Opinion ID: 2508592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: contentions[8]and discussion

Text: Petitioner concurs with the findings set out in paragraphs 1 through 25 of the hearing panel's findings and conclusions. [9] Petitioner opines that the hearing panel was wrong to find, in paragraph 26, [10] that there is nothing in the trial record that shows Applicant was falsely accused of the incest offenses. Petitioner asserts that [t]he unanimous Kansas Supreme Court decision, the trial transcripts and motions and memoranda filed in the case are replete with evidence that clearly and convincing [sic] show [he] was innocent of all charges brought and was wrongfully tried and convicted. The Kansas Supreme Court's opinion supports Petitioner's assertion that he was wrongly convicted, but lends no support to Petitioner's statement that the case [is] replete with evidence that clearly and convincing [sic] show [he] was innocent of all charges brought and was wrongfully tried[.] The Kansas Supreme Court characterized the evidence against Petitioner as not overwhelming and noted that the credibility of the [daughters'] testimony is the State's case, but the Kansas Supreme Court did not say Petitioner was innocent or that the evidence was insufficient. Indeed, the Kansas Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. Petitioner does not identify any part of the trial record to support his assertion that the case [is] replete with evidence that clearly and convincing [sic] show [he] was innocent of all charges brought[.] A favorable resolution of a criminal proceeding does not preclude consideration of the criminal accusation and evidence in support of it when the Board of Examiners and this court are reviewing a bar application. On this subject, the Oregon Supreme Court said, for example: Of course, an arrest or a charge ending in dismissal does not establish that the accused committed the prohibited act.... As the United States Supreme Court has said: The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense. ... On the other hand, dismissal does not preclude inquiry to ascertain whether an offense was committed. We recently considered a similar question in a proceeding concerning the conduct of a judge ...[.] There, criminal charges had been filed and later dismissed. The judge argued that the dismissal precluded our consideration of the charges. We rejected this contention, concluding that it was our duty to determine whether or not the accused had violated the law, regardless of whether criminal charges had been filed. Had no criminal prosecution ever been instituted in connection with the judge's conduct brought to our attention by this record, we should still inquire whether he failed to comply with the criminal law. .... Similarly, in this case, the trial court's dismissal of the charges in no way bars our examination of the underlying events. [A]cquittal in a criminal action cannot be deemed to be res judicata here upon any issue, for the purpose and scope of an inquiry to determine an applicant's character and fitness to become a member of the Bar are essentially different.    Conduct not descending to the level of guilt of the violation of a criminal statute may well present an insuperable obstacle to admission to the Bar if such conduct evinces a lack of that `character and general fitness requisite for an attorney and counselor-at-law.' In re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 647 P.2d 462, 463-64 (1982) (citations omitted). Petitioner's convictions were vacated, but the evidence was sufficient to remand for new trial. Petitioner has not shown why the charges were dismissed, and, to that extent, Petitioner has failed to address his burden of proving good character. In any event, the record requires denial of the application on other grounds, as set out below.
Petitioner says the hearing panel erred when it found in paragraph 27 [11] that he informed police ... an adult female ... accused [him] of a sexual assault[.] Petitioner urges that the police report actually says that the woman, in a dispute over a bill, actually stated if she didn't get her money back she would accuse [him] of sexual abuse. [N]o accusation was ever made[,] Petitioner says, nor was he questioned about the subject by the panel. A January 9, 1995 report by a Detective K. Joseph Langer about Petitioner's police interview during the investigation of his adopted daughter's sexual assault accusation says, in relevant part: I then asked [Petitioner] if there were any other claims of sexual abuse against him in his past. He said that when he was the owner of ... a customer came in and stated she wanted her money back. [Petitioner] said he refused to refund the money. [Petitioner] said at that time the customer said she would claim sex abuse against [Petitioner]. [Petitioner] said he refunded the money to her. [Petitioner] said he does not know if the woman made a police report. He said he was never charged and this incident would have occurred between 1990 and 1992. On this point, Petitioner's characterization of the police report is more accurate than the hearing panel's finding. [12]
Panel finding 28, [13] Petitioner notes, questions whether Petitioner's character witnesses were informed about all of the charges against him. Petitioner says that the panel did not exercise its ability to ask any questions ... of [his] witnesses to resolve... concerns or doubts ... concerning his good moral character. Petitioner asserts that the panel apparently completely disregarded ... favorable recommendations from long-time acquaintances that included [National Conference of Bar Examiners (]NCBE[)] letters of recommendation and letters from his in-laws, the grandparents of one of the complaining witnesses. The hearing panel's findings address only the testimony given by character witnesses called by Petitioner at the [January 27, 2004] hearing. The panel's findings do not specifically indicate whether the committee reviewed the NCBE character reports from the individuals Petitioner had listed in his application. The NCBE references were, presumably, reviewed before the Board first indicated that it would recommend denying Petitioner's application. Thus, it appears that any favorable character references did not outweigh the concerns that formed the basis of the Board's recommendation to deny the application. The hearing was Petitioner's opportunity to present additional character or other evidence, and he did so. The hearing panel's characterization of the live testimony is not necessarily a discounting of the previously submitted references; it is merely an indication of the weight the panel attributed to the live witnesses who Petitioner presented at the hearing. [14] A rational fact-finder could reach the conclusions reached by the hearing panel, i.e. that Petitioner's hearing witnesses had not known him long enough for their character testimony to be given much weight. Insofar as the lack of panel questions is concerned, the proceeding provided by RSCH Rule 1.3(d) [15] and HBBE §§ 2.5 [16] and 2.6 [17] is not generally an adversarial proceeding. The proceeding is held at the request of the applicant and is an opportunity for an applicant to meet the burden of proving good character. Although a hearing panel is authorized to inquire further, it is not mandated to do so. [18]
Petitioner disagrees with panel finding 29 [19] that Petitioner's explanation of a 1991 aggravated battery charge was not credible. Petitioner opines that his explanation is consistent with police reports. Petitioner says that the panel did not question him about the incident. Petitioner was charged in Kansas with unlawfully, feloniously and willfully touch[ing] or apply[ing] force to the person of another ... with the intent to injure that person and which was done with a deadly weapon, to wit: an automobile or which was done in a manner whereby great bodily harm, disfigurement, dismemberment or death could have been inflicted, in violation of K.S.A. [§] 21-3414 and K.S.A. [§] 21-4501(c). As previously noted, prosecution was deferred, and Petitioner entered a diversionary program. The police officers' accounts of the incident said, in sum, that they were assigned to serve a protection from abuse order, that when Petitioner drove into a driveway and got out of the car one of the officers drove in behind Petitioner, and that Petitioner ran back to and reentered his car and reversed the car toward the officer. The officer jumped onto the hood of the officer's car, but the officer's left foot was momentarily pinned between the bumpers of the two cars. On his application Petitioner described the incident thus: I was dropping off my daughter's overnight bag at my estranged wife's residence when I was rapidly approached by two men unknown to me. Believing that I was in immediate danger I attempted to flee and during that attempt accidently bumped one of the men chasing me with my automobile. The men then drew guns and pointed them at me and identified themselves as County Deputies. I complied with their directions and was immediately arrested and charged with aggregated [sic] battery against a LEO.[ [20] ] Petitioner's explanation at the hearing was lengthier and varied to some extent: The 1991 charge for Aggravated Battery I think needs to be explained in the context of some surrounding circumstances. In late January 1991, I moved out of our family home after discovering that my wife at the time ... was having an affair. That was the end of January 1991. On February 18th, 1991, while [wife] was at work at Johnson County Community College, I used my house key and entered the home with the intention of retrieving a fish tank, some clothing, and some other personal items that I still had in the house, thought the best time to do that, since it was a very emotional time for both of us, was when she was not there. So I entered the house, and I heard the alarm beeping. I went over to the keypad to disarm it, and she had changed the code, so I knew the alarm was going to go off. I also knew that it was a monitored system so that the police would be summoned in a very short period of time, so I simply waited for them. They arrived. I showed them my ID. They asked me what I was doing there. I explained the situation, and they were fine with it. They said, Get your stuff, do what you need to do, and leave, and so I did that. The police left. While I was there, the phone rang and I answered it, and it was my wife at the time, my ex-wife now, on the phone. She was very irate that I was in the house, although we had no formal separation agreement or anything, I'd simply moved out, there was no divorce pending at that time or anything, sobut anyway, she was irate. She accused me of spying on her and digging into her personal affairs and activities, and she ended it by saying that she was going to have my ass kicked, specifically those words. Later that evening, I had my daughter, our daughter, over for overnight visitation, and prior to going to bed that night, she had karate class. I took her to karate, and when we were talking, she said, Oh, mom's new boyfriend has a black belt in karate, and so I thought, okay, well, I made a little mental note of that. The next morning, I went over to drop I dropped my daughter at the elementary school, and then I went by the house to drop off her overnight bag to my ex. As I drove into the driveway, I got out of the car, parked it, started walking up the walkway, and two cars from different directions descended on me. The men, two different men, jumped out of the car, and although they didn't run, they were approaching me in a rapid fashion. I remembered the threat from the day before and thought she was