Opinion ID: 1922190
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Derrick's Confession

Text: In his first claim, Derrick contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the evidence presented at his suppression hearing by: (1) failing to call lay and expert witnesses, such as a confessionologist; and (2) failing to impeach the State's witness. In sum, Derrick asserts that his alleged confession to Detective Vaughn was given under police coercion and that the techniques used during questioning could lead to false confessions. The trial court denied an evidentiary hearing on this claim because Derrick failed to establish a basis for suppression of the confession. As to the failure to call a confessionologist, Derrick specifically claims that a confessionologist would have testified that the techniques used during Derrick's confession could lead to false confessions; thus, the confession should be suppressed. [7] We rejected a similar claim in Bryant v. State, 901 So.2d 810 (Fla.2005). There, Bryant claimed that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain a false confession expert. Id. at 821. Bryant neither provided proposed testimony nor claimed to have retained a confession expert. Id. Instead, Bryant concluded that an expert could testify that [Bryant's] confession is typical of those which are false. Id. at 821-22 (alteration in original). This Court held that such a claim was legally insufficient. Id. at 822. Likewise, Derrick's claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present testimonial evidence from the confessionologist are legally insufficient. We reject the claim as we did in Bryant because Derrick does not provide specific factual allegations regarding the confessionologist's testimony. In making this determination, we also deem it important that Derrick does not allege that his confession to Detective Vaughn was actually false. [8] Derrick also asserts that trial counsel was ineffective at the suppression hearing for failing to impeach the State's witness by: (1) failing to present evidence that Derrick did not waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); (2) failing to challenge the inconsistencies in Detective Vaughn's testimony; and (3) failing to cross-examine Vaughn about his interrogation techniques. As to this ineffective assistance claim, Derrick first asserts that he never waived his Miranda rights; therefore, any statements made to Detective Vaughn should have been suppressed. Derrick emphasizes that he never signed the Statement of and Waiver of Miranda Rights. However, an unsigned waiver form does not necessarily equate to a failure to waive Miranda rights. See Sliney v. State, 699 So.2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1997) (holding that the failure to sign a Miranda form in full does not necessarily invalidate the waiver). Here, Detective Vaughn testified that Derrick was read his Miranda rights, a fact Derrick does not dispute. Further, in response to the question of whether he understood his rights, Derrick replied in the affirmative and stated that he would talk to the officers. Second, Derrick asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the inconsistencies in Detective Vaughn's testimony. In summarily denying this aspect of Derrick's claim, the trial court found that the inconsistencies between witness statements would not have led to suppression of Derrick's confession. Derrick has not identified any significant disparities between statements and we conclude independently that none of the identified inconsistencies would have led to the suppression of the confession as either coerced or involuntary. Third, as to the adequacy of the cross-examination of Detective Vaughn, we agree with the trial court that any cross-examination of Detective Vaughn would go to credibility and not admissibility. [9] We agree with the summary denial because, even assuming counsel had taken the steps proposed by Derrick, there was no legally cognizable basis to suppress Derrick's confession and hence no prejudice. Without an allegation of falsity in this case, any proposed testimony offered by the confessionologist would not have affected the trial court's ultimate decision as to the admissibility of the confession. There is nothing about the circumstances of Derrick's confession that suggest it was coerced, involuntary or otherwise inadmissible, especially in light of the testimony of David Lowry, to whom Derrick initially confessed. [10] In short, we conclude that no prejudice has been established as a matter of law, based on the record in this case, and nothing that Derrick has alleged would alter the conclusion that the confession was voluntary and admissible. Accordingly, this claim is conclusively refuted by the record.