Opinion ID: 2281555
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Text: The point here is that the design of section 17 of the Married Persons Act, R.S. 37:2-17, was the removal of the common-law disability of a married woman to dispose of her separate property, but not to enable a wife to release dower directly to her husband. It is conceded that dower and curtesy are now subject to release directly, by one spouse to the other, in virtue of L. 1953, c. 352, effective August 8, 1953, as amended by L. 1954, c. 21, effective May 3, 1954, N.J.S.A. 37:2-18.1. At common law, upon the principle of mutual disability and upon the presumption that the wife is sub potestate viri, a husband and wife may not contract with one another, and a wife cannot execute a valid release of dower in the real estate of her husband, in any other way than by joining with him in a conveyance to a third person. But while void at law, in New Jersey postnuptial agreements between husband and wife for the release of dower have ever been enforceable in equity, if fair and equitable and sustained by an adequate consideration, and the wife's consent has been understandingly given uninfluenced by fraud, deceit, oppression or duress. Ireland v. Ireland, 43 N.J. Eq. 311 ( Ch. 1887). See Bendler v. Bendler, 3 N.J. 161 (1949); also Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 Ill. 323, 154 N.E. 146, 50 A.L.R. 347 ( Sup. Ct. 1926) ; Crise v. Smith, 150 Md. 322, 133 A. 110, 47 A.L.R. 467 ( Ct. App. 1929). And see annotation in 49 A.L.R. 116. By such criteria, the release of dower is unassailable. It is insisted that, even so, the separation agreement could have no effect on dower for want of an acknowledgment deemed requisite by R.S. 3:37-1, now N.J.S. 3 A :35-1, and also that the agreement was purely executory in nature and was abrogated by the subsequent reconciliation and cohabitation of the parties. But in this regard the agreement was fully performed  a fait accompli. The dower was released and the agreed value of the interest paid. Martha concurrently executed, acknowledged and delivered to her husband a release of her dower right and joined her husband in a duly acknowledged deed of conveyance of the lands to Charles J. Hampton, who later made a conveyance to the corporation. The reconciliation did not constitute a rescission or annulment of the release of dower, an executed settlement and adjustment of the interests of the parties in the property, supported by a sufficient consideration, that was not made to depend for its continued efficacy on the continuance of the separation. The question is ordinarily one of intention. Compare Smith v. Terry, 38 App. Div. 394, 56 N.Y.S. 447 ( App. Div. 1899), affirmed 166 N.Y. 632, 60 N.E. 1120 ( Ct. App. 1901); Mach v. Baranowski, 152 Md. 53, 136 A. 34 ( Ct. App. 1927); Garrett v. Kirtley, 97 W. Va. 484, 125 S.E. 347, 40 A.L.R. 1222 ( Ct. App. 1924). And see annotation of cases in 40 A.L.R. 1227; also 42 C.J.S., Husband and Wife, § 599, p. 186. And the property was not held by the corporation to the use of Robert at the time of his death, within the intendment of R.S. 3:37-1, now N.J.S. 3 A :35-1. Attention is directed to the life estate reserved to Robert by the deed of conveyance to the corporation, the payment of $10,000 to him by the corporation for the transfer, the expenditure by the corporation of substantial sums for the maintenance of the property, and the expressed desire of Robert that his son, Robert F., be given leave to purchase the property for $8,000; and it is said that these facts clearly indicate that the deceased never parted with beneficial ownership; he held everything but the bare legal title. The argument continues that if, by the conveyance to Charles J. Hampton, plaintiff completely divested herself of dower, then her dower right arose anew in the equitable estate created by the subsequent holding of the corporation, just as if the legal title had been conveyed to her husband. But a life estate, and such it was here, is not in its very nature an estate of inheritance. Compare Heldhauser v. Schulz, 93 N.J. Eq. 449 ( E. & A. 1922); Cummings v. Cummings, 76 N.J. Eq. 568 ( Ch. 1910). The corporation did not hold the lands to the use of the deceased in the statutory sense. The case is clearly within the principle of Frank v. Frank's Inc., cited supra. Moreover, Martha has had adequate compensation for her dower interest in the property. The judgment of the Appellate Division directing dismissal of the complaint is affirmed. For affirmance  Chief Justice VANDERBILT, and Justices HEHER, OLIPHANT, WACHENFELD, BURLING and JACOBS  6. For reversal  None.