Opinion ID: 463698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction to hear this appeal

Text: 119 This appeal should be transferred, under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1631, and should be heard and decided by a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a panel on which I would not sit. 120 Transfer is compelled by 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295(a)(2), by which Congress vested in the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from district court judgments in cases such as this, where the jurisdiction of the district court was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2). 121 Saying we take jurisdiction on the basis of our reading of the plain meaning of the statutory language, the majority stands the statute on its head when it holds that this court has appellate jurisdiction because jurisdiction of the district court was based in part on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (Federal Tort Claims Act). The majority frustrates the intent of Congress, encourages forum shopping, and directly conflicts with precedent in this court, when it holds that this appeal falls squarely within the 'except' clause of section 1295(a)(2), allowing for jurisdiction in the regional Circuit Court of Appeals, just because counsel included a tort claim under Sec. 1346(b) with the taking claim under Sec. 1346(a)(2). 122
123 The statutory phrase in whole or in part in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295(a)(2) would by itself make the exclusive grant of Sec. 1346 jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit all-inclusive. The statute, however, specifies exceptions where the case was brought in a district court under section 1346(a)(1), 1346(b), 1346(e), or 1346(f) of this title or under section 1346(a)(2) when the claim is founded upon an Act of Congress or a regulation of an executive department providing for internal revenue. (Emphasis added). A literal reading of the statute makes plain that the except clause applies only to cases brought in whole under one of the excepted subsections of Sec. 1346. The majority improperly reads the except clause as though it also contained the broad jurisdictional grant of in whole or in part, a construction clearly contrary to the literal language of the statute and destructive of its intent. 124 It is simply senseless to say that Sec. 1295 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit in cases where, as here, district court jurisdiction was based in part on Sec. 1346(a)(2) and that Sec. 1295 also grants jurisdiction to the regional circuits (making the first grant non-exclusive) where, as here, district court jurisdiction was based in part on Sec. 1346(a)(2). It is equally senseless to nullify the words in part in Sec. 1295(a)(2) by proceeding as though the statute granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit only when district court jurisdiction was based in whole, that is solely, on a taking claim under Sec. 1346(a)(2). 125 The majority's construction of Sec. 1295(a)(2) in light of Sec. 1295(a)(1) is equally invalid. In Sec. 1295(a)(1), Congress excluded from the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction over cases brought under Sec. 1338 a case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights and trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a). The no other claims clause was required because there are three fields of law encompassed by the single subsection 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1338(a). The only other claim is one under the patent laws. Hence jurisdiction of cases under Sec. 1338(a) which are brought in whole under the copyright or trademark laws, and which involve no patent claims, are appealable to the regional circuits. The assignment of jurisdiction in Secs. 1295(a)(1) and (2) is thus the same. Use of Sec. 1295(a)(1)'s no other claims language in Sec. 1295(a)(2) would simply not fit, because these are specific subsections in Sec. 1346, each dealing with a separate field of law. 126 Section 1346 deals with district court and Claims Court jurisdiction. The except clause of Sec. 1295(a)(2) deals with tax refunds, Sec. 1346(a)(1), money damages for torts, Sec. 1346(b), a series of causes provided for in certain statutes, Sec. 1346(e), quieting title, Sec. 1346(f) and certain tax suits, Sec. 1346(a)(2). It simply makes no sense to say that the in part language of Sec. 1295(a)(2) gave jurisdiction simultaneously to the Federal Circuit and regional circuits over appeals from district court judgment whenever the case was brought under Sec. 1346(a)(2) and also under anyone of the sections in the except clause. Nor is it appropriate to read exclusive out of Sec. 1295(a)(2). 127 Further, it is most curious that the majority rests its holding of jurisdiction on the presence of appellants' claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Sec. 1346(b). Appellants never filed an administrative claim, Hohri v. United States, 586 F.Supp. 769, 793 (D.D.C.1984), and thus failed to cross the threshold requirement for suing under the Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a). The majority properly affirms the district court's dismissal of those claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. It is difficult to see how claims over which the district court had no jurisdiction can create jurisdiction in this court. The claims under the Tort Claims Act being entirely illusory, they can provide no satisfactory basis for jurisdiction of either the district court or this court. 128
129 (1) Uniformity 130 In creating the Federal Circuit, Congress clearly expressed the need to provide a forum for appeals from throughout the country in areas of the law where Congress determines that there is special need for national uniformity. S.Rep. No. 97-275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 11, 14 (Senate Reports). Suits against the government for money damages, like those under Sec. 1346(a)(2) (the Little Tucker Act) constituted one such area of special and long-recognized need. Indeed, that basic need engendered creation of the Court of Claims in 1855. 131 Before October 1, 1982, suits against the United States for money damages in excess of $10,000 had to be filed in the Court of Claims, and suits against the United States for $10,000 or less could be filed in either the Court of Claims or in a district court. Appeals from judgments of the Court of Claims were by writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court and appeals from judgments of the district courts were to the appropriate regional Circuit Court of Appeals. As stated in the legislative history an adequate showing has been made for nationwide subject matter jurisdiction in the areas of patent and claims court [sic] appeals. Senate Report at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 13. 132 After October 1, 1982, suits for more than $10,000 must be filed in the Claims Court, and suits for $10,000 or less may still be filed in a district court. In accord with the intent of Congress expressed in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, P.L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), however, appeals from judgments in all such suits filed after October 1, 1982, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit to provide reasonably quick and definitive answers to legal questions of nationwide significance. Senate Report at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S.Cong. & Ad.News at 13. The Federal Circuit hears all appeals from judgments of the Claims Court. Sec. 1295(a)(3). Congress sought uniformity in the law governing suits under Sec. 1346(a)(2) when it also assigned exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over all appeals from all judgments of the district courts in such suits. Thus, the Federal Circuit has been granted exclusive jurisdiction, whether those suits were for more than $10,000 in the Claims Court or for $10,000 or less in a district court. 133 The majority's holding here, because it directs appeals on the basis of whether the ad damnum is more or less than $10,000, frustrates Congress' desire for uniformity in answers to legal questions arising under Sec. 1346(a)(2). 134 (2) Forum Shopping 135 The legislative history of Sec. 1295 spells out Congress' intent to eliminate forum shopping, as was exhaustively discussed in Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1434-35. That intent was not limited to patent-related cases, but applied equally to those which, like the present case, are filed under the Little Tucker Act. Id. at 1437 n. 13. 136 The majority's reading of Sec. 1295(a)(2) reinstates the forum shopping evil congress tried to eliminate. Any lawyer worthy of the name is capable, as were the lawyers here, of adding to a taking claim under Sec. 1346(a)(2) one or more claims under Sec. 1346(a)(1), 1346(b), 1346(e), 1346(f) or an internal revenue claim under Sec. 1346(a)(2). The majority's reading of Sec. 1295(a)(2) tells the bar it can obtain jurisdiction of the appeal in this court by inserting any one of such additional claims in the complaint, and may thus escape the statute of limitations governing the taking claim under the majority's view of the present or similar facts. It is precisely the creation of potential for different results on similar facts (respecting the limitation of actions under Sec. 1346) by which the majority holding provides both opportunity and incentive for forum shopping. 137 The evil of forum shopping is the same whether a claim added for that purpose is or is not frivolous. This court, moreover, would have to assert jurisdiction to consider whether a claim was or was not added for that purpose. At that point, the evil purpose has been served. That the majority seizes jurisdiction here on the basis of an illusory claim under the Tort Claims Act only compounds the error that lies in exerting appellate jurisdiction not granted by Congress. 138 To the extent that policy considerations are appropriate, the majority's creation of a need for multiple appeals in different courts appears unsupportable. Having disposed of appellant's tort and contract claims, the majority says any future appeal in this case will lie in the Federal Circuit. It hardly fits the dignity of this court to render it a mere way station for the gleaning of forum shopping claims from appeals enroute to the Federal Circuit. 139 Whatever the district court may do on remand, the Federal Circuit cannot, it would seem, be precluded from holding on appeal that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of the statute of limitations. Surely, comity is not served by the majority's attempt to set the law of the case respecting the statute of limitations before releasing its grasp.
140 In Professional Managers Ass'n v. United States, 761 F.2d 740 (D.C.Cir.1985), this court held that [t]he Federal Courts Improvement Act clearly grants the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in cases such as this where the district court's jurisdiction was based in whole or in part on the Tucker Act, Id. at 743 (emphasis in original). As a basis for its holding, the court noted that the legislative history ... construes the 'in whole or in part' language quite literally. Id. at 744. It concluded: [b]ased on the Senate Report, it would appear that the regional courts of appeals should transfer cases to the Federal Circuit unless immaterial or frivolous Tucker Act claims have been added to a case for purposes of forum shopping ... Id. Obviously, transfer is equally if not more required where a frivolous additional claim has been added, for purposes of forum shopping, to a non-frivolous Tucker Act claim. 141 In Professional Managers, the court noted that Sec. 1295(a)(2) had been a source of confusion in this court, citing Judge MacKinnon's dissent in Doe v. Department of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1119 (D.C.Cir.1985), and two cases in which this court ordered transfer: Wilson v. Turnage, 755 F.2d 967 (D.C.Cir.1985); and Riggsbee v. Bell, No. 83-2242 (D.C.Cir. Jan. 28, 1985). 142 Other circuits are in accord with the precedent of this court. See Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 587 n. 3 (3d Cir.1985); Oliviera v. United States, 734 F.2d 760 (11th Cir.1984); cf. Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 982 (Fed.Cir.1985) ([i]n creating this court, Congress assigned it exclusive appellate jurisdiction of district court decisions involving claims for money from the government under Sec. 1346(a)(2)). 143 I cannot find in the majority opinion an adequate effort to justify its departure from this court's precedent.