making good on it. So what I did at that point was I ran back to the car, locked the door, and I was, since I was blocked in, I was going to try and drive through the grass to get out of harm's way. The first gear that hitit was an automaticwas reverse. The car jerked back a couple of feet, and one of the men was between the two cars at the that time. He saw the car lurch back and jumped up on the hood of his vehicle, and I momentarily pinned his foot between the two vehicles. Fortunately for all of us, the car had a polyurethane rear bumper. He was not injured. At that point, I managed to get the car into first gear and started to make a turn to get out. He jumped off the hood of his car into my path, drew a gun, and leveled it at me through the windshield. At that point, he identified himself as with thehe was a county deputy with the Sheriff's Department, so I was relieved that it was not the situation that I thought. He ordered me out of the car. I put the car into park, immediately got out of the car, did not resist. I was immediately placed under arrest, and the subsequent charges of Aggravated Battery against an LEO were filed. Actually, the charges that were actually filed were Aggravated Battery instead of Aggravated Battery against an LEO supposedly because they had notthey realized that nobody had identified themselves prior to the time that they leveled a gun at me. After the situation was explained, they still were not willing to drop the charges at that point but the case was referred for diversion, and a year later, the charges were dropped. At the time of the incident, Petitioner was thirty-six years of age. The report of each deputy indicates that Petitioner attempted to run over one deputy and then attempted to flee by trying to drive across the lawn. The deputies' reports say that Petitioner did not stop until an officer drew his weapon and ordered Petitioner from the car. We generally give some weight to credibility determinations made by fact-finders who had an opportunity to observe witnesses, but we are free to review the testimony de novo, see Disciplinary Bd. of Hawaii Supreme Court v. Bergan, 60 Haw. 546, 592 P.2d 814 (1979), and make our own determination of credibility. Our determination here is not different from the hearing panel's determination. More importantly, we note that negligently, carelessly, or intentionally using an automobile to escape from real or imagined danger, in a manner that puts the lives of others at risk, and that actually pins a person between cars in the circumstances related by the officers and Petitioner is a record of conduct that evidences a deficiency in trustworthiness or respect for the requirements of the law, and it is not a record of conduct [that] justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts and others with respect to the professional duties owed to them. See RSCH 1.3(c) (set out above); Cf. In re Silva, 266 Neb. 419, 665 N.W.2d 592 (2003) (Applicant with history of assaultive behavior, including misdemeanor convictions that he did not fully disclose on his law school application, denied admission. In light of strong, favorable references, applicant was authorized to reapply in two years.); In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 462 A.2d 165 (1983) (Applicant who participated in Ponzi scheme and did not file tax returns denied admission, although eight years had passed, he had made restitution, and the court was unable to conclude definitely that he knew the fraudulent nature of the Ponzi scheme. Pattern of activity bespoke of avarice, selfishness, extraordinary incredulity, and indifference to the welfare and individuals relying on him.).
Petitioner asserts that the panel apparently disregarded [his] explanation that default judgments and bankruptcy filings were related to business failures. [21] [R]emaining questions, Petitioner asserts, could have been answered had the hearing [panel] simply asked the questions that apparently were on their minds. Petitioner says that there was no question about misapplication or misdirection of client funds and opines that the panel abused its power to the extent that it suggest[s] ... he is undeserving because [his] business plans were not financially successful[.] Petitioner notes that one of his bankruptcy filings occurred nineteen years ago and that the most recent occurred over ten years ago. The hearing panel's findings with regard to Petitioner's numerous debt problems are not necessarily an indication the panel ignored Petitioner's explanations. The hearing panel's findings could be an indication that the hearing panel found the explanations to be unpersuasive or that the explanations did not mitigate the fact that Petitioner exhibited a very clear pattern of financial irresponsibility. We are cognizant that Petitioner's bankruptcies alone cannot justify denying a license to practice law. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 525(a). [22] The Oregon Supreme Court explained the distinction between considering an applicant's financial reputation and considering bankruptcy alone thus: The fact that petitioner filed for bankruptcy, standing alone, is not a factor which we consider in determining his moral fitness. The bankruptcy statutes prevent a rule which would preclude applicant's admission to the Bar solely because he declared bankruptcy. However, an applicant's handling of financial affairs is regularly considered in determining moral fitness. See, e.g., In re Cheek, 246 Or. 433, 425 P.2d 763 (1967); In re Connor, 265 Ind. 610, 358 N.E.2d 120 (1976); In re O'Brien's Petition, 79 Conn. 46, 63 A. 777 (1906). The bankruptcy statutes do not prohibit examination of the circumstances surrounding bankruptcy, as these circumstances illustrate an applicant's judgment in handling serious financial obligations.