Opinion ID: 2613228
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The off-the-record request

Text: As noted above, at one point in the March 28 interview, after Officer McCarthy had assured defendant that he was not bluffing about charging defendant with murder, defendant abruptly stated, This is off the record. McCarthy replied, You're doing all the talking, don't let me stop you, go ahead. Defendant thereupon asked McCarthy, Can you get me 10 years? The ensuing discussion concerned possible penalties that might be imposed. (All of these sentencing discussions were excluded at trial.) Soon thereafter, defendant asked McCarthy, Tell me what you have and I might make you a proposition. After McCarthy falsely told defendant that McCarthy knew that defendant had pawned some of the victims' jewelry, and that victim Holmes had identified defendant before she died, defendant stated that his name was not on any pawn slip, that it would be his word against the pawnshop owner, and that a dying declaration from victim Holmes would convict me of killing her ... but not [victim Castro], but it's close in time, but I am not saying I did it. [¶] ... I probably did do it, but you are not going to get me to say I did do it. (This latter statement was introduced at trial.) Immediately thereafter, defendant again said, This is off the record, and McCarthy told him to go ahead. Defendant then directed McCarthy to go to the district attorney and get me ten straight ... years, and I will give you something you want. The remaining discussion concerned possible arrangements for reduced sentences in return for defendant's statement about the murders. The trial court found that defendant's off the record requests pertained only to the sentencing and plea bargain discussions which immediately followed those requests, and that accordingly any statements not pertaining to sentencing were admissible. The court ruled that only the sentencing discussions would be inadmissible at trial. (10) Defendant contends that all statements following his initial off-the-record request should have been suppressed, because McCarthy never informed him that the interview was no longer off the record. He cites no cases imposing such a rigid requirement, and we have found none so holding. The main inquiry should be whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent. Here, the trial court found the waiver remained valid as to discussions not involving sentencing. (See People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629-630 [247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070] [suspect's refusal to discuss certain subjects not conclusive indication of intent to terminate interrogation]; People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 784-786 [214 Cal. Rptr. 652, 699 P.2d 1259] [defendant's expressed reluctance to discuss details of confession did not invoke Miranda right to silence]; see also People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 814-817 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436] [off-the-record request does not render volunteered statements inadmissible].) We find the record amply supports the trial court's finding. It seems unlikely defendant would have repeated his off-the-record request if he had intended or assumed the proceedings remained off the record following his initial request. It could be argued that defendant's request that the interview proceed off the record disclosed his confusion about the admissibility of his statements to the officers, thereby vitiating the Miranda waiver. In People v. Braeseke, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pages 702-703, we held that a defendant's off-the-record request, acceded to by the officers, was inconsistent with a knowing waiver of self-incrimination rights. As we stated in that case, defendant's request revealed a marked lack of understanding of the Miranda warnings. [Citation and fn. omitted.]. (See also Frazier v. United States (D.C. Cir.1969) 419 F.2d 1161, 1168-1169 [136 App.D.C. 180] [officers' obligation to clarify the defendant's misconception regarding admissibility of oral admissions].) Braeseke, supra, 25 Cal.3d 691, is distinguishable, however, because there the trial court permitted admission of the defendant's statements despite his request for off-the-record treatment. In the present case, as we have indicated, the trial court excluded those statements regarding possible sentencing to which the off-the-record request was directed. Moreover, it is arguable that an off-the-record request no longer necessarily demonstrates confusion on the defendant's part because, following Braeseke, such a request effectively insulates the affected portion of the interview from subsequent courtroom use. As with defendant's statement that maybe I ought to talk to a lawyer, because we find no Miranda violation in connection with defendant's off the record remark, it is unnecessary to determine the prejudicial effect of such error. Nonetheless, because it seems apparent that no prejudice resulted from any such violation, we address that subject briefly, as follows: