Opinion ID: 1434860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is a juvenile traffic hearing officer constitutionally authorized to hear and decide contested cases?

Text: Section 255 authorizes juvenile court judges to appoint as traffic hearing officers one or more persons of suitable experience who need not be judges. The officer in this case was not a judge. Section 256 permits the hearing officers to hear and decide charges against a minor of any violation of the Vehicle Code not declared to be a felony. [3] If the minor consents the hearing may be held on a copy of the traffic citation, in lieu of a juvenile court petition. (§ 257.) The minor or the parent may request modification or rehearing of the hearing officer's order; a request not granted within 10 days of the order's date is deemed denied. (§ 262; see In re Conley (1966) 244 Cal. App.2d 755 [53 Cal. Rptr. 321]; In re F.E. (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 222 [136 Cal. Rptr. 547].) In this case the hearing was held on February 24, 1977, and the request for rehearing dated March 4 was denied by the judge on April 1. There was no transcript; available to the judge were the notice to appear, the disposition and hearing forms (akin to minutes), the hearing officer's notes of the testimony, and the summarizing memo of a juvenile traffic court supervisor. (2) Kathy contends she was entitled to rehearing because the judge who denied her request did not have a transcript of the proceedings before the hearing officer. [4] She relies on the rule in wardship cases that availability of meaningful review by a judge is required to prevent a juvenile court referee's contested order that adjudges a minor a ward of the court for criminal conduct (§ 602) from violating the limitation on the referee's function to subordinate judicial duties (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 22; In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727 [122 Cal. Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406]). (3) Denial of an application for judicial rehearing of such an order must be based on review of a transcript of the proceeding before the referee so that the judge may arrive at an independent decision; otherwise the constitutional limitation requires that rehearing be granted as of right. ( In re Damon C. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 493 [128 Cal. Rptr. 172, 546 P.2d 676].) [5] (4) When serious juvenile misconduct is charged, the referee's subjudicial authority to make a final determination extends to uncontested or collateral matters but not to contested adjudications. ( In re Edgar M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 727, 735.) The adjudication in the present case was contested but dealt with a routine traffic infraction and resulted in imposition of only a small fine. The issue, therefore, is whether the minor nature of the offense converts its contested adjudication into a subordinate judicial task. In 1976 the Legislature authorized municipal courts to allow commissioners and traffic referees to have the same jurisdiction and exercise the same powers and duties as the judges of the court with respect to any infraction (Gov. Code, §§ 72190, 72401, subd. (c)). The statute declares that the functions are subordinate judicial duties within the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI of the California Constitution (Stats. 1976, ch. 959, § 3, p. 2191). That declaration was sustained in People v. Lucas (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 47 [147 Cal. Rptr. 235], which affirmed judgments that after trial by municipal court commissioners found defendants guilty of traffic infractions (violations of Veh. Code, §§ 22350 and 22450). Upholding the subordinate nature of those adjudications, Lucas took into account that punishments for infractions are markedly lighter than for other offenses [6] and that the unique and specialized function of trying infraction cases ... could properly be ranked as `subordinate' in relation to the diversity and complexity of the other duties of a municipal court judge. (82 Cal. App.3d at p. 54.) Given their nature, the high volume of infraction cases ( id. at p. 51, fn. 2) clearly necessitates simplified procedures for their fair and efficient disposition. In other contexts this court often has recognized the permissibly summary handling of infraction cases by excepting them from rules required in misdemeanor cases ( Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 302, fn. 13 [110 Cal. Rptr. 329, 515 P.2d 273] [on the record waiver of constitutional rights as prerequisite to guilty plea]; [7] Gordon v. Justice Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 323, 326, fn. 2 [115 Cal. Rptr. 632, 525 P.2d 72, 71 A.L.R.3d 551] [necessity of lawyer-judges for trial of offenses punishable by confinement]), by permitting minor traffic charges to be tried without a prosecuting attorney ( People v. Carlucci (1979) 23 Cal.3d 249 [152 Cal. Rptr. 439, 590 P.2d 15]), and by holding conviction of a traffic infraction not a bar to prosecution for a more serious related offense ( In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687 [135 Cal. Rptr. 82, 557 P.2d 514]). Advantages of expediting infraction cases through flexible, innovative procedures are that defendants gain a swift and inexpensive disposition of their cases without risk of major penalties; and the prosecution, the court system, and ultimately the public benefit because judicial and law enforcement resources are freed to concentrate on serious criminal behavior. ( In re Dennis B., supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 695; see too People v. Carlucci, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 257.) (5) Thus we conclude that the Legislature properly authorized the adjudication of traffic infraction cases by commissioners and referees as part of their