Opinion ID: 904253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: emory v. united air lines, inc.

Text: The eight Emory plaintiffs are former pilots for defendant United Air Lines who turned 60 between December 1 and December 11, 2007, just days before FTEPA’s December 13 enactment. Although United removed plaintiffs from their Part 121 flying duties pursuant to the then-operational Age 60 Rule, it was defendant United’s custom and practice to allow outgoing pilots to remain employed until the last day of their birth month. Emory Compl. ¶ 20. From their birthdays to their 16 Emory’s appellate briefing departs from the complaint to bring a second, “distinct” bill of attainder challenge criticizing the District Court’s application of § 44729(e)(1)(A) insofar as it allegedly benefits flight engineers at plaintiffs’ expense. Emory Appellants’ Br. 5 n.1; see also Emory Appellants’ Br. 56–57 (“This [pro-flight engineer] holding by the District Court applying FTEPA amounts to quintessential violation of the Bill of Attainder prohibition.”). We read this as a narrowing gloss, a suggestion that the statute was even more discriminatory than previously thought. It does not, however, change the analysis. 19 “involuntar[y] terminat[ion]” on December 31, it follows, plaintiffs were certified pilots with “unchanged seniority numbers” in United’s employ. Emory Compl. ¶ 19(c). Pointing to these curious circumstances, plaintiffs believe themselves entitled to the benefits of the Age 65 Rule that governed the final weeks of their employment. In their view, they satisfied § 44729(e)(1)(A), the first exemption to FTEPA’s nonretroactivity provision, because it requires only that the exempted pilot be “in the employment of” an air carrier, which they claim they were. Emory Compl. ¶ 21(c). To the extent United and ALPA advocated a contrary interpretation, plaintiffs contend, they did so discriminatorily in violation of a host of state and federal laws. We turn to the interpretive question first.

FTEPA admits of two exceptions to the general prohibition on retroactive application: (e) (1) Nonretroactivity. No person who has attained 60 years of age before the date of enactment of this section may serve as a pilot for an air carrier engaged in covered operations unless — (A) Such person is in the employment of that air carrier in such operations on such date of enactment as a required flight deck crew member; or (B) Such person is newly hired by an air carrier as a pilot on or after such date of enactment 20 without credit for prior seniority or prior longevity for benefits . . . . 49 U.S.C. § 44729 (e)(1)(A)–(B). The Emory plaintiffs interpret the “in such operations” language in § 44729(e)(1)(A) to modify the term “carrier,” not “person.” This is significant. If the carrier — and only the carrier — need be engaged in Part 121 operations on the enactment date for the exemption to attach, presumably any over-60 individual then in the carrier’s employ as “required flight deck crew members” (“RFDCM”) would qualify. If one accepts, as plaintiffs do, that RFDCM includes “pilots,”17 it follows that over-60 pilots who were consigned to non-Part 121 flights or were removed from active flight status by operation of the Age 60 Rule (but remained in the carrier’s employ) will also qualify as exempt. But if it were otherwise — if the person invoking the exemption had to actively serve in Part 121 operations on the enactment date — the universe of possible RFDCM shrinks dramatically. The phrase would include only those persons serving secondary roles in Part 121 operations, such as check airmen18 and flight engineers, since the Age 60 Rule would have barred all Part 121 piloting work. Plaintiffs’ interpretive argument is certainly not without merit. Under the “grammatical ‘rule of the last antecedent,’ . . . a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as 17 See Emory, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 215. For present purposes, we agree with plaintiffs that a purely facial reading of the statutory phrase would bear this reading. Pity the passengers on a plane with an “optional” pilot. 18 Check airmen are also known as “second officers.” Emory, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 210. 21 modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.” Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). As applied here, the rule suggests “in such operations” should modify “that air carrier,” the language that immediately precedes it — not “Such person,” which begins the sentence. This is a plausible but in no way dispositive interpretation. “[T]he last antecedent rule,” we recently observed, “ ‘is not an absolute and can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning.’ ” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 3669 v. Shinseki, 709 F.3d 29, 33 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Barnhart, 540 U.S. at 26). We find such indicia present here. Emory’s interpretation fails to account for the prefatory language in § 44729(e)(1) that bars over-60 persons from serving as pilots “for an air carrier engaged in covered operations” unless they qualify for either one of the two exemptions.19 Logically, we think, one must read § 44729(e)(1)(A)’s use of “that air carrier” as a reference back to § 44729(e)(1)’s “air carrier engaged in covered operation” language. So understood, it would be redundant to do as plaintiffs urge and apply “in such operations” to the already qualified “that air carrier” as opposed to “Such persons.” The former generates needless surplusage and the latter does not. See Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012) (“[T]he canon against surplusage . . . 19 Whether § 44729(e)(1)’s broad language prohibiting nonexempt, over-60 persons from serving as a “pilot for an air carrier engaged in covered operations” barred pilots from piloting all flights (including Part 91 and Part 135 flights) or just Part 121 flights for an employer “engaged in covered operations” is a question we need not reach. The Emory plaintiffs would not qualify as a RFDCM under either approach and there was no suggestion that plaintiffs sought — and were wrongfully denied — the opportunity to pilot non-Part 121 flights. 22 favors that interpretation which avoids surplusage”). That § 44729(e)(1)(B) speaks unqualifiedly of “an air carrier” only buttresses this view. Having defined the term in § 44729(e)(1), it was unnecessary for the drafters to do so with specificity in either exception.20 For these reasons, we reject Emory’s interpretation and hold that the “in such operations” language of § 44729(e)(1)(A) modifies “Such person.” The implications of such a holding are clear. Because over-60 persons were barred from piloting Part 121 flights under the Age 60 Rule, only those over-60 persons serving as RFDCM in a secondary, non-piloting capacity on December 13, 2007, would have qualified for the exemption.21 Since “[t]he plaintiff pilots in this case were not, and could not have been, employed as pilots after their respective birthdates” and “had not been reassigned to another ‘required flight deck crew 20 We think this holding consistent with FAA’s initial efforts to define the nonretroactivity exemptions. In recognizing that the over-60 pilot must have “conduct[ed] part 121 operations for the carrier” on the enactment date to be eligible for an exemption under § 44729(e)(1)(A), FAA effectively read the Act’s “in such operations” language to qualify “Some person,” not “that air carrier.” See Two Legal Interpretations Regarding the Age 65 Law Effective 12/13/2007, FAA Information for Operators 07023 (Dec. 20, 2007). 21 We have elsewhere in this opinion spoken of check airmen and flight engineers as possible RFDCM, but we do not take a formal position as to the scope of a phrase FTEPA does not define. See Mann v. ALPA, 2012 WL 1447891, at  (M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2012). 23 member’ position,” the § 44729 (e)(1)(A) exemption plainly “does not apply.” Emory, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 216.22