Opinion ID: 48724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Crime of Violence Definition

Text: 16 Brieva further asserts that the retroactive application of Galvan-Rodriguez, decided six years after he pled guilty and four years after his guilt was adjudicated, violates due process. He argues that he should not be removable, as his crime had no negative immigration consequences at the time he entered into his plea bargain. 17 Contrary to Brieva's assertions, no law is being applied to him retroactively. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) has defined crimes of violence as aggravated felonies since 1990, prior to Brieva's plea. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978. No relevant statutory change took place following his conviction; the only change that occurred was that this court declared that, based on the continuously effective statutory definition, UUV qualifies as a crime of violence and therefore is a deportable aggravated felony. See Galvan-Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 220. As Brieva was already on notice, prior to his plea, that a conviction for a crime of violence rendered him deportable, there are no due process retroactivity concerns. 4