Opinion ID: 671512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Entrapment by Estoppel Defense

Text: 25 Normally, in reviewing a district court's grant of a government's motion in limine, the standard is abuse of discretion. United States v. Thompson, 976 F.2d 666, 671 (11th Cir.1992). However, the district court, in granting the government's motion in limine, reached the legal conclusion that entrapment by estoppel is not a permissible defense in Sec. 922 cases. R2:36. Additionally, the district court reached the conclusion that Thompson's factual proffer did not give rise to a defense to a Sec. 922 violation. Id. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. United States v. Goolsby, 908 F.2d 861, 863 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Alexander, 835 F.2d 1406, 1408 (11th Cir.1988). Findings of fact made by the district court, however, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 915 (11th Cir.1990). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). 26 The district court ruled that Thompson's entrapment by estoppel defense was not a permissible defense to a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. R2:36. That simply is not true. 27 It is generally true that motive or intent is irrelevant with respect to strict liability offenses. Dees v. United States, 789 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir.1986). 4 However, the Supreme Court and various circuits have carved out exceptions to that general rule. E.g., Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980) (stating that a felon who has been expressly entrusted with the possession of a firearm by prison authority, who has been pardoned and expressly granted authority to possess a firearm, who had previous conviction vacated, and a defendant who has consent to his possession by Secretary of the Treasury, all may assert a defense to a Sec. 922 charge); United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 939, 127 L.Ed.2d 230 (1994) (entrapment by estoppel serves as a defense to a Sec. 922 charge where government official tells defendant that certain conduct is legal, defendant relies on that representation in engaging in that conduct and subsequently is prosecuted for it); United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397 (11th Cir.1990) (entrapment by estoppel is a viable defense to a strict liability offense); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.1987) (defendant who had been told by federal official that he could legally possess firearm because his prior felony had been reduced to a misdemeanor could rely on defense of entrapment by estoppel). 5 28 Title 18, United States Code, Sec. 922 involves a strict liability offense which ordinarily renders the defendant's state of mind irrelevant. However, the defense of entrapment by estoppel focuses on the conduct of the government officials, not on the state of mind of the defendant. Hedges, 912 F.2d at 1405. [E]ntrapment by estoppel applies when an official tells a defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant believes that official. Id. (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959); United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir.1988)). Because the defense of entrapment by estoppel rests upon principles of fairness ... it may be raised even in strict liability offense cases. Id. (citing Tallmadge, 829 F.2d at 773). To disallow such a defense to be presented would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the State. Cox, 379 U.S. at 571, 85 S.Ct. at 484 (citing Raley, 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257). 29 In applying these basic principles, this circuit has held that the defense of entrapment by estoppel may prevent a defendant from being convicted of a Sec. 922 offense. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562. 6 Therefore, the district court was in error when it ruled that the defense of entrapment by estoppel is inapplicable in Sec. 922 cases. To the contrary, the defense of entrapment by estoppel is a viable defense in Sec. 922 cases. Id. 30 Working from this rule, the next inquiry is whether Thompson should have been permitted to present evidence of his theory of defense to the jury. Generally, courts should not prohibit a defendant from presenting a theory of defense to the jury. Nevertheless, the court recognizes that some relevant factual basis for the defense should exist under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 before evidence or testimony is offered. If Thompson's in camera testimony had no relevance to his theory of defense, then it may have been proper to prohibit him from presenting evidence of entrapment by estoppel to the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402; See generally United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, n. 18 (11th Cir.1994) (noting that confusion can arise when determining relevancy issues in cases involving defenses based on perceived governmental authority, including innocent intent, public authority and entrapment by estoppel defenses). 7 31 However, the question of the extent of a grant of immunity, i.e., in this case, whether it included the possession of a firearm, is generally a question of fact for the jury. United States v. Cross, 928 F.2d 1030, 1045 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 594, 116 L.Ed.2d 618 (1991). Therefore, if there was any basis to support the theory that Thompson had been told he could possess a firearm, the jury should have been permitted to hear the testimony and weigh the evidence itself. Even if Thompson's testimony regarding the alleged immunity agreement was not credible, as the government asserts and the district court found, it is the jury's, not the district court's, function to determine questions of credibility and assess Thompson's testimony. Billue, 994 F.2d at 1565 (citing United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir.1990)); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir.1981). 32 Thompson's factual proffer in support of his theory of defense, while not the most convincing testimony, was not so incredible as to render it irrelevant in this case. 8 For instance, Thompson testified that he had been sent by the ATF or other law enforcement officers to the pawn shop where he pawned various firearms. R2:4-5, 28. Next, Thompson testified that he had been hired by various government officials to get some drug dealers. R2:8. His participation would be just like the 'Wise Guy' off of t.v. ... just like ... having a badge, other than without having a badge. Id. He further testified that when he brought guns to the pawn shop, he was doing what he was told to do by the government agents. R2:10, 34. In fact, Thompson testified that FBI agent Mike Twibell even gave him a gun and told him to protect himself because the people Thompson was assisting the law enforcement officers in investigating were dangerous. R2:28. Finally, Thompson testified that he had been granted immunity for crimes committed, short of murder, in connection with his assistance in the investigations. R2:13, 18. 33 It is evident from Thompson's testimony that he had some connection with law enforcement officers, both state and federal, a fact which the government does not dispute. Therefore, it is possible that one or more law enforcement officers told Thompson it was all right for him to possess a firearm, instructed him to carry guns to the pawn shop, or granted him immunity. At the very least, Thompson should have been given the opportunity to present his defense to the jury, in order to permit the jury to perform its function and assess the credibility of Thompson's defense. See e.g., Billue, 994 F.2d at 1565. The district court denied Thompson this opportunity. Therefore, the district court erred in granting the government's motion in limine to exclude as irrelevant evidence of the reasons for Thompson's possession of the firearms. 9 34 AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. REMANDED for new trial.