Opinion ID: 2308059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duress Jury Instruction

Text: Wonnum next contends that the trial judge improperly denied her request for a duress instruction. The trial judge found that Wonnum failed to demonstrate that Martin had actually threatened her and thus would not give her requested duress instruction. We review the Superior Court's denial of a requested instruction de novo. [9] To establish the affirmative defense of duress, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that she was coerced to engage in the conduct charged by the use of, or a threat to use, force against her person or the person of another. [10] Under 11 Del. C. § 304(b), Unless the court determines that no reasonable juror could find an affirmative defense established by a preponderance of the evidence presented by the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that the jury must acquit the defendant if they find the affirmative defense established by a preponderance of the evidence. The affirmative defense is established by a preponderance of the evidence only if it is more likely than not that each element of the defense existed at the required time. [11] In addition, for a duress instruction to be given, the trial judge must be satisfied that some credible evidence supporting the defense has been presented. [12] Credible can be defined as capable of being believed. In Gutierrez v. State, in discussing the affirmative defense of self-defense, we held that the judge, in her role as gatekeeper, ensures (1) that the affirmative defense evidence describes a situation that is within the realm of possibility, and (2) that such situation would legally satisfy the requirements of [the asserted affirmative defense.] [13] We went on in Gutierrez to cite with approval the proposition that, If there is credible evidence supporting an affirmative defense, the court must instruct the jury on the defense even if the supporting evidence consists of highly improbable testimony by the defendant. [14] Thus, as in Gutierrez, when the defendant presents some evidence capable of being believed, on each of the elements of an affirmative defense, whether the defendant has proved the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence is a jury question. We believe that the defendant's testimony supported a jury instruction for duress. The defendant's testimony is for the jury to believe or reject. Wonnum's testimony, as well as the excluded psychological report, provides some credible evidence to support a duress instruction. As the Fifth Circuit wrote in United States v. Willis, In determining whether the elements of duress are met, the fact-finder may take into account the objective situation in which the defendant was allegedly subjected to duress. In addition to the immediate circumstances of the crime, this would include evidence concerning the defendant's past history with the person making the unlawful threat. [15] Wonnum testified that when she disobeyed Martin, he would curse, yell, and hit her. On an earlier occasion, when he wanted her to commit a robbery and she would not, he beat her. On May 18, 2005, Martin told her to rob someone, he put the loaded gun in her purse, and directed her to call someone. Wonnum testified at trial she wanted to get [the robbery] done so Martin can leave me alone. She also testified that she was afraid Martin or one of his friends would hurt her family if she did not follow his orders. The trial judge's factual findings prevented Wonnum from presenting a viable duress defense. After finding that Martin made no specific or immediate threat to Wonnum, that he was absent at the time of the shootings, and that Wonnum had the opportunity to escape and after excluding the expert report without having read it or considered any of its implications, barring a duress defense and refusing to instruct the jury accordingly, became a self-fulfilling prophecy. While the record superficially supports those findings (depending on one's view of how specific the threat must be), a threat can also mean an implied threat the genuineness of which can be reinforced by earlier conduct. Wonnum's testimony supported, by actual relationship history, an implied, current threat. Based on Wonnum's testimony, it was within the realm of possibility that Wonnum was acting under duress when she committed the crime of robbery. The jury, not the trial judge, should have decided whether Wonnum satisfied her burden of proof to establish that defense by a preponderance of the evidence. We note that our colleague dissents from this, Part II, of the Opinion. We do not hesitate to point out that in his thoughtful and articulate dissent, he agrees with much of our analysis in Part II though he parts from us by concluding that the trial judge rightfully made a unilateral judgment that a reasonable person would have found several legal alternatives to both robbing and killing Jackson and that, therefore, the trial judge correctly found in the first instance as a matter of law, that a reasonable person in Wonnum's situation would have been able to resist Martin's coercive conduct. We disagree. We do so because evidence both admittedWonnum's testimonyand improperly barredthe psychological reportoffered some credible evidence supporting the duress defense. As we point out in Part III, under the Delaware Constitution, juries, not judges, are fact finders in Delaware jury trials. [16] Superficially, characterizing the duress defense as battered woman syndrome and rejecting it, without even reading or considering the psychological report does not morph the trial judge's rejection of the request for a jury instruction on duress into a ruling as a matter of law. Here, the jury should have weighed Wonnum's ability to pursue legal alternatives and assessed her credibility, that of the report and the application of those facts and opinion if believed, to both elements of the duress defense. It should have been they, and not the trial judge, who answered the questions of whether a reasonable person in Wonnum's situation would have been able to find legal alternatives to robbing and shooting the victim. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge committed reversible error when she failed to instruct the jury on the duress defense.