Opinion ID: 2163718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: attempt murder

Text: A Person attempts to commit a crime when he knowingly or intentionally engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the crime. The crime of Murder is defined by statute as follows: A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being commits Murder. To convict the Defendant of Attempt Murder, in this case, the State must have proved each of the following elements: 1. The Defendant knowingly 2. Engaged in conduct that constituted a substantial step toward the commission of 3. Knowingly killing another human being. The Defendant must have had the specific intent to commit Murder in order to be found guilty of Attempt Murder. Intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner reasonably calculated to cause death. The enumerated elements of the crime in this instruction were erroneous. Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind.1991). On the other hand, Yerden made no objection to the preliminary or final jury instructions on attempted murder. When the defendant objects to an erroneous instruction on the elements of attempted murder and the trial court fails to correct the instruction, the defendant is generally entitled to reversal. Greer v. State, 643 N.E.2d 324 (Ind.1994). Yerden seeks to avoid his default by asserting that the error was fundamental. To assess fundamental error claims of this sort, we look at the instructions as a whole to determine if they sufficiently informed the jury of the specific intent requirement for attempt. Id. If some other instruction adequately inform the jury that they must find that defendant had the intent to kill then there is no fundamental error. Beasley v. State, 643 N.E.2d 346 (Ind.1994). We find that the instruction, on the whole, adequately informed the jury that Yerden must have intended to kill Bergstresser. The last two sentences of the instruction state that Yerden must have had specific intent to commit murder.
The State charged Yerden separately for the crimes against Jayson Bergstresser and David McMahon, and the court scheduled two separate jury trials. Subsequently, the State moved to consolidate, pursuant to Indiana Code 35-34-1-10(b) (West Supp. 1996), on grounds that both causes were based on a series of connected acts or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. The trial court granted the consolidation, and Yerden filed an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Yerden v. State, No. 49A02-9404-CR-233, 643 N.E.2d 999 (Ind.Ct.App., Dec. 7, 1994). Yerden contends that the trial court abused its discretion in joining the offenses. The issue of consolidation is not available to be relitigated. The Court of Appeals decision regarding consolidation is now the law of the case. Avery v. State, 531 N.E.2d 1168 (Ind.1988).
Yerden next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on his interlocutory appeal. Specifically, Yerden targets the brief submitted to the Court of Appeals on interlocutory appeal and faults his counsel for (1) failing to argue that the defendant would be denied his right to testify in his own behalf since he may have wanted to testify in one case and not the other; (2) failing to show how prejudice would result by the new rules of evidence, particularly Rule 404; (3) and after the Court of Appeal's decision, failing to seek transfer to this Court. Yerden's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated under the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prevail, Yerden must show that (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel's performance the result would have been different. Id. at 687-96, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-69; Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1372 (Ind.1993). There is a strong presumption that counsel performance was not deficient, and that presumption must be overcome with strong and convincing evidence. Id. at 1372. Counsel has literally provided no argument, much less any cogent argument, explaining how the lawyer who took the interlocutory appeal performed below prevailing norms. A healthy majority of lawyers who lose before the Indiana Court of Appeals, for example, elect not to seek transfer. On the face of it, without any explanation, a lawyer who does not petition for transfer has simply performed according to the statistical norm. Yerden's ineffective assistance claim fails.
We affirm the trial court. DICKSON, SULLIVAN, BOEHM and SELBY, JJ., concur.