Opinion ID: 2523874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boose/Staley

Text: ¶ 131 In Boose, this court held that a defendant should not be subjected to physical restraint while in court unless the trial judge has found such restraint manifestly necessary. A defendant may be shackled when there is reason to believe that the defendant may try to escape, or that the defendant may pose a threat to the safety of people in the courtroom, or if necessary to maintain order during trial. This determination is left to the discretion of the trial court, which may select the particular restraint most suitable in light of all the circumstances. The trial court should state for the record the reasons for allowing the defendant to remain shackled after being brought into the courtroom. Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 266, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303. In Staley, this court held: In the absence of such a showing, however, which must be established clearly on the record [citing Boose ], an accused cannot be tried in shackles whether there is to be a bench trial or a trial by jury. Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 38, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72. ¶ 132 B. Jonathon's Juvenile Proceeding ¶ 133 In the present case, Jonathon concedes that neither he nor his trial counsel objected to the shackles, or requested a Boose hearing to determine whether the shackles were manifestly necessary. Before this court, the State does not respond that no error occurred at all. Rather, the State concedes that error occurred, but contends that Jonathon forfeited the error by failing to object, and that the conceded error did not amount to plain error. Thus, Jonathon and the State squarely request this court to apply the plain-error rule to this conceded trial court error. ¶ 134 However, instead of adjudicating the issue presented, the court concludes that there is no affirmative indication in the record that the trial court was aware of the shackles before Jonathon was called to testify, so we presume that the trial court acted properly and did not commit error with regard to Jonathon's shackling. Supra ¶ 72. For this reason, the court determines that it need not reach [Jonathon's plain-error argument]. Supra ¶ 74. ¶ 135 I cannot accept this maneuver to avoid a proper plain-error analysis. It strains credulity that the trial judge did not learn that Jonathon was shackled in her courtroom until the third court day of the proceeding. Rather, the more realistic inference from the record is that the trial court was aware of Jonathon's shackles during the juvenile proceeding because the trial court directed that Jonathon's shackles be removed when he testified. ¶ 136 My colleagues in the majority state that I am guilty of speculating as to my view of the record. If I am speculating, so are they. The court presumes that the trial judge knew and followed the law concerning shackling absent affirmative evidence to the contrary. Supra ¶ 76. However, the law clearly required more from the judge than what the record indicates. This court has recognized the axiomatic principle that the trial court `must rigorously control its own courtroom procedures and, consistent with the mandates of due process, protect the rights of the parties and the public.' People v. Allen, 222 Ill.2d 340, 349, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349 (2006) (quoting People v. Martinez, 347 Ill.App.3d 1001, 1004, 283 Ill. Dec. 801, 808 N.E.2d 1089 (2004)); accord State v. Stewart, 162 N.J.Super. 96, 392 A.2d 234, 239 (1978) (it is essential to administration of justice that trial judge be acutely responsive to task of supervising and controlling trial); People v. Kamischke, 3 Mich.App. 236, 142 N.W.2d 21, 24 (1966) (trial courts are obliged to guard and enforce personal rights secured by state and federal constitutions). ¶ 137 My colleagues in the majority wish to have it both ways. They have acknowledged these responsibilities of a trial judge, but refuse to hold this trial judge accountable for abdicating her responsibilities in this case. Therefore, I agree with Justice Burke that if this court presumes anything, we should presume that the trial judge was aware of the security measures being used in her own courtroom. Infra ¶ 169 (Burke, J., dissenting). ¶ 138 Today's analysis is problematic for other reasons as well. The court states that since the trial judge did not expressly order that Jonathon wear the shackles and, further, did not even know that he was wearing them, then the trial judge cannot be charged with responsibility for them. Further, if the trial judge did nothing wrong, then there is no court action that needs to be justified and no need for a Boose hearing. However, once the trial judge did become aware of the shackles, and became charged with responsibility for them, the judge ordered that they be removed. Thus, there was no error either at the start of the proceeding or when the trial court became aware of the shackles. Supra ¶ 71. ¶ 139 The clear implication of this reasoning is that the trial judge had no affirmative obligation to ascertain whether Jonathon was shackled when he was brought into the courtroom during the course of his juvenile proceeding. Rather, the trial judge could passively decline to exercise her discretion on the record, and defer the subject of courtroom security to the county sheriff. I disagree with this reasoning and its result in this case for several reasons. ¶ 140 As an initial matter, the record shows that the trial court did not heed our message in Allen, rendered only a few months prior to Jonathon's trial: This opinion sends a clear message to the trial courts: control of the courtroom is vested in the trial judge. While the sheriff may be responsible for courtroom security, it is the trial judge who makes the determination as to how security involving a defendant who is on trial is handled, so as to fully protect his constitutional rights. Allen, 222 Ill.2d at 355-56, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. In Allen, this court took judicial notice of the routine use of stun belts on felons in Will County. Id. at 356, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349; id. at 379 n. 6, 305 Ill. Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349 (Freeman, J., joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). Although this court condemned blanket or standard policies of sheriffs' offices to physically restrain all defendants during court proceedings, this case demonstrates how pervasive the practice has become throughout the state. As the dissenting justice in the appellate court surmised, defense counsel currently assume that an objection to a juvenile's shackling would be futile because routine shackling is the modus operandi.  386 Ill.App.3d at 753, 325 Ill.Dec. 519, 898 N.E.2d 252 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting). This court's continued tolerance of the intolerable will only embolden the continued disregard of the necessity of the Boose hearing. ¶ 141 Nonetheless it remains the law, if not the practice, that `[a] trial court abuses its discretion if it abdicates this decision-making authority to security personnel or law enforcement.' People v. Mar, 28 Cal.4th 1201, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95, 105-06 (2002) (quoting People v. Hill, 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, 696 (1998)); State v. Flieger, 91 Wash.App. 236, 955 P.2d 872, 874 (1998) (same). While courtroom security is an increasingly pressing concern, routinely restraining defendants is not a permissible manner in which to address it. Davis v. Texas, 195 S.W.3d 311, 316 (Tex.App.2006). ¶ 142 Further, the court, without expressly saying so and without citation to authority, appears today to be saying that no error occurred because defendant did not object. In People v. Hyche, 77 Ill.2d 229, 32 Ill.Dec. 893, 396 N.E.2d 6 (1979), the court said that when a defendant does not object to the use of handcuffs, that failure `is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.' Id. at 241, 32 Ill.Dec. 893, 396 N.E.2d 6 (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). ¶ 143 However, in Allen, this court retreated from Hyche without noting that it was doing so. In Allen, the court expressly observed that the defendant had failed to object to the use of a stun belt. Allen, 222 Ill.2d at 350, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. Yet the court also held that the trial court erred in not providing proper justification for the restraint. Id. at 348, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. Thus, under Allen, when the trial court is aware of the physical restraint, the court is charged with the responsibility for it and we can say that the court has compelled the defendant to wear it, even if there is no objection by the defendant. See 386 Ill.App.3d at 753, 325 Ill.Dec. 519, 898 N.E.2d 252 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting) (the supreme court apparently no longer subscribes to the rather facile no-objection, no-compulsion rationale of Hyche ). Therefore, based on Allen, the failure to object to unnecessary shackles does not mean that the error did not occur. ¶ 144 Further, I am not convinced that it should be the responsibility of a juvenile in a delinquency proceeding to ensure that he or she is provided a trial free from inherently prejudicial practices. That duty should belong to the State and to the trial court. Ironically, as noted in today's opinion, the current purpose of the juvenile justice system is not only to protect the public, but also to develop delinquent minors into productive adults. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill.2d 510, 520, 308 Ill.Dec. 292, 861 N.E.2d 623 (2006). A purpose of the current Juvenile Court Act is to correct and rehabilitate, not to punish. Therefore, delinquency proceedings are protective in nature. Id. (collecting cases). In delinquency proceedings, [t]he relationship between the minor and the court is open and in the nature of parens patriae.  In re W.C., 167 Ill.2d 307, 325-26, 212 Ill.Dec. 563, 657 N.E.2d 908 (1995). For example, our appellate court has held that the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2010)), a collateral remedy for most adult offenders, does not apply to juveniles. See In re A.W.H., 95 Ill.App.3d 1106, 1107, 51 Ill.Dec. 483, 420 N.E.2d 1041 (1981); In re Thomas, 77 Ill.App.3d 299, 300, 32 Ill.Dec. 918, 396 N.E.2d 31 (1979). Accordingly: It is the public policy of this State that a court guards carefully the rights of minors, and, to this end, a court will even intervene of its own motion and take note of legitimate and substantial errors in proceedings [involving] minors even though the minors were represented by counsel. In re Carson, 10 Ill.App.3d 387, 388-89, 294 N.E.2d 75 (1973). ¶ 145 It should be beyond debate that shackling is `inherently prejudicial.' Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)). The rule that a prisoner brought into court for trial is entitled to appear free from all bonds or shackles is an important component of a fair and impartial trial. Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105 (6th Cir.1973) (citing Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir.1970)). Courts have repeatedly explained the three due process concerns with subjecting defendants to unnecessary physical restraints such as shackles. First, unnecessary shackling tends to prejudice the jury against the accused. Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 265, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303; accord Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). [E]ven when there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it    runs afoul of the presumption of innocence   . Allen, 222 Ill.2d at 346, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349. Requiring an accused to appear in a courtroom in unnecessary physical restraints while he or she is being judged jeopardizes the value and protection of the presumption of innocence. Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72. ¶ 146 Second, unnecessary physical restraint is impermissible because it can confuse, distract, and embarrass a defendant ( Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007), thereby restricting the ability of an accused to cooperate with defense counsel and otherwise assist in his or her defense. Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72. ¶ 147 Third, unnecessary physical restraint is impermissible because it offends the dignity of the judicial process. Boose, 66 Ill.2d at 265, 5 Ill.Dec. 832, 362 N.E.2d 303. The United States Supreme Court has explained as follows: The courtroom's formal dignity, which includes the respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the gravity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an individual's liberty through criminal punishment. And it reflects a seriousness of purpose that helps to explain the judicial system's power to inspire the confidence and to affect the behavior of a general public whose demands for justice our courts seek to serve. The routine use of shackles in the presence of juries would undermine these symbolic yet concrete objectives. Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, 125 S.Ct. 2007. Even in a bench trial, unnecessary physical restraint demeans our justice. Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 37, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72. ¶ 148 Unnecessary physical restraints in a bench trial not only offend the dignity of the judicial process, but they also jade the defendant's perception of the trial judge's impartiality. Again as Presiding Justice Appleton explained in the appellate court dissent: [U]nnecessary shackling threatens the dignity of the court. [Citation.] As a court loses its dignity, it loses credibility with the public [citation]; and I further would argue that it loses credibility with the respondentto the possible detriment of his defense. To do his best at trial, the defendant must have confidence that he is making his case to a rational and impartial trier of fact who genuinely presumes he is innocent until the State proves him to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Unnecessary and unjustified shackling weakens that confidence; it jeopardizes the presumption's value and protection. [Citation.] The presumption of innocence is a noble ideal, but this ideal will inspire little hope if hard iron reminds the defendant, every moment of the trial, how things really are between him and the courtfor, plainly, he is not stand[ing] trial with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man. [Citation.] In addition to defending himself against the State's evidence, a defendant should not have to struggle with a sense of futility, a disheartening suspicion that he is presumed guilty. Anyone who can sit in chains with no diminution of courage and confidence has a thicker hide than the common run of humanity. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 386 Ill. App.3d at 757-58, 325 Ill.Dec. 519, 898 N.E.2d 252 (Appleton, P.J., dissenting). This court requires that trial judges recognize and abide by the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the constitution. However, trial judges are only human, and from the perspective of an unnecessarily shackled defendant, guilt is presumed and trial is merely a formality. ¶ 149 These constitutional concerns are enhanced in the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Scholars recognize that unnecessarily shackling children causes not only physical harm from restraints designed for adults, but also psychological harm. The routine and indiscriminate imposition of shackles on children may exacerbate feelings of isolation, hopelessness, and insecurity (Anita Nabha, Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in Court, 73 Brook. L.Rev. 1549, 1575-80 (2008)), and causes needless humiliation and trauma (Brian D. Gallagher & John C. Lore III, Shackling Children in Juvenile Court: The Growing Debate, Recent Trends and the Way to Protect Everyone's Interest, 12 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol'y 453, 460-62 (2008)). These enhanced psychological harms significantly burden shackled children in exercising their constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Bernard P. Perlmutter, Unchain The Children: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 Barry L.Rev. 1, 37 (2007). Therefore, a child's right to remain unshackled during a juvenile proceeding accords with the rehabilitative purposes of juvenile justice. Allowing a young person who poses no security hazard to appear before the court unshackled, with the dignity of a free and innocent person, may foster respect for the judicial process. In re Millican, 138 Or.App. 142, 906 P.2d 857, 860 (1995). ¶ 150 It appears that those in the majority again wish to have it both ways regarding juvenile proceedings. They rely on the unique nature of juvenile proceedings to deny a general right to a jury ( supra ¶¶ 78-97), but in the same breath disregard that unique nature to allow children to be routinely shackled during juvenile proceedings without a Boose hearing. The court discusses at length our case law pertaining to juvenile proceedings. Indeed, it emphasizes that proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act ` are to be administered in a spirit of humane concern for, and to promote the welfare of, the minor   .' (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 92 (quoting In re A.G., 195 Ill.2d 313, 317, 253 Ill.Dec. 911, 746 N.E.2d 732 (2001)). It repeats the maxim that delinquency proceedings are protective in nature, and that the purpose of the Act is to correct and rehabilitate, rather than to punish, juveniles. Supra ¶ 94. My colleagues again recognize that there still exist significant differences between the juvenile justice system and the criminal justice system, which indicate that the goal of treating children separately is still worth pursuing. Supra ¶ 87. If juvenile delinquency proceedings are so different from the criminal justice system as to justify denial of a jury, then juvenile proceedings are sufficiently unique to require a trial judge to ascertain whether a juvenile is physically restrained in the courtroom. My colleagues cannot have it both ways. [1] ¶ 151 For all of these reasons, I would hold that a juvenile respondent has the right to appear in a courtroom free of unnecessary physical restraints unless justification is established. Staley, 67 Ill.2d at 38, 7 Ill.Dec. 85, 364 N.E.2d 72. Further, the trial court has the duty, in the nature of parens patriae, to ascertain whether a juvenile is physically restrained in the courtroom. If the juvenile is to remain shackled after being conducted into a courtroom, a Boose hearing, upon motion, is required because physical restraints implicate the above-described due process concerns and, therefore, require that strict limits be placed on their use. See Allen, 222 Ill.2d at 356, 305 Ill.Dec. 544, 856 N.E.2d 349; Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. App.4th 1344, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 363, 373 (2007) (concluding that any decision to shackle a minor who appears in [juvenile court] for a court proceeding must be based on the non-conforming conduct and behavior of that individual minor. Moreover, the decision to shackle a minor must be made on a case-by-case basis).