Opinion ID: 2099123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony Properly Excluded

Text: The record in this case is unusual because Perry's attorney never asked Dr. Eppley for an updated opinion based upon Perry's correct medical history. The record reflects Dr. Eppley was never asked, either at his deposition or by way of a supplemental report, to render an expert opinion on causation based upon Perry's pre-existing back condition and treatments for pain. The trial judge questioned why Perry never asked Dr. Eppley to address the improper factual predicate for the opinion in his 2005 report, i.e., no back condition prior to the accident. Perry's answer by way of argument was that Dr. Eppley's lack of accurate knowledge about her pre-existing back condition goes to the weight and credibility, rather than admissibility, of Dr. Eppley's testimony. That argument is without merit. Under D.R.E. 702, the trial judge must make a preliminary determination that the expert witness is able, as a factual matter, to provide the proposed opinion. It is this foundational determination to which subsection D.R.E. 702(1) refers. If an expert's proposed testimony is not based upon sufficient facts or data, the expert must be disqualified. Weight and credibility challenges, on the other hand, relate to an expert's skill or knowledge in being able to tie the facts of the case to the opinion he or she plans to give. Once the trial court has determined that a witness is competent to testify as an expert, challenges to the expert's skill or knowledge go to the weight to be accorded the expert testimony rather than its admissibility. [23] The Superior Court properly held that Dr. Eppley did not have a correct understanding of the facts of the case, thereby completely undermining the foundation of his expert opinion and not merely his credibility. We recognize that, as a general rule, the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is for the opposing party to challenge the factual basis of the expert opinion on cross-examination. [24] When the expert's opinion is not based upon an understanding of the fundamental facts of the case, however, it can provide no assistance to the jury and such testimony must be excluded. [25] Perry's case was not within the general rule's application because Dr. Eppley rendered an expert opinion based upon a completely incorrect case specific factual predicate. As the Virginia Supreme Court stated in Vasquez, [e]xpert testimony founded upon assumptions that have no basis in fact is not merely subject to refutation by cross-examination or by counter-experts; it is inadmissible. [26] Perry's prior medical history was pivotal to the issue of whether the car accident caused her back injuries. Without this basic case specific information, Dr. Eppley rendered a causation opinion without an accurate factual predicate. Given Dr. Eppley's complete lack of knowledge of the most fundamental relevant facts, the trial judge properly exercised his discretion when he determined that Dr. Eppley's testimony was inadmissible under Daubert and D.R.E. 702(1). [27]