Opinion ID: 2517821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Collision Requirement

Text: Williams argues that there is no real evidence of a `collision' in this case. Collision is defined as the action or an instance of colliding, violent encounter, or forceful striking together typically by accident and so as to harm or impede. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 446 (1993). Based on the facts adduced at the motion to suppress hearing, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Williams was involved in a collision. Officer Martins testified that he found Williams sitting alone, on the shoulder of the highway, about 15 feet away from the motorcycle, and that he was bleeding from the mouth and had lacerated his lip. He further testified that his investigation revealed no debris on the ground, skid marks, or anything like that. Notably absent from Officer Martins's testimony was any indication that the motorcycle was damaged or of its position with respect to the road. Furthermore, by his own testimony, Officer Martins concluded that, based on his investigation, Williams fell off the bike. These facts are insufficient to establish that there was a collision. Although single-vehicle accidents may qualify as collisions, see Entrekin, 98 Hawai`i at 223, 47 P. 3 at 338 (Entrekin's auto crossed the center lane marking of Haleakala Highway, sideswiped the guardrail along the opposite side of the highway, and then crossed back into his original lane of travel and collided with a dirt embankment. (Emphasis added.)), in such a case the vehicle must nevertheless collide with another object. Here, the factual record does not establish any collision, and even Officer Martins's theory of the incident merely suggests that Williams fell, which is insufficient, without more, to imply a collision. Without any collision, the blood draw under HRS § 291E-61 was unlawful. The district court did not make express determinations regarding whether or not a collision occurred, nor did the ICA consider the matter. Rather, the lower courts focused on the injury requirement, which was apparent and not contested by Williams, and the probable cause issue. As pointed out by the prosecution, Williams appears to have conceded that he was involved in an accident, as revealed by the questions his attorney asked of Officer Martins at the hearing on the motion to suppress. However, Williams nowhere admits to being involved in a collision, and, rather, has contested that very point. The prosecution argues that the fact that Williams was involved in a motor vehicle `accident' as opposed to a `collision' does not preclude the police from obtaining a blood sample from Williams pursuant to HRS Section 291E-21, and notes that, in Entrekin, this court used the terms accident and collision interchangeably in discussing the applicability of HRS § 291E-21 to the facts of that case. It is plain that in common parlance, an automobile collision is often referred to as an accident. In fact, automobile accidents usually involve a collision, as the Webster definition of the term collisionan act that is typically by accidentrecognizes. See supra. However, while a traffic accident can occur in various ways, the statute requires that there be a collision. Officer Martins's theory that Williams fell from his bike would qualify as an accident that falls short of a collision. The prosecution has not presented a persuasive argument that the plain language of HRS § 291E-21 is meant to embrace accidents that do not involve collisions. Although this court, in Entrekin, at times used the word accident to refer to what was clearly a collision, in no way were we suggesting that the latter is not a necessary part of the statutory requirement. Furthermore, the legislative history of HRS § 291E-21 buttresses the conclusion that collision cannot be read as synonymous with accident. Although the current statute was enacted in 2000, its predecessor was first enacted in 1981 and codified as HRS § 286-163. In its initial form, it applied to the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person. 1981 Haw. Sess. L. Act 67, § 3, at 101 (emphasis added). However, in 1995, the law was amended to apply to collisions rather than accidents. See 1995 Haw. Sess. L. Act 197, § 1 at 372-73 (In the event of a collision resulting in injury or death. . . . (Emphasis added.)). This change makes clear that the legislature intended the amended law to apply only in case of a collision, not merely an accident. When the law was reenacted in 2000 as part of a consolidation of provisions relating to operating a vehicle while using an intoxicant, see 2000 Haw. Sess. L. Act 189, Part III, at 406-07, what would become HRS § 291E-21 kept the prior law's reference to collision rather than accident. Id. § 11, at 410-11. Therefore, because there is insufficient evidence of a collision in this case, the statutory requirements of HRS § 291E-21 were not met. For this reason, the blood draw was improper and should have been suppressed. Having found that the motion to suppress was improperly denied on this ground, we need not address Williams's argument that the district court erred in its determination that Officer Martins had probable cause to believe Williams had committed the OUI offense.