Opinion ID: 1702553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Standing of the Defendants to Compel Arbitration

Text: Lewis does not challenge on appeal the standing of any of the defendants to compel arbitration under the Form U-4/NYSE constitution art. XI, section 1, contract (electing instead, as already noted, to put all of his eggs in one basketthat the dispute arises solely out of the Purchase Agreement), so we have no appellate issue presented in that regard. See Rule 28, Ala. R.App. P.; and Gonzalez v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 689 So.2d 812, 819 (Ala.1997) (`When an appellant fails to properly argue an issue, that issue is waived and will not be considered on appeal.') (quoting Sullivan v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 656 So.2d 1233 (Ala.Civ.App.1995)). Nonetheless, Oakley makes the point in his brief to this Court that, given Merrill Lynch's status as a signatory, he would have standing by virtue of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, also sometimes referred to as the doctrine of intertwining. We will briefly address that issue. As recently reiterated in Ex parte Lovejoy, 790 So.2d 933, 937 (Ala.2000), quoting First Family Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Rogers, 736 So.2d 553, 560 (Ala.1999): `[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.` A T & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960)). Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a plaintiff may be compelled to arbitrate his or her claims against a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration provision if the claims `are founded on, and are intertwined with, the facts surrounding the underlying contract that contains the arbitration clause.' Ex parte Dyess, 709 So.2d 447, 451 (Ala.1997). Specifically, claims against a nonsignatory to a contract containing an arbitration provision are `founded on, and are intertwined with, the facts surrounding the underlying contract,' id., (1) where the plaintiff asserts breach of duty imposed or entailed by that contract, or (2) where the plaintiff alleges conspiracy or agency between a nonsignatory and a signatory to a contract containing an arbitration clause. Ex parte Isbell, 708 So.2d 571 (Ala.1997). See also MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir.1999). See also Ex parte Stamey, 776 So.2d 85, 89 (Ala.2000), and Ex parte Napier, 723 So.2d 49, 53-54 (Ala.1998). The description in the contract of the parties entitled to arbitration is, as already shown, clearly broad enough to include Oakley. Hence Oakley has shown himself alternatively entitled to compel arbitration under this doctrine.