Opinion ID: 165533
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unrealized Threat of Termination Contingent Upon Engaging in Protected Title VII Activity

Text: 30 An adverse employment action includes acts that `constitute[ ] a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.' Sanchez v. Denver Pub. Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir.1998) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). In our recent decision of Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1033 (10th Cir.2004), however, we expressly held that an adverse employment action is not limited to such acts. Rather, we liberally interpret the second prong of the prima facie case and take a case-by-case approach, examining the `unique factors relevant to the situation at hand.' Id.; see also Stinnett v. Safeway, Inc., 337 F.3d 1213, 1217 (10th Cir.2003). Nevertheless, we will not consider `a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities' to be an adverse employment action. Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 532. 31 On appeal, Ms. Dick does not argue that her unrealized termination falls within one of the four scenarios outlined in Sanchez, nor does she argue that the threat constitutes an adverse employment action under Hillig. Further, she does not argue the District Court erred in relying on Jeffries v. State of Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir.1998), and Cole v. Ruidoso Municipal Schools, 43 F.3d 1373 (10th Cir.1994), to hold that the threat was not an adverse employment action. Rather, she merely asserts the District Court failed to address the threats of termination from her supervisor.... in light of the record as a whole, or to consider them in the context of Dick's retaliatory harassment claim. This curious assertion is unsupported by the record. 32 Here, the District Court relied on the fact that we have never expressly held that an unrealized threat of termination, without more, constitutes an adverse employment action. For example, in Jeffries, a resident chaplain and student at a state hospital filed a formal sexual harassment complaint against a coworker. 147 F.3d at 1226. After learning of the complaint, the student's supervisor told her that he would no longer supervise her as a student and that he would not renew her contract of employment. Id. at 1232. The student, however, quit before her contract had to be renewed. Id. at 1228. While we ultimately found an adverse employment action on other grounds, id. at 1232-33, we intimated that if certain special circumstances exist, such as a unique interpersonal or educational relationship between the supervisor and employee, an unrealized threat of termination may constitute an adverse employment action. Id. at 1232. Relying on this decision, the District Court held that Ms. Bills' alleged threat was not an adverse employment action because Ms. Dick and Ms. Bill did not have the unique type of relationship present in that case. Dick, 265 F.Supp.2d at 1288. 33 The District Court also held that the alleged threat was not an adverse employment action because it was never carried out. It relied on Cole, in which we held that a principal's statement, made after a teacher had filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, that the teacher's performance would be evaluated more often than other teachers of the same experience level was not an adverse employment action because there was no suggestion that the requirement was ever adopted or carried out. Cole, 43 F.3d at 1381. The District Court found this reasoning persuasive in this context because Ms. Bills never carried through with her threat. Given the District Court's thorough analysis of the entire record in light of our case law, Ms. Dick's bare assertion that the District Court failed to consider her claim in light of the record as a whole, or to consider them in the context of Dick's retaliatory harassment claim[ ] is without merit.