Opinion ID: 2286082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Supported Quisenberry's Convictions.

Text: In a criminal prosecution, of course, it is the Commonwealth's burden to prove each element of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In the Matter of Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). At the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of Williams's evidence, Quisenberry moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the ground that the evidence was insufficient. The trial court is to grant such a motion only if the evidence, when construed in favor of the Commonwealth, could not induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. There must be evidence of substance, and the trial court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Ky.1991). When the denial of a properly preserved directed verdict motion is challenged on appeal, the standard of review is likewise whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, any rational juror could have found all the elements of the crime. Id. As the Commonwealth points out, however, our rules provide that [a] motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01. [4] We have held that insufficiently specific motions for directed verdict do not preserve sufficiency of the evidence challenges for appeal and that in such cases the appropriate standard of review is not the any rational juror standard from Benham but the palpable error standard of RCr 10.26. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 292 S.W.3d 889 (Ky.2009); Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 345 (Ky.2005). Under that standard, appellate relief may not be granted unless a clear error at trial affected the appellant's substantial rights and resulted in manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665 (Ky.2009); RCr 10.26. Whether in this context the two standards, any rational juror vs. palpable error, differ is open to some debate. Discussing the similar federal rules and noting that an unsupported conviction is apt to violate a defendant's substantial rights, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that it is difficult to envision a case `in which the result would be different because of the application of one rather than the other of the standards of review.' United States v. Alvarez-Valenzuela, 231 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting from United States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir.1995)). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, have held that unpreserved sufficiency of the evidence challenges will result in reversal only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt. United States v. Damra, 621 F.3d 474, 494 (6th Cir.2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir.1989). There do not appear to be any cases, however, in which relief was not available under one standard but would have been under the other. Similarly, in Potts v. Commonwealth , although we were at some pains to leave open the possibility that a failure of proof might not amount to manifest injustice, the evidence in that case, we held, was sufficient even under the any rational juror standard. Similarly here. We agree with the Commonwealth that Quisenberry's directed verdict motions, which asserted only the insufficiency of the evidence, did not comport with our rules' specificity requirement, and thus did not properly preserve the issue for appeal. Our review, therefore, is under the palpable error standard, but we need not decide how that review might differ from review under the Benham any rational juror standard, for even under the latter standard the evidence was sufficient. Quisenberry concedes that for directed verdict purposes the Commonwealth adequately proved Harper's murder, the assault upon Erica, the commission of a robbery, and the tampering with physical evidence. The photos of Harper's body at the scene; the testimony of the officers who witnessed Erica there; the medical examiner's reports; the recovered bullets and casings; the ransacked safe, emptied purse, and strewn-about pill bottles; and the credit cards, driver's license, and other items found in the catch basin, was evidence more than sufficient to permit a finding that the alleged crimes occurred. What the Commonwealth failed to prove, however, according to Quisenberry, was his participation in those crimes. He concedes his presence, as his cell-phone records and DNA on the cigarette butt at the scene suggest and as his statement to the detectives confirms, but mere presence at the scene does not prove participation in the crimes. Otherwise, Quisenberry maintains, there was no evidence that he intended or aided the robbery, that he wantonly contributed to a substantial risk of Harper's death, that he knew Williams intended to assault or to kill Erica and contributed to Williams's doing or attempting to do so, or that he had anything to do with concealing either the murder weapon or the property stolen from Harper. The Commonwealth failed to prove, in other words, according to Quisenberry, that he bore a criminal state of mind or did anything to further the crimes. We disagree.
Seldom is there direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind, but direct evidence is not required. As we recently reiterated in Rogers v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 303 (Ky.2010), state of mindintent in that casemay be established by circumstantial evidence. That evidence includes the defendant's actions preceding and following the charged offense, Commonwealth v. Suttles, 80 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky.2002), as well as the defendant's knowledge and the surrounding circumstances. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 60 S.W.3d 513 (Ky.2001). With respect to robbery, moreover, we also noted in Rogers that to be convicted of that crime, the accused need not have taken any money or other property from the victim with his own hands, or actually participated in any other act of force or violence; it is sufficient that he came and went with the robbers, was present when the robbery was committed, and acquiesced. 315 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Commonwealth v. Smith, 5 S.W.3d 126 (Ky. 1999)). From those circumstances, a reasonable juror could infer that the accused intended the robbery to occur and lent aid, if only by virtue of his approbation and the extra intimidation his presence adds to the force employed by others. See KRS 502.020 (providing in part that one is guilty of an offense committed by another if, intending to promote the offense, he aids in its commission). Here, of course, there was evidence that the two defendants had been together at a Walgreens pharmacy not long before the crimes, which permitted an inference that they drove to Harper's home together, and there was also Rashon Turner's testimony that Williams arrived at his mother's house in a car driven by Quisenberry, permitting an inference that the two left the robbery together as well. Turner also testified that Williams claimed Quisenberry went with him to Harper's house to obtain pills. By his own testimony, of course, Quisenberry acknowledged being present at Harper's home when the robbery must have occurred. The phone records established two calls to Harper from Quisenberry's phone, shortly after midnight on May 18. Given the evidence that Harper's pills were stolen, a reasonable juror could also infer that the pair's trip to the Walgreens pharmacy was also somehow an attempt to obtain pills, and that their breaking into the Walgreens pharmacist's car could reasonably be thought related: retaliation perhaps, or, at the very least, evidence of the men's willingness that night to break the law in pursuit of their goals. Not only was there evidence that Quisenberry drove Williams to and from the scene, but when the police interviewed him not long after the crimes, he concealed what he knew. From these circumstances a reasonable juror could conclude that Quisenberry was not a mere bystander at the robbery, but that he initiated contact with Harper, that he shared with Williams the purpose of obtaining drugs by whatever means necessary, that he drove the pair to Harper's home, and, however the robbery may have commenced, acquiesced in it once it had, and assisted in the getaway. There was sufficient evidence, in other words, of Quisenberry's complicity in the robbery; the trial court did not err by so finding.
