Opinion ID: 2442245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Identity of the Confidential Informant

Text: Prior to trial, the Reyeses moved the trial court to require disclosure of the name and address of the confidential informant used for the controlled buy because this knowledge was essential to the preparation of an adequate defense. The trial court took the motion under advisement and asked for briefs. No ruling was made. At trial, defense counsel in opening statement referred to the frame job by the confidential informant who had rented the room. He then renewed his motion during his cross-examination of Detective Alexander. When counsel began asking Detective Alexander about Carl Jones's involvement in the crime, the prosecution objected to any questions pertaining to whether he was the confidential informant. The record reflects the following colloquy in a sidebar conference: PROSECUTOR: I think the Officer is going to state in response to that question that the investigation determined it was not Carl Jones' cocaine, and that he had denied that he had placed the cocaine in there. We have no objections to that question being asked and being answered like that, but I do not want to get into a rule 509 issue about his actual identity, the informant, so with the Court's permission, with the defense being present, I'd like to go over and tell the officer to answer that question with a truthful answer, that they did interview him and that he denied that he'd placed the cocaine. DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have no doubt he denied it. THE COURT: I'm going to let you ask him, but I want you to stay away from this confidential aspect, but you can ask him. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Then, I would like to renew my motion for disclosure of confidential informant. This has very great bearing on the defense of my clients. I'd like to renew my motion. PROSECUTOR: I'm going to let him ask questions, and there'll be honest answers, but I'm not going to let him get in to reveal who the informant is. THE COURT: O.K., go ahead. The motion to disclose was never made again. The first question presented is whether this point is barred from appellate review. It is blackletter law that the appealing party must obtain a ruling in order to preserve an argument for appeal and that the failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 327 Ark. 339, 939 S.W.2d 811 (1997); Burton v. State, 327 Ark. 65, 937 S.W.2d 634 (1997). We conclude that while the trial court's ruling could have been more precise, the issue before the trial court was obvious, and the trial court decided it adversely to the Reyeses. Turning to the merits, we discussed the confidential informant privilege in Hill v. State, 314 Ark. 275, 280, 862 S.W.2d 836, 839 (1993): [D]isclosure shall not be required of an informant's identity where his identity is a prosecution secret, and a failure to disclose will not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the defendant. Rovario [Roviaro] v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 [77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639] (1957). When the disclosure of the informant's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. Id. at 60-61 [77 S.Ct. at 628] In determining whether the privilege shall prevail, the trial court must balance the public interest in getting needed information against the individual's right to assert a defense. The trial court must consider the crime charged, the possible defenses, the significance of the informant's testimony, and any other relevant factors. Id. at 62 [77 S.Ct. at 629]. The burden is upon the defendant to show that the informant's testimony is essential to his defense. West v. State, 255 Ark. 668, 501 S.W.2d 771 (1973). Id. See also Ark. R.Crim. P. 17.5(b); Ark. R. Evid. 509. This court has held repeatedly that trial courts do not abuse their discretion in denying requests to reveal the identity of a confidential informant when the defendant is merely charged with possession of a controlled substance, and when the informant's involvement supplied only a lead to the officers and provided information leading to the issuance of a search warrant. See, e.g., Heard v. State, 316 Ark. 731, 876 S.W.2d 231 (1994); Sanchez v. State, 288 Ark. 513, 707 S.W.2d 310 (1986); Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415, 688 S.W.2d 718 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945, 106 S.Ct. 311, 88 L.Ed.2d 288 (1985); Jackson v. State, 283 Ark. 301, 675 S.W.2d 820 (1984); Robillard v. State, 263 Ark. 666, 566 S.W.2d 735 (1978); Brothers v. State, 261 Ark. 64, 546 S.W.2d 715 (1977). In the case before us, the Reyeses were not charged with delivery of a controlled substance which would have directly involved the confidential informant who bought the cocaine with marked bills, but only with possession with intent to deliver. Hence, the confidential informant did not directly participate in the crime though his involvement led to the search warrant. Still, the Reyeses maintain that knowing the identity of the confidential informant was essential to their defense that Carl Jones, who had reserved Room 28, had framed them. The facts in Hill v. State, supra , are instructive. There, Hill was charged with manufacturing or possessing with intent to manufacture a controlled substance. Hill's defense was that he was entrapped by an individual named Ronnie Prescott, who purportedly offered him $10,000 to manufacture an illegal chemical and who, he suspected, was the confidential informant. Evidence elicited at trial from law enforcement officers proved that Prescott was working generally for them as an informant though that work was never tied specifically to the Hill case. The trial court declined to order the prosecution to reveal the name of the confidential informant, and this court concluded as follows: In sum, the trial court's rulings regarding disclosure of whomever might have been the informant were correct. However, the ruling was in error when appellant's counsel limited the request to disclosure of whether Ronnie Prescott was the informant and it had already been shown that disclosure might be a substantial factor in his defense. Hill v. State, 314 Ark. at 281, 862 S.W.2d at 839. The case at hand is distinguishable from Hill v. State, supra , in that the proper motion was never made by the defense. Here, there was evidence before the jury that Carl Jones reserved Room 28 in his name and the testimony by Basilio Reyes indicating that the tall man had orchestrated the brothers' arrest. Indeed, defense counsel argued to the jury that Carl Jones was the true culprit in all of this. We have some doubts that additional evidence establishing Carl Jones as the confidential informant was a substantial factor in the Reyeses' defense when possession of contraband with intent to deliver was the charge. But, more importantly, the Reyeses failed to move for disclosure that Carl Jones was the confidential informant. This they were required to do under Hill v. State, supra . Because the proper motion was never made, we find no error by the trial court on this point. With regard to Rogelio Reyes, the record has been reviewed pursuant to S.Ct. Rule 4-3(h) for other reversal error, and none has been found. Affirmed. GLAZE, J., joins in the opinion but concurs on point III.