Opinion ID: 788144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the arbitrator's affidavit was inadmissible and the district court improperly relied upon it

Text: 21
22 The defendants argue that Rubens did not preserve her objection to the admission of Fensterstock's affidavit because the objections she made before the District Court focused on prohibiting Fensterstock from testifying at trial, rather that on striking the admission of his affidavit in support of summary judgment. This argument fails to acknowledge that in deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court may rely only on material that would be admissible at trial. Azrielli v. Cohen Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir.1994). Thus, any argument that Fensterstock's testimony at trial would be inadmissible was also, necessarily, an argument that his testimony through affidavit in support of summary judgment was inadmissible. 23 Rubens argued for preclusion of Fensterstock's testimony in her opposition to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in an affidavit submitted in support thereof. She argued that allowing Fensterstock to testify would be prejudicial because he acted as judge and jury in the arbitration so that a fact-finder in the malpractice case would see Mr. Fensterstock as the person who is supposed to be fair and neutral. She also argued that allowing Fensterstock to testify would usurp the role of the judge and jury in the malpractice suit: it is the job of this judge and jury to make the legal and factual decisions. By these arguments Rubens raised the issue of the admissibility of Fensterstock's testimony sufficiently to preserve it for appeal. Cf. Albany Savings Bank, FSB v. Halpin, 117 F.3d 669, 672 (2d Cir.1997) (appellant adequately raised issue of contract release's ambiguity to preserve for appeal claim that parol evidence should be admitted). 24
25 On a motion for summary judgment, a district court may rely only on material that would be admissible at trial. See Azrielli, 21 F.3d at 517. Of course, to be admissible, evidence must be relevant, sée Fed.R.Evid. 402, but relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Fed.R.Evid. 403. 26 In order to prevail on a claim of legal malpractice under New York law, 6 a client must demonstrate that the attorney was negligent, that the negligence was a proximate cause of the injury and that the client suffered actual and ascertainable damages. McCoy v. Feinman, 99 N.Y.2d 295, 301-02, 755 N.Y.S.2d 693, 697, 785 N.E.2d 714 (2002). An attorney is negligent if it is shown that he `failed to exercise the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession.' Id. at 301, 755 N.Y.S.2d at 697, 785 N.E.2d 714 (quoting Darby & Darby v. VSI Int'l, 95 N.Y.2d 308, 313, 716 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380-81, 739 N.E.2d 744 (2000)). For a defendant in a legal malpractice case to succeed on a motion for summary judgment, evidence must be presented in admissible form establishing that the plaintiff is unable to prove at least one of the essential elements. Crawford v. McBride, 303 A.D.2d 442, 442, 755 N.Y.S.2d 892, 892 (2d Dep't 2003) (mem.). 27 Because legal malpractice is a species of negligence, see W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32 (5th ed.1984), the question of causation presented is the objective, reasonable person standard, id. § 41 ([I]t is enough [for plaintiff] to introduce evidence from which reasonable persons may conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that it was not.). The questions to be resolved by the fact-finder in the legal malpractice action, therefore, are whether the lawyer fell below the applicable standard of care, and if so, whether a reasonable fact-finder in the underlying suit would have arrived at a different result but for the attorney's negligence. See Zarin v. Reid & Priest, 184 A.D.2d 385, 386, 585 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (1st Dep't 1992) (In order to establish the elements of proximate cause and actual damages in a malpractice case, the plaintiff must show that but for the attorney's negligence, what would have been a favorable outcome was an unfavorable outcome.). The malpractice judge or jury must decide a case within a case and determine what the result would have been absent the alleged malpractice. See 5 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 33.8 (5th ed.2000); Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP v. Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc., 780 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (1st Dept. 2004) ([T]o establish the elements of proximate cause and actual damages,... the client must meet a `case within the case' requirement, demonstrating that `but for' the attorney's conduct the client would have prevailed in the underlying matter or would not have sustained any ascertainable damages.). 28 Here, the parties did not dispute that MKM and Mason owed Rubens a duty. On the issue of breach, the parties submitted competing expert affidavits. Rubens's expert opined that Mason departed from applicable standards of legal practice in several respects and that these departures substantially contributed to Ms. Rubens losing her case at arbitration. The defendants' expert countered that these same acts were reasonable strategic decision[s]. Determining whether Mason's alleged failures were negligent or merely reasonable tactical decisions presented a question of fact that could not be resolved on summary judgment. See Greene v. Payne, Wood & Littlejohn, 197 A.D.2d 664, 666, 602 N.Y.S.2d 883, 885 (2d Dep't 1993) (affirming denial of summary judgment where the question was whether defendants' failure to plead separately a pendant state law claim in federal court was negligent or an honest mistake of judgment where the proper course of action was open to reasonable doubt) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the dispositive issue on summary judgment became whether the defendants could demonstrate through admissible evidence that Rubens was unable to prove causation. 29 Fensterstock's affidavit addressed the subjective question of what Fensterstock himself would have decided if Mason had performed exactly as Rubens now alleges he should have performed. In response to Rubens's claim that Mason was negligent in failing timely to disclose expert witnesses, Fensterstock declared that he had reviewed the expert reports that Rubens claimed should have been admitted and that they would not have changed my opinion. To Rubens's claim that Mason erroneously stipulated to the admission of the Trust's chlamydia test and misunderstood the results of Rubens's own test, Fensterstock responded that the competing chlamydia tests were a non-issue because [e]ven if the chlamydia tests had not been presented to me, I would still have found in favor of the Trust because of the scientific uncertainty surrounding biofilm. He further averred that Mason's failure to argue that the Reichel presumption applied to Rubens's case could not have changed the result because he was aware of the ` Reichel presumption' and determined that it was not applicable to Ms. Rubens's case. 30 Fensterstock's pronouncements in the subsequent malpractice suit about what he would have decided absent the allegedly negligent acts carry undue weight because he was the sole decision-maker, in essence, the judge in the underlying arbitration. Cf. Georgou v. Fritzshall, 93 C 997, 1995 WL 248002, at  (N.D.Ill. Apr.26, 1995) (noting there is substantial risk that a jury will give too much weight to the testimony of a judge because his position and authority bestow an imprimatur of character, credibility and reliability); Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal.App.3d 858, 110 Cal.Rptr. 511, 528 (1973) (in suit against insurer for bad faith in defense of personal injury action it was unduly prejudicial for judge who presided over personal injury action to testify as an expert witness with respect to matters that took place before him in his judicial capacity); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 441 (Utah 1996) (determining that it was error to consider on motion for summary judgment in malpractice suit against bankruptcy attorneys the testimony of judge who presided over the bankruptcy proceeding because the marginal relevance of that testimony was substantially outweighed by the prejudice created by the judge `in effect, sid[ing] with one of the litigants in an ongoing proceeding') (citation omitted). Admitting the testimony of the decision-maker below not only places a heavy burden on the party opposing [that] testimony because of that decision-maker's virtually unimpeachable credibility, but it becomes practically impossible for a party to challenge the mental impressions of a [decision-maker], as his thought process is known to him alone. Georgou, 1995 WL 248002, at ; see also Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276, 307, 25 S.Ct. 58, 49 L.Ed. 193 (1904) (testimony given by trial judge as to what matters he considered six years earlier in adjudicating will dispute was inadmissible because no testimony should be received except of open and tangible facts,—matters which are susceptible of evidence on both sides). Indeed, the prejudicial effect of the affidavit is apparent from the District Court's conclusion that in light of Fensterstock's affidavit, no reasonable jury could conclude that Rubens would have prevailed at arbitration. In essence, because of Fensterstock's affidavit, it became impossible for Rubens to introduce any evidence capable of creating a question of material fact on the issue of proximate cause. 31 The admission of Fensterstock's affidavit also violated well-settled law that testimony revealing the deliberative thought processes of judges, juries or arbitrators is inadmissible. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593, 27 S.Ct. 326, 51 L.Ed. 636 (1907) (examination of members of state tax board as to the reasons for their assessment is wholly improper as it would be to examine a jury, umpire, judge or arbitrator); Fayerweather, 195 U.S. at 307, 25 S.Ct. 58 (noting that a judgment should not be overthrown or limited by the oral testimony of a judge or jury of what he had in mind at the time of the decision); Hoeft v. MVL Group, 343 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir.2003) (Permitting depositions of arbitrators regarding their mental processes would make arbitration only the starting point in the dispute resolution process and deprive arbitration awards of the last word on their authors' intentions.); Brownko Int'l Inc. v. Ogden Steel Co., 585 F.Supp. 1432, 1436 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (arbitrator may not be called as a witness in subsequent lawsuit to explain award); cf. Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). 32 The District Court erred in admitting Fensterstock's affidavit into evidence because its limited probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect in that it had the potential to usurp the fact-finder's responsibilities in the trial within the malpractice trial. Indeed, any affidavit or testimony from an expert arbitrator or judge as to what should have happened in the proceeding that is the subject of subsequent malpractice litigation is likely more prejudicial than probative, because the affidavit or testimony would tend improperly to displace the fact-finder in the malpractice case within a case. Additionally, the affidavit impermissibly revealed the deliberative thought processes of the decision-maker in the underlying arbitration. Because the District Court's conclusion that no reasonable jury could conclude that Rubens is able to prove either a breach of the duty to use reasonable care or proximate causation was premised on that inadmissible affidavit, that portion of the judgment granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment on liability must be vacated. 33