Opinion ID: 1930187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Officer's Subjective Suspicion of Criminal Conduct

Text: The record here on review fully supports the court's finding that when Officer Short stopped defendant's car he in fact harbored a suspicion that defendant was driving while under the influence. Contrary to defendant's contention, Officer Short's failure to testify specifically as to what he suspected did not prevent the court from rationally inferring from all the evidence that he in fact had suspected defendant to be engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d at 317. The officer's subjective suspicion of ongoing criminal activity may be established either by the direct testimony of the officer or by circumstantial evidence, in the same way as any other factual question is resolved in a court of law. As Professor LaFave has written specifically of Terry stops, a reasonably specific statement by an officer of the circumstances underlying his actionwhen considered together with how he in fact reacted to the situation which confronted him afford an adequate basis for judicial review. 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.3(a), at 428 (2d ed. 1987). Our decision in State v. Garland, 482 A.2d 139 (Me.1984), constitutes no authority to the contrary. In that case we held four suspicions that the officer articulated on the stand to be objectively unreasonable, and in those circumstances we refused to consider a fifth suspicion advanced by the State for the first time at oral argument. Id. at 145-46.