Opinion ID: 510217
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kaplan: The Datacom Witnesses

Text: 173 (a) The Immunity Agreements. Three Datacom executives--Joseph Delario, Neal Anderson and Robert Sargenti--testified for the government under grants of use immunity. The offers of immunity were made during the sixth week of the trial, after Lindenauer had testified and shortly before the government was scheduled to rest its case. The offers of immunity were contingent upon proffers of testimony that the government deemed truthful. Delario and Anderson had already testified before federal grand juries in three districts and had consistently denied that either they or Datacom had engaged in any wrongdoing. The government regarded this grand jury testimony as perjurious. At trial, the Datacom witnesses testified, among other things, as to how Kaplan had helped Delario bribe both Manes and Lindenauer in order to obtain a data-processing contract for Datacom. 174 Kaplan contends that the offer of immunity was so coercive that it effectively rendered the [Datacom] witnesses unable to testify truthfully. He argues that the immunity agreements effectively protected the Datacom witnesses from the potential forfeiture of millions of dollars in a subsequent RICO prosecution. In Kaplan's view, the immunity agreements amounted to a huge contingency fee, and the resulting testimony thus constituted a denial of due process. The government contends that the effect of any immunity agreement or fee arrangement or testimony is an issue to be decided exclusively by a properly instructed jury. Our caselaw supports the government. 175 Even if the immunity agreements in this case are assumed to be as coercive as a contingency-fee arrangement, the testimony of the Datacom witnesses would not be inadmissible. United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 716-17 (2d Cir.1987), a case decided after the argument of these appeals, involved a witness who was promised a payment in an amount to be determined after the government's evaluation of the overall quality of cases brought as the result of that information and testimony provided by the witness. Like Kaplan, the appellants in Persico relied upon a now-overruled line of Fifth Circuit cases holding that, in certain narrow circumstances, contingency-fee arrangements violate due process. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.1962), overruled in United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (decided August 21, 1987, after main briefs had been filed but before argument in this case), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988). In Persico, we expressed our confidence in the jury's ability to assess counsels' arguments about the inherent unreliability of 'purchased' testimony, and to evaluate the witness' credibility accordingly. 832 F.2d at 717. We therefore held that the credibility of the compensated witness, like that of the witness promised a reduced sentence, is for a properly instructed jury to determine. Id. (quoting Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d at 316). 176 Under our decisions, therefore, the question is whether the circumstances surrounding the agreements were aired before the jury, and whether the court gave proper instructions regarding the immunized witnesses' testimony. Here, through both direct and cross-examination of the Datacom executives, the jury learned in exhaustive detail about the witnesses' agreements with the government and about the potential financial ramifications of those agreements. In addition, defense counsel in their summations sharply challenged the credibility of the Datacom witnesses. As to the jury instructions, Kaplan contends that the district court did not give the jury sufficient guidance with respect to the immunity agreements. However, the careful and lengthy instruction given by Judge Knapp, set forth in the margin, 7 more than adequately advised the jury of the possible incentives created by the immunity agreements. 177 (b) The Reading of the Trial Transcripts. Kaplan also contends that the testimony of the Datacom witnesses should have been excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 615 because Delario and Anderson had read portions of the trial transcript prior to agreeing to cooperate with the government. This argument is meritless. Although the reading of testimony may violate an order excluding witnesses issued by a district court under Rule 615, see, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1373 (5th Cir. July 1981) (reading of testimony may be more harmful than watching it because reading enables witness to thoroughly review and study [previous testimony] in formulating his own), the exclusion of testimony is  'a serious sanction,' appropriate only where 'the defendants have suffered actual prejudice, and there has been connivance by the witness or counsel to violate the rule.'  United States v. Jimenez, 780 F.2d 975, 980 (11th Cir.1986) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 914, 104 S.Ct. 275, 78 L.Ed.2d 256 (1983)). The decision whether or not to exclude testimony, moreover, is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 774 F.2d 807, 810 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1024, 106 S.Ct. 1218, 89 L.Ed.2d 329 (1986). Because the government did not cause the Datacom witnesses to read the trial transcripts, and because the whole episode was revealed to the jury in defense counsel's attacks on the witnesses' credibility--e.g., counsel for Friedman, referring to Delario's testimony in summation: Did you hear that before? Does that have a certain ring to it? It has the ring of Geoffrey Lindenauer on the pages of the transcript that Mr. Delario so dutifully read.--we find no abuse of discretion in Judge Knapp's refusal to exclude their testimony.