Opinion ID: 1907719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The MMSAA.

Text: The past is prologue. [E]very statute must be construed with reference to the original intent and meaning of the makers, which intent and meaning may be collected from the cause or necessity of the enactment, and the objects intended to be accomplished by it. Ex parte Redmond, 3 App.D.C. 317, 318 (1894). There is no better key to a difficult problem of statutory construction than the law from which the challenged statute emerged. Remedial laws are to be interpreted in the light of previous experience and prior enactments. United States v. Congress of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 112-13, 68 S.Ct. 1349, 1352-53, 92 L.Ed. 1849 (1948). Because this case turns on the Council's intent in enacting the MMSAA, a few words are in order regarding the circumstances which led to the passage of this legislation. In the autumn of 1982, the citizens of the District of Columbia were in an angry frame of mind towards drug dealers and armed criminals. Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1379 (D.C.1989). On September 14 of that year, by a vote of 72% to 28%, they adopted an initiative providing, inter alia, for mandatory minimum penalties for defendants who distributed controlled substances or who possessed such substances with the intent to distribute them. See D.C.Law 4-166, §§ 9 & 10, 30 D.C.R. 1082 (Mar. 9, 1983), codified in D.C.Code § 33-541(e) (1993) (repealed by the MMSAA). The mandatory minimum sentencing scheme for which the voters cast their ballots was obviously designed to ensure that drug dealers would be severely punished. Judges were to be precluded from thwarting the popular will by exercising excessive leniency. It soon became apparent, however, that the new statute would not bring about the consistency and severity in sentencing that its proponents may have anticipated. Because a defendant had no incentive to plead guilty if his sentence was pre-ordained, prosecutors routinely sweetened the pie. They permitted many drug traffickers to plead guilty to attempted distribution, or even to attempted possession with intent to distribute, where the evidence showed that the attempt was actually a completed act. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 115 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 221 (D.C.Super.Ct. Feb. 4, 1987). The mandatory sentences for which citizens had voted were not applicable to attempts, id., and many drug dealers thus continued to escape serving mandatory minimum time. One consequence of the introduction of mandatory minimum sentences was that the discretion in sentencing previously exercised by judges was now exercised by prosecutors in their charging and plea-bargaining decisions. Many drug dealers received sentences far less severe than the mandatory minimum because prosecutors simply charged them with, or permitted them to plead guilty to, less serious offenses. Those defendants who went to trial and were convicted, however, necessarily received mandatory minimum sentences, even where a particular defendant's role in the distribution scheme was relatively minor. In March 1994, Councilmembers William P. Lightfoot and Harry L. Thomas introduced Bill No. 10-617, in which they proposed, among other things, to repeal mandatory minimum sentences for unarmed drug offenders. The bill was referred to the Council's Committee on the Judiciary, which received testimony and other evidence from a substantial number of witnesses, most of whom focused on the injustices which were said to have characterized the eleven-year regime of mandatory minimum sentencing. The testimony of Mary Jane DeFrank, a representative of the American Civil Liberties Union, was evidently quite influential with the Council. [2] Ms. DeFrank testified that after mandatory minimum sentences became the weapon of choice in the war on drugs, justice became a casualty in the process. She quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist to the effect that federal mandatory minimum sentences impose unduly harsh punishment for first time offenders  particularly for `mules' who play only a minor role in drug distribution schemes. [3] Ms. DeFrank told of a number of specific cases, in the District and elsewhere, in which disproportionately harsh sentences had caused extreme hardship to individual defendants and their families. Other witnesses described in detail the effect of mandatory minimum sentences on women and children [4] and on racial and ethnic minorities. [5] Noting that the District has the highest per capita incarceration rate in the United States, the executive director of the D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project described the serious overcrowding of our prisons which has resulted from the influx of non-violent drug offenders. He especially emphasized the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on prisoners with medical problems. [6] Judge Henry F. Greene of the Superior Court testified that many individuals were effectively coerced into pleading guilty because only those defendants courageous  or foolhardy  enough to assert their constitutional right to a jury trial at the risk of receiving a mandatory minimum sentence of at least four years if convicted choose to reject a government plea offer.... The members of the Council were also aware that, if the MMSAA was enacted, those drug dealers who merited severe punishment would not escape it. As the Director of the PDS explained, the proposed legislation does not eliminate stiff mandatory sentences for crimes of violence, or even drug offenses committed while armed with a gun. [I]t does not prevent District of Columbia Superior Court judges from imposing long sentences for drug offenses inappropriate cases. Judges retain the power to impose sentences which require the defendant to serve as much time as the current mandatory minimum sentences, or even longer. If the proposed legislation were adopted, a judge could still sentence a person convicted of a felony drug offense to a maximum term of as much as thirty years. The problem, as perceived by a number of the witnesses before the Council, was that under then existing law, defendants whose role in the distribution of drugs was minimal were nevertheless subject to unreasonably harsh (for them) mandatory minimum penalties. United States Attorney (formerly Superior Court Judge) Eric H. Holder, Jr. testified that although he had previously expressed some reservations with regard to the wisdom of mandatory minimum sentences in drug cases for low-level street dealers, he had come to believe that the existence of such sentences forces defendants to consider seriously the possibility of early treatment as an alternative to trial. Judge Holder suggested that [i]f changes are to be made, we believe that only the length of those sentences should be examined. A representative of the Office of Corporation Counsel also opposed the wholesale elimination of all mandatory minimum penalties for drug dealing regardless of the seriousness of the offense.... On October 26, 1994, the Judiciary Committee issued its Report on the proposed legislation. Quoting extensively from the testimony of the ACLU representative, the Council stated that [t]hese [mandatory minimum] sentences take away the discretionary power of judges. Judges are thus forced to impose harsh mandatory sentences on undeserving individuals without the latitude to consider a defendant's background, individual culpability, or likelihood of recidivism  facts which could support a lesser sentence. Some judges have resorted to refusing to hear drug cases because they cannot conscionably sentence a first-time offender to a lengthy prison term. Another problem is the use of mandatory-minimum sentences as a threat by prosecutors to get defendants to plead to a lesser offense. A defendant charged with a non-violent drug offense who asserts his or her right to a jury trial does so at the risk of serving [a minimum of] four to ten years in jail if convicted. The discretion in sentencing rests with the prosecutor, not the judge. Additionally, mandatory-minimum sentences result in a large percentage of the District's youth being locked up for long periods of time at great expense to the District. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY REPORT ON BILL No. 10-617 at 1 (Oct. 26, 1994) (emphasis added). Apparently in response to the views of the United States Attorney and the Corporation Counsel, the Judiciary Committee recommended that mandatory minimum sentences be shortened rather than eliminated. The Council, however, rejected this compromise, and voted instead to abolish such sentences altogether for unarmed drug offenders. As enacted, Section 3 of the MMSAA simply states that D.C.Code § 33-541(c), which prescribed mandatory minimum sentences, is repealed. Section 4 provides that the Act shall take effect following Congressional review and after publication in the District of Columbia Register. The MMSAA became effective on May 25, 1995. [7]