Opinion ID: 2546413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of a Demonstration Weapon

Text: Defendant claims the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to display two Uzi-like weapons as demonstrative evidence when questioning five witnesses. He contends the trial court's decision to permit the display of such demonstrative evidence violated his due process rights to a fair trial and a reliable penalty verdict and requires a reversal of the convictions under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution because (a) it was impermissible to use demonstrative evidence; (b) the prosecutor did not establish a proper foundation for such display; and (c) the evidence was irrelevant to the robbery, attempted murder, and murder charges. Defendant did not assert these constitutional claims below. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 510, fn. 3, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Assuming without deciding the issue was properly preserved for appellate review ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 908, fn. 6, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93), we find it is meritless. It is entirely proper for a prosecutor to use objects similar to those connected with the commission of a crime for purposes of illustration. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1135, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) [D]emonstrative evidence is admissible for the purpose of illustrating and clarifying a witness' testimony so long as a proper foundation is laid. ( People v. Ham (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 768, 780, 86 Cal.Rptr. 906, disapproved on another ground in People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60, fn. 3, 98 Cal.Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537.) [I]t is paramount that it be established that the [weapon] was substantially similar to that which it seeks to illustrate. ( People v. Ham, supra, at p. 780, 86 Cal.Rptr. 906.) We approved of Ham's analysis in People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162, 177, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135, 554 P.2d 881, and noted that once a proper foundation had been laid, admission was within the sound discretion of the trial court. People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1044, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384, is illustrative. In that case, two witnesses observed the defendant hook a fishing lure into the victim's back before murdering him. The prosecution did not have the actual lure used by the defendant so he displayed a demonstration lure to the witnesses. Both witnesses described characteristics of the lure before the prosecutor displayed it, and one witness identified similarities and differences between the demonstration lure and the lure actually used by the defendant. The demonstration lure was substantially similar to the actual lure with the only difference being it lacked the feathers the actual lure had. We held the prosecutor's display of a demonstration lure was proper [b]ecause it was useful for illustrative purposes and had no tendency to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual even though the actual lure was used by the defendant to injure and torture the victim before his death. ( Id. at p. 1136, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) We further noted that the prosecutor did not use deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion [citations] in showing the lure to the witnesses and did not try to pass it off as the lure used by the defendant. Commendably, the prosecutor specifically elicited testimony from [one of the witnesses] identifying the difference between the two lures. No misleading impression was created. ( Ibid. ) In this case, the trial court properly permitted the prosecutor to display a gun similar to defendant's for demonstrative purposes because the actual gun defendant used was never recovered. As a threshold matter, we reject defendant's claim that the prosecutor failed to lay a proper foundation that the gun defendant used was substantially similar to the demonstration Uzi. Although defendant objected on this ground below, the prosecutor established a proper foundation necessary to display the demonstration weapon to witnesses. Based on the prosecution's firearms expert's opinion, the prosecutor asserted the likely weapon was an Uzi. The prosecutor used two different Uzis as demonstrative evidence. One was an open-bolt model, not marked as an exhibit at trial, that could be fired automatically or semiautomatically, and the other was a closed-bolt model, that could be fired only semiautomatically. With respect to each witness, the prosecutor elicited testimony about the witness's recollection of the gun before he displayed the demonstration Uzi. For example, Dominic Wright testified that defendant's weapon was not a handgun and defendant needed both hands to hold it. Wright particularly indicated that defendant's left palm was face-up, holding the front of the weapon, and his right hand was on the grip and magazine about six inches behind his left hand. After examining the demonstration Uzi, Wright testified the barrel was similar to defendant's gun. In like fashion, Ricardo Mireles testified that defendant's gun was a submachine gun and that he held it with both hands, similarly to the way Wright had described. After being shown the demonstration Uzi, Mireles testified the barrel was similar to defendant's gun. Thus, the prosecutor laid the proper foundation and established that the demonstration Uzi was substantially similar to the actual gun used by defendant. Having found the People laid an adequate foundation for the evidence, we turn to defendant's contention that use of the demonstration Uzi was improper because, as it could not be adequately linked to the crime, it was irrelevant. We disagree. The demonstration weapon assisted the jury in understanding the evidence and testimony. Investigators had recovered expended shell casings at the crime scene, as normally expected in a shooting, but also found four live rounds that were previously chambered and identical to the caliber and manufacturer of the expended shell casings. Leticia Calderon testified that she heard defendant's gun make a clicking sound when he pointed it at Judy Adams during the initial confrontation in the parking lot. The prosecution theorized that defendant's gun had probably malfunctioned or jammed, which made a metal-on-metal clicking sound and caused him to manually eject the live rounds later found by the police. The prosecution's firearms expert testified that if an Uzi malfunctions or jams, manual ejection of the bullets would be required. Thus, the demonstration Uzi was relevant in explaining the four live rounds found at the crime scene and the metal-on-metal clicking sound heard by Calderon. Finally, the prosecutor did not attempt to mislead the jury with the Uzi. Rather, the prosecutor specifically stated the demonstration Uzi was not the actual weapon used by defendant. Upon initial display, the judge immediately repeated to the jury that the weapon was just a demonstration weapon. On these facts, the demonstration Uzi could not have evoked any emotional bias against defendant. ( People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1136, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) Finding the prosecution laid a sufficient foundation, that the evidence was relevant, and that the prosecutor did not use the evidence in an inflammatory or misleading way, we find no error.