Opinion ID: 1958968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other Alleged Trial Errors

Text: On the usual criminal appeal where a new trial is necessary, we forego examination of the appellant's other claims of error and simply remand to the trial court. Here, however, several of the issues raised on the present appeal are almost certain to recur upon retrial, and thus it promotes judicial economy for us to address them now, to afford guidance to counsel and to the court on retrial. See Kimball v. State, 490 A.2d 653, 659 (Me.1985).
We first address the admissibility in evidence of a statement defendant made, shortly after his arrest, to Detective Shuman of the State Police. Defendant contends that his statement was taken in violation of his right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). That issue was raised by motion before trial and was disposed of at a suppression hearing on May 3, 1984. Detective Shuman testified at that hearing on direct examination regarding the right-to-counsel portion of the Miranda warnings: A. ... I said, you have an absolute right to a lawyer before questioning and the presence of a lawyer with you during questioning. Do you understand that? I got the answer from Mr. Murphy that he understood and I was insulting him and I did not have to ask him those questions. He understood he could have a lawyer if he wanted one and if he couldn't afford one he did not have to answer any questions without one. I went on, if you cannot afford a lawyer one will be furnished free for you before any questioning if you desire. I asked if he understood that and his answer was that he understood that if he could not afford one one would be obtained for him. On the back of the Miranda I asked the two waiver questions. If he understood each of the rights I gave him and he said yes and I said having these rights in mind do you wish to talk to us now without a lawyer present and he said, sure, he would talk to us. No problem. Q. Then you proceeded to conduct an interview with him? A. Yes, I did. At the probable cause hearing some two years earlier, the detective had also testified: I continued on that, If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be furnished to you free before any questioning, if you desire. I asked him if he understood that. Hehis response was, Yes. He said, I don't need a court-appointed lawyer; I'm gonna get one. I said, Do you understand what that last line meant? And he said, Yes; that if I can't afford one, one will be furnished. At the suppression hearing, Shuman affirmed the accuracy of his earlier testimony. The suppression justice found that defendant's statement was taken during a custodial interrogation following defendant's voluntary waiver of his right to have an attorney present. That determination must be allowed to stand if there is evidence in the record that rationally supports it. State v. Schueler, 488 A.2d 481, 484 (Me.1985). The preceding quotations from the record make clear that defendant understood his right to an attorney and agreed to speak to the police without his lawyer being present. His comment that he was gonna get his own attorney was given in the context of the question whether he needed to have counsel appointed for him. At no time did he ever express a present desire to have the assistance of counsel. The suppression justice was correct in refusing to suppress defendant's post-arrest statement.
The next issue we address is defendant's contention that the fruits of a search made of his house were improperly admitted at trial because the warrant under which the search was conducted was invalid. The reason he assigns for the warrant's invalidity is that the complaint justice who issued the warrant was appointed to that office in violation of Me. Const. art. III, § 2, and art. VI, § 5, and that he therefore had no authority to issue the search warrant. In January 1979, the magistrate in question had taken office as Judge of Probate in Hancock County. In March of that same year he was also appointed a complaint justice by the Chief Judge of the District Court. He held both offices at the time he issued the warrant to search defendant's house. Defendant argues that the appointment of a sitting judge of probate to the office of complaint justice violated the prohibition in Me. Const. art. VI, § 5 against a judge's holding another office. We have no occasion to reach the question whether a judge of probate may be validly appointed a complaint justice. The capacity in which the magistrate acted when he issued the warrant in this case was that of justice of the peace, [7] a post he also held, and not that of complaint justice. 4 M.R.S.A. § 161 (1979) provides: The Chief Judge of the District Court may authorize any attorney-at-law, who is duly licensed to practice law in the State of Maine who is also a justice of the peace, to receive complaints and ... to issue search warrants.... Any complaint so received or process so issued shall be in his capacity as a justice of the peace. (Emphasis added) The prohibition in the Maine Constitution against a judge's holding another office specifically exempts from that restriction the office of justice of the peace: No Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court or any other court shall hold office under the United States or any other state, nor under this State, except as justice of the peace or as member of the Judicial Council. Me. Const. art. VI, § 5 (emphasis added). It therefore matters not, for the validity of the search warrant in the case at bar, whether the issuing justice of the peace was validly appointed a complaint justice. No defect in his appointment as a justice of the peace appears of record, and none is even suggested by defense counsel. We will therefore assume that his appointment to that office was both regular and valid. The sole attack made by the defense upon the validity of the search warrant is thus without foundation.
At trial, the presiding justice admitted in evidence certain of the victim's personal papers, and other items such as might be found in a woman's handbag, that had been recovered in a partially burned condition from a dump known as Merchant's Pit, at a remote location in the woods outside Northeast Harbor. Defendant asserts that their admission on the question of his culpability of the murder-robbery was error, [8] first, because the evidence did not connect those exhibits in any way to him. The record does not support that contention. The police found the exhibits at the dump as the result of the report by a 15-year-old boy who had seen defendant at that remote location. Defendant's second argument, that the Merchant's Pit exhibits even if relevant should have been excluded under Evidence Rule 403, is equally unpersuasive. We fail to see how their admission could have resulted in any unfair prejudice to defendant, let alone unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs their obvious probative value. The exhibits were not such as might inflame the minds of the jurors, or otherwise distract them from their duty. There was no error in admitting the Merchant's Pit exhibits.
The last question that we consider has to do with the reason why defendant voluntarily gave his gun to the police a few days after the murder, without ever being asked to do so. The State at trial sought to prove a motive for the surrender of defendant's weapon that would be inculpatory rather than exculpatory. It produced testimony that defendant had repeatedly told his daughter's boyfriend that he believed that hollowpoint bullets could not be traced to any particular gun. The State also provided an expert witness who testified that the spent bullet found in the victim's house must have been fired from defendant's gun and, although it was so damaged that he could not tell if it was a hollowpoint bullet, it was perfectly consistent in weight and configuration with the hollowpoint bullets found in defendant's house. Defendant argues that the testimony of both the boyfriend and the expert should have been excluded at trial as irrelevant. He says that hollowpoint bullets cannot be connected either to himself or to the murder, and that therefore any testimony concerning them or his belief about them is not relevant to any issue in the case. Again, the record does not support defendant's contention. A State Police detective discovered a partial box of .38 caliber bullets in defendant's home. He thought that there were nine bullets in the box. He gave the box to the State's ballistics expert, who produced it at trial and identified the bullets as being of the hollowpoint variety. It was thus established that defendant had hollowpoint bullets in his house. The fact that at trial the box turned out to contain ten rather than nine bullets shows merely that someone made a mistake in counting, and does not affect the fact that the bullets that were there were found in defendant's house and fitted his gun. The ballistics expert's testimony was relevant to the question whether the bullet that killed Maxine Eaton was a hollowpoint bullet that had come from the box in defendant's house. The hollowpoint bullets were thus connected both to defendant and to the scene of the crime. The Superior Court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony relating to them. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. All concurring.