Opinion ID: 2575849
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Circuit Court Erred In Interpreting HRS Ch. 481C As Excluding All Buyer-Initiated Transactions.

Text: The Appellants contend that the circuit court erred when it: (1) ruled that, because the Appellants were the first to initiate contact between the parties, ASR had not solicited the transaction; and (2) therefore concluded that the Appellants' claims did not fall within the purview of HRS ch. 481C. They cite to Weatherall Aluminum Products Co. v. Scott, 71 Cal.App.3d 245, 139 Cal.Rptr. 329 (1977) (holding that a buyer's invitation to visit the home to provide an estimate for home improvements did not automatically divest the buyer of protections under California's door-to-door sales laws), for the proposition that the fact that a buyer initiates contact does not automatically remove the transaction from the protections of HRS ch. 481C. In its answering brief, ASR argues that solicitation inherently requires an initial contact by the seller and that buyer-initiated transactions are therefore outside the purview of the chapter. Specifically, the Appellants contend that the circuit court misconstrued the structure of HRS ch. 481C with regard to buyer-initiated transactions and overly relied on general summary statements concerning such transactions contained in a legislative committee report, see Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 25-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 918. To the extent the circuit court relied in reaching its determination that ASR did not solicit the Appellants on the fact that the Appellants made initial contact, the Appellants are correct.
The Appellants note that HRS ch. 481C contains two specific exclusions from its protections under circumstances in which the buyer makes initial contactone for emergency repairs and one for repair or maintenance of personal property. See HRS § 481C-1(B)(ii), (iv), supra note 1. The Appellants contend that the circuit court's interpretation of HRS ch. 481C as excluding all buyer-initiated transactions would render these two specific exclusions superfluous, thereby violating the rule of statutory interpretation that requires courts to avoid rendering any provision redundant or superfluous. See, e.g., State v. Mueller, 102 Hawai`i 391, 395, 76 P.3d 943, 947 (2003); State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai`i 139, 145, 63 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2003); Coon v. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai`i 233, 259, 47 P.3d 348, 374 (2002). HRS § 481C-1(1)(A)(i) defines a door-to-door sale as a sale of goods or services solicited in person and signed by the buyer at a place other than the seller's business address shown on the contract. See supra note 1. The following section then lists four exceptions that are not to be considered door-to-door sales under the law, two of which involve buyer-initiated transactions. See HRS § 481C-1(1)(B), supra note 1. Particularly enlightening is the last sentence of HRS § 481C-1(1)(B)(iv), which provides that if the buyer who made initial contact purchases any new goods or services in relation to the repair or maintenance of his or her personal property, the protections of HRS ch. 481C apply. These provisions demonstrate by implication that, if the buyer initiates contact for something other than a bona fide personal emergency or for the purpose of repairing or performing maintenance upon the buyer's personal property, the transaction falls within the definition of a door-to-door sale, and the protections of this act apply. The mere fact that a buyer has made the initial contact does not render HRS ch. 481C automatically inapplicable to a contract negotiated at the buyer's home. As the court in Weatherall reasoned, in addition to protecting homeowners from uninvited high-pressure sales pitches, door-to-door sales laws such as HRS ch. 481C also serve to protect consumers who may find themselves regretting making the initial contact: A second and equally serious pressure arises ... from the fact that the seller may be an intimidating presence once inside the buyer's home. A reluctant buyer can easily walk away from a seller's place of business, but he cannot walk away from his own home, and he may find that the only practical way of getting the seller to leave is to agree to buy whatever the seller is selling. This latter type of pressure may arise regardless of whether or not the buyer invited the seller to call at his residence. 139 Cal.Rptr. at 331. As the Appellants argue, to establish a blanket exclusion for any buyer-initiated transaction would allow vendors to respond to trade show inquiries with high pressure sales techniques at people's homes without fearing the remedies afforded under HRS ch. 481C. Given the focus of the chapter on guarding against vendor coercion during at-home transactions, the proper inquiry must focus on the presence of coercive pressure, rather than on a blanket rule turning on which party initiated contact. If negotiations occur in the home, then the protections of HRS ch. 481C are not automatically suspended merely because the buyer initiated contact with the vendor, so long as the totality of the circumstances establish a true effort to solicit on the part of the vendor.
In determining that buyer-initiated transactions fell outside the purview of HRS ch. 481C, the circuit court also relied on a summary of amendments to the draft bill contained in the Senate Committee on Consumer Protection's report on Senate Bill 1780-76, which was ultimately codified as HRS ch. 481C. The report stated in relevant part that the Committee amended the bill by removing from the definition of a door-to-door sale any transaction: ... (d) in which the buyer had initiated the contact. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 25-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 918. The circuit court, however, misinterpreted the legislature's intent behind the changes to the draft law. By removing the language regarding buyer-initiated transactions from earlier general definitions of door-to-door sales, while retaining them in the two specific exclusions discussed supra in part III.A.1, it appears that the legislature drafted the law, not to exclude all buyer-initiated transactions, but to include all buyer-initiated transactions except those laid out in two carefully crafted exclusions. [4] See also Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 778-76, in 1976 House Journal, at 1651 (recommending Senate Bill 1780-76 as a way of harmonizing federal and state law on door-to-door sales, retaining those federal and state provisions, respectively, that offer the greater protection to consumers). In light of the statutory provisions excluding two specific types of buyer-initiated transactions from the purview of HRS ch. 481C, as well as the consumer protection policies underlying it, the circuit court erred to the extent that it relied on the fact that the buyer initiated the transaction to determine that no solicitation had occurred.