Opinion ID: 2343734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The legal basis of the majority's decision

Text: ¶ 42. While I am reluctant to address the merits of the basis for the majority decision given the absence of briefing and argument by the parties, I will nonetheless set forth causes for concern about the opinion of the majority. ¶ 43. Under ordinary negligence jurisprudence, proximate causation is a fact question for the trier of fact. Roberts, 2003 VT 10, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. 480, 820 A.2d 995 ([P]roximate cause in lawyer malpractice actions is `cause-in-fact.'). Both parties agree that the trial judge did not make a finding of fact on this issue because he applied the actual innocence rule instead. The majority concludes that plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause for these fees because the attorney's fees were charged irrespective of the quality of defendant's representation and therefore not proximately caused by malpractice. Ante, ¶ 27. It is unclear whether the majority is announcing this as a rule of law, or making its own determination of fact. ¶ 44. If it is a rule of law, it is difficult to determine what the ruling is, and what its governing principle is. Is it a rule of law that no remedy for the return of any fees paid is available in a malpractice case against a criminal defense attorney as long as the lawyer took some action `for which plaintiff[] received some value,' and the client eventually pled guilty to at least one crime? If so, how is that different from the actual innocence rule? ¶ 45. Is it a rule of law that in such a case a client is precluded from recovery only if he or she is asking for return of all fees paid? While plaintiff sought to recover the full amount he paid, the prayer for relief in his amended complaint asked for judgment in an amount commensurate with his damages. The trial judge recognized that the purpose of the trial was to determine whether a part or all of the fees paid were incurred as a result of inadequate representation. In any negligence case the trier of fact does not grant an all-or-nothing recovery in response to a plaintiff's request, but is required to limit recovery to the extent of harm proved to have been caused by the negligence. It is difficult to conclude that the majority ruling means that a plaintiff will be barred if he asks for return of the full fee, but not so barred if he asks for a return of less than the full amount paid. Such a rule is not consistent with either negligence or contract law and procedure, in which a plaintiff may assert a claim for the maximum amount desired, but recovery is limited to the amount proved at trial. ¶ 46. Is it a rule of law that in any malpractice case brought against any professional a client may not sue for return of fees paid if the fees would have been charged absent negligence? If so, this is an extremely broad legal doctrine that deserves more attention. Who determines whether the fees would have been charged absent negligence? In a footnote, the majority distinguishes this case from one in which there may be a bona fide fee dispute in the course of criminal representation that would give rise to a breach of contract claim that was not a disguised malpractice claim. Ante, ¶ 27 n. 5. It is unclear whether the majority recognizes that there could ever be a bona fide fee dispute arising from substandard attorney work in the absence of special obligations created by contract. This is an important question, since the case moves further toward treating all attorney malpractice cases as negligence cases and not contract actions in the absence of specific contractual terms. See ante, ¶ 24 (plaintiff's claim was properly construed as a tort claim because plaintiff did not allege that defendant breached any special obligations in his employment contract with defendant, nor could he as their agreement was oral and contained no specific or special obligations). ¶ 47. Thus, it is difficult to discern not only what the rule is, but what the governing principle underlying that rule is, so that it may be applied in variant factual circumstances in the future. For example, imagine a plaintiff who is convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) after a trial in which his privately retained counsel performed competently prior to trial but made numerous errors at trial, or perhaps slept through it, to use plaintiff's example. The plaintiff, with different counsel, obtains a reversal on appeal. To avoid a retrial, he subsequently pleads guilty to the lesser charge of negligent operation with the same fine amount he previously paid. [9] Can he assert a malpractice claim for that portion of the fees paid to the first trial attorney for incompetent work in the trial portion of the case? It is work that would have been charged for, whether it was competent or not. If he is barred from such a recovery by the holding in this case, how does the rule of law differ from the actual innocence rule? If he is not, what is the basis for the difference? ¶ 48. In the broadest application of the majority decision, it would insulate all professionals from malpractice suits in which clients seek a return of fees paid where there are no special contractual obligations. In its narrowest application, it appears indistinguishable from the actual innocence rule. Because of the lack of clarity, it is not helpful to either attorneys or trial judges, and carries the risk of inconsistent interpretation. ¶ 49. Alternatively, the conclusion that plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause for these fees may be read as a determination of fact. Determination of proximate cause requires a finding by the trier of fact except in rare circumstances. Roberts, 2003 VT 10, ¶¶ 14-15, 175 Vt. 480, 820 A.2d 995; Fritzeen v. Trudell Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 170 Vt. 632, 635, 751 A.2d 293, 297 (2000) (mem.) (Proximate cause is ordinarily an issue to be resolved by the jury unless the proof is so clear that reasonable minds cannot draw different conclusions or where all reasonable minds would construe the facts and circumstances one way.) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, it is the fact-finder's task to find proximate cause, especially where there are various possible causal contributors to an event, such that [t]he proof and facts . . . do not lend themselves to . . . singular clarity. Fritzeen, 170 Vt. at 635, 751 A.2d at 297. ¶ 50. If the Court is making a factual determination, it is not based on a review of the evidence, as the nature of the appeal did not call for a review of evidence presented at trial. The trial judge as fact-finder never made such a determination based on the trial evidence because he applied the actual innocence rule. Therefore, I would remand to the trial court for a factual finding of whether defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of any harm to plaintiff in relation to fees paid for services.