Opinion ID: 1158134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: A trial of this case was before the court. By request of one of the parties, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law were stated under W.R.C.P. 52(a) (hereinafter Rule 52(a)). Rule 52(a) states: General and special findings by court. Upon the trial of questions of fact by the court, or with an advisory jury, it shall not be necessary for the court to state its findings, except generally for the plaintiff or defendant, unless one of the parties requests it before the introduction of any evidence, with the view of excepting to the decision of the court upon the questions of law involved in the trial, in which case the court shall state in writing its special findings of fact separately from its conclusions of law; provided, that without such request the court may make such special findings of fact and conclusions of law as it deems proper and if the same are preserved in the record either by stenographic report or by the court's written memorandum, the same may be considered on appeal. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule. While the specific language of Rule 52(a) differs from its federal counterpart, F.R.C.P. 52(a), in part because current federal rules require findings of fact and conclusions of law in all cases of trial to the court without a request of parties, this court has adopted the view that the similarity in language and purpose of the state and federal rules permits resort to federal precedent for aid in effectuating the intent of Rule 52(a). Whitefoot v. Hanover Ins. Co., 561 P.2d 717, 720 (Wyo.1977). Unfortunately, on appeal, the parties have misconstrued the appropriate standard of review relevant to such findings and conclusions. We believe this confusion results from a misapplication of principles of review utilized for jury verdicts and administrative law with those related to facts found by the court. The factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the more limited review afforded a jury verdict. 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2585 at 730 (1971). The purpose of specific findings under Rule 52(a) is to inform the appellate court of the underlying facts supporting the trial court's conclusions of law and disposition of the issues. Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, 698 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Wyo. 1985); Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 730 (Wyo.1979); Whitefoot, 561 P.2d at 720. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Shores v. Lindsey, 591 P.2d 895, 899 (Wyo.1979); 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 729, 731. Deference is given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Shores, 591 P.2d at 899. Because this court does not weigh the evidence de novo, findings may not be set aside because we would have reached a different result. Shores, 591 P.2d at 899; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 732-33. The appellant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the finding is erroneous. 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 729. On appeal, findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous. Shores, 591 P.2d at 899; Whitefoot, 561 P.2d at 720; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 729. The definitive test of when a finding is clearly erroneous was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). A finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. at 395, 68 S.Ct. at 542. See Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 495 U.S. 660, 670, 110 S.Ct. 2034, 2041, 109 L.Ed.2d 677 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2990, 120 L.Ed.2d 868 (1992) (reaffirming the United States Gypsum Co. test). Wyoming accepted this standard for Rule 52(a) in Shores, 591 P.2d at 899. Alternatively, a determination that a finding is against the great weight of the evidence means a finding will be set aside even if supported by substantial evidence. Rocky Mountain Turbines, Inc. v. 660 Syndicate, Inc., 623 P.2d 758, 762 (Wyo.1981); Shores, 591 P.2d at 899; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2585 at 735 n. 10. Conclusions of law made by the district court under Rule 52(a) are not binding upon this court and are reviewed de novo. Shores, 591 P.2d at 900; 9 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2588 at 752. Findings of fact of the trial judge can also lose the insulation of the clearly erroneous standard if they are induced by an erroneous view of the law, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,    333 U.S. at 394, 68 S.Ct. at 541; and United States v. Richberg,    398 F.2d 523 ([5th Cir.] 1968), or contain factual and legal conclusions that reflect the application of an improper legal standard. Shores, 591 P.2d at 899-900.