Opinion ID: 2845376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Russ

Text: ¶25. Dr. Carol Miller was accepted as an expert in the field of pediatrics. Although Dr. Miller stated that her testimony would be based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty and that she was familiar with the standard of care required of a minimally competent pediatrician, she opined that the standard of care required Dr. Russ to examine Hunter within one hour of his admission. That testimony was based on Dr. Miller’s thirty years’ experience in a teaching hospital in San Francisco, California. But on crossexamination, Dr. Miller conceded that the one-hour rule was based on that “hospital[’s] medical staff bylaws” and from the “various hospitals over the thirty years that [she] has worked.” She testified that she did not review the bylaws of either Natchez Community Hospital or Natchez Regional Medical Center. Additionally, she could not cite any specific authority, publication, text, treatise, or peer-reviewed article in support of her opinion regarding a one-hour rule. ¶26. “Mississippi physicians are bound by nationally-recognized standards of care. . . ,” and not institution-specific standards which may exceed the nationally recognized standard 11 of care for minimally competent physicians. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1354 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Phillips v. Hull, 516 So. 2d 488, 491 (Miss. 1987); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1985); King v. Murphy, 424 So. 2d 547 (Miss. 1983)). Physicians have a “duty to employ ‘reasonable and ordinary care’ in their treatment of patients.” Id. Our law requires a plaintiff “to establish–through a qualified expert–what is required of a minimally competent [physician], ‘whose skills and knowledge are sufficient to meet the licensure or certification requirements for the profession or specialty practiced.’” Braswell v. Stinnett, 99 So. 3d 175, 179 (Miss. 2012) (quoting McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377, 381 (Miss. 1994)). Our law does not require meeting the standards and protocols of an unknown institution in an unknown locale, unless it can be shown they are one and the same. No evidence was offered of such. ¶27. Dr. Miller failed to establish that the nationally recognized standard of care was one and the same as that of the San Francisco teaching hospital. As Dr. Miller’s testimony fell short of establishing the standard of care applicable to Dr. Russ, no further analysis is required. We affirm the trial court’s grant of Dr. Russ’s motion for JNOV. II. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff a fair trial. A. Whether the trial court permitted the introduction of collateral, prejudicial, and irrelevant evidence. ¶28. The dynamic of this family is extremely contentious. Jennifer and Dusty are no longer married. Dusty refused to have any part of this lawsuit, claiming that the doctors did everything properly, even though he and his mother, a former registered nurse, failed to tell 12 the doctors that Hunter had bumped his head on a church pew earlier that morning. Dusty’s and his family’s testimony focused on the alleged wrongdoings of Jennifer and her responsibility surrounding the car accident months prior. ¶29. Jennifer sought to exclude evidence of the facts surrounding the automobile accident which had occurred approximately ten months prior to Hunter’s death. The defendants initially sought to introduce evidence that Jennifer was driving the car and that Hunter was unrestrained. The defendants argued that the reason the prior car accident was relevant was because Hunter had suffered a subarachnoid bleed as a result. The defendants also argued that Jennifer did not take Hunter to a follow-up appointment, which might have revealed an aneurysm or rebleed. ¶30. In response, the trial judge acknowledged that this action was a medical negligence case and the issue to be determined was the standard of care rendered by Drs. Wheelis and Russ. The trial judge ruled that “[t]he fact that there was some type of injury if you can show that by the evidence that affects what happened or how the child was treated, then that will be dealt with by the Court.” The trial judge stated that if Hunter had suffered a previous injury to the head, the defendant would be allowed to introduce evidence regarding the injury. However, he also stated any evidence regarding fault for the accident would not be allowed. And there are not to be any questions giving into the driving, the circumstances of the accident or things of that nature. However, it is probative – I have ruled about the injury that the child suffered on this occasion. Reason being because there’s a lot of testimony about what [effect] that had in the following months leading up to the death of Hunter McIlwain. Therefore, the defendants will be allowed to elicit testimony as to whether or not he was in the car seat and 13 whether or