Opinion ID: 2547215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Possible Exculpatory Evidence in L.M.'s Psychotherapy Records.

Text: Appellant argues that the trial judge erred by refusing to provide to the defense certain portions of L.M.'s psychotherapy records. Both before and after he made the allegations against Appellant, L.M. had received counseling and treatment from several social services organizations. Upon Appellant's request, the trial judge reviewed L.M.'s psychotherapy records in camera and provided to the parties the documents that he believed to be exculpatory. At a status hearing, the defense counsel expressed surprise that the judge had returned so few documents and asked if the records had included information about L.M.'s abuse at the hands of his father, John. The judge explained that there was some information about John's abuse of L.M. but he did not believe it was relevant to the case against Appellant. The judge said the records contained information that John had been physically abusive toward L.M. when disciplining him, but that there was no indication that L.M. had been sexually abused by anyone other than Appellant. The judge said that much of the information about the physical abuse was from four to six years before, and that there was not much detail about the abuse. Appellant argues that the trial judge should have turned over all the information related to John's abuse of L.M. because it was exculpatory in that it explained L.M.'s motivation to fabricate the allegations against Appellant. Appellant's theory is that L.M.'s fear of his father led him to make up the allegations against Appellant to deflect attention and anger onto Appellant. Because John already had a tense relationship with Appellant, L.M. could have believed that John would focus his anger on Appellant rather than L.M. L.M. made the allegations against Appellant while he was at a psychiatric center; he had recently been accused of killing cats and dogs, and he had disclosed to his counselor that John had abused him. Appellant believes that the context in which L.M. first reported being sexually abused makes John's physical abuse of L.M. relevant. The Commonwealth responds that this theory about L.M.'s motivation does not make sense because L.M. did not want his father to know about the abuse. L.M. testified that he was afraid of what John would do when he found out about the abuse, and when L.M. told his stepmother about the abuse, he made her promise not to tell anyone. Thus, the Commonwealth argues, the information about John's physical abuse of L.M. is not exculpatory and the trial judge was correct in refusing to provide it to the parties. As a general matter, a psychotherapy patient has a privilege against disclosure of his confidential communications with his psychotherapist. KRE 507(b). In Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky.2003), this Court held that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to discover exculpatory evidence prevails over the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and so the parties must be given access to exculpatory information in a witness's psychotherapy records. But to preclude fishing expeditions into psychotherapy records, Barroso required a two-step process before evidence from the records may be turned over to the defense. Id. at 563-64. First, the defendant must produce `evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records contain exculpatory evidence.' Second, the trial court must conduct an in camera review to determine whether or not the records sought actually do contain such evidence. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. Bartlett, 311 S.W.3d 224, 227 (Ky.2010) (quoting Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563-64) (citation omitted). Here, neither party disputes that the trial judge followed the proper two-step procedure. The judge properly conducted the in camera review of the records and did find that some of the documents were exculpatory; he provided copies of those documents to the parties. The dispute here is whether the evidence about John's physical abuse of L.M. should be considered exculpatory. If it is exculpatory, the documents that discuss that abuse should have been included in the materials provided to the parties. Exculpatory evidence is defined as evidence favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 564. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-38, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (discussing the materiality standard); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289-96, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (same). Here, Appellant's theory of how John's abuse of L.M. resulted in L.M.'s motivation to accuse Appellant of sexual abuse is just too speculative and attenuated for the evidence to be exculpatory. Appellant's theory requires a series of assumptions about L.M.'s psychological motivations that are not supported by the evidence. It is mere speculation that L.M. would try to deflect John's anger by making up a story of sexual abuse perpetrated by Appellant. And as the Commonwealth points out, Appellant's argument that L.M. fabricated the allegations in order to focus his father's attention on Appellant rather than L.M. is belied by the fact that L.M. repeatedly told interviewersand testified in courtthat he did not want his father to know about the abuse. For these reasons, it is not clear that the evidence of John's abuse was favorable to the defense, and it certainly was not material to guilt or punishment; there is not a reasonable probability that, if the evidence from L.M.'s psychotherapy records about John's physical abuse had been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in finding that this information was not exculpatory and in declining to provide the documents to the parties.