Opinion ID: 1874238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the trial court err in denying plaintiff wirtz the right to testify as to her basis for claiming mental anguish?

Text: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898 (Miss. 1981), sets forth the criteria for the imposition of damages for mental distress. Where there is something about the defendant's conduct which evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionally  or even unintentionally yet the results being reasonably foreseeable  Courts can in certain circumstances comfortably assess damages for mental and emotional stress, even though there has been no physical injury. In such instances, it is the nature of the act itself  as opposed to the seriousness of the consequences  which gives impetus to legal redress ... Also, in a case of simple, or ordinary `garden variety negligence,' even in the absence of physical injury accompanying the negligent conduct, if there is a resulting physical illness or assault upon the mind, personality or nervous system of the plaintiff which is medically cognizable and which requires or necessitates treatment by the medical profession, this Court has followed the modern tendency and held a legal cause of action exists. This assumes, of course, the test of reasonable foreseeability is also satisfactorily met. Devers, 405 So.2d at 902. See also Singleton v. Stegall, 580 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1991) (a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action may recover only those damages for emotional distress which are fairly separable from those which flow from his encounter with the law). Charlena Wirtz attempted to testify as to the mental anguish which she suffered as a result of Switzer's alleged negligence. The defendant objected to the testimony on the basis that mental anguish was not a proper subject for recovery of damages since Charlena was suing in her capacity as Executrix. The court sustained the objection. Under Devers, if the results of the alleged conduct of the defendant were reasonably foreseeable, then damages for mental distress may be proper when that conduct evokes outrage or revulsion. Here, the reasonable foreseeability test is met. It was reasonably foreseeable that Switzer's mistake might harm Charlena in her capacity as Executrix. Although it cannot be said that Switzer's conduct evoked outrage or revulsion, in a case of even simple negligence, if there is a resulting physical illness which requires medical treatment, damages for mental distress are proper. Here, the court cut off Charlena's testimony on this issue so there is no way of knowing whether she required medical treatment. Therefore, the court erred in cutting off her testimony. However, a party who wishes to preserve an issue for appeal must make a proffer. Generally, when a party seeks to offer evidence which in turn is excluded by the trial court, before we will consider the matter on appeal the party must have somehow placed in the record the nature and substance of the proffered evidence for our consideration. Harris v. Buxton T.V., Inc., 460 So.2d 828, 833 (Miss. 1984). The appellants made no proffer on the issue of mental distress. Although the court erred in disallowing the testimony, the issue was not properly preserved for appeal.