Opinion ID: 4419429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: probable cause to arrest defendant

Text: Having determined that the Santana holding is applicable under these facts, it is still necessary to determine whether Officer Staman had probable cause to arrest defendant42 and whether a “hot pursuit” justified Officer Staman’s entry into the home after initiating the arrest. I would hold that Officer Staman had probable cause sufficient to execute a public arrest and that—regardless of the relatively fleeting “pursuit” leading into defendant’s home—Officer Staman’s entry after beginning the arrest was lawful. As the majority articulates, “[p]robable cause to arrest exists where the facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”43 In this case, by the time Officer Staman attempted to perform the arrest at issue, he had already discovered an abandoned car registered to defendant bearing indication that it had been the cause of damage to public road fixtures. After Officer Staman arrived at defendant’s residence, defendant made 41 See id. 42 See id. 43 People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). See also Devenpeck v Alford, 543 US 146, 152; 125 S Ct 588; 160 L Ed 2d 537 (2004), citing Maryland v Pringle, 540 US 366, 371; 124 S Ct 795; 157 L Ed 2d 769 (2003). 11 noncustodial prearrest statements that she was driving and that she had left the scene of the accident without reporting the damage. Probable cause was therefore clearly established as to defendant’s involvement in failing to report an accident causing damage to fixtures.44 MCL 764.15 outlines several state-specific rules for conducting warrantless arrests. Under that statute, a police officer may conduct a warrantless arrest for any felony, misdemeanor, or ordinance violation committed in that officer’s presence.45 Felonies can form the basis for a valid warrantless arrest under MCL 764.15(1)(b) even when not committed in the officer’s presence; but misdemeanors that are not committed in the officer’s presence can only form the basis for a warrantless arrest under MCL 764.15(1)(d) when they are punishable by imprisonment for more than 92 days and when the arresting officer has “reasonable cause” to believe the person being arrested committed the misdemeanor. Here, Officer Staman went to defendant’s home to investigate a suspected failure to report an accident causing damage to fixtures in violation of MCL 257.621, although the crime was not committed in his presence. Failure to report an accident causing damage to fixtures is only a 90-day misdemeanor.46 Accordingly, it does not meet the criteria for a valid warrantless arrest under MCL 764.15(1)(d). The arrest at issue therefore constituted a statutory violation. Nevertheless, as this Court stated in People v Hawkins: 44 See MCL 257.621. 45 MCL 764.15(1)(a). 46 MCL 257.621(a); MCL 257.901(1) and (2). 12 Irrespective of the application of the exclusionary rule in the context of a constitutional violation, the drastic remedy of exclusion of evidence does not necessarily apply to a statutory violation. Whether the exclusionary rule should be applied to evidence seized in violation of a statute is purely a matter of legislative intent.[47] That is, “where there is no determination that a statutory violation constitutes an error of constitutional dimensions, application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate unless the plain language of the statute indicates a legislative intent that the rule be applied.”48 Nothing in the text of MCL 764.15 indicates that violations of the statute warrant application of the exclusionary rule. Thus, exclusion of evidence on the basis of violations of that statute is appropriate only if such violations establish “error of constitutional dimensions.”49 The majority appears to acknowledge as much in a footnote.50 Putting aside, for the moment, probable cause to arrest defendant for failure to report an accident causing damage to fixtures, precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States provides: [A]n arresting officer’s state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. As we have repeatedly explained, the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action. [T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with “reasonableness” allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, 47 People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 500; 668 NW2d 602 (2003). 48 Id. at 507. 49 Id. 50 See note 4 of the majority opinion. 13 whatever the subjective intent. [E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.[51] Regardless of the propriety of an arrest for defendant’s failure to report an accident causing damage to fixtures, Officer Staman also had probable cause to initiate an arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, in violation of MCL 257.625(9)(c). The felony information and affidavit of probable cause in the record state that defendant had been convicted of operating while intoxicated twice in the past— once in 1998 and once in 2006.52 Officer Staman testified at the evidentiary hearing that 51 Devenpeck, 543 US at 153 (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also United States v Anderson, 923 F2d 450, 457 (CA 6, 1991) (“[K]nowledge of the precise crime committed is not necessary to a finding of probable cause provided that probable cause exists showing that a crime was committed by the defendants.”). 