Opinion ID: 2751111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collins’s In-Court Identification

Text: ¶23. Although Flowers’s issue heading asserts that Collins’s in-court identification was “constitutionally unreliable,” he provides no substantive argument or support for that claim. The extent of his argument is in a footnote, which provides: “there is no issue of the admissibility of the in-court identification, given that Collins could not positively identify Flowers in the courtroom at the second trial, and was deceased by the time of this, the sixth trial.” His assertion is incorrect. Collins unequivocally identified Flowers at the second trial. Flowers also implies that the typical jury consideration of determining Collins’s credibility is not applicable in the case sub judice because his testimony was read to the jury, as opposed to live testimony. Although the jury did not personally observe Collins testifying, defense counsel’s cross-examination of Collins adequately addressed credibility. For example, defense counsel asked Collins about his memory, any medication he was taking that could affect his memory, and whether he wore glasses. The characteristics of trial itself – trial by jury, an impartial judge, representation by counsel, and witnesses subject to an oath and cross-examination – adequately protects against any suggestiveness of in-court identifications at trial. Galloway v. State, 122 So. 3d 614, 663 (¶ 164) (Miss. 2013). 15 ¶24. Although Flowers does not claim that Collins’s in-court identification was tainted by the alleged suggestiveness of the out-of-court identification, that is often the argument made by defendants. See Butler, 102 So. 3d at 266-67. We have held that “an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification does not preclude in-court identification by an eyewitness who viewed the suspect at the procedure, unless: (1) from the totality of the circumstances surrounding it, (2) the identification was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Id. at 267 (¶ 17) (quoting York, 413 So. 2d at 1383). Collins’s out-of-court identification was not impermissibly suggestive, therefore, it could not give rise to the likelihood of an irreparable misidentification. For the reasons given above, the issue is without merit. II. Whether the trial court’s exclusion of expert testimony violated Mississippi law and Flowers’s right to present a defense as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ¶25. Flowers contends that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of two experts – Robert Johnson and Dr. Jeffrey Neuschatz. Flowers tendered Johnson as an expert in criminal investigation procedures, but the trial court did not permit Johnson to testify. In Flowers’s fourth trial, he filed a motion to determine the admissibility of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence. Flowers renewed the motion in the present case, and the trial court denied the motion. ¶26. We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the exclusion of expert testimony. Gillett v. State, 56 So. 3d 469, 494 (¶ 61) (Miss. 2010). Analysis of the admissibility of expert testimony begins with Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702: 16 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Miss. R. Evid. 702. The expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable to be admissible. Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 495 (¶ 63). “Expert testimony is relevant if it will ‘assist the trier of fact in understanding or determining a fact at issue.’” Galloway, 122 So. 3d at 632 (¶ 27) (quoting Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 996 (¶ 57) (Miss. 2007)). To determine reliability, the following nonexhaustive list of factors may be considered: whether the expert’s theory can be or has been tested; whether the theory has been the subject of peer review and publication; the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; the existence of standards to control the technique’s operation; and the general acceptance the theory has garnered in the relevant expert community. Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 495 (¶ 64) (citing Miss. Transp. Comm’n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 37 (Miss. 2003); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993)). “The applicability of these factors varies depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of the testimony.” Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 495 (¶ 64) (citing McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 37). A. Robert Johnson ¶27. Flowers attempted to call Robert Johnson as an expert in criminal investigation procedures, and the State objected. Johnson would have testified that the criminal investigation was flawed in various ways. After a lengthy voir dire, the trial court held that 17 Johnson could not testify because “there is no valid way of testing the field of police investigatory techniques.” The trial court also found that, even if Johnson’s testimony met the reliability prong of Daubert, the testimony was cumulative because the law enforcement officers who already had testified at trial were throughly cross-examined and had admitted that there were flaws in the investigation. Flowers also attempted to have Johnson give an expert opinion relating to the photographic array shown to Collins. The trial court excluded the testimony because Johnson stated during his voir dire that he did not have sufficient information about the lineup.
¶28. During the voir dire, Johnson testified at length about his law enforcement experience. Johnson is currently a law enforcement consultant and previously served as police chief in Jackson, Mississippi; Jackson, Michigan; and Lansing, Michigan. He was Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections from 2000 to 2002. Johnson has a master’s degree in public administration, and he graduated from the FBI National Academy and the FBI Law Enforcement Executive Development program. During his career, Johnson performed homicide investigations as a detective and directly supervised homicide investigations. Johnson also developed protocols for criminal investigations. ¶29. Johnson testified that generally accepted standards for homicide investigations exist, and he opined that the investigation in today’s case failed to meet them in various ways. First, Johnson said the investigation lacked management and organization. In support of his contention, Johnson referred to the testimony of law enforcement officers who said the investigation was a “shared responsibility.” Johnson also said the investigation lacked an in18 depth case file, which should have included all original notes and reports. Johnson testified: “There has to be somebody who is the recipient of all the information coming from a variety of sources and is able to correlate that information and further direct the direction that the investigation needs to develop.” He said that the investigation also lacked written reports of events. ¶30. Johnson next criticized the crime scene integrity. Johnson said that the integrity of the crime scene could