Opinion ID: 1308968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ransome

Text: [1, 2] WEPCO contends that the circuit court erred by failing to dismiss the insurers' complaint and Pinky's cross-complaint as a matter of public policy. We disagree. (WEPCO accepts the jury's findings of negligence and cause for the purposes of this argument only.) Even though a jury has found negligence and that such negligence was a cause (or substantial factor) in producing a plaintiff's damages, liability may be denied under factors that we have termed public policy considerations. Such factors include: (1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent tort-feasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) (citations omitted). The question of whether to deny recovery because of public policy considerations is a question of law. See Widell v. Tollefson, 158 Wis. 2d 674, 682, 462 N.W.2d 910 (Ct. App. 1990). WEPCO argues that each of the factors discussed in Coffey compels dismissal. We disagree. [3] The injury is not too remote from the negligence. The word remote as it is used in Coffey and like cases means removed or separated from the negligence in time, place, or sequence of events. See, e.g., Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d 594, 599, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957); Toeller v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 631, 638-39, 340 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1983). In this case, the fire occurred minutes after trees contacted WEPCO lines across the street from Beacon Bowl, and the chain of causation was direct and unbroken. WEPCO argues that the injury is too remote because its experts had no knowledge of voltage transients starting fires inside buildings. This argument may have relevance to another public policy consideration, but it has little, if any, relevance to whether or not the negligence is remote. We also disagree with WEPCO's contention that the injury is too wholly out of proportion to its culpability. WEPCO trimmed the trees near feeder X22262 in 1982. According to WEPCO, the trees that touched WEPCO lines in 1985 consisted of minimal new growth. Its argument is that the damage caused by the fire is too wholly out of proportion to WEPCO's culpability failing to trim trees soon enough. We disagree. WEPCO knew that tree contact with WEPCO lines had previously caused flickering lights at Beacon Bowl, triggered electrical outages, and burned electrical wires. [4] Culpability in negligence jurisprudence is tied to foreseeability, and WEPCO contends that this occurrence was not foreseeable. It is a given that serious harm can result from simple everyday negligence. This case involves a utility's negligence with electricity. The damage that negligence caused to Beacon Bowl is not out of proportion to the culpability inherent in negligent conduct related to electricity. WEPCO's strongest public policy argument is that it is too highly extraordinary that its negligence should have brought about the harm. Indeed, the circuit court appeared persuaded by WEPCO's argument. The circuit court thought the result, a fire caused by transients, was unprecedented. Thus, the circuit court concluded that the fire was an extraordinary result. Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that our discussion of public policy in Ransome precluded it from cutting off WEPCO's liability. WEPCO appealed, and the court of appeals certified the issue of whether Ransome applies in this tort action and, if so, what are the limits, if any, of Ransome regarding foreseeability of harm? [5] Ransome has relevance to this action although it does not apply to this action. Liability is determined on a case-by-case basis in negligence and strict liability cases, depending on the facts. The Coffey court discussed the public policy factors a court considers when determining proximate cause. Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541; Sanem v. Home Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 530, 538-39, 350 N.W.2d 89 (1984). The Ransome court discussed public policy as well. Ransome, 87 Wis. 2d at 618-19, 625. However, the court's discussion in Ransome focused primarily on the considerations which weighed in favor of imposing the doctrine of strict liability to electricity and only secondarily on whether to deny liability in that particular case. The Ransome court's discussion of public policy does not preclude circuit courts from considering public policy factors which weigh in favor of denying liability. Having said that, we consider WEPCO's contention that this was an unprecedented or extraordinary result. We are not persuaded. Dr. Szews testified that he knew of a similar type of event which occurred in Oshkosh, and he had read of others. Moreover, as discussed before, WEPCO had experienced problems with trees in its lines in 1982 which had burned down its lines and the tops of trees. While it may not be common that negligence with electricity will cause a fire like the one that occurred at Beacon Bowl, neither is it so highly extraordinary that we are compelled to deny recovery for WEPCO's negligence. WEPCO next argues that allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on it because imposing liability will require it to prevent all future voltage transientsa feat WEPCO says is impossible. WEPCO says that at a minimum it will have to trim all trees away from all of its lines under all circumstances and at all times in order to prevent imposition of liability. In support of this argument, WEPCO cites Walker v. Bignell, 100 Wis. 2d 256, 263, 301 N.W.2d 447 (1981), and Sanem, 119 Wis. 2d at 540. We reject WEPCO's argument for two reasons. One, Walker and Sanem dealt with municipal liability and county liability which raise different policy concerns than this case. Second, and more importantly, holding WEPCO liable will neither increase WEPCO's common-law duty nor subject it to an unreasonable burden. WEPCO has a duty to exercise reasonable care. Walker, 100 Wis. 2d at 263. Depending on the circumstances, reasonable care may, or it may not, require WEPCO to trim all trees. Additionally, as discussed more fully later in this opinion, WEPCO is also under a statutory duty to trim trees. NESC 281 provides: 281. Tree Trimming
1. Trees which may interfere with ungrounded supply conductors should be trimmed or removed. NOTE: Normal tree growth, the combined movement of trees and conductors under adverse weather conditions, voltage, and sagging of conductors at elevated temperatures are among the factors to be considered in determining the extent of trimming required. 2. Where trimming or removal is not practical, the conductor should be separated from the tree with suitable materials or devices to avoid conductor damage by abrasion and grounding of the circuit through the tree. B. At Line Crossings, Railroad Crossings, and Limited Access Highway Crossings The crossing span and the adjoining span on each side of the crossing should be kept free from overhanging or decayed trees or limbs which otherwise might fall into the line. Imposing liability in this case will not enlarge the duty WEPCO is under to any meaningful degree. Given the dangerous characteristics of electricity, imposing liability will not make WEPCO's burden unreasonable. We also disagree with WEPCO's assertion that imposing liability will open the way for fraudulent claims because the sole basis for the conclusion that the voltage transient caused the fire was the testimony of experts. Many tort cases depend solely on expert testimony for evidence of cause, and in this case qualified experts testified in support of the insurers' and Pinky's theories. Although WEPCO's expert testified to the contrary, the jury apparently believed Pinky's and the insurers' experts. Imposing liability in this case will not relieve future plaintiffs of the burden of proving cause. This was not an unexplained fire. WEPCO simply disagrees with the explanation the jury evidently believed.