Opinion ID: 2600609
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witt Error

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in excusing Prospective Juror K.K. based on her views concerning the death penalty, and in failing to ask followup questions before dismissing her. As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing this prospective juror.
In her written juror questionnaire, K.K. twice stated that she was strongly opposed to the death penalty. She indicated she believed the death penalty was too often imposed and wrote: I don't feel the death penalty should be imposed at all. In response to whether she had any moral or philosophical views that would affect her ability to impose either death or life without the possibility of parole, she wrote, It would be extremely difficult for me to vote to impose the death penalty. In response to a question asking whether her views on the death penalty would cause her to refuse to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder in order to prevent the penalty phase from taking place, she wrote that, while she was morally and philosophically against the death penalty, she could never vote `not guilty' if [she] had no doubt of the defendant's guilt. She also indicated she would not vote against a special circumstance allegation that had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, just to prevent a penalty phase. In response to a question asking whether her views on the death penalty would cause her to vote automatically for life in prison without considering the penalty phase evidence, she wrote, I hope I don't have to face this question. It is not possible for me to automatically vote in any direction. This would be very, very tough for me, however. On the last question, whether she could set aside her own personal feelings regarding what the law ought to be and follow the law as the court explained it to her, she wrote yes. During voir dire, K.K. stated that she was strongly against the death penalty, but she also stated she felt she could decide the guilt phase based on the facts and law in the case without regard to penalty or punishment. In response to the question whether she could vote for death in the penalty phase, she stated she could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. The prosecutor challenged her for cause. In response, defense counsel requested that the court ask her if she could, in fact, impose the death penalty as directed by the court and as directed by the oath she had taken. The court asked her whether she would be able to consider and vote for the death penalty as an alternative to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and she replied, I could not vote for the death penalty. There was no objection or any further request for elaboration from defense counsel, and the trial court excused K.K. for cause.
(2) The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is, `[W]hether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2223], citing Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844].) Applying Witt, we have stated: ``A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.' [Citation.] In addition, `[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.' [Citations.]' ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 743 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145], quoting People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused K.K. for cause, claiming (1) the record does not support the trial court's determination that she held views that would prevent or substantially impair her ability to perform her duties as a juror, and (2) the trial court failed to make sufficient inquiries to establish whether she held such views. We conclude K.K.'s answers to the written questionnaire and during voir dire support the trial court's ruling. As noted, K.K. indicated in her questionnaire answers that she was strongly opposed to the death penalty, that she did not think the death penalty should be imposed at all, and that she was morally and philosophically against the death penalty. During voir dire, she stated she could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. When, at defense counsel's request, the trial court further questioned her, she again unequivocally stated she could not vote for the death penalty. The record therefore fairly supports the trial court's determination of her true state of mind. Because we conclude the record supports the trial court's ruling, we also reject defendant's contention that the trial court should have questioned the juror further before dismissing her. In essence, defendant contends the trial court failed to ask the appropriate followup question, and implies that the trial court erred by failing to ask the exact question as suggested by defense counsel (namely, could she impose the death penalty as directed by the court and as directed by the oath she had taken?). But defendant provides no authority that the trial court was obliged to so state the question. The question the trial court did ask K.K. (would she be able to consider and vote for the death penalty as an alternative to life in prison without the possibility of parole?) addressed defense counsel's request for additional inquiry into her views and elicited an answer that supported the trial court's exclusion of the juror.