Opinion ID: 1057606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal Service of Process Upon Defendants Within the State of Tennessee

Text: Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(1), which governs the personal service of process on individual defendants in this state, provides as follows: The plaintiff shall furnish the person making the service with such copies of the summons and complaint as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows: (1) Upon an individual other than an unmarried infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally, or if he or she evades or attempts to evade service, by leaving copies thereof at the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, whose name shall appear on the proof of service, or by delivering the copies to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the individual served. The language of this rule makes clear that the preferred method of service upon an individual ... is clearly by delivery of the summons and complaint to the defendant personally. Robert Banks, Jr. & June F. Entman, Tennessee Civil Procedure § 2-3(d), at 2-26 (2d ed.2004). Nevertheless, personal service may also be effected upon an individual via a properly authorized agent. In any event, however, actual notice of the lawsuit is not a substitute for service of process when the Rules of Civil Procedure so require. Frye, 70 S.W.3d at 715; accord LSJ Inv. Co. v. O.L.D., Inc., 167 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir.1999). It is undisputed in this case that Constable Peckenpaugh did not serve process on Dr. Haynes personally. Rather, he delivered to Enochs the summons addressed to Dr. Haynes. Whether this constituted service of process upon Dr. Haynes hinges upon whether Enochs was an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of Dr. Haynes. In the workplace context, service is not effective when another employee whom the individual defendant has not appointed as an agent for service of process nonetheless accepts process on the defendant's behalf. In Basham v. Tillaart, No. M2002-00723-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 21780974 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 31, 2003), the plaintiff served both individual defendants through the Tennessee Secretary of State at the defendants' nursery business in Ontario, Canada. The international mail return receipts were signed by a general laborer at the nursery whose ordinary duties consisted of outside farm labor rather than office work. In the laborer's affidavit, she testified that a postman approached asking her to sign for some mail, and [i]n the bustle of activity prevailing at the moment, she signed the return receipts. Id. at . Although international law governed the question of sufficiency of process and service was insufficient under the applicable treaty, the Court of Appeals went on to state, [p]laintiff's attempted method for service of process even fails to satisfy the standard established by the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure for service within the state.  Id. at . In other words, if the defendants had worked in Tennessee and process had been served on someone in the general laborer's position, that service would have been insufficient. The court explained that, under Rule 4.04(1), personal service is the preferred method under Tennessee law and concluded that the rule does not permit[] a plaintiff to serve process by sending documents to an individual's place of business, thereafter to be receipted for by an employee who is not an authorized agent for service of process. Id. The reasoning in Basham is consistent with the holdings of decisions from other jurisdictions construing similarly worded provisions in their rules of procedure. See Babb v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 861 F.Supp. 50, 51-52 (M.D.Tenn.1993); Adams v. Gluckman, 183 Ga.App. 666, 359 S.E.2d 710, 711 (1987); Cooley v. Brawner, 881 So.2d 300, 302-03 (Miss.Ct.App.2004); Cook v. Polineni, 967 S.W.2d 687, 693 (Mo. Ct.App.1998). In these latter three medical malpractice actions, the court held that an individual physician was not effectively served by leaving the process documents at the physician's place of business with a receptionist or office manager. That service was insufficient because the recipient was not an agent authorized by appointment to receive service of process. The phrasing of the rule in Tennessee and other jurisdictions was intended to cover the situation where an individual actually appoints an agent for the purpose of receiving service. 62B Am.Jur.2d Process § 216 (2005). A principal may expressly give actual authority to the agent in direct terms, either orally or in writing. Rubio v. Precision Aerodynamics, Inc., 232 S.W.3d 738, 742-43 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006). Implied authority, by contrast, embraces all powers which are necessary to carry into effect the granted power, in order to make effectual the purposes of the agency. Id. at 743. Implied authority that the principal has actually conferred on the agent can be circumstantially established through conduct or a course of dealing between the principal and agent. Bells Banking Co. v. Jackson Ctr., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tenn.Ct. App.1996) (quoting 2A C.J.S. Agency § 153 (1972)). Implied authority must be predicated `on some act or acquiescence of the principal,' rather than the actions of the agent. Id. In the context of serving process, the record must contain evidence that the defendant intended to confer upon [the] agent the specific authority to receive and accept service of process for the defendant. Arthur