Opinion ID: 48746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Claim Seven

Text: Lastly, Scheanette relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey72 and Ring v. Arizona73 to argue that the Texas mitigation special issue is unconstitutional because it does not require the prosecution to prove the nonexistence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.74 On direct appeal, the TCCA denied relief on this claim, finding that it had “previously addressed and rejected this argument.”75 On state habeas review, the TCCA adopted the state trial court’s conclusions that this claim be denied because it had 71 See, e.g., Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1996); James v. Collins, 987 F.2d at 1120 & n.5. 72 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 73 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 74 In particular, Scheanette asserts violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Scheanette refers to a Fifth Amendment violation in the title of this claim, but refers to violations of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in his closing remarks. If Scheanette is now arguing a Fifth Amendment violation, Scheanette’s Fifth Amendment claim is waived because he did not seek a COA from the district court on this basis. See Brewer v. Quarterman, 466 F.3d at 346. 75 Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d at 505 (citing Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). 24 already been raised and rejected on direct appeal; and because the TCCA had already ruled on and rejected this claim. The district court also denied relief on this claim, concluding that because neither Apprendi nor Ring require a mitigating factor to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, Scheanette failed to identify any erroneous or unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s dismissal of this claim because it has been previously rejected in both state76 and federal court, and is not supported by Supreme Court authority. We have specifically held that the Texas death penalty scheme did not violate either Apprendi or Ring by failing to require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of mitigating circumstances.77 In Granados v. Quarterman, we stated that “the state was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every finding prerequisite to exposing [the defendant] to the maximum penalty of 76 The TCCA has previously remarked that “the burden is implicitly placed upon the [defendant] to produce and persuade the jury that circumstances exist which mitigate against the imposition of death . . .;” and the court is “unaware of any constitutional requirement that the burden of proof regarding mitigating evidence be placed on either party, and to the extent that the burden is on [the defendant], we note that it is not unconstitutional to so place the burden.” Lawton v. Texas, 913 S.W.2d 542, 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc); see Hankins, 132 S.W.3d at 386. 77 Granados, 455 F.3d at 536; see Rowell, 398 F.3d at 379 (“No Supreme Court or Circuit precedent constitutionally requires that Texas’s mitigation special issue be assigned a burden of proof.”). 25 death,”78 and we concluded that “a finding of mitigating circumstances reduces a sentence from death, rather than increasing it to death.”79 In sum, the Texas court’s denial of relief was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal law. As a result, reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s dismissal of Scheanette’s claim.