Opinion ID: 1765408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: right to choose representation

Text: The Counsel Clause of the Florida Constitution is contained in Section 16 of our Declaration of Rights, which provides in part: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, ... have the right ... to be heard in person, by counsel or both... . Art. I, § 16, Fla. Const. Our state clause embodies an express right to choose the manner of representing oneself  either pro se or through counsel  against criminal charges. The right to choose one's manner of representation in a criminal trial has been recognized historically by both this Court and our state legislature as an obvious but important state right belonging to the accused. At the turn of the century, in Cutts v. State, 54 Fla. 21, 45 So. 491 (1907), this Court ruled that [e]very person accused of crime has a right to have counsel to aid him in his defense, but no one is compelled to employ counsel. Id., 54 Fla. at 24, 45 So. at 492 (quoting Barnes v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S.E. 784 (1895)). We reaffirmed this view a few years later: It does not appear that the assistance of counsel was `desired by' the accused... . A party on trial for a felony may waive his right to have counsel, and may conduct his own defense... . Weatherford v. State, 76 Fla. 219, 223, 79 So. 680, 681-82 (1918). The right was long ago codified by the legislature; [18] our modern statutes [19] and rules of procedure [20] continue to protect it. The language of our Counsel Clause is simple and direct and we conclude that the framers intended it to mean just what it says: In all criminal prosecutions, the defendant may choose to be heard either by himself or through counsel. This reading is backed by both English and colonial law. Under early English common law, it had been the practice to deny the defendant any choice as to the means of defending himself against state charges in serious criminal cases. Retained counsel was permitted in civil and misdemeanor trials but was severely limited in treason and felony trials: In civil causes and on the trial of charges of misdemeanor, the parties were entitled to the aid of counsel in eliciting the facts, and in presenting both the facts and the law to the court and jury; but when the government charged a person with treason or felony, he was denied this privilege. Only such legal questions as he could suggest was counsel allowed to argue for him... . 1 Thomas M. Cooley, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 698 (1927). An era of reform, however, began with the Treason Act of 1695, which authorized counsel for the accused in treason trials, but not felony trials. In this and subsequent reform legislation, [t]he right to counsel was viewed as guaranteeing a choice between representation by counsel and the traditional practice of self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 825, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2536, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (emphasis added). The ban on counsel in felony cases in England was finally lifted in 1836. The colonies unequivocally rejected the English felony rule and accorded to the individual the fundamental right to choose his own method of defense: Colonial judges soon departed from ancient English practice and allowed accused felons the aid of counsel for their defense. At the same time, however, the basic right of self-representation was never questioned. We have found no instance where a colonial court required a defendant in a criminal case to accept as his representative an unwanted lawyer. Indeed, even where counsel was permitted, the general practice continued to be self-representation. The right of self-representation was guaranteed in many colonial charters and declarations of rights. These early documents establish that the right to counsel meant to the colonists a right to choose between pleading through a lawyer and representing oneself. After the Declaration of Independence, the right of self-representation, along with other rights basic to the making of a defense, entered the new state constitutions in wholesale fashion. The right to counsel was clearly thought to supplement the primary right of the accused to defend himself... . And when the Colonies or newly independent States provided by statute rather than by constitution for court appointment of counsel in criminal cases, they also meticulously preserved the right of the accused to defend himself personally. Id. at 827-30, 95 S.Ct. at 2537-38 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). This right to choose has since been recognized by the federal Court [21] and is preserved in the constitutions of at least thirty-six states. [22] Based on the foregoing, we hold that a prime right embodied by the Section 16 Counsel Clause is the right to choose one's manner of representation against criminal charges. [23] In order for this right to have meaning, it must apply at least at each crucial stage [24] of the prosecution. For purposes here, a crucial stage is any stage that may significantly affect the outcome of the proceedings. Because a prime interest [25] that is protected is the right of the individual to exercise self-determination in the face of criminal charges, prosecution begins [26] under the Counsel Clause when an accused is charged with a criminal act, as set out below. [27] Once the defendant is charged  and the Section 16 rights attach  the defendant is entitled to decide at each crucial stage of the proceedings whether he or she requires the assistance of counsel. At the commencement of each such stage, an unrepresented defendant must be informed of the right