Opinion ID: 775822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Penalty-Phase Claim

Text: 77 During the penalty phase, Petitioner requested that the court give an instruction concerning the jurors' sentencing responsibilities. That instruction -special instruction 60 --contained a typographical error. As written, the instruction read: 78 If you have a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict fixing the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of parole. 79 (Emphasis added.) The emphasized word in the instruction should have been without -not with; life without parole and death are the only two sentences that California law authorized for aggravated murder under special circumstances. The trial court read the instruction, including the error, to counsel, during discussions about the penalty-phase instructions. Unfortunately, neither counsel nor the court noticed the mistake. 3 80 The court agreed to give special instruction 60. When reading that instruction aloud to the jury, the court corrected the mistake, apparently unconsciously, stating: 81 If you have a reasonable doubt as to which penalty to impose, death or life in prison without the possibility of parole, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and return a verdict, fixing the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of --without the possibility of parole. 82 (Emphasis added.) Unfortunately, the court did not correct the written instruction before submitting it to the jury for their use during deliberations. 83 After deliberating for a time, the jury sent the trial court a written inquiry: In the event this jury cannot decide 100% on the penalty phase of this case what would be the sentence imposed? Please explain noted page of instructions[special instruction 60]. 84 The court asked that the jury be brought in, and the following colloquy took place between the court and the jury foreman, in the presence of the rest of the jury panel: 85 THE COURT: Mr. Lewis, the Court has been in receipt of your question -or questions. 86 And before I respond to the questions, I have discussed them with counsel as well. 87 Without telling me exactly how the jury stands one way or the other, can you give me some idea or give us an idea about the numerical count, how might it stand? Seven/five, six/six, four/eight? 88 JUROR LEWIS: Approximately ten to two, Your Honor. 89 THE COURT: Do you feel as though if I allow you to continue to deliberate, you might be able to reach a decision in the matter? 90 JUROR LEWIS: I think there's a possibility, Your Honor. 91 THE COURT: I'm going to let you do that. The statutes provide for what happens in the event that you folks aren't able to reach a decision, but I can't tell you what that is at this point in time. 92 So that's the answer to your first question. I am unable to tell you. 93 The answer to the second question is that I feel as though the instruction itself is self-explanatory. And we would hope with that in mind, that you might be able to reach a decision. 94 I suggest that you take as long as you might want to take. Don't rush. Please, do not rush, all right? 95 JUROR LEWIS: Thank you, Your Honor. 96 THE COURT: You are welcome. 97 After that colloquy, the jury resumed its deliberations and eventually returned a sentence of death. The mistake in special instruction 60 was not discovered until after the jury's verdict was received. When the error was discovered, Petitioner moved to set aside the verdict. The trial court denied the motion. 98 The penalty-phase jury instructions repeatedly stated that the only possible sentences that the jury could impose were death or life without parole. For example, the jury was instructed: 99 It is the law of this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstance charged in this case has been specially found to be true. The jury also was instructed: 100 You are instructed that life without parole, that verdict, means exactly what it says. That the defendant shall be imprisoned for the rest of his life. 101 And when reading the instructions to the jury, the trial court began by informing the jury that it could have written copies of the instructions if it wished but, 102 [i]n the event there are any delineations or modifications, you are not to take that into considers[sic]. You are only to take the text as read to you as follows. 103 Finally, the jury was given only two verdict forms, one for the verdict of death, and one for the verdict of life without parole. 104 On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the erroneous instruction clearly confused the jurors and led them to believe that, if they could not unanimously agree on a verdict, then Petitioner would receive life with the possibility of parole. The California Supreme Court rejected that argument. Morris, 807 P.2d at 998. In rejecting the argument, the court concluded that (1) the jury had merely asked for a general explanation of special instruction 60, and there was no way to know whether they were confused by the typographical error or by some other aspect of the instruction, id. at 996; (2) Petitioner's interpretation of the mistyped instruction was physically impossible because the jury was not given a life with parole verdict form, id.; (3) Petitioner's interpretation was logically inconsistent because the jury repeatedly had been informed that the only possible verdicts were death and life without parole, id. at 997-98; and (4) the error was only in the typewritten copy of the instructions, and the jury was instructed that the text of the instruction as read controlled over any delineations or modifications in the typewritten instruction, id. at 997. 105 Justices Mosk and Broussard dissented separately. Justice Broussard's dissent contains a long discussion of this claim, which includes the following observation: 106 [T]he majority fail to see the potential connection between the erroneous instruction and the jury's simultaneous inquiry with regard to the consequences of a jury deadlock. The jury did not need to interpret the special instruction literally in order to prejudice [Petitioner]. As noted, the jurors were obviously concerned about the effect of a deadlock on [Petitioner's] future; one or more jurors may have feared, in light of the erroneous instruction, that if the jury was unable to arrive at a unanimous decision the court might be required, by the unspecified statute to which the court referred, to sentence [Petitioner] to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In my view, this is a plausible, perhaps even a likely, explanation of why the jury asked what sentence would be imposed in the event of a deadlock and for an explanation of special instruction No. 60. 