Opinion ID: 179075
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying the Common Sense Approach to Grob's Case

Text: Grob's prior act of criminal mischief is similar to disorderly conduct for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, even though, as in Reyes-Maya, 305 F.3d at 367, the statutory punishments for the crimes differ slightly. Under Montana law (1) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if the person knowingly or purposely: (a) injures, damages, or destroys any property of another or public property without consent; [or] (b) without consent tampers with property of another or public property so as to endanger or interfere with persons or property or its use;    (2) A person convicted of criminal mischief must be ordered to make restitution in an amount and manner to be set by the court.    (3) A person convicted of the offense of criminal mischief shall be fined not to exceed $1,500 or be imprisoned in the county jail for any term not to exceed 6 months, or both. If the offender commits the offense of criminal mischief and causes pecuniary loss in excess of $1,500, injures or kills a commonly domesticated hoofed animal, or causes a substantial interruption or impairment of public communication, transportation, supply of water, gas, or power, or other public services, the offender shall be fined an amount not to exceed $50,000 or be imprisoned in the state prison for a term not to exceed 10 years, or both. Mont.Code Ann. § 45-6-101(1)-(3). There is no federal definition of the crime of disorderly conduct, the closest offense to criminal mischief enumerated in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Therefore, we may look to either state law or the Model Penal Code for a definition of the crime. Lopez-Pastrana, 244 F.3d at 1028 n. 4 (citing Kemp, 938 F.2d at 1023-24 (examining disorderly conduct under Arizona law); and Martinez, 69 F.3d at 1001 (examining loitering under the Model Penal Code)). Under Montana law (1) A person commits the offense of disorderly conduct if the person knowingly disturbs the peace by: (a) quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting; (b) making loud or unusual noises; (c) using threatening, profane, or abusive language;    (i) creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose; or (j) transmitting a false report or warning of an impending explosion in a place where its occurrence would endanger human life. (2) Except as provided in subsection (3), a person convicted of the offense of disorderly conduct shall be fined not to exceed $100 or be imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed 10 days, or both. (3) A person convicted of a violation of subsection (1)(j) shall be fined not to exceed $1,000 or be imprisoned in the county jail for a term not to exceed 1 year, or both. Mont.Code Ann. § 45-8-101. [2] In Montana, the statutory punishment for committing criminal mischief can be, but need not be, more serious than the statutory punishment for disorderly conduct. In the ordinary case, a defendant convicted of disorderly conduct can be fined up to $100, imprisoned in the county jail for up to ten days, or both. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-101(2). In the most extreme case, if the conviction is for transmitting a false warning regarding the imminence of an explosion, a defendant can be fined up to $1,000, imprisoned for up to one year, or both. Id. § 45-8-101(3). In contrast, in the ordinary case, a defendant convicted of criminal mischief can be fined up to $1,500, imprisoned for up to six months, or both. Id. § 45-6-101(3). The statutory punishment rises to a fine of up to $50,000 and imprisonment of up to ten years if the defendant also causes more than $1,500 worth of damages, injures or kills a commonly domesticated hoofed animal, or causes a substantial interruption of various public services. Id. Nonetheless, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's observation that [m]ore important than the statutory range of punishments is the actual punishment given, as `[t]he level of punishment imposed for a particular offense serves as a reasonable proxy for the perceived severity of the crime.' Reyes-Maya, 305 F.3d at 367 (quoting Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 282); see also Booker, 71 F.3d at 689 (citing Kemp, 938 F.2d at 1023). Following Grob's prior conviction, the Flathead County Justice Court imposed a $130 fine and ordered Grob to pay an $80 court fee and $750 in restitution. [3] Grob's actual punishment for committing criminal mischief was thus very similar to the $100 fine that can be imposed on those convicted of disorderly conduct. By imposing such a light sentence, moreover, the Montana court deemed Grob's crime fairly minoran important consideration in applying the second factor in Application Note 12, the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment. See Reyes-Maya, 305 F.3d at 367; Booker, 71 F.3d at 689 & n.7; see also United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d 1113, 1115-16 (9th Cir.2009) (finding that a suspended prison sentence and two years probation indicates that the offense of which he was convicted was not regarded as serious). Such a minor punishment militates strongly in favor of treating the crime for purposes of [§ 4A1.2(c)] as akin to a relatively minor breach of the peace. Booker, 71 F.3d at 689-90. Next we consider the elements of the two offenses. As in Reyes-Maya, 305 F.3d at 367, a comparison of the elements of the prior