Opinion ID: 4685717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicable Standards of Review and Relevant

Text: Principles of Statutory Interpretation ¶18 We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 19, 465 P.3d 554, 559. Hence, when reviewing such an order, we apply the same legal standard as the district court. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 2016 CO 29, ¶ 9, 369 P.3d 573, 578. ¶19 It is apodictic that summary judgment is a drastic remedy reserved for those situations in which it is clear that the applicable legal standard has been satisfied. Rein, ¶ 21, 465 P.3d at 559. Summary judgment is proper only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at ¶ 19, 465 P.3d at 559 (quoting C.R.C.P. 56(c)). The court must afford the nonmoving party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from 12 the undisputed facts. Id. at ¶ 20, 465 P.3d at 559. Conversely, the court must resolve all doubts against the moving party. Id. That’s not to suggest that the nonmoving party may simply rest on the allegations and demands in its pleadings. Id. To survive a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must put forth specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. ¶20 We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Id. at ¶ 22, 465 P.3d at 559. In interpreting a statute, we aim to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Linnebur v. People, 2020 CO 79M, ¶ 9, 476 P.3d 734, 736–37. To do so, we consider first the plain language of the statute, giving the words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Id., 476 P.3d at 737. We look to the entire statutory scheme because we are required to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts, while simultaneously avoiding constructions that would either render any of its words or phrases superfluous or yield illogical or absurd results. Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, ¶ 18, 477 P.3d 694, 698. If the statute is unambiguous—i.e., if it is not reasonably susceptible to multiple interpretations—we apply it as written and refrain from resorting to other rules of statutory construction. Id. 13 B. The State Was Required to Prove the Voluntary Act Proscribed by the Taking Statutory Provisions (the Actus Reus) ¶21 5 Star claims, the State concedes, and we conclude that the State could prevail on its civil claim only if it proved that 5 Star violated at least one of the predicate taking statutory provisions. While the State had to prove any such violation only by a preponderance of the evidence (not beyond a reasonable doubt) because this is a civil (not criminal) case, it was nevertheless required to prove all the elements necessary for a conviction. § 33-6-110(1); cf. Itin v. Ungar, 17 P.3d 129, 133 (Colo. 2000) (holding that recovery of treble damages under the civil theft statute requires a plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “the elements” necessary “to establish a defendant’s liability for the crime” of theft). The plain language in section 33-6-110(1) makes this clear: The State may “bring and maintain a civil action against any person . . . to recover possession or value or both . . . of any wildlife taken in violation of articles 1 to 6 of this title.” (Emphasis added.) All three taking statutory provisions reside in articles 2 and 6 of title 33 and pronounce certain conduct unlawful.7 7 The provisions of the criminal code “do not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right [to] or liability [for] damages . . . authorized by law to be recovered . . . in a civil action.” § 18-1-103(3), C.R.S. (2020). However, “unless the context otherwise requires,” the provisions of the criminal code “govern the construction of . . . any offense defined in any statute of this state.” § 18-1-103(1). 14 ¶22 As pertinent here, each taking statutory provision prohibits the unauthorized taking of protected wildlife. In 2015, when the rainstorm led to overflow from one of 5 Star’s wastewater containment ponds, section 33-1-102(43), C.R.S. (2015), defined “[t]ake” to mean “to acquire possession of wildlife; but such term shall not include the accidental wounding or killing of wildlife by a motor vehicle, vessel, or train.”8 Possession meant (in 2015) and continues to mean “either actual or constructive possession of or any control over the object referred to.” § 33-1-102(34). The parties see eye to eye on the applicability of these definitions. Where the parties diverge is on the elements of the predicate criminal offenses defined by the taking statutory provisions. Because this civil action is moored to those offenses, their elements are pivotal. ¶23 The parties skirmish over two questions related to the elements of the offenses underlying this civil action: (1) Do the taking statutory provisions impose strict liability or was the State required to prove that 5 Star acted with the culpable 8 In 2020, the legislature amended the definition of “[t]ake” as follows: “to kill or otherwise acquire possession of wildlife; except that the term does not include the accidental wounding or killing of wildlife by a motor vehicle, vessel, or train.” Ch. 49, sec. 1, § 33-1-102(48), 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 167, 167 (emphasis added to underscore the substantive part of the amendment). We assume without deciding that, with some exceptions not relevant here, the 2015 definition of “[t]ake” included the killing of the wildlife identified in the taking statutory provisions. 