Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditional Examination Testimony

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred under state law in overruling his objection to admission at trial of the conditional examination testimony of Brian Johnsen, and that this error violated defendant's constitutional rights to due process, to counsel, to confrontation, and to fair and reliable determinations of guilt and penalty under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
On November 1, 1991, the trial court granted the prosecutor's request under section 1054.7 for an in camera hearing out of the presence of defendant and his attorney to consider postponement or limitation of discovery. At the hearing, the prosecutor told the court that in September 1991, during an interview with a prosecution investigator, Brian Johnsen had said that defendant had killed Holloway to prevent her from revealing a plan to kill a man named Doug Mynatt, who was believed to have ties to the Hell's Angels and whose whereabouts was unknown. The prosecutor expressed concern that disclosure of this information to the defense through the discovery process could endanger Mynatt's life or cause Mynatt to become a threat to the lives of Johnsen and Anna Humiston, who was not then in custody. The prosecutor also stated his intention to secure Johnsen's testimony by conditional examination. The trial court granted the prosecutor a one-week extension of the deadline for disclosure of the information obtained during the September interview of Johnsen. At a hearing on November 8, 1991, the prosecutor gave the defense an investigator's report of the September interview of Brian Johnsen, and the prosecutor submitted a written motion for a conditional examination of Johnsen on the ground that his life was in jeopardy (§ 1336, subd. (b)). Defendant's attorney asked for more time to study the report and the motion, but the trial court granted the motion for conditional examination. The court observed, however, that under section 1341, if the magistrate was convinced, on the date set for the conditional examination, that Johnsen's life was not in jeopardy, then the conditional examination would not take place. The conditional examination of Brian Johnsen, which was recorded on videotape, began on November 15, continued on November 18, and concluded on November 19, 1991. Thereafter, on July 6, 1992, the prosecutor announced that he was seeking the death penalty against defendant, in part because of the evidence disclosed at the conditional examination. On September 10, 1993, the defense filed a motion to exclude the conditional examination at trial, primarily on the ground that conditional examinations are not permitted in capital cases. After receiving opposition to the motion from the prosecution, and holding a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October 29, 1993. Defendant petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate barring use of the conditional examination at trial. The Court of Appeal denied the petition in an unpublished opinion on December 2, 1993. This court granted defendant's petition for review of the Court of Appeal's decision and transferred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to reconsider in light of People v. Municipal Court ( Ahnemann ) (1974) 12 Cal.3d 658, 117 Cal.Rptr. 20, 527 P.2d 372 (stating that mandate is unavailable to resolve an issue as to the admissibility of evidence). After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal again denied the mandate petition, this time citing Ahnemann. On March 22, 1994, defendant filed a motion asking the trial court to reconsider his motion to exclude the conditional examination on the ground that the controlling law had been clarified by the Court of Appeal's decision in Dalton v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1506, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 248 (holding that in a capital case the prosecution could not conditionally examine a witness whose life was in jeopardy). The trial court agreed to reconsider its ruling, but after reconsideration it again denied the motion to exclude the conditional examination. Defendant sought appellate review of this ruling by again petitioning the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition, and this court denied defendant's petition for review. At trial, the parties stipulated to Brian Johnsen's unavailability as a witness. Over defendant's continuing objection, the videotape of the conditional examination was played for the jury. In his conditional examination testimony, Johnsen described how he and Teresa Holloway had become acquainted with defendant, Denise Shigemura, Anna Humiston, and Doug Mynatt, and how their relationships had developed. His testimony provided the only evidence of the telephone conversations in which the plan to kill Mynatt was discussed and concern was expressed that Holloway not be told about the plan for fear she would disclose it. His testimony also described a telephone conversation after Holloway's murder in which Johnsen asked defendant why he had killed Holloway and defendant had replied that it had to be done.
