Opinion ID: 1335912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: pretrial/jury selection

Text: In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), by informing the jury venire that the trial court was seeking jurors with no predisposition concerning the case. The defendant argues that Witherspoon and Wainwright allow jurors to carry into the jury room all manner and variety of personal beliefs so long as those beliefs do not prevent or substantially impair any juror's ability to follow the law. After careful review, we conclude that the trial court's statement to the jury was an accurate statement of the law. Contrary to the defendant's argument, a juror who is predisposed with regard to the law or the evidence is not competent to serve on the jury. See State v. Leonard, 296 N.C. 58, 63, 248 S.E.2d 853, 856 (1978). Furthermore, the defendant failed to object at any point to the trial court's instruction. Therefore, the proper standard of review is for plain error. Plain error is a `fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done,' or `where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused.' State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 103 S.Ct. 381, 74 L.Ed.2d 513 (1982)). The defendant points out in his brief, [p]rejudice from this error is difficult if not impossible to establish. This falls far short of a fundamental error. Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court's instruction was improper, the instruction was not so prejudicial as to amount to plain error. This assignment of error is overruled. In his next assignment of error, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for individual voir dire without affording him the opportunity to present evidence or argument in support of his motion. Prior to jury selection, the following exchange between defense counsel and the trial court took place: MR. HARRELL: We have filed a motion in this matter, Your Honor, for individual examination of jurors.... COURT: Denied. MR. HARRELL: ... and so that we don't waive that we want to bring it up at this time. COURT: Denied. The defendant asserts that this summary denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion thereby entitling him to a new trial. In a capital case, the trial court may direct that jurors be selected individually if the moving party shows good cause for the individual voir dire. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(j) (1988). No party has a right to individual voir dire, and the decision whether to grant individual voir dire rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Short, 322 N.C. 783, 788, 370 S.E.2d 351, 354 (1988). Although the court's treatment of defendant's motion appears somewhat abrupt, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider the motion on its merits. The record indicates that the defendant filed his motion for individual voir dire several weeks before trial. In it, defendant raises as his only grounds for individual voir dire the conclusory allegation that the defendant believes individual voir dire is required in order to receive a fair trial. The defendant's motion does not set forth any grounds upon which the trial court could have found that there was good cause to grant his motion. Further, the trial court would not have abused its discretion even had the defendant's motion included more than the unsubstantiated allegation that individual voir dire was required in order to receive a fair trial. The practice of hearing oral argument on a motion is not mandated by statute. The mere refusal by the trial court to receive supportive oral argument, by itself, does not demonstrate substantive reversible error in the denials of discretionary motions. See State v. Smith , 305 N.C. 691, 699-700, 292 S.E.2d 264, 270, cert. denied , 459 U.S. 1056, 103 S.Ct. 474, 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982). This assignment of error is overruled. The defendant next contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State's challenge for cause as to prospective juror Virginia Batts. In Witherspoon v. Illinois , the Supreme Court held that a prospective juror may not be excused for cause simply because he voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. 391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d at 785. However, a prospective juror may be excused for cause if his views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852, 83 L.Ed.2d at 851-52. Further, prospective jurors may be properly excused if they are unable to  `state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.'  State v. Brogden, 334 N.C. 39, 43, 430 S.E.2d 905, 907-08 (1993) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137, 149-50 (1986)). When initially questioned by the trial court in the case sub judice, Ms. Batts stated that she was opposed to capital punishment and could not, under any circumstances, vote to impose the death penalty. When asked if she could think of any set of facts that would warrant the imposition of the death penalty, Ms. Batts answered, I cannot vote for capital punishment. Ms. Batts further stated to the trial court that she was absolutely unable to consider the death penalty and that she was unequivocally opposed to the death penalty. During examination by defense counsel, however, Ms. Batts indicated that she could set aside her beliefs and render a verdict that would require the imposition of the death penalty. During questioning by the State, Ms. Batts stated that she could not impose the death penalty unless it was mandated. Finally, when asked by the trial court if there were any circumstances under which she could return a verdict requiring the trial court to impose the death sentence, Ms. Batts replied, No sir. Prospective juror Batts was then excused for cause. Notwithstanding her indications to defense counsel, prospective juror Batts was never able to state clearly, through her responses in toto, her willingness to temporarily set aside her own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. This Court has recognized that a prospective juror's bias may not always be `provable with unmistakable clarity,'  and in such instances,  `reviewing courts must defer to the trial court's judgment concerning whether the prospective juror would be able to follow the law impartially.'  