have been compromised by law enforcement officers and investigators meeting within the crime scene to discuss and organize the investigation. According to Johnson, a crime scene log should have been maintained of who came and went from the crime scene to ensure that it was not contaminated. Next, Johnson testified that he was “concerned” about the investigation’s early focus on one suspect – Flowers – to the exclusion of any other suspects. Johnson said early focus can result in lost evidence: “It’s okay to very quickly focus on one suspect; that happens all the time, you know. But to the exclusion of all else and all others is where it becomes problematic, and you sometimes lose vital evidence that may be had because you haven’t included and kept them in as a potential suspect or person of interest.” ¶31. On cross-examination, Johnson admitted that Mississippi has no minimum standards for criminal investigations. He also admitted that the Justice Department guidelines he mentioned in direct examination were not requirements and that there are no national minimum standards for criminal investigations. Johnson stated that, rather than minimum standards, he based his opinions on generally accepted practices in police work. Further, when asked if he could provide an opinion on whether investigations that lack written reports 19 lead to incorrect results, Johnson said investigations with written reports are “more complete.” He did not, however, state that an investigation without a written report would lead to an incorrect result.
¶32. The Daubert factors apply to expert testimony relating to police investigatory techniques. See Ross v. State, 954 So. 2d 968, 996-97 (Miss. 2007) (“Ross I”). In Ross I, the defendant proffered an expert who opined that the securing of the crime scene and evidence collection were deficient. Id. at 997 (¶ 61). Although the Court held the testimony did not meet the reliability standards of Daubert and McLemore, the opinion did not discuss why the testimony was unreliable. Id. The case was reversed and remanded for other reasons. Id. at 1019-20 (¶¶ 138-41). The defendant was convicted again and appealed, and the case was assigned to the Court of Appeals. Ross v. State, 22 So. 3d 400 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“Ross II”). In Ross II, the Court of Appeals addressed the proffered expert testimony and found that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony. Id. at 420-21 (¶¶ 99104). First, the expert testimony was cumulative because the investigating officers had been cross-examined about their investigative techniques and had admitted that “things could have been handled better.” Id. at 421 (¶ 102). Second, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the testimony failed to meet the Daubert reliability prong because the expert’s “memberships and associations were voluntary and fee based, not peer reviewed or tested” and “the trial court was unable to evaluate the value of [the expert’s] certifications because the trial court was unaware of the requirements for certification.” Id. at 421 (¶¶ 103-104). 20 ¶33. Under Rule 702, the first prong of the inquiry for determining whether expert testimony should be admitted is whether the witness is “qualified by virtue of his or her knowledge, skill, experience[,] or education.” Galloway, 122 So. 3d at 632 (¶ 28) (quoting McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 35). Johnson certainly is qualified through his knowledge, experience, and training in the field of criminal investigations. Further, there is no question that Johnson’s testimony is relevant. Johnson’s testimony addressed facts relating to the criminal investigation that eventually led to Flowers’s arrest; thus, his testimony had a “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Miss. R. Evid. 401. ¶34. The critical inquiry, however, is whether Johnson’s testimony is reliable. The trial court focused on the inability to test Johnson’s theories as a basis for excluding the testimony, holding: “Because there is no valid way of testing the field of police investigatory techniques, this Court finds the proposed testimony in the field fails to meet the reliability standards required under Rule 702.” Whether the expert’s theory can be tested is one factor to be considered under Daubert, but it is not conclusive. Johnson’s proffered testimony is not the typical expert testimony contemplated by the testing factor – for example, one cannot test what effect the lack of organization and leadership would have on a murder investigation. As such, reliance on the testing factor alone would have been error. However, the trial court cited other reasons for excluding the testimony. ¶35. The trial court also found that, although Johnson testified that the investigation fell below generally accepted standards and practices in law enforcement, Johnson did not 21 sufficiently articulate the standards. See McGee v. River Region Med. Ctr., 59 So. 3d 575, 579 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2011) (An expert testifying about a failure to meet generally accepted standards must “identify and articulate the requisite standard that was not complied with.”) A review of the proffered testimony reveals that Johnson did articulate standards relating to some – but not all – of his opinions. Johnson offered four opinions: (1) that the investigation lacked organization and management; (2) that the integrity of the crime scene was compromised; (3) that the investigation focused on one suspect too quickly; and (4) that the photo lineup used during Collins’s identification was flawed. Johnson did not articulate a standard for his opinion relating to the investigation’s early focus on Flowers as a suspect. And Johnson said that he was not familiar with the procedures used during Collins’s identification. Thus, the trial court did not err in excluding his testimony. See Dedaux Util. Co., Inc. v. City of Gulfport, 938 So. 2d 838, 841 (Miss. 2006) (expert testimony must be based on sufficient facts and data). ¶36. Johnson did provide applicable standards for his opinions related to the investigation’s organization and management and crime scene integrity. Regarding the investigation’s organization and management, Johnson testified that, based on his experience and knowledge, the investigation should have had centralized leadership that collected information, maintained the case file, and directed the investigation. Johnson said, “There has to be somebody who is the recipient of all the information coming from a variety of sources and is able to correlate that information and further direct the direction that the investigation needs to develop.” Regarding crime scene integrity, Johnson said a crime scene log should have been maintained at the crime scene. He explained that the crime scene can 22 be contaminated, evidence can be overlooked, and evidence can be deposited after the crime. He said, “There may be a number of issues related to the presence of people at the crime scene, so you want to have a record of when they were there, how long they stayed and when they left.” ¶37. Although Johnson provided some standards on which he based his opinions, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion when he held the standards insufficient. Johnson testified that the standards he applied in forming his theories were “generally accepted practices in police work.” Certainly, expert testimony can be based on experience, and one factor that may be considered in determining reliability is general acceptance in the relevant expert community. See Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 495 (¶ 64); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59394. But Johnson did not provide support for his statement that the practices he referenced were, in fact, generally accepted. Allowing an expert to simply state that his opinions are based on “generally accepted practices,” without support for the assertion, could lead to essentially permitting experts to qualify themselves. While Johnson’s opinions and standards seem sensible, we cannot say that he presented enough evidence that his opinions were sufficiently reliable such that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing the testimony. ¶38. Further, the trial court was correct that Johnson’s testimony was cumulative. Law enforcement officers who participated in the investigation were thoroughly questioned about the investigation and admitted that there were flaws in the investigation. Specifically, officers admitted that a crime scene log was not maintained, and the police chief testified that one should have been maintained. The officers also admitted that there was not a lead 23 investigator, and the police chief testified that responsibilities should have been assigned, an investigative plan should have been developed, and information should have been shared with investigators and first responders. The trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion in not allowing Johnson’s testimony. B. Dr. Jeffery Neuschatz ¶39. During Flowers’s fourth trial, he filed a motion to determine the admissibility of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence. Dr. Neuschatz’s affidavit and curriculum vitae were attached to the motion. Dr. Neuschatz’s affidavit essentially provided two opinions: (1) that Collins’s identification of Flowers could have been affected by a number of different circumstances; and (2) that the identification procedure was flawed. Before the fourth trial commenced, the State announced that it would not seek the death penalty, and Flowers withdrew his motion regarding Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony.2 ¶40. At Flowers’s fifth trial, the State sought the death penalty, and Flowers renewed his motion to determine the admissibility of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony. The court held a hearing on the motion, but Flowers did not provide a proffer of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony other than the affidavit previously submitted. The trial court denied the motion, holding that, because Collins was extensively cross-examined, the expert testimony would not assist the jury: And he was extensively cross-examined, even into the most minute detail about issues concerning what path he took driving around town that morning. 2 Flowers’s counsel apparently believed that eyewitness identification expert testimony was not admissible in noncapital cases. 24 He stated in his testimony that he had a brief glimpse of who he believed to be Mr. Flowers. There was – he was cross-examined about his ability to remember things. He was cross-examined about whether he had had difficulty with memory problems in the past. I mean I do not think there could be a more thorough cross-examination of a witness than was done with Mr. Collins. So I think given the extensive cross-examination of Mr. Collins and because all other witnesses knew Mr. Flowers on sight, I do not believe an expert on witness identification would assist the jury in the least bit in this case. The court also found that Flowers did not demonstrate that Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony was reliable based on the Daubert factors. In the present case, Flowers renewed his motion on the admissibility of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony. The trial court denied the motion, adopting its ruling from the fifth trial. ¶41. Again, in determining whether expert testimony is reliable, the court may consider the following factors: whether the expert’s theory can be or has been tested; whether the theory has been the subject of peer review and publication; the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory when applied; the existence of standards to control the technique’s operation; and the general acceptance that the theory has garnered in the relevant expert community. Gillett, 56 So. 3d at 495 (¶ 64) (citing McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 37, and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94). The admissibility of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony was addressed recently in Corrothers v. State, ___ So. 3d ___, 2014 WL 2894310 (Miss. June 26, 2014), reh’g denied (Oct. 23, 2014). In Corrothers, the Court applied Rule 702 and Daubert to Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification procedures, and found that Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony was unreliable: 25 Dr. Neuschatz attempted to apply the principles and methodologies underlying his expertise in eyewitness identification to opine that [the eyewitness’s] identification “could” be unreliable. But Dr. Neuschatz’s opinions were undermined by his inaccurate and incomplete understanding of the facts on which he based his opinions and his complete lack of expertise on [the eyewitness’s] brain injury. These deficiencies rendered his opinions so fundamentally unsupported that they could offer no assistance to the jury and amounted to nothing more than unsupported speculation. His testimony was unreliable, and there was no abuse of discretion in excluding it. We further note that Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony was inconclusive and speculative because he did not offer his opinions to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, but testified only that Josh’s lineup identification “could” be unreliable and that in-court identifications “probably” are suggestive. Nor did Dr. Neuschatz submit any peer-reviewed publications supporting his principles and methodologies; the trial court had only the benefit of Dr. Neuschatz’s curriculum vitae and his testimony that his studies had been subjected to peer review and publication and were generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. These facts further support the exclusion of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony. Corrothers, 2014 WL 2894310, at  (¶ 35). ¶42. In the instant case, the trial court applied the Daubert factors and held that Dr. Neuschatz’s theories were not generally accepted and that he did not provide information about the rate of error or the principles and methods used. As to the first factor, Dr. Neuschatz’s affidavit cited several tests that support his theory that exposure time, appearance