Opinion ID: 732155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reweighing of the Cocaine

Text: Smith alleges that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to continue sentencing to allow for a reweighing of the cocaine with a defense expert present. We review the district court's decision to deny the motion under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1323 (1995) (providing standard of review). A district court must balance a number of factors in ruling on a motion for a continuance: 1) whether the continuance would inconvenience the witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; 2) whether other continuances have been granted; 3) whether legitimate reasons exist for the delay; 4) whether the delay is the defendant's fault; and, 5) whether a denial would prejudice the defendant. United States v. Fowlie, 24 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 742 (1995). Here, the court gave Smith's expert almost four months to attend a reweighing. On March 23, the court ordered the prosecution to reweigh the cocaine. On April 25, it ordered the prosecution to give defense counsel notice of the time and place for the reweighing. On June 18, the court continued sentencing to give Smith's expert an additional opportunity. Although the prosecution apparently complied with these orders, the expert did not observe a reweighing. Smith fails to offer a legitimate excuse for this failure. Although the DEA scheduled two reweighings, miscommunication between Smith's attorney and his expert prevented them from attending either one. The defendant is also unable to present concrete evidence of prejudice. He fails to dispute the DEA chemist's testimony that the weighings were conducted properly. In addition, the chemist testified that the highest weighing, conducted in August, 1989, was the most accurate because impurities in cocaine evaporate over time. Smith elicited no testimony, nor presented any evidence to illustrate that the court erred by accepting the DEA's determination of the weight. While determining the exact weight is clearly important, Smith presented no tangible evidence of actual prejudice. It is preferable to allow a defendant to insure that the government accurately conducts measurements, but we cannot disturb a district court's ruling absent a concrete demonstration of prejudice. See Gonzalez-Rincon, 36 F.3d at 865. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.