Opinion ID: 2321640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether CRSS Owed a Duty of Care to Presley

Text: Appellants contend that the trial court erroneously granted judgment as to CRSS on the basis that CRSS owed no legal duty of care to Presley. We review the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. Carleton v. Winter, 901 A.2d 174, 178 (D.C.2006); Brown v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 844 A.2d 1113, 1117 (D.C.2004). Judgment as a matter of law may be granted only if, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, there is `no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find' for the non-moving party. Brown, supra, 844 A.2d at 1118 (quoting Super. Ct. Civ. R. 50(a)). This is an exacting standard, and `it is only in the unusual case, in which only one conclusion could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, that the court may properly grant judgment [as a matter of law].' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Homan v. Goyal, 711 A.2d 812, 817 (D.C.1998)). Whether there is a duty of care is a question of law. Tolu v. Ayodeji, 945 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.2008). Appellants contend that CRSS owed a duty to Charles Presley to ensure that proper safety procedures were in place at the worksite to protect him and other workers, and that CRSS' breach of that duty caused Presley's fall and resulting injuries. In support of this contention, appellants raise two arguments: first, that a statutory duty existed under the obligations imposed by the ISA, and second, that CRSS assumed a common-law duty of care to Presley by undertaking to monitor safety conditions in the CQM contract. We conclude that appellants' claims fail because they have not established that CRSS owed Presley a legal duty under either theory. [8]
Appellants look to the ISA to support their argument that CRSS had a statutory duty of care to Presley. The ISA requires that [e]very employer shall furnish a place of employment which shall be reasonably safe for employees, [and] shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards. . . . D.C.Code § 32-808(a). The ISA defines an employer as someone having control or custody of any place of employment or of any employee. D.C.Code § 32-802(1). An examination of our existing case law interpreting the meaning of custody or control, which we undertake below, demonstrates why appellants' reliance on the ISA to argue that CRSS was an employer, and thus had a duty to Presley, is misplaced. Appellants nonetheless assert that CRSS exercised the necessary control or custody over the workplace or of any employee to be considered an employer under the ISA because: 1) there is compelling evidence demonstrating that CRSS exercised the requisite control or custody; 2) their expert witness testified that CRSS had the standard of care to anticipate, plan for and monitor expected [safety] hazards, including those falling under the cooling tower placement project, notwithstanding its contractual obligations; and 3) CRSS assisted the State Department in acquiring the permit for use of the athletic fields where the cooling towers were assembled. However, we conclude that each of these arguments is without merit. To determine whether CRSS was an employer such that the statutory duty to provide a safe workplace under the ISA was triggered, an examination of our existing case law interpreting the meaning of control or custody of the worksite is illustrative. In particular, when an employer does not have direct custody or control over the employee, as in the present case, we have emphasized ownership of the worksite and authority with respect to safety rules in finding that an entity is an employer under the ISA. In Traudt v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326 (D.C.1997), we reviewed a grant of summary judgment for the general contractor and reversed. 692 A.2d at 1329. There, an independent contractor's employee was injured while attempting to remove asbestos with a screwdriver from energized electric cables. Id. at 1330-31. We found it important that PEPCO retained ownership of the workplace and the electric cables, asserting this form of control concretely by dictating that work on the cables was to be done while they were energized. Id. at 1331. We also emphasized that PEPCO insisted on compliance with its own as well as public safety rules and reserved the right to inspect that work, direct stoppage, and require replacement or supplementation of personnel and equipment in case of noncompliance with the contract. Id. Thus, we held that PEPCO's ownership of the manhole system and the electric cables, together with the authority it reserved in the contract to monitor [the independent contractor's] work and perform other work simultaneously at the job site, established its control of the `place of employment' sufficient to make it Traudt's employer for purposes of the statute. Id. Similarly, we determined that the defendant was an employer under the ISA in Velásquez v. Essex Condominium Ass'n, 759 A.2d 676 (D.C.2000), where we reviewed the grant of summary judgment and affirmed. 