Opinion ID: 187075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Harmless Error Standard to the Facts of this Case

Text: As has already been indicated, the Magistrate was of the view that the NPS regulations imposed strict liability and proceeded on the basis that mens rea was not an element of the offense. Pursuant to this erroneous view of the law, the Magistrate Judge barred appellant from advancing a defense based on her lack of knowledge and intent. When Ms. Sheehan and other defendants attempted to proffer testimony about what they knew during the day of the demonstration, the prosecutor objected, arguing that intent was irrelevant, and the Magistrate Judge sustained the objections and expressly stated that intent was irrelevant. See, e.g., Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 103 (Testimony of Defendant Cindy Sheehan); Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 60-62 (Testimony of Defendant Manijeh Saba). Thus, as the record makes clear, the Magistrate Judge incorrectly ruled that the NPS regulations did not contain a mens rea requirement and then prevented appellant from advancing a defense on this element of the charged offense. In determining whether the Government has met its burden of demonstrating beyond a reasonable doubt that the error[s] complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained, Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, a reviewing court invariably considers whether (1) the case is not close, (2) the issue not central, or (3) effective steps were taken to mitigate the effects of the error. In re Sealed Case, 99 F.3d 1175, 1178 (D.C.Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, for example, an error will be found harmless under Chapman where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that [an] omitted element [of the charged offense] was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the . . . verdict would have been the same absent the error. Neder, 527 U.S. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. None of these caveats provides relief from the legal errors in the instant case. First, it surely cannot be said that the case is not close. Indeed, it is impossible to assess the weight of the evidence in this case, because appellant was prevented from advancing a defense on her knowledge and intent. The Magistrate Judge's erroneous legal premise might not have resulted in reversible error if appellant had been allowed to present a defense on her mens rea and the Government had been able to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the Magistrate Judge's failure to consider an element of the charged offense did not contribute to the verdict obtained. No such showing can be made here, because the Magistrate Judge would not allow appellant to testify on her knowledge and intent. Second, appellant's intent is undoubtedly a central issue in this case, because, as the Government now concedes, mens rea is an element of the charged offense. And, finally, no steps were taken to mitigate the effects of the Magistrate Judge's error. The verdict was not rendered by a jury, so no jury instructions or other steps were readily available to lessen the gravity of the erroneous legal conclusion drawn by the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge was of a clear mind that mens rea was not an element of the offense and he conducted the trial and reached his judgment accordingly. At the conclusion of the Government's case, appellant's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the Government had failed to prove that appellant or her codefendants had notice that they were violating the law. Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 47; see also id. at 44-47. The motion was denied, undoubtedly because the Magistrate Judge viewed the NPS regulations as imposing strict liability. In its arguments to this court, the Government attempted to minimize the effect of the trial errors by noting that appellant was asked at one point by the prosecutor whether she had a permit, and she responded that she didn't know that [she] needed a permit. Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 110. It is unclear whether this statement by appellant was intended as sarcasm, but it does not matter because the statement does not give evidence of appellant's intent or knowledge. Because of the Magistrate Judge's ruling, appellant was never, allowed to testify about her intent and knowledge on the day in question. Thus, there is no evidence in the record indicating, inter alia, (1) whether appellant heard the police officer's bullhorn announcements and, if she did hear them, what she reasonably understood from them; (2) whether she knew that the original permit would have allowed the protestors to demonstrate on the White House sidewalk; and (3) whether she knew that the demonstration leaders had changed the permit just a few days before September 26, 2005, such that the permit no longer included the White House sidewalk as an acceptable place for demonstrating. The. Magistrate Judge's written opinion occasionally refers to the intent of the demonstrators to engage in civil disobedience. See, e.g., Allen, Mag.Crim. No. 05-00649 at 10. But these references are merely rhetorical, at least insofar as they relate to appellant, because she was not allowed to offer any testimony about her knowledge and intent regarding the charge of demonstrating without a permit. When, as happened in this case, a defendant is prevented from offering crucial evidence in her own defense, it can hardly be concluded that the trial errors are harmless. Error cannot be harmless where it prevents the defendant from providing an evidentiary basis for his defense. United States v. Saenz, 179 F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that where a trial court mistakenly ruled as a matter of law that certain evidence relating to the defendant's self-defense claim was inadmissible, the error was not harmless); United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that erroneously excluding testimony that supported appellant's defense was not harmless error because the defense went to the core of the prosecution's case); cf. United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647, 653-55 (D.C.Cir.1994) (finding reversible error where the trial judge had erroneously excluded testimony critical to the appellant's defense). During oral argument, Government counsel argued that the Supreme Court's holding in. Neder supports a finding of harmless error in this case. We disagree, because the circumstances in Neder are quite different from appellant's case. In Neder, the defendant was convicted of filing false federal income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the element of materiality with regard to the tax and bank fraud charges was a question for the judge, not the jury, and found that the evidence established that element. The Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court's failure to submit the materiality element of the tax offense to the jury was error, but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed on these points. However, Neder is distinguishable from the case before us. In Neder, the district court did not prevent the defendant from adducing evidence on the disputed issue of materiality. The defendant was heard on the issue. The trial judge's error was in deciding the issue, rather than presenting it to the jury. 527 U.S. at 6-7, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Moreover, the defendant in Neder did not contest the issue of materiality. Id. at 15, 119 S.Ct, 1827. On this record, the Neder Court concluded that it was beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. Id. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. It is clear that, despite the Court's holding that a trial error concerning the omission of an element of a charged offense can be subject to harmless error review, Neder does not control this case. Unlike the defendant in Neder, Ms. Sheehan sought to present evidence on the critical element of the charged offense, but the Magistrate Judge barred the introduction of the evidence when the prosecutor objected to its admission. The trial judge in Neder misperceived the law, but he did not eliminate the prosecutor's burden of proving an element of the charged offense or bar the defendant from presenting a defense on that issue. Given these differences between Neder and the instant case, and in consideration of the record here, we cannot hold that the Government has met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Magistrate Judge's failure to consider an element of the charged offense did not contribute to the verdict obtained. In light of our holding that appellant was denied an opportunity to present a defense to an element of the offense, we are unable to determine whether appellant was in fact demonstrating on the day in question. Nor can we determine whether the police officer's bullhorn announcements gave appellant notice that she was demonstrating on the White House sidewalk without a valid permit. These matters can be addressed if and when appellant is retried for the alleged offense that gave rise to her prosecution in this case.