Opinion ID: 1763897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying brawner's ore tenus motion to abolish the use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases.

Text: ¶ 33. During the selection of the jury, Brawner raised this motion ore tenus asking the trial court to abolish the use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases. The trial court denied the motion. This issue was raised in Snow v. State, 800 So.2d 472, 483 (Miss.2001), where Snow asserted that the racial and gender restrictions on peremptory challenges are not enforceable under the three-step analysis provided by Batson, and, therefore, that the appropriate remedy is the abolition of peremptory challenges. This Court stated: No court, this Court included, has held the allowance of peremptory challenges to be unconstitutional despite the argument made by Justice Marshall in Batson to that end and we decline to take that opportunity here, where the issue is presented for the first time on appeal. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 104, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (Marshall, J., concurring)(writing that peremptory challenges should be eliminated in order to end racial discrimination in the jury-selection process because Batson could not do so alone). Snow, 800 So.2d at 483-84. [4] Unlike Snow, Brawner brought up this issue during trial and in his post trial motions. Brawner argues that Justice Sullivan of this Court also supported restrictions on peremptory challenges, advocating their complete elimination in his concurring opinion in Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 896-97 (Miss. 1994). Additionally, Brawner argues that a prosecutor may easily assert a purported race-neutral or gender-neutral reason for striking a potential juror, but it is difficult for the trial judge to determine if the reason given is in good faith. ¶ 34. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the right of peremptory challenge is not a constitutional guarantee. Batson, 476 U.S. at 108, 106 S.Ct. at 1729, 90 L.Ed.2d at 95 (citing Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 69 S.Ct. 201, 93 L.Ed. 187 (1948)). However, notwithstanding Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, the Batson majority upheld the use of peremptory challenges. Additionally, in J.E.B. the Court maintained this position stating [o]ur conclusion that litigants may not strike potential jurors solely on the basis of gender does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143, 114 S.Ct. at 1429. Brawner concedes that in the almost 20 years since Batson was decided no court, including this Court, has adopted Justice Marshall's position. Additionally, Brawner has not cited any authority that would persuade this Court that the abolition of peremptory challenges would necessarily secure a more fair or impartial jury for a defendant, and the potential exists that it would have the opposite effect. As Chief Justice Hawkins stated in his specially concurring opinion in Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294 (Miss.1993), [a] structure centuries in the building should hardly be radically altered, much less demolished, without painstaking study. Id. at 305. Therefore, we decline to make such a sweeping change.