Opinion ID: 2032017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: amrep

Text: The supremacy clause contained in article VI of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land,    any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2.) Thus, where State law conflicts with Federal law, the former is without effect. ( Maryland v. Louisiana (1981), 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S.Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L.Ed.2d 576, 595.) The United States Supreme Court recently revisited the issue of Federal preemption in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. (1992), 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407. In Cipollone, the Court reiterated that [c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause `start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' ( Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 112 S.Ct. at 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (1947), 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447, 1459.) Accordingly, the Court noted, `[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone` of pre-emption analysis. [Citations.] Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 112 S.Ct. at 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422; accord Spitz v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. (1992), 151 Ill.2d 71, 74, 175 Ill.Dec. 727, 600 N.E.2d 1185; Castillo v. Jackson (1992), 149 Ill.2d 165, 173-74, 171 Ill.Dec. 471, 594 N.E.2d 323 (It is the power and intent of Congress to preempt an area of law which triggers the requirements of the supremacy clause (emphasis in original)). Congress' intent to preempt State law may be manifested by express provision, by implication, or by a conflict between federal and state law. ( New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance (1995), 514 U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1676, 131 L.Ed.2d 695, 704.) However, [w]hen Congress has considered the issue of preemption and has included in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when that provision provides a `reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority,' [citation], `there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive provisions' of the legislation. [Citation.] Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517, 112 S.Ct. at 2618, 120 L.Ed.2d at 423. In addressing the preemptive scope of the FHSA, we note preliminarily that the decisions of the Federal courts interpreting a Federal act such as the FHSA are controlling upon Illinois courts, in order that the act be given uniform application. ( Bowman v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1957), 11 Ill.2d 186, 200, 142 N.E.2d 104; Boyer v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (1967), 38 Ill.2d 31, 34, 230 N.E.2d 173; Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1956), 9 Ill.2d 505, 507, 138 N.E.2d 553; see also Hiles v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1994), 268 Ill.App.3d 561, 563, 205 Ill.Dec. 952, 644 N.E.2d 508; Golden Bear Family Restaurants, Inc. v. Murray (1986), 144 Ill.App.3d 616, 620, 98 Ill.Dec. 459, 494 N.E.2d 581.) Having so noted, we proceed now to determine how the Federal courts have construed the FHSA's preemptive scope. In the recent case of Moss v. Parks (4th Cir.1993), 985 F.2d 736, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the relevant legislative history of the FHSA and its preemption provision. The court explained: The FHSA was enacted in 1960. The purpose of the law was to `provide nationally uniform requirements for adequate cautionary labeling of packages of hazardous substances which are sold in interstate commerce and are intended or suitable for household use.' House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act, H.R.Rep. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833, 2833. As enacted the FHSA did not contain a preemption section. However, when the Act was amended in 1966, the legislative history discussed the impracticality of having the states produce potentially fifty different labels for a particular hazardous substance. Congress recommended `a limited preemption amendment which would encourage and permit states to adopt requirements identical with the federal requirements for substances subject to the Federal Act, and to enforce them to complement Federal enforcement ...' House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Child Protection Act of 1966, H.R.Rep. No. 2166, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4095, 4096. (Emphasis added.) Moss, 985 F.2d at 739. The 1966 amendments to the FHSA added the following preemption provision, at issue in the present case: [I]f a hazardous substance or its packaging is subject to a cautionary labeling requirement under section 2(p) or 3(b) [subsec. (p) of this section or section 1262(b) of this title] designed to protect against a risk of illness or injury associated with the substance, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement applicable to such substance or packaging and designed to protect against the same risk of illness or injury unless such cautionary labeling requirement is identical to the labeling requirement under section 2(p) or 3(b) [subsec. (p) of this section or section 1262(b) of this title]. 