Opinion ID: 1752479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the applicability of lsa-r.s. 32:24

Text: LSA-R.S. 32:24. Emergency vehicles; exceptions provides: A. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges set forth in this Section, but subject to the conditions herein stated. B. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: (1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this Chapter; (2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation; (3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property; (4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions. C. The exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle. D. The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others. Defendants contend that the court of appeal erred in its interpretation of LSA-R.S. 32:24(B)(4), in that the statute allows emergency vehicles to disregard the regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions. Defendants contend there are no limitations or restrictions in the statute which would prevent defendant Nash's movement herein. They further aver that the court of appeal erred in limiting the statute to a situation where the emergency vehicle driver is driving the wrong way, down a one-way street. Defendants contend that the court of appeal's decision limits the protection afforded to emergency vehicle drivers and the actions they may take to respond to an emergency. Further, Defendants argue that in limiting the protection afforded to emergency vehicle drivers, the decision of the court of appeal exposes emergency service providers, both public and private, to a greater likelihood of civil liability. Defendants argue that subsection (B)(4), allows emergency vehicle drivers to move around stopped traffic by using the shoulders, turning lanes, or other means to reach the scene of an emergency, as long as the driver is making use of audible or visible signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach. Plaintiffs contend that LSA-R.S.32:24(A)(1) is not applicable to the facts of this case, because defendant Nash was not driving a fire truck and he was driving in a center turning lane not designated for travel. In fact, the lane was marked as a no passing lane. They also argue that the fire was no longer an emergency. Plaintiffs contend that Nash's emergency lights and sirens were not sufficient to warn motorists of his impending approach, and he failed to exercise the proper standard of care. Rabalais contends that as a motorist, he had the right to assume that Nash and others would follow the traffic laws and regulations. Plaintiffs argue that the statute must be strictly construed, pursuant to the principal of stricti juris. Subsection A(1) of LSA-R.S.32:24, sets forth the circumstances in which the driver of an emergency vehicle is granted particular driving privileges. Those circumstances are when the driver is: (1) responding to an emergency call; (2) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law; or (3) when responding to, but not upon returning from, a fire alarm. Plaintiffs contend first that the statute is not applicable because the fire was no longer an emergency and Nash was not responding to, but instead returning from a fire. The record reflects that when the fire was initially discovered, the entire Marksville Fire Department rushed to the Jen-Re Plastics Plant. After arriving and fighting the fire for sometime, the Chief and the Assistant Chief of the Fire Department determined that the fire was out of control and that they needed additional assistance and equipment to fight the fire. Ned Bordelon, the Retired Chief of the Marksville Fire Department testified via deposition, that due to the dangerous nature of this plastics fire, assistance was requested from the Baton Rouge-Hazardous Materials (HazMat) team which arrived on the scene of the fire and assisted the other fire departments in extinguishing the fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant. When they arrived, they contacted the HazMat team at the Exxon Plant in Baton Rouge and requested foam to help extinguish this chemical fire. The foam arrived in Marksville, approximately two hours after it was requested by the HazMat team. Ned Boredelon testified that Chris Bordelon, Assistant Chief of the Marksville Fire Department ordered Nash and firefighter Mark Bordelon to return to the fire station in Marksville to pick up the Pumper No. 1 Fire Truck. He testified that he needed the second fire truck brought to the scene in case it was needed to help fight the fire at Jen-Re Plastics Plant. On cross-examination, Assistant Chief Christopher Bordelon, testified he considered the fire an emergency and that it was a life or death situation for the firemen who battled the fire. Although the record is not clear as to exactly how long the fire was in progress when this