Opinion ID: 1763145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Applicability to County Regulations

Text: Although not raised by the parties, we begin our analysis by noting that, while section 13-7-208(b)(1) is codified in the part of the statute pertaining to municipal zoning, the plain language of the statute protects establishments from subsequent changes in zoning restrictions enacted by any governmental agency of this state or its political subdivisions, including counties. Chapter 7 of Title 13 is divided into four parts, including Part 1 (County Zoning), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 13-7-101 to -115, -117 to -119, and Part 2 (Municipal Zoning), id. sections 13-7-201 to -212. Both of these parts contain a section on the enforcement of zoning ordinances and remedies for violations thereof. See id. §§ 13-7-111, -208. Part 2's enforcement and remedies provision includes a grandfather clause, but Part 1's corresponding provision does not. Id. Based on the statutory scheme, some opinions from the Court of Appeals have reasoned that the grandfather clause protects prior conforming uses only from subsequent ordinances enacted by municipalities. See Fields v. White, No. 88-250-II, 1989 WL 5456, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.27, 1989) (rejecting argument premised on the statute's broad language and holding that the grandfather clause has no application where the zoning change is not a result of municipal zoning); accord Riggs v. Burson, No. 03A01-90506-CV-00193, 1995 WL 635748, at  (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct.31, 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn.1997); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 806 S.W.2d 181, 189 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990) (concluding that the General Assembly dealt separately and differently with counties and cities insofar as enabling legislation pertaining to zoning is concerned). By contrast, the Court of Appeals reached a different result in Chadwell v. Knox County, 980 S.W.2d 378 (Tenn.Ct. App.1998), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 19, 1998). Despite the implications of the statutory scheme, the court held that the statutory text would still control: Since [the grandfather clause] is found under the title, chapter and part dealing with municipalities, it would appear ... that [the grandfather clause] has no application to counties. A closer scrutiny, however reveals otherwise. We are not at liberty to overlook the clear, unambiguous language of any statute and must interpret it in accordance with well-established rules of construction. Id. at 382. The court ultimately concluded that the grandfather clause applies not only to municipalities but to any governmental agency of the state or its political subdivisions. Clearly a county is a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee and falls within the contemplation of the legislation. [14] Id. We agree with the interpretation of the grandfather clause set forth in Chadwell . The primary purpose of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the legislature. Walker v. Sunrise Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc., 249 S.W.3d 301, 309 (Tenn.2008). Whenever possible, we discern legislative intent `from the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language.' Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tenn.2000) (quoting Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn.1997)). Therefore, when we are confronted with clear, unambiguous language, we must apply its plain meaning in its normal and accepted use, without a forced interpretation that would limit or expand the statute's application. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tenn.2004). Here, the grandfather clause's reference to a[ny] governmental agency of this state or its political subdivisions clearly and unambiguously includes counties. In a variety of contexts, the Tennessee Code Annotated confirms that political subdivisions include both counties and municipalities. See, e.g., Tenn.Code. Ann. §§ 4-18-102(4) (2005) (False Claims Act defines political subdivision as meaning any city, town, municipality, [or] county, including any county having a metropolitan form of government); 8-48-111 (2002) (applying emergency interim succession provisions to officers of political subdivisions (including, but not limited to, cities... and counties)); XX-XX-XXX(a) (2009) (exempting licensed private investigators from requirement to obtain permit or post bond in any municipality, county or other political subdivision of this state). The inference that the grandfather clause excludes counties because of its placement within the statutory scheme would amount to a forcibly narrow interpretation of the natural and ordinary meaning of political subdivisions. Instead, we apply the plain meaning of the term, adopting the reasoning of Chadwell and rejecting contrary interpretations set forth in other decisions of the Court of Appeals.