Opinion ID: 479235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: claim of denial of due process by use of witness coleman

Text: 172 Reference has been made to the testimony of Lynn Coleman. Coleman had not testified at the 1980 trial. He was called by the government at the third trial and identified Kimberlin as the person he had seen at the site of the September 1 explosion. Defense trial counsel made no objection nor motion to strike. 173 Defendant appears to argue that defendant was entitled to notice in advance concerning Coleman. It is clear, however, that not even under Rule 16 is a defendant in a noncapital case entitled to lists of prospective government witnesses. United States v. Bouye, 688 F.2d 471, 473-74 (7th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). 174 Coleman testified that no government agent had shown him a picture of defendant. He had seen defendant's picture on television at the time of his arrest and later. We do not agree that that type of observation triggers a due process right to judicial evaluation of the reliability of the in-court identification under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199, 93 S.Ct. 375, 382, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). 175 Defendant now argues that the court should have given a greater portion of the instruction on identification recommended in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C.Cir.1972). This claim was waived by failure to object. 176 Coleman testified late on a Friday. After considerable cross-examination his counsel asked the court, because the testimony was unexpected, to continue cross-examination until Monday. Counsel wished to have time for investigation. The court denied the request. After colloquy in which the court suggested the possibility of opening the record for further cross-examination, counsel withdrew the request. The court later said, If there is any basis to open the Government's case in chief for the purpose of allowing further cross-examination of Mr. Coleman, counsel are at liberty to put that request before the Court. No request was made during the four weeks of trial thereafter. On this record, cross-examination was not improperly limited. 177 As Coleman left the court, he was given a notice of deposition in a civil case in state court brought against defendant by individuals injured in one of the explosions. The deposition was to be taken the next afternoon. On motion of the government, the district court ordered defendant to direct his attorney in the civil case to stay the deposition until further order. Judge Steckler added that his order would cease when counsel for the government and defendant appeared before the state court and gave the state court an opportunity to determine whether the deposition should go forward. 178 There is conflict between the liberality of discovery in a civil case and the purpose of restrictions on discovery in a criminal case. See, e.g., Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir.1962). In any event, this order did not impair any right Mr. Kimberlin had as a defendant in the criminal case. 179 J. MISCELLANEOUS CLAIMS OF GOVERNMENT MISCONDUCT 1. Use of Prior Convictions for Impeachment 180 Defendant testified. During direct examination he testified that he had been convicted of perjury. Defendant argues that the government improperly inquired on cross-examination concerning the details of the offense. On direct, for the obvious purpose of minimizing the offense, and its impact on the jury, defendant testified he was convicted when he had just turned eighteen, the grand jury was investigating drug abuse at the high school, and no lawyer was with him when questioned before the grand jury. Apparently believing that the door had been opened, the prosecutor inquired whether the perjury consisted of telling the grand jury he had not sold LSD to certain persons when in fact he had done so. The answer was affirmative. No objection was made. We think there was no plain error, if error at all. See United States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376, 1381 (10th Cir.1977). 181 On cross-examination the government also brought out the convictions of Counts 26 through 34 (the impersonation and insignia counts) which had resulted from the 1980, first, trial. Although defendant had earlier sought a ruling on admissibility, the court deemed the motion premature, and there was no objection when the testimony was elicited. 182 On appeal defendant appears to argue that convictions which occurred at the same trial which resulted in mistrial as to Counts 1 through 22 could not be brought out on retrial of the latter. 183 In a sense, it was fortuitous that the convictions on Counts 26 through 34 had occurred before the defendant testified concerning Counts 1 through 22 at retrial. Nevertheless we are aware of no principle which prevented their use as impeachment. Defendant cites only United States v. Burkhead, 646 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 102 S.Ct. 399, 70 L.Ed.2d 214 (1981), but the circumstances were different, and the type of unfairness perceived by the court in that case did not exist in this one. 184 Counts 31 through 34 charged felonies. Although Counts 26 through 30 charged misdemeanors, defendant raised no question whether the misdemeanor convictions were admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as involving dishonesty or false statement. 2. Defendant's Possession of Weapons 185 On cross-examination of defendant, the government inquired concerning his possession or involvement with a number of weapons. In part he admitted and explained and in part he denied possession or involvement. Insofar as credibility was the only consideration, defendant is correct in saying that his answers could not be disproved by extrinsic evidence. Rule 608, FED.R.EVID. On rebuttal, however, the government offered evidence concerning his possession of weapons. 