Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Other Crimes Attributable to the Codefendant

Text: (20) Defendant challenges the admission of evidence of his codefendant's criminal conduct during the New York robbery incident in driving the getaway car at breakneck speeds through populated city streets. He argues that consideration of criminal conduct committed by someone other than the defendant is impermissible under section 190.3, factor (b). He also points out that the prosecution's notice listing its intended penalty phase evidence did not specify the codefendant's driving, as distinguished from defendant's own violent conduct during the robbery and chase. According to defendant, this omission violates the notice requirements of section 190.3. [10] He also contends that allowing the jury to hear evidence of violent conduct committed by someone other than the defendant violates the constitutional constraint on capital sentencing that it reflect the jury's `reasoned moral response to the defendant's background, character, and crime.' ( Sumner v. Shuman (1987) 483 U.S. 66, 76, fn. 5 [97 L.Ed.2d 56, 66, 107 S.Ct. 2716], italics added and deleted.) We reject these arguments. Defendant concedes that as an accomplice in the robbery and getaway he could have been criminally liable for harm resulting from his codefendant's actions. He argues, however, that the rule of accomplice liability does not apply to the presentation of other-crimes evidence under section 190.3, factor (b), arguing that such evidence must be limited to criminal activity involving force or violence in which defendant was himself the perpetrator. We previously have rejected a similar contention in People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 633 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376], when we held that evidence of a defendant's aiding and abetting of a violent criminal offense was admissible under factor (b). In addition, we consistently have held that the prosecution is entitled to present evidence of a defendant's other crimes in context. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 754; accord People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 526 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) Section 190.3, factor (b) is not violated when, as here, defendant could have been liable as an accomplice for conduct by the codefendant, and evidence of that conduct is necessary to place the defendant's own conduct in context. Equally lacking in merit is defendant's argument that the prosecution's notice was insufficient under section 190.3. The prosecution gave notice of its intent to present evidence of the New York robbery and gun battle as aggravating circumstances. That notice adequately advised defendant that the described evidence would include reference to the attempted getaway during which the gun battle took place. We also reject defendant's contention that permitting the jury to consider his participation in a criminal joint venture violated the constitutional requirement that the sentencing decision in a capital case be based on the character and record of the individual offender.... ( Woodson v. North Carolina, supra, 428 U.S. 280, 304 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961].) Moreover, in light of the evidence of violent criminal conduct personally attributable to defendant during this same incident (threatening Mrs. Granell with a gun pressed against her head and, after fleeing the scene, repeatedly firing at the pursuing officers), any possible error in admitting evidence of the codefendant's reckless driving was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].)