Opinion ID: 1239150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Hostile jurors

Text: (48a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred both in failing to make an adequate inquiry and in failing to discharge the jurors, once it learned that several jurors had indicated prejudice toward defendant. On December 3, 1987, during the third day of deliberations, the trial court received a note from the jury foreperson, Kimiko Bonner, stating: We do have big problems. We must to talk to judge. We took a vote and we would not be able to go on any longer. (8-3-1 stand.) The trial court conferred with counsel, advising them that it did not believe the jurors had had sufficient time to review the evidence, and did not know what type of vote the jurors had taken. Accordingly, the court summoned the jury and interviewed the foreperson. Bonner informed the court: We do have a few hostile jurors in the group. And some other  a few other juror[s] expressed they can't go on as long as those few hostile jurors are on the panel. When the trial court asked Foreperson Bonner to explain, she advised that a conflict had arisen between a few jurors, and some jurors express a prejudice remark ... [a]gainst this case and defendant. So therefore I personally feel we don't think we should go on because some of the juror[s] already express fate of defendant, even  not even discuss the entire evidence. Bonner further advised the court that she did not think it would be possible to reach a verdict unless the hostile jurors were replaced. Bonner explained that the vote taken was not to determine innocence or guilt, but to determine whether, because of their personal differences, the jury could deliberate further. Eight jurors had indicated they could deliberate further, three had indicated that they could not deliberate further, and one juror had abstained. After further consultation with counsel, the trial court again summoned the jurors and inquired how much evidence they had reviewed. Foreperson Bonner reported that the jurors had reviewed only 25 to 30 percent of the evidence during their three days of deliberations, at which point a few jurors made a very prejudiced remark and the controversy commenced. When asked whether those jurors were willing to participate in further deliberations, she indicated that they were more than willing to participate. The trial court then individually questioned each juror: Do you feel this jury can engage in further deliberations? Seven jurors answered affirmatively, three jurors answered negatively, one juror indicated she could continue to deliberate if two new jurors were substituted in, and Foreperson Bonner was not polled. Outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor urged the trial court to reread the instructions concerning the jury's duty to deliberate, and to advise the jury to continue its deliberations. The defense urged, on the other hand, that the presence of the prejudiced jurors had contaminated the deliberation process and that either the jury as a whole, or individual jurors, should be discharged. The trial court again summoned the jury and reread CALJIC No. 17.40 (each juror must render his or her individual opinion after considering and discussing the evidence) and No. 17.41 (4th ed. 1979 bound vol.) (it is rarely productive for a juror to state his or her opinion at the outset; jurors are not partisans but judges). The trial court advised the jury to put aside any hard feelings and continue to deliberate. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the basis of juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion. The jury recommenced deliberations without further incident and deliberated during the remainder of that day and for 10 additional court days prior to rendering a verdict. As indicated above, pursuant to section 1089 the trial court may discharge a juror who becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his [or her] duty, and once put on notice that good cause to discharge a juror may exist, the court has a duty to make whatever inquiry reasonably is necessary to determine whether the juror should be discharged. ( People v. Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th 806, 821.) As we observed in People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301], to establish juror misconduct, the facts must establish `an inability to perform the functions of a juror, and that inability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.' ( Id. at p. 1199; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 21.) (49) The decision whether to investigate the possibility of juror bias, incompetence, or misconduct, as well as the ultimate decision whether to retain or discharge a juror, rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th 622, 675-676.) If any substantial evidence exists to support the trial court's exercise of its discretion pursuant to section 1089, the court's action will be upheld on appeal. (See People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 400.) (48b) In the present case, having learned that the jury had reached an apparent impasse, the trial court conducted an inquiry. The court discovered that the disagreement arose because of comments made by two strongly opinionated jurors that had caused several other jurors to conclude they could not deliberate further with those jurors  and not because of any deadlock with regard to the substantive issue of defendant's guilt. The court then reinstructed the jurors, emphasizing their duties as jurors, including the entitlement of each party to the individual opinion of each juror based upon a consideration and discussion of the evidence, and the appropriate manner in which to approach their task, including the inadvisability of declaring an opinion at the outset. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that no juror misconduct had occurred warranting discharge of the entire jury or of individual jurors. The record reflects that several jurors, apparently having failed to heed the admonition in CALJIC No. 17.41 (4th ed. 1979 bound vol.) the first time it was read, had in fact stated their opinions or their intended vote very early in the deliberations, in an emphatic manner that offended or upset certain other jurors. That conduct, identified in the instruction as rarely productive, although inadvisable, nevertheless did not constitute misconduct. The language of the instruction is derived from an early decision by this court upholding a jury instruction advising that it would be better that they refrain from emphatic declarations of opinion and hold their minds `in a state of abeyance,' so that they might `fully and freely interchange views with each other,' it being `for the interests of the State and the benefit of the defendant, that a verdict should be returned.' ( People v. Selby (1926) 198 Cal. 426, 439 [245 P. 426].) This instruction, while strongly suggestive in its terms, is not mandatory. (See People v. Neely (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 1011, 1018 [157 Cal. Rptr. 531].) The emphatic statements made by certain jurors early in their deliberations did not disclose any improper conduct on their part. The jurors, after receiving reinstruction and an explanation of their duties, continued to deliberate during the remainder of that day and for an additional 10 court days following this incident, requesting on a number of occasions to see the exhibits or hear a read-back of testimony, without giving any indication they were having personal differences or were unable to review the evidence together as a deliberative body. The record does not in any way demonstrate an inability on the part of the jurors to perform their functions. ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199.) B. Penalty Phase 1. Failure to impanel a new jury (50) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to impanel a new jury at the commencement of the penalty phase or, in the alternative, to voir dire the existing jury in order to determine whether good cause existed to discharge the jury. Defense counsel's motion was based upon the above-related circumstances brought to the trial court's attention on December 3, 1987, regarding the jury's initial difficulty deliberating together due to the remarks and outspoken opinions of several jurors. The trial court denied the motion in a lengthy explanation observing that although one or two jurors forcefully had stated their views early in the deliberations, leaving other jurors with the impression that the one or two jurors regarded any further deliberations as an unnecessary exercise, the court upon learning of the jury's difficulty had reread pertinent instructions, had further admonished the jurors, and had obtained the jurors' commitment to resume deliberations. The jurors had deliberated over the next 10 court days, in the course of that time requesting to view a large number of exhibits and to listen to the rereading of a substantial portion of the testimony. At no time after December 3 did the foreperson indicate further problems in the deliberations of the jury. In view of these factors, the trial court determined that it did not appear the jury had demonstrated an inability to function properly or an unwillingness to consider the evidence, and that in fact the jury had engaged in a deliberative process. The court indicated that during the penalty phase it would remind the jurors of their earlier commitment to keep an open mind concerning the alternate punishments until all evidence bearing on the issue had been heard, and that it would inquire of the jurors as to their ability to honor that commitment. At the outset of the penalty phase, prior to the presentation of evidence, the trial court reminded the jurors that they previously had indicated they would keep an open mind, regardless of any ideas or preconceptions they had, and that they would listen to the evidence, statements, and arguments of both parties. The trial court then individually inquired, and received the affirmative response of each juror that he or she could keep an open mind with respect to the question of penalty. The trial court's decision not to impanel a second jury for the penalty phase of the trial or to re-voir dire the jury is subject to reversal only upon an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 482; People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 268 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897].) Section 190.4, subdivision (c), states: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of the finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into the minutes. This statute `reflects the long-standing legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty.' ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 483; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 572 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199.) More than the speculation or desire of defense counsel is necessary to establish good cause to discharge the jury. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th 238, 268; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 252-253; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 846 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249].) As we observed in Gates, [t]here is no direct authority on the meaning of `good cause' in this context. There are, however, cases involving the question of good cause for discharge of a juror under sections 1123 and 1089. As to the latter statutes, the facts must `show an inability to perform the functions of a juror, and that inability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.' [Citation.] ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199.) Moreover, a showing of good cause is a prerequisite to granting the motion to discharge the jury or to reopen voir dire. The trial court is not obliged to reopen voir dire based upon mere speculation that good cause to discharge the jury thereby may be discovered. ( Ibid. ) We have held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impanel a new jury when, during voir dire, the court had advised the prospective jurors that the defense would present evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase, but thereafter the defense decided not to present evidence in mitigation at that phase. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 415, 483-484.) Similarly, we have held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to impanel a new jury simply because defense strategies at the guilt phase and the penalty phase were different. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 252; People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 737-738 [276 Cal. Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142].) Nor does the trial court abuse its discretion in declining to impanel a new jury based upon the assertion that the jury at the penalty phase might be prejudiced by having heard the evidence of the capital crimes. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 252; see People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 204.) In a number of cases, we also have rejected substantially similar arguments for reopening the voir dire of the jury before the penalty phase. ( People v. Taylor, supra, 52 Cal.3d 719, 738 [trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to re-voir dire the jury based upon contemplated deviation between defense strategy at guilt and penalty phases]; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 27-28 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249] [defendant's assertions of possible juror bias, based upon inflammatory nature of guilt phase evidence and jury's promptness in rendering verdict, held insufficient to impose duty of inquiry upon court]; People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1028-1029 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017] [trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to reopen voir dire where counsel could point to no facts furnishing good cause and only the speculation that the jury, having found defendant guilty, no longer could be impartial]; see People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 748-750 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) Similarly, in Gates, we concluded that the defense motions, based upon generalized assertions of prejudice, general publicity about crimes, and criticism of the judicial system, afforded no ground to discharge or reopen the voir dire of the jury. ( People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1198-1199.) In the present case, as defendant has pointed out, the defense motions were directed at more specific conduct of the jurors that occurred near the outset of their deliberations. As the trial court carefully determined, and as we previously have concluded, however, no misconduct was shown to have occurred. Thus, defendant has not pointed to any facts furnishing good cause in support of his motion  only to speculation that the sitting jury, having found defendant guilty, no longer could be impartial or thereby had demonstrated its lack of impartiality. ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d 984, 1028-1029.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that good cause had not been shown and in denying the motion to impanel a new jury or to voir dire the existing jury. 2. Defendant's absence from hearings (51a) Defendant contends that his absence from certain court proceedings on several occasions defeated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Defendant was absent on the following occasions. On November 10, 1987, as described above, defendant apparently was not present during an ex parte hearing at which defense counsel discussed with the trial court their intention to rest without calling defendant to testify. The trial court advised that it would await any request by defendant to testify in his own behalf. On January 5, 1988, prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, the trial court alerted the parties that one juror temporarily was absent due to a death in her family, and discussed the available options of postponing the trial or substituting an alternate juror. During that hearing, the trial court noted that defendant was not present in court. Later that day, after requesting an ex parte hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant did not wish to present evidence in mitigation, but that defense counsel would present evidence in mitigation despite defendant's wishes. Defense counsel also advised the court that defendant's decision to grow a beard was a sign that his mental instability was increasing. On January 14, 1988, outside defendant's presence, the court, stating without contradiction that defendant had waived his appearance, held a hearing on a defense motion to exclude evidence of the rape of Julianne P. The parties discussed attempts to locate portions of the court file in that case. On January 19, 1988, following opening statements by counsel, the prosecutors called Julianne P. to testify. Prior to her testimony, defense counsel, stating that defendant had expressed concerns over his ability to conduct himself, informed the court that defendant had requested to be excused during the prosecution's case. The trial court permitted his excusal following in-court identification by each witness, and specifically and extensively advised defendant of his right to be present during all phases of the proceedings, of the potential consequences of his absence, and that he would not have the right to raise the issue on appeal. Defendant specifically waived his right to be present and to appeal any error arising from his absence. Following Julianne P.'s appearance and identification of defendant, he absented himself from the courtroom for the remainder of her testimony. On January 20, 1988, similarly, the prosecutor called Tamara H., and after she identified defendant, he exited from the courtroom. Defendant subsequently expressed a desire to be present at trial and was present during the testimony of Mark W. and the remaining witnesses. On January 25, 1988, court proceedings commenced at 11:00 a.m., the trial court informing the parties that a juror had taken ill and that the presentation of evidence would be continued to the following day. After a brief discussion concerning submission of jury instructions, the court adjourned proceedings at 11:05 a.m. On January 26, 1988, court proceedings commenced at 2:00 p.m. and the prosecutors and defense counsel conferred with the trial court regarding proposed penalty phase jury instructions. Court adjourned at 3:40 p.m. After a one-day hiatus, during which the defense, apparently with defendant present, met ex parte with the court, the prosecution and the defense presented further argument concerning the jury instructions on January 28, 1988, in defendant's absence. The trial court issued its proposed rulings on the jury instructions. On February 1, 1988, defense counsel requested a hearing outside the presence of defendant, at which they informed the court that defendant again was seeking to represent himself. Counsel informed the court that defendant did not wish any witnesses to testify on his behalf and wished to testify before the jury that he wanted to be executed. Defense counsel alerted the court that they believed defendant was incompetent to proceed. The trial court denied the defense requests for a continuance and for a hearing on competency. In subsequent ex parte hearings, the court queried defendant directly concerning his request to represent himself. (52) It is established that a defendant has a federal constitutional right, emanating from the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to be present at any stage of the criminal proceedings that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. ( Kentucky v. Stincer (1987) 482 U.S. 730, 745 [107 S.Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631] [no constitutional violation when defendant was absent from competency hearing]; United States v. Gagnon (1985) 470 U.S. 522, 526-527 [105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484-1485, 84 L.Ed.2d 486] [no constitutional violation when defendant was absent from judge's discussion with juror].) In addition, a defendant has the right to be personally present at critical proceedings, pursuant to the state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 18), as well as pursuant to statute (§§ 977, 1043). This court repeatedly has held that a defendant is not entitled to be personally present either in chambers or at bench discussions that occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters as to which the defendant's presence does not bear a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1080 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1120-1121 [47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478]; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 18; People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 902-903 [274 Cal. Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282]; People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1116 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327].) Sections 977 and 1043 do not require the defendant's presence, or a written waiver, unless that standard has been met. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 825; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 902; People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1116; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 359-360 [233 Cal. Rptr. 368, 729 P.2d 802].) Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair trial. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1116; People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 783 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].) (51b) Defendant clearly has not met his burden of establishing prejudice in the present case. Defendant notes his absences from various in-chambers conferences, but fails to observe that he specifically had waived his presence when the court discussed jury instructions and certain other questions of law. In any event, it is apparent that the matters discussed did not bear a substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, 825; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 902-903.) In those instances in which counsel advised the court of defendant's desire to proceed in propria persona, the settled statement reveals that defense counsel requested that such hearings be held outside the presence of defendant in order to protect and secure his rights, despite his efforts to prevent his attorneys from acting in his best interests. Moreover, defendant was permitted to act in propria persona on several occasions until he relinquished that role. Defendant has not shown how his attendance at such hearings would have assisted the defense or otherwise altered the outcome of his trial, and therefore has not demonstrated prejudice. ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1121; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 902-903.) Defendant notes his absences during the testimony of several witnesses, but fails to observe that he expressly had requested to be absent during their testimony, and that defendant and his counsel specifically were concerned that his adverse behavior would be detrimental to his case, should he be required to remain in court. (See People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1116.) As explained above, he fully was advised of his rights and the possible consequences of his absence, and validly waived his presence during this portion of the penalty phase. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1209-1212 [56 Cal. Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254].) Accordingly, no violation of defendant's Federal Constitutional occurred. ( Id. at p. 1210.) Nor, given defendant's threatened disruption, did any statutory violation occur. ( Id. at pp. 1210-1211.) Moreover, defendant has failed to explain how his attendance during the testimony of these witnesses would have altered the outcome of his trial and, accordingly, has not demonstrated any prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 1211-1212.) 3. The prosecution's notice of evidence in aggravation (53a) Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to provide him with timely notice of the evidence of aggravating circumstances to be presented at the penalty phase and that he thereby was denied his rights to due process of law, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination pursuant to the federal Constitution. (U.S. Const., 5th, 8th, & 14th Amends.) In particular, defendant contends that the prosecution's notice concerning the incident involving Ellen F., who was to testify to the facts underlying one of defendant's prior criminal activities, did not meet the requirements of section 190.3, and that the trial court erred in declining to grant the defense a continuance to investigate the evidence concerning this incident. (54) Section 190.3 provides in relevant part that the prosecution may present evidence in aggravation only if it has given the defendant notice of the evidence to be introduced ... within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. To be timely, the notice must be given before the cause is called to trial or as soon thereafter as the prosecution learns the evidence exists. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 258.) To be sufficient as to content, the notice must afford the defendant `a reasonable opportunity' to prepare a defense to the allegations. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 166.) Actual notice may be provided not only by the statutory notice, but by supplemental information such as police reports. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 258-259; People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d 334, 391.) (53b) In the present case, considerably prior to the time the cause was called for trial, the prosecutors on July 3, 1986, filed a notice describing several categories of aggravating evidence that they intended to introduce at the penalty phase. That notice included the following: There appears to be evidence of a sexual and physical assault committed by the defendant in the State of Florida about seven years ago. I am attempting to obtain more information about this incident from the sheriff's department, and should be able to provide you with the details and copies of any police reports by next week. On January 11, 1988, at the penalty phase of the trial, defendant orally and by written motion asserted that the notice provided as to this incident was insufficient, and moved for a one-week continuance in order to investigate the incident. At the hearing, the defense noted that the defense investigator had interviewed Ellen F. on December 29, 1987. Defense counsel, noting that one of the supplemental reports from the Valparaiso, Florida, Police Department described the incident, asserted that the medical evidence did not appear to support the victim's statement and hence defendant found it necessary to consult a physician. The prosecutor stated without contradiction that defense counsel earlier had acknowledged that he was in receipt of the reports concerning Ellen F. Defense counsel then described the information they already had received, including the July 1986 notice, police reports, the physician's report, a report from the victim, and a report from Al Prizio [ sic ], Florida. The trial court found that the original notice was wanting, but that the original lack of specificity had been cured by the circumstance that reports had been sent to the defense specifying the assault in question, providing the dates, names, and specific information, followed by an opportunity for the defense investigator to interview the victim, and that certain information had been provided fairly soon after the July 1986 notice. The trial court concluded that defendant had suffered no prejudice, and denied the motions. The trial court correctly found that the insufficiency of the original notice had been cured by the materials subsequently provided by the prosecution after it obtained those additional materials, and that a continuance was unnecessary. (See People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 879-880 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) Defendant has not demonstrated how his defense was actually hampered by the manner in which notice was given. ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 958 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571].) The record reflects that as of September 3, 1986, the defense knew that the incident involved a sexual assault incorporating strangulation and an attempt to cut off the victim's nipples; that as of January 13, 1987, the defense additionally knew that the incident occurred in Florida approximately seven years earlier; and that as of February 17, 1987, several months prior to commencement of the guilt phase of defendant's trial, the defense knew that the incident related to Ellen F. and, in order to seek the court's authorization for funds to travel to Florida to interview this witness, had sought and received a preliminary indication from the trial court that the evidence would be admissible at the penalty phase, and prior to the defense motion on January 11, 1988, had received all available materials and had interviewed Ellen F. This witness was not called upon to testify until February 2, 1988. Moreover, there is no reasonable possibility that defendant suffered any prejudice from the manner in which the prosecution provided notice of this evidence in aggravation. (See People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th 865, 958.) 