Opinion ID: 6944922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver by Failure to Object at Bench Trial

Text: In addition to their waiver argument based on Rule 38, defendants argue that Cohen-Strong waived her right to a jury trial by participating in the bench trial without objection. See White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 703 (9th Cir.1990) (en banc). However, because Cohen-Strong objected several times prior to trial, we reject defendants’ argument. In White, the plaintiff prisoner timely demanded a jury trial for his civil rights suit. Id. at 700. The district court apparently overlooked or ignored the request and notified the parties that the case was set for a bench trial. Id. Plaintiff then participated in the bench trial without objection. Id. This court, sitting en banc, held that “knowing participation in a bench trial without objection is sufficient to constitute a jury waiver.” Id. at 703. Defendant argues that White requires a plaintiff to object at the ■ bench trial itself in order to preserve the right to a jury trial on appeal, no matter how vigorously a party contests the issue prior to trial. That would be reading too much into White. In White, the plaintiff “never brought his prior jury demand to the district court’s attention during the five and one-half month period between the bench trial notice and the trial.” Id. at 700. Nor did he object at trial or before the court entered judgment. Id. Nor did he file a motion for a new trial. Id. Rather, he raised the issue for the first time on appeal. Id. at 700 n. 4. Emphasizing White’s failure to bring the jury demand to the attention of the court, the White Court analogized his failure to that of an attorney in a similar case where, “The totality of the circumstances here [manifested] that the attorney slept on his client’s rights.” Id. at 702 (quoting Pope v. Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1355 n. 29 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotations omitted)). In this case Cohen-Strong sufficiently contested the issue of her right to a jury trial. Here, Cohen-Strong included her demand for a jury trial in the complaint lodged with her motion to intervene. Unlike in White, when the district court did not allow Cohen-Strong to file the complaint, she then sought reconsideration of the court’s decision. One week after the court denied her jury demand, Cohen-Strong again moved to submit a first amended complaint, with another demand for a jury trial. In support of her motion, Cohen-Strong filed a detailed Memorandum of Points and Authorities arguing her position and California Mobile Home submitted its own Memorandum of Points and Authorities. Cohen-Strong then filed a reply. After inviting oral argument, the court denied Cohen-Strong’S motion to file an amended com- ■ plaint. While White has become the leading jury waiver case in the circuit, Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1531 (9th Cir.1995), no Court has expanded it to find a waiver of a right to a jury trial where a plaintiff actively contests the district court’s decision to refuse the demand. For example, in United States v. Nordbrock, 941 F.2d 947 (9th Cir. 1991), the court found that plaintiffs filing a “continuing demand” for a jury trial after the district court set the case for a bench trial was sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal. Id. at 949. In Nordbrock, which was decided after White, the plaintiff did not argue his position as adamantly as Cohen-Strong has in this case. We hold Cohen-Strong sufficiently objected the district court’s denial of her right to a jury trial.