Opinion ID: 1232173
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do the Distinctions Drawn by the Statute Bear a Fair and Substantial Relationship to the Statute's Purpose?

Text: Since an individual's interest in a permanent fund dividend is at the low end of our sliding scale, the state need only show that the distinctions drawn bear a fair and substantial relationship to the statute's objective. Sonneman, 790 P.2d at 705. We conclude that denying incarcerated felons dividends bears a fair and substantial relationship to the goal of compensating crime victims. The fair and substantial relationship test does not require a perfect fit between a legislative classification and the government objective it is intended to further. Wilson, 669 P.2d at 572 (upheld statute conferring immunity on municipalities for liability arising from safety inspections of private property). See also Ostrosky, 667 P.2d at 1193 (upheld statute requiring an entry permit to fish commercially in certain areas). Despite the language in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976), indicating that this court's lower level of scrutiny will be more rigorous and less deferential than the federal rational basis test, we have invalidated only two legislative enactments under the fair and substantial relationship test since Isakson. In Gilman v. Martin , we invalidated a Kenai Peninsula Borough Ordinance that limited participants in a land sale lottery to those who had resided in the borough for at least a year. 662 P.2d at 125. We concluded that the residency requirement did not bear a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the lottery  to sell selected parcels of land to adjoining property owners or to leaseholders so as to resolve existing controversies regarding access and title. Id. at 126. Nonresidents owned over half of the property within the borough. Id. In Gilman, it is difficult to imagine any relationship between the legislative goal and the means the borough employed to further it. Here, there appears to be a relationship between the denial of dividends to incarcerated felons and compensation of crime victims. In Turner Constr. Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1988), we invalidated a statute barring suits against the designers or builders of an improvement to real property more than six years after substantial completion of the improvement. We held that there is no substantial relationship between exempting design professionals from liability, shifting the liability for defective design and construction to owners and material suppliers, and the goal of encouraging construction. Id. at 472. In addition, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1980), significantly narrowed the holding in Isakson. 606 P.2d at 1261. In Apokedak, we held that limiting applicants for entry permits to gear license holders bears a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of avoiding unjust discrimination in the awarding of entry permits. Id. at 1266. We clarified that Isakson only invalidated the use of a specific date, January 1, 1973, in entry permit legislation. Id. at 1260-61. Applying the fair and substantial relationship test, we have upheld legislative enactments in the following cases: Sonneman, 790 P.2d 702 (upheld denial of unemployment compensation benefits to individual who voluntarily terminated employment to enter law school); Taylor v. Southeast-Harrison Western Corp., 694 P.2d 1160 (Alaska 1985) (providing greater compensation to estates of deceased workers leaving dependents than to deceased workers leaving no dependents bears a fair and substantial relationship to the overall purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act); Wilson, 669 P.2d 569, 572-73 (granting immunity to municipalities for liability arising from safety inspections of private property bears a fair and substantial relationship to the statute's purpose of encouraging municipalities to conduct safety inspections without the fear of a financially devastating lawsuit); Rose v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 647 P.2d 154, 159-60 (Alaska 1982) (regulations which precluded award of participation points for year in which fishery was closed bear fair and substantial relationship to the goal of allocating a limited number of entry permits); Hilbers, 611 P.2d at 40-41 (municipal ordinance regulating massage parlors and physical culture studios bears fair and substantial relationship to the two purposes of the ordinance  controlling prostitution and reducing its adverse environmental effects); Apokedak, 606 P.2d at 1267 (In upholding a statute limiting the eligible pool of applicants for entry permits to gear license holders, the court stated, [E]qual protection, even under Alaska's stricter standard, does not demand perfection in classification. If it did, there would be few laws establishing classifications that would sustain an equal protection challenge.); Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426, 437 (Alaska 1979) (there is a fair and substantial relationship between the legislative objective of providing guaranteed, expeditious compensation to the injured employee and the limitation on the employer's total liability regardless of its percentage of fault); Younker v. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 598 P.2d 917, 922 (Alaska 1979) (regulations awarding limited entry permits according to point scheme which is in part based on percentage of one's income dependent on fish is substantially related to government objective of giving entry permits to those who would suffer greater hardship as a result of exclusion from the fishery); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 15-16, 18 (Alaska 1978) (classification of cocaine as a narcotic bears a fair and substantial relationship to the legislative goal of outlawing drugs that are considered harmful to the health and welfare of society); and State v. Reefer King Co., 559 P.2d 56, 65-66 (Alaska 1976) (imposition of higher tax upon floating processors of raw fish than upon shore-based processors bears a fair and substantial relationship to the goal of encouraging societal contributions of the type made by shorebased processors). The statute at issue in this case draws two distinctions: (1) between felons and misdemeanants and (2) between those felons who are incarcerated and those who are not. Both classifications separate, at least to some extent, those who have injured victims to a degree deemed highly significant by society and those whose infliction of injury is deemed less blameworthy. Misdemeanants usually cause less harm to victims than felons. AS 11.81.250. The fact that a particular misdemeanant might cause as much or more harm than a particular felon does not mean that AS 43.23.005(d) denies equal protection. Every law that attempts to allocate a benefit or burden contains some imperfection. For example, the residency requirement for a dividend is imperfect in that an individual who has lived in Alaska for precisely the requisite amount of time is eligible to receive a dividend, but another person who has lived in Alaska for one day less is not eligible. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has implied that such a bona fide residency requirement is constitutional. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 58-59, 102 S.Ct. at 2311-2312. Appellee Smith argues that the distinction drawn by AS 43.23.005(d) between incarcerated felons and felons whom the court does not sentence to serve jail time bears no relationship to the purpose of the legislation  to compensate crime victims. The essence of Smith's argument is that whether a particular felon is incarcerated does not depend on the degree of harm that the felon causes to his or her victims. In addition, he argues that all incarcerated felons lose their dividends even though some may have caused a great deal more harm to victims than others. Smith compares two recent felony cases to illustrate his point. In State v. Price, 740 P.2d 476 (Alaska App. 1987), the defendant was convicted of assault in the first degree but was not sentenced to serve more time in jail since he had already spent one year in jail for other crimes. In State v. Ridgway, 750 P.2d 362 (Alaska App. 1988), the court sentenced the defendant to serve five years in prison for sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree. Smith argues that both Price's and Ridgway's victims suffered harm, but Ridgway loses his dividend and Price does not. We observe that those felons who actually serve time in prison generally have caused more harm to victims than those who receive suspended or probationary sentences. The purpose of Alaska's presumptive sentencing framework (AS 12.55.005-12.55.185) is to ensure that to the extent possible, similarly situated offenders receive similar sentences. Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856, 860-61 (Alaska App. 1982). The extent to which the offense harms the victim is one of the specific factors the statute requires the sentencing court to consider. AS 12.55.005(4). The degree of physical or psychological violence involved in the offense is also an important factor in sentencing. Kelly v. State, 622 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1981). It is possible that a felon may have his dividend taken by the state even though he has already paid restitution to his victim. Section 12.55.045 of the Alaska statutes permits a court to order a defendant convicted of an offense to make restitution to the victim and to public or private organizations which have provided services to the victim. There are, however, at least two reasons why individual restitution orders may be inadequate: (1) a felon who owes a victim restitution might not even apply for a permanent fund dividend since he or she will not benefit from it; [5] and (2) since many felons do not have the means to pay restitution, victims must depend on the crime victim's compensation fund. We think it irrelevant that a judge may require a particular felon to pay restitution to the victim. Specific restitution is simply an element of a larger picture. Again, equal protection does not require perfection. We are persuaded that those felons who are sentenced to serve time in prison are more likely than those who are not sentenced to incarceration to have seriously harmed others. [6] The trial court was specifically troubled by the fact that one of two individuals who are arrested at the same time for the same crime might receive a dividend while the other might not. This could occur, for example, if one cannot make bail and therefore spends ten days in jail. Later, both are convicted and sentenced to serve ten days in jail. The one who could not make bail gets credit for the time already served and therefore does not spend any time in jail as an incarcerated felon. The other is incarcerated and forfeits his or her dividend. The state responds that both felons in the trial court's example would be ineligible for dividends. According to the state, even if an individual is sentenced only to time served, the incarceration is deemed to have commenced on the date of sentencing and therefore will be deemed to have been served as a result of the conviction. The state concedes that some criminals who cause harm to victims may continue to receive a dividend while others who cause harm do not. The state argues, however, that the distinctions drawn by AS 43.23.005(d) are sufficiently related to the statute's purpose to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. We agree.