Opinion ID: 1233533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Relevant Career Offender Law

Text: Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Hopkins is a career offender if he: (1) was at least eighteen years old when the instant offense occurred; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a violent felony or a controlled substance offense; and (3) he has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2005). The first two requirements are satisfied and are not at issue here. The instant offense is a controlled substance one, and Hopkins was more than eighteen at the time of its commission. We focus therefore on the third requirement: two prior felony convictions of ... a crime of violence. Id. A prior felony conviction is any adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n. 1 (2005). Hopkins concedes that a 2002 assault conviction qualifies as a prior felony conviction of a crime of violence. Accordingly, the only career offender issue presented by this appeal is whether Hopkins' 2001 conviction for second degree misdemeanor escape pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5121 qualifies as a crime of violence. If it does, then Hopkins was properly characterized as a career offender. Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a), the term crime of violence means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The parties agree that Hopkins cannot be found to have been convicted of a crime of violence unless it can be said that his § 5121 conviction comes within the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(ii): otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The Supreme Court has cautioned that this clause must be applied with due regard for its context. It is not implicated unless the ordinary case falling within the crime of conviction (1) poses a degree of risk roughly similar to that posed by burglary and the other offenses enumerated in subsection (ii) and (2) is roughly similar ... in kind to those offenses. Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). In order to determine whether the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) is applicable, we must first determine the crime of which Hopkins was convicted. See United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th Cir.2009). In making this determination, the classifications we adopt must be fashioned from lines drawn by the applicable state law. See Chambers, 129 S.Ct. at 691 (breaking down Illinois statute into seven separate elements for the purpose of identifying the relevant conduct); Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584 (quoting New Mexico's DUI statute for the purpose of identifying the relevant crime); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 197, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007) (The question before the Court, then, is whether attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law, falls within ACCA's residual provision.). In other words, in residual clause cases, such as this, we pay attention to the way that the state statutory scheme identifies the relevant crime. Once we have determined the crime of conviction, the Court must, of course, address whether that crime was a crime of violence. Under the Supreme Court's modified categorical approach, we must resolve this issue without delving into the particular facts disclosed by the record of conviction. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005). Rather, having determined the crime of which Hopkins was convicted, we look to the elements of that offense to identify the way in which that crime is generally committed. Chambers, 129 S.Ct. at 690. [T]he proper inquiry is whether the conduct encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk of injury to another comparable to the offenses specifically enumerated in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). James, 550 U.S. at 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586.