Opinion ID: 2399306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of prosecutorial misconduct

Text: Appellant next raises an issue concerning commentary by the district attorney regarding his failure to produce an alibi witness. By way of background, Johnson's defense case included presentation of two alibi witnesses: his wife at the time of trial, Crystal Johnson, and her friend, Shadena Johnson (who was of no relation to Johnson or his wife). Both testified that Johnson resided in Brooklyn, New York, in June of 1996, and specifically that, at the time the victim was killed, he was with them in Brooklyn at the residence of Alice Jackson, where he proposed to Ms. Johnson. Johnson, however, did not produce testimony from Ms. Jackson, and, during closing argument, the prosecutor challenged the viability of Johnson's alibi defense with reference to her absence. [9] During and immediately after the Commonwealth's argument, defense counsel objected, on the latter occasion requesting a curative instruction, asserting that the Commonwealth was not entitled to a missing witness inference where the testimony of the absent witness is cumulative, the uncalled witness is equally available to both parties, and there is a satisfactory explanation as to why the party failed to call the witness. [10] The court sustained this objection and, after the conclusion of the closing speeches, instructed the jury as follows: [D]uring the Commonwealth's closing argument there was mention made that the defendant did not call a certain witness perhaps from New York on his behalf. And you're not to take any negative inference against the defendant for any witnesses that were not produced by him ... [T]he defendant has no obligation to take the stand, [and] the defendant has no obligation to call any witnesses or present any evidence. So there would be no negative inference taken by you against the defendant because of anybody he didn't call ... You are not to make any negative findings or inferences against the defendant for not calling additional witnesses. N.T., at 515-16. Generally, a prosecutor's comments will not establish a ground for relief from a conviction unless their unavoidable effect was to prejudice the jurors, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. See Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 549 Pa. 352, 373, 701 A.2d 492, 503 (1997). Moreover, the prejudicial effect of improper comments may be cured by a cautionary instruction. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. 464, 511, 668 A.2d 491, 514 (1995); see also Baker, 531 Pa. at 559, 614 A.2d at 672 (The presumption in our law is that the jury has followed instructions.). Here, regardless of the propriety of the Commonwealth's comments, [11] there is no evidence that the trial court's detailed cautionary instructions failed to cure any potential, prejudicial effect. Accord Jones, 542 Pa. at 513, 668 A.2d at 515 (concluding that, to the extent that a prosecutor's comments could be interpreted as shifting the burden of proof to the defense, the trial court's cautionary instructions that it was not the defendant's responsibility to call any witnesses, and that the Commonwealth had the burden of proof, adequately cured any prejudice).