Opinion ID: 707200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Testimony regarding the cocaine bse being packaged for resale

Text: 3 Beck first argues the district court erred by permitting FBI Agent David Hirtz to testify whether the cocaine base recovered from Beck was packaged for resale. The government asked: 4 Q: Now, Special Agent Hirtz, based strictly on your experience and training and education involving common criminal practices, specifically on the crack cocaine trade here in Peoria, specifically on the crack cocaine trade in the housing projects in Peoria, and absent and not and completely avoiding any, if any, specific knowledge of the defendant, do you have any opinion on whether or not a person possessing Government Exhibit 3 and 3A and Government Exhibit 4 would have those for the purpose of resale--have the cocaine for purposes of resale? 5 A: Yes, they would. 6 Q: Is that your opinion? 7 A: Yes, it is. 8 Beck contends that the government's insertion of the clause, and absent and not and completely avoiding any, if any, specific knowledge of the defendant, allowed the jury impermissibly to infer that Hirtz was commenting on Beck's mental state in violation of Fed.R.Evid. 704(b). Because Beck did not object to these questions, we will reverse only for plain error. United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778-79 (1993). 9 Rule 704(b) limits expert testimony on medical or psychological analysis of a defendant's mental processes, but not law enforcement testimony that does not depend on such analysis. United States v. Willis, 61 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir.1995). 10 [W]hen a law enforcement official states an opinion about the criminal nature of a defendant's activities, such testimony should not be excluded under Rule 704(b) as long as it is made clear, either by the court expressly or in the nature of the examination, that the opinion is based on the expert's knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes. 11 United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir.1994). 12 Beck argues that the negative used in the last question implied that Hirtz was allowed to base his opinion on special knowledge of Beck, and thus confused the jury. However, in reading the question, the more logical inference is that the prosecution asked Hirtz to base his opinion on his general knowledge and not on any special knowledge of Beck's intent. Hirtz testified as an expert on drug trade practices. Beck did not challenge his expertise. The record does not suggest that Hirtz had any special knowledge of Beck outside of the arrest reports. Further, the prosecution's question and Hirtz's answer avoided any express reference to Beck's intent. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242-43 (finding references to the defendant's intent relevant although not determinative). 13