Opinion ID: 1711278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: alleged new evidence

Text: The facts of this case are adequately set out in this Court's opinions on direct appeal, McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 669 S.W.2d 519 (1984), and on appeal from the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion, McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694 (1986). Suffice it to say that Appellant and his half-brother, Keith Burnell, robbed a Minit Mart store during which the store clerk, Rebecca O'Hearn, was killed by two shots, one to her head and the other to the back of her neck. Appellant's girlfriend, Linda Rose, waited in the car while the two men entered the store. She testified at trial that Appellant had the gun in his possession both when he left the car and when he returned after the shooting. She also testified that Appellant told her he  had shot the clerk twice. Appellant did not testify at trial. He was found guilty of both robbery and murder and was sentenced to twenty years for the robbery and to death for the murder of O'Hearn. Until two weeks before his scheduled execution, Appellant maintained that he had no memory of the robbery and murder. Appellant claims in his CR 60.02 motion that there is new and compelling evidence of his innocence which entitles him to relief. Specifically, he asserts that his present counsel discovered on January 12, 1994 that there is an entry in the police investigative file indicating that Appellant claimed several days after the robbery and murder that it was not he, but Burnell, who actually killed O'Hearn. Even if this were newly discovered evidence, such would only entitle Appellant to a new trial under RCr 10.06, not to extraordinary relief under RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02. Polsgrove v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 776 (1969). Regardless, under either rule, a motion for relief for newly discovered evidence must be made within one year after entry of the final judgment. Id. at 780; CR 60.02(b). Even if it could be argued (as Appellant implies) that evidence was deliberately concealed by the Commonwealth and that the fact of concealment should toll the one year limitations period, Appellant would be precluded from raising the issue after the expiration of one year from the date the evidence was discovered. The alleged discovery date is January 12, 1994. This motion was filed on June 18, 1997. Meanwhile, on May 5, 1994, Appellant filed a motion in federal district court under FRCP 60(b), the federal counterpart to CR 60.02, and did not include this newly discovered evidence as grounds for relief. See generally McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302 (6th Cir. 1996). His attempt to obtain relief on grounds of newly discovered evidence is too late. Regardless, there is nothing newly discovered about this evidence. This is not a statement made to the police by an undisclosed witness or even a confession by an accomplice as in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). This is a statement made by Appellant, himself, in which he denies killing O'Hearn and accuses another of the deed. Since he made the statement, he knew of its existence and there was nothing to discover. In fact, Judge Adams found that the Commonwealth's Attorney had an open file discovery policy and Appellant does not claim that his trial counsel was unaware of the existence of the statement when the case was tried. In fact, Appellant's present counsel tacitly concedes that Appellant made a conscious decision not to accuse Burnell of the murder of O'Hearn and directed his counsel not to raise that defense. That was his option. With respect to trial strategy, a defendant is the pilot of his own ship. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412 (1994). Having exercised that option, he cannot now change course after having remained silent for sixteen years, and raise the issue for the first time on the eve of his execution and expect to obtain a new trial. We note that evidence that Appellant told the police he was not the trigger man would not even have been admissible at his trial. Appellant did not testify, so there is no theory under which it could have been admitted as a prior statement. KRE 801A(a). Although it would be classified as an admission, admissions are admissible only against the declarant. KRE 801A(b)(1). (Although the evidence code was not in effect at the time of Appellant's trial, the code did not change existing law in this regard.) The evidence in question would have been proffered by Appellant, not against him. Appellant admits he does not want a new trial, but only cites this evidence as proof of his innocence of murder and ineligibility for the death sentence. He would be satisfied to have his sentence commuted from death to life without benefit of parole (a sentence not authorized under Kentucky law). But newly discovered evidence is grounds only for a new trial. We are unaware of any authority which would permit a court to commute or alter a legally imposed sentence on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Appellant's claim of a discovery violation per Brady v. Maryland, supra , is inapposite.  The exculpatory evidence suppressed by the prosecution in that case was a statement made by the defendant's accomplice in which he admitted that it was he who had committed the actual killing. Such evidence was deemed exculpatory. We do not perceive a mere self-serving denial by a defendant to be exculpatory evidence in the context of a claimed Brady violation.