Opinion ID: 2211982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: fourth amendment challenge to subsection 9

Text: The first issue presented is whether subsection 9 of the implied consent act [6] survives constitutional scrutiny under US Const, Am IV and Const 1963, art 1, § 11. [7]
The initial inquiry must be whether the actual taking of the blood constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Clearly, a blood test conducted under the direction of police falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v California, 384 US 757; 86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966). However, before constitutional protections from searches and seizures can be activated, state action must be involved in the alleged search. See United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109; 104 S Ct 1652; 80 L Ed 2d 85 (1984). In Jacobsen, the majority stated that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable `to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.' Id., p 113, quoting Walter v United States, 447 US 649, 662; 100 S Ct 2395; 65 L Ed 2d 410 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Perlos, the Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient state involvement to activate Fourth Amendment protections. [8] The Court held that a search and seizure improperly took place without a search warrant, and that none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to authorize the prosecutorial action. [9] Thus, the statute was found to be unconstitutional. In England, the Court of Appeals considered the Perlos Court's analysis of this issue and rejected it. The England Court stated that the Perlos decision fails to recognize the distinction between the withdrawal of the blood and the turning over of blood test results to the state. The search performed here, i.e., the removal of the blood sample from defendant, was done strictly for purposes of medical treatment and not at the direction of the police, the prosecutor, or state agents. Thus, the actual removal of the blood sample is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, since state action is not involved. [176 Mich App 343-344.] We agree with the distinction drawn by the England Court and its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when defendants had their blood withdrawn for medical treatment. Certainly there are various medical reasons for a doctor to order an alcohol analysis on a patient. For example, determining an alcohol level may be a necessary step for doctors to prescribe safe and effective medication. In these cases, blood was drawn for medical reasons, by medical personnel, and not in connection with any police investigation. [10] Subsection 9 of the implied consent act is not designed to influence the judgment of medical personnel regarding whether chemical analyses should be performed. Since there was no state involvement in the withdrawal and testing of defendants' blood, we find that there were no Fourth Amendment intrusions at this stage of the cases. In similar circumstances, other state courts have reached the same conclusion. See State v Johnston, 108 NM 778; 779 P2d 556 (1989); Nelson v Alaska, 650 P2d 426, 427 (Alas, 1982); Wisconsin v Jenkins, 80 Wis 2d 426, 427-434; 259 NW2d 109 (1977); Turner v Arkansas, 258 Ark 425, 435-437; 527 SW2d 580 (1975); Oregon v Enoch, 21 Or App 652, 654; 536 P2d 460 (1975); Pennsylvania v Gordon, 431 Pa 512, 517-519; 246 A2d 325 (1968), cert den 394 US 937 (1969).
Our second inquiry is whether the state's request and acquisition of blood test results without a search warrant infringed on defendants' Fourth Amendment privacy interests. In other words, did defendants have privacy interests in their blood alcohol test results? If no privacy interests existed, defendants do not have standing to challenge the government action. The test to determine if a person has a protected Fourth Amendment privacy right is whether that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area invaded by the government. Katz v United States, 389 US 347; 88 S Ct 507; 19 L Ed 2d 576 (1967). [11] The test was articulated by this Court in People v Smith, 420 Mich 1, 28; 360 NW2d 841 (1984), as whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure and whether that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. In discussing the parameters of the expectation test, the Smith Court stated: It offers no exact template that can be mechanically imposed upon a set of facts to determine whether or not standing is warranted. It does, however, provide the normal common-law value of general direction and practical flexibility. [ Id., p 26.] The Court proceeded to cite with approval from Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Rakas v Illinois, 439 US 128, 152; 99 S Ct 421; 58 L Ed 2d 387 (1978), where he stated [t]he ultimate question, therefore, is whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the Smith Court determined that whether a person's expectation of privacy is reasonable should be decided after considering the totality of the circumstances. [12] The Court of Appeals in Perlos did not address whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in blood test results. However, in England, the Court found that the defendant's expectation of privacy was not reasonable, stating: By enacting subsection (9) of the implied consent statute, the Legislature has chosen to limit the scope of the evidentiary privilege. By doing so, the people of the State of Michigan, through the action of their Legislature, have indicated that they do not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the results of a blood alcohol test taken from the driver of a car in an accident, where the test was administered by a