Opinion ID: 2982994
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Government’s Motion to Adjourn Trial

Text: Despite not having been formally adjourned, the trial in Case 2 did not begin on November 13, 2012. On November 28, 2012, two weeks after the scheduled trial date, the government filed a motion to adjourn the trial. In that motion, the government noted that it had sent a proposed stipulation for adjournment of trial to Mr. Daly, as was discussed during the October 2012 status conference. In response, Mr. Daly informed the government that it would take him a week to speak with his client. On January 8, 2013, the district court scheduled a hearing to address the government’s motion. ii. Richardson’s Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Two days after notice of the hearing was filed, on January 10, 2013, Richardson filed a motion to dismiss Case 2 with prejudice for violation of his right to a speedy trial. In his motion, Richardson argued that he was unaware of and had not consented to his previous attorney’s May 24, 2012 stipulation to adjourn the trial. Richardson also argued that the government was dilatory in delaying Richardson’s arraignment in Case 2 because he was already in their custody pending Case 1. Finally, Richardson argued that he was prejudiced by the death of two witnesses who were prepared to testify that they were involved in the robbery and that he was not. iii. Hearing on Motion to Dismiss on Speedy Trial Grounds At a subsequent hearing, the district court determined that, given the extent to which the trial delay was caused by Richardson’s “inabilities to get along with his lawyers [and] the filing of grievances . . . , there [was] really no way that this case could have proceeded to trial on the scheduled date.” (R. 65, Hearing Transcript, Page ID # 272.) At the hearing, Mr. Daly indicated that he would not have been prepared to go to trial on November 13, 2012 and focused his argument primarily on the time period between Richardson’s indictment and arraignment in Case 2. As to that period, the government conceded that it was partially to blame for the delay. The government explained that, because there had been ongoing informal conversations about Case 2 with Richardson’s first attorney in Case 1, it took the government some time to realize that Richardson had never been formally arraigned in Case 2. Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 9 The district court ultimately determined that Richardson did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the pre-arraignment delay, despite the government’s partial blame for causing it. Accordingly, the district court denied Richardson’s motion to dismiss the case and agreed to consolidate Case 1 and Case 2. The parties then agreed to an adjournment of the combined case and stipulated to a speedy trial exclusion. The court found the time between November 13, 2012 and February 5, 2013 to be excludable delay. d. Exclusion from February 5, 2013 to June 11, 2013 The district court entered an order on February 26, 2013 officially consolidating the two cases for the purposes of trial and setting a trial date for June 11, 2013. In that order, the district court found that the period of time between February 5, 2013 and June 11, 2013 was all excludable delay agreed to by the parties in order to provide Mr. Daly with sufficient time to prepare for trial. 2. Speedy Trial Act Claim The Speedy Trial Act “generally requires a federal criminal trial to begin within seventy days after a defendant is charged or makes an initial appearance . . . .” Brown, 498 F.3d at 529; 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). However, the Act provides for the exclusion of certain periods of delay from the calculation of these seventy days. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1). These exclusions include delays for pretrial motions and proceedings. Id. If, after accounting for all permissible exclusions, the seventy day deadline is not met, “the district court must dismiss the indictment, either with or without prejudice.” United States v. Monger, 879 F.2d 218, 220 (6th Cir. 1989). a. Starting Point for the Seventy Day Calculation The first determination that must be made in addressing Richardson’s Speedy Trial Act claim is the point in time at which the seventy day clock began to run. We have held that the Speedy Trial Act clock begins to run after a defendant’s indictment or after the defendant’s first court appearance, “whichever occurs later.” United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 717 (6th Cir. 2007). Richardson’s first court appearance related to Case 2 occurred after his indictment at his arraignment on April 5, 2012. The seventy day clock therefore began running after his arraignment. Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 10 b. Seventy Day Calculation Sixty days elapsed between the date of Richardson’s arraignment and the original June 4, 2012 trial date. As the above timeline indicates, all of the periods of delay between June 4, 2012 and November 13, 2012 were agreed to by the parties, both to facilitate potential pre-trial resolutions and to accommodate the replacement of defense counsel in both Case 2 and Case 1. The delay between November 13, 2012 and the June 11, 2013 trial date was also properly excluded from the speedy trial calculation in order to provide Richardson’s counsel with time to prepare for trial, as he had only recently been assigned to represent Richardson in Case 2. The district court appropriately granted the adjournment and exclusion requested by the government. Following the February 5, 2013 hearing, both parties agreed to a stipulation to exclude the period of time from the date of that hearing to the eventual trial date of June 11, 2013. Altogether, the stipulations and orders entered by the district court provide for proper Speedy Trial Act exclusions for the entire duration between the original trial date of June 4, 2012 and the actual trial date of June 11, 2013. Accordingly, only the initial sixty-day period between Richardson’s arraignment and the original June 4, 2012 trial date counted towards Richardson’s Speedy Trial Act calculation. His trial therefore began before the seventy day deadline had elapsed, and his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were not violated as a result of delay. 