Opinion ID: 2634656
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Proper State Constitutional Test

Text: As noted, the court in Glickman held that if the First Amendment had been implicated, then the test of Abood and Keller would clearly [be] satisfied in this case because . . . the generic advertising . . . is unquestionably germane to the purposes of the marketing order[]. . . . ( Glickman, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 473, 117 S.Ct. 2130.) As has been recognized, the standard employed by the Glickman court was plainly less exacting than the intermediate scrutiny test employed in testing the constitutionality of commercial speech restrictions. ( Gerawan I, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 534-535, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720 (dis. opn. of George, C.J.).) In light of our recognition in Gerawan I that the generic advertising program does in fact implicate the free speech clause, that is to say, a program of compelled subsidization of generic advertising does interfere with the right protected under the free speech clause and requires some justification for that interference, we believe it would be incongruous to subject the program to only minimal scrutiny. On this point we are partly persuaded by Justice Souter's dissent in Glickman, supra, 521 U.S. at page 474, 117 S.Ct. 2130, wherein he points out that previous forays into compelled funding of speech have involved areas in which the importance of the government interest at stake and legitimacy of compelled association was already well established. Commenting on the seminal case of Abood, supra, 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, Justice Souter reasoned that the court had concluded some interference with the First Amendment interests was `constitutionally justified by the legislative assessment of the important contribution of the union shop to the system of labor relations established by Congress.' [Citation]; see also Keller, supra, [496 U.S. at pp.] 13-14 [110 S.Ct. 2228] (`[T]he State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services' justifies `the compelled association [inherent in the] integrated bar'). But this was simply a way of saying that the government's objective of guaranteeing the opportunity for a union shop, the importance and legitimacy of which were already settled, [citations], could not be attained without the incidental infringements of the interests in unfettered speech and association that petitioners there claimed. ( Glickman, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 484, 117 S.Ct. 2130 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.).) Justice Souter appears correct that an assumption underlying Abood and Keller, albeit an implicit one, is that the interest justifying the compelled association must be important, and that there be no effective alternative means of achieving this interest with less intrusion on free speech rights. On the other hand, the conclusion of the Glickman majority that the compelled funding of generic advertising requires only minimal scrutiny is at variance with the general rule that intrusion into free speech rights requires substantial justification, even when the intrusion is incidental to the enforcement of a content-neutral law. (See O'Brien v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672.) The requirement of substantial justification is further supported by the fact that the right to free speech under the California Constitution is in some respects `broader' and `greater' than under the First Amendment. ( Gerawan I, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 491, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720, and cases cited therein.) Because generic advertising was not self-evidently incidental to the functioning of some important, legislatively established institution, such as a union shop or an integrated state bar as in Abood and Keller, Justice Souter argued for treating compelled funding of such advertising the same as any other regulation implicating the right of commercial speech, subjecting it to the test articulated in Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S.Ct. 2343. That standard asks (1) whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment, which means that the expression at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; if yes to both, then (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. ( Id. at p. 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.) We believe this intermediate standard appropriately protects the free speech rights article I was designed to safeguard. Drawing on constitutional doctrine summarized above, we conclude that the compelled funding of commercial speech neither warrants application of the strictest scrutiny reserved for such matters as the censorship or compelled utterance of noncommercial speech (see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson (1989) 491 U.S. 397, 412, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342; West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette (1943) 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628), nor can it pass muster simply because it is rationally based. Turning to the present case, we apply the Central Hudson test to determine whether this case can be resolved on the pleadings. As explained, we conclude it cannot be and requires remand. There can be no dispute that the first prong of the Central Hudson test  whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment ( Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343)  should be resolved in Gerawan's favor. After Gerawan I, it is established that the right not to contribute financially to a commercial message is protected by the free speech clause. Moreover, the right Gerawan seeks to exercise has nothing to do with untruthful or misleading speech on its part. The second prong is whether the government interest is substantial. ( Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.) The government's goal in promoting generic advertising schemes is, in the words of the legislation explaining the purpose of the CMA, to [p]rovide methods and means for the maintenance of present markets, or for the development of new or larger markets, for commodities that are grown within this state. . . . (Food & Agr.Code, § 58654, subd. (d); see Voss v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 907-908, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 [historical experience with agriculture prompted legislative intervention to improve agricultural markets].) We do not doubt, in the abstract, that the objective of maintaining and expanding markets for agricultural products, thereby ensuring the viability of California agriculture, is a substantial objective. (See Gerawan I, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 524, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 12 P.3d 720 (dis. opn. of George, C.J.) [explaining the unique position agriculture holds in the state and national economy].) Moreover, as discussed in the next part of this opinion, we reject the Court of Appeal's position that the government's interest is not substantial simply because the CMA has delegated the decision whether to create a marketing program in a given sector of the agricultural economy to the agricultural producers themselves. This case comes to us, however, on the pleadings. It cannot be definitively determined whether the above-stated statutory goals are in fact the goals of the marketing program at issue in this case, and further factfinding is required to ascertain the nature of the government's actual interest. The third prong of the Central Hudson test is whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted. ( Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.) Here, the State must demonstrate that the challenged regulation `advances the Government's interest in a direct and material way.' [Citation.] That burden . . . `is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.' ( Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995) 515 U.S. 618, 625-626, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 ( Went For It ).) [4] Moreover, in the First Amendment intermediate scrutiny context, the government's position must be supported not merely by any evidence but by substantial evidence. (See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (1994) 512 U.S. 622, 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497.) Given that this case has not advanced beyond the pleading stage, there is as yet no evidence in the record to support the government's position that generic advertising is an efficacious means of significantly improving the sale of agricultural products in this state. Accordingly, the case must be remanded for further factfinding on that point. The fourth prong of the Central Hudson inquiry is [w]hether [the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve [the government] interest. ( Central Hudson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343.) What this prong requires `is a fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends . . . a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.' ( Went For It, supra, 515 U.S. at p. 632, 115 S.Ct. 2371.) Again, without an evidentiary record, we cannot say whether alternative, less-speech-restrictive programs would be less efficient or effective in accomplishing the government's objective. (See Glickman, supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 502-503, 117 S.Ct. 2130 (dis. opn. of Souter, J.) [discussing marketing programs that give producers a choice whether to spend money on their own advertising or generic advertising].) However, we reject Gerawan's position that, as a matter of law, the government always has an alternative means of encouraging plum sales through subsidies drawn from general revenue. The government is not, per se, constitutionally forbidden from funding a marketing program by the financial contribution of those who benefit from it the most, rather than of the general taxpaying public, any more than it is forbidden to fund a state bar association from member dues rather than general revenues. (See Keller, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 12, 110 S.Ct. 2228.) In sum, we conclude this case must be remanded to the trial court for further factfinding to determine whether the California Plum Marketing Program is intended to promote the substantial government interest articulated in Food and Agricultural Code section 58654, subdivision (d), whether the generic advertising program at issue directly advances that interest, and whether it is narrowly tailored in light of the availability of less-speech-restrictive alternatives.