Opinion ID: 1592254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: necessity defenses

Text: The defendants argue that the trial courts erred in preventing them from presenting evidence for their justification defenses of necessity, or, as they choose to describe them, their choice of evils defenses. In doing so, the defendants develop six underlying premises: [1]. [They] have constitutional rights to present a defense under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [2]. The Non-personhood of the Unborn under Roe v. Wade Does Not Preclude... the Necessity Defense. [3]. The Application of the Necessity Defense has Usually Been to Circumstances in which the Evil Prevented, Like Abortion, is Not Unlawful. [4]. Roe v. Wade and [following] Opinions do not Prohibit Private Individuals from Non-Violently Attempting to Prevent Loss of Life From Abortions. [5]. North Dakota has Recognized that Justification can be a Defense in Chapter 12.1-05 of the N.D.C.C. [6]. The Choice of Evils or Necessity Defense Should Apply to Defendants' Actions in this Case. We conclude that these premises, separately or together, do not justify criminal trespass to interfere with legal abortions. It is true, as the defendants advance in their fifth premise, that North Dakota recognizes that justification can be a defense in a criminal prosecution. NDCC Ch. 12.1-05. Chapter 12.1-05 is an almost complete adoption of Ch. 6 of the Proposed [New Federal Criminal] Code dealing with defenses involving justification and excuse. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D.1983). See Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (1971). Leidholm explained justification and excuse: A defense of justification is the product of society's determination that the actual existence of certain circumstances will operate to make proper and legal what otherwise would be criminal conduct. A defense of excuse, contrarily, does not make legal and proper conduct which ordinarily would result in criminal liability; instead, it openly recognizes the criminality of the conduct but excuses it because the actor believed that circumstances actually existed which would justify his conduct when in fact they did not. In short, had the facts been as he supposed them to be, the actor's conduct would have been justified rather than excused. 334 N.W.2d at 814-15. The broad notion of necessity, however, is not one of the particular justifications authorized in NDCC Ch. 12.1-05 and has not yet been recognized by this court. Yet, in their sixth premise, defendants argue that the necessity defense is available here. The defense of necessity has its roots deep in the common law. State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Mo.App. 1989). As Blackstone said of self-defense, one variation of necessity: Both the life and limbs of a man are of such high value, in the estimation of the law of England, that it pardons even homicide if committed se defendendo (in self-defense), or in order to preserve them. For whatever is done by a man, to save either life or member, is looked upon as done upon the highest necessity and compulsion. I Blackstone, Commentaries . See also IV Blackstone, Commentaries  (... it is highly just and equitable that a man should be excused for those acts which are done through unavoidable force and compulsion.). That certain kinds of public necessity will excuse what would otherwise be a breach of the law, has long been a recognized principle. VIII W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 445 (2nd Impression 1973). During the medieval period, criminal liability came to be based upon a mens rea. Id. at 433. The defenses of coercion, compulsion, and necessity rest ultimately on the fact that, in the circumstances, no mens rea is imputable. Id. at 443. The modern equivalent of the common-law defense of necessity is the so-called `choice of evils' or `competing harms' doctrine. 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 88 at 413 (14th ed. 1978). Some kinds of necessity  for example, self-defense  have become well established as justification for conduct that would otherwise be criminal, but there is less agreement on recognizing other kinds of necessity as defenses. [1] General statements of the necessity defense have been formulated in a number of ways, usually by statute. For illustrations, see New York Penal Law § 35.05; [2] Model Penal Code § 3.02; [3] 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 124 (1984). [4] With his formulation, Professor Robinson opines that only legally recognized interests justify responsive criminal conduct. The phrase legally protected interest... is to be interpreted broadly to include all interests that the community is willing to recognize and that are not specifically denied recognition by the legal system.4 4 Surprisingly, no statute explicitly excludes from triggering conditions threats to interests specifically rejected by law. But there can be little doubt that if the situation arose, courts would refuse to recognize the justified use of force in protection of legally repudiated interests on the ground of presumed legislative intent, but it would seem preferable to make clear from the outset that only threats to legally-recognized interests can trigger a justified response. 