Opinion ID: 676159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burden Shifting Under McDonnell Douglas and its Progeny

Text: 22 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) the Supreme Court established a framework for the allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in cases dealing with discriminatory treatment in employment. 2 BP does not challenge the trial court's finding that Howard satisfied the minimal requirements of the prima facie case, creating a presumption of racial discrimination: (1) Plaintiff is black, (2) he is qualified to own and operate a BP station, (3) BP rejected his application for a dealership, and (4) the dealerships were given to non-blacks. See Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. To establish a 'presumption' is to say that a finding of the predicate fact (here, the prima facie case) produces 'a required conclusion in the absence of explanation' (here, the finding of unlawful discrimination). St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting 1D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence Sec. 67 p. 536 (1977)). 23 Once the prima facie case establishes the presumption of intentional racial discrimination, the defendant may rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision. See Id. The defendant's burden, like Plaintiff's prima facie burden, is easily fulfilled. 24 Defendant can easily rebut this presumption, however, by articulating some legitimate reason for its actions. Once defendant states a legitimate reason, plaintiff must show that defendant's articulated reason is merely a pretext and that defendant's true reason for discharging plaintiff was discrimination. 25 Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir.1987). 26 BP claims it awarded the two stations to Bruce Pforisch based on his ten years experience with BP. BP also notes that Pforisch's station was a full service station, the type of station in which Howard expressed no interest. BP says it granted Kianian a station because he received an award for being an outstanding BP dealer at his other station. BP chose Dean, Robertson and Mary Bailey because their relatives were successful BP dealers. BP also notes that it awarded a station to I.C. Gordon's son, Fernando, on that same basis. Fernando Gordon is black. BP granted a station to Delmar Rice because he was recommended by I.C. Gordon. Defendant's articulation of these reasons defeats the presumption of intentional racial discrimination. 27 At this point, plaintiff may demonstrate through presentation of his own case and through cross examination of the defendant's witnesses, 'that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision' and that race was. St. Mary's, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2747 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). St. Mary's held that to prevail at trial, a plaintiff must do more than merely prove the articulated reasons false. The plaintiff must also prove that the real reason for the employer's decision was intentional racial discrimination. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2752. However, to withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that a genuine question exists as to whether the reason for the decision was intentional discrimination. 28 B. Quantum of Evidence Necessary to Rebut Defendant's Articulated Reason for Awarding Stations to Other Applicants 29 St. Mary's was an appeal of a bench trial in which the district judge entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding its finding that the stated reasons for the adverse employment decision were false. See Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2748. The Supreme Court found that such a conclusion was possible because a finding that the employer lied as to the reasons for its decision does not restore the presumption that the real reason was racial discrimination. Nonetheless the Court added the following dicta: 30 [t]he fact finder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.... [n]o additional proof of discrimination is required. 31 Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Society, 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir.1992)). 32 St. Mary's holds that proof that a defendant's articulated reasons are false is not proof of intentional discrimination; it is merely evidence of intentional discrimination. However, evidence of intentional discrimination is all a plaintiff needs to defeat a motion for summary judgment. That evidence must be sufficient to create a genuine factual issue with respect to the truthfulness of the defendant's proffered explanation. 33 In Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir.1993), we held: Evidence already introduced to establish the prima facie case may be considered, and 'indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation' and establish pretext. Id., quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n. 10. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion at oral argument, our holding in Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 939 F.2d 946 (11th Cir.1991), upon which the district court relied so heavily, is still good law. In Brown, we upheld the principle that to withstand a defendant's motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff had to do more than establish a prima facie case and deny the credibility of defendant's witnesses. Id. at 950. 34 The difference between Hairston and Brown is the difference between evidence sufficient to overcome summary judgment and that which is insufficient. In Brown the court upheld summary judgment, holding that Honda's evidence supporting its articulated reason was extremely compelling and the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find defendant's articulated reasons were false. We concluded, [a]lthough the plaintiff has produced scattered pieces of circumstantial evidence, none of it, even taken as a whole, raises sufficient questions to undermine [defendant's] nondiscriminatory rationale. At p. 954. Beyond establishing his prima facie case, the Brown plaintiff merely denied the credibility of the defendant's witnesses. Accordingly, summary judgment was proper in Brown notwithstanding the finding that the plaintiff established a prima facie case. 35 Hairston and Burdine hold that the identification of inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony is evidence of pretext. Thus, the identification of a defendant's inconsistent statements has evidentiary value; mere denial of credibility has none. Under St. Mary's, a plaintiff withstands summary adjudication by producing sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the defendant's articulated reasons for its decision are not believable. Such evidence may consist of a defendant's inconsistent statements. 36 We emphasize that St. Mary's does not in any way alter the summary judgment burdens articulated in Celotex. In Celotex the Court held that when the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, as Howard will with respect to the issue of intentional discrimination, Rule 56(e) ... requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and ... designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. St. Mary's merely indicates that evidence from which a jury could find that the articulated reasons are false is enough to create a genuine issue for trial. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. 37 C. Evidence that BP's Articulated Reasons for Denying Howard a Dealership are False 38 Howard argues that he presented evidence that BP's articulated reasons for choosing other applicants is false. The evidence consists of alleged inconsistencies in BP's testimony as to the qualifications of those awarded stations and as to the extent to which BP had a policy of awarding stations to relatives of current owners. Howard claims this evidence, viewed in the context of unwritten criteria for the award of dealerships and individualized rationale for individual decisions, articulated only after the fact, is enough to bring the case before the jury. We agree.
