Opinion ID: 692998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relationship between Ms. Bailor and the Salvation Army

Text: 16 Absent privity deriving from a special consensual relationship between Ms. Bailor and the Salvation Army, there must exist another independent basis to impose a duty of care on the Salvation Army. When addressing the duty to control the conduct of others, the courts of Indiana generally follow the principles set forth in the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. Cole v. Indiana Dep't of Correction, 616 N.E.2d 44, 46 n. 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). The general rule is set forth in Sec. 315. That section provides in relevant part: 17 There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless 18 (a) a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or 19 (b) a special relationship exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right of protection. 20 Section 319 elaborates on these general criteria in the context before us today. That section, entitled Duty of Those in Charge of Person Having Dangerous Propensities, provides: 21 One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. 22 To establish the special relationship needed to impose a duty, Ms. Bailor must establish that the Salvation Army took charge of a third person. Indiana law does not delineate in comprehensive fashion what is required to conclude that an entity has taken charge of an individual. Nor are there any Indiana cases directly on point as to whether a private halfway house, providing transitional services to pre-release inmates, meets the criteria for liability under Sec. 319 of the Restatement. 5 However, in Estate of Mathes v. Ireland, 419 N.E.2d 782, 784 (Ind.Ct.App.1981), the court held that under Sec. 319, [f]or the duty to exist there must therefore not only be an actual taking charge of the third person, there must also be a knowledge of the likelihood that he will cause bodily harm. Further, in Sports, Inc., 431 N.E.2d at 538, the appellate court added that the entity taking charge must possess the right to intervene or control the actions of a third person. Thus, Ms. Bailor must demonstrate that the Salvation Army had the legal right to control Holly, did actually control Holly, and had knowledge of his propensity for violence. In order to make this determination, we must examine the relationship between the Salvation Army halfway house and the Department of Corrections (Bureau of Prisons). 23 Although Holly clearly resided at the Salvation Army facility, he remained under the legal custody of the Attorney General and the Bureau of Prisons. 6 The Salvation Army's ability or right to control Holly was limited. The contract that defined the parameters of the Salvation Army's responsibilities allowed minimal discretion to the Salvation Army. The Salvation Army personnel were not authorized to possess lethal weapons while on duty; the personnel could not use physical force to restrain a resident except in instances of justifiable self-defense, prevention of loss or damage to property or person, or the prevention of self-inflicted harm, and only to the degree necessary. R.101, Ex. B at 3. The Salvation Army also had limited independent disciplinary discretion, and could impose sanctions on residents only for the most minor of prohibited acts. Any serious sanctions required approval of a Bureau of Prisons representative. 24 Under its arrangement with the government, the Salvation Army facility, as a halfway house, could not detain a resident. Residents were free to leave, provided they signed a sign-out sheet. The facility could not be locked down in order to prevent residents from leaving, and individual rooms could be locked only by the residents themselves from the inside. In sum, residents could leave the facility at any time, subject only to the consequences that could be imposed by the courts or by the Bureau of Prisons. Once Holly left the facility, the Salvation Army could only report the incident to the Bureau of Prisons. 25 The district court's determination that the Salvation Army had the responsibility to house Holly in a safe, clean and nurturing environment; but virtually no say-so as to effectuating meaningful control over him 7 supports the conclusion that the Salvation Army did not possess sufficient control over Holly to create a duty to Ms. Bailor as a matter of law. The limitations on the authority of the halfway house are important and we believe a controlling factor in the relationship between the Salvation Army and Ms. Bailor. The Salvation Army had but limited authority to restrict the activity of Holly and, therefore no realistic opportunity to control Holly's activities with respect to Ms. Bailor.