Opinion ID: 1934346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: refusal to sequester sharon

Text: Next, Miller alleges error in the referee's refusal to sequester Sharon and in allowing her to be present throughout the testimony and to testify as a rebuttal witness. The exclusion or sequestration of a witness is within the discretion of the trial court, and a denial of a sequestration motion will not be overturned absent evidence of prejudice to the defendant. State v. Bautista, 193 Neb. 476, 227 N.W.2d 835 (1975). Referees in disciplinary proceedings have the same type of discretion in determining sequestration motions. The general rule provides that witnesses may be excluded upon a party's motion or by the court sua sponte. As noted in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Kellogg, 54 Neb. 138, 141, 74 N.W. 403, 404 (1898), sequestration of witnesses has long been a part of Nebraska law: We think the practice of causing unexamined witnesses, except those called as experts, to be sequestered so that they may not hear the testimony of the witness being examined is a good one, as it tends to elicit the truth and promote the ends of justice; but we also think that the decided weight of authority, as well as the doctrine of this court, is that whether the witnesses shall be so sequestered is a matter resting in the discretion of the trial court.... Miller points to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-615 (Reissue 1995) to support his claim that Sharon should have been excluded. Section 27-615 provides: At the request of a party the judge shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and he may make the order on his own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause. Miller argues that none of the exceptions apply. Further, he asserts that the refusal to sequester Sharon and then subsequently allowing her to testify as a rebuttal witness provided Sharon with the opportunity to fine tune her testimony and denied Miller the right to a fair hearing. We disagree. First, as noted in State v. Bautista, supra , Miller must show prejudice for this court to disturb the denial of a motion to sequester. Miller has failed to show prejudice. The initial hearing before the Committee on Inquiry revealed to Miller what Sharon's testimony would likely be at the referee's hearing. Sharon's testimony in both proceedings is substantially the same. Further, there is no evidence that her rebuttal testimony was fine tuned because of her presence during the hearing. Rather, the rebuttal was substantially a mere reiteration of Sharon's previous testimony. This does not constitute prejudice sufficient to find error in the referee's ruling. Additionally, Sharon falls within the § 27-615(3) exception as an essential witness, and therefore, the referee was correct in excepting her from the sequestration order. Although this court has never ruled on who is an essential witness in a disciplinary case, State v. Eynon, 197 Neb. 734, 250 N.W.2d 658 (1977), gives guidance. In State v. Eynon , this court affirmed the trial court's decision to allow the victim to remain in the courtroom during the prosecution of the defendant on the charge of burglary with intent to commit rape. We determined that the essential witness exception applied to the circumstance. Similarly, Sharon was an essential witness to this cause because she was Miller's client and was also the complaining witness in the instant cause.