Opinion ID: 1513262
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Heading: estates by the entirety at common law.

Text: At the outset we note that the industry of counsel and our own independent research have failed to reveal any English case decided prior to 1776, touching upon the question of whether a voluntary or involuntary conveyance of a husband's interest in a tenancy by the entirety carries with it his right of survivorship. The unique form of concurrent ownership at common law, labeled estates by the entirety, may be traced into antiquity at least as far back as the 14th and 15th Centuries. 3 Holdsworth, History of the English Law (3 d ed. 1923), 128; Kepner, The Effect of an Attempted Creation of an Estate by the Entirety in Unmarried Grantees, 6 Rutgers L. Rev. 550 (1952). The estate was unique because of the common-law concept of unity of husband and wife and the positing of that unity in the person of the husband during coverture. Putnam, The Theory of Estates by the Entirety, 4 Southern L. Rev. 91 (1879). A husband and wife cannot hold by moieties or in severalty, said Littleton, and the cause is, for that the husband and wife are but one person in law.    Coke on Littleton, sec. 291. Blackstone, in his judicial capacity, noted: This estate [entirety] differs from joint-tenancy, because joint-tenants take by moieties, and are each seised of an undivided moiety of the whole, per my et per tout, which draws after it the incident of survivorship or jus accrescendi, unless either party chooses in his life-time to sever the jointure. But husband and wife, being considered in law as one person, they cannot, during the coverture take separate estates; and therefore upon a purchase made by them both, they cannot be seised by moieties, but both and each has the entirety. They are seised of their respective moieties, but both and each has the entirety. They are seised per tout, and not per my. Green v. King, 2 Wm. Blackstone 1211, 1214, 96 Eng. Rep. 713, 714 ( C.P. 1777). To the same effect see the opinion of Chancellor Kent in Rogers v. Benson, 5 Johns. Ch. 431 ( N.Y. 1821). The unity of the spouses theory was early recognized in New Jersey as the foundation upon which estates by the entirety rested. Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N.J.L. 42 ( Sup. Ct. 1828). By virtue of the jus mariti and jure uxoris the husband was the dominant figure in the marital unity. Thus, in an estate by the entirety the husband had absolute dominion and control over the property during the joint lives. The husband was entitled to the rents, issues and profits during the joint lives of himself and his wife, with the right to use and alienate the property as he desired, and the property was subject to execution for his debts. Washburn v. Burns, 34 N.J.L. 18 ( Sup. Ct. 1869) (it should be noted that although Washburn was decided after the Married Women's Act, the court overlooked the effect of the act and decided the case on common-law principles); Freeman, Co-Tenancy and Partition (2 d ed. 1888), 140; 2 American Law of Property, § 6.6 p. 28 (1952); Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 Temple L.Q. 24, 25 (1951). As stated by the court in Washburn v. Burns, supra :    the husband has an interest which does not flow from the unity of the estate, and in which the wife has no concern. He is entitled to the use and possession of the property during the joint lives of himself and wife. During this period the wife has no interest in or control over the property. It is no invasion of her rights, therefore, for him to dispose of it at his pleasure. The limit of this right of the husband is, that he cannot do any act to the prejudice of the ulterior rights of the wife. (34 N.J.L., at page 20) The remaining question is, could the husband unilaterally alienate his right of survivorship at common law? Our study of the authorities convinces us that he could. The entire thrust of the authorities on the common law, with one notable exception, is to the effect that the only distinction between a joint tenancy and a tenancy by the entirety at common law was that survivorship could not be affected by unilateral action in the latter estate. It was settled in England as early as the 14th Century that the husband could not defeat the wife's right of survivorship. In that case, reported in 2 Coke on Littleton, sec. 291, William Ocle was found guilty of treason (he murdered Edward II) and his estate was forfeited. Edward III granted the forfeited lands (owned jointly with the wife) to someone else. It was held that the husband's act of treason could not deprive the wife of her right of survivorship. Back v. Andrew, 2 Vern. 120 (1690), stands for the same proposition. But to say that the husband cannot by his voluntary or involuntary act defeat the wife's right of survivorship is not to say that his own right of survivorship, subject to wife's right of survivorship, should he predecease her, cannot be alienated. The notion that the husband could not alienate his interests stems from Blackstone's comment, writing in 1765 to the following effect: And therefore, if an estate in fee be given to a man and his wife, they are neither properly joint tenants, nor tenants in common, for husband and wife being considered as one person in law, they cannot take the estate by moieties, but both are seised of the entirety, per tout et non per my; the consequence of which is that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain in the survivor. 