107 Id. at 1005 (emphasis added). 108 Petitioner made that argument to the district court in claims 36 and 40 of his federal habeas petition. The magistrate judge agreed with Petitioner's argument and recommended that the case be remanded for a new penalty phase. The magistrate judge concluded that the issue was controlled by McDowell v. Calderon, 130 F.3d 833, 837-38 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), in which this court held that the trial court's failure to explain a correct jury instruction to an obviously confused penaltyphase jury violated the Eighth Amendment. 4 109 The district court rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation and held that the mistyped instruction did not rise to the level of constitutional error. The court observed that the jury did not indicate a specific concern or question about the instruction, but merely asked for a general explanation. Nor did the jury return with a follow-up question, which would have been evidence of juror confusion. In view of the totality of the circumstances, the court reasoned, the assumption must be that the jurors, through their collective debate and discussion, reached the inevitable conclusion that the instruction contained a typographical error. Further, the court concluded that, even if there was constitutional error, the error was harmless. 110 Because Petitioner is arguing that he was prejudiced by an allegedly ambiguous jury instruction, this issue is analyzed under the two-step process set out in Coleman , 525 U.S. at 146. As noted, Coleman requires us to decide (1) whether the asserted error was constitutional error under Boyde; and (2) if so, whether the error was harmless under Brecht. 111 Petitioner argues, first, that there is a reasonable likelihood that some or all of the jurors understood special instruction 60 to mean that, if they could not agree unanimously on a penalty, then Petitioner would receive life with parole. We agree. That is the most logical inference that can be drawn from their question to the trial court. When they presented their question to the court, they had reached an initial impasse; they could not unanimously agree whether Petitioner should receive death or life without parole. So they asked the court what would be the sentence imposed if they could not unanimously agree. At the same time, they asked for clarification of special instruction 60. 112 Because they asked about that instruction at the same time that they asked about the effect of a deadlock, it is logical to assume that they thought that instruction 60 spoke to the issue of deadlock. After all, no other penalty-phase instructions contained an explanation of what happens in the event of a deadlock; understandably, the jurors were not instructed that, if they were unable to make this terribly difficult decision, they would be sent home and the state would try again with a new jury. And it is clear from their first inquiry to the court that they believed that Petitioner would receive some sentence (rather than a new penalty-phase trial) if they deadlocked. Recall that their question was not what will happen if we cannot agree 100%, but, rather,  what would be the sentence imposed in those circumstances. (Emphasis added.) 113 Special instruction 60 can be read as answering that question. The instruction is directed to individual jurors and instructs them that, if they have reasonable doubt about the appropriate sentence, they should impose the lesser sentence. But, if the instruction is read as applying not to individual jurors but to the jury as a whole, then it has a somewhat different import. So read, it appears to state that, if the jury as a whole cannot decide on the appropriate sentence, then it must impose a particular sentence. In other words, the instruction can be read as a deadlock instruction that informs the jurors of the consequences if the jury cannot agree unanimously on a punishment. 114 So, it is clear that the jurors initially were deadlocked and that they did not know what would happen if they remained deadlocked. And it appears likely that they thought that special instruction 60 was relevant to that question. It is also apparent that they were confused by the instruction, and rightly so; they repeatedly had been instructed that the only sentences available to them were death and life without parole, but the instruction as typed appeared to provide that, if they could not choose one of those sentences, then Petitioner would receive life with parole. 115 The jurors took their questions to the trial court, which unwittingly exacerbated the problem. First, in response to the jurors' question about what would happen if they deadlocked, the court (properly) urged them to go back and try again to reach a unanimous verdict. The court also informed them that [t]he statutes provide for what happens in the event that you folks aren't able to reach a decision, but I can't tell you what that is at this point in time. Second, in response to their request for clarification of special instruction 60, the court stated that the instruction itself is self-explanatory. And we hope that with that in mind, that you might be able to reach a decision. In sum, the court informed the jury that (1) there was a consequence if they came back deadlocked; (2) the consequence was mandated by statutes; (3) the court would not tell them what the consequence was; (4) the mistyped jury instruction was self-explanatory; and (5) with that in mind, they should try to reach a decision. 116 In the circumstances, there is a reasonable likelihood that one or more of the jurors interpreted the instruction as Petitioner suggests. If the instruction is deemed to be selfexplanatory, then clearly it can be read to mean that, if the jury cannot choose between penalty A and penalty B, the court would impose penalty C. If one or more jurors understood the instruction in that manner, then the error is of constitutional significance. So understood, the instruction would suggest to any holdout juror that, if he or she did not join the majority of the other jurors, then Petitioner would be eligible for parole. That suggestion is, of course, incorrect, and its coercive potential is obvious; in effect, it would place such a juror in the apparent position of choosing between death and life with parole. 