Opinion ID: 2353264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Cumulative Effect of Sentencing Errors

Text: Appellant's next claim pertains to the penalty phase of his trial. He argues that the cumulative effect of three statements made by the prosecutor during his closing argument rendered the sentencing proceedings fundamentally unfair, and all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to object to or properly litigate this issue. On direct appeal, we rejected Appellant's claim that he was denied a fair penalty phase hearing by virtue of prosecutorial misconduct on the basis of five segments of the prosecutor's argument. This time, Appellant attacks three more segments of the prosecutor's argument. The PCRA court found this issue was not cognizable under the PCRA. The Commonwealth argues that this claim is previously litigated. We agree, and thus will not review Appellant's current attempt to relitigate this claim. To the extent Appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the three additional comments of which he currently complains, however, this claim is distinct and should be reviewed under the three-prong ineffectiveness standard. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564. Upon review, we conclude that once again, Appellant's claims lack arguable merit. As we noted on direct appeal, comments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true penalty determination. Moreover, [a]t the penalty phase, where the presumption of innocence is no longer applicable, the prosecutor is permitted even greater latitude in presenting argument. The prosecutor may `present argument for or against the sentence of death' and may employ oratorical license and impassioned argument. Washington, 549 Pa. 12, 700 A.2d 400, 414 (1997) (citations omitted). Appellant claims the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to shift the burden of proof by requiring the defense to prove that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. In closing, the prosecutor stated: The Commonwealth has a burden to prove to the Jury that there is an aggravating circumstance which justifies the death penalty and the Defense has a burden to prove that there is  are mitigating circumstances to justify life. They have a burden and it is important to remember that because now they have to meet that burden. They simply can't come in here and make arguments and produce evidence and throw something on the wall and hope that it sticks and you jurors come back and sentence him to life. They have to prove that he is entitled to be sentenced to life just like I have to prove that he should be sentenced to death. Keep that in mind because I will ask you to ask that question amongst yourselves. Have they met their burden? Have they proved to your satisfaction that there are any mitigating circumstances in this case, and if there are any, do those mitigating circumstances in any way outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The Judge will give you the law on how you're to conduct yourselves when you go out and deliberate, and just like at the guilt phase, you're not going to be left to go out and wander aimlessly in the dark as to how you're to deliberate to reach a fair and a just verdict. There are rules and there are laws and there are guidelines, and the Judge will instruct you on. N.T. 10/12/94, 9-10. Read in context, the prosecutor was informing the jury that Appellant has the burden of proving mitigating circumstances, which is true. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(ii). He also informed the jury that the judge would charge them on the law, which he did. See N.T. 10/12/1994, 36-39. Because the prosecutor's comments in no way misrepresented the jury's duty, Appellant has not demonstrated that he was unduly prejudiced by the prosecutor's comments. Appellant also argues that the prosecutor improperly expressed a personal opinion that the testimony of Appellant's mother and grandmother did not constitute mitigating evidence. The prosecutor argued that the testimony of Appellant's grandmother regarding the Appellant's good character was flawed because she testified that she was not aware of how Appellant behaved when he was not around her. He also noted that Appellant's mother's testimony contradicted that of his grandmother. These comments were firmly based on the evidence. Further, it was entirely proper for the prosecutor to argue that Appellant had not met its burden of proving mitigation evidence. Trial counsel, therefore, had a reasonable basis not to object, and appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Next, Appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly stated that no mitigation evidence had been proved, which should make the jury's job easier. In context, the prosecutor was simply arguing that no mitigating circumstances had been proved: I ask you based upon the evidence to find no mitigating circumstances. Make your job easier. We cannot conclude that this comment rendered the jury incapable of objectively weighing the evidence. Additionally, the jury found evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). Appellant once again fails to demonstrate how the prosecutor's comment prejudiced him.