Opinion ID: 6498740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trepanier Elements

Text: ¶ 36. The first Trepanier element asks whether the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party in the earlier action. 155 Vt. at 265, 583 A.2d at 587. Petitioner does not dispute that he was a party in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the first element is met. ¶ 37. The second Trepanier element asks whether the issue was resolved in the earlier action by a final judgment on the merits. Id.; see also Trahan v. Trahan, 2003 VT 100, ¶ 8, 176 9 We note that petitioner entered his guilty pleas on November 19, 2019, long after Bridger issued. 10 Two civil division decisions have addressed this precise issue. Normandy v. Martin, No. S0278-04 CnC, (Vt. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 2005), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites /default/files/documents/2005-9-20-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/M33C-4QAC]; Geico Gen. Ins., Co. v. Cota, No. 490-4-17 Cncv, (Vt. Super. Ct. Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/ default/files/documents/2019-6-7-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/NEE8-UKBV]. In each case, the courts held that guilty pleas had collateral-estoppel effect in subsequent civil proceedings and noted that Vermont’s safeguards for ensuring voluntary guilty pleas significantly diminished the risk that it would be unfair for defendants to be precluded from relitigating issues in other proceedings. 16 Vt. 539, 839 A.2d 1246 (mem.) (“To determine whether the second, third, and fourth criteria [of collateral estoppel] are also satisfied, we must identify what is at issue here and what was at issue in the [prior action].”). “[T]he key question [is] whether the factual or legal question presented in the first action is the same as the question presented in the second.” In re H.H., 2020 VT 107, ¶ 26, __ Vt. __, 251 A.3d 560 (quotation omitted). ¶ 38. In the criminal prosecution, the State bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a visual depiction of a “clearly lewd exhibition of a child’s genitals or anus,” and that he did so knowingly. 13 V.S.A. § 2827(a). During the plea colloquy, petitioner affirmatively indicated he understood these elements and admitted to the underlying factual basis for each. The court accepted petitioner’s guilty plea, finding that he made it voluntarily after consultation with counsel and that petitioner waived his constitutional rights. The plea judge found that there was a factual basis for the plea based on petitioner’s answers during the colloquy. Following a sentencing hearing in February 2020, the court entered final judgment in the case. This was a final judgment on the merits. See State v. Merchant, 173 Vt. 249, 253, 790 A.2d 386, 290 (2001) (“[E]ntry of judgment after sentencing constitutes final judgment, not the entry of the plea.”); see also V.R.Cr.P. 32(b). The second element is met. ¶ 39. The third Trepanier element asks whether the issue is the same in both proceedings. Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265, 583 A.2d at 587; see also In re R.H., 2010 VT 95, ¶ 36 (“Preclusion is possible only if the issue was necessarily and essentially determined in a prior action.” (quotation omitted)). Petitioner maintains that the issues are not the same because DCF must prove the existence of identifiable children and a relationship between those children and himself. Therefore, he asserts that the legal standards applied in each proceeding are different. See Harwood, 2013 VT 89, ¶ 11 (stating that issues are not same if “second action involves application of a different legal standard” (quotation omitted)). However, as we concluded in Section II above, the issue in this substantiation proceeding is whether petitioner possessed child pornography under 17 § 4912(15)(G). DCF is not required to prove more. The issue in the first proceeding was whether petitioner knowingly possessed child pornography. The State could not win a conviction against petitioner in the criminal prosecution without obtaining a necessary and essential determination on the issue of possession. Id. Therefore, the issue was the same in both proceedings—whether petitioner possessed child pornography. The third element is met.11 ¶ 40. The fourth Trepanier element asks whether petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action, and the fifth element asks whether the application of collateral estoppel against him in the subsequent litigation is fair. Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265, 583 A.2d at 587. “No single test is determinative as to the last two criteria, which must be considered on a case-by-case basis.” Daiello v. Town of Vernon, 2018 VT 17, ¶ 13, 207 Vt. 139, 184 A.3d 1192. Some factors to be weighed “are the type of issue preclusion, the choice of forum, the incentive to litigate, the foreseeability of future litigation, the legal standards and burdens employed in each action, the procedural opportunities available in each forum, and the existence of inconsistent determinations of the same issue in separate prior cases.” Trepanier, 155 Vt. at 265, 583 A.2d at 587. ¶ 41. DCF, as plaintiff, seeks to apply collateral estoppel against petitioner. This is an example of offensive collateral estoppel. We have previously explained that “[t]he use of offensive collateral estoppel is more controversial than the use of defensive collateral estoppel, and generally requires additional considerations.” Id. at 265 n.2, 583 A.2d at 588 n.2; see also In re R.H., 2010 VT 95, ¶ 33 (same). The United States Supreme Court enunciated factors courts should consider 11 In cases where the issues between the two proceedings are a closer call, we recently explained that additional factors may be appropriate to decide the question. See State v. NutbrownCovey, 2017 VT 26, ¶¶ 10-11, 204 Vt. 363, 169 A.3d 216 (adopting considerations for courts weighing second and third Trepanier factors from Restatement § 27 comment c); see also In re H.H., 2020 VT 107, ¶ 25 (citing factors enunciated in Nutbrown-Covey). However, because we conclude that the issue here is the same in each proceeding, we need not proceed with a discussion of those additional considerations. 18 when deciding whether offensive collateral estoppel is fair. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979) (“[O]ffensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in the same manner as defensive use does.”). These factors may include whether: (1) the plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action; (2) the plaintiff adopted a “wait-and-see” approach hoping that another plaintiff obtained favorable judgment against the defendant; (3) a defendant failed to litigate vigorously in the first action; (4) the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities that were unavailable in the first action; and (5) it would be unfair to apply collateral estoppel to a judgment that is inconsistent with previous judgments in favor of the defendant Id.; see also Bifolck v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 936 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying some Parklane Hosiery factors and explaining that list is not exclusive). ¶ 42. Offensive collateral estoppel is appropriate here because the first, second, third, and fourth Parklane Hosiery considerations above do not weigh in petitioner’s favor, and the fifth is inapplicable. First, DCF could not have joined the State in prosecuting petitioner in the first action. Therefore, the first Parklane Hosiery factor weighs in favor of DCF. ¶ 43. The second Parklane Hosiery factor also weighs in favor of DCF. While DCF did stay petitioner’s request for administrative review of its substantiation determination while he litigated the criminal action, he points to nothing in the record indicating DCF’s actions were a calculated strategy to obtain a favorable judgment before deciding to proceed against him. In fact, he requested the stay himself. See 33 V.S.A. § 4916a(c)(2) (permitting stays pursuant to request of person substantiated). DCF already had the State’s evidence before he entered his plea, which was sufficient on its own to substantiate petitioner. Thus, DCF did not adopt a “wait-and-see” approach. ¶ 44. The third Parklane Hosiery factor asks whether the defendant litigated vigorously in the first proceeding. 439 U.S. at 329-31. Petitioner does not argue that he failed to vigorously litigate his criminal defense. He does not attack his plea agreement or allege that the plea colloquy 19 was improperly conducted; nor does the record contain any evidence indicating otherwise.12 We presume petitioner had an “incentive to fully litigate and defend” in an action where his liberty interests were at stake. See Allen v. Martin, 203 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). ¶ 45. As explained above, our safeguards are designed to ensure that defendants voluntarily and expressly admit their guilt. At the plea colloquy, petitioner admitted to the factual basis underlying each charge, indicated that he understood the elements of the charges, and waived his constitutional right to trial and rights related to trial. He answered “No” when asked whether he was coerced into the plea agreement, testified that he was of sound mind, and again answered “No” when given an opportunity to ask questions. Petitioner concedes he “pleaded guilty with the assistance of highly competent trial counsel based on the evidence against him.” Permitting petitioner to now take a different position than he took in the criminal action on the issue of whether he possessed child pornography defies the purposes of collateral estoppel, which include encouraging the public to trust the judicial process. See Harwood, 2013 VT 89, ¶ 10 (“The purpose of collateral estoppel is to conserve court resources by protecting the recourses against repetitive litigation, to promote the finality of judgments, to encourage reliance on judicial decisions, and to decrease the chances of inconsistent adjudication.” (quoting In re P.J., 2009 VT 5, ¶ 8)). The third Parkland Hosiery factor weighs in DCF’s favor. ¶ 46. The fourth Parklane Hosiery factor asks whether petitioner has procedural opportunities in the second action that were unavailable in the first action. 439 U.S. at 331 n.15 (providing example of unfair procedural opportunity where defendant in first action was forced to 12 Petitioner also does not challenge the admission of his plea before the Board. The statute governing fair hearings provides that a “plea of any type . . . shall be competent evidence in a hearing held under this subchapter.” 33 V.S.A. § 4916b(b)(4). Presumably, this would also include a plea of nolo contendere. See V.R.Cr.P. 11(b). Though we express no opinion on it today, the Reporter’s Notes to Rule 11 suggest that nolo contendere pleas do not have collateralestoppel effect. Reporter’s Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 11. 20 litigate in inconvenient forum which hampered ability to conduct discovery and call witnesses). Petitioner does not have procedural opportunities available to him in the substantiation proceedings that he did not have in the first action. As we have emphasized, criminal defendants in Vermont who plead guilty are afforded significant procedural safeguards to ensure that their pleas are voluntary. Therefore, the fourth Parklane Hosiery factor weighs in DCF’s favor. Offensive collateral estoppel is appropriate in this case. ¶ 47. Returning to the final Trepanier element, application of collateral estoppel in this case is fair because the evidentiary burden in the criminal prosecution exceeded DCF’s burden in the substantiation proceedings. We have held that collateral estoppel was not appropriate to apply against the State in a subsequent civil-suspension hearing where it failed to prove elements of a charge beyond a reasonable doubt in an earlier criminal action. See Pollander, 167 Vt. at 306-07, 706 A.2d at 1362. We explained “that what cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt may still be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 306, 706 A.2d at 1362. However, it follows that what is proven beyond a reasonable doubt is proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Put differently, by proving the allegations in the criminal prosecution, the State also impliedly met DCF’s “burden of proving that it has accurately and reliably concluded that a reasonable person would believe that the child has been abused and neglected by that person.” 33 V.S.A. § 4916a(e). Accordingly, the fourth and fifth Trepanier elements are met. Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that collateral estoppel is inappropriate. In re P.J., 2009 VT 5, ¶ 13.