Opinion ID: 1852218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretrial Severance

Text: We next proceed to evaluate whether the district court erred in denying Santiago's pretrial severance motions. Santiago's first and second pretrial severance motions were based on Rule 17.03, subd. 2(1), and section 631.035. The third and fourth motions were made in the context of evidentiary hearings and the record does not reflect whether the motions were based on the rule, the statute, or both. Section 631.035's joinder and severance standards differ with those articulated in Rule 17.03, subd. 2(1). While the statute requires that a court must consider two factors when evaluating whether severance is proper, the rule provides that a court must consider four factors. Therefore, we must determine whether the statute or the rule takes precedence. We have the authority to regulate the pleadings, practice, procedure, and the forms thereof in criminal actions in all courts of this state, by rules promulgated by [our court] from time to time. Minn.Stat.§ 480.059, subd. 1 (2000). This authority arises from our inherent powers. State v. Willis, 332 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Minn.1983). In matters of procedure rather than substantive rights, the rules of criminal procedure take precedence over statutes to the extent that there is any inconsistency. Minn.Stat. § 480.059, subds. 1, 7 (2000), State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn.1994); State v. Wingo, 266 N.W.2d 508, 513 (Minn.1978). Because severance is a matter of procedure, Santiago's pretrial severance claims should be evaluated under Rule 17.03, subd. 2(1), rather than under the statute. See DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 841-43 (analyzing pretrial severance claim under subdivision 2(1) rather than section 631.035). Therefore, the district court erred to the extent that it may have based its decision on the statute. A court evaluates whether a joint trial is proper in light of the nature of the offense charged, the impact on the victim, the potential prejudice to the defendant, and the interests of justice. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 2(1). Here, the district court identified and evaluated the state's motion for joinder in the context of all four factors. However, when evaluating Santiago's subsequent pretrial severance motions, the court only focused on the third factorpotential prejudice to the defendant. Santiago's petition also focuses on this factor. Therefore, the primary focus of our analysis will be on whether the court properly evaluated the potential prejudice to Santiago. Santiago claims that severance was warranted because he and Rodriguez presented antagonistic defenses. In reviewing a district court's pretrial severance decisions, we make `an independent inquiry into any substantial prejudice to defendants that may have resulted from their being joined for trial.' DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 842 (quoting State v. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d 498, 502 (Minn.1985)). Our most recent articulation of pretrial severance standards in the context of antagonistic defenses appears in a trilogy of decisions beginning in 1985. In State v. Hathaway , we applied the 1975 version of Rule 17.03, concluded there was no substantial prejudice, and upheld the district court's refusal to sever a defendant's murder trial from that of his codefendant. 379 N.W.2d at 502-03. We concluded that the defendants regularly adopted the motions and objections of the other and did not present antagonistic defenses. Id. at 503. We then explained that antagonistic or inconsistent defenses exist when defendants seek to blame each other, but that mere differences in trial strategy do not constitute substantial prejudice. See id at 503. We stated: This is not a case in which the state introduced evidence that showed only one of the defendants killed the victim, thus forcing each defendant to point the finger at the other. Nor is this a case in which the jury was forced to believe either the testimony of one defendant or the testimony of the other. Instead, the jury was faced with the choice between the state's theory    and the theory   expounded by both defendants   . Id. (citations omitted). In Greenleaf, we concluded that the district court properly joined the defendants for trial because the defendants did not present conflicting defenses. 591 N.W.2d at 499-500. The defendant, Lester Greenleaf, claimed intoxication, duress, and that he was innocent while his codefendant, Andy Leo DeVerney, claimed that he was innocent. Id. at 499. In affirming the district court, we concluded that these defenses did not conflict and the jury was not forced to choose between the testimony of the defendants to arrive at the verdicts. Id. Greenleaf was decided under the current version of Rule 17.03, subd. 2(1). 591 N.W.2d at 499. In DeVerney, a case involving the same events as in Greenleaf, DeVerney argued that the district court erred in joining him and Greenleaf for trial and subsequently erred in denying him severance. 592 N.W.2d at 841. Drawing on Hathaway, we concluded in DeVerney that the codefendants presented different defenses, but DeVerney did not suffer substantial prejudice because the defenses were not antagonistic. 592 N.W.2d at 842. In support of this conclusion, we stated: [S]ubstantial prejudice is not simply whether the defenses presented were different, but whether the defenses were inconsistent, or whether the defendants sought, through their chosen defenses, to shift blame to one another. Id. (citing Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d at 503). We observed that neither Greenleaf nor DeVerney sought to shift the blame to the other; rather, both claimed that they did not intend to kill the victim or that they had an excuse for aiding and abetting his murder. Id. As in Greenleaf, DeVerney's joinder and severance claims were decided under the current version of subdivision 2(1). 592 N.W.2d at 841-43. When ruling on Santiago's pretrial motions, the district court did not have the benefit of our decisions in Greenleaf and DeVerney because we had not yet decided these cases. Nevertheless, in evaluating whether Santiago and Rodriguez presented antagonistic defenses, the court did not look to Hathaway for guidance. Instead, in ruling on the January 30 motion, the court took note of a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court and four federal court decisions. In ruling on the February 19 motion, the court concluded that the 1990 version of Rule 17.03 was modeled on the federal rules and that, under the federal severance standard, Santiago would not be prejudiced by a joint trial. The district court inappropriately used the federal severance standard in analyzing our Rule 17.03, subd. 2(1). Hathaway defined antagonistic defenses and stated that the presence of antagonistic defenses constitutes substantial prejudice to a defendant. See 379 N.W.2d at 503. Further, in Greenleaf and DeVerney, we confirmed that Hathaway's enunciation of the standard for antagonistic defenses is still the test under the 1990 version of subdivision 2(1). Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d at 499-500; DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 842. The federal standard is an inappropriate source of guidance when interpreting subdivision 2(1) because the federal standard varies significantly from our rule. Fed.R.Crim.P. 8 carries a presumption in favor of joinder. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 933. Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 grants a court broad discretion on the issue of severance and imposes a heavy burden on the defendant when moving for severance. United States v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168,177 (5th Cir.2002); Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538-39, 113 S.Ct. 933; United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986). Minnesota, unlike the federal system, has a historical preference for separate trials and our current version of subdivision 2(1) expresses neutrality on the issue of joinder. Even though the legislature enacted a new severance standard in 1992 that closely mirrors the federal rule, Rule 17.03 has not been amended to conform to the statute. For all these reasons, the district court should not have looked to the federal rules and case law to inform its understanding of our rule. Therefore, we conclude that the court erred when it used the federal standard to reach its conclusion that Santiago's pretrial severance motions should be denied. Santiago's pretrial severance claims should be evaluated under the substantial prejudice test of subdivision 2(1) as we applied that test in Hathaway, Greenleaf, and DeVerney. Under this test, a defendant suffers substantial prejudice when he and his codefendant present antagonistic defenses. See Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d at 503; Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d at 499-500; DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 842. Defendants have antagonistic defenses when the defenses are inconsistent and when they seek to put the blame on each other and the jury is forced to choose between the defense theories advocated by the defendants. See id. In evaluating Santiago's February 19 motion, the district court acknowledged that if Hathaway provided the standard for antagonistic defenses, then Santiago's severance motion has a lot of legs. We agree. Santiago's theory of defense for all four pretrial severance motions was that Rodriguez was the shooter and that Rodriguez acted alone. Rodriguez's theory of defense for his pretrial severance motions was that Santiago was the shooter. Applying the standards of Hathaway, Greenleaf, and DeVerney, we conclude that Santiago and Rodriguez presented antagonistic defenses because Santiago and Rodriguez pointed the finger at each other and each sought to shift the blame for the shooting to the other. This is one of the classic examples of antagonistic defenses we identified in Hathaway and DeVerney. Hathaway, 379 N.W.2d at 503; DeVerney, 592 N.W.2d at 842. As set forth below, the record reveals that Santiago presented sufficiently specific evidence that his defense theory was antagonistic to Rodriguez's defense theory. Further, there is no indication on the record that Santiago could not produce the evidence to back up his offer of proof or that there was a want of good faith on the part of Santiago's attorney. As previously noted, in evaluating whether severance is warranted, a court must consider the nature of the offense charged, the impact on the victim, the potential prejudice to the defendant, and the interests of justice. Minn. R.Crim. P. 17.03, subd. 2(1). Because Santiago and Rodriguez had antagonistic defenses, the potential prejudice to Santiago favored severance. For the same reason, the interests of justice favored severance. Here, the nature of the offense charged and the impact on the victim do not outweigh the considerations of prejudice and the interests of justice; therefore, we conclude that the district court erred when it denied Santiago's pretrial severance motions. The dissent contends that because Rodriguez's theory of defense was ever-changing and evolving, the district court cannot be faulted for finding an absence of antagonism between the defense theories of Rodriguez and Santiago. However, the record reveals that Rodriguez's defense theory throughout the pretrial stage was that Santiago was the shooter. This theory was presented to and understood by the court. Santiago's memorandum of law in support of his first pretrial severance motion clearly identified his defense theory and identified Rodriguez's defense theory based on Rodriguez's statements to psychological examiners. In its order regarding Santiago's first severance motion, the court had no trouble identifying the respective defense theories of the defendants as follows: Defendant Santiago asserts as his defense, through counsel rather than by direct statement, that he never possessed the involved weapon. Defendant Rodriguez, on the other hand, asserts through protected statements made to court-ordered Rule 20 examiners, that he never possessed the involved weapon. At the hearing on Santiago's second pretrial severance motion, each party identified his respective defense theory to the court. Rodriguez told the court that his defense theory was that Santiago was the shooter. Santiago told the court that his defense theory was that Rodriguez was the shooter and that Rodriguez acted alone. During the evidentiary hearing at which Santiago raised his third pretrial severance motion, Santiago specified that his theory was that Rodriguez acted alone, but Rodriguez did not specify his theory. However, this motion was made in the context of an evidentiary ruling regarding a witness's testimony that Rodriguez was the shooter. Finally, during the hearing at which Santiago raised his fourth severance motion, Santiago indicated that his theory was that Rodriguez acted alone and Rodriguez indicated that his theory was that Santiago was the shooter. Thus, Rodriguez's defense theory was stable and identifiable throughout the pretrial stage and was not, as the dissent contends, so ephemeral that it was unidentifiable by the district court for purposes of severance analysis. [6] Because Santiago's offer of proof regarding his defense was sufficient and because the defendants had antagonistic defenses resulting in potential prejudice to Santiago, we hold that the district court erred when it denied Santiago's pretrial severance motions.