Opinion ID: 71719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requisite Intent for Violation

Text: We review a district court's interpretation and application of a statute de novo. International Union v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 724 (11th Cir.1993). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it controls interpretation  absent a legislative intent to the contrary. Chandler, 996 F.2d at 1084 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981)) (emphasis added). We resort to legislative history when the statutory language is unclear. United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 235, 106 S.Ct. 555, 557, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985). Our objective when interpreting a statute is to determine the drafters' intent. United States v. Castro, 829 F.2d 1038, 1049 (11th Cir.1987), modified on other grounds, 837 F.2d 441 (11th Cir.1988). Under these guiding interpretive principles, we must examine the statutory language of the AECA to determine if the district judge properly instructed the jury as to its application given the facts in this case. Regarding the prohibited importation act at issue, the AECA states: Except as provided in section 4222(e) [the sport-hunted Id. 13 Under 50 C.F.R. pt. 23, Endangered Species Convention, are the federal regulations implementing CITES. See 50 C.F.R. § 23.1(a) (1992) (The regulations in this part implement the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, TIAS 8249.). trophies exception] of this title, it is unlawful for any person -- - to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. 16 U.S.C. § 4223(1). The AECA provides both criminal and civil penalties. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4224(a) & (b). This case was prosecuted criminally, and it is that statutory penalty provision that has caused the interpretive determination of the requisite intent: Whoever knowingly violates section 4223 of this title shall, upon conviction, be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.14 16 U.S.C. § 4224(a) (emphasis added). Although the district judge tentatively had been inclined toward defense counsel's interpretation that knowingly, as used in section 4224(a) with reference to section 4223(1) meant specific intent,15 she reverted to her original interpretation, urged by the government, of general intent.16 Thus, the district judge 14 In contrast, the AECA civil penalty provides: Whoever violates section 4223 of this title may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $5,000 for each such violation. 16 U.S.C. § 4224(b). 15 In leaning toward a specific intent interpretation for 16 U.S.C. § 4224(a), the district judge reasoned as follows: THE COURT: I'm tentatively inclined to think Mr. Brehm's [David Grigsby's counsel's] interpretation is correct. It is true that the word knowingly normally implies only that the act is volitional, but this statute is somewhat different from the norm in that it speaks of who[m]ever knowingly violates. It is different from what the result would be if section 4223 were to say that it is unlawful for any person to knowingly import raw ivory from any other country, et cetera. R14-938. 16 The district judge initially believed that knowingly in 16 U.S.C. § 4224(a) referred to general intent and, subsequently, instructed the jury that violation of the AECA required only general intent: In order for a defendant to be found guilty of Count Two [AECA violation], the government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. That the defendant either knowingly or fraudulently imported into the United States raw African elephant ivory. And secondly, that the importation was from a non-ivory producing country, in this case the country of Canada. The word knowingly means that an act is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident.17 returned to this view: THE COURT: And the definition of knowingly is that an act is done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident. There isn't a specific intent requirement in that act. There is no requirement that the defendant's actions be done willfully; that is, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. So, the government's evidence would have to show a volitional act by the defendants. .... Knowingly normally means volitional, general intent. R14-917, 936 (emphasis added). Throughout the discussions at the charge conference and in the proposed jury instructions, knowingly is construed to mean general intent, while willfully is interpreted to mean specific intent. 17 The district judge essentially used the government's proposed Request to Charge No. 15 to instruct the jury on violation of the AECA: Title 16, United States Code, Section 4223(1) makes it unlawful to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of Count Two of the indictment, the Government must prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: R15-1089-90. Because no federal court had addressed whether knowingly violates in section 4224(a) requires general or specific intent, the district court was persuaded by the government's analogy to the Endangered Species Act, which contains similar language.18 The Fifth Circuit and a district court in our circuit have found that general intent is sufficient to violate the Endangered Species Act. United States v. Ivey, 949 F.2d 759, 766 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 819, 113 S.Ct. 64, 121 L.Ed.2d 32 (1992); United States v. Nguyen, 916 F.2d 1016, 1018-20 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (S.D.Fla.1987). In denying Doris Grigsby's motion for a new trial, the district judge clarified that she had adopted this rationale in determining that general intent was required for violation of the AECA: The court finds the analogy to the Endangered Species Act persuasive, and agrees with the rationale of the Fifth Circuit cases and the Billie case. The pattern of the language in § 4224(a) of the African Elephant Conservation Act (whoever knowingly violates) is identical to the language which has been interpreted not to require specific intent under the Endangered Species Act. The two acts are similar in purpose. Both criminal violations are misdemeanors. Accordingly, the court finds that the violation of § 4223(1) required only a finding of general intent and that the court properly charged the jury in this regard.
