Opinion ID: 1060373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 30

Heading: Whether Aggravator (i)(4) Violates State v. Middlebrooks

Text: The Appellant was found guilty of accessory before the fact to first degree murder. An accessory before the fact is [a]ny person who shall feloniously move, incite, counsel, hire, command, or procure any other person to commit a felony. . . . TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-107. In imposing a sentence of death in this case, the jury found that [t]he defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration. TENN.CODE ANN. 39-2404(i)(4). The Appellant now contends that the evidence used to convict him as an accessory before the fact to first degree murder duplicated that used to support the aggravating factor in TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2404(i)(4) (employing another to commit the murder for the promise of remuneration). Relying upon State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992), the Appellant asserts that the duplication of facts to support both the conviction and sentence does not achieve the constitutionally required narrowing of death eligible defendants. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (aggravating factor must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder). In State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 346, our supreme court held that, when a defendant is convicted of felony murder, the aggravating circumstance set out in TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(7)(murder committed while committing certain enumerated felonies) does not narrow the class of death eligible murderers sufficiently under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution because it duplicates the elements of the offense. See State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679, 692 (Tenn.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 941, 118 S.Ct. 2348, 141 L.Ed.2d 718 (1998). The court reasoned that all participants in a felony murder, regardless of the degree of culpability, enter the sentencing stage of the trial with at least one aggravating factor against them because the aggravating factor duplicates the elements of the offense. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d at 343 (quotation omitted). The Appellant applies this same analysis to the (i)(4) aggravating factor when the conviction is based upon accessory before the fact. The State acknowledges that this court, in the Appellant's fourth petition for post-conviction relief, rejected this identical issue and argues that, although not the law of the case, this court should apply the same analysis in this direct appeal. See Richard H. Austin v. State, No. 02C01-9310-CR-00238 1995 WL 263930 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Jackson, May 3, 1995), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Nov. 6, 1995). The Appellant responds that this court misapplied the supreme court's decision in State v. Stephenson in determining that the Appellant had no Middlebrooks issue. Specifically, he asserts that the Stephenson analysis is not germane to the present issue because the Stephenson court based its decision on the criminal responsibility statute, a different underlying statute than this court is faced with today. After re-examination of the issue, we remain convinced that our previous rationale is correct and the same analysis applies. In State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 557, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder by employing another to kill his wife. Stephenson's conviction was based on his role in the killing under the criminal responsibility statute, TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2) (1991), and the death sentence was based solely on the aggravating factor involving murder for remuneration or promise of remuneration. TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(4) (1991). The defendant claimed that the constitutionally required narrowing of death eligible offenders was not achieved because of the duplication of facts to support the conviction and the death sentence. Our supreme court disagreed, noting that the defendant stood convicted of first degree premeditated murder, which is defined as an intentional, premeditated and deliberate killing of another. TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1991). The conviction was based on the criminal responsibility statute, TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-11-402(2), which provides: A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if: Acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceeds or results of the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. . . . The supreme court concluded that the statutory aggravating circumstance found by the jury is a proper narrowing device because it provides a `principled way in which to distinguish' the cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. . . . Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 557. The court reasoned: The aggravating circumstance-the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration-does not duplicate the elements of the offense, even incorporating the criminal responsibility statutes. Constitutional narrowing is accomplished because at the sentencing hearing, the State was required to prove that this defendant hired someone to kill his wife, or promised to pay someone to kill his wife. Obviously, not every defendant who is guilty of first-degree murder pursuant to the criminal responsibility statutes has also hired another or promised to pay another to commit the murder. Thus, the aggravating circumstance found by the jury in this case narrows the class of death-eligible defendants as required by State v. Middlebrooks, supra . Id. at 557 (emphasis added). As noted in this court's decision in Richard H. Austin v. State, No. 02C01-9310-CR-00238, 1995 WL 263930, the Appellant's conviction was premised on a theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, although not expressly designated as such at the time. [12] Specifically, the Appellant was convicted of accessory before the fact to first degree murder. An accessory before the fact is [a]ny person who shall feloniously move, incite, counsel, hire, command, or procure any other person to commit a felony. . . . TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-107. Applying the Stephenson rationale, not every person who is convicted as an accessory before the fact to first degree murder has also hired another or promised to pay another to commit the murder. [13] Accordingly, as in Stephenson, we conclude that the aggravating factor enumerated in TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-2404(i)(4) achieves the constitutionally required narrowing of death eligible defendants even where the conviction is based on the defendant's role as an accessory before the fact. See Owens v. State, 13 S.W.3d 742, 764-765 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 846, 121 S.Ct. 116, 148 L.Ed.2d 73 (2000). For these reasons, the Appellant is denied relief on this claim.