Opinion ID: 1695578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: elimination of the ravenswood u-turn

Text: Similarly, we agree with the district court that DOT's elimination of the Ravenswood U-turn did not sufficiently impair the petitioners' access to S.R. 84 to constitute a compensable taking. [2] In resolving this issue, the district court correctly relied on Division of Administration v. Capital Plaza, Inc., 397 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1981). Accord Merit Oil, Inc. v. State, 123 N.H. 280, 461 A.2d 96 (1983). In Capital Plaza, DOT acquired, through condemnation, a strip of land owned by Capital Plaza, to use in widening a two-lane road. After reconstruction, the road had six lanes and was divided by a raised four-foot-wide median. Due to the median, northbound drivers could no longer turn across traffic and directly into Capital's service station. Capital Plaza, 397 So.2d at 683. At issue was whether the construction of the median resulted in a compensable loss of access to the service station. We held that the construction of the median did not constitute a compensable loss of access, because a land owner has no property right in the continuation or maintenance of traffic flow past his property. Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, the district court stated: Capital Plaza is strikingly similar to this case in that the concrete barriers installed in this case only affected the accessibility of traffic going in one direction, just as the median did in Capital Plaza, in which the supreme court pointed out that the service station still had free, unimpeded access... albeit only by southbound traffic. On the other hand, the construction of the median in Capital Plaza had less of an effect on access to the service station, since it was located at an intersection than the rerouting of traffic did to these property owners. ... We also find it difficult to distinguish Capital Plaza since the median in Capital Plaza and the concrete barriers erected here were similar in that they affected the access of traffic in one direction only. We therefore conclude that there was no taking of access. Rubano, 636 So.2d at 752 (footnote omitted). In short, the district court held that a taking does not occur when the government merely limits direct access to one's property from one side of a two-way roadway adjacent to the property. We agree and conclude that, because our holding in Tessler did not invalidate or otherwise disturb the holding and reasoning of Capital Plaza, the district court was correct in applying the reasoning of Capital Plaza to this situation.