Opinion ID: 4486921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CHINS Stipulation

Text: ¶ 16. Under 33 V.S.A. § 5315a(b)(2), the court may accept a written stipulation to merits if the parties agree to its terms and the court determines that: the agreement is “voluntary”; the parties “understand the nature of the allegation”; and the parties “understand the rights waived if the court approves of and issues an order based upon the stipulation.” ¶ 17. Parents argue on appeal that they did not understand the rights they were waiving because the court did not tell them that the State had the burden of proving its case by a 2 While the juveniles did not file a notice of appeal, they filed notice that they join in the briefs filed by parents. We need not consider if they have standing to do so as we have considered and rejected parents’ arguments on the merits. 7 preponderance of the evidence. They further assert that the court should have explained to them the circumstances under which—absent their stipulation—it could have relied on findings from the temporary-care order. See id. § 5315(d) (explaining that, at CHINS merits hearing, court may adopt findings “based on nonhearsay evidence” made in temporary-care order “provided that a witness who testified at the temporary care hearing may be recalled by any party at a contested merits hearing to supplement his or her testimony”). Finally, parents suggest that they were induced to waive their rights in exchange for a favorable conditional custody order which the court did not ultimately issue, rendering their stipulation involuntary. According to parents, the court’s errors deprived them of the opportunity to have the merits of the CHINS petition determined by a preponderance of admissible evidence. ¶ 18. As parents acknowledge, plain error is “found only in a rare and extraordinary case where the error is an obvious one and so grave and serious as to strike at the very heart of a [party’s] constitutional rights.” In re G.S., 153 Vt. 651, 651, 572 A.2d 1350, 1351 (1990) (mem.) (quotation omitted). We find no plain error here. ¶ 19. As reflected above, the CHINS stipulation was under discussion for many months before the merits hearing. The parents were present and represented by counsel throughout the contested, evidentiary temporary-care hearing. They each testified, and the court carefully weighed their testimony. Notwithstanding the court’s temporary-care decision, it observed that parents both “testified well.” Additional witnesses were also called, and testified, on parents’ behalf at the temporary-care hearing. The court made clear to the parties both orally and in writing that it was not going to relitigate matters that were recently decided by clear and convincing evidence following the temporary-care hearing. Parents raised no objection to this approach. They ultimately agreed, after consulting with counsel, to stipulate to CHINS. By entering into the stipulation, the parties waived their right to have a hearing on the merits of the CHINS petition 8 and present any additional evidence under the unobjected-to process described above. The court explained this to parents and parents indicated that they understood. ¶ 20. The court did not commit plain error in this case by failing to explicitly advise parents that, if there was a hearing, the State would have to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the children were CHINS. Especially in this case, where the State had already presented substantial evidence that the children were at risk, and the court had made findings to the level of clear and convincing evidence, the court did not commit plain error in failing to explain to parents that they could rest on their rights and put the State to its proof. And the failure to specify that the State’s burden of proof was a preponderance of the evidence was not a grave error warranting reversal, especially given that the court had already made relevant findings using a clear-and-convincing standard, and the preponderance standard is a relatively low one. ¶ 21. Nor did the court commit plain error by failing to explain to parents when, and under what circumstances, a court can rely on temporary-care findings in a CHINS merits hearing. The court discussed this issue at the status conference preceding the merits stipulation and parents raised no objection to the court’s approach. We note that most of the court’s findings in the TCO— adopted in support of the CHINS findings—were made by clear and convincing evidence, and the court made sufficient findings on the basis of nonhearsay evidence to support a CHINS order. ¶ 22. Finally, parents’ suggestion that they were somehow wrongly induced into stipulating to CHINS with the (unfulfilled) promise of a CCO at merits is unsupported by the record. The court made clear to parents that while a CCO was contemplated, its disposition order would depend on what occurred between the merits ruling and the disposition hearing. ¶ 23. While the parents may have benefitted from a more thorough discussion with the court, we conclude that the record in this case does not show that parents failed to understand the rights they were giving up by stipulating to CHINS, and that, in approving parents’ stipulation 9 under § 5315a, the court did not commit any error that was so obvious, grave, and serious as to warrant reversal. See In re G.S., 153 Vt. at 651, 572 A.2d at 1351.3