Opinion ID: 2283170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: VALIDITY OF APPLICATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY UNDER 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311

Text: Initially, it should be observed that appellant does not challenge the constitutionality of the death penalty per se as violating the proscription against cruel and unusual punishments of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or the proscription against cruel punishments of Article I,  13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [13] Nor does appellant suggest that the sentencing procedures of 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 (now 42 Pa.C.S.A.  9711) do damage to the constitutional principles condemning capital punishment procedures that are either too rigid (i.e., those that do not permit the sentencing body to consider particular mitigating factors relating both to the crime and to the individual [14] ) or too lax (i.e., those that provide inadequate guidelines or unbridled discretion to the sentencing body in making the life imprisonment vs. death penalty choice with the result that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily [15] ). Obviously, it is not an easy task for the legislature to strike a delicate balance and adopt sentencing procedures which give neither too much nor too little discretion to the sentencing body. We believe, however, that the procedures of 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 have deftly made that delicate balance and that the sentencing procedure falls squarely within the controlling guidelines as pronounced by both the United States Supreme Court and this Court. Compare Commonwealth v. Moody, supra (former 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 struck down because the three mitigating circumstances which the jury there could consider were insufficient, i.e., there was not enough discretion to consider all of the possibly mitigating factors concerning the individual) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (we conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (upheld Georgia statutory scheme procedurally quite similar to 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 [16] ) and 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311(d) (aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the ten enumerated situations) and (e) (seven specific mitigating circumstances plus one general circumstance permitting defendant to introduce any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.) We turn then to the specific, narrower constitutional objections voiced by appellant to the application of 18 Pa.C. S.A.  1311 in the instant case. In dealing with these objections, we must be mindful of one overriding fact ÔÇö it is the legislature which has adopted the death penalty as a possible sentence for murder of the first degree in Pennsylvania. In considering such an emotionally charged, controversial and polarizing issue such as the death penalty, the legislature is peculiarly well-adapted to respond to the consensus of the people of this Commonwealth. Regardless of the personal beliefs of any member of this Court, it is manifestly not our function or prerogative to perform as a super-legislature and disturb the determination of the General Assembly absent a demonstration that the legislative enactment  clearly, palpably and plainly violates some specific mandate or prohibition of the constitution. Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159 at 166, 436 A.2d 593 at 596 (1981), citing Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975). In Snider v. Thornburg, supra , this Court identified what is perhaps the most fundamental principle of statutory construction: the presumption that the legislature has acted constitutionally. This presumption `reflects on the part of the judiciary the respect due to the legislature as a co-equal branch of the government.' School District of Deer Lakes v. Kane, 463 Pa. 554, 562, 345 A.2d 658, 662 (1971). 496 Pa. at 159, 436 A.2d at 596. So too, in Gregg v. Georgia, supra 428 U.S. at 174-76, 96 S.Ct. at 2925-26, the United States Supreme Court instructed: But, while we have an obligation to insure that constitutional bounds are not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as legislators. Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable, within narrow limits. The essential quality is detachment, founded on independence. History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525, 71 S.Ct. 857, 875, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in affirmance of judgment). Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved. And a heavy burden rests on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the people. This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. [I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people. Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S., at 383, 92 S.Ct., at 2800 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Accordingly, this Court is constrained from interference with the legislative judgment that the crime of murder of the first degree, coupled with specific aggravating circumstances, is a heinous enough act as to warrant imposition of the death penalty under carefully drafted sentencing procedures, unless appellant can meet his heavy burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality of 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 in some particular. We proceed, therefore, to appellant's specific constitutional objections.
