Opinion ID: 703200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intervention Pursuant To Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2)

Text: 32 This court has, upon more than one occasion, stated that, besides timely application, the applicant for intervention must satisfy a tripartite test in order to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2): 33 1) the party must have a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation; 2) that interest must be one that might be impaired by the disposition of the litigation; and 3) the interest must not be adequately protected by the existing parties. 34 Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997 (citing Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Action, 558 F.2d 861, 869 (8th Cir.1977)); see also Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1307 (identifying same three inquiries); Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409 (same). 35
36 Recognized interest. Although in Mille Lacs and Planned Parenthood, this court defined an interest sufficient to support intervention as a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation, the courts of appeals of other circuits have stated that intervention requires that the intervenor have an interest in the proceedings that is direct, substantial, and legally protectable. Alameda Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Browner, 9 F.3d 88, 90 (10th Cir.1993); Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Perry County Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir.1978). These standards are not contradictory. The applicant for intervention must have an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, i.e., an interest that is direct, as opposed to tangential or collateral. Furthermore, that interest must be recognized, i.e., both substantial and legally protectable. See S.E.C. v. Flight Transp. Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 949 (8th Cir.1983) (interest asserted must be  'significantly protectable interest' in the primary litigation, quoting Corby Recreation, Inc., 581 F.2d at 177, in turn quoting Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531, 91 S.Ct. 534, 542, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971)). 37 In Mille Lacs, this court found a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation on the part of the applicants for intervention, because the litigation involved the rights of a band of Indians to use property owned by the applicants, and the applicants had an interest in protecting their property values. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 998. The court in Mille Lacs cited its prior decision in Planned Parenthood, 558 F.2d at 869, as holding that an interest in protecting property values was a protectable interest. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 998. In S.E.C. v. Flight Transp. Corp., 699 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1983), this court also held that an interest in maintaining market values in the proposed intervenors' homes was sufficient to support intervention. 38 Impairment of the interest. The second factor of the Mille Lacs analysis is whether the interest of the applicant for intervention is one that might be impaired by the disposition of the litigation. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. In Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., this court noted that in 1966 the Supreme Court had amended the rule to eliminate a requirement that the proposed intervenor is or may be bound by the judgment in the action in favor of the requirement that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect [its] interest. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1307 (citing precedent of this circuit so holding since 1966). This court then reaffirmed that the applicant need not show that, but for its intervention, its interest 'would be' impaired by the operation of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or stare decisis, but rather only that its interest 'may be' so impaired. Id. (reversing district court for requiring that the intervenor show that its interest would or will be impaired, because that requirement conflicted with numerous holdings of the court, and listing cases so holding). 39 In Mille Lacs, the court found that a settlement favorable to the Indian Band might have impaired the recognized interests of the applicants for intervention, because it might have permitted Band members to exercise treaty rights upon the proposed intervenors' land, thereby affecting property values. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. Even if the Band's treaty rights could only be exercised on public land, that result of the litigation could still affect intervenors' interests in property values by depleting stocks of fish and game on the proposed intervenors' property. Id.; see also Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 948 (recognized interest that might be impaired where the litigation might have resulted in a loss in market value of the intervenors' homes). In J & N Logging Co. v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 1438 (8th Cir.1988), this court described the necessary showing as a sufficient stake in the litigation. J & N Logging Co., 848 F.2d at 1439 (where a person was an insured by operation of the language of an insurance policy, the person had an interest in the payment of claims under the policy; the district court was therefore ordered to reconsider whether the person had a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation that might also be impaired in litigation to require payment of claims under the policy). 