Opinion ID: 507763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fee Award Against the New Haven Defendants

Text: 42 On the basis of the New Haven defendants' concession that Counsel had obtained a very limited measure of success at the administrative level against them, the district court concluded that it was appropriate to award attorneys' fees as to both the state and local defendants. 666 F.Supp. at 369. Accordingly, the New Haven defendants were ordered to pay 20% of Counsel's fee award. 7 The New Haven defendants challenge the determination that Counsel is entitled to attorney's fees from them, arguing that attorney's fees are unavailable for work done in connection with administrative hearings under the EHA, and that Counsel did not prevail against the New Haven defendants as required by the HCPA. 43 Under the HCPA, the court may award attorney's fees to any handicapped youth who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(4)(B). A plaintiff is considered a prevailing party for attorney's fees purposes if he succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the plaintiff sought in bringing suit. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). 8 Here, while Counsel clearly prevailed against the Connecticut defendants with respect to the consent decree, it is difficult to conclude that Counsel prevailed against the New Haven defendants, either at the administrative level or in connection with the consent decree, on any significant issue which achieved any benefit sought by Counsel, as required by Hensley. 44 First, we consider the question whether Counsel prevailed against the New Haven defendants under the Hensley standard through the consent decree which concluded Counsel's federal district court case. It is undisputed that under the consent decree Counsel achieved the relief he sought: two years of compensatory education. However, it is also undisputed that the decree imposes no obligations or expenses on the New Haven defendants. Although the New Haven defendants signed the decree, only the Connecticut defendants are required to pay for the costs of the compensatory education awarded and no obligations are imposed on the New Haven defendants. 45 Counsel, citing Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir.1982), argues that he is nevertheless entitled to fees from the New Haven defendants as well as the Connecticut defendants on the basis of the relative culpability of the defendants. We disagree. In Jose P., the defendants conceded that they had failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the EHA, and the parties entered into a consent judgment which specified that the state and city defendants--without distinguishing between them--had violated the requirements of federal and New York law. The decree ordered both sets of defendants to take all necessary steps to come into compliance with the law. Under these circumstances, this Court rejected the city defendants' argument that the plaintiffs had not prevailed against them under Sec. 1988 as bordering on the frivolous in light of the judgment finding the state as well as the city defendants in violation of statutory obligations and ordering them to comply. Jose P., 669 F.2d at 871. 46 Here, in contrast, the consent decree specifically states that none of the defendants admits any liability or violation of Counsel's rights. The district court correctly noted that to attempt to assess relative culpability under these circumstances would require the opposing parties to litigate the merits when the purpose of the consent decree was to avoid litigation of the merits and to demand that this court issue what is, in essence, an advisory opinion concerning the merits of a closed case. 666 F.Supp. at 369. We agree that the consent decree provides no basis for an award of attorney's fees from the New Haven defendants. 47 The district court, however, concluded that it was appropriate to award attorneys' fees as to both the state and local defendants because the New Haven defendants concede[d] that the plaintiff obtained a very limited measure of success at the administrative level. 666 F.Supp. at 369. Hence, we must also consider the question whether Counsel prevailed against the New Haven defendants under the Hensley standard at the administrative level. 48 As an initial matter, the New Haven defendants argue that under the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina Dep't of Trans. v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 107 S.Ct. 336, 93 L.Ed.2d 188 (1986), attorney's fees may not be awarded under any circumstances for legal work done in connection with administrative hearings under the EHA. We disagree. 49 In Crest Street, community groups in a black neighborhood filed an administrative complaint with the United States Department of Transportation, challenging an allegedly race-biased plan to build a highway through their neighborhood. After negotiation, plaintiffs reached a settlement with the state and city defendants. The plaintiffs then filed an action in district court for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The Supreme Court, considering only the question whether attorney's fees under Sec. 1988 can be sought in a court action other than litigation in which a party seeks to enforce the civil rights laws listed in Sec. 1988, Crest Street, 107 S.Ct. at 340 (emphasis in original), held that the Crest Street plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney's fees for work in connection with the negotiations which led to the favorable settlement. The Court found it entirely reasonable to limit the award of attorney's fees to those parties who, in order to obtain relief, found it necessary to file a complaint in court. Id. at 341. 50 However, the Crest Street court explicitly stated that attorney's fees are available for time spent on administrative proceedings to enforce the civil rights claim prior to the litigation, Crest Street, 107 S.Ct. at 341. Here, Counsel seeks attorney's fees for just such a purpose--to recover for time spent on the administrative hearing which, under the EHA, he was required to pursue prior to bringing a federal court action. 9 Crest Street does not bar the award of attorney's fees for work done in an administrative hearing where, as here, attorney's fees are sought for work done in connection with a statutorily required EHA administrative hearing which was followed by a federal court action brought to enforce the plaintiff's rights under the EHA. 51 There remains the question whether Counsel prevailed against the New Haven defendants under the Hensley standard at the administrative level. New Haven defendants concede that, as they put it, Counsel had an extremely limited success against them in the administrative hearing because the hearing officer found that the New Haven Board of Education was fiscally responsible for Counsel's education for the time period in question. 52 However, we cannot agree with the district court that this concession is sufficient basis for an award of attorney's fees against the New Haven defendants. Although the administrative hearing officer found that New Haven Board of Education was fiscally responsible for Counsel's education during the two year period when Counsel was hospitalized in a state mental health facility, she denied Counsel's claim for compensatory education, concluding that 53 [b]ecause the Board could not initiate decisions or effect any control over [Counsel's] obtaining an education during the time [in question], they have not been negligent in providing for his education. Thus the petitioner has no basis to make a claim for compensatory education from the Board. 54 Thus, the hearing officer's limited finding of fiscal responsibility brought Counsel no closer to the relief he sought. Nor is there any discernable connection between the hearing officer's finding as to the New Haven defendants on this issue and the consent decree's award of compensatory education to be paid by the Connecticut defendants. 55 Under these circumstances, even though New Haven's concession that Counsel enjoyed a limited success at the administrative hearing gives us pause, we cannot conclude that Counsel succeeded on any significant issue which achieved any benefit he sought through the administrative hearing against the New Haven defendants. Hence, Counsel cannot be considered a prevailing party as to New Haven. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. 56 In sum, we conclude that there is no basis for an award of attorney's fees against the New Haven defendants.