Opinion ID: 1191612
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure-to-warn instruction

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on the manufacturer's duty to give adequate instructions for use of a product. However, the trial court refused to give an instruction on failure to warn. [1] Although no court reporter was present when jury instructions were being settled, the trial court later allowed counsel to note objections on the record. We have voiced strong disapproval to motions argued in chambers without the benefit of court reporters. See State v. Bay, 150 Ariz. 112, 722 P.2d 280 (1986). Jury instructions should always be settled in the presence of a court reporter. We view this issue as whether Gosewisch presented a prima facie failure-to-warn case that would have entitled him to an instruction. The court of appeals viewed the issue differently and held: Because plaintiffs here did not contend at trial that the ATC was faultlessly manufactured and designed  their sole contention being that the vehicle had design defects  there was no error in failing to give the instruction. Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 737 P.2d at 368. The court relied exclusively on Embry v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ariz. 433, 436, 565 P.2d 1294, 1297 (App. 1977) because it was [s]ingularly appropriate. Maj. op. at 392, 737 P.2d at 368. We disagree with the reasoning of the court of appeals. A plaintiff is not required to make an election between pursuing a case on a strict products liability theory of either design defect or failure to warn. A plaintiff may proceed with both theories if both are viable. Plaintiffs are allowed to plead theories in the alternative, Rule 8(f)(2), Ariz.R. Civ.P., 16 A.R.S., and the same set of facts may present more than one theory of recovery. See, e.g., Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 150 Ariz. 153, 722 P.2d 321 (App. 1985) (plaintiffs proceeded simultaneously with theories of defective design, improper instructions, and failure to warn); Brown v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 667 P.2d 750 (App. 1983) (genuine issue of material fact concerning both alleged design defect and failure to warn). Therefore, the court of appeals' decisions in this case and Embry are overruled to the extent they preclude plaintiffs from proceeding simultaneously with causes of action in strict liability for failure to warn and design defects. A jury instruction is justified if it relates to a legal theory within the issues raised in the case and if it is supported by the evidence. See Sparks v. Republic National Life Ins. Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 539, 647 P.2d 1127, 1137, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 490, 74 L.Ed.2d 632 (1982); Kauffman v. Schroeder, 116 Ariz. 104, 106, 568 P.2d 411, 413 (1977) (duty of court to instruct jury on all phases of law applicable to facts developed at trial). Therefore, resolution of the question of whether Gosewisch was entitled to a failure-to-warn jury instruction turns on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. In order to establish a prima facie case of strict products liability, the plaintiff must show that the product is in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous, the defective condition existed at the time the product left the defendant's control, and the defective condition is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Rocky Mountain Fire and Casualty Co. v. Biddulph Oldsmobile, 131 Ariz. 289, 292, 640 P.2d 851, 854 (1982); Amburgery v. Holan Division of Ohio Brass Co., 124 Ariz. 531, 532, 606 P.2d 21, 22 (1980); see also Readenour v. Marion Power Shovel, 149 Ariz. 442, 447, 719 P.2d 1058, 1063 (1986); Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976). Three types of defects can result in an unreasonably dangerous product: (1) design defects, (2) manufacturing defects, and (3) informational defects encompassing instructions and warnings. See Brown, 136 Ariz. at 562, 667 P.2d at 756; Henderson, Strict Products Liability and Design Defects in Arizona, 26 Ariz.L.Rev. 261, 262-65 (1984); Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U.Cin.L.Rev. 101 (1977). Thus, to establish a prima facie case of strict products liability based on an informational defect, Gosewisch had the burden of proving that Honda had a duty to warn of the alleged propensity of the ATC to flip; that lack of an adequate warning made the ATC defective and unreasonably dangerous; that the ATC lacked adequate warnings when it left Honda's control; and that the failure of Honda to give an adequate warning proximately caused his injuries. Failure to prove any one of these elements is fatal. We focus our inquiry on the last element  causation. [2] [A] plaintiff may show that the injury proximately resulted from the failure to warn, or from an inadequate warning, by evidence that had a proper warning been given, he would not have used the product in the manner which resulted in his injury, or by evidence that certain precautions would have been taken that would have avoided the accident. W. Kimble & R. Lesher, Products Liability § 257, at 296 (1979) (footnotes omitted); see also Keeton, Products Liability  Inadequacy of Information, 48 Tex.L.Rev. 398, 414 (1970); accord Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 492-93 (3rd Cir.1985). At trial, the warning labels affixed to Gosewisch's ATC were introduced. These