4. Failure to investigate the nature of defendant's medication (55) Defendant contends that the trial court, having been alerted to the circumstance that defendant was taking medication, deprived him of due process of law by failing to conduct an adequate inquiry to determine whether it was being administered involuntarily, or what side effects defendant was experiencing. Prior to the appearance of any witnesses at the penalty phase, defendant indicated to the trial court that he wished to represent himself. During the court's extensive examination as to whether defendant fully understood all the potentially adverse consequences of such a decision, the prosecutor alerted the court that defendant then was being medicated with a drug that might affect his ability to represent himself. Upon inquiry by the court, defendant stated that he was taking Sinequan, a psychotic [ sic ], that he had been taking the medication since the time of the pretrial motions in the case, and that he anticipated he would continue to receive the medication during the course of the penalty phase. When the trial court inquired whether, in view of defendant's daily experience with the medication during the course of the trial, he believed it would have any effect upon his ability to represent himself, defendant responded in the negative. [18] Defense counsel observed that in the course of their representation of defendant, they had not noticed any perceptual difficulties or disorientation on the part of defendant, that he had no disability as a result of the medication that would cause him to be unable to function as his own counsel, and that he clearly understood the proceedings and actively had participated and assisted in his own defense. In Riggins v. Nevada (1992) 504 U.S. 127 [112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479], relied upon by defendant, the high court granted certiorari to decide whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Id. at pp. 132-133 [112 S.Ct. at p. 1814].) The court held that a potential deprivation of due process of law occurs when a defendant involuntarily is prescribed such medication during criminal proceedings, and that once the defendant moves to terminate the administration of antipsychotic medication, the state becomes obligated to establish that the medication is needed and medically appropriate. ( Id. at pp. 134-135 [112 S.Ct. at pp. 1814-1815].) In the present case, defendant did not move to terminate the administration of medication, or otherwise assert that he was being medicated involuntarily. Defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal the claim that he was denied due process of law because drugs were administered to him to control his mental condition during the proceedings. ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 152-153 [61 Cal. Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960].) We also reject defendant's contention that, in light of Riggins, the trial court upon becoming aware that defendant was being medicated was required sua sponte to determine whether or not he was receiving medication voluntarily, and whether or not that medication had exposed defendant to side effects. That case clearly limited its holding, which imposed upon the trial court a duty to inquire, to the situation in which a defendant has moved to terminate the involuntary administration of medication. ( Riggins v. Nevada, supra, 504 U.S. 127, 135 [112 S.Ct. 1810, 1815]; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 155-156.) In the present case, defendant did not make any such motion. Additionally, nothing in the record suggests that the administration of defendant's medication was involuntary. ( Riggins v. Nevada, supra, 504 U.S. 127, 135 [112 S.Ct. 1810, 1815]; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 152-154.) During the hearing to determine defendant's competence to act as his own counsel, moreover, the court received information from both defendant and his counsel that, based upon many months' experience with the treatment, defendant's ability to function and to present a defense had not been impaired by the medication. Defendant was not denied due process of law under Riggins v. Nevada, supra, 504 U.S. 127, 135-138 [112 S.Ct. 1810, 1815-1817], and he has not established that the voluntary administration of medication rendered him incompetent to stand trial. ( People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 155-156.) 5. Defendant's court appearance in jail clothing (56) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in compelling him to wear county jail clothing rather than civilian apparel. The record does not support this claim. On January 20, 1988, defendant appeared at trial in county jail clothing. The trial court noted that fact, observing that it had advised the deputy to take steps to have defendant dressed in civilian apparel, but that defendant had stated his desire to appear in court in county jail clothing. The court, noting that at all prior court appearances defendant had been dressed in civilian clothing, inquired of defendant whether he realized he still could change into civilian clothing, whether he desired to appear in county jail clothes, and whether he realized the jury might draw adverse inferences from his appearance in jail attire. Defendant informed the court that he wished to appear in jail attire and realized that the jury might draw such inferences. On this occasion, defendant appeared in court only for a few moments until the witness, Tamara H., identified him, and then, pursuant to his request, was escorted from the courtroom for the remainder of the day. On January 21, 1988, the occasion about which defendant complains, defendant again appeared in county jail clothing. The court repeated its inquiry whether defendant wished to appear in jail attire rather than civilian clothing. Defendant replied: My civilian clothes have been stolen from the county jail, haven't been released yet. I'll wear whatever.... This will be sufficient right here. Defendant wore jail clothing for the duration of the penalty phase. As we observed, ante, page 1335, a court may not require a defendant to wear jail clothing during trial. ( People v. Taylor, supra, 31 Cal.3d 488, 494.) The wearing of jail clothing, serving constantly to remind the jury that the defendant is in custody, tends to undermine the presumption of innocence by creating an unacceptable risk that the jury impermissibly will consider that circumstance in rendering its verdict. ( Ibid. ) As an initial matter, it is clear from the record that defendant was not compelled to wear county jail attire, but expressed his desire to do so, even after having been advised of his right not to be compelled to wear such clothing. Having expressly been informed that the jury might draw adverse inferences from his wearing of this attire, defendant nonetheless waived that right. His remark that his civilian clothing had been stolen does not alter the circumstance that the previous day the court had offered to take steps to secure civilian clothing, and that on that day and the following day, defendant had indicated his desire to attend trial dressed in county jail attire. Thus, defendant's stated preference to appear in jail clothing defeats his claim that he was compelled to do so by the trial court, and in any event he is not free to raise the issue on appeal. ( Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501, 507-508 [96 S.Ct. 1691, 1694-1695, 48 L.Ed.2d 126]; see People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 253-254.) Moreover, even if we were to assume that error occurred, defendant has not demonstrated any possibility of prejudice. As explained above, the rule that a defendant may not be compelled to attend trial in jail or prison garb is premised upon the notion that doing so might subvert the presumption that an accused is innocent until proved guilty. In the present case, defendant's guilt of both murders already had been determined at the guilt phase of the trial, and at the time defendant appeared in county jail clothing, the jury was confronted with the remaining issue of the appropriate penalty. Because the presumption of innocence already had been rebutted and defendant had been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no reasonable possibility that the jury would base its penalty decision on the factor of defendant's attire. (See People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1179 [no prejudice when, at penalty phase, juror inadvertently observed defendant transported in custody with handcuffs]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 179-180 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] [mere viewing of defendants handcuffed during jury view of crime scene did not result in an inherently unfair penalty phase trial].) 