Opinion ID: 150474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standard Set Forth in Buckley v. Valeo

Text: Buckley first determined that the public financing system was a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. 424 U.S. at 92-93, 96 S.Ct. 612. Accordingly, Buckley rejected the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge out of hand, holding that the presidential-candidate financing system only further[ed], and did not abridge[ ], the pertinent First Amendment values. Id. Turning to the discrimination claim that is, the claim that the presidential-candidate financing system violated the requirement of equal protection of the laws in its differential treatment of minor-party candidates and major-party candidates Buckley initially questioned whether the exacting scrutiny standard should apply to the system. Id. at 93-94, 96 S.Ct. 612. Buckley cited several precedents and observed that, at the time, a principle ha[d] been developed that restrictions on access to the electoral process must survive exacting scrutiny. Id. Yet Buckley distinguished those precedents, finding them inapplicable because they dealt primarily with state laws requiring a candidate to satisfy certain requirements in order to have his name appear on the ballot. Id. at 94, 96 S.Ct. 612. Such laws, Buckley reasoned, were direct burdens not only on the candidate's ability to run for office but also on the voter's ability to voice preferences regarding representative government and contemporary issues. Id. A public financing system, in contrast, was not restrictive of voters' rights and less restrictive of candidates' [rights], because the system did not prevent any candidate from getting on the ballot or any voter from casting a vote for the candidate of his choice. Id. As a result, Buckley determined that public financing is generally less restrictive of access to the electoral process than the ballot-access regulations dealt with in prior cases. Id. at 95, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). Buckley did not, however, complete that line of reasoning and establish a less searching standard for equal protection challenges to public financing systems. Instead, Buckley determined that the presidential-candidate financing system could be upheld even assuming, for the sake of analysis, that the correct standard was exacting scrutiny. After distinguishing the precedents that had applied the exacting scrutiny standard, Buckley held:  In any event, Congress enacted [the presidential-candidate financing system] in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental interests and has not unfairly or unnecessarily burdened the political opportunity of any party or candidate. Id. at 95-96, 96 S.Ct. 612 (emphasis added). Following Buckley, therefore, the starting point for a court in determining whether a public financing system unconstitutionally discriminates against minor parties is to assume, for the sake of analysis, that the correct standard is the version of exacting scrutiny articulated in Buckley. Under that standard, a court must first examine whether the system was enacted... in furtherance of sufficiently important governmental interests. Id. at 95, 96 S.Ct. 612. [7] The court must then determine whether the system burden[s] the political opportunity of any party or candidate in a way that is unfair[ ] or unnecessar[y]. Id. at 96, 96 S.Ct. 612. If the public financing system fares favorably under that two pronged test, the inquiry is over-the system does not violate the Constitution. If, however, the public financing system fails under Buckley's version of the exacting scrutiny standardthat is, if the system furthers insufficiently important governmental interests, or if the system does, in fact, burden the political opportunity of a party or candidate in a way that is unnecessary or unfair then the court must proceed to a second step of the inquiry: the court must finish the line of reasoning that Buckley left unresolved and determine whether a less searching standard applies. Here, in evaluating plaintiffs' claim in Count One, we are not required to perform that second step of the inquiry because, as we set forth in greater detail below, we, like the Supreme Court in Buckley, reject plaintiffs' claim of unconstitutional discrimination even applying Buckley's version of exacting scrutiny. Nonetheless, we conclude that if, in another case, a court determines that a public financing system cannot withstand Buckley's version of exacting scrutiny, the court must proceed to the second step of the inquiry, finish the line of reasoning that Buckley left unresolved, and determine whether a less searching standard applies. [8]