Opinion ID: 2709585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of an Agreement to Distribute

Text: Here, when considered in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence in the record demonstrates that the government successfully distinguished Vaughn’s conspiratorial relationship with his co-defendants from a nonconspiratorial buyer-seller affiliation. Ford testified at trial that he picked up between fifty and seventy prepackaged bags of heroin and a cell phone from Vaughn each day during the summer of 2010 and that he sold those bags to customers who called Vaughn to set up deals. At the end of his shift, Ford would turn over the money from the sales and any leftover heroin to either Lockhart or Vaughn, and Lockhart would sell heroin in the afternoon. In exchange for selling the heroin, Ford testified that he received either heroin for his personal use, cash, or both. During his testimony, Ford also explained that Vaughn wanted to exercise control over his heroin sales because of earlier complaints about the quality of the product. Other witnesses corroborated Ford’s description of the two-shift arrangement and Vaughn’s command over the drug sales, including Ford’s girlfriend, who often drove Ford to pick up the heroin and to drop off the proceeds and the cell phone at Lockhart’s house. Vaughn seemingly recognizes that Ford’s testimony implicates him in a conspiracy, but contends that Ford was not a credible witness and that his testimony was influenced by a desire to reduce his own sentence. He suggests that the jury could not have given any credit to Ford’s testimony or to that of his girlfriend, which 22 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 he argues was tainted by her desire to have Ford serve a shorter sentence. But in determining whether the evidence in the record supports the jury’s verdict, this court’s task is not to “weigh the evidence” or “to secondguess the trier of fact.” United States v. Smith, 576 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While jurors have an “opportunity to observe the verbal and nonverbal behavior of the witnesses,” this court may look only to the cold appellate record. Id. at 687. We have therefore adopted a clearly erroneous standard with respect to credibility determinations; a jury’s conclusions on credibility will be set aside “only if [it] has chosen to credit exceedingly improbable testimony,” meaning that the testimony is “internally inconsistent” or “implausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). True, Ford is a convicted felon and heroin user who agreed to testified against Vaughn as a part of his plea agreement. Kast, his girlfriend, was granted immunity. And several of the witnesses who corroborated the structure of the transactions testified under the impression that they would not be prosecuted for their testimony. But each witness faced cross-examination concerning their own charges, prior convictions, plea agreements, immunity, and bias, giving the jury an opportunity to assess each witness’s testimony in light of those facts. Notwithstanding this cross-examination and the defense’s arguments in closing relating to the witness’s motives, the jury apparently accepted the testimony as credible, a determination we do not find to be clearly Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 23 erroneous. Ford’s testimony unquestionably supports the finding of an agreement to distribute heroin and is neither internally inconsistent nor facially implausible. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support Vaughn’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. D. The District Court Properly Calculated Vaughn’s Guidelines Range for Sentencing. For the first time on appeal, Vaughn challenges three aspects of his sentencing guidelines determination. First, he argues that the district court made incorrect findings as to the drug amounts that were part of the same course of conduct as the charged offense. Second, he contends that the district court miscalculated his criminal history. And finally, he asserts that the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement for acting as a leader or organizer in the conspiracy. We review a district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Turner, 400 F.3d 491, 500 (7th Cir. 2005). When no objection to the guidelines calculation is made at trial, however, we review the calculation for plain error. United States v. Jumah, 599 F.3d 799, 811 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, because we find no error affecting Vaughn’s substantial rights in the district court’s determination of the appropriate guidelines range for sentencing, we affirm the sentence imposed. See id. 24 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 1. Drug Weight Calculation During Vaughn’s sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the probation officer’s guidelines calculation in the PSR and explicitly stated that the calculation “takes into consideration the defendant’s relevant conduct according to Section 1B1.3.” Vaughn argues that in calculating the relevant drug weight applicable to his base offense level, the district court erred by considering drug transactions that were not a part of the conspiracy and that were too far removed from the conspiracy to be considered relevant conduct. Moreover, Vaughn contends that the district court double counted a portion of the relevant drug weight by attributing to two individuals heroin that the individuals shared.
Section 1B1.3 of the guidelines instructs district courts to compute sentences based on quantities of distributed drugs that were not accounted for in the actual conviction but that were “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan” as the convicted offense. United States v. Arroyo, 406 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2)). This “relevant conduct” rule allows district courts to consider additional quantities of drugs not specified in the conviction on the condition that “the unconvicted activities bore the necessary relation to the convicted offense.” United States v. Bacallao, 149 F.3d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the guidelines, two or more offenses are part of a common scheme or plan if they are Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 25 “substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims, common ac- complices, common purpose, or similar modus ope- randi.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.9. Offenses that do not meet the requirements of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are “sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” Id. When a court relies solely on the PSR to make its relevant conduct finding, the PSR must explain how the earlier distribution activities were a part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction. United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539-40 (7th Cir. 2001). On the basis of statements made by individuals who had purchased heroin from Vaughn, the probation officer included in Vaughn’s drug weight calculation amounts of heroin that he sold before the conspiracy began, dating back to beginning of 2007. The relevant preconspiracy amounts are reflected in the top portion of the following chart: Drug Amounts Attributable to Vaughn as Stated in the PSR Pre-Conspiracy Relevant Conduct Amounts Errin Meding (Dec. 23, 2009) 11.1 grams of heroin Valerie Crenshaw (Dec. 16, 2009) 0.5 gram of heroin 26 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 Andre Shelley (Dec. 2009 through April 22, 3 grams of heroin 2010) Pat Riley (Late 2007/Early 2008 through 215 grams of heroin Mid-2010) Jesse Green (Beginning of 2007 through 729 grams of heroin Sept. 2007) Amounts Included in the Conviction Pat Riley (included in the conspiracy) 53 grams of heroin Crystal Freeman (included in the 31.85 grams of heroin conspiracy) Andre Simms (included in the conspiracy) 23.4 grams of heroin Carlos Ford (included in the conspiracy)2 455 grams of heroin Darrell Jackson (included in the conspiracy) 46.8 grams of heroin Total Amount Attributable to Vaughn 1,568.65 grams of heroin 2 Because the drug amounts attributed to Ford are included in the total calculation, the amounts the other purchasers received from Ford were not included in the drug weight calculation. Instead, only the heroin the purchasers obtained through Lockhart was considered in the overall calculation. It appears from the PSR that some of the 53 grams Pat Riley purchased during the course of the conspiracy may have been purchased from Ford, but Vaughn did not raise an objection to this particular calculation in either the district court or on appeal. Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 27 Dkt. 40 at 14. In addition to listing the estimated purchase amounts, the PSR included a short summary of the statements from each individual who admitted to purchasing heroin from either Vaughn or Lockhart, including statements from Jesse Green who bought heroin from Vaughn in 2007, three years before the initiation of the charged conspiracy. Vaughn argues that the district court erred in relying on these statements when it accepted the PSR’s relevant conduct finding because the statements were not admitted at trial and the individuals were not subject to cross-examination. That the PSR relied on statements not offered during Vaughn’s sentencing hearing or during his trial is of no consequence. See United States v. Wilson, 502 F.3d 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2007). “Reliable drug quantity evidence need not come directly from sworn witnesses” as Vaughn suggests. Id. The evidence may also come from the PSR so long as the report itself is based on reliable witness statements. Id. And Vaughn offers no support for his assertion that Green’s statement to law enforcement was “presumptively unreliable as it was given with government involvement, it described events from three years prior and Vaughn never had an opportunity to test it via cross-examination or otherwise.” 3 Appellant Br. at 34. However, we must proceed with caution when assessing the nature of relevant conduct occurring long 3 Vaughn also argued that “the trial court did not make findings of the trustworthiness of Meding, Crenshaw or Shelly’s statements.” Appellant Br. at 35. 28 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 before a charged conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 478 F.3d 800, 802 (7th Cir. 2007); United State v. Bullock, 454 F.3d 637, 642 (7th Cir. 2006). We have previously noted that long gaps of time between a conspiracy and other drug sales can “cast doubt on the relevance of the earlier conduct.” McGowan, 478 F.3d at 802. But amounts from earlier drug sales may still be included in a defendant’s overall drug weight for sentencing if the government makes a sufficient showing on the other course-of-conduct factors. See id. Indeed, Vaughn’s sales to Green, which added 729 grams of heroin to his overall drug weight calculation (moving his base offense level from 30 to 32), occurred between January 2007 and September 2007, nearly three years prior to the formation of the charged conspiracy. But unlike a case in which a defendant engaged in no apparent drug activity between a charged offense and an uncharged drug offense two years earlier, see, e.g., Bullock, 454 F.3d at 642, the evidence summarized in Vaughn’s PSR places Vaughn repeatedly selling gram quantities of heroin to at least one individual in Beloit from the beginning of 2007 until the end of the con- spiracy in 2010 with little, if any, interruption. When a substantial period of time exists between drug offenses without any intervening activity, it is possible to conclude that the defendant put his criminal activity on hold during that period of time. But where a defendant sells drugs, albeit to different purchasers, for an extended period of time with little or no break leading up to the charged offense, it is much more likely that the Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 29 sales are part of the same common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. Thus, while Vaughn’s sales to Green in 2007 were nearly three years removed from the charged conspiracy, the sales came on the heels of Vaughn’s distribution to Riley in late 2007 or early 2008, which continued into the time of the conspiracy. In light of the statements supporting the continuity of Vaughn’s heroin distribution in the PSR, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err when it accepted the probation officer’s relevant conduct determination. See United States v. Acosta, 85 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]here it is clear from the record that the district court considered and adopted the facts recited in the presentence report, as well as the government’s reasoning concerning the significance of those facts in establishing the defendant’s responsibility for uncharged conduct, we have upheld the court’s decision to treat the uncharged activities as relevant conduct despite the lack of an express finding that the activities were part of ‘the same course of conduct’ or ‘common scheme or plan’ as the convicted offense.”).
