Opinion ID: 424928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: adjustment committee procedures

Text: 59 The district court incorrectly ruled that the holdings in Wolff v. McDonnell and Bono v. Saxbe require disqualification of all Adjustment Committee members who are defendants in unrelated civil suits for damages brought by the inmate appearing before the Committee. Although the requirement of a neutral and detached decisionmaker must not be impaired, disqualification is not necessary in every case. 60 On the issue of what constitutes a neutral and detached decisionmaking body, the Wolff Court ruled, in part, that an adjustment committee consisting of the Associate Warden for Custody (as chairperson), the Correctional Industries Superintendent, and the Reception Center Director was sufficiently impartial to satisfy due process. The Bono court approved qualifications suggested by the district court to ensure fairness, that is, that the hearing officer should have a [l]ack of former personal involvement in any disciplinary or adjustment matter with the inmate. Bono v. Saxbe, 462 F.Supp. 146, 149-50 (E.D.Ill.1978) (appendix), aff'd, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.1980). The district court in this case, in its order on summary judgment, construed Wolff and Bono to mean that disciplinary committee members at least should not be defendants in pending lawsuits for damages instituted by the very persons over whom the committee sits in judgment. 61 The district court ruling unnecessarily extends Wolff 's reach. A prisoners' rights lawsuit often includes several defendants, some of whom may not know the plaintiff. Moreover, if an Adjustment Committee member is a defendant in the unrelated action named in her or his administrative capacity for performing ministerial duties, then the Committee member may have little personal involvement in the case. Under these circumstances, the Committee member's ability to serve as a neutral and detached decisionmaker at a hearing involving the plaintiff-prisoner may not be impaired, and disqualification may not be necessary. From a practical standpoint, requiring each staff member who is the subject of a separate lawsuit to disqualify himself from sitting in judgment of that inmate would heavily tax the working capacity of the prison staff. Additionally, prisoners may file many lawsuits naming multiple defendants. If every named defendant in a prisoners' rights lawsuit must be disqualified from sitting on the Adjustment Committee, such a litigation strategy would vest too much control in a prisoner to determine the Committee make-up. For these reasons, the disqualification issue should be decided on a case-by-case basis. 62 The Third Circuit has ruled, following Justice Marshall's concurrence in Wolff, 418 U.S. at 592, 94 S.Ct. at 2992, that due process prohibits only those officials who have a direct personal or otherwise substantial involvement, such as major participation in a judgmental or decision-making role, in the circumstances underlying the charge from sitting on the disciplinary body. Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d at 773. Mandatory disqualification in this case would extend that position. Nevertheless, we believe that circumstances other than those arising directly out of the disciplinary process may raise such doubts about the integrity of the hearing procedure and the impartiality of its participants so as to trigger due process considerations. 63 We reverse the ruling of the district court requiring disqualification of every Committee member who is a defendant in a suit filed by the inmate appearing before the Committee. Our decision affects Plaintiffs Redding, Akbar, and Tedder. The record does not reflect the nature of the plaintiffs' pending lawsuits against the Committee members. Thus, we remand this issue to the district court with direction to evaluate the circumstances involved in the lawsuits and determine whether disqualification is required. Among other considerations, the district court should determine the extent of the Committee members' personal involvement in those lawsuits. The purpose of this inquiry is to protect individuals against arbitrary action of government. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 558, 94 S.Ct. at 2975.
