Opinion ID: 6341325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Stealth” Class Actions?

Text: In his reply brief, Miller argues that the lack of class alle‐ gations in Ali’s complaint is not relevant to the timeliness is‐ sue. According to Miller, “nothing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include class 2 As Miller points out, McDonald also recognized in a footnote that post‐judgment intervention “has been found to be timely even in litigation that is not representative in nature.” 432 U.S. at 395 n.16. All that shows, however, is that intervention might be allowed as timely in such cases if the would‐be intervenor has acted promptly in light of all the circum‐ stances. That does not establish the bright‐line rule Miller urges nor indi‐ cate that the district court abused its discretion in denying Miller’s motion to intervene. No. 21‐1536 13 allegations.” In eﬀect, Miller’s position would allow a plaintiﬀ to bring a class action—and therefore give potential interve‐ nors a right to assert the reliance interests of class members— without including class allegations or demands for class‐wide relief in either the original complaint or an amended com‐ plaint. That is not how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure work. Rule 23(a) says explicitly that class actions allow class mem‐ bers to “sue or be sued as representative parties.” Rule 23(c)(1)(A) provides that the district court must decide “[a]t an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative … whether to certify the action as a class action.” The district court cannot make that determination early in the case if the plaintiﬀ is allowed to keep his class‐ action intentions hidden. We have also said that Rule 23(e) “presumptively applies to all complaints containing class alle‐ gations.” Baker v. America’s Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 58 F.3d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), quoting Glidden v. Chro‐ malloy American Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 1986).3 Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim” and “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3). The purpose of those requirements is “to provide a defendant with fair notice of the claims against him.” Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 632 (7th Cir. 2014); 3 The “early practicable time” phrasing of Rule 23(c)(1)(A) was adopted in 2003, replacing an earlier requirement that the court decide class certification “as soon as practicable after commencement of an ac‐ tion.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 2003 amend‐ ment. The change was intended to give district courts more flexibility in managing putative class actions. It was certainly not intended to allow “stealth” class actions. 14 No. 21‐1536 see also 7B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1798 (3d ed.) (“As in all federal suits, the pleading stage of a class action is designed to inform the parties of the nature of the claims and defenses being asserted and the relief de‐ manded.”). Miller’s theory would contravene that purpose and the requirement that relief be demanded by allowing plaintiﬀs to spring “stealth” class actions on defendants late in a case, without earlier warning. A class action “must be brought as a class action.” LG Display Co. v. Madigan, 665 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that state attorney general’s parens patriae action was not a class action under federal Class Action Fairness Act). The complaint should identify the case as a class action if the plaintiﬀ intends to pursue a class ac‐ tion.4 Miller rests his argument that class allegations need not be included in the complaint on Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2015), a class action complaining about un‐ wanted receipt of an advertiser’s faxes. The plaintiﬀ proposed in his complaint, and later moved to certify, a class of all per‐ sons who had received faxes from the defendant without giv‐ ing their consent. After the court denied the motion, the plain‐ tiﬀ proposed a diﬀerent class, this time including all persons who had received faxes without an opt‐out notice or with a deficient notice. The court declined to certify that class as well, 4That is not to say, of course, that the absence of class allegations in the original complaint controls all later developments. A plaintiff may move for leave to amend the complaint to assert a class claim, thus notify‐ ing the defendant of the possibility of class‐wide liability, as Ali eventually tried to do here (albeit too late in the district court’s view). Such amend‐ ments are governed by the generally liberal standards of Rule 15 for amending pleadings. No. 21‐1536 15 concluding that the plaintiﬀ could not change the focus of the litigation almost five years into the case. Id. at 784–85. On appeal, we observed that both parties and the district court had proceeded as if the second certification proposal re‐ quired an amendment to the complaint, but we could not see why: “A complaint must contain three things: a statement of subject‐matter jurisdiction, a claim for relief, and a demand for a remedy. Class definitions are not on that list.” 796 F.3d at 785 (internal citation omitted). Instead, we noted, “the obli‐ gation to define the class falls on the judge’s shoulders.” Id. Although the judge may ask the parties for help, “motions practice and a decision under Rule 23 do not require the plain‐ tiﬀ to amend the complaint.” Id. Those comments cannot bear the weight Miller tries to place on them. For one, they were dicta, as we said that the amendment issue did “not aﬀect the disposition.” 796 F.3d at 785; see also id. at 788 (aﬃrming denial of class certification). More fundamental, this case did not involve an eﬀort to mod‐ ify a class definition that was already in the case. Unlike the plaintiﬀ in Chapman, Ali did not bring his case as a class ac‐ tion. His complaint did not include “a claim for relief” and “a demand for a remedy,” see id. at 785, notifying the defendant that it faced the prospect of class‐wide liability. If Ali had filed such a complaint and had then later sought to change the def‐ inition of his class, Chapman suggests that amending the com‐ plaint would not have been necessary. That makes sense. As the district court here observed, proposed class definitions are often narrowed or expanded as the parties engage in discov‐ ery at the class certification stage. Cf. Beaton v. SpeedyPC Soft‐ ware, 907 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir. 2018) (“District courts may amend class definitions either on motion or on their own 16 No. 21‐1536 initiative.”); Schorsch v. Hewlett‐Packard Co., 417 F.3d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Litigants and judges regularly modify class definitions ….”). Since there was no operative class action complaint in Ali’s case, however, Chapman is not relevant on this point. The denial of Miller’s motion to intervene is AFFIRMED.