Opinion ID: 2571543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In Light of Washington v. Recuenco, U.S. , 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006), the Court of Appeals Properly Remanded for Resentencing Within the Standard Range

Text: ¶ 35 At Womac's sentencing the trial judge imposed an exceptional sentence of 480 months based on two aggravating factors: particular vulnerability of the victim and abuse of a position of trust. CP at 30, 43 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Exceptional Sentence). Per existing state sentencing law, these factual findings were made by the judge and not submitted to the jury. See former RCW 9.94A.535 (2003). ¶ 36 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court determined, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). The Court of Appeals held the trial court's imposition of an exceptional sentence based on factors not found by Womac's jury was error under Apprendi and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). Blakely clarified the `statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. ' [10] Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. at 2549 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531). Relying on State v. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d 118, 110 P.3d 192 (2005), for the proposition that a Blakely error is structural error, which always requires reversal, the Court of Appeals remanded for resentencing Womac within the standard range. Womac, 130 Wash.App. at 458, 123 P.3d 528. ¶ 37 In Recuenco, the United States Supreme Court abrogated Hughes, holding failure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury is not structural error and may be subject to harmless error analysis. Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. at 2553. The Court held, [f]ailure to submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element to the jury, id. at 2553, [11] may be subject to harmless error analysis, observing, [o]nly in rare cases has this Court held that an error is structural, and thus requires automatic reversal. Id. at 2551. The Court concluded we erred in State v. Recuenco, 154 Wash.2d 156, 164, 110 P.3d 188 (2005) by relying on Hughes for the proposition that a Blakely error can never be harmless. Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. at 2550-51. In light of Washington v. Recuenco , we must now determine whether the Court of Appeals properly remanded for resentencing Womac within the standard range. ¶ 38 In Recuenco the United States Supreme Court opined [i]f . . . Washington law does not provide for a procedure by which [Recuenco's] jury could have made a finding pertaining to his possession of a firearm, that merely suggests that respondent will be able to demonstrate that the Blakely violation in this particular case was not harmless.  [12] Recuenco, 126 S.Ct. at 2550 (second emphasis added). Following this reasoning, Womac argues, [b]ecause state law does not and did not provide for a jury to be empanelled to make the factual findings necessary to support the exceptional sentence in this case, the error cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 3. We find this argument persuasive. ¶ 39 Former RCW 9.94A.535 (2003) provided The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds . . . that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. Whenever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law. ¶ 40 As explained by Hughes, former RCW 9.94A.535 explicitly direct[ed] the trial court to make the necessary factual findings to support an exceptional sentence and d[id] not include any provision allowing a jury to make those determinations during trial, during a separate sentencing phase, or on remand. Hughes, 154 Wash.2d at 149, 110 P.3d 192 (emphasis added). Hughes also declared, no procedure is currently in place allowing juries to be convened for the purpose of deciding aggravating factors either after conviction or on remand after an appeal. Id. Our recent decision in State v. Pillatos confirmed trial courts do not have inherent authority to empanel sentencing juries. 159 Wash.2d 459, 470, 150 P.3d 1130 (2007). ¶ 41 Furthermore, the new sentencing provisions, Laws of 2005, chapter 68 (providing for a procedure whereby facts supporting aggravated circumstances are proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt), do not apply to Womac. Pillatos held the new sentencing provisions apply only to pending criminal matters where trials have not begun or pleas not yet accepted. Id. at 470, 150 P.3d 1130. As Womac correctly observes, even if the new sentencing provisions applied to him, RCW 9.94A.537(1) permits the imposition of an exceptional sentence only when the State has given notice, prior to trial, that it intends to seek a sentence above the standard sentencing range; and it is too late for the State to comply with that requirement. In addition, RCW 9.94A.537(2) requires a jury to find the existence of facts supporting aggravating circumstances, and as discussed above, state law does not authorize impaneling a new jury to make such findings. See Pillatos, 159 Wash.2d at 470, 150 P.3d 1130. ¶ 42 Accordingly, we hold that because there was no legal procedure whereby Womac's jury could have made the findings necessary to support his exceptional sentence, the error was not harmless. [13] ¶ 43 The State argues that if we affirm the Court of Appeals remand for resentencing, we should not direct the sentencing court to impose a sentence within the standard range. The State acknowledges that post- Blakely a jury must hear evidence of aggravating circumstances, but suggests that on remand the sentencing court should be permitted to convene a panel of jurors and seat a jury to hear evidence. Br. of Resp't at 49, 50. However, per our discussion of Pillatos above, this argument does not have merit. Therefore, because Womac's jury could not have made the findings necessary to support his exceptional sentence, trial courts are not authorized to impanel juries, and the new sentencing laws do not apply to Womac (thereby foreclosing the option of a jury finding the presence of aggravating factors), we direct the court to resentence Womac within the standard range.