Opinion ID: 848768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the majority's policy argument is ill-conceived

Text: Although the majority rests its holding primarily on the notion that Mr. Heier's claims are barred by MCR 5.921(D), it has attempted to fortify its reasoning by alluding to public policy. It asserts that the public policy considerations underlying the enactment of the Paternity Act also underlie child protective proceedings. Again, I disagree. The public policy objective of the Paternity Act is to ensure that all children are provided with support and education. Crego v. Coleman, 463 Mich. 248, 269, 615 N.W.2d 218 (2000), citing Whybra v. Gustafson, 365 Mich. 396, 400, 112 N.W.2d 503 (1961). The objective would be frustrated if a legal father were able to abandon his duty of support as the result of unfounded allegations of paternity. Hence, before an action can be sustained under the Paternity Act, a determination must be made that the child in question was born out of wedlock, M.C.L. § 722.711(a); Girard v. Wagenmaker, 437 Mich. 231, 470 N.W.2d 372 (1991). By contrast, the purpose of termination proceedings under the juvenile code is to assure a child of care, guidance, and control conducive to his welfare and the interest of the state. M.C.L. § 712A.1(3). Accordingly, when a child is removed from his parents, the court must provide him with care that approximates the care his parents should have provided. Id. Thus, the two acts serve different masters. A person must not blindly assume that a single public policy consideration fulfills their distinct purposes. Similarly, the majority's reliance on our opinion in Serafin v. Serafin [2] is unsuited to this case. Serafin did not address the statutes or court rules at issue here. Instead, it held that Lord Mansfield's Rule, a common-law rule of evidence, was no longer viable in Michigan. It is true that Serafin observed that children remain guarded by [a] still viable and strong ... presumption of legitimacy that can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence. Serafin, 401 Mich. at 636, 258 N.W.2d 461, citing Maxwell v. Maxwell, 15 Mich.App. 607, 617, 167 N.W.2d 114 (1969). Yet, Serafin goes on to rebuke a too dogged pursuit of the presumption of legitimacy rule: If the function of a court is to find the truth of a matter so that justice might be done, then a rule which absolutely excludes the best possible evidence of a matter in issue rather than allow it to be weighed by the trier of fact must necessarily lead to injustice. Further, when a court voluntarily blindfolds itself to what every citizen can see, the public must justifiably question the administration of law to just that extent.[ Serafin, supra at 635-636, 258 N.W.2d 461, quoting Davis v. Davis, 507 S.W.2d 841, 847 (Tex.Civ.App., 1974), rev'd on other grounds 521 S.W.2d 603 (1975).] In accordance with that rationale, I do not agree that the presumption of legitimacy rule has persuasive force in this case. Certainly, the majority would not advance the argument that this rule protects the sanctity of CAW's family unit. That proposition is absurd in the context of termination proceedings, the object of which is to destroy any familial bond between a child and the parent whose rights are being terminated. Similarly, the policy cannot be advanced on the basis that it furthers the goals expressed in the juvenile code. Rigid application of the presumption of legitimacy would frustrate the code's preference for placing a child with his parent, if the parent is willing and able to care for him. For example, if Heier were a fit biological parent of CAW, rigid application of the presumption relied on by the majority would prevent the court from placing CAW with him.