Opinion ID: 1058080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the validity of riekse's deed

Text: Fairfax argues that the ROFR divested the Kapanis of the power to sell the parcel without first offering it to Fairfax. Accordingly, the deed conveying the parcel to Riekse is void ab initio. However, the cases Fairfax cites do not support this proposition. The primary case upon which Fairfax relies is Bond v. Crawford, 193 Va. 437, 69 S.E.2d 470 (1952). There, the Crawfords contracted to sell a parcel to the Bonds but instead sold to the Londons. The Londons had actual knowledge of the Bonds' contract prior to their purchase. Id. at 443, 69 S.E.2d at 474. The Bonds asked the circuit court to declare the Londons' deed void ab initio and to order the Crawfords to perform the Bonds' purchase contract. This Court determined that the relief was appropriate, citing Thompson v. Thompson, 171 Va. 361, 198 S.E. 897 (1938). In Thompson, the Court ruled that collusion between a grantor and a grantee to convey property to allow the grantor to escape performance of a contract rendered the resulting deed void. Id. at 370, 198 S.E. at 900. The Court held that [w]here a conveyance is made in order to put it out of the power of the grantor to fulfill a contract previously entered into with the knowledge or concurrence of the grantee, the transaction will be declared null and void, and, if the proper parties are before the court, a decree will be rendered compelling a conveyance to the party rightfully entitled. Id. at 371, 198 S.E. at 901 (quoting Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 40 (2nd ed.)). Fairfax concedes that Riekse did not collude with the Kapanis to avoid their performance of the ROFR and that he did not even have actual knowledge that the ROFR existed. Rather, Fairfax contends only that Riekse had constructive knowledge of the ROFR because it was contained in the Tovars' deed, which had been properly recorded. Consequently, Bond and Thompson are distinguishable and the extraordinary relief of declaring an executed deed void ab initio is not appropriate in this case. Fairfax also cites cases where conveyances by trustees under deeds of trusts were declared void ab initio. [2] They are distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the well-settled rule that a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with the trust property what the deed either in express terms or by necessary implication authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or deed of trust are limited and defined by the instrument under which he acts, and he has only such authority as is thus expressly conferred upon him, together with incidental and implied powers that are necessarily included therein. Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must see that in all material matters he keeps within his powers, and must execute the trust in strict compliance therewith. Schmidt & Wilson, Inc. v. Carneal, 164 Va. 412, 415, 180 S.E. 325, 326 (1935). [3] That line of cases is inapplicable here because the Kapanis were not trustees under a deed of trust. Rather, they were owners of a fee simple estate, though the fee was defeasible rather than absolute, and they had all necessary power to convey the whole estate of which they were themselves seised at the time of their conveyance. Consequently, the circuit court did not err when it refused to declare Riekse's deed void ab initio.