Opinion ID: 450644
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Arrest of Mora and Protective Sweep of His Hotel Room

Text: 54 Mora argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress items taken from his hotel room following his arrest. He maintains that there was neither probable cause for arrest, nor justification for the warrantless protective sweep of his room. 55 The ultimate conclusion of presence or absence of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); United States v. One Twin Engine Beech Aircraft, 533 F.2d 1106, 1108-09 (9th Cir.1976). We review the underlying facts under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review the court's ultimate conclusion de novo. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). We apply the same standard in reviewing whether exigent circumstances justified the warrantless protective sweep of Mora's hotel room. United States v. Hicks, 752 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir.1985). Probable cause consists of 56 facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense. 57 Michigan v. De Fillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); United States v. Thornton, 710 F.2d 513, 515 (9th Cir.1983). 58 The district court concluded that the acts and circumstances known to the officers warranted their belief that Mora had committed and was committing an offense. We defer to the trial court's resolution of the evidence presented to it. Mora had met with other smuggling suspects, including crew member Serrano-Tellez. At the Queen City Motel, he was seen removing a package from Alfonso's car and placing it into another car, looking about as if to detect surveillance. 59 The agents saw Mora don a wetsuit and scuba tanks on January 29 and swim in Los Angeles Harbor toward the Santa Marta. He and Serrano-Tellez had been seen gesturing toward the ship. On January 30, 1984, when the Los Angeles police officers reached the Surf Motel, Alfonso and Serrano-Tellez had been arrested, and thirty five pounds of cocaine wrapped in waterproof material had been seized from Serrano-Tellez's cabin aboard the Santa Marta. The officers had had word of a recent smuggling operation in San Francisco involving another Gran Colombian vessel that also relied upon the use of wetsuits and scuba gear. Another informant indicated that the same smuggling organization was involved in the San Francisco and Los Angeles smuggling efforts. Thus, the district judge clearly had evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that it was probable that Mora's actions were criminal in nature. Therefore, there existed probable cause for his arrest. 60 Even though there be probable cause to arrest, the Fourth Amendment does not sanction warrantless nonconsensual entry into a suspect's dwelling for purposes of a routine felony arrest except in exigent situations. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1374, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). The government argues that exigent circumstances existed. This requires the government to show that the warrantless entry of Mora's hotel room was imperative. United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 522 (9th Cir.1983). 61 Exigency has been defined asthose circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry ... was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. 62 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). Officers acting on probable cause and in good faith who reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or that they may be endangered may undertake a warrantless entry through an open door, after having knocked, identified themselves, and sensed suspicious circumstances. United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 190-92 (9th Cir.1982). 63 Law enforcement officers of course are reasonable in wanting to assure that suspects are not armed, and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). When suspects in a drug transaction learn they have been discovered, undue delay may result in the destruction of contraband or increase the likelihood of violence. United States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519, 523 (9th Cir.1983). 64 Nevertheless, search of a residence merely because a suspect is arrested inside does not follow as a matter of routine. United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir.1980). An arrest even on probable cause does not itself automatically provide exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search of the suspect's house. See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). 65 Exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into Mora's hotel room. The arrest of suspects had already begun by that time, and several suspects remained at large. The manager of the Surf Motel had called the police, informing them that a person in scuba gear and several others had appeared and were in room 3 of the motel. When the door to that room was opened after police knocked and identified themselves, they saw Mora near the bed, and two other men. They also heard a hurried scuffling noise coming from the bathroom. It was reasonable to believe that concealed presences might pose danger, or that an unidentified person might be able to destroy evidence. This could supply the exigency required for search. United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir.1984) (to establish exigent circumstances due to possible destruction of evidence there must be probable cause to suspect that evidence is present on the premises; mere suspicion that evidence may be present cannot justify warrantless entry). A protective sweep of room 3 was therefore justified. United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906, 909-10 (9th Cir.1980). 66 On entering, the officers saw on a table a drawing of a ship, scuba gear on the floor, a wet suit in the bathroom and a rental receipt for underwater equipment on top of a suitcase. Under the plain view doctrine, visible evidentiary items may be seized by officers lawfully on the premises. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324, 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983) (citations omitted). Since the police officers were lawfully present and the seizure of the items was valid under the plain view doctrine, the district court correctly denied Mora's motion to suppress.