Opinion ID: 2996020
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grouping as to Litwin

Text: Litwin argues that the district court erred by not grouping the aiding and abetting perjury count with the tax evasion charges against him. We agree with the district court and reject Litwin’s claim. Litwin bases his argument on § 3D1.2(c), which provides that counts involve substantially the same harm “[w]hen one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guidelines applicable to another of the counts.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). Litwin’s sentence on the tax offense was enhanced two levels for sophisticated concealment. Litwin argues that the perjury charge was used as part of the basis for the sophisticatedconcealment enhancement of the tax sentence; thus, the perjury count should have been grouped with the tax offense under subsection (c) because it was used as “an adjustment to” the tax sentence. Nos. 01-2302 & 01-3414 17 We begin by noting that the commentary specifically states that subsection (c) was intended to apply only to counts that are “closely related.” Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.5. While we recognize that Glickman’s perjury did to some extent aid in the perpetuation of the tax conspiracy: the ostensible purpose of the perjury was to keep Chavin’s assets hidden from his creditors. Consequently, we doubt that these counts are closely related.6 However, the reason we reject Litwin’s argument for grouping is that his situation simply does not fit within the primary purpose of subsection (c), which is to “prevent ‘double counting’ of offense behavior.” Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.5. Refusal to group the perjury offense and the tax conspiracy offense did not result in double counting here because, as was brought out at oral argument, Litwin would have received the same enhancement for sophisticated concealment even if the perjury charge was not considered at all. In other words, other evidence besides the perjury offense provided ample support for the sophisticatedconcealment enhancement. Indeed, the district court appears to have concluded that the perjury actually did not provide any support to the sophisticated-concealment enhancement because the purpose of the perjury was not to cover up the tax crimes.7 Consequently, it cannot be said 6 As did Chavin, Litwin asserts that the fact that there are different victims is irrelevant to the grouping determination under subsection (c). We reject Litwin’s argument just as we did Chavin’s. Identity of victims is not a determinative factor under section (c), but it is a “primary consideration.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, cmt. n.7. 7 At the sentencing hearing the district court stated: “[w]hat we are talking about here, as I understand it, is in one context lying to the United States, in another context lying in effect to the bankruptcy court and Mr. Chavin’s creditors. I think that means there are different victims. I think it means that the criminal (continued...) 18 Nos. 01-2302 & 01-3414 that the perjury charge was double counted because it was not counted at all under the sophisticated-concealment enhancement.