Opinion ID: 1992744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the court's jurisdiction

Text: District Intown, as we have noted, does not challenge the propriety of the Mayor's Agent's denial of the permit applications on the ground that the proposed construction would be incompatible with the historic landmark on which the town houses were to be located. See D.C.Code § 5-1007(f). As the intervenors correctly point out in their brief, the practical effect of any decision by this court on the petition for review will be to leave in place the denial of the permit application.... District Intown seeks to have those portions of the Mayor's Agent's opinion resolving the unreasonable economic hardship and taking claims vacated so that it can relitigate them in another forum. These circumstances raise the question whether the case presents a live and justiciable controversy. [5] In order to obtain judicial review, District Intown must allege that it has been adversely affected or aggrieved by the findings and conclusions of which it complains, or that it has suffered a legal wrong. See D.C.Code § 1-1510(a) (1992). A party has not been adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action unless, inter alia, it has suffered or will sustain some actual or threatened injury in fact from the challenged agency action. Concerned Residents v. Grant, 537 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir.1976) (citations omitted). Moreover, the actual or threatened legal wrong or injury must be certain, rather than conjectural or speculative. Florida v. Weinberger, 492 F.2d 488, 494 (5th Cir.1974) (citations omitted). Generally, administrative orders are not reviewable unless and until they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process. Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112-13, 68 S.Ct. 431, 437 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 311-12, 47 S.Ct. 413, 415, 71 L.Ed. 651 (1927) (Brandeis, J.). Here, the findings and conclusions regarding economic hardship which are the subject of District Intown's challenge do not, standing alone, impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix any legal relationship. The order of the Mayor's Agent denying the permits would, of course, qualify for review under the standards articulated in these authorities, but District Intown has explicitly declined to challenge that order, nor has it demanded that we direct that the permits issue. The only threatened injury of which District Intown complains in this case derives from the apprehended preclusive consequences, in possible future civil proceedings, of the findings and conclusions of the Mayor's Agent regarding the question whether District Intown suffered an uncompensated taking. But even assuming, without deciding, that threatened collateral consequences to a party's rights in a hypothetical future lawsuit may ever be sufficient to entitle a party to judicial review pursuant to the DCAPA, [6] we conclude as a matter of law that no such injury has been sustained or threatened here. The findings and conclusions of the Mayor's Agent can have preclusive effect only if the Mayor's Agent acted within his statutory authority in issuing them. It is essential ... to the conclusiveness of a judgment or decree rendered by a court [or agency][ [7] ] that the court [or agency] have jurisdiction of the subject matter.... 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 689, at 146 (1947 & Supp.1995). In order to invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party must show that the court or agency had jurisdiction to render a [decision] adjudicating the question. Wilburn v. North Jellico Coal Co., 272 Ky. 749, 115 S.W.2d 288, 292 (1938). If the Mayor's Agent lacked the authority to issue these findings and conclusions, his decision was ineffective as an estoppel. United States v. Silliman, 65 F.Supp. 665, 669 (D.N.J.1946) (citations omitted). District Intown's apprehensions of preclusive consequences thus have substance only if the Mayor's Agent was authorized by law to decide the issue of economic hardship. We conclude that he was not.