Opinion ID: 2807529
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor’s Closing Arguments

Text: “Improper vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony. . . .” United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]redibility is a matter to be decided by the jury.” Id. at 1082 (citation omitted). “To that end, prosecutors have been admonished time and again to avoid statements to the effect that, if the defendant is innocent, government agents must be lying.” Id. at 1082–83 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “It is also true, however, that the prosecution must have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments. Inherent in this latitude is the freedom to argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence. In a case that essentially reduces to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that one of the two sides is lying.” Id. (citations omitted). Reversal of Alcantara’s conviction based on the prosecutor’s closing arguments is not warranted given Alcantara’s credibility problems and the evidence presented at trial. Alcantara was found in the United States in an area described as “very mountainous, rugged terrain” north of the United States-Mexico border. The government presented photographs to the jury evincing the rugged and mountainous terrain through which Alcantara maintained that he blindly and unconsciously wandered as he was under the influence of methamphetamine. Despite Alcantara’s contention that he was engaged in methamphetamine-induced wandering, Agent Hunter testified that border patrol agents found empty food containers and bottles in Alcantara’s backpack and that UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 37 Alcantara did not appear to be under the influence of narcotics. Alcantara’s alleged statement to Agent Hunter that Alcantara was separated from a group of aliens traveling to the United States after being dispersed by border patrol agents was consistent with Agent Joseph Moore’s testimony concerning similar events that occurred that evening. Alcantara also suffered from an extensively selective memory. He testified in great detail about his decision to enter a rehabilitation clinic on the day before his arrest; the one thousand pesos he won at a casino “on Revolucion and Third Street” after purchasing a fifty-peso ticket he used to buy six balloons of methamphetamine on the night before making his decision to seek rehabilitation; his purchase of five bags of methamphetamine at the Hotel Nizan on the same evening; his bus trip at five o’clock in the morning on June 25th to Tecate; his purchase of two bags of methamphetamine immediately before his bus trip; his arrival in Tecate at eight o’clock in the morning; his cab ride to “the Andalucia neighborhood” to meet a friend, Juan, who had a small home near Tecate with sheep; his consumption of two balloons of methamphetamine with two men in a tunnel near a bridge and railroad tracks; and his subsequent methamphetamine purchase for seven hundred pesos. After waking up the next day in the United States, Alcantara remembered seeing “a small little farm that had some palm trees”; picking up a water bottle from the side of the road; cleaning a board on the ground next to a container so that he could rest; being approached by an individual “dressed in green”; asking Agent Hunter for water because Alcantara had filled his water bottle “over . . . where the palm trees were at, and the water was dirty”; and picking up a water bottle as he was walking with Agent Hunter. 38 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO Despite Alcantara’s detailed recollection of the former events, Alcantara did not remember traveling through a rugged and mountainous area into the United States, any statement to Agent Hunter about his entry into the United States, or even Agent Hunter’s trial testimony from the day before until finally answering the district court’s question. Moreover, Alcantara’s credibility was severely undermined by his admissions that he had been convicted of illegal reentry in 1995, 1997, 2002, and 2009. Notably, Alcantara was arrested for illegal reentry on two occasions after traveling into the United States from Tecate. Alcantara also conceded that he lied during a prior arrest when he falsely stated that he had never used methamphetamine. Although the prosecutor did improperly vouch for government witnesses by mentioning during rebuttal argument that the border patrol agents were “sworn to uphold the law,” the district court immediately sustained the defense attorney’s objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the comment, rendering any error harmless. See United States v. Parks, 285 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that improper statement was rendered harmless because the district court “sustained [the defendant’s] objection . . . and admonished the jury to disregard the statement”). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Alcantara’s request for a curative instruction, as the district court properly held that the jury had been fully instructed concerning the credibility of government witnesses, and its prompt instruction to disregard the isolated comment sufficiently remedied any error. See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 955 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court’s swift response instructing the jury to disregard the improper comment “prevented . . . [the] improper comment from UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 39 materially affecting the verdict”) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A judge’s prompt corrective action in response to improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems arising from such improper comments. . . .”) (citations omitted). Considering Alcantara’s significant credibility problems, the evidence presented at trial of his illegal presences in the United States, and the curative instruction given by the trial judge, Alcantara failed to demonstrate that “in the context of the entire trial, it is more probable than not that [the prosecutor’s comment] materially affected the verdict. . . .” Dorsey, 677 F.3d at 954 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated another way, any error in vouching for the witnesses was harmless. See id. at 955. Finally, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the requested curative instruction. See Skinner, 667 F.2d at 1310 (recognizing that use of curative or limiting instructions is within the district court’s discretion). Our decision in United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), does not compel a contrary result. In that case, the prosecutor extensively vouched for government witnesses. The prosecutor started out by describing a police witness as “a credible officer.” Id. at 1146. Despite being instructed not to vouch, the prosecutor went on to argue that the police officers had no reason to come in here and not tell you the truth. I guess, if you believe . . . defense counsel, they must have lied at the scene there; they came into this court and they lied to you; they lied to this judge; they lied to me; 40 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO they lied to my agent . . . I guess they lied to the dispatcher when they called it in. These are officers that risk losin’ [sic] their jobs, risk losin’ [sic] their pension, risk losin’ [sic] their livelihood. And, on top of that if they come in here and lie, I guess they’re riskin’ bein’ [sic] prosecuted for perjury. . . . Id. The prosecutor used the “they lied” refrain six consecutive times, and told the jury that the officers risked losing their jobs, losing their pensions, losing their livelihood, and being prosecuted for perjury. Id. In contrast, the prosecutor in this case simply stated once that the agent was sworn to uphold the law. Unlike in Weatherspoon, see id., the prosecutor in this case did not continue to vouch for the agent after the court sustained the defense objection. Moreover, unlike in Weatherspoon, see id., the court in this case gave a curative instruction. The two cases are so different that Weatherspoon does not dictate the result in this case. In Weatherspoon, we held that reversal of the defendant’s conviction was warranted because the district court’s approach did not produce any meaningful alteration of the prosecutor’s arguments, and the manner in which such objections were sustained unfortunately did not deliver the required strong cautionary message . . . Id. at 1151. We opined that UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 41 [s]uch failures to correct the improper statements at the time they were made cannot be salvaged by the later generalized jury instruction reminding jurors that a lawyer’s statements during closing argument do not constitute evidence. In short, the curative instructions offered . . . did not neutralize the harm of the improper statements because they did not mention the specific statements of the prosecutor and were not given immediately after the damage was done. Id. (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court in this case immediately sustained the defense’s objection and instructed the jury to disregard the isolated comment. Unlike in Weatherspoon, Alcantara does not contend that the government continued to improperly vouch for government witnesses after the district court’s ruling. See Dorsey, 677 F.3d at 955 (noting that the judge’s curative action prevented any improper comment from “materially affecting the verdict”); see also Parks, 258 F.3d at 1141 (same).