Opinion ID: 1801025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Melton's Lack of Remorse

Text: The final claim Melton asserts on appeal is that in referencing Melton's lack of remorse in its order denying postconviction relief, the lower court improperly considered a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Melton cites to numerous opinions from this Court holding that lack of remorse is a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance and cannot be considered in a capital sentencing. Thus, Melton claims that he was denied the right to a fair hearing and that he is therefore entitled to a new hearing before an impartial tribunal. We conclude that Melton is not entitled to relief on this claim since the court below was not sentencing the defendant, nor was it considering aggravating circumstances in considering the postconviction claims. Furthermore, the court only made a passing reference to Melton's lack of remorse, which has been found to constitute no error by this Court in previous cases. The relevant portion of the trial court's order denying relief concerns the court's discussion of the mitigation presented by counsel at Melton's original trial: This court finds that, in essence, this information was presented to the jury during the penalty phase and to the trial court who ultimately decided that the death penalty was appropriate. In the penalty phase, the Defendant steadfastly denied his involvement in the Saylor murder. It is this Court's belief that the steadfast denial of his involvement in the Saylor murder may have been one of the strongest condemning factors against him during the penalty phase. The complete denial of culpability must, of necessity, reflect a complete lack of remorse regarding the death of Ricky Saylor. The judge and the jury had before it the overwhelming aggravating factor of the Defendant's murder of another human being prior to the murder of Mr. Carter. Defense counsel was at an overwhelming disadvantage and this Court finds that he presented the best evidence and argument that could be made for the benefit of the Defendant. Melton relies on the following four cases to establish that his lack of remorse cannot be considered in his capital sentencing: Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837 (Fla.1997); Colina v. State, 570 So.2d 929 (Fla.1990); Trawick v. State, 473 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 1985); and Pope v. State, 441 So.2d 1073 (Fla.1983). Melton is correct that these cases stand for the proposition asserted; however, this Court makes clear, in Shellito for example, that lack of remorse is a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance and cannot be considered in a capital sentencing.  701 So.2d at 842 (emphasis added). Initially we note that Melton is contesting comments made by a trial court in dismissing his claims for postconviction relief; these comments were not a part of his sentencing. Thus, these holdings do not govern the instant case. Furthermore, in Shellito, we went on to note that, on the record in that case, the brief reference to lack of remorse was of minor consequence and constituted harmless error. Id. In this case, the trial court only included two sentences in its postconviction order regarding Melton's lack of remorse in a detailed and lengthy discussion regarding the presentation of mitigation and the weight of the aggravators considered by the jury during his penalty phase. Accordingly, such comments constitute harmless error. We do not find that Melton was denied his right to an impartial postconviction hearing.