Opinion ID: 1111486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meehan

Text: During World War II, from 1942 to 1944, Charles Meehan worked as a pipefitter at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, where he was exposed to asbestos products. Meehan and his wife, Carmella, did not move to Florida until 1969. Eight years later, Meehan was diagnosed as having asbestosis and mesothelioma, diseases caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibers. As a result of these afflictions, Meehan died in 1978. Carmella Meehan, as personal representative of the estate of her late husband, filed this suit in 1979. The trial court entered final summary judgment for Celotex in 1981 on grounds that Meehan's claim was barred by the New York statute of limitations as borrowed under section 95.10, Florida Statutes (1979). A revised panel decision reversed the summary judgment. On rehearing en banc, the revised panel decision stood as the final decision of the court by virtue of an en banc four-four tie on the merits, with Chief Judge Schwartz and Judge Hubbart writing dissenting opinions. The panel decision determined that under Florida law a borrowing statute is purely procedural and the determination of whether a cause of action has arisen is made in accordance with the law of this state. Meehan, 466 So.2d at 1101 (citing Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1972); Farris & Co. v. William Schluderberg, T.J. Kurdle Co., 141 Fla. 462, 193 So. 429 (1940); Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So.2d 1323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), review denied, 446 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1984)). In construing section 95.10, the district court reasoned that a cause of action in tort arises in the jurisdiction where the last act necessary to establish liability occurred, and since the accrual of a cause of action must coincide with the aggrieved party's discovery of the injury, a cause of action in tort arises only when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of the cause of action. Meehan, 466 So.2d at 1102. The district court concluded that the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that Meehan's cause of action arose in New York, where he was exposed to asbestos, rather than in Florida, where he discovered the injury. Furthermore, the district court held that Meehan could bring the cause of action in Florida unless he knew or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, that his cause of action existed more than four years prior to filing the action in this state. Id. at 1103. In so holding, the district court overruled its decision in Marano v. Celotex, 433 So.2d 592 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 438 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1983). Chief Judge Schwartz dissented, stating: The court's decision has resuscitated an action which has been barred for over thirty years in New York, where the defendants' allegedly wrongful acts took place. 466 So.2d at 1105-06. He reasoned that to vindicate the very basis of section 95.10  we must look to the law of the place where the wrongful act occurred and, under that law, the limitations period was simultaneously initiated. Id. at 1106. Judge Schwartz argued that this interpretation carried out the purpose of a borrowing statute `which is to give a cause of action no greater life in the forum jurisdiction than it would have in the state whose substantive law is to be applied.' Id. n. 2 (quoting J. Pearson's revised majority opinion, 466 So.2d 1102 n. 1). Under Florida's discovery standard, the cause of action does not accrue, for limitations purposes, until the injured party discovers or has a duty to discover the act constituting an invasion of his legal rights. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So.2d 331, 334 (Fla. 1969). Consequently, a medical diagnosis which revealed that the party was suffering from asbestos-related diseases would be the event that triggered Florida's statute of limitations unless it was shown that the party should have been aware of a cause of action before that time. In Florida, the statute does not begin to run until such a discovery occurs. As will be explained, that was not the law in the state of New York at the time this action was initiated, nor is it the law in the state of Virginia, each of which has a different method for determining when a statute of limitations begins to run. Under New York law in effect at the time this claim was filed and the trial court and district court ruled on the matter, Meehan's cause of action arose and accrued in 1944, the final year of Meehan's employment in the Brooklyn shipyards. Further, the New York statute of limitations expired in 1947, and consequently Meehan's suit in New York had been barred for thirty-nine years. Unlike Florida, New York had expressly rejected the discovery standard. Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 430 N.E.2d 1297, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, amendment granted, 55 N.Y.2d 802, 432 N.E.2d 139, 447 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1981), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, sub nom. Rosenberg v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 456 U.S. 967, 102 S.Ct. 2226, 72 L.Ed.2d 840 (1982). Under New York law when the district court ruled, a cause of action arose and accrued regardless of Meehan's knowledge or discovery of the injury in the state of New York in 1944. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transportation Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824 (1936). Given the state of the law, we must reject the holding of the majority opinion of the district court of appeal. Its reasoning effectively allows a former New York resident to resurrect a cause of action in Florida barred in New York for over thirty-nine years (Meehan), but denies a Florida resident the opportunity to bring his cause of action in Florida, where the wrongful act occurred, because the injury was discovered in Tennessee (Colon). In view of Bates, it is the significant relationship with the states involved that is the critical factor in determining the application of section 95.10. Where the injury is discovered is only one factor to be considered, not the determining factor. The legislative purpose of section 95.10 is to not allow a longer statute of limitations in Florida than is provided in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose. To determine the applicability of the statute, we must apply the significant relationship criteria to Meehan. In our opinion, the criteria clearly show that New York has the significant relationship with Meehan. Meehan was a resident of New York at the time of his exposure; the employer was domiciled in New York; the entire asbestos exposure was at one place of employment in New York; and Meehan continued to reside in New York for twenty-five years after his exposure to asbestos. These circumstances establish that the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, Meehan's domicile, and the domicile of Meehan's employer at the time of the conduct causing the injury were all in the state of New York. The only significant contact with Florida is that the injury manifested itself and was discovered in this state. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (1971). We find these circumstances establish a significant relationship with New York and, consequently, under the law of New York at the time of the district court of appeal decision, section 95.10 barred the action in Florida. That should dispose of this matter. However, while this appeal was pending in this Court, the New York Legislature enacted a statute allowing a one-year period for claimants previously barred to bring actions for the recovery of damages for latent effects of exposure to deleterious substances, including asbestos. The new New York law, effective July 30, 1986, provided, in part: [E]very action for personal injury ... caused by the latent effects of exposure to ... asbestos . .. which is barred as of the effective date of this act or which was dismissed prior to the effective date of this act solely because the applicable period of limitations has or had expired is hereby revived and an action thereon may be commenced provided such action is commenced within one year from the effective date of this act. 1986 N.Y. Laws, ch. 682, § 4 (emphasis added). Meehan has not advised this Court whether an action was filed by him in New York during the one-year savings period, which has now expired. In supplemental briefs which we permitted, Meehan now contends that this change of law in New York revives any cause of action which may have expired in New York, and therefore makes our borrowing statute inapplicable. He also contends that a recent New York decision, Piccirelli v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 128 A.D.2d 762, 513 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1987), holding that a cause of action pending in a New York court would not need to be refiled in New York in order to satisfy the requirements of the statutory one-year window provision also applies in this circumstance. Clearly, this action was barred at the time the claim was filed and decided by the lower courts of this state; however, we find the action has now been revived by the newly enacted New York statute and New York case law. We agree with Meehan that we must follow the law in effect at the time of our decision and allow the revival of this cause of action in Florida based on the New York statutory window period. As the law now stands, this cause of action is no longer barred in New York. It may proceed, but, since the significant relationships are with the state of New York, New York law must be applied, and, if the New York statute is declared unconstitutional or Piccirelli is overruled during the pendency of this case, New York law will control and bar the action. []