Opinion ID: 873217
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: G&C’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Text: This diversity case is governed by Oklahoma law, and “Oklahoma follows the American rule concerning the recovery of attorney fees. It provides that each litigant pay for legal representation and that courts are without authority to assess attorney fees in the absence of a specific statute or contract.” Whitehorse v. Johnson, 156 P.3d 41, 47 (Okla. 2007). Because G&C is seeking to recover its attorney’s fees under Section 13.5 of the Agreement, the American rule is not a bar to recovery. Instead, G&C’s request for fees raises issues of contract interpretation. The controlling legal principles under Oklahoma law are as follows: -6- If the terms of a contract are unambiguous, clear and consistent, they are accepted in their plain and ordinary sense and the contract will be enforced to carry out the intention of the parties as it existed at the time it was negotiated. The interpretation of a contract, and whether it is ambiguous is a matter of law for the Court to resolve. Whitehorse, 156 P.3d at 47 (footnote omitted). We review the district court’s legal conclusions concerning the provision for attorney’s fees in Section 13.5 of the Agreement de novo. See Tulsa Litho Co. v. Tile & Decorative Surfaces Magazine Pub., Inc., 69 F.3d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1995). Having conducted the required de novo review, we agree with the district court’s analysis. We therefore adopt the following reasoning of the district court: [I]n this case, the Court finds the contractual provision on which Plaintiff relies to be clear and unambiguous. The Agreement expressly provided that upon a termination according to its terms – without a breach of contractual obligations by either party – the parties would simply walk away, with no further rights or obligations other than those specifically provided for in the Agreement. The express provision for attorney fees obligated one party to bear the other party’s costs and expenses only “[i]n the event that the termination of this Agreement occurs as a result of a Party’s misrepresentation, breach or failure to perform.” See Agreement, § 13.5. Despite Plaintiff’s attempt to recharacterize its action at this late stage, Plaintiff did not assert prior to judgment that Defendant breached the Agreement or failed to perform it. Instead, Plaintiff sought and obtained an interpretation of the Agreement and a judicial declaration of rights under it. The parties simply had a legitimate dispute about whether Plaintiff had timely exercised its termination right. Upon the Court’s determination in Plaintiff’s favor, the Agreement was terminated according to its terms, and each party must simply walk away. Aplt. App. at 210-11. We also reject the arguments advanced by G&C on appeal. First, G&C argues that “Defendant would not allow Plaintiff to terminate the Agreement and reclaim its -7- earnest money. Plaintiff submits that this was a breach of the Agreement by Defendant as it prevented Plaintiff [from] performing [its] rights on the contract.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 9. We disagree. Section 13.5 of the Agreement unambiguously provided that “in the event that the termination of this Agreement occurs as a result of a Party’s . . . breach . . . , the breaching Party shall be obligated and responsible for any . . . reasonable attorney’s fees . . . incurred by the non-breaching Party.” Aplt. App. at 79 (emphasis added). Given this explicit language, the attorney’s fees provision in Section 13.5 is limited to a breach that results in the termination of the Agreement, and no such breach occurred here. Second, G&C argues that it “had to defend against a [counterclaim] of breach and the parties litigated a cause for breach. Therefore, the Court erred in when it failed to consider these facts in determining whether attorney’s fees should be awarded under the Agreement for breach of contract.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 11. This argument is a nonsequitur. As Rexam points out, “the District Court’s denial of Rexam’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was a determination that G&C had not committed a breach, not that Rexam had.” Aplee. Br. at 15. Third, G&C argues for the first time on appeal that it was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under Section 22 of the Agreement. However, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.” Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1237 n.4 (10th Cir. 2011) -8- (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no such circumstances here, and we therefore decline to consider Section 22 of the Agreement. Finally, G&C argues that Rexam should be judicially estopped from opposing its request for attorney’s fees because Rexam pled in its counterclaim that “[u]nder the terms of the Agreement, the prevailing party in this action is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.” Aplt. App. at 32. This argument is without merit. To be entitled to judicial estoppel, G&C had to prove that the district court relied upon Rexam’s representation to either grant relief to Rexam or to deny relief to G&C. See Johnson v. Lindon City Corp., 405 F.3d 1065, 1069 (10th Cir. 2005). Neither of these scenarios occurred in the district court proceedings.