Opinion ID: 855991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chief Hankla’s common law liability

Text: The dispatchers argue that even if Chief Hankla cannot be liable under the AHRA, he still can be liable for sexual harrassment under common law theories of public policy tort or intentional infliction of emotional distress. But the record is not clear that the dispatchers raised these theories before the superior court. The dispatchers did not expressly mention these theories in their amended complaint, which alleged “sexual harassment and discrimination, causing pain, humiliation, suffering, and physical and emotional loss . . . in violation of [AS] 18.80.220(a).” The dispatchers only referenced the theories in their opposition to summary judgment to rebut an argument that the AHRA shields the harassing employee. The dispatchers asserted that harassing employees are not protected both because of the language of the AHRA and because “[s]exual harassment is a well-recognized common law tort . . . [that] may take the form of a common law claim based on assault, on intentional infliction of emotional distress, on interference with contract . . ., and as a public policy tort” (emphasis omitted). But they did not argue that they relied on those theories in their claims against Chief Hankla. Welsh expressly asserted an intentional 58 118 P.3d 1070, 1077 (Alaska 2005) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 876 (1979)). 59 Reno v. Baird, 957 P.2d 1333, 1342 (Cal. 1998). -26- 6765 infliction of emotional distress claim, but only at a status hearing three days before the scheduled trial date. The superior court concluded that Welsh’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim had not been pleaded and declined to allow trial to proceed on that claim. We have explained that “as a general rule, appellate review is precluded where questions which appellants denominate as triable issues of fact were not presented to the [trial court].”60 Because it is not clear that the claims of public policy tort or intentional infliction of emotional distress were expressly before the superior court, and because the superior court did not rule on the merits of these claims, we decline to consider the merits of the claims on appeal. But because we are reversing summary judgment dismissing the dispatchers’ sexual harassment claims against the City, the dispatchers may move to amend their complaint to include their common law claims against Chief Hankla.61 Rule 15(a) “commands that leave [to amend] is to be freely