Opinion ID: 218848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Pretrial Motion in Limine Ruling

Text: Based on information that Reed, a student at South Dakota State University, was using a chat and file-sharing program to download and share child pornography, federal agents conducted a warrant search of Reed's residence on September 19, 2007. The agents seized Reed's laptop computer, a USB storage device, and three hard drives. A forensic examination of the hard drives uncovered thousands of chat transcripts, many of which involved sexually explicit topics and the transfer of images depicting child pornography. The government initially charged Reed with nine counts of receipt and distribution of child pornography. After Reed responded to a Demand for Notice of Alibi with evidence tending to show that various roommates had access to his computer and that he was out of town when some of the nine chats took place, the government filed a superseding indictment that charged only three counts of receipt and distribution on February 15, 16, and 18, 2007, and added a fourth count of knowing possession of child pornography between the dates April 14, 2006 and September 19, 2007. On the eve of trial, the government filed a motion in limine to exclude any reference to the fact that 9 counts . . . were charged in [the initial Indictment] and that 6 of those counts are not present in a Superseding Indictment. Defense counsel objected that cross-examining the government's witnesses about the six dropped counts would support Reed's defense that other persons with access to his computer had downloaded and shared all the child pornography. The prosecutor responded that it was probably fair to allow Reed to offer other chats to show it [was] not him, but that evidence as to the government's charging decisions was not fair game. The district court granted the motion in limine but stated that Reed was not prevented from attempting to show that others at various times used his computer. On appeal, Reed argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government to suppress exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The government's motion essentially withdrew evidence, he explains, which resulted in a situation identical to one where the Government suppressed the evidence in the first instance. This contention is without merit. Reed concedes that the government permitted his attorney to view all seized images and their associated dates through the discovery process. Brady addressed only the government's duty to provide access to evidence favorable to an accused upon request. It does not require a prosecutor to retain or pursue criminal charges to which the defendant has an alibi so that the defendant can refute those charges at trial. Reed's suggestion that the government's decision to drop charges relating to the downloading of certain images rendered evidence relating to that downloading inadmissible at trial is obviously contrary to the district court's explanation of its pretrial ruling. Several circuits have unanimously upheld the exclusion of evidence of prior charging decisions on the ground that many factors unrelated to guilt may influence those decisions and their admission therefore risks misleading the jury and confusing the issues. See United States v. Kim, 95 Fed.Appx. 857, 860 (9th Cir.2004) (unpublished); United States v. Pitt-Des Moines, Inc., 168 F.3d 976, 991-92 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 35 (1st Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1055, 120 S.Ct. 1559, 146 L.Ed.2d 463 (2000); United States v. Delgado, 903 F.2d 1495, 1499 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028, 111 S.Ct. 681, 112 L.Ed.2d 673 (1991). In a related context, we held in United States v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119, 118 S.Ct. 1060, 140 L.Ed.2d 121 (1998), that the minimum probative value of evidence that an IRS agent had recommended against prosecuting was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, and misleading the jury. Here, the government limited its motion in limine to evidence of its charging decisions. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting that motion.