Opinion ID: 462381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Appellant Cleveland.

Text: 30 Michael Cleveland is a long-time member of the Authority's Commission. Shortly after Smith became mayor, Cleveland became chairman. He is sued in his official capacity and claims that, because Smith controlled personnel decisions, he was not responsible for appellees' plight and accordingly should have been dismissed from the case. He also argues that if the Commission be liable it should be sued in its corporate capacity, not through its head. 31 The court refused his motion on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to send the question to the jury. The court's refusal to dismiss is equivalent to refusal to direct a verdict and is governed by the standard of Boeing whereby we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to one opposing this motion. The jury's determination that Cleveland was in part to blame for this matter is subject to reversal only if there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. Michelman, 534 F.2d at 1042. 32 The evidence here was not insubstantial. Whether Cleveland had any direct hand in the decision, both sides admit that appellees' employment status was governed by regulations promulgated by the Commission that he chaired. The jury could reasonably find that the Commission's failure to intervene to protect appellees' rights made it in part responsible for the denial of due process. Nonfeasance as well as misfeasance will support a Section 1983 claim. Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 412 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979). Nor did Cleveland produce evidence sufficient to create a qualified immunity defense. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 183, 187, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir.1980). There is nothing unusual about suing the director of an agency under Section 1983 to assert claims against the agency generally. Brandon v. Holt, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 105 S.Ct. 873, 878-79, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985). As chairman of that body at the relevant time, Cleveland could reasonably be held liable in his official capacity. 33