Opinion ID: 733260
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In addition to the other penalties set forth in this section--

Text: 9 (A) any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, or any person engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section 960(b)(1) of this title who intentionally kills ... an individual ... shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death; and 10 (B) any person, during the commission of, in furtherance of, or while attempting to avoid apprehension, prosecution or service of a prison sentence for, a felony violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter who intentionally kills ... any Federal, State or local law enforcement officer engaged in, or on account of, the performance of such officer's official duties ... shall be sentenced to any term of imprisonment, which shall not be less than 20 years, and which may be up to life imprisonment, or may be sentenced to death. 11 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1). 12 NJB asserts that because § 848(e)(1) applies [i]n addition to other penalties set forth in this section, § 848(e) must set forth a penalty enhancement, not a separate crime. NJB also points to the title of the section--Death Penalty--as proof that § 848(e)'s sole purpose is to apply a new penalty to certain § 848(c) continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) violations. 13 We begin our analysis with the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985). In Garrett the Supreme Court considered whether § 848, as originally enacted (which at that time only outlawed CCE violations and included none of the language at issue in this case), created a substantive offense separate from its predicate offenses, and whether a subsequent CCE prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. In holding that § 848 was a separate offense, Garrett directed that analysis of whether a statute creates a separate offense is a question of statutory interpretation; a court must discern the legislative intent based upon [t]he language, structure, and legislative history of the statute. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 779, 105 S.Ct. at 2412. 14 The language, structure, and legislative history of § 848(e)(1) establish that it is a separate offense, not merely a penalty enhancement. First, several other subsections of § 848 refer to § 848(e) as a separate offense. For example, § 848(i) requires a separate sentencing hearing if the government is seeking the death penalty and the defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to an offense under subsection (e) of this section. 21 U.S.C. § 848(i) (emphasis added). Section 848(n) lists the aggravating factors to be considered in punishing an offense under subsection (e). 21 U.S.C. § 848(n). See also 21 U.S.C. § 848(j) (describing the proof necessary for mitigating and aggravating factors when a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to an offense under subsection (e) of this section); 21 U.S.C. § 848(p) (allowing life imprisonment if the death penalty is not imposed and [i]f a person is convicted for an offense under subsection (e) of this section). The fact that the statute itself cross-references to § 848(e) as a distinct offense clearly expresses Congress' intent that § 848(e) be a separate crime. 15 Second, § 848(e) cannot be a penalty enhancement that only applies in addition to the other penalties set forth in this section because, in fact, § 848(e) does not apply solely to § 848 offenses. Section 848(e)(1)(A) also covers intentional killing while engaging in an offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title or section 960(b)(1) of this title. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). Section 848(e)(1)(B) applies even more broadly to the intentional killing of a law enforcement officer pursuant to a felony violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B). The express statutory language thus provides that the predicate offenses which trigger a § 848(e) violation include statutory provisions outside § 848, and directly contradicts any argument that § 848(e) is a penalty enhancement for a § 848(c) violation. 16 Third, in concluding that the congressional intent to create a separate offense was indisputable in Garrett, 471 U.S. at 784, 105 S.Ct. at 2414, the Supreme Court relied upon the fact that under the CCE statute a separate penalty is set out, rather than a multiplier of the penalty established for some other offense. Id. at 781, 105 S.Ct. at 2412. The same is true here. The Garrett Court also relied on the fact that the statute before it was aimed at a special problem. [Its] language is designed to reach the 'top brass' in the drug rings, not the lieutenants and foot soldiers. Id. at 781, 105 S.Ct. at 2413. Section 848(e) is similarly aimed at special and serious crimes: killing a law-enforcement officer in connection with a drug offense, or killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise, large-scale drug distribution, or large-scale drug importation. 17 Finally, as the Fifth Circuit noted in United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir.1992), the legislative history of § 848(e) illustrates a Congressional intent to establish a separate offense: 18 Before 1988, § 848 embodied only a single statutory prohibition--it punished offenders who engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. After amendment by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub.L. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4382, 4387-88, § 848(e) had added a death penalty provision, not for CCE offenses, but for an entirely new group of offenses--intentional murders committed during certain specified felonies. 19 Id. See also, United States v. Snow, 48 F.3d 198, 200 (6th Cir.1995). 20 To counter this substantial evidence of legislative intent, NJB offers two arguments. Neither is persuasive. 21 First, NJB points to several flaws in Congress' drafting of § 848(e) and asserts that because the Supreme Court noted that the statute at issue in Garrett was carefully crafted, Garrett 's analysis should not be followed here. NJB misunderstands Garrett. In Garrett the Supreme Court did not suggest that judges should base their conclusions as to legislative intent upon a critical analysis of Congressional drafting skills. Instead, Garrett established that courts must apply the tools of statutory construction to determine whether Congress meant to create a separate offense. Under that analysis, it is manifest that § 848(e) states a separate offense. 22 NJB's remaining contention is that such a holding would render the statutory language [i]n addition to the other penalties set forth in this section a nullity. This is so only under NJB's narrow construction of this language. Garrett itself offers insight into an alternative reason why Congress may have specified that § 848(e) applies in addition to other penalties. Garrett dealt with the question of whether a CCE prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by punishing an accused first for the predicate offenses, and again for the offenses joined in the CCE prosecution. The Court found no Double Jeopardy violation. Garrett, 471 U.S. at 786-95, 105 S.Ct. at 2415-19. One of the questions at issue in Garrett was whether Congress meant to replace prosecutions of the underlying predicate offenses with the CCE prosecution. Id. at 784-86, 105 S.Ct. at 2414-15. Despite silence in the legislative history, the Supreme Court found that Congress did not mean to substitute the CCE offense for the underlying predicate offenses; instead, the Court concluded that a CCE prosecution and punishment occurs in addition to prosecution for the predicate offenses. Id. at 785, 105 S.Ct. at 2415. 23 In light of this discussion in Garrett, it seems likely that, in using the similar language on which NJB now relies, Congress hoped to make absolutely clear that the punishment for a crime under § 848(e) was in addition to, and did not replace, any other punishments. See United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1105 (10th Cir.1996) (Congress has clearly expressed its intention that the § 848(e) punishment be cumulative with any other applicable punishment, stating in the statute that the § 848(e) penalties are '[i]n addition to the other penalties set forth in this section.' ). As such, the language on which NJB's argument hinges is not inconsistent with our construction of the statute, but rather supports our holding. 24 In sum, because § 848(e) clearly sets forth a separate substantive violent offense, the Government's certification of this fact did not constitute error.