Opinion ID: 2806518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: IAC - Penalty Phase

Text: The representation Bemore received at the penalty phase by counsel Barranco, like the representation by McKechnie at the guilt phase, was “outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, assuming, as we must, that the California Supreme Court concluded otherwise, its conclusion was an “objectively unreasonable” application of the Supreme Court’s holding in Strickland. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520–21 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). Finally, as to the penalty phase, we are persuaded that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and that “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 786. We therefore reverse the denial of habeas relief with regard to imposition of the death penalty.
At the penalty phase, counsel’s duty to follow up on indicia of mental impairment is quite different from—and much broader and less contingent than—the more confined guilt-phase responsibility. See Doe, 782 F.3d at 435; Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2006). At the guilt phase, a defendant’s mental state is directly relevant for limited purposes—principally, as we have discussed, legal insanity or actual failure to form the requisite intent at the time of the offense. See supra note 14. By contrast, “[b]ecause a sentencing jury is given ‘broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, in effect, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability,’ the presentation of relevant mitigation evidence is of vital importance to the jury’s penalty determination.” Frierson, 463 F.3d at 993 (quoting Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1044). BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 37 Consequently, “‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’” Wharton v. Chappell, 765 F.3d 953, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1999)). “To that end, trial counsel must inquire into a defendant’s social background, family abuse, mental impairment, physical health history, and substance abuse history; obtain and examine mental and physical health records, school records, and criminal records; consult with appropriate medical experts; and pursue relevant leads.” Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009)). Where counsel is aware of potentially mitigating evidence, he or she must investigate that evidence, absent a reasonable strategic reason not to do so. Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1039. Barranco’s penalty-phase investigation failed to meet these standards. Like McKechnie, Barranco was on notice, through preliminary hearing testimony, transcripts of the state’s interviews with Bates Street residents, and her own conversations with Bemore’s friends and family, that Bemore had periodic manic-like episodes; was a heavy drug user; and was severely beaten as a child in a manner and to a degree that brain damage could have resulted. Barranco was also aware, through Dr. Fineman’s preliminary diagnoses, that Bemore may have been bipolar or suffered other mental disorders. And, notably, while many of Dr. Fineman’s diagnoses were preliminary, he conclusively found that Bemore suffered “mild, diffuse organic impairment,” and exhibited impaired reasoning skills, judgment, and ability “to control his impulsivity.” Despite these indications, Barranco purposely truncated the inquiry into Bemore’s mental health. She hired Dr. Fineman specifically for the purpose of developing the “sun child” theory that would have explained Bemore’s drug use 38 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL as the product of cultural pressures, not to develop evidence of mental impairment. When Dr. Fineman reported that Bemore did suffer a number of mental impairments and possible disorders, and recommended further inquiry, she terminated his involvement and put his report in the back of a drawer. And Dr. Bucky, who testified only about the impact on Bemore of growing up in a family with chemical dependency, was “neither asked . . . to conduct any psychological testing of Mr. Bemore nor requested . . . [to] give an opinion as to his mental state at the time of the homicide.” The net result was that there was, except for Dr. Fineman’s fairly vague “organic impairment” assessment, and despite Dr. Fineman’s indications of possible, serious mental health issues, no definitive conclusion concerning either Bemore’s mental state at the time of the crime or his overall mental health diagnosis. None of the state’s arguments in defense of Barranco’s ill-considered decision to brush aside any mental health mitigation inquiry are convincing. The state points to the “over forty witnesses” who did testify for the defense at the penalty phase. Many of these witnesses knew Bemore only slightly, as one-time basketball teammates or co-workers. One witness was an orthopedic surgeon who testified about a foot injury Bemore had suffered. The vast majority spoke only about their perception that Bemore had good character. But “the ABA Standards prevailing at the time called for [Bemore]’s counsel to cover several broad categories of mitigating evidence,” not just one. Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 11. And a good character defense was unlikely to be persuasive to a jury that had just decided that Bemore had carried out a grizzly murder, including torturing the victim, and had lied on the stand to boot. Some of the defense penalty phase witnesses did mention Bemore’s drug problems and tumultuous upbringing. Even BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 39 so, it is not enough just to present “extensive mitigating evidence” where particularly persuasive evidence—especially evidence in the form of expert testimony—was omitted. Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227. Caro held, for instance, that a petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an IAC claim because his lawyer had not engaged toxicologists or neurologists to evaluate the impact of the petitioner’s extensive chemical exposure, nor provided “those experts who did examine [him] with the information necessary to make an accurate evaluation.” Id. at 1227; see also id. at 1226–27. We so held even though the jury was presented with evidence that the petitioner was beaten as a child and exposed to chemicals. Id. at 1230 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). As Caro made clear, it is not enough that some of the defense witnesses informed the jury of the facts that might underlie a mental health mitigation defense; “expert testimony to explain the ramifications of those experiences on [petitioner’s] behavior . . . is necessary.” Id. at 1227 (maj. op.). The state also maintains that it would have been apparent from the outset that a mental health defense would have conflicted with Barranco’s strategy of presenting Bemore as “a good guy with a drug problem, garnering whatever benefit [she] could from the notion of lingering doubt.” Had Dr. Fineman testified, the state argues, the state would have cross-examined him about some of the adverse elements of his initial report—namely, that Bemore, in addition to possibly suffering from bipolar disorder and organic impairment, was “subtly controlling,” “self-indulgent,” unable to “empathize with others,” and possibly a sociopath. These findings would have cast doubt on Bemore’s character, the state suggests, and so Barranco could have made a strategic decision not to pursue a theory that would allow those findings to come out. 40 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL This reasoning is unpersuasive, for several reasons. First, Barranco’s investigation into her chosen “good guy” mitigation strategy itself contained a serious omission, making her decision to pursue that approach in lieu of presenting mental health evidence uninformed in that respect.20 As part of her “good guy” strategy, Barranco attempted to present Bemore as a good inmate, which opened the door to damaging rebuttal testimony about Bemore’s bad behavior in jail, including several instances of assault and, most particularly, his role in the alleged food-tampering incident that sent a number of prisoners to the hospital in the hope of fostering escape. Barranco expected that evidence of the food tampering incident would not be admitted, as she thought—erroneously—that Bemore had been found factually innocent of the offense. See Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 849. In fact, Barranco admitted to the trial court that she had relied on “rumor and hearsay,” id. (alteration omitted), rather than looking into the food tampering case herself, and told the court that “she would not have introduced good inmate evidence ‘at all’ had she known the food tampering evidence 20 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed the narrow question whether Barranco provided ineffective assistance by presenting evidence of Bemore’s good behavior in jail, as that evidence opened the door to damaging rebuttal testimony about the uninvestigated foodtampering incident. See Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 850–51. The court held that the food-tampering testimony was not so damaging that it would have altered a reasonably competent attorney’s defense strategy. On the whole, the court reasoned, Barranco made an informed decision to present the “good inmate” evidence and “risk unfavorable revelations on rebuttal.” Id. at 851. We assume, for present purposes, that the California Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland in concluding that Barranco’s presentation of “good inmate” testimony and her investigation of the foodtampering incident did not themselves fall below Strickland’s standard for effective assistance of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). But that assumption does not address the reasonableness of the California Supreme Court’s denial of relief on the much broader penalty phase IAC claim, discussed above, on habeas review. BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 41 ‘had happened’ and ‘could come in . . . as the last evidence the jury hear[d] before they deliberate penalty.’” Id. Given that Barranco should have been aware the state would attempt to rebut evidence of Bemore’s good behavior in jail, her failure to examine the details of the incident is, at least, strong evidence of deficient performance. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383–85 (2005) (holding that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that counsel’s performance was adequate, where counsel failed to examine a publically available file on the defendant’s prior conviction). Second, while it “may well have been strategically defensible upon a reasonably thorough investigation” to rely on good character evidence in addition to mental health evidence, “the two sentencing strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535. One can have a serious mental illness and still be a good friend and kind person. A defense that Bemore was “a good guy with a drug problem,” was fully consistent with a defense that he was a good guy who was plagued by a drug problem and mental illness. And even if the mental health evidence showed Bemore to be impaired in a manner that made him self-serving, explosive, and violent, as the state contends, “brain damage that could manifest in impulsive, violent behavior” is nonetheless mitigating, as it indicates that Bemore was “substantially impaired in his ability to conform his conduct to the law and suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 36. Third, a decision is not a “strategic” one if not informed. The question under Strickland is not only “whether counsel should have presented a [different] mitigation case,” but also “whether the investigation supporting [counsel’s] decision not to introduce mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523. 42 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL We recently held, in Elmore v. Sinclair, for example, that it was a reasonable strategic decision for counsel to pursue a remorse mitigation defense in lieu of a mental health defense that would “detract from, or destroy, the remorse strategy.” 781 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). In Elmore, counsel hired two mental health experts to evaluate the defendant, and, armed with their conclusions, conducted two mock trials. The mock trials showed that jurors responded more favorably to a defense based on remorse and acceptance of responsibility than to one based on the defendant’s mental health or brain damage. Id. Here, by contrast, Barranco decided to present her “good guy” mitigation defense without first investigating appropriately the mental health alternative. When an alternative in the form of a mental health mitigation strategy became apparent by way of Dr. Fineman’s report and anecdotes from Bemore’s friends and family, she precipitously pushed that possibility aside as inconsistent with the “sun child” aspect of her planned “good guy” mitigation presentation. In short, Barranco’s early decision to pursue a riskfraught “good guy” mitigation strategy did not satisfy her duty first to unearth potentially mitigating mental health evidence. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36. “In deferring to counsel’s decision not to pursue a [mental health] mitigation case despite [counsel’s] unreasonable investigation, the [California Supreme Court] unreasonably applied Strickland.” Id. at 534.