With respect to the charge of second-degree manslaughter, we note that if in the course of a robbery a participant other than the defendant commits an act of killing, the defendant may be judged complicit in the killing to the extent that his participation in the robbery establishes, with respect to the killing, a culpable state of mind, whether intent, aggravated wantonness, wantonness, or recklessness. Meredith v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.3d 500 (Ky.2005). To justify an instruction on second-degree manslaughter, which applies to wanton killings, KRS 507.040, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Quisenberry acted wantonly, i.e., that the robbery posed a substantial risk to Harper's life and that Quisenberry consciously disregarded that risk when he participated in the robbery. Repeating his argument that the evidence failed to establish his participation in the robbery, Quisenberry maintains that he likewise could not be deemed complicit in Harper's killing. As discussed above, however, there was sufficient evidence that Quisenberry joined in the robbery. His ability to describe the murder weapon to the detectives, moreover, permits an inference that he knew Williams was armed, and we have held that knowing participation in an armed robbery, where there is obviously a substantial risk that someone will be killed, may be deemed wanton, at least. Kruse v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 192 (Ky.1985). The trial court did not err, therefore, by instructing the jury on second-degree manslaughter.
Quisenberry next contends that the evidence fails to support his convictions for facilitating the assault upon and the attempted murder of Erica. As the Commonwealth points out, however, at the close of proof, when the trial court and parties were discussing the jury instructions, Quisenberry himself requested facilitation instructions and referred the court to evidence he claimed supported them. These alleged errors, therefore, were not merely unpreserved, they were invited. Generally, a party is estopped from asserting an invited error on appeal. Gray v. Commonwealth, 203 S.W.3d 679 (Ky.2006). Noting the United States Supreme Court's distinction, in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), between forfeited errors, which are subject to plain error review, and waived errors, which are not, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that invited errors that amount to a waiver, i.e., invitations that reflect the party's knowing relinquishment of a right, are not subject to appellate review. United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir.1997). Applying that approach to a case very much like this one, in which the defendant requested a manslaughter instruction as a lesser offense, was convicted of manslaughter, and then appealed on the ground that the manslaughter evidence was insufficient, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the defendant's specific request for a voluntary manslaughter instruction ... constituted an intentional waiver of the right to argue on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the voluntary manslaughter conviction. State v. Rich, 415 Md. 567, 3 A.3d 1210, 1218 (2010). We agree. Quisenberry's express representation to the trial court that the evidence of facilitation was sufficient, waived his right to claim on appeal that it was not. Quisenberry is not entitled to relief from his facilitation convictions, therefore. Moreover, he would not be even were we to consider his claim on the merits, for it was not unreasonable for the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt that Quisenberry intended or promoted the attack upon Erica but to believe that he knew at some point that the attack was about to occur or was occurring and yet remained and continued to assist Williams, at least by driving him away from the scene.
Finally, Quisenberry contends that the evidence does not support his conviction for tampering with physical evidence. Under the pertinent section of KRS 524.100, a person is guilty of that offense when, believing that an official proceeding may be instituted he destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes or alters physical evidence which he believes is about to be produced or used in the official proceeding with the intent to impair its verity or availability in the official proceeding. The jury was instructed that it could find Quisenberry guilty of tampering if acting alone or in complicity with Kenneth Williams, [he] concealed or removed firearms or personal property of Earon Harper that he believed were about to be produced or used in a criminal prosecution or official proceeding. We have upheld this sort of combination principal/abettor instruction where there is evidence that two or more defendants acted in concert, but it is not clear whether both were principals or which was principal and which abettor. Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 730 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.1986). Here, the evidence that Quisenberry participated in the robbery and that Harper's personal effects and those of the Walgreens pharmacist were found a short time after Harper's murder in a catch basin near her residence permitted a rational juror to conclude either that Quisenberry had aided Williams in disposing of those items or that he had disposed of them (or some of them) himself intending to conceal them and to prevent their use as evidence in the proceeding against him. The trial court did not err by deeming the tampering evidence sufficient.