Opinion ID: 2631798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claims also barred under NRS 34.810

Text: Pellegrini's claims numbered 4, 5, 9, and 10 and a variation of claim numbered 6 were raised and rejected on direct appeal. Variations of claims numbered 1, 3, 6, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17 and 19 were raised in Pellegrini's first-post conviction petition and rejected by the district court in its denial of the petition, which we upheld on appeal. Our determinations on appeal are the law of the case. [66] To the extent that the district court determined the merits of these claims in denying the first petition, these claims are also barred under the successive petition provisions of NRS 34.810(2) absent a showing of good cause and actual prejudice. To the extent that any of the above claims were not fully raised in the prior proceedings, these claims as well as claims numbered 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21 and 22 are new claims which could have been raised either at trial, on direct appeal or in the prior petition. [67] Lacking a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice, these claims are procedurally barred under the waiver provisions of NRS 34.810(1)(b) or as an abuse of the writ pursuant to NRS 34.810(2). Pellegrini does not dispute this. However, he argues that this court applies procedural bars inconsistently in cases involving successive petitions, and, therefore, the application of NRS 34.810 here violates his rights to equal protection and due process of law. His contentions lack merit. We emphasize that we are not asked to consider any issue of stare decisisPellegrini cites no prior decision of this court holding that the bars at NRS 34.810 do not apply under circumstances similar to those presented here. Further, he cites no authority holding that a court in conducting habeas review may ignore valid statutory procedural rules on the basis that these may have been inconsistently applied in the past. Pellegrini relies on authority stating a rule of federal habeas review which provides that federal courts are normally prohibited from reviewing constitutional claims where a state court has explicitly invoked a state procedural bar as a separate basis for decision. [68] Under this rule, a state court's decision that a habeas claim is procedurally barred under state law is not adequate to bar federal review unless the procedural bar is applied regularly in the vast majority of cases [69] and its application is not discretionary. [70] However, this rule has no legitimate application to our review in habeas, [71] and we have rejected the assertion that this court inconsistently applies the procedural default rules under NRS 34.810. [72] Even so, we take this opportunity to clarify the law regarding Nevada's procedural rules because this is an argument arising with greater frequency, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has in two opinions rejected the adequacy of our procedural bars for waiver, and we are concerned with the proper interpretation of Nevada's procedural bars. First, we note that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized as adequate to prohibit federal habeas review Nevada's statutory procedural bars both for claims that are untimely [73] and for claims in noncapital cases that were waived by the failure to raise them in a first petition or by the failure to appeal from the denial of that petition. [74] Conversely, in its decisions in McKenna v. McDaniel [75] and Petrocelli v. Angelone, [76] the Ninth Circuit court concluded that our procedural bars for waiver are discretionary in capital cases and thus inadequate to prohibit federal review of the merits of waived claims. In McKenna, a capital case, the Ninth Circuit court held that federal review of the merits of a claim was not barred by this court's decision affirming, on the ground of waiver, the lower court's denial of a post-conviction claim of trial court error which was not raised on direct appeal. [77] The Ninth Circuit court stated: [I]t would appear at first blush as if the Nevada Supreme Court made a plain statement that McKenna's challenge to the depravity of mind instruction was procedurally waived because he failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. After noting the possibility of procedural default, however, the court went on to specifically reach the merits of the federal claim. This analysis was necessary to the court's holding because in Nevada failure to raise constitutional claims on direct appeal does not necessarily bar consideration of those claims on collateral review. See Pertgen v. Nevada, 110 Nev. 554, 875 P.2d 361, 364 (1994).... Thus, the court's refusal to entertain McKenna's complaints on collateral review, at best, represents a refusal to exercise discretion to hear the claim. This is insufficient for the State to invoke the procedural bar doctrine. [78] The Ninth Circuit court later followed McKenna in Petrocelli, where it held that, in the context of capital cases, Nevada's procedural bar for waiver is discretionary and inadequate to prohibit federal court review of the merits of waived claims. [79] In concluding that Nevada courts have discretion in applying procedural bars to constitutional claims in capital habeas cases, the Petrocelli court relied on this court's