Opinion ID: 1971799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Involuntariness Issue

Text: Rush noted what she termed a cross-appeal. The docket entries, however, reflect that Rush's Motion [was] Granted, indicating that the judge granted Rush's Motion to Suppress in its entirety; additionally, the ruling from the bench is ambiguous: The Court is required to consider the totality of the circumstances, and in my ruling, I am considering that. Court reviewed the Court's own docket, or its own file which has in it the Application For Statement of Charges. That's the information that the Prince George's County Police had when they got the original warrant for murder. And so when the Detective told her that was bullshit, that's exactly what he believed based on the information he had; that she was, in fact, telling him a story that didn't even come close to what they had already; he told her why. Court finds that in doing that, he left within her mind the impression that the only way she could be helped would be to tell the truth; ultimately, she did. But I think that was an inducement. I don't think it was intentional, but I definitely, in light of all of the circumstances: a person with a 9th grade education; no prior contact with the Court; that's what I heard from the tape or from the CD. And that, alone, probably wouldn't be sufficient for me to suppress the statement, but then you have to take into consideration that when we get to the statement about the lawyer; you couple those two, that's a violation of Miranda; not a violation of Maryland common law. That's important, the distinction being made. When the Detective told her that you would get one at some time, that left a false impression that she couldn't have one now. All she had to do is say, I want one now. We lawyers know that. Lay people don't. See, that puts an end to it. So when you take that into consideration, along with the only thing that could help her is to tell the truth, well, it might have helped her in the eyes of the All Mighty, if she so believed, or it might help her morally in her soul, but based on information the Detective had, there was no way that was going to help her, and he had every reason to know that. . . . The Motion to Suppress, for the reasons stated     I understand that was a violation of Miranda.    Not a violation of common law. Although one cannot appeal from a favorable ruling, see Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 664, 299 A.2d 1, 3 (1973) ([G]enerally, a party cannot appeal from a judgment or order which is favorable to him, since he is not thereby aggrieved.); Thompson v. State, 395 Md. 240, 248-49, 909 A.2d 1035, 1040-41 (2006), the Court of Special Appeals and the parties proceeded on the basis that the trial court did not rule entirely favorably to Rush on the issue of voluntariness. Rush asks us to consider her complaint regarding the ruling on voluntariness in tandem with the State's appeal because a voluntary statement, albeit one not satisfying the Miranda dictates, may be used for impeachment purposes, see Brittingham v. State, 306 Md. 654, 661, 511 A.2d 45, 48. The State asks this Court to determine whether the Court of Special Appeals had jurisdiction to consider Rush's cross-appeal on the alternative ground of involuntariness. In determining whether it had jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's cross-appeal, the Court of Special Appeals first examined the plain language of Section 12-303(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the legislative history of the statute, and this Court's jurisprudence construing authority to hear interlocutory appeals and noted that: What little direct Maryland precedent there is would seem, therefore, to militate in favor of the most narrow interpretation of the State's right to appeal a decision to suppress evidence as not including a challenge by the defendant to the court's unfavorable ruling on an alternative ground. State v. Rush, 174 Md.App. at 289, 921 A.2d 334 at 351. The Court of Special Appeals did not end its analysis, however, but chose also to consider the general principles that guide the scope of appellate review . . . developed in the context of appeals from final judgments, id., and found cases construing analogous statutes in Illinois and the federal system as providing appellate courts with jurisdiction to consider defendant's alternative suppression arguments; the intermediate appellate court reasoned that the general principle that a reviewing court may uphold the final judgment of a lower court on any ground adequately shown by the record is well-established in Maryland. The legislature created the right of immediate appeal for the State at issue here in order to equalize the opportunities the parties to criminal cases have for meaningful correction of erroneous pretrial evidentiary rulings, made on constitutional grounds. . . . The legislative goal of equalization is most thoroughly and efficiently accomplished when the general scope of appellate review principle is applied in the State's immediate appeal as it is in the defendant's appeal from a final judgement. Id. at 293, 921 A.2d at 353. The State contends that it was error for the intermediate appellate court to consider a defendant's cross-appeal as Section 12-302(c)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article makes no reference to cross-appeals. The State also contends that the intermediate appellate court's reliance on federal and Illinois jurisprudence to support its assertion that it has jurisdiction