Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Court's ex parte meeting with cocounsel Fuller.

Text: On the morning of October 21, 1986, just before the second day of jury selection began, a chambers conference took place on the record, in defendant's presence, among appointed lead defense counsel Robert Birchfield, appointed cocounsel Peggy Fuller, the prosecutor, and the court. Birchfield said he and Fuller had decided, with defendant's concurrence, that for reasons of efficiency Birchfield should be primarily involved in the courtroom presentation while Fuller undertook research and coordination duties outside the courtroom. Fuller confirmed these points. The court commented that the proposed division of labor made sense and suggested that Birchfield ask prospective jurors whether they would be influenced by Fuller's periodic absences from court. Earlier the same morning, Fuller had met ex parte with Judge Ferguson, who was presiding at defendant's trial. In April 1990, an evidentiary hearing was held before Judge King to settle what occurred during this unreported meeting. The resulting settled statement declares in substance as follows: About 8:30 a.m. on October 21, 1986, Fuller asked to see Judge Ferguson on a personal matter. In a very brief meeting, Fuller told him she was concerned about the general manner in which [Birchfield] was handling the case and ... did not know what to do. As a solution, she and Judge Ferguson discussed the possibility that in the future, [she] could do legal research for the defense outside of the courtroom rather than participating personally in the courtroom proceedings. She had previously discussed with Birchfield this change in her role. (1) Defendant argues from these facts that he was denied his state and federal constitutional right to effective, conflict-free representation. He reasons as follows: By disclosing uncertainty how to handle her reservations about Birchfield's performance, Fuller revealed a conflict between her representational duties, on the one hand, and her concerns for her own professional reputation and her desire not to embarrass Birchfield, on the other. The court violated its duty to pursue and resolve a potential conflict brought to its attention, and defendant was given no opportunity to waive the conflict with full knowledge. (See People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 836-837 [254 Cal. Rptr. 298, 765 P.2d 460].) Hence, reversal is required, because the record shows (see Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272-274 [67 L.Ed.2d 220, 230-232, 101 S.Ct. 1097]; Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838), or at least permits informed speculation (see Holloway v. Arkansas (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 484-491 [55 L.Ed.2d 426, 434-439, 98 S.Ct. 1173]; People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 105 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835]), that the conflict prevented Fuller from seeking Birchfield's removal, withdrawing, or participating fully at trial, and thus adversely affected her performance. However, the record does not support defendant's elaborate claims of a constitutional conflict. At most, the evidence indicates that at a particular moment, Fuller had unspecified disagreements with lead counsel's conduct of the case, briefly sought Judge Ferguson's advice about how to proceed, and ultimately confined herself to noncourtroom activities. There is no indication that Fuller was motivated by anything except her sense of professional obligation. (Compare Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d 808 [book rights fee arrangement; counsel's prior relationship with accomplice]; People v. Singer (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 23 [275 Cal. Rptr. 911] [counsel secretly dated defendant's wife]; People v. Jackson (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 829 [213 Cal. Rptr. 521] [counsel secretly dated prosecutor].) Good faith tactical differences among cocounsel are not uncommon, and they do not create a conflict of interest in the constitutional sense. The state and federal Constitutions do not demand complete compatibility among appointed cocounsel (cf. Morris v. Slappy (1981) 461 U.S. 1, 14 [75 L.Ed.2d 610, 621-622, 103 S.Ct. 1610] [Sixth Amendment does not guarantee meaningful relationship between accused and appointed counsel]), require judicial inquiry into any and all signs of disagreement, or mandate particular working relationships within the defense team. The instant record discloses no fundamental breakdown among defendant, Birchfield, and Fuller (cf., e.g., People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1163-1164 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730] [dispute between defendant and counsel not so fundamental as to substantially impair right to effective counsel]), nor does it indicate that the logical division of attorney responsibility endorsed by the trial court had the slightest adverse effect on the defense. (2)(See fn. 5.) No basis appears for a finding of reversible conflict. [5] (3) For similar reasons, we also reject defendant's suggestion that Judge Ferguson erred by failing to inquire sua sponte into the possibility that Birchfield should be replaced for incompetence. Of course, the court must allow the accused to give specific reasons why he wishes replacement of his appointed counsel ( People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44]), but no request for substitution and no specification of reasons was then forthcoming from either defendant or Fuller. Fuller's brief, general, and very tardy complaint that she was concerned about the general manner in which Birchfield was handling the case but did not know what to do was not sufficient to trigger further judicial inquiry. [6]