Opinion ID: 2291324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Circuit Court's Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and decide a case. Missouri circuit courts have subject matter jurisdiction over criminal cases under article V, section 14 of the Missouri Constitution. J.C.W. ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249, 253 n. 6 (2009). But no state, including Missouri, can grant subject matter jurisdiction to its courts to hear matters that federal law places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. The United States purchased the Neosho post office in 1933 and continuously has owned it since then. Under Article I, section 8, clause 17 of the United States Constitution, the United States gains exclusive authority over the land if that jurisdiction is ceded by the state; this provision grants to the federal government: To exercise exclusive Legislation [i.e., jurisdiction] in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings. By enacting section 12.010, RSMo 2000, [2] the state of Missouri consented to the federal government's purchase of the land to establish and maintain a post office in Neosho. Section 12.020, RSMo 2000, [3] granted and ceded jurisdiction over that land to the United States, reserving to the state the right to serve process but not to prosecute crimes committed on the property. Missouri does not have jurisdiction over land or a building that is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. As James Madison explained in The Federalist No. 43, Article I, section 8, clause 17, in addition to providing for purchase of land for the seat of government, also explicitly provided for other land to be purchased for federal purposes for needful buildings and that the state in which the land was located had to agree by cession of the land. The necessity for federal jurisdiction of such land and buildings, Madison said, is not less evident than the need for federal control of the seat of government. The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State, he said. The federal-state, or federalist, principle is preserved by the need for the state's agreement. All objections and scruples are here also obviated by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every such establishment. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). Article I, section 8, clause 17 has since been interpreted by state and federal courts in the manner envisioned by Madison. The United States Supreme Court has noted that a state must cede jurisdiction to the United States for the state no longer to have jurisdiction; it is not enough for the United States simply to purchase land within the state. The consent of the states to the purchase of lands within them for the special purposes named, is, however, essential, under the constitution, to the transfer to the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion, the Court said in Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 531, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264 (1885). Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. Id. (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has held a state's cession of jurisdiction does not have to be absolute. See, e.g., Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) ([T]he state undoubtedly may cede her jurisdiction to the United States and may make the cession either absolute or qualified as to her may appear desirable, provided the qualification is consistent with the purposes for which the reservation is maintained and is accepted by the United States. And, where such a cession is made and accepted, it will be determinative of the jurisdiction of both the United States and the state within the reservation.). When the United States acquires title to lands, which are purchased by the consent of the legislature within which they are situated, ... the Federal jurisdiction is exclusive of all State authority. United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 143, 50 S.Ct. 284, 74 L.Ed. 761 (1930) (emphasis added). [T]he state may impose conditions which are not inconsistent with the carrying out of the purpose of the acquisition. Id. Under section 12.020, the state retained only the right to serve civil and criminal processes within the land. United States v. Heard, 270 F.Supp. 198, 200 (W.D.Mo.1967). The United States, therefore, has exclusive jurisdiction for all crimes occurring on the Neosho post office's land. [4] See 21 Am. Jur.2d section 445: Offenses committed within state on land owned by federal government (citing state as well as federal cases, e.g., State v. Mack, 23 Nev. 359, 47 P. 763 (Nev.1897) (holding that the state had no jurisdiction to prosecute crimes where the United States had exclusive jurisdiction); People v. Mouse, 203 Cal. 782, 265 P. 944 (Ca.1928) (same)). The Federalist No. 43 and these cases make it clear that the state of Missouri could have chosen not to cede criminal jurisdiction to the United States. If the state had not done so, the state of Missouri could prosecute Laughlin for burglary and property damage just as if he had committed his crimes on any other property in the state. See Lowe, 114 U.S. at 531, 5 S.Ct. 995. By enacting section 12.020, however, the state chose to give exclusive federal jurisdiction over the Neosho post office, reserving only the right to serve civil and criminal process. See Heard, 270 F.Supp. at 200. No reservation was made for crimes occurring on the land. Therefore, the state of Missouri had no jurisdiction to prosecute Laughlin in this case. The state argues that it has jurisdiction over Laughlin because his mens rea to commit his crimes was formed before he stepped onto the Neosho post office's land and because the results of his crime affected events in the state of Missouri. Section 541.191.1, RSMo Supp.1993, provides: This state has jurisdiction over an offense that a person commits by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which such person is legally accountable if: (1) Conduct constituting any element of the offense or a result of such conduct occurs within this state.... The state asserts that Laughlin's possession of the instrumentalities of his crime a scanner set to the Neosho police frequency, a flashlight, a crowbar, a pipe wrench, screwdrivers, a hammer and a metal punchshows that he formed the knowingly element of burglary and property damage while in the state of Missouri. But the statute requires  conduct constituting any element of the offense, and a defendant's mens rea is not conduct, nor is possession of the instrumentalities of his crime an element of the offense. The state also notes that Laughlin's crimes resulted in the local police being summoned to the post office to arrest Laughlin and that the burglary would have affected the state of Missouri. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, no state can enact a law that infringes on the supremacy of the federal government. [5] In this case, the federal government has been given exclusive jurisdiction over the land of the Neosho post office. This jurisdiction extends to all crimes committed on such land. The state's reading of section 541.191.1 as allowing the state of Missouri to prosecute Laughlinsimply because he may have acquired the instrumentalities of his alleged acts while in Missouri and formed the knowingly mens rea to violate the law while in Missouri or because Laughlin's actions affected the state of Missouri in some wayusurps the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction of the post office's land. [6] A Missouri statute cannot grant subject matter jurisdiction to its courts for cases that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. The circuit court had no jurisdiction to try Laughlin for these crimes.