Opinion ID: 1935139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendants' claims that the Jensens could not have been defrauded as a matter of law are not persuasive. Defendants' claim that Roy and Evelyn could not have been damaged because they received more than they were owed on their original contract for deed. This argument misconceives the issue. If Peterson made a secret profit on his sale to the Beckmans, he must give that profit up. Division of the proceeds is a matter for the plaintiffs. Even if the James Jensens were damaged by Roy Jensen's conduct, Peterson should not be able to assert their claim as a defense to his breach of duty. [11] Defendants also argue that James and Mary Jensen could not have been defrauded as a matter of law because they were satisfied to receive $4,000. This argument fails for the same reason as the argument with regard to Roy and Evelyn. If the defendant's argument were to prevail, then no one could ever recover on a fraud or breach of duty claim because the defrauded party is usually satisfied until he finds out about the fraud or breach of duty. Defendants argue that since plaintiffs must have known that Petefam, Inc. was purchasing the trailer court and because plaintiffs signed a release, defendants were entitled to a directed verdict. The proper scope of review of the court's refusal of a directed verdict in this case is whether the evidence viewed most favorably to plaintiffs reasonably sustains the verdict. Freeman v. Morris Const. Co., 185 Minn. 503, 241 N.W. 677 (1932). Under this standard the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's finding. Even if, as defendants contend, plaintiffs knew that Petefam, Inc. was purchasing the trailer court, the evidence is overwhelming that Peterson misrepresented the ultimate selling price to plaintiffs and failed to disclose his ongoing negotiations with the Beckmans. The release is drafted to disclose as little as possible: it states only that Peterson is Petefam's agent, not its sole shareholder, and it nowhere mentions a $45,000 resale price. In its memorandum accompanying the post trial orders the court clearly used the correct standard in denying the motion for a directed verdict, applying the rule in Stenzel v. Bach, 295 Minn. 257, 203 N.W.2d 819 (1973).