Opinion ID: 4536576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Caro-Silva

Text: Caro-Silva appeals his sentence. We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 864 (6th Cir. 2016). Caro-Silva argues that the district court violated his due process rights when it attributed to him, as relevant conduct, methamphetamine discovered in the duffel bag located at Quezada’s -4- Nos. 18-4235/19-3169 United States v. Juan Caro-Silva, et al. residence. See generally USSG § 1B1.3(a). “[D]ue process requires that some evidentiary basis beyond mere allegation in an indictment be presented to support consideration of such conduct as relevant to sentencing.” United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1504 (6th Cir. 1992). That evidentiary basis must have “some minimal indicium of reliability,” United States v. Santana, 723 F. App’x 331, 337 (6th Cir. 2008), which is “a relatively low hurdle,” United States v. Greene, 71 F.3d 232, 235 (6th Cir. 1995). Caro-Silva argues that Hernandez-Salazar’s testimony regarding the duffel bag was selfserving and uncorroborated. But Special Agent Blohm’s testimony demonstrates otherwise. First, detailing various investigations, Blohm stated that she had never observed Hernandez-Salazar selling methamphetamine. Second, Blohm had placed a GPS unit on Hernandez-Salazar’s vehicle which tracked it from Hernandez-Salazar’s apartment to Quezada’s neighborhood on the night Hernandez-Salazar testified she and Caro-Silva had given the duffel bag containing methamphetamine to Quezada. Hernandez-Salazar’s testimony thus bears “some minimal indicium of reliability” to support the district court’s decision to attribute to Caro-Silva the methamphetamine discovered in the duffel bag. That determination does not rise to clear error. Caro-Silva nevertheless argues that Hernandez-Salazar’s testimony is unreliable because when arrested, she lied to the FBI about her involvement with the conspiracy. But HernandezSalazar testified that she did not initially disclose her full involvement in the drug conspiracy because at that point she did not have an attorney, was pregnant, and feared incarceration. When she did secure counsel, Hernandez-Salazar cooperated and offered admissions of guilt. Blohm also corroborated various aspects of Hernandez-Salazar’s testimony, as explained above. This record does not leave us “with the definite and firm conviction” that the district court committed a mistake. United States v. Darwitch, 337 F.3d 645, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. -5- Nos. 18-4235/19-3169 United States v. Juan Caro-Silva, et al. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 659 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[C]o-conspirators’ hearsay statements are admissible at sentencing, notwithstanding the fact that such statements may be ‘suspect’ on account of co-conspirators’ ‘explicit or implicit desire to secure favorable treatment from the police.’” (quoting United States v. Hunt, 487 F.3d 347, 352–53 (6th Cir. 2007))). Lastly, Caro-Silva contends that the Government’s decision to indict him for cocaine, but not methamphetamine, undermines Hernandez-Salazar’s testimony. But “[r]elevant conduct need not be charged.” United States v. Gill, 348 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 2003). The Government, moreover, explained that the indictment was filed before the lab could test the methamphetamine’s purity, and it intended to file a superseding indictment depending on those test results. The Government’s decision to proceed before receiving the test results has no bearing on the reliability of Hernandez-Salazar’s testimony or the district court’s sentencing conclusions.