Opinion ID: 393167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supreme Court Decisions Interpreting Section 8(b)(1)(A)

Text: 25 The NLRB argues that the Supreme Court decisions interpreting Section 8(b)(1) (A), which rely in part on the legislative history, support the position it has adopted here. We disagree. These decisions do not hold that Section 8(b)(1) (A) only proscribes union conduct involving threats of violence, intimidation, or economic reprisal. 26 The NLRB relies heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, Helpers, Local Union No. 639, supra. In that case the Court held that peaceful recognitional picketing by a labor union did not restrain or coerce employees within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A). The NLRB points out that in reaching this conclusion the Court reviewed the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded that the chief evil at which Section 8(b)(1) (A) was aimed was the elimination of the use of repressive tactics bordering on violence or involving particularized threats of economic reprisal. 362 U.S. at 287, 80 S.Ct. at 714. The Court then emphasized the peaceful nature of the picketing in question. The NLRB suggests that by adopting this line of reasoning the Supreme Court endorsed a narrow interpretation of Section 8(b)(1) (A). However, the Court never expressly held that the sole purpose of Section 8(b)(1)(A) was to prevent union violence 37 ; in particular, it never suggested that Section 8(b)(1)(A) might not apply to union conduct lying somewhere between threats of violence and simple peaceful persuasion. In fact, the Supreme Court decided to uphold peaceful recognitional picketing primarily because provisions in the House version of the bill that would have explicitly prohibited such picketing were deleted in conference. The Court also relied on statements in the Senate debates clearly indicating that the bill's sponsors did not intend it to apply to peaceful methods of persuasion. 362 U.S. at 287-289, 80 S.Ct. at 713-715. 38 27 Although Drivers Local 639 might be read as containing some support for the NLRB's narrow interpretation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), a subsequent decision significantly undercut that support. In Internat'l Ladies' Garment Wkrs Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 738, 81 S.Ct. 1603, 1607-08, 6 L.Ed.2d 762 (1961), the Supreme Court stated: 28 In the Taft-Hartley law, Congress added § 8(b)(1)(A) to the (National Labor Relations) Act, prohibiting, as the Court of Appeals held, unions from invading the rights of employees under § 7 in a fashion comparable to the activities of employers prohibited under § 8(a)(1).    It was the intent of Congress to impose upon unions the same restrictions which the (National Labor Relations) Act imposed on employers with respect to violations of employee rights. 29 (Emphasis added; citation and footnote omitted.) The Court then held that, just as an employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by granting exclusive bargaining representative status to a union that does not have majority support, so also a union violates Section 8(b)(1)(A) by accepting such status. 39 30 The NLRB also relies on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., supra, 388 U.S. 175, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123. In that case the Court held that a union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) when it fined its members for violating union membership rules. As the NLRB correctly points out, this union conduct would seem to fall within the literal meaning of the terms restrain or coerce. However, the Court did not approve the union fines because it believed that the words restrain or coerce should be given a narrow interpretation. 40 Rather, the Court decided to protect the union's conduct because it concluded that Congress had not intended to regulate internal union affairs. It noted that Section 8(b)(1) (A) contains an internal union affairs proviso, which states that the section shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership(.) 41 The NLRB did not rely on this proviso in reaching its decision here. In any event, as we explain in Part III infra, we do not believe that the proviso protects the union's conduct.