Opinion ID: 1043937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tennessee Consumer Protection Act Claim

Text: The Akerses argue that the trial court erred by granting Mr. Marsh a JNOV and dismissing their claim alleging violation of the TCPA, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 47-18-101 to -2704 (2001 & Supp. 2011). Mr. Marsh argues that the TCPA does not provide a cause of action when the alleged damages suffered are for emotional distress without any economic or pecuniary loss. We agree with Mr. Marsh and hold that an action does not lie under the TCPA for emotional distress in the absence of pecuniary damages.11 A motion for “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” is governed by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 50.02, which terms such a motion as one for directed verdict12 and provides in pertinent part: Within 30 days after the entry of judgment a party who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the party’s motion for a directed verdict . . . . If a verdict was returned, the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. 11 The issue of whether a plaintiff may recover under the TCPA for non-economic damages such as pain and suffering and emotional distress in addition to economic damages is not presented here, and we do not express an opinion on that issue in the present case. 12 We have observed that “Rule 50.02 does not use the term ‘judgment notwithstanding the verdict’; rather, it employs the term ‘judgment entered in accordance with the motion for directed verdict.’ There is no substantive difference between the terms, however[.]” Huskey v. Crisp, 865 S.W.2d 451, 453 n.1 (Tenn. 1993). -14- “In ruling on such a motion, the standard applied by both the trial court and the appellate court is the same as that applied to a motion for directed verdict made during trial.” Mercer v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 121, 130 (Tenn. 2004). This standard requires the trial court and appellate courts to “take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favor of the opponent of the motion, allow all reasonable inferences in his or her favor, discard all countervailing evidence, and deny the motion when there is any doubt as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 130-31. In this case, the trial court granted its JNOV based purely on conclusions of law; there is no factual issue. In Mercer, this Court observed that “when the jury’s verdict rests upon an error of law, a party who has moved for a directed verdict may request the trial court to set aside the verdict and enter a judgment in accordance with the party’s motion for directed verdict.” Id. at 130. At the time the complaint was filed, the TCPA, Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-18-109 (Supp. 2001), provided in pertinent part as follows: (a)(1) Any person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property, real, personal, or mixed, or any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive act or practice declared to be unlawful by this part, may bring an action individually to recover actual damages. (Emphasis added). Thus, the TCPA provides a cause of action for a plaintiff who has suffered an ascertainable loss of (1) money; (2) property; or (3) “any other article, commodity, or thing of value.” See Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363 S.W.3d 479, 496 (Tenn. 2012) (“Once an ascertainable loss has been established, the TCPA allows consumers to recover ‘actual damages.’”); Morrison v. Allen, 338 S.W.3d 417, 440 (Tenn. 2011) (holding no cause of action under TCPA resulting from plaintiffs’ decision to allow insurance policy to lapse because the decision “does not constitute a ‘loss of money or property’”); see also Wood v. Woodhaven Memory Gardens, Inc., 1991 WL 112273, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. June 27, 1991) (reversing award under TCPA where “the only damages claimed . . . are for emotional distress” resulting from cemetery’s refusal to allow plaintiffs to place a full ledger memorial on their son’s grave). The TCPA does not provide a cause of action for purely emotional loss resulting from wrongful death. In Kirksey v. Overton Pub, Inc., 804 S.W.2d 68 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990), the plaintiffs asserted a TCPA claim resulting from the alleged wrongful death of their son due to the defendant’s deceptive acts. The Kirksey plaintiffs argued that the life of their son was a “thing of value” that they had lost, and therefore the TCPA provided -15- them a cause of action. Id. at 73. The Court of Appeals, ruling that the TCPA did not provide an action for purely emotional loss resulting from wrongful death, stated: Our interpretation of T.C.A. § 47-18-109 is that a person would be allowed to bring an action for loss of money or property as a result of unfair or deceptive acts. We must hold that the General Assembly intended for the Consumer Protection Act to be used by a person claiming damages for an ascertainable loss of money or property due to an unfair or deceptive act or practice and not in a wrongful death action. Id. The Akerses have stated a claim for emotional loss and have not demonstrated that they have suffered an ascertainable loss of money, property, or any other article, commodity or tangible thing of value.13 Although a person’s cremains have significant emotional and sentimental value, they do not have tangible economic value as required by the TCPA. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 869 cmt. a (1965) (noting that “the body ordinarily cannot be sold or transferred, has no utility and can be used only for the one purpose of internment or cremation”). Consequently, by the plain and unambiguous terms of the TCPA, that statute does not provide a cause of action for their recovery. We affirm the judgment of the trial court granting Mr. Marsh a JNOV and dismissing the TCPA claim.