Opinion ID: 374663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Goals and Targets

Text: 40 FOP makes a broad attack on the use of hiring and promotional goals in the consent decree, relying on Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The attack appears to be concentrated on the use of percentage goals or targets per se, although their appropriateness and reasonableness in this particular case are also questioned.
41 At this point in the history of the fight against discrimination, it cannot be seriously argued that there is any insurmountable barrier to the use of goals or quotas 26 to eradicate the effects of past discrimination. See Detroit Police Officers' Association v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S.Ct. 225, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975); Rios v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Masonry Contractors Association of Memphis, Inc., 497 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974), modified, 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895, 95 S.Ct. 173, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974); Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Commission of the City of New York, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1971, 40 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1997, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975); United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam); United States v. Local Union No. 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, Local Union No. 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2773, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851, 93 S.Ct. 63, 34 L.Ed.2d 94 (1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2045, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984, 92 S.Ct. 447, 30 L.Ed.2d 367 (1971); Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 98, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971); United States v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943, 91 S.Ct. 245, 27 L.Ed.2d 248 (1970); Local 53 of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969). To the contrary, affirmative relief is required to ensure that the effects of past discrimination are negated. In Morrow, supra, this court held, en banc, that a decree which resulted in an increase in the number of black patrolmen on the Mississippi Highway Patrol from four to six was insufficient. We insisted that the District Court fashion an appropriate decree which would have the certain result of increasing the number of blacks on the Highway Patrol. We suggested to the District Court several of the various forms of affirmative relief which might be appropriate: hiring ratios, hiring pools, or a freeze on white hiring. We recognized the need for the plaintiffs and defendants to fully cooperate with each other and with the District Court. 42 No decision of the Supreme Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be color blind. See Bakke, supra, 438 U.S. at 336, 98 S.Ct. at 2772 (opinion of Justice Brennan). The Supreme Court has unanimously rejected a statute mandating color blindness on the ground that it would prevent District Courts from fashioning appropriate decrees. See North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45, 91 S.Ct. 1284, 1285, 28 L.Ed.2d 586 (1971). Race must be considered, the Supreme Court said. Id. at 46, 91 S.Ct. at 1286. Race-conscious plans have also been approved by the Supreme Court in, for example, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 91 S.Ct. 1287, 28 L.Ed.2d 582 (1971); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225, 89 S.Ct. 1670, 23 L.Ed.2d 263 (1971); and Green v. New Kent County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). 43 Thus, unless the Supreme Court's decision in Bakke spells the doom of the use of racial and sexual goals by municipal employers, 27 prior precedent compels us to conclude that hiring and promotional goals are not per se unconstitutional, illegal, or against public policy. 44 We frankly admit that we are not entirely sure what to make of the various Bakke opinions. In over one hundred and fifty pages of United States Reports, the Justices have told us mainly that they have agreed to disagree. In addition, we now know that Mr. Bakke must be admitted to the Medical School at the University of California at Davis, but that this does not mean that all affirmative action is doomed. If we wished to delay voluntary efforts by municipal employers to achieve equality of employment opportunity for all persons regardless of race, national origin, or sex, we would have no trouble finding language in the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell supporting the position that, as a constitutional matter, race cannot be used as a factor in a selection process unless constitutional or statutory violations have been proved. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2755, 2757, 2758 (opinion of Justice Powell). However, this was the view of Justice Powell alone; the four Justices who agreed with his result in the case found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue. Moreover, we read his opinion to deny that specific findings of past illegal conduct are constitutionally required before a public employer can base decisions on race. 45 First, Mr. Justice Powell states explicitly that the decision does not call into question congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as consent decrees under Title VII. 98 S.Ct. at 2755 n.41 (emphasis added). Not only is the factual situation in employment discrimination cases materially different from that involved in Bakke, see id. at 2754, but also there has been detailed legislative consideration of the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations, id. at 2755 n.41, particular administrative bodies have been charged with detecting violations and formulating remedies, id., and there is a legislative mandate to remove barriers to equality of employment opportunities. Id. at 2758. 28 46 Moreover, the opinion of Justice Powell suggests that the Congressional findings of discrimination in employment accompanying the passage of Title VII are sufficient to justify race-conscious remedies. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2758 n.44 (opinion of Justice Powell). This conclusion is supported by Mr. Justice Powell's citation with approval of two cases involving affirmative action remedies imposed under Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), reprinted following 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e at 281 (West 1974), without detailed findings of past discrimination. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2754-55 (opinion of Justice Powell), citing Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854, 92 S.Ct. 98, 30 L.Ed.2d 95 (1971); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altschuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957, 94 S.Ct. 1971, 40 L.Ed.2d 307 (1974). In neither of these cases were detailed findings of past discrimination by the employer relied on to support the affirmative action plan; rather, the remedies were based on underutilization of minorities by labor organizations and the general findings supporting the Executive Order. In neither case were there findings of specific instances of identified past discrimination. 47 In the instant case, the Department of Justice made a determination, based on its investigation of the employment practices of the City of Miami, that there was a pattern and practice of discriminatory employment practices in the City of Miami. 29 By signing the consent decree, the Department of Justice gave its administrative approval to the remedy chosen. Nothing more is constitutionally required by the opinion of Mr. Justice Powell. To conclude otherwise would require parties in agreement over a proposed remedial plan to put on a trial neither desires to convince a judge to approve their proposed plan. 48 It is clear that, under the views of the other four Justices 30 who reached the constitutional issue, the only possible obstacle to affirmative relief of the type here proposed would be a determination that the specific plan is unreasonable. See Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2792 (opinion of Justice Brennan). 31 They correctly prognosticated the precise problem we face today: 49 Indeed, the requirement of a judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial actions would be self-defeating. Such a requirement would severely undermine efforts to achieve voluntary compliance with the requirements of law. And, our society and jurisprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law. Judicial intervention is a last resort to achieve cessation of illegal conduct or the remedying of its effects rather than a prerequisite to action. 50 Bakke, supra, 98 S.Ct. at 2786 (opinion of Justice Brennan). 51 Moreover, Justice Brennan noted that the presence or absence of past discrimination is largely irrelevant to resolving respondent's constitutional claims, id. at 2787, because the whites and males affected by affirmative action are innocent of past discrimination. Thus, while it may be fair to punish an employer or educational institution by interfering with its free selection processes only if it has been guilty of past discrimination, the wrongdoing of the institution is largely unrelated to the expectations of nonminority workers or applicants. 52 We thus conclude that at least under the views of the five Justices who reached the constitutional issue in Bakke, the consent decree here is constitutional so long as the remedy was reasonable. To that question we now turn.