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (1988). In discussing Congress' purpose for enacting the FHSA's preemption provision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Association, Inc. v. Allenby (9th Cir.1992), 958 F.2d 941, noted: On the one hand, a national safety standard would ease the burden of compliance for chemical product manufacturers by relieving them from the burden of complying with fifty-one separate regulatory schemes promulgated by each state and the federal government. On the other hand, such a standard would take police powers away from the states who best know how to serve the interests of their citizenry. The preemption clause in [the] FHSA balances these competing concerns by leaving cautionary labeling requirements to the federal government while allowing states to regulate the sale and use of hazardous chemicals. (Emphasis added.) Allenby, 958 F.2d at 950. It is clear from the foregoing that Congress intended to preempt all nonidentical State laws proposing cautionary labeling requirements addressing the same risk of illness or injury as the FHSA. The question remains, however, whether the state laws which the FHSA's preemption provision is intended to preempt include common law tort claims based on a failure to warn which seek to impose labeling requirements different from those imposed under the Federal act. The plaintiff argues that such claims are not included in the category of laws subject to preemption. We find, however, that under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone and the Federal decisions which have followed since Cipollone, such claims are subject to preemption. In Cipollone, a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that Federal law can, under some circumstances, preempt common law tort actions. At issue in Cipollone was whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, served to preempt the petitioner's common law tort claims. Both statutes contained express preemption provisions. Although the Court found that the predecessor statute had no preemptive effect on State-law tort actions, it concluded that the preemption provision of the 1969 statute did. That provision reads as follows: (b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act. (Emphasis added.) See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 515, 112 S.Ct. at 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422. In holding that the above provision was broad enough to preclude common law tort actions, the plurality rejected the petitioner's contention that such actions imposed neither requirement[s] nor prohibition[s]. The plurality dismissed the petitioner's assertion that Congress intended only to preempt State statutes, injunctions, and executive pronouncements and not tort actions pursued in a judicial forum. ( Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521, 112 S.Ct. at 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d at 426.) On this point, the Court declared: The phrase `[n]o requirement or prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass obligations that take the form of common-law rules. As we noted in another context, `[state] regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.' [Citation.]       Moreover, common-law damages actions of the sort raised by petitioner are premised on the existence of a legal duty, and it is difficult to say that such actions do not impose `requirements or prohibitions.'    [I]t is the essence of the common-law to enforce duties that are either affirmative requirements or negative prohibitions. We therefore reject petitioner's argument that the phrase `requirement or prohibition' limits the 1969 Act's preemptive scope to positive enactments by legislatures and agencies. (Emphasis in original.) Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22, 112 S.Ct. at 2620, 120 L.Ed.2d at 426. The Court went on to state the standard to be applied in determining which, if any, of the petitioner's common law claims were preempted by the 1969 act. The Court explained that [t]he central inquiry in each case is    whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a `requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect to ... advertising or promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading. ( Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-24, 112 S.Ct. at 2621, 120 L.Ed.2d at 427.) Applying that test to each of the common law claims raised by the petitioner, the Court held that the petitioner's failure-to-warn theory was preempted because it sought to impose additional or more clearly stated warnings relating to cigarettes than those imposed by the 1969 act. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621-22, 120 L.Ed.2d at 428. [1] Since Cipollone, the majority of Federal courts that have addressed the issue of Federal preemption over State common law claims based on, among other things, a failure to warn, where the preemption provision at issue is similar or identical to the one in Cipollone, have found the State-law claims to be preempted. See, e.g., Taylor AG Industries v. Pure-Gro (9th Cir.1995), 54 F.3d 555; Bice v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc. (8th Cir.1994), 39 F.3d 887; National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp. (8th Cir.1994), 38 F.3d 988; MacDonald v. Monsanto Co. (5th Cir. 1994), 27 F.3d 1021; Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp. (3rd Cir.1994), 22 F.3d 540; Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc. (1st Cir.1994), 18 F.3d 13; Worm v. American Cyanamid Co. (4th Cir.1993), 5 F.3d 744; King v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. (1st Cir.1993), 996 F.2d 1346; Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc. (7th Cir.1993), 994 F.2d 364; Moss, 985 F.2d 736; Papas v. Upjohn Co. (11th Cir.1993), 985 F.2d 516; Stamps v. Collagen Corp. (5th Cir.1993), 984 F.2d 1416; Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. (10th Cir.1993), 981 F.2d 1177. More pertinent to this case, a number of these Federal decisions have addressed the effect of the preemption provision under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) (7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1988)) and have found no notable difference between the preemption language in the 1969 act at issue in Cipollone and that found in the FIFRA. (See, e.g., Taylor, 54 F.3d 555; Bice, 39 F.3d 887; MacDonald, 27 F.3d 1021; Worm, 5 F.3d 744; King, 996 F.2d 1346; Shaw, 994 F.2d 364; Papas, 985 F.2d 516; Arkansas-Platte, 981 F.2d 1177.) The preemption language of the FIFRA provides that States shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter. (7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988).) The FIFRA provision is substantively equivalent, in our view, to the FHSA's preemption provision. Indeed, Federal courts which have addressed the issue are in accord with this finding. See, e.g., Moss, 985 F.2d at 740 n. 3 (The preemption language of the two statutes is nearly identical); Chemical Specialties, 958 F.2d at 945 (The preemption issues arising under FHSA are identical to those arising under FIFRA); see also DeHaan v. Whink Prods. Co. (N.D.Ill. January 25, 1994), No. 91-C-0014, 1994 WL 24322 (the preemption provisions under FHSA and FIFRA are effectively identical). Thus, applying Cipollone and its progeny to the present case, we conclude that the FHSA's preemption provision precludes plaintiffs from bringing common law tort claims which seek to impose cautionary labeling requirements for hazardous substances which are different from and are designed to protect against the same risk of illness or injury as those imposed by the FHSA. We must now consider whether the plaintiff's claims against AMREP seek to impose labeling requirements that are different from those imposed under the FHSA. Under section 1261(p) of the FHSA, the labeling of a hazardous substance must: (1)    state[] conspicuously (A) the name and place of business of the manufacturer, packer, distributor or seller; (B) the common or usual name or the chemical name (if there be no common or usual name) of the hazardous substance or of each component which contributes substantially to its hazard, unless the Commission by regulation permits or requires the use of a recognized generic name; (C) the signal word `DANGER' on substances which are extremely flammable, corrosive, or highly toxic; (D) the signal word `WARNING' or `CAUTION' on all other hazardous substances; (E) an affirmative statement of the principal hazard or hazards, such as `Flammable', `Combustible', `Vapor Harmful', `Causes Burns', `Absorbed Through Skin', or similar wording descriptive of the hazard; (F) precautionary measures describing the action to be followed or avoided, except when modified by regulation of the Commission pursuant to section 1262 of this title; (G) instruction, when necessary or appropriate, for first-aid treatment; (H) the word `poison' for any hazardous substance which is defined as `highly toxic' by subsection (h) of this section; (I) instructions for handling and storage of packages which require special care in handling or storage; and (J) the statement (i) `Keep out of the reach of children' or its practical equivalent, or, (ii) if the article is intended for use by children and is not a banned hazardous substance, adequate directions for the protection of children from the hazard   . 