Opinion ID: 2585915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Doe's Parental Rights

Text: In the instant case, the State sought to terminate Doe's parental rights because he allegedly abandoned and neglected his daughter. The magistrate judge agreed with the State and held there was clear and convincing evidence that Doe had both abandoned and neglected his daughter, and that it was in the best interests of the child that the relationship be terminated. On appeal, Doe asserts the magistrate judge erred in finding that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that he abandoned and neglected his daughter and contends that the similarities between his case and Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 (2002), mandate that we vacate the magistrate's order terminating his parental rights. While the magistrate judge's opinion addresses both grounds for the termination, abandonment and neglect, it is only necessary that one of the grounds be supported by the evidence. Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 179, 125 P.3d 530, 535 (2005). Because there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's determination that Doe had neglected Jane, we address only that ground. The magistrate judge made the following factual findings relating to Doe's conduct prior to his incarceration, which support the ultimate finding of neglect: (1) When the family was together, no parent was capable of: a. Providing a stable home environment for the children b. Providing support for the children c. Complying with the law and requirements of society [or] d. Educating the children and teaching them to be productive law abiding citizens. (2) When the family resided with [Doe] . . . there was a lot of violence in the home and (3) Testimony was that [Doe] was regularly intoxicated. The magistrate judge also found that reunification efforts were impossible because there was no parent or combination of parents who could provide a stable home environment, support or education and training, and indeed the parents were not capable of complying with the law and requirements of society. There is ample evidence in the record to support these factual findings. First, between Jane's birth in August of 1998 and Doe's initial incarceration in county jail in June of 1999, Doe had the opportunity to provide for the health, morals and well-being of his daughter. Instead, during the first year of his daughter's life he saw her sporadically, totaling a period of six weeks, clearly supporting the magistrate judge's finding that Doe was incapable of providing a stable environment and support for his daughter. This finding is further supported by the fact that in June 2000, after spending a year in the county jail, Doe was given a second chance to be a stable presence in Jane's life, as he was placed on probation with a home-monitoring system. Again, he failed to provide any type of consistent parental presence, this time cutting off his ankle bracelet and absconding from the state where he remained out of contact with his daughter. Indeed he provided no support or care throughout this time and was then apprehended a year later and placed in prison for violating his probation. The nominal amount of time he spent with his daughter and his inability to comply with the law is contrary to providing for the health, morals and well-being of Jane. Doe spent only six weeks with Jane, out of a possible two years where he was free from incarceration and the very act of absconding intentionally cut off all contact with Jane. Next, even during the minimal periods of time spent at the family home, the record contains evidence of incidents of Doe's violence and the detrimental effect of this conduct on his family and specifically, Jane. Doe admitted that during an argument with Jane's mother, where he suspected she was not carrying his child, he punched her in the stomach, knowing she was five months pregnant with Jane. Doe irrationally attempted to defend his behavior by testifying at trial, I didn't mean to punch her in the stomach . . . I was trying to punch her in the solarplexis [sic], or, in other words, that he missed. Mother testified that when Doe slugged her in the stomach, he told her the child was not his. This conduct alone shows a complete disregard for the health, morals and well-being of his unborn daughter. Even if punching Mother in the stomach while she was pregnant with Jane does not constitute violence by Doe toward Jane, this is not the standard for a finding of neglect. Neglect is defined as a situation in which the child lacks parental care necessary for his health, morals or well-being. . . . I.C. § 16-2005(b). The statute does not require or suggest that a child suffer demonstrable harm before the parent-child relationship can be terminated. Doe v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 645, 837 P.2d 319, 320 (Ct.App.1992). Rather, infliction of perpetual domestic violence, even if not directed at the children, supports a finding of parental neglect as it provides for an unstable and dangerous home environment. Id. at 646, 837 P.2d at 321. Doe also admits that the very reason for his incarceration was committing felony domestic battery against Mother. When asked what happened he testified: I took off my watch and I threw it at her and I guess I threw a wind chime at her. Mother testified that she and Doe were drinking and he got abusive, beat her up and gave her a head concussion. When asked what he was charged with as a result of this incident, he testified: Felony domestic battery. I guess they had just changed the law because the previous one was only a misdemeanor domestic battery. Doe then admitted he also had two prior misdemeanor domestic battery convictions. He also acknowledged at trial that he thought the abusive relationship he had with Mother was detrimental to the children. Mother testified that Doe was abusive to her while the children were home on several occasions, causing bruising, bleeding, sometimes a fat lip and on two occasions, head concussions. Although Doe disputed Mother's characterization as to the frequency of violence, Doe admitted that he pushed, shoved and slapped Mother on a number of occasions, which would sometimes bruise her body. When asked if he left marks on Mother, he testified: My wedding band might have. I'm not sure. Mother testified that he physically abused her twice while she was pregnant with Jane. There is also evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding about Doe's intoxication. The magistrate judge noted in his findings that [t]here had been a particularly nasty incident that had taken place at the time of the birth of [Jane] because of [Doe's] belief that he may not have been the father. The record includes testimony from the oldest daughter that [w]hen [Doe] was drinking he had went to the hospital when [Jane] was born and started arguing with my mom saying that [Jane] wasn't his and he tried to kill her. In fact, the magistrate judge found that Doe was regularly intoxicated. There was testimony that he would get really drunk about once a week, drinking during other times of the week and that when he got drunk he would get into physical fights with Mother in front of the children. It is difficult to imagine a worse, detrimental and dysfunctional family relationship than that which existed between Jane and her father prior to his incarceration for beating up her mother. Obviously, Doe's later imprisonment simply exacerbated the neglect he had already clearly demonstrated. Ultimately, the magistrate judge concluded that [N]o reunification efforts, no matter how great, would have worked to accomplish reunification of [Jane] with [Doe] in the statutory time. A finding that reunification is not a viable option lends support for the magistrate judge's ultimate decision to terminate Doe's parental rights. It is obvious from the record that Doe's neglect, violence and drinking were having a highly detrimental effect and there was no point in further considering reunification. Doe has had little or no contact with his daughter since June of 2000, about six years ago when she was less than two years old and then only sporadically for a total of six weeks. She now has an opportunity to be adopted by responsible parents with a stable home environment, in marked contrast to what she has known for the first seven years of her life. The magistrate judge's findings would have been much more helpful if done in more detail. However, the findings are sufficient to indicate the trial court's basis for finding neglect and are amply supported by the record. On appeal, Doe also argues this case is controlled by our decision in Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 53 P.3d 341 (2002), in which this Court reversed the trial court's decision to terminate the parental rights of an imprisoned father. Unlike in Doe, there is sufficient evidence here of this father's neglect of Jane prior to the time he was imprisoned, so that it is not necessary to evaluate his conduct while imprisoned. The half-hearted efforts made to contact Jane during that time are simply not enough to overcome the prior years of neglect. Moreover, in the Doe case, the child was not even born until the father was incarcerated and blood tests established the child was his. Thereafter, the father did everything in his power to act as a parent toward the child. This is certainly not the situation with which we are presented here. We affirm the trial court's decision to terminate Doe's parental rights pursuant to I.C. § 16-2005(b).