Opinion ID: 1215322
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Waiver of Conflict

Text: (6a) The People argue that any conflict of interest was waived. (7) The right to conflict-free counsel may be waived. ( Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 346-347 [64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-346]; Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, at p. 619 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333].) That waiver, however, must be a `knowing, intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 110, quoting Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748, fn. omitted [25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756, 90 S.Ct. 1463].) In the context of a conflict presented by joint representation, we have held: No particular form of inquiry is required, but, at a minimum, the trial court must assure itself that (1) the defendant has discussed the potential drawbacks of joint representation with his attorney, or if he wishes, outside counsel, (2) that he has been made aware of the dangers and possible consequences of joint representation in his case, (3) that he knows of his right to conflict-free representation, and (4) that he voluntarily wishes to waive that right. [Citations.].... We indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of unimpaired assistance of counsel. ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 110.) The same considerations apply here. We note that at the December 1983 trial setting conference, after hearing the public defender's explanation of the various conflicts, defendant repeatedly stated he wanted Hanson as his attorney. In early January 1984, defendant rejected a suggestion that Hanson should not represent him, after the prosecutor raised the issue of a conflict because Hanson's name might be mentioned in any discussion of defendant's confession. At the hearing in March 1984 the possibility that Hanson might be called as a witness was discussed, but defendant reiterated his desire that Hanson be appointed. In April 1984, another discussion of Hanson's possible conflict occurred. The trial court advised defendant of his right to counsel free of any potential conflict, and that such counsel would be appointed for him if he chose. Defendant again indicated his desire to have Hanson represent him. (6b) As in Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d 86, however, there was no valid waiver here. At none of these hearings was there an indication that Hanson had discussed the conflict issue with defendant, or that defendant was offered the opportunity to discuss that matter with independent counsel. Although it appears the trial court informed defendant of his right to conflict-free counsel, defendant was never asked for a waiver. Finally, our review of the record does not reveal defendant was ever advised of the full range of dangers and possible consequences of the conflicted representation in his case. Nevertheless, the People insist defendant twice expressly waived any conflict. These two asserted waivers occurred at the March and April hearings. At the March hearing, Hanson was not present. As a result, the court and the prosecutor specifically stated that defendant was not being asked for any statement in the absence of his attorney. It would be difficult, in the face of such a statement, to now construe defendant's remarks at that hearing as an express waiver. Furthermore, neither the prosecutor nor the court fully explained to defendant the conflicts that faced Hanson. And, although the prosecutor informed the court about the possibility of a conflict, the only conflict mentioned was Hanson's involvement in obtaining defendant's confession, which, the prosecutor explained, meant that Hanson would face an ethical and legal conflict in putting defendant on the stand. As in Mroczko, we believe defendant's alleged waiver at the March 1984 hearing is evidence that he did not understand the true conflict issue, and that he perceived the prosecutor's concern simply as an attempt to prevent Hanson from representing him. [18] At the April hearing, the discussion focused on the possibility that Hanson might be required to be a witness. When the prosecutor noted that Hanson had represented Plankington in the arson matter and that Plankington was a probable witness at the penalty retrial, Hanson stated he felt this would not be a problem (in that, if necessary, the prosecution had other witnesses to testify regarding the confession), and that the judge who presided at the January hearing had agreed with that assessment. Hanson also stated he believed defendant's confession had to be excluded in any event, because of the federal immunity grant. Hanson then raised his prior representation of defendant's sister, and at this point the asserted waiver occurred. The judge told defendant that he had a right to counsel who would be free of any potential conflict of interest and that such counsel would be appointed for him should he so desire. Defendant responded that he wanted Hanson to continue representing him. This exchange, however, was inadequate to make defendant aware of the dangers and possible consequences of the conflicted representation. No one explained to defendant that Hanson owed a conflicting duty of loyalty to Plankington that could affect his ability to cross-examine Plankington and attack the prosecution's arson evidence. [19] The consequences addressed by the court and other parties were of an entirely different and less virulent sort. In discussing the conflict, the parties focused primarily on the possibility that Hanson might have to testify about the facts surrounding defendant's confession. This facet of the conflict, moreover, was presented by the court and by Hanson as a surmountable obstacle, and was conveyed to defendant as posing no serious conflict. Because the court identified only a minor portion of the potential consequences arising from Hanson's representation of Plankington and defendant, we cannot conclude that defendant fully understood the real scope of the conflict and intelligently waived it. [20] Furthermore, the trial court was too eager to accept Hanson's representations that there was no conflict, or that problems posed by any conflict could be evaded. It is troublesome that, having learned that it was Hanson who had obtained defendant's confession to the arson, and that Hanson represented Plankington in a federal civil suit, the court made no further inquiry into the possible effect of the conflict on defendant's trial. ( Sullivan, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 347-348 [64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 345-347].) Instead, Hanson  who had manifestly taken an action adverse to defendant by obtaining from him a confession to a crime in order to benefit another client  was appointed defendant's counsel in a case in which the crime to which defendant had confessed was highly relevant. As was true of the counsel in Mroczko, Hanson's behavior strongly suggests that he was unwilling or unable to assess accurately whether his representation of [defendant] was in [the client's] best interest.... The very fact that he was willing to represent such clearly conflicting interests despite the ethical and legal ramifications of his position, raises questions about his judgment, or at least his impartiality. ( Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 113.) We conclude that the failure adequately to explain to defendant the consequences of Hanson's conflict precludes a finding that defendant knowingly waived the conflict.