Opinion ID: 1634087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interference with Business Relationship

Text: The elements for the tort of interference with business relationship are: (1) the act was intentional and willful; (2) that they were calculated to cause damage to the claimants in their lawful business; (3) that they were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss without right or justifiable cause; and (4) that actual damage and loss resulted. Irby v. Citizens National Bank of Meridian, 239 Miss. 64, 121 So.2d 118 (1960). The Hammons argue that May 1990 conversation between Bounds and the contact of Stripling by Mr. Hux, the loan officer, in the Fall of 1991, to attend the foreclosure sale constitute interference with a business relationship. There is no dispute that the bank officers' actions were intentional. However, there is considerable doubt as to whether they were intended to cause damage or loss to the plaintiff, and whether loss or damage actually occurred. Bounds' statements to Stripling, disclosed the existence of the Hammons' debts and amount of those debts. At the time of the statements the Hammons were in default on one note, and therefore, the debts were a matter of public record. Although Stripling may have made an offer of five cents per gallon, the record indicates that the Hammons never accepted that offer. Moreover, the record indicates that a contract between Stripling and the Hammons never transpired, not because of Bounds' statements, but because the last offer made to the Hammons was conditioned upon all shareholders selling  a condition that the Hammons could not fulfill due to Allain and King's 49% ownership of the Hopewell stock. Bounds testified that he disclosed the amounts of the debt in an effort to help Stripling make an offer on the water, thus enabling the Hammons to have sufficient funds with which to pay their debt note. The record simply does not establish that the actions of Trustmark officers were calculated to cause malice. In regards to Hux's contact with Stripling, the record indicates that such a maneuver was done to promote the foreclosure. It appears that Bounds and Hux's made their statements in order to recover the money owed to the bank. We again find nothing out of the ordinary and normal course of doing business here. This Court has stated: It is equally well established that the interference complained of must be wrongful in order to be actionable and that any interference is not wrongful and actionable if undertaken by someone in the exercise of legitimate interest or right, which constitutes privileged interference. ... The general rule in this state is that there is no tortious interference when one has a justifiable interest and reason for acting. Vestal v. Oden, 500 So.2d 954, 956 (Miss. 1986) (citations omitted). Because this case involves a default, and the bank's conduct was justifiable when considering that it was concerned with getting paid on the note, we find that the bank enjoyed a privileged interference. If anything, the interference by the bank aided the Hammons by locating bidders for the foreclosure sale. See Federal Land Bank v. Collom, 201 Miss. 266, 28 So.2d 126 (1946) (banks are to refrain from action which might deter bidders or suppress offers at a foreclosure). Here, there was clearly a justifiable interest and reason the actions of Trustmark officers. Vestal, 500 So.2d at 956. Having failed to establish the tort of interference in business relationships, the Chancellor was not in error in finding that there was no interference with business relationships.