Opinion ID: 381306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Indictment, the Trial, and the Convictions

Text: 6 The defendants charge that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the record keeping offenses alleged under §§ 922(b)(5) and 922(m) constituted an amendment of the indictment. This purported amendment, they assert, compromised their fifth amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury. The indictment alleged noncompliance with the record keeping requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 923, but failed to specify whether the offense charged pertains to the compendium of all transactions by the firearms dealer required by 27 C.F.R. § 178.125(e) (1980) or to the individual Firearms Transaction Records (Form 4473's) required by 27 C.F.R. § 178.124(c) (1980). 8 The defendants urge that the trial court impermissibly altered the indictment on the essential element of the offense charged by instructing the jury that the indictment referred to Form 4473. 7 We disagree. The indictment gave the defendants notice that record keeping violations with respect to eight discrete sales were at issue; the universe of all possible records implicated here encompasses only eight entries on a bound log and the Form 4473's completed in connection with each of these particular sales. By specifying in its jury instructions that the indictment referred to Form 4473, the trial court merely tailored the charge to the evidence adduced at trial. This constriction of exposure to criminal liability did not impair the defendants' right to the safeguards of grand jury processes. See United States v. Glassman, 562 F.2d 954, 957 (5th Cir. 1977). Appellants here failed to show that stripping superfluous baggage from the indictment by a more precise, less inclusive jury instruction prejudiced their cause. 8 Nor do we perceive an abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to allow defendants' counsel to replay edited segments of the tape recordings of the gun transactions during closing argument. The trial court's control over the scope of closing argument is necessarily broad, especially when confronted with a repetitive offer. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2555, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975). The defendants concede that they enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to confront and to discredit the tape recordings during the four day trial. In these circumstances, we cannot agree that the trial judge abused his discretion by denying the defendants' request to repeat the exercise in closing argument. 9 Defendant Newman separately challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction for the August 22, 1978 sale of a revolver to undercover agent Williams. Newman questions the adequacy of proof that he knew Williams was a non-resident and that he engaged in affirmative conduct aiding and abetting the sale. On review of this point, we take the evidence and inferences drawn from it in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2911, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). 10 The evidence in the record on appeal indicates that Williams declared his South Carolina residence four times during the approximately fifteen minutes it took to consummate the August 22 sale. The evidence shows that Newman was within earshot of Williams for the entire period; Williams testified that Newman overheard his declarations regarding South Carolina residence. The record contains ample evidence to sustain the jury verdict on this count. Therefore, Newman's challenge grounded on insufficiency is meritless. 11 Further, Newman's removal of the gun from a display rack and his handing the weapon to Harley to facilitate the sale satisfied the overt act element of the aiding and abetting offense. See United States v. Cowart, 585 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1979). We find that reasonable minds could have found this evidence of Newman's guilty knowledge and affirmative participation in the proscribed sale inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See, e. g., United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1979). Accordingly, this separate contention of Newman is not persuasive. 12