Opinion ID: 539929
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Effect of the Union's Decertification

Text: 35 Jason contends the decertification of the union by the NLRB requires a finding that the NJAB award was void ab initio. The district court rejected this argument and held that the contract would only be void prospectively from the actual date of decertification. We affirm the district court's holding. 36 The NLRA generally requires that a union possess majority support before it may act as a bargaining representative for a group of employees. Sections 8(a)(1), (2) and 8(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a), (b), collectively require that a union possess majority support before a collective bargaining agreement can be negotiated. 37 Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Calif. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc). Any right to recognition as bargaining agent, which the plaintiff unions secured by virtue of their contracts, ceased and became inoperative on decertification.... An implied condition of the contracts was the continuance of that status as such certified representative. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir.1963). 38 After February 6, 1986, the date of decertification, the union had no rights under the agreement. Jason's employees could not be forced to join the now minority union and the union could not insist upon compensation for an act it could no longer perform--representation. Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 216 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir.1954). When a union has been decertified ... it is no longer the representative of the employees, and it cannot become a proper representative of the employees until it re-establishes its majority status. Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local No. 520, ILGW, 283 F.2d 936, 939 (4th Cir.1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S.Ct. 1902, 6 L.Ed.2d 1243 (1961). If we compel the employer to bargain with the union under these circumstances, we compel the employer and the union to commit an unfair labor practice in violation of the rights guaranteed to the employees under Sec. 7. Id. at 940; see also National Labor Relations Board v. Retail Clerks Local 588, 587 F.2d 984, 986 (9th Cir.1978). 39 As the district court held, the NJAB arbitration decision was void after decertification of the union. Until February 6, 1986, however, the union remained the recognized representative of Jason's employees and is entitled to any damages suffered up to that date. 10 40 F. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Refusing to Order a Stay Pending the NLRB Decision on Jason's Decertification Petition or Unfair Labor Practice Charges 41 Jason contends the district court abused its discretion when it refused to stay its summary judgment pending resolution by the NLRB of the decertification question. As we have previously stated, however, decertification only affected the parties after February 6, 1986; the district court's summary judgment award was limited to an earlier time period. 42 Jason also argues that the district court erred in refusing to stay summary judgment pending resolution by the NLRB of the unfair labor practices charges. We disagree. When a labor dispute involves both a breach of contract and an unfair labor practice charge, the NLRB and the courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Central Valley, 762 F.2d at 746; Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 752 F.2d at 1478. An unfair labor practice allegation is not a valid defense to the enforcement of an arbitration award. American Metal, 794 F.2d at 1455; Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 752 F.2d at 1478; Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Standard Sheet Metal, Inc. (Standard Sheet Metal), 699 F.2d 481, 483-84 (9th Cir.1983). The mere possibility of a conflict is no barrier to enforcement of the [arbitration] award. Standard Sheet Metal, 699 F.2d at 483. Nor does a pending charge before the NLRB require stay or dismissal of the enforcement suit. Id. 43 The decision whether to stay court proceedings pending a decision by the NLRB is committed to the discretion of the district court; we review a district court's denial of such a stay for abuse of discretion. Id.; Central Valley, 762 F.2d at 746. 44 In the present case, the NLRB action involves allegations of unfair refusals to bargain in good faith, coerced selection of representatives and forced recognition of a minority union, and unfair enforcement of the NJAB procedure once Jason withdrew from the multi-employer organization. We have held similar allegations insufficient to bar enforcement: 45 We do not read Kaiser Steel [Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 102 S.Ct. 851, 70 L.Ed.2d 833 (1982) ] as allowing this court to invade at will the province of the NLRB. Unfair labor practices remain within its primary jurisdiction. Unlike its treatment of hot cargo clauses, the National Labor Relations Act does not declare interest arbitration clauses unenforceable. We see no bar to our enforcement of the contract here. 46 Standard Sheet Metal, 699 F.2d at 484 (citations omitted). Moreover, the NLRB has not resolved these charges. Thus, no conflict exists at this point. If the alleged conflict actually emerges and enforcement of the NJAB arbitration award would be unfair under the NLRB decision, Jason could have the award vacated. See Cannery Warehousemen v. Haig Berberian, Inc., 623 F.2d 77 (9th Cir.1980). Finally, we note that the issues framed by the NLRB allegations differ from the issue before the district court of whether the contract required NJAB arbitration. 11 47 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jason's request for a stay of the district court's summary judgment proceedings pending the NLRB's resolution of the unfair labor practices charges. 48 G. The District Court's Award of Attorney Fees to the Union for Opposing Jason's Motion for Reconsideration 49 The district court awarded the union $500.00 as reasonable attorney fees for opposing Jason's motion for reconsideration of the court's judgment determining liability for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. This award was made pursuant to an attorney fee provision in the parties' agreement. In its order denying reconsideration, the district court also stated that the fees were imposed against Jason as a sanction for bringing the motion in violation of Rule 11. Jason argues the district court erred in basing its fee award on a Rule 11 violation. We need not decide this question. The award clearly was proper under the parties' contract. H. Fees on Appeal 50 The union requests this court award it attorney fees because Jason's appeal is frivolous. Appellate courts have discretion to award damages, attorney's fees, and single or double costs as a sanction for bringing a frivolous appeal. Glanzman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 892 F.2d 58, 61 (9th Cir.1989); Fed.R.Civ.P. 38; 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1912 (1987); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 699 F.2d 484, 485 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1080, 104 S.Ct. 1445, 79 L.Ed.2d 765 (1984). An appeal is considered frivolous in this circuit when the result is obvious, or the appellant's arguments of error are wholly without merit. McConnell v. Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). Jason's appeal is not frivolous or wholly without merit. Attorney fees for a frivolous appeal are denied. 51 AFFIRMED.