Opinion ID: 1591177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of EvidenceAggravating Circumstance (i)(6)

Text: In addition to the erroneous exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence, we have also determined that the evidence in this case is insufficient to establish one of the aggravating circumstances, the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant. During closing argument the State asserted that Hartman had committed the murder because the victim would have been able to identify him and report him for the kidnaping. The jury found this aggravating circumstance, and the Court of Criminal Appeals held that, viewing the evidence and the fact that the victim would have been able to report both her kidnaping and the unlawful use of the patrol car, the jury could reasonably infer that one purpose of the murder was to prevent the victim's identification of the defendant. The defendant argues that the proof is insufficient to support this aggravating circumstance. We agree. The relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 887 (Tenn.1998); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn.1994). While it may be plausible to believe that one of the defendant's motives in committing the murder was to avoid arrest for the kidnaping, such a belief is not supported by any particular proof in the record. The State's proof on this issue was purely speculative, and the evidence in this record is simply insufficient to establish that any rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1993) (holding the evidence insufficient to establish this aggravating circumstance). In concluding that the evidence is insufficient, we do not depart from prior decisions which have held that this aggravating circumstance may be applied when the proof shows that avoiding arrest was one motivation for the killing. As we have previously held, application of this aggravating circumstance is not limited to only those killings which are solely or predominantly motivated by a desire to avoid arrest or prosecution. See State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 504-05 (Tenn.1997). However, we emphasize that there must be sufficient proof to establish that avoiding arrest or prosecution was a motivation for the killing. The evidence in this record is simply insufficient in this regard. [12] Accordingly, having determined that the trial court both erroneously excluded evidence relevant to establish residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance and erroneously permitted the jury to consider an aggravating circumstance which was not supported by sufficient evidence, we must next determine whether these errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the erroneously excluded mitigation evidence, the record shows that the clear defense strategy at this re-sentencing hearing was to establish residual doubt in the minds of the jurors. [13] This strategy was evident during opening statements when defense counsel told the jury that the defense would present proof about how the State paid money to procure the testimony of a prison inmate, the only witness to directly implicate the defendant. The defense strategy was obvious throughout cross-examination of the State's witnesses. This strategy also was consistently followed during the presentation of the defense proof. Specifically, the defense called witnesses who testified that they had seen the victim alive after the time the State believed she had been abducted and murdered by the defendant. Considered in context, there is no doubt that the proof excluded by the trial judge was the cornerstone of the defense theory of mitigation at this re-sentencing hearing. Moreover, as the defendant points out, recent studies have shown that in general residual doubt is one of the most compelling mitigating circumstances a capital defendant can establish to improve his chances of receiving a life sentence. See Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum.L.Rev. 1538, 1563 (1998); William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am.J.Crim.L. 1, 28 (1988) (The existence of some degree of doubt about the guilt of the accused was the most often recurring explanatory factor in the life recommendation cases studied.). However, the most important factor for our purpose in determining whether these errors were harmless is that these errors directly impacted the jury's sentencing decision to the defendant's disadvantage. The jury was allowed to consider an aggravating circumstance not supported by sufficient proof and was precluded from considering relevant mitigating proof crucial to the theory of defense. While the proof in this record is sufficient to support the two remaining aggravating circumstances, it is not overwhelming. [13] And given that the jury deliberated for approximately eight hours before reaching a sentencing verdict despite these errors, we are unable to conclude that the verdict would have been the same had these errors not occurred. Accordingly, the defendant's sentence of death is vacated and the case remanded for re-sentencing. Issues not likely to re-occur have been pretermitted, [14] but in the interest of judicial economy, we will address two issues that may be presented at any re-sentencing hearing.