Opinion ID: 902303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cumulative Effects under ESA

Text: The Forest Service prepared a biological assessment and engaged in informal consultation with the FWS to evaluate the potential effects of the Mudflow Project on the Owl and its critical habitat. CC argues that Defendants violated the procedural requirements of ESA section 7(a)(2) by “failing to analyze the cumulative effects of [Defendants’] multiple allowances of degradation of critical habitation through the Mudflow Project and in connection with other past, present, and future, nearby logging projects.” This argument is unavailing. As a preliminary matter, CC’s argument is premised on a misunderstanding of the term “cumulative effects” in the ESA CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . 13 context. The ESA defines “cumulative effects” as “those effects of future State or private activities, not involving Federal activities, that are reasonably certain to occur within the action area of the Federal action subject to consultation.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added); see also Medina Cnty. Envtl. Action Ass’n, 602 F.3d at 694. Applied to the Mudflow Project, cumulative effects are those stemming from future state or private activities that are reasonably certain to occur within the Project area. This definition only pertains to ESA section 7 analyses and should not be conflated with NEPA’s broader term “cumulative impact,” which means “impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7; see also Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1183 (9th Cir. 2011).6 Nor, contrary to CC’s argument, is “cumulative impact” (or cumulative effects) a shorthand for “environmental baseline,” which means “past and present impacts of all Federal, State, or private actions and other human activities in the action area. . . .” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02; see also ESA Handbook, at 4-22 (stating that cumulative impact captures “a ‘snapshot’ of a species’ health at a specified point in time.”). In sum, the terms “cumulative effects,” “cumulative impact,” and “environmental baseline” have distinct regulatory meanings under the ESA and NEPA. 6 In this case, the Forest Service prepared a cumulative effects analysis of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions under NEPA, but that fact is of no help to CC because its NEPA claim is not at issue in this appeal. 14 CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . Moreover, CC complains that Defendants failed to analyze the cumulative effects of other nearby federal projects past, present, and future. But consideration of federal projects, past projects, and projects outside the Mudflow Project area exceed the scope of a cumulative effects analysis, as defined under 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. Additionally, in conducting an analysis of the effects of the Mudflow Project on the Owl, the Forest Service considered past effects by incorporating them into the baseline it used for analysis. Thus, the baseline already appears to account for the aggregate effects of past activities, while future federal and private actions must withstand independent regulatory scrutiny. In essence, CC demands that Defendants conduct a more extensive, NEPA-like cumulative impacts analysis. But NEPA and ESA call for different regulatory review, and we must defer to the procedural mechanisms established by the implementing agency. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (“Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.” (citations and quotes omitted)). CC’s argument also fails because there is simply no statutory mandate to consider cumulative effects during informal consultation. We must uphold any reasonable interpretation agencies give to ambiguous statutes they are charged with administering. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). Here, Congress has not “directly spoken” to the issue of whether a cumulative effects analysis is required during informal consultation under ESA section 7(a)(2). Id. at 842. The statute only requires “consultation” with the appropriate CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . 15 agency. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Under its implementing regulations, FWS has clearly created an affirmative duty to consider cumulative effects during formal consultation, but there is no such duty during informal consultation. The FWS’s “responsibilities during formal consultation” include the formulation of a biological opinion that advises the action agency as to whether or not the action, “taken together with cumulative effects,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(4), is “likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat,” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (h)(3). In contrast, an informal consultation is defined as “an optional process that includes all discussions, correspondence, etc., between the Service and the Federal agency or the designated non-Federal representative, designed to assist the Federal agency in determining whether formal consultation or a conference is required.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.13(a). Here, there is no mention of a cumulative effects analysis. CC acknowledges as much, but provides no statutory or regulatory provision, legislative materials, or other relevant authority7—and we are aware of none— supporting a duty to evaluate cumulative effects during informal consultation. In addition, we cannot—as CC requests—read section 402.13’s failure to address cumulative 7 CC relies on Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, Inc. v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 265 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2001), and National Wildlife Federation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 524 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2008), for the general proposition that consideration of cumulative effects under the ESA is crucial. These cases are inapposite. They concern challenges to a biological opinion prepared during formal consultation, and neither addressed the issue of whether an agency must consider cumulative effects of a proposed action during informal consultation. 