Opinion ID: 1293069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unilateral Severance of a Joint Tenancy in Personal Property

Text: (1a) California's judicially developed rule prohibiting unilateral severance of a joint tenancy in personal property is an unwarranted departure from the common law. The rule seems to stem from a misunderstanding of the 1915 decision in which the rule was thought to originate ( Harris I, supra, 169 Cal. 725), rather than from an analysis of the rule's intrinsic merits. (2) Under the common law, to create a joint tenancy a conveyance must convey to two or more persons at the same time the same title to the same interest with the same right of possession. (4A Powell on Real Property (rev. ed. 1989) ¶ 615[1], p. 51-2; see Civ. Code, § 683.) In other words, creation of a joint tenancy requires these four unities: time, title, possession, and interest. A joint tenant simultaneously possesses both the entire tenancy and an equal, undivided share of the tenancy. (See 4A Powell on Real Property, supra, ¶ 617 at p. 51-9; 2 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property (3d ed. 1939) § 418, p. 196.) (3) The principal characteristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship. At common law, the destruction of one of the essential unities severs the joint tenancy and extinguishes the right of survivorship. (4A Powell on Real Property, supra, ¶ 618[1] at pp. 51-14 & 51-15.) As we observed in Tenhet v. Boswell (1976) 18 Cal.3d 150, 155-156 [133 Cal. Rptr. 10, 554 P.2d 330], [A] joint tenant's right of survivorship is an expectancy that is not irrevocably fixed upon the creation of the estate [citation]; it arises only upon success in the ultimate gamble  survival  and then only if the unity of the estate has not theretofore been destroyed by voluntary conveyance [citation], by partition proceedings [citations], by involuntary alienation under an execution [citations], or by any other action which operates to sever the joint tenancy. (4) The common law recognizes the right of a joint tenant to sever the joint tenancy, without the knowledge or consent of the other joint tenants, by conveyance or other acts inconsistent with the continuance of one of the essential unities. (See, e.g., Tenhet v. Boswell, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 155; Delanoy v. Delanoy (1932) 216 Cal. 23, 26 [13 P.2d 513]; 4A Powell on Real Property, supra, ¶ 618[1] at p. 51-14; 2 Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, supra, § 425 at pp. 208-209.) Severance of the joint tenancy converts the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common. (4A Powell on Real Property, supra, ¶ 618[1] at p. 51-14.) Because a tenant in common also has an undivided fractional interest in the property ( id., ¶ 601[1] at p. 50-2), the unilateral severance of the joint tenancy by a joint tenant does not deprive other joint tenants of their fractional shares. ( Id., ¶ 618[1] at pp. 51-14 & 51-15.) With respect to real property, California courts have consistently applied the common law principle that [a]n indisputable right of each joint tenant is the power to convey his or her separate estate by way of gift or otherwise without the knowledge or consent of the other joint tenant and to thereby terminate the joint tenancy. ( Riddle v. Harmon (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 524, 527 [162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 7 A.L.R.4th 1261]; see, e.g., Tenhet v. Boswell, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 155-156; Wilk v. Vencill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 104, 108-109 [180 P.2d 351].) As to joint tenancies in personal property, however, California case law has diverged from the common law by prohibiting a joint tenant from severing the joint tenancy without the consent of the cotenants. (See, e.g., Fish v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 387; Wallace v. Riley (1937) 23 Cal. App.2d 654, 665 [74 P.2d 807].) This divergence is based on a misinterpretation of certain language in Harris I, supra, 169 Cal. 725. In Harris I, the decedent and his spouse had orally agreed that all the property held or acquired by either one during the marriage would be held in joint tenancy. Consistent with their agreement, they opened a joint bank account. With money from that account, they then bought corporate stock, and agreed that the title thereto should be taken and held by them as joint tenants in the same manner as the money was deposited. ( Harris I, supra, 169 Cal. at p. 727.) Following the death of her husband, Mrs. Harris was appointed administratrix of his estate. She filed a final accounting that did not include the property acquired with funds from the joint account. The decedent's sister challenged the accounting; she claimed that the joint property was either the decedent's separate property or community property, and this had not passed to his wife as the surviving joint tenant. In rejecting the sister's claim in Harris I, this court observed that the case was not essentially different from Kennedy v. McMurray (1915) 169 Cal. 287 [146 P. 647], and explained: The property acquired with money taken from the bank account would retain the