40 Contingent interests. Questions of the adequacy of an interest and its potential for impairment may overlap in cases in which the interest is in some way contingent. Although the intervenor cannot rely on an interest that is wholly remote and speculative, the intervention may be based on an interest that is contingent upon the outcome of the litigation. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1245, 1248 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Clark v. Jenkins, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 811, 121 L.Ed.2d 684 (1992); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist, 738 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir.1984); Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 948. Furthermore, a tardy intervenor cannot breathe life into rights already foregone. Jenkins by Agyei, 967 F.2d at 1248 (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84, and finding application to intervene untimely because intervenors waited until school board vote actually impaired their interest and time for appeal had run). Thus, a person claiming an interest in the litigation does not have to wait until he or she has suffered irreparable harm before the requirements for intervention under Rule 24(a) have been met. Id. This court has emphasized that 41 [t]he rule does not require, after all, that appellants demonstrate to a certainty that their interests will be impaired in the ongoing action. It requires only that they show that the disposition of the action 'may as a practical matter' impair their interests. 42 Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84 (emphasis in original); see also Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1307-08 (listing cases confirming that the requirement is that the interest may be affected); Jenkins by Agyei, 967 F.2d at 1248 (quoting Little Rock Sch. Dist.). The court should be mindful that  '[t]he interest test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process.'  Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 949 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (1967)). Thus, in Flight Transp., this court rejected an argument that inchoate interests are insufficient, because even where the precise moment of vesting is undetermined, the interest may be sufficiently certain to do so to support intervention. Id. at 948-49. 43 Other circuit courts of appeals have similar standards concerning purportedly speculative claims. For example, in Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir.1994), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the interest of representatives of the forest products industry in existing lumber contracts was too speculative and generalized to satisfy rule 24 where the litigation involved a potential bar on a particular kind of forest management. Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1207. The court found instead that the intervenors' interest in the contracts was legally protectable when threatened by the potential bar. Id. By way of contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals found the interest of a power company unduly remote and too academic to allow intervention pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), where the company did not operate in the parties' geographical market or have any other economic relationship with the parties, but instead might at some time seek to reopen the proceedings concerning licensing of a competitor. City of Cleveland, Ohio v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517-18 (D.C.Cir.1994) (equating interest sufficient for intervention as of right with standing under Article III of the Constitution). 44 The contingency of contribution claims under CERCLA. Whether an interest in contribution claims is sufficiently protectable, rather than excessively speculative or contingent, to support intervention in an action under CERCLA has concerned a remarkably small number of courts in view of the statutory authority to intervene in CERCLA actions. Nonetheless, the small group of resulting decisions has produced a split on the issue. In United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir.1994), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed denial of a motion to intervene by applicants who had settled with the government, but were seeking to intervene in litigation between the government and later settling parties. The court reasoned, in dicta, that where the intervenor has not yet settled with the government, thus establishing what if any liability it will have, its interest in contribution is contingent, and therefore insufficient to support intervention. Alcan, 25 F.3d at 1184. The court reasoned that any contribution right a non-settling PRP might have depends on the outcome of some future dispute in which the applicant may, or may not, be assigned a portion of liability. Id. The court contrasted the interest of a non-settling PRP in contribution with that of a settlor as follows: 45 When a PRP settles with the government it accepts a specific liability. Unlike the interest of an applicant who has not yet settled, which is contingent in the sense that it may never ripen, the interest of an applicant who has already settled is contingent only in the sense that it cannot be valued. However, the fact that the interest cannot be valued does not mean it does not exist. The act of settling transforms a PRP's contribution right from a contingency to a mature, legally protectable interest. 