Opinion ID: 2450080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pfeifer case

Text: There was an aberration in our case law, which is set out only to show that it existed and that it has ended. Shortly after we correctly decided the foundation case of Herring v. Stannus , we decided City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer, 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S.W. 883 (1925), and in essence, held that the review of zoning appeals could be by trial de novo rather than by solely determining whether the enactment by the legislative branch was arbitrary. The effect was to judge the wisdom of the enactment in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. We began to retreat from the Pfeifer doctrine in the 1953 case of Evans v. City of Little Rock, 221 Ark. 252, 253 S.W.2d 347 (1953), and backed further away from it in the 1966 cases of Downs v. City of Little Rock, 240 Ark. 623, 401 S.W.2d 210 (1966) and City of Little Rock v. Parker, 241 Ark. 381, 407 S.W.2d 921 (1966). The Pfeifer doctrine led to criticism. Morton Gitelman, Judicial Review of Zoning in Arkansas, 23 Ark.L.Rev. 22 (1969); Morton Gitelman, ZoningThe Expanding Business District Doctrine in Arkansas: An Obstacle to Land Use Planning, 28 Ark.L.Rev. 262 (1975). In Baldridge v. City of North Little Rock, 258 Ark. 246, 523 S.W.2d 912 (1975), we re-examined the Pfeifer doctrine and almost laid it to rest. See Robert R. Wright, Zoning Law in Arkansas, 3 UALR L.J. 421, 477 (1980). Finally, in City of Little Rock v. Breeding, 273 Ark. 437, 619 S.W.2d 664 (1981), we noted the many cases that restricted, limited and modified the holding in Pfeifer, and said the case now has little if any validity. Id. at 447-48, 619 S.W.2d at 669-70. In summary, we have returned to the foundational doctrine of Herring v. Stannus , which provides that the judicial department can set aside a legislative enactment only when the legislative branch has abused its discretion in an enactment because of arbitrariness.