Opinion ID: 1181141
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislative History of Section 5(b)

Text: The foregoing conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history of the section, which supports respondents' assertion that a nomination is rejected if either house of the Legislature votes to reject the nominee within 90 days of the time the nomination is submitted by the Governor, and that the purpose of the second sentence is to prevent rejection by mere inaction. Section 2 of the 25th Amendment was added to the United States Constitution in 1967 to provide for filling a vacancy in the office of Vice President. It is strikingly similar to the first sentence of section 5(b). [11] In 1970, the Council of State Governments recommended that states adopt a similar provision to fill vacancies in the office of lieutenant governor, and such measures were adopted by a number of states in the years following. (Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation (1970) Model Exec. Art. 14-10-00, § 4, p. 5); Ind. Const., art. V, § 10, subd. (b), adopted 1978; La. Const., art. IV, § 15, adopted 1974; Md. Const., art. II, § 6, subd. (d), adopted 1970; S.D. Const., art. IV, § 6, adopted 1972; Wis. Const., art. XIII, § 10, subd. (2), adopted 1979.) [12] Section 5(b) of our Constitution, adopted by the voters as Proposition 9 at the General Election in 1976, was clearly a part of this movement, sparked by the 25th Amendment, to provide for the filling of vacancies in state offices. The ballot argument in favor of the measure informed the voters that it was modeled after the 25th Amendment, which provides that a nominee for the Office of Vice President must be approved by the Senate and House. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 1976), argument in favor of Prop. 9, p. 38 [hereafter ballot argument].) There can be no doubt that under the 25th Amendment and the constitutional provisions of the other jurisdictions cited, the requirement that both houses must confirm a nominee, embodied in the first sentence of section 5(b), means that an express refusal by one house to approve the nomination or the failure of either house to vote thereon results in rejection. Lungren's claim that the first sentence means only that the nominee might possibly take office sooner than if he had been rejected by one house is particularly unpersuasive in light of the close similarity between the first sentence of the section and the 25th Amendment, and the fact that the section was expressly modeled after the amendment which, the voters were told, requires confirmation by both houses of Congress. Indeed, the ballot pamphlet repeated at least half a dozen times that the measure requires confirmation by both houses. The point was made in the ballot title and the analysis by the Legislative Analyst, [13] and in the arguments to the voters. These statements are incompatible with the view that confirmation would result if one house rejected the nominee. But neither the 25th Amendment nor the constitutional provisions in the other jurisdictions referred to above include a provision similar to the second sentence of section 5(b). As just observed, in these jurisdictions the failure of either or both houses to vote on the nomination would result in rejection by inaction. (7) (See fn. 14.) The ballot title as well as the arguments to the voters by both the proponents and the opponents of Proposition 9 make it clear that the second sentence was intended to cover inaction by the Legislature and to prevent it from rejecting a nominee merely by failing to act on the nomination. [14] The ballot title explicitly stated that if the Legislature  does not act within 90 days of Governor's nomination ... appointees may take office as if confirmed. (P. 739, ante, fn. 13, italics added.) The argument against the measure, written by Assemblyman Antonovich, described the situation that would exist if the two houses could not agree on whether to confirm the nominee: Proposition 9 would also result in a political football game between the Legislature and the Governor. As the Governor would be subject to the whims of either the Senate or the Assembly, he could be rendered virtually powerless. The simple act of filling a vacancy could assume monstrous proportions if the Senate or Assembly could not reach agreement regarding a candidate that would be acceptable to both. Hence, the appointment could bounce back and forth between the Governor and Legislature, with each rejection involving more time wasted. In turn, the vacancy would remain unfilled and unproductive, while the Legislature becomes further embroiled in political maneuvering. (Ballot argument, p. 39, italics added.) The proponents, in response, impliedly acknowledged that the nomination would fail if the two houses did not agree, since they rebutted the foregoing argument with the statement that if there was a delay in filling the office because of a genuine disagreement on the qualification of a candidate the tasks of the vacant office [would be] performed by the appropriate deputy. ( Ibid. ) We do not see how it can be denied that the statements by both proponents and opponents advised the voters that disapproval by either house would result in rejection of the nomination, requiring the Governor to submit another nominee to fill the vacancy. Lungren argues that the ballot pamphlet is inconclusive as to the intention of the voters because some language in it supports his view as to the meaning of the section, and because it is impossible to know whether the voters accepted the arguments made by one side or the other in approving the measure. As to the first of these assertions, the portions of the pamphlet relied on by Lungren do not bear him out. For example, he cites a statement by the Legislative Analyst as follows: If the Senate and Assembly neither accept nor reject the person designated to the vacancy by the Governor within 90 days, the person automatically assumes office. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 3, 1976), analysis of Prop. 9 by Legislative Analyst, p. 36.) But as we make clear above, this language is subject to the construction advocated by respondents, i.e., that the reference to the Legislature's acceptance or rejection of the nominee relates only to its failure to act on the nomination. There was no such failure here. Lungren's second contention, that it cannot be determined whether the voters agreed with the argument of one side or the other in approving the measure, misses the point; whether one side or the other was more persuasive, the fact is that the proponents and the opponents both premised their arguments on an interpretation of the proposal that is inconsistent with Lungren's position, and that premise was communicated to the voters. Furthermore, Lungren's claim proves too much; the assertion that the voters' motivation cannot be determined from the ballot argument could be made in every case involving a measure adopted by vote of the people.