2 Blackstone's Commentaries ( Tucker, ed. (1802), 181) (Emphasis supplied) Kent, in his Commentaries first published in 1825, merely said: Neither of them can alien so as to bind the other. 4 Kent's Commentaries 362. Preston, a much quoted authority in early America, writing in England in 1820 declared categorically: An alienation by the husband alone, in the lifetime of the wife, will, in the event of his surviving his wife, be good for the share of himself and his wife. (1 Preston on Estates 134 (1820)) Blackstone's enigmatic statement that neither the husband nor the wife can dispose of any part without the assent of the other, but the whole must remain in the survivor was early limited in New Jersey. In Den ex dem. Wyckoff v. Gardner, 20 N.J.L. 556 ( Sup. Ct. 1846), decided prior to the Married Women's Act, and hence under common-law principles, the issue was whether the husband could mortgage the premises in an estate by the entirety without the consent of his wife. In that case, Carpenter, J., held: It is said, in the cases cited, and in the usual authorities which treat of this peculiar estate that neither husband nor wife, separately and without the assent of the other, can dispose of or convey away any part. That the husband cannot alien, and much less devise that estate, the whole of which belong to his wife as well as to himself. The conveyance of the husband is doubtless void as against the wife, she surviving her husband, and as against those claiming under her; but can it be said to be void as against the husband himself? Has the husband no power at all over the land during coverture, not even to make a lease? If it be so, notwithstanding marital rights, the wife would seem to have an absolute veto, and her consent would be necessary, not only to convey the estate, but even to dispose of the possession, during the husband's life and during coverture. As urged in the argument, in such case, the wife would have a more controlling influence over an estate like this, than when the fee is in herself, which cannot be. The general language of the authorities is to be restrained to the case itself under consideration, and the obvious meaning of the passages relied on, is more guardedly expressed by Sir William Grant, in a case recited. `The husband, as against her, cannot pass any right, title or interest; but if she survive, the whole must accrue to her.' Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Ves. Jr. 199. `The husband alone,' says Chancellor Kent, `may grant or charge the wife's land, during their joint lives, and if he be tenant by the curtesy during his own life; but he cannot alien or incumber it, if it be a freehold estate, so as to prevent the wife, or her heirs, after his death, from enjoying it discharged from his debts or engagements.' 2 Kent's Com. 133, 5 th Ed. This doctrine is as equally applicable to the estate now under consideration, as to the case when the fee is in herself. The husband has the right of possession and control during coverture. Though he cannot convey the estate at all events, cannot convey so as to prejudice her rights in case she survive; yet he may demise, alien or mortgage his interest during his own life. Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. [ N.Y. ] 615; Jackson [ ex dem. Suffern ] v. McConnell, 19 Wend. [ N.Y. ] 175. But does it lie in the mouth of the defendant in possession of the premises, in an action of ejectment brought against him upon his own mortgage deed, to deny his right to mortgage? Whatever may be the effect of ordinary deeds of conveyance without warranty in concluding a grantor, who has released or conveyed without interest, yet in relation to mortgages the question is well settled. By an equitable estoppel, based upon the legal fraud which would be otherwise permitted, one who mortgages land as his own, upon suit thereupon brought against him, shall not be permitted to derogate from his own mortgage, by denying his title, or by setting up title in any third person. (20 N.J.L., at pages 559-561) Nevius, J., held:    The counsel for the defendant seemed to think, from the general expression found in the books, `that where an estate is conveyed to husband and wife, neither can convey or dispose of the same or any part of it without the concurrence of the other,' and that the husband is precluded from leasing the land or charging it by mortgage. The true meaning of such expression is, that neither can make such a disposition of the estate, without the concurrence of the other, as will affect the right and interest of the other. The mortgage by the husband does not affect the wife's right or interest in the lands; if she survive, the whole title and estate will vest in her freed from the mortgage. I am of the opinion that judgment