Opinion ID: 1163470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of general principles to the present case

Text: As noted above, the ICA purported to apply a common law, albeit ipse dixit, presumption that the person whose property was allegedly damaged would not consent to the violent destruction of the property[.] Pone, slip op. at 2. According to the ICA, until the defendant introduces evidence that... consent was given, the [prosecution] is not required to show ... non-consent. Id. Thus, the ICA concluded that because Pone offered no evidence of consent, [15] the prosecution was not required to prove otherwise. Id. Lack of Townsend's consent to the damage to his front door was a material element of the offense with which Pone was charged. See supra at ___, 892 P.2d at 459. [16] Accordingly, the burden was upon the prosecution to prove the element beyond a reasonable doubt. Cuevas, 53 Haw. at 113, 488 P.2d at 324. As articulated by the ICA, however, the presumption of nonconsent imposed on Pone a burden of persuasion of the nonexistence of an essential element of the crime with which he was charged. See id. at 112-13, 488 P.2d at 324. So construed, the presumption would violate the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 5 of the Hawai`i Constitution by virtue of improperly shifting the burden of proof to Pone. Bumanglag, 63 Haw. at 617-18, 634 P.2d at 94; Pimentel, supra ; Cuevas, 53 Haw. at 114-15, 488 P.2d at 325; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072. The ICA therefore erred in its characterization of the presumption. At most, the proposition that a person whose property was allegedly damaged would not consent to the violent destruction of the property is a permissible inference of fact, which the trier of fact is permitted, but not compelled, to draw from common experience and the evidence as a whole, and which need not eliminate reasonable doubt of guilt. See Pimentel, supra ; Brighter, 61 Haw. at 111-12, 595 P.2d at 1079-80; Dwyer, 57 Haw. at 529-30, 560 P.2d at 112-13; HRE 306(a). Put simply, lack of consent to the violent destruction of a person's property may be proved circumstantially on the basis of logical and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence adduced and common human experience. Batson, 73 Haw. at 245-46, 831 P.2d at 930; Simpson, 64 Haw. at 373 n. 7, 641 P.2d at 326 n. 7; Bright, 64 Haw. at 228, 638 P.2d at 332; O'Daniel, 62 Haw. at 528-29, 616 P.2d at 1391; Murphy, 59 Haw. at 19, 575 P.2d at 460; Emmsley, 3 Haw. App. at 464-65, 652 P.2d at 1153.