Opinion ID: 3004145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Director shall be the executive officer of the

Text: Commission; shall be hired, supervised, and evaluated by the Commission; and shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission. .... 3. The Director shall be afforded the same rights and privileges as outlined in the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415), except for hiring. The Personnel Code, mentioned in both the Admin- istrative Rules and Bylaws, provides a system of personnel administration for the state government under the governor, based on merit principles and scientific methods. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/2. Generally, directors of department and members of commissions are exempted from the Personnel Code. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4c(7), amended by 2008 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 95-728 (S.B. 970). However, the Personnel Code provides for partial exemptions for directors and other positions if the Civil Service Commission determines that the position “involve[s] either principal administrative responsibility for the determination of policy or principal administrative responsibility for the way in which policies are carried out,” based upon written recommendation of the Director of Central Management Services (“CMS”). 20 Ill. 6 No. 08-3245 Comp. Stat. 415/4d(3). Accordingly, provisions of the Personnel Code, called “jurisdictions”, can be extended to specified individuals if the CMS Director makes the recommendation. The Personnel Code provides, in part: No officer or employee under jurisdiction B, relating to merit and fitness, who has been appointed under the rules and after examination, shall be removed discharged or demoted, or be suspended for a period of more than 30 days, in any 12 month period, except for cause. See 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/11 (emphasis added). Therefore, if Covell was covered under jurisdiction B, he could only be terminated for cause. Covell does not argue that he was covered by the Personnel Code. See Reply Br. at 5. However, he claims that he had a property interest in his employment because he had “the same rights and privileges as outlined in the Personnel Code [20 ILCS 415], except for hiring.” Based on the language of the Personnel Code, Covell maintains that he could not be terminated from his employment absent good cause, and argues that the lack of either a predisciplinary hearing or a prompt hearing following the assessment to terminate him violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants dispute that Covell could only be terminated for cause and maintain that Covell was an “at will” employee who served “at the pleasure” of the Commission. To the extent that Covell argues that the Defendants intended to provide him an extension of Personnel Code protection for all employment matters, No. 08-3245 7 other than hiring, the Defendants assert that any attempt would be beyond the Commission’s authority. The Defendants note that the General Assembly specifically created a provision for extension of jurisdiction within the Personnel Code, see 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 415/4b, but there is no evidence that the Defendants sought to undertake this process in order to provide Covell with all of its protections, except for the specific provision related to hiring. Covell maintains that the Commission’s inclusion of the phrase “except for hiring” was based on its desire to be able to hire a deaf director in the future. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Covell, we conclude that he failed to sufficiently demonstrate that he had a property interest in his employment because he did not establish that there was a mutually explicit understanding that he could only be terminated for cause. Instead, the rules governing the Commission make clear that Covell’s position as Director of IDHHC was terminable at will. The language from 2 Ill. Admin. Code § 3300.380(a) that states that the Director “shall be hired, supervised, and evaluated by the Commission; and shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission” as well as the portion of the bylaws that state that he “shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission” supports this conclusion. The Personnel Code, standing alone, does not establish that Covell could only be terminated for cause, as it provides multiple rights and privileges, and Covell cannot establish that he is entitled to the protections under jurisdiction B. To find a contrary interpretation, i.e., that Covell enjoyed the right to be employed except 8 No. 08-3245 for cause, would conflict with the previously stated language that states Covell serves “at the pleasure of the Commission.” As we conclude that Covell was an at-will employee, it is unnecessary to discuss whether the Defendants would be covered under qualified immunity.