Opinion ID: 1156814
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Court Err in Using a Concept of Fault in Dividing the Marital Estate?

Text: Jay argues that the superior court impermissibly relied on fault in the breakdown of the Hartland marriage as a factor in dividing the marital property. One of the factors for determining an equitable division of marital assets set forth in Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 n. 4 (Alaska 1962), is the duration and conduct of each [party] during the marriage. In 1968, the Alaska Legislature adopted AS 25.24.160 which provides that the court may provide ... for the division between the parties of their property ... in the manner as may be just, and without regard to which of the parties is in fault.  [5] (Emphasis added). In its findings of fact involving the Merrill factors the superior court stated: The equities favor the defendant over the plaintiff with regard to the conduct of the parties during the marriage. The plaintiff's relationship with a third party was a disruptive event in the parties' marriage which led to differences between them and occurrence of domestic violence incidents. The plaintiff was the aggressor against the defendant during those incidents. During the course of the last year, the plaintiff has used marital property belonging to the parties and manipulated it to his advantage. Despite their separation, the plaintiff used the marital property to maintain the same lifestyle to which he had been accustomed. Because of his profession, the plaintiff is better at manipulating figures, accounts and assets. This court finds that he did manipulate assets for his own benefit. In summarizing its findings, the superior court noted: This Court began with the presumption that a 50-50 split between the parties was the fairest division. However, based on the foregoing findings and the evidence adduced at trial, this Court finds that the 60-40 split advocated by the defendant is a fairer allocation of the marital assets. A division which gives 60% of the marital assets to the defendant and 40% to the plaintiff will compensate the defendant for the financial activities of the plaintiff during the year. We agree with Jay's reading of AS 25.24.160. Under the concept of nofault divorce, a court cannot rely on one party's fault in ending the marriage to justifying awarding a greater portion of the marital property to the other spouse. However, reading the court's above statements in context, we conclude that the trial court did not reduce Jay's share because his actions were disruptive of the marriage. Rather, the court reduced his share for the entirely appropriate reason that he dissipated substantial amounts of marital assets for his own benefit during the parties' separation. [6]