Opinion ID: 1557922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Improper Comments By Prosecutor Regarding the Hunt Correctional Records

Text: Defendant argues the prosecutor made misstatements regarding the contents of the 1996 Hunt Correctional Center records during his cross-examination of Dr. Cenac and again during his closing argument. Particularly, defendant faults the prosecutor for making misleading references to the highest score from the 1996 TONI, which yielded intelligence test results in the 72 to 78 range. Defendant claims the prosecutor mischaracterized the facts contained in these documents when he cross-examined Dr. Cenac, and caused Dr. Cenac to appear to jurors as stubborn, defensive, or evasive. He further complains the Hunt records were never introduced into evidence, and that it was, therefore, error for the prosecutor to reference them. Much of defendant's argument turns on his assertion that the prosecutor made specific reference to the high score of 78 from the 1996 TONI during his cross-examination of Dr. Cenac, and then repeated that misleading reference during closing argument. However, the transcript reveals the prosecutor did not refer to the score of 78 during his cross-examination of Dr. Cenac, though he did make reference to that score of 78 during closing argument in the guilt phase. [19] This IQ score was not admitted in evidence; therefore, the reference to the score of 78 arguably fell outside the bounds of proper argument. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 774. [20] However, defense counsel did not contemporaneously object to the reference to this score during the State's closing argument. [21] Because defense counsel voiced no objection during the portions of the State's closing arguments about which defendant now indirectly complains, any error in the guilt phase was not preserved for appellate review. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 841. [22] Further, with regard to the penalty phase argument, we do not find the prosecutor exceeded the scope of proper argument in generally referencing the existence of scores higher than 73, because Dr. Hoppe testified as to having reviewed IQ scores for the defendant that were higher than 73, i.e., that such scores existed, and the defense chose neither to object to his testimony nor to cross-examine him. Furthermore, we find no prejudicial error in the State's references to the Hunt Correctional Center records in the cross-examination of Dr. Cenac. Although defendant argues the prosecutor referenced facts outside the record, primarily the TONI scores contained in the Hunt records, we find the Hunt records were the subject of proper cross-examination. The State in the present case was entitled to cross-examine defendant's mental health expert for being unaware, or for possibly having ignored, the 1996 and 1999 intelligence tests administered subsequent to defendant's 1988 WAIS-R test, which had yielded a full-scale IQ of 73. The State's question to Dr. Cenac as to whether he had considered the intelligence testing performed on defendant at Hunt Correctional Center was within the scope of proper cross-examination, because the prosecution has the right to rebut the evidence adduced by the defense. See State v. Constantine, 364 So.2d 1011, 1013 (La. 1978); see generally La.Code Evid. art. 611(E). Throughout the testimony of Dr. Cenac, the defense sought to present a picture of defendant as mildly mentally retarded, in the absence of a contemporaneous IQ test of defendant, by relying exclusively on the WAIS-R test administered eighteen years before defendant's trial. The State was entitled to inquire into the defense expert's bases for making his assessment, including whether he had considered testing administered more recently than the 1988 test on which he had relied. On cross-examination, the questioner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, or discredit, the witness. State v. Draughn, 05-1825, pp. 47-48 (La.1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 616(quoting State v. Robinson, 01-0273, p. 6, (La.5/17/02), 817 So.2d 1131, 1135). Moreover, under La.Code Evid. art. 607(D)(1), [e]xtrinsic evidence to show a witness'[s] bias, interest, corruption, or defect of capacity is admissible to attack the credibility of a witness. Therefore, the State was entitled to use the Hunt records as extrinsic evidence to discredit the testimony of Dr. Cenac, particularly with respect to the apparently incomplete sources upon which he had based his opinion of mental retardation. Defendant, via his claim of mental retardation, had placed his intellectual functioning at issue; therefore, the prosecutor's targeted questioning of the defense expert about more recent IQ testing was proper under La.Code Evid. art. 611(B), because a witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility. Even if defendant could show that the higher TONI scores obtained in 1996 and 1999 have diminished significance when considered alongside his 1988 WAIS-R full scale IQ score of 73, see n. 17, supra, the prosecutor presented the Hunt records to Dr. Cenac, and without referencing a numerical score, informed the expert that defendant had been tested four times and that his scores had increased with every test. As discussed above, Dr. Cenac was able to explain that such an increase in testing scores was likely the result of a practice [e]ffect, and thus did not necessarily change his opinion that the defendant had mild mental retardation. Furthermore, regardless of whatever tests on intellectual functioning were presented, those results were only one part of the mental retardation evaluation, with the other part being adaptive skills, and we have previously determined the jury could have reasonably found on the evidence that the defendant had failed to prove inadaptability in life skills.