Opinion ID: 2166544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliation Claims

Text: We now turn to issues regarding Allen's retaliation claims. In relevant part, Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301(1) provides as follows: It is a discriminatory practice for a person or for two (2) or more persons to: (1) Retaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has opposed a practice declared discriminatory by this chapter or because such person has made a charge, filed a complaint, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this chapter. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-301(1) (2005). The standards by which a person or entity may be found liable for retaliation under Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301(1) are issues of first impression for this Court. Our Court of Appeals has held that stating a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge requires an employee to prove: 1) that she engaged in a protected activity; 2) that the exercise of her protected civil rights was known to the defendant; 3) that the defendant thereafter took an employment action adverse to her; and 4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the defendant's adverse employment action. Miller v. City of Murfreesboro, 122 S.W.3d 766, 775 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003). If an employee satisfies all four prongs, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. Id. at 776. If the employer articulates such a reason, the employee, who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the process, must present evidence demonstrating that the articulated reason is pretextual and that the employer's action was actually motivated by a desire to retaliate against the employee. Id. These four elements of a prima facie case and the burden shifting framework are identical to standards previously adopted in federal courts. See Canitia v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1064, 1066 (6th Cir.1990). Since our intermediate appellate court first adopted the above requirements, the United States Supreme Court has significantly modified the third prong of the retaliation test. Specifically, the Court has clarified that an employer may be held liable for adverse actions that are not employment-related. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2414, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). In other words, an employee need not demonstrate that an employer took an employment action adverse to her. Any materially adverse action taken by the employer may satisfy the third prong of the retaliation analysis. See id. The United States Supreme Court further clarified that an employee is required to show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, `which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' Id. at 2415, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C.Cir.2006)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court stressed that the standard is an objective one and that the materiality component is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Id. The United States Supreme Court's conclusion that a retaliatory action need not be work-related is based upon the statutory differences between discrimination and retaliation claims. Title VII's anti-discrimination provision makes it illegal for an employer  to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. at 2411, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, on the other hand, makes it unlawful for an employer  to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The italicized portions of the anti-discrimination statute limit the provision's application to actions that affect employment or alter the conditions of the workplace. Id. at 2412, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The retaliation provision, however, expresses no limitation upon the forms of discrimination that may give rise to a valid claim. Id. at 2412, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court concluded it is appropriate to hold employers liable for materially adverse actions that occur outside the scope of the employment. See id. at 2414, 126 S.Ct. 2405. The language of the THRA compels the same conclusion concerning retaliation claims brought under the THRA. Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-21-301(1) provides that it is unlawful for an employer to [r]etaliate or discriminate in any manner against a person because such person has opposed a practice declared discriminatory by this chapter. (emphasis added). Use of the phrase, in any manner, makes it clear that employees are not required to demonstrate that the adverse action affects the employment. In light of the clear statutory language of the THRA and in furtherance of our policy of interpreting Tennessee law consistently with Title VII, we adopt the standard set forth in White for retaliation claims under the THRA. See Parker, 2 S.W.3d at 176. Applying White , we hold that in order to state a prima facie case for retaliation under the THRA an employee must demonstrate: 1) that she engaged in activity protected by the THRA; 2) that the exercise of her protected rights was known to the defendant; 3) that the defendant thereafter took a materially adverse action against her; and 4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. The burden-shifting analysis that follows the establishment of a prima facie case remains unchanged by White . After an employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the materially adverse action. Miller, 122 S.W.3d at 776; see also Canitia, 903 F.2d at 1066. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the employee, who bears the burden of persuasion throughout the process, must present evidence demonstrating that the articulated reason is pretextual and that the defendant's action was actually motivated by a desire to retaliate against the employee. Miller, 122 S.W.3d at 776; see also Canitia, 903 F.2d at 1066. Having set forth the appropriate standards governing a retaliation claim, we now must apply those standards to the case before us. The first and second prongs of our retaliation test are clearly satisfied against both the State and McPhee. Allen clearly engaged in a protected activity by filing a sexual harassment complaint against McPhee. It is also clear that both the State and McPhee were aware of her exercise of this right. To survive a motion for summary judgment on her retaliation claims, Allen must allege facts that, if true, would allow a reasonable jury to find that the State and McPhee took materially adverse actions against Allen and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse actions. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214-15 (Tenn.1993).
