Opinion ID: 1058794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Pleadings in the Malpractice Litigation

Text: The three-judge court concluded that Barrett violated Rule 1.1 and Rule 3.1 by the following acts which occurred in conjunction with the Barrett's representation of Eller and her legal malpractice action against him: failing to file or settle a lawsuit within the two year statute of limitations period, filing a special plea of immunity that was not warranted by existing law or the good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and failing to read the motion to strike the plea and memorandum in support thereof until the day of the hearing on the motion at which time he withdrew the plea. Barrett argues that these facts are insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he violated either Rule. We agree. Rule 1.1 requires that a lawyer provide competent representation to a client, which requires legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Disciplining an attorney on the basis of incompetent representation under Rule 1.1, as reflected in the commentary, involves attorney performance that extends significantly beyond mere attorney error. See Motley v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 262-64, 536 S.E.2d 101, 106-07 (2000) (imposing discipline under former DR 6-101 for incompetence when attorney allowed client to sign promissory note to complete a real estate transaction which did not reflect parties' agreement and the consequences of which attorney did not understand). Whether an attorney is subject to discipline for failing to provide competent representation is a matter decided on a case by case basis. In this case, Barrett admitted that his failure to file or settle the personal injury lawsuit within the limitations period was negligent; nevertheless, such negligence without more is not clear and convincing evidence of incompetence under Rule 1.1. Similarly, discipline of Barrett under Rule 1.1 is not justified based on research that results in the wrong legal conclusion because incorrect legal research alone, although attorney error, is not clear and convincing evidence of incompetence for purposes of that Rule. Finally, Barrett's failure to read responsive pleadings in a more timely manner and his delay in withdrawing the special plea, while not the preferred way of practicing law, do not support a finding of incompetent representation in this case. Barrett filed his special plea on January 30, 2003; opposing counsel filed the motion to strike and supporting memorandum on February 18; and Barrett withdrew the plea on March 18, the date of the hearing on various motions in the case including the special plea and motion to deny the special plea. The delay itself was less than a month, and Barrett withdrew the plea before the court was required to consider it. Accordingly, we conclude that this delay does not provide clear and convincing evidence that Barrett violated Rule 1.1. We next turn to violations of Rule 3.1. That rule prohibits a lawyer from advancing a position that is frivolous. [7] The failure to timely file a lawsuit does not implicate this rule. Thus, violation of this rule had to be based on the three-judge court's finding that Barrett asserted an erroneous legal position that was not a good faith argument for extension of the law, and that he failed to timely read opposing pleadings and withdraw his special plea. An erroneous position is not necessarily a frivolous position. In this case, Barrett produced evidence, accepted by the three-judge court, that his position, although erroneous, was based on principles he learned in his law school classes, on legal research he had conducted on the issue, and on a misunderstanding of the law. This evidence does not support a finding that filing the special plea was a frivolous act in violation of Rule 3.1. Compare Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 269 Va. 583, 596, 611 S.E.2d 375, 382 (2005) (imposing discipline for filing frivolous pleading where attorney moved to strike wife's divorce pleadings solely because of minor mistake in wife's legal name, and attorney clearly knew correct name and had himself used multiple versions of it in own motion). Similarly Barrett's delay in reading opposing counsel's memorandum and refusal to withdraw his special plea at an earlier time do not constitute asserting a position that is frivolous. In summary, we find that the record does not present clear and convincing evidence that Barrett violated Rules 1.1 and 3.1 when he failed to file or settle a lawsuit within the limitations period, filed a special plea asserting an erroneous legal position, or delayed in reading responsive pleadings and withdrawing the special plea. [8]