Opinion ID: 768185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Uttering Jury Instruction

Text: 24 Chang also objects to the instruction given the jury regarding the meaning of the term uttering as set forth in his indictment. The challenged instruction provided that the term `uttering' means to make or attempt to make use of any written or printed instrument with intent to defraud . .. . Chang argues that it was improper for the district court to instruct the jury that an attempt to make use of the Certificate was sufficient to constitute an utterance 4 . 25 Chang concedes that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal; therefore, we may review the jury instruction only for plain error. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 2102 (1999). The relevant inquiry under the plain error standard is whether the error is clear  or obvious and  `affect[s] substantial rights.'  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-35 (1993) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). This is a very high standard, under which we must find that it is highly probable that the error materially affected the verdict before reversing. United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 1989). 26 We conclude that reversal on this grounds is not merited. In doing so, we need not determine whether an utterance of an instrument is, in all cases, tantamount to an attempt to make use of that instrument or whether such an instruction is sufficient to support conviction of a defendant for uttering a counterfeit foreign security. Regardless, there is ample evidence in this case to support our finding that the jury instruction error (if there was any such error) did not affect thejury's verdict. The adequacy of jury instructions is determined by examining them in their entirety. United States v. Harris, 738 F.2d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1984). Subsequent jury instructions -- which are not objected to by Chang on appeal -- further explained the term utter and placed it in a context in which it is highly likely that the verdict would have remained the same even if the language to which Chang objects had been removed. 27 One such instruction told the jury that [o]ne utters an item in payment or negotiation if he offers the item to another while representing that the item is genuine, . . . in an effort to ultimately receive money or other things of value in exchange for the item. As discussed previously, the evidence supported a finding by the jury that Chang (a) offered the Certificate to BNY or Midland Bank, (b) while representing it was authentic and (c) with the ultimate goal of receiving money from Midland Bank or insurance and an asset statement from BNY. Thus, the attempt to make use of language of the disputed instruction is tempered with the language of the second instruction, which informed the jury that an attempt to make use of must amount to an offer. The district court's instruction was not plainly erroneous.