Opinion ID: 1742831
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Speculation regarding motive.

Text: The state's closing argument is not required to be colorless, [but] it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn.1995). Young alleges that the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument by misstating the evidence and speculating about the motive for the murder. The prosecutor stated: Why would somebody do this to [Anthony]? Nobody knew. Nobody could give a reason why Curtis Anthony was killed. Did anybody have a reason? You've got enough facts before you to form a few reasons. Was Monique Frye pregnant with Curtis's baby? She told [you that] she last slept with Curtis in October. Did she find out she was pregnant? And Curtis snuffed her and went back to Precious? So Monique cried to Jeffery and Lennell, You've got to help me. Curtis won't take care of this baby. He's dumping me. And Jeff and Lennell, as they've done in the past, go to Monique's rescue? Is that the motive? Sounds pretty harsh.     The only people that really know are those people that were in the room that night. Jeff, Lennell and Curtis. Curtis can't tell us why. Frye testified that her sexual relationship with Anthony ended in August of 2002, not October of 2002. While misstating a date is not ordinarily a basis for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, absent the incorrect date, the prosecutor's argument becomes implausible. Since the child with whom Frye was pregnant at the time of Anthony's murder was born in July of 2003, it is not reasonable to infer that Anthony was the father of the child or that Frye thought Anthony was the child's father. This portion of the prosecutor's closing argument was error, and, in light of Porter, the error was plain. While this portion of the argument constituted plain error, there is no reasonable likelihood that the error had a significant effect on the jury's verdict. The impact of improper speculation was lessened because the prosecutor emphasized that no one knew the actual motive. In light of this qualification of the improper statements, the jury's acquittal of Young of premeditated murder, and the fact that the jury was instructed that the arguments of the attorneys were not evidence, the error was not prejudicial.