Opinion ID: 1349797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence elicited at the first evidentiary hearing

Text: In our initial decision in this case, we summarized Judge Egly's report and the testimony elicited at the first hearing as follows: [I]t is clear that defendant told Oglesby about the Brookhaven Motel murders sometime prior to May 21-22, when Oglesby recounted that conversation to Lt. Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald testified Oglesby also told him at the May 21-22 meetings of Williams's boast of killing a large number of Orientals, but Oglesby said it was sometime later. At one point Oglesby said he received the `Blackie' note sometime early in May even though it bears the date of June 21; at another time he said it was after the May 21-22 meetings. It is apparent that the initial planning of the escape preceded May 21, including the delivery of the map and the two notes concerning Oglesby's wife. Sgt. Allender, who was assigned to prevent the escape, received the `dynamite' note from Oglesby on May 25, but it is not clear when Oglesby received it. Other notes, including all discussion of the role of Oglesby's wife, postdated May 25. Oglesby and Fitzgerald testified concerning their meetings. Fitzgerald recalled a meeting on March 5 in which Oglesby asked Fitzgerald to review the record in Oglesby's murder case and see if he could help; the next meeting between the two was May 21. Oglesby recalled the first conversation as earlier than March 5, and claims there were several other meetings before May 21. But they both agree defendant was not discussed until the meetings of May 21 and May 22, that Fitzgerald never asked or directed Oglesby to get information from defendant, and never promised any reward for such information. A few additional details appeared concerning the conversations between defendant and Oglesby. Most conversations took place on `freeway time,' when prisoners were permitted to walk on the tier. Oglesby and defendant rarely discussed defendant's crime, but frequently discussed escape. Oglesby did not initiate these discussions or interrogate defendant, but neither was he a passive listener; drawing on his knowledge of police and courthouse routines (Oglesby had worked for a bail bondsman), Oglesby suggested a number of `improvements' in the escape plan. Finally, the parties presented evidence concerning the competency of defense counsel. The evidence shows counsel was an experienced defense attorney and generally conducted a competent defense. He was, however, unaware of the decision in United States v. Henry, supra, 447 U.S. 264, which was decided about eight months before defendant's trial. Counsel neither investigated the factual basis for a constitutional objection to Oglesby's testimony nor did he research the legal grounds for such an objection, but decided instead to concentrate on attacking Oglesby's credibility. The referee submitted extensive findings, one of which, as we shall explain, disposes of defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. First, he found Oglesby was a `paid government informant' from only May 25, 1979, until the conclusion of defendant's trial. The referee further stated: `[Defendant] has failed to prove by a preponderance that there was a deliberate eliciting of the incriminating statements furnished the Sheriff by Oglesby on May 21, 1979 and May 22, 1979 in violation of rules established in Massiah v. United States, supra [377 U.S. 201] and United States v. Henry, supra [447 U.S. 264]. The only evidence that the referee has [ as ] to the post May 22, 1979 date is that Oglesby was permitted to remain in [ defendant's ] presence and that he did furnish information to Sgt. Allender. There is no evidence that Oglesby either initiated conversations or interrogated [ defendant ] on behalf of any police agency, but [ simply ] passed on information given him by [ defendant ].' (Italics added.) Finally, the referee found ... that counsel's failure to undertake a sufficient legal and factual inquiry into grounds for objecting to Oglesby's testimony constituted unreasonable performance. He expressed no opinion whether counsel's conduct affected the outcome of the case. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1139-1140, italics in original.)