Opinion ID: 200115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Suspension Without Pay

Text: 29 Finally, Gonzalez points to Mr. Mercado's rejection of her alternative proposals for repaying the $6,000 loan; i.e., through payroll deductions or by tendering valuable artwork in lieu of cash. Mr. Mercado suspended Gonzalez for acting in bad faith, presumably because she had insisted, a mere seven days earlier, that Mr. Mercado draw up a repayment agreement. Inasmuch as Gonzalez was well aware on June 20 that she was in serious financial straits, her contention that she reasonably expected to obtain a bank loan within seven days seems suspect at best. As for her belated alternative repayment proposal, Gonzalez tendered no evidence that she possessed artwork with a ready fair-market value approaching $6,000. Cf., e.g., Wootton v. Ravkind (In re Dixon), 143 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1992) (noting market value of artwork often speculative). 30 With regard to her contention that El Dia displayed an age-based animus by declining to allow her to repay the $6,000 debt in installments, Gonzalez cites but one instance in which El Dia ever allowed an employee an extension on the original repayment schedule. Moreover, in that case the employee was obligated to repay a mere $200, mistakenly disbursed by El Dia in the first instance, whereas the present record is devoid of any suggestion that El Dia mistakenly disbursed the $6,000 loan to Gonzalez. Additionally, after she accepted the advance, Gonzalez knowingly and voluntarily executed a written agreement specifying the repayment terms. See Rodriguez-Cuervos v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 181 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir.1999) (`[A] claim of disparate treatment based on comparative evidence must rest on proof that the proposed analogue is similarly situated in all material respects.') (citation omitted). 31 Further, Gonzalez asserts that Mr. Mercado demonstrated an age-based animus, in that his decision to suspend her without pay created a Catch-22; i.e., without a salary she would be unable to repay the $6,000 and return to work at El Dia, yet her prior work experience qualified her only for work as a reporter. Alternatively, were she to accept work as a reporter for a competing newspaper she would be in violation of the anti-conflict-of-interest provision in the CBA. This thesis fails the reasonable plausibility test as well. 32 First, as already noted, Gonzalez claimed that she owned artwork worth $6,000, which, if sold on the open market, would have enabled her to repay the $6,000 loan and return to work at El Dia almost immediately. Second, and more importantly, her contention that she was qualified to work only as a reporter is both conclusory and without record support. That is to say, presumably an experienced reporter would possess the requisite qualifications for various other positions requiring research and writing skills, but would not trigger the narrowly written conflict-of-interest provision in the CBA. See supra Section I. Yet Gonzalez made no attempt to demonstrate that no such positions were available in the relevant geographic area. 33 Accordingly, as it would be overly speculative to infer an age-based animus from the evidence contained in the record on appeal, the district court ruling rejecting the Rule 56 proffer by Gonzalez must be affirmed. 7