Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Kerr's statements regarding her fear of defendant

Text: Defendant was charged with the crimes of murder, stalking, and arson. In connection with the stalking count, the trial court permitted the prosecution to elicit from several witnesses Kerr's out-of-court statements regarding her fear of defendant. (See former § 646.9, subd. (e), as amended by Stats. 1998, ch. 825, § 4, p. 5162; id ., ch. 826, § 1, p. 5166; CALJIC No. 9.16.1 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. 1996) [the crime of stalking under former § 646.9 requires a showing that the harassing conduct directed at a specific person actually caused that person substantial emotional distress]; cf. People v. Ewing (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 199 , 211-212, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 [evidence that the victim experienced sleepless nights and had joined a support group for battered women was insufficient to show that she suffered substantial emotional distress for purposes of establishing the stalking charge].) Defendant contends the court erred in admitting Kerr's out-of-court statements, in part, because the statements were not admissible under any hearsay exception and should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. His primary argument, however, is that, even if Kerr's statements were relevant to prove the fear element of the stalking charge, the court's limiting instructions were inadequate to prevent the jury from using those statements for the improper purpose of finding that he killed Kerr intentionally and with premeditation, rather than in the heat of passion. Although we conclude that the statements in question were properly admitted, we need not decide whether the court's limiting instructions  provided adequate safeguards against the improper use of that evidence because even if they did not, any error was harmless.
Prosecution witness Mark Harvey testified in large part about his interactions with Kerr on the evening preceding her death. Over repeated defense objections, and after extensive argument by the parties over the course  of several court days, the trial court ruled it would permit Harvey to recount several statements Kerr made to him expressing her fear of defendant  and relating that defendant had threatened to kill her. In ruling the evidence admissible, the court found Kerr's expressions of fear fell within the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a).) In this regard the court found Kerr's statements were both trustworthy and highly relevant to the issue of whether she was afraid of defendant, an element of the crime of stalking. The court further found that Kerr's statements regarding defendant's threats to kill her were also admissible, but as an admission of a party opponent, not under the state-of-mind exception. In response to defense counsel's objection under Evidence Code section 352, in which he argued that the evidence of defendant's threats was highly prejudicial because the jury would use this evidence to find intent to kill and premeditation, the court determined that the probative value of the evidence far outweighed its prejudice. Acknowledging that the prejudicial impact was considerable, however, the court indicated it would instruct the jury to consider the evidence only when deciding the charge of stalking, and for no other purpose. The court also granted defense counsel's request to give the limiting instruction during Harvey's testimony, rather than at the close of evidence. In accordance with the court's ruling, Harvey described for the jury his conversations with Kerr on the night before her death. As mentioned in the factual recitation, Kerr had come to Harvey's home to babysit while Harvey attended an AA meeting. After Harvey returned, Kerr went outside to smoke a cigarette and when she came back inside, she was shaking. When asked what was wrong, Kerr stated that she did not believe it would be a good idea to accept Harvey's earlier offer to rent her a room in his home because defendant had threatened her. More specifically, she told Harvey that defendant had threatened to kill Harvey and his children, if he had to, in order to get to her. The court interrupted Harvey's testimony at this point to instruct the jury about the limited purpose of the testimony, directing the jury not to consider it for ... proof of an intent to commit a murder or any sort of proof of premeditation. Subsequent to Harvey's testimony, the court similarly overruled defense counsel's hearsay and prejudice objections to testimony by three other  prosecution witnesses who related Kerr's statements regarding her fear of defendant. Accordingly, Kerr's friend Lynda Farnand testified that Kerr mentioned in three separate conversations that she was afraid of defendant. As during the Harvey testimony, the court interrupted the questioning to instruct the jury that the evidence of Kerr's statements to Farnand was being admitted only to show Kerr's state of mind and whether she was afraid of defendant, for purposes of the stalking charge. When Farnand then testified that Kerr told her defendant once said no one could have Kerr if he could not have her, the court again admonished the jury that the evidence was being introduced for the limited purpose of determining whether or not the victim was afraid for purposes of the stalking count. Later, over defense counsel's Evidence Code section 352 objection, the court permitted Kerr's friend Cheryl Zornes to testify briefly regarding a telephone conversation in which Kerr told her she was afraid of defendant because every time she turned around [defendant] was there, following her. Another friend, Kim Hyer, likewise was permitted to testify regarding Kerr's statements suggesting she feared defendant. Specifically, Hyer told the jury that Kerr made her promise to take care of Kerr's young son were anything to happen to her. Immediately after this part of  Hyer's testimony, the court reminded the jury that the limited purpose of this evidence was its relevance to the fear element of the stalking charge. The court also included a limiting instruction when instructing the jury prior to its deliberations.
