Opinion ID: 3033671
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Peremptory Strikes Can Form the Basis

Text: of a Batson Challenge [1] In Batson, the Supreme Court held that a “[s]tate’s privilege to strike individual jurors through peremptory challenges, is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause.”5 476 U.S. at 89. Batson and its progeny established a three-part test for determining whether the exercise of a peremptory strike violates equal protection. First, the challenging party bears the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. Id. at 93-94. If the challenging party satisfies this burden, the burden of production shifts to the party exercising the strike to articulate a race-neutral reason for the strike. Id. at 97-98. The raceneutral reason provided does not have to “rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,” id. at 97, nor does the explanation have to be “persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). But the reason 5 This analysis applies in federal criminal cases as well. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”); United States v. De Gross, 913 F.2d 1417, 1422 n.7 (1990). UNITED STATES v. ESPARZA-GONZALEZ 12331 must be tied to the particular case. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. Third, once the striking party provides a race-neutral explanation, the burden returns to the challenging party to show that the reason given was pretextual and that the striking party engaged in purposeful discrimination. Id. Because a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact, a reviewing court must give appropriate deference to the trial court’s decision at this last stage. Id. at 98 n.21. [2] Whether under the struck jury system waivers of peremptory strikes can form the basis of a Batson challenge is a question of first impression. In denying that they can, the district court relied on a case decided by the Arizona Supreme Court. Paleo, 22 P.3d at 37. The court in Paleo held that under the struck jury system waivers of peremptory strikes in combination with other factors can establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Batson, but that such waivers standing alone cannot.6 Id. Because under this particular method of jury selection waivers of peremptory strikes result in the removal of known jurors, we conclude that such waivers are best viewed as effective strikes against identifiable jurors, and therefore for the purposes of establishing a prima facie case such waivers should be treated the same as the exercise of peremptory strikes. [3] In Paleo, the Arizona Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that peremptory strikes and the waiver of these strikes differ because the former require action, while the latter simply inaction. 22 P.3d at 37. Under the struck jury system, both the exercise of a peremptory strike and the waiver of a strike remove a single, clearly identified juror. If a peremptory strike is used, the striking party directly removes an identifi- 6 Two Texas Appellate Courts previously considered, and rejected, the use of a peremptory strike waiver as a basis for a Batson challenge. See Mayes v. State, 870 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App. 1994); Russell v. State, 804 S.W.2d 287, 290-91 (Tex. App. 1991). In both cases the trial court appears to have used a version of the struck jury system for juror selection. 12332 UNITED STATES v. ESPARZA-GONZALEZ able juror, and no new juror is seated. Similarly, if a party waives a peremptory strike in the struck jury system, an identifiable juror (the one with the highest juror number) is removed and no new juror is seated. However, under other selection procedures, such as the jury box system, use of a peremptory strike results in the removal of a known juror who is replaced with an unknown, randomly selected juror. Under these systems, the waiver of a peremptory strike does not remove a juror or introduce a new juror.7 It is only under selection systems like the jury box system that waiver of a peremptory strike amounts to inaction or preservation of the status quo. By contrast, under the struck jury system, a waiver of a peremptory strike is not merely passive, but is more properly viewed as an effective strike of an identifiable juror. For this reason, the struck jury system has long been criticized for allowing the racial engineering of juries. See, e.g., United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the struck jury system might “increase the opportunity to shape a jury along racial or other class lines”); James Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 623, 668 (1998) (“It may be easier, however, to camouflage discrimination with the struck jury model because the demographics of the entire panel will be known from the start, making it easier to pick and choose.”); Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures: Our Uncertain Commitment to Representative Panels 150 (1977) (observing that the “struck jury system [has been] employed to use [the peremptory challenge] power to elimi- 7 See Plevan, 706 PLI/Lit at 451-52 (“For good or for ill, the ‘jury box’ method focuses on the selection of individual jurors and does not allow the shaping of an entire jury. Counsel have no way of knowing . . . who will replace the challenged juror. This means that counsel must decide who to strike based on the individual’s qualities, rather than whether that person is better or worse than the replacement.”). UNITED STATES v. ESPARZA-GONZALEZ 12333 nate entire races or classes of people from jury venires”). As the Second Circuit has noted, “[i]t is far from clear, however, that the right to challenge peremptorily should necessarily imply a right to shape a jury’s profile” to the extent allowed by the struck jury system. Blouin, 666 F.2d at 798. Despite the power the struck jury system gives to parties to shape the composition of the jury, it has been held to pass constitutional muster, at least in the abstract. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144 n.17 (1994) (noting that Alabama is free to use the struck jury system so long as its actual use complies with the Constitution); see also Amsler v. United States, 381 F.2d 37, 44 (9th Cir. 1967) (upholding the “Arizona system” of jury selection, which is similar to the struck jury system). The Supreme Court recently held that jury selection procedures may give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent even though the prosecutor is not actively striking potential jurors. In Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2332-33 (2005), the Court condemned the use of a practice called the “Texas jury shuffle.” Under the Texas Criminal Code, either side may request shuffling of the venire panel such that a certain group of potential jurors (those shuffled to the back of the venire) will likely never be called for voir dire questioning because a jury will be formed before they reach the front of the list. Id. at 2332-33 & n.12 (citing Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 35.11 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005)). When used to exclude potential black jurors, this practice supported an inference of discrimination. [4] Similarly, the struck jury system allows parties who intentionally want to remove jurors for discriminatory reasons to camouflage these removals by unseating jurors through the waiver of peremptory strikes rather than resorting to direct removals by using peremptory strikes. It is clear that under the struck jury system, the waiver of peremptory strikes, just like the exercise of these strikes, allows those of “a mind to discriminate” to do so. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (observing 12334 UNITED STATES v. ESPARZA-GONZALEZ that “the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Failing to provide protection against removal of identifiable jurors, when such removal is achieved by waiver rather than exercise of a peremptory strike, would frustrate the essential purpose of Batson — to eliminate the race-based selection of jurors — and would violate the equal protection rights of both the defendant and prospective jurors. [5] The government correctly notes that it is not required to exercise all of its peremptory challenges and that it was well within its rights to waive five of its six peremptory strikes in this case. In the abstract, this is of course true. The use of peremptory strikes has long been recognized as a capricious and arbitrary right used at the will of the striking party. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (observing that “[t]he right to challenge a given number of jurors without showing cause is one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused . . . . [H]e may exercise that right without reason or for no reason, arbitrarily and capriciously”) (internal quotation omitted). But even this capricious right is limited by equal protection requirements, and when a waiver of a peremptory strike creates an inference of intentional discrimination, the party waiving that strike must provide a raceneutral explanation for its decision to effectively remove a specific juror. The government argues that such a rule would grant the defendant the right to a jury composed in whole or part of persons of his race — a right to which no defendant is entitled. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85. We disagree. Our holding simply requires the prosecution to provide race-neutral reasons for a waiver of a peremptory strike under the struck jury system when a defendant establishes a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination based on the challenged waiver.