Opinion ID: 1860134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Weighing the danger of harm and unfair prejudice to Brooks

Text: In Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637 (8th Cir.2006), a sexual harassment suit, the court allowed into evidence sexually charged comments made by the plaintiff in the work place. Testimony was also allowed that the plaintiff used lewd, rude and unlady-like language in the workplace. Id. at 643. The evidence was allowed on the basis that the plaintiff might have welcomed the alleged harassment. The admission of such evidence was affirmed on appeal, wherein the court noted: While we agree that the district court erred in mischaracterizing this evidence as non-Rule 412 evidence in the first instance, there was no danger of harm or prejudice to [the plaintiff] or any other party, and the district court correctly determined that it was admissible as relevant to the issues raised by [the plaintiffs] claims. Id. In another sexual harassment suit, Hall v. Transit Authority of Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 883 S.W.2d 884 (Ky.App.1994), the court allowed evidence of the plaintiffs extra-martial affair with a co-worker. In affirming admissibility, the court noted: If an employee made a claim for damages based upon a physical trauma allegedly suffered in the workplace, any prior or contemporaneous complaints relating to other causes of the alleged injury would most certainly be relevant. The same reasoning applies to injuries resulting from non-physical traumas such as sexual harassment. Evidence of other factors that possibly contributed to [the plaintiffs] emotional injuries are clearly relevant to the issue of damages in this case. Id. at 887. Thus, considering Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records during the term of her treatment within the context of the issues raised by the evidence, particularly in regards to the issues of consent and damages, we find no unfair prejudice. To the extent the jury finds the sexual event to have been non-consensual, it is unlikely that the evidence contained within the records dealing with her sexuality would suggest a decision on any improper basis. Were the jury to find the sexual event was consensual, then the damage to Brooks' case would be by virtue of the consent rather than the evidence of the medical records. Moreover, a trial court can, concurrent with the introduction of the evidence, give such admonitions to the jury as it deems proper to avoid any untoward use of the evidence. See Wilkinson, 307 F.3d at 422 (The court could minimize any danger of undue prejudice by admitting the evidence with a cautionary instruction.). We must also consider the danger of harm to the victim. KRE 412(b)(2). This test is, however, more objective than subjective, and must relate to potential actual harm of a physical, emotional or mental nature, as opposed to the unfair prejudicial affect one would assess upon behalf of a party. Thus, this test is separate from that of unfair prejudice. Yet, the measurement of this danger of harm to the victim, like that of unfair prejudice, may not transcend a party's right to a fair defense. See Wilkinson, 307 F.3d at 422 (The constitutional violations in this case are significant enough to outweigh any violation of the rape shield law, whose purposes can be served by the instructions of the trial court.). Conversely, the closer one gets to damaging a party's right to cross-examining a critical witness and presenting a defense, the higher the probative value of the evidence being considered for exclusion. Id. at 419-21. Considering the objective circumstances, we recognize that Brooks entered Ten Broeck for treatment stemming from her past sexual history and the mental and emotional turmoil and injury created thereby. We note from Ten Broeck's records that Brooks' discharge summary of January 20, 2001, states she felt 100% better than when she was admitted, that the group sessions had helped her, and that she had done well on her treatment. Her principal concerns upon discharge were that she might be bi-sexual and she was concerned about how her boyfriend might react to this. She noted this condition stresses her. Moreover, the fact of the trial itselfand we are not unmindful of her tearful testimonygenerated stressful, and emotional conditions for her. Yet, to the extent the evidence discussed herein is true, it is a truth she has lived with for some time. To the extent that it is not true, one would expect it would generate anger, which one would expect to be fleeting. It is not evidence, which if disclosed at trial, would cause someone to want to hurt her. In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence in this regard, the proper standard of review is an abuse of discretion. Thus, from a consideration of the evidence excluded and the relationship of this evidence to the other evidence of the case, we cannot place a value on the danger of harm to Brooks that would overcome the substantial need of Appellant for the probative value of the excluded evidence. We thus conclude that the probative value of the excluded evidence substantially outweighs the danger of harm and unfair prejudice to Brooks. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Brooks' Ten Broeck hospital records during her treatment period, as well as, the other evidence of her sexual history as discussed herein, excepting, however, Brooks' statement in her deposition that she had sex with one-hundred (100) men and one woman. This last statement should remain excluded for reasons that Brooks' Ten Broeck medical records already note that she stated she had been sexually promiscuous and had unprotected sex with numerous men and with at least one woman. Once sufficient evidence is introduced on a particular point, the KRE 403 and 412(b)(2) balancing considerations may shift to protect against unnecessary and unfair repetition designed solely to place a victim in a bad light. We note Brooks' argument that KRE 412(c) requires the defendant to file a written motion at least fourteen (14) days before trial specifically describing the evidence sought to be admitted for the purposes for which it is offered. However, two separate motions were filed by Ten Broeck seeking the admissibility of this evidence, both before, and after, the 2003 Amendment adding KRE 412(b)(2), and that Ten Broeck requested an evidentiary hearing, which the court improperly denied. Nor, do we consider the evidence to have involved evidence of reputation as argued by the Appellant. We find these arguments without merit. Moreover, having found error in the exclusion of the stated evidence, we cannot under the facts of this case, find it to be harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. To the extent they are preserved and are capable of repetition, we will also address other issues raised.