Opinion ID: 2611383
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pecuniary Gain: 13-703(F)(5)

Text: This aggravating factor is present when, [t]he defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5). The trial court found this factor present because the killing of Ellis took place in the context of a drug deal gone awry. Rienhardt murdered Ellis because Breedlove had not returned with either methamphetamines or Rienhardt's $1,180. Rienhardt argues that the trial court's finding of this aggravating factor is illogical, because the killing of Michael Ellis could not possibly have brought any type of pecuniary gain. In response, the state points to State v. LaGrand (Walter), 153 Ariz. 21, 734 P.2d 563 (1987), a case in which the defendant fatally stabbed a bank employee who had kicked the defendant in the leg during the defendant's exit from the bank. In finding that the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain was present, we stated that [w]hen the defendant comes to rob, the defendant expects pecuniary gain and this desire infects all other conduct of the defendant. Id. at 35, 734 P.2d at 577. The state reasons that Rienhardt's desire to receive either drugs or the return of his money infected all of his other conduct, and that the aggravating factor of pecuniary gain is therefore present. We do not believe that Rienhardt killed in the expectation of receipt of anything of pecuniary value. His very reason for killing Ellis was that he was not going to receive anything of pecuniary value. While it is certainly possible that Rienhardt killed Ellis in order to frighten Breedlove into returning the drugs or the money, the state did not prove this beyond a reasonable doubt. It is equally, if not more, plausible that Rienhardt killed Ellis in an act of rage, out of frustration at being cheated. This court has held that murder motivated by revenge alone will not support a finding of this factor, and that the hope of financial gain must supply an impetus for the murder. State v. Robinson, 165 Ariz. 51, 60, 796 P.2d 853, 862 (1990). We think that State v. LaGrand is distinguishable. In LaGrand, the defendant came to rob, and killed the employee during the robbery itself. Here, while Rienhardt held his human collateral hostage in expectation of the receipt of something of pecuniary value, his decision to take Ellis to the desert and kill him signified the end of his expectation of receipt of anything of pecuniary value, because killing Ellis frustrated this purpose. The killing was also removed in time and place from the underlying drug deal that was supposed to have happened hours earlier at the Benz apartment. Unlike LaGrand, this is not a case in which the defendant came to rob, expected pecuniary gain, and this affected all other conduct of the defendant. Here, the defendant came to buy drugs, not to steal, and he killed because the seller tricked him. As awful as this is, Rienhardt did not kill as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5).