Opinion ID: 2071623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CMPA Exclusivity

Text: The CMPA establishes a merit personnel system that, among other things, provides for (1) employee performance ratings, including corrective actions when necessary; (2) employee discipline through adverse action proceedings; and (3) prompt handling of employee grievances. See D.C.Code §§ 1-615.1 to -615.5 and 1-617.1 to -617.3 (1992). [6] As a general rule, whether a public employee defends a corrective or adverse action by the employer, or initiates a grievance proceeding against the employer, the matter will be resolved either under detailed CMPA procedures or under a CMPA-sanctioned collective bargaining agreement. Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 625. In Thompson II we noted, after reviewing the purpose and text of the CMPA, that the Council of the District of Columbia intended the Act to address[] virtually every conceivable personnel issue among the District, its employees, and their unions with a reviewing role for the courts as a last resort, not a supplementary role for the courts as an alternative forum. 593 A.2d at 634. We concluded that the Council intended CMPA to provide District employees with their exclusive remedies for claims arising out of employer conduct in handling personnel ratings, employee grievances, and adverse actions. Id. at 635. The CMPA therefore implicitly preempts claims of wrongful treatment and injury cognizable as a personnel issue under the Act's performance ratings, adverse actions, and employee grievances provisions. King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 663 (D.C.1993). In Thompson II, Thompson, a former District employee, brought suit against the District and Alfred Maury, her supervisor, arising from an altercation between herself and Maury. The confrontation, which began with an exchange of angry words regarding the propriety of Thompson's allegedly excessive leave-taking, escalated to pushing and shoving. Following the incident, Maury discussed his side of the story with Sigrid Washington and June Sweeney, his superiors. He also wrote a memorandum to Washington describing the incident and recommending that Thompson be dismissed. A month after the incident, Thompson received a performance evaluation which rated her unsatisfactory. After her termination, Thompson filed a complaint in Superior Court alleging that Maury's actions constituted assault and battery, and that his subsequent statements describing the incident were defamatory. She further alleged that his actions constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress. A jury awarded Thompson damages on each claim. We reversed on appeal, holding that Thompson's tort claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress arose out of disputes with her supervisor that clearly fall within the scope of CMPA §§ 1-615.1 to -615.5 and §§ 1-617.1 to -617.3. [7] 593 A.2d at 635. We concluded that the supervisor's actions constituted personnel evaluation decisions and disciplinary actions fitting squarely within the text and purpose of the CMPA's administrative review and grievance procedures. As a result, Thompson was precluded from litigating those claims in Superior Court. Here, Moss' statements, like Maury's, fell within the ambit of the CMPA. The defamatory remarks clearly arose out of Moss' conduct in handling personnel evaluation decisions and disciplinary actions as contemplated by the CMPA. His statements regarding Stockard's deficient job performance were offered in explanation of why her status as basketball coach was being terminated through nonrenewal of her contract, in a sense an adverse action. [8] We see no meaningful distinctions between the defamation in Thompson II and that in this case. We see little of consequence to the fact that Moss' statements were oral, while Maury's statements were both oral and written. Nor does the fact that Moss' statements were directed to others with a direct interest in the event remove them from the realm of performance evaluation. In Thompson II, we found remarks made outside the formal process sufficient to constitute a personnel evaluation decision. The dispute regarding Moss' statements in any realistic sense clearly related to a personnel issue as contemplated by the Act and was cognizable by the applicable grievance procedures. [9] The Act defines a grievance broadly as encompassing any matter under the control of the District government which impairs or adversely affects the interest, concern, or welfare of employees. D.C.Code § 1-603.1(10). The Act directs the Trustees of the University to issue rules and regulations providing procedures for the prompt handling of employee grievances. D.C.Code § 1-617.2(a). Stockard argues for the first time in her reply brief that she would have been unable to bring her grievance under the applicable University regulations. It is the longstanding policy of this court not to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. District of Columbia v. Patterson, 667 A.2d 1338, 1346 n. 18 (D.C.1995); Bingham v. Goldberg, Marchesano, Kohlman, 637 A.2d 81, 95 n. 34 (D.C.1994). However, the argument appears to lack merit in any event. UDC's grievance procedures are set forth in detail in chapter 16 of Title 8 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations, and provide in the introductory paragraph that they shall be utilized by all University employees for the resolution of conflict, the prompt and equitable relief of personal concerns, and the redress of grievances. 8 DCMR § 1600.1 (1988). Certain categories of grievances are specifically excluded from the procedures, such as complaints of discrimination covered under the Human Rights regulations. § 1600.2. Stockard does not contend that her grievance would be barred as falling into any of these enumerated categories. Instead, her argument centers upon § 1600.3, which provides that [a] grievance may consist of a complaint of dissatisfaction or dispute concerning the following: (a) The interpretation or application of University policies or procedures; (b) A claimed violation, misrepresentation, or misapplication of University rules or applicable law; or (c) A failure to act pursuant to the policies and practices of the University or other applicable policies and practices. 8 DCMR § 1600.3 (1988) (emphasis added). We need not decide the question of whether Stockard's defamation claim fits squarely within § 1600.3 because we read this section as an illustrative but not exhaustive list of grievable complaints. The word may is permissive rather than mandatory. The opening provision of the University's grievance regulations, quoted above, is itself expansive in stating the intended coverage. § 1600.1. Moreover, the broad scope of grievable complaints as defined in the statute, see D.C.Code § 1-603.1(10), and the intention that the Act address virtually every conceivable personnel issue, Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 634, militate in favor of this reading. Consequently, we conclude that Stockard would have been entitled to initiate grievance proceedings under the CMPA. [10] As we noted in Thompson II, the remedies available under the CMPA are substantial and may, in some respects, afford more complete relief than the damage remedies available at common law. 593 A.2d at 635. D.C.Code § 1-617.2(a) requires that the grievance system provide for the expeditious adjustment of grievances and complaints and the prompt taking of appropriate corrective action when the complaint or grievance is, upon review, found to be justified. Also, the CMPA defines the Office of Employee Appeals' power to grant relief broadly, permitting it to uphold, reverse, or modify the decision of the agency and to take corrective or remedial action. D.C.Code §§ 1-606.3(b), -617.3(b). Furthermore, the CMPA does not require an employee to overcome the qualified immunity of government officials as would be required in a common law damage action, and CMPA procedures may be speedier and less costly than litigation. Thompson II, supra, 593 A.2d at 635 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 391, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 2418, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring)). In sum, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that the CMPA provides the exclusive remedy for claims falling within its ambit and compels Stockard to pursue her grievance in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Act. [11]