Opinion ID: 2168065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Issue With Respect to Taft's Alleged Negligence.

Text: A determination of this issue requires a review of the pertinent evidence. The accident occurred on a clear, warm afternoon in late June. The traveled portion of the highway is surfaced with blacktop with a marked center line and runs in a general easterly and westerly direction. A bathing-beach area along the north shore of Silver lake extends along the south side of the road, while to the north stands a building, housing a roller-skating rink. To the west of the scene of the accident is a hill over which the highway passes. Witnesses estimated the distance from the crest of the hill to the point of impact was from 165 to 400 feet. At the time of the accident Patricia Mack was fifteen years of age and Decker was several years her senior. For a quarter to half a mile prior to the accident the Decker motorcycle, on which Miss Mack was a passenger, had been following the Taft automobile. Both were going in an easterly direction. As the Taft car went over the crest of the hill the motorcycle was 200 to 300 feet to its rear. No witness placed the speed of either vehicle from this time to the occurrence of the collision at more than 20 to 25 miles per hour. Slightly west of the top of the hill are two traffic signs for vehicles proceeding in an easterly direction. The first read Slow Pedestrian Crossing while the second read No Parking on Highway. The Slow Pedestrian Crossing sign obviously referred to the beach area where the accident occurred, although there does not appear to have been a marked crosswalk there. Taft testified: As he came over the crest of the hill he saw two small children, whom he described as toddlers, on the south portion of the roadway, proceeding northerly. He gradually brought his car to a stop about 10 feet from the point where these children were crossing. In the meantime, another small child had come onto the south portion of the roadway followed by a lady. The latter child was directly in the path of the car when the collision occurred. The first point in time at which he was aware of the approach of the motorcycle was when he heard a screech made by the application of the motorcycle's brakes. He then looked in his rearview mirror and saw the motorcycle coming directly at his car. He estimated that the collision occurred anywhere from twenty-five to forty seconds after he brought his car to a stop, and that it is possible it could be longer than that. It is undisputed that application of the car's brakes activated the rear lights. Taft's version of the accident is corroborated by the disinterested witnesses. One of these was the beach lifeguard who at the time was seated at a picnic table close by. All witnesses, including Miss Mack and Decker, testified that Taft had stopped his car in his own traffic lane. The north half of the roadway was completely open and there was no traffic approaching from the opposite direction. Decker testified that prior to the collision he had glanced across the lake to look at a radio tower. He then looked back at the road but did not realize Taft's car was stopped until he was 50 to 75 feet away. He then slammed on his brakes and tried to go around the right of the stopped car. The rear of the motorcycle swerved to the left or north and went forward sidewise, striking the right rear bumper of Taft's car. In other testimony Decker stated that when he looked back after glancing at the radio tower he did not know whether the Taft car was then moving, and did not know how the car was brought to a stop. He positively testified, however, that he did observe that there was nothing there in front of Taft's car. The police officer who investigated the accident testified that Decker stated after the accident that: He [Decker] was traveling east on County Trunk BZ at approximately twenty, twenty-five miles an hour when he was looking across the lake at a radio tower, and all of a sudden he looked back and here this car stopped in front of him. He applied his brakes and tried to swerve to the right to go around him [the Taft car] but struck the bumper of the car. Patricia Mack testified as follows: She saw the Taft car ahead of the motorcycle for about one-half mile before the accident. The car disappeared over the hill, and she glanced at a radio tower across the lake. When she again looked back, the Taft car was still in motion 30 to 50 feet ahead, but its rear taillights (those activated by the brakes) were on. It stopped real quick. She also saw a lady and some children on the right or south gravel shoulder of the road but no pedestrians were then crossing the road. Patricia Mack also testified that: Decker slammed on the brakes of the motorcycle and that it started to skid. Miss Mack was thrown off as the motorcycle slid into Taft's stopped car. She places the scene of the accident about 400 feet east of the crest of the hill. It is conceded by the parties that if Taft stopped his car on the south half of the paved portion of the highway because of children then crossing or attempting to cross the highway, such momentary stopping would not violate secs. 346.51 (1) [1] and 346.53, [2] Stats. These parking statutes were not intended to cover a motorist stopping under such circumstances. Reuhl v. Uszler (1949), 255 Wis. 516, 524, 39 N. W. (2d) 444. See also, 2A, Blashfield, Cyc. Automobile Law and Practice (perm. ed.), p. 398, sec. 1495. The great weight of the evidence is to the effect that Taft did stop his car and remained stopped because of the presence of children crossing and about to cross the highway. Such evidence alone would preclude a finding of negligent stopping on Taft's part. Both Decker and Patricia Mack, however, testified that there were no children on the roadway in the path of the Taft car at the time Taft stopped, although Patricia Mack admitted seeing a lady and some children on the south shoulder. The credibility of the parties' testimony was for the jury. If the jury believed this testimony, a jury issue was then presented as to whether Taft violated secs. 346.51 and 346.53, Stats., in stopping on the highway. The applicable test is whether a man of ordinary prudence similarly situated would reasonably conclude that the safety of the children present in the immediate area required that he then stop his car. If he would not so reasonably conclude, then the act of stopping violated these statutes and constituted negligence. Even a temporary stop may constitute a violation of these statutes. Jeffers v. Peoria-Rockford Bus Co. (1957), 274 Wis. 594, 80 N. W. (2d) 785, and Vidakovic v. Campbell (1956), 274 Wis. 168, 79 N. W. (2d) 806. Appellants urge that there is no evidence in the record that sec. 346.51, Stats., was applicable because of the absence of any testimony establishing that the accident occurred outside of a business or residence district. [3] Our review of the evidence discloses sufficient proof that it did occur outside of both a business district and a residence district. Therefore, we conclude that this court cannot hold that there was no credible evidence to support the jury's finding that Taft was negligent in stopping his car where he did even though this court might not have so found, had it been the trier of fact.