Opinion ID: 4014894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals

Text: On appeal, Petitioner argued that, “to the extent the no unsupervised contact condition relates to [his] interaction with his own infant son, the condition constitutes an illegal sentence that must be vacated.”5 According to Petitioner, “there was no evidence presented which would have indicated that [he] presented any danger to either his son or to other children related to him by blood.” Thus, “there was no rational basis for the imposition of the no unsupervised contact condition, which… unreasonably infring[ed] on his fundamental [due process] right to parent his child.” The Court of Special Appeals disagreed, and observed that trial courts have broad discretion in imposing a sentence. (quoting Md. Code (2001, Repl. Vol. 2008), § 6-221 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“Crim. Proc.”)). According to the Court of Special Appeals, this discretion is limited by the requirement that: conditions of probation must be reasonable and have a rational basis. They must not be the product of arbitrariness or capriciousness. Moreover, the conditions imposed must be clear, definite and capable of being properly comprehended and understood not only by the individual upon whom they are imposed but by those responsible for their enforcement. 5 In his appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Petitioner raised two other issues which are not relevant to the parties’ arguments before this Court. -8- (quoting Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 274, 301 A.2d 26, 31-32 (1973)). The Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that several federal cases cited by Petitioner indicated that a sentencing court must find evidence which unambiguously shows that the defendant is a danger to his own children before restricting access to them, (citing United States v. Lonjose, 663 F.3d 1292, 1303 (10th Cir. 2011), and further discussing United States v. Bear, 769 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2012)). However, the Court remarked that that those cases are not binding in Maryland, and those cases “are directly at odds with Maryland’s approach to limiting the custody and visitation rights of individuals who have previously abused or neglected a child.” Regarding Maryland’s approach, the Court observed that, under Md. Code (1984, Repl. Vol. 2012), § 9-101 of the Family Law Article (“Fam. Law”), “an individual who has abused or neglected any child has no right to any unsupervised visitation unless he or she is able to persuade the court that there is no likelihood of further abuse of neglect.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted). The Court pointed out that § 9-101 “applies regardless of whether the child abused or neglected was the child whose custody or visitation is currently in issue.” (citing In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. 209, 234, 725 A.2d 1037, 1049-50 (1999)). Thus, according to the Court of Special Appeals, Maryland courts take a default position that a parent who has abused or neglected a child will be denied unsupervised contact with his or her own child. Turning to the no-unsupervised-contact condition, the Court of Special Appeals observed that the condition did not impose an outright ban on contact, just unsupervised -9- contact, and was limited to the five year period of active probation. The Court of Special Appeals also noted that: [A] condition to the granting of probation which compels a defendant to give up a fundamental or constitutional right is not in and of itself unconstitutional or invalid. [A] court will not strike down conditions of release, even if they implicate fundamental rights, if such conditions are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public from recidivism. Such a condition cannot stand [only] if it is not related to the crime of which defendant has been convicted and if it has no reasonable relation to future criminality. (quoting Henson v. State, 212 Md. App. 314, 327-28, 69 A.3d 26, 34, cert. denied, 434 Md. 314, 75 A.3d 319 (2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted)). The Court concluded that the condition of probation imposed “was sufficiently related to the crime for which [Petitioner] was convicted, i.e., sexual assault of a child residing in his household.”