Opinion ID: 3039136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trademark Registration Claim

Text: In its counterclaim, Creamery sought an order from the district court directing the PTO (1) to cancel Smoker’s ribbondesign mark already registered in 1997, and (2) to refuse registration of Smoker’s word-only mark for “Tillamook Country Smoker,” for which Smoker applied in 1999. Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1119, permits district courts to resolve these subsidiary registration disputes when joined with an infringement claim. [13] Under § 2(d) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), the test for trademark registration uses the same “likelihood of confusion” standard as the test for trademark infringement. See Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 6 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:78. In granting summary judgment for Smoker, the district court ruled that Creamery had conclusively admitted during discovery that Smoker’s ribbon-design mark and its longstanding use of “Tillamook Country Smoker” did not create a “likelihood of confusion” with Creamery’s trademarks. Tillamook II, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 985. Creamery argues that the district court misconstrued its response to a request for admission. We agree with the district court. 17542 TILLAMOOK COUNTRY v. TILLAMOOK COUNTY
[14] Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to “serve upon any other party a written request for the admission . . . of the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) set forth in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or the application of law to fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). The effect of the admission is such that “[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established” unless the court grants a motion to waive or amend. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b).1 As the district court noted, the court and parties are bound by such admissions, which cannot be “ignored by the district court simply because it finds the evidence presented by the party against whom the admission operates more credible.” Tillamook II, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 984 (citation omitted). “Where the district court’s ruling rests solely on law and the facts are established or undisputed, review is de novo.” Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 394 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
The request for admission at issue reads: Request No. 79: [Creamery] alleges that [Smoker’s] activities between 1995 and 2000 violated [Creamery’s] rights in TIL- LAMOOK. Response: Objection, the term “[Smoker’s] activity” is vague and ambiguous. Moreover, Defendant is not aware of the full nature and extent of 1 Creamery has not moved to amend or withdraw the admission at issue. See Tillamook II, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 985. TILLAMOOK COUNTRY v. TILLAMOOK COUNTY 17543 [Smoker’s] activities between 1995 and 2000. Without waiving the foregoing objection and subject to the limitations of those objections: Defendant admits that [Smoker’s] activities began violating [Cream- ery’s] rights in the word TILLA- MOOK at some point in the latter part of the stated time period. (emphasis added). The district court construed Creamery’s response as a conclusive admission that Smoker’s ribbon-design mark and “Tillamook Country Smoker” word mark did not violate any of its trademark rights until 1997, which proves that there was no likelihood of confusion before that. Tillamook II, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 985. The district court held that this admission was fatal to Creamery’s registration claims. Id. Creamery, by contrast, frames this admission as an opinion on a matter of law; it says it was “a somewhat compressed statement of Creamery’s position on laches.” Creamery disclaims any admission of fact in the statement. The difficulty with Creamery’s position is that the request for admission includes an underlying admission of fact that traverses both its infringement and registration claims. In its response, Creamery admits that Smoker did not violate Creamery’s rights until the latter part of the 1995-2000 time period, which it later identified as 1997. A concession that there was no actionable infringement by Smoker prior to 1997 necessarily includes a concession that there was no “likelihood of confusion” from Smoker’s marketing prior to 1997. The latter automatically follows from the former because an actionable infringement claim has one element — a “likelihood of confusion.” 17544 TILLAMOOK COUNTRY v. TILLAMOOK COUNTY Creamery contends that this reasoning suffers from a logical fallacy, arguing that two marks may be “confusingly similar” and still not give rise to an actionable infringement claim (because, for instance, the marks were used in different geographic areas or markets). This misstates the test for infringement. “Confusion, or the likelihood of confusion, not competition, is the real test for trademark infringement.” Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added). Even in the case of non-competing goods, so long as “the reasonably prudent purchaser [is] likely to be confused” between the marks, the trademark owner has a right — and an obligation, in order to avoid laches — to bring an infringement claim. 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 24:1 (emphasis added). [15] Creamery’s response to Smoker’s request for admission was aimed at advancing Creamery’s position on laches, but at the same time, it cut the heart out of Creamery’s request to cancel the registration of Smoker’s “ribbon-design” mark and application to register the “Tillamook Country Smoker” word mark. Smoker used both marks extensively prior to 1997 and those usages, according to Creamery’s admission, did not create a likelihood of confusion with Creamery’s marks. The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Smoker with respect to the registration claims. AFFIRMED.