Defendant contends that conditional examinations are not permitted in capital cases. He relies on section 1335, subdivision (a), which provides: When a defendant has been charged with a public offense triable in any court, he or she in all cases, and the people in cases other than those for which the punishment may be death, may, if the defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel as provided by law, have witnesses examined conditionally in his or her or their behalf, as prescribed in this chapter. (Italics added.) Defendant argues that this provision bars the prosecution from conditionally examining any of its witnesses in a capital case. In ruling the conditional examination admissible, however, the trial court relied on subdivision (b) of the same section, which at the time of defendant's trial provided: When a defendant has been charged with a serious felony, the people may, if the defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel as provided by law, have a witness examined conditionally as prescribed in this chapter if the people have evidence that the life of the witness is in jeopardy. (§ 1335, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 2, p. 2525.) [5] On first reading, subdivision (a) and former subdivision (b) of section 1335 appear inconsistent. Subdivision (a) appears to generally prohibit the prosecution from conditionally examining witnesses in cases for which the punishment may be death, whereas former subdivision (b) appears to allow the prosecution to conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy in any case in which the defendant is charged with a serious felony. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we view the provisions in their statutory context as part of an overall statutory scheme for conditional examinations in criminal cases, seeking to harmonize the provisions in light of the apparent legislative purpose. ( Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901, 135 Cal. Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951; People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 112, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, 52 P.3d 624; People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) The statutory scheme for conditional examinations includes section 1336. At the time of defendant's trial, subdivision (a) of that section provided: When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is about to leave the state, or is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehension that he or she will be unable to attend the trial, the defendant or the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally. (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 3, p. 2525.) Subdivision (b) of section 1336 provided: When the people have evidence that the life of a prosecution witness is in jeopardy, the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally. (Stats. 1985, ch. 783, § 3, p. 2525.) [6] Reading sections 1335 and 1336 together, it appears that the Legislature may have intended to prohibit the prosecution in a capital case from taking a conditional examination of a witness for any of the reasons stated in subdivision (a) of section 1336illness, dependency, age, or impending departure from the statebut to permit the prosecution in a capital case to conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy. This reading would resolve the apparent inconsistency between subdivision (a) and former subdivision (b) of section 1335 and harmonize those provisions with section 1336. Arguing against this construction, defendant relies on Dalton v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1506, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248. The Court of Appeal there expressed the view that allowing the prosecution to conditionally examine a witnesses in a death penalty case only when the witness's life was in jeopardy would create a distinction in the use of preserved testimony which seemingly would have no justification in that the testimony of a witness who is to die before the death penalty trial because of natural causes could not be preserved, while that same witness's testimony could be preserved if the threat of nonattendance at trial were based upon possible kidnap or murder. ( Dalton, supra, at p. 1512, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248.) We do not view this distinction as irrational, however. When a prosecution witness may die before trial from natural causes, the prosecution risks the loss of important evidence. This same interest is at stake when the witness's life is in jeopardy from criminal violence, but there is in addition the strong public interest in deterring criminal conduct in the form of an actual or attempted murder of the witness. Recognizing the presence of this additional interest, the Legislature could reasonably decide to authorize prosecutorial conditional examinations in capital cases when the witness's life is in jeopardy from criminal violence, to remove the incentive a capitally charged defendant or his or her allies might otherwise have to murder prosecution witnesses to prevent them from testifying. This construction is also consistent with the history of conditional examinations in criminal cases in California. As enacted in 1879, the California Constitution granted the Legislature power to authorize prosecutorial conditional examinations in criminal cases, other than cases of homicide. (Cal. Const., former art. 1, § 13, repealed Nov. 5, 1974.) In 1905, the Legislature exercised this constitutionally granted authority by providing, in section 1335, for conditional examinations of prosecution witnesses in cases other than homicide. (Stats.1905, ch. 540, § 1, p. 702.) In 1951, section 1335 was amended to permit conditional examinations of prosecution witnesses in cases other than those for which the punishment may be death. (Stats. 1951, ch. 96, § 1, p. 354.) In 1974, the state Constitution was amended to remove the prohibition on conditional examinations in capital cases. The relevant provision now reads: The Legislature may provide for the deposition of a witness in the presence of the defendant and the defendant's counsel. (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 15, cl.4.) In 1985, the Legislature amended section 1335 to permit the prosecution to take a conditional examination when the defendant has been charged with a serious felony and there is evidence the witness's life is in jeopardy. (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 2, p. 2525.) We infer that, after the 1974 constitutional amendment removed the blanket prohibition on conditional examinations by the prosecution in capital cases, the Legislature used its new authority in 1985 to authorize the prosecution to take conditional examinations in capital cases in the limited situation where the witness's life is threatened. The 1985 amendment of sections 1335 and 1336 was included in Assembly Bill No.2059 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.), which also added section 1350 to the Evidence Code. That provision establishes an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement by an unavailable declarant when, among other things, [t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the declarant's unavailability was knowingly caused by, aided by, or solicited by the party against whom the statement is offered for the purpose of preventing the arrest or prosecution of the party and is the result of the death by homicide or the kidnapping of the declarant. (Evid.Code, § 1350, subd. (a)(1).) Like the life in jeopardy provision for conditional examinations (§ 1335, subd. (b)), the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1350 applies in criminal proceedings in which a serious felony is charged ( id., subd. (a)), and serious felony is defined to include felonies listed in subdivision (c) of section 1192.7. (Compare Evid.Code, § 1350, subd. (d), with Pen.Code, § 1335, subd. (c).) Those listed felonies include any felony punishable by death . . . . (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(7).) Because they were packaged together, it is reasonable to infer that the adoption of the hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 1350 and the amendment of the conditional examination provisions of Penal Code sections 1335 and 1336 address a common problem and result from a common Legislative concerncriminal violence against prospective prosecution witnesses to prevent their testimony. The risk that this will occur likely increases in proportion to the potential punishment for the charged offense, and thus it is greatest in capital cases. Absent language expressly barring application of these provisions to capital cases, therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended to permit the prosecution to conditionally examine witnesses in capital cases when there is evidence that their lives are in serious danger. We conclude, therefore, that under subdivision (b) of section 1335, conditional examination of a prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case when the witness's life is in jeopardy. [7]
