Opinion ID: 2966293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Live Case or Controversy

Text: The Ministry contends that this appeal is moot because the Cargo has been discharged in Israel, making possession of the oil impossible. “[A] federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). “[A]n appeal must be dismissed when an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party.” Motient Corp. v. Dondero, 529 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). “A claim becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Neither we nor the 5 Case: 15-40062 Document: 00513201789 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 No. 15-40062 district court has the power to grant the Ministry’s requested relief, possession of the Cargo. Accordingly, this appeal is now moot. See In re Nat’l Mass Media Telecomm. Sys., Inc., 152 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of appeal as moot where property at issue was sold to a nonparty and only relief plaintiff had demanded was return of the property). The KRG argues that the appeal is not moot because the Ministry’s complaint seeks relief beyond mere possession of the Cargo and those other requests present an ongoing case or controversy. “Where several forms of relief are requested and one of these requests subsequently becomes moot, the Court has still considered the remaining requests.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 n.8 (1969). First, the KRG contends that the Ministry requested a declaratory judgment when it asked the court to (1) “declare[] [the Ministry] the owner of the Cargo and that title be awarded” to it and (2) “order, adjudge and decree that [the Ministry has] a decree against [the KRG] and John Doe Buyer” for its claims. The KRG suggests that these requests preserve a “definite and concrete” controversy that we could resolve. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (applying the Article III standing analysis to the “actual controversy” requirement found in the Declaratory Judgment Act); Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993) (holding appeal was not moot where sole issue remaining was request for declaratory relief). The Ministry responds that it did not request a declaratory judgment, but instead requested to be declared the owner of the Cargo because that is a predicate to obtaining permanent possession of the Cargo pursuant to maritime law. See Gulf Coast Shell & Aggregate LP v. Newlin, 623 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2010) (“[A] party seeking possession of a vessel under [Admiralty] Rule D must have legal title or a legal claim to possession.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goodpasture, Inc. v. M/V Pollux, 602 F.2d 84, 87 (5th Cir. 6 Case: 15-40062 Document: 00513201789 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 No. 15-40062 1979) (ruling that maritime suit for conversion of cargo turns on establishing ownership of the subject cargo). The Ministry’s operative complaint makes clear that this is fundamentally a suit for possession of the Cargo. Nowhere in the complaint did the Ministry explicitly seek a declaratory judgment. Instead, the Ministry’s request to be “declared” owner of the Cargo is best understood as an attempt to satisfy the requirements for obtaining full possession of the Cargo under admiralty law. See Gulf Coast Shell, 623 F.3d at 239; cf. Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir. 2002) (refusing to treat earlier court decision as a declaratory judgment where plaintiff had not “filed what was clearly a declaratory judgment action”). We will not ascribe to the Ministry a request for relief that does not appear in its complaint and which the Ministry explicitly disclaims. We thus conclude that the Ministry did not seek a declaratory judgment. 4 Second, the KRG argues that because the Ministry requested “interest and costs” against the KRG and John Doe Buyer, a live controversy remains. As a general matter, an outstanding request for interest may prevent a dispute from becoming moot. See Templin v. Independence Blue Cross, 487 F. App’x 6, 11 (3d Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“Dismissal of the claims as moot without considering the plaintiffs’ entitlement to interest was error.”); Tucson Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 971, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (ruling that appellants’ interest claims were moot only if the underlying reimbursement claims were moot at the time they were filed); 13C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3533.3 (3d ed. 2008) (“[M]ootness is avoided by demands 4 The Ministry’s redundant request that the court “order, adjudge and decree” that the Ministry has a “decree” against the KRG relates to the Ministry’s requests for possession of the Cargo, which is no longer available. 7 Case: 15-40062 Document: 00513201789 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 No. 15-40062 for . . . interest.”). But this appeal does not present an ordinary request for prejudgment interest. “[T]he purpose of prejudgment interest is to put a plaintiff in the position he would have been in had he had his trial and recovered his judgment immediately after his injury.” Carlton v. H. C. Price Co., 640 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 335 (1988) (“Prejudgment interest is normally designed to make the plaintiff whole and is part of the actual damages sought to be recovered.”). Here, the Ministry does not seek money damages and cannot obtain possession of the Cargo, so prejudgment interest is not available. The KRG cites no case, and we have uncovered none ourselves, wherein prejudgment interest has been awarded where a plaintiff did not seek monetary damages. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (in a suit to enforce a maritime lien against a foreign state, a decree “may include costs of the suit and, if the decree is for a money judgment, interest as ordered by the court.” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (“Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court.” (emphasis added)); West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 n.2 (1987) (“Prejudgment interest serves to compensate for the loss of use of money due as damages . . . .” (emphasis added)). Since the Ministry does not seek money damages, the district court likely could not award interest. Even if we assume, arguendo, that interest is theoretically available in a suit for possession of tangible goods, an award of interest would be inappropriate here, since the Ministry never obtained possession of the subject goods. Given that “[t]he essential rationale for awarding prejudgment interest is to ensure that an injured party is fully compensated for its loss,” City of Milwaukee v. Cement Division, National Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 195 (1995), an award of interest cannot serve its purpose standing alone. It would thus be inappropriate to award interest in a suit for possession of tangible goods where such possession has become 8 Case: 15-40062 Document: 00513201789 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 No. 15-40062 impossible. See id. Because the Ministry has not requested money damages and cannot obtain possession of the Cargo, the Ministry’s demand for interest does not rescue this appeal from mootness. Additionally, neither the Ministry’s request for court costs nor the court’s continuing power to award costs averts mootness as to the merits of the case. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20-22 (1994) (concluding that no statute could authorize federal court to decide legal question posed in absence of Article III case or controversy . . . “[b]ut reason and authority refute the quite different notion that a federal appellate court may not take any action with regard to a piece of litigation once it has been determined that the requirements of Article III no longer are (or indeed never were) met”; noting that, in cases that have become moot, courts nonetheless have power to award costs and enter dismissal, and holding that they have power to vacate judgments entered by lower courts); see also, Heitmuller v. Stokes, 256 U.S. 359, 362-363 (1921) (“Where no controversy remains, except as to costs, this court will not pass upon the merits.” (citing In re Paper-Bag Cases, 105 U.S. 766, 772 (1881)). Third, the KRG asserts that the Ministry did, in fact, request money damages for the allegedly converted oil, because the operative complaint asked for “such other and further relief that [the] Court deems just and proper.” However, the Ministry did not explicitly request damages in its complaint, the district court did not suggest that the Ministry sought damages, and the Supreme Court has cautioned courts to approach with skepticism claims for damages “extracted late in the day from [a] general prayer for relief and asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) (discussing eleventh-hour allegation that nominal damages were requested); see also Fox v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[W]e perceive no basis to 9 Case: 15-40062 Document: 00513201789 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 No. 15-40062 allow a belated claim for damages to breathe life into a moribund dispute.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, undesired damages should not be “foisted upon the parties by the court.” Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 176 n.3 (5th Cir. 1975). Since the Ministry never explicitly requested damages and now disavows any such request, we will not foist it upon the Ministry. Last, the KRG makes a number of still less persuasive arguments against mootness. The KRG suggests the appeal is not moot because the district court ordered the KRG to provide ten days’ notice of any additional oil sales in the Southern District of Texas, but that was merely a condition of the court’s stay pending appeal, not a remedy for the alleged harm. The KRG further contends that this appeal is not moot because it has stated an intention to ship more oil for sale in the United States, but hypothetical future shipments do not prevent the dispute regarding the Cargo at issue here from being moot. See Staley v. Harris Cnty., 485 F.3d 305, 307-09 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that suit over display of monument featuring the Bible at a county courthouse was mooted by removal of the monument during renovations, and that any dispute over a probable redisplay was not ripe for review because the precise manner in which the monument would be redisplayed was unknown). We conclude that because the KRG has made possession of the Cargo impossible, and because the Ministry requested no other available relief, we must dismiss this appeal as moot. See Thibaut v. Ourso, 705 F.2d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f, pending an appeal an event occurs which renders it impossible for [an] appellate court to grant any relief or renders the decision unnecessary, the appeal will be dismissed as moot.” (quoting NLRB v. O.E. Szekely & Assocs., Inc., 259 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1958), which referred to and approved the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Fink v. Cont’l Foundry & Mach. Co., 240 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1957))). 10 Case: 15-40062 Document: 00513201789 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/21/2015 No. 15-40062