Opinion ID: 1166745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: co-conspirator hearsay

Text: Hearsay statements are out-of-court declarations offered into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted. See CRE 801(c). Hearsay statements are presumptively unreliable since the declarant is not present to explain the statement in context. Moreover, since the declarant is not subjected to cross-examination, the truthfulness of the statement is questionable. See Paul Marcus, Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Conspiracy Cases § 5.04[1], at 5-16 (1996). Due to this presumptive unreliability, hearsay statements are generally not admissible as evidence at trial. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2780-81, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). However, the out-of-court declarations of criminal conspirators made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy are deemed non-hearsay under CRE 801(d)(2)(E) and may be admissible against all of the participants in the conspiracy. The scope of the co-conspirator exception [4] is narrow, see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 444, 69 S.Ct. 716, 718-19, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949), and the requirement that the co-conspirator's statement be made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy is a prerequisite to admissibility that must be scrupulously observed. Id. The proponent must demonstrate the existence of both of these factors to overcome the presumption of unreliability that is the basis of the prohibition against the admission of hearsay. See Williams v. People, 724 P.2d 1279, 1285 (Colo.1986). CRE 801(d)(2)(E)'s provision for the admission of co-conspirator statements is based on a theory of agency. Each conspirator is considered the agent of the other conspirators when acting or speaking to promote the conspiracy. [5] See 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 801.30, at 801-59 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed.1998); United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1577 (10th Cir.1993). However, just as an agent's responsibilities end upon the termination of the agency relationship, all such responsibility is at an end when the conspiracy ends. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217, 67 S.Ct. 224, 227-28, 91 L.Ed. 196 (1946); see also People v. Armstrong, 704 P.2d 877, 879 (Colo.App.1985). There can be no furtherance of a conspiracy that has ended. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 617-18, 73 S.Ct. 481, 489, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953). Thus, it is well-settled under Colorado and federal law that co-conspirator statements made after the conspirators attain the object of the conspiracy are not admissible under this exception unless the proponent demonstrates an express original agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-protection, traces of the crime after its commission. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 404, 77 S.Ct. 963, 974, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957); see also Villafranca v. People, 194 Colo. 472, 474, 573 P.2d 540, 542 (1978). [6] The proponent can satisfy this requirement by showing that the objectives of the original conspiracy include such an agreement or that there exists a separate conspiracy to conceal. See Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 18, 300 P. 575, 579 (1931). It is also well-settled that secrecy plus overt acts of concealment do not establish an express agreement to act in concert in order to conceal the crime. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 403, 77 S.Ct. at 973. Acts of concealment occur in every conspiracy case, see id. at 404, 77 S.Ct. at 973-74, and admission of hearsay statements on this basis would impermissibly expand the narrow scope of the co-conspirator exception and further dilute the general prohibition against hearsay statements. See Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 444, 69 S.Ct. at 718-19 (holding that statements aimed at preventing detection and punishment were not admissible under the co-conspirator exception). As the United States Supreme Court articulated in Grunewald v. United States : [A] subsidiary conspiracy to conceal may not be implied from circumstantial evidence showing merely that the conspiracy was kept a secret and that the conspirators took care to cover up their crime in order to escape detection and punishment.... Acts of covering up, even though done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy, cannot themselves constitute proof that concealment of the crime after its commission was part of the initial agreement among the conspirators.... [E]very conspiracy will inevitably be followed by actions taken to cover the conspirators' traces. Sanctioning the Government's theory would for all practical purposes wipe out the statute of limitations in conspiracy cases, as well as extend indefinitely the time within which hearsay declarations will bind co-conspirators. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 401-02, 77 S.Ct. at 972. We adopted this view in Villafranca v. People , when we stated: Not every conspiracy continues beyond the time of the occurrence of the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. There must be some specific evidence of a plan or agreement of concealment to demonstrate the pendency of the conspiracy at the time that the statements were made. Villafranca, 194 Colo. at 474, 573 P.2d at 542. [7] Applying these principles to the facts of this case, the prosecution sought the admission of two hearsay statements made by Younger after the commission of the murder. Such statements are admissible only if the prosecution demonstrates the existence of an express agreement among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to conceal the crime. The record shows that the conspirators disposed of the murder weapon and placed the victim's body in a manner that would give the appearance that the victim was asleep. [A]cts of covering up, even though done in the context of a mutually understood need for secrecy, cannot themselves constitute proof that concealment of the crime after its commission was part of the initial agreement among the conspirators. Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 402, 77 S.Ct. at 973 (holding that conspirators' efforts to conceal irregularities in documents and attempts to silence witnesses were insufficient evidence of an explicit agreement to conceal the crime). The record also shows that in the days following the murder, Younger made two statements to Bates that could be construed as an attempt to silence Bates. While these statements may demonstrate Younger's purpose to conceal the murder conspiracy, they are not evidence that the murder conspiracy included the further agreement to conceal. See Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 616, 73 S.Ct. at 488 (explaining that statements in the nature of an afterthought by the conspirator for the purpose of covering up do not constitute evidence of an agreement to conceal). Other conspirators did not similarly attempt to silence witnesses. Review of the record discloses no evidence that concealment was an explicit objective of the murder conspiracy and no evidence of a separate conspiracy with the explicit objective of concealing the murder. Hence, we hold that Younger's statements were not admissible under the co-conspirator exception because they were not made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder as required by CRE 801(d)(2)(E), and we affirm the court of appeals' ruling that the district court's admission of these statements was error.