Opinion ID: 2585338
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The circuit court considered all the relevant statutory factors in sentencing Rauch.

Text: Rauch asserts that findings of fact consistent with all the factors of [HRS] § 706-606(2)... are necessary prior to imposing a jail term where the person is placed on probation. Rauch reasons that, inasmuch as the circuit court did not expressly make findings of fact with regard to the factors set forth in HRS §§ 706-606(2)(c) and 706-606(2)(d) and, in any event, the record, according to Rauch, is insufficient to support either of these factors, the circuit court abused its discretion by imposing a one-year term of imprisonment as a special condition of her probation. HRS § 706-621 (1993) generally sets forth the factors a sentencing court shall consider in imposing a term of probation, and subsection (1) directs the sentencing court to consider the factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606 to the extent that they are applicable. HRS § 706-624(2) (1993), entitled [d]iscretionary conditions of probation, provides in relevant part that [t]he court may provide, as further conditions of probation, to the extent that the conditions are reasonably related to the factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606 and to the extent that the conditions involve only deprivations of liberty or property as are reasonably necessary for the purposes indicated in [HRS §] 706-606(2), that the defendant: (a) Serve a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year in felony cases[.] HRS § 706-606 (1993) provides as follows: The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider: (1) The nature of the circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) The need for the sentence imposed: (a) To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (b) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (c) To protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (d) To provide the defendant with needed educational and vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) The kinds of sentences available; and (4) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. We find nothing in the foregoing statutory provisions that requires, as argued by Rauch, a sentencing court expressly to make findings of fact with regard to each of the factors enumerated in HRS § 706-606(2). Indeed, the foregoing statutory provisions expressly vest the sentencing court with wide discretion, and, with regard to imposing a sentence of probation, require only that the court consider the HRS § 706-606 factors that are applicable. HRS § 706-621. The record in the present matter reflects that the circuit court did consider all relevant statutory factors in sentencing Rauch. See supra section I. Rauch principally relies upon the following proposition: As a general matter, when exercising its broad discretion to impose any particular sentence so as to fit the punishment to the offense as well as to the needs of the individual defendant and the community, the sentencing court [is] obligated to consider the HRS § 706-606 `factors' as part of its decision making process. State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 149, 890 P.2d 1167, 1189 (1995) (citations omitted). However, Rauch's claim is not that the circuit court failed to consider the HRS § 706-606 factors in imposing a sentence of probation for ten years. Rather her claim is that the HRS § 706-606 factors must be considered in the specific context of imposing conditions of probation; Gaylord, consequently, is inapposite. In Gaylord, this court observed that the HRS § 706-606 factors must be considered in the context of the sentencing court's decision to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, inasmuch as HRS § 706-668.5, vesting the sentencing court with discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, expressly provides that the sentencing court shall consider the factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606. By way of contrast, in imposing a sentence of probation, the applicable statute expressly provides that the sentencing court shall consider . . . [t]he factors set forth in [HRS §] 706-606 to the extent that they are applicable. Accordingly, we find no merit in Rauch's claim that the circuit court was required to consider all of the HRS § 706-606 factors in determining whether to impose a term of probation and the conditions thereof. Rauch next appears to argue that because the record allegedly fails to support findings under HRS §§ 706-606(2)(c) and 706-606(2)(d), the circuit court was precluded from imposing a sentence of incarceration. This argument is also without merit, inasmuch as the foregoing statutory provisions require the sentencing court to weigh and balance the various factors and in no manner indicate that any given factor is dispositive of whether a term of imprisonment may be imposed as a condition of probation. Thus, even if neither factor had evidentiary support, the circuit court would not, under the statutory sentencing scheme outlined above, be required to forego imposing a term of imprisonment as a condition of probation.