Opinion ID: 1780246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: DENIAL OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS D-7 and D-8

Text: ¶ 63. Bennett's ninth assignment of error asserts the trial court erred in denying jury instructions D-7 and D-8, both circumstantial evidence instructions. Instruction D-7 would have informed the jury as follows: The court instructs the jury that if the State has relied on circumstantial evidence to establish its theory of guilt of Devin Allen Bennett, then the evidence for the State must be so strong as to establish the guilt of Devin Allen Bennett, not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but the evidence must be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt. ¶ 64. Instruction D-8 would have informed the jury as follows: The court instructs the jury that if there be a fact or circumstance in this case which is susceptible to two interpretations, one favorable and the other unfavorable to Devin Allen Bennett, and if after considering all the other facts and circumstances there is a reasonable doubt regarding the correct interpretation, then you, the jury, must resolve such doubt in favor of the accused, and place upon such fact or circumstance the interpretation most favorable to Devin Allen Bennett. ¶ 65. According to the Bennett, because he never admitted any element of the offense charged, the case was wholly circumstantial and the jury should have been instructed as such. The State submits that this case was not a purely circumstantial evidence case, but rather involved both circumstantial and direct evidence. Therefore, the State claims a circumstantial evidence instruction was not required. ¶ 66. Circumstantial evidence cases lack direct evidence, and they include cases where the state is without a confession and wholly without eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged. Kniep v. State, 525 So.2d 385, 392 (Miss.1988) (citations omitted). But where the accused has made an admission on an element of the offense, the case is no longer circumstantial such that a circumstantial evidence instruction is required. Lynch v. State, 877 So.2d 1254, 1264 (Miss. 2004); Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1256 (Miss.1993); Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793, 795 (Miss.1985). Nor is the defendant entitled to a circumstantial evidence instruction where both circumstantial and direct evidence are admitted at trial. Smith v. State, 897 So.2d 1002, 1009 (Miss. Ct.App.2004) (citing Gilleylen v. State, 255 So.2d 661, 663 (Miss.1971)). ¶ 67. In addition to direct scientific evidence such as fingerprints and DNA, [d]irect evidence has been held to include evidence such as eyewitness testimony, the defendant's confession to the offense charged, or the defendant's admission as to an important element thereof. Turner v. State, 910 So.2d 598, 603 (Miss.Ct.App. 2005) (citing Lynch, 877 So.2d at 1265). ¶ 68. A defendant's admission to a significant element of the offense obviates the need for a circumstantial evidence instruction. Conner, 632 So.2d at 1256; Mack, 481 So.2d at 795. This admission was defined in Lynch as `a statement by the accused  it may be direct or implied  of facts pertinent to the issue and tending in connection with other facts to prove his guilt.' 877 So.2d at 1265 (quoting Mack, 481 So.2d at 795). While not a confession per se, an admission of a significant element of the offense is direct evidence of guilt. See Swinney v. State, 829 So.2d 1225, 1236-37 (Miss.2002) (Court held that a confession to a shooting could be direct evidence to an underlying felony for capital murder purposes where defendant admitted to pointing the gun at the victim and stated the gun accidently fired). ¶ 69. Bennett admitted to Sergeant Eriksen that he shook Brandon and that he could have kicked Brandon off the bed. Although Bennett asserted he did not intend to hurt Brandon, he affirmatively stated, I shook [Brandon] too hard. The State correctly asserts that while Bennett claimed Brandon's death was accidental, he also claimed responsibility for the injuries to the child. Bennett's statements constitute an admission, and this admission obviates the need for a circumstantial instruction. The trial court did not err in denying Instructions D-7 and D-8. Thus, Bennett's assignment of error is without merit.