change/disguise, and post-identification feedback may affect eyewitness identifications. However, he did not submit documentation of the tests. Regarding peer review and publication, Dr. Neuschatz’s affidavit stated that he has “published several articles in peer reviewed journals, written peer invited chapters, and presented [his] research findings at regional and national conferences.” Again, however, he did not provide the articles. The same was true in Corrothers. Corrothers, 2014 WL 2894310, at  (¶ 35). Dr. Neuschatz’s affidavit did not mention anything relevant to the third or fourth factors – 26 the known or potential rate of error of the applied theory and the existence of standards and controls – therefore, the factors were not satisfied. Finally, Dr. Neuschatz cited several articles and studies supporting his theories to show that his theory is accepted in the scientific community but, again, the articles were not submitted. ¶43. Because Flowers did not provide an additional proffer of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony, we have no way of knowing whether Dr. Neuschatz could have offered further support for the Daubert factors if he had provided live testimony. We do not hold that every expert is required to submit every article or report on which he or she relies. However, here, the trial judge – in exercising his considerable discretion – found that the defense did not present sufficient evidence in support of Dr. Neuschatz’s opinions. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the affidavit alone was insufficient to withstand the Daubert analysis and in denying Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony. ¶44. Dr. Neuschatz’s affidavit included two opinions: that Collins’s identification could have been affected by several factors and that the photo identification process was flawed. Regarding the photo array, the same issue was addressed in Corrothers, and we held that Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony may have been more prejudicial than probative due to the risk of confusion. Corrothers, 2014 WL 2894310, at  (¶ 36). Allowing testimony from Dr. Neuschatz that the photo identification process was flawed, while also admitting evidence of the identification because the court determined that it was not impermissibly suggestive, 27 could result in confusing the jury.3 Thus, the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony about the photo-identification process. ¶45. As to Collins’s identification, discussed at length supra, the judge held: “[G]iven the extensive cross-examination of Mr. Collins and because all other witnesses knew Mr. Flowers on sight, I do not believe an expert on witness identification would assist the jury in the least bit in this case.” The quoted finding represents precisely the type of finding the trial judge is called upon to make. In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the trial judge must determine whether the testimony will “assist the trier of fact” in understanding the evidence or issues, and the judge must be satisfied that the testimony is “more probative than prejudicial.” Corrothers, 2014 WL 2894310, at , 8 (¶¶ 24, 27) (citations omitted). ¶46. We recognize that many courts admit expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification, and we do not hold that such expert testimony is per se inadmissible. Rather, we recognize that the decision of “whether to admit this testimony is squarely within the discretion of the trial judge[.]” United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986). 3 In Corrothers, Presiding Justice Randolph wrote the following about the admission of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony on a photo lineup after the judge determined that the lineup was admissible: Neuschatz also proffered a criticism of the photo lineups presented to Josh, previously ruled admissible by the trial judge. Such generalized expert testimony in limited circumstances may be pertinent at a hearing on a motion to suppress, but once the court has ruled photo-lineup evidence is admissible, offering such testimony at trial encroaches upon a legal issue already determined and usurps the trial judge’s discretionary authority. Corrothers, 2014 WL 2894310, at  (¶ 184) (Randolph, P.J., specially concurring). 28 In Moore, the Fifth Circuit explained that “the trial court should exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not to admit it and should balance the reliability of the testimony against the likelihood that the testimony would overwhelm or mislead the jury.” Id. (discussing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)). The Moore Court recognized that a trial judge’s exclusion of expert eyewitness testimony was not harmful where “there was evidence indicating guilt apart from the eyewitness identification.” Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1108 (6th Cir. 1984)). The Moore court wrote: [I]n the present case we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to admit this evidence. We have earlier held and we now affirm that the decision whether to admit this testimony is squarely within the discretion of the trial judge and properly so. . . . Although admission of expert eyewitness testimony is proper, there is no federal authority for the proposition that such testimony must be admitted. The district judge has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of this evidence, and we hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in this case. In some cases casual eyewitness testimony may make the entire difference between a finding of guilt or innocence. In such a case expert eyewitness identification testimony may be critical. But this is not at all the situation in the case before us. Even if the eyewitness identifications of Lamberth and Holder are completely disregarded, the other evidence of guilt is overwhelming. . . . We emphasize that in a case in which the sole testimony is casual eyewitness identification, expert testimony regarding the accuracy of that identification is admissible and properly may be encouraged. In the present case, we find no abuse of discretion in not admitting such evidence. This was not a case where casual eyewitness identifications were at all critical. Moore, 786 F.2d at 1312-13 (internal citations omitted). ¶47. Like the eyewitnesses in Moore, Collins’s identification was far from the only evidence of guilt in the instant case, and it cannot be labeled “critical.” No fewer than seven other witnesses placed Flowers near Angelica Garment Factory, where Simpson’s gun was 29 stolen, and near Tardy Furniture on the morning of the murders. Collins’s testimony was no different. He identified Flowers as a man he saw outside of Tardy Furniture. Out of all of the witnesses, Collins was the only witness placing Flowers near the scene who did not know Flowers. The other witnesses provided even more credible testimony as they recognized Flowers by sight, having known him previously. If the case hinged on Collins’s identification of Flowers, expert testimony on eyewitness identification may have been helpful to the jury. However, as in