to consider a defendant's cross-appeal is misplaced because of the significant differences between the federal and Illinois statutes and Section 12-302(c)(3) and its legislative history. Rush, conversely, argues that the intermediate appellate court did have jurisdiction to consider a cross-appeal under Maryland Rule 8-202(e), which mandates that [i]f one party files a timely notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within ten days. Rush also contends that judicial time and resources would be wasted if the appellate court were unable to hear the cross-appeal at the same time the State's appeal is granted. In analyzing whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to consider a cross-appeal positing alternative grounds for the grant of a motion to suppress, the Court of Special Appeals appropriately began its inquiry by noting that [i]n Maryland, `[a]ppellate jurisdiction is established by constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and rules; jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the parties.' State v. Rush, 174 Md.App. at 283, 921 A.2d at 347, quoting Shofer v. Stuart Hack Co., 107 Md.App. 585, 596, 669 A.2d 201, 206 (1996), quoting in turn Pearlstein v. Maryland Deposit Ins., 79 Md.App. 41, 48, 555 A.2d 528, 532 (1989). The question then becomes whether Section 12-302(c)(3) of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article, or any other statute, rule, or constitutional provision, grants jurisdiction to entertain a defendant's interlocutory cross-appeal when the State has appealed the grant of a motion to suppress. It is well established that [t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 661, 911 A.2d 1245, 1249 (2006); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 688, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004). We begin our analysis by first looking to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395; Collins, 383 Md. at 688-91, 861 A.2d at 730-32. Further, whenever possible, an interpretation should be given to the statutory provisions which does not lead to unreasonable or illogical consequences. Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 663, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250 (2006); Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006). If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends. Stoddard, 395 Md. at 661, 911 A.2d at 1249-50; Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395; Collins, 383 Md. at 689, 861 A.2d at 730. If, however, the language is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to the statute's legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. Stoddard, 395 Md. at 662-63, 911 A.2d at 1250; Blake, 395 Md. at 224, 909 A.2d at 1026; Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395; Collins, 383 Md. at 691-92, 861 A.2d at 732. Additionally, we have narrowly construed any grant of appellate authority. In State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 78, 785 A.2d 1275, 1285 (2001), we overruled our earlier decision in Cardinell v. State, 335 Md. 381, 644 A.2d 11 (1994), in which we determined that the State had a common law right to appeal in criminal cases and that the language of Section 12-302(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceeding Article did not clearly supersede that right. In Green, we specifically overruled the holding by emphasizing that the State does not enjoy a common law right to appeal an allegedly criminal sentence as to the extent a common law right to appeal criminal sentences ever existed, the Legislature abrogated that right when it enacted § 12-302(c). 367 Md. at 76, 785 A.2d at 1283. In so finding, we adopted the reasoning of the dissent of Judge John C. Eldridge in Cardinell that today, there is no common law right to appeal. Id. at 72, 785 A.2d at 1281, citing Cardinell, 335 Md. at 398-401, 644 A.2d at 19-21 (Judge Eldridge, dissenting). We have strictly construed the right to appeal in post- Cardinell cases. See Dvorak v. Anne Arundel County Ethics Commission, 400 Md. 446, 929 A.2d 185 (2007) (holding that neither State nor Anne Arundel County law conferred a right of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from the order of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Anne Arundel County Ethics Commission); Fuller v. State, 397 Md. 372, 918 A.2d 453 (2007) (holding that the denial of an inmate's petition to be committed to a drug treatment program under Section 8-507 of the Health-General Article is not appealable); Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 884 A.2d 1215 (2005) (holding that the denial of a motion to quash an arrest warrant was not appealable as there was not specific statutory authority granting such an appeal); Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 388 Md. 214, 879 A.2d 695 (2005) (holding that victim of a juvenile's delinquent act had no right to appeal the terms of a consent order for restitution as a victim is not a party to a criminal prosecution); In re Billy W., 386 Md. 675, 874 A.2d 423 (2005) (holding that a trial court order from a periodic permanency plan review hearing was not appealable as it was not a final order nor made appealable by Section 12-303 of the Court and Judicial Proceedings Article or any other statute); State v. Manck, 385 Md. 581, 870 A.2d 196 (2005) (holding that the State does not have a statutory right to appeal a trial court's striking of notice of intention to seek the death penalty and that this Court could not issue a prerogatory writ to permit