Opinion ID: 1869392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to DismissMootness

Text: Having determined that the circuit court's decision should be affirmed, we turn to the Board's motion to dismiss for mootness premised on the fact that the total severance payment has already been made to Dr. Brooks. On August 24, 2007, the Board moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that it had been rendered moot by the fact that all payments to Dr. Brooks and other parties that were being made as a result of Dr. Brooks's termination would be completed by the close of business on August 24. [6] This court passed on deciding this motion at that time, preferring instead to take it up when the case was submitted for our review. The Board emphasizes that Dr. Brooks has not been joined as a party to this action, nor have the members of the School Board been sued in their individual capacities. The Board maintains, as a result, that no relief is available to the taxpayers, because any order to refund money would require the School District to pay itself back from tax money. Moreover, the Board argues that Dr. Brooks and the other payees were indispensable parties who should have been joined to the action pursuant to Rule 19 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. The Board relies, in general, on the principle that this court will not review moot cases and argues that no exception exists for the case at hand, which involves a unique settlement that encompasses not only severance pay, but also the settlement of litigation in federal court, the payment of attorneys' fees, and the cooperation of Dr. Brooks in future matters with respect to litigation involving the School District. Therefore, the Board claims that this case is not one which is likely to arise again. Our law regarding mootness is well established in this state: As a general rule, appellate courts of this state will not review issues that are moot. To do so would be to render advisory opinions, which we will not do. Generally, a case becomes moot when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect upon a then-existing legal controversy. We have recognized two exceptions to the mootness doctrine. The first one involves issues that are capable of repetition, but that evade review, and the second one concerns issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, would prevent future litigation. Potter v. City of Tontitown, 371 Ark. 200, 205, 264 S.W.3d 473, 478 (2007) (citations omitted). Where considerations of public interest or prevention of future litigation are present, this court may, at its discretion, elect to settle an issue, even though moot. Owens v. Taylor, 299 Ark. 373, 374, 772 S.W.2d 596, 597 (1989). We are mindful that the Board urges that what was paid to Dr. Brooks was more than mere severance pay and included, among other things, substantial attorney's fees. Nevertheless, the issue, as we see it, is whether the severance-pay provision under Paragraph 11E of the employment contract is constitutional. For reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that it is. While the specific payment plan involving Dr. Brooks may not be capable of repetition, we hold that the issue of whether severance pay in superintendent employment contracts is constitutional is one of substantial public interest. We further recognize that our decision on this issue will prevent future litigation in school districts throughout this state. Hence, one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine is met. For that reason, we addressed the issue in this case. Affirmed. The motion to dismiss is denied.