Opinion ID: 1429107
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limited Entry Act

Text: In 1973, the Alaska legislature enacted the Limited Entry Act. Ch. 79, § 1, SLA 1973, codified at AS 16.43. The purpose of this act was to promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of Alaska's fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry into the commercial fisheries... . AS 16.43.010; see also Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1258-61, 1264-65 (Alaska 1980). Indications of legislative intent relevant to the prohibition of execution against limited entry permits do not specifically address execution for past due child support. Rather, the legislature appeared to be concerned that limited entry permits might be pledged as security and subsequently taken pursuant to court judgment. A report issued by the House Resources Committee explained: During deliberations on HB 126 the possible problems resulting from the transfer and sale of entry permits were considered at some length. Concern was expressed that the free transferability of entry permits might result in a pattern of economic coercion against fishermen holding permits. Fear was expressed that the general lack of adequate financing for fishermen ... might make it possible for those providing financing to indirectly control entry permits to some degree. Certain safeguards against the abuse of the transfer provisions were contained in HB 126 and have been retained in the committee substitute... . Entry permits cannot be pledged as security for loans or taken pursuant to judgment [sic]. 1973 House Journal 503, 504 (emphasis added). As part of the complicated statutory scheme designed to regulate and control the issuance of entry permits, the legislature later amended the act in 1977 to provide that, with certain exceptions not relevant in this case, an entry permit may not be (1) pledged, mortgaged, leased, or encumbered in any way; (2) transferred with any retained right of repossession or foreclosure; or (3) attached, distrained, or sold on execution of judgment or under any other process or order of any court. Ch. 73, § 1, SLA 1977, codified at AS 16.43.150(g) (emphasis added). With this background in mind, we now turn to the parties' arguments. Both parties rely on Brown v. Baker, 688 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1984), the only case construing AS 16.43.150(g). Mr. Anderson cites Brown for the proposition that subsection (g)(3) was designed to insulate fishermen from `economic coercion' and `to prevent the forced loss of livelihood that would result from the court-ordered sale of permits.' Brown, 688 P.2d at 948. In Brown, however, this court was construing subsections (g)(1) and (g)(2) in the context of a limited entry permit purchaser's pledge of the permit as security for the purchase. The application of subsection (g)(3) was neither in issue nor discussed. In holding the purchaser's pledge and the seller's retained interest in the permit invalid, we found that the security agreement contravenes and defeats the purpose of the statute. Id., citing 1973 House Journal 504. It is not surprising that the court would cite the 1973 House Journal in gleaning the legislative purpose of the statute, for Brown involved the very kind of evil that the legislature wanted to prevent. For this reason, and because we [saw] no special public interest in enforcing the illegal agreement, 688 P.2d at 948, we held that the agreement was unenforceable. Brown is thus of limited application to this case. Nonetheless, it is clear that subsection (g)(3) is effective beyond the core concern of financiers' control of the right to fish as a permit holder, and that subsection cannot be ignored merely because it goes further than the core concern.