Opinion ID: 171694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the facts warranted a proper second degree murder instruction

Text: We next turn to the question Beck instructs us to ask: whether the evidence supported a second degree murder instruction, such that a jury could have rationally concluded that Mr. Taylor did not intend to kill Mr. Sauer. We find that there was sufficient evidence introduced at trial from which a jury could have rationally acquitted Mr. Taylor of first degree murder and convicted him of second degree murder. In Oklahoma, homicide is second degree murder [w]hen perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to another person and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual. 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 701.8. A design to effect death is inferred from the fact of killing, unless the circumstances raise a reasonable doubt whether such design existed. 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 702. In addition, a design to effect death sufficient to constitute murder may be formed instantly before committing the act by which it is carried into execution. 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 703. The most direct evidence regarding Mr. Taylor's state of mind involved Steven and Lindsay Verner. The prosecution introduced evidence that Mr. Taylor told his friend Steve Armstrong shortly before the incident that if Mr. Verner did not pay his drug debt he would need to cap Mr. Verner. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Taylor's girlfriend was sitting in her car with the engine running while Mr. Taylor was inside supported the inference that Mr. Taylor had made plans for a speedy getaway. There also was evidence that, prior to shooting Lindsay Verner Mr. Taylor said: I hope you die, bitch. There was no direct evidence regarding Mr. Taylor's state of mind toward Michael Sauer, the only person who died as a result of Mr. Taylor's shooting spree. It is undisputed that Mr. Taylor did not know Mr. Sauer. The prosecution's theory of the case was that after his premeditated shooting of Mr. Verner, Mr. Taylor shot the other three victims, including Mr. Sauer, in order to eliminate witnesses. If believed by the jury, this would be sufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder of Mr. Sauer. The focus of the defense to the first degree murder charge was the absence of any evidence that Mr. Taylor had a premeditated design to effect the death of Mr. Sauer. Defense counsel articulated the theory in this passage from his closing argument to the jury: Most if not all of the evidence that has come from [the state] about Charles Taylor's intent to kill anybody is about his intent as it affects Steve Verner. The only problem with that is the only murder now filed is not about Steve Verner; it's about Michael Sauer. He doesn't even know Michael Sauer. There is no evidencenot a shred that he knew him; that he had any motive[;] that he had any reason to kill Michael Sauer[.] Tr. III 692-93. The only witness for the defense was Mr. Taylor himself. He testified that he shot Mr. Verner because for some reason I don't know it scared me when Mr. Verner reached out to put his arm around him. Tr. III 600. When he saw Mr. Verner fall to the floor and grab his face after being shot, Mr. Taylor testified that it scared me. I didn't realize what had really happened at that point and-uh-flipped out and started to run out the door. . . . Id. As to shooting Michael Sauer, he claimed that he seen somebody out of the corner of [his] eye, didn't know who it was, but fired shots in that direction. Tr. III 601. Mr. Taylor maintained this story on cross-examination. When the prosecutor asked Mr. Taylor whether he shot Michael Sauer, Adrienne Smith, and Lindsay Verner because he had thought that they might be able to report him, he responded I don't think I was thinking at all. Tr. III 620. In response to Mr. Taylor's account of the incident, the State notes that Mr. Sauer was shot twice in his back and argues that [t]he fact that both bullets traveled a similar path through the victim's back suggests that Petitioner had not traveled between the shots and therefore may have stood and shot the victim twice in a row. Aple. Br. 41. The State argues that if Mr. Taylor had paused, taken aim, and shot Michael Sauer twice in a row, this would cast doubt on Mr. Taylor's explanation of the shooting. Accepting the factual findings of the state court and of the district court but reviewing their legal conclusions de novo, we conclude that the evidence would have allowed a jury to reasonably find that Mr. Taylor did not entertain a premeditated design to kill Michael Sauer. In reaching this conclusion, we begin with the fact that the trial judge, who was most intimately familiar with the evidence in the case and observed the demeanor of the witnesses, concluded that Mr. Taylor was entitled to a second-degree murder instruction (although unfortunately, the court delivered one that was not correct). This casts serious doubt on the State's argument that a reasonable jury, hearing the same evidence heard by the trial judge, could not have found Mr. Taylor guilty of second degree murder. For reasons already explained, the contrary conclusion reached by the OCCA is not entitled to deference. It is also significant that the prosecutor, who had every incentive to sniff out an implausible defense, made no objection at trial to the court's decision to give the second degree murder instruction. See Tr. III 644. This, too, casts doubt on the State's later argument, offered for the first time