Opinion ID: 2207851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instructions Mitigating Evidence of Limited Mental Capacity

Text: Sullivan contends that the instructions given to the jury during the penalty phase of his trial were insufficient with respect to the issue of mitigating circumstances. The Superior Court broadly defined a mitigating circumstance as  any factor which tends to make the defendant's conduct less serious or the imposition of a penalty of death inappropriate [6] (emphasis added). According to Sullivan, the Superior Court should have specifically instructed the jury that his alleged mental retardation could be considered by it to be a mitigating circumstance. Sullivan did not request a specific instruction with respect to his alleged mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance before or during the prayer conference in the Superior Court. [7] Sullivan made no objection to the instruction regarding mitigating circumstances as it was actually given to the jury. In the absence of an objection, the standard of appellate review is plain error. Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 117, 132-33 (1990). See Supr.Ct.R. 8. Under the plain error standard of review, the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects which are apparent on the face of the record; which are basic, serious and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest injustice. Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed.2d 161 (1986). This Court recently held, in a similar context, that [b]ecause the error alleged ... relates to the deficiency of instructions in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, any such error would be of constitutional dimension. In view of the resulting imposition of the death sentence, any such error would clearly be fundamental in character and deprive the defendant of a substantial right. Wright v. State, Del.Supr., 633 A.2d 329, 336 (1993). See also Stringer v. Black, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1136-37, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 322-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2948-51, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Accordingly, we will also examine Sullivan's claim pursuant to the plain error standard of appellate review. Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 336; Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d at 133. Sullivan's challenge to the Superior Court's jury instruction is based upon the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [8] Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Sullivan argues that his death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the Superior Court failed to give a specific jury instruction concerning his alleged mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance, when Sullivan had presented evidence sufficient to support such an instruction. See id.; Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 117 (1990). This Court recently reviewed the decisions, including Penry and Sanders, which are relevant to an understanding of the state and federal constitutional standards which must be satisfied before the ultimate sentence of death can be imposed. Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 335-39. In Penry, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the Texas statutory death penalty scheme did not allow for sufficient consideration by the jury of the defendant's undisputed evidence of mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 318-19, 109 S.Ct. at 2946-47. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 337. The Texas death penalty statute, which was reviewed in Penry, required the jury to answer three special issues: (1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result; (2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and (3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. at 2942. If the jury responded to these three questions in the affirmative, the trial court was obligated to impose a sentence of death. Otherwise, the defendant would be sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. Pursuant to the Texas statute, any mitigating evidence must be considered exclusively within the context of the three special issues which are that statute's focus. In Penry, the Court held that because the Texas statutory issues provided no genuine opportunity for the jury to give mitigating effect to the petitioner's evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse, a special instruction was constitutionally mandated. Id. at 318-19, 109 S.Ct. at 2946-47. [9] Thus, the requirement for a specific instruction in Penry was predicated upon the conclusion that the inquiries to which the three special issues in the Texas statute directed the jury (deliberateness, future dangerousness, and provocation) did not provide the jury with a vehicle for expressing a reasoned moral response to the particular mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse. Id. at 320-25, 109 S.Ct. at 2947-50. Compare Johnson v. Texas, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993). The Delaware capital punishment statute is significantly different than the Texas statutory scheme, which was found to be defective in Penry, with regard to the consideration of mitigating circumstances. Pursuant to the present Delaware statute, as revised in 1991, a sentence of death may be imposed only under the two-step procedure prescribed by 11 Del.C. § 4209. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 335. First, the Delaware statute requires the jury to determine, during the penalty phase, (1) whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and (2) whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances found to exist. 11 Del.C. § 4209(c)(3); Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 335. The second step requires the trial judge, taking into consideration the recommendation of the jury, to answer the same questions. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d). Pursuant to the Delaware statute, if the trial judge concludes that the answers to both questions are in the affirmative, he or she must impose a sentence of death; otherwise, a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or other reduction in sentence must be imposed. Id. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 335. Consequently, under the present Delaware capital punishment statute, the trial judge of the Superior Court bears the ultimate responsibility for imposition of the death sentence. The jury acts in an advisory capacity as the conscience of the community. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 335 (quoting State v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 846, 856 (1992)). [10] In Sullivan's case, the record reflects not only that the jury was properly instructed in accordance with the provisions of the Delaware statute, but also that the following special interrogatories were submitted to the jury: 1. Does the evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following statutory aggravating circumstance? The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of Robbery. Yes ___________ No ___________ (Place the number of jurors (Place the number of jurors answering in answering in the affirmative here.) the negative here.) 2. Does the evidence show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the following statutory aggravating circumstance? The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of Burglary. Yes ___________ No ____________ (Place the number of jurors (Place the number of jurors answering in answering in the affirmative here.) the negative here.) 3. Does the jury find by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, that the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist? Yes ___________ No ____________ (Place the number of jurors (Place the number of jurors answering in answering in the affirmative here.) the negative here.) In the context of the proceedings in Sullivan's case, if the jury was convinced of Sullivan's mental retardation, mitigating effect could have been given to that evidence by the jurors individually or collectively, pursuant to the instructions and interrogatories given by the Superior Court. Therefore, the mitigating evidence of Sullivan's limited mental capacity, whether or not it amounted to mental retardation, was within the effective reach of the jury, as mandated by the holding in Penry. See Graham v. Collins, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 113 S.Ct. 892, 901-02, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993) (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 2951). See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). In fact, the record reflects that although all twelve jurors answered the first two interrogatories affirmatively, three jurors responded no to the third question. The trial judge had the same opportunity to consider evidence of Sullivan's alleged mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance, pursuant to part two of Delaware's statutory scheme for capital punishment. While rejecting the proposition that Sullivan was mildly mentally retarded, the Superior Court judge expressly stated in his sentencing opinion that Sullivan does have limited intelligence and reasoning powers which are mitigating circumstances that will be considered by this Court. Thus, the record reflects that when the trial judge announced Sullivan's death sentence, Sullivan's limited mental capacity was acknowledged, in fact, to be a mitigating circumstance. Consequently, Sullivan's reliance upon Penry is misplaced. The Delaware statute does not have the effect of placing evidence of alleged mental retardation beyond the scope of either the judge's or the jury's consideration. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 322, 109 S.Ct. at 2948. The Delaware death penalty statute requires the jury and the judge to determine the existence of any statutory aggravating circumstances and then to weigh  all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender. 11 Del.C. § 4209(c)(3)a.2 (emphasis added). In this case, Sullivan's alleged mental retardation was clearly subject to consideration as a factor in mitigation by both jury and judge. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 339. Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2951; Johnson v. Texas, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2669. This Court's recent decision in Wright demonstrates that Sullivan's reliance on Sanders is also misplaced. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 338 n. 18; Sanders v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 117 (1990). Sullivan argues that if the jury, in its penalty deliberations, after hearing the relevant evidence, could have found the functional equivalent of a basis for a guilty, but mentally ill guilty plea or a basis for the same factual finding by verdict after the guilt phase of the proceedings, the jury should have been instructed by the trial court that a finding of mental retardation or limited mental capacity establishes mitigation as a matter of law. See Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d at 134. Sullivan's argument is not supported by this Court's holding in Sanders. In Sanders, as part of a bifurcated trial, the jury initially found the defendant, who was charged with Murder in the First Degree, to be guilty but mentally ill, and then unanimously recommended that he be sentenced to death. This Court vacated the death sentence, holding that in order for the jury to properly perform its sentencing function, specific jury instructions were required to explain the significance of the verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which establishes a mitigating circumstance as a matter of law. Id. at 134. In Wright, this Court explained that the law has long held the mentally ill to a different set of standards, and that tradition was the underlying rationale of the Sanders decision. See Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 338 n. 18 (citing Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d at 136-38). Sullivan did not enter any pleas of guilty but mentally ill. Sullivan entered pleas of guilty. Consequently, the risk of jury confusion that was the basis for the mandatory specific instruction regarding mitigating evidence in Sanders was entirely absent from Sullivan's penalty hearing. Since the jury was never required to return any verdict on Sullivan's guilt or innocence, there were no instructions during the initial (guilt) phase of his bifurcated proceedings that could cause any jury confusion. We conclude in Sullivan's case, as this Court held in Wright, that there is no reason to extend Sanders beyond its extraordinary facts. Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 338 n. 18. In summary, there are no state or federal constitutional principles which mandated that the Superior Court include a specific jury instruction with regard to the consideration of Sullivan's alleged mental retardation as a mitigating circumstance. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 328, 109 S.Ct. at 2951; Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d at 133-34. See also Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 338-39. Accord Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 104, 128, 151 (1983) (penalty phase instructions sufficient even though low mentality of defendant was advanced as mitigating circumstance), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 198, 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 185, 88 L.Ed.2d 154 (1985). Since the Delaware law explicitly permits consideration of any mitigating evidence without the constraint of the Texas statute's special issues format, Sullivan's case is clearly distinguishable from Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). The mitigating evidence of Sullivan's alleged mental retardation was within the effective reach of the sentencer,  the Superior Court judge, as well as the advisory jury, pursuant to the Delaware death penalty statute. See Johnson v. Texas, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 2669 (emphasis added) (quoting Graham v. Collins, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 901-02). Compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. at 327-28, 109 S.Ct. at 2951. Unlike the unique situation in Sanders, Sullivan's bifurcated proceedings had no inherent potential for confusing the jury. Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d at 133-34. Consequently, we hold that the omission of such a specific instruction to the jury, in the absence of a request for one, did not constitute plain error. Wright v. State, 633 A.2d at 338-39.