Opinion ID: 2329163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Doughertys' fraud-by-concealment and NRS 645.257 claims

Text: Davis asserts that the district court erred in entering judgment on the Doughertys' fraud-by-concealment claim because, as she interprets it, NRS 645.251 shields real estate licensees from any and all common law forms of liability. Similarly, Platinum asserts that NRS 645.251 precludes all common law forms of liability, and that the district court thus erred in entering judgment against it on the Doughertys' NRS 645.257 claim, as this claim is premised on respondeat superiora common law theory of liability. [Q]uestions of statutory construction, including the meaning and scope of a statute, are questions of law, which this court reviews de novo. City of Reno v. Reno Gazette-Journal, 119 Nev. 55, 58, 63 P.3d 1147, 1148 (2003). However, the fact-finder's fact-based conclusions of law are entitled to deference, and ... will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence. Manwill v. Clark County, 123 Nev. 238, 241, 162 P.3d 876, 879 (2007). NRS 645.251 provides, in relevant part, that [a] licensee is not required to comply with any principles of common law that may otherwise apply to any of the duties of the licensee as set forth in NRS 645.252, 645.253 and 645.254. NRS 645.252 sets forth the general duties of care and disclosure of real estate licensees. NRS 645.253 describes the duties of nondisclosure of licensees affiliated with the same brokerage. Lastly, NRS 645.254 provides additional duties of care, disclosure, and nondisclosure of licensees who have entered into a brokerage agreement to represent a client in a real estate transaction. Although we conclude that NRS 645.251 alters the traditional landscape of liability with respect to real estate licensees, we disagree with Davis's and Platinum's contention that the statute precludes, in all instances, common law forms of liability, such as fraud. Simply put, NRS 645.251 does not state that real estate licensees are shielded from all forms of common law liability, and therefore, Davis's and Platinum's interpretation of NRS 645.251 is overbroad and improperly reads language into the statute. See Szydel v. Markman, 121 Nev. 453, 457, 117 P.3d 200, 202 (2005) (When the language of a statute is clear on its face, this court will deduce the legislative intent from the words used.). Nonetheless, NRS 645.251 expressly limits a real estate licensee's duties of care and disclosure to those specifically set forth in NRS 645.252-645.254. NRS 645.251 would be rendered meaningless if a party could circumvent this limitation by simply casting a claim for a violation of NRS 645.252-645.254 as a common law claim. We therefore conclude that NRS 645.251 precludes common law claims against real estate licensees to the extent that the type of conduct forming the basis of such a claim is the type of conduct proscribed in NRS 645.252-645.254. Stated differently, NRS 645.251 displaces common law forms of liability when the type of conduct complained of overlaps with the conduct covered by NRS 645.252-645.254. Thus, although NRS 645.251 does not abrogate all common law claims for a real estate licensee's wrongful conduct, such claims remain viable only if the type of conduct complained of is not covered by NRS 645.252-645.254. The Doughertys' fraud-by-concealment claim is predicated on Davis's failure to disclose material information regarding their various real estate transactions. The duties of disclosure of real estate licensees are covered by NRS 645.252(1) and NRS 645.254(5). Thus, the type of conduct forming the basis of the Doughertys' fraud-by-concealment claim overlaps with the type of conduct covered by NRS 645.252(1) and NRS 645.254(5), and therefore, as a matter of law, this conduct cannot form the basis of a common law fraud-by-concealment claim against Davis. Consequently, we conclude that the district court erred in entering judgment on this claim. However, as substantial evidence supports the jury's finding in favor of the Doughertys on their NRS 645.257 claim against Davis for breach of the statutory duties set forth in NRS 645.252-645.254, the district court did not err in entering judgment, as to liability, on the statutory claim. In contrast to the type of conduct forming the basis of the Doughertys' fraud-by-concealment claim, respondeat superior liability is not covered in NRS 645.252, 645.253, or 645.254. Indeed, those statutes have nothing to do with such liability. Platinum's contention that NRS 645.251 precludes its respondeat superior liability for Davis's wrongdoing is therefore without merit. Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Platinum is liable under a respondeat superior theory, the district court did not err in entering judgment, as to liability, on the Doughertys' NRS 645.257 claim against Platinum.