Opinion ID: 1936501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Waiver of Plea Colloquy.

Text: The State asserts that the absence in the record of any reference to some of the rights required to be discussed under rule 2.8(2)( b ) is not fatal because Meron affirmatively waived the necessity for the court to explain all the requirements of the rule. The State relies upon the following language of rule 2.8(2)( b ): The court may, in its discretion and with the approval of the defendant, waive the above procedures in a plea of guilty to a serious or aggravated misdemeanor. The State claims waiver occurred in this case when Meron agreed to abbreviate the proceedings. The court of appeals adopted this claim in affirming the judgment and sentence of the district court. Prior to our decision in Kirchoff, we interpreted rule 2.8(2)( b ) to require the district court to engage in an in-court colloquy with the defendant covering all the requirements of the rule. See 452 N.W.2d at 804 (citing State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857 (Iowa 1980) (use of written plea form does not satisfy rule 2.8(2)( b ))). In Kirchoff, however, we said that the requirements for the court to personally address a defendant to cover the necessary areas of inquirynow listed under rule 2.8(2)( b )could be satisfied in cases involving pleas of guilty to serious and aggravated misdemeanors by supplementing the in-court colloquy with a written plea that tracked with the language of the rule. See 452 N.W.2d at 804-05. We recognize that the waiver language of rule 2.8(2)( b ) was a codification of our holding in Kirchoff. Hook, 623 N.W.2d at 869. Thus, while the rule embraces the use of written waiver forms, neither Kirchoff nor the waiver language of rule 2.8(2)( b ) diminishes the importance and necessity of the court's role to ensure each plea is voluntary, intelligent, and supported by facts. Instead, they simply recognize that the court, in making its required determination in misdemeanor cases, can use a defendant's written acknowledgement. The language of the waiver portion of the rule adopted after Kirchoff tracks with this approach and explains why it is written to permit the court to waive the procedures, subject to the approval of the defendant. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b ). It allows the court, upon examination of a written plea, to waive the necessity of a full in-court colloquy. It does not give the defendant the right to waive the means for the court to determine that the plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered. This background reveals the flaw in the State's argument. There are two separate components of rule 2.8(2)( b ). See Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 577-78. The first concerns the requirement of an in-court colloquy. See id. The second concerns the requirement the defendant is informed. See id. Although the court in guilty pleas to serious and aggravated misdemeanors can waive the in-court colloquy component, the rule still requires substantial compliance with the requirement that the defendant be informed. The waiver language of rule 2.8(2)( b ) only means the full in-court colloquy can be waived and the written plea can serve to establish substantial compliance with the rule. We have already determined that there was no substantial compliance in this case. We further reject the State's argument that the defendant's consent to an abbreviated proceeding at least supports a relaxation of the substantial compliance standard in those cases, like this case, where the defendant is represented by counsel, the charges are misdemeanors, the defendant acknowledges that counsel explained all rights, and the plea is entered pursuant to a plea bargain which is adopted by the court at sentencing. This approach is completely contrary to the purpose of the rule. Rule 2.8(2)( b ) was enacted for the purpose of ensuring that all guilty pleas are made voluntarily, intelligently, and with a factual basis. Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d at 804. The approach suggested by the State would completely eviscerate the rule, and essentially transform the process of entering guilty pleas into a rubber stamp. See Hook, 623 N.W.2d at 870. Substantial compliance requires that the essence of each requirement of the rule be expressed to allow the court to perform its important role in each case. See Myers, 653 N.W.2d at 577-78. This role is not subject to waiver under the rule.