Opinion ID: 77333
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Admitted Cromer's Expert Testimony.

Text: 24 Garcia and Nunez raise three issues with Special Agent Cromer's expert testimony. First, Garcia argues that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 403 by permitting Special Agent Cromer to testify as an expert witness. Second, Garcia and Nunez argue that the district court erred under the Sixth Amendment by permitting Cromer to testify about the hearsay statement of a cooperating conspirator. Third, Nunez argues that the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703 when it permitted Cromer to testify about the hearsay statement of a cooperating conspirator. Each argument fails. 25 1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Permitting Cromer to Testify as an Expert Witness. 26 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert testimony if specialized knowledge will help the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. [A] witness [may be] qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Id. The operations of narcotics dealers are a proper subject for expert testimony under Rule 702, United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1985), and we have recognized the well-established rule that an experienced narcotics agent may testify as an expert to help a jury understand the significance of certain conduct or methods of operation unique to the drug distribution business. United States v. Butler, 102 F.3d 1191, 1199 (11th Cir.1997) (internal quotations omitted). We also have affirmed the admission under Rule 702 of the expert testimony of a police officer interpreting `drug codes and jargon.' United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1008 (11th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Brown, 872 F.2d 385, 392 (11th Cir.1989)). 27 The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting Special Agent Cromer to testify as an expert witness. Cromer had been a DEA agent for several years and had received training regarding the operation and structure of drug trafficking organizations and how those organizations transport and distribute drugs. Cromer had been involved in at least 50 drug investigations and the majority of those involved Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Cromer also had participated in numerous wiretap investigations and was familiar with the coded language that some drug trafficking organizations use. Cromer clearly was an experienced narcotics agent, and his testimony could have helped the jury understand the evidence. See id.; Fed.R.Evid. 702. 28 Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed R. Evid. 403. Special Agent Cromer's testimony was highly probative. Cromer's testimony about drug traffickers' use of code words, for example, was probative because drug dealers often camouflage their discussions. . . [and] expert testimony explaining the meanings of code words may `assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 702). Cromer's testimony about how drug trafficking organizations compartmentalize certain operations and roles was highly probative because, as the government argues, this is precisely the type of testimony. . . [that could] help the jury understand how the conduct and evidence relating to the individual participants might further the goals and purposes of the drug trafficking organization. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that any unfair prejudice Cromer's testimony could have caused did not outweigh its high probative value. 29 2. The District Court Did Not Err Under the Sixth Amendment by Admitting Cromer's Testimony About the Out-of-Court Statement of a Drug Trafficker Who Testified at Trial to the Same Statement. 30 Garcia and Nunez contend that, because Cromer explained that his opinion about the meaning of shirts was based on a statement made by Mojica, a cooperating conspirator, part of Cromer's testimony was hearsay admitted in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford. 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. This argument fails because the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Crawford, bars the admission of the out-of-court statements of declarants who do not testify at trial: the Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial.  Id. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. at 1365 (emphasis added). Unlike the declarant in Crawford, id. at 40, 124 S.Ct. at 1357, Mojica testified at trial and he testified to the same statement Cromer had described. Garcia and Nunez had ample opportunity to confront and cross-examine Mojica, and Cromer's testimony about Mojica's statement was offered to explain the basis of Cromer's opinion as an expert. 31 3. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Under Rule 703 by Admitting Cromer's Testimony About Mojica's Statement. 32 Nunez objects that Cromer's testimony was inadmissible hearsay, but a district court enjoys the discretion to permit an expert witness to disclose[] to the jury [f]acts or data that are otherwise inadmissible if the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. Fed.R.Evid. 703. It is understandable that the district court might have wanted the jury to understand that Cromer had relied on the statements of Mojica: any problems with the credibility of Mojica, whom the jury saw and heard testify, might have affected the decision of the jury to credit or reject Cromer's testimony. 33 Nunez correctly reminds us that Rule 703 applies only when an expert witness testifies about matters within the scope of his expertise. See Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 58. We certainly agree that hearsay evidence admitted under Rule 703 must be the type of evidence reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject, United States v. Scrima, 819 F.2d 996, 1002 (11th Cir.1987), but there is no abuse of discretion in concluding that the debriefing of suspected drug traffickers is the type of evidence that is reasonably relied upon by seasoned drug enforcement officers in forming opinions or inferences about the use of coded language by drug traffickers. This Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer testifying as an expert witness may rely on information he received from other people if such sources of information were regularly relied upon by experts in his field. United States v. Brown, 299 F.3d 1252, 1257, 1258 (11th Cir.2002), vacated, 538 U.S. 1010, 123 S.Ct. 1928, 155 L.Ed.2d 847 (2003), remanded to and reinstated by 342 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 823, 125 S.Ct. 37, 160 L.Ed.2d 34 (2004). We have stated, for example, that Rule 703 encompasses hearsay statements in a context . . . where the government expert specifically testified that his opinion was based on his experience and expertise, in conjunction with the information he received from a DEA intelligence agent and Bermudan authorities, and that such sources of information were regularly relied upon in valuating narcotics. Id. at 1257. We also have explained that expert testimony by an ATF agent based partly on his own analysis, but verified by consultation with an ATF technical specialist, was properly admitted under Rule 703 where the agent testified that the consultation was of the kind regularly relied upon by experts in his field. Id. at 1257-58 (characterizing the holding in United States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1349-50 (11th Cir.2002)). 34 Nunez's reliance on Dukagjini is misplaced. That court concluded that the expert testimony at times departed from the bounds of Rules 702 and 703 and from reliable methodology and the witness had repeatedly deviated from his expertise on drug jargon. Id. at 58-59. Unlike Cromer, the expert in Dukagjini was relying on his conversations with non-testifying witnesses and co-defendants in order to prove `the truth of the matter asserted' rather than translating drug jargon, applying expert methodology, or relying on his general experience in law enforcement. Id. at 59. The court recognized that an expert [is permitted] to rely on hearsay evidence for the purposes of rendering an opinion based on his expertise, id., but excluded the testimony in that case because the expert was repeating hearsay evidence without applying any expertise whatsoever, id. 35 In contrast with Dukagjini, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Cromer had applied his expertise in relying on, among other sources, his interview with Mojica to determine the meaning of coded language. An experienced agent like Cromer, by virtue of his professional knowledge and ability, [was] competent to judge for himself the reliability of statements made by an admitted drug trafficker in post-arrest debriefings in forming an expert opinion about the drug traffickers' use of coded language. United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 1285, 1290 (5th Cir.1971). The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that testimony. B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Not Holding a Second Hearing on Whether to Disqualify Garcia's Attorney. 36 Garcia argues that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting a second hearing on whether to disqualify Garcia's attorney due to a conflict of interest. Garcia does not argue that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Garcia argues that the district court should have intervened at trial when he testified adversely to himself and favorably to Molina, although the district court already had held a full hearing and Garcia had waived any actual, apparent, or possible conflict. Garcia's argument fails. 37 An attorney may be disqualified when an actual or even a potential conflict of interest exists, United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir.1994), but the defendant may waive this conflict of interest and elect to have the attorney continue representation, so long as that waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, id. at 1524; see McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir.1990). In order for a waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel to be knowing and intelligent, the State must show that the defendant (1) was aware that a conflict of interest existed; (2) realized the consequences to his defense that continuing with counsel under the onus of a conflict could have; and (3) was aware of his right to obtain other counsel. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir.1979). Although the district court is not required to accept a defendant's waiver, Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1700, a criminal defendant has a presumptive right to counsel of choice and courts should hesitate to disqualify defense counsel, Ross, 33 F.3d at 1522-23 (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164, 108 S.Ct. at 1700). 38 Garcia knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived objection to his attorney's conflict of interest. The magistrate judge held an extensive pretrial hearing and confirmed that Garcia spoke English and was not under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or medication. The magistrate judge explained how a conflict of interest could arise in plea bargaining, exercising peremptory challenges to jurors, direct examination, and sentencing. The magistrate judge told Garcia the government would pay for a lawyer to represent him. The magistrate judge told Garcia the government even would pay for a lawyer to discuss with Garcia the wisdom of proceeding without independent counsel. Garcia knew there was at least a possible conflict, he knew how this conflict could harm his interests, and he knew he had the right to an attorney at no cost to himself. Because Garcia effectively waived any conflict following a thorough pretrial hearing, the district court was not required to inquire at trial about Wright's conflict of interest. C. Sufficient Evidence Supported Both Convictions for Conspiracy. 39 Garcia and Nunez argue that the district court erroneously concluded that sufficient evidence supported their convictions for conspiracy. To convict a defendant for conspiracy . . . , the evidence must show (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the defendant knew of it, and (3) that the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined it. United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1994). The very nature of conspiracy frequently requires that the existence of an agreement be proved by inferences from the conduct of the alleged participants or from circumstantial evidence of a scheme. United States v. Ayala, 643 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); see United States v. Spradlen, 662 F.2d 724, 727 (11th Cir.1981). A conspiracy conviction will be upheld . . . when the circumstances surrounding a person's presence at the scene of conspiratorial activity are so obvious that knowledge of its character can fairly be attributed to him. United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir.1983). We apply these standards to each verdict of guilt and conclude the evidence was sufficient. 40
