Opinion ID: 221835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Causation Requirement Attending Extraordinary Circumstances

Text: To secure equitable tolling, it is not enough for a party to show that he experienced extraordinary circumstances. He must further demonstrate that those circumstances caused him to miss the original filing deadline. See, e.g., Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d at 134 (explaining need for causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances on which the claim for equitable tolling rests and the lateness of [the] filing). A court may conclude that such causation is lacking where the identified extraordinary circumstances arose and concluded early within the limitations period. In such circumstances, a diligent petitioner would likely have no need for equity to intervene to file within the time remaining to him. See, e.g., Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir.2001) (declining to grant equitable tolling for petitioner's twenty-two-day period of solitary confinement at beginning of limitations period); see also Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir.2001) (identifying no causation to support equitable tolling of twenty-seven-day period occurring eleven months before AEDPA filing deadline); Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 715-16 (5th Cir.1999) (concluding causation not established where seventeen-day period to be tolled occurred more than six months before AEDPA filing deadline). Respondent does notand cannotargue that this case presents such a causation concern. The extraordinary circumstances of Harper's hospitalization arose after 288 days of the limitations period had run and continued past the one-year deadline. In short, no filing time remained when the extraordinary circumstances ended. We have suggested that a court also may find causation lacking where a petitioner has been so neglectful in the preparation of his petition that even in the absence of the extraordinary circumstances, a reasonable person in the petitioner's situation would have been unable to file in the time remaining within the limitations period. Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d at 136; see also Belot v. Burge, 490 F.3d at 207-08. [5] This comports with the principle that equity will not intervene to reward negligence. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. at 419, 125 S.Ct. 1807 (Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (One who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles to excuse that lack of diligence.). We have cautioned, however, that causation should not be used to fault a party for failing to file early or to take other extraordinary precautions early in the limitations period against what are, by definition, rare and exceptional circumstances that occur later in that period. Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d at 136. This case presents no negligence to undermine causation. A reasonably diligent person could have prepared a petition in the seventy-eight days remaining on the AEDPA limitations period when Harper encountered the extraordinary circumstances of his hospitalization. Indeed, after discharge, Harper himself filed his petition in sixty-five days, i.e., within the time that would have remained available to him under AEDPA had he not been hospitalized. Under these circumstances, it cannot be argued that undue delay, rather than the identified extraordinary circumstances, caused Harper to miss the original AEDPA filing deadline. In sum, the undisputed record demonstrates both that Harper was subject to extraordinary circumstances for the period of his hospitalization and that those circumstances caused his failure to file for § 2254 relief within AEDPA's one-year limitations period.