Opinion ID: 582485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The $1,000,000 Restitution Order

Text: 57 Merit contends that the district court's $1,000,000 restitution order was improper under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664. We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion as long as it is within the statutory framework. United States v. Sharp, 941 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir.1991). 58 Merit looks to Sharp, in which we stated that [e]ven when the offense of conviction involves a conspiracy or scheme, restitution must be limited to the loss attributable to the specific conduct underlying the conviction. Id. at 815 (interpreting Hughey v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 1979 (1990) (superseded by Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-647, § 2509, 104 Stat. 4789, 4863 (1990) [to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) ]). If Merit had been convicted only of wire fraud, which is an offense of conviction involv[ing] a conspiracy or scheme, he would be justified in looking to Sharp for relief. Cf. id. ([O]ne of the elements of wire fraud is the existence of an underlying scheme.). Here, however, the second offense of conviction was conspiracy. 6 The district court was therefore justified in taking into account the losses attributable to the conduct described in count 14, which alleged conspiracy to fraudulently induc[e] investors throughout the United States to purchase more than $2,000,000 of Tracon common stock. 59 We reject Merit's argument that the court should have considered whether each investor's harm was actually attributable to the actions of his codefendants. Judge Broomfield noted that Merit's involvement in the case was the most complete, most comprehensive and overreaching of all the defendants, and he was unquestionably the leader and planner, the organizer and if you would brains of the effort to manipulate and defraud others in this case. It is apparent that all of the investors were harmed by Merit's actions. 60 Merit, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(1), also argues that the restitution order was improper in light of the fact that the investor-victims may ultimately recover through Tracon's plan of reorganization under Chapter 11. Merit's unsupported speculation that the victims may ultimately recover, however, falls short of the certain recovery contemplated by this section of the VWPA. Any future recovery can be credited against the restitution amount. Cf. Smith, 944 F.2d at 625. 61 Merit also claims that the order was improper because he was indigent. Even if he were indigent, the VWPA does not prohibit a sentencing court from imposing a restitutionary sentence upon a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing. United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1393 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985). 62 Finally, Merit argues that the district court failed to consider the financial resources of the defendant, [and] the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). Merit's presentence report, however, included information about these matters. Although the PSR indicates that Merit does not have the capacity to pay an additional fine, it also indicates that he had had access to substantial funds. As in United States v. Schubert, No. 91-10165, slip op. 1811, 1815-16 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 1992), the district court resolved the conflict against Merit. We affirm the restitutionary and other portions of Merit's sentence, as well as the sentences of his co-defendants. 63 AFFIRMED.