Opinion ID: 807595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial Exclusion

Text: The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court’s initial order to exclude Jones did not violate Allen because Jones had voluntarily consented to removal. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32-34. We find that this holding rests on an “unreasonable determination of the facts” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2), but that any Allen error in excluding Jones was nonetheless harmless. This claim therefore provides no basis for granting the writ. The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that the trial court had ordered Jones removed because Jones had requested to leave, and not because he was disruptive. Id. With respect, we find that this holding cannot reasonably be reconciled with the trial transcript.1 On the morning of February 3, before the jury arrived, Jones’s counsel indicated that Jones disputed the court’s ruling of the previous day regarding Minnifield’s 1 The trial transcript is the same evidence upon which the state supreme court relied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (providing that a writ “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding” (emphasis added)). 14 testimony. After the court declined to reconsider the ruling and Jones had a chance to consult with his counsel, counsel stated: Mr. Jones is indicating to me, Your Honor – and I’ve tried to explain to him that as a result of what he considered to be this – the prejudicial impact of Miss Minnifield’s testimony that as a result of that he would choose personally at this point not to go further with the proceedings. Counsel also indicated that he had told Jones that there was “no legal way to interrupt, continue, stop the proceedings.” Jones interrupted, stating, “Your Honor, I – I don’t even want to be here then.” The court then engaged Jones in a discussion about whether he actually wished to remove himself from the courtroom. The court warned Jones that “[t]he case is going to proceed, you know, without you,” that Jones was “going to be prejudiced by this,” and repeatedly asked if Jones understood what he was doing. The colloquy, which spans more than four transcript pages, culminated in the following exchange, which we quote again in full due to its importance: THE COURT: Mr. Jones, you understand that you’re going to be prejudicing yourself by leaving today; you understand that? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Well, I want to – I’m going to put a motion in to dismiss counsel, then. THE COURT: No, it’s – THE DEFENDANT: For the record. THE COURT: No, Mr. Jones, we’re proceeding – THE DEFENDANT: And I’ll take my case myself. THE COURT: – we are proceeding – THE DEFENDANT: I’ll take my case myself, Your Honor. THE COURT: – that’s denied, Mr. Jones. THE DEFENDANT: I have a right, Your Honor. That’s my 15 Constitutional right. THE COURT: All right. THE DEFENDANT: You’re laughing, but I’m serious. THE COURT: Marshals, remove Mr. Jones. A MARSHAL: Let’s go, Mr. Jones. THE DEFENDANT: I’m not going nowhere, man. A MARSHAL: Come on. THE DEFENDANT: No, I’m not going nowhere. A MARSHAL: Let’s go. THE DEFENDANT: Don’t touch me. The transcript then breaks off as a “scuffle ensued” in the courtroom. After order was restored, the trial court made a record that “Mr. Jones had to be physically restrained by a number of marshals.” Reviewing the transcript, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that “it was not the defendant’s conduct that precipitated his removal,” but rather that “the trial court ordered the defendant’s removal because the defendant had requested that he be permitted to leave the courtroom, which, although inadvisable, was the defendant’s right.” State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32. The high court noted that Jones “never explicitly stated that he had changed his mind about absenting himself from the courtroom,” and observed in a footnote that “it does not appear that the trial court perceived the defendant’s request to dismiss counsel and represent himself to be a sincere one.” Id. at 33 & n.17. Respectfully, we find the Connecticut Supreme Court’s finding of fact unreasonable.2 When Jones asserted that he would like to leave, the trial court did not 2 The Connecticut Supreme Court characterized its holding on this point as a finding of fact based on the transcript. See State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 32 (“We reject this claim because it is predicated on a faulty factual premise. The record reflects that the trial court did not warn the defendant that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted in 16 accede to that request. Rather, it engaged him in a discussion of the consequences of a decision to absent himself from the trial. That was entirely proper, and indeed necessary, since a waiver of the right to be present at trial, “as the waiver of any constitutional right in a criminal proceeding, must be knowing and voluntary.” Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1319 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Tureseo, 566 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) (at least in federal cases, “[t]o establish waiver, the District Court must conduct a record inquiry to determine whether the defendant’s absence was ‘knowing and voluntary’”). A criminal defendant, who is not an expert in criminal procedure or constitutional law, must generally be advised of the consequences of waiving his rights, and be found by the court to have made a knowing and voluntary waiver, before being permitted to waive such an important right as presence at trial. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and [] we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added); cf. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (citing Zerbst and holding that a waiver of constitutional confrontation rights must be knowing misbehaving for the simple reason that it was not the defendant’s conduct that precipitated his removal.”). 17 and voluntary); see also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 484-87 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (collecting cases holding that waiver must be knowing and voluntary).3 If the trial court had concluded its colloquy, and Jones had still wished to leave the courtroom after understanding the consequences, the state supreme court’s reading of the situation would be correct. But the transcript indicates that the colloquy instead caused Jones to rethink his decision to leave the trial. Indeed, reconsideration was the intended effect of the colloquy. The trial court was correct that leaving would have prejudiced Jones by, for example, preventing him from participating in his own defense, and the entire point of advising a defendant about the consequences of a waiver is to give him the opportunity to decide whether, in light of those consequences, he persists in his desire to waive. Once the warnings had their intended effect, Jones indicated he wanted to fire his attorney and represent himself, a desire plainly inconsistent with waiving his presence in court. At a minimum, the record does not indicate that Jones had made any final decision to waive his right to be present at trial at the time the court ordered the marshals to “remove Mr. Jones.” Although the Connecticut Supreme Court correctly noted that Jones “never explicitly stated that he had changed his mind about absenting himself from the courtroom,” State v. Jones, 916 A.2d at 33, that observation cannot reasonably support a 3 Indeed, even a constructive waiver of the right to be present through disruptive behavior must in effect be knowing; in Allen, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must ordinarily be “warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior” before he may be removed. 397 U.S. at 343. 18 finding that Jones’s departure was voluntary. Indeed, to require the defendant expressly to revoke his earlier request, at least on the facts presented here, puts the burden in the wrong place. For Jones’s attempted waiver to be valid, the trial court was required to make sure that he understood the consequences of his decision, and that his waiver was knowing and intelligent. Polizzi, 926 F.2d at 1319; Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464. The trial court clearly understood this obligation, and proceeded to ask Jones whether he did indeed understand what he was doing. Since there is no indication that Jones’s initial request was knowing and intelligent, a voluntary waiver could not be sustained unless Jones reiterated his request after he was properly advised by the court. He never made such a request. To the contrary, Jones’s words and actions made clear that he did not wish to leave the courtroom. Jones’s comment about proceeding pro se, whether or not it was a “serious” request that could not be summarily denied without further inquiry, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), at a minimum indicated that Jones had rethought his decision to leave the courtroom. And certainly, the circumstances surrounding his exit do not show a man voluntarily departing. The immediate cause of his exit was the trial court’s order to the marshals, the execution of which Jones violently resisted. We therefore hold that the state supreme court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.4 4 The Supreme Court has not yet clarified the precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2), which provides that relief is only available if the state court decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 19 That Jones did not expressly waive his right to be present, however, does not dispose of the case. In addition to express waiver, a defendant may constructively waive his rights to be present at trial by disruptive behavior. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. But the record here presents difficulties in assessing any contention that Jones was properly removed on that basis. The transcript shows a defendant who insisted on speaking personally with the court despite being represented by counsel and who persisted in arguing with the court about its rulings – behavior that, while contentious and improper, would not in itself warrant the extreme response of involuntary exclusion. Nevertheless, caution is appropriate in assessing the trial judge’s response to the interaction. Absent specific record findings by the judge about what occurred in the courtroom, a cold transcript provides no insight into tone of voice, body language, or possible overtly threatening behavior that might cast mere spoken words in a different light. The actual situation facing a judge in the real world is not limited to the words that a court reporter can transcribe. Cf. Harris v. Kuhlmann, 346 F.3d 330, 354 (2d Cir. 2003). In any event, State court proceeding,” and § 2254(e)(1), which provides that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” See Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 848-49 (2010) (declining to reach the question). Our Circuit has also not yet decided the question. See Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 298 