Opinion ID: 2290999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutor's Comments on Appellant's Failure to Testify

Text: In closing, the prosecutor asked: [W]here are the facts that showed that at that time, Frederick Gray actually believed he was in danger of death or serious bodily harm? Where is that evidence? Where is the evidence that that was reasonable? And where is the evidence that showed he had to take his belt off and crush Damon Chase's throat? And in rebuttal the prosecutor stressed: [W]here is the evidence that at the point in this fight, where Frederick Gray was sitting on Damon Chase's back on the ground that Frederick Gray actually felt himself in fear of death or serious bodily injury, that that was reasonable at that point and that he has to kill to protect himself at that point.... There wasn't one word about that. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objections to these statements. Appellant contends the prosecutor improperly commented on appellant's failure to testify. Appellant acknowledges that these comments do not expressly refer to his failure to testify. He relies, however, on Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485 (D.C.1985), where we noted that a statement is improper if it is of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure to testify. Id. at 490 (citation omitted). We have also explained that a comment naturally and necessarily highlights a defendant's silence when the defendant's trial testimony is the only source of an answer to the prosecutor's question. See Boyd v. United States, 473 A.2d 828, 833 (D.C.1984). Appellant argues that the prosecutor's comments about what appellant actually believed and actually felt when he was choking Chase naturally and necessarily implicated his failure to testify at trial. Appellant stresses that he was the only person who could have provided this information. This argument is unconvincing. We do not attach the most sinister possible interpretation to a prosecutor's remarks, particularly when evidence of an intended impropriety is lacking (as in this case). Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643-44, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871-72, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989). Even if appellant is correct, that only his testimony could provide the answers to the prosecutor's questions, the prosecutor could have been referring to appellant's statement to the police which was admitted as substantive evidence. See supra note 1. Thus, the prosecutor's statements, at worst, reflected on the evidence that appellant had not mentioned in his sworn statement to the police that he actually had felt or believed his life was in danger when he was choking Chase. Moreover, appellant's own statement was not the only source of evidence on the question whether, subjectively, appellant feared imminent serious bodily injury. On occasion, a defendant's subjective belief of danger can be determined from the objective circumstances of the killing. See Fersner v. United States, 482 A.2d 387, 392-93 (D.C.1984). It is possible, therefore, for a defendant to rely on self-defense, based on circumstantial evidence of reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury, without the defendant's own testimony. See Reid v. United States, 581 A.2d 359, 367 (D.C.1990); Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678, 681 (D.C.1984). In this case, the jury heard two eyewitness accounts of the fightFrederick's trial testimony and Nickens' signed statementas well as appellant's own statement. The prosecutor's comments in closing and on rebuttal, therefore, may be viewed as comments on the failure of the defense in general to demonstrate any basis for believing appellant actually felt or believed he was in imminent danger of bodily harm justifying deadly force in response. The prosecutor's comments did not naturally and necessarily implicate defendant's failure to testify.