Opinion ID: 2076678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: deceased's status as a chicago police officer

Text: The defendant contends that the continuous reference to James Koumoundouros as a police officer during the entire sentencing hearing and the prosecution's closing argument caused the sentencing jury to sentence him to death, in part, for killing a Chicago police officer. The State maintains that the defense, by failing to object to any reference to the deceased as a police officer and in light of defense counsel's repeated reference to Mr. Koumoundouros as a police officer, waived this issue on appeal. The State also contends that the fact that the deceased was a police officer was relevant because it explained the reaction of Officer Koumoundouros to the defendant's command to put his gun down. In addition, the State maintains that divulging the fact that the victim was a police officer was actually beneficial to the defendant. During voir dire, prospective jurors were excused because they stated that their relationships with police officers would influence their decision in the instant case. In each case, the prospective juror was either related to or friends with a police officer or law-enforcement agent, and that fact, they stated, would prevent them from being fair and impartial. If the deceased's status had not been brought to light, then the excused jurors may have remained on the jury and acted through prejudice in reaching their decision. We agree with the State that the prosecutor did not try to prove that the defendant killed Officer Koumoundouros knowing him to be a police officer, as the defendant alleges. However, we do agree with the defendant that the prosecutor, without stating that he was trying to prove an additional aggravating factor, did prejudice the defendant in his closing argument. One of the aggravating factors listed in the Illinois death penalty statute provides that a person convicted of murder may be sentenced to death if: 1. the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman;   . Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(1). It wasn't until the prosecutor gave his closing argument that he presented the deceased's status to the jury as if the fact that he was a police officer was material in determining the sentence which was to be imposed. In his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: I'd like to reflect upon the incident of September 7th in which a fine police officer lost his life. Now, whether you want to say he was acting in the performance of his duties as a police officer or if you want to say he was working part time to make a few extra bucks, he stood and represented the same thing.    James Koumoundouros, every moment of his life was a policeman ... There is a little saying on the side of police vehicles. And it is a four word saying. And it says `we serve and protect.' I think that you should dwell upon that as we look at the September 7th incident according to Mr. Carey.    I mention to you those four words, `We serve and protect.' Those words mean that police officers are willing to die to uphold the law. They are putting their lives on the line for you each day. James Koumoundouros died, not as a part-time security guard, and not for that purpose. He died serving and protecting. And it's about time, ladies and gentlemen of this jury, it is about time that we value the lives of our policemen. Value the lives of the people who protect us every day.    These are the tools of the life of Roberto Ramirez. This is the tool of a police officer who died upholding the law.    You must now serve and protect the people of this country. You must now fulfill your obligation to the law, to the evidence. You must serve and protect so that James Koumoundouros doesn't die for nothing ... Ladies and gentlemen, you must serve and protect us all. Whether the deceased in the instant case was a Chicago police officer was irrelevant to the determination of whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. The only reason it was irrelevant was that at the time he was shot he was not acting in the course of his official duties as a police officer. The prosecutor's remarks were improper because they made the jurors think that the deceased's status as a police officer was a factor to be taken into account in their deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The Illinois death penalty statute requires that aggravating and mitigating factors must be relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c).) The remarks of the prosecutor in his closing argument could only be interpreted one way  that the defendant should receive a death sentence because he killed a Chicago police officer. These comments by the prosecutor were error.