Opinion ID: 209637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The CAA provides legislative branch employees with the protection of various labor and employment statutes, and it prohibits reprisal against any covered employee who opposes any practice made unlawful by the Act. 2 U.S.C. § 1317(a). The Office of Compliance is an independent agency within the legislative branch charged with enforcing the CAA. 2 U.S.C. § 1381. The AOC argues that the CAA does not extend anti-reprisal protection to OSHA-related claims and that, accordingly, the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Duncan's claim. We disagree. As argued by the Office of Compliance, the Board had subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Duncan's claim because the express, unambiguous language of the CAA accords legislative employees anti-reprisal protection for OSHA-related claims. Section 215 of the CAA states that [e]ach employing office and each covered employee shall comply with the provisions of section 5 of [OSHA]. 2 U.S.C. § 1341. Section 5 of OSHA states, inter alia, that the employer shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards and it also requires that the employer comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under [OSHA]. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a). Thus, the CAA extends OSHA's workplace protections to legislative employees, making it unlawful for Congressional agencies to fail to comply with the substantive requirements of OSHA. Section 207(a) of the CAA states: It shall be unlawful for an employing office to intimidate, take reprisal against, or otherwise discriminate against, any covered employee because the covered employee has opposed any practice made unlawful by this Act, or because the covered employee has initiated proceedings, made a charge, or testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in a hearing or other proceeding under this Act. 2 U.S.C. 1317(a) (emphases added). Thus, the express language of the CAA accords legislative employees anti-reprisal protection for opposition to any practice made unlawful by this Act, which, as we have previously explained, extends to OSHA-related claims. The AOC argues that section 207 applies only to issues invoking the laws that are expressly mentioned in Part A of the CAA, and that because OSHA is mentioned only in Part C the anti-reprisal protections of the CAA do not extend to OSHA-related claims. Accordingly, in the AOC's view, there is no jurisdiction in the Board for OSHA-related retaliation claims. The AOC also argues that Part A's title enumerates the federal laws to which it applies and that Congress did not include the OSHA in this list. The language used by Congress in section 207, however, clearly provides that it is applicable when a covered employee opposes any practice made unlawful by this Act. Like the Board, we refuse to construe the placement of section 207(a) in Part A to trump its express language. Additionally, the AOC argues that Congress did not waive its sovereign immunity regarding OSHA-related retaliation claims and that any ambiguity regarding the applicability of section 207 to OSHA-related retaliation claims must be construed in favor of sovereign immunity. Because the CAA unambiguously extends its anti-reprisal protections to OSHA-related claims, however, there is no impediment to the waiver of sovereign immunity in this case. Finally, we note that the AOC and the Office of Compliance each argue that the legislative history of the CAA supports their respective positions as to the applicability of anti-reprisal protections to OSHA-related claims. While we agree with the Office of Compliance that the legislative history supports our conclusion that the CAA extends its anti-reprisal protections to OSHA-related claims, we do not rely on the legislative history in this case because our judicial inquiry was complete once we determined that the statutory language unambiguously resolves this issue. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003) (Our precedents make clear that the starting point for our analysis is the statutory text. And where, as here, the words of the statute are unambiguous, the `judicial inquiry is complete.' (citations omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that the Board properly determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Duncan's OSHA-related reprisal claim.