52 The majority suggests that defendant’s prior two convictions cannot be relevant to the probable cause supporting the arrest because the record is unclear as to whether Officer Staman was actually aware of the convictions at the time of the arrest. See note 5 of the majority opinion. As a preliminary matter, Officer Staman may well have been aware of those convictions, having testified at the evidentiary hearing that, in order to determine the registered owner of the vehicle at the scene of the accident, he had to consult secretary of state records. See MCL 257.625(21)(a) (prior convictions for operating under the influence under MCL 257.625(1) are reported to the secretary of state). Regardless, the majority’s interpretation of Devenpeck ignores language from the Supreme Court’s opinion stating that an officer’s “subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause,” and “the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” See Devenpeck, 543 US at 153 (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted). This language is consistent with the Supreme Court’s guidance in Herring v United States, which explained that exclusion is a tool of “ ‘last resort, not [of] first impulse . . . .’ ” Herring v United States, 555 US 135, 140; 129 S Ct 695; 172 L Ed 2d 496 (2009), quoting Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586, 591; 126 S Ct 2159; 165 L Ed 2d 56 (2006). That is, the exclusionary rule is properly applied only where it results in “appreciable deterrence” of future Fourth Amendment violations. Herring, 555 US at 141 (quotation marks and 14 when he was dispatched to the scene of the accident, he found defendant’s vehicle abandoned, facing the wrong direction on an exit ramp from US-131, and showing signs that it had struck both of the protective barriers on the exit ramp. Defendant, herself, did not report the accident to the police. After Officer Staman arrived at defendant’s home, he observed defendant leaning against a wall as if to maintain balance. He also noticed that her speech was slurred prior to transporting her to the police station.53 A violation of MCL citation omitted). Even when exclusion may facilitate some marginal degree of such deterrence, exclusion is not appropriate if the cost of applying the rule—“letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free”—outweighs the potential benefit. Id. “[T]he rule’s ‘costly toll’ upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging application of the rule.” Pennsylvania Bd of Probation & Parole v Scott, 524 US 357, 364-365; 118 S Ct 2014; 141 L Ed 2d 344 (1998). Moreover, the Herring Court explained, “[t]he extent to which the exclusionary rule is justified by these deterrence principles varies with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct.” Herring, 555 US at 143. “[E]vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that’ ” his or her conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v Krull, 480 US 340, 348-349; 107 S Ct 1160; 94 L Ed 2d 364 (1987), quoting United States v Peltier, 422 US 531, 542; 95 S Ct 2313; 45 L Ed 2d 374 (1975). Here, the record reveals no evidence that Officer Staman believed this arrest to be unlawful before proceeding in spite of such awareness. Indeed, from his testimony at the evidentiary hearing, it seems clear that—notwithstanding the probable cause or lack thereof pertaining to the offense of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor—Officer Staman believed that he was arresting defendant for a 93-day misdemeanor in compliance with MCL 764.15(1)(d). There is no flagrant or culpable conduct on the part of the police to deter in future cases. The circumstances existing at the time of the arrest were sufficient to establish probable cause, and Officer Staman’s failure to recognize that he was able to arrest defendant for operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor should not be punished by implementation of the exclusionary rule. 53 The majority believes that “more concrete facts”—aside from the nature of defendant’s accident, the fact that defendant abandoned her crashed vehicle without contacting the police, defendant’s use of a wall in a manner suggesting that she needed it to maintain balance, and defendant’s slurred speech—are necessary to establish probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating alcohol when the accident 15 257.625(9)(c) would constitute a felony. Thus, Officer Staman was statutorily authorized under MCL 764.15(1)(b) and (h) to arrest defendant, notwithstanding his mistaken belief that failure to report an accident to fixtures was a 93-day misdemeanor.