15 mental state of knowingly?; and (2) Was the State required to prove that 5 Star committed an unlawful voluntary act or simply a voluntary act? Resolution of the latter is dispositive, so we pass no judgment on the former. ¶24 The State avers that the voluntary act or actus reus prong of criminal liability in Colorado does not require proof of an unlawful act.9 5 Star counters that the State was required to prove the voluntary act proscribed by the taking statutory provisions. We agree with 5 Star. ¶25 Our General Assembly has declared that “[t]he minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing.”10 § 18-1-502, C.R.S. (2020) (emphasis added). “Voluntary act” means “an act performed consciously as a result of effort or determination.” § 18-1-501(9), C.R.S. (2020). An “[a]ct,” in turn, is defined as “a bodily movement.” § 18-1-501(1). 9 Before the division, the State largely sang a different tune. Its chief argument there was that there is no voluntary act requirement in the taking statutory provisions because, in its view, they create strict liability offenses. The division had no trouble rejecting this contention, and we devote no time to it because the State abandoned it before knocking on our door. 10The State does not rely on an alleged omission by 5 Star. For that reason, and for the sake of simplicity, we do not analyze the concept of omission of an act in this opinion. 16 ¶26 Of course, not all voluntary conduct is subject to criminal liability. After all, the law doesn’t impose liability on the blameless. People v. Marcy, 628 P.2d 69, 73 (Colo. 1981), superseded by statute, § 18-3-102(1)(d), C.R.S. (1986), as recognized in People v. Lee, 2020 CO 81, ¶¶ 14–16, 476 P.3d 351, 354–55. As we proclaimed in Marcy four decades ago, a person is generally not subject to criminal liability for his conduct unless there is “an unlawful act (actus reus) and a culpable mental state (mens rea).” Id. (emphasis added). Here, our focus is on the actus reus prong of criminal liability. ¶27 Black’s Law Dictionary defines actus reus as: 1. The wrongful deed that comprises the physical components of a crime and that generally must be coupled with mens rea to establish criminal liability; a forbidden act . 2. The voluntary act . . . , the attendant circumstances, and the social harm caused by a criminal act, all of which make up the physical components of a crime.—Also termed deed of crime; overt act. Actus Reus, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (first two emphases added); see also id. (quoting Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 19 (2d ed. 1961), for the following propositions: (1) in the event “the specification of a crime includes a number of circumstances, all of these are essential and all must be regarded as part of the actus reus”; and (2) “[t]he view that actus reus means all the 17 external ingredients of the crime is not only the simplest and clearest but the one that gives the most satisfactory results.”). ¶28 Colorado jurisprudence has long treated the “voluntary act” required by section 18-1-502 synonymously with the “actus reus” of the offense and has made clear that the terms refer to the voluntary act proscribed by the statute defining the offense (i.e., the voluntary act rendered unlawful by the statute defining the offense). Marcy is illustrative. See 628 P.2d at 73 (pointing out that the minimum requirements for criminal liability in Colorado are an “unlawful act” or the “actus reus” and a “culpable mental state” or “mens rea”). And Marcy keeps good company. See, e.g., Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000) (referring to “the actus reus” as “an unlawful act”); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982) (same); People v. Hoskay, 87 P.3d 194, 198 (Colo. App. 2003) (same). ¶29 We have made similar declarations in other cases. In People v. Wilhelm, after acknowledging that the General Assembly has enacted strict liability offenses, which do not contain a culpable mental state or mens rea requirement, 11 we explained that such offenses simply require “proof . . . that the prohibited conduct was ‘the product of conscious mental activity involving effort or determination.’” 11See § 18-1-502 (providing that when a culpable mental state or mens rea is not required for the commission of an offense, “the offense is one of ‘strict liability’”). 18 676 P.2d 702, 706 (Colo. 1984) (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Rostad, 669 P.2d 126, 129 (Colo. 1983)). Similarly, in Rostad, we said that “the minimal requirement for a ‘strict liability’ offense is proof that the proscribed conduct was performed voluntarily.” 