to counsel and the consequences of waiver. Any waiver of this right must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and courts generally will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of this fundamental right. [28] Where the right to counsel has been properly waived, the State may proceed with the stage in issue; but the waiver applies only to the present stage and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial stage where the defendant is unrepresented. [29] Once the right to counsel has attached and a lawyer has been requested or retained, the State may not initiate any crucial confrontation with the defendant on that charge in the absence of counsel throughout the period of prosecution, [30] although the defendant is free to initiate a confrontation with police at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. Because a prime interest protected by the Counsel Clause is the right to exercise self-determination in the face of specific criminal charges, the right to counsel is charge-specific [31] and invocation of the right on one offense imposes no restrictions on police inquiry into other charges for which the right has not been invoked. Evidence obtained by the State in contravention of these guidelines violates the Florida Constitution and may not be used by the State. The right to choose, as envisioned by our framers, recognizes the defendant's right to exercise freedom of choice in relying on his or her own abilities and assets in obtaining the manner of representation best suited for the defense. It is a highly personal choice concerning the allocation of one's own individual resources. The Counsel Clause, standing alone, thus imposes no obligation on the state to provide court-appointed counsel in order to protect this particular right. The right to appointed counsel arises when Section 16 is read in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 2, Florida Constitution.
The Equal Protection Clause of our state Constitution provides: All natural persons are equal before the law... . Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const. We conclude that the right of indigent defendants to assistance of court-appointed counsel in criminal prosecutions is constitutionally required under this and the Counsel Clause. This Court has historically recognized the general right of indigent defendants to assistance of court-appointed counsel in criminal prosecutions. Almost a century ago, in Cutts v. State, 54 Fla. 21, 45 So. 491 (1907), we stated: It has been the general practice in trial courts in this state, when a party charged with felony has been brought to the bar for arraignment, to inquire of the accused whether he had counsel to represent him, and if, upon inquiry, it developed that he had no attorney and was unable to employ one, to ask the accused whether he desired one to represent him. If he signified his desire to be represented by counsel, then it has been the practice for the trial judge to appoint some attorney to represent the accused. Id., 54 Fla. at 23, 45 So. at 491. Although this right was originally viewed as discretionary [32] and was limited by the legislature to capital cases, [33] the principle underlying the right nevertheless endured and is now codified in our statutes [34] and rules of procedure. [35] The Equal Protection Clause of our state Constitution was framed to address all forms of invidious discrimination [36] under the law, including any persistent disparity in the treatment of rich and poor. We conclude that our clause means just what it says: Each Florida citizen  regardless of financial means  stands on equal footing with all others in every court of law throughout our state. See generally Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1987). Nowhere is the right to equality in treatment more important than in the context of a criminal trial, for only here can a defendant be deprived by the state of life and liberty. In light of the widely-recognized and oftentimes decisive role the lawyer plays in the judicial process, we conclude that our state Constitution requires that the Section 16 right to counsel be made available to impoverished defendants. No Florida citizen can be deprived of life or liberty in a criminal proceeding simply because he or she is too poor to establish his or her innocence. This Court has long recognized in our rules of procedure this right of impoverished defendants to court-appointed counsel commencing at the point in time when they are charged, either formally or informally, with a criminal act. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111 provides in part: (a) When Counsel Provided. [An indigent person] shall have counsel appointed when he is formally charged with an offense, or as soon as feasible after custodial restraint or upon his first appearance before a committing magistrate, whichever occurs earliest. In other words, a defendant is entitled to counsel at the earliest of the following points: when he or she is formally charged with a crime via the filing of an indictment or information, [37] or as soon as feasible after custodial restraint, [38] or at first appearance. [39] Although rule 3.111 speaks specifically to indigents, we conclude that the procedural rights of nonindigents under Section 16 are at least coextensive with those of indigents. Rule 3.111 was adopted from The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice [40] and was intended to provide equal representation, [41] commencing early in the proceedings. [42] The rule is grounded in Sections 2 and 16 of our state Constitution. Assistance of counsel  either retained or appointed  begins under these two sections as provided in rule 3.111. [43]