Opinion ID: 1959870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of missouri detainer

Text: If nothing else, this case illustrates that the summary procedures designed to determine the propriety of habeas corpus relief are inappropriate for determinations unrelated to whether a prisoner is being unlawfully detained. It was for good reason that our predecessor observed that habeas corpus procedure is designed for the determination of one limited question  the right to immediate possession  and it would be a perversion of the procedure to allow other issues to be injected.... [37] Although we disagree with Appellant's contention that Kentucky courts should never concern themselves with the validity of another state's detainer, [38] we observe that Appellee's original petition for habeas relief made no claim of entitlement to immediate release, and merely questioned the validity of a detainer that, in and of itself, was not the source of her confinement. As the issues before the trial court blossomed, the detainer issue became such a collateral issue that it is virtually impossible to discern the evidentiary basis for the trial court's determination that Appellee had exhausted service of her Missouri sentence as of October 19, 1999. And, in fact, a review of the videotaped proceedings suggest that the trial court improperly applied the burden of proof as to this issue because, rather than requiring Appellee to demonstrate the invalidity of the Missouri detainer, the trial court largely required Appellant to demonstrate its validity. In any event, we conclude that Appellee failed to demonstrate that she had completed service of her Missouri sentence. After it was determined that there was no merit to Appellee's initial unsubstantiated allegation that, her concurrent Missouri sentence should have the same starting date as her Kentucky sentence  i.e., 1982  and had therefore long ago expired, [39] the issue became when would (or did) Appellee serve out on the Missouri sentence? and, in declaring the detainer void, the trial court apparently reached a conclusion that is unsupported by substantial evidence. In particular, the trial court's finding of fact that Missouri regulations indicate petitioner should have been released from Missouri on conditional discharge on January 30, 1999 lacks any grounding in the record. Appellee's own statements to the trial court reflect that the January 30, 1999 date was a date at which she could have, with accumulated credit for good time, received an early conditional release from her Missouri sentence if she accepted an additional term of supervised release. However, Appellee declined to sign the necessary paperwork to secure this release, and thus was not eligible for release from her Missouri sentence until she reached the normal conditional release date of November 30, 1999. And, the trial court released her from custody over a month prior to that November 30, 1999 conditional release date. Nonetheless, Appellee argues that this issue is now moot because November 30, 1999 has come and gone, and Appellee's counsel has submitted an affidavit with Appellee's brief in which she recounts a conversation with unidentified Corrections officials where she was informed that Appellee was discharged from the Missouri sentence. [40] We also observe that the federal district court presiding in Appellee's civil suit stated in its order granting summary judgment for the defendants that Missouri granted plaintiff a conditional release, effective November 30, 1999. She remains on conditional release until July 30, 2001. [41] Of course, we, like Appellant, are at a loss as to how, after being discharged from prison over a month prior to her conditional release date, Appellee subsequently accumulated the necessary custody credit to reach that date. We can find no evidence in the record, and no precedent or statutory provision in Missouri, to support a conclusion that Appellee would be released from MDOC custody on November 30, 1999 regardless of whether she actually accumulated custody credit until that date. And, although we are equipped with nothing more than the relevant dates and a calculator, our arithmetic suggests that Appellee owes forty-two (42) more days on her Missouri sentence before she would be eligible for conditional release. Notwithstanding the above, we observe that in Chitwood v. Dowd , the primary authority upon which Appellee based her argument in favor of habeas corpus, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that [u]nconditional release from all remaining Missouri time may not be justified if, after serving his time in Oklahoma, Chitwood would have had remaining time to serve in Missouri. [42] And, while we recognize the possibility that the MDOC has finally discharged Appellee from custody, it is clear that the evidentiary record in this case did not support the trial court's conclusion. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's order declaring the detainer null and void. If, in fact, Appellee has somehow managed to satisfy her Missouri sentence during the pendency of this appeal, we anticipate that the proper authorities will administratively lift the detainer. If not, Appellee may always petition for a declaration of rights as to the validity of the detainer and, if she is armed with appropriate MDOC documents reflecting a final discharge of sentence, should easily prevail.