Opinion ID: 1700511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Aggravating Circumstance (1)(a)

Text: We first examine the constitutionality of aggravating circumstance (1)(a). In assignment of error 7, Ryan claims that (1)(a) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him. In issue 2, Ryan claims that (1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to him because this court, on direct appeal, imputed to Ryan the serious assaultive or terrorizing acts committed by others. Ryan also claims, in issue 3, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issue of whether such vicarious acts may constitutionally be used to support (1)(a). Ryan concedes that the constitutionality of aggravating circumstance (1)(a) was properly presented on direct appeal and that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in issue 3 is therefore moot. However, he argues that this court's analysis of the issue was constitutionally deficient because the terms substantial history and criminal activity were not adequately narrowed or defined. We disagree. In State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 912, 98 S.Ct. 313, 54 L.Ed.2d 198, the defendant argued that the terms serious assaultive or terrorizing criminal activity were vague and indefinite. We rejected that argument, stating: The words serious, assaultive, and terrorizing are words in common usage with meanings well-fixed and generally clearly understood. The term substantial history is likewise reasonably clear. History refers to the individual's past acts preceding the incident for which he is on trial and substantial, as here used, refers to an actual, material, and important history of acts of terror of a criminal nature. (Emphasis supplied.) 197 Neb. at 546, 250 N.W.2d at 879. Ryan's assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, this court long ago defined the term substantial history. The term criminal activity is one in common usage, with a well-fixed and generally clearly understood meaning. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in holding that aggravating circumstance (1)(a) is not unconstitutionally vague, stated that [t]he Nebraska Supreme Court has provided sufficient guidance to sentencing bodies, concerning this particular aggravating circumstance, to prevent the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.... Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226, 1234 (8th Cir.1990), reh'g denied 951 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992). Ryan's argument that the terms in aggravating circumstance (1)(a) have not been adequately narrowed and defined is lacking in legal merit, and Ryan has failed in his burden to establish a basis for postconviction relief on this issue. We decline to further address the issue, Ryan having conceded that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly presented to this court on direct appeal.