Opinion ID: 617507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: False Statements Made in Support of a Material Witness Order.

Text: Flagler contends that by making sworn factual statements in support of the order, Trainor was acting as a complaining witness rather than as an advocate. In Kalina v. Fletcher , the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor was not absolutely immune from liability for making false statements in support of an arrest warrant. There, the prosecutor provided a Certification for Determination of Probable Cause that summarized the evidence supporting the arrest warrant. 522 U.S. at 121, 118 S.Ct. 502. Rather than attaching to the motion an affidavit from a witness with personal knowledge of facts, the prosecutor personally vouched for the truth of the facts set forth in the certification. Id. The certification included two inaccurate factual statements, id.; the charges against the defendant were eventually dismissed, id. at 122, 118 S.Ct. 502. The former defendant sued the prosecutor under Section 1983 based on [the prosecutor's] alleged violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures. Id. The prosecutor moved for summary judgment based on absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court denied immunity and both the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 122-23, 118 S.Ct. 502. After surveying the history of prosecutorial immunity, the Supreme Court recognized immunity's two important functions: (1) protecting the prosecutor from harassing litigation that would divert [the prosecutor's] time and attention from his official duties; and (2) the interest in enabling [the prosecutor] to exercise independent judgment when deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court. Id. at 125, 118 S.Ct. 502 (internal quotation omitted). The Court recognized that the second functioninsulating the prosecutor's discretion when acting as advocate was of primary importance. Id. But sworn statements in support of an arrest warrant were not intimately associated with a prosecutor's duty to advocate. [9] Rather, offering sworn statements was an act that any competent witness might have performed. Id. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502. The prosecutor was acting as a complaining witness, not as an advocate; [t]estifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer. Id. at 130, 118 S.Ct. 502. The Court also noted that neither federal nor state law made it necessary for the prosecutor to make [the factual assertion]. Id. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502. Kalina is easily distinguishable from the case before us. There are key differences between arrest warrants and material witness orders. For one, in New York, only a prosecutor or defense attorney can seek a material witness order. N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 620.20(1); see also N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 620.30(1) (requiring the applicant to make a written, sworn application in order to commence material witness proceedings; the applicant is either the prosecutor or defense attorney). Further, an arrest warrant is one of the first steps required to begin a criminal investigation. A material witness order, in contrast, may issue only when a prosecution is ready for trial. Seeking a material witness order is within the prosecutor's function as an advocate. A prosecutor employs prosecutorial discretion when determining whether to seek such an order. See Betts v. Richard, 726 F.2d 79, 79 (2d Cir.1984) [10] ; Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 69 (7th Cir.1978). It is an act intimately associated with presenting the State's case. The material witness order ensures the attendance of a material witness at trial, which often makes or breaks the prosecutor's case. Nevertheless, Flagler argues that the Third and Ninth Circuits have denied absolute prosecutorial immunity for wrongdoing in connection with prosecutorial functions. Flagler, however, fails to recognize that the wrongdoing in those cases was either administrative in nature [11] or akin to the function of law enforcement officers in protecting the public safety by making a complaint of wrongdoing. [12] Therefore, notwithstanding Flagler's arguments to the contrary, we find Trainor absolutely immune for making alleged false statements in support of a material witness order and warrant.