Opinion ID: 1758374
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Unavailability Requirements of Sections 90.803(23) and 90.804(1)

Text: In addition to these strict reliability requirements, the hearsay statement of a child victim is considered admissible under section 90.803(23) only if the child testifies or is judicially found to be unavailable as a witness. A child is unavailable as a witness if the court finds, based on expert testimony, that a substantial likelihood exists that the child will suffer severe emotional or mental harm if the child testifies or finds that the child falls within one of the definitions for unavailability set forth in section 90.804(1). Section 90.804(1) provides that a witness is unavailable for purposes of admitting a hearsay statement if the witness: (a) Is exempted by a ruling of a court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; (b) Persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; (c) Has suffered a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement so as to destroy his effectiveness as a witness during the trial; (d) Is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or because of then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or (e) Is absent from the hearing, and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance or testimony by process or other reasonable means. (Emphasis added.) As previously indicated, the child's hearsay statements in this case were admitted based on the district court's ruling in Townsend I that the child was unavailable under section 90.804(1)(d) due to incompetency. In Townsend II, however, the district court reversed itself, finding that incompetency was not the equivalent of unavailability for purposes of admitting the child's statements under section 90.803(23), and, as such, that the child's statements should not have been admitted at trial. The district court reached this conclusion by determining that the reference in section 90.804(1) to ` then existing ... mental ... infirmity' requires that the mental condition of the declarant must have arisen after the purported hearsay statement was made. The district court also noted that incompetency is not a specifically enumerated definition for unavailability under section 90.804(1). In making these findings, the district court distinguished this Court's discussion of competency and unavailability in Perez. In Perez, we specifically stated that a child need not be found competent to testify before that child's out-of-court statements could be found to bear sufficient safeguards of reliability to enable admission of that statement at trial. The fact that a child is incompetent to testify at trial according to section 90.603(2) does not necessarily mean that the child is unable to state the truth. The requirement that the trial court find that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability furnishes a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, obviating the necessity that the child understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth. Perez, 536 So.2d at 211. In Perez, however, we did not specifically address whether incompetency fell within any of the definitions of unavailability set forth in section 90.804(1). It was on that issue that the district court distinguished Perez from the instant case. Consequently, we now address that issue. As noted by the district court, section 90.804(1)(d) provides that a declarant is unavailable if the declarant cannot testify because of a then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity. Although the then existing language of the statute does refer to an infirmity existing at the time the witness is to testify, we find, contrary to the district court's interpretation, that an infirmity under that section need not arise after a hearsay statement was made in order for the declarant to be unavailable. The district court's evaluation of the statute assumes that the witness must have been competent at the time the hearsay statements were made; however, as we stated in Perez, it is the particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that ensure the reliability of a statement, not the competency of the witness making the statement. Federal and other state courts that have considered similar statutory provisions overwhelmingly agree. See Gregory v. North Carolina, 900 F.2d 705, 707 n. 6 (4th Cir.) (incompetency equals unavailability under rule 804 of the Federal Evidence Code), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 211, 112 L.Ed.2d 171 (1990); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir.1986) (witness who testified but was too young and frightened to be subjected to meaningful direct examination was unavailable for all practical purposes); Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 957 n. 4 (4th Cir.1985) (victim, although present, was unavailable because she was declared incompetent given her young age); Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d 1050 (6th Cir.1983) (because the declarant was ruled incompetent to testify, she was clearly unavailable under the Federal Evidence Code), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 980, 79 L.Ed.2d 217 (1984); Government of Virgin Islands v. Riley, 754 F. Supp. 61, 64 (D.V.I. 1991) (even though incompetency is not an enumerated basis for unavailability under rule 804, an incompetent witness is unavailable for purposes of that provision; [t]he literal language of rule 804(a) suggests that the definition of unavailability is illustrative rather than exhaustive); People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511 (Colo. 1990) (a finding that a child is incompetent to testify does not necessarily impair any particularized guarantees of reliability that otherwise inhere in the child's hearsay statement); People v. Hart, 214 Ill. App.3d 512, 158 Ill.Dec. 103, 573 N.E.2d 1288 (child who was deemed incompetent to testify due to age was unavailable to testify within meaning of statute), abrogated on other grounds, People v. Schott, 145 Ill.2d 188, 164 Ill.Dec. 127, 582 N.E.2d 690 (1991); State v. Lanam, 459 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 1990) (text of federal and state provisions are almost identical and, under the statute, incompetency equals unavailability), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033, 111 S.Ct. 693, 112 L.Ed.2d 684 (1991); State v. Deanes, 323 N.C. 508, 374 S.E.2d 249 (1988) (the unavailability of a child witness in a sexual abuse trial due to incompetency adequately demonstrates the necessity for using the child's hearsay declaration), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S.Ct. 2455, 104 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1989); but see State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984) (unavailability and incompetence are not the same because they serve different purposes; if a declarant is incompetent, then the statement is too unreliable). We agree with the majority position and find that an incompetent witness is an unavailable witness within the meaning of section 90.804(1)(d)'s existing mental infirmity requirement. We conclude that a finding of incompetency to testify because one is unable to recognize the duty and obligation to tell the truth satisfies the testify or be unavailable requirement of section 90.803(23). This does not mean, however, that a trial judge should not look to the competency of the child in determining whether the hearsay statements of the child are otherwise admissible. To the contrary, as explained in the discussion that follows, the competency of the child is a factor that should be considered in determining the trustworthiness and reliability, and thus the admissibility, of hearsay statements attributable to the child. Having answered the certified question in the affirmative, we turn to the confrontation clause concerns raised by Townsend and the district court.