Opinion ID: 171959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Severance of Mr. Caldwell's Trial

Text: In addition to challenging his joinder in the indictment, Mr. Caldwell filed a pretrial motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendants. The motion was denied and he appeals. We review a district court's denial of severance for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Zapata, 546 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir.2008). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a), a district court has discretion to sever trials if a joint trial appears to prejudice a defendant. But severance should be granted only when there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zapata, 546 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotation marks omitted). The prejudice standard requires a showing of actual prejudice, not merely a showing that a defendant may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials, United States v. Pursley, 474 F.3d 757, 766 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), or that there would be a negative spill-over effect from damaging evidence presented against codefendants, United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1468 (10th Cir.1995). Mr. Caldwell points to no specific trial right that was prejudiced by joinder. Rather, his concern appears to be only a negative spill-over effect. Id. He argues that severance was necessary because [t]he criminal scheme alleged to have been repeated ... by Baum and his associates was hammered into the minds of the jur[y], with a constantly altering and jumbled cast of characters, Corrected Aplt. Br. at 22, leading to a parade of testimony from those who had already plead[ed] guilty ..., thus dramatically increasing the danger of guilt by association, id. at 23-24. As a result, argues Mr. Caldwell, [e]ven a cursory reading of the transcript and review of the evidence leaves the distinct impression that everyone was confused by the end. Id. at 24. We are not persuaded. By grouping together the exhibits for each transaction and by organizing its questioning of each of its witnesses to address the transactions separately, the government assisted the jurors in keeping clear which transactions involved Mr. Caldwell and which did not. Also, the district court instructed the jury that the guilt or innocence of a defendant as to each count or offense must ... be considered separately, and that [t]he fact that you may find one defendant guilty or not guilty as to the crime or offense charged in one count must not control your verdict with reference to any other count or offense charged against that defendant or any other defendant. Supp. R. (C. Caldwell), Doc. 187 at 8. We presume that the jury obeyed these instructions. See United States v. Eads, 191 F.3d 1206, 1209 (10th Cir.1999). Indeed, the jury acquitted codefendant Joseph Conrad Therrien on one count. See United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir.2005) (acquittal of codefendants on some charges showed that jury considered each defendant separately). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of severance.