Opinion ID: 71480
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Use of United States v. Alli

Text: Harris also argues that the district court erred in relying on the First Circuit case of United States v. Alli. 444 F.3d at 34. The district court cited that case as support for the proposition that, because Harris gave account information to other people, including her codefendant [ sic ], Keasha Turner, the aggregate credit limit of the accounts she compromised was the proper measure of her intended loss, since she had no control over the amount of charges [these] other people made to the victim's [ sic ] accounts. Harris argues that the district court's reliance on Alli was improper, because the facts of Alli involved no actual loss, and because the First Circuit declined to follow what it viewed as the law of this circuit in reaching its holding. In Alli, the First Circuit held that a defendant's `intended loss' includes `losses that might naturally and probably flow from' his unlawful conduct and therefore that a defendant who sold (or intended to sell) cards to a third party without making any charges himself could be held to have intended to inflict the loss of their aggregate limit. 444 F.3d at 38 (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1997)). In reaching this holding, the panel rejected our requirement that a sentencing court's intended loss calculation be based on actual, not constructive, intent. Id. (citing Morrow, 177 F.3d at 301). We do not need to decide whether the First Circuit's examination of losses that might naturally and probably flow from a defendant's conduct is equivalent to our examination of what property was recklessly jeopardized. We also do not need to determine whether Alli 's holding relied upon the fact that there was no actual loss inflicted in Alli. These inquiries are irrelevant, because the record reflects that the district court cited Alli to support the proposition that, generally, a defendant who transfers stolen property to a third party whom he does not control recklessly jeopardizes the face value of that property. This proposition is amply supported by our case law. See, e.g., Morrow, 177 F.3d at 300-01; Sowels, 998 F.2d at 251. Therefore, the district court did not err by referring to Alli to support it.