To determine whether Barranco’s failure to investigate and uncover mitigating evidence prejudiced Bemore, we must consider both whether there is “a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of this [evidence], would have introduced it at sentencing,” and that “had the jury been BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 43 confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.” Id. at 535, 536. If no reasonable jurist could disagree that the mitigating evidence a proper investigation would have uncovered “may have meant the difference between a life or death sentence,” Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d at 1210, we must grant relief. See Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403. The available mitigating mental health evidence was compelling. Even without the benefit of a final diagnosis, Dr. Fineman had determined, before trial, that Bemore had organic brain damage and “a fundamental inability to control his behavior” when his “needs press upon him.” Reviewing Dr. Fineman’s report in light of information about Bemore’s drug use just before the crime and his history of erratic, explosive behavior, Dr. Rosenthal stated that whatever Bemore’s specific condition might be, it was clear at the time of trial that his ability “to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(h). Dr. Fineman’s and Dr. Rosenthal’s conclusions would have been bolstered by Dr. Wright’s statement that “[o]nce Bemore stated using Crack he was no longer able to control his behavior,” and by available testimony from Bemore’s friends that he was prone to uncontrollable manic-like episodes. Troy Patterson, for example, stated in his declaration that, had he been asked, he would have testified that, at the time of the Aztec incident, Bemore was “constantly using mind-altering drugs” that “made him crazy . . . flip out, go out of his mind and lose control of himself.” At the penalty phase, the jury was explicitly instructed to take mental health evidence into account, by considering whether Bemore was “under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance” and whether his “capacity . . . to 44 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or effects of intoxication.” The prosecution affirmatively addressed each of these issues during closing argument, emphatically stating that Bemore “wasn’t under the influence of any extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” and that his capacity to conform his conduct with the law was not diminished by intoxication or mental defect. Had the mental health evidence been presented, this reductive argument could not have been made. At the capital penalty phase, where the jury is given broad latitude to consider all factors that bear on whether a defendant ought to live or die, see Frierson, 463 F.3d at 993, a reasonably competent attorney would have presented that evidence, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36. That Cosby received twenty-five years to life for Muck’s murder is also of some relevance to our conclusion regarding Strickland prejudice.21 Cosby, whose attorneys presented evidence of impaired judgment due to drug use and organic brain damage, received this lesser sentence despite his having been concurrently convicted, by a single jury, of a second robbery and murder. In ruling on a motion to reconsider Bemore’s death sentence, Judge Gill stated that the significantly different sentence in the Cosby trial was “in [his] mind.” He was satisfied that the discrepancy was justified, however, because in “the case of Mr. Cosby there was some fairly convincing evidence [of] head trauma he sustained as an infant . . . [and] demonstrable physiological damages and deficits.” He noted that “[t]here’s no such evidence in the case of Mr. Bemore.” Had mental health 21 The result in Cosby’s trial is, of course, not itself a sufficient basis for determining the likely impact of mental health evidence in Bemore’s penalty phase. C.f. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43–46 (1984). BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 45 evidence been presented, “there is clearly a reasonable probability that the . . . jury—and the . . . judge—‘would have struck a different balance,’ and it [was] unreasonable to conclude otherwise.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 42 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537). Our conclusions with regard to IAC at the guilt phase further support our conclusion that it would have been objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that the Strickland prejudice standard was not met at the penalty phase. First, as a general matter, “[e]vidence that might not rise to the level of defense of a crime may nonetheless be important mitigating evidence.” Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 624 (9th Cir. 2010). And second, in this instance, counsel’s guilt phase IAC in choosing, between two inadequately investigated defenses, each unlikely to succeed, a weak alibi defense likely to undermine Bemore’s credibility and thus the likelihood of jury sympathy for him, could well have contributed to the outcome of the penalty phase. The two ineffective representation decisions—not putting on a mental health mitigation defense at the penalty phase, and putting on a guilt phase defense both unlikely to succeed and likely adversely to affect the jury’s view of Bemore for the penalty phase—must be viewed cumulatively in determining whether the Strickland prejudice standard was met with regard to the jury’s decision to sentence Bemore to death. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3 (1973); Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). As the state indicates, the prosecution did present significant aggravating evidence, including allegations of assault and rape. But mitigating mental health evidence would have proven a heavy counterweight. In addition to lessening Bemore’s culpability for the Aztec crimes, such testimony would likely have affected the jury’s opinion with regard to the unadjudicated offenses. 46 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL Prejudice under Strickland does not require a showing that counsel’s actions “more likely than not altered the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. For Bemore to have avoided the death penalty, only one juror need have been persuaded by mitigating evidence to show mercy and vote against a capital sentence. So Bemore need only show that counsel’s errors were “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome” reached by a single juror. Id. at 694.22 In denying Bemore’s penalty-phase IAC claim, the state court “either did not consider or unreasonably discounted the mitigation evidence” that could have been presented. Porter, 558 U.S. at 42. We conclude that mitigating mental health evidence, combined with a different guilt phase strategy, “‘might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal’ of [Bemore’s] moral culpability,” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 398), and that the state court’s contrary conclusion constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland.