Opinion ID: 2010647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A Test for the District of Columbia

Text: Procedural labels such as prima facie or summary judgment may prove misleading, but the test we now adopt closely resembles the summary judgment standard articulated in Cahill. [10] When presented with a motion to quash (or to enforce) a subpoena which seeks the identity of an anonymous defendant, the court should: (1) ensure that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the elements of the defamation claim, (2) require reasonable efforts to notify the anonymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and the subpoena has been served, (3) delay further action for a reasonable time to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a motion to quash, (4) require the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the claim that is within its control, and (5) determine that the information sought is important to enable the plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit. We do not require a separate balancing test at the end of the analysis, nor do we require a showing that the plaintiff has exhausted alternative sources for learning the information. This brief summary of our test must be read in context of the discussion that follows. Before enforcing a subpoena seeking the identity of an anonymous user of the internet, the court must first determine whether the plaintiff has adequately pleaded each element of his claim. If the complaint cannot survive scrutiny for failure to state a claim, there is no justification for going further. This is only the first step, however. If the complaint is adequate, the court then must ensure that reasonable efforts are made to notify the defendant that the subpoena has been served. Many courts have required the plaintiff to provide this notice, usually by posting it in the same manner in which the allegedly defamatory statement was published. See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (requiring a plaintiff who alleges defamation has occurred over the internet to post on the message board where the offending comment was located a notice informing the anonymous defendant that the subpoena has been served); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 ([N]otification efforts should include posting a message of notification of the identity discovery request to the anonymous user on the ISP's pertinent message board.). Nevertheless, it often will be simpler and more effective to require the recipient of the subpoena (who likely knows the identity of the anonymous defendant, or at least knows how to contact him) to provide such notice. See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F.Supp.2d at 252 (AT & T sent a letter to the person whose internet account corresponded with the IP address at issue.); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 721 (the superior court did not err by ... plac[ing] the burden on [the e-mail service provider] to notify Doe of the pending proceedings); Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr.3d at 235 (Yahoo! notified the defendant that it would comply with the subpoena in 15 days unless he filed a motion to quash); Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 342 N.J.Super. 160, 775 A.2d 773, 775 (2001) (Yahoo! contacted defendant Jean Doe). We leave it to the trial court to determine in the circumstances of each case who should notify the anonymous defendant of the efforts to discover his identity. In this case, we are informed, SIIA notified Doe that the subpoena had been served. Once suitable efforts have been made to notify the defendant, the court should delay action to allow him a reasonable opportunity to file a motion to quash the subpoena. A court should not consider impacting a speaker's First Amendment rights without affording the speaker an opportunity to respond to the discovery request. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 719. In several cases, the anonymous defendant has actually appeared in the litigation through counsel. See, e.g., Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F.Supp.2d at 250-51 (Doe 21 moved to quash plaintiffs' subpoena); Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 716 (Doe appeared through e-mail service provider's counsel to contest the trial court's order allowing the plaintiff to conduct discovery); Krinsky, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at 234 (Doe 6 moved to quash the subpoena); In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.App.2007) (Doe 1 sought mandamus relief from order requiring the internet service provider to disclose his identity). The plaintiff next is required to proffer evidence to show that it has a viable claim of defamation. Whether this evidence is presented in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts, or courtroom testimony under oath, it must be sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to all the elements of the defamation claim within the plaintiff's control, see Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463in other words, all elements not dependent upon knowing the identity of the anonymous speaker. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720. (Because of unpredictable variations among cases, we leave the determination of which elements are within a particular plaintiff's control to the informed discretion of the trial judge.) Requiring the requesting party to satisfy this step furthers the goal of compelling identification of anonymous internet speakers only as a means to redress ... misuses of speech rather than as a means to retaliate against or chill legitimate uses of speech. Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720. An important part of this process is to set forth as precisely as possible the statements by the anonymous defendant that are alleged to be defamatory. In some cases, the court has refused to compel disclosure of the defendant's identity because the statements were not actionable. See, e.g., Highfields Capital Management, 385 F.Supp.2d at 979 (In context, [the statements] are clearly sardonic opinion or parody, not to be taken seriously by anyone.); Krinsky, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at 250 (the statements of which plaintiff complains are not actionable); Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 772 (Dendrite failed to establish a sufficient nexus between John Doe No. 3's statements and Dendrite's allegations of harm); Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 18 Misc.3d 185, 845 N.Y.S.2d 695, 700 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2007) (statements were not reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation). The court should also ensure that the information sought is important to the litigation. This portion of the test is easily satisfied when the anonymous speaker is the defendant and the litigation cannot proceed without serving him with process. Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F.Supp.2d at 255 ([C]learly the defendant's identity is central to Doe II's pursuit of her claims against him.). We do not, in these circumstances, require a showing that the plaintiff has exhausted alternative sources for learning the information. When the other elements of the test have been satisfied, we see little point in requiring the plaintiff to travel more circuitous trails in search of Doe's identity. [11] Finally, we agree with the concurring judges in Brodie that a separate balancing test at the end of the analysis is not necessary. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (no balancing test is required because [t]he summary judgment test is itself the balance). When there is a factual and legal basis for believing libel may have occurred, the writer's message will not be protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, a further balancing of interests should not be necessary to overcome the defendant's constitutional right to speak anonymously. Krinsky, 72 Cal.Rptr.3d at 245-46 (citations omitted). [12] SIIA protests that enforcement of subpoenas like this one will have a chilling effect on reporting of software piracy: Because few would-be Internet communicators seeking to report potential software piracy would risk the financial and other burdens of defending a lawsuit, that speech likely would disappear. This forecast includes hyperbole, no doubt, but the test we have adopted takes this concern into account. As the previous discussion should make clear, we do not take lightly a person's decision to speak anonymously. But that is not an absolute right, and SIIA's website alerted John Doe that SIIA might be required to disclose his identity. [13] We do not question the importance of combating software piracy, [14] but that is only one of the interests we must balance. [15]