Opinion ID: 590623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts I & II: Stop, Search, and Arrest

Text: 16 Mr. Burger submits that, in response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on counts I and II, he provided sufficient facts to establish a genuine issues of material fact whether Officer Rattigan had reasonable suspicion to stop him, probable cause to search his van, or probable cause to arrest him. In response, Officer Rattigan submits that the district court was correct to ignore Mr. Burger's version of events and to rely on Officer Rattigan and Officer Jurak's deposition testimony, because the qualified immunity analysis turns on the police officer's subjective view of the facts at the time of the incident.
17 Even in the absence of valid reasonable suspicion to stop, probable cause to search, or probable cause to arrest, qualified immunity provides officers with an additional layer of protection against civil liability. Hughes v. Meyer, 880 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir.1989) (collecting cases), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 931 (1990). Police officers are generally protected by qualified immunity as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987). [W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken. Id. at 639 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). Knowledge of a general right is not sufficient to invoke liability; [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). This test focuses on the state of the law at the time of the alleged violation. Zook v. Brown, 748 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir.1984). This court has stated that the challenged action is judged by an objective standard: what a reasonable officer would have believed under the circumstances, given the facts actually known to the arresting officer. Richardson v. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir.1988) (emphasis in original).
18 The defendants' motion for summary judgment on counts I and II relied upon the version of events Officer Rattigan relates in his deposition. In response to Officer Rattigan's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Burger invited the district court's attention to a copy of his verified amended complaint, 3 in which he stated that he had not committed any traffic violation or any crime at said time and place. Officer Rattigan suggests that Mr. Burger's version of events is irrelevant because it is the facts known to the officer that determine his eligibility for qualified immunity. The district court agreed with Officer Rattigan, citing Richardson v. Bonds, 860 F.2d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir.1988). 19 In Richardson, we noted that, in the qualified immunity inquiry, the facts known to the objective reasonable officer are more important than what the officer believed to be the legal basis for the stop, search, or arrest: 20 The court apparently believed that [the officer's] subjective belief as to the legal basis for the arrest was relevant to the probable cause inquiry. While an arresting officer's subjective knowledge of facts sufficient to constitute probable cause is central to evaluation of the propriety of an arrest, we do not believe that the officer's view of the legal basis for the arrest is important. 21 Richardson, 860 F.2d at 1430 (emphasis in original). We then noted that it would be fruitless to debate the officer's beliefs, at the time of the arrest, as to the legal basis for the arrest: 22 Disputes about an arresting officer's actual state of mind at the time of the arrest would quickly resolve themselves into credibility battles, with each side presenting its own post hoc explanation of the officer's actions. If statements made by the officer at the time of the arrest were used as an indication of the offense for which the officer believed probable cause existed, officers could simply remain silent as to the basis for the arrest. 23 .... 24 [T]he question of an officer's actual justification for an arrest would rarely be capable of resolution at the summary judgment stage, but would ultimately become a credibility issue for the jury. 25 Id. (emphasis in original). In the present case, it appears that the district court misapprehended the holding of Richardson. The district court reasoned that, because we emphasized in Richardson the importance of the officer's actual knowledge of the facts, the plaintiff's version of those facts is irrelevant: 26 Burger's version of the arrest, or discrepancies in Rattigan's testimony regarding the arrest, are irrelevant if we find that a reasonable officer could conclude, based upon the facts known by Rattigan and Mulack, that probable cause existed for the search and seizure at issue here. 27 Memorandum Opinion and Order of July 8, 1991, (R.44) at 6. 28 However, Richardson and other Seventh Circuit cases on qualified immunity make it clear that the plaintiff's version of material facts is relevant; indeed, a defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity based upon facts about which there is a genuine dispute. 4 In Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647, 652 (7th Cir.1987), we stated that if there are issues of disputed fact upon which the question of immunity turns, ... the case must proceed to trial. In Apostol v. Landau, 957 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir.1992), we recently cited Green for the same proposition: If there are issues of disputed fact upon which the question of immunity turns, ... the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants was not proper. And, in Maust v. Headley, 959 F.2d 644, 649 (7th Cir.1992), we reiterated that, [i]f there are issues of disputed fact upon which the question of immunity turns, ... summary judgment may not be granted. 5 Thus, the proper formulation of the qualified immunity inquiry is whether, based on all the undisputed facts, the defendant's conduct violated any clearly established constitutional or statutory right. Green, 826 F.2d at 652 (emphasis added).
