Opinion ID: 1931405
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zoning Merger

Text: Petitioner grounds his argument that Lot 11 and Lot 12 have functionally merged for zoning purposes pursuant to our decision in Friends of the Ridge v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 352 Md. 645, 724 A.2d 34 (1999), wherein we recognized the existence of the doctrine of zoning merger in Maryland. We described zoning merger to be the merger for zoning purposes of two or more lots held in common ownership where one lot is used in service to one or more of the other common lots solely to meet zoning requirements. Petitioner argues that Ridge is an equitable doctrine that seeks to prevent lots from being broken up in such a way that would create zoning violations. In Ridge, respondent Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) sought to increase the capacity of its electric substation. In order to effectuate this expansion, BG&E acquired additional parcels of land contiguous with the parcel on which the existing substation was located and BG&E attempted to create a new resubdivision. It was argued that its attempt to create a formal resubdivision was inadequate. We did not address that particular controversy, resolving the case on the assumption that no proper formal resubdivision had occurred. BG&E sought and was granted a public utility special exception to operate a larger capacity substation. BG&E also applied for a variance from the side yard setback requirements. In considering BG&E's request, the Baltimore County Board of Appeals determined that the variance criteria of the Baltimore County Zoning Ordinance did not apply. In response to the Ridge petitioners' concerns with the propriety of BG&E's lot consolidation, we stated that, as to Ridge, [w]e are concerned here only with the applicability of the zoning ordinance's variance provisions and not Baltimore County subdivision regulations. Id. at 649-50, 724 A.2d at 36. [8] We sustained the Board of Appeals' conclusion, reasoning that there was no need for BG&E to obtain a variance from the zoning regulations [9] because BG&E's intended use of its three contiguous parcels as one parcel effectively overcame the conditions triggering the need for a variance. Thus, BG&E was permitted to use the entire parcel for its substation expansion, provided that its proposal met the setback requirements as measured from the exterior property lines of the combined parcel. Specifically, this Court held, unless the ordinance's language specifically and clearly prohibits it, an owner of contiguous parcels of real property . . . is free to combine them into larger and fewer parcels without violating the zoning code. Id. at 648, 724 A.2d at 35-36. [10] In reaching our resolution, we examined the mechanisms triggering the doctrine of zoning merger in other jurisdictions and observed that merger had been applied to prohibit[ ] the use of individual substandard parcels if contiguous parcels have been, at any relevant time, in the same ownership and at the time of that ownership, the combined parcel was not substandard. Id. at 653, 724 A.2d at 38. We also stated: We see no reason why a doctrine that seeks to prevent the proliferation or use of nonconforming, undersized lots by holding that they have been combined or merged into a larger parcel should not, as far as zoning is concerned, be applied properly to permit the creation, through the combining by use of a larger parcel from already conforming smaller parcels, without the necessity of official action or conveyancing. Id. at 654, 724 A.2d at 38 (emphasis added). The facts of the instant case, as one may suppose, present issues somewhat differently than the facts in Ridge. In Ridge, BG&E, as the developer, sought a conclusion that its three lots had merged for zoning purposes so that it might possess a land assemblage of sufficient size, with sufficient setbacks to allow it to enlarge its electricity substation. In the case at bar, respondents seek the conclusion that Lot 11 and Lot 12 have not merged, for varying reasons including that informal lot consolidation, according to respondents, is not available other then by formal plat submission in Montgomery County and so that Mr. Duffie might sell Lot 11 to Design-Tech, the developer, who seeks to build a single-family dwelling on this piece of land. [11] We indicated in Ridge that merger may be derived from the common owner's intent, as evidenced by integrat[ing] or utiliz[ing] the contiguous lots in the service of a single structure or project. . . . Id. at 658, 724 A.2d at 40 (alterations added). Intent is to be derived from the facts. Id. at 659, 724 A.2d at 41; see also Rouse-Fairwood Devel. Ltd. Partnership v. Supervisor of Assessments for Prince George's County, 138 Md.App. 589, 630, 773 A.2d 535, 559 (2001); Iannucci v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 25 Conn.App. 85, 87, 592 A.2d 970, 971 (1991) (stating that intent of the owner may be inferred from his conduct with respect to the land and the use which he makes of it). In reviewing scenarios from varying jurisdictions, we noted that [s]ome cases discuss automatic merger, but most require that the intent of the owner to merge the parcels be expressed, though little evidence of that intent is required. Ridge, 352 Md. at 653, 724 A.2d at 38. Petitioner contends that, in applying Ridge to the instant case, Lot 11 and Lot 12 remain separate for subdivision purposes, but are combined for zoning purposes. This is, indeed, a correct articulation of the thrust of zoning merger: zoning merger does not cause a nullification of any subdivision that has previously occurred. It merely consolidates lots insofar as the determination of what can be constructed upon that land, or what uses can be made of it, bearing in mind the requirement that one must comply with zoning requirements including area, setback, etc. For title purposes, the platted lot lines may remain, but by operation of law a single parcel emerges for zoning purposes. Ridge, 352 Md. at 658, 724 A.2d at 34. Respondents urge that merger in Montgomery County may arise only from a formal replatting. Thus, according to the respondents, other indicia of merger such as common ownership, contiguous parcels, use of one or more lots in service of another, offer no evidentiary import and are of little moment in Montgomery County. They are incorrect. The respondents read this Court's decision in Ridge as narrowly focused on the realm of zoning, and to this effect, Montgomery County insists that the Court limited its ruling to the zoning requirements and did not address the subdivision perspective of creating lots. The respondents' assertion illustrates a point, that we emphasized in Ridge, and that bears repeating: zoning merger is not a resubdivision. When zoning merger occurs, the lots remain divided. Thus, zoning merger, in effect, is an adjustment of zoning requirements. It has no effect on subdivision. Title examiners regularly consider aspects of zoning when examining titles in order to be able to indicate to purchasers the uses that can be made of a property. Those uses have no effect on subdivision regulation. One must comply with both zoning and subdivision requirements. In the present case, the applicant cannot meet zoning requirements because of the doctrine of zoning merger and thus, while Lot 11 may be sold, it cannot be used, absent zoning variances or other zoning relief, if any. Simply because an applicant submits documents articulating plan specifications, engineering details, and a plot diagram showing details of the building to be erected [12] does not remove the fact that the instant lot may be part of some larger zoning configuration  a configuration that arose through a common owner's use of the property, if not through schematics. Each case must be examined on its own. In the case at bar, there is ample evidence to conclude the elder Duffies intended to use their Lot 11 and Lot 12 as one property for zoning purposes: the pool on Lot 11 violates (or violated) the prescribed setbacks from the street and from Lot 12, unless it was dedicated for zoning purposes to Lot 12, and from the time of its creation was thus an accessory use to the structure or use of Lot 12; the additions to the house on Lot 12 encroach upon that lot's setbacks; the circular driveway traverses both Lot 11 and Lot 12; until very recently the lots were assessed for tax purposes as a single parcel; and the subsequent personal representative's deed conveying Lot 11 and Lot 12 to Mr. Duffie described a single lot comprised of two lots, in that it reads Lot numbered eleven (11) and twelve (12). [13] Thus, petitioner maintains that the building permit for the construction of a single-family dwelling on Lot 11 was issued in error and its issuance violates the current relevant provisions of the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance, which prohibit a second single-family dwelling on a single lot, as follows: § 59-A-5.2. Buildings to be located on lots. Every building hereafter erected shall be located on a lot, as herein defined; and, except as provided in this chapter, there shall be not more than one single-family dwelling on one lot. § 59-A-5.3. Yards and open spaces generally. No building shall be erected, nor shall any existing building be altered, enlarged, moved or rebuilt, nor shall any open space surrounding any building be encroached upon or reduced in any manner not in conformity with the yard, lot, area and building location regulations hereinafter designated for the zone in which such building or open space is located, except as otherwise specifically provided. No yard or other open space provided about any building for the purpose of complying with the provisions of this chapter shall be considered as a yard or open space for any other building; and no yard or other open space of a building on one lot shall be considered as a yard or open space for a building on any other lot. [14]