Opinion ID: 182845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Campaign of Retaliatory Harassment

Text: Barton further contends that Clancy violated clearly established law by conducting a campaign of harassment against him in retaliation for his protected activity. Barton's claim of retaliatory harassment is based on substantially the same facts as his handicap harassment claim: Clancy's statements conveying his disapproval of Barton being hired as the basketball coach and Clancy's investigation into Barton's tax records and pension. [17] We first survey the law relevant to Barton's claim of retaliatory harassment before assessing the claim itself.
Public employees do not forego all the protections of the First Amendment by virtue of working for the government. Foley v. Town of Randolph, 598 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2010). The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has long protected the First Amendment rights not only of the employees themselves, but of the general public in receiving the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic discussion. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether a challenged government action violates a public employee's First Amendment right to freedom of speech, we examine (1) `whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern,' (2) `whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public,' and (3) whether the plaintiff can show that the protected expression was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision. Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36, 45 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006)). Clancy does not argue that Barton did not speak as a citizen on matters of public concern, that the government had an adequate justification for its treatment of Barton, or that Barton's protected speech was not a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged harassment. Indeed, the district court reached conclusions in Barton's favor on each of these issues, [18] and Clancy does not dispute those determinations. Therefore, we do not address these issues on appeal.
Clancy first argues, without citation to authority, that there can be no constitutional violation in the absence of an employer-employee relationship with Barton for purposes of the coaching position. As discussed above, Clancy did not exercise sufficient control over Barton's employment as a high school basketball coach to qualify as his employer for purposes of Massachusetts's antidiscrimination law. However, the fact that Clancy was not Barton's employer for purposes of employment discrimination law does not foreclose Barton's First Amendment retaliation claim. A traditional employment relationship is not a prerequisite to a First Amendment retaliation claim. Official retaliation is actionable because it tend[s] to chill individuals' exercise of constitutional rights. Powell, 391 F.3d at 17 (quotation marks omitted); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 1584, 140 L.Ed.2d 759 (1998) (The reason why such retaliation offends the Constitution is that it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.). Government actions that threaten to chill protected activity can occur in a variety of factual contexts and are not limited to cases in which the government actor is the plaintiff's employer. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996) (holding that First Amendment protections apply to government contractors as well as government employees, noting that in either case government efforts may chill speech on matters of public concern). Indeed, actionable retaliation may occur outside the employment context altogether. See, e.g., El Dia, Inc., 165 F.3d at 109-10 (retaliatory withdrawal of government advertising from newspaper infringes on First Amendment rights); Nestor Colon-Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 40-41 (1st Cir.1992) (retaliatory denial of land use permit violates First Amendment).
Clancy further contends that Barton's inability to show a tangible adverse employment action is fatal to his First Amendment claim. Clancy emphasizes that Barton has not alleged specific changes in his working conditions such as the loss of a promotion. For purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim, even in an employment setting, a plaintiff need not suffer an adverse employment action as that term ordinarily is used in the employment discrimination context. The term adverse employment action first developed in the Title VII context as a shorthand for the statutory requirement that a plaintiff show an alteration in the material terms or conditions of his employment. Bergeron, 560 F.3d at 7-8 (emphasis added). However, there is no similar requirement for a First Amendment claim filed pursuant to § 1983. See id. at 8. Instead, the `adverse employment action' inquiry in the section 1983 context focuses on whether an employer's acts, viewed objectively, place substantial pressure on the employee's political viewsor, more generally, on whether the defendants' acts would have a chilling effect on the employee's exercise of First Amendment rights. [19] Id. at 8 (citing Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1218 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc)); see also Rivera-Jiménez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87, 94 (1st Cir.2004) ([T]he standard for showing an adverse employment action is lower in the First Amendment retaliation context than it is in other contexts (such as Title VII). . . .). Thus, the pertinent question in a § 1983 retaliation case based on the First Amendment is whether the defendant's actions would deter a reasonably hardy individual[] from exercising his constitutional rights. Agosto-de-Feliciano, 889 F.2d at 1217. A campaign of informal harassment, for example, would support a First Amendment retaliation claim if the alleged harassment would have such a chilling effect. See id. (informal harassment short of actual or constructive discharge can support § 1983 retaliation claim if government's actions are sufficiently severe to cause reasonably hardy individuals to compromise their political beliefs and associations); accord Martinez-Vélez v. Rey-Hernández, 506 F.3d 32, 42 (1st Cir.2007) (same); see also Rosario-Urdaz v. Velazco, 433 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir.2006) (stating that a substantial campaign of harassment, instigated or knowingly tolerated by superiors, can form the basis for a § 1983 claim). Even relatively minor events can give rise to § 1983 liability, Rivera-Jiménez, 362 F.3d at 94, so long as the harassment is not so trivial that it would not deter an ordinary employee in the exercise of his or her First Amendment rights. See id. at 94-95 (retaliatory harassment of plaintiff, including denial of special benefits and assignments, was sufficiently adverse to form basis for First Amendment claim); see also, e.g., Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 976-77 (9th Cir.2003) (campaign of retaliatory acts, including disciplinary investigation, change in duties, and verbal harassment and humiliation, was sufficient to support First Amendment claim); Pieczynski v. Duffy, 875 F.2d 1331, 1335-36 (7th Cir.1989) (campaign of minor harassments, including removing plaintiff's long distance phone line, denying requests for vacation time, confining duties to paperwork, and not allowing her to change lunch hour, was sufficient to support First Amendment claim); Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir.1982) (campaign of petty harassments, including groundless reprimands of plaintiff and holding her up to ridicule for bringing a birthday cake to the office, supported First Amendment claim). But see McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170-71 (3d Cir.2006) (three comments by supervisor that were critical of plaintiff's job performance, without more, were too trivial to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights).
We have no difficulty concluding that the contours of the allegedly infringed right, Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269, were clearly established at the time of Clancy's actions in 2006 and 2007. Precedents from this court and the Supreme Court demonstrated that a First Amendment retaliation claim requires neither a formal employment relationship, see Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674, 116 S.Ct. 2342, nor an adverse employment action as that term is used in Title VII, see Rivera-Jiménez, 362 F.3d at 94. Moreover, we had held that even relatively minor events can give rise to liability for retaliation under § 1983, see id., and that a campaign of harassment can support a First Amendment retaliation claim if the harassment would deter a reasonably hardy individual in the exercise of his or her First Amendment rights, see, e.g., Rosario-Urdaz, 433 F.3d at 179; Agosto-de-Feliciano, 889 F.2d at 1217. Given the facts of this case, however, we need not decide whether Clancy's conduct amounted to unconstitutional retaliation based on these established principles. Rather, because we conclude that Clancy lacked fair warning that his particular conduct was unconstitutional, Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269, we hold that Clancy is entitled to qualified immunity. [20] For the most part, Clancy's statements consisted of substantively appropriate speech criticizing the decision to hire Barton as a city-employed coach while he was receiving a disability pension from the City. In his letters, Clancy invoked the financial interests of the City of Lynn and the skyrocketing increases in pension costs that were put[ting] a strain on municipal budgets and the City of Lynn's tax rate. He also asked to review public documents related to Barton's pension and payment of taxes. In essence, Clancy instigated a public controversy about an unusual hiring decision that had larger policy implications. Given Clancy's focus on that decision, the legitimate fiscal-responsibility thrust of his commentary, and the limited nature of his records inquiry, it is far from clear that Clancy's actions were sufficiently oppressive to chill the speech of a reasonably hardy individual. In these particular circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonable official in Clancy's shoes `would have understood that his conduct violated the Plaintiff['s] constitutional rights.' Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269) (alteration in original). Accordingly, Clancy is entitled to qualified immunity on Barton's retaliation claim.