Opinion ID: 171646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ACCA Sentence Enhancement

Text: Mr. Zuniga asserts that his Texas conviction for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution is not a violent felony pursuant to the ACCA. Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Fell, 511 F.3d 1035, 1037 (10th Cir.2007). The ACCA mandates a fifteen-year statutory minimum sentence for any defendant who is (1) convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and (2) has three previous convictions by any court ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In pertinent part, the ACCA defines violent felony as: any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that ... is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). This court has determined that a conviction for conveying a weapon in a federal prison is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA enhancement. United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1341 (10th Cir. 1997). In that case, however, we analyzed the issue only in terms of whether possessing a weapon in prison posed a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id. (quotations omitted). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), expands this analysis. After Begay, our determination of whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA's residual provision ... requires a two-part inquiry. United States v. West, 550 F.3d 952, 960 (10th Cir.2008). We consider (1) whether the offense of conviction `presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,' 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); and (2) whether the offense is `roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the' offenses specifically enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives. Id. (quoting Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1585). We do not inquire into Mr. Zuniga's specific conduct, but consider the offense generically, that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584. See also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (adopting this categorical approach). At the time of Mr. Zuniga's conviction, Texas defined possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if, while confined in a penal institution, he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly: (1) carries on or about his person a deadly weapon; or (2) possesses or conceals a deadly weapon in the penal institution. . . . . (d) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.10. We must consider, then, whether this offense presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and is roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the offenses specifically enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Our Romero decision is strongly persuasive on the issue of whether possession of a deadly weapon in prison presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We concluded in Romero that it did, 122 F.3d at 1341, and we now reaffirm that conclusion. For two reasons, a conviction under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.10 clearly involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. First, it requires carrying, possessing, or concealing something manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or ... anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07 (defining deadly weapon). Second, it requires that the act be committed within the confines of a penal institution. We have determined that such confines preclude any recreational uses for a deadly weapon and render its possession a serious threat to the safety of others. By its nature ... the possession of a deadly weapon by a prison inmate presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Romero, 122 F.3d at 1341 (quotations omitted). [2] Accordingly, we are satisfied that Mr. Zuniga's predicate offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
We next consider whether Mr. Zuniga's offense was roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving explosives. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1585. In West, we read Begay as holding that the crime at issue is sufficiently similar to the offenses enumerated in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) if it `typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.' West, 550 F.3d 952, 966 (quoting Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1586). We therefore must determine whether possession of a deadly weapon in prison is a crime that typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. We conclude that it does. We stated in West that  Begay equates purposeful with deliberate or intentional. Id. at 970. Under the statute in question, Mr. Zuniga could have been convicted for possessing the deadly weapon intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.10(a). Because the statute's definition includes reckless conduct, it does not necessitate that the possession be deliberate or intentional. However, the Begay test specifically requires that the crime in question typically involve purposeful conduct. West, 550 F.3d 952, 966. It is reasonable to surmise that those who possess deadly weapons in a penal institution typically intend to possess them. Additionally, Texas interprets Mr. Zuniga's offense in terms that are unmistakably deliberate and intentional. A Texas court has held that [t]o support a conviction for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution, the State must show that the accused (1) exercised actual care, control, or custody of the weapon, (2) was conscious of his or her connection with it, and (3) possessed the weapon knowingly or intentionally.  Wilson v. State, No. 13-04-00298-CR, 2007 WL 1559104, at  (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi May 31, 2007) (unpublished) (emphasis added). Mr. Zuniga's offense is therefore appropriately characterized as typically involving purposeful conduct. Possessing a deadly weapon is, moreover, more analogous to the offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosivesthan it is to driving under the influence of alcohol, the crime at issue in Begay. 128 S.Ct. at 1583. The Court in Begay determined that driving under the influence was not a purposeful crime because it was similar to a strict liability offense, criminalizing conduct in respect to which the offender need not have any criminal intent at all. Id. at 1586-87. Possession of a deadly weapon in prison is not a strict liability crime, because it requires either intentional or reckless behavior. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.10. In terms of purpose, it is therefore not analogous to driving under the influence. We next consider whether the predicate offense is violent and aggressive. Mr. Zuniga asserts that any offenses included in the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) must be exclusively characterized as involving acts of violence against a person. We disagree. Even the listed offenses in that clause cannot be so characterized. More importantly, we held in West that an offense is violent if it creates a likelihood of violence. We noted that the Supreme Court identified the violent aspect of a burglary as the possible confrontation between the burglar and the occupant or someone else investigating.... [A] burglar's entry need not be violent, for it creates the possibility of violence should the burglar confront an occupant, officer, or bystander. West, 550 F.3d 952, 969 (quotations omitted) (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). We added that the offender's awareness about the likelihood of violence indicated a willingness to use violence if necessary. Id. Similarly, possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution creates the possibilityeven the likelihoodof a future violent confrontation. See id. As we held in Romero, [T]here is no legitimate purpose for a prisoner to carry a weapon designed to kill, injure or disable another ... [T]he only reason to carry such a weapon is to use it to attack another or to deter an attack. Either way, the possession involves a substantial risk that physical force will be used while the weapon is in the possession of the prisoner. Romero, 122 F.3d at 1343. Mr. Zuniga's possession of a deadly weapon in prison likely indicated that he was prepared to use violence if necessary. See West, 550 F.3d 952, 969. Thus, applying the same analysis as this court applied in West, we conclude that possession of a deadly weapon in prison involves violent conduct. We consider it unlikely that any conduct properly characterized as violent could not also be characterized as aggressive. [3] In West, we held that flaunting the order of a police officer was aggressive conduct. Id. Our analysis noted that the conduct in question was likely to produce a dangerous response. Id. The same analysis applies to the possession of a deadly weapon in prison. When a prisoner carries a deadly weapon, that behavior indicates a readiness to enter into conflict, which in turn creates a danger for those surrounding the armed prisoner. For that reason, possessing a deadly weapon in prison is aggressive conduct. We therefore conclude that possessing a deadly weapon in prison involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. Based on the test outlined in West, the offense is similar in kind and degree of risk to the statutory offenses. Because we have previously determined that the offense poses a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, the offense therefore can properly be characterized as a violent felony. Finally, it is worth noting that this conclusion accords with the basic purposes of the ACCA, as thus described in Begay: [i]n order to determine which offenders fall into this category [of armed career criminals], the Act looks to past crimes. This is because an offender's criminal history is relevant to the question whether he is a career criminal, or, more precisely, to the kind or degree of danger the offender would pose were he to possess a gun. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1587. Mr. Zuniga's convictions include felony manslaughter, felony assault with a dangerous weapon, and possession of a deadly weapon in prison. His criminal history indicates that he would likely pose significant danger were he to possess a gun. Accordingly, his classification as an armed career criminal is congruent with the basic purposes of the ACCA. See id. For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that Mr. Zuniga's crime of possessing a deadly weapon in prison is a violent felony.