3. Sixth Amendment Claim The Sixth Amendment guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy trial and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. We have recognized that the right to a speedy trial is typically “trigger[ed] [by] the filing of an indictment.” United States v. Watford, 468 F.3d 891, 901 (6th Cir. 2006). In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Supreme Court established a four factor test for courts to employ when assessing whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. Under this test, courts consider and balance: the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530. “When a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, dismissal of the indictment is the only remedy even when it allows a Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 11 defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime to go free.” United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 667 (6th Cir. 2001). a. Length of Delay The “length of delay” factor constitutes a “triggering mechanism.” Id. at 667. “[I]f the delay is not uncommonly long, judicial examination ceases.” United States v. Robinson, 455 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2006). However, if this threshold requirement is met, it necessitates consideration of the remaining three factors. Id. As the government concedes, “[a] delay approaching one year is presumptively prejudicial.” Id. In this case, the nearly two year delay between Richardson’s indictment on July 12, 2011 and the start of his trial on June 11, 2013 necessitates a full consideration of the remaining Barker factors. b. Reason for the Delay In weighing the second Barker factor, “[t]he core task is determining which party shoulders the balance of blameworthiness for [the] delay.” O’Dell, 247 F.3d at 667. We have recognized that “[n]ot all delays are susceptible to equal blame.” United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2003). “[D]ifferent weights should be assigned to different reasons.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Where a government’s delay is motivated by “bad faith, harassment or attempts to seek a tactical advantage,” these reasons “weigh heavily against the government.” Schreane, 331 F.3d at 553. “A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered . . . .” Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Finally, “valid reasons for a delay weigh in favor of the government.” Robinson, 455 F.3d at 607. The resolution of pretrial motions is viewed as a “presumptively justifiable reason[]” for delay. O’Dell, 247 F.3d at 668. It is evident that Richardson, rather than the government, is responsible for much of the fourteen-month delay between his arraignment and trial. As has already been discussed, the delay between Richardson’s arraignment and trial was largely caused by his conflicts with his counsel, the subsequent appointment of new defense counsel, and both parties’ desire to seek pre-trial resolution that was dependent on separate proceedings in Case 1. Nos. 13-2655/2656 United States v. Richardson Page 12 However, with respect to the period of nearly nine months that elapsed between Richardson’s indictment on July 12, 2011 and his arraignment on April 5, 2012, the government is solely responsible. The government even conceded that this delay was partially caused by an oversight on its part. Nonetheless, a large portion of this period of delay appears to have been justifiable. When a defendant is in state, rather than federal, custody, it may be justifiable for the federal government to delay prosecution on federal charges. As we previously explained in Schreane: [T]o require the federal government to prosecute an accused before state proceedings have run their course would be to mire the state and federal systems in innumerable opposing writs, to increase inmate transportation back and forth between the state and federal systems with consequent additional safety risks and administrative costs, and generally to throw parallel federal and state prosecutions into confusion and disarray. 331 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). Until February 28, 2012, Richardson was in state custody, and the government needed to secure his presence by writ whenever he was needed in federal court for federal proceedings related to Case 1. Therefore, even if it was technically possible for the government to proceed with Richardson’s Case 2 arraignment while he was in state custody, it was not plainly improper for the government not to have done so. Consequently, the only period of delay for which the government is solely responsible and has no excusable justification is the period of just over a month from February 28, 2012, when Richardson was released to federal custody, to April 5, 2012, when he was finally arraigned. In sum, while Richardson and the government are both responsible for portions of the delay in bringing Richardson to trial, Richardson bears greater responsibility for it. Cf. O’Dell, 247 F.3d at 671 (finding a defendant’s “culpability with respect to delay” to be “at least equal to that of the government” where the defendant had filed multiple interlocutory appeals).