Opinion ID: 779969
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reform Efforts

Text: 46 We also note that subsequent efforts to reform the Convention have not clarified the rights of a non-custodial parent with a ne exeat order. In 1996, the delegates of the thirty-five Member States of the Hague Conference adopted the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, 35 I.L.M. 1391 (1996), an effort to reform the then current system. 18 Marisa Leto, Whose Best Interest? International Child Abduction Under the Hague Convention, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 247, 249 (2002). 47 Article 7 of the 1996 Convention on Jurisdiction copies verbatim the language of article 5 of the 1980 Convention, and thus creates the same distinctions between rights of custody and rights of access. The remedy of return is, again, available for the former and not the latter. In the official explanatory note to article 7 of the 1996 Convention, the Convention reporter explains that it suffices here to make reference to the very complete explanations set out in the Report of Professor Elisa Perez-Vera on that Convention (paragraphs Nos. 64-74). 19 From this, we know only that the drafters intended to incorporate the same distinctions in the 1996 Convention as existed in the 1980 Convention. Beyond this inference, we find no guidance for determining the effect of ne exeat orders. 48 In sum, the post-ratification understanding of the Convention provides little assistance with respect to the appropriate characterization of non-custodial parental rights with a ne exeat order. We rely instead on the other substantial sources of interpretive guidance. In light of the Convention's text, purposes, and drafting history, we hold that a ne exeat clause does not confer rights of custody upon a parent who otherwise possesses only access rights. 49 B. Patria Potestas Does Not Establish Rights of Custody 50 In the alternative, Arce argues on cross-appeal that the Mexican legal concept of patria potestas confers upon him rights of custody under the Convention. We consider this issue as one of first impression. The concept of patria potestas is derived from Roman law and originally meant paternal power over the family and household. In common law legal systems, patria potestas was first replaced by parens patriae and eventually by the best interests of the child standard. Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 457 n. 7 (1st Cir.2000). Many civil law countries, however, continue to recognize some form of patria potestas. In support of his claim, Arce relies upon Whallon, in which the First Circuit held that patria potestas conferred custody rights as understood under the Convention on both parents under Mexican law. Arce's reliance on Whallon is misplaced. 51 In Whallon, the court held that, in the absence of a custody agreement, it could rely upon patria potestas to determine custodial rights between two parents who had never married, and had never entered a formal custody agreement. 230 F.3d at 458 n. 9 (distinguishing Croll, where there had been a clear determination of custody rights by a court of the country of habitual residence.). Here, unlike the situation in Whallon, the parties have executed a formal, legal custody agreement, thus eliminating any basis for relying on patria potestas. Thus, we hold that patria potestas does not confer rights of custody upon a parent given access rights from a custody agreement.