In challenging the district court’s drug weight calculation, Vaughn also argues that the district court double counted the heroin attributed to Vaughn through sales to Jackson and Simms. The relevant testimony at trial indicated that Jackson and Titus would contact Simms, an intermediary, for the purchase of heroin. Simms would make a phone call in their presence and the three 30 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 would then travel to a specified location to pick up the heroin. Jackson testified that during the summer of 2010, he obtained heroin from Lockhart, through Simms, thirty to sixty times. In exchange for the money Jackson and Titus gave Simms for the purchases, Simms would obtain twelve bags of heroin. Simms would then keep one or two of the bags as payment, and Jackson and Titus would divide the remaining bags for their own personal use. Although Simms testified that he orchestrated at least one heroin purchase for Aaron Thompson on July 14, 2010 and stated that he received heroin twice a day for approximately a month supplied by either Ford or Lockhart, he did not indicate the specific quantity of heroin he received from Lockhart each day or whether the quantity reflected the heroin he received in exchange for brokering the purchases for Jackson and Titus. Moreover, Thompson’s statements to authorities revealed only that Simms middled deals between Thompson and Ford, not between Thompson and Lockhart. Based on this information, the PSR calculated the amounts attributable to Vaughn through Jackson and Simms as follows: • Jackson: “(Approximately 30 occasions x 12 bags x 0.13 gram of heroin = 46.8 grams of heroin received from Lockhart). On a number of occa- sions Jackson purchased heroin from Simms who received it from Carlos Ford. (This amount is not included in the calculations to avoid double counting as it is included in Ford’s drug calcula- tions.)” Dkt. 40 at 12. Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 31 • Simms: “The drug quantities he received from Ford are included in Ford’s drug amounts and are not included in the calculations to avoid double counting. Simms received approximately a total of 23.4 grams directly from Lockhart. (30 days x 6 bags x .13 gram of heroin = 23.4 grams of heroin).” Dkt. 40 at 9. The PSR did not include the heroin Titus divided with Jackson, apparently because every bag of heroin the pair obtained through Simms was included in Jackson’s calculation.4 Although we believe that the PSR properly calculated Jackson’s drug quantities, even if those quantities included the heroin Jackson ultimately divided with Titus or gave to Simms as payment, it is less clear where the probation officer found support for the additional 23.4 grams of heroin that the PSR attributed to Simms as purchases from Lockhart. The PSR indicates that Simms testified he received heroin twice a day for approximately a month from either “Ford or . . . Lockhart,” but the PSR does not state how much heroin Simms received each day or whether the heroin he received from Lockhart is the same as the “one or two bags of heroin” Simms would keep after brokering a deal for Jackson and Titus. This detail is 4 Vaughn argues that the PSR did not make clear the fact that Jackson’s totals included the bags he shared with Titus. But while the PSR did not include an explicit statement regarding the breakdown, the overall calculation did not include any amounts for Titus. 32 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 important because although Jackson testified that Simms would keep one or two of the twelve bags he received from Lockhart, Jackson’s drug weight calculation included all twelve bags. But ultimately, the inclusion of the amounts attributed to Simms in the PSR, if an error, was harmless. The drug quantity the district court used to formulate Vaughn’s base offense level, which amounted to 1,568.65 grams of heroin, far exceeds the one kilogram of heroin required to reach the base offense level of 32, even when the 23.4 grams of heroin attributed to Simms in the PSR are subtracted from that calculation. We therefore find no plain error in the court’s calculation of Vaughn’s base offense level because of the inclusion of the heroin attributed to Simms.
