Opinion ID: 2266316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: strict scrutiny standard applies to a statute regulating an elected public officer's protected political speech of voting on public issues

Text: Having concluded that voting by an elected public officer on public issues is protected speech under the First Amendment, we must next determine the appropriate standard to apply in reviewing the constitutionality of NRS 281A.420(8)(e). Carrigan argues that a strict scrutiny standard applies because voting is protected free speech. The Commission contends, and the district court agreed, that Carrigan's free speech rights must be analyzed under the two-part balancing inquiry enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), because Carrigan, as an elected city council member, is a state employee. Therefore, the Commission argues that the state's interests, as Carrigan's employer, in establishing an efficient government must be balanced with Carrigan's free speech rights as an employee. The Pickering balancing test is a lower standard of review used in situations involving a state employee. 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. This standard is based on the view that the state, as an employer, has a stronger interest in regulating an employee's speech than in regulating the speech of the general public, in order to promote efficiency in the public services it offers, while also recognizing that a citizen does not forfeit all free speech rights when working for the government. Id. Under the Pickering balancing test, the court must balance the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Id. Carrigan's relationship with the state differs from that of most public employees, however, because he is an elected officer about whom the public is obliged to inform itself, and the `employer' is the public itself, at least in the practical sense, with the power to hire and fire. Jenevein v. Willing, 493 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2007). While Carrigan is employed by the government, he is an elected public officer, and his relationship with his employer, the people, differs from that of other state employees. Id. Therefore, the district court erred in applying the Pickering balancing test. Instead, a strict scrutiny standard applies. NRS 281A.420 establishes requirements for when a public officer must refrain from exercising speech by abstaining from voting on certain public issues. Thus, the statute deals directly with regulating speech, and as recognized in Hardy, political speech is a core function of a public officer. Strict scrutiny is therefore the appropriate standard. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 898, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (stating that [l]aws that burden political speech are subject to strict scrutiny) (internal quotations omitted); Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 460-61 (9th Cir.2009) (stating that a law that directly regulates speech is subject to strict scrutiny).