Opinion ID: 628594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Barth's Other Claims

Text: 56 Mr. Barth asserts that the district court has made two significant legal errors, in addition to the misallocation of the burden of proof, each of which alone justifies reversal. Reply Brief for Appellant at 1. He maintains, first, that the court erred in allowing the VOA to refuse to offer an accommodation to an applicant for employment that it has extended to current employees. Mr. Barth notes that the VOA has made special accommodations for employees who have incurred medical problems while on duty overseas or whose children have particular educational needs. From this, he argues that (1) if such limitations on the assignment of an existing employee do not create an undue hardship, similar restrictions on the assignment of an applicant will not do so; and (2) if the VOA restricts the assignments of a current employee for medical or family reasons, it must be equally willing to restrict the assignment of a handicapped applicant. 57 These arguments overlook the benefits that agencies derive from accommodating the special needs of existing employees, which they do not gain from serving those of applicants. A willingness to accommodate incumbent employees increases the likelihood that they--and their knowhow--will be retained by the employing agency. Cf. Mem. op. at 831 (describing the VOA's difficulties in maintaining a skilled work force and measures it has taken in response). It will also contribute to employee morale and, presumably, to productivity. Thus there is economic logic as well as moral truth behind the intuition that distinguishes between family and stranger and the level of obligation owed to each. Robert Frost captured that intuition in his poem, The Death of the Hired Man: 58 Home is the place where, when you have to go there, 59 They have to take you in. 60 The Poetry of Robert Frost at 38 (Edward C. Lathem ed., 1967). Mr. Barth may knock at the door, but he is not family, and his handicap does not give him the right to be treated as such. An agency is entitled both to take the measure of the burden imposed by an accommodation net of its benefits and to take account of the duty of care, whether legal or not, that is owed employees who develop problems while on the job. Accordingly, we decline to find that the disparate treatment Mr. Barth complains of constitutes handicap discrimination within the meaning of the Act. 61 In his second claim of legal error, Mr. Barth argues that the district court improperly accepted speculative assertions of impaired management flexibility and employee morale. Reply Brief for Appellant at 2. He contends that an agency must establish 'undue hardship' through objective evidence, not mere supposition, of the actual impact of any proposed accommodation on specific aspects of its program. Brief for Appellant at 17. He supports this argument with statements from Title VII religious discrimination cases. See EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1988); Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 961 (8th Cir.1979); Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir.1975). We, however, find nothing in these cases more remarkable than the proposition that evidence becomes less persuasive as it becomes more speculative. 62 Mr. Barth also contends that even if the VOA had offered admissible evidence of an adverse effect on employee morale, it was inappropriate to take that factor into account. For support, he relies on cases holding, for example, that racial animus may not be used to defend race-based policies or practices. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984) (holding that community hostility to mixed-race marriages does not excuse a policy that disadvantages mixed-race couples in disputes over child custody). 63 This argument, however, confuses animus against the handicapped with the morale effects of a particular means of accommodating them. Consider an extreme example: An agency is asked to accommodate an employee with extra-sensitive eyes by moving operations underground. It seems clear that in considering this request, the agency could not properly take into account the other workers' animus against the handicapped or their resentment over the handicapped's protected legal status. But this does not mean the agency must ignore the probable effects of subterranean working conditions on the morale of other employees, however pure of heart. 64 An element of the undue hardship calculus cited in the EEOC regulation is the relationship between the number of employees and the size of the agency's program. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1613.704(c). This factor is relevant, we presume, precisely because the degree of the imposition of a particular accommodation on non-handicapped employees as a group, and the effects of such impositions on a small work force, are legitimate concerns under the Rehabilitation Act.