Opinion ID: 6317061
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fourth Intel Factor

Text: Finally, Nigeria argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the fourth Intel factor – whether the discovery request is “unduly intrusive or burdensome,” Intel, 542 U.S. at 265 – weighed against the application. We agree to the extent that the district court’s evaluation of the fourth factor relied on the possibility that Nigeria would use the materials it obtained in the English Proceeding. The district court concluded that the fourth factor weighed against the application for two reasons: (1) because “various document requests in the subpoena appear to sweep well beyond [the] subject” of “bribery in connection with procuring the [Arbitration] Award;” and (2) because “the breadth of the requests for materials relating to the arbitration and its enforcement may reflect interested in using the documents it sought in the English proceeding as “rank speculation,” J. App’x at 275, may have been disingenuous, given that it promptly used them in that very proceeding as soon as it obtained them. But in the same submission to the court Nigeria explicitly reserved its right – which it indeed had under our decision in Accent Delight – to use the documents in any proceeding. Moreover, Judge Schofield never suggested that she had been misled, did not grant P&ID’s request to prohibit such use of the discovered documents, and even expressly permitted such use in her ruling on JPMorgan Chase’s application for a protective order. There is little in that series of events to suggest that Nigeria’s statements misled Judge Schofield in any material way. 50 an intention to use U.S. discovery for purposes outside the contemplation of § 1782.” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 17. We detect no reversible error in the first reason. Although Nigeria’s discovery requests seem largely consistent with a purpose of criminally investigating the procurement of the Arbitration Award, the ultimate question of burdensomeness is within the district court’s discretion to decide, and not ours. The second reason is somewhat opaque, but appears to refer to the possibility that Nigeria would use the materials it obtained pursuant to this application in the English Proceeding. As explained above, use in the English Proceeding is not a “purpose[] outside the contemplation of § 1782.” Id. If that was the purpose to which the district court referred, it based its reasoning regarding the fourth factor at least in part on legal error. We therefore conclude that the district court erred in evaluating the fourth Intel factor insofar as its reasoning depended on its view that the use of evidence in the English Proceeding was a “purpose[] outside the contemplation of § 1782.” Id. 51