Opinion ID: 2997131
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants have failed to rebut the Oregon

Text: presumption or exonerate themselves from liability. The M/V Morgan has failed to rebut the Oregon presumption or exonerate itself from liability by proving either that (1) the allision was the sole fault of the bridge, (2) it acted reasonably, or (3) the allision was the result of an “inevitable accident.” In addition, the in extremis doctrine does not aid the M/V Morgan.
stationary object. To prove that the allision was the sole fault of the bridge and exonerate itself from liability, the M/V Morgan asks this court to draw a distinction between what it character14 No. 03-1789 izes as the “actual fault” of the bridge and the “presumed fault” of the vessel.13 For the purposes of this analysis, we find no real distinction between “presumed fault” and “actual fault.” As discussed above, presumptions are merely tools used by courts to analyze the facts which underlie an allision and address any factual voids in the record. A presumption implicates the burden of production and proof, not the ultimate liability determination. Folkstone Maritime, Ltd., 64 F.3d at 1050. The district court found that the City’s decision not to replace the fender over the recessed slot was not the sole cause of the damage to the electrical cables. See White Stack Towing Corp. v. Hewitt Oil Co., 216 F.2d 776, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1954) (exonerating vessel of liability when damage to breasting dolphins was solely caused by their negligent construction and vessel was properly piloted during docking). Under a pure comparative fault analysis, “[t]he plaintiff’s negligence reduces the amount of damages that he can collect, but it is not a defense to liability.” Brotherhood Shipping Co., Ltd., 985 F.2d at 325 (citing Reliable Transfer Co., 412 U.S. at 397); Bryant v. Partenreederei-Ernest Russ, 352 F.2d 614, 615 (4th Cir. 1965) (in admiralty “contribu- 13 The M/V Morgan points to the following language in the district court opinion in support of this distinction: “Although the Court does not necessarily find specific acts of negligence on the part of the Defendants, the Court need not do so. Rather, the Defendants have not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that they were not at fault under the standards necessary to rebut the presumption under the Oregon rule.” M/V Morgan, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (emphasis in original). To support its argument concerning the significance of the City’s “actual fault,” defendants seize on the district court’s statement that the City’s negligence in failing to replace the fender system over the recessed slot “was a proximate cause of the damages from the allision.” Id. at 775. No. 03-1789 15 tory negligence is properly considered in mitigation of damages.”).14 The district court’s finding that the fender system (or lack thereof) contributed to the accident is supported by the record and therefore was not clearly erroneous. The district court reasoned that while the City placed the cables in a recessed slot to protect them, placing a wooden fender in front of the slot would have likely prevented the accident. Thus, the court determined that while the City took some preventative action, it did not take sufficient action. On the part of the defendants, the court found that the crew’s response to the starboard winch brake failure was unreasonable in that it was not able to face up the M/V Morgan and this negligence lead to the unusual angular impact. It was therefore proper for the court to decrease the M/V Morgan’s percentage of liability in proportion to the plaintiff’s relative degree of fault. 14 The district court also properly rejected defendants’ superceding cause argument. “The doctrine of superceding cause is thus applied where the defendant’s negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff ’s injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable.” 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-3 (4th ed. 2004). Here, the City’s decision not to replace the wooden fender over the recessed slot was not a superceding cause of the injury to the cables because it did not cut off the M/V Morgan’s negligence in failing to face up the vessel after the mechanical failure of the starboard winch. See Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837-38 (1996) (discussing the continued viability of the superceding cause doctrine after Reliable Transfer Co.). The City’s decision not to replace the fender could be deemed a superceding cause if, for example, the cables were left completely open, in a navigable waterway, with no protection whatsoever, and the M/V Morgan’s contact with the cables was made at a parallel angle. This would amount to the type of “extraordinary” negligence necessary to break the causal nexus and completely shield the defendants from liability. See id. 16 No. 03-1789
