Opinion ID: 1705889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Spicer's Appearance Before the Jury Venire Wearing Shackles.

Text: ¶ 71. Spicer asserts that he was denied fundamental constitutional rights on the ground that he was brought before the jury venire in shackles. Before voir dire was conducted and while the potential jurors were seated in the courtroom, Spicer was led into the courtroom wearing civilian clothes with his hands and feet shackled. Theresa Ball, an officer with the Mississippi Department of Corrections, led Spicer into the courtroom through the back door behind the bench to the witness room, approximately three to six feet away, where she removed the shackles. The trial judge estimated that Spicer was in view of the potential jurors for only a few seconds. When Spicer's counsel moved for a mistrial based on an argument that potential jurors were prejudiced as a result of possibly seeing Spicer shackled, the trial judge denied Spicer's motion, finding that this particular display was inadvertent and momentary. ¶ 72. This very issue was discussed and rejected by this Court on Spicer's direct appeal. Spicer, 921 So.2d at 302-04. Spicer argues that errors affecting fundamental constitutional rights may be excluded from procedural bars which would otherwise prohibit their consideration. Smith v. State, 922 So.2d 43, 46 (Miss.App. 2006). However, this matter did receive consideration. Further, this Court has held that: [T]he procedural bars of waiver, different theories, and res judicata and the exception thereto as defined in. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1-5) are applicable in death penalty PCR Applications. Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss. 1986); Evans v. State, 485 So.2d 276 (Miss.1986). Rephrasing direct appeal issues for post-conviction purposes will not defeat the procedural bar of res judicata. Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305 (Miss.1986); Rideout v. State, 496 So.2d 667 (Miss.1986); GilHard v. State, 446 So.2d 590 (Miss.1984). The Petitioner carries the burden of demonstrating that his claim is not procedurally barred. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(6) (Supp. 1991); Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 320 (Miss.1988). However, `an alleged error should be reviewed, in spite of any procedural bar, only where the claim is so novel that it has not previously been litigated, or, perhaps, where an appellate court has suddenly reversed itself on an issue previously thought settled.' Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 311 (Miss. 1986). Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888, 893 (Miss. 1992). ¶ 73. Like his direct appeal, Spicer again relies on Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). This Court considered his argument and rejected it. Spicer asserts that he has newly discovered evidence by way of an affidavit from Terrell Walters, Spicer's uncle, who stated in his affidavit: I was summoned to jury duty in connection with Fred's capital murder trial. On the first day I reported to jury duty, the judge, asked the jury pool if anyone had a reason they felt they could not serve on the jury. I approached the judge and advised him that Fred is my nephew. The judge told me that this was not a good enough reason to be excused. Thereafter, I remained in the jury pool for two (2) days before being excused. While I was in the jury pool, I witnessed Fred being escorted into the courtroom in shackles. Fred was in plain view of the jury while he was shackled. Spicer points to a sentence in the direct appeal opinion wherein this Court stated: However, Spicer presented no evidence that any of the jurors noticed the shackling. Spicer, 921 So.2d at 303. He submits that now he has done so. ¶ 74. First, the sentence in the direct-appeal opinion to which Spicer refers was detailing that Spicer's trial counsel presented no evidence on the matter to the trial court when Spicer moved for a mistrial. In this Court's analysis of the present issue on direct appeal, we admitted that potential jurors may have seen Spicer: . . . potential jurors possibly observed Spicer shackled in his brief walk of approximately six feet, from the back entrance of the courtroom to the witness room. That would not require a mistrial. Id. at 304. Second, Terrell Walters was not Selected to sit on Spicer's jury, not that our decision should be any different if he had been. [2] ¶ 75. Spicer has not demonstrated a novel claim or a sudden reversal of law relative to these issues, which would exempt his claim from the procedural bar of res judicata pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Rev.2007). See also Lockett v. State, 614 So.2d 888 (Miss.1992) (citing Rideout v. State, 496 So.2d 667 (Miss. 1986); Gilliard v. State, 446 So.2d 590 (Miss.1984)).