Opinion ID: 1890026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Post-Miranda Silence

Text: On August 1, 2002, the fourth day of trial, the State called Detective Susan Mercer to testify. Detective Mercer responded to the Slobodow home following the report of a shooting and was the lead investigator in the case. She testified first about the arrest of Landry and the various injuries noted on Landry's hand and finger. She then was asked about her first contact with Newman, upon her arrest on January 10. This was the relevant colloquy: Q And did you have any conversation with Ms. Newman? A Yes. Q Okay. Did you advise her of her rights? A Yes, sir. Q And what rights did you advise her of? A That she had the right to remain silent, she had the right to an attorney. At which time she advised that she would like to consult with an attorney. Actually, she had an attorney waiting in the station lobby for her. Newman immediately moved for a mistrial based on the Detective's volunteered statement regarding Newman's decision to consult an attorney. The court recognized the error but concluded that a mistrial was not necessary and instead gave the following curative instruction: You have heard testimony that Elsa Newman was accompanied by an attorney when she appeared at the police station on January 10, 2002. This is not evidence to be considered by you. Ms. Newman is presumed to be innocent of the charges against her. You have heard evidence that Ms. Newman's x-husband, Arlen Slobodow was shot on January 7, 2002. Ms. Newman's house was searched following the shooting. She was aware of this on January 10, 2002. It is fully consistent with the presumption of innocence that anyone under these circumstances would appear and consult with an attorney at the police station to protect his or her interests. We have always accorded trial judges wide discretion in ruling on motions for mistrial. They are in the best position to determine whether an error, especially an evidentiary error, is so dramatically prejudicial as to require a mistrial  to be beyond remedy by a curative instruction. Only in the rarest instances have we second-guessed a trial judge's determination in that regard. Citing cases that are wholly inapposite, the Court holds, as a matter of law, that the brief, unsolicited remark by Detective Mercer is of that character. To me, that is utter nonsense. Yes, it was error. That is not the point. The point, rather, is that this brief, unsolicited remark was immediately corrected by a clear and responsive curative instruction, that it occurred on the fourth day of trial, and that the overall evidence against Newman was more than abundant, if not, in fact, overwhelming. There is simply no rational basis for concluding that Detective Mercer's remark so thoroughly and uncorrectably tainted the trial that a mistrial was required as a matter of law. We have allowed far more grievous errors to be corrected by curative instructions. But for Judge Harrell's concurrence in this part of the dissent, which deprives the Court's opinion on this issue of any precedential value, its purported ruling would sow nothing but confusion; it could not be cabined to just remarks about post- Miranda silence. Every error that creeps into a trial would become the subject of a motion for mistrial, and trial judges would be acting at their peril if they did not grant the motion. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. Judge CATHELL and Judge RODOWSKY authorize me to state that they join in this dissent.