Opinion ID: 770692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Claims Brought by Cole and Chris and Jason Niemeyer are Moot

Text: 13 As the Supreme Court has recently noted, both standing and mootness are jurisdictional issues deriving from the requirement of a case or controversy under Article III. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 120 S.Ct. 693, 703-04, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); see also Blair v. Shanahan, 38 F.3d 1514, 1518 (9th Cir. 1994) ( `Article III of the Constitution requires that there be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case . . . .'  (quoting Burke v. Barnes , 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987))). It is well-settled that once a student graduates, he no longer has a live case or controversy justifying declaratory and injunctive relief against a school's action or policy. See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Thus, this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claims for injunctive relief brought by Cole and Chris and Jason Niemeyer unless an exception to mootness applies. 14 The capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to mootness applies only when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated before cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998); Madison Sch. Dist., 177 F.3d at 798. In Madison School District, we held that this exception did not apply to a student's Establishment Clause challenge to a school district's graduation prayer policy because the student had graduated, and thus would never again be compelled to participate in a prayer at his or her high school graduation ceremony. 177 F.3d at 799. Similarly, as graduates of Oroville, Cole and Chris and Jason Niemeyer will never again be required to omit sectarian references from their Oroville graduation presentations. This case is therefore different from Lee v. Weisman , 505 U.S. 577 (1992), in which the Supreme Court concluded that, although the student who objected to the graduation prayer at her middle school had herself graduated, the Court had a live and justiciable controversy before it because she was enrolled as a high school student in the same district and it appeared likely, if not certain, that an invocation and benediction [would] be conducted at her high school graduation. Id. at 584. Thus, Cole's and the Niemeyers' injunctive claims are moot. 2 15 The appellants try to avoid the jurisdictional defect in the injunctive claims of Cole and Chris and Jason Niemeyer by asserting that they present a live controversy under the third party standing doctrines of First Amendment over-breadth and jus tertii. Appellants' claim is more properly characterized as an over-breadth claim than as jus tertii because the appellants base their third-party claim on a theory that the District might in the future apply its policy to infringe the rights of students at Oroville, not that a single application of the District's policy threatens their rights as well as those of a third-party. 3 Nevertheless, whichever theory of third-party standing applies, Cole and Chris and Jason Niemeyer can no longer sustain such a claim. 16 Under the doctrine of jus tertii, a plaintiff can invoke the rights of third parties who are not before the court only if that plaintiff has a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the[ ] suit to make it a case or controversy subject to a federal court's Art. III jurisdiction . . . . Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976); accord Powers v. Ohio , 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); see also Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 423, 429 (1974) (Because the judiciary's primary role in judicial review is to adjudicate the rights of the private parties before it, the mere fact that the constitutional rights of third parties may be in jeopardy provides no justification for judicial intervention.  (footnote omitted)). Similarly, only if he presents a case or controversy, [may] a litigant . . . challenge a statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not before the court. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (emphasis added); accord Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816-17 (1975) (explaining that, in order to have overbreadth standing, a person must have a `claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm,'  and concluding that this requirement is met where there can be no doubt concerning the appellant's personal stake in the outcome of the controversy (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972))). In short, a litigant cannot sustain an over-breadth or jus tertii claim if he no longer has a personal interest in the outcome which itself satisfies the case or controversy requirement. See Howard v. City of Burlingame, 937 F.2d 1376, 1381 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that litigant's facial over-breadth challenge to city zoning ordinance requiring special permits for radio antennas over 25 feet became moot when the city granted his permit to erect such an antenna). 17 Although a student's graduation moots his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against school officials, it does not moot his damage claims. See Madison Sch. Dist., 177 F.3d at 798. Thus, we must address the damage claims brought by Cole and Chris Niemeyer and determine whether the District officials are entitled to qualified immunity for their decisions to refuse to allow these students to give a sectarian speech or prayer as part of the Oroville graduation ceremony. 4 Before we reach that question, we turn to the issue of whether the other appellants have standing to sustain the claims for injunctive relief. 18