Opinion ID: 1264906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Career Offender Issue

Text: Finally, Stymiest argues the district court improperly enhanced his sentence by applying the career offender provision of the advisory guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), because his prior South Dakota felony conviction for third-degree burglary is not a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2) [3] as construed in cases that apply the Supreme Court's recent decision in Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). Reviewing this issue de novo, we conclude that it is controlled by our decision in United States v. Bell, 445 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir.2006), a case inexplicably not cited by government counsel. The Armed Career Criminal Act imposed a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence if a defendant convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) has three prior violent felony or serious drug offense convictions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The definition of violent felony in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the definition of crime of violence in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) except the enumerated offenses under the ACCA include burglary, but only burglary of a dwelling is an enumerated offense under § 4B1.2(a)(2). In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-99, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), decided a few months after adoption of the current version of § 4B1.2(a)(2), the Supreme Court held that an offense constitutes burglary under the ACCA if it contains the elements of generic burglary, which the Court defined as unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. (Emphasis added.) In Bell, 445 F.3d at 1090, we thoroughly reviewed the history of these provisions and concluded: Though they used different operative terms, crime of violence and violent felony, in this context the two terms should have the same meaning, both as a matter of statutory construction and to avoid sentencing disparity.      Based upon [ United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997) ], were it necessary to the decision in this case, we would invalidate the term of a dwelling in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) as inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the governing statute in Taylor. But it is not necessary to do so because the otherwise involves provision in § 4B1.2(a)(2) as construed in [our prior cases] produces the same result. It is a correct result. Stymiest's third-degree burglary of an unoccupied structure was a generic burglary under Taylor, 495 U.S. at 597, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (Congress presumably realized that the word `burglary' is commonly understood to include ... burglaries involving ... an unoccupied building). At the time, S.D. Codified Laws § 22-32-8 provided: Any person who enters an unoccupied structure, with intent to commit any crime other than the act of shoplifting or retail theft ... or remains in an unoccupied structure after forming the intent to commit any crime other than shoplifting... is guilty of third degree burglary. The statute is potentially over-inclusive because it defines structure to include motor vehicles, watercraft, aircraft, railroad cars, trailers, and tents. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 591, 599, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143. However, Stymiest's pre-sentence investigation report, to which he did not object, stated that he burgled the West River Research Building. When a defendant fails to object to fact recitations in the PSR establishing that a prior offense was generic burglary, the government need not introduce at sentencing the documentary evidence that Taylor and Shepard [v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005),] otherwise require. United States v. Reliford, 471 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 938, 127 S.Ct. 2248, 167 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2007); see Bell, 445 F.3d at 1090-91. Here, Stymiest's general objection to the PSR classifying him as a career offender was not sufficient to trigger the government's obligation to introduce court documents confirming the PSR's fact statement that he burgled a building. As noted in Bell, we have repeatedly held that any generic burglary is a crime of violence under the otherwise involves residual provision in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). See, e.g., United States v. LeGrand, 468 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1109, 127 S.Ct. 2926, 168 L.Ed.2d 254 (2007); United States v. Olthoff, 437 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir.2006) (burglary of unoccupied ski resort office a crime of violence). This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 203-05, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007), which held that the ACCA's otherwise involves provision encompasses attempted burglary because an attempted burglary poses the same kind of risk of face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party as a completed burglary. Likewise, burglary of an unoccupied or commercial structure, while not posing a risk of harm to the occupants of a dwelling, poses the same kind of risk of violent confrontation with a police officer, night watchman, store security guard, or innocent passer-by as other types of generic burglary. In Begay, the Court considered whether felony DWI is a violent felony under the ACCA's otherwise involves residual provision. The Court limited those offenses to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the enumerated crimes in that they typically involve purposeful, `violent,' and `aggressive' conduct. 128 S.Ct. at 1585-86. That additional limitation has prompted reconsideration of many offenses previously deemed violent felonies or crimes of violence solely because they involve conduct that necessarily presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, such as the broad array of escape offenses considered in Chambers v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009), and in United States v. Hudson, 577 F.3d 883 (8th Cir.2009), and the automobile theft and tampering offenses at issue in United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969 (8th Cir.2008). Begay did not question the decision in James and thus does not undermine our burglary precedents. Stymiest's third degree burglary offense was not only, in the words of Begay, roughly similar, in kind to generic burglary, it was generic burglary as defined in Taylor and therefore should be an enumerated offense under § 4B1.2(a)(2) but for the Commission's arbitrary of a dwelling limitation. Even if that limitation compels analysis under the otherwise involves residual provision, nothing in Begay or Chambers suggests that an offense this similar to an enumerated offense, which presents the same kind of risk of violent confrontation recognized in James, would be classified differently than the attempted burglary at issue in James. For these reasons, we conclude that our prior decisions classifying generic burglaries of structures other than dwellings as crimes of violence under the otherwise involves provision of § 4B1.2(a)(2) were not implicitly overruled by Begay. Accord United States v. Cantrell, 530 F.3d 684, 695-96 (8th Cir.2008); United States v. Woodard, 321 F. App'x 543 (8th Cir. 2009) (unpublished per curiam); United States v. McFarlin, 306 Fed.Appx. 342 (8th Cir.2009) (unpublished per curiam). Contra United States v. Giggey, 551 F.3d 27 (1st Cir.2008) (en banc). Alternatively, if Begay requires a different result under the otherwise involves provision, we holdas forecast in Bell that Stymiest was convicted of an enumerated burglary offense because the of a dwelling limitation in § 4B1.2(a)(2) was invalidated by the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor. Under either of these alternative holdings, the district court correctly ruled that Stymiest's third-degree burglary conviction was a crime of violence and sentenced him as a career offender. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.