Opinion ID: 2507486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Declaratory Judgment Claim

Text: Petitioners' second contention is that the superior court erred by dismissing their declaratory judgment claim that the Council's approval of the execution protocol violated section 15-188 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Although petitioners correctly contend that dismissal of the claim was improper, we agree with the superior court's conclusion that petitioners' rights pursuant to section 15-188 are limited to the obligation that [their] death[s] be by lethal injection, in a permanent death chamber in Raleigh, and carried out pursuant to an execution protocol approved by the Governor and the Council of State. Section 1-254 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides, in relevant part, Any person . . . whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. N.C.G.S. § 1-254 (2009). With respect to declaratory judgments, our General Assembly provided: This Article is declared to be remedial, its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations, and it is to be liberally construed and administered. Id. § 1-264 (2009). For a declaratory judgment action to proceed, an actual controversy must exist between the parties. Sharpe v. Park Newspapers of Lumberton, Inc., 317 N.C. 579, 583, 347 S.E.2d 25, 29 (1986) (Although the North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act does not state specifically that an actual controversy between the parties is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an action thereunder, our case law does impose such a requirement. (citing Gaston Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Harrison, 311 N.C. 230, 234, 316 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1984))). Although a declaratory judgment action must involve an actual controversy between the parties, plaintiffs are not required to allege or prove that a traditional cause of action exists against defendant[s] in order to establish an actual controversy. Goldston, 361 N.C. at 33, 637 S.E.2d at 881 (alteration in original) (quoting Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 320 N.C. 640, 646, 360 S.E.2d 756, 760 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted). [A] declaratory judgment should issue (1) when [it] will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations at issue, and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 588, 573 S.E.2d 125, 130 (2002) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other instances similar to this case, we have addressed questions presented to us through declaratory judgment actions. See N.C. Dep't of Corr., 363 N.C. at 199, 675 S.E.2d at 648 (An action for declaratory judgment was proper when the actions of the DOC and North Carolina Medical Board, both seeking to fulfill their statutory duties, are in irreconcilable conflict.); Martin, 320 N.C. at 535, 359 S.E.2d at 473 (noting that [p]laintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action to determine the rights and duties of the Governor and Council of State with respect to the entry of leases on behalf of the State and answering the questions presented); Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 559-61, 184 S.E.2d 259, 262-64 (1971) (converting a claim pursuant to the Post Conviction Act to a Declaratory Judgment Act claim because the question of [a parole statute's] constitutionality is a matter of importance both to the public and to prisoners and [w]hen a plaintiff has a property interest which may be adversely affected by the enforcement of the criminal statute, he may maintain an action under the Declaratory Judgment Act to determine the validity of the statute in protection of his property rights. (citations omitted)). In addition, other states have dealt with this precise issue-the conflict between the DOC's responsibility to develop a lethal injection protocol and the rights of death row inmates that flow from the adoption of the protocol-by issuing a declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Bowling, 301 S.W.3d at 481 (A declaratory judgment action is the appropriate means of challenging implementation of a defendant's death sentence. . . .). As in the instant case, a declaratory judgment is proper when [f]undamental rights are involved. Petitioner is entitled to know what effect the statute has upon his future. Jernigan, 279 N.C. at 562, 184 S.E.2d at 264. It is important to note that a motion to dismiss a declaratory judgment action should not be granted merely because the party seeking the declaration ultimately is incorrect in his interpretation of the statute at issue. As we previously have noted, [w]here the plaintiff's pleading sets forth an actual or justiciable controversy, it is not subject to demurrer[ [4] ] since it sets forth a cause of action, even though the plaintiff may not be entitled to a favorable declaration on the facts stated in his complaint; that is, in passing on the demurrer, the court is not concerned with the question whether plaintiff is right in a controversy, but only with whether he is entitled to a declaration of rights with respect to the matters alleged. Woodard v. Carteret Cnty., 270 N.C. 55, 61, 153 S.E.2d 809, 813-14 (1967) (citation omitted). Here, the parties have fundamental differences as to how this Court should interpret section 15-188. According to petitioners, [t]he Council of State's approval of an execution protocol which does not definitively specify the appliances and personnel to be employed in executions violated N.C.G.S. § 15-188 and violated Petitioners' constitutional rights to due process. To construe section 15-188 either to require the Council's substantive review of the DOC's provision of the necessary appliances and qualified personnel, or to give death row inmates procedural rights with respect to the Council's approval, would create new causes of action that petitioners could pursue. However, the superior court's interpretation of the statutethat petitioners' rights are limited to the obligation that [their] death[s] be by lethal injection, in a permanent death chamber in Raleigh, and carried out pursuant to an execution protocol approved by the Governor and the Council of State and that no factual or legal authority supports Petitioner[s'] claims of a due process right to participate in the approval processforecloses further review based upon the Council's process for approval of the protocol. Accordingly, a genuine controversy between the parties exists as to the proper construction of section 15-188, and a declaratory judgment would both serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations at issue and terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Goldston, 361 N.C. at 33, 637 S.E.2d at 881 (quoting Augur, 356 N.C. at 588, 573 S.E.2d at 130) (internal quotation marks omitted). The statute at issue here reads: In accordance with G.S. 15-187, the mode of executing a death sentence must in every case be by administering to the convict or felon a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until the convict or felon is dead; and when any person, convict or felon shall be sentenced by any court of the State having competent jurisdiction to be so executed, the punishment shall only be inflicted within a permanent death chamber which the superintendent of the State penitentiary is hereby authorized and directed to provide within the walls of the North Carolina penitentiary at Raleigh, North Carolina. The superintendent of the State penitentiary shall also cause to be provided, in conformity with this Article and approved by the Governor and Council of State, the necessary appliances for the infliction of the punishment of death and qualified personnel to set up and prepare the injection, administer the preinjections, insert the IV catheter, and to perform other tasks required for this procedure in accordance with the requirements of this Article. N.C.G.S. § 15-188 (emphasis added). The subject of petitioners' claim for declaratory judgment centers on the italicized portion of the statute and whether [t]he Council of State's approval of an execution protocol which does not definitively specify the appliances and personnel to be employed in executions violated N.C.G.S. § 15-188. In other words, petitioners argue that section 15-188 requires the Council to conduct a substantive review of the protocol rather than [l]eaving those important decisions [with respect to specific appliances and personnel] to the discretion of the warden. However, as discussed previously, the General Assembly clearly has delegated primary responsibility for creating the execution protocol to the DOC. The General Assembly's requirement that the Council approve the protocol does not diminish DOC's authority. Furthermore, the plain language of section 15-188 mandates that the DOC provide both the necessary appliances for the infliction of the punishment of death and qualified personnel to perform the tasks involved. Id. § 15-188. The statute requires neither a step-by-step protocol nor a detailed description of the appliances or personnel to be used in order for the Council to give its approval. We decline to engraft onto the statute any requirements beyond what its plain language provides, and we see no indication that the Council is required, pursuant to section 15-188, to conduct a substantive review of the protocol. We hold that, `even though the plaintiff [is not] entitled to a favorable declaration on the facts' of this case, Woodard, 270 N.C. at 61, 153 S.E.2d at 813-14 (citation omitted), the superior court erred in dismissing the declaratory judgment claim because petitioners did present a genuine controversy. Nonetheless, we affirm the superior court's order as modified because the court correctly construed section 15-188 to mean that petitioners' rights are limited to the obligation that [their] death[s] be by lethal injection, in a permanent death chamber in Raleigh, and carried out pursuant to an execution protocol approved by the Governor and the Council of State and that no factual or legal authority supports Petitioner[s'] claims of a due process right to participate in the approval process.