Opinion ID: 1135960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sentence enhancement for delivery of cocaine in a jail

Text: Hendrickson challenges his enhanced sentence for delivering drugs in jail both on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict and the constitutionality of the statute. RCW 9.94A.310(5) provides for an enhanced sentence for delivery of drugs in a jail: The following additional times shall be added to the presumptive sentence if the offender or an accomplice committed the offense while in a county jail or state correctional facility as that term is defined in this chapter.... For the purposes of this subsection, all of the real property of a state correctional facility or county jail shall be deemed to be part of that facility or county jail. Hendrickson argues that the delivery of cocaine for which he was convicted occurred outside the jail, and that his sentence should not have been enhanced. He claims that since the delivery occurred on the steps leading into the county courthouse in which the jail was housed, it did not occur on the real property of the county jail. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the legislative direction that a county jail includes all of its real property is broad enough to cover the area in question here. Hendrickson, slip op. at 15. The ash can was located on the steps just outside the jail. The area was used as part of the jail's facilities. Hendrickson's narrow interpretation of the statute is contrary to the actual utilization of the area in question. Moreover, county jails, unlike state prisons, share physical facilities with numerous other county agencies. If the Legislature had wished to limit the statute's application to only the jail itself, it could have done so. It did not. We reject Hendrickson's view of RCW 9.94A.310 because it is contrary to the legislative intent of deterring the delivery of drugs in jail facilities. In order to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, Hendrickson was obliged to prove that, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could not have found the essential elements of RCW 9.94A.310(5) to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salas, 127 Wash.2d 173, 183, 897 P.2d 1246 (1995). Hendrickson delivered the cocaine under an ash can on the back steps of the Wahkiakum County Courthouse, where the prisoners of the county jail are routinely taken to smoke. The prisoners access the smoking area through a door not open to the public. This was part of the real property of the jail. There was substantial evidence that Hendrickson delivered drugs in a county jail here for purposes of RCW 9.94A.310(5). Hendrickson also claims that imposition of an enhanced sentence under RCW 9.94A.310 was improper because the statute is void for vagueness, and therefore deprived him of his right to due process under both the state and federal constitutions. The crux of his argument is that the statute is so vague as to the meaning of the real property of the county jail that Hendrickson could not have known in advance that placing the cocaine under an ash can just outside the jail could result in a sentence enhancement. In order to establish the statute was unconstitutionally vague in a case not involving rights under the First Amendment, a person may challenge the statute on one of two grounds. Hendrickson must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute does not convey a sufficiently definite warning of proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. In re Powell, 92 Wash.2d 882, 888, 602 P.2d 711 (1979) (quoting State v. Jordan, 91 Wash.2d 386, 389, 588 P.2d 1155 (1979)). Alternatively stated, Hendrickson must show beyond a reasonable doubt that ordinary people cannot understand what constitutes illegal conduct from the language of the statute. The second basis for challenging a statute as vague is that it fails to provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary enforcement. City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990). This vagueness challenge in a case not involving the First Amendment is determined on the basis of the statute's application to the facts of this case, rather than on a facial analysis of the statute. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181-82, 795 P.2d 693. The statute is presumed to be constitutional, and the person challenging the statute for vagueness has a heavy burden in meeting the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 178, 795 P.2d 693. Hendrickson has not met this burden. An ordinary person would understand the criminal conduct proscribed by RCW 9.94A.310. See In re Coria, 120 Wash.2d 156, 839 P.2d 890 (1992) (enhanced sentence for drug sales near school bus stop not unconstitutionally vague). Hendrickson placed the drugs in an ash can in an area frequently utilized by jail inmates for smoking. It was clear that this area was part of the real property of the Wahkiakum County Jail. Moreover, under the second aspect of the vagueness test, a statute supplies sufficient standards unless it requires resort to inherently subjective terms to define the illegal behavior or invites inordinate police discretion in enforcing the statute. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d at 181, 795 P.2d 693. A ban on drug sales in correctional facilities or the real property associated with such facilities such as the ash can in question here does not open the door to arbitrary enforcement practices. The statute here is not unconstitutionally vague.