Opinion ID: 2766194
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Permissibility of Double Counting

Text: As discussed, Walters pleaded guilty to two counts of possession, receipt, and distribution of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and 2252A(a)(5)(B). Walters argues that each of the three sentence enhancements applied by the district court was already an element of his crime. However, an examination of the language in Walters’ Indictment, the relevant statutes, and the Sentencing Guidelines reveals that each enhancement was properly applied under our existing jurisprudence regarding double counting. No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 7
Walters first challenges a two-point sentence enhancement imposed by the district court for “distribution” under the Sentencing Guidelines. His claim fails because the enhancement does not constitute double counting. Walters pleaded guilty to Count 1 of his Indictment, which stated that he “did knowingly receive and distribute . . . numerous computer files, which files contained visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct . . . in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)].” The statutory language supporting Count 1 states that “[a]ny person who [] knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction . . . if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). Section 2G2.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines addresses “Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor.” This section establishes a base offense level of 22 for a defendant convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Count 1 of Walters’ Indictment). It then goes on to provide for various sentence enhancements based on particular characteristics of the offense, stating that [i]f the offense involved: (A) Distribution for pecuniary gain, increase by the number of levels from the table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and Fraud) corresponding to the retail value of the material, but by not less than 5 levels. (B) Distribution for the receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain, increase by 5 levels. (C) Distribution to a minor, increase by 5 levels. (D) Distribution to a minor that was intended to persuade, induce, entice, or coerce the minor to engage in any illegal activity, other than illegal activity covered under subdivision (E), increase by 6 levels. (E) Distribution to a minor that was intended to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct, increase by 7 levels. (F) Distribution other than distribution described in subdivisions (A) through (E), increase by 2 levels. No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 8 U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3) (emphasis added). The officer preparing Walters’ PSR recommended a two-level enhancement based on subsection (F), highlighted above. The district court accepted the recommendation and applied the enhancement. At sentencing and on appeal, Walters argues that subsection (F) duplicates the “distribution” element of his conviction under § 2252(a)(2) and therefore constitutes impermissible double counting. He notes that subsections (A) through (E) articulate actions that aggravate a typical case of distribution. Subsections (A) and (B) draw a distinction between distribution alone and distribution for the purposes of a quid pro quo; subsections (C), (D), and (E) apply increases for distribution to a minor. By contrast, Walters argues, subsection (F) adds a two level enhancement “solely for committing the act.” He claims this unjustly punishes him twice for the same conduct: once as an element of the offense, and again as an enhancement to the offense. Walters’ analysis is flawed. The sentence enhancement for distribution is not double counting in this instance. Recall that, where a defendant is penalized for distinct aspects of his conduct, no double counting takes place. United States v. Kizer, 517 F. App’x 415, 419 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Moon, 513 F.3d at 542 (6th Cir. 2008)). The statute states that a defendant may be convicted for “receipt[] or distribution”; it does not require both. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (emphasis added). The Sentencing Guidelines similarly differentiate between receipt and distribution, noting that distribution aggravates an offense under § 2252(a)(2) because it is more than the “mere solicitation” of pornographic material by a defendant. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, cmt. n. 1. The distribution enhancement is therefore distinct from sentencing for mere receipt under the statute. We recently affirmed this approach in United States v. Clark, 553 F. App’x 538, 539 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Like Walters, Clark pleaded guilty to distribution under § 2252(a)(2) and the district court applied a two-point enhancement to his sentence under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). Id. On appeal, Clark argued the enhancement was “improper double counting because the fact that he had distributed child pornography was taken into account by his conviction under § 2252A(a)(2)[.]” Id. We disagreed: “[d]espite Clark’s argument to the contrary, the district No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 9 court’s application of the enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) did not result in improper double counting.” Id. (referencing United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 227-28 (2d Cir. 2013) (“Section 2252(a)(2) proscribes the knowing receipt or distribution of child pornography. . . . the Guideline provides for an enhancement to the base offense level for offenses that involved the distribution of child pornography. Specifically, [§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(F)] dictates a two-level enhancement whenever an offense involved distribution[.] . . . This structure cannot be understood to address the harm associated with the distribution of child pornography in a base offense level of 22 that applies equally to a variety of offenses, some involving distribution and others not. Rather, § 2G2.2 is structured so that the range of harms associated with distribution can be addressed through various enhancements.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted))). Further, the district court clarified when it sentenced Walters that it applied subsection (F) not just for distribution, but for distribution through a peer-to-peer network. (R.42, Page ID #183) (“As to the first objection to the addition of two points for distribution, it is true that pierto-pier [sic] and searching, and searching and sharing files, is distribution, that’s well settled, and of course Mr. Walters had knowledge of how it works.”)) We have repeatedly found that subsection (F) is appropriately applied in cases where a defendant distributed child pornography through use of peer-to-peer software. See, e.g., Clark, 553 F. App’x at 539; United States v. Gerick, 568 F. App’x 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Knowing use of a file-sharing program is sufficient to warrant the two-point increase under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F).” (citing United States v. Conner, 521 F. App’x 493, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2013))); United States v. Darway, 255 F. App’x 68, 72 (6th Cir. 2007). Contrary to Walters’ characterization, the district court applied subsection (F) for distribution that is aggravated in ways not discussed in (A) through (E): distribution aggravated through use of peer-to-peer software. The enhancement of Walters’ sentence under § 2G2.2(a)(2) was not double counting. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement.
