Opinion ID: 2550075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: trial issues regarding witness testimony

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred by precluding him from questioning Duva about the reason her trial testimony was inconsistent with that which she gave at an earlier preliminary hearing, and, also, differed from the contents of statements she previously gave to state police. Appellant wished to establish through this cross-examination that Duva had testified untruthfully at the preliminary hearing and given statements that were not entirely true to investigating officers because Appellant's brother, Mark Briggs, threatened her. Appellant is entitled to no relief on this basis. A trial court has discretion to determine both the scope and the permissible limits of cross-examination. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340, 371, 983 A.2d 1211, 1230 (2009). The trial judge's exercise of judgment in setting those limits will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion, or an error of law. Commonwealth, v. Birch, 532 Pa. 563, 566, 616 A.2d 977, 978 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record compels us to agree with the trial court that Appellant did not provide the requisite foundation for the avenue of cross-examination he wished to pursue, since there was no evidence of record to establish that Mark Briggs was the person who threatened Duva. Indeed, Mark Briggs testified immediately before Duva at trial, and he was extensively cross-examined by Appellant, through counsel, and asked repeatedly if he had threatened Duva. He denied having done so. N.T. Trial, 1/24/06 AS, at 42-43, 65-66. Thus we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in barring, on this basis, Appellant's desired cross-examination of Duva. Furthermore, Appellant suffered no prejudice from the trial court's denial of his requested line of cross-examination, as we are in accord with the trial court's finding that Appellant's requested cross-examination was irrelevant under the circumstances. Any identification by Duva of Mark Briggs as the person who allegedly threatened her would only have been arguably relevant to the central issue in the case, i.e., who killed the deputies, if there was evidence suggesting Mark Briggs threatened Duva in order to conceal his own involvement in the murders. The trial court found no evidence to suggest Mark Briggs was involved in committing the murders. Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/07, at 38. Additionally, the trial court apparently was willing to allow Appellant to raise a possibility of Mark Briggs' involvement in the murders through cross-examination, if he could lay a proper evidentiary foundation. The trial court indicated it would allow Appellant to cross-examine Duva about any potential threats from Mark Briggs, provided Appellant followed through on his offer of proof that he would produce evidence showing that Mark Briggs was at the junkyard at the time of the murders. Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/07, at 38-39. The trial court found that Appellant produced no such evidence. Id. at 39. As our review of the record indicates that it supports the trial court's conclusion, its decision to prohibit Appellant from pursuing cross-examination on these grounds likewise does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Appellant avers that the trial court improperly precluded him from cross-examining his cousin, Albert `Bert' Briggs, about potential motives for his testimony. Around 6:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, Albert Briggs observed Appellant open the door of a camper located on his property. N.T. Trial, 1/25/06 AS, at 39. Albert Briggs, aware that Appellant was being sought in the murder of the deputies, told his family to leave. After they left, Albert Briggs inspected the camper, but did not see Appellant inside. Albert Briggs then got in his truck and drove to the police command center which was overseeing the manhunt for the deputies' killer to tell law enforcement personnel his observation of Appellant. Id. at 41. At trial Appellant, through counsel, sought to cross-examine Albert Briggs about an alleged motive for testifying favorably for the Commonwealthnamely that Albert Briggs suffered a drop in income after this incident and that the police allegedly damaged the camper and his house in their search for Appellant. Id. at 43. The trial court denied the requested cross-examination as irrelevant. Id. at 44. Appellant presently contends that the trial court erred, averring that Briggs could have been testifying on behalf of the Commonwealth to elicit good favor with the Commonwealth and with the community as Albert `Bert' Briggs went from a successful self-employed businessman to earning substantially lesser amount[s] of money due to the arrest of his cousin and his role in possibly harboring his cousin. Appellant's Brief at 45. This argument is unavailing. As the trial court aptly noted: Albert Briggs testified in a manner consistent with his conduct. He saw [Appellant], and he notified the police. It was thereafter that the alleged property damage and income loss occurred. Thus, since the alleged motivating factors occurred after the conduct which formed the basis of the testimony, those factors, logically, could not have motivated the testimony. That disconnect, between the potential motivating factors and the testimony, renders the subject cross-examination irrelevant. Trial Court Opinion, 7/6/07, at 42. We agree with the trial court's reasoning as Appellant's suggested motive for Albert Briggs' trial testimony is wholly unsupported by the record; thus, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in prohibiting this line of inquiry. [39]
Appellant first claims the trial court improperly allowed Mark Marcoccia, who at the time of trial had pled guilty to federal drug charges, to testify that he had sold a .44 Magnum Ruger to Appellant at a point prior to the murder. Appellant contends that, because this constituted testimony regarding a prior bad act which was not connected to the charges for which he was on trial, its admissibility had no legitimate purpose and was highly prejudicial to him. [40] After review, we conclude that this claim affords Appellant no relief. A trial court's decision to allow the admission of evidence is a matter within its sound discretion, and we will reverse that decision only when it has been shown that the trial court abused that discretion. Commonwealth v. Reed, 605 Pa. 431, ___, 990 A.2d 1158, 1167 (2010). The particular Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence governing the admission of prior bad acts is Pa. R.E. 404(b) which provides, in relevant part: (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. (1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. (2) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. (3) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts proffered under subsection (b)(2) of this rule may be admitted in a criminal case only upon a showing that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential for prejudice. Pa.R.E. Rule 404(b)(1)-(3). Under this rule, the admission of prior bad acts is inadmissible for the sole purpose of proving the defendant has a bad character, or a criminal propensity. Commonwealth v. Powell, 598 Pa. 224, 246, 956 A.2d 406, 419 (2008). Nevertheless, this rule permits the admissibility of such evidence for other relevant purposes such as: showing the defendant's motive in committing the crime on trial, the absence of mistake or accident, a common scheme or design, ... to establish identity[,][or] where the acts were part of a chain or sequence of events that formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development. Id. However, admission for these purposes is allowable only whenever the probative value of the evidence exceeds its potential for prejudice. Pa.R.E. 404(b)(3). At trial, Marcoccia testified regarding the sale of the gun to Appellant as follows: [Commonwealth]: Did you know [Appellant] before you ran into him in jail? A. Yes, I did. Q. For how long a period of time? A. Uh, approximately six months. Q. And when you saw him in the Bradford County Jail, late November of '04, or sometime thereafter, did you have any conversation with him about a gun? A. Yes, we did. Q. And could you explain to the jury what that conversation was?    A. Yes, I'd sold a gun to [Appellant]. And I was concerned as to what happened to the gun. Q. Did you sell the gun to him before the killings? A. Yes, I did. Q. And you were concerned about the gun that you'd sold to him, so what, if anything, did you say to [Appellant]? A. I asked him about the gun, and he'd said that it was safe, it was a Ruger, .44. Q. What, what kind of gun was it? A. A Ruger. Q. And what caliber? A. .44 Magnum. Q. Revolver or semi-automatic? A. Revolver. Q. Okay. And [Appellant] said it was what? A. He said it was safe. Q. Now, did you have any conversation with him at that time about what if anything happened up at the junkyard involving [Appellant] and the Sheriffs? A. Uh, I don't believe at that time,I don't believe at that time, we talked about anything. Q. Did you ask him anything at all about what happened or anything of that nature, A. Uh Q. at that first conversation? A. Yes, I just told him sometime I wanted to hear the story about it. Q. And what did he say in response to that? A. And he said, some day. Q. And did that some day come some weeks or months later? A. Yes, weeks later,uh, we were going down to the law library together, and he'd said, here, I'll let your buddy Brad Brown tell you the story.... N.T. Trial, 1/27/06 MS, at 66-68. It is clear from this testimony that Marcoccia's brief mention of Appellant's previous purchase of the gun from him was not part of an effort by the Commonwealth to show that Appellant was a person of bad character who purchased guns from drug dealers as Appellant suggests; rather, it constituted part of the sequence of events forming the history of this case. Marcoccia's testimony established the prior relationship between himself and Appellant, and his interest in learning from Appellant the details surrounding the shooting of the deputies. This explained the manner by which Marcoccia and Appellant came to have their later conversation in which Appellant showed Marcoccia the content of his cellmate's statement containing Appellant's inculpatory admissions which Appellant admitted to Marcoccia were accurate. Further, as the trial court found, this aspect of Marcoccia's testimony was relevant to show Appellant's ability to acquire handguns. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 20, 640 A.2d 1251, 1260 (1994) (holding that evidence of defendant's possession of guns which were not the murder weapons was relevant to show that he readily obtained and disposed of handguns). All of this constituted probative evidence. Because the Commonwealth did not introduce the actual .44 caliber handgun into evidence, and due to the fact the jury also heard evidence indicating that Appellant had access to other handguns stored in his residence, [41] as well as testimony that he sometimes carried a handgun on his person, [42] any prejudicial effect of Marcoccia's testimony was scant in comparison to its probative value. Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to grant his request for a mistrial when Marcoccia made the following reference to being subjected to a polygraph test during his testimony on redirect examination: [43] [The Commonwealth]: As part of your cooperating agreement, in terms of getting a reduced sentence, does that require you to tell the truth? A. Yes, it does. Q. And if you don't tell, if you're found not to have told the truth, in any setting whatsoever, is the deal off? A. The deal is off. Q. Have you told this Jury the truth today? A. Yes, I have, in fact, in the plea agreement I am subject to polygraph. N.T., 1/27/06 MS, at 95-96. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth, by asking questions relating to the plea agreement on redirect examination, after having already asked about it during direct examination, was soliciting answers which gave Marcoccia the opportunity to a use the word polygraph. Appellant alleges that this was an improper effort by the Commonwealth to give Marcoccia's testimony super-credibility. Appellant's Brief at 53. This claim is groundless. The trial court found that the Commonwealth did not deliberately elicit this remark, and our review of the record discloses nothing to disturb this conclusion. When the Commonwealth asked Marcoccia about the plea agreement during direct examination he mentioned nothing about a polygraph. Thus, the Commonwealth had no reason to believe Marcoccia would mention it when Marcoccia was asked again about the agreement during redirect examination. Additionally, we discern no improper motive on the part of the Commonwealth in asking Marcoccia about the agreement during redirect since this appeared to be part of an effort by the Commonwealth to rehabilitate Marcoccia, after Appellant's cross-examination, by reminding the jury that Marcoccia was required by the agreement to provide truthful information to the police and, thus, to establish for the jury that Marcoccia would not benefit from lying about the contents of his conversation with Appellant. Further, as the trial court found, Marcoccia merely mentioned the fact that he was subject to a polygraph, but he did not mention the results of any such test. We note also that the Commonwealth did not further exploit the remark to the jury and immediately ceased questioning. Although Appellant's counsel indicated at that time that he did not want a curative instruction, the trial court did not allow the trial to continue, but, instead, elected to take the entire matter under advisement and entertain further arguments from the parties regarding an appropriate course of action. Since this occurred late on Friday afternoon, the trial court adjourned the proceedings for the weekend. When court reconvened the following Monday, the trial court again heard argument from the parties and, afterwards, gave the jury a curative instruction in which it expressly informed the jury that polygraph test results are not admissible, as such results are unreliable. The trial court explicitly directed the jury to disregard what they had heard regarding the polygraph test. N.T. Trial, 1/30/06 MS, at 33-34. Additionally, the trial court asked the jury panel, collectively, whether any of them could not follow this instruction, or if any of them had previously taken a polygraph test. No juror answered in the affirmative. Under these circumstances, Appellant suffered no prejudice from Marcoccia's fleeting reference to a polygraph test, and Appellant's request for a mistrial was properly denied by the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 497 Pa. 257, 263-64, 439 A.2d 1167, 1170-71 (1982) (ruling that new trial not warranted due to witness' unsolicited response to prosecutor's question that detective wanted to give me a lie detector test to make sure I was telling the truth since the response did not indicate that witness had taken the test and obtained a favorable result, and trial court gave prompt and adequate curative instructions); see also Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 453, 480 A.2d 980, 986 (1984) (holding that defendant suffered no prejudice by witness' gratuitous reference to polygraph test, when reference was not elicited by counsel, the witness did not disclose the results of the polygraph test, and the trial court gave a curative instruction to the jury immediately thereafter).
Appellant argues that the trial court erred by precluding him from presenting, at trial, the testimony of John Schwenkler, a public defender, who had represented Appellant the day before the shootings at a hearing in a city court proceeding in Elmira, New York. Appellant contends that Schwenkler would have testified that, though Appellant fully expected to be taken into custody at the conclusion of that hearing, Appellant nevertheless voluntarily appeared at that hearing. Appellant now asserts, somewhat implausibly, that Schwenkler's proposed testimony, if permitted, would have established that Appellant did not fear being arrested or incarceratedthereby negating the Commonwealth's suggested motive that he killed the deputies because he did not want to be taken into custody. The trial court excluded this testimony as irrelevant, and we agree with this determination. [44] Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Pa.R.E. 401. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 402 provides that [e]vidence that is not relevant is not admissible. As our Court has observed: the rule that irrelevant evidence is not admissible is categorical. Commonwealth v. Cook, 597 Pa. 572, 602, 952 A.2d 594, 612 (2008). Simply because Appellant acted in a particular manner previous to the day on which the deputies were shot, and under entirely different circumstances, i.e., at a court hearing in the presence of his attorney and court personnel, in no way tends to make it less probable that he shot the deputies when they attempted to take him into custody at his residence, a happenstance he was not expecting. Thus, Appellant's proposed testimony was inadmissible under Pa.R.E. 402, and the trial court did not err in precluding it. To hold otherwise would contravene the well recognized evidentiary principle of res inter alios acta, which provides that a thing or event which occurs at a time different from the time in issue is generally not admissible to prove what occurred at the time in issue. Black's Law Dictionary, 1178 (5th Ed.1979); see also Commonwealth v. Majorana, 503 Pa. 602, 605, 470 A.2d 80, 81 (1983) (observing that the rule of res inter alios acta underlies judicial concepts of relevance and precludes use of a past act to show present conduct).