Opinion ID: 1469016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Good-Faith-Marriage Determination

Text: Having established that jurisdiction is proper, we review the agency's conclusion of lawthat Ibrahimi's credited evidence did not satisfy the legal standard of what constitutes a good-faith marriage de novo. See Iyamba v. INS, 244 F.3d 606, 607-08 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam). In determining whether an alien has entered into a good-faith marriage, the central question is whether [the couple] intended to establish a life together at the time they were married. Damon v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 1084, 1088 (9th Cir.2004); Cho v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 96, 102 (1st Cir.2005); see also Matter of Laureano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 1,  (BIA 1983). Criteria that the agency may consider to gauge this intent and the commitment of both parties to the marital relationship is set forth in the regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2); see also Nyonzele v. INS, 83 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir.1996). This evidence may include (i) [d]ocumentation relating to the degree to which the financial assets and liabilities of the parties were combined; (ii)[d]ocumentation concerning the length of time during which the parties cohabited after the marriage and after the alien obtained permanent residence; (iii)[b]irth certificates of children born to the marriage; and (iv)[o]ther evidence deemed pertinent. 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(e)(2). The credited evidence supports the BIA's decision that Ibrahimi did not enter his marriage in good faith. [5] The BIA relied heavily on the timing and length of Kohring and Ibrahimi's courtship in combination with the testimony of Ibrahimi's former girlfriend, Urgento, in reaching its conclusion. While Kohring's and Ibrahimi's courtship was short, this alone does not require a conclusion that the relationship was not bona fide. See, e.g., Damon, 360 F.3d at 1089 (courtship of several weeks). There is other evidence in the record, however, to indicate that at the time of the marriage Ibrahimi was not committed to the marital relationship. Ibrahimi had just ended a long-term relationship with Urgento during which they had discussed marriage. Urgento's credited testimony revealed that Ibrahimi had threatened to leave her and find someone else to marry if Urgento refused to marry him, which she ultimately did. Urgento's credited testimony further revealed that Ibrahimi called her within the first two weeks of January 2002 and that [t]he nature of the conversation was asking [her] to reconsider getting married. This call took place, at most, one week prior to Ibrahimi's marriage to Kohring. Thus, while the record contains evidence of a shared life together, the agency's determination that the evidence of a shared life was of limited probative value in light of the testimony regarding [Ibrahimi's] motivation at the time of his marriage is conclusive. We again note that § 1186a(c)(4) explicitly provides that [t]he determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). We are not at liberty then to reevaluate the relative strength of the evidence of Ibrahimi's shared life compared to Urgento's testimony regarding Ibrahimi's intentions. See Nyonzele, 83 F.3d at 980-81 (We are not at liberty to reweigh the evidence.). And there is no claim that the BIA substituted its personal conjecture or inference for reliable and credited evidence. See Damon, 360 F.3d at 1089. In conclusion, the credited evidence in the record supports the BIA's conclusion that Ibrahimi did not intend to establish a marital life with Kohring at the time he entered the marriage. We thus find that the BIA did not err by concluding that Ibrahimi was ineligible for a good-faith-marriage waiver because he did not meet the legal standard of what constitutes a good-faith marriage.