Opinion ID: 1652067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: victims' states of mind

Text: A common thread appears to exist when interpreting whether hearsay statements about the murder victim's fear of a defendant falls under the state-of-mind exception, KRE 803(3), or whether the hearsay statements are relevant. Where a victim's state of mind is not at issue, the testimony is not allowed to be admitted into evidence. Specifically, where a defendant did not claim self-defense, an accidental death, or suicide, such statements usually have little relevancy except toward providing a strong inference of appellant's intent, actions, or culpability. [1] Because Appellant's alibi defense did not put the victims' states of mind at issue, it was not relevant that Sexton, Conaster, and Ferrier circled the parking lot at the dance hall because they was afraid that [Appellant] was going to be there, [2] or that Ferrier had expressly identified her fear as the reason for the decision to circle the lot. [3] Although the majority opinion suggests that this evidence was relevant because it invited speculation as to why [the victims] would have such fear[,] [4] the fact that such evidence might lead to conjecture that the Appellant was a bad guy whom persons might justifiably fear i.e., to infer evidence of bad character that is prohibited by KRE 404(a)is precisely the reason that such evidence is inadmissible. Although this evidence, standing alone, might not warrant reversal of Appellant's convictions, it was clearly prejudicial, and, in combination with the erroneous introduction of prior bad acts evidence, it deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial.