Opinion ID: 1428244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relevance of R.A.V. and Harris

Text: As noted, ante, nothing in the decisions of the Supreme Court provides definitive guidance on whether racist speech at the workplace that is so pervasive and constant that it creates a hostile and abusive work environment is protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. Hints from two decisions, however, suggest the high court considers such speech outside the protective scope of the First Amendment. In 1992, the Supreme Court held the City of St. Paul's municipal ordinance banning certain hate speech was unconstitutional. ( R.A.V. v. St. Paul (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 ( R.A.V . ).) Justice Scalia, speaking for a five-justice majority, explained that, although fighting words in general are not protected by the First Amendment, the city's ordinance unconstitutionally engaged in viewpoint discrimination by prohibiting hate speech on some topics but not others. Noting the ordinance outlawed fighting words that insult, or provoke violence, `on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender' ( id. at p. 391, 112 S.Ct. 2538), the majority found it significant that [d]isplays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to use `fighting words' in connection with other ideasto express hostility, for example, on the basis of political affiliation, union membership, or homosexualityare not covered. ( Ibid. ) The justices concurring separately in the R.A.V. decision expressed concern that the majority's rationale called into question the constitutionality of sexual harassment claims under title VII, which declares it an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).) Thus, Justice White, writing for four justices, stated that [u]nder the broad principle the Court uses to decide the present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment should fail First Amendment review.... ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 409-410, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (cone. opn. of White, J.).) Addressing this question, Justice Scalia replied that title VII claims did not come within the ambit of the majority's analysis: since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the Nation's defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. [Citations.] Thus, for example, sexually derogatory `fighting words,' among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices, [citations]. ( R.A.V., supra, 505 U.S. at p. 389, 112 S.Ct. 2538, italics added.) Of course, R.A.V. did not involve a title VII claim and thus its pronouncement on whether such a claim would survive under the First Amendment is dictum. Moreover, what Justice Scalia was referring to when he explained that, in addition to fighting words, some other words could produce a constitutionally valid hostile work environment claim under title VII is unclear. We need not unravel this conundrum, however. It is enough for us to recognize that [w]hen the majority and concurring opinions are viewed in conjunction, it appears that all nine Justices participating in R.A.V. assumed that the core Title VII prohibition against speech that creates a discriminatorily hostile work environment would pass constitutional muster. (Fallon, Sexual Harassment, supra, 1994 Sup.Ct. Rev. at p. 12.) Thus, although R.A.V. did not hold that harassing workplace speech violative of title VII is unprotected speech, the opinions in the case suggest the court would so hold. The next year, the Supreme Court gave a further hint of its views when it decided Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 ( Harris ). Harris concerned a sexual harassment claim under title VII, the basis of which involved both conduct and speech. For example, the defendant's male president made Harris, the plaintiff, the target of sexual innuendo and made comments such as `You're a woman, what do you know' and that Harris was `a dumb ass woman.' ( Harris, supra, at p. 19, 114 S.Ct. 367.) He also made sexually suggestive comments about Harris's clothing. ( Ibid. ) Because the case involved the defendant's speech as a contributory factor to the creation of a hostile work environment, [s]ome observers therefore thought that the Supreme Court might use Harris to clarify the bearing of the First Amendment on sexual harassment law and, in doing so, might cut back sharply on accepted theories of Title VII liability. (Fallon, Sexual Harassment, supra, 1994 Sup.Ct. Rev. at pp. 1-2.) That both the parties and amici curiae briefed the First Amendment issue before the court further supported this belief. ( Id. at pp. 9-10 & fns. 44-47.) It was not to be. The Supreme Court in Harris simply found that, where an abusive and hostile work environment is created in violation of title VII, the plaintiffs entitlement to relief is not dependent on her ability to show she suffered psychological injury. ( Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at p. 22, 114 S.Ct. 367.) Neither Justice O'Connor, who wrote for the Harris majority, nor Justices Scalia or Ginsburg, concurring separately, mentions whether harassing speech, standing alone, may constitute a violation of title VII consistent with the First Amendment. [5] The question thus remains open. [6] Nevertheless, I find strands of analysis in several high court decisions which, taken together, indicate that, even if speech creating a racially hostile or abusive work environment is protected by the First Amendment, such speech may be subject to some restrictions consistent with that amendment. I turn now to discussion of these strands.