Opinion ID: 2758537
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Amend Expert-Disclosure Deadline

Text: Mrs. Smith next challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to extend the expertdisclosure deadline. Rule 16 permits district courts to amend the pretrial scheduling order provided that the movant demonstrates “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The primary -5- Case No. 14-5417, Smith v. Holston Med. Grp., P.C., et al. measure of Rule 16’s ‘good cause’ standard is the moving party’s diligence in attempting to meet the case management order’s requirements,” though courts may also consider prejudice to the nonmoving party. Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bradford v. DANA Corp., 249 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that Mrs. Smith lacked good cause because she failed to exercise reasonable diligence in vetting Dr. Markowitz. We have upheld past rulings where the plaintiff sought to reopen discovery without good cause in order to cure similar deficiencies in expert testimony. See Pride v. BIC Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 2000); cf. Downs v. Perstorp Components, Inc., 26 F. App’x 472, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2002). But Mrs. Smith contends that her case is different. She blames any failure to perceive Dr. Markowitz’s shortcomings on the doctor’s “untruthful” statements, “misrepresentations,” and “deception.” As its order makes clear, however, the district court found that Dr. Markowitz did not deceive Mrs. Smith’s counsel. The most compelling evidence that Dr. Markowitz actively misrepresented his credentials comes from the affidavit of Mary Lynn Tate, one of Mrs. Smith’s attorneys. Ms. Tate avers: “[Dr. Markowitz] told me that within the year of the negligence alleged by the Plaintiff herein he consulted for colleagues regarding patient care in 3-5 cases; he reviewed several medical charts for attorneys . . . ; and he taught some classes at the Medical College of Virginia though not regular curriculum.” (R. 45-1, Tate Aff. ¶ 3.) But in an earlier affidavit, Mrs. Smith’s other attorney, Olen G. Haynes, called the figure of three to five consultations per year an “estimate.” (R. 41-2, Haynes Aff. ¶ 4.) And Dr. Markowitz’s expert-witness statement, filed with the complaint, contains the more general assertion that he “regularly practiced medicine in [his] two -6- Case No. 14-5417, Smith v. Holston Med. Grp., P.C., et al. specialties for many years and currently practice[s] consulting, medical chart review and teaching in these areas.” (R. 18-1, Markowitz Statement at 1.) After considering this evidence, the district court described Dr. Markowitz’s representations as “vague” and found “[i]t abundantly clear, from Ms. Tate’s affidavit, that there was a serious lack of documentation to inform whether Dr. Markowitz had actually practiced medicine in the year before [Mr. Smith]’s death . . . .” (R. 49, Expert Deadline Order at 3–4.) The court found it unreasonable for counsel to rely on Dr. Markowitz’s estimates without inquiring into the “specifics” of his professional activities in 2009 and 2010. It also detected “serious warning signs” in Dr. Markowitz’s curriculum vitae that Mrs. Smith and her counsel either missed or ignored. Specifically, the CV indicated that Dr. Markowitz ceased actively teaching and practicing medicine in 2004 and his only positions since that time were an emeritus professorship and Admissions Committee appointment at the Virginia Commonwealth University School of Medicine. Mrs. Smith offers no tenable explanation for how her counsel missed these “warning signs” during the vetting process. Other evidence on the record supports the district court’s findings. First, Dr. Markowitz’s deposition testimony fairly aligns with his pre-deposition statements. He testified that he (1) saw one or two patients per year from 2010 through 2012, (2) served as professor emeritus and admissions committee member at VCU, and (3) reviewed charts for local colleagues who would contact him by phone. (See R. 31-1, Defs.’ Mot. Strike, Ex. 1 Markowitz Dep. at 50-51, 110-11, 128-29, 164-65.) Although this level of practice falls below the low-end estimate cited in the affidavits of Mrs. Smith’s attorneys, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding the testimony consistent enough to reject Mrs. Smith’s justification on grounds of deceit. The record also supports the finding that Mrs. Smith’s counsel -7- Case No. 14-5417, Smith v. Holston Med. Grp., P.C., et al. did not act diligently in light of the “warning signs” in Dr. Markowitz’s CV. Mrs. Smith’s counsel first met Dr. Markowitz in person the day prior to his deposition. Before that, counsel communicated with the doctor by “e-mail contact and maybe a conversation or two by phone.” (R. 42-1, Markowitz Dep. at 5.) And although Ms. Tate asserts that Dr. Markowitz came “highly recommended by several colleagues,” there is no indication whether her colleagues discussed Dr. Markowitz’s work history from 2009 through 2010 or his qualifications to testify as an expert in Tennessee. In short, we find no basis on which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in viewing the evidence as it did. Nor do Mrs. Smith’s remaining arguments move us to hold otherwise. She contends that granting her motion would not “unduly” prejudice the defendants. But courts consider the extent of prejudice to the nonmoving party only if the movant proceeded diligently, and then only to ascertain whether there exist “additional reasons to deny a motion.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) (cited approvingly in Inge, 281 F.3d at 625). Similarly, Mrs. Smith’s expeditious retention of a new expert after Dr. Markowitz’s exclusion has no bearing on whether she exercised reasonable diligence in timely vetting Dr. Markowitz. See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 907 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiffs can demonstrate ‘good cause’ for their failure to comply with the original schedule[] by showing that despite their diligence they could not meet the original deadline.”). And that the defendants moved to exclude Dr. Markowitz after the scheduling order’s expert-objection deadline does not alter our analysis. Mrs. Smith forfeited this procedural challenge by failing to oppose the motion to exclude Dr. Markowitz. Finally, Mrs. Smith protests that it is “entirely contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such mere -8- Case No. 14-5417, Smith v. Holston Med. Grp., P.C., et al. technicalities.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962). But a party’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence is no mere technicality. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610 (“The district court’s decision to honor the terms of its binding scheduling order does not simply exalt procedural technicalities over the merits of Johnson’s case. Disregard of the order would undermine the court’s ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreed-upon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and the cavalier.”); see also Estes v. King’s Daughters Med. Ctr., 59 F. App’x 749, 754 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The ‘importance of . . . proposed testimony cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and scheduling orders.’” (citation omitted)).