Opinion ID: 2518822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the questioning by the trial judge was in error

Text: ¶13 The very essence of our judicial system is the right of every citizen to have his case heard by a neutral and impartial judge. Our constitutional system is designed to assure fairness to those who stand in jeopardy of life and property, even to the disadvantage of others. We hold the state, in its efforts to extract life, liberty, or property from those accused of crime, to a very high standard of proof. We insist that the process by which that guilt is proven also be of the very highest standards, including the meaningful participation of a neutral and impartial presiding officer, the judge. ¶14 As part of this process, we hold trial judges to high standards of conduct, both on and off the bench. In the vast majority of circumstances, that standard is not only met, but exceeded. It is a rare case indeed when judges anywhere in America act in intentional contravention of their oaths and legal duty. The error alleged in this case is not such an error. In the course of managing and participating in a trial, criminal or otherwise, it is perfectly correct for the trial judge to take an active role. It is his or her obligation to superintend the proceedings, and all of the elements that bring it about. Asking questions in the course of a trial, even of key witnesses or the defendant in a criminal matter, is often perfectly appropriate. It is only when that questioning strays into areas, or into a form, that may raise doubts about the neutrality of the court itself, that it becomes problematic. ¶15 The restrictions on active questioning by a trial judge are well established. They are based upon bedrock principles of constitutionally mandated fairness and the presumption of innocence afforded every defendant. The court must always be a fair and impartial venue committed to the purpose of seeking justice. [3] The trial judge must preside over a trial with dignity and impartiality. [4] In the course of a jury trial, a judge must not act or speak so as to indicate an opinion either on the credibility of evidence or on disputed issues of fact. [5] ¶16 Impartiality, both perceived and actual, is of particular importance in a criminal case before a jury. The judge has the primary duty to protect the accused's right to a fair trial. The judge is forbidden to express or otherwise indicate a view as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. That determination is for the jury exclusively, and is to be made without additional urging by the judge. [6] ¶17 The judge need not always sit upon the bench in stony silence. [7] It may often be necessary to intercede in the proceedings to direct the pace of the trial or to conduct housekeeping items. In appropriate circumstances, a judge has discretion to briefly question witnesses to elicit the truth and clarify facts. [8] Rule 614(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly provides that [t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. However, as we have counseled in the past, [t]he practice of questioning by a judge is not to be recommended or encouraged because even with the best of intentions a judge in all sincerity may carry his examination too far and unwittingly prejudice a defendant before the jury. [9] ¶18 In questioning a witness, the judge should not engage in extensive examination or usurp the function of counsel. [10] The judge must take particular care when the defendant takes the stand on his or her own behalf, as any unnecessary comments by the court are too likely to have a detrimental effect on the jury's ability to decide the case impartially. [11] ¶19 These are not new guidelines. They are, and have been, the clearly established law for a long time. As such, violation of these restrictions is not only error in nearly every circumstance, but is also obvious, or should have been, to the trial judge. ¶20 In this case, the trial judge overstepped these bounds. The court of appeals correctly decided that the trial judge exceeded his permitted discretion in some of the questioning he engaged in, and thereby committed obvious error. As here, a judge commits error when, in a criminal case before a jury, he questions a defendant extensively about weak aspects of her defense. The trial court asked the defendant forty-eight questions. He questioned her on several aspects of her case, focusing on why she had not produced certain items of evidence, whether the high school principal had told her one of her letters was incriminating, why she had not turned her computer over to investigators, and how she thought her fingerprints might have appeared on written correspondence she had denied authoring. The questions went well beyond what was necessary or desirable to clarify, explain or add to the evidence as it relate[d] to the disputed issues. [12] They were prosecutorial in both substance and tone. ¶21 The error should have been obvious to the trial court in light of our decisions in Gleason and Mellen. The judge extensively examined the defendant and usurp[ed] the function of counsel. [13] Although the judge may have sought to maintain an attitude of neutrality, his questions were such that the jury could have inferred, maybe unfairly or incorrectly, his opinion as to the credibility of the defendant and critical disputed issues of fact. This is not permitted.