Opinion ID: 1203661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Right of Spencer to Act as Co-counsel

Text: Spencer also filed a pretrial motion requesting that he be permitted to participate as co-counsel in the presentation of his own defense. He contends that he has the constitutional right to act as co-counsel. We do not agree. Spencer, of course, has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). He also has the right to conduct his own defense. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). See also Townes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 307, 318, 362 S.E.2d 650, 656 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 971, 108 S.Ct. 1249, 99 L.Ed.2d 447 (1988). Spencer, however, did not assert his right to conduct his own defense. Instead, he asserted a hybrid right, i.e., both the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to serve as co-counsel. Under Faretta, a pro se defendant retains actual control over the case he chooses to present. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178, 104 S.Ct. 944, 951, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Indeed, control is the core of the Faretta right. Id. Conversely, when a defendant does not assert his Faretta right, counsel has control over the presentation of the case. See Townes, 234 Va. at 320, 362 S.E.2d at 657. If a defendant were permitted to act as co-counsel, however, such a hybrid representation could promote a conflict over who controls tactical trial decisions, thereby frustrating the orderly conduct of the trial.  Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit `hybrid' representation, McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183, 104 S.Ct. at 953, and we hold that no such constitutional right exists. [3] C