Opinion ID: 790329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: MCC Phone Call Recording

Text: 69 Smith also challenges the trial court's ruling allowing the government to play the recording of a phone call that Smith made to his employer while he was in federal custody at the MCC. Smith telephoned his supervisor at the Illinois Department of Transportation to explain his sudden absence from work and told him that a relative from out of state had been murdered and that Smith had to retrieve the children and deal with DCFS because they were taking guardianship of the children. Smith also called his wife from the MCC and joked about the elaborate lie he told his boss. Consistent with MCC policy, the phone calls were recorded. The prosecution played the tape of Smith's call to his supervisor at the beginning of his cross-examination after the following colloquy: BY THE PROSECUTOR: 70 Q. Mr. Smith, you tell stories. You make things up on occasion. Correct? 71 A. As I'm sure everyone does. People make things up on occasion. Yes. 72 Q. Is that a yes, Mr. Smith? 73 A. Yes. 74 Q. And you do that, [sic] in many times, to get out of a jam, to get out of a bind. Correct? 75 A. No. 76 Q. You don't do it to get out of a jam? 77 A. No. Now, you said many times, sir. I'm saying no to many times. 78 Q. Mr. Smith, we'll start here. Have you ever made up stories to get out of a jam? 79 A. Yes. DEFENSE COUNSEL: 80 Judge, I'm going to object for lack of foundation. THE COURT: 81 Okay. The objection—the objection is overruled. BY THE PROSECUTOR: 82 Q. Have you, in fact, made up stories regarding your situation in this case to get out a jam, Mr. Smith? 83 A. No. 84 Q. Have you ever made up a story regarding your situation in this case to get out of a jam, Mr. Smith? 85 A. No. 86 Q. Now, Mr. Smith, after you were arrested in December of 1999, you placed several phone calls from the Metropolitan Correctional Center, didn't you? 87 A. Yes, I did. 88 Q. And you knew those calls were being recorded, didn't you? 89 A. No. I did not. 90 Q. You saw that big sign over the phone that told you that those calls were being recorded, didn't you, Mr. Smith? 91 A. The phone was in the middle of a desk, sir, and there was no sign there at all. 92 Q. Mr. Smith, one of the people you called was your wife. Correct? 93 A. Yes. 94 Q. And one of the stories you told was to your employer, isn't that correct, Mr. Smith? DEFENSE COUNSEL: 95 Objection. Foundation. THE COURT: 96 Overruled. BY THE WITNESS: 97 A. I'm not sure what you're talking about. BY THE PROSECUTOR: 98 Q. You're not sure what I'm talking about. Well, let me refresh your recollection. DEFENSE COUNSEL: 99 Judge, I've never received this. I've never heard it. May we take a break for me to hear it? 100 THE COURT: No. You can proceed. 101 Smith later moved unsuccessfully for a mistrial based on the playing of the tape and then objected unsuccessfully during the government's closing when the prosecutor argued that Smith's coercion defense was just another story he'd made up to get out of a jam. During rebuttal, the prosecutor likened Smith's defense to a made-for-TV-movie, and argued that his coercion story was strikingly similar to the same lie he told his boss. 102 Citing Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Smith asserts that the MCC tape was inadmissible extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct bearing on his character for truthfulness. Smith argues that playing the tape devastated his credibility, and that the only remedy was a mistrial because Smith's defense rested on his credibility. In response, the government maintains that the tape was admissible extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement under Fed.R.Evid. 613. The government also notes that even if the tape was inadmissible extrinsic evidence, Rule 608(b) does not bar questioning about the conduct, and Smith eventually admitted that he told this story to his employer. 103 We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 969 (7th Cir.2003). If we identify an error that amounts to an abuse of discretion and a timely objection to the error was raised at trial, we must determine if the error was harmless under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). If no timely objection was raised at trial, we review the error under the Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)'s plain error standard. Id. In the instant case, the government argues that the playing of the MCC tape should be reviewed for plain error because Smith's counsel failed to note the specific ground for her objection. In the context of this case, we disagree with the government's position. Smith's counsel objected twice for lack of foundation and then objected to the prosecutor's suggestion to refresh the witness' recollection with the tape by saying, Judge, I've never received this. I've never heard it. May we take a break for me to hear it? If the government actually wanted to use the tape to refresh Smith's recollection, the proper course would have been to play the tape for Smith outside the presence of the jury, and Smith's request to excuse the jury before playing the tape would have been appropriate. United States v. Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d 301, 303-04 (7th Cir.2003). But the record shows that the government used the tape to impugn Smith's credibility rather than refresh his recollection, which makes the prosecutor's refresh the recollection comment puzzling. Considering that Smith was in the dark about the contents of the tape and that he was led astray by the prosecutor's refresh the recollection foundation, we conclude that Smith's objection was sufficient and that any error is subject to harmless error review. Rule 608(b) provides, in relevant part: 104 (b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness .... 