Opinion ID: 672080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Regina Ramsey

Text: 56 Regina was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and use of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. She contends the evidence is insufficient to support any of her convictions. A. 57 When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, [t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Reversal is warranted only when the record is devoid of any evidence, regardless of how it is weighed, from which a jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gutierrez, 978 F.2d 1463, 1468-69 (7th Cir.1992). [T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be ... to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318, 99 S.Ct. at 2789-90. 58 Regina's Conspiracy to Possess Cocaine with Intent to Distribute Count 59 A conspiracy is defined as a combination or confederation of two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, a criminal act. Id. at 1469. In other words, a conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime. United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 482, 126 L.Ed.2d 433 (1993). To prove a conspiracy, the government must demonstrate that 1) there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act, 2) that the defendant was a party to the agreement, and 3) that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the agreement by one of the co-conspirators. United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1478 (7th Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Navarez, 954 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1614, 123 L.Ed.2d 174 (1993). When the sufficiency of the evidence to connect a particular defendant to a conspiracy is challenged on appeal, substantial evidence should be the test rather than slight evidence or slight connection. Olson, 978 F.2d at 1479 (quoting United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1228 (7th Cir.1990)). 60 The evidence supporting Regina's conspiracy conviction is more than substantial. Parker testified that Kenneth Cross had informed her that Regina was selling cocaine for him. Parker also related how Regina had accompanied Ken to Detroit to pick up a supply of cocaine. Gary Petty testified that he purchased cocaine from Ken at Regina's house and in Regina's presence. He also recounted how on occasion both Regina and Dwight loaned money to Ken Cross to purchase a new batch of coke. The evidence adduced at trial plainly demonstrates that there was an agreement between Kenneth, Regina and others to commit an unlawful act, that Regina was a party to the agreement, and that an overt act (selling cocaine) was committed in furtherance of the agreement by one of the co-conspirators. Because substantial evidence was presented at trial with which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Regina conspired to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it, we affirm Regina's conviction for conspiracy. B. 61 Regina's convictions for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and using a handgun in relation to a drug trafficking crime were based on the results of a search of the house she resided in at 3023 N. 18th Street. Regina contends this evidence is insufficient to sustain her two convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 62 Regina's Possession of Cocaine with Intent to Distribute Count 63 In order to demonstrate possession of cocaine, it is sufficient that the government show a level of control that meets the standard of 'constructive possession'. United States v. Martinez, 937 F.2d 299, 305 (7th Cir.1991). Although mere association with those who possess drugs is not enough to sustain a possession conviction, [a] person can be convicted for possessing cocaine though he does not possess it in a literal sense. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 756 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S.Ct. 3221, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (1989). To establish constructive possession of cocaine, the government must put forth evidence demonstrating ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband. Id. at 756. 64 When viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence produced at trial established Regina constructively possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it. Sabrina Owens had made a controlled buy of an ounce of cocaine from Regina at the 18th Street address on October 30, 1991, the day before the search of Regina's house, and observed that Regina had used a key to enter the building. While searching her 18th St. residence pursuant to a search warrant, DEA agents found a safe containing eighteen ounces of cocaine, packaging materials, and a loaded .25 caliber handgun. A registration check revealed that Regina had lawfully purchased and registered the gun in her name some three and one-half years earlier. On the floor next to the safe the DEA agents found a strongbox, too large to fit in her safe, containing Regina's personal papers. Gary Petty testified that immediately following the search of Regina's 18th Street home, he found Regina weeping, and in response to his inquiry, she said her house had been raided. Additional evidence was presented that Regina had been arrested at the 3023 N. 18th Street address in February of 1989, and at that time had admitted that the residence was hers. Although it is true that papers belonging to persons other than Regina were also found during the search and also that some of Regina's papers found in the strongbox indicated Regina resided elsewhere at the time of the search, it is not our responsibility to weigh conflicting evidence; that is the duty of the jury alone who weighed the evidence and found credible the testimony offered in the government's case that she resided at 3023 N. 18th St. 65 When considered in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence produced at trial demonstrated Regina's ownership, dominion, and control over the cocaine found in her safe. We hold the evidence was sufficient to support Regina's conviction for possession of cocaine, and therefore affirm the conviction. 66 Regina's Using a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Crime Count 67 Regina contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1) because no evidence was presented that she used her firearm. In relevant part, Sec. 924(c)(1) provides that [w]hoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. This court has found 'using' to 'include[ ] the possession of a firearm which in any manner facilitates the execution of a felony'. United States v. Wilson, 938 F.2d 785, 791 (7th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. LaGuardia, 774 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir.1985)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 946, 117 L.Ed.2d 115 (1992). In addition, we have previously noted that the nature of the illegal drug business encourages the possession of weapons by its participants. Id. A weapon 'provid[es] the defendant with security and confidence, facilitat[ing] a narcotics transaction. Id. 68 In Wilson, the defendant argued that he did not use a handgun found locked in a trunk. This court noted that we will find that a defendant intended to use the firearm in facilitation of a drug related crime 'if it [is] strategically located so as to be quickly and easily available for use during a drug transaction....'  Id. at 791 (quoting United States v. Whitley, 905 F.2d 163, 166 (7th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). The defendant's gun in Wilson was in just such a position: It was strategically located on top of the bag containing the cocaine and the defendant knew where the gun was and it was loaded and readily accessible for use if necessary should any problems arise during the drug transaction. Id. Regina's handgun was likewise strategically located: the loaded gun was found next to her eighteen ounces of cocaine, and the gun was readily accessible for use if necessary should any problems arise during her drug transactions. Because the jury could reasonably infer that Regina used the firearm in violation of Sec. 924(c), we affirm Regina's conviction for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.