Opinion ID: 1925518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Right to Select His Own Attorney

Text: It appears from the record that on December 5, 2001, five days before the trial began, defendant sought to discharge his court-appointed attorney. His pretrial motion to remove his counsel was denied. When the case was reached for trial on December 10, 2001, defendant pressed a similar motion, which was held to be moot because the previous denial was the law of the case. Then, after a jury panel had entered the courtroom, defendant's counsel advised the trial justice at a sidebar conference that members of defendant's family had informed him that they had retained private counsel, and that he had been fired as defendant's attorney. The trial justice then excused the jury and asked defendant whether he was prepared to proceed pro se. Mr. Snell responded that he did not wish to represent himself, but alleged that his current counsel was ineffective. The trial justice noted that defendant had an opportunity to obtain new counsel since his motion was denied on December 5 and that the private attorney his family purportedly engaged was not present in the courtroom. He then rejected this 11th hour request, you can call it, I guess the 12th hour, because the jury walked in the room, and said, [t]here is no doubt in this Court's mind, Mr. Snell, all of this is to obtain a continuance of the trial in this matter. Although defendant insisted that he was not seeking a continuance, we conclude otherwise. He clearly stated that he did not wish to represent himself, yet no private counsel was prepared to proceed on his behalf when he made the request. [4] Moreover, it seems clear from the transcript that defendant was primarily concerned that he was not ready for trial. At one point he said, I'm not asking for a continuance. What I am asking for is knowledge to know if this was put in for a speedy trial. Therefore, we will treat this as the denial of a request for a continuance to secure alternative counsel, just as the trial justice did. See State v. Burke, 811 A.2d 1158, 1163 (R.I.2002) (holding that although the defendant made neither a motion to substitute counsel nor for a continuance, we would treat the case as if such motions had been made because it was clear from the trial justice's ruling that such motions would have been denied). It is well settled that the decision whether to grant a defendant's request for a continuance to secure alternative counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Ashness, 461 A.2d 659, 663 (R.I.1983). In exercising that discretion, the trial justice must weigh the interest of the defendant in securing counsel of his choice against the interest of the public in an efficient and effective judicial system. Id. at 663-64. Whether the trial justice's denial was so arbitrary as to constitute a violation of due process depends upon the particular circumstances of each case and the reason asserted for the request. Id. at 664. Some of the factors to be weighed in the balance include the promptness of the continuance motion and the length of time requested; the age and intricacy of the case; the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, jurors, counsel, and the court; whether the request appears to be legitimate or merely contrived foot dragging; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request; whether the defendant in fact has other competent and prepared trial counsel ready to pinch-hit; whether there are multiple codefendants, making calendar control more difficult than usual; and any other relevant factor made manifest by the record. State v. Moran, 699 A.2d 20, 26 (R.I. 1997). Although we have recognized that a criminal defendant has the right to obtain counsel of his or her choice, State v. Dias, 118 R.I. 499, 502, 374 A.2d 1028, 1029 (1977), [j]udges must be vigilant that requests for appointment of a new attorney on the eve of trial should not become a vehicle for delay. State v. Monteiro, 108 R.I. 569, 576, 277 A.2d 739, 743 (1971). Accordingly, it has been said that [a]n accused's right to choose his own counsel cannot be manipulated to delay proceedings or hamper the prosecution. United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (1st Cir.1987). Consequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that [w]hen a defendant attempts to substitute counsel at the eleventh hour or in mid-trial, he must show good cause such as a conflict of interest, a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable dispute with his attorney. Id. This Court similarly has stated that to work a delay by a last minute discharge of counsel, there must exist exceptional circumstances   . Monteiro, 108 R.I. at 575, 277 A.2d at 742. In the present case, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in deciding that, although defendant had a right to his counsel of choice, he had no right to obtain a continuance for that reason. Applying the above-listed factors from Moran, we are persuaded that the trial justice did not act arbitrarily when he denied Mr. Snell's motions for appointment of counsel and refused his attempts to discharge his court-appointed lawyer. The trial justice was indeed warranted in his assessment that this was simply a last-minute attempt to delay the trial. The case had been ready for trial since November 19, 2001, and had been assigned to a specific trial date for at least five days. The state was ready to proceed and noted the inconvenience and emotional turmoil that a continuance would have caused its witnesses. The new private attorney Mr. Snell wished to procure was not present in the courtroom and had not entered an appearance on his behalf. Also, defendant's main concern once his motion for new counsel was denied was whether a motion for a speedy trial had been filed on his behalf, because he alleged he was not ready to proceed. These circumstances, taken together, indicate that the present case is one in which the purported interest of the defendant in securing counsel of his choice was outweighed by the interest of the public in an efficient and effective judicial system. See Ashness, 461 A.2d at 663-64. No exceptional circumstances were present to constitute good cause for Mr. Snell to discharge his lawyer, and we agree with the trial justice that his 11th hour request to obtain new counsel when the jury was already entering the courtroom was nothing but a last-ditch attempt to delay his trial. Therefore, we hold that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's attempt to secure new counsel, and we will not overturn the convictions on that ground.