Opinion ID: 2508037
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lourdes's Testimony Regarding the Perpetrators' Demands

Text: During direct examination, Lourdes testified the perpetrators were demanding money and telling us to just not do anything stupid and to give them what they wanted. On cross-examination, she further testified that Michael Berry asked for money. Although she could not remember exactly what he said, she testified he said something like, Give us the money. Give us what we want. At one point, trial counsel asked, Do you know  do you have any idea  do you know what they were referring to when they said, `Give us what we want'? Do you know what he was talking about, what Michael Berry was talking about? Lourdes answered, No. Defendant claims on appeal that Lourdes committed perjury when she responded that she had no idea what Michael Berry was talking about when he said, Give us what we want. Noting the recovery and release of the $31,600 occurred more than two years before his trial, and asserting the $31,600 was probably drug money from Alex Cardenas, defendant argues that both Lourdes and the prosecutor knew Lourdes's testimony was false because she must have known, at least by the time of trial if not on the night of the crimes, that the perpetrators were looking for the gym bag with its large sum of alleged drug money. Defendant further complains that the prosecutor's closing argument  that the perpetrators went into a house and at gunpoint demanded property, demanded money, and got that money, got the jewelry as well as the dollars that Ms. Cardenas told us about (italics added)  also falsely implied that the $2,000 that Lourdes gave the perpetrators (and not the gym bag containing thousands of dollars more) was the purpose of the robbery which set this chain of events in motion. The prosecutor's knowing presentation of false testimony and/or false argument, defendant asserts, denied him his federal constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair trial, and a reliable conviction and sentence. Under well-established principles of due process, the prosecution cannot present evidence it knows is false and must correct any falsity of which it is aware in the evidence it presents, even if the false evidence was not intentionally submitted. ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 647, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175 [relying on Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 and other decisions].) Put another way, the prosecution has the duty to correct the testimony of its own witnesses that it knows, or should know, is false or misleading. ( In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 595, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371, disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) This obligation applies to testimony whose false or misleading character would be evident in light of information known to the police involved in the criminal prosecution ( In re Jackson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 595, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371), and applies even if the false or misleading testimony goes only to witness credibility ( id. at p. 594, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 531, 835 P.2d 371; Napue v. Illinois, supra, 360 U.S. at p. 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173; cf. Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 153-154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104.) Due process also bars a prosecutor's knowing presentation of false or misleading argument. (See Miller v. Pate (1967) 386 U.S. 1, 6-7, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed.2d 690; Brown v. Borg (9th Cir.1991) 951 F.2d 1011, 1015.) As we recently summarized, a prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence or argument to obtain a criminal conviction or sentence deprives the defendant of due process. ( People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 633, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) Here, the People argue review of these claims has been forfeited because the defense failed to raise the specific objection at trial or to request an appropriate admonishment, even though trial counsel knew from their pretrial review of the murder book all the information pertaining to the May 12, 1989 recovery of the $31,600 and its subsequent release to Lourdes (see ante, pt. II.B.2). (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1016-1017, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 92, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Defendant counters, however, that the prosecution's constitutional duty to correct its witness's false testimony is not discharged merely because trial counsel knows the testimony is false. (See United States v. LaPage (9th Cir.2000) 231 F.3d 488, 492.) Even assuming defendant did not forfeit review, the claims are without merit. The fact that trial counsel's question called for present knowledge does not show that Lourdes's denial was false or misleading  she might not have known or believed at trial that the intruders supposedly were referring to a gym bag containing $31,600. With our review limited to the record on appeal, we still do not know that to be the case. Defendant's conclusion that Lourdes must have known what Michael Berry specifically had in mind when he demanded, Give us what we want  (italics added), does not inevitably or necessarily follow from the mere fact that the police released $31,600 to her after the crimes. Although it arguably may be inferred from Lourdes's receipt of the money that she might have at least suspected Michael Berry to have had some knowledge of the money, her testimony to the contrary was not physically impossible or demonstrably false. Notably, there was no evidence indicating that the intruders demanded any particular money amount, or that they pressed for significantly more cash after Lourdes relinquished $2,000 and her jewelry to them. Consequently, it would not have been unreasonable, at the time of trial, for either her or the prosecutor to believe that the intruders knew nothing about a bag containing $31,600. In sum, we cannot say the prosecutor misled the jury or violated defendant's due process rights when he failed to correct Lourdes's testimony or when he argued that the perpetrators got the money they demanded from her. Defendant's claims are rejected.