Opinion ID: 2176458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutionality of SDCL 22-19A-1.

Text: McGill argues that SDCL 22-19A-1 is unconstitutionally vague. In addressing this issue, there exists a presumption that the statute is constitutional. Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238, 241 (S.D. 1994); State v. Big Head, 363 N.W.2d 556, 559 (S.D.1985). McGill has the burden to refute this presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d 25, 27 (S.D.1989); State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 428 (S.D.1984). McGill cites State v. Blakey, 399 N.W.2d 317 (S.D.1987), to support his proposition. Blakey held a statute void for vagueness when the forbidden conduct is so poorly defined `that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application[.]' Id. at 318 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). McGill claims the words willful, maliciously, repeatedly, follows and harass are impermissibly vague. The vagueness of a statute has been considered on several previous occasions. Statutory language cannot be so vague that selective or discriminatory enforcement is permitted. State v. Dale, 439 N.W.2d 98, 106 (S.D.1989) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909 (1983)). In Dale, this court held: A crime must be statutorily defined with definiteness and certainty. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process. A criminal statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden. Dale, 439 N.W.2d at 106; see State v. Big Head, 363 N.W.2d 556, 559 (S.D.1985). The language of statutes needs to be fair and reasonably certain. State v. Hoffman, 430 N.W.2d 910, 912 (S.D.1988). It is realized that criminal laws represent a legislative balancing act in many instances. In an attempt to prohibit certain conduct, the laws are usually written in a fashion to give broad application to the type of conduct sought to be forbidden. There is nothing inherently wrong with a broad application; for otherwise, there would exist a criminal law for each specific act. What is not allowed are laws so general in nature that people of ordinary intelligence may apply them differently. Dale, 439 N.W.2d at 106. Upholding the constitutionality of Florida's stalking statute, the Florida Supreme Court stated: In determining the sufficiency of the notice, a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. Pallas v. State, 636 So.2d 1358, 1360 (Fla.App.Ct.1994), approved 654 So.2d 127 (Fla.1995) (holding Florida's stalking statute not void for vagueness where a reasonable person would have fair notice the conduct described was prohibited); see also State v. Culmo, 43 Conn.Supp. 46, 70-72, 642 A.2d 90, 102 (1993) (constitutionality of Connecticut's stalking statute upheld because the statute was narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests ... while leaving open ample alternative channels of communication). Similarly, in People v. Heilman, 25 Cal. App.4th 391, 400, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 422, 427 (1994), the California Court of Appeals stated: The requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding. Id. (citation omitted). `Repeatedly' is a word of such common understanding that its meaning is not vague. It simply means the perpetrator must follow the victim more than one time. There is nothing mysterious or ambiguous about the term `repeatedly' to lead an actor to reasonably believe he will not be subject to the penalty under the statute if he engages in willful, malicious following on more than one occasion. Id. `Repeatedly' as used in this statute is not so vague as to create the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law. (Citations omitted.) In fact, `repeatedly' adds to the restraint police officers must exercise. Not until a perpetrator follows a victim more than once does the conduct rise to a criminal level. In addition, the statute provides several other restraints on arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. [T]he perpetrator must be found to have followed or harassed the victim within the meaning of the statute. Id. The court concluded that a reasonable person's common sense would understand that the term repeatedly, when read in light of the entire statute, was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 428; see also Johnson v. State 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind.App. 1 Dist.1995). In his brief, McGill limits his argument to whether the terms maliciously and repeatedly are unconstitutionally vague. Aside from a limited discussion on the meaning of repeatedly, McGill's sole argument regarding the impropriety of the word maliciously is a reference to the trial court's definition of that term in jury instruction number ten. These terms certainly have adequate interpretations in common usage and understanding and their meanings can be obtained from a common sense reading of the statute. See Heilman, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d at 428. McGill's brief is markedly absent of any discussion pertaining to the other statutory terms which he alleges are vague. People v. McMiller, 202 Mich.App. 82, 82-84, 507 N.W.2d 812, 813 (1994); State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 906-908, 510 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1994); State v. Scherreiks, 153 Wis.2d 510, 519-21, 451 N.W.2d 759, 763 (1989). We find McGill waives any argument regarding these terms. Ultimately, McGill did not carry his burden in showing beyond a reasonable doubt that SDCL 22-19A-1 is unconstitutionally vague. A reasonable person can easily discern what constitutes the prohibited conduct when exercising common sense. Affirmed. MILLER, C.J., and SABERS, J., concur. KONENKAMP, J., concurs in part and concurs in result. GILBERTSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this case was submitted, did not participate.