Opinion ID: 1339821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Arrest And Subsequent Inculpatory Statements

Text: Having concluded that the seizure and search of the paper bag was unlawful, we must also conclude that the arrest of the passenger for possession of marijuana was unlawful. There is little doubt that if the police lack probable cause to search, thereby making the search unlawful, the subsequent arrest of the individual based on the evidence found in the unlawful search is also unlawful. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959). In Alderman, the Supreme Court found that there had been an illegal search of the premises and concluded: Nothing seen or found on the premises may legally form the basis for an arrest or search warrant or for testimony at the homeowner's trial, since the prosecution would be using the fruits of a Fourth Amendment violation. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426 (1920); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 394 U.S. at 177, 89 S.Ct. at 968-69, 22 L.Ed.2d at 176. We have come to much the same conclusion in Syllabus Point 10 of State v. Thomas, W.Va., 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974): An arrest cannot be justified by the fruits of an illegal search nor can a search be justified by what it produces. See also State v. Duvernoy, 156 W.Va. 578, 583-84, 195 S.E.2d 631, 635 (1973). This same rule is uniformly followed in other jurisdictions. United States v. Palazzo, 488 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Leib, 16 Cal.3d 869, 548 P.2d 1105, 129 Cal.Rptr. 433 (1976); D'Agostino v. State, 310 So.2d 12 (Fla.1975); People v. Corrado, 22 N.Y.2d 308, 239 N.E.2d 526, 292 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1968); State v. Hoggans, 35 Or.App. 669, 582 P.2d 466 (1978); McMillon v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 505, 184 S.E.2d 773 (1971). Moreover, where, as here, the unlawful arrest is immediately followed by inculpatory statements, these statements are not admissible even though they were made after Miranda warnings had been given to the suspect. In Brown v. Illinois, 472 U.S. 590, 601-03, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, 426-27 (1975), it was recognized that there was an interrelationship between the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Fourth Amendment right against illegal arrests: Thus, even if the statements in this case were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue remains. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be `sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.' 371 U.S., at 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441, Wong Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement's admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment. If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-727, 89 S.Ct. 1394, [1397] 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). Arrests made without warrant or without probable cause, for questioning or `investigation,' would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom could well be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings. Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a `cure-all,' and the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to `a form of words.' See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 648, 81 S.Ct. 1684, [at 1687] 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824, (1979); Stevens v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1976); Morris v. State, 399 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1980); State v. Olson, 287 Or. 157, 598 P.2d 670 (1979); Hart v. Commonwealth, 269 S.E.2d 806 (Va.1980). We have followed Brown v. Illinois, supra , in State v. Canby, W.Va., 252 S.E.2d 164 (1979), where we held in Syllabus Point 3: Exclusion of a confession obtained as a result of an illegal arrest without a warrant is mandated unless the causal connection between the arrest and the confession has been clearly broken. In the present case, the illegal arrest of the defendant was followed immediately by the officer placing the defendant in his cruiser, giving the Miranda warnings and then questioning the defendant, who admitted that the bag did contain marijuana which he had obtained from a third party. It was this inculpatory statement that was offered at trial over the defendant's objection. Clearly, there was no break in the causal connection between the illegal arrest and subsequent statement. [14] Consequently, because there was initially an illegal search, the object seized could not be admitted into evidence. The arrest based on the object illegally seized was also invalid, as were the inculpatory statements made immediately following the arrest. For these reasons, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial. Reversed and Remanded.