Opinion ID: 1060719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: constitutional harmless error analysis

Text: To understand Howell `s rationale and underpinnings, it is helpful to review the history of constitutional harmless error analysis in the United States Supreme Court. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule requiring reversal for all constitutional errors which occur in a trial. The Court observed that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless . . . . Id. at 22, 87 S.Ct. at 827. The Court recognized that harmless-error rules can work very unfair and mischievous results when, for example, highly important and persuasive evidence, or argument, though legally forbidden, finds its way into a trial in which the question of guilt or innocence is a close one. Id. The Court therefore held that before a constitutional error could be deemed harmless, the beneficiary of the error, i.e., the prosecution, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828 (citing Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 84 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). The Supreme Court first applied Chapman to a capital sentencing proceeding in Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988) (holding that the admission of expert testimony about the defendant's risk for future dangerousness violated Sixth Amendment). In holding that the error was not harmless under Chapman , the Court emphasized that the question is not whether the legally admitted evidence was sufficient to support the death sentence . . . but rather, whether the State has proved `beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Id. at 258-59, 108 S.Ct. at 1798 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828). Two years later in another capital sentencing case, Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the United States Supreme Court remanded to the Mississippi Supreme Court, holding that when a capital sentencing jury in a weighing state has relied in part on an unconstitutional aggravating circumstance, an appellate court may either reweigh the remaining aggravating circumstances, if that is otherwise permissible under state law, or apply the Chapman harmless error analysis. In performing either analysis at the appellate level, however, the Court stressed that the defendant must be afforded an individualized and reliable sentencing determination based on the defendant's circumstances, his background, and the crime as required by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 749, 110 S.Ct. at 1449. In Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992), the Supreme Court again stressed the need for close appellate scrutiny of the import and effect of invalid aggravating factors to implement the well-established Eighth Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing determinations in death penalty cases. Id. at 230, 112 S.Ct. 1136 (emphasis added). Moreover, with regard to states such as Tennessee which employ a weighing process in the capital sentencing determination, the Court observed: [W]hen the sentencing body is told to weigh an invalid factor in its decision, a reviewing court may not assume it would have made no difference if the thumb had been removed from death's side of the scale. When the weighing process itself has been skewed, only constitutional harmless-error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sentence. This clear principle emerges not from any single case . . . but from our long line of authority setting forth the dual constitutional criteria of precise and individualized sentencing. Id. at 232, 112 S.Ct. at 1137 (emphasis added). Finally, in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992), a majority of the Supreme Court vacated a death sentence due to the Florida Supreme Court's failure to conduct a sufficient harmless error analysis under Chapman . In particular, the Court observed that the Florida court did not explain or even `declare' that the trial court's consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance `was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt' in that it `did not contribute to the [sentence] obtained.' Id. at 540, 112 S.Ct. at 2123 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828). In a separate concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor summarized the principles in this area: In Chapman v. California , . . . we held that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the reviewing court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. This is justifiably a high standard, and while it can be met without uttering the magic words harmless error, the reverse is not true. An appellate court's bald assertion that an error of constitutional dimensions was harmless cannot substitute for a principled explanation of how the court reached that conclusion. In Clemons v. Mississippi , . . . for example, we did not hesitate to remand a case for a detailed explanation based on the record when the lower court failed to undertake an explicit analysis supporting its cryptic, one-sentence conclusion of harmless error. Id. at 541, 112 S.Ct. at 2123 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).