Opinion ID: 1818338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of past abuse

Text: Appellant first claims that the trial court erroneously admitted relationship evidence without following the proper protective procedures. Some of the admitted evidence contested by the appellant relates to what may have been a prior crime, i.e., Younghans' testimony about an assault five on July 3, 1999 and Kia Vang's testimony about this assault. Other evidence alleged to be improperly admitted did not relate to this assault, i.e., Kia Vang's testimony that she had, on more than one occasion, seen appellant push, punch, and kick Xia Vang. Relying on State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389 (Minn.1984), the trial court ruled at the beginning of the trial that evidence related to appellant's prior acts of violence against Xia Vang were relevant but could be subject to a foundation objection during trial. Evidence that pertains to the relationship between a defendant and a homicide victim may be admissible in criminal prosecutions even if it refers to other crimes. Langley, 354 N.W.2d at 397; State v. Salas, 306 N.W.2d 832, 836 (Minn. 1981). Relationship evidence related to a defendant's past abuse of a victim is not admissible to prove character in order to show that defendant acted in conformity with that character, but may be admissible to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 236 (Minn. 1999) (quotation and citation omitted); Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). For such abuse evidence to be admissible, the state must provide clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the prior abuse and must show that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 336 (Minn.1998); Minn. R. Evid. 403. As with other evidentiary rulings, we generally defer to the trial court's discretion in admitting such evidence and will reverse only upon a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 336. As discussed above, Kia Vang took the stand and testified about seeing appellant push, punch, and kick Xia Vang on more than one occasion as well as appellant's assault of Xia Vang on July 3, 1999. Appellant did not object to this testimony or to the admission of the two photographs taken on July 3, 1999 showing how Xia Vang looked as a result of appellant's assaultive behavior. Failure to object to the admission of evidence generally constitutes waiver of the right to appeal on that basis unless the admission of evidence constituted plain error and affected the defendant's substantial rights. State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 684-85 (Minn.2001). In order to show substantial rights were affected, the defendant bears a heavy burden of persuasion to show that the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn.1998). Even if the defendant meets this burden, we must still decide whether we should address the issue in order to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 740. Furthermore, a defendant's contentions that a trial court's cautionary instruction was inadequate or that a cautionary instruction should have been given at the time the evidence was received are deemed forfeited on appeal if not raised before the trial court. See State v. Ford, 322 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Minn.1982). Appellant neither objected to Kia Vang's testimony nor requested a cautionary instruction at the time her relationship testimony was offered. Therefore, the question before us as to Kia Vang's testimony is not whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Kia Vang's testimony but whether the trial court plainly erred in such a way that affected appellant's substantial rights. See Vick, 632 N.W.2d at 685; see also State v. Mills, 562 N.W.2d 276, 284 n. 6 (Minn.1997) (recognizing that the defendant's objection that testimony was improper was waived on appeal because he failed to object at trial); Ford, 322 N.W.2d at 615 (recognizing that a defendant's contention that a cautionary instruction should have been given at the time the evidence was received is deemed forfeited if not raised before the trial court). Appellant claims that the trial court erred because it did not determine whether the testimony offered by Kia Vang was clear and convincing. However, Kia Vang's testimony that she had, on more than one occasion, seen appellant push, punch, and kick Xia Vang is eyewitness testimony, thereby satisfying the clear and convincing prong. See Williams, 593 N.W.2d at 236. Furthermore, the pictures of Xia Vang after the July 3, 1999 assault corroborated Kia Vang's testimony about this assault. This again is clear and convincing evidence that an assault occurred. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error by admitting Kia Vang's relationship testimony. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Younghans to testify that appellant had denied being involved in an assault five with Xia Vang but had nevertheless admitted to beating Vang on two separate occasions and threatening to kill her. While appellant did object to Younghans' testimony, his objection was overruled. Younghans' testimony was clearly relevant to show the history of the relationship between appellant and Vang and any statements about appellant beating his wife and threatening to kill her were appellant's own admissions and were therefore admissible. See Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). While appellant asserts that the court failed to consider whether the probative value of the relationship evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, the record indicates that the amount of relationship evidence admitted was minimal and not excessively explicit or inflammatory. See Buggs, 581 N.W.2d at 336. Furthermore, the court provided a cautionary instruction at the end of the trial regarding the testimony about the July 3, 1999 incident, telling the jury, whatever you find about the events of July 3, 1999, should not be used to convict the defendant. Under these facts, we hold that the trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion by allowing Younghans' testimony to be admitted at trial.