Opinion ID: 2549044
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jury function usurped

Text: [¶ 16] Abeyta next claims that the prosecutor elicited comments from Officer Alpizar that usurped the jury's function of determining his guilt or innocence. Abeyta contends that Officer Alpizar testified that he had reasonable suspicion to stop Abeyta because of Abeyta's actions and expressed the opinion that innocent people do not run from police. Abeyta argues that such testimony suggested he was guilty because he ran from Officer Alpizar. [¶ 17] Officer Alpizar testified that he was on patrol driving east on Lincolnway, at about the 2200 block, when he received a radio call to locate an Hispanic male wearing a white t-shirt and blue jeans. The suspect had left a crime scene somewhere in the 2500 block of East Ninth. The officer saw a man matching this description running across Lincolnway and followed him. As soon as the man saw the police car, he ran away. [¶ 18] On direct examination of the officer, the following dialogue took place: [PROSECUTOR:] You said he tried to hide from you. How did he do that? [OFFICER:] He turned his head and saw the patrol vehicle. At that time rather than stopping he continued to run and went around, if I may, around the wall and hid behind the wall by the entrance at Taco Bell. [PROSECUTOR:] What did you do? [OFFICER:] I stopped the vehicle as soon as I had visual of this person. I got out of the patrol vehicle and I said, Police, stop. I then said, Please come out, I need to have a word with you. The gentlemen looked out, saw me, but he refused to move. Once again I said, I need to have a word with you. At that time by then I had enough probable causeI'm sorryI had enough reasonable suspicion to believe that this person may be the person that the attempt to locate was referring to on the radio. [PROSECUTOR:] What made you draw that conclusion I guess? Why? [OFFICER:] I drew my conclusion based not only on his appearance, which matched the description on the attempt to locate, but his actions. Any other person wouldn't have run from the police. They would have stopped. Most people are very helpful. They tend to want to stop and talk to police officers and find out if there is anything they can do to assist. Rather this person [ran] away from the police vehicle at first. Then once I verbalized my command, he refused to comply. [¶ 19] Abeyta concedes that this line of questioning was not necessarily improper had the officer merely stated that Abeyta's actions made him believe they found the right person. However, he contends that the officer's recitation of how to view the evidence was improper. [¶ 20] Since defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning at trial, we again apply the plain error standard. Abeyta asserts in his appellate brief that plain error has been proved because the record is clear that the prosecutor elicited improper opinion testimony that ... Abeyta must be guilty because of his actions.... Abeyta has been prejudiced by both [of] the comment[s] because it is the jury's function to determine if ... Abeyta is guilty. Plain error has been proven. [¶ 21] To support his assertion, Abeyta relies on Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 48, 43 P.3d at 99 (quoting Huff v. State, 992 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Wyo.1999)): This Court has consistently recognized that it is the jury's duty to resolve the factual issues, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and determine the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant.... ... Like opinions as to guilt, opinions as to the veracity, or lack thereof, of the victim or defendant are fundamentally objectionable if those opinions have the capacity to decide the case for the jury. Curl [v. State], 898 P.2d [369] at 374 [(Wyo.1995)] (emphasis in original). See also Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882-83 (Wyo.1990) and Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66-67 (Wyo.1989) (where this Court condemned eliciting opinion testimony). [¶ 22] We presume prejudice when the prosecutor elicits an express opinion as to the guilt of the defendant. Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 21, 17 P.3d 715, 722 (Wyo.2001). In the instant case, the prosecutor did not elicit an express opinion as to Abeyta's guilt. He asked the officer why he had concluded that he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Abeyta was the person to whom the attempt-to-locate call was referring. The officer did not directly express an opinion that innocent people do not run. Instead, the officer testified that his decision to stop Abeyta was based on Abeyta's appearance and actions. The officer's testimony explained his decision to apprehend the suspect and was not a direct comment on Abeyta's guilt or innocence. We conclude that Abeyta has not met his burden of establishing plain error because he has not demonstrated that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated or that any substantial right was prejudiced thereby. Nevertheless, we caution prosecutors that questioning along these lines is fraught with danger and should be avoided unless directed at a particular fact at issue. Poorly disguised questions aimed at eliciting opinions as to guilt are no more acceptable than direct questions posed for the same purpose.