Opinion ID: 2448503
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Hearing Committee properly granted summary judgment on Rice's failure to cooperate with the Bar's requests for information.

Text: Rice contends that the Hearing Committee's grant of summary judgment against him on the grounds of his failure to cooperate under Alaska Bar Rule 15(a)(4) was improper for three reasons: (1) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rice deliberately broke the CD he sent to the Bar; (2) when it became clear that the Hearing Committee was not going to rule on his motions for protective order or to quash the subpoena, Rice submitted the requested documents; and (3) Rice's motions to quash the Bar's subpoena and for protective order were pending at the time the Hearing Committee granted summary judgment. We find these arguments unconvincing. First, we observe that none of the Hearing Committee's conclusions rely upon disputed issues of fact. The language cited by Rice for this claim simply reflects what the record clearly shows: the CD did, in fact, arrive in an unusable state, and although Rice expressed his willingness to provide the information, he had not provided it by the time the Hearing Committee issued its order granting summary judgment in July 2009. The Hearing Committee did not find that Rice broke the CD. Its determination that Rice violated Bar Rule 15(a)(4) was based on Rice's continuing failure to provide the subpoenaed information after he learned from the October 1, 2008 petition for formal hearing that the CD had arrived brokenregardless of what caused it to break. It was never fully resolved how the CD broke, but this issue was not material to the Hearing Committee's decision and did not preclude entry of summary judgment. The fact that Rice eventually provided information requested by the Bar does not excuse his earlier delays, particularly given that the record suggests Rice never provided all of the requested information. For instance, although Rice's attorney argued before the Disciplinary Board that he supplied information to the Bar in satisfaction of the subpoena, he also acknowledged that the individual client ledgers requested in the subpoena had not been produced to the Bar, the Hearing Committee, or the Disciplinary Board. [9] Second, Rice argues that [b]ecause [he] supplied the very information on which the Hearing Committee found an ethical violation, the Hearing Committee order granting summary judgment on [his] failure to cooperate should be reversed. But this argument overlooks Rice's duty under Bar Rule 15(a)(4) and the subpoena to provide all the documentation requested by the Bar for its investigation. The fact that the information he did provide proved sufficient for the Bar to demonstrate trust accounting violations did not relieve him of his duty, nor does his partial and reluctant compliance constitute a mitigating factor. Finally, Rice's motion to quash the Bar's subpoena and motion for protective order did not explain his failure to cooperate with the Bar's investigation prior to filing those motions. The subpoena was issued in April 2008. The Bar received the broken CD on July 17, 2008. On October 1, the Bar filed its petition for formal hearing, stating that the CD had arrived broken. By the time the Bar moved for summary judgment on February 18, 2009, Rice had known for four and a half months that the CD had arrived broken, but he did not resubmit the requested information in order to comply with the subpoena. Rice then waited another three months before filing his motions to quash the subpoena and for protective order. (The Hearing Committee ultimately granted summary judgment on Bar Rule 15(a)(4) on July 2, 2009; it subsequently addressed Rice's motions at its August 3 hearing, when the Hearing Committee chair stated, At the moment, we're not going to quash anything and we'll maintain the current arrangement we have for maintaining confidentiality.) We hold that Rice's delay during this nearly eight-month period (October to May) was sufficient to constitute a violation of Bar Rule 15(a)(4) for failure to furnish information and respond to requests from Bar Counsel and the Hearing Committee. Rice's subsequently filed motions do not retroactively cure this violation. We further observe that Rice's failure to cooperate persisted throughout the proceedings. Rice produced hundreds of pages to the Bar immediately before the August 3 hearing, making it difficult for the Bar to prepare. More problematically, Rice did not provide copies of those records to the Hearing Committee in Juneau, forcing committee members to examine a document at one point during the hearing by viewing defense counsel's laptop computer. [10] Rice has repeatedly referred to documents and information most notably individual client ledgersthat he claims to be able to provide but has not produced. Even as late as his oral argument before our court, Rice's attorney argued that Rice had access to client ledger cards he was willing to produce, but acknowledged that this data had not been submitted at earlier stages of the proceedings.