1. Admissibility of Kerr's statements Defendant argues that Kerr's statements regarding her fear of defendant were not admissible, either as state-of-mind evidence under Evidence Code sections 1250 and 1252,  or under Evidence Code section 352. 3 We agree with defendant that Kerr's statements fall into two categories for purposes of analyzing their admissibility, namely, Kerr's statements that she feared defendant, and Kerr's statements indicating that defendant had threatened her. Contrary to defendant's assertions, however, both categories of Kerr's statements were properly admitted below. Defendant acknowledges that Kerr's statements that she feared defendant were relevant to the fear element of stalking and that they therefore fell within the scope of the state-of-mind exception under  Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1), which allows admission of a hearsay statement when the declarant's statement of his or her then existing state of mind is itself an issue in the action. (See People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835 , 872, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 602 , 69 P.3d 446 [A murder victim's fear of the alleged killer may be in issue when the victim's state of mind is directly relevant to an element of an offense].) Defendant points out that before the trial court ruled on the admissibility of Harvey's testimony relating Kerr's statements, defense counsel indicated that he did not intend to challenge the point that Kerr feared defendant. According to defendant, this rendered Kerr's statements inadmissible because they no longer were an issue in the action, as required by Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant's argument does not succeed. [A] fact ... generally becomes 'disputed' when it is raised by a plea of not guilty or a denial of an allegation [and] remains 'disputed' until it is resolved. ( People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238 , 260, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 841 P.2d 897 ; accord, People v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452 , 471, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 91 , 257 P.3d 703 .) Defendant further argues that Kerr's statements that she feared defendant were inadmissible because defense counsel also offered to stipulate that Kerr told Harvey she was afraid of defendant. Contrary to defendant's assertion, however, the proposed stipulation was not a concession of the fear element of the stalking count and therefore did not remove that issue from dispute. In any event, and as defendant acknowledges, the prosecutor refused the stipulation. It is well settled that a prosecutor generally cannot be compelled to agree to a stipulation if it would diminish the persuasiveness and forcefulness of the prosecution's case. ( People v. Rogers (2013) 57 Cal.4th 296 , 329, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 626 , 304 P.3d 124 ; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983 , 1007, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586 , 766 P.2d 1 .) Defendant argues nonetheless that the trial court's refusal to force the prosecutor to accept the stipulation was error under Evidence Code section 352. He relies on  Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 for support, but that decision reaffirms the general rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case free from any defendant's option to stipulate the evidence away. ( Id . at p. 189, 117 S.Ct. 644 .) The general rule must bend, the high court explained, when the point at issue is a defendant's legal status [as a convicted felon], dependent on some judgment rendered wholly independently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him. ( Id . at p. 190, 117 S.Ct. 644 .) Defense counsel's proposed stipulation concerned evidence from which the jury could draw the inferences necessary to reach its verdict on the stalking count; it did not concern defendant's status as a convicted felon. Old Chief 's exception to the general rule is not applicable here.  Nor does defendant persuade that the trial court's failure to compel the prosecutor to accept the proposed stipulation violated his right to due process. He argues that although Kerr's hearsay statements were not admitted to prove the murder charge, there was a significant risk the jury would conclude defendant premeditated the murder based on those statements. As explained post , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at page 370, 396 P.3d at page 512,  however, any inadequacy in the court's limiting instructions could not have prejudiced defendant. Equally meritless is defendant's assertion that the admission of Kerr's statements violated the confrontation clause, as interpreted in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 . As defendant recognizes, the confrontation clause is implicated only when testimonial statements are involved. ( Id . at p. 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 .) Kerr's statements to her friend Harvey were clearly nontestimonial in nature and therefore fell outside the reach of confrontation clause protections. As Crawford itself explained, the confrontation clause addresses the specific concern of [a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers because that person bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. ( Ibid . ; accord, People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965 , 991, 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 789 , 155 P.3d 205 ; see People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536 , 579-580, fn. 19, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743 , 93 P.3d 344 [statement made to a friend at school does not constitute  'testimonial hearsay'  under Crawford ].) We likewise reject defendant's argument that the trial court erred by admitting Kerr's statements that defendant had threatened to kill her. Defendant asserts that these statements could not be admitted under the state-of-mind exception in Evidence Code section 1250 because they showed defendant's state of mind, not Kerr's. Defendant's argument does not succeed, however, because the statements in question were not being admitted for their truth; that is, they were not presented to prove that defendant intended to kill her or thought about killing her. Rather, Kerr's statements that defendant had threatened to kill her were relevant circumstantial evidence that she was afraid of defendant. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 , 23, fn. 9, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ; People v. Ortiz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 377 , 389-390, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 .) Because the statements were being offered for a nonhearsay purpose, they fell outside the reach of Evidence Code section 1250 and other exceptions to the hearsay rule. The trial court found that evidence of defendant's threats to Kerr were admissible under the hearsay exception for admissions by a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220 ), rather than as statements not being  offered for their truth. Although this analysis is different from ours, we have explained that  'we review the ruling, not the court's reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.'  ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 351, fn. 11, 75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289 , 181 P.3d 105 .)  Defendant relies on People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 441 P.2d 942 , to support his argument that Kerr's out-of-court statements relating defendant's threats to kill her were inadmissible because they amounted to double hearsay that concerned defendant's state of mind, not Kerr's. For several reasons, however, the reasoning in that case does not assist defendant. In Lew , although the court determined that the murder victim's out-of-court statements that the defendant had threatened to kill her were relevant to an issue raised by the defense, the evidence was deemed inadmissible, in part, because the statements referred to the defendant's past acts, rather than threats of future conduct. ( Id . at pp. 779-780, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 441 P.2d 942 .) But the decisional basis for excluding the evidence for that reason, People v. Hamilton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 881 , 893, 13 Cal.Rptr. 649 , 362 P.2d 473 , appears to have been largely undermined by the later enactment of the Evidence Code. Under the Evidence Code, trial courts were granted broad discretion to determine in every case whether the need for the state-of-mind evidence outweighed the danger of misuse by the jury. (See People v. Ortiz, supra , 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 387-389, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 914 ; 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 211, pp. 1070-1071.) The other basis for exclusion in Lew was that the victim's statements were made under circumstances indicating they were probably not trustworthy. ( Lew, at pp. 779-780, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 441 P.2d 942 .) We observe, again, that Lew preceded enactment of the Evidence Code, and that the codified state-of-mind exception does not mention independent indicia of trustworthiness as part  of the required foundation. Here, moreover, nothing in the record contradicts the trial court's determination that Kerr's statements to Harvey and her other friends were trustworthy. This is not a case like Lew, in which the victim may have claimed that the defendant had threatened her as a pretext for explaining to a college professor why she had missed a midterm examination. ( Id . at p. 780, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102 , 441 P.2d 942 .) Finally, we find no merit in defendant's argument that Kerr's out-of-court statements should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. In People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 , this court held that the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecution to present the murder victim's statements that the defendant said he would kill her if she left him. ( Id . at p. 23, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 .) In Green , the victim's statements were relevant as circumstantial evidence that she was in fear of the defendant on the morning of the murder and would not have left with him willingly. We concluded, however, that the evidence was improperly admitted because the trial court failed to determine that the risk of undue prejudice from the evidence was outweighed by its probative value. ( Id . at p. 26, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 .) Although a trial judge need not expressly weigh prejudice against probative value-or even expressly state that he has done so ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612 , 656, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 ), here, the trial court specifically considered the prejudicial impact of the evidence in question and reasonably  determined that the prejudice was outweighed by the substantial probative value of the evidence with regard to the fear  element of the stalking charge. The court properly exercised its discretion and its ruling fell well within the bounds of reason. 2. Adequacy of the court's limiting instructions Defendant contends that even if Kerr's out-of-court statements were relevant to the fear element of the stalking charge, the court abused its discretion in admitting them, and their admission deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process, jury trial, and a reliable fact finding process, because the court's limiting instructions were not adequate to prevent the jury from using the evidence as proof of first degree premeditated murder. In defendant's view, it was impossible for the jury to have limited its consideration of Kerr's statements solely to the stalking charge, and he asserts that this evidence was used by the prosecution to convince the jury that he premeditated the murder. We need not resolve whether the court's limiting instructions did not sufficiently protect against the jury's improper use of Kerr's statements that she feared defendant. Even if the instructions were inadequate, the error was harmless under any standard of review because the evidence of premeditation, including defendant's own statements, was extremely strong. For example, several months before Kerr's death, defendant told his plumbing assistant Heiserman that he wanted to get Kerr off his mind by blowing up her car or setting it on fire. Defendant also told Heiserman, closer in time to the killing, that were Kerr to refuse to leave her family for him, he wouldn't be able to live with it or be able to see her, and again mentioned blowing up her car. Premeditation was further shown by strong circumstantial evidence, including the secluded location of Kerr's burning car and evidence showing that defendant poured accelerant over Kerr and the inside of her car, stuffed a burning rag into the gas tank and, when that did not ignite the accelerant, lit a rolled-up piece of paper on fire and threw it inside the car to set it ablaze.