Opinion ID: 2460227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Prejudicial Statements: Guilt Phase

Text: Johnston alleges unfair surprise by and resulting harm from the prosecutor's failure to disclose a statement by Michael Federhofer. Federhofer testified at trial that [Johnston told me] [i]f I called the police he'd kill me too. The statement was never reduced to writing and was never discovered in a deposition. After consulting the depositions, the trial court found that Federhofer made a spontaneous voluntary answer to a previously unsolicited question made to him for ... information that apparently was not discovered before from either side.... A discovery violation under Rule 25.03 depends on the State's failure to disclose written or recorded statements of witnesses and summaries of witnesses' oral statements. Rule 25.04(a) requires the state, upon motion, to disclose material and information not covered by Rule 25.03. These rules do not require the State to disclose what it does not have. Johnston relies on State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. banc 1976). In Harrington , the state failed to deliver a copy of the defendant's statement to an FBI agent. This Court noted that discovery is designed to avoid surprise. `Simple justice requires that a defendant be permitted to prepare to meet what thus looms as a critical element of the case against him.' Id. at 47, quoting State v. Scott, 479 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Mo. banc 1972). As in Harrington , the critical element relational lies at the heart of State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. banc 1992), another case in which Johnston seeks solace. In Whitfield , this Court reversed a first-degree, death penalty conviction where the state failed to endorse its firearms expert as a witness and failed to disclose that a coat that contained bullet holes and was owned by a wounded witness would be introduced into evidence. The defense had decided to attack that wounded witness as the center of its strategy. The coat, however, corroborated the witness's credibility and the accuracy of her testimony and severely injured the defendant's theory of the case. The surprise in Harrington , Scott and Whitfield was the product of the state's withholding information that it possessed, that was critical to the case and that the defense would have had an opportunity to prepare to attack or blunt its influence had it been disclosed. This case is distinguishable from Harrington , Scott and Whitfield . First, the trial court considered Johnston's objection and determined that the State did not have knowledge of the eleven-year-old Federhofer's statement prior to his trial testimony. The statement was not undisclosed; it was undiscovered. This ends the inquiry. Johnston had the opportunity to cross-examine Federhofer about his statement and seek a continuance to consider strategy when faced with its discovery during trial. His brief before this Court shows that he has not yet discovered an argument or evidence in the years of reflection since the trial that would show what Johnston would have been able to do to negate the statement had he learned of it prior to trial. Claims of surprise requiring a mistrial must be supported by some reasoned basis for the existence of actual prejudice. Johnston offers none.
Johnston also complains that emergency medical technician James Motlik testified that he remembered the emergency call [b]ecause it was the most brutal beating [he had] ever seen, in twenty-five years of ambulance work. According to Johnston, the statement prejudiced him and required a mistrial. Motlik's recollection attempted to explain the clarity of his memory of the events on the night of Nancy Johnston's murder more than two years after the fact. The trial court found that the statement was unsolicited. Unsolicited statements that are brief and limited in substance do not amount to reversible error in the absence of evidence that the prosecutor intentionally tried to inject unfair prejudice into the trial. See State v. Kalagian, 833 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Mo.App. 1992); State v. Masterson, 733 S.W.2d 40, 42 (Mo.App.1987). There was no evidence here that the prosecutor intentionally tried to inject this statement into the guilt phase of the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.
The State referred to the shotgun seized at the Johnston home during the guilt phase of the trial. Although Johnston did not object when officers described finding the shotgun at the house, he did object when Officer George referred to the shotgun during his testimony. The State concedes that the shotgun played no part in Nancy Johnston's death. Johnston now claims that the prejudice generated by the evidence of the shotgun rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The trial court erred in permitting the objected-to evidence concerning the shotgun. In light of Johnston's confession and the abundance of evidence proving he killed his wife, the error was not prejudicial. See State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d at 591 (discussion of fast driving, stealing license plates and one minor burglary would not encourage the jury to find Roberts guilty of murder).
Johnston claims that since the State did not endorse Deputy Wagganer as a guiltphase witness until the first day of trial, the trial court erred in failing to grant a continuance and in denying his motion to suppress Wagganer's testimony. The State originally certified Wagganer as a penalty phase witness. In response to Johnston's motions to exclude evidence of Johnston's prior threats to and beatings of his wife and for a continuance, the trial court heard Wagganer's proposed testimony at a pre-trial motion hearing. Wagganer testified about arresting Johnston on a prior occasion. The State certified Wagganer as a guiltphase witness on the first day of jury selection. Determining whether a sanction should be imposed for a discovery violation lies within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Neil, 869 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Mo. banc 1994). When the trial court declines to impose a sanction, we must determine whether the State's violation resulted in fundamental unfairness or bore a real potential for substantively altering the outcome of the trial. Id. Fundamental unfairness occurs in discovery violation cases when the State's failure to disclose results in defendant's genuine surprise at learning of an unexpected witness or evidence and the surprise prevents meaningful efforts by the defendant to consider and prepare a strategy for addressing the state's evidence. In this instance, the late certification caused no fundamental unfairness, nor did Wagganer's testimony substantively alter the outcome of the trial. This is because Johnston knew the details of Wagganer's likely testimony at the penalty phase prior to trial. Moreover, Wagganer's testimony was neither complex nor lengthy. Johnston could not claim prejudicial surprise when the State chose to offer Wagganer's testimony at a different part of the trial. In a related claim, Johnston claims that a statement he volunteered to Wagganer on February 16, 1989which was admitted at trialwas obtained in violation of his 6th Amendment right to counsel and should have been suppressed. The statement, however, was made during Wagganer's investigation of a previous, separate charge (tampering with a witness). Johnston's statementthat he would kill the bitch [Nancy] for f___ it upwas in response to Wagganer's admonition to Johnston to stop making harassing phone calls to Nancy to get her to drop charges against him or he would face potential prosecution. The statement did not arise from an interrogation. Assuming arguendo that Johnston's statement was the product of an interrogation (which it was not), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). There is no constitutional violation here. See State v. Parker 886 S.W.2d 908, 918 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1098, 115 S.Ct. 1827, 131 L.Ed.2d 748 (1995); State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 291 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 679, 133 L.Ed.2d 527 (1995).