Opinion ID: 779898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Expert Opinion

Text: 13 Although the district court allowed Gieszl to testify generally about the accidental discharge theories, it did not allow Gieszl to offer an opinion concerning whether the four shootings at issue in this case were accidental or to comment on the particular facts of the case. Seschillie urges that because an expert may testify regarding an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, Fed. Rule Evid. 704(a), the district court should have permitted all of Gieszl's testimony, including his opinion on the ultimate issue in the case: whether the shootings were, in fact, accidental. We review the district court's determination for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 544 (9th Cir.1997). 14 In some circumstances, to be sure, an expert may render an opinion on an ultimate issue. See generally Fed.R.Evid. 704. We need not decide whether proffering such an opinion would have been proper here. The district court excluded the contested portion of Gieszl's testimony not only on the ultimate issue theory but also on the alternate rationale that the subject did not require expert illumination. The district court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. 2 15 Whether or not expert testimony is appropriate in a particular circumstance is governed by Fed. Rule Evid. 702: 16 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 17 (Emphasis added). 18 The district court concluded that the jury could determine, as a matter of common sense, whether the shootings as described by the victims were accidental according to Gieszl's theories, and would not be assisted in that determination by any specialized knowledge. A district court does not abuse its discretion when it refuses expert testimony where the subject does not need expert `illumination' and the proponent is otherwise able to elicit testimony about the subject. United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir.1997). That someone struggling over a gun could experience some of the factors Gieszl identified as causing accidental fire, such as a loss of balance, a surprised reaction, or a need to use his other hand is a matter which anyone could figure out for herself.