Opinion ID: 736300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Our View

Text: 27 In attempting to interpret the IDEA and its regulations to resolve this case, we acknowledge, as have others, that the fundamental problem stems from the ambiguity of the statutory and regulatory language. Nonetheless, some basic principles are discernible. 28 We agree with the Fifth Circuit that Congress clearly intended that disabled students voluntarily placed in a private school by their parents are to be active participants in and beneficiaries of programs established under the IDEA. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 397. The level of that participation, however, may be different from the participation by students attending public schools or those placed in private schools by LEAs. Congress clearly differentiated between the three groups of students. Those in public schools are unquestionably entitled to the IDEA's free appropriate public education, including special education and related services. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(a)(18), 1412, 1414. Similarly, those placed in private schools by LEAs will be provided special education and related services ... at no cost to their parents, § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i). By contrast, for those voluntarily attending private schools, the SEA need only make provision ... for the participation of such children in IDEA programs, to the extent consistent with the number and location of [such] children. § 1413(a)(4)(A). And although the IDEA regulations suggest that LEAs must provide such services to those students, see note 5, supra, the EDGAR regulations make it clear that such students are entitled only to a genuine opportunity for equitable participation in program benefits, which must be comparable in quality, scope, and opportunity for participation to the program benefits provided for public school enrollees. 34 C.F.R. §§ 76.651(a)(1), 76.654(a); see also, Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056 (observing that the Anderson decision is unquestionably correct that the rights accorded disabled students in public school differ from those accorded such students voluntarily placed in private schools). We agree that children voluntarily placed in private schools are entitled to some level of participation in special education services, but not necessarily the identical level as they would were they in public schools or in private schools pursuant to state or local agency referral. 29 Accordingly, we reject the proposition that the District must provide a full-time interpreter for Michael at Collegiate, once his parents have asked for the provision of such services. We agree with other courts in holding that the IDEA and its regulations create no automatic right to any and all special education services at a private school site for all students voluntarily attending such a school. See Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 397 (It is clear that the statute does not mandate that services for students voluntarily enrolled at private schools be provided on-site at the private school.); Russman, 85 F.3d at 1055 ([W]e do not take the position that the IDEA requires the on-site provision at private schools of any and all services that might be required in the context of public education....); Anderson, 81 F.3d at 678 ([P]ublic schools need not provide comparable benefits to students voluntarily attending private school in every instance.); Goodall, 930 F.2d at 369 (holding that the statutory and regulatory requirements were satisfied by the district's offering to provide special education services at a public school site); cf. Murray v. Montrose County Sch. Dist. RE-1J, 51 F.3d 921, 930 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that there is no presumption under the IDEA that the least restrictive environment in which to educate a disabled student is the neighborhood school). As indicated above, the language of the statute and regulations refute any such argument. That conclusion does not, however, mean that LEAs have no obligation to provide such services at private school sites, in some cases. 30 Rather, we agree with other circuit court decisions which have recognized that the IDEA and its regulations afford considerable discretion to educational agencies to determine the manner and extent of services to be provided. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 396-97; Anderson, 81 F.3d at 678 ([T]he public school has discretion over what services to provide.). However, that discretion is not unfettered. Otherwise, the student's genuine opportunity for equitable participation and the requirement that benefits be comparable would be meaningless. See Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 396-97. We accordingly also reject the proposition that the District has unfettered discretion to simply deny Michael such services at Collegiate, and claim to have fulfilled its obligations under the IDEA by offering those services to Michael at a public school. 31 We therefore agree with the decisions in Russman and Cefalu that, while LEAs have considerable discretion to determine how they will provide services to students voluntarily placed in private schools, that discretion has parameters. We disagree with the Anderson and Goodall decisions, which appear to confer virtually unfettered discretion on LEAs to deny services on-site at private schools. 32 We now consider what properly confines that discretion. In attempting to provide some rational criteria to guide that discretion, and to apply the statute and the regulations, we note that there are some inherent problems. First, the statute and regulations generally refer to groups of students, as perhaps they must, whereas in many cases, as in this case, we deal with an individual student. Thus, the statutory and regulatory reference to the number and location of private school students, as a reference to groups of students, is difficult to apply to an individual student's situation. Second, the statute and regulations refer to all special education services, again as perhaps they must, whereas, in practice, there are different types of special education services, some of which present unique problems. For example, certain special education services can easily and effectively be provided to private school students at public school sites after school. The student receives the benefit of the service, and the school incurs no added cost because it makes the service available in the same setting it would were the child enrolled in the public school. Other services, however, such as the sign language interpreter at issue in this case, cannot be effectively provided to a private school student anywhere other than the private school site, because they confer no benefit unless they accompany the child throughout his or her educational day. See generally, Dixie Snow Huefner & Steven F. Huefner, Publicly Financed Interpreter Services for Parochial School Students with IDEA-B Disabilities, 21 J.L. & Educ. 223 (1992). Despite these problems inherent in the statutory and regulatory scheme, we endeavor to apply them to this case. 33 While the IDEA and its regulations do not specifically refer to cost as a relevant factor, courts which have addressed this issue refer to cost as a highly relevant factor for school districts to consider when determining whether to provide particular services to private school students. As the Fifth Circuit in Cefalu observed, educational agencies must be afforded the broadest discretion to design special programs in the light of the finite funds that are available. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 397 (emphasis added). In considering 34 C.F.R. § 76.651's requirement that a subgrantee provide voluntarily enrolled private school students with a genuine opportunity for equitable participation in IDEA program benefits in a manner that is consistent with the number of eligible private school students and their needs, the Cefalu court held that [t]he word 'equitable,' certainly in the context of the finite funds available, means fair to all concerned, not simply fair to the private school student; in this context, it means not unfair to others depending on the same pool of money for services and benefits. Cefalu, 103 F.3d at 397. Similarly, the Russman court read the IDEA to mean only that, where the provision of services at a distant private school would entail significant additional costs, e.g., transportation, to be borne by the state, public school authorities may fulfill their IDEA obligations by offering the services at a local public school. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056. 9 Such a gloss on the IDEA, which by its terms appears to contemplate only a disabled child's individual needs, is an entirely reasonable, and realistic, interpretation of a statute designed to provide necessary educational services to all disabled students, but with an inevitably limited, or finite, pool of funds. 34 We do not suggest that cost alone, however, is the only factor which LEAs may consider in determining what services will be provided to voluntarily-placed private school students. As indicated, LEAs can and must have considerable discretion in determining how best to serve disabled students. The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or guardian of the child. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). A variety of educational considerations, including, as in this case, a determination that clustering hearing impaired students in a single location provides some educational benefit to those students, may inform the discretion exercised by the LEA. 35 Nonetheless, the IDEA clearly contemplates parents voluntarily placing their disabled children in private schools, and those children must be provided with an opportunity to participate in special education services offered at public schools. We accordingly hold, like Russman, that [w]here the cost of special services does not vary with where they are provided, the IDEA and regulations regarding voluntary private school students make little sense if such services may be made available only in the public schools. Russman, 85 F.3d at 1056. 10 We further agree with the Russman court that the reference in the IDEA regulations to number and location of students, as a reference to groups of students, is of little assistance in determining whether the individualized service Michael seeks must be provided. 11 36 In this case, we are not dealing with a group of students in a variety of locations, demanding a variety of special education services. Rather, we are faced here with the question of whether an individual disabled child, who requires an individualized service which only benefits him if it is provided to him on-site, throughout his educational day, is entitled to that individualized service at the private school he has chosen to attend. We conclude that, in such a situation, the District must pay for that service an amount up to, but not more than, the average cost to the District to provide that same service to hearing-impaired students in the public school setting. Were Michael to remain in Caldwell Elementary, the District would be obligated to provide him with interpretive services. His parents chose voluntarily to place him in Wichita Collegiate, a private school, which they are entitled to do. In our view, it is a fair and reasonable interpretation of the Act and regulations to require the District to pay the same amount towards the special education service (a sign language interpreter) Michael needs in his private school setting, as the average amount the District pays for such services for hearing-impaired students in the public schools. 37 Our selection of the average amount as the guiding principle finds support in the regulations, as 34 C.F.R. § 76.655(a) provides that a LEA shall spend the same average amount of program funds on [a] student enrolled in a private school who receives benefits under the program[ ] and [a] student enrolled in a public school who receives benefits under the program. The regulation thus seems to endorse the spending of the average amount spent per student in the public school on an individual private school student. The use of the average amount further takes into account variations in the amounts spent on individuals in the public school, because of the particular needs of their IEPs. 12 38 In so holding, we make several observations. The average cost is necessarily derived from costs associated with a number of individual hearing-impaired students, with a variety of IEPs. By directing the District to calculate such an average, we by no means invite, and we strongly discourage, endless argument over each piece of data used to calculate the average. We are very aware that our rule is not mathematically precise, and the calculation of the average cost is not intended to be an exercise in pure mathematics. 13 The District has very broad discretion to calculate the average, using any rational basis, and we will give substantial deference to its calculation. 39 Our rule will also require ongoing consideration of the relative costs of providing the service, in light of changing populations of disabled students at public and private schools, and other factors. 40 Finally, we acknowledge that our holding in this case may have a very short shelf life. Petitions for certiorari have been filed in Anderson and Russman, and undoubtedly will be in Cefalu and, perhaps, this case. This is an area in which Supreme Court guidance is needed, and, we hope, forthcoming.