Opinion ID: 2504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: AEDPA's Standard of Review Governs Wilson's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Even Though the District Court Found Additional Facts in Habeas Proceedings.

Text: We review [a] district court's decision to grant or deny habeas relief de novo.  Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 238 (2d Cir.2009). When [a] state court has adjudicated the merits of petitioner's claim, we apply the deferential standard of review established by [AEDPA], under which we may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court's adjudication `was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). [6] Where, as here, a state court fails to articulate the rationale underlying its rejection of a petitioner's claim, and when that rejection is on the merits, the federal court will focus its review on whether the state court's ultimate decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court was uncertain about whether AEDPA's deferential standard governed its review of Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting [i]t is. . . unclear whether deference is still appropriate under AEDPA once a federal court has conducted an evidentiary hearing and elicited new evidence that was not before the state court. The Second Circuit has not answered this question. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at  8, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . The District Court decided that the standard of review depended on which prong of Strickland was at issue. Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate both that (1) his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. With respect to the first prongthe performance of counselthe District Court determined that the evidence elicited at the July 13, 2005 hearing is relevant solely in deciding whether . . . GaNun had strategic reasons for his decisions at trial . . . [and, therefore,] in analyzing Strickland 's first prong, a de novo standard of review is appropriate. Wilson VII, 2007 WL 952037, at  10, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492 at . With respect to the second prongthe prejudice pronghowever, the Court concluded that the evidence from the July 13, 2005 hearing [was] irrelevant in deciding whether GaNun's actions prejudiced defendant. Id. Accordingly, the District Court applied AEDPA deference only to Strickland 's prejudice prong. See id. 2007 WL 952037, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22492, at . On appeal, Wilson argues that the District Court should have reviewed the entirety of his ineffective assistance claim de novo. Specifically, Wilson contends that [i]t is impossible to ascertain how the New York state court would have decided [his] claim for post-conviction relief if it had the benefit of the testimony elicited years later at the hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy. Pet'r Br. 36. Respondent counters that the plain meaning of AEDPA's statutory language makes clear that AEDPA deference governs the claim in its entirety. We agree with respondent. The standard of review set forth in AEDPA is not conditional. It is stated in mandatory termshabeas relief  shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings . . ., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphases added)and these terms do not lose their force because an intervening evidentiary hearing is held in federal court. Indeed, the provision of AEDPA setting forth the circumstances under which a federal evidentiary hearing can be held, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), does not suggest that holding such a hearing has any impact whatsoever on the standard of review governing habeas claims. [7] Accordingly, a habeas claim, even if subject to a federal evidentiary hearing, is still a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and is subject to the highly deferential standard of review established therein, id. Where, as here, the habeas claim is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), a habeas court asks whether there was an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, in light of all the facts and circumstancesincluding whatever facts are discovered during a post-conviction hearing in federal court subject to the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ([A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.). Any new evidence uncovered in the federal proceeding is relevant only insofar as it assists the habeas court in determining whether the state court reached an unreasonable application of law. [8] In reaching this conclusion, we join two of our sister circuits that have considered this question. [9] In Pecoraro v. Walls, the Seventh Circuit held: [AEDPA] authorizes us to upset . . . a [state court] conviction only if the state courts' adjudication resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). . . . [T]his standard is applicable even though the district judge held an evidentiary hearing. The evidence obtained in such a hearing is quite likely to bear on the reasonableness of the state courts' adjudication; that is true; but we do not see why it should alter the standard of federal review. 286 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.2002). The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Valdez v. Cockrell, explaining: Where a district court elects, in instances not barred by § 2254(e)(2), to hold an evidentiary hearing, the hearing may assist the district court in ascertaining whether the state court reached an unreasonable determination under either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). An evidentiary hearing is not an exercise in futility just because §§ 2254(d) and (e)(1) require deference. 274 F.3d 941, 952 (5th Cir.2001). [10] With respect to Wilson's argument that [i]t is impossible to ascertain how the New York state court would have decided [his] claim if it had had the benefit of the testimony elicited years later at the hearing before Magistrate Judge Levy, Pet'r Br. 36, we acknowledge that this may be so, but that is not the relevant inquiry under AEDPA. In the instant case, our review is limited by statute to whether the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Where, as here, a district court has performed additional fact-finding, the court must then ask whether the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, id., in light of any newly-discovered facts. It is clear that federal courts are not being directed to construct and answer an impossible subjunctivewhat would the state court have decided had additional information been available? Instead, we are directed to apply the same AEDPA standard that would otherwise be in force, now in light of the new information that has been obtained through a § 2254(e) hearing. Accordingly, AEDPA's deferential standard of review governs Wilson's claim in its entirety.