Opinion ID: 1166845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: expert testimony in disciplinary proceedings

Text: {10} The Legislature has listed gross negligence, Section 61-4-10(A)(16)(f), and repeated similar acts of negligence, Section 61-4-10(A)(16)(i), as unprofessional conduct that may serve as grounds for suspending or revoking a license to practice chiropractic. Based on findings that Dr. Gonzales's acts fell below the standard of chiropractic care, the Board concluded that Dr. Gonzales had been grossly negligent and had committed repeated similar negligent acts. Dr. Gonzales claims that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support these findings. He claims that he is being held to a standard applicable only to him and that the Board relied on its own expertise rather than evidence in the record to reach its decision. Dr. Gonzales argues that due process requires expert testimony depicting the standard of care in the community in order to suspend a professional license. The Board, in response, contends that expert testimony is not necessary to determine the standard of chiropractic care because that is a matter particularly within the expertise of the Board itself and appellate courts should defer to the Board's expertise. {11} In Weiss v. New Mexico Board of Dentistry, 110 N.M. 574, 583, 798 P.2d 175, 184 (1990), a dentist challenged an administrative board's disciplinary action because it was taken without the benefit of expert testimony. The Board of Dentistry in Weiss had revoked the dentist's license following four felony convictions for submitting false claims of reimbursement. The Board based its action on those convictions and on the dentist's failure to practice dentistry in a professionally competent manner. Weiss, 110 N.M. at 577, 798 P.2d at 178. With respect to both grounds for the disciplinary action, we rejected the argument that expert testimony was necessary for the license revocation. Id. at 583, 798 P.2d at 184. We concluded that the existence of the underlying convictions was not at issue, thereby making it unnecessary to establish the convictions through expert testimony. Id. Additionally, in response to the argument that expert testimony was required to establish a failure to practice in a professionally competent manner, we stated that where the agency conducting the hearing is itself composed of experts qualified to make a judgment as to the licensee's adherence to standards of professional conduct, see [NMSA 1978, § 61-1-11(C) (1981)], there is no need for the kind of assistance an expert provides in the form of an opinion under Rule 11-702 of the Rules of Evidence. Id. {12} In taking this position in Weiss, we aligned ourselves with a substantial minority of jurisdictions that do not require expert testimony in such matters. See, e.g., Levinson v. Connecticut Bd. of Chiropractic Exm'rs, 211 Conn. 508, 560 A.2d 403, 412-13 (1989) (listing cases and applying minority position of not requiring expert testimony). We did so in order to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. The Legislature, in creating the Board of Dentistry, determined that a majority of the board shall be composed of experts in the relevant field. See NMSA 1978, § 61-5A-8 (1994). The Legislature provided for a certain level of internal self-regulation, subject to limited judicial review, by granting the Board of Dentistry power over licensure and discipline. See NMSA 1978, § 61-5A-2 (1994) (describing issuance of licenses and discipline as among the primary duties of board of dental health); NMSA 1978, § 61-5A-10(F) (1994) (listing specific powers and duties). Further, the Legislature has provided that [b]oards and hearing officers may utilize their experience, technical competence and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of evidence presented to them. Section 61-1-11(C). Thus, our conclusion in Weiss reflected the Legislature's intent not to require expert testimony to determine a standard of professional competence against which to judge the actions of a particular dentist. See Weiss, 110 N.M. at 583, 798 P.2d at 184 (citing Section 61-1-11). {13} These considerations apply with equal force to the Board of Chiropractic Examiners. Unlike a jury, a majority of the members of the Board have a degree of expertise which allows for a greater ability to draw inferences from expert and non-expert testimony. See NMSA 1978, § 61-4-3(A) (1993). Additionally, the Board possesses licensure and disciplinary powers, see, e.g., § 61-4-3(F), (I), and is governed by the same statutory rule of evidence noted in Weiss that allows the use of the Board's expertise in evaluating evidence, see § 61-1-11(C). Therefore, we do not believe that the Legislature intended to require expert testimony in order to establish the standard of care for disciplinary actions against chiropractors. {14} We recognize that a slight majority of jurisdictions have chosen to require expert testimony in determining a standard of care and whether a professional's conduct fell below that standard in order to revoke or suspend a professional license. See, e.g., In re Appeal of Schramm, 