Opinion ID: 2298131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Veterans' Disability Benefits

Text: The petitioner first argues that federal law precludes the trial court from counting his monthly veterans' disability benefits as income for alimony purposes. RSA 458:19 (Supp.2011) authorizes a trial court to award alimony if: (1) the party in need lacks sufficient income, property, or both, including property apportioned in accordance with RSA 458:16-a, to provide for such party's reasonable needs, taking into account the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; (2) the party from whom alimony is sought is able to meet reasonable needs while meeting those of the party seeking alimony, taking into account the style of living to which the parties have become accustomed during the marriage; and (3) the party in need is unable to be self-supporting through appropriate employment at a standard of living that meets reasonable needs. In determining the amount of alimony, a trial court must consider: the length of the marriage; the age, health, social or economic status, occupation, amount and sources of income, the property awarded under RSA 458:16-a, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties; the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income; the fault of either party as defined in RSA 458:16-a, II( l ); and the federal tax consequences of the order. RSA 458:19, IV(b). RSA 458:19, IV(c) expressly allows trial courts to consider veterans' disability benefits collected by either or both parties to the extent permitted by federal law when determining amount and sources of income. The petitioner contends that 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) (2006) precludes the trial court from considering his veterans' disability benefits as income for alimony purposes. Section 5301(a)(1) provides that federal veterans' disability benefits shall be exempt from the claim of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary. The petitioner argues that because the amount of income available to [him] ... from alternative sources is insufficient to cover the amount of the alimony payments, the trial court's alimony order effects an attachment, levy, or seizure of his veterans' disability benefits. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1). The petitioner's contention is contrary to the governing law. See In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill.App.3d 144, 297 Ill.Dec. 795, 838 N.E.2d 282, 299 (2005). An overwhelming majority of courts have held that [federal veterans'] disability payments may be considered as income in awarding spousal support. Urbaniak v. Urbaniak, 807 N.W.2d 621, 626 (S.D.2011) (quotation omitted). These courts conclude that federal law does not prohibit an award of alimony against a spouse receiving military disability pay and, once alimony is awarded, federal law will not relieve the paying spouse from paying such alimony obligations, even if most of the veteran's income consists of military disability benefits.  Id. (emphasis added); see Morales and Morales, 230 Or.App. 132, 214 P.3d 81, 85 (2009); Youngbluth v. Youngbluth, 188 Vt. 53, 6 A.3d 677, 687 n. 3 (2010); Annotation, Enforcement of Claim for Alimony or Support, or for Attorneys' Fees and Costs Incurred in Connection Therewith, Against Exemptions, 52 A.L.R.5th 221, 372 (1997) (With few exceptions, the cases hold that payments arising from service in the Armed Forces ..., though exempt as to the claims of ordinary creditors, are not exempt from a claim for alimony, support, or maintenance....). In so concluding, courts have relied upon Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct. 2029, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987). The issue in Rose was whether a state court had jurisdiction to hold a disabled veteran in contempt for failing to pay child support when federal veterans' disability benefits were the veteran's only means of satisfying his obligation. Rose, 481 U.S. at 621-22, 107 S.Ct. 2029. The veteran argued that federal law conflicted with and, thus, preempted state statutes that purport to give state courts jurisdiction over veterans' disability benefits. Id. at 625, 107 S.Ct. 2029. The Court disagreed. Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. 2029. One of the federal provisions upon which the veteran relied was the precursor to section 5301(a). Id. at 630, 107 S.Ct. 2029; see Marriage of Strong v. Strong, 300 Mont. 331, 8 P.3d 763, 770 (2000). After reviewing the legislative history of the provision, the Court held that [veterans'] disability benefits were never intended to be exclusively for the subsistence of the beneficiary. Marriage of Strong, 8 P.3d at 770; see Rose, 481 U.S at 634, 107 S.Ct. 2029. Rather, they were intended to support the veteran's family as well. Rose, 481 U.S. at 634, 107 S.Ct. 2029. Accordingly, to recognize an exception to the statute's prohibition against attachment, levy, or seizure in the child support context would further, not undermine, the federal purpose in providing these benefits. Id. The Court ruled, therefore, that regardless of the merit of the distinction between the moral imperative of family support obligations and the businesslike justifications for community property division, ... [the statute] does not extend to protect a veteran's disability benefits from seizure where the veteran invokes that provision to avoid an otherwise valid order of child support. Id. Courts have used the logic of Rose  to hold that a state court is clearly free to consider post-dissolution disability income and order a disabled veteran to pay spousal support even where disability benefits will be used to make such payments. Marriage of Strong, 8 P.3d at 770 (quotation and brackets omitted). These courts have held that the anti-attachment provisions of section 5301(a)(1) do not shield a veteran's benefits from being considered in an alimony or maintenance proceeding because a spouse seeking maintenance is not a `creditor' under the statute but is instead seeking family support. In re Marriage of Wojcik, 297 Ill.Dec. 795, 838 N.E.2d at 300. These authorities provide a compelling basis for concluding that a trial court may consider a former spouse's present and anticipated disability benefits as income for alimony purposes. Id., 297 Ill.Dec. 795, 838 N.E.2d at 301. The petitioner argues that Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989), requires a different result. We disagree. In Mansell, the court concluded that a different federal statute precludes state courts from treat[ing] as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans' disability benefits. Mansell, 490 U.S. at 587 n. 6, 594-95, 109 S.Ct. 2023. The petitioner's argument is based upon an overly broad interpretation of Mansell. The federal question in Mansell was a narrow one: Whether federal law preempts the application of state community property laws to military retirement pay. Morales and Morales, 214 P.3d at 85 (quotation, brackets, ellipsis and emphasis omitted). In other words, Mansell limits a state court's ability to treat military retirement pay that a retiree has waived in order to receive veterans' disability benefits as property that can be divided on the dissolution of a marriage. Id. [N]early every state court that has addressed th[e] question has concluded that Mansell affects property division, not spousal support. Id. The petitioner's argument conflates the consideration of disability benefits for property division purposes with their consideration to determine alimony. Youngbluth, 6 A.3d at 687 n. 3.