Opinion ID: 697058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Giglio Material

Text: 13 The district court's refusal to order the prosecutors to turn over material under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) is reviewed de novo. United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 1991). 14 Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), failure of the prosecutor to disclose evidence that is both favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment violates due process. United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 1986). This includes materials going to the credibility of a government witness. Id.; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Two questions are thus presented: (1) did the prosecution withhold evidence relevant to the credibility of a government witness, and (2) if so, is there a reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the outcome of the trial. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. 15 Sometime between her arrest on November 22, 1991, and her interview with prosecutors in February 1992, Williams received an indeterminate result on an HIV test. The February interview notes contain the following entry: HIV-positive defendant can argue for DOW. departure. This note apparently refers to a conditional term of Williams' agreement with prosecutors in the event she did turn out to be HIV-positive. This agreement was incorporated into the terms of Williams' plea bargain. Two subsequent test results, received months before trial, showed that, in fact, Williams was not HIV-positive. 16 The district court correctly determined that the February interview notes did not constitute Giglio material. The critical information--that in exchange for her testimony Williams would be free to argue for a downward departure in the event that she did turn out to be HIV-positive--was not withheld from defense counsel. According to the representations made by government counsel before the district court in the hearing after remand, defense counsel was expressly invited to review the plea agreement, which includes the terms at issue, on October 14, 1992, about a week before trial, but declined to do so. These representations were not disputed by defense counsel either in the district court or on this appeal. 17 Even if the government had withheld the information, there is no reasonable probability that its disclosure would have changed the outcome of the trial. The record indicates that defense counsel was well aware that Williams had been under the mistaken impression that she may have been HIV-positive during the period when she was negotiating her plea agreement with prosecutors. In fact, he made reference to this fact in his opening statement when he told the jury: 18 We intend to inquire into her [Williams'] state of mind and you will learn the following: 19 That Rosalie Williams does not like being in custody; that it is not pleasant for her; that she has suffered in the past from mental instability; that she has a serious physical ailment which makes it very important for her to be able to get out of custody as soon as possible .... 20 RT1 at 129-30 (emphasis added). Despite recognizing both Williams' mistaken belief, and the effect that this might have had on her decision to testify, defense counsel made no efforts to review the plea agreement, and elected not to cross-examine Williams on her HIV status, or to otherwise introduce evidence on this point. 21 Finally, the fact remains that Williams was not HIV-positive, and she knew this long before she testified at trial. Thus, the term in her plea agreement allowing her to argue for a health-related downward departure was worthless to her when she testified. 22 The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.