Appellant asserts that application of 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 to his case is an illegal ex post facto law under Article 1,  17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (No ex post facto law . . . shall be passed.) (As will be seen in this section, the ex post facto standards under our constitution are comparable to the standards under the United States Constitution and our interpretations have been consistent with those of the United States Supreme Court: therefore, references to decisions of the latter Court may be made interchangeably with our decisions). Appellant's theory is as follows: (1) when Commonwealth v. Moody, supra , was decided while his appeal was pending, he had a right to have his death penalty vacated and to receive a sentence of life imprisonment; (2) at the time of the Story I decision (January 26, 1978), he was subject to no greater punishment than life imprisonment because no constitutional death penalty was then in effect in Pennsylvania; (3) therefore, application of  1311 to his case results in an increase in his punishment from life imprisonment to death in violation of Art. 1,  17 as interpreted by Commonwealth ex rel. Wall v. Smith, 345 Pa. 512, 29 A.2d 912 (1942) (the only case offered by appellant in support of this contention). While this syllogism is not without a certain abstract, intellectual appeal, upon scrutiny it reveals itself to be pure sophistry, as a perusal of the ex post facto cases readily reveal. In 1913, this Court adopted the ex post facto standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Kalck, 239 Pa. 533, 87 A. 61 (1913). In Kalck, appellant was convicted on March 1, 1911 of murder of the second degree for a homicide occurring December 19, 1910. Subsequent to the conviction, but prior to her sentencing, the legislature adopted the then-controversial Indeterminate Sentencing Act. Act of June 19, 1911, P.L. 1055. It was there argued that imposing sentence under that Act for a crime committed prior thereto was an ex post facto law and, therefore, unconstitutional. This Court unanimously rejected that contention. The Court held, supra at 239 Pa. 538, 87 A. 61: The probation against the enactment of ex post facto laws in this country was first written into the Constitution of the United States and since that time has been incorporated into the organic law of every state. As far back as 1798, the Supreme Court of the United States in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 [1 L.Ed. 648], undertook to define the meaning of an ex post facto law, and that case has remained as a leading authority on the question to the present time. Under that decision ex post facto laws were grouped into four classes, as follows: (1) Every law that makes an act done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; (2) every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed; (3) every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed; (4) every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and requires less or different testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict. The appellant in Kalck had asserted that the Indeterminate Sentencing Act inflicted greater punishment on her than the law that had been annexed to her crime when committed. Since, under Act of 1911, the minimum sentence was indeterminate and was actually fixed by the court at 15 years, and since the prior act limited the minimum sentence to not more than five years, the appellant's minimum sentence was, in fact, greater than that which could have been imposed under the prior act. However, the Court noted that the determinative factor on the issue of whether greater punishment had been inflicted was the maximum sentence fixed by the legislature. Under both acts, that maximum remained set at 20 years pursuant to an entirely separate statute (the Act of April 14, 1893, P.L. 17) which had been in force both at the time of the crime and the time of the sentencing. Accordingly, the Court noted that the Indeterminate Sentencing Act undertook to regulate, not the law which fixed the punishments, but the sentencing of convicts, and the method of releasing them on parole . . . . The Act does not fix punishments; it relates exclusively to the manner of sentencing. Both acts expressly recognize as still in force the law fixing maximum punishments . . . . At the time of the passage of these acts the maximum punishment for murder of the second degree was twenty years, and this is still the law, and the indefinite term for which sentence is imposed under these acts must be within the maximum limit. This statutory punishment remains unchanged, but the court is given a discretion in the manner of imposing the sentence, and this was intended to work a substantial benefit to the convicted person as a reward for good conduct. . . . . A statute which mitigates the penalty is not objectionable on the ground of being an ex post facto law, although passed after the crime was committed. [citations omitted] So, too, statutes which relate to procedure or penal administration, or prison discipline, are not to be considered ex post facto, even though the effect may be to enhance the severity of the punishment. [citations omitted] Indeed, it may be stated as a general rule, that no one has a right to insist that particular remedies shall remain unchanged, or that courts and their jurisdiction and the proceedings in them shall