Opinion ID: 1061002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jury instructions mitigation

Text: In this case, the defendant contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing because the trial court's instructions on mitigating circumstances: (1) erroneously informed the jury that their duty to consider mitigating circumstances was discretionary and conditional upon their being proven; (2) failed to adequately state defendant's requested mitigating circumstances; and (3) inappropriately distinguished between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e). The State responds that any error in the trial court's charge was harmless. We emphasize at the outset, however, that none of the alleged errors are of constitutional magnitude. This Court previously has held that jury instructions on specific non-statutory mitigating circumstances are not constitutionally mandated. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 173-74 (Tenn. 1994). Therefore, the right to such instructions, as well as the form and content of the instructions, derives solely from the statute. Second, it is not violative of the federal constitution to require a defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649-51, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3055-56, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Thus, assuming that the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider those proven mitigating circumstances, the error is statutory only. Therefore, the question for consideration in this case as to each allegation of error is whether the trial court's failure to strictly adhere to the statute constitutes error which affirmatively appears to have affected the verdict. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(a). To resolve that question, we must scrutinize the statute and our recent decision in Odom which interpreted the statute. We begin our analysis with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e)(1) (1991 Repl. & 1996 Supp.), which, as amended in 1989, provides as follows: After closing arguments in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall include in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (i) which may be raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both. The trial judge shall also include in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing or both which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). No distinction shall be made between mitigating circumstances as set forth in subsection (j) and those otherwise raised by the evidence which are specifically requested by either the state or the defense to be instructed to the jury. These instructions and the manner of arriving at a sentence shall be given in the oral charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberations. (Emphasis added.) Recently, in Odom, supra , this Court interpreted that statute to require jury instructions on non-statutory mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence and proffered by a defendant as having mitigating value. In addition, we stated that instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances must not be fact specific and imply to the jury that the judge had made a finding of fact. Instead, we stated that instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances must be drafted so that when they are considered by the jury, the statutory mitigating circumstances are indistinguishable from the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Id. at 32. Finally, in Odom , we interpreted the no distinction portion of the statute as precluding the trial judge from revealing to the jury that a request was made and from identifying the party making the request. Id. Generally, in determining whether instructions are erroneous, this Court must review the charge in its entirety and read it as a whole. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 555 (Tenn. 1994). A charge should be considered prejudicially erroneous if it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law. State v. Forbes, 918 S.W.2d 431, 447 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977). The United States Supreme Court has observed that in evaluating claims of error in jury instructions, courts must remember that [j]urors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that lawyers might. Differences among them in interpretation of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial likely to prevail over technical hairsplitting. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990); see also State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 479 (Tenn. 1993). Applying that standard to the instructions in this case, a majority of this Court has concluded that none of the assigned errors affirmatively appear to have affected the verdict.
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Judge Kurtz charged the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:       The evidence and arguments in this hearing have been completed, and it is my duty now to instruct you as to the law, the law applicable to this case as stated in these instructions; and it is your duty to carefully consider all of them. The order in which these instructions are given is no indication of their relative importance. You should not single out one or more of them to the exclusion of another or others, but should consider each one in light of and in harmony with the others.       