Opinion ID: 848860
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court of Appeals and the Transactional Approach

Text: This Court has never recognized the transactional approach. In 1971, the Court of Appeals began to expand the codified common-law requirements of robbery. In People v. Sanders, [7] it concluded that the defendant, having completed his theft by stealth, was guilty of armed robbery because he fired a gunshot into the air to frighten off pursuers. Although it recognized the general rule that an assault must be concomitant with the taking in order to support a charge of armed robbery, the panel relied on the law of other jurisdictions. Id. at 276, 184 N.W.2d 269. It held that there was no valid basis for isolating the incidents of the entire event when the taking is not effectively completed until after the assault.... [A]nd the incident of the taking must be viewed in its totality in order to ascertain the intent of the defendant when the assault occurs. Id. at 277, 184 N.W.2d 269. Thus, with the decision in Sanders, the Court of Appeals began its shift toward the transactional approach. In LeFlore, the concept was identified by name and applied in the context of unarmed robbery. Supra at 561-563, 293 N.W.2d 628. In that case, the defendant took money from the victim after physically assaulting her. On appeal, he claimed that there was insufficient evidence to support the unarmed robbery conviction because the taking had been a mere afterthought. He claimed to have had no larcenous intent at the time of the assault. The LeFlore panel held that the larceny transaction should be viewed as a whole to determine the defendant's intent. Le-Flore, supra at 562, 293 N.W.2d 628. In Turner, the transactional approach was extended further to express that a robbery is incomplete until the defendant escapes with the stolen property: We agree that a completed escape is unnecessary to constitute asportation. Any movement of goods, even if by the victim under the direction of defendant... constitutes asportation.... However, robbery is also a continuous offense: it is not complete until the perpetrators reach temporary safety. As such, while the essential elements were completed, the offense continued during the escape. [120 Mich.App. at 28, 328 N.W.2d 5 (citations omitted; emphasis added).] The Turner holding was repeated in Tinsley. The fiction found there, that a robbery is not complete until a defendant reaches temporary safety, gave rise to the Court of Appeals holding in the instant case: that the defendant must complete his escape with the stolen merchandise or he cannot be convicted of unarmed robbery. This transactional approach can not be harmonized either with the language of M.C.L. § 750.530 or with the common-law history of our unarmed robbery statute. [8] As Judge William Blackstone stated: This previous violence or putting in fear is the criterion that distinguishes robberies from other larcinies. For, if one privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards keeps it by putting in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is subsequent.... [Blackstone, supra at 242.] [9] Thus did Blackstone identify the real difficulty with the transactional approach: it inappropriately characterizes a completed larceny as a robbery. It is useful to recall that at common law simple larceny was defined as the felonious taking, and carrying away, of the personal goods of another. Blackstone, supra, p. 229; see also, People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 576, 45 N.W. 1119 (1890). Larceny was contrasted with robbery in that common-law larceny was a robbery minus the use of force to accomplish the taking and absent the requirement that the taking be from the person. Blackstone stated this cogently when he summarized: This previous violence or putting in fear, is the criterion that distinguishes robberies from other larcenies. Id. at 242. [10] We emphasize that a larceny is complete when the taking occurs. The offense does not continue. This fact is illustrated in People v. Bradovich, [11] in which two defendants in a store concealed two suits under their own clothing and attempted to leave. Realizing that store personnel were following them and that they would be apprehended, they abandoned the stolen clothing and departed. When later charged with larceny, they claimed to have abandoned the property before leaving the store, and therefore, not to have completed the offense. This Court disagreed, holding that the larceny was complete when the thieves concealed the store's clothing under their own. Id. at 332, 9 N.W.2d 560. The dissent acknowledges that larceny and robbery are distinct crimes. That the two crimes are distinct offenses indicates nothing more than that they have different elements: robbery is a larceny aggravated by the fact that the taking is from the person, or in his presence, accomplished with force or the threat of force. People v. Wakeford, 418 Mich. 95, 127-128, 341 N.W.2d 68 (1983) (opinion of Levin, J.). However, the dissent asserts without supporting authority that for the purpose of the crime of robbery, the relevant act encompasses a broader spectrum of time, and includes not simply an initial larcenous taking, `by force and violence' or `by assault,' but a robbing of the victim `by assault' when the property remains in the victim's presence. Op. at 563, 648 N.W.2d at 181. Neither the common law nor contemporary authority supports the view that the taking that establishes the larceny element of robbery continues until the robber reaches a place of temporary safety. We reject the dissent's reliance on cases from other jurisdictions because they are either distinguishable on their facts or inconsistent with the common-law view of robbery adopted by Michigan. We also find particularly instructive State v. Manchester, 57 Wash.App. 765, 790 P.2d 217 (1990). There, the Washington Court of Appeals, noting the split in jurisdictions on the question of the timing of the use of force, cited Sanders, supra, and People v. Beebe, 70 Mich.App. 154, 245 N.W.2d 547 (1976). Manchester placed Michigan with the majority of jurisdictions that do not consider a robbery complete until the robber has reached a place of temporary safety. The Court observed: Because this approach does not follow the common law, courts focus on the language of the robbery statute to reach this result. Id. at 770, 790 P.2d 217. We agree that the transactional approach used by our Court of Appeals is contrary to the common law. As we have explained above, the language of our statute does not permit us to adopt the view espoused by the Court of Appeals and the dissent. We are also persuaded by Tennessee v. Owens, [12] where the Tennessee Supreme Court was faced with the question, [H]ow closely connected in time must the taking and the violence be? By way of response, the court compared the language of Tennessee's robbery statute with the language of other states' robbery statutes. The court noted that many jurisdictions have rejected the common-law rule in favor of the continuous offense theory. Id. at 638-639, 639, n. 7. However, most of those states have statutes that specifically define robbery to include the use of force to retain property or to escape. Id. at 639. Many of the statutes provide that a person commits robbery if he uses force in the course of committing a theft or larceny. See Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-8-43; Ariz. Rev. Stat., §§ 13-1901-1904; Conn. Gen. Stat., § 53a-133; Del. Code. Ann., tit. 11, § 831; Fla. Stat., § 812.13; Haw. Rev. Stat., § 708-841; Minn. Stat., § 609.24; Mont. Code Ann., § 45-5-401; N.J. Stat. Ann., § 2C:15-1; N.Y. Penal Laws, § 160.00; ND Cent. Code, § 12.1-22-01; Or. Rev. Stat., § 164.395; Tex. Penal Code Ann., § 29.02; Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-301. All the statutes define in the course of to include either escape, flight, retention, or subsequent to the taking. In other jurisdictions that follow this approach, the statutes specifically include the expressions resisting apprehension, [13] facilitate escape, [14] fleeing immediately after, [15] or used to retain possession. [16] By contrast, other jurisdictions have statutes that follow the common-law rule requiring that the force, violence, or putting in fear occur before or contemporaneous with the larcenous taking. These states have statutes substantially similar to Michigan's. See Ga. Code Ann., § 16-8-40; Ind. Code, § 35-42-5-1; Kan. Stat. Ann., § 21-3426; Miss. Code Ann.,§ 97-3-73; N.M. Stat. Ann., § 30-16-2; Tenn. Code Ann., § 39-13-401; see also 93 A.L.R.3d 647-649. In summary, at common law, a robbery required that the force, violence, or putting in fear occur before or contemporaneous with the larcenous taking. If the violence, force, or putting in fear occurred after the taking, the crime was not robbery, but rather larceny and perhaps assault. Hence, the transactional approach espoused by the Court of Appeals is without pedigree in our law and must be abandoned. Sanders, LeFlore, Turner, and Tinsley are overruled.