should be entered for the plaintiff. (20 N.J.L. at page 563) Thus, the view that neither spouse could alienate his interest in the estate without the consent of the other, was interpreted to mean that the husband could not alienate so as to prejudice the wife's rights in the estate, and it is clear that the wife's only right at common law was her right of survivorship. No prejudice would result to the wife's interests at common law by the husband's alienation of his right of survivorship. If he predeceased her, she would take a fee. If she predeceased him, her interests were cut off anyway. During his lifetime she had no interest in the estate. That the husband could alienate his right of survivorship at common law is buttressed by the fact that at common law, in instances where property was held in the wife's name alone, the husband had the right to possession and had the absolute control over the rents, issues and profits during coverture. He could freely alienate that interest and it was subject to execution by his creditors. I American Law of Property, supra, § 5.51. It would be incongruous to suggest that the husband could convey at the common law no greater interest in property held jointly by his wife and himself than in property held solely by his wife. Most courts and commentators have taken the position that at common law the husband's right of survivorship was alienable, so that the purchaser or grantee would take the entire fee in the event the wife predeceased the husband and the interest was subject to execution for his debts. See e.g., Howell v. Folsom, 38 Or. 184, 63 P. 116 ( Sup. Ct. 1900); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613, 63 A.L.R. 231 ( Sup. Jud. Ct. 1929); Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337, 30 L.R.A. 305 ( Ct. App. 1895); Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424, 30 L.R.A. 324 ( Sup. Ct. 1895); Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed 683, 36 Tenn. 683, 70 Am. Dec. 269 ( Sup. Ct. 1857); In re Brown, 60 F. 2 d 269 ( D.C. Ky. 1932); Preston on Estates, supra, p. 134; 1 Washburn, Real Property (5 th ed. 1887), 707; 2 Jones, Real Property in Conveyancing, 632 (1896); 2 American Law of Property, supra, § 6.6, p. 28; 4 Thompson, Real Property ( rev. ed. 1940), § 1816, p. 352; 2 Tiffany, Real Property, § 435, p. 232 (1939); 166 A.L.R. 969, 971-974 (1946); Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, supra, at page 26; Bordwell, Real Property, 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 141 (1953); 26 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, § 84; Ritchie, Tenancy by the Entirety in Real Property, 28 Virginia L. Rev. 608, 609 (1941). In New Jersey the seeds of doubt on the proposition at hand were first sown in Bilder v. Robinson, 73 N.J. Eq. 169 ( Ch. 1907). In that case a judgment had been recovered against one Robinson who owned property by the entirety with his wife, Ottie. Levy was made upon the husband's interest and the plaintiff was the purchaser at the execution sale. The bill charged that plaintiff was entitled to receive one-half of the rents from the premises from the date of the sheriff's deed, but that the defendants, who were insolvent, totally excluded plaintiff from possession and refused to account to him for his share of the rents. The bill prayed that a receiver be appointed and an accounting had. Vice-Chancellor Stevenson, in discussing the husband's interest in an estate by the entirety, stated:    Whether the husband could convey an estate in fee which his grantee would hold subject to the wife's right of survivorship is a matter about which there seems to be some difference of opinion, and also great vagueness of statement among the authorities. Inasmuch as the husband, in theory of law held the entire estate in fee, and, unlike the wife, was under no general incapacity to make conveyances of land, it would seem to follow that the husband could, by his deed, convey the estate which he held, viz., an estate in fee subject only to be defeated in case his wife should survive him. There are authorities which distinctly declare the power of the husband to make such a conveyance. 1 Washburn on R. (6 th ed. ) 913; Freeman Co-ten. & Par. (2 d ed. ) 75; Ames v. Norman 4 Sneed (36 Tenn. ) 683 (1875); Berrigan v. Fleming, 2 Lea (70 Tenn. ) 271 (1879). (73 N.J. Eq. at page 172). What, then, would create a disability in the husband to convey his right of survivorship? The answer is found in the following passage from the vice-chancellor's opinion: The sheriff's deed to the complainant in this case passed the same title which a deed of bargain and sale executed by the judgment debtor, Mr. Robinson, would have passed. 