Opinion ID: 1267469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Erroneous Advice

Text: Davis next proposes his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted because Davis's former attorney gave erroneous advice regarding the likelihood (1) Davis would receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, and (2) the government would make a motion for a downward departure for substantial assistance. In his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Davis cast his claims as a misunderstanding of the plea agreement and the application of the Guidelines. However, during the second hearing before the magistrate and now on appeal, Davis recast his claims as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent Davis continues to assert his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted based on Davis's misunderstanding of the agreement and the application of the Guidelines, we disagree. We have explained: A defendant may not withdraw a plea. . . merely because he misunderstands how the sentencing guidelines will apply to his case. So long as the district court tells a defendant the statutory range of punishment that he faces and informs him that the sentencing guidelines will be used in determining the ultimate sentence, the plea is binding. This is true even where the misunderstanding is caused by defense counsel's erroneous estimation of what the ultimate sentence will be. United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d 824, 826 (8th Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted). Our review of the plea hearing transcript satisfies us the magistrate fully complied with the requirements of Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b), and Davis does not suggest otherwise. Davis also claims his motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been granted due to the erroneous advice, or ineffective assistance, of his attorney. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. . . are usually best litigated in collateral proceedings. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d at 826-27 (citation omitted). We will consider ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal only where the record has been fully developed, where not to act would amount to a plain miscarriage of justice, or where counsel's error is readily apparent. Id. at 827 (citation omitted). Because Davis asserted his ineffective assistance claim at the second hearing, and Davis's former attorney testified at the hearing, we conclude the record is sufficiently developed to permit our review. See id. (A properly developed record for purposes of determining [whether] a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [justifies a withdrawal of a guilty plea] would include cross-examination by [the defendant] of his counsel on the question of what advice counsel gave him.). Davis complains his attorney provided ineffective assistance because the attorney failed to advise Davis that (1) Davis likely would not receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility if Davis were found to have obstructed justice, and (2) the district court could only reduce Davis's offense level by two levels for acceptance of responsibility unless the government made a motion for the third level. [T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). First, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, id. at 57, 106 S.Ct. 366 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052), and second, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial, id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. Davis's attorney provided the following testimony in regard to Davis's acceptance of responsibility: I specifically remember explaining that under the Honken case there was a formidable barrier. . . to getting the reduction for acceptance of responsibility if obstruction of justice was found. The attorney did admit, [I]n all fairness to Mr. Davis, the one thing that I did not advise him of, and I probably should have, in retrospect, is that. . . the government must make the motion for the third-level reduction. However, the attorney also explained that he had read to Davis the provision in the plea agreement that stated, The parties agree to litigate whether any [acceptance of responsibility] adjustment applies under USSG § 3E1.1. The parties understand that application of an upward adjustment [for obstruction of justice] under USSG § 3C1.1 may preclude any decrease for acceptance of responsibility, unless defendant's [acceptance of responsibility] is extraordinary.. . . [I]t is not the United States' present intent to make a motion [for the third-level reduction] under USSG § 3E1.1(b), as the United States does not agree defendant timely accepted responsibility. Davis also charges his attorney erroneously advised him the government would file a substantial assistance motion. [2] Davis's attorney testified, I told [Davis] explicitly that I believed the government would file the motion because of the quantity and the quality of [Davis's] prior cooperation. Yet, Davis's attorney testified he also read the provisions of the plea agreement to Davis, and one of the provisions stated, The United States may, but shall not be required to, make a motion pursuant to [U.S.S.G.] § 5K1.1 . . . requesting the court to depart below the [advisory Guidelines range] in the event defendant provides substantial assistance. This decision shall be in the sole discretion of the United States Attorney's Office. . . . No downward departure for substantial assistance may be made absent a government motion under § 5K1.1. Davis's ineffective assistance claims fail. Even if Davis's allegations regarding the advice of his attorney were accepted as true, Davis's plea agreement accurately described the procedure and requirements for obtaining a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and a downward departure for substantial assistance. Davis's attorney read the plea agreement to Davis, Davis placed his initials next to each provision of the plea agreement, and the district court properly assessed Davis's understanding of the plea agreement and application of the Guidelines. Assuming Davis's counsel's opinion and advice were deficient, Davis cannot show he was prejudiced. We conclude Davis has not articulated a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). Moreover, Davis has not propounded his innocence, he filed his motion to withdraw his plea more than one month after he pled guilty and eighteen days after the district court accepted the guilty plea, and the government may be prejudiced if Davis is permitted to withdraw his guilty plea approximately two years after he was arrested and nearly a year and a half after he pled guilty. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Davis's motion.