Opinion ID: 1696650
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the chancellor commit manifest error by modifying the child custody order?

Text: ¶ 33. In order for child custody to be modified, a non-custodial party must prove (1) there has been a substantial change in the circumstances affecting the child; (2) the change adversely affects the children's welfare; and (3) a change in custody is in the best interest of the child. Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 775 (Miss.1997); Thompson v. Thompson, 799 So.2d 919, 922 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). However,... a chancellor is never obliged to ignore a child's best interest in weighing a custody change; in fact, a chancellor is bound to consider the child's best interest above all else. `Above all, in `modification cases, as in original awards of custody,' we never depart from our polestar consideration: the best interest and welfare of the child.' Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d 740, 744 (Miss.1996) (quoting Ash v. Ash, 622 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Miss. 1993)) (citing Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1382). See also Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss.1983). A modification of custody is warranted in the event that the moving parent successfully shows that an application of the Albright factors reveals that there had been a material change in those circumstances which has an adverse effect on the child and modification of custody would be in the child's best interest. Sanford v. Arinder, 800 So.2d 1267, 1272 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). ¶ 34. The chancellor found that more of the Albright factors weighed in favor of Michael. Therefore, he granted the modification in his favor. Julie argues that while less factors weighed in her favor, these factors are not the equivalent of a mathematical formula and are not an exact science. Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1287 (Miss.2001). [T]he chancellor must allow full and complete proof with respect to all circumstances and conditions directly or indirectly related to the care and custody of the children, existing at the time of the original divorce decree and at the time of the modification hearing. Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1158 (Miss. 1985) (citing Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1382). It is true that the Albright factors are not intended to be exhaustive but a beginning point. Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d at 1158. However, this Court has also found that the Albright factors should not thwart the chancellor from transferring custody of a child from one parent to another when, in the chancellor's judgment, the child's welfare would be best served by such transfer. Julie's argument is without merit since she had less factors weighing in her favor; and the chancellor, upon looking at the facts, found that Hailey should be placed in the custody of her father. ¶ 35. The chancellor found that Julie outweighed Michael with regards to the age of the child, the health and sex of the child, and emotional ties. All of the factors in favor of Julie are dependent on something extrinsic to her capacity as a parent. They all hinge on the fact that Hailey is a young, female child. The factors in favor of Michael weigh heavier on actual parenting capacity such as parenting skills, willingness and capacity to provide primary care, and physical and moral fitness of the home environment. ¶ 36. The importance of all the factors is in no way intended to be undermined or demeaned. All the factors are important, but the chancellor has the ultimate discretion to weigh the evidence the way he sees fit. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony, as well as the interpretation of evidence where it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, are primarily for the chancellor as the trier of facts. Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850, 860 (Miss.1994). It is obvious, by looking at the record, that the chancellor reasonably looked at all the factors and came to the correct decision. ¶ 37. The burden of proof is on the movant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a material change in circumstances has occurred in the custodial home. Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So.2d at 818 (citing Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d at 743). Michael carried the burden of proving a material change in circumstances. He brought forth an insurmountable amount of evidence showing Julie's alcoholism, drug addiction, and psychological problems. Julie's only rebuttal was that she was seeking treatment for her problems. She had no doctor to testify on her behalf, only one counselor, and family members who had contradictory stories from the first hearing. The chancellor praised Julie for attempting to get her life back on track, but was unconvinced that Julie was fully recovered. Julie's main argument is that the chancellor did not take her rehabilitation, her family's testimony, or her counselor's comments into account when making his decision. The chancellor stated that he believed she was just beginning the healing process, not fully recovered like she claims. Undoubtably, the chancellor is in the best position to make this determination because it is his role ... to ascertain whether witnesses and evidence are credible and the weight to give to each. Robison v. Lanford, 841 So.2d 1119, 1122 (Miss.2003) (citing Chamblee, 637 So.2d at 860). ¶ 38. Julie points out that in Sellers this Court overturned a chancellor's decision by awarding custody to a father who had overcome his problem with marijuana. Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So.2d 481 (Miss. 1994). However, Julie's case is greatly distinguishable from Sellers. Sellers had been drug free for an entire year, whereas Julie had only been sober for a few months. In Sellers, the battle was not between two natural parents, but an aunt and the natural father. Also, Sellers was not a child modification case; it dealt with initial custody. ¶ 39. The second factor that must be evaluated is if the change was detrimental to the child. Once again, Michael was able to present an abundant amount of evidence to prove that Hailey was in danger when she was in her mother's company. Testimony revealed that Julie was involved in car accidents, arrests, and fits of rage, all attributable to her alcoholic stupors. Julie claims that Hailey was not present when these incidents occurred and was never involved in anything that would hurt her. However, this Court has held that where a child living in a custodial environment clearly adverse to the child's best interest, somehow appears to remain unscarred by his or her surroundings, the chancellor is not precluded from removing the child for placement in a healthier environment. Riley v. Doerner, 677 So.2d at 744. ¶ 40. Third, the court must determine if a change in custody is in the best interest of the child. Michael is able to provide a more stable environment for Hailey. Michael takes Hailey to church, owns his own home and business, and is remarried to a woman with whom Hailey has a good relationship. It was only just prior to the trial that Julie got married, began attending church, and was building a home. One of the most significant facts is that Julie had only been out of rehabilitation for 125 days when the modification hearing began. This is hardly enough time to determine if someone will be able to remain sober. It is more likely that Michael, and not Julie, will be able to provide a continuing stable environment. As this Court has stated, the chancellor must have found that `the overall circumstances in which a child lives have materially changed and are likely to remain materially changed for the foreseeable future and, of course, that such a change adversely impacts the child.' Touchstone v. Touchstone, 682 So.2d 374, 379 (Miss.1996) (quoting Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss.1984)). ¶ 41. The chancellor did not commit manifest error by modifying custody in favor of Michael.