186 ATF Agent Donovan testified that in a search of defendant's home September 23, 1978, he found a .22 caliber rifle and two shotguns, a box of 12 gauge shotgun shells, a box of .22 caliber ammunition, and a clip containing four .30 caliber rounds. Twelve (12) gauge shotgun shells and 30.06 ammunition had also been found in the Impala. This evidence came in without objection. 187 Scott Bixler was a co-defendant with defendant Kimberlin in the Texas marijuana case. In rebuttal he testified that in the summer of 1978 he purchased seven AR-15 rifles at $300 each. Defendant Kimberlin supplied the money, and Bixler turned six of the rifles over to him. Days before, Bixler had purchased a shotgun for defendant Kimberlin. This testimony came in without objection. There was testimony that an AR-15 was found at the Patricia Strait residence in Texas, along with apparent bomb components, and that the serial number on the rifle was scratched through. This evidence came in without objection. 188 On redirect, Bixler testified, over objection, that he and defendant Kimberlin had shot a semi-automatic .22 caliber pistol with a silencer on the end of it. Kimberlin had provided this weapon. They shot it at the airstrip, a location which figured in the marijuana operation. 189 In overruling the objection to the last mentioned Bixler testimony, the court told the jury the evidence could be considered only as to predisposition and intent. 190 For several reasons, we find no reversible error. 191 a. The possession of a pistol with a silencer is at least marginally relevant to the intent necessary to convict on Counts 17 through 22. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(f) requires that damaging or destroying the property described by means of an explosive must be maliciously accomplished. 192 It is true that defendant here contended that he was not the person who caused the explosions and raised no direct issue concerning intent. 193 This court has stated, however, that [w]hen the crime charged requires proof of specific intent, we have held that, because it is a material element to be proved by the government, it is necessarily in issue and the government may submit evidence of other acts in an attempt to establish the matter in its case-in-chief, assuming the other requirements of Rules 404(b) and 403 are satisfied. United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). 194 b. Repeatedly in the course of the defense case, episodes were brought out which tended to show defendant as a gentle, caring person. 195 For example, the defendant and other witnesses repeatedly described his regular and frequent periods of transcendental meditation. His alibi for one explosion starts out with his taking the teenage daughter and niece of friends on a shopping trip and to dinner. While at dinner there was an incident in which the defendant comforted and gave a generous tip to a young employee of the restaurant who had dropped a tray of dishes. Another alibi witness described the warmth of defendant's response to the witness' three-year-old daughter. 196 Although some of these instances were integral parts of alibi testimony, some were not. Taken together, they clearly suggest the inference that defendant was not likely to have the intent, general or specific, to carry out the bombings. In these circumstances, it seems fair that the government be able to rebut by proof that defendant possessed many firearms, including a pistol with a silencer. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 634 F.2d 735, 737 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 907, 101 S.Ct. 1974, 68 L.Ed.2d 295 (1981). 197 c. One prong of the defense was repeatedly to suggest the suspicion that Scott Bixler was really the bomber, and was responsible for the components found in the trunk of the Impala. The defense included testimony that defendant's deceased brother, Scott Kimberlin, and Scott Bixler were very close friends; that Scott Kimberlin had possession of the Tovex after May, 1975, and was flaky and irresponsible; that Scott Bixler had been overheard making a statement to Scott Kimberlin which sounded like an expression of regret for the personal injury which occurred in one of the explosions. Defendant testified that he had borrowed the Impala in Dayton about September 15th or 16th; he got it from a friend of Scott Kimberlin's, by arrangement with Scott and that he had turned it over to Scott Bixler about two days before defendant was arrested September 20. 6 198 During the government's case-in-chief, the defense, while cross-examining an ATF agent, had introduced documentary evidence showing that Bixler had purchased the seven AR-15 rifles. The defense also brought out that this rifle uses .223 caliber ammunition and that .223 ammunition had been found in the Impala. Bixler's testimony was an explanation of the transaction the defense had proved. 199 On cross-examination of Bixler, the defense had asked whether he had used any weapons in Texas in February of 1979, and he had said, Yes. On redirect, the government elicited his testimony concerning the use of the pistol with a silencer as an explanation of his earlier response. It seems to us, under the circumstances, a legitimate explanation of an answer elicited by the defense, although that justification was not asserted by the defense, or adopted by the court. 200 d. The testimony concerning defendant's possession of the AR-15 rifles, and the weapons and ammunition found in his home came in without objection. Assuming error in the admission of the Bixler testimony concerning the pistol and silencer, we conclude that such testimony did not affect the outcome, and the error, if any, was harmless. 