that we consider Gary Ritter's cross-appeal on the issue of child support from Susan. However, as a consequence of the reversal obtained in this appeal, the district court, on remand, shall, as soon as practicable, hold a hearing to determine the questions of Gary Ritter's visitation rights regarding Travis Ritter and whether Gary Ritter shall pay child support for Travis. AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTION.