Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Admissibility of Confession/Assignments of Error 2 and 3

Text: In these related assignments of error, defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting defendant's confession (1) because it was the product of police coercion after defendant had invoked his right to remain silent, and (2) because it was taken in violation of the Due Process Clause because the reinitiation of the interrogation was unrecorded. The record reveals defendant was arrested at the home of his girlfriend pursuant to a warrant charging two counts of first degree murder at about 1:10 a.m. on January 3, 1995. He was given verbal Miranda warnings and transported to the Mayflower Street station house. After additional Miranda warnings, defendant executed a written waiver of rights and agreed to give a taped statement. The statement began at 2:25 a.m. with defendant repeatedly denying any complicity or involvement in the Prestenback murders. The statement concluded with the following exchange between various officers and defendant: Officer: We're fixing to leave right after this. Officer: Okay, and uh, as far as they go ya'll gonna split pretty soon then right. Officer: As soon as we get finished with this, we gonna take him and book him in. Officer: Okay Al, so you don't want to say no more about what happened over there at them old people's house. Def.: Uh uh. Officer: You didn't have nothing to do with it? Def.: I'm serious man, I didn't have nothing to do with the murder, murder, I ain't done it. Officer: You ain't got nothing else you want to say? [no transcribed response] Officer: Was you treated fair here today[?] Def.: Yea. Officer: Nobody beat you up? Def.: No. Officer: Nobody promised you anything? Def.: No. Officer: Threatened you? Def.: No. Officer: We played square with you just like we said we was doing huh? Def.: Yea Officer: Got anything else you want to add? Def.: I didn't kill them people, though. Officer: We gonna conclude the statement, then. It's approximately 3:12 in the morning, date is 1/3 of '91. We're still at 704 Mayflower in the Interrogation Room at the, uh, Detective Office. Tape Stops. The recorder was turned off at 3:12 a.m. Twelve minutes later, at 3:24 a.m., it was turned on and a sobbing defendant then gave a detailed confession. Testimony in the record indicates that just after the recorder was turned off at 3:12 a.m., Det. James Dietrich, who had been observing events through a one-way mirror, entered the interview room. He joined Lt. Hillburn, Sgt. Sam Miceli and Det. Terry Wilson in the interrogation room with defendant, sat close to defendant, put a hand on his leg, and told defendant he would feel better if he got something off his chest and unburdened himself prior to meet[ing] his God. Defendant then started crying and admitted the murders. The recorder was turned back on and, after defendant was again asked whether he understood his rights as contained in the waiver of rights form he had signed, defendant gave a detailed confession. At no time did defendant ask for the questioning to stop nor did he request an attorney. Admissibility of the statements was litigated at defendant's first trial, with the trial judge denying his motion to suppress. The merits of this ruling were not reached on appeal because of our reversal. In the instant trial, defendant objected to the admissibility of the statements subject to the preservation of [his] rights, under the original motion to suppress evidence. This objection was overruled, and a redacted version of the tape, containing portions of the initial and subsequent statements, was played for the jury. Defendant's initial argument is that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent when he responded uh uh to the policeman's question as to whether he wanted to say anything more about what happened. Thus, he argues, the subsequent coercive questioning of him by Det. Dietrich constituted a violation of his previously invoked right to silence. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court provided a person in custody must be given certain warnings before interrogation may commence in order to safeguard his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. [10] See also State v. Davis, 92-1623, p. 19 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 1012, 1024, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 975, 115 S.Ct. 450, 130 L.Ed.2d 359 (1994). After these warnings have been given, if the individual indicates at any time that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. However, when the protections provided by Miranda are not specifically invoked, police may continue to question the suspect in the hope of obtaining a statement. Green, 94-0887 at p. 10, n. 8, 655 So.2d at 280, n. 8. For a statement which was obtained where an individual's right to remain silent was not invoked after being informed of his Miranda rights to be admissible, it is the State's burden to show defendant waived his rights prior to speaking. Davis, 92-1623, at p. 19, 637 So.2d at 1024; Green, Id. The waiver must be knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances which include the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Green, 94-0887 at p. 11, 655 So.2d at 280. In light of the above, our inquiry begins with whether or not defendant was advised of his rights to remain silent and to speak with an attorney under Miranda. Defendant was Mirandized at his girlfriend's house upon his arrest and again, later, when he arrived at the station. He signed a waiver of rights form containing a list of his rights. After defendant spoke with Det. Dietrich and prior to his confession, the tape was turned on again, and defendant was again reminded of the rights which were contained in the written waiver. Defendant was advised several times prior to his confession of his Miranda rights. Advisement of rights is not enough for admissibility, however. Defendant must knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to remain silent. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (citations omitted), the Supreme Court discussed the nature of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights. The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. In the instant case, it is clear defendant's waiver of his right to remain silent was a product of his free choice and was made with a full awareness of the right being waived. There is no evidence in the record defendant was intimidated, coerced or deceived in any way which would have led him to waive his right to remain silent for any reason other than as a function of his free will. At the end of the first statement, defendant admits he was not coerced, threatened, physically harmed or treated unfairly by the detectives interrogating him. During the second statement wherein defendant confessed to the murders, there is no indication defendant's decision to speak was anything other than a result of his choice to do so. The record is devoid of any suggestion the police resorted to any pressure, physical or psychological, to elicit the statements from defendant. Additionally, there is no question defendant comprehended the rights afforded him and the potential consequences of a decision to relinquish them. Defendant was informed of his rights many times, both verbally and in the waiver of rights form which he signed. Furthermore, an individual's prior experiences with the criminal justice system are relevant to this inquiry because they may show the individual has, in the past, and, perhaps, on numerous occasions, been informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination both by law enforcement and judicial officers. Green, 94-0887 at p. 17, 655 So.2d at 284. One of the ways that people are educated and gain an understanding of things is through repetition, through repeated exposure, and it [is] permissible for the trial court to read [an individual's] Miranda waivers ... against [that individual's] criminal history. Green, Id. Defendant had been arrested, and in some cases, convicted, innumerable times, giving rise to the permissible inference he was more than familiar with his right to remain silent. In light of the above, we find defendant was properly advised of his rights and voluntarily chose to waive his right to remain silent. Once an individual has waived his rights, he may be interrogated by the police and any freely and voluntarily made statement will be admissible at trial. However, a prior valid waiver of rights does not prohibit or prevent this individual from subsequently invoking his rights during questioning, and, as stated earlier, upon an invocation of the right to remain silent, all interrogation must cease. [I]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627. Whether interrogation must cease until reinitiated by the individual is determined by whether the individual actually invoked his right to counsel [or his right to remain silent] either prior to or during the investigation. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). Defendant's position is that his statement, uh uh, in response to the question: Okay Al, so you don't want to say no more about what happened over there at them old people's house, constitutes an invocation of his right to remain silent, and that Det. Dietrich's subsequent discussions with him, as well as the detectives' subsequent questioning of him, were prohibited by Miranda. Defendant is incorrect. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the arrestee had actually invoked his Miranda right to counsel, as opposed to his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, for purposes of triggering Miranda's proscription against further interrogation. The Supreme Court held that an equivocal or ambiguous statement, such as maybe I should talk to a lawyer, was insufficient to constitute an invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, and that an unambiguous, clear assertion of the right was necessary to trigger the rule that interrogation cease upon invocation of the right. Analogizing to the instant case, defendant's indication he had nothing further to say about the crimes does not reasonably suggest a desire to end all questioning or to remain silent. Defendant's negative reply, uh uh, cannot plausibly be understood as an invocation, ambiguous or otherwise, to cut off questioning in all respects. Rather, defendant was willing to talk to authorities even after the uh, uh response as indicated by his continuing to respond to questions and to assert his innocence. Defendant never indicated he did not want to speak to the police at all, only that he had nothing to say about the murders. The fact defendant continued to speak to police reflected an intent to continue the exchange, thus giving effect to the fundamental purpose of ... Miranda,  which was to assure that the individual's right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. Green, 94-0887 at p. 10, n. 8, 655 So.2d at 280, n. 8 (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528, 107 S.Ct. 828, 831, 93 L.Ed.2d 920 (1987)). Because defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent prior to or during questioning, it was permissible for the investigators to continue to question him. In addition to the above prerequisites, before a confession may be introduced into evidence, the State must affirmatively show the statement itself was free and voluntary, and not the result of fear, duress, intimidation, menace, threats, inducements or promises. State v. Lavalais, 95-0320, p. 6 (La.11/25/96), 685 So.2d 1048, 1053, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 85, 139 L.Ed.2d 42 (1997); Davis, 92-1623 at p. 19, 637 So.2d at 1024; State v. Simmons, 443 So.2d 512, 515 (La.1983). Defendant asserts his statement was not voluntary and was coerced by Det. Dietrich's comments to him regarding the state of his soul. Although not a part of the transcript of the statement because the recorder was off, Det. Dietrich testified at trial he reminded [defendant] of hisuhsituation with his soul being weighed down and heavily burdened and that beforethat one day he would meet his God and wouldit would be improper for him to meet [H]im with such a heavy soul, burden and such. And we went on and I talked to him about, he needed to clear his conscience and speak to us about it and get it off his chesthis problems. Statements by police to a defendant that he would be better off if he cooperated are not promises or inducements designed to extract a confession. Lavalais, 95-0320 at p. 7, 685 So.2d at 1053. Additionally, a confession is not rendered inadmissible by the fact law enforcement officers exhort or adjure an accused to tell the truth provided the exhortation is not accompanied by an inducement in the nature of a threat or one which implies a promise of reward. The references by Det. Dietrich to defendant's soul and his suggestion defendant would feel better if he got it off his chest do not imply either a threat or a promise, and, defendant's decision to confess in light of these comments was his own. [11] In fact, defendant admitted he felt better after confessing. Furthermore, the record does not support the allegation defendant's confession was anything other than a freely made decision to admit his crimes. This assignment of error has no merit. In a related assignment of error, defendant argues his due process rights were violated by Det. Dietrich's talking to him while the tape recorder was turned off. We are not aware of any due process requirement that a statement given to the police be recorded. Nor is there any support in the record for defendant's claim that the fact a portion of his statement was unrecorded somehow violated his due process rights or coerced him into giving a confession. This assignment of error has no merit.