Opinion ID: 2330451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Section 14-10-123(1)

Text: ¶ 8 Nonparent standing to seek an allocation of parental responsibilities is governed by section 14-10-123, C.R.S. (2011). Section 14-10-123(1) provides for a nonparent to seek an allocation of parental responsibilities in two circumstances that are relevant here: (1) if the child is not in the physical care of one of the child's parents, pursuant to subsection (1)(b); or (2) if the nonparent has had physical care of the child for at least six months and commences the action within six months of the termination of that care, pursuant to subsection (1)(c). To this end, the statute provides that an APR proceeding may be commenced: (b) By a person other than a parent, by filing a petition seeking the allocation of parental responsibilities for the child . . ., but only if the child is not in the physical care of one of the child's parents; (c) By a person other than a parent who has had the physical care of a child for a period of six months or more, if such action is commenced within six months of the termination of such physical care; . . . . § 14-10-123(1). ¶ 9 According to the plain language of the statute, whether a nonparent has standing to petition for an allocation of parental responsibilities turns on who has or recently had physical care of the child. Nothing in the statutory language suggests that parental consent to a nonparent providing care for a child is necessary for the nonparent to establish standing. The word consent does not appear in the statutory text, nor is there any reference in the statute to the means by which the child comes to be in the nonparent's care. The term care is not defined in the statute but has a plain and ordinary meaning that contemplates responsibility for or attention to safety and well-being. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 338 (2002). Thus, there is no statutory basis for reading a consent requirement into the concept of care for standing purposes in section 14-10-123(1)(b) or (1)(c). Despite the plain language of the statute, the court of appeals looked beyond the statutory language to resolve this case. We examine the authority upon which the court of appeals relied to understand the source of the consent requirement that the court of appeals read into the statute.