Opinion ID: 153666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Mr. Veatch's Money Laundering Charge

Text: 109 Defendant Veatch asserts that insufficient evidence supported his conviction for money laundering because the government did not prove that the transactions were designed to conceal the nature, the location, the source, or ownership of the control of the funds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I). 9 Appellant Veatch's Br. at 45. Defendant, however, was indicted and found guilty of violating § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), which does not include concealment as an element. To convict Mr. Veatch of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the government had to prove that (1) the defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction, (2) which the defendant knew involved the proceeds of unlawful activity, (3) with the intent to promote or further unlawful activity. United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2599 (1995). 110 It is undisputed that Mr. Veatch conducted the financial transactions at issue and that the proceeds of the transactions were from Dion Enterprises's business dealings with Security National Bank. The evidence presented at trial showed that Mr. Veatch used an assumed name and Social Security Number in applying for a credit card merchant account in the name of Dion Enterprises at Security National Bank, a financial institution insured by the FDIC; that he misled Security Bank to believe that Dion Enterprises was a travel agency that would process only sales made by its employees; that the credit card merchant account for Dion Enterprises was approved on the basis of his false statements; that approximately $151,000 of credit card sales not made by Dion Enterprises's employees were deposited into the Security National Bank account; that Security National Bank lost $96,000 from chargebacks resulting from unauthorized sales credited against the Dion Enterprises's merchant account; that Mr. Veatch again used an assumed name and Social Security Number to open a checking account at Central Bank in the name of Dion Enterprises; that twice Mr. Veatch conducted monetary transactions that transferred funds obtained from the unauthorized credit card charges against the merchant account at Security National Bank to the Dion Enterprises's account at Central Bank; and that the transferred funds were used to promote or further fraudulent activity by paying salaries, rent, and other miscellaneous business expenses of Dion Enterprises. Clearly, there was sufficient proof from which a reasonable jury could find Mr. Veatch guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). XIV. Bias of the Trial Judge 111 Defendant Veatch claims the trial judge should have disqualified herself from Mr. Veatch's trial. Prior to the first competency hearing, Mr. Veatch filed a motion to have Judge Cauthron recuse herself, which the judge refused to do. See United States v. Veatch, 842 F.Supp. 480, 481 (W.D.Okla.1993). We review a denial of a motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 994 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2250 (1995). A federal judge should recuse pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) if there are grounds to question the judge's impartiality. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 861 (1988). 112 Mr. Veatch argues that Judge Cauthron's impartiality was called into question after he filed a civil lawsuit against her for racketeering, obstruction of justice, conspiracy to murder Mr. Veatch, kidnaping and extortion, and other criminal conduct. The allegations in the complaint were unsubstantiated and facially frivolous. In short, Mr. Veatch's suit was an attempt to disqualify all federal judges in the Western District of Oklahoma from sitting on his criminal case. In the civil action he named all six district court judges for the Western District of Oklahoma, but Judge Cauthron's name did not appear in the body of the civil complaint. Judge Cauthron correctly denied the recusal motion after finding it was merely an attempt to obtain the forum and judge of his choice. See Veatch, 842 F.2d at 481. 113