Opinion ID: 3202132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Restitution Schedule

Text: The district court did not abuse its discretion in setting Inouye’s restitution schedule at 8% of his gross monthly income. When assessing whether a restitution schedule under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2) was an abuse of discretion, we follow a two-step inquiry: First, we determine whether the lower court applied the correct legal rule, and second, we determine whether the application of that rule or standard was illogical, implausible, or without support from any inferences that can be drawn from the record. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1261–62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc); see also United States v. Booth, 309 F.3d 566, 575 n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A restitution order is reviewed for abuse of discretion if it is within the bounds of the statutory framework.”). Inouye fails to make out a case at either step, so we affirm. First, contrary to Inouye’s repeated assertion, the district court committed no legal error when it considered Inouye’s projected future income. To the contrary. By law the district court “shall . . . specify . . . the schedule according to which[] the restitution is to be paid, in consideration of . . . projected earnings and other income of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2)(B) (emphasis added). As we have made clear regarding § 3664(f)(2)(A), “a sentencing court must consider the defendant’s financial resources in setting a restitution payment schedule.” Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). The same holds true for § 3664(f)(2)(B)—a district court must consider projected earnings when imposing restitution. See, e.g., United States UNITED STATES V. INOUYE 9 v. Bogart, 576 F.3d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that § 3664(f)(2) “provides that district courts must evaluate” the “financial resources,” “projected earnings,” and “financial obligations” of the defendant (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 366 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the financial resources and other assets of the defendant; projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and any financial obligations of the defendant, including obligations to dependents” are “mandatory factors” for consideration in setting a restitution schedule). That conclusion is not changed by the fact that Inouye was unemployed at the time of his sentencing (a state of affairs likely to be true in many sentencing proceedings). See, e.g., Booth, 309 F.3d at 576 (holding that a $500-permonth schedule was not an abuse of discretion, even though the defendant claimed that “his circumstances do not permit any payment,” because the defendant could “reasonably look forward to being able to pay [that amount] after his term of imprisonment”); Bogart, 576 F.3d at 574–75, 574 n.4 (noting that restitution schedule was proper in light of the defendant’s “potential earning capacity” despite a recorded monthly cash flow of $193, only $200 in his checking account, over $400,000 in debts, and defendant’s statement that he was “just released from prison” and had unknown prospects (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Viemont, 91 F.3d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If a district court possesses the necessary information regarding the financial condition of a defendant, there is no abuse of discretion in ordering restitution—even where the defendant has a negative net worth and a monthly cash flow of zero.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, as to the application of the restitution statute, we fail to see anything in the district court’s order that is 10 UNITED STATES V. INOUYE illogical, implausible, or without support from the record. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1261–62. The district court did not “ignore[] the cash flow report that was in the PSR,” nor did it “ignore[] that [Inouye] was not paying medical insurance.” The court recognized both of those facts explicitly. And the court’s determination that Inouye’s expenses in the immediate future were likely to be lower than they had been had ample support in the record. The court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Inouye’s expenses would be less when he was no longer living with his children, paying rent, or paying for utilities. Finally, we note, as did the district court, that if Inouye has no job, then 8% of $0.00 is $0.00, and he suffers no real prejudice. Inouye is free to seek further modification of his restitution schedule as his circumstances continue to evolve. AFFIRMED.