Opinion ID: 1522122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Psychiatric Defense

Text: Proceeding to the claims of error at trial, we first take up defendant's argument that two decisions by the trial court deprived him of due process and effective assistance of counsel with respect to his psychiatric defense. First, defendant attacks the trial court's refusal to rule on the issue whether defendant's prior murder conviction would be admissible in evidence until after one of the defendant's psychiatric experts, Dr. Lewis, had testified. Defendant contends that he chose not to bring out the conviction in direct examination of Dr. Lewis because he was unsure whether the conviction would be admissible. When the court later did rule this evidence to be admissible and the State raised the evidence in its direct examination of its own expert, the jury, according to defendant, was led to the erroneous conclusion that Dr. Lewis had ignored the conviction in reaching her findings regarding defendant's psychiatric condition. We find no error. The trial court's decision to delay its ruling until the State requested to offer the prior conviction was not improper. We have advised courts against making evidentiary decisions prematurely. See State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352 (1967) (a trial judge generally should not rule on the admissibility of particular evidence until a party offers it at trial); State v. Hawthorne, 49 N.J. 130, 143 (1967) (most evidence problems are best and most expeditiously settled in the atmosphere and context of the trial), overruled on other grounds, State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127 (1978). [59] Even assuming that the court should have made a ruling on the admissibility of the conviction prior to Dr. Lewis' testimony, the fact is that defense counsel did not, at the time, object to the court's decision to postpone his ruling. The predicament, if such it be, in which defense counsel found themselves was one of their own making. Most important, defendant was not prejudiced by the court's actions. Defendant does not challenge the correctness of the trial court's ruling, reached after a full Evidence Rule 8 hearing, that the prior conviction was admissible. Defendant was free to raise the issue in direct examination of Dr. Lewis if he so desired. The record tends to support the State's assertion that it was defense counsel's strategy rather than the absence of a trial court ruling that led defense counsel not to question Dr. Lewis about the prior conviction; even after the State had raised this matter in direct examination of its own witness, defendant did not question his rebuttal witness, Dr. Ervin, about it. Having chosen not to elicit testimony regarding the prior conviction from either Dr. Lewis or Dr. Ervin, defendant cannot now renounce his strategy. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's refusal to rule on this issue earlier was not an abuse of discretion. Second, defendant contends that the trial court forced the case to trial even though defense counsel's preparations for the psychiatric defense were incomplete, thereby depriving him of effective assistance of counsel. A defendant is entitled to a reasonable time to prepare for trial. 3 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 422 (12th ed. 1975). What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the facts of each case. Relevant factors include the time available for investigation and preparation, the gravity of the charge, the experience of counsel, the complexity of possible defenses, and the accessibility of witnesses. United States v. Golub, 638 F. 2d 185, 189 (10th Cir.1980). Whether defense counsel has had enough time to prepare for trial is ordinarily a question for the trial court, and its decision will not be set aside unless the court abused its discretion. United States v. Gallagher, 620 F. 2d 797, 800 (10th Cir.), cert. den., 449 U.S. 878, 101 S.Ct. 224, 66 L.Ed. 2d 100 (1980); see State v. Tulenko, 133 N.J.L. 385, 391 (E. & A. 1945) (whether to grant a continuance is a matter for the discretion of the trial court); In re Elizabeth Educ. Ass'n, 154 N.J. Super. 291, 299 (App.Div. 1977) ([t]he granting of a continuance is a matter exclusively within the province and sound discretion of the trial judge), certif. den., 77 N.J. 492 (1978). Under the facts of the present case, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. Defendant was indicted on September 17, 1982. The first trial date set was February 14, 1983. On January 3, 1983, defense counsel advised the court that medical and psychiatric examinations of the defendant were not complete, and the court postponed the trial date until February 28. On February 14 defendant again requested an adjournment on the ground that weather conditions had delayed the arrival of his doctors. The trial date was postponed until April 4, with no objection to that date from defense counsel. Although jury selection began on April 4, the actual trial did not commence until April 25. Despite some difficulty in obtaining written reports from his experts, defendant did have these reports prior to the start of the trial on April 25 and presumably had ample time prior to that date to communicate with his expert. We thus can find no prejudice resulting from the trial court's adherence to the April 4 schedule. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's scheduling decision did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.