Opinion ID: 2602047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror Misconduct Issues

Text: (14) Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to excuse Juror No. 84, thereby violating state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Specifically, defendant argues reversal is required because the trial court should have excused Juror No. 84 for being unable to perform her duty. We disagree. After the trial commenced, the court told the jury it anticipated the trial would conclude by the end of Labor Day week. On August 16, 1996, during the penalty phase, the trial court told the jurors that closing argument would likely occur the day after Labor Day, with deliberations to begin thereafter, and if any of the jurors had any problem with the case going into the week of September 9, they should notify the bailiff. The court then recessed until August 26. On August 29, the jurors were excused early and told to call the court clerk after 4:00 p.m. to see whether they should return on Friday, August 30 or Tuesday, September 3. After the jury exited the courtroom, the trial court advised counsel that Juror No. 84 indicated that, because she was the office manager of an elementary school, it would be difficult on the new students and the staff if she were not at school when the teachers returned on September 9. Defense counsel, concerned that deliberation might be affected if Juror No. 84 remained, requested that the juror be excused and an alternate be seated. The prosecutor asked the trial court to wait and see whether a problem would actually arise. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with the prosecutor and decided not to excuse the juror. When the jurors called on August 29 to see when they should return, they were informed they should return on September 3. When Juror No. 84 called, the juror told the court clerk she was not happy that she had to return on Tuesday. The court clerk surmised the juror was unhappy because she had wanted to come back on Friday, August 30, and the court described the juror as being disappointed that the jury was not returning until September 3, instead of August 30. Defense counsel asked the court to voir dire the juror and the court agreed. When the jury returned on September 3, the court told Juror No. 84 that it needed to talk to her, but would do so during a break. At the end of the day, outside the presence of the other jurors, the trial court told Juror No. 84 that it received her note and appreciated her concerns. Your commitment to your job and your concerns about your job demonstrate you're a responsible person and when you've got a job to do you're going to do it, so that tends to cause us to believe you'd be a good juror because you understand your obligations and are true to them, but I'm very concerned with respect to divided attention, and the law sets up certain standards for me to review in terms of whether a juror should be excused on the basis of hardship, and I guess what I need to know from you is . . . whether you'll be distracted. Juror No. 84: No, I just felt like I've already given up my summer vacation for this and I've got almost seven hundred students to worry about and a staff of sixty. The court: When you say I've already given up my summer vacation for this, it has been a hardship and I need to know either based on that you think subconsciously you would move more quickly either towards reaching a verdict or more quickly towards declaring an impasse saying we can't reach a verdict. Again, I know you won't consciously do that, but Juror No. 84: I don't even think subconsciously that would be a problem. The court: Because I know sometimes if I'm in a hurry to get out of here on Friday afternoon when I come back Monday and look at something I wrote, I think I didn't spend a Juror No. 84: I understand what you're saying. That's not a problem. The court: So if you are required to remain to the conclusion of the case, it could be two or three weeks into the school year. Juror No. 84: I understand. The court: You still feel you'd be able to approach this task with the same commitment you've had throughout the trial? Juror No. 84: Sure. The court: You won't be distracted wondering what's happening in school? Juror No. 84: Of course I'll be wondering what's happening at school, but it's justreally, I feel strongly about continuing. The court: Continuing on the jury? Juror No. 84: Yes The court: And maintaining your focus on the jury? Juror No. 84: Yes. The next day, after defense counsel finished their closing argument, the court excused the jury and asked counsel for feedback regarding Juror No. 84 while indicating that it thought [Juror No. 84] made it pretty clear that she would continue to perform her duties as a juror in a competent fashion . . . . Defense counsel continued to believe the juror should be excused and the prosecutor thought the juror should remain. The court decided not to excuse the juror, explaining that, Based on what she said yesterday, although I initially had some concerns, after talking with her yesterday I think she appreciates the seriousness of her duties in connection with this case. And I'm not concerned that she will rush to a verdict or rush to an impasse in an effort to end her jury service. The jury began deliberating later that day, continued to deliberate on Thursday, September 5 and Friday, September 6, stopped for the weekend, and reached a verdict on Monday, September 9. (15) Defendant claims the trial court erred when it decided not to excuse Juror No. 84. We disagree. Section 1089 authorizes the trial court to discharge a juror at any time before or after the final submission of the case to the jury if, upon good cause, the juror is found to be unable to perform his or her duty. A trial court has broad discretion to investigate and remove a juror in the midst of trial where it finds that, for any reason, the juror is no longer able or qualified to serve. ( People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 142, fn. 19 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990].) A juror's inability to perform `must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality and bias may not be presumed.' [Citations.] ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 975 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153].) We review the trial court's determination for abuse of discretion and uphold its decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 462 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391].) Here, the juror never indicated at any point that her ability to deliberate would be affected by her concern about the impending school year. To the contrary, on numerous occasions, she affirmatively indicated she would not be distracted, would not feel pressure to reach a decision, and would not lose focus because of her job. Indeed, she told the court she felt strongly about remaining on the jury. The court was in the position to observe the juror's demeanor ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 298 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451]) and the court was persuaded that the juror could perform her duties. Defendant speculates the juror was biased; however, nothing in the record supports his assumption. ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 975.) Accordingly, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to excuse Juror No. 84.