failure in a reasonable manner. The M/V Morgan’s fault is based on the district court’s finding that the defendants could have prevented the angular impact by properly facing up the M/V Morgan. Specifically, the district court found that: (1) the M/V Morgan did not respond reasonably to the starboard winche’s failure; (2) the crew was inexperienced with the M/V Morgan; (3) the crew was not diligent in its maintenance of the vessel’s winches in that they did not inspect the winches that day and could not recall when they were last inspected; (4) Captain Long’s decision to cast a center line was unreasonable in that it delayed drawing in the starboard winch line; and (5) Captain Long’s decision to plug the control box was ineffective to restore tension to the winch line.15 The district court was correct that the vessel must bear some of the responsibility for the allision. See American River Trans. Co., 148 F.3d at 450 (finding a drifting vessel liable for alliding with a moored barge based on the vessel’s negligent reaction to the mechanical failure of its steering system); In re American Milling Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1091 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding a vessel liable for an allision with a bridge when the vessel failed to prove that a mechanical failure caused the allision as opposed to the captain’s navigational errors). 15 It is important to note that these facts support a finding of negligence against the defendants absent the presumption. See 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 5-2 (4th ed. 2004). These facts clearly demonstrate that “the allision could have been prevented by the exercise of due care.” Folkstone Maritime Ltd., 64 F.3d at 1046 (citing The Jumna, 149 F. 171, 173 (2d Cir. 1906). See also Paige Hess, Applying the Pennsylvania Rule—Circumstances to Consider in Allisions: American River Transportation Co. v. M/V Kavo Kaliakra, 24 Tul. Mar. L.J. 343, 352 (1999) (“In light of modern day technology and practices, the value of such presumptions has diminished. . .”). No. 03-1789 17
ble accident.” The “inevitable accident” doctrine applies when “the cause of the collision was a cause not produced by [the vessel], but a cause of which [the vessel] could not avoid.” The Olympia, 61 F. 120, 123 (6th Cir. 1894). Generally, this doctrine is invoked when an act of God, or vis major, causes a vessel to collide with another object or vessel. The Louisiana, 70 U.S. at 173; Frost v. Saluski (The Blue Goddess), 199 F.2d 460, 462 (7th Cir. 1952). “Unless it appears that both parties have endeavored by all means in their power, with due care and a proper display of nautical skill, to prevent the collision, the defense of inevitable accident is inapplicable to the case.” The Clarita, 90 U.S. 1, 13 (1874). Therefore, the defense cannot be “sustained where it appears that the disaster was caused by negligence.” Id.; American River Transp. Co., Inc. v. Paragon Marine Serv., Inc., 329 F.3d 946, 947 (8th Cir. 2003). If applicable, each party is responsible for his respective damages and no liability attaches. The Continental, 81 U.S. 345, 355 (1872). The doctrine has been applied to collisions brought about by a vessel’s loss of control due to a mechanical failure, however, the inquiry is whether the defect which caused the malfunction was latent in nature or detectible by the vessel through proper inspection. See The Olympia, 61 F. at 122;16 Cranberry Creek Coal Co. v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 33 F.2d 272, 274 (2d Cir. 1929) (finding that vessel 16 “The defendants say ‘Our tiller rope broke, and the vessel became unmanageable, and the collision was unavoidable.’ That only shows that the breaking of the tiller rope was the cause of the collision. They must go further, and show that the cause was operated to break the tiller rope was unavoidable. The collision was but the result of the cause which produced a broken tiller rope. If that cause is not shown to be unavoidable, how can it be said that the collision was an inevitable accident?” Id. 18 No. 03-1789 failed to rebut presumption of fault by proving “inevitable accident” when it failed to present evidence that mechanical defect was latent or that the vessel was properly maintained and inspected); The William E. Reed Hudson River Shipyards Corp. v. Metropolitan Sand & Gravel Corp., 104 F.2d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 1939) (finding that the vessel failed to establish “inevitable accident” defense as it did not present evidence that broken steering gear was in good condition prior to accident, properly or frequently inspected, or purchased from a reputable manufacturer); Arkansas River Co. v. CSX Transp., 780 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (W.D.Ky. 1991); Meadows and Markulis, Apportioning Fault in Collision Cases, 1 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 1, 21 (1989) (discussing applicability of the inevitable accident doctrine when a collision occurs as a result of a latent defect in properly inspected and maintained vessel machinery). The M/V Morgan failed to prove that the accident was inevitable. The vessel did not put forth any evidence that the defect in the starboard winch was latent or could not be uncovered through proper inspection. In fact, the defendants testified that they did not know when the starboard winch was last inspected or who was responsible for its continued inspection. Most importantly, the district court found that the M/V Morgan could have prevented the accident by properly handling the vessel after the mechanical failure. This finding suggests that the allision was not caused by the failure of the starboard winch, but rather by the subsequent mishandling of the vessel. See In re American Milling Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (rejecting the “inevitable accident” defense when captain could have prevented the allision by properly handling vessel after failure of rudders); Meadows and Markulis, supra (an inevitable accident is one “which occurs without fault”). Thus, the defendants have not sustained the very heavy burden of proving that the accident was inevitable. No. 03-1789 19
Sometimes confused with the inevitable accident doctrine, the in extremis doctrine or “agony of the moment defense” applies when a ship is placed in sudden peril through no fault of its own and is forced to take “evasive maneuvers that may be a violation of a rule.” 2 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 14-2 n. 49 (4th ed. 2004). See, e.g., N.M. Paterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1963) (applying in extremis doctrine to absolve a vessel from liability for striking a bridge when the bridge failed to open and failed to give advance warning to the vessel or tug of its inability to open); Monroe v. City of Chicago, 194 F. 936, 939-40 (7th Cir. 1912) (same). As explained in The Blue Jacket, 144 U.S. 371, 392 (1892) an example of such an occurrence is “where one ship has, by wrong maneuvers, placed another ship in a position of extreme danger, that other ship will not be held to blame if she has done something wrong, and has not been maneuvered with perfect skill and presence of mind.” The party relying on the in extremis doctrine must be completely free from fault prior to the emergency occurrence. Puerto Rico Ports Authority v. M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1990). “It does not excuse a vessel making a wrong maneuver in extremis where the imminence of the peril was occasioned by the fault or negligence of those in charge of the vessel, or might have been avoided by earlier precautions which it was bound to take.” 70 Am. Jur. 2d Shipping § 619 (2003). Further, applicability of the doctrine does not prevent a finding of liability, it merely requires courts to judge a captain’s reac- tions more leniently because of the crisis situation. Grosse Ile Bridge Co. v. American Steamship Co., 302 F.3d 616, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2002). Whether to rebut the presumption or argue for its inapplicability, defendants incorrectly attempt to avail them20 No. 03-1789 selves of the in extremis doctrine equating it to the “inevitable accident” doctrine. Based on the district court’s findings, it is clear that the M/V Morgan was not operating in extremis. The dangerous situation was caused by a mechanical failure of the vessel itself; it was not placed in sudden peril by an outside force or party. Cf. Grosse Ile Bridge Co., 302 F.3d at 625-26 (finding in extremis applicable where bridge failed to timely open but reasoning that captain’s reaction to emergency situation was still negligent even under more lenient standard because his delay in dropping anchor to stop vessel’s forward movement was unreasonable); Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 897 F.2d at 6-7 (applying in extremis doctrine to shield a tug from liability for striking a pier after it was forced to cast off its lines to avoid a collision with a tanker). Moreover, the district court’s finding that the vessel had sufficient time to respond properly to the failure of the starboard winch brake negates the applicability of this doctrine as it was not in “sudden peril” and had sufficient time to prevent the allision. See Richard J. Nikas, Skimming the Surface: A Primer on the Law of Collision, 9 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 225, 240 (1996) (“Normally, the law of collision assumes there will be a reasonable opportunity for decision, however, this assumption is abandoned in cases of sudden peril.”). Defendants attempt to merge the two doctrines of “inevitable accident” and in extremis, however, we find the in extremis doctrine inapplicable to accidents caused by mechanical failures.