Opinion ID: 2525141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Landowners' Testimony

Text: ¶ 26 In this case, the trial court ruled in response to Hildale's motion in limine that Claude Cooke could testify to highest and best use of the land because of his status as a former landowner. The court stated, The court will . . . allow Mr. Cooke to testify as to his opinion, as a former owner, of the highest and best use of the property and the reasons for his opinion. . . . I think it would be misleading to the jury to disallow that kind of testimony if there was at least something being done showing that someone had an opinion that residential development was the highest and best use and someone who is directly involved in the property. As a result, Mr. Cooke opined that the highest and best use of the land at issue was residential, and then testified at length concerning what steps he and Ms. Cooke had taken to establish a subdivision on the property. The landowners never moved to have Mr. Cooke qualified as an expert, and the court never qualified him as such. ¶ 27 Consequently, the court should have excluded Mr. Cooke's opinion of the highest and best use of the property. Mr. Cooke's opinion that the land's highest and best use was residential directly conflicted with the opinion of those witnesses who were qualified by the court as experts. The City's two experts, Dale Jackman and Stanford McConkie, testified that the land's highest and best use was, respectively, holding for investment and speculative holding. The landowners' own witness, Daniel Johnson, similarly testified that the property's highest and best use was long [term] investment purposes. Therefore, Mr. Cooke's opinion of the highest and best use of the land as residential was improper and should have been excluded under Jones. See id. ¶ 28 Likewise, because of its intrinsic tie to Mr. Cooke's improper highest and best use opinion, both Claude and Gherri Cookes' testimony regarding what steps they took to develop their subdivision should have been excluded from evidence. If offered only to prove the value of the land, this evidence may have been admissible to establish a higher per acre value for the property on the basis of improvements, such as the construction of roads or installation of fire hydrants and electrical lines. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Ferrebee, 844 P.2d 308, 311-12 (Utah 1992). Similarly, had the Cookes presented expert testimony establishing that the highest and best use of their property was residential, their testimony would have been admissible to remove the proposed subdivision from the realm of the conjectural and speculative and demonstrate its feasibility. See, e.g., id.; Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d at 170-71, 397 P.2d at 465. To this degree, the Cookes' statements about how they secured water rights, dug wells, conducted soil and water analyses, and otherwise prepared the land for their planned subdivision would have helped establish that the land was physically ready for such a development, and that they were in the process of obtaining the legal permissions needed to proceed. But the Cookes did not offer their testimony to show the value of improvements to the land, and they presented no expert opinion that the highest and best use of their property was residential. In the absence of such an expert opinion, the trial court should have excluded the Cookes' testimony outlining the steps they had taken to develop their subdivision. See Jones, 694 P.2d at 1036. ¶ 29 In the same regard, although not challenged on appeal, Barbara Hall's highest and best use opinion should have been excluded along with the Cookes' testimony. Like Claude Cooke, Ms. Hall testified in contradiction to the expert witnesses that the highest and best use of her land was residential  without ever having been qualified as an expert herself as required by Jones. Importantly, Ms. Hall based this opinion on the Cookes' testimony, which we have already determined should have been excluded by the trial court. When asked how she formed her opinion that the highest and best use of her land was residential, Ms. Hall stated, Well, a couple of things. Mostly, we have mentioned briefly, you know, the Cookes' development. Accordingly, because she explicitly founded her opinion of her land's highest and best use on the inadmissible testimony of the Cookes, Barbara Hall's statement to this extent was covered by the City's motion in limine and the trial court's ruling thereon, and thus was erroneously admitted under Jones. Indeed, Ms. Hall explained that she planned to construct a larger subdivision on her property as an extension of the Cookes' development after they had finished theirs up and I [had] gotten some money together. ¶ 30 However, while we find that the trial court erred in admitting the Cookes' highest and best use testimony, along with Barbara Hall's opinion of the highest and best use of her land, a finding of error by itself does not command reversal. We reverse a trial court's judgment for the improper admission of evidence only where the court's erroneous ruling was prejudicial, Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978), overruled in part on other grounds by Mgmt. Servs. Corp. v. Dev. Assocs., 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980), affected the substantial rights of a party, Kelson v. Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Utah 1989), or was otherwise harmful. State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah 1995); see also Utah R.Evid. 103(a). For an error to be harmful, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987); see also Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 442 (Utah 1996). ¶ 31 Here, the trial court's erroneous admission of the landowners' highest and best use testimony directly undermines confidence in the verdict. Specifically, the trial court's error prejudiced Hildale by presenting the jury with an impermissible and inadmissible basis on which to assess the value of Gherri Cooke's and Barbara Hall's land and, thus, any severance damages the City might have owed these defendants. Because severance damages are measured by the difference in market value of the property before and after the taking, Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Toone, 11 Utah 2d 232, 234, 357 P.2d 486, 488 (1960), and the market value of condemned property is based on the highest and best use to which it could be put at the time of the taking, Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d at 170, 397 P.2d at 464, the trial court's erroneous admission of Claude Cooke's and Barbara Hall's highest and best use opinions tainted the verdict by allowing the jury to consider severance damage estimates clearly premised upon the assumption that the highest and best use of the respective properties was residential. ¶ 32 In fact, Claude Cooke expressly testified that his highest and best use opinion impacted his estimate of severance damages. When asked how severance damages were created on Gherri Cooke's land, Mr. Cooke responded, [The condemnation] left . . . raw land instead of residential land. When the landowners' attorney then queried further as to the cause of severance damages, Mr. Cooke clarified: Because it wasn't cost effective to do a subdivision anymore. Similarly, when Gherri Cooke was asked how she arrived at her severance damage estimate, she explained that her estimate was made in reliance on Mr. Cooke's assertion that the highest and best use of her land was for residential purposes. She stated that the easement harmed the remainder of her property in [s]everal ways: If you look at the plan that we had for the subdivision, it would take an easement across the five front lots, as Claude already pointed out. And the total taking of the easement was .5 acres, which would eliminate at least one lot out of the subdivision. . . . Barbara Hall likewise testified that her estimate of severance damages was premised on the assumption that the land's highest and best use was residential. The landowners' attorney asked Ms. Hall why she believed the remainder of her property had suffered severance damages, and she stated, The one thing I mentioned was the fact that the Cookes and I had a plan for a future . . . . ¶ 33 As a result, had the trial court properly excluded the landowners' highest and best use testimony under Jones, it would have excluded the basis and foundation for the severance damage estimates of Claude Cooke, Gherri Cooke, and Barbara Hall. These estimates provided the only support for, respectively, the $65,000 severance damage verdict awarded to Gherri Cooke and the $15,000 severance award rendered as to Barbara Hall. In other words, had the trial court properly excluded the evidence, the jury would have had no ground on which to find severance damages on Gherri Cooke's and Barbara Hall's properties based on the assumption that the highest and best use of their land was for residential purposes. See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Utah 1995) (An error is harmful if it is reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.). In view of the far-reaching impact Mr. Cooke's and Ms. Hall's highest and best use opinion had on the verdict, we hold that the trial court's erroneous admission of their opinions harmed Hildale to such an extent that the likelihood of a different outcome in this case is sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987). ¶ 34 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial. Moreover, because the court's erroneous admission of the landowners' highest and best use testimony is dispositive of the case on appeal, we do not address the City's arguments that the trial court erred in denying Hildale's motion for a new trial, or that the court erred by admitting the archaeological testimony of Barbara Frank. However, because the issue will necessarily be implicated on remand, we will address the landowners' cross-appeal of the trial court's prejudgment interest ruling.