Defendant argues, next, that the prosecution should not have been allowed to conditionally examine Brian Johnsen because there was no evidence that his life was in jeopardy. Section 1335, subdivision (b), permits the prosecution to conditionally examine a witness if there is evidence that the life of the witness is in jeopardy. (Italics added.) Section 1336, subdivision (b), similarly requires the prosecution to produce evidence to support a claim that a witness's life is jeopardy. Section 1337 provides that an application for conditional examination shall be made upon affidavit stating among other things that the life of the witness is in jeopardy. Section 1338 requires that the application be made on three days' notice to the opposite party, and section 1339 provides that [i]f the court or judge is satisfied that the examination of the witness is necessary, an order must be made that the witness be examined conditionally, at a specified time and place, and before a magistrate designated therein. Here, the prosecution's application to conditionally examine Brian Johnsen was supported by evidence in the form of a declaration of Deputy District Attorney Pettine stating, in relevant part: I am informed that witness Brian Johnsen was directly involved with defendants Shigemura and Jurado in a plot to kill Doug Mynatt. According to Mr. Johnsen, the defendants, acting on their own and without the knowledge of Mr. Johnsen, killed victim Teresa Holloway so that she would not disclose the plan to murder Mr. Mynatt. Mr. Mynatt's current whereabouts is unknown. Mr. Johnsen, who was in custody on the date of the Holloway murder, is currently out of custody. [¶] Declarant believes that once this information becomes known, witness Brian Johnsen's life will be jeopardized by Mr. Mynatt, the defendants, and/or their associates. The trial court granted the application without allowing the defense the three days' notice specified in section 1338, but the court said that under section 1341 the conditional examination would not take place if, on the day set for the conditional examination, the defense was able to show to the magistrate's satisfaction that Johnsen's life was not in danger. [8] The conditional examination began a week later. Before it began, defendant offered no evidence that Johnsen's life was not in danger. The prosecution satisfied the requirements of sections 1335, 1336, and 1337 by submitting a declaration stating that Johnsen's life was in danger from Doug Mynatt, defendant and his codefendants, and their associates. In granting the prosecutor's application for a conditional examination, the trial court did not abuse the broad discretion with which the statutory scheme vested it. In particular, it was not necessary, under the circumstances of this case, for the prosecution to present evidence that anyone had expressly threatened Johnsen or conspired to harm him. Because of the evidence that defendant, Shigemura, and Humiston had killed Holloway to prevent her from exposing a plot to kill Mynatt, the trial court who both granted the application for conditional examination and served as magistrate in the taking of the examination could justifiably conclude that defendant and the persons with whom he associated would be likely to use deadly force against anyone perceived as a threat, and that the substance of Johnsen's proposed testimony made him an actual or potential threat to defendant and his codefendants, and also to Mynatt. Although defendant did not receive the three days' notice to which section 1338 entitled him, he was not prejudiced by the shortened notice because seven days elapsed before the conditional examination began during which, under section 1341, defendant could have presented evidence to contradict the prosecutor's declaration that Brian Johnsen's life was in danger. We conclude that defendant has failed to show that any prejudicial error occurred in the taking of Brian Johnsen's conditional examination.
The prosecutor argued below, and the Attorney General argues in this court, that even if the prosecution is prohibited from taking conditional examinations in capital cases, that prohibition did not apply here because the prosecutor had not yet decided to seek the death penalty, and indeed had announced the death penalty would not be sought, when the trial court granted the prosecution's application for a conditional examination and when Brian Johnsen was conditionally examined. In response to this argument, defendant argues that even if it was proper to conditionally examine Johnsen because the prosecutor was not then seeking the death penalty, it was error to admit Johnsen's conditional examination in evidence at defendant's capital trial. Because we have concluded that the prosecution in a capital case may conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy, we need not address this issue. Defendant also argues that admission of Brian Johnsen's conditional examination in evidence at trial denied him his rights under the federal Constitution to due process, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and reliable guilt and penalty determinations in a capital case. But Johnsen testified under oath at the conditional examination, and defendant had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine him at that time. For purposes of due process, confrontation, and reliability, the situation is no different than if Johnsen or any other witness had testified at the preliminary hearing or at an earlier trial and then, because he had become unavailable, his prior testimony was admitted at trial. When a defendant has had an adequate opportunity for cross-examination and the witness is unavailable at trial, use of prior testimony does not violate the defendant's rights under the federal Constitution. ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 343, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758; see Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 55-57, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.) Defendant asserts that he did not have an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Brian Johnsen at the conditional examination because his attorneys later acquired additional information that would have been useful in cross-examining Johnsen. In particular, he calls our attention to the statements that Johnsen later made, after he had been charged with capital murder, [9] admitting that he was aware of and agreed with defendant's plan to kill Holloway. Again, however, the situation is no different than if Johnsen had testified at defendant's preliminary hearing or at a prior trial of defendant on the same charges. Absent wrongful failure to timely disclose by the prosecution, a defendant's subsequent discovery of material that might have proved useful in cross-examination is not grounds for excluding otherwise admissible prior testimony at trial. (See People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 851, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2 [admission of prior testimony does not violate the right of confrontation regardless whether subsequent circumstances bring into question the accuracy or the completeness of the earlier testimony.].)