Opinion ID: 2600184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the 2002 SRA Amendments to Varga

Text: Varga argues that the 2002 SRA amendments should succumb to the same fate as the SRA amendments at issue in Smith. He asserts that to meet the requirement that we articulated in Smith, the legislature must explicitly state its intent that the 2002 amendments apply retroactively. Varga claims that the legislature fails to provide such a statement of retroactive intent and that the 2002 SRA amendments improperly contravene our judicial construction of the 1997 SRA amendments in Smith. Conversely, the State argues that the legislature may amend the SRA to include previously washed out convictions as part of defendants' criminal histories and offender scores provided that the amendments apply prospectively. Here, the legislature clearly intended that the amendments apply prospectively at sentencing for crimes committed on or after June 13, 2002. Since Varga committed his crime on June 13, 2002, the amendments require courts to include his previously washed out conviction. We agree. We have repeatedly held that sentencing courts must look to the statute in effect at the time [the defendant] committed the [current] crimes when determining defendants' sentences. State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 726, 63 P.3d 792 (2003); see Williams, 111 Wash.2d at 361, 759 P.2d 436 (applying the SRA wash out provisions in effect at the time the defendant was sentenced for his crimes); see also State v. Dunaway, 109 Wash.2d 207, 216, 743 P.2d 1237, 749 P.2d 160 (1987) (holding that the 1987 SRA amendments to the definition of `[s]ame criminal conduct' do not apply to defendant's 1984 and 1986 crimes (quoting Laws of 1987, ch. 456, § 5)). Here, the 2002 SRA amendments were in effect when Varga committed his crime on June 13, 2002. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 4. These amendments explicitly state that a defendant's criminal history includes washed out convictions. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 2(13). Further, the legislature directed sentencing courts to consider these previously washed out convictions when calculating offender scores if the current version of the SRA requires consideration of that type of conviction. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 3(18). Our decisions in Cruz and Smith do not require a contrary result. It is well-established that the legislature may effectively overrule our decisions interpreting statutory terms by prospectively amending a statute. See Dunaway, 109 Wash.2d at 215-16 & n. 6, 743 P.2d 1237 (acknowledging that the legislature may enact a prospective SRA amendment that alters the definition of `[s]ame criminal conduct,' in spite of the court's construction of the term in a former version of the SRA); Windust v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash.2d 33, 37-38, 323 P.2d 241 (1958) (holding that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply when the legislature amends a statutory term that the court has previously interpreted); State v. Dolson, 138 Wash.2d 773, 779, 982 P.2d 100 (1999) (noting that the legislature implicitly overruled State v. Baker, 49 Wash.App. 778, 745 P.2d 1335 (1987) by amending RCW 46.20.205). In both Cruz and Smith, we reached our decisions by construing the statutory terms of the SRA in effect at that time. Our holding in Cruz rests on an interpretation of the statutory definition of criminal history in effect at Cruz's sentencing. 139 Wash.2d at 193, 985 P.2d 384. In Cruz, we reasoned that [u]nder the SRA a defendant's offender score is determined by the `offenses for which the defendant was convicted and by the defendant's criminal history as that term is defined in the SRA.' Id. (quoting Williams, 111 Wash.2d at 357-58, 759 P.2d 436). The definition of criminal history provided that [a] prior conviction is one that exists before the date of sentencing for the current offense. Id. (emphasis added). We concluded that Cruz's washed out juvenile sex conviction no longer existed under the definition of criminal history in the SRA in effect at that time; therefore, any amendment must act retroactively to require Cruz's sentencing court to include his nonexistent conviction when calculating his offender score. Id. Relying on Cruz, we reached a similar conclusion in Smith, holding that the 1997 and 2000 SRA amendments failed to evidence sufficient retroactive intent. 144 Wash.2d at 672-73, 30 P.3d 1245. The 1997 SRA amendments at issue in Smith modified the definition of criminal history. The amendments provided that: [c]riminal history means the list of a defendant's prior convictions and juvenile adjudications, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere. The history shall include, where known, for each conviction (a) whether the defendant has been placed on probation and the length and terms thereof; and (b) whether the defendant has been incarcerated and the length of incarceration. Laws of 1997, ch. 338, § 2(12). Critically, we determined that this amendment did not clearly illustrate the legislature's intent to include previously washed out convictions as part of a defendant's criminal history. 