Opinion ID: 159242
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Manipulation of the Judicial Assignment System

Text: 65 On appeal, Mr. Pearson first argues that the government violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by improperly manipulating the judicial assignment system so that his case was assigned to Judge Belot. Mr. Pearson's argument raises not only constitutional issues, but also significant questions regarding the fair administration of justice. Accordingly, we will consider his challenge not only under the Due Process Clause but also, pursuant to our supervisory authority over the district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. That section codifies this court's power to order such relief as is just under the circumstances. Id.
66 In his motion for random reassignment, Mr. Pearson argued that there was a significant difference between the judge sought by the government--Judge Belot--and the other judges who could have been assigned to the case. He noted that Judge Belot had recently issued rulings in two capital cases that were in large part favorable to the government and were not directly dictated by higher court precedent. Rec. vol. I, doc. 77 at 3; see id. at 3-5 (discussing United States v. Chanthadara, 928 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Kan. 1996) , and United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd, 155 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 1998)). On appeal, Mr. Pearson does not invoke these decisions, and he does not suggest that Judge Belot ruled any differently on issues in this case than the other judges in the district would have had they been assigned to it. Instead, he argues that, even absent a claim that he suffered actual prejudice from the assignment of the case to the judge preferred by the government, the government violated his due process rights by manipulating the case assignment system. He thus characterizes the government's alleged judge-shopping as a structural error, a fundamental defect[] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies] analysis by 'harmless-error' standards. See Aplt's Reply Br. at 2 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)). 67
68 The Supreme Court has recognized that judges are not fungible. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 834 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit of the United States, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting)): 69 [T]hey cover the constitutional spectrum; and a particular judge's emphasis may make a world of difference when it comes to rulings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom, the tolerance for a proffered defense, and the like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about 'shopping' for a judge; Senators recognize this, when they are asked to give their 'advice and consent' to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this when they appraise the quality and image of the judiciary in their own community. 70 Id. at 834-35. 71 More recently, the Seventh Circuit has offered a similar observation: 72 [T]he exercise of discretion is shaped by a judge's values and intuitions, which in turn are shaped by the judge's background and experiences. Among a group of six American judges, even of the same court in the same county, there is likely to be considerable, and relevant, diversity in background and experience. Former prosecutors may have a different bent from former defense lawyers, former lawyers for tort plaintiffs a different bent from former lawyers for insurance companies. 73 Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1995) (hereafter Tyson II). 74 In spite of these significant differences between judges, there is scant authority discussing the requirements (if any) imposed by the Due Process Clause on the judicial assignment phase of adjudication. Congress has granted broad discretion to the federal district courts in the assignment of cases to particular judges. See 28 U.S.C § 137 (The business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges as provided by the rules and orders of the court.). In light of this discretion, a number of courts have concluded that a defendant does not have a right to have his case heard by a particular judge, see Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512, 515 (6th Cir. 1984), that a defendant has no right to any particular procedure for the selection of the judge, Cruz v. Abbate, 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987), and that he or she does not enjoy the right to have [the] judge selected by a random draw. Sinito, 750 F.2d at 515; see also Board of Sch. Dirs. of City of Milwaukee v. Wisconsin, 102 F.R.D. 596, 598 (E.D. Wisc. 1984) (Even a criminal defendant has no due process rights in the assignment of his case.); United States v. Keane, 375 F. Supp. 1201, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (concluding that a defendant has no vested right to have his case tried before any particular judge, nor does he have the right to determine the manner in which his case is assigned to a judge). 75 This circuit has considered the judicial assignment phase of adjudication on only a few occasions. Recently, in United States v. Diaz, 189 F.3d 1239, 1243-45 (10th Cir. 1999), we concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 137 vests the district courts with broad discretion in the assignment of cases to particular judges. We rejected a defendant's due process challenge to a rotating assignment system in which different judges were assigned to various phases of the same case. See Diaz, 189 F.3d at 1243 (stating that the defendant's argument was undermined by 28 U.S.C. § 137, which vests the district court with broad discretion in assigning court business to individual judges). Previously, in Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 434 (10th Cir. 1985), vacated as moot, 800 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1986), we concluded that a district judge accused of violating the Due Process Clause by improperly assigning a case to himself was entitled to absolute immunity. We observed, Although it is an 'administrative' act, in the sense that it does not concern the decision who shall win a case, the assignment of cases is still a judicial function in the sense that it directly concerns the case-deciding process. Id. 76 Although these decisions both concern the district court's assignment of cases to particular judges, neither Diaz nor Martinez addresses the due process limitations, if any, on prosecutorial involvement in the assignment process. Accordingly, we turn to a sister circuit for helpful analysis. 77 In a case involving an allegation of improper manipulation of the case assignment system by a judge rather than a prosecutor, the Ninth Circuit concluded: 78 While a defendant has no right to any particular procedure for the selection of the judge--that being a matter of judicial administration committed to the sound discretion of the court--he is entitled to have that decision made in a manner free from bias or the desire to influence the outcome of the proceedings. 79 Cruz, 812 F.2d at 574; see also Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (noting that the Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized [that] due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities). In our view, if the assignment of a case to an individual judge should not be based on the desire to influence the outcome of the proceedings, then allowing a prosecutor to perform that task raises substantial due process concerns. 80 In particular, although the Due Process Clause imposes strict neutrality requirements on officials performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, those requirements are not applicable to those acting in a prosecutorial or plaintiff-like capacity. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980). In an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law. Id. When prosecutorial rather than judicial functions are involved, the constitutional interests in accurate finding of facts and application of law, and in preserving a fair and open process for decision, are not to the same degree implicated. Id. 81 In light of the role that prosecutors play as advocates, two state courts have concluded that judicial assignment systems allowing prosecutors to select the judge assigned to a particular case violate due process. In State v. Simpson, 551 So.2d 1303 (La. 1989) (per curiam), the defendant filed an application for a supervisory writ seeking reassignment of his case to another judge. Noting that the prosecutor and the defense attorney had stipulated that in the Louisiana district at issue, the prosecution was allowed to select the judge who presided over criminal cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted the writ. The court reasoned: 82 To meet due process requirements, capital and other felony cases must be allotted for trial to the various divisions of the court, or to judges assigned criminal court duty, on a random or rotating basis or under some other procedure adopted by the court which does not vest the district attorney with power to choose the judge to whom a particular case is assigned. 83 551 So.2d at 1304. 84 The Simpson court based this conclusion on decisions holding that [d]ue process of law requires fundamental fairness, i.e., a fair trial in a fair tribunal. Id. (citing Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); State v. Mejia, 197 So.2d 73 (La. 1967)). The court noted decisions from other jurisdictions concluding that courts may utilize different methods of assigning criminal cases to judges, but observed that these decisions do not stand for the proposition that the prosecutor may assign cases to the judge of his choice. Id. at 1304 n.3. 85 In an earlier decision, a New York state court took a similar approach. In McDonald v. Goldstein, 83 N.Y.S.2d 620 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1948), the court rejected a district attorney's challenge to an order divesting his office of its long-accepted authority to select judges for criminal cases. See id. at 622 (noting that [t]he District Attorney for some time past has selected the judge in each case by moving indictments for trial directly to the several parts of the court). The court based its ruling on general principles of judicial independence, noting that judges should be free from outside control, especially by any of the litigants. See id. at 625 (It is the people's prerogative, not the District Attorney's to say who will preside over the County Court of Kings County.). 86 In contrast to Simpson and McDonald, most federal courts that have addressed the issue of prosecutorial involvement in judicial assignments have not found due process violations. In Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 439 42 (7th Cir. 1995) (Tyson II), the most recent and thorough of these federal decisions, the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument raised in a habeas corpus proceeding that the case assignment system in an Indiana state court violated the defendant's due process rights. The system in question allowed the prosecutor to select one of six grand juries to which a proposed indictment would be presented. Each grand jury was assigned to a specific judge, and thus, by selecting the grand jury, prosecutors could choose the judge to which the case would be assigned. The habeas petitioner in Tyson II did not argue that the assigned judge was prejudiced against him. Instead, he asserted to allow the prosecutor to pick the judge so greatly stacks the deck against the defendant as to make the trial unfair--so unfair as to deny due process of law. Id. at 439. 87 The Seventh Circuit rejected that argument. First, it noted a lack of precedent holding that prosecutorial steering could constitute a due process violation warranting the reversal of a conviction. Additionally, it concluded that the fact that the prosecutor might gain a certain advantage over the defendant in being allowed to select the judge did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. See id. at 440-41. It reasoned that the American system of criminal procedure is not balanced equally between the prosecution and the defense at every stage, but rather represents an aggregate of imbalances. Id. at 440. Thus, prosecutors have certain advantages in the investigative stage and in impeaching witnesses, while the rules on burdens of proof favor defendants. See id. Absent any allegation that the judge selected by the prosecutor was actually biased against the defendant, the imbalance caused by the Indiana system was not so egregious as to affect the fairness of the trial. 88 Several other federal courts have held that, in order to establish a due process violation for prosecutorial judge-shopping, a defendant must demonstrate that he has been actually prejudiced by the assignment of a particular judge to his case. For example, in United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1532 (6th Cir. 1985), the Sixth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that he was entitled to a new trial because the prosecutors had engaged in a pattern of steering significant criminal cases to the judges of their choice. See id. at 1532. The court relied on its earlier decision in Sinito v. United States, 750 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1984), in which it had held that due process concerns were not implicated by a clerical error resulting in the assignment of a case to a particular judge. See Gallo, 763 F.2d at 1532. The Sinito panel had concluded that 'a defendant does not have the right to have his case heard by a particular judge,' does not 'have a right to have his judge selected by a random draw,' and 'is not denied due process as a result of the error unless he can point to some resulting prejudice.' Gallo, 763 F.2d at 1532 (quoting Sinito, 750 F.2d at 515). The Gallo panel found this reasoning dispositive, rejecting the defendant's argument because he had not alleged that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's alleged steering of cases. 763 F.2d at 1532. Several other decisions have similarly required a showing of prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d at 815, 825 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Osum, 943 F.2d 1394, 1401 (5th Cir. 1991). 89 Although all of these decisions offer helpful and relevant analysis, they differ from the instant case in several important respects. The Seventh Circuit's Tyson II decision rejects a claim of prosecutorial steering, but some of its discussion applies only to habeas corpus proceedings and not to direct appeals. See Tyson II, 50 F.3d at 439-40 (noting the absence of precedent on the issue and observing that new rules of constitutional law may not be applied in habeas proceedings). Moreover, Tyson II does not address the situation in which a prosecutor succeeds in having a case assigned to a particular judge due to some perceived advantage that judge will afford the government. See id. at 441-42. 90 Cases like Gallo and Erwin, which require a showing of prejudice in order to establish a judge-shopping claim, do not discuss how such a showing may be made. Although these cases suggest that prosecutorial judge-shopping may violate the Due Process Clause, they do not contain substantial analysis in support of that proposition, and they do not set forth a standard for determining what kinds of prosecutorial judge-shopping are constitutionally prohibited. These cases also do not address the type of conduct at issue here: the alleged manipulation of a case assignment system that appears to afford the prosecutor discretion in selecting the judge in certain instances. Finally, the state court cases--Simpson and McDonald--although containing sweeping language about the impropriety of allowing prosecutors to select judges, address the judge-shopping issue before the defendant was convicted. Thus, they too do not address the situation that confronts us--the alleged manipulation of the case assignment system in an individual case and the contention that a conviction should be overturned because of that manipulation. 91 In the absence of guidance from the Supreme Court on the due process limitations, if any, on prosecutorial steering, we are therefore presented with an issue of first impression in this circuit. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the resolution of the constitutional question presented by Mr. Pearson's allegation of prosecutorial steering is not necessary to the disposition of this appeal. See United States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (The Supreme Court has long endorsed, if not always adhered to, the notion that federal courts should address constitutional questions only when necessary to a resolution of the case or controversy before it. This is a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint.') (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984)). Instead, we will assume, without deciding, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles Mr. Pearson to an impartial method of judicial assignment. 3 We will further assume, without deciding, that the prosecution deprived Mr. Pearson of that right by manipulating the system so that his case was assigned to Judge Belot. 4 Affording Mr. Pearson the benefit of those two favorable assumptions, we nevertheless conclude that the assumed due process violation does not warrant reversal of his convictions. 92
93 Mr. Pearson characterizes the prosecution's alleged manipulation of the case assignment system as a structural error--a defect[] in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which def[ies] analysis by harmless error standards. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). Such errors affect [t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end and deprive the defendant of basic protections, without which 'a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence.' Id. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)). Errors of this type are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal . . . without regard to their effect on the outcome. Neder v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1833 (1999). If a criminal proceeding includes such an error, the resulting punishment may [not] be regarded as fundamentally fair. Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78. 94 Supreme Court decisions have found structural error only in a 'very limited class of cases,' Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1833. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997)), including those involving: (1) the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); (2) a biased presiding judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); (3) the systematic exclusion of members of the defendant's own race from a grand jury, see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1986); (4) the denial of the right to self-representation at trial, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174 (1984); (5) the denial of the right to a public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984); (6) the denial of the right to have a district judge (rather than a magistrate judge) preside over jury selection, see Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 876 (1989); and (7) a defective reasonable doubt instruction, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993). In Rose, the Supreme Court described these kinds of errors as the exception rather than the rule. [I]f the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis. Rose, 478 U.S. at 579. 95 In a helpful review of the concept of structural error, the Second Circuit has noted, We do not understand [the Supreme Court's] list of examples of violations that have been held exempt from harmless error review to mean that any violation of the same constitutional right is a 'structural defect,' regardless whether the error is significant or trivial. Yarborough v. Keane, 101 F.3d 894, 897 (2d Cir. 1996). Conversely, the fact that the Supreme Court has applied harmless error analysis to one level of violation of a particular right does not necessarily mean that an egregious violation of that same right may never constitute structural error. See id. 96 Thus, the determination of whether an error is structural depends on not only the right violated, but also the nature, context, and significance of the violation. Id. For example, the total deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes structural error, while the denial of the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing is subject to harmless error review. See id. (contrasting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970)). Similarly, although the unjustified exclusion of a defendant from the entire trial would constitute structural error, a defendant's absence when the judge engaged in two conversations with a juror has been subjected to harmless error analysis. See id. (citing Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 n.2, 120-21 (1983)). 97 In our view, the due process violation alleged here--one that resulted from allowing the prosecutor to select the judge--should be placed on an analogous continuum. Although the District of Kansas's case assignment system arguably allowed the prosecutor to perform a kind of quasi-judicial function, there are important distinctions between allowing a prosecutor perform judicial functions after the judge has been selected and the case proceeds to trial and final decision (i.e., functions like ruling on motions and objections, issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and sentencing defendants) and allowing the prosecutor to perform the quasi-judicial function of selecting the judge. Although a prosecutor's performance of such post-selection judicial functions necessarily deprives the defendant of an impartial adjudicator, we conclude for several reasons that prosecutorial involvement in the selection of the judge does not necessarily result in the same degree of deprivation. 98 First, a prosecutor's choice of judges is limited. Even if a case assignment system allows the prosecutor to select the judge, the prosecutor must still choose from a group who have undergone the process of selection and appointment, who have sworn to uphold the law and defend the Constitution, and whose conduct can be scrutinized through appellate review. There is a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators, Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975), and, as a result, we cannot presume that a federal judge selected by the prosecutor will be his agent or henchman. Additionally, we note that a prosecutor may want the case assigned to a particular judge for a variety of reasons, some of which may not involve any disadvantage to the defendant at all: a prosecutor may simply make a random selection or he or she may seek out the most intelligent or the most experienced judge, or the one most familiar with a particular area of law. 99 Moreover, a defendant who must proceed to trial before a judge selected by the prosecutor is not without remedies. If the judge appears biased, a defendant may file a motion for recusal. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d at 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995). If the judge denies that request, the defendant may challenge that decision prior to trial by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition with this court. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 350. In certain instances, by invoking this court's supervisory powers, a defendant may also, prior to trial, challenge the case assignment procedure itself. See Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir. 1972) (granting a petition for a writ of prohibition and mandamus barring a judge from assigning a case to himself and requiring reassignment). Additionally, a defendant may contest the government's prosecution of the case by filing pretrial motions, making objections at trial, and introducing evidence; he may also challenge the trial judge's rulings on appeal. For all these reasons, a defendant in a case in which the prosecutor has selected the judge does not necessarily receive a trial that cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence and consequently renders any resulting punishment fundamentally unfair. Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78. 100 Finally, we have unearthed no decision finding structural error in analogous circumstances. As stated above, the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the argument that allowing a prosecutor to select the judge constitutes structural error. See Tyson II, 50 F.3d at 442 (characterizing structural error as involving a denial of the most fundamental constituents of due process). The Louisiana courts, although following Simpson's holding that the prosecutor's selection of the judge violates due process, have nevertheless applied harmless error analysis. See Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of the Four: Judicial Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 Miss. L.J. 369 (1998) (Even in post-Simpson Louisiana, the courts have rejected numerous claims on harmless error grounds because the aggrieved party could not show how the defective assignment prejudiced the case.); State v. Huls, 676 So.2d 160, 167-68 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (applying harmless error analysis and affirming conviction even though case assignment system violated due process); State v. Romero, 552 So.2d 45, 49 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (same). 101 Accordingly, even assuming that the Due Process Clause entitles Mr. Pearson to a neutral method of selecting a judge and that the prosecution deprived Mr. Pearson of that right by manipulating the judicial assignment system here, this assumed error is not structural. We therefore turn to the question of harmless error. 102
103 Typically, when an error occurs at trial, we inquire on direct appeal whether the error 'substantially influenced' the outcome of the trial, or whether we are left in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had such an effect. United States v. Snow, 82 F.3d 935, 940 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1455 (10th Cir. 1995)). When constitutional error is involved, we must be persuaded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). In a variety of circumstances, courts have applied this kind of harmless error analysis to violations of due process. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118-19 (1983) (applying harmless error analysis to a due process violation involving ex parte contacts with jurors and noting that '[c]ases involving [such constitutional] deprivations are [therefore] subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered . . . and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests' (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (alterations in original))). 104 Here, upon a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the government has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged due process violation arising out of the judicial assignment was harmless. As we have noted, Mr. Pearson has not alleged that he was actually prejudiced by the assignment. Moreover, our independent review has uncovered no evidence that Judge Belot decided any substantive issues in a manner more favorable to the government than the other judges in the district would have decided those issues. Finally, as we conclude below, Mr. Pearson has not made a sufficient showing of bias on the part of Judge Belot under the applicable statutes. 105 In summary, Mr. Pearson's allegations of an improper manipulation of the case assignment system raise substantial due process concerns. However, even if we accept Mr. Pearson's contentions as to the prosecution's motivation in reordering the defendants' names on the superseding indictment so that the case would be assigned to Judge Belot, the assumed due process violation arising out of that conduct is not structural error and is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, Mr. Pearson's due process challenge does not warrant a new trial. 106
107 The allegations that Mr. Pearson directs at the government raise concerns beyond the requirements of the Due Process Clause. In addition to the due process problems we have discussed, our review of prior decisions and scholarly commentary reveals four related problems with the practice of allowing prosecutors to steer cases to particular judges. 108 First, the practice arguably affords the government an unfair advantage in litigating the case. [I]f a litigant can choose which of [a group of] judges shall preside at the trial, that party may be able to obtain a subtle advantage over the other by selecting a judge more likely to resolve close questions in that party's favor, even if the trial is to be a jury trial so that the judge will not make the ultimate decision. Tyson II, 50 F.3d at 439. 109 Second, prosecutorial maneuvering in an attempt to steer a case to a particular judge may involve an abuse of the judicial system. Thus, prosecutors may file successive cases in multiple districts in search of a judge whom they think will treat their arguments more favorably. See Erwin, 155 F.3d at 825 (finding the filing of successive cases strongly suggestive of judge shopping). In such an instance, when the choice of forum is made not for its connection with the dispute or for convenience to the parties and witnesses but rather as a means of obtaining a particular judge, a prosecutor's conduct may violate ethical rules prohibiting the filing of actions that 'delay[,] . . . harass or maliciously injure another.' Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 Harvard L. Rev. 1677, 1690 (1990) (quoting Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981)) (alteration in original); see generally id. 110 Third, a system that allows prosecutorial judge-shopping arguably lacks the appearance of impartiality that is required to obtain the confidence of the public and the accused in the system. See Tyson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 276, 300 (Ind. App. 1993) (Tyson I); see also Tyson II, 50 F.3d at 441 (concluding that [t]he practice [in the Indiana state courts] of allowing the prosecutor to choose the grand jury and hence the trial judge is certainly unsightly . . . ; it does lack the appearance of impartiality). If a judge is selected by a prosecutor rather than by a neutral procedure, then one might reasonably question the decisions made by the selected judge. Although the judge's decisions might well be justified by the facts and the applicable law, the suspicion arises that the real reasons for the decisions may lie in some unspoken understanding or shared values that led the prosecutor to select the particular judge to handle the case. Prosecutorial steering thus exposes the tension between the ideal of the rule of law and the reality of a system created and administered by human beings. Forum Shopping Reconsidered, supra, at 1686. 111 Fourth, the practice, if undertaken on a broad scale, arguably threatens the independence of the judiciary. If a judge receives case assignments not through some neutral system, but rather because of prosecutors' opinion that he or she is more favorably disposed to the government's arguments than another judge in the same district, then a judge's caseload might be based in part on prosecutors' evaluations of judicial performance. Under that scenario, judges meeting with the prosecutors' approval might have future cases assigned to them whereas judges whom prosecutors dislike might not receive future assignments. In rendering judges' workloads dependent on advocates' assessment of their decisions, a widespread tolerance of prosecutorial steering might tempt judges to base their decisions in a given case on the effect of those decisions on their future assignments. See McDonald, 83 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (criticizing a county system allowing the district attorney's office to select judges for particular cases and concluding [t]hat a judge should ever be burdened with the thought that his assignments depended on the district attorney's appraisal of his court work is unthinkable in American jurisprudence). 112 In light of these serious concerns about the practice of prosecutorial steering, we believe that Mr. Pearson's allegations warrant the exercise of our supervisory power over the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (providing that the court may order such relief as may be just under the circumstances). We therefore consider whether, aside from the due process claim raised by Mr. Pearson, his allegations of an improper manipulation of the case assignment process warrant reversal of his conviction. 113 In conducting this analysis, we will apply the standard that we have adopted for reviewing certain violations of the recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, when there is no indication that the tribunal is actually biased. As in this case, these recusal cases view the promotion of public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process as an important policy. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988). As with prosecutorial steering, the elimination, if possible, of even the appearance of impropriety is desirable. See id. at 860. 114 In Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994), we concluded that a judge should have recused himself from a case pursuant to 455 because his participation in the case created an appearance of impropriety and because he was related to a party. We then considered the following factors in determining whether the error was harmless: (1) the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case; (2) the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases; and (3) the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process. Harris, 15 F.3d at 1571-72 (quoting Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864). Because that approach addresses both the individual and systemic interests at issue in this instance of alleged prosecutorial steering, we apply it to Mr. Pearson's claim. 115 Having already concluded that the alleged selection of Judge Belot did not affect this result in this case, we proceed to the second factor--the risk of injustice in other cases. Here, it is significant that the District of Kansas's practice operates to allow prosecutors to select judges in only a narrow set of circumstances: when a superseding indictment is filed after a series of related cases have been assigned to different judges. There is no indication that the alleged manipulation of the case assignment system will recur in a large number of cases. Cf. Tyson II, 50 F.3d at 438 (observing that a law of general application that provided that the U.S. Attorney in each district shall designate the federal judge to preside in criminal cases . . . would raise profound issues under the due process clause). 116 Here, Ms. Stinson (an employee of the clerk's office in the District of Kansas) testified that, in most instances, the district follows a random assignment system. In our view, such an assignment system will usually protect against the most egregious forms of prosecutorial steering. Moreover, the specific practice at issue here appears to be remediable in other cases. In particular, the record suggests no reason why the District of Kansas could not employ a case assignment system that does not allow the prosecutor to select the judge in instances in which the government files several separate but related cases and then obtains a consolidated superseding indictment. We strongly urge the District of Kansas to adopt such a system, and we note that, even under the current system, defendants in other cases may still seek reassignment or recusal if the facts warrant such relief. Thus, this factor too, suggests that the error in the assignment of the case was harmless. 117 The third factor--the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process--presents a closer question. Unfortunately, the cases applying this harmless error test do not set forth a clear standard for determining when a particular violation undermines the public's confidence in the judicial process. Liljeberg, the Supreme Court decision from which this standard is derived, indicates that the determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. See 486 U.S. at 862-87. In our view, several considerations support a finding of harmlessness here. 5 118 First, in contrast to other instances of prosecutorial steering, Mr. Pearson has not alleged that the government has violated particular ethical rules or criminal laws. See United States v. August, 745 F.2d 400, 401-04 (6th Cir. 1984) (affirming conviction for interfering with the due administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1503 by circumventing the case assignment system in a bankruptcy court); State v. Jurek, 556 N.E.2d 1191, 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (affirming conviction for bribing bond commissioners in order to steer criminal cases to particular judges). Even if we assume that the prosecution manipulated the judicial assignment system by reordering the defendants' names on the style of the indictment, as Mr. Person suggests, we are not presented with such egregious prosecutorial conduct that reversal of his conviction is necessary in order to protect the public's confidence in the judicial system. 119 Second, we must acknowledge that a certain type of judge-shopping inheres in our federalist system. See McCuin v. Texas Power & Light Co., 714 F.2d 1255, 1261 (5th Cir. 1983). In the case before us, for example, we note that although robbery and murder charges outside federal or Indian land are typically filed in state courts, the provisions of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, authorized the United States Attorney's office to bring charges against Mr. Pearson in federal court. The decision to proceed in federal court (rather than to allow the state prosecutors to try the case in state court) could have been made for a variety of reasons. See McCuin, 714 F.2d at 1261. However, if the prosecution here admitted that it chose the federal forum because it thought that the federal judges in Kansas were more favorable to the government than the state judges, we do not believe that such a form of judge-shopping would undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of the proceedings to the extent that reversal of the conviction would be warranted. Cf. United States v. Andersen, 940 F.2d 593, 596 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant's due process rights are not violated by the federal government's decision to prosecute under a federal, rather than state, statute, notwithstanding the harsher penalties). This limited tolerance for certain kinds of judge-shopping (in contrast, for example, to our judicial system's complete intolerance of biased judges) echoes Judge Posner's observation in Tyson II that our system of criminal procedure far from being balanced every step of the way, is an aggregate of imbalances, 50 F.3d at 440, some of which favor the prosecution and some of which favor the defendant. 120 Most importantly, as further discussed in later sections of this opinion, Mr. Pearson was tried before an impartial judge, under the correct standard of proof and with the assistance of counsel. Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 1834. [A] fairly selected, impartial jury was instructed to consider all of the evidence and argument. . . . Id. Moreover, the allegedly improperly selected judge committed no reversible legal errors and was not the trier of fact. See United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction but remanding for resentencing when the judge erred in failing to recuse herself and distinguishing between the judge's role in ruling on legal questions at trial and her role as a factfinder at sentencing). Although public confidence in our judicial system may be undermined to some degree by a prosecutor's manipulation of the case assignment system, we believe that it would also be undermined by requiring a second trial of a defendant who was convicted by a properly selected and instructed jury that considered the evidence and found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a trial conducted by a judge who committed no reversible errors. 121 In this instance, we are confident that the District of Kansas can adopt an assignment system that prevents prosecutors from selecting judges on the basis of the order of the defendants' names in superseding indictments. Our confidence in the adoption of such a system and our assessment of the fairness of the trial that Mr Pearson actually received convince us that, in the exercise of our supervisory powers, we need not vacate Mr. Pearson's conviction.
122 In summary, we have assumed, without deciding, that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment entitles Mr. Pearson to an impartial method of assigning his case to a particular judge. We have further assumed, without deciding, that the prosecution here deprived Mr. Pearson of that right by manipulating the system so that his case was assigned to Judge Belot. Viewing Mr. Pearson's arguments in light of these assumptions, we conclude that these assumed errors are not structural and are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We also conclude that these errors are harmless pursuant to our supervisory power over the district court. Thus, Mr. Pearson's allegations that the prosecution manipulated the case assignment system do not warrant a new trial.