669 P.2d at 129 (emphasis added). And in People v. Caddy, we noted that it was “well settled that the legislature may make a prohibited act a crime, irrespective of the elements of intent or scienter, when public policy so requires.” 540 P.2d 1089, 1090 (Colo. 1975) (emphasis added). ¶30 Not surprisingly, the Colorado Model Criminal Jury Instructions have followed suit. COLJI-Crim. G1:01 recommends instructing jurors in all but strict liability cases as follows: “A crime is committed when the defendant has committed a voluntary act prohibited by law, together with a culpable state of mind.” (Emphasis added.) ¶31 Therefore, here, the State could not prevail unless it proved that 5 Star committed the voluntary act proscribed by the taking statutory provisions.12 Though the State disputes this point and argues that any voluntary act—not necessarily the voluntary act proscribed by the taking statutory provisions— 12To the extent that the division’s references to an “unlawful” voluntary act meant the voluntary act proscribed by the taking statutory provisions, its analysis aligns with ours. 19 would have sufficed, it ultimately concedes in its reply brief that it was required to prove that 5 Star killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish without authorization. But that’s precisely the voluntary act proscribed by the taking statutory provisions (i.e., the actus reus). As the State reluctantly acknowledges, what the taking statutory provisions proscribe is any voluntary act that kills or otherwise acquires possession of or control over certain wildlife without authorization. ¶32 So, did the State present proof of the voluntary act proscribed by the taking statutory provisions? We turn to that question next. C. The District Court Erred in Granting the State’s Motion for Summary Judgment ¶33 In the district court, the State presented no evidence that 5 Star performed a voluntary act by which it killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish without authorization. Accordingly, the State failed to satisfy the voluntary act or actus reus requirement of the taking statutory provisions. ¶34 The voluntary act the State alleged 5 Star performed was the lawful, yearslong operation of wastewater containment ponds. But 5 Star’s lawful, longstanding operation of wastewater containment ponds was not proscribed by the taking statutory provisions because such operation didn’t kill or otherwise acquire possession of or control over the fish. 20 ¶35 Significantly, the State’s complaint didn’t even allege that 5 Star’s lawful, longstanding operation of wastewater containment ponds killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish. The State’s theory was that the “discharge” of a mixture of wastewater and rainwater from one of 5 Star’s containment ponds killed the fish. That discharge, however, was triggered by the rainstorm, which was certainly not an act performed by 5 Star, much less an act 5 Star undertook “consciously as a result of effort or determination.” § 18-1-501(9). ¶36 The State’s attempt to analogize 5 Star’s lawful, long-term operation of wastewater containment ponds to the situation we dealt with in People v. Garcia misses the mark. 541 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1975), superseded by statute, § 18-4-105, C.R.S. (1977), as recognized in Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1285 (Colo. 2000). Indeed, Garcia actually undercuts the State’s position. There, the defendant lodged a constitutional challenge against the fourth degree arson statute, which, at the time, made it unlawful for anyone to “start[] or maintain[] a fire on . . . his own property or that of another” when doing so “place[d] any building or occupied structure of another in danger of damage.” Id. at 688 (quoting section 18-4-105(1), C.R.S. 21 (1973)).13 The defendant argued, among other things, that the statute reached constitutionally protected conduct. Id. at 689. In rejecting the claim, we relied on section 18-1-502’s general prerequisites for criminal liability and held that the prosecution was required to prove that the defendant had performed the voluntary act proscribed by the statute. Id. We reasoned that a person could not be found guilty if the fire was started “by events beyond [his] control.” Id. ¶37 Our holding today jibes with Garcia. Just as a defendant can’t be found guilty of fourth degree arson if the fire was started by events beyond his control, a defendant can’t be found guilty of taking protected wildlife without authorization under one of the taking statutory provisions if the taking was accomplished by events beyond his control. Regardless of whether the culprit was fire or water, criminal liability may not attach in either scenario if the defendant did not perform the voluntary act proscribed by the statute defining the offense. Thus, although the State seeks refuge in Garcia, we perceive nothing in Garcia that can reasonably be read as relieving the State of its burden to prove that 5 Star 13Two years after we decided Garcia, the legislature amended section 18-4-105 by adding the mens rea of “knowingly or recklessly.” Copeland, 2 P.3d at 1285 (quoting §§ 18-4-105 and 18-4-106, C.R.S. (1999)). 