Opinion ID: 2675537
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Limited Continuing Effect of Sleepiness

Text: In Tankleff v. Senkowski, this court recognized that the particular coercion informing a first confession is properly considered to determine whether it irredeemably taints a second confession. See 135 F.3d at 244–45. This is because coercion is not all of a kind. Where it is achieved through physical force, the presumption of continuing coercion may be strongest, not only because of lingering pain but also because of feared repetition. Cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. at 604 (concluding that taint from use of force had dissipated because defendant had no reason to fear mistreatment in second interrogation). Similarly, coercive deceit that is not corrected can have a continuing effect because a defendant may be relying on the same misrepresentations in making 17 his second admission as he did in making his first. See United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1991) (relying on fact that agent “made no effort to dispel the original threat” but, rather, “reaffirmed [other agent’s] earlier coercive statements” in holding second statement tainted).7 The “coercion” at issue here is of a very different sort. Given the panel’s acknowledgment that no abusive questioning tactics were employed, its only reason for viewing the initial interview informing Taylor’s first confession as “coercive” is that the questioning was pursued while he was intermittently dozing off. Even assuming that such a determination of coercion could be squared with Connelly, the coercive reach of such conduct—by contrast to physical abuse or deceit—is not long. Indeed, I do not see how it can be presumed to continue beyond the sleepiness that supports it. The panel acknowledges agent testimony that Taylor never fell asleep during his second interrogation. See Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 26. But rather than recognize this as a strong factor militating against continuing coercion from the prior day’s sleepiness, the panel appears to question the testimony’s reliability by 7 At the same time, Anderson recognizes that police trickery does not per se preclude a voluntary confession. See 929 F.2d at 99; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d at 244–45. 18 pointing to “uncontradicted testimony” of Taylor’s continued mental impairment on the day of the second interrogation. Id. As noted supra at [4 & n.2], that testimony pertains to observations of Taylor at times other than during the interview when he made his second confession. As to that 20‐minute period, the “uncontradicted testimony” of the credited interviewing agent was that Taylor “appeared fine” throughout and participated in a “lucid give and take” respecting information that he wanted to clarify. Tr. 216:17–21, S.A. 216. Thus, whatever inferences a factfinder might have drawn from Taylor’s behavior at times distinct from the second interview, one thing is clear: a reviewing court cannot itself weigh that evidence and conclude therefrom that Taylor was not awake and lucid when he made his second confession—at least not without rejecting the district court’s express finding that the agents who so testified to his condition were credible. See, e.g., United States v. Iodice, 525 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasizing “particularly strong deference” owed district court’s credibility determinations). Accordingly, even if—despite Dickerson and Connelly—Taylor’s sleepiness during the first confession had rendered it coercive to question him in 19 that condition, his ability to stay awake throughout the second interview is a factor that strongly weighs against a conclusion of continuing coercion. (2) Taylor’s Initiation of the Second Police Interview The panel also accords little if any weight to the fact that Taylor himself sought the second interview with law enforcement officials. Where a defendant thus seeks out the authorities to initiate a second interview, and where a prior incriminating statement is deemed coercive only because the defendant was sleepy during that questioning—not because abusive interrogation tactics were employed—I submit that a presumption of continuing coercion cannot attach to that second interview solicited by the defendant, for which he again waived Miranda rights, and throughout which he was awake. No different conclusion is warranted by United States v. Bayer, which the panel cites to explain that the reason a presumption of continuing compulsion arises from a coerced confession is “because, ‘after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed.’” Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 25 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540). When this language of Justice Jackson’s in Bayer is read in context, 20 however, it makes a quite different point, namely, that although a first confession lets the “cat out of the bag,” that does not preclude admission of a second confession at trial, particularly where the second confession is made after the original conditions of coercion have been removed: Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. But this Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540–41 (emphasis added); accord Tanner v. Vincent, 541 F.2d 932, 937 (2d Cir. 1976) (instructing that although first confession “let the cat out of the bag,” that is “only one factor” bearing on voluntariness of later statement; existence of first confession “should not, in itself, always be fatal” to use of second admission at trial (internal quotation marks omitted)). In sum, Taylor’s initiation of the second interview, together with the agents’ re‐administration of Miranda rights, Taylor’s waiver of those rights, and his ability to remain awake and lucid throughout the 20‐minute interview, 21 compel a conclusion that, whatever, if any, coercion attached to Taylor’s first confession because of his sleepiness, it did not “carr[y] over” into the second confession. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. To the extent the panel concluded otherwise by looking only to intervening time and common participants, factors less relevant to the continuing coercion inquiry in this case, en banc review is necessary to reaffirm that totality‐of‐the‐circumstances is the appropriate standard of review. 3. Vacatur of Co‐Defendants’ Convictions for Purportedly Inadequate Redaction of Taylor’s Confessions In its first opinion, the panel identified no concern with how Taylor’s confessions had been redacted for use at a joint trial with co‐defendants Antonio Rosario and Samuel Vasquez. Rather, it vacated these co‐defendants’ convictions based on a risk that the jury had ignored instructions to consider the confessions only as to Taylor. See Taylor I, 736 F.3d at 673–74. Upon reconsideration, the panel abandons this position. Nevertheless, it persists in its vacatur decision, concluding that the redacted statements contained “obvious” indications of alteration from which the jury would “immediately infer” that Taylor had inculpated Rosario and Vasquez. Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 27–30. This new holding warrants en banc review because it marks an unprecedented extension of Bruton 22 v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, to neutral substitution language previously approved by this court and solicited by co‐defendants, and depends on viewing the redacted statements together with other trial evidence contrary to Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200. In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that admission at a joint trial of a non‐ testifying defendant’s unredacted confession inculpating a co‐defendant violates the latter’s Confrontation Clause rights because of the great risk that a jury cannot follow instructions to consider such evidence against only the confessing defendant. See 391 U.S. at 135–36. This rule, however, is a “narrow exception” to the “almost invariable” assumption that juries follow instructions and one that the Supreme Court has carefully limited. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 206– 09 (identifying no Bruton error where redactions eliminated co‐defendant’s existence because confession was not “incriminating on its face, [but] became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has extended Bruton to preclude admission of a redacted confession only where a co‐defendant’s name was replaced with “a blank space or the word ‘deleted,’” i.e., “obvious indications of alteration” that “so closely resemble 23 Bruton’s unredacted statements” as to “refer[] directly to the ‘existence’ of the nonconfessing defendant.” Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 188, 192 (1998). From these precedents, our court has determined that admission of a redacted confession violates Bruton if the statement (a) contains “obvious indications of alteration” that signal to the jury that the original statement “contained actual names”; or, (b) even if viewed in isolation as the “very first item introduced at trial,” “immediately” inculpates the co‐defendant in the charged crime. United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the panel’s analysis of both factors raises concerns. a. Obvious Indications of Alteration In concluding that Taylor’s redacted statements displayed “obvious indications” of alteration, the panel holds—for the first time by our court—that neutral redactions were insufficient to avoid Bruton error.8 In support, it points 8 We have repeatedly upheld the replacement of co‐defendants’ names with “neutral pronouns or references” as satisfactory to avoid Bruton error. United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d at 50; see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Williams, 936 F.2d 698, 700–01 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989). Many of our sister circuits have held similarly. See, e.g., United States v. Cone, 714 F.3d 197, 218 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Vasilakos, 508 F.3d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Taylor, 186 F.3d 24 to dictum in United States v. Jass, which in rejecting a Bruton challenge to a redacted confession in that case, left open the possibility that neutral redactions might be so ham‐handed as to result in constitutional injury, see 569 F.3d at 61–62 (using example of direct quote redacted to read, “Look, other person, we have to get out of here’” (emphasis added)). See Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 29. Here, the panel does not—and cannot—identify any substitutions in Taylor’s confessions as awkward as that hypothesized in Jass.9 Nevertheless, the panel concludes that the employed neutral substitutions—including the words “persons” and “individuals”—produced “stilted circumlocutions” that, with the identification of confederate Luana Miller by name, demonstrated such obvious redaction as to violate Bruton. Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 29. The conclusion is flawed in several respects. First, the panel’s reliance on the inclusion of Miller’s name together with neutral substitutions for co‐defendants’ own as a basis for identifying Bruton error conflicts with United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125 (2d Cir. 1989). There, we upheld the admission of a redacted confession that replaced two co‐ 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999). 9 The final redacted versions of Taylor’s two confessions as admitted at trial are reproduced at the conclusion of this opinion as Appendices A and B. 25 conspirators’ names with “others,” “other people,” and “another person,” but still identified confederate Vince Cafaro, observing that “the jury never knew that Tutino’s original statement named names, and could easily have concluded that Tutino did not want to reveal the identity of his coconspirators.” Id. at 1135.10 To be sure, in Tutino, the confessing defendant knew that Cafaro was cooperating with law enforcement authorities and, thus, already known to them. Id. at 1137. But there are any number of reasons why a defendant might name one confederate (a grudge against the named party, blaming the named party for the declarant’s own predicament, an expectation that the named party will avoid apprehension or be treated leniently, etc.) and not another (loyalty, family relations, fear, etc.). Here, Taylor might well have named Miller because he knew she was unmasked while inside the robbed pharmacy and, thus, most likely to be identified by the police, and yet tried to shield the identities of masked gunman Rosario and getaway driver Vasquez.11 Indeed, Rosario’s Although Tutino preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Gray v. Maryland, 10 523 U.S. 185, we have since confirmed that “our Tutino line of precedents remains useful” to Confrontation Clause analysis. United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d at 61. 11 Miller was, in fact, caught on the pharmacy’s surveillance video. 26 counsel himself argued to the district court that the jury could readily conclude that Taylor had chosen to shield his co‐defendants while, nevertheless, naming Miller. See S.A. 409:2–12. Moreover, neither Rosario’s nor Vasquez’s counsel ever objected to Miller being named in the redacted confessions or sought redaction. In such circumstances, there is no basis for the panel to depart from Tutino.12 Second, as to the panel’s concern with “stilted circumlocutions,” the purported awkwardness of the employed redactions is not only not akin to that hypothesized in Jass. It also does not “so closely resemble Bruton’s unredacted statements” as did the use of a blank space or the word “deleted” in Gray, 523 U.S. at 192. Thus, the panel provides no good reason to depart from courts’ frequent approval of neutral substitutes such as “person” and “individual” for co‐defendants’ names. See, e.g., United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d at 61 (approving use of “another person”); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d at 1135 (approving “others,” “other people,” and “another person”); see also United States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2011) (upholding use of “straw buyer” because it is 12 Insofar as it appears that co‐defendants were satisfied to have Miller identified by name in Taylor’s confessions as part of a strategy bolstering their attack on her credibility, such a tactical decision would reach beyond forfeiture to demonstrate true waiver, negating all appellate review. See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007). 27 “similar to an anonymous reference such as ‘another person’ or ‘an individual’”). Much less does the panel provide any guidance for district courts as to when such neutral substitutions will be held so “stilted” as to manifest constitutional error. Third, co‐defendants’ own actions hardly support the panel’s departure from precedent to extend Bruton to the neutral redactions in this case. Although co‐defendants objected generally to the admission of Taylor’s confessions, they did not object to the particular language ultimately employed by the district court. To the contrary, they solicited the use of such gender‐neutral substitutes, complaining that the government’s suggested substitution of the more colloquial “guys” implied male confederates. See S.A. 404:23–410:2. Indeed, when the district court itself expressed concern that co‐defendants’ requests would lead to an unnatural syntax, Rosario’s counsel insisted that what he was proposing would “seem more realistic to the jury” and not “awkward.” S.A. 409:10–25; see also id. 406:20–24 (maintaining that proposed gender‐neutral substitutions would make statements “less awkward,” “more readable,” and “less obvious[ly ] redacted”). Further, Rosario’s counsel argued that, if there were any awkwardness, the jury might well attribute it to Taylor’s deliberate efforts not to 28 name his confederates, see S.A. 409:2–12—the very conclusion that supported our rejection of a Bruton challenge in Tutino, see 883 F.2d at 1135. Such defense conduct might well qualify as true waiver of any complaint about stilted circumlocutions. See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 321 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that “true waiver applies with even more force when . . . defendants not only failed to object to what they now describe as error, but they actively solicited it”). On this record, there is no sound basis in law to conclude that redacted confessions employing neutral substitutes, urged by co‐defendants and previously approved by this court, caused constitutional injury requiring vacatur of co‐defendants’ convictions. b. Immediate Reference to Co‐Defendants Nor does established precedent support the panel’s conclusion that, because the “unnamed persons [in the redacted statements] correspond by number (two) and by role to the pair of co‐defendants,” the redacted confessions necessarily referred to Rosario and Vasquez. Taylor II, 745 F.3d at 29. In Jass, we squarely rejected such a numerosity argument, upholding the replacement of the single female co‐defendant’s name with the singular “another 29 person”—which, given the particulars of the confession, likely referred to a female—because “a jury would have had to refer to other trial evidence to link [that co‐defendant] to the redacted statement.” 569 F.3d at 62–63. In evaluating Bruton challenges to redacted confessions, a reviewing court properly considers the confessions in isolation, without regard to other evidence. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208 (holding that Bruton does not categorically exclude confession that is incriminating “only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial”); cf. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. at 196 (holding redaction inadequate because jury could “immediately” infer that declarant inculpated co‐ defendant, “even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial”). This reasoning applies equally to role as to numerosity. Considering the redacted confessions here in isolation, the jury would not immediately know that Taylor had assigned the two confederate roles described therein to co‐defendants Rosario and Vasquez. Such an inference depended on other evidence, notably, Miller’s testimony. Following Richardson, this court has consistently declined to identify Bruton error where statements thus inculpate co‐defendants only “when placed in context with other testimony.” United States v. Lung Fong Chen, 393 F.3d 139, 150 (2d. Cir. 2004); accord In re Terrorist 30 Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 134 (2d Cir. 2008). Insofar as the panel decision now departs from this precedent, it warrants correction en banc.    In sum, en banc review is required in this case, 1. to ensure our court’s adherence to Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, and Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, in evaluating the voluntariness of a confession made by an impaired defendant after a valid waiver of Miranda rights and in response to non‐abusive questioning; 2. to clarify that, consistent with Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, and Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, the assessment of a claim of continuing coercion is not cabined by the trio of illustrative factors identified in Elstad, but properly extends to the totality of circumstances—which can include the type of coercion initially employed and defendant’s own initiation of the second police interview; and 3. to maintain our Bruton jurisprudence consistent with the neutral redaction principles articulated in Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, Gray v. 31 Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, and United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125. Because of the significance of these legal concerns to our jurisprudence generally and because proper application of these precedents to this case would result in affirmance of all three defendants’ challenged convictions rather than the vacatur ordered by the panel, I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc. 32