Opinion ID: 1088560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the court erred in refusing the defendant a change of venue and/or a continuance.

Text: Appellant's motion for change of venue was not accompanied by the two supporting affidavits as required by statute. Nevertheless, a hearing on the motion was conducted. The motion was initially overruled but the trial court reserved a final ruling until after voir dire of the jury. Prior to the beginning of the trial, the trial court moved venue to adjacent Harrison County, to which appellant again objected. After voir dire and impaneling of the jury, the motion was finally overruled. The trial court would have been correct in withholding its ruling on the motion for change of venue based on the failure to provide the two statutory affidavits. However, there is ample authority in our jurisprudence that once the trial court proceeds to a hearing on the motion and takes evidence that this Court may review his findings on appeal. Gentry v. State, 416 So.2d 650 (Miss. 1982); Gilliard v. State, 428 So.2d 576 (Miss. 1983); Fabian v. State, 267 So.2d 294 (Miss. 1972); Wilson v. State, 234 So.2d 303 (Miss. 1970). This is particularly true in light of Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-105, Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360 (Miss. 1978), and Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216 (Miss. 1982), which require heightened review in capital cases. The rule has become well established that, The granting of a change of venue is a matter so largely in discretion [sic] of the trial court that a judgment of conviction will not be reversed on appeal on the ground that a change of venue was refused, unless it clearly appears that trial [sic] court abused its discretion. Parks v. State, 267 So.2d 302, 304 (Miss. 1972), quoting Dalton v. State, 141 Miss. 841, 846, 105 So. 784, 785 (1925). See also, Daumer v. State, 381 So.2d 1014 (Miss. 1980); Saucier v. State, 328 So.2d 355 (Miss. 1976). This Court has further expounded upon the requirements of Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-15-35 (1972). For instance, in Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830 (Miss. 1981), the Court quoted Shelton v. State, 156 Miss. 612, 620, 126 So. 390, 393 (1930). Where the testimony is to the effect that the people of the county have not prejudged the defendant's case, and that there is no prejudice against the accused, and the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors shows that a fair proportion of the jurors of the county are qualified for service in the case, it is not error for the trial judge to overrule a motion for a change of venue. 402 So.2d at 837. And, in Parks v. State, supra , this Court, noting that the trial judge had developed evidence the majority of which indicated that the defendant could receive a fair trial, stated, The trial judge in the case at bar had the opportunity to view the prospective jurors, watch their demeanor and form an opinion as to whether or not a fair trial could be given in the county. While it is true the appellant introduced affidavits of a number of people who testified that they did not believe a fair trial was possible, Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 128 So.2d 341 (1961) in quoting from Shelton v. State, 156 Miss. 612, 126 So. 390 (1930), states as follows: The court must look to all the attendant facts and circumstances and should not and will not reverse a trial judge in the exercise of his discretion if a fair proportion of the jurors examined can give the defendant a fair trial (240 Miss. at 465, 128 So.2d at 344). It is our opinion that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion; therefore, we will not overrule his decision. 267 So.2d at 304. Finally, in deciding whether the trial judge has so abused his discretion this Court will look to the completed trial including the voir dire examination of the jurors to ascertain if the defendants have received a fair and impartial trial. Franklin v. State, 189 Miss. 142, 158-59, 196 So. 787, 789 (1940); Stevenson v. State, 325 So.2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1975). The record reflects that the trial court gave two reasons for the move to Harrison County. One, that it would be far more convenient to try the matter in Harrison County where there is a continuous court term as opposed to the 10-week term in Hancock County. Two, it was felt by the trial court that 12 jurors could be selected from the larger Harrison County. The trial court reserved ruling until the jury was selected. On November 15, 1982, a hearing was conducted on the motion for continuance which was filed because of, among other things, the Biloxi jail fire. Appellant contends that this fire, along with the John Hinckley acquittal on the grounds of insanity, would make it impossible to receive a fair trial. This motion was denied. That the trial court might better have moved the trial further away from Hancock County is not the issue before us. The question is, Did the trial court's refusal to grant another change of venue from Harrison County deprive this defendant of the right to have his case fairly and impartially tried and uninfluenced by the preponderant sentiment of the community? Upon a review of the entire record of this proceeding, we cannot say that the trial court abused his discretion in refusing to grant an additional change of venue from Harrison County. Billiot was not flung to the lions. The second assignment of error is without merit.