201 3. Claim That Defendant Properly Invoked Fifth Amendment 202 Defendant asserted his privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination. He had testified on direct by way of alibi that he had driven from Indianapolis to Dayton the evening of September 6, 1978, and had stayed at the home of a lady friend, who took him to the airport the next day, September 7. He then flew to Texas. In explaining how he obtained possession of the Impala, he testified that after four or five days in Texas, he flew back to Dayton, and arranged, through his brother, Scott, to borrow the Impala from a friend of Scott's. 203 Defendant refused to answer questions asking the name of the friends he met in Texas, his destination, whether he knew the individuals in certain pictures, and whether he knew Lorenzo Reyes, Francisco Gonzales, or Rodriquez Cantu. 204 After the first two refusals there was a hearing outside the presence of the jury after which the court directed defendant to answer. The defendant persisted in refusal. Judge Steckler instructed the jury that the refusal may be considered in determining credibility and the weight of his testimony. The prosecutor commented in final argument. Defendant argues that his invocation of the privilege was proper and should not have been held against him. 205 At the hearing on the matter, defendant testified that while in Texas, he had talks with other individuals; that the discussions pertained to more than one foreign country, to airplane flights other than commercial; and that whether or not the discussions included marijuana, they involved something other than or in addition to marijuana. 206 Of course the questions asked involved only names and destination, not the subject matter of any conversations. 207 The appropriate test is whether the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. (Citation omitted.) To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); Ryan v. C.I.R., 568 F.2d 531, 539 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 99 S.Ct. 84, 58 L.Ed.2d 111 (1978); United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir.1976). 208 The burden on defendant in this case is somewhat heavier because he had been convicted in a federal court in Texas of conspiracy with others from on or about February 7, 1979 to on or about February 16, 1979 to possess marijuana with an intent to distribute. Another count, dismissed with prejudice, charged him and others with unlawful importation of marijuana on February 15. If the conversations he had on his September 7 trip were incidental to the conspiracy of which he was convicted, they could not be the basis of a new prosecution, and defendant could incur no danger in testifying. On this point, defendant merely called attention to the period of time between September 7 and February 7, 1979 and testified that in September he talked to individuals other than or in addition to his co-defendants in the February indictment. 209 Bearing in mind that the questions asked only for names and destination, we do not think defendant carried his burden of demonstrating reasonable cause to apprehend danger. 210 In any event a defendant who testifies waives the privilege as to all matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination. Neely v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1048, 104 S.Ct. 723, 79 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984). 211 As already indicated he had testified to the trip to Texas in close connection with his trip to Dayton which, if his testimony as to time en route were believed, would have made it impossible for him to have been present when the timer was set for explosion No. 8. He had also linked the trip to Texas with his explanation of borrowing the Impala from someone whose name he did not know. Getting possession of the Impala in a way consistent with his not being responsible for the contents of its trunk was most important to his defense. 212 We think the question as to destination and names of friends he met were reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination. 213 Defendant relies on the provision of Rule 608(b), FED.R.EVID., negating waiver when the witness is examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility. As already noted, the testimony as to the Texas trip was closely related to such important substantive issues as an alibi, and avoiding linkage with very significant evidence of guilt. 214 Moreover, in rebuttal, the government called Francisco Gonzales, one of the individuals inquired about, who testified that between sometime in September, 1978 and the beginning of December, he and defendant had traveled from Beeville, Texas to Austin, Texas. At defendant's direction, Gonzales drove him to a place in the general area of the Patricia Strait home, where apparent bomb components were later found. Defendant told Gonzales to drop him off and come back in about fifteen minutes. In final argument the prosecutor suggested that defendant's refusal to answer had avoided disclosure of the trip with Gonzales and the hiding of the bomb components at the Strait home. 215 By hindsight it seems likely that the prosecutor had hoped to get answers lending support to the proposition that defendant had hidden the bomb components at the Strait home. 216 Finally, in this particular case, the defendant's waiver of the privilege was somewhat broader than waiver based only on his taking the stand. 217 In direct testimony defendant explained the purpose of some of the items found when the Impala was searched. Flares found there were to be used for a clandestine airstrip to smuggle marijuana, bring an airplane in. He testified that he had purchased uniforms and insignia in Dayton September 14 or 15, and they were to be used for an international marijuana smuggling operation. He had made the trip to Texas immediately before purchase of these items. It seems highly probable that they were purchased to carry out plans made in Texas a few days earlier, and his testimony waived the privilege as to any marijuana importing conspiracy formed or existing on September 7, whether or not the same conspiracy continued until February. 