Opinion ID: 1427732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gravity of the Offense and Harshness of the Penalty

Text: In determining the gravity of the offense, we must examine the type of harm threatened or inflicted and the level of defendant's culpability, measured by the seriousness of the crime, against whom it was committed, and its level of violence. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93, 103 S.Ct. at 3011-12; Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 247, 792 P.2d at 710. In enacting the harsh penalties of the dangerous crimes against children act, the legislature determined that crimes against children are among the most serious crimes in our society. By providing lesser penalties for those crimes against children who have reached the age of 15, the legislature also determined that crimes against children under age 15 are more serious crimes than those against older children. This line-drawing functioning is properly the legislature's. See Jonas, 164 Ariz. at 248, 792 P.2d at 711. Additionally, by not providing the defense of consent to sexual conduct with a child younger than 18, the legislature declared that, in its judgment, children below the age of majority are incapable of making a mature decision to engage in sexual conduct. See Fristoe, 135 Ariz. at 30, 658 P.2d at 830 (When a person has participated in sexual conduct with a minor, he is equally guilty of the crime whether he forced himself upon the minor or whether he succeeds in persuading the minor to allow the sexual act to take place). But see State v. Puig, 154 Ariz. 624, 628-29, 744 P.2d 725, 729-30 (App. 1987) (although consent is not at issue if minor is under 15, where minor is older than 15 and defendant reasonably believes the minor to be over 18, consent will be a defense to a sexual abuse charge). Although the minor's consent will not decriminalize the sexual conduct, that consent is relevant to our inquiry into the gravity of the offense. In this case, both minors were close to the maturity line that the legislature has drawn for less serious offenses. According to their testimonies, both were willing participants in defendant's conduct. Defendant used no violent force or threats against them. Neither girl was physically injured or testified to any emotional trauma. Under these circumstances, we must certainly consider these offenses less grave than the others punishable under the same statutory scheme: second degree murder, sexual assault, taking a child for the purposes of prostitution, child prostitution, involving or using a minor in drug offenses, aggravated assault, molestation of a child, sexual exploitation of a minor, child abuse, or kidnapping. See generally A.R.S. § 13-604.01. Additionally, we must consider the minors' proximities to their 15th birthdays. Although the legislature may be forced to draw a bright line at a particular age (in this case, at the age of 15) in distinguishing between class 6 and class 2 sexual conduct felonies, a reviewing court can look at a more graduated line, depending on the nature of the individual offense, in deciding the proportionality of the punishment to the crime. Thus, although the fact that both consenting girls were close to their 15th birthdays cannot be used to reduce the crimes from class 2 felonies to class 6 felonies, the punishment imposed for those harsher class 2 felonies must be proportionate to these individual offenses. And although the legislature has determined that a minor's consent to sexual conduct does not excuse its commission, certainly the punishment for consensual sexual conduct with a minor over 14 1/2 years old should be closer to the punishment for sexual conduct with a 15-year-old than to punishment for sexual conduct with a 2-year-old. We thus examine what punishment defendant would have received if the minors were 15. If Mary and Susan had been two months and six months older, respectively, defendant would have faced sentencing for two counts of a class 6 felony for sexual conduct with a minor 15 years of age. The range of sentencing for the first offense would have been a minimum term of 9 months, a presumptive term of 1.5 years, and a maximum term of 1.875 years. See A.R.S. §§ 13-701(C)(5), -702(A). The trial court would have had discretion to place defendant on probation and to designate the offense as a class 1 misdemeanor upon successful completion of that probation. See A.R.S. § 13-702(H). If imprisoned, defendant would have been eligible for early release after one-half the sentence had been served. The range of sentencing for the second offense, as a repetitive felony under A.R.S. § 13-604(H), would have been a minimum term of 1.5 years, a presumptive term of 2.25 years, and a maximum term of 3 years. See A.R.S. §§ 13-604(A), -702(H). Defendant would not have been eligible for probation for the second offense, but would have been eligible for early release after one-half the sentence had been served. See A.R.S. § 13-604(A). Defendant's terms could have been imposed either consecutively or concurrently, within the trial court's discretion. See A.R.S. § 13-708. The sentences defendant actually received were significantly more harsh. As to defendant's personal culpability, the record indicates that he was an immature young man who associated with a younger peer group because of his emotional insecurities, which included a pending divorce after marriage at a young age. He had no prior felony record and no history of assaulting young children. No evidence was presented that he intended to harm these girls, either physically or emotionally. But for his age of 23, this situation would be similar to others in which we have recognized a defendant may have less culpability in a crime resulting from a teenage romance: We do not for a moment undertake to minimize the wrong done to the minor child or to in any degree condone it. But we feel that the wrong may be ascribed more to the follies of youth in this era of confusion and frustration than to a wicked and depraved heart. State v. Telavera, 76 Ariz. 183, 187, 261 P.2d 997, 1000 (1953) (Phelps, J.). We must also recognize that sexual conduct among post-pubescent teenagers is not uncommon. Other courts have taken such notice: It is a fact that many young people, male and female, engage in sexual intercourse. In 1976, 2.7% of all 16-year-old girls in the United States, and 6.4% of all 17-year-olds, had borne at least one child. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Statistics of the United States, Table 1-17 (1978). About half of these children were illegitimate. Id., Table 1-32. These statistics, including those on abortions (331 reported for every 1,000 live births, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 56 (1977)), indicate that a great number of unmarried 15- and 16-year-olds have engaged in sexual intercourse resulting in pregnancy and suggest that a greater number have done so without pregnancy. Without applauding the sexual permissiveness of the times, we can only note that in the social context of the times this type of offense between young people is committed many times without criminal prosecution and that, in ordinary sentencing practice, is not regarded as so serious as to require imprisonment. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 771 (La. 1979). Measuring the gravity of the offenses in this context, we must compare the harshness of the penalty. The legislature has imposed mandatory minimum consecutive sentences of 15 and 25 years for the first and second acts of consensual sexual conduct with a minor, with no possibility of early release. The trial court thus had no discretion to reduce the penalty according to the individual circumstances that indicated a less serious offense or a less culpable defendant. Defendant, with no prior felony history, has received a 40-year penalty for sexual conduct with two consenting post-pubescent teenagers. The broad application of the statute to encompass this situation results in a penalty grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. Although such a harsh penalty may be justified in the context of other, more heinous crimes included within the sentencing scheme, it is not justified under the specific circumstances of this case.