Opinion ID: 2037357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right of Intervention.

Text: The fundamental and paramount issue we face in this case is whether the Lofts have a right to intervene. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 75 delineates who is generally entitled to intervention. [3] Rule 75 provides [a]ny person interested in the subject matter of the litigation, ..., may intervene at any time before trial begins.... Iowa R. Civ. P. 75. Although we are to liberally construe the rule of intervention, we must be certain that the applicant has asserted a legal right or liability that will be directly affected by the litigation. In re J.R., 315 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Iowa 1982). In determining whether an applicant has a legal interest, we examine the source of the right claimed. A.G., 558 N.W.2d at 403. An indirect, speculative, or remote interest will not provide one a right to intervene. Id. ; see 59 Am.Jur.2d Parties § 134, at 591-92 (1987) (to have an interest in an action, a person must assert more than a mere general interest in the subject matter of the litigation); 67A C.J.S. Parties § 75, at 815 (1978) (same). Thus, the mere interest or desire to adopt a child will not qualify as a sufficient interest. B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 427 (noting that if such an interest were found sufficient, an unlimited number of people would be entitled to intervene); In re C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Iowa App.1991) (same). On the other hand, statutes often provide the best guidance in determining who possesses the right to intervene. 59 Am. Jur.2d Parties § 133, at 587 ([t]he right of intervention depends largely on the construction of the particular statute or rule under consideration); see also A.G., 558 N.W.2d at 403 (statute may support right to intervention if the right will be directly affected by the outcome of the suit). Section 232.117(3) of the Iowa Code is the statute applicable to this matter. It provides in pertinent part: If the court terminates the parental rights of the child's parents, the court shall transfer the guardianship and custody of the child to one of the following: .... c. A parent who does not have physical care of the child, other relative, or other suitable person. Iowa Code § 232.117(3) (1999) (emphasis added). Thus, after a juvenile court terminates the parental rights of a child's natural parents, those qualifying as suitable persons under section 232.117(3) are given the legal right to be considered as the child's guardian. C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d at 343 (relying on the rationale of J.R., 315 N.W.2d at 750). The term suitable person is not defined by our legislature. C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d at 344. Instead, it is a flexible term which provides the district court with discretion to determine the suitable person status based on the particular facts of each petition for intervention. See A.G., 558 N.W.2d at 404; C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d at 344. Thus, the Lofts have a statutory avenue to intervene if their interest is sufficient enough to rise to the level of a suitable person for the purpose of appointment as custodian and guardian following the termination. The sufficiency of the interest asserted by the intervenor under the suitable person provision is considered in light of the nature of the proceeding and surrounding facts and circumstances. See A.G., 558 N.W.2d at 404; B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 427-28. Additionally, the focus must always include the welfare and best interests of the child. See B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 428. The intervention must be compatible with the child's best interest. See id. at 429 (cannot elevate interests of intervening grandparents above those of the child). We have previously indicated that the closeness of the relationship between the child in interest and the intervenor is a critical factor in determining the sufficiency of the interest of an intervenor. See id. Thus, in B.B.M., we found the lack of an ongoing relationship between the child in interest and his grandparents weighed against intervention by the grandparents in a termination proceeding. Id. On the other hand, the formation of a close relationship between the intervenor and the children in interest has supported a petition for intervention in a parent-child termination action. See C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d at 344. In B.B.M., the grandparents were literally strangers to the child, B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 429, while in C.L.C., the couple who sought to intervene had devoted a significant amount of time each week to the children for nearly two years prior to the intervention. C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d at 344. They also provided financial support to the children. Id. Another factor in determining a suitable person is the existence of other prospective adoptive parents who maintain a strong relationship with the child. If the child has no strong bond with a prospective adoptive parent, the intervenors' own lack of an ongoing relationship with the child becomes less important in determining their suitability to intervene. See B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 429 (children had not established bonds of affection); J.R., 315 N.W.2d at 753 (children had established bonds of affection). The Lofts, unlike the couple in C.L.C., have not established a family relationship with H.N.B. and A.J.B. The Lofts were foster parents to H.N.B. for nine months, but this ended in May 1997, when H.N.B. was fourteen months old. The Lofts have not had contact with her since that time. More than two years have passed from the time the Lofts have had any contact with H.N.B. and the filing of the petition for intervention. In addition, the Lofts have never had any contact with A.J.B. Thus, the Lofts have not established the same level of relationship as the prospective adoptive parents did in C.L.C. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that the children have a positive ongoing relationship with foster parents who do desire to adopt. Other factors may also exist to support the existence of a sufficient interest to justify intervention. See B.B.M., 514 N.W.2d at 430-31 (medical necessity may support intervention). In this case, the Lofts assert the provisions of the ICWA apply and enhance their suitability. We agree that H.N.B. and A.J.B. are Indian children for purposes of the ICWA. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(4) (1983) (`Indian child' means any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is ... a member of an Indian tribe....). However, Byron does not satisfy the definitional requirements of an Indian under the ICWA. To be recognized as an Indian, an individual's tribe must be eligible for benefits provided by the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1903(3) (definition of Indian), 1903(8) (definition of Indian tribe). Byron's tribe, the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte, is not federally recognized by the Secretary. Therefore, because Byron is not an Indian under the ICWA, the Lofts cannot be considered an Indian family, and are not entitled to a preference in the adoptive placement of Indian children. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a) (with the adoption of an Indian child, a preference in placement is given to: (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families  (emphasis added)). In addition, the Lofts are not entitled to a preference for foster care or preadoptive placement as a foster home... approved, or specified by the Indian child[ren's] tribe. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(ii). The Rosebud Sioux Tribe did file a position statement with this court requesting the children to be placed with the Lofts if we do not place them with the Tribe. However, we do not find a position statement to be the equivalent of Tribe approval or specification as required by section 1915(b)(ii). Thus, because the ICWA is inapplicable to the Lofts, the ICWA does not enhance their suitability to be guardians under Iowa Code section 232.117(3). We are unable to distill any other circumstances from the facts presented to the district court to support intervention by the Lofts. We understand Byron still has the ability to raise the children in an Indian culture even though the law gives him no recognized preference. The children will benefit from an environment which will maintain their heritage and culture as they grow into adults, and the ability of prospective parents to do this will be a proper consideration in the proceedings that will follow in this case. Thus, it is a factor to consider in permitting intervention, but one we think the district court considered. Moreover, it is not sufficient enough for us to conclude the district court abused its discretion in failing to permit intervention by the Lofts considering all the circumstances. We conclude the district court acted within its discretion in finding the interests of the Lofts as suitable persons under section 232.117(3) were insufficient to support intervention. The term suitable persons cannot be interpreted to include every non-relative interested in adopting a child. C.L.C., 479 N.W.2d at 344. Moreover, it cannot be interpreted to include intervenors who have had no relationship with the children when the children maintain an ongoing relationship with a foster family who do want to adopt. The Lofts do not possess a sufficient interest in light of all the circumstances of the case, and consequently do not have a legal right that will be directly affected by the litigation as required by Rule 75. Thus, because we affirm the denial of the Lofts' motion to intervene, we need not address any other issues presented.