Opinion ID: 774879
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: any Insured Event, or any Loss or claim under this policy.

Text: 88 Under New York law, 'nondisclosure of a fact concerning which the applicant has not been asked does not ordinarily void an insurance policy absent an intent to defraud.' First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Interior Demolition Corp., 193 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting H.B. Singer, Inc. v. Mission Nat'l Ins. Co., 223 A.D.2d 372, 372, 636 N.Y.S.2d 316, 316 (1st Dep't 1996)); see also Sebring v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 382, 387, 174 N.E. 761, 762-63 (1931) (Unless nondisclosure of a fact, concerning which he has not been asked, be fraudulent, the applicant's omission to state it will not avoid a fire or life policy.). 89 As we have noted repeatedly, National Union has specifically disclaimed any allegation that Stroh engaged in fraud. National Union I, 1999 WL 619635, at , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12580, at . And it is undisputed that before agreeing to extend coverage to Heileman, National Union did not ask either defendant about known instances of contamination or the risk of a recall -- or indeed about any risks -- in relation to Heileman's assets. Stroh thus did not breach its duty of non-disclosure as that term is defined under New York law. Cf. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balfour MacLaine Int'l Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that policy could not be voided where insured disclosed everything it was asked to by [the insurer] during its application process, and... there was no evidence of a willful intent on [the insured's] part to defraud [the insurer]). 90 National Union contends that non-disclosure may render an insurance policy void even in the absence of fraudulent intent on the part of the insured or a specific inquiry by the insurer. But all of the decisions on which it relies involved either incomplete or misleading answers to specific questions from the insurer, see Vella, 887 F.2d at 391, 393; Wageman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 24 A.D.2d 67, 263 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 777, 221 N.E.2d 566, 274 N.Y.S.2d 908 (1966); Schondorf v. SMA Life Assurance Co., 745 F. Supp. 866, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), or fraudulent concealment by the insured, see Lighton, 106 A.D.2d at 892-93, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 516. 91 On the May 1, 1996 renewal application that led to the extension of the Policy in Endorsement No. 4, National Union did ask whether Stroh knew of any actual or suspected accidental contaminations involving any of [Stroh's] products during the last twenty-four... months, and Stroh denied any such knowledge. But Stroh's statements were indisputably truthful when made. Stroh was then seeking extension of insurance coverage for costs associated with contamination of Stroh's products. Not until later that month did Stroh's broker contact National Union to ask about the possibility of adding to the Policy coverage with respect to contamination of Heileman products, and not until May 21 did National Union make a proposal to add Heileman to the Policy. National Union did not then or thereafter ask Stroh about contamination involving Heileman products. 92 National Union argues, however, that the renewal application put Stroh on notice that it considered information about known or potential contaminations to be material, and asserts that New York law requires an applicant for insurance to disclose facts it knows to be material even in the absence of specific inquiry. Therefore, National Union asserts, when Stroh sought to extend the Policy's coverage to Heileman products, it was required to disclose what it knew about actual or potential Heileman contamination. 93 National Union first raised this argument in connection with its motion for reconsideration under Rule 6.3 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. The district court thus rejected the argument as untimely. See National Union III, 2000 WL 264320, at , 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2581, at -. National Union does not expressly challenge this ruling, and we see no reason to question it. See Caribbean Trading & Fidelity Corp. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 948 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that predecessor to Rule 6.3 preclud[es] arguments raised for the first time on a motion for reconsideration), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992); Polsby v. St. Martin's Press, No. 97 Civ. 690(MBM), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 596, at , 2000 WL 98057, at  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2000) (On such a [Local Rule 6.3] motion, a party may not advance new facts, issues, or arguments not previously presented to the Court. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 94 The district court ruled in the alternative that National Union's argument failed on the merits. Although we are inclined to agree, 6 we need not reach this issue which, since it was not properly raised in the district court, is not properly before us.