Opinion ID: 1754113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Board's Consideration of Robertson's Felony Convictions

Text: We begin by analyzing whether the Board's consideration of Robertson's stale felony convictions is error under the UAPA. Tennessee's Rules of Evidence do not specifically apply to administrative hearings. See Roberts v. Traughber, 844 S.W.2d 192, 196 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991). The UAPA standard governing admissibility of evidence in a contested case hearing states that: The agency shall admit and give probative effect to evidence admissible in a court, and when necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably susceptible to proof under the rules of court, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted if it is of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The agency shall give effect to the rules of privilege recognized by law and to agency statutes protecting the confidentiality of certain records, and shall exclude evidence which in its judgment is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-313(1) (1998). Even under this relaxed standard, however, the UAPA plainly requires the exclusion of irrelevant or immaterial evidence. We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals below that the 1982 convictions and 1997 Order were not relevant to the Board's decision in Robertson's case and should not have been admitted. Robertson was charged solely with establishing and maintaining a dual relationship with D.W. That Robertson, while abusing drugs and alcohol twenty years earlier, forged three checks to support a drug habit, is not probative of her 1999 professional conduct. Nor are the pre-licensure convictions relevant in this case to a consideration of the appropriate remedy, because their existence and relevancy already had been considered fully before the initial license was ever granted. We reject the Board's contention that it properly considered the convictions because Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-5-313(6)(B) allows an agency to take official notice of [t]he record of other proceedings before the agency. While the statute clearly confers this general authority, we believe that the more specific statute controlling the admissibility of evidence in a contested case hearing constrained any general right to take notice of the record of previous agency proceedings. See, e.g., Arnwine v. Union County Bd. of Educ., 120 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tenn.2003) ([s]pecific statutory provisions control over conflicting general provisions). We conclude, then, that the Board's consideration of Robertson's felony convictions was erroneous. We emphasize the narrowness of our holding. We have merely determined that, under the evidentiary rules that apply to UAPA adjudicative hearings, evidence of Robertson's pre -licensure conduct that was entirely unrelated to her 1999 misconduct and that the Board specifically considered in conjunction with its 1997 decision to grant her a license was improperly a part of the Board's deliberations. In this case, Robertson's offenses were committed prior to her licensure and therefore before any duty to abide by the regulations applicable to social workers. Had Robertson committed the felonies after licensure, their consideration might have been relevant in crafting the appropriate remedy, regardless of whether they were probative of whether she committed the infraction with which she was charged. [4] In this particular case, though, our inquiry does not end here. Robertson failed to preserve this issue for review because she did not object at the hearing to the felony convictions' admissibility. Instead, Robertson's counsel addressed the convictions in his opening statement and questioned Robertson specifically about them. A party who invites or waives error . . . is not entitled to relief on appeal. Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000); see also Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). When a party fails to object to or affirmatively elicits evidence, that evidence, even if otherwise inadmissible, ` may properly be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible, the only question being with regard to how much weight [it] should be given.' State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tenn.2000) (citation omitted); Anderson v. Carter, 512 S.W.2d 297, 306-07 (Tenn.Ct.App.1974). An administrative tribunal, like a trial court, must be given the opportunity to correct procedural errors. McClellan, 921 S.W.2d at 690. Allowing parties to acquiesce in the procedures, but to challenge those same procedures on appeal is ineffective and unreasonable. Id. Because Robertson's counsel did not object to admission of the 1997 Order at the hearing, and, in fact, affirmatively elicited testimony concerning the felony convictions, Robertson may not now challenge the Board's consideration of this evidence. Even if Robertson had not waived this issue, we would still be constrained from reversing or modifying the Board's remedy on this basis. As we show below, any impact that the felony convictions may have had on the Board's choice of a remedy did not affect the decision's merits. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-322(i) (2005).