Opinion ID: 1291973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Montano asserts the government never proved Montano intentionally joined the conspiracy. To convict Montano of a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, the government had to prove (1) the existence of a conspiracy, that is, the agreement to distribute drugs; (2) Montano knew of the conspiracy; and (3) Montano intentionally joined the conspiracy. United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 2007 WL 2820288, at  (8th Cir.2007). We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences. United States v. Wintermute, 443 F.3d 993, 1003 (8th Cir.2006). We will reverse the jury verdict only if no reasonable jury could have found Montano guilty. United States v. Sanders, 341 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir.2003). Montano concedes the government proved the existence of the Hinestroza cocaine conspiracy. Thus, the only issues are Montano's knowledge of the conspiracy and whether Montano knowingly joined the conspiracy. Montano acknowledges he bought and sold drugs with members of the conspiracy, and Montano concedes the Government's evidence established . . . Montano's presence and knowledge of the actions of . . . Hinestroza's organization. Montano undeniably knew of the conspiracy. Montano's real contention is the evidence is deficient to show he joined the conspiracy. [A] defendant may be convicted for even a minor role in a conspiracy, so long as the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she was a member of the conspiracy. United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc). Joint delivery and resale of narcotics by purchasers is sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Espino, 317 F.3d 788, 793-94 (8th Cir.2003). Here, numerous cooperating witnesses testified to Montano's involvement. Andres-Borja and Lusk both testified to a drug transaction between Montano and Colon in a Kansas City, Missouri, shopping center parking lot involving three to five kilograms of cocaine. Andres-Borja also testified Montano was one of the Hinestroza cartel's two largest cocaine buyers in Kansas City. Drug ledgers recovered by the FBI corroborated Andres-Borja's testimony with one entry documenting the sale of five kilograms of cocaine to Montano, and another entry documenting the sale of eleven kilograms of cocaine to Montano. Andres-Borja delivered cocaine to Montano, and Lusk transported drugs for Montano on twenty separate occasions. Collins and Harris both bought kilogram quantities of cocaine from Montano, while Watson took delivery of three kilograms of cocaine from Montano and Ortiz. The government's evidence was certainly sufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction. Montano also attacks the credibility of the government's witnesses. It is axiomatic that we do not review questions involving the credibility of witnesses, but leave credibility questions to the jury. United States v. Dabney, 367 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir.2004). The jury is free to believe the testimony of any witness in its entirety, or to reject that testimony as untrustworthy. United States v. One Star, 979 F.2d 1319, 1321 (8th Cir.1992). In Montano's case, the testimony of the cooperating witnesses was corroborated by other consistent testimony and by the drug ledgers and other exhibits. We conclude Montano's conviction for conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine is supported by more than sufficient credible evidence.