218 We conclude there was no error in the court's treating the defendant's claim of privilege as unjustified. 4. Claim of Comments on Defendant's Silence 219 FBI Agent Lucas described the circumstances of his confrontation with defendant at the print shop on September 20, 1978. As previously noted, this episode was relevant to Counts 1 through 22 because it linked defendant to the Impala in which apparent bomb components were found. 220 Agent Lucas observed defendant's conversation with the proprietor of the print shop. Lucas then identified himself. He testified: 221 At that time he [defendant] never replied to my questions. I asked him who he was or could he show me some identification. He wouldn't reply to those questions. 222 I then asked him why he needed these documents or what would he do with them and, since he had the appearance of being an official, what was he an official there for, and he never gave me an answer to any of those questions. 223 We shall refer to this as Testimony I. 224 Lucas then described patting defendant down, defendant's stepping on one of the documents and eating another. At that point, Lucas arrested defendant and read him his rights. 225 When asked whether Lucas had a discussion with defendant, Lucas responded, We had a discussion, but it was really a one-sided discussion. It was me asking him questions and him not willing to answer. Testimony II. 226 Later Lucas instructed defendant that he could make arrangements to have his car moved or we would move it for him, if he wished. Since he would not acknowledge owning the car, he stated that he had no interest in it. Testimony III. 227 No objection was interposed until, after Testimony III, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, relying on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). His motion was based on Testimony II and III, and he expressly acknowledged that there was no cause for objection to Testimony I. 228 Judge Steckler denied the motion, indicating that the content of the testimony did not demonstrate a violation of Doyle. He inquired whether either side wanted a cautionary instruction and both said they did not. 229 Doyle, United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), and United States v. Shue, 766 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir.1985), involve more than testimony recounting that an accused, after being informed of his right to silence, remained silent. The facts of each case included affirmative use by the prosecutor of the accused's silence to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story. In this case there was no such use nor comment by the prosecutor. 230 Testimony I, as noted, was considered unobjectionable by defense counsel. 231 Testimony II, although capable of being read as stating that there had been a series of questions met with silence by the defendant, could also mean that no responsive answers had been given. Agent Lucas asserted this meaning in testimony in the absence of the jury. Even if the jury understood Lucas as saying defendant was silent in the face of questions immediately after arrest, it heard Agent Lucas testify that he had discussions later at the FBI office in which defendant answered questions. It also heard Agent Melchiori testify that he had custody of defendant for an hour at the scene of the arrest, and had discussions with him during that time. When defendant was asked whether he had discussions with these agents on that day, he testified, We talked a little bit. Testimony II does not focus on any fact as to which defendant remained silent or refused to answer. Reading Testimony II as a Doyle violation, however, we find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 232 Testimony III clearly related a statement by defendant that he had no interest in the car. That was not silence. Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1410-13 (7th Cir.1985) (en banc ). Defendant's present claim rests entirely on a vague implication from the introductory clause that the agent asked defendant about the ownership of the car and defendant remained silent or orally refused to answer. 233 United States v. Williams, 665 F.2d 107, 109 (6th Cir.1981) held it was plain error to admit an agent's testimony that defendant had refused to answer specific questions about the price he paid for an item and its source. This court, pre-Doyle, held that where the prosecutor learned from one response that the agent would testify that defendant refused to answer a specific question, it resulted in prejudicial error for the prosecutor to go on eliciting similar answers. United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179, 183 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1010, 95 S.Ct. 330, 42 L.Ed.2d 284 (1974). We had previously reversed where an agent testified to two separate occasions where an accused responded that he did not have anything to say. United States v. Kroslack, 426 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (7th Cir.1970). Those cases are readily distinguishable. 234 We think that Testimony II and III are just too vague to constitute an impairment of defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 235 5. Claim That Illegally Seized Evidence was Before Jury 236 On cross-examination of defendant, the government asked defendant whether certain photographs were accurate depictions. Defendant was not permitted to consult counsel at that moment, and responded that some were accurate and some had been suppressed because of an illegal search. The latter were not offered nor received in evidence. The most that can be said is that the jury heard something about an illegal search. We find no reversible error. 