Opinion ID: 2402254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legality of Defendant's Sentence for Disorderly Conduct

Text: The defendant's first argument on appeal is that this Court's decision in Martini renders his sentence illegal because, based on Martini, defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct is not subject to the DVPA's sentencing enhancement provisions found in § 12-29-5(c)(1) [4] because disorderly conduct is classified as a petty misdemeanor. See Martini, 860 A.2d at 693. He contends that instead, he should have been sentenced pursuant to the penalty provision of the disorderly conduct statute itself, which permits a prison sentence of no more than six months, a fine of no more than $500, or both. See § 11-45-1(c). Although the state acknowledges that the eighteen-month sentence, post- Martini, clearly exceeds that provided by statute, and does not oppose defendant's request to remand the case to the Superior Court for resentencing, the state points out that defendant has waived the opportunity to argue on direct appeal that his sentence should not have been enhanced to a felony. Indeed, defendant's counsel affirmatively said on the record at trial that he was waiving any argument that a conviction on either the simple assault or disorderly conduct charge did not constitute a felony as a third offense under the DVPA. This Court agrees with the state that the issue of whether defendant's sentence should be reduced is not properly before us at this time. The record in this case reveals that defendant has not filed a motion to reduce sentence under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. [5] It is well settled in this state that: in the absence of `extraordinary circumstances,' this Court will not consider the validity or the legality of a sentence on direct appeal.    Rather, we have repeatedly held that the proper procedure for a review of a sentence begins in the Superior Court under Rule 35 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.    In the event that a defendant continues to be aggrieved by the ruling of the Superior Court, this Court then will review the decision on appeal. State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1114 (R.I.1999) (quoting State v. Collins, 679 A.2d 862, 867 (R.I.1996)). This Court has not delineated specifically what would constitute extraordinary circumstances. We have held, however, that a defendant's allegation that a sentence was unlawful because the trial justice considered improper criteria in imposing the sentence did not amount to an extraordinary circumstance. State v. Brigham, 638 A.2d 1043, 1046-47 (R.I. 1994); see Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. We also have held that no extraordinary circumstances arose when a hearing justice extended a defendant's sentence by imposing an additional probationary period. State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1156-57 (R.I.2003). This Court similarly has said that no extraordinary circumstances existed when a defendant essentially [was] challenging the length of his sentence by arguing that the trial justice improperly sentenced him to consecutive sentences. State v. Girard, 799 A.2d 238, 253-54 (R.I.2002). Likewise, we held that no extraordinary circumstances were present in a case in which the defendant argued that his sentence was too long because the trial court sentenced him inappropriately under certain habitual criminal provisions of the General Laws similar to the one at issue in the present case. State v. Morris, 744 A.2d 850, 859-60 (R.I. 2000) (involving G.L.1956 § 12-19-21). Here, as in the above-noted cases, defendant has not raised an extraordinary circumstance that would allow us to consider the legality of his sentence on direct appeal. [B]ecause the issue raised does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance, the absence of a determination made pursuant to a Rule 35 motion precludes this Court's consideration of the defendant's challenge to his sentence. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1114. As in the other cases we have faced concerning this issue, we note that [t]he statutory 120-day period in which to seek Superior Court review of the sentence commences on the date of this opinion should the defendant choose to file such a motion. Id.