Opinion ID: 2629508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The federal interest analysis

Text: We next analyze whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute undermines any important federal interests. The first issue in this section is whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute is neutral and procedural. This is an important consideration because a state court's determination that it lacks jurisdiction over a federal claim due to a neutral and procedural statute should only be overturned with great caution. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). The second issue we consider is whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute undermines any important federal interests. For this analysis, we discuss whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding any of John's three federal claims.
The DCSD argues that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute is a neutral and procedural statute that does not obstruct federal substantive law. We agree. As courts of general jurisdiction, Nevada district courts have the authority to decide federal claims. Id. at 367, 110 S.Ct. 2430. This authority arises from the federal Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2., which charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce [federal] law according to their regular modes of procedure. Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367, 110 S.Ct. 2430. In Howlett, the United States Supreme Court recognized three corollaries that arise from this concurrent jurisdiction, and the corollary relevant to this case is the following: When a state court refuses jurisdiction because of a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the courts, [the Supreme Court] must act with utmost caution before deciding that it is obligated to entertain the claim. Id. at 369, 372, 110 S.Ct. 2430 (emphasis added). Although the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to treat federal substantive law as the law of the land, the clause does not require state courts to apply federal procedural rules. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 919, 117 S.Ct. 1800, 138 L.Ed.2d 108 (1997) (discussing state court authority to refuse jurisdiction over a federal claim based on a neutral procedural state court rule). `[F]ederal law takes the state courts as it finds them.' Id. (quoting Howlett, 496 U.S. at 372, 110 S.Ct. 2430) (other internal quotations omitted). Therefore, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute may apply to John's federal claims if it is a neutral and procedural statute. When determining whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute falls within this category, we consider California caselaw because California's anti-SLAPP statute is similar in purpose and language to Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. See NRS 41.660; Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). In Bradbury v. Superior Court (Spencer), the appellant raised an argument in a California Court of Appeal that was similar to John's assertion that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal substantive claims. 49 Cal.App.4th 1108, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 207, 213 (1996). The Bradbury appellant argued that California's anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal civil rights claims. Id. The court rejected this argument, holding that [w]here the action is founded on a federal statute and brought in state court, state procedure controls unless the federal statute provides otherwise. Id. Thus, the appellate court applied California's anti-SLAPP statute to the federal civil rights claim because it viewed the statute's provisions as procedural in nature. Id.; see generally Vergos v. McNeal, 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 (2007) (applying California's anti-SLAPP statute to a federal civil rights action). Moreover, California's anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to a SLAPP lawsuit to file a special motion to strike the lawsuit within 60 days of service of the complaint or in the court's discretion. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(b)(1), (f) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). Once the defendant proves that the anti-SLAPP statute applies, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to show that there is a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim. Id. In making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(b)(2). The district court's ruling on the motion is an adjudication on the merits. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(i). Similarly, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute allows the defendant to file a special motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of the complaint. NRS 41.660(1)-(2). The statute requires the district court to treat the special motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and its granting the motion is an adjudication upon the merits. NRS 41.660(3)-(4). Thus, once the defendant proves that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute applies to the case, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. A comparison of the two statutes illustrates that both statutes create a procedural requirement that the plaintiff must overcome if his claim is to proceed to discovery and trial. Essentially, both statutes treat the procedure as a form of summary judgment wherein both parties are allowed to present their evidence. NRS 41.660(3); Cal.Civ. Proc.Code § 425.16(b)(1)-(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009). The burden of production is initially on the defendant who must demonstrate the applicability of the statute. See Globetrotter Software v. Elan Computer Group, 63 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1129 (N.D.Cal. 1999). Once he meets his initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff who must show that his claim has merit. See id. And at all times, the burden of persuasion is on the defendant. See NRS 41.660; Cal.Civ.Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1)-(3). In providing an additional pretrial mechanism for filtering frivolous claims from those claims having arguable merit, these statutes amount to a unique summary judgment motion, a motion that, if granted, is appealable. See Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 428, 996 P.2d 416, 418 (2000) (concluding the district court order granting summary judgment was an appealable final judgment). Neither statute creates a substantive cause of action or defense. Instead, like rules of civil procedure, the statutes create a procedural mechanism to prevent wasteful and abusive litigation by requiring the plaintiff to make an initial showing of merit. Thus, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute is procedural in nature. Cf. U.S. Ex Rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles, 190 F.3d 963, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying California's anti-SLAPP statute to pendent state law counterclaims and, while recognizing the state interest in deterring frivolous, retaliatory litigation as substantive to the extent of meriting application in federal court, characterizing the anti-SLAPP statute as a state procedural statute for purposes of its analysis). In addition, the statute is neutral in application. The statute applies to both state and federal substantive claims raised by either a plaintiffs complaint or a defendant's counterclaim. Further, the statute only applies in those cases involving [g]ood faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition the government. NRS 41.637. Thus, the statute is neutral and limited in its application. See 17A James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 124.61 (3d ed. 2009) (stating that [s]tates may apply their own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless federal law preempts those rules because application of the state rules would defeat federal substantive rights). Consequently, we agree with the reasoning set forth in Bradbury and conclude that, based on the similarities between Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute and California's comparable statute, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute is a neutral and procedural statute.
