Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A confidential relationship between a favored beneficiary and the testator

Text: The parties stipulated that Tucker and Miller had a confidential relationship. They dispute whether there was substantial evidence showing that Tucker was a favored beneficiary under Miller's will. This Court has defined a favored beneficiary as [o]ne who, in the circumstances of the particular case, has been favored over others having equal claim to the testator's bounty. An unnatural discrimination, leading to a natural inference that advantage has been taken by one in position so to do; and shown to have been busy in getting such will executed. Cook v. Morton, 241 Ala. 188, 192, 1 So.2d 890, 892 (1941). Citing Clifton v. Clifton, 529 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.1988), in which this Court stated that the `equal claim' of others refers not to the laws of descent and distribution, but to the facts of the particular case, and Windham v. Pope, 474 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1985), Tucker asserts that there is no evidence indicating that Pirtle and Prchal had an equal claim to Miller's bounty or that any discrimination in Tucker's favor was unnatural. According to Tucker, under the particular facts of this case, Pirtle and Prchal's claim was not equal because they had had only minimal contacts with their grandfather, they had not been involved in his daily life, and they had left Miller to Tucker's care. (Tucker's brief at 31-32.) The statement from Clifton originated from this Court's explanation in Cook, supra, that the fact that a wife received more under a will than she would have under dower and homestead laws was not a determinative test of whether she was a favored beneficiary. Cook, 241 Ala. at 192, 1 So.2d at 892. Instead, the Court reviewed the evidence to see whether the wife had dominating power over her husband. 241 Ala. at 192, 1 So.2d at 892. In light of its original context, this statement does not require us to ignore wholly the fact that Pirtle and Prchal were Miller's closest living issue. In Windham, this Court reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of a will contestant. 474 So.2d at 1076. The testator, a widower with no children, executed a will leaving one parcel of property to the daughter of his brother-in-law. Although the evidence showed that the brother-in-law was present when the testator signed the will and that both he and his daughter had helped the testator with his financial affairs, this Court found that there was no evidence indicating that others had a claim to the testator's sympathy or benevolence which was equal to or greater than the devisee's. . . . The record is devoid of evidence as to who the natural objects of the testator's bounty might have been. He was a widower without children. There was no evidence tending to show that he was closer to some other person or persons than he was to [his brother-in-law's daughter]. 474 So.2d at 1077. Furthermore, because the will devised only one portion of the testator's estate and there was no evidence showing the value of the remaining estate or how it would be distributed, it was mere speculation to conclude that [the devisee] was to receive a disproportionate share of the estate under the will. 474 So.2d at 1077. The facts underlying this Court's decision in Windham differ materially from those of this case. Unlike the testator in Windham, Miller had blood descendants his granddaughters, Pirtle and Prchal  who would have inherited Miller's entire estate under Alabama's laws of intestacy. Ala.Code 1975, § 43-8-42. Furthermore, Miller's will devises his entire estate to Tucker, not just one part. We can, therefore, determine that the will significantly favors Tucker over Pirtle and Prchal. Pirtle and Prchal presented evidence indicating that Miller wanted them to have either his entire estate, whatever money was left in his estate, or $100,000. This evidence shows that Pirtle and Prchal were objects of his bounty and raises an inference that their claim to Miller's bounty was equal to Tucker's, whereas in Windham, there existed no evidence on which to make a similar determination. Finally, although it is clear that Tucker helped Miller in the latter stages of Miller's life, the evidence does not show that he helped Miller so much that the the testamentary disposition [of Miller's entire estate to Tucker] is proper as a matter of law. Armstrong v. McGee, 579 So.2d 1310, 1314 (Ala.1991). As stated in the definition of favored beneficiary, whether one is a favored beneficiary depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. See also Cleveland v. Central Bank of the South, 574 So.2d 741, 744 (Ala.1990) (finding sufficient evidence that proponent was a favored beneficiary, particularly when this issue is viewed in the light of the totality of the evidence). Under the circumstances of this case as revealed in the evidence discussed above, Pirtle and Prchal have presented substantial evidence indicating that they had a claim to Miller's bounty equal to Tucker's and that the will favors Tucker over them. Therefore, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tucker was a favored beneficiary.