Opinion ID: 2362987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enforceability of EOM as a Regulation

Text: Title 10, subtitle 1 of the State Government Article (SG), which is part of the Administrative Procedure Act, sets forth certain requirements for the adoption of regulations by Executive agencies subject to the statute. The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and DOC are subject to the statute. Massey v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, supra, 389 Md. at 499, 886 A.2d at 587. SG §§ 10-110 and 10-111 require that a unit desiring to adopt a regulation, other than as an emergency measure, publish the proposed regulation in the Maryland Register and send a copy of it to the Joint Legislative Committee on Administrative, Executive, and Legislative Review (AELR Committee) for that Committee's review. Section 10-111(a) provides that a unit may not adopt a proposed regulation until that is done. Section 10-112 specifies that, in order to have a proposed regulation published in the Register, it must be accompanied by a notice that (1) states the economic impact of the proposed regulation on State and local government revenues and expenditures and on groups that may be affected by it, and (2) sets a date, time, and place for public hearing. A unit may not change the text of any regulation unless it is proposed anew and adopted in accordance with the requirements of §§ 10-111 and 10-112. . . . SG § 10-113. Section 10-114 requires that, if the regulation is adopted, the unit must submit a notice of adoption for publication in the Maryland Register. SG § 10-117 provides that the effective date of a non-emergency regulation is the tenth calendar day after notice of adoption is published in the Maryland Register (unless a later effective date is specified). Thus, a unit may not adopt a regulation until there has been compliance with §§ 10-110 and 10-111, and a non-emergency regulation duly adopted does not become effective until ten days after notice of its adoption is published in the Register. None of the procedures mandated by those statutes were followed by DOC prior to adopting or, from time to time, amending the EOM. None of the proposals were submitted to the AELR Committee, published in the Maryland Register, or subjected to public hearing. No notice of final adoption was ever submitted to or published in the Maryland Register. Thus, if the execution protocols challenged by Evans fall within the definition of, and thus constitute, a regulation as defined in SG § 10-101(g), they are ineffective. Section 10-101(g)(1) defines a regulation as including, in pertinent part, a statement that has general application and future effect, is adopted to detail or carry out a law that the unit administers or govern the procedure of the unit, and is in any form, including a standard, statement of interpretation, or statement of policy. Section 10-101(g)(2) exempts from that definition a statement which otherwise would be included within it but which concerns only internal management of the unit, or does not affect directly the rights of the public or the procedures available to the public. Evans contends that the actual execution protocols set forth in the EOM  those included in the Lethal Injection Checklist  constitute a regulation, as defined in SG § 10-101(g). The State responds that the EOM is not a regulation because it (1) does not have general application, (2) concerns only the internal management of DOC, and (3) does not directly affect the rights of the public. Those were the bases upon which the Secretary of DPSCS rejected Evans's administrative challenge. Largely for the reasons set forth in Massey, supra, we disagree with the State's response. The State's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, there can be no legitimate doubt that the portions of the EOM that govern the method of and procedure for administering the lethal injection have general application and future effect, were adopted to detail or carry out a law that DOC administers, and govern the procedure of DOC. They have general application and future effect because they comprehensively govern the manner in which every death sentence is implemented. Unquestionably, they were adopted, and, indeed, it is their sole purpose and function, to carry out the mandates of CS §§ 3-905 and 3-906 and add details to the procedure that are unaddressed by the statute. They clearly are within the ambit of SG § 10-101(g)(1). The question is whether the execution protocols fall within the exemptions set forth in § 10-101(g)(2). That was the issue in Massey as well  whether DPSCS directives that established the basis for administering inmate discipline fell within the subsection (g)(2) exemptions. We observed there that, although an exemption from some of the procedural requirements for adopting regulations that pertain only to the internal management of an agency had been part of the Model Administrative Procedure Act for about 50 years and was common in the various State laws, there was surprisingly little comment on the general meaning and scope of that exemption. The available cases and commentary indicated that it was a pragmatic and balanced exemption. Massey v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, supra, 389 Md. at 519, 886 A.2d at 598. On the one hand, applying the procedural requirements too far into the internal workings of the agency would completely stifle agency activities if it were enforced, id. at 519, 886 A.2d at 598-99, quoting from Gary M. Haman and Robert P. Tunnicliff, Idaho Administrative Agencies and the New Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, 3 IDAHO L.REV. 61, 79 (1966), but on the other, agencies could too easily subvert public rulemaking requirements if they could avoid those procedures for anything they called an internal directive to staff. Massey v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, supra, 389 Md. at 519, 886 A.2d at 599, quoting from Arthur E. Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, 60 IOWA L.REV. 731, 833 (1975). (Emphasis in original). Bonfield, who seemed to be the most prolific commentator on this subject, viewed the internal management exemption as a very narrowly drawn provision with several important qualifications meant to assure that matters of internal agency management that are purely of concern to the agency and its staff are effectively excluded from normal rule-making and rule-effectiveness requirements. Massey v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, supra, 389 Md. at 520, 886 A.2d at 599, quoting from Arthur E. Bonfield, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING § 6.17.2, at 402. The kinds of directives falling within the exemption, he concluded in his aforecited law review article, face inwards and do not substantially affect any legal rights of the public or any segment of the public.  