Opinion ID: 1768734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consistency with Other Statutes

Text: Petitioners argue that the statute's intended purpose is undermined by the fact that there is no mandatory closure provision in the statute providing the procedure for adjudication of dependency actions. Petitioners argue that most TPR proceedings are initiated as dependency cases. If there is no closure order at the dependency phase, there may already have been significant publicity by the time TPR proceedings are instituted. Petitioners argue that the better view would be a presumptively open proceeding that is only closed after a particularized showing is made that such closure is justified. This argument was asserted in H.Y.T. We did not find this argument compelling then, and do not find this argument compelling now. We do not believe the Legislature intended that the child bear the burden of proving the need for confidentiality in TPR proceedings, which is why the Legislature removed the discretion from the court. As we held in H.Y.T., petitioners' argument attempts to lay on the shoulders of the child the burden of proving a need for the protection the people of the state, through the legislature, have attempted to afford parties to an adoption. H.Y.T., 458 So.2d at 1129. Inconsistent though the dependency and TPR statutes may be, neither is unconstitutional. Where a statute does not violate the federal or state Constitution, the legislative will is supreme, and its policy is not subject to judicial review. The courts have no veto power, and do not assume to regulate state policy; but they recognize and enforce the policy of the law as expressed in valid enactments, and decline to enforce statutes only when to do so would violate organic law. City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, 772 (1914).