Opinion ID: 2509517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Jury Instructions Relating to Dr. Hatcher's Testimony

Text: The trial court gave this limiting instruction: The testimony of Dr. Chris Hatcher was received in evidence and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of explaining, if it does, the meaning of certain pieces of evidence offered in this case, to explain the general phenomena of sexual fantasies and to provide information on the subject of the behavior and mental processes of children who are abducted for the purpose of violent sexual assault and persons who commit such crimes. He testified to a generalized body of knowledge. However, should you find that there are facts in this case which are or may be explained by such testimony you may consider the testimony for that purpose. However, such evidence was not received and may not be considered by you, to prove that the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes. Further, Dr. Hatcher did not examine [defendant] nor did he express any opinion about the defendant or how the crime actually occurred. (Italics added.) Defendant correctly observes that the inclusion of the italicized phrase permitted the jurors to consider Dr. Hatcher's testimony as information relevant to defendant's mental processes. But this observation simply returns us to the issue previously discussed: May the jury consider, as aggravating evidence under section 190.3, factor (a), evidence of defendant's mental illness insofar as it relates to the circumstances of the crime? Our conclusion that it may do so resolves the controversy over the jury instruction; if the jurors can consider Dr. Hatcher's testimony as evidence relating to defendant's mental processes, it cannot be error to tell them they may do so.
Defendant proposed five jury instructions relating to mental illness and mitigation. The trial court was not obliged to give any of these instructions, but exercised its discretion to give defendant's proposed special instruction No. 6. Special instruction No. 6 read, in pertinent part: You have been instructed that you may consider, as mitigation, any circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any sympathetic or other aspect of the Defendant's character or record as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not those circumstances or aspects of the Defendant's character are related to the offense. Circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime which you should consider include, but are not limited to, the following: 1. Whether the Defendant acknowledged responsibility for the crime; 2. Whether the crime involved a single victim; 3. Whether the Defendant committed the offense while under the influence of a mental or emotional disturbance, which disturbance need not be extreme nor amount to legal insanity or an inability to form a specific intent. This includes, but is not limited to whether [defendant] has low self-esteem, or suffers from a brain dysfunction, that has affected his ability to learn and may affect his judgment or perception. Mitigating factors also include any sympathetic, compassionate, merciful, or other aspect of Defendant's background, character, record, or social, psychological or medical history, that the Defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial.... Defendant argues that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's special instructions Nos. 7 and 8. Defendant's proposed special instruction No. 7 read: The term `mental or emotional disturbance' as used in these instructions includes any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion including, but not limited to, fear, revenge, and the emotion induced by and accompanying or following any intent to commit a felony. [¶] The presence of mental or emotional disturbance may only be considered by you as a factor in mitigation, and may not be considered as an aggravating factor. The trial court correctly rejected this instruction. Defendant's assertion that any emotion that accompanies an intent to commit a felony constitutes a mental or emotional disturbance and cannot be considered as a factor in aggravation is incorrect. As we have explained, the presence of mental or emotional disturbance may be considered as an aggravating factor if admitted as relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Defendant's proposed special instruction No. 8 read: The term `mental disease or defect' as used in these instructions is not limited to evidence which excuses the crime or reduces defendant's culpability, but includes any degree of mental defect, disease or impairment which you may determine is of a nature that death should not be imposed. Such a mental disease or defect may be considered by you as a mitigating factor whether or not the mental condition caused the defendant to commit the offense, and whether or not the condition was operative at the time of the offense. The presence of mental disease or defect may only be considered by you as a factor in mitigation, and may not be considered as an aggravating factor. The first two paragraphs of this instruction correctly state the law. (See Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 113-114, 102 S.Ct. 869; People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 655, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.) The third paragraph, however, is inconsistent with our conclusion ( ante, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d at 567-569, 107 P.3d at 240-241) that the jury can consider evidence of mental disease or defect as aggravating when that evidence is admitted under section 190.3, factor (a). The trial court therefore correctly rejected the proposed instruction.