Opinion ID: 1288666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Dismissal of Jail Authority and Edward Rudloff

Text: The circuit court found that the Jail Authority was not liable under W. Va.Code § 5-11-9(1) because it was not Plaintiff's employer and that it was not liable under W. Va.Code § 5-11-9(7) because it is not an entity subject to liability for unlawful discrimination under that statute. The court also dismissed Edward Rudloff from the case. The court dismissed him first from the cause of action alleging discrimination under W. Va.Code § 5-11-9(1) because he was not Plaintiff's employer, and later, under a separate order, dismissed the entire case against him, stating that the earlier order had contained a clerical error. We can only assume that the court used the same reasoning for the second cause of action as it did for the Jail Authority, that is, that Lt. Rudloff was not subject to liability for unlawful discrimination under W. Va.Code § 5-11-9(7). We approach these issues fully cognizant of W. Va.Code § 5-11-15 (1967), which provides that the West Virginia Human Rights Act shall be liberally construed to accomplish its objectives and purposes. [11] With that in mind, we consider, first, whether either the Jail Authority or Lt. Rudloff can be held liable to the plaintiff under § 5-11-9(1). That provision makes it an unlawful employment practice [f]or any employer to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.... Employer is defined in § 5-11-3(d) (1992) as meaning the state, or any political subdivision thereof, and any person employing twelve or more persons within the state[.] The Authority and Lt. Rudloff contend that § 5-11-9(1) reaches only discrimination by an employer against its employees or applicants for employment. Thus, the two defendants argue, they cannot be liable to the plaintiff under that section because they were not her employer; rather, she was paid for and supervised by ARA Szabo. We have to agree that the plaintiff was employed by ARA Szabo. The plaintiff counters, however, that both the Authority and Lt. Rudloff were employers within the meaning of § 5-11-3(d) and that they discriminated against the plaintiffan individualwith respect to ... [the] terms, conditions or privileges of [her] employment by creating, or at least permitting, a sexually hostile working environment and by effecting her termination. In other words, the plaintiff argues that § 5-11-9(1) prohibits any person who is an employer from discriminating against any individual regarding his or her employment opportunities irrespective of whether the individual is an employee of that employer. Both of those interpretations are reasonable. We note at the outset, however, that neither can sustain an action against Lt. Rudloff. He was certainly not the plaintiff's employer, nor was he the state, or any political subdivision thereof, [or] any person employing twelve or more persons. Lt. Rudloff employed no one, at least according to this record. [12] By contrast, our choice between the competing interpretations of § 5-11-9(1) is squarely presented regarding the Authority because it is part of the state and is, thus, an employer within the meaning of the Act. Bearing in mind § 5-11-15's admonition of calling for a liberal interpretation of the Act, we conclude that the plaintiff's interpretation is the preferred one. Several reasons explain our selection. First, it permits us to give the statute's language its literal meaning: § 5-11-9(1) says that an employer shall not discriminate against an individual ; it does not say against an employee or applicant. Second, we think the plaintiff's interpretation better promotes the purpose of the statute, which is, of course, to guarantee equal opportunity to all persons regardless of their gender, race, religion, etc. Third, no reason exists to insulate an employer from liability if it obstructs the employment opportunities of any individual because of her gender even if she works for, or seeks work with, some other employer. [13] Accordingly, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity on remand to prove that the Jail Authority caused her to suffer a hostile working environment because of her sex and/or caused her to lose her job because of her sex or her opposition to sexual harassment. To prevail on the hostile environment claim, plaintiff will have to show that the Authority's management participated in the harassment or knew about the harassment but failed to take measures reasonably calculated to stop it. Hanlon, supra . To prevail on the discharge claim, the plaintiff must prove the Authority's management caused her termination and did so because of her sex or her opposition efforts. Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995). Next, we address whether the Jail Authority or Lt. Rudloff can be held liable under W. Va.Code § 5-11-9(7). The circuit court held that the Jail Authority was not an entity which could be held liable under that section, and we are assuming that the court used the same reasoning for dismissing Lt. Rudloff from that cause of action. In light of our decision in Holstein v. Norandex, Inc., 194 W.Va. 727, 461 S.E.2d 473 (1995), the circuit court's rulings are clearly wrong. The provision in question makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice: For any person ... [or] employer ... to: (A) Engage in any form of threats or reprisal, or to engage in, or hire, or conspire with others to commit acts or activities of any nature, the purpose of which is to harass, degrade, embarrass or cause physical harm or economic loss or to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce any person to engage in any of the unlawful discriminatory practices defined in this section; . . . . . (C) Engage in any form of reprisal or otherwise discriminate against any person because he has opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this article or because he has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this article. Holstein held that this section permitted a cause of action against an employee for aiding or abetting an employer engaging in an unlawful discriminatory practice. An employee is, plainly, a person who would be liable if he engages in any of the prohibited acts, W. Va.Code § 5-11-3(a) (`person' means one or more individuals....), and Lt. Rudloff is, just as plainly, such a person. As we have already stated, the Authority is an employer under the Act. Thus, both it and Lt. Rudloff can be defendants under § 5-11-9(7). We also believe that the plaintiff has made sufficient allegations to state claims against both the Authority and Lt. Rudloff under both subsections (A) and (C) of § 5-11-9(7). If Lt. Rudloff urged ARA Szabo to discharge her because of her sex, then he acted to ... incite, compel or coerce [ARA Szabo] to engage in an unlawful employment practice in violation of subsection (A). (The statement attributed to Lt. Rudloff that women employees did not belong at the jail may be enough, by itself, to put that claim at issue.) If Lt. Rudloff's motive in doing so is proved to be retaliatory, then he engage[d] in [a] form of reprisal prohibited by subsection (C). As for retaliation, plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence, if there is any, that Lt. Rudloff knew of her complaints about harassment and that he acted on that knowledge to secure plaintiff's discharge. If Lt. Rudloff acted against the plaintiff in his capacity as an Authority manager, then the Authority may also be liable. [14] Regarding these claims, it will also be relevant whether the Jail Authority dealt as severely with its own employees, or with other individuals working at the jail, who cussed in front of inmates. On this record and at this stage of the litigation, we cannot express any opinion on these issues but merely hold that plaintiff has stated a claim and is entitled to accumulate and put forward her evidence. [15]