Opinion ID: 2403621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(e).

Text: Before reaching the merits of S.B.'s appeal, we must decide whether her motion for review of the magistrate judge's order, which was filed in the Superior Court on June 29, 2004, was timely. The government maintains that it was not; it argues that under Rule D (e) of the Superior Court's General Rules of the Family Division, S.B. had ten days from the date the order was entered in which to file a motion of review in the Superior Court. Given that S.B. did not file her motion within ten days as prescribed by Rule D(e), and that a magistrate judge's order is not an appealable order, the government claims that S.B. has waived her right to appeal. It also rejects S.B.'s contention that Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(e) may be used to extend the time in which a motion for review may be filed in the Superior Court. While a panel of this Court has not had the opportunity to consider whether Rule 6(e) is applicable to Super. Ct. Gen. Fam. R. D, we have held that the rule applies similar circumstances. For example, in Wallace v. Warehouse Employees Union # 730, 482 A.2d 801, 807 (D.C.1984), we concluded that Rule 6(e) was applicable to Rule 59(e) motions for reconsideration, even though the literal language of Rule 6(e) cause[d] us to pause, since it refers to `service' rather than `entry.' Nevertheless, we held that when a judgment is rendered outside the presence of the parties or counsel and, therefore, notice is mailed pursuant to Rule 77(d), three additional days are added to the period of time prescribed in Rule 59(e), pursuant to Rule 6(e). Id. at 806. Our reasoning for applying Rule 6(e) in that case, that [i]t would not be reasonable to require that when a case is taken under advisement the parties must on every day thereafter check the records of court to find if action ha[d] been taken, in order that they may have the full four days contemplated by the rules, see id. at 806 (quoting United Retail Cleaners & Tailors Ass'n of D.C. v. Denahan, 44 A.2d 69, 70 (D.C.1945)), is equally applicable in this case. Similarly, in Denahan, supra, the Court was asked to answer ... the question ... whether Rule 6(e) applies to motions for new trials made pursuant to Rule 52(a). 44 A.2d at 69. In finding Rule 6(e) applicable to Rule 52(a), we noted that it would be incongruous for the length of time a litigant had to move for a new trial to vary depending on whether the trial court's judgment was made in open court or sent by mail. Id. at 70. We reasoned: It seems evident to us that the rules of the trial court intend that a party shall have four days after verdict or finding in which to decide whether to file a motion for new trial.... If appellant's position is correct, then in this case and similar cases the period for filing the motion for new trial would be reduced to three days; and we do not think that the rules intended that where the finding is made in open court the parties shall have four days, and where decision is reserved and notice is sent by mail the parties shall have only three days for filing their motion. There is no basis in reason for such discrimination. Denahan, 44 A.2d at 70. We therefore concluded that a reading of the rules as a whole requires that when finding is made out of the presence of counsel or parties, notice of such action shall be given by mail, and that in such a situation the time for filing a motion for new trial is by Rule 6(e) enlarged by one day. Id. at 70. See also Faggins v. Fischer, 853 A.2d 132, 136 (D.C.2004) (noting that since the Court's decision in United Retail Cleaners & Tailors Ass'n of D.C. v. Denahan , Rule 6(e) applies where the Superior Court clerk is required by Rule 77(d) to serve a notice of the entry of a judgment by mail upon parties not in default). The same reasoning found in Wallace and Denahan which permitted the Court to apply Rule 6(e) to both Rule 59(e) and Rule 52(a), respectively, is equally persuasive here. When a magistrate judge makes finding[s] ... out of the presence of counsel or parties, Denahan, supra, and the Superior Court clerk is required by Rule 77(d) to serve a notice of the entry of [that] judgment by mail, Faggins, supra, we believe that three additional days [should be] added to the period of time prescribed [by Rule D(e)], see Wallace, 482 A.2d at 806. We therefore hold that Rule 6(e) applies to [Rule D(e)] motions, and that [S.B.] had an additional three days within which to file [her] motion [in the Superior Court]. Wallace, 482 A.2d at 808. We also note that in Faggins, supra, the Court held that the additional three-day time period for filing a motion contained in Rule 6(e) is calculated separately from the ten-day period found in Rule 59(e). 853 A.2d at 137-38. Applying Faggins here, we hold that the three-day mailing extension in Rule 6(e) refers ... to business days, id. at 137, not calendar days, and does not begin to run until Rule D(e)'s ten-day time period has expired, see Singer v. Singer, 583 A.2d 689, 690 (D.C.1990). By separating the time into two separate periods, the three-day period of Rule 6(e) invoke[s] the provision of Rule 6(a) excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. [6] Faggins, 853 A.2d at 138 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the magistrate judge issued her written findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting permanent guardianship to the C.'s, on June 9, 2004. Pursuant to Super. Ct. Gen. Fam. R. D (e)(1), [7] S.B. had 10 days after the entry of the order of judgment in which to file her motion for review in the Superior Court. [8] Excluding intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, see Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(a), S.B. had until June 24, 2004, to file her motion. [9] This would make her June 29, 2004 motion untimely. However, because we have concluded that Rule 6(e) is applicable to Rule D(e) motions for review, S.B. had an additional three days within which to file [her] motion. Wallace, supra, 482 A.2d at 808. Thus, excluding both the June 11th Day of Mourning, which counts as a holiday, and a single intervening weekend, which fell on June 26 and 27, 2004, S.B. actually had until June 29, 2004, to file her motion. Her motion, filed on that exact day, was therefore timely.