Opinion ID: 1940167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claim 1: Failure to Raise a Nixon Error

Text: Duncan's first claim in his habeas petition is wholly identical to the second claim raised in his cross-appeal, namely that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase for conceding that Duncan was guilty of second-degree murder, save for the fact that Duncan is now arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. This Court has held that the criteria for proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel parallel the standard used for ineffectiveness of trial counsel claims. See State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 364 (Fla.2000). Therefore, here, Duncan must demonstrate: (1) specific errors or omissions which show that appellate counsel's performance deviated from the norm or fell outside the range of professionally acceptable performance and (2) the deficiency of that performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the fairness and correctness of the appellate result. Id. (quoting Wilson v. Wainwright, 474 So.2d 1162, 1163 (Fla.1985)). As we denied Duncan's identical claim in his cross-appeal, we likewise conclude that the instant claim is without merit. Duncan's trial counsel made a strategic, tactical decision to address second-degree homicide in an attempt to save Duncan's life. Given the weight of the evidence against Duncan, including a confession and three eyewitnesses, trial counsel's strategy was not unreasonable. See Jones, 845 So.2d at 70-71. Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.