Opinion ID: 4423975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: City Council Defendants

Text: Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that City Council Defendants violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by “pass[ing] and sign[ing] into effect” XCO § 648.12, “[t]he effect of [which] was to restrict panhandling in all but extremely limited areas.” (RE 1, Complaint, PageID # 5.) The district court held that City Council Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity against Plaintiff’s claims. We agree. Local legislators sued in their individual capacities may invoke absolute legislative immunity to insulate themselves from liability for certain actions. Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 218 (6th Cir. 2011). This immunity “attaches to all actions taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.” R.S.S.W., Inc. v. City of Keego Harbor, 397 F.3d 427, 437 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). And passing an ordinance is a “purely legislative act.” Id. at 438; see also Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 2004); Shoultes v Laidlaw, 5 No. 18-3939 886 F.2d 114, 117 (6th Cir. 1989). Thus, City Council Defendants are entitled to legislative immunity against Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff argues that City Council Defendants are not entitled to legislative immunity because passing an unconstitutional ordinance is not within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity, and that the district court erred by “focus[ing] on the nature of the act [rather than] the unconstitutionality of the ordinance.” (Reply Brief for Appellant at 12.) Yet, to the contrary, “whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.”4 Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted); see also Collins v. Vill. of New Vienna, 75 F. App’x 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Thus, the constitutionality of XCO § 648.12 is not relevant to this legislative immunity analysis. See, e.g., Smith, 641 F.3d at 218 (“Even if the Board did not have the power to abolish the alternative school under Tennessee law, the Board members may still enjoy legislative immunity as individuals in federal court for their legislative actions, sound or unsound.”); Shoultes, 886 F.2d at 117–18 (“While the ordinance subsequently was held invalid, it was passed by a properly constituted legislative body, which was empowered to pass zoning regulations. Accordingly, we hold that the Mayor and Council members are shielded from suit by absolute legislative immunity.”). 4 In Haskell v. Washington Twp., 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cr. 1988), this Court appeared to hold otherwise, stating that “absolute [legislative] immunity does not extend to even traditionally legislative actions of officials taken either in bad faith, because of corruption, or primarily in furtherance of personal instead of public interests.” However, the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998), “made clear that the determination of whether an act[] is ‘legislative’ must be made without regard to the legislators’ subjective intent.” Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 2000). The rationale for this rule is straightforward: “[T]he threat of liability,” including liability based on a judge’s or jury’s determination of legislators’ subjective intent, “may significantly deter service in local government, where prestige and pecuniary rewards may pale in comparison.” Smith, 641 F.3d at 219 (quotation omitted). 6 No. 18-3939 Accordingly, we hold that City Council Defendants are entitled to judgment on the pleadings based on legislative immunity.5