Opinion ID: 771175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutor's reading of excluded and misleading documents into the record

Text: 25 As her third claim, Downs contends that the prosecutor acted improperly during closing argument when he read a statement by Danny Downs identifying his mother as the shooter. The state had earlier moved successfully to exclude portions of the medical reports in which that statement appeared.
26 While the government may not suggest that information not in evidence supports its case, United States v. Badger, 983 F.2d 1443, 1455 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 928, 113 S. Ct. 2391 (1993), prosecutorial misconduct violates due process only if evidence is presented which taken as a whole gives a jury a false impression.  Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957) (per curiam). It is uncontested that the prosecutor, confused about which portions of the voluminous medical records had been admitted into evidence, read Danny's statement inadvertently. Furthermore, the reference was made in passing in the course of an eight-hour closing argument and the prosecutor, immediately after reading the statement, explicitly told the jury that he did not believe it to be competent evidence of Downs's guilt. Upon defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor apologized and immediately changed the topic. The state court granted summary judgment on the claim and the district court rejected it. We find no clear error.
27 Downs further contends that trial counsel should have moved for a mistrial after the prosecutor's statement. The state court found that trial counsel, after conferring with Downs, made a valid tactical judgment not to seek a mistrial and that the prosecutor's action was not in fact ground for a mistrial. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). The second, or prejudice prong, requires a showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. The question is not whether the verdict would more likely than not have been different, but whether the defendant received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 28 There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, or sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Tactical decisions after consultation with the client are virtually unchallengeable. Id. at 690. Moreover, even if Downs could show deficient performance, the record does not establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged ineffective performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. As Downs cannot show that she did not receive a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence, the state court's rejection of this claim was not clearly erroneous. 29