Opinion ID: 891705
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Interstitial analysis

Text: {51} It is well-established that Article II, Section 10 provides more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 16, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (For the past fifteen years, [A]rticle II, [S]ection 10 has been construed to provide broader protections than the Fourth Amendment.); Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 130 N.M. 386, 25 P.3d 225 (The extra layer of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles is a distinct characteristic of New Mexico constitutional law); State v. Pittman, 2006-NMCA-006, ¶ 14, 139 N.M. 29, 127 P.3d 1116 (New Mexico law expresses a strong preference for a warrant); Sullivan, supra, at 427-39 (discussing cases in which this Court and the Court of Appeals have departed from Fourth Amendment analysis in construing Article II, Section 10). As such, we need not be confined by Fourth Amendment law in determining whether Leyva's rights were violated under the New Mexico Constitution. The fact that we have departed from the analysis used to determine whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred in certain contexts, however, does not require us to do so in all contexts. It remains necessary to conduct our de novo review of the law, as this Court has demonstrated a willingness to undertake independent analysis of our state constitutional guarantees when federal law begins to encroach on the sanctity of those guarantees. State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 440, 863 P.2d 1052, 1061 (1993).