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1) (1988). The plaintiff maintains that the labeling provisions of section 1261(p) impose no requirements with respect to the cautionary labeling of paint strippers, such as the Misty Paint Stripper at issue here, because they set forth no specific precautions for any specific type of product. The plaintiff argues that the labeling provisions of section 1261(p) are more in the nature of noncompulsory guidelines to which companies can refer in crafting the cautionary labels for the hazardous substances they manufacture. We reject this contention. Despite the fact that the provisions are couched in general terms encompassing every type of hazardous substance, they are nonetheless requirements for the cautionary labeling of hazardous substances, which the plaintiff concedes includes Misty Paint Stripper. Indeed, Congress made this fact clear by referring to the provisions of section 1261(p) as cautionary labeling requirements in the language of the FHSA's preemption provision. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (1988). Moreover, the Consumer Product Safety Commission (Safety Commission) the Federal agency responsible for administering the FHSAoffered a detailed labeling example for paint strippers containing methylene chloride which it concluded conformed to the labeling requirements of section 1261(p) of the FHSA. Apart from evidencing that the provisions of section 1261(p) are to be treated as labeling requirements, the Safety Commission's labeling example illustrates how those requirements are met for products like Misty Paint Stripper. The promulgation of the labeling example was prompted by a 1985 petition filed by the Consumer Federation of America seeking to have household products containing methylene chloride declared hazardous substances and to have them banned pursuant to section 1261(q). (See Petition HP 85-1, Petition Requesting Ban of Household Products Containing Methylene Chloride, 53 Fed. Reg. 14,590 (1988).) Subsequently, the Safety Commission, in August of 1986, proposed a rule to declare paint strippers and other household products containing other than nominal levels of methylene chloride to be hazardous substances. Household Products Containing Methylene Chloride; Status as Hazardous Substances, 51 Fed.Reg. 29,778 (1986). In August 1987, the Safety Commission determined that there was insufficient controversy to warrant a rulemaking proceeding on the issue and published a notice of interpretation and enforcement policy (hereinafter 1987 Notice) stating its view that household products containing methylene chloride are hazardous substances and are thus subject to the FHSA's labeling requirements. (Labeling of Certain Household Products Containing Methylene Chloride; Statement of Interpretation and Enforcement Policy, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,698 (1987).) Discussing the labeling requirements under the FHSA for products containing methylene chloride, the Safety Commission set forth a Detailed Example of Labeling for Paint Strippers and noted that the label was the work product of industry and consumer interest representatives working with the Safety Commission's staff. (52 Fed.Reg. 34,698, 34,702 (1987).) The detailed example offered by the Safety Commission provides as follows: [Front Panel] CAUTION: Vapor Harmful, Read Other Cautions and HEALTH HAZARD INFORMATION on Back Panel [or equivalent language] [Back Panel] Contains methylene chloride, which has been shown to cause cancer in certain laboratory animals. Risk to your health depends on level and duration of exposure. [Or equivalent language] [The back panel labeling given above would be placed separately from use precaution information such as the following.] Use this product outdoors, if possible. If you must use it indoors, open all windows and doors or use other means to ensure fresh air movement during application and drying. If properly used, a respirator may offer additional protection. Obtain professional advice before using. A dust mask does not provide protection against vapors. Do not use in basement or other unventilated area. Open container carefully and close after each use. Clean up rags, papers, and waste promptly. Allow solvent to evaporate, then dispose of in metal containers. The Safety Commission declared in its 1987 Notice that the above labeling language fulfills the requirements of section 1261(p) of the FHSA. (52 Fed.Reg. 34,698, 34,702 (1987).) The Safety Commission's labeling example represents an interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged with administering the FHSA. This court has held that an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute it is responsible for administering should be accorded considerable deference so long as Congress has not expressed its intent as to the issue and provided the agency's interpretation is reasonable. See Spitz, 151 Ill.2d at 76, 175 Ill.Dec. 727, 600 N.E.2d 1185; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694, 704. As stated, the Safety Commission has concluded that its detailed labeling example satisfies the cautionary labeling requirements of section 1261(p)(1) of the FHSA. (52 Fed.Reg. 34,698, 34,702 (1987).) In the view of the Safety Commission, therefore, nothing more is required of labels for paint strippers containing methylene chloride under the FHSA, other