hospital staff pursuant to medical treatment or diagnosis. [176 Mich App 345.][ [13] ] Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to the instant case, we believe that defendants shared a subjective expectation that their test results would remain private. However, we do not believe that an expectation of privacy in blood alcohol test results, under these circumstances, is one which society is willing to consider reasonable. Furthermore, we believe that a review of United States Supreme Court cases relating to third-party records supports our analysis. In Couch v United States, 409 US 322; 93 S Ct 611; 34 L Ed 2d 548 (1973), the petitioner challenged an IRS summons directed at her accountant to produce business records. The Court rejected the petitioner's arguments that she had a protected interest in tax records in the hands of her accountant. Justice Powell noted that no confidential accountant-client privilege existed under federal law, id., p 335. The Court found no justifiable expectation of privacy because much of the summons information was required to be disclosed on tax returns and would not remain private. The Court also noted that the tax system was dependent on honest self-reporting to survive. In United States v Miller, 425 US 435; 96 S Ct 1619; 48 L Ed 2d 71 (1976), the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 mandated that banks maintain certain transactional records. [14] The Treasury Department subpoenaed all bank records connected with the respondent's activities. The respondent was subsequently convicted of tax-related crimes arising from an illegal liquor manufacturing operation. The respondent challenged the subpoena on the ground that it constituted a search and seizure of his private papers. Id., p 440. The Court held that the respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the records. The Court reasoned that the records belonged to the bank and that the respondent could not claim ownership or possession of the records. Also, the subpoenaed checks and deposit slips were not of a confidential nature, but were financial documents to be used in commercial transactions. The Court reasoned that no legitimate expectation of privacy existed because the information was voluntarily exposed to the bank's employees in the ordinary course of business. Also, the Court stated that Congress did not perceive any legitimate expectation of privacy in the records because the purpose of the act was to maintain records which have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings. 12 USC 1829b(a)(1). Lastly, the Miller Court stated: The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.... This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed. [15] [425 US 443.] Several state courts have also dealt with similar issues regarding privacy rights in medical records or blood samples. In Wisconsin v Jenkins, supra , the defendant was charged with negligent homicide as a result of using a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The defendant was in and out of consciousness after an accident, and his blood was drawn without his consent for purposes of medical treatment. The prosecution somehow obtained the results prior to the defendant's arrest. The doctor who ordered the chemical analysis testified at the defendant's preliminary examination, and the defendant was bound over for trial. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the test results on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin allowed admission of the evidence. The court held that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed either in the doctor's testimony or the test results. The basis of the court's decision was a Wisconsin statute which precluded the physician-patient privilege from applying in homicide trials. In Pollard v State, 439 NE2d 177 (Ind App, 1982), the defendant appealed his conviction for driving while intoxicated which resulted in the death of another person. After a collision, the defendant's blood was drawn at a hospital for medical treatment. Although they had probable cause, the prosecution later subpoenaed the blood sample without a search warrant. The court noted that a state statute exempted blood alcohol test results from the physician-patient privilege. The court dismissed the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge to the use of the results by noting that the blood sample was not privileged and was taken from the hospital, not the defendant. The defendant could not claim the right of another to be free from search and seizure. 439 NE2d 183. In State v Fears, 659 SW2d 370 (Tenn Crim App, 1983), cert den 465 US 1082 (1984), the defendant was convicted of aggravated rape, and challenged a subpoena of his medical records on Fourth Amendment grounds. The court relied on United States v Miller, supra , in rejecting the defendant's argument. It found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records owned and possessed by the hospital, citing Miller for the proposition that information revealed to a third party, even for a limited purpose, can be conveyed to the government without violating Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant was convicted of causing death by use of an automobile in State v Dyal, 97 NJ 229, 232; 478 A2d 390 (1984). After a collision, the defendant consented to a blood test for medical treatment. Four days later, the prosecutor subpoenaed the results. The court balanced the physician-patient privilege against the public interest in prosecuting drunken driving cases and determined that a reasonable basis to believe the defendant had been drinking was required to subpoena the test results. Although the privilege clearly applied, the public interest required a mitigation of the