Moore, that was not the situation. ¶48. The trial judge made a rational and reasoned decision regarding the admissibility of Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony based on the totality of the facts before him. We afford “the widest possible discretion” to a trial judge’s determination on the admissibility of expert testimony, and “that decision will only be disturbed when there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” Smith v. State, 925 So. 2d 825, 834 (¶ 23) (Miss. 2006) (quoting Logan v. State, 773 So. 2d 338, 346-47 (¶ 31) (Miss. 2000)). The trial judge’s ruling on Dr. Neuschatz’s testimony was not an abuse of discretion. The issue is without merit. III. Whether the trial court erred in not excluding evidence of a single particle of gunshot residue found on Flowers’s hand. ¶49. Investigator Jack Matthews interviewed Flowers on the day of the murders and asked him to submit to a gunshot residue test. Flowers agreed to the test. A single particle of gunshot residue was found on the back of Flowers’s right hand. Joe Andrews, a forensic scientist who analyzed the gunshot residue test, testified that three scenarios can result in the presence of gunshot residue on a person’s hands: (1) the person actually fired a gun; (2) the person was in close proximity to a discharged gun; or (3) the person handled an object that 30 had gunshot residue on it. At trial, Flowers moved to exclude the evidence concerning the gunshot residue, and the trial court denied the motion. Flowers contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that a particle of gunshot residue was found on his hand approximately three hours after the murders were reported. Flowers claims that the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly outweighed the probative value, so it was inadmissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. ¶50. Rule 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Miss. R. Evid. 403. Applying Rule 403, the trial judge must conduct a balancing test to determine if the probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” McGowen v. State, 859 So. 2d 320, 329 (¶ 29) (Miss. 2003). On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Stone v. State, 94 So. 3d 1078, 1085 (¶ 20) (Miss. 2012); Baldwin v. State, 784 So. 2d 148, 156 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2001). We do not reweigh the evidence and conduct a new balancing test. “The question on review is not whether this Court would have admitted the evidence, but whether the trial court abused its discretion in doing so[.]” Stone, 94 So. 3d at 1085 (¶ 20). See also Baldwin, 784 So. 2d at 156 (¶ 27) (on appeal we “must simply determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the factors and admitting or excluding the evidence”). ¶51. Flowers cites Foster v. State, 508 So. 2d 1111 (Miss. 1987), in support of his argument. In Foster, the prosecution presented testimony that paint chips found on the 31 victim’s clothing were similar to paint chips found in the defendant’s car. Id. at 1117. A chemist testified that the paint chips were “indistinguishable in color, texture, and inorganic chemical composition; and that they therefore could have had a common origin.” Id. The State also presented evidence that the victim’s stab wound was caused by a knife found in the defendant’s car or one similar to it. Id. The Court characterized the testimony in Foster as “could have” testimony, which could easily mislead a jury, and held that the testimony was too speculative to be admissible. Id. at 1118. Thus, the Court held that the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. Id. at 1117-18. ¶52. We have distinguished Foster in other cases when the risks associated with “could have” testimony did not outweigh the probative value. In McGowen v. State, the Court held testimony that a victim’s physical condition likely was caused by sexual assault did not result in unfair prejudice or jury confusion. McGowen, 859 So. 2d at 334 (¶ 46). McGowen was distinguishable from Foster because the testimony in McGowen “did not employ or rely on phrases such as ‘could have’ or ‘possible.’ Rather, [the witness] merely testified as to the condition of [the victim’s] body.” Id. at 331 (¶ 36). ¶53. In the instant case, Andrews testified that the presence of gunshot residue could result from three scenarios, and Andrews’s testimony was clear that the residue did not unequivocally prove that Flowers had fired a gun: Q: Now, you are not telling the jury, are you, that finding a single particle of gunshot residue says that any individual actually pulled the trigger on a firearm, are you? 32 A: No, ma’am. The conclusions you can draw from finding and identifying the gunshot residue on the hands of the person are one of three conclusions: That person has discharged a weapon. That person has been in close proximity to a discharged weapon or that person has handled an object that has gunshot residue on it. Those are the three conclusions you can draw from a positive gunshot residue identification. ... Q: The fact that you found that single particle does not bring this jury or us one step closer to knowing [by] which one of these three means that gunshot residue particle got on Mr. Flowers’s hand; is that correct? A: Yes, ma’am, that’s correct. Andrews’s testimony is distinguishable from the testimony contemplated in Foster. Andrews set out three events that could result in a person having gunshot residue on his hands. He clearly explained that the gunshot residue did not unequivocally show that Flowers had fired a gun. Because Andrews’s testimony was clearly explained, there is little risk that the jury was confused or misled by the testimony. As such, the testimony was admissible under Rule 403, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting it. The issue is without merit. IV. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as mandated by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section Fourteen of the Mississippi Constitution. ¶54. Flowers claims that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support the verdict. He attacks the sufficiency of the evidence from multiple angles: (1) lack of motive; (2) lack of evidence that Flowers knew Simpson kept a gun in his car; (3) lack of evidence that one person, acting alone, committed the murders; (4) the eyewitnesses were not credible; 33 and (5) the physical evidence lacked probative value. Flowers contends that the instant case is one of circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence; therefore, he argues that the State was required to meet a higher burden of proof. ¶55. At the end of the State’s rebuttal, Flowers moved for JNOV. The trial court denied the motion. “A motion for JNOV challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Taylor v. State, 110 So. 3d 776, 782 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2013) (citing Knight v. State, 72 So. 3d 1056, 1063 (¶ 24) (Miss. 2011)). We apply the following standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence: When ruling on a motion for JNOV, the trial court must view all credible evidence consistent with the defendant’s guilt in the light most favorable to the State. The Court will not disturb the trial court’s ruling if the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that [the] accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction, and reversal is required. Thus, the Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor, 110 So. 3d at 782 (¶ 19) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Flowers was charged with four counts of capital murder with the underlying felony of armed robbery. Thus, the State was required to prove that Flowers killed each of the victims “without the authority of law by any means or any manner . . . [w]hen done with or without any design to effect death, [while] engaged in the commission of the crime of . . . robbery . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2014). A. Burden of Proof 34 ¶56. Because Flowers claims that the burden of proof – and, consequently, the sufficiency of the evidence analysis – depends on whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, we address burden of proof first. Flowers claims that the case is based on circumstantial evidence, not direct evidence. Therefore, he claims that the State must meet the following burden of proof: It is fundamental that convictions of crime cannot be sustained on proof which amounts to no more than a possibility or even when it amounts to a probability, but it must rise to the height which will exclude every reasonable doubt; that when in any essential respect the State relies on circumstantial evidence, it must be such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that the contention of the State is true, and that throughout the burden of proof is on the State. Westbrook v. State, 32 So. 2d 251, 252 (Miss. 1947). ¶57. Flowers’s case, however, is not a case of circumstantial evidence. If an eyewitness is produced or a statement from the defendant is admitted, the case is not circumstantial. Rubenstein v. State, 941 So. 2d 735, 785 (¶ 225) (Miss. 2006); Ladner v. State, 584 So. 2d 743, 750 (Miss. 1991). Further, a defendant’s “admission of culpability . . . to a third party who is not a law enforcement officer constitutes direct evidence of a crime.” Minor v. State, 831 So. 2d 1116, 1119 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2002) (citing Ladner, 584 So. 2d at 750). In Ladner, the Court held that a case is not based only on circumstantial evidence even if the only direct evidence is a “jailhouse confession.” Ladner, 584 So. 2d at 750. See also Foster, 508 So. 2d at 1115 (Court held that, without the jailhouse confession, the prosecution’s case would have been entirely circumstantial), overruled on other grounds by Powell v. State, 806 So. 2d 1069 (Miss. 2001). 35 ¶58. Odell Hallmon, a jailhouse informant, testified that Flowers had told him that he had committed the murders. According to Ladner, a jailhouse informant’s testimony is considered direct evidence, and when a jailhouse informant’s testimony is present, the case is not circumstantial. See Moore v. State, 787 So. 2d 1282, 1288 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2001) (discussing Ladner, 584 So. 2d at 750). Following the Court’s holdings in Ladner and Moore, the trial judge found that Hallmon’s testimony provided direct evidence of the crimes. We hold that the trial judge did not err in applying the Court’s precedent. Under Ladner, the case sub judice is not one of circumstantial evidence, and the Westbrook standard suggested by Flowers does not apply. B. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶59. Flowers claims that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Flowers asserts that the State failed to prove motive; that there was a lack of evidence that Flowers knew Simpson kept a gun in his car; that the evidence does not support the State’s theory that the murders were committed by a single gunman; that the eyewitnesses were not credible; and that the physical evidence lacked probative value. First, although Flowers vehemently argues on appeal his theory that the number of victims and the placement of the gunshot wounds demonstrate that the murders were “almost certainly not a one-man crime,” that theory was not presented at trial. Therefore, Flowers cannot raise it on appeal. Lyons v. State, 766 So. 2d 38, 40 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (“Failure to raise this defense waives the right of the appellant to raise it here.”). 36 ¶60. Regarding motive, Flowers claims that the State failed to prove that he was so aggrieved about being firing from Tardy Furniture that the firing resulted in his murdering four people. To support his contention, Flowers cites his statement given to the police shortly after the murders. Flowers told investigators that he had worked at Tardy Furniture for about three days at the beginning of July 1996. On his last day, Flowers improperly loaded large tractor batteries, and they fell off the truck and were damaged. Bertha Tardy told Flowers that the cost of the damaged batteries would be deducted from his paycheck. Flowers failed to return to work after the incident. After not reporting to work for several days, Flowers called Bertha Tardy and asked if he still had a job. Bertha Tardy told Flowers that he no longer had a job and that the majority of his paycheck was “covered up with [the] batteries.” Flowers never stated that he was angry with Bertha Tardy for losing his job. ¶61. Flowers is correct that the State did not provide direct evidence of any anger toward the Tardy Furniture employees, but the State did provide evidence that Flowers had lost his job at Tardy Furniture and had his paycheck reduced as a result of the damaged batteries. A reasonable juror could conclude from that evidence – and it is in the jury’s province to draw such inferences if reasonable – that Flowers had a motive to rob Tardy Furniture and kill four employees. See Howell v. State, 860 So. 2d 704, 739 (¶ 125) (Miss. 2003) (“It is within the jury’s province to draw reasonable inferences from facts based on experience and common sense.”) (citing Lewis v. State, 573 So. 2d 719, 723 (Miss. 1990)). The State’s evidence supported the contention that Flowers had a motive. ¶62. Next, Flowers contends that the State’s theory hinged on proving that Flowers knew he would find a gun in Simpson’s car the morning of the murders, and he claims the State 37 failed to prove that. He cites Simpson’s testimony that Flowers did not know Simpson’s gun was in his car on the morning of the murders: Q. Your testimony was you did not recall agreeing and saying there was no way that Curtis Flowers would have known that gun was in the car that particular morning. A. No. He, he didn’t know it. Q. He did not know it. A. He did not know it. Although Simpson stated at that point in his testimony that Flowers did not know the gun was in his car on the morning of the murders, Simpson had first testified that Flowers had seen the gun in Simpson’s car previously. In a followup question regarding whether Flowers knew the gun was in his car that morning, Simpson confirmed that Flowers had seen the gun in his car before. Q. So you had known [Flowers] pretty much forever. A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Q. Did he know that you had this pistol? A. Yes, he did. Q. Had he seen it in your car before? A. Yes, sir. ... Q. You were asked . . . whether or not there was any way he knew the gun was in there that morning and your answer was that it wasn’t; is that right? A. That’s right. 38 Q. But you were also asked how [Flowers] knew you kept a gun in your car, I believe. How did [Flowers] know you had had a gun in your car? Had he seen it in there before? A. Yes, sir, he had. ¶63. Because Flowers previously had seen Simpson’s gun in his car, the evidence supports the contention that Flowers knew he would find the gun in Simpson’s car the morning of the murders. The jury, as “the ultimate finder of fact,” is responsible for considering the evidence and weighing the credibility of witnesses, and the Court will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Conley v. State, 790 So. 2d 773, 807 (¶ 13) (Miss. 2001) (“We do not have the task of re-weighing the facts in each case and going behind the verdict of the jury to detect whether the testimony and evidence they chose to believe was or was not the most credible.”). Whether the jury believed that Flowers knew Simpson kept a gun in his car was one piece of evidence for the jury to consider. ¶64. Flowers also attacks the credibility of the witnesses who placed him walking between his home, Angelica Garment Factory, and Tardy Furniture the morning of the murder. He asserts that the $30,000 reward for information lured the witnesses to testify. Several witnesses testified that they were aware a reward was being offered for information.4 Some witnesses were not asked about the reward. Two of Flowers’s fact witnesses, Latarsha Blissett and Kittery Jones, testified that investigators had implied that they would receive the reward if they provided statements implicating Flowers. The reward was never given. The jury heard testimony related to the reward, and Flowers’s counsel argued during closing 4 The State’s witnesses who testified that they knew about the reward were: Patricia Odom, Katherine Snow, James Kennedy, Mary Fleming, and Clemmie Fleming. 39 argument that investigators allegedly had tried to entice witness statements by offering the reward. The issue was within the jury’s province of determining credibility. See Taylor, 110 So. 3d at 784 (¶ 29). ¶65. Flowers also claims that testimony from people who saw him on the morning of the murders is not credible because the witnesses’ testimony contains “irreconcilable differences.” One difference Flowers cites is the witnesses’ descriptions of his clothing. One witness testified that Flowers was wearing black windsuit pants; another said Flowers had on brown pants; and another thought Flowers wore white shorts. Flowers also points out that the times at which the witnesses claimed to have seen him at various locations in Winona overlap. For example, James Kennedy testified that he saw Flowers in front of his home at 7:15 a.m., but Katherine Snow said that she saw Flowers at Angelica at 7:15. Inconsistency in witness testimony is an issue of credibility for the jury. “It is within the jury’s province to determine the weight and credibility to give to the evidence, resolving all conflicts in the evidence.” Taylor, 110 So. 3d at 784 (¶ 29). ¶66. Finally, Flowers claims that the physical evidence linking him to the murders lacks probative value. First, he argues that the bloody shoeprint found at the scene does not connect him to the crime, because another person could have come into the store after the murders and stepped on the bloody floor. His assertion lacks merit. The shoeprint was a size ten-and-a-half Fila Grant Hill tennis shoe. Flowers wore a size ten-and-a-half shoe. A shoebox for size ten-and-a-half Fila Grant Hill tennis shoes was found in Flowers’s girlfriend’s home. Witnesses testified that they had seen Flowers wearing Fila Grant Hill shoes. Second, Flowers contends that the gunshot residue particle found on his hand has no 40 probative value, claiming that it could have come from another source. As discussed above, Joe Andrews, a forensic scientist, testified that the gunshot residue found on Flowers’s hand could prove one of three things: (1) he had discharged a weapon; (2) he had been in close proximity to a discharged weapon; or (3) he had handled an object that had gunshot residue on it. Although the gunshot residue could have come from another source (for example, coming in contact with an item at the police station), one alternative was that Flowers actually fired a weapon. Thus, the evidence does have some probative value. ¶67. The State responds to Flowers’s claim that the evidence was insufficient by citing the following evidence linking Flowers to the murders: Flowers was fired from Tardy Furniture and was told he would not receive pay for his days worked. Flowers was seen standing next to Simpson’s car – where the gun used in the murders was located – on the morning of the murders. Numerous witnesses saw Flowers walking to and from Tardy Furniture on the morning of the murders. The shoeprint found at the crime scene matched Flowers’s shoe size and matched a pair of shoes he had been seen wearing. Flowers tested positive for gunshot residue. The only paperwork that had been disturbed at Tardy Furniture was Flowers’s paycheck and timecard. Cash was found hidden in Flowers’s headboard after the murders. Hallmon testified that Flowers confessed to committing the murders. When the evidence is viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved the essential elements of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the issue is without merit. V. Whether Flowers’s right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by Mississippi law and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was violated 41 by the prosecution referencing facts not in evidence during the culpability phase closing argument. ¶68. Flowers claims that the prosecution improperly argued facts not in evidence during its culpability phase closing argument. During closing arguments, attorneys may “fairly sum up the evidence,” comment on facts in evidence, and “draw whatever deductions and inferences” seem proper from the facts. Rogers v. State, 796 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (¶15) (Miss. 2001); Bell v. State, 725 So. 2d 836, 851 (¶ 40) (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted). We apply the following standard of review to attorney misconduct during opening statements and closing arguments: “whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.” Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 661 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2001) (citing Ormond v. State, 599 So. 2d 951, 961 (Miss. 1992)). ¶69. “Where prosecutorial misconduct endangers the fairness of a trial and the impartial administration of justice, reversal must follow.” Goodin v. State, 787 So. 2d 639, 645 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2001) (citing Acevedo v. State, 467 So. 2d 220, 226 (Miss. 1985)). However, we have held that, even if a prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments are inconsistent with the facts, reversal is not warranted if the statements do not rise to the level necessary to endanger the impartial administration of justice and the fairness of the trial. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 233 (¶ 62) (Miss. 2010) (quoting Goodin, 787 So. 2d at 645 (¶ 18)). In Pitchford, the prosecutor said that the defendant “went to the sheriff’s department the same morning of the murder and he admitted it.” Pitchford, 45 So. 3d at 233 (¶ 62). The 42 testimony, however, was that the defendant “talked to” an investigator. Id. Despite the inconsistency, the Court held that the statement did not result in an unfair trial. Id. ¶70. Flowers claims that, during closing argument, the prosecution misstated facts about: (1) the time Sam Jones discovered the victims at Tardy Furniture; (2) Flowers’s motive; (3) Porky Collins’s response to the photo arrays; and (4) the location of the victims at the crime scene. The State correctly asserts that Flowers did not object contemporaneously to the statements during closing argument. Generally, even in death penalty cases, “the failure to object to the prosecution’s statements in closing argument constitutes a procedural bar.” Ross I, 954 So. 2d at 1001 (¶ 71) (citing Spicer v. State, 921 So. 2d 292, 309 (Miss. 2006); Williams v. State, 684 So. 2d 1179, 1203 (Miss. 1996)). However, in some cases, we have considered the merits of the argument even where the defendant failed to object contemporaneously. See Ross I, 954 So. 2d at 1002 (¶ 71) (citing cases). ¶71. In Flowers II, we recognized plain error for misstatements by the prosecution in closing arguments. Flowers II, 842 So. 2d at 550-56 (¶¶ 52-74). Therefore, because we found plain error on a similar issue in Flowers II, we proceed under a plain error analysis for the purpose of a thorough analysis. Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1289 (Miss. 1994) (“defendant who fails to make a contemporaneous objection must rely on plain error to raise the assignment on appeal”) (citing Gray v. State, 487 So. 2d 1304, 1312 (Miss. 1986)). To reverse under the plain error doctrine, an error must have occurred and that error must have “resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice” or “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Conners v. State, 92 So. 3d 676, 682 (¶ 15) (Miss. 2012) (quoting Brown v. State, 995 So. 2d 698, 703 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2008)). 43 A. Sam Jones’s Arrival at Tardy Furniture ¶72. Flowers claims that, during closing argument, the State misrepresented Sam Jones’s testimony regarding the timeline of events on the morning of the murders. Jones died prior to Flowers’s 2010 trial, so his testimony from the 2007 trial was read into evidence. Jones initially testified that he arrived at Tardy Furniture between 9:15 and 9:30 a.m. When the State questioned Jones about the timeline, the State’s attorney misstated Jones’s arrival time as being closer to 10:00 a.m. The State’s attorney asked, “. . . when you got to the store, that was going to be closer on up to 10 o’clock, wasn’t it?” Flowers’s counsel objected to leading, but the judge overruled the objection. However, Jones never responded to the question. During closing argument, the State discussed the timeline and the attorney said: “Mr. Sam Jones came into the store slightly after 10:00 on the morning of the 16th and discovered the bodies.” Flowers claims the statement was prejudicial because it skewed the timeline in the State’s favor. Both Porky Collins and Clemmie Flemming testified that they had seen Flowers near Tardy Furniture around 10:00 a.m. Flowers claims that, if Jones’s testimony that he arrived at the store between 9:15 and 9:30 had been described accurately, it would have raised a question in the jurors’ minds about what Flowers was doing near the murder scene thirty to forty-five minutes after the murders could have occurred. ¶73. The State responds that, although Jones did not testify to arriving at the store at 10:00 a.m., other evidence presented at trial supported that position. For example, the 911 call reporting the murders was placed at 10:20 a.m., and Jones testified that he was in Tardy Furniture for ten to fifteen minutes before going to a nearby business to call for help. So, working backwards, the conclusion could be drawn that Jones arrived at Tardy Furniture 44 closer to 10:00 a.m., rather than 9:15 or 9:30. Further, the State claims that any misstatement relating to the time Jones arrived was harmless error, and the error was cured with the following comments by defense counsel in their closing statement: [Sam Jones] came in and you know, his testimony, I looked it up as they were saying that. His original testimony was he might have gotten there, started his voyage to go in to – as early as 9:00. He, he thought maybe he got there closer to 9:30. But we know from the police that the call came in at 10:20. And if you will remember, Mr. Jones also told you he thought it might have been 15 minutes before he recovered himself enough to go and actually make the report. So there is a bunch of time in there. Sam Jones did not testify that he arrived at Tardy Furniture at 10:00 a.m. However, a reasonable inference could be drawn from the other evidence, including the 911 call, that Jones may have arrived closer to 10:00. Defense counsel’s summary of the timeline in closing and the reasonable inference that could be drawn from the evidence as a whole preclude a finding of plain error on the issue. B. Flowers’s Motive ¶74. Next, Flowers claims that the following statement by the prosecutor about Flowers’s alleged motive was not based on facts in evidence: The investigators learned pretty quickly when they asked who in the world could have had some reason, some motive, some anything to attack four people like this. Have you had anybody that’s had beef with the store? Just one. Well, that doesn’t mean he did this though, does it? No. But you check that out. You look at him. And in the course of deciding what, if anything, Curtis Flowers had to do with this crime. In his brief, Flowers claims that no evidence was presented to support the State’s theory that Flowers was angry about being fired. To the contrary, the State identified several facts that 45 supported the contention that Flowers “had beef” with Tardy Furniture: Flowers lost his job days before the murders. Bertha Tardy deducted the cost of damaged inventory from Flowers’s paycheck. Police Chief John Johnson testified that the Tardy family considered Flowers a threat and that “they were concerned about their safety dealing with him.” Investigator Jack Matthews testified Flowers was the only employee who had been fired from Tardy Furniture in the last few years and was the only person they had had any problems with. Doyle Simpson testified that he had heard that Flowers had “problems” with Tardy Furniture. A reasonable inference could be drawn from the evidence that Flowers had ill will toward Tardy Furniture. We cannot say that the State’s comment during closing rose to the level of plain error.