237 6. Claim of Inference From Improper Question 238 On cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor asked a question which might have permitted defendant to include in his answer the fact that the jury had disagreed on these counts in the first trial. Apparently, so realizing, the prosecutor withdrew the question before it was answered. We find no reversible error. 7. Claim That Question Confused the Jury 239 On cross-examination of defendant, the government had asked if he owned the Impala, and defendant answered he did not. On redirect, defense counsel had referred to the government's question and asked what the person who sold the Impala had to say about that. The government had objected that this called for hearsay. The defense said it was a statement in court in defendant's presence, and the judge overruled the objection. Referring to the testimony of Don Wiltheiss at the earlier trial, defendant answered he came and he said I wasn't the one that bought it. What the defendant now challenges as confusing, and hearsay, is that on re-cross of defendant, the government brought out that at the same time Wiltheiss had looked at the identification set of seven photographs and said that he had identified defendant's as the person that most clearly resembled the individual he sold the vehicle to. We find no error. 8. Claims Concerning Secret Room Evidence 240 Defendant testified that on the night of September 1, he was asleep in his room, did not leave it except to go to the bathroom, and that Sandra Barton slept outside the door of his room. She testified he did not leave, and his mother testified similarly. On cross-examination of defendant, the government brought out that there was a concealed room next to defendant's room with access from it. This at least suggested the possibility that defendant could have left his bedroom without the knowledge of Sandra. 241 The argument now is that this cross-examination exceeded the scope of the direct. We do not agree, defendant having testified to his alibi. 242 On rebuttal the government called a witness who had examined the room during 1979, and testified it was very easy to remove a piece of plasterboard at the ceiling of the room and the floor of the attic. Defendant also argues that the witness was called only for the purpose of impeaching defendant, who had testified there was no access. This rebuttal evidence was not limited, however, to impeachment, since it also tended to rebut the alibi. 243 9. Claim of Invasion of Attorney-Client Privilege 244 As already noted, defendant told Agent Lucas he had no interest in the Impala. Although defendant later described his possession of the Impala, the government did not know defendant would testify. It was important to prove that defendant did have responsibility for the car. 245 In its case in chief, the government called Attorney Keithley. Over objection, Keithley testified that he met with defendant on September 20, 1978; that thereafter he called an automobile dealer, told him the description and location of the Impala and that my client had lost his keys; they'd have to have some keys made, and the motor wasn't working, there was something wrong with it, it would have to have some repair work, and would they tow it in, repair it and bill it to my client Brett Kimberlin. By the time a towing vehicle reached the Impala, the FBI had decided to get a search warrant and would not permit removal. 246 The attorney was transmitting a message at the direction of the client. The communication of the message from defendant to the attorney for the purpose of further transmission was not confidential and not privileged. See McFee v. United States, 206 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.1953). 10. Claim of Improper Use of Mug Shots 247 At the time of defendant's arrest photographs were taken of him. He was wearing the uniform. The pictures were clearly so-called mug shots. They were admitted in evidence. They were relevant because of the uniform. The fact of his arrest was then before the jury, and his convictions on the related counts came in later during his testimony. We find no reversible error. 11. Claim of Improper Closing Argument 248 Defendant asserts that the government's closing argument was a mass of impropriety. One of his citations was characterizing MMAN as the patented ingredient of Tovex 200. Upon objection, government counsel withdrew the word patented. We have addressed all other claims. We are satisfied that in the light of the evidence in the record the argument was within the bounds of fairness and that it is not necessary to discuss the details of each reference in this opinion.12. Claims of Other Misconduct 249 Defendant cites as misconduct three instances of government questions which, with their answers, he claims raised inferences which were unfair. He also asserts that an answer by an ATF agent, contradicted by another witness, was a lie. We have considered each claim and find nothing to be deemed reversible error. K. CLAIM OF INSUFFICIENT PROOF 1. Proof of Unlawful Making of Firearms 250 Count 9 charged that on or about September 1, 1979, defendant manufactured 7 a firearm (destructive device) in violation of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 5861(f) (and the penalty provision, Sec. 5871). Counts 10 through 16 made the same charge on the date of the other explosions. 251 Section 5861(f) provides that it is unlawful to make a firearm in violation of the provisions of the chapter. Section 5821 requires a tax to be paid (by a stamp) upon the making of a firearm. Section 5822 prohibits any person from making a firearm unless he has done all of the following: filed an application, paid the prescribed tax, and obtained the approval of the Secretary to make and register the firearm and the application form shows such approval. Section 5841(c) provides that each maker shall, prior to making, obtain authorization and such authorization shall effect the registration. 252 As evidence of violation, the government introduced a self-authenticating document (FED.R.EVID. 902), an ATF certification that a diligent search of the National Firearms Register and Transfer Record (NFRTR) failed to disclose evidence that any firearm had been registered or acquired by defendant, or that he had made application to make firearms, or paid the making tax. It has been held that such certification is admissible proof of lack of registration under Rule 803(10), FED.R.EVID., not admissible proof of failure to file an application or pay the tax, because filing occurs in advance of registration and payment of the tax is not directly reflected in NFRTR. United States v. Stout, 667 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir.1982), and United States v. Beason, 690 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1177, 103 S.Ct. 828, 74 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1983). 253 Because a person must obtain the Secretary's approval before making a firearm, and because such approval effects registration, we think the ATF certification that no registration was of record is sufficient evidence of this element of the offense. 254 We note that the Stout and Beason courts reversed the convictions of the unlawful making counts in those cases. Whether the indictments were different in form from the one before us, or not, those opinions appeared to treat the nonpayment of the tax as the critical element of the charge, not adequately proved. Stout, 667 F.2d at 1352-53; Beason, 690 F.2d at 441 n. 1, 446. 255 Additionally, in the case before us, defendant made no objection at trial to the portions of the certification with respect to failure to find evidence of the filing of an application, or payment of tax. 256 We note also that in this case the court instructed that the jury must find, in order to convict, that defendant failed to file an application or failed to pay the making tax. The court did not refer to the third step which must also be fulfilled, that defendant must have obtained approval before making, but no objection was made to the instruction. 257 2. Proof of Federal Financial Assistance to School Town of Speedway 258 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(f) makes it an offense maliciously to damage or destroy by means of an explosive any property owned, possessed, or used by any institution receiving federal financial assistance. Counts 18 and 22 charged such offenses against property of the School Town of Speedway on September 2 and 6. Its property was damaged by explosions on those dates. 259 Defendant contends there was no proof that the School Town received federal financial assistance within the meaning of Sec. 844(f). 260 It has been held that federal funds need not be directly disbursed to an institution in order to constitute federal financial assistance under Sec. 844(f). United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571-72 (10th Cir.1975); United States v. Brown, 384 F.Supp. 1151 (E.D.Mich.1974), decision on motion affirmed although conviction reversed on other grounds, 557 F.2d 541, 559 (6th Cir.1977). In interpreting a different statute, the Supreme Court decided that a college whose students financed their education with federal grants is a recipient of federal financial assistance. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984). 261 A very thoughtful opinion by Judge Cornelia Kennedy in Brown, supra, analyzes the constitutional authority by which Congress could enact Sec. 844(f). She found it in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, and concluded that Congress must have the means to protect those institutions it is currently funding to carry out federal programs.... 384 F.Supp. 1160. The institution need not be a part of government, but if it effectuates a national program with federal funds, it acts as an instrumentality of the federal government. 384 F.Supp. at 1159. 262 In United States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, cert. denied, 430 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 1653, 52 L.Ed.2d 361 (1977), this court considered the intended reach of Sec. 844(i), making it an offense maliciously to damage property used in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. Upholding the application of the statute to use of explosives in an intrastate activity having a de minimis effect on interstate commerce, we noted legislative history indicating that Congress intended to exercise the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 200 (citation omitted). 263 Although the legislative history of Sec. 844(f) spells out as its constitutional base only the power of the government to protect its own property, it clearly expresses outrage over bombings of university and other non-federal property, and urgency over supplying expanded federal investigative and prosecutive authority to meet the problem. This section also protects real and personal property belonging to institutions and organizations receiving Federal financial assistance such as universities, hospitals, and police stations. See House Report No. 91-1549, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 1970 U.S.CODE CONG & AD.NEWS, pp. 4007, 4011, 4014. We have no doubt that Congress intended broad construction of the terms used, within constitutional limits. 