Defendant argues the trial court erred when it allegedly failed to adequately examine Juror No. 20, failed to excuse Juror No. 20, and declined to reinstruct the jury. Defendant contends reversal is required because his rights under state law and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution were violated. We disagree. At 10:00 a.m. on September 9, the jury informed the court it had reached a verdict. The court excused the jury until 2:00 p.m. Before taking the verdict, the court called counsel into chambers and told them that, at 1:40 p.m., Juror No. 20 called the courtroom and spoke with the bailiff. The bailiff, who was in chambers, recounted that The gist of the phone call was that [Juror No. 20] had a concern as to what was taking place in the jury room. At that point I told him if there's any problems you need to write them down and I will forward them up and he said he just didn't feel right and once again I told him to write it down and, you know, if he had any problems he had to put it on paper and I would pass it on. The trial court then indicated that Juror No. 20 did not give the bailiff a note when he, along with the other jurors, assembled in the jury room. The trial court was unsure whether it should inquire of Juror No. 20. Defense counsel felt an inquiry was necessary and the prosecutor wanted to take the verdict without doing so, reasoning that the juror's failure to write a note must mean any concerns had been resolved. There was a lengthy discussion about how best to proceed and, ultimately, it was decided to bring Juror No. 20 into chambers, reference his phone conversation with the bailiff, and invite him to write down any concerns should he have any. Once Juror No. 20 had been brought into chambers, the court inquired and advised him to write any concerns on a note. The juror did so and then returned to the jury room. The court read the note aloud to counsel: I have reached a verdict as to the proper verdict. It is just very hard for me to verbally say it when being polled. In my mind I do believe my verdict is true and correct, but my heart tells me I cannot do this. It's very difficult. I don't want this trial to go on any longer, but is there any way that an alternate can take my place to reach a verdict so I won't have to verbally say it. I know I said I could do it, but it's a lot harder than I thought, and if I must do it I will. The court and counsel discussed the note and discussed what action to take. Defense counsel argued that the note meant Juror No. 20 could not fulfill his oath and asked that he be excused and replaced by an alternate. Alternatively, defense counsel asked the court to tell Juror No. 20 that he should not have signed the verdict form unless he was prepared to state it was his verdict in open court. Defense counsel also asked the court to reinstruct the entire jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.88, that it should only impose the sentence that each juror personally felt was warranted. The prosecutor asked the court to bring the juror into chambers and inquire what he intended to do when polled in open court. Because a verdict had been reached, if the juror intended to agree when polled, there was no problem to resolve. The prosecutor felt further intervention was warranted only if the juror said he intended to disagree when polled. The court ultimately concluded that there were not sufficient grounds to excuse the juror. It instead decided to tell the juror that the jury would be individually polled after the verdict was announced and to ask him whether he could answer yes. If not, the court could deal with it then. Then, referring to the bailiff's recounting of Juror No. 20's phone call, defense counsel noted that the juror had made reference to some things going on in the jury room and asked the court to conduct an inquiry into his concerns. The court pointed out that the statement was merely part of the bailiff's best effort to paraphrase the conversation. The court then brought Juror No. 20 into open court and told him that, as in the guilt phase, the jurors would be collectively and individually polled after the court clerk read the penalty phase verdict to determine whether the verdict expressed their votes. The court said it did not want to know what the verdict was, but wanted to know if the juror could give an answer when polled. The juror responded, I think I could do it. It's just, I guess, the nervousness if you want to call it. It would be easier for meall the jurors. It's not an easy thing. It's difficult to do it, but I can do it. It's just the nervousness was part of my concern. The court followed up, But when asked in open court if this expresses your verdict you can answer either yes or no? The juror responded, Yes and was returned to the jury room. Defense counsel renewed his motion to excuse the juror and replace him with an alternate and to reinstruct the jury. Finding no good cause, the trial court denied the motion. The jury returned a death verdict and, when polled, Juror No. 20 responded that the verdict reflected his penalty determination. Defendant argues the trial court erred. He contends the trial court's inquiry was too limited, that the court should have excused Juror No. 20 for inability to fulfill his duty as a juror, and that the court should have reinstructed the entire jury. We disagree. First, the court did not err when it concluded Juror No. 20 could fulfill his duty. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 462.) The juror's note and the court's subsequent inquiry established that the juror's concern was about having to state in open court that he felt a death sentence was appropriate. Any such anxiety was understandable given the consequences of his vote. However, the juror subsequently told the court that, while difficult, he could fulfill his duty by verbally affirming that he concurred in the jury's penalty determination. Indeed, the juror ultimately did so. There is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the juror was unable to perform his duty. [17] ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 975.) (16) Second, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the scope of its inquiry. Defendant argues that Juror No. 20 communicated a broader concern about jury deliberations and it was incumbent upon the court to inquire. The record does not support his contention. The bailiff, in what the trial court described as his best effort to paraphrase the conversation with Juror No. 20, made a vague reference to a concern as to what was taking place in the jury room. However, despite being instructed to do so by the bailiff, Juror No. 20 did not write a note about any concerns. Even after the trial court brought the juror into chambers and invited him to write down any concerns, the juror's note made no mention of concerns about anything taking place in the jury room. Nor, during the court's subsequent inquiry, did the juror mention any other concerns. `The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconductlike the ultimate decision to retain or discharge a jurorrests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.]' ( People v. Cleveland (2001) 25 Cal.4th 466, 478 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 313, 21 P.3d 1225].) Moreover, trial courts should use caution when making inquiries because of the need to protect the sanctity and secrecy of jury deliberations. ( Id. at p. 475.) In light of the juror's failure to raise concerns about anything taking place during jury deliberations, the court did not abuse its discretion when it chose not to conduct a broader inquiry. Third and finally, the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined defendant's request that it reinstruct the entire jury with CALJIC No. 8.88. The jury had already been so instructed and nothing suggests the trial court needed to do so again. The jury had already reached a verdict. Nothing in Juror No. 20's note nor in his answers during the court's inquiry called the validity of the verdict into question. Accordingly, the court's decision not to reinstruct the jury was not error.
Defendant claims Juror No. 20 committed prejudicial misconduct during the penalty phase deliberations and that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. Defendant further contends that reversal of both his conviction and penalty is required under state law and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. We disagree. On December 6, 1996, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging Juror No. 20 had committed misconduct. Exhibit A to the motion was a November 26, 1996 declaration, signed by Juror No. 20 under penalty of perjury, in which he stated that, In 1993 or 1994, I was arrested for my role in a bar fight. I spent two days in jail. The charges were eventually dropped. That experience was very difficult for me. Exhibit B to the motion was the juror's May 8, 1996 voir dire questionnaire, also signed under penalty of perjury, in which he stated that he had never been arrested. Defendant argued Juror No. 20 had committed prejudicial misconduct by lying during voir dire. At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel indicated that a number of jurors indicated Juror No. 20 had said during deliberations that he had previously been arrested. Defense counsel asked the prosecutor to check whether the juror had any criminal arrests. The prosecutor opposed the request, unsure that he had the authority to obtain the juror's arrest record and provide it to the defense. Moreover, the prosecutor argued that, even assuming the juror had committed misconduct, defendant had not established any prejudice. The trial court concluded further inquiry was warranted. At subsequent hearings, both the prosecution and defense indicated they had inquired with several law enforcement agencies, but had been unable to locate any booking records for Juror No. 20. Defense counsel indicated that several jurors remembered Juror No. 20 talking about having been arrested. Juror No. 20 had also allegedly expressed how horrible jail was. Defense counsel argued that one could infer from such a statement either that the juror was advocating a life sentence verdict or that it's a lot easier to sentence somebody to death if you think jail is so bad anyway. Defense counsel also acknowledged that it was alternatively possible that the juror made up a story in deliberations then lied on a declaration. The prosecutor indicated that we have received some information that in fact the juror may not have been arrested in the sense of the word that we would consider an arrest. It was decided that the prosecutor would obtain a declaration from Juror No. 20 addressing the apparent inconsistencies. At the next hearing on the matter, the court discussed Juror No. 20's most recent declaration, obtained by the prosecution. The court noted that the juror's declaration appears to suggest that he was not arrested, that he was detained, and he believes it might have beenit was with private security guards who detained him in an office, and it might have been overnight. The court noted that the most recent declaration conflicted both with his previous declaration and with the recollection of the other jurors who clearly remembered Juror No. 20 mentioning jail. In light of counsel's inability to verify that the juror had been arrested and of the new declaration, the court concluded Juror No. 20 did not lie on his juror questionnaire, but did lie to the other jurors when he told them he had spent time in jail and it was a horrible experience. Addressing whether defendant had suffered any prejudice, the court said its initial take on it is [Juror No. 20] exaggerated his experience for attention getting. Defense counsel was concerned about exactly what Juror No. 20 said to the other jurors and indicated that Juror No. 20's behavior possibly indicated something about his state of mind. It was agreed that the court would have the juror come in and the court would further inquire. At the next hearing, the court questioned Juror No. 20 at length under oath. In addition to inquiring about the alleged incident, the court