Opinion ID: 2442122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Punitive Sanctions for Contempt

Text: [¶ 12] St. Onge contends that the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in criminal court because his alleged contempt arose from a civil court order. [¶ 13] Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Windham Land Trust v. Jeffords, 2009 ME 29, ¶ 19, 967 A.2d 690, 696. [¶ 14] A court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider motions for contempt of its own orders. Edwards v. Campbell, 2008 ME 173, ¶ 8, 960 A.2d 324, 326 (discussing the court's subject matter jurisdiction to enforce divorce judgments through contempt proceedings). The court's power to impose sanctions for contempt is based on its inherent and statutory authority. M.R. Civ. P. 66(a)(1); see 4 M.R.S. § 114 (2010) (The Superior Court may . . . punish for contempt. . . .); Linscott v. Foy, 1998 ME 206, ¶ 21, 716 A.2d 1017, 1022. The procedure for exercising that authority is provided in M.R. Civ. P. 66. M.R. Civ. P. 66(a)(1); Linscott, 1998 ME 206, ¶ 21, 716 A.2d at 1022; see also M.R.Crim. P. 42 (cross-referencing Rule 66). For punitive contempt sanctions in plenary proceedings, the Rule directs the court to proceed as provided by the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure for the prosecution of a Class D crime. . . . M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(2); State v. Manter, 2001 ME 164, ¶ 5, 784 A.2d 513, 515. The court has discretion to impose a punitive sanction that is proportionate to the conduct constituting the contempt. M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(3). If the court contemplates that a punitive sanction of imprisonment of more than 30 days . . . may be imposed, trial shall be to a jury unless waived by the alleged contemnor. M.R. Civ. P. 66(c)(2)(D). [¶ 15] The court's subject matter jurisdiction to hold contempt proceedings to punish noncompliance with a court order is clearly established. See Edwards, 2008 ME 173, ¶ 8, 960 A.2d at 326. Consistent with its inherent and statutory authority and the procedure prescribed by Rule 66(c), the court docketed this case as a criminal case, it conducted the case as a criminal proceeding, and it afforded St. Onge an opportunity for a jury trial.
[¶ 16] St. Onge also argues that the court did not have authority to charge a new Class D crime of criminal contempt out of thin air. [¶ 17] We review a court's interpretation of procedural rules de novo. Town of Poland v. T & M Mortg. Solutions, Inc., 2010 ME 2, ¶ 6, 987 A.2d 524, 526. By its plain language, Rule 66(c) provides that a plenary contempt proceeding for punitive sanctions shall proceed as provided by the criminal rules for the prosecution of a Class D crime. However, contempt with punitive sanctions is not defined as a Class D crime by rule or statute. Indeed, we have stated that we no longer categorize contempt as either `civil' or `criminal' but, rather, as `punitive' or `remedial.' Manter, 2001 ME 164, ¶ 5, 784 A.2d at 515. The classification of St. Onge's offense as Class D on the summons and on the judgment and commitment form, therefore, was error. [¶ 18] We find, however, that it is highly probable that the court's classification of St. Onge's contempt charge as a Class D crime did not adversely affect his substantial rights, and we disregard the error as harmless. See M.R.Crim. P. 52(a); In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶¶ 24-25, 775 A.2d 1144, 1152 (discussing that there is no significant distinction between the harmless error standards in civil and criminal matters). Nevertheless, we recognize that an adjudication of contempt with punitive sanctions is not a Class D crime, and we modify the judgment accordingly. See M.R.Crim. P. 50.