Opinion ID: 2332514
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the strickland/hill test and standard of review

Text: [¶ 12] In Lang v. Murch, 438 A.2d 914, 915 (Me.1981), we enunciated a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In a subsequent case we described the test as involving: first, whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel amounting to performance measurably below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible attorney; and second, whether any such ineffective representation likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense. Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 656 (Me. 1985) (quoting Lang, 438 A.2d at 915). We later deleted the word measurably from the first prong of the Lang test, finding that the term measurably was without meaning in this context and served only to confuse courts applying the Lang standard. See State v. Brewer, 1997 ME 177, ¶¶ 6-7, 699 A.2d 1139, 1144. A few years after Lang, the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), articulated a similar two-part test that a petitioner must meet in order to obtain post-conviction relief. We noted that the Strickland and Lang tests are virtually identical. Kimball, 490 A.2d at 656. [¶ 13] In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), the Supreme Court applied Strickland to convictions resulting from a guilty plea as opposed to a trial. Hill reformulated Strickland 's second prong, the prejudice prong, to require a showing by the petitioner that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. In Laferriere v. State, 697 A.2d 1301 (Me.1997), we said that in order to demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner had to show a reasonable probability he would have insisted on going to trial if he had not received ineffective assistance of counsel. We further said that reasonable probability means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 1305 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). These holdings mean that, before the Superior Court could vacate Aldus's conviction, it had to find that (1) the performance of Aldus's attorney fell below that of an ordinary fallible attorney; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for her attorney's error, Aldus would not have entered a guilty plea and would have insisted on going to trial. [¶ 14] We apply a deferential standard of review to the trial court's holding on both parts of the Strickland/Hill test. Whether the performance of an attorney falls below the standard is a question of fact. We will not overturn a postconviction court's determination as to the effectiveness of trial counsel unless it is clearly erroneous and there is no competent evidence in the record to support it. Tribou v. State, 552 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Me. 1989). See also Brewer, ¶ 19, 699 A.2d at 1144 (stating, [w]e must uphold the court's findings regarding the quality of trial counsel's performance unless they are clearly erroneous and unsupported by any evidence in the record); True v. State, 457 A.2d 793, 795 (Me.1983) (stating that the court's findings, express and implied, are reviewed under the `clearly erroneous test' and will not be overturned on appeal unless there is no competent evidence to support them. (emphasis supplied)). Lang, 438 A.2d at 915 (vacating the denial of a writ of habeas corpus and remanding for consideration of the new standard enunciated in the decision because it is a factual question). Likewise, the finding of whether the petitioner was prejudiced by her attorney's error is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. See Conner v. State, 543 A.2d 819, 820-22 (Me.1988) (holding that the trial court's finding that petitioner was not prejudiced was not clearly erroneous). Our decisions have emphasized the fact-laden nature of postconviction review when the issue is inadequacy of counsel. See True, 457 A.2d at 795. The two-prong inquiry set forth in Strickland and Lang does not lend itself to categorical rules but rather is meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Id. [¶ 15] We bear in mind that the purpose of the constitutional requirement of effective counsel is to ensure a fair trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. That purpose, in the context of a conviction based upon a guilty plea, is to ensure that the advice of counsel is within the realm of an ordinary competent attorney because the voluntariness of the plea hinges upon whether the advice is that of an ordinary competent attorney. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56-57, 106 S.Ct. 366. In Laferriere we noted that our inquiry is whether the plea proceeding produced a just result which is the knowing and voluntary entry of a guilty plea by a guilty party. Laferriere, 697 A.2d at 1307. Thus, in making the determination of whether counsel was ineffective, we and the trial courts must be guided by the overall justness and fairness of the proceeding.