29 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), the Supreme Court stated that a police officer can stop a pedestrian to ask him questions so long as the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct: specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant such a stop. This reasonable suspicion standard has also been applied to the police officer's authority to stop a moving vehicle. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1985); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); United States v. Somers, 950 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1959 (1992); United States v. Randall, 947 F.2d 1314, 1318 (7th Cir.1991). An investigatory stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. In determining whether the officer has reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances--the whole picture--must be taken into account. Id. 30 The most important fact in the reasonable suspicion inquiry is whether Officer Rattigan actually saw Mr. Burger weaving, crossing the yellow line, or tailgating. The evidence in favor of Officer Rattigan's version of events consists of the testimony of Officer Rattigan, the testimony of Officer Jurak, and the Dispatcher Pryor's statement that the tipster said he saw the van driving recklessly. In rebuttal, Mr. Burger submitted his sworn statement that he had not committed any traffic violation or any crime at said time and place, R. 42 Ex. 8 at 2. We assume, for purposes of argument, that Mr. Burger's simple statement is sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether Officer Rattigan actually saw Mr. Burger weaving, crossing the yellow line, or tailgating is in genuine dispute. 31 The next most significant fact in the reasonable suspicion inquiry is whether Officer Rattigan was aware that a young man entered the Hickory Hills police station and reported that he had seen a maroon van with diamond-shaped windows being driven recklessly near the Saber Room, in the 9100 block of 95th Street, and that the driver was throwing beer cans out of the window. The record contains Dispatcher Pryor's testimony, Officer Rattigan's testimony, and a photocopy of the complaint report filled out by Dispatcher Pryor. R. 42 Ex. 1. Mr. Burger suggests that the police officers fabricated this event, and that the anonymous complainant did not exist, but Mr. Burger can offer no evidence to support this suggestion. Thus, the fact that Officer Rattigan received a report of a maroon van being driven recklessly and of beer cans being thrown from the window is not in genuine dispute. For similar reasons, Mr. Burger cannot genuinely dispute that Officer Rattigan located him driving eastward on 95th Street in the maroon van with diamond-shaped windows. 6 32 Thus, we limit ourselves to those facts which are clearly undisputed: the anonymous complaint and Officer Rattigan's identification of Mr. Burger's van matching the complainant's description and location. 7 The relevant issue is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, a police officer with knowledge of these facts and those legal rules which were clearly established on June 4, 1989, could reasonably have thought he could stop the van without violating the driver's Fourth Amendment rights. At the time, the Supreme Court had not yet spoken on the question of when an anonymous tip would justify an investigatory stop. On January 16, 1990, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990), [b]ecause of differing views in the state and federal courts over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for a stop. See also White v. United States, 454 U.S. 924 (1981) (Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (Two Terms previous, I dissented from a denial of certiorari that left the state and lower federal courts in conflict and confusion over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention. Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 958 (1980). Because it remains apparent that this difficult issue of everyday importance to law enforcement officials and citizens on the street alike requires resolution here, I am again moved to note my dissent.). The fact that there was sufficient conflict and confusion on the issue in January 1990 to cause the Court to grant certiorari in Alabama v. White reveals that, in June 1989, it was not clearly established whether an investigatory stop, based upon an anonymous tip of a reckless vehicle and police corroboration of the description and location of the vehicle, violated the reasonable suspicion standard required by Terry. For this reason, even assuming arguendo that Mr. Burger properly disputed the assertions that he was weaving, crossing the yellow line, and tailgating, he failed to create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to preclude the granting of summary judgment to Officer Rattigan on the investigatory stop.
