Opinion ID: 1951308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Certiorari Cases

Text: At the threshold we consider whether the commissioners had standing to seek judicial review of the administrator's decision. If they did, we must then decide what procedural route they should have followed to obtain that review. Because our case law on these questions is far from clear, we are required to reexamine closely several cases in order to ameliorate the existing confusion in this area. Our starting point is Tillinghast v. Brown University, 24 R.I. 179, 52 A. 891 (1902), where we said that the rule generally followed in construing statutes containing a standing or aggrievement requirement is that a party is aggrieved by the judgment or decree when it operates on his rights of property or bears directly upon his interest. [citation omitted] The word 'aggrieved' refers to a substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation. Id. at 183-84, 52 A. at 892. The Tillinghast rule was for many years consistently followed by this court. See, e. g., Hassell v. Zoning Board of Review, 108 R.I. 349, 275 A.2d 646 (1971); Malinou v. Kiernan, 107 R.I. 342, 267 A.2d 692 (1970); Jeffrey v. Platting Board of Review, 103 R.I. 578, 239 A.2d 731 (1968); Paterson v. Corcoran, 100 R.I. 475, 217 A.2d 88 (1966); Malinou v. Mears, 97 R.I. 15, 195 A.2d 232 (1963); Greene v. Willis, 47 R.I. 251, 132 A. 545, rehearing denied, 47 R.I. 375, 133 A. 651 (1926); McKenna v. McKenna, 29 R.I. 224, 69 A. 844 (1908); cf. Vermette v. Cirillo, 114 R.I. 66, 328 A.2d 419 (1974); Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232, 172 A. 326 (1934); Hall v. Burgess, 40 R.I. 314, 100 A. 1013 (1917) (cases holding that the administrator or executor of an estate comes within the Tillinghast rule because of injury suffered in his representative capacity). In recent years, however, and particularly since the enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) ch. 35 of tit. 42, the trend has been away from that rule and in the direction of a more liberal standard. The trend began with Newport National Bank v. Providence Institution for Savings, 101 R.I. 614, 226 A.2d 137 (1967), where we held that competing banking institutions were aggrieved within the contemplation of sections 15(a) and (b) of the APA [4] and could therefore seek review in the Superior Court of a decision of the Board of Bank Incorporation allowing certain banks to locate a branch bank in the same community served by the competing banks. The test we applied was whether they [persons aggrieved] may be adversely affected by the administrative action and whether the realities of the situation in reason require that they have standing to seek judicial review. The better-reasoned cases hold that a person who is directly adversely affected in his economic interest by the administrative decision which he challenges has the required standing. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 622, 226 A.2d at 142. Little more than a year later, however, a unanimous court in New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Fascio, 105 R.I. 711, 254 A.2d 758 (1969), although citing the Newport National Bank case as authority, in reality cut across its grain and reverted to the more stringent Tillinghast rule. In that case, we held that an employer lacked standing under the APA to seek judicial review in the Superior Court of a decision of the Department of Employment Security's Board of Review granting compensation benefits to company employees who were on strike. We found no substantial injury to a personal or property right, nor imposition of a burden or obligation. Not long thereafter, in Buffi v. Ferri, 106 R.I. 349, 259 A.2d 847 (1969), we faced a slightly different issue. The question there was whether the Commission for Human Rights had standing under section 16 of the APA [5] to seek review of a Superior Court judgment reversing its decision that a property owner had violated the Fair Housing Practices Act. We recognized that the public had a very real and substantial interest in protecting the right of all individuals to equal housing opportunities regardless of race, color, religion, or country of ancestral origin. It was obvious, however, that the public interest would not be protected if the Tillinghast rule were strictly applied. Therefore, in order to insure protection of that public interest, we applied an exception that was first alluded to in Board of Police Commissioners v. Reynolds, 86 R.I. 172, 178, 133 A.2d 737, 741 (1957), and we held that the Tillinghast rule like most rules of general application, has its exceptions. One permits an agency itself to seek review, even though not technically aggrieved, if the public has an interest in the issue which reaches out beyond that of the immediate parties. Buffi v. Ferri, 106 R.I. at 351, 259 A.2d at 849. [6] Finally, in Rhode Island Ophthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I. 16, 317 A.2d 124 (1974), we completely abandoned the Tillinghast rule when, in a case holding that ophthalmologists had standing to challenge the validity of a statute permitting optometrists to administer drugs during eye examinations, we said: The Newport National Bank case is the precursor of today's rule. It is our belief that standing can now be determined by our adoption of the first of the Data Processing criteria [ Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)]. The question is whether the person whose standing is challenged has alleged an injury in fact resulting from the challenged statute. If he has, he satisfies the requirement of standing. 