Opinion ID: 531329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disbursement of Attorney's Fees and Costs

Text: 17 At no time during the underlying litigation did Swanger function as independent counsel to the plaintiffs' class. His involvement began as an employee of NJLC, and ended as an employee of PRLS. Thus, the attorney-client relationship existed between PRLS, NJLC and the plaintiffs' class. Cf. Shadis v. Beal, 692 F.2d 924 (3d Cir.1982) (holding that where an attorney is employed both by a legal services corporation and as an independent attorney, the attorney is entitled to separate compensation). Swanger is consequently entitled to compensation only from his employer, PRLS. 18 Of course, Swanger claims that his contract with PRLS is not enforceable because it was written in Spanish, a language which he did not understand, and that he had a valid attorney's lien over the award, pursuant to Missouri law. We need not address the merits of these arguments because Swanger has not brought a separate claim for relief against plaintiffs before this court. Moreover, we hold that the confutable merits of these claims are more appropriately the province of state court. 19 Our inquiry ends here. Swanger cannot meet the threshold requirement of standing because he has no authorization to appeal on behalf of the civil rights class plaintiffs. Moreover, section 1988 does not give him, as an attorney, an entitlement to receive, or appeal from an award of, attorney's fees. Finally, the propriety of the distribution of the award is an issue more appropriately addressed by state court. Thus, we need not address the seven causes of error which Swanger assigns, and dismiss his purported appeal. 20 Appeal dismissed. Costs in favor of appellees.