Opinion ID: 2410262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Previous conviction for subsequent crime

Text: For his second point on appeal, Sanders argues that the trial court erred in permitting the State to prove the aggravating circumstance of the commission of another felony involving the use of violence by introducing his conviction for a murder that occurred after the killings in the present case. Under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(3) (Repl. 1993), one of the aggravating circumstances that may be considered in death-penalty cases is that The person previously committed another felony, an element of which was the use or threat of violence to another person or the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person.... The murder of Frederick LaSalle, for which Sanders was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, occurred on December 31, 1989, whereas the Brannon killings occurred on or about November 21, 1989. Therefore, Sanders maintains, it cannot be considered a previously committed violent felony under the statute. We reversed Sanders's original conviction in the LaSalle murder and remanded the matter for a new trial in Sanders I. The second conviction and life sentence were affirmed in Sanders III, handed down on October 5, 1992. In the previous appeal in the present case, Sanders II, involving the murder of the Brannons, we held that, where the prosecutor had introduced the conviction judgment in the LaSalle killing to establish an aggravating circumstance and that judgment was subsequently reversed, the use of the conviction was prejudicial, and Sanders was entitled to be resentenced. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). In Sanders II, we noted that, because we must declare error on this point, we need not address the appellant's argument that the capital murder was not previously committed to the present crimes as is required under § 5-4-604(3). 308 Ark. at 184, 824 S.W.2d at 357. The State, in the present appeal, contends that, by virtue of the requirement of Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 4-3(h) that the Supreme Court of Arkansas review all prejudicial errors in a death case, this court has decided the issue against Sanders, and the doctrine of the law of the case applies. See Bennett v. State, 308 Ark. 393, 825 S.W.2d 560 (1992). In Sanders II, however, we were merely declining to consider a single facet of a larger issue which had already been resolved in Sanders's favor, thus rendering consideration of the subpoint unnecessary. Thus, it is necessary to focus upon the merits of the question as law of the case does not apply. It should be noted that this court has never addressed precisely this issuethat is, whether a violent felony committed after a crime that warrants imposition of the death penalty may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the sentencing phase when the conviction for the violent felony was entered prior to the sentencing trial. Other jurisdictions, however, have dealt with the question, and their holdings have been collected in Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence, for Purposes of Death Penalty, to Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance that Defendant was Previously Convicted of or Committed Other Violent Offense, had History of Violent Conduct, Posed Continuing Threat to Society, and the LikePost Gregg Cases, 65 A.L.R.4th 838, 919-925 (1988). In Daugherty v. State, 419 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 1982), the appellant, who had been sentenced to death for the murder of a hitchhiker, challenged the admission of various prior murder, assault, and robbery convictions as an aggravating circumstance because, except for one murder, all of the crimes occurred after the killing for which he received the death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court, citing its earlier decision in Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Fla.1977), emphasized that the operative statutory language referred to previous convictions rather than previous crimes. However, the Florida court, quoting from King v. State, 390 So.2d 315, 320 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989, 101 S.Ct. 1529, 67 L.Ed.2d 825 (1981), pointed out that [t]he legislative intent is clear that any violent crime for which there was a conviction at the time of sentencing should be considered as an aggravating circumstance. 419 So.2d at 1069. An Alabama death penalty case raised the question whether the trial court had erred in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior convictions in Georgia when those offenses occurred after the crime for which he was sentenced to death in Alabama. The Alabama Code employed the Model Penal Code term previously convicted, and the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the determination by the Court of Criminal Appeals that the language referred to a time prior to sentence instead of prior to the date of the commission of the capital offense. Ex Parte Coulter, 438 So.2d 352 (Ala.1983); see also Coulter v. State, 438 So.2d 336 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). The Arizona Supreme Court, in State v. Steelman, 126 Ariz. 19, 612 P.2d 475 (1980), rejected the appellant's contention that nine murder convictions and five robbery convictions from California should not have been considered as an aggravating circumstance in his Arizona sentencing because they were committed after the murders for which he was sentenced to death. The court discussed the enhancement statutes in the Arizona Criminal Code, which required that the prior conviction be based on an offense committed before the offense for which the defendant is sentenced in order to serve simultaneously as a warning and encouragement to first offenders. But the Arizona death penalty statute, said the court, makes no reference to when the acts underlying those convictions must have been committed. 612 P.2d at 481. The court, noting that the purpose of an aggravation/mitigation hearing is to determine the character and propensities of the defendant, observed that the revelation of subsequent lawless acts of violence would help to attain the objectives of the sentencing statute. Id. See also State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 526, 633 P.2d 335 (1981). A prior murder convictions special circumstances statute was at issue in People v. Hendricks, 43 Cal.3d 584, 238 Cal.Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350 (1987), a California death penalty case. There, the California Supreme Court stated that the statutory language setting forth the special circumstance that [t]he defendant was previously convicted of murder in the first or second degree was unambiguous in its simple and unequivocal reference to previous convictions. The order of the commission of the homicides, declared the court, is immaterial. 238 Cal.Rptr. at 73, 737 P.2d at 1357. Each of the cases just cited contains a distinction that is critical in the present matter. The relevant statute in each instance speaks in terms of previous convictions. Within that framework, a murder or violent act might occur before or after the commission of the homicide under current consideration. Under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604(3), however, the language clearly states that [a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to, among other enumerated examples, a situation in which [t]he person previously committed another felony.  This phraseology is superficially similar to the Florida Supreme Court's disapproved term previous crimes in Daugherty v. State, supra . Implicit in the Arkansas statute's phrase previously committed another felony, which itself is supported by the statutory elaboration of the element of the use of threat of violence and the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury, is at least the contemplation of a conviction. Indeed, proof of a conviction serves to establish the aggravating circumstance of a previous violent felony. And, it should be recalled, the Florida court stressed in Daugherty that the purpose of the statute was to ensure that any violent crime for which there was a conviction at the time of the sentencing should be considered as an aggravating circumstance. 419 So.2d at 1069. The fundamental thrust of the Arkansas aggravating-circumstances statute is prospective. As we held in Whitmore v. State, 296 Ark. 308, 756 S.W.2d 890 (1988), a case concerning the introduction of a twenty-three-year-old violent felony conviction: Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-604 ... is not concerned with the defendant's character at the time of trial, for the jury already knows the defendant has just recently committed a murder. Instead, this statute is concerned with disclosing whether the defendant's history establishes such a propensity for violence that it will reoccur. Once the jury knows about a defendant's past propensity for violence, it can weigh that against any mitigating circumstances. In striking this balance the jury determines if the defendant has such a marked propensity for violence that it would likely manifest itself again in the future. If the jury determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant will strike again, it may sentence him to death. 296 Ark. at 316, 756 S.W.2d at 894. Naturally, a violent felony that was committed after the killing in question (but which resulted in a conviction prior to the sentencing hearing) would have considerable bearing on a convicted murderer's propensity to strike again. For these reasons, we have no hesitancy in saying that the trial court did not err in allowing the State to introduce evidence of Sanders's conviction for the murder of Frederick LaSalle.