Although Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute is neutral and procedural, it cannot be applied to federal claims under the Supremacy Clause if it defeats federal rights or frustrates [c]ongressionally-created substantive rights. 17A Moore, supra, § 124.62. Here, John alleges three substantive claims, including: (1) religious discrimination, (2) violation of the ADA, and (3) civil rights violations against his free speech. However, he fails to identify how Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute would undermine or frustrate important federal rights. In Lockheed, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that both California's anti-SLAPP statute and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serve similar purposes, namely the expeditious weeding out of meritless claims before trial. 190 F.3d at 972. In addition, the Ninth Circuit recognized that anti-SLAPP statutes protect a citizen's right to petition his government without repercussion. Id. at 973. Given these two characteristics of anti-SLAPP statutes, including Nevada's, and John's failure to identify any undermined or frustrated federal interests, we conclude that Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute does not violate any important, substantive federal interests in this case. With regard to John's religious discrimination claim, he alleged that the DCSD engaged in adverse employment actions against him due to his Protestant religion. At the hearing on the special motion to dismiss, the DCSD submitted evidence that it was not aware of John's religious beliefs. In response, John failed to provide any evidence of religious discrimination other than his own general allegations in his pleadings. John also alleged that the school district had violated the ADA because his alcoholism constituted a disability under the Act and the school district's adverse employment actions violated the Act. While alcoholism is a disability under the ADA, John failed to provide any documentation supporting his claimed disability or adverse employment treatment. Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir.2001). Instead, the evidence shows that the DCSD terminated John for, among other things, his failure to cooperate with a school investigation after he obtained confidential student disciplinary records. Further, when responding to John's EEOC complaint, the DCSD stated that it did not know of John's alcoholism, and he never sought accommodation for any disability. Finally, John alleged civil rights violations against his freedom of speech. After the DCSD initially investigated John's behavior, it found, among other things, that he had inappropriately used school surveillance equipment. In addition to a suspension, the DCSD also removed John's access to video equipment, and John objected. At the hearing, John failed to rebut the DCSD argument that Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), precluded his First Amendment claim because his objections to the removal of his surveillance duties are not protected communications. In Garcetti, the United States Supreme Court held that when a public employee is not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern, then the employee has no First Amendment cause of action against the employer for its reaction to the speech. Id. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Further, the Supreme Court held that [a] government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations. Id. Here, John was abusing the school district's video equipmentby taping special education students, sexually narrating the taping, and showing it to othersin a manner that could open the DCSD to liability. Further, the DCSD asserted that John's use of the equipment was creating a hostile work environment, adversely affecting the school district's operations. In addition, the Ninth Circuit has also stated that First Amendment protection does not apply to public employees making statements pursuant to their official duties. Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.2007). Thus, John's disagreement with the school district over the removal of his video equipment duties is not protected speech. As a result, we conclude that John's failure to rebut the DCSD's positions does not mean Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute undermined or frustrated any federal substantive claims. On the contrary, John could have proceeded with his federal substantive claims had he shown a genuine issue of material fact. In other words, Nevada's neutral and procedural anti-SLAPP statute neither undermines nor frustrates John's federal substantive claims. As a result, Nevada district courts can apply the statute to cases involving similar SLAPP claims. We now discuss whether Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute can be used by private individuals or a government entity to dismiss a complaint when the private individuals or government entity claim that the communications for which they are being sued were truthful, made without knowledge of falsehood, or regard a matter of reasonable concern to the government entity.