759 A.2d at 678. Essex Condominium Association, the owner of Essex Condominiums, and the property manager (together, Essex) contracted with an independent contractor, Ev-Air-Tight, to renovate the concrete facade of its building. Id. Velásquez was employed by Ev-Air-Tight and was injured in a fall from a scaffold being used in the renovation project. Id. We emphasized that the contract between Essex and Ev-Air-Tight required Ev-Air-Tight to obey . . . the rules and regulations which may from time to time during [its] work be promulgated by [Essex] for various reasons such as safety, health, preservation of property or maintenance of a good and orderly appearance to the area. Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we held that Essex constituted an employer within the meaning of the ISA because Essex owned the property where the work was performed and retained authority to promulgate rules and regulations and monitor the work performed by Ev-Air-Tight. Id. at 681. [9] Our decisions in Traudt and Velásquez reflect the principle that the ISAparticularly its definition of employeris to be read broadly. See Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 70 (D.C. 1978). However, even with broad interpretations, Traudt and Velásquez do not support a determination that CRSS was an employer under the ISA. CRSS did not, under the contract here, have the degree of control over the workplace to qualify as an employer that was present in both Traudt and Velásquez. In contrast to the employers in Traudt and Velásquez, CRSS did not own the property on which the injured individual was working. More importantly, CRSS did not maintain the same degree of authority with respect to safety rules as the employers did in Traudt and Velásquez. Although appellants place much emphasis on the CQM contract language requiring CRSS to monitor and report on various safety violations, CRSS did not have the authority to rectify safety violations directly under the CQM contract. Rather, the CQM contract required CRSS to inspect, review, monitor, and report, and then submit the reports to the GSA, which in turn submitted them to Grimberg to take the appropriate actions. [10] Although the CRSS safety reports indicate that CRSS had limited authority to stop work in situations where it actually observed imminent danger situationsand it appears that on occasion CRSS stopped the work of Grimberg employees to correct safety hazards it observed first-handthe reports also state that CRSS was not responsible for performing periodic and exhaustive surveys of the work environment in regard to safety. Furthermore, even in viewing the testimony of Joseph Angsten, Grimberg's project manager, in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot say that his testimony establishes that CRSS had the level of authority with respect to safety rules such that it can be deemed an employer under the ISA. Although Angsten testified that CRSS inspectors' responsibilities with respect to monitoring compliance with safety regulations included walking the site on a daily basis and bringing any problems to the attention of Grimberg, he could not recall if CRSS inspectors ever stopped work at the site if they encountered safety hazards. [11] Thus, CRSS' limited authority falls well short of the level of contractual authority retained by the employers in Traudt and Velásquez, where the employers were responsible for promulgating and implementing specific safety regulations. Nonetheless, appellants argue that the most compelling evidence one can imagine to demonstrate control over the safety aspects of the employment and the place of employment is the draft notices that Grimberg proposed to send to its subcontractors, which Grimberg sent to CRSS in advance for approval. However, the draft notices do not state that Grimberg requested CRSS' approval; rather, they noted the actions that Grimberg took in response to the safety violations that CRSS noted in its safety reports. Furthermore, Grimberg noted that [i]f for any reason a sub-contractor cannot operate in a safe manner, [Grimberg] will take corrective measures. Also, appellants' reliance on a CRSS safety report that they claim demonstrates that not only did CRSS exercise the authority to stop the work, they exercised the ultimate control over the workplace, the power to discharge an employee for failing to comply with safety code requirements, is misplaced. The safety report stated that CRSS [o]bserved a selected employee working from an elevated area without fall protection; a fall hazard of approximately 12 feet, after which the [e]mployee was cautioned of the hazard and supervisor [was] notified. The report further stated that if the worker was seen without the use of fall protection again, he would be removed. However, the report did not state and there was no testimony about who cautioned the employee and who would have removed the employee if he was seen without the use of fall protection again. Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot say that there is evidence in the record to support that CRSS was an employer as defined under the ISA. In support of their contention that CRSS nevertheless exercised custody and control over the workplace in a manner sufficient to bring CRSS within the ambit of the ISA, appellants point to the expert testimony of Terry Lane, a former OSHA Area Director. Lane testified that CRSS had the standard of care to anticipate, plan for and monitor expected [safety] hazards, including those falling under the cooling tower placement project, notwithstanding its limited contractual obligations. Relying on the applicable ANSI standard, Lane testified that CRSS had to conduct and implement a hazard analysis describing potential hazards and actions required to provide a safe and healthful workplace, which was to be undertaken at the initiation of a construction project and for the critical stages of work. Lane further testified that based on this duty, CRSS failed to anticipate, plan for, and monitor expected [safety] hazards. However, this duty falls well short of the expansive type of obligations with respect to safety that we held amounted to the requisite custody or control to be deemed an employer in Traudt and Velásquez, as there is no evidence that CRSS promulgated safety regulations or breached an obligation to maintain a constant presence at the workplace to oversee safety requirements. Angsten's testimony that CRSS inspectors' responsibilities with respect to monitoring compliance with safety regulations included walking the site on a daily basis and bringing any problems to the attention of Grimberg does not amount to an obligation to promulgate safety regulations or maintain a constant presence at the workplace to oversee safety requirements. It is undisputed that no CRSS investigators were on site on the day that Presley was injured. The evidence (or permissible inferences from evidence) that CRSS had some authority to stop work and perhaps, at times, might have intervened with Grimberg to remind them of safety requirements, shows, at most, limited and infrequent interactions that are insufficient to establish that CRSS had the requisite control, in fact, over the workplace when Presley was injured. Particularly where an entity does not own the workplace, liability under the ISA must be grounded on facts showing authority and actual control. See Velásquez, supra, 759 A.2d at 681 (noting that an employer's responsibility under the [ISA] for a particular injury is commensurate with the nature and extent of the control that it exercises in fact over the workplace). Thus, even viewing Lane's testimony in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot say that there is evidence in the record to support that CRSS was an employer as defined under the ISA. [12] Appellants also contend that CRSS' role in assisting the State Department in the acquisition of the permit to use the athletic fields was evidence that CRSS exercised control and custody of the workplace, thus demonstrating that it was an employer pursuant to § 32-802(1) of the ISA. However, the acquisition of the permit to use the athletic fields does little to bolster appellants' claim that CRSS was an employer under the ISA. Although CRSS assisted in the acquisition of the permit to use the athletic fields, the permit was issued to the State Department and does not mention CRSS. We cannot say that such limited involvement indicates that CRSS had control or custody over the workplace. In conclusion, CRSS lacked the requisite control or custody over the workplace to be considered an employer under the ISA. See D.C.Code § 32-802(1). CRSS' principal role was as a consultant to the State Department. CRSS did not own the worksite, did not promulgate safety regulations, had only limited authority to stop work, did not normally act directly to rectify safety violations, and was not required to maintain a constant presence at the workplace. Therefore, CRSS had no duty to Presley under the ISA to ensure that safety procedures were followed. [13]
Appellants next contend that CRSS, by virtue of the services it undertook and performed under the CQM contract, assumed a duty of care to Presley under a common-law tort theory. [14] See Haynesworth, supra, 645 A.2d at 1097-98. The thrust of appellants' argument is that CRSS assumed a duty of exercising reasonable care in carrying out its contractual obligations that extended to workers on the site, irrespective of whether contractual privity with those workers existed. Specifically, appellants argue that CRSS assumed the duties owed by [the] GSA to [] Presley as controlling employer once CRSS undertook the responsibility pursuant to the CQM contract to monitor labor and safety requirements. However, an examination of our case law demonstrates why appellants' arguments are unpersuasive. [A] defendant is liable to a plaintiff for negligence only when the defendant owes the plaintiff some duty of care. Youssef v. 3636 Corp., 777 A.2d 787, 792 (D.C.2001) (citing Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, Inc., 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C.1997)). [A] determination of whether a duty exists is the result of a variety of considerations and not solely the relationship between the parties. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of District of Columbia v. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d 868, 871 (D.C.2009). In the absence of contractual privity with an unrelated third party, whether a party should have foreseen that its contractual undertaking was necessary for the protection of the third party is important. See Haynesworth, supra, 645 A.2d at 1098-99. Thus, even in the absence of contractual privity, we still look to the contract to determine the scope of the undertaking as it relates to the protection of the third party. See id. at 1098; Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 203 U.S.App.D.C. 407, 418-19, 631 F.2d 989, 1000-01 (1980). In addition, [t]he existence of a duty is also shaped by considerations of fairness and `results ultimately from policy decisions made by the courts and the legislatures.' DiSalvo, supra, 974 A.2d at 871 n. 2 (quoting Williams v. Baker, 572 A.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C.1990) (en banc)). In our jurisdiction, we have acknowledged that a legal duty arises when a party undertakes to render[ ] services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things. . . . Haynesworth, supra, 645 A.2d at 1097 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Haynesworth, we looked to § 324A, Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance of Undertaking, of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, in determining whether a party who performs services under a contract for one party assumes a duty to an unrelated third party. Id. Section 324A recognizes that: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. § 324A, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. In Haynesworth, we determined that a plumber who contracted with the owner to repair a broken pipe in a common area of a building did not assume a duty to warn the management company or the public of the dangerous conditionice in a nearby alleycaused by the broken pipe. 645 A.2d at 1099. We reasoned that neither the contract nor the practice in the plumbing industry extended the plumber's legal obligation beyond repairing the faulty plumbing. Id. at 1098-99. Thus, the plumber could not have foreseen that his undertaking, the fixing of a broken pipe, was necessary for the protection of a passerby such that a legal duty of care would arise to warn third parties. Id. at 1099. In the present case, finding a common-law duty depends primarily on whether CRSS should have recognized that its undertakings pursuant to the CQM contract were necessary for the protection of Presley. See id. at 1098-99. Though appellants' claim is premised upon a tort theory, the CQM contract nevertheless remains central to our analysis of duty, as it defines the scope of the undertaking and the services rendered by CRSS. See id. at 1098; Caldwell, supra, 203 U.S.App.D.C. at 418-19, 631 F.2d at 1000-01. By examining the scope of CRSS' undertaking and services pursuant to the CQM contract, we can then determine whether CRSS assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out its contractual obligations that extended to workers such as Presley on the site. We are not persuaded that any evidence shows CRSS should have foreseen that its obligation under the CQM contract to anticipate problems and to monitor safety compliance was  necessary for the protection of Presley. See Haynesworth, supra, 645 A.2d at 1097 (emphasis added) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A) (internal quotation marks omitted). The renovation of the main State Department building was a significant undertaking with a broad scope, spanning several years and involving numerous contracting parties to ensure that the contracts were being performed on time and according to specifications. The GSA, through Grimberg, a skilled construction contractor, implemented safety standards and procedures that were to be followed by the construction workers and contractors on the site at all times. In contrast, CRSS undertook to perform only the limited duties of a contract compliance consultant, not the more extensive duties of a safety engineer or general construction manager, and was not required to have safety personnel on site at all times. Cf. Caldwell, supra, 203 U.S.App.D.C. at 412-13, 631 F.2d at 994-95 (finding a duty because the safety engineer was required to develop and ensure compliance with safety procedures, to maintain a constant presence on the job site, and to direct the contractor to correct any unsatisfactory condition); Brady v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 82 Md.App. 519, 572 A.2d 1115, 1118-19 (1990) (finding a duty because the contract required the construction manager to provide safety engineering services. . . necessary to develop and ensure the application of a uniform system of safety and accident prevention and reporting procedures[,] . . . to provide safety engineering services as required to ensure compliance with . . . applicable guidance[,]. . . [and to] also direct contractors to correct any unsafe acts or conditions that may be