Opinion ID: 576719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Level of Constitutional Scrutiny

Text: 32 Because the exclusion of Duke from the Republican presidential primary was state action, we must next determine the proper level of scrutiny to apply. 2 The majority assumes arguendo that the strict scrutiny standard applies to this case. I firmly believe that this is the appropriate level of scrutiny. 33 As the majority observes, the Supreme Court recently has reasserted that a court assessing the constitutionality of a state's ballot access restriction must first examine whether [the restriction] burdens rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Eu v. San Francisco City Democratic Cent. Com., 489 U.S. 214, 222, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1019, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (citations omitted). If the action burdens such rights, it can survive constitutional scrutiny only if the state shows that it advances a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Id. at 222, 109 S.Ct. at 1019-1020 (citations omitted). See also Norman v. Reed, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 698, 705, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1991). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's occasional deviations from this standard, see, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789-90, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), it remains the traditional method by which alleged state deprivations of First Amendment rights are reviewed. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 759-762, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1294, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 3 34