Opinion ID: 1818626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Stare Decisis Mississippi Precedent.

Text: ¶ 36. The doctrine of stare decisis is not new to this Court, which in 1914 held that [a] former decision of this court should not be departed from, unless the rule therein announced is not only manifestly wrong, but mischievous. Forest Prod. & Mfg. Co. v. Buckley, 107 Miss. 897, 899, 66 So. 279 (1914). Almost eighty years later, this Court stated: In stare decisis generally, we look for error, but, finding that, we look for more and we look largely in the area of public or widespread disadvantage. Ordinarily, we do not overrule erroneous precedent unless it is pernicious, Stone v. Reichman-Crosby Co., 43 So.2d 184, 190 (Miss.1949); impractical, Robinson v. State, 434 So.2d 206, 210 (Miss.1983) (Hawkins, J., concurring); or is mischievous in its effect, and resulting in detriment to the public. Childress v. State, 188 Miss. 573, 577, 195 So. 583, 584 (1940). We look for evils attendant upon a continuation of the old rule. Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So.2d 454, 467 (Miss.1983). State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624, 635 (Miss.1991). ¶ 37. There is no shortage of cases in which this Court has followed the doctrine of stare decisis. For instance, as recently as 2003, this Court stated: State ex rel. Moore v. Molpus, 578 So.2d 624, 635 (Miss.1991), requires this Court to find that the law as it stands is pernicious, impractical, or mischievous in its effect and resulted in a detriment to the public in order to modify the law. [13] Smith v. State, 839 So.2d 489, 495 (Miss. 2003). See also Land Comm'r v. Hutton, 307 So.2d 415, 421 (Miss.1974) (Unless mischievous, resulting in detriment to the public, [precedent] will not be overruled although we are of the opinion that it was wrongfully decided); Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Med. Found., 276 So.2d 661, 671 (Miss.1973) (a decision of this Court is binding in its effect and unless mischievous resulting in detriment to the public, it will not be overruled although wrongly decided); Westmoreland v. State, 246 So.2d 487, 497 (Miss.1971) (This Court follows the doctrine of stare decisis and under this doctrine we follow our former decisions, unless such decisions are manifestly wrong and mischievous in their results); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nessossis, 189 Miss. 414, 423, 196 So. 766 (Miss.1940) ([I]t is the settled rule that prior decisions will not be overruled unless manifestly and undoubtedly wrong, and mischievous in operation and effect); Childress v. State, 188 Miss. 573, 577, 195 So. 583 (Miss.1940) (Unless mischievous in its effect, and resulting in detriment to the public, a case will not be overruled although wrongly decided). ¶ 38. Thus, our precedent applying stare decisis may be summed up as follows: Even though this Court's previous interpretation of a statute was (in the current Court's view) erroneous, we must continue to apply the incorrect interpretation unless we consider it pernicious, impractical, or mischievous in ... effect, and resulting in detriment to the public. Id. ¶ 39. Unfortunately, having stated what must be found to prevent application of stare decisis, this Court has offered no guidelines for finding or identifying these prerequisites (pernicious, impractical, mischievous, etc.). A justice on this Court might reasonably conclude that some of the definitions of mischievous [14] or pernicious [15] apply to all of this Court's prior opinions with which that justice disagrees. ¶ 40. Worse still is the fact that this Court has never handed down an opinion which reversed a prior statutory interpretation because it was found to be impractical or pernicious, and has rarely found a prior interpretation to be mischievous. [16] Since the pernicious/mischievous test has virtually never been met, one would think this Court has virtually never reversed a prior statutory interpretation. Not so. Without any finding of pernicious or mischievous, this Court has not hesitated to reverse numerous prior cases which wrongly interpreted a statutory provision. See e.g., Cash Distrib. Co. v. Neely, 947 So.2d 286 (Miss.2007) overruled previous statutory interpretation of ADEA in Columbus Paper & Chemical, Inc. v. Chamberlin, 687 So.2d 1143 (Miss.1996); C.L. Thornhill, et al. v. System Fuels, Inc., 523 So.2d 983, 1011 (Miss.1988) (Robertson, J., concurring) (The history of our law is strewn with the carcasses of cases long defended in the name of stare decisis ultimately reversed by the rule of reason.). Harper v. Harper, 491 So.2d 189, 202 (Miss.1986) (overruled Brickell v. Lightcap 115 Miss. 417, 76 So. 489 (1917) and progeny that espoused a different statutory interpretation). ¶ 41. Thus, the need for a clear, consistent rule is apparent. The bench and bar should not be left to guess when, and upon what basis, this Court might decide to reverse prior interpretations of statutes. Although we cannot agree with Justice Brandeis that it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right, we do think there comes a point when the Legislature may incorporate an incorrect interpretation of a statute. ¶ 42. While we do not agree that the Legislature's mere silence is enough, we do agree with the view offered by Justice Roberts in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 130-32, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940), that congressional re-enactment of a statute creates a presumption of legislative approval of the Court's prior interpretations of that statute. This threshold test for application of stare decisis has been followed in numerous cases. For instance, in Lorillard, Div. of Loew's Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978), Justice Marshall noted, Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change. ¶ 43. We agree with this reasoning, [17] and hold that  in cases where this Court concludes a statute was incorrectly interpreted in a previous case  we will nevertheless continue to apply the previous interpretation, pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis, upon finding the Legislature amended or reenacted the statute without correcting the prior interpretation. In our view, such action on the part of the Legislature amounts to incorporation of our previous interpretation into the reenacted or amended statute. The Legislature is, of course, free to preclude our incorrect interpretation by specific provision, failing which, we must conclude that the legislative silence amounts to acquiescence. Stated another way, the incorrect interpretation becomes a correct interpretation because of the Legislature's tacit adoption of the prior interpretation into the amended or reenacted statute. We must now determine whether the doctrine of stare decisis, as defined today, applies to this Court's previous interpretations of the MTCA.