Opinion ID: 774909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Categories of Regulation

Text: 32 Although we have determined that the CSRA validly regulates a thing in commerce within Lopez's category two, we also believe that the statute is a constitutional regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. 14 Accord Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1400(finding CSRA valid regulation under category one because payment of child support on behalf of an out-of-state child requires the use of channels of interstate commerce); Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1227 (concluding that CSRA is valid regulation under category one because the child support obligation -- made interstate in nature as a direct consequence of the diversity requirement imposed upon the obligor and the obligee -- can be satisfied normally by a payment that necessarily must move in interstate commerce). 33 In Lopez, the Court stated that there are two kinds of permissible regulation under the first category of activity: (1)regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce; and (2) an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. As the Court's references toUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 114 (upholding criminal prosecution under the Fair Labor Standards Act for interstate shipment of lumber which was manufactured intrastate by employees whose wages and hours did not conform with Act) and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 256 (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbidding public accommodations from refusing to serve customers based on race and noting that the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question) illustrate, permissible category one regulation encompasses more than simple regulation of the nation's highways, railroads, or other literal channels of commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558. These cases teach that Congress has the power, under category one, to regulate or exclude certain categories of goods from flowing across state lines through the channels of commerce. Our case law is in harmony with the Supreme Court: in United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at 784, we upheld, as a category one regulation, 18 U.S.C. §922(o), a statute criminalizing the possession or transfer of a machinegun because the illegal possession of a machinegun cannot occur without an illegal transfer, which given the national marketplace for machineguns, involves the channels of interstate commerce. We therefore conclude that, based upon its power to regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce, the CSRA was validly enacted under Lopez's category one. 34 Finally, we also believe that, although not necessary to our holding today, we could find the CSRA a valid regulation under Lopez's category three. The statute regulates financial obligations which must move in interstate commerce, via mail, wire, or electronic transfer; it has an explicit jurisdictional nexus to interstate commerce -- the child and non-custodial parent must reside in different states; and itis supported by Congressional findings explaining the effect on interstate commerce of the failure to make court-ordered child support payments. Accord Parker, 108 F.3d at 30; Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1400; Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1004 (all upholding CSRA under Lopez's category three). Congress clearly had a rational basis for enacting the CSRA under its category three Commerce Clause power. In sum, we believe that the CSRA is valid under each of the three Lopez categories.