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses, § 124(b), p. 47. While the other formulations are not as clear as Professor Robinson's on this point, each formulation posits some limits to the kind of evil, harm, or injury that will justify criminal conduct to avoid. The Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code (1970) was the forerunner of the draft criminal code from which our North Dakota criminal code was drawn. The Study Draft proposed another formulation of the necessity defense: § 608. Conduct Which Avoids Greater Harm. Conduct is justified if it is necessary and appropriate to avoid harm clearly greater than the harm which might result from such conduct and the situation developed through no fault of the actor. The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the penal statute defining the offense, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. The Comment to proposed § 608 said: This section affirms the proposition that a man is not to be punished as a criminal if his prohibited conduct averted more harm than it caused. This is sometimes called the `choice of evils' rule. The Comment also said: Proposed section 608 embodies the legal doctrine of `necessity.' It makes no sense to punish persons who have acted to avoid great harm, even if they have `broken a law' to do so. I Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 270 (1970). The National Commission eventually recommended a narrower codification of justifications and excuses without an explicit necessity-defense formulation. The National Commission explained why in its Comment to § 601 (Justification): This partial codification is not an attempt to freeze the rules as they now exist. It may therefore be desirable to be explicit that the statutory definition of these rules is not intended to preclude the judicial development of other justifications. For example, the so-called choice of evils rule, i.e., that emergency measures to avoid greater injury may be justified, has not been included in this Chapter on the view that, while its intended application would be extremely rare in cases actually prosecuted, even the best of statutory formulations (see N.Y.Pen.L. § 35.10) is a potential source of unwarranted difficulty in ordinary cases, particularly in the context of the adoption of the broad mistake of fact and law provisions found in the Code. Codification, as opposed to case-by-case prosecutive discretion, is regarded as premature. On the other hand, some Commissioners believe that a penal code is seriously deficient if it does not explicitly recognize that avoidance of greater harm is, if not a duty, at least a privilege of the citizen. Final Report of the National Commission On Reform of Federal Criminal Laws at 43 (1971). Our Legislature adopted, almost complete[ly], the National Commission's chapter on justifications and excuses in enacting our criminal code in 1973. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d at 814. Thus, while the history of the legislative development of justification defenses in our state shows that NDCC Ch. 12.1-05 is not intended to preclude the judicial development of other justifications, it is clear that our criminal code does not license the judicial extension of justification to any individualized conception of necessity. As a result, we conclude that we need not determine the precise scope of the necessity defense available in this state. In our view, the defendants' criminal trespasses at medical clinics to prevent legal abortions may not be justified under any reasonable formulation of the necessity defense. The evil, harm, or injury sought to be avoided, or the interest sought to be promoted, by the commission of a crime must be legally cognizable to be justified as necessity. [I]n most cases of civil disobedience a lesser evils defense will be barred. This is because as long as the laws or policies being protested have been lawfully adopted, they are conclusive evidence of the community's view on the issue. 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 124(d)(1), at 52. Abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognized harm, and, therefore, prevention of abortion is not a legally recognized interest to promote. [5] The Abortion Control Act, NDCC Ch. 14-02.1, authorizes and regulates abortions. The purpose of this chapter is to protect unborn human life and maternal health within present constitutional limits. NDCC 14-02.1-01. Those constitutional limits are set by the United States Supreme Court. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), holds that the right of privacy guaranteed by the United States Constitution encompasses a woman's decision whether to terminate a pregnancy, and that the State may not interfere with that decision during the first trimester of pregnancy. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), holds that the State may not give a woman's spouse or parents, or other third parties, the right to interfere with the woman's decision to have an abortion since the State itself lacks that right. See also Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989) (Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the plurality, would modify and narrow Roe and succeeding cases. 