Opinion ID: 419819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Recommendation as a Trigger

Text: 29 We consider next Kerr-McGee's contention that the recommendation triggers state action on redesignation. Kerr-McGee alleges that the triggering effect injures it because California will not act on permit applications until the conclusion of redesignation proceedings. 30 There is no basis in the statute for a trigger interpretation. The statute allows states to initiate redesignation proceedings. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 7474(a). It does not suggest that federal land managers may initiate redesignation or that the states must act once a federal recommendation has been made. 31 In support of its trigger theory, Kerr-McGee relies on the statement of an Assistant Solicitor for Interior in a memorandum to the Chief of the Office of Legislation for the National Park Service. This inter-agency memorandum cannot nullify the plain language of the statute that gives the states discretion over redesignation. 32 Even if we accord the memorandum significant weight, however, it does not support Kerr-McGee's theory. It says that Interior might sue to compel a response to a recommendation, but it acknowledges that the states have complete freedom to act on redesignation: [t]here is no time deadline for the States to act on the Secretary's recommendation. The States may act at any time on discretionary redesignations. Memorandum from David A. Watts to Chief, Office of Legislation, National Park Service (November 21, 1979). 33 To demonstrate injury, Kerr-McGee must show that the recommendation has caused California to act in a way that harms Kerr-McGee. At most, the recommendation triggers a duty for California to acknowledge the federal position on redesignation. It creates no duty for California to delay permit applications, initiate redesignation proceedings, or commit any other injurious act that Kerr-McGee alleges. 34 California may or may not plan to redesignate Death Valley and injure Kerr-McGee in the manner alleged. The federal recommendation, however, is purely advisory and is neither a trigger nor a prerequisite to California's action. It subjects Kerr-McGee to no federal control or regulation, and has caused the company no injury. Without an injury, Kerr-McGee has no standing and its claim is not ripe for decision. 35 We reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.