Opinion ID: 2581274
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Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Do the Criminal Discovery Statutes Authorize a Trial Court to Order a Psychiatric Examination? [3]

Text: The People argue that because petitioner placed his mental state in issue by announcing his intention to rely on a diminished actuality defense, a longestablished rule in California authorizes the trial court to order the prosecution be granted access to him for purposes of a mental examination by an expert retained by the prosecution. In support, the People cite a number of cases which they contend support this rule. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146] ( McPeters ); People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312 ( Carpenter); People v. Danis (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 782 [107 Cal.Rptr. 675] ( Danis ).) Following the passage of Proposition 115 in 1990 and the enactment of the criminal discovery statutes, however, any discovery rules announced in the cited cases require more rigorous justification. As explained, ante, section 1054, subdivision (e) provides that no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States. [A]ll court-ordered discovery is governed exclusively byand is barred except as provided bythe discovery chapter newly enacted by Proposition 115. ( In re Littlefield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 129.) (4) We conclude that Danis, McPeters, and Carpenter have not survived the passage of Proposition 115. Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 782, opined that prosecutorial discovery from a criminal defendant, in the form of a courtordered mental examination, was permissible even absent an authorizing statute, because the trial court possessed inherent power to order such discovery. This reasoning is insupportable following the 1990 enactment of section 1054, subdivision (e), which insists that rules permitting prosecutorial discovery be authorized by the criminal discovery statutes or some other statute, or mandated by the United States Constitution. Although Danis's result may have been supportable when decided more than 30 years agoa point we need not reach hereno part of its reasoning can have survived the enactment of section 1054, subdivision (e). Similarly, the rule announced in McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1148, and followed in Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, did not survive Proposition 115. Neither decision explained the basisstatutory or otherwiseof their assertion that a criminal defendant who places his mental state in issue thereby creates in the prosecution the right to discovery in the form of a mental examination by a prosecution expert. Because neither McPeters nor Carpenter rests on a statutory or constitutional basis, both are inconsistent with section 1054, subdivision (e). [4] The People contend the abrogation of the sound principle that a defendant who places his mental state in issue must submit to a prosecution examination would thwart an express purpose of Proposition 115, namely to make comprehensive reforms ... in order to restore balance and fairness to our criminal justice system. (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) text of Prop. 115, § 1, subd. (a), p. 33, italics added (hereafter Ballot Pamphlet).) The People cite the preamble to Proposition 115, which provides in part: [W]e the people further find that it is necessary to reform the law as developed in numerous California Supreme Court decisions as set forth in the statutes of this state. These decisions and statutes have unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond that which is required by the United States Constitution, thereby unnecessarily adding to the costs of criminal cases, and diverting the judicial process from its function as a quest for truth. (Ballot Pamp., supra, text of Prop. 115, § 1, subd. (b), p. 33, italics added, also quoted in Williams v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 320, 336 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 832].) (5) In order to effectuate the goals set forth in the preamble to Proposition 115, however, the framers of that initiative did not authorize the judiciary generally to create appropriate rules governing discovery in criminal cases. Although we must interpret the statutes governing discovery in criminal cases, we are not at liberty to create new rules, untethered to any statute or constitutional mandate. Instead, the framers of Proposition 115, by including the exclusivity provision of section 1054, subdivision (e), authorized the Legislature to create the applicable rules in the first instance. Only when interpreting a statute or where a rule of discovery is mandated by the Constitution of the United States (§ 1054, subd. (e)) does this court have a role. (See discussion, post. ) We thus conclude that nothing in the preamble to Proposition 115 authorizes or justifies the judicial creation of a rule that a criminal defendant who places his mental state in issue may be ordered by the court to grant the prosecution access for purposes of a mental examination by a prosecution expert. Irrespective of whether Danis, McPeters, or Carpenter survived the 1990 enactment of Proposition 115, the People contend that after the enactment of the criminal discovery statutes, courts have upheld the right of the prosecution to obtain an examination of a defendant who places his mental state in issue. In support, the People cite In re Hawthorne (2005) 35 Cal.4th 40 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 189, 105 P.3d 552] ( Hawthorne ), Centeno, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 30, and People v. Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 347 ( Sumahit ). None of these cases stands for the broad proposition that a criminal defendant, by placing his mental state in issue, necessarily agrees in all cases to give a prosecution expert access for purposes of a mental examination. Hawthorne, supra, 35 Cal.4th 40, and Centeno, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 30, both involved criminal defendants facing the death penalty who claimed their mental retardation rendered execution an impermissible penalty under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 536 U.S. 304.) In Centeno the issue arose pretrial. The defendant thus was subject to the statutory procedure enacted by our Legislature in response to Atkins whereby capital defendants can attempt to prove their retardation (§ 1376), including requesting the appointment of experts ( id., subd. (b)(2)). [5] In Hawthorne, the defendant had already been convicted. We held that, in postconviction cases, courts should follow the procedures in section 1376 as closely as logic and practicality permit so as to avoid due process and equal protection implications. ( Hawthorne, at p. 47.) In other words, the examinations in these cases were permissible not simply because the defendants placed their mental states in issue by claiming they were mentally retarded, but because the proceedings were governed by statutory and constitutional considerations that are inapplicable to the instant case. Sumahit, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th 347, involved yet another statutory scheme. In that case, an inmate subject to a sexually violent predator (SVP) petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 was examined by a defense expert but refused to submit to an examination by two experts who testified for the People. ( Sumahit, at p. 351.) Sumahit is distinguishable because the SVP proceeding is civil in nature. ( Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1175 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584].) Moreover, like the mental retardation determinations at issue in Hawthorne, supra, 35 Cal.4th 40, and Centeno, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th 30, in SVP cases the appointment of experts to examine an inmate named in a petition is expressly authorized by statute. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 6601, subd. (d), 6603, subd. (c)(1).) (6) In sum, we conclude that (1) any rule that existed before 1990 suggesting or holding a criminal defendant who places his mental state in issue may thereby be required to grant the prosecution access for purposes of a mental examination by a prosecution expert was superseded by the enactment of the criminal discovery statutes in 1990, and (2) nothing in the criminal discovery statutes (§ 1054 et seq.) authorizes a trial court to issue an order granting such access.