Opinion ID: 2569334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Voluntariness of Subsequent Statements

Text: Hedges contends that at the time he confessed to the officers at the county jail, he was not capable of making a rational and intelligent choice to waive his rights. He asserts that he was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance characterized by distorted and disorganized thought. Waiver of Miranda rights must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. The burden of proving a voluntary waiver of rights is on the State. State v. Esquivel-Hernandez, 266 Kan. 821, 825, 975 P.2d 254 (1999). Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary include: (1) the accused's mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused on request to communicate with the outside world; (4) the accused's age, intellect and background; and (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the investigation. State v. McCorkendale, 267 Kan. 263, 270, 979 P.2d 1239 (1999). The absence of police coercion or duress does not foreclose a finding of involuntariness. See State v. William, 248 Kan. 389, 407-08, 807 P.2d 1291, cert. denied 502 U.S. 837 (1991) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 93 L. Ed.2d 473, 106 S. Ct. 515 [1986]). Voluntariness of a confession is determined from the totality of the circumstances, and where a trial court conducts a full prehearing on the admissibility of extrajudicial statements by the accused, determines the statements were freely and voluntarily given, and admits the statements into evidence at trial, appellate courts accept that determination if supported by substantial competent evidence and do not attempt to reweigh the evidence. Mc-Corkendale, 267 Kan. at 270-71. At the county jail, Hedges was upset, but he had no problem communicating. In response to questions by law enforcement officers, he recounted the events leading up to and during his siege of Roberta's house. Hedges explained that he blamed Roberta for the fact that he had not been able to visit his son. Hedges assumed Roberta's house would be empty on July 14, 1996, because Roberta's daughters had a softball tournament that evening. Hedges was not aware that the family was at home until he saw them sitting on the front lawn. At the conclusion of Hedges' oral statements, the interviewing officer requested Hedges to make a written statement. Hedges began to write, and then stated that he was tired and did not wish to complete the statement. Hedges then requested an attorney, and the officers terminated the interview. At trial, the officer who interviewed Hedges testified that during the interview Hedges became agitated about his ex-wife and the system. The officer stated that during this period, Hedges' speech was coherent. The interview lasted an hour and a half. Hedges was provided with something to drink during the interview. Hedges did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Hedges made no allegation of police coercion. There was no evidence presented that Hedges was incapable of understanding his rights. The trial court observed that Hedges indicated to the officers that he understood his rights, Hedges' answers were responsive, and Hedges terminated the interview by requesting an attorney. The court determined that these facts indicated that Hedges gave a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. We agree. There was substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's decision to admit the post- Miranda statements.