Opinion ID: 73281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did clover engage in protected activity under

Text: THE PARTICIPATION CLAUSE? Clover contends she engaged in statutorily protected activity under the participation clause because her participation in TSYS' investigation of Waters' charge of discrimination constitutes participat[ion] in any manner in an investigation . . . under this subchapter [i.e., subchapter VI of Chapter 21 of Title 42 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e)]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). TSYS, on the other hand, contends that participating in an internal employer investigation is not protected conduct because an internal inquiry is not an “investigation . . . under this subchapter. It relies upon dicta from Silver v. KCA, Inc. 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978), that participation conduct is participation in the machinery set up by Title VII to enforce its provisions. Whether the participation clause protects Clover from retaliation for the statements she made in the TSYS Human Resources meeting depends upon whether participation in an employer's internal investigation of a discrimination charge is participation in an investigation . . . under this subchapter. 13 Subchapter VI of chapter 21 of title 42 fails to define precisely what constitutes an investigation . . . under this subchapter, which is the only type of investigation that the participation clause covers. However, examination of the context in which the word investigation appears in that subchapter leads us to conclude that an investigation . . . under this subchapter means an unlawful employment practice investigation conducted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or its designated representative. It does not mean an employer’s in-house investigation. The term investigation and its derivative investigate appear in several other sections besides § 2000e-3(a). Every time either term appears, without exception, the context indicates that the statute is concerned only with EEOC investigations. The terms “investigations” and “investigate” are found in code sections that outline EEOC authority and responsibility in conducting its investigations of unlawful employment practice charges. For example, § 2000e-6 indicates that the EEOC has the authority to conduct official 14 investigations of alleged unlawfully discriminatory employment practices. In that section, the term “investigate” appears as follows: [T]he Commission shall have authority to investigate and act on a charge of a pattern or practice of discrimination, whether filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved or by a member of the Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (emphasis added). The EEOC, not the employer, bears the responsibility for conducting investigations once formal charges have been filed with the Commission. In § 2000e-5(b), “investigation” once again refers to an EEOC investigation: Whenever a charge is filed by . . . a person . . . alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice the Commission . . . shall make an investigation thereof. . . . If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge. . . . If the Commission determines after such investigation that 15 there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis added). This language contemplates the EEOC bearing responsibility for investigation of any charge of discrimination, and thus indicates that an “investigation . . . under this subchapter” will be an EEOC investigation. Similarly, § 2000e-5(f)(2) suggests that any “investigation” must be conducted by the EEOC, because that provision authorizes the EEOC to file suit, should its investigation suggest that such action is necessary: Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary investigation that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, the Commission . . . may bring an action . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (emphasis added) . Because the EEOC uses the results of its investigation to determine whether to file a lawsuit, the 16 statutory language authorizing the EEOC to file suit contemplates that an EEOC investigation will precede such a lawsuit. Likewise, § 2000e-8(a) gives the EEOC broad access to evidence in conjunction with investigations, supporting the conclusion that it is responsible for conducting those investigations: In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under section 2000e-5 of this title, the Commission or its designated representative shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge under investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (emphasis added). In each of these code sections, the term investigation refers to an investigation of a charge of discrimination by the EEOC or its representative. The final mention of “investigations” occurs in § 2000e-9, which states: 17 For the purpose of all hearings and investigations conducted by the Commission or its duly appointed agents or agencies, section 161 of Title 29 shall apply. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (emphasis added). This section’s use of the term “investigations” is consistent with that of the other sections. None of them use “investigation” in conjunction with inquiries conducted by employers, private individuals, or other entities. The complete absence of any mention of in-house or internal investigations indicates that only EEOC investigations are investigations “under this subchapter.” In light of this statutory framework, we conclude that Congress intended the term investigation . . . under this subchapter in § 2000e-3(a) to include only investigations of a charge of discrimination that the EEOC or its designated representative conducts. Therefore, the participation clause of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) protects against retaliation for cooperation with an investigation of allegedly unlawful employment practices only when the EEOC or its designated representative conducts the investigation. 18 It is not our role to second-guess congressional judgment. As we said last year: “Courts have no authority to alter statutory language. We cannot add to the terms of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision what Congress left out . . . .” Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1997).1 We do note that the policy judgment Congress made not to extend the participation clause’s protections to an employer’s internal investigation is not without some arguable basis. Congress could have believed that including such investigations under the participation clause might have a chilling effect on an employer’s willingness to conduct internal investigations, and that the risk that employers would take adverse employment action against employees who cooperate in internal investigations that the employers themselves initiate was minimal. From those two reasonable premises Congress may have concluded that avoiding 1 Merritt involved participation in a Title VII lawsuit, which undisputedly is a “proceeding . . . under this subchapter,” because the subchapter authorizes such lawsuits. The issue was whether involuntary testimony by one of the alleged harassers in a deposition taken by the plaintiff was participation “in any manner.” We held it was, interpreting that statutory language to mean what it says: “in any manner.” See Merritt at 1186. In this case, we follow the same principle of statutory interpretation in deciding that “investigation . . . under this subchapter” means just that. 19 the deterrent effect on internal investigations outweighed the risk of retaliation for participation in such investigations.