Opinion ID: 1797618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court committed reversible error when it granted the appellees' motion in limine, as the excluded evidence was admissible.

Text: ¶ 17. The Appellants' first assignment of error is that the cost to cure damages listed by Moak in his initial appraisal were admissible and should not have been excluded by the trial court. ¶ 18. In eminent domain proceedings in Mississippi, the before and after rule is used to determine the compensation due a landowner when a portion of his property is taken through eminent domain. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 198 So. 565 (1940). In Hillman, this Court said the following: When part of a larger tract of land is taken for public use, the owner should be awarded the difference between the fair market value of the whole tract immediately before the taking, and the fair market value of that remaining immediately after the taking, without considering general benefits or injuries resulting from the use to which the land taken is to be put that are shared by the general public. Hillman, 189 Miss. at 866, 198 So. at 569. This has become known generally as the before and after rule. See State Highway Comm'n of Mississippi v. Havard, 508 So.2d 1099 (Miss.1987). ¶ 19. One mandate under the before and after rule is that items such as increased noise due to traffic or increased proximity to a highway may not form the basis of separate and distinct elements of damage. Havard, 508 So.2d at 1101 (citations omitted). ¶ 20. As this Court stated in Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hall : The `before and after rule' swallows and absorbs all of the damages of every kind and character, and while it is proper to put on evidence of special items so that the jury can properly determine the `after' value, it is not proper to comment on any particular aspect of the damages in the instructions. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hall, 252 Miss. 863, 874, 174 So.2d 488, 492 (1965). ¶ 21. In the present case, the initial appraisal submitted by the Appellants reflected the certain costs to cure. As mentioned above, one of the major costs was that of moving the house back from the new roadway ($12,000). ¶ 22. The Appellants' appraiser, Moak, claimed in his initial report that the new road being 11 feet from the front of the house would severely and adversely affect its market value. Therefore, Moak proposed that the house should either be moved back from the road or purchased by the Appellees. However, in his initial appraisal report, Moak did not state a value of the residence. ¶ 23. While the decreased value of the home was relevant to the overall diminution in value of the property, under the before and after rule it cannot be considered as a separate item of damage. ¶ 24. The Appellants claimed that the costs to move the home were relevant, despite the before and after rule, because the Appellants' were to attempting to mitigate damages. This mitigation represented the difference in the fair market value of the home versus the cost to move it. The Appellants contended that it would be cheaper for the Appellees to move the home than pay the fair market value for it. ¶ 25. We disagree. The Appellants' appraisal did not contain a value of the residence based on comparable sales in the area. Therefore, the Appellants' assertions concerning the mitigation of damages were moot because they offered no proof of damages in the first place. Further, the Appellants failed to cite a single precedential authority to support their position that expenses incurred in mitigating damages in eminent domain cases can be considered exclusive of the before and after rule. ¶ 26. Therefore, this Court holds that the trial court properly excluded the cost to cure items listed in Moak's initial appraisal report, including the cost to move the home, because they did not comport with the before and after rule. The motion in limine was properly granted and does not constitute error. This claim is denied. II. THE SUPPLEMENTAL APPRAISAL WAS SEASONABLY DELIVERED AND DID NOT UNFAIRLY SURPRISE OR PREJUDICE THE APPELLEES AS THE NEW INFORMATION IT CONTAINED WAS MINIMAL. ¶ 27. The Appellants' second assignment of error hinges on the trial court's exclusion of Moak's supplemental report. The lower court held that the report was not timely filed according to M.R.C.P. 26(f) as it was submitted six (6) days before trial. The Appellants assert that the additional information provided in the report was minimal and its admission would not have surprised or prejudiced the Appellees. ¶ 28. Rule 26(f) of the M.R.C.P. concerning supplementation of discovery responses reads in relevant part: (1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any question directly addressed to (B) the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony. M.R.C.P. 26(f)(1)(B) (1997) (emphasis added). ¶ 29. In Eastover Bank for Savings v. Hall, 587 So.2d 266, 272 (Miss.1991), we stated that, [t]his Court has laid down no hard and fast rule as to what amounts to seasonable supplementation or amendment of answers. ¶ 30. In Motorola