Opinion ID: 1386737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prejudice Resulting From Counsel's Deficient Performance

Text: If Fautenberry is to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, not only must he prove that his counsel were defective, but also he must show that counsel's defectiveness was prejudicial. Because the Ohio Court of Appeals did not reach this issue, we apply no deference under AEDPA. Maples, 340 F.3d at 436. The majority states that even if Fautenberry had presented evidence of an organic brain impairment, [i]t is highly unlikely that this sort of evidence would have altered the three-judge panel's decision to impose the death sentence for Fautenberry's murder of Daron, which they found was `contemplated and calculating'a conclusion that is not at all mitigated or reduced by the traits associated with or the side effects of organic brain disorder. Maj. Op. at 627. I must disagree; we have repeatedly held that evidence of a brain impairment is very significant during mitigation. Furthermore, the sentencing panel's conclusion that the murder was contemplated and calculating cannot be divorced from the fact that the panel was repeatedly told that Fautenberry was mentally healthy; evidence of a brain impairment would almost certainly cast doubt on Fautenberry's abilities to contemplate and calculate and would certainly raise questions of culpability. The hurdle for establishing prejudice is not high: Petitioner `need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case,' rather, only that `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 770 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Ohio is a `weighing' state, which means that the aggravating circumstances must outweigh the mitigating factors in order to impose the death penalty. Under federal law, one juror may prevent the death penalty by finding that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors. As the Supreme Court recently said in Wiggins, the `prejudice' prong is satisfied if `there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.' Id. (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523-28, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). Although Fautenberry was sentenced by a panel of three judges and not a jury, Ohio similarly requires a panel of judges to be unanimous in a death sentence. OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(3). Our precedent has repeatedly emphasized the significance of evidence of an organic brain impairment during the penalty phase. In Harries, we held that it was reasonably probable that evidence of frontal lobe damage would have changed the sentencing outcome. See Harries, 417 F.3d at 641. In Frazier, we noted that there was a significant probability that the jury would find that a murderer who suffers from a functional brain impairment is less morally culpable than one who does not, even if the brain impairment did not `cause' Frazier to murder Skiba. Frazier, 343 F.3d at 798. And in Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204 (6th Cir.1995), we suggested that a jury's sentence would change when presented with evidence of an organic brain defect. See id. at 1211 (John Glenn's sentencing proceeding can hardly be relied upon as having produced a just result when the jurors were given to understand, in the unchallenged report of Dr. Siddall, that the crime was not the product of mental retardation or organic brain disease. (footnote omitted)). Given the importance of evidence of an organic brain impairment during sentencing, I believe the only conclusion is that Fautenberry could establish prejudice in his counsel's defective performance.