Opinion ID: 2625168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drive Time Compensation

Text: ¶ 12 Under the MWA, employees are entitled to compensation for regular hours worked and for any overtime hours worked. See RCW 49.46.020, .130; see also Bostain v. Food Express, Inc., 159 Wash.2d 700, 708-09, 153 P.3d 846 (2007) (Subject to specific exemptions, the MWA requires employers to pay their employees . . . overtime pay for the hours they work over 40 hours per week.). This case requires us to determine whether Technicians' drive time constitutes hours worked within the meaning of the MWA. ¶ 13 The legislature has not defined hours worked or addressed the compensability of employee travel time. Accordingly, WAC 296-126-002(8) governs the determination of whether drive time is compensable. [1] Under WAC 296-126-002(8), `[h]ours worked' . . . mean[s] all hours during which the employee is authorized or required . . . to be on duty on the employer's premises or at a prescribed work place. [W]here a regulation is clear and unambiguous, words . . . are given their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears. Silverstreak, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 159 Wash.2d 868, 881, 154 P.3d 891 (2007). Thus, to determine whether drive time is compensable, we must examine the undisputed facts and assess whether Technicians are on duty at the employer's premises or prescribed work place within the meaning of WAC 296-126-002(8). ¶ 14 In Anderson v. Department of Social & Health Services, 115 Wash.App. 452, 63 P.3d 134, review denied, 149 Wash.2d 1036, 75 P.3d 968 (2003), the Court of Appeals evaluated whether employee travel time was compensable under WAC 296-126-002(8). Id. at 456, 63 P.3d 134. Under the WAC standard, the court held that state employees who worked at the Special Commitment Center on McNeil Island were not entitled to compensation for time they spent traveling to work on the state/employer-provided ferry. Id. The employees were not on duty within the meaning of WAC 296-126-002(8) because [d]uring passage, plaintiffs engage in various personal activities, such as reading, conversing, knitting, playing cards, playing hand-held video games, listening to CD (compact disc) players and radios, and napping. They perform no work during the passage. Id. at 454, 63 P.3d 134. The court also concluded that the employees were not on the Special Commitment Center's premises or prescribed work place during their commute for purposes of WAC 296-126-002(8). Id. at 456, 63 P.3d 134. ¶ 15 As in Anderson, we must evaluate the extent to which Brink's restricts Technicians' personal activities and controls Technicians' time to determine whether Technicians are on duty for purposes of WAC 296-126-002(8). Here, Brink's company policy strictly controls Technicians' use of the Brink's trucks, specifically mandating that they use the trucks for company business only. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 74. To that end, Technicians may not carry non-Brink's employees as passengers in the trucks. Id. Company policy also requires Technicians to wear seat belts, obey traffic laws, not park haphazardly, lock the vehicle at all times, and never carry alcohol. Id. Unlike ordinary commuters who regularly run errands during their commutes and carry additional passengers, Brink's policy prohibits Technicians from engaging in personal activities while driving the Brink's trucks. See id. at 92 (explaining that Technicians cannot use the Brink's trucks for shopping). Further, in contrast to ordinary commuters and the state employees in Anderson, Technicians receive jobsite assignments at home via voice mail or handheld computer. Id. at 479-80, 484, 488, 494, 63 P.3d 134. They must spend time writing down the assignments and mapping the best route to reach their installation and service locations before beginning their drive. Id. In addition to the restrictions on Technicians' drive time, Technicians remain on duty during the drive. Supervisors may redirect Technicians under the HDP while en route to and from their homes to assist with other jobs or answer service calls. E.g., id. at 273, 281-82. ¶ 16 The undisputed facts establish that Technicians were on duty during the drive time for purposes of WAC 296-126-002(8). Technicians are performing company business during the drive time because Brink's strictly controls the drive time, prevents Technicians from using the trucks for personal business, and requires Technicians to remain available to assist at other jobsites while en route to and from their homes. Thus, we must next determine whether the Brink's trucks constitute the employer's prescribed work place under the WAC definition of hours worked. ¶ 17 Driving the trucks is an integral part of the work performed by Technicians. The nature of Brink's' business requires Technicians to drive the Brink's trucks to reach customers' homes and carry the tools and equipment necessary for servicing and installing home alarm systems. Technicians in the HDP report to the Kent office only once each week to refill supplies and attend the weekly company meeting. CP at 61 n. 1. In addition, the Brink's trucks serve as the location where Technicians often complete work-related paperwork because company policy dictates that employees must complete all paperwork either at the customer's home or in the Brink's truck. See id. at 668. Finally, like a work premises, Brink's requires employees in the HDP to ensure that the vehicle is kept clean, organized, safe and serviced. Id. at 74. Based on these undisputed facts, we hold that the Brink's trucks constitute a prescribed work place under WAC 296-126-002(8). ¶ 18 We conclude that Technicians were on duty at a prescribed work place during the drive time and therefore entitled to compensation under the MWA for the hours worked. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of Technicians' motion for summary judgment on the drive time claims.