Opinion ID: 775859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard for Routine Traffic Stops

Text: 6 We begin by examining the appropriate legal standard for traffic stops. We review questions of law de novo. United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001). 7 A traffic stop, however brief, constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and is therefore only constitutional if it is reasonable. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). In United States v. Botero-Ospina we set forth the standard governing the reasonableness of traffic stops: [A] traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has occurred or is occurring. 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc); see also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (We have consistently applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio to routine traffic stops. (citation omitted)). Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). When determining whether an officer possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion, the subjective motivations of an arresting officer are irrelevant. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d at 787; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (adopting an objective approach). 8 Callarman argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Whren overturned Botero-Ospina and requires probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. In Whren, the Court stated that, [a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. 517 U.S. at 810. Other recent Supreme Court cases have also referred to a probable cause standard. E.g., Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, ___, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000). 9 While these cases indicate that probable cause is a sufficient ground for a stop, none of them indicates that it is necessary for a stop. Other Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases have held that reasonable articulable suspicion is also sufficient grounds to justify a stop. E.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that a traffic stop was supportable under a reasonable articulable suspicion standard). In Knowles v. Iowa, for example, the Court noted that a routine traffic stop is a relatively brief encounter and is more analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' . . . than to a formal arrest. 525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)). The Knowles Court also made clear that a routine traffic stop justifies other incidents of a Terry search, such as a patdown of the driver and a brief search of the car. Id. at 118, 119 S. Ct. 484. Similarly, in Brignoni-Ponce the Court stated: [W]hen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. 422 U.S. at 881. 10 There is no inconsistency between these two lines of cases. While either probable cause or reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify a traffic stop, only the lesser requirement of reasonable suspicion is necessary. We decline Callarman's request to overturn our decision in Botero-Ospina, and we rely on the legal test it articulated: Our sole inquiry [in traffic stop cases] is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that this particular motorist violated 'any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the jurisdiction. 71 F.3d at 787 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).