Opinion ID: 1209716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Principles of Admissibility

Text: (1) The parties agree generally that admissibility of expert testimony based upon the application of a new scientific technique traditionally involves a two-step process: (1) the reliability of the method must be established, usually by expert testimony, and (2) the witness furnishing such testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the subject. (See Evid. Code, §§ 720, 801; Jones, Danger  Voiceprints Ahead (1973) 11 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 549, 554.) Additionally, the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case. (See People v. Adams (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 109, 115-116 [125 Cal. Rptr. 518] [polygraph tests]; United States v. Ridling (E.D.Mich. 1972) 350 F. Supp. 90, 94 [same]; Comment, supra, 56 Minn.L.Rev. at p. 1244.) (2) The test for determining the underlying reliability of a new scientific technique was described in the germinal case of Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir.1923) 293 F. 1013, 1014, involving the admissibility of polygraph tests: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.  (Italics added.) We have expressly adopted the foregoing Frye test and California courts, when faced with a novel method of proof, have required a preliminary showing of general acceptance of the new technique in the relevant scientific community. ( Huntingdon v. Crowley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 647, 653-654 [51 Cal. Rptr. 254, 414 P.2d 382] [blood tests]; People v. Law, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 69, 74 [voiceprints]; People v. Spigno (1957) 156 Cal. App.2d 279, 290 [319 P.2d 458] [polygraph tests].) Some criticism has been directed at the Frye standard, primarily on the ground that the test is too conservative, often resulting in the prevention of the admission of relevant evidence (see United States v. Sample (E.D.Pa. 1974) 378 F. Supp. 43, 53 [voiceprints admissible in probation revocation proceeding]; McCormick, Evidence (2d ed. 1972) § 203, pp. 490-491). As indicated below, we are satisfied that there is ample justification for the exercise of considerable judicial caution in the acceptance of evidence developed by new scientific techniques. Arguably, the admission of such evidence could be left, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial court, in which event objections, if any, to the reliability of the evidence (or of the underlying scientific technique on which it is based) might lessen the weight of the evidence but would not necessarily prevent its admissibility. This has not been the direction taken by the California courts or by those of most states. Frye, and the decisions which have followed it, rather than turning to the trial judge have assigned the task of determining reliability of the evolving technique to members of the scientific community from which the new method emerges. As stated in a recent voiceprint case, United States v. Addison, supra, 498 F.2d 741, 743-744: The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice. Additionally, the Frye test protects prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case. (Italics added.) Moreover, a beneficial consequence of the Frye test is that it may well promote a degree of uniformity of decision. Individual judges whose particular conclusions may differ regarding the reliability of particular scientific evidence, may discover substantial agreement and consensus in the scientific community. (See Comment, supra, 35 Md.L.Rev. 267, at p. 290.) The primary advantage, however, of the Frye test lies in its essentially conservative nature. For a variety of reasons, Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific principles. There has always existed a considerable lag between advances and discoveries in scientific fields and their acceptance as evidence in a court proceeding. ( People v. Spigno, supra, 156 Cal. App.2d at p. 289.) Several reasons founded in logic and common sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area. Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to scientific evidence when presented by experts with impressive credentials. We have acknowledged the existence of a ... misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental nature. ( Huntingdon v. Crowley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 656; see People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 461.) As stated in Addison, supra, in the course of rejecting the admissibility of voiceprint testimony, scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury.... ( United States v. Addison, supra, 498 F.2d at p. 744.) (3) Exercise of restraint is especially warranted when the identification technique is offered to identify the perpetrator of a crime. `When identification is chiefly founded upon an opinion which is derived from utilization of an unproven process or technique, the court must be particularly careful to scrutinize the general acceptance of the technique.' ( People v. Law, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d at p. 85; see People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 459.) (4) Moreover, once a trial court has admitted evidence based upon a new scientific technique, and that decision is affirmed on appeal by a published appellate decision, the precedent so established may control subsequent trials, at least until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community. For all the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded by the wisdom of, and reaffirm our allegiance to, the Frye decision and the general acceptance rule which that case mandates. In the matter before us, the People attempted to satisfy the Frye test by reliance upon prior decisions of the courts of this state and sister states, and upon Lieutenant Nash's testimony. Yet, as discussed below, none of these sources provide satisfactory proof of the reliability of voiceprint evidence.