Opinion ID: 1671765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in impaneling jurors who had been improperly influenced by adverse media coverage, some of whom violated the court's specific instructions.

Text: ¶ 214. Two hundred and fifty veniremen were summoned to report to the Batesville Courthouse on Tuesday, January 18, 1994, and an additional two hundred and fifty were summoned to report the following Monday, January 24, 1994. Beckwith argues that the second group received no admonitions from the Court to prevent their unfettered exposure to the media of the voir dire of the first group. ¶ 215. The first group had been admonished by the Court to not read the local newspapers or otherwise expose themselves to media coverage of the case. Five of them, however, admitted having read various articles concerning the case. ¶ 216. As to the second group of veniremen, the appellant cites no authority for his contention that the trial court should have admonished jurors who had received a summons but had not yet been to court. Clearly no error occurred here because the trial court cannot admonish persons who are not in his presence. Since no authority is supported for this portion of the appellant's argument, we will not consider it on appeal. Allman v. State, 571 So.2d 244 (Miss. 1990). ¶ 217. The second part of this issue deals with the failure of the trial court to excuse for cause jurors from the first group who stated on voir dire that they had read newspaper articles or seen television newscasts about the case after being admonished by the trial court not to do so. These jurors who had some exposure to the media were as follows: Mrs. Reed said she had seen the case on the news after she had received her summons; Mr. Barksdale had seen about two minutes on Channel 3 News; Mr. Hentz had read about the jury selection for the case in the local newspaper the day after he reported for jury duty; Mrs. Stewart had read about the jury selection; and Mrs. Johnson had read about the case after receiving her summons. ¶ 218. None of these jurors said that his or her opinion would be affected by anything they had read or seen. ¶ 219. The defense asked that only Hentz and Stewart be excused for cause. They did not name the other jurors. This motion was overruled by the trial court. The trial court also denied Beckwith's motion for additional peremptory challenges. ¶ 220. Beckwith cites Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985), for his proposition that he was denied the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. In Billiot, as in the case sub judice, the trial court refused to remove several jurors for cause when asked to do so by the defendant. Citing Armstrong v. State, 214 So.2d 589 (Miss. 1968, Cert. Den. 395 U.S. 965, 89 S.Ct. 2109, 23 L.Ed.2d 750) we stated that a juror who may be removed on a challenge for cause is one against whom a cause for challenge exists that would likely affect his competency or impartiality at trial. Id. at 457. In the present case, none of the jurors ever intimated that he or she was prejudiced either for or against the defense by anything seen or heard outside the courtroom. ¶ 221. Justice Sullivan, writing in Billiot, noted that the defense had not asked for more peremptory challenges and did not exhaust those he had until the choosing of the alternate juror. We repeated the standard that generally improper failure to excuse a juror for cause is error when the defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. Beckwith, on the other hand, used all of his peremptory challenges, but not merely because the challenged jurors had read or heard something about the case after being cautioned by the Judge. The record shows that Beckwith did challenge Juror Reed because she had read news accounts in the local newspaper after being admonished not to do so. Barksdale was challenged because he was too quick to agree with the District Attorney that he would consider circumstantial evidence ... Hentz was challenged by the defense because he had read books and magazines about Medgar Evers, and based on what he read, he appreciated and admired Medgar Evers. Neither Johnson nor Stewart were challenged by the defense although they had both stated that they had read or heard about the case through the news media after receiving their summons. ¶ 222. In essence, Beckwith argues that he was forced to take Stewart on the jury. This argument is not supported by the record. The record shows that he had peremptory challenges remaining when her name came up. He chose to use those challenges on other jurors instead. Therefore, this issue is not appealable. The names of both Stewart and Hentz, the two jurors that Beckwith asked the trial court to excuse for cause, were brought up before the defendants' challenges were exhausted. Thus Billiot does not apply in this case. ¶ 223. We have also previously dealt with the issue of a trial judge refusing to excuse for cause veniremen who stated that they had been shocked, upset or bothered by what they had heard and read about a case. Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899 (Miss. 1993). In Porter, we upheld the trial judge who refused to excuse veniremen. The judge in the present case was faced with veniremen who had read a story dealing only with the selection of the jury. There was no proof in the record that any of them were in any way prejudiced toward or against the defendant. The trial court in the present case was clearly within his discretion in denying the challenges for cause. See Coverson v. State, 617 So.2d 642 (Miss. 1993). A defendant does not have the right to be tried by particular jurors so long as the panel selected to hear the case is fair and impartial. Beckwith has made no showing that his jury was in any way prejudiced against him and we therefore find no merit in this issue.