Opinion ID: 4184275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Audio Recordings

Text: The defendant first contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing him to make the decision to admit two audio recorded telephone calls. During trial, the State questioned one of the law enforcement officers involved in the case about certain telephone calls between the defendant and his mother that occurred while the defendant was in jail following the assault. The State played a portion of one of the recorded calls in which the defendant stated, “I told you I’m not gonna let him yell in my face the rest of my life.” The State asked the detective whether the defendant was 5 referring to his father in the statement. Defense counsel objected, and the following exchange took place: [Defense counsel]: I know that the State’s just trying to save time, but I don’t think it’s proper for him to base an opinion -- you know, give his opinion to the jury about what this is about or, you know, what it was in regards to. Want to play the whole tape, then we play the whole tape. [Prosecutor]: If he wants us to play the whole tape, I will play both tapes. There’s a lot in there that I assume he doesn’t want in, but if he wants the whole tape, I’ll play the whole tape. THE COURT: Why don’t you talk to [the defendant], your client, and see if he wants -- I think your objection is well founded. The question is, is that really what you want to have happen. So -- if it is, then I’m going to grant that request, but I haven’t heard the -- I haven’t heard anything more than this, so I don’t know -- I assume you know what’s -- what -- the remainder that’s on there. So if that’s really your request, then -- then, I just want to make sure that that’s your client’s specific request that we do that. [Defense counsel]: Yeah, I’ll stop. THE COURT: Thank you. [Defense counsel]: Can I have a minute? THE COURT: Absolutely. (Pause) [Defense counsel]: Yes, he does. He would prefer playing the entire conversation. THE COURT: Okay. So really the request is that -- what brought us here is the specific objection to the last question. Do you want to press that question? [Prosecutor]: Let me ask this. Are we going to play the full two phone calls? [Defense counsel]: Most likely, yeah. That’s what he wants. .... 6 THE COURT: I think -- I think -- you’re saying it’s important from your perspective that the context be put on; is that your request -- [Defense counsel]: That’s my client’s position, is that he would prefer that the entirety be played. THE COURT: All right. We’ll do that. We’ll do that. (Emphases added.) Thereafter the State played the two audio recordings of the telephone conversations between the defendant and his mother. The recordings included statements by the defendant referencing the assault for which he was being tried and his rationale for the assault, as well as his mental health issues and potential drug use. The recordings also included threatening and homophobic statements made by the defendant. In addition, during the telephone calls, the defendant made derogatory remarks about his father. Following the hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court found that “playing the otherwise inadmissible recording was very damaging to [the defendant]. If [trial counsel], acting alone, had introduced the full recording as evidence, it would fall below the established standards for reasonable attorney conduct.” However, the court found that [t]hat is not what happened here. [Trial counsel] conferred with [the defendant] after the State offered to play the full recording. The record is clear that [the defendant] decided to play the full recording, even after the Court asked again if that was really what the defense wanted to do. The question is whether [trial counsel’s] conduct in following his client’s specific request fell below the established standard of reasonableness. The court concluded that trial counsel “was not required to override [the defendant’s] wish to have the full recording played in order to remain objectively reasonable as counsel.” Thus, the court ruled that the defendant had failed to prove that his trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The defendant contends that the trial “court erred in finding that counsel’s performance did not fall below the established standards for reasonable attorney conduct” because, here, “counsel did not adequately advise [the defendant] before allowing him to make the decision about whether the full recordings would be played,” nor did counsel “seek to mitigate the damage from the full recordings by asking the court for an instruction limiting the jury’s use of the statements and forbidding their use as character or propensity 7 evidence.” Rather, the defendant claims that trial “counsel blindly followed [his] wish that the calls be heard in full.” (Quotation omitted.) In doing so, the defendant maintains that trial counsel “abdicated his responsibility to make a critical strategic decision to his uninformed and uncounseled client” and, therefore, “[f]or this decision, [the defendant] essentially represented himself.” We recognize that the preferable course in a challenge based upon ineffective assistance of counsel is to require the defendant to prove as a threshold matter that the alleged error by counsel prejudiced his case. State v. Wisowaty, 137 N.H. 298, 302 (1993). As we have explained, “[i]f the defendant cannot demonstrate such prejudice, we need not even decide whether counsel’s performance fell below the standard of reasonable competence.” Id. (quotation omitted). We have also recognized, however, that courts have the flexibility to adopt the analytic approach that promotes clarity and ease of review. Id. Here, we find it helpful to address the merits of the defendant’s argument, and consider the issue of prejudice only if there is a legitimate question as to whether counsel’s conduct was indeed deficient. See id. “An attorney undoubtedly has a duty to consult with the client regarding ‘important decisions,’ including questions of overarching defense strategy.” Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004). “That obligation, however, does not require counsel to obtain the defendant’s consent to every tactical decision.” Id. (quotation omitted). In that respect, we agree with the defendant that “[t]he decision of whether to object to inadmissible evidence is an aspect of trial strategy that counsel may make on behalf of a defendant.” State v. Rawnsley, 167 N.H. 8, 13 (2014). Nonetheless, we do not believe that this means that counsel is required to ignore the defendant’s request to allow the admission of such evidence. As the Supreme Court stated in Strickland, “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. This is so because “trial counsel, while held to a standard of ‘reasonable effectiveness,’ is still only an assistant to the defendant and not the master of the defense.” Mulligan v. Kemp, 771 F.2d 1436, 1441 (11th Cir. 1985). “Because we recognize that a defendant must have this broad power to dictate the manner in which he is tried, it follows that, in evaluating strategic choices of trial counsel, we must give great deference to choices which are made under the explicit direction of the client.” Id. Accordingly, “if [counsel] is commanded by his client to present a certain defense, and if he does thoroughly explain the potential problems with the suggested approach, then his ultimate decision to follow the client’s will may not be lightly disturbed.” Id. at 1442; see also United States v. Weaver, 882 F.2d 1128, 1140 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Where a defendant, fully informed of the reasonable options before him, 8 agrees to follow a particular strategy at trial, that strategy cannot later form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”); State v. Brown, 160 N.H. 408, 416 (2010) (concluding that trial counsel did not act unreasonably where “counsel consulted with his client and they chose to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy, eliminating the possibility of a compromise verdict”). In this case, trial counsel testified at the hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial that he recalled having “a brief discussion [with the defendant] about whether or not . . . playing the entire phone call was a good idea or not.” Counsel stated that, in his opinion, “it was not,” however, he believed “that [the defendant] wanted to play the entire tape.” He testified that he listened to the tapes prior to trial and that he believed “that [the defendant] said that he had listened to them.” He agreed with the prosecutor that, although he had reservations about playing the recordings, he let the defendant “ultimately make the call.” He explained: I think in my opinion and my experience and training that there’s times during a trial or during any part of a case when you make certain strategic and tactical decisions. And whenever possible you want to have your client involved in the conversation and in the decision. And ultimately it’s my opinion that I err to the side of doing what my client wishes to do so long as there’s been, you know, kind of full disclosure and an opportunity to, you know, to have a conversation about it, to let him know the merits and demerits of doing so, of taking any particular tactic or strategy. Trial counsel later agreed with the counsel representing the defendant at the hearing that, if it had been his choice, he would not have played the entire recordings, but that he consulted with the defendant and let him make the decision. He further stated: If [the defendant] had told me that he did not know what was on [the recordings], that I would not have -- I don’t believe that I would have had them played. I would have, you know, asked for a recess where we could have listened to them again. That’s what typically would have happened, but I don’t remember. The defendant did not testify at the hearing. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that counsel’s decision to allow the defendant to make the decision to admit the recordings was so egregious that he failed to function as the counsel the State Constitution guarantees. See Cable, 168 N.H. at 680; United States v. Mathis, No. CRIM. A.97-334-04(CK, Civ.A.02-095(CKK), 2005 WL 692082, at  (D.D.C. 2005) 9 (“Circuit courts confronted with cases like this one at bar have also refused to characterize a tactic pursued by an attorney at her client’s behest as ‘unreasonable.’”); see also Parker v. State, 510 So. 2d 281, 287 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (concluding that, where defendant had participated in decision to not submit jury instruction on lesser-included offense, court could not say that counsel’s decisions were unreasonable and “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment” (quotation and ellipsis omitted)). On the record before us, we cannot conclude, as the defendant suggests, that counsel abdicated his role by failing to “adequately advise [the defendant] before allowing him to make the decision about whether the full recordings would be played.” Contrary to the defendant’s suggestion, this is not a case where the defendant merely acquiesced to a decision made by his trial counsel. Rather, trial counsel’s uncontradicted testimony at the hearing supports a finding that counsel did, in fact, consult with the defendant regarding whether it was a good idea to play the recordings and that the defendant chose to admit the recordings. See Cable, 168 N.H. at 683-84 (stating that court could not conclude from record that defense counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness where defense counsel had, in fact, done what defendant claimed he had not done). Moreover, counsel testified that he believed the defendant said that he had listened to the recordings and, although counsel could not recall, he stated that, if the defendant had told him that he did not know what was on the recordings, counsel did not believe he would have had them played to the jury, and he would have asked for a recess to allow the defendant to listen to the recordings. Even assuming, as the defendant contends, that, at trial, “counsel [initially] suggested that the full recording be played before he was given an opportunity to consult with [the defendant],” the record shows that counsel thereafter did consult with the defendant and that the defendant’s choice was to play the recordings. “Cutting through the smoke, it is apparent that we are being asked to permit a defendant to avoid conviction on the ground that his lawyer did exactly what he asked him to do. That argument answers itself.” United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is noteworthy that, at trial, trial counsel utilized certain statements made by the defendant in one of the recordings in his crossexamination of a detective involved in the case. Further, in his closing argument, trial counsel relied upon one of the statements made by the defendant in the same recording to argue that the defendant should be acquitted of the felon in possession of a deadly weapon charge. The jury thereafter acquitted the defendant of that charge. Thus, although the decision to admit the recordings introduced detrimental evidence, trial counsel utilized the recordings as part of his trial strategy. 10 Based upon the foregoing, we hold that the defendant has failed to overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, his trial counsel acted reasonably. See Cable, 168 N.H. at 680; see also Mathis, 2005 WL 692082, at  (determining that counsel did not act “outside the bounds of reasonable professional assistance when she allowed Defendant’s informed opinion to ‘trump’ her own with respect to calling” a witness).