He gave as examples purely internal personnel practices and directions. Massey v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, supra, 389 Md. at 520, 886 A.2d at 599, quoting from 60 IDAHO L.REV. at 834. (Emphasis added). The rather meager case law fairly supported and applied those principles. The real test of whether a DOC Directive (or other policy statement) is exempt from the APA requirements because it concerns only the internal management of the agency and does not affect public rights is whether, given the nature and impact of the Directive, the Legislature intended that the agency be free to adopt, change, or abrogate the Directive at will, without any public input or legislative review. As noted, the APA requires that proposed regulations be submitted to the AELR Committee for its review. Although the Committee may not veto a proposed regulation, it may hold hearings, get public input, and object to the proposal. SG § 10-111.1(b) directs the Committee, in deciding whether to oppose a proposed regulation, to consider whether the regulation is in conformity with the statutory authority of the agency and whether it complies with the legislative intent of the statute under which the regulation was promulgated. The ability of the Committee to oppose the regulation is important, because if it does object, the unit has but three options: it may withdraw the proposed regulation, it may amend the regulation, which essentially requires starting the process anew, or it may submit the proposal to the Governor with a statement explaining why it refuses to withdraw or amend the proposal. See Delmarva Power v. PSC, 370 Md. 1, 27, 803 A.2d 460, 475 (2002). The Governor may consult with the Committee and the unit in an effort to resolve the conflict and, after notice to the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Delegates, may instruct the unit to withdraw or amend the regulation or may approve the regulation. A proposed regulation opposed by the Committee may not be adopted and is not effective unless approved by the Governor. The importance of that measure of legislative oversight is highly relevant in considering whether an agency policy directive is of the kind intended by the Legislature to be exempt from that oversight as a matter of purely internal management. We may fairly take judicial notice that the whole issue of the death penalty, and particularly the method of its implementation, is of great interest to the Legislature. It has enacted detailed statutes governing capital punishment and governing, in particular, the method and manner of executing death sentences, and it considers bills dealing with aspects of the death penalty at nearly every session. Notwithstanding that it was advised in 1994 of how DOC intended to implement the lethal injection law if that law were enacted, we are unwilling to assume that the Legislature intended to leave to DOC, on its own and without any formal notice to the AELR Committee, without any opportunity for the Committee to object, without any oversight, unbridled authority to determine and then change at will, as a matter of internal management, how that statute is to be implemented. In this case, DOC has decided to use two chemical paralytic agents. Using the canons of statutory construction applied by courts, we have concluded, as a matter of statutory construction, that the current protocol is consistent with the statute. Applying different standards allowable in a legislative context, the AELR Committee may have a different view, but even if that Committee agrees that the protocol is consistent, it may wish to object to it and direct DOC to consider some other one. Although the three-drug protocol is standard in States using lethal injections, it has been challenged in a number of cases and some believe that it is not as humane as it was purported to be. See Denno, supra, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63. Indeed, that issue appears to be currently pending in a proceeding instituted by Evans in the U.S. District Court. See Evans v. Saar, Civil No. 06-149 (U.S.Dist.Ct.D.Md.). Suppose DOC decides in the future to use three rather than two paralytic agents, or drop potassium chloride or Pavulon and use only the other agent, or use 80 cc or 150 cc of barbiturate rather than 120 cc, or 100 cc of Pavulon rather than 50 cc, or use one or more entirely different drugs? Those kinds of decisions do not constitute routine internal management, any more than the decision to adopt the current mix; they affect not only the inmates and the correctional personnel, but the witnesses allowed to observe the execution and the public generally, through its perception of the process. Accordingly, we hold that those aspects of the EOM that direct the manner of executing the death sentence  the Lethal Injection Checklist  constitute regulations under SG § 10-101(g) and, because they were not adopted in conformance with the requirements of the APA, are ineffective and may not be used until such time as they are properly adopted. To that extent, we shall reverse the ruling of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Although the question actually before us in No. 122 is whether the Circuit Court erred in denying a temporary restraining order, our resolution of the predominant legal issue presented by that question mandates, as a matter of law, that a final injunction issue, and we shall remand the case for that purpose. IN NOS. 107, 123, AND 124, JUDGMENT OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS; IN NO. 122, ORDER OF CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY DENYING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENJOIN ENFORCEMENT OF LETHAL INJECTION CHECKLIST INCLUDED AS PART OF DIVISION OF CORRECTION EXECUTION OPERATIONS MANUAL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CONTENTS OF THAT CHECKLIST, IN THEIR CURRENT OR ANY AMENDED FORM, ARE ADOPTED AS REGULATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY EXEMPTS THE CHECKLIST FROM THE REQUIREMENTS OF THAT ACT; COSTS IN NO. 122 TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE GREENE, J., joins in Nos. 107 and 124 only. BELL, C.J., dissents which GREENE, J., joins in Parts C and D only.