Opinion ID: 3165208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: preculusion of sassan khoubyari’s testimony

Text: Javidan asserts that the district court’s decision to preclude, as hearsay, her husband, Sassan Khoubyari (“Khounyari”), from testifying about an alleged meeting he had with Acure’s attorneys constituted reversible error. We disagree.
During the government’s direct examination of Shahab, he testified about a February 2009 meeting with Javidan, Khoubyari, and another individual. At the meeting, Shahab discussed how his companies, Patient Choice and All American, along with Javidan’s company, Acure, would create fraudulent marketer contracts and invoices to give the appearance that the marketers were paid hourly, as opposed to per patient.8 Khoubyari testified in Javidan’s defense, and he stated that Javidan was not present at the meeting. He alleged that at this meeting he met with attorneys who provided him with legal advice, which he relayed to Javidan. The government objected after Javidan’s counsel asked him to detail the advice he relayed to Javidan. The district court sustained the government’s objection. Subsequently, Javidan’s counsel submitted a memorandum of law that argued that Khoubyari should be allowed to testify about his version of what was said at the meeting. Specifically, it argued that his testimony should be allowed because (1) Javidan had a right to impeach Shahab’s testimony about the meeting, (2) Javidan’s Confrontation Clause rights would be violated, and (3) the proposed testimony was not hearsay. The government responded, arguing that (1) “Javidan could not impeach an earlier witness by offering hearsay testimony through a later witness,” (2) Javidan had the full ability to exercise her right to confront Shahab, and (3) Khoubyari’s proposed testimony would constitute inadmissible hearsay. 8 In February 2009 the State of Michigan asked Patient Care to provide its marketer contracts, which allegedly prompted the meeting. Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 16 In a written order, the district court ruled that Khoubyari’s proposed testimony was not admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 802 or 608(b) and that prohibiting Khoubyari’s proposed testimony would not offend the Confrontation Clause.
When examining a district court’s evidentiary determinations, we review de novo conclusions of law and review for clear error any factual determinations that underpin the district court’s legal conclusions. United States v. Baker, 458 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 2006). As to the district court’s hearsay determination, we review that decision de novo because it calls for us to decide “whether evidence offered at trial constituted hearsay within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence.” See id. (quoting Field v. Trigg County Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735 (6th Cir. 2004)). In arguing that Khoubyari’s proposed testimony was not hearsay, Javidan states that the testimony would prove “a different version of what [] Javidan did.” (Appellant Br. 26.) Specifically, she goes on to propose that, if a jury were to accept Mr. Khoubyari’s testimony that, rather than being about falsification of invoices of backdating of contracts, the meeting featured attorneys talking about the legal ways of paying marketers, then it would have a different view of Ms. Javidan’s guilty knowledge than if it accepted Mr. Shahab’s version of the meeting. (Appellant Br. 26.) Respectfully, we conclude that Javidan is mistaken. Proposing that the jury should accept Khoubyari’s version of events, as opposed to Shahab’s, is an implicit admission that Khoubyari’s testimony was offered to prove the truth of the matter it asserted. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(b). Javidan argues that she offered the testimony to prove her “state of mind.” (See Appellant Br. 27.) But her brief makes clear that she put her husband on the stand to offer a different version of the meeting than the one that was offered by Shahab. Therefore, the proffered testimony was hearsay. Nos. 13-2598/2599 United v. Meda, et al. Page 17 We also find that even if this proffered testimony was not hearsay, the district court’s decision not to admit it constituted harmless error. Due the abundance of incriminating evidence against Javidan in the record, Khoubyari’s testimony would not have changed the outcome of the trial. See McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The harmless error standard calls for reversal when the appellate court lacks a fair assurance that the outcome of a trial was not affected by evidentiary error.”) (citations omitted).