Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Refusal to Excuse Juror Schwark

Text: On the fourth day of jury deliberations at the penalty phase of the trial, Juror David Schwark, outside the presence of the other jurors, informed the court that the previous night he inadvertently had overheard a television news report announcing that defendant had made threats against the guards ... if he were given the death penalty. The court informed the juror that evidence of such a threat never came before you because it amounted to something probably no more than just a rumor and asked him whether he could base his verdict solely upon the evidence. Schwark answered in the affirmative and confirmed, in response to an additional inquiry, that he still could be fair and impartial. Defendant asked that Schwark be excused, and the trial court ruled: I saw an honest man who said he could be honest with Mr. Zapien, and I have to believe him. He is going to stay on the jury. The trial court subsequently polled the other jurors, determined they had no knowledge of the news report, and denied defendant's motion for mistrial. (43) Defendant correctly observes that, although the juror did nothing improper, his inadvertent receipt of information outside the court proceedings is considered misconduct and creates a presumption of prejudice which, if not rebutted, requires a new trial. ( People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327].) `[W]hether a defendant has been injured by jury misconduct in receiving evidence outside of court necessarily depends upon whether the jury's impartiality has been adversely affected, whether the prosecutor's burden of proof has been lightened and whether any asserted defense has been contradicted. If the answer to any of these questions is in the affirmative, the defendant has been prejudiced and the conviction must be reversed. On the other hand, since jury misconduct is not per se reversible, if a review of the entire record demonstrates that the appellant has suffered no prejudice from the misconduct a reversal is not compelled.' [Citation.] ( People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1156 [245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901].) In People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388], a juror brought a Bible into the jury room during penalty phase deliberations and read verses with other jurors. The trial court learned of this misconduct at the end of the court day and, the following day, questioned the jurors individually, admonishing them to decide the case solely on the basis of the evidence received in court and the court's instructions on the law, and not to take any written materials into the jury room. On appeal, we ruled that the presumption of prejudice had been rebutted because there was no substantial likelihood that the incident prejudiced defendant. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 467.) (44a) The same is true in the present case. Juror Schwark informed the trial court at the earliest opportunity that he inadvertently had received information concerning the case. The trial court held a hearing, outside the presence of the other jurors, at which Schwark pledged he would not divulge this information to his fellow jurors and would disregard it in performing his duties as a juror. In his opinion, he still could be fair and impartial. The trial court, which had the benefit of observing Schwark's demeanor, stated it believed him. According proper deference to this finding, we uphold the ruling of the trial court, concluding that the record rebuts the presumption of prejudice and that there is no substantial likelihood the incident prejudiced defendant. Defendant argues that the juror's answers to questions posed by defense counsel revealed that receipt of the information necessarily affected the role he played in deliberations. Defendant misconstrues the juror's responses, which we set forth in full: [Defense Counsel]: .... Do you feel that you would be able to entirely put that out of your mind as if you had never heard it? [Juror]: Yes. Q: Okay. Why do you think you could do that? That's a little bit of an unfair question, but โ A: Obviously, it bothers my conscience, and that's why I'm here. I want you to know it. I want everybody to know it. I recognize it may not be fair to the defendant that I know that. All I can tell you is that any decision that I would make would be based upon whatever was presented in court, and that's all I can say. Q: Okay. The next level, of course, past your personal feelings, is, of course, that that can't be communicated to anybody else. A: I understand that, and I would pledge that I would not do that. Q: Okay. Now, there may be people talking about things that would directly contradict what was said on โ what you heard the news people talk about. How does that affect your ability to deliberate? A: Obviously, if I am not going to disclose that I have that information, I can't refute if someone were to make that charge. I would not be able to stand up and strongly refute it and say, `I have some other information.' So I would simply have to play a passive role if something like that ever came up. That's all I can tell you. Q: Okay. And โ A: And that has concerned me, is that, what part in the deliberation could I play? I mean, that is a concern. I have to be careful about that. Defendant focuses on the juror's statement that he would have to play a passive role if the subject of defendant's future dangerousness was raised during deliberations. Read in context, however, the juror's remarks indicated only that he would be careful not to reveal to the other jurors the information he received outside the court proceedings. Taken as a whole, the juror's responses support the trial court's finding that no prejudice resulted. Defendant also stresses the following remark by the court regarding Juror Schwark: I saw an honest man who said he could be honest with Mr. Zapien, and I have to believe him. Defendant contends this demonstrates the court erroneously believed it was compelled to accept the juror's testimony, regardless of its credibility. Defendant interprets this statement too literally. It is clear from the context of the court's comment that it did not consider itself bound to accept Schwark's testimony as true, but that it merely did, in fact, believe the juror was telling the truth. At the conclusion of Schwark's testimony, the court observed: I look at the man, he seems to me to be eminently honorable. Defendant relies upon our decision in People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, which reversed a judgment of death because a juror had read a newspaper article stating that the defendant was on parole from prison after having served time for assaulting a woman with a deadly weapon. After the guilt phase verdicts had been signed, the juror disclosed that he had read this article to a fellow juror. That juror, in turn, had informed the court. The court questioned the juror who had read the article, as well as two other jurors, and ruled that no prejudice had resulted. This court reversed the judgment, noting: `A juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of the disturbing influence, but he cannot be permitted to testify how far that influence operated upon his mind.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1109.) (45) This statement in Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, is based upon the proscription in Evidence Code section 1150 against admission of evidence of a juror's mental processes in reaching a verdict. [10] It does not preclude a court, upon learning of misconduct prior to rendition of a verdict, from questioning the jurors concerning the misconduct and admonishing them to disregard such improper influences. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 838.) To the contrary, this court has held that [t]he presumption of prejudice may be dispelled by an admonition to disregard the improper information. [Citations.] ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 925 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571].) We generally presume that jurors observe such instructions. ( Ibid. ) (44b) The trial court in the present case questioned Juror Schwark concerning his improper, but inadvertent, receipt of information concerning the case. The effect of this questioning was to admonish the juror to disregard the information, which Schwark pledged he would do. Unlike the juror in Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, who (until after the guilt phase verdicts had been signed) hid the fact he had read the newspaper article, Juror Schwark disclosed his inadvertent exposure to the television news report the morning after it occurred and promised to disregard it. (See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 838.) Under these circumstances, the trial court was not required to excuse Schwark and replace him with an alternate juror. (46) A trial court's decision whether good cause exists to excuse a juror or to discharge a jury is within its discretion. The court's decision will be upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support it. [Citations.] ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 467.) We reject defendant's claim of prejudicial error.