Opinion ID: 852904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Must the Attorney General Supply Counsel?

Text: The trial court relied on Indiana Code Annotated § 33-2.1-9-1(c)(2) (West Supp.2003), in determining that Indiana's Attorney General must provide private counsel for Evans. The statute at issue reads in relevant part: If a judge or prosecuting attorney is sued for civil damages or equitable relief and the suit would be construed, under notice pleading, as arising out of an act performed within the scope of the duties of the judge or prosecuting attorney, the attorney general shall: (1) defend the judge or prosecuting attorney in the suit; or (2) authorize the executive director of the division of state court administration to hire private counsel to provide the defense. Ind.Code Ann. § 33-2.1-9-1(c). While Evans, as a prosecuting attorney, enjoys the protections that this statute provides, we cannot ignore the incongruous result that a literal reading would render under the present facts: the Attorney General's office would be either litigating or financing both sides of this suit. Our method of analyzing statutes on such occasions is this: When interpreting a statute, appellate courts independently review a statute's meaning and apply it to the facts of the case under review. If a statute is unambiguous, that is, susceptible to but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and plain meaning. If a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, however, we must try to ascertain the legislature's intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent. We presume the legislature intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results. Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind.2002) (citations omitted). We conclude that the interpretation urged by Evans would produce an absurd result. The statute's objective is to protect officeholders from litigation by those dissatisfied with the decisions they make (typically, in the case of judges and prosecutors, lawsuits by prisoners). We think the General Assembly's intent for situations like the present case is reflected by its explicit rule for statewide officials. See Ind.Code Ann. § 4-6-2-1 (2002) (Attorney General shall defend all suits brought against the state officers in their official relations, except suits brought against them by the state). Requiring the Attorney General to finance both sides of this suit is akin to the dog chasing its own tail and an absurdity that the General Assembly could not have intended. See, e.g., Livingston v. Fast Cash USA, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 572 (Ind.2001) (applying the absurd result rule to the Indiana Uniform Consumer Credit Code). [1] Whether the statute would afford reimbursement to a defendant who prevails we leave for another day. Evans also contends that Indiana Code Annotated § 33-14-11-4 (West 1996) entitles him to a defense provided by the State. The statute provides in relevant part: The state shall pay the expenses incurred by a prosecuting attorney from a threatened, pending, or completed action or proceeding[.] We conclude that this section is unavailing to Evans for reasons substantially similar to those mentioned above.