Opinion ID: 2067759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Brady and Winfield Issues

Text: Mr. Ingram argues that [c]oupled with [Mr. Aleem's] admission that he possessed a gun near the crime scene [on the] night [of the shooting], [Mr.] Aleem's grand jury testimony was exculpatory because it provided a sufficient basis to mount a third-party defense. He also asserts that [b]y withholding [Mr.] Montgomery's grand jury testimony and statements to investigators the government deprived Mr. Ingram of the ability to use the statements to impeach [Mr.] McKay's testimony. The government contends that Mr. Ingram fails to show any Brady [25] violation; and that [t]here is no reasonable probability that [Mr.] Aleem's testimony, if disclosed, would have changed the outcome of the trial.  Brady established that the government has a constitutional duty to disclose material evidence favorable to a criminal defendant in time for the defendant to make effective use of it at trial. [26] The duty to disclose also applies to evidence that could be used to impeach the credibility of a government witness. [27] To obtain a reversal of his conviction on Brady grounds, the defendant bears the burden of establishing a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [28] A `reasonable probability' of a different result exists when the undisclosed evidence `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial'; and it is insufficient to show a `mere possibility' that the undisclosed evidence might have aided the defense or changed the trial's outcome. . . . [29] To mount a third-party culpability defense, a defendant must present [P]roof of facts or circumstances which tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. The focus of the standard is not on the third party's guilt or innocence, but on the effect the evidence has upon the defendant's culpability, and in this regard it need only tend to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense.[ [30] ] Neither Mr. Aleem's grand jury testimony, nor that of Mr. Montgomery was exculpatory as to Mr. Ingram, or material to his guilt or punishment. Mr. Aleem informed the grand jury that he did not shoot Mr. McKay and he did not know who shot Mr. McKay. He went to his car after the shooting to get his gun but he did not retrieve it. While Mr. Montgomery was in the alley at the time of the shooting and claimed that he saw Mr. Ingram and Snags (presumably Mr. Aleem), he stated that Mr. Ingram was a good 80 feet from [him] and Snags also was behind him. The shot he heard came from the middle of the alley which was dark. He saw the victim fall but could not see that it was Mr. McKay. As he put it, I wasn't that close to actually see that. Not only was the grand jury testimony of Mr. Aleem and Mr. Montgomery not exculpatory or material to guilt or punishment with respect to Mr. Ingram, but Mr. Aleem's testimony also would not have been sufficient to allow Mr. Ingram to present a Winfield defense. The presence of unidentified people in the alley who asked whether Mr. Aleem was shooting at them, and Mr. Aleem's statement that he went to his car with the intent to get his gun after Mr. McKay was shot do not tend to indicate some reasonable possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense. [31] Moreover, as the trial court determined, even though some of Mr. Montgomery's grand jury testimony arguably was inconsistent with portions of [Mr.] McKay's trial testimony, and [Mr.] Montgomery could have been used to impeach [Mr.] McKay on certain details of his testimony, . . . the government did not violate Brady by not turning over the grand jury testimony of this witness, who was known to the defense and whom the government intended to present at trial if he could be found. Furthermore, [t]he discrepancies between the grand jury testimony of [Mr.] Montgomery and the trial testimony of [Mr.] McKay were relatively minor, and those discrepancies would have also impeached, in a much more powerful way, the trial testimony of the defendant himself. [32] In sum, we are satisfied that there is no reasonable probability that if the evidence had been disclosed [prior to trial], the result of the proceeding would have been different. [33] Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered.