Opinion ID: 2424301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Legislature Authorize or Approve Expressly Collective Bargaining?

Text: We reviewed the many powers delegated to the MdTA throughout the Maryland Code. Undoubtedly, the General Assembly bestowed upon the MdTA not only a wide array of powers, but also a great measure of self-governance and autonomy. As such, we may conclude safelyin the same vein as the Court of Special Appealsthat the MdTA is a special agency, entrusted with a unique set of powers and tools to carry out those powers. Nonetheless, we do not agree that the grant of these powers satisfies the requirement that the Legislature authorize expressly the formation of collective bargaining agreements. The MdTA possesses only those powers provided for in the statutes (notwithstanding a reference to incidental powers [8] ) and only those tools necessary to execute the powers. See Transp., § 4-205 (The [MdTA] may do anything else necessary or convenient to carry out the powers [ already ] granted in this title. (emphasis added)). The power to bargain collectively was not among them in 2006. We explain. In 1982, we rephrased a well-established rule: [A]bsent express legislative authority, a government agency cannot enter into binding arbitration or binding collective bargaining agreements establishing wages, hours, pension rights, or working conditions for public employees. Mass Transit Admin., 295 Md. at 97, 453 A.2d at 1195 (citations omitted). We traced the original iteration of this rule to Maryland Classified Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Anderson, 281 Md. 496, 508-09, 380 A.2d 1032, 1039 (1977), which explained that: The validity of collective bargaining agreements in which municipalities bind themselves to exercise their discretionary legislative powers over compensation of public employees in a particular manner, or agree to delegate such powers to binding arbitration, has been the subject of much recent litigation. Where municipal governments have been authorized by higher law, i.e., state constitutional provisions or public general laws or municipal charter provisions, to enter into collective bargaining agreements which bind them in the exercise of their legislative discretion, the courts have generally upheld such collective bargaining agreements, rejecting contentions that they amount to invalid abdications or delegations of legislative authority. On the other hand, in the situation where neither a public general law nor municipal charter provision authorized the municipality to bind itself in the exercise of legislative discretion over public employee compensation, the courts have generally taken the position that attempts to do so in collective bargaining agreements or municipal ordinances are invalid. This exposition of the law, we held, was consistent with precedent dating to 1945. Anderson, 281 Md. at 509, 380 A.2d at 1039-40 (citing Mugford v. City of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 270, 44 A.2d 745, 746-47 (1945)), in which we stated that (the Department of Public Works could not bind the City, by contract, in any particular relative to hours, wages or working conditions, either as to union employees, or as to all employees in the same classification. To the extent that these matters are covered by the provisions of the City Charter, creating a budgetary system and a civil service, those provisions of law are controlling. To the extent that they are left to the discretion of any City department or agency, the City authorities cannot delegate or abdicate their continuing discretion). In 1999, the General Assembly enacted a statutory regime to govern collective bargaining at the State level. See Chapter 298 of the Laws of 1999. In this statutory scheme, the Legislature granted expressly the right to bargain collectively to a limited universe of employees, while restricting expressly such right to other types of employees. MdTA employees were not among either group. In choosing the fortunate few, the Legislature provided a caveat. S.P.P., § 3-102(b)(8) provides that [t]his title does not apply to ... an employee who is entitled to participate in collective bargaining under another law.... Therefore, the Legislature left open the possibility that another law may authorize collective bargaining that is, the Legislature indicated that another statutory provision may arise to grant and govern the collective bargaining process between State entities and employees. Although the Court of Special Appeals makes no reference to this statutory exception, its opinion expresses the same ideathat other parts of the Maryland Code, pertaining to the MdTA, authorize expressly the MdTA and its employees to bargain collectively. See Brief of Petitioners at 36 (The Court of Special Appeals erroneously reversed the circuit court ... because, the opinion states, the Authority had sufficient budgetary autonomy to enter into discretionary agreements with its own employees and be bound by them, regardless of the collective bargaining statutes.). Indeed, the intermediate appellate court concluded that the MdTA enjoyed an array of delegated powers so expansive that, it stands to reason, the right to bargain collectively is included in them implicitly. The sum of these individual grants of power, our appellate brethren went so far as to suggest, imbue the MdTA with plenary power, such that the agency operates in an autonomous, parallel governmental universe. See Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 207, 5 A.3d at 1222 ([B]y virtue of its plenary authority over its own budget, [the MdTA] occupies the same position as the Governor and General Assembly....). [9] As a result of this level of self-governance, the Court of Special Appeals determined that the MdTA was able to enter into a binding agreement with the FOP, irrespective seemingly of any other statutory strictures or procedures. Md. Trans. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 208, 5 A.3d at 1223. We disagree with our appellate brethren that the Legislature authorized expressly the MdTA to bargain collectively. Without debate, the General Assembly delegated to the MdTA a range of powers, including the authority to make any contracts and agreements necessary or incidental to the exercise of its power and performance of its duties, Transp., § 4-205(c), as well as to fix the compensation of ... any other agents and employees that it considers necessary to exercise its powers and perform its duties. Transp., § 4-205(d). The General Assembly did not authorize expressly and separately, however, the MdTA to bargain away [that] statutory discretion. McCulloch, 347 Md. at 276, 701 A.2d at 100 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In these particular circumstances, the Legislature may not satisfy the requirement of express legislative authori[zation] implicitly, i.e., through broad grants of tangentially-related powers. Indeed, when we referred to such express authorization in the past, we described specific legal provisions that not only granted the power to bargain collectively, but also set forth a detailed framework by which such bargaining is to be conducted. We were not commenting on a broad swath of legislative delegations that, when taken collectively, may authorize arguably a certain agency action. See e.g., Anderson, 281 Md. at 507, 380 A.2d at 1038 (discussing the implications of a Harford County ordinance which authorized County employees... to participate effectively in the determination of the terms and conditions of their employment and set forth bargaining procedures); Mass Transit Admin., 295 Md. at 98, 453 A.2d at 1196 (holding that a legislative provision which permitted the Mass Transit Administration to bargain collectively with accredited representatives of the employees who form part of any operating company, using particular procedures, did not include the union and, consequently, the two could not bargain collectively); Montgomery County Educ. Ass'n, 311 Md. at 305, 534 A.2d at 981 (interpreting a provision of the Education Article which empowers a public school employer and its employees ... to meet and negotiate, in accordance with certain procedures, a collective bargaining agreement) (internal quotation marks omitted); Anne Arundel County v. Fraternal Order of Anne Arundel Det. Officers and Pers., 313 Md. 98, 543 A.2d 841 (1988) (analyzing a county ordinance which authorizes the County to bargain collectively pursuant to pre-set procedures); Freeman v. Local 1802, AFSCME Council 67, 318 Md. 684, 569 A.2d 1244 (1990) (same); Fraternal Order of Police, Inc., Baltimore County, Lodge No. 4 v. Baltimore County, 340 Md. 157, 665 A.2d 1029 (1995) (same). We expect to see such an unequivocal authorization of the right to bargain collectively, as well as a promulgation of practical bargaining requirements related thereto, given that collective bargaining involves (1) delegating powers previously-entrusted to the agency, and (2) the careful balancing of important considerations, such as (a) the right of employees to take part (or not) in an employee organization, S.P.P., § 3-301(a)(1); (b) the right of employees to be fairly represented by an exclusive representative, S.P.P., § 3-301(a)(2); and (c) the right of the State to carry out its mission efficiently and effectively, S.P.P, § 3-302(1)(ii), to name a few. The initial decision to permit an agency to bargain away legislatively-given powers as well as the decision respecting how such a relinquishment may take placeinvolves material policy choices that belong to a legislature, not a government agency. As such, our rule forbidding agencies from bargaining collectively preemptivelythat is, from abdicat[ing] or bargain[ing] away... statutory discretion without express authorizationremains sound. [10] The fact that the General Assembly invested the MdTA with powers to render the agency somewhat independent does not alter our conclusion. No amount of statutory powers could set adrift the MdTA in its own governmental sea where it exists self-contained (i.e., as both governor and legislature) and immune from most statutes and legal principles governing virtually all other State agencies and units. The legislative delegation of important powers does not change the fact that in 2006 there was no express legislative authority to bargain collectively. In Title 3 of the S.P.P Article, the Legislature granted and denied, expressly, certain groups the right to bargain collectively. At the relevant time in this case, the Legislature did not include the MdTA or its employees in either group. Neither did the Legislature grant the MdTA, in any other statutory provision, the authority to bargain collectively. In these circumstances, we decline to view the broad grants of authority as an equivalent of, or a substitute for, an express legislative directive in this regard. [11]