Opinion ID: 3001570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Race and Gender Discrimination Claims

Text: Ms. Maclin also contends that Ameritech discriminated against her on the basis of her race and gender. Ms. Maclin attempts to support her Title VII claims using the indirect, burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this method, she must establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she reasonably performed to Ameritech’s legitimate job expectations; (3) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (4) Ameritech treated her differently than a similarly situated employee outside her protected class. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 2006). Ms. Maclin’s claims necessarily fail if she cannot establish these four elements.6 See id. This court has taken a broad view with regard to what qualifies as an adverse employment action, the third element of a prima facie case. Nevertheless, an action must be “significant” to be cognizable as discrimination. Washington v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 2005). The action must involve more than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.-Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2007). We have articulated three general categories of 6 Under this method of proof, the burden shifts to Ameritech to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions only if Ms. Maclin establishes all four elements of her prima facie case. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). In that event, Ms. Maclin would have the burden to show that Ameritech’s justification is pretextual. Id. 10 No. 07-1751 actionable, materially adverse employment actions for the purposes of Title VII: (1) cases in which the employee’s compensation, fringe benefits, or other financial terms of employment are diminished, including termination; (2) cases in which a nominally lateral transfer with no change in financial terms significantly reduces the employee’s career prospects by preventing her from using her skills and experience, so that the skills are likely to atrophy and her career is likely to be stunted; and (3) cases in which the employee is not moved to a different job or the skill requirements of her present job altered, but the conditions in which she works are changed in a way that subjects her to a humiliating, degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or otherwise significantly negative alteration in her workplace environment. Id. (citing O’Neal v. City of Chicago, 392 F.3d 909, 911 (7th Cir. 2004)). “We have cautioned, however, that cases in the second category are to be distinguished from cases involving a purely lateral transfer, that is, a transfer that does not involve a demotion in form or substance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither does a “transfer involving no reduction in pay and no more than a minor change in working conditions” qualify as an adverse employment action. Id. (citation omitted). Ms. Maclin contends that she suffered an adverse employment action when she was denied a discretionary bonus, when she was denied a sufficiently large pay raise and when her title was changed upon her return to work. We consider each in turn. No. 07-1751 11
Ms. Maclin contends that she suffered an adverse employment action when she was denied a discretionary bonus. This claim must fail as a matter of law. Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2005); Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996). Ameritech’s guidelines state that the bonus that Ms. Maclin was denied “is not an entitlement.” R.69-2, Ex. F at 6. Furthermore, Ms. Maclin concedes that the bonus she was denied was a wholly discretionary payment by her employer. The “loss of a bonus is not an adverse employment action . . . where the employee is not automatically entitled to the bonus.” Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488-89; see also Farrell, 421 F.3d at 614. Additionally, Ms. Maclin has not shown that Ameritech’s reason for declining to give her a discretionary bonus was a pretext for discrimination. Ameritech contends that it did not award her a discretionary bonus because she only had met—not exceeded—her supervisor’s expectations. Ameritech contends that three Bid Central employees—a white male, an Asian-American female and an African-American male—performed exceptionally well and therefore each was given an individual discretionary award. Ms. Maclin has offered no evidence that this explanation is a pretext for discrimination. She therefore has failed to carry her burden, and her claim must fail. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610.
Ms. Maclin contends that she suffered an adverse employment action when she was given a smaller pay raise than Gentilini, her white, male coworker. Because Ms. Maclin abandoned this claim in the district court, she 12 No. 07-1751 cannot pursue it on appeal. Keck Garrett & Assocs. v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 07-1350, 2008 WL 451300, at  (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2008). Ameritech moved for summary judgment on Ms. Maclin’s pay raise claim on two grounds: (1) Ms. Maclin could not show that anyone outside her pro- tected classes was both similarly situated to her and more favorably treated, and (2) Ms. Maclin could not show that Ameritech’s proffered reasons for giving Gentilini a comparatively larger salary increase were pretextual. In her response to Ameritech’s motion for summary judgment, Ms. Maclin failed to defend her claim against these arguments. See id. She therefore abandoned the claim. Id. Even if Ms. Maclin had not abandoned her claim, however, summary judgment for Ameritech would be appropriate. As noted by the district court, Ms. Maclin failed to establish at least one necessary element of her claim: that she was similarly situated to Gentilini. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610. Ms. Maclin’s only evidence that she is similarly situated to Gentilini is her own perceptions about her work performance, which cannot suffice to establish this element of her case. See Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1181 (7th Cir. 2002). Because she failed to demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact on a necessary element, summary judgment on the pay raise claim was appropriate. Moreover, even if Ms. Maclin had succeeded in establishing her prima facie case, she has failed to prove that Ameritech’s proffered reasons for awarding her a comparatively small pay raise were a pretext for discrimination. Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610. Ameritech contended that it had determined Ms. Maclin’s and Gentilini’s raises in No. 07-1751 13 accordance with the company’s non-discriminatory matrix. The matrix takes into account two factors, the employee’s salary relative to her pay range and the employee’s performance review, and, based on those factors, it determines the total raise and bonus for which the employee qualifies. Ms. Maclin has offered no evidence that this explanation is a pretext for discrimination. She therefore has failed to carry her burden of proving that Ameritech’s justification for its pay raise was pretextual, and her claim must fail. See id.
Finally, Ms. Maclin submits that she suffered an adverse employment action when, upon her return from medical leave, Ameritech refused to reinstate her as the team lead and changed her title. To survive summary judgment on this claim, she must establish that the change in job duties and title constitute an adverse employment action within the meaning of the statute. Id. Ms. Maclin and Ameritech agree that she returned to work at the MU salary grade, the same grade that she had before her leave of absence. Gentilini, the new team lead, also had that salary grade. Ameritech contends that, because Ms. Maclin’s position has the same salary, benefits and opportunities for promotion as the person in the team lead role, denying her the team lead position was not an adverse employment action. See Grayson v. City of Chicago, 317 F.3d 745, 750 (7th Cir. 2003). Ms. Maclin does not offer any evidence that there is a difference, significant or otherwise, between her duties as complex bids manager and the team lead. She contends only that some time after Gentilini was made team lead, 14 No. 07-1751 Ameritech officially changed her title from area manager to complex bids manager. Ms. Maclin submits that she suffered an adverse employment action because that change in title resulted in a loss of prestige. This contention fails to establish that Ms. Maclin suffered an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action must involve a material, substantive change in an employee’s pay and responsibilities. Grayson, 317 F.3d at 750. An employee has not suffered an adverse employment action if her title changes but her position remains the same in terms of responsibilities, salary, benefits and opportunities for promotion. Id. Even a change in title that deprives an employee of prestige is insufficient if it lacks more substantive effect. See id. Ms. Maclin contends only that Ameritech changed her title after she was placed in Bid Central and in the MU salary, and that it did so on the basis of her race or gender. It is undisputed that Ms. Maclin remains in the same salary grade that she held before her title changed in 2004 from area manager to complex bids manager. She has not established that the change had any significant or material affect on her job or opportunities for advancement. See id. Ms. Maclin has not shown that, if she had been given the team lead role upon her return to work, she would have had better responsibilities, salary, benefits or opportunities for promotion. Id. In fact, she conceded that the team lead position as it exists today does not have the responsibilities that she had as team lead in 2003. At most, Ms. Maclin contends that she lost prestige when Ameritech changed her title and began calling her a complex bids manager instead of an area manager. Therefore, she has failed to establish that she suffered an adverse employment action; she consequently cannot state a discrimination claim No. 07-1751 15 because she failed to establish a necessary element of her prima facie case. Id.; Raymond, 442 F.3d at 610.