Opinion ID: 799337
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of the State Officials

Text: The State defendants also argue that, with respect to them, the complaint fails to state a claim for substantive due process violations because it does not adequately allege that the State officials had a custodial relationship with the foster children or that they are liable as supervisors. [6] Although the district court did not address this argument, the State raised it below, and we may affirm the district court's dismissal on any ground supported by the record. Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900. First, the State defendants argue that they cannot be held liable under the special relationship exception in Count One because the plaintiff foster children are technically in the custody of Clark County. This argument is not persuasive. The complaint alleges that defendant Willden has responsibility for ensuring the provision of child welfare services throughout the state and that defendant Comeaux leads the agency which must evaluate all child welfare services provided throughout the State and take corrective action against any agency providing child welfare services which is not complying with any applicable laws, regulations, or policies. Furthermore, the complaint also alleges that at least two plaintiffs, Henry and Linda, were in the custody of the State before the foster care system was transferred to Clark County. This is sufficient to plead a custodial relationship between the foster children and the State defendants. Second, the State defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against them for supervisory liability. We recently reaffirmed that a plaintiff may state a claim under § 1983 against a supervisor for deliberate indifference. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). A defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Id. at 1207 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others. Id. at 1208 (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)). In order to adequately plead such a claim, allegations in a complaint ... may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Id. at 1216. These factual allegations must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation. Id. After thoroughly examining the plaintiffs' complaint, we agree that there are few specific allegations against the State defendants. Most of the allegations in the complaint simply reference Defendants, without specifying whether the conduct at issue was committed by the named State officials, County officials, or the John Doe supervisors or caseworkers. For many of the detailed factual allegations, such as the failure to respond to a particular report of abuse or authorize a particular medical procedure, it is implausible to suggest that Willden or Comeaux personally committed the alleged violation. The allegations that do expressly reference the State defendants are too general to state a claim for supervisory liability. In Starr v. Baca , the plaintiff alleged that Sheriff Baca himself had been given clear notice by the Department of Justice of the specific unconstitutional conditions in the jails; that the Sheriff received numerous reports documenting inmate violence caused by the unconstitutional conduct of his deputies; and that the Sheriff ultimately acquiesced in these constitutional violations. See 652 F.3d at 1208-10. In contrast, the allegations here claim that the agencies directed by Willden and Comeaux have oversight responsibility for Clark County's foster care system and are required to ensure that Clark County is complying with state and federal law. The complaint also alleges that all of the defendants had knowledge of independent reports documenting the systemic failures of foster care in Nevada. But it does not allege that Willden or Comeaux had any personal knowledge of the specific constitutional violations that led to Plaintiffs' injuries, or that they had any direct responsibility to train or supervise the caseworkers employed by Clark County. The allegations that come closest to pleading personal involvement by Willden and Comeaux concern the failure to provide medical records to the children and their foster parents in order to facilitate their medical care. Paragraphs 27 and 28 allege that Willden is responsible for ensuring county compliance with all federal mandates of the Medicaid program and that Comeaux is responsible for administering the Medicaid program with respect to children in the child welfare system. Paragraph 42 alleges that State Defendants... are responsible for the management and day-to-day operation of Nevada's Children's Mental Health Services program. Finally, Paragraph 59 alleges that the State defendants fail to share the medical records from the State's Medicaid database and the Mental Health Services program with the County defendants, which in turn prevents County employees from sharing that information with foster parents. When read together, these allegations suggest that there may be a causal connection between the State defendants' failure to share these medical records and the injuries suffered by plaintiffs such as Henry, who received a dangerous combination of prescription drugs because his medical records were not given to his treatment providers. But even if the complaint in its current form fails to state a claim against the State officials for substantive due process violations, the district court abused its discretion by failing to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint. [W]e have repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiffs offered to amend their complaint if necessary in their response to the motion to dismiss, but the district court did not grant leave to amend and did not provide any reasons for its decision. As we have already concluded, the complaint adequately pleads violations of Plaintiffs' clearly established substantive due process rights, and it plausibly suggests an entitlement to relief from at least some of the defendants. Where the complaint falls short in some places is tying its factual allegations to particular defendants. But this type of deficiency can likely be cured by amending the complaint, and there is certainly no evidence to suggest that allowing amendment would be futile. Therefore, on remand, Plaintiffs should be given an opportunity to amend their substantive due process claims. We note that in any future proceedings in the district court, each defendant's liability must be analyzed individually using the proper standard, whether that individual is a line-level caseworker, a supervisory official, or a municipality. See Tamas, 630 F.3d at 847.