In one last attempt to dispute the district court’s calculation of the relevant drug weight, Vaughn contends that the court improperly relied on the 0.13 gram-perbindle calculation completed by the detective who seized the seventy bags of heroin from Ford on the day of his arrest. Vaughn suggests that a more appro- priate estimate, as Lockhart put forth in his sentencing memorandum, would have been a measure of 0.09 grams per bindle. Prior to his sentencing, Lockhart submitted a report prepared by a chemistry student obtaining a PhD at UW-Madison who had visually compared packages of a similar substance and speculated that it would have Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 33 been possible for the packages to contain 0.09 gram of heroin, which would change the total weight figures. In contrast to the PhD student, the testifying detective physically weighed the bindles of heroin he seized from Ford. He weighed all of the bindles together and then weighed one of the empty bags. The detective multiplied the weight of the single, empty bag by seventy and then subtracted that number from the overall weight of the bags and the heroin combined to arrive at an average weight of 0.13 gram of heroin per bindle. Moreover, the PSR noted that the crime lab had actually determined the weight of the heroin in the seventy bags seized from Ford to be 11.621 grams, yielding an average weight of 0.166 gram per bag, but it ultimately used the detective’s more conservative estimate to calculate the relevant drug weight. The district court accepted the PSR’s calculation of the average weight per bindle during Vaughn’s sentencing hearing on March 29, 2012, before Lockhart submitted the report offering the alternative 0.09 gram figure.5 Because the 0.13 gram per bindle calculation is supported by reliable information in the PSR, we find no error in the district court’s acceptance of that estimate. And having determined that the district court committed no prejudicial error in identifying the relevant drug quantities or approving the average drug weight, we affirm the calculation of Vaughn’s base offense level for sentencing. 5 Lockhart submitted the report to the district court on April 12, 2012. 34 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 2. Criminal History Calculation Vaughn turns next to the district court’s calculation of his relevant criminal history. He contends that but for the court’s consideration of the heroin sales to Green in 2007 as relevant conduct, the district court could not have included a 1998 conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and a two-point increase for committing the instant offense while under supervised release. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1) (specifying that “[a]ny prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense” and “any other prior sentence that was imposed within ten years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense” should be counted when computing the defendant’s criminal history); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (directing the addition of two points “if the defendant committed the instant offense while under . . . supervised release”); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 comment n.8 (defining the “commencement of the instant offense,” as including any relevant conduct considered under § 1B1.3). Having already determined that the district court committed no plain error by including the 2007 drug sales as relevant conduct, we agree with the district court’s calculation of Vaughn’s criminal history points. The prior conviction at issue was imposed by an Illinois court within ten years of the 2007 conduct, and Vaughn was on supervised release until August 1, 2008 for a more recent offense. Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 35 3. Application of the Leader/Organizer Enhancement Vaughn’s final argument with respect to the district court’s calculation of his guidelines range pertains to the court’s application of a two-level leader or organizer enhancement. Section 3B1.1(c) of the sentencing guidelines provides that a defendant’s offense level should be increased by two levels “[i]f the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Vaughn contends that in his case, the application of the enhancement was improper because the facts presented at trial demonstrated no more than a buyer-seller relationship or alternatively, because he played the lesser role of bringing the parties together. Vaughn argues, as he did in challenging his conviction, that the record is devoid of any evidence corroborating Ford’s and Kast’s testimony placing Vaughn in the leadership role. In determining whether a defendant acted as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor, we have held that courts may consider the factors outlined in Application Note 4 to § 3B1.1(c), including the degree of control and authority the defendant exercised over others. See United States v. Weaver, No. 12-3324, 2013 WL 2402851,  (7th Cir. June 3, 2013) (allowing but not requiring courts to reference the factors in Application Note 4 to the extent they “help to straighforwardly identify whether a defendant helps manage or supervise a criminal scheme” (inter36 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 nal quotation marks omitted)).6 There may be cases in which a court need not consider those factors in order to conclude that the defendant was a leader or manager, but here, the factor addressing control and authority is instructive. See id. The evidence at trial showed that Vaughn supplied Ford with heroin to sell each day during the conspiracy and exercised direct, ongoing control over Ford’s sales by requiring customers to contact him before purchasing from Ford. Only when Vaughn called Ford on the cell phone Vaughn provided would Ford be informed of when and where to meet a purchaser to distribute the