Opinion ID: 2117067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: coaching of witnesses

Text: In his second assignment of error, the defendant makes two separate allegations that the prosecution was allowed to coach witnesses. The first allegation claims that the juvenile witnesses were coached prior to the trial. G.O. and L.O., two male victims, and C.T., a female victim, all independently testified that they had been in the courtroom with attorneys prior to the trial and that at that time they had talked about their testimony and answered questions similar to those which were asked at trial. When specifically asked by the prosecutor at trial if they were told what to say while testifying, G.O. answered, You told me to tell the truth, and C.T. answered, No and I tell the truth. L.O. answered, On some of them youif I didn't remember, just say I didn't remember. All this indicates is that the prosecution prepared the children for trial in part by familiarizing them with the courtroom and with the trial process, a procedure encouraged by legal scholars. See Nancy W. Perry and Larry L. Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court Examination of Children: Practical Approaches for Attorneys, 18 Creighton L.Rev. 1369 (1985). There is nothing in this record to suggest that the attorneys who prepared the children directed or suggested to the children what they were to say other than to tell the truth while they were testifying. Osborn also argues that the trial court erred in granting a recess during C.T.'s direct examination so that the prosecutor could take C.T. aside and make her remember the right answer and to coach C.T. when she did not give the testimony that the prosecutor wanted. Osborn argues that the trial court erred in not dismissing the charges which were brought against the defendant based upon C.T.'s testimony. During C.T.'s direct examination, the following colloquy occurred: [Prosecutor:] [D]id he touch the outside or the inside of your vagina? [C.T.:] The outside. Q. Did he ever touch the inside of your vagina? A. No. Q. Do you rememberdid you ever talk to Deputy Stemper about this case? A. Yes. Q. Was that just this last summer? A. Yes. Q. Do you remember what you told him? [Defense counsel]: Object, hearsay. THE COURT: Overruled. [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, this witnessthe witness is repeating her own words. [Prosecutor:] Do you know what you told Deputy Stemper, do you remember? A. No. Q. Do you remember telling him [Defense counsel]: Wait a minute, Your Honor. I will object to that as leading, an attempt by the public prosecutor to testify. After a discussion at the bench, the prosecution requested and was granted permission to break with C.T.'s testimony, call another witness, and thereafter resume the direct examination of C.T. This was done without an objection by the defendant. C.T. then testified as follows: [Prosecutor:] [W]e just had a little recess and I talked to you in [the county attorney's] office, is that right? [C.T.:] Yes. Q. What did we talk about? A. Why I didn't say such and such. Q. Okay.... What happened in the bathroom when you went to visit Lawrence's house? A. He stuck his finger in my vagina. Q. Why didn't you say that before?... A. I forgot. C.T. testified on cross-examination that she also forgot when she told defendant's counsel prior to trial that the defendant had not digitally penetrated her. Later in the examination, C.T. stated that when she had spoken to the prosecutor during the recess in her testimony, he had not told her what to say, and he had told her she was to tell the truth. The order in which proof is introduced is to a large extent within the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling in that regard is no cause for reversal where the rights of the defendant are not shown to have been prejudiced. State v. Chaney, 184 Neb. 734, 171 N.W.2d 787 (1969). The general conduct of the trial rests within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Smith, 192 Neb. 794, 224 N.W.2d 537 (1974). The trial judge must meet situations as they arise and to do this must have broad power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in the adversary process. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). To this end, the judge may determine generally the order in which parties will adduce proof; his or her determination will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Id. The defense herein made no objection to the continuing direct examination of C.T. following the recess and therefore waived whatever objection the defendant may have had to the evidence so adduced. See Griffith v. Griffith, 230 Neb. 314, 431 N.W.2d 609 (1988). The defendant is precluded from a dismissal on the grounds that the witness may have been coached. The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that [t]he opposing counsel in the adversary system is not without weapons to cope with coached witnesses. A prosecutor may cross-examine a defendant as to the extent of any coaching during a recess, subject, of course, to the control of the court. Skillful cross-examination could develop a record which the prosecutor in closing argument might well exploit by raising questions as to the defendant's credibility, if it developed that defense counsel had in fact coached the witness as to how to respond on the remaining direct examination and on cross-examination. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. at 89-90, 96 S.Ct. at 1336. The Washington Court of Appeals, in a case strikingly similar to this case, found that the state was properly granted a short recess in a sexual assault prosecution to consult with the 67-year-old victim after she testified on direct examination that two sex acts took place but answered in the negative when asked about any other sex act, contrary to her pretrial statement. The court, relying upon Geders v. United States, supra , found that the defendant had the opportunity to attack the victim's credibility by cross-examining her as to the nature of the consultation with the state during the recess and the reasons for the change in her testimony. See State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wash.App. 514, 799 P.2d 736 (1990). The defendant herein had ample opportunity to cross-examine C.T. as to the nature of the talk she had with the prosecutor during the recess. There is no evidence here that the prosecution did anything other than review with C.T. the prior statements she had made. Finally, there is no validity to Osborn's argument that the statement C.T. made after the recess regarding the penetration should be discredited as a matter of law. We have found that when it is clear that a party as a witness, to meet the exigencies in pending litigation and without reasonable explanation, changes such witness' testimony and then testifies to facts materially different concerning a vital issue, the subsequent and altered testimony from such witness is discredited as a matter of law and should be disregarded. State v. Robertson, 223 Neb. 825, 394 N.W.2d 635 (1986). However, an inconsistent or contradictory statement by a witness who is not a party opponent is a factor which may affect a jury's evaluation of a witness' credibility or weight to be given such witness' testimony. Id. Clearly, C.T. is not a party in the litigation, and her testimony, therefore, should not be discredited as a matter of law. Osborn's second assignment of error is without merit.