Opinion ID: 1107717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prejudice Occurs at Trial

Text: Carratelli also argues that the prejudice a defendant suffers when trial counsel fails to renew an objection to the jury occurs on appeal, not at trial. The Fourth District held that the focus must be on the trial. Carratelli II, 915 So.2d at 1263-64. The Fifth District in Austing, however, stated that where counsel fails to preserve reversible error in jury selection, there can never be a showing as to what would have occurred with a different jury, 804 So.2d at 604, and concluded that it is apodictic that the result would have been different  i.e., reversal on appeal. Id. at 605. We agree with the Fourth District. In establishing the standard for postconviction relief, the Supreme Court stated that in determining prejudice, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). In this case, the proceeding whose result is being challenged is the trial. Counsel's failure to renew the objection  the subject of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim  occurred at the trial. The result at trial  a conviction  is what Carratelli challenges; and had counsel renewed the objection, the trial court might very well have reconsidered the prior denial and granted the cause challenge. Moreover, the prejudice  a juror to whom Carratelli objects  occurs at trial. Again relying on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Davis, Carratelli argues that the prejudice occurs on appeal. Davis applied the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000). See Davis, 341 F.3d at 1315 ( Flores-Ortega thus establishes that the prejudice showing required by Strickland is not always fastened to the forum in which counsel performs deficiently. . . .). But Flores-Ortega does not support petitioner's argument. In that case, the defendant alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 473, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court held that to establish prejudice in such a case a defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed. Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court compared the situation to that in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Id. at 485, 120 S.Ct. 1029. In Hill, the defendant alleged counsel's ineffective assistance in advising the defendant about a guilty plea. The Court held that to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant had to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. In Flores-Ortega, the Supreme Court rejected any requirement that a defendant identify meritorious issues that could have been raised on appeal. 528 U.S. at 486, 120 S.Ct. 1029. The Court stated that [i]n adopting this standard, we follow the pattern established . . ., requiring a showing of actual prejudice ( i.e., that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant might have prevailed) when the proceeding in question was presumptively reliable, but presuming prejudice with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of his underlying claims when the violation of the right to counsel rendered the proceeding presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent. Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029. Thus, the Supreme Court did not hold that the Strickland standard, as applied to trial counsel, is sometimes assessed based on the outcome of the appeal, as the Eleventh Circuit found in Davis. See Davis, 341 F.3d at 1315. [5] Rather, it held that prejudice may be presumed when the defendant essentially was deprived of any proceeding at all. In Flores-Ortega, counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal deprived the defendant of an appeal. In Hill, counsel's deficient advice deprived the defendant of a trial. In this case, Carratelli alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve reversible error in jury selection. He was not deprived of a judicial proceeding, as in Hill and Flores-Ortega, and he is not entitled to a new trial simply because reversible error was not preserved. He had a trial that was presumptively reliable, and under Strickland, it is that trial whose result is being challenged. Accordingly, we hold that a defendant alleging that counsel was ineffective for failing to object or preserve a claim of reversible error in jury selection must demonstrate prejudice at the trial, not on appeal.