Opinion ID: 781039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard of Review of the State Court Decision

Text: 29 AEDPA changed the landscape of federal habeas corpus review by significantly curtail[ing] the power of federal courts to grant the habeas petitions of state prisoners. Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S.Ct. 1611, 152 L.Ed.2d 625 (2002); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1849, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (noting that AEDPA modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas `retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law). Under AEDPA, 30 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — 31 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 32 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 33 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). In an apparent attempt to elude the heavy burden AEDPA presents, Eze makes two arguments for why § 2254(d)(1)'s deferential standards should not apply. First, Eze contends that the respondent waived the standards by failing to raise them in the District Court. Second, Eze argues that the Appellate Division merely adjudicated his ineffective assistance claim under state law, and therefore did not adjudicate his federal claim on the merits so as to trigger § 2254(d)(1). 34
35 Eze maintains that the respondent waived the statute's standard of review by failing to reference the standard in its papers before the District Court. Eze therefore urges us to apply the pre-AEDPA de novo review of a state court adjudication. See Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.2001) (Under [pre-AEDPA law], pure questions of law are reviewed de novo, as are mixed questions of law and fact; state court factual findings are presumed correct absent certain circumstances.) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The gravamen of Eze's waiver argument is that procedural defenses can be waived if not raised by the defendant. 36 AEDPA's standard of review, however, is not a procedural defense, but a standard of general applicability for all petitions filed by state prisoners after the statute's effective date presenting claims that have been adjudicated on the merits by a state court. See Brown v. Artuz, 283 F.3d 492, 498 n. 2 (2d Cir.2002) (AEDPA's standards for reviewing state court findings and conclusions apply to any petition filed ... after April 24, 1996, the AEDPA's effective date.); Mancuso v. Herbert, 166 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1999) (stating that AEDPA is applicable to all petitions filed after its effective date), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 119 S.Ct. 2376, 144 L.Ed.2d 779 (1999). The statute contains unequivocally mandatory language. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (instructing that a state prisoner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus  shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding) (emphasis added). Therefore, if the Appellate Division adjudicated Eze's federal ineffective assistance claim on the merits, we must apply AEDPA deference. 37
38 Eze argues that the Appellate Division failed to adjudicate his claim on the merits because its decision cited the New York test for ineffective assistance from People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 (1981), but failed to mention the federal test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See People v. Eze, 217 A.D.2d 987, 631 N.Y.S.2d 268, 268 (4th Dep't 1995). According to Eze, because Baldi and Strickland set forth different tests for ineffective assistance, see infra II.A., the Appellate Division did not adjudicate his federal ineffective assistance claim. 39 AEDPA's deferential standard is limited to claims that were adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If a state court has failed to adjudicate a claim on the merits, we apply the pre-AEDPA standards, and review de novo the state court disposition of the petitioner's federal constitutional claims. Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir.2001) (citing Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.2001)). To adjudicate a claim on the merits, the state court need not mention the argument raised or cite relevant case law, Brown, 283 F.3d at 498, or even explain[] its reasoning process, Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir.2001). Rather, a state court adjudicates a claim on its merits by (1) dispos[ing] of the claim `on the merits,' and (2) reduc[ing] its disposition to judgment. Id. at 312. Whether a claim has been disposed on its merits turns on: `(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and (3) whether the state court's opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination on the merits.' Id. at 314 (quoting Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir.1999)). 40 Since Sellan, we have given a broad reading to state court dispositions. Norde v. Keane, 294 F.3d 401, 410 (2d Cir.2002). We have explained that the state court need only dispose of the petitioner's federal claim on substantive grounds, and reduce that disposition to judgment. No further articulation of its rationale or elucidation of its reasoning process is required. Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 93-94. In fact, an issue may be considered to be adjudicated on its merits even when the state court does not specifically mention the claim but uses general language referable to the merits. Norde, 294 F.3d at 410. 41 Eze alerted the Appellate Division to the federal nature of his claim by citing Strickland in his pro se supplemental brief. Therefore, the Appellate Division was apprised of Eze's federal claim and the governing federal law when it rejected Eze's ineffective assistance claim. The Appellate Division held that [t]he record does not support the contentions of the defendant that ... he was denied effective assistance of counsel. People v. Eze, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 268. This language demonstrates that the Appellate Division disposed of the claim on substantive grounds. See Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 94 (concluding that the Appellate Division adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits because there is nothing in its decision to indicate that the claims were decided on anything but substantive grounds). Therefore, under Sellan and its progeny, the Appellate Division adjudicated Eze's federal ineffective assistance claim on the merits so as to trigger § 2254(d)(1)'s review.