Opinion ID: 2177201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Life Sentence as Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

Text: Applicant asserts the combination of Iowa statutes that resulted in his life sentence offended the disproportionality branch of the prevailing eighth amendment standard on cruel and unusual punishment. See Iowa Code §§ 710.1, 710.2, 902.1. The sentence, he argues, is so excessively severe that it is disproportionate to the offense charged. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); State v. Robbins, 257 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1977). This is because a life sentence may be given in this situation even though no death or serious injury occurs. This issue was raised in trial court in a post-trial motion. We consider it despite the failure to appeal the sentence, for the reasons assigned in division I. We have analyzed the crime and punishment under the three-factor test laid out in Solem v. Helm, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 649-50 (1983): Gravity of the offense and harshness of the penalty; sentences imposed on other crimes in this jurisdiction; and the sentence imposed for kidnapping in other jurisdictions. Iowa is not alone in considering kidnapping a serious crime. See In re Maston, 33 Cal.App.3d 559, 563, 109 Cal.Rptr. 164, 167 (1973) ([K]idnapping is one of the most serious of all crimes. By its very nature it involves violence or forcible restraint.) (citations omitted); Vacendak v. State, 264 Ind. 101, 105, 340 N.E.2d 352, 355, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 851, 97 S.Ct. 141, 50 L.Ed.2d 125 (1976) (The severity of punishment... can be explained by the degree to which the legislature has deplored this [kidnapping] crime.). When a prospective rape victim is kidnapped, the potential for additional harm justifies the increase in defendant's punishment: The asportation frequently is accomplished by the use of force, making it possible for death or bodily injury to result. Taking a victim from familiar surroundings to an unknown location can cause psychological damage, or the movement may aggravate the victim's freedom-seeking impulses, causing the victim to attempt an escape and thus possibly incur more serious bodily harm. Second, the harm of detention can justify increased penalties. Once the victim is isolated from the public, the defendant is free to deal with the victim at will and is more likely to be in a position to engage in an extended assault upon the victim. Additionally, isolation from the public increases the victim's risk of being cut off from medical aid. Note, Kidnapping in Iowa, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 773, 782-83 (1982). See also State v. Knupp, 310 N.W.2d 179, 182 (Iowa 1981). Thus, although the punishment for first-degree kidnapping is severe, the crime, too, is one of utmost severity. In Iowa first-degree murder and first-degree sexual abuse are the only other crimes punishable by life imprisonment. Although the harm to the victim in a first-degree murder case clearly outweighs the harm to the victim here, first-degree murder in Iowa includes felony-murder, Iowa Code section 707.2(2), a crime in which defendant need not even have contemplated a killing when commencing a foray into crime. Although first-degree sexual abuse requires the victim to suffer disabling mental illness, or bodily injury, Iowa Code section 702.18, it was not unreasonable for the legislature to equate the psychological effects of a kidnapping on a rape victim with the affliction of a mental injury. Our criminal statutes do not create a situation where lesser or less serious offenses are punished more severely than applicant's crime; on the contrary, the lesser included offense of second-degree sexual abuse receives the next most severe penalty in the statutory scheme. In imposing enhanced punishment on the defendant who actually commits two serious, life-threatening crimes instead of only one, the legislature was not meting out a disproportionate penalty. Louisiana, like Iowa, imposes a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole on those who kidnap with the intent of subjecting their victims to sexual abuse, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14.44 (West 1984). California and West Virginia also impose life imprisonment without parole on a defendant who kidnaps with the intent to collect a ransom and fails to return his or her victim unharmed. Cal.Penal Code § 209 (West 1984); W.Va.Code § 61-2-14a (1977). [2] From the victim's perspective, an abductor's intent to collect a ransom surely is less terrifying than the abductor's intent to inflict sexual abuse; nor is it unreasonable to equate physical harm to the victim with the psychological harm flowing from sexual assault. Alabama imposes a life sentence on the first-degree kidnapper. Ala. Code §§ 13A-5-6(a)(1), 13A-6-43(a)(4) (1982). South Carolina defines kidnapping as a crime of violence, S.C.Code Ann. § 16-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977), and punishes it with a life sentence, id. § 16-3-910 (1983). We find no merit in the contention that Iowa's penalty for this crime is unconstitutionally disproportionate. We have considered other arguments advanced by the applicant even though we have not discussed them in this opinion. The judgment of the postconviction court is affirmed except as modified in subdivision II(C), and the case is remanded with direction. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED, REMANDED WITH DIRECTION.