In arriving at the punishment, you, the jury, shall consider, as heretofore indicated, any proven mitigating circumstances, which shall include the following: Any mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or the defense at the sentencing hearing; that is, you shall consider any aspect of the Defendant's character or record or any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the Defendant, which is supported by the evidence. In determining mitigating factors, you are to consider the above. In addition, the defense has submitted the following issues for your consideration. They are to be considered, if you believe they have been proven and are mitigating or favorable to the Defendant or reduce his blameworthiness. (1) History of childhood; (2) Victim of child sex abuse; (3) Mental illness or mental or emotional disturbance; (4) Dominance by another person and/or immaturity; (5) Drug abuse; (6) Any other aspect of the Defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense, which you believe reduces the Defendant's blameworthiness. As to a determination of mitigating circumstances, you may deliberate as a  as a body about mitigating circumstances; but you are not required to reach a unanimous verdict as to their existence or weight, nor are you to gauge whether their existence is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, when you consider mitigating circumstances, each of you must decide for yourself whether mitigating circumstances may exist and, if so, how much weight each deserves. If you conclude that any evidence supports a mitigating circumstance, then you should consider that mitigating circumstance to be established and then determine the weight to which it is entitled. In considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, you must not weigh the two in a mechanical fashion. Do not merely compare the number of circumstances in aggravation to the number in mitigation, or arbitrarily assign different weights to be given the factors. Instead, you should personally determine the convincing force of each circumstance. You may find that the State has proved multiple aggravating circumstances, and that only one mitigating circumstances  circumstance exists, and still find that life is appropriate, due to the convincing force of the single mitigating circumstance. (Emphasis added.) The defendant first asserts that the instruction is erroneous because it charges the jury to consider only proven mitigating circumstances. While acknowledging that the trial court's use of the term proven was not appropriate under the statute, the State, nonetheless, argues that the error was harmless. We agree with the defendant's contention that the trial court erred by including the term proven in the jury charge. The statute requires jurors to consider those statutory or nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which have been raised by the evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e)(1) (1991 Repl. & Supp. 1996). The statute does not impose a burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. Therefore, to comply precisely with the statute, the trial court should have only instructed the jury to consider those statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which had been raised by the evidence. Nevertheless, read in context and as a whole, it is clear that the jury charge given in this case fairly informed the jury of the legal issues and the applicable law. The erroneous term proven was clarified by the trial court's subsequent instructions to the jury advising it to consider as mitigating any circumstance raised or supported by the evidence. In addition, the trial court advised the jury that [i]f you conclude that any evidence supports a mitigating circumstance, then you should consider that mitigating circumstance to be established... . Further clarification of the term was provided when the trial court told the jury that as to mitigating circumstances, it was not required to reach a unanimous verdict... nor are you to gauge whether their existence is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Though the term proven should not be used because the statute contains no burden of proof and because the term is potentially misleading, in this case, the trial court's further explanations eliminated any potential confusion, and the error does not affirmatively appear to have affected the verdict. We do not agree with the defense contention that the error can not be harmless because the charge is contradictory. Though we agree with the dissent that the trial court's use of the term proven was not appropriate, it was given contextual meaning by the subsequent explanatory instructions which fairly informed the jury to consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence. Therefore, the error was harmless and this issue is without merit. Relying upon the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions and certain general statutory provisions, the defense, during oral argument before this Court, asserted that the trial court should have instructed the jury that the State has the burden to disprove any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. First of all, Tenn Code Ann. § 39-11-201(a)(3) (1991 Repl.) [8] and § 39-11-203(d) (1991 Repl.) [9] do not support the defendant's claim. These are general statutes which govern the prosecution of criminal offenses. They have no application in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding which is controlled by Tenn.Code. Ann. § 39-13-204 (1991 Repl). It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that a specific statute on a particular subject will prevail over a general statute. State v. Black, 897 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn. 1995). There is no provision in the capital sentencing scheme to support the defendant's claim that the State must disprove mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the State could meet such a burden. Jurors individually consider mitigating circumstances and need not unanimously agree to any certain one. Accepting the defendant's argument would impose upon the State the untenable task of disproving the existence of each mitigating circumstance to twelve different individuals. This duty has not been imposed by statute and we refuse to judicially impose it. Moreover, the defendant's reliance upon § 7.04(d) of the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions is misplaced. As we have previously stated, pattern jury instructions are not officially approved by this Court or by the General Assembly and should be used only after careful analysis. They are merely patterns or suggestions. While previously printed forms may be convenient, they must be revised or supplemented if necessary in order to fully and accurately conform to applicable law. State v. Martin, 702 S.W.2d 560, n. 4 (Tenn. 1985). To the extent that § 7.04(d) [10] purports to require that the jury be instructed that the State must disprove mitigating circumstances, it does not conform to applicable law and is hereby expressly disapproved. This issue is without merit.
