Opinion ID: 203882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Words and Actions Instruction

Text: This argument rests on appellant's contention that, as a matter of law, a conspiracy conviction requires that a defendant's `membership in a conspiracy be proved on the basis of his own words and actions (not on the basis of mere association or knowledge of wrongdoing).' United States v. Richardson, 225 F.3d 46, 53 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1003 (1st Cir.1987)). Therefore, he alleges reversible error in the court's failure to give the instruction he requested, which was taken from the Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the First Circuit [5] and which stated that proof that [defendant] willfully joined in the agreement must be based on evidence of [his/her] own words and/or actions. [6] The parties agree that our review of this claim is for abuse of discretion. Gonzalez was convicted of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, which requires proof that a conspiracy existed and that a particular defendant agreed to participate in it, intending to commit the underlying substantive offense. ... United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1173 (1st Cir. 1993). Gonzalez is thus clearly correct that the law requires the government to prove  and the jury to find  more than mere association or knowledge of wrongdoing. However, his argument of error in the court's failure specifically to incorporate the words and actions instruction is meritless, even under the standard of review applicable to this issue because of defendant's contemporaneous objection. In fact, in Richardson, which appellant cites for the proposition that the words and actions instruction is a correct statement of the law, we specifically rejected a challenge based on the trial court's deviation from this language. 225 F.3d at 53-54. [7] Although we acknowledged that the court's deviation from the Pattern Instruction  the same instruction that Gonzalez requested here  created an arguable ambiguity, we found that any such ambiguity was cured by additional instructions, and that the charge as a whole correctly informed the jury that a guilty verdict ... had to rest on evidence of [defendant's] own words or actions. Id. at 54. We pointed to portions of the charge that effectively made the point that [defendant's] guilt could only be established by his own words or actions, such as (1) the court's explicit warning that mere association did not establish membership in a conspiracy; (2) its instruction that the government had to prove both intent to agree and intent to commit the underlying crime, and, (3) most significantly, the following: no defendant may be found guilty for the acts of others unless you find that that defendant himself engaged in criminal acts. ... The fundamental question is whether or not through acts and statements of his own, reflected both in those acts and statements and in the other evidence in this case, the defendant has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have engaged in the crime that is alleged. Id. In this case, as in Richardson, the court warned that [t]he fact that various persons may have engaged in similar conduct or that they may have associated with one another ... are factors that you can consider, but [] don't, by themselves, prove a conspiracy. Like the jury in Richardson, the jury here was also told that the government had the burden to prove that Gonzalez both voluntarily participated in the conspiracy or was a member of the conspiracy (i.e., had intended to agree) and that the defendant intended that the offense ... be committed (i.e. intent to commit the crime). Finally, the court repeatedly emphasized that the key element of a conspiracy was a mutual agreement to commit unlawful acts, and explicitly stated that the defendant must have been a party to that mutual agreement or understanding. The court stated that [t]he essence of conspiracy is participating in a plan or a scheme to do something unlawful. The charge, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed the idea that Gonzalez must have personally and intentionally joined the agreement, which is all the law requires. The district court is not required to parrot the language proffered by the parties. United States v. Glaum, 356 F.3d 169, 178 (1st Cir.2004).