144 Wash.2d at 674, 30 P.3d 1245. In contrast, the 2002 SRA amendments irrefutably alter the definition of criminal history by adding that [a] conviction may be removed from a defendant's criminal history only if it is vacated, and [a] prior conviction that was not included in an offender score calculated pursuant to a former version of the sentencing reform act remains part of the defendant's criminal history. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 2(13)(b), (c). Unlike previous versions of the SRA in Cruz and Smith, this definition of criminal history explicitly includes previously washed out convictions. Moreover, the amendments direct sentencing courts to include previously washed out convictions if the current version of the SRA requires consideration of such convictions when calculating defendants' offender scores. Laws of 2002, ch. 107, § 3(18). Varga also argues that our decisions in Cruz and Smith afforded washed out convictions a quasi-expunged legal status. See State v. Dean, 113 Wash.App. 691, 697, 54 P.3d 243C (2002) (Citing Cruz, our Supreme Court again determined that any future legislative amendment would have to operate retroactively to change the washed-out (quasi-expunged) status of prior convictions.), review denied, 149 Wash.2d 1009, 67 P.3d 1097 (2003). Because washed out convictions enjoy this quasi-expunged legal status, Varga claims that the legislature may not act prospectively to modify the SRA to include previously washed out convictions. Our precedent, however, clearly establishes that statutes defining punishment fall within the province of the legislature. State v. Bryan, 93 Wash.2d 177, 181, 606 P.2d 1228 (1980) (Determination of crimes and punishment has traditionally been a legislative prerogative, subject to only very limited review in the courts.). `Fixing of penalties or punishments for criminal offenses is a legislative function, and the power of the legislature in that respect is plenary and subject only to constitutional provisions.' State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 767, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (quoting State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 628, 66 P.2d 360 (1937)). We declined to rest our holdings in Cruz and Smith on constitutional grounds and instead rested our holding on an interpretation of the SRA's terms in effect at that time. The legislature may exercise its plenary powers to determine crimes and punishment by prospectively amending the SRA to require sentencing courts to include previously washed out convictions when calculating offender scores. [5] See Windust, 52 Wash.2d at 37, 323 P.2d 241 (Of course, it is the duty of the court to invalidate a statute if it contravenes the constitution.... For the court to repeal a statute for no other reason than that it conflicts with the doctrine of stare decisis, is an obvious encroachment upon the legislative branch of the government.). Lastly, Varga contends that when the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.030 and RCW 9.94A.525 it violated separation of powers by contravening our interpretation of the SRA in Cruz and Smith. Without citing to any authority, Varga claims that the legislature may not prospectively amend the SRA and thus, avoid the interpretation we placed on it in Cruz and Smith. He contends that in order to respect separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches, the legislature must enact a new statute that wholly replaces previous versions. We do not find this argument persuasive. As previously noted, this court has repeatedly held that the legislature may prospectively overrule this court's interpretations of statutory terms. See Dunaway, 109 Wash.2d at 215-16 & n. 6, 743 P.2d 1237; Windust, 52 Wash.2d at 37, 323 P.2d 241; Dolson, 138 Wash.2d at 779, 982 P.2d 100. The legislature frequently moves to amend or add to the existing statutory language. We have never demanded that the legislature wholly replace its existing statute to avoid contravening this court's interpretation of a previous version's statutory terms. See Windust, 52 Wash.2d at 37, 323 P.2d 241 (Interpretation of the meaning of a statute ends where the amendment or repeal of it begins.). In sum, we hold that the legislature may prospectively amend the SRA to include washed out convictions in defendants' criminal histories and require sentencing courts to include washed out convictions when calculating offender scores for crimes committed after the amendments' effective date.