Opinion ID: 815390
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Direct Evidence Standard

Text: Hilti does not dispute that Mr. Teel made the alleged comments during the interview, but it insists they are “innocuous and non-discriminatory.” Aplee. Br. at 12. Hilti points to our decisions in Ramsey and Heim v. State of Utah, 8 F.3d 1541 (10th Cir. 1993). In these cases, we emphasized that “stray remarks in the workplace” based on sex stereotypes do not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Heim, 8 F.3d at 1547 (quotations omitted). “The plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on . . . gender in making its decision.” Id. (quotations omitted). But none of Hilti’s cited cases involve statements by a decisionmaker during an interview expressing discriminatory beliefs about whether members of the plaintiff’s protected class are capable of doing the job at issue. We have previously emphasized the importance of context and temporal proximity in determining whether comments reflecting personal bias qualify as direct evidence of discrimination. Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1118. Here, Mr. Teel explicitly stated a view that women have inferior knowledge of tools and inferior ability to sell tools. These statements spoke directly to central requirements of the job for which Ms. Tabor was interviewing, and he made them during a discussion about her fitness for the position. The content of his statements, the -14- interview context, and the temporal proximity to the adverse employment decision directly link the discriminatory statements to his decision not to promote Ms. Tabor.5 Given these circumstances, Mr. Teel’s remarks may be considered direct evidence of discrimination.