Opinion ID: 2711
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Defendants' Alleged Acts Were Legislative Under Bogan

Text: Defendants argue that, in firing plaintiffs and (allegedly) eliminating their positions, they were engaging in acts that were legislative in nature and thus, entitled to immunity for those acts. We first address the District Court's application of the functional test set forth by the Supreme Court in Bogan for deciding whether a defendant's acts are legislative and therefore protected by the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity. According to that test, two factors are relevant in determining whether a defendant's acts are within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (internal quotation marks). First, it is relevant whether the defendants' actions were legislative in form, i.e., whether they were integral steps in the legislative process. Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Second, it may also be relevant whether defendants' actions were legislative in substance,  i.e., whether the actions bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation, including whether they reflected . . . discretionary, policymaking decision[s] implicating the budgetary priorities of the [government] and the services the [government] provides to its constituents. Id. at 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. Although the Court in Bogan did not state explicitly whether establishing both the procedural and substantive elements of this inquiry was required for legislative immunity to apply, we agree with the District Court that establishing both elements is required in these circumstances. In particular, we think that before high-level executive branch officials in the State of Connecticut can claim the protections of an immunity traditionally accorded to members of the legislative branch, it is important that they show that their activities were legislative both in form and in substance. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (Regardless of the level of government, we believe the two-part substance/procedure inquiry is helpful in analyzing whether a non-legislator performing allegedly administrative tasks is entitled to immunity.). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly framed its broad inquiry as whether defendants' alleged acts were both: (1) substantively legislative, i.e., acts that involve policy making; and (2) procedurally legislative, i.e., passed by means of established legislative procedures. Dist. Ct. Op., 2006 WL 141645, at  (citing Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989)). We turn now to evaluate the District Court's application of this inquiry to facts of the instant case. Defendants argue that the District Court erred in concluding that further factual discovery is necessary to determine whether their alleged acts were procedurally legislative under the first prong of the Bogan test. In particular, defendants contend that the District Court impermissibly focused on defendants' motives, rather than on the nature of their acts, when conducting its analysis. Defendants point specifically to the District Court's conclusion in the April 5 Order that further discovery is necessary so that the Court can determine whether defendants are able to make a good faith [showing] . . . that they ordered the layoffs to achieve budgetary savings under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 4-85(b)(2), and not for other reasons. April 5 Order at 2, J.A. 90. We agree with defendants that the District Court impermissibly focused on defendants' motives when concluding that discovery was warranted. It has been well-settled since the Supreme Court's decision in Bogan that courts may not consider a defendant's motives when assessing the legislative nature vel non of his actions. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Recognizing that the privilege of absolute immunity `would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to . . . the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives,' id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783), and that it is not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783), the Supreme Court in Bogan held that questions concerning the defendants' motives were wholly irrelevant to its determination of whether they were entitled to legislative immunity. See id. The Court concluded that the relevant question was whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioner's acts were legislative. Id. (emphasis added). The District Court thus erred when it determined that before defendants' activities could be cloaked with legislative immunity, defendants would have to make a good faith showing as to their reasons for ordering the alleged terminations. Neither a showing of good faith nor an inquiry into defendants' subjective reasons addresses the relevant issue of whether the nature of the act[s] that gave rise to the alleged harm was legislative or executive. Id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966. Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court's ultimate conclusion that further discovery is necessary to determine whether defendants' acts were indeed procedurally legislative under Bogan. We are unable to determine on the current record whether defendants' alleged acts were integral steps in the legislative process. Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Although the District Court concluded that the governor had the legislative authority under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 4-85(b)(2) to make deficit reduction decisions, April 5 Order at 2, J.A. 90, it is unclear whether the alleged terminations were integral steps in the statutory budget process. More specifically, the record does not show whether defendants acted pursuant to their statutory budget authority when they ordered the terminations, or whether the terminations occurred independent of (or in violation of) that authority. [11] Thus, whether defendants' alleged acts were procedurally legislative under the functional test of Bogan remains a disputed question of fact that must be resolved after discovery. Compare Appellants' Br. at 41-42 (contending that when the Governor acted to remedy the State's fiscal condition by revising its budget and reducing its workforce, he . . . was fully authorized to make legislative decisions), with Appellees' Br. at 57 (Plaintiffs are prepared to prove that Governor Rowland never invoked his rescission authority . . . and did not follow the mandatory statutory procedures), and id. at 58 (asserting that the Governor did not act within 30 days of being notified of the deficit, did not submit a report explaining the reasons for the deficit [as] required by § 4-85(b)(2), and did not submit a plan for spending reductions that he could implement to eliminate the budget deficit). We turn next to the District Court's application of the second prong of the Bogan test, inquiring whether the acts undertaken by defendants were substantively legislative. Defendants argue that because the District Court concluded that defendants' actions were substantively legislative, and because the Supreme Court in Bogan did not address whether legislative immunity attaches only to actions that are both substantively and procedurally legislative, we should conclude that legislative immunity bars the instant action. Appellants' Br. at 37. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, as explained above, to establish a legislative immunity defense in the instant case, defendants must show that their acts are procedurally, as well as substantively, legislative. Second, the current record does not reveal whether the District Court properly concluded that defendants' actions were substantively legislative. The District Court based its conclusion on its observation that in this case the governor faced a budget crisis in the fall of 2002, and, as the state's chief executive officer, exercised his discretion to reduce expenditures by demanding collective bargaining agreement concessions and by eliminating some 3,000 union jobs through executive order. Dist. Ct. Op., 2006 WL 141645, at  (emphasis added). The elimination of a position, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, is a substantively legislative act for legislative immunity purposes. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966 (noting that termination of an employee's position may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office). By contrast, [a] personnel decision is administrative in nature if it is directed at a particular employee or employees, and is not part of a broader legislative policy. Almonte, 478 F.3d at 108; see also Harhay, 323 F.3d at 210 (Discretionary personnel decisions, even if undertaken by public officials who otherwise are entitled to immunity, do not give rise to [legislative] immunity. . . .). However, we do not think it was proper for the District Court to conclude at the pleading stage, and without explanation, that defendants eliminated plaintiffs' positions, rather than terminated the employment of particular employees administratively. Plaintiffs do not allege in their amended complaint that defendants terminat[ed] the budget lines that would have funded their positions, Almonte, 478 F.3d at 108, or that defendants eliminated the positions through other means. Rather, plaintiffs allege only that state union employees were terminat[ed] for illegal reasons. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 42. Moreover, no undisputed record evidence contradicts plaintiffs' allegations. Accepting plaintiffs' allegations as true, as we must in reviewing defendants' motion to dismiss, see Almonte, 478 F.3d at 104 & n. 2, we conclude that the District Court should not have found that the positions were eliminated. Even assuming arguendo that the current record established that some positions were eliminated from the state workforce during the relevant time period, defendants cannot demonstrate at this stage of the litigation that their acts were substantively legislative. The District Court did not consider whether plaintiffs' positions were eliminated, or whether plaintiffs' loss of their state employment was directly attributable to any budget modifications proposed or implemented administratively by defendants. [12] Accordingly, discovery is necessary before the District Court can determine conclusively whether defendants' actions were substantively legislative. After discovery, the dispositive question to be answered by the District Court regarding this aspect of its Bogan inquiry should be whether plaintiffs' positions were eliminated (a substantively legislative act), see Almonte, 478 F.3d at 108, or whether plaintiffs were administratively fired (a substantively non-legislative act), see id. The District Court should include within the realm of substantively legislative activity not only any elimination of positions that occurred, but also any discussions [defendants] may have held, and any agreements they may have made . . . regarding the new budget in the months preceding any decision to eliminate the positions. Id. Although we do not set forth the precise contours of the distinction between legislative position eliminations and administrative firings, we briefly note, for the benefit of the District Court, the possibility that discovery will reveal facts suggesting defendants initially administratively fired plaintiffs and only subsequently eliminated their positions. In Jessen v. Town of Eastchester, 114 F.3d 7 (2d Cir.1997), we held that a plaintiff could sue municipal board members for firing him administratively before they eliminated his position. We rested our conclusion in Jessen on the fact that the earlier termination from a position which then, at least briefly, remained open was an administrative act that legislative immunity does not protect. Id. at 8. But insofar as plaintiffs are seeking reinstatement to positions that have been legislatively eliminated, it would make no difference whether plaintiffs had been administratively fired prior to the legislative position elimination. This is so because, for reasons of legislative immunity, the District Court would lack the power to direct state officials to perform the legislative act of recreating the positions in order to reinstate the plaintiffs to them.