Opinion ID: 1103334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: motion for mistrialfitzpatrick mentioned he thought he needed an attorney

Text: A trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999). A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. Id. at 547 (quoting Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845, 853 (Fla.1997)). Fitzpatrick asserts that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial when Detective Bousquet testified that during the initial interview Fitzpatrick mentioned that he thought he needed an attorney. Bousquet testified in pertinent part: From there I asked [Fitzpatrick] if he had any type of sexual intercourse with the victim, and he stated he had not. I confronted [Fitzpatrick] about picking up the female at A.J.'s residence, and he states that he didn't pick her up there. [Fitzpatrick] said the last time he saw the victim was when he dropped her off at the motel. [Fitzpatrick] said he went to check back on the victim at the motel, but she had already gone. [Fitzpatrick] stated he was afraid, because in the last item of the news article that he had read, it stated that the person would be charged with murder, and he did not want to be charged with murder. I informed [Fitzpatrick] I did not state he was going to be charged with anything, and he stated he read this in the paper, and that is why he was scared. Subsequently [Fitzpatrick] did make mention that he thought he needed an attorney. At that point in Bousquet's testimony, Fitzpatrick's counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Specifically, the record reveals that Fitzpatrick stated, Maybe I need to talk to a lawyer. Bousquet's testimony at trial that Fitzpatrick did make mention that he thought he needed an attorney was fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on silence, and was therefore improper. State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Fla.1986) (concluding that a police officer's testimony that [a]fter that, [defendant] advised me he felt like he should speak to his attorney was fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a comment on silence); see also Smith v. State, 492 So.2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 1986) (determining the detective's testimony that the defendant stated I want to talk to a lawyer was a comment on the exercise of the right to remain silent). In DiGuilio, we explained that improper comments on a defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent are subject to a harmless error analysis. See 491 So.2d at 1137. This Court explained the proper test that appellate courts must apply when performing a harmless error analysis: The test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence, a correct result, a not clearly wrong, a substantial evidence, a more probable than not, a clear and convincing, or even an overwhelming evidence test. Harmless error is not a device for the appellate court to substitute itself for the trier-of-fact by simply weighing the evidence. The focus is on the effect of the error on the trier-of-fact. The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. The burden to show the error was harmless must remain on the state. If the appellate court cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is by definition harmful. Id. at 1139; see also Jones v. State, 748 So.2d 1012, 1021-22 (Fla.1999). Application of the harmless error test requires not only a close examination of the permissible evidence on which the jury could have legitimately relied, but an even closer examination of the impermissible evidence which might have possibly influenced the jury verdict. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d at 1138. On this record, we conclude that there was no reasonable possibility that Bousquet's testimony affected the jury verdict, and it was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There was overwhelming permissible evidence of Fitzpatrick's guilt. The jury was presented with DNA evidence matching Fitzpatrick to the source of the semen recovered from the victim and eyewitness testimony establishing that Romines was last seen alive with Fitzpatrick three hours before she was discovered. The only arguably impermissible testimony placed before the jury was the fact that Fitzpatrick simply stated that he thought he needed an attorney. This Court in Jones, stating that it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict, emphasized that although the witness did improperly comment on the defendant's invocation of his right to silence, the remark was neither repeated nor emphasized. Jones, 748 So.2d at 1022; see also Cole v. State, 701 So.2d 845, 853 (Fla.1997) (concluding that a remark regarding the defendant's prior criminal history, which the witness had been instructed by the trial court not to mention, was isolated and was not focused on and therefore was not so prejudicial as to require reversal). Here, the impermissible remark was neither repeated nor emphasized, and the trial judge expressly indicated the lack of importance he felt the jury attributed to the remark. Based upon the review of the record, this Court concludes that this isolated and singular comment does not constitute harmful error.