collision occurred, what is clear from the photographs in evidence, is that smoke was still billowing approximately thirty (30)feet in the air at the time of this accident. Therefore, based on the uncontroverted testimony of the fire officials, we conclude that Nash was responding to an emergency when he traveled from the fire at the Jen-Re Plastics Plant to retrieve additional equipment to take to the fire scene. Next, we address the issue of whether the pick-up truck driven by Nash was an emergency vehicle. We are guided by a review of the jurisprudence, where non-traditional vehicles have been held to be emergency vehicles. In Metoyer v. Benjamin, 00-1728(La. App. 3 Cir. 5/2/01), 784 So.2d 823, the appellate court held a wrecker, with its emergency lights flashing while responding to a traffic accident, is considered an emergency vehicle, and may not be held liable for an accident in which it is involved without finding that it exhibited a reckless disregard for the safety of others. In Prather v. Gauthreaux, 297 So.2d 439 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1974), the appellate court held that the driver of wrecker with 4-way flasher and emergency beacon, who had been dispatched to the scene of an automobile accident and who had been instructed to get there as soon as possible was entitled to the benefit of LSA-32:24. In both Metoyer and Prather, the courts held that wreckers were emergency vehicles. Considering non-traditional vehicles such as wreckers have been held to be emergency vehicle for the purposes of invoking the immunity provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:24, we must conclude that an official truck of the Marksville Fire Department qualifies as an emergency vehicle. Therefore, we conclude the fire pick-up truck qualifies as a emergency vehicle. Subsection B of LSA-R.S.32:24, lists the privileges granted to an emergency vehicle driver. These privileges allow the driver to: (1) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of Chapter 32 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes (2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation (3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property; and (4) Disregard regulations governing the direction of movement or turning in specified directions. [Emphasis ours.] Subsection B(4) covers two types of maneuvers, those governing the direction of movement in specified directions, and those governing turning in specified directions. The court of appeal concluded that LSA-R.S.32:24(B)(4)only applied if the driver was (a) driving down the wrong way down a one way street, or (b) involved in a turn. The court of appeal concluded that since Nash's driving in the center turning lane was not specifically listed in LSA-32:24(B)(4), the statute was not applicable. The court of appeal stated: . . . [W]e find that Captain Nash's actions are not covered by LSA-R.S. 32:24. He was not parking or standing, nor was he proceeding past a red or stop signal at the time of the accident. He did not exceed the speed limit. He did not drive the wrong way down a one way street, nor did his actions involve turning. At the time of the collision, Captain Nash was driving down the center turn lane of a state highway, an exception not enumerated in LSA-R.S. 32:24. Because it must be strictly construed, the list of exceptions granted to drivers of authorized emergency automobiles is exclusive, not illustrative. See Pellegrini v. Crellin [2] , 95-2654 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/8/96), 674 So.2d 463, writ denied, 96-1592 (La.6/27/97), 696 So.2d 991. No where in the statute does it provide that the driver of an emergency vehicle may violate highway regulations and drive in the center turn lane. Therefore, Captain Nash's actions were not granted exception under LSA-R.S. 32:24, and the statute is inapplicable in this case. [Emphasis ours]. The initial point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the law itself. Gregor v. Argenot Great Central Insurance Company, et al., 02-1138 (La.5/20/03) 851 So.2d 959; Ginn v. Woman's Hospital Foundation, Inc., 02-1913, p. 9(La.4/9/03),842 So.2d 338, 344; Rougeau v. Hyundai Motor America, 01-1182, p. 5(La.1/15/02),805 So.2d 147, 151. Special rules for interpreting a statute (such as LSA-R.S. 32:24) have been enacted by the legislative branch and are found in LSA-R.S. 1:1 et seq. LSA-R.S. 1:3 provides, in pertinent part that, [w]ords and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. LSA-R.S. 1:4 provided that [w]hen the wording of a Section of a statute is clear and free of ambiguity, the letter of it shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. The legislative branch also has provided general rules for interpreting laws in LSA-C.C. art. 9 et seq. See, in particular, LSA-C.C. arts. 9 and 11. We are bound by the language of a relevant law. Allen v. State through the Ernest N. Morial-New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority, 02-1072, p. 12 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 373, 381. In Blair v. Tynes, supra ., this Court held that the legislature has given law enforcement officers the exclusive power to regulate traffic and the public has a corresponding obligation to follow traffic regulations. Law enforcement officers are duty bound to exercise this power reasonably to protect life and limb and to refrain from causing injury or harm. When a law enforcement officer becomes aware of a dangerous traffic situation, he has the affirmative duty to see that motorists are not subjected to unreasonable risks of harm. Monceaux v. Jennings Rice Drier, Inc., 590 So.2d 672, 675 (La. App. 3rd. Cir.1991). In Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 94-0952 at 10,(La.11/30/94), 646 So.2d 318, this Court stated that the scope of an officer's duty is to choose a course of action which is reasonable under the circumstances. In other words, the scope of an officer's duty to act reasonably under the circumstances does not extend so far as to require that the officer always choose the best or even a better method or approach. The Louisiana Constitution of 1974 art. III, § 15(A) provides, in pertinent part, that [e]very bill shall contain a brief title indicative of its object. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the title of a law may be examined to determine its purpose. Boutte v. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Sev. Dist. No. 1, 99-2402, p. 5 (La.4/11/00), 759 So.2d 45, 49. When we interpret La. R.S. 32:24, we are bound to give effect to all parts of it and cannot give it an interpretation that makes any part of it superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be avoided. Palmer v. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education, 02-2043, p. 5 (La.4/9/03), 842 So.2d 363, 367; Hollingsworth v. City of Minden, 01-2658 (La.6/21/02), 828 So.2d 514, 517. The Title of LSA-R.S. 32:24, is Emergency Vehicles; Exceptions. After reviewing the title and substance of LSA-R.S. 32:24, we conclude that the purpose of this statute is to provide immunity from liability to drivers of emergency vehicles, under specific circumstances. When two or more interpretations may be given a law, the interpretation which is reasonable and practical is preferred to that which makes part of the law ridiculous or meaningless. Louisiana Horsemen's Association v. Fair Grounds Corporation, First Statewide Racing Company, Inc., d/b/a Evangeline Downs, Louisiana Downs, Inc., Delta Downs Racing Association, Inc., and the Louisiana Dept. of Public Safety and Corrections, 02-1928 (La.4/9/03), 845 So.2d 1039; Langley v. Petro Star Corp. of La., 01-0198, (La.6/29/01);792 So.2d 721. In the instant case, direction of movement is not defined by LSA-R.S. 32:24(B)(4), and is the point of contention here. Dictionaries are a valuable source for determining the common and approved usage of words. Louisiana Horsemen's Assoc. v. Fair Grounds Corp., 02-1928, p. 5,845 So.2d 1039, 1042. In Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, the word movement is defined as the act or process of moving; especially to a change of place or position or posture; a particular instance or manner of moving. The court of appeal concluded that the statute did not apply to Nash's driving in the center lane, since driving in the center turn lane was not specifically listed in LSA-R.S. 32:24. LSA-R.S.32:24 does not specifically list driving the wrong way down a one-way street. Yet, in Carpenter v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 333 So.2d 296 (La.App.1st. Cir.1976), an appellate court held LSA-R.S. 32:24(B)(3) and (4) authorize the driver of an emergency vehicle to exceed the speed limits and to disregard regulations governing the direction of traffic flow. The police vehicle was traveling 60 mph, and the wrong way on a major city street. The instant case does not involve a one way street nor was Nash speeding. The record reflects that Nash was traveling 45 mph in a 55 mph speed. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Nash's behavior constituted reckless disregard for the safety of others, which would violate the duty imposed by LSA-R.S. 32:24 on drivers of emergency vehicles. Nor does the record indicate that Nash acted without due regard for the safety of others. Nash's action in driving the fire pickup truck in the turning lane of Louisiana Highway One was reasonable, particularly since he was entitled to assume that Mr. Rabalais would not move his vehicle until the fire truck had passed. See Smith v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 609 So.2d 1024 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992). When we assign responsibility for this collision, it is clear that