not the plaintiff, Ms. Patterson, McIlwain, made any statements to this witness in regard to that, but it will be limited to whether the child was in the . . . car seat or not . . . . I don’t want to hear fault. The trial judge ultimately allowed questions to be asked about whether the child was unrestrained, holding such testimony went to the severity of the injury. ¶31. On direct examination, Jennifer testified that, as a result of a car accident in 2000, Hunter was taken to a hospital in Jackson. She stated that she did not remember missing any appointments in Jackson. On cross-examination, Jennifer testified that Hunter was restrained in his car seat in the back seat of the car when the accident occurred. ¶32. Donnie McIlwain, Dusty’s brother, was allowed to testify, over objection, as to the damage done to Jennifer’s car after the car accident. He testified that he saw a crack on the inside of the windshield to the right of the steering wheel, closer to the passenger side. He testified that, after further examination, he noticed what appeared to be hairs in the crack. On cross-examination, Donnie admitted that he did not know what happened to the windshield. ¶33. Dusty McIlwain testified that Jennifer had told him Hunter was not restrained in a car seat at the time of the accident. He stated that he did not inform any medical personnel because his focus was on his son. Dusty testified that he was not aware of any follow-up appointments because Jennifer had not informed him of any. Dusty testified that when he observed Jennifer’s car after the accident, he noticed a “grapefruit sized indention on the passenger side of the windshield, right above the glove box area, indented from the inside out.” Dusty testified that, during church the Sunday before Hunter died, he bumped the back of his head on a padded pew. 14 ¶34. The trial judge, in his ruling, properly limited testimony of the accident to the injury that was received. This Court has held that when similar injuries have occurred in the past, it is permissible “to interrogate further as to whether or not they had any connection with the claim then being presented.” Boyd v. Smith, 390 So. 2d 994, 997 (Miss. 1980). Evidence showing that Hunter had suffered a previous head injury properly was allowed by the trial court. However, any evidence that tended to show that Jennifer was at fault, i.e., she was driving, or it was a one-vehicle accident, was not proper because it was not relevant to this medical malpractice suit. B. Whether the trial court erred in limiting the evidence on the present net cash value of Hunter McIlwain’s life. ¶35. Jennifer argues that the trial erred in limiting the testimony of Dr. George Carter, her economic expert. In a bench conference prior to Dr. Carter’s testimony, the trial court made the following ruling: The Court’s ruling pursuant to the authority of the Greyhound case is that he will be allowed to testify as long as they’re based on national averages, national averages that are set forth. That is the presumption that is set out by the law. As long as it’s clear that that’s the basis that he’s going by, the national average. As far as the income, the Court will not allow any fringe benefits to be added because that’s the law. ¶36. In Rebelwood Apartments RP, LP v. English, 48 So. 3d 483 (Miss. 2010), this Court held that “[f]ringe benefits must not be added unless they actually have been received.” Id. at 496-97. 15 ¶37. In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Sutton, 765 So. 2d 1269 (Miss. 2000), a case which concerned the damages awarded to the estates of three children, this Court held: in cases brought for the wrongful death of a child where there is no past income upon which to base a calculation of projected future income, there is a rebuttable presumption that the deceased child’s income would have been the equivalent of the national average as set forth by the United States Department of Labor. This presumption will give both parties in civil actions a reasonable benchmark to follow in assessing damages. Either party may rebut the presumption by presenting relevant credible evidence to the finder of fact. Such evidence might include, but is certainly not limited to, testimony regarding the child’s age, life expectancy, precocity, mental and physical health, intellectual development, and relevant family circumstances. This evidence will allow the litigants to tailor their proof to the aptitudes and talents of the individual’s life being measured. ... [T]he consumption rate is another factor which may be argued by the parties to the finder of fact in support of increasing or decreasing the presumption that the deceased child’s income would have been equivalent to the national average. The credibility and weight of such testimony as are to be determined solely by the finder of fact. Sutton, 765 So. 2d at 1277, 1279. ¶38. Based upon our caselaw and the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of Dr. Carter.