33 Following a Terry stop, the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief ... that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983). If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should ... discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances. Id. at 1050. However, absent a reasonable belief that the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons, there is no automatic right to search concomitant with a Terry stop. Id. at 1049 n. 14. In particular, such a search may not be justified by a desire to discover or preserve drugs. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 & n. 21 (1968); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d 1174, 1179 (D.C.Cir.1987). Rather, such a search requires either a warrant, consent to search, or probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Chamber v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). As the Court noted in Brinegar, when courts attempt after the fact to distinguish between mere suspicion and probable cause, the line must necessarily be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances. Id. at 176. 34 In addition to the undisputed facts of the anonymous tip that a reckless driver throwing beer cans out of the window, and Officer Rattigan's corroboration of the description and location of the van, several more facts are relevant to the determination whether Officer Rattigan is entitled to qualified immunity for searching Mr. Burger's van. Officer Rattigan stated that Mr. Burger, immediately after pulling over, got out of his van and approached Officer Rattigan's squad car. Mr. Burger does not dispute this. Officer Rattigan and Officer Jurak both stated that Mr. Burger was angry, used foul language, and spoke loudly. Mr. Burger does not dispute this. Both Officers Rattigan and Jurak stated that they smelled alcohol on Mr. Burger's breath. Mr. Burger does not dispute this. 8 Both Officer Rattigan and Officer Jurak state that they observed that Mr. Burger had red, bloodshot eyes. Mr. Burger does not dispute this. 9 35 Thus, limiting ourselves to these undisputed facts, the relevant issue is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, a police officer with knowledge of these facts and those legal rules which were clearly established on June 4, 1989, could reasonably have thought he could conduct a limited search of the van for open liquor containers without violating the driver's Fourth Amendment rights. Because Mr. Burger was away from the van and under the supervision of Officer Jurak, Officer Rattigan could not justify the search as attendant to the Terry stop upon reasonable belief that the Mr. Burger was dangerous and might gain immediate control of weapons. Nor did Officer Rattigan have a search warrant or, apparently, Mr. Burger's consent. Nonetheless, it was clearly established that a search was justified if Officer Rattigan had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Chamber v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). A reasonable officer with knowledge of the undisputed facts, including the anonymous tip that beer cans had been thrown out of the window of a van of the same description and in the same location, and Mr. Burger's defensive, angry, combative behavior and smell of alcohol, could reasonably have thought he had probable cause to believe that Mr. Burger had been driving with open containers of alcohol and that such containers, or evidence of them, still existed in the passenger compartment of the van. See Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 95 1/2 p 11-502. An officer in Officer Rattigan's position, therefore, could have concluded reasonably that he could conduct a limited search of the passenger compartment of the van without violating Mr. Burger's Fourth Amendment rights. 10 Thus, Mr. Burger failed to create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to preclude the granting of summary judgment to Officer Rattigan on the limited search of the van.
36 Officer Rattigan stated that Mr. Burger asked to be taken to the station to use the Breathalyzer machine to prove that he was not intoxicated. Officer Rattigan told Mr. Burger that, according to police procedure, they would first have to conduct a field sobriety test. Mr. Burger agreed: Fine. I will take any test you want to give me. Just give me the test and I'll pass it. R.38 Ex.C at 78. Officer Rattigan instructed Mr. Burger to raise one foot about six inches off the ground, look at the raised foot, and start counting. Mr. Burger raised his foot and started to count loudly, but looked straight at Officer Rattigan rather than at his foot. Officer Rattigan told Mr. Burger to look at his foot, but according to Officer Rattigan, Mr. Burger refused: --- you. I am watching you. Id. at 81. Officer Rattigan walked to Mr. Burger's side, but Mr. Burger turned his head and continued to look Officer Rattigan in the eyes. Officer Rattigan continued around Mr. Burger and stopped directly behind him. At that point, Mr. Burger put his foot down and stopped counting. According to Officer Rattigan, Mr. Burger said, --- you. I ain't taking anymore tests. Go ahead and arrest me. Id. at 82. Mr. Burger does not dispute any of these facts alleged by Officer Rattigan. 11 37 It is not entirely clear that Officer Rattigan's investigatory stop of Mr. Burger ever ripened into an arrest. Compare Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983) (investigatory stop in airport lobby ripened into arrest by the time citizen was in police interrogation room and police had seized his ticket, identification, and luggage) with United States v. Boden, 854 F.2d 983, 991-93 (7th Cir.1988) (confrontation between BATF agents and suspect standing beside car never ripened into arrest because it was temporary and agents never transported suspect or even placed him into a vehicle). It might be argued that Mr. Burger consented to his detention when he asked to go to the station to take a Breathalyzer test, or when he said to Officer Rattigan, Go ahead and arrest me. However, we assume for the sake of argument that Officer Rattigan's instruction to Mr. Burger to follow him to the station constituted an informal arrest. A warrantless arrest requires probable cause. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976). Again, we note that probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had reasonable trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). Therefore, the relevant issue is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, a police officer with knowledge of the undisputed facts and those legal rules which were clearly established on June 4, 1989, could reasonably have thought he could arrest Mr. Burger without violating his Fourth Amendment rights. 38 At this point in the encounter, the undisputed facts include the anonymous tip of a reckless driver throwing beer cans out of the window, Officer Rattigan's corroboration of the description and location of the van, Mr. Burger's defensive, angry, combative behavior and smell of alcohol, and Mr. Burger's refusal to cooperate in the field sobriety test. These facts alone would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. That offense could either be driving while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 95 1/2 p 501, or resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a violation of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38 p 31-1. Thus, a reasonable officer in Officer Rattigan's position could reasonably have thought that he could instruct Mr. Burger to follow him to the police station without violating Mr. Burger's Fourth Amendment rights. 39 Thus, while Mr. Burger's version of events is relevant to the qualified immunity inquiry, it fails to create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of Officer Rattigan on counts I and II. 40