Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Combined Guilt and Penalty Phases Issues

Text: When the police searched defendant's wallet, car, and house, they found a significant amount of gun paraphernalia. Defendant had a box in his kitchen closet that contained 500 rounds of ammunition for a .380 caliber weapon, a smaller box containing twenty-six bullets, and equipment and materials used for making one's own ammunition. Defendant did not object to the admission of that evidence at trial, but now claims that the trial court's failure to sua sponte exclude the evidence of the arsenal of bullets and the equipment used to make ammunition constitutes plain error in both the guilt and penalty phases. Defendant asserts that that evidence was not relevant to any issue, but that even if it was relevant, it should have been excluded because it showed defendant's bad character and propensity to commit criminal acts.
Evidence may only be admitted at trial when it is relevant, having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. N.J.R.E. 401, 402; see Davis, supra, 96 N.J. at 619, 477 A. 2d 308 (finding evidence relevant where it renders desired inference more probable than it would be without such evidence). Defendant claims that State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990), requires a finding that the evidence here was not relevant. In Coyle, supra, the State introduced into evidence the defendant's Soldier of Fortune magazine, instructions on the use of a silencer, a target, and a gun catalogue. Id. at 218, 574 A. 2d 951. The State urged that the evidence was relevant to prove that the defendant's conduct was purposeful. The Court conceded that the defendant's marksmanship would be relevant, but held that [d]efendant's ownership of Soldier of Fortune magazine, the silencer instructions, and the gun catalogue does not demonstrate sharpshooter ability. Id. at 219, 574 A. 2d 951. However, the target would be admissible if the State could prove that the defendant had practiced with it or a similar target. Ibid. Defendant misconstrues Coyle. Coyle did not hold that all gun paraphernalia is per se irrelevant; it simply held that literature about guns merely indicates an interest in guns rather than marksmanship. Ibid. Defendant had more than just literature. Defendant had over 500 rounds of ammunition, a complete set of tools to reload cartridges, and a partially used box of ammunition. Moreover, police found in defendant's home a blank application for the Falls Township Rifle and Pistol Association, a club that the owner of D & S Gun Supplies (where defendant purchased his weaponry) recommended to his clients who shot guns often. Defendant's wallet contained a Washington State permit to carry concealed weapons and a business card for Target World, an indoor shooting range. In defendant's car, police found, along with defendant's gun, two magazines for the gun (one empty and one partially loaded), a side-kick shoulder holster that allows a person to conceal a weapon underneath a jacket, and a military identification card from defendant's service in the Navy. Defendant does not object to the admission of those objects into evidence but only objects to the admission of the arsenal of bullets and the bullet-making equipment. A ballistics expert testified at both the guilt and penalty phase trials that test results indicated a strong likelihood that the bullets found in defendant's closet were derived from the same process as the bullet used to kill Marsh. That testimony supports an inference of the knowledge, competency, and experience of defendant in handling firearms. Such evidence is significant to show that defendant intended to kill Marsh when he shot him in the head, and that the shot was not the result of an accidental discharge caused by an inexperienced marksman. As the State asserts, when defendant's possession of 500 rounds is viewed in conjunction with his complete set of tools for reloading cartridges (not to mention his Naval training, his permit to carry a concealed weapon, and his active interest in shooting ranges and clubs), a clear image emerges of a man possessing a wealth of knowledge of the workings of firearms and equally vast firsthand experience in firing them. That inference certainly strengthened the contention of an intentional murder. We agree. In the penalty phase, the ammunition and reloading equipment evidence also was relevant to help demonstrate that one of defendant's motives for killing Marsh was to avoid apprehension. In conjunction with the other evidence that indicated defendant's familiarity with firearms (e.g., Naval training, a permit to carry a concealed weapon, and an active interest in shooting ranges), the ammunition and gun equipment evidence was germane in establishing the likelihood that the shot to the victim's head was intentional and designed to eliminate a witness.
Defendant further contends that, even if the evidence was relevant, it should have sua sponte been excluded because it implied that defendant had bad character and a propensity to commit criminal acts, and its probative value was therefore substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice. N.J.R.E. 403(a). However, the State never argued that defendant's possession of the ammunition was illegal or that the ammunition indicated that defendant would be dangerous in the future. Accord Loftin, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 93, 670 A. 2d 557 (approving of introduction of same evidence into defendant's trial for prior murder). Indeed, defense counsel emphasized, on cross-examination of Officer Burnett, that defendant was not charged with unlawful possession of the ammunition. While the ammunition and reloading equipment may have prejudiced defendant, that evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof. State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308, 558 A. 2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335, 149 A. 2d 217 (1959)). The evidence did not prejudice defendant in an inflammatory way. If indeed it prejudiced defendant at all, it was only because it tended to prove a material element of the case against him. In any event, even if the evidence should not have been admitted, the trial court's decision to admit the ammunition evidence would be harmless error. It strains credulity to believe that the admission into evidence of 500 rounds of cartridge reloading equipment could have prevented a fair consideration of the evidence, because the jury had already been exposed to similar evidence, including testimony during the penalty phase from defendant's wife that they went target shooting together. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted that evidence.
The primary duty of a prosecutor is to see that justice is done. The prosecutor must refrain from using improper methods calculated just to produce a conviction. See, e.g., Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 152, 586 A. 2d 85; State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 104, 293 A. 2d 176 (1972). We have held that charges of prosecutorial misconduct will be more severely scrutinized in capital cases than other criminal cases. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 324, 524 A. 2d 188. We explained that [b]ecause death is a uniquely harsh sanction, this Court of necessity will more readily find prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct in a capital case than in any other criminal matters. Ibid. [P]rosecutors in capital cases have a special obligation to seek justice and to not simply convict.... State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 40, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) ( Biegenwald II ). In Ramseur, supra, we held that in assessing whether prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal of a criminal conviction, an appellate court should determine whether the conduct was so egregious that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, 524 A. 2d 188 (citing State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 218, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984)). In determining whether a defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied, a court should consider whether defense counsel made a timely and proper objection, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly, and whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record and instructed the jury to disregard them. Id. at 322-23, 524 A. 2d 188. The prosecution is afforded considerable leeway, within limits, in making opening statements and summations. See DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 474, 645 A. 2d 734; Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 447, 550 A. 2d 1172. Not every deviation on the part of the prosecutor requires reversal of the conviction or sentence. State v. Darrian, 255 N.J. Super. 435, 453, 605 A. 2d 716 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 13, 611 A. 2d 651 (1992).
Defendant complains that the prosecutor made certain improper comments during his summation that deprived defendant of a fair trial. Although he did not object to the State's reference to the killing as an execution-style murder until after the conclusion of the penalty-phase summation, defendant now complains about the prosecutor's characterization of the murder as an execution-style murder. Defendant asserts that any shot from less than six inches would have left gun powder; thus the absence of powder indicates that this was not an execution-style killing. In view of the considerable leeway prosecutors have in developing a theory and the strong evidence that supports the State's characterization of the murder as execution-style, we find defendant's claim to be without merit. As discussed supra at 386, 680 A. 2d at 722, defendant must have been between Marsh and the door, a distance of three feet. Whether defendant's gun was touching Marsh's head or was slightly further away, we find nothing improper in the State's characterization of this killing as an execution. Defendant also complains that the State told the jury not to speculate or theorize, but to follow the facts and all rational inferences from the facts. Defendant complains that this statement denigrated the defense because the defense legitimately put the State to its proofs by theorizing, based on the absence of evidence. We find no misconduct in this statement and do not agree that it denigrated the defense. That statement simply told the jury to evaluate the facts, as is the jury's duty. Moreover, the court's charge to the jury made it perfectly clear that reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence. During summation, the State argued that there is no evidence about a second slayer.... We know that the defendant