continue unaltered, or that there shall be no departure from established methods in prison discipline or penal administration. Retrospective legislation relating to crimes and punishments may or may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground of being ex post facto. The question in each case is whether it will increase the punishment, or deprive a party of substantial rights to which he was entitled under the law as it stood at the time the offense was committed. If the situation is not altered or changed to the disadvantage of the complaining party, the law even if passed after the offense was committed, is not ex post facto as to him. Id. 239 Pa. at 540-43, 87 A. at 61 (emphasis added). Since the Act of 1911 did not fix punishments, but instead related exclusively to the manner of sentencing, id. 239 Pa. at 540, 87 A. 61, there was no ex post facto violation. See also Commonwealth ex rel. Wall v. Smith, supra ; Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925) (similar standards as in Kalck ) and Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 25 S.Ct. 264, 49 L.Ed. 494 (1905) (same). The United States Supreme Court has recently had occasion to decide the ex post facto issue in a case imposing the death penalty pursuant to sentencing procedures adopted after the murder had been committed. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). The petitioner there committed two grisly murders while a statute was in effect in Florida permitting the death penalty. Prior to arrest and trial, Furman v. Georgia, supra , was decided and, pursuant to that decision, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down its 1971 death penalty statute. Late in 1972, the Florida legislature enacted a new death penalty procedure; this statute was upheld in Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976). Petitioner Dobbert raised several issues concerning the validity of applying the new statute to him. His first argument was that he should have been sentenced under the procedure in effect at the time of his crimes which procedure he viewed as enuring to his benefit. The Court concluded that the changes in the law were procedural and on the whole ameliorative and that for either of these reasons, there was no ex post facto violation. Dobbert v. Florida, supra 432 U.S. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2297. The evil at which the ex post facto proscription aims is simply not present when the change is merely procedural or where the change was, on the whole, ameliorative (even if substantive). The evil is the potential for legislatures to direct arbitrary and oppressive legislation at individuals. Id. 432 U.S. at 293, 97 S.Ct. at 2298 citing Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 35 S.Ct. 507, 59 L.Ed. 905 (1915). In Dobbert the Court concluded, 432 U.S. at 293-94, 296-97, 97 S.Ct. at 2298-99, 2299-2300: In the case at hand, the change in the statute was clearly procedural. The new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime. . . . . In this case, not only was the change in the law procedural, it was ameliorative. It is axiomatic that for a law to be ex post facto it must be more onerous than the prior law. . . . . [V]iewing the totality of the procedural changes wrought by the new statute, we conclude that the new statute did not work an onerous application of an ex post facto change in the law. Perhaps the ultimate proof of this fact is that this old statute was held to be violative of the United States Constitution in Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1972), while the new law was upheld by this Court in Proffit, supra . Dobbert also argued an ex post facto violation based on the theory that at the time he committed his atrocities, there was no valid death penalty in effect in Florida since the statute in effect at that time was later declared to be unconstitutional. The court dismissed this contention. [T]his sophistic argument mocks the substance of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whether or not the old statute would in the future, withstand constitutional attack, it clearly indicated Florida's view of the severity of murder and of the degree of punishment which the legislature wished to impose upon murderers. The statute was intended to provide maximum deterrence, and its existence on the statute books provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State ascribed to the act of murder. Petitioner's highly technical argument is at odds with the statement of this Court in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374, 60 S.Ct. 317, 318, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940): The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 1125, 30 L.Ed. 178; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566, 33 S.Ct. 581, 584, 57 L.Ed. 966. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.  Here the existence of the statute served as an  operative fact  to warn the petitioner of the penalty which Florida would seek to impose on him if he were convicted of first-degree murder. This was sufficient compliance with the ex post facto provision of the United States Constitution. Id. 432 U.S. at 297-99, 97 S.Ct. at 2300. Appellant in the instant case is in exactly the same position as was Dobbert. The lower court correctly held that the existence of the death penalty as punishment for first degree murder on July 3, 1974 was an operative fact fully advising and warning appellant of the severity of his crime and the intentions of the legislature. When appellant murdered Officer Wallace, our statutes permitted the death penalty for the offense. Appellant was at least constructively on notice that this penalty might indeed follow his brutal actions. The death penalty statute was intended to provide maximum deterrence, and its existence at the time of the crime provided fair warning as to the degree of culpability this Commonwealth ascribed to the act of killing a police officer in the performance of his duties. Dobbert, supra, at 297, 97 S.Ct. at 2300. Appellant was sentenced to death pursuant to the statute in effect at the time of his trial. The only effect of the former statute was to provide sufficient warning of the gravity this Commonwealth attached to first degree murder so as to make application of the new statute to him consistent with the ex post facto restraints of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. When appellant was granted a new trial, he quite properly was subjected to the punishment provided for by the statute then in effect, Dobbert, supra, 432 U.S. at 301, 97 S.Ct. at 2302, which was substantively no more harsh than the penalty prescribed for appellant's offense at the time of his crime and imposed at his first trial. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). As the death penalty was in effect at the time of the murder of Officer Wallace, as the changes of the new act were procedural, and as the changes were clearly on the whole ameliorative, there was no ex post facto violation in applying 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 to appellant following his conviction upon retrial. Furthermore, 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1102, sentence for murder, is the statute which fixes the punishment for murder of the first degree at death or life imprisonment. This provision was in effect at the time Story murdered Patrick Wallace, and was in effect at the time of his sentencing. [17] Thus, as Kalck made clear, the changes in sentencing procedure had no effect on the quantum of punishment which had been fixed by 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1102 at death or life imprisonment which was in effect at all times relevant to these proceedings. Appellant Story is even less affected by the modifications in sentencing procedure than was appellant Kalck: the latter had her minimum sentence actually increased from five to 15 years while the former was sentenced to receive the death penalty on both occasions. Moreover, in Dobbert, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that equal protection of the laws was denied to petitioner therein by imposition of the death penalty in effect at the time of his trial. The Florida Supreme Court had resentenced to life imprisonment all prisoners under sentence of death pursuant to the death penalty statute which was in effect at the time petitioner committed the acts for which he was tried, but which had been declared unconstitutional before his trial. Since a new death penalty statute was in effect at the time of petitioner's trial, the United States Supreme Court declared, there was nothing irrational about Florida's decision to relegate petitioner to the class of defendants covered by the new statute. This reasoning applies with equal force to the instant case.
Appellant next makes the related claim that 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311 may not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to its effective date, citing only 1 Pa.C.S.A.  1926 of the Statutory Construction Act, and Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 439-40 n.13, 383 A.2d 174 180 n.13. Section 1926 indeed codifies the presumption that statutes are not to be construed retroactively unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature. We need not concern ourselves, however, with  1926 as there has been no retroactive application of the statute. Application of a sentencing procedure enacted in 1978 to a conviction rendered in 1979 can in no way be viewed as retroactive. Our courts have consistently held that a statute does not operate retrospectively merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came into existence prior to its enactment. Gehris v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, 471 Pa. 210, 215, 369 A.2d 1271, 1273 (1977); Creighan v. Pittsburgh, 389 Pa. 569, 132 A.2d 867 (1957). [18] Appellant's reliance on Commonwealth v. McKenna, is not well founded. Note 13 of that opinion by Justice Pomeroy does state that the provisions of this Act [the comparable Act of 1974] are not applicable to the McKenna trial because the homicide occurred in the year 1973, long prior to the effective date of the Sentencing Code. 476 Pa. 428 at 439-40 n.13, 383 A.2d 174, 180 n.13. However, this gratuitous statement is eminently distinguishable from the case at bar. Justice Pomeroy was merely referring to the Act of 1974 as an indication of the importance of capital punishment cases in order to justify the holding that, despite McKenna's failure to contest the death penalty, this Court would nevertheless address the obvious constitutional problems in that case. There was no issue there as to whether or not the Act of 1974 should be applied and the statement in note 13 was, therefore, truly gratuitous regards retroactivity and without precedential value.
