Opinion ID: 3156372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: B.4, post.

Text: 37 In its motion for summary judgment, Keepers alleged several ways in which Milford’s ordinances have harmed its constitutional and economic interests. But neither in its appellate briefs nor before the District Court has Keepers explained how the alleged infringement of its officers’ and owners’ anonymity rights has caused it any harm. The closest it comes to doing so is through its suggestion that the public‐posting requirements might “chill” Keepers’ expression.114 But “purely conjectural” assertions of a potential “chill” are insufficient,115 and Keepers offers no “objective evidence to substantiate [its] claim that the challenged regulation has deterred [it] from engaging in protected activity.”116 Nor is Keepers able to claim constitutional standing based on its assertion that the public‐posting requirement “injures Keepers directly by requiring it to participate in violating its owners’ right of privacy.”117 Even if Keepers’ statement were factually true,118 it See Keepers Br. Summ. J., Doc. 51, at 59, 62; see also Keepers Supp. Br. 2 114 (“The injury Keepers seeks to redress on its own behalf is the chilling effect on corporate expression that is exerted by the requirement that the individuals who own the business be publicly outed.”). Intʹl Action Ctr. v. City of New York, 587 F.3d 521, 529 (2d Cir. 2009); see 115 also Latino Officers Assʹn v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Allegations of a subjective chill of First Amendment rights are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Latino Officers Assʹn, 170 F.3d at 170 (internal quotation marks and 116 alteration omitted). Keepers Supp. Br. 2. 117 38 would fail to give Keepers the kind of “particularized stake in the litigation” needed to satisfy Article III.119 Keepers asserts, in essence, that it is especially offended by Milford’s alleged violation of the First Amendment. But mere discomfort occasioned by an asserted constitutional violation, no matter how sharply felt, is insufficient to confer standing.120 It is not difficult to imagine situations in which a burden on the First Amendment rights of a firm’s owners, officers, or employees might generate a legally cognizable injury to the firm itself.121 Standing, however, “cannot be inferred, but must affirmatively appear in the record,”122 and it is Keepers’ burden to demonstrate As we discuss in Section II.B.4, post, that part of Chapter 2.3 at issue on 118 appeal has no demonstrated effect on the anonymity of any individual. 119 Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007). 120 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485‐86 (1982) (“[S]tanding is not measured by the intensity of the litigant’s interest or the fervor of his advocacy.”); cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[A] private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”); Dunnet Bay Const. Co. v. Borggren, 799 F.3d 676, 693‐94 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding no standing based on the plaintiff’s allegedly being “forced to participate in a discriminatory scheme”); Thomas v. Mundell, 572 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] public officialʹs personal dilemma in performing official duties that he perceives to be unconstitutional does not generate standing.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 121 See note 107, ante. Gully v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2003) 122 (internal quotation marks omitted). 39 that the alleged infringement of third parties’ constitutional rights has injured Keepers itself.123 Keepers has not met that burden here. 4. Mootness on Appeal In its supplemental brief, Keepers argues for the first time in this litigation that the public‐posting requirement violates its First Amendment “right to be free from government‐compelled expression.”124 According to Keepers, even if it lacked standing below to pursue a claim based on the right to anonymous expression, we can nonetheless uphold the District Court’s judgment on this alternative ground. Assuming arguendo that Keepers did not forfeit this argument by failing to present it below or in its principal brief,125 mootness precludes us from considering it.126 123 See Rajamin, 757 F.3d at 84‐85. 124 Keepers Supp. Br. 4. 125 In general, we do not address on appeal issues not sufficiently raised in a party’s principal brief. See Norton v. Samʹs Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117‐18 (2d Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, we may affirm a district court “on any basis supported by the record, even one not relied on by the lower court,” and “[a]lthough it behooves appellees to raise all their defenses on appeal . . . we are not aware of any case requiring them to do so.” Universal Church v. Geltzer, 463 F.3d 218, 229 (2d Cir. 2006); cf. Intʹl Trade Admin. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 936 F.2d 744, 747 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[A] party need not cross‐appeal in order to assert an alternate ground based on the record to support a district court decree.”). Mootness would also preclude us from considering Keepers’ appeal 126 with respect to anonymous expression, if we had not already disposed of that appeal on standing grounds. See note 77, ante (noting that courts may address standing and mootness in either order). 