Opinion ID: 785549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Threat of Death During the Carjacking

Text: 28 The most difficult question posed by Cline's appeal involves the propriety of an enhancement for making a threat of death during the carjacking, under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Section 2B3.1 of the Guidelines allow enhancement if a threat of death was made during a robbery. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Cline contends that any threats were made after the taking of the vehicle had been accomplished. Appellant's Br. at 9. 29 As the district court correctly observed, a vote to convict necessarily implies that the jury believed Marcum's description of the events leading up to the apprehension of Cline by the police. Marcum's testimony was that she regained consciousness upon arrival at DeLong's trailer, [a]nd we went in the house, and no one was there. J.A. at 177. Asked what happened next, Marcum responded: 30 [Cline] punched me and knocked me over the kitchen table. And I got back up, and he punched me again. That's when he chipped my right front tooth. And then he told me that I had seen too much and [his] exact words were, I've already killed Luther. You've seen too much. Now you are going to die, bitch. 31 Id. From this, it is clear that the threat of death in question 3 occurred after Cline and Marcum returned to DeLong's trailer and exited the purloined vehicle. Enhancement for this threat under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) would require a finding that it was made during the robbery/carjacking, i.e. that the act of carjacking did not terminate when Cline and Marcum left the vehicle. 32 Determining the duration of a carjacking has proved a thorny task for the federal courts. In United States v. Vazquez-Rivera, 135 F.3d 172, 178 (1st Cir.1998), the First Circuit acknowledged the the not insubstantial problem of delineating the precise temporal limits of the crime of carjacking. And while that court opined that it need not provide a comprehensive answer to this problem, it proceeded to uphold an enhancement for serious bodily injury where the defendant used a firearm first to obtain possession of the victim's car, and then to intimidate her immediately prior to raping her. Id. Although the rape occurred outside of the vehicle, the court held that the injuries covered are not limited to those resulting from the `taking' of a vehicle, but also include those caused by the carjacker at any point during his or her retention of the vehicle. Id. (citing United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134, 1137 (3rd Cir.1997) (holding that a woman raped during a carjacking was a victim of the carjacking for sentencing purposes; court may look at all the conduct underlying the offense of the conviction)). 33 In Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 30 n. 9 (1st. Cir.2002), the First Circuit reaffirmed, without hesitation, that the commission of a carjacking continues at least while the carjacker maintains control over the victim and her car. The court concluded that rape of the victim resulted from the carjacking, because the rape, like the earlier brandishing of the gun, provided the intimidation by which the carjackers extended their control of the victim and the automobile. Id. at 30. 34 The First Circuit's decision to consider for purposes of sentencing all acts occurring during a defendant's control of the seized vehicle represents an effort to effectuate legislative intent 4 and accords with that circuit's interpretation of sentencing enhancement regimes generally. Vazquez-Rivera, 135 F.3d at 178. Courts have arrived at similar conclusions in measuring the duration of carjacking for purposes of mens rea. See United States v. Lebron-Cepeda, 324 F.3d 52, 62 (1st Cir.2003)(Howard, J., concurring); United States v. Jones, 2003 WL 21362798, 2003 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9933 (E.D.Pa.2003) (adopting reasoning of Howard, J., on the issue of the length or definition of taking when there's an extended carjacking involving the continued presence of the victim.) 35 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has reasoned that a carjacking continues until the victim is permanently separated from her car. United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 844 n. 5 (9th Cir.1996). The District Court of Puerto Rico has upheld an enhancement for serious bodily injury where a rape took place in an apartment, but the defendant was still in full control of the carjacked vehicle, as he retained the keys to the car, had a victim in its trunk, and the owner under his command. United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 239 F.Supp.2d 148, 150 (D.P.R.2002). 36 In accord with this well-supported approach, we do not find that the district court erred in applying the enhancement for Cline's threat of death. At the time of the threat, Cline had control over the victim of the carjacking, and had left for dead the owner of the vehicle. Although Marcum did not testify as to whether Cline retained the keys to the car, the district court was justified in finding that he had not permanently separated her from the vehicle. As with prior efforts to address this issue, we need not draw a precise line demarcating the termination of any and all carjackings. It will suffice to hold that the carjacking persisted at least until further dissipation of the indicia of Cline's control over the vehicle. We will not reach a different result merely because the arrival of police denied Cline the opportunity to flee in the stolen car (as in Vazquez-Rivera ) or to return it to the victim (as in Gonzalez-Mercado ).