Opinion ID: 2294040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Dr Stephen Siebert

Text: Judge Berger found that Dr. Siebert, who has a master's degree in public health and is board certified in the field of psychiatry, was qualified to testify in the fields of psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. As with the other experts of the Blackwells, however, Judge Berger found that Dr. Siebert's board certifications bore no relevance to the appropriate basis for opinion testimony on the issue of whether thimerosal-containing vaccines can cause autism. Further, Judge Berger noted that, although Dr. Siebert was well-qualified to testify to his diagnosis of Jamarr Blackwell as mentally retarded and autistic, he did not possess the expertise to testify regarding the causes of Jamarr's autism by nature of his knowledge and experience. In this case, Judge Berger did not receive Dr. Geier, as well as the other of the Blackwells' experts, as qualified to testify regarding causation because they were not qualified in the field of epidemiology, which he determined to be central to the Blackwells' claims. Although we recognize that Judge Berger excluded Dr. Geier's testimony under the third prong of Maryland Rule 5-702, which requires a sufficient factual basis [to] exist[] to support the expert testimony, and the Frye-Reed analysis, we, nevertheless, address Dr. Geier's credentials along with the four other experts, because voir dire of an expert is normally the threshold issue. We have not had occasion to review the exclusion of witnesses based on voir dire of their credentials in a case where a complex and novel theory of science has been postulated. In Massie and Deese, we addressed expert specialization in the context of an expert's ability to execute a previously acceptable technique for determining the time or manner of death. In Radman, we held that an expert need not be specialized in a precise field where negligence had been alleged in order to opine about deviation from the standard of care. In each instance, we rebuffed challenges based on specialization in a relevant field, when we were presented with the expert's ability to perform an accepted technique. When a novel theory of science is presented, however, its reliability and validity are dependent not only on the application of generally acceptable methodology and analyses, but also upon the knowledge, skill, experience, training or education of the scientist who purports to utilize them, because the expert must embody expertise in the relevant scientific field to be able to give an opinion regarding the results of the process of scientific discovery. One of our sister states, when confronted with this conundrum under a similar rule governing experts, [29] identified three factors as relevant in defining the minimal level of qualification necessary: Appellate courts may consider several criteria in assessing whether a trial court has clearly abused its discretion in ruling on an expert's qualifications. First, is the field of expertise complex? The degree of education, training, or experience that a witness should have before he can qualify as an expert is directly related to the complexity of the field about which he proposes to testify. If the expert evidence is close to the jury's common understanding, the witness's qualifications are less important than when the evidence is well outside the jury's own experience. For example, DNA profiling is scientifically complex; latent-print comparison (whether of fingerprints, tires, or shoes) is not. Second, how conclusive is the expert's opinion? The more conclusive the expert's opinion, the more important is his degree of expertise. Testimony that a given profile occurred one time in 2.578 sextillion (2.578 followed by 21 zeroes), a number larger than the number of known stars in the universe (estimated at one sextillion) requires a much higher degree of scientific expertise than testimony that the defendant's tennis shoe could have made the bloody shoe print found on a piece of paper in the victim's apartment. And third, how central is the area of expertise to the resolution of the lawsuit? The more dispositive it is of the disputed issues, the more important the expert's qualifications are. If DNA is the only thing tying the defendant to the crime, the reliability of the expertise and the witness's qualifications to give his opinion are more crucial than if eyewitnesses and a confession also connect the defendant to the crime. Rodgers v. State, 205 S.W.3d 525, 528 (Tex. Crim.App.2006) (footnotes omitted). See Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 171 n. 2, 367 A.2d 472, 475 n. 2 (1977), quoting Baltimore Refrigerating & Heating Co. of Baltimore v. Kreiner, 109 Md. 361, 370, 71 A. 1066, 1070 (1909) ([E]xpert capacity is a matter wholly relative to the subject of the particular inquiry.); See also Faigman, supra, at 41, ([J]ust as with [federal] Rule 702 validity assessments, the judge's gatekeeping obligation should extend not merely to qualifications in the abstract, but qualifications to testify about the subject that is relevant to the issues in dispute.). Although we do not apply the second prong, regarding the conclusiveness of the expert's opinion, because it would necessitate going to the merits of the expert's opinion prior to a review of credentials, we do believe that two of the factors are relevant in our analysisthose being whether the field of expertise is complex and whether the area of expertise is central to the resolution of the lawsuit. In the present case, clearly the level of complexity regarding the establishment of a causal relationship between the administration of a vaccine containing thimerosal and the onset of autism is complex; to the extent that establishing such a conclusion is even possible, it involves the extrapolation from, and scientific review of, numerous studies spanning a gamut of fields and methodologies, and most particularly, available epidemiological studies. As Blackwells' counsel stated during oral argument before this Court, their experts' causal conclusions are based on: (1) peer reviewed published epidemiological studies; (2) in vitro studies; (3) toxicological studies; (4) pharmacokinetic [30] studies that discuss the distribution of mercury throughout the body; (5) diagnostic tests of blood to determine the level of gluthionine in the body, which is a molecule necessary to eliminate mercury; (6) porphyrin urine analysis to determine mercury toxicity; (7) differential diagnosis; and (8) extrapolation from animal studies and from other in vitro studies. It is noteworthy also, as the IOM Committee recognized in its 2004 Report, that any conclusion regarding the cause of autism is complicated by the fact that autism, itself, is not a single disorder but a  set of developmental disorders characterized by sustained impairments in social interaction [and] communication, and that autism, and autistic spectrum disorders refer to a  broad[] group of pervasive developmental disorders. IOM Report, at 3-4 (2004) (emphasis added). That the complex field of epidemiology is central to the resolution of the lawsuit, moreover, is not disputed. The Blackwells have never challenged Judge Berger's finding that epidemiology, primarily, is the relevant field for establishing a causal relationship, nor do they dispute that the establishment of a causal relationship is dispositive to the outcome of the lawsuit. Their contention, rather, is that their experts were qualified to offer conclusions based on epidemiological principles. Judge Berger, therefore, did not abuse his discretion when he required a specificity of knowledge, skill, experience, training or education related to the resolution of the lawsuit, and concluded that Drs. Geier's, Haley's, Deth's, Mumper's and Siebert's fields of expertise were not relevant to the specific bodies of science that purport to maintain generally acceptable scientific methods and analyses related to autism and its causes. Based upon all of the forgoing analysis, we agree with the well-reasoned and cogent opinion of Judge Berger. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.