Opinion ID: 4014803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wiggins claim— strickland performance prong

Text: Turning to the merits of Trevino’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim under Wiggins, we must determine whether Trevino satisfied both prongs of Strickland. First, we must determine whether Trevino’s trial counsel’s performance was deficient. To demonstrate deficient performance, “the defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by “prevailing professional norms.” Our scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” To overcome this presumption, “[a] convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Of central importance here, “choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable [only] to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Factors affecting whether it is reasonable not to investigate include whether counsel has “reason to believe that pursuing 31 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 32 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful,” resource constraints, and whether the information that might be discovered would be of only collateral significance. 69 As set out above, the district court held that Trevino had failed to allege facts showing that the performance of his trial counsel was deficient and instead concluded that Trevino’s “trial counsel was not wholly inattentive to developing mitigating evidence,” in that he interviewed Trevino’s stepfather, and Trevino “failed to assist his trial counsel in identifying any family members or others who may have provided mitigating testimony.” 70 Moreover, the court emphasized that because Trevino’s mother drank heavily during the time of trial in 1997, Trevino’s trial counsel could not be blamed for failing to locate her or discover evidence pertaining to FASD. 71 Reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the district court’s determination that Trevino failed to plead that his trial counsel conducted a constitutionally deficient investigation into mitigation evidence. The record shows that Trevino’s trial counsel only put forward one mitigation witness, Trevino’s aunt, and that he interviewed her briefly only on the day of her testimony. As Trevino argued in his COA application: The relevant legal question is not whether counsel were “wholly inattentive” to developing mitigation evidence. Nor is it whether counsel’s client meaningfully assisted in the mitigation investigation. Nor is it whether one particular witness was easily locatable. Nor is it whether counsel successfully managed to investigate so little so as to remain completely ignorant about significant aspects of their client’s background. It is significant to note here that the one witness the trial counsel did present, Appellant’s aunt Juanita DeLeon, testified that Appellant’s mother could not be present to testify because she “had alcohol problems” and lived “in Elgin [Texas].” Clearly, Ms. DeLeon had 69 Coleman, 716 F.3d at 903-04 (footnotes to Strickland omitted). 70 2015 WL 3651534 at . 71 Id. 32 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 33 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 current knowledge of where Appellant’s mother was living, and of her current state of health. Had counsel simply asked that question of Ms. DeLeon during the trial preparation phase, instead of when she was on the stand, and followed up with a diligent investigation, significant mitigation evidence could have, and would have, been uncovered. It is also significant that, in the state habeas hearing, trial counsel testified that he knew Appellant’s mother had been in court - or at least in the courthouse - at some time before the appellant’s trial, but that he was “unable to get hold of her.” [record citations omitted]. This is a fair characterization of the evidence. The record shows that the minimal investigation conducted by Trevino’s trial counsel here is remarkably similar to the investigation in Wiggins that the Supreme Court held to be constitutionally deficient. Not only did Trevino’s trial counsel do an abysmal job of locating potential mitigation witnesses, but he failed to elicit easily obtainable information from the few interviews he conducted, most notably the whereabouts of Trevino’s mother. Trevino’s trial counsel also admitted in a 2003 affidavit that the trial team “did not ask for any experts in this case other than to check the DNA results” and that “[i]n hindsight, we should have gotten mitigation expert [sic] to do a psycho-social history of Carlos’ life. But mitigation experts were not used very much at the time of the trial (1997 in Bexar County).” As Wiggins pointed out, the ABA has called for intensive mitigation investigations in capital cases, including into a defendant’s family and social history, since well before Trevino’s sentencing in this case. 72 Given that Trevino’s life was on the line, reasonable jurists would consider the mitigation investigation conducted by his trial counsel insufficient. We therefore conclude that not only would reasonable jurists debate the district court’s determination of the Strickland performance prong, they would agree that it erred. Trevino has at least sufficiently pleaded that 72 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524-25. 33 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 34 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 his trial counsel’s investigation into mitigation evidence was constitutionally deficient under Strickland and, more specifically, Wiggins.