Opinion ID: 1525908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merger of the Possession of a Firearm During a Crime of Violence Counts

Text: Appellant's third argument is that under Nixon v. United States, 730 A.2d 145 (D.C.1999), and West v. United States, 866 A.2d 74 (D.C.2005), his two convictions for possession of a firearm during a crime of violence (PFCV) must merge because the shootings of the Hajar brothers occurred with the same gun during the same violent episode. We disagree. As we noted in Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845 (D.C.1995), PFCV. . . requires more than mere possession: the defendant must possess the firearm while committing a crime of violence. Each time the defendant commits an independent violent crime, a separate decision is made whether or not to possess the firearm during that crime. Id. at 855 n. 12. As a rule, crimes do not merge if they are perpetrated against different victims. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 466 A.2d 439, 443 n. 3 (D.C.1983) (two offenses do not merge where each offense was directed against a different victim). [7] We have found, however, that under certain circumstances, PFCV crimes do merge even when the predicate crimes are perpetrated against different victims. In particular, in West, we held that two PFCV counts merged in a shooting with two victims, and in Nixon, we held that multiple PFCV counts merged when there was a single shooting incident with multiple victims. But in each of these cases there was a single shooting incident, that is, one assaultive act that resulted in multiple victims. [8] This exception to the general rule does not apply in this case. In Reeves v. United States, this court held that multiple PFCV counts did not merge where the predicate crimes were distinct assaults, each stem[ming] from a fresh impulse. 902 A.2d 88, 90 (D.C. 2006). Like Wages, Reeves assaulted several patrons in a restaurant, with a weapon, while robbing them. We found that after each assault, Reeves was able to desist from violence against another victim, but chose not to do so, and so, his successive intentions made him subject to cumulative punishment. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). As in Reeves, here Wages committed distinct assaults. After shooting Mohamed, he reached a fork in the road where he could have chosen not to shoot and rob Ahmed. Instead, with a fresh impulse, he executed a new assault. Therefore, despite the proximity of the crimes in time and place, they constitute distinct violent crimes, and the PFCV convictions do not merge. For the foregoing reasons, appellant's motion for a new trial pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110 is denied, and his convictions, including the conviction for malicious disfigurement, are affirmed. So ordered.