Opinion ID: 1426752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Sophistication

Text: The juvenile court assessed the minors' criminal sophistication, concluding their relative lack of criminal sophistication indicated they were amenable to the care and treatment of the juvenile court. The court explained this was a first offense for both minors and their lives showed no pattern of criminality. Although the crime was planned, the number of blunders the minors made in its execution indicated they did not really know what they were doing. The court observed the minors, for example, did not even know how to uncock the hammer of the gun they used, a [v]ery simple [procedure] if you know guns. In addition, the minors stood outside the store without their masks on, permitting them to be recognized by passersby. Even though the minors apparently knew they had been seen, they nevertheless continued into the store to commit the crime. Of critical importance, the court found the minors did not intend to kill the victim. The court found that, after the minors were arrested, they were very frightened of the situation in which they found themselves. In conclusion, the juvenile court explained: Everybody thinks they are going to go get away with it, and they don't. This [crime] did not take a rocket scientist ... a highly intellectual individual. What it did is it took, you know, thinking young men who for some reason or another thought that they could... [¶] ... make some money and not get caught, without the slightest intent, I believe, according to the evidence that I heard, to hurt or kill anyone. [¶] Taking into consideration all of those factors, there is a degree of sophistication. There is a degree of sophistication, but neither of the minors is at the point where they are criminally sophisticated sufficiently to be unamenable. And the court, therefore, as to Melvin and as to Marcus, taking into consideration the things that I have just discussed, both would be amenable under criteria number one. (Italics added.) The majority concludes the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding the minors' lack of criminal sophistication was sufficient to rebut the presumption of unfitness, because its factual findings were not supported by substantial evidence. I cannot agree, for it cannot be said the juvenile court's decision was unsupported by evidence that was `reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value.' ( People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 576, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, quoting Estate of Teed, supra, 112 Cal. App.2d at p. 644, 247 P.2d 54.) Undeniably, one reasonable view of the evidence is that the minors' blunders in effectuating the crime do not indicate a lack of sophistication, given their advance planning, use of a firearm, and earlier planning activity in obtaining gloves and masks, and, further, that in view of their brandishing of the cocked gun, the minors intended to kill. This, indeed, is the interpretation of the evidence the majority adopts; it contends [t]he fact that [the minors] were `inept' and did not elude arrest ... does not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding that their conduct was `unsophisticated.' The juvenile court's conclusion that the minors lacked `the slightest intent ... to hurt or kill anyone' is belied by the highly dangerous manner in which they carried out the robbery. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 652 of 76 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 404 of 958 P.2d.) This view is also consistent with the probation report prepared for both minors. Where the majority goes astray is in its refusal to recognize that this is not the only reasonable interpretation of the facts. The juvenile court below concluded the minors' lack of any criminal record, blunders in the commission of the crime and evident lack of intent to kill indicated their relative degree of criminal sophistication was insufficient to indicate an unfitness to remain in juvenile court. In reaching that conclusion, the juvenile court did not, as the majority finds, rely on evidence so ephemeral or insubstantial that an appellate court should decline to accord the conclusion the traditional deference given to factual findings made by the trier of fact. On the question of whether the blunders committed by the minors in the commission of the crime reasonably could be construed as failing to demonstrate a sufficiently high level of criminal sophistication so as to preclude retention in the juvenile justice system, I quote the psychological report of Dr. Clive Kennedy, prepared after his examination of Melvin: [Melvin's] behavior and recent past do not meet the criteria for a moderate or severe conduct disorder. This suggests that the minor's behavior is not consistent with that of sophisticated juvenile delinquents. He does not affiliate with an organized gang or criminal group. He does not engage in firesetting, routinely initiate fights using weapons, or violate the rights of others with confrontation. [¶] The present crime[,] however, does have sophisticated elements. He used a handgun and mask. However, his choice of a target near his home (where he was identified), decision to become intoxicated prior to participating in the crime, and his mode of escape (no vehicle was used) shows poor planning, were less sophisticated, and may have contributed to his capture. The mask was not effective as the minor was identified as he left the store. And the gun appeared to be `borrowed' from a classmate, another potential source of capture. Therefore, the facts of this case alone, are not sufficiently compelling to indicate [] a lack of amenability. Again, the fact that these behaviors appear to be inconsistent with his customary lifestyle does argue for amenability. He is considered fit under this criteria. (Italics added.) The court considered the minors' lack of any prior contacts with the juvenile justice system and that their crime was inconsistent with their character. [3] The court also read and considered the behavioral studies, including the one quoted above from Dr. Kennedy, which concluded specifically that Melvin's lack of criminal sophistication rendered him amenable to treatment. (A different study of Marcus, prepared by Dr. Jack Rothberg, was not so specific, but did conclude overall that he was amenable to treatment.) By no stretch of the imagination can one legitimately characterize this evidence as insubstantial and therefore deserving of no deference. That I, like the majority, might disagree with the trial court and draw different inferences from the evidence, is of no consequence. Our role is not to try the case de novo, nor do we exercise independent review. When, as here, two reasonable views of the evidence are possible, proper appellate procedure requires that we view the evidence in a light favorable to the minors, as the parties who prevailed below, and defer to the juvenile court's interpretation of the significance of the blunders they committed in execution of their planned robbery. The proper inference to be drawn from the blunders aside, the juvenile court found the minors did not intend to kill; this fact alone, if supported by substantial evidence, supports the juvenile court's conclusion the minors were insufficiently sophisticated to be unamenable to rehabilitation. Indeed, both common law and statutory law recognize that a lack of intent to kill is the single most powerful circumstance that can mitigate a homicide. On this point, the juvenile court considered carefully the minors' recorded statements in the back of the police car. At one point, Marcus states: Man how the fuck you pull the trigger on that nigger man? He didn't do nothing man. Melvin replied: I didn't even try to man, I don't mean it  (Italics added.) Although the juvenile court could reasonably have disbelieved these statements as self-serving, the court instead decided the statements were credible. Speaking of Melvin, who apparently was holding the weapon when it discharged, the court stated: There was [an] indication that he did not know how to work the gun, did not know how to uncock it. The sole purpose of the weapon was to rob the store, but there was no intent to kill (Italics added.) Later: The court didn't find in any of the material or evidence that was presented to it that the minors contemplated killing anyone. There was not an attempt to do so. Considering that the minors did not know they were being recorded in the police car and, thus, were more likely to be speaking the truth, the juvenile court's conclusion the minors lacked the intent to kill was not unreasonable. Faced with disputed facts, the juvenile court simply made a commonplace credibility determination. The juvenile court personally heard the witnesses testify, personally observed the minors and was able personally to evaluate their demeanor, all factfinding advantages not shared by myself or my colleagues in the majority. To the extent the majority chooses to disregard or disbelieve this evidence, they simply are substituting their own credibility determination for that of the juvenile court. To do so, of course, is improper. In addition to the minors' statements, support for the juvenile court's conclusion they did not intend to kill is found in the minors' behavioral studies. Dr. Kennedy's study of Melvin notes information from [the minor's] interview and police reports indicates that the shooting was not planned. Dr. Rothberg's study of Marcus notes Marcus insists that he had no intention of ever hurting anyone. The majority apparently disregards this evidence as well. In short, not just substantial, but ample, evidence supports the juvenile court's findings of fact concerning [t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor[s]. Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the minors had rebutted the presumption of unfitness under section 707, subdivision (e), criteria (A).