Opinion ID: 3169263
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tourtellotte

Text: Tourtellotte premises her disability claim on a non-physical handicap, based on the mental health diagnoses she received due to Rowland’s conduct. (App. 18a.). The District Court found that Tourtellotte presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she suffered from a cognizable non-physical handicap upon which she could premise her discrimination claim. (Id. at 19a). The District Court nevertheless granted summary 30 The Supreme Court of New Jersey has noted that while disability discrimination claims under the NJLAD proceed according to McDonnell Douglas, “[i]dentifying the elements of the prima facie case that are unique to the particular discrimination claim is critical to [a claim’s] evaluation.” Victor, 4 A.3d at 142. The Court has further observed that the first element of a prima facie case of disability discrimination differs from other discrimination claims in that it “requires [the] plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she qualifies as an individual with a disability, or who is perceived as having a disability, as that has been defined by statute.” Id. (footnote omitted). The NJLAD defines disability in a broader sense than does federal law. Id. at 142 n.11. judgment against Tourtellotte under her failure to accommodate claim on the basis of failure to engage in the interactive process. (Id. at 22a).
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disability discrimination, in a failure to accommodate claim the plaintiff must establish four elements “to show that an employer failed to participate in the interactive process.”31 Victor, 4 A.3d at 145 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 319 (3d Cir. 1999)). The elements are that: “1) the employer knew about the employee’s disability; 2) the employee requested accommodations or assistance for his or her disability; 3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations; and 4) the employee could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s lack of good faith.” Id. at 145 (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 319–20). Interpreting the requirements of the NJLAD articulated by New Jersey courts, this Court places the burden on the employer, who has notice of an employee’s disability, to make a reasonable accommodation for the employee. Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 247. This burden does not require that “any particular concession must be made by the employer . . . [but instead what it] requires is that employers make a good-faith effort to seek accommodations.” Victor, 4 A.3d at 150 31 New Jersey courts have recently suggested that it may be possible to successfully assert failure to accommodate as a separate claim without a prima facie showing of disability discrimination. Victor, 4 A.3d at 145–49. This would allow plaintiffs who have not experienced an adverse employment action such as termination, to nevertheless assert a failure to accommodate claim. At the time of this Opinion, this Circuit has not yet decided this issue. Since Tourtellotte experienced an adverse employment action, we need not determine if failure to accommodate can proceed as a separate action. (alterations in original) (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317). An employer making a good faith effort in the interactive process bears the responsibility of “mak[ing] [a] reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.” Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 247 (quoting Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of Super. Ct., 798 A.2d 648, 657 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2002)). The District Court correctly found that Tourtellotte presented sufficient evidence to show that she is disabled as matter of law. (App. 19a). Tourtellotte states that as a result of Rowland’s conduct she suffered from extreme stress and anxiety, for which she sought treatment by an internal medicine practitioner. (Id. at 13a, 1860a). Looking to the requirements of a failure to accommodate claim, Tourtellotte easily meets the first two elements. Lilly does not dispute that it was aware of Tourtellotte’s disability because she requested medical leave based on her mental health issues. (Id. at 21a). With respect to the second element, Lilly agrees that Tourtellotte’s request to not come in contact with Rowland constituted a request for accommodation. (Appellee Lilly’s Br. 44). Tourtellotte’s disability discrimination on the basis of failure to accommodate claim fails at the third element, which focuses on whether the employer did acted in good faith. We agree with the District Court’s finding that Lilly met its burden and engaged in the interactive process in good faith. (App. 21a). As the District Court found, it was Tourtellotte’s outright refusal to engage in the interactive process at all, that made summary judgment against her on this claim appropriate. (App. 22a). Tourtellotte’s reliance on Tynan, in which the Superior Court of New Jersey determined a material issue of fact existed in whether the employer acted in bad faith by not initiating the interactive process, is misplaced here. (Appellants’ Br. 53–54) (citing Tynan, 798 A.2d at 658). Unlike Tynan, Lilly did not ignore Tourtellotte’s request and did not effectively force her to return to work without any accommodation. See id. Lilly told Tourtellotte that it could not guarantee that she would never come in contact with Rowland, and Tourtellotte has not presented any evidence indicating that this response to Tourtellotte’s request was not made in good faith. (App. 1890a). As the District Court noted, Lilly engaged in the interactive process by “identif[ying] specific positions outside of Rowland’s chain of command for [Tourtellotte] to consider. Yet [Tourtellotte] failed to apply for a single position during this period.” (Id. at 22a). Tourtellotte’s description of HR Representative Washburn’s response to her request does not compel the result that Tourtellotte has demonstrated failure on the part of Lilly to make a good faith effort.32 32 On appeal, Tourtellotte contends that at Washburn’s deposition he admitted that it was possible to accommodate Tourtellotte’s request. (Appellants’ Br. 53–54); (App. 755a–756a). The disagreement between the parties as to exactly what Washburn told Tourtellotte does not foreclose the entry of summary judgment. The parties do not dispute that Tourtellotte’s requested accommodation was to have no contact with Rowland. (Id. at 21a–22a). Lilly’s response to this request does not demonstrate that Lilly failed to meet its burden in the interactive process. Tourtellotte does not present a genuine factual dispute as to whether Lilly’s response constituted a reasonable accommodation. At his deposition, Washburn merely said he supposed it would be possible for Tourtellotte to have hardly any interaction with Rowland, except for email. (App. 755a–756a). This is not inconsistent with what Tourtellotte claims Washburn told her during her medical reassignment, which is that he could not guarantee she could avoid Rowland. (App. 1890a). Lilly presented reasonable accommodations by identifying positions outside Rowland’s chain of command, while Tourtellotte refused to engage in the interactive process because the accommodation was not the specific one she requested. (App. 1896); see Armstrong, 438 F.3d at 247. As this Court has stated in Armstrong, “once an employer engages in the interactive process, both parties have an obligation to take part in the process in good faith.” 438 F.3d at 249 n.15 (citing Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317). “An employer cannot be faulted if after conferring with the employee to find possible accommodations, the employee then fails to supply information that the employer needs Accordingly, we will affirm the finding of the District Court granting summary judgment against Tourtellotte on this claim. b. Reyes’s Disability Discrimination Claim Under the ADA33 Plaintiffs pursuing discrimination claims must file a discrimination charge with the required agencies, including the EEOC, prior to filing in federal court. Williams v. Runyon, 130 F.3d 568, 573–74 (3d Cir. 1997). Reyes claims Lilly discriminated against her on the basis of disability in violation of the ADA. (App. 59a). The District Court found that Reyes did not exhaust administrative remedies for her disability discrimination claim because this claim was not within the scope of the EEOC complaint or the resulting investigation. (Id.). In the complaint Reyes filed jointly with the EEOC and PHRC, she checked off the boxes indicating her pursuit of discrimination claims on the basis of race and sex, but not disability. (Id.). The accompanying factual statement identified Reyes’s or does not answer the employer’s request for more detailed proposals.” Id. (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tourtellotte’s insistence on a single unreasonable accommodation and rejection of all other possibilities renders Tourtellotte the party responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 316 n.7; Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 579-81 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that an employee’s request to be transferred away from co-workers who caused him stress was unreasonable as a matter of law because he failed to make a prima facie showing that his proposed accommodation was possible). Based on Tourtellotte’s undisputed refusal to apply for a single job during her sixteen-week medical reassignment period, even after Lilly’s HR department identified two jobs outside Rowland’s chain of command, a reasonable jury could not find that Tourtellotte demonstrated Lilly’s failure to engage in good faith. 33 Reyes also claims discrimination based on failure to accommodate because Lilly did not respond to her request that she be assigned a new supervisor or she would not return to work. The District Court did not consider this basis for disability discrimination since the disability claim was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (App. 68a n.5). We do not reach this claim on the same grounds as those set forth by the District Court. national origin and ethnicity, but did not indicate any specific bases for discrimination.34 Reyes contends that her references to “mental and physical distress,” as well as medical leave and medication for anxiety could have reasonably notified the EEOC of a possible disability discrimination claim. (Id.; Appellants’ Br. 48–49). We agree with the District Court that Reyes did not exhaust the administrative remedies for her disability discrimination claim because her complaint did not provide a basis from which the EEOC could reasonably have notice of such a claim. Reyes’s claim does not fail simply because she did not check the box indicating she wished to file a charge of discrimination on the basis of disability. As the District Court also noted, Reyes’s claim fails because there is nothing in the factual statement filed with the charge that would make a disability discrimination complaint reasonably related to the EEOC charge. (App. 59a–60a). Our determination that Reyes did not exhaust administrative remedies with respect to this claim is based on her failure to provide any basis from which the EEOC could be on notice of her intent to bring a disability discrimination charge. Additionally, Appellants’ insistence that Hicks v. ABT Associates, Inc. entailed a “virtually identical” process is inaccurate. (Appellants’ Br. 49). In Hicks, this Court determined that there was an issue of material fact as to whether the 34 Reyes wrote the following for the portion of the complaint asking for the complainant to identify themselves as it relates to the basis for discrimination: “I am Hispanic and a national from the Dominican Republic.” (App. 59a) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the complaint Reyes described the harm resulting from the alleged discrimination as: “Due to Mr. Rowland’s behavior, I have suffered mental and physical distress and loss of pay. I am currently on Medical Leave and am taking medication for anxiety as a result of this treatment.” (Id.) (internal quotation marks omitted). plaintiff had tried to amend his complaint, but which the EEOC improperly refused to allow. Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 964 (3d Cir. 1978). The issue in Hicks was whether summary judgment was proper when it was arguable that the Appellant had amended the complaint. Id. at 963–64. In the present case, Reyes made no attempt to, nor does she argue that she did, amend the complaint, or file an additional one. Looking at the factual statement provided, we will affirm the District Court’s finding that Reyes failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to her disability discrimination claim. 5. Retaliation Claims Under Title VII and the PHRA Section 704(a) of Title VII states in relevant part that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against [an employee] . . . because he has made a charge” of discrimination against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA35, a plaintiff must produce “evidence that: (1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Moore, 461 F.3d at 340–41 (quoting Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing whether 35 With few exceptions, none of which apply here, the PHRA is applied in the same manner as Title VII. This Court has stated that the “aiding and abetting” provision in PHRA goes beyond the protections Title VII affords. As discussed infra, since we do not reach Appellants’ claim that Rowland aided and abetted Lilly because we determine that Lilly has not violated any of the applicable statutes, we apply the McDonnell Douglas test to the claims brought under both statutes in a single analysis. Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996). there is a causal connection, this Circuit has focused on the temporal proximity of the protected activity and the adverse employment action, as well as whether or not there is a pattern of antagonism. Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 450 (3d Cir. 2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 53. This Court has stated that the “retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300. Accordingly, we use an objective standard, in which “a reasonable employee would have found the alleged retaliatory actions ‘materially adverse’ in that they ‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Moore, 461 F.3d at 341 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the analysis proceeds as described supra within the McDonnell Douglas framework, which applies to retaliation cases brought under Title VII and the PHRA. Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2015). Once the employer provides legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its action, the burden shifts back to the employee, who must demonstrate, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s proffered reasons were merely pretextual. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1997). This Court has recognized two alternative ways by which a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext. Atkinson, 460 F.3d at 454. One, the plaintiff can provide evidence that “casts sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason was a fabrication.” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762. Two, the plaintiff can present evidence that “allows the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.” Id. a. Tourtellotte Tourtellotte claims that Lilly violated the NJLAD by retaliating against her for filing a complaint about Rowland with HR. (App. 26a–27a). The District Court found that Tourtellotte did not establish a prima facie case due to her failure to establish a causal connection between her grievance and her termination. (Id.). On appeal, Tourtellotte argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against her retaliation claim for two reasons.36 First, Tourtellotte asserts that the District Court mischaracterized the facts regarding her communications with Washburn. (Appellants’ Br. 55). Second, Tourtellotte contends that the District Court held her to a heightened standard, which it did not apply to Reyes, whose retaliation claim was the only claim of the Appellants to survive summary judgment. (Appellants’ Br. 56). Tourtellotte contends 36 Tourtellotte also argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment against her on the retaliation claim because it usurped the role of the jury. As discussed supra, per Rule 56 and this Court’s jurisprudence, a court does not err by granting summary judgment on a claim when it determines there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because Tourtellotte has failed to meet her burden as the nonmoving party opposing summary judgment by demonstrating any genuine issue of material fact as to a causal link between her complaint and her termination, the District Court correctly entered summary judgment on this claim, which we will affirm. Echoing the arguments of her co-Appellants, Krieger charges the District Court with improperly usurping the role of the jury in determining that she failed to prove that Lilly’s nonretaliatory reason was pretext. (Appellants’ Br. 58–59). For the reasons stated above in relation to Tourtellotte’s claim, we reject this argument. that the facts of her retaliation claim are “nearly identical” to Reyes’s. (Appellants’ Br. 56). Even construing the record in the light most favorable to Tourtellotte, the District Court correctly determined that Lilly’s response to Tourtellotte’s request complied with its obligation under the NJLAD. The second assertion over simplifies the nuanced specifics of each case, and the impact of Tourtellotte’s actions while on medical reassignment, which were not present in Reyes’s case. Tourtellotte provides no facts supporting her allegation that Lilly placed her on medical reassignment for the purpose of terminating her employment. (Appellants’ Br. 55). As discussed in the section supra on Tourtellotte’s disability discrimination claim on the basis of failure to accommodate, Tourtellotte was responsible for the breakdown in the interactive process. Tourtellotte has not provided any other that would establish a causal link between her HR complaint and termination. For the reasons set forth by the District Court, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment against Tourtellotte on her retaliation claim. (App. 27a–28a).