Opinion ID: 2279946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maine Privilege Against Self-incrimination

Text: [¶ 10] The Maine Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused... shall not be compelled to furnish or give evidence against himself or herself.... Me. Const. art. I, § 6. Defendant contends that this language should be broadly interpreted to prohibit the State from compelling criminal defendants to submit to field sobriety tests because they are being compelled to furnish or give evidence against themselves. Field sobriety test results are generally considered to be physical or non-testimonial evidence. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 602-603 n. 16, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2651, n. 16, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990). It is undisputed that the federal privilege against self-incrimination [2] only prohibits the compulsion of evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. See e.g. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-1831, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). Nevertheless, defendant argues that we should treat field sobriety test results in the same manner as inculpatory statements. To do this would require us to abandon the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial evidence in the context of interpreting the Maine privilege and ignore or overrule our historical stance on this subject. [3] We decline to do so. [¶ 11] The federal and state privileges against self-incrimination serve the same end. As noted by the United States Supreme Court, the constitutional guarantees, however differently worded, should have as far as possible the same interpretation. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 584-585, 12 S.Ct. 195, 206, 35 L.Ed. 1110 (1892); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 n. 6, 86 S.Ct. at 1831 n. 5 (denying that the testimonial/non-testimonial distinction rests on the use of the word witness in the fifth amendment). [¶ 12] We have consistently interpreted the Maine privilege co-extensively with the federal privilege. [4] These two constitutional provisions are so similar in nature and identical in purpose that precedent with respect to the construction of the one may well serve as precedent for the construction of the other. Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 395, 82 A.2d 773, 780 (1951). Furthermore, in State v. Nason , we held that the Maine Constitution is not violated when a defendant is compelled to produce physical, non-testimonial evidence. State v. Nason, 433 A.2d 424, 428 (Me.1981). The introduction of the field sobriety tests performed at the request of the officer violated neither the state nor the federal privilege against self-incrimination.