117 The state presents several arguments in opposition to Petitioner's claim. First, it argues that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury misinterpreted the erroneous instruction, because it repeatedly had been instructed that the only possible sentences were death and life without parole. In the circumstances, the state argues, it would be a logical impossibility for Petitioner to receive any other sentence. In the same vein, the state notes that the jury did not receive a life with parole verdict form. 118 It is clear from the instructions that the jury was told that it could only agree to sentence Petitioner to death or life without parole. But that is not the difficulty here. The question that the jury posed was what would happen if it could not agree on either sentence. Special instruction 60, as written, appears to answer that question. To be sure, the answer that it gives is puzzling. But it is not a logical impossibility. Everyone is familiar with the tactic of forcing a choice between two alternatives by threatening an unpleasant third alternative (I want to rent Alladin!  But I want to rent Tarzan! If you kids can't decide in five minutes, we're not renting anything!). As lawyers, we know that such sentencing coercion was a legal impossibility under California law, but these jurors were not lawyers. They logically could have believed that the self-explanatory special instruction 60 meant what it appeared to say: If they could not make up their minds between the two available sentences, statutes  would require an unpleasant third alternative. To quote Justice Broussard's dissent on this point in the California Supreme Court: 119 Thus the jury would be effectively coerced into unanimity if the dissenting jurors could not countenance allowing [Petitioner] the prospect of parole. However illogical [that] interpretation may appear to persons who are familiar with the workings of the law, [it] is a plausible interpretation of the instruction that the court submitted to the jury and, upon the jury's inquiry, directed that the jury follow. 120 Morris, 807 P.2d at 1005. 121 Next, the state argues that the trial court's instruction that, [i]n the event there are any delineations or modifications, you are not to take them into considers [sic]. You are only to take the text as read to you as follows, defeats Petitioner's claim. But there were no apparent delineations or modifications in special instruction 60. Rather, the written copy of that instruction simply substitutes with forwithout. The gist of the state's argument is that the jury could not have misinterpreted the written instruction, because it was required to follow the spoken instruction, which it had heard once in the middle of the trial court's uninterrupted reading of 13 pages of jury instructions. In the circumstances, it is too much to expect that any juror noticed a three-letter mistake in a single jury instruction, let alone remembered that mistake. After all, neither the trial court nor counsel noticed the mistake. Further, the trial court's spoken instruction actually contained both versions of the instruction (return a verdict fixing the penalty of life in prison with the possibility of -without the possibility of parole). It certainly is too much to expect a lay jury to sort out which was a misstatement and which was a correct statement -especially in the absence of a clear explanation from the trial court. 122 Also unpersuasive is the argument that, because the jury asked for only a general explanation of special instruction 60, there is no way to be sure what the jury was confused about. Although it is theoretically possible that something else about the instruction confused the jury, the overwhelming likelihood is that it was confused by the typographical error, which contradicted several other sentencing instructions. Further, the fact that the jury asked about the instruction in connection with its question about the appropriate penalty in the event of a deadlock makes it even more likely that the jury was focused on the without parole/with parole discrepancy. 123 Finally, the state argues that the question of constitutional error is answered by the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999). In Jones, the Supreme Court rejected the direct appeal of a prisoner condemned under the Federal Death Penalty Act. As in this case, the petitioner in Jones argued that the penalty-phase jury instructions might have misled the jury into believing that, if it could not choose between death and life without parole, then the court would impose a lesser sentence. Reviewing for plain error (because the petitioner had not challenged the instructions at trial), the Supreme Court rejected the argument, concluding that there was no plain error. See id. at 390-91, 119 S. Ct. 2090. 124 Jones is not controlling because, in that case, there was no indication that the jury actually was confused by any of the instructions. The petitioner parsed the instructions and verdict forms and suggested an interpretation of those materials that arguably conflicted with the law, but there was no evidence to suggest that the jury actually interpreted the instructions in that manner or was confused by them in any way. By contrast, here the jury zeroed in on the single mistyped instruction and asked the court to explain it. This jury was confused by the challenged instruction and, as noted, was reasonably likely to have interpreted it incorrectly, in a manner unfavorable to Petitioner. 125 In sum, the erroneous jury instruction amounted to constitutional error under Boyde. Turning to the second step of the inquiry, the error was not harmless under the Brecht standard. The jury was deadlocked when it presented its questions to the trial court. The trial court's responses to those questions, while not improper, unfortunately made it more likely that some or all of the jurors would misapply the incorrect instruction. In the circumstances, it is impossible to state confidently that the error did not prejudice Petitioner's substantial rights. If we are in grave doubt as to whether the error had such an effect, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. Coleman, 210 F.3d at 1051. Because a death sentence is qualitatively different from other forms of punishment, there is a greater need for reliability in determining whether it is appropriate in a particular case. Id. at 1049. Here, the error is too obvious, the likelihood of prejudice is too great, and the stakes are too high to conclude that the error was harmless. 126 We therefore reverse the district court's denial of this claim and order the district court to remand the case to state court for a new penalty-phase trial.