Opinion ID: 1652195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Standard for Determining Constitutionality

Text: The free speech clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech. [3] Similarly, Article I, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution states in relevant part that [t]he free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. Article 1, section 19 provides protection of free speech rights at least as broad as the First Amendment. Leech v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 738, 745 (Tenn. 1979). The Attorney General does not dispute that Rule 9, section 25 restricts speech based on its content. A determination of what speech is subject to the confidentiality requirement cannot be made without reference to the content of the speech. Courts have found similar confidentiality provisions to be content-based restrictions. See Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F.Supp. 981, 985 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Petition of Brooks, 140 N.H. 813, 678 A.2d 140, 143 (N.H. 1996). Content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988). Under the strict scrutiny standard, the State has the burden of proving (1) that the restriction is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and (2) that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992).