pre-packaged, sealed bags of heroin. At the end of each shift, Ford testified that he returned the cell phone and the proceeds to either Vaughn or Lockhart so that Lockhart could continue selling into the afternoon and evening. This arrangement is distinct from one in which a supplier merely fronts drugs to distributors; Vaughn told Ford what to do and determined whether he had done it. See United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2012). And although Vaughn again urges this court to discredit Ford’s and his girlfriend’s testimony, we refuse to re-weigh the evidence presented to the jury or independently assess each witness’s credibility. The jury accepted Ford’s testimony, which clearly established Vaughn’s supervisory role, and the district court appro- 6 In Weaver, we explained that “[a]lthough Note 4 offered these factors to distinguish between organizer/leaders and managers/supervisors, we have, in the past, consulted these factors to decide whether Guideline 3B1.1 applies in the first place.” Weaver, 2013 WL 2402851 at  (emphasis in original). Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 37 priately applied the two-level enhancement. Together with Vaughn’s base offense level and his criminal history, the district court properly determined Vaughn’s guidelines range for sentencing to be 235 to 293 months. E. Vaughn’s Within-Guidelines Sentence is Substantively Reasonable. After hearing argument from the parties and con- sidering the relevant sentencing documents, the district court imposed a sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment. Although sentences within or below a correctly-calculated guidelines range are presumed reasonable, United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009), Vaughn contends that the district court committed procedural error by not properly considering the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and that it ultimately imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. This court reviews de novo whether the sentencing court committed a procedural error, but considers the substantive reasonableness of the sentence for an abuse of discretion in light of the factors in § 3553(a). United States v. Annoreno, 713 F.3d 352, 357 (7th Cir. 2013). A sentencing court is not required to comprehensively discuss each of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and explicitly formulate a conclusion with respect to each one. United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, “sentencing judges must only demonstrate meaningful consideration of [the] § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Paige, 611 F.3d 397, 398 (7th Cir. 2010). And “we regularly affirm sentences where the district judge does 38 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 not explicitly mention each argument raised by the defendant.” Id. Before imposing Vaughn’s sentence, the district court addressed the seriousness of the offense and Vaughn’s history and characteristics. The judge explained that Vaughn’s relevant conduct involved a conservative estimate of 1.57 kilograms of heroin, an extremely addictive substance, and noted that Vaughn’s previous terms of imprisonment had not deterred him from com- mitting additional crimes. Although Vaughn had been laid off from his job at a GM parts distributor in the fall of 2008, the judge explained that his drug activity could not be traced back to that event because Vaughn began selling heroin while he was still employed. Given the nature of the offense and Vaughn’s personal history and characteristics, the judge determined that a custodial sentence of twenty years would be reasonable and no greater than necessary to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. With respect to the court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, Vaughn essentially argues that the district court gave insufficient weight to facts that may have counseled in favor of a lower sentence, such as his desire to act as a father to his step daughters and biological son. This court has explained, however, that “it is perfectly acceptable for courts to assign varying weights to the factors as they deem appropriate in the context of each case.” United States v. Busara, 551 F.3d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 2008). Because the district court adequately considered the statutory sentencing factors and provided a compreNos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 39 hensive explanation for the sentence imposed, it committed no procedural error. See United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2009). In addition to contesting the procedural aspects of his sentencing, Vaughn argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the lesser, seventy-twomonth sentence Lockhart received for his role in the conspiracy. True, § 3553(a)(6) requires judges to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). But the fact that the district court imposed a lesser sentence on Vaughn’s co-defendant does not mean that Vaughn’s sentence is therefore unreasonable. United States v. Hill, 683 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2012). Vaughn’s criminal history points put him in criminal history category V, whereas Lockhart fell within category II. Moreover, Lockhart’s need for rehabilitation and deterrence was much less pronounced than Vaughn’s. And although Vaughn suggests that he played a lesser role in the conspiracy, the court properly imposed a two-level enhancement for his role as a leader, an enhancement that was not applicable to Lockhart. These distinctions resulted in considerably different guidelines ranges, and the sentencing disparity between them was warranted. Accordingly, we conclude that Vaughn has not overcome the presumption of reasonableness attached to his withinguidelines sentence. 40 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947