detected.). The limited scope of CRSS' undertaking included non-exhaustive and occasional inspections, which ultimately benefitted Presley and the other Grimberg workers. However, these inspections were not the primary means of ensuring that safety precautions were taken at all times. Under the contractual scheme, that was the primary obligation of Grimberg and the other contractors charged with performing the actual construction work. Cf. Brady, supra, 572 A.2d at 1121. Thus, it was not reasonably foreseeable to CRSS that its responsibility under the CQM contract, limited as it was to occasional inspections and reports, was necessary to protect Presley. See Long v. District of Columbia, 261 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 3, 10, 820 F.2d 409, 411, 418 (1987) (holding that PEPCO acquired a duty to foreseeable plaintiffs, traveling members of the general public, by enter[ing] into a contract to perform services within its field of expertise, which included repair of malfunctioning traffic signal controls and notification of the repair or continuing malfunction of this safety equipment); Caldwell, supra, 203 U.S.App.D.C. at 418, 420, 631 F.2d at 1000, 1002 (determining that safety engineer's duty arose from a contractual relationship from which it was foreseeable that a negligent undertaking. . . might injure the appellant, and noting the superior skills of the safety engineer to take steps reasonable under the circumstances to protect appellant from the foreseeable risk of harm. . . .); Brady, supra, 572 A.2d at 1121 (holding that construction manager's duty arose from the notion that one who assumes the contractual obligation to supervise and enforce safety on a multi-employer worksite owes a duty of reasonable care to a worker even though he or she has no contractual privity). Furthermore, policy considerations of fairness counsel against imposing a duty on CRSS where doing so would effectively restructure the contractual relationships and obligations undertaken by the parties. See DiSalvo, supra, 974 A.2d at 871 n. 2. The GSA hired CRSS not as a guarantor, but to monitor the projects and report to the GSA. CRSS' CQM contract with GSA made clear that it was not intended to supplant the obligations of Grimberg, as general contractor, and the other contractors that had operational charge of construction. ([CRSS] is not responsible for and will not have control or charge of construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures; safety programs or procedures; or for acts or omissions of other contractors, agents or employees, or any other persons performing any of the work.). The GSA and CRSS also made clear in the CQM contract that the GSA was not delegating, and CRSS was not assuming, any of the duties of the architect-engineer or construction contractors. (Nothing in this contract shall be construed to mean that [CRSS] assumes any of the contractual responsibilities or duties of the architect-engineer or construction contractors.). To impute the claimed duty to CRSS, despite the explicit disclaimers and specified contractual responsibilities in the CQM contract, would improperly realign the allocation of risks and responsibilities structured in private contractual agreements. See Haynesworth, supra, 645 A.2d at 1099. There is no cause to do so where the evidence does not show that the GSA or Presley relied on CRSS to patrol and control the worksite, which would have been beyond the scope of CRSS' limited undertaking in the CQM contract. We have noted that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all. Sec. Nat'l Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833, 834 (D.C.1973) (quoting Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Notably, there is no evidence that CRSS acted beyond the limited scope of its undertaking at the time of the incident, as its inspectors were not on site when Presley was attaching the fan shroudsnor were they required to beand did not see the dangerous activity. [15] Although Angsten testified that CRSS inspectors' responsibilities with respect to monitoring compliance with safety regulations included walking the site on a daily basis, this was not an explicit obligation of CRSS under the CQM contract. [16] Therefore, CRSS cannot be said to have assumed the GSA's or Grimberg's duty to provide a safe workplace, or their duty to direct and determine the means or methods by which the employees were to perform the work, and we should not extend CRSS' legal obligation accordingly. See Haynesworth, supra, 645 A.2d at 1099. In sum, we are not persuaded that CRSS owed a common-law duty to Presley by virtue of CRSS' obligations under, or as a result of its performance of, the CQM contract. Although imposition of a duty may be appropriate in other cases, with different contractual arrangements, or where the actual performance of the contract indicates a measure of control of the worksite, it is not appropriate to do so based upon the facts in this case. Thus, we discern no error in the trial court's granting of judgment as a matter of law on the basis that CRSS owed no duty to appellants on the facts of this case.