Opinion ID: 8704066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: BOA’s Motion to Dismiss the FDIC’s Counterclaims

Text: The FDIC claims that 4,808 Participated Mortgage Loans were purchased by Ocala off of the Colonial COLB, but that Colonial never received payment for its 99% ownership interest in those Loans. (Id. at ¶ 39.). These 4,808 Loans are the subject matter of the FDIC’s Counterclaims against BOA. (Id.). As discussed previously at Section H.A., Ocala was intended to function in the following manner: Colonial would send its Participated Mortgage Loans to BOA (in BOA’s capacity as the Custodian of the Loans under the Custodial Agreement); the Ocala Facility would purchase Colonial’s ownership interest in the Loans from the COLB Facilities; after BOA sent Colonial the purchase amount for its ownership interest in the Loans from Ocala’s collateral account at BOA, Ocala would be the owner of the Loans; the Loans would then be applied as collateral for the Ocala Notes; next, Ocala would sell the Loans to Freddie Mac; after Freddie Mac purchased the Loans, the purchase funds (from Freddie Mac) would be sent back to Ocala’s collateral account at BOA and would serve as either collateral for the Ocala Notes or as capital with which Ocala could purchase more Loans from the Colonial COLB Facilities. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 40.). The FDIC alleges that in certain instances commencing around December 2008, the payments were not made to Colonial (as outlined above); instead, BOA would receive the Loans from Colonial, and upon instructions from TBW, would pledge them as collateral and sell them to Freddie Mac, all without payment to Colonial. (Id. at ¶ 43.). The FDIC further asserts that in transmitting the Loans to Freddie Mac in these instances, BOA would sign a document (the “Form 996Es”) stating that it had the exclusive right to sell them, thus denying the existence of Colonial’s ownership interest. (Id. at ¶ 44.). The FDIC asserts that although Colonial eventually received payment for the Loans (other than the 4,808 Loans) in these instances, it was not paid until after BOA had effectively stripped Colonial of its ownership interest in the Loans. (Id. at ¶ 45.). The FDIC further claims that Colonial was unaware of BOA’s actions because it typically received payment for the Loans within an appropriate period of time. (Id. at ¶ 46.). However, BOA’s conduct was revealed when Colonial closed on August 14, 2009 and 4,808 Loans had been purchased by Ocala off of the COLB Facilities, for which Colonial was never paid. (Id. at ¶ 47.). The FDIC asserts sixteen Counterclaims. (See Dkt. No. 25.). The first five causes of action are based on BOA’s alleged breach of the Custodial Agreement between it, Colonial and TBW (Counts 1 through 5). (Id. ¶¶ at 46-92.) The next seven claims are based on BOA’s alleged violation of the terms of the Bailee Letters that were used to transfer the Participated Mortgage Loans from Colonial to BOA (Counts 6 through 12). (Id. at ¶¶ 93-103.). The FDIC’s final four Counterclaims sound in tort (Counts 13 through 16). (Id. at ¶¶ 134-154.). The FDIC alleges that BOA breached its duty of care as Colonial’s agent, as well as its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, by pledging the Loans as collateral for the Ocala Notes and then selling them to Freddie Mac without first ensuring that Colonial was paid. The FDIC also asserts that BOA breached its duty of care under a common law bailment by encumbering the loans, executing the Form 996Es, and selling the Loans to Freddie Mac, again without first ensuring that Colonial was paid. BOA moves to dismiss each of the FDIC’s Counterclaims. First, it argues that the claims for breach of the Custodial Agreement and Bailee Letters must be dismissed pursuant to exculpatory clauses in the Custodial Agreement. Second, BOA argues that each of the claims for breach of the Custodial Agreement are independently subject to dismissal because the FDIC failed to allege violations of any specific contract provisions. Next, BOA argues that the claims based on breach of bailment fail because they are based on Bailee Letter provisions that are inconsistent with the Custodial Agreement. Lastly, BOA argues that the tort claims fail as a matter of law because: (1) the Custodial Agreement expressly limits BOA’s liability; (2) the Custodial Agreement shelters BOA from liability for claims based on something other than the Custodial Agreement; (3) the Economic Loss Doctrine bars each of the tort claims as a matter of law; (4) the Custodial Agreement expressly limits BOA’s liability to acts of gross negligence; and (5) the Custodial Agreement expressly disclaims any fiduciary duty. The Court will address each of BOA’s arguments in turn.
The Custodial Agreement between BOA, TBW, and Colonial contains the following two provisions: [I0.]A. Limitation of Liability. Neither' [BOA] nor any of its directors, officers, employees or agents ... shall be liable for any action taken or omitted to be taken by it or them under or in connection ivith this Agreement or the Participated Mortgage Loans, except for its or their oum gross negligence or willful misconduct, breach of this Agreement by [BOA] that constitutes bad faith or a material breach that is not cured within 10 days of notice from the other parties or if such breach is a of [SIC] a nature that is not unable [SIC] within such 10-day period and [BOA] is diligently and in good faith working on curing same, then within 30 days of such notice or within such other reasonable period, or other malfeasance by [BOA] hereunder. The duties of [BOA] hereunder shall be mechanical and administrative in nature and nothing in this Agreement or any of the Participated Mortgage Loans, express or implied, is intended to or shall be so construed as to impose upon [BOA] any obligations in respect of this Agreement or any of the Participated Mortgage Loans except as expressly set forth herein. Subject to the foregoing, in performing its functions and duties hereunder on behalf of [Colonial] and/or [TBW], [BOA] shall not (a) be responsible in any manner to [Colonial] or the [TBW] for the effectiveness, enforceability, genuineness, validity, due execution, collectability, priority or sufficiency of this Agreement or any of the Participated Mortgage Loans, or for any recital, representation, warranty, document, certificate, report or statement herein or therein made or furnished under or in connection with this Agreement or the Participated Mortgage Loans, or for the sufficiency of the Collateral or the validity, perfection or priority of any security agreement on the part of [TBW], or the financial condition of [TBW] or the existence or possible existence of any event of default under any such loan or security agreement or any other document or agreement of [TBW] or [Colonial]. [BOA] shall act as the agent of [Colonial] and [TBW] in performing its obligations as Custodian hereunder and with respect to the Participated Mortgage Loans and nothing herein contained shall be deeded to create a fiduciary relationship among or between [BOA], [TBW] or [Colonial], 11. LIMITATION ON OBLIGATIONS OF CUSTODIAN. [BOA] agrees to act in accordance with any direction given it pursuant to this Agreement in good faith in the performance of any obligations and duties required pursuant to this Agreement and shall incur no liability to [Colonial] or [TBW] for any acts or omissions on the part of [BOA] except as may result from [BOA’s] gross negligence or willful misconduct occurring in connection with the performance of the duties, responsibilities and obligations to be performed by [BOA] under this Agreement. [BOA] shall also be entitled to rely upon any notice, document, correspondence, request or directive received by it from [Colonial] or [TBW], as the case may be, which [BOA] believes to be genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper and duly authorized officer or representative thereof, and shall not be obligated to inquire as to the authority or power of any Person so executing or presenting such documents or as to the truthfulness of any statement set forth therein. [BOA] shall have no duties or responsibilities to [TBW] or [Colonial] except as expressly provided in this Agreement or by law or by any other agreements to which [BOA] is a party, and [BOA] shall not be obligated to recognize, nor have any liability or responsibility to, [Colonial] or [TBW] under any instrument to which [BOA] is not a party. (Custodial Agreement at ¶¶ 10A, 11, attached as Ex. A Myles Decl., Dkt. No. 36-2) (emphasis added). BOA argues that the above language forms an exculpatory provision that precludes the FDIC’s claims for breach of the Custodial Agreement and/or Bailee Letters. (Dkt. No. 43 at 2.). BOA contends that the exculpatory language limits BOA’s liability to instances of gross negligence, willful misconduct, material breach, bad faith, or “other malfeasance,” and precludes liability for “material breach” unless the parties have given BOA notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure, all of which, BOA asserts, the FDIC failed to plead in its Counterclaims. (Dkt. No. 43 at 3 (citing the Custodial Agreement at ¶ 10A)). BOA concedes that the language in paragraph 10A “is more specific” than that of paragraph 11, but argues that both paragraphs preclude liability “under the circumstances” alleged in the Counterclaims. (Id. at 3.). According to BOA, the exculpatory language “could not be clearer or less equivocal.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 14.). Under Florida law, 18 exculpatory clauses are disfavored and strictly construed against the party claiming to be relieved from liability. Murphy v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Lake Wales, Inc., 974 So.2d 565, 567-68 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2008); see also, Hackett v. Grand Seas Resort Owner’s Ass’n Inc., 93 So.3d 378, 380 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (noting that exculpatory clauses are disfavored). “Such clauses are enforceable only where and to the extent that the intention to be relieved was made clear and unequivocal in the contract, and the wording must be so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable party will know what he is contracting away.” Murphy, 974 So.2d at 568 (quoting Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 580 So.2d 628, 634 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1991)); see also, Dynair Tech of Fla. v. Cayman Airways Ltd., 558 So.2d 30, 32 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1989) (holding that exculpatory clauses had “no force and effect” because they contradicted each other). The FDIC argues that the exculpatory language in question here is anything but clear. Indeed, according to the FDIC, the exculpatory language is unenforceable because the language contained in both paragraphs 10A and 11 is unclear and contradictory, thereby making it impossible for this Court to ascertain the parties’ intent. The FDIC also points to other alleged contradictions between provisions in the Custodial Agreement. For instance, the FDIC alleges, on the one hand, the Custodial Agreement requires BOA to “exercise reasonable care in the custody and preservation” of Colonial’s loans, but on the other hand, it purports to release BOA for its failure to exercise such care with respect to the Loans. (Dkt. No. 41 at 8 (citing the Custodial Agreement at ¶¶ 4D, 11).). The Court finds that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the FDIC as it is required to do, the exculpatory language in the Custodial Agreement is simply too ambiguous to be “so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what he is contracting away.” Murphy, 974 So.2d at 568. First, the Court does not find — as BOA urges it to do — that paragraph 10A shelters BOA from liability except for actions constituting gross negligence, willful misconduct, and bad faith, or for an uncured material breach. Paragraph 10A actually opens BOA up to far greater liability: [BOA] ... shall [not] be liable for any action taken or omitted to be taken by it ... in connection with this Agreement or the Participated Mortgage Loans, expect for [BOA’s] ... own gross negligence or willful misconduct, breach of this Agreement ... that constitutes bad faith or a material breach that is not cured within 10 days of notice ..., or other malfeasance by [BOA] hereunder. 0Custodial Agreement at ¶ 10A.) (emphasis added). The term “other malfeasance” as used in paragraph 10A is undefined and is simply too broad to constitute “clear and unequivocal” notice of what Colonial contracted away when it entered into the Custodial Agreement. Under Florida law, “malfeasance” means the commission of some act that is unlawful. See, e.g., Bent v. Ballantyne, 368 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 1979) (defining malfeasance as the “commission of some act which is positively unlawful,” citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1109 (rev. 4th ed.1968)); Thompson v. Napotnik, 923 So.2d 537, 540 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2006) (defining malfeasance in the context of recall petitions); Moultrie v. Davis, 498 So.2d 993, 995 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986) (same). Whatever its meaning, the term “malfeasance” is certainly broad enough to include the allegations brought in the FDIC’s Counterclaims. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a more broadly defined scope of liability. In addition, there is the nonsensical sentence in paragraph 10A (and repeated in section D of the same paragraph): a material breach that is not cured within 10 days of notice from the other parties or if such breach is a of a[SIC] nature that is not unable [SIC] within such 10-day period and Custodian is diligently and in good faith working on curing same, then within 30 days of such notice or within such other reasonable period.... ('Custodial Agreement, 1110A.)