Opinion ID: 778692
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The conflicting legal arguments of counsel

Text: 34 The trial court's failure to correct the prosecutor's erroneous interpretation of that instruction, by compounding the potential for confusion inherent in the text of the factor (k) instruction, roots more deeply our conclusion that there was constitutional error. There is no dispute that the prosecutor impermissibly narrowed the scope of factor (k) when he argued to the jurors that the factor did not refer to anything after the crime or later and that they should not consider Payton's evidence in mitigation. See Payton, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d at 1048 (It is true that the prosecutor during closing argument suggested a narrow and incorrect interpretation of factor (k).); see also Payton, 258 F.3d at 916 (In this case, there is no question that the prosecutor misstated what factor (k) refers to.). 35 The prosecutor's statements further distinguish this case from Boyde. The prosecutor in Boyde never suggested that the background and character evidence could not be considered. 494 U.S. at 385, 110 S.Ct. 1190. In contrast, the prosecutor here told the jurors that the statutory list of factors precluded them from considering the only mitigating evidence Payton presented — evidence of a post-crime religious conversion and its positive effects on other inmates and the administration of the jail. When a natural reading of the unadorned factor (k) instruction already favored the prosecutor's stance, defense counsel faced an imposing hurdle to convince the jury of the proper interpretation. 36