109 S.Ct. at 3058. Justice Blackmun, writing for three justices, concurring and dissenting, says: For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. 109 S.Ct. at 3079). Thus, prevention of abortion is not a legally recognized interest, and an abortion is not a legally cognizable injury. The element of a legally cognizable injury for the necessity defense has been identified repeatedly in decisions on other criminal attempts to protest abortions at medical clinics. State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 801 P.2d 789, 797 (1990) (Because termination of pregnancies are legal, nontortious activity, ... their occurrence cannot be a `public or private injury' and defendants are foreclosed from asserting the defense of choice of evils.); State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192 (In short, the defense of necessity asserted here cannot be utilized when the harm sought to be avoided [abortion] remains a constitutionally protected activity and the harm incurred [trespass] is in violation of the law.); People v. Crowley, 142 Misc.2d 663, 538 N.Y. S.2d 146, 149-151 (Just.Ct.1989) (In this case, the very activity labelled an injury by Defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the New York Legislature and by the Supreme Court ... [A]t least with regard to criminal cases arising from attempts to disrupt medical procedures that are within the parameters of the law, the necessity defense must fail as a matter of law.); Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Alaska 1981) (Abortion ... is not unlawful in this state, as appellants concede. Given these principles, appellants' argument must fail since the alleged harm sought to be avoided did not arise from a natural source and was not unlawful.); People v. Stiso, 93 Ill.App.3d 101, 48 Ill.Dec. 687, 689, 416 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (1981) ([T]he very activity labelled an injury [abortion] by defendants and sought to be prevented has been afforded legal protection by the United States Supreme Court.); People v. Krizka, 92 Ill.App.3d 288, 48 Ill.Dec. 141, 142, 416 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1980) (Under Roe, an abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy is not a legally recognizable injury, and therefore, defendants' trespass was not justified by reason of necessity.). In sum, a claim of necessity cannot be used to justify a crime that simply interferes with another person's right to lawful activity. [6] We go back to the first three premises advanced by defendants: their constitutional rights to present a defense; The Non-personhood of the Unborn; and the occasional application of the necessity defense to prevent a not unlawful evil. To be operative, a defense must be legally cognizable. As we have explained, the evil which the defendants use to justify their conduct is a legal abortion, a constitutionally protected act. It does not matter that the necessity defense, as advanced by the defendants, may have been used to justify conduct where the evil prevented is a not unlawful one, a lawful act. It is the lack of a legally cognizable evil, rather than The Non-personhood of the Unborn under Roe v. Wade, that precludes use of the necessity defense to justify criminal conduct in interfering with abortions. The fact that abortions are legally protected makes the necessity defense unavailable here. The defendants' fourth premise, that Roe v. Wade and similar decisions do not apply to individual efforts to prevent abortion, has been roundly rejected: Moreover, defendants' argument that the decision in Roe is not applicable here because that case relies on the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits actions by the States, not individuals, is without merit. The argument ignores the fact that defendants' convictions did not arise from the violation of the constitutional rights of pregnant women, but rather, were the result of defendants' acts of criminal trespass. People v. Krizka, 48 Ill.Dec. at 142, 416 N.E.2d at 37. We join in that rejection. Also, we agree with the Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning: If the legislature cannot delegate a veto power to the patient's parent or spouse, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), we think it unlikely that a state court could delegate such a veto power to strangers, to be exercised in such an obtrusive manner. Cleveland v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d at 1080 n. 15. It is this interference with other persons' rights to engage in legally protected acts that makes the defendants' criminal trespasses unjustifiable. The court in State v. O'Brien, 784 S.W.2d at 192, pointed out that every court which has considered the defense of necessity has for various reasons, rejected it when asserted in trespass-abortion proceedings. These defendants have not identified any reported appellate opinion in which abortion protesters have been allowed to use the necessity defense to justify a criminal trespass, and we find none. A lawful abortion is not a legally cognizable evil, harm, or injury justifying criminal trespass at a medical clinic. We conclude, as a matter of law, that the necessity defense is not available to these defendants.