Opinion ID: 1120007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: constitutionality of street vacation

Text: London bases her constitutional argument upon Const. art. 1, § 16 (amendment 9), which provides in part: No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first made, or paid into court for the owner, ... She contends the street vacation ordinance is void because it was enacted without first ascertaining and paying compensation for the taking or damaging of her property. PMC responds that London had no property taken or damaged and, in any event, she has already been compensated. Alternatively, PMC asserts that if there is any defect it lies not in the taking but in the manner thereof, and is thereby an excusable defect. Under the case law of this state, an abutter suffering damage peculiar to himself because of a street vacation is entitled to recover compensation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Centralia, 67 Wash. 142, 120 P. 886 (1912). Further, substantial interference with access may constitute a taking or damaging of property requiring compensation under our constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, 26 Wash. 278, 66 P. 385 (1901). [3] Article 1, section 16 has been consistently construed by this court as requiring that compensation be first paid. See, e.g., State ex rel. Eastvold v. Yelle, 46 Wn.2d 166, 279 P.2d 645 (1955), and cases cited therein. It is conceded that the City of Seattle did not, prior to enactment of the vacation ordinance, take steps to ascertain or pay for any damages London may have sustained because of the street vacation. She asserts that the city council lacked the power to vacate until it complied with the constitutional requirement. Absent such compliance, she contends that the ordinance vacating the street is void and injunctive relief is presently mandated. We disagree. The state has plenary power over public streets and may vacate the public easement therein. The state may invest municipal corporations with this authority and it has done so by statute. See, e.g., RCW 35.79 (street vacation statute); RCW 8.12 (delegating eminent domain powers to cities). The instant ordinance was clearly within the City's vacation power. At issue is whether failure to assess damages prior to passage voids the ordinance. RCW 35.79, which authorizes the legislative authority of cities or towns to vacate streets, does not provide for ascertainment and payment of damages in advance of the vacation. Compare RCW 8.12. RCW 35.79 has existed in virtually the same form since 1901. [1] Although numerous street vacations have been contested before this court in the 80 years since the statute's enactment, we have discovered no case where a vacating ordinance was declared void solely because of the failure to previously ascertain and pay damages. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the vacation ordinance and denied injunctive relief, relegating London to her remedy in damages. Under these circumstances, we agree. All procedures required prior to enacting the ordinance were followed including public meetings by the city planning commission, the planning and urban development committee, and the transportation committee of the city council. An environmental impact statement was prepared. Although London and her counsel were well aware of the imminence of the enactment of the street vacation ordinance, she took no judicial action to restrain it. Her protests to the Seattle City Council against the ordinance did not raise the issue of failure to ascertain and pay her damages as affecting the legality of the ordinance. After the council approved the vacation ordinance and the mayor signed it, a 30-day period had to elapse before it became effective. London did nothing. Finally, December 9, 1977, almost 2 weeks after the ordinances became effective, she brought an action asking that the ordinance be declared unconstitutional and void and that injunctive relief be ordered. [4] Any injury that the vacation might occasion to London was effected when the public right to continued use of the street was terminated  the date the ordinance became effective. See Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465, 473-74, 252 P. 111, 49 A.L.R. 1249 (1927). Thus, the issue becomes the propriety of post -damaging injunctive relief. We have stated in another context that damaging without prior compensation is not illegal in an ultimate and compelling constitutional sense. Wandermere Corp. v. State, 79 Wn.2d 688, 698, 488 P.2d 1088 (1971). Assuming, arguendo, that London's damages should have been ascertained prior to enactment of the vacation ordinance, such a determination by this court at this time would appear to be at most a Pyrrhic victory for her. See Wandermere Corp. v. State, supra at 698. Before a taking has been completed, injunction is an appropriate remedy to enforce the prepayment requirements of our constitution. But once the taking is complete, payment of just compensation is the only sufficient and suitable remedy. Domrese v. Roslyn, 89 Wash. 106, 154 P. 140 (1916); Wandermere Corp. v. State, supra . See Comment, Balancing Private Loss Against Public Gain To Test for a Violation of Due Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 Wash. L. Rev. 315, 326 (1979). Under the circumstances of this case, injunctive relief to London would not appear to be equitable. See Steele v. Queen City Broadcasting Co., 54 Wn.2d 402, 341 P.2d 499 (1959). The court has considerable discretion in granting or withholding equitable relief. Goetz v. Russell, 132 Wash. 339, 232 P. 300 (1925). The record indicates a cost to PMC exceeding $100,000 for each month of delay in construction. It appears that the amount of London's damages, if any, was not affected by prior passage of the ordinance. The sole remaining matter is to determine the amount. We note that damages for injuries of this nature, where no property is physically taken, are more closely akin to consequential damages than to direct damages. No one is actually dispossessed of his or her property. The trial court correctly denied London injunctive relief and reserved determination of damages for trial.