Opinion ID: 24520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable Cause/Wrongful Arrest

Text: 13 “The Fourth Amendment requires that an arrest be supported by a properly issued arrest warrant or probable cause. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest if ‘a reasonable person in their position could have believed he had probable cause to arrest.’” Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 740 (5th Cir. 2000)). Probable cause “exists ‘when the totality of the facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.’” Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “Thus, the central question in our qualified immunity inquiry is ‘the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.’” Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging false arrest, in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the officer lacked probable cause, which means that she must show that the legality of her conduct was clearly established. See Sorenson, 134 F.3d at 330. 14 The probable cause inquiry is an objective one. “A police officer need not actually have had the crime for which probable cause existed in mind at the time of the arrest; rather, the question is ‘whether the conduct that served as the basis for the charge for which there was no probable cause could, in the eyes of a similarly situated reasonable officer, also have served as the basis for a charge for which there was probable cause.’” Gassner v. City of Garland, Tex., 864 F.2d 394, 398 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 486 (5th Cir. 1982)). In this case, certain facts are undisputed. After Scudder told Jeffrey to stay where he was, Huang told Jeffrey to go back into the house. Further, Huang closed the security gate behind Jeffrey as Scudder, then aware Jeffrey was re-entering the home, ran up the walk and attempted to grab Jeffrey. She was informed by Scudder that if she did not allow Jeffrey to come out of the house, she would be arrested for interference with a police investigation. Further, Huang refused to give Scudder information he requested, such as her identity, and Huang was ultimately placed under arrest. There is, however, some dispute as to the order of the events surrounding Huang’s arrest. While Huang testified that Scudder placed her under arrest for failure to identify herself and then asked for her identification, Scudder testified that he asked Huang for her information and, when she refused to give it 15 to him, placed her under arrest for failure to identify. We do not find, however, that given the undisputed facts and circumstances of this case, that this difference is material to the issue of probable cause. Texas law recognizes the offense of “failure to identify.” “A person commits [the offense of failure to identify] if he intentionally refuses to give his name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer who has lawfully arrested the person and requested the information.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(a) (Vernon 1994); see also Presley v. City of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1993). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Huang, she was not under arrest at the time she refused to give her information to Scudder. Therefore, we cannot find as a matter of law that “a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.’” Sorenson, 134 F.3d at 328 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641). However, Texas law also recognizes the crime of “interference with public duties.” A violation occurs when “[a] person with criminal negligence[5] interrupts, disrupts, impedes, 5 “Criminal negligence” is a state of mind occurring “when [a person] ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 16 or otherwise interferes with . . . a peace officer while the peace officer is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law.” TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 38.15(a)(1) (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2001). A defense to prosecution under this statute is that the alleged interference consisted of speech only. Id. § 38.15(d); see also Carney v. State, 31 S.W.3d 392, 396 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no writ). Huang’s testimony that she closed the gate behind Jeffrey as he entered the home, thereby preventing Scudder’s access to him, supports a probable-cause determination. Cf. Carney, 31 S.W.3d at 398 (defendant’s verbal challenges to the sufficiency of the search warrant did not impede officers’ entry under § 38.15 where there was no physical action on his part). We are not required to determine that Huang’s actions would be legally sufficient to support a conviction. We are only required to determine that it was not unreasonable for Scudder to believe he had probable cause for arrest. Although Huang was not charged with the offense of interfering with public duties, “the legality of an arrest may be established by proving that there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff had committed a crime other than the one with which [s]he was eventually charged, provided that the crime under circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(d) (Vernon 1994). Criminal negligence is the lowest culpable mental state under Texas law. See Carney v. State, 31 S.W.3d 392, 395 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no writ). 17 which the arrest is made and [the] crime for which probable cause exists are in some fashion related.” Gassner, 864 F.2d at 398 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We conclude that, given the factual circumstances here, failure to identify and interfering with public duties were sufficiently related that an objective officer might have charged the offense of interference with public duties. After Scudder asked Jeffrey to remain where he was, Huang told her son to return to the house and, as Scudder tried to “grab” Jeffrey, shut the security gate. Huang, after having been warned that she was interfering with a police investigation, refused to bring Jeffrey back outside and refused to give Scudder any information about Jeffrey or herself. The conduct that gave rise to the arrest for failure to identify was part of the same conduct that would have supported an arrest for interference with public duties. See Vance v. Nunnery, 137 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 1998); see, e.g., Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 479 n.12 (5th Cir. 1994); Gassner, 864 F.2d at 400; Trejo v. Perez, 693 F.2d 482, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1982). Finally, under Texas law, “[a] person commits [the offense of resisting arrest] if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer . . . from effecting an arrest . . . of the actor or another by using force against the peace officer or another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03(a) (Vernon 1994). The undisputed testimony is that, after having been placed under arrest, Huang clung to both her front door and then 18 to her security gate in an effort to resist Scudder’s attempt to handcuff her. Scudder also asserted, and Huang did not produce evidence to refute Scudder’s testimony, that she resisted Scudder’s attempts to place her under arrest by entwining her legs inside the iron security gate. We note that there is a split of authority under Texas law whether simply hanging onto the gate and trying to shake off the peace officer’s grip constitutes a violation of § 38.03. Compare Leos v. State, 880 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. Ct. App.–Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (finding insufficient evidence to support conviction for resisting arrest when evidence only showed appellant attempted flight and shook off officer’s grip because such force not directed against officer), and Luxton v. State, 941 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. Ct. App.–Fort Worth 1997, no writ), with Bryant v. State, 923 S.W.2d 199, 207 (Tex. Ct. App.–Waco 1996, pet. ref’d) (“We disagree with the courts’ decisions in Leos[ v. State, 880 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Ct. App.–Corpus Christi 1994, no writ)] and Raymond[ v. State, 640 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App.—El Paso 1982, pet. ref’d),] to the extent that they hold that any effort to shake off an officer’s detaining grip by ‘simply pulling one’s arm away’ is not sufficient force to sustain a conviction for resisting arrest.” (citations omitted)). However, we need not resolve the conflict. Huang did not dispute Scudder’s testimony that she kicked the constable repeatedly in the shin during the incident. Kicking Scudder while he attempted to arrest her 19 constitutes using force against him. Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would have believed he had probable cause to arrest Huang for resisting arrest. Scudder and Darbe have demonstrated probable cause for Huang’s arrest, entitling them to the defense of qualified immunity. Huang has failed to carry her summary judgment burden by producing competent evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact on this issue. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim to the extent it was grounded on an alleged false arrest.