Opinion ID: 2183308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defective and Unreasonably Dangerous Condition

Text: To establish strict liability in tort, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant sold the product in question in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. In design defect cases, most jurisdictions decide this issue by applying some form of a risk-utility balancing test. AM LAW PROD LIAB 3D at § 28:11. We follow that approach in this case. [9] In general, the plaintiff must show the risks, costs and benefits of the product in question and alternative designs, and that the magnitude of the danger from the product outweighed the costs of avoiding the danger. Hull v. Eaton Corp., 263 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 317, 825 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C.Cir.1987) (design defect case, looking to Maryland law in the absence of D.C. case law clearly setting out the necessary elements of a D.C. strict liability claim); [10] see also AM LAW PROD LIAB 3D at § 28:12-15 (general discussion of the risk-utility test). [11] There are many different factors that may be considered by the jury in applying a risk-utility analysis. [12] In order to weigh properly the interests of manufacturers (or distributors), consumers, and the public, the risk-utility analysis must be applied in a flexible manner that is necessarily case specific. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., supra, 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298, 305 (1983). [13] In the context of this case, the risk side of the equation is comprised of the danger of death or serious injury presented by the use of a single-cylinder liftgate with no safety backup, less the extent to which that danger might have been reduced by the warning decals routinely placed on the liftgates. On the other side of the balance is the availability of commercially feasible design alternatives, a factor which indicates the utility or benefit derived from marketing the product with the design at issue in this case. The risk of bodily injury presented by the design of the single-cylinder liftgate was serious. The evidence presented by the Bostons reveals that: (1) over half of the Anthony single-cylinder liftgates in PEPCO's fleet had reportedly experienced identical free falls; [14] (2) tests observed by PEPCO's Safety Committee Chairman comparing Anthony single-cylinder liftgates to similar liftgates with two cylinders showed that single-cylinder liftgates would fall free in the event of a mechanical failure, but that dual-cylinder liftgates would not; (3) tests conducted after Boston's injury by PEPCO's Maintenance Superintendent showed upon a mechanical failure the liftgate involved in Boston's accident fell several times while being operated normally; and (4) the liftgate's warning decal and instructions manualboth stating that [t]he lift is not equipped with a back-up system to prevent falling in the event of a failureindicate the serious risks presented by the design of the Anthony single-cylinder liftgate. [15] Under a risk-utility analysis, [a] manufacturer [or distributor] is entitled to defend a strict liability claim based on defective design by showing that a warning accompanied the product that reduced its dangers. Carter v. Johns-Manville, supra, 557 F.Supp. at 1320. However, while the adequacy of a warning is relevant and may even tip the balance in the decision whether a product is or is not defectively designed, it is not the sole consideration: A warning is only one of a product's many design attributes that weigh in the balance of dangers against utility ... but could be a pivotal design attribute in a particular case. Id. (emphasis added). There is some inconsistency among the authorities concerning the effectiveness of warnings in various factual scenarios. [16] However, we do not have to resolve the issues those authorities raise, because the warning decals in this case were inadequate as a matter of law. As indicated above, one of the warning decals was inadequate because the jury would have had to engage in conjecture to have concluded that it was in a location where Boston could have seen it, and because it consisted of 189 words only the last few of which contained the vague warning of possible danger quoted above. [17] The other decal[s]tand clear while lowering and raising the gatedid not provide any warning of the specific defect alleged or of the danger created by it. [18] Turning to the other side of the scale, we must determine, based upon the record before us, whether the utility or benefit realized from marketing the liftgate with the design at issue outweighed any risks presented by that particular design. In order to determine whether a safer design that would have prevented the injury should have been used, the trier of fact ordinarily must consider whether any safer alternative designs were commercially feasible. In determining the feasibility of design alternatives the trier of fact should consider the financial cost of the alternative as well as any adverse consequences created by the alternative. AM LAW PROD LIAB 3D at § 28:14. The Bostons presented uncontradicted expert testimony that the liftgate, as designed, was unreasonably dangerous. Both the Bostons' mechanical engineering expert, James Kita, and Warner Fruehauf's mechanical engineering expert, Roger Link, [19] testified that alternative designs that would have prevented the metal platform from a free fall were available when the Anthony A-146 single-cylinder liftgate was manufactured in the mid-1970s. These alternative designs included dual-cylinder and multi-cylinder configurations, as well as the inclusion of a limit switch on the latching mechanism of the liftgate. [20] The Chairman of PEPCO's Safety Committee, Fred Lawless, testified that the committee had investigated six incidents in which Anthony single-cylinder liftgates [fell] from a near-vertical folded position to the ground creating a hazard. He explained that he had observed tests demonstrating that, in the event of the failure of the locking or hooking mechanism, a single-cylinder liftgate would fall in a split second with no warning. In the case of a similar failure, however, a dual-cylinder liftgate would