Opinion ID: 1262799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disproportionality of the Penalty

Text: Code  17-110.1(C)(2) requires that we consider and determine [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar crimes, considering both the crime and the defendant. Beavers argues that the sentence is disproportionate because it is not based on a long history of prior adult incarcerations. Such evidence, Beavers asserts, has been a factor in the imposition of the death penalty in cases similar to this case. The absence of prior adult incarcerations, and the absence of medical evidence supporting a finding of future dangerousness, Beavers asserts makes the penalty of death excessive and disproportionate in this case. We disagree. The death penalty has been imposed on defendants with substantial records of prior incarceration. These records are generally reviewed in conjunction with a determination regarding the future dangerousness of the defendant. But a history of prior incarceration is only one of the factors to be considered in making this determination and in making our proportionality evaluation. Here, Beavers did have an extensive criminal history, including vandalism, petit larceny, assault, and firing into an occupied dwelling. Mrs. Lowery's murder occurred while Beavers was still under supervision for offenses he committed as a juvenile. The murder went unsolved for approximately one year. During that time, the evidence showed that Beavers engaged in two additional rapes of middle-aged women who lived alone. This evidence showed unquestionably that Beavers would commit acts of violence that constitute a continuing serious threat to society. The penalty of death, in light of this history of violent criminal acts, both preceding and succeeding the murder of Mrs. Lowery, was neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared to sentences generally imposed by sentencing bodies in Virginia for comparable or similar crimes. See, e.g., Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 281, 112 L.Ed.2d 235 (1991); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1171, 107 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1990); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 384 S.E.2d 775 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672, 364 S.E.2d 491, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 186, 102 L.Ed.2d 154 (1988); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109, 104 S.Ct. 1617, 80 L.Ed.2d 145 (1984); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 239, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979).