Opinion ID: 2587254
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper subjects of examination or argument

Text: Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by urging the jury to consider nonstatutory matters in aggravation. We have held that in deciding penalty, a jury may consider only the factors in aggravation set forth in section 190.3. ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 773, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor elicited testimony from the witness to the attempted sodomy that he did not wish to be housed near defendant or his associates because he feared retaliation, and that the prosecutor in closing argument referred to the witness's fear of retaliation, despite the absence of express or implied threats by defendant. Pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b), only a defendant's actual threat to use force or violence, whether express or implied, may be considered. It is apparent from the record, however, that the substance of the testimony and related argument clearly was intended to demonstrate that the witness was credible and would not be motivated to lie. (Evid.Code, ง 785; cf. People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1017, 22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) It is not reasonably likely that the jurors understood the comments to suggest that defendant actually had threatened this witness. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's closing argument that defendant on the street was a vicious, heartless, cold-blooded killer, and would behave the same in prison, constituted impermissible comment on future dangerousness. First, viewed in context, the prosecutor made these comments following defense counsel's argument that defendant posed no substantial behavioral problems in prison. Second, prosecution argument citing a defendant's future dangerousness is proper when that is a permissible inference to be drawn from the evidence. (See People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 720-721, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729.) Defendant asserts that in opening argument the prosecutor improperly informed the jury that its task was to decide whether defendant was good or bad. In fact, the prosecutor described the weighing process of the penalty phase, telling the jury it was being called upon to weigh aggravation versus mitigation. Good versus bad. Defense counsel objected to the reduction of the concept of weighing to good versus bad, and the trial court explained to the jury that although counsel was permitted latitude in describing concepts, the jury was to follow the instructions regarding aggravation and mitigation. Considered in context, the prosecutor merely provided a simplified explanation of the law that the jury was required to follow at this phase of the trial. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1248, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) The trial court clarified that more detailed instructions would explain the jury's actual task in this regard. In context, the prosecutor's comments cannot be construed as argument that the jury was to decide whether defendant was good or bad. Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant's negotiated plea in the 1980 case of assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer, informing the jury that defendant was treated with leniency because he pleaded guilty to that charge without having to plead guilty to the theft of the taxicab or the assault on the second police officer. Defense counsel objected on the ground it was improper to discuss the plea agreement or its effect. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor's argument was not improper, because defendant previously had raised the subject of leniency. Defendant claims the prosecutor's argument attempted to treat as aggravating factors the offenses to which defendant had not pleaded guilty and the circumstance that defendant received a negotiated plea, and denigrated the plea negotiation system itself. Prior to the prosecutor's comments, defendant told the jury that he never had received a break in his life or received any leniency, and had been incarcerated following each arrest. In response, the prosecutor merely pointed out that, as revealed in defendant's criminal records, in fact defendant had been treated leniently and had not been incarcerated for every crime he had committed. The prosecutor's argument was proper. On rebuttal, a prosecutor may refer to prior criminal conduct not admitted as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3 if it relates directly to a particular incident or character trait that defendant offered on his own behalf. ( People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 644-645, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Moreover, it is not reasonably likely that the jury understood the prosecutor's comments as advocating that it consider the negotiated plea itself as a factor in aggravation. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th 475, 526, 46 Cal. Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued that although defendant's mother cried while on the stand, defendant was unmoved by his mother's emotion, suggesting that by his demeanor he had shown himself to be a hardened criminal who deserved to die. It is proper for a prosecutor, at the penalty phase at which the defendant has placed his or her character in issue as a mitigating factor, to make references to the defendant's facial demeanor apparent during the court proceedings. ( People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 197, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by utilizing testimony intended to be considered in mitigation as a circumstance in aggravation. The prosecutor, referring to defendant's testimony that he had taught children's Sunday school, commented that the thought of defendant teaching children scared the daylights out of her. She wondered what lessons children would learn from defendant, in view of his description of himself as a pimp, murderer, adulterer, thief, and gambler. The prosecutor assertedly also committed misconduct by referring to evidence that defendant kept a photograph of the woman he had murdered in 1975 in the same box with a likeness of Jesus Christ, commenting that it made her blood boil, and asking rhetorically how one could be a religious person and do that. The prosecutor's comments did not suggest to the jury that these facts were to be considered in aggravation. Rather, the remarks were an appropriate response to defendant's previous testimony as to his good character and, in particular, as to his religious devotion. A defendant who offers evidence of his or her good character widens the scope of the evidence of bad character that may be introduced in rebuttal. ( People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th 599, 644, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) The scope of rebuttal legitimately embraces argument by the prosecutor 'suggesting a more balanced picture of [the accused's] personality.' [Citation.] ( Ibid .) The argument was proper. Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by attempting to establish defendant's homosexuality in order to prejudice the jury. As part of the evidence presented by the defense at the penalty phase, defendant explained that he had had consensual sexual encounters with men in prison, assuming the dominant role. He testified he was heterosexual on the street but bisexual in prison, and would not classify himself as homosexual. Defendant denied that he had committed forcible attempted sodomy. On cross-examination, when the prosecutor asked defendant whether he was gay, he responded in the negative. The prosecutor asked defendant about his having been disciplined for subscribing to Gay Sunshine magazine. She inquired about a photograph in his album depicting a partially unclothed man named Candi who claimed to love defendant. Defendant explained that he and this individual merely corresponded and that Candi resided in another state. The prosecutor also asked defendant about a photograph that appears to have part of a male body and something that may or may not be female. She stated the inscription was, I'm getting a lesson in Hollywood on how to get a blowjob. The prosecutor again asked whether defendant had sexual relations with men outside prison, and defendant reiterated that he was in prison when he became acquainted with the individuals depicted in the photographs. Defendant's direct testimony had suggested he had had consensual sexual relations with men in prison, that he was bisexual in those circumstances out of necessity, and that such contacts were infrequent. His testimony tended to minimize the possibility that he would attempt to have forcible sexual relations with another man against the latter's consent. The prosecutor's cross-examination and use of exhibits in part impeached defendant's credibility. Evidence tending to contradict a witness's testimony is relevant for purposes of impeachment. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1017, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Although the prosecutor appears to have dwelled on evidence of defendant's sexual preferences in a manner suggesting that this evidence was a negative reflection on defendant, without regard to its illumination of defendant's credibility, any possible harm could have been cured by timely objection by counsel and admonition to the jury by the trial court. ( People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 181, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960.) Defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly used defendant's age as a factor in aggravation by asserting that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole would be appropriate if defendant were 17, 18, 19, or 20 years of age, but was inappropriate because defendant was older. The consideration of a defendant's age in argument or instructions is proper. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th 155, 189-190, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) As we have explained, age may refer to any age-related matter suggested by the evidence, common experience, or morality that `might reasonably inform the choice of penalty.' ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 554, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100.) A permissible inference is that defendant is `old enough to know better.' ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th 41, 170, 10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561.) Defendant asserts the prosecutor improperly suggested to the jurors that defendant might be able to just walk out of here unless they voted for a death verdict. This claim is not supported by the record. The prosecutor argued that defendant wanted the jurors who were religious to view that circumstance as a reason not to vote for the death penalty, even though defendant voted for the death penalty three times and twice he succeeded.... And he wants you to use different values than he uses. [ถ] Well, I want you to use different values, too. I want you to use the factors in aggravation and the factors in mitigation and weigh it. I don't want you to use the selfish purpose that he used. I don't want you to just walk up and say, `You're out of here,' because that's exactly what Mr. Cunningham did. As cold, calculated as you please, he just said, `Boom, you're dead.' He didn't say, 'Tell me about your life....' It is apparent from the foregoing context that the prosecutor's comments did not refer to the possibility of defendant's being released from prison. Instead, the prosecutor admonished the jurors to consider and weigh the penalty and not vote for the death penalty automatically as defendant in effect had done with his victims. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the argument in the manner urged by defendant. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th 475, 526, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Defendant claims that the prosecutor engaged in argument calculated to dehumanize him by suggesting that it is hard for people like any of us in this courtroom, who have not shot somebody and watched them die, who have not experienced something like that and say, `let me weigh this.' Defendant also urges that the prosecutor's comments concerning defendant's lack of emotion while his mother cried on the witness stand, and concerning his motive for shooting himself in the stomach, similarly were intended to convince the jurors that defendant was less than a human being. The prosecutor appropriately commented that the jurors' task was difficult in view of their lack of experience. The other comments were directed at reminding the jurors that defendant was calculating and inhumane rather than inhuman or beneath humanity. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct.