Opinion ID: 2823847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing in Colorado

Text: Â¶7Â Â Â Â Â We review de novo the court of appealsâ determination that Respondents have standing to sue the Governor. See Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008). Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be raised any time during the proceedings. See Ainscough v. Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004); Anson v. Trujillo, 56 P.3d 114, 117 (Colo. App. 2002). Because âstanding involves a consideration of whether a plaintiff has asserted a legal basis on which a claim for relief can be predicated,â Bd. of Cnty. Commârs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Colo. 1992), the question of standing must be determined prior to a decision on the merits, see Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855. If a court determines that standing does not exist, then it must dismiss the case. Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163, 168, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (1977). Â¶8Â Â Â Â Â In Wimberly, this Court articulated a two-prong test for determining whether a plaintiff can establish standing to sue. See id. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. This test has become the routine test for assessing standing in Colorado. Brotman v. E. Lake Creek Ranch, L.L.P., 31 P.3d 886, 890 (Colo. 2001) (âBecause we have applied the Wimberly test in a variety of contexts, it has become our âgeneralâ test for standing.â); see, e.g., Barber, 196 P.3d at 246â47 (applying the Wimberly test to determine whether the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing). 9 To satisfy the Wimberly test, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he suffered an injury in fact, and (2) his injury was to a legally protected interest. See Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539. Â¶9Â Â Â Â Â The first prong, the injury-in-fact requirement, maintains the separation of powers mandated by article III of the Colorado Constitution by preventing courts from invading legislative and executive spheres. Because judicial determination of an issue may result in disapproval of legislative or executive acts, this constitutional basis for standing ensures that judicial âdetermination may not be had at the suit of any and all members of the public.â Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 167, 570 P.2d at 538 (quoting Ex-Cell-O Corp. v. City of Chicago, 115 F.2d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 1940)); see also Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 855â56; Conrad v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982). The injury-in-fact requirement also finds constitutional roots in article VI, section 1, under which Colorado courts limit their inquiries to the resolution of actual controversies. Bd. of Dirs., Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Natâl Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 105 P.3d 653, 655â56 (Colo. 2005); City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for theÂ Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 436â37 (Colo. 2000). In sum, the injury-in-fact requirement ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution. See Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668. The requirement ensures a âconcrete adversenessâ that sharpens the presentation of issues to the court. City of Greenwood Vill., 3 P.3d at 437. Thus, although both tangible injuries (e.g., physical damage) and intangible injuries (e.g., aesthetic deterioration of the environment) can satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, âan injury that is overly âindirect and incidentalâ to the defendantâs actionâ will not convey standing, nor will the remote possibility of a future injury. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856; see also Wimberly, 194 Colo. at 168, 570 P.2d at 539 (holding that the plaintiffsâ â[i]ndirect and incidental pecuniary injuryâ was insufficient to confer standing). Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â The second prong, the legally-protected-interest requirement, promotes judicial self-restraint. Conrad, 656 P.2d at 668. This prudential consideration recognizes âthat unnecessary or premature decisions of constitutional questions should be avoided, and that parties actually protected by a statute or constitutional provision are generally best situated to vindicate their own rights.â City of Greenwood Vill., 3 P.3d at 437. Claimsfor relief under the constitution, the common law, a statute, or a rule or regulation satisfy the legally-protected-interest requirement. Ainscough, 90 P.3d at 856. Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Because Respondentsâ Preference Clause claimâwhich derives from article II, section 4 of the Colorado Constitutionâclearly satisfies the second prong of the Wimberly test, our standing determination hinges on whether Respondents have alleged injuriesâeither as taxpayers or as individual nonbelieversâthat satisfy the first prong. Thus, we begin our analysis by considering whether Respondents have suffered an injury as Colorado taxpayers that is sufficient to establish taxpayer standing. We next consider whether Respondents have suffered an injury as nonbelievers that is sufficient to establish individual standing. 10 Because we determine that Respondents lack either form of standing, we dismiss their case without reaching the merits of Respondentsâ substantive legal claim.