Opinion ID: 1249847
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Heading: validity of the interim zoning ordinance

Text: The authority of the county to enact a zoning ordinance is found in Code §§ 15.1-486 [2] through 15.1-498 (Repl. Vol. 1973). There is no special statutory provision for interim zoning ordinances. Matthews, relying on our decision in Bd. of Supervisors v. Horne, 216 Va. 113, 215 S.E.2d 453 (1975), contends that without express statutory authority to enact an interim zoning ordinance, such an ordinance is void. But Horne is not controlling in the present case. In Horne we held that in the absence of express or implied authority under the enabling subdivision or zoning statutes an ordinance imposing a temporary moratorium on the filing of site plans and preliminary subdivision plats pending completion of a new comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance was void. In the present case, the Ordinance did not temporarily prohibit all new subdivision development in the county by suspending the operation of applicable ordinances; it merely purported to zone Greene County for a period not exceeding one year. In the absence of specific authority for interim zoning, all zoning ordinances, however titled, are subject to the same statutory requirements. The temporary duration of the Ordinance under consideration is irrelevant, and the Ordinance must stand or fall as a valid or invalid zoning ordinance. See Kline v. Harrisburg, 362 Pa. 438, 68 A.2d 182 (1949); State ex rel. Kramer v. Schwartz, 336 Mo. 932, 82 S.W.2d 63 (1935); Downey v. Sioux City, 208 Iowa 1273, 227 N.W. 125 (1929); Phillips Petroleum Company v. City of Park Ridge, 16 Ill.App.2d 555, 149 N.E.2d 344 (1958); Morris v. Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954). Although the Interim Zoning Ordinance, like the Interim Development Ordinance in Horne, was designed as a temporary expedient to control growth in the county until a better ordinance could be prepared, this purpose does not of itself invalidate the Ordinance. Any zoning ordinance may be said to be temporary in the sense that it is always subject to amendment. The critical question is whether the Board of Supervisors of Greene County acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enacting this single-district ordinance which permitted of right only minimum lot sizes of two acres throughout the county. The validity of single-district zoning ordinances enacted by municipalities has been considered in some jurisdictions with varying results. See Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 1282. We are aware of no case, however, in which such an ordinance adopted by a county was considered. In Town of Hobart v. Collier, 3 Wis.2d 182, 87 N.W.2d 868 (1958), a one-district zoning ordinance for a town of 180 square miles, an area greater than Greene County, was held to be unreasonable and arbitrary on its face because the ordinance failed to implement the purposes stated in its preamble of creating districts for trade, industry, residence or other uses. Code § 15.1-486 authorizes a locality to divide the territory under its jurisdiction. . . into districts of such number. . . as it may deem advisable. A reasonable inference from this language is that there was a legislative intent that there be a division into two or more districts, rather than one or more districts. In so construing similar language the Michigan Supreme Court held invalid an ordinance which zoned an entire village in a single district. Gundersen v. Village of Bingham Farms, 372 Mich. 352, 126 N.W.2d 715 (1964). However, a Missouri case to the same effect, City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 367 S.W.2d 568 (Mo.1963), cited with approval in Gundersen, was overruled by McDermott v. Village of Calverton Park, 454 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.1970), which held that a statute containing language similar to ours did not indicate a legislative intent that, under all circumstances, a municipality must provide for more than one zoning district. The court considered the evidence which showed that there was no commercial construction in the village, that the village adjoined two cities, and that there were ample commercial facilities for its 1,700 inhabitants, and upheld an ordinance creating one single-family residential district for the entire village. We find it unnecessary to decide whether Code § 15.1-486 precludes the enactment by any county or municipality under any circumstances of a single-district zoning ordinance. In addition to McDermott, cases from other jurisdictions which have considered such ordinances have ruled that their validity should be determined on the basis of the evidence. Thus, in Valley View Village v. Proffett, 221 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1955), where a zoning ordinance placed a residential village of 1,000 inhabitants, 18 square miles in area on the periphery of the City of Cleveland, in one residential zone, it was held that the ordinance was not per se arbitrary and unreasonable in its application. In Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965), an interim zoning ordinance placed the entire town, a residential community containing 750 dwellings and nine small commercial or mercantile establishments, in a residential zone with minimum lot sizes of one acre. The ordinance, adopted with reference to a comprehensive plan, was held to be valid. An ordinance zoning a town of 19.9 square miles and 6,700 inhabitants as a residential and farming district was upheld in Cadoux v. Planning and Zoning Com'n of Town of Weston, 162 Conn. 425, 294 A.2d 582 (1972). The court held that the reasonableness of the one-zone ordinance was a matter of fact, and that it was not arbitrary and unreasonable for a town on the periphery of larger metropolitan centers to preserve its residential character so long as the business and industrial needs of its inhabitants were supplied by accessible areas. See also Blank v. Town of Lake Clarke Shores, 161 So.2d 683 (Fla.App.1964). In Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427 (1931), an ordinance which placed an entire village except for a small part thereof in one residential zone was held to be invalid. The court found that the ordinance did not attempt to segregate in appropriate places all the activities of commercial life and that the small area to which business and industry were relegated was not suitable for that purpose. Accordingly, we consider the Interim Zoning Ordinance in the light of the evidence in the record before us. A zoning ordinance is presumed to be valid, the one attacking the ordinance must carry the burden of proof, and if the reasonableness of the ordinance is fairly debatable it must be sustained. Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 660, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959). In that case, a zoning ordinance requiring minimum lot sizes of two acres in the western two-thirds of Fairfax County was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable, where by amendment developers were permitted for a period of two years to record plats providing for lots of a minimum size of one-half acre. It was conceded by the landowners that the two-acre minumum restriction was not per se invalid. In the present case, the appellees, fortified by the ruling of the trial court sustaining the validity of the Ordinance, are entitled to have the evidence considered in the light most favorable to them. There was evidence that Greene County is a rural, homogeneous political subdivision. We cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that the factors set forth in Code § 15.1-490 were considered before adoption of the Interim Zoning Ordinance, although the evidence supporting this finding is weak. Nor can we say that the standards prescribed for the Board of Zoning Appeals in considering the issuance of special use permits provided insufficient guidelines as a matter of law. But the difference between this ordinance of limited duration and the permanent Zoning Ordinance, adopted after extensive and careful study, illustrates the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Interim Zoning Ordinance. The permanent Zoning Ordinance created eight districts in lieu of the single district of the Interim Zoning Ordinance; the eight districts permitted lot sizes varying from no minimum area requirement other than that mandated for setbacks in certain districts to five acres in another district; and three districts provided for commercial and industrial development. Under the Interim Zoning Ordinance, however, all commercial and industrial uses became non-conforming uses and there was no provision of right for future non-residential development. The basic characteristics of Greene County did not change appreciably, if at all, during the twelve months that the Interim Zoning Ordinance was in effect. Hence, the conclusion is inescapable that if eight zoning districts were required in March, 1975, a single district was not adequate in March, 1974. We can understand the preference of the county's expert witness for a lowdensity one-district ordinance with all other uses conditioned on the issuance of special use permits. From the planning point of view such a requirement would indeed provide maximum flexibility for the political subdivision. At the same time it would create maximum doubt and uncertainty for a landowner faced with the necessity of obtaining a special use permit over vocal opposition. We hold that the enactment of a one-district zoning ordinance permitting of right only lots of two acres or more in Greene County was arbitrary, unreasonable, and invalid.