Opinion ID: 392240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hiring Requirements.

Text: 42 We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that we should alter the judgment entered by the district court and dissolve the racial hiring standards imposed. We note that the relief to be afforded when intentional racial discrimination is proved is within the trial court's discretion. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g); 9 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972). There is no indication that the district court misapprehended the applicable principles of law in its fashioning of relief. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-416, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2370-2371, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). 43 The district court found that a broad-ranging pattern and practice of racial discrimination existed in the Arkansas National Guard that was long-standing and pervasive. This finding is amply supported by the record. Statistical evidence is particularly revealing. There were no black members of the National Guard until 1965; the first black employee of the Guard was not hired until 1971. Although blacks now constitute twenty-three percent of the Guard membership, they only hold two percent of its full-time jobs. All of the decisionmakers in the Guard in Eastern Arkansas are white, with the exception of Lieutenant Nathaniel McGee, a Guard member since 1971. There are more than ninety Administrative Supply Technicians who are in charge of the armories; only one of the ASTs is black. The paucity of black personnel is not surprising in light of the procedure used to fill positions. When job openings are announced, a screening board composed of three persons is impaneled to consider applicants. During the entire history of the Arkansas National Guard, only one black has been a member of the screening panel. 44 The district court further found that although some improvement had been made from the dismal racial atmosphere existing at the time of Corenna Taylor's constructive discharge, the racial atmosphere in the Arkansas National Guard is still far below that civilized and decent respect for coworkers that both the state and its citizens are entitled to. This finding, too, is amply supported by the record. 45 Under these circumstances, it was clearly within the district court's discretion to conclude that more was required than to simply reinstate Taylor into a work atmosphere only somewhat improved from the appalling conditions that obtained in 1974. As the Supreme Court has noted, Where racial discrimination is concerned, 'the (district) court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, supra, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372 (citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154, 85 S.Ct. 817, 822, 13 L.Ed.2d 709 (1965)). In cases in which a discriminatory atmosphere has been shown, the more common forms of relief, such as reinstatement and back pay, may not be appropriate or adequate, and the district court should fashion injunctive relief to alleviate the unlawful practice before it. See Bundy v. Jackson, supra, 641 F.2d at 946-948. The court has done so here: witnesses for both the plaintiff and the defendant testified that as the number of blacks employed by the Guard has increased, the degree of racism present in the work environment has decreased. 46 We have previously recognized the district courts' power to order affirmative action programs requiring that preferential treatment be afforded to minority persons. EEOC v. Contour Chair Lounge Co., 596 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979); Firefighters Institute v. City of St. Louis, 588 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 904, 99 S.Ct. 3096, 61 L.Ed.2d 872 (1979); Carter v. Gallagher, supra, 452 F.2d at 331. There is no indication that significant improvement will be made in the work atmosphere to which Taylor must return absent the relief afforded. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. 47 The court's order, moreover, is carefully drawn to protect the defendant's rights. It does not impose any restraint on the defendant with respect to military appointments or positions. The defendant is not required to hire anyone as a federal technician who does not meet all of the qualifications for that position as established by federal statutes, regulations and manuals. 48 The decree is a moderate one, providing the Adjutant General maximum flexibility in fulfilling its terms. The district court, consistent with its reasoning, could have ordered the plaintiff to be reinstated into the specific office where she worked as a recruiter and commanded that the racial makeup of that office be altered. However, this would have constrained the Adjutant General much more than the present order does. The present order does not specify the geographical location or the type of positions that must be filled by blacks. Thus, the Adjutant General will not be hampered by the uneven geographical distribution of blacks in the state, or by the disparities in skills required by the Guard positions. Moreover, it is not realistic to assume that an equitable racial balance in one office will significantly affect the discriminatory animus which the court found to permeate the Arkansas National Guard. Importantly, the court's opinion provided that: If a specific job opening occurs for which, after diligent affirmative effort, no qualified black person applies, defendant may apply to the Court for relief, which will be granted if a sufficiently persuasive showing can be made. 49 The defendant argues that the court has erroneously granted class-action relief in a suit that proceeded as an individual action. This argument is without merit. The district court, having found a violation of section 1981 ordered the affirmative equitable relief it considered appropriate. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d at 328-329. The relief awarded cannot be considered peculiarly class-action relief. The district court's order does not provide for the reinstatement of or back pay awards to any employee other than Corenna Taylor. Its sole design is to ensure the relief to which Taylor is entitled reinstatement into a work place that is not infected with virulent racism. It is a remedy carefully tailored to fit the circumstances. 50 The cases cited by the defendant are inapposite. In both Danner v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 447 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1971), and Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1976), vacated, 431 U.S. 952, 97 S.Ct. 2671, 53 L.Ed.2d 268 (1977), the Court modified the lower court's orders mandating revision of the defendants' seniority plans. The plaintiffs in Danner and Nance had initiated individual suits alleging that they had suffered adverse consequences from their employers' discriminatory seniority systems. The Appeals Courts held that the plaintiffs' relief should have been limited to adjustment of their own seniority rights because complete relief could be accomplished merely by modifying those parties' seniority; the seniority of the other women in the plants, even if discriminatorily calculated, would not affect the plaintiffs. By contrast, the district court in the instant case concluded that complete relief could not be afforded by simply returning Corenna Taylor to the work environment that forced her resignation in the first place. We agree with that conclusion. 51