Opinion ID: 1508948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Informant Disclosure

Text: Appellant argues that his trial counsel afforded him ineffective assistance of counsel by not making a pre-trial motion for the discovery of the identity and testimony of the informant. In Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967), the Supreme Court of this Commonwealth chose to approve of certain language appearing in the United States Supreme Court case of Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). [1] Writing for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice Roberts first adopted the general proposition that, under certain circumstances, the informant's identity must be disclosed. A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action. Justice Roberts also adopted the general standard by which these matters were to be decided. We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors. Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, 427 Pa. at 59, 233 A.2d at 287, quoting Roviaro v. U.S., supra, 353 U.S. at 60-2, 77 S.Ct. at 628-9. We find that weighing the facts of this case results in nondisclosure. This conclusion is reached because no convincing argument is presented as to what defenses might have been aided by the informant's availability. In appellant's brief the possible significance of the informer's testimony is detailed. The informant's value would have rested upon his ability to testify as to his, the informant's, use of heroin, his ability to testify as to who were the other individuals present at the March 10th meeting, and trial counsel's ability to examine the informant on his character for truth and veracity. Furthermore, the informant would have been the only witness to the transaction which allegedly occurred on March 10, 1980. . . . Finally, to have had a pre-trial motion for disclosure would have likely resulted in at least an in-camera hearing and cross-examination of said informant, allowing Appellant the ability to confront this witness and to refute this informant's incriminating testimony. We fail to see how any of the elements could have been helpful to the defense. The informant's use of heroin and the identity of the other individuals present at the meeting are not tied to any theory of defense. Also, since the informant did not testify at trial, there was no point in examining him on his character for truth and veracity. Similarly, there was no incriminating testimony by informant to refute. Finally, as the facts outlined in the first section make clear, the informant was not the only witness to the March 10 transaction. As presented to us on appeal this case is distinguishable from those cases in which the information to be obtained from the defendant was linked to a specific defense theory. In Carter the defense sought to present a defense of mistaken identity. Also, in Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa.Super. 401, 312 A.2d 434 (1973), the informant had potential relevance to an entrapment defense. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 238 Pa.Super. 22, 364 A.2d 702 (1975) (Spaeth, J., dissenting) the informant might have been helpful to a specific denial defense. In the case before us, no such utility of the informant to a theory of defense is put forth. A mere allegation that the informant's testimony might be helpful does not suffice. Commonwealth v. Pritchett, supra, 225 Pa.Super. at 407, 312 A.2d at 438. In this connection, it should be made clear what it is that we find absent here. In coming to a resolution of this issue we have kept in mind the following language in Pritchett. However, the defendant cannot be expected to predict exactly what the informant would say on the stand. Rather, in keeping with Roviaro and Carter, all the defendant must show is a reasonable possibility that the anonymous informer could give evidence that would exonerate him. Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 836, 83 Cal.Rptr. 369, 463 P.2d 721 (1970). Commonwealth v. Pritchett, Id . There is a point between a mere allegation that the informant's testimony might be helpful and predicting exactly what the informant would say on the stand. The former asks too little of defendant and the latter too much. That point between the two  constituting what defendant can be asked to reasonably suggest is a nexus between a defense theory and the informant's potential helpfulness in establishing that defense. That is the essential element that is totally lacking in appellant's argument. Thus, had counsel sought pre-trial discovery relating to the informant, he would have had to present a defense theory which might plausibly be aided by the informant. Requiring a defendant who seeks disclosure before trial to indicate in some detail his possible defenses does not violate his constitutional right to remain silent as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Commonwealth v. Pritchett, supra, 225 Pa.Super. at 410-11, 312 A.2d at 439. Had trial counsel presented no more convincing an argument as to the usefulness of the informant to the defense than has been presented on appeal, we have no doubt that the discovery motion would not have been granted. [2] The discovery motion having no arguable merit, counsel will not be found ineffective for not making it. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977). Judgment of sentence is affirmed.