Opinion ID: 612876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Long-Range Best Interests

Text: The BIA denied Smith's application, first, because it determined the gift was not in the long-range best interests of Smith or other Reserve landowners. When the BIA considers an application for a gift of restricted Indian land, the application may be approved if, after careful examination of the circumstances in each case, the transaction appears to be clearly justified in the light of the long-range best interest of the owner or owners or as under conditions set out in § 152.25(d). 25 C.F.R. § 152.23 (emphasis added). Section 152.25(d) governs Gifts and conveyances for no consideration or less than the appraised fair market value, and states With the approval of the Secretary, Indian owners may convey trust or restricted land, for less than the appraised fair market value or for no consideration when the prospective grantee is the owner's spouse, brother, sister, lineal ancestor of Indian blood or lineal descendant, or when some other special relationship exists between the grantor and grantee or special circumstances exist that in the opinion of the Secretary warrant the approval of the conveyance. Id. § 152.25(d) (emphasis added). Distilling these regulations, an Indian may give an interest in restricted land if they have a special relationship with the grantee, and the BIA may approve such a gift if it concludes the gift is in the long-range best interests of the landowners. In applying these regulations, the BIA has a duty to consider the donor's best interest In the case of a gift conveyance, it is BIA's duty to ensure that the prospective donor understands and intends the effect of his/her action. It is also BIA's duty to make a careful examination of the circumstances to determine whether the transaction is in the donor's best interest. BIA must refrain from approving a gift deed where there is any question as to the donor's intent or where the facts show the conveyance is not in the donor's best interest. Downs v. Acting Muskogee Area Dir., 29 IBIA 94, 97 (1996) (citation omitted). When deciding whether to approve a gift conveyance the BIA owes a duty only to the landowner(s) ... [which] includes discerning the grantor's intent and refraining from approving deeds where a question exists concerning that intent. LeCompte v. Acting Great Plains Reg'l Dir., 45 IBIA 135, 143 (2007). The actual determination of whether to approve a gift conveyance is a matter within the discretion of BIA. Id. While perhaps these regulations reflect a paternalistic mindset, the simple fact is that applicable federal law vests substantial discretion with the BIA to approve or reject gift transfers by Indians. Applying these regulations, the BIA acknowledged the special relationship between Smith and Miami Tribe  under § 152.25(d)  but found the partial transfer was still not in the long-range best interests of Smith or the other Reserve landowners  under § 152.23. In particular, the BIA found the transfer raised concerns regarding tract management, competing interests between the tribe and the individual Indian landowners, and the potential for land use conflicts. Id. Also, the recent history and gaming-related aspects of the Reserve continue[d] to cause [BIA] concern over the propriety of such a transaction. [18] Id. The BIA acknowledged Smith's desire to benefit the tribe, but stated the existing business lease with the tribe will accomplish this because the lease gives the Tribe the necessary tool to undertake the development of a gaming facility and improve the potential for significant revenue for the Indian landowners. Id. The BIA also noted its position that Indian landowners should receive at least fair market value when disposing of property and that Indian tribes should pay fair market value for land purchases unless special circumstances warrant otherwise. Aplt.App. at 133. While acknowledging the special relationship between Smith and the tribe, the BIA found there were no special circumstances that would justify a gift of a portion of [Smith's] undivided interest to the Tribe rather than a sale of the interest. Id. In summary, the special relationship between Smith and the tribe did not overcome the BIA's finding that the proposed gift conveyance [was] not in the long-range best interest of either [Smith] or the other Indian owners of the allotment. Id. Our review under the APA's familiar arbitrary and capricious standard gives the BIA wide latitude to administer its duties under the regulatory scheme adopted by Congress. Our duty is to ascertain whether the agency examined the relevant data and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the decision made. Citizens' Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). Therefore, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one [and we are] not empowered to substitute [our] judgment for that of the agency. Utah Envtl. Congress v. Richmond, 483 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)) (alteration in original). We may not second-guess the BIA so long as it acts within the boundaries set by Congress, and it has done so here. Under these principles, the BIA properly interpreted and applied its own regulations, §§ 152.23 and 152.25(d), both of which afford discretion to approve a land transfer. The BIA recognized the special relationship between Smith and the tribe. But a special relationship permits a gift; it does not mandate it. See 25 C.F.R. § 152.25(d) (Indian owners may convey ... restricted land ... when some other special relationship exists....) (emphasis added). A gift conveyance also may be approved if after a careful examination of the circumstances the BIA determines the transfer is clearly justified as being in the long-range best interest of the landowners. Id. § 152.23. There are no explicit factors the BIA must consider when making its determination. Nevertheless, the BIA explained its rationale for denying Smith's application in some detail. Given those plausible grounds, we cannot substitute our judgment for the BIA's considered judgment. The tribe claims the disjunctive or in § 152.23 requires the BIA to approve a gift when a special relationship exists under § 152.25(d) without performing a long-range best interests analysis. The government, in contrast, argues the BIA must review a gift for the long-range best interests, even when the gift falls within § 152.25(d). Section 152.25(d), itself, imposes no limits on the BIA's discretion to approve a gift. The BIA's discretion is limited only by the general restriction that its decision not be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law. Despite this, the BIA chooses to apply the long-range best interests analysis as a self-imposed limit to channel its discretion under § 152.25(d). That choice is neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation because it is a reasonable framework to guide the BIA's otherwise unfettered discretion. Therefore, we defer to the BIA's interpretation of its own regulation. See Plateau Mining, 519 F.3d at 1192. The tribe also argues the consolidation policies set out in § 2216(a) and (b) of the ILCA reinforce the special relationship between Smith and the tribe is enough to compel approval of the transfer. But, as we discussed above, § 2216(a) does not apply because the tribe lacks jurisdiction over the Reserve. And § 2216(b) only provides that a gift  may be made for less than fair market value if certain statutory conditions are met; not that it must occur. The decision is still within the discretion of the BIA and its consideration of the long-range best interests under § 152.23. If Congress intended to require the BIA to approve all transfers that qualified under §§ 2216(b) or 152.25(d) it certainly could have, but it did not. In addition, the BIA's preference toward land transfers for fair market value does not run afoul of § 2216(b). Nothing in the statute abrogates the BIA's discretionary review of gift transfers or mandates their approval. If anything, the statute provides some protection to the agency by immunizing approval of a transaction from allegations of breach of trust by the Secretary. § 2216(b)(1)(A)(ii). In short, the BIA's denial of Smith's application was a valid exercise of its administrative discretion. It was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the BIA to conclude the partial transfer of Smith's property interest to the tribe was not in his or other Reserve landowners' long-range best interests.