Opinion ID: 1962809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Photographs and Brady v. Maryland

Text: Similar to the situation with the police notes, there were system failures with respect to the photographs taken at the scene of the assault. Ms. Forrest testified that the police took about 8-10 pictures of her face, shoulder and back area in her apartment, with a flash camera that was not a polaroid. She removed her shirt for the pictures. When defense counsel requested production of the photographs under Brady, supra, the government informed the court that: We never received photographs from the crime scene people. We normally do receive them. We didn't receive them in this case. The trial court said: [T]here's no reason to believe there is anything exculpatory in it and the prosecutor responded, `no.' The trial court added: [B]ut in any event I think it prejudices the government by not having it and not the defense. In response to the court's question, have you made all the efforts you can to find them, the prosecutor answered, Yes, we have. Mr. Cook asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to sanction the prosecutor for not disclosing photographs of [Ms. Forrest], taken at the scene as required by Brady, [ supra ]. He states that it is unclear from the record whether defense counsel made a Brady request before trial. Nevertheless, he seeks a remand to determine whether the photographs were material to his defense because they could have gone a long way towards helping to determine the credibility of all three witnesses. The government maintained that it never received the photographs from the crime scene people and that it had made all the efforts [it could] to find them.  Brady and its progeny require the government to disclose to the defense, upon request, evidence in its possession that is `material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' Farley v. United States, 694 A.2d 887, 889 (D.C. 1997) (quoting Brady, supra, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). Moreover, even when the prosecution may not know about certain evidence, `the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.' Id. at 889 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). As the court said in United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App. D.C. 132, 140, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (1971): The duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor, but the Government as a whole, including its investigative agencies. Failure to disclose evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment results in a violation of a defendant's due process rights. See Boone v. United States, 769 A.2d 811, 819 (D.C.2001). The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Farley, supra, 694 A.2d. at 889 (citations omitted). On this record, Mr. Cook has not made the required showing of materiality. As we said in Robinson v. United States, 825 A.2d 318 (D.C.2003): There is no Brady violation absent a showing of materiality, i.e., that the missing evidence `would have made a different result reasonably probable.' Id. at 325 (quoting Farley, supra, 694 A.2d at 889 (other citation omitted)). Furthermore, Brady does not require us to speculate about the exculpatory value of the photographs. We discussed this precise point in Robinson, supra . We said: In Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), the Supreme Court held that in cases where the exculpatory value of the evidence is unknown, `unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law.' Robinson, supra, at 325 (quoting Arizona, supra, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333). Mr. Cook had at least two opportunities to show bad faith on the part of the government or to establish the materiality of the photographs. The first was when the government responded, Yes, we have, to the court's question: Have you made all the efforts you can to find the photographs[?] He could have requested details regarding the government's efforts to locate the photographs. The second opportunity arose during the trial court's inquiry about the photographs. The judge made the statement: [T]here's no reason to believe there is anything exculpatory in [the photographs]. The prosecutor agreed. Defense counsel made no comment at all, but could have explored how that determination was made in the absence of the photographs. In short, Mr. Cook did not sustain his burden to show materiality, or that the photographs would have made a different outcome in his case reasonably possible. Consequently, there is no basis for reversing his conviction on Brady grounds. For the foregoing reasons, we reject Mr. Cook's argument that his conviction should be reversed on Brady grounds. However, we vacate his conviction and remand this matter to the trial court for a proper Jencks Act inquiry regarding notes taken by the police officers at the time of the assault. So ordered.