Opinion ID: 1954259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: language of la.r.s. 16:6

Text: It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes must be interpreted in their entirety. The meaning of a word in a statute must be determined in light of the statute as a whole. There is a presumption that the legislature enacted 16:6 for some definite purpose and we must endeavor to construe it so as to give it effect and accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. When a statute is susceptible of two interpretations, a court must choose the one which affords a reasonable and practical effect to the entire act over one which renders part of it meaningless or useless. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398, 400 (La.1980); J.M. Brown Const. Co. v. D & M Mechanical Con., Inc., 275 So.2d 401, 404 (La. 1973); Chappuis v. Reggie, 222 La. 35, 62 So.2d 92, 95 (1952); Pepsodent Co. v. Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942). In 1938, when the legislature first enacted 16:6, it stated the purpose of the act was to provide that the district attorneys of this state shall be reimbursed for expenses incurred in their official duties. 1938 La. Acts No. 20. Since its origin in 1938, the first paragraph of 16:6 has provided for a mandatory expense allowance for district attorneys. This is evidenced by the use of the phrase shall be entitled to an expense allowance appearing in every version of 16:6 from 1938 to the present. The second paragraph of 16:6, provides that the police jury is authorized to pay the expenses as provided for herein. This language refers to the mandatory expense allowance. It would make little sense for the legislature to create a mandatory expense allowance and then tell the providers of the fund they were free to fund that expense allowance or not. The court of appeal was incorrect in reading the two paragraphs in isolation, rather than in their entirety. A reading of the first paragraph of 16:6 as mandatory, and the second paragraph as discretionary, renders the first paragraph basically meaningless. The legislature could not have intended such a result when it used the word authorized in the second paragraph. In addition, we believe the choice of the word authorized in the second paragraph of 16.6 was nothing more than a legislative recognition of the principle that a police jury is a creature of the state and possesses only those powers conferred by the state's constitution and statutes. La. Const. art. VI § 7(A); Rollins Environmental Serv. v. Iberville Parish, 371 So.2d 1127, 1131 (La.1979). In reference to the delegation doctrine, this court stated in State v. Jordan, 207 La. 78, 20 So.2d 543, 545 (1944): Parishes and municipal corporations of this state are vested with no powers, and possess no authority, except such as are conferred upon, or delegated to, them by the Constitution and statutes. Thus, unless the legislature vested the police jury with authority to act, it would be powerless to act. A reading of the language employed by the legislature, in the context of the statute as a whole, leads us to the conclusion the term authorized is mandatory. It is only if both paragraphs are read as mandatory that effect can be given to the entire statute. However, our search to determine the legislature's intent does not end with a review of the language of 16:6. Rather, we address whether the history of 16:6, or the fact the legislature created a number of funding sources for the expenses of the district attorney's office, compels us to reach a different conclusion.