Opinion ID: 677885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-termination damages

Text: 48 The district court's finding for extending the back pay award beyond the 1990 lay-off of Hamblin is as follows: 49 Hamblin is entitled to back pay measured by the salary paid to employee Albert Hallett from May 1, 1984, to December 31, 1992, the date this court selects as an appropriate ending date based on plaintiff's amended trial Exhibit 69. This recognizes that Hamblin would not have been laid off on June 30, 1990, had gender played no role in her employment at Cherry Burrell. Cf. EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 765 F.Supp. 583 (W.D.Mo.1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 664, 670 (8th Cir.1992) (voluntary resignation did not toll back pay where motivated by defendant's unfair treatment). 50 The statement that Hamblin would not have been laid off in mid-1990 had gender played no role is accompanied by the district court's conclusion that she was laid off due to a lack of seniority in the Buyer's position, which the district court added is a valid, independent, non-discriminatory justification for the lay-off. By reason of this latter conclusion, the district court determined that there was no intended retaliation against Hamblin for filing her earlier discrimination claim. The district court proceeded to augment this somewhat inconsistent determination by stating that [d]efendant did not intend to harm plaintiff but acted willfully in treating her differently than men, yet deeming the action intentional for Title VII purposes. (emphasis added). 51 Since C-B reduced its work force in 1990 due to economic circumstances and acted with valid seniority considerations in mind, was the lay off 3 of Hamblin an intentional discriminatory act directed against her by reason of gender? 52 When asked specifically about whether an additional four year period of Buyer experience would have improved Hamblin's chances to not be termination in 1990, C-B's Norton said that would be speculative but, yes, it probably would have. C-B's responsible officer also testified, without contradiction, that employees with greater seniority than Hamblin were also terminated in the 1990 substantial reduction-in-force. He also testified that Hamblin, unlike others in a comparable position, had not pursued educational opportunities nor did she have the same level of experience in all of C-B's lines as other Buyers. Hamblin may have been qualified to be a Buyer, but she may not have been as experienced, knowledgeable and fully competent in all areas of a Buyer's job as others who were male. Performing similar duties does not bring about an inference that all Buyers did identical work or even that objectively measured, they performed the Buyer's role equally. Substantial equality only is required. McKee v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 801 F.2d 1014, 1019 n. 5 (8th Cir.1986). 53 Our problem in this case is with respect to what appears to be inconsistent findings and conclusions with regard to post-termination damages. The district court made a finding that unfair treatment of Hamblin (that is treating her differently than a comparable male employee was treated) constituted subconscious, not willful, conduct. (emphasis added). We presume that unfair treatment pertained to applying seniority considerations in the reduction-in-force in the Buyer position in 1990 without considering Hamblin to have a 1984 seniority date. Unfair treatment may have been deemed to consist of not making Hamblin a Buyer in 1984 when Hallett was hired as a Buyer and not paying her the same compensation as Hallett. The district court further concluded that Hamblin performed duties similar to those required of a Buyer in 1984. Unfair treatment may also have been the lay-off or termination of Hamblin in the reduction-in-force, because seniority in the Buyer position was a factor, together with other business reasons as contended by C-B. The point is that C-B's actions deemed unfair by the district court may also have been deemed to be discriminatory under Title VII, and a violation of the latter statute requires a finding of intentional misconduct, not subconscious unlawful action. If C-B's actions were not willful with respect to termination, could they have constituted intentional discrimination if the district court also found this very conduct not intentionally retaliatory? See Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406 (10th Cir.1993); McKee v. Bi-State Development Agency, 801 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir.1986). 54 The district court also noted that during the period in question, Hamblin received the same percentage salary increases as did the male Buyers. There was very little evidence in the record about the circumstances of 1990 lay-off/termination, except the statement attributed to Norton that if Hamblin had a 1984 seniority date as Buyer, it probably would have helped her chances vis-a-vis other Buyers. There is evidence that 78 of 225 salaried employees were terminated in 1990. 55 We find the somewhat cryptic determination that C-B had no valid basis for not making Hamblin a Buyer in 1982 not supported by the evidence in light of her experience, or lack thereof, skills and education in comparison to the other Buyers at C-B at the time. Hamblin had three years' experience in 1982 as an Expeditor Coordinator, having previously been an Expeditor in the Purchasing Department. Hamblin herself did not assert, until a complaint was filed in December of 1983, that she should be transferred to a position of Buyer. See Investigative Report of Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission. The district court did not find the 1983 action by C-B in hiring Ott to be discriminatory. Hamblin acknowledged that she received instructions and had new requirements imposed in 1982 for performing her new task as Junior Buyer. She then felt she was coming along pretty good. 56 In 1982, furthermore, the district court found that C-B had a hiring freeze. In sum, we find an insufficient basis or explanation for the district court's finding that C-B had no valid basis for making Hamblin a Junior Buyer in 1982. The district court acknowledged that purchasing assistance was needed at C-B in 1982. The district court excluded other proffered evidence about the opportunities afforded women generally during this period at C-B. If the finding of the district court regarding post-termination damages were substantially linked to the finding of no valid basis for not making Hamblin a Buyer in 1982, when a hiring freeze was in effect, we are further troubled by the nature of the award of post-termination damages. The district court, moreover, noted that back pay should be limited, because of delay in modification, so as not to unfairly penalize defendant. 57 We recognize that the district court has broad equitable discretion to fashion back pay awards in order to make the Title VII victim whole, 4 but in view of our expressed uncertainties and the potentially inconsistent findings about intended discrimination in the lay-off/termination in 1990, we REMAND only this aspect of the damages for further consideration, clarification, or amendment. 5 In other respects, we AFFIRM the finding of Title VII liability of C-B (and the finding of no liability as to retaliation) and the finding of damages up to the date of termination.