Opinion ID: 2212288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Findings of Fact and Admission of Culpability.

Text: Avoiding the established standard of review, the court of appeals panel substituted its findings for those of the trial court and ordered termination under section 260.221(b)(4). Section 260.221(b)(4) permits termination where a parent is palpably unfit because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct before the child or of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and child relationship either of which are determined by the court to be permanently detrimental to the physical or mental health of the child. Minn.Stat. § 260.221(b)(4) (emphasis added). The burden under section 260.221(b)(4) is onerous. The petitioning party must prove a consistent pattern of specific conduct or specific conditions existing at the time of the hearing that appear will continue for a prolonged, indefinite period and that are permanently detrimental to the welfare of the child. In re Welfare of R.M.M., 316 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Minn.1982); In re Welfare of Chosa, 290 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1980); Minn.Stat. § 260.221(b)(4). [6] The court of appeals panel did not specify what consistent pattern of conduct or specific conditions were permanently detrimental to the welfare of M.D.O. Rather, the court of appeals found an admission of Ostlund's culpability was a prerequisite for effective rehabilitation, implying Ostlund's refusal to offer that rehabilitative admission is permanently detrimental to the child. Welfare of M.D.O., 450 N.W.2d at 657-58. This raises the most troubling issue in this matter. The county syllogizes an admission of culpability is necessary for effective therapy, Ostlund refuses to admit culpability, so, therefore, Ostlund cannot benefit from therapy and cannot be rehabilitated. The county's expectations seem especially daunting considering the county's admitted failure to provide services, counseling or assistance to aid Ostlund in coming to grips with her conduct. It never told Ostlund what programs at the Shakopee institution would be appropriate for her to satisfy the case plan. It never contacted the leaders of therapy programs Ostlund joined. The social worker observed only one visit between M.D.O. and Ostlund. Moreover, the county's expectations are conflicting. Steve Heckler, the first social worker assigned to the case, testified the county wanted an explanation of Maria's death consistent with medical findings and not necessarily an admission by Ostlund. The next social worker assigned to Ostlund's case, Jean Podvin, testified Ostlund must admit responsibility for Maria's failure to thrive and for a pattern of abuse against Maria, not to mention admitting responsibility for shaking the child to death. According to Podvin, however, Ostlund could have satisfied the goal by saying I think I really do need some help. The county social workers did not communicate any of these expectations to Ostlund because they felt Ostlund did not need to be told what kinds of things would satisfy the first case plan goal. The county never even asked Ostlund whether she would comply with the case plan drafted on July 21, 1987. Notwithstanding, the county concedes Ostlund was fulfilling other case plan goals. We have expressed our reluctance at entering the psychological debate on whether an initial admission of culpability is a prerequisite to rehabilitative therapy. In In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1987), we said: [I]t would seem a difficult task to engage in any effective therapy without confronting honestly one's own inadequacies   . [I]t remains to be seen whether a less than candid therapy will suffice to make appellants good parents. Id. at 884. The trial court in Welfare of J.W. assumed an admission was necessary before treatment; an assumption the parents were free to disprove. Id. This matter does not contain the same assumption; rather the trial court specifically found an admission was not a necessary predicate to completion of other case plan goals. The trial court's finding is supported by the substantial testimonial evidence of several psychologists and psychiatrists. Without explanation of why or how the trial court's finding was unsupported or clearly erroneous, the court of appeals panel made its own findings. Welfare of M.D.O., 450 N.W.2d at 658 (citation omitted). It stressed there was no finding of rehabilitation in this case. Id. This reasoning misconstrues section 260.221 and the burden it places on the county in termination cases. If, as here, the county alleges the refusal to comply with the case plan requirement of admitting culpability impedes rehabilitation and is detrimental to the parent-child relationship under section 260.221(b)(4), then the county must prove not only the parent is not and cannot be rehabilitated in the foreseeable future, but that the lack of rehabilitation is permanently detrimental the child's welfare. This is true whether or not the case plan is ordered by the court, because the refusal to comply could affect rehabilitation if, as the county argues, compliance is truly necessary for effective therapy and rehabilitation. Cf. Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 883 (therapy that does not include admission may be ineffective and impair chances of regaining children). If the county considers rehabilitation without an initial admission of culpability impossible, [7] it bears the onus of proving the necessity of an admission prerequisite. Based on the trial court's findings, the county did not accomplish that here. Because the therapeutic treatments contemplated by the county have not yet been tried, we can only reiterate, that it remains to be seen whether a less than candid therapy will suffice to make Ostlund a good parent. Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 884. The trial court found no clear and convincing evidence that Janet Ostlund fits the pattern of an abusive parent likely to repeat abusive acts. It found Ostlund had profited from those treatment programs available in prison and, if given the opportunity, Ostlund would be a good candidate for therapy. Furthermore, the trial court found an admission of culpability was not necessary before Ostlund could benefit from therapy, noting [Ostlund] has admitted her shortcomings as a parent and has opened herself up to the benefits of counseling and found it to be helpful. Most importantly, the trial court found it is in M.D.O.'s best interests to maintain and strengthen the relationship with Ostlund. Here, the evidence clearly supports the trial court's findings on these issues and the court of appeals panel erred in substituting its findings for those of the trial court. [8]