Opinion ID: 701292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence on count ii

Text: 9 The evidence is sufficient to support Kearns' conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana if, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 162, 130 L.Ed.2d 100 (1994). 10 Kearns never had actual possession of the 50 pounds of marijuana that are the subject of count II. We may nevertheless affirm her conviction on count II if her coconspirator, Ron Lynch, 1 had possession of the marijuana, thereby rendering Kearns in constructive possession. The question, therefore, is whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Lynch possessed the marijuana. 2 We conclude that it was not. 11 The Terans testified that after meeting several times in prison with Jim and Catherine Kearns and Ron Lynch, they decided that Lynch would make the first purchase of marijuana from Sergio Teran's brother (who was actually Detective Hawkins). Hawkins arranged for Lynch to meet with Teran's cousin (actually undercover officer Jose Pino), who was to deliver the drugs. Lynch and Pino met on September 6, 1990 in the parking lot of a Mega Foods store to conduct a 50-pound transaction. Lynch and Pino opened the trunk of Pino's car to inspect the 50-pound bag of marijuana. Lynch opened the bag, put his hands into it, took out a small amount, and smelled it. Pino closed the trunk, leaving the marijuana in his car. Lynch and Pino then went to Lynch's car and Lynch opened the trunk to show Pino envelopes containing the purchase money. Pino inspected the money, and then signalled surveilling officers to arrest Lynch. 12 The foregoing events do not involve many of the typical indicia of possession present in other cases. For example, the marijuana remained in Pino's car, there was no showing that Lynch obtained control over Pino's car (e.g., by possessing a key to it), and Lynch was arrested before the transaction actually took place. See O'Connor, 737 F.2d at 818 (sufficient evidence of constructive possession existed where defendants controlled the tests performed on the drugs and then supervised the secreting of the cocaine in their vehicle); cf. United States v. Medrano, 5 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (9th Cir.1993) (insufficient evidence of constructive possession where there was no evidence that undercover officers, who had placed ephedrine in the trunk of the defendant's car pursuant to the defendant's instructions, had returned the car keys to the defendant). The strongest evidence that Lynch acquired possession of the drugs is the fact that he briefly touched and smelled the marijuana in Pino's trunk. 13 Prior Ninth Circuit cases that have upheld convictions for possession where a defendant had sampled the drugs involved other evidence of possession as well. In United States v. Baron, for example, the evidence indicated not only that the defendant had handled and sampled the drugs, but also that the defendant had dumped the drugs and even cleaned out the container when she realized that she was under surveillance. 860 F.2d 911, 919 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct. 1944, 104 L.Ed.2d 414 (1989). Similarly, in O'Connor, two defendants controlled the tests that were performed over a two-hour period on each of 31 bags of cocaine, and two other defendants actually performed the tests and handled the cocaine extensively. 737 F.2d at 818. After sampling the cocaine, the defendants took the additional step of secreting it in their vehicle. Id. 14 We hold that Lynch's brief sampling of the marijuana, in the absence of other steps taken to give him physical custody of or dominion and control over the drugs, is not sufficient to constitute possession. Because Lynch did not possess the marijuana, Kearns did not either. Accordingly, we reverse Kearns' conviction on count II due to insufficient evidence.