41 Garcia argues that his mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict him for conspiracy, but Garcia was not merely present in a house full of drugs, drug money, drug traffickers, and at least one firearm. Most of the physical evidence against Garcia was found in either his bedroom or bathroom, Garcia admitted the drugs were his, and one of the digital scales had cocaine residue. Garcia testified the drugs were merely for his personal use, but the jury reasonably could have concluded that the drugs were for distribution because a defendant [who] chooses to testify . . . runs the risk that if disbelieved `the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.' United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir.1995) (quoting Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 961 n. 7 (11th Cir.1992)). Garcia lived with two conspirators and was related through his common-law marriage to Cuevas, the ringleader of the conspiracy. It would have been reasonable to conclude that Garcia's drug activity was related to the charged conspiracy. 42 The DEA agents also found nearly $300,000 in Garcia's house, most of it in his bedroom closet. A person who owns or exercises dominion and control over a . . . residence in which contraband is concealed may be deemed to be in constructive possession of the contraband, United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1983), and a defendant involved only in the money laundering facet of the drug business could be considered a part of the conspiracy to distribute those drugs, United States v. High, 117 F.3d 464, 469 (11th Cir.1997). The large sum of money in Garcia's room provided yet another basis for conviction. Sufficient evidence supported Garcia's conviction for conspiracy. 43
44 Nunez argues the government failed to prove that he was the person recorded on the phone calls, the phone calls involved illegal activity, the phone calls referred to cocaine, or the phone calls were part of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment. Each argument fails. 45 First, a jury reasonably could have concluded that Nunez was the speaker in the five phone calls. Self-identification and telephone subscriber information are recognized means to establish the identity of persons speaking in recorded conversations. See United States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1173 (11th Cir.1994). Three of the calls were to or from Nunez's cell phone. In the fourth call, Cuevas asked for Hector and an unidentified female said that Hector had just returned from Houston. Nunez's first name is Hector and he is from Houston. In that same call, Hector and Cuevas call each other cuz. Nunez and Cuevas are cousins. 46 The fifth call was subject to comparison by the jury with the first four calls because the government played all the calls at trial. The jury had the opportunity to compare the voice, matter of discussion, manner of speech, and use of language in the fifth call with these qualities and characteristics in the first four calls. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see Miranda, 425 F.3d at 959, and a jury reasonably could have concluded that Nunez was the speaker on these five phone calls. 47 Second, a jury reasonably could have concluded that the recorded conversations involved illegal activity. Nunez and Cuevas discuss shirts, a lady, a truck driver, McAllen, and Ruthie. Special Agent Cromer testified that shirts means cocaine and sometimes methamphetamine, lady means cocaine, and he believed Ruthie referred to drugs. Cromer explained that McAllen is a city in Texas that is an entry point for drugs smuggled into the United States from Mexico and the word trailer refers to a tractor trailer[,] which is one of the common forms of how to transport drugs from McAllen, Texas, to Atlanta. A cooperating co-conspirator also testified that, in his conversations with Cuevas, one shirt meant an ounce of cocaine. The combination of testimony about the meaning of coded language and conversations that make little facial sense at all but gain a great deal of meaning when viewed as coded references to dealings in [drugs], United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 370 n. 4 (5th Cir.1980), was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Cuevas and Nunez's conversations were about drugs. 48 Third, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that the conversations were about cocaine or methamphetamine. Mojica testified that an ounce of cocaine is one shirt. Cromer testified that shirts meant cocaine, and sometimes methamphetamine. Cromer also testified that lady meant cocaine. The phone calls support the inference that Nunez was transporting something and it was reasonable to conclude that that something was cocaine. 49 Fourth, it was reasonable for a jury to conclude that the phone calls were related to the charged conspiracy. Nunez contends that a buyer-seller relationship is not sufficient to prove a conspiracy. We recognize that two parties . . . charged with agreeing to distribute drugs might not be guilty of conspiracy when the evidence [demonstrates] that the parties understood their transactions to do no more than support the buyer's personal drug habit, United States v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 830 (11th Cir.1999), but there was ample evidence that Nunez was involved in much more than supplying whatever personal drug habit Cuevas might have had. Nunez participated in the transportation of drugs in cooperation with the ringleader of the charged conspiracy and used at least some of the same coded language to discuss that conspiracy as had at least one other conspirator. The jury reasonably could have concluded that Nunez was involved in the conspiracy charged in the indictment. D. Sufficient Evidence Supported Garcia's Conviction for Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime. 50 Garcia argues that the district court erroneously concluded that sufficient evidence supported his conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. A person violates federal law when during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . [he] uses or carries a firearm, or. . . , in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). To be in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, there must be some nexus between the firearm and the drug selling operation. United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). This argument fails. 51 Because Garcia testified that the firearm belonged to him, the only question is whether he possessed it in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Garcia testified that he did not possess the firearm to protect the money, but when a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved `the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.' Brown, 53 F.3d at 314 (quoting Atkins, 965 F.2d at 961 n. 7). Because a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt, id., the jury was free not only to conclude that Garcia possessed the firearm to protect the money, but also to rely upon that conclusion to convict Garcia. A conclusion of guilt based on Garcia's testimony would have been supported by evidence that Garcia's firearm was in the open drawer of the nightstand in the bedroom, the bedroom and adjoining bathroom contained drugs, a bedroom closet contained a large amount of money that Garcia openly admitted he suspected to be drug proceeds, and Garcia was concerned someone might try to take the money. Sufficient evidence supported Garcia's conviction under section 924.