46 Id. Although it had earlier rejected reliance on legislative history, id. at 1181, the court then considered legislative intent as supporting this conclusion, finding that Congress intended non-settling PRPs to be expos[ed] ... to liability for the rest of the cleanup cost even if that exposure exceeds the amount the non-settlor's actions added to the overall cost of the cleanup. Id. at 1184 (citing United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 720 F.Supp. 1027, 1040 (D.Mass.1989), aff'd, 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir.1990)). Because the Third Circuit Court of Appeals believed that [p]ermitting intervention should encourage settlements, it held that PRPs who had earlier settled with the government have a sufficiently protectable interest in the litigation [in suing a non-settling PRP for contribution] to permit their intervention. Id. at 1185; see also United States v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 19 Chem. Waste Lit.Rep. 436 (M.D.La.1989) (holding that earlier settlor could not intervene to protect contribution claims in litigation for entry of a subsequent consent decree against other settling PRPs, because Sec. 113(f)(3)(C) subordinated rights of all others to the rights of the government). 4 The conclusions of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Alcan and of the district court in Browning-Ferris Industries are, of course, only dicta on the issue presently before this court, because the present case involves instead non-settling PRPs seeking to intervene. Compare Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 770 (7th Cir.1994) (assuming in dicta that if the non-settlor before it were barred from pursuing an independent action for contribution after entry of a consent agreement between the government and the settling parties, in the future, other non-settling persons would seek to intervene pursuant to Sec. 113(i) in litigation between the government and settling parties for entry of a consent decree in order to protect their contribution rights). 47 Earlier decisions of district courts, however, in which non-settlors sought intervention, followed much the same reasoning as was stated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Alcan, looking to legislative history and policy, to conclude that non-settling PRPs did not have a legally protectable interest in contribution claims to intervene in litigation between the government and settling PRPs to enforce a consent decree. See United States v. ABC Indus., 153 F.R.D. 603, 607-08 (W.D.Mich.1993) (finding disproportionate liability under CERCLA placed upon non-settling PRPs to be well-accepted, and holding that an interest in contribution claims, although it did not appear to be contingent or speculative here, was nonetheless not significantly protectable, because of CERCLA's express subordination of contribution claims by the desire for early de minimis settlements and finality of settlement judgments); United States v. Wheeling Disposal Serv., Inc., No. 92-0132-CV-W-1, slip op. at 1-3, 1992 48 WL 685724 (W.D.Mo. Oct. 1, 1992) (holding that non-settling PRPs do not have a protectable interest in contribution sufficient to support intervention); Motorola, Inc., 139 F.R.D. at 144-146 (relying on the evident legislative intent of CERCLA to encourage settlement and require non-settlors to bear disproportionate liability to deny intervention by non-settlors founded on an interest in contribution and fair settlement); United States v. Vasi, 22 Chem.Waste Lit.Rep. 218, 219 (N.D.Ohio 1991) (reviewing legislative history to find non-settling PRPs do not have an automatic right of intervention under Sec. 113(i) and that allowing intervention to protect contribution claims would result in parties refusing to enter into meaningful settlement negotiations); United States v. Beazer East, Inc., 22 Chem.Waste Lit.Rep. 218, 222-23 (N.D.Ohio 1991) (rejecting intervention to protect contribution as encouraging recalcitrance by PRPs in settlement negotiations); United States v. Mid-State Disposal, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 573, 576-77 (W.D.Wis.1990) (also relying on statutory incentive of settlement, and fear that allowing intervention would render negotiations between the original parties a waste of time and stall the implementation of the settlement as justifying denial of motion to intervene to protect contribution claims). 49 Against the clamor of this authority is heard a lone voice declaring that a different result is proper. In United States v. Acton Corp., 131 F.R.D. 431 (D.N.J.1990), the court first rejected the government's argument that Congress did not intend to permit dissatisfied non-settlors to intervene in order to challenge the entry of CERCLA consent decrees. Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433. The court reasoned as follows: 50 [T]he Court need not consider the legislative history of the CERCLA provisions, as the statute's terms are unambiguous. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); Malloy v. Eichler, 860 F.2d 1179, 1183 (3d Cir.1988). Section 113(i) gives the intervention rights to any person who satisfies the section's requirements. Accordingly, the Government's argument [that legislative intent indicated dissatisfied non-settlors should not be allowed to intervene in order to challenge entry of a CERCLA consent decree] will be disregarded. 