Opinion ID: 1897473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: owens-corning's appeals

Text: A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate only in those cases in which the facts, viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party, permit but one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. Faniel v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 404 A.2d 147, 150 (D.C.1979) (citations and footnote omitted); accord, e.g., Lewis v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 463 A.2d 666, 669 (D.C.1983). If a case is allowed to go to the jury, and the jury returns a verdict which is unreasonable when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the entry of a judgment n.o.v. is the appropriate remedy. Bauldock v. Davco Food, Inc., 622 A.2d 28, 32 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted). However, the trial court may not set aside the jury verdict as against the weight of the evidence simply because it would have reached a different result if it had been the trier of fact. Lyons v. Barrazotto, 667 A.2d 314, 325 (D.C.1995). The trial court must take care to avoid weighing the evidence, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or substituting its judgment for that of the jury. Corley v. BP Oil Corp., 402 A.2d 1258, 1263 (D.C.1979) (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Robinson v. Group Health Ass'n, 691 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C. 1997). The issue of proximate cause is usually a question of fact for the jury to decide. District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713, 716 (D.C.1984); McCoy v. Quadrangle Development Corp., 470 A.2d 1256, 1259 (D.C.1983). Only if there are absolutely no facts or circumstances from which a jury could reasonably find that the defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of injury, would the matter be a question of law for the court. Id.; see Claytor v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 662 A.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C.1995). When the question of the defendant's causation remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant. W. PAGE KEETON, et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 268-69 (5th ed.1984); see District of Columbia v. Freeman, supra, 477 A.2d at 716 (the question becomes one of law ... when the evidence ... will not support a rational finding of proximate cause). In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment n.o.v., we apply the same standard as the trial court. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.1986) (citing cases). [W]e must balance the evidence against the judge's determination and in favor of the jury's. Baker v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 248 A.2d 829, 831 (D.C.1969). The question ... is not whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the findings and decision of the judge, but whether there is evidence upon which reasonable [persons] might differ as to negligence and other elements of liability; whether a jury of reasonable [persons] could properly have reached a verdict in favor of appellant[s], the part[ies] upon whom the onus of proof was imposed. Id. (citation omitted). In any product liability case, including cases involving asbestos, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to show that the defendant's product was the cause of his or her injuries. Claytor, 662 A.2d at 1382. The complaining party must identify the manufacturer or distributor of the particular product which caused, or was a substantial cause of, his or her injury. Id. at 1383. [12] However, as we said in Claytor, another asbestos case, we are not requiring appellants to present direct evidence of their exposure to specific asbestos products, or testimony from others who could verify appellants' presence during the use of specific asbestos products, because we agree that `[s]uch burden is unreasonable.' Id. at 1384 (citation omitted). Rather, [w]hat is minimally required.. is proof that appellants and the defendants' products were in the same place at the same time. Id. at 1384-1385 (footnote omitted). The testimony of Mr. Bragg, Mr. Tarbox, Mr. Miller, Dr. Rockoff, and Dr. Daum, and the inferences from that testimony to which Mr. Bragg was entitled, were sufficient to raise an issue for the jury concerning his exposure to Owens-Corning's product. First, Bragg testified that he worked at Chalk Point in 1973 and that, because of the open floor grating, dust from the insulators working above him permeated the air all the way down to the basement. Second, Russell Tarbox testified that he used Owens-Corning's Kaylo at Chalk Point in 1973, when Mr. Bragg was also there. Third, Paul Miller testified that whenever he cut Kaylo to fit a pipe, it released dust into the air. Fourth, both Drs. Rockoff and Daum opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Mr. Bragg had been exposed to asbestos and was suffering from progressive asbestosis. That evidence, viewed as a whole, was sufficient to permit the jury to determine whether Mr. Bragg was exposed to Owens-Corning's product (not just asbestos in general) to such a degree that Owens-Corning might be liable for his asbestos-related illness. See Alliegro v. ACandS, Inc., 691 A.2d 102, 106 (D.C.1997); Claytor, 662 A.2d at 1384-1385. In addition, a jury could reasonably infer that Mr. Bragg was exposed to Owens-Corning's Kaylo while he was working at Walter Reed Hospital. He testified that at Walter Reed he worked throughout the entire building, from the basement to the roof. While he was installing piping, insulators at the same time were insulating the piping and the air ducts. Furthermore, Mr. Bragg testified that he saw boxes labeled Kaylo stacked all over the job site, piled up everywhere. This evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that Mr. Bragg was exposed to Kaylo while working at Walter Reed. See Alliegro, 691 A.2d at 106-107 (holding that evidence was sufficient when plaintiff testified that he worked side-by-side with pipe coverers using the defendant's asbestos products). [13] Owens-Corning also challenges the testimony of the expert witnesses, arguing that they failed to establish that Kaylo proximately caused appellants' injuries. In personal injury cases, expert medical testimony is almost always required to prove causation unless (1) the injury develops coincidentally with, or within a reasonable time after, the negligent act, or (2) the causal connection is clearly apparent from the illness [or injury] itself and the circumstances surrounding it, or (3) the cause of the injury relates to matters of common experience, knowledge, or observation of laymen. Williams v. Patterson, 681 A.2d 1147, 1150 (D.C.1996) (citation omitted). Although Owens-Corning is correct in pointing out that none of these exceptions apply to the instant case, Owens-Corning is incorrect in asserting that appellants failed to present sufficient expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause. Drs. Rockoff and Daum each testified, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that both appellants had asbestos-induced or asbestos-related diseases of the chest. From the very words the doctors used, a jury could reasonably infer that an asbestos-induced or asbestos-related disease is proximately caused by exposure to asbestos. Given the evidence that both appellants were exposed to Owens-Corning's Kaylo, [14] a jury could reasonably infer from all the evidence that their illnesses were caused by Owens-Corning's product. See, e.g., Alliegro, 691 A.2d at 106 (finding evidence legally sufficient when expert testified that [plaintiff] suffered from asbestosis, and opined, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that assuming use of [defendant's] asbestos-containing products... these products constituted a substantial factor in the development and progression of [plaintiff's] asbestosis). We find this particular argument by Owens-Corning about the expert testimony very close to frivolous.