Opinion ID: 360504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Supplement Charge.

Text: 68 At the close of this four week trial, the jury was given a comprehensive general charge. After deliberating approximately one day, the foreman requested a clarification on the relationship between Counts One and Two. The trial court gave a supplemental charge in which it attempted to clarify this relationship; however, the court misstated the law when it charged if there is no violations (sic) of any substantive count, then, of course, there couldn't be any violation of Count One, which is conspiracy, because the conspiracy depends upon there being a violation of a Federal law. . . . Immediately upon the jury's returning to continue with its deliberations, counsel for the government objected to the erroneous portions of the supplemental charge. Realizing the error, the court recalled the jury and gave the following exchange: 69 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it has been called to my attention that I may have misstated the law with respect to conspiracy as it relates to the other counts of the indictment, and I want to be sure that I am correct in what I tell you in that regard. 70 As I charged you earlier, of course, a conspiracy is an unlawful agreement between two or more persons to violate a law of the United States, and of course, if an agreement is made to violate the law and a defendant in the case becomes a member of that conspiracy or becomes a part of that agreement, then of course, that would be a conspiracy, that is a violation of the law. It may not be that the violation may not eventually be successful. 71 I think I charged you that yesterday. The venture may not be successful at all. They may get caught before it is ever carried out. But still, if there is an agreement to violate the laws of the United States and a defendant participated in that agreement then he becomes a member of the conspiracy. I think that generally states the law as I charged it to you yesterday. 72 If you want a re-charge on any portion of that, I will be glad to do it, but I will again give you the definition that I gave you in the charge yesterday, that, If two or more persons conspired to commit an offense against the United States, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each is guilty of an offense against the laws of the United States. And simply, a conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish some unlawful purpose or to accomplish some lawful purpose by unlawful means. So a conspiracy is a kind of partnership in criminal purposes in which each member becomes the agent of every other member. 73 The gist of the offense is a combination or agreement to disobey or disregard the law and that is the definition of a conspiracy. 74 (Emphasis added.) 75 Defense counsel objected to this second supplemental charge on the grounds that it emphasized the law more favorable to the prosecution, arguing specifically that the final charge neglected to give the overt act requirement for a conspiracy conviction. They requested a third supplemental charge to stress this point, but the trial court denied it, stating if I followed what you want me to do, I would have to give the entire charge all over again, and I don't think that is required. 76 The only contention challenging the supplemental charges that requires consideration is the appellants' attack on the failure of the court to adequately give the overt act requirement in the second supplemental charge. Concentrating their attack on the fifth and sixth paragraphs, the appellants argue that this instruction left the jury with the impression that a conspiracy conviction is permissible on finding an illegal agreement alone, without proof of an overt act. We disagree. As previously stated, this final charge was given in response to the government's objection that the first supplemental charge was incorrect in stating that a defendant could not be found guilty on the conspiracy count if there were no violations as to substantive counts. Consequently, the court stated several times that the essence of a conspiracy is the agreement, and that even if the venture is unsuccessful, a defendant may still be found guilty of conspiracy. Yet while the court stressed these instructions in an attempt to cure its misstatement, it did not overlook the overt act requirement. This is clearly given in the first paragraph of the second supplemental charge, as well as having been set out in the general charge to the jury given the previous day. 77 In examining a challenge to the court's charge, we do not segment it and pass upon isolated statements out of context. January v. United States, 409 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1969). We must look at the entire charge and assess its meaning as a whole in order to determine if the issues were fairly presented to the jury. Beck v. United States, 317 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1963), Cert. denied, 375 U.S. 472, 84 S.Ct. 480, 11 L.Ed.2d 419 (1964). After a thorough review of all the court's charges here, we find that the instructions fairly presented the issue of conspiracy and the relationship of a conspiracy to the substantive counts. From the manner and types of verdicts returned, it is apparent that the jury understood the charge and how to apply it to all of the counts of the indictment. The rights of the appellants were certainly not so adversely affected as to constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v. Rojas, 502 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Resnick, 488 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 416 U.S. 991, 94 S.Ct. 2400, 40 L.Ed.2d 769 (1974). Thus, we find no reversible error. 78