Opinion ID: 1140983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Text: ¶ 16. The plaintiffs allege that a number of acts by Fluor Daniel warrant recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The main actions, as portrayed in the depositions, include: Amaro saying that the monkeys could go to work or go to the rope; segregation of black and Mexican employees; and requiring the black workers to do harder manual labor than the Mexican laborers. Some of the plaintiffs claim that this conduct by Fluor Daniel caused them distress which has manifested itself in physical injury, including sleepless nights, headaches, depression, and sexual difficulty. However, even without physical manifestation of an emotional injury, some of the conduct of Amaro and Fluor Daniel may rise to the level necessary to maintain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ¶ 17. In Smith v. Malouf, this Court stated that: [w]here there is something about the defendant's conduct that evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionallyor even unintentionally yet the results being reasonably foreseeablecourts can in certain circumstances comfortably assess damages for mental and emotional distress even though there has been no physical injury. In such instances, it is the nature of the act itselfas opposed to the seriousness of the consequences which gives impetus to legal redress. 722 So.2d 490, 497 (Miss.1998) (citing Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 658 (Miss.1995)). This Court must look at the nature of the acts of Fluor Daniel as alleged by the plaintiffs and decide whether they evoke outrage or revulsion. ¶ 18. We must answer the question of whether a reasonable juror could find that Amaro's comment to a group of black workers (you monkeys can go to work or go to the rope) was patently a racial slur constituting outrageous and revolting conduct. ¶ 19. This Court has dealt with issues of racism in a work environment before. In Richmond v. Mississippi Department of Human Services, this Court was faced with the question of whether an employee's use of the word nigger in reference to a black coworker created a hostile work environment and merited that employee's dismissal. Richmond, 745 So.2d 254 (Miss.1999). Part of the employee's defense was that she was using the term in a joking manner and that workers in that particular office often joked about racial issues. Id. at 262 (Banks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While not directly on point with the case at bar, language in Justice Banks's separate opinion does offer guidance: While the alleged joking in the DeSoto County office regarding the differences between black and white people may not in and of itself be enough to constitute a racially hostile environment, when coupled with the racial slur or slurs uttered by Bonnie Richmond, such conduct may have been enough to do so. Id. (internal citation omitted). Returning to the case at bar, we note that referring to a group of black employees as monkeys, while terrible on its own, could possibly be passed off as a tasteless joke. However, as in Richmond, that insult coupled with an apparent reference to lynching could permit a reasonable juror to conclude that this comment was outrageous and revolting. Id. at 262. ¶ 20. We also note that several of our sister states have addressed such issues. In Taylor v. Metzger, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed whether an employer's use of the term jungle bunny against a black employee rose to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Taylor, 152 N.J. 490, 706 A.2d 685 (1998). The Court stated, [w]e do not hold that a single racial slur spoken by a stranger on the street could amount to extreme and outrageous conduct. But, a jury could reasonably conclude that the power dynamics of the workplace contribute to the extremity and the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 511, 706 A.2d 685. Therefore, the fact that defendant uttered only one slur toward plaintiff does not, as a matter of law, preclude his conduct from being extreme and outrageous. Id. at 512, 706 A.2d 685. ¶ 21. The Louisiana Supreme Court also has pointed out the special circumstances of incidents arising between supervisors and employees in the workplace: A plaintiff's status as an employee may entitle him to a greater degree of protection from insult and outrage by a supervisor with authority over him than if he were a stranger. White v. Monsanto Co., 585 So.2d 1205, 1210 (La.1991). Other jurisdictions have dealt with similar issues. See Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash.2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173, 1176 (1977) (stating that one in position of authority over another making racial slurs and jokes gives added impetus to claim of outrageous behavior). ¶ 22. Fluor Daniel claims that the plaintiffs have offered no admissible evidence of vicarious liability on the part of Fluor Daniel for the comment made by Rudy Amaro. However, the plaintiffs claim that, immediately after making the comment, Amaro said that someone in the main office had told him to make the statement. Fluor Daniel argues that Amaro's statement is hearsay and would not be admissible at trial. However, we find that Amaro's statement would be admissible under M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D) as an admission by a party opponent. Therefore, viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as we must, we find evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment on this issue. ¶ 23. The allegations of segregation of black and Mexican workers also present an issue to be considered. Certainly, there could be good reason for separating these groups of workers; the Mexicans spoke very little English, and it might have been easier just to let them work in separate groups. However, the record reflects that the plaintiffs also testified that they were forced to work harder jobs than the Mexican workers. If this is true (and for the purposes of summary judgment we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs), this also could rise to the level of outrageous conduct. A jury could reasonably conclude that showing a preference for one race at the expense of another is outrageous conduct. ¶ 24. In viewing the record in its entirety in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we find there is enough evidence to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. A reasonable juror could conclude that Amaro's actions were intentional and the results reasonably foreseeable. We hold that the plaintiffs should be afforded their day in court.