offense with the elements of the exempted offense ... shows both similarity and difference. Criminal mischief under Montana law involves the knowing or purposeful injuring or destruction of property. Mont.Code Ann. § 45-6-101(1). Disorderly conduct involves the knowing disturbance of the peace in various ways, including by quarreling, fighting, making loud or unusual noises, using threatening, profane, or abusive language, or creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose. Id. § 45-8-101(1). That criminal mischief and disorderly conduct have some distinct elements, however, is not dispositive of the question of whether the offenses are similar for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. See Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 281. Indeed, in promulgating Application Note 12, the Sentencing Commission explicitly rejected the strict elements test under which courts determine similarity by comparing only the elements of two separate offenses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual supp. to app. C at 240 (2009). Especially where both offenses are crimes of generic definition that proscribe a great variety of activity, see Booker, 71 F.3d at 689, we instead focus on the actual offense conduct, see id. (citing Kemp, 938 F.2d at 1023), and on whether the enumerated offense covers the prior conduct. Grob's vandalism in 2000 could have been described (and prosecuted) as disturbing the peace by creating a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act that serves no legitimate purpose. See Mont.Code Ann. § 45-8-101(1)(i). Put another way, the Montana criminal mischief and disorderly conduct statutes can reach similar conduct, and in this case seem to do so. Cf. Montana v. Vukasin, 317 Mont. 204, 75 P.3d 1284 (2003) (addressing an appeal by a defendant convicted of both criminal mischief and disorderly conduct after breaking things and yelling in his apartment following a fight with his girlfriend). In considering the fourth factor in Application Note 12, we conclude that Grob's prior conviction for criminal mis-chief does not evidence a level of culpability suggesting dissimilarity with the minor offenses which are enumerated under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2. While, as the government argues, the fact that Grob's prior offense was motivated by a desire for revenge against his landlord may indicate a heightened level of culpability, we must examine the entire episode which led to the prior conviction. Reyes-Maya, 305 F.3d at 367 (citing United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir.1993)). We note that Grob committed this offense at the age of nineteen, and that it was his first conviction as an adult. Grob, moreover, fully cooperated with law enforcement by agreeing to answer questions and by confessing to the crime. Cf. id. at 367-68. (holding that failure to cooperate with the police was suggestive of both a greater degree of culpability and increased likelihood of future criminal conduct). Most importantly, the Flathead County Justice Court, having had the opportunity to observe Grob and review the factual basis of the underlying offense, imposed a light punishment by ordering Grob to pay a $130 fine and restitution to his landlord. This extremely light sentence ... suggests a low level of culpability and low predictive capacity for future criminality. See id. at 367; see also Booker, 71 F.3d at 690; Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 283. Finally, we conclude that Grob's prior conviction for criminal mischief, in isolation, does not evidence a strong likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. The government, assessing the situation with the benefit of hindsight, suggests that Grob's attempt to take revenge against his ex-girlfriend indicates that the prior acts of criminal mischiefin which he took revenge against his landlorddemonstrated a serious risk of recurring revenge-based criminal conduct. Like the Seventh Circuit, however, [w]e do not believe such a methodology is compatible with the approach mandated by § 4A1.2(c)(1). Booker, 71 F.3d at 690. Application Note 12 makes it clear that, rather than employing hindsight in light of the instant offense, when determining whether a prior offense demonstrated a risk of recurring criminal conduct, courts should look only to the circumstances present at the time of that prior offense. See id. Although it is true that Grob ultimately sent threatening messages to his ex-girlfriend indicating that he was seeking vengeance, the fact that at the age of nineteen he sought to get back at his landlord by vandalizing a rented house simply does not demonstrate that he was likely to engage in future revenge-based criminal conduct. To summarize: the punishment Grob received for his prior act of criminal mischief and the punishment he could have received for disorderly conduct are quite similar, as are his actual conduct in vandalizing the house in 2000 and the conduct covered by disorderly conduct. The minimal punishment Grob received for his act of criminal mischief, moreover, demonstrates that Grob's prior act was of similar perceived seriousness to disorderly conduct, and that his earlier vandalism did not indicate a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. We therefore conclude that, under these circumstances, criminal mischief under Montana law is similar to the enumerated offense of disorderly conduct within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c).