Opinion ID: 2973336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the WPA is Jones’s Exclusive Remedy

Text: Defendants argued in the district court and argue before us that the remedy set forth in the WPA is exclusive and encompasses all related claims, and thus precludes Jones’s § 1983 claim. The district court disagreed, finding no merit to the argument that a federal statute protecting individuals’ constitutional rights from being infringed by public actors could be pre-empted by a state statute. The defendants appeal this ruling, citing Covell v. Spengler, 366 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 10 1985), a case in which the court, addressing a situation nothing like the one presented here, happened to say that “the [WPA] is plaintiff’s exclusive remedy”—the only language in the opinion to which defendants seem to pay attention. Defendants point to no authority that would permit us, in light of the Supremacy Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2, and in the absence of any indication that Congress intended state laws such as the Michigan WPA to supersede the right to bring a § 1983 action for violation of constitutional rights, to construe the WPA in the way defendants suggest. Furthermore, this circuit has on several occasions entertained without comment actions in which plaintiffs have brought WPA and First Amendment claims in the same suit based on the same underlying conduct. See, e.g., Hopkins v. City of Midland, 404 N.W.2d 744, 751-56 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Feliz v. Taylor, 49 Fed. Appx. 3, 4-5 (6th Cir. 2002); Dalton v. Wayne County, 202 F.3d 267 (Table), 1999 WL 1281719 (6th Cir. 1999); Berbeula v. Richard, 124 F.3d 196 (Table), 1997 WL 468337 (6th Cir. 1997). The district court correctly held that the WPA is not Jones’s exclusive remedy. B. Whether Dobson and Allen Park Violated Jones’s First Amendment Rights The § 1983 claim premised on a violation of Jones’s First Amendment rights differs from the WPA claim because the limitations period on such a claim is three years. See Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 991 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Owens v. Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573, 582 (1989) (“where state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering §1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal injury actions”)). All of Jones’s claims, therefore, were timely filed. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805(10). In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a constitutionally protected activity; (2) 11 the defendant’s action caused him to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the activity; and (3) the adverse action was motivated—at least in part—by the plaintiff’s exercise of his constitutional rights. Timm v. Wright State Univ., 375 F.3d 418, 422-23 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)). The defendants do not challenge—and we therefore do not address—the district court’s finding that Jones engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment. And we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Jones’s being subjected to the discipline (punishment that could have hurt his promotion prospects) and required to repay the overtime (lost wages), and his failure to obtain the FBI undercover job (lost wages and title) are all adverse employment actions. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 396-97 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quoting Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that discharge, demotion, refusal to hire, non-renewal of contracts, and failure to promote are examples of adverse employment actions in the context of § 1983 actions based on the First Amendment)). However, the circulation of rumors about Jones is not an adverse employment action, nor does it rise to the level of a hostile work environment; this is the kind of “minor harassment” that is not actionable in constitutional cases. See Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 397; Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 521 (6th Cir. 1999). To satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case, Jones was required to provide some evidence that the adverse employment actions had some tangible connection to his providing testimony in the Madrigal matter. Jones wholly failed to provide such evidence.
Dobson disciplined Jones for not reporting to him the stabbing incident that took place on Dobson’s front lawn in February, a few months before Jones was scheduled to give testimony in the 12 Madrigal matter. The district court found, and our review of the record confirms, that Jones presented no evidence other than temporal proximity to support his claim that this discipline was imposed either in retaliation for or in an attempt to prevent Jones’s testifying. The mere proximity in time of the allegedly retaliatory act to the plaintiff’s exercise of his constitutional right is not enough to establish causation. See Cushman-Lagerstrom v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 72 Fed. Appx. 322, 332 (6th Cir. 2003). Jones has failed to establish a prima facie case with regard to the imposition of discipline.
Jones was forced to repay overtime that was erroneously paid to him in April 2002 for time spent going to the doctor’s office during a time when he was on disability leave and unable to work. The error was discovered in May 2002; Jones had been deposed and was scheduled to testify before the City Commission regarding the Madrigal matter when he was asked to repay the $233.60, making the action temporally proximate to the testimony. The defendants argue that there was an unwritten policy in place regarding overtime pay in these circumstances that was subsequently reduced to writing. While the existence of a policy is a disputed fact, the district court found and the record establishes that the money had in fact been improperly paid to Jones, and that Jones failed to provide any evidence that Dobson’s demand that it be repaid was motivated by any retaliatory animus. Indeed, our review of the record persuades us that Jones’s union agreed that the money had been improperly paid to him, and should be repaid. Jones has failed to establish the causation element of a prima facie case of retaliation with regard to the overtime pay.
13 The undisputed facts are that, after Jones testified in the Madrigal matter, he applied for an undercover position with the FBI and he did not get the job. The district court found that representatives from the State Police and the FBI made the hiring decision and Dobson had nothing to do with it, and that this fact was fatal to Jones’s claim. Jones contends that Dobson had told the interviewers that he wanted Sergeant Mathis hired and they simply did his bidding. Jones presented no specific evidence to support his belief that Dobson influenced the hiring decision, but even if Jones’s suspicions are correct, he has offered no evidence whatsoever that Dobson was motivated in any way by Jones’s participation in the Madrigal matter. Because temporal proximity alone is not sufficient to show causation, see Cushman-Lagerstrom, 72 Fed. Appx. at 332, Jones has failed to establish the causation element of a prima facie case of retaliation with regard to his failure to obtain the FBI position. 4. Posting Tobacco Sting Assignments and Hostile Environment We addressed earlier with regard to the WPA claims Jones’s failure to establish the causation element relative to his claim that he was denied the opportunity to participate in the tobacco sting operation. The analysis here is identical, and yields the identical result. And Jones’s hostile environment claim fails here, as it did in the context of his WPA claim, because the spreading of rumors is simply not sufficient to demonstrate a hostile work environment. We therefore conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on Jones’s claims of retaliation.