Walters next appeals the district court’s application of a four-point enhancement for exchanging material that is sadistic, masochistic, or otherwise violent. He argues that this No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 10 enhancement also constitutes impermissible double counting and must be removed from his sentence. This argument also fails. The Sentencing Guidelines for crimes under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and 2252A(a)(5) state that if the particular offense “involved material that portrays sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence,” the court should enhance the defendant’s sentencing level by four points. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4). Walters contends that “every image involving children in any sexual context or for that purpose is, at the very least, an image of violence,” and that any act to which U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) might apply is always “an act that satisfies the violence enhancement therein.” Thus, he reasons, the enhancement serves only to punish an offender twice for the same conduct. However, we have held that the enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(4) does not apply to all child pornography convictions. United States v. Phillips, 383 F. App’x 527, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2010). In Phillips, the defendant was similarly convicted under § 2252(a)(2) and the district court applied the same four-level enhancement for sadistic and masochistic material at issue here. Id. at 528. On appeal, Phillips argued that “‘[c]hild pornography inherently victimizes the child [portrayed therein] through sexual dominance and control,’ and that the district court therefore ‘misapplied the law . . . when it overruled [his] objection that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) . . . enhances a base sentence which intrinsically already contains the U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(4) considerations.’” Id. at 532 (alterations in original) (quoting the appellant’s brief). We rejected Phillips’ interpretation, noting that “sadistic or masochistic conduct” typically involves an additional element: “the infliction of pain.” Id. at 532 (citing United States v. Groenendal, 557 F.3d 419, 425 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Quinn, 257 F. App’x 864, 866-67 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fuller, 77 F. App’x 371, 383-84 (6th Cir. 2003)). We explained that [t]he base offense[] at issue here-receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)-need not involve the depiction of acts likely to cause pain. Those base offenses require receiving or possessing depictions of minors “engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” which is defined to include not just hardcore sexual acts, but also, inter alia, “lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.” It is clear that, at least under some circumstances, lascivious nude posing, without more, would not inflict sufficient pain on a minor to trigger the sadomasochism enhancement. No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 11 Id. at 532-33 (citing United States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that “not all child pornography is equally sadistic” and distinguishing an image of sex between two minors and “a video clip depicting an adult male anally raping a toddler”)). We held that the enhancement was not double counting.1 Id. at 533. On appeal, Walters makes the same argument as Phillips, and his argument fails for the same reasons. Among the pornographic materials discovered on his computer at the time of his arrest were several videos of adult males raping prepubescent boys and girls, including a video of a male subject having genital-to-genital intercourse with a female toddler. These videos are clearly distinguishable from materials involved in other child pornography cases. The four-level enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(4) does not “double count” any aspect of Walters’ crime. Rather, it separately punishes him for exchanging and possessing the sadistic, masochistic material it is explicitly designed to address. The district court acted within its discretion to apply the enhancement.
Finally, Walters challenges the district court’s application of a two-level sentence enhancement for “use of a computer or an interactive computer service” in commission of his crime. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6). This claim fails on multiple bases. As with his other objections, Walters asserts that application of an enhancement for use of a computer under § 2G2.2(b)(6) constitutes impermissible double counting. He does not explain why or how this might be; instead, he attacks the rationale behind the enhancement itself. In particular, Walters claims that frequent application of the enhancement “blurs the logical difference between the least and worst offenders.” He argues that there is “no reason to believe that computer images are any more permanent than those in print,” and that, although the enhancement is applied often, a “computer does not aggravate the offense” in every case. 1 Our interpretation regarding the enhancement for sadistic or masochistic materials is widespread. “In [rejecting Phillips’ claim as meritless], we join[ed] every other circuit to consider this argument.” Id. at 533 (citing United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 616 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument that the sadomasochism enhancement “is already covered by the base offense level” because “the base offense . . . could, for example, involve pictures of a naked child without physical sexual contact”); United States v. Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Myers, 355 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2004) (same); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1263 n.17 (11th Cir. 2002) (same)). No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 12 Because Walters does not explain how these arguments apply to his sentence, his claim is best interpreted as a facial challenge to § 2G2.2(b)(6). Walters’ challenge lacks the facts or law necessary to succeed. In drafting § 2G2.2, the Sentencing Commission explicitly considered whether the computer enhancement would be frivolous. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 664, pp. 58-59. The Commission purposefully set both the base offense level and the degree of enhancement with the frequency of computer use in mind. Id. We have adopted that rationale and rejected arguments that the computer enhancement should not be used simply because it is applied frequently. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 669 F.3d 723, 732-33 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming the district court’s rejection of defendant’s argument “that the frequency with which the enhancements applied in other cases rendered them invalid”). Contrary to Walters’ suggestion that computer images are no more permanent than physical ones, the enhancement exists because the electronic nature of some videos makes them easier to duplicate and distribute over time and across geography. There is a quantifiable cost to copying, sending, saving, and cataloging physical materials. No comparable cost exists when it comes to downloading, saving, and sharing electronic materials like those Walters had in his possession. It is often said that once a photo is online, it exists forever. Peer-to-peer software like that Walters used ensures as much: two people on opposite sides of the globe can instantaneously search, send, receive, and save materials at the click of a mouse. The enhancement remains relevant—regardless of its frequency of application—because the harm it addresses is real. And as the district court explained during sentencing, the enhancement applies in Walters’ case not because he used a computer, but because his use of a computer ensured that thousands of people had access to videos of children being sexually assaulted over the course of 2012. (R.42, Page ID #192-93 (“It’s not unusual to have people commit crimes from the convenience and privacy of their home, the computer and Internet makes that possible nowadays. . . . You can do what you want and nobody is going to find out, and you don’t think you’re harming anybody by doing that, but just the opposite is true.”).) The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement for computer use to Walters’ sentence. No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 13