Opinion ID: 1264177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Concealment as a Material Factor in Defense's Use of Peremptory Challenges

Text: The Court of Appeals held that if Scott's concealment was unintentional, the court does not need to determine whether the information would have supported a challenge for cause or would have been a material factor in the defense's use of a peremptory challenge. State v. Sparkman, Op. No.2003-UP-165 (Ct.App. Filed February 27, 2003). In Woods, we held that where the failure to disclose is innocent, no inference of bias can be drawn. Woods, 345 S.C. at 588, 550 S.E.2d at 284. Because Scott's concealment was unintentional our inquiry is over, however, we fail to see how Sparkman was prejudiced given that the trial judge questioned the jury after the verdict. In Woods, this Court said, [w]here a juror, without justification, fails to disclose a relationship, it may be inferred, nothing to the contrary appearing, that the juror is not impartial. Id. (emphasis added). After being informed of Scott's attack, the trial judge asked every member of the jury, individually, if Scott's comments persuaded them to convict Sparkman and no one answered affirmatively, including Regina Jenerette. Usually we must develop inferences of jury bias because we do not have the luxury of post-verdict juror testimony. However, in this case, the juror testimony is clearly contrary to an inference of bias or prejudice, and the trial judge was in the best position to make a factual decision concerning the effects of Scott's alleged misconduct. See Harris. 340 S.C. at 63, 530 S.E.2d at 627 (2000) (citing Kelly, 331 S.C. at 141, 502 S.E.2d at 104) (The trial court has broad discretion in assessing allegation of juror misconduct ... [t]he determination of whether extraneous material received by a juror during the course of the trial is prejudicial is a matter for determination by the trial court.)