Opinion ID: 2220653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: dunning's public policy defense

Text: According to Dunning, the district court erred by disallowing her public policy defense based on Neb.Rev.Stat. § 59-801 (Reissue 1988): Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, within this state, is hereby declared to be illegal.... See, also, Stanford Motor Co. v. Westman, 151 Neb. 850, 39 N.W.2d 841 (1949); Swingle & Co. v. Reynolds, 140 Neb. 693, 1 N.W.2d 307 (1941). In her appellate brief, Dunning makes it clear that she is complaining about the district court's decision not to reexamine the enforceability of the noncompetition agreement. As noted, the Dunning-Tallman dissolution decree had become final before the trial on the allegation of Dunning's contempt. Because the dissolution decree contains a specific adjudication that all provisions of the property settlement were fair to the parties, prior judicial determination was res judicata in reference to reasonableness of the noncompetition provision. The doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any later litigation involving the same cause of action.... Res judicata is founded on a policy favoring termination of an action by preclusion or prevention of subsequent litigation on the same cause. NC + Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 228 Neb. 306, 310-11, 422 N.W.2d 542, 545 (1988). Accord, In re Estate of Watkins, 243 Neb. 583, 501 N.W.2d 292 (1993); Ballard v. Giltner Pub. Sch., 241 Neb. 970, 492 N.W.2d 855 (1992).