Opinion ID: 604552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards for Vindictive Prosecution and Application

Text: 10 Jennifer Edelman first argues the additional counts filed against her in the superseding indictment should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness. We conclude the prosecution did not seek the additional counts out of a hostility towards the appellant's exercise of her rights. The prosecution had a reasonable belief the evidence warranted the additional charges. 11 Due to the difficulty of demonstrating actual prosecutorial vindictiveness, the appellant may present facts indicating an appearance of vindictiveness. United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (9th Cir.1982). An appearance of vindictiveness arises only in rare situations in which the facts surrounding the addition of counts establishes a very real likelihood of actual vindictiveness. Id. at 1170, 1167. The appellant establishes an appearance of vindictiveness only where, as a practical matter, there is a realistic or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but for hostility or a punitive animus towards the [appellant] because [she] has exercised [her] specific legal rights. Id. at 1169. 12 In the present case, the original indictment returned on October 3, 1989, charged Jennifer Edelman only with making false statements to IRS agents. The charges against Harold Edelman in the original indictment included the filing of false individual income returns for the years 1983 and 1984, and the filing of false corporate returns for the years 1983 and 1984. On March 6, 1990, Jennifer Edelman moved to sever. On March 13, 1990, the prosecution obtained a superseding indictment, charging her with additional counts: filing a false individual return for the years 1983 and 1984 and assisting in the preparation of false corporate returns for the years 1983 and 1984. The district court then denied her motion for severance and motion to dismiss for prosecutorial vindictiveness. 13 We conclude the prosecution did not seek the superseding indictment against Jennifer Edelman out of a hostility towards her for seeking a severance. The circumstances indicate the prosecution had a good faith belief that the evidence warranted the additional charges. Indeed, the jury convicted Jennifer Edelman on all counts except one alleging a false statement. The prosecution represented that prior to the filing of the severance motion, it was in the process of reexamining the evidence, in particular Jennifer Edelman's role. In response to the appellant's charges of vindictiveness, the prosecution stated it sought the superseding indictment after [a]n exhaustive examination of the evidence in preparation for trial (prior to the filing of the Severance Motion) revealed the important role that defendant JENNIFER EDELMAN played in defendants' business.... 14 If the prosecutor's conduct results from an objective assessment of the case, and the prosecution believes the evidence warrants additional or more serious charges, an appearance of vindictiveness does not arise, provided no procedural unfairness results to the appellant. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d at 1169; United States v. Austin, 902 F.2d 743, 745 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 200 (1990). We also have acknowledged that numerous procedural rights are routinely asserted prior to trial as 'an integral part of the adversary process', [and] it would be 'unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor's probable response to such motions is to seek to penalize and to deter,' even if they do burden the prosecution. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d at 1168 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982)). Accordingly, we reject Jennifer Edelman's prosecutorial vindictiveness argument.