Opinion ID: 1264177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intentional or Unintentional Concealment

Text: Whether a juror's failure to respond is intentional is a fact intensive determination that must be made on a case-bycase basis. Woods, 345 S.C. at 588, 550 S.E.2d at 284. In Woods, this Court distinguished intentional concealment from unintentional concealment: intentional concealment occurs when the question presented to the jury on voir dire is reasonably comprehensible to the average juror and the subject of the inquiry is of such significance that the juror's failure to respond is unreasonable. Unintentional concealment, on the other hand, occurs where the question posed is ambiguous or incomprehensible to the average juror, or where the subject of the inquiry is insignificant or so far removed in time that the juror's failure to respond is reasonable under the circumstances. Id. (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals held that Scott's concealment was unintentional. State v. Sparkman, Op. No.2003-UP-165 (Ct. App. Filed February 27, 2003). We agree that Scott's failure to recall his attack was reasonable under the circumstances. First, Scott's attack occurred approximately forty years agoa lapse of time that we believe renders his failure to respond reasonable. Scott testified that he did not remember his attack until he began to discuss whether he believed that Newton's eyewitness testimony was credible. In our review, it is reasonable that Scott did not recall his attack until he began to draw from his own experiences while considering the evidence. Second, Scott testified that he was unsure whether his attack was a serious crime. We understand that the term serious crime is ambiguous and recognize that it was reasonable that Scott was unable to distinguish between serious crimes and other, non-serious crimes. We find that Scott unintentionally concealed that he was the victim of an attack.