Opinion ID: 2613162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Conduct

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's finding in aggravation does not satisfy the level of individual conduct required by [A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6)]. After reviewing the record before us, we conclude that it amply supports the trial court's finding that defendant's conduct satisfies the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance. Section 13-703(F)(6) provides that the sentencing judge shall consider as an aggravating circumstance the fact that [t]he defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. In this case, defendant committed the offense of first degree felony murder. The question, then, is whether defendant committed Deputy Marconnet's murder in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. We find Gillies instructive in addressing this question. Gillies and an accomplice kidnapped, brutally raped, and ultimately murdered a helpless young woman. A jury later found Gillies guilty of first degree felony murder. [1] In finding the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance and sentencing Gillies to death, the trial judge found it immaterial who actually struck the fatal blow to the head of the victim. He relied instead on an abundance of evidence that the victim suffered both physical pain and mental anguish and the fact that Gillies was actively engaged in the kidnapping, the rape and the robbery of the victim and that he transported her to the place where she was killed. Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 513-14, 662 P.2d at 1020-21. The trial judge concluded, Her death is the result that you wished to have occurred, that is manifestly clear by your statements and manner at the time the lady was killed. I do not find that your participation was relatively minor. Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 514, 662 P.2d at 1021. This court affirmed. As in Gillies, the record before us provides an abundance of evidence showing that Deputy Marconnet suffered both physical pain and mental anguish before his death, and that defendant was actively engaged in causing that pain and anguish. After being physically overpowered by defendant and his sons, Deputy Marconnet was forced to lie supine on the ground. He was unarmed, and he had a gash in his forehead. He knew he was helpless. As he lay helpless on the ground, he looked up into the barrel of his own gun, knowing that the gun could be fired either by pulling the hammer back and then squeezing the trigger, or by merely squeezing the trigger. He shielded himself the only way he could; he put his hand over his face. As Deputy Marconnet lay there, he undoubtedly hoped that he would not be shot. His hopes were crushed, however, when he heard defendant command his son to Shoot him. Then, after a kind of little long while, the command was heeded and Deputy Marconnet's worst fear was his last. These facts establish cruelty under the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 51, 659 P.2d 1, 10 (1983) (Cruelty has been specifically defined to involve the infliction of pain on the victim[].... [O]ur concept of cruelty involves not only physical pain, but also `mental    distress visited upon the victim[].') (citation omitted); State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 480, 715 P.2d 721, 733 (1986) (Cruelty can involve mental as well as physical suffering. A victim's uncertainty as to the ultimate fate can be significant in indicating mental suffering.). As in Gillies, Deputy Marconnet's death is the result that [defendant] wished to have occurred, that is manifestly clear by [his] statements and manner at the time [Deputy Marconnet] was killed. Defendant's participation in Deputy Marconnet's murder was substantial and intentional. Because the finding by the trial court beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was especially cruel is so compelling, and because the trial court made no finding as to heinousness or depravity, it is unnecessary for us to make findings of heinousness or depravity. See, e.g., Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 513, 662 P.2d at 1020; State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 436, 616 P.2d 888, 896 (1980) ([I]t [is] not necessary that all three elements, heinous, cruel, [and] depraved, be present in the murder. The statutory expression is in the disjunctive, so either all or one could constitute an aggravating circumstance.). We do not consider A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(10) (murder of peace officer) as an aggravating circumstance because its effective date was after Deputy Marconnet's murder. Laws 1988, Ch. 155, § 1.