Opinion ID: 768749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hall's Challenge to His Sentencing Under the 1997 Guidelines

Text: 28 Hall contends that his sentencing under the 1997 Sentencing Guidelines violated the ex post facto clause because he was not an active participant in the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana after June 1995, and thus, the less severe 1994 Guidelines should have been applied to his sentencing. We note at the outset that Hall raises this challenge for the first time on appeal, and thus, it is deemed waived and the plain error standard applies. See United States v. Rivero, 993 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1993). Nevertheless, [a] sentence based on an incorrect guideline range constitutes an error affecting substantial rights and can thus constitute plain error. United States v. Robinson, 20 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); see United States v. Aman, 31 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 1994). 29 As a general rule, a court imposes a sentence based on the guidelines in effect as of the date of sentencing. See U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.11(a). But if the court determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause [(i.e., subject the defendant to increased punishment)] . . ., the court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed. sec. 1B1.11(b)(1), cmt. (backg'd); see United States v. Kezerle, 99 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Brassell, 49 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1384 (7th Cir. 1994). 30 To resolve Hall's claim, 5 we must initially determine the date of the occurrence of Hall's criminal offense and determine if the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at that time would have resulted in a less severe penalty because the retroactive application of a harsher sentencing guideline contravenes the very purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Seacott, 15 F.3d at 1384. Hall contends that his active participation in the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana ended as of June 1995, when the 1994 Guidelines were still in effect. 31 It is evident from the charging papers and the record, however, that Hall was charged and convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and marijuana from June 1993 to November 1996. We also note that Hall did not raise any objections to the information contained in his PSR, which concluded that the drug conspiracy charged in Count one continued from 1993 through August 1996. Indeed, a court may adopt 32 the factual findings and calculations contained in a PSR, provided that those findings are based upon sufficiently reliable information. United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 340 (7th Cir. 1994); Zarnes, 33 F.3d at 1474; United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1308 (7th Cir. 1991). In fact, when a defendant has failed to produce any evidence calling the report's accuracy into question, a district court may rely entirely on the PSR. . . . In the absence of actual evidence controverting the information in the PSR, i.e., something more than the appellants' mere denials, it was not necessary for the court to conduct any further inquiry into the disputed sentencing issues. 33 United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 547 (7th Cir. 1995). 34 Further, the evidence presented at trial established his participation in the conspiracy during the period charged in the indictment (Count one: from 1993 through 1996). Regardless of the date of the occurrence of his final criminal act, as a member of a conspiracy, Hall's relevant conduct for sentencing purposes includes all reasonably foreseeable acts . . . of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 35 It is not, however, all that easy to withdraw from a conspiracy. Withdrawal requires an affirmative act to either defeat or disavow the purposes of the conspiracy, such as making a full confession to the authorities or communicating to co-conspirators that one has abandoned the enterprise. United States v. Patel, 879 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1989). Merely ceasing participation in the conspiracy, even for extended periods, is not enough. Id. 36 United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1477 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The burden to establish withdrawal from a conspiracy remains firmly on the defendant even once it appears that he has been expelled from the conspiracy. See United States v. Schweihs, 971 F.2d 1302, 1322-23(7th Cir. 1992). It is evident that other than his bald assertion to the contrary, the record is devoid of any evidence that demonstrates that Hall affirmatively disavowed the purposes of the conspiracy. 37 For these reasons, we reject Hall's assertion that his involvement in the conspiracy ended in 1995, and conclude that he remained a member of the conspiracy until its end in 1996, and for purposes of sentencing, is responsible for the reasonably foreseeable offenses of his coconspirators, which also carried through 1996. See U.S.S.G. sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). We hold that the sentence the court imposed upon Hall under the 1997 Guidelines was not in violation of the ex post facto clause for this version of the Guidelines was in effect at the time of his sentencing. 6 38