Opinion ID: 3030137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A COA on Williams’ Batson Claim Should Have Been

Text: Issued In 1981, Williams was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by an all-white jury. During jury selection, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike all three AfricanAmericans who would otherwise have sat on the jury or in the alternate juror pool. Without explanation or tactical justificaWILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1317 tion, Williams’ trial counsel failed to object to this violation of his client’s constitutional rights, even though he later acknowledged that he was aware of applicable California law prohibiting the practice and that he could have made a meritorious objection. Williams argues that the prosecutor engaged in impermissible racial discrimination in the jury selection process in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. He also argues that his counsel’s failure to object to this constitutional violation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied Williams’ habeas petition, granting summary judgment for the state on both the Batson claim and the related ineffective assistance of counsel claim without conducting an evidentiary hearing, and then denied Williams’ discovery request as moot. Williams appealed to this court, but the panel did not grant a COA on the Batson claim, and our court as a whole declined Williams’ request to review that denial. The panel also failed to address the question of whether trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s discriminatory peremptory challenges gives rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The panel opinion concluded that Williams failed to make the “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” necessary to warrant a COA because he did not make a prima facie showing of a violation. Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 584 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended Sept. 9, 2004) (Williams I). Unfortunately, this holding represents a fundamental misapplication of the standards set by the Supreme Court, this circuit, and other circuits regarding: 1) what evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson; 2) what evidence is relevant to the making of a prima facie case; 3) what kind of evidence is necessary to establish a prima facie 1318 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD case; and 4) what showing is sufficient to warrant a COA on a Batson claim. Because of the profound importance of Batson to AfricanAmericans and, indeed, all Americans who cherish justice, I spell out the jurisprudence in this area, hoping to impel a much-needed focus on our solemn obligation to provide color-blind tribunals.
Although the panel correctly noted that to make a prima facie showing under Batson, Williams must show that the facts and circumstances of the jury selection create an inference of discrimination by the prosecutor, the opinion does not incorporate any analysis of the cogent facts presented by Williams, and the inference of discrimination compelled from those facts. Instead, the panel apparently imposed a requirement that Williams present additional evidence not required by Batson. The striking of even a single juror based on race violates the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, the prosecutor struck three African-American prospective jurors. Specifically, the prosecutor used two of his nineteen peremptory challenges to remove the only two African-Americans who had been drawn, passed for cause, and placed in the jury box and who otherwise would have served on the jury. He also used one peremptory challenge to remove the only AfricanAmerican who had been drawn as an alternate juror. As a result, the prosecutor obtained a jury, and an alternate juror pool, that contained not a single African-American. The facts of Williams’ jury selection are remarkably similar to those considered by the Court in Batson itself: in Batson, “[t]he prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike all WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1319 four black persons on the venire, and a jury composed only of white persons was selected.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 83. To discount the significance of the prosecutor’s removal of the African-American jurors in this case, the panel relies on Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902, where we “stated that [u]sing peremptory challenges to strike Blacks does not end the prima facie inquiry; it is not per se unconstitutional, without more, to strike one or more Blacks from the jury. A district court must consider the relevant circumstances surrounding a peremptory challenge.” Williams I, 384 F.3d at 584 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In VasquezLopez, one black was struck. The defendant was Latino. The district court appropriately examined the surrounding circumstances. In this case, by contrast, the relevant circumstances actually strengthen the inference of discrimination raised by the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes against African-Americans. Although the fact that a prosecutor struck one or more African-Americans from the jury may be insufficient in and of itself to create an inference of discrimination, when a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges results in the exclusion of all of the African-American jurors summoned to the jury box, it creates an inference of discrimination sufficient to constitute a prima facie showing of a Batson violation. See, e.g., United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding significant the