Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Robbery Special Circumstance

Text: In his motion for a new trial, defendant alternatively requested that the trial court strike the robbery special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)), which the jury had found true. Defendant argued that based on the crucial but unreliable testimony of Pridgon, the special circumstance was unsupported by evidence. Denying his motion, the trial court declined to reconcile inconsistencies in Pridgon's testimony, including the fact that money was found on Simms's person. The court rejected defendant's contention that Pridgon had hallucinated the death and manner of killing Simms. The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt under section 211 that defendant killed Simms while engaged in the commission of robbery. On appeal, defendant asserts that substantial evidence does not support the robbery special circumstance, and argues that the trial court otherwise implicitly concluded that defendant had not committed a robbery. We discuss each point in turn. Substantial evidence must support a special circumstance finding. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1022, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a special circumstance, the question we ask is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 678, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) We find the record contains substantial evidence that defendant murdered Simms while engaged in the commission of a robbery. After Pridgon testified that defendant had pressed on Simms's throat and reached into her blouse after striking her, the following colloquy took place: Q[uestion by the prosecution:] And what did you see when you say he went in the blouse? A[nswer by Pridgon:] He came out with some money. Q[:] Were you able to tell exactly how much money? A[:] No, I can't tell how much it was, but I knew it was a lot of money. Q[:] And can youwere you able to tell if it was coins or paper? A[:] It was paper. Q[:] From what you could see, did it appear to be more than one piece of paper money or just one piece? A[] He came out with a lot of money. Q[:]'He came out' A[:] With a handful of money. Q[:] `A handful'? A[:] Hum. Q[:] Now, you've been gesturing with your hand to thethe breast area on your body. Is that where you saw him reach in and come out with the money? A[:] Yes. Q[:] What's the next thing that happened after you saw him come out with the money? A[:] He got off of her. Q[:] And then what happened? A[:J Then he grabbed me and said if I say something, he's going to kill me. In addition, when the prosecution asked whether defendant had ever mentioned wanting to hit Simms and take money from her, Pridgon answered, Yes. [¶] He say he know where a prostitute at that got money. . . . He asked me if I'm down for taking the money. [¶] I don't quite understand what he was saying. And I told him, `Yeah.' I didn't understand what he said. But when he repeat over again, I told him, `No. I don't do that kind of stuff.' [¶] . . . He said, Well, I do it my damn self.' There was also circumstantial evidence that defendant robbed Simms. Defendant admitted he had seen Simms keep money in her bra. Physical evidence also showed that the top of Simms's blouse was ripped open, revealing her brassiere containing a folded $20 bill, and that buttons that had come from Simms's blouse lay near her body. There was evidence that Simms had recently cashed a paycheck and that she normally set aside money for rent from the paycheck and used the rest to purchase crack. Based on these facts, a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant robbed Simms. As discussed previously, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court should have disregarded Pridgon's testimony as inherently unreliable. (See ante, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 299, 28 P.3d at p. 57.) We also reject defendant's claim that the trial court implicitly foreclosed the finding of robbery based on the court's observation that [although somewhat illogical, the apparent motive of the murder was to obviate the necessity of the defendant returning money to the victim which had been given to the defendant for the purpose of purchasing drugs. In other words, defendant did not kill Simms intending to rob her, but killed her to avoid paying a debt. As further evidence that he did not rob Simms, defendant states he did not take money from her person, which is supported by the fact that $20 was found on Simms's body. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the trial court's observation that defendant may have had the motive to kill Simms to cancel a debt he owed her does not preclude the finding of the robbery special circumstance. (See People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68 [appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence].) Although the record may have supported both theories, it was up to the trier of fact to determine whether or not defendant committed the robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 791, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Indeed, the trial court, upon denying defendant's motion for a new trial or alternatively to strike the robbery special circumstance, independently reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and credited Pridgon's testimony on the fact that the Defendant killed Sandra Simms and took money from her person at the time of the killing, and that the Defendant Raymond Lewis told him that he intended to hit the victim and take her money. `If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]' ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1054, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) As noted, the record reveals substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that defendant robbed and murdered Simms. Thus, a reversal of the robbery special-circumstance finding was not warranted. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1054, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that his sentence violates the federal constitutional prohibition against arbitrary and capricious action.