Opinion ID: 791970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vouching for the Credibility of Witnesses and Bolstering their Testimony

Text: 59 Carr also contends that the government improperly vouched for the credibility of its witnesses when it (1) asserted in its rebuttal summation that the cooperating witnesses have to tell the government the truth because they were testifying pursuant to cooperation agreements, and (2) argued that certain cooperating witnesses had already earned their 5K1.1 letters. 8 In addition, Carr argues that the government impermissibly bolstered the testimony of its witnesses when it suggested that Brian Boyd had testified against SMM founder Pete Rollack and that the cooperating witnesses had repeatedly told the same story, when there was nothing in the record to support either of those claims. 60 It is well established that prosecutors may not vouch for their witnesses' truthfulness. United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1179 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S.Ct. 2269, 73 L.Ed.2d 1284 (1982). In other words, a prosecutor is prohibited from express[ing] his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. Id. at 1178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the prosecution may not vouch for the credibility of its witnesses, the government is allowed to respond to an argument that impugns its integrity or the integrity of its case, and when the defense counsel have attacked the prosecutor's credibility or the credibility of the government agents, the prosecutor is entitled to reply with rebutting language suitable to the occasion. United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 807 (2d Cir.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Lan Ngoc Tran v. United States, 513 U.S. 977, 115 S.Ct. 456, 130 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994); see also United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30, 34 (2d Cir.) ([The defendant's] counsel sufficiently raised matters of credibility in opening that the government could develop the whole cooperation agreements on direct.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 303, 102 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988). 61 An improper remark by a prosecutor will justify a reversal by this Court only if it causes the defendant substantial prejudice by so infecting the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. United States v. Sharee 190 F.3d 71, 78 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Because Carr did not object at trial to the prosecutor's remarks that he now challenges, we must reject his claim unless it, inter alia, seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (citation, internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The statements must amount to flagrant abuse, United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 103 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Lysaght v. United States, 531 U.S. 1143, 121 S.Ct. 1077, 148 L.Ed.2d 954 (2001), causing substantial prejudice, United States v. Bantisto 23 F.3d 726, 732 (2d Cir.1904). 62 Judged by this standard, Carr's arguments are unpersuasive. Beginning with its opening statement and throughout Carr's trial—from the cross-examination of witnesses to its summation—the defense continually sought to undermine the credibility of the government's witnesses by emphasizing that their testimony was provided pursuant to cooperation agreements. For example, Carr's attorney argued in his opening statement that Carr was 63 very vulnerable to the ... cooperating witnesses that are going to testify in this case, the cooperating witnesses who are testifying to save their lives, cooperating witnesses who have made deals with the government hoping, praying that the information they give keeps them out of jail, because each and every one of them is facing almost certain lifetime incarceration. 64 Trial Tr., Aug. 5, 2003, at 36-37. 65 And in his cross-examination of the government's cooperating witnesses, defense counsel similarly suggested that the jurors should view the testimony skeptically because the government was the ultimate arbiter of whether or not the witnesses had testified truthfully and had earned a 5K1.1 letter. Continuing this line of attack, during his summation, Carr's attorney argued that let's not say [the witnesses] don't have a motive to get the 5K[1.1] letter and all they have to do is tell the truth. Because, remember, it was the truth according to the government. Trial Tr, Aug. 14, 2003, at 1069. He argued that Romero and Boyd. are just willing to admit what they can admit and tell what they can tell and do as much as they can to get their 5K[1.1] letter, because they are going to jail for the rest of their li[ves]. Id. at 1071. 66 Considering the defense counsel's persistent attacks on the witnesses' credibility, the district court rightly permitted the government to introduce into evidence the various cooperation agreements and to elicit testimony about each cooperating witness's understanding of what his agreement required—specifically, to tell the truth. See, e.g., Cosentino, 844 F.2d at 34 (holding that the written text of a cooperation agreement may be admitted during a witness' direct testimony whenever a defense attack on credibility in opening has made evidence of the whole agreement admissible); United States v. Smith, 778 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir.1985) (noting that truth-telling portions of cooperation agreements can properly be elicited on direct examination if a witness's credibility has been attacked). 