Opinion ID: 655313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hours reasonably spent on litigation

Text: 13 The party seeking attorneys' fees must present adequately documented time records to the court. Using this time as a benchmark, the court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 432-34, 103 S.Ct. at 1939; Von Clark, 916 F.2d at 259. The hours surviving this vetting process are those reasonably expended on the litigation. 14 Here, the court considered each time entry documented by Appellants. From the total billable hours, the court disallowed 274 hours spent on lobbying-related activities, 230 hours of travel time, 86.87 hours of pre-litigation time which the court considered excessive, 125.4 hours the court characterized as duplicative or excessive, and four hours spent on press conferences. Watkins, 807 F.Supp. at 412-14. We find no reversible error in the district court's analysis.a. Lobbying Activity 15 Prior to filing suit, Appellants spent significant time lobbying the Mississippi Legislature and the Attorney General. Appellants contend they should be compensated for this time. We disagree. 16 Under §§ 1973l(e) and 1988, the district court may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in any action or proceeding. Prevailing parties may recover only that time reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. While prevailing parties may be compensated for time spent preparing to file suit, they may not recover for their pre-litigation participation in the preclearance process under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Craig v. Gregg County, 988 F.2d 18, 21 (5th Cir.1993). 17 Similarly, time spent lobbying a state legislature before filing a lawsuit is not time reasonably expended on the litigation. In Webb v. Board of Ed. of Dyer County, the Supreme Court held that the district court could, in its discretion, disallow time spent pursuing optional administrative remedies. 471 U.S. 234, 244, 105 S.Ct. 1923, 1929, 85 L.Ed.2d 233 (1985). Lobbying resembles such an optional remedy. Instead of filing suit, individuals may seek relief through the political process. While, at times, it may be advisable to pursue political alternatives before resorting to litigation, these activities, occurring before the initiation of a lawsuit, are not within the purview of litigation. See generally id. at 242-43, 105 S.Ct. at 1928. Furthermore, Appellants did not show that any discrete portion of the work product from the [lobbying] was work that was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the civil rights litigation to the stage it reached before settlement. Id. at 243, 105 S.Ct. at 1928-29. Because pre-litigation lobbying is not a necessary precursor to the filing of a lawsuit, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it deducted these hours during its lodestar analysis. 18 b. Press Conferences 19 This circuit has not yet decided whether prevailing parties may recover attorneys' fees for time spent holding press conferences. The district court opined that time spent on press conferences is not spent on the litigation. Watkins, 807 F.Supp. at 413. The Ninth Circuit, however, has allowed recovery when a prevailing party shows that the press conferences contributed, directly and substantially, to the attainment of [the party's] litigation goals. Davis v. San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir.1992), vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.1993). Without considering the merits of either position, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's exclusion of the press-conference hours, because Appellants did not present any evidence regarding the efficacy of the press conferences, nor did they offer to present such evidence in their request for an evidentiary hearing. 20 c. Other hours excluded 21 We find no error in the district court's exclusion of time it considered inadequately documented, excessive, or duplicative. Appellants did not adequately document their travel time. Watkins, 807 F.Supp. at 413 n. 11 (The court ... is ... at a complete loss to divine where or why Mr. Rhodes was traveling during these 224 hours.); see Von Clark, 916 F.2d at 260 ([T]ime and time again this court has admonished attorneys ... to keep careful time records so that the court may determine if the hours submitted are reasonable.). Concerning the time the court characterized as excessive or duplicative, we defer to the court's experience and understanding of the case. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941.