Opinion ID: 513263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: warrantless arrests

Text: 23 Betts, Vargas and Sangineto argue that the police lacked probable cause to arrest them without a warrant. Betts faults the officers for failing to conduct an independent investigation of the information supplied by Hamilton, the government informant. Vargas and Sangineto, characterizing their arrest as global and undifferentiating, contend that they were arrested merely because they were at the 7-Eleven, appeared to be of Latin descent and spoke Spanish. They say that [a ]ny hispanic individual at the 7 Eleven Store would have been equally mistreated at the hands of officers who were ill-advised as to the identity of a suspect. (emphasis in original). Focusing on the telephone conversations received by Holmes at the Pidgeon Perch apartment, Vargas and Sangineto insist that the DEA agent made no reference to drugs and thus the conversation could easily have been an innocent discussion between people not selling contraband. 24 A warrantless arrest is justified if, at the time of the defendant's arrest, police officers have probable cause to believe that an offense has been, is being, or will be committed. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (and cases cited therein). The probable cause requirement does not demand any showing that such a belief is correct or more likely true than false. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1543, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). 25 Probable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain conmon-sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same--and so are law enforcement officers.); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Thus, in determining whether probable cause exists, the trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances, Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, and view the facts as a whole and in a practical manner. United States v. Pepple, 707 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir.1983). We review the district court's finding of probable cause under the clearly erroneous standard. Ibid. 26 Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the police had probable cause to arrest Betts without a warrant. In early April, Hamilton, a reliable informant, had provided law enforcement officials with detailed information concerning Betts's efforts to furnish cocaine in Memphis. Much of this information was verified by police recordings of the informant's negotiations with the defendant. During these conversations, Betts indicated that his source for cocaine was a man from Florida named Ben, who could provide any quantity they requested. 27 On April 28, 1986, Hamilton informed police that Betts would be meeting his man Ben at the airport, but the cocaine would be coming by another route. That evening, Hamilton and Betts began negotiating a cocaine deal in the apartment on Pidgeon Perch Lane. At that time, the informant observed two kilograms of cocaine in Betts's possession. See United States v. Remy, 658 F.Supp. 661, 667 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (probable cause existed where confidential informant was given a sample of cocaine in the apartment minutes before the arrest). Hamilton relayed this information to Sergeant Swain, and also advised that Betts was upset because the money man was not present to consummate the deal. Seeking to contact Swain, Hamilton and Betts then drove to a nearby public telephone, where Betts was arrested. The district court concluded that 28 on April 28 at the time of his arrest Betts was engaged in a cocaine transaction to be completed that same night. Considering all the circumstances, there was ample probable cause for the arrest of defendant Betts. Clearly there were sufficient facts to convince a reasonable person that Betts was engaged in the commission of a crime. 29 The trial court's determination of probable cause is not clearly erroneous. 30 Alternatively, Betts contends that probable cause had existed for a sufficient period of time to allow the police to obtain a warrant for his arrest. We disagree. To be sure, the police knew in early April about Betts's possible involvement in criminal activity. However, it is unlikely they truly had probable cause until April 18, the date of arrest, when Hamilton notified Sergeant Swain that he was negotiating a cocaine deal with Betts and had observed two kilograms in the Pidgeon Perch apartment. We will not second-guess the officers in determining when probable cause arose. In any event, the officers were conducting an ongoing investigation, and were not required to seek a warrant as soon as they had probable cause to suspect a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934, 105 S.Ct. 332, 83 L.Ed.2d 268 (1984). Instead, police officers reasonably could wait until they gathered additional evidence of the conspiracy or for further charges. 31 We also conclude that police had probable cause to arrest Vargas and Sangineto at the 7-Eleven. As noted, Betts had informed Hamilton and Sergeant Swain that his source for cocaine was a person named Ben. When law enforcement officials, including DEA agent Holmes, entered the Pidgeon Perch apartment on April 28, they discovered Ben Nelson; this was the same Ben Nelson that Holmes had detained at the airport earlier that day on suspicion of drug trafficking. As the magistrate noted, [t]he presence of Benjamin Nelson in the apartment fitted quite nicely with Luray Betts's statement that his source of cocaine was a man named Ben. 32 While the officers were securing the apartment, Holmes answered a call from a Hispanic person asking for Ben. After some miscommunication, a second voice with a heavy Spanish accent came on the line, and Holmes indicated that he was ready to do the deal. The caller insinuated that he had the package, and a meeting was scheduled for the 7-Eleven nearby. At this point, it was reasonable for Holmes to conclude that the two callers were involved in the narcotics transaction the police were investigating. 33 After Holmes returned from the 7-Eleven without meeting the callers, he received a second call from the Hispanic individuals. Meanwhile, Sergeant Cox and Pike, who were maintaining surveillance of the store, observed Vargas and Sangineto approach the public telephone and make a call. Both officers knew they were looking for Hispanic or Latin type people who had agreed to make a delivery of narcotics. While one subject was on the telephone, the officers received a radio transmission that a second call from the Spanish-speaking persons had been received at the apartment and that the subjects were waiting at the convenience store to do the deal. Pike approached the 7-Eleven and heard Sangineto and Vargas conversing in Spanish, confirming his identification of the callers. On the basis of these facts, Pike and Cox were justified in believing that Sangineto and Vargas were the persons even then engaged in a phone conversation concerning the cocaine transaction under investigation. The magistrate determined, and the district court agreed, that the arrest was based on probable cause. We affirm these findings of probable cause. 34