Opinion ID: 744062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fact or Opinion

Text: 40 Because expressions of opinion are not actionable, the disposition of defamation actions frequently turns on the issue of whether the defendant's words constituted actionable assertions of fact or protected expressions of opinion. Categorizing a defendant's statements as either fact or opinion, however, is often not an easy task. As one commentator has noted, No area of modern libel law can be murkier than the cavernous depths of this inquiry. See Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 5.1 (Supp.1997); see also Brian v. Richardson, 87 N.Y.2d 46, 52, 637 N.Y.S.2d 347, 350, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1129 (1995). In New York, resolution of the fact/opinion issue is a matter for the court. See Gross v. New York Times Co., 82 N.Y.2d 146, 154, 603 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817, 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (1993). 41 New York courts have developed a three-stage inquiry to distinguish statements of fact from statements of opinion. The first stage of inquiry involves a consideration of whether the specific language used has a precise and readily understood meaning. Second, the court determines whether the statements are susceptible of being proven false. At the third stage, the court evaluates whether the context of the statements signals to the reader that what is being conveyed is likely to be opinion rather than fact. Id. 42 The Supreme Court, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), explained that the United States Constitution offers no wholesale protection for so-called expressions of opinion if those expressions imply assertions of objective fact. Id. at 18, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06. The Court also reiterated the rule that when statements are within the category of rhetorical hyperbole or imaginative expression, those statements are not actionable because they cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts.'  Id. at 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 43 The New York Court of Appeals, however, has expressed its belief that an analysis that begins by looking at the content of the whole communication, its tone and apparent purpose better balances the values at stake than an analysis that first examines the challenged statements for express and implied factual assertions, and finds them actionable unless couched in loose, figurative or hyperbolic language. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 255, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906, 917, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1281 (1991) (citation omitted). 44 While New York's tripartite inquiry therefore does and is intended to differ from the inquiry required under the First Amendment, see Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 52, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51, 660 N.E.2d at 1129-30; Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d at 255, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917, 567 N.E.2d at 1281, we note that the thrust of the dispositive inquiry under both New York and constitutional law is whether a reasonable [reader] could have concluded that [the publications were] conveying facts about the plaintiff, Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 817, 623 N.E.2d at 1167 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (first alteration in original). Instead of parsing out and evaluating the challenged statements in isolation, New York courts look to the immediate context and the broader social context of the statement, see Brian, 87 N.Y.2d at 52, 637 N.Y.S.2d at 348-49, 660 N.E.2d at 1127-28 (explaining Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d at 254, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 916, 567 N.E.2d at 1280); Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 153, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 819, 623 N.E.2d at 1169, and evaluate the impact that the statements would have on a reasonable reader, see Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d at 254, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 917, 567 N.E.2d at 1281. When the defendant's statements, read in context, are readily understood as conjecture, hypothesis, or speculation, this signals the reader that what is said is opinion, and not fact. See Gross, 82 N.Y.2d at 155, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818, 623 N.E.2d at 1168. 45 Though some statements may be characterized as hypothesis or conjecture, they may yet be actionable if they imply that the speaker's opinion is based on the speaker's knowledge of facts that are not disclosed to the reader. Id. at 154, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818, 623 N.E.2d at 1168 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977)). On the other hand, if a statement of opinion either discloses the facts on which it is based or does not imply the existence of undisclosed facts, the opinion is not actionable. Id. at 154, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 818, 623 N.E.2d at 1168. 46 Ransom is a nonfiction work, primarily presenting the story of how Norton Dodge amassed his renowned art collection during an intriguing and dangerous era in the Soviet Union. Though the overall content of the book generally informs the reader that the book describes factual and historical accounts of real events, McPhee uses a number of clear signals to indicate to the reader that the versions of the events surrounding the studio fire were nothing more than conjecture and speculation. 47 The book describes the studio fire as an incident that remains shrouded in mystery even to the present day. The differing accounts of what either did or might have happened are explicitly presented as versions. These versions are told by people who were personally acquainted with the painter and therefore might be expected to have their own personal theories regarding the mystery. The continuing mystery of the incident is compounded not only by the conflict among the versions as to how and why the fire started, 6 but also by inconsistencies within what was said by each of the individuals interviewed. Moreover, not one of the versions is related by a person with first-hand knowledge of what happened that day, and the book expressly reports that Dodge's Version and Kuzminsky's Version are imagined. All of these considerations combine to place any allegation of Levin's possible involvement in a murder in the category of opinion--opinion based on speculation without any implication of fact. The accusation of cowardice appears only in Kuzminsky's explicitly labeled imagined version, and therefore could not be viewed as anything other than conjecture. Our conclusions about the book apply equally to the New Yorker article. Both the book and the article emphasize that the facts underlying the studio fire and Rukhin's death remain unknown, and a reasonable reader would understand that any allegations of murder, especially any implicating Levin, are nothing more than conjecture and rumor.