Opinion ID: 1269735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The majority's decision fails to give proper deference to the mall's time, place, and manner regulation of the wearing and carrying of signs.

Text: Macerich has not imposed a complete ban on the use of signs, but rather has a rule that [p]articipants may not carry or wear any signs, posters or placards. [1] Macerich allows posters, placards, displays and signs that are smaller than 22 inches by 28 inches and are affixed to a table so as not to endanger any person or property, block the view of any tenant's store or display, or directly compete with Center activities or the business displays or logos of Center tenants. California courts have recognized that private property owners have different interests than municipalities for the purposes of balancing those interests against First Amendment rights. In re Hoffman, 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 434 P.2d at 355 n. 3. Private property owners have an interest in avoiding interference with the commercial purposes of property. [2] Id. at 356-67. This includes an interest in controlling litter and traffic, Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., Inc., 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 273 Cal.Rptr. 302, 307 (Cal.App.1990), and consideration of whether the number and/or size of signs, posters or placards will interfere with and/or directly compete with business displays or logos. H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 238 Cal.Rptr. 841, 856 (Cal.App.1987) ( H-CHH ) disapproved on other grounds by Fashion Valley Mall, 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288, 172 P.3d at 754 n. 12. Under California law, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied `so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' Savage, 273 Cal.Rptr. at 307 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689, 105 S.Ct. 2897). In this case, restricting the union members from wearing signs or carrying pickets promotes Macerich's substantial interest in making sure that protesters do not block access to stores or the sight-lines for store displays or impede foot traffic. That interest would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Id. As already noted, California courts have stated that commercial property owners may consider[ ] whether the number and/or size of signs, posters or placards will interfere with and/or directly compete with business displays or logos. H-CHH Assocs., 238 Cal.Rptr. at 856. The majority concludes that the ban on wearing or carrying signs does not leave open ample alternatives for communication, speculating about the adequacy of various alternatives including Macerich's allowance of two signs attached to a table. The Supreme Court, however, requires us to give deference to reasonable determinations that substantial interests are best served by the restriction at issue. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (The Court of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city's reasonable determination that its interest in controlling volume would be best served by requiring bandshell performers to utilize the city's sound technician.). [3] In fact, the Court has stated that the less restrictive-alternative analysis has never been part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place, and manner regulation. Ward, 491 U.S. at 787, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court went on to conclude that it is error to sift[ ] through all the available or imagined alternative means of regulating [activity] in order to determine whether the city's solution was `the least intrusive means' of achieving the desired end. [4] Id. The proper analysis is whether Macerich's rules foreclose an entire medium of public expression across the landscape of a particular community or setting. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1138 (9th Cir.2005) (quotations omitted). In the `ample alternatives' context, the Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment requires only that the government refrain from denying a `reasonable opportunity' for communication. Id. at 1141 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). Foreclosing one narrow form of expression while allowing myriad and diverse alternatives for reaching the intended audience does not violate the First Amendment. One World One Family Now v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.1996). The majority assumes that picketing includes the right to wear or carry signs. The Board, however, has noted that picketing does not require the holding of a sign. Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., 287 NLRB 570, 573 (1987) (citing United Mine Workers of Am., District 12, 177 NLRB 213, 218 (1969)). I cannot find any authority that defines picketing to necessarily include the carrying or wearing of signs. See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495 (noting ordinance stated that pickets need not be carrying a sign). Macerich's rule forbidding the wearing or carrying of signs did not ban picketing. [5] Indeed, I conclude that Macerich's rule foreclosed only one method of picketing and did not categorically deny the unions of their ability to express their dissatisfaction with the use of non-union labor. Macerich's rules left open ample alternative means for the unions to communicate their message to the mall patrons. The union could have used a table with two signs staffed by members, and Macerich's rules allowed union members to carry clipboards and leaflets with additional information for mall patrons. The majority mentions that Local 586 representatives went to Arden Fair Mall wearing shirts that said Do Not Patronize Arden Fair MallUnfair to Carpenters, but fails to note that there is no evidence that Arden Fair Mall ejected the union representatives for wearing those shirts. Union members were free to wear or carry signs on the public sidewalks surrounding the malls' parking lots. The union had myriad and diverse alternatives for communicating their messages to mall patrons. As the majority acknowledges, under California law, the adequacy of alternative channels is not measured by the fondest hopes of those who wish to disseminate ideas. Savage, 273 Cal.Rptr. at 308 (citing Clark, 468 U.S. at 295, 104 S.Ct. 3065). Although no California case has expressly approved of a rule banning the wearing or carrying of signs, an intermediate court has noted that commercial establishments are free to establish restrictions on the size and number of signs, placards, and posters. H-CHH Assocs., 238 Cal.Rptr. at 856. Thus, the California cases indicate that the California Supreme Court would uphold a commercial property owner's right to ban the wearing or carrying signs, placards, or posters as narrowly tailored and leaving ample alternative channels for communication and deny the petition. See Calkins, 187 F.3d at 1089 (discussing how to interpret state law).