Opinion ID: 606718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subject-to-Call Agreement

Text: 17 The Commission assigns as error the district court's refusal to instruct the jury to consider whether an agreement about subject-to-call compensation existed between the Commission and its employees. The Commission proffered an instruction which read in part: 18 In order to determine whether the Plaintiffs are engaged to wait or waiting to be engaged you should consider among other things: ... 19 (8) The existence of any agreement whether written or verbal between the plaintiffs and the Commission regarding subject-to-call. 20 Appellant's Appendix at 157-158. The Commission contends that the evidence it presented at trial entitled it to the requested jury instruction. The Commission cites both the employees' testimony that they knew they had been hired to work subject-to-call, and the pre-employment questionnaires completed by the employees as evidence of an agreement. 21 To further bolster its argument, the Commission relies on Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944). In Skidmore, the Supreme Court stated that any determination of whether waiting time should or should not be compensable under the FLSA involves scrutiny and construction of the agreements between the particular parties, [and] appraisal of their practical construction of the working agreement by conduct.... Id. at 137, 65 S.Ct. at 163. This language presupposes that an agreement between the parties exists. The Commission is entirely correct that if such an agreement between the parties exists, the interpretation of that agreement would be an issue for the jury. However, the district court decided that the Commission had not presented sufficient evidence of an agreement to warrant the requested jury instruction. The Commission unilaterally changed the subject-to-call policy in 1987. Furthermore, the testimony and documents on which the Commission relies are general statements that do not indicate knowledge of, or acquiescence to, the specifics of the subject-to-call policy. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's refusal to give the requested instruction. 7 22 Even if we agreed that the district court erred by refusing to give the proffered jury instruction, we are convinced that the error would be harmless. The court did not prevent the Commission from introducing evidence to support its contention of an agreement, and the court did instruct the jury that: 23 In determining whether the time the plaintiffs spent on subject-to-call status was spent for the defendant's benefit, you should consider the defendant's subject-to-call policy as it was in fact communicated to, and explained to, the plaintiffs and as it was implemented by the defendant. 24 Trial Transcript vol. VII, at 1295-96. Therefore, the jury had a full opportunity to consider any agreement that may have existed between the parties.