Opinion ID: 1477601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility Under Pa.R.E. 803(6)

Text: Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 802 provides: Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other rules prescribed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute. Pa.R.E. 802. `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id., 801(c). A statement, as pertinent to this instance, is an oral or written assertion[,] id., 801(a), and [a] `declarant' is a person who makes a statement. Id., 801(b). The Rules of Evidence provide certain statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even when the declarant is not present. Rule 803(6), known as the business record exception, provides: (6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, or conditions, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, . . . unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term business as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. Id., 803(6). The Rule places the burden on an opposing party to show that the sources of information or other circumstances indicate that a business record is untrustworthy, and thus does not qualify for exception to the hearsay rule. Id., Comment. Here, the lab manager verified the report was made by the forensic chemist at or near the time the chemist conducted the analysis of the substance seized from appellee. See N.T., 1/11/99-1/12/99, at 70-71. It is the regular practice of the crime lab to generate such reports. See id., at 71. Thus, the report is the type of record encompassed by the Rule. However, even if a record falls within the business record exception, its admission may still violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of United States Constitution. [2] See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (Confrontation Clause not congruent with hearsay rule; confrontation rights may be violated even though evidence is admitted under recognized hearsay exception). The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). First, the prosecution is required to demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to introduce against the defendant. Id. Once the witness is shown to be unavailable, the statement must be shown to be inherently trustworthy. Id., at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531. However, a demonstration of unavailability is unnecessary where the utility of confrontation at trial is remote. See id., at 65 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970) (plurality)). Additionally, firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule do not violate the Confrontation Clause. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987); Roberts, at 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531 [3] ; see also Commonwealth v. Romero, 555 Pa. 4, 722 A.2d 1014, 1018 (1999) (evidence admitted under well-recognized exception to hearsay rule and supported by sufficient indicia of reliability does not raise confrontation problems). Appellee relies, as did the Superior Court, on Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 322 A.2d 653 (1974), which held reading a medical examiner's report into evidence at a murder trial, without calling him as a witness, was reversible error. Appellee contends McCloud precludes a report which establishes an element of the crime to be read into evidence without the opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the report; in McCloud, the element at issue was the cause of death. Here, the issue was the identity and weight of the substance, [4] which was contained in the lab report; therefore, appellee argues McCloud prohibits admission of the report without the testimony of its maker. The Commonwealth contends McCloud is distinguishable; we agree. In that case, the report contained an expert opinion regarding the cause of death; it was not merely reporting a factual condition, such as the presence of a substance in the body or the characteristics of the body. Here, the report indicated the substance seized from appellee was 11.6 grams of cocaine; this is not an opinion, but rather the recording of a test result. Prior to testing, the forensic scientist who conducted the test may have had an opinion regarding the substance's identity based on its physical appearance; after testing, however, his opinion was irrelevant, as the test result was objective and stood on its own, despite any subjective impressions concerning the substance's identity or weight. The scientist simply recorded the test result in the report. Thus, it was not an expert opinion which would require the expert who rendered it to testify. See Primavera v. Celotex Corp., 415 Pa.Super. 41, 608 A.2d 515, 521 (1992) (expert may not act as mere conduit or transmitter of content of extra-judicial source). Several Superior Court cases addressing the admissibility of BAC test results without the testimony of the technician who administered the test are analogous. In Seville, the court held a BAC test is basic, routine, and highly reliable, thus rising beyond mere opinion or conclusion to the level of a medical fact. Id., at 1265-66; see also Kravontka; Karch. The court concluded such tests were inherently reliable, as [n]o such doubts as to reliability and accuracy are entertained when a record is offered merely to prove facts, such as . . . existence of some readily ascertained substance or chemical within the body. . . . It is this element of trustworthiness, serving in place of the safeguards ordinarily afforded by confrontation and cross-examination, which justifies admission of the writing or record without the necessity of calling all the persons who may have had a hand in preparing it.    