Opinion ID: 2211408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compelled Self-Incrimination in the Prison Setting

Text: There is no dispute that the Fifth Amendment privilege extends to inmates involved in disciplinary proceedings. Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976), if inmates are compelled in those proceedings to furnish testimonial evidence that might incriminate them in later criminal proceedings, they must be offered `whatever immunity is required to supplant the privilege'.... As stated, the Carr Court believed that the so-called Catch 22 choice faced by inmates in the prison discipline settingeither incriminate themselves or forgo the right to offer exculpatory or mitigating statementsconstitutes an impermissible penalty for the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 659, 386 N.W.2d 631. We disagree with the Carr Court's analysis. The United States Supreme Court has indeed held on more than one occasion that a penalty imposed on the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege creates a compulsion repugnant to the constitution. For example, in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), several police officers were questioned by the Attorney General in connection with an investigation concerning the fixing of traffic tickets. Each officer was warned that refusal to answer would result in removal from office. Some of the answers given were used, over objections, in subsequent criminal prosecutions. Id. at 494-495, 87 S.Ct. 616. In reversing the defendants' convictions, the Garrity Court explained that [t]he option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or remain silent. The Court held that the officers' statements cannot be sustained as voluntary. Id. at 497-498, 87 S.Ct. 616. Thus, what Garrity and its progeny make clear is that a state `may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.' Murphy, supra at 434, 104 S.Ct. 1136, quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). Unlike the situation in Garrity, however, Michigan's prison disciplinary process does not place any direct penalty on an inmate's decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. The hearing officer's decision must be made on a preponderance of the evidence presented. MCL 791.252(k); MSA 28.2320(52)(k). An inmate at all times has the choice not to testify. We agree with Judge Markman's opinion below that [t]he tactical decision that an inmate must make regarding whether to testify at a disciplinary hearing, when his testimony might potentially be used against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding, while perhaps quite difficult, does not constitute `compulsion' under the Fifth Amendment. 226 Mich.App. at 692-693, 575 N.W.2d 48. The Carr Court's holding to the contrary is overruled. [11]