decisions in Jones v. State, [80] Hill v. State , [81] Paine v. State, [82] Pertgen v. State, [83] and Flanagan v. State. [84] The court also relied on Warden v. Lischko [85] to support the general conclusion that the application of Nevada's procedural bars for waiver is discretionary. [86] We take this opportunity to clarify our prior case law relied on by the Ninth Circuit court in McKenna and Petrocelli. First, we acknowledge that our analysis in Pertgen, though much of it dictum, was unfortunately flawed. There, we stated: Under certain circumstances, a valid claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel may establish good cause such that we may review apparently meritorious issues that should have been raised on direct appeal. Under the unique circumstances of this case, we consider appellant's allegations to be sufficient to overcome this significant procedural hurdle. Moreover, the power of this court to address plain error or issues of constitutional dimension sua sponte is well established. Emmons v. State, 107 Nev. 53, 60-61, 807 P.2d 718, 723 (1991); see also Edwards v. State, 107 Nev. 150, 153 n. 4, 808 P.2d 528, 530 n. 4 (1991) (where appellant presents an adequate record for reviewing serious constitutional issues, this court will address such claims on the merits). Because this case involves the ultimate punishment and because appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are directly related to the merits of his claims, we will consider appellant's claims on the merits in order to determine whether appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel. [87] This language confuses the waiver analysis as it applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Pertgen incorrectly indicated that procedural bars for waiver are applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel initially brought in a first post-conviction proceeding. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly raised for the first time in a timely first post-conviction petition; thus, the cause and prejudice analysis is not necessary in determining whether these claims are appropriately considered on the merits. This was not always the rule. Before the 1980s, this court was generally willing to review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, [88] and recognized that such claims could be waived by the failure to raise them on direct appeal. [89] As early as 1975, however, we had begun to recognize that such claims, if without support by the record, were not appropriate for consideration on direct review. [90] In 1981, we decided Gibbons v. State, [91] where we declined to consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because it was unclear whether counsel in that case had any basis for his actions which, from the record, were seemingly ineffective. We declared that the more appropriate vehicle for presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through post-conviction relief. [92] In step with our decisions limiting the availability of review on direct appeal of most claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we also held that such claims, if properly brought for the first time in a post-conviction petition, would not be subject to the post-conviction procedural bar for waiver. [93] But this left open the question of whether such claims were waived if they would have been appropriate for resolution on direct appeal without an evidentiary hearing. Ultimately, we adopted a bright-line rule in Daniels v. State [94] and held that, [b]ecause of the usual need for an evidentiary hearing to resolve a claim of ineffective counsel, the failure to raise the claim on direct appeal does not constitute a waiver of the claim for purposes of post-conviction proceedings. Following these determinations, we have generally declined to address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal unless there has already been an evidentiary hearing [95] or where an evidentiary hearing would be unnecessary. [96] In reviewing our prior decisions, we are mindful that we have not always acknowledged the exceptions to the rule barring review of such claims on direct appeal. For example, we have stated, without qualification, that this court has consistently concluded that it will not entertain claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. [97] Therefore, fairness to habeas petitioners requires a bright-line rule regarding the waiver of these claims. Accordingly, we reaffirm our previous holding in Daniels and specifically hold that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel brought in a timely first post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus are not subject to dismissal on grounds of waiver, regardless of whether the claims could have been appropriately raised on direct appeal. That being stated, Pertgen does not stand for a relaxation of the procedural bars for waiverthe issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was appropriately raised in the post-conviction proceeding under review. The procedural bar was not applicable to the claim. Pertgen failed to make a crucial distinction: trial court error may be appropriately raised in a timely first post-conviction petition in the context of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but independent claims based on the same error are subject to the waiver bars because such claims could have been presented to the trial court or raised in a direct appeal. [98] We also view as problematic and disapprove of Pertgen 's other implication that special discretion attaches to procedural bars applied in capital habeas cases. The Ninth Circuit court in Petrocelli also relied on Jones and Flanagan as support for the conclusion that this court relaxes its procedural bars in capital habeas review. Our decisions in the latter two cases resolved direct appeals from judgments of conviction. On direct appeal of any judgment of conviction, this court has discretion to review instances of plain error despite the failure to preserve an issue at trial or the failure to raise the issue on appeal. [99] We have acknowledged the special import attached to this discretion where the death penalty has been imposed. [100] However, this plain error rule is a rule for review on direct appeal and does not create a procedural bar exception in any habeas proceeding, capital or not. As noted by the Ninth Circuit court in Petrocelli, [101] in Paine, a direct appeal from a death sentence, we elected to address issues that we had previously determined in a prior appeal wherein we remanded the case for a new penalty hearing. [102] We briefly discussed these issues in Paine, stating that we did so without attenuating the force and applicability of the law of the case. [103] Our decision was proper, as the law of the case doctrine states that `[t]he law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same.' [104] Paine argued that new evidence was adduced at his second penalty hearing. [105] Thus, it was appropriate for this court in applying the law of the case doctrine to address whether the facts were substantially the same in both appeals. We also addressed Paine's argument that in the previous appeal we erroneously interpreted the law with respect to an aggravating circumstance. [106] However, it cannot be seriously disputed that a court of last resort has limited discretion to revisit the wisdom of its legal conclusions when it determines that further discussion is warranted. [107] We reject the suggestion that the rare exercise of that discretion must result in a determination that the law of the case doctrine is inadequate to bar reassertion of a claim in habeas. [108] The Ninth Circuit court's reliance on Hill v. State [109] also warrants discussion. This was an appeal from an order dismissing a second post-conviction petition in a death penalty case, wherein we reached the merits of claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel without mention of the waiver and successive petition bars. This case involved unique circumstances that were not fully set forth in our opinion. Hill had filed a first petition for post-conviction relief in proper person, which was summarily dismissed by the district court. At the time the relevant statutes required appointment of counsel in cases of indigence. [110] Hill filed a late notice of appeal from that dismissal, and we determined that we lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. [111] However, we noted that dismissal of the appeal with prejudice would be inappropriate, and we dismissed the appeal without prejudice to Hill's right to refile the petition. Further, in the event that Hill elected to re-file his petition, we instructed the district court to appoint counsel for Hill and to conduct an evidentiary hearing. [112] Our opinion dismissing the appeal from the order denying the second petition does not mention the procedural bars; however, this is because the district court had recognized that pursuant to our order dismissing the earlier appeal, the second petition was a properly refiled or renewed first petition. Therefore, the procedural bars were not raised on appeal from the denial of the second petition, and we did not discuss them. Finally, the Ninth Circuit court also relied on Warden v. Lischko [113] for the proposition that this court generally has discretion to overlook procedural bars. There, in reviewing an appeal from an order granting a post-conviction petition under NRS Chapter 177, we stated: Although the district court properly may have refused to entertain Lischko's post-conviction petition because of his failure to urge the incompetency of trial counsel as a claim of error upon direct appeal, it chose instead to conduct an evidentiary hearing and rule upon the merits. That choice fell within its discretionary power. [114] Lischko's petition was filed in July of 1972. [115] As we have explained, at that time the statutory procedural bar for waiver was far less stringent than the current statutory bar at NRS 34.810. Moreover, Lischko was decided during the transitional period before this court had formulated its current rules for when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must be brought. To the extent that Lischko supports the discretionary application of the current procedural bar for waiver, we hereby overrule it. The current statutory language is mandatory. [116] In sum, we conclude that we have been consistent in requiring good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the statutory procedural bars. We perceive no basis to ignore the procedural bars here. Thus, NRS 34.810 requires Pellegrini to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice.