Opinion ID: 1034430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Waiver and Guilty Plea

Text: In his second issue, Petitioner argues that his jury waiver and guilty plea were not entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.4 This claim was presented to the Ohio Supreme Court on direct appeal, and that court found, Nothing in the record suggests that Fitzpatrick’s jury waiver was involuntary. When the trial court accepted Fitzpatrick’s written waiver, Fitzpatrick affirmed that his decision was voluntary. He also affirmed that his counsel had reviewed the waiver form with him and that he had discussed his decision with them. A defendant’s having had the advice of counsel is a factor supporting a finding of voluntariness. [State v.] Bays, 716 N.E.2d 1126 [(Ohio 1999)]. Although Fitzpatrick was on medication when he executed the waiver, he denied that the medication interfered with his ability to understand the waiver form or the proceedings. Nothing in the record contradicts this. . . . Importantly, Fitzpatrick’s decision to waive a jury trial followed from his decision to plead guilty. . . . It is clear from the record that his decision to plead guilty was voluntary: Fitzpatrick initiated that decision, insisted upon it against advice of counsel, and held to it through a lengthy plea colloquy. ... In this case, the record contains a representation by defense counsel that they had explained the charged offenses to Fitzpatrick. At the end of Fitzpatrick’s written guilty plea is the following statement, which was 4 Petitioner specifically notes that his “appeal is not [about] competency.” (Reply Br. at 2.) The Supreme Court has explained the difference between competency and knowing-and-voluntary claims: The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary” inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 & n.12 (1993) (citations omitted). Petitioner’s specificity on this point is understandable since the Ohio Court of Appeals found his competency claim barred by Ohio’s res judicata rule because he had not raised it on direct appeal when he could have. Fitzpatrick, 2004 WL 2367987, at ; see also Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 967 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing State v. Perry, 226 N.E.2d 104, 105–06 (1967)) (Ohio’s res judicata rule “provides in relevant part that a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant from raising in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any issue that was raised, or could have been raised, at trial or on appeal from that judgment.”). Therefore, had his federal habeas claim been based on competency, it would have been procedurally defaulted. See Williams, 380 F.3d at 967; see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991); Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc). No. 09-4515 Fitzpatrick v. Robinson Page 19 signed by his counsel: “We have explained to the Defendant, STANLEY L. FITZPATRICK, prior to his signing this plea, the charge(s) in the indictment, the penalties therefore [sic] and his constitutional rights in this case.” Moreover, both the written plea and the plea colloquy contained representations by Fitzpatrick that he had spoken with his counsel and understood the charges against him. Fitzpatrick asserted that he had graduated from high school and could read without any problem. He also agreed that he had talked to his attorneys about the case for “many, many hours.” The written plea states: “I understand the nature of the charges against me in the Indictment and the possible defenses I might have,” and “I understand the nature of the charges to which I plead guilty.” During the colloquy, the presiding judge asked: “[D]o you understand the