53 A stipulation was entered between the United States and the City of Miami concerning the statistical composition of the workforce of the City of Miami on September 2, 1976. It was presented to the district court along with the joint motion of the City and the United States seeking re-entry of the consent decree. The FOP has not challenged the stipulated statistics. 54 These statistics show that of the 911 black males employed by the City on September 2, 1976, 680 just less than 75%, were employed as maintenance workers. For white males, the corresponding figure was 10%. Conversely, the job categories official/administrative, professionals, technicians, and protective service collectively employed almost 79% of the white male city workers, but only about 15% of the black employees. This disparity in job categories was directly reflected in a striking disparity in earnings between white and black males. Approximately 53.4% of the white males employed by the City earned an annual salary in excess of $16,000, as compared to 6.8% of the black males. Fully 64% of the black males earned less than $13,000 per year; only 17.2% of the white males earned salaries in this range. 55 The statistics speak just as plainly for female and Spanish-surnamed employees. The labor force in Miami is 46.9% Spanish-surnamed, but this category makes up only about 11% of City employees. For women, the corresponding figures are 44% and 16%. Only 17.4% of Spanish-surnamed males employed by the City and only 7% of the females, earned more than $16,000 per year (compared to 53.4% of the white males). 56 These statistics present an overwhelming prima facie case of discriminatory employment practices. 32 See, e. g., Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In Teamsters, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that statistics are competent in proving employment discrimination. Id., 97 S.Ct. at 1856. 57 Of course, statistics do not tell the whole story. There may well be an explanation other than intentional racial or sexual discrimination for some or all of these statistical disparities. But, as the Supreme Court has recently pointed out, statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are often a tell-tale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a workforce more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired. Teamsters, 97 S.Ct. at 1857 n.20. 58 The hiring and promotional goals established by the decree are substantially related to ending the long-standing pattern of discrimination evidenced by these statistics. The ultimate goal is to obtain percentages of blacks, Spanish-surnamed individuals, and women generally consistent with their percentages in the community. The interim entry level goals appear to be set below those levels, 33 presumably reflecting the parties' belief that for the immediate future there may be an inadequate supply of qualified minority and female applicants. Black, Latin, and female employees who were initially assigned to jobs traditionally assigned to members of those groups are given preference in filling vacancies in the City workforce, but these rights are limited so as not to unnecessarily trammel the opportunities of white male employees. 34 59 The consent decree explicitly provides that (i)n no event shall the City be required to hire unnecessary personnel, to hire, transfer or promote a person who is not qualified, or to hire, transfer or promote a less qualified person, in preference to a better qualified person, consistent with the provisions of this decree. The major exception to this provision is that members of the affected class who are the most senior applicants for vacant positions are given preference over persons not members of the affected class, unless the non-member has demonstrably superior qualifications. These provisions appear to us to be entirely reasonable. The members of the affected class (identified victims of discrimination, blacks and Latins who were initially assigned to traditionally black or Latin jobs, and women who were initially assigned to traditionally female jobs) are precisely those who were, or are members of the class most likely to have been, victims of discrimination. The preference is limited to one successful promotion or transfer, a preference that might still leave some victims of discrimination behind their rightful places. 60 Moreover, the affirmative relief is temporary. The trial court retains jurisdiction to make other appropriate orders. When the objectives of the decree have been met, it will be dissolved. In the interim, if any provisions of the decree prove to be unduly burdensome to non-minority workers, the court can make whatever adjustments are necessary. 61 Therefore, because we find the goals established to be substantially related to the legitimate goal of ending the long-standing pattern or practice of discrimination alleged by the United States, because the plan does not require the promotion of unqualified persons, because the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white male employees or act as an absolute bar to their advancement, and because it is temporary, we can easily find that it is a reasonable effort at a solution to a difficult problem.