Opinion ID: 2447872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of Allowed Bias Cross-Examination

Text: Appellant argues that the court's limitations on his cross-examination of Grady  essentially preventing him from examining Grady regarding his previous juvenile cases, probationary status, and recent arrest  impermissibly prevented his exploration of a potential source of bias. The government argues that, to the contrary, appellant was given sufficient opportunity to cross-examine Grady's potential bias under our case law. It is well established that the complete denial of the opportunity to cross-examine a witness as to bias denies a defendant his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. See Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431; Davis, supra, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347. The Supreme Court has described this type of cross-examination as aimed at revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand and has stated that such examination is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (citing 3AJ. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 940, at 775 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). In Van Arsdall and Davis, the Supreme Court found reversible error where the trial court prevented all inquiry into the possibility that a key witness would be biased toward the government. 475 U.S. at 679-80, 106 S.Ct. 1431; 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In Van Arsdall, appellant was unable to question a key witness about a charge for public drunkenness that was dismissed, and arguably may have furnished the witness a motive for favoring the prosecution.... 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. In Davis, the key witness was on probation for burglary, and appellant was unable to cross-examine him and thereby pursue his argument that the witness was influenced by undue pressure because of [his] vulnerable status as a probationer. ... 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105. It is also well-established that bias cross-examination is not limitless. The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (citing Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)) (emphasis in original). We have held that the court has discretion to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination that is repetitive, protracted, or cumulative. Sherer v. United States, 470 A.2d 732, 737 (D.C.1983) (citing Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1099 (D.C.1979)). In Sherer, we held that a witness's continuing relationship with the government was a proper subject of cross-examination, but that appellant was not denied his constitutional right and the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the court allowed inquiry into the witness's plea bargain in the current case but prevented inquiry into the witness's prior dealings with the government and alleged perjury in an earlier case. Id. In the present case, appellant was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Grady on his potential bias related to currying favor with the government. Defense counsel questioned Grady about his immunity agreement, selling drugs on the night of the shooting, the absence of a charge against him for selling drugs, and his initial refusal to cooperate with the government. Defense counsel used the information elicited on cross-examination to argue that Grady had a motive to curry favor with the government, and the court provided a jury instruction regarding the significance of the immunity agreement. See note 4, supra. Consequently, the limitations on cross-examination of Grady were not as extensive as those in Van Arsdall or Davis, where they completely prevented appellants from exploring the witnesses' motive to curry favor with the government. Nor were the limitations as extensive as those in Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529 (D.C.1992), where we observed predicate error for the harmlessness holding of prohibiting cross-examination regarding the underlying crime to which a witness pleaded guilty because the jury was without knowledge if the crime committed carried a significant sentence which might induce [him] to shade his trial testimony to curry the government's favor in the future. See id. at 532. In Jenkins, appellant was prohibited from demonstrating the core reason for the bias; here, appellant was not denied the opportunity to provide meaningful evidence of Grady's on-going relationship with the government. The limitations imposed on bias cross-examination in this case render it similar to Sherer, where we held that limitations imposed on inquiry into a witness's past relationship with the government did not deny appellant's right of confrontation because the witness's plea bargain in the present case allowed sufficient exploration of bias. As in Sherer, appellant was given an opportunity for effective bias cross-examination through inquiry into Grady's interactions with the government pertaining directly to the present case. Cross-examination regarding Grady's previous interactions with the government could reasonably be considered cumulative in addition to this evidence. Appellant argues that the court had no discretion to disallow the bias theory proffered, that of Grady's on-going relationship with the government. But Grady's on-going relationship with the government is only one aspect of the overarching theory of bias that appellant proffered: his motive to curry favor with the government arising from his involvement with the law. The right to confrontation does not guarantee him the ability to cross-examine each separate incident that could give rise to bias. Just as we allow trial courts some discretion to curtail the use of previous convictions to impeach witnesses, the purpose of limiting cumulative bias cross-examination is to prevent the jury from being overwhelmed where the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence outweighs its probative value. See Guzman v. United States, 769 A.2d 785, 790 (D.C.2001) (citing Brown v. United States, 683 A.2d 118, 124 (D.C.1996)). Thus the trial court possessed discretion and did not abuse that discretion by limiting cross-examination of Grady to only some of the aspects that suggest bias toward the government. Moreover, if we assume error, even constitutional error, as appellant claims, we must follow the ultimate holding in Jenkins, that the issue here raised would none-the-less be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the extensive corroboration of Grady's testimony described in the government's brief at pages 36-38 and supra, pages 348-49. See 617 A.2d at 533 (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). [5]