Opinion ID: 1882225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Right to Counsel Waiver

Text: Worthy and McKinnis argue that their waivers of their right to an attorney were invalid. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to an attorney. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that: The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.     The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). This right to an attorney may be waived if the waiver is competent and intelligent. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Whether a waiver of a constitutional right is valid depends upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Id. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019. This court will only overturn a trial court's finding of a valid waiver of a defendant's right to counsel if that finding is clearly erroneous. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168-69 (Minn. 1997). A defendant who seeks to waive the right to counsel should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that `he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). We have cautioned that to determine whether a waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, trial courts should comprehensively examine the defendant regarding the defendant's comprehension of the charges, the possible punishments, mitigating circumstances, and any other facts relevant to the defendant's understanding of the consequences of the waiver. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 173. In State v. Brodie , this court was presented with circumstances that demonstrated a valid waiver by the defendant even when a detailed on-the-record colloquy between the defendant and the trial court was absent. 532 N.W.2d 557, 557 (Minn.1995). In Brodie, the defendant wanted to fire his appointed attorney, so the trial court asked the defendant whether he would like to proceed with the original appointed attorney or represent himself. State v. Brodie, 529 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Minn.App.), rev'd, 532 N.W.2d 557 (Minn.1995). Opting to represent himself, the defendant responded, I guess I've got no choice. Id. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred by failing to make a showing on the record that the defendant was aware of the consequences of self-representation. Id. at 400. We reversed the court of appeals, stating: This is not a case in which the record is silent on whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Defendant was in fact given counsel and he then fired counsel. The record is clear that defendant knew that he did not have a right to a different public defender but would have to represent himself if he did not accept the services of the public defender. Brodie, 532 N.W.2d at 557. Likewise, in this case, although the trial court's on-the-record inquiry regarding waiver did not include a recitation of the charges or potential punishments, it is clear that Worthy and McKinnis were in fact given counsel and then unequivocally fired their attorneys. When they did so, they were fully aware of the consequences. Worthy and McKinnis were provided with competent legal representation for over a month before trial and took full advantage of that representation up until the morning of their scheduled trial date. When a defendant has consulted with an attorney prior to waiver, a trial court could reasonably presume that the benefits of legal assistance and the risks of proceeding without it had been described to defendant in detail by counsel. State v. Jones, 266 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn.1978). Furthermore, Worthy and McKinnis knew that they would be expected to conduct their own defense if they chose to fire their attorneys. The trial court warned Worthy and McKinnis that if they insisted on firing their attorneys, who were prepared to proceed, it would not grant a continuance but instead they would have to represent themselves. The court further explained to Worthy and McKinnis that if they chose to proceed pro se, they would be held to the same standard as the attorneys and would be expected to call and examine witnesses. Further, Worthy and McKinnis were familiar with the criminal justice system. Worthy had five prior felony convictions and McKinnis had four prior felony convictions. McKinnis admitted that he had seen a lot of trials of late and that he had been around the block a couple of times. Although knowledgeable, both Worthy and McKinnis were still steadfast in their decision to fire counsel. We also note that Worthy and McKinnis dismissed their counsel because they were unhappy with counsels' rather bleak but candid assessment of their case. However, attorneys have a duty to render candid advice to clients. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 2.1, cmt. A defendant's refusal, without good cause, to allow appointed counsel to continue representation may by itself be sufficient to find a valid waiver. See State v. Krejci, 458 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Minn.1990). See also Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 173 (concluding that defendant's request for another attorney before choosing self-representation will not preclude a valid waiver, particularly when the defendant is aware that he has no right to a different attorney and must proceed pro se upon rejection of the appointed attorney's assistance). Worthy's and McKinnis's dissatisfaction with the opinion of their counsel was not good cause to fire counsel on the morning of trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that Worthy and McKinnis waived their right to counsel.