Opinion ID: 1060912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Definition of Passion

Text: The appellant also contends that the trial court's instruction on first degree murder was erroneous, because the instruction did not include the definition of passion. The trial court instructed the jury as follows: The mental state of the accused at the time he allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. The State asserts that the trial court employed the ordinary usage of the word passion, and, accordingly, further instruction was unnecessary. The appellant does not offer any authority which requires the trial court to define passion. Moreover, although Tennessee courts have defined the term, see. e.g., State v. Bullington, 532 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tenn. 1976), we have been unable to find any case which requires a court to provide that definition. We conclude that the word passion is in common use and can be understood by people of ordinary intelligence. Raines, 882 S.W.2d at 383. In the absence of anything in the charge to obscure the meaning of such terms, it is not necessary for the court to define or explain them. Id.See also State v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 761 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993). This issue is without merit.