Opinion ID: 2760889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: evidence of appellant's past drug use

Text: On direct examination, and not in response to the question posed by the prosecutor, Helen spontaneously testified that she had on occasion purchased illegal drugs for Appellant. Appellant objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection based upon the rationale that the information was admissible under KRE 404(b)(2). As a follow up, Helen, was then permitted to testify that Appellant used drugs every day. KRS 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. An exception to this general rule is codified in KRE 404(b)(2) such that prior bad act evidence may be introduced if it is so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party. As Professor Lawson points out, the words of KRE 404(b)(2) (inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case) are 17 designed to be flexible enough to permit the,state to present a complete and realistic picture of the crime committed by the defendant, including necessary context . . . and perspective. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.25[4][b] (4th ed. 2003). One of the accepted bases for the admissibility of evidence of other crimes arises when such evidence furnishes part of the context of the crime or is necessary to a full presentation of the case, or is so intimately connected with and explanatory of the crime charged against the defendant and is so much a part of the setting of the case and its environment that its proof is appropriate in order to complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate context [ 1. Norton v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Ky. App. 1994); see also Webb v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319 (Ky. 2012). The Commonwealth argues that the evidence was properly admitted because its overall theory of the case was, that during the period when the rape occurred Appellant exercised an extraordinary level of domination and control over the victim and the rest of the household. In this vein other evidence was elicited to the effect that Appellant had the windows of the home boarded; would not allow the victim to leave the house; that the victim's brother usually stayed away from the house; that Appellant beat the victim and Appellant's mother; that the victim's mother would lie to social services about the beatings; and that Appellant would go looking for her if she was delayed in returning home from school. Thus, the trial court reasoned that having Helen buy drugs was part and parcel to Appellant's domination and control over her during the time of the sexual assault. 18 The standard of review for a trial court's evidentiary rulings is abuse of discretion. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky. 2000). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Certainly there are situations in which a defendant's drug use is inextricably intertwined with the crime, and thus is admissible under KRE 404(b)(2). But, this is not such a case. Helen's claim that Appellant used drugs every day and that he would send her to buy drugs was not necessary for a complete and realistic picture of the forcible rape, including any necessary context and perspective for it. There is simply no other evidence linking Appellant's drug use to the rapes. The Commonwealth's evidence of Appellant's role in the household generally established his domination and control over fourteen-year old Helen, and the evidence of his drug use did nothing to further prove the point. At most, the drug evidence was only marginally relevant under KRE 401 and its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. KRE 403; Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 888-91 (Ky. 1994) (evidence of prior bad acts pursuant to KRE 404(b) should be excluded even if relevant and probative if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect). Undue prejudice is most often found when there is a risk that the evidence might produce a decision grounded in emotion rather than reason or where the evidence might be used for an improper purpose. 19 Kentucky Evidence Law at § 2.15[3][b]. See, e.g., Purcell v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 400 (Ky. 2004) 7 (although prior acts of sexual voyeurism were relevant and probative, evidence should have been excluded because of its devastating effect in that it encouraged conviction because of what [defendant] was, rather than what he did on the occasion of the charged offense.); Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S':W.3d 577, 618 (Ky. 2010) (evidence is unduly prejudicial if it will induce the jury to decide a case based on an emotional response rather than the evidence presented.). The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Helen's testimony of Appellant's drug use to be admitted into evidence under KRE 404(b)(2). Nevertheless, the presentation of the evidence was fleeting and was not otherwise emphasized by the Commonwealth. Since it was not used as a prosecutorial tool and did not tend to bolster the victim's version'of events nor denigrate Appellant's denial, we are further persuaded that the error did not substantially sway the verdict and was, therefore, harmless. Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009).