Opinion ID: 2461509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: krs 439.3401, parole for violent offenders

Text: The Majority Opinion is wide of the mark when it states the entire attack on KRS 439.3401 is predicated on the possible disparity (between a life sentence and a term of years) in sentencing which may exist in the minimum for parole eligibility. [Emphasis original.] Disparate sentencing is the least of appellant's stated objections and probably the least significant of the constitutional considerations involved. The potential for constitutionally impermissible disparity occurs because a life sentence may, depending on future unknowable considerations, result in a shorter term of incarceration than a sentence to a term of years. But the primary and insurmountable constitutional problem occurs when this section of the Truth-In-Sentencing Act is juxtaposed with the section we have just discussed, KRS 532.055(2)(a)(1), permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence regarding minimum parole eligibility. Taken together, these two provisions present an insolvable dilemma for defense counsel in a criminal case amply illustrated by present circumstances. The appellant's counsel cannot argue sentencing in the best interest of his client. This presents a constitutionally impermissible encroachment on the accused's right to be heard by . . . counsel, [emphasis added] as guaranteed by the Kentucky Constitution Section 11, and the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in the United States Constitution. The Kentucky constitutional protection is stronger because this is not just a right to be represented, but a right to be heard. The right to be heard necessarily carries with it the premise that counsel will be able to make a reasonable judgment and logical argument as to what is in his client's best interest. The terms of KRS 439.3401, assuming their meaning can be understood, apparently require that a violent offender as defined in KRS 439.3401(1), including a murderer, shall not be considered for parole until he has served at least twelve years in the penitentiary if sentenced to life imprisonment, and shall not be considered for parole until he has served at least fifty percent of the sentence imposed if he has been sentenced to a term of years. [2] Excluding the prospect of parole, the statutory sentencing structure which is set out in KRS Chapter 532, styled Classification and Designation of Offenses-Authorized Disposition, contemplates that life imprisonment is the maximum punishment that the sentencing authority can order in any case where the death penalty is not imposed. Indeed, the statutory language specifically involved states the authorized sentence is not less than twenty (20) years nor more than life imprisonment, KRS 532.060(2)(a), and the jury is so instructed. As the Majority Opinion suggests, except for the confusing evidence that will be introduced regarding parole eligibility, a layman considers [`a life sentence'] a longer sentence. Indeed, except for the uncertain and unknowable answers to the questions, will the Parole Board release the prisoner on the first hearing; how many times will he be deferred; will the Parole Board require him to serve out his time? a life sentence will be in fact as well as in theory the longer sentence. Attached as an Appendix to this Opinion are Parole Board statistics styled Results of First-time Hearings Only, 1983-87. The number paroled at first hearing has dropped by over 25%. The number committed to serve out has more than doubled. Who knows what the future will bring? The point of all this is that it is impossible for defense counsel to make a rational argument to the sentencing authority, jury or judge, in his client's best interest, because he cannot divine the future actions of the Parole Board in his client's case. The defense attorney will be sorely tempted to ask for a life sentence since presumably he then has a possibility of parole in twelve years, but he must also consider that the Parole Board may well refuse to parole his client at the first time hearing (the last available statistics show the rejection rate at first time hearing almost 70%), and the possibility that his client may have to serve out the life sentence to the end cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, if he assumes the defendant will be paroled at the point of his minimum parole eligibility, this would mean twelve years for a life sentence, and any sentence to a term of years greater than twenty-four years is more severe than a life sentence because KRS 439.3401 fixes statutory minimum parole eligibility for a term of years at fifty percent. The appellant in the present case, faced with the prospect of trial and conviction for a violent shotgun killing, had no meaningful argument for a minimum sentence of twenty years in the event of conviction even though, arguably, there may have been some mitigating circumstances relating to the defendant's diminished capacity. Logic foreclosed attempting to argue for the minimum sentence or for a sentence from twenty to twenty-four years. Faced with this prospect and deprived by the statute of any meaningful opportunity to argue sentencing, he opted for a negotiated plea, reserving the right to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme which denied him a sentencing argument. KRS 439.3401, as structured, providing minimum parole eligibility of twelve years for life sentence but fifty percent for a term of years, is arbitrary and denies due process as guaranteed by our Kentucky Constitution, Section 2. This much should be obvious to an elementary sense of justice. However, even were I able to understand how or why my colleagues can accept this statute as reasonable, surely it surpasses understanding to disclaim the accused's constitutional guarantees, federal and state, to the assistance of counsel and to the right to be heard by counsel. There is no way that counsel can figure out how to argue in his client's best interest for a reasonable sentence to a jury that will be burdened with a bundle of half-truths about minimum parole eligibility. He is forced, as was this defendant, to give up his right to contest guilt in exchange for the promise of a minimum sentence. No doubt inspired at least in part by the outrageous confusion thrust upon the sentencing procedure by the Truth-In-Sentencing statute, Justice Gant has filed a Concurring Opinion proposing a change to judge sentencing from our time honored system of jury sentencing. The problems created by Reneer are of our own making and should not be used as a vehicle to abandon the people's right to decide by verdict what is an appropriate sentence. A proper sentence is a question of fact and not just a matter of procedure. It is out of character with the deliberative process for our Court to assume power to trade in jury sentencing for judge sentencing until first the issue has been properly presented and carefully considered. This should include preliminary