[FN4] FN4. The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act indicates that Congress intended to bar a per se rule which would make filing in bankruptcy an automatic bar to a license or similar grant. Congress did not intend to preclude examination of the circumstances surrounding bankruptcy. The prohibition does not extend so far as to prohibit examination of the factors surrounding the bankruptcy, the imposition of financial responsibility rules if they are not imposed only on former bankrupts, or the examination of prospective financial condition or managerial ability. The purpose of the section is to prevent automatic reaction against an individual for availing himself of the protection of the bankruptcy laws.    (I)n those cases where the causes of bankruptcy are intimately connected with the license, grant, or employment in question, an examination into the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy will permit governmental units to pursue appropriate regulatory policies and take appropriate action without funning afoul of bankruptcy policy. (Emphasis added) [sic] H.R.Rep. No.95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. at 165 (1977), reprinted in 5 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 5787, 5963, 6126 (1978). The Supreme Court of Minnesota recently considered the application for admission of a person who had discharged student loans in bankruptcy. After reviewing the legal considerations pertinent to the evaluation of such bankruptcies, the court said: We hold that applicants who flagrantly disregard the rights of others and default on serious financial obligations, such as student loans, are lacking in good moral character if the default is neglectful, irresponsible, and cannot be excused by a compelling hardship that is reasonably beyond the control of the applicant. Such hardship might include an unusual misfortune, a catastrophe, an over riding financial obligation, or unavoidable unemployment. In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826, 831 (Minn.1979). The Supreme Court of Florida formulated a similar standard in cases of two applicants who had discharged student loans in bankruptcy. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re Groot, 365 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1978); Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners re GWL, 364 So.2d 454 (Fla.1978). Examining the circumstances surrounding applicant's discharge of his student loans, we find no extraordinary hardship which would compel resort to bankruptcy. When he declared bankruptcy, applicant's current liabilities did exceed his current assets, but he acknowledged before the Board of Bar Examiners that he could have managed his debts, including his student loans, had he wished to do so. His own explanation of his resort to bankruptcy is that he felt that society owed him an education. At the time, applicant was employed in a steady position, with a gross annual income of approximately $10,000. He faced no catastrophe or unusual misfortune. Further, he made no effort to adjust, extend, or renegotiate his student loans. On the other hand, he reaffirmed several other debts, those on which his creditors held security over property which he wished to retain. Applicant had a legal right to discharge his student loans in bankruptcy as he did, and our decision herein is not based on his exercise of that right. The circumstances of his bankruptcy, however, show a selfish exercise of legal rights and a disregard of moral responsibilities. The bankruptcy statutes prescribe only the criteria needed to discharge debts; they do not say what is required to demonstrate good moral character. Cf. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L.Rev. 457, 459 (1897): If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict. We need not decide whether we would find that applicant's moral character is wanting on the basis of his discharge of student loans alone. We declare to all attorneys and future applicants the importance of scrupulously honoring all financial obligations. With respect to this applicant, his discharge of student loans is a fact which we consider.[FN5] FN5. We also note that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 changed the law, restricting the right to discharge student loans. Under the current statutes, unless there is a showing of undue hardship, an individual must make payments on student loans for five years before they are subject to discharge in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8). In re Taylor, 647 P.2d at 466-67; Accord In re Anonymous, 74 N.Y.2d 938, 550 N.Y.S.2d 270, 549 N.E.2d 472, 473-74 (1989) ([T]he [bankruptcy] statute was not intended to shield debtors from reasonable inquiries about their ability to manage financial matters when the ability to do so is related to their fitness for the license sought.... A determination of unfitness must rest not on the fact of bankruptcy but on conduct reasonably viewed as incompatible with a lawyer's duties and responsibilities as a member of the bar. (Citations omitted.)); In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d at 828-29 (The fact of filing bankruptcy or the refusal to reinstate obligations discharged in bankruptcy cannot be a basis for denial of admission to the bar.... Any refusal so grounded would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution since applicable Federal law clearly prohibits such a result[,] ... and state law may not chill the exercise of that right.... However, these constitutional limitations do not preclude a court from inquiring into the bar applicant's responsibility or moral character in financial matters. (Citations omitted.)). Petitioner completed law school in 1980. According to the record, by 1985, Petitioner had unpaid debts totaling more than $90,000. The debts included nearly $36,000 in unpaid taxes, unpaid equipment