Opinion ID: 1290351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The amended ordinance

Text: As described above, while this case was before the district court, the City amended the variance procedure to address the constitutional issues and to remove (moot) the issue. The City later extended the duration of the amendment until 90 days after a final decision from the Court of Appeals, when the City Council will adopt permanent amendments to the Planning Code and/or Municipal Code regarding the subject matter of this ordinance for codification. The amendment eliminated one of the four conditions required before a variance could be issued. After that deletion, OPC § 17.148.050(A) provides that a variance for the new construction of advertising signs may be granted only when (1) strict compliance would result in practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship inconsistent with the purposes of the zoning restrictions, due to unique physical or topographic circumstances or conditions of design; (2) strict compliance would deprive the applicant of privileges enjoyed by owners of similarly zoned property; and (3) a variance would not constitute a grant of special privilege. Desert argues that, even as amended, OPC § 17.148.050(A) continues to violate the First Amendment by granting City officials undue discretion to permit or deny variances. [8] [A] law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license, without narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority, is unconstitutional. Arkansas Educ. Television Com'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 684, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998) (quoting Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-151, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162(1969)). The requirement of sufficient direction for City officials seeks to alleviate the threat of content-based, discriminatory enforcement that arises `[w]here the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit. . . .' G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1082 (internal citation omitted). For this reason, a permit requirement cannot condition the free exercise of First Amendment rights on the `unbridled discretion' of government officials. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir.1996) (internal citations omitted). In Moreno Valley, we invalidated a sign ordinance providing for permits subject to a finding that a structure or sign would not have a harmful effect upon the health or welfare of the general public and would not be detrimental to the welfare of the general public . . . [or] to the aesthetic quality of the community or the surrounding land uses. 103 F.3d at 818. We found that this abstract scheme placed no limits on the authority of [c]ity officials to deny a permit and allowed the city to deny permit applications without offering any evidence in support of its denial. Id. at 819. Because city officials had unbridled discretion to determine whether a particular sign would be harmful to the community's health, welfare, or `aesthetic quality,' the sign ordinance did not comport with the First Amendment. Id. Subsequently, in G.K. Limited Travel, we upheld a sign code requiring permits for sign display and authorizing city officials to review signs for compatib[ility] with the surrounding environment. 436 F.3d at 1082-83. The plaintiff alleged that this compatibility review placed insufficient limits on the discretion of permitting officials, but our court disagreed. Id. We upheld the permit requirements on three grounds. First, surrounding environment and compatibility were explicitly defined in the relevant code by a limited and objective set of criteria. [9] Id. at 1083. The code also required that most applications be processed within 14 days of receipt, instructed applicants what to include in an application, and allowed for appeal. Id. Finally, a permitting official was required to state the reasons for his or her decision to either grant or deny a permit so as to facilitate effective review of the official's determination. Id. These criteria were sufficiently specific and objective to survive a First Amendment challenge. The amended OPC variance procedure falls somewhere between the abstract standards invalidated in Moreno Valley and the more explicit criteria and procedural requirements upheld in G.K. Limited Travel. Compared to the ordinance challenged in Moreno Valley, § 17.148.050(A) does provide limits on the authority of City officials to deny a permit. Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d at 818. At issue in Moreno Valley were abstract appeals to health, welfare, or `aesthetic quality,' all of which required broadly subjective determinations. Id. at 819. The three variance prerequisites contained in the amended version of OPC § 17.148.050(A) are significantly more concrete and allow far less subjectivity. Whether denial of a variance would deprive the applicant of privileges enjoyed by owners of similarly zoned property depends on objective comparisons to similarly situated properties. Whether a variance constitutes a grant of special privilege likewise turns on an objective inquiry: whether the variance allows the applicant to engage in conduct otherwise forbidden by the City. Questions of practical difficulty and unnecessary hardship are less concrete, but § 17.148.050(A) defines these criteria specifically in terms of unique physical or topographic circumstances or conditions of design. This limitation is reasonably specific, G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1083, and sufficiently constrains the authority of City officials to deny a permit. Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d at 818. Section 17.148.050(A) provides less explicit guidance overall than the ordinance upheld in G.K. Ltd. Travel. Even so, its criteria are significantly more concrete than the abstract aesthetic standards invalidated in Moreno Valley. The provisions of § 17.148.050(A) are somewhat elastic and require reasonable discretion to be exercised by the permitting authority, but this does not make [the ordinance] an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. Satisfied that § 17.148.050(A) contains appropriate standards cabining the [City's] discretion, id., we agree with the district court that the ordinance is constitutional as amended.