Opinion ID: 2229872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Appropriateness of Death Penalty

Text: Defendant next contends that his death penalty should be reversed in light of the mitigation evidence presented at his sentencing hearing. Defendant argues that the mitigating evidence admitted below shows that he is a youthful offender whose criminal behavior can be traced to an upbringing without supervision or role models. Defendant further argues that his behavior would improve as he grows older in the structured environment of prison. Thus, defendant requests that this court vacate his death sentence and remand the cause so that the trial court could impose a sentence other than death. A sentencing decision by the trial court will generally not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court abuses its discretion. People v. Blackwell 171 Ill.2d 338, 360, 216 Ill.Dec. 524, 665 N.E.2d 782 (1996); People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill.2d 79, 89, 175 Ill.Dec. 731, 600 N.E.2d 1189 (1992). However, this court has recognized the qualitative difference between death and imprisonment as penalties. People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill.2d 145, 161, 44 Ill.Dec. 483, 411 N.E.2d 849 (1980). For this reason, this court traditionally gives less deference to the trial court in reviewing a decision to impose death than for other sentencing matters. Blackwell, 171 Ill.2d at 361, 216 Ill.Dec. 524, 665 N.E.2d 782. In reviewing whether death is an appropriate penalty, we are guided by the recognition that each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts. People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253, 280, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989). In making this evaluation, the focus must be on the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant. People v. Carlson, 79 Ill.2d 564, 590, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980). Where defendant's crime is shown to be an aberration brought about by special circumstances, neither the deterrent nor retributive functions of the death penalty are served and death is an inappropriate sentence. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 278, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118. An examination of the cases where we have found death to be an inappropriate penalty reveals a consistent pattern. In those cases, the circumstances surrounding the murder generally involved the defendant acting under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. See, e.g., Carlson, 79 Ill.2d at 590, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233 (marital discord); People v. Buggs, 112 Ill.2d 284, 295, 97 Ill.Dec. 669, 493 N.E.2d 332 (1986) (marital discord); Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 282, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118 (job loss). In addition, the defendants in those cases generally led blameless lives with little contact with the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Blackwell 171 Ill.2d at 364, 216 Ill.Dec. 524, 665 N.E.2d 782; Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 282, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118; Buggs, 112 Ill.2d at 295, 97 Ill.Dec. 669, 493 N.E.2d 332; Carlson, 79 Ill.2d at 590, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233. Under such circumstances, this court has determined that the death penalty is excessive and inappropriate. Defendant's character and the circumstances surrounding his crime are easily distinguishable from those cases where we have found the death penalty excessive. Defendant committed an opportunistic murder that was not the result of any stressful event or emotional circumstances. In addition, defendant's crime was not an aberration in an otherwise blameless life: he had a lengthy and continually escalating criminal history. Given the circumstances surrounding defendant's crime and his criminal history, we decline to disturb the trial court's finding that death is an appropriate penalty.