Opinion ID: 1258573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: penalty proceeding issues

Text: Defendant raises several issues by assignment of error and argument in his brief concerning the prosecution's closing argument at the penalty proceeding on 16 February 2006. Defendant first contends that the prosecution misrepresented the law with regard to mitigating circumstances. The prosecutor suggested more than once during closing argument that mitigating evidence would have to lessen the severity of this crime. However, defense counsel failed to object to any of these remarks at trial. Thus, we review the remarks for whether they were so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.  State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 358, 572 S.E.2d 108, 135 (2002) (citing State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 120 S.Ct. 95, 145 L.Ed.2d 80 (1999)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 123 S.Ct. 2087, 155 L.Ed.2d 1074 (2003). As with defendant's similar assignment of error concerning prosecutorial remarks made during jury selection, we find that the prosecutor's remarks at closing argument were shorthand summaries of the definition[] of. . . mitigating circumstances and were substantially correct, even if slightly slanted toward the State's perspective. Frye, 341 N.C. at 491, 461 S.E.2d at 674. Because these remarks were at least substantially correct, it does not stand to reason that they were in any way grossly improper. Id. These assignments of error are overruled. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the following portion of the prosecution's closing argument: You also saw Dr. [Steve] Kramer sitting in the front row, somebody on the State's witness list. Defense may make  make a comment about why didn't the State call Dr. Kramer? Well, what is the net effect of zero? Zero. The cumulative effect of zero is zero. You want more testimony to tell you that this defendant is not schizophrenic? [4] We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court's decision to overrule defendant's timely objection. State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 606, 652 S.E.2d 216, 229 (2007) (citing State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1682, 170 L.Ed.2d 377 (2008). Under this standard, we apply a two-part analysis: `[T]his Court first determines if the remarks were improper. . . . Next, we determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been excluded by the trial court.' Id. at 606-07, 652 S.E.2d at 229 (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106 (alterations in original)). Defendant asserts that the jury was erroneously permitted to infer from the prosecutor's line of argument that Dr. Kramer's testimony would have been favorable to the State had he been called as a witness and qualified as a mental health expert. However, the only aspect of Dr. Kramer's potential testimony that was even conceivably suggested by the State's closing argument was an assessment, with which defendant's own mental health expert witness concurred, that defendant was not schizophrenic. Even assuming, arguendo, the impropriety of the prosecutor's reference to Dr. Kramer, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant's objection to these remarks. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled. Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's failure to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecution's closing argument when the prosecutor implored jurors to find the inner strength to carry out justice. Since defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, we must determine whether these remarks were `so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu. ' State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 101, 588 S.E.2d 344, 364 (quoting Barden, 356 N.C. at 358, 572 S.E.2d at 135), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971, 124 S.Ct. 442, 157 L.Ed.2d 320 (2003). Defendant provides no authority or legal analysis to demonstrate that the language find the inner strength to carry out justice was in any way grossly improper. Defendant argues instead that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's questions during jury selection concerning jurors' intestinal fortitude to vote for the death penalty and the prosecutor's repeated remarks at closing argument imploring jurors to find the inner strength to carry out justice was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new sentencing hearing. Relatedly, defendant asserts that the prosecutor's question during jury selection concerning whether prospective jurors possessed the intestinal fortitude to vote for the death penalty was recalled in the minds of the jurors at closing argument when the prosecutor stated, We asked you in jury selection if you were strong enough to do this. As set forth above, we can discern no prejudicial error in the trial court's decision to allow the prosecutor's inquiry into the intestinal fortitude of prospective jurors to vote for a sentence of death. Absent any further analysis from defendant specifically addressing the prosecutor's remarks at closing argument, we are unable to hold that these remarks rose to the level of gross impropriety. Moreover, defendant has not carried his burden under the Strickland test with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he sets forth related to this issue. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (requiring a defendant to show both that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result). Accordingly, defendant's assignments of error are overruled. Defendant contends that the following portion of the prosecution's closing argument prompted the jury to consider defendant's evidence in mitigation as evidence in support of an aggravating circumstance instead: Consider whether [defendant] has shown signs in his childhood of emotional disturbance as evidenced by prolonged crying spells or periods of staring at nothing or unwillingness to engage with other children or inability to tolerate being touched. He had temper tantrums when he was a toddler. He had a bad temper. He would throw fits when he didn't get what he wanted, I believe, was the testimony. Perhaps his personality for murder was already formed. