Opinion ID: 1257044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: h. jensen

Text: Appellant contends that respondent Jensen, already holding the office of probate judge, was ineligible to be a state representative when he declared his candidacy for that office thus rendering his declaration of candidacy void. This is the same argument made in reference to respondent Spraker. Bradfield v. Avery, discussed supra, is controlling against appellant here. Appellant, however, points out that Jensen's term as state representative began December 1, 1966, (Idaho Const. Art. 3, § 3), while his term of office as probate judge did not expire until January, 1967. Appellant cites Section 9 of the Organic Act with the following emphasis: Sec. 9. Territorial Courts  Jurisdiction and Powers.  The judicial power of said territory shall be vested in a Supreme Court, district courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court shall consist of a chief justice and two associate justices, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum, and who shall hold a term at the seat of government of said territory annually and they shall hold their offices during a period of four years, and until their successors shall be appointed and qualified.   . Appellant calls attention to the similarity of that provision with Idaho Const. Art. 5, § 2, emphasizing that The courts shall constitute a unified and integrated judicial system for administration and supervision by the Supreme Court. She then refers to I.C. § 1-702, pointing out that the term of office for a district judge is four years and that when a new district judgeship is created, such judge holds office until the next general election, and until his successor is elected and qualified. She concludes that by inference these provisions are applicable to probate judges and thus Jensen automatically was ineligible for office on December 1, 1966, because he had to serve as probate judge until after expiration of his term and until his successor was elected and qualified and could not resign from that position. From the statutory provisions themselves, they are inapplicable to respondent Jensen as probate judge. Sec. 9, Organic Act applied only to justices of the territorial Supreme Court, now extinct, and I.C. § 1-702, applies only to appointed district judges. Not only do the statutes fail to prohibit a probate judge from resigning before his term is over, but they expressly permit such resignation. I.C. § 59-901 provides: Every civil office shall be vacant upon the happening of either of the following events at any time before the expiration of the term of such office, as follows: 1. The resignation of the incumbent. 2.   .