67 The government's remarks in its rebuttal summation emphasizing that the cooperation agreements required that witnesses tell the truth in order to gain any benefits were also proper. As the government argued: 68 [The cooperating witnesses] have to tell the truth. They have to tell the truth to the government, and they have to tell the truth to you, most importantly. Because if they don't tell the truth, then the government doesn't write them their letter. The only way they get that letter is if they tell the truth. It doesn't matter whether [Carr is] convicted or not. If they tell the truth, they still get their letter. 69 Trial Tr., Aug. 18, 2003, at 1106-07. The agreements did, after all, require that the witnesses tell the truth to benefit from i em. And., with the cooperation agreements themselves properly admitted into evidence, the prosecutor could properly argue that [the cooperating witnesses were] believable because [they] had an incentive to tell the truth, uphold [their] plea bargain, and receive a reduced sentence. United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398, 416 23 (7th Cir.1993). The prosecutor's statements did not amount to express[ing] his ... personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1178 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the statements were a permissible reference to the evidence in the case. United States v. Perez, 144 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir.1998) 70 The government's further assertion that neither Boyd nor Romero had any reason to lie, and instead had every incentive not to jeopardize the benefits they had already earned by testifying against others, was also proper argument. The government argued that Boyd came into [sic] testify against Peter Rollack, and so, 71 There's your letter. There's your 5K[1.1] letter right there.... Brian Boyd has provided his substantial assistance to the government. If he wasn't telling the truth about Sean Carr, why would he make that up? What possible motivation could he have for making, that up? He's already got his letter. 72 Trial Tr., Aug. 18, 2003, at 1105. Similarly, the government argued that Romero's already earned his letter, too. He's already testified in one trial against a high-ranking guy. He doesn't need to make stuff up about Sean Carr. Id. 73 It was established at trial that both Boyd and Romero had testified against other SMM members. The prosecution's statement that both had already earned their 5K1.1 letters therefore need not be interpreted as a conclusion that they had already been deemed to be truthful witnesses, even though perhaps it could be so construed. Instead, the statements could be understood as a simple, common-sense argument that a witness who has already agreed to testify against others would likely not jeopardize the potential benefits of providing such. testimony—assuming it is truthful—by testifying untruthfully in another case. As such, the statements did not amount to the government's improper vouching ... but simply constituted permissible argument ... that [the cooperating] witnesses, whose veracity and credibility had been fiercely attacked by defense counsel, had no motive to testify falsely. United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264, 274 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Indiviglia v. United States, 431 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 1697, 52 L.Ed.2d 389 (1977). 229 74 Carr also argues that the government referred to evidence not in the record and misled the jury when it suggested that Boyd had testified against Peter Rollack. Def.-Appellant's Br. at 31. Carr argues that, not only did Boyd not testify against Rollack, but the record does not even indicate that Boyd was prepared to testify against Rollack. 75 In its rebuttal summation, as noted, the prosecution did say that Boyd came into [sic] testify against Peter Rollack. Trial Tr., Aug. 18, 2003, at 1105. In fact, as the government acknowledges, Boyd eventually did not testify against Rollack, because Rollack ultimately pleaded guilty. At trial, although it does not appear that Boyd referred specifically to Rollack, Boyd testified that he had, indeed, cooperated against many others, including identifying the photographs of nearly 30 people[ ], telling the government about guys that [he] was dealing with, that [he] was doing things with, and agreeing to testify against others in addition to Carr. Trial Tr., Aug. 5, 2003, at 196-97. As a result, we conclude that although the language employed by the government may have been unclear and arguably may have suggested that Boyd had testified against Rollack when in fact he was merely prepared to testify against other SMM members, any error did not rise to the level of,flagrant abuse. 76 Finally, Carr contends that the prosecutor's statement that it's hard to keep your stories straight through ten meetings with the Government, id. at 1107, was improper bolstering of testimony because it misleadingly suggested that two former SMM members who had testified against Carr had provided testimony that was consistent over numerous meetings with the government, when in fact, the defendant argues, there was no evidence to support such a suggestion. 77 Although the prosecutor's statement 9 could indeed have been understood by the jury to refer to evidence not in the record by suggesting that the cooperating witnesses' testimony was consistent over multiple meetings with the govenment, 10 we conclude that, as with each of Carr's other claims of prosecutorial misconduct, even if there was error, read in the context of the trial as a whole, it was insignificant. 78 We conclude that none of the government's assertions in its rebuttal summation were so prejudicial that a new trial is required. United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847, 113 S.Ct. 139, 121 L.Ed.2d 92 (1992).