Opinion ID: 1593668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mosers' Motion to Amend.

Text: The final question we must answer is whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Mosers' motion to amend to assert the counterclaim nearly seven months after their original answer was filed. We conclude the denial of the motion constituted an abuse of discretion. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 88 provides: A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is required and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within twenty days after it is served. Otherwise, a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave to amend, including leave to amend to conform to the proof, shall be freely given when justice so requires. (Emphasis added). We review on abuse of discretion, but we are ever mindful of the last sentence of the rule and have frequently said that allowance of amendments should be the rule and denial the exception. Chao v. City of Waterloo, 346 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Iowa 1984); Johnston v. Percy Construction, Inc., 258 N.W.2d 366, 370-71 (Iowa 1977). Our real inquiry in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to amend is whether the ruling lacks a solid legal basis. Id. at 371. Here, it is apparent from the trial court's written ruling that it denied permission to amend primarily because it believed the five-year statute of limitations barred the proposed counterclaim. Thus did the district court write: If the amendment is permitted, the amendment may relate back to the date of the original pleading which in this case would be within the five year period required by the statute of limitations [Iowa R.Civ.P. 89]. The statutes outlaw the cause of action. Therefore, the difficult question before this court is whether to now permit Mosers' leave to amend and thereby use the rule to circumvent the statute of limitations as established by the legislature. Of course, our determination that the Mosers' claim was not time barred eliminates the concern that the statute of limitations would be circumvented. The district court was also troubled, as are we, by the Mosers' seven-month delay in asserting their counterclaim after initially filing their answer, but the record does not support the district court's finding that Mosers were negligent in that regard. Nothing in the record suggests that the case had been made ready for trial or that trial had even been scheduled when the motion to amend was filed. On balance, we conclude that the district court's denial of Mosers' motion to amend was without a sound legal basis and must be reversed. We remand this case to the district court with directions that it enter an order granting the Mosers' motion for leave to amend, and for other proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.