Opinion ID: 883919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Presentence Sex Offender Evaluation

Text: Campbell's final allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel relates to counsel's failure to object to Ms. North, who had evaluated the victims of the offenses and testified for the State at trial, performing the presentence sex offender evaluation. As a general rule, defense counsel's use of objections lies within his or her discretion; in the context of an ineffective assistance claim, a failure to object must, in addition to being error, also prejudice the defendant. State v. Hurlbert (1988), 232 Mont. 115, 120, 756 P.2d 1110, 1113 (citations omitted). The record reflects that the District Court ordered Campbell's counsel to make the arrangements for the presentence sex offender evaluation and that counsel chose to have Ms. North perform the evaluation. We need not speculate regarding whether counsel's affirmative choice could have constituted deficient performance under the first Strickland prong, because it is clear that Campbell has not established the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Campbell alleges that it seems reasonable to assume that [Ms. North's] objectivity in conducting the evaluation of the defendant might well have been compromised. At best, this allegationwhich is premised on both an assumption and a might havecan be characterized as conclusory, and conclusory allegations are insufficient to meet a defendant's burden in establishing ineffective assistance of counsel. See Hurlbert, 756 P.2d at 1113. Moreover, as discussed above, the District Court apparently relied on Ms. North's confidential report and testimony at the sentencing hearing in excepting Campbell from the mandatory minimum sentences which ordinarily would have attached upon his conviction of sexual intercourse without consent against L.D. and A.D. Thus, we conclude that Campbell has not established that having Ms. North perform the presentence sex offender evaluation prejudiced him. In summary, we decline to address Campbell's claim of ineffective assistance based on his counsel's failure to independently investigate the offenses with which he was charged. With regard to Campbell's ineffective assistance allegations relating to mental state and mental capacity, and counsel's failure to object to Ms. North performing the presentence sex offender evaluation, we conclude that Campbell has not met his burden under the Strickland test. As to these latter claims, therefore, we hold that Campbell was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 5. Did the District Court err regarding either its order for a psychological examination or a determination that Campbell was indigent? Campbell advances several abbreviated, and largely unsupported, arguments asserting error by the District Court, rather than by counsel, relating to the ordered psychological examination and his alleged indigency. We address each in turn. We observe, first, that the issue statement under which the arguments referenced immediately above are set forth states that the trial court erred in failing to order psychological evaluations prior to trial. This issue statement is not developed and, in any event, mischaracterizes the record. As discussed above in issue 4b, the District Court did, by Minute Entry, order both a § 46-14-202, MCA, examination and a sex offender evaluation; its subsequent written order was specifically for the sex offender evaluation, but indicated that a § 46-14-202, MCA, examination would be ordered if required. Moreover, Campbell concedes that the court ordered the requested evaluation. Next, Campbell argues that, in light of the District Court's order for an evaluation of his mental competency, the court erred in failing to ensure that its order was carried out. He relies on §§ 46-14-202(1) and (4), MCA, and State v. Bartlett (1995), 271 Mont. 429, 898 P.2d 98. Section 46-14-202(1), MCA, provides that, if a defendant or defense counsel files a written motion requesting an examination or if the issue of a defendant's fitness to proceed is raised by the court, the prosecution or defense counsel, the district court shall appoint a qualified professional to examine and report on the defendant's mental condition. The language of the statute is mandatory on its face and we have so held. See Bartlett, 898 P.2d at 100. We reversed the trial court's denial of a § 46-14-202, MCA, motion for examination in Bartlett, observing that the statute, which originally had vested a measure of discretion in the trial court regarding the grant or denial of such a motion, is now compulsory. Bartlett, 898 P.2d at 100. In the present case, Campbell's counsel filed a written motion for an examination pursuant to § 46-14-202, MCA, and the District Court granted the motion, as required by the statute and Bartlett. In arguing that the court erred in failing to follow up on its own order, Campbell seeks to place an affirmative duty on the trial court to enforce the order granting defense counsel's motion. Nothing in § 46-14-202(1), MCA, or Bartlett imposes such an obligation. Campbell argues separately that the District Court was required, sua sponte, to determine that Campbell was indigent for purposes of obtaining the examination without cost to Campbell or his family. He relies on the portion of § 46-14-202(4), MCA, which provides that [i]f the defendant is indigent ..., the cost of the examination must be paid by the county or the state, or both, according to procedures established under 3-5-902(1). Nothing in § 46-14-202(4), MCA, requires, or even suggests, that a district court must sua sponte raise and determine the question of a defendant's indigency upon a motion for examination thereunder. Nor does Campbell cite to any authority imposing such a requirement. Moreover, in the present case, no showing was made that Campbell was indigent for purposes of obtaining the examination at county or state expense under § 46-14-202(4), MCA. No determination of indigency had been requested or made for purposes of court-appointed counsel under § 46-8-111, MCA, and, indeed, the motion for examination pursuant to § 46-14-202(1), MCA, specifically was premised on payment by Campbell or his mother. We cannot ascribe error to a district court for failing to take an action neither requested by the party nor required by the law. We conclude that the District Court did not err in failing to enforce its order for a psychological examination. We further conclude that the court did not err in failing to determine, sua sponte, that Campbell was indigent for purposes of that examination. Affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and NELSON, LEAPHART and ERDMANN, JJ., concur.