105 Although Rule 608(b) bars extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct bearing on a witness' character for truthfulness, the extrinsic evidence may still be admissible for another reason, such as impeachment for bias, contradiction, or prior inconsistent statement. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). The government argues that the tape was admissible because it was extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement. Under Rule 613(b), extrinsic evidence of a witness' prior inconsistent statement is admissible as long as the witness is given an opportunity to explain the statement and opposing counsel is afforded an opportunity to question the witness about it. 106 In some instances, it is difficult to distinguish between Rule 608(b) evidence and Rule 613(b) evidence. In this case, however, the government's attempt to characterize the MCC tape as Rule 613(b) evidence is unconvincing and would amount to an end-run around Rule 608(b)'s bar on extrinsic evidence. The First Circuit's discussion in United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548 (1st Cir.1999) helps clarify the distinction between these rules and illustrates why the government's position is without merit: 107 In our view, Rule 613(b) applies when two statements, one made at trial and one made previously, are irreconcilably at odds. In such an event, the cross-examiner is permitted to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence if necessary —not to demonstrate which of the two is true but, rather, to show that the two do not jibe (thus calling the declarant's credibility into question). In short, comparison and contradiction are the hallmarks of Rule 613(b).... In contrast, Rule 608(b) addresses situations in which a witness' prior activity, whether exemplified by conduct or by a statement, in and of itself casts significant doubt upon his veracity.... So viewed, Rule 608(b) applies to a statement, as long as the statement in and of itself stands as an independent means of impeachment without any need to compare it to contradictory trial testimony. 108 Id. at 558 (citations omitted). The force of the MCC phone call recording was not due to a comparison of Smith's statements on the tape and his equivocations at trial. Rather, Smith's elaborate lie to his supervisor, in and of itself, cast significant doubt on Smith's character for truthfulness. For this reason, the MCC tape falls squarely within the ambit of Rule 608(b), and it was error for the district court to allow the government to play the tape. 109 Nevertheless, we decline to reverse Smith's conviction because the error was harmless. United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 529 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that courts do not reverse convictions for evidentiary error unless the error had a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict). Smith, who was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics and the use of a telephone to facilitate the conspiracy, took the stand in his own defense, admitted that the government properly identified his voice on the phone call recordings and acknowledged that he dealt cocaine and crack with Allen from February 1998 until July 1998 (Allen was arrested in August 1998), but maintained that he was coerced into dealing drugs in February 1998 to pay off a debt to the Black Disciples. Even if the government had not played the MCC tape and the jury credited Smith's testimony that the Black Disciples pushed him back into drug dealing in February 1998 to pay off a debt, we think that his coercion defense is deficient as a matter of law. The government intercepted and recorded dozens of phone calls between Smith and Allen discussing drug transactions. Based on our review of the record, there is neither a hint of coercion on the tapes nor any discussion of payment of a debt to the Black Disciples (though Allen and Smith often discuss payment for drugs that Allen had fronted Smith). Instead, in the tapes played to the jury and interpreted by Allen, Smith arranges to purchase large quantities of cocaine and crack, Tr. 1035, bickers with Allen about the prices of the drugs, Tr. 1033-35, 1096, complains about the quality of the drugs, Tr. 1084-85, complains that he is losing business and profits because Allen cannot always deliver the cocaine when the customers want it, Tr. 1099-1100, 1106, and informs Allen that he was renting a house to open up shop there. Tr. 1080. On one occasion, Smith tells Allen that some of his customers claim that they were robbed and that he is holding the customers at gunpoint until they pay him. Tr. 1056-62. Although we do not foreclose the possibility of a viable coercion defense to federal narcotics charges, we are dubious of the defense in circumstances where the defendant engaged in numerous drug transactions over an extended period of time, accepted the proceeds from the drug sales, and made no effort to contact authorities or permanently flee the area. Even if Smith's initial step into the drug conspiracy in 1998 was not voluntary, the only reasonable conclusion supported by the evidence is that Smith persisted in the illegal activity after any immediate danger had passed and failed to permanently flee or seek protection despite having the opportunity to do so, and this dooms his coercion theory. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (Under any definition of these defenses [coercion/duress and necessity] one principle remains constant: if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law, `a chance both to refuse to do the criminal act and also to avoid the threatened harm,' the defenses will fail.). Consequently, we reject Smith's invitation to reverse his conviction on the basis of a Rule 608(b) error.