subordinate judicial duties (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 22). Parallel aims led to enactment in 1961, as former §§ 561-567 (now §§ 255-258, 260-262), of provisions which would empower a juvenile traffic hearing officer, appointed by the court, to make final judgments in all traffic cases except those considered serious enough to warrant referral to the juvenile court (Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice, part I  Recommendations for Changes in California's Juvenile Court Law (1960) p. 22). [8] (6) The minor here argues that the hearing officers' powers nonetheless do not qualify as subordinate judicial duties because the officers' jurisdiction includes not only infractions but also certain misdemeanors, including any violation of the Vehicle Code not declared to be a felony (§ 256). Because she was charged only with an infraction, however, she may not challenge the authority of hearing officers in hypothetical misdemeanor proceedings. ( Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization (1965) 63 Cal.2d 222, 227 [45 Cal. Rptr. 869, 404 P.2d 477]; People v. Perry (1931) 212 Cal. 186, 193 [298 P. 19, 76 A.L.R. 1331].) She contends also that she was exposed to different and more severe penalties than could be invoked against an adult for the same offense. Possible dispositions of cases wherein hearing officers find minors guilty of traffic violations are listed in section 258 (fn. 1, ante ). Several of them also are available for adult traffic infractions: reprimand (§ 258, subd. (a)(1)), attendance at traffic school (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(ii); Veh. Code, § 42005), $50 fine plus penalty assessment (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(iii); Veh. Code, § 42001), and proof of correction of vehicle defect (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(v); Veh. Code, § 40150). (1b) The remaining dispositions, unavailable for adult infractions, are restrictions on driving for up to 30 days (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(i)), supervision by a probation officer for up to six months (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(iv)), or work in a park or recreational facility for up to 25 hours in a 30-day period during other than school or job hours (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(vi)). Those dispositional provisions do not make the hearing officer's adjudication of the minor's case more than a subordinate judicial duty. A court may suspend driving privileges because of certain infractions by adults; e.g., speeding (Veh. Code, §§ 13200, 22348 et seq.). To authorize suspension for other traffic infractions by minors is not disparate but reflects the precautions with which the Legislature has surrounded the granting of drivers' licenses to persons under 18 (Veh. Code, §§ 12507, 12512-12516, 12650-12653). Similarly, providing for an order that the probation officer undertake a program of supervision for up to six months (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(iv)) adopts the pre-1976 wording of section 654 and seems to contemplate not involuntary supervision but an attempt by the officer to obtain the consent of the minor and the minor's parent (§ 654) to the supervision. Finally, an order to work in a park or recreational facility must be approved by a judge of the juvenile court (§ 258, subd. (a)(3)(vi)). If based on a hearing before the judge the approval converts the order from that of the hearing officer to that of the judge. (See Edgar M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 727, 738.) In any event we would not say that a power to require 25 nonschool, nonjob hours of work in a recreational setting unlawfully expands the subordinate nature of the officer's adjudication of an infraction. [9] Thus we conclude that the hearing officers' functions are subordinate judicial duties. Further, the similarity between the functions of those officers in juvenile infraction cases and of municipal court commissioners and referees in adult infraction cases refutes one of the two arguments on which the minor here claims denial of equal protection. (7) (See fn. 10.), (1c) Her other argument concerns differences in qualifications for office. Commissioners and referees who hear adult cases generally must have been admitted to the bar. [10] Though persons appointed as juvenile traffic hearing officers may include lower court judges, they are required only to be persons of suitable experience such as probation officers or assistant or deputy probation officers. (§ 255.) The People concede that the hearing officer who adjudicated the present case may not have been a member of the bar. The differences in qualifications of commissioners, referees, and hearing officers seem justified by the differing characteristics and needs of adult and juvenile offenders. Though adults and juveniles when operating vehicles have the same duties, juveniles who breach those duties may require programs addressing discrete social and psychological problems that apparently accompany adolescence. Thus the Legislature concluded that juvenile traffic hearing officers should have a broader range of dispositions through which to guide minors into more responsible attitudes toward the driving privilege. The Legislature could reasonably assume that, as to infractions, the goals of the juvenile justice system are better served by personnel familiar with the special problems confronting juveniles, in contrast to attorneys who may not have that familiarity. [11] Does the use of nonattorneys deny due process? Juvenile traffic infraction cases rarely involve complex issues, can result at most in light penalties, and therefore lack the characteristics that caused adjudication by nonattorney judges to be held violative of due process in Gordon v. Justice Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 323.