imported or brought into the United States raw African elephant ivory, Loxodonta africana; and
producing country, in this case Canada. R4-78-15 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 4223(1) & 4224(a)). 18 Under the Endangered Species Act, [a]ny person who knowingly violates any provision under that Act or any provision of any permit issued under the Act is subject to criminal prosecution. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1). R3-115-10-11. David and Doris Grigsby argue that, to be convicted under section 4224(a) of the AECA, the government must prove that the importer had specific knowledge of the AECA as well as knowledge that the specific, challenged conduct would be violative. David Grigsby sought this jury instruction in his Request to Charge No. 11: The African Elephant Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 4223(1) and § 4224(a), makes it a violation of criminal law to knowingly import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. In order to prove a violation of this law as alleged in Count Two of the indictment, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt both of the following two elements: 1. That the defendant imported raw ivory from a country other than an ivory producing country as charged in the indictment; and 2. The defendant imported raw ivory knowing that such importation was in violation of federal law. R4-74-11 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 4223(1) & 4224(a)) (emphasis added). This request to charge, which was adopted by Doris Grigsby, was rejected by the district judge.19 R15-957, 966. 19 The district judge also specifically refused to give David Grigsby's Request to Charge No. 15, which addresses knowledge of violating the AECA: The Defendant, David Grigsby, is accused of smuggling raw ivory into the United States. It is against federal law to smuggle raw ivory into the United States. For you to find David Grigsby guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of these things beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that David Grigsby brought raw ivory into the United States. Second, that David Grigsby knew the raw ivory should have been reported to customs authorities as required by law. Similarly, Doris Grigsby proposed jury instructions explaining that knowledge that the importation was unlawful was required for conviction in Request to Charge Nos. 17 and 20: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, with respect to the charge alleging possession or concealment of smuggled goods, I charge you that the law does not make the mere receipt or concealment of smuggled goods an offense. There must be, on the part of the person receiving or concealing the goods after their importation, knowledge of their illegal importation .... It has been uniformly held that the jury was not authorized to convict unless the possession or concealment of the goods was accompanied with knowledge on the part of the possessor that they had been smuggled or imported contrary to law.'  Third, that David Grigsby, intending to avoid the United States customs laws, did not report the raw ivory to the customs authorities. R4-74-15 (citing Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions No. 68 (1988)) (emphasis added). R15-966. In discussing the knowledge/intent requirement with the district judge prior to the finalization of the jury instructions, David Grigsby's counsel explained his position: If you look at section 4223 of the Title 16 Act [AECA], that sets forth the acts themselves which are prohibited, and, of course, the charge in this case is subpart (1), which is to import raw ivory from any country other than an ivory producing country. That's the conduct that is prohibited, but then if you look at section 4224 right after that, that talks about penalties and enforcement, and subpart (a) is the criminal violation, and subpart (b) is civil. It would be our position as to David Grigsby that section 4224, subpart (a), the criminal violation, which says whoever knowingly violates section 4223, it is our position that that establishes a knowledge requirement which is a knowledge of the law itself. R14-935. Despite this explanatory background and the district judge's comments that the evidence as to David Grigsby was pretty thin and a little bit close in my mind, id. at 947, the judge did not give any instruction clearly delineating that knowledge of the AECA was required for its violation, which would demonstrate specific intent for criminal violation of the statute. R4-77-17 (quoting United States v. Sauer, 73 F. 671, 677 (W.D.Tex.1896) (emphasis added)). Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I charge you that you are not to presume the Defendants knew, or should have known, the sophisticated importation or customs laws of the United States just because they were in the taxidermist business in Canada. Id. at 20 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 234 n. 4, 93 S.Ct. 489, 491 n. 4, 34 L.Ed.2d