Opinion ID: 891683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Source and Nature of Contempt Powers

Text: {21} We begin by recognizing the indisputable authority of judges to compel obedience to their orders and to maintain the decorum and safety of their courtrooms. {22} Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 34-1-2 (1851), all New Mexico courts have the power to preserve order and decorum, and for that purpose to punish contempts by reprimand, arrest, fine or imprisonment, being circumscribed by the usage of the courts of the United States. This statute is declaratory of the common law. In re Klecan, 93 N.M. 637, 638, 603 P.2d 1094, 1095 (1979). {23} Even in the absence of express statutory authority, courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect and decorum in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates. Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 19 U.S. 204, 227, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821). While statutes may provide reasonable regulatory measures, the Legislature may not substantially impair or destroy the implied power of the court to punish for contempt. State ex rel. Bliss v. Greenwood, 63 N.M. 156, 162, 315 P.2d 223, 227 (1957). {24} The exercise of the contempt power and the conduct it is intended to address may take various forms. Contempts of court are classified as civil or criminal.... The major factor in determining whether a contempt is civil or criminal is the purpose for which the power is exercised. In re Klecan, 93 N.M. at 638, 603 P.2d at 1095. Criminal contempts are further delineated as direct or indirect. Id. at 638, 603 P.2d at 1095. Direct contempts are contemptuous acts committed in the presence of the court, while indirect [contempts] are such acts committed outside the presence of the court. Id. at 639, 603 P.2d at 1096. {25} Civil contempts are remedial and may use fines, imprisonment, or other sanctions as coercive measures to compel the contemnor to comply in the future with an order of the court. See State ex rel. Apodaca v. Our Chapel of Memories of N.M., Inc., 74 N.M. 201, 204-05, 392 P.2d 347, 349-50 (1964). Because the purpose of those civil contempt sanctions is to compel compliance with the court's orders and not to punish, the continuing contempt sanctions end when the contemnor complies. A civil contempt defendant carries the keys of his prison in his own pocket. He can end the sentence and discharge himself of contempt at any moment by doing what he has previously refused to do. State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 364, 721 P.2d 1294, 1295 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Civil contempt sanctions may be imposed by honoring the most basic due process protections-in most cases, fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994); see Turner v. Rogers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2520, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011) (holding that constitutional due process in civil contempt proceedings requires notice and a hearing but not the right to counsel). {26} Criminal contempt proceedings are instituted to punish completed acts of disobedience that have threatened the authority and dignity of the court and are appropriate even after the contemnor is no longer acting contemptuously. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 828-29, 114 S.Ct. 2552. Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court have long recognized that '[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense; it is a violation of the law.' Pothier, 104 N.M. at 365, 721 P.2d at 1296 (alteration in original) (quoting Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968)). A criminal contempt defendant is therefore entitled to due process protections of the criminal law, the specific nature of which will depend on whether the criminal contempt is categorized as direct or indirect. No matter how a criminal contempt is characterized, it is a fundamental proposition that criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires of such criminal proceedings, including the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). {27} A person who commits disruptive or defiant conduct in the midst of an ongoing court proceeding within the personal perception of the judge has committed an act of direct criminal contempt and may be punished summarily without further evidentiary proceedings. See, e.g., Purpura v. Purpura (In re Cherryhomes), 115 N.M. 80, 81-82, 85, 847 P.2d 314, 315-16, 319 (Ct.App.1993) (upholding a finding of contempt where an attorney disobeyed the judge's direct orders, attempted to leave the court room before the hearing had finished, and pushed the sheriffs deputy who was attempting to restrain him). If feasible, even in summary proceedings for an act of direct contempt occurring in open court, an adequate opportunity to defend or explain one's conduct is a minimum requirement before imposition of punishment. In re Klecan, 93 N.M. at 639, 603 P.2d at 1096 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (reversing a direct contempt citation for failure of the judge to permit the contemnor to explain his conduct). {28} When the judge has not personally witnessed the defendant's contemptuous behavior in the course of a court proceeding, the contempt is classified as indirect criminal contempt and must be resolved through more traditional due process procedures. State v. Stout, 100 N.M. 472, 474, 672 P.2d 645, 647 (1983) (holding that an attorney charged with contempt for failing to attend a scheduled hearing could be charged only with indirect, not direct, contempt because the contempt did not occur in open court and the judge did not have personal knowledge of the reasons for the attorney's nonappearance). {29} The contempt power of a court is so broad that it is uniquely `liable to abuse.' Bloom, 391 U.S. at 202, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313, 9 S.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405 (1888)). As human beings, judges `sometimes exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to which human flesh is heir.' Id. at 202 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 1477 (quoting Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 12, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952)). Contumacy often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament. Id. at 202, 88 S.Ct. 1477. Not only is a judge often personally involved to some degree in the conflict that must be adjudicated, the same judge exercises several responsibilities normally assigned to separate persons or institutions: That one and the same person should be able to make the rule, to adjudicate its violation, and to assess its penalty is out of accord with our usual notions of fairness and separation of powers. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 840, 114 S.Ct. 2552 (Scalia, J., concurring). {30} Because we necessarily give judges such extraordinary unilateral powers, this Court repeatedly has cautioned that we must require judges to exercise a correspondingly extraordinary self-restraint to avoid abuses of those powers. See, e.g., Pothier, 104 N.M. at 369, 721 P.2d at 1300 (explaining that, in exercising the contempt power, a court should not exercise more than the least possible power adequate to the end proposed); Case v. State, 103 N.M. 501, 503, 709 P.2d 670, 672 (1985) (It is the responsibility of the judiciary to exercise that power wisely and always within its limitations.); Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Local 177, United Stone & Allied Prods. Workers, 74 N.M. 195, 200, 392 P.2d 343, 346 (1964) (explaining that contempt power must be used cautiously and sparingly). {31} We now examine Respondent's actions in this case to determine whether they constituted a lawful exercise of judicial power. In doing so, we must first determine what kind of contempt power was exercised by Respondent and then consider whether he acted within the bounds of his lawful discretion.