Opinion ID: 2639434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Materially False Testimony by Darlene

Text: The referee found that Darlene, petitioner's former girlfriend, had lied at petitioner's trial on three points: (1) that on the night of Denise's disappearance, Darlene saw Denise get into petitioner's car; (2) that a day or two after the disappearance of Denise's sister, Debbie, Darlene found Debbie's unicorn key chain in petitioner's car; and (3) that, when Darlene confronted petitioner with the key chain, he told her he had killed not only Debbie but also Denise and Lynda. Was Darlene's false testimony substantially material or probative (Pen.Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)) on the question of petitioner's guilt of killing the three girls? As stated earlier, false evidence is substantially material or probative if it is `of such significance that it may have affected the outcome,' in the sense that 'with reasonable probability it could have affected the outcome....' [Citation.] ( In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) As I explain, this test is met here. Of Darlene's three lies, the most damaging to petitioner's defense was her testimony that petitioner told her about killing the three girls. This court has held that the erroneous admission of a confession is not reversible per se. ( People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 509, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) But as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, evidence of a confession has such a profound impact on the jury that appellate courts `may justifiably doubt [the jury's] ability to put [a confession] out of mind even if told to do so' ( Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302.) To put it succinctly, a confession is a kind of evidentiary bombshell. ( People v. Schader (1965) 62 Cal.2d 716, 731, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401 P.2d 665, overruled on other grounds in People v. Cahill, supra, at pp. 509-510, fn. 17, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037.) The majority concludes that Darlene's false testimony that petitioner told her he had killed the three girls was not substantially material because overwhelming evidence at trial, separate and apart from [Darlene's false evidence] amply supported the jury's verdict. (Maj. opn, ante, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 341, 70 P.3d at p. 335.) In support, the majority relies first and foremost on Joanna's trial testimony that she witnessed petitioner murder Denise. ( Id. at pp. 341-343, 70 P.3d at pp. 335-336.) I agree that Joanna's trial testimony, if accepted by the jury, together with the circumstantial evidence supporting petitioner's guilt, would amply support the determination that petitioner killed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda. But without Joanna's trial testimony, the circumstantial evidence was very weak. [1] Moreover, the record of petitioner's capital trial reveals substantial problems with Joanna's testimony that she saw petitioner kill Denise, thus calling into question whether the jury ever seriously considered that testimony in determining petitioner's guilt. At the guilt phase of petitioner's capital trial, the jury heard that Joanna had lied to the police and others throughout the summer and fall of 1984 about the disappearance of Denise; defense counsel elicited from Joanna that in her interviews with the sheriffs deputies and with Dr. Frank Dougherty of the El Dorado County Mental Health Department she had made up stories, lies, and other scenarios that never happened, repeatedly asking all three if she had given enough information to get [petitioner] arrested; and he established on cross-examination that shortly before Joanna told Detective Harnage and Sergeant Wilson she knew something about the murders, an $8,500 reward was offered for information leading to the conviction of the killer, and that after telling the sheriffs deputies she saw petitioner kill Denise, Joanna had applied for the reward. Defense counsel also played for the jury a tape-recording of Dr. Dougherty's initial interview with Joanna, whose account of her June 12, 1984 trip to the woods outside Placerville with murder victim Denise and petitioner differed greatly from her trial testimony describing that same event. Thus, at the close of the guilt phase of petitioner's trial, the prosecution must have realized there was a serious problem with the credibility of its star witness, Joanna. This is apparent from the prosecutor's argument to the jury describing the credibility of Joanna as a major issue, and suggesting that the jury could hypothetically take Joanna out of the case and evaluate the evidence as if Joanna never appeared before this jury and ... ha[d] nothing whatsoever to do with the prosecution's case. The prosecutor then discussed other evidence as supporting petitioner's guilt, stressing that none of that evidence had one iota to do with Joanna. He added that if Joanna never came here and never said one word, between the testimony of Darlene and the other witnesses there is a fabric, there is a thread that goes through the case, and it weaves together with an absolute and compelling certainty, a point the prosecutor twice reiterated in closing argument. The prosecutor's argument to the jury underscores the materiality of Darlene's false testimony, as the Attorney General essentially conceded at the reference hearing. The Attorney General's brief filed with the referee on August 28, 1995, states: If this Court finds that Darlene neither witnessed any of the murders nor heard a confession of those murders by petitioner and that her trial testimony in that regard (and, likewise, all the pre-offense incriminating statements Darlene also attributed to petitioner) was false, then respondent concedes that since there is no physical evidence linking [petitioner] to any of the three murders, no evidence linking him to Debbie's murder, and only circumstantial evidence linking him to Lynda's murder, this false evidence was both material and probative as to guilt and to punishment as to Counts II (Lynda) and III (Debbie). It is also arguable [Darlene's false evidence] is material and probative as to Count I (Denise), since