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objection to this argument. Thus, we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and therefore, whether its ruling could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Peterson, 361 N.C. at 606, 652 S.E.2d at 229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106). Specifically, defendant characterizes the statement, Perhaps his personality for murder was already formed, as an invitation to jurors to vote for a sentence of death because of the mitigating evidence he presented at the penalty proceeding. However, it is well established that `statements contained in closing arguments to the jury are not to be placed in isolation or taken out of context on appeal.' See State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 110, 604 S.E.2d 850, 873 (2004) (quoting State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 115 S.Ct. 642, 130 L.Ed.2d 547 (1994)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830, 126 S.Ct. 48, 163 L.Ed.2d 80 (2005). The prosecutor's line of argument from which the challenged remarks have been extracted can be traced back for seven pages of transcript and continues on for approximately eleven pages for a total of eighteen transcript pages. This line of argument served the prosecutor's purpose of calling into question the weight jurors ought to assign to each individual item of defendant's mitigating evidence. At one point, the prosecutor stated to the jury that defendant would hurl grapes around the courtroom in the form of mitigating circumstances [a]nd even though there are 41 of them, when you put 41 grapes on a scale with four watermelons, we know that it's not going to weigh more than four watermelons. Viewed in this context, it is readily apparent that the prosecutor was not in any way suggesting defendant had formed a personality for murder as a toddler, but rather was using a skeptical tone to advocate the opposite conclusion: That, in the prosecutor's view, defendant's early temper tantrums should not be significant factors in jurors' consideration of defendant's mitigating evidence. For this reason, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection to this argument; therefore, this assignment of error is overruled. Finally, defendant contends that prosecutors expressed their personal desires, opinions, or beliefs during closing argument when advocating that the jury return a binding recommendation of death and that these remarks were grossly improper. Specifically, defendant assigns error to the following: [T]here are going to be four questions. I want you to answer yes, yes to every one of them, and then I want you to write  I want your foreperson to write on that last line death, because I want you to do justice, I want you to give a punishment that is appropriate for the crime. Additionally, the prosecution encouraged the jury to answer those questions yes, yes, yes, and yes. The recommendation in this case is death. Because defendant did not object when these remarks were made, we review them for whether they were `so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu. ' Walters, 357 N.C. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting Barden, 356 N.C. at 358, 572 S.E.2d at 135). Defendant cites this Court's decision in Jones to support his assertion that the prosecutor's argument was grossly improper. See 355 N.C. at 135, 558 S.E.2d at 108 (stating that closing argument must be devoid of counsel's personal opinion); see also N.C.G.S. § 15A-1230(a) (2007) (stating that during closing argument to the jury an attorney may not . . . express his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant); N.C. St. B.R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(e), 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 759, 848-49 (stating that [a] lawyer shall not . . . in trial . . . state a personal opinion as to the justness of the cause). In Jones, this Court vacated the defendant's death sentence and awarded a new sentencing hearing after holding that the trial court abused its discretion by affording the prosecution undue latitude in its closing arguments at sentencing. 355 N.C. at 135, 558 S.E.2d at 109. Two distinct sets of remarks were found by the Court in Jones to exceed the bounds of permissible argument. First, the prosecutor had been permitted, over the defendant's objection, to state the following: [PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, judge. The United States of America, a great country, indeed around the world for its freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of privacy in your own home. But with those freedoms comes individual responsibility that every citizen of this country must realize; that to have these freedoms, one is responsible for their own conduct; one is responsible for their own behavior. A year ago the Columbine shootings; five years ago Oklahoma City bombings. When this nation faces such tragedy [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Overruled. [PROSECUTOR]:  the laws of this country come in to bring order to that tragedy, to speak to that tragedy. Here we are addressing a tragedy of a man's life. The tragedy not of this defendant, the tragedy of [the victim]. . . . Id. at 132 n. 2, 558 S.E.2d at 107 n. 2. Second, the trial court did not intervene ex mero motu to prevent the prosecutor from describing the defendant as a quitter, a loser, worthless, as mean as they come, and lower than the dirt on a snake's belly. Id. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107. In sharp contrast with Jones, the case at bar presents this Court with a closing argument well within the wide latitude of what is permissible, as the prosecutor merely sought to fulfill the well-recognized duty to advocate zealously that the facts in evidence warrant imposition of the death penalty. Williams, 350 N.C. at 25, 510 S.E.2d at 642 (citing State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 334, 480 S.E.2d 626, 633, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 118 S.Ct. 196, 139 L.Ed.2d 134 (1997)). Thus, the prosecutor was advocating the State's position as to the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form rather than expressing a personal opinion or desire that defendant be sentenced to death. Defendant's argument is without merit, and consequently, his related assignments of error are overruled.