6. Defendant's self-representation (57a) Defendant asserts that the trial court erred both in initially denying, and in subsequently twice granting, his motion for self-representation during the penalty phase. (58) Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution, a defendant has the right to conduct his or her own defense, providing he or she knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel ( Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 835-836 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541-2542, 45 L.Ed.2d 562] ( Faretta )), and is able and willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 173 [104 S.Ct. 944, 948, 79 L.Ed.2d 122].) To find a valid waiver, the court must determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 401, fn. 12 [113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 321], italics omitted.) In Faretta, the court held that a defendant who chooses self-representation must do so competently and intelligently, but also made it clear that the defendant's technical legal knowledge is not relevant to the determination whether he or she is competent to waive the right to counsel, and that, although the defendant may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, 834 [95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541].) Thus, a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself has no bearing upon his competence to choose self-representation. ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. 389, 400 [113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687], fn. and italics omitted.) (59) The standard for competency to waive the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel has been equated with that for competency to stand trial: whether the defendant has a `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding,' and has `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 397-402 [113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685-2688]; see Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 [80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824] ( per curiam ).) The state constitutionally may presume that a defendant is competent and require him or her to shoulder the burden of proving his or her incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Cooper v. Oklahoma (1996) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [116 S.Ct. 1373, 1377, 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 515]; Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 449 [112 S.Ct. 2572, 2579, 120 L.Ed.2d 353]; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 885.) (60) The right to self-representation recognized in Faretta is not limited to the conduct of a defense during the guilt phase of the trial, but extends to the penalty phase in a capital case. ( People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 617-618 [268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127]; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1222-1224 [259 Cal. Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) Notwithstanding the state's significant interest in a reliable penalty determination, a determination best made by a fully informed sentencer, a defendant's fundamental constitutional right to control his defense governs. [Citation.] The defendant has the right to present no defense and to take the stand and both confess guilt and request imposition of the death penalty. [Citations.] It follows that the state's interest in ensuring a reliable penalty determination may not be urged as a basis for denying a capital defendant his fundamental right to control his defense by representing himself at all stages of the trial. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 583, 617-618, fn. omitted.) (61a) As we repeatedly have held, although in a criminal trial a defendant has a federal constitutional, unconditional right of self-representation, in order to invoke that right, he or she must make an unequivocal assertion of that right within a reasonable time prior to the commencement of trial. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 827 [55 Cal. Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280]; People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1107; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 98 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 127-128 [137 Cal. Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) When a motion for self-representation is not made in a timely fashion prior to trial, self-representation no longer is a matter of right but is subject to the trial court's discretion. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 809; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 193-194.) For purposes of assessing the timeliness of a motion for self-representation, the guilt and penalty phases in a capital prosecution are considered part of a unitary trial. Therefore, a motion made between trial of the two phases is untimely, and is subject to the court's discretion. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 810; People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1006-1007 [30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248]; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 193-194.) (57b) As is apparent in the present case, defendant did not assert his Faretta rights in a timely manner at any point in the proceedings. (61b) As we have observed, an untimely motion is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which should consider such factors as the quality of counsel's representation of the defendant, the defendant's prior proclivity to substitute counsel, the reasons for the request, the length and stage of the proceedings, and the disruption or delay that reasonably might be expected to follow the granting of such a motion. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th 799, 827; People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1006-1007; People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 98-99; People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128.) a. Denial of December 28, 1987, motion for self-representation (57c) Defendant asserts that he unequivocally asserted his right to proceed in propria persona, and that in denying his request the court violated his right to self-representation. Following the guilty verdict rendered by the jury and prior to the commencement of the penalty phase, defendant on December 28, 1987, moved to discharge his appointed counsel and represent himself. Because the judge (Judge Boland) who presided at trial was on vacation, the motion was heard by another judge (Judge Munoz). When that judge questioned defendant as to his reasons for wanting to represent himself, defendant stated he did not wish to have his family members or friends called to testify and did not wish to present any defense. The court denied the motion for self-representation. Defendant did not assert that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance or that their relationships with defendant had so deteriorated that they could not provide defendant with effective representation at the penalty phase. (See People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th 668, 795.) As the trial court recognized, the granting of the motion would cause unnecessary disruption and delay, given the length and the stage of the proceedings, and defendant's request to represent himself appeared to be motivated in part by an effort to create reversible error in the proceedings. The trial court's reluctance to grant such a motion at this phase of the proceedings in a capital trial was reasonable, given the lack of opportunity on the part of the judge temporarily presiding to review the prior course of the trial or the conduct of defendant over the previous months. The court adequately considered the factors described above ( People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th 799, 827-828; People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128), and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. In any event, defendant cannot show prejudice, because defendant's renewed motion for self-representation shortly was granted. b. Grant of January 12, 1988, motion for self-representation (1) Propriety of granting the motion (62a) Defendant asserts that the trial court erred on January 12, 1988, in granting his requests to discharge appointed counsel and represent himself with the assistance of advisory counsel, because his mental condition had degenerated into incompetency. On January 5, 1988, upon the return of Judge Boland from vacation, defense counsel alerted the court to defendant's prior motion for self-representation, to the circumstance that following the denial of that motion, defendant had directed counsel not to present a defense at the penalty phase, and to defendant's decision to grow a beard  viewed by counsel as a sign of defendant's mental deterioration. On January 12, 1988, prior to the presentation of any evidence, defendant renewed his request to represent himself and discharge his appointed counsel, in order to ensure that no penalty phase evidence would be presented on his behalf. Defense counsel noted their obligation to present mitigating evidence and stated their view that defendant was insane. The trial court observed that defendant appeared to be competent and advised that it would conduct an inquiry pursuant to Faretta. During that inquiry, defendant indicated he was ready to proceed without delay. Because the prosecutor earlier had advised that defendant's medication status should be scrutinized, the court inquired and received defendant's assurance that the medication was not affecting him any more at that time than it had during the earlier phase of the trial. The trial court expressly found that defendant was mentally competent and had knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. The court granted his request for self-representation, and also granted his request to appoint former counsel as advisory counsel. Defendant contends that in granting the motion, the trial court failed to weigh the factors described in People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128. We have stated, however, that if a defendant's request is granted, the defendant may not be heard to complain on appeal that his or her motion should not have been granted. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 109; see People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1219-1220.) Because the trial court granted the motion at defendant's insistence, he may not assign as error the trial court's failure to weigh the Windham factors. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 109.) (2) Limitation on role of advisory counsel Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in restricting the role of advisory counsel, thereby effectively preventing defendant from conducting his own defense and ultimately forcing him to forgo his right to self-representation. The record reflects that appointed counsel had filed various defense motions prior to the time defendant sought and obtained self-representation and the appointment of former counsel as advisory counsel. Thereafter, the trial court reviewed those pending defense motions. When the court inquired of defendant concerning the various motions, advisory counsel, having prepared them, repeatedly offered to explain the motions. On each occasion the trial court advised that, because defendant had requested to represent himself, he personally would have to respond to the court's questions. Subsequently, during the trial court's inquiry of defendant, following the prosecution's objection that defendant essentially was repeating whatever advisory counsel told him to say, advisory counsel suggested that they be allowed to argue the legal motions and that defendant be allowed to examine the witnesses and make the opening statement and closing argument. The trial court, again having inquired and received defendant's assurance that he wished to continue to represent himself, declined advisory counsel's suggestion and admonished the defense that defendant could not simply repeat whatever advisory counsel told him. At a hearing held pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 to determine the admissibility of defendant's 1984 no-contest plea to one count of rape, the prosecution commenced the examination of its first witness, Meredith Rust, a deputy district attorney, concerning her prior advisement to defendant of the consequences of his no-contest plea to that count. (At this point, the court file pertaining to that plea apparently had been lost.) When advisory counsel interjected, the trial court continued to admonish the defense that only defendant could question the witness or explain his objections, and also denied several requests by advisory counsel to be relieved, on the basis that only defendant could make that request. Later the same day, when advisory counsel moved to be relieved as counsel, the court again inquired of defendant whether he wished to continue representing himself. This time defendant asked the court to reappoint counsel and stated that he no longer wished to represent himself. (63) A criminal defendant does not have a right to simultaneous self-representation and representation by counsel. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 97; see People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 741 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197]; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1162 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) [N]one of the `hybrid' forms of representation, whether labeled `cocounsel,' `advisory counsel,' or `standby counsel,' is in any sense constitutionally guaranteed. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218.) We have observed that the powers and responsibilities attendant upon the representation of a person criminally accused never should be conferred jointly and equally on the accused and the attorney. Rather, in all cases of shared or divided representation, either the accused or the attorney must be in charge. Stated otherwise, at all times the record should be clear that the accused is either self-represented or represented by counsel; the accused cannot be both at once. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1219; People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1003.) When a defendant chooses self-representation, he or she retains primary control over the conduct of the case, and consequently the role of advisory counsel is limited. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 112; People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14; see People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218-1219, 1226.) The court retains authority to exercise its judgment regarding the extent to which such advisory counsel may participate. (See People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1044 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756], revd. on other grounds sub nom. Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 [114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293]); People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 115; cf. People v. Marshall, supra, 13 Cal.4th 799, 827-828 [participation of a professionally represented defendant in the presentation of the case is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge]; People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1003; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 75-76 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) In addition, as described above, a defendant's right to conduct his or her own defense is subject to the proviso that he or she must abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. ( McKaskle v. Wiggins, supra, 465 U.S. 168, 173 [104 S.Ct. 944, 948].) (62b) In the present case, the trial court authorized former appointed defense counsel to perform a limited role as advisory counsel, and at all times sought to have counsel remain within the limits of that role rather than permit counsel to act in a primary role by making objections and arguments, or by instructing defendant exactly what to say next. Having granted defendant's requests for self-representation and for advisory counsel, the court was not obliged to accede to the defense's requests both for self-representation and for whatever degree of participation in the proceedings it desired for advisory counsel. The court was well within its discretion in refusing to permit defendant both to represent himself and to have the benefit of professional representation. Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's action. Defendant sought and was granted the opportunity to represent himself on January 12, 1988, and requested to cease self-representation and to renew his representation by appointed counsel on January 13, 1988. During that time, defendant made several arguments concerning the written motions previously filed by his former defense counsel. The sole witness during that period was a deputy district attorney, who, as noted above, testified at a hearing held pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 that defendant had received advisements of, and waived, his constitutional rights when he entered his 1984 plea of no contest. During her testimony, defendant interposed numerous objections on the grounds of hearsay, nonresponsiveness, and lack of foundation. When defendant discontinued his self-representation and resumed representation by appointed counsel, defense counsel performed an extensive cross-examination of this witness. As discussed in greater detail below, the evidence pertaining to defendant's conviction for this offense was inadmissible as a prior conviction, but its admission constituted harmless error because this evidence was admissible as violent criminal activity and Julianne P.'s testimony amply established that the underlying criminal activity had occurred. c. Grant of February 1, 1988, motion for self-representation On February 1, 1988, prior to the testimony of the final three prosecution witnesses, outside the presence of the prosecutors, defendant again moved to discharge his appointed counsel and represent himself. Defense counsel explained that defendant had informed his attorneys that he (i) did not wish to present any defense, (ii) desired (after some vacillation) to testify, (iii) would testify for the prosecution if defense counsel presented the testimony of defendant's mother, who had come to court to testify, and (iv) intended to be totally disruptive and testify in a manner designed to guarantee a death verdict. According to defense counsel, defendant had threatened both defense counsel with bodily injury and desired to sabotage his defense. It was their belief that he was doing this in a post-conviction setting for a tactically better position. The court directed the prosecutors to return and again asked defendant whether he understood his right to be represented by counsel, whether he understood his duties as counsel (including making arguments and examining witnesses), whether he could proceed without any continuance, whether he realized any examination or argument must take place while defendant was seated at counsel's table, whether he realized the jury might draw adverse inferences from his self-representation, and whether he realized that his lack of technical expertise and vocabulary would be detrimental, that neither the court nor the prosecutors would assist him with anything related to preparing a defense, that his custodial status would impede his ability to locate and subpoena witnesses, that he would be precluded from raising on appeal issues arising from inadequacy of counsel, and that if subsequently defense counsel were reappointed, they might encounter difficulty in representing defendant due to their lack of familiarity with what had transpired in the case. In his response to each of the trial court's inquiries, defendant indicated that he understood. Asked to consider all these consequences in total, defendant stated he wished to represent himself. The trial court granted defendant's motion for self-representation, appointing former defense counsel as standby counsel. [19] The prosecution proceeded to present the testimony of its final three witnesses, as described above. Immediately following the jury's rendering of its verdict fixing the punishment at death, defendant sought and was granted reappointment of counsel, who represented him during the remainder of the proceedings. (64a) Defendant again contends that in granting the motion for self-representation, the trial court failed to weigh the factors described in People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d 121, 128. As indicated above, because the trial court granted the motion at defendant's insistence, defendant may not be heard to complain on appeal that that the trial court failed to weigh the Windham factors. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 109.) We also reject the contention that the trial court's failure to conduct an inquiry pursuant to Windham or otherwise state its reasons for granting defendant's motion precluded preparation of a record adequate for appellate review. Defendant urges that the trial court was required to state its reasons for granting the motion for self-representation, and that the existing record is inadequate for our review of the ruling, due to the loss of transcripts of various in camera proceedings, discussed below. We have reviewed the settled statement concerning these proceedings, and conclude that the absence of the original transcripts of these proceedings does not render the existing record inadequate for the purpose of our review of the ruling, nor does it warrant imposing a requirement (contrary to our precedents) of an expression of reasons for granting a defendant's motion for self-representation. Defendant contends the trial court improperly granted his motion because defendant at the time had made it clear that, in effect, he wished to commit suicide. First, the record does not establish that at the time the trial court considered the motion for self-representation, defendant's intent to seek the death penalty was clear. Defendant, during his prior period of self-representation, had argued the various motions previously filed by his appointed attorneys. Even after the trial court granted his motion to represent himself, defendant on February 1, 1988, advised the court that he might call his mother as a witness in mitigation and, accordingly, asked that she be excluded from the courtroom. Defendant briefly cross-examined Cindy F. as to her marital status, eliciting her testimony that she had remarried without obtaining a divorce from defendant and without learning whether he had obtained a divorce. Defendant waited until after the prosecution rested on February 2, 1988, to inform the court that he did not intend to present any evidence in mitigation. Following the jury's verdict fixing the punishment at death, defendant immediately sought reappointment of defense counsel. Second, we have held that a trial court that permits a defendant to represent himself or herself, even with knowledge that the defendant intends to seek the death penalty, does not violate the public policy against state-assisted suicide. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1222-1224.) Even when a defendant who is representing himself or herself openly states that he or she will seek the death penalty and refuses to introduce evidence in mitigation or argue to the jury, the trial court is not obligated to revoke the defendant's self-representation and appoint counsel to conduct the defense. ( Ibid. ) We have rejected similar arguments that the Eighth Amendment interest in a reliable penalty determination overcomes the defendant's Sixth Amendment interest in self-representation. Although a defendant has no right to waive the statutory automatic appeal from a judgment imposing the death penalty ( People v. Massie (1985) 40 Cal.3d 620, 624 [221 Cal. Rptr. 140, 709 P.2d 1309]), or otherwise seek the state's assistance in committing suicide, it does not follow that a defendant's right of self-representation must be circumscribed in order to thwart his or her decision not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial. ( People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1062-1063.) In People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 360-368 [222 Cal. Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925], we indicated that defense counsel should present evidence in mitigation over the objection of the defendant, but we subsequently disapproved that decision to the extent it suggested that the failure to present mitigating evidence in and of itself is sufficient to render a death judgment unreliable, holding instead that the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase does not make the proceeding unreliable in constitutional terms. ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 566 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 811 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 716-717 [280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1030 [264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627]; People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228, fn. 9.) (65) We have stated that a verdict is constitutionally reliable `when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence and within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute, the death verdict has been returned under proper instructions and procedures, and the trier of penalty has duly considered the relevant mitigating evidence, if any, which the defendant has chosen to present.' ( People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th 495, 566.) Under those conditions, despite a defendant's avowed intent not to present available evidence in mitigation, the state's interest in ensuring a reliable and fair penalty determination has been met. ( People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1062-1063; People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 109; see People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1185-1186 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315].) (64b) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in permitting defendant to represent himself, even if it understood that his intent was not to present any mitigating evidence. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in failing to recognize that defendant's motions for self-representation actually constituted motions to substitute counsel, requiring that the court inquire and afford him an opportunity to explain his reasons for requesting such substitution. (See People v. Bean, supra, 46 Cal.3d 919, 947-948; People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 123 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44].) The court fully inquired of defendant with regard to his reasons for preferring self-representation. Defendant himself requested advisory counsel. His preference for self-representation reflected his desire to more fully control the proceedings rather than a wish to acquire new counsel. Defendant's motions clearly were made for the purpose of obtaining self-representation, and the trial court was not required to make further inquiry. ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 854-855 [251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423].) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing into his competency to waive counsel or to act as his own attorney, at the time he sought self-representation. As we have explained, the standard for competency in either case is whether the defendant possessed `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him' ( Godinez v. Moran, supra, 509 U.S. 389, 396, 401-402 [113 S.Ct. 2680, 2685, 2687-2688]), and a state constitutionally may presume that a defendant is competent and require him or her to prove incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. ( Cooper v. Oklahoma, supra, ___ U.S. ___, ___ [116 S.Ct. 1373, 1377, 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 515]; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 885.) Although a court is required to conduct a hearing in the event a reasonable doubt arises as to a defendant's competence (§§ 1367, 1368), the record in the present case does not indicate that a reasonable doubt existed as to defendant's ability to understand the proceedings against him. His changing preferences with regard to the extent of his own participation in the proceedings, and the extent to which a defense would be presented, did not create a reasonable doubt as to his competence to proceed. Nor did his eventual choice not to present a defense establish reasonable doubt as to his competence. 7. Admission of evidence of rape conviction a. Admission as a prior conviction (66) Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his conviction for rape pursuant to section 190.3, factor (c), which provides for the admission of any prior felony conviction as a circumstance in aggravation. During the penalty phase of defendant's trial, the prosecution introduced court records documenting that defendant had suffered a conviction for the rape of Julianne P. The records included the reporter's transcript of the proceedings at which defendant had entered a plea of no contest to that offense. In addition, the prosecutors called Julianne P., who described the incident in detail. Defendant is correct that the trial court improperly admitted the evidence pursuant to section 190.3, factor (c). Although the rape, occurring on April 10, 1983, preceded the present offenses, defendant on August 23, 1984, entered his plea of no contest to the rape charge, following his commission of the two murders. The law is well settled that for purposes of that subdivision, prior felony conviction[s] are limited to those convictions entered prior to the commission of the subject offense or offenses. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th 313, 349; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 549-550 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385]; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 201-203.) This limitation arises because the basis for the prior-conviction circumstance in aggravation is that an offender undeterred by his prior brushes with the law deserves more severe criminal treatment. (41 Cal.3d at p. 201, italics omitted.) Nonetheless, no prejudice occurred. The evidence of the conviction for rape was admissible pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), as proof of defendant's participation in the violent criminal activity underlying the rape conviction. ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th 495, 550; People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 454; see People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 567 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].) The prosecutor's argument and the jury instructions describing the evidence as admissible pursuant to factor (c) do not establish prejudice. ( People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 454.) Even had the prosecutors relied solely upon evidence of the conviction, that evidence would have been admissible pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b). As this court recently has concluded: `[T]he prosecution may rely upon a prior conviction of a crime involving the use or threat of force or violence to establish the presence of criminal activity involving the use or threat of force or violence for purposes of [satisfying] factor (b).' ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1234, original italics.) Moreover, the jury in the present case heard credible testimony from the rape victim recounting the circumstances of the underlying crime. We often have held that such evidence is sufficient to establish a circumstance in aggravation described in factor (b). ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th 495, 550; People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 454; People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 567.) b. Admission of Alford plea as evidence of a prior conviction Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting defendant's conviction for rape pursuant to section 190.3, factor (c) (prior felony convictions), because the conviction followed a plea of no contest (§ 1016), which does not constitute an express admission of guilt but only a consent to be punished as if guilty. ( North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 35-36, fn. 8 [91 S.Ct. 160, 167, 27 L.Ed.2d 162]; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 [91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409].) As explained above, the court erred in admitting the conviction resulting from this plea as a prior conviction under section 190.3, factor (c), but the error was harmless because the evidence was admissible as evidence of violent criminal activity under factor (b). Defendant's entry of a plea of no contest does not alter that circumstance. As we have recognized, section 1016 explicitly provides that the legal effect of a no-contest plea to a crime punishable as a felony is the same for all purposes as a plea of guilty. (E.g., People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 809 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310]; see People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 279 [266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892].) Therefore, evidence of defendant's conviction of rape based upon a no-contest plea properly was utilized as evidence to establish defendant's violent criminal activity. 8. Admission of rape incident as evidence of prior violent activity (67) Defendant originally was charged in case No. A804290 with 11 different counts in connection with the incident that occurred on April 10, 1983. The charged offenses were two counts of forcible rape, two counts of sexual battery, two counts of penetration with a foreign object, and five counts of oral copulation. As a condition of defendant's plea of no contest on August 23, 1984, to one count of forcible rape, the prosecution dismissed the remaining ten counts. At the penalty phase defendant unsuccessfully sought to exclude all evidence pertaining to the incidents underlying the dismissed counts. a. Implied acquittal Defendant contends that the doctrine of implied acquittal precluded the prosecution from introducing for the jury's consideration any aspect of the Julianne P. incident. Section 190.3 provides that in no event shall evidence of prior criminal activity be admitted for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted. Pursuant to the doctrine of implied acquittal, a defendant's conviction of a lesser degree or lesser included offense of that charged constitutes an implied acquittal of the greater offense. Nonetheless, a dismissal, whether or not pursuant to a plea agreement, is not the equivalent of, and does not constitute, an acquittal pursuant to section 190.3. ( People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 199 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664]; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 257; People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 193 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 755.) b. Collateral estoppel or double jeopardy Defendant contends that evidence of the incidents underlying the dismissed counts was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, preventing relitigation of an issue decided at a prior proceeding. We repeatedly have rejected this claim, noting that the presentation of evidence of past criminal conduct does not place a defendant in jeopardy for past offenses. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 720 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729]; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 71 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) Defendant argues that, in light of the avowed need for greater reliability in the penalty determination in a capital case, our decisions are erroneous. We decline defendant's invitation to overrule these decisions. c. Dual use of rape evidence pursuant to section 190.3, factors (b) and (c) Defendant also contends that by permitting the prosecutor both to introduce the testimony of the rape victim pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), and to establish the fact of the conviction pursuant to factor (c), the trial court erroneously permitted dual use of the rape evidence. As we previously have recognized, the evidence was improperly admitted under factor (c), although not for the reason presently advocated by defendant. (See People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th 495, 549 [use both of conviction and underlying circumstances is admissible under factors (b) and (c), because each factor serves a separate purpose]; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 472.) We already have concluded, however, that no prejudice resulted from the introduction of this evidence under factor (c). 9. Admission of evidence of unadjudicated offenses beyond the period of limitations (68) Defendant contends that admission of evidence of 11 unadjudicated offenses, for which the applicable statute of limitations had expired, violated his right to due process of law, equal protection of the laws, and the need for greater reliability in capital sentencing matters. The prosecution introduced Ellen F.'s testimony and asked the jury to consider whether defendant had committed assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, occurring on September 20, 1980. The prosecution introduced Cindy F.'s testimony and asked the jury to consider whether defendant had committed spousal rape, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, battery with serious bodily injury, spousal abuse, child abuse, false imprisonment, and battery, occurring prior to June 1978. The prosecution also introduced Cheryl V.'s testimony and asked the jury to consider whether defendant had committed attempted oral copulation, false imprisonment, and battery, occurring in May 1972. The applicable statutes of limitations were of three years or less. Defendant recognizes that this court repeatedly has affirmed that California law imposes no time limitation upon the introduction of evidence of violent crimes, and the jury may consider such acts occurring at any stage of a defendant's life. ( People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 192; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 202; see People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1252; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) We specifically have rejected defendant's further claim that the United States Supreme Court, in stressing the special need under the Eighth Amendment for reliability in the determination whether the death penalty is appropriate, has dictated a different conclusion. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1244.) We also previously have denied the claim that the admission of time-barred offenses violates due process or equal protection principles. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1, 51-52; People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d 870, 906-907.)