Opinion ID: 572629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Individual Challenges to the Convictions

Text: 74 Defendants make a number of individual challenges to their convictions, including (1) Vulpis's challenge to the introduction of evidence that he attempted to bribe SDEC investigators, (2) the Vulpis companies' contention that they were not responsible for derelictions of Vulpis, and (3) McDonald's contentions that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction and erred in certain evidentiary rulings with respect to character evidence. We have considered all of defendants' challenges to the merits and find in them no basis for reversal.
75 During its rebuttal case, the government was allowed to introduce evidence that, in connection with the illegal A & A landfill, Vulpis had offered SDEC officers bribes. Vulpis challenges the admission of this evidence, arguing principally that it was not probative of the issues at trial, that the unfair prejudice to him outweighed its probative value, and that he did not have proper notice that the evidence would be offered. We disagree. 76 Under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted at trial to show, inter alia, that a defendant who claims that his conduct was the result of accident or mistake had the intent to commit the offense. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); see, e.g., United States v. Mills, 895 F.2d 897, 907 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2216, 109 L.Ed.2d 541 (1990); United States v. Caputo, 808 F.2d 963, 968 (2d Cir.1987). A defendant's attempt to bribe a law enforcement official is relevant to show his awareness that his actions were not innocent. See, e.g., United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1260 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955, 100 S.Ct. 435, 62 L.Ed.2d 328 (1979); see also United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 78-79 (6th Cir.1986) (attempt to bribe witness), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 1384, 94 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Evidence of such other acts should be excluded, however, if the trial court finds that its potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. See Fed.R.Evid. 403; Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) Advisory Committee Note: Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1500-1501, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988). The trial court's decision to admit such evidence will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Sappe, 898 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Caputo, 808 F.2d at 968. 77 Vulpis's principal defense at trial was that he did not intend the Arlington Yard operations to violate the law and that any impermissible dumping there was the result of accident or mistake. To substantiate that defense he was allowed, over the government's objection, to introduce testimony that Weiss had given in a civil action. In that testimony, Weiss said that when two SDEC officers discovered buried garbage at the landfill Vulpis had been shocked and surprised. In response to this evidence, the government was permitted, in its rebuttal case, to offer testimony by those two officers that upon their calling the violations to Vulpis's attention, Vulpis had promptly offered them money. Accordingly, SDEC Lieutenant David Baker testified about his visit to the A & A landfill in mid-September 1988 and a conversation he had there with Vulpis. When Baker told Vulpis he was operating illegally and risking $25,000 a day in penalties, Vulpis responded, I'm losing $75,000 a day every day the place is closed. How about $100,000, you just go away. Similarly, SDEC officer Milewski testified that on the same day, Vulpis told him he was losing approximately $80,000, and how about $50,000. These statements by Vulpis, which the jury was plainly free to interpret as offering bribes, were relevant to show a consciousness of guilt on the part of Vulpis and thereby to cast doubt on his lack-of-intent defense. The court properly gave the jury a limiting instruction, and it was well within the court's discretion to conclude that, with that instruction, the probative value of this evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice. 78 Finally, we reject Vulpis's contention that the bribe evidence should have been excluded because he did not have advance notice that the government would seek to use it. In support of this contention, Vulpis relies on United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151 (2d Cir.1988). His reliance is misplaced, for Davidoff did not involve a Rule 404(b) question; rather, we ruled that it was error for the trial court not to require the government to provide a bill of particulars identifying the alleged victims of discrete extortionate schemes that the government intended to prove as RICO predicate acts. See 845 F.2d at 1154. A requirement that, upon request of the defendant in a criminal case, the government give advance notice of the general nature of any other-act evidence that is to be offered at trial will soon be added to Rule 404(b). See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) (effective Dec. 1, 1991: evidence of other acts is admissible to prove, inter alia, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial). No such requirement was in effect, however, at the time of the trial in the present case. See generally 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 404, at 404-158 (1991) (Rule 404 does not require the government to give notice of an intention to use other crimes evidence at trial.). 79 In any event, even if Vulpis had been entitled to advance notice that the government would offer the bribe evidence against him, he received adequate notice. The evidence was introduced during the government's rebuttal case. The government had initially offered this evidence, on another theory, during its direct case; when it was rejected, the government pointed out that if the testimony were viewed as reflecting the offer of a bribe, it would be admissible under Rule 404(b) as other-act evidence to meet a defense of mistake or lack of intent; the government expressly reserved its right to offer the testimony on rebuttal. The district court was not required to exclude the bribery evidence on the ground that Vulpis had not received notice.