creep [down] very slowly. According to Mr. Kita's cost-benefit analysis, any one of the above alternatives was available at nominal additional cost to appellant, would have caused no reduction in the liftgate's overall utility, and would have prevented the metal platform from falling free. Principally on the basis of these factors, Mr. Kita ultimately opined within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty that the liftgate as designed was defective and unreasonably dangerous. By contrast, Warner Fruehauf failed to offer any expert or even lay testimony to substantiate its general assertion that the liftgate as designed was safe for its intended use and was therefore neither defective nor unreasonably dangerous. Moreover, Warner Fruehauf failed to impeach or contradict any of the statements or opinions expressed by either Mr. Link or Mr. Kita. The only question that Warner Fruehauf's counsel asked Mr. Link during cross-examination related to the payment of his expenses. Warner Fruehauf's cross-examination of Mr. Kita focused on PEPCO's maintenance of the liftgate. [21] Moreover, Warner Fruehauf failed to offer any evidence showing any benefit gained by marketing a single-cylinder liftgate that outweighed the risk of death or serious bodily harm inherent in this particular design. Although directed verdicts are granted sparingly in favor of the party who has the burden of proof, we recognize that to the extent that the party with the burden of proof has established his case by testimony that the jury is not at liberty to disbelieve, a verdict may be directed for him.... See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2534, at 590-91 (1971). The standard to be applied in considering a motion for directed verdict by a party who has the burden on one issue is similar to the standard applied when considering such a motion made against that party. The court must consider whether reasonable jurors could differ. Id. at 592. [22] The application of the standard is different in practice, however: Yet though a motion for directed verdict in favor of the proponent of an issue is cast in the same form as when made by the defending party, it requires the judge to test the body of evidence not for its insufficiency to support a finding, but rather for its overwhelming effect. He must be able to say not only that there is sufficient evidence to support the finding, even though other evidence could support as well a contrary finding, but additionally that there is insufficient evidence for permitting any different finding. Mihalchak v. American Dredging Co., 266 F.2d 875, 877 (3rd Cir.1959). In Hurd v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.1984), the court upheld a directed verdict granted in favor of the plaintiff as to liability in a products liability action against a manufacturer. Specifically, the court held that when expert testimony establishing that a product is defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous is uncontradicted, unimpeached, and not discredited by cross-examination[, it] must be taken as true. Hurd, supra, 734 F.2d at 500. As in this case, the plaintiff offered expert testimony that a design defect caused the injury. The manufacturer in Hurd offered no evidence to refute plaintiff's expert testimony, nor did the manufacturer's attorney weaken the force of plaintiff's experts' testimony by cross-examination. Id. [23] In ruling as it did, the court observed that a directed verdict may be granted in favor of the party with the burden of proof only if the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses the only reasonable conclusion is in his favor. Id. at 499. In Dmitrieff v. Campbell, 234 A.2d 808 (D.C.1967), this court upheld a verdict directed in favor of a plaintiff in a contract action. While noting that a trial court is usually reluctant to direct a verdict in favor of a party bearing the burden of proof, the court pointed out that the appellant did not contradict any of the factual showings supporting the claim of breach, and stated: [W]here the evidence of a party to the action is not contradicted by any direct evidence or by any legitimate inferences therefrom and where the evidence is not improbable, impossible, or subject to suspicion, there is no valid basis for denying its conclusiveness. Id. at 810. The court quoted with apparent approval the trial judge's observation that even granting appellant every reasonable inference, he would have had to set aside any verdict a jury might return for defendant. In Service Auto Supply Co. v. Harte & Co., Inc., 533 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.1976), the president of the defendant corporation had testified concerning the transactions that underlay the claim of breach of contract. Though the appellate court reminded the trial court that it is generally preferable to submit to the jury cases with apparently conflicting testimony, it scrutinized the president's testimony and concluded that it did not contradict the plaintiff's evidence on liability and that a jury therefore could not reasonably have found for the defendant on that issue. In this case, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the Bostons, even on issues as to which they bore the burden of persuasion. Given the danger presented by the design of the liftgate, the ineffectiveness of the warning of that danger, and the uncontradicted expert testimony that safer alternative designs providing the same utility were both economically and technologically feasible, we find no error in the trial judge's conclusion that, as a matter of law, the liftgate was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous. Warner Fruehauf, like the manufacturer in Hurd, failed to refute the Bostons' expert testimony or to neutralize it by cross-examination. Under the circumstances, appellees' expert testimony establishing that the liftgate was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous must be taken as true. Therefore, not only did the trial court conclude correctly that, as a matter of law, Warner Fruehauf had failed establish William Boston's assumption of the risk, it also decided correctly that the Bostons were entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of liability. Accordingly, the judgment is Affirmed.