Opinion ID: 2230068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiently Broad Spectrum Standard

Text: The Court propounds today that chapter 390 is not a permissible accommodation because the class benefitted by it is anything but broad (majority opn, at 695). Ancillary to this determination is the discrete objection that the eligibility requirements of the statute are so narrowly drawn as to prevent other similarly situated groups from qualifying for the statute's entitlements. Initially, this inverted analysis ignores the presumption of constitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. It also devalues the constitutional burden into a mere counting exercise. Under the standard presumption of constitutionality, the challengers against chapter 390 must bear the burden to demonstrate the practical impossibility of any general application of the legislation. Challengers did just that in Kiryas Joel II. Quite differently here, the Majority's insistence upon a showing that chapter 390 immediately applies to a sufficiently broad spectrum of existing municipalities effectively switches the judicial review standard into a presumption of unconstitutionality. Moreover, it shifts the burden of overcoming the transformed standard onto the defenders of the constitutionality of the statute. While not expressly so stated, the Majority's concerns here appear to stem largely from some apprehension that the State action inhering in chapter 390 will be perceived as an endorsement of Satmar Hasidism ( see, infra, at 707). This concern was first reflected by this Court in Kiryas Joel I, which referenced School Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v Ball ( supra ). After Agostini, however, Ball and the perception of endorsement no longer provide the dispositive force that the Majority's rationale gives it under the guise of the broad spectrum requirement. The Majority flatly refuses to credit the neutral criteria of the statute itself because of a pre-determined concentration on its perceived sense of advancement of one religion over another. Even if the proponents had to meet this amorphous constitutional standard, we note that it is not surprising that a sufficient population or wealth shift has not occurred over the short span of the statute's existence so as to allow the immediate qualification of more municipalities. Nor is it remarkable that no potential groups have yet undertaken the process of incorporating in order to pursue the benefits of a statute, the constitutionality of which has remained mired in controversy and litigation. The Majority's constitutional barrierthe impermissible accommodation due to an insufficiently broad spectrum of religious groupscannot be dispositive or be given the prevailing weight that a constitutionality-reviewing Court inaptly confers in this case. Furthermore, precedent does not support the application of this theory. Indeed, after Agostini, courts specifically need not look at how many religious or nonreligious groups benefit from a statute or challenged State action ( see, Agostini v Felton, supra, at 229-230). Even if we were to recognize and conduct that analytical step, the current practical effect of chapter 390 is that it is equally applicable to sectarian, as well as nonsectarian, municipal assemblages. The Majority cancels chapter 390 because it may presently be available to only two municipalitiesone undeniably secular in every sense of the word. This contradicts relevant and longstanding precedent and legislative practices in this respect, as well as the expert proof adduced by the proponents of the enactment and expressly adopted by the Governor in signing the bill into law ( see, Governor's Mem approving L 1997, ch 390, 1997 NY Legis Ann, at 259 [Data provided by the State Education Department show ten municipalities throughout the State which are currently eligible to form school districts under the criteria set forth in this legislation, in addition to those that can become eligible in the future ] [emphasis added]; see also, Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 70, 79, supra ). If the mere fact that the source for chapter 390 is traceable originally to one municipality becomes a litmus test of constitutional dimension, the State would have many fewer statutes on its books and the courts can look forward to a lot more legislative review business on that challenge basis. This Court has repeatedly upheld legislation which has an initial effect on only one municipality so long as the statute, on its face (with the formidable presumption of constitutionality also going for it), is general enough that application to other municipalities is real and available prospectively ( see, Matter of McAneny v Board of Estimate & Apportionment, 232 NY 377, 392-393; see also, Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources, supra, at 373). That is the nucleus and thrust of much programmatic, remedial legislation. At the very least, there is no conclusive presumption to the contrary ( Matter of McAneny v Board of Estimate & Apportionment, supra, at 393). Thus, this Court's Kiryas Joel II decision establishes an uncontestable given for the review of chapter 390that the core requirement of a constitutional statute is that it must apply to other municipalities ( see, Grumet v Cuomo, 90 NY2d 57, 75, supra ). This one now does. Yet, the Majority substitutes a judicial, quantitative arithmetic analysis for the policyempirical calculus that was used by the Legislature and the Governor ( see, Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, supra ). Also uncontested is the fact that it was perfectly proper for the citizens of Kiryas Joel to take advantage of State legislation that created the Village that exists today. This is a right that New York's Village Law gives almost any group of residents who satisfy certain procedural niceties ( see, Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vil. School Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 691, supra ). Indeed, it probably would have been unconstitutional to deprive these citizens of their right to incorporate simply because the geographic boundaries allowed a Village to be formed consisting solely of members of the same religious beliefs. Once again, that very municipality similarly seeks to secure and take advantage of other generally applicable legislation. The Majority's decision today essentially, functionally and virtually forever forecloses this right for the citizens of the Village of Kiryas Joel; it deprives them of the opportunity afforded by chapter 390 simply because the civic Village is the first municipal group to utilize the statutory enablement. Were other municipalities to precede Kiryas Joel in opting in under this legislation, just as other communities incorporated themselves as villages prior to Kiryas Joel, the courts would lack the power under the Establishment Clause to deny Kiryas Joel the same statutory benefit. It is sadly ironic that the Legislature's overture to assist the handicapped children of this Village, who require special secular education needs, is again struck down simply because the children happen to be members of the Satmar Hasidim community within a duly incorporated civic Village.