Opinion ID: 2623059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court of appeals' analysis of the shondel doctrine

Text: ¶ 5 The court of appeals took care to begin its analysis of Mr. Williams' case with an orthodox, plain language inquiry into whether the elements of possession of a controlled substance overlapped with the elements of possession of drug paraphernalia and, if they did, by how much. The court first noted that in order to convict Mr. Williams of the felony of possession of a controlled substance, the State needed to show that he knowingly or intentionally possessed the methamphetamine residue. The court then turned its consideration to misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and observed that the statute made it unlawful to possess a container used to store the controlled substance; the presence of drug residue was one among many facts that could be considered when attempting to discern whether a container, such as a plastic bag, was innocent or illicit. ¶ 6 Had the court of appeals stopped its analysis at this point, it could have concluded that the plain language of the statutes communicated this message: possession of a controlled substance is a felony, while possession of drug paraphernaliawhich may be proven by the presence of the residue of a controlled substance within a containeris a misdemeanor. Clearly, the elements of the two offenses are not identical. To be guilty of possession of a controlled substance, one need not possess drug paraphernalia. Similarly, one may be guilty of possessing drug paraphernalia while not being in possession of a controlled substance. ¶ 7 The court of appeals did not understand its Shondel analysis to end here, however. Despite its recognition that the Shondel doctrine appears to permit the Legislature to enact statutes that impose different penalties for criminal conduct so long as the statutory elements are not identical, the court of appeals expanded the scope of its inquiry in Mr. Williams' case to include consideration of the specific facts. The court noted that [u]der the facts of this case, the State would be required to demonstrate exactly the same proof to convict Defendant for possession of a controlled substance or possession of drug paraphernalia .. Therefore, both chargespossession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernaliadepend solely on Defendant's possession of methamphetamine residue. State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 181U, para. 5. According to the court of appeals' interpretation of the Shondel doctrine, the particular circumstances of a defendant's conduct could trigger the application of the doctrine even in the absence of perfect congruity of the statutory elements of the crimes applicable to that conduct. ¶ 8 This line of reasoning led the court of appeals to hold that the State was prohibited from prosecuting Mr. Williams for the more serious offense, felony possession of a controlled substance. The itinerary of the courts' reasoning appears to have taken it into realms quite distant from the equal protection terrain in which the Shondel doctrine resides. See. State v. Shondel, 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146, 147 (1969). Central to the guarantee of equal protection under the law is the notion that if a law has the effect of treating differently classes of people subject to the law, the government must adequately justify its disparate treatment. E.g., State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, ¶ 31, 114 P.3d 585. As we will discuss, the Shondel doctrine is linked to equal protection in an indirect and unusual way.. The doctrine presumes that the Legislature is never justified in enacting two criminal statutes with identical elements but that carry different degrees of severity and impose different penalties. Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148. Should the Legislature do so, it does not inevitably create unconstitutional classifications of persons, but rather creates the possibility that prosecutors may exploit the options available to them by reason of the identical statutes and charge persons under the statutes in a way that might create discriminatory classifications. The purpose of the Shondel doctrine, then, is to cut off the possibility of creating unconstitutional classifications rather than to remedy classifications actually created by identical criminal laws. ¶ 9 As the court of appeals' decision demonstrates, the application of the Shondel doctrine in the cause of fending off prosecutors' power to create unconstitutional classifications of defendants can itself create the perverse classification of defendants described in the opening sentence of this opinion: possessors of controlled substances without paraphernalia may face felonies, while possessors of controlled substances who also possess paraphernalia are shielded from the risk of a felony conviction. That an entirely plausible and logical application of the Shondel doctrine could have carried the court of appeals to such an anomalous result suggests that a flaw lurks within the doctrine itself and not in the way the court of appeals applied it. Locating that flaw is the task to which we now turn our attention.