Opinion ID: 2052636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seizure in the Home.

Text: Judge Ruiz bases her dissenting opinion largely on the fact that Womack was seized in the home in which he lived with his grandmother. She maintains that the exception to the constitutional probable cause requirement established in Terry v. Ohio, [ supra ], do[es] not easily extend to seizures in one's home. Dissenting op. at 615. She asserts that a felony arrest based on probable cause, when effected in a public place, is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, but that the Supreme Court has not been similarly tolerant of seizures of suspects occurring in the suspect's home. Id. at 618. Further, according to Judge Ruiz, [t]he fact that the seizure occurred in Womack's home ... undermines, rather than helps justify, the police's use of handcuffs under the circumstances presented in this case. [14] Id. at 629. The point Judge Ruiz raises is an interesting one, but it is not properly before us. Womack did not base his suppression motion or his appeal on any claim relating to the respect for the sanctity of the home. The principle that animates Judge Ruiz' opinion  namely, that the Terry doctrine does not apply, or applies with substantially less force, to seizures in a home which officers have entered with the homeowner's consent  was introduced into this case by our dissenting colleague. Womack, who is represented in this case by able counsel from the Public Defender Service, did not include such a contention  we will call it the diminished Terry exception claim [15]  in his motion to suppress, in his brief on appeal, in his reply brief, or at oral argument. He cited none of the cases on which Judge Ruiz relies for her diminished Terry exception theory. Indeed, Womack relied in his brief on decisions addressing Terry -type issues which arose at a Greyhound bus station, [16] during a traffic stop, [17] on the street, [18] and, in one case, in an apartment, [19] without any suggestion that greater restrictions should be placed on the police where the seizure followed a consensual entry into a home. Furthermore, in the memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Womack asserted in the trial court that, according to Terry, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. 392 U.S. at 8-9, 88 S.Ct. at 1873. He thus equated a seizure in the home with a seizure on the street, and thereby affirmatively invited the purported error which our dissenting colleague finds in the trial court's disposition. See District of Columbia v. Wical Ltd. Partnership, 630 A.2d 174, 182-83 (D.C.1993) (discussing invited error doctrine). Under these circumstances, the diminished Terry exception claim has not been preserved. Questions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal. Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Even if Womack had raised the issue in this court, which he did not, he would have to demonstrate that the trial judge committed plain error (or, indeed, invited error) by failing, on his own initiative, to grant the motion to suppress on the basis of a theory which was not presented to him by the defense. See, e.g., Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 32-33 (D.C.1989). To establish plain error, Womack would have to show that the application of conventional Terry principles in a seizure following a consensual entry into a home was obviously wrong, and that the failure of the judge, sua sponte, to adopt the diminished Terry exception theory would result in a clear miscarriage of justice. See Baxter v. United States, 640 A.2d 714, 717 (D.C.1994) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Because the correctness of that theory is anything but obvious, [20] and because the result in this case is not unjust, [21] Womack would not have even a remote prospect of sustaining his burden under the plain error doctrine. But even the plain error scenario is more favorable to Womack than the present record. Here, Womack failed to present his diminished Terry exception claim not only in the trial court, but also on appeal. Where counsel has made no attempt to address an issue, an appellate court will generally decline to consider it. Rose v. United States, 629 A.2d 526, 536 (D.C.1993); Carducci v. Regan, 230 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 86, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (1983). As Judge (now Justice) Scalia reiterated in Carducci, [t]he premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them. Id.; accord, Rose, 629 A.2d at 536-37 (quoting Carducci ). [22] The diminished Terry exception issue has not been briefed by counsel. The government has never had any occasion or opportunity to address it. [23] Accordingly, we decline to consider it. [24]