himself and no other person has all of the credit cards.... Two, the defendant has the fifty-dollar bill which is beyond the majority of the proceeds. Defendant points out that the State never established that defendant had all of Marsh's credit cards, and furthermore that the State was unable to conclusively link the fifty-dollar bill found on defendant with that stolen from the gas station. He argues that that intentional misrepresentation of the facts warrants reversal. In Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1967), the prosecutor knew that a stain on the defendant's clothing was the result of paint but told the court that it was blood. The United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by the knowing use of false evidence. Id., 386 U.S. at 7, 87 S.Ct. at 788, 17 L.Ed. 2d at 694. See also Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 153-54, 586 A. 2d 85 (finding misconduct when prosecutor represented knowledge of evidence never presented to court). The State's comment does not rise to the level of false evidence in Miller. While no witness conclusively linked the fifty-dollar bill to the robbery, the fact that the relatively uncommon bill was hidden inside defendant's wallet, apart from his remaining money, certainly yields a strong inference that it was the same stolen bill. Similarly, because defendant was carrying Marsh's driver's license, car registration, social security card, health insurance card, ATM card, life insurance card, and various business cards along with five credit cards, there was a strong inference that defendant had all of the contents of Marsh's wallet. The State should not have been so definitive in its description of the evidence, but that misstatement was not so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Defendant next complains that the State impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defense when it told the jury that there has been no dent made in the proofs of the State. Although that comment could be interpreted as shifting the burden to the defense to disprove the State's allegation, it seems more likely to have been intended as an observation of the strength of the State's case. Given the trial court's comprehensive charge explaining the presumption of innocence, that the presumption remains until the State has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant has no burden to come forward with one scintilla of evidence, and that the burden is on the State and that burden never, ever shifts, we do not find that statement to have denied defendant a fair trial. Defendant also complains that the State characterized him as a cold-hearted and depraved murder [sic]. In Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 577, 575 A. 2d 816, we disapproved of the prosecutor's use of epithets to describe defendants. We caution prosecutors, as we have in the past, `to be circumspect in their zealous efforts to win convictions.' Ibid. (citation omitted). The use of that phrase was inappropriate. However, the statement was not sufficiently egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial.
Defendant argues that there were several incidents of prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase. As a result of those errors, defendant claims he is entitled to a reversal of his death sentence. First, defendant alleges that the State sought and obtained the presentence report prepared on defendant from the Atlantic County Probation Department without first notifying the defense. Over the defense's objection that the report was confidential under Rule 1:38(b), the report was admitted for the purpose of cross-examination of defendant's wife and the defense psychiatric expert who had reviewed the report. Although the contents of a presentence report are not for public consumption, Rule 1:38(b), the report is not privileged. A defendant may not obstruct a third party from obtaining the report through discovery when a legitimate trial need for discovery of its contents exists. Blue, supra, 124 N.J. Super. 276, 282-83, 306 A. 2d 469 (1973). Furthermore, the report would ultimately have been discoverable because the defense psychiatric expert used it in preparation for trial. Therefore, no prejudice resulted from the State's failure to give notice of the acquisition of the report. Defendant also alleges in the penalty phase that the State's repeated characterization of the murder as execution-style amounted to misconduct. Defendant contends that the inflammatory nature of the comments satisfy the plain error standard to Rule 2:10-2. As discussed, supra at 387, 680 A. 2d at 722, there was no error in the State's characterization of the murder as execution-style. Defendant also contends that the State's characterization of the murder as a cruel, inhumane, senseless act, encouraged the jury to find an additional aggravating factor. Defendant did not object to the State's characterization at trial. However, the trial court, sua sponte, observed that the prosecutor had not gone as far as alleging that the murder was heinous and cruel, but was concerned that the jury might perceive that it should consider cruel and inhumane murder as an extra aggravating factor. Consequently, the court issued the following curative instruction: [Y]ou are limited to the statutory aggravating factors alleged by the Prosecutor, and may not consider any factors that you believe are aggravating if they are not one of the three alleged aggravating factors specifically set forth by the prosecution, which the Court will instruct you on very shortly. Defendant did not object to the instruction and only now claims that the instruction was too little, too late. That the jury will follow the instructions given is presumed. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 271, 255 A. 2d 193. The instruction given by the court was proper. Any potential prejudice resulting from the State's comments was cured by the court's instruction. Defendant also contends that some of the prosecutor's comments violated this Court's directive in Bey III, supra, 129 N.J. at 620-21, 610 A. 2d 814, that a prosecutor may not mischaracterize a possible mitigating factor as an excuse. The comments made by the prosecutor did not amount to a violation of Bey III. The trial court correctly distinguished the first comment (what defense counsel `call' mitigating factors) as different from characterizing mitigating factors as excuses. The second comment (anything the defense may claim is a mitigating factor), was objected to by defense counsel and the trial court provided an immediate curative instruction. Finally, although no immediate curative instruction followed the final comment concerning the relevance of mitigating factors (in deciding whether the general information, apart from the murder, is a mitigating factor, you should ask yourself of what relevance is this information? What does it have to do with punishment for this crime.), the court instructed the jury to disregard any comments of counsel that were inconsistent with the law pronounced by the court. Any prejudice was cured by that instruction. Even if that instruction were inadequate, the prosecutor's statements were not so egregious as to require reversal. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, 524 A. 2d 188. Defendant also complains that the prosecutor implied that he had personal knowledge of facts regarding the prior Atlantic County murder of Mrs. Fetter when he stated that the jury knew very little about the murder because the State was only permitted to provide limited information about the killing. Defendant asserts that those comments suggested to the jury that the prosecutor had additional information regarding the murder that would require that a death sentence be imposed. The defendant also alleges that the potential prejudice was exacerbated as a result of the courtroom outburst of Mrs. Fetter's daughter. Defendant claims that the jury may have known it was Mrs. Fetter's daughter and therefore assumed that the information the jury lacked on the prior murder was even more emotional and significant. Those inferences would lead the jury, defendant claims, to conclude that there exists additional, important reasons to sentence defendant to death. Defendant's arguments are speculative and meritless. The State's comments concerning the Fetter murder were proper and did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant also alleges that the prosecutor improperly implied that the jurors will violate their oath if they fail to convict or return a death sentence, when in its summation the State argued: [D]efendant wants you to take the easy road, they say he will get sixty years and so he will never get out of prison, he'll die in prison. We asked you, though, that question in the voir dire process ... and you all said that if there was a chance he would die in prison that wouldn't affect your decision. You swore to that. I hold you to that promise.... [R]emarks implying that jurors will violate their oaths if they fail to convict or return a death sentence are improper. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 576, 575 A. 2d 816. However, the comments made by the prosecutor in this case did not convey that message. Instead, those comments referred to a question asked to all jurors in voir dire, about whether the possibility of consecutive life sentences would affect their judgment. The court had determined that such a consideration was not an appropriate mitigating factor. See supra at 372-73, 680 A. 2d at 715. Despite the court's ruling, the defense was able to argue that the defendant would likely die in prison if the jury sentenced him to life. Therefore, it was reasonable for the prosecutor to remind the jury that it should not consider the potential of sixty years parole ineligibility as a mitigating factor. No misconduct occurred. Finally, defense cites two instances in which the State arguably disparaged the credentials and objectivity of defendant's expert witnesses, Carmeta Albarus and Dr. Edward Dougherty. The State referred to Albarus as a purported expert who was a student trained in coming to court and telling us a story of someone from ... a mitigation specialist point of view. Referring to Dr. Dougherty, the prosecutor stated that the doctor was a professional in the business of testifying in the defense of penalty phase cases and instructed the jury to weigh Dougherty's testimony with this bias in mind. That latter comment regarding Dr. Dougherty's bias was improper. However, it did not rise to the level of impropriety exemplified in State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 462, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991), where this Court cautioned against prosecutorial comments to the effect that a defense expert was a professional bleeding heart who was duped by the defendant. In conclusion, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's remarks at issue so tainted the jury as to render it incapable of fairly [assessing] the persuasiveness of [defendant's] case. Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 452, 550 A. 2d 1172.
At both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, a videotape and testimonial evidence of defendant's arrest for the attempted purchase, four days after the Marsh murder, of $3000 worth of computer equipment with Marsh's Sears credit card was presented to the jury. There was no objection to the introduction of the evidence at the guilt phase of the trial. At the penalty phase, the defense counsel objected, seeking to preclude the introduction of the videotape. Defendant now contends that the introduction of this evidence at the guilt phase without a limiting instruction and its introduction at the penalty phase with an inadequate legal instruction constituted plain error.
N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. In Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 302, 558 A. 2d 833, we recognized the widespread agreement that other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant. We therefore required a limiting instruction ... to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence, informing the jury that it could not infer from that evidence that a defendant acted in accordance with his bad character. Id. at 304, 558 A. 2d 833. But see Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 241, 619 A. 2d 1208 (holding that the Rule does not apply to uncharged acts of misconduct that are components of the crime that is the subject of the trial). As defendant concedes, evidence of the credit card use was relevant and admissible in the guilt phase. It proved defendant's motive (greed) and identity (because he could not have known about the victim's employment with Exxon unless he had been at the murder scene). However, defendant contends that the trial court should have sua sponte issued a limiting instruction pursuant to Stevens, supra, warning the jury not to infer guilt of murder from his attempted credit-card use. Defendant claims that the court's failure to issue an instruction constituted plain error. We need not consider whether, like the evidence in Martini I, supra, the evidence here was res gestae and part of the same crime, because [i]t seems unlikely to us that a juror would have been so affected by the sight of defendant engaging in the act of credit card fraud that she or he would have been moved to convict defendant of the violent crime of murder. Loftin, supra, 287 N.J. Super. at 97, 670 A. 2d 557 (affirming Loftin's conviction of the Atlantic County murder); see also DiFrisco II, supra, 137 N.J. at 497, 645 A. 2d 734 (finding introduction of evidence about prior car theft to be harmless. Considering that the defendant had confessed to the execution-style killing of [the victim], the fact that he stole a car, committed a few traffic violations and yelled at his mother had very little tendency to divert the jurors' attention from their duties.) Because the other crime evidence (credit card fraud) was nonviolent and not at all similar to the murder of Marsh, the fact that a limiting instruction was not given does not require a reversal of defendant's murder conviction.
At the penalty phase the other crime evidence was introduced again. The defense counsel insisted that no limiting instruction be provided because of a concern that any instruction would serve to highlight defendant's other crimes. Despite defense counsel's objection, the trial court instructed the penalty-phase jury: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I would just like to at this time give you a limiting instruction. You've heard the testimony from this witness that subsequent to the events at Sears, that the defendant was arrested in connection with the credit card fraud and theft. To the extent that the testimony was disclosed to you, those additional charges are not  that the testimony was not elicited for the purpose of establishing the three aggravating factors which the State seeks to establish with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The only aggravating factors that the State is seeking to prove are those which have been specifically set forth to you by the State in its opening, and you're not to consider these arrests on these additional charges as evidence in support of the aggravating factors. The trial court reiterated those instructions in its final charge to the jury. Defendant does not challenge the admission into evidence of those crimes, recognizing that the evidence was relevant to aggravating factor c(4)(g) (murder was committed in the course of a robbery). However, defense counsel contends that despite its insistence that no limiting instruction be given, the instruction provided at the penalty phase concerning those crimes was insufficient under Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. 289, 558 A. 2d 833. In Stevens, supra, we observed that trial courts should take pains to instruct juries carefully and comprehensively, with ample reference to the specific evidence and issues in a case, on the limited relevance of other-crimes evidence. 115 N.J. at 309, 558 A. 2d 833. Similarly, in Rose, supra, we noted that a penalty phase jury is not permitted, in its weighing process, to add other evidence of defendant's past conduct to the weight it assigns to the aggravating factors, nor to consider other evidence of defendant's past conduct, except to the extent offered to rebut mitigating factors, as detracting from the weight it assigns to the mitigating factors. 112 N.J. at 507-08, 548 A. 2d 1058. In this case, the limiting instruction was sufficient. In its instruction, the court explained to the jury the limited relevance of the evidence, advising them you're not to consider these arrests on these additional charges as evidence in support of the aggravating factors. Furthermore, the trial court again instructed the jury in its final charge: You are not permitted in your weighing process to add evidence of defendant's past conduct, except to the extent offered to rebut mitigating factors and as detracting from the weight you assign to mitigating factors. That instruction was in full conformance with Rose, supra . Finally, because it was defense counsel who insisted that no instruction of any kind be given, he cannot now attack the adequacy of the charge issued. Supra at 364-65, 680 A. 2d at 710-11. Even if the limiting instruction provided in this case was imperfect, the fact that the other-crimes evidence at issue consisted of a non-violent crime and was not at all similar to the crime charged supports the conclusion that an imperfect limiting instruction, under these circumstances, is not reversible error.