Allen argues that the State should be held vicariously liable for McPhee's allegedly retaliatory actions. Because Tennessee courts have not previously addressed the issue of an employer's vicarious liability for retaliation of a supervisor, Allen relies on Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784 (6th Cir.2000). In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed that both the anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII prohibit discrimination by an employer. Morris, 201 F.3d at 791-92. Given the similarity of the prohibitions, the court reasoned that if severe and pervasive harassment by a supervisor constitutes discrimination under the anti-discrimination statute, then it should also be sufficient to constitute discrimination under the anti-retaliation statute. Id. Because Faragher and Ellerth held that an employer is vicariously liable for a supervisor's violation of the anti-discrimination statute, an employer should also be vicariously liable for similar conduct when it violates the anti-retaliation statute. Id. The court therefore held that an employer may be held vicariously liable when the retaliation takes the form of severe and pervasive harassment by a supervisor. Id. The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have reached similar conclusions. Bryant v. Brownlee, 265 F.Supp.2d 52, 67 (D.D.C. 2003) (observing that most circuits recognize that allegations of harassment or hostile work environment may form the basis of a retaliation claim against an employer). Finally, the Morris court concluded that the Faragher / Ellerth defense is available to employers who are exposed to vicarious liability for retaliatory harassment by a supervisor. Morris, 201 F.3d at 792. We now adopt the holding in Morris as a natural and reasonable extension of the principles set forth in Faragher and Ellerth and in furtherance of our policy of maintaining the continuity of the THRA and Title VII. See Parker, 2 S.W.3d at 176. Under the rule articulated in Morris the State will be held vicariously liable only if McPhee engaged in severe and pervasive retaliatory harassment. 201 F.3d at 791-92. As we have previously concluded, however, the harassment of Allen ended immediately after Allen filed her complaint. Although Allen maintains that McPhee took a materially adverse action against her by issuing press releases and an email and by making false allegations against her, this conduct is not the type of severe and pervasive harassment that warrants a finding of retaliatory harassment. See id. at 790. Morris does not expose employers to liability for every materially adverse act by a supervisor, but only for those retaliatory acts that are severe and pervasive enough to also constitute harassment under the anti-discrimination provision. See id. at 791-92. Therefore, there is no evidence of retaliatory conduct by McPhee for which the State can be held vicariously liable. If the State is to be held liable for retaliation, it must be based on a materially adverse action taken directly by the State. Allen also argues that the State is directly liable for retaliation because it took a materially adverse action against her by transferring her to a position with less prestige and less responsibility after she filed her complaint for sexual harassment. In White , the Supreme Court held that a reassignment of duties can be deemed retaliatory even if both the former and present duties are within the same description. 126 S.Ct. at 2416. The Supreme Court explained that [a]lmost every job category involves some responsibilities and duties that are less desirable than others and that [c]ommon sense suggests that one good way to discourage an employee . . . from bringing discrimination charges would be to insist that she spend more time performing the more arduous duties and less time performing those that are easier or more agreeable. Id. The Supreme Court further observed that [w]hether a particular reassignment is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and `should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position.' Id. at 2417 (citation omitted). Allen initially worked as an administrative assistant for McPhee, where her responsibilities included numerous special projects, supervising student workers, and other administrative tasks. She was transferred to MTSU's Development Office in the position of Coordinator. Although she received an increase in pay, Allen claims she no longer has a job description, has no supervisory responsibilities, has only clerical tasks, and has no opportunities for growth or promotion. Allen also claims that her new position lacks the responsibilities, exposure, and prestige that she had in the President's office. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Allen, we conclude that a reasonable employee might have been dissuaded from filing a complaint if she knew that she would be reassigned from the President's office to Allen's current position. Accordingly, we conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether the State's reassignment of Allen was materially adverse. Turning to the fourth prong of our retaliation analysis, we must determine whether there was a causal connection between Allen's sexual harassment complaint and the State's decision to reassign Allen. To make the determination of whether a causal link exists courts consider whether an employer's conduct can be linked to retaliatory intent. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 n. 2 (3rd Cir.2006), overruled on other grounds by White, 126 S.Ct. at 2414; Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 720 (2nd Cir.2002); Goostree v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 854, 863 (6th Cir. 1986). Temporal proximity of the adverse action to the complaint, a pattern of antagonism following a complaint, or other circumstantial evidence supporting causation are all relevant to a determination of causation. Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279-81 (3rd Cir.2000). A majority of circuits have held that proof of close temporal proximity alone can establish causation, at least for purposes of stating a prima facie case. McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir.2006); Treglia, 313 F.3d at 720; Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 557 (7th Cir. 1998); Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir.1997); Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir.1996); but see Michael v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 496 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir.2007). We adopt the majority rule and hold that close temporal proximity of a complaint and a materially adverse action are sufficient to establish a prima facie case of causation. In this case, the TBR first attempted to reassign Allen two weeks after the filing of her complaint. When Allen declined to accept the reassignment, she was allowed to remain on paid leave while the TBR concluded its investigation. Allen was then officially reassigned when the TBR accepted the findings and recommendations of the investigation less than two months after Allen filed her complaint. These facts indicate a close temporal proximity of the complaint and the reassignment and therefore allow an inference that the TBR was motivated by an intent to retaliate. See Jensen, 435 F.3d at 450. This inference when combined with the evidence of a materially adverse action is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Allen has established a prima facie case of retaliation. Although we have concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that Allen has established a prima facie case, the State is entitled to summary judgment if it can articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for transferring Allen and if Allen is unable to present evidence that raises a genuine dispute over whether the proffered reason is pretextual. See Young v. Dillon Cos., 468 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.2006). To meet its obligation to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the reassignment, the State contends that it reassigned Allen to MTSU's Development Office to protect her from further harassment. Protecting employees from sexual harassment is clearly a legitimate and nondiscriminatory goal. Protecting employees is, in fact, one of the central purposes of the THRA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101(a)(1)-(4) (2005). By articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the transfer, the State has presented Allen with the burden of producing evidence that the State's proffered motive is pretextual. Allen can meet her burden by presenting evidence that: 1) the State's proffered reason has no basis in fact; 2) the proffered reason did not actually motivate the reassignment; or 3) the proffered reason is insufficient to explain the reassignment. Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir.2003). Allen has failed to present such evidence. On the contrary, the evidence in the record supports the State's assertion that Allen was transferred to protect her from further harassment by McPhee. While a reasonable person could conclude that Allen has been assigned to a position that is less desirable than her previous position, her reassignment is clearly superior to the alternative of remaining in a position in which she would be forced to interact closely with her harasser. We therefore hold that Allen has failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the State's motivation for the reassignment. Accordingly, we conclude that the State is entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
Allen argues that McPhee took an adverse employment action against her by issuing an email and two press releases that arguably portrayed McPhee as the victim of false accusations. [5] She asserts that these communications undermined her credibility and caused her to suffer a loss of reputation in the local community. Allen further argues that McPhee took an adverse employment action against her by making false accusations against her to Johnson, the TBR investigator. The main text of the email merely affirmed that the complaint would not impact the day-to-day operations of the university, expressed gratitude for phone calls of support, and asked the employees and students of MTSU to focus on their work and on the university. We find nothing in the main text of this email that could reasonably be found to be materially adverse to Allen. We now examine whether issuing the first and second press releases and circulating the first press release in the email to MTSU employees could be found to be materially adverse by a reasonable employee. Neither press release discloses Allen's identity or any information from which others could easily identify her. Furthermore, neither press release makes any affirmative allegations against Allen. Although both press releases imply that McPhee was being falsely accused of sexual harassment and were arguably intended to curry favor with the public, this alone is insufficient to support a finding that the press releases were materially adverse to Allen. We are unwilling to hold that a person accused of sexual harassment necessarily exposes himself to liability for retaliation merely by asserting his innocence publicly. A reasonable employee would expect that a person accused of harassment will oppose the accusation. This is no less true of public figures who, as a result of their public status, will be expected to respond to the accusations publicly. While public figures do not have license to use their status to bully or embarrass their accuser, we hold that a reasonable employee would not be dissuaded from reporting discrimination based solely on the fact that the accused will publicly assert his innocence. Because the press releases are essentially limited to statements that imply McPhee's innocence, we conclude that the issuance of the press releases was not materially adverse to Allen. Finally, we conclude that McPhee's allegations of inappropriate conduct by Allen were not materially adverse to her. In his written response to Allen's allegations, McPhee claimed that Allen initiated sexually explicit conversations, expressed a desire to have sex with a married MTSU employee, drank excessively at university events, and danced suggestively with MTSU employees. Although the statements were undoubtably intended to show Allen in a negative light, a reasonable employee would anticipate that a person accused of sexual harassment will oppose the allegation and perhaps make false statements about his accuser. Furthermore, it is highly relevant that McPhee's statements were made to Johnson in the context of a confidential investigation, rather than to other MTSU employees or the public at large. We cannot under these circumstances conclude that a reasonable employee would be dissuaded from filing a sexual harassment complaint by the fact that the accused will attempt to deny the allegation and discredit the accuser in the context of a confidential investigation. Accordingly, we hold that Allen has failed to present evidence satisfying the third prong of the retaliation test with regard to the email, press releases, and McPhee's statements to Johnson.