At an appropriate time in the sentencing hearing, the defendant submitted the following proposed jury instructions with respect to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. 1. The defendant had a disturbed childhood due to the irregular nature of the relationship of his parents, the conflicts that existed between them, and the financial hardships experienced by the family. 2. The defendant's psychological and social development was severely impacted by the trauma of being abducted and homosexually raped at the age of 12, an experience which he was afraid to reveal to others for fear that he would be blamed and rejected; 3. The after effects of the trauma, in combination with a genetic predisposition to alcoholism, led to the defendant's becoming drug and alcohol-dependent during his adolescence; 4. The defendant's drug and alcohol dependency, in combination with the psychological impairments resulting from his disturbed childhood and preadolescent sexual abuse, contributed to the defendant's becoming truant from school and to his delinquent, and later criminal, behavior; 5. As a result of his disturbed childhood and preadolescent sexual abuse, the defendant developed a severe conflict regarding his sexual identity which he felt compelled to keep secret from his family; 6. When the defendant's sexual conflicts were revealed to his family he suffered a mental and emotional disturbance. 7. The intent to commit murder was formed while the defendant was under the influence of this mental and emotional disturbance. 8. The defendant did not wish to kill the victim and was persuaded to commit the murder by his juvenile accomplice, Trina Brown, who was permitted to plead guilty and receive a sentence of incarceration in a juvenile correctional institution until she is twenty-one years of age; 9. The defendant was an immature and emotionally dependent person at the time of the offense, and his judgment was impaired by alcohol and drugs; and 10. The murder of the victim in this case added to the mental and emotional disturbance the defendant was experiencing and contributed to the commission of the homicide in Atlanta which has been listed as one of the statutory aggravating factors. The trial court refused to give the instructions requested by the defense and instead, instructed the jury as to six general categories of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, as follows (1) history of childhood; (2) victim of child sex abuse; (3) mental illness or mental or emotional disturbance; (4) dominance by another person and/or immaturity; (5) drug abuse; (6) any other aspect of the defendant's background or character or the circumstances of the offense, which you believe reduces the defendant's blameworthiness. In this Court, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by refusing to give his requested instructions and he contends that the instructions given were erroneous because they lacked specificity and failed to convey the defendant's theories of mitigation to the jury. The State responds that the trial court fully complied with this Court's decision in Odom , which was rendered after the trial of this case. We agree. In Odom, supra , the defendant claimed that the trial court erred by refusing to submit to the jury his requested fact specific instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. We rejected that claim, concluding that the fact specific instructions advocated by the defense implied to the jury that the judge had made findings of fact in contravention of Article VI, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. Id., 928 S.W.2d at 32. We held that specificity in the charge on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances is inappropriate and cautioned that instructions must be drafted so that when they are considered by the jury, the statutory mitigating circumstances are indistinguishable from the non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Id. Though not explicitly stated in Odom , the clear implication is that instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances must be phrased in general categories similar to the statutory mitigating circumstances. [11] Finally, we emphasized in Odom , that under the statute, a trial court has no duty, absent a timely and proper request from the defense, to include instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Id., 928 S.W.2d at 31. However, when the defense proffers a requested instruction which is overly specific, it is incumbent upon the trial court to revise and generalize the instruction to conform to the evidence and the law. Id. Applying those principles to the facts in this case, it is clear that the trial court appropriately denied the defendant's requested instruction. A fair reading of the defendant's requested instructions leaves the distinct impression that the trial judge has made findings of fact which is impermissible under the Tennessee Constitution. Moreover, by their specificity, the requested instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were clearly distinguishable from the statutory mitigating circumstances which is not permissible under the statute and our decision in Odom . Therefore, the trial court correctly refused to give the defendant's proffered instructions. The defense claims also that the revised instructions given by the trial court, by their lack of specificity, defeated the purpose of the instructions and did not convey to the jury a fair picture of the mitigation proof. We do not agree. As was previously recognized, unlike lawyers, jurors do not parse jury instructions in an attempt to find subtle shades of meaning. Jurors interpret the instructions in a commonsense manner and in light of the evidence presented at the trial. Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-81, 110 S.Ct. at 1198. The defense assertion ignores the reality that these jurors had heard specific evidence during the sentencing hearing about the defendant's childhood, his immaturity, alleged sexual abuse, drug abuse, mental illness and emotional disturbance, as well as the dominance by Trina Brown. By their breadth, the instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances encompassed all the evidence presented by the defense at the sentencing hearing. Under this Court's decision in Odom , trial courts have a duty to modify proffered instructions to remove factual specificity. The trial court in this case fulfilled that responsibility long before the Odom decision was rendered. For that he deserves commendation, and the defendant's claim of error is without merit.
Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly distinguished between statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in violation of the statute and our decision in Odom . The only distinction error alleged is the trial court's preface of the charge on non-statutory mitigating circumstances with the phrase, the defense has submitted the following issues for your consideration. Without question, the phrase was improper under this Court's subsequent interpretation of the statute in Odom, supra , in which we stated that a trial court is prohibited from revealing to the jury that a request was made and from identifying the parties making the request. Id., 928 S.W.2d at 32. However, in this case, the error does not affirmatively appear to have affected the verdict in light of the trial court's prior instruction cautioning the jury that [t]he order in which these instructions are given is no indication of their relative importance. You should not single out one or more of them to the exclusion of another or others, but should consider each one in light of and in harmony with the others. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the defendant's claim that this error was prejudicial requiring a new sentencing hearing is without merit.