Opinion ID: 2025141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application of the Open Meetings Law.

Text: A. Scope of review. Review of actions to enforce the open meetings statute are ordinary actions at law. See Telegraph Herald, Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 297 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Iowa 1980) (discussing the 1979 version of the open meetings law, chapter 28A); Gavin v. City of Cascade, 500 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Iowa App.1993) (discussing chapter 21, the open meetings law). The trial court's findings are binding if supported by substantial evidence. Telegraph Herald, 297 N.W.2d at 533; Gavin, 500 N.W.2d at 731. B. Interpretation of the statute. The relevant portion of our open meetings law provides: 1. A governmental body may hold a closed session only by affirmative public vote of either two-thirds of the members of the body or all of the members present at the meeting. A governmental body may hold a closed session only to the extent a closed session is necessary for any of the following reasons: .... e. To discuss whether to conduct a hearing or to conduct hearings to suspend or expel a student, unless an open session is requested by the student or a parent or guardian of the student if the student is a minor. .... i. To evaluate the professional competency of an individual whose appointment, hiring, performance or discharge is being considered when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual's reputation and that individual requests a closed session. .... 5. Nothing in this section requires a governmental body to hold a closed session to discuss or act upon any matter. Iowa Code § 21.5 (1995) (emphasis added). The Intentdeclaration of policy section of this chapter is important: This chapter seeks to assure, through a requirement of open meetings of governmental bodies, that the basis and rationale of governmental decisions, as well as those decisions themselves, are easily accessible to the people. Ambiguity in the construction or application of this chapter should be resolved in favor of openness. Iowa Code § 21.1 (emphasis added). The school board essentially concluded that the rights of an employee who requests a closed meeting are superior to the rights of a student who requests that it be open. The district court disagreed, and we believe properly so. While Iowa Code section 21.1 provides that ambiguity in the construction or application of that chapter should be resolved in favor of openness, the Schumachers need not rely on that principle here. Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(e) clearly provides that a student may request an open hearing. Lord relies on section 21.5(1)(i) in claiming her right to a closed meeting, but that section is inapplicable. It applies only if (1) the meeting is to evaluate the professional competency of an individual (2) for the purpose of deciding issues of appointment, hiring, performance or discharge. Lord failed to meet either of these requirements. The meeting was not for the purpose of evaluating her; it was for the purpose of considering a proposed suspension. In addition, the issue was what to do about Schumacher, not Lord. Lord's performance had already been evaluated and discipline imposedaccording to the stipulated facts, Lord received an incident letter for her personnel file. Because Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(e) allowed Schumacher the right to an open meeting, and section 21.5(1)(i) is inapplicable, the district court correctly ruled that the board acted illegally in closing the hearing.