Opinion ID: 1685556
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.

Text: ¶ 15. In dismissing Jennings's claim, the chancellor stated that the case had been on file for nearly fourteen years and that there had been some prejudice to Peggy as a result of the delay. Jennings argues that the chancellor relied primarily on the passage of time and that factors other than delay must be present to warrant dismissal under Rule 41(b). ¶ 16. Cases from both this Court and the Court of Appeals indicate that factors other than delay typically are present when a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is upheld. See Hoffman v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 752 So.2d 1030, 1034-35 (Miss.1999) (dismissal improper); AT & T, 720 So.2d at 181-82 (dismissal improper); Watson, 493 So.2d at 1279-80 (dismissal affirmed); Tolliver ex rel. Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Green, ___ So.2d ___, 2007 WL 2034622, 2007 Miss.App. LEXIS 467, 20-23 (Miss. Ct.App.July, 17, 2007) (dismissal affirmed); Hensarling v. Holly, 972 So.2d 716, 720-21 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (dismissal affirmed); Hine v. Anchor Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, 911 So.2d 1001, 1004-07 (Miss.Ct.App. 2005) (dismissal affirmed); Camacho v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 862 So.2d 540, 543-44 (Miss.Ct.App.2003) (dismissal improper); Lone Star Casino Corp. v. Full House Resorts, Inc., 796 So.2d 1031, 1032-33 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (dismissal improper). ¶ 17. Nevertheless, factors other than delay are not required. The standard is whether there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff. . . . AT & T, 720 So.2d at 181 (emphasis added); see also Hine, 911 So.2d at 1005 (where a clear record of delay has been shown, there is no need for a showing of contumacious conduct). Aggravating factors serve to bolster the case for dismissal, but are not required. AT & T, 720 So.2d at 181 (citing Rogers, 669 F.2d at 320). ¶ 18. Even though delay alone may suffice, the chancellor relied both on the passage of time and his finding of prejudice in dismissing Jennings's claim. The chancellor had specifically reserved the right to dismiss the case if prejudice were found. It was the chancellor's later finding of prejudicenot the passage of time alone  that tipped the balance in favor of dismissal. ¶ 19. Jennings further argues that he has not been guilty of any delay or contumacious conduct, but consistently has pursued his claim. Jennings points out that he has been through four attorneys as part of his effort to advance the case. [9] ¶ 20. Efforts to secure substitute counsel may constitute excusable delay. Cf. Watson, 493 So.2d at 1279 (lack of counsel not permissible delay where plaintiff materially contributed to the delay); see also Morris v. Ocean Systems, Inc., 730 F.2d 248, 249, 253 (5th Cir.1984) (delay of eight months included efforts to secure substitute counsel); Camacho, 862 So.2d at 544 (delay of five months in acquiring counsel); Lone Star Casino Corp., 796 So.2d at 1033 (delay of twenty months in acquiring counsel). However, the delay in this case is significantapproximately seven years and one month in which no activity occurred on the docket and almost nine years in which Jennings took no action on the case. ¶ 21. Jennings asserts that settlement discussions were ongoing between the parties during the dormancy period. Settlement efforts also may constitute excusable delay. See Morris, 730 F.2d at 252-53; see also GCIU Employer Retirement Fund v. Chicago Tribune Co., 8 F.3d 1195, 1200 (7th Cir.1993); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 626 F.Supp. 90, 94 (M.D.Ga.1985); but see Rovner v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 29 F.R.D. 488, 490 (E.D.Penn.1962) (active prosecution of a case can be expected to leave footprints on the docket.). However, the pendency of negotiations is not an excuse where the delay is unreasonably long . . . or if it continues after it is apparent that the negotiations would not be fruitful. GCIU Employer Ret. Fund, 8 F.3d at 1200 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 626 F.Supp. at 94). ¶ 22. Even assuming that informal settlement discussions took place during the significant period of inactivity, Jennings should have abandoned settlement efforts and pursued litigation on his claim when it became apparent that negotiations were unyielding.