Opinion ID: 1197887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appellant's Testimony

Text: In response to Stellmach's testimony, appellant testified that he never had any agreement whatsoever with Hall to pay him any part of the fees appellant earned in cases that Hall referred to appellant. Rather, any payments to Hall were for investigative services, asset checks and other work that Hall performed in the cases at issue. Appellant explained that he has known Hall ever since appellant was about 10 years old. In his late teens, Hall was involved in a serious car accident which left him with neurological damage. As a result, Hall became a different sort of person who had difficulty remembering, in moving about, and in maintaining jobs. Hall worked for a time collecting overdue bills at the Reno Orthopedic Clinic. At one point during this period, Hall experienced financial difficulties and needed extra money for his wife and children. When Hall expressed a desire to become an investigator, appellant explained that it was not as easy as it seemed. Nonetheless, appellant told Hall he would try to find extra work for him. Thereafter, Hall referred Kelly Neff to appellant. Neff was a personal friend of Hall's and had been injured in an automobile accident. At appellant's request, Hall obtained medical bills and records relating to Neff's injuries and a copy of the police accident report. When Neff experienced problems in obtaining medical treatment because of a lack of insurance, Hall was helpful in finding a specialist to treat Neff. Hall also ran a check on the personal assets of the woman who was responsible for the accident, and was helpful in keeping track of Neff and in updating him on the progress of the case. Appellant testified that he believed the $500.00 he paid Hall was reasonable for the work that Hall did in the case. Appellant also explained that he represented a passenger referred to him by Hall who was injured in the car along with Neff. Hall received no payments with respect to that case, however, because Hall performed no work in that case. Similarly, appellant testified that the payment Hall received relating to the Griffey/Sabatini matter was simply a payment for work that Hall performed and not part of a fee-splitting, or referral fee arrangement. As with Neff, Hall was personally acquainted with Sabatini, who was the brother of Hall's boss at the Reno Orthopedic Clinic. Hall referred Sabatini to appellant when he was injured by a drunk driver, and appellant agreed to represent Sabatini and the Griffeys who were injured in the same accident. In exploring a possible claim for punitive damages, appellant requested Hall to run an asset check on the driver responsible for the accident. Also, because Sabatini changed jobs frequently and the Griffeys moved to California, Hall proved to be a good liaison and was useful in getting interrogatories, discovery responses, and other information from them. After the case was settled, Hall and appellant negotiated a payment of ten percent of appellant's fee for the work Hall did on behalf of Gail Griffey and Sabatini. Appellant further explained that Craig Colfer was the stepson of Hall's sister. Hall referred Colfer to appellant when Colfer was involved in an altercation at a local nightclub. Appellant stated that he used Hall to keep in touch with Colfer while the case was pending, to investigate the extent of any prior such incidents at the nightclub, and to run an asset check on the nightclub in contemplation of proceedings to execute on the judgment that appellant ultimately obtained in Colfer's favor. In December of 1988, after a favorable verdict was obtained, but before formal judgment was entered, appellant advanced Hall $300.00 for the work he had performed because Hall said he needed funds so he could give his kids a decent Christmas. Later, Hall performed the above-noted asset check and was paid an additional $275.00. Explaining why he did not charge Hall's services to the clients, appellant testified that a lot of it was basically finding work for Harold to do, and also assisting my office in things that my normal staff would have to do, contacting a client, making contact with them, making sure that he got answers to interrogatories... . Appellant found work for Hall to do because he was Hall's friend, because Hall had difficulty with one of his kids medically, and because Hall had problems maintaining a job. Appellant insisted that Hall was only paid for services performed and did not receive any remuneration in other cases he referred to appellant where Hall did not perform work. Appellant also explained why Hall never submitted any written bills for his services: Mr. Hall was not a licensed  in fact, Mr. Hall told me he wanted to become an investigator. The only way that I could really have Harold do anything for my cases, other than people he would know and that he would be able to contact, he would have to either be employed by my office, which I didn't want to do, or he would have to go ahead and go formally with another investigative agency. And that just wasn't in the ballpark for Harold Hall. And he wasn't  he didn't have a secretary, and I'm not going to have my secretary type his bills. It was just a thing of this is what I had done type of transaction. Appellant directly contradicted Skelly's testimony that he used Business and Professionals Collection agency to perform asset checks. Appellant flatly denied ever using that company to conduct an asset check. Appellant further testified that both Skelly and Stellmach left appellant's office under less than amicable circumstances. According to appellant, Skelly was disappointed when appellant informed her that she would not be employed as an attorney in appellant's office after she obtained her license to practice. Additionally, hard feelings resulted from a number of problems, one of which involved alleged incidents in which she provided legal advice to appellant's clients. With respect to Stellmach, appellant testified that he got extremely mad when she left some gay literature (relating to the Gay Rodeo Association) in the office copy room. The literature was inadvertently stapled to some other papers which were then sent off to a client. Additionally, when appellant upbraided Stellmach for making off-colored comments and jokes in his office, Stellmach took offense and suggested that appellant should be taken to the Equal Opportunity Employment... . Stellmach resigned shortly thereafter when he refused to let her leave early on the Friday before New Year's Eve. Appellant stated that Stellmach informed him that because of ... personal reasons and the pressures at the office, she was no longer going to work for me. Later, when Stellmach made a claim for unemployment benefits, appellant confronted her on it. Appellant also called an attorney from a large personal injury firm in San Francisco to testify. The attorney testified that his firm often hires people to perform tasks similar to those which appellant claimed were provided by Hall. Further, the attorney stated that payments for such services come out of the attorney's fees themselves rather than the costs attributed the client. Our view and our practice is that if  if what we're doing for the client is a lawyer-related activity, then we don't charge that expense to the case costs. Although Hall was present at the disciplinary proceedings, for reasons unclear from the record, neither appellant nor bar counsel called Hall to testify. On August 7, 1990, the panel filed its findings and recommendations. The panel found in pertinent part: [O]n a number of different occasions, Mr. Hall referred individuals who had sustained personal injuries to the law office of [appellant]. [Appellant] undertook the representation of these individuals and successfully obtained monetary settlements and/or judgments in varying amounts. [Appellant] paid referral fees to Mr. Hall which in two specific cases totalled ten percent (10%) of [appellant's] fee on that particular case. [3] The panel further found that appellant had thus violated the following Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct: 1. SCR 188(1) (a lawyer shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer); 2. SCR 196(3) (a lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer's services); 3. SCR 197 ([a] lawyer shall not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain); and 4. SCR 203(1) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate the rules of professional conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or to do so through the acts of another). The record of the disciplinary proceeding before the panel was filed in this court on August 29, 1990. Both Drakulich and bar counsel requested and were granted extensions of time to file appellate briefs. Briefing was completed on January 22, 1991. Thereafter, former CHIEF JUSTICE MOWBRAY disqualified himself from any further participation in the matter. On July 17, 1992, the governor designated District Judge Jerry Carr Whitehead to sit in the place of then CHIEF JUSTICE MOWBRAY. On June 2, 1993, this court entered an unanimous five-judge order remanding this matter back to the disciplinary panel. This court indicated that after conducting an independent review of the record and after having carefully considered the arguments of counsel, the court had determined that additional evidentiary proceedings before the hearing panel would assist the court in resolving the issues on appeal. Specifically, this court directed the panel to conduct a further evidentiary hearing for the purpose of receiving testimony from ... Mr. Harold Hall. This court also noted that appellant could present the testimony of other witnesses as well during the additional proceedings.