Opinion ID: 2604613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analysis Under Gunwall

Text: Malyon has fully briefed the Gunwall factors and, accordingly, we will analyze whether the state constitution bears differently upon the issue than its federal counterpart. The Court of Appeals concluded that [a]ll of the Gunwall factors favor an independent interpretation of the state constitutional provision. Malyon, 79 Wash.App. at 475, 903 P.2d 475. We agree with the scholarly Gunwall analysis conducted by Judge Wiggins and agree, as does the dissent, that an independent interpretation is warranted. This court has never conducted a Gunwall analysis of the relevant portion of article I, section 11. One is appropriate here. [10] Under Gunwall, there are six relevant nonexclusive neutral criteria which help determine whether the constitutional clause is intended to carry meaning different from its federal counterpart: (1) the textual language of the state constitution; (2) significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) state constitutional and common law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or local concern. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d 808.
Article I, section 11 provides: Religious freedom Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this article shall not be so construed as to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for such of the state custodial, correctional, and mental institutions, or by a county's or public hospital district's hospital, health care facility, or hospice, as in the discretion of the legislature may seem justified. No religious qualification shall be required for any public office or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a witness or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of religion, nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his religious belief to affect the weight of his testimony. Const. art. I, § 11 (emphasis added). The relevant portion of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... The text of article I, section 11 significantly differs and is considerably more specific. The state provision explicitly prohibits appropriation or application of public money or property for four explicit purposes, religious worship, religious exercise, religious instruction, and support of any religious establishment. The federal clause refers generally, almost cryptically, to laws respecting religion. In all, we have characterized the state provision as different from its federal counterpart as it is both `sweeping and comprehensive' in the area of public education. Witters II, 112 Wash.2d at 370, 771 P.2d 1119 (citing State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 375, 173 P. 35 (1918)). We agree with the Court of Appeals that [t]he language of section 11 alone virtually demands an interpretation different from the First Amendment. Malyon, 79 Wash.App. at 468, 903 P.2d 475. The text remains unchanged from that which was originally ratified at statehood in 1889 except the proviso which was added by amendment 4 in 1904 and slightly altered by amendment 34 in 1958 and amendment 88 in 1993 relating to chaplains employed for various state institutions at public expense. Such proviso states the article shall not be so construed to forbid employment of a chaplain for state custodial, correctional, and mental institutions as the legislature may so provide. (Emphasis added.) Article IX, section 4 is related to article I, section 11 and adds special and unique emphasis to the subject of religion in public schools: All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence. Const. art. IX, § 4. And article XXVI makes the same point: Fourth. Provision shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools free from sectarian control which shall be open to all the children of said state. Const. art. XXVI. Proper analysis of article I, section 11 must distinguish similar provisions solely applicable to public schools, and concerns unique to public schools, when schools are not at issue.
The treatment given religion during the state constitutional convention demonstrates religious concerns and outlooks significantly differed from those motivating the First Amendment a century before. The driving concern of the state constitutional convention was religious influence in, and control over, public education. [11] The Enabling Act carried a strict requirement that the new state constitution include a stern separation of church and public education clause. [12] As noted, the resulting state constitution contains three separate prohibitions of religious involvement in public education. [13] By contrast the First Amendment, drafted with fresh memories of the Church of England, resulted from the distinctly different concern to prevent the establishment of a national religion and to keep the national government from interfering with the religious establishments of the several sovereign states. [14] This difference also suggests the state constitutional clause was not intended to be identical to its federal counterpart. [15] Our precedent since constitutional ratification is consistent with the conclusion that article I, section 11 is focused on religious influence in public education. Numerous cases have held the prohibition on religious influences in schools is sweeping and comprehensive. State ex rel. Dearle v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 375, 173 P. 35 (1918). While circumstances motivated the drafters to take a strict stance on religion in schools, evidence suggests a friendlier accommodation to religion elsewhere. After deliberate debate [16] the constitutional drafters adopted a Preamble which gave thanks to the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. [17] Delegate Buchanan, noting that the federal constitution lacks any reference to the Divine, opined that [n]o matter what Congress did, the colonies set the example. They recognized the Creator by frequently devoting days to thanksgiving and humiliation for the blessings bestowed upon them. [18] Scholars note [f]ar from being hostile to religion, the framers [of the Washington Constitution] viewed religion as an important component of a stable society. [19] The framers of article I, section 11 were also well aware religious societies in Washington commonly provided social services to the public. Indeed, reference to the health care work provided by the Sisters of Providence appears in the debates themselves. [20] Religious orders operated nearly all hospitals within the State. Many religious groups received state funding through public service contracts. [21] For example in 1877 the Sisters of Providence favorably responded to a bid proposal by King County by establishing the first hospital in Seattle. [22] Other religious groups were particularly active in providing other public services such as orphanages and poor houses. [23] The drafters were aware of this practice. One of the first acts of the framers was selection of a chaplain paid $1.50 per day at public expense to commence each convention session with prayer. [24] By contrast, the United States constitutional convention never opened its sessions with prayer. [25] Last, this very article of the state constitution has been amended to include a rule of construction [26] that specifically allows use of state salaried religious chaplains at state custodial, correctional, and mental institutions as well as any state hospital or health care facility. Const. art. I, § 11 (amends.4, 34, 88). We stress the voters clearly directed us, by constitutional amendment, to construe the original language of the entire article to be consistent with the state hiring, employing, and paying the salary of chaplains in some state facilities.
The remaining three Gunwall factors (preexisting state law, differences in structure between state and federal constitutions and matters of particular state and local concern) do not shed significant light on our inquiry. The fourth factor, preexisting state law, usually pertains to state law preexisting ratification and for that reason is nondispositive here. We do note, however, various governmentally sanctioned religious practices mentioned in the preceding section preceded constitutional ratification and are, therefore, relevant. The fifth factor, the differences in structure between state and federal governments, always favors an independent state interpretation. Richmond v. Thompson, 130 Wash.2d 368, 922 P.2d 1343, 1350 (1996). This factor is most valuable when the differences between the federal and state government are relevant and can be articulated. Certainly factors of federalism are indicative of different considerations served by the First Amendment than by article I, section 11. [27] The sixth factor reminds us nearly everything is local in nature. [28] Certainly the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that county law enforcement chaplains are no exception. [29] In summary, the significant differences in the texts and purposes of the constitutional provisions in addition to Washington's constitutional history amply support the conclusion that article I, section 11 should be read independently from the establishment clause of the Federal Constitution in the chaplaincy context. However, where that independence leads is a different question. [30]