Opinion ID: 28979
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Symmetry: Art. 595(A) as a Default Provision

Text: 38 The propriety of this holding is underscored by a functional analysis of art. 595(A) in the context of Louisiana's statutory class action scheme. Such a contextual reading of art. 595(A) reveals that it is Louisiana's default provision for attorney's fees in class actions. Remembering that (1) as a general rule, Louisiana does not authorize the court to award attorney's fees in tort suits, and (2) art. 595(A) stands as a statutory exception to that general rule for purposes of class actions, the function and necessity of using may rather than shall becomes self-evident. Art. 595(A) completes the attorney's fees picture for Louisiana class actions by covering the otherwise-unaddressed situation in which (1) there is no separate statutory provision for attorney's fees, and (2) such fees could not be assessed against a defendant cast in judgment were the action based on an individual delictual claim rather than a class claim. The way that art. 595(A) harmonizes Louisiana's attorney's fees rules in the context of class actions is by empowering, without mandating, the court to allow attorney's fees to class representatives from funds or other sources of recovery made available to the class — whether by judgment, settlement, or otherwise — so long as such favorable result is the product of the class litigation. 39 Quite simply, when there is a separate statute (such as § 51:137 in Abbott ) that mandates assessment of attorney's fees in favor of the class and against the defendant, there is no need for the court to invoke art. 595(A)'s default authorization to shift a portion of the class members' recovery for the benefit of those class representatives who have contracted with the attorneys and could be out of pocket for various costs and expenses. But when, as here (and in myriad other Louisiana tort class actions) attorney's fees are not recoverable under some separate statute, art. 595(A) clutches in to supply the default rule, authorizing the court to allow attorney's fees and other costs to the class representatives out of the sums recoverable by the entire class in recompense for damages — specifically, the funds made available by judgment, compromise, or any other source, as long as it results from the class litigation and is for the benefit of all class members — whether in a common fund or in separate, individual recoveries. Of course, this is only meet and right when the recovery from which attorney's fees are allowed flows from the class action litigation. 40 It is this default function of art. 595(A) — complementing as it does, those situations, such as in Abbott, in which separate statutes mandate attorney's fees — that explains why the redactors of Louisiana's Civil Procedure code consciously employed the permissive may rather than the mandatory shall. Were it otherwise, the class representatives would be, or at least could be, the unintended beneficiaries of double dipping: In an Abbott -like situation, receiving fees first from the defendant and then from their fellow class members as a result of a mandatory (shall) taxing of their respective shares of either a common fund or separate awards of damages, would constitute a windfall to the class representatives rather than a making them whole, as clearly intended. The use of may avoids the potential of such a windfall to the class representatives, imparting discretion to the court either to (1) refrain from shifting a portion of the class members' recoveries from the rank and file to the class representatives when a separate statute imposes attorney's fees on the defendant, over and above damages; or (2) shift a portion from the shares of the non-representative class members by awarding therefrom attorney's fees and other costs to the class representatives when no other source is available. 37