Opinion ID: 1194882
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Denying Motions for New Trial on Basis of Jury Misconduct or to Reveal Jurors' Names and Addresses to Ascertain Whether Misconduct Occurred

Text: (23) After the jury returned a verdict of death and was dismissed, the Star-News, a Pasadena newspaper, quoted a juror as saying, `He didn't deserve any more than she [Haro] did. He doesn't deserve to go to prison, take classes and have conjugal visits.... We need a deterrent. We need to make a statement.' (Ellipsis in original.) On the strength of these comments, defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct or, in the alternative, to compel disclosure of the jurors' telephone numbers and addresses to ascertain whether misconduct occurred. The purported or hypothesized misconduct consisted of failing to follow an instruction that the jurors were not to consider the deterrent effect of their penalty decision. The trial court denied the motions. Defendant claims that the decisions violated state law and rights contained in the United States and California Constitutions to a reliable penalty determination. A losing defendant may be entitled to a new trial [w]hen the jury has ... been guilty of any misconduct by which a fair and due consideration of the case has been prevented[.] (§ 1181, subd. 3.) The trial court stated that it would assume the comments were accurately reported. It rejected the motion because [i]n this case, the statements attributed to the jury foreperson  assuming that she made them as defense counsel asserts, which I do for the purpose of this motion  nonetheless, do[] not implicate juror misconduct.... The inquiry would clearly and improperly go to the mental processes by which the verdict was reached and the contents of juror deliberations. The court misapprehended the scope of subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1150, which bars admitting evidence showing the effect of statements or events on the mental processes of a juror, but does permit admitting any otherwise admissible evidence to show that statements were made or events occurred. Thus, even if the juror's posttrial statements were not themselves misconduct, arguably they provided a basis for permitting defendant to investigate whether the jury discussed the improper subject of deterrence during deliberations. (See People v. Perez (1992) 4 Cal. App.4th 893, 908 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 141] [jury misconduct to disregard trial court's express instruction not to consider defendant's failure to testify].) Defendant must, however, show an abuse of discretion in declining to hold a hearing on jury misconduct ( People v. Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 675-676) or to order a new trial ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 667 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]). No evidence shows that the trial court abused its discretion in either respect. Telling a newspaper that `[w]e need a deterrent' does not suggest that the juror, or any juror, considered deterrence in deliberating. The court could reasonably have thought that the juror was saying only that society needs the option of extreme punishment for crimes as cruel as defendant's, and that she might have privately considered the same when deliberating, in which case subdivision (a) of Evidence Code section 1150 would have barred further inquiry. ( Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 59, 81 [137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d 1022].) We also address the question whether, in denying the motion to compel disclosure of jurors' addresses and telephone numbers, the court abused its discretion  the standard of review we believe should apply to such motions (see Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (a)(1)). It did not. Because the verdict was returned before Code of Civil Procedure 237 was enacted, we agree with the People that the substantive rule set forth in People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal. App.3d 541 [261 Cal. Rptr. 1] applies. Rhodes held that counsel for a convicted defendant is entitled to the list of jurors who served in the case, including addresses and telephone numbers, if the defendant sets forth a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial. ( Id. at pp. 551-552.) The trial court relied on Rhodes and ruled that none of its conditions had been met. It did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. Even if the juror's offhand purported comment, reportedly made after she was discharged from the jury, provided a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred ( id. at p. 552), defendant did not show the court that he had made diligent efforts ... to contact the jurors through other means ( ibid. ). He simply informed the court that because no juror had supplied the requested information during voir dire or on the jury questionnaire he had no way to contact the individual jurors ... without the court's assistance.