Opinion ID: 76258
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.

Text: 28 The Court revisited the issue of nude dancing in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). In another splintered opinion, the Court upheld a public indecency ordinance similar to the statute at issue in Barnes. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 283, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Writing for a four-justice plurality, in an opinion stating the holding of the Court under Marks, Justice O'Connor began by clarify[ing] that government restrictions on public nudity ... should be evaluated under the framework set forth in O'Brien for content-neutral restrictions on symbolic speech. Id. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Justice O'Connor then concluded that Erie's ordinance was justified under the four requirements of O'Brien. The first and third of those requirements—that the regulation was within the government's power to enact and that the government's interest was unrelated to the suppression of expression—were easily satisfied. Id. at 296, 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382. In connection with the second O'Brien requirement that the government's regulation further an important or substantial interest, Justice O'Connor reasoned that the evidentiary standard described in Renton and in Justice Souter's concurrence in Barnes was the appropriate measure of whether Erie's ordinance furthered the city's interest in combating the harmful secondary effects associated with nude dancing. As she emphasized, that evidentiary requirement was a weak one: 29 In terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities to demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses. [ Renton ] Because the nude dancing at Kandyland is of the same character as the adult entertainment at issue in Renton, Young ... [and] LaRue, it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that such nude dancing was likely to produce the same secondary effects. And Erie could reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation set forth in Renton and [ Young ] to the effect that secondary effects are caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a given neighborhood. In fact, Erie expressly relied on Barnes and its discussion of secondary effects, including its reference to Renton and [ Young ].... [T]he evidentiary standard described in Renton controls here, and Erie meets that standard. 30 Id. at 296-97, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (internal citations omitted). Finally, Justice O'Conner found that O'Brien 's fourth condition that any incidental limitation on protected expression be no greater than necessary was satisfied, since [t]he requirement that dancers wear pasties and G-strings is a minimal restriction in furtherance of the asserted government interests ... [that] leaves ample capacity to convey the dancer's erotic message. Id. at 301, 120 S.Ct. 1382. 31 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that Erie's ordinance was constitutional, but did so on an entirely different basis. Reiterating the view he expressed in Barnes, Justice Scalia deemed the ordinance to be a total ban on public nudity, which was aimed at conduct, not expression, and thus was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. Id. at 307-08, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Meanwhile, Justice Souter filed a concurring and dissenting opinion, agreeing with the plurality that the O'Brien test governed, but dissenting from the Court's judgment in the case because he disagreed with how the plurality applied the second prong of O'Brien. On Justice Souter's view, the record failed to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either for the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy. 529 U.S. at 314, 120 S.Ct. 1382. As such, the record did not permit the conclusion that Erie's ordinance is reasonably designed to mitigate real harms. Id. at 317, 120 S.Ct. 1382. Since, on his view, O'Brien's second condition was not satisfied, Justice Souter would have remanded the case to permit Erie to attempt to make that factual showing. 11 32