Opinion ID: 498378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claimed errors with respect to the conviction for

Text: POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE 16 As a consequence of the District Court's ruling at the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the Government was permitted to introduce the items from the safe during the trial on the criminal charge. Relying on this and other evidence and testimony offered at trial, the jury found Zabalaga guilty of possession with an intent to distribute cocaine. 2 The appellant now claims that, even if the evidence from the safe was properly admitted, the conviction should be reversed because (1) the evidence before the jury was insufficient to support a charge of possession and (2) the trial court erred in its instructions on reasonable doubt. We will consider these claims in turn.
17 The appellant has argued that the evidence before the jury was insufficient to support a charge of illegal possession because no evidence was presented to indicate that the appellant had control over the items in the safe. We can find no merit in this claim. The facts developed at trial revealed that Zabalaga had the keys to the locked car in which the drugs were found; his wallet and other personal belongings were in the safe; the safe's combination was on a card in his wallet; his clothing and other personal belongings were in the passenger area of the vehicle; and it appeared that the appellant had actual control over the car and the drugs therein, for only he had keys to the car. 18 On this record, we think that it is plain that the Government offered adequate evidence to establish that the appellant constructively possessed the cocaine. In United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 548 (D.C. Cir.1980) (quoting United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 684 (D.C.Cir.1977)), we held that [t]o prove constructive possession of narcotics the Government must show that the defendant was in a position or had the right to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. On the evidence here, a jury clearly could have concluded that [Zabalaga] knew what was in the [safe] and was in a position to exercise some control over it. 636 F.2d at 548.
19 Finally, the appellant claims that the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly on the Government's burden to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government must prove all the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and Zabalaga argues that the trial court's jury instructions may have confused the jury as to its proper role in examining the evidence. We conclude that there was no reversible error. 20 In his opening instructions to the jury, after indicating that the Government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial judge stated: 21 Your function is to view or review, evaluate and assess the facts and determine whether or not the facts in your judgment pursuant to the instructions of law as given by the Court weigh in favor of the defendant's guilt or against the defendant's guilt. 22 Tr. (July 9, 1986) at 9. Defense counsel objected and the trial judge corrected himself by instructing: 23 Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a criminal proceeding and not a civil proceeding. And in this case, the Government, as I indicated earlier in my opening remarks, the Government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and at the appropriate time, I will define for you what is meant by a reasonable doubt. 24 The defense does not have to prove its innocence. As a matter of fact, the defense does not have to--the defendant through his counsel does not have to offer any defense whatsoever. 25 Id. at 11-12. In his closing instructions, the trial judge gave a lengthy explanation of the reasonable doubt standard. That explanation was followed by a conclusion that included the following statement: 26 In other words, you have two explanations of the events surrounding the bringing of this indictment, and it is your responsibility as jurors to consider and weigh the evidence that has been presented by both sides, to weigh it objectively, impartially, without passion, without prejudice. 27 Tr. (July 10, 1986) at 523. Defense counsel made no objection to this portion of the closing instructions. 28 In determining whether trial instructions improperly diminished the Government's burden of proving guilt, the instructions must be examined as a whole and in the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1340 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226, 104 S.Ct. 2678, 81 L.Ed.2d 874 (1984); United States v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 187 (D.C.Cir.1982). Corrective instructions may make previous errors harmless. Greer v. Miller, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987). Furthermore, a party must object to allegedly erroneous instructions before the jury retires. FED.R.CRIM.P. 30. If a party fails to object, only plain errors affecting substantial rights may be overturned on appeal. FED.R.C RIM$4.P. 52(b). The plain error exception is only applied in cases where a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. Baker, 693 F.2d at 187 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). 29 We conclude that the opening jury instructions, taken as a whole and viewed in light of the curative instruction given after the objection, were not erroneous. As for the closing instructions, we review them under the plain error doctrine because defense counsel did not object to the alleged error. Such review reveals no reversible error. The closing instructions fully define the burden on the Government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The reference to weighing the evidence was only a minor part of lengthy and clear instructions. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the jurors would be confused about the Government's responsibility in this case.