Opinion ID: 55800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: horn’s statement to federal officers

Text: In his second claim for habeas relief, Horn insists that the statement he made to federal officers describing his involvement in Chad Choice’s disappearance and murder was involuntary. Horn bases this argument on several assertions, including: his statement was compelled through promises contained in his plea agreement with federal authorities; his will was overborne by the threat of a death sentence; and his will was overborne because of the pressure he received from those in authority to confess. We find no merit in this claim of involuntariness. “The applicable standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether, taking into consideration the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ the statement is the product of the accused’s ‘free and rational’ choice.” Rogers, 906 F.2d at 190 (citing Martinez v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1980). “A statement is not ‘compelled’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment if an individual ‘voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently’ waives his constitutional privilege.” Id. at 190–91 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966)). Before trial, Horn moved to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement authorities after the in camera proceeding on May 31, 1996. On August 23, 1999, the state trial court conducted a federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, we do not further address the matter of harmlessness. 32 pretrial motion to suppress hearing, during which state prosecutors presented testimony from the assistant United States attorney handling Horn’s sentencing at the time of the May 31, 1996 proceeding; from Horn’s lawyer at the time of the May 31, 1996 proceeding; and from the FBI special agent who had primary responsibility for the case of Choice’s disappearance. The state trial court carried the motion to suppress forward with the trial. On September 15, 1999, the state trial court denied Horn’s motion to suppress: “As far as the voluntariness of - - of the actions of Mr. Horn, based upon the - - he was with counsel during the - - in particular the - - the discussions with [the federal district court judge], that record that was obtained from that, he had a full and knowing chance to - - to consult with counsel, his rights were certainly explained to him in some detail from that record. As far as any inducements that may have been made such that would have overcome any free will that he would have exercised in leading authorities, in making any statements that were made leading them to the evidence that I know is at issue here, I believe it was voluntary. It didn’t rise to the level of involuntary action on his part. . . . [T]he motion to suppress is denied.” (emphasis added) On direct review, the TCCA also rejected Horn’s contention that his statements to federal authorities on May 31, 1996 were involuntary: “[T]he appellant argues that his rights to due process and due course of law were violated when the trial court admitted involuntary statements he made to law enforcement officers that led them to the discovery of the victim’s remains. The appellant argues that he struck a plea agreement with federal authorities whereby he would plead guilty to carjacking and credit union robberies, but provide information regarding the 33 whereabouts of Chad Choice in return for consideration on his federal sentence. The appellant’s federal defense counsel, a federal prosecutor, and a federal agent testified that no one offered to recommend consideration for inculpatory information leading to Chad Choice’s remains. . . . The record supported the trial court’s decision to admit the complained-of statements in the instant case.” (emphasis added) As discussed below, the state trial court’s and the TCCA’s determination that Horn’s statements to law enforcement officials on May 31, 1996 were voluntary, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. At the time that Horn disclosed to federal law enforcement officials his involvement in Choice’s disappearance, there were no related charges pending against him. In March 1995, Horn had entered into a written plea agreement (signed by Horn and his counsel and the Assistant United States Attorney) with the United States government in which the federal government agreed to “not oppose a reduction in the Defendant’s base offense level of three (3) points pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 3E1.1(b)(2) for acceptance of his responsibility in the charged offense.”25 However, this plea 25 The agreement stated, however, that Horn “understands that the Government WILL NOT be filling [sic] a motion to reduce sentence pursuant to USSG Section 5K1.1 or Fed. R. Crim. P. 35.” The agreement further stated: “The Defendant agrees to cooperate fully and honestly with the United States Government as well as the Smith County, Texas, District Attorney’s Office in the investigation and prosecution of others involved in the subject matter of this indictment. The Defendant understands and agrees that complete and truthful cooperation is a material condition of this agreement. Cooperation shall include providing all information known to the Defendant regarding any criminal activity, including but not 34 agreement and the separate agreement Horn entered into with state authorities were entirely unrelated to Choice’s kidnapping and murder. As such, Horn’s situation is distinguishable from that of the defendant in Gunsby v. Wainwright, 596 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), a case upon which Horn relies. In Gunsby, the district court granted habeas relief to the defendant after determining that the defendant’s statements were legally involuntary, and we affirmed. 596 F.2d at 655. However, unlike Horn, the statements at issue in Gunsby were related to the offense for which the defendant entered into a plea bargain. See id. at 658. That is, Gunsby, who had been charged with robbery and had negotiated a plea bargain “whereby he agreed to plead guilty to robbery and testify against two codefendants,” made statements by which he incriminated himself in the charged robbery. Id. at 655. Rather than being sentenced to the seven years and six months that his plea agreement stated would be the maximum sentence, the plea bargain was set aside, his statements were used against him, and he “was convicted of robbery and given a 20-year sentence.” Id. In this case, Horn’s statements regarding his involvement in Choice’s disappearance were unrelated to the charges then pending against limited to the offenses described in this agreement. . . . The United States Government agrees that any statements made by the Defendant during the cooperation phase of this agreement shall not be used against the Defendant in any subsequent prosecutions, unless and until there is a determination by the Court that the Defendant has breached this agreement, or for purposes of impeachment.” (emphasis added) 35 him and to the subject matter of the plea agreements he had with federal and state authorities. The fact that Horn’s existing plea agreements were wholly unrelated to Choice’s abduction and murder also distinguishes this case from United States v. Rogers, 906 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1990), a federal criminal prosecution, another case that Horn relies on heavily. In Rogers, this court affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress, determining that the defendant’s confession was involuntary under the circumstances. 906 F.2d at 191. However, unlike in Horn’s case, in Rogers the defendant made statements inside the local sheriff’s office to federal officials regarding stolen guns—the same subject for which local law enforcement officers had specifically promised him he would not be charged if he cooperated.26 Id. at 190. Under those circumstances, it was reasonable for the defendant to conclude that this “questioning [by federal officers] was related to the original investigation and promise by the Sheriff’s Office.” Id. at 191. 26 The details of Rogers are as follows: Law enforcement officials from a local sheriff’s department interviewed the defendant regarding some stolen guns. 906 F.2d at 190. The defendant cooperated after officials told him that he would not be charged if he helped them. Id. Later, the defendant was asked to go down to the sheriff’s office to speak with someone regarding the guns. Id. After he arrived, he spoke with two federal officers. Id. at 192. When his statements to the federal officers led to a three-count indictment related to the firearms, the defendant moved to suppress. Id. at 190. In affirming the decision to grant the motion, we explained: “Because the interview was conducted under the auspices of the Lee County Sheriff’s Department, whose representatives had assured [the defendant] that he would not be prosecuted for his purchase of the stolen guns, [the defendant’s] statement was not ‘voluntary’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 192. 36 The same cannot be said of Horn’s statements to officials regarding Choice’s murder. Further, Horn’s plea agreement with federal authorities specifically spelled out that it did not bind state authorities: “The Defendant understands that the Smith County, Texas, District Attorney’s Office is also going to prosecute him for his role in the subject matter of this Indictment which includes the murder of James Clark Levassar. The Smith County, Texas, District Attorney’s Office has agreed not to seek the death penalty in return for his plea of guilty and cooperation. Additionally, they have agreed that any sentence of imprisonment the Defendant receives in state court on related charges will run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment he receives in federal court. . . . The Defendant understands that his agreement with the Smith County District Attorney’s Office is distinct from this agreement. The Defendant understands that the United States of America and the United States District Court cannot bind the Smith County, Texas, District Attorney’s Office regarding this matter.” We also reject Horn’s contention that his will was overborne by pressure to confess placed on him by authorities. During the May 31, 1996 in camera proceeding, the federal district court judge specifically encouraged Horn to discuss with his attorney the pros and cons of disclosing information to the authorities. The substance of the in camera proceeding was as follows: “THE COURT: . . . Mr. Horn, I’m going to suggest to you that you not say one word during this proceeding. MR. HORN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Just have nothing whatever to say. I just want to make some statements to you. The attorneys have outlined to me what your present situation is. From my past dealings with you, I have perceived that you are a person of high intelligence and you understand what goes on. I think you understand what your situation is now. As you know, the Court is bound by the Sentencing 37 Guidelines unless there is a motion for downward departure from the Government. I think you know that. MR. HORN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Nothing I can do. It is just up to whether the Government files that motion. I am told that you have indicated, without telling any details, that you may know something about the disappearance of a young man by the name of Chad Choice. Whether that is so, I don’t know. I am not– I am saying to you that you face a bleak prospect if you don’t do something. I am not going to advise you what to do. You are a free spirit. You can do what you want to do. But you have an extraordinarily good lawyer. He is one [of] the best lawyers that I know of in Texas. I have always found him to be completely dependable. If he tells me something that is going to happen, that is the way it is going to be. Any communication that he has with you is absolutely secret. It cannot be divulged. In other words, what you tell him is between you and him and no one else. And no one can ever call him aside and say, ‘Tell us what he said.’ If he did that, he could – if he did say what you said, he could be disbarred and never again practice law. I am told by the Government that they would be willing to file a motion under 5K1 to depart downward from your - - what is presently projected as your sentence if you were to reveal the details of this Chad Choice disappearance, anything that you might know. I’m not going to advise you what to do, but I have got a suggestion. My suggestion to you is that you tell anything you know to your lawyer. If he thinks that there is any way that he could cut a deal with these state authorities based on what you know, he might be able to get immunity over there. I said “might.” I don’t know. That would have to be a matter that they decided between themselves. But if you were to do that, the attorney for the Government has told me on the record here - - isn’t that right,. . .? [GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY]: That’s correct. THE COURT: - - that he would file a 5K1 departure motion. Now, if you were to tell your attorney the full details and it wasn’t to your credit, there would be no way he could get anything for you, I think he would tell you that. And you still haven’t lost anything because he is not going to to tell it. He can’t. That is the law. And he will also tell you whether he thinks he can make a deal for you with the state. I just wanted to tell you this on the record. This is all being taken down. 38 I am not, I emphasize to you, I am not giving you advice. I am just telling you what the possibilities are because I think you need to know.” (emphasis added) This record makes clear that, rather than putting insurmountable pressure on Horn to confess to his involvement in Choice’s disappearance, the district court judge encouraged Horn to consult with his attorney before discussing any knowledge with law enforcement officials. While it is true that “a confession given as the result of a direct or implied promise would be legally involuntary,” Gunsby, 596 F.2d at 656, the circumstances surrounding Horn’s confession to his involvement in Choice’s disappearance and murder cannot be said to be the result of any such promise. Horn was clearly advised by the federal district court judge to consult with his attorney regarding the possibility of reaching some sort of agreement. The plea agreements he had entered into at the time were wholly unrelated to Choice’s abduction and murder, and there was never any promise that Horn would be immune from prosecution in relation to Choice’s disappearance. The findings of the state trial court and the TCCA that Horn’s statements were knowing and voluntary, that his free will was not overcome, and that no one offered to recommend consideration for inculpatory information regarding Choice, are reasonably supported by the record. Admission of Horn’s statements to the FBI, and the evidence discovered as a result (Choice’s remains), was not contrary to and did not 39 constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.