Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Limiting instructions on uncharged offenses

Text: As stated, before Olin Davis testified about the attempt to kill him, the trial court instructed the jury: Mr. Davis is about to testify to a series of events that took place on May 4th, 1987, which involve interaction between Mr. Davis, [defendant], and Mr. Ronald Gino Harrison. And the evidence ... will reveal the commission of a crime against [Davis], namely an assault with a deadly weapon at the very least. What I want to have you understand is this. [Defendant] is not charged with this crime in this case, and you are not to consider this evidence for determining his guilt for this crime that he's not charged with, or to hear it to come to some conclusion that he's a bad person because of what happened here. This evidence is being admitted to explain  to evaluate  to assist you in evaluating the testimony of Mr. Olin Davis and to flesh out, if you will, the relationship between Mr. Davis and [defendant], and it may become relevant for purposes for which you will be specifically instructed otherwise. But I want to make sure you understand it's evidence of an uncharged crime, and it's being heard here for very limited purposes. And you must not  it is not direct evidence on the issues that you're here to ask about the two counts of murder, but it relates to Mr. Davis' credibility and believability as you should evaluate that, the motives that he may have for testifying here in relationship to [defendant], and other factors which may become apparent upon which you will be specifically instructed. At a sidebar conference immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked to have the instruction read back during the break because he was concerned the court had instructed the jury it was not to consider this evidence in any form as to defendant's guilt. The court denied having done so, but the prosecutor nevertheless asked to read the transcript of the instruction to make sure. The trial court then told the jury: As is frequently the possibility when we speak extemporaneously, I may have misspoken. I'm going to have this transcript reread to me. I want to make sure all I'm telling you here is that this testimony that you're about to hear is special testimony, and it will be heard by you for limited reasons which will be fully explained at the conclusion of the trial. And I want you to understand that and to keep it separate from the testimony of Mr. Davis on, for instance, attributed to him, that he attributes certain statements to [defendant] directly relevant to the two counts, and we'll leave it at that. [¶] If I've misspoken myself, I'll correct it when I've reread the transcript. All of this will be cleared up at the end of trial, I hope. The prosecutor read the relevant portion of the reporter's transcript during a break. Thereafter, he said he had no objections to the wording of the court's instructions to the jury. At the close of the guilt phase, the trial court gave the standard jury instruction on evidence limited as to purpose (CALJIC No. 2.09 (5th ed.1988)) [6] and a modified jury instruction on other crimes evidence (CALJIC No. 2.50 (5th ed.1988)). [7] Defendant challenges these instructions on several grounds. First, defendant contends the trial court's limiting instruction to the jury during Davis's testimony was erroneous because evidence of defendant's attempt to kill Davis should not have been admitted at all. As discussed in part III.A, ante, the court properly admitted that evidence. Accordingly, we reject the argument that the limiting instruction on this issue was erroneous on this basis. Next, defendant complains this instruction must have confused the jury because the trial court told the jury it might have misspoken in instructing the jury, without identifying the portion of the instruction at issue. Thus, defendant argues, the jury was left without guidance as to how to consider the evidence of defendant's attempted murder of Davis. Not so. The court expressly instructed the jury that it could consider such evidence for limited purposes, such as credibility, believability, and motive, and that, if other purposes later became relevant, the jury would be instructed accordingly. In any event, any possible jury confusion engendered by the trial court's statement that it might have misspoken was cleared up at the end of trial when the court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50, which identified the particular limited purposes for which the jury could consider other crimes evidence. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused and misconstrued or misapplied the instruction (see People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 662-663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705), and defendant's argument to the contrary is speculation. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in giving a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.50, because it was unnecessary and irrelevant. He argues that instructing the jury that other crimes evidence may be considered for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show the defendant had knowledge or possessed the means that might have been useful or necessary for the commission of the crimes charged was unnecessary because at trial defendant did not deny that he had access to guns. He also argues that instructing the jury that other crimes evidence may be considered for the limited purpose of determining if it tends to show [that] ... the defendant had a consciousness of guilt with respect to the crimes charged was erroneous because the March 1987 incident was irrelevant on this issue. We find no error. [T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. ( People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) In addition to the above instructions, the trial court instructed the jury: Whether some instructions apply will depend upon what you find to be the facts. Disregard any instruction which applies to facts determined by you not to exist. (See CALJIC No. 17.31 (5th ed.1988).) Viewed as a whole, the instructions adequately advised the jury how to consider evidence limited as to purpose and other crimes evidence. Finally, defendant contends the trial court's guilt phase instructions were inadequate to overcome the voluminous evidence admitted on attempted murder and the prosecutor's improper closing argument that defendant's character, as shown by other crimes evidence, proved he committed the double murders. Defendant's contention essentially repeats earlier claims of erroneous admission of evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, which we have already rejected.