Opinion ID: 707581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Classification as a Career Offender

Text: 19 Mr. Kissick also argues that he was improperly classified as a career offender under USSG Secs. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. In particular, he focuses on his 1986 conviction for possession of cocaine and argues that it does not constitute a controlled substance offense as that term is used in Sec. 4B1.2. 20 Under USSG Sec. 4B1.1, a defendant is classified as a career offender if: (1) he is at least 18 years old at the time of the instant offense; (2) the instant offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) he has at least two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 21 USSG Sec. 4B1.2 defines the terms crime of violence and controlled substance offense. At the time of Mr. Kissick's sentencing, USSG Sec. 4B1.2 defined a controlled substance offense as an offense identified in 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841, 845b, 856, 952(a), 955, 955(a), 959; and similar offenses. See USSG App. C, Amend. 49 (effective January 15, 1988), Amend. 268 (effective November 1, 1989). Accompanying application notes to USSG Sec. 4B1.1 supplied a more specific definition of controlled substance offense: 22 Controlled substance offense includes any federal or state offense that is substantially similar to any of those listed in subsection (2) of the guideline. These offenses include manufacturing, importing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, import, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance). This definition also includes aiding and abetting, conspiring, or attempting to commit such offenses, and other offenses that are substantially equivalent to the offenses listed. 23 USSG App. C, Amend. 268. 24 Mr. Kissick maintains that the mere possession of cocaine does not constitute a controlled substance offense under these guidelines definitions of that phrase. His argument is supported by the provisions of the statutes to which USSG Sec. 4B1.2 refers. All of them involve more that mere possession See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a) (manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing controlled substances and possessing controlled substances with the intent to commit these acts); Sec. 845b (now 861) (employing juveniles to commit controlled substance violations); Sec. 856 (establishing manufacturing operations); Sec. 952(a) (importing controlled substances); Sec. 955 (possessing controlled substances on board a vessel arriving in or departing from the United States); Sec. 955a (manufacturing, distributing, or possessing controlled substances with the intent to manufacture or distribute on board vessels); Sec. 959 (manufacturing or distributing for purposes of unlawful importation). 25 Moreover, decisions applying the version of Sec. 4B1.2 under which Mr. Kissick was sentenced have noted that [s]imple possession, as defined by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844 [sic], is not included in the list of crimes that constitute a controlled substance offense under the Career Offender provision. Hansen v. United States Parole Comm'n, 904 F.2d 306, 310 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052, 111 S.Ct. 765, 112 L.Ed.2d 784 (1991). Decisions applying subsequent versions of USSG Sec. 4B1.2 have also concluded that simple possession is not a controlled substance offense. See United States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542, 549 (10th Cir.1991) (noting government concession that controlled substance offense under Sec. 4B1.2 does not include mere possession); United States v. Gaitan, 954 F.2d 1005, 1011 (5th Cir.1992) (noting that controlled substance offense does not include mere possession). 3 26 Nevertheless, as the government notes and he concedes, Mr. Kissick did not raise this issue at sentencing or in his direct appeal. 4 As a result, Mr. Kissick may only pursue this issue in a Section 2255 proceeding if he can show cause for his failure to raise it and prejudice resulting from that failure. United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir.1995). Mr. Kissick attempts to establish cause by arguing that his failure to challenge the Florida conviction resulted from his attorney's neglect. 27 In fact, a defendant may establish cause for failing to raise a claim by demonstrating that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)). In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient; and (2) that this deficient performance was prejudicial. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 28 Under the first prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must establish that counsel made errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Under this standard, Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The court must avoid the distorting effects of hindsight, and the defendant must overcome the presumption that the attorney's action constituted sound trial strategy. Id. Nevertheless, a defendant is entitled to the 'exercise [of] the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney.'  United States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir.1985) (quoting Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 945, 100 S.Ct. 1342, 63 L.Ed.2d 779 (1980)) (alteration in original). 29 Under the second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. However, a court may not set aside a conviction or a sentence solely because the outcome would have been different absent counsel's deficient performance. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842-43, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). Instead, in order to establish the required prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 842. 30 We have applied the Strickland test in various circumstances to conclude that an attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient and prejudicial. In Cook, we held that an attorney who had failed to raise an issue on appeal that was (in Judge Easterbrook's colorful parlance) a dead-bang winner had provided ineffective assistance under Strickland. Cook, 45 F.3d at 395 (quoting Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989)); see also Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515-16 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that attorney who had failed to raise clearly meritorious issues on appeal provided ineffective assistance). Similarly, in Baker v. Kaiser, 929 F.2d 1495, 1499-1500 (10th Cir.1991), we concluded that the representation provided by an attorney who failed to ascertain whether a defendant wanted to appeal a conviction or who failed to discuss the merits of the appeal with the defendant was constitutionally deficient. Finally, in Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626-31 (10th Cir.1988), we affirmed a district court's finding that an attorney who failed to discover mitigating evidence to present at a capital sentencing proceeding provided ineffective assistance under Strickland. 31 Several other courts of appeals have applied Strickland in determining whether the failure to challenge findings in a presentence report constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, in Durrive v. United States, 4 F.3d 548 (7th Cir.1993), the Seventh Circuit concluded that an attorney's failure to object to the sentencing court's disregard of various provisions of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32 did not render his performance constitutionally deficient. The Durrive court noted that, according to the defendant, adequate performance by his counsel at sentencing would have only reduced the offense level from 28 to 26. Because the corresponding guidelines range of sentences was 87 to 108 months, the defendant's sentence would have been at least 12 months less than the 120 months that he actually received. The Seventh Circuit found this potential reduction in the defendant's sentence insufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland. However, the court added that grave errors by the sentencing court and counsel might be sufficiently prejudicial to meet the Strickland standard. Durrive, 4 F.3d at 551. [A]n error that produces a large effect on the sentence could be condemned on this basis. Id. 32 In Spriggs v. Collins, 993 F.2d 85 (5th Cir.1993) (per curiam), the Fifth Circuit also concluded that an attorney's failure to object to part of a presentence report did not satisfy the Strickland test for prejudice. The court observed that the inaccurate sections of the report were relatively short and non-specific and that the rest of the report (which was accurate) was sufficient to support the defendant's sentence. Spriggs, 993 F.2d at 90. The Fifth Circuit held that under the Strickland prejudice prong, a court must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel's errors the defendant's non-capital sentence would have been significantly less harsh. Id. at 88. Importantly, the Spriggs added that one foreseeable exception to this requirement would be when a deficiency by counsel resulted in a specific, demonstrable enhancement in sentencing--such as an automatic increase for a 'career' offender or an enhancement for use of a handgun during a felony--which would have not occurred but for counsel's error. Id. at 89 n. 4 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Stevens, 851 F.2d 140, 145 (6th Cir.1988) (concluding that attorney's failure to advise the court of error in presentence report might constitute deficient performance under Strickland); United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169, 1173 n. 3 (7th Cir.1984) (same); Smith v. United States, 871 F.Supp. 251, 255 (E.D.Va.1994) (While courts are properly deferential to attorneys' discretion, failure to raise an objection to a clear and indisputable error in the [presentence report] is not within the broad range of performance that can be deemed reasonable.). 33 In the instant case, the record supports Mr. Kissick's argument that his failure to challenge the Florida conviction at sentencing resulted from his attorney's ineffective representation. As to the first element under Strickland--counsel's deficient performance--it appears from the presentence report that the Florida conviction included none of the elements beyond simple possession necessary to establish a controlled substance offense under USSG Secs. 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. Just as in Banks, Cook, Baker, and the other cases in which we have concluded that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, an objection to the government's use of the Florida conviction to classify Mr. Kissick as a career offender appears to have been a dead-bang winner. An attorney's failure to challenge the use of a prior conviction to classify the defendant as a career offender when that prior conviction is facially insufficient to satisfy the definition of a controlled substance offense under USSG Sec. 4B1.2 therefore constitutes deficient performance under Strickland. See Cabello v. United States, 884 F.Supp. 298, 303 (N.D.Ind.1995) (holding that counsel's failure to object to use of possession of cocaine charge to support career offender status was ineffective and subpar). 34 As to the second Strickland element, the prejudice resulting from the failure to challenge a career offender classification is clear. With regard to Mr. Kissick, the applicable guideline established a range of sentences between 324 and 405 months for career offenders. If he had not been classified as a career offender, the presentence report indicates, Mr. Kissick would have been assigned a criminal history score of IV, and the applicable range of sentences would have been 262 to 327 months. See USSG Ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table); Rec. vol. VIII, at 15. Under the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Durrive and the Fifth Circuit in Spriggs, such a significant increase in the range of sentences that Mr. Kissick could receive constitutes prejudice under Strickland--particularly when the sentencing judge characterized the applicable guidelines provisions as harsh and sentenced Mr. Kissick at the lower end of the guidelines range. Following Durrive and Spriggs, we conclude that when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance results in the defendant's improper classification as a career offender and when that improper classification results in a significantly greater sentence, the prejudice element of Strickland is satisfied. In conjunction with constitutionally deficient performance by counsel, such prejudice meets the standard for procedural default. See generally Banks, 54 F.3d at 1516; Cook, 45 F.3d at 395. 5 35 Nevertheless, the record before us does not allow a definitive conclusion as to the performance of Mr. Kissick's counsel and the impact of that performance on the sentence received by Mr. Kissick. Aside from a brief description in the presentence report, we can find no documents in the record concerning Mr. Kissick's Florida conviction. It is therefore conceivable that, in spite of the report's description of the conviction as involving Possession of Cocaine, Rec. vol. VIII, pt. B, at p 33, Mr. Kissick was actually convicted of an offense that contained elements other than mere possession and that may have satisfied the definition of a controlled substance offense under USSG Sec. 4B1.2. Because of the significant impact of the Florida conviction on sentencing and because the nature of the Florida conviction was not specifically addressed by the district court in either the initial sentencing or the Section 2255 proceedings, we conclude that this matter should be remanded to the district court. 36 On remand, the district court should determine whether the Florida conviction was for mere possession of cocaine or whether it involved the additional elements required under USSG Sec. 4B1.2 to constitute a controlled substance offense. 6 If the Florida conviction was for mere possession, then Mr. Kissick should not have been sentenced as a career offender. Moreover, Mr. Kissick's attorney's failure to challenge his career offender status in the initial sentencing proceedings will satisfy the cause and prejudice standard for procedural default and Mr. Kissick will be entitled to resentencing. Alternatively, if the government can establish on remand that the Florida conviction constitutes a controlled substance offense under USSG Sec. 4B1.2, then Mr. Kissick will not be entitled to resentencing. As to any resentencing, we note that the district court will be governed by the guidelines in effect at the time of resentence. United States v. Ziegler, 39 F.3d 1058, 1063-64 (10th Cir.1994). 37 Accordingly, the district court's order denying Mr. Kissick's motion to vacate, modify, or set aside his sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion.