Opinion ID: 765997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brown's Conviction

Text: 83 Because Brown challenges his conviction, we first must decide whether the government introduced enough evidence against Brown such that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The heart of the government's case against Brown lay in the inference that Brown contributed to the conspiracy as an enforcer; the pieces of evidence supporting this inference were the tape recorded conversations and Agent Coleman's interpretations thereof, in addition to Collier's testimony. 84 On appeal, Brown challenges the sufficiency of the government's evidence by arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in permitting Agent Coleman to testify to Brown's knowledge and intent in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Under Rule 704(b), no expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged . . . . Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). Specifically, Brown alleges that Agent Coleman was expressing his own opinion that Brown intended to hurt Sydnor or Brickel. He also implicitly argues that the testimony of Agent Coleman, who was qualified as an expert, violated the dictates of Rule 702 when he defined words that did not require specialized knowledge to understand, since that testimony would not assist the jury. 85 In support of his Rule 704(b) argument, Brown points to two statements by Agent Coleman. First, Coleman testified that (in his opinion) when Gibbs told Brown, Tonight will be the night, Gibbs meant that Brown and Fluellen could complete the mission against Sydnor or Brickel that night. Agent Coleman also testified that when Brown stated, I was on that last night, plus we're going to be on that tonight, he believed that Brown was referring to the mission they had talked about earlier to locate or find some individual and hurt them. 86 The government responds that Agent Coleman did not testify to Brown's state of mind or intent. Rather, the government contends that, in the passages cited by Brown, Coleman limited his testimony to interpreting the cryptic language, never opined on Brown's intent, and never stated that Brown was an enforcer. Indeed, the government points to two exchanges in the record where Agent Coleman explicitly disclaimed knowledge of what Brown's intentions were with regard to the mission. The government also notes that the District Court instructed the jury that they were not bound to believe or follow Agent Coleman's expert opinion. This was a proper instruction. 15 87 As a first step in deciding whether the evidence against Brown was sufficient, we must decide whether Agent Coleman improperly opined on Brown's intent or knowledge in violation of Rule 704(b), or whether his testimony violated Rule 702, and thus whether part of Coleman's testimony should have been excluded. The admission of expert testimony should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 171, 182 (3d Cir. 1998). The trial Judge has broad discretion to admit or exclude expert testimony, based upon whether it is helpful to the trier of fact. See id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 702); 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 702.02[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). 88 As a preliminary matter, we note that it is well established that experienced government agents may testify to the meaning of coded drug language under Fed. R. Evid. 702. See, e.g., Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 590-91; see also United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the jargon of the narcotics trade and drug dealers' code language are proper subjects of expert opinion), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1376 (1999); United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). Because the primary purpose of coded drug language is to conceal the meaning of the conversation from outsiders through deliberate obscurity, drug traffickers' jargon is a specialized body of knowledge and thus an appropriate subject for expert testimony. See United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997); Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 591. 89 Such testimony is relatively uncontroversial when it permits a government agent to explain the actual meanings of coded words--that is, when the agent acts as a translator of sorts. See, e.g., Griffith, 118 F.3d at 322 (agent testified that days of work meant pounds of marijuana); Delpit, 94 F.3d at 1144 (agent testified that straps meant guns); United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 946 (2d Cir. 1991) (boyfriend or boy meant heroin). This precept applies here to much of what Agent Coleman testified about. It was within the scope of Agent Coleman's expertise to explain, for example, in specific contexts, that jawn meant cocaine, that to hit someone meant to page them on a beeper, that on post meant ready and waiting, and that a quarter meant $2,500. 90 It is a different matter when an agent testifies that, in light of the meanings he has attributed to certain conversations, a defendant has played a certain role in, or has certain knowledge about, a conspiracy or other offense. See, e.g., Boissoneault, 926 F.2d at 233 (expressing discomfort with expert testimony that draws Conclusions as to the significance of conduct or evidence). But see United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that although certain behavior may have an innocent explanation, it is a fair use of expert testimony to offer another explanation for that behavior); United States v. DeSoto, 885 F.2d 354, 360-61 (7th Cir. 1989) (everyday appearance of an activity is not an automatic bar to admission of expert testimony that may attribute a more sinister motive to the actions, though admission does require special vigilance to avoid unfair prejudice). Brown contends that Agent Coleman testified about Brown's intent to harm the target of the mission in violation of Rule 704(b). 91 However, Agent Coleman never testified to what Brown's intent was with regard to the mission. Indeed, he specifically refused to do so. Where an expert in a criminal case has not explicitly testified about a defendant's intent, courts have been reluctant to exclude the expert's testimony under Rule 704(b). See United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1994) (using two-part test that examines whether the actual word intent was used and looking to the source of the expert's opinion to determine admissibility under 704(b)); United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (adopting Seventh Circuit test). Similarly, in Plunk, the court noted that the defendant, who alleged that the expert's testimony violated Rule 704(b), pointed to nothing in [the expert's] testimony that comprises an explicit opinion that Plunk intended or knew anything in conjunction with the crimes charged. Likewise, nothing in the testimony necessarily compels such an inference or Conclusion. 153 F.3d at 1018; see also Simmons, 923 F.2d at 947 ([The agent's] testimony, which related only to the meaning of unfamiliar narcotics jargon, left to the jury the task of determining whether the decoded terms demonstrated the necessary criminal intent.). 92 The two sentences of Agent Coleman's testimony that allegedly offer an opinion on Brown's intent to further the conspiracy by protecting Gibbs--as the ringleader of the conspiracy--against a threat of harm do not in fact offer such an opinion. At no point did he articulate either that Brown intended to kill Sydnor or Brickel, or that Brown intended to further the conspiracy by acting as its enforcer. Coleman specifically stated, I don't know what his intentions were, and he agreed that he had no idea whether [Brown was] going on this mission or not. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in permitting Agent Coleman to testify in this regard. 93 We read Brown's objection to Agent Coleman's testimony to include an objection that the District Court permitted Coleman to interpret several segments of conversation that did not require expertise to interpret, that his interpretation would thus not assist the jury, and that this evidence was prejudicial. Coleman testified that tonight is the night was a reference to the fact that Brown and Fluellen were going to go on their mission that night. He also testified that got to do it tonight meant got to go on the mission tonight. Unlike a word like jawn, which would not be familiar to most jurors and which is the proper subject of expert testimony, a phrase like tonight is the night contains no intrinsic code that a jury would be unable to understand. Testimony about such a phrase's meaning is therefore not helpful to the jury. 94 We have upheld the exclusion of expert testimony when that testimony ventures into areas in which the jury needs no aid or illumination. See, e.g., United States v. Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1988) (Although courts have construed the helpfulness requirement of Fed. R. Evid. 701 and 702 to allow the interpretation by a witness of coded or `code-like' conversations, they have held that the interpretation of clear conversations is not helpful to the jury, and thus is not admissible under either rule.); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee notes (stating that whether the situation is a proper one for expert testimony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1384 (3d Cir. 1991) ([W]e agree with the district court's exclusion of Stevens's expert testimony on two of the three disputed points in that such testimony would not have been `helpful' --the touchstone of Fed. R. Evid. 702--to the jury.); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1052, 1055 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that Rule 702 makes inadmissible expert testimony as to a matter that obviously is within the common knowledge of jurors because such testimony, almost by definition, can be of no assistance; but noting that the admission of such testimony, though technical error, will almost invariably be harmless); 2 Stephen A. Saltzburg et al., Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1218-19 (7th ed. 1998). 95 We conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to exclude Agent Coleman's testimony explaining what tonight's the night, we're going to be on that tonight, and got to do it tonight meant. It was the function of the jury, which heard all of the relevant tape recordings, to determine what these phrases meant in the context of the surrounding sentences. Agent Coleman's testimony was not helpful to the jury; in fact, the only purpose of that testimony was to bolster the government's allegations that Brown was an enforcer. 96 We cannot say, however, that the three sentences of Coleman's testimony that infringed on the jury's role constituted prejudicial error under Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), in light of the other properly admitted evidence against Brown. 16 97 We reach this Conclusion based on the strength of the remaining evidence against Brown. First, Collier testified that a mission meant an attempt to harm or kill someone, and that Gibbs had asked Collier to steal a car to be used in effectuating the mission. See supra Part III.A. Agent Coleman opined that mission meant [a]n attempt to locate, find and hurt whoever Gibbs wants them to locate, find and hurt. This type of interpretation is admissible since it is an interpretation of a code word whose definition a jury would most likely need to have explained. Taken in conjunction with those definitions of mission, Gibbs's statement that Earl was . . . on a mission the other night substantially furthers our Conclusion. Finally, taking the content and timing of conversations between Gibbs and Brown as a whole, a jury reasonably could have concluded that the exchanges (including Brown's statements like got to do it tonight and his assent to Gibbs's statement that [t]onight will be the night) traced a plan to harm someone who was getting on [Gibbs's] nerves, a plan that involved waiting outside a particular nightclub for the person to emerge unarmed and then injure him. 98 In light of our Conclusion that the vast bulk of Agent Coleman's testimony is admissible, and in view of the strength of the remaining evidence, we believe that the government offered sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude not only that Brown had acted as an enforcer for the conspiracy, but that Brown knew that by his acts he was furthering the aims of the conspiracy by protecting the individual whom he knew to be the ringleader. We therefore will affirm Brown's conviction.