Opinion ID: 1297320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Other Pollution Exclusions

Text: The other two pollution exclusions at issue include a pollution exclusion found in other primary policies under the Central National policy, and a pollution exclusion in the Maryland Casualty policy. The second pollution exclusion in the primary policies under the Central National policies excludes coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by or resulting from the discharge of matter ... on or into water, land[,] air or any other real or personal property but not if the discharge is sudden, unexpected, unintentional. Discharge of matter includes release, spillage, leakage or by means of dumping, emptying, pumping or due to failure of any equipment or resulting from any other source or cause whatsoever. Clerk's Papers (Appellant) vol. 2, at 222, 250. The Maryland Casualty policy excludes coverage for damage to property and cleanup costs caused by seepage, pollution or contamination but not where such seepage, pollution or contamination is caused by a sudden, unintended and unexpected happening. Clerk's Papers (Appellant) vol. 2, at 460. All of these policies contain the word sudden, which, as noted above, may be susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning. However, each of these pollution exclusions also expressly provides the polluting event must be unexpected. Because the word unexpected is used in the excepting language, it would render sudden superfluous to interpret it as meaning unexpected. However, reading sudden as having a temporal meaning, like beginning abruptly, or occurring over a short period of time, or instantaneous, also leads to problems in construing the language. In each of the exclusions there are words suggesting a gradual release or discharge, i.e., leakage and seepage. It does not make sense to speak of an abrupt, instantaneous seepage or leakage, nor of seepage or leakage occurring over a short period of time. [20] Thus, reading sudden as either having a temporal nature or as meaning unexpected leads to confusing and inconsistent meanings of the policy language. We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that these exclusions are ambiguous, and therefore should be construed against the drafter-insurer, to mean that if the polluting event is unexpected and unintended, coverage is provided. [21] As with the qualified pollution exclusion clause discussed above, there is the further question about what constitutes the relevant polluting event. In the case of the primary policies under the Central National policy, the event is the discharge on or into land, water or air. Discharge is defined in the policy as the emission of matter, through, among other things, its release, spillage, leakage or by means of dumping, emptying [or] pumping. Clerk's Papers (Appellant) vol. 2, at 222. Release and leakage may obviously pertain to migration of contaminants from a waste disposal site or a sanitary landfill. The policy language is ambiguous as to whether the leakage of materials from a waste disposal pit or the initial dumping into the pit is the relevant event. In accord with the rules for construing ambiguity, including the evident purpose of the policy to provide coverage unless damage arises from expected or intended pollution, we construe the clause against the drafter-insurer to mean the relevant polluting event is the release or escape of materials from a waste pit which is intended and expected to contain the material. Although dumping is listed as a polluting event, dumping may be given effect in accord with our holding in that dumping may pertain to the indiscriminate depositing of hazardous materials on land which does not constitute a disposal site expected and intended to contain waste materials. In the Maryland Casualty policy, seepage, pollution or contamination also may be construed to mean the escape of the contaminants from the pit. Like the other exclusions at issue, the clause is ambiguous as to the relevant event. We conclude the clause should be construed to mean the escape of materials from a waste disposal site expected and intended to contain the materials. The jury has determined that the leakage was expected and intended as of December 31, 1968, and thereafter; however, it did so under an objective standard. Remand is necessary for determination of if and when leakage was subjectively expected and intended.