Opinion ID: 2296532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Points 5 through 12, inclusive:

Text: The ultimate issue, is whether the Committee is empowered to establish regulations which impose salary sanctions for substandard teaching performance, or is faced with the alternative of accepting such performance, or instituting dismissal proceedings under the statute. [2] It is implicit that the authority of the Superintendent and Committee covers the employment of teachers and determination of their salary, limited only by the funds annually appropriated by the respective cities and towns for school purposes, [3] and since July 1, 1958 (Chapter 364 P.L. 1957) affected by the minimum salary schedule fixed by state law. [4] It is implicit also that a Committee charged with the management of the schools among the ten areas of responsibility delegated by 20 M.R.S.A. § 473, one paragraph of which appears in Footnote 2, has the power to adopt reasonable regulations and indeed the statute (Footnote 1) presupposes that salary policies are to be included in such regulations. At the outset let plaintiff's contention that he had a vested right in the statutory minimum salary for the second year of his tenure contract be laid to rest. The law does not permit that contention. The contractual relation between Teacher and Town was fixed by 2 documents,the continuing (tenure) contract and the annual salary agreement. The funds with which the school system operates are determined and made available annually. The Committee has no power to secure or to commit funds beyond the amount appropriated annually by the city or town involved. As this opinion is being written the inhabitants of the respective towns throughout the state in their annual meetings assembled are debating, approving, disapproving, the budgets submitted for school purposes. The Committees have no funds with which to operate schools and hire teachers until the electors have spoken. The annual salary agreement, separate from the tenure contract emphasizes this reality. A teacher's right to salary becomes vested only upon performance under his salary contract until payment becomes due. Our statutes dictate this and other jurisdictions have passed upon comparable situations. See Greenway v. Board of Education of City of Camden (1943) 129 N.J.L. 461, 29 A.2d 890, 145 A.L.R. 404 and Smith v. School District of Philadelphia et al. (Pa.1939) 334 Pa. 197, 5 A.2d 535, [7, 8] 538. The tenure contract protects his teaching position, free from political and personal arbitrary interference, whereby capable and competent teachers may feel professionally secure ( Smith, supra, [7, 8] 539), but by virtue of the fiscal relationship between a town and its Committee the tenure contract does not and cannot guarantee an unalterable rate of pay. Teacher must look to the annual salary contract for protection in that area. The permanency of tenure given by the legislature    carries with it no assurance against changes in salary reasonably exercised. 47 Am.Jur., Schools, § 135, and Kacsur v. Board of Trustees of South Whittier Elementary School District et al. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 586, 116 P.2d 593, [1-6] 596. Teacher's tenure contract promised him salary in accordance with the salary schedule. Included within the salary schedule was the sanction imposable for sub-standard performance. The Committee's regulatory power authorized such sanction, limited only by the Constitutional requirement of reason, good faith, and absence of discrimination and arbitrariness. Such regulations in effect at the date of the making or renewal of a teacher's contract of employment, are integral parts of it. Rible v. Hughes (1944) 24 Cal.2d 437, 150 P.2d 455, [1] 458, 154 A.L.R. 137. The good faith of the Committee is not challenged. A differential in salaries,   , based solely upon differences in individual attainments and worth is not repugnant to the 14th Amendment. Morris v. Williams (CA Eighth Circuit, 1945) 149 F.2d 703, [9] 708. See also Rible, supra, [7, 8] 459, Board of School Trustees, School City of Peru et al v. Moore (1941) 218 Ind. 386, 33 N.E.2d 114, [5-7] 117, 133 A.L.R. 1431, and Richards v. Board of Education of Township High School District No. 201 (1960) 21 Ill.2d 104, 171 N.E.2d 37, [4-6] 41, [8-9] 42. Appeal sustained. WILLIAMSON, C. J., did not sit.