Opinion ID: 874086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Idaho Code Section 39-1392b Apply to This Case?

Text: A peer review privilege is created by Idaho Code section 39-1392b, which provides: Except as provided in section 39-1392e, Idaho Code, all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged, and shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto be admitted in evidence, or in any action of any kind in any court or before any administrative body, agency or person for any purpose whatsoever.... It is undisputed that the records sought by Plaintiffs are peer review records. The statute states that all peer review records shall be confidential and privileged. It further provides that such records shall not be directly or indirectly subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings or be admitted as evidence, nor shall testimony relating thereto be admitted in evidence. The privilege applies in any action of any kind in any court. Thus, by its terms, the statute applies to this litigation. Plaintiffs contend that Hospital is a business; that it developed an in-house entity named the Spine Medicine Institute of Idaho, which competes with Plaintiffs; that Hospital's actions in denying Physician privileges were motivated by the desire to remove him as a competitor; and that for public policy reasons the statute therefore should not apply. The statute does not create an exception for this type of litigation, and we cannot create such an exception under the rubric of public policy. The creation of such an exception is an issue within the province of the legislature. The act creating the peer review privilege, I.C. §§ 39-1392 through 39-1392e, was enacted in 1973. Plaintiffs contend that the statement of purpose accompanying that legislation indicates that it was intended to apply only to medical malpractice actions. The statement of purpose was not enacted into law. The statutes were. There is no wording in section 39-1392b that limits its scope to peer review records sought in a medical malpractice action. In that respect, the legislation is unambiguous. The asserted purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning. The scope of the legislation can be broader than the primary purpose for enacting it. Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 191-92, 233 P.3d 118, 122-23 (2010). If the statute as written is socially or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not judicial. In re Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations omitted). We have consistently held that where statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993). Plaintiffs also contend that wording in subsections (a) through (e) of Idaho Code section 39-1392e indicate that the peer review statutes were intended only to apply to medical malpractice actions. Those subsections specifically apply in medical malpractice actions. [1] Subsection (f) clearly is not limited to medical malpractice actions. For example, it applies to any physician ... whose conduct ... is the subject of investigation... in the course of ... disciplinary proceeding or investigation of the sort contemplated by this act, [who] makes claim or brings suit on account of such health care organization activity. I.C. § 39-1392e(f). Likewise, section 39-1392b, which creates the peer review privilege, is not, by its terms, limited to medical malpractice actions. The fact that a portion of a statute has a restricted application does not similarly restrict the entire act of which that portion was a part.