Opinion ID: 2035676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The Change of Venue Was Proper

Text: James next argues that the trial court erred in refusing to name non-adjoining counties to the panel of receiving counties in connection with his motion for change of venue. James contends that because two of the three counties designated as receiving counties had low minority populations, he was denied the right to an impartial jury. We do not agree. James moved for a change of venue from LaPorte County, where the crime was committed, on account of pre-trial publicity. According to evidence James presented to the trial court, Americans of African descent comprise twenty per cent of LaPorte's population. The three counties surrounding LaPorte County are Porter and Stark Counties, both of which have a minority population of less than one per cent, and St. Joseph, the minority population of which is unknown. Essentially, James argues that he is entitled to change of venue to a county with a population of Americans of African descent higher than one per cent. Thus, he asserts, he would not be able to receive a trial by an impartial jury in either Stark or Porter counties. James correctly notes that Indiana Criminal Rule 12 permits the trial judge before whom an application for a change of venue from the county is pending to eliminate a county from the list of counties to be submitted for striking if it appears that the grounds for a change of venue also exist in one or more of the adjoining counties. The decision as to whether to add non-adjoining counties to the panel of receiving counties is within the discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion. McDaniel v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 380, 382, 375 N.E.2d 228, 230. On this record, we find nothing to suggest that such an abuse occurred. The issue of the racial composition of the jury, when raised by a defendant, requires a demonstration of purposeful discrimination against that racial group. Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1105, 1115. The defendant bears the burden of showing that the discrimination was due to a systematic exclusion of that particular group. Id. Absent such purposeful discrimination and systematic exclusion, defendants' claims relating to the racial composition of jury panels have not been recognized. See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579. James claims that by submitting the current census figures for Porter and Stark counties, he proved that he would not receive a trial by an impartial jury in either of those counties. We do not agree. We find nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court's decision to follow the mandates of Criminal Rule 12 in any way demonstrated purposeful discrimination or systematic exclusion of Americans of African descent from juries. James also argues that the trial court erred in failing to require the prosecutor to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for striking St. Joseph County from the list of receiving counties. James analogizes his situation to that of the racially-motivated exclusion of jurors via peremptory challenges as discussed in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. James claims that LaPorte County prosecutors systematically strike St. Joseph County as a receiving county, and that by doing so, the LaPorte County Prosecutor's office effectively and purposely excludes Americans of African descent from serving as jurors in a case with a defendant of the same heritage. We need not decide today whether such an analogy could ever be appropriate. In this case, James has not shown any such systematic exclusion as discussed in Batson. The record upon which James relies to support his claim indicates that, of the three cases in which venue had been granted from LaPorte to St. Joseph County, St. Joseph County had been chosen as the receiving county in one. Of the remaining two, one case was venued to Porter County and one to LaPorte County. We find no particular pattern of systematic exclusion. Inasmuch as the burden of proof rests with James, we find that he has not sustained it.