Opinion ID: 1741615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: There was a Justiciable Controversy Presented

Text: The majority does not address the First Amendment issues the parties argue in their briefs, but, instead, holds that the controversy was nonjusticiable, and that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its judgments, and that the judgments entered by the trial court were, therefore, void. 711 So.2d at 964. As I stated earlier, I agree with the result, which is to set the judgments aside, but I cannot agree with the reasoning used by the majority to reach that result. It is well established under Alabama law that one can seek a declaratory judgment if the facts show that a bona fide justiciable controversy exists between the parties that ought to be settled; a party need not make a case for an injunction. See the Declaratory Judgment Act, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-6-220 to -232, and Berman v. Wreck-A-Pair Bldg. Co., 234 Ala. 293, 175 So. 269 (1937). The Declaratory Judgment Act, which substantially adopts a model act that many States have adopted, provides that [t]his article [i.e., the Act] is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respects to rights, status, and other legal relations and is to be liberally construed and administered. § 6-6-221. More specifically, Alabama law establishes that the Declaratory Judgment Act extends to cases involving public rights or important public matters and to controversies in which the legality of action of public officials or public agencies is challenged. Morgan v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 248 Ala. 22, 25, 26 So.2d 108, 110 (1946). [12] The majority primarily relies upon State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 300 So.2d 106 (1974), a case in which I did not participate, and Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642 So.2d 941 (Ala.1994), to support its conclusion that this case presents no justiciable controversy. I believe those two cases are factually distinguishable from the present case and are inapposite. In Johnson, the attorney general filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment against the superintendent of banks, claiming that certain banks were violating applicable regulations and that the superintendent of banks had failed to properly prevent and correct the violations. Johnson, 293 Ala. at 71, 300 So.2d at 108. Several banks, rather than participating directly in the litigation as parties, presented their position in the form of amicus briefs. On rehearing, this Court described the superintendent of banks as a straw-man defendant, 293 Ala. at 73-74, 300 So.2d at 109-10, because the superintendent, in reality, made no argument in opposition to that of the attorney general. This Court held that the banks appearing as amici curiae were the only entities with a real interest in opposing the attorney general; however, they had not been made parties. Consequently, the Court concluded that the case was nonjusticiable. Johnson, 293 Ala. at 73, 300 So.2d at 110. In Stamps, 642 So.2d 941, special education teachers brought an action for a declaratory judgment against various officials connected to the Jefferson County Board of Education, claiming that the Board's requirement that they perform certain medical procedures for students made them subject to being prosecuted for violating the Nursing Practices Act, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 34-21-1 to -63. However, the Board of Nursing, the entity responsible for enforcing the Nursing Practices Act, was not made a party to the action. The trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the Board, and the teachers appealed. This Court, noting that the Board of Nursing would not be bound by any decision this Court made in the case, held that the case did not present a justiciable controversy. 642 So.2d at 945. Specifically, the Court explained: `Actions or opinions are denominated advisory,` and, therefore, not justiciable, 'when there is an insufficient interest in the plaintiff or defendant to justify judicial determination, where the judgment sought would not constitute specific relief to a litigant ... or where, by reason of inadequacy of parties defendant, the judgment could not be sufficiently conclusive. ' E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 31 (1934) (emphasis added [in Stamps ]). `Actions for declaratory judgments brought by individuals to test or challenge the propriety of public action often fail on this ground, ... because the ... public officer or other person selected as a defendant has ... no special duties in relation to the matters which would be affected by any eventual judgment.` Rogers v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 392 So.2d 235, 237 (Ala.Civ.App.1980) (emphasis added [in Stamps ]) (quoting E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 76 (2d ed.1941)). ` The absence of adversary or the correct adversary parties is in principle fatal. A mere difference of opinion or disagreement or argument on a legal question affords inadequate ground for invoking the judicial power.` Id. (emphasis added [in Stamps ]). 642 So.2d at 944. At the outset, I note that it is apparent that this Court's discussion in Stamps, quoted above, is applicable to this case insofar as the Chief Justice is concerned, because the Chief Justice does not have the authority to direct a circuit judge to follow certain guidelines in his management of sessions of court or in decorating the courtroom in which he presides. [13] However, with regard to the remaining parties to this dispute, I believe the facts of the present case stand in stark contrast to those presented in Johnson and Stamps. As noted by the majority, Joel Sogol, on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama (ACLUA), sent a letter to then Chief Justice Sonny Hornsby, stating, This letter comes in an attempt to avoid litigation involving a number of judges in this State. The letter stated that the ACLUA had received complaints from people in a large number of circuits regarding prayers prior to jury week terms. The threat of litigation came to fruition when Judge Moore was sued in a federal court by one of the appellees in this present appeal. Both the ACLUA and the Alabama Free Thought Association (AFA) were made parties in the trial court in the present case. Both vigorously prosecuted their claims before the trial court and suggested at one point that Judge Moore be realigned as a party plaintiff; realignment of parties is permissible under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure and it has been done in other cases involving State officials. [14] A fact that was lacking in Johnson, the presence of a party with an adverse interest, exists in this case. The result would have been different, of course, had the action continued as it was filed, with the Governor and the attorney general on one side and Judge Moore on the other. If that were the situation before us, I would agree that this case would not present a justiciable controversy. However, that is not the situation in this case. During the course of the proceedings, the ACLUA and the AFA were made parties. The Governor, as the chief magistrate of the State, has a constitutional duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, [15] and the attorney general, who has been held to have the authority to manage and control all litigation of behalf of the State of Alabama, [16] had a right to seek a declaration of rights on behalf of the State of Alabama. [17] Upon my review of the record, it seems clear to me that the ACLUA and the AFA actively participated in the trial of this case and that the trial court granted relief that the ACLUA and the AFA considered to be favorable. They have filed briefs in this Court as appellees in support of the trial court's judgment; unlike the banking superintendent in Johnson, who was merely a straw-man defendant, the ACLUA and the AFA have in the present case occupied roles as adversaries to the State since they were joined as parties. Based on all of the foregoing facts and circumstances, I conclude that this case presents a classic case of a justiciable controversy.