Opinion ID: 1110208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Improper References to Camouflage Jacket

Text: Pagan argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial based on improper prosecutorial comments during closing argument. Specifically, Pagan argues that reference by the prosecutor to a Desert Storm camouflage jacket was in error because that jacket was not in evidence. The comments read as follows: Prosecutor: We've heard that Mr. Pagan had on a black coat and Graham had on a camouflaged army jacket and back around 1992 they were talking about Desert Storm and camouflage, desert camouflage is different than Defense Counsel: Objection, your Honor. Court: Sustained. Prosecutor: You can just take into account your own common sense. Camouflage has many different colors in it. Defense Counsel: Objection, side bar. Court: Come to the side. Defense Counsel: I'm going to object as to the improper bolstering of the credibility of this witness by evidence that has not been given in this case. The State's continued trying to described [sic] the jacket that Willie Graham was wearing that night knowing there was no evidence given is the gross attempt to bolster the credibility of that witness. Court: Objection's sustained. There's no evidence of anything, different kind of camouflage or anything else. It's not a reasonable inference from the evidence that has been presented, so the objection is sustained. Defense counsel: I think the colors of camouflage, I mean, by definition is a reasonable inference that camouflage is different colors. As the State points out, there was reference to a camouflage jacket in testimony introduced during trial. Thus, reference to a camouflage jacket during closing argument was not in error. The prosecutor's reference to Desert Storm, however, was error because this was not a fact introduced at trial, nor a fact that could be reasonably inferred from the evidence presented at trial. However, any error in prosecutorial comments is harmless if there is no reasonable probability that those comments affected the verdict. See Hitchcock v. State, 755 So.2d 638, 643 (Fla.2000); King v. State, 623 So.2d 486, 488 (Fla.1993). After a review of this record, there is no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's single reference to Desert Storm affected the verdict in this case. Thus, any error in referencing Desert Storm was harmless and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial based on the prosecutor's comment. See Cole, 701 So.2d at 853.