Opinion ID: 4486866
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: Although the Iowa Code no longer permits claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to be decided on direct appeal, see 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 31 (to be codified at Iowa Code § 814.7 (2020)), we held in State v. Macke that this provision “do[es] not apply to a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before July 1, 2019.” 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019). Because the judgment and sentence here were entered before July 1, 2019, we are not foreclosed from considering Kuhse’s claim of ineffective assistance. “Thus, we will decide whether the appellate record is adequate to determine the claim. If not, the claim will be preserved for postconviction relief.” State v. Brothern, 832 N.W.2d 187, 192 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). If the record is adequate, we review Kuhse’s claim of ineffective assistance for failing to object to the marshaling jury instruction de novo. See State v. Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182, 185–86 (Iowa 2017). III. Was Trial Counsel Ineffective for Failing to Object to the Marshaling Instruction that Did Not Mention the State Needed to Prove the Act Was Done Without Justification? In Iowa, the term “justification” appears in the statutory definition of the crime of assault. That is, “[a] person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following . . . .” Iowa Code § 708.1(2). Yet the Iowa State Bar Association’s model instruction for assault omits this language. See Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 800.1 (2018). In State v. Delay, we clarified that “justification is an affirmative defense rather than an element of that crime.” 320 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1982). We elaborated, “It is unreasonable to think that the legislature intended to place upon the State the burden of laboriously disproving each of those forms of justification in every 9 prosecution for assault, no matter how unrelated to the facts of the case they may be.” Id. at 834. As with any affirmative defense, the district court must instruct the jury on justification if substantial evidence supports the theory. Id. at 835. The defendant bears the initial burden of producing sufficient evidence to support the instruction. Id. at 834. Once that threshold is met, the burden shifts to the State to prove lack of justification beyond a reasonable doubt. The constitutions of the United States and Iowa guarantee a criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. In order to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) that prejudice resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064– 65 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141–42, 145 (Iowa 2001) (en banc). To prove counsel failed to perform an essential duty, the defendant “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” meaning counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The court determines “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.” Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; see Nguyen v. State, 878 N.W.2d 744, 752 (Iowa 2016). The crux of the prejudice component rests on whether the defendant has shown “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 10 2068; see State v. Lorenzo Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2019) (finding that even where there was outdated language within the jury instruction, the defendant could not show prejudice due to the overwhelming evidence against him). To establish prejudice in the context of an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. A defendant must show the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. This standard requires us to consider the totality of the evidence, identify what factual findings would have been affected, and determine if the error was pervasive or isolated and trivial. State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 557–59 (Iowa 2015) (citations omitted) (deciding there was no ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to object to an instruction that told the jury not to consider lesser included offenses until it had acquitted the defendant of the greater offense). “Jury instructions are not considered separately; they should be considered as a whole.” State v. Fintel, 689 N.W.2d 95, 104 (Iowa 2004). In Fintel, the defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to three instructions as prejudicial misstatements of the law. Id. at 103. He contended those instructions improperly directed the jury “to determine his guilt or innocence.” Id. (emphasis added). We concluded that because two other instructions both explained that the State had the burden to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and defined reasonable doubt, the defendant was not prejudiced and counsel was not ineffective. Id. at 103–04. We recently emphasized how the applicable standards differ depending on whether claimed error in jury instructions is preserved or raised by way of ineffective assistance. See Lorenzo Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 11 at 871–72. A “presumed-prejudice standard applies to preserved errors in jury instructions.” Id. at 871. However, “an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim based on failure to preserve jury instruction error must demonstrate deficiency and prejudice.” Id. at 871–72. We have at times found ineffective assistance of counsel when an element of an offense was omitted from a marshaling instruction. An example is Harris, 891 N.W.2d 182. In Harris, the defendant exited a bar and then struck an individual outside the bar multiples times with a knife. Id. at 184. He was convicted of going armed with intent. Id. at 185. The marshaling instruction, however, “did not include the element of going or moving with specific intent to use [the knife] against [the victim].” Id. The defendant argued his counsel’s failure to object to this omission amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. In our decision, we acknowledged that “[a] reasonable fact finder could find Harris carried the knife as he moved from inside the bar to the outdoors where he attacked [the victim].” Id. at 187. But this of course did not resolve the issue before us. See id. at 187–89. We noted that the existence of substantial evidence to support a finding of movement “does not control our determination of whether prejudice flowed from the flawed marshalling instruction.” Id. at 189. As we explained, “[W]e must apply the familiar prejudice framework prescribed for ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims.” Id. at 188. “Upon review of the record,” we concluded that “our confidence in the jury verdict is undermined because the evidence of Harris’s movement was not great and the flawed jury instruction did not require the jury to make a finding on that element of the crime.” Id. at 189. Harris illustrates that even when a marshaling instruction omits a required element of a crime, a particularized review of the record is needed 12 to determine whether counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the omission. Harris is consistent with prior law. In State v. Propps, we held that counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the omission of a knowledge element from a marshaling instruction covering the crime of false use of a financial instrument. 376 N.W.2d 619, 623 (Iowa 1985). We noted, “The State does not contend the instruction, as it related to knowledge, was proper.” Id. Yet we concluded, “The State is on firm ground in arguing the defendant has shown no prejudice.” Id. Among other things, we pointed out that “the instructions elsewhere supplied the missing element.” Id. In State v. Douglas, we found that counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the court’s felony-murder instructions. 485 N.W.2d 619, 621–22 (Iowa 1992). There the defendant, who suffered from epilepsy, raised diminished responsibility as a defense to both first-degree murder alternatives—premeditated murder and felony murder. Id. We discussed what had happened at trial: The trial court submitted an instruction on diminished responsibility on the issue of specific intent to kill [the victim]. As an alternative to this charge of first-degree murder, the court instructed that defendant could be convicted of firstdegree murder if, as an element thereof, he was participating in the offense of first-degree robbery or attempted murder. This alternative did not include an instruction on specific intent or diminished responsibility. Douglas claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to these omissions in instructing on alternative B. Id. Yet we found no ineffective assistance for two reasons. First, the defendant’s expert testimony “belie[d] the suggestion of a nexus between [the defendant’s] acts and his condition of epilepsy.” Id. at 622. Second, the defendant “received the benefit of this defense [diminished capacity] through other instructions by the court.” Id. 13 Likewise, in State v. Heacock, the defendant contended that the marshaling instruction for child endangerment with serious injury was missing a specific intent element. 521 N.W.2d 707, 709 (Iowa 1994). We rejected the claim: We need not resolve the conflicting contentions, even assuming error in the challenged marshaling instruction. For reasons that follow we think Heacock has failed in his burden of showing a different result was probable if the instruction had been worded in accordance with his present theory. Had it been preserved by objection, Heacock’s claimed error may have demanded reversal. But error was not preserved and the fundamental rule is that it was therefore waived. Id. at 709–10. In sum, under cases like Harris, Propps, Douglas, and Heacock, ineffective assistance of counsel does not necessarily occur when defense counsel fails to object that a marshaling instruction does not refer to a required element of a defense—or cross-reference a defense that the State is required to disprove. Instead, one must examine the record and consider the evidence presented, how the case was tried, and what the jury instructions as a whole said. In this case the jury received twenty-seven jury instructions in total. The first eight and the last eight were standard criminal-case instructions. In between, instructions nine through eleven covered the offense charged and lesser included offenses. Instructions twelve through nineteen covered the justification defense. Instruction twelve on justification concluded with the following stand-alone sentence: “The State must prove the Defendant was not acting with justification.” Under these circumstances, we do not share the court of appeals’ concern that “[t]he jurors may well have believed their work was done once they found the State satisfied the elements in the marshaling instruction.” 14 Both sides made justification a focal point of their closing arguments. This helped confirm for the jury that justification was an essential part of its deliberations and that the State had to prove “the Defendant was not acting with justification.” In any event, there was strong evidence that Kuhse did not act with justification. Photographs of V.P.’s and Kuhse’s injuries were admitted at trial. According to the photographs, V.P.’s injuries were much more significant than Kuhse’s. Also, the photographic images matched her testimony. There were multiple fresh abrasions to her neck, elbow, arm, and knee. Meanwhile, the Kuhse photographs showed only a scratch on his nose. There is more. Kuhse’s claim, as relayed through police officer testimony, that V.P. was “bumping into him” and “throwing herself onto his arm” seems implausible. It does not explain her significant neck injuries. By contrast, V.P.’s testimony that she was “swiping at” Kuhse to stop him from strangling her easily accounts for the scratch on his nose. Furthermore, the jury could readily observe the gap in size between V.P. and Kuhse. V.P. was five feet, two inches and 105 pounds; Kuhse was five feet, nine inches and 190 pounds. Also undermining Kuhse’s claim of selfdefense is that V.P. was by herself in the basement while Kuhse had his drinking buddies down there with him. 2 Viewing the instructions and the trial record as a whole, we do not see a reasonable probability of a different outcome if the marshaling instruction on domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury had included or cross-referenced lack of justification. Because we find that Kuhse cannot establish Strickland prejudice, we do not reach the question whether his counsel breached an essential duty. 2Neither of these individuals testified at trial. 15