Opinion ID: 1215390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: legality of intrusion in other than a criminal context

Text: We recognize that an emergency doctrine, of one sort or another, has been applied to warrantless searches and seizures in which probable cause and exigent circumstances exist without reference to criminal activity or situations likely to involve criminal activity. [4] We never have expressly held that emergencies solely justify warrantless entries in a criminal context, and we decline to do so here. It is apparent, however, that an emergency doctrine, as an exception to the warrant requirement, is most useful in the criminal law context where the issue of warrantless entries most often arises. Moreover, as is demonstrated by Part I.A. of this opinion, the doctrine is best utilized as the emergency/exigent circumstances exception. 759 P.2d at 1057-58. Probable cause has been a traditional criminal law construct. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 n. 5, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097 n. 5, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (probable cause peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, non-criminal procedures); but see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (probable cause required for housing inspection warrant) and n 6, infra. With this in mind, the Court of Appeals wrote: On these facts, it makes no sense to speak of warrants or the warrant requirement. When they first went to defendant's property, the deputies did not have probable cause to seek a warrant to search for any purpose. Therefore, no search warrant could have issued. 87 Or. App. at 321, 742 P.2d 648. The Court of Appeals went on, however, to find that the deputies lawfully were upon defendant's premises pursuant to their community caretaking function. As the Court of Appeals observed, the concept of a community caretaking function was recognized in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). The United States Supreme Court recognized that local law enforcement officials frequently investigate motor vehicle accidents and engage in community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528. This phrase previously has been quoted in one of this court's decisions. In State v. Atkinson, 298 Or. 1, 688 P.2d 832 (1984), we observed that the First Circuit upheld an intrusion upon a boat where there was a reasonable fear of a drowning. The federal decision was based upon a combination of `community caretaking functions' and possibly exigent circumstances. 298 Or. at 9 n 4, 688 P.2d 832. We also noted in Atkinson that a Florida appeals court upheld a police officer's entry into an automobile driver's pocketbook to look for medical disability identification under circumstances suggesting that the driver was undergoing a medical emergency. Id. The Court of Appeals previously has dealt with the concept of a community caretaking function. In State v. Apodaca, 85 Or. App. 128, 735 P.2d 1264 (1987), the court held that state troopers were not entitled, as part of their community caretaking functions, to enter a house without a warrant as part of an investigation into an automobile accident. In State v. Fleming, 63 Or. App. 661, 665 P.2d 1235 (1983), the court held that police officers could not, pursuant to a community caretaking function, lift a folded-down back seat of an automobile that they had stopped and moved at the defendant's request. See also State v. Thirdgill, 46 Or. App. 595, 613 P.2d 44 (1980). There is no generic community caretaking function. Whether law enforcement officers have specific functions is a matter of statutory law. Whatever the existence, extent, or nature of community caretaking functions, however, mere exercise of any activity pursuant to one of them does not insure compliance with Article I, section 9. Any intrusion of state power upon a constitutionally protected interest, be it for civil or criminal investigative purposes, must comply with constitutional standards. The Court of Appeals decided that the intrusion in this case complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness and so upheld the deputies' entry upon defendant's premises. 87 Or. App. at 324, 742 P.2d 648. We find it unnecessary to decide the issue because the deputies were without statutory or other authority from a politically accountable body to enter upon defendant's premises pursuant to a community caretaking function. As the lead opinion stated in Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 102 n. 2, 743 P.2d 692 (1987), [w]e often have stressed the need to examine statutory authority and the limitations imposed by that authority before reaching any constitutional question. In this case, the state cannot point to a statute or ordinance authorizing entries by sheriffs or their deputies in response to citizen concern about the safety and well-being of neighbors. We conclude that the deputies were without authority to enter upon defendant's premises and that all evidence resulting from that unauthorized entry properly should be suppressed. Contrary to the assertions in the concurring/dissenting opinion, however, our decision today does not mean that law enforcement officers may not enter upon a person's premises to render assistance to someone in need of that assistance. In situations implicating criminal law enforcement functions, law enforcement officers may enter without a warrant to render emergency assistance under the emergency/exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. In situations not implicating criminal law enforcement functions and not justified by the emergency/exigent circumstances exception, law enforcement officers, like private individuals, also may enter to render emergency assistance. [5] In the latter situation, however, incriminating evidence arising from the intrusion by law enforcement officers must be suppressed. [6] The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed and the case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.