Opinion ID: 2168477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of Review and Applicable Law

Text: Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction petitions are regarded as mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Honeycutt, 54 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn.2001); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn.1999). Under our statutory law, the Petitioner bears the burden of proving the allegations of fact in his post-conviction petition by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f); Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 293 (Tenn.2009). Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim.App.1998). On appeal, the findings of fact made by the trial court will not be disturbed unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates against them. Brooks v. State, 756 S.W.2d 288, 289 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); Clenny v. State, 576 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978). When reviewing the application of law to the post-conviction court's factual findings, our review is de novo, and the post-conviction court's conclusions of law are given no presumption of correctness. Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293; Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 457-58 (Tenn.2001). In this instance, the Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). If he is able to prove the fact of his trial counsel's alleged error by clear and convincing evidence, then he must first establish that the error fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Dellinger, 279 S.W.3d at 293 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In other words, the services rendered or the advice given must have been below the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn.1975). Secondly, the Petitioner must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The question for the post-conviction court, therefore, is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the result would have been different. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Should the Petitioner fail to establish either counsel's deficient performance or the resulting prejudice, he is not entitled to relief. This Court has interpreted the standard of review as follows: Because a petitioner must establish both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not address the components in any particular order or even address both if the defendant makes an insufficient showing of one component. Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052). When a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to a guilty plea, as in this instance, he or she must prove that counsel performed deficiently and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763(1970). [8] The primary consideration is whether the deficiency in performance affected the outcome of the plea process. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. The petitioner is not, however, required to demonstrate that he would have fared better at trial than by a plea of guilt. Id. at 59-60, 106 S.Ct. 366. [9]