Opinion ID: 4540025
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strength of the Agency’s Evidence

Text: As to the first Carr factor, the Board found strong evidence supporting the agency’s decision to order a fitness for duty examination. The Board relied on the fitness for duty order itself, which described specific instances of Mr. Cerulli’s conduct that gave the agency concern as to whether he was mentally and emotionally stable enough to continue performing the duties of a Fire Protection Inspector. These instances include: (1) Mr. Cerulli abruptly leaving work without permission on December 30, 2016, despite the fact that Mr. Danley was not present on that day; (2) hypervigilance by way of arming himself with a paring knife, seeking leave, and monitoring Mr. Danley’s activities on January 2, 2017; (3) discussions regarding Mr. Cerulli’s prior PTSD diagnosis; and (4) Mr. Cerulli’s feelings of being “violated” and “sick to [his] stomach” from a heated conversation with Mr. Eskew and Mr. Castro on January 3, 2017. J.A. 263. Moreover, the Board cited the testimony of Mr. Watkins, who described Mr. Cerulli’s physical appearance during their January 10 meeting as “very upset and emotional, his face was red, and his eyes teared up.” J.A. 24. Mr. Castro also testified that he ordered the fitness for duty examination out of concern for Mr. Cerulli’s “emotional wellbeing” and “safety of the organization” because “it 2 The Board’s Carr analysis is premised on the un- disputed finding that Mr. Cerulli’s December 30, 2016, email constitutes a protected disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel actions. We address Mr. Cerulli’s arguments regarding whether there were additional protected disclosures infra (§ II). Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 8 Filed: 06/09/2020 8 CERULLI v. DEFENSE could be very dangerous . . . if [he was] not a hundred percent there.” J.A. 702. While acknowledging that Mr. Cerulli did not threaten anyone, the Board nonetheless emphasized his decision to arm himself with a knife, observing that no other employee—including the three witnesses to Mr. Danley’s statements—was so greatly concerned that they “absented themselves from working with [Mr. Danley] or armed themselves as a defensive measure.” J.A. 25. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that “the agency had a legitimate reason to order [Mr. Cerulli] to undergo a fitness for duty examination.” Id. The Board also found “strong evidence in support of the 10-day suspension” imposed on Mr. Cerulli. J.A. 26. It is undisputed that Mr. Cerulli did not attend his scheduled fitness for duty examination on January 24, 2017, and that he was suspended for failing to follow orders. The Board rejected the argument that the 10-day suspension was unwarranted because the fitness for duty order was itself improper. Instead, the Board observed that even if an order is improper, “an employee must comply with a lawful order and grieve the propriety of that order later.” Dias v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 102 M.S.P.R. 53, 57 (2006), aff’d, 223 Fed.Appx. 986 (Fed. Cir. 2007). On appeal, Mr. Cerulli argues that the fitness for duty order was not just inappropriate, but unlawful, and any personnel action resulting from his failure to follow the order cannot satisfy the first Carr factor. Relying on the Board’s finding that the fitness examination included “a psychiatric component,” J.A. 13-14, Mr. Cerulli cites Harris v. Department of Air Force, 62 M.S.P.R. 524 (1994), for the proposition that an employee may not be disciplined for Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 9 Filed: 06/09/2020 CERULLI v. DEFENSE 9 refusing to participate in a psychiatric examination that violates 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(e)(1). 3 Id. at 527-29. Section 339.301(e)(1) states that an agency may only order a psychiatric examination under two circumstances: (i) a properly-ordered physical examination “indicates no physical explanation for behavior or actions which may affect the safe and efficient performance” of the employee or others; or (ii) “a psychiatric examination or psychological assessment is part of the medical standards for a position . . . or required under a medical evaluation program.” Id. In Harris, the Board ruled in favor of an employee who was wrongly disciplined for failing to cooperate in a psychiatric examination violating § 339.301(e)(1). With respect to § 339.301(e)(1)(ii), 4 the Board found that “there [was] no 3 Mr. Cerulli also argues that the fitness for duty order violates 5 C.F.R. § 339.301(e)(2), which requires a psychiatric examination authorized under (e)(1) to be conducted “by a licensed physician certified in psychiatry by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology or the American Osteopathic Board of Psychiatry and Neurology, or by a licensed psychologist or clinical neuropsychologist.” Id. While the Board found that Dr. Hull was not qualified under § 339.301(e)(2), we find that the order itself does not violate § 339.301(e)(2). Nothing in the order requires Mr. Cerulli to receive his examination from a physician that does not meet the requirements of § 339.301(e)(2). The order merely specifies that the examination will be conducted by a “physician at the Occupational Health Office.” J.A. 264. 4 The Board in Harris also found that § 339.301(e)(1)(i) did not apply because there was no evidence that the employee’s behavior or actions affected the safe and efficient performance of herself or others. 62 M.S.P.R. at 528. Case: 19-2022 Document: 37 Page: 10 Filed: 06/09/2020 10 CERULLI v. DEFENSE allegation or evidence to indicate that [the employee] held a position that had medical standards.” 62 M.S.P.R. at 528. Here, unlike in Harris, the record supports that Mr. Cerulli’s position does require medical standards implicating a psychological assessment. Specifically, a description of the Fire Protection Inspector position enclosed with the fitness for duty order states that the position requires the “[a]bility to maintain alertness, self-control, and emotional stability to work in conditions of stress, confusion, panic, and physical injury and even death.” J.A. 269. We therefore find Mr. Cerulli’s argument that the fitness for duty order violates § 339.301(e)(1) unavailing.