Appellant asserts [s]ince no valid death penalty provision was then in effect [referring to the interim period between Moody and enactment of the new 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311] the Moody decision clearly granted appellant the option of abandoning his appeal from his conviction and, pursuant to Moody, vacating his sentence of death and replacing it with one of life imprisonment. Brief for Appellant at 18. Because of this, appellant maintains that his appellate rights were somehow chilled. We fail to see the logic of this argument. It is incongruous to suggest that Story's appellate rights were chilled when he in fact vigorously pursued the appeal and won a reversal of his conviction. In Chaffin v. Stynchombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), the petitioner was convicted of a capital offense and was sentenced by a jury to a prison term of 15 years. On a federal habeas corpus petition, the district court granted him relief, vacated sentence, and ordered the case returned to the Georgia State Court for retrial. On retrial, petitioner was again convicted and the jury this time sentenced him to life imprisonment. Petitioner asserted that the possibility of a harsher sentence on retrial, even in the absence of a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness (no such claim is made in the instant case), has an impermissible chilling effect on the exercise of his rights to appeal. The Court disagreed. The criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring `the making of difficult judgments' as to which course to follow . . . . Although a defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose. Id. at 32, 93 S.Ct. at 1985, quoting Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). The Court determined that the choice required in Georgia, (i.e., appeal and take the chance of a more stringent sentence on retrial or fail to appeal and stick with the original sentence) was not forbidden by the constitution. A state may legitimately require the accused to choose whether to accept the risk of a higher sentence or to waive his rights. Id. at 32-33, 93 S.Ct. at 1985-86. The Court further noted: Petitioner was not himself chilled in the exercise of his right to appeal by the possibility of a higher sentence on retrial and we doubt that the chill factor will often be a deterrent of any significance. Unlike the guilty-plea situation and, to a lesser extent, the nonbifurcated capital trial, the likelihood of actually receiving a harsher sentence is quite remote at the time a convicted defendant begins to weigh the question whether he will appeal. Several contingencies must coalesce. First, his appeal must succeed. Second, it must result in an order remanding the case for retrial rather than dismissing outright. Third, the prosecutor must again make the decision to prosecute and the accused must again select trial by jury rather than securing a bench trial or negotiating a plea. Finally, the jury must again convict and then ultimately the jury or the judge must arrive at a harsher sentence in circumstances devoid of a genuine likelihood of vindictiveness. While it may not be wholly unrealistic for a convicted defendant to anticipate the occurrence of each of these events, especially in the infrequent case in which his claim for reversal is strong and his first sentence was unusually low, we cannot agree with petitioner that such speculative prospects interfere with the right to make a free choice whether to appeal. Id. at 33-35, 93 S.Ct. at 1986-1987. The choice occasioned by the possibility of a harsher sentence, even where that choice may in fact be quite difficult, does not place an impermissible burden on the right of a criminal defendant to appeal or attack collaterally his conviction. We agree with Chaffin that any asserted chilling effect on appellate rights (here, we are actually speaking of the right to withdraw an appeal) is too tenuous and speculative to be forbidden by the Constitution. Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 433 Pa. 336, 250 A.2d 811 (1969) does not require an opposite result. Littlejohn involved two cases wherein the appellants had actually failed to exercise their rights to appeal because of their fear of receiving the death penalty on retrial as opposed to the sentences of life imprisonment that had been imposed by the respective juries. The differences between Littlejohn and Stanton Story's situation are apparent. Story's appellate rights were not chilled in any fashion, nor, as he received the death sentence on both occasions, was he exposed to a risk of a harsher penalty than that meted-out at the first proceeding. [19]
Appellant claims that placing upon the defendant the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing stage of his trial, 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311(c)(1)(iii), is violative of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, relying on Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) and Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977). Those cases dealt with the allocations of burdens of proof at the guilt stage of the proceedings to prove elements of the crime charged, and so are of dubious precedential value in the instant case. Decisions of this Court and of the United States Supreme Court have expressed approval of the allocation of the burden of proving mitigating circumstances at the sentencing procedure upon the accused, so long as the prosecution has established its burden of proving that the crime falls into one of the categories for which the death penalty is appropriate. Commonwealth v. Moody, supra, 476 Pa. at 237, 382 A.2d at 449, stated: [I]n our view, in order to protect a defendant from cruel and unusual punishment in a capital case, it is now necessary both that the aggravating circumstances that will justify the imposition of the death penalty be clearly defined for the sentencing authority, and that the sentencing authority be allowed to consider whatever mitigating evidence relevant to his character and record the defendant can present. Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964, held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.  Additionally, assuming arguendo that Mullaney and Patterson would apply, they would not prohibit the placing of the burden on the defendant to establish mitigating circumstances. As the Court noted in Patterson, even at the guilt stage, the mere recognition of a mitigating circumstance (i.e., a true affirmative defense to guilt as opposed to the Mullaney situation wherein the defendant had been required to negate what was actually an element of the crime) does not require the state to prove its nonexistence. 432 U.S. at 209-10, 97 S.Ct. at 2326-27. Under 18 Pa.C.S.A.  1311, the Commonwealth, by proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of murder of the first degree and of the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances (specified by subsection (d)), has demonstrated all that is constitutionally required of them under the scheme adopted by the legislature. It is the existence of those facts which the legislature has determined should mandate the death penalty unless the accused can prove (only by a preponderance) that there are reasons (specified in subsection (e)) why that sentence should be commuted to life. The burden of proof is fairly, and legitimately, allocated.