The standardized, precise calculations used in arriving at a final result leave little room for error. Seville, at 1264-65. Furthermore, the court subsequently observed: [T]he utility of confrontation is extremely remote due to the inherent reliability of blood tests and their recording.    Because of the overwhelming indicia of reliability inherent in blood-alcohol tests and the records of those test [sic], the cross-examination of the technician who performed the test would be of insignificant utility to a defendant. Moreover, we see little need to parade before a jury every technician who was associated with a defendant's blood-alcohol test simply to explain a procedure which, on a daily basis, is proven most reliable. Kravontka, at 869-70. Thus, the court held BAC test results did not constitute expert opinion which would require the testimony of the technician who conducted the test, nor did the admission of such tests absent the technician's testimony violate a defendant's confrontation rights. Additionally, the court noted production of the declarant in such instances would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility to a defendant. Id., at 868 (citing Dutton, at 96-97, 91 S.Ct. 210 (Harlan, J., concurring)). Here, as with BAC tests, [5] the drug tests are basic, routine, and highly reliable. The forensic chemists use standardized, precise calculations in determining the presence of a controlled substance and in ascertaining its weight, arriving at a final result that leaves little room for error. Furthermore, given the fact the chemist in this case performed the test nearly one year prior to trial, [h]is testimony inevitably would have been based on the lab report now at issue. Carter, at 974 (Joyce, J., dissenting). Thus, cross-examining the chemist about the specifics of one test out of perhaps hundreds of identical tests would have been of little utility; as the Superior Court dissent noted, any testimony regarding the likelihood of error in the test procedure would have concerned general practices and probabilities in the lab, about which the lab's manager was qualified to testify. See id. Other jurisdictions which have addressed the admissibility of reports regarding the identity of controlled substances, absent the testimony of the forensic scientist who prepared the report, have concluded such reports fall under a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, and thus do not violate the Confrontation Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988); Howard v. United States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C.App.1984); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958); State v. Cosgrove, 181 Conn. 562, 436 A.2d 33 (1980); State v. Malsbury, 186 N.J.Super. 91, 451 A.2d 421 (Law Div.1982); State v. Kreck, 86 Wash.2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975). [6] Appellee and the Superior Court majority articulated their concern regarding the possibility of inherent bias by the police lab, as the lab is part of the same branch of government as the prosecutor's office, both being vested with the task of law enforcement. However, as the Howard court noted: [T]he chemists who conduct such analyses do so routinely and generally do not have an interest in the outcome of trials. In fact, as employees and scientists, they are under a duty to make accurate reports. It is difficult to perceive any motive or opportunity for the chemists to falsify. Howard, at 839. Additionally, the court in Cosgrove emphasized the unique role of a state toxicologist: The chemist is employed in a completely different and separate agency of state government and owes no allegiance per se to the state's attorney who functions in a separate constitutional branch of state government. . . . [T]he tests performed by the chemist could just as easily be seen as a check on the prosecutorial effort so as to ensure not only that proper convictions are obtained but also that further prosecutorial time is not expended if the substance examined is not contraband. It would be incumbent upon the chemist to take particular effort to ensure the reliability of tests not only because of her training as a scientist and to maintain her position . . ., but also so that the prosecution could proceed or not with assurance. Cosgrove, at 41. We find this reasoning persuasive; a state police lab chemist has no interest in the outcome of a trial and is employed specifically to determine whether a controlled substance is present. If not present, his employer is served, as no state resources need be expended in prosecution of an offense. The chemist is a professional, a scientist who is employed to be neutral and objective; thus, the potential for bias is very small. Furthermore, in the instant case, appellee bore the burden under Rule 803(6) of showing the record was untrustworthy; he made no such claim. The lab manager was available for cross-examination regarding the testing procedure itself and other circumstances behind the creation of the report. See N.T., 1/11/99-1/12/99, at 79-80; see also Kay, at 480 (admission of BAC test result does not foreclose inquiry into regularity of procedure, purity of sample, or accuracy of chemical analysis; such questions go to weight of evidence, not admissibility); State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 58 (Tenn.Crim. App.1999) (admission of DNA report through testimony of laboratory supervisor instead of technician who performed test did not violate defendant's confrontation rights where defendant was able to cross-examine supervisor regarding samples, procedures, safeguards, and results). Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the lab report pursuant to the business record exception, and the PCRA court did not err in concluding there was no violation of appellee's confrontation rights.