than what is stated in its example. We hold that it is appropriate to defer to the Safety Commission on this point since Congress has yet to express its view on the issue and because we find the Safety Commission's interpretation to be reasonable. As the facts indicate, the label contained on the Misty Paint Stripper product used by Melissa was virtually identical to the detailed example set forth by the Safety Commission. The labeling requirements which the plaintiff seeks to impose on AMREP, namely, a warning that inhalation of Misty Paint Stripper would cause death and adequate instructions for its use (implying that the existing instructions are not adequate), constitute requirements that are not identical to those required under section 1261(p)(1). (See 15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (1988).) As the Safety Commission's interpretation of section 1261(p)(1) reveals, the additional information which the plaintiff seeks to require AMREP to place on the label is not mandated by the FHSA. Accordingly, the plaintiff's tort claims against AMREP, based on a failure to warn, are preempted. As a final argument, however, the plaintiff contends that his claims are not, in fact, preempted because the information he alleges should have been included on the Misty Paint Stripper label covers a risk of injury different from the risk of injury against which the labeling requirements of the Federal act were designed to protect. The plaintiff asserts that the Safety Commission's own comments in its 1987 Notice reveal that the risk of injury which the FHSA's cautionary labeling requirements for paint strippers were intended to protect against was the risk of cancer, not the risk of asphyxiation, which Melissa encountered. We agree with the plaintiff that under the subject preemption provision, only those labeling requirements which are designed to protect against the same risk of illness or injury as those targeted by the Federal statute are preempted. (Emphasis added.) (15 U.S.C. § 1261 note (b)(1)(A) (1988).) We also agree that the Safety Commission's primary focus in issuing its 1987 Notice was, in fact, to warn consumers of the carcinogenic risks posed by methylene chloride found in products such as paint strippers. We disagree, however, that the risk of cancer was the Safety Commission's sole focus. The Safety Commission has expressly acknowledged its concern with the risk to individuals of acute inhalation intoxication posed by methylene chloride vapors. This concern is evidenced by statements made by the Safety Commission in 1992 when it responded to several individuals' comments regarding the preemptive scope of the FHSA. In responding to one individual's comment that the labeling requirements of the FHSA were too weak and vague to preempt State laws, the Commission responded: The requirements of the FHSA are not vague.    [T]he labeling must communicate to the consumer an understanding of the potential principal hazard or hazards presented by the product in order to avoid being misbranded and subject to legal action.       The cautionary label required under [section 1261(p) of] the FHSA must present a balanced perspective of the potential hazards of the product. Many products which may cause chronic health effects may also be acutely toxic and present physical hazards, such as flammability. (Emphasis added.) 57 Fed.Reg. 46,626, 46,664 (1992). The Commission then went on to highlight the labeling requirements under the FHSA for paint strippers containing methylene chloride: The suggested labeling for methylene chloride paint strippers had to take into consideration the product's acute inhalation toxicity in addition to the carcinogenicity hazard. Therefore, the suggested front panel label statement is `VAPOR HARMFUL' with the instruction `Read Other Cautions and HEALTH HAZARD INFORMATION on back panel' and the back panel statement is `Contains methylene chloride, which has been shown to cause cancer in certain laboratory animals.' For products where the only hazard is carcinogenicity and the evidence of increased risk of cancer to humans is clear, the labeling would be more straightforward. (Emphasis added.) 57 Fed.Reg. 46,626, 46,664 (1992). As the foregoing comments of the Safety Commission indicate, the cautionary labeling requirements of the FHSA for paint strippers containing methylene chloride are intended to protect against the same risk at issue here, namely, the risk of acute inhalation toxicity. Accordingly, we find the plaintiff's final argument to be without merit. For the reasons stated, we hold that the plaintiff's failure-to-warn claims against AMREP, upon which he bases his wrongful death action, are preempted by the FHSA. Our holding today comports with Congress' stated goal in enacting the Federal statute and the preemption provision contained therein of providing nationally uniform requirements for the cautionary labeling of hazardous substances like the paint stripper at issue here. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of AMREP.