Opinion ID: 6500514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cafra101

Text: Pelullo asserts that he was entitled to the protections of CAFRA, 18 U.S.C. § 983 et seq. That statute governs nonjudicial forfeiture, a process that allows the government to obtain title to seized property without any involvement by the courts, as long as it gives affected parties timely notice and no one comes forward to claim an interest in the property. Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 182 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2)(B); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607(a), 1609. If someone does contest the seizure, the government must then promptly initiate a civil or criminal judicial forfeiture proceeding and obtain a court order to allow title to pass to the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3). Pelullo argues that the government violated CAFRA’s deadlines for giving notice of a forfeiture and initiating a forfeiture action. But that claim comes too late. Pelullo waived any rights he may have had under CAFRA, just as the District Court said. See United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Waiver is an ‘intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” (citation omitted)). The government represented, and Pelullo does not argue otherwise, that it was prepared to initiate judicial forfeiture proceedings when, through counsel, PS Charters demanded the yacht. As soon as the prospect of Pelullo facing discovery in a civil forfeiture 101 We review for clear error the District Court’s factual determination of waiver. See Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Forest Grove, Inc., 33 F.3d 284, 285 (3d Cir. 1994); Bermuda Exp., N.V. v. M/V Litsa (Ex. Laurie U), 872 F.2d 554, 562 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989). 148 action arose, however, PS Charters decided to “back[] off” and to consent to the government not filing any action. (JAB at 3913-14, 3921.) It was not until five years later that Pelullo himself demanded the return of the property. He offers no basis for disturbing the District Court’s finding that his actions constituted a waiver of his rights under CAFRA. 102 PS Charters was Pelullo’s tool.103 After employing it to, in effect, ask the government not to initiate civil forfeiture proceedings, Pelullo cannot now complain that the government’s failure to file an action violated his rights.104 102 Pelullo does not address the legal significance of Cedrone’s discussions with the government except to call them, without explanation, “a complete red herring[.]” (SP Reply Br. at 47-48.) 103 In so recognizing, we are not engaged in an ersatz corporate veil-piercing. Rather, Pelullo admits that PS Charters was his tool by asserting that Cedrone was really acting on his behalf in requesting the return of the yacht. How much PS Charters was also under Scarfo’s control is not a question before us. 104 Pelullo also points to Department of Justice policy statements that set internal deadlines for bringing a judicial forfeiture action. But the government’s internal policies, such as its Asset Forfeiture Policy Manual, do not “create enforceable rights for criminal defendants[,]” so Pelullo would not be entitled to relief even if the government failed to abide by its own rules. United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 389 (3d Cir. 2005). 149