Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Firearm-use Enhancement for Rape

Text: In addition to the death penalty, defendant was sentenced to serve the upper term of eight years for each of his two convictions for forcibly raping L.R. (§261, subd. (a)(2)), plus an enhancement term of four years each for his use of a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). He contends both enhancements must be vacated for lack of sufficient evidence he used a firearm in connection with the rapes. We disagree. The standard of appellate review for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is settled. `On appeal we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738]; see also Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317-320 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781].)' ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 504.) Whether a defendant used a firearm in the commission of an enumerated offense is for the trier of fact to decide. ( People v. Masbruch (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1001, 1007 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705].) We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support an enhancement using the same standard we apply to a conviction. ( People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1382 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596].) Thus, we presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence. ( People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1058 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 768].) (14) Proof of firearm use during a felony does not require a showing the defendant ever fired a weapon. Although the use of a firearm connotes something more than a bare potential for use, there need not be conduct which actually produces harm but only conduct which produces a fear of harm or force by means or display of a firearm in aiding the commission of one of the specified felonies. `Use' means, among other things, `to carry out a purpose or action by means of,' to `make instrumental to an end or process,' and to `apply to advantage.' (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961).) The obvious legislative intent to deter the use of firearms in the commission of the specified felonies requires that `uses' be broadly construed. ( People v. Chambers (1972) 7 Cal.3d 666, 672 [102 Cal.Rptr. 776, 498 P.2d 1024], italics added.) Thus when a defendant deliberately shows a gun, or otherwise makes its presence known, and there is no evidence to suggest any purpose other than intimidating the victim (or others) so as to successfully complete the underlying offense, the jury is entitled to find a facilitative use rather than an incidental or inadvertent exposure. The defense may freely urge the jury not to draw such an inference, but a failure to actually point the gun, or to issue explicit threats of harm, does not entitle the defendant to a judicial exemption from section 12022.5[, subdivision] (a). ( People v. Granado (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 317, 325 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 636]; see People v. Carrasco, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) Nor must the firearm use be strictly contemporaneous with the base felony. In considering whether a gun use occurred, the jury may consider a `video' of the entire encounter; it is not limited to a `snapshot' of the moments immediately preceding a sex offense. Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude that although defendant's presence with the victims was sporadic, the control and fear created by his initial firearm display continued throughout the encounter. ( People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1011.) Accordingly, defendant's jury was instructed that [a] gun need not be continually displayed during the course of a crime in order for it to be personally used within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5, [s]ubdivision (a). Masbruch is applicable here. Defendant kidnapped L.R. and her family at gunpoint and threatened that if they did not comply with his commands, he would not hesitate to blow you and your kids away. L.R. was afraid for herself, her boyfriend and her three children, because defendant had a gun. At defendant's house, she heard a gunshot when defendant shot Uwe Durbin in the knee, establishing that defendant's threats were not idle ones. When her boyfriend Michael Durbin protested, she heard defendant tell him to [s]it down or you're next. Defendant told her his gun contained 16 or 17 bullets. Although the gun was passed around among the codefendants, defendant apparently retained control and access to it, at one point brandishing it. When defendant first raped L.R., in the park, he told her Michael would live if he cooperated, but that Uwe was going to be killed. When he instructed her to take down her pants, she kept telling him [she] didn't want to die. The second rape occurred in the house where defendant and his confederates were using the gun to hold L.R. and her family. Under these circumstances, the entire video of the lengthy criminal encounter between defendant and L.R., beginning with his initial display of the firearm to terrorize her and her family, his threats to use the gun on all of them, and his actual use of it to injure Uwe, are sufficient to prove he used the firearm when he raped L.R. on both occasions. Defendant argues there was no evidence that at the actual time of either rape he was in actual possession of the gun, but this compartmentalization of the ongoing criminal event improperly attempts to take a snapshot of the crime. ( People v. Masbruch, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1011.) He contends Masbruch is distinguishable because, in that case, the defendant used a firearm, bound the two victims, committed other crimes in the house, and then committed sex acts against the victims. This scenario, defendant claims, is qualitatively different from the present case where the gun was shared by other people in a location different from the place where the rapes were committed. We agree the fact situation here, where the sex crimes occurred in a location remote from the weapon, is different from that posed in Masbruch, but we disagree the jury must necessarily reach a different result. Because there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the control and fear created by [defendant's] initial firearm display continued throughout the encounter ( Masbruch, at p. 1011), we conclude substantial evidence supports the two section 12022.5 firearm enhancements.