Opinion ID: 76910
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mercado's Fourth Amendment Claim Against Orlando

Text: 42 Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), municipalities are subject to § 1983 liability when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury[.] Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. Furthermore, municipalities cannot be held liable for employees under respondeat superior. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir.1988). 43 For Mercado's Monell claim to survive summary judgment, he must bring forth some evidence of a pattern of improper training to sustain his claim, and he must show that Orlando was aware of the deficiencies in the program. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (noting that constitutional policies can become unconstitutionally applied through a repeated failure to train); see also Riley v. Newton, 94 F.3d 632, 638 (11th Cir.1996). Furthermore, Mercado must show that this training or failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference on the part of the Orlando. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389, 109 S.Ct. 1197; see also Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.1998) (noting that there are only limited circumstances in which an allegation of a failure to train or supervise can be the basis for liability under § 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). 44 Both of Mercado's arguments regarding his Monell claim challenge the district court's rulings on the defendants' motion in limine to exclude evidence from trial. Mercado first claims that the court erred in determining that Officer Burgos's statement, which would have been introduced through Mercado's sister, that officers are trained to shoot people in the head, is inadmissible hearsay and more prejudicial than probative. The district court, however, did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the statement was hearsay. 45 Rule 801(d)(2)(D) states that a non-hear-say party admission includes a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Although the statement may meet all of these requirements, the Rule further provides that the contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to establish the agency or employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision (D). The only evidence Mercado has produced relating to Burgos's statement is the uncorroborated statement itself. Because Mercado has not brought forth any evidence to corroborate this statement, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the statement is inadmissible hearsay. 46 Mercado also argues that the district court erred in precluding him from introducing into evidence other instances of Orlando officers using excessive force. In Gold, we determined that a plaintiff could not establish a Monell claim when he could not point to any other incidents involving similar facts. 151 F.3d at 1351. Mercado, too, cannot meet this burden. During discovery, he was given a list of all cases involving excessive force, but he cannot show that any of them involved factual situations that are substantially similar to the case at hand. For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and the dismissal of Mercado's Monell claim against Orlando should be AFFIRMED. 47