Opinion ID: 1984448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right to impartial, unbiased trier of fact

Text: In announcing its verdict, the trial court, apparently using standard jury instructions as a guide, addressed the defendant on matters concerning the applicable law, the burden of the State, reasonable doubt, the weighing of evidence, circumstantial evidence, credibility of witnesses, and other matters which the trial court described as the basic rules which apply to criminal cases. From these observations, reported in eight pages of the transcript, Olmstead quotes, out of context, the following: The Court is of this opinion that this evidence can be reconciled in part. It can be reconciled by accepting the testimony of the defendant's wife and corroborating witnesses as to the defendant being at the coffee house on the night of June 27, 1975. It cannot be reconciled as to the time factor. It's the Court's opinion that testimony as to going out to the carnival to witness for the Lord after 12:15 a.m. is incredible and defies common sense beyond good judgment. At one point in the statement, before making the above comment, the trial court had stated: An instruction which certainly has great importance in this case relates to weight and credibility of testimony given by witnesses. The jury or the Judge in this case is the judge of all questions of fact. The jury or the Judge alone must weigh the evidence under these instructions and determine the credibility of those who have testified. And in performing this task the jury or the Judge may consider those facts and circumstances in the case which tend to strengthen, weaken or contradict one's testimony. The jury or the Judge may consider the age, intelligence and experience of the witness, the strength or weakness of his recollection, how he came to know the facts to which he testified, his possible interest in the outcome of the trial, any bias or prejudice he may have, his manner and appearance, and whether he was frank or evasive while testifying, and whether his testimony is reasonable or unreasonable. If it's found that there is a conflict in the evidence, the Judge or the jury should reconcile it, if it's possible, because each witness is presumed to have told the truth. If this cannot be done, the jury or the Judge has the right to determine whom of the witnesses he will believe in whole or in part. And I believe this should be emphasized, that the jury or the Judge should give credible testimony its just and fair weight and should consider the evidence in the case in the light of his common sense and ordinary experience and observation of human affairs. If the Jury or the Judge concludes that a witness has knowingly testified falsely concerning any material matter, he has the right to distrust such witness's testimony in other particulars and may reject all the testimony of that witness and give it such weight and credibility as he thinks it deserves. The test is not which side produces the greater number of witnesses or presents the greater quantity of evidence, but rather which testimony and what evidence convinces the jury or the Judge as being more accurate and otherwise trustworthy. The court then discussed specific items of testimony, such as that of the complainant, evaluating its consistency and credibility, and pointed out some inconsistencies. In commenting on the testimony of alibi witnesses for the defense, the court likewise pointed out consistencies and inconsistencies and, immediately before making the observation which Olmstead finds objectionable, said: The Court, if there is a conflict in the evidence, which is obvious, it must be reconciled if possible because each witness is presumed to have told the truth. If it cannot be reconciled, the Judge has the right to determine whom he will believe in whole or in part. Immediately after the remarks which Olmstead says prove religious bias, the trial court said: Carrying that a step further if there was any witnessing done for the Lord out at the carnival setting that evening, the only reconciliation that is reasonable is that such time for the defendant and his wife to return to their apartment. The defendant's wife testified he left the apartment and the witness Sissy Williams, I believe, testified that he came to her apartment and knocked on the door about 1:30 that morning of June 28th and that he stayed there a half an hour and the Court asked her specifically what was the urgency of his visit. She said to tell her to pray for some homosexual and for someone who was deadly ill from cancer and this witness Williams had met this woman only very briefly on one occasion. It appears to the Court that this was an attempt on the part of the defendant to establish an alibi and to account for his time. Olmstead argues that a fair reading of the remarks of the trial court indicates that the sole basis for discounting the defense testimony was the court's unwillingness to accept the religious practices of these witnesses. Counsel for Olmstead acknowledged, during oral argument before this Court, that the court could have validly said, the testimony is not credible, but he argues that, in effect, the trial judge said, I don't believe that it is good religious practice to witness for the Lord at a carnival between 12:30 and 1:00 o'clock in the morning. We do not read the comment in that manner. If alibi testimony which involves a religious activity must be believed, few convictions could occurit would be everyone's alibi. We readily acknowledge that trial before an unbiased judge is essential to due process [ Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 (1971)], and that this means that courts should avoid even an appearance of bias [ Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 (1972)]. See, also, Canons 1, 2 and 3, Code of Judicial Conduct, and State v. Weippert, 237 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1975). Section 4 of the Constitution of North Dakota provides: The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall be forever guaranteed in this state, and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness or juror on account of his opinion on matters of religious belief; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state. Article I of the Amendments to the United States Constitution provides: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Article XIV of the Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibits states from doing those things which Article I prohibits Congress from doing. An alibi is a recognized, valid defense in this State. State v. Lyon, 59 N.D. 374, 230 N.W. 1 (1930); State v. Gates, 51 N.D. 695, 200 N.W. 778 (1924); State v. Nelson, 17 N.D. 13, 114 N.W. 478 (1908). See, also, Rule 12.1, NDRCrimP. In 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial, § 733, it is stated: In general, the defense of alibi is not one requiring that the evidence given in support of it be scrutinized otherwise or differently from that given in support of any other issue in the case, ... Olmstead presents the novel argument that because his alibi placed him away from the scene of the crime, witnessing for the Lord, the trial court's comment of disbelief of the testimony displays religious bias. When considering all of the comments by the trial court, including the remark, It's the Court's opinion that testimony as to going out to the carnival to witness for the Lord after 12:15 a.m. is incredible and defies common sense beyond good judgment, we conclude that no religious bias was displayed. The descriptive phrase as to going out to the carnival to witness for the Lord after 12:15 a.m. identifies which testimony the court found to be incredible and which defied common sense beyond good judgment. It does not explain why it was deemed incredible. It may have been the demeanor of those who testified, or the inconsistencies, or the unusual total recall of certain events and exact times of occurrences from a remote and insignificant time in the past. We do not attribute a bad motive to a remark by an experienced, capable trial judge, made at the conclusion of a difficult trial during which he displayed complete fairness. The statement was, at most, undiplomatic. See State v. Weippert, 237 N.W.2d 1 (N.D.1975). The purpose of reviewing a judgment in a criminal action is not to determine whether the record is perfect, but to determine whether the defendant has had a fair trial under the law and whether his conviction is based upon evidence establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55, 64 (N.D.1967). See, also, State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154, 162 (N.D.1975); State v. Iverson, 187 N.W.2d 1, 44 (N.D.1971); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). No violation of Section 4 of the North Dakota Constitution or Articles I and XIV of the Amendments to the United States Constitution has been shown. Cases (primarily from Michigan [2] ) cited by Olmstead, or discovered by this Court, involving the questioning of witnesses about their religion, have no bearing upon the issue before us.