probable cause standard. In tending to emergency duties at the scene of an accident, police may not have time to accompany an injured person to a hospital to supervise a blood test. The court also noted that it was more likely that injured parties would receive prompt medical attention if the police did not feel compelled to establish probable cause at the scene of an accident. [16] We also look to other analogous statutes to gauge the propriety of the law in question. Government frequently imposes obligations on third parties to report information evidencing suspicious or criminal activity. The United States Supreme Court in Whalen v Roe, 429 US 589; 97 S Ct 869; 51 L Ed 2d 64 (1977), considered the constitutionality of a New York reporting statute. The statute required that physicians report to the State Department of Health the names and addresses of those persons using dangerous prescription drugs. Physicians also had to identify the prescribing physician and the pharmacy, and report the type and amount of the drug prescribed. The primary purposes of the act were to acquire information and to prevent unlawful use and diversion of hazardous drugs. In upholding the law against challenges by doctors and patients, the Court said that the disclosures were not meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care. Unquestionably, some individuals' concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention. Nevertheless, disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. [ Id. at 602.] Indeed, many institutions demand the use of personal medical information for a variety of reasons, and these uses serve important societal functions. [17] After finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the statute, stating that cases finding such a privacy right involve affirmative, unannounced, narrowly focused intrusions into individual privacy during the course of criminal investigations. We have never carried the Fourth Amendment's interest in privacy as far as the Roe appellees would have us. We decline to do so now. [ Id. at 604, n 32.] A similar type of reporting act is the Bank Secrecy Act and corresponding regulations which require financial institutions to report suspicious banking activity. One such provision is that currency transactions over $10,000 have to be reported. [18] In California Bankers Ass'n v Shultz, 416 US 21; 94 S Ct 1494; 39 L Ed 2d 812 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld this reporting requirement in the face of a Fourth Amendment challenge by banking institutions. In United States v Kaatz, 705 F2d 1237 (CA 10, 1983), the court upheld the reporting provision against a Fourth Amendment challenge by a bank customer who claimed a privacy interest in bank records, citing United States v Miller, supra , in rejecting the customer's argument. On the state level, all states have child protection statutes which require that suspected child abuse be reported to state or local authorities. [19] Michigan's law, MCL 722.623; MSA 25.248(3), requires therapists, doctors, psychologists, teachers, and many others to report suspected child abuse to state authorities. In People v Cavaiani, 172 Mich App 706; 432 NW2d 409 (1988), lv den 432 Mich 853 (1989), the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant therapist's argument that the statute violated his Fourth Amendment rights and those of his patients. Similar legislation placing a reporting obligation on medical institutions is MCL 750.411; MSA 28.643, which requires that medical personnel report wounds inflicted by deadly weapons to local authorities. Applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test to Perlos and England, we believe that defendants shared a subjective expectation that their test results would remain private. Generally, information relating to medical treatment falls under the physician-patient privilege, and remains confidential. [20] However, we do not believe that an expectation of privacy in blood alcohol test results, under these circumstances, is one which society is willing to consider reasonable. To assess the objective aspect of this test we must consider the totality of the circumstances in searching for understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. [21] Although not determinative, one source in analyzing the reasonableness of an expectation is to look to the Legislature. In Jenkins and Pollard, finding no Fourth Amendment interest, the courts acknowledged that state statutes exempted the physician-patient privilege in those circumstances. [22] Also, as part of its analysis, the United States Supreme Court in United States v Miller, supra , noted that Congress did not consider reasonable an expectation of privacy in bank records because of their usefulness in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations. Likewise, we are persuaded that in Michigan, under subsection 9, the Legislature does not consider reasonable an expectation of privacy in blood alcohol test results. The Legislature decided to abrogate the physician-patient privilege by granting prosecutors access to test results. [23] Nor has the Legislature abolished a longstanding common-law right by creating an exception to the privilege. The physician-patient privilege is a statutorily created right which did not exist at common law. See New York Life Ins Co v Newman, 311 Mich 368; 18 NW2d 859 (1945), and People v Boucher, 131 Mich App 216; 345 NW2d 670 (1983). In fact, the privilege is subject to many exceptions in states where it exists by virtue of statute. [24] By enacting subsection 9, the Legislature has acted consistently with other provisions of the implied consent act in expressing its belief that when people drive, they encounter a diminished expectation of privacy. For example, under MCL 257.625c; MSA 9.2325(3), a person is presumed to have given consent to blood, urine, or breath tests if arrested for any of various offenses related to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances. Under MCL 257.625a(6); MSA 9.2325(1)(6), if a person refuses the request of a peace officer to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test, the person's operator's license will be suspended, and six points added to that person's driving record. Furthermore, it is apparent there is a strong public interest reflected in subsection 9 of the implied consent act. We believe society is aware of the need for effective laws to curtail drunken driving. Intoxicated drivers take a devastating human and financial toll each year. In 1988, in Michigan alone, there were 705 fatal traffic accidents that were alcohol related. Those accidents claimed 793 lives, 46.5 percent of the total highway deaths that year. [25] Nor is this a recent problem. Throughout the nation, state legislatures have been wrestling with this tragic problem for decades. [26] We are persuaded that the public interest is furthered by this act because it facilitates the prosecution of drunken drivers and insures that drivers who are injured in automobile accidents will get prompt medical attention because police will be less inclined to detain an injured driver for criminal investigation. We find subsection 9 to be a carefully tailored statute which only allows chemical test results to be turned over to the state under narrowly defined circumstances, if the state requests them. For the statute to apply there first must be an accident, a person must be taken to a medical facility, the person must have been the driver of a vehicle involved in the accident, and medical personnel must order a chemical analysis, on their own initiative, for medical treatment. This is not a sweeping abandonment of the physician-patient privilege. Prosecutors can only gain access to chemical test results. They cannot obtain all of a person's medical records, nor can they obtain a blood sample for their own discretionary testing. Consequently, within narrow parameters, the Legislature has created a minor exception to the physician-patient privilege. Thus, we conclude that the scope of the enactment does not amount to an authorization for government intrusion on defendants' Fourth Amendment interests. Furthermore, we agree with the rationale underlying United States v Miller suggesting that there is no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the test results. Clearly, defendants cannot claim ownership or possession of the results. Also, as stated in Miller, information revealed to a third party, even for a limited purpose, can properly be conveyed to the government even if the information was revealed in confidence. In these cases, blood was taken for a limited purpose, medical treatment. As in Miller, in both Perlos and England, the information conveyed was not privileged. Under the Miller analysis, once the hospitals obtained the results for medical purposes, [27] it would have been unreasonable for defendants to assume that the results would necessarily remain private. [28] At the very least, various hospital employees become aware of the test results in the normal course of their work. Society places a risk on persons in their dealings with third parties that information conveyed to third parties will not remain private. Moreover, while in Miller the government was allowed access to all of the respondent's bank records, in the instant case, the state could only obtain an extremely limited and well-defined portion of defendants' overall medical records. In summary, we find persuasive statutory analogies in the reporting acts related to prescription drugs, child abuse, deadly weapon injuries, and financial activity. These statutes impose obligations on third parties to report to the government certain types of information which they might happen upon during the ordinary course of their jobs. Much of this information is personal medical or financial data. These statutes are commonly used and relied on. An efficient information gathering tool, this type of statute is effective in helping government to effectuate its priorities. We view the prevalence of reporting statutes as clear evidence that society recognizes as reasonable laws which oblige third parties to report certain sensitive information to the government. Furthermore, we note that these statutes have consistently withstood constitutional challenges. Subsection 9 is comparable to the reporting acts to the extent it imposes obligations on medical personnel to turn over information to the government which they acquire during the ordinary course of their jobs. In addition, unlike the reporting acts which impose blanket obligations, under subsection 9 the obligation to turn over information is only activated upon request by the state. By our decision today, we do not hold that unrestricted access to medical records is outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. Rather, we hold that defendants do not have a protected Fourth Amendment interest in blood alcohol test results under the circumstances presented by these cases. Any expectation of privacy defendants may have had in the test results was unjustified, given societal concerns with regard to drunken driving, the Legislature's implied amendment of the physician-patient privilege, and the resulting minimal intrusion on defendants. In so holding, we also recognize that defendants, in conveying information to the hospitals, assumed the risk that the hospitals might disclose information to the state. We find that MCL 257.625a(9); MSA 9.2325(1)(9) does not violate US Const, Am IV or Const 1963, art 1, § 11.