Opinion ID: 165413
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Conviction Determination

Text: For the first time on appeal, Mr. Warren raises a due process claim concerning the criminal history category applied to his sentence. He suggests the district court erred in applying a higher criminal history category than the ones tentatively set out in the plea agreement, and then failing to sua sponte give him the option of withdrawing his plea. Both attorneys and the court have a duty to apprise a defendant of the consequences of a guilty plea and ensure it is voluntary. See United States v. Williams, 919 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1990). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c), the court must “advise the defendant of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for the crime committed and that the guidelines will govern sentencing.” Id. “When the court accepts a guilty plea, it may expressly retain the power to determine relevant facts bearing on sentencing under the Guidelines, notwithstanding the parties’ stipulations of facts.” Id. “If neither the -5- plea agreement nor the court has guaranteed the defendant that the plea agreement stipulations are binding, a defendant cannot claim undue surprise or that the plea is rendered involuntary when the court exercises this power.” Id. Thus, a district court is not bound by inaccurate or tentative stipulations contained in a plea agreement, because “an erroneous sentencing estimate does not render a plea involuntary.” See United States v. Reyes Pena, 216 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 973 (2000). In this case, it was not error for the district court to exercise its power in determining the applicable criminal convictions for the purpose of calculating a correct criminal history category, given 1) the “tentative” criminal category stipulations in the plea agreement; 2) the district court’s explanations; and 3) Mr. Warren’s stated understanding that the maximum penalty for his offense included a possible forty-year imprisonment, and that his sentence would depend in large part on his criminal history as determined by a probation officer because an uncertainty existed as to the applicable criminal category. In addition, under the circumstances presented, we cannot say the district court erred by not sua sponte initiating a withdrawal of plea proceeding. A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but rather -6- bears the burden of demonstrating a “fair and just reason” for the withdrawal of the plea. See United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 2000). Given Mr. Warren gave no reason for withdrawing the plea and no reason is apparent from the district court proceedings, as previously discussed, we reject Mr. Warren’s contention the district court somehow erred in not sua sponte providing him an opportunity to withdraw his plea.