Opinion ID: 891705
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The effect of recent United States Supreme Court opinions on our Fourth Amendment analysis developed in Duran.

Text: {8} The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). In this section we review our most recent pronouncement on the limitations of police questioning during a traffic stop, subsequent cases from the United States Supreme Court, and the effect of those cases on the Fourth Amendment analysis to be employed by the courts of New Mexico. {9} The Fourth Amendment, incorporated against state actors via the Fourteenth Amendment, see Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable in their execution, see Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The test for whether a search or seizure was reasonable is objective. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Reasonableness, of course, depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). {10} A law enforcement officer who stops a vehicle to investigate a traffic violation seizes the occupants. See State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. Although traffic stops often are made when the officer has probable cause to believe that a law has been violated, see United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir.1993), courts generally analyze traffic stops under Terry, because they resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry,  Johnson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)); see also Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836 (stating that New Mexico courts apply the Terry analysis to traffic stops). The two-part Terry analysis looks at `[1] whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and [2] whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868). The scope of the investigation may be expanded `where the officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity has been or may be afoot.' Id. (quoting State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 20, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246). Unrelated questions may also be posed where the stop has ended and a consensual encounter has developed. See, e.g., United States v. Chavira, 467 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (10th Cir.2006) (stating that a traffic stop may become a consensual encounter after the officer has returned the driver's documents and the driver reasonably understands that the stop is over). Where evidence has been obtained as a result of questions not justified under the Fourth Amendment, suppression of that evidence is the proper remedy. See State v. Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, ¶ 28, 148 N.M. 659, 241 P.3d 1099.
{11} In Duran, we applied the Terry analysis to determine when questions posed about travel plans during traffic stops are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The defendant was stopped for failure to display a license plate. 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 3, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. During the stop, the police officer questioned the defendant and her passenger about their travel plans and made observations leading him to believe drugs were concealed in the car. Id. ¶¶ 4-14. After completing the traffic citations, the officer continued to question the defendant and requested consent to search her vehicle, which was granted. Id. ¶¶ 14-16. Marijuana was discovered in the gas tank, and the defendant was arrested. Id. ¶ 16. {12} Employing the two-part Terry analysis, we framed the question on appeal in Duran as whether a police officer impermissibly expands the scope of the search or seizure beyond the justification for the initial stop by inquiring into a motorist's travel plans or whether such questions are reasonably related to the initial justification for a traffic stop. Id. ¶ 26. Reviewing cases from the federal courts of appeal, we noted a split of authority in the reasoning but a definite consensus that inquiries into a motorist's travel plans are permissible. . . . Id. The Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits conducted a case-by-case analysis, concluding that questions about travel plans generally were permissible because they are usually related to the purpose of the stop and further valid governmental law enforcement interests and because the intrusion to the public is normally minimal. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. In contrast, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits applied a bright-line test, under which, if the questions asked do not lengthen the stop, the questions are valid. Id. ¶ 31. {13} We adopted the former analysis, relying specifically on United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.2001), and United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir.2001), because [o]ur case law has consistently disfavored a bight-line test in analyzing Fourth Amendment questions. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 34, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. We rejected the latter approach because it ignores the scope requirement of the second[] prong of the Terry test, which our case law has consistently recognized as appropriate to analyze traffic stops. Id. ¶ 33. Duran articulated the Fourth Amendment analysis to be applied in our courts: [A]ll questions asked by police officers during a traffic stop must be analyzed to ensure they are reasonably related to the initial justification for the stop or are supported by reasonable suspicion. . . . [T]his determination must also include an examination of both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out. The length of the detention should be reasonably limited to the time it takes to complete the underlying justification for the stop. Further, the scope of the questioning should be limited, as well. Id. ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {14} Although Duran concluded that the Fourth Amendment contained a subject-matter scope limitation, that analysis was not determinative to the Court's holding. Duran determined that the questions asked of the defendant and her passenger while the officer was completing the tasks necessary to issue the citations resulted in no additional delay. Id. ¶ 37. The responses to the officer's questions, as well as the officer's observations during the stop, then gave the officer reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have been afoot. Thus, [the officer] permissibly expanded the scope of the stop by asking about drugs or large amounts of currency, and then requesting consent to search the vehicle. Id. ¶ 38. Duran concluded that the district court did not err by denying the suppression motion. Id. ¶ 42.
