Opinion ID: 685183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Threats to Indict Appellant's Family Members

Text: 29 Finally, appellant claims that the prosecution coerced him into pleading guilty by threatening to indict members of his family. According to appellant, on the morning his trial was to begin, the government threatened to indict several members of his family if he did not agree to plead guilty. 3 Appellant contends that, although he knew his family members were innocent when the prosecution made the threats, he did not learn that the government lacked sufficient evidence with which to indict them until after he had been released from prison. 30 At his sentencing hearing, appellant testified that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, that the government had made no promises in exchange for his plea, and that he had not been coerced or threatened. A defendant who has made an affirmation of voluntariness and has pled guilty ... carries a heavy burden in subsequently claiming that his plea was involuntary. United States v. Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346, 1348 (10th Cir.1992). Nevertheless, such statements do not stand as an absolute bar to post-conviction relief. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74-75, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). Appellant may still claim that his representations at the time his guilty plea was accepted were so much the product of such factors as misunderstanding, duress, or misrepresentation that they rendered his guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment. Id. at 75, 97 S.Ct. at 1629. 31 Appellant may nonetheless be barred from seeking post-conviction relief pursuant to section 2255 due to his failure to raise this claim at any point previously. As discussed above, to raise a claim for the first time in a section 2255 petition, a defendant must demonstrate either cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Warner, 23 F.3d at 291. Appellant contends that he has demonstrated cause for his procedural default because, at the time he could have filed a direct appeal, he believed his family members were still vulnerable to indictment. 32 The District of Columbia Circuit addressed a similar claim in United States v. Pollard, 959 F.2d 1011 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 322, 121 L.Ed.2d 242 (1992). Like appellant, the defendant in Pollard claimed for the first time in his section 2255 petition that the prosecution had coerced him into accepting his plea agreement. He contended that he could not have raised his claim on direct appeal because his plea was wired to his wife's, who was also being prosecuted. As a result, any challenge to his plea made before his wife's sentence was final would have placed her in further jeopardy, the very result he sought to avoid in entering his plea agreement. 33 The Pollard court held that the defendant was not barred from raising his claim for the first time on collateral attack. Id. at 1019. If the defendant had been coerced into accepting his plea to protect his wife, he could not be expected to openly challenge that very arrangement as unlawful while his wife was still vulnerable. Id. In other words, the coercion that formed the basis of his claim deterred [him] from raising that argument until his wife was out of harm's way. Id. 34 We find the reasoning of Pollard persuasive. Where the coercive threat still exists at the time the defendant was supposed to file his direct appeal, he has cause to claim on collateral attack that his plea was involuntary. To hold otherwise would force defendants to choose between jeopardizing the persons they are attempting to protect and waiving their claims of unlawful coercion. In this case, the district court did not make factual findings as to (1) whether the prosecution actually communicated the alleged threats, and (2) if so, whether the threats caused appellant to plead guilty. If appellant establishes these facts, he has cause for having failed to raise his claim on direct appeal. 35 To show prejudice, appellant must demonstrate that he was denied 'fundamental fairness,'  Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2648, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986), or that, but for the error, he might not have been convicted, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 2908, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984). In the context of a guilty plea, appellant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the alleged coercion, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Appellant has alleged that, but for the threats against his family, he would have proceeded to trial. Under these circumstances, the government's threats, if they were made, were clearly prejudicial. Thus, if appellant can establish the factual bases for demonstrating cause (including that the prosecution actually communicated the threats), he has cleared the hurdle of cause and prejudice. We therefore address the merits of his claim. 36 This court has held that government threats to prosecute third persons during plea negotiations are not necessarily unconstitutional. See Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 988, 107 S.Ct. 582, 93 L.Ed.2d 584 (1986). But because such bargaining can pose a danger of coercion and increase the leverage possessed by prosecutors, the government must abide by a high standard of good faith in its use of such tactics. Id.; see also United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.1979). The Supreme Court has warned that plea bargains involving adverse or lenient treatment for some person other than the accused ... might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n. 8, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 n. 8, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (citation omitted). Thus, [a] plea agreement entailing lenity to a third party imposes a special responsibility on the district court to ascertain [the] plea's voluntariness ... due to its coercive potential. Whalen, 976 F.2d at 1348 (internal quotations omitted). 37 This court has yet to define what practical requirements this high standard of good faith imposes on prosecutors. Most courts have held that, to act in good faith, prosecutors must have probable cause to indict the third person at the time they offer lenity or communicate the threat. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir.1990) (Where the plea is entered after the prosecutor threatens prosecution of a third party, courts have afforded the defendant an opportunity to show that probable cause for the prosecution was lacking when the threat was made.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084, 111 S.Ct. 957, 112 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1991); Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that defendant demonstrated that the government did not observe a 'high standard of good faith' based upon probable cause to believe that the third party had committed a crime); United States v. Diaz, 733 F.2d 371, 375 (5th Cir.1984) (Good faith is established when the prosecutor has probable cause to bring charges.); Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 837 (4th Cir.1982) (stating that  'absent probable cause to believe that the third person has committed a crime, offering concessions as to him or her constitutes a species of fraud' ) (quoting Nuckols, 606 F.2d at 569). 38 The most analogous decision in our circuit is Whalen. In that case, a section 2255 petitioner alleged that the government had coerced him into pleading guilty by threatening to prosecute his wife. Whalen, 976 F.2d at 1348. He asserted that, although he subsequently learned that the government had no intention of charging his wife, he believed the threats at the time they were made and therefore pleaded guilty. Id. at 1348-49. This court noted that the government had not demonstrated what probable cause it had, if any, to charge Whalen's wife with a crime. Id. 1349. We therefore held that, were the petitioner's allegations true, he was entitled to relief. Id. 39 Considering the rationale of Whalen, as well as the weight of authority from other circuit courts, we hold that the standard of good faith requires probable cause: To lawfully threaten third persons with prosecution during the course of plea negotiations, the government must have probable cause that those third persons committed the crime that the government threatens to charge. 4 40 Applying this rule to the case at bar, we find that the district court failed to apply the appropriate legal standard for ascertaining good faith. In its order denying appellant's petition, the district court stated that it accept[ed] the Government's assertions that any investigation of Petitioner Wright's family was being conducted in good faith under the law as it existed at the time of that investigation. The court did not examine whether the prosecution had probable cause to indict any of appellant's family members at the time it allegedly made the threats. Its finding that the prosecution acted in good faith was based purely on the government's assertions to that effect. 41 At the evidentiary hearing, appellant offered evidence plausibly showing that the prosecution never had the requisite probable cause. In response, the government merely averred that the prosecution had acted in good faith. 5 On this record, there is no evidence from which to conclude that the prosecution had probable cause to indict those persons it allegedly threatened to indict. If the prosecution actually made the alleged threats, the threats caused appellant to plead guilty, and the threats were not supported by probable cause, the prosecution violated appellant's right to due process. We therefore remand to the district court for these factual findings.