character of joint property, the same as the money with which it was obtained, unless by some agreement between the parties its character was changed. No such agreement was made, but the contrary was agreed upon. On the authority of the case of Kennedy v. McMurray, [ supra, 169 Cal. 287, 293-294,] the order of the court below is correct. ( Harris I, supra, 169 Cal. at p. 728, italics added.) The Kennedy decision relied upon in Harris I enforced an agreement that all funds deposited in a bank account were to be held in joint tenancy. Harris I simply extended the holding of Kennedy by enforcing the agreement of the decedent and his wife that not only funds in the bank account but also any property acquired with those funds would be held in joint tenancy. (See Note, Joint Tenancy: Character of Personal Property Acquired with Withdrawals from Joint Bank Accounts, supra, 28 Cal.L.Rev. 224, 225.) This interpretation is consistent with the common law. (See 4A Powell on Real Property, supra, ¶ 618[1] at p. 51-14.) Nothing in Harris I suggests that the decedent ever attempted to sever the joint tenancy or to breach the agreement with his wife that all of their property would be held in joint tenancy. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions interpreted Harris I as establishing a rule  contrary to the common law  that the proceeds of a joint tenancy in personal property retain their joint tenancy character unless there is an agreement to the contrary. (See, e.g., In re Kessler (1932) 217 Cal. 32, 34-35 [17 P.2d 117]; Estate of McCoin (1935) 9 Cal. App.2d 480, 482-483 [50 P.2d 114]; Young v. Young (1932) 126 Cal. App. 306 [14 P.2d 580].) In 1937, in Estate of Harris (1937) 9 Cal.2d 649 [72 P.2d 873] [ Harris II ], this court, following the death of Mrs. Harris, decided a dispute over the distribution of real property acquired by the Harrises. There, the court observed that Harris I laid down the rule that joint tenancy property may be traced into personal property and the personal property so acquired with joint tenancy funds will be deemed to be held in joint tenancy, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, regardless of the circumstance that title to said acquired property may be held by only one of the joint tenants. ( Harris II, supra, 9 Cal.2d at pp. 654-655.) Though acknowledging that this interpretation appears to be contrary to the common law rule, Harris II concluded that this exception to the common law rule, which had its origin in Estate of Harris, supra [ Harris I ], has become the recognized and established law of this state, and has been followed in numerous recent decisions. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 655.) But Harris II retained the common law rule regarding severance of a joint tenancy in real property. As it explained: It is one of the incidents of joint tenancy that either joint tenant may convey his separate property estate by way of gift or otherwise without the approval or consent of his other joint tenant, and upon such conveyance the joint tenancy is terminated. [Citation.] This incident of joint tenancy ownership must be presumed to have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the creation of the joint tenancy ownership. ( Harris II, supra, 9 Cal.2d at p. 659.) Harris II is devoid of any explanation why a joint tenant of real property has the power to destroy the other joint tenants' survivorship rights through severance, whereas a joint tenant of personal property lacks such power, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. [2] Notwithstanding this absence of analytical explanation, and the acknowledgement that requiring the consent of all cotenants to effectuate a severance of a joint tenancy in personal property was contrary to the common law, this court has since adhered to its judicially developed exception to the common law rule with respect to personal property. ( Fish v. Security-First Nat. Bank, supra, 31 Cal.2d at p. 387.) (1b) We now conclude that the exception serves no constructive purpose and should be abrogated. Though the exception was once viewed as a binding rule of property even before Harris II ( Lagar v. Erickson (1936) 13 Cal. App.2d 365, 369 [56 P.2d 1287] [conc. opn.]), judicially formulated rules of property carry special weight only because of the reliance placed upon them in property transactions ( City of Berkeley v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 515, 532 [162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362]; City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 240-241 [123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 537 P.2d 1250]; Abbott v. City of Los Angeles (1958) 50 Cal.2d 438, 456-457 [326 P.2d 484]). Here, not only does there appear no widespread reliance on a right of survivorship in joint tenancy personal property immune from a joint tenant's unilateral act of severance, but the layperson's likely expectation is that the joint tenancy may be unilaterally severed in the absence of contrary agreement. As noted earlier, the distinguishing characteristic of joint tenancy is the right of survivorship, which arises only upon success in the ultimate gamble  survival.... ( Tenhet v. Boswell, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 156.) But under the present, judicially developed California rule, a joint tenancy in personal property may be terminated only with the consent of the other joint tenants, thereby negating the contingent nature of the right of survivorship. If any joint tenant refuses to consent to a severance, the rule creates, in effect, an irrevocable will in personal property. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is difficult to accept the proposition that parties to a joint tenancy intend to divest themselves of their respective interests to this extent. The adverse consequences of a rule so manifestly contrary to general expectations were pointed out half a century ago in a comment advocating the result we now reach. In words no less pertinent today, the comment observed: It is highly possible ... that an entire estate may go through [a joint tenancy] account, and if a testator in his will leaves to his children corporate stocks or bonds or other personal property acquired with funds from the account, his plainly expressed desire would go for naught. If he left an insurance policy, the premiums for which were paid by check upon the account, his naming of a beneficiary would have no effect, except perhaps to cause a lawsuit. (Note, Joint Tenancy: Character of Personal Property Acquired with Withdrawals from Joint Bank Accounts, supra, 28 Cal.L.Rev. 224, 226.) Similarly, the California Law Revision Commission, expressly referring to the holding of the Court of Appeal in this case, gave these reasons for recommending legislative modification of the existing rule: [P]ractitioners generally agree that remedial legislation is urgently needed ... to permit a joint tenant having a present right of withdrawal to eliminate survivorship rights in a joint tenancy bank account without the consent of the other joint tenants.... (20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (Feb. 1989) pp. 104-105.) Family law practitioners are concerned about the limitation on the ability of one spouse to eliminate survivorship rights in a joint account held by a married couple in a bank or savings and loan association. Where the spouses are estranged, one spouse cannot by unilateral action terminate the rights of survivorship with respect to funds in a joint account. As a result, after the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse may make a claim based on the survivorship right to funds withdrawn from a joint account by the deceased spouse or to property the deceased spouse acquired with those funds.... [¶] Estate planning also is hampered by the inability of one party to a joint account in a bank or savings and loan association to eliminate survivorship rights by either changing the terms of the account or withdrawing funds from the account. Moreover, if a joint tenant cannot eliminate the right of survivorship by withdrawing the funds from the joint account, the likelihood of litigation is increased because the joint tenant will attempt to defeat the right of survivorship by seeking to establish that the account was not a true joint tenancy account. ( Id. at pp. 103-104.) Our holding in this case, that a joint tenant of personal property is free to sever his or her interest from the joint tenancy in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, by no means precludes giving effect to an affirmative agreement against unilateral severance. Thus, we do not disavow Harris I, supra, 169 Cal. 725, insofar as it simply gave effect to such an agreement. Nor does today's holding alter existing rights to establish the true character and ownership of funds in joint tenancy accounts by evidence, including oral testimony, of the parties' actual agreement and understanding. (See Paterson v. Comastri, supra, 39 Cal.2d 66, 71; Estate of Drucker, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d 509, 513-514; Estate of Zeisel, supra, 143 Cal. App.3d 516, 525-526, cited in fn. 2, ante. ) Respondent contends that any change in the law prohibiting unilateral severance of joint tenancies in personal property should be made by the Legislature. She argues that provisions of the California Multiple-Party Accounts Law (Prob. Code, § 5100 et seq.), added in 1983 to take effect on July 1, 1984 (Stats. 1983, ch. 92, § 5), reflect a legislative determination that only joint tenancy accounts in credit unions and industrial loan companies may be unilaterally severed. This law, which until July 1, 1990, applies only to credit unions and industrial loan companies (Prob. Code, § 5101, subd. (c)), provides that the terms of a multiple-party account (Prob. Code, § 5101, subds. (d), (e)) may be changed by [c]losing the account and reopening it under different terms (Prob. Code, § 5303, subd. (b)(1)), by presenting a modification agreement that is signed by all parties with a present right of withdrawal ( id., § 5303, subd. (b)(2)), or by complying with a method of modification provided by the terms of the account or deposit agreement ( id., § 5303, subd. (b)(3)). As the California Law Revision Commission's comment on Probate Code section 5101 explains: The limitation of this part to credit unions and industrial loan companies is not intended to preclude a court from applying a rule set out in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 5301) to a multiple-party account in another type of financial institution. (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 54A West's Ann. Prob. Code, § 5101 (1990 supp. pamp.) p. 116 [Deering's Ann. Prob. Code, § 5101 (1990 supp.) p. 71].) The legislative intent not to preclude judicial development is thus clear. [3] Respondent also argues that Civil Code section 683.2 is indicative of the Legislature's intent not to permit unilateral severance of bank accounts held in joint tenancy. That provision, which was enacted in 1984 (Stats. 