Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prospective Juror R.F.

Text: On her juror questionnaire, R.F. did not answer inquiries about her death penalty views, except to say she was not sure whether she would vote for a death penalty measure if one were on the ballot. In the course of a lengthy voir dire by court and counsel, R.F. vacillated among three basic positions: first, that she honestly didn't know whether she could vote to impose the death penalty; second, that she needed full information about the crime and the defendant's background to answer; and third, that she could choose between the two penalties under the process as explained to her. However, R.F. alluded to deep personal reservations about her ability to make this decision, suggesting at one point that [S]ubconsciously, I do not know whether I could be the one to say, yes, he deserves the death penalty. When the court asked what good society gets out of the death penalty, R.F. responded, Nothing, really, while she indicated that life without parole requires the person . . . to sit and think about what he has done. She indicated she thought life without parole was the worse penalty. When the court asked if R.F., acting as jury foreperson, could sign a death verdict, she flatly said no and maintained that position, explaining that she could not assume such a responsibility. When defense counsel then asked what was the difference between voting to impose the death penalty and signing a verdict form, R.F. responded,  Put it that way, there is no difference.  (Italics added.) Over a defense objection, the court thereupon granted the prosecution's challenge for cause. After R.F. had left the courtroom, an extended discussion ensued between court and counsel. The court explained that its ruling was based on Witt, and was supported by R.F.'s confusion, her inconsistent answers, and her demeanor. Defense counsel urged that further questioning should have been allowed, and that R.F.'s demeanor did not support the court's decision. The court responded that R.F. had had plenty of opportunity to make her position clear, that she had not done so, and that an attempt to rehabilitate her would have been futile. At this point, the prosecutor pointed out that in response to defense counsel's last question, R.F. had agreed there was no difference between signing a death verdictan act R.F. clearly stated she could not perform and voting to impose the death penalty. The court responded, Yeah. Anybody reviewing this record can read that for themselves. It's in black and white in the record. And I'll go to the bank with this ruling. We agree. Despite her earlier struggles to formulate her death penalty views, R.F. achieved clarity when confronted with defense counsel's suggestion that it was illogical to be willing to vote to impose the death penalty, but unwilling to sign the death verdict. R.F.'s response could only be understood as her concession that she could do neither. The excusal was proper.