Opinion ID: 751222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arson Conviction

Text: 17 Ferranti contends there is insufficient proof to support the interstate commerce element of the arson homicide offense. Citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), he urges that to support a conviction under the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), the government must establish the criminalized activity's substantial impact on interstate commerce. 18 In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A), a statute criminalizing the knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone, on the ground that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the statute. The Court found problematic the fact that the statute neither regulate[d] a commercial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. Id. at 551, 115 S.Ct. at 1626. In particular, the Court emphasized that the Gun-Free School Zones Act contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. Id. at 561, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. Unlike the statute in Lopez, the federal arson statute does contain such a jurisdictional element, which provides that 19 whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned.... 20 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (emphasis added). In considering other federal criminal statutes containing jurisdictional elements, we have held that Lopez did not elevate the government's burden in proving a nexus to interstate commerce. See United States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir.1997) (We find nothing in Lopez to suggest that the Court intended to heighten the threshold for establishing jurisdiction under such statutes.); United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1100 (2d Cir.) (holding that Lopez did not raise the government's burden under the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B), which contains a jurisdictional element requiring the financial transaction to affect interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1713, 137 L.Ed.2d 837 (1997). We hold that in light of the fact that, unlike the statute in Lopez, § 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, Lopez did not elevate the government's burden in establishing jurisdiction in a federal arson prosecution. See United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 974 (8th Cir.1996) (The Lopez decision did not address the amount of evidence required to prove an explicit jurisdictional element of an offense and does not control this case.). Hence, to satisfy § 844(i) the government need only prove that the arson in question destroyed or damaged property either used in or used in any activity affecting interstate commerce. 21 Sufficient evidence to establish the interstate commerce nexus for the arson homicide offense was produced in this case. In Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 2457, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985), the Court established a per se rule that, for purposes of § 844(i), rental property constitutes property that is used in an activity affecting interstate commerce. Inasmuch as § 844(i) contains a jurisdictional element, distinguishing it from the type of statute addressed in Lopez, we see no reason to conclude, as Ferranti apparently would have us do, that Lopez overruled the Court's holding in Russell. See United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir.1996) ([W]e find no basis to conclude that Lopez in any way undercuts Russell's holding that rental property is unquestionably an activity that affects interstate commerce within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 1109, 137 L.Ed.2d 310 (1997). Under the jurisdictional standard outlined in § 844(i), the government offered enough proof to allow a rational jury to conclude that the building was rented for both commercial and residential purposes at the time of the arson, thereby conclusively establishing the requisite connection between the burned building and interstate commerce.