Opinion ID: 820524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Bennett’s activity

Text: Bennett continues, however, that, even if we are permitted to analyze his interactions with Hill, they do not rise 22 No. 11-3245 to a level indicating that he was “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.” § 3B1.1. We disagree and cannot find error in the district court’s ruling. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 provides for a sentencing enhancement when the convicted individual played a specific role in the offense. As noted, subsection (c) (under which Bennett was sentenced) provides a two-level enhancement when the defendant was an “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Subsection (a), however, provides for a four-level enhancement only where the defendant was an “organizer or leader” of a large criminal enterprise. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Subsection (b), in turn, gives a three-level enhancement only where the defendant was a “manager or supervisor” of such an enterprise. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Application note 4 of § 3B1.1 helpfully provides seven factors that courts “should consider” in “distinguishing a leadership and organizational role from one of mere management or supervision.” Included among the factors are “exercise of decision making authority . . . , the recruitment of accomplices, [and] the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime.” Id. Despite the apparently clear purpose of the application note to be used to help contrast subsections (a) and (b), Bennett asks us to use these factors to assess the appropriateness of subsection (c) to his case. This was not a completely outlandish request, as we (as well as our sister circuits) have applied these factors to the question of whether a defendant had any sort of leadership role—not merely for distinguishing between roles. See, e.g., United States v. Howell, 527 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 (7th Cir. 1994); see also No. 11-3245 23 United States v. Jackson, 639 F.3d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gonzalez Edeza, 359 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Taylor, 248 F.3d 506, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2001). Recently we have noted the apparent absurdity of that approach—the application note helps to distinguish between the distinct roles of “leader” or “organizer” and “manager” or “supervisor,” while subsection (c) is aimed at defendants who inhabit any of those roles. United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2012). Perhaps this is why in prior cases where we used the seven factors, we have advised that “slavish adherence to them is unnecessary: the ultimate question is what relative role the defendant played.” Mustread, 42 F.3d at 1104 n.3. Here, we follow that guidance. We do not think the district court wrongly determined that Bennett’s role was that of “an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). The district court observed during sentencing that “Hill stated and testified that she met Mr. Bennett in 2005 and began transporting drugs between Chicago and Madison for him.” (R. 252 at 26) (emphasis added). Further, Bennett acknowledged during the sentencing process and acknowledges again in his briefs to this court that he used Hill as his courier on multiple occasions. (Appellant’s Br. at 4.) Like the district court, we think all of this speaks to Bennett’s role as, at least, a manager or supervisor of Hill. Figueroa is an instructive comparison and takes what might be described as a plain-meaning approach to 24 No. 11-3245 § 3B1.1. 682 F.3d at 697. There, the defendant arranged for a man named Cruz to travel from Texas to Chicago transporting drugs. Id. at 696. Figueroa claimed, however, to be merely a “conduit”; that is, he only passed along instruction from his boss to Cruz. Id. Regardless, we determined that “[t]he defendant supervised Cruz. He told him where to go to get the drugs and, when he returned with them, where to meet him to deliver the drugs and get paid.” Id. at 697. Thus, the § 3B1.1 enhancement was appropriate. Id. at 698. We think the case here is just as clear. Like Figueroa, Bennett told his drug courier, Hill, “where to get the drugs and, . . . where to meet him to deliver the drugs and get paid.” Id. at 697. Bennett claims that Hill was simply somebody else’s (Kelly’s) supervisee and that he occupied no supervising role. Evidence of Hill’s primary employer may indeed be ambiguous, but it is clear that Bennett took it upon himself to mete out a punishment when she did not follow instructions. Upon discovering that she did not have the drug money, Bennett forced Hill to strip, beat her, and burned her, all while demanding the money. Although most super- visors do not terrorize their subordinates (at least not physically), administering sanctions for poor work quality is a quintessential supervisory task. Regardless of who gave Hill more instruction during the course of the relationship, it is clear that Bennett acted as a supervisor (perhaps along with Kelly) in this particular instance. We do not think the district court erred in coming to that same conclusion and applying the enhancement. No. 11-3245 25 D. Acceptance of Responsibility Credit Finally, we find no merit to Bennett’s argument that the district court erred in failing to credit him for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Our review of the district court’s decision is once again for clear error. United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2010). Because we are “ill-equipped to assess whether a particular defendant is motivated by genuine acceptance of responsibility or by a self-serving desire to minimize his own punishment,” we afford “great deference” to the sentencing judge in such cases. United States v. Gilbertson, 435 F.3d 790, 799 (7th Cir. 2006). U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) provides that a court may decrease the offense level by two levels “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility.” Bennett argues that—following his four-year flight from the law under an assumed name, arrest, and removal to Wisconsin—he pled guilty and “clearly accept[ed] responsibility” and that it was error for the court to ignore this acceptance. Based on United States v. Lallemand, 989 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1993), Bennett argues that, because there is not a necessary logical incompatibility between his obstruction of justice (for which he received a sentencing enhancement) and possible acceptance of responsibility, he is entitled to the § 3E1.1(a) reduction. That argument misconstrues our precedent. Although a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice “ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct,” U.S.S.G. 26 No. 11-3245 § 3E1.1(a) cmt. n.4, Bennett is correct to point out that such a relationship is not required. The presumption that the relationship exists, however, can only be rebutted by a defendant in an “extraordinary case[ ].” Id.; see also United States v. Black, 636 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2011). Bennett argues that the timing of his actions is key and makes his case “extraordinary”: while he obstructed justice during his four years on the run, he clearly manifested an acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty after his arrest. However, simply because Bennett can argue that the district court was not required to deny him the two-level credit, it does not follow that the court was then required to grant him the credit. We have never used “extraordinary” in this setting to refer only to the issue of timing, in fact we have explicitly rejected that notion. See United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the argument that a defendant who earlier obstructed justice may “wipe the slate clean, and earn the acceptance of responsibility discount, just by pleading guilty and thereafter refraining from obstructing justice further”). The district court did not find that Bennett presented an extraordinary case, (R. 252 at 26-27), and we do not think that decision was clearly erroneous. Lallemand is not to the contrary. In Lallemand, the defendant directed a friend to destroy evidence upon the defendant’s arrest. 989 F.2d at 937. Immediately following the defendant’s arrest, however, he confessed, began cooperating with law enforcement, and even phoned the friend to tell him not to destroy the evidence (an impossible request, it turned out, as the friend had followed the instructions faithfully). Id. at 937-38. We found No. 11-3245 27 that the enhancement and the credit were not mutually exclusive under those circumstances—though Lallemand did obstruct justice, he almost immediately sought to minimize the effect of that obstruction and cooperated with the authorities to the full extent of his ability. Id. at 938-39. The district court held that behavior to be extraordinary, and we did not find that decision incom- patible with the upward adjustment. In the same vein, we defer to the district court’s decision here and cannot find that it clearly erred in finding Bennett’s case not to be extraordinary. Bennett’s obstruction—fleeing and living in Atlanta under an assumed name for four years—was more significant, and the evidence of his purported acceptance of responsibility—a guilty plea—was more dubious than in Lallemand, the case on which Bennett relies. The district court found that Bennett cooperated post-arrest “because he believed it would help him . . . , not because he really accepts responsibility.” (R. 252 at 27.) That determination “is entitled to great deference on review.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5. We afford the district court that deference here and find that it was not clearly erroneous to deny Bennett the two-level § 3E1.1(a) credit.