Opinion ID: 2419596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scheduling of Trial

Text: Pyles also contends that the trial court erred by requiring that the defense present his case at night without giving the jury a dinner break. Appellant contends that the trial was rushed from its initiation with the hurried selection of jurors, with the first day of trial continuing until 7:15 pm. and the second day beginning at 9:00 am with the State resting at 3:00 pm. The appellant began its case at 3:15 pm. At 6:39 pm. appellant requested the court to adjourn until the next day; this was denied and the court stated that there would be no adjournment until the defendant rested its case. There was no break the rest of the day except an eight minute break from 6:27 until 6:35 pm. Appellant contends that he was treated differently than the State. He contends that there was error in the trial court's continuing the trial well into the evening. The trial court denied a request by defense attorney to adjourn for the night. The trial court admonished both attorneys saying that they both had drug the case on and on and gone over stuff that didn't having any bearing on the case. The Court went on to say that there had been more irrelevant testimony in this case than I have ever seen. Clearly by reprimanding both counsels, the court was not treating one side differently from the other. In fact, after the defense rested, the Court ruled that the State would have to introduce its case in rebuttal before adjourning for the night. In Kitchen v. State, 271 Ark. 1, 607 S.W.2d 345 (1980), we held that it is the duty of the trial judge to see not only that the trial proceeds in accordance with law but that it proceeds efficiently and effectively and in keeping with the ends of justice. He should be free to shut off long-winded and irrelevant testimony or questioning and to confine counsel to the actual issues in the case. Also, in Clines, Holmes, Richley, & Orndorff v. State, 280 Ark. 77, 656 S.W.2d 684 (1983), we found no abuse of discretion for a trial court to order a five-day recess as the trial was nearing a close. The Court found that absent proof of great prejudice there was no evidence of an abuse of discretion. It is not necessary for us to rule on this point as the issue will be moot when the case is retried. However, we will note that while a trial court has great discretion in scheduling a trial in a manner to allow all necessary evidence to be presented, we do not find it desirable for a trial court to hurry a trial along. Trial courts should allow both sides ample time to fairly present their sides and allow the jury sufficient time to digest and consider all of the evidence within reasonable time restraints. All other points raised on appeal are found to be without merit and moot following our decision to remand this case for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.