Opinion ID: 844218
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admission of Martha Godinez's Preliminary Hearing Testimony

Text: Over defendant's objections, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of Martha Godinez. After a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ruled that Godinez was unavailable as a witness because she could not be found, and that the prosecution had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate her. Defendant contends the trial court erred by finding the prosecution's efforts to find Godinez were adequate. The trial court did not err. (15) `The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.) That right is not absolute, however. An exception exists when a witness is unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding against the same defendant, has given testimony that was subject to cross-examination. Under federal constitutional law, such testimony is admissible if the prosecution shows it made a good-faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness at trial.' [Citations.] (16) `In California, the exception to the confrontation right for prior recorded testimony is codified in [Evidence Code] section 1291, subdivision (a), which provides: Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. A witness is unavailable if [a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court's process. ([Evid. Code,] § 240, subd. (a)(5).) Although section 240 refers to reasonable diligence, this court has often described the evaluation as one involving due diligence.' [Citation.] ( People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 848-849 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879].) We have said that the term `due diligence' is `incapable of a mechanical definition,' but it `connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, efforts of a substantial character.' [Citations.] Relevant considerations include `whether the search was timely begun' [citation], the importance of the witness's testimony [citation], and whether leads were competently explored [citation]. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 904 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243].) When, as here, the facts are undisputed, a reviewing court decides the question of due diligence independently, not deferentially. [Citation.] ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 610 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302] ( Smith ).) Detective Verdugo, a sergeant in the homicide division of the sheriff's department who had served as a deputy sheriff for more than 31 years, testified that he was assigned the task of attempting to locate and serve a subpoena upon Godinez in order to obtain her testimony at trial. He began looking for Godinez approximately two weeks before the date set for the start of the trial, first checking her two last known addressesthe motel where she had been residing at the time of the preliminary hearing, and her brother's house. Detective Verdugo found that Godinez had checked out of the motel, and her brother's house was vacant. One neighbor at the brother's house believed that Godinez had gone to Mexico, and another neighbor had not seen her in quite awhile. Detective Verdugo checked the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, but found only an address that appeared to predate the last known addresses he had already checked. He nonetheless went to that address, but did not find Godinez there. Detective Verdugo had no knowledge of Godinez's ever having been employed. He checked the hospital and jail records in Los Angeles County on a pretty regular basis to determine whether Godinez or her brother had been admitted into either system. He also gave the patrol deputies in the Century Station a photograph and physical description of Godinez, and directed the deputies to contact him if she was spotted, and to take her into custody if that was necessary to ensure that she would appear in court. Based on this testimony, we conclude the trial court properly ruled that the prosecution had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate Godinez. First, the reasonableness of the activities is supported by the circumstance that her testimony was not of critical importance in the trial. She testified at the preliminary hearing that on the night of the shooting she was seated inside her car, which was in the parking lot near the park at the end of Walnut Avenue, when she heard gunshots. She then saw defendant and several other people run from Walnut Avenue into the park, thereby placing defendant near the scene of the shooting. Other prosecution witnesses and evidence, including defendant's own jailhouse conversation with his family members, provided much stronger support for the jury finding that defendant was the person who shot Deputy Blair. [16] (17) Second, Detective Verdugo began the search a reasonable period of time before the trial was to commence. Defendant urges that the prosecution should have kept tabs on Godinez between the preliminary hearing and the trial because she testified that she had been fearful of testifying, and, therefore, the prosecution should have known she might choose to flee or hide rather than testify. We disagree. Although Godinez testified that she had been fearful, she did testify at the preliminary hearing, and, moreover, she testified that she had moved (with the assistance of the sheriff's department) since the shooting, which presumably was for her protection. Moreover, we rejected a claim similar to defendant's in People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 564 [244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]: [W]e could not properly impose upon the People an obligation to keep `periodic tabs' on every material witness in a criminal case, for the administrative burdens of doing so would be prohibitive. Moreover, it is unclear what effective and reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who plans to leave the state, or simply `disappear,' long before a trial date is set. (See also People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 630 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 729, 232 P.3d 710] ( Herrera ).) In Hovey we also distinguished the decision upon which defendant relies, People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969 [232 Cal.Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180], because the witness at issue in Hovey, like Godinez in the present case and unlike the witness in Louis, could not be deemed a `critical' or `vital' witness. ( Hovey, at p. 564.) Finally, Detective Verdugo competently pursued the leads he had concerning Godinez's whereabouts. He checked two possible addresses of which he initially was aware, and a third address he learned from Department of Motor Vehicle records. He periodically checked county hospital and jail records to determine whether she had been placed into either system. He attempted to locate her brother. He interviewed neighbors at the brother's house and learned that Godinez might have gone to Mexico, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Detective Verdugo should have suspected she might have gone somewhere else. (See Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 611 [the prosecution may reasonably rely upon hearsay in deciding what steps should be taken to locate a witness, and need not attempt a `futile act,' such as trying to compel an unwilling witness outside the court's jurisdiction to return to testify].) Because Detective Verdugo had no information concerning Godinez's employment history, he had no lead to follow in that area. In sum, the prosecution exercised reasonable diligence under the circumstances in attempting to locate Godinez. (See Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 623.) Even if, as defendant asserts, the prosecution could have contacted the law enforcement officers who assisted in moving Godinez before the preliminary hearing, attempted to find other people who knew her, or searched for her in Mexico, the circumstance that additional efforts might have been made or other lines of inquiry pursued does not affect this conclusion. [Citation.] It is enough that the People used reasonable efforts to locate the witness. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1298 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] ( Cummings ); Hardy v. Cross (2011) 565 U.S. ___, ___ [181 L.Ed.2d 468, 132 S.Ct. 490, 495] (per curiam) [when a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness' presence [citation], but the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.].) [17] Accordingly, the presentation at trial of Godinez's preliminary hearing testimony did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights. To the extent defendant separately contends the use of Godinez's preliminary hearing testimony was unduly prejudicial because the jury might have inferred that her absence at trial indicated that the fears of being harmed that she had expressed at the preliminary hearing had come to fruition, defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object or request an admonition that might have prevented such speculation by the jury. Moreover, there is nothing in the record demonstrating the jury drew such an inference from Godinez's absence, and we observe that the prosecutor in no way implied that Godinez had been harmed. In addition, we might surmise that because Renele Brooks and Sara Frausto, who also expressed fear of retaliation for testifying and yet provided much more damaging evidence, testified in person at the trial, it was even less likely the jury would have believed Godinez had been harmed to prevent her from testifying. Further, Godinez had testified at the preliminary hearing that the reason she feared she might be harmed was because she initially had lied to the police to provide an alibi for someone other than defendant, but she later told the police that that person was, in fact, not with her when the shooting started. She confirmed that her false statements to the police had nothing to do with defendant. Accordingly, we discern no reasonable probability that defendant could have been unduly prejudiced by the admission of Godinez's preliminary hearing testimony.