Opinion ID: 2654896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modification of the Suspension Ruling

Text: 1. Applicability of the January 2007 Ruling to Brown’s Current Application for Benefits The Workers‟ Compensation Act “imposes reciprocal obligations on an employer and an employee in respect to vocational rehabilitation.”33 D.C. Code § 32-1507 requires employers to furnish rehabilitation services “designed, within reason, to return the employee to employment at a wage as close as possible to the wage that the employee earned at the time of injury.”34 In return, the statute provides that if “the employee unreasonably refuses . . . to accept vocational rehabilitation[,] the Mayor shall, by order, suspend the payment of further compensation, medical payments and health insurance coverage during such 33 Epstein, Becker, & Green v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 850 A.2d 1140, 1142 (D.C. 2004). 34 D.C. Code § 32-1507 (a) & (c). If an employer fails to provide “adequate and sufficient” rehabilitation services, the Mayor is authorized to use government funds to procure the services and then to institute proceedings against the recalcitrant employer to recover their cost. Id. § 32-1507 (c). 20 period, unless the circumstances justified the refusal.”35 As the Board has stated, “a suspension of benefits pursuant to D.C. Code § 32-1507 (d) is only appropriate throughout the period that an injured employee unreasonably refuses to accept vocational rehabilitation and upon demonstration of a willingness to participate in the vocational rehabilitation which an employer is obliged to continue to provide, the suspension of benefits must end.”36 Accordingly, we have stated, the suspension of benefits continues until such time as the employee begins to cooperate37 or manifests a willingness to do so.38 On its face, therefore, the 35 Id. § 32-1507 (d); see Black v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 801 A.2d 983, 986 (D.C. 2002). It is striking that the statute mandates the suspension not only of wage loss benefits (the need for which might be reduced or eliminated if the employee were to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation) but also of schedule benefits, medical payments, and health insurance coverage. (However, with respect to the obligation of employers to pay health insurance premiums for injured employees, § 32-1507 (d) has been preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act. See District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 126-33 (1992).) 36 Darden v. Guest Services, CRB No. 03-115, 2007 DC Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 39, at -7 (D.C. Dep‟t of Emp‟t Servs. 2007); accord Darden v. Guest Services, CRB No. 03-115, 2005 DC Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 58, at  (D.C. Dep‟t of Emp‟t Servs. 2005) (“[T]his jurisdiction has consistently held that a suspension of benefits, pursuant to § 32-1507 (d) is only appropriate throughout the period that the injured employee unreasonably refuses to accept vocational rehabilitation. Upon demonstration of a willingness to participate in the vocational rehabilitation which [the employer] is obligated to continue to provide, the suspension of benefits payments must end.”). 37 Black v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 801 A.2d 983, 986 (D.C. 2002). 21 January 2007 finding that Brown unreasonably refused to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation would seem to require the suspension of her benefits so long as she adheres to that refusal.39 In arguing that the suspension in January 2007 of her temporary total disability benefits does not apply to her current claim for permanent partial disability benefits, Brown relies on our decision in Capitol Hill Hospital v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services,40 which affirmed that a claimant did not need to modify an earlier award of temporary disability benefits to bring a claim for permanent disability benefits arising out of the same injury. This was because the statutory modification procedure in what is now D.C. Code § 32-1524 “is designed for the review of a specific compensation award covering an issue (continued…) 38 Darden v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 911 A.2d 410, 417 (D.C. 2006) (citing Byrnes v. Grand Hyatt Washington, AHD No. 03-171B, OWC No. 569630, 2005 DC Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 140 (D.C. Dep‟t of Emp‟t Servs. 2005)). 39 Brown argues that there was no evidence that PEPCO had continued to offer her vocational rehabilitation services after her benefits were suspended, which she contends it was obligated to do by D.C. Code § 32-1507 (a). But the lack of such evidence is immaterial to the continuation of the suspension in the absence of any expression by Brown of a genuine willingness to take advantage of such services. 40 726 A.2d 682 (D.C. 1999). 22 „previously decided‟ by that order, and is not addressed to new issues that were not decided in the prior compensation award.”41 The new claim in Capitol Hill Hospital did not require reconsideration of anything decided in connection with the earlier award; instead, it turned on a new issue—permanence—that had not been considered previously. In the present case, however, the Board held that Brown‟s current claim does require reconsideration of an issue—her refusal to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation and its consequences—decided in the earlier proceeding. Whether that is so turns on the Board‟s interpretation of D.C. Code § 32-1507 (d) as requiring the suspension of any and all benefits that a recalcitrant employee otherwise could receive, not just those benefits that were considered in the proceeding that resulted in the order of suspension. This seems to us a reasonable construction of the provision at issue; it certainly does not “contravene” the statutory text.42 The Board‟s construction is consistent with the evident statutory goal of providing a powerful incentive to employees to cooperate with 41 Id. at 685 (quoting Short v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 849 (D.C. 1998)). 