stated: READ OWNER'S MANUAL CAREFULLY; REMEMBER: PRESERVE NATURE, ALWAYS WEAR A HELMET, THINK SAFETY; WARNING  OPERATOR ONLY  NO PASSENGERS. The owner's manual, which contained more than fifty pages of information, riding techniques and safety cautions, was also introduced. The manual instructs riders to perform a pre-ride safety check, to check the tire pressure before riding, to drive cautiously in unfamiliar terrain, and to be aware that a strong possibility of severe personal injury or loss of life is possible if instructions are not followed. The manual also warns that the safe operation is largely dependent upon the operator's proper judgment. Although evidence of the warnings and instructions provided by Honda were introduced, Gosewisch did not establish the causal relationship between Honda's alleged failure to warn of the ATC's propensity to flip and his injury. Gosewisch testified at trial, but he was never asked about warnings or instructions. Neither he nor any other witnesses testified that Gosewisch would have altered his behavior to avoid injury had he been appropriately warned. There was no testimony that different warnings would have influenced Gosewisch's conduct in purchasing or riding his ATC. Ordinarily, what constitutes the proximate cause of an injury is a question of fact. However, the jury is not entitled to make a decision absent a proper evidentiary foundation. Cf. Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 131 Ariz. 344, 352, 641 P.2d 258, 266 (App. 1982) (proximate cause is a question of law where evidence is undisputed and reasonable minds could not differ). Because of the absence of any testimony, the jury would have been forced to speculate whether the alleged informational defect was a proximate cause of Gosewisch's injury. We recognize that some courts reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof in failure-to-warn products liability cases by adopting a rebuttable presumption of causation. See J. Beasley, Products Liability and the Unreasonably Dangerous Requirement, 438-41 (1981); Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 521, 562 n. 149 (1982). Under this approach, the law supplies the presumption that a warning would be read and heeded if given. Without deciding whether or under what circumstances Arizona should follow this approach, we note that even with the benefit of such a presumption, Gosewisch would not have proved that the alleged failure to warn was a proximate cause of his injury. The undisputed evidence would have rebutted the presumption as a matter of law. A label affixed to the ATC warned the operator to READ OWNER'S MANUAL CAREFULLY. The inside front cover of the owner's manual indicated that the manual should be considered a permanent part of the vehicle and should remain with the vehicle when resold. Gosewisch testified that he requested but did not receive the ATC owner's manual from his cousin, although his cousin received the manual when she purchased the ATC. In addition, there was evidence that even if a suitable warning had been provided, Gosewisch would have ignored it. The evidence showed that he ignored the warning about carrying passengers and hit a tree while riding double on his ATC. The evidence also showed that he ignored the warning to always wear a helmet, as he did not usually wear a helmet and was not wearing one on the day of his accident. Where such evidence exists, it cannot be said that a failure to warn was a proximate cause of the injury. See W. Kimble and R. Lesher, supra, § 206 at 224. The record contains further support for the conclusion that Gosewisch presented solely a design defect case. The day before Gosewisch rested, there was a discussion in chambers and the trial court was surprised that Gosewisch was pursuing a warning claim. THE COURT: I didn't think that we had a failure to warn case here. I didn't realize that you were making any claim on that basis. MR. MOLLOY: Yeah, we have requested an instruction, Your Honor, instruction on failure to warn. Yes, Your Honor. We think that this thing has a  at certain speeds and certain terrain  that should be a warning  anything over 15 miles an hour in rough terrain we feel is hazardous. THE COURT: Well, you  MR. MOLLOY: And there should be a warning someplace. THE COURT: Well, you will agree, if you get into that, why then you have opened up all the can of worms about whether or not if there had been a warning: first, whether your guy would have read it; and second, if he had read it, whether or not he would have heeded it. MR. MOLLOY: These are jury questions. THE COURT: Yes, but they're entitled to instruction on that and you have the burden of proof to show that. This case gets broader every day. I didn't know we were trying a failure to warn case. Although Gosewisch was called again to the stand, no testimony from him, or any other witness in his case, was introduced regarding the warning issue. Although expert testimony is not required, Rossell v. Volkswagen of America, 147 Ariz. 160, 709 P.2d 517 (1985), some testimony must be presented. Despite the trial court's admonition, Gosewisch rested without developing a warning case and failed to meet his burden to present a prima facie case. We hold that it was not error for the court to refuse Gosewisch's request for a warning instruction. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence of the causal relationship between Gosewisch's injury and the alleged inadequacy or lack of warnings.