Opinion ID: 6111678
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements by the third man in the hotel suite

Text: As an initial matter, we need not consider whether the prosecution met its burden under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as to the unidentified third man in the hotel suite because his statement, as recounted by Ortiz, that he was pushing drugs, was relevant and admissible for a non-hearsay purpose: to explain why Pena completed the January 6 drug transaction in the bathroom without the unidentified man or Ortiz. For an out-of-court statement to - 18 - constitute hearsay, and thus be deemed inadmissible under Rule 802, the statement must be offered to prove the truth of the matter it asserts. United States v. Soto, 799 F.3d 68, 89 (1st Cir. 2015); see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay). Outof-court statements offered not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but merely to show context -- such as a statement offered for the limited purpose of showing what effect the statement had on the listener -- are, by definition, not hearsay and thus not excludable under Rule 802. United States v. Cruz-Díaz, 550 F.3d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976, 981 (1st Cir. 1992)). Though Pena posits that the jury may have considered the unidentified man's statement beyond the limited purpose for which it was offered, he fails to explain how such consideration constitutes plain error when neither he nor Ortiz requested a limiting instruction under Federal Rule of Evidence 105 or otherwise raised the potential hearsay issue at any time prior to the guilty verdict. Cf. United States v. Lebrón Cepeda, 324 F.3d 52, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that it would be most unusual for us to find that a district court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction that was never requested regarding an extra-judicial statement by the appellant's codefendant implicating both defendants). In the absence of cited authority, we are also unpersuaded by Pena's claim that the prosecution was required to - 19 - present a witness to explain the effect the unidentified man's statement had on Pena or Ortiz before it could be deemed nonhearsay. Because the prosecution introduced the unidentified third man's statement not for its truth -- that is, to prove that the man was in fact pushing . . . a whole bunch of dope or crack -- but rather to explain that Pena wanted to avoid the involvement of a potentially competing drug dealer, the statement did not constitute hearsay as defined by Rule 801(c). The prosecution accordingly was not required to show that the out-ofcourt statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Bailey, 270 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir. 2001). We thus find no plain error.