asked what Juror No. 20 had said to other jurors during deliberations regarding his experience and Juror No. 20 responded that he had, on two occasions, told a juror in the presence of other jurors, have you ever been in jail, it's a very difficultit was for me when I was there. The court took a brief break to allow counsel to propose any additional questions. Upon resumption of the examination, the court asked additional questions about the alleged incident with the security guards. At the conclusion of the hearing, after considering the evidence and hearing argument from both counsel, the court found that the juror did not lie on his juror questionnaire, but that he did lie when he told jurors he had been arrested and been in jail. The court further found that the juror had made only a brief mention of the alleged experience and did not have a conversation about it. The court found that the juror had not been truthful when he signed either of the posttrial declarations. The court concluded that the juror committed misconduct when he made a false statement during deliberations. The court further concluded, however, that there was no evidence of prejudice. In addition to the statement being brief, the court explained that jail is commonly known by the public to be a bad place. The court also noted that jail is portrayed as awful in popular media and that the defense had introduced testimony in the penalty phase about the difficulties of life in jail. The court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. (17) Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. We disagree. At the outset, we note that the trial court found that the juror did not lie on his juror questionnaire and we accept that factual determination, as it is supported by substantial evidence, including the lack of any records indicating defendant had been arrested. ( People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 520 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 101 P.3d 478].) As for the juror's posttrial declarations, the court found that the juror had lied in them. However, a juror's postverdict lying to cover up misconduct, although certainly improper, does not show bias during the trial, deliberations, and verdict.  ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985].) Accordingly, only the juror's comments during deliberation constitute potentially prejudicial misconduct. While the court concluded these comments constituted misconduct, it nonetheless decided defendant had not established prejudice. Misconduct by a juror raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. ( People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 302 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249].) However, we will set aside a verdict only where there is a substantial likelihood of juror bias. ( Id. at p. 303.) We will find such bias if the misconduct is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the jury. ( Ibid. ) Alternatively, even if the misconduct is not inherently prejudicial, we will nonetheless find such bias if, after a review of the totality of the circumstances, a substantial likelihood of bias arose. ( Ibid. ) While the existence of prejudice is a mixed question of law and fact subject to this court's independent determination, we accept a trial court's credibility determinations and factual findings when they are supported by substantial evidence. ( Id. at pp. 303-304.) We conclude Juror No. 20's comments did not create a substantial likelihood of juror bias. First, the trial court found Juror No. 20's comments were brief, and its finding was supported by substantial evidence including both the juror's answers to the court's questions as well as the other jurors' declarations. For example, while Juror No. 17 said Juror No. 20 had stated he had spent a very short stay in jail, she indicated she could not recall any specific comments made by Juror No. 20. Similarly, Juror No. 94 told the defense investigator that Juror No. 20 had mentioned only that he had `an experience' in jail and that it was horrible, and that the other jurors did not ask for any details nor did she recall any other information on the subject. In short, as the trial court concluded, Juror No. 20's reference to being in jail was merely a fleeting comment. [18] Second, the trial court concluded that the substance of the juror's brief commentthat jail was scary and horribledid not create a substantial likelihood of juror bias. The court noted that jail is already widely understood to be a bad place to be and that it is portrayed as such in novels, movies, television programs, . . . documentaries. The court also pointed out defense witnesses testified in the penalty phase about unsavory jail conditions. For example, Emedio Sandoval, a convicted child molester, testified that defendant had been attacked by another inmate in jail and also testified about the social hierarchy among inmates. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Juror No. 20's comment that jail was scary and horrible did not create a substantial likelihood of juror bias. Alternatively, defendant also argues the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial because Juror No. 20 was unfit to sit on the jury. Citing the juror's numerous lies, defendant claims something was off with Juror [No.] 20 and that he engaged in bizarre and pathological behavior. Nothing supports this interpretation. To the contrary, the record suggests the juror first lied to his fellow jurors about having been in jail in order to garner attention and then, once the defense investigator approached him about his comments, the juror understood he had committed misconduct and engaged in a series of contradictory explanations in an effort to get out of trouble. Nothing other than mere speculation supports defendant's contention that Juror No. 20 was pathological or otherwise incapable of performing his duty as a juror. ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 975.) The trial court did not err when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial.