Opinion ID: 2459828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Victim-impact statute

Text: We discuss appellant's remaining penalty-phase arguments should they arise upon remand. Appellant challenges Arkansas's victim-impact statute, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1993), as being void-for-vagueness. Particularly, appellant claims that this statute fails to define who is a victim. This statute provides in pertinent part as follows: In determining sentence, evidence may be presented as to any matters relating to aggravating circumstances enumerated in § 5-4-604, any mitigating circumstances, or any other matter relevant to punishment, including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence, provided that the defendant and the state are accorded an opportunity to rebut such evidence. (Emphasis added.) Recently, we rejected a similar vagueness challenge to this provision in Nooner v. State, supra , stating as follows: The United States Supreme Court permits the States to authorize victim-impact testimony. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 [111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720] (1991). The Court referred specifically to who might qualify as being impacted by a victim's death and to the State's legitimate interest in counteracting the defendant's mitigating evidence and in reminding the jury that the victim was a person whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family. 501 U.S. at 825 [111 S.Ct. at 2608]. Thus, the testimony may range from the victim's family to those close to that person who were profoundly impacted by his death. In the case before us, only [the victim's mother] gave impact testimony. We decline to hold Act 1089 of 1993 to be impermissibly vague. That our victim-impact statute is not void for vagueness only resolves part of appellant's argument. He further contends that, because there is no place in the Arkansas statutory weighing process for the jury to consider victim-impact evidence, our victim-impact statute is violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 9. Particularly, appellant contends that the victim-impact statute conflicts with Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-4-603 and -604 (Repl.1993), which direct the jury to determine whether aggravating circumstances exist, to weigh any aggravating circumstances against any mitigating circumstances, and to determine whether the aggravating circumstances justify a death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, we find appellant's argument unpersuasive. In our decision in Nooner, we alluded to the State's legitimate interest in counteracting the defendant's mitigating evidence. Id. at 109, 907 S.W.2d 677, citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608. As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Payne, there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in mind [the specific harm caused by the defendant] at the same time it considers the mitigating evidence introduced by the defendant. 501 U.S. at 826, 111 S.Ct. at 2609. The Court recognized that a misreading of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), had unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial, as there are virtually no limits placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances. 501 U.S. at 822, 111 S.Ct. at 2607, citing Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1876-77, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As such, the Court held that a State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. at 2609. Regarding appellant's Eighth Amendment claim, the United States Supreme Court has held that [a] capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. Tuilaepa v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2638, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). In so holding, the Court recognized that a contrary rule would force the States to adopt a kind of mandatory sentencing scheme requiring a jury to sentence a defendant to death if it found, for example, a certain kind or number of facts, or found more statutory aggravating factors than mitigating factors. The States are not required to conduct the capital sentencing process in that fashion. Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2639, citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199-200, n. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2937, n. 50, 49 L.Ed.2d 859. Appellant also asserts that the victim-impact statute violates Art. 2, § 9, of the Arkansas Constitution, yet he has failed to present us with any argument showing us why we should interpret this provision in manner contrary to that of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Diffee v. State, 319 Ark. 669, 894 S.W.2d 564 (1995); Ridenhour v. State, 305 Ark. 90, 805 S.W.2d 639 (1991). While the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to the introduction of victim-impact testimony, this rule is not without limits. When evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-183, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2470-72, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). After reviewing the victim-impact evidence presented in this case, we conclude that this line was not crossed here. Initially, we note that there was no victim-impact testimony offered at trial pertaining to victim Helton. Roberta Sullivan and Jerri Fletcher, sisters of Robert Phegley, both testified as to the loss they felt after their brother's death. Particularly, Roberta described her brother as her best friend. She further described Cheryl as more like a daughter than a niece, as Cheryl had lived with her from age three to age fourteen. Jerri testified that she was angry over her brother's death and that he and Cheryl were a duo in the family. Since Jerri lived in Mississippi, she described her loss as not a day-to-day thing [like] what the other sisters feel. Rhonda Darby, Robert's daughter and Cheryl's sister, testified that while she has never been really close to Cheryl, she was just starting to get close with her father again prior to his death. A high school senior at the time of the incident, Rhonda stated her grades fell and she quit basketball. As she was to be married in three weeks, she would be denied the privilege of having her father escort her down the aisle. Kelly and Kerri Falls, sisters of Richard Falls, testified that they were very close to their brother. As Kelly was the first person in her family notified of her brother's death, she experienced difficulty in having to inform her other family members. According to Kelly, her family experienced disbelief and anger and was torn apart. Kerri used to see her brother every day, and her three-year-old son did not understand his uncle's death. We cannot say that this testimony was so unduly prejudicial that it rendered appellant's trial fundamentally unfair; thus, we reject his argument.