Opinion ID: 2454706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted into evidence a 911 recording under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)?

Text: [¶ 12] The appellant next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence a 911 recording as a prior consistent statement under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). We review alleged errors relating to the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hutchinson v. Taft, 2010 WY 5, ¶ 27, 222 P.3d 1250, 1257 (Wyo. 2010). We will not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the district court could reasonably conclude as it did. Id. [¶ 13] W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) provides: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement by Witness.The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.. . . Regarding W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), we have held that [f]our requirements must be satisfied before a prior consistent statement will be properly admissible: (1) The declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Tombroek v. State, 2009 WY 126, ¶ 8, 217 P.3d 806, 810 (Wyo.2009) (quoting Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo.2007)). The appellant concedes that the State met its burden with regard to the first three requirements. Therefore, the only issue before this Court is whether the fourth requirementthe prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motivewas met. We have previously said that [t]he charge of fabrication or improper motive need not come only as a specific allegation during cross-examination and may be derived from the thrust of the defenses and testimony presented. Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 80, 89 (Wyo.2002). Further, we have said that it is not necessarily error that the prior consistent statement was received in evidence before the allegation of fabrication or improper motive. Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d at 89. [¶ 14] The proffered prior consistent statement in this case was a recorded 911 call made by the victim almost immediately after he jumped out of the window of the hotel room where he was beaten and held hostage. At trial and on appeal, the State asserted that the 911 call statements were admissible because there had been an implication by the appellant that the victim was fabricating his story, or that he could not remember the events accurately because he was using drugs and alcohol at the time. The appellant counters that he never alleged recent fabrication, but merely cross-examined the victim and tested his recollection of the events. [¶ 15] Upon reviewing the record before us, especially the trial transcripts, we find the appellant's characterization more accurately reflects the parties' respective positions below. While the appellant did attack the victim's credibility generally, and also submitted evidence of his prior criminal convictions involving lying, the appellant did not, either explicitly or implicitly, allege that the victim's testimony was the result of a recent fabrication or improper motive or influence. [4] The focus of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) is the use of a prior consistent statement as rehabilitation of a witness whose credibility has been impeached in the particular manner described in the rule.  Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 15, 43 P.3d at 89 (emphasis added). A general attack on a witness's credibility, without a claim of motive, influence or recent fabrication, does not warrant admission of 801(d)(1)(B) evidence. Ordinarily, attacks suggesting untruthful disposition (bad character for truth or veracity), or some lack or defect in sensory or mental capacity, do not suggest fabrication, improper influence, or motive. Hence such attacks do not usually invite repair by consistent statement, and do not bring Fed.R.Evid. 801[(d)(1)](B) into play. 4 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 8.39, at 329-30 (3d ed.2007). (Emphasis in original.) Likewise, [i]t has generally been held in state prosecutions that mere contradiction of a witness through the testimony of other witnesses or through attacks on the witness' reputation for truth or veracity are insufficient grounds for the admissibility of the witness' prior consistent statement. Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Admissibility of impeached witness' prior consistent statementmodern state criminal cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1014, 1025 (1987). [¶ 16] In this case, the appellant did not explicitly or implicitly claim that the victim's in-court testimony was a recent fabrication or the result of some improper motive or influence. [5] Without such a claim, the prior consistent statement in the 911 call did not fall within the purview of 801(d)(1)(B), and was therefore inadmissible hearsay.