(emphasis added). It is clear that the sentence, “if such breach is a of a nature that is not unable within such 10-day period,” contains several clerical errors. The clerical errors render the sentence unintelligible. This is significant because the sentence is meant to set forth one of the exceptions to the limitation on BOA’s liability, a limitation that is meaningless due to its unintelligibility. Likewise, the exculpatory language in paragraph 11 is ambiguous. BOA argues that paragraph 11 limits its liability to breaches for gross negligence and/or willful misconduct, but a careful reading of paragraph 11 shows that it actually opens the door to much greater liability. The last sentence of paragraph 11 states: “[BOA] shall have no duties or responsibilities to [TBW] or [Colonial] except as expressly provided in this Agreement or by law or by other agreements to which [BOA] is a party----” (Custodial Agreement> ¶ 11.) (emphasis added). By imposing on BOA any duties or responsibilities provided “by law or by other agreements to which [BOA] is a party,” this sentence can reasonably be interpreted as leaving BOA’s liability open to limitless possibilities. The question before the Court is whether the language attempting to limit BOA’s liability is “so clear and understandable that an ordinary and knowledgeable person will know what he is contracting away.” Cain v. Banka, 932 So.2d 575, 578 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2006). That is not the case here. Accordingly, the Court determines that the exculpatory language in paragraphs 10A and 11 is ambiguous and, therefore, unenforceable. 19
Having determined that the FDIC’s Counterclaims based on BOA’s alleged breach of the Custodial Agreement are not barred by the Agreement’s exculpatory provisions, the Court must now determine whether Counts 1 through 5 allege factual allegations sufficient to survive BOA’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Count 1 pertains to BOA’s alleged obligations under paragraph 4B of the Custodial Agreement. Paragraph 4B provides as follows: [4]B. Possession of Mortgage Files. Following [BOA’s] receipt of each Mortgage File ..., [BOA] shall retain possession and custody thereof solely for the exclusive use and benefit of [Colonial] and [TBW] (to the extent of their respective ownership interests in the Participated Mortgage Loans) as the agent and bailee of [Colonial] and [TBW], and for purposes of perfecting [Colonial’s] and [TBW’s] ownership interest in the Participated Mortgage Loans and the related Mortgage File as contemplated by the Uniform Commercial Code of the State of Florida or other jurisdiction or such other applicable jurisdiction in effect and adopted thereby (it being understood that [BOA] has no responsibility to ensure such perfection or compliance with state law) ... [BOA] shall segregate and maintain continuous custody of all mortgage documents constituting the Mortgage File in secure and fire-resistant facilities in accordance with customary standards for such custody. 0Custodial Agreement at ¶ 4B.) (emphasis added.). The FDIC alleges that, pursuant to this provision, BOA was obligated to hold the Participated Mortgage Loans for the exclusive use and benefit of Colonial and for the purpose of perfecting Colonial’s ownership interest in said Loans. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 68.). The FDIC claims that BOA breached this obligation with respect to the 4,808 Participated Mortgage Loans because it failed to hold the Loans for Colonial’s exclusive use, and engaged in acts that were inconsistent with “the purposes of perfecting Colonial’s ownership interests in these [Loans].” (Id. at ¶ 69.). BOA argues that Count 1 must be dismissed because the claim improperly relies on the premise that BOA owed an exclusive duty to Colonial, when in fact, it owed a duty to both Colonial and TBW. (See Dkt. No. 36 at 16.). According to BOA, the Counterclaims allege that it collateralized and sold the Loans “upon instructions from TBW.” (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 43.)). BOA asserts that because it owed the same duties to Colonial and TBW under paragraph 4B, it cannot have breached “its duties to the one by acting on instructions from the other.” (Id.). As such, BOA argues Count 1 must be dismissed. 20 In response, the FDIC contends that the fact that BOA owed duties to TBW under the Custodial Agreement in addition to those it owed to Colonial is irrelevant as to whether BOA breached its obligations to Colonial. According to the FDIC, BOA mischaracterizes Count 1. The FDIC asserts that it does not claim that BOA breached its duties to Colonial by following TBW’s instructions; rather, it alleges that Colonial should have received payment for the 4,808 loans before BOA collateralized the Loans and sold them to Freddie Mac. (See Dkt. No. 41 at 22 (citing Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 42).). The Court agrees. Count 1 must be read in context with the rest of the Counterclaims, which unequivocally allege that BOA failed to ensure that Colonial received payment for the 4,808 Loans before they were pledged as collateral for the Ocala Notes and ultimately sold to Freddie Mac. (See Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 36, 39, 43-49.). While not the most artfully pled allegation, Count 1 need not be read as BOA would have the Court read it (i.e., that BOA owed an exclusive duty to Colonial), a claim that would not be supported by paragraph 4B. Count 1 is more logically read to assert that BOA was obligated to hold the Loans for the exclusive use and benefit of Colonial with respect to Colonial’s 99% ownership interest in the Loans. Indeed, paragraph 4B states as much: “[BOA] shall retain possession and custody thereof solely for the exclusive use and benefit of [Colonial] and [TBW] (to the extent of their respective ownership interests in the Participated Mortgage Loans)....” (Custodial Agreement at ¶ 4B) (emphasis added). This Court is obligated to view the allegations in the Counterclaims in the light most favorable to the FDIC. Given this standard, and in light of the remaining allegations in the Counterclaims, the Court concludes that Count 1 states a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted. Therefore, BOA’s motion to dismiss Count 1 is denied.
Again citing paragraph 4B of the Custodial Agreement, Count 2 alleges that BOA was obligated to segregate and maintain continuous custody of any mortgages documents associated with a Participated Mortgage Loan that was transferred to BOA. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 73.). The FDIC alleges that BOA failed to meet this obligation. (Id. at ¶ 74.). BOA argues that Count 2 must be dismissed because paragraph 4B simply instructs it on how to store the mortgage documents during the time that they are in its custody. (Dkt. No. 36 at 17-18 (noting that paragraph 4B requires BOA to store the documents in “secure and fire-resistant facilities in accordance with customary standards for such custody.”)). BOA accuses the FDIC of reading into this provision a requirement that does not exist-namely, that BOA maintain custody of the documents “in perpetuity.” (Id. at 18.). In response, the FDIC argues that the Counterclaims allege that BOA was required to segregate the loans in order to “protect Colonial’s ownership interest and that BOA failed to perform as promised.” Count 2, itself, makes no such allegation. However, the claim incorporates the allegations contained in Count 1, which do make such an allegation. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶72.). And, as this Court determined above, paragraph 4B plausibly supports such assertions. Accordingly, BOA’s motion to dismiss is denied as to Count 2.
In Count 3, the FDIC alleges that paragraph 4D of the Custodial Agreement obligated BOA to exercise reasonable care in the custody and preservation of the items that it received from Colonial, and that BOA failed to fulfill this obligation with respect to the Participated Mortgage Loans. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 78-79.). Paragraph 4D of the Custodial Agreement reads as follows: D. Care of Collateral. [BOA] shall exercise reasonable care in the custody and preservation of the Collateral in its possession to the extent required by statutes and in any event shall be deemed to have exercised reasonable care if it (i) takes such action for that purpose as [Colonial] shall reasonably request in writing (but no omission to comply with any request of [Colonial] shall of itself be deemed a failure to exercise reasonable care), or (ii) exercises at least the same degree of care as it would exercise with respect to a like transaction in which it alone is interested. (Custodial Agreement at ¶ 4D) (emphasis added). BOA argues that Count 3 must be dismissed because paragraph 4D only requires it to exercise reasonable care “to the extent required by applicable statute,” and the FDIC does not allege that BOA failed to comply with “any statutory duty of care.” (Dkt. No. 36 at 19.). In other words, BOA argues, because the FDIC’s claims rest on a provision that can be breached only be violating a statute, the FDIC must identify what statute it allegedly breached. The FDIC counters that it is not required to reference a specific statute in its pleadings in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Citing Skinner v. Switzer, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011), the FDIC argues that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require that a complaint pin a plaintiffs claim to relief to a precise legal theory. (Dkt. No. 41 at 25.). The Court finds Skinner v. Switzer inapplicable. The FDIC gives no indication whatsoever of which statute BOA allegedly ran afoul. In the absence of a statute, the Court must dismiss the claim. If the FDIC does have a statute on which it relies for this claim, it may move to amend the Counterclaims. In the meantime, Count 3 is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Citing paragraph 7A of the Custodial Agreement, the FDIC alleges in Count 4 that BOA breached its duty to return to Colonial any Participated Mortgage Loan that was not purchased within six business days of BOA’s receipt of the Loan. BOA argues that this claim must be dismissed because it had no duty to act under paragraph 7A unless and until instructed to do so by TBW. Paragraph 7A states: 7. RELEASE OF COLLATERAL A. Release of Collateral to [TBW] or its Designee. [BOA] shall ... upon receipt from, [TBW] of a Request for Re lease of Documents and Receipt release any Collateral specified in such request and [BOA] shall thereupon cause delivery of the same to [TBW] or its designee. Any such Request for Release of Documents and Receipt shall be subject to the prior approval of [Colonial], at its sole and absolute discretion. In the event that a Participated Mortgage Loan is not purchased by Ocala within 6 Business Days from receipt of the related Mortgage file, [TBW] shall request, and [BOA] shall deliver, such Mortgage File to [Colonial]. 0Custodial Agreement at ¶ 7A.) (emphasis added). As BOA correctly points out, the FDIC did not allege in the Counterclaims that TBW ever issued a request for a release of an outstanding Participated Mortgage Loan. Apparently conceding this point, the FDIC attempts to avoid the ramifications of this failure by arguing that the word “and” in the last sentence of paragraph 7A created an independent requirement on the part of BOA to deliver the Loans, regardless of whether TBW first requested them. The FDIC argues that “[t]his independent obligation is sensible because [BOA], the entity in possession of the [L]oans and [Ocala’s] bank accounts, was in the best position to know whether a [L]oan had been purchased within six days.” (Dkt. No. 41 at 26.). At a minimum, the FDIC argues, paragraph 7A is ambiguous and, as such, Count 4 cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. (Id.). The Court agrees as to the ambiguity of Count 4. While the FDIC’s reading of paragraph 7A may be a stretch, in deciding a motion to dismiss, this Court is required to evaluate all inferences derived from the allegations contained in the Counterclaims in the light most favorable to the FDIC. In doing so, this Court concludes that Count 4 survives BOA’s motion to dismiss.
In Count 5, the FDIC alleges that under paragraph 17K of the Custodian Agreement, BOA represented and warranted that it did not have at the time of execution, and would not hold during the existence of the Agreement, any interest adverse to Colonial, by way of security or otherwise, in the Participated Mortgage Loans. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 88.). Paragraph 17K states: K. No Adverse Interest. By execution of this Agreement, [BOA] represents and warrants that it currently holds, and during the existence of this Agreement shall hold, no interest adverse to [Colonial] or [TBW], by way of security or otherwise, in any Participated Mortgage Loan, and hereby waives and releases any such interest which it may have in any Participated Mortgage Loan as of the date hereof. (Custodial Agreement at ¶ 17k.). The FDIC maintains that BOA breached this warranty and argues that the Court need look no further than the Amended Complaint — in which BOA asserts a security interest in some of the Participated Mortgage Loans — to see evidence of the breach. (Id. at ¶¶ 89-90.). BOA counters that paragraph 17K only applies to BOA’s interests in its own capacity. (Dkt. No. 36 at 20.). BOA disavows that it brought the underlying action in its own capacity; rather, it filed suit “in its capacity as the representative of the Ocala Facility.” (Id. at 21.). Furthermore, the “Custodial Agreement contemplated ‘that BOA would obtain security and possessory interests in the loans on behalf of Ocala’s Secured Parties.’ ” (Id.). The FDIC responds that paragraph 17K is not clearly and unambiguously limited to BOA in its own capacity. (Dkt. No. 41 at 27.). The “clear purpose” of the Custodial Agreement was to ensure that Colonial’s ownership interest in the Loans was protected. The Agreement, the FDIC argues, contemplated that BOA would obtain a security interest on behalf of the Ocala Facility after Colonial received payment for its interest in the Loans. Because BOA failed to remit payment, Colonial’s interest was not satisfied, and the requirements of paragraph 17K continue to apply. (Id. at 28.). The Court agrees. At a minimum, paragraph 17K is ambiguous. Furthermore, as discussed previously at Sections II.B.-D., it is not entirely clear that BOA does not seek relief for damages it allegedly incurred in its own capacity. As such, Count 5 will not be dismissed.
Next, BOA moves, in the alternative, to dismiss the breach of bailment Counterclaims (Counts 6 through 12) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Counts 6 through 12 pertain to Colonial’s use of a standard financing form known as a “bailee letter” (the “Bailee Letter(s)”) when it transferred Participated Mortgage Loans to BOA under the Custodial Agreement. 21 (See Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 31.). The FDIC maintains that the Bailee Letters either created a new agreement between Colonial and BOA that superseded the Custodial Agreement or the Letters modified the Agreement. Either way, the FDIC argues, BOA was obligated to abide by the terms of the Bailee Letters. (Id. at ¶ 32-33.). The provisions of the Bailee Letters are as follows: Pursuant to the terms and conditions set forth below, [Colonial] hereby deliver[s] to [BOA], as Custodian for [Ocala], with this letter, the [Participated Mortgage Loans] ... By taking physical possession of this Bailee Letter, the [Participated Mortgage Loans] and other loans documents, [BOA] hereby agrees and is bound: i. to hold in trust, as bailee for Colonial [ ], the [Loans] ..., subject to the direction and control of Colonial until [BOA’s] status as bailee is terminated ...; ii. to not release or deliver ... the [Loans] ... to [TBW] ... which release, delivery or other action could cause the security interest of [Colonial] to become unperfected or which could otherwise jeopardize the perfected security interest and/or title and ownership interest of [Colonial] in the Loan(s); iv. to return the [Loans] immediately to Colonial [ ] upon receipt of a written or telephonic request by Colonial ...; v. not to honor request or instructions from [TBW] relating to any [Loans] ...; vi. immediately upon [Ocala’s] acceptance or rejection of the Loan(s) for purchase, and in any event within forty-five (45) days after the date of delivery of this Bailee Letter to either (A) remit the [sales proceeds] to Colonial or (b) [SIC] return the [Loans] to Colonial; By your acceptance of the enclosed [Loans], you are bound by the terms, provisions and conditions of this Bailee Letter. We request that you acknowledge receipt of this Bailee Letter and the enclosed [Loans] by signing in the space provided at the bottom of this Bailee Letter and returning it to Colonial ... (but your failure to do so in no way compromises the terms, provisions and conditions of this Bailee Letter or nullifies your agreements resulting from your acceptance of the enclosed [Loans], as set forth in this Bailee Letter. (Dkt. No. 36, Myles Decl., at Ex. B; Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 33.). The FDIC claims that the 4,808 Participated Mortgage Loans that are the subject of its Counterclaims were transferred to BOA pursuant to the above-listed terms of the Bailee Letters, yet Colonial never received payment for its ownership interest in those Loans. (Id. at ¶39.). As such, the FDIC asserts, BOA breached the terms of the bailment between the parties. BOA argues that Counts 6 through 12 must be dismissed because: (1) to the extent that the FDIC argues that the Bailee Letters modified, amended or superseded the Custodial Agreement, that argument fails as a matter of black-letter contract law; or (2) to the extent that the FDIC argues that the Custodial Agreement and Bailee Letters can be harmonized, that argument similarly fails because the Letters contradict material terms of the Custodial Agreement. (See Dkt. No. 36 at 22-23.).
BOA argues that the provisions of the Bailee Letters upon which the FDIC relies for its breach of bailment claims are inconsistent with the Custodial Agreement, and therefore each claim must be dismissed. BOA contends that the “broad structure and terms” of the Bailee Letters are inconsistent with Custodial Agreement because they read as though BOA’s custodial duties were owed only to Colonial, and not divided with a duty to TBW (as provided for in the Custodial Agreement). As an example of this, BOA points to the provisions of the Bailee Letters that require BOA to “hold in trust, as bailee for Colonial [], the Loans] ...” and prohibit BOA from releasing the Loans to TBW if “doing so would jeopardize the security interest of [Colonial],” and further prohibit BOA from “honoring] requests or instructions from [TBW] relating to any [Loans].... ” (See Dkt. No. 36 at 29 (quoting the Bailee Letter at ¶ 2(i),(ii), and (v).)). BOA argues that these terms directly contradict the Custodial Agreement, which require BOA to act as the Custodial Agent and Bailee for both Colonial and TBW, referring the Court to the provisions of the Custodial Agreement that state that BOA is appointed as “Custodian ... by each [Colonial] and [TBW] as its agent and bailee hereunder,” and further state that BOA “shall retain possession and custody [of the Loans] solely for the exclusive use and benefit of [Colonial] and [TBW],” and authorize BOA to act on the instructions of both Colonial and TBW. (Id. at 28-29 (quoting the Custodial Agreement, ¶¶ 2, 4B and 7).). According to BOA, these inconsistencies render the Bailee Letters unenforceable, noting that it is “hornbook law” that a party cannot unilaterally supersede or amend an agreement. BOA claims that Florida courts have rejected similar tactics by parties who attempted to modify governing contracts with unilateral form letters. (Id. (citing Gulf Power Co. v. Coalsales II, L.L.C., 661 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1279 (N.D.Fla.2009) and Newkirk Constr. Corp. v. Gulf Cnty., 366 So.2d 813, 815 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.1979)).). BOA maintains that a recent district court decision from the Ninth Circuit, FDIC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. SACV 10-0713 DOC (MLGx), 2011 WL 3737435 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 24, 2011), is directly on point. First American involved a loan transaction in which Indy-Mac Bank was the lender and First American Title Insurance Company (“First American”) was the closing agent. Id. at . The FDIC, as receiver for IndyMac Bank, sought to enforce negotiated Closing Instructions between the parties, and First American argued that a pre-printed Funding Letter that First American included with the closing documents served to modify the Closing Instructions. Id. In granting summary judgment for the FDIC, the district court held that the Funding Letter did not modify the Closing Instructions for several reasons. First, the court noted that nothing in the Funding Letter purported to modify the Instructions. Id. at -6 (stating that “[i]f First American were truly modifying [the] Closing Instructions, it would have specified exactly what provisions to which it did not agree and would have indicated so on the Closing Instructions document itself’) (emphasis in original). Second, the court noted that the Funding Letter was not supported by additional consideration to IndyMac for First American’s purported release from the Closing Instructions. Id. at . Lastly, the court rejected First American’s argument that merely by funding the loan, IndyMac performed under the Funding Letter and had thereby accepted its terms. Id. at . BOA argues that the same is true in this case. It asserts that the Bailee Letters, like the Funding Letter in First American, make no mention of any intent, much less “specific intent,” to modify the Custodial Agreement. (Dkt. No. 36 at 26.). Nor do the Bailee Letters offer any sort of additional consideration for the reduction of BOA’s or TBW’s rights under the Custodial Agreement. In addition, BOA argues, the FDIC does not allege in the Counterclaims that BOA ever signed, acknowledged, or even read the Bailee Letters. Therefore, BOA argues, this Court cannot enforce the terms of the Bailee Letters over the negotiated terms of the Custodial Agreement because to hold otherwise “would afford too little recognition to the other documents and the overall character of the transaction.” (Id. at 27 (quoting Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. Am. Fin. Mortg. Corp., 579 Pa. 275, 296, 855 A.2d 818 (Pa.2004)).). Finally, BOA argues that the Custodial Agreement contains an integration clause that prohibits unilateral amendments ■ to the Agreement. (Id. at 24 (citing the Custodial Agreement at ¶ 17C).). In response, the FDIC argues that the Counterclaims allege factual allegations sufficient to state a claim that bailments existed between Colonial and BOA and that these bailments, established pursuant to the terms of the Bailee Letters, represent new, independent agreements between Colonial and BOA that are separate from the Custodial Agreement. (See Dkt. No. 41 at 10.). The FDIC maintains that the fact that BOA did not sign the Bailee Letters is not fatal to the enforceability of the agreements because Florida does not require a countersignature on a bailee letter in order to create a bailment. (Id. at 10 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 679.3131, comment 9; 4 James J. White, Robert S. Summers, & Robert A. Hillman, Uniform Commercial Code § 31-8 (6th ed.).)). Instead, the FDIC argues, acceptance of the collateral documents constitutes assent to the terms of the bailee letter. Id. (citing Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co. v. Natixis Real Estate Capital, Inc., No. 0602359/2007, 2008 WL 1999522 (Trial Order) (N.Y.Sup. Ct. Apr. 30, 2008) (“The standard practice in the [mortgage warehouse lending industry] is not to require a countersignature on the bailee letter ... [the] acceptance of the collateral documents constitutes assent to the terms of the bailee letter ... ”).). Here, BOA accepted the terms of the Bailee Letters when it accepted the Loans under cover of the Letters, held them in trust, and then remitted payment to Colonial (until the alleged breach) once the Loans were sold to Ocala. (Id. at 13 (citing Counterclaims, ¶¶ 31, 36 and 42).). What is more, the FDIC argues, the Bailee Letters expressly stated that acceptance of the Loans transmitted under the Bailee Letter constituted acceptance, and failing to countersign the Letter “in no way ... nullifies [BOA’s] agreements resulting from [BOA’s] acceptance of the enclosed Note(s) ...” (Id. at 12 (citing Bailee Letter at p. 2).). The FDIC claims that this provision of the Bailee Letters is consistent with the use of bailee letters in the mortgage warehouse lending industry as a whole and is reflected in Florida’s statutes, which allow a mortgage warehouse lender who transfers mortgage notes to a custodian pursuant to a bailee letter to retain its perfected security interest in the notes, as long as the lender instructed the bailee to hold the collateral for the benefit of the lender. (Id. at 13 (citing Fla. Stat. Ann. § 679.3131(8), n. 9 (“Requiring [lenders] to obtain authenticated acknowledgments ... would be unduly burdensome and disruptive of established practices”)).). In the alternative, the FDIC argues that the Bailee Letters operated to modify the terms of the Custodial Agreement, and BOA’s acceptance of the Bailee Letters in the ordinary course of business without objection formed either “(i) an ‘agreement in writing’ that overrides the integration clause in the Custodial Agreement or (ii) an amendment of the Custodial Agreement through course of performance.” (Dkt. No. 41 at 28.). The Court concludes that the FDIC has alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for breach of bailment. To create a bailment under Florida law, there must be: (1) the delivery of a bailor’s property to a bailee; (2) acceptance of the property by the bailee; and (3) an agreement, either express or implied, to use the property for a particular purpose and later redeliver it to the bailor. See Monroe Sys. for Bus., Inc. v. Intertrans Corp., 650 So.2d 72, 75-76 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994); 46 AmJur. Proof of Facts 3d 361 (1998). Here, the FDIC alleges that: (1) Colonial delivered the Loans in question to BOA under cover of a Bailee Letter (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 31); (2) BOA accepted the Loans (Id. at ¶ 43); and (3) BOA agreed to hold the Loans, and within 45 days of delivery, to either remit payment for the Loans or return the Loans to Colonial (Id. at ¶ 33.). These factual allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim that a separate, independent contract for bailment existed between the parties. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that the terms of the Bailee Letters materially conflict with the terms of the Custodial Agreement. The Custodial Agreement unequivocally states that BOA’s duties with respect to TBW and Colonial are limited to the extent of each of TBW’s and Colonial’s respective ownership interests in the Loans. See, e.g., the Custodial Agreement at Fifth WHEREAS Clause (stating that BOA is authorized to act as TBW’s and Colonial’s custodial agent and bailee “to the extent of their respective ownership interests in [the] Participated Mortgage Loans”) (emphasis added); see also Id. at ¶ 4B (“... the Custodian shall retain possession and custody thereof solely for the exclusive use and benefit of [Colonial] and [TBW] (to the extent of their respective ownership interests in the Participated Mortgage Loans) as the agent and bailee of [Colonial] and [TBW], and for purposes of perfecting [Colonial’s] and [TBW’s] ownership interest in the [Loans] ----”) (emphasis added). 22 Similarly, the Bailee Letters acknowledge that Colonial has only a “participation” interest in the Loans. (See Bailee Letter, Introductory paragraph “[Colonial] owns a participation interest in the Loan(s) and the proceeds thereof ... ”). Accordingly, the Bailee Letters can be read to affect only Colonial’s participation interest in the Loans, thereby leaving unaffected TBW’s interest in the Loans and BOA’s obligations thereto under the Custodial Agreement. What is more, the Custodial Agreement gives Colonial the power to direct BOA’s actions towards the Loans on behalf of TBW. (See Custodial Agreement at ¶ 2 “[TBW] hereby irrevocably appoints [Colonial] as its attorney in fact and agent ... to take any action and give any direction hereunder on behalf of [TBW] with respect to [TBW’s] interest in any [Loan], and [BOA] shall be entitled to rely on [Colonial’s] directions and instructions on behalf of itself and [TBW]”). As such, Colonial’s use of the Bailee Letters can be read as entirely consistent with the terms of the Custodial Agreement. At a minimum, these provisions create an ambiguity that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. See Novoneuron Inc. v. Addiction Research Inst., Inc., 326 Fed.Appx. 505, 508-509 (11th Cir.2009) (trial court erred in granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when disputed contract was susceptible to two different interpretations, each one of which was reasonably inferred from the terms of the contract). Nor is the Court persuaded by BOA’s argument that Paragraph 17C of the Custodial Agreement bars the creation of a separate agreement. Paragraph 17C states: Entire Agreement. This Agreement contains the entire agreement and understanding among the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements, understandings, inducements and conditions, express or implied, oral or written, of any nature whatsoever with respect to the subject matter hereof including any prior custody agreements. The express terms hereof control and supersede any course of performance and/or usage of the trade inconsistent with any of the terms hereof. This Agreement may not be modified or amended other than by an agreement in writing. (Custodial Agreement, ¶ 17C.)(emphasis added.). The plain language of this provision precludes only agreements made prior to, or contemporaneously with, the Custodial Agreement. Because the Bailee Letters were issued after the parties executed the Custodial Agreement, the first sentence of paragraph 17C is inapplicable to the present situation. Nor does the last sentence of paragraph 17C, which refers to “modified or amended,” necessarily bar the creation of an entirely new agreement. On the briefing before it, the Court is not persuaded that there was a meeting of the minds that this last sentence was meant to exclude an entirely new agreement between the parties in perpetuity. Likewise, BOA’s argument that the Bailee Letters did not create a binding agreement because they were not signed by BOA is unavailing. A countersignature on a bailee letter is not required to form a contract. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co., 2008 WL 1999522 (a bailee’s failure to countersign a bailee letter does not make bailment unenforceable as a matter of law); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 679.3131, comment 9; 4 White, Summers, & Hillman, supra § 31-8. Instead, acceptance can be conveyed through performance or implied from the circumstances. See 8A Am. Jur.2d Bailments § 38 (2012); 8 C.J.S. Bailments § 25 (2012) (“If the contract is in writing, its enforceability is not affected by the fact that it is not signed[.]”). “A contract may be binding on a party despite the absence of a party’s signature. The object of a signature is to show mutuality or assent, but these facts may be shown in other ways, for example, by the acts or conduct of the parties.” Gateway Cable T.V., Inc. v. Vikoa Constr. Corp., 253 So.2d 461, 463 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1971). Indeed, the Bailee Letters themselves provide that BOA became “bound by the terms, provisions and conditions of the Bailee Letter” by its “acceptance of the [Participated Mortgage Loans].” (Dkt. No. 36, Myles Deck, Ex. B at p. 2.). Moreover, the cases cited by BOA do not support its motion. First, their applicability to the present situation is limited because they do not involve the use of bailee letters in the mortgage warehouse lending industry which, the FDIC correctly points out, receives special statutory treatment because of the nature of the industry. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 679.3131(8), n. 9 (noting that “[requiring [lenders] to obtain authenticated acknowledgments ... would be unduly burdensome and disruptive of established practices” in the warehouse lending industry). The cases are distinguishable in other ways as well. For example, BOA’s reliance on First American is misplaced. First, importantly, First American was decided on summary judgment. 2011 WL 3737435 at . The decision is replete with references to the fact that there was “no evidence” to support First American’s position that the agreement in question had been amended. Id. at . Here, the FDIC is not required to produce such evidence in order to defeat BOA’s motion to dismiss. Second, the question in First American was whether the existing contract between the parties — the closing instructions — had been modified by a later agreement — -the funding letter. Id. Here, the FDIC maintains that the Bailee Letters represent new, independent contracts between Colonial and BOA that are separate and distinct from the Custodial Agreement. As such, the First American court’s conclusion that the funding letter did not clearly evidence the parties’ intent to modify the closing instructions is inapplicable to the present situation. Likewise, Gulf Power Co. v. Coalsales II, LLC, 661 F.Supp.2d 1270 (N.D.Fla.2009) and Newkirk Constr. Corp. v. Gulf Cnty., 366 So.2d 813 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1979) are distinguishable on the same grounds. BOA refers this Court to a Pennsylvania case for the proposition that a bailee letter cannot supersede an existing agreement. (Dkt. No. 36 at 26-27 (citing Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. v. Am. Fin. Mortg. Corp., 579 Pa. 275, 855 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2004)).). However, the Pioneer court merely made a passing reference to this issue and specifically limited its finding to “the circumstances presented” in that case. Pioneer, 579 Pa. at 296, 855 A.2d 818 (reversing and remanding for entry of judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict in favor of bank). And again, the issue was decided after the parties had the benefit of discovery. Id. Therefore, construing the Counterclaims in the FDIC’s favor as this Court must do in deciding BOA’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, this Court concludes that the FDIC has plausibly alleged the existence of a new contract pursuant to the Bailee Letters. See Sierra Equity Grp., Inc. v. White Oak Equity Partners, LLC, 650 F.Supp.2d 1213, 1228 (S.D.Fla.2009) (noting that whether the contract was accepted is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss).
Next, BOA argues that even if the Bailee Letters constitute valid, enforceable agreements between the parties, the individual bailment Counterclaims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. BOA moves to dismiss Counts 6 and 7, alleging that the provisions of the Bailee Letters on which the FDIC bases these claims are inconsistent with the terms of the Custodial Agreement, and therefore, unenforceable. This argument fails for the reasons discussed in the previous section. BOA’s motion to dismiss Counts 6 and 7 is denied. In Counts 8 and 9, the FDIC alleges that, under the terms of the Bailee Letters, BOA was obligated to either remit to Colonial the proceeds for the sale of the Participated Mortgage Loans or to return the Loans to Colonial within 45 days of the initiation of the bailment. (See Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 107, 112, and 113.). The FDIC alleges that more than 45 days have passed since the 4,808 Participated Mortgage Loans were transferred to BOA, and BOA has not returned the Loans, nor has it remitted the proceeds for the 4,808 Loans to Colonial, an amount that the FDIC alleges is approximately $898,873,958. (Id. at ¶ 108.). The FDIC alleges that this failure constitutes a breach of the bailment. (Id. at ¶ 109.). In moving to dismiss Counts 8 and 9, BOA mischaracterizes the claims as a demand that BOA “pay” the sale proceeds. (Dkt. No. 36 at 31-32.). It argues that neither the Custodial Agreement nor the Bailee Letters require BOA to “pay” for the Loans. The FDIC makes no such claim. To the contrary, the FDIC alleges that BOA breached the bailment by failing to either “remit”, ie., transmit, the sale proceeds to Colonial or return the Loans (with Colonial’s ownership interest intact) within the 45 day timeframe. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 108.). The FDIC alleges that BOA’s failure to comply with this obligation under the Bailee Letters has damaged Colonial in the amount of nearly $1 billion. These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for relief. BOA also maintains that it returned the Loans to Colonial. (Dkt. No. 36 at 32-33.). This argument borders on farcical. As the FDIC correctly maintains, BOA did not “return” the Loans to Colonial in Colonial’s capacity as owner of the Loans, but sent them to Colonial’s Trust Department in Colonial’s capacity as custodian for Freddie Mac. What is more, BOA returned “qualitatively different [L]oans,” that are now “owned by Freddie Mac.” (Dkt. No. 41 at 36; Dkt. No. 25 at ¶ 38.). Again, the FDIC has alleged factual allegations that are sufficient to state a claim for relief. Accordingly, BOA’s motion to dismiss Counts 8 and 9 is denied. In Count 10, the FDIC alleges that BOA breached the bailment agreement by failing to subordinate its alleged interest in the Participated Mortgage Loans to Colonial’s interest. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 118-120.). The FDIC alleges, that, “based in part on the allegations of BOA’s Amended Complaint, BOA has asserted alleged interest of its own which BOA claims to be superior to, rather than subordinate to, Colonial’s interest in the Participated Mortgage Loans.” (Id. at ¶ 119.). The FDIC asserts that by bringing these claims, BOA has breached the bailment. (Id. at ¶ 120.). BOA counters that it does not assert any interest in the Loans on its own behalf. (Dkt. No. 36 at 34.). Rather, it brings these claims in its representative capacity on behalf of Ocala, DB, and BNP. (Id.). Contrary to BOA’s assertion, the record is not clear that BOA is not asserting any interest of its own in the Loans. For instance, in its opposition to the FDIC’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, BOA argues that it seeks to recover for losses incurred by Ocala, “including losses incurred by all investors in the Ocala facility and by BOA itself.” (Dkt. No. 35 at 18) (emphasis in original). BOA states further that it “sought an administrative remedy for Ocala and all parties with interests in Ocala assets, including Ocala’s investors and BOA itself.” (Id.) (emphasis in original). In addition, the proofs of claim state “[t]he tax ID number shown is for [BOA]. Many of the claims described in this proof of claim, however, are made by [BOA] in its capacity as Trustee on behalf of the secured parties with respect to [Ocala Notes].” (Dkt. No. 20 at Ex. A, n. 1.) (emphasis added). This statement indicates that at least some of the claims in the proofs of claim were brought by BOA on behalf of its own purported interest in the Loans. Accordingly, the FDIC has stated a plausible claim that BOA breached the bailment by failing to subordinate its interest in the Loans to that of Colonial. Count 10 will not be dismissed. In Counts 11 and 12, the FDIC alleges that BOA exercised its alleged rights with respect to the Participated Mortgage Loans without first receiving written authorization to do so from Colonial and, instead, acted pursuant to instructions from TBW. (Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 123-126 and 130-131.). The FDIC asserts that these actions breached the terms of the bailment. (Id. at ¶¶ 127 and 132.). BOA counters that the requirement to seek written authorization from Colonial before acting and the prohibition from following TBW’s instructions are inconsistent with the terms of the Custodial Agreement and therefore cannot be the basis for a claim for relief. This argument fails for the reasons discussed above at Section IV. D.3.a. BOA’s motion to dismiss Counts 11 and 12 is denied.
The final four Counterclaims against BOA sound in tort. The FDIC alleges that BOA breached its duty of care as Colonial’s agent, as well as its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to Colonial, by pledging the Participated Mortgage Loans as collateral for the Ocala Notes and then selling them to Freddie Mac without first ensuring that Colonial was paid. ’ (See Dkt. No. 25 at ¶¶ 135-137, 140-142, and 145-147.). The FDIC also asserts that BOA breached its duty of care under a common law bailment by encumbering the loans and selling them to Freddie Mac. (Id. at ¶¶ 150-153.). BOA argues that these claims must be dismissed for two reasons: (1) the economic loss doctrine bars the tort claims, and (2) the Custodial Agreement limits or precludes BOA’s tort liability.
“The economic loss rule is a judicially created doctrine that sets forth the circumstances under which a tort action is prohibited if the only damages suffered are economic losses.” Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So.2d 532, 536 (Fla.2004). One of the circumstances in which the economic loss doctrine applies is “when the parties are in contractual privity and one party seeks to recover damages in tort for matters arising out of the contract.” Id. The economic loss doctrine “is designed to prevent parties to a contract from circumventing the allocation of losses set forth in the contract by bringing an action for economic loss in tort.” Id. Any recovery in tort “requires proof of facts that are distinct from breach of contract.” Invo Fla., Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., 751 So.2d 1263, 1265 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.2000); accord Electronic Sec. Sys. Corp. v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 482 So.2d 518, 519 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986). BOA argues that the only loss asserted by the FDIC is the loss of the 4,808 Participated Mortgage Loans, for which Colonial should have been paid a Takeout Amount of $898,873,958. BOA maintains that because Colonial was entitled to this Takeout Amount only by virtue of the written agreements between the parties, the alleged damages fall squarely within the definition of economic losses barred by the economic loss rule. (See Dkt. No. 36 at 38-39.). The FDIC counters that this argument is not ripe for review at this stage in the litigation because BOA has moved to dismiss the FDIC’s breach of contract claims and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(3) expressly permits a party to plead claims in the alternative, even if the claims are inconsistent. (See Dkt. No. 41 at 39.) The Court agrees. At this early stage of the litigation, the Court finds that the tort claims are adequately pled and not barred by the economic loss doctrine. To the extent that discovery or further case development show that the duties allegedly breached by BOA are in fact based on or inextricably intertwined with valid written agreements between Colonial and BOA, the Court will revisit the issue. Bd. of Trs. of the City of Lake Worth Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 3:10-cv-845-J-32MCR, 2011 WL 2144658 at  (M.D.Fla. May 31, 2011); see also Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C.Cir.1996) (stating that plaintiff can properly plead alternative theories of liability, regardless of whether such theories are inconsistent with one another); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 736 F.Supp.2d 254, 262 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(3) permits a plaintiff to plead inconsistent claims in support of alternative theories of recovery ... ”).
BOA’s final argument is that the Custodial Agreement precludes tort liability for BOA. (See Dkt. No. 36 at 40.). As discussed supra, BOA contends that the Custodial Agreement expressly limits BOA’s liability to breaches committed through “gross negligence or willful misconduct.” (Id. citing the Custodial Agreement at ¶¶ 10A, 11.). BOA argues that the FDIC seeks to do an “end-run” around this contractual limitation by alleging breaches of noncontractual tort duties, none of which amount to gross negligence or willful misconduct. (Id.). Therefore, BOA argues, the tort claims must be dismissed as a matter of law. BOA’s argument fails for two reasons. First, as discussed in Section IV.D.1., supra, the exculpatory clauses in the Custodial Agreement are simply too ambiguous to effectively limit BOA’s liability. Second, the claims in Counterclaim 13 through Counterclaim 16 relate to the bailment relationship created by the Bailee Letters, not the Custodial Agreement. As discussed in Section IV.D.3.a., supra, the FDIC has plausibly stated that the Bailee Letters created a new agreement between Colonial and BOA that is independent of the Custodial Agreement. Accordingly, BOA’s motion to dismiss Counterclaims 13 through 16 is denied.