80 The Vulpis companies contend that the jury's verdict finding them guilty on counts 1, 2, and 5-9 was not supported by sufficient evidence because the only evidence linking them to the A & A illegal operation was the fact they were 50% owned by Vulpis. They contend that they could not properly be held liable for his actions because there was no evidence that they had conferred any authority on him to involve them in the A & A landfill. This contention need not detain us long. 81 A corporation can act only through its agents, and the acts of individuals on [the corporation's] behalf may be properly chargeable to it. United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 3111, 77 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1983). Thus, the corporation may be held criminally liable for the conduct of its supervisory employees who had either intentionally disregarded the law or had acted with plain indifference to its requirements. United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir.1978). 82 The evidence in the present case was sufficient to permit a rational juror to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Vulpis's actions with respect to the A & A dump were for the benefit of and authorized by Rosedale and Vulpis Brothers, Ltd. It included proof that Vulpis owned 50% of each company; that he was an officer of each corporation; and that he largely ran their operations. Vulpis entered into the A & A partnership with Paccione for the purpose of operating the illegal dump. Vulpis helped run the dump. Truck drivers for both of Vulpis's companies testified that they daily made numerous dumps in Arlington Yard without being required to pay a fee. Use of that dump saved the Vulpis companies millions of dollars. 83 In short, the evidence was ample to support the convictions of the Vulpis companies on the RICO and mail fraud counts with which they were charged.
84 McDonald contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction to the jury and in making certain evidentiary rulings, to wit, barring McDonald's character witnesses from testifying with respect to his relationship with his son and allowing other witnesses to be questioned hypothetically with respect to McDonald's commission of crimes. For the reasons below, we find no basis for reversal. 85
86 McDonald asked the trial court to charge the jury that defendants' representations that Environmental Contractors was licensed to deal with infectious medical waste were not fraudulent because defendants relied in good faith on the permits they possessed. Thus, he requested the court to instruct that whether or not Environmental Contractors's licenses were fraudulently or irregularly obtained, advertisements describing the company as being licensed w[ere] not false and that defendants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors as licensed. McDonald contends that the trial court's refusal to give this instruction was error. It was not. 87 The trial judge is not required to give a requested charge if it lacks a foundation in law, see, e.g., United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 828 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Ouimette, 798 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 163, 102 L.Ed.2d 134 (1988), or lacks a foundation in the evidence adduced at trial, see United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1737, 48 L.Ed.2d 202 (1976). Where the defendant requests a charge as to his defense of good faith, there is no basis for reversal where the court's instructions have properly explained the thrust of that defense. See, e.g., United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1026 (2d Cir.1990); see also Cheek v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 604, 611, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (in criminal tax case, trial court should not instruct jury that, in order to negate willfulness, defendant's belief that enforcement of tax laws was unconstitutional must be objectively reasonable). 88 Here, the court gave the essence of a proper good-faith defense in its jury charge, stating as follows: 89 Under the antifraud statutes, even false representations or statements or omissions of material fact do not amount to a fraud unless done with fraudulent intent. However misleading or deceptive a plan may be, it is not fraudulent if it was devised or carried out in good faith. An honest belief in the truth of the representations made by a defendant is a good defense, no matter how inaccurate the statements may turn out to be. 90 (Trial Transcript, May 21, 1990, at 7069-70.) This general instruction was sufficient. The record did not warrant a charge, as McDonald requested, that the individual defendants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors as licensed. At the outset, Environmental Contractors represented that it was licensed when it was not. When doctors asked to see its license, defendants simply took another company's license and pasted Environmental Contractors's name on it, and distributed copies of the fabricated document. As a matter of law, defendants could not have had a good faith belief that their bogus document was an Environmental Contractors license. Given this record, for the court to have told the jury that defendants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors as licensed would have been error. 91
92 McDonald, who did not testify at trial, presented only character evidence in his defense. In addition to producing witnesses to testify to his honesty and integrity, he sought to introduce evidence that his then-teenage son had been born with cerebral palsy and that McDonald had devoted his life to caring for the son, in order to persuade the jury that McDonald would never do anything to risk imprisonment thereby disabling himself from caring for the boy. He contends that the court erroneously excluded this evidence. We find no basis for reversal. 93 The admissibility of character evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir.) (Rarely and only upon a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will appellate courts disturb the rulings of trial courts in the admissibility of character evidence.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1701, 52 L.Ed.2d 391 (1977). It is within the court's discretion to exclude evidence that is prejudicial, as well as evidence of specific acts intended to demonstrate character traits not at issue. United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 143, 93 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986). 94 Here, the court properly allowed McDonald's four character witnesses to testify to their opinions that McDonald was a forthright man of honesty whose integrity was beyond reproach. It was well within the court's discretion to draw the line to exclude testimony that had no bearing on his honesty or integrity and that could well cause the jury to be influenced by sympathies having no bearing on the merits of the case. 95 McDonald's other evidentiary contention is that the court improperly allowed the government to pose questions that assumed his guilt. In United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1695, 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991), decided after the trial of the present case, we held that lay character witnesses should not be asked guilt-assuming hypothetical questions. Here, one of the government's challenged questions was:Are you aware, Ms. Tanella, that on the permit application in the area, in the part of the permit application regarding the New Hanover Incinerator, John McDonald forged the name of another individual and wrote the name of another individual on that application? 96 (Trial Transcript, April 24, 1990, at 3761.) The government concedes that this question, though not in the form of a hypothetical, was improper under the spirit of this Court's ruling in Oshatz. We agree that the question was improper, but we regard this single improper question in the course of the 12-week trial as harmless error.