264 The proof here was that the School Town of Speedway was one of ten school corporations entering into a Joint Agreement for Special Education Services, in the summer of 1970. One of them was to be the Servicing Corporation. It would provide joint programs for students with various types of exceptional problems. The joint program would be administered by the Servicing Corporation. The Agreement provided for a Board of Directors, composed of all the superintendents. One of the functions of the Board would be the development of the assessment formula for each Participating Corporation. 265 The Agreement recited that the parties intended that financing of the joint special education project can be obtained by each Participating Corporation through federal and state funding programs, but provided that each Participating Corporation shall be responsible to pay only its share computed on a formula based on enrollment from each. There was provision for withdrawal, amendment, and renewal from year to year. There was a recitation of authority for the Agreement, including a state statute authorizing two or more local school corporations to engage in joint purchasing and employment programs. 266 The director of West Central Joint Services Cooperative, a school for handicapped children, testified that this Cooperative, or school, was established by the Agreement. Money used for operation is forty percent federal and the balance state. The Participating Corporations send students with special needs to the Cooperative for training. Speedway has sent up to six children. In 1978 it sent four. He said that in each year the federal money was about $300,000 out of a total of $750,000, and he calculated that when Speedway sent five students, about $10,000 of the federal money would be helping to train the Speedway students. 267 Defendant appears to contend that the Co-op should be deemed an entity apart from Speedway and the other Participating Corporations; Speedway received a valuable benefit when some of its students were trained by the Co-op, but Speedway did not receive money and therefore received no financial assistance. It would follow under the Brown analysis that Speedway would not be rendered an instrumentality of the federal government so that Congress could protect its property. 268 In our view, however, the Co-op seems not to be a separate entity, but a group of corporations acting jointly by agreement to carry on these specialized services. It seems reasonable and in keeping with Congressional intent to view each school corporation as performing the public and federally encouraged function of educating its students in need of special services, accomplishing that by collective action for the sake of efficiency, and receiving its proportionate share of federal money with which to do so. So viewed, Speedway was receiving federal financial assistance within the meaning of Sec. 844(f). 269 3. Claim of Insufficiency of Evidence As A Whole 270 We have already indicated our view that the evidence was strong, albeit circumstantial, support for the guilty verdict. Supra, p. 221. Defendant's testimony and that of his witnesses supporting his alibi testimony did not, as claimed, produce a reasonable doubt as a matter of law. L. CLAIM OF JUROR MISCONDUCT 1. 271 On October 23, 1981, defendant filed a timely motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 33, FED.R.CRIM.P. The motion stated a belief that juror misconduct had occurred. No affidavits or record citations were supplied. The motion requested a hearing, and stated that defendant is prepared to adduce evidence of three instances of alleged misconduct. The motion was denied December 10, United States v. Kimberlin, 527 F.Supp. 1010 (S.D.Ind.1981). Summarizing, defendant claimed: 272 a. One juror, during trial and in presence of all others, said, They ought to hang him now, so that we can go home, or words to that effect. 273 b. One juror made notes, and when reminded by other jurors that note-taking had been forbidden by the judge, tore them up. 274 c. One juror commented in the presence of the others during trial that he or she had been hypnotized before and discussed the experience. Defendant stated belief that on voir dire this juror had denied being hypnotized. 275 Judge Steckler's rejection of allegation b has not been challenged on appeal. In 527 F.Supp. at 1013, the court said: 276 In summary, the Court concludes that the allegations made by defendant in his motion do not require a hearing because the only types of inquiry which would aid the Court in assessing possible effects of such alleged conduct are not permitted by the Rules of Evidence [citations omitted]. Further, the Court finds that none of the three allegations, if true, would create prejudice to the defendant, such that a new trial would be warranted. 277 We recognize that these communications between jurors were allegedly made during the course of trial. Hence, they are not literally included in the prohibition of Rule 606(b) against testimony by a juror as to a statement during the course of the jury's deliberations. We note, also, as did Judge Steckler, that a juror's relating of a past personal experience may literally be extraneous ... information. We agree, however, with Judge Steckler that the Rule would not permit a juror to testify to the effect of the communication upon his mind or emotions, or concerning his mental processes in connection with the verdict. Thus, a hearing would be fruitless unless these statements, if made, would be presumed to be prejudicial. 278 We find no error of law or abuse of discretion in Judge Steckler's unwillingness to assume prejudice or to conduct a hearing to determine whether the statements were made. 2. 