Opinion ID: 619103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reverse-Batson Challenge

Text: [T]he Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348. [T]he prosecution has standing to assert the equal protection rights of excluded jurors. United States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1372 (5th Cir. 1993). Because Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), involved a defendant challenging the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges, the same type of challenge by the prosecution is called a reverse- Batson  challenge. Whether a criminal defendant or the prosecution challenges the other's use of peremptory challenges, the same three-step analytical process is applied by the district court: First, the claimant must make a prima facie showing that the peremptory challenges have been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if this requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party accused of discrimination to articulate race-neutral explanations for the peremptory challenges. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the claimant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d at 1373 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348).
The district court's determination that a party has used peremptory strikes in a discriminatory manner is a finding of fact and thus cannot be overturned by this Court absent clear error. Id. at 1372 (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365-66, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). A district court's finding is clearly erroneous if, on the entire evidence, [this Court is] left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir.2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court's determination is entitled to great deference, since findings in this context largely turn on an evaluation of the credibility or demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d at 1373 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S.Ct. 1859).
As a preliminary matter, Dalton and Miller argue that the Batson line of cases ought not even apply here. Their argument is that discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause is impossible where black defendants strike white prospective jurors who are replaced by other white prospective jurors, because no race is favored over any other race. Dalton further argues that Batson should not apply to this case because a white prospective juror's right to serve on a jury is outweighed by the superior fair trial right of a minority class defendant to use his allotted share of peremptory challenges not only to increase the chance of obtaining more members of his or her race on the jury but to also select freely among the majority members that necessarily will serve on his or her jury. Br. of Dalton Bennett at 18-19. In Batson, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant. 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The McCollum Court extended Batson 's prohibition on racially motivated peremptory challenges to defendants, explaining that  Batson was designed to serve multiple ends, only one of which was to protect individual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors. 505 U.S. at 48, 112 S.Ct. 2348 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). McCollum 's extension of Batson was designed to remedy the harm done to the dignity of persons and to the integrity of the courts. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). McCollum vindicated the dignity of persons because denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race unconstitutionally discriminates against the excluded juror. Id. McCollum also vindicated the integrity of the courts because [j]ust as public confidence in criminal justice is undermined by a conviction in a trial where racial discrimination has occurred in jury selection, so is public confidence undermined where a defendant, assisted by racially discriminatory peremptory strikes, obtains an acquittal. Id. at 50, 112 S.Ct. 2348. Dalton and Miller correctly point out that Batson and McCollum both involved the use of peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors, and that neither the Supreme Court [3] nor the Fifth Circuit has squarely held that Batson and its progeny prohibit a black defendant from striking a white prospective juror based on the juror's race. This court has, however, assumed without raising the issue that black defendants' attempts to remove white prospective jurors based on their race implicated Batson and McCollum. See United States v. Dillard, 354 Fed.Appx. 852, 856-57 (5th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's use of the three-step Batson analysis to determine whether black defendant who had used eight of nine peremptory challenges on white jurors had violated Batson and McCollum ); United States v. Bailey, 92 Fed.Appx. 99, 99 (5th Cir.2004) (affirming district court's conclusion that black defendant's use of peremptory challenge on white juror was discriminatory); United States v. Duncan, 191 F.3d 569, 574 (5th Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 606-07 (5th Cir.1998) (same). Moreover, the Second Circuit has held that the argument that Batson does not apply where an African American defendant seeks to eliminate white jurors is entirely without merit. United States v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.2008). Because the right to be free from discrimination is a right enjoyed by individual potential jurors, McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48, 112 S.Ct. 2348, we reject Dalton and Miller's first argument that discrimination was impossible here, where white jurors were struck in favor of other white jurors. And because [i]t is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate against a group of citizens based upon their race, id. at 57, 112 S.Ct. 2348, we reject Dalton's second argument that black defendants should be able to use peremptory challenges in a discriminatory fashion. We therefore hold that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a black defendant from using a peremptory challenge to strike a white prospective juror because of that juror's race.
Defendants argue that the district court did not properly apply Batson 's three-step process to evaluate the Government's reverse- Batson challenge. In particular, they argue that the district court improperly combined Batson 's second and third steps and required not merely race-neutral reasons for striking Ms. E and Mr. B, but minimally plausible reasons. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995) (The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible.). Relying on United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir. 1988), Defendants also argue that it was incorrect for the district court to base its finding of pretext solely upon Defendants' decision to strike jurors who were comparable to jurors they decided not to strike. The Government argues in response that the district court properly applied the three-step Batson analysis and had good reason for determining that Defendants' rambling, evolving reasons that would exclude much of the Eastern District of Louisiana were pretextual. Br. of Appellee at 54. With respect to Defendants' argument that under Lance, pretext cannot be shown merely by pointing to characteristics shared by struck and non-struck jurors, the Government points to the following language from Bentley-Smith: There will seldom be any evidence [of pretext] that the claimant can introducebeyond arguing that the explanations are not believable or pointing out that similar claims can be made about non-excluded jurors who are not minorities. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d at 1373-74. To be sure, the district court made comments that could be interpreted as betraying a misunderstanding of the minimal explanation required at the second step of the Batson analysis. [4] Notwithstanding those unfortunate comments, in light of our deferential review of fact and credibility determinations and based on our review of the voir dire transcript, we affirm the district court. See id. at 1373 (Although the defendants are able to parse out quotations from the district court that appear to support their argument, an examination of the whole transcript tells a different story.). A fair reading of the transcript reveals that despite the district court continuously saying that it did not accept a particular reason offered by Defendants, the district court simply did not believe that the proffered reason was the Defendants' true reason for dismissing the juror. See id. at 1375 ([T]he ultimate inquiry for the judge is not whether counsel's reason is suspect, or weak, or irrational, but whether counsel is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race-based.). Our reading of the record does not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Brown, 650 F.3d at 589. Finally, we note that the district court's suspicion regarding Defendants' true reason for dismissing particular jurors was seemingly confirmed at oral argument, when Dalton's attorney stated, Yes, we had a preference representing blacks, to get as many blacks as possible on the jury. Oral Argument Recording at 48:37, available at http:// www.ca5.uscourts.gov/OralArgRecordings/ 10/XX-XXXXX_XX-X-XXXX.wma. We therefore affirm the district court's determination that Defendants struck Mr. B and Ms. E for racially motivated reasons. [5]