Defendant contends that the trial court gave an incorrect definition of mitigating circumstances in its final charge to the jury at the close of the penalty proceeding. He challenges the following portion of the trial court's final charge to the jury at the conclusion of the penalty proceeding, although no timely objection was raised at the charge conference or made contemporaneously with the instructions: A mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of facts which do not  which do not constitute a justification or excuse for a killing or reduce it to a lesser degree of crime than first degree murder, but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability of the killing or as making it less deserving of the extreme punishment than other first degree murders. Our law identifies several possible mitigating circumstances; however, in considering issue two, it is your duty  it would be your duty to consider as a mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant's character or record or any circumstances of this murder that the defendant contends is a basis for a sentence less than death and to consider any other circumstances arising from the evidence which you deem to have mitigating value. Because defendant did not object to the trial court's jury instructions, this assignment of error was not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Hardy, 353 N.C. 122, 131, 540 S.E.2d 334, 342 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840, 122 S.Ct. 96, 151 L.Ed.2d 56 (2001). Alternatively, defendant asserts plain error; however, this Court has repeatedly upheld virtually identical instructions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 32-34, 510 S.E.2d 626, 647, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880, 120 S.Ct. 193, 145 L.Ed.2d 162 (1999); State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 564, 476 S.E.2d 658, 669-70 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1147, 117 S.Ct. 1321, 137 L.Ed.2d 483 (1997); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 52-53, 446 S.E.2d 252, 280-81 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 115 S.Ct. 953, 130 L.Ed.2d 895 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2002, as recognized in State v. Price, 337 N.C. 756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994). Thus, there was no error in the trial court's instructions, plain or otherwise. Accordingly, defendant's assignment of error is overruled.
Although the trial court properly submitted and instructed the jury on the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not object to a number of questions asked by the prosecution and the trial court during jury selection concerning prospective jurors' sympathy for defendant on account of his age. Further, defendant contends that these questions were prejudicial because they prevented the jury from considering the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, defendant's age at the time of the murder, in its sentencing deliberations. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (2007). Among other questions cited by defendant, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors whether they would be sympathetic to this defendant because of his age; whether they agreed that the law must apply the same to everyone regardless of their age, sex, and race; and whether they agreed that a decision based upon somebody's age, race, or sex would be unlawful. At one point during the State's jury voir dire questioning, the trial court interjected and asked prospective jurors whether they understood that deciding this case based on a person's age, race, religion, or sex would be morally wrong in addition to being unlawful. The prosecutor thereafter characterized basing [a] decision on sex, age, or race as both unlawful and immoral when questioning prospective jurors. This Court has long recognized the two components of a defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as set forth in Strickland v. Washington. State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 623, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007) (citations omitted); State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 690, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30 (2005) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 126 S.Ct. 1773, 164 L.Ed.2d 523 (2006). First, defendant must demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was deficient, such that the errors committed were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, defendant is required to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel's deficient performance, which requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. This Court has previously held that a prosecutor may `inquir[e] into the sympathies of prospective jurors in the exercise of [the State's] right to secure an unbiased jury.' See State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 170-71, 513 S.E.2d 296, 308, (quoting State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 15, 372 S.E.2d 12, 19 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 973, 120 S.Ct. 417, 145 L.Ed.2d 326 (1999). Defendant contends that the questions asked of prospective jurors by the State and the trial court in the present case were not permissible inquiries into the bias of prospective jurors. Instead, in effect defendant argues that these were hypothetical questions involving the existence of a