Opinion ID: 1773091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time in Custody Must Be Related to Second Sentence.

Text: Even had Whiteaker been correctly decided, Mr. Haldeman would not be entitled to relief. The 1995 version of section 558.031 does not permit him to seek credit on his sentence for the time he was imprisoned prior to May 13, 1996. As noted earlier, section 558.031 states in pertinent part that a person who is sentenced in this state shall receive credit toward the service of a sentence of imprisonment for all time in prison, jail or custody after the offense occurred and before the commencement of the sentence, when the time in custody was related to that offense. Id. (emphasis added). In granting Mr. Haldeman's petition for writ of habeas corpus, Respondent noted that the two offenses of which Mr. Haldeman was convicted originally had been charged in the same case and tried at the same time. He concluded, without further explanation, that all of Mr. Haldeman's time in prison after his original conviction, therefore, should be considered `related to' both offenses, citing Goings v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 6 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. banc 1999). [7] Respondent reached this conclusion despite the fact that Mr. Haldeman asked for and received a new trial on one of the convictions and was not convicted of it until May of 1996. Nothing in either section 558.031 or Goings provides that a prisoner's time in custody can be considered related to an offense in this circumstance, however. The habeas court's analysis simply reads Goings too broadly. It is not the relationship of the specific facts underlying two convictions, or the fact that two charges were initially tried at the same time and involved the same victim, that is determinative of jail-time credit for purposes of section 558.031. Under section 558.031, it is to the time in custody that the second conviction must be related. Goings dealt with just such a situation. Mr. Goings was on parole for Charge 1 when he was arrested for Charge 2. Because of his arrest for Charge 2, his parole on Charge 1 was revoked and he was placed in prison. He remained in prison while awaiting his trial on Charge 2, of which he was eventually convicted. This Court held that the time that Mr. Goings spent in custody prior to receiving his sentence on Charge 2 was related to that sentence because it was Goings' arrest on Charge 2 that resulted in revocation of parole on Charge 1 and returned him to custody. In this case, there is no similar relationship between Conviction II and Mr. Haldeman's time in custody on Conviction I (i.e., the time prior to Conviction II on May 13, 1996). It is true some of the facts surrounding both convictions are similar because they both involved sexual assaults of the same victim, and that similarity permitted the State to charge and try Mr. Haldeman for the two crimes at the same time. But Respondent cites no authority for the proposition that, under these facts, Mr. Haldeman's time in custody on Conviction I also constitutes time in custody related to Conviction II. To the contrary, and unlike in Goings , even absent Mr. Haldeman's arrest, trial or conviction on Conviction II, he would have been in prison on Conviction I. Absent Conviction I, there is nothing in the record to indicate that he would not have been out on bail on the charge that resulted in Conviction II until he was convicted of it on May 13, 1996. Mr. Haldeman's time in prison prior to May 13, 1996, related solely to Conviction I. For these reasons, he is not entitled to jail-time credit on Conviction II for that period. [8] The trial court's decision granting the writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the record is quashed. ALL CONCUR.