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005), citing Channer v. Brooks, 320 F.3d 188, 194 (2d Cir. 2003). We assume, without deciding, that § 2254(d)(2)’s unreasonableness standard is the proper one for review of this claim. We may so assume because even if “presumed to be correct” consistent with § 2254(e)(1), the state court’s conclusion cannot be supported by the transcript, which we find to be “clear and convincing evidence,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), contrary to the state court’s conclusion. Moreover, as we also hold, any error is harmless. Thus, the standard under which the state court’s findings are reviewed does not decide this case. 20 Jones’s violent resistance to the court’s removal order also supported a decision to continue the exclusion at least until he could comport himself appropriately, which purpose is implicit in the trial judge’s decision to declare a three-hour recess. It is not necessary, however, for us to decide whether AEDPA deference applies to our review of the trial court’s decision to exclude Jones5 or whether the exclusion was proper, because any error in the initial decision to remove Jones from the courtroom was harmless.6 See Lucky, 569 F.3d at 108 (stating that harmless error applies to erroneous 5 It is not clear that the trial court’s decision would receive heightened AEDPA deference, since it was not the final state adjudication of the exclusion claim on the merits. See Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 894-95 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Our court has not directly addressed whether, if the reasoning of the state appellate court cannot pass muster under AEDPA, the rationale of the state trial court also merits deference under § 2254(d).”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 308 (2011) . The usual rule, as stated by the Ninth Circuit, is that “[w]hen more than one state court has adjudicated a claim, we analyze the last reasoned decision,” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005), and also defer only to that last reasoned decision, see id. at 1092-93 (declining to consider an intermediate state appellate court’s decision). See also Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 29:4 (2011); cf. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44-45 (2011) (for retroactivity purposes, relevant state decision is the ultimate merits determination by a state court). We have previously discussed and deferred to both a state trial court’s initial decision and an appellate court’s affirmance thereof, see McKinney v. Artuz, 326 F.3d 87, 89, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2003), but that was in a case where, under the Ninth Circuit’s taxonomy, “the last reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the reasoning from a previous decision and, as a result, it was reasonable for the reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision,” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093. Nonetheless, because of our harmless error determination, we do not decide this question today. We note, however, that even on direct review, “a district court’s determination of whether the defendant waived his right to be present at a particular stage of trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Tureseo, 566 F.3d at 83. Thus, even without AEDPA deference, we would review the trial court’s decision here under a deferential standard. 6 Our finding of harmless error obviates the need to decide the first question in the certificate of appealability, i.e., whether Jones should have been warned before he was excluded. 21 exclusion from the courtroom); cf. Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2006) (declining to decide whether to apply AEDPA deference because claim failed even without deference). Under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, a defendant has the right to be present at trial to confront the witnesses against him. See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816; Allen, 397 U.S. at 338. This right extends as a matter of due process to “critical stages” of the trial beyond the presentation of evidence when the defendant’s “presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Tureseo, 566 F.3d 77 at 83. No further trial proceedings occurred on February 3 after Jones was excluded. Immediately after the exclusion, the trial court ordered a three-hour recess to permit Jones to cool off and discuss his situation with defense counsel. After a colloquy with both the prosecution and the defense about how to proceed in light of Jones’s behavior, the trial court decided to dismiss the jury for the rest of the day and resume proceedings on the following day. The minimal proceedings conducted in Jones’s absence on February 3 did not bear on Jones’s “opportunity to defend against the charge,” Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745, but only on the entirely collateral issue of how the court should deal with Jones’s own dangerous and disruptive behavior. This was not a critical stage of the trial: the jury did not hear evidence, no motions were argued, jurors were not selected. Any argument that Jones had a right to be present during the discussion of the consequences of his own 22 violent and disruptive behavior would be circular, and would imply that a court could never exclude a defendant under Allen. In sum, Jones’s exclusion for the remainder of February 3 was not an exclusion from a critical stage and did not prejudice Jones. Jones’s initial exclusion thus provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief.