Opinion ID: 2338714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Colloquy Among Court and Counsel

Text: In order to understand clearly what issues emerged from the court's ruling, it is important to focus more precisely on the interchange between counsel and court after the defense completed its proffer that Hungerford had committed a similar crime just two weeks earlier, but with different accomplices. [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: And my position, our theory is, number one, she [Hungerford] in fact did set up the events with Sharon Bost, that she did it in conjunction with others, that she is not only lying about her own role but the role of others and that she's identifying my client in order to protect the real person involved in this offense. .... [PROSECUTOR]: Well, I would submit that the only reason that the earlier armed robbery can be questioned about is the possible bias. As specific[ally] we have a Brown [3] - Beal[e] [4] issue here. THE COURT: That's right. .... [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: This is Drew [5] evidence. THE COURT: Is she [Hungerford] on trial for something here? Is she on trial for something here? .... [PROSECUTOR]: It still comes back to the Brown and Beal[e] problem. She could have done a hundred other robberies. There is absolutely nothing to tie anybody involved in any other robbery with Ms. Hungerford to this case. .... [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: What I am trying to do is impeach her credibility with respect to the issue that she identified my client because my client was involved in this case. And I am trying to show that she has a motive for keeping out, just as she said my client came to her and threatened her, I am trying to show that she has a motive for minimizing her own conduct and keeping out informationand hiding information from the government and the jury of others who are involved. .... THE COURT: Well, I think on the credibility issue, I think you have got a problem. If I let you ask her these questions on credibility, I still view this matter as a collateral issue. .... [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: My understanding is that bias is not a collateral matter. THE COURT: You can call everything bias, that doesn't make it bias. [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: I understand. It strikes me that her motivation to lie is directly an issue, that does constitute bias and that can be impeached by extrinsic evidence. .... THE COURT: I will permit the question, but you are going to be stuck with the answer. [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: In order not to violate the ruling, I want guidance. I can ask the question as I indicated to the Court but I am stuck with the answer? THE COURT: That's right. [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: But that is the guts of what Drew is all about. You and I have litigated Drew many, many times. THE COURT: Not with respect to witnesses. [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: Drew applies to anybody who testifies. THE COURT: Not here in this case, it isn't the law here. (Emphasis added.) When Samuels renewed the proffer the next day, adding that Keith Bego was present and willing to testify that Samuels definitely was not one of the men who had attacked him, counsel for Samuels elaborated his bias theory: [SAMUELS' COUNSEL]: Again, Mr. Bego's testimony I think is directly relevant to her [Hungerford's] motivation to lie, to falsely implicat[e] my client in order to protect the people with whom she has engaged in virtually identical robberies just two weeks before. Counsel for Newman then emphasized the similarity of the crimes and argued that they established a modus operandi for Hungerford, admissible under a reverse Drew  theory. [NEWMAN'S COUNSEL]: This is a classic [Federal Rules of Evidence] 404[/]608 evidence involving withdealing with uncharged evidence of other crimes and uncharged misconduct. And whether the Government wants to bring in Mr. Harvey and Mr. Nicholas to see if they can identify these two [defendants], I have no problem with that. But the jury has a right to know that this is her modus operandi, this is almost like a reverse Drew. The government argued that differences between the crimes negated such a showing and, in any event, that the previous robbery had no relevance to Hungerford's testimony about the June 18 robbery and murder. As indicated earlier, Judge Alprin agreed with the government, replying that he could hardly think of a more collateral issue and that to allow defendants to proceed would create a trial within a trial.