Opinion ID: 1198729
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Heading: Highway Department Driveway Regulation

Text: Mitchell filed a copy of the New Mexico Highway Department's driveway regulation in his efforts to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Although Duran raised a question of the admissability of the regulation based on the document not having been submitted in affidavit form, he did not preserve his record for purposes of appeal on that point and did not raise at all the question of the materiality of the evidence in relation to the application of the regulation to this particular highway. This point is unavailable to Duran since the record was not perfected for appeal. N.M.R. Civ.App. 11 [§ 21-12-11, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Supp. 1975)]. The regulation deals specifically with driveways that are on the right-of-way of public highways ... from the edge of the highway driving surface to the right-of-way line to serve any business. The pertinent language in the rule reads: On public highways already constructed, the construction and maintenance of driveways shall be the responsibility of the owner of the adjacent property. The regulation states that the purpose of controlling the driveways is to control traffic for the safety of the traveling public. It is our duty to construe the regulation to establish the legitimate end sought by the State Highway Commission when it enacted the rule. Burroughs v. Board of Cty. Com'rs, Cty. of Bernalillo, 88 N.M. 303, 540 P.2d 233 (1975); State ex rel. Sanchez v. Reese, 79 N.M. 624, 447 P.2d 504 (1968). Both Plateau and Duran had a vital interest in the safety of the people using the driveways to reach the premises leased to them and had a sufficient ownership interest to come within the terms of the rule. The lessee who is present on the premises cannot escape the obligation imposed merely by saying that he is not the owner. The regulation itself recognizes that as to applications for new driveways a lessee would be considered the real party in interest and permitted to file the necessary requests. The adoption of the regulation by the Highway Commission constituted a legislative act under the doctrine set forth in Wylie Bros. C.C. v. Albuqerque-Bernalillo C.A.C.B., 80 N.M. 633, 459 P.2d 159 (Ct.App. 1969). A legislative rule is valid and as binding upon a court as a statute if it is (a) within the granted power, (b) issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (c) reasonable. 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 5.03 at 299 (1958); Nat. Broadcasting Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L.Ed. 1344 (1943). There being no challenge to any of these required elements, the rule in question here is binding upon this court. Regents of New Mexico v. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 158 F.2d 900 (10th Cir.1947); Goldenberg v. Village of Capitan, 55 N.M. 122, 227 P.2d 630 (1951); Brininstool v. New Mexico State Board of Education, 81 N.M. 319, 466 P.2d 885 (Ct.App. 1970). Plateau and Duran argue that responsibility is placed solely on the owner under the terms of the regulation and that, since both of them were lessees rather than owners, the duty to maintain the driveway did not fall upon them. We disagree. Such an interpretation would effectively frustrate the purpose behind the regulation. Both lessees had obligations under the subleases signed by them to keep the premises in good condition. The lessee in possession certainly would be a logical person upon whom the primary liability should fall for failure to carry out the mandate of the regulation. The duty of Plateau to maintain the premises under the circumstances here is somewhat different from that of Duran. Although Plateau placed upon Duran the duty to maintain the premises and to indemnify Plateau for any loss because of negligence in doing so, it retained the right to go on the premises to make whatever repairs or changes that it considered necessary. The duty of Duran to maintain the driveway is unquestioned. The general rule seems well settled that where a landlord fully parts with the possession of the premises and retains no control or right of control over them, and does not thereafter assume control, he is under no duty to inspect their condition while a tenant remains in possession, and is not chargeable with liability for defects not made by him or under his direction or for a failure to make repairs. City of Dalton v. Anderson, 72 Ga. App. 109, 33 S.E.2d 115 (1945). However, there has developed a sound body of law in many jurisdictions where the question has been raised of the landlord's continuing liability after the leasing of the premises, where he has reserved the right to enter to make repairs, even in cases where he has not convenanted to make any repairs. City of Dalton v. Anderson, supra, and authorities cited therein. A later Georgia case, Levy v. Logan, 99 Ga. App. 253, 108 S.E.2d 307 (1959) held that a landlord who retained a right to enter and inspect the premises for purposes of repair was liable to third parties for injuries resulting from defects which ordinary care in making such an inspection would have revealed, regardless of whether, as between the parties to the lease, the landlord is relieved from obligation of making such inspection or repairs or both. The same situation exists in the case at hand. Plateau, who sought to protect itself by placing the liability for the repairs on Duran and to cause him to indemnify Plateau for any damages as a result of negligence, is still not relieved of its responsibility to Mitchell. It has been asserted in numerous cases that a reservation of a right to enter to make repairs extends the duty of the landlord to the traveling public, who may be off the premises, to maintain the premises in a safe condition. Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W.2d 723 (1942). It follows that a landlord who reserves a privilege which bears directly upon his relation to the passerby has not surrendered or divested himself of the duty of care. The reason for relieving the owner of the obligation fails when he retains the right to enter and repair even though he may not choose to exercise the right. Sheehan v. 535 North Water Street, 268 Wis. 325, 67 N.W.2d 273 (1954). See also Appel v. Muller, 262 N.Y. 278, 186 N.E. 785 (1933); Wilson v. Jaybro Realty & Development Co., 266 App.Div. 668, 40 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1943); Tauraso v. Texas Co., 192 Misc. 147, 79 N.Y.2d 812 (1948). We approve the reasoning in McDonald v. Frontier Lanes, Inc., 1 Ill. App.3d 345, 272 N.E.2d 369 (1971) in which case a patron of a bowling alley sustained a fall in a twelve-inch-deep hole resulting from the gas company's installation of a gas line to the defendant's bowling alley at defendant's request, the hole being on a city-owned parkway. The court held that the rule that an occupant or owner of premises owes to an invitee a duty to use ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition includes the duty to provide an invitee with reasonably safe means of ingress and egress, both within the confines of the premises owned or controlled by the inviter, and, within limitations dictated by the facts of the case, beyond the precise boundaries of such premises. Since this case will be remanded for trial, we now consider other issues raised by the parties in the event that they may later become material.