Opinion ID: 1443815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Double Jeopardy Clause

Text: The United States Constitution provides that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . [7] As a constitutional principle, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against: (1) successive prosecutions; (2) multiple charges under separate statutes; and (3) being charged multiple times under the same statute. [8] According to Nance, his four convictions violate the prohibition against multiple charges under separate statutes. When evaluating whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated because a person has been charged under two separate statutes for one act, [t]he question is whether, both sections being violated by the same act, the accused committed two offenses or only one. [9] To determine this, the Court must look at whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. [10] When determining whether the statutory provisions require different factual proof, the general assumption is the legislature ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. However, that rule of construction gives way in the face of clear legislative intent to the contrary. [11] Thus, the primary inquiry must be one of statutory construction and whether there exists clearly expressed legislative intent to impose multiple punishments. [12] The statute at issue in Nance's appeal is title 11, section 1447 of the Delaware Code, Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, which states (a) a person who is in the possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony is guilty of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony. [13] Nance contends that the two underlying felonies in this case, Possession With Intent to Deliver Cocaine, and Possession With Intent to Deliver Marijuana, should be consolidated as one underlying offense for the charge of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony because the conduct was the same. In other words, the possession of two different types of drugs should not matter; only that Nance was in possession of a controlled substance. Nance mistakenly relies on Williams v. State [14] to support his contention that the trial judge should have only considered one drug conviction when calculating the weapons' charges. In Williams, this Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibited two separate convictions for Possession With Intent to Deliver when only one statute was violated because both convictions involved the same drug, cocaine, and the acts occurred within one place with one intended purpose. [15] Nance correctly acknowledges that the primary difference between Williams and the present case is that here two drug statutes were violated because Nance possessed two different types of drugs, and in Williams only one statute was violated. This difference is dispositive. The promulgation of two drug statutes is a clear indication that the legislature intended there to be two separate punishments for the two acts. Thus, calculating the weapons' charges using Nance's two drug convictions is not a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In this appeal, Nance concedes that charging him for two separate drug felonies does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Nance also concedes that he can receive separate convictions for each gun in his possession, even though the conduct was essentially the same and the only distinguishing factor was the separate gun. In two previous, similar cases, Robertson v. State, [16] and Pauls v. State, [17] this Court concluded that the legislative intent of section 1447 was to provide separate convictions for a deadly weapon offense for each felony the defendant committed while in possession of a deadly weapon. [18] In both Pauls and Robertson, the defendants argued that section 1447 should not be read to impose one count for each weapon possessed during each felony. [19] The defendants in Pauls and Robertson contended that if there were only two guns involved, then there should only be two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony, regardless of the number of felonies they committed. In both Pauls and Robertson, this Court held that charging the defendants with multiple counts of weapons' offenses was consistent with the purpose of the statute, which is to deter the use of a deadly weapon while committing a felony because the use of a weapon increases the likelihood of harm to the victim. [20] We have concluded that Nance's argument, that the two underlying drug felonies should converge as one for the purposes of calculating the number of weapons' violations of section 1447, is contrary to the legislative intent as previously determined in Pauls and Robertson. The purpose of the statute is to deter the use of deadly weapons during the commission of a felony. Therefore, combining the underlying separate drug felonies to reduce the number of convictions for weapons possession would directly contradict the statute's purpose and the legislative intent. The statute's unambiguous language supports the multiplication of counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony by both the number of weapons as well as the number of separate underlying felonies. The Superior Court correctly held that the two separate drug felonies each resulted in two separate weapons charges. Therefore, Nance's four sentences for Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause protections in the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that there was no error and a fortiori there was no plain error.