Opinion ID: 2050771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶ 13] Joann contends that New Hampshire has jurisdiction over the guardianship petition pursuant to the PKPA and the UCCJEA. As set forth above, the PKPA is not directly at issue where no competing court order is involved. However, the jurisdictional requirements of the PKPA, which are similar but not identical to the UCCJEA, must be met, or the decree risks being denied full faith and credit by courts of other states. See Wambold v. Wambold, 651 A.2d 330, 333 (Me.1994). [¶ 14] Both the PKPA and the UCCJEA provide that a state has jurisdiction over a child custody proceeding if the state is the home state of the child on the date the proceeding is commenced, or was the home state within six months before the date the proceeding is commenced. [6] See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1745. The PKPA and the UCCJEA define the home state as the state in which the child lived with a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding, and include periods of temporary absence as part of the period. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4); 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1732(7). [¶ 15] Immediately prior to the filing of the temporary guardianship petition, Amberley lived in New Hampshire, but for less than six months. Nevertheless, Joann contends that New Hampshire is Amberley's home state because she lived there for almost six months, last attended school there, and had contacts with individuals providing services in the state, such as her physician and the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services' workers concerning her truancy. However, this evidence is inadequate because the six-month requirement was not met, due to Joann and Amberley's transitory living situation. New Hampshire cannot be considered Amberley's home state. [¶ 16] When the child has no home state, the PKPA and the UCCJEA require the court to examine whether a sufficiently significant connection and substantial evidence exists to exercise jurisdiction. Pursuant to the PKPA, in the absence of a home state, a state can exercise jurisdiction when it is in the child's best interest because the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical presence, and substantial evidence is available in the state concerning the child's care. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B). The corresponding UCCJEA provision, which does not include the best interest language, states that jurisdiction is proper when the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent has a significant connection with the state. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1745(1)(B)(1). [¶ 17] Diana and Richard B. are residents of Maine. They have had physical custody and care of Amberley since her arrival in this state, and they are the parents of her stepfather. The record indicates that Amberley has visited them on a regular basis in the past, and that she lived and attended school in Maine for periods during 1991-97. Consequently, the significant connection and substantial evidence requirements were satisfied under the UCCJEA and the PKPA, and the Probate Court has jurisdiction over the guardianship petition. See Gabriel W., 666 A.2d at 509-10. [¶ 18] Regarding Joann's claim that venue did not exist, under 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-205 (1998), venue for guardianship proceedings for minors is in the place where the minor resides or is present. Amberley's presence within Maine was determinative in establishing venue. See Guardianship of Zachary Z., 677 A.2d 550, 552-53 (Me.1996).