Opinion ID: 492488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenge to Uranium Enrichment Services Contract

Text: 12 In count two of their complaint, plaintiffs challenged the DOE's adoption of the UESC. The claim was based on both substantive and procedural grounds, but the district court reached only the latter in concluding that the adoption of the UESC was procedurally defective. It stated: 13 I conclude that the new [UESC] amounts to a change in the criteria under which enrichment services are to be performed. Because the contract was not submitted to Congress, it is null and void. 14 Accordingly, it is ordered that the plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment as to Count II is granted. 15 Amended Order, record, vol. 2, doc. 15, at 4. 16 The DOE now challenges the decision on count two, claiming that: (1) plaintiffs' claim is moot; (2) plaintiffs lack standing; and (3) the district court was erroneous on the merits.
17 Mootness goes to the jurisdiction of a federal court. To satisfy the case or controversy limitation of Article III, [t]he actual controversy between the parties 'must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated.'  Wiley, 612 F.2d at 475 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)). Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1951, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969). The burden of demonstrating mootness 'is a heavy one,'  County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979) (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953)), and can be satisfied only if two conditions are shown: 18 (1) it can be said with assurance that there is no reasonable expectation ... that the alleged violation will recur, see [U.S. v. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. 629] at 633 [73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ]; see also SEC v. Medical Committee For Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 [92 S.Ct. 577, 30 L.Ed.2d 560] (1972), and 19 (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation. See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 [94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164] (1974); Indiana Employment Security Div. v. Burney, 409 U.S. 540 [93 S.Ct. 883, 35 L.Ed.2d 62] (1973). 20 Davis, 440 U.S. at 631, 99 S.Ct. at 1383. 21 We need only reach the second condition. The DOE asserts that plaintiffs' sole challenge to the UESC was that its implementation was procedurally defective. Indeed, the grounds for the district court's granting of plaintiffs' summary judgment motion was that the [UESC] amounts to a change in the 'criteria' under which enrichment services are to be performed [and it] was not submitted to Congress. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315, slip op. at 4 (D.Colo. Sept. 19, 1985). Since the district court's decision in this case, the DOE has submitted the UESC to rulemaking procedures. DOE, therefore, argues that plaintiffs' appeal is moot. 22 We need not determine whether subsequent DOE and congressional activity cured any alleged procedural defects in this case and thus mooted plaintiffs' claim. Their challenge was not based only on procedural grounds; it included substantive grounds as well, and plaintiffs' substantive challenge to the UESC remains viable. The DOE admits that the criteria adopted through the subsequent rulemaking procedures are the same as those embodied in the UESC. Consequently, if substantive deficiencies existed before the DOE rulemaking process, they still exist. 23 Because we conclude that the DOE has not shown that plaintiffs' claim has been eradicated by subsequent rulemaking, we need not reach the issue of whether the violations can recur. The DOE has failed to show that plaintiffs' claim is moot.
24 Even though the DOE did not challenge plaintiffs' standing in the district court, we must address that issue before we can reach the merits of this case. 25 Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173-180, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). For that reason, every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 165, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934). 26 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). One jurisdictional requirement is that of standing. 27 Standing focuses on whether a particular plaintiff has the right to pursue a cause of action. [L]ike mootness and ripeness, [it] 'has its constitutional origins in the case or controversy limitation of Article III which insures that courts exercise their power only in cases where true adversary context allows informed judicial resolution.'  Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1294 (10th Cir.1980) (quoting Wiley v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 612 F.2d 473, 475 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 2168, 64 L.Ed.2d 798 (1980)), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963, 101 S.Ct. 3114, 69 L.Ed.2d 975 (1981). While the courts have not always been clear as to which standing requirements are based on the Constitution and which are based on prudential concerns of the courts, they have established that 28 at an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 [99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66] (1979), and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 [96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450] (1976). 29 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Consequently, to establish standing, plaintiffs must show 1 that the DOE's adoption of the UESC has injured them and that the court can redress that injury by invalidating the UESC. 30 Plaintiffs claim they have met this burden because the DOE, by filing its cross-motion for summary judgment without challenging standing, implicitly acknowledged plaintiffs' standing. However, [p]arties may not by stipulation invoke judicial power of the United States in litigation which does not present an actual case or controversy, and jurisdictional questions are of primary consideration and can be raised at any time by courts on their own motion. City of Denver, 628 F.2d at 1296-97 (citations omitted). Thus, the DOE cannot consent to plaintiffs' standing. In fact, even if no party challenged standing, we are required to raise the issue. 31 At the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs are entitled to prevail only if the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [plaintiffs are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When the standing issue is not raised in the district court, review on appeal may reveal factual disputes. See, e.g., Steele v. National Firearms Act Branch, 755 F.2d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir.1985). 32 The factual dispute with respect to standing in this case revolves around the causation element of standing. The parties agree that plaintiffs have been harmed by the decline in demand for domestic uranium; however, they disagree on whether the adoption of the UESC has any nexus to that decline. An affidavit filed by plaintiffs in support of their motion for summary judgment states in relevant part: 33 DOE policies with respect to the provision of enrichment services can have and do have a significant impact on demand for uranium and, consequently, the viability of the domestic uranium industry. For example, independent consultants (e.g., Nuexco and Nuclear Resources International) indicate that DOE's new [UESC] may diminish demand for uranium by as much as 100,000,000 pounds or more over the next five to ten years. This approximates or exceeds expected production for the period. 34 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II, record, vol. 1, doc. 3, Exhibit B (affidavit of Larry A. Boggs), at p 2. To support the causal link, and thus standing, between the adoption of the UESC and the decrease in demand for domestic uranium, plaintiffs argue on appeal that the UESC: (1) fails to restrict enrichment of foreign uranium; (2) permits enrichment customers to select a variable-tail assay that increases the use of enrichment services and decreases the use of uranium; and (3) contains pricing provisions that decrease demand for domestic uranium. If the UESC is invalidated, plaintiffs argue, these policies will be reversed and the demand for domestic uranium will consequently increase. However, since standing was not challenged in the district court, the record fails to explain how the UESC would decrease demand for domestic uranium and thereby cause plaintiffs harm. Plaintiffs' claim that we may look beyond the record to the circumstances surrounding the case is inaccurate. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that [t]he existence of a justiciable 'case' or 'controversy' under Art. III must affirmatively appear in the record. Bender, 106 S.Ct. at 1334. 35 Notwithstanding DOE's failure to challenge plaintiffs' standing at the trial level, it did specifically refute plaintiffs' claim that the UESC harmed them because it decreased demand for domestic uranium. The DOE claimed in that forum that the UESC did not amend existing DOE policy and, thus, could not change the demand for domestic uranium. On this appeal, the DOE renews this contention by arguing that even though the demand for domestic uranium has declined and will likely continue to decline, the adoption of the UESC did not affect that demand and, consequently, plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge the UESC. It maintains that the policies behind the UESC existed prior to its adoption and would continue to exist even if the UESC were declared null and void. 36 Plaintiffs conceded in their complaint that the DOE did not restrict enrichment of foreign uranium and allowed customers to select a variable-tail assay before the adoption of the UESC. See Complaint, record, vol. 1, doc. 1 at 9, 17, 18. An injury that occurred before, existed at the time of, and continued unchanged after the challenged action cannot support a standing claim. California Ass'n of the Physically Handicapped, Inc. v. FCC, 778 F.2d 823, 827 (D.C.Cir.1985). Policies ostensibly harming plaintiffs that existed prior to the adoption of the UESC are insufficient to vest plaintiffs with standing to challenge the legality of the UESC. However, the record in this case is unclear as to whether adoption of the UESC did in fact effect a change in DOE policies regarding enrichment of foreign uranium and availability of variable-tail assays. The UESC may have implemented more lenient policies that exacerbated the economic harm already experienced by plaintiffs. This unresolved factual dispute surrounding the causation component of the standing inquiry may not be resolved on appeal. 37 Plaintiffs argue alternatively that UESC pricing of DOE enrichment services may decrease demand for domestic uranium, thus harming them and supporting standing to challenge the UESC. Plaintiffs cannot argue that lower enrichment prices decrease domestic uranium sales. If the DOE has higher prices, DOE customers are encouraged to seek enrichment services from DOE's foreign competitors. Both parties agree that entities who use foreign enrichers also tend to purchase foreign uranium. Consequently, a decrease in DOE enrichment prices should encourage domestic enrichment and, concomitantly, domestic uranium purchases. On the other hand, plaintiffs may be arguing that new pricing techniques favor foreign uranium over domestic uranium and, thus, decrease demand for domestic uranium. We find this doubtful because section 2201(v) specifically mandates that pricing of enrichment services be nondiscriminatory. Nonetheless, plaintiffs should be permitted to present whatever factual support they have for this argument on remand. 38 Because of the unresolved factual dispute surrounding the causation component of the standing inquiry, we cannot conclude that plaintiffs have satisfied their burden on appeal of establishing standing. However, because the DOE failed to contest standing in the district court, plaintiffs should be allowed to present evidence supporting their standing allegations. Factual issues concerning the existence of the standing requirements in a particular case are to be resolved in the same manner as any other controverted fact. Steele, 755 F.2d at 1414. Thus, we remand for resolution of the factual dispute which will be determinative of plaintiffs' standing to challenge the UESC.
39 Because the issue of standing on this claim remains unresolved, any opinion on the merits of this case would be an advisory opinion. [F]ederal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89, 67 S.Ct. 556, 564, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Thus, we cannot reach the merits of plaintiffs' challenge to the UESC. 40