Opinion ID: 786582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Single-Load Conspiracy

Text: 12 We next address the impact of Recio II on our previous evaluation of appellants' conviction on the single-load conspiracy theory. We conclude that the entire framework of the second trial was predicated on Cruz and that use of this framework amounted to plain error. We therefore reverse the appellants' conspiracy convictions and remand the case for a new trial. 13 In Recio I, we weighed the evidence of involvement in the single-load conspiracy under the Cruz rule. See Recio I, 258 F.3d at 1071. We remain convinced that there is insufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza joined the single-load conspiracy prior to the government's seizure of the drug shipment at 1:18 a.m. on November 18. This determination was not called into question by the Supreme Court's decision in Recio II. The logical issue raised by the Supreme Court's overruling of Cruz in Recio II is whether the evidence of appellants' post-seizure involvement in the single-load conspiracy was sufficient for a rational jury to convict the appellants on this basis. However, because use of the Cruz rule in the second trial amounted to plain error, we do not address this issue ourselves, but rather remand for a third trial under post- Cruz conspiracy principles. 14 Appellants' second trial and our decision in Recio I reversing appellants' convictions for the single-load conspiracy were both predicated on the Cruz rule. The second trial was required solely because of the failure to address Cruz in the first trial, and the framework of the second trial was dictated by Cruz. The Government introduced new evidence designed to prove that the defendants were involved in the conspiracy prior to the drug seizure. Appellants tailored their defense strategy around the Cruz rule, challenging the government's evidence only as it applied to pre-seizure involvement in the single-load conspiracy. Finally, the jury instructions in the second trial included an instruction based on Cruz: 15 A defendant may only be found guilty of the conspiracy charged in the indictment if he joined the conspiracy at a time when it was possible to achieve the objective of that conspiracy. 16 Therefore, if you find beyond reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, the sole object of which was the possession with intent to deliver and/or the delivery of the controlled substances seized by the authorities in Las Vegas, Nevada on November 18, 1997, a defendant may be found guilty of that conspiracy only if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant joined or became a member of the conspiracy prior to 1:18 a.m. on November 18, 1997. 17 Under this instruction, the jury was barred from convicting Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza for the single-load conspiracy if it found that the defendants joined the conspiracy only after the drugs were seized by the government. 18 Neither party objected to the application of the Cruz rule at the second trial or on appeal in Recio I, and neither party argues on remand from Recio II that use of the Cruz rule in the second trial requires reversal of the convictions and a new trial. Since this case is on direct appeal, we have authority to review only for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)(A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.); United States v. Portillo-Mendoza, 273 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.2001). In reviewing for plain error, we apply the four-part test set forth in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). To notice error under Rule 52(b), we must find that (1) there is error; (2) it was plain; and (3) the error affected substantial rights. Id. at 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770. If these conditions are met, we may notice the forfeited error only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the four-part plain error test set forth in Olano applies on direct appeal even where an intervening change in the law is the source of the error. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-68, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); see also United States v. Keys, 133 F.3d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc), as amended by 143 F.3d 479 and 153 F.3d 925. Therefore, the fact that there was no reason for either party to object to the Cruz framework during the second trial or on appeal is not grounds for reviewing the trial error under the Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) harmless error standard. Keys, 133 F.3d at 1286. 4 19 The first prong of the Olano test is met in this case, since it is beyond question that if [appellants'] trial occurred today, inclusion of the Cruz -based jury instruction would be in error. See Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The second prong of the test is also met. Error is plain where it is clear and obvious. United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d 957, 962 (9th Cir.2000). Where a legal doctrine is overruled by the Supreme Court, the district court's error in applying that doctrine below is plain. As the Court held in Johnson, in a case such as this — where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal — it is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration. 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544; see also United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1118 (9th Cir.2002). 20 In applying the third prong of the Olano test, we conduct a harmless error inquiry in order to determine if the error was prejudicial to the defendant. United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1999), as amended by 204 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.2000); Minore, 292 F.3d at 1118-19. 5 In most cases, the third prong of the Olano test requires that we determine whether the error in question was prejudicial, in the sense that it `affected the outcome of the district court proceedings' in a manner that violated the substantial rights of the defendant. United States v. Jimenez-Dominguez, 296 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770); United States v. Fuchs, 218 F.3d at 962. In one sense, the use of the Cruz framework in the second trial did not prejudice Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza. As the government correctly points out, the rule required the government to prove more than is required following Recio II. However, the effect of the erroneous framework of the second trial is apparent when viewed in conjunction with our determination that there is insufficient evidence for a rational jury to convict the appellants of the single-load conspiracy based on pre-seizure involvement. Were we now to review the evidence presented at the second trial and determine that there is legally sufficient evidence to show that appellants joined the conspiracy after the drug seizure, we would uphold appellants' conviction on a basis that the jury was barred from reaching. 6 21 The Supreme Court has distinguished between structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by `harmless-error' standards, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), and trial errors that occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented. Id. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. 1246. This Circuit has defined structural error as an error that permeate[s] the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end, or affect[s] the framework within which the trial proceeds. Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir.1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Walters, 309 F.3d 589, 593 (9th Cir.2002). We have previously indicated, without holding, that where a fault in the trial proceedings constitutes a structural error, the third prong of the Olano test is satisfied, and a specific showing of prejudice is not necessary. United States v. Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc); see also Johnson, 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (stating that in assessing the third prong of the Olano test, petitioner's argument that the failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is `structural error' becomes relevant, and assuming arguendo that the error affected substantial rights). At least two other circuits have recognized that structural errors satisfy the third prong of the Olano test. See United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 646-47 (4th Cir.1996). We now join these circuits and hold that a finding of structural error satisfies the third prong of the Olano test. 22 In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a deficient reasonable-doubt instruction constitutes a structural error and is not subject to harmless-error analysis. The Court first noted that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial includes, of course, as its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding. Id. at 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078. A deficient reasonable doubt instruction, the Court then held, vitiates all the jury's findings. Id. at 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (emphasis in original). Therefore, the faulty reasonable doubt instruction in question could not be cured because [t]he Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual finding of guilty. Id. at 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078 (citing Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946)). Sullivan's logic in this regard applies with even greater force where there was no jury finding at all.  Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1117 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (emphasis in original), cert. granted in part, 540 U.S. 1045, 124 S.Ct. 833, 157 L.Ed.2d 692 (2003) (03-526). 23 When viewed in conjunction with our determination that there was insufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that appellants joined the conspiracy pre-seizure, the Cruz framework employed in the second trial constituted structural error. The application of the Cruz rule affect[ed] the framework within which the trial proceed[ed]. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246. The government tailored its evidence around the Cruz rule, appellants based their defense strategy on the Cruz rule, and the trial court instructed the jury based on the Cruz rule. The jury was barred from convicting if it found that the appellants joined the conspiracy only after the government seized the drug shipment. Thus, for purposes of the question now before us — whether there is sufficient evidence to find that appellants joined the conspiracy post-seizure — there is no jury finding for us to affirm or reverse. We may not direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the evidence. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078. 24 The fundamental nature of the trial error in this case distinguishes it from those cases in which an acknowledged element of the offense was argued at trial but submitted to the trial judge rather than the jury for determination. The latter type of error is subject to harmless error review. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (applying harmless error review to failure to submit materiality element of a tax fraud charge to jury); United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558, 568-69 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc) (applying harmless error review to failure to charge drug quantity in indictment and submit it to the jury for purposes of sentencing); Keys, 133 F.3d at 1286-87 (applying harmless error review to failure to submit materiality element of perjury charge to jury). In cases involving a single element of the charged crime that is submitted to the wrong trier of fact, the defendant has had opportunity and reason to challenge the element at trial. See Keys, 133 F.3d at 1287 (Keys had an opportunity to argue materiality in his perjury case, albeit to the judge rather than the jury.); see also Buckland, 289 F.3d at 572 (citing as basis for ruling in Keys that the defendant failed to contest the element as part of his defense). 25 This case is also not like those where the trial court's jury instructions misstate or omit one element of the charged crime. See Perez, 116 F.3d at 847 n. 11 (holding that it is not structural error for a trial court to omit a necessary element from its jury instructions). The trial judge's error in this case was not limited to one element of conspiracy. Instead, the erroneous instruction prevented the jury from considering an entire category of evidence — evidence of post-seizure involvement — as relevant to any of the elements of a single-load conspiracy. When an element is misstated or omitted, the jury is prevented only from reaching a complete verdict. Neder, 527 U.S. at 12, 13, 119 S.Ct. 1827. In this case, by contrast, the jury returned no verdict on the only theory of the case still available to the government: a single-load conspiracy proved by post-seizure evidence. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1118 n. 20 (distinguishing Neder, stating that [t]here is a vast difference between not submitting the element of materiality to the jury for decision and having no jury decision at all.). As the entire premise on which the second trial was based, the Cruz rule prevented the jury from considering the government's only viable theory of the case and, as a result, rendered the second trial an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Neder, 527 U.S. at 9, 119 S.Ct. 1827. 26 In these circumstances, harmless error review is inapplicable and the third Olano prong is satisfied. 27 Applying the fourth prong of the Olano test, we may exercise our discretion to reverse on the basis of plain error where the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The error in this case meets that standard. 7 As noted above, a finding by this court that there is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the appellants joined the conspiracy post-seizure would deny appellants their right to have a jury decide this question. See United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.2000), overruled on other grounds by Buckland, 289 F.3d at 567-68. Having carefully reviewed the record, we also cannot say that the evidence against Jimenez Recio and Lopez-Meza was overwhelming. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544(error failed to meet the fourth Olano requirement where the evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming and had been uncontroverted at trial and on appeal). The fourth Olano prong is satisfied and we exercise our discretion to remand for a new trial. 8