Opinion ID: 2009694
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Single-factor exigent circumstances

Text: The State argues that when police have probable cause to believe that a defendant committed criminal vehicular operation resulting in homicide or injury, [4] they may take a blood draw without a warrant because the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood creates a single-factor exigent circumstance. The single-factor exigent circumstance the State relies on is the imminent destruction of evidence. In the landmark case of Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758-59, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court considered whether the taking of a blood sample from a nonconsenting driver violated his right under the Fourth Amendment to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Schmerber, who was the driver of a car involved in an accident, was suspected by an investigating officer at the accident scene to be under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 768-69, 86 S.Ct. 1826. At the hospital, the officer placed Schmerber under arrest and, without first obtaining a warrant or Schmerber's consent, directed hospital staff to take a blood sample. Id. at 758-59, 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Supreme Court held that the blood tests were admissible, concluding that probable cause existed to arrest the driver, id. at 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, and that [t]he officer in the present case    might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence. We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. Id. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (citation and quotation marks omitted). It is unclear whether the Supreme Court justified the warrantless search because of the threatened destruction of evidence caused by the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the defendant's bloodstream or because the search was a reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest. Then in the case of Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 292-93, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), the Supreme Court considered whether taking scrapings from the fingernails of a defendant, who the police suspected had murdered his wife, violated the Fourth Amendment when the defendant had not been arrested. During an interview with the defendant, officers noticed a dark substance on the defendant's finger that they believed to be blood. Id. at 292, 93 S.Ct. 2000. The defendant refused a request for a sample of his fingernail scrapings and immediately placed his hands behind his back and appeared to rub them together. Id. at 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000. He then placed his hands in his pockets, at which point the officers heard a metallic sound, such as keys or change rattling. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The officers detained the defendant and, without first obtaining a warrant, took a sample from under his fingernails. Id. at 292-93, 93 S.Ct. 2000. This sample contained skin and blood cells from the victim. Id. at 292, 93 S.Ct. 2000. Relying in part on Schmerber, the Court upheld the search, concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest the suspect for murder, id. at 293, 93 S.Ct. 2000, and were justified in subjecting him to the very limited search necessary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails. Id. at 296, 93 S.Ct. 2000 (emphasis added). Subsequent cases of the Supreme Court have recognized Schmerber as a case in which exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759, 105 S.Ct. 1611, 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985) (discussing Schmerber and explaining that [b]ecause the case fell within the exigent-circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, no warrant was necessary); Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (discussing examples of exigent circumstances the Supreme Court has recognized and citing Schmerber as one such example, based on the destruction of evidence). This court has also concluded that a warrantless blood draw is justified if supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn. 1980). Further, we have upheld warrantless blood draws in cases involving the offense of criminal vehicular homicide when exigent circumstances existed that required immediate action to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. See id. at 82; State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978). In Oevering, we rejected a Fourth Amendment challenge to the admission of blood-alcohol content evidence when a blood sample was taken without the defendant's consent or a warrant and when the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant, while under the influence of alcohol, had caused a traffic accident resulting in a fatality. 268 N.W.2d at 69, 74. Applying the rule articulated by the Supreme Court in Cupp, we stated that the blood draw could be conducted without a warrant if, among other things, the evidence sought will be forever lost absent the search. Id. at 73. We stated that it is beyond question that with the passage of time, normal physiological functions eliminate the alcohol content of an inebriate's blood. Id. at 74. We concluded that, due to the passage of time after the accident, immediate action was required to avoid the loss of blood-alcohol content evidence. Id. Two years later in Aguirre, we held that a nonconsensual, warrantless removal of a suspect's blood did not violate the Fourth Amendment when an officer had probable cause to believe that defendant driver was not only intoxicated but had just committed the felony offense of criminal negligence resulting in death. 295 N.W.2d at 82 (citing Minn.Stat. § 609.21 (1978)). We reasoned that the officer was confronted with a situation in which he knew that it was essential that he obtain the blood sample without delay and without regard to whether defendant would consent to the removal of a blood sample. Id. We did not use the terminology single-factor exigent circumstances or totality of the circumstances in either Oevering or Aguirre. But we had not adopted the two separate tests for exigent circumstances until after these cases were decided. See Gray, 456 N.W.2d at 256 (first recognizing in 1990 the distinction between single-factor exigent circumstances and the totality of the circumstances test for determining exigent circumstances). Instead, Oevering and Aguirre rested on the determination that the evidence sought will be forever lost absent the search because with the passage of time, normal physiological functions eliminate the alcohol content of an inebriate's blood. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d at 73-74; see also Aguirre, 295 N.W.2d at 82 (finding it was essential the officer obtain the blood sample without regard to whether the defendant would consent to the blood draw). But our analysis in Oevering and Aguirre still focused on the imminent destruction of evidence  the rapid dissipation of alcohol content in the defendant's bloodstream was the dispositive factor on which we based our conclusion that evidence in those cases would be lost without an immediate search. Consequently, our holdings in Oevering and Aguirre support the conclusion that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream may be a single-factor exigent circumstance based on the imminent destruction of evidence. In State v. Paul , this court held that the police, who were in hot pursuit of a suspected DWI offender, could make a warrantless entry into the defendant's home in order to effectuate arrest. 548 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Minn.1996). We concluded, among other things, that the rapid dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a single-factor exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. Specifically, we found that the need to preserve evidence of [the defendant's] blood alcohol level is a compelling exigent circumstance under the `destruction of evidence' exception to the warrant requirement first recognized [in Schmerber ]. Id. at 266. We further noted, in summarizing Schmerber, that the warrantless removal of blood is necessary to prevent the destruction of the most probative evidence of [a defendant's] offense because `the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system.' [5] Id. at 267 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826); see also State v. Heaney, 689 N.W.2d 168, 173 n. 2 (Minn.2004) (describing in dicta that Schmerber and Oevering, due to the natural exigency involved in obtaining blood-alcohol evidence, recognize the power of a peace officer to compel a blood sample from a driver where there is probable cause to believe the driver has violated a criminal vehicular operation law); State v. Speak, 339 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn.1983) (holding [e]xigent circumstances were clearly present that justified warrantless, nonconsensual breathalyzer test where defendant was suspected of fatally hitting pedestrian while driving under the influence of alcohol). Consequently, we conclude that when officers have probable cause to believe a defendant has committed the offense of criminal vehicular homicide or operation under Minn.Stat. § 609.21, it is important that the defendant's blood be tested within 2 hours of the accident causing injury to or the death of another. [6] With every passing minute, the most probative evidence of this crime is subjected to destruction by the body's natural processes. The rapid, natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood creates single-factor exigent circumstances that will justify the police taking a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw from a defendant, provided that the police have probable cause to believe that defendant committed criminal vehicular operation. [7]