Opinion ID: 1998711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: right to counsel at the identification

Text: The trial court held, alternatively, that Mrs. Markowitz's identification of appellee must be suppressed because the confrontation violated appellee's Sixth Amendment right to representation of counsel at post-arrest identification procedures. I find that appellee was not under arrest or subjected to a custodial detention; alternatively, I find that the right to counsel is not violated by the absence of counsel at a post-arrest, unplanned encounter which results in a spontaneous identification.
The events preceding Mrs. Markowitz's encounter with appellee may be summarized as follows. Appellee was issued a subpoena which directed him to appear for the purpose of giving testimony at Banks' sentencing hearing. Although appellee arrived and checked in at the courthouse, he was later stopped by a police detective when (by appellee's own admission) he was in the process of leaving the courthouse with the purpose of violating the subpoena. (N.T. 5/15/86 at 45-46; see also N.T. 5/15/86 at 14). The detective informed appellee that if he was subpoenaed, he was not free to leave the courthouse. At that point, appellee did not feel (subjectively) free to leave. (N.T. 5/15/86 at 16). When the time for Banks' hearing arrived and appellee was not present in the appropriate courtroom, the assistant district attorney directed the detectives to find appellee and bring him to the courtroom. (N.T. 5/15/86 at 94-95). The detectives found appellee in the law library, and informed him that it was time for him to come upstairs to Banks' sentencing hearing. (N.T. 5/15/86 at 15-17). The detectives then escorted appellee to the courtroom with the minimal force indicated ( i.e. a partial grip on appellee's arm), directed him to a seat, and sat beside him. (N.T. 5/15/86 at 16-17). I do not find that these facts demonstrate a custodial detention or a formal arrest. Encounters with police may be classified as mere encounters, non-custodial detentions, [3] custodial detentions, and formal arrests. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 379 Pa.Super. 337, 354, 549 A.2d 1323, 1331 (1988); Commonwealth v. Douglas, 372 Pa.Super. 227, 237, 539 A.2d 412, 417 (1988) (plurality); see generally LaFave, Classifying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant Grounds and Search Issues, 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 417, 417-38 (1984); McGinley, Characterizing Police Encounters Under the Fourth Amendment: Inquiry, Stop, Arrest? 10 Search & Seizure L.Rptr. 157, 157-64 (1983); Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of Stop and Arrest, 43 Ohio St.L.J. 771, 771-818 (1982). The classification of the encounter determines the applicability and scope of constitutional protections. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. at 354, 549 A.2d at 1331. A mere encounter is one which does not involve a seizure of the person. A seizure of a person sufficient to trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, ___, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565, 572 (1988); see also INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 80 L.Ed.2d 247, 254 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, 508 (1980) (Opinion of Stewart, J.); Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. at 354, 549 A.2d at 1331. The trial court's finding that appellee was not free to leave from the time the detectives came to the library to the time appellee was formally arrested is supported by the record. I agree that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave if he were told by a police detective that he could not leave the courthouse, was later escorted to a courtroom by police detectives, and was then seated between two police detectives. Hence, Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 protections apply. However, seizure and arrest are two distinct concepts in the modern criminal constitutional law lexicon. Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. at 354, 549 A.2d at 1331. While a seizure is deemed to occur when a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave, an arrest is deemed to occur only when a reasonable person would conclude that he had been taken into custody and subjected to the will and control of the person making an arrest. See Commonwealth v. Lovette, 498 Pa. 665, 450 A.2d 975 (1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1178, 103 S.Ct. 830, 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983). The mere fact that an individual is subjected to a stop and a period of detention during which the individual is subject to the control of the police and is not free to leave does not render a detention necessarily custodial. While a suspect may certainly walk away from a mere encounter with a police officer, every traffic stop and every Terry stop involves a stop and a period of time during which the suspect is not free to go but is subject to the control of the police officer detaining him. Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. 355, 549 A.2d at 1331, quoting Commonwealth v. Douglas, supra, 372 Pa.Super. at 241-42, 539 A.2d at 419. [4] Though Terry, Berkemer and Bruder involved brief detentions, it is important to recall that: In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the [suspect]. A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second guessing. Commonwealth v. White, supra, 358 Pa.Super. at 127-28, 516 A.2d at 1215, quoting Commonwealth v. Mayo, 344 Pa.Super. 336, 341-42, 496 A.2d 824, 826 (1985), quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575-76, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 615-16 (1985) (rejecting per se time limits). [5] Indeed, police detentions become custodial only when under the totality of circumstances the conditions and/or duration of the detention become so coercive as to constitute the functional equivalent of formal arrest. See Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 519 Pa. 116, 124-125, 546 A.2d 26, 29-30 (1988) (appellant was not under arrest as he has not shown that he was subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with formal arrest); Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. at 356, 549 A.2d at 1332 (same); Commonwealth v. Douglas, supra, 372 Pa.Super. at 239-40, 539 A.2d at 418 (same); see also California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279 (1983) ( per curiam ) ( Miranda applies when suspect is restrained to a degree associated with formal arrest); Dunaway v. New York, supra, 442 U.S. [200] at 212, 99 S.Ct. [2248] at 2256, 60 L.Ed.2d [824] at 835-36 (1979) (seizing, transporting, and then questioning a suspect at a police station was custodial as it was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977) (suspect who voluntarily accompanied police to stationhouse for questioning was not in custody where degree of restraint was not equivalent to that associated with formal arrest). Among the factors which should be considered in determining whether a detention is custodial are: the basis for the detention (the crime suspected and the grounds for suspicion); the duration of the detention; the location of the detention (public or private); whether the suspect was transported against his will (how far, why); the method of the detention (restraints utilized); the show, threat or use of force; and the investigative methods used to confirm or dispel suspicions. Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. at 356, 549 A.2d at 1332; Commonwealth v. Douglas, supra, 372 Pa.Super. at 246, 539 A.2d at 421, citing 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, §§ 9.1, 9.2 at 332-422 (2d Ed. 1987); see also LaFave, supra, 17 U.Mich.J.L. Ref. at 417-38; McGinley, supra, 10 Search & Seizure L.Rptr. at 157-64; Williamson, supra, 43 Ohio St.L.J. at 771-818. [6] In the instant case, the trial court concluded that appellee was under arrest because the previously stated facts demonstrated that the detectives obviously intended to exercise full control over defendant until they received further instructions from the prosecutor. Once the detectives summoned defendant from the library, defendant did not feel free to leave the courthouse. Trial Ct. Op. at 13. Regardless of whether the trial court has correctly divined the subjective intent of the detectives and the subjective impressions of the appellee, such findings do not support the conclusion that appellee was arrested or subjected to a custodial detention. The supposed, yet uncommunicated, subjective intent of the detectives to restrain appellee beyond merely ensuring his compliance with the subpoena is not relevant to a determination of whether a reasonable person subjected to the same treatment as appellee could reasonably have concluded that he was being taken into custody or being placed under arrest. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 379 Pa.Super. at 358, 549 A.2d at 1333 n. 7; see also Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at ___ n. 7, 108 S.Ct. at 1980 n. 7, 100 L.Ed.2d at 573 n. 7 ([o]f course, the subjective intent of the officers is relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct only to the extent that the intent has been conveyed to the person confronted), citing United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at 554 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. at 1877 n. 6, 64 L.Ed.2d at 509 n. 6 (Opinion of Stewart, J.) and 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.2(h) at 407 (uncommunicated intent of police irrelevant). [7] Applying the applicable objective standard, I find the evidence insufficient to support a conclusion that a reasonable person subject to the same treatment as appellee could reasonably have concluded that the detectives intended to exercise any control over appellee beyond ensuring appellee's compliance with the subpoena directing appellee to appear to testify at Banks' sentencing hearing. Viewed objectively, the detention was more analogous to a brief investigative detention designed to preserve the status quo than to an arrest or a coercive custodial detention. There was a reasonable basis for the detention, i.e. appellee had indicated an intent to leave the courthouse in order to attempt to illegally evade the subpoena, and was not in the appropriate courtroom when the time for the hearing arrived. The detention occurred in a courthouse and primarily in open court. Though appellee was transported (presumably against his will), the distance was minimal (from the law library to the courtroom) and was for the purpose of ensuring appellee's appearance before the court in compliance with the subpoena. The method of detention involved minimal force, i.e. a partial grip on appellee's arm and sitting beside the appellee. No excessive restraints were used. No interrogation of appellee took place during the detention. Finally, the duration of the detention was circumscribed by its legitimate purpose; probable cause for the further detention arose before the legitimate time period for compliance with the subpoena expired. I find that a wide chasm separates the use of minimal force to ensure that a wandering witness complied with a subpoena and the incommunicado detentions and third degree interrogations which powered the constitutional decisions which appellee attempts to invoke here. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3149, 82 L.Ed.2d at 333 (though traffic stops significantly curtail freedom of movement, they do not entail the type of coercion which led to the constitutional decisions upon which the defendant based his claim that an illegal arrest occurred). While the better practice might have been for the detectives to have detained appellee and then to have sought direction from the trial court rather than the prosecutor, I do not find that the detectives acted unreasonably or that the force used was excessive. To the contrary, the prosecutor and the detectives merely anticipated the course that reasonable prudence would have dictated to the court had appellee's intent to evade the subpoena been communicated to the court rather than the prosecutor. Based upon the foregoing, I find that the trial court erred in concluding that appellee was under arrest or in custody at the time he was escorted from the law library to the courtroom where Banks' sentencing was to occur. Because appellee was not under arrest or in custody, his Sixth Amendment suppression claim must fail. Furthermore, as appellee has failed to establish the merit of his suppression claim in this respect, counsel may not be deemed ineffective. Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra ; Kitrell v. Dakota, supra .
Alternately, I find that even assuming appellee was under arrest or in custody, no violation of appellee's Sixth Amendment rights occurred. While a suspect is entitled to the presence of counsel at any post-arrest identification procedures ( see generally Commonwealth v. Minnis, 312 Pa.Super. 53, 58, 458 A.2d 231, 234 (1983)), the Commonwealth could not reasonably be expected to ensure the presence of counsel at every unplanned encounter which might result in a spontaneous identification, nor is the Commonwealth required to do so. See Commonwealth v. Butler, supra, 354 Pa.Super. at 540-41, 512 A.2d at 671-72 (citing cases). In this case, the trial court specifically found that the encounter was uncontrived; consequently, I find appellee's Sixth Amendment suppression claim is without merit. As appellant has failed to establish the merit of his suppression claim in this respect, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra ; Kitrell v. Dakota, supra .