Opinion ID: 1440383
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Introduce Successful Rehabilitation and Mental Health Evidence

Text: Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of the following: (1) his successful rehabilitation at a juvenile institution; (2) diagnosis of mixed personality disorder in 1989; and (3) psychiatric evaluation revealing an IQ of 75. He fails to develop the second and third claims in any meaningful fashion, except to provide citations to the relevant reports, nor did he question counsel about these claims. Accordingly, those claims are waived. [18] See Bracey, supra . Therefore, we will address only his rehabilitation-evidence claim. Appellant raises two arguments in regard to his rehabilitation at the juvenile institution. He first insists that counsel was required to forward the Forestry Camp records to Dr. Tepper because they indicated that he is receptive to, and would benefit from, rehabilitation. He also suggests that counsel should have used records from Youth Forestry Camp, a secure, juvenile institution, to counter the Commonwealth's evidence that Appellant had behavioral problems at the Sleighton School. During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Tepper acknowledged that he was aware of the Youth Forestry Camp records: A. Yes, I know. I had the [Pre-Sentence Investigation report]. Q. Okay. A.  and that he had made  there's an indication there that he made a positive adjustment at the Youth Forestry placement and that I was aware of. Today, as we discussed, I cannot say a hundred percent if I had all those specific Youth Forestry records themselves, but there was a reference to them in the 1989 presentence report. N.T., 10/31/05, at 140. Dr. Tepper also specifically acknowledged the report on cross-examination during the penalty-phase hearing: Q: And your records indicate he was there for some period of time, don't they? A: At the Forestry Camp? Q: Yes. A: Yes. N.T., 11/12/97, at 121. Even if Dr. Tepper did not receive the report from Youth Forestry Camp, he was aware of the existence of a beneficial report and did not consider it crucial to his evaluation. Counsel added that [i]f [Dr. Tepper] said [the report] is important, I would have brought it out. Id. at 95. Accordingly, Appellant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by the failure, if any, of counsel to provide the report to Dr. Tepper. Nonetheless, Appellant asserts that counsel should have introduced the Youth Forestry Camp report to counter the unfavorable Sleighton School report, which had indicated that Appellant was not receptive to rehabilitation. [19] Initially, we observe that Appellant also claims the Commonwealth impermissibly introduced the evidence as a non-statutory aggravator. Appellant's Brief at 68. After reviewing the penalty-phase transcripts and jury instructions, we find no evidence that the Commonwealth attempted to introduce the Sleighton School report as an aggravator. Rather, the Commonwealth questioned Dr. Tepper further about his evaluation of Appellant's schooling. See N.T., 11/12/97, at 121. Thus, the Commonwealth's introduction of the report was appropriate, and Appellant's supporting citations involving impermissible use of non-statutory aggravating evidence, are inapposite. Compare Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 578 Pa. 284, 851 A.2d 883, 898-99 (2004) (permitting Commonwealth to question defendant about prior acquittal when direct examination opened door to subject), with Appellant's Brief at 68 n. 40 (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 795-97 (2004) (finding evidence that defendant entered into consent decree inadmissible because it was not finding of guilt and defendant's character was not at issue); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 113 (2004) (vacating sentence when prosecutor exhorted jury to send a message during closing arguments); Malloy, supra (same)). [20] We therefore examine whether, in the context of Dr. Tepper's testimony, counsel should have asked Dr. Tepper on re-direct examination about the Youth Forestry Camp report. When questioned by Appellant about why he did not introduce the report, counsel responded, I do see the next sentence [from the report], which gives me pause here. `His counselor was of the opinion that he derived maximum benefit from his placement there.' N.T., 10/31/05, at 52. The Commonwealth argues that counsel reasonably assessed the statement as implying that any further attempts at rehabilitation would be futile. Commonwealth's Brief at 53. We disagree. Counsel, on cross-examination, clarified his evaluation of the report: A. Well, it gave me pause because the jury just convicted him of doing these crimes and the report indicates they've already done what they could for him at Youth Forestry Camp so that's  that's why I was given pause. Q. In other words, it showed he could not be rehabilitated? A. Yes. N.T., 10/31/05, at 96. Our review of the report reveals that counsel's evaluation was unreasonable, as the report clearly details that Appellant had complied with all of the camp's goals. Thus, the camp did not, as the Commonwealth implies, give up on Appellant, but rather suggested that Appellant had adequately satisfied the requirements for leaving the camp. We cannot agree, therefore, that counsel's assessment of the report, as stated at the evidentiary hearing and construed by the Commonwealth, was reasonable. Nevertheless, Appellant must demonstrate that counsel's assessment was prejudicial. See Pierce, supra . When asked about the potential impact of the Youth Forestry Camp report, Dr. Tepper was less than certain: Q. Had you been asked by [counsel] what the Forestry Camp  forgive me, I'm struggling for a word  how [Appellant] behaved at the Forestry Camp, would you have been able to respond to the points made by [the prosecutor]? A. I can't say I would have been able to respond point by point to what Mr. Sax was asking me, but the Forestry Camp background would be  would have been a way to show that, with certain kind [sic] of guidance or structure, [Appellant] had certain either resources or ability to respond. That's what the Forestry Camp records seem to indicate. N.T., 10/31/05, at 118. As we found above, Dr. Tepper had opportunities on cross-examination to discuss the Youth Forestry Camp report, but did not do so. Further, Appellant compiled a significant history of drug abuse and criminal activity soon after his positive report from the Youth Forestry Camp, which was issued seven years prior to the instant crimes. [21] In the context of Dr. Tepper's testimony and the jury's finding of the previous-crimes aggravator, we cannot conclude that Appellant was prejudiced by counsel's interpretation of the Youth Forestry Camp report. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. See Basemore, supra .