Opinion ID: 2651680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New York Civil Rights Law

Text: Finally, Bary asserts, without any citation to case law or the record, that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his claim brought pursuant to the NYCRL. In this claim, Bary alleged that he was not allowed “to travel with carry-on cabin luggage . . . based on [his] perceived race, color, ancestry, and/or national origin.” (Civ. No. 02cv5202(MDG) [Dkt # 15] at 11.) We conclude that his challenge to the summary dismissal of this claim is moot essentially for the same reason that his challenge to the summary dismissal of his Title VI claim is moot. Section 40 of the New York Civil Rights Law provides for “[e]qual rights” in various types of public accommodations. The court below found after trial that the designation of Bary as a “selectee” for search of his baggage was arrived at “follow[ing] standard procedures” and 1 As noted in Shotz, the Stabilization Act “begins by stating ‘the President shall take the following actions to compensate air carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001.’” 420 F.3d at 1336. 3 “in a non-discriminatory manner,” using a “computer system mandated by the FAA”; that Bary “was, in fact, not forced to check the suitcase containing his jewelry” and “was permitted to take his jewelry bag on the plane”; and that Bary “was not treated in a discriminatory manner on the basis of his ethnicity, religion or any other improper ground.” Accordingly, even if “public accommodations” as used in § 40 were interpreted to include airplanes, Bary could not establish that he was denied “equal rights.” Thus, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Bary’s NYCRL claim. We have considered Bary’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4