Opinion ID: 700460
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: National origin harassment

Text: 13 To make out a claim of national origin harassment, Amirmokri must show (1) that the acts of BG & E employees were severe and pervasive enough to create a hostile working environment and (2) that some basis exists to impute liability to his employer. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc) (adopting panel dissenting opinion); Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir.1989). Liability may be imputed to the employer if the employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a hostile working environment and took no prompt and adequate remedial action. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106; Dwyer, 867 F.2d at 184. 14 Whether harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment is quintessentially a question of fact. Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524, 530 (4th Cir.1994); Paroline, 879 F.2d at 105. To show that harassment was severe or pervasive, a plaintiff must show that he perceived, and a reasonable person would perceive, the work environment to be abusive. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 367, 371, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). 15 The district court found that Amirmokri produced sufficient evidence to show that harassment occurred and that it was severe and pervasive. He testified that for six months Polak and other co-workers abused him almost daily, calling him names like the local terrorist, a camel jockey and the Emir of Waldorf. He also asserted that Polak intentionally tried to embarrass him by giving him impossible tasks and by saying in front of co-workers that Amirmokri did not know what he was doing. He testified that this abuse led to his ulcer and his ultimate resignation. A reasonable person could easily find this atmosphere to be hostile. See Boutros v. Canton Regional Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 203-04 (6th Cir.1993). 16 BG & E may be liable for Polak's harassment if it knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir.1983). The adequacy of BG & E's response once it was aware of the harassment is a factual issue. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 106. In Paroline, a Unisys employee was sexually harassed by a co-worker. When she complained, Unisys launched a formal investigation, disciplined the harasser, and required him to seek counseling. The harasser was informed that any further incidents would be grounds for his immediate termination. We held that a reasonable factfinder could infer that Unisys intended the reprimand to be no more than a slap on the wrist and, therefore, a genuine issue of fact existed about whether Unisys's action was reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Id. at 107. 17 Here, BG & E's response was even less decisive than that in Paroline. To begin with, it is not clear whether anyone at BG & E ever investigated Amirmokri's complaint, even after Amirmokri complained to Dunson, the Employee Grievance Coordinator, in August 1990. Dunson claims that he spoke to Polak and several other members of the Calvert Cliffs supervisory staff, Richard Honaker (Employment Recruiter), Thornton, Creel (a company Vice President), and a Mr. Denton. However, Polak testified that he never heard about Amirmokri's allegations until after Amirmokri resigned and filed his EEOC complaint. Thornton also denied speaking to Dunson until after the complaint was filed and said he had no recollection of Dunson investigating the matter. Amirmokri testified that Dunson (who knew about Amirmokri's complaints in August 1990) did not get back to him until after he complained to Creel in October 1990. Creel testified that he first spoke to Dunson after his October meeting with Amirmokri, when he asked Dunson to review Amirmokri's allegations. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent regarding when (if at all) Dunson investigated Amirmokri's allegations, and thus whether BG & E's remedial action was prompt. 1 18 Even if Dunson had investigated promptly, a reasonable factfinder could find his superficial response inadequate. After speaking with Polak and other supervisors, Dunson did not pursue the matter further. He did not interview any members of Amirmokri's work group other than Polak, did not warn or reprimand Polak, did not counsel Polak, and did not grant Amirmokri's request to be separated from Polak. This action falls far short of that taken by other employers in harassment cases. Cf. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 103-04 (formal investigation undertaken, perpetrator disciplined, given written warning and required to seek counseling); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir.1987) (harasser given written warning, told suspension would follow further misconduct, and monitored). We cannot say that the extent of Dunson's investigation and his failure to take further remedial action were, as a matter of law, reasonably calculated to end the harassment. 19 The district court, after holding that Amirmokri made out a prima facie case of national origin harassment, nonetheless dismissed his claim on the grounds that no equitable relief was available to him. In his complaint, Amirmokri requested compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees and costs, and [s]uch other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate. We interpret the last item as a sufficient request for appropriate equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g)(1) (permitting equitable relief as the court deems appropriate). The district court concluded that because it had previously held that compensatory and punitive damages were unavailable, 2 and Amirmokri had articulated no other available relief, Amirmokri's claim must be dismissed. 20 The equitable relief ordinarily available in Title VII workplace harassment cases is an injunction prohibiting further harassment. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g)(1); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371-72, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 660 (4th Cir.1990). The fact that Amirmokri made only a general request for equitable relief does not prevent him from being awarded an injunction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c); Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 66, 99 S.Ct. 383, 387, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978). However, because Amirmokri is no longer employed by BG & E, an injunction against future harassment would be of no benefit to him unless he first obtains an injunction reinstating him at Calvert Cliffs. Thus, to obtain equitable relief on his harassment claim, he must prevail on his constructive discharge claim. If the district court had correctly dismissed Amirmokri's constructive discharge claim, its dismissal of the harassment claim also would have been correct. As we discuss below, however, the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the constructive discharge claim. If Amirmokri prevails on that claim, he may seek an injunction reinstating him at Calvert Cliffs, and hence he may be eligible for an injunction against further harassment. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on Amirmokri's national origin harassment claim.