Opinion ID: 333038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Counsel

Text: 12 As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that '(i) n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense' applies to every 'critical stage' in a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121--23, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970). At least absent unusual circumstances, a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is sufficiently important in a federal criminal prosecution that the Sixth Amendment requires the presence of counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Joslin, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 252, 434 F.2d 526, 529--30 (1970); cf. United States v. Mainer, 383 F.2d 444, 447 (3d Cir. 1967). In any event, assuming the Sixth Amendment's guarantee does apply, we have concluded that the absence of counsel at such a hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances shown in this record. 13 In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the Supreme Court made clear that 'all trial errors which violate the Constitution (do not) automatically call for reversal.' The Court in Chapman also stated, however, that 'there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error. . . .' As an example of such a right, the Court cited in footnote 8 to the above-quoted sentence, inter alia, 'Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799) (1963) (right to counsel).' In reliance on footnote 8, a number of courts and commentators prior to 1971 seem to have concluded that denial of the right to counsel can never be treated as harmless error. 6 See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961). 14 In our view, neither Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, nor Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, forecloses application of the harmless error doctrine to the denial of counsel 7 in this case. First, this case involves neither the absence of counsel at trial nor a capital offense and, hence, both Gideon v. Wainwright (trial) and Hamilton v. Alabama (capital offense) are factually distinguishable. See also Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974) (trial). 15 Furthermore, we believe that application of the automatic reversal rule of Chapman's footnote 8 to denial of counsel at a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty would be inconsistent with the more recent case of Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1970). In Coleman, a majority of the Court joined in Part III of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in which he makes it clear that '(t)he test to be applied is whether the denial of counsel at the (particular) hearing was harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705) (1967).' 16 In its most recent opinions, particularly those decided in this decade, discussing the right to counsel, the Supreme Court has observed that the role of counsel at various pre-trial and post-trial hearings depends upon the circumstances of the case and may differ significantly from the role of counsel at trial. 8 See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 121--23, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); 9 cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788--90, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 281--83, 92 S.Ct. 916, 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1972). In accordance with the approach of these more recent cases, this court has held that in certain circumstances ineffective assistance of counsel can be nonprejudicial, requiring the affirmance of a district court judgment in spite of such ineffective assistance. See United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970). In light of these cases and Coleman v. Alabama, supra, we conclude that the harmless error doctrine is applicable to denial of counsel at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea at least where (1) the defendant alleges neither that he is innocent nor that his original plea was involuntary, cf. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, and where (2) it is clear that the defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea. We therefore turn to an examination of whether the denial of counsel in this case was harmless constitutional error. 17 In this case, defendant was 29 years old, had graduated from high school, and 'had schooling in electronics' (46a). At the December 6 hearing, he fully presented his factual argument in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 10 The Government's attorney did not cross-examine him and no legal arguments were made in opposition to the motion. 11 Moreover, defendant's present counsel has not advanced any legally acceptable reasons or proffered any new facts in support of the motion, and the record indicates that none could have been advanced at the time of the motion. The contention that substitute counsel should have been appointed by the court on or before December 6, so that such counsel could have called defendant's appointed counsel and elicited testimony that Crowley was not properly advised at the time of the change of plea on November 21, is based on pure speculation as to what such testimony would have been and is unsupported by anything in the record. 12 18 Furthermore, in view of the facts of this case, it is extremely unlikely that counsel would have been any more effective than the defendant himself in convincing the district court to exercise its discretion to permit withdrawal of the plea. The Government would have been unfairly prejudiced by any grant of the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty since all the trial witnesses were present on November 21 and would have had to be reassembled for a trial held after that date. In addition, defendant was thoroughly interrogated about the basis of his plea at the time it was entered and did not claim thereafter that he was innocent. 12a Indeed, the record shows that the plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. 19 Under the circumstances presented by this record, we conclude that the absence of counsel for defendant at the December 6 hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.