leases, money borrowed to purchase office furniture and equipment, a business loan, and credit purchases of office supplies, including law books, and professional services. A bankruptcy discharge in 1985 provided Petitioner with a fresh start, but, by 1993, he was again unable to meet his obligations and listed outstanding unsecured debt of more than $373,000 that included more than $70,000 in unpaid office rent, as well as debts owed for various services and charge cards, some of which had been reduced to creditor judgments. The fact that the pattern of Petitioner's financial irresponsibility is related, for the most part, to businesses other than the practice of law is irrelevant. Cf. Bergan, 60 Haw. at 553-54, 592 P.2d at 818 (we will not hesitate to impose substantial sanctions upon an attorney for any act whether committed in a professional capacity or not which evidences want of personal honesty and integrity or renders such attorney unworthy of public confidence). The failure to pay debts is an appropriate subject for attempting to determine whether a bar applicant has shown financial responsibility and one of the specifically enumerated factors for determining whether a bar applicant has proven good character. See RSCH 1.3(c)(1)(v); cf. In re R.M.C., 272 Ga. 99, 525 S.E.2d 100, 101, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 854, 121 S.Ct. 133, 148 L.Ed.2d 86, reh'g denied, 531 U.S. 854, 121 S.Ct. 133, 148 L.Ed.2d 86 (2000) (Lack of fiscal responsibility, failure to cooperate with the Board, and a lack of candor are all bases on which certification may be denied.... It is not the fact of debt, but the absence of genuine effort to meet one's responsibilities which serves to establish a lack of the character and integrity expected and required of one who seeks to become a member of the Bar of Georgia. (Citations omitted.)); In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d at 830 (The conduct of a bar applicant in satisfying his financial obligations has been widely recognized as a relevant factor in assessing good moral character.... The failure of a person to honor his legal commitments adversely reflects on his ability to practice law, evincing a disregard for the rights of others. (Citations omitted.)); Florida Bar Examiners v. G.M.C., 658 So.2d 76 (Fla.1995) (approved denial of application where Board concluded failure to pay twelve delinquent creditor accounts totaling more than $32,000, defaulted student loans totaling $50,000, and three unsatisfied judgments for failure to make timely payments on outstanding debts, exhibited pattern of irresponsible conduct or faulty judgment reflecting adversely on the applicant's ability to accept the responsibilities and perform the duties of a practicing attorney). Petitioner's credit history provides a clear and repeated pattern of irresponsibility with regard to his financial obligations. We are well aware that financial irresponsibility is a frequent subject of attorney disciplinary proceedings and often includes misappropriation of client funds to meet personal expenses. Petitioner's credit history is not one from which we can conclude that Petitioner's character would justify the trust of clients, adversaries, or others with regard to the professional duties owed to them.
Petitioner opines that the panel has not produced nor referenced any evidence that refutes the evidence he provided that [he] is of good moral character and has requisite character and fitness to be a member of the Hawai`i state bar. Petitioner asserts that the panel's findings of fact do not show a record ... manifesting a deficiency in honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reliability. Petitioner asserts that he has committed no crime, no bad acts. If he had, Petitioner writes, prior to admission [ [23] ] he would be required to show evidence of rehabilitation. Petitioner says he was merely falsely accused of crimes and bad acts. Contrary to his hint, Petitioner was not required to show evidence of rehabilitation before reinstatement in Missouri. Petitioner was reinstated under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 5.21(b), quoted in Petitioner's Missouri motion to set aside suspension as follows: (b) If an order of suspension based upon such plea or finding is entered and, thereafter, the suspended lawyer files a certified copy of an order rejecting or setting aside the guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere or the order of a court reversing or setting aside the finding of guilty, this Court shall immediately enter an order reinstating said lawyer unless the lawyer is under suspension or disbarred as a result of having been found guilty of professional misconduct in a disciplinary proceeding brought pursuant to this Rule 5. Such reinstatement shall not bar prosecution in a disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer.[ [24] ] That is, unlike Petitioner's application proceeding before this court, the Missouri reinstatement did not require proof of character and competence. More importantly, the burden of providing a character record is upon the applicant, not the Board of Examiners or the hearing panel. See RSCH 1.3(c)(2). Unfortunately for Petitioner, the record he provided is not a record from which we can conclude that we can entrust the lives, rights, and property of clients to him.
Petitioner notes that he is a member is good standing of the Missouri State Bar and the bars of the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Petitioner asks us to allow him to sit for the next scheduled bar examination and be admitted if he passes it. The fact that a lawyer is licensed to engage in the general practice of law in one state does not give him a vested right to freely exercise such license in other states. In re Petition of Avery, 44 Haw. 597, 598, 358 P.2d 709, 710 (1961) (citations omitted).