Appellant here argues that the jurors excluded for cause because of their opposition to the death penalty were excluded on a broader basis than that permitted by Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra . Of the five jurors so excluded, appellant points to only one as possibly violating the Witherspoon standards (set forth in section I of this opinion). [20] Appellant's brief states at 20-21: In particular, the exclusion for cause of Ms. Stadnik [N.T. 487] was in direct violation of Witherspoon. During the course of her examination, Ms. Stadnik stated, I don't believe in people having to die, [N.T. 486] and, I don't think I would want to see anybody executed, [N.T. 487] and reiterated twice that she did not like capital punishment. [N.T. 486, 487.] When the court asked whether her scruples would prevent her from returning a death sentence under any circumstances, she responded, I guess I would sort of go against it. I wouldn't like to see them ÔÇö [N.T. 487] At most, these statements indicate that Ms. Stadnik did not believe in capital punishment and she had a fixed opinion against it. Appellant does not recite the entire story. Judge Ross' opinion denying post-verdict relief on this issue completes the picture: Prospective juror Stadnik was not excluded simply because she stated that she didn't believe in people having to die and that she didn't like capital punishment, as defendant asserted (T.T. 486). Rather, this Court questioned her further to ascertain her ability to consider the death penalty: THE COURT: If you were chosen to sit on this jury. . . and . . . reached a verdict . . . that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, then . . . you and your fellow jurors then must make a decision as to whether or not the defendant should suffer life imprisonment or he should suffer death as prescribed by law. Now what we're asking you is, could you make that decision? MS. STADNIK: No. I wouldn't object to the life imprisonment, but I don't like capital punishment. THE COURT: It's not whether you like it . . . The question is could you make that decision or is there something . . . that would prevent you under any circumstances from returning a verdict of death . . .? MS. STADNIK: I guess I would sort of go against it. I wouldn't like to see them ÔÇö (T.T. 486-87). BY MR. SCHWARTZ: Q: . . . Can you imagine the most horrible of crimes which was totally uncalled for that would justify you saying yes, that man should be executed? A: I don't think I would want to see anybody executed. I would like to see them punished. Does that answer it? (T.T. 487). Clearly, this was not a general objection to the death penalty which was condemned in Witherspoon ; rather, Ms. Stadnik evinced total opposition to the death penalty so as to prevent an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. Witherspoon, supra, [88 S.Ct.] at 177 [1777] n.21. The absence of neutrality in this situation is clear when viewed in context of the venireman's complete responses. Thus, the court found the defendant's allegation, that it was error to strike this prospective juror for cause, was without merit. Lower court opinion at 12-13. The court did not err in so ruling.
This argument is reprinted in its entirety: 18 Pa. C.S.A.  1311 is in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses of the state and federal constitutions because it expressly provides that the jury's verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance. This mandatory rule combined with the allocation to the defendant of the burden of proving mitigating circumstances, see Argument VIII, supra, prevents the jury from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances of the offense proferred in mitigation. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (Plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.) For example, if the jury believed there was a significant probability that defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor,  1311(e)(7), but were not convinced of that fact by a preponderance of the evidence,  1311(c)(1)(iii), they would be precluded under the statute from deciding that life imprisonment rather than death should be imposed because of their doubt as to the degree of the defendant's participation in the crime. This is in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses of the state and federal constitution. Appellant's example is absurd, for a jury's finding that a significant probability that a particular fact were true would surely satisfy it that defendant had met his burden, especially in light of the court's instruction that a preponderance of the evidence exists when one side is more believable than the other side. N.T. 1881. We have already discussed the general issue regarding the allocation of the burden of proving mitigating circumstances.