Opinion ID: 717992
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadmissible Testimony

Text: 42 Even if we find that the prosecutor did not intentionally act improperly, we must assess whether the conduct affected the outcome of the trial. The touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 947 (1982). 43 In any case, in his prosecutorial misconduct argument, Glover implicitly argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the inadmissible evidence was not sufficiently prejudicial so as to require a mistrial or a new trial. Glover takes issue with the comment about the warrant, the Pedrioli parole testimony, and also with the adequacy of the instruction in addressing the prejudice. 44 The improper admission of evidence mandates reversal unless the reviewing court can say with fair assurance that the error did not influence the verdict. United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993). 2 45
46 In support of his argument, defendant refers to several of our cases involving the improper admission of testimony or physical evidence by the court. See, e.g., United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934 (1984); United States v. Lehay, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir.1959); United States v. Bradley, 5 F.3d 1317 (9th Cir.1994). 47 The above authorities are factually inapposite to the matter before us today. 3 In this case, the district court did not allow the jury to consider the improper testimony in reaching their verdict as to Glover. The court immediately struck the offending testimony about the warrant and later gave a curative instruction with respect to all of the improper evidence. 48 Even if we treat the testimony about Glover's outstanding warrant as improper admission of bad character evidence causing some prejudice to the defendant, reversal does not automatically result. We may affirm the conviction where the lower court gave an admonishment to the jury and there is strong evidence of defendant's guilt. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.1991) (citing to United States v. Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir.1980)). 49 We explained in Aichele,: If the case against a defendant is very strong, though not overwhelming, and the reviewing court is unconvinced that the admission of the evidence influenced the outcome of the case, the court may uphold the verdict. Id. Glover urges that in Aichele, the prejudice to the defendant was much less significant and the government's case was much stronger than in his case. In Aichele, the inadmissible testimony was about the one time defendant was in prison in 1964, about 25 years before the trial. 50 Although testimony about an outstanding warrant would be more prejudicial than the testimony in Aichele, our analysis does not stop here. We consider the prejudice in the context of the government's case. The government's case against Glover is quite powerful. The circumstantial evidence and the witness identifications of Glover as the driver constitute strong evidence tending to show that Glover was a participant in the robbery. As we discussed and concluded above, there is also sufficient evidence to conclude that Glover knew he was helping the use of a gun. Moreover, each time Speckman mentioned the warrant, he did not finish his sentence, and the testimony was not admitted into evidence. 51
52 Glover also argues that the Pedrioli parole testimony was extremely prejudicial to Glover's case. He reasons that the jury now linked Glover with an accomplice, who the jury heard was on parole for the same crime for which the jury now tried Glover. However, the evidence against Pedrioli was very strong--it included the use of his mother's car as the getaway vehicle, Pedrioli's presence at the house of the sister of the person identified as the driver of that car, and the identification of Pedrioli by four employees. The court also instructed the jury to disregard the McNeff comment. 53
54 Glover contends that the jury instruction failed to alleviate and even aggravated the prejudice caused by the evidence erroneously presented to the jury. 55 The court instructed the jury as follows, in relevant part: Ladies and gentlemen, just prior to the noon hour, you heard some testimony relating to criminal acts by the defendant and a violation of parole. You are admonished and instructed to disregard that testimony. Glover asserts that the court erroneously spoke of a violation of parole and of criminal acts, when the testimony only informed the jury about an outstanding arrest warrant and about parole. 56 Neither defendant objected to the instruction during the trial. Glover explains that any objection would have drawn more attention to the fact that there was an outstanding warrant. 57 Nonetheless, when a defendant fails to object to the instruction at trial, we review the instruction for plain error. United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir.1995). Reversal is warranted only when viewing the error in the context of the entire record, the impropriety 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings, or where failing to reverse a conviction would amount to a miscarriage of justice.'  United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1993). We have the authority, but are not required, to correct a forfeited error which is plain and affect[ing] substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993). 58 After weighing all the relevant factors and considering especially the strength of the government's case, we have a fair assurance that neither the Speckman statements about the warrant nor the McNeff comment about Pedrioli's parole influenced the jury's verdict as to Glover. We also find that the instruction did not amount to plain error which we must recognize to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 59