22 performed a voluntary act by which it killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish without authorization. ¶38 The flaw in the State’s analytical approach in the district court was that it seemed to analyze this case through the prism of a negligence tort. 14 But tort principles can’t be shoehorned into section 33-6-110(1) because that statutory provision doesn’t authorize the State to recover by proving a civil negligence claim. Rather, as we observed above, section 33-6-110(1) requires proof establishing a criminal offense pursuant to one of the taking statutory provisions. And the voluntary act or actus reus required by each such offense (i.e., the voluntary act proscribed) is killing or otherwise acquiring possession of or control over certain wildlife without authorization. Contrary to the State’s suggestion, that voluntary act or actus reus requirement can’t be satisfied by proof of any voluntary act without regard to whether such act killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish without authorization. ¶39 In short, to borrow from the old idiom, the State brought a negligence-tort knife to an actus-reus gun fight and, as this opinion demonstrates, it could not 14To establish a prima facie case for a negligence tort claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant, having a legal duty of care, breached that duty through any act or omission, and that such act or omission caused the plaintiff’s injury. See Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc. v. Parsons Corp., 242 P.3d 1067, 1074 (Colo. 2010). 23 withstand 5 Star’s summary-judgment salvo. Because the State didn’t even allege in its complaint that 5 Star’s sole voluntary act—the lawful, years-long operation of wastewater containment ponds—killed or otherwise acquired possession of or control over the fish without authorization, the district court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment.15 ¶40 Our work isn’t done yet, though, because the denial of 5 Star’s cross-motion for summary judgment is also before us. We explore that aspect of 5 Star’s appeal below. D. The District Court Also Erred in Denying 5 Star’s Motion for Summary Judgment ¶41 An order denying a motion for summary judgment is generally not appealable because it doesn’t terminate the litigation. Glennon Heights, Inc. v. Cent. 15The State admits in its opening brief that the issue of “causation . . . is not before this Court.” True to this concession, the State discusses causation and related concepts (such as foreseeability) only in the limited context of arguing that interpreting the taking statutory provisions as imposing strict liability does not give rise to any constitutional infirmities because, in its view, a “proximate cause requirement” is automatically imported into those provisions. Since we do not reach the mens rea question, however, that contention is irrelevant. And we do not otherwise discuss causation because ours is an adversarial system of justice that adheres to the party presentation principle, which puts the onus on the parties to frame the issues to be decided while assigning to courts the role of neutral arbiters of the matters raised by the parties. United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). As the division put it, courts “should not be making arguments for a party.” Dep’t of Nat. Res., ¶ 40. Attorneys, not judicial officers, should lawyer cases. 24 Bank & Tr., 658 P.2d 872, 875 (Colo. 1983). However, as the division astutely recognized, where the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of liability and the district court grants one, denies the other, and then resolves the issue of damages at a bench trial, the judgment is final and we may review the order denying summary judgment. See Dep’t of Nat. Res., ¶ 36 (citing Yaffe Cos., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2007)). ¶42 In its motion for summary judgment, 5 Star relied on the lack of any argument or evidence by the State regarding the voluntary act or actus reus required by the taking statutory provisions. As such, it was incumbent on the State to come forward with evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact vis-à-vis that requirement. Rein, ¶ 20, 465 P.3d at 559. Because the State failed to do so, the district court erred in denying 5 Star’s motion and we now direct the entry of judgment against the State and in favor of 5 Star. See In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511, 515–16 (Colo. App. 2004) (directing entry of judgment for the party whose summary judgment motion was denied by the district court because no factual issue remained); Udis v. Universal Commc’ns Co., 56 P.3d 1177, 1183 (Colo. App. 2002) (same); see also Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445, 456–57 (Colo. 1986) (explaining that a party’s failure to challenge evidence presented in support of a motion for summary judgment in the district court waives any such challenge on appeal). 25