on appeal in the OCCA, that the evidence of intent at trial was so clear that a second degree murder instruction was unsupportable. Turning now to the facts, we cannot agree with the State that the evidence regarding intent was so one-sided that a reasonable jury had no alternative but to conclude that Mr. Sauer's death was a product of premeditated design. If Mr. Taylor did not aim as he shot, but the gun was just flailing around, as the OCCA summarized the defendant's testimony, Taylor II, 998 P.2d at 1229, it is hard to see why a second degree murder instruction would not be appropriate. Such behavior would be imminently dangerous to another person, and it would evinc[e] a depraved mind, regardless of human life, but it would not indicate any premeditated design, 21 Okl. St. Ann. § 701.8, to kill Michael Sauer. Even if the jury believed that Mr. Taylor intentionally shot at Mr. Sauerindeed, even if the jury believed that Mr. Taylor was intentionally seeking to harm himit could have believed his testimony and concluded that Mr. Taylor had no intent to kill him. See Quilliams v. State, 779 P.2d 990 (Okla.Crim.App.1989) (affirming second degree murder conviction where defendant testified his gunshots were intended to wound, but not to kill). The OCCA has upheld second degree depraved mind murder convictions in a variety of cases in which the facts were similar to these, or arguably even more suggestive of an intent to kill. In Dorsey v. State, the OCCA upheld a second degree murder conviction where the defendant intentionally armed himself with a knife and entered the store where he started a fight with the victim and intentionally stabbed him. 739 P.2d 528, 529 (Okla. Crim.App.1987). In Quilliams v. State , the OCCA upheld a second degree murder conviction where the defendant admitted intentionally shooting [the victim], but denied an intent to do more than wound [the victim]. 779 P.2d 990, 991 (Okla. Crim.App.1989). In both cases, the OCCA concluded that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [second degree murder] beyond a reasonable doubt. Dorsey, 739 P.2d at 529; Quilliams, 779 P.2d at 991. See also Hall v. State, 698 P.2d 33 (Okla.Crim.App.1985) (affirming second degree depraved mind murder conviction where victim was stabbed thirteen times in the chest and neck areas and sustained a large skull fracture); Tucker v. State, 675 P.2d 459 (Okla.Crim.App.1984) (determining evidence supported second degree depraved mind murder conviction where five-month-old infant was battered by defendant with his fists and hands over two-day period and deliberately dropped to the floor). We recognize the force of the State's argument that the similar paths of the two bullets through Mr. Sauer's back makes it less likely that Mr. Taylor shot him while running wildly through the apartment. While this may have been a legitimate argument for the prosecutor to make to the jury, however, it is not so self-evident a proposition as to compel the jury to disbelieve Mr. Taylor's testimony. Although the prosecution called numerous medical and law enforcement personnel to discuss the shootings, it never elicited any testimony on whether the bullet path evidence suggested, let alone conclusively established, that Mr. Taylor stopped, took aim, and shot Mr. Sauer in the manner the State now hypothesizes. None of the state courts, nor the district court below, made any factual finding regarding the probabilities that the two shots could have been fired in rapid succession by someone running towards the front door of the house. A forensics investigation might well be able to draw a confident conclusion from this evidence, but as an appellate court we cannot. The evidence regarding the paths of the bullets does not provide us, therefore, with an unequivocal basis to conclude that Mr. Taylor intended to kill Mr. Sauer. One additional consideration contributes to persuade us that a rational jury could have convicted Mr. Taylor of second degree murder. When Mr. Taylor argued at his evidentiary hearing on direct appeal that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense more vigorously, the State responded by claiming that defense counsel's strategy to focus on showing a lack of intent to kill Michael Sauer was ingenious. Evid. Hr. IV 73. After describing the defense's theory that there was a lack of specific intent, not because [Mr. Taylor was] intoxicated, but because [he] didn't know [Michael Sauer;] . . . had never met [him], the State argued that this factual avoidance [strategy] was a fairly good attack. Id. If this theory was sufficiently plausible to constitute sound trial strategy, it can scarcely be so flawed that a second degree murder instruction was unwarranted. For all these reasons, we are persuaded that the evidence would have allow[ed] a jury to rationally conclude that the defendant did not intend to kill Michael Sauer. Whether a jury was more likely to convict on first or second degree grounds is not the question. Due process demands that a jury be permitted to consider a lesser-included offense of first degree murder before imposing death so long as the evidence would have supported such a verdict. Beck, 447 U.S. at 627, 100 S.Ct. 2382; see Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1312. Here, if the jury accepted Mr. Taylor's account that he shot in the direction of Michael Sauer in a panicked withdrawal from Mr. Verner's home, without intent to kill, it could have validly convicted him of second degree murder. Thus, we conclude that a second degree depraved mind murder instruction was warranted based on the facts of Mr. Taylor's case.