42 Sch. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 764 A.2d 798, 805 (D.C. 2001) (quoting District of Columbia v. Pierce Assocs., Inc., 462 A.2d 1129, 1130 (D.C. 1983)). 23 vocational rehabilitation.43 We conclude that the CRB‟s interpretation of D.C. Code § 32-1507 (d) is entitled to deference.44 2. Procedure for Ending the Suspension of Benefits On the other hand, the Board‟s further conclusion—that if Brown wishes to abrogate the suspension of her benefits, her only recourse is to apply for a modification of the January 2007 order based on a change of conditions pursuant to D.C. Code § 32-1524 (a)—gives us pause. As we have said, “consistent with the Act‟s humanitarian purpose, that section creates an exception to principles of claim and issue preclusion and provides a procedure that enables claimants to revisit compensation awards.”45 But the exception is time-limited. The statute permits an order rejecting an employee‟s claim to be reopened only within one or three years, 43 See 5 ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON‟S WORKERS‟ COMPENSATION LAW (hereinafter, “LARSON”) § 95.04 (2013) (explaining the difficulties in giving employers and employees incentives to provide and cooperate with vocational rehabilitation). 44 Furthermore, we see no merit to Brown‟s suggestion that the Board should have affirmed her award of permanent partial disability benefits even though her right to receive benefits remained in suspension. 45 WMATA v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 981 A.2d 1216, 1219-20 (D.C. 2009); see also Walden v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 759 A.2d 186, 190 (D.C. 2000); Short v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 723 A.2d 845, 849-50 (D.C. 1998). 24 depending on whether the claim is for schedule or non-schedule benefits.46 This seems to mean that an employee whose benefits (including medical benefits) have been suspended for failure to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation has only one or three years to lift the suspension by choosing to cooperate or showing that her continued refusal has become reasonable.47 That limitation may be justified, but it would appear to be in tension with the proviso in D.C. Code § 32-1507 (d) that, as interpreted by the CRB, mandates that benefits be suspended only “during such period” as “the employee unreasonably refuses . . . to accept vocational 46 D.C. Code § 32-1524 (a) provides: (a) At any time prior to 1 year after the date of the last payment of compensation or at any time prior to 1 year after the rejection of a claim, provided, however, that in the case of a claim filed pursuant to § 32-1508(a)(3)(V) the time period shall be at any time prior to 3 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or at any time prior to 3 years after the rejection of a claim, the Mayor may, upon his own initiative or upon application of a party in interest, order a review of a compensation case pursuant to the procedures provided in § 32-1520 where there is reason to believe that a change of conditions has occurred which raises issues concerning: (1) The fact or the degree of disability or the amount of compensation payable pursuant thereto; or (2) The fact of eligibility or the amount of compensation payable pursuant to § 32-1509. 47 If that is so, the time apparently has run for Brown. 25 rehabilitation.”48 The harshness of the time bar on claimants who are otherwise eligible for disability benefits is also arguably out of step with the general rule that “workers‟ compensation statutes should be liberally construed to achieve their humanitarian purpose.”49 This is not to say that the imposition of § 32-1524 (a)‟s time limits on claimants whose benefits are suspended under § 32-1507 (d) cannot be justified. So far as we can tell, however, the Department of Employment Services has not addressed the tension between the two statutory provisions. While the CRB has said, in this and prior cases, that a claimant seeking the reinstatement of suspended benefits must utilize the modification statute, it has never specifically acknowledged the problem created by § 32-1524 (a)‟s deadlines in this context, let alone reconciled them with its understanding of § 32-1507 (d). In accordance with our usual practice, we will not attempt to construe the statutory provisions before the agency charged with administering them has done 48 D.C. Code § 32-1507 (d); see supra notes 36 to 38. 49 Howard Univ. Hosp. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 952 A.2d 168, 173 (D.C. 2008) (quoting Vieira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 721 A.2d 579, 584 (D.C. 1988) (alteration omitted)); accord Poole v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 77 A.3d 460, 468 (D.C. 2013). 26 so; “we think it inadvisable for this court to attempt to review the issue on this record without a clearer exposition by the agency of its statutory analysis in light of the facts of this case and the broader considerations presented by the issue.”50 The interpretation of the suspension and modification provisions “should be made, in the first instance, by the agency.”51 We trust that on remand, or perhaps in subsequent proceedings, the CRB will “engage in the necessary analysis of the legislation it is charged with carrying out.”52