Opinion ID: 176349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eleventh Circuit’s Morillo-Cedron

Text: In Morillo-Cedron, this Court concluded that Buckhannon applies to the fee-shifting provisions of the EAJA. Morillo-Cedron, 452 F.3d at 1258. Additionally, Morillo-Cedron provides guidance here because it also arose in the context of the USCIS’s delay in processing an immigration application. 11 In Morillo-Cedron, the Administrative Office of Appeals ordered the District Director of the USCIS to act on the plaintiffs’ applications for lawful permanent residency. Id. at 1255. When the USCIS timely failed to do so, the plaintiffs filed an action under the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the Administrative Procedures Act. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys fees and costs under the EAJA. Id. The district court issued a show cause order “why the mandamus relief requested should not be granted.” Id. The USCIS then “voluntarily granted lawful permanent resident status” to some of the plaintiffs, referred to as the “adjusted plaintiffs,” and scheduled interviews with the remaining plaintiffs, referred to as the “non-adjusted plaintiffs.” Id. & nn. 1, 2. The district court issued an interim order requiring the USCIS to “proceed on the plaintiffs’ voluntary adjustment status” and later denied the request for mandamus relief and dismissed the complaint. Id. However, the district court awarded the plaintiffs attorneys fees and costs under the EAJA. Id. The district court relied on the catalyst theory, concluding that the adjusted plaintiffs were prevailing parties because plaintiffs’ action caused the government to process their applications. Id. This Court reversed the award under the EAJA. Applying Buckhannon, we concluded that the plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties.” Id. at 1258. We 12 explained that, under Buckhannon, “a ‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded some relief by the court; i.e., some court-ordered change in the legal relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant,” and that a defendant’s voluntary change in conduct “‘lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.’” Id. at 1257 (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-05, 121 S. Ct. at 1840). This Court concluded that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the prevailing party requirement because they did not litigate the case to final judgment, stating: [W]e hold the plaintiffs here are not “prevailing parties.” The record demonstrates that they did not litigate to judgment the District Director’s failure to abide by the AAO rules and process their applications. In other words, the plaintiffs did not obtain a courtordered change in the legal relationship between them and the Government; they did not obtain relief on the merits of their claim. The Government voluntarily processed their applications and conducted interviews before the district court entered any final judgment. Moreover, the district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss because the case was moot. Id. at 1258.