Opinion ID: 1119051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: ability to care

Text: Since the superior court's CINA adjudication cannot be upheld under subsection (C), we must determine whether it can be justified under subsection (A). Subsection (A) permits a child to be declared CINA as a result of the child being habitually absent from home or refusing to accept available care, or having no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative caring or willing to provide care, including physical abandonment by (i) both parents (ii) the surviving parent, or (iii) one parent if the other parent's rights and responsibilities have been terminated under AS 25.23.180(c) or AS 47.10.080 or voluntarily relinquished[.] (Emphasis added.) The superior court's decision that S.A. and D.A. are CINA under subsection (A) as a result of parental conduct which is likely to continue is based on a finding that N.A. cannot provide the care required by the boys and cannot meet their needs. [4] This finding raises the issue of whether a parent's inability to care for a child can support a CINA declaration under subsection (A) if the parent is willing to care for the child. Our prior decisions conflict in their resolution of this issue. In In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166, 170 (Alaska 1992), we stated, without analysis: While a finding of inability to care would be grounds for jurisdiction under subsection (2)(A), that finding must also extend to any relatives who are in fact caring for or willing to assume care. We cautioned, however, that adjudication under subsection (2)(A) normally would arise under abandonment. Id. at 170 n. 9. In A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 824 (Alaska 1995), and In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941, 945 (Alaska 1994), we interpreted J.L.F., again without analysis, as meaning that a CINA adjudication under subsection (A) may be predicated on a parent's lack of ability to care for a child. But in F.T. v. State, 862 P.2d 857, 861 (Alaska 1993), we rejected an argument that inability to care could support a finding that a child is CINA under subsection (A). We stated, AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) would support a CINA adjudication only if [the child] had no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative caring or willing to provide care. Specifically, the parties' dispute whether [the parent] was willing to provide care.  Id. The State argued that [the parent] could not have been willing to provide care because he was unable to meet [the child's] needs. Id. We rebuffed this argument and the State's conclusion that if a child has needs a parent cannot meet, then the parent cannot be `willing to provide care' for that child. Id. We explained that the State's conflation of willingness to care and ability to satisfy needs leads to absurd conclusions. Id. We now determine that the approach taken in F.T. is the correct one, and we hold that a parent's or caregiver's inability to care for a child cannot support a CINA adjudication under subsection (A) if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for the child. Our conclusion is based on the plain language of subsection (A) and a careful examination of the structure and purposes of AS 47.10.010(a)(2) as a whole. The clear language of subsection (A) covers only willingness to care, not ability to care. Subsection (A) allows a CINA adjudication if there is no parent ... caring or willing to provide care. (Emphasis added.) Subsection (A) does not state having no parent ... caring and willing to provide care. The State has argued that subsection (A) covers ability to care because AS 47.10.990(1) states, `care' or `caring' under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) ... means to provide for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child. See F.T., 862 P.2d at 861 & n. 5; J.L.F., 828 P.2d at 169. However, plugging the definition in AS 47.10.990(1) into subsection (A) results in the following: having no parent ... providing for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child or willing to provide for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of the child. The statute still would not require ability to care  willingness is enough. An analysis of the structure and purposes of the entirety of AS 47.10.010(a)(2) shows that while ability to care is relevant under subsections (B) through (F) of the statute, it is not relevant under subsection (A), for three main reasons. First, the State's interpretation of subsection (A) would permit CINA adjudications based on parenting deficiencies much less severe than those covered under AS 47.10.010(a)(2)(B)-(F). Second, unlike subsection (A), subsections (B) through (F) set clear, specific standards for adjudicating a child CINA based on a parent's inability to care. Third, permitting ability to care to be considered under subsection (A) would make subsections (B) through (F) virtually superfluous. The full text of AS 47.10.010(a)(2) states: (a) Proceedings relating to a minor under 18 years of age residing or found in the state are governed by this chapter, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, when the court finds the minor .... (2) to be a child in need of aid as a result of (A) the child being habitually absent from home or refusing to accept available care, or having no parent, guardian, custodian, or relative caring or willing to provide care, including physical abandonment by (i) both parents (ii) the surviving parent, or (iii) one parent if the other parent's rights and responsibilities have been terminated under AS 25.23.180(c) or AS 47.10.080 or voluntarily relinquished; (B) the child being in need of medical treatment to cure, alleviate, or prevent substantial physical harm, or in need of treatment for mental harm as evidenced by failure to thrive, severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior or hostility toward