Opinion ID: 531844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mullins' Conditional Offer of Reemployment to Keene

Text: 13 In its opinion, the Commission asserts that the facts compel it to overrule the ALJ's conclusion that Mullins transgressed Sec. 105(c) by refusing to rehire Keene except under illegal and unsafe conditions. Thus the Commission says that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's finding that Mullins ... unlawfully discriminated against Keene. J.A. 17 (emphasis added). 14 While the Commission's opinion is not a model of clarity, a careful reading of its discussion of the reemployment issue indicates that it overturned the ALJ on legal and not factual grounds: 8 15 While this offer [of reemployment under the same circumstances] did not resolve Keene's safety concerns, neither did it suggest any additional adverse action against Keene by Mullins.... We find no evidence that would cause the conversation to be characterized as anything other than an attempt by Keene and Mullins, in his role as President of S & M, to settle the original discrimination complaint.... Thus we view this conversation as an outgrowth of the original illegal discharge by S & M and not as a separate act of discrimination by Mullins individually. Under these circumstances, we hold that Keene's testimony regarding the crucial aspects of the conversation does not support a finding by the judge of a separate act of discrimination by Mullins individually. J.A. 17 (emphasis added). 9 16 The first clue that the Commission's analysis hinges on its view of the law and not on its view of the facts is that the Commission found precisely the same dispositive facts as did the ALJ--that Mullins offered Keene his old job back under the conditions that prevailed prior to his original discharge except that he would not have to report the violations he found. J.A. 31-32. The second clue is that while the Commission emphasizes the nexus between an unlawful discharge and a refusal to rehire, the ALJ did not even mention the relationship. Id. Thus we read the Commission's opinion as articulating the following legal rule: An offer to reemploy a miner under illegal and dangerous conditions does not constitute a violation of Sec. 105(c) of the Act separate from a prior unlawful discharge for refusing to work under the same illegal and dangerous conditions and thus cannot be charged as an additional violation of Sec. 105(c). 17 We agree with the Secretary that this rule mischaracterizes the law. Moreover, because the Secretary reads the Mine Act differently than does the Commission, we are not bound by Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), to accord great deference to the Commission's interpretation of the Act. 10 18 Mullins' offer to reemploy Keene under illegal and dangerous conditions transgresses the clear prohibition of Sec. 105(c) that [n]o person shall ... interfere with the exercise of the statutory rights of any miner ...or applicant for employment because such miner or applicant for employment has [ ] made a complaint under or related to this chapter of an alleged danger or safety or health violation in a coal or other mine ..., or because of the exercise by such miner ... or applicant for employment on behalf of himself or others of any statutory right afforded by this chapter. (Emphasis added.) Keene was an applicant for employment when Mullins conditioned his job offer on Keene's working under illegal and unsafe conditions. Clearly, Mullins would not have felt compelled to condition his offer on illegal terms if Keene had not, while still employed at S & M, made a complaint of the unsafe conditions to which the illegal practice of bridging-out gave rise. The fact that S & M also violated Sec. 105(c) at an earlier point in time by interfering with Keene's statutorily protected rights while he was still a miner within the meaning of the Act does not insulate Mullins from liability for subsequently interfering with Keene's statutorily protected rights in his capacity as an applicant for employment. 19 Moreover, our interpretation of the applicability of the Act to Mullins' discriminatory reemployment offer is supported by the Senate Report that preceded the Act. As the Report explains, Sec. 105(c) is to be construed expansively to assure that miners will not be inhibited in any way in exercising rights afforded by legislation, including the right to refuse work on conditions they believe to be unsafe or unhealthful. S.Rep. No. 95-181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1977, pp. 3401, 3436 (emphasis added). That language speaks directly to the issue here, as Keene was offered reemployment only under conditions he believed to be unsafe. Additionally, the report states that [i]t is the Committee's intention to protect miners against not only the common forms of discrimination ... [but also] against the more subtle forms of discrimination. Id. An offer of reemployment conditioned on a miner's willingness to work under dangerous conditions of which a miner has previously complained surely qualifies as a more subtle form of discrimination. Finally, while Sec. 105(c) does not explicitly protect miners against discriminatory offers of reemployment, the report explains that, [t]he listing of protected rights contained in Sec. 105(c) is intended to be illustrative and not exclusive. Id. 11 20 In addition to the Act and its legislative history, prior discussions by this court of both the Mine Act and its forerunner, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (CMHSA), support our conclusion that an employer's unlawful discharge of a miner for complaining of illegal and unsafe working conditions and an employer's offer to rehire the miner under the same illegal and unsafe conditions constitute distinct violations and thus are separately actionable. 21 In Simpson, 842 F.2d 453, we reviewed a decision by the Commission in which it had reversed the ALJ's findings of both discriminatory discharge and discriminatory failure to rehire under Sec. 105(c). After explaining its contrary views of both the futility exception and constructive discharge, the court remanded to the Commission to redetermine, in a manner consistent with its opinion, whether Simpson had been unlawfully discharged. We explained, however, that if the Commission determined that Simpson had been unlawfully discharged, the refusal of Simpson's employer to rehire Simpson constituted a second act of unlawful discrimination: If Simpson's work refusal was protected by the Mine Act, the evidence ... would have supported the ALJ's finding that the refusal to rehire was based on protected activity, in violation of section 105(c)(1). Simpson, 842 F.2d at 464. 22 Similarly, in Munsey, 507 F.2d at 1209-10, this court remanded to the Commission with a special instruction to address the petitioner's claim of unlawful failure to rehire in addition to reconsidering petitioner's claim of unlawful discharge: The Board addressed petitioner's grievance solely as a matter of dismissal from ongoing employment.... We note, however, that not only was there the dismissal on April 15, but also the company's refusals on that date and later on April 29 to reemploy petitioners after they had expressed their willingness and desire to return to work. 12 23 Nonetheless, while our dicta in both Simpson and Morton lend support to our holding here, we do not need to adopt as expansive a reading of the Act as we suggested in those cases. In both Simpson and Morton, the respective refusals to reemploy the discharged miners were just that; unconditional refusals to reemploy. We are not called upon in this case to hold that a mere unconditional refusal to reemploy an unlawfully discharged miner constitutes a violation of Sec. 105(c) separate from the miner's original unlawful discharge. Rather, under the facts of this case, we hold only that where a miner is discharged for complaining of illegal and unsafe working conditions and is subsequently offered reemployment conditioned on his willingness to return to those same illegal and unsafe working conditions, the unlawful discharge and the discriminatory reemployment offer constitute separate violations of Sec. 105(c) and thus may be charged independently and simultaneously. 13 Consequently, we reverse this part of the Commission's holding and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 14