Opinion ID: 2169857
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: The defendants next contend that the trial justice erred when she denied their motion for judgment as a matter of law because, according to defendants, the Meads failed to prove that defendants were on notice of the presence of a small puddle of clear liquid on the restaurant's floor prior to Mrs. Mead's fall. After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the Meads and drawing all reasonable inferences in their favor, it is our opinion that the trial justice was correct in denying defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law because issues of fact were raised at trial upon which reasonable minds could differ. With respect to the spoliation issue, as we stated in Mead I, the question of whether or not Back Bay employees had prepared an incident report on the night in question, as required by company policy, was an issue of fact to be considered and resolved by the jury. Mead I, 840 A.2d at 1108 (Without a satisfactory explanation that such a report never existed, the jury should be permitted to infer that its production would have had adverse consequences for defendants.). In the instant case, as in Mead I, plaintiffs produced evidence about the procedures that defendants ordinarily used to document incidents such as Mrs. Mead's slip and fall. It was within the province of the jury, not that of either the trial court or this Court, to determine what inference was to be drawn from that evidence. See Mead I, 840 A.2d at 1109; see also Conlin v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 120 R.I. 1, 6, 384 A.2d 1057, 1059 (1978). Consequently, we hold that the trial justice's denial of defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law was appropriate.