Opinion ID: 615771
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scoping

Text: Wyoming's first claim under NEPA alleges that the scoping period of the Forest Service was inadequate. Specifically, Wyoming argues that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to (a) extend the scoping period beyond the initial sixty days allotted, and (b) provide during the scoping period detailed maps of the IRAs affected by the Roadless Rule. The district court held that the Forest Service's failure to extend the scoping period and provide maps accurately depicting the areas covered by the rule was arbitrary and capricious in that it deprived Wyoming of the opportunity to meaningfully `participate' in determining the scope and significant issues to be analyzed in the EIS. Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1333-34. On appeal, the Forest Service argues that it fully complied with its scoping obligations under NEPA, that it was not required to extend the scoping period, and that the district court erred in finding that its failure to provide maps prevented Wyoming from meaningfully participating in the scoping process. We hold that the Forest Service fulfilled its scoping obligations under NEPA, and therefore did not act arbitrarily and capriciously. Scoping is the initial phase of the overall EIS process under NEPA. Citizens' Comm. to Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1022. The scoping process is an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7; see Citizens' Comm. to Save Our Canyons, 297 F.3d at 1022 (stating that the goal of the scoping process is to identify[] specific issues to be addressed and studied during the EIS process (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7)). To initiate the scoping process, the agency is required to publish a NOI in the Federal Register [a]s soon as practicable after its decision to prepare an [EIS]. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7. As part of this process, the lead agency is required to, inter alia, [i]nvite the participation of affected Federal, State, and local agencies and [d]etermine the scope . . . and the significant issues to be analyzed in depth in the [EIS]. Id. § 1501.7(a)(1), (2). In addition, the agency  may . . . [s]et time limits for the scoping process and [h]old an early scoping meeting or meetings. Id. § 1501.7(b)(2), (4) (emphasis added). In regard to setting time limits for the scoping process, the only requirement is that such limits comply with 40 C.F.R. § 1501.8. Id. § 1501.7(b)(1). Section 1501.8 does not prescribe[] universal time limits for the entire NEPA process, but instead merely authorizes agencies to set time limitsincluding times limits on the scoping processthat are appropriate to individual actions and are consistent with the purposes of NEPA and other essential considerations of national policy. Id. § 1501.8. More specifically, the principal regulations governing scopingi.e., the CEQ Regulationsdo not set minimum time limits for the scoping period and do not require an agency to extend or reopen the scoping period; those determinations are generally left to the agency's discretion. In accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7, the Forest Service published a NOI commencing the scoping period for the Roadless Rule on October 19, 1999. 64 Fed. Reg. at 56,306. The NOI stated that the Forest Service is initiating a public rulemaking process to propose the protection of remaining roadless areas within the [NFS]. Id. The scoping period for the proposed rulemaking was to close on December 20, 1999, sixty days after it opened. Id. The NOI gave an overview of the proposed rulemaking, see id. at 56,307 (stating that the Forest Service proposes to promulgate a [two-part] rule that would restrict certain activities, such as road construction, in unroaded portions of [IRAs] and establish national direction for managing inventoried roadless areas, and for determining whether and to what extent similar protections should be extended to uninventoried roadless areas); listed the possible alternatives that would be considered in the DEIS, see id. (listing the four alternatives, including the no action alternative); and gave a tentative timeline for completion of the overall NEPA process, see id. (stating that the [DEIS] and proposed rule are expected . . . in Spring 2000, and a [FEIS] and final rule will follow). The NOI did not indicate the existence of any maps depicting the geographic scope of the Roadless Rule, but it did indicate that the proposed rule would apply to unroaded portions of inventoried roadless areas, as previously identified in RARE II and existing forest plan inventories. Id. Turning to the Forest Service's refusal to extend the scoping period, we conclude that it was not unreasonablethat is, not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretionto limit the period to sixty days and to decline to extend it any further. As stated above, there is no requirement mandating a minimum number of days the scoping period must remain open or requiring the Forest Service to extend or reopen the scoping period. We have found that [a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances the administrative agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and methods of inquiry permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. U.S. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 559 (10th Cir.1986) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress intended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should be employed. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 546, 98 S.Ct. 1197) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, as long as the agency complies with the statutory and regulatory minima, absent extremely compelling circumstances, a reviewing court generally may not overturn an agency decision for failure to provide additional procedure, Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 543, 98 S.Ct. 1197; such [extreme] circumstances, if they exist, are extremely rare. Id. at 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197. Nothing in NEPA or the CEQ Regulations (or the APA for that matter) required the Forest Service to extend the scoping period beyond the initial sixty-day allotment; Wyoming itself acknowledges this. See Wyo. Br. at 16 (Wyoming agrees that the NEPA scoping regulations do not specifically require . . . extensions of the scoping period upon request.). To impose upon the agency more stringent requirements than the legal framework requires, absent extremely compelling circumstances, would violate the well-settled principle articulated by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee that the formulation of procedure is to be basically left within the discretion of the agencies to which Congress has confined the responsibility for substantive judgments. Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 559. Because Wyoming has cited to no extremely compelling circumstance that would justify our intrusion, we conclude that the agency's refusal to extend the comment period was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., id. (applying Vermont Yankee and holding that the EPA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously under the APA in refusing to extend the [45-day] comment period 30 days because [t]here [wa]s no requirement concerning how many days the EPA must allow for comment or that the EPA must re-open the comment period at the request of one of the participants); cf. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 673 F.2d 525, 534 (D.C.Cir.1982) (holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's refusal to extend the minimum comment period under the APA was not unreasonable because [n]either statute nor regulation mandates that the agency do more, even though a longer comment period might have been helpful due to the technical complexity of the regulations). [21] The district court likewise erred in holding that the Forest Service's failure to present detailed maps of the areas impacted by the Roadless Rule during the scoping period was arbitrary and capricious. The district court found that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to provide maps accurately depicting the areas covered by the Roadless Rule because without such maps Wyoming could not meaningfully participate in defining the scope of a rule when it did not know what lands within its borders would be impacted by the rule. Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1333. Again, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the Forest Service's refusal to provide such information was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. As Wyoming acknowledges, neither NEPA's provisions nor the CEQ Regulations require an agency to include detailed maps or a precise geographic description of the areas potentially affected by a proposed rule during the scoping process. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7. [22] Furthermore, Wyoming's assertionand the district court's conclusionthat the failure to provide maps deprived Wyoming of an opportunity to meaningfully participate in the scoping process because it could not determine which areas would be affected is wholly without merit. A review of the record demonstrates that Wyoming had adequate notice of the unroaded areas within their borders that would be affected by the proposed rule, which in turn enabled Wyoming to meaningfully participate in the scoping process. See Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1116-17 (The primary purpose of the scoping period is to notify those who may be affected by a proposed government action which is governed by NEPA that the relevant entity is beginning the EIS process; this notice requirement ensures that interested parties are aware of and therefore are able to participate meaningfully in the entire EIS process, from start to finish. (citing Nw. Coal. for Alts. to Pesticides (NCAP) v. Lyng, 844 F.2d 588, 594-95 (9th Cir.1988))). First, the Forest Service displayed preliminary versions of the Roadless Rule maps at the scoping meetings, including the meetings in Wyoming. See Aplt.App. at 312-13 (Baron Decl., dated Feb. 28, 2003) (stating that preliminary maps were presented at scoping meetings in Wyoming, which displayed rough depictions of the RARE II IRAs located within Bighorn, Bridger-Teton, Medicine Bow, Shoshone, and Ashley National Forests, as well as the Thunder Basin National Grassland); id. at 2023-26 (large-scale copies of Geographic Information System (GIS) maps depicting RARE II IRAs in Bighorn, Bridger-Teton, and Medicine Bow National Parks, which were displayed at scoping meetings in Wyoming). These maps, although not depicting the precise boundaries of the rule's geographic scope, gave Wyoming sufficient notice as to which IRAs within its borders would generally be impacted by the rule. Second, even without the maps, Wyoming was aware of the IRAs that would be impacted because the NOI indicated that the rule would restrict certain activities . . . in unroaded portions of inventoried roadless areas, as previously identified in RARE II and existing forest plan inventories. 64 Fed.Reg. at 56,307. This description alone reasonably informed the public, including Wyoming, of which IRAs would be affected by the rule. The notice provided by the preliminary maps and also the NOI's reference to IRAs identified in the RARE II and existing forest plan inventories were more than sufficient to allow Wyoming to meaningfully participate in the initial scoping phase of the EIS process; that is, sufficient to allow them to meaningfully participate in the early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7. [23] Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in holding that the Forest Service's failure to provide more detailed maps during the scoping period was arbitrary and capricious.