mitigating circumstance and thus, impermissible because they were designed to elicit in advance what the juror's decision will be under a certain state of the evidence or upon a given state of facts. See id. at 170, 513 S.E.2d at 307 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is far from clear that the questions asked by the prosecutor and the trial court were directed toward the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance of defendant's age rather than toward any bias which may have affected prospective jurors during the guilt phase of the trial because of defendant's age. Regardless, we are not persuaded that the performance of defendant's trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as is required to show that counsel's performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Indeed, as defendant acknowledges, his trial counsel made repeated references to defendant's youth throughout the penalty proceeding and stated the following in closing argument: The defendant's age at the time of the crime was a mitigating factor. He was twenty-four. He had not finished college. The State wants you to believe he had apartments and lived with women, but what was he doing? He was living in somebody's dorm room. He had lived with various people that kicked him out. And I would contend that that's not evidence that he had established some home and was living through life as a mature person. And I think you can consider his age. That is a statutory mitigating factor. He was young. Moreover, as the trial court submitted the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance and did not err in its instructions to the jury on this mitigator, there is nothing in the trial transcript and record to support a conclusion that defendant's trial counsel did not act reasonably to ensure the jury fully considered defendant's age as a mitigator in its sentencing deliberations. Because it would have been reasonable for trial counsel to interpret the questions asked of prospective jurors concerning defendant's age as permissible inquiries into potential bias, and because counsel sufficiently advocated during the penalty proceeding that the jury find the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated the first component of his ineffective assistance of counsel claimthat counsel's performance was deficient. Consequently, defendant's claim is without merit, and his related assignments of error are overruled.
Defendant asserts plain error and a violation of his rights to due process in the following instruction given by the trial court concerning the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance  whether the murder was committed for pecuniary gain: A murder is committed for pecuniary gain if the defendant, when he commits it, has obtained or intends or expects to obtain money or some other thing, in this case the victim's automobile, which can be valued in money, either as compensation for committing it or as a result of the death of the victim. If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that when the defendant killed the victim, the defendant took or intended to take the victim's automobile, then you would find this aggravating circumstance and would so indicate by having your foreperson write yes in the space after this aggravating circumstance on the issues and recommendation form. (Emphasis added.) See N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (2007). The jury subsequently found the (e)(6) aggravator to exist. Defendant contends that the italicized portion of the above instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving that the murder was committed for the purpose of pecuniary gain and of thereby showing that the taking was [not] a mere act of opportunism committed after a murder was perpetrated for another reason. See State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 54, 591 S.E.2d 521, 530 (2004). However, this Court has rejected several previous challenges to virtually identical instructions. See Barden, 356 N.C. at 383, 572 S.E.2d at 149-50 (citing, inter alia, State v. Davis, 353 N.C. 1, 35-37, 539 S.E.2d 243, 266-67 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 839, 122 S.Ct. 95, 151 L.Ed.2d 55 (2001)). In the instant case, as was true in the cases cited above, the trial court sufficiently informed the jury regarding the circumstances which would support a finding of some causal connection between the murder and the pecuniary gain at the time the killing occur[red], Maske, 358 N.C. at 54, 591 S.E.2d at 530 (citations omitted), with its instructions that the pecuniary gain must have been [obtained] as compensation for committing [the murder] or [intended or expected] as a result of the death of the victim. Thus, defendant has failed to demonstrate any error in these instructions, much less plain error. Defendant's assignment of error is overruled, as it is without merit. Alternatively, defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective, depriving defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel, by failing to note a timely objection to the trial court's instructions on the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance. [5] Since we have found no error in the challenged instructions, defendant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and his claim is without merit as a result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, defendant's assignment of error is overruled.