Opinion ID: 1159011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: part i: legal sufficiency

Text: Protestants first two challenges to the legal sufficiency of the Petition involve assertions the proposed constitutional addition is facially unconstitutional. They first contend the proposal is unconstitutional because it attempts to add, by State law, qualifications a person must have to be a member of the United States House or Senate when, protestants allege, the qualifications contained in the United States Constitution for these offices are exclusive. [5] Their contention is that only through the process contained in the United States Constitution itself for amendments of that document [U.S. CONST. Art. V] can term limits be imposed on Representatives and Senators. Protestants secondly allege the proposed amendment is facially unconstitutional because it restricts voters' rights to make their own choices as to who should represent them in Congress in violation of their free speech and associational rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. Amend. I; U.S. CONST.Amend. XIV. In our view, neither of these constitutional challenges are appropriate for determination at this pre-election stage and in the circumstances of this case the voters' basic right to vote on changes to the Oklahoma Constitution should not be abridged. We have recognized that the people's right to institute change through the initiative process is a fundamental characteristic of Oklahoma government. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 775. The initiative process is precious to the people and courts are zealous to preserve it to the fullest tenable measure. Oliver v. Tulsa, 654 P.2d 607, 613 (Okla. 1982). All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions are to be resolved in favor of the initiative [ Id. ] and the initiative power should not be crippled, avoided, or denied by technical construction by the courts. Ruth v. Peshek, 153 Okla. 147, 5 P.2d 108, 111 (1931). We have recognized, however, the right of initiative is not absolute and there are both constitutional and statutory limitations on the process. In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 820 P.2d at 775; In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 797 P.2d 326, 330 (Okla. 1990). We may reach a facial constitutional attack in a pre-election setting, when raised, if in this Court's opinion to do so could prevent a costly and unnecessary election. In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. 1992) cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1028, 122 L.Ed.2d 173 (1993); In re Initiative Petition No. 315, 649 P.2d 545, 548 (Okla. 1982); In re Supreme Court Adjudication of Initiative Petitions in Norman, Oklahoma No. 74-1 & No. 74-2, 534 P.2d 3, 8 (Okla. 1975). In addition to a determination by this Court that reaching such an issue could or may prevent the holding of a costly and needless election, we have limited such pre-election review to clear or manifest facial constitutional infirmities and have noted we will not reach challenges to the interpretation, implementation or application of an initiative proposal because such challenges present only abstract questions which will not be reviewed at a pre-election stage. In re Initiative Petition No. 358, 870 P.2d 782, 785-786 (Okla. 1994). In essence, our cases set out our discretionary authority to reach clear and manifest facial constitutional challenges at the preelection stage if, in our opinion, to do so will prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary election. Although we have used this discretionary authority on numerous occasions we must not forget it is of a discretionary character and, in our view, we must always keep in mind, before exercising such authority, the fundamental basis of the people's right to institute change and express their will through the initiative process. Only in the clearest cases do we believe it is essential to use the discretionary authority, and only in the clearest cases do we believe it is warranted to interfere with the people's basic right to vote on important issues by a holding of constitutional infirmity. Based on the submissions in this case, we are unconvinced both that the constitutional infirmities lodged by protestants are clear or manifest, or that reaching the merits of those challenges would prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary election. Accordingly, we decline to reach the constitutional challenges lodged by protestants in this case. At least three courts have decided questions similar to those raised by protestants based on arguably similar term limit provisions. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994) cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2703, 129 L.Ed.2d 832 (1994); Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.Wash. 1994); Stumpf v. Lau, 108 Nev. 826, 839 P.2d 120 (1992). In each case these courts found the provision seeking to limit the terms of federal Representatives and Senators unconstitutional based on the argument the states did not have authority to add qualifications (i.e. term limits) to the qualifications set forth in the United States Constitution. [6] However, only in one was the decision made at the preelection stage. Stumpf v. Lau, supra . In Stumpf, however, the decision was by a 3-2 majority only and a cogent dissent by Justice Steffen, joined by Justice Young, recognized the highly complex nature of the question presented, necessitating an in-depth analysis of the available history of the framers' intent in enacting the qualification clauses of the United States Constitution. 839 P.2d at 128-130 (Steffen, J. dissenting). Justice Steffen also recognized potentially valid arguments that the qualifications specified in Art. I of the United States Constitution were merely a floor or minimum set of qualifications, but that the states retained power to add qualifications or conditions for the election of our federal representatives, although he did not deem it necessary to decide the matter definitively at the pre-election stage. 839 P.2d at 129-130. Further, in Stumpf, although the majority there held the proposed measure unconstitutional on grounds a state had no right to enact term limits on United States Representatives or Senators in view of the exclusivity of the qualification clauses in Art. I of the United States Constitution, they also held the proposal was not fit for submission to the voters of that State because the majority could not discern whether the measure was meant to enact a statutory law or amend its constitution, in violation of Nevada initiative law [839 P.2d at 123-124] and they found an insufficiency of signatures to place the measure on the ballot. Id. 839 P.2d at 124-125. Neither of these latter deficiencies are involved in the Petition before us. The Petition here clearly proposes an addition to the Oklahoma Constitution and no protest is made to the validity or numerical sufficiency of the signatures accompanying the Petition. [7] The Arkansas case also contained a cogent dissent by Justice Hays to the effect the qualification clauses of Art. I were intended by the framers only to be the minimum requirements rather than the exclusive ones and that the United States Constitution did not prohibit additional qualifications for Representatives and Senators. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. at 268-270, 872 S.W.2d at 366-368 (Hays, J. concurring in part; dissenting in part). [8] In reading these cases and considering the arguments presented by the protestants we simply cannot say they have carried their burden to show a clear and manifest facial unconstitutionality which in our view would be sufficient to interfere with the peoples' right to vote on this important question. Furthermore, we believe another reason militates against deciding definitively the constitutional issue based on the exclusivity of the qualification clauses of Art. I of the United States Constitution. On June 20th of this year the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the U.S. Term Limits, Inc. case. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and Hill, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2703, 129 L.Ed.2d 832 (1994). The questions presented include the qualification clause arguments advanced by protestants in this case. ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 2703. If in this case, we were to agree with protestants' arguments on this issue and later the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Arkansas provision a situation would arise where a new Petition would presumably have to be circulated to obtain a vote on the measure. In our view, in light of the United States Supreme Court's pending determination of this issue and a recognition the people have the right to vote on proposed changes to their fundamental law unless the changes are clearly or manifestly unconstitutional, it is the better practice to allow a vote on the issue to go forward, rather than to interfere with the initiative process at the pre-election stage. To rule otherwise would thwart the initiative process without any real determination that it would prevent a costly and needless election. [9]
Protestants complain that the proposed initiative violates the single subject requirement in that the proposal involves two distinct bodies, the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate, as well as distinct subjects, term limitations for members of the House and term limitations for members of the Senate. Specifically, protestants argue the danger in this two subject initiative is logrolling  the offering of unrelated proposals in order to secure approval by appealing to different groups which will support the entire proposal in order to secure some part of it although perhaps disapproving of the other parts. In re Initiative Petition No. 314, supra, 625 P.2d at 603. In the case of In re Initiative Petition No. 314, this Court has previously held OKLA. CONST. Art. 24, § 1 applies to initiative petitions and that in order for the amendment to pass our sufficiency test it must be limited to one general subject. 625 P.2d at 599-600. [10] We determined Art. 24, § 1 was applicable to prevent corruption in making, procuring, and submitting initiative and referendum petitions. 625 P.2d at 601. Further, we resolved that the single subject requirement is necessary so that the voter is not forced to vote approvingly for an initiative containing unrelated proposals in order to secure approval of the entire initiative. In Kerby v. Luhrs, 44 Ariz. 208, 303, 36 P.2d 549, 554 (1934), the court held that: If the different changes contained in the proposed amendment all cover matters necessary to be dealt with in some manner, in order that the Constitution, as amended, shall constitute a consistent and workable whole on the general topic embraced in that part which is amended, and if, logically speaking, they should stand or fall as a whole, then there is but one amendment submitted. But, if any one of the propositions, although not directly contradicting the others, does not refer to such matters, or if it is not such that the voter supporting it would reasonably be expected to support the principle of the others, then there are in reality two or more amendments to be submitted, and the proposed amendment falls within the constitutional prohibition. Nor does the rule as stated unduly hamper the adoption of legitimate amendments to the Constitution. Such a document was presumably adopted deliberately, after careful preparation, as a harmonious and complete system of government. Changes suggested thereto should represent the free and mature judgment of the electors, so submitted that they cannot be constrained to adopt measures of which in reality they disapprove, in order to secure the enactment of others they earnestly desire. We find the proposed amendment meets the single subject requirement. The sole subject of the proposed amendment is limiting the number of terms certain elected public officers may serve. Although, the proposed amendment affects officeholders in two different divisions of the Congress, and though each have distinct responsibilities, this is not alone sufficient to invalidate the proposed amendment. In In re Initiative Petition No. 314, we determined the proposal violated the single subject rule because the four separate and distinct subjects had separate objectives and were not interdependent. 625 P.2d at 607. In the present proposal, the objective is clearly term limitations for Congressional delegates. Protestants argue that a voter, given the opportunity, conceivably could desire to vote independently on the term limitation of a Representative than that of a Senator. While this may be true, it is also reasonable to conclude that the voters recognize the objective of the initiative as a whole is to limit the terms of office of Congressional delegates and that it is this principle they will be voting for or against when casting their vote. We hold that Protestants have failed to establish the proposed initiative is violative of the one general subject rule under Art. 24, § 1.
Protestants also claim the Petition before us is deceptive and misleading because they assert the gist statement required to be on each signature page of the Petition by 34 O.S.Supp. 1992, § 3, informed prospective signers that the gist of the proposition was to, [l]imit terms of elected U.S. Senator to a maximum of 12 years and U.S. Representative to a maximum of 6 years. Protestants take the position the Petition does not really limit terms of Senators and Representatives, but in actuality only restricts their access to a named place on the ballot and the proposal would allow incumbents having already served the required number of years to wage a write-in campaign and, if elected, serve additional terms than the limits specified in the gist statement. We disagree with protestants. As we set out more fully in PART II of this opinion which concerns an appeal of the ballot title prepared by the Attorney General, in practical effect, the proposition contained in the Petition is a term limit proposal. This is so for the reason the laws of the State of Oklahoma do not allow the counting of write-in votes. 26 O.S. 1991, § 7-127(1), provides that write-in votes are not valid in Oklahoma. The gist statement as required by § 3 in simple language informs a signer the proposition would impose term limits on United States Representatives and Senators. This is exactly what the proposal would do under current Oklahoma law. Thus, the gist statement cannot be said to be misleading or deceptive and it adequately complied with the provisions of § 3. In re Initiative Petition No. 347, 813 P.2d 1019, 1025-1026 (Okla. 1991); In re Initiative Petition No. 341, 796 P.2d 267, 274 (Okla. 1990).