Opinion ID: 2155443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Participation in a strike.

Text: The employer's principal contention before this court is that Brant voluntarily absented himself from work while his union was on strike, and that because he could have worked during that period but did not, the time that he was on strike should be included in the thirteen weeks from which the AWW is calculated. Recognizing that our standard of review of the Director's determination is deferential, see pages 5-6, supra, the employer nevertheless claims that the Director's decision in Brant's favor is unreasonable and erroneous as a matter of law. We disagree. The issue is one of first impression for the courts of the District of Columbia. As we have seen, however, the position taken here by the employer was rejected by the Director both in Thomas and in the present case. The Director's position is supported by persuasive authority from other jurisdictions. In Monterey Coal Co. v. The Indus. Comm'n, 79 Ill.2d 334, 38 Ill.Dec. 175, 403 N.E.2d 263 (1980), the Supreme Court of Illinois was called upon to decide whether the claimant's [AWW] should be computed to include the [sixteen] weeks spent on strike. Id. at 264. The court held that strikes were unavoidable causes within the meaning of Illinois' WCA: [W]e refuse to confront the individual employee with the dilemma of choosing between, on the one hand, participating in a strike and thus risking a substantial reduction in workmen's compensation benefits should he be injured within the ensuing year and, on the other hand, declining to participate in a strike and thereby facing fines and perhaps expulsion from the union. Id. at 265. Citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967), the court pointed out in Monterey that a union has the authority to discipline its members for strikebreaking, and that the power to expel or fire strikebreakers is essential if the union is to be an effective bargaining agent. Id. The court concluded that the claimant's absence due to participation in a strike was an unavoidable cause within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. When confronted with the irreconcilable choices previously discussed, the claimant had, practically speaking, no alternative but to participate in the nationwide mine workers strike. It would not be fair or just to subject him to penalties no matter which choice he made. Id. at 266; [7] accord, Hawthorne v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 844 F.2d 318, 320 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that sum of claimant's earnings does not accurately and fairly approximate his annual earning capacity because it does not take into account time lost in the year prior to the injury on account of a strike); Rakie v. Jefferson & Clearfield Coal & Iron Co., 262 Pa. 444, 105 A. 638, 639 (1918) (apparently holding, for workers' compensation purposes, that where a coal mine was closed on account of a labor dispute, an employee's idleness during this period was not due to any fault of his own, and that deduction of the days missed due to the labor dispute was proper); [8] cf. Hartley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Tenn. 504, 276 S.W.2d 1, 3 (1954). [9] If taken to its logical conclusion, the employer's position leads to altogether unacceptable, if not absurd, results. If the strike had lasted all thirteen weeks, and if Brant had refused to cross the picket line, he would, under the employer's logic, be entitled to no benefits at all. Although counsel for the employer asserted that this should not be the result of a thirteen-week strike, he was unable to suggest a reasonable limiting principle, and so are we.