Opinion ID: 766741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Evaluating Evidence in FELA Cases

Text: 13 The parties debate at great length the proper standard for determining whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant sending a case to a jury in a FELA action. The LIRR is correct, and the District Court noted, that FELA is not a strict liability statute, see Sinclair v. Long Island R.R., 985 F.2d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 1993), and the fact that an employee is injured is not proof of negligence. See Eaton v. Long Island R.R Co., 398 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1968). However, it is also true that a relaxed standard of negligence applies in FELA cases in this Circuit. See Syverson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 19 F.3d 824, 826 (2d Cir. 1994) (reversing a district court's judgment as a matter of law in a FELA case). 14 The Supreme Court has said, based on the explicit language of the statute, that with respect to causation, a relaxed standard applies in FELA cases so that an employer is liable for injuries caused in whole or in part by the employer's negligence. Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1957) (quoting 45 U.S.C. 51, which states in relevant part: Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States . . . 15 shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury . . . or . . . death . . . resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier . . . .). While some circuits have limited the application of the in whole or in part language to the element of causation and apply traditional standards to the duty of care owed, see, e.g., Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), this Circuit has explicitly stated that it construes the statute, in light of its broad remedial nature, as creating a relaxed standard for negligence as well as causation, Ulfik v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 77 F.3d 54, 58 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has not expressly held that a relaxed standard for negligence, as opposed to causation, applies under FELA) (citing Syverson, 19 F.3d at 825); see also Eaton, 398 F.2d at 741 ([T]here can be no doubt that under [FELA] the right of the jury to pass upon the question of fault and causality must be most liberally viewed. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16 Accordingly, in the Second Circuit, an employer breaches its duty under FELA if it knew or should have known of a potential hazard in the workplace, and yet failed to exercise reasonable care to inform and protect its employees. Ulfik, 77 F.3d at 58; see also Syverson, 19 F.3d at 826; Sinclair, 985 F.2d at 76 (all citing Gallose v. Long Island R.R., 878 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1989)). The test is whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury. Ulfik, 77 F.3d at 58 (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Moreover, an employer may be held liable under FELA for risks that would be too remote to support liability under common law, Syverson, 19 F.3d at 826, and the right of the jury to pass on factual issues must be liberally construed, Gallose, 878 F.2d at 85. Therefore, [o]nly in instances where reasonable jurors could reach only one conclusion may the court take the determination from the jury and decide the question as a matter of law. Id.