others, and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian has knowingly failed to provide the treatment; (C) the child having suffered substantial physical harm or if there is an imminent and substantial risk that the child will suffer such harm as a result of the actions done by or conditions created by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian or the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian adequately to supervise the child; (D) the child having been, or being in imminent and substantial danger of being, sexually abused either by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, or as a result of conditions created by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian, or by the failure of the parent, guardian, or custodian adequately to supervise the child; (E) the child committing delinquent acts as a result of pressure, guidance, or approval from the child's parents, guardian, or custodian; (F) the child having suffered substantial physical abuse or neglect as a result of conditions created by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian. Under subsections (B) through (F), only serious forms of parental misconduct can support a CINA adjudication. Subsection (B) deals with failure to provide needed medical treatment. Subsection (C) concerns substantial physical harm caused by parental conduct. Subsection (D) addresses sexual abuse. Subsection (E) is about parental encouragement of criminal conduct. And subsection (F) speaks of substantial physical abuse or neglect. The legislature thus intended for the State to be able to assume custody of minors only to remedy severe parenting deficiencies and prevent significant harm to children. But the State's reading of subsection (A) would give the State the power to assume custody over children for much less serious types of parental misconduct and harm to children. The State would define ability to care as the ability to provide for the physical, emotional, mental, and social needs of a child, relying on AS 47.10.990(1). See F.T., 862 P.2d at 861 & n. 5; J.L.F., 828 P.2d at 169. This interpretation would permit the State to assume custody over any child who had needs the child's parents could not meet. Applied to the facts of this case, the State's interpretation would justify terminating N.A.'s parental rights on the grounds that S.A. and D.A. would not meet their potential with N.A. because she would not be able to satisfy their needs for structure and consistency. The better way to interpret subsection (A) is in accordance with its plain intent  subsection (A) is designed to deal with situations where the parent abandons the child, the child runs away, or the child refuses to accept the parent's care. The seriousness of these kinds of situations is congruent with the types of circumstances covered by subsections (B) through (F). Unlike subsection (A), which focuses on a parent's willingness to care and does not explicitly give superior courts guidance in determining what constitutes inability to care, subsections (B) through (F) contain specific standards for adjudicating a child CINA and terminating parental rights based on a parent's or caregiver's [5] inability to care. Under subsection (B), inability to provide needed medical treatment can support a CINA finding. Subsection (C) covers inability to care that causes, or creates an imminent and substantial risk of, substantial physical harm. Subsection (D) deals with sexual abuse or a danger of sexual abuse caused by a parent's inability to supervise a child or by other conditions created by the parent. Subsection (E) permits a CINA adjudication if a parent approves the commission of delinquent acts by the child. Subsection (F) concerns substantial physical ... neglect. Reading subsection (A) as permitting a CINA adjudication based on inability to care would make all these parts of subsections (B) through (F) superfluous. A superior court would not have to determine whether the requirements in subsections (B) through (F) were met if the court could easily declare a child CINA upon a general finding of inability to care under subsection (A). [6] Such a result would violate basic principles of statutory construction. See, e.g., Journey v. State, 895 P.2d 955, 959 n. 10 (Alaska 1995) (as a general rule, statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions and no part is inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant) (citing Homer Elec. Ass'n v. Towsley, 841 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Alaska 1992)). For these reasons, we overrule A.M., 891 P.2d at 824, T.W.R., 887 P.2d at 945, and J.L.F., 828 P.2d at 170, to the limited extent that those cases stated that ability to care may be considered under subsection (A). We continue to follow the central teaching of those cases  parental rights may be terminated because a parent is unable to care for a child. [7] We only clarify that superior courts should be guided by the specific, explicit standards of subsections (B) through (F) in determining whether a parent or caregiver is able to care for a child. Since a child may not be adjudicated CINA under subsection (A) based on a parent's inability to care for the child if the parent is willing to care for the child, we overturn the superior court's finding that S.A. and D.A. are CINA under subsection (A). We realize that our opinions in A.M., J.L.F., and T.W.R. may have led some superior courts to make CINA findings solely under subsection (A) and not address subsections (B) through (F) in cases where the evidence would support a CINA adjudication under subsections (B) through (F). If this were such a case, the proper remedy would be to remand for consideration of whether the children are CINA under the appropriate provision(s) in subsections (B) through (F). However, the record in this case cannot support a CINA adjudication under subsections (B) through (F), meaning that the termination of N.A.'s parental rights must be reversed. [8]