Opinion ID: 4271642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of “Public Employee”

Text: ¶18 We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Doubleday v. People, 2016 CO 3, ¶ 19, 364 P.3d 193, 196. If the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, then we interpret the statute according to its plain meaning and look no further. See 7 Marsh v. People, 2017 CO 10M, ¶ 20, 389 P.3d 100, 105; Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo. 2000). ¶19 Here, although Title 18 does not define the term “public employee,” it does define a similar term, “public servant,” and that definition is instructive. “‘Public servant’ means any officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a governmental function . . . .” § 18-1-901(3)(o), C.R.S. (2017) (emphases added). Accordingly, in the context of public servants, “public” means “governmental,” and this court has interpreted the term “public” similarly in multiple other contexts. See, e.g., Univ. of Colo. v. Booth, 78 P.3d 1098, 1101 (Colo. 2003) (recognizing the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act’s definition of “public entity” as the “state . . . and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof organized pursuant to law”) (quoting section 24-10-103(5), C.R.S. (2017)); Denver Area Labor Fed’n v. Buckley, 924 P.2d 524, 527–29 (Colo. 1996) (concluding that the term “public moneys” includes the moneys of a fund administered by a political subdivision of the state); Colo. Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Colo., 804 P.2d 138, 143 (Colo. 1990) (explaining that public corporations, in contrast with private ones, are “created as subdivisions of the state as an expedient device to carry out the functions of government”); Currigan v. Flor, 299 P.2d 1098, 1099 8 (Colo. 1956) (stating that it is “plain” that, in his capacity as a city councilman, a plaintiff was “holding public office”).2 ¶20 “Employee,” in turn, is ordinarily defined as “[s]omeone who works in the service of another person (the employer) under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the employer has the right to control the details of work performance.” Employee, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Norton v. Gilman, 949 P.2d 565, 567 (Colo. 1997) (“Under the common law, the most important factor in determining whether a worker qualifies as an employee is the alleged employer’s right to control the details of performance.”). ¶21 Applying these settled definitions, we conclude that the term “public employee” is unambiguous and means a person who works in the service of a governmental entity under an express or implied contract of hire, under which the governmental entity has the right to control the details of the person’s work performance. See People v. Moore, 2013 COA 86, ¶ 13, 338 P.3d 348, 350 (“Accordingly, we interpret the phrase ‘public official or employee’ in section 18-9-110(2) to apply only to a victim who is either an official or an employee of a public entity.”). ¶22 We are not persuaded otherwise by the People’s assertion that the General Assembly intended the phrase “public employee” to capture any employee who serves a governmental function, whether or not a governmental entity actually employs that person. Had the legislature intended such a broad application of section 18-9-110(1), 2 The People themselves rely on this meaning of the word “public,” defining a “governmental function” as a “public service [performed] on behalf of a public entity.” People’s Opening Br. at 20. 9 the statutory term defined above—“public servant”—would serve this purpose, and the term “public employee” would be superfluous. Specifically, at its broadest, “public servant” encompasses “any person participating . . . in performing a governmental function”—precisely the meaning that the People seek to impart to “public employee.” § 18-1-901(3)(o). Our precedents clearly instruct, however, that “the use of different terms signals an intent on the part of the General Assembly to afford those terms different meanings.” See, e.g., Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998, 1010 (Colo. 2008). And we may not construe a statute so as to render any statutory words or phrases superfluous. People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 679 (Colo. 2010). Accordingly, in our view, “public employee” must mean something different than “public servant.”