113 R.I. at 25-26, 317 A.2d at 129 (emphasis added). Moreover, the injury need not be to an economic interest to satisfy this test. Since the Ophthalmological decision, the injuryin-fact test has been relied upon generally to determine standing questions. [7] Furthermore, the public interest exception has been liberally applied to permit an agency to challenge a decision which, right or wrong, might otherwise be completely shielded from judicial review. This exception, as we said in Altman v. School Committee, 115 R.I. 399, 347 A.2d 37 (1975), should apply when a potential challenger to an administrative action is disqualified by a literal application of the customary test and when its disqualification will in-evitably result in the challenged action's, notwithstanding its possible arbitrariness, taking on a conclusive character. Id. at 404, 347 A.2d at 39. Although our reasoning to this point strongly suggests that the commissioners in this case had standing under sections 15(a) and (b) of the APA to prosecute an appeal from the administrator's decisions to the Superior Court, we hesitate to accept that conclusion without considering the plurality and dissenting opinions in Ramsay v. Sarkas, 110 R.I. 590, 295 A.2d 416 (1972). [8] In that case, the local and state liquor licensing authorities disagreed about whether to permit the relocation of a liquor establishment: [9] Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions recognized that when the public has a substantial interest in the outcome of a controversy, the local authority, though unable to satisfy technical rules of aggrievement, nonetheless has standing under sections 15(a) and (b) of the APA to prosecute an appeal from the state authority's decision. The two opinions disagreed, however, about whether there was a substantial public interest in the relocation of a liquor establishment. The plurality maintained that the public interest was insubstantial and, therefore, that the local agency lacked standing; the dissenters said that the interest was substantial and that there was standing. It seems to us now, however, that the question of standing in the public interest area, as in other areas, should not center on the quantum of the public's interest, but on whether an unfavorable outcome of the controversy will adversely affect the public interest. This conclusion is consistent with the test adopted in the Ophthalmological decision. It is also the view urged by Professor Davis, who says that one need not be substantially injured in order to be allowed standing. The line is not between a substantial injury and an insubstantial injury. The line is between injury and no injury. Davis, Administrative Law of the Seventies § 22.02-10 at 507 (1976); see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2417 n.14, 37 L.Ed.2d 254, 270 n.14 (1973). Henceforth, that standard shall govern in this state. Although there will be cases where the line between injury and no injury will be difficult to draw, this is not one of them. The South Kingstown zoning ordinance was adopted in order to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Certainly, the public had an interest in the values protected by that ordinance. When that interest was threatened by the administrator's decision which, if implemented, would have authorized the conduct of a business in violation of the comprehensive plan for land usage adopted by the town council, the potential adverse effect on the public at large was very real. Consequently, the commissioners had standing under sections 15(a) and (b) of the APA to seek judicial review of the administrator's decision by appealing to the Superior Court. The availability of that avenue of review, however, precluded a petition for common-law certiorari [10] because, absent unusual hardship or exceptional circumstancesand neither is alleged herecertiorari will not lie if, as in this case, another adequate and direct remedy was available to correct the errors alleged. Zito v. East Side Associates, R.I., 381 A.2d 1364, 1365 (1978); Murphy v. Charlie's Home Improvement Co., 117 R.I. 324, 325, 366 A.2d 809, 810 (1976); Concannon v. Concannon, 116 R.I. 323, 326-27, 356 A.2d 487, 490 (1976); Taft v. Tribelli, 114 R.I. 676, 678, 337 A.2d 794, 796 (1975); Burrillville School Committee v. Burrillville Teachers' Association, 110 R.I. 677, 678, 296 A.2d 464, 465 (1972); White v. White, 70 R.I. 48, 52, 36 A.2d 661, 663-64 (1944). The writs of certiorari heretofore issued must therefore be quashed as improvidently granted.