Opinion ID: 198296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Challenges Relating to the Convictions as to a Single Overarching Conspiracy

Text: 23 All three defendants claim, first, that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove a single, overarching conspiracy among them and the government's cooperating witnesses. They claim further that, given this alleged variance between the conspiracy charged and the proof at trial, they were prejudiced by the admission of inadmissible hearsay and by evidentiary spillover. Finally, both LiCausi and Fogarty claim that they should not have been sentenced for both conspiracy to violate the laws of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Addressing each one of these claims in turn, we find no reason to disturb the judge's rulings or the jury's verdict. 24 Whether a single conspiracy or a multiple conspiracy exists is, of course, a question of fact for the jury. See United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 17 (1st Cir.1984). In assessing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to such a finding, we credit both direct and circumstantial evidence, resolve all evidentiary conflicts and credibility questions in the prosecution's favor, and choose from among competing inferences the one best fitting the prosecution's theory of guilt. See United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 970 (1st Cir.1995). To uphold a conviction, we need not believe that no verdict other than a guilty verdict could sensibly be reached, but must only satisfy [ourselves] that the guilty verdict finds support in 'a plausible rendition of the record.'  United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711 (1st Cir.1992)). 25 In reviewing a jury's finding that a single conspiracy existed, we consider specifically such factors as the commonality vel non of the nature, motive, design, implementation, and logistics of the illegal activities as well as the scope of coconspirator involvement. See United States v. Randazzo, 80 F.3d 623, 629 (1st Cir.1996). While these factors inform our inquiry, however, we will leave undisturbed the jury's finding so long as the totality of the evidence sufficiently demonstrates that all of the alleged coconspirators directed their efforts towards the accomplishment of a common goal or overall plan. Drougas, 748 F.2d at 17. The government need not prove that each defendant participated in every transaction necessary to fulfill the aim of the overall agreement, see id., nor must it prove that each defendant knew every detail of the conspiracy or knew or had contact with every other coconspirator. See United States v. Mena-Robles, 4 F.3d 1026, 1033 (1st Cir.1993). We think that the facts outlined above, which include meetings involving all of the defendants and relating to supermarket robberies, shared equipment contributed by different members of the group, common participants and similar logistical arrangements, and close contact among members of the group during the life of their association, adequately support the jury's finding that a common goal or overall plan existed. 26 As for individual defendants and their culpability vel non for involvement in that overarching conspiracy, we start with the principle that a defendant who has committed only one or a few of the crimes necessary to fulfill the aim of a multiple-crime conspiracy can nevertheless be convicted for that conspiracy if the evidence supports a finding that he had knowledge or foresight of the conspiracy's multiplicity of objectives. United States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1234 (1st Cir.1994) (emphasis omitted). This is so even if the conspiracy is open-ended (e.g., a conspiracy to rob banks) and the specifics of the future crimes (e.g., which banks) is undetermined or at least unknown to the defendant. Id. A defendant can be found guilty of a narrower conspiracy only if he agreed with others to commit one or a few crimes and had no knowledge or foresight of the conspiracy's broader scope. See id. We have no trouble finding here that each of the defendants had knowledge or foresight of the conspiracy's multiplicity of objectives. Indeed, the association formed here appears very much like the hypothetical one described in Morrow: an open-ended conspiracy where the specifics of future crimes were undetermined or unknown to particular defendants. See id. Thus, the jury properly found beyond a reasonable doubt that all three defendants and others formed a single, overarching conspiracy. 27 We may therefore spend very little time on defendants' other claims regarding admissibility of evidence offered to prove the individual crimes. As to the hearsay testimony, [h]earsay statements are admissible against a defendant when it is more likely than not that he was a coconspirator of the speaker, that the conspiracy existed at the time the statements were made, and that they were made in furtherance of it. United States v. Rivera, 68 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1995); see also Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). Since the overarching conspiracy was adequately proven at trial, the testimony as to statements made regarding the individual robberies was properly admitted. As to the prejudicial spillover claim, the evidence presented was relevant not only to prove that the individual robberies, attempts, and associated crimes took place, but also to the issue of whether an overall conspiracy existed. See United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847, 853 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that proof of a conspiracy may consist of circumstantial evidence and inferences from surrounding circumstances). It was therefore relevant to all of the defendants, and [w]here evidence featuring one defendant is independently admissible against a codefendant, the latter cannot convincingly complain of an improper spillover effect. United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir.1993). Moreover, the jury acquitted Durfee on one count and Fogarty on two counts, including one on which Durfee was convicted, indicating to us that the jury was able to assess the guilt of each defendant on each count separately. 28 Nor do we see any merit in LiCausi's and Fogarty's claims that imposing separate, consecutive sentences for the overarching conspiracy and the individual Hobbs Act conspiracies violates Double Jeopardy principles. 3 Under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and its progeny, [a] single act may constitute two different offenses for double jeopardy purposes so long as two different statutes were violated and each requires an element that the other does not. United States v. Claudio, 44 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir.1995). This is true of conspiracy as well as other crimes. See id. (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)). The test is satisfied here. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, requires proof that the objective of the conspiracy was obstruction of the flow of commerce or an article in commerce. Such proof is not necessary under the general conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 371 requires proof of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, an element that the government need not prove to establish a Hobbs Act conspiracy. Thus, the charged conspiracies are two separate offenses and can be punished as such. 29