Opinion ID: 516169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of travel expenses

Text: 52 Prior to trial, defendant's attorney filed a motion with the district court requesting travel expenses. The motion alleged that in order to provide an adequate defense it was necessary for the defendant's attorney to travel to Spain to interview witnesses that could testify in the trial on his behalf and to investigate his background, police records and documents. The motion was denied by the district court. 53 Appellant claims that the denial of this motion was an abuse of discretion. He argues that information necessary to the defense could have been obtained if his attorney had been allowed to travel to Spain to interview witnesses who could testify at the trial on his behalf and to investigate his background, police records and documents. 54 Appellant contends that the trip to Spain should have been authorized under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(e)(1), which states: 55 Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte motion. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court, or the United States magistrate if the services are required in connection with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. (Emphasis added.) 56 Appellant relies upon the holding in United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.1976), in which the Second Circuit, relying upon the legislative history, declared that the purpose of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A, was to redress the imbalance in the criminal process when the resources of the United States Government are pitted against an indigent defendant. The court held that the statutory phrase necessary to an adequate defense, must be construed with this commendable purpose in mind. Id. Durant is distinguishable from the case at hand. In Durant, the court found that the trial court's denial of a motion to provide a fingerprint expert was likely to be pivotal to the identification of the defendant, id. at 828, and, therefore, a new trial was warranted. But, appellant here has made no showing that the proposed investigatory expedition to Spain would produce any evidence likely to be pivotal to his defense. 57 More pertinent is United States v. Davis, 582 F.2d 947, 951 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2408, 60 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1979), where the court held that, when investigative services are requested, a defendant must show specifically the reasons why the services are necessary. In Davis, the defendant's motion for funds from the court to contact potential witnesses was denied because he gave no explanation of the relevance of the witnesses he wished to contact, he did not point to a particular lead which needed to be pursued and he did not explain what other investigative efforts had been exhausted. Id. at 951-952. 58 The reasons given by defense counsel here for the trip to Spain were: to interview witnesses that could testify in the trial on his behalf and to investigate his background, police records or documents. No names of specific witnesses were stated, nor was the relevance of the putative testimony stated. Nor was there any showing that records, documents or other evidence were unobtainable without a costly trip to Spain. 59 The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A(e)(1), provides that a defendant may request an investigative expert or other services necessary to an adequate defense. But, the concern for fairness does not mean that all applications should be granted regardless of merit. Based upon the facts before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to fund an exploratory junket to Spain.