Opinion ID: 2631807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Factors (d), (g), and (h)

Text: Defendant asserts that section 190.3, factors (d) (defendant's extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and (g) (defendant acting under extreme duress or substantial domination of another), are unduly vague and overbroad. We have repeatedly upheld these provisions and the instructions based on them. (E.g., People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 768-769, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 479, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 699, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Defendant also challenges the instruction based on section 190.3, factor (h), which requires the jury to consider whether at the time of the offense the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts or conform to law was impaired by mental disease or intoxication. In defendant's view, the jury could have read the instruction as excluding consideration of such evidence as mitigating if it did not influence the commission of the crime. We recently rejected a similar argument regarding section 190.3, factor (d). ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1225, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) As Riel observed, under the so called catchall instruction following section 190.3, factor (k) (`any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime ... whether or not related to the offense for which he's on trial '), the defendant is entitled to present a full range of mitigating evidence, whether or not it related to the crime. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1225, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, italics added by Riel; see also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 420-421, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The court gave a similar instruction here. d. Failure to delete inapplicable factors Defendant next contends the court erred in failing to delete from the penalty instructions any inapplicable sentencing factors. We have rejected similar arguments on several occasions. (E.g., People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1064, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) e. Failure to designate aggravating and mitigating factors Defendant contends the court improperly failed to designate which sentencing factors are aggravating and which are mitigating. We have rejected similar arguments on several occasions. (E.g., People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 420, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1026-1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) f. Failure to limit aggravating evidence Defendant complains the trial court failed to give an instruction limiting the use of nonstatutory aggravating evidence. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-776, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) The point lacks merit. The court gave the standard sentencing instruction (see CALJIC No. 8.85), and we have held that instruction is proper despite its failure expressly to limit aggravating evidence to the enumerated statutory factors, and to exclude nonstatutory factors as a basis for the death penalty. (See, e.g., People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 899, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) g. Mitigating factors instruction The court gave an instruction (CALJIC No. 8.88) defining a mitigating circumstance as one that may not constitute a justification for the crime, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriate penalty. Defendant, armed with empirical evidence gleaned from studies not presented to the trial court, contends this instruction was insufficient and likely was understood as limiting the kinds of mitigating evidence the jury could consider. We have rejected similar arguments in recent cases. (See People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 772-773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754; People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 936-937, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) In a related argument, defendant contends the court failed affirmatively to instruct the jury to consider all sympathetic mitigating factors, mercy and nonstatutory mitigation, failed to instruct on the role sympathy for defendant and his family should play, and failed to instruct that the guilt phase anti-sympathy instruction was inapplicable during the penalty phase. These arguments lack merit. The jury was told it could consider any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record and was also told to disregard guilt phase instructions in conflict with that principle. Under our case law, these instructions were sufficient. (See People v. Champion, supra , Cal.4th at p. 943, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93; People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 588, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 118, 249 Cal.Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569.) h. Failure to instruct on returning life imprisonment verdict Defendant faults the sentencing instructions (CALJIC No. 8.88) for failing to direct the jury to impose a life imprisonment without parole sentence if it concluded the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating ones. We have repeatedly rejected the claim in light of other language in this instruction, allowing a death verdict only if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones. (See People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1243, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131.) Defendant also faults CALJIC No. 8.88 for calling on the jury to impose death if they find substantial aggravating factors, implicitly compelling a death verdict if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones. Defendant observes that under our case law, the jury may reject a death sentence even if mitigating circumstances do not outweigh aggravating ones. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 450-54, 250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135.) Our reading of the instruction discloses no compulsion on the jury to impose death under such circumstances. Instead, the instruction simply explains that no death verdict is appropriate unless substantial aggravating circumstances exist which outweigh the mitigating ones. This instruction was proper under our case law. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 781-782, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1194, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Defendant also argues CALJIC No. 8.88 was deficient for failing expressly to inform the jurors they could vote against the death penalty even if they believed the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones. We have rejected the argument in past cases. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171, 51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 782, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) i. Inadequate notice of penalty phase evidence Defendant next contends the prosecution gave him inadequate notice it intended to rely on victim impact evidence at the penalty phase. (See § 190.3.) According to defendant, the prosecutor announced his intent to submit such evidence only one day before the penalty phase commenced. The record shows that, in December 1989, the prosecutor timely notified defendant that he intended to introduce penalty phase evidence of the facts and circumstances of the crime. At this time, the cases proscribed admitting victim impact evidence at the penalty phase, and therefore the prosecutor's failure to include such evidence in his original notice was understandable. (See South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876; cf. People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1266-1267, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) However, by November 5, 1991, when the prosecutor notified defendant of his intent to use victim impact evidence, it had become clear that no constitutional impediment existed to the admission of victim impact evidence at the penalty phase. On June 27, 1991, the high court had decided Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, so holding. Yet the prosecutor waited more than four months to notify defendant of his intent to use such evidence. The People observe that general notice of the intended evidence will suffice, and that the failure to specify the precise evidence to be presented does not render the notice constitutionally insufficient. (See People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 638-639, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 421, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1033, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) Yet when, on November 5, the prosecutor informed defendant he intended to use victim impact evidence, we had not yet ruled that such evidence properly could be admitted at the penalty phase as evidence of the facts and circumstances of the crime. (See People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, decided Nov. 25, 1991.) Therefore, we cannot charge defendant with knowing, prior to November 5, that the prosecutor's notice of evidence of the circumstances of the crime was intended to include victim impact evidence. Nonetheless, we find any error in the timing of the prosecutor's notice to be harmless to the defense. The purpose of the notice provision is to afford defendant an opportunity to meet the prosecutor's aggravating evidence. ( People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 334, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121.) Here, the trial court was careful to limit the victim impact evidence to testimony by Kazumi and Dean Hanano, much of which was already elicited during the guilt phase. Although defendant now claims that Counsel were not given sufficient notice to allow them to effectively meet this evidence, he fails to explain what more he could have done. The record shows that defendant, when notified of the prosecutor's intent to offer victim impact evidence, neither objected, requested a continuance, nor otherwise indicated the delay in receiving notice had prejudiced the defense. These omissions demonstrate a clear lack of prejudice to the defense. (See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; People v. Carrera, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 334, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121.)