Opinion ID: 59670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ball’s Trial and Direct Appeal

Text: Ball was charged with two counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) (Counts 1 and 2), brandishing a firearm during the second bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (Count 3), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 4). Ball pled not guilty. At trial, the government presented evidence of two bank robberies. The first bank robbery occurred on May 10, 2001 at Chemical & Industrial Federal Credit Union (“Chemical”). A Chemical bank teller, Elizabeth Styron, testified that a dark-complected black man entered, grabbed her hand and demanded that she give him all her money. The robber had a small silver revolver with a black handle. Styron gave the robber $10,784, and he left. Styron immediately called 911. Styron gave police a description of the robber and assisted in developing a composite sketch, which generally matched Ball. The second bank robbery occurred on June 1, 2001 at Colonial Bank. The 2 robber pointed a revolver at the teller and demanded money. The teller gave the robber $2,271 with a dye pack surrounded by “bait bills.” Other bank employees saw the robber get in a car and called out the license plate number. Bank employees gave the police the license plate number and a description of the robber and the car. Shortly thereafter, police spotted a car matching the description of the bank robber’s car. This car belonged to Ball, who was arrested. A search of Ball’s car revealed $2,271, the “bait bills,” and a chrome-plated revolver. Police also found stubs for $8,000 in money orders issued on May 11, 2001, the day after the Chemical bank robbery, and on May 22, 2001. Ball was taken to Colonial Bank, where a bank employee identified him as the bank robber. At trial, Styron testified that Ball was the man who robbed Chemical. Ball’s trial counsel did not file a pretrial motion to suppress Styron’s in-court identification or object to her in-court identification during trial. Instead, Ball’s trial counsel cross-examined Styron about her earlier inability to identify Ball during a photo lineup prior to trial and about the police officers’ suggestive procedures during that photo lineup. Ball’s counsel also got Styron to admit that photographs taken by the bank’s surveillance camera during the robbery showed a man who appeared to be lighter complected. During closing arguments, Ball’s 3 counsel argued that Styron’s in-court identification of Ball was a result of the suggestive photo lineup and was unreliable. The jury found Ball guilty on all counts. The district court imposed concurrent 109-month sentences on Counts 1, 2 and 4 and a consecutive 84-month sentence on Count 3, the brandishing-a-firearm offense. In his direct appeal, Ball argued, among other things, that the admission of Styron’s in-court identification violated due process.1 Reviewing for plain error, this Court concluded that there was no reversible error. United States v. Ball, No. 02-10453, slip op. at 13-14 (11th Cir. Oct. 30, 2002). Specifically, the Court concluded that, even assuming there was plain error that affected Ball’s substantial rights, the admission of this testimony under the circumstances did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceeding. Id. at 13. The Court explained that this was so because Ball’s counsel had chosen a trial strategy of using the weaknesses in Styron’s in-court identification to impeach her, as follows: At trial, rather than object to the admission of this testimony, Ball’s counsel opted to cross-examine Styron and draw out her earlier inability to identify Ball during the photo line-up and her subsequent certainty only after suggestive identification procedures [were] used. Indeed, discrediting Styron’s identification appeared to be defense 1 Shortly after Ball filed his notice of direct criminal appeal, his trial counsel died in an automobile accident. 4 counsel’s entire strategy with regard to the Chemical robbery count. Defense counsel reemphasized this strategy during closing argument, when he challenged Styron’s credibility and reliability as a witness, based on her testimony that she had been unable to identify him in the photographic line-up. Because Ball chose to develop Styron’s testimony highlighting the unreliability of her identification and then to capitalize on it in closing argument, any error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings. We conclude this is particularly so because of the other evidence linking Ball to the Chemical robbery, including the composite sketch, the positive identification of his firearm later found in his car, and the $8,000 in money order stubs also found in his car. Id. at 13-14 (citation omitted).