Opinion ID: 2525113
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Loncar's Pre-Accident Medical History

Text: Loncar argues that the superior court erred in admitting testimony regarding her prior medical history. We conclude that the superior court did not err. Prior to trial, the superior court excluded evidence of Loncar's less recent medical history, including records of doctors' visits in 1983, 1986, and 1989six to twelve years before the accident. [6] The court's initial order implied, and later reiterations confirmed, that Loncar's medical history during this period would be considered collateral, and all evidence regarding it would be excluded, unless the defense could offer a medical opinion laying [a] nexus between her prior medical condition and the present medical condition. The court informed the parties that it would require an offer of proof outside the presence of the jury before admitting any records, expert testimony, or lay testimony about the records and associated medical history. Judge Tan later clarified, however, that Loncar's ex-husband would be permitted to testify about her condition at the time immediately before the accident. Taken together, the court's orders established that recent medical history was relevant and admissible, but that longer-term medical historyincluding Loncar's 1983-1989 medical recordswould be deemed collateral unless medical testimony established its relevance. On the fifth day of trial, Loncar's attorney asked a neuropsychologist, Dr. Paul Craig, questions that Judge Tan later deemed to have opened the door to prior medical history evidence. Loncar asked Dr. Craig whether it would be important for his diagnosis to know if Loncar had suffered similar symptoms in the year or the two years before the accident, and whether, if there had been prior doctors' appointments, it's fair to say that the greater the time period between the treatments, the less significant they are. Dr. Craig testified that ongoing pre-injury treatment for serious headaches could be significant, and increasingly significant the closer in time the treatment was to the post-accident headaches. Loncar's attorney also asked a lay witness, Loncar's friend Gordana Dadic, whether Loncar had complained of headaches or dizziness before the accident; Dadic said no. Later, despite the apparently still-valid preclusion order, Gray's attorney asked Mike Loncar about his ex-wife's dizziness, nausea, headaches, and vomiting in the ten years before the accident. Mr. Loncar testified that she had complained of the symptoms for that entire period. Judge Tan admitted the testimony over Loncar's objection, because he found that Loncar herself had opened the door to this line of questioning by asking Dr. Craig about prior ongoing symptoms and treatment. Judge Tan instructed the parties that Mr. Loncar can testify as to his personal observations of the condition. We're not talking about admitting medical testimony or medical exhibits.... The door is open slightly, but not everything comes in. Following this ruling, Mr. Loncar's non-expert and allegedly hostile testimony was admitted, but the medical records suggesting that Loncar's previous ailments were far in the past and possibly unrelated to her 1995 accident were not. Loncar did not attempt to remedy this disadvantageous situation by moving to modify Judge Tan's earlier preclusion order so that she could bring in the records or other medical history evidence of her own. However, she now argues that the superior court erred in admitting Mr. Loncar's testimony. We conclude that the superior court did not err in ruling that Loncar had opened the door to her ex-husband's testimony. Under our case law, a party may open the door to evidence on a subject by putting that subject at issue in the case. [7] Because Loncar did put her medical history at issue in this case, the superior court was within its discretion in allowing Gray to present Mr. Loncar's testimony about the subject. [8] We considered the issue of evidentiary door-opening in Worthy v. State , a sexual assault case against defendant Conrad Worthy. [9] The prosecution in that case sought to generate sympathy for the victim and antipathy for Worthy by eliciting testimony that the victim had been raped once before, and that Worthy made reference to the previous rape during his assault. [10] But the trial court excluded testimony tending to suggest that the victim's previous rape allegations had in fact been unfounded. [11] We held that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence, because once the prosecution opened the door to the subject of the previous rape accusation, the defense was entitled to litigate the truth or falsity of that accusation. [12] It was Loncar who raised the issue of her previous medical history at trial. Thus, the superior court did not err in concluding that Loncar opened the door to Mr. Loncar's lay testimony about her medical history. Dr. Craig introduced the subject in response to Loncar's questions. Moreover, Loncar herself had already elicited lay testimony about medical history from Dadic. Given this background, it was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to admit additional lay testimony about Loncar's long-term medical history. [13] Loncar argues that she questioned Dr. Craig about medical history only to cure the defense's insinuations that she had lied to her doctor about her prior medical condition. [14] But Loncar did not object to Gray's insinuations at the time, and she does not now explain why statements by the defense should immunize her own intrusion into the subject area covered by the preclusion order. Loncar also points out that her questions to Dr. Craig carefully focused on the period of one to two years before the accident. However, both Dr. Craig's replies and Loncar's own earlier questions to her lay witness raised the issue of ongoing health problems and ongoing treatment.