in his argument [Deputy District Attorney] Tepper told the jury that they [ sic ] could reject Joanna's testimony in its entirety and still find sufficient evidence to convict on all three counts. (Italics added.) In addition to Darlene's false testimony that petitioner told her he had killed Denise, Debbie, and Lynda, she also lied about seeing Denise get into petitioner's car the night Denise disappeared and finding Debbie's key chain in petitioner's car a day or two after Debbie disappeared. Darlene's false testimony that on June 12, 1984 (the night Denise disappeared), she saw Denise get into petitioner's car corroborated Joanna's trial testimony that petitioner that night had picked up Denise and then Joanna near the freeway underpass in Placerville. (Compare Joanna's trial testimony on this point (135 Cal. Rptr.2d pp. 350-351, 70 P.3d p. 343, ante ) with Darlene's (p. 351, 70 P.3d p. 343, ante ).) Because Darlene's false testimony tended to support Joanna's testimony by placing Denise in a car with petitioner on the night of her murder, that false testimony by Darlene was particularly damaging to petitioner. Jurors skeptical of Joanna's credibility, which the prosecutor acknowledged was a major issue in the case, may have been persuaded of the essential truth of Joanna's testimony because of the corroborating evidence provided by Darlene. Darlene's false testimony about finding Debbie's key chain in petitioner's car shortly after Debbie disappeared, as the deputy attorney general highlighted in the portion of the brief quoted above, was the only evidence presented by the prosecution at trial to tie petitioner to Debbie's murder. Thus, it too was highly damaging. In determining the materiality of Darlene's false testimony that she saw Denise get into petitioner's car the night Denise disappeared, that she found Debbie's key chain in petitioner's car a day or two after Debbie disappeared, and that petitioner admitted to her that he had killed Denise, Debbie, and Lyndathis court must view it objectively, in light of all relevant circumstances to decide whether there is a reasonable probability that the false testimony affected the outcome of the trial. ( In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) Thus, we must consider the potential effect of Darlene's false testimony on the jury in light of the other evidence favoring the prosecution at trial. Putting aside the testimony of Joanna that defense counsel had effectively impeached, leading the prosecutor to suggest to the jury that Joanna's testimony was unnecessary to the jury's determination of petitioner's guilt, the prosecution's case consisted of this scant circumstantial evidence: Petitioner disliked the Oz-crowd girls, which included murder victims Denise, Debbie, and Lynda, and he had made callous and threatening remarks about them; he was seen with Lynda the night she disappeared, and the next day he had a scratch on his forehead; he told contradictory stories about whether he knew Lynda; he kept knives, guns, and handcuffs in his car; and he was known to have frequented the forested areas where the girls' bodies were found. Considering the totality of circumstances in this case, I conclude that Darlene's false testimony that she saw Denise get into petitioner's car the night Denise disappeared, that she found Debbie's key chain in petitioner's car shortly after Debbie disappeared, and that petitioner told her he killed Denise, Debbie and Lynda was substantially material or probative (Pen.Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1)) on the question of petitioner's guilt. In concluding that Darlene's false testimony was not material, the majority adopts the referee's finding that defense counsel's cross-examination had `torn to pieces' Darlene's story of petitioner's confession. (Maj. opn., ante, 135 Cal. Rptr.2d at p. 340, 70 P.3d at p. 334.) The referee noted that when defense counsel questioned Darlene about the details of what she claimed petitioner had told her about the killings, she could not remember the lies she had stated on direct [examination], so [she] either denied them or made [up] new and more obvious lies. From this the majority concludes that the confession's believability was `open to question' and would not have been accepted by the jury. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 341, 70 P.3d p. 335.) I agree that under intense questioning by defense counsel about certain details of the three killings, Darlene's confusion was evident. But in my view her uncertainty did not completely undercut the basic thrust of her testimonythat petitioner, her then boy friend and near-constant companion, had told her of killing Denise, Lynda, and Debbie. Moreover, as explained on 135 Cal.Rptr.2d page 354, 70 P.3d page 346, ante, whether false evidence is material, that is, whether it could have affected the outcome of the trial (see In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527), presents a mixed question of law and fact that this court reviews independently (see In re Johnson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 461, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 957 P.2d 299; In re Cordero, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 180-181, 249 Cal.Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370). Thus, I do not here defer to the referee's findings on the materiality of the false testimony. The false evidence included testimony attributing to petitioner a confession to killing the three teenage victims, which likely would have made a strong impact on the jury. In light of defense counsel's effective impeachment of Joanna (who testified that she saw petitioner kill Denise), the prosecutor's invitation for the jury to find petitioner guilty without considering Joanna's testimony, and the prosecution's otherwise relatively weak circumstantial case against petitioner, there is at least a  reasonable probability  that Darlene's false evidence could have affected the jury's determination of petitioner's guilt. (See In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 546, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) Accordingly, based on the false testimony of Darlene, petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief. (Pen.Code, § 1473, subd. (b)(1).)