3 Gen. Stat. p. 2980 § 7; P.L. 1799 p. 486 § 12; 1 Nevill 280; Hackensack Savings Bank v. Morse, 46 N.J. Eq. (1 Dick. ) 161; Brady v. Carteret Realty Co., 67 N.J. Eq. (1 Robb. ) 641. It may be noted, however, that our statute authorizing the transfer of estates in expectancy is made inapplicable by an express proviso to sales of real estate under executions. P.L. 1851 p. 282; 1 Gen. Stat. p. 881 § 138. (73 N.J. Eq., at page 173) Since the husband and wife were alive at the time the suit was brought, and since the relief prayed for only requested one-half the rents, issues and profits, the vice-chancellor found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the right of survivorship of a spouse could be alienated, voluntarily or involuntarily. The caveat in the Bilder case, i.e., that L. 1851, p. 282 (now R.S. 46:3-7) prohibits execution upon contingent estates is not well taken. Indeed, Vice-Chancellor Stevenson himself seems to have recognized this when he said, in the previously quoted passage, that the husband in an estate by the entirety held an estate in fee subject only to be defeated in case his wife should survive him. That a tenant by the entirety has a vested estate, subject to defeasance upon his predeceasing the other spouse, is amply supported by the authorities. It was first enunciated in New Jersey in 1828 in the case of Den ex dem. Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, supra . Chief Justice Ewin there declared:    Between husband and wife the jus accrescendi does not exist. The surviving joint tenant takes something by way of accretion or addition to his interest, gains something he previously had not, the undivided moiety which belonged to the deceased. The survivor of husband and wife, has no increase of estate or interest by the decease, having before the entirety, being previously seized of the whole. The survivor, it is true, enjoys the whole, but not because any new or farther estate or interest becomes vested, but because of the original conveyance, and of the same estate and same quantity of estate as at the time the conveyance was perfected. (10 N.J.L., at page 46) To the same effect, see In re Staiger's Estate, 104 N.J. Eq. 149, 152 ( E. & A. 1929); Bordwell, supra, 8 Rutgers L. Rev., at p. 142. For a collection of cases in other jurisdictions holding that upon the death of a spouse in an estate by the entirety the interest belongs to the other, not by virtue of survivorship, but by virtue of the title that vested under the original limitation, see 4 Thompson on Real Property ( rev. ed. 1940), § 1803, pp. 331, 332. The estate, being presently vested, would be subject to execution, N.J.S. 2 A :17-1. Servis v. Dorn, 76 N.J. Eq. 241 ( Ch. 1909), decided subsequent to Bilder, fails to shed any light upon the question of whether the right of survivorship of a tenant by the entirety was alienable in New Jersey. In Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N.J. Eq. 199 ( E. & A. 1912), a father who held property as a tenant by the entirety conveyed his interest to his daughter. The daughter sought partition against her mother. A motion to strike the bill was denied. In that case Vice-Chancellor Walker held that the daughter by virtue of the conveyance became a tenant in common with the mother for the joint lives of the mother and father. He further held that if the premises were not susceptible of division, it should be ordered to be sold. The vice-chancellor, by way of dictum, proffered that the father's right of survivorship could not be transferred to the daughter and that upon the death of either father or mother, the daughter's estate would terminate. But on appeal the Court of Errors and Appeals did not adopt the full views of Vice-Chancellor Walker (who by the time of appeal had become Chancellor). Rather, the opinion by Justice Parker, which affirmed the order appealed from, was premised with the careful observation: We concur in the result reached by the court below, and, for the most part, upon the grounds expressed in the foregoing memorandum of Vice-Chancellor (now Chancellor) Walker. (80 N.J. Eq., at page 201) A careful reading of Justice Parker's opinion shows that he studiously avoided adopting the dictum below that the right of survivorship was not transferable and that the purchaser's estate would terminate upon the death of either of the tenants by the entirety. Justice Parker's opinion was summed up in the following language: We hold, therefore, that by virtue of an estate by entireties [as modified by the Married Woman's act] the seisin of husband and wife during the joint lives is essentially a tenancy in common, terminated on the death of either, with remainder in fee to the survivor; and that the right of the husband may be transferred by him to a third party who thereby becomes tenant in common for the joint lives in the husband's place; and that partition may be had between such purchaser and the wife of this tenancy in common, but without affecting in any way the common-law right of survivorship. (Emphasis supplied) (80 N.J. Eq., at pages 201-202) It is clear that the Court of Errors and Appeals had some doubts concerning the statement below of Vice-Chancellor Walker as to the alienability of the right of survivorship in a tenancy by the entirety at common law. At best the opinion is non-committal and fails to shed any light on the problem here involved. Wortendyke v. Rayot, 88 N.J. Eq. 331 ( E. & A. 1917), also decided subsequent to Bilder, did not involve the present problems and contains no comment, by way of dictum or otherwise, upon it.