1984, ch. 519, § 1, p. 2065), sets forth several means of severing a real property joint tenancy, including a severance by transfer of a joint tenant's interest to himself or herself. But the statute itself expressly provides that its provisions for means of severance are not exclusive. (Civ. Code, § 683.2, subd. (a).) Nor are we aware of any other statutory provision that would preclude our changing the present, judicially created rule prohibiting unilateral severance of joint tenancies in personal property. To the contrary, recent legislative action lends significant support to our present holding. While this case was pending before this court, the Legislature amended the California Multiple-Party Accounts Law (Prob. Code, § 5100 et seq.) to extend its provisions to banks and savings and loan associations (Prob. Code, § 5128; Stats. 1989, ch. 397, § 25, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, p. 1331) and to provide that [w]ithdrawal of funds from the account by a party with a present right of withdrawal during the lifetime of a party also eliminates rights of survivorship upon the death of that party with respect to the funds withdrawn (Prob. Code, § 5303, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 1989, ch. 397, § 30, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 1335-1336 [adding subdivision (c) to section 5303]). The amendments will take effect on July 1, 1990, and apply to accounts in existence on that date and those established thereafter. (Stats. 1989, ch. 397, §§ 41, 42, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, p. 1339.) But for their prospective effect, the amendments would have caused termination of respondent's right of survivorship in the funds withdrawn by the decedent from their joint bank accounts. These new statutory provisions were enacted in direct response to the report of the California Law Revision Commission, quoted earlier, criticizing the holding of the Court of Appeal in this very case and calling for a lifting of the prohibition against unilateral severance of joint tenancy interests in bank accounts. (See 20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (Feb. 1989) pp. 102-106, 138.) Though not directly applicable to the present controversy, the new provisions persuasively reflect legislative policy ( Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 627, 636 [111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168]) and constitute an appropriate model for this court to adopt ( Estate of Mason (1965) 62 Cal.2d 213, 217 [42 Cal. Rptr. 13, 397 P.2d 1005]). (See 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 762, pp. 729-730.) Accordingly, we hold that in the absence of prior contrary agreement, a joint tenant of personal property may unilaterally sever his or her own interest from the joint tenancy and thereby nullify the right of survivorship, as to that interest, of the other joint tenant or tenants without their consent. We construe Harris I, supra, 169 Cal. 725, 728, as consistent with this holding. Our holdings to the contrary in Fish v. Security-First National Bank, supra, 31 Cal.2d 378, 387, Harris II, supra, 9 Cal.2d 649, and In re Kessler, supra, 217 Cal. 32, 34, are overruled. Statements in the following cases inconsistent with this holding are disapproved: Estate of Drucker, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d 509, 512; Estate of Zeisel, supra, 143 Cal. App.3d 516, 524; Taylor v. Crocker-Citizens Nat. Bank (1968) 258 Cal. App.2d 682, 685 [65 Cal. Rptr. 771]; Cordasco v. Scalero (1962) 203 Cal. App.2d 95, 105 [21 Cal. Rptr. 339]; Doran v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. (1947) 80 Cal. App.2d 790, 795 [182 P.2d 630]; Wallace v. Riley, supra, 23 Cal. App.2d 654, 665; Lagar v. Erickson, supra, 13 Cal. App.2d 365, 368; Estate of McCoin, supra, 9 Cal. App.2d 480. Respondent maintains she is entitled to the funds from the joint tenancy bank accounts because, as in Harris I, there was an agreement between herself and her deceased husband to hold all of their property as joint tenants. She relies on the execution of mirror wills as constituting evidence of the requisite agreement. The agreement to execute mirror wills, however, pertained only to the disposition of the property that would be subject to probate administration upon either spouse's death. Joint tenancy property, which passes by right of survivorship, is not subject to such administration. ( Guardianship of Wood (1961) 193 Cal. App.2d 260, 267 [14 Cal. Rptr. 147].) Moreover, as noted earlier, respondent did not seek to enforce the mirror will agreement. (See fn. 1, ante. )