Opinion ID: 1549002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Subjectively Baseless

Text: Section 9-33-2(a)(2) defines a subjectively baseless activity as that which is actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its own direct effects. However, [u]se of outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the governmental process itself for its own direct effects. Id. In Pound Hill, 668 A.2d at 1264, this Court addressed the elements of sham litigation in a decision that predated the enactment of § 9-33-2's definition of subjectively baseless. The Pound Hill Court suggested that courts must inquire into whether the litigants utilized the process itself rather than the intended outcome in order to hinder and delay plaintiff. Pound Hill, 668 A.2d at 1264. The 2003 motion justice found that: [The Karousoses] do not allege that Pardee's appeal was meant to harass, blackmail, or otherwise serve a purpose other than to contest what the parties appear to have taken to be a binding determination of the Zoning Officer. Rather, their suit is based solely upon the existence of the 1989 letter and Pardee's alleged desire to appeal that determination. However, where, as here, a potential litigant's motivation in seeking review of a governmental action, albeit non-binding governmental action, relates solely to the substance of that action, the existence of a previous action to the same effect does not render the appeal any less an attempt to use the outcome or result of the process, rather than the direct effects. The motion justice determined that in his objection to the motion for summary judgment Karousos was unable to offer any facts that would suggest that Pardee's appeal was motivated by anything other than outcome of the process. She therefore found that Pardee's appeal was not subjectively baseless and ruled that summary judgment must be granted. We agree with the motion justice's conclusions, and affirm the grant of summary judgment. A party opposing a summary judgment motion may not simply rest on the allegations and denials in his or her pleadings, but must prove by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact. Brito v. Capone, 819 A.2d 663, 666 (R.I.2003) (citing Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I.1996)). Therefore, we will affirm the grant of summary judgment `against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case   .' Berardis, 969 A.2d at 1291 (quoting Lavoie v. North East Knitting, Inc., 918 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 2007)). In his 2003 motion for summary judgment, Pardee submitted the transcripts from two depositions, his own and that of Alexander Walsh, who was Pardee's attorney and an original defendant in this action. [8] In those depositions, both Pardee and Walsh testified that Weston's 1996 letter was appealed because Pardee wanted to prevent Fairlawn's use as a culinary school. In Pardee's words, I didn't want any commercial activity next to my planned home. Neither Pardee nor Walsh testified to any other motive for pressing the appeal. Once Pardee came forward with this evidence, the burden shifted to Karousos to offer some evidence to establish that Pardee sought the appeal for its direct effects and not for its outcome. See § 9-33-2(a)(2); Brito, 819 A.2d at 666. In his opposition to Pardee's 2003 motion for summary judgment, Karousos merely repeated his allegations that, given the long delay between Weston's 1989 letter and his 1996 letter, Pardee could have been motivated only by an interest in causing further burdens and delays to the opening of Karousos's culinary school. Karousos's mere allegations were insufficient to rebut the statements under oath offered by Pardee, and therefore Karousos failed to meet his burden of showing the existence of a disputed material issue of fact. See Casco Indemnity Co. v. Gonsalves, 839 A.2d 546, 548 (R.I.2004) (the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions). As a result, Pardee's petitioning activity was not a sham and warrants immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, Pardee was entitled to summary judgment in his favor because his appeal to the board was not subjectively baseless.