Opinion ID: 1718369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the Industrial Commissioner's Award of Permanent Partial Disability Benefits Supported by Substantial Evidence?

Text: We now consider the employer's alternative argument that the industrial commissioner's finding of a twenty-percent industrial disability is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. As noted earlier, the industrial commissioner's findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. See Sioson, 529 N.W.2d at 262. In viewing the record, we consider only evidence favorable to the [agency's] findings, whether or not contradicted. Second Injury Fund v. Hodgins, 461 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1990). Here, the evidence shows that Conley was a thirty-four year old high school graduate whose employment had historically been in the areas of construction and maintenance. The record also reveals that these jobs generally require lifting, bending, and twisting of a repetitive nature. It was undisputed that Conley's back injury resulted in a functional impairment of seven to eight percent. The agency's finding that Conley was subject to permanent restrictions on the type of jobs he could perform was supported by expert testimony that Conley should not lift more than fifty pounds and should not engage in frequent bending or twisting. Although Conley was earning a slightly higher rate of pay after his injury than he was earning at the time of his injury, there was also evidence that his earnings would be substantially higher if he could have performed the jobs from which he was disqualified by his medical restrictions. With respect to the evidence of potential earnings in other positions, Cargill complains that Conley was allowed to testify, over Cargill's hearsay objection, to what other employees were earning in other jobs at the plant. Cargill does not assign the admission of this evidence as error on appeal; it only asks that we not consider Conley's testimony in judging the sufficiency of the evidence. Initially, we note that [s]trict rules of evidence are not to be applied in proceedings before the industrial commissioner. Morrison v. Century Eng'g, 434 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Iowa 1989). Additionally, the hearsay information to which Conley testified was certainly within the knowledge of Cargill, Cargill being the entity paying the workers in question. Therefore, witnesses and documents to impeach Conley's testimony were readily available to Cargill and could have been submitted in evidence. See generally Hamer v. Iowa Civ. Rights Comm'n, 472 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Iowa 1991) (When relevant evidence is within the control of a party whose interest is affected, a court may infer that the evidence, if not produced, would be unfavorable to that party.). Under these circumstances, we think it is appropriate to consider Conley's testimony in assessing the evidence. Cargill also argues that Conley's job restrictions resulted not from his inability to do the jobs, but from an agreement between Conley and Cargill that predated Conley's third back injury. This purported agreement was evidenced by an internal Cargill memo prepared after the settlement of Conley's grievance that arose after his second back injury. In this memo, Cargill states that Conley could return to his previous job, but that if he sustained another back injury, Cargill may place [him] on a medically restricted job. This memo was not signed by Conley and Conley disputed that he had agreed to job restrictions at Cargill's discretion should he suffer a third back injury. The deputy did not mention this agreement in his findings. Therefore, consistent with our rule that we interpret the agency's findings broadly so as to support its decision, see Hodgins, 461 N.W.2d at 455, we conclude that the agency did not find that Conley had voluntarily agreed to these restrictions. Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that Conley did not agree to future job limitations, we disregard this argument in assessing the evidentiary support for the agency's decision. We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner's decision that Conley had a twenty-percent industrial disability. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court that reversed the commissioner's award of permanent partial disability benefits and remand to the court for entry of an order affirming the commissioner's decision. REVERSED AND REMANDED. McGIVERIN, S.J., [] participates in place of NEUMAN, J., who takes no part.