Opinion ID: 782233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention

Text: 68 Unlike transborder arrests, there exists a clear and universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention. This prohibition is codified in every major comprehensive human rights instrument and is reflected in at least 119 national constitutions. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 235, 260-61 (1993). The Universal Declaration, perhaps the most well-recognized explication of international human rights norms, provides that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, Universal Declaration, art. 9, and the ICCPR, which the United States has ratified, 16 unequivocally obliges states parties to refrain from arbitrary arrest or detention. ICCPR, art. 9. 17 69 We recently reaffirmed the universal, obligatory, and specific nature of this norm in Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384 (recognizing a clear international prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention); see also Marcos IV, 103 F.3d at 795 (recognizing arbitrary detention ... as[an] actionable violation[] of international law). We explained, in defining the norm, that [d]etention is arbitrary `if it is not pursuant to law; it may be arbitrary also if it is incompatible with the principles of justice or with the dignity of the human person.' Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384 (quoting Restatement on Foreign Relations § 702 cmt. h). 18 70 Sosa acknowledges the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and detention, but he contends that for ATCA liability to attach, Alvarez's detention must be prolonged in addition to being arbitrary. We can divine no such requirement in our precedent or in the applicable international authorities. Rather, as the language of the international instruments demonstrates, the norm is universally cited as one against arbitrary detention and does not include a temporal element. Other authorities reflect this understanding. See, e.g., Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice, supra, at 260; Paul Sieghart, The International Law of Human Rights 135-59 (1983); see also United Nations Study, supra, at 5-8 (defining elements of the norm without mention of a temporal component). 19 71 Although § 702 of the Restatement on Foreign Relations includes a reference to prolonged arbitrary detention, 20 neither the Restatement nor our cases import a separate temporal requirement for purposes of ATCA liability. Section 702 contains a short list of human rights norms that it deems sufficient to qualify as customary law violations. See Restatement on Foreign Relations § 702(a)-(g). But the comments to § 702 clarify that the list is non-exhaustive and that virtually all of the norms listed, including prolonged arbitrary detention, belong among the elite set of jus cogens norms that are non-derogable. Id. cmts. a, n. Section 702 does not state that every arbitrary detention must be prolonged to qualify as a violation of the law of nations — which is all that is required under the ATCA — and in fact implies the opposite. See id. cmt. (A single, brief, arbitrary detention by an official of a state party to one of the principal international agreements might violate that agreement.). Likewise, our holding in Martinez, which cited the Restatement, included the length of detention as but one factor among many in determining whether a violation of the law of nations had occurred. 141 F.3d at 1384. 72 This is not to say that the length of detention cannot be a factor in evaluating whether there was an actionable violation of international law. Indeed, an extended detention following an improper arrest would necessarily contribute to arbitrariness. We simply hold, consistent with international law, that there is no free-standing temporal requirement nor any magical time period that triggers the norm. 73