40 “The case‐or‐controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate.”127 A dispute that is live when suit is filed remains so only for as long as the parties continue to have a “concrete stake in the outcome.”128 There is “no case or controversy, and a suit becomes moot,” when the parties cease to have “a legally cognizable interest in the outcome” of the case.129 When this litigation started, the alleged injury and the nature of the dispute would have been clear: Chapter 2.3 required Keepers to post names that it did not want to post. As a result, the requirement potentially implicated the right of Keepers’ owners and officers to express themselves anonymously, as well as Keepers’ own First Amendment right against compelled speech. At this stage of the litigation, however, that injury has disappeared. The 2007 ordinance requires an SOB to post publicly the names of individuals who (1) have “actual power” to operate the business or control its “operation, management or policies”; (2) own at least thirty percent of the business; or (3) are officers of a legal entity that operates the business.130 The District Court upheld this requirement Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (internal quotation marks 127 omitted). See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288 (2000). 128 Chafin, 133 S. Ct. at 1023 (internal quotation marks omitted). 129 § 2.3‐2 (2007). 130 41 except as it applies to individuals who “do not manage, operate or control the sexually oriented business.”131 Because Keepers does not appeal that decision,132 the only posting‐related issue before this Court is the 2007 ordinance’s requirement that SOBs post the names of “[p]assive [o]wners” and officers.133 In other words, what is at stake in this appeal is whether Keepers must display the names of those individuals who fall within the scope of the 2007 ordinance’s public‐posting requirement but “do not manage, operate or control” the business.134 We have seen no evidence that such persons exist. The record indicates that Keepers has no passive shareholders, but only a single owner, Angela Silano, who also serves as the company’s president and, as far as the record indicates, sole officer.135 Therefore, Keepers will have to display Silano’s name—regardless of the outcome of this appeal—under that part of the 2007 ordinance which the District Court upheld and which Keepers no longer challenges.136 Keepers, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 131 See Keepers Reply Br. 12. 132 Id. at 8. 133 Keepers, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 134 See Regensberger Affidavit, Doc. 52‐6; Silano Affidavit, Doc. 52‐7. 135 As president and sole owner, Silano undoubtedly has power to, and 136 does, “operate” or “control” Keepers. See § 2.3‐2 (2007); see also Keepers, 944 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 42 That part of the 2007 public‐posting requirement invalidated by the District Court has no effect on Silano’s anonymity, and Keepers has identified no other shareholders or officers whose anonymity might be implicated. As a result, we can identify no individual whose anonymity is potentially at stake in this appeal, nor will this appeal affect what information Keepers itself would be compelled to display.137 In short, this appeal is moot, both with respect to Keepers’ third‐party anonymity claim and its compelled‐speech claim. Although Milford has a stake in defending the constitutionality of its ordinance, Keepers no longer has any concrete interest in the result of this appeal. As a result, this case now lacks “that concrete We note that Silano would also have been required to post her name under the 2003 ordinance—if Milford had not repealed it—as an “officer or partner” of Keepers, since Silano is the only officer who appears in the record. See § 2.3‐5 (2003). 137 In its supplemental brief, Keepers asserts for the first time that the current “president, secretary, and director of Keepers, Inc.” is not Silano but Julia Kish. Keepers Supp. Br. 4. As noted above, this assertion is irrelevant to our decision. Even if we were to relax our normal rule against considering new facts on appeal, see note 14, ante, Keepers has merely identified another third party who already lacks anonymity, not only because of this litigation, but because her name is already associated with Keepers on the website of the Connecticut Secretary of State. See Keepers Supp. Br. 4. Moreover, as “president, secretary, and director,” Kish would have to include her name on Keepers’ license as a person with “actual power to operate the sexually oriented business” or to control its operation. See §§ 2.3‐2; 2.3‐4(d) (2007). Keepers’ supplemental brief did not identify any other shareholder or officer, besides Kish, whose anonymity might be implicated. 43 adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues,”138 and which is necessary for a case to remain “fit for federal‐court adjudication.”139 5. Summary and Disposition of Keepers’ Challenge to the Public‐ Posting Requirements We hold that Keepers lacks prudential and constitutional standing to challenge the public‐posting requirements based on its owners’ and officers’ right of anonymous expression. We therefore VACATE the District Court’s judgment insofar as it reached the merits of this challenge and REMAND with direction to dismiss that claim. Insofar as Keepers urges us to uphold the judgment based on its own right against compelled speech, we find the appeal moot and DISMISS it accordingly.