Opinion ID: 3013461
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Present Injury Claim

Text: Atkinson’s present injury claim for ETS exposure also is grounded in a clearly established constitutional right. Although Helling dealt only with prisoner’s risk of future harm, the Supreme Court clearly established the framework _________________________________________________________________ he subjected appellee to the risk of future harm. Moreover, even if appellee is unable to establish a right to compensatory damages, he may be entitled to nominal damages. See Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 2001) (Where a constitutional deprivation has not caused actual injury, an award of nominal damages may be appropriate.). 7. The dissent characterizes this reference as an attempt to form a societal consensus from a single state regulation. However, we refer to the regulation merely to show that Atkinson has offered some proof of a societal consensus. Proof of a national consensus might include, inter alia, the federal regulation which protects the public and federal employees from ETS in all federal workplaces: Pursuant to Executive Order 13058, Protecting Federal Employees and the Public From Exposure to Tobacco Smoke in the Federal Workplace (3 CFR, 1997 Comp., p. 216), it is the policy of the executive branch to establish a smoke-free environment for Federal employees and members of the public visiting or using Federal facilities. The smoking of tobacco products is prohibited in all interior space owned, rented, or leased by the executive branch of the Federal Government, and in any outdoor areas under executive branch control in front of air intake ducts. 41 CFR S 101-20.105-3(a). 13 for analyzing claims of present harm in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See Weaver, 45 F.3d at 1256. In Weaver, a case directly on-point, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Estelle clearly established that prison officials could not be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s existing serious medical needs caused by ETS. Id. at 1256. In affirming the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity to the prison officials the Weaver Court stated, Such claims were first recognized by the Supreme Court almost two decades ago. Id. at 1256. In Estelle, the Supreme Court concluded that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, which violates the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. at 104. The Estelle Court recognized that even in less serious cases, where the prisoner does not experience severe torment or a lingering death, the infliction of unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with standards of decency. See id. at 103. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 106. Atkinson has alleged a serious medical need to which appellants were deliberately indifferent. As this Court explained in Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987),The standard enunciated in Estelle is two-pronged: ‘[i]t requires deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials and it requires the prisoner’s medical needs to be serious.’  Id. at 346, quoting West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d 1978). Although this Court has defined a medical need as serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, we also have recognized: Estelle makes clear that if ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . . results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature contemplated by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 347. Needless suffering resulting from a denial of simple medical care, which does not serve any penological 14 purpose, is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency and thus violates the Eighth Amendment. See id. In Weaver, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit specifically recognized that severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, and breathing difficulties stemming from exposure to ETS constituted a serious medical need, which required removal of the prisoner from a smoking environment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1254. Similarly, other Courts of Appeals have recognized that an illness arising from an inmate’s exposure to ETS can constitute a serious medical condition. See, e.g., Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 651 ([Prisoner]’s complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that because of the prison officials’ deliberate indifference, he was being exposed to levels of ETS which aggravated his chronic asthma, thereby endangering his existing health, a claim recognized as an Eighth Amendment violation twenty-five years ago in Estelle v. Gamble . . . .); 8 Hunt v. Reynolds, _________________________________________________________________ 8. The dissent points out that the Seventh Circuit decisions of Henderson and Oliver rejected present injury claims similar to Atkinson’s because the prisoners in those cases were unable to prove that their medical needs were sufficiently serious. See Henderson , 196 F.3d at 846; Oliver, 77 F.3d at 161. Again, in our view the dissent engages in the sort of evidence weighing that we are forbidden from undertaking by Johnson, 515 U.S. at 313. See Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61; see also Sanders, 60 F.3d 487-88 (refusing to consider insufficient evidence argument on appeal from denial of qualified immunity on motion for summary judgment for prisoner’s ETS claim). Moreover, the Oliver Court did not conclude that such symptoms were insufficiently serious as a matter of law. See Oliver, 77 F.3d at 161 (On this record, Oliver has not demonstrated that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.). As the dissent in Oliver clearly explained, the entire panel agreed that the prisoner’s allegations (which are similar to Atkinson’s) satisfied the requirements of Estelle: No one disputes that Oliver’s allegations were enough to satisfy Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), Farmer and the other Eighth Amendment cases. Both here and in the lower court the issue has been instead whether there were disputed issues of fact. Viewed in this light, it is clear that there is a material dispute of fact about the severity of Oliver’s asthma problem, which in turn raises a material dispute of fact about 15 974 F.2d 734, 735-36 (6th Cir. 1992). The Hunt Court determined that: Medical consequences of tobacco smoke do not differ from other medical problems. Prisoners allergic to the _________________________________________________________________ whether the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Oliver, 77 F.3d at 161 (Wood, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Although the Court of Appeals found the Henderson prisoner’s allegations insufficient as a matter of law, we believe it is clear that breathable air that will not constantly subject a susceptible prisoner to severe allergic reactions is the sort of minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities that the Eighth Amendment protects. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Therefore, we refuse to hold as a matter of law that Atkinson’s symptoms were insufficiently serious. The dissent cites to other decisions to support its general proposition that the tide has turned against ETS claims in the Courts of Appeals. See Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming District Court’s dismissal of prisoner’s ETS claim as frivolous); Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing District Court’s injunction mandating smoke-free environments for plaintiffs). Both cases are distinguishable from the present one. In Richardson, the prisoner’s exposure was at best de minimis and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit clearly set it apart from cases where prisoners were housed in a severe ETS environment: [T]he two Fifth Circuit cases that have recognized a potential ETSbased Eighth Amendment claim, the exposure to second-hand smoke was substantially more severe and sustained than that alleged by Richardson. See Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 888 (5th Cir. 1998) (the prisoner shared living quarters with a smoker); Rochon v. City of Angola, 122 F.3d 319, 320 (5th Cir. 1997) (the inmate was required to live and work in ‘environments filled with tobacco smoke’ ). In contrast, Richardson does not share living quarters with a smoker, nor does he work in a smoke-filled environment. He only alleges that he had to sit near some smokers during a bus ride on several occasions. We do not believe that society considers this treatment to violate[ ] contemporary standards of decency. 260 F.3d at 498-99. Unlike Richardson and Scott, the issue in this case does not involve a complete ban on all ETS exposure. Such a ban may be impractical (or impossible) for prison officials to implement. Here, we merely conclude that the District Court correctly determined that the level of ETS to which Atkinson claims he was exposed and his symptoms justify the denial of qualified immunity. 16 components of tobacco smoke, or who can attribute their serious medical conditions to smoke, are entitled to appropriate medical treatment, which may include removal from places where smoke hovers . . . . Thus we will adhere to the position, adopted by every circuit to address the issue, that the Eighth Amendment’s objective component is violated by forcing a prisoner with a serious medical need for a smoke-free environment to share his cell with an inmate who smokes. Id., quoting Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 1991). We cannot conclude that appellants are entitled to qualified immunity. Atkinson has fulfilled Saucier’s first prong for denying qualified immunity by alleging a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. As both the Weaver and Alvarado Courts point out the Constitutional right alleged by Atkinson was established over two decades ago by the Supreme Court in Estelle. See Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 651; Weaver, 45 F.3d at 1256. Atkinson’s amended complaint alleges that he was exposed, with deliberate indifference, to constant smoking in his cell for over seven months and as a result suffered nausea, an inability to eat, headaches, chest pains, difficulty breathing, numbness in his limbs, teary eyes, itching, burning skin, dizziness, a sore throat, coughing and production of sputum. The dissent describes these symptoms as causing discomfort somewhere between that of hay fever and the common cold and notes that millions of people not in prison voluntarily tolerate similar levels of risk every day from second-hand smoke and numerous other sources. However, unlike individuals who voluntarily expose themselves to ETS, a prisoner cannot simply walk out of his cell whenever he wishes. When a susceptible prisoner is confined to a cell, a small and confined space, with a constant smoker for an extended period of time, such symptoms may transform what would otherwise be a passing annoyance into a serious ongoing medical need. Additionally, Atkinson has fulfilled the second prong of Saucier’s test by demonstrating that the constitutional right was clearly established by the Hunt, Weaver and Estelle Courts on or before his own claim 17 arose in 1998-1999. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.); Weaver, 45 F.3d at 1256 (recognizing that severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, and breathing difficulties stemming from exposure to ETS constitutes a serious medical need, which requires removal of the prisoner from a smoking environment under the Eighth Amendment); Hunt, 974 F.2d 735-36 (concluding prisoner could state a present injury claim for ETS exposure); see also Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 651-52 ([Prisoner]’s complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim when he alleged that because of the prison officials’ deliberate indifference, he was being exposed to levels of ETS which aggravated his chronic asthma, thereby endangering his existing health, a claim recognized as an Eighth Amendment violation twenty-five years ago in Estelle v. Gamble . . . .).9 Moreover, Dr. Rizzo, an examining physician, has concluded that these symptoms possibly were precipitated by Atkinson’s exposure to ETS. 10 The _________________________________________________________________ 9. Although Alvarado postdates the time when Atkinson’s cause of action accrued, we cite to that case to demonstrate that, as the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized, the constitutional right which Atkinson asserts was clearly established over twenty-five years ago in Estelle. 10. The dissent contends that Dr. Rizzo’s affidavit undermines Atkinson’s claim. Aside from the matter that the dissent is weighing the evidence supporting the District Court’s determination in contravention of Ziccardi, the dissent misconstrues Dr. Rizzo’s statements. Dr. Rizzo noted the following: Roger Atkinson is a former cigarette smoker who was diagnosed with childhood asthma and may have symptoms of persistent reactive nasal passages and airways based on his response to exposure to seasonal changes in temperature and air quality. His spirometry is currently normal, but this does not preclude the presence of airway sensitivity. (A. 127). If anything, this notation supports Atkinson’s claim that he is particularly sensitized to air quality and that ETS seriously exacerbates his underlying condition. The dissent also points out that the affidavit of Dr. Keith Ivens weakens Atkinson’s claim. This, however, takes this Court into the forbidden territory of evidence weighing. 18 District Court found that deliberate indifference to these alleged symptoms constituted a violation of clearly established law, and we agree. Atkinson alleges that when he tried to seek help at the prison infirmary the treating nurse responded that she was unable to transfer him to a cell with a nonsmoking roommate. Similarly, Atkinson has produced evidence that after telling prison officials about his sensitivity to ETS no change was made in housing conditions. This evidence demonstrates deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 ([A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .).