Opinion ID: 842400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the governing statutory provisions

Text: I begin, as is appropriate, with the language of the statute. The taxes in this case were levied under the authority of MCL 224.20b. It provides: (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the board of commissioners of any county by proper resolution may submit to the electorate of the county at any general or special election the question of a tax levy for highway, road and street purposes or for 1 or more specific highway, road or street purposes, including but not limited to bridges, as may be specified by the board. (2) Unless otherwise agreed by the governing bodies of the cities and villages and the board of county road commissioners the revenues derived from the tax levy authorized by this section shall be allocated and distributed by the county treasurer as follows: (a) To the county road fund: (i) A percentage of the total revenues equal to the proportion that the state equalized valuation of the unincorporated area of the county bears to the total state equalized value of the county. (ii) A percentage of the remainder of the revenues equal to the proportion that the county primary road mileage within cities and villages bears to the total of the city and village major street mileage in the county plus the county primary road mileage within cities and villages in the county. The mileages to be used are the most recent mileages as certified by the state highway commission. (b) The remaining revenues shall be distributed to the cities and villages in the proportion that the state equalized valuation of each bears to the total state equalized valuation of the incorporated areas of the county. (3) The revenues allocated to the cities and villages shall be expended exclusively for highway, road and street purposes. The revenues allocated to the county road fund shall be expended by the board of county road commissioners exclusively for highway, road and street purposes. (4) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 22 of this chapter, section 7 of Act No. 156 of the Public Acts of 1851, as amended, being section 46.7 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, or section 1 of Act No. 28 of the Public Acts of 1911, being section 141.71 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, a board of county commissioners shall not submit to the electorate of the county the question of a tax levy for any highway, road or street purpose, including but not limited to bridges, nor submit the question of borrowing money for any such purpose, to be voted upon at any election held on or after September 1, 1971 unless the revenues or proceeds are allocated and distributed in the same manner as the revenues derived from a tax levy authorized by this section. Pursuant to subsection 1, the board of county commissioners can submit to the electorate a tax levy for either a specific or a general purpose. MCL 224.20b(1). The monies raised from the levy must be allocated in accordance with the formula set forth in subsection 2. MCL 224.20b(2). [1] There is no dispute that plaintiff, the city of South Haven, is a municipality for purposes of subsection 2. Hence, plaintiff was entitled to a portion of the proceeds from each of the ballot proposals. However, without dispute, plaintiff did not receive any of the revenues generated. They were all to be used for maintaining and repairing primary and local county roads. [2] Presumably because no county roads existed within plaintiff's city limits, plaintiff did not receive any of the revenues. Yet, the statutory language is unambiguous. This Court has repeatedly stated that it will enforce unambiguous statutes as written. [3] Therefore, this Court should enforce the statute and remand the case to the trial court for a determination of what portion of the revenues should have been distributed to plaintiff. But the majority refuses to do so, even though it (1) notes that the term shall, as used in the statute, indicates that the formula for allocating funds is mandatory, (2) states that [t]he phrasing of the ballot proposal is irrelevant to these statutory responsibilities and cannot be a vehicle for avoiding their application, and (3) states that `[i]f the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written.' Ante at 539, quoting Parkwood Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Dev. Auth., 468 Mich. 763, 772, 664 N.W.2d 185 (2003).