Opinion ID: 1652198
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Negligent Performance of Duties

Text: Stoltze next contends that AVECC should be liable because it undertook to perform certain safety measures and negligently failed to perform them thereafter or performed them in a negligent manner. Stoltze argues that the language of the contract indicates that AVECC maintained control over the work. To support his argument, Stoltze points to the following contract provisions: The contract between AVECC and AECI provides that [AVECC] reserves the right to require the removal from the Project of any employee of the [AECI] if, in the judgment of [AVECC], such removal shall be necessary in order to protect the interest of [AVECC]. The Contract also provides that [Allgeier-Martin] may recommend to [AVECC] that [AECI] suspend the work wholly or in part for such period or periods as [Allgeier-Martin] may deem necessary due to ... such other conditions as are considered unfavorable for the satisfactory prosecution of the work or because of the failure of [AECI] to comply with any of the provisions of the Contract. The entrusting of work to an independent contractor does not remove the duty of reasonable care from one who retains control over any part of the work. Williams v. Nucor-Yamato Steel Co., 318 Ark. 452, 455, 886 S.W.2d 586 (1994). We have stated: When ... there is no demonstration of an exercise of actual control or violation of the duty to warn by the one engaging an independent contractor to perform work, we have turned to the contract to see if the prime contractor or owner retained the right of control or supervision and thus assumed an additional duty [of] care toward the employees doing the work. Id. We further stated that [w]hen there is no such right retained in the contract, we affirm a summary judgment entered in favor of the owner or prime contractor. Id, In Williams, supra , we cited general authority from Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414: In order for the rule stated in this Section to apply, the employer must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work his own way. Williams, 318 Ark. at 455-56, 886 S.W.2d 586 (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 414, cmt. c (1965)). The contract provisions cited by Stoltze are insufficient to show that AVECC retained the right of control. The provisions do nothing more than give AVECC a general right to order the work stopped or resumed. Moreover, the contract provides that AECI shall cause the construction work on the Project to receive constant supervision by a competent superintendent ... who shall be present at all times during working hours where construction is being carried on. It further provides that [AECI] will make available for use in connection with the proposed construction all necessary tools and equipment and qualified superintendents and foremen. In the present case, the contract appears to have been drafted carefully to assure that all control and supervision other than priorities of projects remained with AECI and not AVECC. See Williams, 318 Ark. at 456, 886 S.W.2d 586. Still, Stoltze argues that the contract states that all work shall be performed to meet at least the safety rules and regulations prescribed by [AVECC] for its employees. The rest of the provision states that this includes the use of rubber gloves, hot sticks and associated protective equipment.... Stoltze argues that this is evidence that AVECC attempted to put in place certain safety requirements. Stoltze also argues that the APPA safety manual, in use by AVECC at the time of this incident, was dated 1988. It does not comply with the OSHA rules regarding rubber gloves that were in effect in 1997. According to Stoltze, the APPA safety manual in use at the time of the injury did not require rubber sleeves when the voltage between any two conductors does not exceed 7500 volts; he states that this is not in compliance with OSHA. In addition, Stoltze states that the National Electric Safety Code (NESC) requires the use of rubber sleeves when employees approach any conductive object within 2.2 feet when the object is energized and not fully insulated from the employee. Further, he cites NESC Rule 441 A3b, which provides that employees must use rubber sleeves when exposed to energized lines or parts that are not covered with insulating protective equipment. Stoltze also cites Ark. Code Ann. § 23-17-236(a) (Repl.2002), which provides that any violation by a telecommunications company or cooperative of the National Electric Safety Code or requirements established by the commission shall merely be evidence of negligence. AVECC states: The Appellant attempts to connect alleged violations of OSHA, alleged violations of the National Electric Safety Code (NESC), and an alleged violation of the Code of Federal Regulations by AECI in not providing rubber sleeves to its workers due to some alleged negligent performance of AVECC. AVECC's contention is well taken. Stoltze does not explain how the alleged violations of AECI support his argument that AVECC was negligent in performance of its duties. Finally, Stoltze argues that, [a]nother area in which AVECC undertook certain safety measures is that the local cooperatives, such as AVECC, made safety training available to employees of AECI. This argument has no merit because, as AVECC states, AECI presented safety meetings and training to the members of various state electric cooperatives, such as AVECCnot the other way around as Appellant asserts. Indeed, Tommy Lee Stark, Stoltze's supervisor at AECI, stated that AECI put on the safety training at the cooperatives. In sum, Stoltze has failed to demonstrate that AVECC should be liable to Stoltze because it undertook to perform certain safety measures and negligently failed to perform them thereafter or performed them in a negligent manner.