Opinion ID: 2075944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probative value, prejudice, and the trial court's responsibility.

Text: In rhetoric which I do not find to be understated, the government contends that the proffered testimony would have been the rankest imaginable form of prejudicial character assassination with absolutely no countervailing probative value. Accordingly, says the government, there was no abuse of discretion in excluding it. As the foregoing recitation of the manner in which the issue was decided demonstrates, however, I can find nothing in the record to show that the trial [judge] was exercising [her] discretion in excluding the testimony, and [I] therefore cannot [vote to] uphold the exclusion on those grounds. State v. Dutremble, 392 A.2d 42, 46 (Me. 1978); see also Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 725, 732-33, 484 P.2d 599, 604-05, 94 Cal.Rptr. 623, 628-29 (1971) ( en banc ) (error to fail to weigh probative value against prejudicial impact). [33] Although the trial judge has wide latitude in balancing these factors, evidence should be excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. McCORMICK, supra, § 185, at 545 (emphasis added). The Judge made no such determination here, and the probative value of the evidence was substantial. [34] It should have been admitted.