64 Plaintiffs Redding, Akbar, Armstrong, Tedder, and Woodruff all claimed that their due process rights were denied when the Adjustment Committee refused their requests to call witnesses at the hearings. Plaintiffs Akbar, Woodruff, and Tedder, however, did not follow the required procedure for requesting witnesses. The administrative regulations require inmates to submit a request for witnesses desired in advance of the hearing. The district court approved that procedure, and did not allow those three claims to go to the jury. Those plaintiffs have not appealed that ruling. As a result, only the claims of Plaintiffs Redding and Armstrong are raised on appeal. 65 Plaintiffs Redding and Armstrong testified that they had properly requested witnesses. The administrative records in those cases support that testimony. The jury found that these plaintiffs were denied due process because their requests were denied without justification. 66 The right to call witnesses is basic to a fair hearing. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. at 2979; Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d at 918. Nevertheless, prison officials have the discretion to refuse inmates' requests for witnesses to protect institutional safety or to keep the length of the hearing within reasonable limits. But in this case no witnesses were allowed to testify at either hearing, and there is no indication that the requests were unreasonable. Furthermore, the only reason the Adjustment Committee offered for denying Plaintiff Redding's requests was that one of the three requested witnesses was off duty the day of the hearing. The Committee wrote on Plaintiff Armstrong's summary: Witnesses were requested by the resident, however, based on the resident's testimony, the Adjustment Committee is of the opinion the witnesses could offer no pertinent information or testimony to the situation. 67 In Hayes I, 555 F.2d at 630, this court recognized that the Wolff Court declined to require a formal statement of reasons when requests for witnesses are denied. We noted, however, that some support for denial of witnesses should appear in the administrative record; without such a record judicial review would be meaningless. Id.; see also Hayes II, 637 F.2d at 486. The Adjustment Committee Summaries for Plaintiffs Redding and Armstrong do not enable us to determine whether the broad discretion of prison officials was exercised arbitrarily. See generally Langton v. Berman, 667 F.2d at 234 (allowing four of fifteen witnesses was not abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we must sustain the jury's determination that the denials of the requests for witnesses abridged those plaintiffs' due process rights.
68 The principal issue in this appeal concerns the adequacy of the Adjustment Committee Summaries. Administrative Regulation 804 requires that these summaries enunciate the basis for the Committee's decision and specify the evidence underlying the ruling. See Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d at 60-61. This requirement is not to be taken lightly. The Supreme Court has written: 69 [T]he actions taken at such proceedings may involve review by other bodies. They might furnish the basis of a decision by the Director of Corrections to transfer an inmate to another institution because he is considered to be incorrigible by reason of frequent intentional breaches of discipline, ... and are certainly likely to be considered by the state parole authorities in making parole decisions. Written records of proceedings will thus protect the inmate against collateral consequences based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the original proceeding. Further, as to the disciplinary action itself, the provision for a written record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the courts, where fundamental constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act fairly. Without written records, the inmate will be at a severe disadvantage in propounding his own cause to or defending himself from others. It may be that there will be occasions when personal or institutional safety is so implicated that the statement may properly exclude certain items of evidence, but in that event the statement should indicate the fact of the omission. Otherwise, we perceive no conceivable rehabilitative objective or prospect of prison disruption that can flow from the requirement of these statements. 70 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 565, 94 S.Ct. at 2979 (footnotes omitted). 71 In Hayes I, 555 F.2d at 631-33 & n. 1, this court rejected as inadequate an adjustment committee summary which stated: Based on our review of the violation report and the report by the special investigator it is our motion that we find Mr. Hayes guilty as charged. We find that Mr. Hayes is guilty of conspiracy to incite to riot and commit mutinous acts. The committee report to Inmate Hayes stated: The Committee's decision is based on the violation report as written and upon the report by the special investigator which during your absence was made part of the record. See United States v. Warden, Stateville Correctional Center, 635 F.2d at 659. The Hayes I court stated that the general finding, by merely incorporating the violation report and the special investigator's report, does not ensure that prison officials will act fairly. Nor will this finding protect against subsequent collateral effects based on misunderstanding of the initial decision. Hayes I, 555 F.2d at 633. In Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d at 1286-87, this court rejected as inadequate a summary which stated: We recognize and consider the resident[']s statement[,] however[,] we accept the reporting officer[']s charges. The statement was deemed inadequate because [i]t did not mention what evidence the reporting officer relied on, the investigatory report containing exculpatory evidence, or [an] earlier report. It gave no clear indication of why the reporting officer was to be believed rather than [the inmate] or [the victim, whose testimony favored the inmate]. The court stated that the defendants, in failing to provide Chavis with a written statement giving facts relied on and reasons for the conclusions reached, ... violated Chavis' due process rights under Wolff, and also his right not to be found guilty except by an appropriate quantum of evidence. Id. at 1287. 72 We have looked long and hard at the eighteen summaries of the evidence before us. We are forced to conclude that none of them, standing alone, fulfills the essential functions stated in Wolff. Moreover, the summaries violate A.R. 804, which states that [i]t will not be sufficient for the Committee's decision to simply adopt and copy the exact wording of the Resident Disciplinary Report, and violate the Due Process Clause, which requires the Committee to state not merely how it acts, but also why it acts in a particular manner. Many of the summaries are even less specific than the reports found constitutionally deficient in Hayes I. The phrases based on all available evidence, or all evidence presented are conclusory; they do not disclose what evidence forms the bases of the Committee rulings. The Committee apparently gives credence to the resident disciplinary report in almost every case, but does not admit to doing so in its summaries. Also, no reasons are given for discounting the inmates' contradictory evidence. 4 See Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d at 1287; see generally Kyle v. Hanberry, 677 F.2d 1386 (11th Cir.1982) (administrative record must reflect how disciplinary committee concluded that an unidentified informant was credible and reliable). 73 Evaluating the form summaries as a whole by combining the sections Record of Proceedings with the sections Basis for Decision/Evidence Relied Upon rescues two of the eighteen summaries from constitutional inadequacy. In the section Record of Proceedings for Plaintiff Jones, the Committee noted in part: Resident states he struck resident due to he owed him money. In the section Basis for Decision/Evidence Relied Upon, the Committee noted residents testimony given. Because there was no conflict between the resident disciplinary report and testimony at the Committee hearing, it can be assumed that the Committee relied on Plaintiff Jones' own testimony to find him guilty. Similarly, the Record of Proceedings for the February 4, 1980, hearing on Plaintiff Tedder states in part: resident states he was not going to be assigned with a Black, and this is why he refused [his housing assignment]. The plaintiff thus admitted his infraction, and the Basis for Decision notes: Residents testimony given. It therefore can be assumed that the Committee relied on Plaintiff Tedder's admission to find him guilty, though the summary does not so state. Accordingly, the summary for Plaintiff Jones and the summary for Plaintiff Tedder's February 4, 1980, hearing satisfy minimum constitutional requirements. The district court's ruling on these two summaries is reversed. 74 In the sixteen remaining summaries the inmates either denied guilt or refused to answer the charges. Therefore, even reading the summaries as a whole provides no clue as to why the Committee acted as it did. Accordingly, in those sixteen instances the judgment of the district court holding the summaries constitutionally inadequate is affirmed. 75 The line between constitutional adequacy and inadequacy is a fine, but important one. When the Committee writes based on all available evidence the resident is guilty, no agency or court can discern the basis for the Committee's rulings. If, however, the Committee writes resident is lying, or the guard saw him therefore ..., or resident admits he committed the act charged, or resident does not refute charges, or another statement establishing the evidence underlying its decision, then the inmate is protected from a mischaracterization of the disciplinary action when it comes under review. 5 76 Prisoners enjoy privileges and rewards which can be taken away when they misbehave. When a prisoner loses the opportunities to shower daily, exercise daily, visit with other prisoners, use the library, watch television, and visit the commissary, he has lost much. Each aspect of the freedoms most of us take for granted becomes more precious as the totality of freedom is reduced. Forfeiting good conduct time credit is perhaps the most serious loss. Prisoners thus must be protected from arbitrary actions extinguishing their privileges. The surest protection is an impartial decisionmaker. And the integrity of that decisionmaker can be insured only if she or he enunciates the bases for her or his actions. The Committee summaries before us do not satisfy that minimal requirement.