Mr. Rabalais' actions violated the duty imposed on drivers by LSA-R.S. 32:125 [3] to make way for emergency vehicles. Rather than stopping and staying in position until the fire truck had passed, Rabalais' testimony indicated that he never looked to his left, that he looked only to his right, and then moved forward into the roadway. He was negligent in failing to look left, to see what he should have seen, and hear the approaching fire trucks; negligent in failing to yield the right of way, and failing to stop and remain in position until the authorized emergency vehicle had passed. The phrase direction of movement implies any process that involves movement on a particular course or in a particular direction. As such, the phrase direction of movement could include both an emergency vehicle traveling down the wrong way of a one-way street, and an emergency vehicle traveling down the center lane of a two-way highway. Subsection C of LSA-R.S. 32:24 states that the exceptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach, except that a police vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front of the vehicle. Subsection C, then, makes applicable the privileges under subsection B only when the emergency vehicle is making use of audible or visual signals sufficient to warn motorists of their approach. [4] Here, the record reflects there were six witnesses to the accident. Gretchen Laborde, Lee Bordelon, Mark Bordelon (firemen), Lloyd Nash (defendant), and Carl James Ducote, all testified that the emergency lights on the fire pickup truck were activated. (R. 747, 752, 792-793, 826, 839, and 894). In addition, Earl Guillory (defendant), testified that he heard the sirens from the fire trucks. (R. 900-902). At trial, Mr. Rabalais attempted to establish that Captain Nash did not in fact activate the fire truck's sirens and/or flashing lights. The jury evidently believed Nash and the independent witnesses on this point and their finding was reasonable, based on the record before us. When the driver of an emergency vehicle meets the requirements of LSA-R.S. 32:24, the driver can only be held liable for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others, i.e., gross negligence. Neloms v. Empire & Marine Ins. Co. (La.App.2 Cir.10/16/03), 859 So.2d 225. If the emergency vehicle driver's conduct does not meet the requirements of LSA-R.S. 32:24, the driver's actions will be gauged by an ordinary standard of due care. Lenard v. Dilley, 01-1522 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175; See also Pope v. Prunty, 37,395 (La.App.2 Cir.8/20/03), 852 So.2d 1213, where the court determined that LSA-R.S. 32:24(C) requires an emergency vehicle driver(ambulance), to use lights and/or sirens sufficient to warn motorists of their approach. The trial judge concluded that the use of warning lights alone was insufficient. Since the driver's actions did not follow LSA-R.S. 32:24; the court measured her actions by an ordinary standard of due care. Subsection D of LSA-R.S. 32:24, sets out two standards of care for an emergency vehicle driver depending on the circumstances of the case. When an emergency vehicle driver's actions fit into subsections A, B and C of LSA-R.S. 32:24, the emergency vehicle driver will be held liable only for actions which constitute reckless disregard for the safety of others. [5] On the other hand, if the emergency vehicle driver's conduct does not meet the statutory requirements, the driver's actions will be gauged by a standard of due care. In Spears v. City of Scott, 05-0230(La. App.3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 983, the appellate court found that the police officer's actions in approaching and then continuing on through the intersection constituted gross negligence and that the officer's siren was insufficient to warn motorists of his immediate approach to the intersection. In Spears, the appellate court noted that Subsection (B)(2) of LSA-R.S. 32:24 allows the driver of an emergency vehicle to proceed past a stop signal, but only after slowing down or stopping as may be necessary for safe operation. The trial court found that the driver came to a rolling stop at the intersection, but that he did not continue to monitor traffic when he entered the intersection, even though he was traveling through the intersection against a red light. Spears can be distinguished from the instant case. In Spears the officer failed to maintain a lookout before he proceeded. Therefore, the immunity provisions of LSA-R.S. 32:24 were inapplicable. In the instant case, Mr. Rabalais failed to maintain a lookout as he proceeded into the roadway. After careful review of the record in its entirety, and applying the appropriate standard for review, we find the court of appeal erred in reversing the jury's conclusion that defendants Nash, the Marksville Fire Department and their insurer, were not liable.