Opinion ID: 2995148
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Present Expert Testimony

Text: Next, Valenzuela alleges that his counsel was deficient because he did not call an expert witness to refute the gov ernment’s contention that the controlled substances at issue were crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine or another form of cocaine base. At the sentencing hearing, Valenzuela’s attorney strenuously cross-examined the government’s witnesses to establish the limitations of the police officers’ ability to ascertain that the substances in question were actually crack cocaine. Valenzuela asserts that this was not sufficient; he claims that his counsel should have called a chemist to testify that, based on the lab reports as presented at the sentencing hearing, it would not be possible to determine to a scientific certainty that the substances in question were crack cocaine. Unfortunately for Valenzuela, however, [a] lawyer’s decision to call or not to call a witness is a strategic decision generally not subject to review. United States v. Williams, 106 F.3d 1362, 1367 (7th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1294 (7th Cir. 1990) (The Constitution does not oblige counsel to present each and every witness that is suggested to him. In fact, such tactics would be considered dilatory unless the attorney and the court believe the witness will add competent, admissible and non-cumulative testimony to the trial record.). Here, Valenzuela’s attorney established on cross-examination that: (1) the police officers did not have a background in chemistry; (2) the police officers did not perform the lab tests themselves; (3) many of the lab reports used the term rock as opposed to the term crack and none of the lab reports state that the cocaine tested positive for crack; and (4) the police reports of the cocaine purchases did not use the term crack. Given this testimony, we are unsure what, if any, added value the proposed witness would have added. Thus, because Valenzuela has not demonstrated that his counsel’s decision not to call a chemist was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, his second ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail.