Opinion ID: 2574897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Statements relating to plan or subject matter of conspiracy

Text: Sharp does not dispute the existence of a conspiracy. Rather, she argues that the State merely established to the trial court's satisfaction a conspiracy to kidnap; and Hollingsworth's two statements instead relate entirely to a conspiracy to kill. The State responds that the kidnapping and murder were a single continuing conspiracy. Specifically, the murder occurred during the commission of the kidnapping and was a means of concealing the kidnapping. We generally agree with the State. There need not be any formal agreement to constitute a conspiracy. [I]t is enough if the parties tacitly come to an understanding in regard to the unlawful purpose, and this may be inferred from sufficiently significant circumstances. State v. Swafford, 257 Kan. 1023, 1040, 897 P.2d 1027 (1995). Sharp admitted Hollingsworth told her to get a rope, and she told Cornell to get one for tying up Owen. More important, she also told Wheeles that she had told Hollingsworth  when she was afraid he was going to chop up Owen  Don't kill him here. The admission suggests she approved of his being killed elsewhere. She further admitted it was her idea to burn Owen's possessions because I don't want to be tied to this. Accordingly, it can be inferred that this was Owen's death, and not merely his kidnapping. Indeed, burning the possessions of a dead man in order to prevent ties to his death makes more sense than burning the notebooks and cell phones of a live man to prevent permanent detection of his kidnapping. Additionally, evidence indicates that Sharp helped burn after Hollingsworth said Owen was probably dead and turning blue. Specifically, although different from Sharp's statement to Wheeles, she testified at trial that Hollingsworth told her that Owen's shoes, socks, and glasses were burned after Hollingsworth and Baker returned from dragging Owen toward the dike, i.e., after Hollingsworth's hearsay statements were made. As the State suggests, we have held that a conspiracy is not terminated when an attempt to conceal the offense is made. State v. Campbell, 210 Kan. 265, 277, 500 P.2d 21 (1972). Therefore, a conspiracy exists to the disposition of its fruits, and to acts done to preserve its concealment. Campbell, 210 Kan. at 277, 500 P.2d 21 (citing State v. Borserine, 184 Kan. 405, 411, 337 P.2d 697 [1959]). It can be inferred from the evidence that Hollingsworth killed Owen because Hollingsworth wanted to stop him from reporting the crimes already committed against him, e.g., the kidnapping and battery. It can also be inferred from the evidence that Baker, as a sex offender purportedly on parole with an outstanding arrest warrant, similarly did not want Owen to be able to contact the authorities after his forcible restraint, which had originally been performed to prevent Owen from calling the police. Consequently, even if, as Sharp contends, she could have only conspired to kidnap  which conspiracy arguably ended with Owen's death  it can be established that she also participated in the conspiracy to kill, by helping burn Owen's possessions after Hollingsworth's statements. In short, she likely knew the kidnapping victim was dead, and she was helping cover up that crime. Hollingsworth's two statements meet the requirement of relating to the subject matter of the conspiracy to commit kidnapping  and resultant murder  because they clearly concern the physical status of the kidnapped victim: turning blue and probably dead.