Opinion ID: 2301936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Defendant's Challenge to the Eyewitness Identification

Text: The defendant attacks the reliability of eyewitness identifications in general and the eyewitness identification of defendant by Jessica in particular. He contends that Jessica's testimony was clearly unreliable due to her age, the brevity of the incident in her bedroom, the fact that she had just awakened from her sleep at the time of the incident, and the passage of over three weeks time between the May 30 incident and Jessica's identification of defendant's photograph at the Pawtucket police station. The defendant further argues that the hearing justice placed too much reliance on Jessica's identification despite what defendant characterizes as Jessica's uncertainties, and the escalating, non-verbal allegations. [12] The defendant states as his bottom line that, although Jessica's identification may have been confident, confidence is by no means tantamount to accuracy of recollection   . We note that defendant attacks the reliability both of Jessica's testimony and her identification; however, defendant does not contend that the identification procedure utilized in identifying him was suggestive and therefore of questionable constitutional validity. Hence, we need not evaluate the reliability of that identification procedure from a constitutional perspective. See Perry v. New Hampshire, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S.Ct. 716, 730, 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012) ([W]e hold that the Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.). With respect to the relationship between reliability and credibility, we have stated as follows: [A] trial justice must exercise [his or] her independent judgment in evaluating the reliability of [a] witness[]. [A] trial justice must also determine to what extent reliability affects the witnesses' credibility and what weight should be given to [his or her] testimony. State v. Luanglath, 749 A.2d 1, 6 (R.I.2000) (discussing, in the course of reviewing the denial of a motion for a new trial, the relationship between credibility and reliability). Furthermore, we are mindful that [w]e do not have the same vantage point as the presiding judge, and we are unable to assess the witness' demeanor, tone of voice, and body language. Our perspective is limited to analyzing words printed on a black and white record. State v. Woods, 936 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I.2007) (so stating in the context of a hearing justice's conclusions with respect to the credibility of a complaining child-witness). Therefore, we give considerable deference to the reliability and credibility determinations made by the trial justice at a probation violation hearing. See Jones, 969 A.2d at 679 ([T]his Court will not second-guess' supportable credibility assessments of a hearing justice in a probation-revocation hearing. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, this Court has noted that: When a probation-violation inquiry turns on a determination of credibility,    and the hearing justice, after considering all the evidence, accepts one version of events for plausible reasons stated and rationally rejects another version, we can safely conclude that the hearing justice did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in finding that a probation violation ha[d] occurred. State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I.1998); see also Shepard, 33 A.3d at 164; State v. Gauthier, 15 A.3d 1004, 1008 (R.I.2011). We have also on more than one occasion acknowledged that the presence of some inconsistencies between or among utterances of a witness or witnesses at different points in time does not ipso facto render the testimony unworthy of belief. See, e.g., State v. Rosario, 35 A.3d 938, 948-49 (R.I.2012); Shepard, 33 A.3d at 164; State v. Cerda, 957 A.2d 382, 386 (R.I.2008). After considering defendant's contentions, we remain convinced that the hearing justice in this case appropriately evaluated Jessica's testimony. The hearing justice noted that there were some inconsistencies in Jessica's testimony, yet he nevertheless credited her eyewitness identifications of defendant, particularly noting her forthrightness in making these identifications. Given the deference we accord to a hearing justice's determinations as to credibility and reliability and, taking into account the laudably meticulous manner in which the hearing justice in this case addressed the credibility and reliability issues and, after having conducted a thorough review of the record and especially the testimony of young Jessica, we see no basis for concluding that the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in crediting her testimony.