Brogden, 334 N.C. at 43, 430 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting State v. Davis, 325 N.C. 607, 624, 386 S.E.2d 418, 426 (1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 905, 110 S.Ct. 2587, 110 L.Ed.2d 268 (1990)). After a thorough review of the exchanges between the trial court, the prosecutor, counsel for the defendant and prospective juror Batts, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the views of prospective juror Batts would prevent or substantially impair her from performing her duties as a juror. Deferring to the trial court's judgment, we find no error in excusing, for cause, prospective juror Batts. This assignment of error is overruled. The defendant next contends that the trial court violated the defendant's constitutional rights during voir dire by (1) utilizing a jury selection information sheet, (2) sustaining the State's objections to several questions asked by defense counsel, and (3) failing to properly evaluate prospective jurors' responses for bias. The defendant first asserts that the trial court erred by utilizing a jury selection information sheet which failed to define for the prospective jurors the concept of mitigation. The defendant's argument is without merit. Prior to selection of a jury, the trial court is required to briefly introduce the case to the prospective jurors and in so doing to identify the parties and their counsel and inform the prospective jurors of the offense of which the defendant has been charged, the victim's name, the defendant's plea, and any affirmative defense relied on by the defendant. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1213 (1988). There is no requirement that the trial court define during this brief, general introduction any of the legal terms used or to be used during the voir dire process. After a thorough review of the jury selection information sheet and the trial court's accompanying remarks, we conclude that the trial court met its statutory obligation. The defendant next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining the State's objections to three of defendant's questions to prospective jurors during voir dire. The first two objections occurred during the questioning of a prospective juror who had indicated that he had utilized the services of a therapist. Defense counsel first asked the prospective juror if he had found the treatment of the therapist helpful. The State's objection to this question was properly sustained, as the question was not relevant. At issue was the prospective juror's ability to consider the testimony of a mental health expert, and not the prospective juror's evaluation of his own experience with a mental health expert. The defendant was then allowed to ask whether any prospective juror felt that he or she was as qualified as a psychiatrist in rendering opinions about human behavior. One prospective juror indicated that while she felt she was equally qualified to render an opinion as to some issues, she did not understand drug abuse. The following exchange then took place: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Crack cocaine abuse you wouldn't have that feeling, would you? JUROR: No, I wouldn't. [PROSECUTOR]: Objection. COURT: Well, sustained. The prospective juror had previously told defense counsel that she did not feel as qualified as a psychiatrist to form an opinion concerning drug abuse. Clearly, a prospective juror who states that he or she does not understand or know much about drug abuse in general will not be knowledgeable regarding the abuse of a specific drug. The defendant's question appeared argumentative and redundant, and therefore the State's objection was properly sustained. In any event, the defendant can show no prejudice, as the prospective juror answered the question, and the defendant received the benefit of the prospective juror's answer. The third objection occurred after defendant's counsel asked the prospective jurors: How many of you think that drug abuse is irrelevant to punishment in this case. This Court has repeatedly held that counsel may not use voir dire to stake-out a prospective juror or determine what kind of verdict a prospective juror would render given certain facts not yet in evidence. See State v. Davis, 340 N.C. 1, 23, 455 S.E.2d 627, 638, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 136, 133 L.Ed.2d 83 (1995); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 23, 446 S.E.2d 252, 264 (1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 953, 130 L.Ed.2d 895 (1995). The question asked by defendant was clearly an attempt to stake-out the prospective jurors on how they would react to evidence of the defendant's history of drug abuse and was unlikely to provide responses relevant to a prospective juror's qualification to serve. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the prosecutor's objection to this question. Finally, the defendant argues in support of his allegation that his constitutional rights were violated during voir dire that the trial court failed to properly evaluate the responses of four prospective jurors for bias prior to denying the defendant's challenges for cause. In order to preserve the right to assign error to a denial of a challenge for cause, counsel must have exhausted his peremptory challenges, must have renewed his challenge for cause as to each prospective juror whose previous challenge for cause had been denied, and must have had his renewed motion denied. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h) (1988). The defendant at no time sought to renew any of his previously denied challenges for cause. By failing to comply with the procedure made mandatory by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h), the defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review and is not entitled to relief. This assignment of error is overruled. In his next assignment of error, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to sequester the witnesses. A ruling on a motion to sequester witnesses is reviewable only upon a showing of abuse of discretion and will only be reversed upon a showing that the ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 380, 373 S.E.2d 518, 524 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 110 S.Ct. 1464, 108 L.Ed.2d 602 (1990). In the case sub judice, the defendant makes absolutely no showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court. Absent a substantive showing by defendant that the trial court failed to make a reasoned decision, we can find no error in the denial of defendant's motion. This assignment of error is overruled.