Opinion ID: 454752
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Branton's Culpability

Text: 11 The district court based its order on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927, which allows the award of sanctions against an attorney who multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously. The imposition of liability under this statute requires a finding that an attorney has acted recklessly or in bad faith. United States v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir.1983); Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir.1982). 12 Branton contends that he did not act with the requisite degree of culpability because his conduct conformed to the requirements of California Rule of Professional Conduct 2-111(A)(5), which allows an attorney called as a witness by an adversary to continue the representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client. Branton concedes that he knew at the time of his substitution as defense counsel that the government had listed him as a witness but maintains that it did not become apparent that his testimony would be prejudicial to his client until several weeks later when the government filed its narrative witness list. He asserts that therefore his representation was proper until that time. 13 This argument misconstrues the rationale of the district court's order. Branton was not sanctioned for failing to disqualify himself, but rather for failing to disclose the potential conflict of interest when he became counsel of record so that his requested substitution could properly be evaluated. Order for Sanctions at 4. At issue is Branton's duty of candor to the court, not simply his understanding of the law of attorney disqualification. 4 14 An attorney does not simply act as an advocate for his client; he is also an officer of the court. As such, an attorney has a duty of good faith and candor in dealing with the judiciary. See e.g., Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 762 F.2d 831 (9th Cir.1985). The district court found that Branton's failure to disclose his potential conflict was calculated and unreasonable, vexatious, and irresponsible. Order for Sanctions at 4-5. We cannot say that these findings, which address the appropriate legal standard under section 1927, are clearly erroneous. See Lone Ranger Television, 740 F.2d at 727. 15 Mr. Branton's contention that our decision in Barnd, 664 F.2d 1339 conflicts with our opinion in this case is without merit. In Barnd, the district court had imposed sanctions under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927 without a finding that counsel intended to cause a mistrial or that counsel acted in bad faith. We therefore remanded for such findings. 664 F.2d at 1341-42, 1343. Here the district court made a specific finding that Mr. Branton's failure to disclose his potential conflict of interest to the court was calculated. It noted further that Mr. Branton had been involved in prior litigation on behalf of the same client in which similar conflict issues had been raised, and that Mr. Branton knew that he had been named as a witness by the government before his request to be substituted as counsel in this case. These facts support the district court's conclusion that Mr. Branton's failure to inform the court of his potential conflict was calculated and unreasonable, vexatious, and irresponsible, thus Barnd is inapposite.