Opinion ID: 2827389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Warrant Search of the Store

Text: Long challenges Officer Spargur’s subsequent search of the OC Store claiming the telephonic warrant did not conform with tribal and federal law because, among other things, the warrant itself was never read to Judge Miner and the telephone conversation was not recorded. The district court refused to suppress evidence obtained during the post-warrant search of the store however, concluding the goodfaith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), protected Officer Spargur’s actions. We review the application of the good-faith exception de novo. See United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 2015). Assuming, without deciding, the warrant was deficient, we agree with the district court that the Leon good-faith exception applies. Under the good-faith exception, evidence is not excluded “‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,’ even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated.” Cannon, 703 F.3d at 412 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920). We have recognized four circumstances that preclude a finding of good faith: “(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant; (3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.” -10- Id. (quoting United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011)). In evaluating a search under Leon, we “must look at the objectively ascertainable question of whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite a judge’s issuance of the warrant.” Jackson, 784 F.3d at 1231. Long first claims Judge Miner’s personal biases led her to “wholly abandon[] her judicial role.” In addition to being a tribal judge, Judge Miner was also a member of a tribal judicial committee involved in promoting legislation that criminalized synthetic marijuana on the reservation. Judge Miner also routinely included as a condition of release for arrestees released on bond, “Defendant shall not enter OC Novelties or any other business where synthetic marijuana or synthetic stimulants are sold, offered for sale or possessed.” Long thus claims Judge Miner was not a neutral magistrate because she had “actively lobbied” for the passage of the resolution outlawing synthetic marijuana and had already made “the determination that the OC Store was selling synthetic drugs.” We have explained that a judge abandons her judicial role when she “does not serve as a neutral and detached actor, but rather as a ‘rubber stamp for the police’ and ‘an adjunct law enforcement officer.’” United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914). Judge Miner testified at length about her role on the judicial committee and her prior knowledge of Long and the OC Store. Based on this testimony, the district court concluded Judge Miner was not a strident proponent of synthetic marijuana prosecution, nor was she biased against Long. The district court also credited Judge Miner’s testimony, finding “she issued the warrant solely on the information contained in the affidavit and not on a preconceived notion of Long’s guilt,” and we will not disturb that credibility finding. See United States v. Robbins, 682 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining “‘credibility findings are -11- well-nigh unreviewable’” on appeal (quoting United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 2001))). We further agree with the district court that Judge Miner’s knowledge of and involvement in the small tribal community is not the type of conduct that constitutes abandoning her role as a neutral and detached magistrate. See United States v. Heffington, 952 F.2d 275, 279 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing “to disqualify small-town judges on demand” merely because “judges and police officers in rural counties often know more about the local criminal recidivists [than do] their more urban colleagues”); see also, e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 361 F.3d 1075, 1084 (8th Cir. 2004) (declaring a judge abandons her neutral role when she is so involved in the issuance of a search warrant she “essentially becom[es] a police officer in a robe”). Long also asserts Judge Miner “wholly abandoned her judicial role” by failing to have Officer Spargur read her the full text of the search warrant. Assuming the warrant was not read, this failure does not suggest Judge Miner “acted as a rubber stamp” for law enforcement. United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that a judge abandoned his judicial role because the judge did not read the warrant and “failed to note both that the prosecutor had not signed the warrant and that the warrant did not list the property to be seized” (footnote omitted)). Here, Officer Spargur read Judge Miner the application and affidavit—portions of which are reproduced in the warrant itself—and Judge Miner testified she would have questioned Officer Spargur if the information he provided was not sufficient. Long does not dispute that Judge Miner was given enough information to establish probable cause to search, nor does he contend Judge Miner or Officer Spargur acted in bad faith. Under these circumstances, any failure to have Officer Spargur read the full text of the warrant was not a departure from Judge Miner’s neutral judicial role. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is -12- designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”). Finally, Long asserts Leon’s good-faith exception does not apply because the procedure used to obtain the warrant was so deficient no reasonable officer would have relied on the warrant. Officer Spargur read Judge Miner the application and “the meat” of the affidavit verbatim, giving Judge Miner enough information to establish probable cause to search, and at the end of the long conversation Judge Miner approved the warrant. Officer Spargur was reasonable in believing the warrant was valid. See United States v. Stonerook, 134 F. App’x 982, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained through a telephonic warrant and rejecting the defendant’s claim “that no reasonable police officer could have relied in good faith on the validity of [a] search warrant” issued in violation of state “law regarding telephonic search warrants”); United States v. Hessman, 369 F.3d 1016, 1018, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying the good-faith exception to a technically deficient warrant obtained by fax); United States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 548, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic warrant that had not met all requirements).