Opinion ID: 4584100
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Zaldivar contends we may review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority and, thus, we may reach the question of whether Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)—under which he asserts his 2003 convictions for possession of MDMA, possession of cocaine, and possession of cannabis in violation of Florida Statutes §§ 893.03(1), 893.03(2), and 893.13(6) would no longer qualify as aggravated felonies—constitutes an “exceptional circumstance” justifying the BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte authority to reopen. 1 “We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo.” Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). We must inquire into subject matter jurisdiction whenever it may be lacking. Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir. 2005). 2 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 3 of 17 The BIA has the authority to sua sponte reopen or reconsider removal proceedings at any time, including upon motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). The Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA have the discretion to deny a motion to reopen, even if the moving party has met its prima facie burden. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(3). The BIA may sua sponte reopen any case in which it has rendered a decision. Id. § 1003.2(a). The BIA only exercises its authority to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings in “exceptional situations.” In re G–D–, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132, 1133-34 (BIA 1999). There is no express statutory grant of authority to reopen cases sua sponte. Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir. 2008). Rather, the authority derives from 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2), which grants general authority to the Attorney General over immigration matters. Id. In Lenis, we concluded we lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen or reconsider a case under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because the regulation did not provide any “meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Id. at 1292-94. Lenis also suggested an IJ’s decision denying sua sponte reopening would be unreviewable for the same reasons. See id. at 1294 (citing persuasive authority stating the decision to reopen is within the IJ’s discretion and that “the IJ is under no obligation to reopen a case” pursuant to his or her sua sponte authority). We noted an appellate court might have jurisdiction 3 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 4 of 17 over constitutional claims related to the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority, but we declined to address that question because the petitioner had not raised a constitutional claim. Id. at 1294 n.7. However, in Butka, we reaffirmed our holding in Lenis and stated the jurisdiction-preserving section of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), for questions of law or constitutional claims, “has no impact on our jurisdiction to review motions for sua sponte reopening.” Butka v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 827 F.3d 1278, 1286 n.7 (11th Cir. 2016). We reasoned § 1252(a)(2)(D) created an exception to the jurisdiction-stripping provisions contained only in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), whereas our jurisdiction over sua sponte reopening is limited instead by the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. We lack jurisdiction to review Zaldivar’s arguments regarding the BIA’s sua sponte authority to reopen his case. See Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1292-94. While Lenis indicated this Court might maintain jurisdiction over constitutional claims relating to the decision not to reopen sua sponte, Zaldivar has not raised any specific constitutional claims that relate to the denial of sua sponte reopening. Id. at 1294 n.7. Instead, Zaldivar asserts the BIA erred in finding his case lacked “exceptional circumstances” because there was a significant development in the law, which he argues is “incontrovertible” evidence of an exceptional circumstance. He further argues his case is distinct from that in Lenis or Butka, because he is challenging 4 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 5 of 17 “the very concept that regulation-made authority, in which the executive branch creates power for itself and bars judicial review may withstand constitutional scrutiny.” These arguments do not assert a constitutional challenge to the way in which the BIA made its decision, instead, they assert legal error in the BIA’s analysis of “exceptional circumstances.” His arguments do not speak to the BIA running afoul of his constitutional rights, instead, they challenge this Court’s precedent holding that such decisions are unreviewable. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s exercise of its sua sponte authority.
Because Zaldivar was found removable under two grounds listed in the criminal alien bar, this Court is obligated to consider whether it has jurisdiction to review the challenges he raises to the BIA’s denial of reopening under its statutory authority. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (providing we lack jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed specified criminal offenses, including an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); or a controlled substance offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1272 & n.17 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (stating we must consider sua sponte whether we have subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for review). Notwithstanding the criminal alien 5 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 6 of 17 bar, we have jurisdiction to review any constitutional claims or questions of law presented in a petition for review. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). We have jurisdiction to review Zaldivar’s challenges to the BIA’s denial of his motions to reopen under statutory authority. First, Zaldivar’s motions to reopen challenged both his criminal grounds of removability, and thus, this Court may review the denial of those motions to determine whether the statutory conditions for limiting judicial review exist. See Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining when the criminal alien bar is implicated, we retain jurisdiction to determine whether the statutory conditions for limiting judicial review exist; that is, we may determine whether a petitioner is “(1) an alien (2) who is removable (3) based on having committed a disqualifying offense.” (quotations omitted)). Second, this Court has jurisdiction to review questions of law, including the application of undisputed facts to a legal standard, and the issues Zaldivar raises on appeal—equitable tolling, whether his convictions qualified as controlled substance offenses, and the legal effect of his defective notice to appear—all concern questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1067-68 (2020) (holding the “questions of law” exception to the criminal alien bar includes issues involving the application of undisputed or established facts to a legal standard, such as whether a petitioner had shown sufficient due diligence to equitably toll the deadline for 6 USCA11 Case: 17-15441 Date Filed: 11/05/2020 Page: 7 of 17 filing a motion to reopen). Consequently, the criminal alien bar does not prevent this Court from considering Zaldivar’s claims on appeal.