Opinion ID: 3066150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second degree kidnapping

Text: Under Nevada law: A person who willfully and without authority of law seizes, inveigles, takes, carries away or kidnaps another person with the intent to keep the person secretly imprisoned within the State, or for the purpose of conveying the person out of the State without authority of 16 UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER law, or in any manner held to service or detained against the person’s will, is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.310(2). We have not previously had the opportunity to consider whether second degree kidnapping under Nevada law is a violent felony. But, in United States v. Williams, 110 F.3d 50 (9th Cir. 1997), we determined that second degree kidnapping under Oregon law, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 163.225(1)(a), is a crime of violence as the term is defined in § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 51–53. And in United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1988), we observed that kidnapping as defined by the Model Penal Code “entails a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the victim, making the offense a ‘violent felony’ under subsection (ii).” Id. at 1009 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Although neither of these cases involved statutes exactly like Nevada’s, we keep these persuasive authorities in mind as we review Chandler’s second degree kidnapping conviction. Once again, we apply the framework that we established in Park, 649 F.3d 1175.
Chandler argues that second degree kidnapping as defined by Nevada law can occur in ways that are both violent and nonviolent, particularly because “inveigling” does not require force or restraint. See Bridges v. State, 6 P.3d 1000, 1009 (Nev. 2000); Black’s Law Dictionary 843 (8th Ed. 2004) (inveigle means “to lure or entice through deceit or insincerity”). Accordingly, he contends that we must use the UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER 17 modified categorical approach to determine whether his conviction involved violent conduct. We disagree. We have determined that kidnapping presents a risk of serious force, even where the kidnapping statute at issue has no force requirement. See Delgado-Hernandez v. Holder, 697 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012) (considering whether attempted kidnapping is an aggravated felony). In DelgadoHernandez, we referenced the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), which punishes anyone who “‘unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person.’” Id. at 1130 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)). We adopted the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in explaining that: [T]he essence of kidnapping is requiring another to do something against his or her will; and because physical force or restraint is usually the best way to overbear the will of another, physical force or threat of force is a latent, but more often actual, companion of the coercive element. That deception may be used to effect the kidnapping does not erase the ever-present possibility that the victim may figure out what’s really going on and decide to resist, in turn requiring the perpetrator to resort to actual physical restraint if he is to carry out the criminal plan. Id. at 1130–31 (quoting United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 324 (6th Cir. 1994)). Additionally, we observed in Delgado-Hernandez that “the Supreme Court has seen fit to assume, admittedly without deciding, that [kidnapping] 18 UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER constitutes a crime that presents a substantial risk of force.” Delgado-Hernandez, 697 F.3d at 1130 (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280 (1999)). And while the Supreme Court’s statement in this regard was dictum, it is nevertheless highly persuasive. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Supreme Court dicta have a weight that is greater than ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what the Court might hold; accordingly, we do not blandly shrug them off because they were not a holding.”).8 Of particular importance here, Nevada’s second degree kidnapping statute is very similar to the federal kidnapping statute that we reviewed in Delgado-Hernandez. Compare Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.310(2) (a person is guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully “seizes, inveigles, takes, carries away, or kidnaps” another person), with 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (a person commits kidnapping if he unlawfully “seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away” another person). Kidnapping could potentially be committed in both jurisdictions without the use of force. Because of the similarities between the Nevada second degree kidnapping statute and the federal kidnapping statute, our reasoning in Delgado-Hernandez is highly persuasive here. 8 In Delgado-Hernandez we also noted that “legislative bodies, including Congress, have consistently treated kidnapping as a crime of violence.” Delgado-Hernandez, 697 F.3d at 1131–33. After surveying the evidence, we concluded: “In sum, numerous courts have held that kidnapping generally presents a risk of substantial force. Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and forty jurisdictions have concluded, consistent with historical practice, that kidnapping is a violent crime.” Id. at 1133. UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER 19 Thus, even though force is not required, second degree kidnapping as defined by Nevada law still presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.9 See also United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1009 (“kidnapping entails a ‘serious potential risk of physical injury’ to the victim”); Kaplansky, 42 F.3d at 324 (“kidnapping is the ‘type’ of offense where the risk of physical injury to the victim is invariably present”). 2. Risk of injury roughly similar to the enumerated offenses in the ACCA The only question remaining, then, is whether second degree kidnapping under Nevada law is a crime that is “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives. Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. Like conspiracy to commit robbery, second degree kidnapping is similar to the enumerated crime of burglary. As we discussed above, “[b]urglary is dangerous because it can end in confrontation leading to violence.” Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2273. By comparison, kidnapping is riskier than burglary because “a face-to-face confrontation,” James, 550 U.S. at 203, with the victim is very likely when a kidnapping occurs. Accordingly, the second prong of the 9 If anything, it would seem that Nevada second degree kidnapping categorically presents a greater risk of force than the federal kidnapping statute. Compare Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 200.310(2) (requiring that the action be done “with the intent to keep the person secretly imprisoned within the State,” “for the purpose of conveying the person out of the State without authority of law,” or “ in any manner held to service or detained against the person’s will”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (lacking the heightened mens rea requirements of the Nevada statute). 20 UNITED STATES V. CHANDLER Park framework is satisfied. See, e.g., Delgado-Hernandez, 697 F.3d at 1128–30 (describing the substantial risks kidnapping poses); Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1009 (reasoning that kidnapping, as defined in the Model Penal Code, is a violent felony). 3. Conclusion We conclude that second degree kidnapping in Nevada categorically involves a serious risk that physical force may be used in the course of committing the offense and that this risk is roughly similar to the risk involved in burglary. Accordingly, we hold that second degree kidnapping under Nevada law is categorically a “violent felony” under the residual clause of the ACCA.