16 CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . effects as being equivalent to imposing a duty to analyze them, especially when read in juxtaposition with 50 C.F.R. § 402.14, which creates the duty expressly. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 543; Earth Island Inst., 626 F.3d at 472 (“Courts may not impose procedural requirements not explicitly enumerated in the pertinent statutes.” (citation and quotes omitted)); Wilderness Soc. v. Tyrrel, 918 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990). Likewise, in preparing its BA, the Forest Service was not required to consider cumulative effects under the ESA. The only relevant requirement is that a biological assessment “determine whether any [endangered] species or [critical] habitat are likely to be adversely affected by the action.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a). The contents of a biological assessment are at the “discretion” of the federal agency, “depend on the nature of the Federal action,” and “may” include on-site inspections of the affected area, experts views, literature reviews, and analysis of alternate actions, as well as “consideration of cumulative effects, and the results of any related studies.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(f) (emphasis added); see also Medina Cnty. Envtl. Action Ass’n, 602 F.3d at 699–700; City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, under the plain meaning of 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(f), consideration of cumulative effects is permissive, not mandatory. The district court correctly determined that the Forest Service did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a factor that it was not required to consider in the first place. CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . 17 B. Evidence Controverting Defendants’ Conclusion that the Mudflow Project Is Not Likely to Adversely Affect the Owl The district court also found that CC failed to show Defendants acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that the contemplated degradation from the Mudflow Project would not amount to an “adverse” effect. CC argues that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring contrary evidence in FWS’s own concurrence letter regarding proposed treatments. First, CC observes that proposed treatments in the Owl’s foraging habitat include thinning 22 acres to a basal area of 100–120 square feet per acre, whereas a basal area of 125–150 square feet per acre (or more) is needed to sustain the Owl’s foraging habitat. But CC ignores the fact that no single criterion determines the quality of foraging habitat. The Owl’s foraging habitat is a variegated landscape that primarily functions to provide food supply for survival and reproduction. 73 Fed. Reg at 47346. Assessing the Owl’s foraging habitat involves considering various forest structural features and elements, such as canopy cover, tree size, basal area, tree species composition, canopy layering, presence of edges and small openings, landscape position, slope position, distance to water, and proximity to nesting/roosting habitat, among others. See id. In its concurrence letter, the FWS concludes that “[c]onsistent with the high degree of variability described in research publications, [its] criteria for evaluating foraging habitat for spotted owls consists of a range of stand conditions frequently used by owls rather than a single threshold value.” Basal area is thus only one factor in the calculus. The FWS further states that although most studies suggest some degree of Owl preference for higher 18 CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . basal areas (160–220 square feet per acre), a substantial amount of foraging (44 percent) occurs within stands with basal areas ranging from 80–160 square feet per acre. It is unclear, therefore, from the totality of the factors considered, that a thinning of 22 acres, out of a total of 408 acres of the Owl’s degraded foraging habitat, to a basal area of 100–125 square feet per acre would necessarily mean that the Owl’s total foraging habitat would be “adversely” modified—which, in the regulatory context, means appreciably diminished. See Butte Envtl. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 620 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n adverse modification occurs only when there is a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat” (citation and quotes omitted)); ESA Handbook, at 4-35 (defining “adverse modification” as “a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species”). Even completely destroying 22 acres of critical habitat does not necessarily appreciably diminish the value of the larger critical habitat area. See Butte Envtl. Council, 620 F.3d at 948 (“An area of a species’ critical habitat can be destroyed without appreciably diminishing the value of a critical habitat for the species’ survival or recovery.”). Second, CC notes that the proposed treatments also include 46 acres of fuelbreak treatment. CC argues that 22 acres of thinning with sanitation, together with 46 acres of shaded fuelbreak treatment (totaling 68 acres of treated area), equals an “adverse effect.” But again, “adverse” effect is a technical term referring to effects that appreciably diminish habitat value. See Butte Envtl. Council, 620 F.3d at 948. CC fails to explain how the alteration to 68 acres of the Owl’s CONSERVATION CONGRESS V . U.S. FOREST SERV . 19 foraging habitat will appreciably diminish the Owl’s broader foraging habitat. The Forest Service found that the Mudflow Project would not “downgrade” (temporarily reduce habitat functioning) or “remove” (render no longer functional) any part of the Owl’s critical habitat. The Forest Service further found that neither the Owls nor their nesting/roosting areas would be affected. Only portions of the Owl’s foraging habitat would be “degraded.” Given the totality of the findings, Defendants reasonably concluded that the Mudflow Project “may affect, but is not likely to adversely affect” the Owl or its critical habitat. Under the APA’s deferential standard of review, agency action is presumed to be valid if there is a reasonable basis for the decision. Lands Council, 629 F.3d at 1074. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deferring to Defendants’ determination that the Mudflow Project would not likely adversely affect the Owl or its critical habitat, thus obviating the need for formal consultation.