Opinion ID: 1870865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney's Fees in Paternity Actions

Text: Davis argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her motion for attorney's fees because acts by the circuit court prior to filing the motion for attorney's fees show bias and because the circuit court erred in determining that there was a lack of documentation for services, inflated billings, and a lack of expertise. Davis more specifically argues that statements, decisions, and actions taken by the circuit court prior to Davis filing the motion for attorney's fees are relevant to show an abuse of discretion in later denying her motion for attorney's fees. Davis points out in excess of twenty examples of alleged bias from the trial and hearings resulting in the September 11, 2002, order settling custody, support, and other issues relating to the paternity suit. The parties cite Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992), a paternity case, on the issue of attorney's fees. We find the following relevant language in Green : Finally, appellant urges that the award of an attorney's fee of $40,000 was an abuse of the court's discretion. He recognizes that the court has broad discretion to award attorney's fees, Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987), but maintains that the award is excessive. We stated our rule in Lytle v. Lytle, 266 Ark. 124, 583 S.W.2d 1 (1979). Green, 308 Ark. at 480, 826 S.W.2d 226. There is no discussion in Green, supra , of the right to attorney's fees in paternity cases, making the case only marginally helpful in showing that attorney's fees may be granted. With regard to attorney's fees, this court recently stated, Arkansas follows the American Rule that attorney's fees are not chargeable as costs in litigation unless permitted by statute. Cotten v. Fooks, 346 Ark. 130, 55 S.W.3d 290 (2001). Statutory authority for attorney's fees in paternity actions is found in Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-109 (Repl.2002) and by Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-342 (Supp.2003). See Beavers v. Vaughn, 41 Ark.App. 96, 849 S.W.2d 6 (1993). Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-27-342(d)(Repl.1998) provides: (d) Upon an adjudication by the court that the putative father is the father of the juvenile, the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and requirements as established by the laws of this state applicable to child support orders and judgments entered upon divorce. The court may award court costs and attorney's fees. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-10-109(a)(Supp.2001) provides in pertinent part: subsequent to a finding by the court that the putative father in a paternity action is the father of the child, the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and requirements as set forth in the laws of this state applicable to child support orders and judgments entered by the chancery court as if it were a case involving a child born of a marriage in awarding custody, visitation, setting amounts of support, costs, and attorney's fees. . . . Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-109 (Supp.2001). Thus, procedure applicable to child support orders entered upon divorce applies to a motion on attorney's fees in a paternity action. The decision to award attorney's fees and the amount of an award are discretionary determinations that will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).