39 BP has no written criteria for the selection of dealers. It merely seeks individuals with managerial, business and interpersonal skills and prefers people with prior experience in the petroleum industry. BP admits Howard meets every requirement. BP has different explanations for each station: some were given to people who already owned BP dealerships; some were given to relatives of BP dealers; one was awarded based on the recommendation of the prior owner of the station. We view these subjective and ad hoc criteria with greater scrutiny than we would if BP strictly followed written criteria. See Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir.1984). But, that does not change the fact that Howard must introduce evidence of discrimination. A contract may be granted 'for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as it [ ] is not for a discriminatory reason.'  Brown, 939 F.2d at 951, quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir.1984).
40 The most significant alleged inconsistency in BP's explanations of its dealership assignment decisions arises with regard to the stations awarded to relatives of current dealers. Nepotism does not violate Title VII per se but it may be evidence of intentional discrimination when it works to the detriment of a protected class. See Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825-26 (4th Cir.1989). In the instant case the evidence of disparate impact or equal impact is inconclusive. 41 BP claims it awarded stations to Bart Dean, Mike Robertson and Mary Bailey because their relatives ran successful stations and these applicants received experience working in their relatives' stations. BP also notes that it awarded a station to Fernando Gordon, a black man, because he had experience working in his father's station. The district court rejected Howard's claim that ad hoc contracting decisions, many of which were based on nepotism, discriminatorily impacted blacks. The trial court relied on Brown, which held: It is difficult to hold that a practice which affects applicants of all races in the same manner is actually designed to conceal a racially discriminatory motive. 939 F.2d at 952. 42 While Howard's case is not based on a disparate impact theory, proof of disparate impact would be one form of evidence with which Howard could prove disparate treatment. At oral argument, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the ad hoc contracting decisions disparately impacted black applicants. Neither brief contained meaningful statistics. Therefore, there remains no evidence that nepotism was used as a pretext for discrimination. 43 The fact question that arises with regard to BP's nepotism is not so much whether the employment of nepotistic policies is evidence of discrimination. Rather, the real question is whether BP employed such a policy at all. BP's district manager, James Boulware, testified in his deposition that he was unaware of any BP policy or practice to favor relatives of BP dealers. BP explains Boulware's unfamiliarity with this practice, claiming that Boulware was not the ultimate decision-maker. But the fact that Boulware was not ultimately responsible for choosing dealers from among the applicants, does not explain why the district manager, who was intimately involved in recruiting new dealers, was unaware that BP had a policy favoring relatives of existing dealers. This apparent inconsistency, viewed against the backdrop of BP's unwritten, shifting criteria, would enable a reasonable jury to find that BP, in fact, had no policy of favoring relatives of dealers and that BP's explanation for awarding stations to Mary Bailey, Bart Dean and Mike Robertson is false.
44 Another alleged inconsistency stems from divergent views as to Max Kianian's qualifications. Carol Martin, a BP district manager stated she did not believe Kianian was qualified to run another station, based on his performance in his first station. Martin, nonetheless, awarded Kianian a station at the direction of her superior, Pete Riley. Regardless of Martin's subjective opinion as to Kianian's qualifications, BP's evidence that Kianian received such recognition and BP's assertion that Riley made the decision remains uncontested. 3 Thus, Howard's bare assertion that Kianian was unqualified does not create any fact question for the jury.