Opinion ID: 2183151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lack of an interpreter at the early stages of the child protection proceeding

Text: [¶ 18] The facts found by the trial court with regard to the abilities of Shamso and Mohamed to speak English and the provision of interpreter services are as follows and are supported by the record. Shamso's English is poor, but Mohamed speaks excellent English. When the child protection proceedings were started in March 1996, Shamso refused the services of an interpreter at the hospital. Several of the service providers testified that they were able to communicate with Shamso either through hands-on demonstrations or through Mohamed. They were confident that Shamso understood because of her responses. [¶ 19] Shamso was provided an interpreter throughout the termination hearing. In fact, three Somali language interpreters were sworn at the beginning of the hearing. Evidence was presented that Shamso requested an interpreter in the summer of 1996, but the specific interpreter she requested was not available, and it was not until October 1996 that DHS obtained the services of an interpreter for her. An interpreter was present throughout the Spurwink evaluation. [¶ 20] Shamso argues that the failure of DHS to provide a Somali-language interpreter at all stages of the child protection process is a violation of her rights to due process and equal protection as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [4] She contends that having an interpreter at the termination hearing itself is not sufficient because the termination hearing was preceded by almost two years of various contacts with DHS personnel. She argues that she did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard during those other contacts. [¶ 21] The standard due process analysis enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) requires a balancing of three factors. See In re Charles Jason R., Jr., 572 A.2d 1080, 1081 (Me.1990) and In re Randy Scott B., 511 A.2d 450, 452-54 (Me.1986) (applying Mathews to due process challenges to portions of child protection and parental rights termination statutes and proceedings). The first factor is the private interest affected by the government, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, and there is no question that Shamso's interest in her parental rights is a substantial one, see In re Alexander D., 1998 ME 207, ¶ 14, 716 A.2d 222, 226-27. The second factor is the risk of an erroneous deprivation. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. Shamso argues that there was a substantial risk that her parental rights in Kafia would be terminated erroneously because of the lack of an interpreter at the early stage of the proceedings. We disagree. The provision of an interpreter at the termination hearing itself alleviated any risk of an erroneous termination that might have been engendered by the lack of an interpreter at an earlier point. Shamso was able to raise at the termination hearing, through her attorney and an interpreter, issues as to any misunderstandings that may have developed early in the process from the lack of a neutral interpreter. Furthermore, at a key point between the jeopardy and termination hearings, that is, the psychological evaluation and meetings with Drs. Drach and Ricci, Shamso also had an interpreter. [¶ 22] The third factor in Mathews is the government's interest in adhering to the existing procedure, including the fiscal and administrative implications of additional procedures. See id. Presumably there would be a financial impact upon DHS if it were required to provide an interpreter at every interaction with Shamso. Such an impact would be worthwhile if an interpreter was necessary to communicate with Shamso, but the facts found by the trial court were that the providers and DHS workers were able to communicate with Shamso by demonstrations or through interpretation provided by Mohamed. By the time Shamso and Mohamed began living apart, a separate interpreter was provided for her. Before that time it was not unreasonable to expect Mohamed, whose interests appeared to be the same as Shamso's, to interpret. Weighing the Mathews factors, we find no deprivation of Shamso's due process rights. [¶ 23] Shamso's equal protection argument fails as well for the reason that the trial court found that she was able to communicate with DHS workers before an interpreter was provided and because an interpreter was provided for her at the crucial stages of the termination process.