Opinion ID: 348405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plea Bargain Discussion

Text: 15 Robertson contends that a conversation between himself, co-conspirator Butigan, and two DEA agents constituted plea bargaining and therefore certain admissions made by Robertson during the course of that conversation should have been excluded from evidence under Fed.R.Ev. 410, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6), and United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974). To assess this contention, the conversation must be set in proper context. 16 Appellant and the other three arrestees were administered the Miranda 3 warnings by DEA Agent Widener at the private residence in El Paso where they were arrested. The four arrestees were then taken to the DEA offices in El Paso for processing. As the agents were preparing to take the arrestees to the United States Courthouse for arraignment, Butigan on his own initiative indicated that he was willing to tell everything but first he wanted to talk to Robertson. One of the arresting agents on cross-examination testified as follows concerning Butigan's request: 17 Q And then what did Mr. Butigan tell you at that particular time, sir? 18 A Initially? 19 Q Yes, sir. 20 A He said that he wanted to cooperate and tell us everything, and the reason for this he wanted to know if it would help his wife out. 21 Q Okay. So what did you tell him, sir? 22 A I told him that I couldn't promise him anything, but that we were anxious to have him cooperate with us and that any cooperation he made would probably help him out in the long run. 23 Q Okay. Did he do this voluntarily, sir? I mean did he bring this up himself? 24 A Yes, sir, we were on our route to take him to the Magistrate when he brought 25 Q You were getting ready to take him to the Magistrate, and he tells you voluntarily that he would like to cooperate in order to try and help his wife, is that correct? 26 A Yes, sir. 27 Q And you told him, of course, that you couldn't promise him anything, is that more or less what you told him? 28 A Yes, sir. 29 Q Now, did Mr. Butigan seem concerned about his wife? 30 A Yes, sir. 31 Q What was the next thing that happened in regard to Mr. Butigan cooperating?A He stated before he said anything, though, that he wanted to talk it over with Mr. Robertson. 4 32 Butigan was then permitted to confer privately with Robertson for a few minutes. Thereafter, two DEA agents questioned Butigan and Robertson in the parking lot of the DEA offices about their manufacture and sale of methamphetamine. Most of the questions were answered verbally by Butigan with Robertson indicating his agreement with Butigan by nodding his head. 33 Robertson's counsel argued in the court below that 34 the only reason that the Defendants (Butigan and Robertson) talked to the officers was in order to gain leniency for their wife and girl friend, whoever the other girl was, and under these circumstances, Your Honor, the confessions that they gave cannot be said to be voluntarily given. In fact, they were given in hopes of leniency that would be given to their wife and the girl friend . . which, in fact, did occur. . . . 5 35 Robertson has abandoned the theory pursued in the district court that the admissions were involuntary and argues instead that the fact that the admissions were made in an attempt to gain leniency for the two women demonstrates that the admissions were made in the course of plea bargaining and as such were privileged. In support of this theory appellant cites United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974). 36 In Ross the defendant, upon being arrested, offered to take the blame for some drugs found in his car if his wife, who was also present, was let off. The arresting agent had already talked to the U.S. Attorney, who apparently had agreed not to prosecute the wife if Mr. Ross confessed. Although the arresting agent testified that he did not strike a bargain to immunize Ross' wife from prosecution, he did agree to discuss the matter with the U.S. Attorney and the wife was released from custody. Later, the U.S. Attorney decided to prosecute both of the Rosses. At their joint trials, the prosecution was allowed to introduce testimony that Mr. Ross had offered to take the blame for everything if his wife would be released. Upon appeal of their convictions this Court held that the admission of the conversation between the agent and Ross was reversible error because: 37 We have no doubt that Ross' discussion with the agent, especially since the prosecutor had already been consulted, must be classified as an effort to bargain a plea. Moreover, it is undisputed that in pursuance of it the wife was released and went back to Waco. For reasons not readily apparent from the record, the proposed bargain was not consummated. At least we know that the wife was prosecuted and that both she and her husband pleaded not guilty. 493 F.2d at 775. (emphasis supplied) 38 It is true that Ross and the present case involve a similar and somewhat unusual factual context. In both cases the negotiating defendant was negotiating not about his own plea or leniency for himself, but about leniency for a third person. Despite the similar nature of the negotiations here and in Ross, 6 appellant can take no comfort in Ross because there is a fundamental distinction between the two cases. In Ross the proposed bargain was not consummated; the wife was prosecuted. Thus, Ross merely stands for the proposition that evidence of negotiations for the benefit of a third party must be excluded if a bargain is not consummated. This is so because: 39 it is inherently unfair for the government to engage in such an activity, only to use it as a weapon against the defendant when negotiations fail. 40 Ross, 493 F.2d at 775. 41 Here, the negotiations succeeded and the bargain was consummated. The leniency sought by Robertson and Butigan for the two women was obtained. Hence, Robertson stood trial, even though the bargain was consummated, because the bargain was not for a plea of guilty to a reduced charge, but for leniency for third persons. The Government kept its side of the bargain, Robertson obtained what he sought, and there is therefore no reason to exclude the admissions made by Robertson pursuant to his part of the bargain. To hold otherwise would place the Government in a heads they win, tails we lose position. 42 Furthermore, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) and Fed.R.Ev. 410 do not apply to this situation. 7 Those two rules provide that: 43 evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. 44 The present case, however, does not involve pleas or offers to plead because appellant was not negotiating his own plea, but was instead negotiating for leniency for a third person. 45 In situations where the defendant enters into negotiations about his own plea, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(6) and Fed.R.Ev. 410 render inadmissible testimony relating to such negotiations, if the negotiations fail and the defendant goes to trial. If the plea bargain is consummated, then the case will be disposed of by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without the necessity of a trial. Where, as here, the defendant is bargaining solely for leniency for third persons, it is within the contemplation of the parties that the negotiating defendant will go to trial, even if the negotiations are successful. This situation is beyond the scope of Rule 11(e)(6) and Rule 410. Ross holds that under these circumstances evidence relating to the negotiations is inadmissible if the negotiations fail. We hold today that if a bargain is consummated and leniency is obtained for a third party, admissions made pursuant to that bargain are not privileged. 8 46 AFFIRMED.