Opinion ID: 2508446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gross Intoxication Instruction

Text: The defendant argues that the circuit court's voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury was not a correct statement of law because it included the words gross and grossly before the word intoxication. The defendant argues that the term gross intoxication came from an arcane statement of the law in 1907, which has long since been reviewed and expanded upon[.] Whether jury instructions were properly given is a question of law. State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995). Our standard of review for a challenge to a circuit court's jury instruction is set forth in Syllabus Point 15 of State v. Bradshaw, 193 W.Va. 519, 457 S.E.2d 456 (1995): Jury instructions are reviewed by determining whether the charge, reviewed as a whole, sufficiently instructed the jury so they understood the issues involved and were not misled by the law. A jury instruction cannot be dissected on appeal; instead, the entire instruction is looked at when determining its accuracy. The trial court, therefore, has broad discretion in formulating its charge to the jury, so long as it accurately reflects the law. Deference is given to the circuit court's discretion concerning the specific wording of the instruction, and the precise extent and character of any specific instruction will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. We have previously explained that [t]he purpose of instructing the jury is to focus its attention on the essential issues of the case and inform it of the permissible ways in which these issues may be resolved. If instructions are properly delivered, they succinctly and clearly will inform the jury of the vital role it plays and the decisions it must make. State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. at 672, 461 S.E.2d at 178. [4] In the case sub judice, the circuit court gave the jury the following instruction on voluntary intoxication: The Court instructs the jury that although voluntary intoxication or drunkenness will never provide a legal excuse for the commission of a crime, the fact that a person may have been grossly intoxicated at the time of the commission of a crime, may negate the existence of premeditation and deliberation, which is an element of the offense of murder in the first degree. So, the evidence that a defendant acted while in a state of gross intoxication is to be considered in determining whether or not the defendant acted with premeditation and deliberation. If the evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable doubt that the accused was capable of forming premeditation and deliberation to commit the crime of murder in the first degree because of gross intoxication, then you should acquit the defendant of the offense of murder in the first degree and deliberate on the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree. The defendant argues that by placing the word gross before intoxication, the circuit court impermissibly heightened the level of intoxication a defendant must show in order to negate the premeditation and deliberation elements of first degree murder. [5] This Court has recognized that voluntary intoxication does not ordinarily excuse a crime. State v. Robinson, 20 W.Va. 713 (1882). Voluntary intoxication may, however, reduce the degree of the crime or negate a specific intent. [6] A review of our prior cases involving voluntary intoxication reveals that the trial court did not err by placing the word gross before intoxication in its voluntary intoxication jury instruction. In Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Davis, 52 W.Va. 224, 43 S.E. 99 (1902), this Court stated: A person guilty of homicide may reduce his crime from murder in the first degree to murder in the second by showing that he was so intoxicated at the time the offense was committed as to render him incapable of doing a willful, deliberate, and premeditated act, and that he did not voluntarily become intoxicated for the purpose of committing the offense. All this may be shown by his own and the state's evidence, and the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. (Emphasis added). Five years after Davis was decided, this Court again addressed the level of intoxication a defendant must show to reduce a charge of first degree murder to second degree murder, stating: if a sane man, not having voluntarily made himself drunk for the purpose of committing crime, does, while in a state of such gross intoxication as to render him incapable of deliberation, commit a homicide, he is guilty of no higher offense than murder in the second degree. (Emphasis added). State v. Kidwell, 62 W.Va. 466, 471, 59 S.E. 494, 496 (1907). The defendant argues that Kidwell was the last time this Court used the phrase gross intoxication to describe the level of intoxication a defendant must show in order to negate the premeditation and deliberation elements of first degree murder. [7] Since Kidwell the word `intoxication' has been substituted for the phrase gross intoxication according to the defendant. A review of our post- Kidwell cases does not support the defendant's position. For example, in State v. Painter, 135 W.Va. 106, 113, 63 S.E.2d 86, 92 (1951), this Court described the level of intoxication a defendant must show to negate deliberation and premeditation, stating: [i]n trials for homicide, evidence of gross intoxication, so as to destroy the power of deliberation and capacity to meditate, may be shown so as to reduce the homicide from murder of the first degree to murder of the second degree. (Emphasis added). Additionally, in State v. Keeton, 166 W.Va. 77, 272 S.E.2d 817 (1980), this Court reiterated that voluntary intoxication can, in certain circumstances, reduce first degree murder to second degree murder. In crafting a new syllabus point, the Court relied specifically on the Kidwell decision, citing the phrase gross intoxication used in Kidwell. Keeton, 166 W.Va. at 83, 272 S.E.2d at 820. Syllabus Point 2 of Keeton states: Voluntary drunkenness is generally never an excuse for a crime, but where a defendant is charged with murder, and it appears that the defendant was too drunk to be capable of deliberating and premeditating, in that instance intoxication may reduce murder in the first degree to murder in the second degree, as long as the specific intent did not antedate the intoxication. (Emphasis added). Keeton also noted that the level of intoxication must be `such as to render the accused incapable of forming an intent to kill, or of acting with malice, premeditation or deliberation.' 166 W.Va. at 83, 272 S.E.2d at 821, quoting Syllabus Point 1, State v. Davis, 52 W.Va. 224, 43 S.E. 99 (1902). Our Court has consistently stated that a defendant must show that he was so drunk, too drunk, or grossly intoxicated, to negate the deliberation and premeditation elements of first degree murder. A reading of our relevant case law indicates that for a defendant to rely on this defense, he must show that his level of intoxication was gross or extreme. The State presented considerable evidence in the case sub judice showing that the defendant's actions were deliberate and premeditated. Jeff Mullenax testified that the defendant made threatening remarks about the victim a few days before the murder, stating that he was going to f ... him up. There was testimony about an ongoing dispute between the defendant and Yarborough regarding the defendant's failure to pay rent and his failure to do any household chores. The defendant and Yarborough were in an argument a few hours before the murder, concluding with Yarborough telling the defendant to find a job or move out of the house. After the argument and prior to the murder, Charles Stafford heard the defendant make the following statement while talking on his cell phone, I'll have three hots and a cot. The defendant presented evidence that he had been drinking on the day of the murder and argued that his level of intoxication impaired his ability to premeditate or deliberate prior to his attack on the victim. The State presented substantial evidence rebutting this argument, [8] including the testimony of Jeff Mullenax who testified that after the murder, the defendant was calm and spoke clearly. The defendant was coherent enough following the murder to tell Mullenax don't call the cops on me yet, give me a few hours. The three arresting officers testified that the defendant's speech was clear and coherent. The defendant was coherent enough to ask Officer Williams whether West Virginia had the death penalty. Both the State and counsel for the defendant addressed the defendant's level of intoxication during their closing arguments and the resolution of this issue was a question of fact for the jury to decide. Based on all of the foregoing, we find that when viewed as a whole and in the context of the trial, the voluntary intoxication instruction was not misleading and contained an adequate statement of law to guide the jury's deliberation. We therefore conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by using the phrase gross intoxication in its voluntary intoxication jury instruction.