414 N.W.2d 31, 35-36 (S.D.1987) (listing cases and adopting majority position). These jurisdictions have required expert testimony primarily for three reasons. Id. First, a professional license is a constitutionally protected property right, and professional licensees facing license revocation or suspension must be afforded due process, often including the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at a hearing. See Mills v. New Mexico State Bd. of Psychologist Exam'rs, 1997-NMSC-028, ¶ 14,123 N.M. 421, 941 P.2d 502. As a result, a number of courts have reasoned that the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses would be frustrated by the absence of expert testimony. See Schramm, 414 N.W.2d at 35. Second, boards in many states, like the Board of Chiropractic Examiners, are composed of both experts and lay persons. As a result, a number of courts have relied on the composition of professional boards to conclude that the absence of expert testimony disrupts the balance in the mixed membership by giving too much power to the expert members. See id. Finally, a number of courts have relied on the importance of effective judicial review. Id. at 35-36. Without the requirement of expert testimony, courts have reasoned that a board could rely on knowledge and expertise outside of the record. This practice would render [the] appellate court's review meaningless, as absent expert testimony, we cannot, by telepathy, act as mind readers determining from an empty record the factual determinations of the Board members. Id. at 36. {15} We believe each of these considerations is important, though we do not believe that they are sufficient to overcome our interpretation of the Uniform Licensing Act. Given these considerations, however, we feel it is necessary to clarify our holding in Weiss. We affirm our earlier construction of the Uniform Licensing Act in Weiss and hold that expert testimony is not required in order to establish negligence or a failure to comply with the standards of Section 61-4-10(A)(16). Nevertheless, this holding like our holding in Weiss, should not be construed as altering the standard of review articulated in the Act. We are bound to apply the requirements of the Act and to protect licensees' rights to due process by requiring that the Board rely on substantial evidence in reaching its decision. We will defer to the Board's expert interpretation of evidence, but we will not allow the Board to take disciplinary action without substantial evidence in the record to justify the application of the Board's expertise. Thus, if there is uncontradicted evidence in the record that a chiropractor has complied with the standard of care, the Board would be outside its statutory authority, and outside the requirements of due process, in going beyond the record to rely on its own knowledge and skill as the basis for finding a violation of the standard of care. Cf. In re Williams, 60 Ohio St.3d 85, 573 N.E.2d 638, 640 (1991) (noting that expert testimony is not required in every case but requiring substantial evidence for decision and stating that a board cannot convert its own disagreement with an expert's opinion into affirmative evidence of a contrary proposition where the issue is one on which medical experts are divided and there is no statute or rule governing the situation). {16} This limitation on a board's authority would not apply to patent violations of the standard of care, see Schramm, 414 N.W.2d at 37; cf. Pharmaseal Lab., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 758, 568 P.2d 589, 594 (1977) ([I]f negligence can be determined by resort to common knowledge ordinarily possessed by an average person, expert testimony as to standards of care [in medical malpractice actions] is not essential.), or to disciplinary matters unrelated to negligence and necessarily within the internal self-regulation prerogative of the profession, cf. Section 61-4-3(F) (delegating authority to the Board to promulgate rules and regulations). Further, we do not intend to limit the power of the Board to take notice of facts within the members' expertise, so long as the licensee is notified either before or during the hearing of the fact so noticed and its source and [is] afforded an opportunity to contest the fact so noticed. Section 61-1-11(B). Finally, we do not intend to limit the ability of the Board to reject expert testimony that the licensee complied with the standard of care, or other expert testimony, so long as the Board's ultimate action is supported by substantial evidence. See In re Grimm, 138 N.H. 42, 635 A.2d 456, 464 (1993) ([W]e note that the board may reject uncontradicted opinion testimony that its own expertise renders unpersuasive.); see also Van Orman v. Nelson, 78 N.M. 11, 23, 427 P.2d 896, 908 (1967) (stating general rule that trier of fact is free to reject uncontradicted expert opinion testimony and that the opinion of an expert, although uncontradicted, is not conclusive of the fact in issue); Dickenson v. Regent of Albuquerque, Ltd., 112 N.M. 362, 363, 815 P.2d 658, 659 (Ct.App.1991) (same). With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.