279 Defendant was sentenced December 30, 1981. Notice of appeal was filed January 7, 1982. Thus the proceedings before us on Appeal No. 82-1025 are those of record up to that date. 280 Counsel have argued four other claims of juror misconduct which were not presented to the district court in the motion for new trial of October 22, 1981. From the briefs and from the record of proceedings which took place after January 7 we gather the manner in which these claims subsequently came before the district court. 281 Defense trial counsel having filed notice of withdrawal January 7 and 8, subsequently granted January 26, defendant filed, pro se, on January 19 a motion to reconsider denial of the motion for new trial. Attached was an affidavit of alternate juror Irey, affirming statements in a letter to a judge of this court listing nine numbered claims of jury misconduct. 282 Paragraphs numbered 4, 5, and 8 corresponded to a, b, and c, included in the October motion denied by Judge Steckler, although somewhat differently stated. We are told that Ms. Irey was the source of the claims made in the October motion. 283 Paragraphs numbered 1, 3, 7, and 9 were not presented to Judge Steckler in the October motions and the facts are not reflected in the trial record. They correspond to claims argued or referred to in the defendant's brief on appeal, but they are not properly before us. 284 Judge Steckler denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration February 3, 1982, and no appeal was taken. 3. 285 Defendant has also argued on appeal that one of the jurors repeatedly slept. This claim corresponded to Ms. Irey's paragraph 2. It was not raised in the October motion before Judge Steckler. In fact, the claim happens to have been reflected in the record, and to that extent we can consider whether there was plain error. 286 During the second day of trial, Judge Steckler called counsel to a side bar conference and noted that a juror appeared to be nodding. Counsel said they had seen the juror sleeping. Defense counsel said he thought something should be done, but left how to do it up to the judge. Judge Steckler then addressed the jury, pointing out the need to be alert and pay careful attention. Six weeks later, one of defense counsel asked for a side bar conference. He said the same juror appears to be asleep again. It was the second time this week he had noticed, and I don't know how the Court should handle it. The prosecutor agreed the juror was asleep. Defense counsel said: 287 Your Honor, we would request at this time a recess to get her up on her feet. 288 THE COURT: Is that all? 289 MR. MCSHANE: Yes. 290 The court called a recess. 291 The court might have considered whether the juror was unable to perform her duties. Upon such a finding, Rule 24(c), FED.R.CRIM.P., would authorize replacement with an alternate. United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir.1983). Neither side requested that or any less drastic action, except the recess, and the two excerpts from the record just referred to, do not demonstrate plain error.4. 292 A point argued under the heading of Juror Misconduct is really a challenge to Judge Steckler's conferring with a juror about a reported personal problem of the juror. The conference occurred after discussion with counsel. Neither counsel nor the defendant was present, but the conference was recorded. The point is raised for the first time on appeal. 293 The conference occurred September 24, about four weeks after the beginning of the hearing of testimony. The problem was that the juror's husband had a new job in Florida, starting October 5. His employer had arranged for travel together the coming week (September 29), but would not pay for the juror's travel if she came later. She thought she could stay with her parents after he left. They discussed the financial problems which would arise if the juror were unable to travel with her husband. The length of time for completion of the trial was discussed, including ten days or two weeks, two weeks, two weeks after next week, and two or three days longer than that. The juror indicated that other than having to pay an individual fare to Florida, she would not have any problem. The verdict was returned October 15, three weeks later. 294 There is no claim that any of the content of the conference tended to have a prejudicial effect. Appellate counsel's surmise that the juror was embittered and held the defendant responsible for the delay has no support in the record, and if such feelings did arise, it would not be reasonable to find them caused by the conference with the judge. 295 At the colloquy before the conference defense counsel said he opposed replacing the juror with an alternate at that stage and urged the court to discuss the matter with the juror. 296 MR. STANTON [Defense Counsel]: ... for your Honor to do it in camera, either by yourself or with both parties present but not saying anything. 297 THE COURT: Without the parties present? 298 MR. STANTON: Either without or with the parties present, it makes no matter to us. Just to advise her that it is likely that she be required to stay on the jury and that she should make plans accordingly. And I think at that time then, if later she comes back and says Oh, I just can't do this, or something, then I think it can be rethought. 299 But we would urge the Court to say something, that she is probably going to be required to be on the jury beyond the date that her husband moves down there. 300 After hearing from government counsel, the court announced he would call the juror in and talk to her. At that point defense counsel interposed: 301 MR. STANTON: I don't know why we couldn't be present but not ask her anything. 302 THE COURT: Well ... 303 MR. STANTON: We would prefer to be present but not ask her anything. 304 THE COURT: Well, I will talk to her in camera alone, and if the results of that indicate that counsel should be given an opportunity to question her, we'll set it for another session in chambers. 305