Opinion ID: 1181276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Act Abridges Plaintiffs' Freedom of Speech

Text: In their first point, plaintiffs claim that the Act impermissibly infringes upon the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 17 of the New Mexico Constitution. Plaintiffs challenge the court's findings which provide, in effect, that: 1) outdoor advertising signs limited to locations on the premises or within 1,000 feet of a Stuckey's store or to commercially or industrially zoned areas along interstate or primary highways in New Mexico afford a reasonable means of informing the motorist on such highways of the presence and location of a Stuckey's store; 2) the Act sets forth a regulatory scheme for outdoor advertising which is reasonable, tends to promote the purposes of the Act, and does not impose an undue burden upon any class of persons; and 3) the regulatory scheme constitutes a reasonable regulation as to time, place and manner of plaintiffs' communications of commercial information through outdoor advertising. Plaintiffs argue that these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. They contend that the limited advertising allowed by the Act does not afford timely, adequate or feasible means of informing traveling motorists on interstate and primary highways of the presence of, or the goods and services available at, its stores. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence supports their requested finding that patronage, sales and property values have been substantially reduced by the limited advertising allowed under the Act. Defendant counters that the court's findings are supported by substantial evidence. We have previously addressed the issue of the Act's constitutionality. In National Advertising Co. v. State, Etc., 91 N.M. 191, 571 P.2d 1194 (1977), sign owners brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that they should be compensated for the value of their signs which had been removed pursuant to the Act, or alternatively, if their signs were not compensable, that the Act be held unconstitutional as applied to them. This Court specifically held that the Act is a constitutional enactment by the Legislature. Id. at 193, 571 P.2d at 1196. The Court said: [I]t was implicit in the Memorandum Opinion that the Act was considered a valid exercise of the state's police power. Property is always held subject to the fair exercise of the state's police power, and reasonable regulations enacted for the benefit of the public health, convenience, safety, or general welfare are not unconstitutional. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 193, 571 P.2d at 1196. Plaintiffs argue that the holding in National Advertising is inapplicable to the case at bar because the Act was challenged on due process, rather than first amendment, grounds. For the purpose of clarification, we now hold that the Act does not abridge plaintiffs' guarantee of freedom of speech in violation of the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. Like the federal Highway Beautification Act, the state Act restricts the place and manner of erection of plaintiffs' outdoor advertising structures. It does not regulate the advertising on the basis of its content nor does it completely prevent the dissemination of the same information by alternative means. Thus, we are not faced with a content regulation. In addition, the Act, as applied to plaintiffs, involves restrictions on commercial, rather than political or ideological, speech. The next question, then, is whether plaintiffs' advertising constitutes the type of speech protected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 17 of the New Mexico Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that it does not. Two recent United States Supreme Court cases have accorded first amendment protection to commercial speech. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975), the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for violation of a Virginia statute that made circulation of any publication encouraging or promoting abortions in Virginia a misdemeanor. The Court rejected the argument that the advertisement involved in that case was unprotected because it was commercial speech. Instead, the Court held that advertising is not stripped of all first amendment protection. The Court stated: Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest. (Citations and footnote omitted.) To the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged. Id. at 826, 95 S.Ct. at 2234, 2235. In Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), consumers of prescription drugs brought suit against the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy challenging the validity of a Virginia statute declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision holding the statute void. The Court held that first amendment protection extends to advertising of a purely commercial nature and that it is not limited to speech of public interest. Though the Court concluded that commercial speech is protected, it did not hold that such speech could never be regulated. Indeed, the Court stated that [s]ome forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible. Id. at 770, 96 S.Ct. at 1830. The Court concluded that a state may not completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity... . Id. at 773, 96 S.Ct. at 1831. In Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977), the Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional a municipal ordinance which prohibited the posting of real estate For Sale and Sold signs for the purpose of stemming what the municipality perceived as white flight from a racially integrated community. The Court stated: [T]he Willingboro ordinance is not genuinely concerned with the place of the speech  front lawns  or the manner of the speech  signs. The township has not prohibited all lawn signs  or all lawn signs of a particular size or shape  in order to promote aesthetic values or any other value unrelated to the suppression of free expression,. .. . (Citation and footnote omitted.) Willingboro has proscribed particular types of signs based on their content because it fears their primary effect  that they will cause those receiving the information to act upon it. That the proscription applies only to one mode of communication, therefore, does not transform this into a time, place, or manner case. (Citations omitted and emphasis added.) Id. at 93-4, 97 S.Ct. at 1619. A regulation must satisfy three criteria in order to constitute a legitimate time, place, and manner restriction. These criteria are: (1) the restriction on speech must be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, (2) the restriction must serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) in so doing, the restriction must leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. (Citations omitted.) John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272, 1277 (S.D.Me. 1978). See also Va. Pharmacy Bd., 425 U.S. at 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817. The North Dakota Supreme Court recently addressed the constitutionality of the North Dakota Highway Beautification Act in Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 901, 99 S.Ct. 1205, 59 L.Ed.2d 449 (1979). The court concluded that §§ 24-17-01 through 15, N.D.C.C. 1967 (Repl. 1978), which is almost identical to our Act, did not violate the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech in that the time, place, and manner restrictions under the North Dakota Act satisfied the criteria set forth in Va. Pharmacy Bd., supra, and in John Donnelly & Sons, supra . The court in Newman said: [W]e must balance the interests of the State against those of Newman. The State has an interest in providing a safe place for the users of the State highways... . The nature of highway driving is such that the eyes of the driver may be diverted, sometimes subconsciously, from the road to the billboard. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the existence of highway billboards could have a detrimental effect on traffic safety. ..... The State also has a legitimate interest in protecting, preserving, and enhancing the aesthetic quality of its land ... Id. at 761. The court continued: The interests of Newman are minimal in comparison with the public interest involved and the effect that the regulations have on the public and the businesses contracting for advertising space is not so substantial as to outweigh the State's interest in providing a safe and visually pleasing environment. Id. at 761-2. We hold that the Act meets the three-pronged test used to determine whether a time, place, and manner restriction is valid. First, the Act's restrictions on plaintiffs' exercise of their freedom of speech is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. None of the Act's stated purposes  promotion of public safety, health, welfare, convenience and enjoyment of public travel, protection of public investment in public highways, and preservation and enhancement of the scenic beauty of lands bordering the public highways  are related to a particular message of such signs. § 67-12-3. Secondly, the Act's restrictions on plaintiffs' freedom of speech serve a significant governmental interest. Those interests are matters with which states have been traditionally concerned. In John Donnelly & Sons, supra, the federal district court stated: The emerging majority position, however, and the one to which this Court subscribes, is that the preservation and promotion of aesthetic standards do serve as an adequate basis for comprehensive anti-billboard legislation... . (Citations omitted.) 453 F. Supp. at 1278. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5-6, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33, 75 S.Ct. 98, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). Section 67-12-3 also provides that the Act is designed to protect the public investment in public highways. State compliance with the terms prescribed by the federal Highway Beautification Act insures that New Mexico receives its share of federal-aid highway funds. [W]hen legislation based on aesthetic considerations also promotes economic growth, a significant governmental interest is served. (Citations omitted.) John Donnelly & Sons, 453 F. Supp. at 1279. See also Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Department of Public Wks., 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). As to the third prong of testing a time, place, and manner restriction, we find that the Act leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Section 67-12-4 provides six exceptions to the outdoor advertising prohibited by the Act. Three of these exceptions are the placement of signs on premises occupied by plaintiffs' stores, in areas zoned commercial or industrial under the authority of law, and in areas unzoned commercial or industrial as defined by the Commission's regulations. An additional alternative is provided by the Logo Program. This program allows the State Highway Department to place signs approximately one-half of a mile before an interchange at which a commercial establishment, such as plaintiffs', is located, advertising the name of the business and the fact that it provides gas, food, or lodging. The Logo signs are placed within the rights-of-way of the interstate and primary highways in order to adequately inform traveling motorists on these highways of the presence of such businesses. Indeed, four of plaintiffs' ten New Mexico establishments have been approved for placement on such Logo signs. In addition, plaintiffs introduced no evidence that any of their stores, which availed themselves of on-premise or unzoned commercial or industrial area signs after other off-premise signs had been removed, had suffered a great loss of business so as to rebut the presumption that the Act provides adequate means for plaintiffs to exercise their freedom of speech. Finally, we note that other courts that have considered the first amendment constitutionality of comprehensive anti-billboard legislation, such as is involved in the instant case, have sustained the statute. See John Donnelly & Sons, 453 F. Supp. at 1280. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Act does not violate plaintiffs' first amendment rights.