Opinion ID: 765322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexual Harassment Issues.

Text: 3 Dhyne worked as a checker at the Meiners family-owned grocery store in Kansas City from mid-March to late October 1996. For the first three months of that period, Dhyne alleges that a young African-American grocery sacker, Rodney Davis, subjected her to quiet but persistent sexual harassment and abuse. Davis denied harassing Dhyne and accused her of making racially motivated complaints. Dhyne argues the harassment was so severe and Meiners's response so inadequate that she deserves punitive damages. Meiners argues that, by transferring Davis to a different shift, it handled a difficult situation so well that it deserves judgment as a matter of law. The jury's $1.00 verdict suggests that it did not fully credit either side's evidence. 4 A. The Evidence at Trial. Dhyne was the first of eleven witnesses in the two-day trial. She testified that during her first week as a checker, Davis began a campaign of quiet but offensive sexual harassment. According to Dhyne, the campaign included calling her offensive names such as bitch, whore, and slut, commenting crudely on parts of her body, making sexual moaning noises, asking if she tanned in the nude, inviting her to perform oral sex, and ignoring her repeated requests to stop the harassment. In April, Dhyne complained to assistant manager Tom Watson, who assured her he would speak to Davis. Within a week of that complaint, Dhyne told Watson that Davis was continuing to harass, and Watson said he would again speak to Davis. Rather than improve, Davis's conduct worsened -- he began pinching Dhyne's arm, brushing her behind, and lifting the legs of her shorts. 5 In early June, Dhyne again complained to Watson, accompanied by Stacy Napier, a checker who had previously complained of inappropriate conduct by Davis. Watson responded he had recommended Davis be fired. A few days later, after seeking help from an attorney, Dhyne complained of the continuing harassment to Dan Meiners, director of store operations. Meiners said he would speak to Davis. On June 12, a tearful Dhyne told Watson and then Meiners that Davis's harassment was continuing. Meiners immediately transferred Davis to the night shift, where he had no contact with Dhyne. The night shift manager fired Davis later in June, but he was rehired in September on a different shift than Dhyne worked. She questioned his being rehired but made no further complaints of sexual harassment. 6 Five other present and former non-supervisory employees testified at the trial, including three checkers and one sacker, Eric Norton. None heard or saw Davis direct sexually offensive comments or actions toward Dhyne. Napier testified that she encouraged Dhyne to complain to management because, when Davis had previously made sexually offensive and derogatory comments to Napier, she complained to Dan Meiners, and Davis promptly apologized and never harassed Napier again. All of these witnesses described Dhyne as a difficult and divisive co-worker. 7 Assistant Manager Watson testified that Dhyne repeatedly complained of sexual harassment by Davis between April and mid-June 1996. Watson said he confronted Davis after each complaint. Davis denied harassing Dhyne. Watson told him if this is happening, you better cut it out or you'll lose your job. After Dhyne's third complaint, Watson talked to Dan Meiners. After the fourth complaint, Watson recommended to Meiners that Davis be fired. 8 Dan Meiners testified that, when Dhyne first complained to him of sexual harassment, he warned Davis that harassing behavior would not be tolerated. Davis denied the allegations, adding that Dhyne had something against him. On June 12, when Dhyne complained that the harassment was continuing, Meiners decided to fire Davis. He confronted Davis, who not only denied Dhyne's allegations but also told Meiners that Dhyne's complaints were racially motivated. Faced with that dilemma, Meiners testified that he instead transferred Davis to the night shift where he would have no further contact with Dhyne. Four days later, Davis was fired for failing to report to the night shift. He was rehired in late September to work an evening shift that did not overlap the shift worked by Dhyne. 9 B. The Legal Environment. When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The Supreme Court recently discussed at length an employer's vicarious liability for a hostile work environment created by a supervisor. See Burlington Ind., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). This is a different type of case because it involves harassment by a non-supervisory co-worker. Our court has long recognized that an employer may be directly liable for such harassment if it knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take proper remedial action. See Callanan v. Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (8th Cir. 1996); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 1988). 10 In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to provide for punitive damages if a private employer engages in intentional, unlawful discrimination with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). The Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for awards of punitive damages under this statute. It provides for punitive awards based solely on an employer's state of mind.... The terms 'malice' or 'reckless indifference' pertain to the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging in discrimination. Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 1999 WL 407481, at  (U.S. Jun. 22, 1999). 11 C. Meiners's Claim for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Meiners appeals the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law on Dhyne's hostile work environment claim, arguing that it took prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 2 This is a close question. Dan Meiners effectively remedied the situation in mid-June when he transferred Davis to another shift. The problem with this remedial action is Meiners's delay in taking it. In many cases, the requirement that an employer properly remedy co-worker sexual harassment must tolerate some delay. Here, for example, Davis denied the alleged harassment, and no other employee corroborated Dhyne's complaints of verbal rather than physical harassment. An employer must be allowed some time to gauge the credibility of the complainant and the seriousness of the situation if we are to observe the Supreme Court's caution that Title VII is not a general civility code for the American workplace. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998). Nonetheless, there was evidence of unacceptable delay. Assistant Manager Watson testified that he had the authority to hire and fire. A reasonable jury could find that Watson should not have delayed two months before taking effective action himself or bringing Dhyne's repeated complaints to Dan Meiners's attention. Because Dhyne sought only damages, the jury's one dollar nominal award was in essence a verdict in favor of Meiners. The district court did not err in upholding that verdict. 12 D. Dhyne's Claim for Punitive Damages. Dhyne argues the district court should have submitted her punitive damages claim to the jury. We disagree. There was no evidence suggesting evil motive or an intentional violation of federal law by the Meiners management. Watson credited Dhyne's complaints. Though he failed to remedy the situation, he warned Davis to behave and eventually urged that Davis be fired. Dan Meiners responded decisively when Dhyne complained to him in June 1996. The Meiners management may have excessively delayed, but it was not guilty of acting with malice or with reckless indifference. See Varner v. National Super Markets, Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1214 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1110 (1997). Likewise, Meiners's conduct was not outrageous because of [its] evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others, the punitive damages standard under the MHRA. Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S. W. 2d 780, 789 (Mo. banc 1989). 13