51 Id. The court then applied the four requirements for intervention as of right--timeliness, existence of a protected interest, impairment of that interest, and lack of representation by an existing party--found in both Rule 24(a)(2) and CERCLA Sec. 113(i). Id. The court found the central issue in its inquiry, as in ours, to be whether the applicants had a protectable interest in either contribution or the fairness of the proposed consent decree. Id. 52 As to the protectability of the interest, the Acton court first concluded that the interest of the intervenors in contribution claims was neither merely economic nor so contingent as to be unprotectable. Id. The court found that the interest was statutory and would be extinguished if the consent decree was entered, and therefore was legally protectable. Id. The court then rejected the argument that the interest was contingent. Id. at 434. The court concluded that none of the identified contingencies go to the existence of the right itself. Id. The court also found that the government's position would vitiate the right to contribution in Sec. 113(f)(1), because, under the government's conception, non-settling PRPs could not seek contribution against PRPs who had signed an unapproved consent decree, because the interest was only contingent, but the right would be cut off as soon as the consent decree was approved. Id. Finally, the court rejected the notion that participation in negotiations or notice and comment proceedings before the drafting of the settlement agreement substituted for adequate representation in the litigation by an existing party. Id. at 436. The court found that whatever the non-settlors' representation in those prior proceedings had been, there was no existing party representing those parties in the current litigation. Id. 53
54 In this case, we feel compelled to follow the more cogent reasoning of the minority position. We hold that the prospective intervenors here had both a recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation and that their interest was likely to be impaired in this litigation. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. In reaching this conclusion, we consider each of the proper factors courts must consider to determine whether intervention is appropriate. We must begin our analysis, however, by discussing factors it is inappropriate for courts to consider in determining whether to allow intervention as of right under either the rule or the CERCLA provision. 55 Policy and legislative history. We noted above our disapproval of the district court's reliance primarily on policy arguments instead of on the factors that should be considered in determining whether intervention should be allowed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) and Sec. 113(i). Accord In re Sierra Club, 945 F.2d at 779 (policy considerations, although relevant to permissive intervention, have no place in analysis of a claim to intervention as of right). The error here of considering policy rather than the factors dictated by Rule 24(a)(2) and Sec. 113(i) of CERCLA was further compounded by considering legislative intent when no ambiguity in the statute could make such an inquiry appropriate. The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); United States ex rel. Harlan v. Bacon, 21 F.3d 209, 210 (8th Cir.1994) (When construing a statute, we are obliged to look first to the plain meaning of the words employed by the legislature, and the court must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, citing Chevron ); United States v. Manthei, 979 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir.1992) (When interpreting statutory language, the court must first look to the plain meaning of the language, citing North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312-13, 103 S.Ct. 1095, 1102-03, 75 L.Ed.2d 77 (1983)). The Supreme Court describes this rule as the one, cardinal canon before all others. Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Thus, courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. Id. (citing Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241-242, 109 S.Ct. at 1030-31; United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-103, 18 S.Ct. 3, 4, 42 L.Ed. 394 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68, 3 L.Ed. 150 (1810)). 56 When the language of the statute is plain, the inquiry also ends with the language of the statute, for in such instances the sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1030 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)); Melahn v. Pennock Ins., Inc., 965 F.2d 1497, 1502 (8th Cir.1992) (plain meaning of a statute governs over ambiguous legislative history, citing Ron Pair ). The plain meaning of a statute is decisive, except in the rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1031 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1223-24, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (ordinary meaning governs unless implementing it would be patent absurdity). 57 Here, CERCLA's intervention provisions unambiguously provide for intervention by any person when such person meets the requirements of the statute. CERCLA Sec. 113(i), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(i); Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433. There is no restriction on persons who have refused to settle claims and are seeking to intervene in consent decree litigation to preserve contribution claims under Sec. 113(f)(1). Nor does the court find any patent absurdity or a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of [the] drafters. Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1031; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452, 107 S.Ct. at 1223-24 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The EPA and settling PRPs stress a supposed conflict between allowing intervention under Sec. 113(i) to protect contribution claims under Sec. 113(f)(1) and the intent of Sec. 113(f)(2) to induce prompt settlement. There is no contradiction among these provisions requiring resort to legislative intent. This court finds that all can be read together and each given its proper effect. Under this reading, the incentive to prompt settlement in Sec. 113(f)(2) remains intact; it simply is not the sole purpose of Sec. 113 taken as a whole. By its terms, subsection 113(f)(1) provides for contribution, subsection 113(f)(2) provides for the termination of that interest as to settling PRPs, and subsection 113(i) provides for intervention to protect that and other interests of persons affected by the litigation. 58 Our rejection of legislative intent and policy as the primary considerations in the analysis of whether or not to permit intervention under Sec. 113(i), of course, puts us at odds with the majority of courts to decide the issue. Nonetheless, we find reliance for a determination of intervention solely on the basis of the factors identified in Sec. 113(i) to be the appropriate course, because we are to apply the factors identified by Congress. Germain, 503 U.S. at 253, 112 S.Ct. at 1149. Although Congress has identified a number of factors as relevant to intervention in CERCLA litigation pursuant to Sec. 113(i), policy and legislative intent are not among them. 59 Recognized interest. Turning therefore to consideration of the factors identified in both Sec. 113(i) and Rule 24(a)(2), we consider first whether the applicants here have an interest relating to the subject of the action. CERCLA Sec. 113(i), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(i); Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). The non-settling PRPs' interest was created by provisions of the precise statute under which the litigation was brought. CERCLA Sec. 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(f)(1), provides for the right of contribution as follows: 60 (f) Contribution 61
62 Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 9606 or section 9607 of this title. 63 CERCLA Sec. 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(f)(1). This litigation has been brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 9606 and 9607, and the settling PRPs and the non-settling PRPs seeking to intervene are all persons who are or are potentially liable in this action. The contribution interest created by Sec. 113(f)(1) is directly related to the subject matter of the litigation, because it may be asserted during or following that litigation, and arises from the liability or potential liability of persons as the result of that litigation. CERCLA Sec. 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(f)(1); Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997 (recognized interest in the subject matter of the litigation). That interest is also substantial and legally protectable: CERCLA Sec. 113(f)(1) itself provides for legal protection of the interest in the primary litigation by providing for contribution claims. Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 949 (interest asserted must be  'significantly protectable interest' in the primary litigation, quoting Corby Recreation, Inc., 581 F.2d at 177). 5 64 Contrary to the arguments of the EPA and settling PRPs here, it is precisely because Sec. 113(f)(2) would cut off the interest established by Sec. 113(f)(1) that the non-settling PRPs have an interest in the present litigation sufficient to warrant intervention. Settlement under Sec. 113(f)(2) purports to cut off the rights of persons not necessarily present in the litigation. The threat of cutting off contribution rights of non-settling PRPs creates a direct and immediate interest on the part of non-settling PRPs in the subject matter of the present litigation. 65 We find the conclusion that the contribution interest is speculative or too contingent to support intervention to be wrong in law. The interest does not arise only after the daisy-chain of events identified here by the EPA and settling PRPs and in other decisions by other courts as including litigation against the prospective intervenors, a finding of liability against them, and assessment of excessive liability. Rather, under the terms of Sec. 113(f)(1) itself, the interest arises at any time during or following litigation pursuant to Sec. 106 or Sec. 107 between persons who are or are potentially liable. CERCLA Sec. 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(f)(1). Thus, no finding of liability is required, nor assessment of excessive liability, before the contribution interest arises. Only the recovery on a contribution claim must await the outcome of this or further litigation, not the right to bring such a claim. Even were it true that the contribution interest is somehow contingent upon further litigation, either to determine its monetary value or whether it indeed vests or the actual extent of any impairment, that contingency alone would not bar intervention. Jenkins by Agyei, 967 F.2d at 1248; Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84; Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 948. The interests here may be inchoate to the extent that the value of any contribution claim has not yet been determined, but the interest is nonetheless sufficiently certain once a person has been identified as a PRP to support intervention. Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 949. However, we conclude that the interest itself is not contingent nor speculative, but statutory, and that it existed from the inception of this litigation pursuant to Secs. 106 and 107 of CERCLA. See Acton, 131 F.R.D. at 433 (the interest is statutory, not contingent). 66 Impairment. Certainly, the contribution interest of the prospective intervenors may as a practical matter be impaired by the present litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2); Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1307-08; Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997; Jenkins by Agyei, 967 F.2d at 1248; Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84. CERCLA Sec. 113(f)(2) expressly states that the contribution rights of non-settling parties are impaired as to settling parties: 67
68 A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement. 69 CERCLA Sec. 1113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613(f)(2). Thus, disposition of the present litigation could bar or reduce the monetary value of the contribution claims of the prospective intervenors against the settling PRPs. See Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 998 (litigation could result in impairment of value of property, thus impairing property interest of prospective intervenor); J & N. Logging Co., 848 F.2d at 1439 (interest in payment of claims impaired by litigation to determine payment); see also Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1207 (interest in contract rights was legally protectable when threatened by potential bar at issue in litigation). The prospective intervenors here therefore have a sufficient stake in the litigation to be allowed to intervene. J & N. Logging Co., 848 F.2d at 1439. 6 70 Similarly, we find that an interest in the fairness of the Consent Decree is also legally protectable and otherwise sufficient support intervention, at least to the extent that applicants here have been able to give concrete contours to that interest so that it is not merely an indirect interest or amorphous concern of any settlement. The non-settling PRPs specifically challenge the fairness of the allocation formula used in the Consent Decree as placing upon them excessive liability. The ability of the non-settling PRPs to recoup excessive allocation of liability to them by way of contribution claims against the settling PRPs is again cut off by entry of the Consent Decree. We therefore hold that the applicants for intervention here have presented a protectable interest that may, as a practical matter, be impaired in the disposition of the present litigation. We turn next to the question of whether those interests are adequately protected by existing parties. 71
72 The third requirement for intervention is that the interest must not be adequately protected by the existing parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997. 7 This court has noted that [t]ypically, persons seeking intervention need only carry a 'minimal' burden of showing that their interests are inadequately represented by the existing parties. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 999 (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 636 n. 10, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972), and Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc., 558 F.2d at 869); Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84 (burden on prospective intervenor to show that interest is not adequately represented is minimal, citing Flight Transp., 699 F.2d at 948, and Trbovich, 404 U.S. at 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. at 636 n. 10); see also Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1308 (This requirement is met by a minimal showing that representation 'may be' inadequate, citing Trbovich and Mille Lacs ); Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409. In Little Rock Sch. Dist., this court found the minimal burden more than met where school districts, as employers, could hardly be expected to litigate with the interests of their employees uppermost in their minds in desegregation litigation. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84. 73 Although the burden to show inadequate representation is generally minimal, this court has recognized that the applicant for intervention bears a heavier burden on this factor when a party already in the suit has an obligation to represent the interests of the party seeking to intervene. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000. For example, where the state is a party to a suit involving a matter of sovereign interest, the state is presumed to represent the interests of all of its citizens. Id. at 1000; see also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738 (D.C.Cir.1979) (applying presumption of adequate representation where water districts seeking intervention, like existing governmental parties, sought to avoid requirement that federal officials prepare an environmental impact statement analyzing federal water resource projects); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 530 F.2d 501, 505 (3d Cir.) (presumption of adequate representation of citizens by governmental body or officer), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921, 96 S.Ct. 2628, 49 L.Ed.2d 375 (1976); but see Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 614-15, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 1388-89, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1982) (United States held not adequate representative of interests of five Indian Tribes concerning water rights critical to their welfare, because Tribes are entitled to take their place as independent qualified members of the modern body politic). 8 74 Even where such a presumption of adequate representation arises on this basis, however, it may be rebutted by a showing that the applicant's interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens of the state. Id. at 1000-1001 (citing Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 192-93 (D.C.Cir.1986)). For example, in Dimond, the court found that the citizen, an insurance company, could not be adequately represented by the governmental entity already participating in the litigation. Dimond, 792 F.2d at 192-93. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that while the governmental entity was charged by law with representing the public interest, the insurance company 75 on the other hand, [was] seeking to protect a more narrow and parochial financial interest not shared by the citizens of the District of Columbia. The District would be shirking its duty were it to advance this narrower interest at the expense of its representation of the general public interest. Since [the insurance company's] interest cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens of the District of Columbia, no presumption exists that the District will adequately represent its interests. 76 Id. (citations omitted). This court found that the presumption did not apply in Mille Lacs, because the applicants to intervene, certain counties, owned some property outright from which they derived specific benefits, and that these interests were narrower than and not subsumed by the general interest of the State of Minnesota in protecting fish and game. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1001. 77 The EPA and the settling PRPs appear to argue that the non-settling PRPs' interests have been adequately protected in the present litigation, because of the extensive negotiations and public comment procedures that preceded the drafting of the Consent Decree the EPA seeks to impose in this litigation. The suggestion that the intervenors had the opportunity to protect their interests in the comment procedures prior to filing of the proposed Consent Decree simply misses the point. The question is not whether the intervenors had any other way of protecting their interests, but whether those interests are protected in this litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2); Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 997-99. They are not. 78 The court must compare the interests of proposed intervenors with the interests of current parties. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1308-09; Arrow, 55 F.3d at 409-410 (finding a presumption of adequate representation where the proposed intervenor's interests are identical to those of an existing party). However, [w]here those interests are disparate, even though directed at a common legal goal, ... intervention is appropriate. Kansas Pub. Employees Retirement Sys., 60 F.3d at 1308-09. In this case, the settling PRPs have interests contrary to those of the non-settling PRPs, because they desire to cut-off the contribution interests of the intervenors. The EPA has already disregarded the interest of the non-settling PRPs by offering the Consent Decree to which the non-settling PRPs objected during the comment procedures. Both the existing plaintiffs and existing defendants have an interest in entry of the Consent Decree that is contrary to the interest of the intervenors who oppose entry of the Consent Decree on the ground that it is unfair to them. 79 Nor can it be argued here that the EPA, either through its comment procedures or by its participation in this litigation, is a representative of the sovereign who will adequately represent the interests of the non-settling PRPs as citizens. Here, the interests of the prospective intervenors cannot be subsumed within the shared interest of the citizens of the United States. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1000-1001. The interests of the prospective intervenors are narrower and not subsumed by the general interest of the United States in providing for the clean up of polluted sites. Mille Lacs, 989 F.2d at 1001. Because of this difference in interests, the EPA can hardly be expected to litigate with the interests of the non-settling PRPs uppermost in its mind. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 738 F.2d at 84. The prospective intervenors are seeking to protect a more parochial financial interest not shared by other citizens in not losing a right to seek contribution from other PRPs and in not being subjected to excessive liability for the clean up. Accord, Dimond, 792 F.2d at 192-93. As in Dimond, the EPA would be shirking its duty were it to advance this narrower interest at the expense of its representation of the general public interest. Id. There is no existing party to this litigation who can adequately represent the identified interests of the applicants for intervention. 80 The non-settling PRPs therefore meet the requirements for intervention as of right articulated in both Rule 24(a)(2) and CERCLA Sec. 113(i). We hold that the district court erred in denying the non-settling PRPs' motion to intervene.