research and review of the legal issues and an opportunity afforded to the public and to the bar association to participate in the process. Until this matter has been thoroughly researched and considered, it is both precipitous and presumptuous to suggest that our Constitution does not guarantee the right to a jury's verdict regarding an appropriate sentence in those cases where the defendant pleads not guilty, or to decide that the new Judicial Article meant to disturb anything so fundamental as the people's right to jury sentencing simply because Article 116 now specifies that [t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe . . . rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice. I would seriously question that the people of Kentucky, or the General Assembly, would view it as reasonable for us to presume the power to abolish jury sentencing from the authority to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the court of justice. I am not familiar with how well jury sentencing works in our sister states. But I am prepared to state, quite confidently, that sentencing problems in Federal courts using judge sentencing procedures instead of jury sentencing are as great, or greater, than problems with jury sentencing in Kentucky. A distinguished Federal Judge, The Honorable Marvin E. Frankel, in his book Criminal Sentences, Law Without Order, expounded in detail on the serious problems in judge sentencing in Federal courts. Judge Frankel's conclusion about judge sentencing is as follows: [T]he point is made, in all its stark horror, by the compelling evidence, that widely unequal sentences are imposed every day in great numbers for crimes and criminals not essentially distinguishable from each other. [Frankel, p. 8.] Judge Frankel documents his treatise with example after example. He concludes: The evidences is conclusive that judges of widely varying attitutes on sentencing, administering statutes that confer huge measures of discretion, mete out widely divergent sentences where the divergences are explainable only by the variations among the judges, not by material differences in the defendants or their crimes. [Frankel, p. 21.] What more proof of the failure in the Federal sentencing system is needed than the drastic changes recently enacted by Congress in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. An elaborate new system of sentencing guidelines and supervisory procedures has been enacted to control the sentencing discretion of trial judges, much of which now is being challenged in Federal courts as unconstitutional. [3] The argument that judges are better prepared than juries to decide on a proper sentence is undocumented, and probably untrue. The question of what is an appropriate sentence is a question of fact, and the time honored method for deciding facts in a court of law by jury is a powerful protection of our liberty. My views on this matter may be found in an article in the Louisville Bar Association publication, Louisville Lawyer, Winter 1982. I quote a portion of that article: Disinterested citizens, forced to submit their arguments for or against a proposition to the inquiring scrutiny of their fellow jurors, are more likely to `get it right' on any question of fact, including the punishment that fits the crime, than a judge. The jury selection process insures that the jurors have no stake in the outcome of the case. The law requires that they must be impartial, and those of us with long experience in the judicial process almost without exception develop great respect for jury impartiality. Judges on the other hand have a stake in the system. It is their profession and their livelihood. They must run for reelection. In view of current political wisdom about the importance to the candidate of being viewed as a law and order candidate, a defendant would have every right to fear the worst at the prospect of facing judge sentencing in an election year. As long as we elect judges in Kentucky, I will oppose substituting judge sentencing for jury sentencing. Can we honestly expect of a judge that he will be able to view the prospect of sentencing with the same objectivity and detachment, fairness and impartiality, that we can expect of a jury for whom the outcome of the case has no personal consequences? Justice Gant's Concurring Opinion makes the point that Kentucky already has judicial sentencing in all but about 10% of the cases in our judicial system. This statement leaves a wrong impression because the defendant waives the right to a jury verdict on sentencing only when he pleads guilty. Almost without exception these cases where a plea of guilty is entered are plea bargained. This means there is an agreed sentence beforehand recommended by the Commonwealth at the time the plea is entered. Any judge who is fair, if he decides he will not abide by the plea bargain, will permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty and retain the right to contest his guilt and to jury sentencing. The change to judge sentencing for Kentucky will be no small matter. On the contrary, it will take away from the people the power to make a fundamental and important decision, and transfer that power into the hands of governmental officials, the elected judiciary. In my judgment, such a change should not be casually undertaken. Indeed, it should not be undertaken at all until first it has been established by credible evidence that it is a change for the better and then it has been established that the people of Kentucky want this change. There is much about our present sentencing and parole structure, as mandated by our statutes, that needs reform to restore credibility to the sentencing process. We need to study the feasibility of a system of determinate sentencing, setting fair and reasonable sentences in the first place and abandoning a parole system which often serves only to control the size of the prison population. But there is no reason to believe that abolishing the jury verdict as to the appropriate sentence will improve the system, and every reason to fear that it may make our situation worse. LAMBERT, J., concurs in this Dissenting Opinion, except that portion which discusses whether judicial or jury sentencing is preferable. APPENDIX A ALL INSTITUTIONS  COMBINED STATISTICS (Excluding Parole Violation Hearings and Early Parole Hearings) Results of First-time Hearings Only 1983-1987 TOTAL PAROLE SERVE-OUT YEAR INTERVIEWS RECOMMENDED DEFERRED TIME 1983-1984 2,475 1,079 1,148 248 43.6% 46.4% 10.0% 1984-1985 2,157 953 955 249 44.2% 44.3% 11.5% 1985-1986 2,108 805 954 349 38.2% 45.3% 16.5% 1986-1987 2,211 684 1,060 467 30.9% 47.9% 21.1% Results of All Hearings (Regular, Deferred and Others, Excluding Parole Violation Hearings and Early Parole Hearings) TOTAL PAROLE SERVE-OUT YEAR INTERVIEWS RECOMMENDED DEFERRED TIME 1983-1984 3,845 2,113 1,439 293 55.0% 37.4% 7.6% 1984-1985 3,724 2,156 1,261 308 57.9% 33.9% 8.2% 1985-1986 3,573 1,933 1,209 431 54.1% 33.8% 12.1% 1986-1987 3,517 1,599 1,361 557 45.5% 38.7% 15.8%