Opinion ID: 1879728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retrospective Application of Walz

Text: Even if it were conceded that Walz impliedly overrules the precedent established in Griffin, Walz can and should be applied retroactively. The general rule in civil cases seems to be that unless the overruling decision declares that it shall have only prospective effect, which the court overruling its prior decision generally has the power to do, the judicial overruling of a precedent has both prospective and retroactive effect. 20 Am.Jur.2d Courts § 233 (1965). This general rule has been denominated the Blackstonian Doctrine, Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 571, 157 N.W.2d 595, 596 (1968), and appears to have evolved from a traditional view of the judiciary as the interpretors of law. As a matter of constitutional law, retroactive operation of an overruling decision is neither required nor prohibited. Comment, Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 § 2; Annotation, United States Supreme Court's Views as to Retroactive Effect of Its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 22 L.Ed.2d. 821, 830 (hereinafter S.Ct. Annotation). The United States Supreme Court has developed criteria for determining retroactivity of new rules which are substantially the same as those enunciated by this court in State v. One 1966 Pontiac Auto., 270 N.W.2d 362, 365 (S.D. 1978). These criteria are: (1) the purpose to be served by the particular new rule; (2) the extent of reliance which had been placed upon the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule. S.Ct. Annotation, supra at 832. The first criteria is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Clearly, one general purpose of the rule in Walz was to recognize an implied civil cause of action under a criminal statute. If retroactive application is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the new rule, then this is a significant factor in giving the new rule retroactive effect. S.Ct. Annotation § 4[b] at 832. The court in Walz believed that SDCL 35-4-78(2) was enacted to protect citizens from the risk of being killed or injured `as a result of the drunkenness to which the particular sale of alcoholic liquor contributes.' Walz, 327 N.W.2d at 122-123. Thus, to effectuate the interpreted intent and purpose of the statute, it was and is necessary to give the decision retroactive application. It is argued that there was good-faith reliance on the old rule (i.e., Griffin ) and, therefore, Walz should not be applied retroactively. Specifically, it is argued that it is inequitable to apply the new rule because many bar owners did not have liability insurance coverage for these situations prior to Walz and thus could suffer severe monetary losses, and that the state of the law was and is unclear. Although we agree that the imposition of liability, where proven, may be financially harsh for bar owners who were not covered by insurance, this must be balanced against the harsh effect non-retroactivity would have upon those wrongfully injured whose economic and physical losses may be more severe. Additionally, as mentioned above, there is no question that SDCL 35-4-78(2) prohibited bar owners from serving intoxicated persons or minors. The conduct in question was prohibited and proven violation of the statute was punishable by criminal sanctions. We do not believe good-faith reliance means that violators of SDCL 35-4-78(2) relied upon violation only costing them a one thousand dollar fine, one year of imprisonment, or both. See SDCL 22-6-2. Additionally, the retroactive application of Walz is unlikely to have a significant effect on the administration of justice.