Opinion ID: 1998977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Concurrent Benefits

Text: Petitioners also argue that it is illogical to award concurrent benefits for both temporary total disability and permanent partial disability. How, they ask, is it possible to be both totally disabled and partially disabled at the same time? How can a worker be, at one time, both temporarily and permanently disabled? They also assert that [a] claimant cannot be more than 100%, or totally, disabled whether that total disability be temporary or permanent. These arguments based on policy and logic must confront the language of the statutory provision for schedule awards, which states: In case of disability partial in character but permanent in quality, the compensation shall be 66 2/3% of the employee's average weekly wages which shall be in addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability paid in accordance with paragraph (2) or (4)[ [3] ] of this subsection respectively, and shall be paid to the employee, as follows: [listing the scheduled parts of the body]. D.C.Code § 32-1508(3) (emphasis added). Petitioners respond that in addition to does not necessarily mean concurrently, as opposed to sequentially. We agree, but neither does this language forbid concurrent benefits, and petitioners have not cited any legislative history or persuasive precedent to demonstrate that the Board's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. In the recent Ambrose decision, this court considered whether the Act authorizes concurrent benefits for permanent total disability and permanent partial disability. [4] Although entertain[ing] considerable doubt that concurrent benefits were authorized, 952 A.2d at 170, we remanded for the Board to consider the issue anew, emphasizing two central concerns. We identified [t]he normal rule... that, since a person can be no more than totally disabled at a given point, he or she cannot be awarded both total permanent and permanent partial benefits for the same injurious episode.... Id. at 175 (italics omitted) (quoting A. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 92.01[2] (2000)). We also highlighted the in addition to language in D.C.Code § 32-1508(3), which we have quoted above, pointing out that there is no comparable provision for permanent total disability. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 952 A.2d at 174 (italics in original) (footnote omitted). On remand, after a thorough discussion of the statutory language and existing precedent, the Board held that an injured worker is not entitled to receive permanent partial disability benefits (a `schedule award') pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 32-1508(3) concurrently with permanent total disability benefits pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 32-1508(1). Tommie Ambrose v. Howard University, CRB No. 06-23(R), 2008 WL 3338457, at  (July 22, 2008). But this case involves temporary total disability benefits, and the pertinent statutory provisions are different. When it first reviewed this case, before the Ambrose decisions were issued, the Board noted that the question of whether concurrent schedule and wage loss benefits can be awarded has been resolved by this Board previously, and it readily affirmed the ALJ's determination that an award of concurrent temporary total disability benefits and schedule loss benefits is allowable under the Act.... The Board remanded for further findings of fact concerning whether the non-schedule impairment is a cause or contributing factor of the ongoing wage loss. When the matter returned, after remand, the Board noted that petitioners again raised the question, in light of Ambrose, whether the concurrent disability awards are consistent with the statutory scheme and permissible under current law. Without extended discussion, the Board remarked: The Ambrose decision of the Court, as further refined in the Board's Ambrose decision on Remand, supports the Respondent's position in the instant matter. It held that the compensation order was fully in accordance with the law to the extent that the current case law does not constrain the ALJ from awarding concurrent wage loss and schedule loss benefits. Petitioners rightly point out that the award of concurrent benefits may give the injured employee a financial incentive to stay at home rather than return to work, and perhaps the legislature meant something different when it used the words in addition to. Recognizing, however, that D.C.Code § 32-1508(3) expressly authorizes a schedule award  in addition to compensation for temporary total disability or temporary partial disability[,] we cannot say that the Board's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable.