Opinion ID: 2789948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: continue the present conditions of release;

Text: (5) extend the conditional release by an additional term of 5 years. Id. The terms of §12-221 are identical to those now codified in CP § 3-122. 19 ruling. Report of Governor’s Task Force at 31. No such requirement was thought necessary for applications to change or extend conditional release in the absence of a violation. The General Assembly accepted the Task Force’s recommendations and did not include in the final version of Senate Bill 645 a deadline for changes in conditional release when there was no violation of the pre-existing conditions of release. 1984 Maryland Laws Ch. 501. The provisions for modifying a patient’s conditional release in either instance appeared sequentially in the final Bill, so the Legislature would have been aware of the option of imposing a deadline. See id. The comments of the Task Force (which were included by the Legislature in the Session Laws of the Bill) demonstrate also that our interpretation of “shall” in this statute was intended. About the section of Senate Bill 645 that would be codified as HG § 12121 (and eventually re-codified as CP § 3-122), the Session Laws reported favorably the Task Force’s comment that “[i]n subsection (c) of this section, the phrase ‘court shall’ is substituted for ‘court may’ to clarify that the court is required to take one of the 5 specified actions if an application is appropriately made.” The Task Force and the Legislature were guided by a desire to strengthen protection of the public from the inappropriate release and discharge of defendants in criminal cases who are found not criminally responsible.16 The Legislature made it more 16 The Committee Report prepared on Senate Bill 645 for the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee stated that “[t]he purpose of the bill is to implement the (Continued…) 20 difficult for defendants to avoid punishment by claiming mental non-culpability and increased the State’s ability to confine not criminally responsible defendants and require conditions for their release. There is no evidence that the Legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of courts deciding an application for an extension of conditional release. On the contrary, the Legislature chose to refrain from imposing a finite deadline. 4. Policy Considerations When “confronted with ambiguity regarding legislative intent, it is our duty to announce a rule that we are convinced is best supported by sound jurisprudential policy germane to the pursuit of legislative intent.” Haas v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 396 Md. 469, 493, 914 A.2d 735, 749 (2007). In rare instances, considering the practical consequences of competing interpretations may outweigh other principles of statutory construction. Id. As Harrison-Solomon and the amici curiae point out, a Court reinstating conditions after a long period of time, during which they may have been unenforced or unenforceable, could raise some fairness and due process concerns. See infra Part II.B. In many situations the conditions of release, although deemed necessary by the court and authorized by the General Assembly, limit severely the patient’s autonomy. For example, (…continued) recommendations of the Task Force in an effort to streamline and strengthen, where necessary, the procedures for the defense of not criminally ‘responsible’ in Maryland.” Department of Legislative Reference, Committee Report, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee at 3. 21 Harrison-Solomon was required by the 2006 Order of Conditional Release, among other things, to live in an outpatient facility, comply with all treatment and medication ordered by his doctors, and receive permission before visiting his parents. He was required even to consult with his therapists, and presumably comply with their decisions, if he sought to marry or to father children. It would be jarring understandably for someone who had been living without these conditions for a lengthy period of time, while awaiting a court’s decision whether to reinstate them, to have them re-imposed.17 Indeed, it is possible that some of the conditions ordered previously, such as participation in a specific outpatient or residential program, may become unavailable during the interlude if the patient became unenrolled, thereby perhaps defaulting to institutional confinement for inpatient treatment. The State contends that these concerns may be addressed through means other than limiting the jurisdiction of courts. A patient awaiting a court’s ruling could seek a writ of mandamus or seek proactively a discharge or termination of the conditions. If the circumstances of a delay and reinstatement were to amount arguably to a viable claim of a violation of the patient’s right to due process, he or she would be able to challenge the 17 We presume, for the purpose of this analysis (without deciding), that a timely-filed application for extending an order of conditional release would not continue automatically the conditions during the period between facial expiration of the extant order and when the court ruled on the application. The present case does not require us to confront this question, and we decline to consider it in dicta. If such a circumstance in a future case were to come properly before us, other policy and due process concerns might arise. 22 order on those grounds, without the need to impose a uniform and time-definite jurisdictional limit. Although patients would have some avenues of recourse, the State’s open-ended interpretation of CP § 3-122 might impose an additional burden and uncertainty on some. People suffering from a mental disorder, even if they were not a danger to themselves or others, might be less able than an unimpaired person to mount a legal challenge. Harrison-Solomon and the amici curiae highlight negative effects on patients released conditionally if the State’s major premise is adopted without limitation. That notwithstanding, the State presents persuasive considerations as well in support of its reading of CP § 3-122. For a court to order the extension of a patient’s conditional release, the State or the Department must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conditions of release are appropriate or the patient must fail to establish that he or she would not be a danger if discharged or released without conditions. See CP § 3-122(b); CP §3-114.18, 19 For the application to be granted, the 18 CP § 3-122(b) provides that “[t]he burden of proof of any issue raised by the application for change in conditional release rests with the applicant.” Yet CP § 3-122(c) indicates that the Court must make the determination of whether to change the conditions, impose additional conditions, revoke the conditional release, continue the present conditions, or extend the conditional release, in accordance with CP § 3-114. In turn, CP § 3-114(d) states that a committed person has the burden to establish that he or she either be discharged or released conditionally. 