Opinion ID: 2608607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bailment.

Text: A bailment has been defined as the rightful possession of goods by one who is not the owner. 9 S. Williston, Contracts 875 (3d ed. 1967). Bailment is normally a consensual transaction. The bailor intentionally delivers possession of his goods to the bailee and the latter accepts the same with a real or a presumed knowledge of the responsibility entailed thereby. R. Brown, The Law of Personal Property, § 12.1, at 319 (3d ed. 1975). Thus, the elements of a classic bailment are the intent to create a bailment, delivery of possession of the bailed items, and acceptance of the items by the bailee. The trial court in this case made the following finding of fact with regard to plaintiff's actions upon discovering, prior to his departure on sabbatical, that some of his personal property had been removed from his office: 9. Concurrent therewith, Plaintiff learned that some of the missing items were being used by other members of the Department; whereupon Plaintiff contacted the same and directed them to return the equipment to his office and laboratory. Plaintiff also lodged a verbal complaint with Chairman Inskeep about the incident but did not ask nor did he receive Inskeep's consent to store or otherwise safeguard Plaintiff's personal effects. Plaintiff, on June 17, filed a written complaint with Defendant Inskeep and University authorities, reporting the incident and asking that his office and laboratory not be further disturbed during his absence. (Emphasis added.) On appeal, a trial court's finding of fact will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Rule 52(a), H.R.C.P. As we noted earlier, a finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Kim v. State, 62 Haw. ___, ___, 616 P.2d 1376, 1382, citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 at 395, 68 S.Ct. 525 at 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948); Honda v. Higa, 52 Haw. 311, 313, 475 P.2d 708, 710 (1970); Frey v. Goebert, 52 Haw. 308, 310, 474 P.2d 537, 538 (1970). After carefully reviewing the evidence in this case, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed and thus cannot say that the trial court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous. This finding negates the essential elements of a bailment. Although appellant may have asked that his office and laboratory not be disturbed during his absence, there is no intent to create a bailment, no delivery of possession, and no acceptance of the goods by Inskeep. In some situations courts will imply the existence of a bailment even though not every element of a consensual bailment is present. Such a situation arises, for example, when a finder of lost goods takes them into possession. The law imposes an obligation upon the finder to use due care in keeping the goods and requires the finder to deliver the goods to the owner upon demand. Another such instance is where a landlord resumes possession of leased premises after a tenant has departed, and finds that the tenant has left chattels behind. However, as one commentator has noted, courts are increasingly reluctant to characterize such possession by the landlord as a bailment because of the obligations imposed upon the landlord. Brown, supra, § 12.1 at 320. See, e.g., Row v. Home Savings Bank, 306 Mass. 522, 29 N.E.2d 552 (1940) (plaintiff, former tenant, found to have no right to keep property in building; defendant, mortgagee, acted reasonably in throwing away apparently worthless property found in building); Boston Ed. Research Co., Inc. v. American Mach. & Fdry. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1272 (D.Mass.), aff'd 488 F.2d 344 (1st Cir.1973) (plaintiff found to have abandoned goods left in factory after plaintiff's subsidiary moved from premises; defendant not liable in negligence for destruction of goods); Banks v. Pierpont Estates, Inc., 27 Misc.2d 778, 209 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1961) (no hostile action by landlord in throwing out property of former tenant which had been left in unlocked closet). In this case, appellant urges us to find the existence of a constructive or implied bailment. However, in every bailment case which we have examined, whether the bailment is actual or constructive, the element of possession is necessary. Physical control over the property allegedly bailed and an intention to exercise that control are needed to show that one is in possession of the bailed goods. Berglund v. Roosevelt University, 18 Ill. App.3d 842, 844-45, 310 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1974). Thus, in order to have possession, physical control and an intent to exercise that control must be shown. In determining whether control exists, courts consider the following: [T]he subject matter's amenability to control, steps taken to effect control, the existence of power over the subject matter, the existence of power to exclude others from control, and the intention with which the acts in relation to the subject matter are preformed. Collins v. The Boeing Company, 4 Wash. App. 705, 711, 483 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1971). In the instant case, based upon the findings of fact by the trial court, we conclude that defendant Inskeep did not have sufficient possession of the materials and goods left in appellant's office to impose the doctrine of constructive bailments. It is apparent that Inskeep did have some measure of control over Waugh's property. However, Waugh, although absent from the University, retained possession of his goods. He retained a key to his office and laboratory; he could have, at any point, removed his property (or had someone else remove his property) without asking Inskeep. Other University personnel besides Inskeep also had access to Waugh's office and laboratory, including the visiting professor who occupied the office for six weeks and other members of the Chemistry Department faculty. Although appellant has placed emphasis upon the letter he wrote to University officials on June 17, 1969 requesting that his office and laboratory not be further disturbed during his absence, it is obvious that the letter was in the nature of a complaint and it was addressed to Richard Takasaki, Acting President of the University and not to Prof. Inskeep. Thus, that letter cannot be viewed as transferring possession of the materials to appellee Inskeep. We conclude that no constructive bailment is shown by these facts.