Opinion ID: 2308137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Neither are we persuaded by Mr. Ortiz's contention on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for second-degree child sexual abuse. In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987). This court may reverse the trial court's denial of such a motion only by finding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is such that no reasonable juror could fairly find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Howard v. United States, 656 A.2d 1106, 1110 (D.C. 1995). The government's evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that Mr. Ortiz engaged in second-degree child sexual abuse. D.C.Code §§ 22-3001, -3009. Second-degree child sexual abuse has four elements: (1) the victim was under 16 years of age; (2) the defendant was more than four years older than the victim; (3) the defendant engaged in sexual contact; and (4) the defendant intended by that sexual contact to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of himself or the victim. D.C.Code §§ 22-3001(3), (9), -3009. In this case, the first two age-related elements were supported by C.E.'s testimony that she was 11-years-old at the time of the incident and the parties' stipulation that Mr. Ortiz was 33-years-old  more than four years older than C.E.  at the time of the incident. The third element of sexual contact, which is defined as the touching with any clothed or unclothed body part or any object, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person, was established by C.E.'s testimony that Mr. Ortiz pushed his private part against her bottom and that he moved himself from side to side, well, forward and backward against her. D.C.Code § 22-3001(9). When asked repeatedly by the government what she felt rubbing against her buttocks, C.E. testified that it was Mr. Ortiz's genitals and not the zipper on his pants. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could infer that this touching of Mr. Ortiz's clothed genitalia and inner thigh region with C.E.'s buttocks met the definition of sexual contact under D.C.Code § 22-3001(9). The fourth element of intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire was supported by Mr. Ortiz's actions. Langley v. United States, 515 A.2d 729, 732 (D.C.1986) (intent may be inferred from totality of circumstances). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could infer that Mr. Ortiz's actions in asking C.E. a variety of intimate questions prior to taking her to a more secluded location where he kissed her and gyrated his genitalia against her buttocks was evidence of his intent to either arouse or gratify himself in some way. See Harkins v. United States, 810 A.2d 895, 901 (D.C.2002) (sufficient evidence of intent in misdemeanor sexual abuse case when appellant rubbed his leg and hand against victim's thigh and buttock, followed her as she moved seats repeatedly on train despite her protestations, called her baby, and asked her to call him). Affirmed.