Opinion ID: 3170633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction In Light of Rosemond

Text: When a defendant did not object to a jury instruction at trial, we review only for plain error. United States v. McClel‐ lan, 794 F.3d 743, 753–54 (7th Cir. 2015). “In order to reverse for plain error, we must find (1) error (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects the defendantʹs substantial rights.” Id. at 754 (quotation marks omitted). To show that an error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, he “‘must demonstrate that [the error] affected the outcome of the district court proceed‐ ings.’” United States v. Caira, 737 F.3d 455, 462 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). Fi‐ nally, we may exercise our discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputa‐ tion of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original and quotation marks omitted). For instructional errors, we evaluate whether the defec‐ tive instruction “improperly influenced the jury’s verdict,” United States v. Salinas, 763 F.3d 869, 879 (7th Cir. 2014), “against the backdrop of the entire trial,” Caira, 737 F.3d at 464. The verdict may stand “if it appear[s] ‘beyond a reason‐ able doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to 14 No. 14‐3276 the verdict obtained.’” Caira, 737 F.3d at 464 (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)). Even under this test, “it is rare that we reverse a conviction on the basis of an improper jury instruction to which there was no objection.” United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 689 (7th Cir. 2008). The government properly concedes that the jury instruc‐ tion given on count two, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), was erroneous in light of Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2013). The only remaining question is whether this plain er‐ ror affected Lawson’s substantial rights. We conclude that it did not. Rosemond held that in order to show aiding and abetting a § 924(c) offense, the “defendant’s knowledge of a firearm must be advance knowledge—or otherwise said, knowledge that enables him to make the relevant legal (and indeed, moral) choice.” Id. at 1249. That means knowledge of a fire‐ arm must come “at a time the accomplice can do something with it—most notably, opt to walk away.” Id. at 1249–50. The instruction given at Lawson’s trial required that the government prove “that the defendant knew, either before or during the crime” of the firearm and “intentionally facilitat‐ ed the use.” The instruction was erroneous because it could hypothetically permit a conviction where the jury thought that Lawson learned of the firearm during the attempted robbery and intentionally facilitated its use only because it was too late for him to “opt to walk away.” Id. Such a convic‐ tion would run afoul of Rosemond. The theoretical possibility of a conviction on this improp‐ er ground, however, does not warrant reversal in this case. There is no reasonable doubt that had the proper instruction No. 14‐3276 15 been given, Lawson would have been acquitted. Given the evidence that was presented at trial, it is unreasonable to think that the jury convicted Lawson because he learned of the firearm during the crime and intentionally facilitated its use only because it was too late to opt to walk away. After entering the post office, his confederate immediate‐ ly pulled the firearm, announced that he had a gun, and pointed it at Hunter. Lawson did not abort the offense. Nor is there any indication in the video footage that Lawson hesi‐ tated at the sight of the gun, which appears to be in his line of sight while searching Hunter’s purse. Instead, Lawson continued to participate in the offense. Lawson approached Hunter and looked through her purse and wallet. Lawson also hopped over the counter and searched for items to steal, all while his confederate continued to point the firearm at Hunter. Lawson then rejoined his partner and left with him. Based on these facts, the government argued to the jury that Lawson and his confederate had a “division of labor al‐ ready mapped out” before entering the post office: the ac‐ complice would neutralize threats, while Lawson would steal property. Furthermore, these two men had the fore‐ thought to bring masks to hide their faces, indicating that there was a plan to rob the post office. They walked into the post office to rob it in the middle of the day. It is implausible that such a mid‐day robbery plan would not have included a firearm designed to influence and threaten the employees or patrons that are sure to be there. Cf. Parker, 801 F.2d at 1385 (“[T]he use of an unloaded gun to rob a bank would be a very hazardous venture for the robber.” (quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, the verdict may stand because it ap‐ 16 No. 14‐3276 pears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not have any effect on the verdict. Indeed, Lawson’s case is quite distinct from the facts pre‐ sented to the jury in Rosemond. Rosemond arose out of a “drug deal gone bad.” 134 S. Ct. at 1243. In that case, a deal‐ er arranged a drug deal with two men. The dealer drove to a park accompanied by two confederates, one of whom was Rosemond. One of the buyers entered the vehicle, inspected the marijuana, and instead of handing over the money, he punched the confederate in the face and ran. At that point, one of the male confederates—it was contested who this was—exited the vehicle and fired shots from a handgun. Rosemond was charged under § 924(c), and one of the theo‐ ries of liability was aiding and abetting. The district court instructed the jury that a defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting a § 924(c) violation if he knew of the firearm at some point and actively participated in the underlying drug crime. Id. at 1244. Lawson, however, was convicted of aiding and abetting by intentionally facilitating the use of a firearm, not just by participating in the underlying robbery attempt. Nothing in Lawson’s case indicates that the use of a firearm was an un‐ planned surprise like in Rosemond’s drug deal gone wrong or that Lawson only intended to participate in an unarmed robbery. Rather, the wearing of masks and his confederate’s pulling of the firearm before Lawson attempted to take property was evidence of an armed robbery gone right, and the jury’s conviction based on the evidence it heard confirms this assessment. The crime that Rosemond intended to commit was a peaceful, albeit illegal, transaction, which is No. 14‐3276 17 quite distinct from the mid‐day violent taking of property Lawson intended to commit. Based on the evidence presented and the government’s argument to the jury, the jury’s conviction on count two can only be understood as finding that Lawson intended to aid and abet an armed robbery. Accordingly, Lawson has not shown that the erroneous instruction prejudiced him in any way, and a new trial is not warranted.