Opinion ID: 1616121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Defendants' Former Counsel

Text: Plaintiffs, the Pilgrims, called as their witness Jimmy Carnes, a lawyer, who had represented Ole South doing title research on the Pilgrims' property relative to the mortgage transaction and the subject matter of the suit. Carnes was permitted to testify that Ole South did not furnish him a deed from which he could acquire the legal description of the propertythe inference being that, consistent with the Pilgrims' own testimony, Ole South obtained information for the drafting of the mortgage without the Pilgrims' knowledge or consent. Ole South says that the admission of this evidence contravenes Code 1975, § 12-21-161: No attorney or his clerk shall be competent or compelled to testify in any court in this state for or against the client as to any matter or thing, knowledge of which may have been acquired from the client, or as to advice or counsel to the client given by virtue of the relation as attorney or given by reason of anticipated employment as attorney unless called to testify by the client, but shall be competent to testify, for or against the client, as to any matter or thing the knowledge of which may have been acquired in any other manner. What Ole South's argument overlooks is that Carnes's testimony that he had not obtained a deed from his client, Ole South, was admitted without objection. Our examination of the record discloses that the only question to which Ole South registered an objection was: How did you come upon a description of the property? Rejecting Ole South's objection, grounded on confidential relationship between an attorney and his client, the court stated: Certainly we won't have the conversation or what was going on, but overruled at this stage. An earlier question, to which Carnes had responded without objection, was then repeated: Were you given a deed and a property description by Ole South in the Pilgrim transaction? Again, without objection, Carnes answered: No. He then continued: It was obtained from the Tax Assessor's Office and I went to the Probate Judge's Office and ran the title from that. Even if we take liberties with the record and address the propriety of the trial court's ruling with respect to the question objected to (How did you come upon a description of the property?), including Carnes's subsequent reply (It was obtained from the Tax Assessor's Office), we, nevertheless, find that this is not the type of evidence embraced within the prohibition of § 12-21-161. Carnes's testimony that he obtained the legal description for the Pilgrim transaction from the tax assessor's office, a statement of some act done by him, was in nowise violative of the statutory proscription relating to the incompetency of a lawyer to testify against his client. For a discussion of the lawyer-client privilege, see J. Russell McElroy's The Law of Evidence in Alabama, § 391.04 (2nd ed. 1959), updated by C. Gamble's McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 391.04 (3d ed. 1977).