19 Title 3 of the Criminal Procedure Article contains no provision for releasing a patient without conditions (as distinct from discharging the patient). This may be arguably possible, however, if the court retains jurisdiction until a patient obtains discharge under CP § 3-114. If such were the case, at the expiration of the order of conditional release the (Continued…) 23 court would have to find that it was more likely than not that the patient was a danger to himself, herself or others.20 If a court would have ruled otherwise to extend the order of conditional release (but for having lost jurisdiction), the public safety would be jeopardized and the patient would be released from the therapeutic environment required for his or her possible recovery and protection. The State’s concerns are mitigated by Maryland’s civil commitment regime. If a patient only avoided being a danger to himself/herself or the public while following the conditions of release, failing to follow them could be grounds for commitment. Even though the State would have to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, rather than demonstrate that it was merely more likely so than not, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 1812 (1979) (holding that civil commitment required clear and convincing proof), indisputably dangerous patients would not be released without conditions, according to Harrison-Solomon’s interpretation. It is clear from the legislative history of Senate Bill 645 of 1984, however, that the Legislature wanted to (…continued) patient would be free from conditions, but not discharged, as the State argued in the alternative at oral argument as a sort of fall-back position. But see infra note 24. 20 Although multiple reasonable interpretations of the intersection of CP § 3-122 and CP § 3-114 are possible, the relevant standard requires proof by a preponderance of evidence. Whichever party bears the initial burden, the court determines whether it is more likely than not that the patient would be a danger if released with conditions or without conditions, as the case may be. See Coleman v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Police Dep't, 369 Md. 108, 125, 797 A.2d 770, 781 (2002). The court is making the same finding of dangerousness if, for example, the State failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a patient would be a danger without conditions as it would be if the patient failed to show that he or she would not be a danger to be released without conditions. 24 remove from the State the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the need for continued supervision of defendants found not criminally responsible. We have long held that we “cannot disregard the mandate of the Legislature and insert an exception, where none has been made by the Legislature, for the sake of relieving against hardship or injustice[,]” except in extreme circumstances.21 Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946); c.f. State v. Fleming, 173 Md. 192, 196, 195 A. 392, 393 (1937); Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, 485 (1854). The policy concerns raised by Harrison-Solomon and the amici curiae do not tip ultimately the scale in his favor, so as to overcome the evidence of the Legislature’s intent for courts to retain jurisdiction to rule on timely-filed applications to extend an order of conditional release. 5. Decisions by Courts of Other Jurisdictions 21 The United States Supreme Court summarized the standard thusly, analogizing the interpretation of a contract to that of a constitution: But if, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 202-03 (1819). Although we express the principle differently, we agree with the relative rarity of adopting a construction contrary to the apparent intent of the Legislature. 25 The appellate courts of other states have held that their trial courts retain jurisdiction to extend conditional release or inpatient confinement for patients found not criminally responsible (or the respective jurisdiction’s equivalent) after the term of their conditional release or inpatient confinement has expired, provided the application was filed before the expiration. In People v. Maglio, 923 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), the Illinois intermediate appellate court considered a case on all fours with the question presented here. Maglio was found not guilty, following a bench trial, of two counts of first degree murder by reason of insanity and was eventually released conditionally for a period of five years.22 Id. at 328. Two weeks before his conditional release expired, Illinois filed a petition to extend conditions for an additional period of five years and requested an evidentiary hearing. Id. The matter came before the court after expiration of the facial duration of the immediate prior order. The trial court denied the State’s petition and subsequent requests for reconsideration, stating that it lacked jurisdiction over the patient after the expiration 22 Finding a defendant not criminally responsible under Maryland Law is not an acquittal, but rather operates as a release from punishment. Treece v. State, 313 Md. 665, 676, 547 A.2d 1054, 1059 (1988). For purposes of commitment for mental disorder and subsequent conditional release, however, acquitting a defendant by reason of insanity under the law of Illinois is the functional equivalent of finding a defendant guilty, but not criminally responsible, under Maryland’s scheme. Like states that acquit defendants for mental disorders negating criminal responsibility, commitment is not deemed ordinarily a punishment in Maryland. 26 of the term of conditional release. Id. The Illinois appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further consideration.23 Id. The reasoning in Maglio is similar to the State’s argument and the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in the present case. According to the Illinois appellate court: 23 The relevant Illinois statute and CP § 3-122 are analogous. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-2-4 provided: ‘Conditional Release’ means: the release from either the custody of the Department of Human Services or the custody of the Court of a person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity under such conditions as the Court may impose which reasonably assure the defendant's satisfactory progress in treatment or habilitation and the safety of the defendant and others.