Opinion ID: 184965
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NRDC Challenge

Text: 19 Both NRDC and the industrial challengers petitioned this court for a review of EPA's actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), which provides that all challenges to nationally applicable regulations under the Clean Air Act must be brought in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. After exercising this jurisdiction under applicable legal standards, we conclude that with one exception the challenges either are not justiciable or do not warrant judicial relief.
20 NRDC challenges the adequacy of EPA's CAM program to meet the enhanced monitoring requirements of the Clean Air Act Amendments on multiple grounds. NRDC first asserts that CAM does not substantively comply with § 114(a)(3)'s enhanced monitoring mandate. Specifically, NRDC contends that CAM exempts so many major sources from its coverage that its lack of coverage should invalidate the rule. Further, NRDC argues that CAM's reasonable assurance of compliance standard does not assure compliance as required by the Clean Air Act or assure compliance as a factual matter. In addition, NRDC claims that the length of CAM's phase-in period creates an unreasonable delay. Finally, NRDC asserts that EPA's requirement that a major source certify only whether its report is based on continuous or intermittent data, 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(c)(5)(iii)(B) (emphasis added), does not meet the Clean Air Act's explicit requirement that [c]ompliance certifications shall include ... whether compliance is continuous or intermittent, 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (emphasis added). We conclude that only the last challenge merits relief. 21 NRDC's challenge to EPA's adoption of CAM in furtherance of the enhanced monitoring requirement of § 114(a)(3) questions the interpretation of a statute by the agency entrusted with the administration of that statute. Therefore, we apply the classic two-step test of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which provides that in such review we first look to the statute's language and give effect to any unambiguously expressed intent of Congress, but if the statute is ambiguous or silent with regard to the matter at issue, we accept the agency's interpretation, provided that interpretation is merely reasonable. Id. at 842-43, 845. The phrase enhanced monitoring as used in § 114(a)(3) is sufficiently ambiguous to invoke the second step of the Chevron analysis. As EPA pointed out, section 114(a)(3) does not specify any particular type of enhanced monitoring. Nothing in the phrase enhanced monitoring supports NRDC's view that only continuous or direct emissions monitoring can be regarded as enhanced or that CAM cannot be deemed enhanced. Nonetheless, NRDC argues that CAM cannot constitute enhanced monitoring since it exempts numerous sources from its coverage, does not assure sufficiently reliable compliance as required by § 504(b), and does not in fact provide even a reasonable assurance of compliance.We reject these arguments for several reasons. 22 First, CAM is not invalid on the basis that it does not cover certain major sources (e.g., those that do not utilize emission control devices and those that fail the 100-tons-per-emission point test). True, § 114(a)(3) plainly subjects all major sources to enhanced monitoring and, as NRDC points out, EPA exempts many major sources from CAM's coverage. However, the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments did not mandate that EPA fit all enhanced monitoring under one rule and EPA has reasonably illustrated how its enhanced monitoring program, when considered in its entirety, complies with § 114(a)(3). Cf. NRDC v. EPA, 22 F.3d 1125, 1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding EPA's explanation for excepting certain areas from coverage under a particular rule reasonable given statute's broad mandate and EPA's overall regulatory plan).Specifically, EPA demonstrated that many of the major stationary sources exempt from CAM are subject to other specific rules, and if they are not, they are subject to the following two residual rules: (1)[The permit shall contain] periodic monitoring sufficient to yield reliable data ... that are representative of the source's compliance with the permit.... 40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(3)(i)(B); (2) All part 70 permits shall contain the following elements with respect to compliance: (1) Consistent with paragraph (a)(3) of this section, compliance certification, testing, [and] monitoring ... requirements sufficient to assure compliance with the terms and conditions of the permit. Id. § 70.6(c)(1). 23 While the Part 70 rules are not as specific as CAM, they have the same bottom line--a major source must undertake monitoring ... sufficient to assure compliance. Like CAM, the monitoring protocols will be developed on a unit-by-unit basis. Such monitoring is sufficiently enhanced over the pre-1990 situation to satisfy the statutory requirement. See Compliance Assurance Monitoring, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,900, 54,904 (1997). 24 Second, EPA provides a reasonable basis for its conclusion that CAM will be effective in assuring emissions limit compliance. NRDC contends that there is no across-the-board evidence that monitoring control parameters will assure compliance and that EPA does not require control parameters to be statistically correlated with actual emissions standards. 25 We will not set aside a final rule under the Clean Air Act unless the underlying agency action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law or in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) & (C). The arbitrary and capricious standard deems the agency action presumptively valid provided the action meets a minimum rationality standard. See, e.g., Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In applying this standard we determine whether the agency has considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts and its choices. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). While we carefully review the factual record, we will give due deference to the agency especially when the agency action involves evaluating complex scientific or statistical data within the agency's expertise. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). 26 Applying that standard of review to the rule before us, we conclude that EPA's adoption of CAM survives NRDC's challenge. As EPA argues, across-the-board evidence is unnecessary since CAM requires major source owners, on a unit-by-unit basis, to establish ... appropriate range(s) ... for the selected indicator(s) such that operation within the ranges provides a reasonable assurance of ongoing compliance with emission limitations. 40 C.F.R. § 64.3(a)(2).Thus, CAM enhances monitoring by requiring each major source owner to design a site-specific monitoring system sufficient to provide a reasonable assurance of compliance with emissions standards. See id. § 64.3(a), (a)(2). Moreover, as EPA made clear at oral argument, this standard does require a major source owner to establish a correlation between the control parameters and emission limits. We cannot therefore conclude that the EPA has failed to consider relevant factors or articulate a rational connection between the facts and its choices. For the same reasons, we conclude CAM satisfies the sufficiently reliable compliance requirement of § 504(b). We therefore apply the statutorily mandated deference to the agency's judgment and deny the NRDC's challenge. 27 Third, NRDC misconstrues § 114(a)(1)(D)-(E) as requiring EPA to mandate direct enhanced monitoring of major sources unless EPA finds such monitoring impractical. We agree with EPA that CAM was promulgated under subsection (a)(3) of § 114 rather than under subsection (a)(1). Section 114(a)(1) gives EPA the option to require (the Administrator may require) certain kinds of monitoring whereas § 114(a)(3) squarely requires enhanced monitoring (the Administrator shall ... require enhanced monitoring). Since CAM falls into the required enhanced monitoring category and § 114(a)(3) does not contain language requiring an impracticality finding, EPA did not have to make an impracticality finding before choosing to monitor major source control parameters rather than to monitor emissions directly. 28 Finally, NRDC erroneously believes that CAM does not effectuate the congressional intent behind the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments because CAM fails to facilitate enforcement. See S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 368 (1989). NRDC argues that since CAM monitoring data do not establish source compliance or noncompliance, the data lack the value necessary to be used as probative evidence in enforcement proceedings. However, as we stated before, EPA reasonably concluded that CAM will provide a reasonable assurance of compliance with emissions limitations. Thus, EPA facilitates enforcement under any reasonable definition of the term since CAM monitoring provides evidence that will be relevant in any enforcement action. 29 In sum, we hold that EPA's adoption of CAM as enhanced monitoring meets the requirements of the Clean Air Act.
30 EPA's decision to phase in the CAM requirements as major source permits are renewed is reasonable. EPA acknowledges that some major sources applying for permits will come under CAM's coverage over the next two to three years while some sources will not be phased-in for approximately five to eight years because CAM requirements will not apply to them until their next permit renewal. See 40 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(3)(iii), (iv) (stating that permits are renewed or reviewed every five years). However, EPA reasonably decided to phase-in CAM requirements based on the already existing licensing structure in order to lessen the burden on sources and state licensing authorities and to create a learning-curve for implementation. See 62 Fed. Reg. 54,90203, 54,927-28 (1997). Nor does NRDC point to a compulsory implementation deadline or offer a basis for second-guessing the agency at this point in time. See NRDC, 22 F.3d at 113740 (implying deference to the agency regarding implementation when statute silent regarding implementation deadline).Given the circumstances, EPA offers a reasonable explanation for the extended phase-in plan.
31 Despite CAM's validity, we hold that EPA's certification regulations are inconsistent in one particular with § 114(a)(3)(D)'s statutory mandate. While § 114(a)(3) clearly states that a major source's compliance certification shall include ... whether compliance is continuous or intermittent[,] EPA only requires that a major source's compliance certification include [t]he identification of the method(s) ... used by the owner ... for determining the compliance status ... and whether such methods ... provide continuous or intermittent data. 40 C.F.R. §§ 70.6(c)(5)(iii)(B), 71.6(c)(5)(iii)(B). The statute requires that certification include whether compliance--not just data--is continuous or intermittent. 32 Although EPA may permit owners to certify compliance within the degree of certainty that CAM provides, it may not eliminate the check off requirement altogether. We do not reach the second step of the Chevron analysis on this question. Where Congress has expressed its unmistakable intent in the plain words of the statute, our review ends with step one. See Nuclear Information Resource Service v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 969 F.2d 1169, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). It will not save EPA's failure to meet the statutory requirement that there is ambiguity in other sections of the statute. It is only where the statute ... is 'silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue' before us that we 'defer to the agency's interpretation of the statute.'  Id. (quoting Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, 919 F.2d 158, 162-63 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Here, Congress expressly and unambiguously required that the certification include whether compliance is continuous or intermittent.EPA's regulations do not effectuate that expressed mandate of the statute and must be remanded.