fact that “all the Hispanic jurors were challenged” in concluding that defendants made prima facie showing of Batson violation where prosecutor peremptorily challenged only two minority jurors, one of whom was merely an alternate); Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 275-76 (3rd Cir. 2001) (finding prima facie showing where striking of three prospective jurors resulted in all-white jury).1 1 Although Williams alleges that the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes produced an all-white jury, Respondent argues that Williams did not make a prima facie showing because one of the seated jurors may not have been white. Respondent disputes the race of this juror despite 1320 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD Added to the fact that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to eliminate all African-Americans from the jury and the alternate juror pool, the “relevant circumstances” supporting an inference of discrimination in this case include the following: the prosecutor struck jurors who were of the same race as the defendant, the victims were of a different race, and the case was one in which the jury would be asked to consider imposing the death penalty. See United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 748 (3rd Cir. 1988) (“When assessing the existence of a prima facie case, trial judges should examine all relevant factors, such as: how many members of the ‘cognizable racial group’ . . . are in the panel; the nature of the crime; and the race of the defendant and the victim.”). In establishing his prima facie case, Williams is also “entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; see also Chinchilla, 874 F.2d at 697 n.3. Thus, taken together, all of the “facts and circumstances” surroundRespondent’s own admissions that a juror testified that he could not recall any minorities on the jury, and that the evidence Respondent offered to show that one juror was not white was, at best, “inconclusive as to race.” Respondent’s argument is unconvincing for, in addition to Respondent’s own admissions, Williams’ trial counsel explained in a sworn declaration that he was dissatisfied with the ultimate composition of the jury because it did not represent a fair cross-section of the community and that he should have objected “in order to have the prosecutor justify his removal of the black jurors.” Moreover, even if one juror of a non-white ethnicity, or even one African-American juror, was left on the jury, the facts would still establish a prima facie case under Batson. See, e.g., Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2004) (use of peremptory challenges to excuse five out of six possible African-American jurors raised inference of discrimination; case remanded to district court for evidentiary hearing); Palmer v. Estelle, 985 F.2d 456, 458 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the fact that prosecutor did not attempt to remove all black jurors is not dispositive); cf. Montiel v. City of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335, 340 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the presence of one minority on the jury may weigh against the defendant’s prima facie showing but explaining that “it does so only nominally” (emphasis added)). WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1321 ing the prosecutor’s pattern of strikes against AfricanAmerican jurors at Williams’ trial establish a prima facie Batson claim. Although the panel acknowledged that the “substantial showing requirement for a COA is relatively low,” and that any doubt is to be resolved “in the petitioner’s favor,” Williams I, 384 F.3d at 583 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), unfortunately, these precepts were honored only in their breach. B. The Relevance of Pattern-or-Practice Evidence to Making a Prima Facie Showing Williams presented evidence in the district court that the prosecutor in his case had a pattern and practice of discriminating on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Specifically, Williams points to two California Supreme Court cases that involved the same prosecutor whose actions are at issue here: People v. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d 711, 714 (1986), and People v. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d 707 (1991). All three cases, Turner, Fuentes, and this case, involved an African-American or Latino defendant on trial in a capital case. Although Williams does not need this pattern-orpractice evidence to make out his Batson claim, this evidence buttresses his prima facie case and makes even more clear that issuance of a COA was warranted. The Turner trial took place prior to Williams’ trial: Turner was sentenced to death in 1980, and Williams’ trial commenced in February, 1981. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment in Turner because “the prosecution failed to sustain its burden of showing that the challenged prospective jurors were not excluded because of group bias, and . . . the court failed to discharge its duty to inquire into and carefully evaluate the explanations offered by the prosecutor.” Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 728 (citations omitted). The facts and circumstances of the Turner jury selection are remarkably 1322 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD similar to the Williams jury selection, but with one difference (Williams’ counsel did not object): At the time of the crimes defendant was a young Black man on parole. The two persons he was accused of murdering were White, and both were well known and respected members of the commu- nity. At least three Blacks were in the venire sum- moned to hear the case; all three were called to the jury box, examined, and passed for cause. The prosecutor then struck all three Blacks from the jury by peremptory challenge. Defendant objected vigorously but in vain: the jury that ultimately tried him was all White. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 715. After examining the prosecutor’s proffered explanations for his strikes, the court found “ample reason to suspect” that they were “not bona fide.” Id. at 72129. The court ultimately concluded that “[t]he record demonstrated] that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike Black prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner for the apparent purpose of obtaining an all-White jury to try this Black defendant for crimes against White victims.” Id. at 714. The Fuentes trial took place a few years after Williams’ trial. See Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d at 722. The California Supreme reversed the judgment in Fuentes because the trial court failed to conduct the requisite evaluation after it impliedly found that the defense had established a prima facie case of racially discriminatory jury challenges by the prosecutor and expressly characterized some of the prosecutor’s proffered excuses as “totally unreasonable” and others as “very spurious.” Fuentes, 54 Cal.3d at 713. Although the reversal technically turned on the trial court’s error in assessing the defendant’s jury discrimination claim, Justice Mosk noted in his concurrence: WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1323 Nevertheless, I believe that we must place the ultimate blame on its real source — the prosecutor. It was he who unconstitutionally struck Black prospective jurors. The record compels this conclusion and permits none other. This was no “technical” or inadvertent violation. This prosecutor knew that such conduct was altogether improper. The trial court told him as much. And so did we. Only a few months earlier, in People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal. 3d 711, this court attempted to teach this same prosecutor that invidious discrimination was unacceptable when we reversed a judgment of death because of similar improper conduct on his part. He failed — or refused — to learn his lesson. The result is another reversal — and another costly burden on the administration of justice. Fuentes, 54 Cal. 3d at 722 (emphasis in original). In short, this same prosecutor discriminated against African-Americans in his exercise of peremptory challenges before Williams’ trial, and he continued to engage in this reprehensible and unconstitutional practice after Williams’ trial. We simply cannot, as the panel did, dismiss the circumstances revealing the prosecutor’s pattern and practice of racial discrimination as “irrelevant because they are not ‘the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges’ at Williams’s trial.” Williams I, 384 F.3d at 584 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97). To do so turns Batson on its head. In Batson, the Court explained that under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), “a black defendant could make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination on proof that the peremptory challenge system as a whole was being perverted” to strike blacks for racial reasons. Batson, 476 U.S. at 80. 1324 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD For example, an inference of purposeful discrimination would be raised on evidence that a prosecutor, in case after case . . . is responsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified jurors . . . and who have survived challenges for cause, with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries. Id. at 91-92 (citation omitted). After acknowledging that requiring “proof of repeated striking of blacks over a number of cases . . . has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, [and rendered] prosecutors’ peremptory challenges . . . largely immune from constitutional scrutiny,” id. at 92-93, the Court held that defendants “may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s trial,” id. at 96 (emphasis added). In its holding, the Court urged courts to be flexible in their view of what kinds of evidence could constitute a prima facie showing. Id. at 97-98. Given the fact that “[t]he reality of practice, amply reflected in many state- and federal-court opinions, shows that the challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors . . . , [the Court] requir[ed] trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.” Id. at 99. Thus, the purpose of Batson was to lower the bar for establishing a prima facie case and to open the door to different methods of proving racial discrimination in the jury selection process. See generally, id.; see also, Paulino, 371 F.3d at 1092 (“Batson’s inference standard was intended significantly to reduce the quantum of proof previously required of a defendant who wished to raise a claim of racial bias in the jury selection procedure, and thus is not onerous.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Nothing in Batson changed the fact that Swain pattern-orpractice evidence creates an inference of purposeful discrimination, and nothing in Batson can be construed as holding that WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1325 such evidence is irrelevant. Rather, Batson merely held that other kinds of evidence were also sufficient to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. Batson lessened, not increased the burden of establishing a prima facie case. Indeed, the Court has made clear the continuing relevance of pattern-or-practice evidence in cases following Batson. In Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), the Court explained: Because Batson did not change the nature of the violation recognized in Swain, but merely the quantum of proof necessary to substantiate a particular claim, it follows that a defendant alleging a violation of equal protection of the law under Swain necessarily states an equal protection violation . . . subject to the more lenient burden of proof laid down in Batson. Id. at 420. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (“Miller-El I”), the Court considered both evidence specific to the petitioner’s trial and Swain pattern-or-practice evidence in determining that the Fifth Circuit should have granted a COA on the petitioner’s Batson claim. Id. at 340-47. The Court specifically noted that “in our threshold examination, we accord some weight to petitioner’s historical evidence of racial discrimination by the District Attorney’s Office . . . presented at the Swain hearing.” Id. at 346. As the Court explained, “[t]his [pattern-or-practice] evidence, of course, is relevant to the extent it casts doubt on the legitimacy of the motives underlying the State’s actions in petitioner’s case.” Id. at 347.2 2 Respondent argues that, if Miller-El I made pattern-or-practice evidence relevant to the Batson analysis, it made consideration of such evidence permissible only in the final stage of the Batson analysis — not the first stage in which a prima facie case must be established. Miller-El I suggests otherwise. The Court repeatedly considered both categories of evi1326 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD In sum, disregarding the prosecutor’s pattern and practice of racial discrimination in jury selection directly conflicts with Batson and its progeny.3 Consideration of the trial-specific evidence together with the pattern-or-practice evidence compels a finding that Williams established a prima facie case that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. See, e.g., Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 347 (“Our concerns . . . are heightened by the fact that, when presented with this [pattern-or-practice] evidence, the state trial court somehow reasoned that there was not even the inference of discrimination to support a prima facie case. This was clear error . . . .”).4 dence, distinguishing them qualitatively, but not functionally. See, e.g., Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 331-35. In addition, the Court noted that the trial court that reheard Miller-El’s claim in light of Batson “admitted all the evidence presented at the Swain hearing and further evidence and testimony from the attorneys in the original trial,” id. at 329, and the Court later “conclude[d] . . . that the District Court did not give full consideration to the substantial evidence petitioner put forth in support of the prima facie case,” id. at 341 (emphasis added). 3 The fact that this pattern-or-practice evidence did not become available until after Williams’ trial does not make it less probative of the prosecutor’s discriminatory intent. The Batson inquiry is whether there was racial discrimination in the selection of Williams’ jury. This question, like so many other claims of error that federal courts consider on habeas, concerns whether error occurred, not when evidence of the error became available. The panel opinion cited no case and offered no rationale to support a conclusion that the timing of discovery of relevant evidence should matter in proving a Batson claim. A pattern or practice of discrimination in jury selection is no less pernicious — and evidence of that pattern or practice is no less probative to the issue of prosecutorial intent — whether the pattern or practice was known at the time of the trial, or discovered subsequently. 4 On remand, the Fifth Circuit denied Miller-El’s Batson claim on the merits. Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004). Miller-El again sought certiorari on the ground that the Fifth Circuit had ignored the Supreme Court’s explicit guidance regarding the proper analytical frameWILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1327 C. The Requirement of Additional “Statistical” Evidence The panel opinion discounted the evidence Williams presented because he failed to allege certain additional details concerning the prosecutor’s use of challenges and the venire composition. In doing so, the opinion strayed on two counts: 1) Williams did allege some of the facts that the panel faulted him for failing to provide; and 2) there is no case, and the opinion cited none, that supports any conclusion that such additional allegations are mandatory. Indeed, a finding that Williams failed to make a prima facie showing predicated upon his failure to allege certain details regarding the composition of the jury venire directly conflicts with both the substance and the spirit of Batson. In explaining its refusal to grant a COA on the Batson claim, the panel stated: “Although a pattern of strikes against African-Americans provides support for an inference of discrimination, Williams must point to more facts than the number of African-Americans struck to establish such a pattern. . . . Statistical facts like a high proportion of AfricanAmericans struck and a disproportionate rate of strikes against African-Americans can establish a pattern of exclusion on the basis of race that gives rise to a prima facie Batson violation.” Williams I, 384 F.3d at 584 (internal citation omitted). The panel went on to assert, incorrectly, that Williams did not provide such “statistical facts.” Id. This characterization substantially misrepresents Williams’ claim, for Williams has repeatedly alleged, and the record shows, that the prosecutor struck 100% (3 out of 3) of the African-Americans questioned work for evaluating the merits of his Batson claim. Specifically, Miller-El claimed the lower court erred in disregarding, inter alia, evidence that one of the prosecutors in Miller-El’s case had been found to have discriminated on the basis of race in another capital murder case. The Supreme Court voted to grant Miller-El’s petition for certiorari. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2908, 72 USLW 3761, 72 USLW 3768 (U.S. Jun. 28, 2004) (NO. 03-9659). 1328 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD by the parties, and exercised 3 out of 22 (14%) of his peremptory challenges against African-Americans. Nevertheless, the panel faulted Williams for failing to allege additional facts, such as “how many African-Americans were in the venire, and how large the venire was.” Id. The panel opined that without such additional facts, “it is impossible to say whether any statistical disparity existed that might support an inference of discrimination.” Id. Although Williams did not provide these particular bits of information about the venire, the provision of such information is neither mandatory nor particularly informative.5 While statistical analysis is a way to create the necessary inference of discrimination, it is not the only way. As noted above, we have often reiterated that “[t]o establish a prima facie case, [the defendant does] not need to show that the prosecution had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory strikes against more than one prospective juror. We have held that the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Omoruyi, 7 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that evidence of a pattern of discrimination is not necessary where other evidence reveals discriminatory motive in challenging jurors exists). If evidence of a pattern of discrimination is not a prerequisite for a prima facie Batson case, surely statisticalpattern evidence is not a prerequisite either. Imposition of specific evidentiary requirements for a Batson prima facie showing directly conflicts with the Third Circuit’s holding in Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 USLW 3266 (U.S. Nov. 01, 2004) (NO. 04-101). Rejecting Pennsylvania’s imposition of comparable evidentiary requirements, the Third Circuit explained: 5 This evidentiary demand is also ill-advised in light of the fact that the district court denied Williams’ timely discovery request after it had already granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1329 Notably absent from the Batson discussion of the prima facie case is any call for trial judges to seek the type of statistical accounting required by [Pennsylvania’s evidentiary] rule nor do we see how such an accounting fits within Batson’s first step. A trial judge undoubtedly might find in a given case that a full accounting regarding the race of the venire and the jurors struck would be helpful at the third stage of the Batson analysis, after it has heard the prosecutor’s explanation for the strikes and must determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. But requiring the presentation of such a record simply to move past the first stage in the Batson analysis places an undue burden upon the defendant. Holloway, 355 F.3d at 728 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Hughes, 880 F.2d 101, 102 (8th Cir. 1989) (“we have never held that the Supreme Court contemplated the use of a purely numerical formula” in determining the existence of a Batson prima facie case); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987) (prima facie case established “even though we are here concerned with only a single juror”). In sum, this case should have been reviewed as Batson and Swain require: the correct prima facie standard should have been applied; all of the relevant evidence should have been considered, including the pattern-or-practice evidence relating to this prosecutor; and Williams should not have been penalized for a lack of certain nonmandatory details in his proof, particularly since he was refused discovery. D. The Standard for Granting a COA Because Williams made a strong prima facie showing of his Batson claim, we should have granted a COA. 1330 WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD [A] prisoner seeking a COA need only demonstrate ‘a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.’ A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 327 (citations omitted); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000); Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002). Even if Williams’ prima facie showing were no more than debatable, the court was obligated to grant a COA. “[W]here a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 338 (citation omitted). Here, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent on Williams’ Batson claim after erroneously concluding that “Petitioner has failed to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination.” Williams v. Calderon, 48 F. Supp. 2d 979, 997-98 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (Williams II). The district court reached this conclusion after denying Williams’ discovery request, refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing, making factual errors (that the panel opinion adopts), and erroneously placing the burden on Williams to prove that the prosecution did not have race-neutral reasons for its challenges. Id. The district court’s denial of the Batson claim was wrong, and the panel’s denial of a COA sends a man to his death without adequate review of his substantial constitutional claims. WILLIAMS v. WOODFORD 1331