Communications & Electronics v. Wilkerson, 555 So.2d 713 (Miss.1989), this Court held that supplementation made ten (10) days prior to the trial date was seasonable. We emphasized that the requirement that interrogatories be seasonably supplemented ensures that, a sufficient amount of time is allotted before trial to completely deal with the scope of the planned testimony of an `eleventh hour' expert witness. Motorola, 555 So.2d at 718. ¶ 31. In Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198 (Miss.1987), we ruled that the trial court erred in allowing an expert doctor to testify when his name had been revealed four (4) days before trial, and no information was provided on the subject matter of his testimony. We further stated that, [t]he very purpose of our civil discovery procedures is to prevent such trial by ambush. Jones, 504 So.2d at 201. ¶ 32. Under M.R.C.P. 37(d), [i]f a party ... fails ... to serve answers or objections to interrogatories ... after proper service of interrogatories ... the court in which the action is pending on motion may ... take any action authorized under ... this rule. We have also held that, [t]he power to dismiss for violations of rules of procedure `is inherent in any court of law or equity, being a means necessary to orderly expedition of justice and the court's control of its own docket'. Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. 564 So.2d 1346, 1367 (Miss.1990) (quoting Watson v. Lillard, 493 So.2d 1277, 1278 (Miss.1986)). In the case sub judice, Moak filed a supplemental report to his appraisal six (6) days prior to trial. In defense of the supplemental report, the Appellants said the following: 1. Once the Board's attorneys received Moak's initial appraisal giving his opinion that it would be more practical to move the house than to make the Board buy it, the Board did in fact depose Moak and made no effort to obtain additional information via motion to compel, supplemental interrogatories, etc. regarding his opinion.... 2. The Court never entered any Order to Compel, and the Blantons in fact did not violate, willfully or otherwise, any discovery obligation. 3. There was no effort on the part of the Blantons or the undersigned to obfuscate or deprive the Board of information so as to surprise the Board at trial. 4.... the November 12 supplementation, in our opinion, was not significant enough to prejudice the Board.... ¶ 33. The report was faxed to counsel for the Appellees on Tuesday, November 12, 1996. At the hearing on the Appellees' motion in limine on November 15, 1996, an objection was raised by Appellees' counsel that supplementation was not timely. The Appellees argued that they would be prejudiced due to lack of notice and unfair surprise if the report was ruled to be admissible. The Appellees declared that they would not have enough time to review and investigate the report or further depose Mr. Moak concerning his opinions. They further asserted that their appraiser, Mr. Hogue, lived out of town and had other commitments which would prevent him from adequately reviewing the supplemented opinions. ¶ 34. This Court has declined to delineate a bright-line test to determine if a discovery supplementation is seasonable. However, while precise time limits have not been defined, the purpose of the seasonable requirement is clearto prevent unfair surprise and trial by ambush which would prejudice the other party. Therefore, seasonableness must be determined on a case by case basis looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the supplemental information the offering party seeks to admit. ¶ 35. In the present case, Moak's supplemental appraisal, which was filed six (6) days before trial, was not seasonable under Rule 26(f). We agree that the Appellants' supplemental report did not contain information which was radically different from the first appraisal. ¶ 36. However, it appears from the record that the Appellants' second appraisal was filed in response to the Appellees' motion in limine. The Appellants realized that their first appraisal failed to follow the before and after rule concerning the cost to cure items of damage. In an effort to revive these costs to cure, the Appellants filed their supplemental report. ¶ 37. While this information may not have surprised the Appellees, its admission would have prejudiced them. In order to adequately refute the Appellants' supplemented evidence, the Appellees would have been required to gather comparable sales, confer with their out-of-town appraiser, and make other trial preparationsall in six (6) days including the weekend. In another case, six (6) days might have been seasonable. Yet, in this instance, the inherent complexity of an eminent domain proceeding coupled with the crucial nature of the appraiser's report, requires a finding that the supplemental report was untimely filed. ¶ 38. Therefore, the trial judge's exclusion of the supplemental report was proper. Although the Appellants did not violate a court order when filing their supplemental report, they did violate the rules of procedure. Thus, it was well within the trial judge's discretion to exclude the supplemental report.