Opinion ID: 70335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the use of jackson's prior uncounseled assault conviction

Text: AS A BASIS FOR AN UPWARD DEPARTURE 36 In departing upward from Jackson's original criminal history category pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.1, the district court considered a 1984 Texas assault conviction. 4 That conviction resulted when Jackson, without counsel, pleaded guilty to intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury to Rose Whitfield by hitting her with his fist. Jackson contends that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to an attorney before pleading guilty and for that reason it was error for the district court to consider that conviction as a basis for an upward departure. 37 Generally, we do not allow a defendant to collaterally attack in the sentence proceeding convictions being used to enhance his sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Spell, 44 F.3d 936, 939 (11th Cir.1995) ([T]he practical difficulties of holding mini-trials on a defendant's prior convictions counsel against looking beyond the fact of conviction. (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-603, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159-60, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990))); United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 189 (11th Cir.) (Our system of federalism does not envision federal sentencing courts sitting as open-door review boards at the beck and call of defendants who have failed to avail themselves of well-established procedures for direct appeal or habeas scrutiny.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 180, 130 L.Ed.2d 115 (1994). However, we have held that a defendant may attack a conviction that is presumptively void. See United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117, 1120 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2139, 128 L.Ed.2d 868 (1994). [W]hen a defendant, facing sentencing, sufficiently asserts facts that show that an earlier conviction is 'presumptively void,' the Constitution requires the sentencing court to review this earlier conviction before taking it into account.... [T]he kinds of cases that can be included in the 'presumptively void' category are small in number and are perhaps limited to uncounseled convictions. Id. at 1120 (footnote omitted). However, convictions obtained after a defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel are not presumptively void. 38 In this case, the record reflects that the probation officer who prepared Jackson's presentence investigation report relied on a court document indicating that Jackson's waiver of counsel in connection with the 1984 conviction was indeed knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Although Jackson now asserts that this waiver was neither voluntary nor knowing, he does not contest the authenticity of that court document, he provides no explanation for it, and he provides no substantiation for his assertion. In Roman, we required that a defendant sufficiently assert[ ] facts showing that a prior conviction was presumptively void. Because Jackson has failed to assert sufficiently such facts, the district court did not err in considering the 1984 conviction as a basis for an upward departure. 39