Opinion ID: 377122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: allegations of perjury

Text: 9 Appellants' principal claim is that the prosecution knowingly allowed its chief witness, George Purvis, Jr., to testify falsely that he had received no offer of leniency in exchange for his cooperation. They contend there was a two-fold deal struck in a related investigation in the Southern District of Florida, and Purvis' emphatic denial of this arrangement at trial, supported by the prosecutor's arguments and continued refusal to acknowledge it, deprived appellants of a fair trial under principles set forth in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1976). 2 10 The district judge heard testimony on this issue from the Justice Department attorney in charge of the Florida investigation, the Assistant United States Attorney who handled the North Carolina prosecution, and defendants' counsel. In its Memorandum of Decision of December 22, 1978, the court found: 11 (The Florida) investigation was separate and apart from the investigation surrounding the seizure of marijuana in the Eastern District of North Carolina. Purvis cooperated by providing valuable information to the DEA agents in Florida and performed in an exemplary fashion while working undercover for the DEA. In return for Purvis' cooperation the United States Attorney's office in Florida decided not to prosecute Purvis, although Purvis was never told of that decision. However, the DEA officials and the United States Attorney's office in Florida did promise to make Purvis' cooperation with them known to this court in North Carolina at the time of his sentencing following his guilty plea to the charges brought against him in this state. This was in exchange for Purvis' cooperation regarding the Florida investigations, and was not conditioned on Purvis' cooperation with the authorities in North Carolina. 12 We find no basis for disputing these findings, and find them dispositive of appellants' claim. 13 Assuming the North Carolina prosecutor had constructive, if not actual knowledge of these facts, 3 we are nevertheless unable to conclude that a new trial was required under Napue, Giglio and Boone. The intent of those holdings is not to punish the prosecutor; rather the primary concern is that the jury not be misled by the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony. 4 The critical question is whether the undisclosed promise was material, i. e., whether the purported false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury. Boone, supra, at 451, quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. at 104, 92 S.Ct. at 766. 14 When the terms of a deal between the government and a witness create a motive for falsification, the jury's perception of the witness' testimony is likely to be affected. Cases such as Giglio, Napue and Boone illustrate situations where the prospect of immunity or favorable treatment awaited the witness at the conclusion of trial if his performance on the stand was favorable to the government. We think it obvious that promises of immunity or leniency premised on cooperation in a particular case may provide a strong inducement to falsify in that case. 15 This is a very different situation. Nothing was promised in exchange for Purvis' testimony in this case. Herman Gaskins, the Assistant United States Attorney in North Carolina, repeatedly refused to promise anything in exchange for Purvis' testimony, nor did he hint that his aid might be forthcoming depending on the outcome. Although government officials in Florida promised to bring Purvis' cooperation there to the attention of the sentencing judge in North Carolina in exchange for his cooperation in Florida, this promise was not conditioned on cooperation in this case. 5 16 We do not think the circumstances of Purvis' cooperation in Florida created a substantial motive for falsification in this case. 17 Whatever impact the Florida deal might have had on the jury is further diminished when the government's evidence is viewed in its entirety. Although Purvis was undoubtedly a key witness, other testimony provided independent proof of guilt. 18 Co-conspirator Lee Smith 6 testified at length about his participation in the operation, beginning with the unsuccessful attempt to rescue the Presidential's cargo. He personally assisted Meinster in setting up radio monitoring equipment in the Wilmington Hilton and participated, along with Meinster and others, in various monitoring, planning and support activities on the final day of the operation. And it was Smith who was arrested during the offloading and after his arrest received financial assistance from Platshorn and Meinster. 19 Smith provided substantial independent proof of appellants' guilt. In addition, the government offered extensive documentary evidence to corroborate the testimony of both Purvis and Smith. We think this evidence was more than sufficient to offset any conceivable impeachment value inherent in Purvis' arrangement with the government authorities in Florida. 20 Finally, we think appellants' prior knowledge of the Florida deal precludes our granting the relief they seek. On or before the first day of trial, defense counsel spoke to Walt Schroeder of the Department of Justice in Miami and was informed there was a deal in Florida. Counsel then asked U. S. Attorney Gaskins if there were any deals, and he again insisted there were none. Defense counsel took no further action on the matter, and made no attempt to obtain as a witness any of the Florida officials or take the matter to the trial judge. Thus, defendants had information from the very office that made the deal with Purvis, yet were content to accept until after trial the denials of the North Carolina prosecutor. 7 We think appellants waived their objection to Purvis' testimony by waiting until after trial to bring the question to the attention of the trial judge. 8 United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir.), cert. den., 419 U.S. 1069, 95 S.Ct. 655, 42 L.Ed.2d 665 (1974); United States ex rel. Regina v. LaVallee, 504 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. den. 420 U.S. 947, 95 S.Ct. 1330, 43 L.Ed.2d 425 (1975); see also Brown v. United States, 556 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1977). 21