Opinion ID: 2647902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidentiary Exclusions

Text: During his case-in-chief at trial, Mr. Eller sought to admit a variety of documents that predated the alleged actionable misconduct in the present action. He was attempting to prove that Trans Union did not follow reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of its credit reports for Mr. Eller given previous errors in his credit reports. These documents included: (1) Exhibit 1—an allegedly inaccurate Trans Union credit report from 1999; (2) Exhibit 11—an allegedly inaccurate Trans Union credit report from February 2002; (3) Exhibit 12—an allegedly inaccurate Trans Union credit report from March 2002; (4) Exhibit 31—a letter from Mr. Eller’s prior counsel, Mr. Sola, to Trans Union’s counsel in September 2004 alleging that Trans Union had committed a number of FCRA violations; and (5) Exhibit 55—an excerpt of a letter from Mr. Eller’s prior counsel, Mr. McLain, to military authorities suggesting a connection between errors in Mr. Eller’s military records and his legal struggles with Trans Union. Trans Union objected to each of these five documents on the following grounds: Exhibit 1—relevance; Exhibits 11 and 12—relevance and authenticity; Exhibits 31 and -13- 55—authenticity and hearsay. The district court sustained Trans Union’s objections as to all five of these exhibits.4
We review the district court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. See Whittington v. Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 1000 (10th Cir. 2005). We will not reverse the district court’s evidentiary ruling “absent a distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment.” Id. (quoting Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995)). “Even if the trial judge ‘abused his or her discretion in making a decision to exclude evidence, we will overlook the error as harmless unless a party’s substantial right was affected.’” Perkins v. Silver Mountain Sports Club & Spa, LLC, 557 F.3d 1141, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1991)). 5 4 In all but the first instance, the district court did not specify the ground(s) on which it sustained Trans Union’s objections, as will be discussed in further detail below. 5 Trans Union argues that we should review the district court’s exclusion of these exhibits for plain error because Mr. Eller did not properly preserve the issue for appeal. Generally, a party may only appeal a district court’s exclusion of evidence if the error affects a substantial right of the party and the party “informs the court of [the evidence’s] substance by an offer of proof, unless the substance was apparent from the context.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). Trans Union contends Mr. Eller did not make a proper offer of proof “describ[ing] the evidence and what it tends to show” and “identify[ing] the grounds for admitting the evidence,” United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1241 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Aplee. Br. at 6. Continued . . . -14-
The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding any of the five exhibits at issue here. Exhibit 1 was properly excluded as cumulative evidence. The remaining four exhibits could properly be excluded on that same ground or on other, independently sufficient grounds.
Trans Union objected to Exhibit 1—Mr. Eller’s Trans Union credit report from 1999—on relevance grounds. The district court sustained Trans Union’s objection, noting that a credit report from thirteen years prior was not directly relevant to Mr. Eller’s claims in the present suit that Trans Union violated the law by reporting the NCO Financial account. Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 110. The court reassured Mr. Eller that he would be allowed to provide background information on the two prior lawsuits against Trans Union, id. at 111, and it invited Mr. Eller to prove his case “by other evidence that’s more directly tied to this lawsuit and the events giving rise to [his] claims in this ______________________________________ Cont. Mr. Eller responds that the substance of the exhibits at issue “was apparent from the context,” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2), because colloquies at trial revealed that the court was aware of the contents or nature of each of the exhibits at issue. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 1-3. Mindful of Mr. Eller’s pro se status at trial, we believe Mr. Eller made sufficient showings regarding the substance of the exhibits to preserve this issue for appeal. See, e.g., Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 110-11 (explaining the contents of Exhibit 1 and why he sought its admission). -15- lawsuit.” Id. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Exhibit 1 pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Rule 403 permits the trial court to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of various concerns, including “wasting time” and “needlessly preventing cumulative evidence.” Id.; see also United States v. Archuleta, __ F.3d __ (10th Cir. 2013). Although the 1999 credit report likely satisfied Rules 401 and 402, which permit evidence that has “any tendency” to make a fact of consequence “more or less probable” to be admitted unless otherwise excluded, the district court properly concluded that Rule 403 considerations weighed against its admissibility. See United States v. Mangiameli, 668 F.2d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he trial court, under Rule 403, may exclude otherwise admissible evidence after balancing its probative value against certain competing considerations set forth in the rule and concluding that the costs of the evidence outweigh its benefits.”). In particular, the district court noted that it was concerned with “wasting time”: “[W]e’ll be here for days if we’re going to go through every single credit report you had since 1999 going forward.” Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 111. Because Mr. Eller was given an opportunity to testify about his 1999 credit report and his long history of issues with Trans Union more generally, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by excluding Exhibit 1 as cumulative evidence.
The same reasoning compels us to uphold the district court’s decision to exclude -16- Exhibits 11 and 12 (the two 2002 credit reports). Trans Union objected to each on both relevance and authenticity grounds, and the district court sustained the objections without further comment. Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 124, 133. Although the district court did not specifically indicate the ground(s) on which it excluded these two exhibits, we may “affirm on any ground adequately supported by the record.” Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 950 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012). And like the 1999 credit report, both of the 2002 credit reports were within the district court’s discretion to exclude as cumulative and a waste of time. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.6
The district court acted within its discretion by excluding Exhibits 31 and 55 as well. Exhibit 31 was a composite exhibit (a compilation of documents) including a September 2004 letter from Mr. Eller’s prior counsel, Mr. Sola, to Trans Union’s prior counsel, describing Mr. Eller’s claims against Trans Union up to that date. Trans Union objected to Exhibit 31 as hearsay, hearsay within hearsay, inadmissible settlement communications, and irrelevant. Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 146; see Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802 (defining and rendering hearsay generally inadmissible); id. 805 (same for hearsay within 6 Exhibits 11 and 12 could also be excluded because Mr. Eller failed to properly authenticate them. Unlike Exhibit 1, which was a credit report originated by Trans Union, Exhibits 11 and 12 originated with Mr. Eller and included handwriting or correspondence by third parties. The record does not indicate that Mr. Eller authenticated these documents as required under Federal Rules of Evidence 901 and 902. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir. 1980) (noting that the proponent of documentary evidence must authenticate it sufficiently to support a finding that the document is what the proponent purports it is). -17- hearsay); id. 408(a) (settlement negotiations inadmissible). Exhibit 55, another composite exhibit, contained an excerpt from a memo by Mr. McLain, one of Mr. Eller’s former attorneys, to military authorities attempting to correct errors on Mr. Eller’s military record. Trans Union objected to this page of Exhibit 55 as inauthentic and hearsay. Aplt. Appx. Vol. II at 475-76. The district court sustained Trans Union’s objections to Exhibits 31 and 55 without specifying the ground(s) on which it relied to exclude them. Id. at 146, 476. We conclude that both letters were properly excluded as hearsay—out-of-court statements of declarants offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Mr. Eller has not raised any exception to the hearsay rule that would permit admission of these exhibits; instead, he argues that their admission was necessary because Mr. Sola and Mr. McLain were not permitted to testify, as will be explained below. But unavailability of the declarant, without more, does not suffice to overcome the general prohibition on hearsay. See id. 804(b) (listing narrow exceptions to hearsay rule when declarant is unavailable); id. 807 (residual exception applies only if demanding four-step test is satisfied). 7 7 In addition, as with Exhibits 11 and 12 above, Mr. Eller appears to have failed to authenticate Exhibits 31 and 55. See Fed. R. Evid. 901, 902; see also Amoco Prod. Co., 619 F.2d at 1391. -18- We further note that the same Rule 403 analysis that the district court performed on Exhibit 1 could apply to exclude these two exhibits as well because they constituted cumulative evidence of Mr. Eller’s longstanding difficulties with Trans Union.8 The district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding these exhibits.9