{15} Subsequent to Duran, the United States Supreme Court issued three opinions that together adopted the approach to questioning during traffic stops that Duran rejected. In 2005, Caballes held that a dog sniff, conducted during the time necessary to complete an otherwise lawful stop, revealing no information other than the presence of contraband, did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 543 U.S. at 409, 125 S.Ct. 834. The same term, the Court held in Muehler that Fourth Amendment rights are not violated by investigative questioning unrelated to the reason for the initial seizure so long as the questioning does not prolong the length of the detention, as mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. 544 U.S. at 100-01, 125 S.Ct. 1465 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). Neither case cited to Terry. More recently, in Johnson the Court applied Terry and Muehler to a traffic stop, during which a passenger was frisked, and held that when the initial stop is lawful and the passenger is not free to leave during the duration of the stop, unrelated questions are permitted so long as they do not measurably extend the length of the stop. Johnson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 788 (citing Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-01, 125 S.Ct. 1465). {16} The cases Duran relied upon in rejecting a bright-line approach to police questioning are no longer valid in light of Caballes, Muehler, and Johnson. The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have concluded that Murillo and Holt, respectively, were overruled by the United States Supreme Court's explicit adoption in Muehler of a bright-line analysis in determining limits on the scope of police questioning during a lawful stop. In United States v. Mendez, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by police questioning that, though unrelated to the initial justification of the stop, did not unnecessarily prolong the length of the stop. 476 F.3d 1077, 1080-81 (9th Cir.2007). Likewise, in United States v. Stewart, the Tenth Circuit concluded that, after Muehler, [t]he correct Fourth Amendment inquiry (assuming the detention is legitimate) is whether an officer's traffic stop questions extended the time that a driver was detained, regardless of the questions' content. 473 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In Stewart, the Tenth Circuit held that a question about weapons in the car was permissible because the question did not extend the length of the detention. Id. {17} The creation by the United States Supreme Court of a bright-line rule for permissible questioning during traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment is incompatible with the approach we adopted in Duran. To the extent that Duran rejected the bright-line approach and adopted a case-by-case approach to determine whether police questioning during an otherwise legal traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment, it is overruled. [1] The proper Fourth Amendment inquiry, as stated by the Tenth Circuit, `is whether an officer's traffic stop questions extended the time that a driver was detained, regardless of the questions' content.' Stewart, 473 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Muehler, 544 U.S. at 101, 125 S.Ct. 1465).
{18} The Terry analysis remains applicable to traffic stops. While even members of the United States Supreme Court initially viewed the bright-line rule as effectively discarding the scope requirement of a Terry stop, see Caballes, 543 U.S. at 421, 125 S.Ct. 834 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (In my view, the Court diminishes the Fourth Amendment's force by abandoning the second Terry inquiry (was the police action reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the initial interference). (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted)), application of Caballes, Muehler, and Johnson by lower courts underscores that those cases modified, rather than abandoned, the second prong of the Terry test. The temporal limitations on Terry stops continue to define the limits of the reasonableness of the scope of the investigation. See United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 488 (6th Cir.2010) (Under Terry's duration prong, a stop must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. (internal quotation marks, citation, and ellipses omitted)). The questions posed during a traffic stop no longer need to be reasonably related to the initial justification of the stop in order to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment; the length of the stop, however, is limited by the time required to conduct a reasonable investigation into the initial justification for the stop. See id. at 488-89; Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 438; State v. Jenkins, 298 Conn. 209, 3 A.3d 806, 828-29 (2010). {19} In sum, after an officer has made a stop based on at least reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, [a]n officer's subsequent actions are not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that caused him to stop the vehicle if he detains its occupants beyond the time needed to investigate the circumstances that caused the stop, unless he develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity in the meantime. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir.2010). Whether a detention becomes unreasonably prolonged depends on whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568. The length of the detention should be reasonably limited to the time it takes to complete the underlying justification for the stop. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 35, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. {20} While the temporal limitations of a Terry stop generally require an investigating officer return a driver's documents and permit the driver to depart as soon as the reason for the traffic stop has been completed (unless, of course, the officer has developed reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigation into other criminal activity), most courts have found that a de minimis detention caused by questioning after the completion of the traffic stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. This is because reasonableness is the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis. See Everett, 601 F.3d at 492; see also United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir. 2007) (Whether a particular detention is reasonable in length is a fact-intensive question, and there is no per se time limit on all traffic stops.). But see United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the traffic stop should have been completed as soon as the questions related to the initial investigation were completed); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp.2010-11) (noting that because the United States Supreme Court essentially removed the subject matter scope limitation of Terry questioning, that is all the more reason for holding firm on the matter of temporal limits). The rationale for permitting de minimis extensions of time also is based in Johnson's modification of the Muehler Court's  no extension standard to permitting question so long as there is no measurable extension of the detention. Accord State v. Morlock, 289 Kan. 980, 218 P.3d 801, 807-08 (2009). {21} This Court also has refuse[d] to draw a bright-line, temporal cut-off point for an officer's actions during a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 36, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19; see also State v. Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 39, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (Bosson, J., dissenting) (stating that a de minimis detention to conduct an investigation for reasons unrelated to the initial stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment). Whether an officer's questioning measurably extends the length of a traffic stop remains the proper analysis under the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the Sixth Circuit that a categorical ban on questions that extend the time of a stop is unwarranted because a police officer intent on asking extraneous questions could easily evade [a bright-line rule] by delegating the standard traffic-stop routine to a backup officer, leaving himself free to conduct unrelated questioning all the while, or simply by learning to write and ask questions at the same time. Everett, 601 F.3d at 492. [2] {22} Extended detentions caused by questioning unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop continue to violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir.2008). To determine whether questioning creates an unreasonable detention, the pertinent inquiry is whether the officer conducted the investigation diligently. See Everett, 601 F.3d at 492 ([W]e join our sister circuits in declining to construe Muehler and Johnson as imposing a categorical ban on suspicionless unrelated questioning that may minimally prolong a traffic stop.). We adopt the Sixth Circuit's articulation of the diligence analysis: [B]ecause the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness, we must conduct a fact-bound, context-dependent inquiry in each case. Furthermore, we conclude that it would be inappropriate merely to evaluate the reasonableness of the interval of prolongation in isolation. Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop indicates that the duration of the stop as a whole including any prolongation due to suspicionless unrelated questioningwas reasonable. Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
{23} Even if a court determines that questioning unreasonably prolonged the length of the stop, the questioning still may be constitutionally permissible. An officer may expand the scope of a traffic stop beyond the initial reason for the stop and prolong the detention if the driver's responses and the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity unrelated to the stop is afoot. United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 553 (8th Cir.2008). Reasonable suspicion must consist of more than an officer's hunch that something is amiss; it requires objectively reasonable indications of criminal activity. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 559 F.3d 573, 576-77 (D.C.Cir.2009) (finding reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective frisk and car search existed based on the defendant's furtive movement under the car seat, unlikely explanation of the movement, and nervousness in a high crime area). Courts defer to the training and experience of the officer when determining whether particularized and objective indicia of criminal activity existed. State v. Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 16, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830. Suspicion of criminal activity need not necessarily be of a specific crime. See Pack, 612 F.3d at 355-56 (holding, and compiling cases in support of, the reasonable suspicion required to expand an investigation is that a criminal activity is afoot and that the suspicion need not be directed to a specific crime requirement). {24} Although the scope of a stop may be expanded without violating the Fourth Amendment when an officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous or that other criminal activity is afoot, we underscore that the requirement of reasonable suspicion demands objective and articulable observations that indicate further police action is necessary. This does not mean that an officer must be certain that weapons are present, but rather that a reasonable, well-trained officer would have made the [same] judgment. . . . Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 23, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Courts must require articulable facts indicating reasonable suspicion. We find instructive the caution of Judge Richard Posner, describing the testimony of the arresting officer in a suppression hearing: Gilding the lily, the officer testified that he was additionally suspicious because when he drove by [the defendant] . . . he noticed that [the defendant] was staring straight ahead. Had [the defendant] instead glanced around him, the officer would doubtless have testified that [the defendant] seemed nervous or, the preferred term because of its vagueness, furtive. Whether you stand still or move, drive above, below, or at the speed limit, you will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or arrest you. Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should not be credited. United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th Cir.2005) (original bracket omitted) (holding that reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant existed); see also Neal, 2007-NMSC-043, ¶ 31, 142 N.M. 176, 164 P.3d 57 (rejecting an argument that reasonable suspicion existed when the circumstances smack more of the type of conjecture and hunch we have rejected in the past as insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion). {25} An officer may conduct a protective search of a stopped vehicle for reasons of officer safety during a traffic stop because traffic stops are `especially fraught with danger to police officers.' Johnson, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 786 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983)). A protective search is not a search for evidence. See Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 33, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. Such a search must be based upon the objectively reasonable belief that the individuals stopped pose a threat to officer safety, and the search must be limited to its purpose of protecting the officers, and the public, during the stop. See id. ¶ 22; Holt, 264 F.3d at 1225 (We emphasize also that the balance does not depend on whether the officer subjectively fears the motorist. Subjective intentions rarely play a role in Fourth Amendment analysis. (footnote omitted)). During traffic stops, movements by the vehicle's occupants, consistent with hiding an object, generally give rise to reasonable safety concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 876 F.2d 1359, 1361 (7th Cir.1989) (finding that a limited search for weapons in the car was permitted because the officer could reasonably be concerned about his safety after noticing a furtive gesture by the defendant as the officer approached and the defendant had a jacket awkwardly arranged over his lap and the floor); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 146-47 (Colo.1997) (en banc) (finding that the officers acted reasonably in searching the stopped vehicle for weapons after observing the defendant bend over in his seat and make motions toward the bottom of his seat and limiting the search to the area near the seat); State v. Ashbrook, 586 N.W.2d 503, 508-09 (S.D.1998) (holding that a protective sweep for weapons of a car during a legitimate traffic stop was permitted when the officer observed the defendant make furtive movements during the time between the activation of the emergency lights and pulling over). [3] {26} Questions asked for purposes of ensuring officer safety during a stop generally are proper because [w]hen these measures are not too intrusive, the government's strong interest in officer safety outweighs the motorist's interests. Holt, 264 F.3d at 1221. Questions directed toward officer safety, therefore, do not bespeak a lack of diligence. Everett, 601 F.3d at 495. {27} A police officer may also pose questions after the time needed to reasonably conduct the investigation into the initial reason for the stop if the stop has ended and a consensual encounter developed. A detention for a traffic citation can turn into a consensual encounter after the trooper has returned the driver his documentation so long as a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe he was free to leave or disregard the officer's request for information. United States v. Guerrero-Espinoza, 462 F.3d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the police officer has reasonably conveyed to the citizen that the stop has ended, any further questioning does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Id. (finding that questioning of a passenger who was unaware that the stop of the driver had been terminated was an unreasonable detention and the evidence discovered as a result of those questions must be suppressed). [4] {28} Under these rationales, the holdings of cases we have decided under Duran, and Duran itself, remain valid. The questions posed by the officer in Duran either were asked during the time it took to reasonably complete the initial traffic investigation, were a de minimis extension thereof, or were supported by independent reasonable suspicion. 2005-NMSC-034, ¶¶ 37-38, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836; accord Morlock, 218 P.3d at 807, 811 (finding questions asked constitutionally permissible because they either occurred during the legitimate stop or were supported by reasonable suspicion). In Funderburg, we held that the officer's minimal detention of the defendant based on the presence of reasonable suspicion about the contents of the car, to ask a single question about other criminal activity in the car before asking for consent to search, was reasonable. 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 33, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922; see also Van Dang, 2005-NMSC-033, ¶ 16, 138 N.M. 408, 120 P.3d 830 (Because the detention took no longer than necessary and because the officer's questions arose from a reasonable suspicion, we hold that both the duration and scope of the detention were reasonable under the circumstances). {29} Based on the preceding discussion, our Fourth Amendment analysis requires us to determine whether the contraband and consent questions were asked of Leyva during the time it took to complete the initial lawful investigation. If the questions measurably extended Leyva's detention, Officer Hash was required to have had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or concern for police safety to support further questioning, or the interaction must have evolved into a consensual encounter.