v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 249 F.Supp.2d 924, 929 (E.D.Tenn.2002). Acting as the defendant's agent for some other purpose does not make the person an agent for receiving service of process. Id. Nor is the mere fact of acceptance of process sufficient to establish agency by appointment. Id. In this case, Dr. Haynes did not expressly authorize Enochs to accept service of process of lawsuits on his behalf. Enochs admitted that she did not have authority to accept service of lawsuits for Dr. Haynes. Although Enochs signed for subpoenas for medical records requests as part of her job duties, the law is clear that acting as an agent for some other purpose does not automatically make her Dr. Haynes's agent for accepting service of process. Arthur, 249 F.Supp.2d at 929. Furthermore, the mere fact that Enochs accepted service of this lawsuit does not, in and of itself, bind Dr. Haynes to the court's jurisdiction. Id.; accord Richards v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 572 F.Supp. 1168, 1173 (S.D.N.Y.1983). While some courts have relaxed the rule on agent authorization to find service on a receptionist sufficient where the individual defendant evaded or resisted service, there is no claim or evidence of such evasion or resistance by Dr. Haynes in this case. See, e.g., Frank Keevan & Son, Inc. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 665, 671 (S.D.Fla.1985). The record contradicts Plaintiff's contention that Enochs had implied authority to accept service of process based on a custom and practice of handling important papers. Enochs testified that, when she signed the summons, she did not know what she was signing but was simply complying with Peckenpaugh's request. If she had known that Peckenpaugh was serving a lawsuit, she testified that she would not have signed the summons. Rather than knowing what to do with any important papers that she received at the front desk, as Plaintiff contends, Enochs handed the summons and complaint over to Hill, her supervisor, precisely because Enochs wouldn't have known what to do with [the summons and complaint] without calling Hill. Dr. Melton testified that, to his understanding, customer service agents had signed for lawsuits during his tenure as registered agent, but he could not even identify who worked in the customer service department. Alred testified that customer service agents would sign a summons only [i]f they are not fully aware of what they are signing. Based on these undisputed facts, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the personal delivery to Enochs of the summons and complaint addressed to Dr. Haynes did not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(1). Enochs did not have express or implied authority to accept service of process on behalf of Dr. Haynes. Accordingly, Constable Peckenpaugh's delivery to Enochs of the summons addressed to Dr. Haynes did not constitute service of process on Dr. Haynes.
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(4) governs the personal service of process on corporate defendants in this state. It reads as follows: The plaintiff shall furnish the person making the service with such copies of the summons and complaint as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows: .... (4) Upon a domestic corporation, or a foreign corporation doing business in this state, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer or managing agent thereof, or to the chief agent in the county wherein the action is brought, or by delivering the copies to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of the corporation. [7] Here, Peckenpaugh delivered to Pruitt the summons addressed to MedSouth. Plaintiff does not contend that Pruitt was MedSouth's officer or managing agent or its chief agent. We need only decide, therefore, whether Pruitt was an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on behalf of a corporate defendant. And, again, actual notice does not excuse the failure to serve process in compliance with our Rules of Civil Procedure. Frye, 70 S.W.3d at 715; accord LSJ Inv. Co., 167 F.3d at 322. The rule on serving corporations through their authorized agents contemplates service on agents either expressly or impliedly appointed by the defendant organization as agents to receive process. 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1101, at 557 (3d ed.2002). [8] We have already explained above the concept of actual authority, both express and implied. As Arthur makes clear, specific authority to receive and accept service of process for the defendant is required, and mere acceptance of process in a single instance does not constitute valid service. 249 F.Supp.2d at 929. Our Court of Appeals has held, however, that a corporate defendant's registered agent may authorize a subagent to assist in performing the registered agent's duties, including the acceptance of service of process. Rubio, 232 S.W.3d at 744. In Rubio the process server delivered process to the registered agent's personal secretary. According to the process server's affidavit, the secretary represented to the process server that she had authority to accept service on the registered agent's behalf; that she had, in fact, accepted service many times in the past; and that she would transmit process to the registered agent. After reviewing the statutory scheme for a corporation's designation of its registered agent and summarizing applicable principles of Tennessee agency law, the Court of Appeals held that registered agents, individual or corporate, have implied authority to appoint subagents. Id. at 743-44. Applied to the facts of that case, the intermediate court concluded that the registered agent had actually authorized the receptionist to assist in accepting service of process, and thus personal delivery of process to the receptionist was sufficient to serve the defendant. Id. at 744. We have further stated that the apparent purpose of Rule 4.04 is to insure that process is served in a manner reasonably calculated to give a party defendant adequate notice of the pending judicial proceedings. Garland v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 658 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tenn.1983). Accordingly, service of an organizational defendant [9] may be made upon a representative so integrated with the organization that [s]he will know what to do with the papers. Generally, service is sufficient when made upon an individual who stands in such a position as to render it fair, reasonable and just to imply the authority on h[er] part to receive service. Id. at 531. In this case, MedSouth did not expressly authorize Pruitt to accept service of process of lawsuits on its behalf, based on the testimony of Alred, its administrator, and Dr. Melton, its registered agent. Pruitt admitted that she did not have authority to accept service of lawsuits. While Plaintiff contends that Pruitt had implied authority to accept service of process based on a custom and practice of handling important papers, the record contradicts this contention. Just like Enochs, Pruitt testified that, when she signed for the summons, she did not know what she was signing for. Instead, she signed for the summons at Peckenpaugh's request. While Pruitt occasionally placed other documents in a physician's box in the mail room, she testified that she did not ordinarily sign for mail. As we stated previously, Dr. Melton testified that, to his understanding, customer service agents had signed for lawsuits against MedSouth during his tenure as registered agent, but he could not even identify which individuals worked in the customer service department. Alred testified that customer service agents would sign a summons only [i]f they are not fully aware of what they are signing. Although Pruitt signed for subpoenas for medical records requests as part of her job duties, the law is clear that acting as a corporation's agent for some other purpose does not automatically make a person the corporation's agent for accepting service of process. Arthur, 249 F.Supp.2d at 929-30; 1 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 4.93, at 4-133 (3d ed.2009). Furthermore, the mere fact that Pruitt accepted service of this lawsuit does not, in and of itself, bind MedSouth to the court's jurisdiction. Arthur, 249 F.Supp.2d at 929; Richards, 572 F.Supp. at 1173. While some courts have relaxed the rule on agent authorization to find service on a receptionist sufficient where the corporation evaded or resisted service, there is no claim or evidence of such evasion or resistance by MedSouth in this case. See Amnay v. Del Labs, 117 F.Supp.2d 283, 286 (E.D.N.Y.2000). The federal cases on which Plaintiff relies are distinguishable. In Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., the court emphasized that the company was small; the receptionist [p]resumably held a commensurately large role in the company; and, when the process server asked who was authorized to accept service for the corporation, the receptionist answered that no one else was there and she was the only one in the office. 840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir. 1988). Because the facts before us differ on all of those points, the Direct Mail Specialists opinion is simply not applicable to this case. Moreover, based on the nature of Pruitt's job responsibilities, we are likewise not persuaded by Top Form Mills, Inc. v. Sociedad Nationale Industria Applicazioni Viscosa, 428 F.Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y.1977). In that case, the court denied a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process, where a secretary for the corporate defendant's New York sales representative accepted service. Id. at 1241. The secretary's duties included the endorsement of checks and preparation of correspondence to the defendant, and the process server noted on the return of service that the secretary was in charge of the office. Id. at 1251. The court concluded that the secretary was in practical effect, if not formal title, an assistant manager of [the defendant's] New York agency, and not a mere clerical employee. Id. Here, by contrast, Pruitt performed clerical work, did not have management or supervisory responsibilities, and testified that she was not an officer or managing agent of MedSouth. Indeed, according to Alred's testimony, Pruitt's responsibilities were secretarial or clerical in nature. Pruitt's job responsibilities make clear that she did not st[an]d in such a position as to render it fair, reasonable and just to imply the authority on h[er] part to receive service of process on MedSouth's behalf. See Garland, 658 S.W.2d at 531. Likewise, the record here provides no support for the kind of subagency relationship that the Court of Appeals found in Rubio. Neither Dr. Melton nor Pruitt offered any testimony that would suggest Dr. Melton appointed Pruitt as his subagent to perform any of his duties as registered agent. Based on the undisputed facts, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the personal delivery of the summons and complaint to Pruitt did not comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(4). Pruitt was neither an agent authorized to receive service of process for MedSouth nor a subagent of the registered agent, Dr. Melton. Accordingly, Plaintiff's attempt to effectuate service of process on MedSouth through Constable Peckenpaugh was unsuccessful.