appellate review); Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 829 A.2d 1007 (2003) (holding that the State does not have the right to appeal a sentence under Section 12-302(c)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article when a specific sentence is not mandated by statute); Pack Shack Inc. v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 808 A.2d 795 (2002) (holding that Howard County had no right to appeal an order denying a civil contempt petition under Section 12-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article because the County was not a person adjudged in contempt); Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 748 A.2d 478 (2000) (dismissing the State's appeal from an order to suppress evidence for a violation of the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act because it did not satisfy the terms of the statute). See also Murrell v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 829 A.2d 548 (2003) (holding that a circuit court's common law mandamus action was appealable under the general appeals statute as an appeal from such an action was not precluded by Section 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article); State v. Griswold, 374 Md. 184, 821 A.2d 430 (2003) (holding that the State had a right to appeal under 12-302(c)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article when a circuit court imposed a sentence specifically prohibited by statute). A general grant of appellate jurisdiction is provided in Sections 12-301 [10] and 12-308 [11] of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article for the review of final and reviewable judgments. Section 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article permits a limited number of exceptions to the final judgment rule, one of which is Section 12-302(c)(3) which specifically allows the State to appeal from the grant of a suppression motion under various conditions: (3)(i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, and in cases under §§ 5-602 through 5-609 and §§ 5-612 through 5-614 of the Criminal Law Article, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return of property alleged to have been seized in violation of the Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or the Maryland Declaration of Rights. (ii) The appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the defendant. However, in all cases the appeal shall be taken no more than 15 days after the decision has been rendered and shall be diligently prosecuted. (iii) Before taking the appeal, the State shall certify to the court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that the evidence excluded or the property required to be returned is substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The appeal shall be heard and the decision rendered within 120 days of the time that the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court. Otherwise, the decision of the trial court shall be final. (iv) Except in a homicide case, if the State appeals on the basis of this paragraph, and if on final appeal the decision of the trial court is affirmed, the charges against the defendant shall be dismissed in the case from which the appeal was taken. In that case, the State may not prosecute the defendant on those specific charges or on any other related charges arising out of the same incident. Section 12-302(c)(3) does not confer appellate jurisdiction to hear a defendant's cross-appeal. Rather, the statute clearly limits the right to appeal from an interlocutory order to the State; the defendant is free to appeal from the final judgment. The statute also expressly links the State's right to appeal to certain restrictions inapplicable to defendants, such as [t]he appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches and the State shall certify to the court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay. Where the defendant has been given a specific right to appeal in addition to the right to appeal from final judgments, the Legislature has been specific in protecting that right. For example, Section 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, in addressing the right to appeal a decision of the District Court in criminal cases, specifies that: (b) Criminal cases.  In a criminal case: (1) The State may appeal from a final judgment entered in the District Court: (i) If the State alleges that the trial judge failed to impose the sentence specifically mandated by the Code; or (ii) Granting a motion to dismiss, or quashing or dismissing a charging document. (2) The defendant may appeal even from a final judgment entered in the District Court though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. (emphasis added). [12] Unlike Section 12-401, which specifically states that [t]he defendant may appeal, or the language of a a party may appeal, in Section 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, [13] or [a]ny person may appeal, in Section 12-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, [14] Section 12-302(c) speaks only of the State. Further, contrary to Rush's contention, Section 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 8-202(e) do not create any ambiguity. We have held previously that when provisions of Section 12-302 are in conflict with the general grant of appellate jurisdiction provided by Section 12-301, the more specific Section 12-302 provisions will control. In Gisriel v. Ocean City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 496, 693 A.2d 757, 767 (1997), we held that an appeal was not authorized under Section 12-301 because it was superseded by the more specific provision of Section 12-302(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states that [u]nless a right to appeal is expressly granted by law, § 12-301 does not permit an appeal from a final judgment of a court entered or made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the District Court, an administrative agency, or a local legislative body. Maryland Rule 8-202(e) which states that [i]f one party files a timely notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within ten days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was filed or within any longer time otherwise allowed by this Rule, can also be read with Section 12-302(c) without engendering any conflict or ambiguity, as Rule 8-202 specifically refers to times for filing a notice of appeal and does not grant or limit jurisdiction. Although Rush could not file a cross-appeal, she was entitled to raise the voluntariness issue in the State's appeal, in order to defend the suppression ruling on an alternative ground raised by Rush and ruled on by the hearing judge. See Robeson v. State, 285 Md. 498, 501-04, 403 A.2d 1221, 1223-24 (1979). The Court of Special Appeals was correct in noting that a reviewing court may uphold the final judgment of a lower court on any ground adequately shown by the record; Rush, 174 Md.App. at 293, 921 A.2d at 353; although we disagree that the record is adequate upon which to base an appellate determination of voluntariness. In Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 433-34, 897 A.2d 228, 241 (2006), we declined to consider lack of in rem jurisdiction and bad faith as other grounds for affirming the circuit court's dismissal of a condemnation action because those grounds were not adequately developed in the record. We concluded that the Circuit Court, although presented with argument concerning in rem jurisdiction and bad faith, did not specifically address the contentions. Therefore, because there is a dearth of necessary factual detail in the record regarding these contentions, we will not affirm the Circuit Court's decision on those grounds. Id. at 434, 897 A.2d at 241. See also Mosley v. State, 378 Md. 548, 562-65, 836 A.2d 678, 684-88 (2003) (iterating that, in the post-conviction context, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are best reviewed by a trial court rather than an appellate court); Myers v. Director of the Patuxent Institution, 233 Md. 621, 622, 195 A.2d 716, 716-17 (1963) (in post-conviction context, remanding case to hearing judge when adequate findings of fact upon which appellate court could base its decision were absent). The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the record was adequate for it to rule on the issue of involuntariness, in a decision directly opposite to that of the trial court, based upon its review of the transcript of Detective Jernigan's interview of Rush and reflected that her inculpatory statements were obtained through inducements. Rush, 174 Md.App. at 301-13, 921 A.2d at 358-65. We decline to follow the same path because inferences drawn from viewing the interview DVD, through observation of the inflictions and demeanor exhibited by both Rush and Detective Jernigan, may differ from those inferences that can be drawn from the bare transcript. We are left with a record that is not adequate to base a decision. [15] JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED AS TO MIRANDA ISSUE AND REVERSED AS TO VOLUNTARINESS ISSUE; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS APPEAL OF PETITIONER RUSH, REVERSE SUPPRESSION ORDER OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, AND REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; COSTS IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AND THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. RAKER, J., concurs and dissents. BELL, C.J., and GREENE, J, dissent. RAKER, J., concurring and dissenting: I join in Part II. A. of the opinion of the Court affirming the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court erred in ruling that Rush was not sufficiently advised of her rights in accordance with Miranda, and in granting the motion to suppress her inculpatory statements on that ground. In other words, the Miranda warnings were constitutionally adequate. I dissent from the majority's ruling on the involuntariness issue. I agree with the State that Rush cannot appeal the Circuit Court's finding that portions of her statement were voluntary. The ruling was interlocutory, and because there exists no statute or right to appeal such an order, her claim may be raised in an appeal from a final judgment, and not within the State's appeal. BELL, C.J., dissenting, in which GREENE, J. joins. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States considered the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which accure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself, id. at 439, 86 S.Ct. at 1609, in the process seeking to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow. Id. at 442, 86 S.Ct. at 1611. Addressing the concrete constitutional guidelines it intended to provide, it held: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated bylaw enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. . . . As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. Id. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added). These guidelines were necessary because the Court concluded that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored. Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. Having identified the rights of which a custodial defendant must be apprised, the Court explained the rationale underlying each: At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury. . . . Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.       The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; . . . a warning is a clear cut fact. More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time. The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary system-that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest. The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end. Prosecutors themselves claim that the admonishment of the right to remain silent without more `will benefit only the recidivist and the professional.' Brief for the National District Attorneys Association as amicus curiae, p. 14. Even preliminary advice given to the accused by his own attorney can be swiftly overcome by the secret interrogation process. Cf. Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, n. 5, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1762[, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964)]. Thus, the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial. See Crooker v. State of California, 357 U.S. 433, 443-448, 78 S.Ct. 1287, 1293-1296, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-70, 86 S.Ct. at 1624-26. But, the Court concluded, the advice of the right to counsel generally does not suffice, the defendant's ability to afford counsel must be considered. It explained: In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights . . ., it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. As with the warning of the right to remain silent and of the general right to counsel, only by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it. Id. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (footnotes omitted). The importance of, indeed, the necessity for, the requirement that a defendant be informed explicitly of his or her right to have counsel present both before and during questioning was underscored by the Court and made manifest when it admonished that [n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right. Id. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626. Similarly, with regard to the indigent defendant, the Court was clear and unequivocal: [t]he financial ability of the individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent. In fact, were we to limit these constitutional rights to those who can retain an attorney, our decisions today would be of little significance. Id. at 472, 86 S.Ct. at 1626-27. The majority holds today that the Miranda warnings given the petitioner in this case satisfies the Miranda requirements here in before reviewed. [1] Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 90, 939 A.2d 689, 702 (2007). I do not, and cannot, agree. Rather than being read the Advice of Rights and Waiver Form, the petitioner was given warnings that were modified by the interrogating detective. As modified, the warnings given advised that if the petitioner wanted a lawyer and could not afford to hire one, counsel would be provided her at no cost, at some time. The latter phrase was added by the detective. In addition, rather than informing the petitioner in accordance with the last sentence of the Form, which acknowledged the petitioner's right to elect to proceed with questioning without counsel, the detective amended the sentence to omit any reference to the petitioner's right of election. [2] By blessing these modifications, the majority undermines a key purpose of Miranda, jealously to protect a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by making clear to a suspect in custody that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). The advisements in this case are far from clear. To the contrary, the message that they convey is, at best, ambiguous and, at worst, confusing. This is particularly the case when it is considered that the at some time qualifier applies only to appointed counsel; it does not, and the majority does not suggest that it does, apply to hired counsel. The message is also ambiguous with respect to whether appointed counsel can be present during questioning. While there is no explicit statement that appointed counsel, too, must be present at and during questioning, there is a suggestion that the opposite is the case: the advisements assumed, and conveyed to the petitioner, the expectation that questioning would occur, subject to termination later, when it did not recognize what must be obvious if the spirit and meaning of Miranda are to be respected, that for the questioning to proceed, the petitioner must have waived the right to counsel's presence. And that waiver, Miranda requires to be voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made, an impossibility unless the options are clear and unambiguous. In that regard, the inclusion of the words, at some time, even if to explain the system or protocol for the appointment of counsel for indigents, is significant. That reference may, and indeed is likely to, lead an indigent defendant to believe, and not unreasonably so, that he or she is not entitled to an appointed attorney during the impending questioning, but, instead, counsel will be appointed for him or her only at some time in the future. These ambiguities had so muddied the advisements given, no waiver given, or taken, under these circumstances could ever be knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Acknowledging that the goal of its review of the advisements given is to determine whether the petitioner's rights under Miranda were adequately preserved, the majority purports to have [a]ssess[ed] the totality of the advisements, both oral and written, for that purpose. Rush, 403 Md. at 90, 939 A.2d at 702. In fact, [i]n lawyerlike fashion, the majority parses the advisements, looking for an interpretation that plausibly could be consistent with Miranda. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 216, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2887, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Having noted that Rush was told that she could speak with a lawyer before being questioned and at any time during questioning[,] and concluding that the modification of the advisements did not tie her right to counsel to a future event or to her ability to obtain a lawyer herself; rather, as in Duckworth, the modified language only clarified, in a separate advisement, how and when appointed counsel would be provided, Rush, 403 Md. at 90, 939 A.2d at 702, the majority is satisfied that, as in Duckworth, the advisements touched all of the bases required by Miranda,  492 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. at 2880, and reasonably conve[yed] to [the petitioner her] rights as required by Miranda.  Id. (quoting California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981)). It thus announces that the modified language does not suggest . . . that appointed counsel could not be present during questioning. Rush, 403 Md. at 90, 939 A.2d at 702. The majority is right, of course, its interpretation of the advisements is a plausible one all of the requirements were mentioned and, thus, all the bases were touched. It cannot be disputed that, superficially and technically, Rush was told she could speak with a lawyer before and during questioning. The trouble with the majority's analysis is that the question it answers is the wrong one. It is not the question whether all of the requirements were mentioned or whether one interpretation is to be preferred over another; rather, the question is whether the advice given was sufficiently clear and unambiguous as to enable the defendant, voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, to waive her Miranda rights. It is important to consider the advisements both in toto and in context. In that regard, it is significant that, immediately after being told of the right to have counsel before and during questioning, the petitioner was told that if she could not afford a lawyer, she would be appointed one at some time, not prior to the commencement of questioning. The petitioner could have, and probably did, glean from the at some time qualification that only those able to afford a private attorney would be entitled to seek counsel during questioning, and accordingly, those unable to afford an attorney would have to wait until a later period in time. See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 216-17, 109 S.Ct. at 2887, in which Marshall, J., dissenting, observed, in language remarkably applicable to the case sub judice: What goes wholly overlooked in [the majority's] analysis is that the recipients of police warnings are often frightened suspects unlettered in the law, not lawyers or judges or others schooled in interpreting legal or semantic nuance. Such suspects can hardly be expected to interpret, in as facile a manner as [the majority], the pretzel-like warnings here-intertwining, contradictory, and ambiguous as they are. (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 484 Pa. 349, 399 A.2d 111, 115 (1979).) Just as important, the petitioner was told of her right to terminate questioning once it was begun, but not that the commencement of questioning without counsel had to be with her consent to proceed in that fashion. Miranda mandates that, before an accused may be subjected to custodial interrogation, he or she must be adequately and effectively apprised of his [or her] rights against self-incrimination, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624, which includes being informed explicitly of his or her right to have counsel present both before and during questioning. Id. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. The warnings in this case do not pass muster. If [n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have been aware of this right [to counsel, appointed, if appropriate, during and before custodial questioning] will suffice to stand in its stead, it follows that no amount of parsing to find a plausible interpretation of an ambiguous advisement will save that advisement. Id. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1626. When the advisement is ambiguous, there can be no voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Only an explicit, clear warning provides the ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this right. Id. at 471-72, 86 S.Ct at 1626. What the Supreme Court iterated over forty years ago bears repeating and remembering: [t]he warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent  the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too has a right to have counsel present. . . . [O]nly by effective and express explanation to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a position to exercise it. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 473, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (emphasis added). I dissent. Judge Greene joins in the views expressed herein.