Opinion ID: 1427400
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sixth Circuit Precedent McKinney and Jones

Text: In United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.1967), we had  some 13 years before Payton  already decided the aforementioned, unanswered question concerning police authority to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect, when the police have an arrest warrant but no search warrant. In McKinney, FBI agents went to the apartment of one Ella Mae Snyder, with an arrest warrant for one Louis Edward Baker, for the purpose of arresting Baker. Id. at 260. Upon arrival, three agents encountered appellant Roy McKinney descending the front stairs and asked if Baker was inside. Id. at 261. McKinney denied that he was. Id. Meanwhile, two other agents had entered the apartment from the rear and arrested Baker. Id. The government charged McKinney  who was not the subject of the original search warrant, but an otherwise unimplicated third party  with aiding, abetting, and harboring a fugitive, and McKinney moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the [ ] search of the Snyder apartment, including the fact of Baker's presence. Id. The trial court denied the motion, the jury convicted McKinney, and McKinney appealed. Id. On appeal, we reversed because the trial court had failed to instruct the jury on McKinney's right to remain silent, but we also deemed it useful to discuss [McKinney]'s other contentions because of the possibility that the same issues will arise should the government decide to proceed with a new trial. Id. at 262. Specifically, we addressed McKinney's contention that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, a search warrant must be obtained before entering the dwelling of a third party to execute a valid arrest warrant. Id. In rejecting this contention, we reasoned: [E]ven if we were to accept [McKinney]'s premise that a search warrant must be obtained in the absence of exceptional circumstances, there is good reason to hold that the issuance of an arrest warrant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating the need for a search warrant. An arrest warrant is validly issued only when a magistrate is convinced that there is probable cause to believe that the named party has committed an offense. This determination, together with the inherent mobility of the suspect, would justify a search for the suspect provided the authorities reasonably believe he could be found on the premises searched. In Johnson [ v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)], the Supreme Court itself suggested that in the case of a suspect fleeing or likely to take flight, it would be unnecessary to obtain a search warrant. In order for the search which revealed the presence of Baker in the Snyder apartment to have been valid, however, it must be determined that the F.B.I. reasonably believed Baker to have been there. Id. at 263 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis added). So  working backwards through the analysis  we reasoned that the evidence discovered in the apartment (i.e., Baker) was admissible against third-party McKinney if it was in plain view; the evidence was in plain view if the officers were lawfully entitled to be where they were when they saw it (i.e., in the apartment); and, the officers were lawfully entitled to be in the apartment if they had an arrest warrant and reasonably believed Baker would be there. In a footnote concluding this passage, we explained the basis for our use of the phrase reasonably believed: Restatement, Torts 2d, § 204 provides: The privilege to make an arrest for a criminal offense carries with it the privilege to enter land in the possession of another for the purpose of making such an arrest, if the person sought to be arrested is on the land or if the actor reasonably believes him to be there. To the extent that this provision requires the arresting authority to have a reasonable belief that the person to be arrested is on the land to be entered, it is an accurate statement of what the Fourth Amendment demands when an arrest warrant is to be executed on the premises of a third party. But the mere fact that the person named in the warrant happens to be on the premises would not satisfy the Constitutional requirement that persons be free from unreasonable searches. Id. at 263 n. 3. Notably, neither of the above passages uses the phrase probable cause. Consequently, we said that a search warrant was unnecessary (i.e., it was not necessary for police to a make a further showing of probable cause regarding the location) to justify the entry into the dwelling of a third party to execute an otherwise valid arrest warrant. And, we concluded, considering the totality of the available information, [ ] that the search of the Snyder apartment by the F.B.I. [ ] was not unlawful [and t]he fact of Baker's presence in the apartment was therefore properly received into evidence at [McKinney]'s trial. Id. at 264. In United States v. Jones, 641 F.2d 425, 428 (6th Cir.1981), we again addressed this question  whether police had authority, based on an arrest warrant but no search warrant, to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect, and the effect of that entry on the admissibility of evidence against a previously unimplicated person not the subject of the arrest warrant. Here, the police went to the residence of one Sarah Howard to execute an arrest warrant for one Earl Jones. Id. at 260. The officers' only bases for suspecting that Earl Jones would be present at Sarah Howard's home were: (1) a confidential informant's tip that Sarah was the girlfriend of Earl's brother, Harold Dean Jones, with the further possibility that Earl would be there; and (2) an officer's recollection that Earl and Harold Dean used to associate together quite a bit. Id. at 427. Upon arriving at the residence, the officers demanded entry and entered, announcing that they had a warrant for Earl Jones. Id. Inside the house, the officers found several items of incriminating evidence in plain view, including three rifles, two pistols, a shotgun, drug paraphernalia, and stolen stereo equipment. Id. at 427-28. They did not find Earl Jones. Id. at 428. But, based on this plain-view evidence the government indicted and prosecuted Harold Dean Jones on firearms and drug charges. Id. at 426. Notably, Harold Dean Jones  like Roy McKinney before him  was not the subject of the arrest warrant, but was instead merely a previously unimplicated third party. Prior to trial, Harold Dean Jones moved to suppress this evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search, but the district court denied the motion. Id. Eventually, the jury convicted him and he appealed. Id. On appeal, we determined that the police had failed to demonstrate probable cause to justify their search, reversed the denial of Harold Dean Jones's motion to suppress, and vacated his conviction. Id. at 429. We reasoned that an arrest warrant is not a search warrant  noting that an arrest warrant signifies no more than there is a reason to believe the person named in the warrant has committed a crime, i.e., it does not establish probable cause for an entry  and government officials cannot invade the privacy of one's home without probable cause for the entry. Therefore, an arrest warrant [b]y itself was insufficient to justify the entry. Id. at 428. Then, citing to Payton generally, we announced an absolute rule (deeming it a constitutional minimum) that: [A]n arrest warrant can authorize entry into a dwelling only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within. Id. In a footnote concluding this passage, we explained that we were extending or extrapolating from Payton, inasmuch as Payton applied to cases in which the entry is to the residence of the suspect, but did not answer whether more is required where, as here, entry is to the premises of a third person. Id. at 428 n. 3. We further stated  albeit imprecisely, since McKinney 's statement on this issue was not quite so rigid or unequivocal [2]  that [t]his court has held that an arrest warrant and probable cause is sufficient, United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.1967), but other courts have since held or suggested that more is required. Id. (citing cases from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits). Thus, relying on McKinney (and, tangentially, Payton ), we carved out a middle ground position  a search warrant was not necessary, but an arrest warrant alone was not enough. In finding a middle ground, we required an arrest warrant plus probable cause (albeit without the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate). On review we concluded that the officers had failed to show probable cause, explaining that [t]hey were required only to have had sufficient trustworthy information to suggest that Earl Jones' presence was more likely than not, yet had failed to produce facts that even suggest[ed] that it was probable or likely. Id. at 429. Thus, Jones  which required no search warrant  effectively formalized McKinney 's assertion that a search warrant was not necessary and that an arrest warrant was sufficient to authorize entry into a third-party's residence, but only where the officials executing the warrant have reasonable or probable cause to believe the person named in the warrant is within. Id. at 428 (emphasis added). But Jones did not survive Steagald, and is no longer good law. In fact, even if it were good law, Jones is not on point with the present case (as the majority appears to acknowledge). Jones addressed the admissibility of evidence against a previously unimplicated third party, such as Harold Dean Jones. It did not address the admissibility of evidence against the subject of the original arrest warrant, such as Earl Jones  Malik Hardin's equivalent.