Opinion ID: 2333373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-Assessment Sales.

Text: Erie contends that the Division erred in stating as follows:    since January 1, 1952 was the last assessing date here involved, any sales subsequent to that date could properly have been used by the experts only in corroboration of an opinion of value already established. Because of the stipulation between the parties to accept and use the same value as of the four assessing dates here involved, there is no need to make the same point in respect to sales between January 1, 1949 and January 1, 1952. The quoted portion of the Division findings (Commissioner Hull's report) must be read in the light of the whole expression. The report expressly stated with reference to the sales resorted to as evidential:    In point of time these sales range from 1938 to 1953, a latitude we believe to be proper in railroad cases, where a relative scarcity and background of comparable sales exists   . (Emphasis supplied) The Division, i.e., the railroad panel, permitted introduction of evidence relative to sales subsequent to the assessing dates and resorted thereto in arriving at its findings of fact and determination. In this respect the state of the record is comparable to the record disclosed in Tennant v. Jersey City, 122 N.J.L. 174, 175-176 ( Sup. Ct. 1939), affirmed 123 N.J.L. 200 ( E. & A. 1939). We decline to rule whether an expert may formulate his opinion as to true value of property on an assessment date by reference solely to subsequent sales. No such opinion was advanced by the experts who testified in this case. To that extent all the evidence offered and received was reasonably related to the assessment dates in these matters under the Division's ruling and as well under the Tennant case, supra. Therefore, even if there was error in the expression of the permissible scope of evidence, it was not prejudicial here. It caused neither unwarranted exclusion of evidence nor erroneous consideration thereof.