Opinion ID: 286502
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim for Libel

Text: 7 Bernard asserted that publication of the alleged libel occurred 'no later' than February 5, 1966. The complaint was filed June 6, 1967, more than one year after the publication. The Illinois statute of limitations requires that action for libel shall be commenced within one year after the libel occurs. 1 Thus, because the complaint was not filed until more than one year had elapsed after the publication date, the action was barred unless the action was tolled by Ill.Rev.Sat. ch. 83, 19. 2 8 Although the district court found that Dietene continuously held a Certificate of Authority to transact business in Illinois and that it had maintained a registered office and registered agent in Illinois since September 14, 1965, the court concluded, with respect to the libel claim, that the Illinois statute of limitations had not run in favor of Dietene because it had not been a resident of the State of Illinois at any time after the libel occurred and, therefore, under Illinois law it could not 'claim the benefit of the Illinois statute of limitations until it becomes a resident of Illinois.' 9 The court's ruling was contrary to Illinois law. Under the applicable decisions of that state, the question whether a foreign corporation is within the state for statute of limitations purposes depends upon whether the corporation is amenable to process during the limitation period, and does not depend upon where the corporation is domiciled. Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan, 1 Ill.App. 364 (1878); Hubbard v. United States Mortgage Co.,14 Ill.App. 40 (1883); Thornton v. Nome and Sinook Co., 260 Ill.App. 76 (1931). The Thornton case discussed Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan and Hubbard v. United States Mortgage Co. and said that they were authority 'for holding only that foreign corporations operating in Illinois and subject to process in this State, may be considered as residents of Illinois only in so far as they are amenable to service within the State the same as a domestic corporation, and that since process must be accepted by them, they also share the privilege with domestic corporations, of pleading the statute of limitations.' 260 Ill.App. at 83. 10 At all relevant times, Dietene had a registered agent for service of process within Illinois pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 32, 157.102-157.125 (1967), and was amenable to service of process within Illinois. Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 32, 157.111 (1967). 3 Since the test for tolling the Illinois statute of limitations is amenability to process, it would appear to be beyond question that the statute continued to run in this case until the action was barred. 11 Bernard argues, however, that the Illinois decisions interpreting that state's tolling statute should not be applied because the cause of action arose out of a tort which was 'initiated' in Minnesota and that it did not arise out of any transaction of business between Bernard and Dietene in Illinois. Therefore, Bernard argues that Dietene was a 'nonresident within the meaning of the Illinois Statute of Limitations' tolling provisions, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 83, sec. 19.' We cannot agree with this argument. Bernard's contention is that a registered agent of a foreign corporation is not amenable to process on a cause of action which does not arise out of the transaction of business within Illinois and therefore in the present case the tolling provision of the Illinois Statutes would prevent the statute of limitations from running against Dietene. This objection to personal jurisdiction was not presented below and was therefore waived and need not be considered here. 12 Bernard next asserts that Minnesota's longer statute of limitations should be applied in the present case. First, it should be noted that the place where the alleged tort occurred does not appear to have been a matter that either the parties or the trial court considered in relation to the defendant's statute of limitations defense. But more important, the Illinois statute of limitations applies in this case. Under Illinois decisional law, where either a plaintiff or a defendant is a resident of that state and where the cause of action arises outside of Illinois, Illinois will apply its own statute of limitations if the cause of action is one which is recognized at common law and not one created by statute. Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Ill.App.2d 257, 192 N.E.2d 217 (1963); Wetzel v. Hart, 41 Ill.App.2d 371, 190 N.E.2d 619 (1963); Horan v. New Home Sewing Machine Co., 289 Ill.App. 340, 7 N.E.2d 401 (1937); Haefer v. Herndon, 22 F.Supp. 523 (S.D.Ill.1938); Riley v. Union Pac. R. Co., 177 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1949), cert denied,338 U.S. 911, 70 S.Ct. 350, 94 L.Ed. 561 (1950). Since libel is a common law right under Illinois law, these cases are apposite and must be given recognition. 13 We conclude that the district court erred in not holding that Bernard's claim based on libel was barred because of the Illinois statute of limitations. 14