Lungren advances a complicated and unpersuasive legislative history argument on his own behalf. Proposition 9, which embodied section 5(b), originated as Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 94 (hereafter ACA 94), introduced by Assemblyman (now Senator) Lockyer, who was also one of the persons who later argued in favor of the proposition in the election ballot pamphlet. ACA 94 in turn had its genesis in a bill introduced by the assemblyman in 1974 (Assem. Bill No. 253, hereafter AB 253) which, after undergoing various amendments, passed both houses, but was vetoed by the Governor in 1975. AB 253, in its final version, and ACA 94 were substantially similar to Proposition 9. Lungren relies on the legislative history of AB 253, arguing that it demonstrates the Legislature intended that the bill would require that both houses must reject a nominee in order to defeat the nomination. He places his reliance largely on a statement made in a staff memorandum drafted while the measure was in the Assembly. In January 1975 AB 253 provided, like the first sentence of section 5(b), that the Governor's nominee for Treasurer must be confirmed by both houses, but it did not include what is now the second sentence of the section. [15] The bill was approved in this form by the Assembly Committee on Governmental Organization and reported out to the Assembly. However, the Assembly referred the bill back to the committee. A staff report prepared after the referral stated as follows: It is understood that the author will submit amendments to permit the nominee to take office on the 91st day after nomination unless both Houses vote to reject the nominee. Thereafter, AB 253 was amended by Assemblyman Lockyer to add the second sentence as it now appears in section 5(b). [16] Lungren contends that the statement in the staff report strongly suggests that in passing AB 253, the Legislature intended to require that both houses must disapprove a nominee in order to reject the nomination. We disagree. The statement in the staff report represents neither the intent of the Legislature that drafted the section ( California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 700-701 [170 Cal. Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856]), nor that of the electorate in adopting it ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 311-312 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]). (8) The first of the cited cases stands for the proposition that in construing a statute we will not consider as evidence in favor of a particular meaning the opinions of individual legislators who voted for the bill nor those of the author, on the ground there is no assurance that other legislators shared such opinions. A fortiori, the understanding of an unnamed staff member of a legislative committee, derived from an unnamed source, as to the anticipated contents of a forthcoming amendment to a bill, is not admissible as an indication of the Legislature's intent in ultimately enacting the measure. This is obviously the correct rule where, as here, it appears that the report was distributed only to the members of the committee that was considering the bill and its author, and was not before the general membership of either house of the Legislature. [17] Moreover, in Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, we rejected as evidence of the voters' intent in adopting an initiative measure the majority and minority reports of a legislative committee on the ground that these reports did not represent either the intent of the drafters or of the electorate in approving the measure. We stated that because the reports were not included in the voters' pamphlet they were not helpful in interpreting the intent of the voters, and we can only speculate on the extent to which the voters were cognizant of them. (38 Cal.3d 301, 312.) We can state with confidence in this case that the voters were not aware of the obscure staff memorandum now relied on by Lungren. (3d) We conclude that section 5(b) requires confirmation by both houses of the Legislature unless it fails to act on a nomination within 90 days, in which case the nominee is deemed to be confirmed under the second sentence of the provision. When, as here, one house votes to disapprove a nominee, the nomination is rejected, just as in other matters requiring legislative action. This construction fulfills both the major and minor premises of the section: i.e., that both houses must confirm a nominee, but that he may not be rejected merely by the Legislature's failure to vote on the nomination. Under this interpretation, the nomination process moves expeditiously by virtue of a 90-day time limit on the Legislature's opportunity to vote and by allowing the Governor to appoint another person upon rejection of his nominee by one house. Only this construction is consistent with the voters' intention in adopting the constitutional provision. The alternative writ is discharged and a peremptory writ is denied.