Opinion ID: 750688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reference to Insurance.

Text: 28 Prior to trial, Warren, citing Fed.R.Evid. 403 (generally permitting the exclusion of evidence on the ground of undue prejudice) and Fed.R.Evid. 411 (specifically permitting the exclusion of evidence of liability insurance in certain circumstances), moved in limine to exclude any mention of indemnification or liability insurance. The motion referred to the indemnification and insurance provisions contained in the construction contract between Warren and Rust. The district court granted the motion provisionally, subject to the appellant's right to revisit the issue during the trial. 29 In his case in chief, the appellant offered the construction contract into evidence. Everyone realized that the contract constituted relevant evidence because it contained provisions setting forth on-site responsibilities for construction and safety. The court admitted it, without redaction, as a full exhibit. Both parties made use of the contract during their examination of witnesses, especially in reference to whether Warren had retained control over the construction site. The appellant, however, did not ask the court to reconsider its order in limine, and neither party mentioned the indemnification and liability insurance clauses before the jury. 30 At the close of all the evidence, the appellant seized upon the fact that everyone apparently had overlooked the need for redaction. His counsel requested leave of court to comment in summation on the unredacted indemnification and insurance provisions. The court denied the request. The appellant assigns error, maintaining that the comments should have been allowed because the entire contract, including those provisions, was in evidence. We conclude that, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the district court acted within its authority in limiting the use to which the contract could be put. 31 The touchstone of our analysis is Fed.R.Evid. 105, which states in pertinent part: 32 When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 33 Fed.R.Evid. 105. This rule provides the trial court with substantial control over both the admissibility of evidence and of limitations on its use. 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 105.02, at 105-6 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.1997). Although it would have been better practice for the district court to have redacted the indemnification and insurance provisions when it accepted the contract as a full exhibit, the record leaves little room to doubt that the parties understood that the admission of the exhibit did not signify a withdrawal or relaxation of the court's earlier in limine ruling. The appellant's claim that defense counsel waived the in limine ruling by failing to object to the introduction of the unredacted contract into evidence appears to be wishful thinking. At any rate, an affirmative waiver typically involves the purposeful relinquishment of a known right, and the self-serving claim that Warren intended to relinquish the benefit of the in limine ruling is without support in the record. 34 We will not paint the lily. The parties understood that indemnification and insurance evidence had been banned, and the appellant does not now contest the validity of that prohibition. Taking that as a given, the trial court acted appropriately in refusing to allow the appellant to undercut the in limine ruling by taking advantage of a momentary lapse.